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Balázs Gyimesi | 20 ♢ - Page 9 of 37 + Page 9 of 38 ♢ diff --git a/columns.xml b/columns.xml index 5b020876..d7de855d 100644 --- a/columns.xml +++ b/columns.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-12-10T10:32:55+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV甩手詠2024-09-12T12:00:00+08:002024-09-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/chanting-arm-swinging<p>晨風拂面醒心神，</p> +Jekyll2024-12-12T11:49:41+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV甩手詠2024-09-12T12:00:00+08:002024-09-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/chanting-arm-swinging<p>晨風拂面醒心神，</p> <p>母子相隨練甩身。</p> diff --git a/feed.xml b/feed.xml index 89e14bde..40c7d34f 100644 --- a/feed.xml +++ b/feed.xml @@ -1 +1 @@ -Jekyll2024-12-10T10:32:55+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file +Jekyll2024-12-12T11:49:41+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/heros.xml b/heros.xml index 6e367357..3c07ee34 100644 --- a/heros.xml +++ b/heros.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-12-10T10:32:55+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV暴力与父权：泰国男子从军经历调查2022-08-05T12:00:00+08:002022-08-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/2022-08-05-ElinBjarnegard/ElinBjarnegard...-a1_l-armed-violence-and-patriarchal-values<p>本研究超越男女二元性的论调，强调男性内部对于暴力的态度因意识形态影响而存在分化：志愿参军的人通常更亲近父权制意识形态，而不是军队塑造了士兵的父权思想；强制参军对不希望主动参军人士的父权思想并无明显影响。</p> +Jekyll2024-12-12T11:49:41+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV暴力与父权：泰国男子从军经历调查2022-08-05T12:00:00+08:002022-08-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/2022-08-05-ElinBjarnegard/ElinBjarnegard...-a1_l-armed-violence-and-patriarchal-values<p>本研究超越男女二元性的论调，强调男性内部对于暴力的态度因意识形态影响而存在分化：志愿参军的人通常更亲近父权制意识形态，而不是军队塑造了士兵的父权思想；强制参军对不希望主动参军人士的父权思想并无明显影响。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/hkers.xml b/hkers.xml index b28c26a5..5b2b0755 100644 --- a/hkers.xml +++ b/hkers.xml @@ -1,4 +1,126 @@ -Jekyll2024-12-10T10:32:55+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV【初選47人案・判刑】2024-11-19T12:00:00+08:002024-11-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-sentence<ul> +Jekyll2024-12-12T11:49:41+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIVDefence Procurement Success2024-11-20T12:00:00+08:002024-11-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/defence-procurement-success<p><em>GCAP’s management involves five innovations that should drive success in its technology development and timeline. They also have the potential to transform the UK approach to major development, production and support programmes – if government is willing to change how it approaches project financing.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>On 8 November, the UK government announced its continued commitment to the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). The announcement was likely a relief to Japan and Italy, the UK’s treaty partners in the programme. GCAP – and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme of which it is a part – promises to take UK combat air and industrial capability into the sixth generation of combat jet platforms.</p> + +<h3 id="government-military-and-industry-as-one-team">Government, Military and Industry as One Team</h3> + +<p>GCAP from its inception involved a government-industry team rather than the traditional adversarial model. The GCAP announcement at the Farnborough air show in 2018 presented a team of the MoD and the RAF alongside four core companies. BAE Systems, Rolls Royce, Leonardo and MBDA – to generate a new aircraft and its weapons. This was a broader and earlier grouping than had been used in the 1980s with Eurofighter Typhoon, and a strong contrast even with recent naval practice in which the Navy first works out its requirement and only then goes to industry to find the best supplier. As Vice Admiral Paul Marshall told the House of Commons Defence Committee in 2023:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>“When we have a programme or project in the concept phase, that is done by the Navy Command Headquarters development team. They take the concept and work out the requirements that the Navy needs to meet the threats of the future. Once those requirements are set, what normally happens is that it is passed to a delivery team to get on with the business of full design and implementation.”</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>Two lines of logic underpin the MoD’s new approach in Team Tempest. The first logic was that one purpose of the strategy was sustaining and developing UK industrial capability in the combat air domain. This capability primarily lay in four companies that had survived decades of industrial consolidation. The second logic was that the approach offered the prospect of better integrating and exploiting the expertise of government and industry: the MoD with its understanding of future threats and their nature, and industry with its knowledge of technology, engineering and manufacturing.</p> + +<p>We acknowledge that government-industry partnering in defence is not entirely new. But even the Carrier Alliance had been preceded by a formal competition between BAE Systems and Thales. The nearest thing to the partnering approach to what was first called Tempest may be the relationship between the government, Rolls Royce and other firms in the Submarine Delivery Agency on submarine nuclear reactors. Thus, the expansion of this approach beyond the immediate industrial concerns around the nuclear deterrent is new.</p> + +<h3 id="securing-industry-funding-for-early-stage-work">Securing Industry Funding for Early-Stage Work</h3> + +<p>Selecting key partners could be seen as encouraging corporate complacency, but this risk was mitigated by the readiness of the firms to invest significant sums of their own money in the early work without formal assurance of development, let alone production. The companies have not formally revealed their individual spending, but in total it has been around £800 million, compared to the government’s contribution of around £2 billion. The need to recover this funding, along with recognition that production will be shared across the three partners and that exports will be essential to sustain industrial capability long-term, is a major incentive for companies to avoid slacking.</p> + +<p>The dedication of corporate funding was feasible given more than 13 years of firm government signalling of an intention to maintain the national combat air industrial capability. This had been part of the Labour government’s Defence Industrial Strategy of 2005, which led to the Taranis uncrewed stealthy vehicle and the exploration of collaboration on an aircraft with France. The Conservatives’ 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review stated:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>“We will invest in the next generation of combat aircraft technology, in partnership with our defence aerospace industry and our closest allies. We are working with the US to build and support the F35 Lightning. We will work with France to develop our Unmanned Combat Air System programme, and collaborate on complex weapons.”</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>These words emerged publicly as the Future Combat Air Systems Technology Initiative and launched the commitment to joint MoD and private sector investment.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">GCAP is conceived both as an initially defined project in its own right (a crewed aircraft) and as a platform that will be designed to evolve and spirally develop over time</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>Thus, the Team Tempest model in the Combat Air Strategy emerged after years of discussions on how best to sustain UK industrial capabilities in the broad field of combat air. It was far from being a spur of the moment choice, and reflected an MoD recognition that:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>“The UK’s ability to choose how we deliver our future requirements (including maintenance and upgrade of current systems) is dependent on maintaining access to a dynamic and innovative industrial base.”</p> +</blockquote> + +<h3 id="novel-collaborative-decision-making-structures">Novel Collaborative Decision-Making Structures</h3> + +<p>The UK has participated in many collaborative aircraft projects, but a negative feature of even Typhoon was the limited authority of the government and corporate structures that were supposed to manage and deliver the project. Subsequently decision-making was often slow.</p> + +<p>With GCAP, the emphasis is on empowered structures and streamlined decision-making processes. The three governments were able to agree quickly on a treaty-based GCAP International Government Organisation with the legal and political powers needed to be able to manage the project from the customer side. Its commercial delivery structure – bringing together the top-level industrial players – is understood to be largely settled, with a formal announcement expected by the end of this year.</p> + +<p>The capacity of these bodies to make choices quickly without having to send everything back to national capitals and company headquarters will be exposed only during the operation of the project, but certainly the intention in 2024 is that the joint executive bodies should be able to proceed at pace in order to keep the project on track.</p> + +<p>Japan is a new collaborative partner for the UK, but GCAP is a key element in a strengthening of UK–Japan security relations that dates back to at least 2013. UK Typhoons exercised with Japanese counterparts in 2016, and Theresa May visited Japan as prime minister in 2017. All this was accompanied by company-to-company discussions among the key players. Thus, when the formal announcement of an Italy–Japan–UK aircraft programme was made in 2022, many political, military and industrial preparations had already been made.</p> + +<h3 id="development-for-the-unknown-spiral-development-in-action">Development for the Unknown: Spiral Development in Action</h3> + +<p>A further feature of GCAP is its conception as an initially defined project in its own right (a crewed aircraft), and also a platform that will be designed to evolve and spirally develop over time. There will thus be no single declaration of Full Operational Capability because the final “full” stage of the platform is unknown. Moreover, that platform is to be part of a wider and only partially defined evolving system of equipment and capabilities under the FCAS umbrella. Thus, the aim for 2035 is for a minimum viable product that can deal effectively with threats in the 2035–2040 timeframe, but which will be capable of regular, perhaps even continuous improvements.</p> + +<p>In terms of industrial motivation, spiral development offers an appealing base for the export potential of GCAP. All the companies are aware that the long-term sustainment of their combat air capabilities will not be satisfied by demand from the three core countries alone: exports will be necessary, and the UK government is clear that exporting needs to be a key element of its defence industrial strategy.</p> + +<p>There is nothing innovative about thinking of an aircraft as part of a wider system: the Spitfires and Hurricanes that were so effective in the Battle of Britain owed much of their effectiveness to the radar, communication and ground-based fighter control direction that made up the air defence system of the time. Moreover, the idea of “spiral development” is pretty much the same as the concept of “incremental acquisition” that was prominent in defence procurement earlier in the millennium. However, that idea was little implemented, in part because of customer reluctance to compromise on requirements when access to funding for future improvements was uncertain.</p> + +<p>A key consideration for how effectively spiral development can operate will be the availability of early funding to build in the key enablers of advances, not least strength, space and electric power in the platform as well the ease of upgrading software.</p> + +<h3 id="significantly-enhancing-the-use-of-digital-engineering">Significantly Enhancing the Use of Digital Engineering</h3> + +<p>Finally, a key enabler of affordability and speed of delivery will be digital engineering (DE). While largely a technology matter, DE also has organisational implications, not least in the form of company and governmental relationships with the Military Aviation Authority (MAA).</p> + +<p>The practice of designing aircraft in a computerised, digital environment is not new. All modern civil and military equipment is designed first on a computer using engineers’ expertise to inform how different elements will interact. Digital simulations enable a digital-twin aircraft to be operated by humans in a simulated “cockpit” and environment. Tests with a real system then evaluate how this simulation data corresponds with reality. However, as the documentary film about the competition for the F-35 contract between Lockheed Martin and Boeing illustrates, while these tests often confirmed the simulation data, some unexpected faults emerged. This was over 25 years ago. As time has passed, the computing capacity of simulations has dramatically improved, and so has the data base for generating high fidelity environments in benign and contested scenarios.</p> + +<p>This development in data quality and quantity and processing speed is especially important in the combat air sector because of the time and costs taken up by real-world testing and flying. The US’s transparency on many defence matters enables a sense of the scale of what “testing” has involved to date. This is apparent in a 2018 statement by Vice Admiral Mat Winter, F-35 Program Executive Officer:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>“Since the first flight of AA-1 in 2006, the developmental flight test program has operated for more than 11 years mishap-free, conducting more than 9,200 sorties, accumulating over 17,000 flight hours, and executing more than 65,000 test points to verify the design, durability, software, sensors, weapons capability and performance for all three F-35 variants.”</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>The average sortie lasted less than two hours. Over the 11 years, more than 16 sorties were flown a week. These numbers give some sense of both the time and money that could be saved if development could be done largely online rather than in the air.</p> + +<p>The vision associated with DE is that a large amount of testing will be done online at great speed and low cost. Computers can operate “flights” on a 24-hours a day basis if need be. Sub-system testing, which is usually less expensive, can be done both online and on the ground. But the role of flight testing should be massively reduced, generating significant savings.</p> + +<p>All defence systems must have an approved Safety Case. In the case of aircraft, arrangements need the approval of the MoD’s safety authorities including the MAA. This suggests that safety and certification people should be involved throughout development, as opposed to being asked for cooperation late in the day (as was the case, for example, with the Ajax armoured vehicle programme).</p> + +<p>Another major impact of advanced DE is that it will enable numerous engineers to work on different aspects of the system simultaneously as simulation data on the mutually dependent components is shared, analysed and acted upon at much greater speed. As one key programme manager confirmed to us, this process – from simulation data to design alternations that result from it and from implementation to a model to re-run a simulation – would have taken months in the last significant UK combat air programme. Today, it can be done overnight, as the simulation alternates designs automatically to improve. In the case of GCAP, there is the prospect of a long working day for the humans involved, as those ending their day in Japan can be succeeded by staff in Italy and the UK.</p> + +<p>Development is far from the only area where DE could be a key enabler. The potential reach of DE is extraordinary. BAE Systems is already invested in digital manufacturing, robotic assembly, and training support for those doing skilled manual work. Additive manufacturing is a sub-element in DE, as are computer-controlled machine tools. It could thus cut manufacturing time and increase product reliability. In-service modification and spiral development would be quicker and easier with DE. Building data-collecting sensors into systems would support longer usage rates for platforms and enable condition-based maintenance rather than time- or usage-based maintenance. Many modern civil aircraft engines are already fitted with such sensors (linked to computers analysing their results). These mean that engine companies can take on profitable availability contracts.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Advanced digital engineering will enable numerous engineers to work on different aspects of a system simultaneously as data on the mutually dependent components is shared, analysed and acted upon at much greater speed</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>DE is the clear direction of travel for much of manufacturing. For GCAP, expanding the boundaries of DE is key to holding costs down and delivering an aircraft for 2035: it could and should be rewarding but also inevitably risky. Significantly, it is a field which US defence companies, not least Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman are actively exploring. Because of the hundreds of sub-contractors that will need to be captured within the GCAP DE tent, the expertise they acquire can be applied on other manufacturing projects, both military and civil. Subject to respect for companies’ intellectual property, the government could work to diffuse GCAP-origin DE experiences to other industrial sectors beyond aerospace. This could enable progress, especially in productivity growth, under the government’s industrial ambitions as laid out in its Green Paper of October 2024.</p> + +<p>However, this will require resources and skill. For instance, a highly secure information infrastructure that enables DE is pivotal. Clearly, information on GCAP’s digital twin and its performance in a countless number of combat scenarios will be highly prized, with state and perhaps corporate bodies focused on accessing it. A key to its GCAP capability is keeping that information safe. This has significant implications for the organisations that handle this data, including security clearances, establishing processes, and having the necessary IT infrastructure to handle data securely and at great speed. Skill is also an important factor. Government and industry alike will need to muster the necessary talent to maintain and develop DE capabilities. GCAP is conceptualised as an open-platform system that seeks to enable seamless integration of mission-specific FCAS capabilities from a multitude of suppliers. These suppliers must also be able to recruit the people required for the new digital working environment that they cannot grow themselves. Thus, government and industrial primes will need to produce a skill spill-over to make the FCAS system work.</p> + +<p>All this has consequences for the financial approach to GCAP. Historically, major defence development programmes start cheap and then build up. The DE element of GCAP means that significant initial costs of computing, staff recruitment and training and model development have to be incurred. Investment in a highly secure information storage, processing and communication system is needed early. What this means in UK terms is that Treasury approval for higher than usual early costs is needed. It is a matter of approving a “spend to save” strategy, which clearly involves risk. But DE could then play a pivotal role in materialising the cost reduction and increases in speed.</p> + +<h3 id="conclusions">Conclusions</h3> + +<p>The five areas of innovation in GCAP should be seen holistically as a transformational approach to defence acquisition:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>Government-industry partnering from the outset.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Securing access to significant industrial cost contributions for the early stages.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Bringing in a novel collaborative partner and setting up customer and industry delivery structures to facilitate timely decision-making.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Starting from a minimum viable capability while envisaging spiral development.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Pushing the boundaries of digital engineering to reduce the time and cost of development and production.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p>This will require persistent teamworking across government departments, among multiple businesses and between government and the private sector. But each offers the prospect of lowering costs and flattening the tendency towards increased inter-generational aircraft costs first pointed out by Norman Augustine more than 40 years ago.</p> + +<p>The case for this approach rests on the simple observation that different things should be bought in different ways. There is no doubt that GCAP will require a mindset change from those in Defence Equipment &amp; Support whose instinct is that the only way to secure value is through competitive tendering, passing as much risk as possible to the private supplier, and relying primarily on contracted commitments to assure delivery. Also, for teaming to be effective, there will be a need for government technical expertise to be available, not least on the design and meaning of digital and real-world tests. To be specific, the GCAP approach is particularly relevant for projects in which national operational independence is valued and there is little or no scope for sustained competition within the country.</p> + +<p>The elements of this approach give real hope for effective cost control: incentivising industry by securing early significant company investments, focusing government and industrial delivery structures on pace regarding decisions, defining a realistic but militarily adequate requirement from the outset and, perhaps above all, investing in DE to speed development, reduce risks and lower costs.</p> + +<p>Successive UK governments have shown that they can talk the talk on defence industrial matters, and their defence industrial partners have expressed confidence in their potential. Maintaining the momentum of GCAP will require all concerned to show that they can also walk the walk.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Trevor Taylor</strong> is Director of the Defence, Industries &amp; Society Programme and Professorial Fellow in Defence management at RUSI where he has worked since 2009. He also works regularly on a consultancy basis for the Institute of Security Governance which is based at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.</p> + +<p><strong>Linus Terhorst</strong> is a Research Analyst at the Defence, Industries &amp; Society Programme where he works on defence procurement and industrial strategy questions and innovation management in defence.</p>Trevor Taylor and Linus TerhorstGCAP’s management involves five innovations that should drive success in its technology development and timeline. They also have the potential to transform the UK approach to major development, production and support programmes – if government is willing to change how it approaches project financing.【初選47人案・判刑】2024-11-19T12:00:00+08:002024-11-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-sentence<ul> <li>李予信冀大眾關注案件 藉判詞思考社會走向</li> <li>清晨逾200人排隊旁聽 有公眾指罵大媽為「排隊黨」</li> <li>戴耀廷囚10年 其餘44人囚4年2個月至7年9個月</li> @@ -1057,7 +1179,305 @@ <hr /> -<p>案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022</p>獨媒報導李予信冀大眾關注案件 藉判詞思考社會走向 清晨逾200人排隊旁聽 有公眾指罵大媽為「排隊黨」 戴耀廷囚10年 其餘44人囚4年2個月至7年9個月 戴耀廷等4名組織者被列「首要分子」區諾軒趙家賢任證人獲一半減刑 所有參選人被列「積極參加者」 發起「墨落無悔」3名抗爭派量刑最重 林景楠任證人囚5年2個月 官無就作供減刑：對控方毫無幫助 官：不接受被告稱涉案計劃註定失敗 61萬投票市民不如此認為 法官指11名認罪被告有真誠悔意 當局評估是否提早釋放時會考慮 何桂藍發帖：歷史由有意志者書寫 人人可定義香港 專訪吳政亨：我以「傻」為榮 陳寶瑩：呢個係冤獄，一日都唔應該坐 呂智恆養母判刑後舉標語 涉公眾地方行為不檢被捕 判刑後長毛致信太太：未因言行悔疚、爭取民主並沒有錯 陳文敏指量刑貼近國安法三級制 料律政司上訴難度大 多國發聲明關注 外交部：無端指責、干涉中國內政 民建聯抗議美國抹黑 領事館未有派代表接信【初選47人案・判刑前夕】2024-11-18T12:00:00+08:002024-11-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-pre-sentence<ul> +<p>案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022</p>獨媒報導李予信冀大眾關注案件 藉判詞思考社會走向 清晨逾200人排隊旁聽 有公眾指罵大媽為「排隊黨」 戴耀廷囚10年 其餘44人囚4年2個月至7年9個月 戴耀廷等4名組織者被列「首要分子」區諾軒趙家賢任證人獲一半減刑 所有參選人被列「積極參加者」 發起「墨落無悔」3名抗爭派量刑最重 林景楠任證人囚5年2個月 官無就作供減刑：對控方毫無幫助 官：不接受被告稱涉案計劃註定失敗 61萬投票市民不如此認為 法官指11名認罪被告有真誠悔意 當局評估是否提早釋放時會考慮 何桂藍發帖：歷史由有意志者書寫 人人可定義香港 專訪吳政亨：我以「傻」為榮 陳寶瑩：呢個係冤獄，一日都唔應該坐 呂智恆養母判刑後舉標語 涉公眾地方行為不檢被捕 判刑後長毛致信太太：未因言行悔疚、爭取民主並沒有錯 陳文敏指量刑貼近國安法三級制 料律政司上訴難度大 多國發聲明關注 外交部：無端指責、干涉中國內政 民建聯抗議美國抹黑 領事館未有派代表接信Semiconductor Mfg. Equipment2024-11-19T12:00:00+08:002024-11-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/semiconductor-manufacturing-equipment<p><em>This report argues that existing controls incentivize China to minimize reliance on U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment by indigenizing development of tools and increasing purchases from third-country suppliers, which ultimately hinders U.S. technology leadership.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>Export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) represent a key focus of ongoing U.S. government efforts to “choke off” China’s access to leading-edge semiconductors. The United States, along with allies such as the Netherlands and Japan, is a global leader in production and R&amp;D for chipmaking tools. By imposing uniquely broad and unilateral controls on U.S. toolmakers’ access to the Chinese market, however, the U.S. government has turbocharged Chinese efforts to wean off all U.S. SME due to growing concerns about the reliability and trustworthiness of U.S. companies. In this way, expanding U.S. trade restrictions are facilitating the “design-out” of U.S. toolmakers in Chinese semiconductor supply chains in favor of domestic and third-country (i.e., non-U.S. and non-Chinese) companies. This growing trend in China’s market, the world’s largest for semiconductor manufacturing, threatens the long-term leadership of the United States in SME by diverting revenue (and R&amp;D investment) away from U.S. industry. As a result, current U.S. export controls risk jeopardizing the economic and national security of the United States by hindering U.S. companies’ market share and accelerating China’s relative technological gains. This report, the second in a series on U.S. semiconductor export controls, outlines the importance of SME to chip markets, key types of tools being designed-out, and the rapid growth of Chinese toolmakers. It also evaluates how toolmakers based in third countries have leveraged U.S. unilateral controls to win new business with Chinese customers. The report argues that the United States should limit further unilateral controls on SME sales and consider new incentives for allies to create multilateral export regimes, which could mitigate some of the negative impacts of current controls on U.S. companies.</p> + +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<p>With geopolitical competition intensifying, U.S. economic security policy has undergone significant changes. Primarily, the United States has expanded economic security measures to take new defensive actions around critical and emerging technologies (CETs). Such efforts center on denying China access to key foundational technologies — particularly advanced semiconductors that support dual-use applications such as artificial intelligence (AI).</p> + +<p>The administrations of Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden have expanded economic security measures regarding China’s access to CETs. Export controls are an increasingly common tool in U.S. economic security efforts, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has called them a “new strategic asset in the U.S. and allied toolkit.” Under the Biden administration, the federal government has implemented two major rounds of semiconductor export controls, one in October 2022 and a second in October 2023. Additional controls may be forthcoming as the United States aims to use trade restrictions to deny China access to leading-edge semiconductors, thus limiting China’s ability to develop military and dual-use technologies such as advanced AI systems.</p> + +<p>The potential benefits of such a strategy to economic and national security are obvious. They include maintaining technological superiority for modern military capabilities and intelligence gathering. Washington sees clear, legitimate risks associated with the proliferation of highly advanced semiconductors among its adversaries. A sensible U.S. export control policy focused on preserving technological superiority is a measured response.</p> + +<p>Export controls, however, are a double-edged sword. When a nation decides to implement controls, it effectively restricts its companies’ market share. If controls negatively affect a nation’s technological champions, policymakers may inadvertently compromise their country’s status as a long-term technology leader. The loss in sales decreases these tech champions’ revenue and, in some cases, redirects it to foreign competitors, potentially reducing future investments in innovation for key U.S. firms.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Washington sees clear, legitimate risks associated with the proliferation of highly advanced semiconductors among its adversaries. A sensible U.S. export control policy focused on preserving technological superiority is a measured response.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>If the relative costs imposed on China’s technological progression and the corresponding benefits to U.S. national security outweigh the costs to U.S. industry and innovation, then Washington may well view these impacts as a necessary price. However, China’s semiconductor ecosystem — through its own strategies and through government support — has managed to undermine the effectiveness of many of the controls meant to keep Chinese firms behind their Western counterparts. For one, Chinese companies have found ways to access U.S. technology by circumventing controls. These efforts have been widely written about and include using overseas shell companies to purchase controlled products, as well as leveraging domestic technology trading networks to redirect technology via firms that are exempt from controls.</p> + +<p>Beyond circumvention efforts, U.S. export controls have helped facilitate a farther-reaching unintended consequence: China has set its domestic semiconductor ecosystem on a path toward removing U.S. technology altogether. Chinese government and commercial actors have deployed two key long-term strategies to create ex-U.S. supply chains for semiconductor technologies across the value chain. These strategies, which represent the focus of this series of papers by the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business, include the following:</p> + +<ol> + <li> + <p>Design-out: supplanting existing U.S. and allied semiconductor technologies with comparable technologies, from either</p> + + <p>a. Chinese firms; or</p> + + <p>b. third-country (non-U.S. and non-Chinese) firms</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Design-around: developing new technologies that do away with an entire category of controlled technology in the semiconductor supply chain</p> + </li> +</ol> + +<h3 id="design-out-and-design-around">Design-Out and Design-Around</h3> + +<p>As discussed in the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business’s introductory report in this series, which covers advanced packaging, China is rapidly accelerating the design-out of U.S. technologies from semiconductor supply chains in response to existing — and in anticipation of future — U.S. export controls. It has pursued this goal, in part, by increasingly adopting domestic firms’ technologies. China’s semiconductor industry has rapidly pivoted toward made-in-China technology over the last few years, facilitated by expanded government investment and other incentives, as well as preferential procurement practices by Chinese semiconductor companies.</p> + +<p>There is also evidence of increased Chinese adoption of third-country suppliers within semiconductor supply chains. For instance, competitors from Japan, the Netherlands, Taiwan, Israel, and South Korea have increasingly leveraged China’s chip market as a growth engine, winning new Chinese customers and increasing existing customers’ wallet share as the impacts of U.S. export controls constrain the competitiveness of U.S. companies. This third-country design-out threat potentially shifts semiconductor industry leadership toward foreign competitors, some of whom offer China the very technologies U.S. companies are barred from selling.</p> + +<p>In addition, China is looking to design around U.S. export controls — in other words, innovate to achieve advanced semiconductor capabilities using approaches not modeled on U.S. technologies. Importantly, this trend means China is beginning to innovate rather than copy foreign technology in the chip industry. As discussed in the packaging report, a shift away from a “fast-follower” approach toward a more innovative approach would represent a key change in U.S.-China technological competition — one that potentially threatens long-term U.S. innovation leadership.</p> + +<p>It would be one thing if China’s design-out and design-around strategies affected only leading-edge semiconductor technologies, which are the primary targets of U.S. export controls. However, China’s pivot away from U.S. technology has affected not only the leading edge but also foundational, or “trailing-edge,” semiconductor technologies. Chinese and third-country firms want to avoid dealing with the high regulatory and financial burdens of U.S. export controls, which are complex, stricter than other nations’ in coverage and enforcement, and fast evolving. As a result, Chinese and foreign companies selling to the Chinese market are newly incentivized to avoid using U.S. technology where possible. Additionally, the ambiguity of the controls means that firms may opt to overcomply with export regulations and avoid selling or purchasing U.S. technologies — even if the products technically fall outside of the controls — for fear of dealing with costly litigation.</p> + +<p>The United States, for its part, looks to press forward with stricter controls. This threat of stricter controls, in turn, encourages China to design out and design around other U.S. technologies to hedge against future regulations. In this way, tightening unilateral U.S. export controls is having a ripple effect across the Chinese — and global — semiconductor ecosystem, threatening to undermine U.S. leadership and leverage in the sector.</p> + +<h3 id="overview">Overview</h3> + +<p><strong><em>Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment</em></strong></p> + +<p>This paper focuses on China’s design-out and design-around strategies related to semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) — the machines critical to making chips. China’s access to such equipment has become increasingly important to its national semiconductor ambitions as expanding U.S. and allied export controls limit Chinese access to leading global chip manufacturers such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), Samsung, and Intel.</p> + +<p>SME is a strong example of the design-out issue. Chinese companies are increasingly replacing U.S. producers one-to-one in Chinese semiconductor manufacturing facilities, or fabs. As procurement practices in Chinese fabs shift toward an anywhere-but-the-United-States approach, SME sales are also shifting toward third-country toolmakers.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">SME is a strong example of the design-out issue. Chinese companies are increasingly replacing U.S. producers one-to-one in Chinese semiconductor manufacturing facilities, or fabs.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>The United States would benefit economically and strategically from continuing to sell some SME technology to China. These benefits do not apply to technologies that are highly specific to advanced dual-use technology and cannot be acquired elsewhere or rapidly developed domestically. For example, ASML’s sales of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography provide a choke point for Chinese technological advancement into fabrication processes like 3 nanometers (nm) and is a prime example of the power of export controls. But for less niche and non-sole-sourced tools, unilateral and broad export controls risk U.S. technology champions losing out on revenue while China maintains its access to the same technology, either via industry indigenization efforts or shifting purchases to third countries.</p> + +<p>This paper explores why SME is important to semiconductor technological innovation, what types of U.S. SME are facing design-out and design-around risks, and what implications those risks carry for U.S. economic and national security.</p> + +<h4 id="why-is-semiconductor-manufacturing-equipment-important">Why Is Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Important?</h4> + +<p>Making semiconductors is impossible without a wide array of specialized, highly advanced machinery. Each manufacturing plant, or fab, contains an average of 1,200 multi-million-dollar tools — all of which are critical to chip production. This group of tools transforms a thin piece of crystalline silicon or other semiconducting material into a fabricated wafer containing billions — if not trillions — of nanometric transistors precisely etched onto a tiny surface area (often just 300 millimeters). Capital expenditures (CapEx) on SME constitute an estimated 75 percent of total CapEx on fab construction, and some tools reach the size of a double-decker bus, costing upward of $150 million.</p> + +<p>Semiconductor fabrication, both for leading-edge process nodes and mature chip technologies, is one of the most complex manufacturing processes on the planet — in large part due to the machinery required. For instance, ASML’s EUV lithography devices have been called “the most complicated machine humans have built.” As a result, advancements in SME technology have historically represented a key driver of semiconductor industry innovation. High-quality SME is also critical to the economics of scaled production, as any imprecision in a finished chip’s structure or composition can affect performance and reduce a fab’s production yield. All this means that a fab’s access to tools is a leading determinant of how competitive its technology is on a global scale.</p> + +<p>SME is often divided into front-end equipment used in wafer fabrication and processing, such as lithography, etch, deposition, and cleaning, and back-end equipment used for assembly, packaging, dicing, bonding, and testing. Because the advanced packaging brief covers assembly and packaging equipment, this brief focuses on fabrication and test equipment in evaluating design-out and design-around risks.</p> + +<p>Four types of SME across front-end and back-end equipment are under significant threat of design-out: (1) deposition, (2) etching, (3) process control, and (4) testing. While discussions of the semiconductor supply chain often group testing with assembly and packaging, the authors include testing within SME here for two reasons: First, testing plays a key role in front-end wafer fabrication (as well as in back-end processes like assembly and packaging), as it takes place continually throughout the production life cycle. Second, the design-out and design-around dynamics of testing equipment are more like those of chipmaking tools rather than those of assembly or packaging technologies. As in the areas of etching, deposition, and process control, the United States is home to leading competitors in testing equipment, which are facing design-out risks from foreign manufacturers. For these reasons, testing is included as part of SME in this report.</p> + +<p>The following section introduces each category of SME as well as the key U.S. and global players associated with it. The primary takeaway is that U.S. manufacturers, alongside competitors primarily from U.S.-allied countries such as Japan and the Netherlands, have historically held leading shares of global equipment markets — particularly for chipmaking technologies at the leading edge. This leadership underscores the high stakes of any shift in global market share because of U.S. export controls. U.S. companies have much revenue and technological leadership to lose to new Chinese companies — as well as Dutch, Japanese, Israeli, German, and other foreign firms, many of which are well positioned in equipment markets to grab a share of the U.S. market.</p> + +<h4 id="deposition">Deposition</h4> + +<p>The deposition process involves specialized tools depositing thin films of conducting, isolating, or semiconducting materials on the wafer. Deposition takes place throughout the fabrication stage and often occurs in multiple sequential iterations along with processes such as photolithography and etching. It plays a key role in enabling miniaturization in semiconductors, as it can create protective barriers to prevent atomic-level interference. Deposition can also help strengthen or weaken an electric field and connect transistors with other devices and power sources.</p> + +<p>There are various types of deposition used in wafer fabrication. U.S. companies such as Lam, Applied Materials, Plasma-Therm, and Veeco are key players across most types of deposition tools. The two areas discussed in depth here are epitaxy and atomic layer deposition, given their potential for design-out by Chinese supply chains.</p> + +<p>Epitaxy — also known as “epi” — involves depositing a near-perfect crystalline layer directly on top of the wafer substrate. Epitaxy growth typically occurs during the beginning of the wafer fabrication process, following wafer polishing and preceding the sequences of lithography, etching, and other deposition processes. Adding an epitaxial layer helps fabs better control doping wafers with impurities and can introduce a different material than that used in wafer “bulk” materials. As a result, epitaxy facilitates more effective electron transmission, a key goal in advanced chipmaking.</p> + +<p>Epitaxy innovation plays an important role in the ongoing evolution of both chip fabrication and advanced packaging. Epitaxy is important to nonclassical wafer substrates (i.e., nonsilicon) such as gallium arsenide (GaAs), gallium nitride (GaN), and silicon carbide (SiC), which play a key role in critical technologies such as aerospace and defense applications and electric vehicles. An emerging technology within the field of epitaxy is remote epitaxy. Remote epitaxy is the growth of a thin epitaxial layer that is aligned — but not in contact — with the substrate. This technique has a plethora of applications in advanced packaging, particularly three-dimensional (3D) packaging designs, in which multiple chips are stacked to enhance bandwidth while reducing power consumption and footprint.</p> + +<p>The epitaxy equipment market includes tools used for metal-organic chemical vapor deposition, high-temperature chemical vapor deposition, and molecular beam epitaxy. Leading suppliers are based in Germany, the United States, and Japan — as well as China. Key companies in terms of 2020 market share include Germany’s Aixtron, the United States’ Veeco, China’s Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment Inc., China (AMEC), and Japan’s Tokyo Electron (TEL).</p> + +<p>Atomic layer deposition (ALD) is an advanced type of chemical vapor deposition (CVD) that adds layers consisting of a single atom of thickness onto a wafer. It is key to leading-edge chip designs due to the importance of controlling layer thickness and composition in fabricating advanced chips, whose features are small enough that the industry is running up against the physical limits of miniaturization. There are two key types of ALD: thermal ALD and plasma-enhanced ALD (PEALD). Whereas the former relies solely on chemical precursors to deposit the atomic layer, PEALD uses plasma to provide reaction energy for the process, enabling greater control over film characteristics.</p> + +<p>Netherlands-based ASM is the leader in ALD, particularly PEALD, holding above 50 percent of the market, according to investor materials. Additional key suppliers include Japan’s Kokusai, TEL, and Optorun, as well as the United States’ Lam Research. As of 2020, China’s Naura had a “negligible” share.</p> + +<h4 id="etching">Etching</h4> + +<p>The etching process involves carving a precise pattern onto the wafer by selectively removing layers of material using either liquid or gas chemicals. Etching takes the pattern created during photolithography — during which a light selectively removes parts of a photoresist coating based on a photomask design — and applies this pattern permanently to the material layer below. Etching occurs multiple times in fabrication and creates a complex pattern of cavities where the thin film layer has been removed.</p> + +<p>There are two main types of etching tools: dry and wet. Dry etching tools use gases to engrave the wafer and are necessary to create the circuitry on leading-edge chips. Atomic layer etching tools are particularly important for advanced process node production due to their greater control and precision. Wet etching, which uses liquid chemicals to engrave the wafer, is less common than dry etching for advanced process nodes due to the challenges of creating complex structures. However, it is cheaper and less risky, making it commonly used to clean wafers. Because etching also plays a key role in mature chip technologies, both dry and wet etching tools are critical to semiconductor manufacturing.</p> + +<p>The United States and Japan are the world’s leading suppliers of etching equipment, followed by China and South Korea. Lam Research, Applied Materials, and KLA all have strong shares in global dry and wet etching markets. Japan’s TEL, Hitachi, and Screen are other notable players. South Korea-based SEMES represents a growing wet etching player. Finally, in China, AMEC, Naura, and Kingsemi are notable small providers of etching tools.</p> + +<h4 id="process-control">Process Control</h4> + +<p>Process control refers to using monitoring tools in semiconductor manufacturing to ensure quality control. It takes place concurrently with other stages of fabrication and involves metrics like the purity of wafer materials, transistor dimensions, and chip conductivity. As chip dimensions get smaller, variations at the molecular level represent a larger share of an integrated circuit’s dimensions, making process control increasingly important in fabrication. Ongoing industry shifts, like the switch from single patterning to multiple patterning and from planar to 3D transistors, mean that variations increasingly come from the material quality or the deposition process, calling for more advanced control tools.</p> + +<p>Process control is important to both advanced and mature node production, as it has a key impact on yield. Wafer production yield, or the percentage of individual chips (dies) per wafer that make it through the final probe testing stage, is a critical metric for fabs due to their high per-unit operating costs. Process control technology helps enable a higher yield, thus improving profitability by minimizing wasted output.</p> + +<p>Key types of semiconductor process control technologies include photomask inspection and repair tools, process monitoring equipment, wafer inspection equipment, and wafer-level inspection packaging tools. U.S. companies hold strong market share across all key types of tools. Notable U.S. players include Applied Materials, KLA, Keithley Instruments, Keysight Technologies, Onto Innovation, Nanotronics, and Thermo Fisher. Japan and Germany are home to most leading competitors, such as Lasertec, Rigaku, and Screen in Japan and Zeiss and Bruker in Germany. Chinese players are smaller and include Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE), Jingce, and Raintree.</p> + +<p>While various players compete across the entire process control ecosystem, individual markets are often highly concentrated among a few players. For instance, the market for wafer-level packaging inspection tools is dominated by one U.S. and one Israeli firm. As a result, the impact of export controls on a single company’s positioning can have a significant effect on global market shares.</p> + +<h4 id="testing">Testing</h4> + +<p>Semiconductor testing occurs at multiple stages during fabrication and packaging, helping ensure defective chips do not make it into final packages. Chips go through up to six stages of testing: (1) wafer acceptance, (2) wafer sort, (3) wafer-level burn-in, (4) package test, (5) burn-in test, and (6) testing at the system level. Testing equipment has taken on increased importance and industry value as the cost of testing devices and the potential losses associated with manufacturing defective dice have risen in response to advances in chip design and applications such as advanced graphics processing units, which are commonly used to train AI models.</p> + +<p>Key types of semiconductor testing tools include burn-in test equipment, handlers and probes, linear and discrete testing tools, and system-on-a-chip testing equipment. Japanese and U.S. firms hold leading market shares in different parts of the industry. Notable Japanese companies include Advantest, Tesec, and Accretech. U.S. players include Teradyne, National Instruments, and Cohu. South Korean firms such as UniTest and DI Corporation are also key participants. Chinese capabilities have historically been more limited.</p> + +<h3 id="how-the-ear-impacts-us-and-foreign-toolmakers">How the EAR Impacts U.S. and Foreign Toolmakers</h3> + +<p>The Commerce Department’s October 7, 2022, rules, implemented under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), require licensing of U.S. equipment and persons involved in certain types of chip manufacturing. Affected technologies include equipment used in the production of “logic chips with non-planar transistor architectures . . . of 16nm or 14nm, or below; DRAM memory chips of 18nm half-pitch or less; [and] NAND flash memory chips with 128 layers or more.” The regulation’s October 2023 updates tighten controls to include some older technologies, such as immersion deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography.</p> + +<p>Products newly subject to the EAR include both items in the United States and “all U.S. origin items wherever located.” This inclusion means that U.S.-based multinational companies producing SME (not to mention other semiconductor technologies) cannot avoid the controls when selling to China, even when relying on factories abroad.</p> + +<p>For companies based outside the United States, determining whether the EAR applies is more complex. Foreign-made items may be subject to the EAR in two ways: (1) falling under a U.S. foreign direct product rule (FDPR) or (2) exceeding the de minimis threshold of “controlled” U.S.-origin content. Ostensibly, both rules apply the U.S. controls extraterritorially, leveraging the frequent presence of U.S. technology in third-country products.</p> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="foreign-direct-product-rules"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Foreign Direct Product Rules</code></h4> +</blockquote> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">FDPRs apply the EAR to foreign-made items if they are the “direct product” of certain types of U.S.-origin equipment, software, or other technology, and are destined for designated countries. Specifically, FDPRs empower the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to require licenses for exports of certain foreign-made products if listed U.S. technology was directly used to produce them or produce key parts of the plants that were used to manufacture the products, such as a tool or a piece of software — even if a controlled U.S. component or system does not appear in the product.</code></em></p> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Three FDPRs limit Chinese access to semiconductor technologies: the Entity List (EL), Advanced Computing, and Supercomputer FDPRs. These FDPRs differ in terms of the products, companies, and countries that they cover. The EL FDPR, introduced in May 2020 by the Trump administration, applies U.S. export controls to products destined for hundreds of Chinese (and other foreign) companies and their subsidiaries. These restrictions vary based on the products involved as well as the type of EL classification applicable to the purchaser company. Their reach has continued to grow as the U.S. Department of Commerce has added Chinese firms to the EL. The Advanced Computing FDPR applies the EAR to a narrower range of products meeting certain performance parameters and based on the destination country rather than the destination company. Originally aimed at China, the Advanced Computing FDPR has expanded the list of destination countries to include the countries China likely uses to avoid controls, such as Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Finally, the Supercomputer FDPR applies a country and end-use scope to encompass any items subject to the EAR that are used to produce supercomputers, which are defined based on compute capacity and system dimensions.</code></em></p> + +<p>The FDPRs and de minimis rules aim to limit the ability of third-country suppliers (who face less strict export controls from their governments) to replace U.S. suppliers in Chinese markets. However, their current efficacy in this regard is questionable. Multiple U.S. SME companies told CSIS that these restrictions are not stopping foreign toolmakers from replacing them in Chinese fabs, a complaint that has also been raised to U.S. officials. While public evidence supporting this trend remains limited, a New York Federal Reserve study from April 2024 on the impacts of U.S. semiconductor export controls showed that non-U.S. firms that sell to Chinese semiconductor companies experienced “higher revenues and profitability . . . following the inclusion of the Chinese targets in the U.S. export control lists.”</p> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="de-minimis-rules"><code class="highlighter-rouge">De Minimis Rules</code></h4> +</blockquote> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">De minimis rules apply the EAR based on the inclusion of U.S.-origin controlled inputs in foreign-exported goods destined for specific countries. Notably, unlike the FDPRs, use of de minimis rules requires that the exported goods directly contain products produced in the United States that fall under the EAR. This differs from the FDPR’s broader threshold of goods being the “direct product” of certain U.S.-origin technologies or inputs (that do not need to be included in the actual goods being shipped). In cases where the shipment of the U.S. inputs to the final country destination by themselves (i.e., when not incorporated into a final product) would require a license, a de minimis calculation is necessary for the foreign export of the product that contains the inputs. Depending on the type of product and country destination, different de minimis thresholds — or the minimum percentage of U.S.-origin controlled items as a share of “fair market value” at which the EAR applies (typically 10 or 25 percent) — are relevant to the specific good. If the good exceeds the relevant de minimis threshold, an export waiver is required, pursuant to the EAR. For some products (e.g., certain lithography tools), a zero percent de minimis threshold applies, meaning that inclusion of any U.S.-origin controlled input automatically applies the EAR.</code></em></p> + +<p>Notably, the United States has been relatively hesitant to apply the FDPR to foreign exports of semiconductor technology due to the rule’s negative perception among U.S. allies. Allied governments and companies have sharply criticized the FDPR as an overreach of U.S. export control authority. During recent discussions in which the United States threatened to expand application of the FDPR, foreign governments reportedly said they would not cooperate with enforcement of this application, potentially threatening FDPR expansion. Although the U.S. government is reportedly preparing an expansion to the FDPR and EL that would increase restrictions on foreign exports, a Reuters report indicated that category A:5 countries — which include Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea — would be exempt from the expanded FDPR. The exclusion of countries home to leading toolmakers like ASML and Tokyo Electron belies the U.S. government’s continued hesitation to use the FDPR on key allies in the semiconductor supply chain.</p> + +<p>Enforcement of extraterritorial applications of the EAR is also a challenge. For semiconductor controls, enforcement challenges are exacerbated by needing to know the node process for which the technology is used, in order to determine whether the extraterritorial rules apply. As an example, SME used in the production of “advanced-node integrated circuits” does not have a de minimis level in terms of U.S. content, whereas SME for less mature chipmaking does. For shipments of finished chips, the node process is self-evident, based on the exported product itself. However, for SME and other inputs, the type of process node manufactured using the product may be less transparent to suppliers. For instance, the same types of etch equipment may be used in a wide range of process nodes, a practice known in the industry as “CapEx recycling.” Therefore, suppliers could unintentionally sell some tools used for advanced nodes to Chinese customers, as these customers can lie about the process node they are using the tools for. Additionally, the burden falls on the company to determine whether the foreign-made item is subject to the EAR, further challenging enforcement.</p> + +<p>Interestingly, the New York Federal Reserve study described an increase in revenues for third-country firms despite including firms ostensibly subject to the extraterritorial restrictions (via FDPR or de minimis) in its data set. The authors admitted that this had the potential to bias “estimates towards finding a decline in revenues by non-U.S. firms that sell to Chinese targets.”</p> + +<p>These findings suggest that the United States is applying the EAR less restrictively to third-country firms than U.S. firms, even where the FDPR or de minimis restrictions are meant to apply — another indication of potential challenges facing enforcement.</p> + +<p>Even when fully enforced, FDPR and de minimis requirements are potentially avoidable by removing U.S. technologies from supply chains. Industry participants reported to CSIS that the EAR is incentivizing foreign toolmakers to minimize the use of U.S. technologies, services, and personnel in supply chains to avoid restricted trade with China. For example, one individual noted that a Japanese toolmaker was removing U.S. components from its supply chains and publicizing its products as outside U.S. EAR authority — a practice the individual suggested was widespread across SME markets globally. Reports of these supply chain shifts suggest that, at least for some third-country toolmakers, reliance on U.S. technology is low enough to make avoiding the existing FDPR and de minimis thresholds possible.</p> + +<p>In 2023, the Netherlands and Japan adopted their own export controls following U.S. diplomatic efforts. However, these restrictions remain less stringent than U.S. controls in terms of end use and servicing personnel, giving Japanese and Dutch companies greater ability to sell to Chinese customers and provide on-the-ground support. Additionally, other key supplier countries such as South Korea, Israel, and Germany have not adopted similar export controls. Under the existing set of international export controls, foreign toolmakers continue to face significantly weaker restrictions on access to the Chinese market than U.S. companies.</p> + +<p>A final risk of the current EAR in terms of creating unequal market access for U.S. and foreign companies is overcompliance. As one public commentator argued to BIS,</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>The October 7 IFR is so complex that only a small group of people with significant experience in the EAR and semiconductors can fully understand the rulemaking . . . Many small and medium enterprises, or even large foreign multinationals, not highly versed in these details will either not know if they are following the rule, or out of an abundance of caution, “over-comply” by restricting legitimate exports and trade not otherwise subject to these rules.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>While the October 2023 update simplifies calculations and identifies flags to help companies determine compliance, challenges remain in terms of understanding the breadth of the restrictions, which are highly technical and continually evolving.</p> + +<p>In other words, the EAR’s complexity and ambiguity risk encouraging U.S. toolmakers to pull back from Chinese markets — even in places where they are not legally required to do so. For instance, the previously mentioned New York Federal Reserve study also showed that U.S. firms were more likely to terminate relations with Chinese customers following the export controls, even with those not directly targeted by the controls, and less likely to form new Chinese customer relationships — potentially due to concerns about unintentionally violating restrictions. This risk of overcompliance also makes it more likely that third-country companies will design out U.S. companies, facilities, and personnel, even in areas not covered by export controls, to ensure they avoid the regulations.</p> + +<h3 id="chinese-firms-designing-out-us-firms-in-sme">Chinese Firms Designing Out U.S. Firms in SME</h3> + +<p>As U.S. economic and national security policy has become more stringent, Chinese businesses and policymakers have accelerated the semiconductor industry’s shift away from U.S. inputs. China’s SME industry historically has failed to achieve technological parity with foreign toolmakers due to factors such as the smaller size of its companies and, as a result, its reduced capacity to invest in research and development (R&amp;D). Instead of buying domestic, leading Chinese chipmakers such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), Hua Hong Semiconductor, and Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC) have sought out the most advanced chipmaking technology available — which is often of U.S. origin. For instance, Applied Materials, KLA, and Lam Research all held large market shares in Chinese chip markets as of 2022. That same year, China’s SME localization rate (the share of tools produced domestically) was 21 percent. A 2021 report by Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology estimated a localization rate of just 8 percent.</p> + +<p>However, strong evidence suggests that China’s procurement approach has shifted since late 2022, with the removal of U.S. technology emerging as a primary industry objective. In 2023, China’s SME localization rate nearly doubled year over year to reach 40 percent. A South China Morning Post article recently reported that the “unwritten rule” for Chinese fabs was 70 percent self-sufficiency (made in China) in SME and that firms were achieving “significant progress” for key types of chipmaking equipment, with the exceptions of lithography, ion implantation, and inspection and metrology (parts of process control).</p> + +<p>This design-out trend results from increasing top-down pressure from government officials and growing bottom-up commercial incentives for Chinese companies to minimize exposure to present — and future — U.S. regulatory actions. In the SME space, China’s semiconductor industry is pursuing design-out through two main approaches: (1) increased procurement from and investment in Chinese toolmakers and (2) replacement of U.S. SME technology with products from third-country firms.</p> + +<p>An April 2024 quote in the Financial Times by a YMTC investor neatly summarizes China’s general design-out strategy for SME:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>If Chinese companies have equipment that can be used, [YMTC] will use it. If not, it will see if countries other than the US can sell to it. . . . If that doesn’t work, YMTC will develop it together with the supplier.</p> +</blockquote> + +<h4 id="design-out-via-chinese-toolmakers">Design-Out via Chinese Toolmakers</h4> + +<p>In China, the export controls from October 7, 2022, accelerated a joint government-industry effort to build a domestic semiconductor supply chain for chipmaking equipment. De-Americanizing Chinese semiconductor supply chains has been a Chinese objective for decades. However, Chinese firms frequently ignored this top-down policy goal and sourced large shares of chipmaking equipment from abroad, including from U.S.-based companies.</p> + +<p>The Trump administration’s April 2018 imposition of sanctions and export controls on ZTE represented a major turning point in pushing China to take steps toward reducing U.S. reliance, particularly for semiconductors. These efforts went into overdrive following the October 7 export controls, which created immediate existential challenges for the Chinese semiconductor industry’s access to key technologies. As a result, the controls catalyzed a coordinated response by both government and private sector entities. Central, provincial, and local government entities — as well as chipmaking firms such as Huawei, SMIC, YMTC, Hua Hong, and others — have rapidly expanded efforts to replace U.S. chipmaking technology with technology from Chinese suppliers. Nowhere in the industry has this shift been clearer than in SME.</p> + +<p>Top-down government efforts focus on putting pressure on domestic chipmakers to procure Chinese SME. For instance, some companies told CSIS that Chinese customers are facing mandates from government officials to buy most chipmaking equipment from an approved “white list” of domestic companies. These sourcing goals can overrule traditional business performance metrics such as yield, benefitting Chinese toolmakers even in cases where quality is lower relative to U.S. firms. China is also investing heavily in SME production and innovation, including via the $47.5 billion third phase of its so-called Big Fund and by increasing industry involvement in state-backed research.</p> + +<p>At a bottom-up commercial level, Chinese fabs increasingly see advantages to using Chinese chipmaking tools wherever possible. Chinese firms have diversified supply chains away from U.S. and other foreign suppliers to mitigate risks associated with current export controls — as well as the threat of future controls. For instance, leading foundries such as YMTC are increasingly collaborating with leading Chinese toolmakers to access replacement parts and help Chinese companies quickly develop SME technology. Chinese private investors are also increasingly investing in semiconductor companies, including toolmakers, attracted by public investment and the growing preference for Chinese suppliers.</p> + +<p>Based on publicly available data and interviews with industry participants, the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business identified evidence of the design-out phenomenon taking place in at least four types of SME: (1) deposition, (2) etching, (3) process control, and (4) testing. These areas receive less attention than EUV lithography but nonetheless represent key technologies in the semiconductor manufacturing process. Notably, it is tougher to establish “choke points” using U.S. export controls for these areas than, for example, lithography tools and advanced metrology tools, meaning there are fewer obstacles to Chinese and third-country companies replacing U.S. technologies in Chinese fabs.</p> + +<p>Two chipmaking equipment companies in particular — Naura Technology Group and AMEC — have been the largest beneficiaries of increased investment and innovation in Chinese SME supply chains. These companies represent the best evidence of the design-out of U.S. companies via Chinese suppliers. Other key players include lithography developer SMEE, etching and glue developer Kingsemi, and test equipment provider Jingce. Chinese SME firms increasingly include smaller start-ups taking advantage of new openings in the domestic market, such as Shanghai-based Crystal Growth and Energy Equipment, which went public in early 2023.</p> + +<p>Table 1 summarizes key players in the Chinese SME space, their product focus areas, and historical global leaders based in the United States and its allies.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gY3bR1A.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Product Portfolio of Chinese Original Equipment Manufacturer.</strong> Source: <a href="https://thechinaproject.com/2023/06/15/semiconductor-export-controls-a-catalyst-for-chinese-development/">Kyriakos Petrakakos, “U.S. Semiconductor Export Controls Might Actually Give China the Edge,” The China Project, June 15, 2023</a>.</em></p> + +<p>The growing revenues of Chinese toolmakers offer key evidence of the design-out phenomenon. The Chinese consultancy CINNO Research released a 2023 analysis showing that the revenues of China’s 10 largest SME companies increased by 39 percent in the first half of the year compared to the previous period in 2022. AMEC, for its part, saw a 32 percent rise in sales in 2023. Company executives identified strong demand from domestic firms as a key driver of growth. In August 2023, AMEC’s chairman and CEO announced his firm had developed a road map to replace foreign-produced tools with domestic alternatives. Naura saw its 2023 revenues increase by around 50 percent year over year. As with AMEC, reports attribute Naura’s rapid growth to China’s desire to remove U.S. inputs from the domestic semiconductor fabrication market. AMEC and Naura are no exception — a wide variety of Chinese toolmakers have seen explosive domestic sales growth in the two years since the U.S. export controls.</p> + +<p>There is also evidence of Chinese toolmakers winning market share away from U.S. companies, indicating that growing Chinese revenues are not just the result of top-line Chinese market growth. Historically, Chinese toolmakers could secure only a small share of key equipment markets, even within China. From January to August 2023, however, local manufacturers won 47 percent of all machinery equipment tenders from Chinese foundries, according to an analysis by Huatai Securities. An August 2023 article by the South China Morning Post reported that AMEC’s share of one type of etching equipment is expected to hit 60 percent “in the near future,” increasing from 24 percent in October 2022 — attributed to the fact that “once-dominant US chip equipment maker Lam Research saw its mainland sales drop sharply.” Notably, many U.S. toolmakers are still seeing increasing sales to China due to surging industry growth. However, companies told CSIS that this growth is significantly below what it would otherwise be in the absence of design-out practices.</p> + +<p>Beyond the observable increases in revenue and market share, reporting suggests that the Chinese semiconductor industry is publicly showing great enthusiasm for locally produced semiconductor tools and components. In March 2024, SEMICON China, a major semiconductor industry conference held in Shanghai, saw increased participation of domestic tool manufacturers and the notable absence of rival U.S. firms. Reuters also reported that several domestic Chinese semiconductor equipment companies leaned into marketing strategies encouraging Chinese fabs to buy local at SEMICON: “More [Chinese] manufacturing facilities are willing to use materials prescribed by Chinese firms, a trend that has certainly been accelerated by U.S. sanctions.” The report mentions that while Chinese domestic firms may produce semiconductor manufacturing tools and components of slightly lesser quality, China is quickly catching up to its foreign counterparts. Furthermore, Chinese semiconductor products are sold at significantly cheaper prices than those of rival firms in other countries.</p> + +<h4 id="design-out-via-third-country-toolmakers">Design-Out via Third-Country Toolmakers</h4> + +<p>There has been significant reporting on Chinese tools replacing U.S. tools in the Chinese market. However, less attention has been paid thus far to the other strategy enabling China’s design-out: the increased substitution of tools from third countries — or countries other than the United States and China — in place of U.S. technology.</p> + +<p>While Chinese buyers are increasingly apt to buy from domestic toolmakers, China is still a large buyer of foreign-made tools. Foreign SME helps fulfill technological capabilities not yet developed in China’s market and provides a helpful blueprint for Chinese firms developing new tools. Since early 2023, Chinese fabs have gone on a shopping spree, amassing tools from both domestic and foreign suppliers. The most recent data, as of the first quarter of 2024, suggest that Chinese buying represents an unprecedented 45 percent of revenue for major Western toolmakers, nearly double the share of revenue recorded a year prior (see Figures 1 and 2). Some of this revenue is going to U.S. toolmakers. According to fiscal year 2023 financials, China still represents the largest geographic share of sales for Applied Materials, KLA, and Lam Research. In fact, the dramatic investment boom in China’s semiconductor industry and practices like equipment stocking in case of future restrictions have helped some U.S. toolmakers grow in the near term.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UnZ0Qw7.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Global Semiconductor Equipment Market Revenues by Region, 2019–Present.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.semi.org/en/products-services/market-data/manufacturing-monitor">SEMI, “Semiconductor Manufacturing Monitor,” October 11, 2024</a>.</em></p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fPXjfqo.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Sales to China for Select U.S. and Foreign Toolmakers, 2015–23.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-17/us-considers-tougher-trade-rules-against-companies-in-chip-crackdown-on-china">Mackenzie Hawkins, Ian King, and Takashi Mochikuzi, “US Floats Tougher Trade Rules to Rein in China Chip Industry,” Bloomberg.com, July 17, 2024</a>.</em></p> + +<p>However, there is evidence that China is increasingly redirecting business away from U.S. firms to non-U.S. foreign companies as part of its design-out strategy. CSIS Scholl Chair conversations with SME industry participants revealed reports that Chinese customers are increasingly selecting third-country toolmakers — such as firms based in Japan, Israel, South Korea, Germany, the Netherlands, and Taiwan — over U.S. companies in procurement decisions. Specifically, several U.S. toolmakers told CSIS they rapidly lost share to third-country suppliers in Chinese foundries subsequent to the export regulations, which is unsurprising in the context of explicit rhetoric by Chinese companies indicating a growing preference for third-country purchases. As the previously mentioned YMTC investor noted, the second option after sourcing from China is “countries other than the U.S.”</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China is increasingly redirecting business away from U.S. firms to non-U.S. foreign companies as part of its design-out strategy.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>This trend, in part, reflects the unique limits the EAR places on U.S. firms compared to foreign companies. As previously discussed, companies can sell chipmaking equipment that U.S. companies — whose products are by definition “U.S. origin items” — cannot. Although the United States worked trilaterally in early 2023 to convince the Netherlands and Japan to adopt new controls on advanced chipmaking technologies, these rules do not equate to U.S. controls. Dutch and Japanese restrictions are less stringent than the EL (a regulatory concept they lack a close equivalent to) and do not list China as a country of concern, creating substantial coverage gaps. Additionally, Dutch and Japanese companies can keep personnel on site in China. This servicing ability provides a source of revenue and is a comparative advantage in SME, as toolmakers typically deploy teams of servicers within customers’ fabs.</p> + +<p>Even for technologies the EAR does not encompass, there are reports that Chinese fabs are selecting third-country suppliers over their U.S. competitors. This trend may owe, in part, to U.S. companies overcomplying for fear of unintentionally violating export controls. In the United States, companies such as Applied Materials have faced criminal investigations for alleged violations of export controls, so it is unsurprising that other firms (particularly smaller businesses) would want to avoid these risks, even at risk of overcompliance.</p> + +<p>More importantly, Chinese firms have started seeing U.S. suppliers as higher-risk options compared to third-country suppliers. Tightening U.S. export controls has created a perception in Chinese markets that U.S. suppliers are not a reliable long-term procurement solution. Chinese fabs are concerned both about the repercussions of violating existing controls — either knowingly or unknowingly — and mitigating exposure to stricter U.S. export controls in the future. This view encourages Chinese fabs to turn to third-country toolmakers — at least until domestic supply develops sufficiently to avoid buying foreign technology altogether.</p> + +<p>This shift has both contributed to and been accelerated by growing efforts by third-country suppliers to win business away from U.S. competitors in Chinese markets — sometimes leveraging the U.S. export restrictions as a competitive advantage. In certain cases, industry participants described instances of foreign suppliers explicitly advertising their non-U.S. inputs (an indication they were not subject to the EAR) to attract new Chinese buyers or highlighting regulatory risks as reasons to select them over their U.S. competitors. For instance, some third-country firms raised concerns about future U.S. restrictions as reasons for Chinese businesses to choose them over U.S. firms.</p> + +<p>Industry events like SEMICON China 2024 also demonstrate the new competitiveness of third-country firms. Whereas U.S. firms were absent, other foreign sellers were not. Japanese tool firms, according to a report, kept a strong presence at SEMICON. Per the same report, Chinese demand for certain Japanese products is still strong, as Japanese companies have been rewarded with increased orders from Chinese firms, especially for noncontrolled products enabling leading-edge production. This sales increase is apparent in Japanese trade data. Japanese exports of SME and related tools to China reached $3.32 billion in the first quarter of 2024, an 82 percent year-over-year increase. There have even been reports that Japanese industry groups are arranging trips for Chinese chipmakers to explore “core opportunities in Japan’s semiconductor equipment and materials industry,” with a focus on getting around U.S. export controls.</p> + +<p>While CSIS has identified some preliminary evidence of third-country design-out taking place, there remains a shortage of publicly available data to estimate the extent of the phenomenon — specifically, detailed data from U.S. and third-country toolmakers on market share losses and gains in China. Some industry participants noted that U.S. and foreign companies hesitate to describe design-out trends due to concerns about investor perceptions. Even so, the trend represents the important and largely overlooked impact of increasingly broad and unilateral U.S. export controls that target China.</p> + +<h3 id="chinese-firms-designing-around-us-firms-in-sme">Chinese Firms Designing Around U.S. Firms in SME</h3> + +<p>SME has fewer examples of the design-around strategy — or innovating Chinese technologies to circumvent the need for U.S. technologies — compared to advanced packaging. This is, in large part, because the United States and allied countries have a strong lead over China in manufacturing chipmaking tools, making it harder for Chinese companies to develop innovations that sidestep or “leapfrog” U.S. capabilities in the space.</p> + +<p>That said, one Chinese SME innovation bears mentioning in the context of design-around strategies. Increasingly, China is adopting new strategies to use older lithography equipment to achieve the same capabilities as EUV lithography, which represents a key chokepoint for Chinese lead-edge chip manufacturing. EUV machines — exclusively produced by the Dutch company ASML — are considered essential to the production of advanced chips, and exports to China have been highly limited since the Dutch government imposed restrictions on EUV shipments in 2019. However, in March 2024, Huawei and its chipmaking partner SiCarrier patented a technology known as self-aligned quadruple patterning (SAQP), which may allow them to produce the same chips as ASML’s EUV machines in a novel way. By using older DUV lithography equipment and additional etching to increase transistor density, China reportedly has the necessary capabilities for 5nm fabrication, an advancement beyond the 7nm process that SMIC provided for the Mate 60 Pro smartphone.</p> + +<p>Industry analysts believe China still needs EUV machines in the long run to reach 3nm capabilities — the leading edge in commercial production, as of this report, as pairing DUV with technologies like SAQP may represent a technological cul-de-sac in terms of achieving transistor density beyond 5nm. As a result, China is also investing heavily in attempts to develop EUV lithography domestically via efforts by companies such as Naura and Huawei. These attempts to develop EUV represent an additional example of Chinese toolmakers designing out U.S. and allies’ technology.</p> + +<h3 id="security-impacts-of-sme-controls">Security Impacts of SME Controls</h3> + +<p>The effects of U.S. export controls on the SME industry will shape the future of U.S.-China strategic competition in semiconductors. Chipmaking tools are not only a key driver of advanced semiconductor capabilities but also an industry area where the United States currently leads in market share and innovation. According to 2022 estimates by the Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group, U.S. value-added activity made up 47 percent of the global SME market, along with 26 percent for Japan, 18 percent for the European Union, 3 percent for South Korea, and only 3 percent for China. China is the largest importer of U.S. chipmaking tools in the world and is far from self-reliant. It is reasonable that the United States would seek to use its leverage in SME to ensure leadership over its leading strategic competitor in a key dual-use technology.</p> + +<p>However, current export controls could undermine the innovation leadership of the U.S. SME companies that created this leverage in the first place. The Trump and Biden administrations’ efforts to control advanced chip capabilities have catalyzed a transformative shift away from U.S. technology in China but have failed to stop access to many controlled technologies due to widely documented smuggling efforts such as transshipments via third countries and domestic technology trading networks. Moreover, policymakers have not reckoned with the fact that China’s domestic semiconductor ecosystem is already making large strides toward replicating technologies previously supplied by U.S. toolmakers — aside from a few technological chokepoints, most notably EUV lithography.</p> + +<p>Chinese — and to a lesser but still important extent third-country — toolmakers are poised to be the primary beneficiaries of China’s ongoing shift away from U.S. chipmaking equipment. The primary losers of this transition therefore are U.S. toolmakers, who increasingly find themselves excluded from parts of the world’s leading SME market. Importantly, the extent of this exclusion from Chinese markets is broader than that imposed by the export controls themselves due to multifaceted, interrelated trends such as Chinese companies hedging against future U.S. regulatory actions and overall declining trust in U.S. suppliers in Chinese markets.</p> + +<p>In some cases, the financial impacts of export controls on U.S. toolmakers are already visible. The best available evidence of this trend is the previously mentioned April 2024 New York Federal Reserve study, which stated that export control announcements were associated with negative impacts on market capitalization and revenues for affected U.S. companies. Specifically, export controls preceded a 2.5 percent abnormal decline in stock price and an 8.6 percent decline in revenue. Negative impacts on market capitalization have also taken place following the launch of criminal investigations related to export control violations. Shares of Applied Materials fell by as much as 8.3 percent following a November 2023 report that the company faces a criminal investigation regarding tools sold to SMIC. Shares of KLA and Lam Research also fell during the probe.</p> + +<p>The top-line growth of the Chinese market should not obscure the potential impacts of design-out on long-term U.S. SME revenues. Some U.S. toolmakers have seen growing sales to China because overall Chinese fab spending has soared in the last two years. This short-term sales growth belies the underlying dynamic: market share is increasingly shifting toward Chinese and third-country competitors even as the market as a whole grows. This trend will likely expand as Chinese firms like Naura and AMEC broaden their toolmaking capabilities. While the Chinese SME market “pie” is getting larger, the U.S. share is shrinking.</p> + +<p>This decline in market share means the ultimate losers in the current export regime are U.S. economic and national security. SME markets are capital intensive and have fast-paced product development cycles, much like their foundry and integrated device manufacturer customers in the chip fabrication world. These features mean that market leadership historically has been concentrated among a small group of multinationals who are able to invest large sums in research and development and globalized manufacturing footprints. Lost revenues and market share can therefore have significant long-term effects on the ability of toolmakers to remain competitive in the future. When U.S. SME companies are increasingly sidelined in Chinese acquisition of chipmaking technology, these same companies lose access to R&amp;D dollars to support future innovation leadership.</p> + +<p>Diminishing share in the Chinese market for U.S. toolmakers also means the U.S. government loses data on Chinese fab investment and technological capabilities. Historically, U.S. companies selling to China have offered a source of insight into China’s semiconductor industry, particularly in terms of understanding the microelectronics capabilities available to Chinese defense and dual-use technologies. However, diverted market share to Chinese and third-country firms risks undermining this source of intelligence. The surprise release of Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro in 2023 provides just one example of how Chinese semiconductor advancements increasingly take place under the radar of U.S. intelligence. The risk of design-around innovation represents a particularly pressing concern, as increased Chinese innovation could result in novel technology advancements occurring without advanced U.S. awareness.</p> + +<p>Imposing these export controls has clear costs for U.S. economic and national security. It is therefore worth considering ways the United States can achieve the benefits of export controls while minimizing costs.</p> + +<h3 id="conclusion-and-policy-recommendations">Conclusion and Policy Recommendations</h3> + +<p>China’s ongoing effort to reduce dependency on U.S. SME marks a significant change to previous Chinese industrial policy targets. Although China is still far from self-sufficient in chipmaking tools, its new trajectory represents an important step toward long-term semiconductor industry decoupling goals. Increasingly broad and unilateral export controls are creating strong political and economic incentives for Chinese fabs to design out and around U.S. firms’ technology, with important long-term implications for U.S.-China technology competition.</p> + +<p>This trend is unlikely to reverse entirely, even if the United States relaxes export controls. China has demonstrated progress in developing SME capabilities and is likely to continue down this path. While Chinese indigenization achievements to date have focused on mature processes, future progress at the leading edge is increasingly likely for Chinese toolmakers.</p> + +<p>Despite these changes, the United States can refine its export control regime to better balance national security and economic interests. A crucial step is to better understand how and where existing controls hurt U.S. companies. Conducting a survey of U.S. toolmakers through the Department of Commerce could provide valuable insights into market share shifts and competitive dynamics in global chip markets related to U.S. export controls. The survey could gather metrics like the share of Chinese tenders won by U.S. toolmakers relative to Chinese and third-country suppliers. It could also address the extent to which U.S. mature tools are being designed out, beyond the leading-edge tools that the controls target.</p> + +<p>Past semiconductor industry feedback on Department of Commerce surveys has been mixed, with concerns about confidentiality and business sensitivity. Therefore, the Department of Commerce must carefully communicate any new data collection efforts to ensure transparency and highlight the benefits for U.S. companies in shaping future export policies. If the survey provides evidence that current U.S. export controls have significant adverse impacts on U.S. toolmakers, the next step would be to consider how to mitigate these impacts. The current approach, which results in U.S. companies losing market share to Chinese and third-country competitors, is unsustainable — particularly considering how Chinese circumvention efforts arguably undercut the controls’ national security objectives.</p> + +<p>A key limitation of the existing controls is the failure of the United States to implement them multilaterally. Talks of a full trilateral agreement with the Netherlands and Japan reportedly broke down over inclusion of technologies such as memory and mature logic chips in controls on chipmaking equipment. Any unilateral U.S. export control decision would fuel a growing view in Chinese markets that U.S. semiconductor companies are uniquely risky partners for Chinese companies — even relative to firms based in U.S. allies such as Japan and the Netherlands. The more the United States moves without allied support to control Chinese technology, the more it risks making its firms uncompetitive with allies’ firms.</p> + +<p>The United States must determine how to position its national security partners — not just Japan and the Netherlands but also South Korea, Germany, Israel, Taiwan, and potentially others — on more equal footing in terms of limiting trade of semiconductor manufacturing technologies with China. This strategy could involve a combination of the following three approaches:</p> + +<ol> + <li> + <p>Expand the application of FDPR and de minimis requirements within the U.S. controls to more effectively stop import substitution by third countries.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Apply increased economic or geopolitical pressure on allied countries to expand their own export controls.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Reduce the bounds of U.S. export controls to bring them back in line with multilateral agreements (e.g., the Wassenaar Arrangement).</p> + </li> +</ol> + +<p>The third option, by itself, seems highly unlikely. Any loosening of U.S. trade restrictions appears prohibitively challenging given bipartisan anxieties about China, particularly during an election year. The approach also could fail to stem Chinese companies’ redirection of market share to third countries, as rolling back U.S. controls may not be enough to undo the loss of trust in U.S. firms within Chinese chip markets.</p> + +<p>The U.S. government is focused on the first two options: (1) expanding the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. EAR and (2) convincing U.S. allies to implement more closely aligned controls. Expanding the FDPR and de minimis restrictions could limit sales of third-country technologies, but doing so risks further upsetting allies and accelerating efforts to remove U.S. technology and labor from third-country supply chains. This trade-off limits the effectiveness of U.S. plans to add to FDPRs. The Biden administration is reportedly planning to expand the FDPR’s product scope and add 120 new Chinese companies to the EL, effectively widening the EL FDPR’s destination coverage. But, as previously mentioned, the rule is not expected to apply to category A:5 countries, which include the Netherlands, Japan, and South Korea, undercutting its effectiveness in limiting third-country exports of key chipmaking tools. While an expanded FDPR would affect other countries and territories involved in chip supply chains, such as Israel, Singapore, and Taiwan, the impact on SME markets would likely be limited to specific niches or stages of fabrication.</p> + +<p>The second option — greater multilateralization — is more promising. However, U.S. allies still have strong incentives not to impose restrictions that are comparable with the U.S. controls, as toolmakers are significant and influential economic actors in countries like the Netherlands, Japan, and South Korea. To get around these obstacles, U.S. regulators should consider an expanded menu of carrots and sticks. The current strategy of appealing to shared national security concerns has clearly been unsuccessful. Allied governments have reportedly been unconvinced by justifications for the controls in terms of China’s People’s Liberation Army capabilities, in part because of very different perceptions among key partners (e.g., the European Union) of the extent to which China poses (or does not pose) a national security threat. Some form of mutual benefit, such as via shared intelligence or economic opportunities, might therefore be necessary to convince allies to cooperate.</p> + +<p>Regardless of what incentives are on offer, the United States likely must loosen some restrictions to achieve multilateralization. These reductions could focus on contentious areas such as memory chip production and nodes like 14nm and 16nm, which the semiconductor industry rarely considers “advanced.” A narrower approach could better ground national security arguments for multilateralization, which resonate with allies for some technologies (e.g., tools for fabricating 7nm logic chips) more than others (e.g., tools for fabricating 128-layer NAND flash memory chips).</p> + +<p>Loosening restrictions to enable greater multilateralization could be paired with efforts to improve enforcement of existing controls and stem circumvention efforts, which continue to blunt the controls’ effectiveness at slowing China’s technology development. Combining these efforts provides one way to apply continued pressure on China’s chip industry (and reduce domestic political pushback) while mitigating some of the controls’ negative economic repercussions via greater cooperation with allies.</p> + +<p>Finally, the United States, even if it does not pursue a loosening of the existing controls, could return to a strategic mindset of the “sliding scale” approach in designing future export control policy. This shift could help signal to the Chinese market that the United States is not pursuing full-scale decoupling of its technology ecosystem from China’s and that it remains interested in doing business in technologies outside of the leading edge. This shift may be even more useful in convincing U.S. allies that U.S. companies will not be further restricted unilaterally and unpredictably from access to China’s markets, helping secure their role as trusted and reliable participants in globalized technology supply chains.</p> + +<p>Although U.S. toolmakers are key players in today’s semiconductor markets, U.S. leadership did not develop in a vacuum and is not guaranteed indefinitely. China remains a critical and growing market for semiconductor fabrication, so export restrictions may have far-reaching adverse impacts on U.S. SME companies. If there is one recurring theme in writing policy related to semiconductors, it is that details matter. The U.S. government must take care to design future semiconductor export controls in ways deeply attuned to the nuances of semiconductor competitive dynamics, where one small change often has powerful ripple effects across global supply chains. Export controls must not jeopardize the complex web of factors underlying U.S. market leadership in semiconductors. Otherwise, the controls risk undermining the advantages the United States has in its important technology competition with China.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>William Alan Reinsch</strong> is senior adviser with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> + +<p><strong>Jack Whitney</strong> is a former research intern with the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business and a strategy consultant in EY-Parthenon’s Government &amp; Public Sector.</p> + +<p><strong>Matthew Schleich</strong> is a former research assistant with the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business. He currently works as a foreign affairs officer in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation.</p>William Alan Reinsch, et al.This report argues that existing controls incentivize China to minimize reliance on U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment by indigenizing development of tools and increasing purchases from third-country suppliers, which ultimately hinders U.S. technology leadership.【初選47人案・判刑前夕】2024-11-18T12:00:00+08:002024-11-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-pre-sentence<ul> <li>西九疑現「排隊黨」 記者連問隊頭13人無一回應</li> <li>西九外「點人數」警方稱要檢視維持秩序警力 拒回應會否清走空櫈</li> <li>百歲大黃伯連續兩晚排通宵盼見「受難朋友」 林進嘆僅5公眾可入正庭「非常可惜」</li> @@ -1533,11770 +1953,11115 @@ <hr /> -<p>案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022</p>獨媒報導西九疑現「排隊黨」 記者連問隊頭13人無一回應 西九外「點人數」警方稱要檢視維持秩序警力 拒回應會否清走空櫈 百歲大黃伯連續兩晚排通宵盼見「受難朋友」 林進嘆僅5公眾可入正庭「非常可惜」 致歉、無悔、不求情——45名罪成被告，判刑前的陳詞UK Sanctions On Russia2024-11-15T12:00:00+08:002024-11-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uk-sanctions-on-russia<p><em>This report presents findings from the second meeting of the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce, held in October 2024.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>The discussion aimed to identify opportunities to optimise the use of existing sanctions regimes and enhance the effectiveness of sanctions as a strategic tool. Members provided a list of recommendations for the UK to develop a strategy which not only sends a clear signal of UK priorities, but also has a tangible impact.</em></p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022</p>獨媒報導西九疑現「排隊黨」 記者連問隊頭13人無一回應 西九外「點人數」警方稱要檢視維持秩序警力 拒回應會否清走空櫈 百歲大黃伯連續兩晚排通宵盼見「受難朋友」 林進嘆僅5公眾可入正庭「非常可惜」 致歉、無悔、不求情——45名罪成被告，判刑前的陳詞Retying The Caucasian Knot2024-11-18T12:00:00+08:002024-11-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/retying-the-caucasian-knot<p><em>This paper explores the challenge to Russia’s established position in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes significant change.</em></p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<excerpt /> -<p>Following Brexit, the UK had an opportunity to develop its independent sanctions framework to address the evolving geopolitical landscape and its own foreign policy messaging. This framework included a broader range of thematic and geographic sanctions regimes, targeting issues such as corruption, human rights abuses and cyber activities, while countering threats to international peace and security. In an attempt to give substance to this vision, in February 2024, the UK published its first Sanctions Strategy, outlining its approach to ensuring that sanctions are effective, giving the UK more influence in the world, and helping to “keep Britain safe”.</p> +<p>Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community now find that their reach exceeds their grasp in terms of their ability to shape the regional order in the South Caucasus. Both remain regionally influential, but their leverage to drive developments is eroding as the South Caucasus is affected by multipolar international politics. The rise of multipolarity is being promoted by the increasing role of a broad set of external actors – most of all Turkey, Iran and China – engaging in the South Caucasus, and by strengthening links between the region and Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia, links that are supplementing the region’s established ties to the US, Europe and Russia. In this context, there is increased local agency in relation to external partnerships (reinforced by a turn to illiberal domestic politics), and waning attraction both to Russian and Euro-Atlantic integration projects.</p> -<p>In June 2024, RUSI’s Centre for Finance and Security set up the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce, made up of 50 former UK and other government officials, senior sanctions executives from the financial sector and industry, and academics, from the UK and elsewhere. The first meeting highlighted a series of implementation challenges, such as: resourcing and expertise; engagement with industry; alignment with international partners; and the lack of a clear set of objectives for the UK’s sanctions policy. Notably, while Russia has become the focus of the UK’s sanctions response, the Taskforce also emphasised the need for a more comprehensive and flexible approach beyond Russia alone.</p> +<p>As a result of these changes, Russia has lost its position of pre-eminence, which rested primarily on tying together its security interests with the region’s protracted conflicts. Over the past 30 years, Moscow has leveraged these conflicts to give it a central geopolitical role, which it has used to promote a regional status quo to its advantage and to create a Gordian knot of interwoven obstacles and interests to hinder efforts at Euro-Atlantic integration. The war in Ukraine has played a part in undercutting Moscow’s position in the South Caucasus, but Russia’s long-term relative decline as new actors have entered the region, power shifts within the South Caucasus itself (notably the rise of Azerbaijan), and changing Russian regional interests are the main factors challenging Moscow’s established role.</p> -<p>This report presents findings from the second Taskforce meeting, which was held in October 2024. The discussion aimed to identify opportunities to optimise the use of existing sanctions regimes and enhance the effectiveness of sanctions as a strategic tool. Members provided a list of recommendations for the UK to develop a strategy which not only sends a clear signal of UK priorities, but also has a tangible impact. None of the comments made by the Taskforce members are attributable.</p> +<p>Russia is now seeking to adapt to the new regional situation. It is attempting to establish its role as the leading, but no longer exclusive, external actor in the South Caucasus by reconfiguring its position. This involves a rebalancing of bilateral relations, broadening its range of policy tools (notably in the areas of transport and communications) from a previous reliance on security, and being ready to countenance an expanded presence for other external actors, notably regional powers – principally Iran, Turkey and, increasingly, China – while remaining opposed to the US and the EU.</p> -<h3 id="thematic-sanctions">Thematic Sanctions</h3> +<p>In the absence of a Euro-Atlantic security commitment capable of challenging Russia in the South Caucasus, the policies of enlargement (eventual NATO and EU membership) have lost traction. The Euro-Atlantic community now risks being marginalised in an increasingly competitive regional environment. If it is to undercut Russia’s effort to build a new position – to retie the Caucasian knot – and retain a significant regional role, it will need to develop approaches capable of responding to and shaping the new South Caucasus geopolitics and geo-economics.</p> -<p>The Taskforce first discussed ways to increase the effectiveness of the UK’s thematic regimes, which had been described in the previous meeting as mostly “presentational” and lacking clear criteria and vision. The discussion focused on three regimes: Global Anti-Corruption (GAC) sanctions; Global Human Rights (GHR) sanctions; and cyber sanctions.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<h3 id="global-anti-corruption-sanctions">Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions</h3> +<p>Russia is facing a key moment in its post-Soviet position in the South Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia). Since the mid-2000s, geopolitical competition between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community has emerged as a defining issue shaping the regional order. Using security policy – including direct military action – as its primary tool, Russia was able to establish itself both as the main arbiter in conflict resolution and central to the balance of power in the South Caucasus. On this basis, Russia was able to limit NATO and EU enlargement policies, while at the same time seeking to advance its own integration project.</p> -<p>The Taskforce recognised the steps the UK has taken to address corruption through its GAC sanctions regime. However, discussions highlighted gaps in the current approach that hinder its legitimacy and credibility, mostly linked to the lack of clarity regarding the criteria and purpose for which these sanctions are deployed, and the strategy for their use.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YmknXoW.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Political and Military Map of the South Caucasus.</strong> Source: Labrang/Wikimedia. Edited by RUSI.</em></p> -<p>Members reiterated the risk of sanctions targeting corruption in name only without being accompanied by genuine disruption of related networks and criminal enforcement. They described the GAC regime as an “uncomfortable fit” between sanctions and criminal enforcement, with sanctions being prioritised over the actual targeting of corruption. One Taskforce member pointed to the EU’s misappropriation sanctions regimes as a useful cautionary tale for anti-corruption sanctions. Introduced in 2011 to target corruption and financial misappropriation by government officials in Egypt and Tunisia, these sanctions regimes struggled to achieve tangible results, securing no convictions and becoming the subject of political disputes. The failure of these regimes, according to Taskforce members, resulted from a lack of criminal enforcement efforts due to limited resources and political will.</p> +<p>As a result, the South Caucasus became an internally and externally fragmented region (see Figure 1). Countries were divided domestically and regionally by protracted conflicts – Nagorno-Karabakh was contested between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and conflicts emerged over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia also developed differing foreign and security policy trajectories and built diverse allegiances. Azerbaijan adopted policies of balancing and neutrality, Georgia aspired to join the EU and NATO, and Armenia became Russia’s ally within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Russia has sought to manipulate and deepen these divisions to give itself a central regional role. In recent years, as President Vladimir Putin has developed a more assertive policy of rebuilding Russia as a “great power”, the South Caucasus has become integral to the Kremlin’s wider ambitions of dominating the Black Sea, and projecting power into the Middle East and the Mediterranean.</p> -<p>The Taskforce warned that without robust investigations, prosecutions and confiscations of the proceeds of corruption accompanying the rollout of anti-corruption sanctions, the GAC regime might face a similar fate and lack credibility. To ensure this does not happen, members recommended appropriate resourcing of law enforcement agencies, and stronger coordination between government agencies responsible for sanctions enforcement and criminal prosecutions. They also argued that better processes for listing and delisting would be useful for more targeted action against corrupt individuals.</p> +<p>The pre-eminence that Russia has established in the South Caucasus over the past three decades is now being eroded by far-reaching shifts in the international regional and domestic environments. These changes have the potential to create a new regional order. A variety of international actors – China, Iran, Israel, the Gulf states and India, among others – has entered the region, offering new diplomatic and political, trade and investment, and security relations, and providing alternatives to both Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. The governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have sought to widen their space for political action by developing foreign policies to engage with new international actors and to escape from the geopolitical competition between Russia and the West. Together, these developments have diminished the significance of Russia’s security leverage, notably in respect to the contest over Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijan and Armenia seek to finalise a peace agreement, and shifted the South Caucasus towards alternative agendas for trade, connectivity and strengthening multipolarity.</p> -<p>Another Taskforce member stressed the disparity between the UK’s efforts to combat corruption at home and its actions abroad. Noting the UK’s recent decline in international rankings such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, they argued that the lack of focus on domestic corruption weakens the UK’s credibility in the global fight against corruption and its sanctions response.</p> +<p>This paper explores the challenge to Russia’s established position in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes significant change, and analyses Moscow’s effort to craft a new regional approach. The findings of the paper are drawn from three principal sources. A review of secondary literature on regional developments in the South Caucasus was supplemented by a workshop conducted in Tbilisi, Georgia, in April 2024 that brought together leading experts on regional issues. In addition, interviews were conducted, in confidence, with officials from the US, the EU and the UK in Washington, DC, Brussels, London, Tbilisi and Yerevan between February and May 2024.</p> -<p>To increase international credibility, Taskforce members suggested complementing anti-corruption sanctions, measures to tackle domestic corruption, and criminal enforcement with capacity-building in target countries, particularly in the Global South. One member from civil society cautioned that a failure to cooperate with local justice systems could result in sanctions being perceived as neocolonial, undermining their legitimacy and impact.</p> +<p>The paper has three chapters. Chapter I examines how in the post-Soviet decades Russia established itself as the leading external actor in the South Caucasus. Chapter II analyses how Russia’s regional position is being challenged, notably by the wars over Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh, the appearance of new international actors in the South Caucasus, and by the shift of regional governments to pursuing foreign policies of multi-alignment, made possible by multipolarity, and often in conjunction with increasingly illiberal domestic politics. Chapter III considers the implications of these changes for Russia’s regional position and sets out how Moscow has sought to respond to these shifts to retain a leading role. The paper concludes with the implications of the changes in Russia’s position and the wider shifts in the South Caucasus for the policies of the Euro-Atlantic community.</p> -<h3 id="global-human-rights-sanctions">Global Human Rights Sanctions</h3> +<h3 id="i-russias-south-caucasus-strategy">I. Russia’s South Caucasus Strategy</h3> -<p>The Taskforce also discussed GHR sanctions, which have become a prominent aspect of the UK’s independent sanctions regime, particularly through the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020. GHR sanctions allow the UK to target individuals and entities involved in serious human rights violations by freezing their assets and restricting their travel. While recognising the value of these sanctions in principle, Taskforce members noted that the sanctions were far from realising their full potential.</p> +<p>The South Caucasus has historically played a key role in Moscow’s broader strategic thinking. The conquest of the North and South Caucasus was central to Russian imperial ambitions and involved a prolonged and ultimately triumphant struggle for control over the region with the Ottoman and Persian empires between the 18th and 20th centuries. The defeat of the Ottomans was at the heart of the wider Russian plan to establish dominance in the Black Sea region, including extending state boundaries through the territories of contemporary Ukraine, and expanding influence into the Balkans, as well as through the Caucasus.</p> -<p>One primary concern raised by Taskforce members was that human rights sanctions often do not serve their intended purpose of deterrence, but are instead adopted as a form of punishment. The discussions highlighted that, similarly to GAC sanctions, GHR sanctions often operate in a vacuum, without the support of additional efforts to promote human rights globally. Some participants suggested including GHR sanctions in a broader human rights strategy, combining them, for instance, with diplomatic efforts and criminal prosecution of human rights abuses.</p> +<p>This strategic goal of expanding control over the Caucasus was a stepping-stone for Russia to extend its reach into the Middle East and the Mediterranean, notably as it sought naval access to the world’s oceans beyond the limits of its northern ports. During the Soviet era (1922–91), Moscow applied a similar strategic logic to the region, while also seeing the South Caucasus as a buffer zone to the conflicts of the Middle East and, during the Cold War, the threat posed by NATO to the south.</p> -<p>Taskforce members from the legal sector also noted that these kinds of sanctions are in place indefinitely, with little evidence that they influence the behaviour of the targeted individuals or regimes. This situation, combined with a lack of clear criteria for lifting human rights sanctions or explanation of the reasoning behind designations, raises questions about the long-term purpose and effectiveness of these sanctions, and risks reducing their overall legitimacy. Taskforce members stressed the need to gather more data on the impact of GHR sanctions on the ground, for instance by establishing collaboration with local organisations to assess whether the sanctions were providing accountability for human rights abusers or deterring further abuses.</p> +<h4 id="post-soviet-south-caucasus-engagement">Post-Soviet South Caucasus Engagement</h4> -<h3 id="cyber-sanctions">Cyber Sanctions</h3> +<p>With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of the independent states of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Russia initially shifted away from viewing the South Caucasus as integral to its security policy. The new Russian leadership under President Boris Yeltsin focused instead on a Euro-Atlantic vector in its external ties, while its neighbours were a much lower priority. A series of civil wars in the South Caucasus – over Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan – involved elements of Russia’s security forces and led Moscow to develop a new security engagement in the region around the deployment of Russian-led “peacekeeping operations”. These missions served to freeze the violence, rather than resolve the conflicts, and opened the way for Moscow to manage, as well as manipulate, the conflicts in subsequent years, including the opportunity to influence regional issues.</p> -<p>Cyber sanctions have also emerged as a growing area of focus for the UK, particularly as cybercrime and state-sponsored cyber activities have become more prevalent. These sanctions aim to disrupt the financial operations of cyber-criminals and state-backed actors involved in malicious cyber activities.</p> +<p>From the mid-1990s, growing violent instability in the North Caucasus, notably in Chechnya, drew Russia into a more southern-oriented security and military posture, and promoted a refocus of its foreign and security policy onto the immediate neighbourhood. Notwithstanding the withdrawal of some Russian military facilities from the South Caucasus in the 1990s and early 2000s, notably from Georgia and Azerbaijan, Moscow retained a border guard and military presence in Armenia. This positioning reflected the long-term view in Moscow of the South Caucasus as a buffer to instability from the south and a means to balance Turkey’s regional aspirations.</p> -<p>Taskforce members noted that compliance with cyber sanctions is not particularly complex for financial institutions (FIs) in terms of screening, but that challenges arise with tracing the broader criminal networks involved in cybercrime. Similarly to GAR and GHR sanctions, the key challenge was the lack of criteria clarifying what it takes for a specific network to be sanctioned. Some members noted that the more cyber sanctions designations there are, the easier it is for the industry to learn and comply. However, for cyber sanctions, as well as for other lists, designations are often the result of the work of pressure groups or the gathering of information found in the public domain, which can be altered. Participants noted that this made it difficult for the private sector to understand why sanctions targeted some groups rather than others. Some Taskforce members from the private sector also argued that FIs do not operate in an active intelligence-sharing community within the sector, with banks only seeing data at their disposal and becoming overreliant on information in the public domain.</p> +<p>The growing threat of Islamist terrorism in Russia’s North Caucasus and the launch of the second Chechen war by Putin in 1999 led Russia to strengthen further its military and security focus on both the North and South Caucasus. It was, however, the emergence of growing Euro-Atlantic engagement in the region that led Russia increasingly to instrumentalise protracted conflicts as leverage in an emerging geopolitical struggle with the West.</p> -<p>According to the Taskforce, any information that authorities can provide will make a difference. An example of new approaches to mitigating this challenge is the US Office of Foreign Assets Control’s move to add IP and virtual wallet addresses to sanctions designation details; FIs can input these addresses into their compliance systems to support their efforts to unveil the networks involved.</p> +<p>During Putin’s initial period as Russia’s president (2000–08), and in particular during his second term (2004–08), Russia moved away from cooperative security approaches to regional conflict management, notably through the OSCE, to giving primacy to its own bilateral engagements. Moscow sought to balance betweenArmenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including through the supply of weapons to both sides. Russian repositioning around Georgia’s protracted conflicts accelerated following the November 2003 Rose Revolution that brought to power in Tbilisi a government seeking closer ties to NATO and the EU. Increasingly, Moscow backed the separatist leaderships of the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in opposition to Georgia.</p> -<p>Members of the Taskforce also stressed the legal and operational grey areas for insurers. They noted that insurers may face conflicting obligations: on the one hand, they may be required to pay claims to clients affected by ransomware, but on the other hand, if they identify a designated entity to be behind a ransomware attack, they must avoid making payments because that would violate sanctions. To overcome this issue, the Taskforce recommended the UK issues clearer guidelines on how insurers should handle claims related to ransomware attacks, and share best practices on how to identify and prevent cyber-related sanctions violations.</p> +<h4 id="russia-and-euro-atlantic-regional-competition">Russia and Euro-Atlantic Regional Competition</h4> -<h3 id="geographic-sanctions">Geographic Sanctions</h3> +<p>The August 2008 Russia–Georgia war, following the April NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration that Georgia (and Ukraine) would join the Alliance in the future, marked the onset of full-scale geopolitical confrontation in the South Caucasus. Russia’s use of military force was designed to demonstrate that it was unwilling to countenance Euro-Atlantic integration in territories it considered its backyard.</p> -<p>The Taskforce discussed strategies to enhance the effectiveness of the UK’s country-specific sanctions. Members emphasised the importance of maintaining a balanced approach, ensuring that the focus on Russia does not overshadow other critical sanctions regimes, such as those applied to North Korea and Iran. These states continue to pose significant global security threats through their illicit activities and development of nuclear and other weapons programmes. However, the implementation and enforcement of related sanctions regimes have seen reduced focus in recent years.</p> +<p>The return of Putin as president in 2012 marked a new phase of Russian policy towards the South Caucasus. The region became fully integrated into Putin’s growing great power ambitions for Russia, and the confrontation with the Euro-Atlantic community. Russia’s military action against Georgia in 2008 directly challenged the Euro-Atlantic community by suggesting that it would need to be ready for war with Russia if it sought to advance membership in European organisations for countries in the South Caucasus. Through this positioning, Putin aimed to maintain a regional status quo favourable to Russia.</p> -<p>Taskforce members identified common challenges related to the current geographic regimes. First, they pointed out the persistence across multiple regimes of similar sanctions-evasion practices. For instance, North Korea’s continued use of ship-to-ship oil transfers, flag-hopping, smuggling, and collaboration with other sanctioned countries enable it to evade sanctions and sustain the development of its nuclear weapons programme, while also serving as a blueprint for other sanctioned jurisdictions, such as Russia. According to participants, the cessation of the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea, which previously played a key role in monitoring and reporting on suspicions of sanctions evasion, has also weakened oversight and enforcement, and increased evading activities. Taskforce members agreed that there was an opportunity for the UK to assume a leadership role in ensuring that sanctions violations are properly monitored and addressed. They suggested: expanding sanctions designations to cover individuals and entities involved in facilitating partnerships among sanctioned jurisdictions; ensuring the adequate coordination of geographically divided desks within UK government departments; and implementing measures to cut off access to shared resources and illicit networks.</p> +<p>While Russia’s security position has been its trump card in the South Caucasus, Moscow has developed other interlinked policy approaches, both to coerce and attract the region. As geopolitical competition with the Euro-Atlantic community strengthened after 2008, Russia increasingly sought to integrate the South Caucasus more closely as part of its efforts to create a “sphere of privileged interests” across the territory of the former Soviet Union. Russia aimed to counter Euro-Atlantic integration efforts through its own integration agenda, focused on the EAEU and the CSTO. Ultimately, only Armenia agreed to join the EAEU – it was already a member of the CSTO – when Russia leveraged Armenia’s security dependence to pressure it to reject an EU association agreement in 2013.</p> -<p>Second, as regimes such as North Korea and Russia progressively disengage from Western financial and corporate ecosystems to avoid sanctions, there are fewer opportunities to disrupt evasion activities through the compliance efforts of Western businesses. Some Taskforce members from the insurance community emphasised that overcompliance by the private sector may exacerbate this issue. They noted that, while some government officials view overcompliance as a positive trend that keeps businesses away from high-risk activities, those officials neglect the resulting unintended consequences, such as the creation of parallel structures by sanctioned entities outside the scope of G7 regulatory oversight. Members cited the growing role of Russia’s shadow fleet as an example of this. The oil price cap (OPC) was designed to leverage the fact that 90% of the world’s ocean-going tonnage was insured by Protection and Indemnity (P&amp;I) Clubs in the International Group, all of which are based in G7 countries, and the clubs could therefore police the sanctions. However, Russia has moved away from Western services through the development of the shadow fleet, which now reportedly transports 90% of Russian crude oil, beyond Western oversight. Taskforce members recommended that the UK expand the designations of vessels involved in violations of the OPC to strengthen the enforcement of maritime sanctions.</p> +<p>Moscow’s policy mix has been tailored to the countries of the region. With Georgia, the Kremlin has used a stick-and-carrot approach. Initially, Moscow relied on economic coercion and disinformation, while leveraging the protracted conflicts (including periodically raising the prospect of annexing South Ossetia), and the threat of further coercive and even military action against Tbilisi following the 2008 war. With the adoption by the Georgian government of a policy to normalise relations with Russia from 2012, and in particular as the ruling Georgian Dream Party has grown increasingly authoritarian in its domestic policies, leading to a deterioration of ties with the Euro-Atlantic community, Moscow has offered visa liberalisation, the resumption of direct flights between the two countries, increased tourism and the importance of a trade relationship.</p> -<p>Furthermore, representatives from the P&amp;I insurance community noted that they are largely unconcerned with North Korean sanctions, because vessels associated with the country rarely enter Western ports or rely on major Western insurers. However, this leads to a knowledge gap within the insurance and shipping sectors, where companies have little direct experience dealing with North Korea’s maritime operations, and may therefore be ill-prepared to address the sophisticated evasion techniques being used.</p> +<p>With Armenia, Moscow has employed a different approach. It has provided security guarantees through Armenia’s CSTO membership and the presence of Russian military and border guard facilities. Moscow has also offered Armenia favourable economic terms. It has sought to advance Russian investment in the energy and other sectors, while membership of the EAEU has provided Armenia with access to a large market.</p> -<p>Third, the current system relies heavily on private data providers for information to conduct sanctions screening, without a guarantee of the accuracy of the data they provide. The absence of centralised oversight or clear competency in the management of entity-screening systems means that many organisations may be operating with outdated or incomplete information, reducing the overall effectiveness of sanctions. Taskforce members reiterated the need for the UK government to expand its collaboration with industry and provide more information about sanctioned entities and suspected involved actors, to support compliance in the private sector, reflecting the national security priority placed on the use of sanctions. To address this, a Taskforce member suggested exploring opportunities for industry secondments, where experienced professionals from the private sector could work within government agencies to improve mutual understanding of industry-specific challenges. Such initiatives could bridge the gap between government and industry, accelerating the development of more effective sanctions policies and improving compliance across sectors.</p> +<p>In the case of Azerbaijan, Russia has been ready to accommodate flexibility as long as Baku has eschewed seeking NATO or EU membership, while at the same time pledging good neighbourly relations. This has been achieved through the conclusion of a series of partnership agreements over the past two decades (notably the partnership agreement in February 2022), and building cooperation in key economic areas, critically energy.</p> -<p>Fourth, participants stressed challenges in the enforcement of geographic sanctions similar to those found in the enforcement of thematic regimes. According to one participant, the issue with enforcement is rooted in the lack of proactivity in investigations – the launch of an investigation is often reliant on self-reporting – and the number and amount of fines imposed, which do not act as a deterrent in comparison to the cost of compliance. Members recommended a speedier upscaling and expansion of the remit and resources of agencies responsible for enforcing sanctions. To achieve this, the UK should consider a more collaborative and unified approach to improve information sharing; an increase in resources across the whole sanctions architecture; and greater engagement with industry.</p> +<p>Over the past two decades, Russia has sought to use its pre-eminent security position, supported by other policies, to limit the three South Caucasian republics’ options for external economic and security ties. The aim of these approaches has been to isolate the South Caucasus strategically while tying it ever closer to Russia. Entangling the conflicts of the South Caucasus with Russian security interests has created a Gordian knot for the Euro-Atlantic community in the region which, in the absence of a readiness to challenge Russia directly for fear of escalation to military confrontation and even war, has been unable to advance substantially its integration efforts.</p> -<p>Fifth, consistent with the point raised for GAC/GHR sanctions, the Taskforce noted that the UK should lay out a clear series of actions required for the wind-down of sanctions for geographic regimes. While the grounds for which sanctions were adopted against actors such as Russia remain active, planning for the eventuality of a wind-down or an offramp helps to avoid the unintended consequences of overly extended sanctions. Ensuring that sanctions are well-targeted and calibrated, both in the short and the long term, will help maintain the UK’s credibility and the strategic effectiveness of sanctions in achieving a behavioural change in their targets.</p> +<h4 id="russia-as-a-great-power-and-the-south-caucasus">Russia as a Great Power and the South Caucasus</h4> -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> +<p>As competition with the Euro-Atlantic community intensified, the South Caucasus became part of Russia’s broader ambition to project its power around and across the Black Sea. In a return to Russia’s grand strategy towards the South Caucasus, Moscow’s regional engagement was linked to the wider goal of projecting power into the Black Sea region and beyond, into the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, as Russia became involved in the conflicts in Syria and Libya. After the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its intervention in eastern Ukraine, the military and security dimensions of the South Caucasus were strengthened through enhancing the network of Russian military bases in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Armenia (see Figure 1), and promoting the integration of these facilities with the regional network of Russian military facilities.</p> -<p>To improve the credibility and legitimacy of the UK’s thematic and geographic sanctions regimes, Taskforce members provided the following recommendations:</p> +<h4 id="russias-growing-dominance-of-the-south-caucasus">Russia’s Growing Dominance of the South Caucasus</h4> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Strengthen and unify the UK government architecture.</strong> Effective sanctions implementation and enforcement require greater coordination between the various government departments involved, including the FCDO, the Treasury and the Home Office – and, where relevant, intelligence services. A more unified approach is needed to ensure that sanctions are implemented consistently across departments and that existing programmes are aligned. The UK should consider developing an integrated sanctions “agency” model that would address any inter-institutional competitiveness, gaps and/or opportunities for miscommunication; improve information-sharing; and simplify reporting obligations for the private sector.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Expand and review the list of designated entities and individuals.</strong> The processes and criteria for listing individuals and entities under both thematic and geographic regimes should be reviewed, to ensure sanctions meet the intended goals and are reaching the right targets. The UK should also continue broadening its sanctions on entities and individuals, particularly those involved in facilitating sanctions evasion. This includes targeting and sharing information with the private sector on shell companies, financial intermediaries and other entities that play a role in efforts to circumvent sanctions beyond the Western ecosystem.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Provide more and better data.</strong> The UK government should focus on improving the quality and accessibility of data used in its sanctions regimes. This includes providing FIs and other private sector actors with up-to-date and accurate data, incorporating newer data points such as IP and virtual wallet addresses. Additional training and capacity building should be offered to both government agencies and private sector firms, particularly smaller companies, to ensure their expertise in managing the increasing volume and complexity of data involved in sanctions enforcement.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Improve public-private collaboration.</strong> Regular consultations with FIs, technology companies and other private sector actors are essential to ensure that sanctions are effectively implemented and that their design has the best chance of success. The UK government should establish a formal mechanism for ongoing dialogue with the private sector, focusing on emerging challenges such as cyber sanctions and ransomware, and ensuring that companies have the guidance they need to comply with sanctions regulations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Balance domestic and international efforts.</strong> The UK government must align its domestic efforts with its international actions. This includes strengthening domestic anti-corruption laws, frameworks and enforcement mechanisms to complement the GAC regime. The UK should also focus on diplomatic engagement and capacity-building initiatives in strategic jurisdictions, such as providing training to law enforcement agencies or supporting the development of local anti-corruption frameworks, recognising that sanctions are one tool in a wider foreign policy toolbox.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhance sanctions enforcement capabilities.</strong> Enforcement of sanctions has been inconsistent, with significant gaps in the UK’s ability to investigate and prosecute sanctions violations. The UK government should introduce clearer enforcement guidelines, similar to the framework established under the Bribery Act, to ensure penalties for sanctions violations are appropriate and proportional and focus on genuine sanctions evaders rather than low-hanging fruit. Furthermore, the UK government must increase funding and resources to enable more effective investigations and prosecutions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhance maritime enforcement.</strong> Given Russia’s and North Korea’s reliance on maritime sanctions evasion tactics, the UK government should invest in better maritime tracking systems, and coordinate with international partners to improve enforcement in key shipping lanes. It should prioritise targeted actions against vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers and flag-hopping, along with secondary sanctions on facilitators of these activities. The UK government should ensure it takes a leadership role in the newly formed Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, leveraging its expertise in key areas such as maritime sanctions and financial services in support of this renewed initiative.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Combine sanctions with criminal enforcement.</strong> To ensure the effectiveness of sanctions, they must be deployed together with additional tools, such as robust criminal justice responses. Sanctions should be accompanied by more investigations, prosecutions and confiscations of criminal proceeds. Law enforcement agencies such as the Combating Kleptocracy Cell should intensify their efforts to prosecute money laundering and corruption offences, together with sanctions evasion offences.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Improve monitoring and impact assessment.</strong> The UK government should invest in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to assess the impact of its sanctions regimes. For instance, the FCDO could collaborate with international partners and local organisations to gather data on the effects of sanctions on the ground. Regular assessments can both help to ensure that sanctions are achieving their intended outcomes and inform decisions about whether they should remain in place or whether new ones should be adopted.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Establish a roadmap for lifting sanctions.</strong> The UK government should develop a framework for reviewing and potentially rolling back sanctions. This framework should include specific benchmarks for compliance, such as changes in the behaviour of the targeted individuals or regimes. Sanctions should be seen as a tool for encouraging behavioural change, not just as a punishment. Any wind-down needs to be coordinated with international partners to avoid creating loopholes or undermining the overall sanctions regime. This is applicable across all sanctions regimes to ensure that sanctions have a clear endgame that compels targets to change their behaviour in exchange for sanctions relief.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>By the 2020s, Russia appeared to have largely achieved dominance in the South Caucasus. Moscow’s approach to the region had effectively halted Euro-Atlantic integration while gradually strengthening its own position. In 2020, when Azerbaijan launched the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Russia aimed to advance its regional role with the introduction of “peacekeepers” into the conflict, something it had sought for over 20 years. These developments led to interpretations that Russia was consolidating its regional pre-eminence. In fact, the South Caucasus was already experiencing a set of interrelated shifts that have together undermined the regional position that Russia built up in the post-Soviet period.</p> -<p>The Taskforce agreed that sanctions have become a preferred tool in the UK’s foreign policy arsenal, particularly in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, as the scope and complexity of sanctions continues to expand, the Taskforce was clear that the UK government must ensure that the entirety of its sanctions regimes remain effective. By implementing the recommendations outlined in this report, the UK government can enhance the effectiveness of its thematic and geographic sanctions, ensuring that they achieve real impact in both disrupting illicit activities and promoting international security. Failure to address these issues risks reducing the UK’s sanctions regime to a largely symbolic tool, rather than one that drives meaningful change on the global stage.</p> +<h3 id="ii-russia-challenged-in-the-south-caucasus">II. Russia Challenged in the South Caucasus</h3> -<hr /> +<p>In recent years, the foundations of Moscow’s dominant regional position, built in the context of geopolitical and geo-economic competition with the Euro-Atlantic community, have been challenged by three interlinked developments.</p> -<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter-threat finance. His research focuses on sanctions implementation, circumvention and evasion tactics, and sanctions enforcement, primarily through SIFMANet (Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network). Gonzalo’s reseach on counter-threat finance includes work on the abuse of non-profit organisations for terrorist financing, crime-enabled terrorist financing, and the financing of right-wing extremism.</p> +<p>First, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020 and 2023) created a new regional balance of force and the emergence of economic and connectivity opportunities that have undercut security agendas. Second, a set of external actors has entered the region, providing alternatives to Moscow, Brussels and Washington, and tying the South Caucasus more closely to the Middle East, central Eurasia and Asia. Third, Russia’s war in Ukraine initially led to a questioning of Moscow’s ability to project security and military force in the region, while the prolonged nature of the war has reinforced hedging strategies by countries in the region unsure of who will ultimately be victorious. Together, these developments are promoting foreign and security policies of multi-alignment in the South Caucasus, as regional governments seek to develop multiple external partners to balance and hedge against the dominance of Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.</p> -<p><strong>Maria Nizzero</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. Her research examines the UK, EU and global financial crime landscape, asset recovery and sanctions, and the foreign policy dimension of illicit finance. Maria holds a PhD in International Public Law and International Relations from the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, where she was an Associate Professor for four years, teaching EU Politics and Institutions.</p>Gonzalo Saiz and Maria NizzeroThis report presents findings from the second meeting of the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce, held in October 2024.U.S. Public Diplomacy Now2024-11-14T12:00:00+08:002024-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/us-public-diplomacy-now<p><em>The United States needs to rethink public diplomacy in an era dominated by great-power competition. U.S. public diplomacy must work harder than ever to showcase the superior attractiveness and value of the United States and its policies over competing alternatives.</em></p> +<h4 id="the-second-nagorno-karabakh-war">The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>The most significant development within the South Caucasus region has been Azerbaijan’s military actions in 2020 and 2023 to take back territory occupied by Armenia following the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–94), and ultimately to reclaim control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region itself. As a result, Azerbaijan has emerged as the regional agenda setter and has attracted Russia’s interest.</p> -<p>China and Russia leverage technology, social media, and big data as tools to deceptively present information for hostile purposes. The United States must embrace a bold approach to public diplomacy to protect the ideas, values, electoral processes, and all the elements that make a free and open society possible and prevent it from becoming a casualty in the information war.</p> +<p>For Armenia, there has been a deterioration in the Armenia–Russia alliance as a result of Russia’s failure to restrain Azerbaijan in 2020 and the inability – and possibly unwillingness – of Russian “peacekeepers” to prevent the seizure of the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. This led to the flight of the ethnic Armenian population amid claims of ethnic cleansing – along with a perception that Moscow is more interested in developing a close relationship with Baku.</p> -<h3 id="from-cold-war-to-information-war-the-evolution-of-us-public-diplomacy">From Cold War to Information War: The Evolution of U.S. Public Diplomacy</h3> +<p>Armenia has signalled publicly that it is ready to shift away from its reliance on Russian security guarantees and seek closer relations with others, notably the US and the EU (especially France). Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has indicated that Armenia has suspended its participation in the CSTO – having previously indicated that it would leave the organisation – although he has not closed the door to a future relationship, and Russian border guards have been removed from Yerevan airport. With the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolved by military force, Russia is no longer able to leverage its role as a mediator, while the prospect of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, potentially also leading to Armenia–Turkey normalisation, will further reduce Moscow’s ability to leverage its security role. With the war in Ukraine also redefining Russian regional interests, Moscow has begun to reshape its approach to the South Caucasus.</p> -<p>Discussions of U.S. public diplomacy over the last two decades are often framed around its “failures,” what’s “wrong” with it, what a “mess” it is, and its diminishing returns. The solution is not reorganizing U.S. government institutions or simply increasing congressional appropriations. Rather, it involves refocusing the collective perspective on how the U.S. government should think about public diplomacy in an era dominated by great-power competition. A comprehensive “all of the above” approach to public diplomacy is more appropriate for countering authoritarian states in the context of the Information Age.</p> +<h4 id="emerging-international-actors-in-the-south-caucasus">Emerging International Actors in the South Caucasus</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A comprehensive “all of the above” approach to public diplomacy is more appropriate for countering authoritarian states in the context of the Information Age.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>While the period since 2008 has been marked by geopolitical competition between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community in the South Caucasus, states within the region are increasingly reaching out to a wider network of partners to help them to manage geopolitical competition and expand economic opportunities.</p> -<p>Edmund Gullion coined the term “public diplomacy” in 1965, but deliberate engagements with international audiences had become a prominent component of U.S. peacetime foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War (see Box 1). Initial policy was focused on a bipolar world order, with the Cold War aligning nations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The goal of bipolar public diplomacy was to “win the hearts and minds” in favor of Western values: representative democracy, free speech, religious freedom, gender equality, and capitalistic economies over the only other option — communism.</p> +<p><em>Turkey</em></p> -<p>Following the end of the Cold War, the Clinton administration disbanded many of the institutions at the core of U.S. public diplomacy. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA), created by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953 as an independent agency to promote U.S. values overseas through information programs, was dissolved in 1999. Many components of the USIA’s public diplomacy were transferred to the Department of State, while an independent Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) was tasked with overseeing international broadcasting networks like Voice of America.</p> +<p>The growing influence of Turkey has relied to a significant degree on its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan and the coordinated approach that the two countries have taken to Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as energy projects. Since 1992, they have forged close military, diplomatic and economic ties. Turkey has notably provided Azerbaijan with important military capacities and training. This relationship was central to the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, in which Turkish military technologies played an important role, but even more significant was the ability of Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to balance diplomatic efforts by Putin to shape the outcomes of the conflict to Russia’s advantage. Since then, Turkey and Azerbaijan have coordinated efforts to position the South Caucasus as the gateway to the Middle Corridor, which links Europe through the Caspian region to Central Asia and western parts of China, and to accelerate work on this initiative.</p> -<p>The 9/11 terrorist attacks marked the re-securitization of public diplomacy as the United States sought to “win the hearts and minds of Muslims” across the Muslim world. Like the post–Cold War era, however, there were few media alternatives for audiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, or Somalia.</p> +<p>Although Azerbaijan is Turkey’s key regional ally, Turkey has been exploring deeper ties with Georgia, reflecting the country’s key transit role for energy, transport and trade. Turkey identifies relations with Georgia as a “strategic partnership”, supports its territorial integrity and does not recognise claims by Abkhazia and South Ossetia for independence. Turkey is Georgia’s leading trade partner, ahead of Russia and China, and Ankara views Georgia as a critical partner in its plans for the development and expansion of the Middle Corridor. Turkey has also sought to develop its security ties to Georgia, including as part of a trilateral format with Azerbaijan, and has been a supporter of closer ties between NATO and Georgia. Turkey’s role has also been important as part of a broader strengthening in relations between the South Caucasus and Middle Eastern countries that has included rising trade and deepening diplomatic ties, notably with Saudi Arabia, but also with Iraq and Jordan (as well as Iran and Israel).</p> -<p>In 2018, the Trump administration rebranded the BBG as the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), an independent federal agency that oversees and broadcasts news and information about the United States and the world internationally.</p> +<p><em>Iran</em></p> -<p>The Department of State and the USAGM sought to maintain credibility with international audiences as new technologies emerged, allowing other voices to compete with U.S. efforts to promote Western norms and institutions globally.</p> +<p>Iran does not have the levels of regional influence achieved by Russia and Turkey, in part reflecting its strategic view of the South Caucasus as a buffer region. Tehran’s approach has been focused on preventing overspill from the region into Iran. It hopes to balance the influence of regional rivals (Turkey and Russia) and ensure that the South Caucasus does not become a base of operations for states seen as hostile to Tehran (principally the US and Israel). As the third regional neighbouring state it has, nonetheless, built ties with Armenia, while managing a complex and occasionally confrontational relationship with Azerbaijan.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="box-1-what-is-public-diplomacy"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1. What Is Public Diplomacy?</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>As the South Caucasus has begun to open to greater connectivity, gaining access to Iran’s trade and transport routes has risen in importance. Tehran has developed a more forward-leaning foreign policy towards the South Caucasus and has sought to improve its relationship with Azerbaijan and adopt a more balanced approach to the countries in the region. This has led to an emergent closer relationship with Georgia.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A challenge in any effort to revamp public diplomacy lies in the fact that there are multiple definitions of the term and competing understandings of what activities fall under its umbrella. A traditional understanding of the term might only include state-to-state activities. More broadly defined, U.S. public diplomacy also encompasses official messaging from the Department of State and the White House; U.S. international broadcasting via USAGM, Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe; and other soft power tools, military operations, and covert actions.</code></em></p> +<p>Along with Russia and Turkey, Iran shares an interest in limiting the role of the Euro-Atlantic community in the South Caucasus, and Tehran has supported efforts to advance the “3 + 3” South Caucasus Regional Cooperation Platform format, aimed at bringing together Iran, Turkey, Russia and the South Caucasus countries. Iran has also recognised the strategic importance of efforts to shape a new regional transportation network as part of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Crucially, Tehran has opposed efforts to open the so-called Zangezur Corridor, the proposed transport link between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhchivan across the southern Armenian region of Syunik, fearing it would impede its trade links northwards and strengthen Turkey’s regional position, even when this has led to friction with Russia.</p> -<p>U.S. public diplomacy today faces a fundamentally different landscape than it has ever encountered since its inception: a highly digitalized, multipolar world order where audiences can choose where they get their information and what they believe, all in the palm of their hands. Today’s market diversification provides audiences with many choices, including numerous countries with actively engaging foreign ministries and their state-sponsored news networks. Audiences are no longer passive consumers of whatever is available — they get to choose where they invest their time and attention. There are fewer gatekeepers to instant information. Videos, images, and articles no longer have to pass through a newspaper editor or network producer to reach an audience. A caveat, however, is that deepfakes, propaganda, and other forms of unverified information also have direct lines to mass audiences.</p> +<p>Despite strains in the Iran–Russia relationship, there has been a strategic convergence between Tehran and Moscow as a result of the Ukraine war, which is being formalised through a proposed partnership treaty that will include regional security issues, alongside a free-trade agreement to link the EAEU to Iran. Iran’s evolving engagement in the South Caucasus, and notably its cooperation with Russia in the area of transport, form an important element of the growing alignment between the two countries.</p> -<p>This means U.S. public diplomacy must work harder than ever to showcase the superior attractiveness and value of the United States and its policies over competing alternatives. To do this, policymakers and practitioners must reframe their thinking from what public diplomacy was to what it needs to be in the coming century, which will likely be dominated by superpower competition between the United States, China, and Russia. They must refocus on multipolar public diplomacy and fill leadership voids in this space. In other words, the United States needs to reorient public diplomacy policy as a tool of relativity.</p> +<p><em>Israel and the Gulf States</em></p> -<p>Effective public diplomacy will require appropriate levels of congressional funding and more effective use of that money. As the United States has decreased spending on public diplomacy, China and Russia continue to invest heavily in sophisticated propaganda in the developing world. The underlying goal of the U.S. effort should be not just to make the United States the most attractive and desirable country in the world but to position it as the “partner of choice” in competition with other vying players. Reputational security achieved through public diplomacy is undervalued, as reflected in underinvestment.</p> +<p>After Turkey, Israel has been Azerbaijan’s most important external partner in military, investment and diplomatic support. Azerbaijan has looked to Israel to provide it with key military capabilities, as well as technologies to advance its ambitions to move its economy away from reliance on hydrocarbon production. Azerbaijan has become a significant energy supplier to Israel. Israel has, on the other hand, had modest relations with Georgia and Armenia, and its engagement in the South Caucasus has served primarily to reinforce Baku’s international options and capabilities, rather than to play a regional role. At the same time, Iran’s concern about a potential Israeli security presence in Azerbaijan has fed into Tehran’s broader foreign and military approach to the South Caucasus, notably into an effort to weaken Baku through support for Armenia.</p> -<h3 id="from-values-to-interests-in-public-diplomacy">From Values to Interests in Public Diplomacy</h3> +<p>Building on their established links to Azerbaijan, Gulf states are increasingly looking to the South Caucasus for investment and trade opportunities, particularly in the energy and transportation sectors.</p> -<p>If the United States is to refocus its public diplomacy policy, the central purpose of multipolar public diplomacy must be building alliances. Current U.S. policy underpins the “marketplace of ideas,” which focuses on values and norm-building. The issue is that when the United States advocates for and institutionalizes its values, it often neglects the divergent values held by foreign audiences. Strategic communication is not unidirectional; it is imperative to listen to counterparts when shaping the United States’ image and to avoid actions that contradict the desired perception. This is why the United States continuously struggles to improve its image and reputation in the Middle East. Large majorities in nine Middle Eastern countries report feeling that “the West doesn’t respect Muslim values, nor show concern for the Islamic and Muslim worlds.”</p> +<p><em>China and Central Asia</em></p> -<p>Instead, multipolar public diplomacy is underpinned by the “marketplace of loyalties,” which focuses on interests. In this framework, states can work together to pursue their individual and common goals despite contradicting value sets. This is illustrated by the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II. Based on a shared interest in defeating Nazi Germany, two world powers vying for dominance were able to work together for a common goal that benefited both of their interests, despite disagreements on political and economic values. Likewise, the United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia is a modern example. The two countries have markedly different value sets, yet based on mutual security, economic, and energy interests, they work together for mutual advantage, even in the face of starkly contrasting values and continuous tension. The killing of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 is an example of a value-based difference that tested but did not break the U.S.-Saudi relationship, which is underpinned by common geopolitical interests.</p> +<p>China’s presence in the South Caucasus has been growing through trade and tourism, as well as infrastructure projects. The new international interest in transport corridors through the South Caucasus, in part created by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, has increased China’s engagement in the region as it seeks to develop “the Great Silk Road” as part of its global Belt and Road Initiative. The award to a Chinese-led consortium of a contract to build the Anaklia deepwater port in Georgia is a particular focus for Beijing as part of its effort to build transport infrastructure connecting China’s economy to European markets.</p> -<p>Two-way, mutually beneficial relationships that advance respective interests — not values — must drive the U.S. alliance-building for the remainder of the twenty-first century. Per Richard Haass, “Foreign policy is not about virtue signaling; it is about advancing interests. Prioritizing and compartmentalizing are essential.” This is not to say that the United States should give up on promoting democratic values — quite the contrary. U.S. public diplomacy needs to create reputational security by being genuine, authentic, and consistent. However, given the democratic backsliding over the last two decades and the rise of regimes that do not share Western values regarding universal human rights, the cost of pursuing global democratization and a liberal world order is growing exponentially. The United States’ political, social, and economic capital simply cannot afford to re-democratize the international system while also fending off power advances by China and Russia. It becomes a cost-benefit analysis, where interests offer a greater potential for cross-cultural engagement, dialogue, and cooperation than do values.</p> +<p>The pull of China in relation to economic and trade issues is also drawing the countries of the South Caucasus to the east in their external relations, as efforts to develop the Middle Corridor accelerate. While the central approach of China in the South Caucasus appears to be geo-economic, its growing interest in Georgia has been linked to the erosion of democratic practices through rising elite corruption, while also being seen to reinforce the broader regional shift of foreign policy – away from the Euro-Atlantic community.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">U.S. public diplomacy needs to create reputational security by being genuine, authentic, and consistent.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>To cement its developing regional role, China has sought to conclude “strategic agreements” with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Baku has made the most significant shift to the east, even raising the prospect of joining regional formats, and President Ilham Aliyev has attended the Central Asia head of state consultative meetings, as well as forging bilateral and minilateral ties with countries across that region. The transport connectivity agenda is, however, exerting a pull on all the South Caucasus countries, pushing them to develop ties linking the Black and Caspian Sea regions.</p> -<p>Likewise, the rise of a “post-truth” reality, marked by information overload and rampant disinformation, has created a social ecosystem that significantly bottlenecks the marketplace of ideas. The best ideas do not always rise to the top; even those that do are not always accepted as the best. At a time when the philosophical applicability of the “marketplace of ideas” is failing, the “marketplace of loyalties” offers a viable alternative. The underlying premise of refocusing U.S. public diplomacy is that this new approach focuses on making the United States the partner of choice over China or Russia, based on its superior ability to deliver on the interests of foreign audiences and governments.</p> +<p><em>India and Pakistan</em></p> -<h3 id="the-centrality-of-emerging-technology">The Centrality of Emerging Technology</h3> +<p>India and Pakistan are relatively minor international actors in the region, but India has been increasing its arms sales, notably becoming a primary supplier to Armenia, while Pakistan has concluded defence agreements with Azerbaijan. Pakistan has sought to track India’s growing regional ties as an extension of their bilateral rivalry. Relations with the South Caucasus also reflect India’s long-term plans to build new trade and transport routes from South Asia across Eurasia to Europe, linking the region to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. These new ties are becoming the basis for competing groupings, with India seeking to cooperate with Iran and Armenia, and Pakistan looking to partner with Turkey and Azerbaijan.</p> -<p>Information is the currency of the new world order, so to compete in a multipolar landscape, U.S. public diplomacy must be competitive in telling its narratives to the rest of the world. Technology and buy-in from tech companies are important elements in formulating a public diplomacy strategy suitable for the twenty-first century. The importance of diplomatic ties to and collaboration with tech companies is evidenced by the soaring number of countries that have established dedicated diplomatic missions to Silicon Valley in the San Francisco Bay Area. Luckily, the United States and its private sector already outcompete both China and Russia in technology development, so it simply comes down to leveraging the public and private resources already at play while combating adversarial attempts to weaponize the same technological advances. But how can technology help U.S. public diplomacy in a multipolar world order?</p> +<h4 id="the-south-caucasus-as-a-multipolar-region">The South Caucasus as a Multipolar Region</h4> -<p>First, technology can provide greater internet access. The United States needs to be able to deliver its content to audiences, even in countries that control or restrict access. Therefore, technology that provides increased access is invaluable. For example, Starlink’s mobile broadband satellite system provides access across the African continent. Likewise, USAGM’s Open Technology Fund programs, which provide virtual private networks and censorship-circumvention tools, are steps in this direction. For example, the agency has worked with nthLink, Psiphon, and Lantern since the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict in 2014 to provide Russians with greater access to Western media.</p> +<p>The emergence of a multitude of international actors in the South Caucasus is changing the region’s international environment. While Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community remain key reference points, reflecting their continuing regional strategic weight, new actors are offering additional security, economic and transport relationships. Minilateral formats are emerging to reflect new partnerships and blending of interests, and some South Caucasus states are looking to participate in larger multilateral formats, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the BRICS (Azerbaijan announced its application to join in August 2024), and the Organization of Turkic States.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States needs to be able to deliver its content to audiences, even in countries that control or restrict access. Therefore, technology that provides increased access is invaluable.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>For countries in the region, this approach to external ties is driven by two main interests. First, governments are pursuing balancing approaches to serve as counterweights to external integration projects that seek to curtail the position and interests of domestic elites, whether it is via Russia’s efforts to shape pro-Moscow regimes or the Euro-Atlantic community’s democracy, human rights and rule of law agenda challenging illiberal and kleptocratic regimes. Second, the broadening of external contacts has enabled countries in the South Caucasus to increase their leverage, and notably to hedge their dominant bilateral ties to Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community, in order to improve their bargaining position.</p> -<p>Second, technology can provide improved techniques for telling the United States’ story. Even the most credible and authentic narratives can fail if they are not persuasive or never reach their intended audience. Leveraging new technologies to enhance the storytelling context of U.S. public diplomacy, elicit emotional responses, and achieve persuasive outcomes will be vital for outperforming competing narratives from China and Russia. This can range from artificial intelligence to virtual reality, augmented reality, mixed reality, or infotainment.</p> +<p>The development of this dimension of regional politics is, however, also a source for new instability in the region, with countries now linked to various disputes and competition beyond the South Caucasus, for example the tensions between Turkey and Israel over Gaza and Lebanon have unsettled their ties to Azerbaijan. It is also difficult for external actors to develop a stable approach to the region, as the regional governments are able to switch external partners and play them against each other to secure better offers.</p> -<p>Third, technology can aid in countering state-sponsored disinformation and influence operations. U.S. public diplomacy cannot operate on its own merits alone. It must leverage emerging technology to identify, track, counter, and discredit narratives and false information spread through Chinese and Russian active measures. This requires interagency cooperation through initiatives like the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), as well as public-private partnerships with the tech sector, like Facebook’s election integrity program, to employ rapid alert detection networks to identify artificial amplification, deepfakes, content coordination, etc. The European External Action Service (EEAS), for example, employs a rapid alert system to detect disinformation and coordinate multistate responses through the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, EEAS Situation Room, G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, and NATO.</p> +<h4 id="russias-war-in-ukraine">Russia’s War in Ukraine</h4> -<h3 id="who-is-the-audience-of-a-refocused-public-diplomacy">Who Is the Audience of a Refocused Public Diplomacy?</h3> +<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 created shock waves across the South Caucasus. Initially, Russia pulled forces from the region to reinforce its struggling troops in Ukraine. As Moscow faced difficulties in overcoming Ukrainian forces, questions were raised in the region about the effectiveness of Russia as a military and security actor. The war also increased external pressure on the governments in the South Caucasus to take sides in the conflict, including through observing Western sanctions on Russia.</p> -<p>To enhance the competitive edge of U.S. public diplomacy over the next century, the conceptual focus on “foreign audiences” should be broadened operationally to include a range of foreign actors: corporations, nongovernmental organizations, cities, diasporas, influencers, and more. The Department of State’s Office of Global Partnerships is a model for partnering U.S. government staff and resources with nontraditional partners across business, philanthropy, and community organizations that could be mirrored within the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources (R/PPR).</p> +<p>Georgia, concerned about the Russian threat to its own territories, distanced itself from Kyiv and refused to apply sanctions. Azerbaijan sought to maintain its policy of balancing, providing limited support to Ukraine, agreeing to supply extra gas volumes to Europe as it sought to diversify its energy markets, and emphasised its crucial geographic position at the heart of the Middle Corridor as an alternative to Russian transit routes. At the same time, Baku sought to maintain its strategic relationship with Moscow. Armenia, given its reliance on Moscow and questions about the effectiveness of Russian forces and the ability of Russia’s defence industry to supply weapons, began to recalibrate its security partnership with Russia.</p> -<p>Additionally, U.S. public diplomacy suffers from a lack of engagement with the domestic public. While Americans frequently see headlines about how China and Russia challenge the United States abroad, they often lack substantive knowledge of how the U.S. government is working to compete in this shifting world order. As public opinion influences both political representation and appropriations, better engaging and informing U.S. residents about the efforts and successes of public diplomacy is crucial for securing public support, congressional recruitment, and greater influence in interagency cooperation.</p> +<p>As the Ukraine war has continued, the impact of the conflict on the South Caucasus has shifted. With considerable uncertainty about the outcome of the war, all three South Caucasus states have sought to avoid being too overtly tied to one side and have pursued different balancing options. There is also concern that if Russia is victorious in Ukraine, it may then look to strengthen its control over the South Caucasus as the next step in efforts to expand Russia’s regional power, and so the prudent approach is to avoid taking sides.</p> -<p>The Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 allowed for greater transparency and access to materials intended for foreign audiences but maintained restrictions on their use for influencing domestic U.S. public opinion. Further revisions to the act should consider eliminating outdated policies and rethinking U.S. public diplomacy’s domestic engagement strategy.</p> +<p>At the same time, the Ukraine war has reshaped Russia’s own interests in the South Caucasus. As a result of the war and Western sanctions, the South Caucasus has become critical to Russia’s efforts to reorient trade and communications away from Europe. This has led Moscow to rebalance its regional relations, with Baku becoming central to Russia’s regional transportation plans.</p> -<h3 id="achieving-public-diplomacy-goals-in-the-coming-decades">Achieving Public Diplomacy Goals in the Coming Decades</h3> +<h3 id="iii-russias-repositioning-in-the-south-caucasus">III. Russia’s Repositioning in the South Caucasus</h3> -<p>Refocusing U.S. public diplomacy’s purview requires a whole-of-government approach, interagency exercises to expose resource gaps, and designing a grand strategy that outlines responsibilities and costs associated with expanding capacity. This requires five key first steps to compete in the coming multipolar world. These span leadership, cooperation, evaluation, purpose, and training.</p> +<p>Faced with the current shifts across the region, Russia has sought to craft a new balance of policies so that it can reposition itself and remain at the heart of the South Caucasus regional order.</p> -<h4 id="1-consistency-in-leadership-and-strategy">1. Consistency in Leadership and Strategy</h4> +<h4 id="security-policy">Security Policy</h4> -<p>U.S. public diplomacy has been self-sabotaged out of the gate for over 20 years by a lack of consistent leadership. The position of the undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs (R) was vacant 44 percent of the 22 years between 1999 and 2021 (over nine and a half years), with nine congressional appointees filling the office the other 56 percent of the time (just over 12 years). This lack of institutional continuity has prevented the development of an organized and coherent strategy for implementation across the Department of State, let alone the entire U.S. government. This inconsistency has contributed to China and Russia outperforming the United States in the information and influence domain over the last two decades. If the United States is serious about competing with China and Russia in this space, the White House must prioritize quickly filling this critical office with qualified personnel. However, given the broken Senate confirmation process, creating a role that bypasses the lengthy process would be beneficial.</p> +<p>Despite the emergence of new policy tools, Moscow continues to use security issues to shape the region towards its interests. The ongoing occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their steady integration into Russia remains a defining point in Moscow’s regional position. As the relationship between Georgia and the Euro-Atlantic community has frayed, as Tbilisi has adopted increasingly anti-democratic domestic policies and continued to develop ties with Russia, Moscow has rebalanced its approach from threat to inducement around the protracted Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflict. Before the Georgian elections on 26 October 2024 Moscow hinted that it would be ready to help Tbilisi “normalise” relations with the two breakaway regions.</p> -<p>That said, in the United States, the executive branch cannot bypass the legislative branch if reputational security advancements are to be achieved. If the Senate confirmation process cannot be streamlined, it is critical for congressional leadership to better address authorizations and appropriations related to public diplomacy.</p> +<p>At the same time, the fact that the Euro-Atlantic community has not been prepared to challenge Russian military occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia directly signals to the wider region the limit of EU/NATO regional commitment. While Russia’s policy towards Georgia remains a clear indication that Moscow will not countenance Euro-Atlantic integration in the region, its ability to bind the wider region through security ties has, however, corroded, notably with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the subsequent shift by Armenia towards a broader range of security partners.</p> -<p>In contrast, leaders like Xi Jinping in China and Vladimir Putin in Russia can arbitrarily redirect national resources at will.</p> +<p>Since its defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia has signalled strong dissatisfaction with the Russian security guarantee, and there has been an escalation of negative rhetoric regarding Moscow’s role. Yerevan has taken steps on the margins of its security relationship with Moscow to underline its discontent, opened to a wider range of external relationships, including with the Euro-Atlantic community, and begun to rebuild its military through partnerships with Europe, India and the US. While Armenia may be able to “navigate a path away from Russia” through diversifying its security partnerships, there are real limits on how far Armenia can push, at least in the medium term. It has become clear since 2020 that Russian security protection does not extend to actions by Azerbaijan. However, ultimately, only Moscow is willing to give security guarantees to Armenia when it believes it remains vulnerable to other external threats, notably from Turkey, and there continues to be security interdependence between Russia and Armenia. Moscow may also be ready to threaten more direct responses to Armenia if it veers far from Russian interests.</p> -<h4 id="2-centrality-of-leadership-in-interagency-cooperation">2. Centrality of Leadership in Interagency Cooperation</h4> +<p>Azerbaijan has sought to diminish Russia’s security leverage, notably through a commitment over several decades to building ties to other military partners (Turkey and Israel). But an equally important element of managing the Russian security threat has been Baku’s decision to eschew EU and NATO integration – a decision taken to a significant degree in light of the lesson of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War that the Euro-Atlantic community is not ready to challenge Russia militarily in the region. To underline that it does not seek to break away completely from Russia, Azerbaijan has sought to identify a positive agenda of alternative policy areas for cooperation with Russia where it can shape a partnership in its interests.</p> -<p>U.S. public diplomacy during the Cold War was successful because the USIA was the centralized leader of U.S. government information and influence efforts, with direct access to the White House and the National Security Council. Today, the lack of influential leadership in public diplomacy weakens the U.S. government’s effectiveness in the information domain. Edward R. Murrow, the late director of the USIA, recommended that “public diplomacy be in at the takeoff of foreign policies, not just at the occasional crash landing.” The absence of a prominent agency leader also reduces attention from senior-level policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6BEfo31.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Key South Caucasus Transport Routes.</strong> Source: Tanvir Anjum Adib/Wikimedia. Edited by RUSI.</em></p> -<p>There is no point in creating a new USIA, as that would be an unhelpful bureaucratic reorganization. However, giving the White House and the National Security Council authority over a singular organization or agency, as the USIA once had when it participated in White House cabinet and National Security Council meetings, would clarify, harmonize, and centralize U.S. government efforts, increasing the efficiency of interagency cooperation and resource allocation. Positioning the GEC as the dedicated central hub, for example, would be ideal, as it is Department of State-focused but enjoys more operational cooperation and buy-in from the national security and intelligence communities than R/PPR. This would require official interagency memoranda of agreement directing other agencies and departments to be accountable to the GEC. It would also necessitate more funding — for example, liaisons to the GEC, GEC liaisons to the tech world, and additional billets within the GEC for analysts, supervisors, and possibly their own software programmers.</p> +<h4 id="transport-and-communications">Transport and Communications</h4> -<p>Another way to achieve greater impact is by doubling down on performance measurement in U.S. public diplomacy. This would allow practitioners to demonstrate its effectiveness and value as a security tool to policymakers in Congress and the White House. The work done by R/PPR’s Research and Evaluation Unit is the first step in institutionalizing performance measurements across U.S. public diplomacy. However, it is important to stress that psychological and sociological influences are slow processes. No social science programming can yield comprehensive results in a matter of weeks, months, or even years. Policymakers need to understand that public diplomacy measurement and evaluation is a cumulative process, with trends revealing themselves over the course of years, decades, or even generations. Assessment expectations within an annual budget cycle, for example, will do little more than illustrate the fact that individual and societal influence is far from instantaneous. There must be a willingness to consider the compounding evidence of comprehensive mixed-methods research over time.</p> +<p>Moscow’s most important policy shift regarding the changing political and economic dynamics of the South Caucasus is the new emphasis given to the region as a zone for trade and communications (see Figure 2). The breakdown of ties with the Euro-Atlantic community, the imposition of sanctions and the closing of some markets has effectively forced Russia to reorient its economic policy on a north–south axis, away from the previous east–west axis. Moscow’s efforts to reorient its external economic relations, as part of the wider shift in its foreign and security relations brought about by the Ukraine war, are already having significant results, as trade along a north–south axis, notably with Iran and India, has increased substantially in recent years.</p> -<h4 id="3-efficiency-of-dollars-spent">3. Efficiency of Dollars Spent</h4> +<p>In this context, the key project for Russia is the International North–South Transit Corridor (INSTC), a series of rail, ship and road routes connecting Russia to Iran and its Gulf ports and beyond, to South and East Asia. The most promising route goes through Azerbaijan, the only country that borders both Russia and Iran, and which already has a railway connecting Russia and Iran. While the INSTC has been on the drawing board since 2005, it has gained new impetus since the war in Ukraine and Western efforts to isolate Russia economically. In May 2023, Russia and Iran agreed to complete, by 2027, the construction of a railway from the Iran–Azerbaijan border, at Astara, to Rasht in northern Iran, which represents the last missing rail link to connect St Petersburg to the Gulf. Realisation of the INSTC is a strategic goal for Moscow, supported by Iran and India, but Russia is likely to be the main funder of any new infrastructure, in view of its pressing need to bypass Western sanctions.</p> -<p>Furthermore, the United States does not need to outspend China or Russia in this domain; instead, it must allocate resources and efforts more efficiently. Audience analysis and segmentation are ideal methods to achieve this. The key is to win over moderate and persuadable audiences, so the greatest resources should be focused on countries and regions not already aligned exclusively with China or Russia. This should begin with countries of strategic geopolitical interest to the United States that are being actively courted by either country. For example, Panama was one of China’s first Belt and Road Initiative partners, and the influx of Chinese investments influenced the outcome of Panamanian elections and legislative votes in favor of China’s economic and security priorities over those of the United States. Similarly, the popularity of the Arabic-language RT (Russia’s international news network) has influenced public perception of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in North Africa and the Middle East.</p> +<p>The focus on connectivity in the South Caucasus is giving Russia a new direction for its security policy. Russia is aiming to assert a security role in the South Caucasus transport network to unblock the regional transport network on its terms and, thereby, provide Moscow with important regional leverage. For this reason, the Zangezur Corridor has become a particular focus for Russian diplomacy and a key interest in the wider Armenia–Azerbaijan peace negotiations.</p> -<p>While an in-depth strategic analysis by regional experts is required to develop a comprehensive list of countries of strategic geopolitical interest to the United States, numerous natural-mineral-rich countries in the Global South are being lobbied by both Chinese and Russian public and private sectors. Some key examples include the following:</p> +<p>Citing provisions on Russian security personnel managing the land corridor in the 2020 Armenia–Azerbaijan ceasefire agreement brokered by Moscow, the Kremlin insists on its presence along the corridor. If it were able to exert influence on the region’s transport networks, Moscow would gain new leverage over the countries of the South Caucasus, including Georgia, which currently is the main axis for north–south trade. Russia has sought to channel negotiations on transport links into the 2021 tripartite commission on this issue that it convenes with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and into key bilateral formats.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Africa:</strong> Zimbabwe (platinum group metals and lithium), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (copper, cobalt, lithium, and petroleum), Mali (iron, lead, chromium, nickel, lithium, and uranium), Guinea (iron and uranium), Mozambique (iron, titanium, graphite, and copper), South Africa (iron, platinum, manganese, and uranium), and Zambia (copper, cobalt, and platinum group metals).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>South America:</strong> Bolivia (petroleum), Chile (lithium and copper), Mexico (iron, copper, and zinc), Peru (iron, manganese, and copper), Jamaica (iron, copper, and zinc), the Dominican Republic (copper, nickel, and zinc), Guatemala (iron, nickel, and zinc), and Panama (access to the canal).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Asia:</strong> India (iron, manganese, graphite, zinc, and copper), Uzbekistan (petroleum, uranium, copper, and zinc), Indonesia (nickel, cobalt, and copper), Kazakhstan (manganese, uranium, iron, copper, zinc, and petroleum), Kyrgyzstan (iron, manganese, petroleum, and zinc), Malaysia (iron, manganese, copper, and bauxite), and Tajikistan (iron, uranium, petroleum, and zinc).</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h4 id="pivot-to-azerbaijan-monitoring-georgia">Pivot to Azerbaijan, Monitoring Georgia</h4> -<h4 id="4-purpose-as-informer-or-persuader">4. Purpose as Informer or Persuader</h4> +<p>A third key component of Moscow’s evolving policy towards the South Caucasus is a deepened partnership with Baku. Azerbaijan has emerged as the leading regional state as a result of its military successes against Armenia, its ability to build a latticework of external partners, and its balancing policy towards Russia. Indeed, Azerbaijan is now essential for Russia in terms of energy exports and its transport links to Iran. The Kremlin has stressed that Azerbaijan is a “stable” partner in the region, and has spoken of the bilateral relationship in warm terms as having an “alliance” character.</p> -<p>Reinforcing institutional mission sets is also vital. The goal of U.S. public diplomacy might be compared to counterinsurgency’s purpose of winning the “hearts and minds” during military conflict. In the Information Age, public diplomacy should aim to build the United States’ credibility with global audiences. USAGM has spent decades cultivating a reputation for credibility with its various networks, serving as a transparent and objective news outlet. The agency needs to retain its editorial independence to remain a recognized international source of fact-based journalism.</p> +<p>Azerbaijan has been able to use its newfound regional leverage to bypass Russia’s efforts to manipulate regional conflicts – ignoring Russia’s demands over Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, and sidelining Moscow’s role in mediating the Armenia–Azerbaijan relationship – all while maintaining a degree of support for Ukraine. But Baku has lined up behind Russia on Moscow’s interests where they largely align with those of Azerbaijan. Together with Russia, Azerbaijan has been critical of Armenia’s efforts to reach out to the Euro-Atlantic community, and it has opposed the deployment of an EU border-monitoring mission to the region. Azerbaijan is also publicly supporting Russia’s position on transport corridors across Armenia, even if there are suspicions that Baku would also be keen to leave Russia out of the route.</p> -<p>As Nicholas J. Cull argues, “international broadcasting is powerful but works best at arm’s length.” This necessitates codified barriers to operational interference from the White House or Congress. Politics must stay out of USAGM for it to remain attractive to foreign audiences as a reliable source of information. On the other hand, as a central branch of the executive government, the Department of State should remain the primary tool of political advocacy in advancing the United States’ narratives to the rest of the world. The Department of State is the central hub for engaging, through various soft power means, in persuasive communication that articulates the attractiveness of U.S. policies and engagement.</p> +<p>While Azerbaijan is now Russia’s main regional partner, Moscow is paying close attention to contemporary developments within Georgia. Since the Rose Revolution, Georgia has been the anchor of the Euro-Atlantic community’s regional engagement, and in 2023, the EU granted Tbilisi candidate status. However, despite movement on some bureaucratic processes, the integration of Georgia into the Euro-Atlantic community has been effectively frozen following the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, reflecting the reluctance of the US and its European allies to challenge directly Moscow’s security commitment to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.</p> -<h4 id="5-advanced-training-and-professional-development">5. Advanced Training and Professional Development</h4> +<p>Since the Georgian Dream political party – established and led by the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili – entered government in Tbilisi in 2012, Georgia has followed a twin-track policy of seeking to advance NATO and EU memberships while also pursuing a policy of gradual normalisation with Moscow. With Euro-Atlantic integration unable to make real progress and with the turn to increasingly authoritarian domestic politics in Georgia in recent years, the relationship between Tbilisi, Washington and Brussels has deteriorated significantly.</p> -<p>Lastly, communication is a skills-based profession, yet most foreign service officers and many public diplomacy officers are not highly trained communication practitioners. The State Department should model high-level training and strategically oriented professional development programs with academic partners, like the Defense Department’s program for mid-career public affairs officers (PAOs) at San Diego State University’s School of Journalism and Media Studies. This curriculum provides PAOs with advanced theoretical knowledge and practical skills in campaign planning, implementation, and measurement. It also trains PAOs to serve as strategic counselors to commanding officers.</p> +<p>At the same time, the normalisation process with Russia has continued, even in the difficult context of the war in Ukraine. While there is little evidence that Russia has driven the breakdown in ties between Georgia and the Euro-Atlantic community, Moscow has opportunistically sought to benefit. The Georgian government has also given the impression that it is ready to move closer to Moscow if the US and Europe continue to set democracy and human rights conditions that are unacceptable to Georgian Dream.</p> -<p>Experienced public diplomacy officers need similar advanced training and professional development to build industry-led skill sets in campaign planning and implementation, program development, audience analysis, measurement, and evaluation, and counseling senior foreign service officers, ambassadors, and policymakers.</p> +<p>Against this background, the October 2024 parliamentary elections were seen as a critical test of Georgia’s future. With Georgian Dream claiming victory in the disputed elections, relations with the Euro-Atlantic community appear set to deteriorate further. Following the election, the US and European countries called for an investigation into how it was conducted and, in particular, the steps taken ahead of the vote by the ruling party to ensure its victory. US President Joe Biden publicly raised concerns about the decline of democracy in Georgia.</p> -<p>Options for collaboration with academia include specialized programs in public diplomacy at institutions such as the University of Southern California’s Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Oklahoma State University’s School of Global Studies, and George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs. Another option is to pair the Foreign Service Institute and R/PPR with academic and research partners, facilitated through the Office of Global Partnerships’ Diplomacy Lab program.</p> +<p>At the same time, having offered ahead of the election to facilitate Georgia’s territorial disputes as a means to promote support for Georgian Dream, Moscow will need to demonstrate that it can deliver progress on a new relationship between Georgia and the two breakaway regions that will satisfy Tbilisi. Given Moscow’s strategic investment in the nominal independence of these regions, the prospects of significant shifts over the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are, however, slim, likely placing an important check on how far Russia–Georgia rapprochement can advance. The Georgian government may well move closer to Russia to test Moscow’s offer, but is likely to continue to pursue multi-alignment in its foreign and security policies rather than joining Russia’s regional organisations such as the CSTO or the EAEU.</p> -<p>As the U.S. government seeks to contain its adversaries’ influence and geopolitical impact, it is critical to consider lessons from the twentieth century. Public diplomacy was a novel tool that helped tip the Cold War stalemate in the United States’ favor. The White House and Congress must prioritize investments in public diplomacy’s capacity to become a competitive tool in the international information ecosystem and reconsider what twenty-first-century public diplomacy requires for effective global strategic communications. The undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs (R) and USAGM’s lack of centrality in the national security community will continue to handcuff U.S. government efforts if inaction persists. Meanwhile, the United States will watch as China and Russia continue to build alliances across the globe and fortify their legitimacy as superpowers.</p> +<h4 id="economic-and-trade-relations">Economic and Trade Relations</h4> -<hr /> +<p>As an economic actor, Russia remains vital for the countries of the South Caucasus. Indeed, sanctions on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine have strengthened interdependence between Russia (and, via the EAEU, Belarus and Central Asia) and the countries of the region. The Ukraine war is having far-reaching impacts on the geo-economics of the South Caucasus, with the region’s role as an energy and trade corridor becoming even more significant, notably for Russia.</p> -<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>Georgia serves as an example for Moscow of how – despite the political tensions between the two governments over the occupied territories – economic cooperation has a positive impact on relations. Indeed, trade with Russia has continued to be strong in recent years. Since 2021, Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia has increased, with some sectors reliant on the Russian market. For example, in 2023, wine exports to Russia increased 5% on the previous year, with the Russian market taking 65% of Georgian wine exports, the highest level since 2013. Although there is widespread Georgian public distrust and even hostility to Russia, views on closer economic relations are mixed.</p> -<p><strong>Phillip Arceneaux</strong> is an assistant professor of strategic communication at Miami University.</p>Daniel F. Runde and Phillip ArceneauxThe United States needs to rethink public diplomacy in an era dominated by great-power competition. U.S. public diplomacy must work harder than ever to showcase the superior attractiveness and value of the United States and its policies over competing alternatives.Countering China And Russia2024-11-14T12:00:00+08:002024-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/countering-china-and-russia<p><em>This brief lays an ana­lytic foundation for considering gender analyses, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) programs, as strategic enablers for accomplishing key Department of Defense (DoD) priorities.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>In order to do so, it first explores the gendered dimensions of authoritarianism and deterrence and then discerns a number of specific ways that WPS programs can be leveraged to give the DoD strategic advantages in critical theaters. CSIS stress-tested these concepts through a tabletop exercise designed to illuminate the conditions under which planners might assess that a gender-informed strategic approach would generate meaningful advantage for the United States. The brief concludes with recommendations for how the DoD might generate enterprise-wide momentum toward meaningfully leveraging WPS tools and incorporating gender perspectives in key processes.</em></p> +<p>For Armenia, despite the political rhetoric about souring ties, economic relations continue to flourish, with a notable rise in exports following the onset of the Ukraine war – widely seen as a result of Armenia (alongside Georgia) becoming a route to Russia for goods that avoided sanctions. Russia is Armenia’s largest trading partner, with an overall foreign trade volume in 2023 of more than 35% and notably 49.6% of Armenia’s imports coming from Russia. In 2022, the volume of trade between Armenia and Russia nearly doubled, a trend that continued through 2023 and the first months of 2024. In 2023, Russia’s over 35% share of the country’s foreign trade contrasted with the EU’s 13%. Russian companies also have considerable investments in Armenia, notably owning key parts of the energy sector and the railways, and make a substantial contribution through taxes to the national budget.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>For Azerbaijan, which has sought to diversity its economic as well as security policy, economic ties with Russia are following a similar trajectory to its neighbours. In 2023, trade between Azerbaijan and Moscow was reported to have risen by 17.5%. Bilateral energy trade has also developed in recent years.</p> -<p>Deterrence — essentially, utilizing instruments of power to convince an adversary to refrain from taking a particular course of action — is a core aspect of the United States’ strategy to halt the advance of authoritarian regimes across multiple domains. In order to better organize the DoD’s deterrent posture, the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) puts forward an intriguing construct: tailored, integrated deterrence. Integrated deterrence is, at its core, a way of reminding the DoD about the fundamentals of deterrence: namely, that it is a psychological calculation rather than a particular widget or program. In order for an adversary to be deterred, it must believe that a course of action that it is considering is not worth pursuing. The key components of strategies that dissuade adversaries from undesirable activities are capabilities, such as the actual military and other elements of national power, and credibility, namely demonstrations of the political will to act in the event a red line is crossed.</p> +<h4 id="cooperation-with-regional-powers">Cooperation with Regional Powers</h4> -<p>The central challenge before the DoD — and the U.S. government more broadly — is to better tailor its deterrent strategies through more creative employment of military ways and means. This requires a better understanding of the psychologies of power and vulnerabilities within adversary regimes. In other words, building deterrence strategies that actually affect the psychological calculations of most U.S. adversary authoritarian regimes requires taking a much more serious look at their power structures and concepts of power, both of which are heavily gendered.</p> +<p>It would appear that Russia has implicitly accepted that it can no longer maintain primacy in the South Caucasus and that other, notably regional, powers will have roles. The Russian regionalisation policy aims at intensifying dialogue, coordination and interaction with the main regional powers engaged in the South Caucasus. Moscow has, however, tried to maintain a regional leadership position through seeking to manage informal cooperation – and competition – with Turkey and Iran. Iran has become a key ally for Russia on the international stage and both countries share an interest in developing closer ties and north–south trade links. On 25 December 2023, the EAEU signed a free-trade agreement with Iran that will eliminate customs duties on almost 90% of goods, thereby linking Russia’s regional economic integration initiative to its efforts to build a wider bloc of friendly countries beyond the post-Soviet space. While Turkey and Russia cooperate and compete in various theatres (often articulated through tactical alliances), including in the South Caucasus, they share an interest in establishing a new regional strategic equilibrium around a potential peace settlement of the Armenia–Azerbaijan confrontation.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The central challenge before the DoD — and the U.S. government more broadly — is to better tailor its deterrent strategies through more creative employment of military ways and means.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Institutionally, Russia supports the 3 + 3 South Caucasus Regional Cooperation Platform format, which sets the stage for the direct participation of Iran and Turkey in determining the future of the region – although Georgia has, to date, boycotted the grouping. Speaking at the October 2024 meeting of the 3 + 3 format, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov indicated that Armenia and Azerbaijan should use the platform to negotiate their peace agreement.</p> -<h3 id="gender-as-a-conceptual-lens">Gender as a Conceptual Lens</h3> +<h4 id="the-armeniaazerbaijan-peace-settlement">The Armenia–Azerbaijan Peace Settlement</h4> -<p>“Gender” does not mean “women”; rather, gender is a way to express and promulgate core notions of identity and power at individual and structural levels. “Gender” as a conceptual lens is not limited to women and women’s representation. Although women often play important roles in challenging authoritarian power structures — as recent events in Iran demonstrate — they do so in opposition to the reactionary gender roles prescribed for all citizens by authoritarian regimes. While women are often drivers for thinking about gendered aspects of security questions — if not catalysts for social change — analytically focusing on one gender misses the bigger societal and structural pictures of which gender is a key part.</p> +<p>A resolution of the bitter Armenia–Azerbaijan relationship through a peace agreement and subsequent process of normalisation stands at the centre of the potential transformation of the South Caucasus. Agreement between Baku and Yerevan would open the region for investment in transport, trade, energy and communications projects, unlock closed borders, and create some of the conditions for Armenia–Turkey normalisation. The nature of an agreement would also have a profound impact on the balance of power within the South Caucasus. For these reasons, the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have become a focus of external actors, with Russia, the EU (notably France and Germany) and the US jockeying for influence and a role in the negotiations.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="methodology"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Methodology</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>With Azerbaijan’s victory in its two military campaigns in 2020 and 2023 to reclaim the occupied territories and the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Russia’s previous leverage around the protracted conflict collapsed as the OSCE Minsk Group process (the diplomatic mechanism established in 1992 to facilitate negotiations to end the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh under the co-chairmanship of the US, Russia and France) was marginalised, Moscow’s leverage as the leading arms supplier to both sides evaporated, and Baku sought to move negotiations between different formats and ultimately to push successfully for direct bilateral Armenia–Azerbaijan contacts as the way forward to exclude third parties (principally Russia, the US and the EU).</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To understand how WPS and gender-related approaches might help illuminate more effective approaches to building tailored, integrated deterrence strategies, CSIS initiated a multipronged project that incorporated a mixed methods analytic approach in its research design. Over the course of one year, CSIS</code></em></p> +<p>With the departure of Russian “peacekeepers” from Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2024, as well as pressure on the Russian relationship with Armenia, Moscow’s ability to use security to shape developments on the ground has been undermined. Instead, it has sought to reposition itself diplomatically to shape developments so that an eventual peace agreement would also serve Russian interests.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">convened six working groups with leading gender, regional, and strategy experts;</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">conducted dozens of research interviews;</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">traveled to both U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) theaters to engage with experts and planners at operational or theater levels; and</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">designed, ran, and analyzed a tabletop exercise to “stress test” and validate insights derived from working group discussions, interviews, and study trips.</code></em></p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Moscow’s goals have been to ensure that Russia has a central role in any agreements about the future shape and management of land transport and communications infrastructure in the South Caucasus, that the Euro-Atlantic community is marginalised, and that the region’s immediate neighbours (Russia, Turkey and Iran) emerge as the key regional arbiters – with Moscow in the lead role. Russia has sought to insert itself into the key issue of a transport corridor across Armenia and to ensure that the INSTC, which is vital to its ability to build economic and trade links to the south, goes ahead. Moscow views a role in these areas as critical to ensuring its regional influence, notably in the Armenia–Azerbaijan relationship.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Research interviews were conducted utilizing a grounded theory approach; that is, theory was designed based on the information shared by interlocutors. In this case, participants were asked to share their views of the major problems they grappled with on a daily basis without reference to gender or WPS efforts. Theories on the utility of gender analytic approaches and WPS programs were constructed afterward.</code></em></p> +<p>The partnership with Azerbaijan has become central to Russia’s efforts to advance this agenda – notably as the transatlantic community has increasingly aligned to support Armenia, leading to growing tensions with Baku. In August 2024, the visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu to Baku underlined how the variety of Russian regional interests are now being channelled through the bilateral relationship. In a meeting with President Aliyev, Shoigu highlighted the intersection of the peace negotiations, the development of the INSTC and the future agenda of the 3 + 3 format to manage the stabilisation of the South Caucasus, with efforts to prevent Western “meddling” in the region.</p> -<h3 id="what-do-authoritarians-want">What Do Authoritarians Want?</h3> +<h3 id="conclusion-russia-retying-the-caucasian-knot">Conclusion: Russia Retying the Caucasian Knot?</h3> -<p>What do authoritarians want? The short answer: power. They use gender scripts and repertoires to consolidate and maintain power; however, in so doing, they offer the United States opportunities to fracture, exploit, or contradict those scripts in ways that serve deterrent strategies. Authoritarian scripts often involve the repression of women and marginalized gender groups and the simultaneous promotion of what it means to be a desirable and powerful man, which may reflect both how authoritarian regimes acquire power and what they believe power is.</p> +<p>For most of the past two hundred years, Russia has pursued relatively stable strategic goals in relation to the South Caucasus region. At the core, Russia has focused on binding the region to itself, as a buffer zone against external encroachment. In more expansionist foreign policy phases, such as since the turn of the 21st century under Putin, the region has been seen as integral to ambitions to extend Russia’s influence and control in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, as well as the Middle East. At such times, the territories and peoples of the South Caucasus have also often been viewed by Moscow as part of a wider Russian world.</p> -<h3 id="russia-gender-and-women">Russia, Gender, and Women</h3> +<p>With the South Caucasus undergoing a transformation, notably as result of geopolitical and geo-economic trends towards multipolarity, Russia’s regional role is displaying elements of continuity, but is increasingly characterised by change. Much of the analysis of the region sees Russia as experiencing a “managed decline” or loss of hegemony because of this process of change. The analysis in this paper, however, points to a different conclusion. Moscow is attempting to refashion its position through a renewed regional approach – seeking to retie the Caucasian knot to ensure a continuing central role for Russia in the South Caucasus, retain close links to countries in the region, and marginalise the Euro-Atlantic community.</p> -<p>Women’s equality is written into Russia’s constitution, and women in Russia occupy a relatively more equal social position than their counterparts in other authoritarian contexts. Yet, as of 2024, it is clear that Vladimir Putin’s brand of authoritarianism relies on strict differentiation between men and women. Russian women occupy a significant place in the labor market, and, in general, they are more educated than Russian men, but the legal and social differentiation of men and women has increased in Russia since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Feminist activists and gender equality advocates have been vocal opponents of the invasion.</p> +<p>Over the past two decades, geopolitical competition with the Euro-Atlantic community in the region has been the key challenge to Russia’s ability to achieve its longstanding strategic goals. In this struggle, the Kremlin has deployed security policy as Russia’s trump card. Up until 2020, it was customary to assume that Russia’s goal in the South Caucasus was to use its security advantage to preserve a favourable status quo. Moscow’s current policy towards the region reflects a shift in some respects from this approach and indicates a changed significance of the South Caucasus in Russia’s strategic calculus.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The legal and social differentiation of men and women has increased in Russia since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Moscow has recognised that the changes in the international politics of the South Caucasus towards multipolarity have provided opportunities for the countries in the region to pursue policies of multi-alignment. This has meant that Russia can no longer approach the region as though it remains part of the post-Soviet space where it has an exclusive role, and some of its past policy levers have lost traction – notably in respect to the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. At the same time, the breakdown of ties with Europe and the US has forced Moscow to seek to reorient its foreign and economic ties south and east.</p> -<p>In the Soviet era, Russian laws supported gender equality, but then, as now, women’s social role was heavily centered on their childbearing and childrearing capacity. Although many women held jobs outside the home, they were banned from professions that might threaten their reproductive health, and pronatalist policies featured heavily in Soviet economic plans. Indeed, especially today, Russian women are encouraged to bear children to counter the nation’s declining birth rate — a statistic associated with decreased competitiveness in the global economy. Cloaked in the language of “traditional values,” Moscow’s sustained campaign against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ+) rights can also be understood in light of its pronatalist stance.</p> +<p>Russia now looks on the South Caucasus not just as a buffer against the Euro-Atlantic community and a means to strengthen its power projection ambitions in the Black Sea and the Middle East, but also as a vital link to Iran, as well as the location of potential southern routes to access markets and build political and security ties across Eurasia. Russia is therefore rebalancing and realigning its policies to continue to be a central regional player in the South Caucasus, even if this requires a shift from its previous reliance on security policy and the ambition to exclude other external powers from the region.</p> -<p>This emphasis on “traditional values” has not always been a part of Vladimir Putin’s political arsenal. He began emphasizing cultural traditionalism (and restrictive gender roles for men and women) toward the end of his second term as president (2007–2008) and ramped up the rhetoric significantly after returning to the presidency in 2012. Along with his performance of virile masculine virtues in public spaces and photo opportunities, Putin began drawing starker lines of contrast between Russian “civilization” and the West. The close connections and affinity between Putin’s regime and the Russian army — an organization notorious for the brutality not only of its battlefield tactics, but also of its barracks culture — further underlined the importance of aggressive, “macho” behavior in legitimizing Putin’s abrogation of political opposition. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the violence of the war and domestic violence have been mutually reinforcing.</p> +<p>Moscow is today willing to accommodate and even cooperate with other international actors, notably Iran, China and even Turkey, in the South Caucasus, and it has also adapted by developing new and varied bilateral ties with the three South Caucasian states to shape the regional agenda, particularly on economic and transport issues. However, the Kremlin remains focused on blocking Euro-Atlantic integration efforts in the region, and is willing to work with other regional powers to advance this goal. Indeed, Moscow is now looking to develop its new approach in the South Caucasus as part of a larger Eurasian security initiative, driven, together with China, Iran and other partners, as a counter-West bloc.</p> -<p>These restrictive visions of gender cut across Russia’s many social, ethnic, and cultural divides. In places where support for Putin might be limited because of his regime’s actions in the past — Chechnya, for example — promoting this version of violent, dominating masculinity is a way to consolidate support in certain quarters (and divide potential opposition by casting the regime’s role in “natural” and “nonpolitical” terms). Public memory of the chaos of the 1990s makes calls for order (even if restrictive) appealing across Russia.</p> +<p>Moscow is also experiencing real challenges in forging a new approach to the South Caucasus. It is having to contend with an increasingly complex region in which not only is there a diversity of other, often competitive, external actors, but also the governments of the region have a new degree of agency in developing their foreign relationships. As a result, Moscow is facing resistance to its efforts to insert itself within the central issues that could reshape the regional order, notably the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and the associated initiatives to open the region’s transport network.</p> -<h3 id="china-gender-and-women">China, Gender, and Women</h3> +<p>Faced with the prospect of being marginalised from the peace process, Putin made a rare state visit to Baku in August 2024 to promote Moscow’s regional role. The visit was marked by positive words, photo opportunities and commitments to cooperation (notably on the INSTC). Putin appeared, however, unable to reverse the steps that have seen Russia pushed out from its former regional role. Critically, since the early 1990s, Russia – together with the US and Europe – has been at the centre of diplomatic efforts to resolve the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. Since 2020 and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Baku has, however, managed to exclude major third parties from discussions, even turning to Kazakhstan to host peace negotiations.</p> -<p>Women in twentieth and twenty-first century China have found their social and legal position highly dependent on the internal politics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): despite robust official rhetoric about communism’s equality principles, men remain socially and legally advantaged over women. As of 2024, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is undergoing a period of rising discrimination against women and inequality between men and women. Indeed, the CCP has been intensifying its crackdown on feminist activists and is increasingly reliant on the subjugation of women to maintain its hold on power. This is evident in the proliferation of unchecked gender-based violence, emphasis on “harmony” in response to dissent, and the performance of stereotypical masculinity by Xi and other high-ranking officials.</p> +<p>During his visit to Baku, Putin indicated, with a degree of desperation, that he would “be happy” to serve as a regional peacemaker, but neither Baku nor Yerevan has responded positively. At the same time, the decision of Armenia and Azerbaijan to exclude the issue of the Zangezur Corridor from discussions on a peace agreement struck a direct blow to Moscow’s efforts to reinsert itself between the two countries, leading to further, unsuccessful Russian diplomatic efforts.</p> -<p>Rising economic uncertainty in China in the early 2020s has been accompanied by new policies pushing women into traditional roles of wife and mother in the home and making it far more difficult for women to obtain a divorce. Concern over a “masculinity crisis” has led to crackdowns on certain kinds of popular music, clothing, and other forms of expression deemed too “feminine” for Chinese men. At the same time, official rhetoric in support of Xi Jinping has focused on his paternal and masculine qualities, painting him as an ideal type of husband and father. Mirroring the CCP’s characterization of the Chinese state as a familial unit, this rhetoric makes space both for increasing the centralization of power in the CCP and for collectively enduring potential economic downturns. Sexist elements of Confucianism tend to replace the more egalitarian language of Marxism in these displays.</p> +<p>Russia’s South Caucasus policies are thus at a key moment. Moscow has recognised the importance of the shifts taking place in the region and is taking action to try to ensure that it remains a key regional player. Despite the advantages that Russia has as a consequence of history and geography and the country’s strong security policies, it is nevertheless facing a struggle to reposition itself in the South Caucasus. There is a real prospect that the Kremlin’s efforts to forge a renewed regional role may prove unsuccessful, and Moscow may emerge from the process of realignment a significantly reduced regional force. The high-level political engagement in the region, notably signalled by Putin’s visit to Baku, suggests, however, that the Kremlin is prepared to commit significant political capital to ensure that Russia remains a leading regional actor, and to show that Moscow is not ready to accept a diminished role.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As of 2024, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is undergoing a period of rising discrimination against women and inequality between men and women.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="implications-for-the-euro-atlantic-community">Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Community</h4> -<p>At the same time, China’s economic uncertainty will be directly impacted by women’s choices. Decades of the infamous one-child policy have produced severely declining birthrates in China, threatening a demographic contraction that will likely lead to greater instability. Efforts to both encourage and shame women into marriage and childbearing have had little discernible effect thus far, and, among younger generations, women — and to a lesser extent even men — express solidarity with feminism and gender equality. Most significantly, Chinese women were at the forefront of protests in China against the CCP’s draconian Covid-19 policies. The CCP’s campaign to shut down feminist dissent networks was only partially successful, as their previous anti-dissent campaigns focused on the threat of male dissenters. Women’s criticism of the regime poses a more complicated threat to the CCP’s dominance of the political discourse in China, in part because of the efforts the CCP has made to exclude them from the political realm and because of the growing popularity of feminist ideas among ordinary young women.</p> +<p>The changing geopolitics of the South Caucasus and Russia’s shifting regional approach pose a challenge for the Euro-Atlantic community. Over the past two decades, the prospect of eventual EU and NATO integration has been the main policy framework to build support and attract regional states. The approach marries values – in support of human rights, rule of law and democratisation – with a geopolitical approach to counter Russia and its integration offer, notably through access to European markets and financial assistance.</p> -<p>In other words, as Xi strengthens his grip on power in Beijing, the CCP is fomenting concerns that boys are being “feminized,” and it has chosen not to place women in CCP leadership positions, a move that appears to contradict decades of Chinese policy promoting gender equality. Indeed, Beijing’s vision of a strong China now includes returning women to traditional gender roles — such as pushing them into marriage and childbirth — and cracking down on feminist activism. Much more directly, the Xinjiang crackdown has an extremely strong gendered element — specifically the elimination of Uyghur masculinity and the mass sterilization of women, combined with the imposition of Han men on Uyghur households.</p> +<p>Since 2008, Moscow has, however, been able to thwart Euro-Atlantic integration through its dominance of regional security politics. Unwilling to challenge Russia’s security trump card, the Euro-Atlantic community has officially followed an open-door policy for NATO and EU membership for Georgia, and maintained a readiness to advance ties to Azerbaijan and Armenia if there is an opportunity. In reality, the EU and NATO tracks have effectively been stalled, even in the case of Georgia, which has been at the forefront of building ties.</p> -<h3 id="a-dictators-gender-playbook">A Dictator’s Gender Playbook</h3> +<p>With shifts in the international politics of the South Caucasus, a policy built on “strategic patience” is well past its expiry date. The changes that have affected the South Caucasus have shifted the region from being an exclusively European security region, as it was in the decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to one increasingly linked to the Middle East, South Asia and China. The countries of the South Caucasus now have alternative partners to the Euro-Atlantic community (and Russia), notably for trade, infrastructure investment and business, but also for the supply of weapons and for diplomatic ties. While these ties may lack the potential of Euro-Atlantic integration, they offer immediate and tangible gains, especially in comparison to the promise of a bright future of EU and NATO membership that never seems to quite arrive.</p> -<p>Both Beijing and Moscow are weaponizing aspects of gender to advance their own strategic aims — and in somewhat similar ways. Indeed, there almost appears to be a gender-oriented “Dictator’s Playbook” with the following elements:</p> +<p>The links to other external actors generally also come without the formal conditionality attached by the Euro-Atlantic community. The development of multipolarity has, in this way, reinforced the ability of local elites to advance illiberalism. As a result, Russian-style authoritarian politics has taken hold in Georgia and is consolidated in Azerbaijan, while democratisation remains fragile and vulnerable in Armenia. With this shift, the idea that the region will become part of the Euro-Atlantic community through eventual EU and NATO membership looks unrealistic.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Women support national strength by serving as wives and mothers within the politically stabilizing institution of marriage</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Western ideas about sexuality are a threat to national strength</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Power means domination over other countries</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Young people are weaker than the generation the leaders came from, especially young men, and a demographic crisis looms without change</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Women in power are deceitful and threatening</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>This presents a dilemma for the Euro-Atlantic community: either continue to criticise non-democratic governments and risk them shifting orientation to Russia and others, or try to retain engagement but then face working with regimes that do not reflect Western values. In either option, Euro-Atlantic integration will struggle to advance. In recent years, Georgia has represented this challenge most starkly. The adoption of increasingly antidemocratic practices by Georgian Dream, the ruling party, and the cultivation of a diversity of external ties have seen a withdrawal of Euro-Atlantic security and economic support. After decades of effort to advance Tbilisi as the key Euro-Atlantic partner in the South Caucasus, Georgia was largely absent from the Washington NATO Summit Communique in 2024. An EU report on Georgia’s progress towards membership that appeared immediately after the October 2024 election appeared to indicate that the membership process was effectively frozen.</p> -<p>These gender-driven positions are spilling over into the politics and strategic priorities of third-party states. As elites in Georgia, for example, are expanding cooperation with both Moscow and Beijing, they are simultaneously targeting women political leaders and rolling back progress on gender equity. Conversely, upward of 60,000 Ukrainian women have been on the front lines of the country’s war against Moscow, enhancing the resilience and resistance capabilities of Ukraine overall in the face of an overwhelming adversary. Interviews on the ground in Ukraine in August 2023 suggested that investments in civil society — and in particular women’s groups — since 2014 helped create a sufficiently prodemocratic Ukrainian identity that, in turn, contributed to a ferocious national will to fight. In Iran, which engages in gender apartheid, a powerful protest movement has been challenging the authority and legitimacy of the Ayatollah’s radical Islamic regime — a protest movement that was sparked and carried forward by women and girls.</p> +<p>As the Euro-Atlantic position has weakened in Georgia, there has been an effort to pivot to Armenia, including supplying security assistance and even military equipment. This will add little to Armenia’s overall defence and deterrence, but the shift risks being seen as taking sides within the region, further accelerating the militarisation of the South Caucasus and contributing to the emergence of a new round of internal divisions just as the prospects of a new regional settlement are emerging. In any case, Armenia’s prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration will be constrained by the same developments that have affected the other countries of the region – Russia’s readiness to use its range of policies, and centrally its willingness to use security and military tools, to prevent Euro-Atlantic enlargement, and the appearance of attractive alternative international partners.</p> -<p>The question is: If U.S. adversaries are using similar gender-conservative playbooks, what might these gendered activities mean for U.S. strategy broadly, and for tailored, integrated deterrence specifically? In other words, gender appears to represent a critical societal fault line for contemporary authoritarian regimes — and a key, if perhaps underappreciated, mechanism for mobilizing prodemocratic forces and national will to fight. This leads to an interesting proposition: might gender-related tools, and primarily those associated with the WPS toolkit, provide the United States and the DoD with key vectors for tailoring its integrated deterrence strategies.</p> +<p>The risks for the Euro-Atlantic community of failing to find an effective means of engagement in the region are highlighted by Azerbaijan. Having turned away from Euro-Atlantic integration, Baku has been able to consolidate its authoritarian political order and reclaim the occupied territories and Nagorno-Karabakh, employing approaches that have led to ethnic cleansing. Euro-Atlantic actors appear largely powerless regarding either development. Indeed, Europe has been keen to develop closer energy and transport links to Azerbaijan, even as Baku has followed this domestic and foreign policy course.</p> -<h3 id="strategic-concepts-using-wps-and-gender-analyses-as-strategic-enablers-for-building-competitive-advantage">Strategic Concepts: Using WPS and Gender Analyses as Strategic Enablers for Building Competitive Advantage</h3> +<p>The Euro-Atlantic community must now look at the emerging regional realities and craft a regional policy capable of influencing contemporary developments. Given the broader confrontation with Russia, weakening Moscow’s presence in the South Caucasus and disrupting its efforts to rebuild a new regional position for itself should be at the heart of a regional strategy for the Euro-Atlantic community. A key emphasis should be on countering Moscow’s efforts to position itself in the regional trade and communications infrastructure to support its war effort and reinforce its strategic partnership with Iran.</p> -<p>As one interlocutor over the course of the study noted: given the manifold strategic advantages that WPS programs and capabilities can present for the United States, it may be time for the DoD enterprise writ large to consider gender as a significant dimension of competition rather than as a set of abstract concepts. While a number of components, for example INDOPACOM, have already taken and are promulgating this conceptual approach, the concept of gender as a domain needs to be understood throughout all of the DoD’s echelons.</p> +<p>The focus of Western policy should be on strengthening the sovereignty and independence of regional states and their ability to balance Russia through multi-alignment (in which context the Euro-Atlantic community can remain a leading partner), and to undermine Russia’s efforts to control them or to shepherd them into regional and international formats (such as the 3 + 3 and the BRICS) that exclude Europe and the US. This approach should also include supporting and investing in projects such as the Middle Corridor that will help economic diversification and promote external investment, while seeking to constrain projects that strengthen the Russia–Iran north–south axis and enable Moscow to reshape regional trade and transport around its own agenda.</p> -<p>If gender is a dimension of competition, WPS tools then logically become a DoD strategic enabler — that is, a mechanism for more effective accomplishment of DoD activities and priorities. Accordingly, by considering the interrelated problems of strategic competition and tailored, integrated deterrence within a gender perspective, this brief underscores a number of ways that the DoD can leverage WPS as a strategic enabler to build advantages:</p> +<p>Supporting the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, including measures to build trust and confidence to overcome the legacy of conflict, will be critical, as this agreement is central to opening the region. To play such a role, the Euro-Atlantic community will need to be more effective in balancing its approaches with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Rebuilding a political relationship with Baku, which is increasingly the regional agenda-setter, to go beyond energy cooperation will be a necessary step to balance Moscow–Baku ties. If peace can be achieved, there will also be opportunities to advance regional cooperation among the South Caucasus countries, which Russia has effectively undercut to date, and which can help to balance Moscow’s policies by strengthening regional balancing.</p> + +<p>While domestic political forces more favourable to the West may re-emerge in the countries of the South Caucasus, the geopolitical and geo-economic context in the region militates against the Euro-Atlantic integration model regaining traction, with its interdependent security, normative and economic elements. Russia has begun to adapt its approach to the South Caucasus as the region undergoes change, and so must the West. Support for democracy and human rights should be pursued, where realistic, but its prioritisation will need to be balanced with the geopolitical imperative of building relationships to counter Russia and its major allies.</p> + +<p>Enhancing coordination with Turkey on regional issues should be a priority. Ankara is continuing to strengthen its South Caucasus interests and engagement as part of a broader strategy reaching to Central Asia and across the Black Sea. An opening of the South Caucasus would inevitably see an even greater Turkish presence. As a NATO member, Turkey is uniquely placed to strengthen regional security that aligns with the wider interests of the Euro-Atlantic community, if common cause can be promoted.</p> + +<p>Without a readiness to adapt, the Euro-Atlantic community is likely to face a growing regional marginalisation and the prospect that Russia will be able to reposition itself, while the countries of the South Caucasus are likely to be drawn increasingly into regional and international groupings that exclude the US and Europe. To challenge Russia effectively and to rebuild regional influence, the Euro-Atlantic community will need to recalibrate its policies and move beyond approaches that have lost the ability to shape regional developments effectively.</p> + +<p>This will involve difficult trade-offs, including working with non-democratic regimes. It will also mean being ready to acknowledge that the South Caucasus is unlikely to be part of a wider Europe, and so should be approached through the sort of foreign and security policy frameworks that are applied to other such parts of the world, rather than through integration. While such a shift will be challenging, Russia is at a uniquely vulnerable moment in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes far-reaching change. Although Russia is already active in repairing its position, the Euro-Atlantic community nevertheless has an opportunity to help facilitate a regional realignment that could substantially constrain Moscow.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Neil Melvin</strong> is Director of the International Security research group at RUSI. Prior to joining RUSI, he was Director of the Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme and then Director of Research at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). He has held senior adviser positions in the OSCE and the Energy Charter. He has published widely on the international and security politics of the South Caucasus.</p>Neil MelvinThis paper explores the challenge to Russia’s established position in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes significant change.Project Atom 20242024-11-18T12:00:00+08:002024-11-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/project-atom-2024<p><em>There is a growing risk that U.S. adversaries might resort to nuclear use in a regional conflict. To help address for this threat, the Project on Nuclear Issues invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for responding to strategic deterrence failure.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="heather-williams-reja-younis-and-lachlan-mackenzie">Heather Williams, Reja Younis, and Lachlan MacKenzie</h4> +</blockquote> + +<p>There is a growing risk that the United States and its allies could face scenarios in which one or more adversaries might resort to nuclear weapons use in a regional conflict. This risk is especially evident in Russian strategic theory and doctrine, which envisions regional deterrence as complementing global deterrence. Some Russian military experts see the potential use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons for “de-escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions favorable to the Russian Federation,” or “a demonstration to the enemy of resolve to defend [Russia’s] interests by escalating the use of nuclear weapons (tactical) and forcing him to forego further aggression by the threat of use of strategic nuclear weapons.” Statements by North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un indicate that the country’s nuclear arsenal is also intended for deterrence in a regional conflict, such as a potential decapitation strike. Moreover, China has been rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal for both military reasons and to gain geopolitical leverage, as argued by Tong Zhao, such as upholding its “core interests” in Taiwan.</p> + +<p>Due to these growing risks of regional crisis escalation with potential for nuclear use, U.S. decisionmakers are revisiting the concept of intra-war deterrence, which is about influencing enemy actions during an ongoing conflict. The risks of deterrence failure have been a focal point in the testimony of recent U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commanders, including Admiral Charles Richard, who noted in 2020 that STRATCOM conducted analysis into the risks of strategic deterrence failure, and General Anthony Cotton, who said, “We must be ready if deterrence fails” in testimony in February 2024. Intra-war deterrence operates on the premise that in an active conflict, threats can be leveraged to shape an adversary’s actions and set boundaries on the intensity and nature of military engagement. This concept underpinned much Cold War strategic thinking. One fundamental challenge of intra-war deterrence is how to balance deterrence objectives with war-fighting objectives. As W. Andrew Terrill writes regarding the mismatch of these objectives, “a state pursuing such [an intra-war] policy is waging war against another nation while seeking to prevent its opponent from responding with all of the weapons that it possesses. Such a task is . . . challenging since both sides usually seek to use as much of their capabilities as possible to optimize their chances of victory.”</p> + +<p>To assist in this thinking and to develop actionable insights for the U.S. policy and strategy communities, the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for responding to strategic deterrence failure. This study revives a concept and approach that the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) developed a decade ago to review U.S. nuclear strategy and posture for 2025–2050. The project’s current contributors were each asked to respond to a scenario involving near-simultaneous battlefield nuclear use by Russia and China. The strategies focused on four specific themes: strategic objectives, assurance to allies, military responses, and non-kinetic responses. The strategies demonstrate agreement on key issues, such as the importance of deterring conventional aggression and the relevance of non-kinetic responses to adversary nuclear use. But the strategies also highlight important areas of disagreement about the relative importance and feasibility of assuring allies, at least relative to other strategic objectives; the advisability of a nuclear versus conventional response to deterrence failure; and what “winning” in a strategic deterrence failure scenario would look like. While many people may disagree with these positions, PONI welcomes a diverse range of views, which can help foster a robust debate. CSIS does not take an institutional view, and the views presented here are those of the individual contributors.</p> + +<p>After providing an overview of the authors’ competing strategies, this chapter presents the project’s guiding assumptions and analytic framework. This introductory analysis then distills three principles for intra-war deterrence: establishing (or maintaining) regional deterrence, restoring assurance, and planning precrisis for intra-war deterrence. These principles capture areas of consensus among the strategies while also engaging with areas of disagreement in order to identify which policy options are best suited for the current strategic environment.</p> + +<h4 id="competing-strategies-for-intra-war-deterrence">Competing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence</h4> + +<p>As a foundation for Project Atom’s analysis, PONI provided the authors a scenario that features concurrent nuclear aggression from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. The scenario, set in 2027, is predicated on the following assumptions:</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>WPS as a flanking maneuver.</strong> China and Russia have both ceded this space by ignoring WPS initiatives — that is, by not participating in decisionmaking processes to elevate women’s engagement in peace, political, and security discussions. As a result, this gives the United States, and the DoD specifically, opportunities to outflank Chinese and Russian activities in the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific theaters, if not globally.</p> + <p>Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin remain the leaders of the PRC and Russia, respectively.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>WPS as a mechanism to expand the competitive space.</strong> WPS represents unique opportunities to interact and engage with partner and allied nations in a theater that is entirely absent China’s participation. For instance, WPS opens pathways for enhanced dialogue between the United States and say, Japan, via Track 1.5 dialogues that have positive externalities that span beyond the WPS mission. To that end, WPS represents a key vector for shaping allied and partner perceptions that is presently underutilized.</p> + <p>The PRC and Russia have not relinquished their territorial claims — that is, the PRC continues to pursue “reunification” with Taiwan, and Russia maintains its claims on annexed Ukrainian territory.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>WPS as a mechanism for crisis assurance and communication on other non-WPS national security matters.</strong> Among democratic states, WPS creates positive spaces that are often viewed as not politically controversial. Accordingly, the United States ought to consider how WPS spaces might create vectors for communicating broader policy messages to key allies and partners in theater.</p> + <p>The war in Ukraine continues as a stalemate. Western aid for Ukraine continues.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>WPS and gender as a strategic offset vis-à-vis Russia’s numerical superiority in a warfighting context.</strong> A recent CSIS report found that “European states are likely to face significant challenges conducting large-scale combat missions, particularly in such areas as heavy maneuver forces, naval combatants, and support capabilities such as logistics and fire support.” Much like during the Cold War, Russia has a vast supply of manpower that it is willing to expend on the front lines in Ukraine (and elsewhere). During the Cold War, that numerical advantage was offset by U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear weapons. As it is unlikely that the United States will want to utilize nuclear weapons in a contemporary contingency unless absolutely necessary, U.S. allies and partners in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) must be able to call upon their entire populations to resist and deter Russian aggression.</p> + <p>Western sanctions damage the Russian economy and drive continued economic cooperation between Russia and the PRC.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>WPS and gender as a tool for societal resilience vis-à-vis an expansionist Russia.</strong> As one strategy expert noted, “deterrence is ” In other words, the ability of a society to withstand attacks by aggressors is a key aspect of deterrence strategies, and it informs issues like continuity of governance and operations planning. As discovered during a research trip in August 2023, women’s groups in Ukraine were — and are — critical in building national-level societal cohesion and resistance to authoritarian aggression. Designing gender-informed strategic offsets and societal resilience strategies requires incorporating gender perspectives centrally into national security and societal resilience planning and preparedness operations, rather than as an afterthought.</p> + <p>Russia manages to partially rebuild its conventional military despite low GDP growth, related financial challenges, and ongoing fighting.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Gender treatment as a key strategic competition indicator or warning.</strong> Democratic backsliding in order to cater to authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia is almost always accompanied by gender-based harassment and the undermining of women’s rights. Given that almost all contemporary authoritarian regimes double down on these gender-based playbooks, it is worth exploring how the utilization of gender by U.S. allies, partners, and adversaries can inform indicators and warnings about regime trajectories.</p> + <p>PRC GDP growth stabilizes between 3 and 4 percent, compared to the United States’ approximately 2 percent. The two economies remain deeply intertwined.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Women fighters as strategic assets.</strong> Much as women in Ukraine have been critical on the front lines in the war against Russia, Kurdish women’s units were fierce fighters against the Islamic State. Further, the reputational damage to misogynistic Islamic State fighters being forced to fight — and lose — to women made such women’s units strategic rather than tactical assets. This suggests the need to more meaningfully consider the utility of women and women’s units within combat formations to create military advantage.</p> + <p>The United States and its allies proceed with their planned defense modernization and preparedness efforts. The United States forward deploys additional forces to Europe and the Indo-Pacific.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>It is worth underscoring that these concepts are primarily focused on women and the application of the WPS toolkit. However, given that many contemporary authoritarian regimes use a militaristic, misogynistic version of masculinity to consolidate and promulgate power, considerable further work should be done to understand how different masculinities and different genders might intersect with efforts to implement NDS objectives and tailor deterrent strategies.</p> +<p>By March 2027 in this scenario, Taiwan’s domestic political landscape has shifted decisively against reunification. In response to pro-independence statements from Taiwanese presidential candidates, PRC officials begin to publicly discuss using military force to achieve reunification. In the ensuing weeks, the U.S. intelligence community observes the beginnings of a PRC military buildup in Fujian Province.</p> -<h3 id="testing-the-utility-of-wps-informed-approaches-in-dod-scenarios-through-tabletop-exercises">Testing the Utility of WPS-Informed Approaches in DoD Scenarios through Tabletop Exercises</h3> +<p>Around the same time as this buildup, Xi and Putin host a summit at which Putin voices support for the PRC’s position on Taiwan. The two leaders announce joint naval drills in the Pacific to coincide with Russian conventional and nuclear exercises near Russia’s Western borders in mid-May.</p> -<p>What might applying these concepts in practice look like? How might a WPS or gender-forward approach modify approaches to operations, activities, and investments (OAIs) in key theaters? And do practitioners agree with the premise that such WPS-informed approaches might generate strategic advantage for the United States? To discern answers to these questions, CSIS designed a series of tabletop exercises (TTXs) that allowed players to develop new OAIs associated with global competition against China and Russia. The following insights were gained through that activity.</p> +<p>In preparation for what they consider an imminent threat, the United States and its allies signal that “wars of conquest will be punished” and bolster their defensive postures through expanded forward deployments and elevated readiness levels in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. In the weeks preceding the joint PRC-Russian exercise, a Ukrainian offensive makes significant gains and threatens Russian control of Crimea.</p> -<p>First, according to player assessments, gender-linked OAIs produced greater advantages in long-term competition. As one participant noted, “if you have one country or society that is willing to mobilize 100 percent of its people and one that is only willing to mobilize 49 percent of its people, one’s got a big advantage over the other.” In the words of another player, “the quantity that our adversaries have when it comes to an actual contingency . . . given their numerical superiority, just the mass they can throw at these problems . . . ensuring that all of society and our allies and partners [are] able to mobilize, to resist and to deter, [to] defend all these things is going to be essential.”</p> +<p>On May 14, the joint PRC-Russian naval exercise begins in the Western Pacific. The following day, the PRC begins missile strikes on Taiwan in preparation for a full-scale invasion. On May 16, Russia conducts conventional missile strikes against Polish transportation infrastructure. Xi and Putin release statements justifying their own actions and supporting the other’s.</p> -<p>Second, there was no meaningful difference between the treatments with respect to escalation risk. In other words, players believed that gender-informed competition mechanisms and OAIs constituted a net positive. Gender-informed competition, especially activities that linked civil society groups and showed that U.S. partners had a great capacity to mobilize diverse constituencies, supported integrated deterrence and campaigning.</p> +<p>NATO promptly invokes Article 5, and the United States and its allies begin highly successful conventional campaigns against the PRC and Russia. In the Indo-Pacific, U.S. and allied forces interdict PRC landing craft before they reach Taiwan. Heavy People’s Liberation Army (PLA) casualties prompt limited anti-mobilization protests across China. In Europe, Polish and Lithuanian forces push into Kaliningrad Oblast and threaten to seize Kaliningrad City. NATO states begin to deploy forces to Ukraine, while Ukrainian forces advance with NATO assistance and prepare for an invasion of Crimea.</p> -<p>During the TTX discussion, participants ultimately concluded that U.S. adversaries, particularly China, were likely to view any action as escalatory by virtue of the fact that Beijing is likely to be hostile to any form of increased U.S. activity. Escalation might therefore be better conceived as a given rather than something to be avoided. Further, one participant noted that the United States might do well to design activities that would force adversaries to respond. A number of participants maintained that a command post exercise that tested whole-of-society mobilization in the INDOPACOM AOR might be one useful way to do this while simultaneously building capacity.</p> +<p>On June 2, Russia strikes Polish transportation infrastructure and NATO forces threatening Kaliningrad with low-yield (&lt; 10 kt) nuclear weapons, inflicting approximately 1,000 casualties (including some Americans). Putin warns NATO of “total annihilation” if it does not cease its “aggression.” On June 3, the PRC conducts a 50 kt nuclear strike on a U.S. naval base in the Philippines, resulting in 15,000 casualties. Xi Jinping warns that “Anyone aiding the splitists in Taiwan . . . will face the wrath of a people determined to rejuvenate their nation at any cost.”</p> -<p>The discussion of escalation led to contemplating whether supporting women’s groups might lead to authoritarian backlash. Women’s groups, and women individually, are often targets for repression and retaliation; in any number of instances when women rise in status under authoritarian regimes, conspiracy theories circulate that their power is a result of U.S. backing. In order to minimize such risk, efforts to engage women and women’s groups should be treated carefully and with the overall intention to do no harm.</p> +<h4 id="comparing-strategies-for-intra-war-deterrence">Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence</h4> -<p>Third, there was no major difference with respect to how players assessed long-term competitive effects and regional prioritization for OAIs between the two treatments. Both treatments saw groups prioritize preparing partners as the optimal long-term strategy in support of integrated deterrence and campaigning (48 percent in gender-linked OAI treatments, 45 percent in non-gender-linked treatments). Regionally, across the treatments players focused on activities in INDOPACOM (75 percent in gender-linked OAI treatments, 67 percent in non-gender-linked treatments). Last, there was a similar distribution with respect to complementary interagency activity. Across both treatments, players emphasized combining military competition with diplomacy and measures designed to inform and influence targeted populations.</p> +<p>The PONI team provided experts with four framing assumptions and respective guiding questions as an analytical framework, which are discussed later in this introduction. This report contains five chapters, each of which constitutes a distinct strategy for intra-war deterrence. A comparison of the strategies across the analytical framework is provided in Tables 1–4; discussion of the framing assumptions then follows.</p> -<p>The only meaningful difference between treatments was with respect to intelligence. In treatments with gender-linked OAIs, players appear to have assessed that working with civil society groups gave them increased situational awareness, as they less frequently selected intelligence activities. This is likely due to a sense that WPS-linked activities helped them better understand the operational environment.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YNVe0OD.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Table 1: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — U.S. Strategic Objectives</em></p> -<p>In other words, what became apparent from the TTX is that planners assess that WPS has a key role to play in great power competition. This is because WPS can help mobilize diverse constituencies in partner states (capacity) and increase the ability of the United States to counter malign actions in the gray zone (capability) — especially since the United States is often blind to adversary operations designed to hijack civil society. WPS represents a way to more effectively counter authoritarian strategies to compete with, if not undermine, U.S. positioning and leadership.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SEs7pgx.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ Table 2: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — Assuring Allies</em></p> -<h3 id="applying-the-insights-the-european-and-pacific-deterrence-initiatives">Applying the Insights: The European and Pacific Deterrence Initiatives</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/M3vYNnZ.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ Table 3: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — Military Response Options</em></p> -<p>The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) are flagship programs designed to better organize DoD programs and capabilities intended to communicate U.S. and partner red lines to Moscow and Beijing, respectively. Because they are also theater-specific programs with dedicated congressional authorization, oversight, and funding levels, they provide key insights into how the DoD implements its deterrence strategies over multiple fiscal years. Critically, gender and WPS are rarely, if ever, referenced in discussions about EDI and PDI — which creates opportunities for usefully reconsidering how such approaches might inform OAIs for the EUCOM and INDOPACOM theaters. Combining insights from all the research conducted over the course of the study, some ideas for recalibrating PDI and EDI investments with a gender-informed approach emerge:</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gD1348E.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ Table 4: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — Non-Kinetic Response Options</em></p> + +<h4 id="framing-assumptions">Framing Assumptions</h4> + +<p><em>U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES</em></p> + +<p><strong>Assumption #1:</strong> In the event that strategic deterrence fails and an adversary has used a single or multiple nuclear weapons, the United States will be forced to confront competing priorities to uphold security commitments to allies, manage further escalation, and resolve the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. The adversaries may assume they have more at stake in a regional crisis than the United States and thereby question U.S. resolve. This raises the following questions with regard to U.S. strategic objectives in the event of strategic deterrence failure:</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Exercising.</strong> Within INDOPACOM, the DoD could increase the number of exercises with partner units that have a higher number of women entering their ranks — such as the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and Philippine forces during the annual Balikatan exercise — to show how to build partner capacity while signaling the expanding role of women in defense, something China will struggle to match.</p> + <p>In what ways, if any, did the United States fail to demonstrate resolve and commitment to its strategic objectives in the lead-up to nuclear use? Why did deterrence fail? Could anything have been done to prevent strategic deterrence failure?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Increased presence.</strong> The DoD can use permanent and rotational forces to demonstrate to allies and partners in theater the power and utility of women in combat, as well as in combat support and combat service support Likewise, both Moscow and Beijing are utilizing regressive gender roles as mechanisms for consolidating state power. The United States might consider using its increased forward presence to demonstrate other more democratic and meritocratic gender roles that can undermine adversary morale and cohesion.</p> + <p>What are the United States’ core objectives in this scenario, and how should the United States prioritize its strategic objectives? Is one area of operations more important than another in this scenario?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Network-building.</strong> The DoD can work with women’s groups in countries like Papua New Guinea to build information-gathering mechanisms for monitoring Chinese economic coercion and infrastructure projects that are damaging to the region. Doing so might simultaneously empower women within local societies and create new mechanisms for countering China’s economic expansionism and elite capture strategies.</p> + <p>What does “winning” look like? How would the United States know if deterrence has been “restored”?</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p>Identifying and prioritizing strategic objectives will be critical following adversary nuclear use, and this will require understanding why deterrence failed. Authors reached different conclusions on this point. Ford, on one hand, concludes that deterrence failed because of adversary perceptions about U.S. credibility that had built up over years. He argues that there may have been nothing that U.S. policymakers could have done to deter adversary aggression in the immediate run-up to the crisis. Panda, on the other hand, points to the swift defeat of adversary conventional forces as a primary driver of escalation, adding that the adversary may believe that limited nuclear use can deter the United States from further involvement. Weaver suggests that the United States may have failed to credibly signal its resolve to defend its allies and partners but acknowledges that deterrence failure may have alternatively stemmed from adversary miscalculations about their abilities to fight and win conventional conflicts against the United States and its partners.</p> + +<p>While the authors agree about the importance of avoiding full-scale nuclear war following deterrence failure, they disagree about the relevance and prioritization of other strategic objectives. Sisson, for example, identifies only two U.S. strategic objectives: preventing general nuclear war and preventing further nuclear detonations of any type in any location. Similarly, Panda writes that “no objective should be greater for the president of the United States than ensuring that the survival of the country is not threatened by the prospect of uncontrollable escalation into a general nuclear war.” Ford and Gibbons also both list avoiding nuclear war as the primary U.S. objective but identify a range of secondary strategic objectives, including denying the adversary battlefield victory, denying the adversary any advantage specifically from having used nuclear weaponry, and maintaining alliance relationships. Conversely, Weaver lists four strategic objectives: (1) restoring the territorial status quo ante; (2) restoring nuclear deterrence; (3) avoiding general nuclear war; and (4) denying the adversary any benefit from nuclear use.</p> + +<p><em>ASSURING ALLIES</em></p> + +<p><strong>Assumption #2:</strong> The United States will remain committed to allies’ security and their vital national interests in the event of strategic deterrence failure. For example, if NATO Article 5 is invoked, the United States will respond. Therefore, at least one U.S. objective (from above) will be continuing to assure and demonstrate credibility and resolve to allies. Partners, however, remain in a somewhat ambiguous position in the event of direct military attacks or nuclear strikes. This raises the following questions with regard to allies and partners in the event of strategic deterrence failure:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>What are the risks — and their likelihoods and potential consequences — of allies questioning U.S. credibility in the event of strategic deterrence failure?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Posture and military construction.</strong> As the United States adjusts its posture in the EUCOM and INDOPACOM theaters, choices of where and how bases and facilities are constructed will have effects on local Conducting a gender analysis, and understanding local gender dynamics, can help inform strategies for using military construction monies in a manner that will engender the greatest level of local support for U.S. presence.</p> + <p>What will be allies’ security concerns in the event of strategic deterrence failure? What role might certain allies and partners play in a response?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Enhanced prepositioning.</strong> A key aspect of EDI and PDI is the forward stationing of key equipment and materiel that could be utilized in a crisis or contingency. Host nation support — that is, the ability of a given country to support U.S. forces during peacetime and war — includes a nation’s ability to ensure that U.S. forces are able to land, access such equipment, and move in a crisis. Considering women and women’s networks more centrally in prepositioning and host nation support activities may build complementarity between EDI or PDI and building whole-of-society resistance and resilience strategies.</p> + <p>How can the United States signal resolve to allies in the event of strategic deterrence failure? How does this differ from signaling resolve to non-treaty partners?</p> </li> </ul> -<h3 id="conclusions-and-recommendations">Conclusions and Recommendations</h3> +<p>Based on their differing assessments about the most pressing U.S. strategic objectives, the authors disagree about the importance and feasibility of assuring allies following adversary nuclear use. Panda argues that, given that any U.S. president is likely to prioritize protecting the U.S. homeland above all, severe damage to U.S. credibility is a forgone conclusion in the event of strategic deterrence failure. He writes that the United States would face “insurmountable” assurance and credibility challenges following nuclear use and that “it is highly likely that following strategic deterrence failure, allied perceptions of the credibility of the United States would suffer drastically.” Sisson suggests that the defense of Ukraine and Taiwan should be a primary U.S. war aim but maintains that avoiding further nuclear use of any type should be the United States’ first objective.</p> -<p>War is a centrally human endeavor; gender is a core aspect of individual identity and of the human experience. Omitting gender, and gender perspectives, from defense planning and operations creates enormous blind spots toward adversary weaknesses and opportunities with allies and partners. If the DoD is to build its deterrent strategies in a tailored manner, considering gender more centrally in its war and defense planning is essential. A number of recommendations flow from the above analysis:</p> +<p>Ford, Gibbons, and Weaver, on the other hand, argue that assuring allies should be one of the United States’ primary strategic objectives. Ford and Gibbons both suggest that a nuclear response to deterrence failure is not necessary to reassure allies. Ford writes that the United States is not obligated to use any specific weapons in defense of its allies, as long as it does effectively defend them against aggression. He also argues that that, on the facts of the scenario, “continuing to prosecute a successful conventional campaign” and deny the adversary any benefits from nuclear weapons use “should represent an optimal answer from U.S. allies’ perspectives.” Weaver offers that the U.S. response that deters further aggression while avoiding uncontrollable escalation will be the optimal response from an allied perspective.</p> + +<p><em>MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS</em></p> + +<p><strong>Assumption #3:</strong> The president will consider a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic response options in the event of strategic deterrence failure. Options might include the use — or explicit threatened use — of nuclear weapons, naval deployments, or boots on the ground. This raises the following questions with regard to military response options in the event of deterrence failure:</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Additional resources.</strong> Many of the applications of WPS for tailored, integrated deterrence purposes as outlined above are conceptual rather than resource That said, the current funding levels for WPS activities — particularly those involving allies and partners — is unlikely to be sufficient for these purposes. It is outside the scope of this brief to develop a concrete budgetary recommendation; partnering with Congress, the DoD should establish a WPS/Strategic Competition pilot fund for actioning these activities that includes an assessment of the resources required to increase their scale.</p> + <p>What would be the president’s military options in the event of strategic deterrence failure? Which of these options would you recommend to the president?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Leverage gender advisers.</strong> The DoD has established a cadre of gender advisers (GENADs) across its command structures. In addition to the WPS-related training, education, and partner support work these GENADs perform, components should bring them into key planning and other processes to ensure that their perspective and ideas can be integrated into operational and strategic approaches.</p> + <p>What are the risks associated with a military response?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>A broader gender lens.</strong> While women and women’s issues are often the starting point for considerations of gender, at the end of the day “gender” also includes how men view Do men living under repressive authoritarian regimes in Russia, China, or Iran agree with the policies of gender apartheid — and the promotion of hollow, militaristic versions of “manliness”? How do women in these societies relate to men? What are men’s own aspirations and how do they realize them?</p> + <p>What are the signaling objectives of military response options? How will these options contribute to conflict termination on terms favorable to the United States?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In the event of strategic deterrence failure, how strictly should the United States observe the law of armed conflict (i.e., principles of proportionality and discrimination)? How much should it influence the strategy?</p> </li> </ul> -<p>Taking the WPS agenda forward toward countering and deterring authoritarian regimes requires situating women within the broader societal context of which men are a part. Considering gender and WPS in this way is not to “weaponize” or “militarize” these toolkits. Rather, it is a way to acknowledge that women have been, and will be, decisive when it comes to countering authoritarian expansionism. Women are active, and at times critical, agents in both war and peace; smart strategy will better incorporate women — and all genders — more fully into the tailored deterrence strategies needed to prevent war from occurring. Many authoritarian adversaries are weaponizing gender against U.S. interests; it is past time for the U.S. government, and the DoD within it, to develop sufficiently gender-informed responses. Viewed in this light, applying a gender perspective to the problem of strategic competition is a necessary step toward accomplishing the UN-supported vision for Women, Peace, and Security.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Kathleen J. McInnis</strong> is a senior fellow and director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>While the authors agree on the need for some form of military response to adversary nuclear use, their proposed responses differ significantly. Panda, Ford, and Gibbons each recommend conventional responses to adversary nuclear use. Gibbons and Panda endorse conventional strikes against the adversaries’ forces that were directly responsible for nuclear strikes against U.S. partners and allies. Though he argues that the United States needs to be prepared to use nuclear weapons if the adversaries were to use them again, Ford suggests that U.S. and allied forces should “fight through” adversary nuclear use here and continue their already successful conventional campaigns with slight changes in posture to better prepare for the possibility of further adversary nuclear use.</p> -<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.</p> +<p>Weaver is the only author to propose a nuclear response. He concludes that a conventional response would be problematic for several reasons, including that it may simply encourage adversaries to escalate further.</p> -<p><strong>Audrey Aldisert</strong> is a research associate in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.</p> +<p>Sisson proposes the most restrained response to adversary nuclear use. She suggests that, to avoid further escalation, U.S. and allied forces should cease offensive military operations and look instead to hold the line against further adversary aggression and rely on non-kinetic options.</p> -<p><strong>Alexis Day</strong> is an associate director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS.</p>Kathleen McInnis, et al.This brief lays an ana­lytic foundation for considering gender analyses, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) programs, as strategic enablers for accomplishing key Department of Defense (DoD) priorities.Build A Future Force For UA2024-11-14T12:00:00+08:002024-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/build-a-future-force-for-ukraine<p><em>Ending the war and establishing lasting peace in Ukraine is impossible without implementing practical measures to deter potential future waves of Russian aggression. Crafting an effective deterrence strategy, however, presents its own unique challenges.</em></p> +<p><em>NON-KINETIC RESPONSE OPTIONS</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong>Assumption #4:</strong> The U.S. political and military leadership would consider non-kinetic response options across the diplomacy-information-military-economics (DIME) spectrum. Many of these capabilities might overlap across domains, and the authors were given discretion to decide what are military versus diplomatic, information, economic, or other non-kinetic response options. Possibilities such as economic sanctions, building international pressure, or information operations would likely be part of the U.S. response to a strategic deterrence failure. This raises the following questions with regard to non-kinetic response options in the event of deterrence failure:</p> -<p>The recent US elections have created a new political reality that will impact global stability in the coming years, including the Russian war in Ukraine. While Donald Trump’s stated goal of ending the war quickly resonates with Ukrainians, achieving a lasting peace requires selecting the right strategies and resources to ensure sustainable results. Apart from dealing with immediate challenges on the battlefield, given Vladimir Putin’s obsession with Ukraine, any solution that lacks this lasting impact risks disastrous consequences, as Russia could recover, rearm, and reignite the conflict.</p> - -<p>Defining long-term security arrangements for Ukraine requires a comprehensive set of military and strategic measures for maintaining stability and defending Ukraine’s territory, society, economy and rule of law against future foreign aggression. Such measures are widely seen as critical to Ukraine’s post-war recovery and to preventing future escalations.</p> - -<p>This topic is especially challenging to address while Ukraine’s immediate security remains under severe threat. After enduring nearly three years of active war, Ukraine still needs ongoing support for operations, including additional weapons, funding and domestic mobilisation. Meanwhile, the support from international partners shows signs of wavering, and in the US, assistance to Ukraine has become a point of contentious political debate. With uncertainties around how and when Ukraine will emerge from this war, within what borders and in what economic state, it is understandably difficult to plan for its long-term security.</p> - -<p>However, long-term strategising remains essential, as lacking a clear security vision creates a void that complicates any future planning. Without this long-term perspective, doubts may arise about Ukraine’s prospects, potentially impacting international support even if its territory is liberated. So long as Russia remains under Putin’s regime, the existential threat to Ukraine will persist, driven by Putin’s personal fixation on the country which may push him beyond rational limits. While some observers suggest that Ukraine should pursue territorial concessions as a path to compromise, this approach misunderstands the existential nature of the conflict. For Putin, territory is not the ultimate goal – ending Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence is. Concessions would not end hostilities but instead encourage further aggression, as they would fail to address the core motives driving Putin’s actions.</p> - -<p>NATO membership offers a natural path forward. Once active hostilities conclude, Ukraine’s admission to NATO will be crucial to stabilising the region. Ukraine must, however, be treated not merely as a security liability but as an asset. Structuring and strengthening Ukraine’s defences will make this discussion more feasible, as a robust new NATO member will strengthen the alliance.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Under current conditions, with limitations on weapon types and their use, Ukraine is fighting a war that NATO would never choose to fight</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>One crucial assumption is that Putin will refrain from attacking Ukraine if Russia lacks either the resources or the likelihood of success. Although the first condition may be difficult to ensure indefinitely, the second can be achieved. Should Ukraine possess or have access to sufficient defensive capabilities to thwart any future invasion, this would significantly reduce the likelihood of renewed aggression. This approach, often called “deterrence by denial”, would serve as an effective defence.</p> - -<p>Other forms of deterrence may be less optimal. For instance, “deterrence by punishment” appears limited in impact. Russia is already incurring staggering losses in the current conflict, allocating over 40% of its state budget to the war and losing close to 700,000 troops as casualties, thousands of weapon systems, and most of its Black Sea fleet. For most regimes, such losses would be unsustainable, but for Putin, they do not appear to have impacted his commitment to the war. To force a resolution, the Kremlin would need to lose strategically – not merely in manpower or equipment, but through a fundamental military failure.</p> - -<p>Recognising the importance of deterrence, the Ukrainian government has incorporated this strategy into its national military framework, known as the “Victory Plan”. While largely classified, key elements were outlined by President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Verkhovna Rada on 16 October 2024, with “Deterrence” as a central theme addressing long-term security. Zelensky proposed a “strategic non-nuclear deterrence package” within Ukraine, aimed at providing a robust defence against potential Russian aggression. According to Zelensky, “the deterrence package ensures that Russia faces a choice: engage in diplomacy or see its war machine dismantled. Peace through strength”.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>What would be the president’s non-kinetic options in the event of strategic deterrence failure? Which of these options would you recommend to the president?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>What are the risks associated with a non-kinetic response?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>What are signaling objectives of non-kinetic response options? How will these options contribute to conflict termination on terms favorable to the United States?</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The focus should be on building a force capable of repelling future aggression and ensuring that, if Russia attacks, it will face defeat on the battlefield. Such a capability must not only be developed but also maintained at a high state of readiness. It should be evident to Russia that any attack would lead to decisive failure, thereby preventing it from trying.</p> +<p>The authors generally agreed about the importance of non-kinetic measures in responding to adversary nuclear use. One area of commonality was the importance of non-kinetic deterrence efforts prior to nuclear use during the crisis. Most suggested some form of information warfare or targeted messaging to accompany their proposed military responses, as well as non-kinetic military measures and economic retaliation. Weaver, for example, proposes information operations to maximize international backlash to adversary nuclear use and convince the Russian and Chinese people that their governments’ actions risk large-scale nuclear war, as well as measures to impose economic costs on Russia and China. Ford, Gibbons, Sisson, and Panda each suggest cyberattacks against adversary forces, as well as economic retaliation. Moreover, Gibbons, Sisson, and Panda advocate for diplomatic messaging to the international community to build a coalition condemning Russian and Chinese nuclear use. Panda proposes intelligence declassification as a tool to counter adversaries’ information operations.</p> -<p>The effectiveness of such deterrence must also be evident to the people of Ukraine, allied governments, and the international business community. Confidence in Ukraine’s military potential should be strong enough to assure investors that they can safely conduct business in the country. The only way to sustain such a force in the long term is to match it with a strong economy. In this respect, the example of South Korea is particularly relevant. Despite the absence of a peace agreement with the North, the deterrent capability of military power has provided the security necessary for sustained social and economic growth.</p> +<h4 id="three-principles-for-intra-war-deterrence-in-a-two-peer-environment">Three Principles for Intra-War Deterrence in a Two-Peer Environment</h4> -<p>Building such a force will be a significant challenge. First, it must deter a Russian force that, despite multiple failures in Ukraine, remains large in numbers. Second, any ceasefire would give Russia the opportunity to rebuild its military capabilities, potentially enhancing its strike power. Russia, after all, spares no resources in producing weapons, with at least 40% of its state budget currently allocated to the military.</p> +<p>Based on the expert papers, the PONI team identified three broad principles for thinking about and planning for intra-war deterrence in a two-peer environment. At the outset, however, it is worth observing that intra-war deterrence is highly context dependent, and many of the recommendations of these papers might not be applicable to other intra-war deterrence scenarios, to include whether to respond with nuclear or conventional weapons and how to assure allies. The stakes will depend on the context. In the scenario provided here, what is at stake is allies’ sovereignty and security and U.S. global leadership, but these must be balanced with the stakes of escalation, which could include further humanitarian consequences depending on whether conventional or nuclear weapons are used.</p> -<p>The costs of building a credible deterrent force are easy to underestimate. Simply sending older Western equipment to Ukraine will not achieve the necessary deterrent effect. Only competitive capabilities will suffice. For example, the current provision of older F-16s to Ukraine is inadequate to deny Russian air superiority over the frontlines due to outdated radars and missiles. As a result, Russia continues to dominate the airspace in close proximity to the battlefield.</p> +<p><em>INTRA-WAR DETERRENCE REQUIRES REGIONAL DETERRENCE</em></p> -<p>The value of tactical air superiority cannot be overstated. Today, Ukraine faces significant challenges in dealing with Russia’s gliding bombs, missiles, and long-range drones. A competitive air force is as essential for Ukraine as it is for any NATO country preparing for war. With NATO membership, these costs could be shared – especially for high-cost capabilities like aviation. Without it membership, Ukraine will have to build and sustain them on its own.</p> +<p>In these scenarios, America’s adversaries are acting on the belief that they have more at stake in the region than the United States. Ford describes the strategic challenge: “Both of these failures [are] likely derived from assumptions in Moscow and Beijing, not that Western leaders lacked the capacity to respond effectively, but that they lacked the will . . . . It is the primary task of intra-war deterrence here to convince them that this, too, was a misapprehension.” As demonstrated by all of the papers in this volume, the United States will need a diverse and flexible tool kit, to include regional nuclear capabilities and conceal/reveal capabilities.</p> -<p>Planning for a future force cannot be based on today’s operational environment. Under current conditions, with limitations on weapon types and their use, Ukraine is fighting a war that NATO would never choose to fight. NATO’s strategy would rely on overwhelming airpower and deep strikes to weaken enemy forces before they reached the frontline. Instead, Ukraine is meeting Russian forces at their strongest, at the front. Lacking adequate air and long-range firepower, Ukraine is compelled to compensate with the lives of its people – at least until a more effective operational model is established. Addressing the shortcomings of the current model is crucial not only for immediate success but also for ensuring future security. Delaying this effort results in the tragic loss of lives on a daily basis, underscoring the urgent need for decisive action. This painful reality demands immediate attention and cannot be overlooked.</p> +<p>While only one of the papers calls for the United States to respond with nuclear weapons, nearly all of the authors acknowledge the importance of the United States having a breadth of nuclear response options. For Panda, this is largely tied to assuring allies because “it is highly likely that following strategic deterrence failure, allied perceptions of the credibility of the United States would suffer drastically unless Washington opted for nuclear use in kind,” although he expresses concerns with risks of escalation. For Ford, amid a conventional response, “U.S. nuclear weapon storage vaults at relevant European airfields should also be readied for potential operations, and any existing plans for weapon dispersal to additional airfields that do not involve actual DCA attack assets should be implemented.”</p> -<p>The costs of building this force could be significantly reduced by leveraging Ukraine’s industrial capabilities, implementing leasing arrangements, and creating international funds with contributions from multiple donors for specific programmes. Ukraine has the potential to close a massive capability gap if its industrial base is engaged in full. Unlike Western defence industries, Ukraine’s industry is operating on a war footing, with many factories running 24/7 and bureaucratic red tape kept to a minimum.</p> +<p>These and other points make a case for the United States to improve its regional deterrence posture through increased regional capabilities and flexible options in order to prepare for a proportionate nuclear response in a limited-use scenario. U.S. policymakers should strive to diversify U.S. nuclear forces through investments in new regional capabilities so that the president will have a broader range of credible options, particularly if an adversary threatens limited nuclear attacks. The capabilities should be survivable, lower yield, and responsive and effective across a spectrum of targets. Strategic deterrence is, and should remain, the primary mission of the U.S. nuclear force, and the triad is essential to the success of that mission. These capabilities will play a deterrence function not only during a crisis but also beforehand, as argued by Weaver:</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Strategically planning Ukraine’s future military force, anticipating evolving trends, and conducting rapid assessments is not just essential for Ukraine’s survival; it is critical for the security of Western allies as well</code></em></strong></p> +<blockquote> + <p>If the effect of selecting a nonnuclear response to adversary nuclear escalation is to convince the adversary that the United States is so concerned about uncontrolled escalation that it fears responding in kind, then a U.S. nonnuclear response could actually increase the risk of eventual uncontrolled escalation. This may seem counterintuitive, but if a U.S. nonnuclear response to adversary limited nuclear use results in encouraging further adversary nuclear escalation, then the U.S. nuclear responses that may eventually be required to achieve U.S. objectives are likely to be larger in scale and more provocative in their effects. This could well make uncontrolled escalation more likely.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>However, cost is not the only challenge. In accepting that deterrent capabilities must be competitive, the ongoing need for adaptation and innovation becomes crucial. The speed of technological advancement today is unprecedented. Innovation teams on all sides of the war are working tirelessly, introducing new measures and countermeasures. Technologies such as computer vision, electronic warfare, and long-range communications are poised to profoundly influence future military concepts and capabilities, and we have yet to see how these will ultimately shape weapon systems. The successful implementation of these technologies on the battlefield could render many older weapons and doctrines obsolete, a trend already visible in the current war. Ukraine’s future force must remain competitive in this rapidly evolving operational environment, which makes long-term predictions difficult.</p> +<p>Another option for re-establishing deterrence would be relying on conceal/reveal capabilities, such as demonstrating a previously unknown capability amid a crisis to inspire the adversary to exert caution. As described by Weaver, “There is a potential role here for the calculated revelation of capabilities the adversary was previously unaware of that have potentially decisive military effects (‘You didn’t tell me they could do that. What else don’t I know?’).” Conceal/reveal capabilities could also offer U.S. decisionmakers more flexibility in a crisis, as well as having a powerful deterrence impact when needed most to de-escalate a crisis.</p> -<p>For example, small and medium-sized unmanned platforms are challenging the concept of air superiority, operating beyond the reach of traditional aviation and air defence. At the same time, electronic warfare has significantly impacted the effectiveness of these platforms. Current developments in computer vision aim to make these systems immune to electronic warfare, while counter-air drones are being designed to present a new challenge to drone warfare itself. All of these systems are part of an evolving operational landscape, competing for battlefield dominance.</p> +<p><em>RESTORING DETERRENCE REQUIRES RESTORING ASSURANCE</em></p> -<p>Keeping up the pace of adaptation and technological development is now a critical requirement to remain relevant. Unfortunately, many Western developers and governments have not yet achieved the necessary speed. For example, procurement and export control systems, designed for peacetime conditions, are ill-suited to the fast-paced demands of modern warfare. These bureaucratic hurdles prevent too many innovative platforms from being deployed effectively in the field. Western militaries and governments should not view this as a minor delay in aiding Ukraine. Rather, lengthy supply chains and slow adaptation cycles risk rendering critical platforms obsolete before they can be competitive.</p> +<p>As multiple authors identify, a strategic deterrence failure could inspire a crisis of confidence among U.S. allies and partners. While some of the papers in this volume call for reconsidering U.S. security commitments to allies in a crisis, this would be a mistake for both short- and long-term reasons. Amid the ongoing conflict, the United States would need allies to fight through a scenario such as the one outlined in one or both theaters. While Ford argues that the Indo-Pacific theater is the more important of the two, he notes that “a Western loss in the European theater” would still be “a disaster.” For him, “[j]ust as the United States prioritized defending Europe from the Nazis in World War II without backing off against Japan in the Pacific, even if the United States must now prioritize East Asia in certain ways, it should not abandon Europe.” Ford, for example, points to the importance of European allies in leading on conventional fighting and re-establishing deterrence in one theater while the United States focuses on the Indo-Pacific. For Weaver, “If U.S. responses to initial Russian or Chinese escalation make clear that the United States is willing to engage in a competition in dire risk-taking, and that Russia and China must also fear potential uncontrolled escalation, allies are likely to be reassured in the near term.” Over the long term, alliance structures would be an essential component for any eventual peace settlement and post-conflict international order, assuming a U.S. objective is to maintain global leadership, as argued in nearly all of these papers.</p> -<p>After assessing the ongoing war, former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, co-authored an article warning that the US military is not keeping pace with the fast-changing nature of modern warfare, and this issue is likely even more pronounced in European militaries. Now is the time for faster research and development, more rapid prototyping, and quicker delivery to the battlefield. The multiyear cycles traditionally required for new weapons must be viewed as an unaffordable luxury of the past.</p> +<p>Gibbons points to an additional value of maintaining and assuring allies: they can play a crucial role in generating international condemnation aimed at deterring further nuclear use by the adversaries:</p> -<p>Strategically planning Ukraine’s future military force, anticipating evolving trends, and conducting rapid assessments is not just essential for Ukraine’s survival; it is critical for the security of Western allies as well. The urgent need to innovate and collaborate in defence capabilities cannot be overstated. Only by embracing change and acting decisively can the West ensure that this conflict does not become a harbinger of greater crises in the future.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Allies and partners have a significant role to play in the messaging following nuclear use. They must unite in loudly and publicly condemning the nuclear attacks and should do so repeatedly. They should communicate that using nuclear weapons in these scenarios was unacceptable and neither nation will gain from using these weapons. These messages are key to reestablishing the nuclear taboo following nuclear use.</p> +</blockquote> -<hr /> +<p>Gibbons goes on to make the case for U.S. policymakers to immediately engage the U.S. public on the importance of allies, for example. The United States could also develop an engagement plan for deepening planning and consultations with allies on potential battlefield nuclear use and opportunistic aggression scenarios. A series of mini tabletop exercises could begin familiarizing allied and U.S. government officials across the interagency, including at the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense (including combatant commands) with how deterrence works and how battlefield nuclear use might impact both conventional campaigns and deterrence dynamics.</p> -<p><strong>Andriy Zagorodnyuk</strong> is the Chairman of the Centre for Defence Strategies. He previously headed the Ukraine MOD’s Reform Projects Office, was appointed as an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and served as his country’s Defence Minister between 2019 and 2020.</p>Andriy ZagorodnyukEnding the war and establishing lasting peace in Ukraine is impossible without implementing practical measures to deter potential future waves of Russian aggression. Crafting an effective deterrence strategy, however, presents its own unique challenges.Power And Planet2024-11-13T12:00:00+08:002024-11-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/power-and-planet<p><em>In July 2024, CSIS’s Energy Security and Climate Change Program, in collaboration with the Scholl Chair in International Business, hosted a one-day trade and climate simulation game titled Power and Planet. The focus was on how players representing key nations make decisions at the intersection of climate and trade policy to reduce emissions, boost economic opportunity, and ensure security.</em></p> +<p><em>INTRA-WAR DETERRENCE WILL DEPEND ON PRECRISIS PLANNING AND DECISIONS</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Finally, intra-war deterrence will largely depend on precrisis decisions and planning. These comprise decisions and actions taken with adversaries, allies, domestic audiences, and wider international ones. Examples include dialogue with allies about crisis communication and decisionmaking, conceal/reveal capabilities, and establishing thresholds and threats (i.e., do not bluff). There are at least two main areas where the United States can focus on intra-war deterrence planning before a crisis begins: strategic communications, particularly with international audiences, and wargaming.</p> -<p>The game explored the geopolitical and economic dynamics that arise when a bloc of developed countries establishes a climate club. Will such a club drive greater global cooperation on emissions as it expands, or will it trigger trade wars, creating a bleaker outlook for long-term climate outcomes? How do economic, environmental, geopolitical, or security considerations shape players’ priorities?</p> +<p>Shaping narratives and messaging before and during crises will be essential. Such messages will need to be tailored to multiple audiences: allies (focusing on assurance), domestic audiences (focused on the importance of U.S. alliances, and in support of achieving U.S. military responses to adversarial limited nuclear use), international audiences (aimed to “make the adversary a pariah,” as Weaver argues), and adversarial domestic audiences (meant to foment a facts-based public consensus). When facing a crisis involving potential limited nuclear use, strategic communication must be multifaceted. Messages must be tailored to diverse audiences (allies, the U.S. public, the international community, adversary leadership, and their citizens) and adapted for each stage of the crisis, including preemptive communication. For example, before a crisis, messages aimed at the U.S. population should focus on the importance of alliances. As Gibbons argues, “Before any potential conflict — and frankly, right now — the U.S. government, especially the president, should aim to better educate the public about the history of U.S. alliance relationships and their benefits.” Precrisis messaging to Americans could also focus, for example, on reassuring the U.S. public about U.S. commitment to deterrence and the limited nature of any potential nuclear response.</p> -<p>This report documents the game and how participants navigated the one-day simulation. It outlines the game’s setup, turn-by-turn progression, and key takeaways for policymakers. Additionally, the authors examine the game’s limitations and propose areas for further research.</p> +<p>Precrisis engagement with international audiences (particularly the Global South and “non-aligned” states) was raised in several analyses. Gibbons writes:</p> -<h3 id="game-structure-and-rules">Game Structure and Rules</h3> +<blockquote> + <p>It is worth emphasizing here that improving U.S. and allied relations with states within the Global South before this notional conflict in 2027 is paramount. Though the international community broadly supported the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s attack on Ukraine, there have been fewer governments that have unilaterally condemned the attack or Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling, even among members of the Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons, a treaty that explicitly bans nuclear threats.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Each player was assigned to one of three teams: G7+ (representing the Group of Seven countries along with Australia and South Korea), China, or emerging markets. Each player assumed the role of a government leader tasked with achieving their country’s ambitions for climate, economics, and security. Twenty-five experts from the climate and trade communities participated, representing a diverse mix of academic and civil society institutions, private companies, foreign embassies, and trade associations.</p> +<p>A second priority for precrisis intra-war deterrence will be more wargaming. One way to address this challenge is with more wargames through all stages of escalation, as highlighted in Weaver’s paper in particular. But Sisson also writes, “Each phase of a scenario exercises the thought processes involved in aligning military operations with war aims, and war aims with strategic objectives, under conditions in which some variables that might affect the likelihood of success are foreseeable and controllable and some are not.” Variations of these aims, objectives, and conditions can be explored through wargaming or other exercising. One particular scenario that would be worth exploring is coordination among allies, which is somewhat ambiguous in the scenario used for this study. Even with additional gaming and empirical data, however, there will be limits on knowledge about what happens after nuclear use and how to re-establish strategic deterrence.</p> -<p>During the game, each participant represented a country or, in the case of China, a political or administrative entity. The three teams were as follows:</p> +<p>As Weaver argues, “Detailed wargaming and simulation is needed to analyze the ways in which limited nuclear use by both sides affect the course of twenty-first-century conflict and escalation dynamics across a range of scenarios and strategic circumstances. Without such analysis, U.S. efforts to identify the range of nuclear options needed to address limited nuclear escalation will risk missing key insights.” More comprehensive wargaming of the central problem could require asking these same questions across a set of plausible scenarios that span the range of key strategic circumstances the United States might face. Examples of other scenarios that should be examined using the Project Atom 2024 methodology include</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>G7+ team.</strong> Each of the 11 participants represented each G7 country (except Italy), Australia, and South Korea. The U.S. delegation had three players, acting as the president, the special presidential envoy for climate, and Congress. And European Union was represented by one player.</p> + <p>Conflict with Russia while deterring Chinese opportunistic aggression</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Emerging markets team.</strong> The nine participants represented Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam.</p> + <p>Conflict with China while deterring Russian opportunistic aggression</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>China team.</strong> The five participants represented the following political authorities and administrative entities: Chinese president Xi Jinping and the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; the National Development and Reform Commission and the National Energy Administration; the Ministry of Ecology and Environment; the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Finance, People’s Bank of China, State Administration of Taxation, Security Regulatory Commission, and Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission; and provincial and local governments.</p> + <p>Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is winning conventionally in one theater and losing in the other when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is losing conventionally in both theaters when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The full range of scenarios farther into the future when China is a nuclear peer</p> </li> </ul> -<p>Participants received individual motivations outlining objectives to pursue and defensive interests to protect, both within their team’s deliberations and in the broader game context. They were asked to make decisions consistent with that guidance but to be creative in how they realized their goals.</p> +<p>It is worth acknowledging that even with additional gaming and empirical data, there will be limits on knowledge about what happens after nuclear use and how to re-establish strategic deterrence. However, analysis of additional scenarios and circumstances would likely produce new and important insights regarding the four key issues addressed in this project, to include opportunities for de-escalation and identifying off-ramps.</p> -<p>The game covered a five-year time frame from 2027 to 2032 and consisted of three rounds, each lasting between one and one-and-a-half hours. The first round began with instructions to the G7+ to establish a climate club in the first turn. Over the next two turns, exogenous geopolitical and climate conditions continued to worsen as global temperatures passed key global targets, climate-associated extreme events negatively affected different regions, and geopolitical tensions worsened.</p> +<p>There are a host of other opportunities for strengthening intra-war deterrence before a crisis begins. The United States and its allies may have to be prepared to fight and operate in a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) environment, which will require troop protection, equipment, and training. These preparations could also serve a deterrent function by demonstrating U.S. commitment to prevailing in defense of its allies, even in a CBRN environment.</p> -<p>Teams were assigned separate rooms to strategize, deliberate, and set policies. Teams could submit action forms to make official communications or announce policy decisions. These were publicly announced to all other teams and the game’s moderators (Control). In addition to central moderators, each room had a facilitator answering questions and announcing updates from Control. Control could amend the scenario at any time to introduce events that could shift game dynamics, such as the reestablishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h4> -<p>Except for the first hour and the last 30 minutes of the game, when teams deliberated over their opening and closing strategies, written bilateral communications and in-person bilateral and multilateral meetings were allowed between teams. Participants were free to take action independently of their team by submitting individual action forms. There was no limit to the number of forms participants could table per round, though all were encouraged to stay within the scope of trade, economic, and climate policy actions. They were also blocked from declaring war or resorting to kinetic military action.</p> +<p>To state the obvious, contemplating how to respond to nuclear weapons use and strategic deterrence failure is deeply uncomfortable. Such a scenario could involve hundreds of thousands (perhaps millions) of casualties, environmental disasters, and the potential for further damage. Indeed, Sisson’s paper starts with the assumption that any nuclear detonation could quickly escalate to civilization-threatening general nuclear war. Ideally, the international community would condemn such attacks and impose heavy costs. But the United States also needs to be prepared to restore deterrence and end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. In many of these scenarios, allies’ sovereignty is at stake.</p> -<p>Each team started the game with a score assigned by Control representing their collective standing in 2027 across four categories: economy, emissions, domestic political support, and allies (i.e., the level of cohesion within the group). Control updated the scores after each round based on how each team’s actions had affected these four categories, and facilitators privately distributed these to team members. Teams could choose which categories they wished to prioritize through their actions, consistent with their internal motivations, but they were instructed to consider the long-term effects beyond the game’s five-year time frame. For example, they had no obligation to implement dramatic emissions cuts within five years, as establishing credible long-term climate policies was sufficient to realize climate ambitions, though potentially at the expense of economic outcomes or domestic political support.</p> +<p>This report’s recommendations point to an urgent need for renewed engagement among policymakers and publics on nuclear issues. The stakes could not be higher, as it is the risk of repeated nuclear exchanges as well as the United States’ global leadership and credibility that are on the line. More regional nuclear capabilities will give U.S. planners more rungs on the escalation ladder for restoring deterrence without resorting to large-scale exchanges. They will also give the U.S. president more options in the event of a horrific scenario such as the one outlined here. A future U.S. president must be willing and able to employ nuclear weapons in response to a strategic deterrence failure scenario — and will therefore require flexible, limited options to navigate a scenario of limited nuclear use effectively. Whether a conventional or nuclear response to adversary nuclear use will be more effective in re-establishing deterrence and achieving U.S. objectives will depend on adversary motivations and the specific context of deterrence failure; while a nuclear response may be appropriate in certain scenarios, the same response could be unnecessary and escalatory in others. It is critical, however, that a U.S. president be able to employ whatever military response they determine to be most effective. The United States may therefore benefit from a more diverse nuclear force with a wider range of theater nuclear capabilities. Strategic investments in modernizing, diversifying, and enhancing the resilience of existing deterrent forces will strengthen deterrence and help avoid intra-war deterrence scenarios in the first place. By anticipating scenarios in which adversaries escalate regionally, potentially concurrently, the United States and its allies can strengthen deterrence and reduce the likelihood of adversaries exploiting perceived weaknesses. Preparing for multiple scenarios is not about seeking war but about enhancing deterrence to prevent it altogether.</p> -<p>Each round was followed by a 30-minute break enabling teams to regroup and participants to address personal business, as well as a 30-minute adjudication session in which all teams reconvened in the main meeting room to receive an update on game progress from Control. The day ended with a one-hour hotwash for organizers to reflect on the decisions participants made throughout the game and for participants to share feedback on the game’s overall design and conduct.</p> +<p>In addition to these capability considerations, U.S. decisionmakers can start laying the groundwork now for intra-war deterrence, to include increased and improved wargaming and tabletop exercises, including with allies. And U.S. military and strategic planners, along with policymakers, must immediately consider the question of how to restore assurance alongside deterrence.</p> -<h3 id="game-progression-and-key-events">Game Progression and Key Events</h3> +<h3 id="challenges-of-deterrence-and-security-upon-nuclear-use">Challenges of Deterrence and Security upon Nuclear Use</h3> -<h4 id="round-1-club-formation-and-reactions">Round 1: Club Formation and Reactions</h4> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="christopher-a-ford">Christopher A. Ford</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The first round, set in 2027, was devoted to establishing a G7+ climate club and immediate reactions from other participants. The G7+ team was tasked with reaching an agreement on the nature of their climate club within the first hour, while other teams considered their engagement strategies. The emerging markets team made preemptive announcements, expressing concern that wealthy nations would unilaterally impose border measures and undermine multilateral efforts to reduce emissions. They called on the G7+ to adopt collective strategies that accounted for their past emissions and developing countries’ need for financial support and technology for mitigation. China echoed these sentiments, offering support for the emerging markets’ position and inviting an open bilateral discussion.</p> +<p><em>The following pages respond to questions posed by the organizers of Project Atom 2024.</em></p> -<p>The G7+ announced the creation of a climate club with the following features:</p> +<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives">U.S. Strategic Objectives</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Carbon-free economy goal.</strong> Members commit to achieving a carbon-free economy by 2050.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Carbon accounting.</strong> Members gradually implement value chain accounting across all economic sectors.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Carbon border measures.</strong> Each member establishes its own carbon border measure, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for the European Union or carbon tariffs for the United States under the Foreign Pollution Fee Act.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Internal trade exemption.</strong> Members assign no climate-related border measures internally, pending the negotiation of an internal green marketplace.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Technology transfers.</strong> Members make technology transfers to low- and lower-middle-income countries wishing to join the club.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Shared oversight.</strong> All members participate in oversight and decisionmaking.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><em>ASSESSING DETERRENCE’S “FAILURE”</em></p> -<p>China criticized the proposal as vague and likely to undermine global trading rules for protectionist purposes. However, the China team refrained from taking adversarial action, instead calling for more details from the G7+ about the climate club. Meanwhile, China, Brazil, and India announced they would begin discussions on creating a global carbon accounting system open to all countries. The round closed with the United States and Canada communicating Mexico’s decision to join the club.</p> +<p>The locus of deterrence “failure” here may lie not so much in the specific run-up to the crisis outlined in Project Atom 2024, but potentially years earlier. In this scenario, U.S. and allied leaders were stepping up their military preparedness before war broke out, and were very clear publicly that “wars of conquest will be punished.” Western posture and policy statements, in their own terms, left little basis for U.S. adversaries’ apparent conclusion either that: (a) the United States would not contest aggression in the first place; or (b) the United States could be frightened into intra-war concessions by adversaries’ use of nuclear weapons.</p> -<h4 id="round-2-expansion-attempts-and-emerging-market-responses">Round 2: Expansion Attempts and Emerging Market Responses</h4> +<p>Rather, irrespective of what the United States declared in the run-up to war, U.S. adversaries seem to have assumed that the United States and its allies were: averse to war in general; incapable of waging war effectively or on a sustained basis; and sufficiently afraid of nuclear escalation that Beijing and Moscow could enjoy the benefits of aggression without facing prohibitive risk. This assumption would appear to be rooted not in assessments of specific Western actions undertaken in this scenario, but rather in antecedent beliefs, accumulated over time, about fundamental weaknesses and risk-aversion in Western leadership and societies, coupled — presumably — with the conclusion that the aggressors could draw upon greater resources of martial seriousness and societal stamina in waging war, and that the stakes involved in each theater favored the nearer, “hungrier” power over the distant and more diffident United States and its weak and degenerate local friends.</p> -<p>The second round, covering the period of 2028–2029, unfolded as a battle for influence over emerging markets between the G7+ and China, with China scoring some early wins. Talks between China, Brazil, and India on establishing a global carbon accounting system gained momentum as all remaining BRICS members and Saudi Arabia joined. In response, the G7+ offered to collaborate by sharing data and discussing potential common standards.</p> +<p>Deterrence of this aggression, in other words, arguably failed in Project Atom 2024 much the same way that deterrence of Russia’s 2022 attack on Ukraine failed not in 2021–22 but in 2014 — when Vladimir Putin, observing Western reactions to his annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbas, seems to have concluded that they would not react forcefully “next time” either. In the scenario presented here, the failure was twofold: the United States and its allies failed to deter Russia and China from undertaking wars of conventional military aggression, and then further failed in deterring them from using nuclear weapons when things on the battlefield began to go bad. Both of these failures likely derived from assumptions in Moscow and Beijing not that Western leaders lacked the capacity to respond effectively, but that they lacked the will — and hence were more tied to general and longer-term adversary assessments than to specific U.S. or allied posture and signaling failures in the run-up to the crisis.</p> -<p>In addition, China released a three-pronged strategy designed to counter the G7+ club:</p> +<p>If so, this suggests that the efficacy of deterrence lies not only in clear military postures and public messaging, but also in an adversary’s underlying, longer-term assumptions about the character, motivation, and sociopolitical support enjoyed by those adopting such postures and sending such signals. If the adversary power has concluded that one is fundamentally timid and conflict averse — or simply unable to wage a war with resolution and commitment anyway — that adversary is less likely to be deterred by short-term precrisis signals even if they do, on their face, convey admirable resolution.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Reserve the right to “respond appropriately” to any discriminatory measures.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Invest RMB 10 trillion over 10 years to speed up the decarbonization of China’s economy.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Launch the Inclusive Green Belt, focused on a fair accounting mechanism for carbon, technology sharing for climate challenges, and promoting free trade in environmental goods and services.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Nevertheless, the more immediate problem for Western leaders in this situation lies not in addressing such deeper challenges but in managing escalation risks and restoring deterrence now that bullets have started flying.</p> -<p>China later secured the backing of India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa to pursue a joint dispute settlement case at the WTO against U.S. carbon border tariffs. This decision prompted Control to announce the reestablishment of the WTO Appellate Body based on a coin toss.</p> +<p>If U.S. adversaries assumed that the West’s sociopolitical weakness and fears of nuclear escalation would preclude its responding effectively to conventional aggression by a nuclear-armed great power in this scenario, of course, they were wrong. Since they also seem to have assumed that even their very limited tactical use of nuclear weaponry would scare the United States into abandoning its response to their aggression, it is the primary task of intra-war deterrence here to convince them that this, too, was a misapprehension. To the degree that the United States can do this, it has a chance not merely to manage this scenario, but also to help shape U.S. adversaries’ more general perceptions of the United States in ways that will enable maintaining deterrence once peace is restored. (After all, it is much less plausible to argue that a country will not fight you next time when it has just surprised you, this time, by demonstrating that it actually will.)</p> -<p>However, China’s momentum soon slowed. Crucially, no country chose to join the Inclusive Green Belt. While Russia responded positively to that proposal, China instead started bilateral negotiations on nuclear cooperation and a 30-year gas supply agreement aiming to reduce Chinese coal dependence.</p> +<p><em>CORE U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THIS SCENARIO</em></p> -<p>In contrast, the G7+ successfully enticed Mexico and Turkey to join its climate club, though it had to concede to their demands for preferential conditions. To further strengthen the club, the United States announced a USD 1 trillion fund offering grants and submarket loads for climate investments — exclusively accessible to club members.</p> +<p>Given the potentially existential implications, the first U.S. objective here is to avoid escalation to a full-scale nuclear exchange with either Russia or China. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from this that the best way to achieve this requires backing down, or that this is the United States’ only important objective. On the contrary, making no response to the Russian and Chinese use of nuclear weapons in this scenario — or acting in a way that would reward such use with terrified Western de-escalation and hence cede theater-level advantage (or even victory) to the aggressor or convince that aggressor that the United States was abandoning its commitments to its allies — may actually increase the risk of broader war and even a full-scale exchange sooner or later, more than would a response of judicious firmness that denies them such benefits and makes clear that the United States stands with its friends and is not entirely unwilling to turn up the heat further.</p> -<p>Courted on both sides, emerging markets sought to strengthen their negotiating power by leveraging their collective resources. Brazil, Indonesia, Vietnam, and South Africa came together to form the Organization of Critical Minerals Exporters (OCME) to promote inclusive, fair, sustainable, and stable critical minerals markets. In the process, OCME even attracted Australia and Canada to join its ranks.</p> +<p>The United States has at least two second-order, but nonetheless extremely important, objectives in this scenario. First, it has an incentive to deny Russia and China victory in these regional conflicts (even in conventional terms) and to make good on U.S. commitments to its allies, because were the United States to lose or weaken those alliances, this would open the door to untold future revisionist aggression and upend the international order upon which U.S. prosperity and that of the United States’ most important international trading and security partners depends.</p> -<p>Toward the end of the round, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Plus (OPEC+) coordinated to undermine the green transition within the G7+. They released large quantities of oil into the market, aiming to slow the growth of electric vehicles (EVs) and stall investment in critical minerals. Officially, OPEC+ presented this as a move to ease the global cost of living.</p> +<p>Second, the United States has an incentive to deny Russia and China not just victory in general, but also victory through the use of nuclear weapons in particular. Rewarding their attempt at nuclear coercion would presumably lead to more aggressive employment of such approaches by Russia and China in the future, hence leading to more wars and greater risks of a full-scale nuclear exchange. Rewarding such coercion and aggression, moreover — and demonstrating the inability of U.S. alliance structures to deter them — would also encourage defensive nuclear proliferation to (and perhaps future offensive nuclear-facilitated coercion by) others as well.</p> -<h4 id="round-3-final-negotiations-and-outcomes">Round 3: Final Negotiations and Outcomes</h4> +<p><em>PRIORITIZING THEATERS</em></p> -<p>The third and final round, covering 2030–2032, did not bring any realignment among the teams. The G7+ solidified its climate club by achieving three key milestones. First, it finalized a major internal agreement on the green marketplace, tackling tariffs and nontariff barriers to establish a free market for environmental goods and services, public procurement options, conformity assessment and standards, nondiscriminatory access to incentives programs, and critical minerals. Second, the group tackled inflation concerns by reallocating tariff revenue toward cost transfers, home retrofitting for higher efficiency, and clean vehicles and electricity subsidies. Lastly, the G7+ anchored Turkey into the club, largely through an EU commitment to accelerate Turkey’s accession talks and South Korea’s pledge to invest in Turkey’s nuclear and EV sectors.</p> +<p>A more difficult question is whether, in this scenario, the United States should prioritize one theater over the other. They present different military-operational situations, with the conflict against Russia being primarily a land war and that against China emphasizing naval power projection, although both would require significant air power. For this reason, each region is likely to draw most heavily upon somewhat different mixes of U.S. military capabilities and assets. It is conceivable, therefore, that the United States might not face unmanageably stark prioritization choices.</p> -<p>However, the G7+ could not prevent Mexico from leaving the club as inflationary pressures and declining economic opportunities within the club prompted its exit. Additionally, a joint EU-U.S. offer granting OCME members access to climate funds in exchange for preferential access to critical minerals went unanswered.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, if the United States were forced to choose between concentrating upon Europe and concentrating upon the Indo-Pacific, Washington should prioritize the latter. Even if Russia succeeds in carving out for itself some kind of neo-tsarist imperium in Eastern Europe, Moscow lacks the economic, demographic, and material resources to hold it over the medium-to-long term, especially if confronted by strong and sophisticated adversaries. An allied loss in the Polish-Lithuanian theater in this scenario would be devastating, but even then, a sufficiently alarmed, angry, and resolute Europe could likely still — even alone — present Russia with just such a set of adversaries if it really wished to. Accordingly, the odds of the entire continent falling under the Kremlin’s sway — as well as the odds of Russia maintaining a new empire over the long term — seem low.</p> -<p>China, meanwhile, toughened its opposition to the G7+ club by imposing an export ban on all critical minerals processing technologies. However, China failed to gain traction in emerging markets despite pledging up to RMB 10 trillion in foreign direct investment to countries that would join the Inclusive Green Belt and remove tariffs on Chinese green goods. Additionally, the global carbon accounting discussions from the first and second rounds seemed to stall or fall by the wayside.</p> +<p>By contrast, the implications of a Chinese victory in the Indo-Pacific seem more systemically problematic. Such a victory would very likely lead not merely to the bankruptcy of existing U.S. alliance guarantees, resulting in the Americans’ expulsion from the region — de facto, if not necessarily de jure (or at least not at first) — but also the creation of a Sinocentric imperium in East Asia. Nor would this new authoritarian Chinese regional order likely be particularly short lived. In contrast to the declining state of Russia, and despite some recent economic headwinds and the longer-term specter of demographic decline, China would not lack the manpower, military capabilities, or economic resources necessary to dominate its new network of tributary vassals. Between the two “theater-defeat” scenarios, therefore, from the perspective of the international order and the United States’ future role therein, an Indo-Pacific loss is probably the more traumatic and irreversible.</p> -<p>Among emerging markets, cohesion dissolved as each country pursued its national interests, choosing to negotiate bilaterally — either with other emerging markets or with other teams. India agreed to double its imports of Russian oil and gas in exchange for Indian investment into the Russian energy sector along with enhanced cooperation on decarbonization between the two countries. India further secured public financing from Saudi Arabia for domestic climate and energy transition projects, while Saudi Arabia negotiated a uranium deal with the United States and Australia to facilitate the Gulf region’s development of nuclear energy. OCME welcomed India, Japan, and South Korea within its ranks as “trusted processing and recycling centers,” but no other multilateral agreements emerged.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, in saying that the United States should, in extremis, prioritize the Indo-Pacific theater, this paper is not suggesting that the United States should abandon efforts to protect its European allies in the Russia scenario. Prioritizing one thing need not mean euthanizing the other. Indeed, any failure to stand by NATO would likely have significant adverse consequences in the Indo-Pacific, whose leaders would be watching the war in Europe carefully as a window into their own ability to rely upon the United States when things become difficult. Just as the United States prioritized defending Europe from the Nazis in World War II without backing off in the war against Japan in the Pacific, even if the United States must now prioritize East Asia in certain ways, it should not abandon Europe.</p> -<h3 id="scoring-progression">Scoring Progression</h3> +<p><em>WHAT COUNTS AS “WINNING”?</em></p> -<p>As the day progressed, each team dealt with advances and setbacks, and its scores in the four categories (economy, political support, emissions, and allies) shifted accordingly. The formation of a climate club by the G7+ team in round 1 improved its members’ emissions outlook, raising their emissions score from 2 to 4. By contrast, the club engendered the threat of trade restrictions and geopolitical hostility, lowering the team’s economy score from 6 to 4 and political support score from 5 to 3. China and emerging markets also saw bleak economic outcomes, with the club’s border adjustments and tariffs creating an economic burden for nonmember states. Round 2 saw general improvements for the G7+ and China teams, with the G7+ team expanding its alliance and China presenting a clear alternative to the G7-led climate club. The emerging markets team, however, was left with worsening natural disasters and inadequate financial commitments, reducing its political, economic, and allied scores.</p> +<p>As the great power committed to maintaining the existing system of international order against revisionist challengers, and as the leading state in the two alliance systems challenged by opportunistic authoritarian aggression, the United States has a “theory of victory” requirement here of denying Russia and China the achievement of their own theories of victory. In Europe, for example, this means preserving Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine as sovereign independent states, and as countries enjoying close security ties to the United States. In Asia, this means similarly preserving Taiwan’s autonomy and keeping the United States’ free democratic allies in Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines from having to become vassal states of the Middle Kingdom. As a status quo power facing revisionist aggression, the fundamental victory requirement for the United States here is thus simply that its adversaries do not “win.”</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/loZ92Lb.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Table 1: Progression of Scores by Team and Round</em></p> +<p>To be sure, a broader and more satisfying sort of U.S. victory would see the threat of revisionist aggression from Moscow and Beijing recede (or end?) more broadly, rather than having those powers simply “put back in their place,” thereafter remaining as wounded and aggrieved states looking for future vengeance. Indeed, given the nature of the two authoritarian regimes in question, it is possible that the clear military defeat of either one could shatter its brittle internal legitimacy narrative and lead to regime collapse.</p> -<h3 id="team-analysis">Team Analysis</h3> +<p>That said, the United States should not assume that such regime collapse would end revisionist threats. After all, both polities have strong and vicious hyper-nationalist elements strongly committed to dark and semi-paranoid anti-Western discourse. Moreover, there is no guarantee that either Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping would be replaced by rulers any less committed to violent international self-aggrandizement. Nevertheless, even if further revisionism could not be precluded by the replacement of the current government, the very fact of a decisive defeat could help reinforce future deterrence messages, especially to the degree that this defeat “felt” more like a consequence of the regime having overreached by striking out abroad than like the fruits of a nefarious Western conspiracy to conquer or subvert the state.</p> -<p><strong>G7+ team.</strong> The G7+ team proved particularly fractious due to the large number of participants and their diverse domestic approaches to climate policy. Internal differences kept the club from policy alignment. Early on, the EU and U.S. players retreated to separate rooms to coordinate their positions, a practice they continued at regular intervals. These divided sessions slowed overall club negotiations as each prioritized the management of their internal cohesion. The U.S. and EU policy proposals were also in conflict, as the United States had no internal carbon price to secure its climate goals, while the European Union was attached to its emissions trading system, which forced other members to mediate.</p> +<p>To be sure, after a Western victory in either theater, it might be difficult to tell whether deterrence had truly been “restored,” for each regime might react to such a setback with a policy of tactical retrenchment — that is, effectively accepting only a temporary armistice in order to buy time in which to reprovision, reequip, and prepare to resume hostilities on better terms. Yet deterrence is always provisional and conditional, as it is contingent upon the deterring party’s success in maintaining concrete capabilities (and a perceived willingness to use them) sufficient to persuade a would-be aggressor, each and every day, that “today is not the day.” In this sense, the belligerent powers are not the only ones with agency here. Even a mere armistice would also give the United States and its allies a chance to be better prepared for a potential resumption of hostilities, and hence better able to deter the aggressors. In the face of revisionist moves against the geopolitical status quo, an approach that defeats the aggressor’s initial thrust, returns all players to the territorial status quo ante, and buys time in which the United States can further shore up its alliances and prepare to counter any further attacks looks more like victory than loss.</p> -<p>Ultimately, the European Union and the United States reached an ungainly compromise and agreed on the main terms and benefits of the club, which they reluctantly extended to the rest of the group. However, the European Union stressed that its agreement was contingent on establishing a shared financing mechanism and access to U.S. subsidies in later rounds, which virtually halted the club’s implementation until all details were finalized in the late stages of the game.</p> +<p>As suggested above, moreover, the aggressor’s prior defeat at U.S. hands might itself help to redress the longer-term deterrence problem rooted in adversary assumptions about Western sociopolitical weakness. Rather than being presumed to be a soft and fundamentally weak-willed adversary, the United States would thereafter be “the folks who thrashed you last time, even though you used nuclear weapons.” With a track record of martial success against twenty-first-century near-peer adversaries — and with no less capacity than before to actually use nuclear weapons against future aggression if this is needed — the United States would thus be better positioned to ensure future deterrence than it is now.</p> -<p>Consumed by internal negotiations throughout the game, the G7+ had little bandwidth to devote to a coherent outreach strategy for membership candidates — or even to consider how its proposals might appeal to them. Unable to tolerate China’s presence within the club, the United States clearly defined the group’s collective stance toward China, though the group’s lack of coordination was evident in the absence of cohesive messaging inside meetings.</p> +<h4 id="assuring-allies">Assuring Allies</h4> -<p><strong>The China team.</strong> The team’s structure was designed to mirror the decisionmaking processes that shape energy and climate policies in China. Each player represented a specific government entity. However, such internal dynamics were largely muted during the gameplay, as players were not assertive in their assigned roles. Instead, the team took a collaborative approach and deferred to the president/politburo when making major decisions. This pattern persisted when a different player assumed the presidency later in the game for logistical reasons.</p> +<p><em>QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. CREDIBILITY</em></p> -<p>In the early stages of the game, players spent significant time aligning their views on two key points: the state of energy and climate in China and the government’s priorities and redlines. Once the team reached a consensus, it acted as a unified block in international proceedings. No player deviated from the agenda during meetings with foreign representatives, the group consulted internally before and after each meeting, and no actions were taken without the group’s consent.</p> +<p>In general, there are two levels of U.S. credibility about which U.S. allies have reason to be concerned in this scenario, with the second being of more significance than the first. The first level is whether the United States would be willing to risk a direct clash with a great power adversary, in any form, were it to move against its allies. Here the allies ought to have little doubt about U.S. credibility, for in this scenario the United States not only did respond to aggression against its allies by throwing its conventional forces into the fray against the aggressors, but also responded effectively enough that it led to dramatic setbacks for the aggressors.</p> -<p>Although players were keen to use China’s strengths in technology and state-driven international finance during negotiations, they took a cautious approach, avoiding proposals that might harm China’s economic security. Only in the final turn did China act on its stated opposition to the G7+ club by raising export controls on critical minerals technology. Their other initiatives to compete with the G7+ for global leadership, such as the Inclusive Green Belt and global carbon accounting schemes, stalled.</p> +<p>The second level of allied concern is whether U.S. nuclear extended deterrence will remain available in the event that an adversary uses nuclear weapons against it — that is, whether the United States would be willing to use nuclear weapons in such a conflict if needed. This is a game-theoretical challenge dating back to the early years of the Cold War, which materialized once the Soviets acquired a strategic nuclear arsenal to counterpose against the U.S. one, and it raises a question to which no truly definitive answer has ever been given. In a context in which adversary nuclear weapons hold major U.S. cities at risk, to what degree would a U.S. president really be willing to “lose New York to save Hamburg”? On this level, the present scenario confronts the United States with a clear challenge: how much risk of nuclear escalation against the U.S. homeland should the United States be willing to accept in responding to an aggressor’s use of nuclear weapons against its forces and allies in theaters thousands of miles away?</p> -<p><strong>The emerging markets team.</strong> In the initial stages of the game, India and South Africa sought to lead a preemptive strategy to deter or at least mitigate the impact of the anticipated G7+ climate club. However, discussions broke down due to competing national interests. Turkey’s economic ties with Europe, as well as Mexico’s trade relationship with the United States, made them more conciliatory toward the G7+, culminating in their decision to join the G7+ club. However, Mexico later withdrew after determining the cost of membership was too high. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were wary of antagonizing or overly depending on China, which hindered unification efforts.</p> +<p>This is a challenging question to which no a priori answer is likely possible, as much would depend upon the specific battlefield circumstances, the geopolitical and political contexts, and the personalities of the leaders in question. To judge from U.S. deterrence policy over many decades, however, the answer to the question is “definitely some.” Nonetheless, U.S. intestinal fortitude in this regard is presumably not infinite. The United States was clearly willing to accept considerable risk of escalation to a full-scale nuclear exchange in order to deter Soviet aggression against its allies in Europe during the Cold War. Yet the United States also seems to have recognized that there was an inherent degree of non-credibility in a promise, in effect, to destroy the world in order to “save” (for instance) Hamburg from the Red Army.</p> -<p>Natural resources also played a major role for players on the emerging markets team, as seen in the establishment of the OCME. Russia, meanwhile, pursued a natural gas and nuclear agreement with China, though its primary strategy was disruption. Russia used its cyber capabilities and natural resources to sow discord, particularly within the G7+, and to deter any actions that might threaten demand for its hydrocarbon exports. By the end of the game, the emerging markets team was too fragmented to resemble a cohesive economic bloc.</p> +<p>In response to this problem, the United States and its allies developed three answers that went beyond relying exclusively upon potentially homeland-imperiling U.S. strategic brinkmanship: (a) the British and French invested in their own nuclear weapons programs; (b) the United States adopted a “nuclear-sharing” policy under which it would provide nuclear gravity bombs for delivery by key NATO allies in time of war (while preserving U.S. control of such devices in peacetime); and (c) the United States deployed a variety of theater- and shorter-range nuclear delivery systems that would give it more options to respond to aggression without the stark choice between surrender and jumping all the way up the escalation ladder to a strategic exchange. Together, these choices added considerable operational flexibility to the collective NATO nuclear tool kit, enhancing deterrence without making nuclear use so casually thinkable that the United States would be tempted to engage in it absent the gravest of provocations.</p> -<h3 id="key-outcomes-and-insights">Key Outcomes and Insights</h3> +<p>Today, by contrast, only the first of the United States’ three Cold War–era responses (British and French weapons) really remains viable, though even then in a form considerably attenuated since Cold War days and not optimized for theater-type engagements of this sort in any event. The second response (NATO’s nuclear-sharing policy) has been allowed to atrophy into a fairly noncredible operational capability that would be difficult to employ in a full-scale conflict, is vulnerable to both nuclear and conventional preemption, and which (at least until sizeable numbers of dual-capable F-35 aircraft come online) would have difficulty surviving and ensuring mission-completion against serious air defenses.</p> -<p><strong>The outcomes highlighted the risks of a trade-based climate strategy.</strong> The game ended with escalating trade tensions, a worsening economic outlook for many countries, and only a modest increase in global ambitions for climate change. Despite mounting pressure from the public and increasingly visible climate effects, players prioritized economic and geopolitical goals over emissions reductions. Throughout the simulation, U.S.-China relations remained distant, and even the threat of a trade war failed to inspire rapprochement on carbon accounting standards, green development spending, or a common approach to climate and trade. The potential benefits of joining the G7+ climate club were not compelling enough to attract major emitters such as India, Brazil, or Indonesia.</p> +<p>As for the third response, the United States no longer has any effective U.S. nuclear assets designed for, devoted to, and deployed for theater-level nuclear missions. It does have a low-yield option in the form of the W76-2 warhead, but that device rides on a strategic delivery system, the Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The United States has no flexible, theater-range nuclear systems to array against the considerable Russian and Chinese arsenals of diverse and flexible theater-range systems. This makes it harder to reassure our allies that we really would be there (in a nuclear sense) for their “Hamburg” — as well as harder to convince (and hence deter) the would-be aggressor.</p> -<p><strong>Ambiguity prevented teams from taking decisive action in early rounds.</strong> As China and the emerging markets awaited details about the nascent club, they cautioned the G7+ against adopting protectionist measures but did not oppose the creation of a climate club outright or threaten direct retaliation. This left the G7+ team relatively free to act without external pressure. Most notably, China and the emerging markets failed to unite around a credible alternative to the G7+ effort. This could reflect a lack of appetite for climate clubs, or it could stem from emerging markets hedging their bets between potentially attractive options. In any case, the G7+ team appeared too preoccupied with its internal divisions to capitalize on opportunities to bring large emitters from the emerging markets team (such as Brazil, India, or Indonesia) into the fold or pressure China to increase its internal ambitions for climate.</p> +<p>This is the basic challenge of the second-level question of nuclear use. It is surely possible for nuclear weapons to be too “usable,” and overquick resort to such tools could be catastrophic. Yet it is also possible for nuclear weapons use to be too hard to contemplate, for to find it truly “unthinkable” would be to invite aggression that cannot be deterred or combatted by purely conventional means. Deterrence policy is thus about finding the “Goldilocks point” — or, more elegantly, the Aristotelean Mean — between these bad answers. In the present scenario, however, the United States would surely be more able both to deter and to respond to aggression if it had more theater-range options.</p> -<p><strong>Economic imperatives appeared to have a stabilizing effect on Chinese decisionmaking.</strong> Appearing hesitant to jeopardize economic opportunities through retaliatory measures, the China team explored alternative options ranging from warning the G7+ against discriminatory measures to engaging with emerging markets in various formats and appealing to the WTO. When these efforts failed, China finally opted for retaliation, the scope of which was narrow, focusing on critical minerals and WTO litigation. The China team calculated that persistent macroeconomic difficulties would make it unfeasible to sustain a large-scale trade war that could compromise other priorities, including national security and climate goals.</p> +<p>Now that nuclear weapons have been used in this scenario, this second-level question of nuclear use moves to the forefront. Fortunately, the facts of the scenario so far do not quite precipitate the most challenging dilemma, so it matters less that the United States lacks the more flexible theater-range nuclear options it needs.</p> -<p><strong>Geopolitical considerations, as well as regional and economic proximity, strongly influenced decisionmaking.</strong> After the G7+ formally established its club, the United States and Canada swiftly approached Mexico, and the European Union approached Turkey. These moves seemed low risk and logical given the nations’ geographic proximity, political ties, and significant trade flows. By contrast, India was never directly courted to join either the G7+ club or China’s Inclusive Green Belt. The country’s ambivalent geopolitical positioning, as well as its low-ambition trade and climate mitigation policies, may have acted as deterrents.</p> +<p>Presumably, U.S. allies have no special interest in the United States using nuclear weapons per se: their interest lies in being defended against aggression by whatever means are necessary — not excluding nuclear weaponry, but not necessarily employing it either. Indeed, at various points over the years, some allies have expressed concern that the United States might perhaps be too quick to use such weapons, particularly where such employment in theater would occur on their soil. (Over NATO’s history, U.S. defense planners have struggled incessantly with simultaneous European demands that the United States (a) be entirely ready to wage a nuclear war on their behalf and (b) not be too eager to do so, especially not in Europe. The equilibrium point between these demands is not always easily found.) Most likely, however, U.S. allies’ primary concern here is quite singular. Their fear is only that the United States might fail to use nuclear weapons in circumstances in which there is no way to protect the allies’ own existential security interests other than by using nuclear weapons.</p> -<p>Notably, both Mexico and Turkey sought access to the G7+ club in a manner that would permit continued Chinese investment in their economies. They requested that goods produced by Chinese companies on their soil, like BYD EVs, not be excluded from the internal green marketplace. Meanwhile, bilateral deals — such as those between China and Russia, Russia and India, or Saudi Arabia and the United States — aligned with existing geopolitical and sectoral relationships.</p> +<p>Through this lens, a critical question is whether this scenario is “one of those cases.” And in this regard, the scenario could be said not yet to present such a need. So far, the conventional situation does not seem to be one in which vital U.S. or allied interests are threatened in ways that would require U.S. nuclear use. On the contrary, the United States and its allies seem to be prevailing without it. The primary, existential question from the perspective of allied second-level (nuclear) assurance, therefore, has arguably thus not yet been raised. After all, it would presumably do little harm to the United States’ reputation among its allies as an extended deterrence protector — and might even enhance its reputation for responsible nuclear statesmanship — if Washington were to decline to use nuclear weapons where it did not need to use them.</p> -<p><strong>Trade liberalization and energy supplies were the most effective tools for driving collaboration and realignment.</strong> Both the G7+ and China made technology transfer and investment central to their efforts to entice other countries to cooperate, but they met with little success. Attempts by China and the emerging markets to exert influence through tighter controls on critical minerals or fossil fuels were also of limited influence. In contrast, trade liberalization played a significant role in supporting and dissuading club membership. Access to the green marketplace was key in attracting Mexico and Turkey to the G7+ club, while market access for Chinese green goods deterred emerging markets from embracing the Inclusive Green Belt. Energy supply played a significant role in bilateral deals between teams but was not a driver for clubs.</p> +<p>Instead, the remaining question here is whether a U.S. or allied nuclear response might be needed to the Russian or Chinese nuclear attacks simply because they were nuclear attacks. To this question, under these facts, reasonable people may disagree. Some might argue in the affirmative — claiming, in effect, that we “need” to use nuclear weapons to protect the credibility, to ally and aggressor alike, of the “nuclear” aspect of extended deterrence even when the United States does not need to use nuclear weapons for any actual operational military purpose in a war it is already winning.</p> -<h3 id="lessons-for-policymakers">Lessons for Policymakers</h3> +<p>This paper, however, contends that on the current facts of this scenario, the United States does not yet need to use nuclear weaponry. The extended deterrence the United States provides to its allies has never been an exclusively nuclear insurance policy against aggression. Instead, it has been an inclusively nuclear one. It combines all elements of available military power that are required to deter aggression and to defeat it should deterrence fail. That is, the United States has promised to defend its allies by whatever means are necessary, but it has not promised to use any specific form of military power unless that form is necessary. This is not some U.S. analogue to the mindless automaticity of the old Soviet (and now Russian) “Dead Hand” nuclear launch system. Rather, it is an ironclad promise to the United States’ best friends of effective defense — not of U.S. nuclear use per se and no matter what.</p> -<p><strong>Clear policy communication is paramount in multilateral negotiations — both in the run-up to a major policy pronouncement and upon its enactment.</strong> Slow, cautious play characterized the game’s opening turns as all three teams appeared unsure of how to proceed or respond. After the G7+ and China teams published their proposals, they spent considerable time dispelling misunderstandings and clarifying their terms. Without clearly articulated goals and terms, club members had little opportunity to market membership to large emitters or potential geopolitical allies.</p> +<p>In this author’s view, a fundamental allied loss of trust in the credibility of the U.S. alliance guarantee would therefore probably not arise unless and until either (a) battlefield circumstances changed in ways that presented an ally with the prospect of catastrophic defeat absent U.S. nuclear use, and the United States did not then use nuclear weapons, or (b) the United States reacted to Sino-Russian nuclear use by retreat or some other measure of capitulation. Otherwise, remaining unintimidated and continuing to prosecute a successful conventional campaign — “fighting through” the adversary’s nuclear use in theater, as it were — should represent an optimal answer from the perspective of U.S. allies.</p> -<p><strong>Climate clubs are contingent on flexible mechanisms that accommodate diverse national interests.</strong> The G7+ team struggled to overcome its members’ disparate policy approaches but struck compromises to clinch an ambitious agreement based on long-term decarbonization. For example, the European Union exempted U.S. products from CBAM, even in the absence of a U.S. carbon market, in exchange for access to Inflation Reduction Act–style subsidies and expanded trade in green goods. The members also did not create a unified border measure, instead allowing each country to follow its national preference. Flexibility was crucial in expanding the club in later turns, as demonstrated in Mexico’s and Turkey’s attempts to protect Chinese investment in their territories.</p> +<p>In this scenario, at least, it is possible that some allies would wish the United States to use nuclear weapons against Russia and/or China, while others surely would prefer that we did not. On the whole, however, it would likely be less costly to alliance solidarity for the United States to continue to win the conventional conflict fighting alongside its allies without using nuclear weapons than it would for the United States to use such weapons (especially on European soil) when it was not absolutely clear it needed to do so.</p> -<p><strong>Climate clubs must be aggressively marketed to emerging markets and geopolitical allies.</strong> Neither the G7+ team nor the China team succeeded in attracting development economies to their club. This failure appears to stem from a lack of coordination among emerging markets as well as the one-size-fits-all approaches of the G7+ and China. Participants did not form any transactional arrangements, such as exchanging access to critical minerals for industrial investment or market access.</p> +<p><em>ALLIED SECURITY CONCERNS</em></p> -<p><strong>Trade has the potential to drive, as well as deter, climate action.</strong> Conventional climate club designs feature a common border measure to encourage nonmembers to join and adopt emissions targets. This is precisely what drove Mexico and Turkey to seek accession to the G7+ club. Yet trade policy considerations also complicated the search for solutions. The debate over the nature and extent of the border measure almost derailed the formation of the G7+ club, as the European Union and the United States disagreed on whether to adhere to WTO rules for raising border adjustments or selectively liberalize trade within the club. Later in the game, China’s demand for tariff-free treatment of its exports as a condition for participating in its Inclusive Green Belt deterred emerging markets from joining.</p> +<p>The security concerns of U.S. allies in this scenario are fourfold, deriving from their situations as relatively militarily weak states close to a powerful revisionist great-power predator that is eager to carve out a more expansive sphere of influence or empire for itself in the world. First and most fundamentally, U.S. allies’ security concern is an existential one: they must avoid the loss of their autonomy and independence as sovereign peoples. Beyond this, and deriving from this core concern, U.S. allies have a second security interest in avoiding the loss of their ties to other countries able and willing to assist them in meeting such primary security needs. Most of all, this means preserving military ties to the United States, but it also entails preserving their more general ability to leverage bilateral relationships or collective security institutions to meet security needs.</p> -<h3 id="priorities-for-future-research">Priorities for Future Research</h3> +<p>A third allied security concern is more prosaic, but still significant. Each ally has a security interest in keeping the military forces of its local great-power predator as far from its own borders as possible. Moreover, irrespective of immediate border threats, allies have a security interest in limiting that predator’s deployment of long-range fires, aviation assets, naval power-projection capabilities, and other military tools capable of threatening that ally’s forces, facilities, or critical infrastructure from afar.</p> -<p><strong>Improve modeling of climate-focused trade mechanisms.</strong> A key shortfall in this game was the inability to model or quantitatively understand the economic, trade, emissions, and political stakes of different decisions. Participants had to reason about decisions using intuition or by asking questions of Control. They were also limited in their ability to compare options or grapple with the outcomes of different actions. Although policymakers in the real world face substantial uncertainty in the outcomes of their decisions, they must enter negotiations with some quantitative understanding of how to achieve their climate and economic goals.</p> +<p>More indirectly, U.S. allies have a fourth security interest in avoiding deep entanglement in economic, natural resource–centered, technological, supply chain, financial, or other relationships of dependency with either of the two great-power predators involved in this scenario. Such relationships may, or may not, provide immediate benefits (e.g., inexpensive goods, cheap energy, or corporate profits), but such ties are strategically debilitating and inimical to maintaining the sovereign independence that is each ally’s first-order existential concern. Such relationships give leverage over that ally by allowing the other power to administer rewards and punishments in ways that reduce the ally’s autonomy, undermine its ability to maintain a credible deterrent against aggression, and weaken relationships with third parties that are important to preserving its core security interests. (The existence of such relationships also likely contributes to adversary assumptions underlying the deep sociopolitical failure of deterrence discussed earlier: a country mired in structural dependency upon an aggressor will probably be assumed less likely to fight it.)</p> -<p><strong>Understand the priorities of emerging markets in climate and trade negotiations.</strong> Future research on climate clubs should focus on devising a coherent approach that enables the identification and harmonization of the diverse and often conflicting security, climate, and economic priorities of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). Research could explore how climate clubs can tailor membership incentives, such as market access, technology transfer, and political support, to attract EMDE participation. This could alleviate the shortcomings of the narrow, one-size-fits-all approaches observed in this simulation.</p> +<p><em>SIGNALING RESOLVE</em></p> -<p><strong>Develop a standardized and adaptable global carbon accounting framework.</strong> Lack of consensus on carbon accounting standards and other evaluative criteria emerged as a major obstacle to cooperation during the simulation. Future research should focus on identifying carbon accounting procedures that meet enough needs to become standardized, such as accounting for data access and validation procedures. Proactive multilateral engagement is critical to effectively integrating these global standards into trade negotiations and carbon border mechanisms.</p> +<p>Once deterrence has failed — or more challengingly, failed doubly, as in this scenario where both aggression and nuclear weapons use have occurred — the United States will likely have passed the point at which policy pronouncements and deterrence-related consultations with its allies can, alone, signal sufficient resolve. At this point, what counts most are U.S. actions and how adversaries understand them.</p> -<p><strong>Identify and navigate geopolitical and security redlines in climate negotiations.</strong> The simulation illustrated that bilateral and multilateral agreements that align with existing geopolitical relationships or shared economic and security interests have higher rates of success. Future research should focus on identifying geopolitical and security redlines that hinder climate negotiations, as well as the ways climate clubs can mitigate these obstacles through measures such as public diplomacy, economic incentives, and security guarantees.</p> +<p>In this respect, perhaps the most important signal the United States could send is to not slow or alter its activities against aggressor forces in the two theaters, except when such steps may be needed to preserve ongoing operations in a potentially nuclear environment. To this end, all relevant U.S. (and NATO) conventional assets should be readied to operate in a radiological-nuclear combat environment as quickly as possible, with ground assets dispersing to widely scattered field dispositions and air assets moving to dispersal airfields. This could also include the issuance of detection and protective gear, medical countermeasures, and relevant decontamination equipment, as well as surging radiation-hazard first responder units and medical personnel forward.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Dispersing conventional capabilities — not merely land and naval units near the zone of operations but also aircraft from vulnerable bases to a wider variety of auxiliary dispersed locations, including those dual-capable aircraft (DCA) that would be needed for nuclear attack missions (i.e., unilateral U.S. assets in East Asia and NATO nuclear-sharing aircraft in Europe) — would also demonstrate resolve, unity, and collective preparedness. U.S. nuclear weapon storage vaults at relevant European airfields should also be readied for potential operations, and any existing plans for weapon dispersal to additional airfields that do not involve actual DCA attack assets should be implemented. (Care should be taken, however, not to fly NATO DCAs en masse to weapon storage airfields or to fly DCA from such airfields, lest Russia mistake this for an attack in progress.) Every effort should be made to keep these precautions from slowing the pace of combat operations against the Russian forces, which should not stop, though some impact might be unavoidable. (The scenario gives us notably little detail about the operational implications of the Russian and Chinese nuclear strikes.)</p> -<p><strong>Joseph Majkut</strong> is the director of the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>The signals sent by these efforts are intended, together, to demonstrate in concrete form that (i) NATO will not give up in the face of nuclear provocations and (ii) NATO is quite prepared for the possibility of escalation. Beyond the theaters in question, moreover, U.S. and allied leaders in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific should make clear their intention to isolate the aggressors’ economies as completely as possible from the global economy (e.g., impeding Chinese oil shipments through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca, and ending all Russian resource exports) for the duration of their wars of aggression. This may help create additional incentives for moderation.</p> -<p><strong>Guillaume Ferlet</strong> is an external consultant on trade and climate issues with CSIS.</p> +<p>The alert level of U.S. strategic nuclear forces would also need to be elevated, with vulnerable bomber assets dispersing to auxiliary airfields, and with portions of the force perhaps even beginning rotating in-air readiness patrols (though not flying on headings that could be mistaken for attack trajectories either toward Russia or toward China). U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would remain on ready-to-launch alert, with logistics support crews immediately providing extra supplies of diesel fuel to ICBM bases and individual silos to prepare them to sustain alert operations during a potentially prolonged crisis in which reliance upon local peacetime power grids might be precluded by sabotage or cyberattack.</p> -<p><strong>William Reinsch</strong> holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p>Joseph Majkut, et al.In July 2024, CSIS’s Energy Security and Climate Change Program, in collaboration with the Scholl Chair in International Business, hosted a one-day trade and climate simulation game titled Power and Planet. The focus was on how players representing key nations make decisions at the intersection of climate and trade policy to reduce emissions, boost economic opportunity, and ensure security.Collaborative AI Governance2024-11-13T12:00:00+08:002024-11-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/collaborative-ai-governance<p><em>The UK and Canada, leveraging their strengths as trusted middle powers, are well-positioned to lead in setting global AI standards, fostering ethical, responsible and innovative AI governance.</em></p> +<p>Meanwhile, serviceable in-port nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) — not only in the United States but also in Britain and France — should muster their crews and put to sea as quickly as possible. Emergency notice should also be given to operators of critical infrastructure facilities in the United States, Europe, and East Asia, encouraging or directing them to implement whatever protective protocols they might have to defend against Russian and/or Chinese cyberattacks, and to move to insulate their systems as much as possible from the internet (even at financial cost or loss in operational efficiency) and prepare themselves to implement emergency service restoration or reconstitution plans.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p><em>THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF MESSAGE</em></p> -<p>AI has moved out of the academic sphere and is rapidly becoming a “general-purpose” technology with a significant impact on industry, government and society. As a result, there is an urgent need to develop a cross-sectoral environment for AI within countries to attract foreign direct investment, and actively participate in global trade and meet both economic and national security goals.</p> +<p>While these preparatory steps are important in their own right, they are also critical to the U.S. messaging strategy. To understand the importance of getting U.S. strategic signaling right, it should be remembered that the Russian and Chinese nuclear attacks in this scenario were notably limited. They hit only things in theater that were of tactical operational relevance, for instance, striking only a very small number of targets despite both adversaries possessing a huge numerical advantage in theater delivery systems. Moreover, they refrained from hitting anything in the U.S. homeland or that was of arguable strategic importance to the United States. This suggests that U.S. adversaries are themselves carefully considering escalation risks, and that they do fear provoking a large-scale nuclear response. If they understand that their nuclear use has not intimidated the United States and that the United States is indeed comfortable with escalation despite their previous assumptions to the contrary — but that, at the same time, U.S. war aims are limited, being confined only to restoring the status quo ante — the United States may have a chance to restore deterrence.</p> -<p>However, in parallel to the technological investment in and development of this capability, robust governance systems must be in place to ensure the development and application of AI is trustworthy.</p> +<p>Accordingly, these concrete military moves would be accompanied by full-spectrum public messaging — including by the president directly — making three key points:</p> -<p>These levels of trust, predictability and protection are particularly important at a time when collaboration between global powers and economies of a lesser magnitude is vital, but when different forms of regulation may be better suited to smaller economies and political structures. Moreover, the so-called “rules-based order” that once governed global interactions is now inconsistently applied. This presents a unique opportunity for like-minded middle economies to unite and collectively set the highest standards for AI’s ethical and responsible use in ways that uphold their strong commitment to democratic principles, human rights and freedoms.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>First, the United States would make clear that these nuclear-preparatory steps are indeed underway and that Washington is demonstrating in concrete ways the United States’ ironclad commitment to protecting the sovereignty and independence of its military allies by whatever means necessary.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Second, the United States would make equally clear that under the current circumstances, U.S. nuclear weapons use is not yet necessary. U.S. messaging would stress that, while Russia and China’s nuclear use was the result of tactical desperation as their wars of aggression began to falter, the United States itself faces no such desperate circumstances. On the contrary, despite the United States’ strong preference to avoid using nuclear weapons and its willingness to use them if its adversaries force it to, the United States is currently prevailing in the conventional fight and intends to continue with that winning approach for so long as its adversaries’ fixation upon aggression makes it necessary to resist them in order to protect the security and independence of free sovereign peoples. Washington would also make clear that it remains entirely prepared and ready to use nuclear weapons itself if Russia or China leave it no choice, and the United States would warn them not to test its resolve by using nuclear weapons a second time.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Third, the United States would make explicit that its war aims in this conventional fight are quite limited. The United States do not seek to inflict a “strategic loss” or regime change upon either Russia or China, but rather merely stop their wars of aggression. If they stop that aggression, the United States would have no more need to fight them.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>In times of global uncertainty, the UK and Canada have consistently been viewed as trusted partners and “safe pairs of hands”. Both countries have respected political systems, strong higher education institutions, a shared monarchy, similarities in the legal and regulatory regimes, and military alliances (NATO and the “Five Eyes”). While many middle economies wait for powers like the US and the EU to set data and AI standards rules in the digital world, progress has been slow. Therefore, taking stock of the milestones and progress achieved in countries such as Canada and the UK is crucial, as well as considering the formation of a coalition of middle economies to set and influence global standards in this area.</p> +<p><em>TREATY VERSUS NON-TREATY PARTNERS</em></p> -<p>Both countries are navigating their roles as middle powers in the global AI race, which is dominated by the US, the EU and China. Ranked third (UK) and fifth (Canada) in the 2024 top 10 countries leading in AI research and technology, with a market value of $21 billion for the UK and 144 generative AI-related startups in Canada, and scores of 38.1 (UK) and 34 (Canada) in the leading 20 AI countries in 2023 by research capacity, these countries have significant potential to collaborate on AI governance and the establishment of trustworthy and responsible AI cooperation. Demis Hassabis and Geoffrey Hinton, two thought leaders in AI research and practice, are both British, with Hinton having spent a significant part of his career in Canada – which is also home to other leading global AI scholars like Yoshua Bengio.</p> +<p>Much of this above-mentioned activity would be aimed primarily at protecting and reassuring U.S. military allies, as they would undoubtedly be the United States’ highest priority. Moves that would reassure those treaty allies would likely have some impact in reassuring non-treaty partners as well, but this would be merely a secondary, rather than primary, benefit.</p> -<h3 id="canada-and-the-uks-progress-and-existing-challenges">Canada and the UK’s Progress and Existing Challenges</h3> +<h4 id="military-response-options">Military Response Options</h4> -<p>Progress in data privacy and protection in the UK is an excellent example of progressive national efforts in the data-driven and digitalised world. These efforts have already resulted in comprehensive legislative frameworks like the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK-GDPR, both of which align with the EU’s GDPR to safeguard personal data across various sectors. The UK has also made progress in sector-specific privacy advancements, particularly in health informatics, with initiatives such as NHS Digital implementing stricter controls on patient data access through the Data Security and Protection Toolkit. Innovations like the UK National Data Strategy and the UK National AI Strategy highlight the government’s commitment to ensuring the responsible use of data while fostering innovation in digital services and AI applications. The Alan Turing Institute, which is the UK’s National Institute for Data Science and AI, focuses on advancing world-class research and applying it to national and global challenges, developing skills and training for the future, and driving informed public conversation. The Ada Lovelace Institute develops research, policy and practice to ensure that data and AI is used and harnessed in ways that maximise social wellbeing and put technology at the service of humanity.</p> +<p><em>U.S. MILITARY OPTIONS</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is a unique opportunity for like-minded middle economies to unite and collectively set the highest standards for AI’s ethical and responsible use</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The foregoing pages have already made clear the optimal immediate U.S. military responses to the current scenario: the United States should continue winning the conventional fight without employing nuclear weapons itself, while posturing itself to be ready for nuclear use if adversary nuclear threats or other military circumstances require. The United States would retain the option to do more, of course, and — depending how things develop — might well indeed still need to do so in the face of further Russian or Chinese provocations (e.g., massive U.S. battlefield reverses or a second instance of adversary nuclear use). Absent such further need, however, discretion should remain the better part of valor.</p> -<p>Canadian progress in AI ethics and regulation is also worthy of note. Canada has been at the forefront of promoting ethical AI through the Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Algorithmic Impact Assessment tools. In 2018, as Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commissioner, Dr Ann Cavoukian introduced the seven foundational principles of “Privacy by Design”. These principles directly informed the development of the EU’s GDPR. Currently, the Canadian government is actively working on regulations – including the proposed AI and Data Act (AIDA) – to ensure transparency, fairness and accountability in developing and using AI systems. Canada’s strength in AI research, notably through the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research and Center for International Governance Innovation, has positioned the country as a global leader in AI ethics and governance, encouraging responsible innovation. Programmes including the Vector Institute (Ontario) and Mila (Quebec AI Institute) contribute significantly to research on ethical AI and developing tools for assessing algorithmic fairness.</p> +<p><em>WHAT IF THEY USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAIN?</em></p> -<p>The key challenge lies in integrating these ethical standards into broader legal frameworks and ensuring uniform implementation across provinces, particularly given Canada’s decentralised governance. There are also significant concerns regarding the ethical use of AI in public services, such as law enforcement, where algorithmic bias and surveillance risks must be carefully managed. Balancing the rapid development of AI technologies with ethical considerations and privacy preservation remains a complex and ongoing issue, particularly as AI systems become more pervasive in sectors like healthcare, education and finance. Despite progress on ethical frameworks, the lack of comprehensive national AI legislation presents hurdles in ensuring consistent oversight across industries.</p> +<p>In the event that U.S. adversaries chose to use nuclear weapons a second time, the United States — as it will have signaled that it was ready to do — should be prepared to cross the nuclear threshold itself. At least initially, the key would be to find a type and level of U.S. nuclear response appropriate to the delicate task of (a) signaling undiminished resolve and of (b) not jumping so much further up the proverbial escalation ladder that things spiral out of control.</p> -<h3 id="current-collaborations-and-joint-efforts">Current Collaborations and Joint Efforts</h3> +<p>In this regard, one possibility would be to have a deployed SSBN in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific launch Trident missiles with reduced-yield W76-2 nuclear warheads toward two targets. (If the United States had the capability to do this, and reasonable confidence that its adversaries could see and understand that this is what the United States was doing, these weapons should also be launched on depressed ballistic trajectories clearly incapable of hitting strategic targets deep in the adversaries’ homelands.) These four targets, two in Russia and two in China, would be chosen on the basis of being military locations consistent with legitimate targeting under the law of armed conflict (LOAC), and the destruction of which would have a real impact upon adversary military operations in each theater, but without inflicting massive civilian casualties and without directly posing what could be seen as an existential threat to either ruling regime. Choosing these targets would need to be done relatively quickly, and carefully, but there would be at least some time for careful selection, informed not only by military analysis but also careful assessment of adversary leadership psychology and domestic political dynamics.</p> -<p>This progress notwithstanding, challenges remain, particularly in balancing innovation with compliance, as industries such as health informatics seek more flexible use of personal data while maintaining privacy. The issue of cross-border data flows post-Brexit presents regulatory complexities, especially with potential data adequacy rulings from the EU. The rapid advancement of AI and big data analytics in sectors like finance and healthcare tests the limits of existing frameworks, prompting ongoing discussions about updating privacy laws to cover emerging technologies like AI-driven decision-making systems and biometric data usage.</p> +<p>The point in these attacks would be affirmatively to cross the “nuclear threshold,” including by hitting targets in the adversaries’ homelands — not merely to raise the ante somewhat for purposes of coercive bargaining, but also because, as Willie Sutton might have put it, that is where the targets are, as well as because the United States would prefer not to set off nuclear weapons on its allies’ territory if it can avoid it — while yet doing so in ways that adversary observers would be less likely to mistake for any sort of strategic attack and that signaled U.S. continuing commitment to a great degree of restraint. The U.S. president should also announce these launches publicly, making clear that this is a carefully limited theater action responding directly to these adversaries’ nuclear use and demonstrating that the United States will neither yield to their intimidation nor be provoked into overreaction, and that U.S. commitment to protecting its military allies remains undimmed. (Afterward, moreover, U.S. officials would publicly present the rationale for choosing those targets and that means of attack, also making clear how this decision was consistent with longstanding LOAC principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity.)</p> -<p>Canada and the UK have been actively fostering collaboration on AI-related initiatives. For example, in 2019, the UK-Canada AI Initiative was launched to fund collaborative research projects between the two countries. This initiative focuses on AI’s application in areas like health and environmental sustainability and on the ethical challenges posed by AI technologies. The goal is to leverage the AI expertise of both countries while promoting research that aligns with their shared values of transparency, fairness and privacy protection. The 2024 UK-Canada science of AI safety partnership serves as another collaborative initiative.</p> +<p><em>THE RISKS</em></p> -<p>The UK and Canada are both active internationally in advocating for the responsible use of AI. They are co-signatories of the 2019 OECD AI Principles, the 2022–2024 Council of Europe AI Convention drafting group, the 2023 G7 Ministers’ Statement, the 2023 Bletchley Declaration and the 2024 Seoul Ministerial Declaration. They have also both participated in the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence. This multilateral engagement runs in parallel with national legislative frameworks such as the Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy and the UK National AI Strategy, both of which are oriented towards building AI ecosystems that prioritise ethical standards, transparency and fairness.</p> +<p>This has already been covered, or at least implied, in the paragraphs above. The primary risk lies in the danger that the United States fails to find the optimal Goldilocks point between the extremes as it tries to simultaneously (a) persuade allies and adversaries alike of U.S. seriousness and martial resolution and (b) not signal so much readiness or eagerness for escalation that the adversary feels provoked into catastrophic preemptive moves. Secondary risks also exist, among them the possibility either that some ally “opts out” of the conflict for fear of escalatory consequences, or that it “opts in” with too much enthusiasm by unilaterally taking steps that end up provokingadversary escalation rather than deterring it.</p> -<h3 id="how-can-canada-and-the-uk-make-a-difference">How Can Canada and the UK Make a Difference?</h3> +<p><em>THE LOAC</em></p> -<p>Building on a long history of collaboration between the UK and Canada in emerging technologies, shared values and similarities in political cultures and the diversity of their populations, as well as the novel approaches and practices established and implemented in both countries, joint efforts could be enhanced in the following areas:</p> +<p>The United States has long made clear its belief that the LOAC does apply to the use of all forms of weaponry in wartime, including nuclear weapons. Washington has also made clear in recent years its intention to abide by those rules in the event of conflict, even nuclear conflict. Despite U.S. commitment to such legal constraints, however, LOAC principles — if properly understood as U.S. officials have indeed carefully outlined them, and as generations of operational lawyers in the U.S. armed services have been trained on them — should not be a significant impediment to sound U.S. or allied strategy in this scenario.</p> -<h4 id="data-governance-and-data-protection">Data Governance and Data Protection</h4> +<p>There is no question that the use of nuclear weapons is not illegal under the LOAC when the very existence of a state is threatened — this being a formulation that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accepted in its 1996 advisory opinion on the topic — and the present scenario of aggressor use of nuclear weapons against Poland and the Philippines would certainly seem to raise such concerns. Nor would the LOAC rule out U.S. or other allied nuclear use in defending an ally from such attack as a matter of course, as the right of self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter does not preclude collective self-defense. The law would not permit simply any nuclear response, of course. Nevertheless, under such quasi-existential circumstances the logic of compelling “military necessity” should permit judicious nuclear counter-strikes — both to prevent allied defeat in a growing conventional conflict and to dissuade further (and potentially full-scale) nuclear escalation by the aggressor — even if such strikes entailed considerable civilian casualties.</p> -<p>Both countries could build a bilateral data governance framework that enhances data protection while facilitating secure data sharing for research, public health, and economic growth. This would ensure that data governance aligns with ethical standards and that personal data is protected across both countries while enabling the flow of information critical to innovation and commerce.</p> +<p>LOAC principles are thus unlikely to be an obstacle to a careful and prudent response to the current scenario, even if that response turned out to involve U.S. or allied use of nuclear weaponry. The LOAC would preclude using a U.S. nuclear weapon directly to target Russian or Chinese civilians, of course, and U.S. and allied commanders would need to take feasible precautions to limit civilian damage (e.g., being as precise in their targeting as is feasible under the circumstances and using weapons of yield no greater than needed to accomplish the military objective). Yet it is hard to imagine military circumstances in this scenario giving rise to any need to do more than what a clear-eyed analysis of necessity and proportionality would permit.</p> -<p>For example, the US–EU Privacy Shield Framework offers a reference point for cross-border data governance. Although invalidated in 2020, it was initially designed to facilitate data transfers while ensuring compliance with stringent privacy laws on both sides of the Atlantic. A UK–Canada data governance initiative could draw lessons from this experience to build a framework that maintains high data privacy standards without impeding cross-border innovation and AI research.</p> +<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options">Non-Kinetic Response Options</h4> -<h4 id="development-of-cybersecurity-and-defence-against-hybrid-informational-threats">Development of Cybersecurity and Defence Against Hybrid Informational Threats</h4> +<p>To the degree that non-kinetic options might exist that could affect the ability of Russian or Chinese forces to operate effectively in the specific theater wars described in this scenario, such activity might well contribute usefully to prosecution of the conflict below the level of U.S. or allied nuclear escalation. This might include, for instance: pursuing cyber or electronic warfare (EW) degradation of air defense activity or battlefield command, control, and communications (C3) networks; jamming or spoofing of adversary positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) communications for engaged combatants; launching cyberattacks on infrastructure or transportation capabilities that directly contribute to the fight in theater; or jamming or otherwise engaging space assets in connection specifically with their support to theater operations. If means were available to degrade adversary nuclear C3, but only in the context of theater operations such as the two nuclear attacks that already occurred, this would likely also be a useful contribution to the fight, helping make further regional strikes more difficult.</p> -<p>Joint investments in cybersecurity systems include cooperation on AI-driven threat detection, defensive measures against cyberattacks and developing countermeasures to combat disinformation and hybrid attacks. This could involve research collaborations between top universities in both countries, pooling expertise to create cutting-edge tools that protect national digital infrastructure.</p> +<p>At least initially, however, care should be taken to avoid non-kinetic measures that might be interpreted as having existential implications. This could include, for instance, attacks upon Russian or Chinese space assets that support strategically critical functions such as national nuclear C3, cyberattacks upon critical infrastructure not associated with the specific military theater of operations, or perhaps even — given the paranoid and potentially fragile nature of the regimes in question — the dramatic stepping up of Information Operations (IO) or public diplomacy messaging that could be interpreted as encouraging regime change in Moscow and Beijing.</p> -<p>Australia and Singapore’s cybersecurity cooperation is a strong example of two countries collaborating to enhance cyber defences. Under their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Australia and Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2017 to cooperate on cybersecurity initiatives. This partnership includes joint cyber threat exercises, collaboration on cyber capacity building, sharing good practice on cybersecurity governance, and developing common frameworks for cyber risk management. The UK and Canada could adopt a similar model by establishing a formal cybersecurity cooperation framework focusing on joint threat intelligence sharing, collaborative defence against cyberattacks, and coordinated responses to disinformation and hybrid informational threats.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-1">Conclusion</h4> -<h4 id="investment-in-ai-startups-and-innovation">Investment in AI Startups and Innovation</h4> +<p>This scenario certainly presents challenging questions. For this author, however, the particular fact pattern of Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons use outlined in Project Atom 2024 does not have to drive the United States to nuclear use itself, at least not yet. The United States must continue to stand by its allies and ensure that they are defended against aggression, while denying the aggressors any advantage from their choice to cross the nuclear threshold. Nevertheless, since (and for so long as) the United States is winning both wars without using nuclear weaponry, it should continue to do so, while yet making it very clear that it is prepared to escalate to nuclear use — and indeed actually ensuring that it is thus prepared — if the aggressors leave the United States no choice. With the moderate war aims appropriate to a status quo power seeking to defeat aggression but not to remake the world in its image, the United States has the chance here to confound Sino-Russian aggression, rebuild a strong deterrent posture, prove to its allies that it indeed does stand with them when bullets start to fly, and demonstrate reassuringly temperate nuclear statesmanship, all at the same time.</p> -<p>The AI ecosystem in the UK and Canada is thriving, with solid support for startups and innovation hubs. The UK’s Alan Turing Institute and Canada’s Vector Institute are global leaders in AI research, and both countries have numerous AI startups working on cutting-edge innovations. Earlier this year, Innovate UK invited UK companies developing AI for improving healthcare to apply to join its Global Incubator Programme in collaboration with MaRS Discovery District in Toronto, Canada. However, more can be done to foster cross-border investment and collaboration in this space. A bilateral initiative to increase investment in AI startups could include creating joint AI venture capital funds, protection for creator rights and intellectual property, support for incubators, and cross-border mentorship programmes.</p> +<h3 id="washingtons-response-to-nuclear-use-against-us-allies">Washington’s Response to Nuclear Use against U.S. Allies</h3> -<p>Franco-German AI collaboration is a prime example of bilateral cooperation aimed at fostering innovation. By signing the Aachen Treaty in 2019, the two countries solidified their collaboration in research and digital transformation.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="rebecca-davis-gibbons">Rebecca Davis Gibbons</h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="fostering-responsible-ai-talent-and-establishing-educational-exchange-projects">Fostering Responsible AI Talent and Establishing Educational Exchange Projects</h4> +<h4 id="introduction-1">Introduction</h4> -<p>As AI continues to grow, the need for a skilled AI workforce has become critical. The UK and Canada are home to world-class universities and AI research institutions that have already made strides in educating the next generation of AI talent. However, the demand for responsible AI practitioners is rising, and there is room for deeper cooperation in building the skills pipeline.</p> +<p>The circumstances of nuclear use described in the proposed 2027 scenario are unprecedented. The notional attacks would not only break an 82-year taboo concerning nuclear use in warfare, but nuclear weapons have never been used in conflict against other nuclear-armed states. These novel circumstances combined with the high stakes for all parties involved present U.S. policymakers with significant challenges in determining how to respond. Ideally, Washington would lead a course of action that would illustrate U.S. resolve and credibility to its allies and partners, avoid nuclear escalation, and demonstrate that nuclear use does not result in attackers achieving their strategic goals.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The UK and Canada could build a bilateral data governance framework that enhances data protection while facilitating secure data sharing for research, public health, and economic growth</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The analysis below argues that the primary U.S. objective, if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF) use nuclear weapons in the context of conflicts over Ukraine and Taiwan, is to manage and prevent escalation up to a major nuclear exchange. Secondary — though still vitally important — objectives include maintaining alliance relationships, ending the conflicts on favorable terms, and ensuring that the international community does not perceive nuclear use as benefitting the attackers. The United States and its allies should take several actions, militarily and diplomatically, to prevent these conflicts in the first place, and failing this, be ready to address the first instance of nuclear use since World War II in a manner that does not lead to a broader nuclear war.</p> -<p>The MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab is an example of collaboration between academia and industry on AI. Through this partnership, researchers from both institutions work together on AI research, focusing on responsible AI development.</p> +<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives-1">U.S. Strategic Objectives</h4> -<h4 id="enhancing-healthcare-and-public-health-systems-with-trustworthy-ai">Enhancing Healthcare and Public Health Systems with Trustworthy AI</h4> +<p>The following section explores why deterrence failed and what the United States can do to prevent these deterrence failures, before presenting the U.S. strategic objectives in the scenario.</p> -<p>Canada and the UK have advanced healthcare systems and have increasingly adopted AI to improve healthcare delivery, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic. AI technologies in healthcare can enhance diagnostics, predict patient outcomes, and streamline public health responses. However, AI’s use in healthcare must be carefully regulated to ensure it is trustworthy, ethical and aligned with public trust.</p> +<p><em>WHY DID DETERRENCE FAIL?</em></p> -<p>Canadian-French health cooperation, including the Future of Healthcare using Artificial Intelligence mission, is focused on establishing industrial R&amp;D collaboration opportunities (specifically for technology co-development validation and adaption) in the digital health sector, and has been designed to promote discussions on commercialisation-oriented R&amp;D collaboration opportunities.</p> +<p>In the notional 2027 scenario, the initial failure of conventional deterrence is the most consequential failure. Both adversaries used nuclear weapons because they instigated imprudent conventional conflicts against U.S. allies and partners.</p> -<h3 id="towards-a-deeper-future-ukcanada-cooperative-initiative-on-ai">Towards a Deeper Future UK–Canada Cooperative Initiative on AI</h3> +<p>The purpose of nuclear use in both theaters appears to be twofold: (1) demonstrating the high stakes with which the adversaries view the conflicts and (2) terminating the war by deterring the United States and its allies from continuing to fight due to Western fears of additional nuclear attacks.</p> -<p>A proposed cooperative initiative must grow to encompass more countries than just the UK and Canada. It must include other leading middle economies that are deeply committed to these issues and working to develop national capacities for AI- and data-driven systems. Such a cooperation framework could serve as a model for establishing bilateral agreements and enhancing collaboration among other middle economies within the G20 and beyond. It could also encourage countries like the Netherlands, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand and Japan to strengthen their efforts in developing ethical frameworks for responsible and efficient AI governance.</p> +<p>The best way to prevent these competitors from resorting to nuclear attacks is to ensure that a strong and credible U.S. deterrent posture — integrating nuclear and conventional capabilities — prevents both from initiating aggression against allies and partners in the first place. The United States and its allies could have taken several political and military steps to improve this posture prior to 2027 when the proposed nuclear attacks occur. A deterrence failure would likely result from an adversary questioning the U.S. political commitment to its allies and partners. It is thus helpful to review signals the United States has sent in recent years that were intended to strengthen credibility, but which may have been misinterpreted.</p> -<hr /> +<p>The U.S. government, in June of 2024, began to publicly signal its military plan to aid Taiwan’s defense. Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, described the “Hellscape” strategy for defending Taiwan to a Washington Post columnist. Paparo explained that the “U.S. military would deploy thousands of unmanned submarines, unmanned surface ships and aerial drones to flood the area and give Taiwanese, U.S. and partner forces time to mount a full response.” He continued, “I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities.” International media sources reported on Paparo’s remarks widely, serving a deterrent function for the United States.</p> -<p><strong>Ann Fitz-Gerald</strong> is a Professor of International Security and the Director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada.</p> +<p>Admiral Paparo, however, also warned that the U.S. industrial base would need to increase its production of drones and other capabilities to implement this plan. Along the same lines, in 2023, a retired U.S. general questioned whether the U.S. military would be ready to defend Taiwan. This skeptical public rhetoric and an inability to attain necessary levels of readiness — something the Chinese government would surely learn from intelligence gathering — could contribute to deterrence failure by creating doubt about both U.S. resolve and U.S. military readiness for such an operation.</p> -<p><strong>Carsten Maple</strong> is a Professor of Cyber Systems Engineering at the University of Warwick’s Cyber Security Centre.</p> +<p>Politically, there are reasons for the PRC to doubt the United States’ commitment to defending Taiwan due to the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity. The United States terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan (the Republic of China or ROC) in 1979 when it formally recognized the PRC. Since then, U.S. relations with Taiwan have been based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The act obligates the United States to provide Taiwan “with defense articles and defense services” to allow the island “to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” The act created a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding U.S. defense of Taiwan. Despite this policy, President Biden has spoken strongly of U.S. support for Taiwan’s defense on four separate occasions. Following these statements, White House officials emphasized that U.S. policy regarding Taiwan remained the same, presumably to avoid raising tensions with China. Making a “mistake” about U.S. support for Taiwan four different times likely has sent a strong signal of U.S. intentions to the PRC. It will be important to see how the next president speaks about Taiwan, as their words will send important messages to Chinese leadership about the U.S. defense of Taiwan. It is worth noting, however, regardless of presidential rhetoric, that as long as the policy of strategic ambiguity is in place, there is room for Chinese leaders to question the U.S. commitment to assisting Taiwan’s defense.</p> -<p><strong>Halyna Padalko</strong> is a PhD student in Computer Science at the National Aerospace University (KhAI) and a Fellow at the Balsillie School of International Affairs.</p>Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, et al.The UK and Canada, leveraging their strengths as trusted middle powers, are well-positioned to lead in setting global AI standards, fostering ethical, responsible and innovative AI governance.Build Civic Tech2024-11-13T12:00:00+08:002024-11-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/build-civic-tech<p><em>As technology continues to shape society, it’s essential for tech leaders to recognize their role in strengthening democracy. This report highlights the urgent need to integrate civic knowledge and responsibility into STEM education and careers.</em></p> +<p>Beyond uncertainty regarding Washington’s military and political pledges to Taiwan, any Chinese attacks on Taiwan could stem from an assumption by President Xi that the stakes are higher for the PRC than for the United States. With Taiwan just over eighty miles from mainland China and the PRC increasingly asserting its dominance in the East and South China Seas, it is unsurprising that Chinese leaders would assume that the island of Taiwan matters more to Beijing than to Washington. The assumption that the United States and its Pacific allies have lower stakes in the region could lead Xi to calculate, first, that he could get away with annexing Taiwan by force, and second, that nuclear use could stop the United States from continuing to defend Taiwan in a crisis if the annexation does not go as planned.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Turning to the European theater, the deterrence failure dates to at least 2014, when the RF annexed Crimea. Based on the West’s limited response to that action, Putin determined that it was worth attempting to take the rest of Ukraine by force in 2022. He did not anticipate Ukraine’s ability to resist the invasion or the support Kyiv would receive from the West. As Ukraine was not a member of the alliance, NATO’s Article 5 commitment did not apply, but members of NATO responded to the attack with intelligence, supplies, and funding. The level of NATO unity surrounding Ukraine and the increases in defense spending among alliance members are intended to send a strong deterrent message to Putin regarding further aggression, but if Moscow were in a desperate gamble to split the alliance and to reduce the West’s support for Ukraine in a conventional conflict, then additional attacks could not be ruled out.</p> -<p>There is an urgent need to strengthen civic knowledge, skills, and engagement across all ages, including adults. This includes those who study and work in STEM fields. Technology plays an increasingly central role in our lives and society, in ways that are both constructive and destructive. Tech innovators must understand the concept of civic responsibility inherent in “we the people,” and think critically about the impact of the work they do. At the same time, we need to inspire tech and science experts to help ensure that decisions by government, at all levels and across all three branches, are informed.</p> +<p>Finally, while preventing the conventional attacks in the first place is key to preventing the subsequent instances of nuclear use, this scenario does involve nuclear deterrence failures. The adversaries likely hoped that crossing the nuclear threshold would compel the United States and its allies to stop fighting. They may have doubts about whether the United States would employ nuclear weapons in regional conflicts.</p> -<p>This report focuses on the integration of civic knowledge and responsibility into STEM education and careers, and how individuals in STEM fields can and must hold institutions accountable and move us toward a more perfect union. Reinvigorating civics knowledge and civic skills has become a national and economic security imperative. The urgency requires reaching not just K-12 students but also adults. This report also offers actionable recommendations for businesses and government, and other organizations committed to equipping employees, partners, and associates with essential civic knowledge and skills.</p> +<p><em>WHAT CAN BE DONE TO AVOID THESE DETERRENCE FAILURES?</em></p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>The U.S. military must prioritize the acquisitions required for the Hellscape plan and for follow-on military action in the region. In addition, the United States needs to find a way to sell Taiwan the military hardware required to defend itself from a PRC attack. If the United States does not provide what Taiwan needs in a timely fashion, it signals a lack of political resolve on the part of the United States and undermines Taiwanese military readiness. As (or if) the United States takes these steps to increase U.S. and Taiwanese readiness between 2024 and 2027, U.S. military leaders should project greater public confidence than they have to date about their ability to aid Taiwan’s defense.</p> -<p>Compared to any other period of human history, the pace of technological advancement over the last few decades is unmatched. The era we currently find ourselves in is marked by exponential growth in areas such as biotechnology, the internet, data analytics, quantum computing, machine learning, and artificial intelligence (AI). Each of these holds the power to change the world completely, for better or for worse.</p> +<p>Short of altering the U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding Taiwan’s status, there are several ways the United States could message its resolve to maintain the status quo. First, more statements like those made by President Biden about his intention to defend Taiwan — even if they must be clarified after the fact — are better than saying nothing or being dismissive of the issue.</p> -<p>Humanity and technology are inextricably linked. The 2023 National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy aptly states, “technology itself does not have a value system; rather, it carries the values of its owners and operators.”</p> +<p>Second, top U.S. leaders should make clear to all audiences that the United States has long been a Pacific power and will continue to be one into the future. U.S. stakes in the region are significant: the United States has several allies and partners in the Pacific, maintains key military bases in the region, and benefits from the substantial percentage of global trade transported through the region’s waters. The United States has demonstrated its commitment to the Pacific in recent years with AUKUS, the trilateral security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Australia, India, and Japan. U.S. leaders should not concede that the PRC has more of a stake in the region, and particularly in Taiwan, than the United States.</p> -<p>The release of AI technology widely available to the public has highlighted that today’s technology can be used both as a tool and as a weapon. It is vital to encourage developments that promote innovation while intentionally maximizing the potential for technologies to be used in positive ways. Foundational to this goal is the need to strengthen civic responsibility, respect for the rule of law, and an understanding of the role of government — and, most importantly, the role of citizens — in a healthy democracy. That is the function of civics education.</p> +<p>Third, U.S. leaders should reiterate several talking points regarding Taiwan, both domestically and to the broader international community, to highlight why the United States seeks to maintain the status quo. One set of messages should emphasize what could occur if Taiwan loses its autonomy and becomes part of the PRC. Taiwan is a liberal democracy and a fundamental economic partner to the West. In particular, Taiwan is the world’s foremost supplier of semiconductors and advanced semiconductors, which are necessary for cell phones, computers, cars, and military hardware. If Taiwan were to be swallowed up by its large communist neighbor, this vitally important industry would be under Chinese control. The United States could lose access to the advanced semiconductors necessary for its defense.</p> -<p>CivxNow defines civics as “the lifelong process that makes people into informed and engaged members of their communities — which range from schools and towns or neighborhoods to the whole nation and even the world.” Today, civics education is crucial for understanding and addressing the broader implications of technology. It must be provided at all education levels — K–12, colleges and universities, and even for adults. Strengthening civic knowledge and skills can help build system and societal resilience against tech-enabled threats, actively counter divisiveness and cynicism in society by reinvigorating shared aspirations and empowering citizens, and even strengthen workforce cohesion. Beyond that, incorporating civics concepts into science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education and the technology sector can better position our democracy to benefit from all that technology offers.</p> +<p>Another set of messages should address the PRC’s unlawful claim to Taiwan. There is no history of the PRC controlling the island. The Taiwanese are a mix of indigenous and ethnic Chinese people, some of whom have lived on the island for centuries, well before the PRC existed as a nation-state. The PRC claiming that it has a right to this island is akin to modern colonialism. In sum, the United States and its allies must make clear that taking Taiwan by force is an illegal and illegitimate action.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Today, civics education is crucial for understanding and addressing the broader implications of technology. It must be provided at all education levels — K–12, colleges and universities, and even for adults.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>There are also several steps the United States could take to strengthen its relationship with the Philippines and deter a potential attack on the island nation. The United States could do more to emphasize the importance of its partnership with the Philippines by assisting President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. with his domestic and international priorities, countering the Chinese disinformation campaigns in the country, providing additional military assistance, and engaging in more joint military exercises in the region.</p> -<p>This is the goal of the Defending Democratic Institutions (DDI) project’s Civics in STEM initiative. As part of this effort, DDI has already hosted two private roundtables — on June 17 and July 23, 2024 — bringing together distinguished leaders from the private sector, government, and academia. These discussions explored why incorporating civics education into STEM is critical for society, as well as the challenges and strategies associated with promoting civics within the technology sector.</p> +<p>Moving to the European theater, the RF’s initial attack on Ukraine in February 2022 appears to have been a strategic blunder as it created an enemy on its border, united NATO members against Russia, and caused many European nations to increase defense spending. If at some point in the future, the RF attacks Poland or another NATO member, then there must have been some change of circumstances that made Putin question NATO unity in the face of nuclear use on NATO soil. Alternately, a nuclear attack could be a desperate attempt to stop NATO from supporting Ukraine’s defense.</p> -<p>By embedding civics education into STEM curricula, we help ensure that future innovators are not only skilled in their technical disciplines but also equipped with the knowledge and values necessary to contribute to a just, inclusive, and democratic society. This integration bridges the gap between technical expertise and policy, helping to ensure that the innovations of tomorrow are guided by principles and policies that strengthen democracy and uphold ethical standards.</p> +<p>Finally, Washington must signal its ability and willingness to employ nuclear weapons in these theaters, if necessary, to defend its allies. Signaling comes in a variety of forms, from guidance documents, presidential rhetoric, weapons movement, and exercises that employ these weapons. While the United States under the Biden administration has been wise to avoid the type of belligerent nuclear rhetoric coming from its Russian counterparts, future administrations can privately message their willingness to defend allies using all available options.</p> -<h3 id="background">Background</h3> +<p><em>WHAT DOES WINNING LOOK LIKE?</em></p> -<p>The unparalleled pace of technological advancements in recent history has often caught us off guard, leading to a growing recognition of the need to include ethical and policy considerations alongside technological innovation.</p> +<p>The United States has several immediate and long-term strategic objectives in the proposed scenario. Before outlining those goals, it is worth emphasizing exactly what is at stake in this conflict. The PRC and RF crossing the nuclear threshold means that the world has come significantly closer to nuclear war, and with it, a nuclear exchange ending millions of lives, the loss of societies, and even the risk of human civilization on the planet. Any U.S. leader considering how to address this scenario must have that grave reality — however remote — in mind.</p> -<p>Rapid technological development has significantly impacted U.S. democracy in both positive and negative ways. Technology has enabled increased voter engagement, enhanced transparency, efficient communication, and the rapid dissemination of information. Yet, it has also contributed to a growing digital divide, rampant misinformation and disinformation, and mounting cybersecurity threats.</p> +<p>The primary objective in this scenario is to prevent nuclear escalation, whereby the United States and either the PRC, the RF, or both engage in escalating tit-for-tat nuclear attacks that result in a large-scale exchange of nuclear weapons. This is the primary goal because such nuclear exchanges would destroy societies, lead to millions of deaths, and cause widespread environmental devastation. Even if that outcome appears unlikely from the limited notional scenario, the circumstances are so unprecedented and the possibility of large-scale nuclear exchange so dire that avoiding large-scale nuclear escalation must be considered the goal that supersedes all others.</p> -<p>At the societal level, the internet has enabled unprecedented connectivity, yet it has also contributed to a disconnect between the individual and their respective communities. Social media has empowered civil society and historically marginalized groups, revolutionizing social movements and increasing accessibility to information. However, it has helped enable the rise of tribalism and deepened polarization. Similarly, while there will be many benefits from embedding AI into our daily lives, we must remain aware of both the visible and unforeseen implications, which may carry significant consequences.</p> +<p>Secondary objectives include the following:</p> -<p><em>“Cyberspace is composed of not only technology and protocols but also people. People are an integral part of cyberspace, both in creating and using it. In less than a generation, technology has transformed our daily lives …. We rely on [it] for our national security, economic development, and innovation. More than any other domain — air, space, sea, or land — people conceived of and created cyberspace and will continue to improve it.”</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="kemba-walden-former-national-cyber-director">Kemba Walden, Former National Cyber Director</h4> -</blockquote> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Reestablishing the pre-conflict status quo with the PRC and Taiwan and returning Ukraine to its pre-2022 borders.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Demonstrating U.S. credibility to its allies and partners. This is especially important in terms of nuclear nonproliferation goals. If allies no longer perceive Washington as a trusted security partner, they may consider developing their own indigenous nuclear weapons programs. For example, some leaders in the Republic of Korea (ROK) have called for the country to develop nuclear weapons, and a small number have done so in Japan as well. Polls of the ROK public have found that a majority supports an indigenous nuclear program. Polling of Eastern European publics also indicated support for indigenous nuclear programs in the weeks following the RF’s 2022 attack on Ukraine.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Maintaining the Philippines as an ally in the Pacific, to include the use of its military bases.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Maintaining freedom of movement for all states within the Pacific Ocean.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Reestablishing the taboo against first nuclear use.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Given the double-edged nature of technological innovation, it is important to incorporate civics education to ensure that technology’s impact on society is understood and responsibly managed. Over the past several years, there has been a growing emphasis on including ethics in STEM education. (See, e.g., the work of roundtable participants listed in Appendix A.) Civics, particularly the concept of civic responsibility, can provide an important “why” to that ethics discussion. Democracy only works if individuals understand their obligations as part of “we the people.”</p> +<p>The inability to achieve any of these important secondary goals means the loss of U.S. global leadership. U.S. allies and partners are key enablers in promoting favorable rules, norms, and institutions within the international system. The PRC and the RF, along with Belarus, Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), are increasingly forming a bloc determined to undermine U.S. global influence. If the U.S. response to this conflict were to cause the perception that the United States is not a dependable ally or partner, it would be a strategic win for the so-called Axis of Upheaval.</p> -<p>Civic knowledge and skills should not be limited to students interested in the social sciences; they should be considered essential for those working in the technology sector. Integrating key civics concepts, such as civic responsibility, into STEM education and the tech sector can challenge students and professionals alike to think critically about their responsibilities regarding the work they either hope to do or are already doing. Hopefully, this will inspire them to contribute constructively to their workplaces, communities, nation, and world.</p> +<h4 id="assuring-allies-1">Assuring Allies</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Integrating key civics concepts, such as civic responsibility, into STEM education and the tech sector can challenge students and professionals alike to think critically about their responsibilities regarding the work they either hope to do or are already doing.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>After the nuclear attacks on the territories of allies, other allies and partners will closely watch to see how Washington responds. U.S. leaders will need to address the immediate challenge of the attacks and the ongoing conflicts, while also considering how their actions affect alliance relationships in the immediate and longer term.</p> -<p>Having individuals who are both tech savvy and policy sensitive is a prerequisite for developing effective laws, policies, and norms to guide our democracy in an increasingly tech-driven world. Bringing civics concepts into STEM training can help drive more informed policies around the development and use of technology by building a pipeline of technology-oriented individuals interested in public service, the military, and even private sector work that provides a sense of mission.</p> +<p><em>WHAT ARE THE RISKS — INCLUDING THEIR LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES — OF ALLIES QUESTIONING U.S. CREDIBILITY IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE?</em></p> -<p>“Inspired to Serve,” the report of the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, made reinvigorating civics its number one recommendation for inspiring young people to serve:</p> +<p>It is fair to assume that the publics and elites within allied nations will perceive the nuclear attacks by the PRC and RF as deterrence failures, but it is also important to note that both states used nuclear weapons in this notional scenario when they were losing conventional conflicts against the United States and its allies. Nuclear use stemmed from a place of adversary weakness and was meant to undermine U.S. resolve to keep fighting and to illustrate the high stakes of the conflict for the PRC and RF.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Widespread and effective civic education is an essential requirement for fostering a culture of service in which Americans can identify how their own strengths, skills, and interests could contribute to the public good by addressing needs in their communities and Nation. When 22 percent of American adults cannot name any of the three branches of government, it is well past time for the country to take action.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Given Putin’s behavior over the past decade, it is possible, and perhaps even likely, that U.S. allies and partners will emphasize the RF’s taboo-breaking decision to conduct a nuclear attack more than they will blame the United States for the deterrence failure. For example, Putin already has defied several international rules and norms when it comes to respecting national sovereignty, upholding sanctions against proliferating nations, and using chemical weapons against perceived enemies of the state. Moreover, his strategic mistake in invading Ukraine in 2022 and his administration’s persistent nuclear saber-rattling since may result in NATO leaders questioning Putin’s rationality. The theory of nuclear deterrence relies on leaders behaving rationally, so can the United States be blamed for not deterring an actor who may not be rational?</p> -<p>STEM education has rightly been viewed over the last several decades as a national security imperative. Yet, teaching civics is also a national security imperative. Integrating civics concepts into STEM is critical as society and technology continue to evolve together. The last several decades have seen a decline in civics education that has left too many without a clear understanding of the importance of democracy, the rule of law, or their role in it. This gap exists beyond STEM fields but is particularly consequential for individuals who will help shape innovation moving forward.</p> +<p>The PRC’s nuclear use presents a different and perhaps more complex challenge. The Philippines is not under the protection of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence per the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, and yet in a Pacific conflict, the nation would become a target as the United States operates out of its military bases. A potential nuclear attack on a Philippine military base would likely provoke public backlash toward the United States, especially among Filipinos aligned with the political faction of former president Rodrigo Duterte. Some Philippine leaders have already expressed concerns that U.S. military forces on their islands make them a potential target of a nuclear attack. Maintaining this partnership after an attack may be difficult without extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella.</p> -<p>The future of technology will play a pivotal role in determining whether societies evolve toward greater democracy or slide into authoritarianism. Take AI as an example. AI has the potential to enhance democratic processes by enabling more efficient governance, increasing transparency, and empowering citizens through better access to information. Yet, if AI is left unchecked or misused, it could easily concentrate power in the hands of a few, enabling surveillance, manipulation, and control on an unprecedented scale.</p> +<p><em>HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES SIGNAL RESOLVE TO ALLIES IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE? WHAT WILL BE ALLIES’ SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE? WHAT ROLE MIGHT CERTAIN ALLIES AND PARTNERS PLAY IN A RESPONSE?</em></p> -<p>An expert in one of our roundtable discussions highlighted the importance of securing market democracy, warning that without public action, big data and AI could lead to a drift toward “totalitarian surveillance [and] oppression.” If the public does not actively shape industrial and government policy “toward [ensuring] diversity, competition, and every individual having a voice,” the system risks tilting in the opposite direction, following the models of Russia and China. Technological advances could instead be used for surveillance, censorship, and repression. China is already exporting this model globally through its Belt and Road Initiative. Its recent sale of Huawei surveillance equipment to Uganda’s military regime is an example of moving a nation toward a surveillance society. The governance structures we establish today will be critical in ensuring that technology serves as a force for democratic empowerment rather than a tool for authoritarian control.</p> +<p>The most important means of signaling resolve is for the United States to continue prosecuting the respective conflicts and to respond to the nuclear attacks. Continuing the fight means that military forces may have to operate in spite of, and even in, radiation-contaminated environments.</p> -<p>AI is already being used to refine social media and content algorithms, keeping users engaged in a continuous stream of personalized content. While this may not always be harmful, increasingly personalized feeds can lead to more segmented thinking, the extremization of opinions, and, in some cases, heightened polarization that could escalate into violence. Furthermore, according to Harvard Business Review, AI has the potential to exacerbate existing biases in data, including those against minorities. A 2024 National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine study on facial recognition points out multiple examples of where the systems have misidentified innocent Black Americans, causing them to be arrested. Further, a criminal justice algorithm used in Broward County, Florida, was found to be twice as likely to mislabel African American defendants as “high risk” compared to White defendants.</p> +<p>In the hours after nuclear use, the focus in the White House will be learning as much as possible about the attacks and assessing its response. This will be a tense, high-stress period, but Washington will want to make allies aware of its plans. Ideally, NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group would have discussed responses to RF or PRC nuclear use well before the beginning of this hypothetical conflict in 2027. The public response to the Russian attack should be presented as a NATO response.</p> -<p>Our choices now — both at home and as a global society — will influence whether AI becomes a catalyst for a more open, participatory society or a mechanism for exacerbating injustice and reinforcing autocratic regimes. Understanding the role of governance and governance structures is crucial, as these structures, institutions, and processes will have a huge impact on the outcomes.</p> +<p>A key aspect of demonstrating credible resolve is maintaining public support for U.S. responses to the attacks; reminding the U.S. public of the strategic importance of its alliances will be vital to this support. News of nuclear use on allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe will shock the U.S. public; many could fear nuclear detonations would occur on U.S. territory. As a result, securing public support in the United States for military action in defense of allies and partners following the attacks may be challenging. NATO expanded in a period when most Americans no longer worried about European security or nuclear war; the public salience of the alliance and of U.S. alliance commitments is likely much lower than it was during the Cold War.</p> -<p><em>“We can look at what is happening to society as a result of innovation, and right now, around the AI conversations, there is a sense of we should build what we can, not what we should.… You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, but you can help people holding the bottle understand what the implications may be. The important question to address is: How do we empower people to better understand what the implications are and what role they can play?”</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="jen-ellis-founder-nextjensecurity">Jen Ellis, Founder, NextJenSecurity</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Before any potential conflict — and frankly, right now — the U.S. government, especially the president, should aim to better educate the public about the history of U.S. alliance relationships and their benefits. When it comes to most public discussions of U.S. allies today, there is too much talk about free-riding and too little about how U.S. economic, security, and political interests benefit from maintaining strong relations with its 30-plus treaty allies. Existing research from political science suggests that the U.S. public is more likely to support military action on behalf of formal allies than nonformal allies (such as Taiwan), so public education about Taiwan is also important. Current scholarship also indicates that support for allies among the U.S. public is based on “elite cues,” so leaders need to be providing positive talking points about U.S. allies if they want to build public support for military action.</p> -<h3 id="how-did-we-get-here">How Did We Get Here?</h3> +<p>Following the use of nuclear weapons in this scenario, allies will have several concerns. Any countries targeted or immediately impacted by the nuclear use will need immediate assistance addressing the medical emergencies caused by the nuclear detonation. Allies could also be fearful of follow-on attacks; they will expect the United States to respond strongly to protect them.</p> -<p>The launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 1957 had a profound impact on the United States, particularly on its education system, leading to a dramatic shift toward STEM education. The shock of Sputnik created a sense of urgency, motivating policymakers, educators, and students to prioritize STEM. Numerous public awareness campaigns highlighted the importance of scientific achievement and encouraged a generation of young people to pursue careers in STEM.</p> +<p>Allies and partners have a significant role to play in the messaging following nuclear use. They must unite in loudly and publicly condemning the nuclear attacks and should do so repeatedly. They should communicate that using nuclear weapons in these scenarios was unacceptable and neither nation will gain from using these weapons. These messages are key to reestablishing the nuclear taboo following nuclear use.</p> -<p>In 1958, Congress passed the National Defense Education Act, providing substantial federal funding for STEM education. The act aimed to produce more scientists, engineers, and mathematicians to help the United States maintain its technological superiority and enhance national security. On May 10, 1950, U.S. president Harry S. Truman signed the National Science Foundation Act, creating the first federal agency dedicated to supporting education and fundamental research across all scientific disciplines. Since this pivot, the U.S. education system has undergone significant curriculum reforms to emphasize STEM subjects and create a more technically skilled and scientifically literate workforce.</p> +<h4 id="military-response-options-1">Military Response Options</h4> -<p>These curriculum reforms extended beyond K–12 and into higher education. The launch of Sputnik led to increased support for higher education institutions in the form of funding for research and development programs in STEM fields, leading to the expansion of graduate programs and the establishment of new research facilities.</p> +<p>The most challenging question facing the U.S. president after nuclear use by the PRC and the RF is how to respond to the nuclear attacks. The following section offers options for a military response that aligns with the strategic goals discussed in the section on U.S. strategic priorities.</p> -<p>The focus on STEM education had several implications for civics education in the United States, as the Sputnik-induced shift initially diverted attention and, ultimately, resources from it. As noted in a 2020 commentary, in the decades following Sputnik’s launch, the desire to maintain superiority in STEM-related fields remained a priority as the world grew more connected and complex. Over time, this resulted in less class time and fewer resources available for civics education.</p> +<p><em>WHAT WOULD BE THE PRESIDENT’S MILITARY OPTIONS IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE? WHICH OF THESE OPTIONS WOULD YOU RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT?</em></p> -<p>Other factors have likely contributed to this dynamic. For instance, STEM metrics and outcomes can be easily and uniformly tracked across different countries, reinforcing and intensifying competition between nations. Moreover, civics education is sometimes viewed as a subjective, politically sensitive area of study. It is also difficult for the general public to conceptualize, internalize, and actively prioritize the importance of a good civics education, which means there is less public pressure for it. In comparison, STEM fields appear straightforward, apolitical, and noncontroversial.</p> +<p>Following the Chinese and Russian nuclear attacks, the president will hear many arguments that they must respond with nuclear weapons to signal strength and resolve. Some advisors will argue that responding without nuclear weapons will lead the adversaries to counter with another round of nuclear use. Others will warn that adversaries will perceive a nuclear response as escalatory and set the world on a dangerous path of nuclear exchange.</p> -<p>In recent decades, the difference in career paths and salaries in STEM versus non-STEM fields has substantially changed. When high school students and college freshmen consider their career paths, STEM fields often offer a clearer sense of direction — leading to roles like doctors and software engineers — frequently with attractive salaries. In contrast, the career path in civics is less defined, though equally important, which may partly explain the increasing preference for STEM among younger generations.</p> +<p>Recommendations for the U.S. response to this notional scenario are based on the following assumptions:</p> -<h4 id="the-current-state-of-play-in-civics-education">The Current State of Play in Civics Education</h4> +<p><strong>Assumption 1: Leaders may be unable to control nuclear escalation.</strong> Responding to the initial nuclear attacks with a U.S. or NATO nuclear attack makes it more likely that the United States will find itself engaging in tit-for-tat nuclear exchanges than if it does not initially respond with nuclear weapons. Once this contest of nerves begins, it could be exceedingly difficult to stop. Even if both sides do not want to escalate, in the fog of war, circumstances may add escalation pressures. For example, misinterpretations about the goals of adversary nuclear attacks (such as regime change or undermining command and control centers) could lead to escalation.</p> -<p>The last several decades have seen a drastic decline in civics education in the United States, which has left too many without a clear understanding of the importance of democracy or their role in it. A report by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation found that “more than 70% of Americans fail a basic civics literacy quiz on topics like the three branches of government, the number of Supreme Court justices, and other basic functions of our democracy.” According to the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), in 2022, 22 percent of eighth-graders “scored at or above the NAEP Proficient level in civics.” The 2023 Annenberg Civics Knowledge Survey also found that many adults did not know what rights the First Amendment protected, and only 65 percent of respondents could name the three branches of government.</p> +<p>Alternatively, nuclear-armed states could face other types of accidents, mistakes, or misinterpretations that could lead to nuclear use. There are several historical examples of such mistakes. For instance, during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, an errant U2 pilot, an accidentally inserted nuclear attack training tape, and even a black bear in Duluth, Minnesota, could have led to a nuclear war that neither side wanted. Additionally, leaders below the commander in chief could conduct unauthorized attacks that could lead to further escalation.</p> -<p>Funding for civics remains an ongoing issue. Federal funding for K–12 STEM education is roughly $50 per student, while funding for civics is closer to 50 cents. The lack of funding and attention paid to the humanities affects higher education as well. Facing budget constraints, many public universities target humanities and liberal arts programs first in their attempts to balance their budgets. At private universities, prestige and lack of tangible vocational benefits seem to have played a role in this trend. Other factors also contribute to this trend, such as the perceived value of a humanities-centered education and job prospects after graduation. This trend transcends borders. According to Ben Goldstein, “humanities and social science fields without a clear pre-professional connection — disciplines classifiable as ‘qualitative academia’ — have been falling out of favor worldwide. Between 2015 and 2018, the share of bachelors, masters, and doctoral degrees awarded in humanities fields fell 5%, 11%, and 9% respectively on average throughout the OECD, with drops of varying proportions detected in 24 of the 36 OECD countries.”</p> +<p>Some may argue that the theater nuclear use is far from a strategic nuclear exchange and does not present a risk of all-out nuclear war. In this argument, there is a clear and meaningful line between theater (or tactical) nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. It assumes that leaders could use tactical weapons but remain “below” the strategic threshold. There is little evidence to know whether this is true, and it could be a very costly and dangerous assumption to make. This argument of a clear demarcation between tactical and strategic weapons also has the unintended consequences of reifying three categories of weapons: conventional weapons, theater nuclear weapons, and strategic nuclear weapons. Whether intentional or not, this argument leads to the appearance that theater nuclear weapons are acceptable and thus more usable. And while smaller nuclear weapons do less damage, the damage is still significant and indicates a violation of a long-standing taboo. Furthermore, it is not clear if other leaders share the same assumption that there is a clear divide between employing theater and strategic weapons.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Funding for civics remains an ongoing issue. Federal funding for K–12 STEM education is roughly $50 per student, while funding for civics is closer to 50 cents.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>In sum, significant destruction could occur if both sides begin employing nuclear weapons. This is unprecedented territory, and no one can predict with certainty what will happen. The potential destruction caused by nuclear escalation poses too great of a risk to make the ex ante assumption that leaders can fully manage this risk.</p> -<p>The decline of civics education is matched by a decline of trust in U.S. democracy and democratic institutions, such as the U.S. Congress and the justice system. A 2024 Gallup poll found that only 28 percent of U.S. adults are “satisfied” with how democracy is working in the United States — a new 40-year low. A similar poll found that only 9 percent of U.S. adults have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the U.S. Congress and 30 percent have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court. Similarly, the 2022 Annenberg Civics Knowledge Survey found that nearly 7 in 10 people (67 percent) agreed with the statement that the Supreme Court “gets too messed up in politics,” an increase of 12 percent since 2019. In 2024, another poll found that “7 in 10 Americans think the high court’s justices are more influenced by ideology.” This perspective is not limited to the highest courts. For example, a 2023 survey by the National Center for State Courts found that 61 percent of respondents believed state courts are “political.”</p> +<p><strong>Assumption 2: Military responses that lead to public humiliation of Putin and Xi are not likely to lead to preferred U.S. objectives.</strong> Considering the few checks on their decisionmaking, their regional and global ambitions, and their obsessions with legacy, it worth considering how to minimize actions that serve to humiliate Xi and Putin. For this reason, the West should explore finding the right balance between responses that are conducted in the open and those that can be conducted with plausible deniability.</p> -<h4 id="meeting-an-urgent-need--civics-for-adults">Meeting an Urgent Need — Civics for Adults</h4> +<p><strong>Assumption 3: To be deterred from further escalation, Xi and Putin must be fearful of follow-on actions.</strong> If the United States does not respond strongly to the nuclear attack, it will confirm that Xi and Putin were correct that the United States has lower stakes in both regions relative to the PRC and RF. The responses to the attack must be costly in terms of destruction of adversary capabilities — though not necessarily with nuclear weapons — and indicate that more attacks could follow.</p> -<p>Democracy depends on informed and engaged citizens. Americans today live in one of the most polarized eras in our nation’s history, a pattern that continues to grow exponentially due to information operations by foreign adversaries, declining trust in our democratic institutions, and a lack of civic understanding of how to engage effectively with our democracy. With civics education having been underresourced and undervalued for decades, we now see a resulting lack of civic knowledge and skills that has left many adults ill equipped to fulfill their essential roles within our democracy.</p> +<p><strong>Policy recommendation:</strong> Given the extreme danger of beginning a process of nuclear exchange with U.S. adversaries and the fact that the adversaries may use nuclear weapons again regardless of U.S. and allied action, it is prudent to retaliate with punishing nonnuclear responses that are both public and clandestine. The United States should conduct timely and precise conventional attacks on adversary military bases or installations to degrade their military capabilities. Targeting should not include command and control capabilities, which could be perceived as escalatory. Moreover, these attacks should be reported to the public. This strong conventional response signals both that nuclear use will be punished and that the United States does not need to resort to nuclear use to do considerable damage to the adversary’s military capabilities. At the same time, the U.S. should signal its readiness to conduct limited nuclear operations, if necessary, by moving dual-capable aircraft and submarines to the regions.</p> -<p>K–12 and higher education reform are critical to rebuilding a foundation of civics knowledge but require significant time to implement before we see results. Given the urgency of the issues, we cannot wait for this long-term investment. There is an immediate need to remedy the current civics knowledge gap among adults.</p> +<p>The United States should accompany these conventional attacks with clear assurances both in public and private that the United States does not seek regime change in the PRC or the RF. While in general the United States would prefer fewer authoritarian governments, in this conflict scenario, making adversaries believe their lives and governments are at risk could lead to further nuclear escalation. As prospect theory informs us, those in the domain of losses — as China and Russia would be in this scenario — are willing to take great risks. The United States simply seeks a reversion to the pre-conflict status quo. If either foreign leader assesses that regime change is a goal of the West, the conflict could quickly escalate.</p> -<p>Empowering adults with civics knowledge can strengthen democratic participation and counter the growing influence of misinformation, enabling a more resilient and informed electorate. In the technology sector, where professionals are shaping the digital infrastructure of society, understanding the values and aspirations of democracy and the responsibility of individuals in a democracy is even more crucial.</p> +<p>In addition to these conventional attacks, the United States should consider clandestine operations employing special forces teams that would degrade adversary military capabilities. These attacks do not need to be as immediate as the conventional attacks, but they should surprise the adversaries in terms of the damage done. If there are novel capabilities not employed by the West previously, this would be a suitable time to use them. The goal of these nonpublic attacks is to degrade enemy capabilities and demonstrate U.S. capabilities to adversary leadership with the plausible deniability of secret operations. PRC and RF leaders will not be forced to discuss these attacks in public and thus the potential humiliation or backlash that could come from these attacks is less likely. In other words, these operations should do serious damage while allowing Putin and Xi to save face. Once these actions have taken place, the United States should offer off-ramps to the RF and the PRC, while also making clear that the United States will continue fighting and may have to resort to nuclear use.</p> -<p>In May 2022, CSIS launched its Civics at Work (CaW) initiative, a partnership with leading civics groups, national security practitioners, and business leaders looking to reinvigorate civics literacy as a national and economic security imperative, both through their respective workforces and in their larger communities. Business leaders, in particular, are optimally positioned to take on this role. As leaders, employers, community members, and patriots, businesses must be at the heart of any effort to reinvigorate the public’s civics awareness and engagement. Commerce, innovation, and U.S. competitiveness all depend on a healthy democracy and continuing commitment to the rule of law. Civics literacy is a fundamental part of a successful and thriving community, and businesses have a unique ability to contribute by investing in their workforces. Furthermore, a Harvard Business Review paper notes that free markets rely on free and stable political systems to thrive, which can be reinforced through stronger civics education.</p> +<p><em>WHAT ARE THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH A MILITARY RESPONSE?</em></p> -<p>Importantly, because people today trust their employers more than the government or the media, companies remain one of the few institutions with broad public support and are equipped with the “resources, political power, incentives, and responsibility” to help protect democracy. In another Harvard Business Review white paper, BET Networks president Scott Mills notes that companies also recognize the need to foster environments where employees from diverse backgrounds can collaborate and communicate effectively. As such, skills such as strong collaboration, clear and regular communication, compromise, and mutual respect — areas that can be strengthened by increasing civic skills such as civil discourse and renewing a sense of shared aspirations — are crucial for creating these successful business environments.</p> +<p>The most significant immediate risk is nuclear escalation. Other risks include the PRC and RF retaliating against the U.S. homeland and allies by other means, including conventional, cyber, or space attacks. The risks of not responding, however, include a loss of U.S. credibility, a breakdown in the U.S. alliance system, and a further weakening of the rules-based global order. Moreover, perceptions of “successful” use of nuclear weapons could increase proliferation pressures around the world.</p> -<p>The private sector plays a critical role in its ability to leverage investment for good — directing financial resources toward initiatives that not only generate profits but also contribute to society. This approach aligns with global policies aimed at mitigating risks associated with new and emerging technologies while also addressing the need to move from a first-to-market mentality to a best-to-market imperative. In this context, the business case for promoting civics education has never been stronger or more critical.</p> +<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options-1">Non-Kinetic Response Options</h4> -<p><em>“Teaching the discipline of law to those seeking technical graduate degrees in cybersecurity has been highly rewarding. The students are usually intimidated to begin the class but then embrace the study as they begin to understand the “system” of the rule of law in our country - the Separation of Powers; the role of courts; the distinction between legislation and regulation; etc. I am convinced that we can and must cultivate a commitment within science and technology communities to understand the rule of law, to embrace it, to defend it and proselytize about it.”</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="dan-sutherland-professor-of-cybersecurity-law-and-policy-george-washington-university">Dan Sutherland, Professor of Cybersecurity Law and Policy, George Washington University</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>In addition to military responses to nuclear use, there are several other means by which the United States and its allies can pursue the primary and secondary strategic goals discussed previously. The president, with allies, should take non-kinetic actions against the RF and PRC to punish the use of nuclear weapons and demonstrate the costly repercussions of nuclear use. These actions should be taken along with the military responses described above. Potential non-kinetic responses include the following:</p> -<p>As part of CaW, DDI developed Civics for Adults: An Implementation Guide for Businesses, Civics for Adults: A Guide for Civics Content Providers, and hosted discussions on how civics can promote the role of businesses in U.S. democracy. The first business leader to sign up to participate in CSIS’s CaW was Brad Smith, president of Microsoft. During a January 2021 CSIS program on the importance of equipping STEM students with civics education, Smith said:</p> +<p><strong>Financial punishments:</strong> The United States could utilize the tools of the global financial system to hurt the PRC and RF economies. These tools may have limited utility in 2027, however, as both countries have worked to limit, to the extent possible, their economic vulnerabilities. Additional use of these tools may be necessary, but they will further the decoupling of adversaries from the global economic system led by the United States.</p> + +<p><strong>Cyberattacks:</strong> The United States should consider conducting cyberattacks on the adversaries that are initially limited and measured, but which signal the possibility of pursuing attacks with greater effect if the conflict continues. This action does risk a dangerous escalation of cyber conflict — also unprecedented to date — so these actions must be calibrated very carefully. Attacks should avoid military command and control capabilities or otherwise blinding the adversary in such a way that they misinterpret the attacks as being the prelude to a larger attack.</p> + +<p><strong>Diplomatic statements:</strong> In the days and weeks following the nuclear attacks, U.S. and allied leaders should make strong statements to all audiences — foreign and domestic — about how the PRC and RF have broken a long-standing taboo in international relations. In addition, Washington should work with allies and all other like-minded states to write and publicize a unified statement of condemnation from leaders around the world (with as diverse a geographic grouping as possible). In addition, a UN General Assembly resolution, such as the one following Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2022, would help send the message that the international community disapproves of the nuclear use. These condemnations may not affect RF and PRC actions in the immediate term, but the lack of global condemnation following the first nuclear use since World War II would undermine the nuclear taboo moving forward.</p> + +<p>In making public statements about the nuclear attacks, the United States and its allies must consider how other members of the international community will perceive nuclear use — namely, was it successful for the attackers? The most important message to convey will be that nuclear attacks do not allow states to succeed in territorial aggrandizement. The existing global nuclear order has dealt with many challenges to date, and this nuclear use would be a grave one, but there are indications that the order would be able to survive this challenge.</p> + +<p>It is worth emphasizing here that improving U.S. and allied relations with states within the Global South before this notional conflict in 2027 is paramount. Though the international community broadly supported the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s attack on Ukraine, there have been fewer governments that have unilaterally condemned the attack or Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling, even among members of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a treaty that explicitly bans nuclear threats.</p> + +<h4 id="conclusion-2">Conclusion</h4> + +<p>The notional 2027 scenario discussed in this paper would pose significant challenges to U.S. leadership in the immediate and longer term. At best, the 82-year-old nuclear taboo is broken but further nuclear escalation is prevented. The United States is able to end both conflicts on favorable terms that punish the adversary’s militaries for nuclear use. Taiwan remains an autonomous democracy with a strong economy. Allies and partners remain committed to their security arrangements with the United States. Competition between the United States and both powers continues, but the PRC and RF are chastened. The message is clear that the use of nuclear weapons is not a means of achieving geopolitical goals, and the norm against their use is maintained.</p> + +<p>The worst outcome is almost too horrible to imagine but must be contemplated: large nuclear exchanges that devastate massive swaths of nations on all sides of the conflict.</p> + +<p>Somewhere in the middle of these extremes, a large nuclear conflict is averted, but the use of nuclear weapons and the resulting fear of being targeted make allies and partners reconsider whether they want to be in a defensive alliance. In a world with fewer allies and partners, Washington would lose a great deal of influence to shape the norms and institutions that make up the global order. This outcome likely would hasten the end of any remaining notion of a U.S.-led global order.</p> + +<p>Because so much is at stake, the most significant takeaway from this analysis is the importance of trying to deter such conflict in the first place. As described above, there are several ways in which the United States can improve readiness and signal its resolve. Once nuclear weapons are used in war, one cannot predict how conflict will escalate. Because nuclear weapons present an existential threat to humanity, there is nothing more important than avoiding nuclear war.</p> + +<h3 id="presidential-prudence-and-responding-to-strategic-deterrence-failure">Presidential Prudence and Responding to Strategic Deterrence Failure</h3> <blockquote> - <p>Technology has become a multidisciplinary activity and every engineer at a company like Microsoft needs a bigger dose of the liberal arts and civics in particular … and what is true at a place like Microsoft is true across the tech sector …. At the end of the day, the heart of our society is our democratic foundation and therefore civics education always has to be at the heart of this multidisciplinary approach.</p> + <h4 id="ankit-panda">Ankit Panda</h4> </blockquote> -<h4 id="ongoing-challenges">Ongoing Challenges</h4> +<p>U.S. presidents, their advisers, and military planners must take seriously the possibility of limited nuclear use by adversaries in a range of plausible future contingencies. Resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons may appear attractive to U.S. adversaries as a means of seeking undeniable military and political advantage while simultaneously communicating exceptional resolve, risk acceptance, and stakes. In this way, the detonation of one — or multiple — nuclear weapons with deliberately lower yields on strictly military targets in the course of a conventional war or an intense crisis could compel the president of the United States, in their capacity as commander-in-chief, to weigh several risky response options, none of which may be particularly optimal across the full set of U.S. national objectives as articulated in peacetime.</p> -<p>Incorporating civics concepts into the STEM and tech worlds faces several ongoing challenges, primarily stemming from a disconnect between scientific and policy communities. Yet, a grasp of how our system works is essential for those entering technology and science-oriented fields; governmental decisions not only directly influence innovation and discovery, but, perhaps even more importantly, directly affect implementation. Teaching scientists and engineers that considering social impact and learning about taking a scientific or engineering concept from idea to use requires understanding — and, quite possibly, acting within a civics context — in order to achieve success; this should be an important aspect of science and engineering education.</p> +<p>As Thomas Schelling observed in 1961, reflecting contemporaneously on the Berlin crisis (1958–1961), intense crises between nuclear-armed adversaries are usefully conceived of as games of competitive risk-taking, where the military effects of nuclear use may be a secondary consideration to the resolve conveyed. “We should plan for a war of nerve, of demonstration, and of bargaining, not of tactical target destruction,” Schelling observed. He added that should the United States resort to the use of nuclear weapons against Soviet military targets over Berlin, “destroying the target is incidental to the message the detonation conveys to the Soviet leadership.” For Schelling, prevailing in the crisis over Berlin would require “impress[ing] the Soviet leadership with the risk of general war — a war that may occur whether we or they intend it or not.” Limited nuclear use — or limited nuclear war — thus was an option meant specifically to communicate to the Soviet Union that the United States would be willing to tolerate exceptionally high risks to achieve the political ends it sought at the time. Today, military planners contemplating limited nuclear use may believe that target choice is more than an incidental matter; however, impressing on the adversary the prospect of an uncontrollable lurch toward Armageddon will remain central to such a choice. Adversaries need not be irrational or deliberately seeking nuclear escalation to contemplate such actions; all it may take for limited nuclear use to be attractive is that adversary leaders see that step as being less bad than the alternatives, which may include conventional defeat.</p> -<p>Bridging the gap between “techies” and policymakers is difficult, as it entails encouraging technologists to navigate the nuanced “gray areas” of societal and policy issues, as well as the equally challenging task of teaching policy professionals that there can be clear right and wrong answers in technical realms. Failure to do so means failed public policy due to a mismatch between legislators and regulators intents and what is technically feasible. It also means failure of scientists and engineers to take into account societal issues as they design the technology. Teaching the two communities to be speak a common language is thus really important for society’s health and wellbeing.</p> +<p>Schelling’s prescriptions, written in 1961, may appear somewhat uncontroversial to U.S. audiences familiar with the history of the Cold War and U.S. interests in central Europe in the 1960s. Yet it is not inconceivable that should Russia, China, or North Korea choose in the twenty-first century to rationally resort to limited, nuclear first-use, their calculations will rest on a similar logic. Just as a U.S. president might have resorted to a nuclear detonation to convey a greater stake in the fate of Berlin to the Soviet leadership in 1961, so too might Russian president Vladimir Putin, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, or North Korean leader Kim Jong Un seek to “impress” on a U.S. president that running a risk of a general — possibly spasmodic — nuclear war over nuclear strikes on military targets is simply a risk not worth running. This logic underscoring the potential appeal of limited nuclear use is essentially deductive. To be sure, any nuclear use by U.S. adversaries would represent a world-altering event and the unambiguous manifestation of what U.S. deterrence planners consider “strategic deterrence failure,” but there remains a meaningful difference between successful war termination between nuclear-armed adversaries following limited nuclear use and war termination after a large-scale nuclear exchange. This difference may, quite literally, be measured in the millions-of-human-lives lost.</p> -<p>For example, a potential use case could be the accreditation requirements of the British Computer Society (BCS) in the United Kingdom. Founded in 1957, BCS is a charity dedicated to “[raising] standards of competence and conduct across the IT industry.” To achieve this, BCS provides a wide range of accreditation, qualification, and certification services for IT professionals, higher education programs, and at-home education. Due to its international recognition, BCS accreditations and qualifications are highly sought after by employers in the IT sector and academic programs.</p> +<p>The Project Atom study asks its authors to consider a particularly sobering scenario of limited nuclear use. U.S. adversaries — specifically, Russia and China — escalate to limited nuclear use in order to compel the United States to back away from continuing military action. In the scenario assigned to the authors, both Russia and China resort to nuclear first-use, paired with signals designed to convey their willingness to run greater risks than the United States. In the scenario, both Beijing and Moscow reference each other’s military actions, including the other’s nuclear strikes, and a strong collusive logic appears to drive each adversary’s willingness to run risks. While such a scenario may not cohere to how subject matter experts versed in the decisionmaking and bureaucratic idiosyncrasies of the Russian and Chinese political systems might conceive of pathways to limited nuclear use by those states, it represents something close to a worst-case scenario for strategic deterrence failure manifesting in near-simultaneous nuclear use by two near-peer U.S. adversaries in different theaters. Notably, the scenario also features a resort to nuclear use by both adversaries following exceptional U.S. and allied conventional successes: in Europe, the United States’ NATO allies successfully seize a substantial portion of Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast and, in the Indo-Pacific, the United States successfully interdicts an amphibious invasion force destined for Taiwan.</p> -<p>To obtain official BCS accreditation, programs and courses must satisfy BCS’s “Criteria for Accreditation.” One such criterion is “the ability to [recognize] the legal, social, ethical and professional issues involved in the exploitation of computer technology and be guided by the adoption of appropriate professional, ethical and legal practices.”</p> +<p>Given the problem described above and the prescribed scenario, this paper answers the query posed by the Project Atom study — namely, how the United States should respond to limited nuclear use — by centering the role of the U.S. president in nuclear decisionmaking. U.S. presidents, despite their limited briefings on U.S. nuclear capabilities and policies in peacetime, are unlikely to reason about matters of intra-war deterrence, escalation control, and war termination in a real crisis in the same manner that nuclear strategists writing about these matters in peacetime from their comfortable perches at research institutes might. Put simply, presidents are likely to be inordinately fearful of general nuclear war in the aftermath of limited nuclear use and averse to the possibility of even a single nuclear warhead detonating on U.S. territory. This may be the case even if presidential advisers and intelligence assessments do not necessarily ascribe a high probability to further nuclear escalation in the prescribed scenario. Given that the president is solely imbued with the authority to issue valid and legal orders to release nuclear weapons, any analysis of likely and plausible U.S. response options must center how current and future presidents may weigh response options. Despite however many options are in place or requirements provided in peacetime, a U.S. president cannot be compelled by their military advisers to seek any particular course of action in a given crisis. Given this, this paper largely argues that should Russia and China resort to partially collusive, deliberate, limited nuclear use in simultaneous crises, as specified in the Project Atom scenario, most plausible U.S. presidents — individuals who are overwhelmingly likely to be politicians, unversed in the finer points of nuclear strategy — will likely be compelled to stand down instead of engaging in competitive nuclear risk-taking. These men and women, whoever they may be, are overwhelmingly likely to find themselves worrying about the prospect of general nuclear war — or the “final failure” — as John F. Kennedy once did at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis.</p> -<p>The BCS use case has been studied to assess its effectiveness in implementing a nationwide ethics requirement in educational curricula. A study by Tom McEwan and Sandra Cairncross from Edinburgh Napier University notes some challenges in implementing BCS’s Legal, Social, Ethical and Professional Issues (LSEPIs) criteria in higher education. In their paper, the authors observed that “technically-oriented undergraduate students are often reluctant to engage with [BCS’s] ‘Legal, Social, Ethical and Professional Issues (LSEPI).’” They further noted that, after a decade of increasingly relaxed social and ethical standards in certain media, such as widespread illegal downloading of music, video, and software, many current UK undergraduates “appear to have an increasingly cavalier attitude to intellectual property in digital media” despite receiving BCS training.</p> +<p>If this is true, there is little doubt that several self-professed U.S. national objectives as articulated in peacetime would come under substantial stress, with potentially far-reaching consequences for U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy. This is ultimately the cost of strategic deterrence failure and why the United States must take the prospect of averting any nuclear use anywhere seriously. Other scenarios, including those featuring opportunistic limited nuclear use by one peer, may lead a president to accept greater risks, but this is outside of the scope of this study. As this essay will discuss, prudent planning for such failure can ensure that a U.S. president that may choose to avoid running the risk of nuclear escalation remains able to seek a world after strategic deterrence failure that is somewhat favorable for the United States. This can also be a world where the consequences of having resorted to limited nuclear use do not entail strategic victory for Russia and China, but rather a narrow, costly, pyrrhic victory.</p> -<p>While this is just one paper examining the efficacy of BCS’s LSEPI requirements, it presents a mixed picture. The requirements are well intentioned and capable of being implemented on a national scale, but they still encounter many of the same challenges faced by traditional general education and undergraduate requirements in the United Kingdom. Fundamentally, the results may point toward the importance of instilling a sense of civic responsibility to help explain why students should care about ethics.</p> +<h4 id="fundamental-questions-for-the-united-states">Fundamental Questions for the United States</h4> -<p>Another challenge lies in educating teachers on how to integrate civics into STEM curricula. Education schools are not adequately preparing teachers to teach civics, let alone equipping STEM teachers to integrate civics concepts into their lessons. Political polarization exacerbates the challenge. For example, a study by Daniela Kruel DiGiacomo et al. found that only 28 percent of teachers believe parents would support them teaching about contemporary elections, even though 81 percent report that doing so would help meet state curriculum standards. This impacts both the content teachers feel comfortable covering and the overall quality of civics education students receive. Additionally, the same study found that schools lack training for teachers on handling polarization, largely due to insufficient administrative support. As a result, 92 percent of teachers said they will “shut down” student discussions on contentious topics to avoid partisan conflicts, rather than encouraging constructive dialogue and working on civil discourse.</p> +<p>In reasoning about possible responses to strategic deterrence failure manifesting in limited nuclear use, U.S. leaders, advisers, and planners must be clear about the key national objectives and their relative levels of priority. In the event of strategic deterrence failure, the chief U.S. objective should be to ensure the avoidance of a general, unlimited nuclear war that could lead to fundamentally unacceptable levels of damage against the U.S. homeland as a result of adversary counterforce or countervalue strikes. Democratically elected U.S. presidents, charged by voters with defending the homeland, are likely to consider any nuclear attacks on U.S. territory as tantamount to unacceptable damage. Despite the somewhat methodical Cold War origins of this terminology, in the context of the given scenario, presidents are unlikely to be persuaded by their military advisers that the United States can ride out limited nuclear strikes and continue to exist as it did precrisis. This consideration presents an obvious and uncomfortable source of friction with U.S. assurances to allies as delivered in peacetime, a matter to which we will return later in this essay.</p> -<p>Moreover, an expert in one of our roundtable discussions noted the ongoing challenge of engaging some first-generation students, and other minorities that are underrepresented in STEM fields, with civics because they often feel disenfranchised by the very system we ask them to study and value. A potential solution could be to emphasize that civics can empower them to become effective agents of change, helping to dismantle barriers and injustices that prevent more students from advancing in STEM careers.</p> +<p>Avoiding general kinetic damage against the homeland in the course of an ongoing war should thus be a key consideration for the president and should be prioritized above all other considerations, including, in the context of the scenario, supporting Taiwanese and Ukrainian objectives, supporting NATO and East Asian allies, and generally preserving the international order. These goals will remain operative but are fundamentally secondary to the survival and protection of the U.S. homeland. Because strategic deterrence failure of any magnitude is likely to be a world-altering event, it is quite likely that the precise circumstances of initial adversary nuclear use should cause a reassessment of key U.S. objectives. While the prescriptions that follow will make for unsettling reading in allied capitals, they should not be taken as a recommendation for the United States to exit the business of extended deterrence altogether. There are several plausible limited nuclear use scenarios that do not feature collusion as outlined in the Project Atom scenario where U.S. presidents may be substantially more willing to run risks in the defense of allies, but the scenario at hand here presents a particularly devilish predicament: the possibility of follow-on collusion by Moscow and Beijing in a general nuclear war against the United States.</p> -<p>Moreover, the binary thinking often characteristic of STEM fields — and the focus on solving technical problems — leads many to avoid political discourse and civic engagement, mistakenly believing it doesn’t apply to them. Many in the field are drawn to STEM subjects precisely to avoid the messiness of civil society, preferring a world seen through the binary lens of 0s and 1s. Teaching STEM students that it is not only acceptable to engage in discussions that involve ethics and values, but that it is in fact necessary and valuable in developing acceptable technical solutions to societal problems, is thus critical.</p> +<p>That said, strategic deterrence failure should not paralyze the United States in its ability to respond entirely. While restoring the territorial status quo ex ante in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific in the given scenario may not be possible at acceptable levels of cost to the United States, Washington should nevertheless seek to dissuade and deter further adversary nuclear use and terminate conflict on terms that would be deemed acceptable, if not entirely favorable. Critically, following strategic deterrence failure, U.S. adversaries will be correct in their assessment that their stakes — over Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively — are greater than those of the United States given the objectives articulated above. This is especially likely to be the case if Putin and Xi resorted to nuclear use out of desperation to preserve their political control and out of a belief that maintaining their territorial integrity requires running the risk of a nuclear exchange over these territories. Even if U.S. grand strategy and decades of investment in a global order that seeks to proscribe aggressive territorial revisionism may be at risk, many presidents may nevertheless opt for prudence in averting escalation.</p> -<p>Understanding the variety of motivations of tech professionals is important. An expert in one of our roundtable discussions described the four Ps of motivation guiding people in the field: protection, prestige, patriotism, and puzzle-solving. The challenge — and the opportunity — lies in finding the commonality between those motivations and being civically literate.</p> +<p>While the president’s advisers might point out that Russia and China, like the United States, would also be fearful of a general nuclear war — undoubtedly correctly — and that the U.S. nuclear force is survivable to the point of assuring their destruction should escalation prove uncontrollable, prudent presidential leadership would still have to consider the stepwise process of escalation after a U.S. nuclear response. As a result, the prioritization of the survival of the United States as a key national objective is likely to prompt such a prudent president to abstain from responses that could heighten the probability of a general nuclear war.</p> -<p>Finally, incentives within the business world are not always in sync with broader societal good. While corporate responsibilities lie with shareholders and employees, the right decision for business is not always seen as aligned with what’s best for society. Framing democracy as a business asset is a critical step in aligning private sector incentives with public good. Although the tension between societal good and corporate responsibilities is an issue that we will continue to grapple with, there are numerous cases in which the private sector leverages its influence to safeguard democracy and incentivize civic-minded investment. These companies recognize the importance of civics education as a business imperative and have incorporated it into their programs, demonstrating the societal impact of technology and its alignment with democratic principles.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, the president should be ready to employ the full array of tools from across the diplomacy-information-military-economics (DIME) spectrum to achieve the above-stated U.S. objectives as well as possible. Many of these steps can be planned for and conceived of well outside the immediate confines of a crisis, including the crises specified in the Project Atom scenario.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion-and-recommendations">Conclusion and Recommendations</h3> +<p>Preventing adversary nuclear use and strategic deterrence failure will rest on manifesting in the mind of adversarial leaders the prospect of intolerable costs should they proceed, while simultaneously conveying that nuclear use is unlikely to confer tactical or strategic benefit. For both Putin and Xi, the most substantial cost likely relates to their personal political control over their respective states. While the United States should not unambiguously indicate that any nuclear use would lead to an end of their regimes, its declaratory signaling should maintain calculated ambiguity while conveying that catastrophic costs would ensue. While deterrence should prioritize a willingness to hold at risk what adversaries value most, threatening the personal political control or broader regime security of nuclear-armed great power adversaries is unlikely to advance U.S. interests — either in the scenario at hand or in general terms. Issuing such signals, by contrast, is likely to powerfully disabuse adversaries of any deliberate restraint that may still seem valuable after their limited nuclear use, rendering the prospect of follow-on uncontrollable escalation far more likely. In essence, such signaling by the United States would have the effect of further heightening the stakes for adversarial leaders to essentially existential levels concerning their personal political control. Successful war termination for the United States following limited nuclear use will require forbearance on such messaging. A practical problem for the United States, however, will be its noisy domestic political environment, where prominent political figures, including lawmakers from the president’s own party and the opposition, will likely issue calls for regime change or at least the removal of these leaders. U.S. adversaries will likely be unable to disentangle this “noise” from the “signal” of deliberate presidential messaging and assurances.</p> -<p>Democracy is neither invincible nor inevitable. It can only be sustained by a civically informed and engaged citizenry that comes together with a common purpose. However, this fundamental prerequisite is threatened by the decades-long decline in civics education, which has left Americans lacking the skills to fulfill their essential role in moving us toward a more perfect union.</p> +<p>At higher levels of escalation — particularly, follow-on strikes initiated by Russia and China — U.S. messaging could adopt the position that general nuclear war is a real possibility and would mean the effective end of Putin’s and Xi’s political control. The United States should simultaneously seek to maintain a robust set of flexible and responsive conventional capabilities, including capabilities forward-deployed to both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. It should also seek to enable its allies and partners in the regions to proffer similar capabilities while ensuring integrated military planning and operations with these allies. Critically, U.S. messaging in the course of a crisis prior to strategic deterrence failure should be contingent: emphasizing that consequences will befall adversaries should they choose to transgress the nuclear threshold, but that, by contrast, those same consequences will not befall adversaries should they choose to abstain from nuclear employment.</p> -<p>As we move to reinvigorate civics education, we cannot afford to leave anyone behind. We cannot settle for reaching only those who are already interested in government and the role of the individual in a democracy. We must find ways to also engage those whose interests lie in more technological and scientific fields. And we must reach adults as well as students.</p> +<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives-2">U.S. Strategic Objectives</h4> -<p>The challenges we face today — polarization, misinformation, and a lack of trust in our institutions — underscore the urgent need for a reinvigorated focus on civics education. As democracy’s survival hinges upon informed participation, it is essential that education systems empower citizens to understand their role in shaping our more perfect union. Nowhere is this more important than in the STEM and tech world. Science and technology have an undisputed influence on society, and the decisions made by tech professionals shape not only the future of innovation but also the fabric of society and its democratic institutions.</p> +<p>It is useful to reflect on the factors inherent in the scenario that appear to precipitate a resort by both Russia and China to limited nuclear use. In the scenario, the most critical cause of strategic deterrence failure appears to be the result of two factors. First, leaders in both Russia and China, fearing conventional defeat and having experienced substantial conventional setbacks, are likely primed to reach into their nuclear holsters. Successful conventional denial, in other words, prompts these leaders to view nuclear weapons as a useful offset — for tactical, strategic, and psychological reasons. Second, both Putin and Xi appear to believe — probably correctly — that nuclear use will powerfully convey both their resolve and the substantial asymmetry in stakes that exists for them versus the United States.</p> -<p>Infusing civics concepts into STEM education can ensure that the next generation of technologists understands that they have a civic responsibility to think about the societal impact of their innovations. This interdisciplinary approach is key to preparing a workforce that is technically skilled and civically engaged, including engagement in the development of norms, policies, and laws.</p> +<p>They may further believe that despite professed U.S. diplomatic and other assurances to allies in peacetime, a U.S. president in wartime may be deterred from employing disproportionate force, including through the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, due to the prospect of uncontrollable escalation. Within the confines of the scenario, deterrence failure may have been averted through protracted conventional warfighting, even if this would entail substantial costs to the armed forces of the United States and its allies. Swift conventional success by the United States and its allies appears to have been a powerful motivator for both Russia and China to reach for their nuclear holsters. Deterrence failure in the scenario in no small part appears to be intertwined with both Putin and Xi fundamentally miscalculating the odds of conventional victory.</p> -<p>Integrating civics concepts into the STEM and tech world is not just an educational priority — it is a democratic imperative. As technology continues to shape the world, those at the forefront of innovation must be equipped with the civic knowledge and ethical grounding to guide their work responsibly. And those making governance decisions must be equally prepared to meet the demands of a complex and technological future.</p> +<p>In both the Indo-Pacific and Europe, the United States’ core objectives prior to strategic deterrence failure are to deter significant escalation, to preserve the territorial status quo, to reassure its allies, and to preserve the international norm against territorial conquest. Following strategic deterrence failure, no objective should be greater for the U.S. president than ensuring that the survival of the country is not threatened by the prospect of uncontrollable escalation into a general nuclear war.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Integrating civics concepts into the STEM and tech world is not just an educational priority — it is a democratic imperative.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Victory for the United States within the presented scenario is far from straightforward despite the formidable conventional successes of allied forces in Europe and U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific. A president and their expert advisers may disagree on the precise contours of victory in a crisis like the one envisaged in the scenario — just as President Kennedy and many of the key ExComm members (with the exception of George Ball) disagreed about the advisability of the Jupiter deal in the final days of the Cuban Missile Crisis. After strategic deterrence failure, a president may be rendered exceptionally sober by the prospect of general nuclear war — what Kennedy called the “final failure” — and be willing to take exceptional steps to seek prompt war termination, even on terms that would have been nominally unacceptable to that same president prior to adversary nuclear use.</p> -<p><em>HOW DO WE INTEREST STEM STUDENTS AND TECH WORKERS IN CIVICS?</em></p> +<p>On the contrary, should a president choose to accept the risk of further nuclear escalation and retaliate in kind — either with nuclear weapons or a massive conventional attack — victory could amount to a decision by the adversary to seek termination of the conflict to avoid further damage to their nations or their political control. Because this latter option is far more contingent and depends on variables that may be fundamentally unknowable in the midst of a crisis (such as Putin’s and Xi’s proximal risk acceptance), it bears substantially greater risks. Should the U.S. president seek to sue for war termination following adversary nuclear use, there likely would be severe, unprecedented, and — from the vantage point of peacetime — intolerable consequences to how the United States’ capability to project power globally, to reassure allies at a distance, and to hold global leadership would be perceived. In such an event, the casualty would largely be the United States’ extended deterrence guarantees; a U.S. president would have palpably demonstrated that they are unwilling to run the risk of a nuclear war that could cause damage to the homeland to back its allies. But, in general, the United States would be able to maintain robust deterrence of adversaries for other scenarios, such as attacks on U.S. territory itself. The potentially fatal blow to the U.S. system of extended deterrence thus further underscores the severity of any strategic deterrence failure scenario involving limited nuclear use, but especially the collusive scenario articulated in Project Atom. As mentioned earlier, this analysis should not be taken as a repudiation of extended deterrence, but instead as an appraisal of the challenges to sustaining U.S. allied commitments in the aftermath of the precise limited nuclear use scenario at hand. Even if the course of action recommended here may heighten the probability of allied nuclear proliferation, this outcome — with its many uncertainties — may be preferable to inviting greater escalation by resorting to reciprocal nuclear attacks.</p> -<p><strong>Reveal Impact:</strong> Herbert Lin, a fellow in cyber policy at Stanford University, often tells his students that it behooves them to understand how government works because it is government that effectively dictates what we can know and understand about the universe, primarily through decisions about how to allocate its massive funding. AI and cybersecurity are good examples of how governments are developing rules, regulations, and policies that will impact the development and deployment of technology. But technical experts are not just impacted — they can and should also have an impact. They are members of society with valuable experience and skills to bring to societal problems, and thus they should participate in the discussions both as experts and as members of society.</p> +<h4 id="assuring-allies-2">Assuring Allies</h4> -<p><strong>Elevate the Role of Translators Between STEM and Policy:</strong> There is a critical need for individuals who can bridge the gap between STEM and policy by getting involved in the process and acting as “translators.” These professionals must understand both technical concepts and policy implications, enabling them to communicate effectively between the two communities. Teaching policymakers the technical aspect of emerging technologies, while helping technologists navigate the complexities of policy, is essential for fostering collaboration and innovation. To strengthen this vital role, we must create programs and positions that elevate these “translators” by raising awareness of their importance, making these roles more prestigious, and incentivizing individuals to pursue them. By recognizing and investing in these positions, we can ensure that the intersection of technology and policy is more effectively navigated, driving ethical innovation and informed decisionmaking. There are several examples of Master of Science (MS) degrees in tech and public policy, but there is still room for more. In the field of cybersecurity, Tufts University offers a degree in Cybersecurity and Public Policy and the University of Texas at Austin offers a Master of Public Affairs (MPAff ) dual degree program between its Cockrell School of Engineering and its Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs.</p> +<p>The risks of allies questioning U.S. credibility in the event of strategic deterrence failure are substantial and likely insurmountable in the context of the scenario provided if Washington pursues a course of action that prioritizes its own national survival and immunity from nuclear attack. Allied leaders and a U.S. president will likely have a divergent sense of risk acceptance following strategic deterrence failure. For the presidents of the Philippines and Poland, in particular, nuclear use on their territories will be seen as a cataclysmic deterrence failure verging on an existential threat. For the United States, that same assessment would not hold, but the possibility of further damage in a general nuclear war would likely cause any prudent U.S. president to weigh the trade-off in supporting allies and averting damage to the homeland.</p> -<p><strong>Connect to the Scientific Revolution and the Age of Enlightenment:</strong> STEM students may be interested in the connections between the Scientific Revolution, with its questioning of established concepts and structures, and its influence on the Age of Enlightenment, which in turn informed the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, with the framers developing our radical system of government in the same breath, and in much the same way, that a new world of scientific discovery and understanding was helping inform new ways of thinking. The framers did not see a bright distinction between what today we might call “hard science” and “soft science.”</p> +<p>There are likely conventional options that the president could adopt to inflict military costs on adversaries for nuclear use that would maintain an acceptable level of risk of follow-on nuclear escalation, but these may be insufficient for allied leaders and publics that could be motivated to see a U.S. nuclear response out of a desire for retributive damage against Russia and China. As a result, it is highly likely that following strategic deterrence failure, allied perceptions of the credibility of the United States would suffer drastically unless Washington opted for nuclear use in kind, which would present substantial risks and is unlikely to be preferable to the alternatives presented to most plausible presidents. As much as expert advisers to any president might profess support for U.S. alliances in peacetime, they might find that in the heart of a bona fide nuclear crisis, concerns about credibility are simply unpersuasive to a president concerned first and foremost with averting a pathway to nuclear war. This was precisely the predicament that arose in the final days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when several ExComm members were opposed to Kennedy’s willingness to contemplate an off-ramp by way of withdrawing U.S. intermediate-range missiles deployed to Turkey, a NATO ally. Notably, adversary limited nuclear use against allies may be unlikely to prompt the same kind of national outrage and fervor that drove the United States to run risks in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor (1941) and September 11 (2001) attacks on the homeland. The sole exception may be the Chinese strike specified in the scenario, which hits a U.S. naval base and presumably results in the deaths of thousands of U.S. servicemembers. This could encourage a president to accept greater risks in responding to China, though likely still well under the nuclear threshold.</p> -<p><strong>Bridge the Gap between Binary and Shades of Gray:</strong> We must explore how the mathematical and scientific principles and “answers” that seem so black and white today actually arrived through a process — a process of discernment and discovery that did not always yield societal acceptance at first. Similarly, the framers of the Constitution set up not just institutions but a process for arriving at the “right” answer for the advancement of individuals, society, and the nation. And just as science is constantly raising new questions about long-held answers or assumptions about the universe, democracy is always moving toward a more perfect union, with change coming about through the work of informed and engaged citizens.</p> +<p>A president may further inquire how best to signal resolve to U.S. allies throughout the crisis. They may then be told that the most effective means of signaling resolve to allies would be to meet adversary nuclear use with some form of proportionate nuclear use. There are substantial risks to this, however. First, a proportionate response in the eyes of U.S. military planners may be interpreted as escalatory by the adversary and, therefore, potentially could prompt further escalation. Second, by employing nuclear weapons, the United States would concede substantial normative credibility that could be valuable in shaping global diplomatic narratives in a post-conflict environment (including with nonaligned states). The United States could aim to signal resolve to allies by inflicting calibrated, proportionate damage against adversary forces implicated in the nuclear strikes described in the scenario with its conventional forces. This is unlikely to sufficiently convey resolve as allies may not find a conventional response to nuclear use on their territory as satisfactory. While allies may not be uniform in this assessment of a conventional response, U.S. experts and officials, in consultations with allies, from East Asia to Europe, repeatedly contend with demands that nuclear use be met with nuclear retaliation.</p> -<p><strong>Leverage the Scientific Method to Strengthen Civic Engagement:</strong> The principles of the scientific method — critical thinking, evidence-based reasoning, and an iterative approach to problem-solving — offer a powerful framework for enhancing civic engagement. By teaching students to apply the scientific method to democratic participation, we can cultivate a more informed and thoughtful citizenry. Encouraging students to evaluate information with the same rigor they would in a scientific setting allows them to engage in civil discourse and embrace differing perspectives. This connection between scientific inquiry and the democratic process helps foster collaboration and critical thinking, empowering students who are driven to solve problems to apply their skills to civic challenges. Embedding these principles into civics education not only reinforces a sense of civic responsibility but also ensures that the next generation is equipped to address complex societal issues with thoughtful, evidence-based approaches.</p> +<h4 id="military-response-options-2">Military Response Options</h4> -<p><em>WHAT ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT CIVICS CONCEPTS TO CONVEY?</em></p> +<p>There are four basic categories of military response that could be considered in the course of the Project Atom scenario. First, a U.S. president could choose to forgo all military options and focus solely on war termination by diplomatic means. Second, a U.S. president could opt for a conventional response — either one designed to inflict tailored, proportionate damage, or one designed to disproportionately retaliate for nuclear use without employing nuclear weapons. Third, a U.S. president could opt for a nuclear response designed to inflict tailored, proportionate damage. Finally, a U.S. president could opt to seek escalation dominance and up the ante with significant nuclear use while communicating to the adversary U.S. resolve to escalate further should it be necessary to accomplish U.S. and allied objectives.</p> + +<p>Of these options, the first and second will hold the greatest practical appeal for any prudent U.S. president, who is unlikely to be versed in the strategic rationales for an in-kind or escalatory nuclear response and more concerned with preserving the safety, integrity, and survival of the United States itself. The first option may be unappealing, however, due to it appearing tantamount to complete strategic defeat. (Presidents may consider their own political legacies in weighing responses too.) Following strategic deterrence failure, there is likely an extremely low probability that the United States can, at acceptable levels of risk to the homeland, optimize for all its core strategic objectives, including reassuring its allies. As a result, a prescription for the president could be two-fold. First, they should opt for a limited conventional strike against the nonstrategic and regional nuclear force units involved in the strikes against Poland and the Philippines. At the same time, the president should employ a diplomatic strategy that seeks to persuade these allies as to the inadvisability of a nuclear response, which could beget further nuclear use against their territories (including against nonmilitary targets or military targets more proximal to population centers).</p> + +<p>While allies may be unpersuaded and motivated by a retributive logic demanding nuclear use, it is equally possible that internal fissures within allied governments and domestic political forces may support U.S. goals in persuading allies of the sufficiency of a conventional response. To deter further nuclear use by adversaries, the president should be willing to allude to intolerable and extreme consequences while underscoring to the broader world that the United States differentiates itself from Russia and China in viewing nuclear weapons as tools of last resort for truly extreme circumstances — not as a mere offset to the possibility of conventional defeat, as Moscow and Beijing have demonstrated in the scenario.</p> + +<p>Critics may counter that Russia and China resorted to nuclear use precisely because of U.S. and allied conventional military successes — and so why should a conventional response deter further nuclear use? The answer to this question rests on the logic of nuclear use by both countries in the first place. If both leaders crossed the nuclear Rubicon out of a belief that a single instance of limited nuclear use would paralyze the United States into inaction, the willingness to continue conventional military operations would disabuse them of this notion. By “fighting through” nuclear use and continuing to inflict costs without relying on nuclear weapons, the United States would deny Moscow and Beijing the political benefits of their limited nuclear use. Should Russia and China seek to deprive the United States of this option, they may be forced to opt for additional nuclear strikes against U.S. and allied forces, significantly raising the prospects of a total war across two hemispheres alongside the prospect of general nuclear war with the United States. If Putin and Xi remain rational, they may see no benefit in upping the ante in this game of competitive risk-taking, and instead may seek to minimize their further losses while retaining political control.</p> + +<p>The reason for not recommending that the president seek a tailored nuclear response or adopt an escalation dominance mindset and seek to escalate with nuclear weapons is because both options present substantial drawbacks and an unacceptable level of risk of a general nuclear war that would be most ruinous to the United States. Even assuming a small probability of escalation by the adversary should be sobering for a president given the consequences that could ensue. In the case of a tailored nuclear response option, U.S. adversaries may fail to be deterred if they continue to believe that their stakes in resolving their short-term territorial conquests are greater than those of the United States. Putin and Xi would, in their own minds, likely be willing to believe this — especially if they see the stakes in the crises as having now grown to encompass their own political survivals and legacies. If this is the case, a tailored, proportionate U.S. nuclear response, even if correctly interpreted as proportionate by U.S. adversaries, may beget further adversary nuclear use. Neither Putin nor Xi may choose to escalate in the types of targets they choose to hold at risk — keeping retaliation confined to military targets — but could continue strikes on NATO and Philippine territory by focusing on military targets. The collusive logic that is at play in the scenario could also influence this decisionmaking as both Moscow and Beijing may understand that their continued choice to participate in a game of competitive nuclear risk-taking will force the United States to contend with the challenge of waging a general nuclear war simultaneously against both powers. Hewing to the damage-limiting principles that have guided U.S. nuclear strategy for decades simultaneously against Russia and China would be largely unfeasible, even if survivable U.S. systems could inflict massive damage in punishment against both aggressors. A collusive all-out nuclear attack by Russia and China against the United States with their surviving forces would still result in the practical end of U.S. civilization and society.</p> + +<p>An escalation dominance approach, meanwhile, would succeed in conveying U.S. resolve and likely persuade Xi and Putin that their assumptions about U.S. stakes in these conflicts may be incorrect. However, a substantial use of nuclear weapons by the United States against military targets in Russia and China runs a serious risk of generating concerns in both states about the possibility of their forces remaining intact and about the viability of their regimes themselves. Without robust means of communication with the national or senior military leadership of both countries, which cannot be taken for granted, the United States may be unable to assure Russia and China that its choice to opt for nuclear escalation was not the precursor to a massive, damage-limiting counterforce campaign or a broader war of regime change. Fear of either outcome will encourage both Putin and Xi to contemplate larger-scale nuclear use. Because U.S. and allied combined military posture in the Indo-Pacific and Europe will also consist in the scenario timeframe of precise, conventional munitions, adversaries will have to also account for the possibility of massive, supplemental, conventional counterforce strikes. This option, while appealing for what it might convey about U.S. credibility to adversaries and allies alike, generates the greatest possibility of massive adversary nuclear use, which would result in unacceptable damage to the U.S. homeland. It would not be advisable for a president to run these risks immediately; instead, they should seek to maximize U.S. goals through the nonnuclear means articulated above, at least initially.</p> + +<p>There is a meaningful difference between the preceding two options in terms of how they might prompt reactions from Russia and China. Russia, which is known to incorporate a degree of counterforce targeting itself, may be more willing than China to run greater risks by attempting to destroy U.S. nuclear forces preemptively. In the 2028 timeframe specified in the Project Atom scenario, China’s nuclear forces will remain quantitatively inferior to those of the United States, and Chinese leaders would likely be deterred by the prospect of assured U.S. retaliation. As a result, it is substantially more likely that, even if opting for escalation dominance, U.S.-China nuclear exchanges could take place across several steps before either side considers massive nuclear strikes against the other. Despite this, Chinese leaders may remain pathologically vulnerable to fears of a disarming U.S. counterforce strike; these fears could be compounded by 2028 with the deployment of additional missile defense and conventional long-range strike assets in the Indo-Pacific.</p> + +<p>Regardless of U.S. objectives, it will be in the interest of the United States to have adversaries remain less concerned about the possibility of a massive, damage-limiting first strike than about limited retaliation (either nuclear or conventional). Additionally, the United States should endeavor to avoid feeding adversary expectations that it seeks to end their political control or regimes. The key to successful war termination will differ with regard to both Russia and China. For China and Xi, inflicting substantial enough damage to the People’s Liberation Army’s conventional and amphibious landing forces to render seizing and controlling Taiwan unfeasible will confer bargaining leverage. With Russia, the United States and NATO may try to use seized territory in Kaliningrad to sue for war termination with Putin. If either Putin or Xi begin to exhibit particular psychological pathologies indicating irrational risk acceptance (which cannot be ruled out), these assumptions may not hold, and the United States may be forced to contemplate greater escalation than might otherwise be prudent. Given the impossibility of predicting irrational decisionmaking pathologies in a serious nuclear crisis, further elaboration on this point will not be provided, though it does bear consideration.</p> + +<p>U.S. planners must also consider the law of armed conflict. Adversaries will expect a U.S. nuclear or conventional response to adhere to publicly stated prewar principles, which include an emphasis on counterforce targeting and compliance with the law of armed conflict. This should rule out adversary expectations of countervalue strikes (deliberate attacks against major urban population centers and other nonmilitary targets). However, this will likely also heighten adversary fears about a possible damage-limiting strike against their nuclear forces, command and control, and other enabling capabilities. While the United States will be unable to disabuse adversaries of its long-stated interests in damage limitation, to the extent possible, any U.S. nuclear or substantial kinetic response should be accompanied by assurances that it does not seek to destroy adversary nuclear forces or sever adversary national leadership from key military functions. To this end, a response should be accompanied by public and private messaging (if feasible) designed to indicate tailored punishment against military units implicated in the execution of nuclear strikes. There is no reason the United States should deliberately seek to eschew the law of armed conflict in navigating responses to the scenario at hand.</p> + +<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options-2">Non-Kinetic Response Options</h4> + +<p>The president would have a wide array of non-kinetic options available in the event of strategic deterrence failure. Choices would include broad diplomatic messaging to allies, partners, and the nonaligned world aimed at obtaining unconditional condemnation of Russia and China for resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons in war in more than 80 years. The president could simultaneously marshal U.S. diplomatic resources to seek a broad, international coalition condemning both countries. It is likely that certain nonaligned states or states more aligned with Russia and China would opt to blame the United States for Russian and Chinese nuclear use, citing well-trodden narratives built up over years by Moscow and Beijing about U.S. alliances, military posture, and other factors. The United States should be ready to actively counter this, including by declassifying intelligence as much as possible to demonstrate that nuclear use was a result of desperation for both Putin and Xi. Given the severity of the scenario and the implications for U.S. interests, the president should be willing to authorize broad declassification that would serve these ends, even at the cost of possibly compromising sensitive sources and methods.</p> + +<p>Practically, the United States would likely also seek to enhance international economic sanctions, but the efficacy of these sanctions is likely to be limited; in anticipation of a decision to employ nuclear weapons, Putin and Xi would likely have expected such a response and have been undeterred by the prospect, as their limited nuclear use exhibits. Other non-kinetic options could include cyber operations against both Russia and China. These could be carried out for a range of objectives, including sowing a narrative within both countries that seeks to convey to the Russian and Chinese people the erratic character of their national leadership; seeking intelligence on likely follow-on military action following deterrence failure; and, finally, undermining Russian and Chinese military operations. Out of caution, the president should ensure that U.S. offensive cyber operations, to the extent feasible, do not affect Russian or Chinese assertive political control over their own nuclear — or broader military — forces. In general, cyber operations, if detected, could prove escalatory. The president should be particularly cautious about authorizing operations aimed at penetrating sensitive systems related to strategic situational awareness or command and control, which could raise the fears in both states about non-kinetic interference in their nuclear forces either as an end in itself or as a precursor to broader counterforce strikes.</p> + +<p>A chief purpose of U.S. non-kinetic efforts should be to maintain the normative higher ground, which will be valuable in a post-conflict environment with allies, partners, and nonaligned states alike. Even if allied governments view U.S. credibility as having taken a fatal hit following a decision to resort to a nonnuclear response, allied publics may be more readily persuaded by a U.S. choice to respond in a more limited fashion, particularly if Washington is able to make the case that opting for more escalatory responses would likely have resulted in nuclear strikes on their territories (and further nuclear strikes, in the case of Poland and the Philippines). For Russia and China, however, U.S. non-kinetic measures will largely be peripheral in shaping their cost-benefit calculations on further escalation.</p> + +<h4 id="conclusion-3">Conclusion</h4> + +<p>It should be acknowledged that from the vantage point of peacetime in 2024, the above-stated analysis does not make for particularly encouraging reading. One does not need to have read this assessment of the scenario and U.S. response options to conclude that the strategic deterrence scenario presented likely portends “defeat” for the United States. However, this defeat should be construed narrowly: the United States likely fails to compel Russia and China away from seeking their territorial revisionist goals at substantial cost, but ultimately survives as a nation and polity to restore and seek influence in a post-conflict world. Writing about potential nuclear crises demands an abundance of imagination, and U.S. policymakers and planners should be clear-eyed about the possibilities that would remain for the country in a post-strategic deterrence failure world.</p> + +<p>The centrality of presidential decisionmaking about nuclear crises represents both a strength and a weakness in the analysis above. It is a strength because it contends with the often-heard dictum that military plans “never survive first contact with the enemy” — partly because reality is complex and inherently unpredictable, but also because the ineffable idiosyncrasies of presidential decisionmaking can only become known under the psychological and emotional stress of a real crisis. However, the choice to center the president and presidential guidance also represents an analytical limitation in reasoning about U.S. responses to limited nuclear use because it is inherently impossible to account for the various personalities that may one day be asked to reason about matters of nuclear war.</p> + +<p>Finally, for U.S. allies, this scenario presents the crystallization of long-held anxieties about extended deterrence. Indeed, as much as U.S. policymakers may see peacetime assurance demands from allies as a leaky sieve, they are born of well-placed anxieties about extended deterrence failing under extreme circumstances. Allied fears in this regard are not entirely misplaced and there are indeed scenarios, at the worst-case end of the spectrum, involving collusion by the United States’ two great power, near-peer, nuclear-armed adversaries that will bend and possibly break assurances made in peacetime. The Project Atom scenario could be one such example. Analytically, however, this should not condemn extended deterrence to the status of a bluff. Instead, the United States and its allies should be ready to consult, plan, and game out various strategic deterrence failure scenarios to ensure that they can be averted in the first place. For instance, in the provided scenario, it appears that escalation to nuclear use by Russia in the European theater was driven by Polish and Lithuanian conventional operations into Kaliningrad without a central decision by NATO or broader consultations with the United States. Ensuring coordination and strategic synchronicity between the United States and its allies will be key to avoiding the worst in high-intensity conventional crises. Finally, beyond the working- and expert-level tracks, U.S. assurances must be supplemented by high-level political engagement with allies, underscoring in particular the special role of the president in U.S. nuclear decisionmaking.</p> + +<p>Above all, this analysis should also underscore the essential importance of averting strategic deterrence failure in the first place. The hard choices U.S. nuclear-armed adversaries could force upon the United States by resorting to limited nuclear use are ones no president should be asked to consider.</p> + +<h3 id="basis-and-elements-of-a-strategy-for-multiparty-intra-war-nuclear-deterrence">Basis and Elements of a Strategy for Multiparty, Intra-War Nuclear Deterrence</h3> <blockquote> - <h4 id="csiss-civics-for-adults"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CSIS’s Civics for Adults</code></h4> + <h4 id="melanie-w-sisson">Melanie W. Sisson</h4> </blockquote> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Developed in partnership with the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania, CSIS’s Civics for Adults guide aims to help civics experts and content providers create resources for business, government, and higher education leaders. The goal is to enhance civic understanding among adults and improve the functioning of democratic institutions within communities by identifying existing resources suitable for adults and adapting civics materials originally designed for schools.</code></em></p> +<p>Though much is known about nuclear explosions — their physics, their mechanics, their effects — very little is known about their use as weapons of war. History provides analysts a single war in which nuclear weapons were detonated, and a small number of occasions in which decisionmakers are known to have seriously contemplated their use. This record is thin gruel upon which to make compelling inferences, or from which to draw solid conclusions.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">First, the guide emphasizes that civic knowledge alone is insufficient; it must be paired with civic skills that can produce positive outcomes for both institutions and communities. Second, it offers actionable guidance on developing civics content for adults, ensuring they grasp the importance of the federal system, the roles of each branch of government, the separation of powers, the rule of law, and civilian control of the armed forces. Additionally, it highlights the importance of promoting civic engagement and fostering a sense of civic responsibility in learners. Only when individuals take ownership of their work and are invested in the success of their institutions and communities can they consistently make decisions that contribute to the long-term health of democracy.</code></em></p> +<p>A paucity of empirical data, however, is not evidence that nuclear weapons cannot — or will never — be used again. Nor does it exempt civilian policymakers and military practitioners from the responsibility of preparing to make choices about nuclear employment.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The guide also provides advice on how to effectively tailor civics to adults, noting that adults are typically self-directed learners who engage more with content when it has immediate relevance to their lives or careers. It emphasizes that materials should include narratives that resonate with adults’ work experiences and lived realities, sparking discussions about both the strengths and shortcomings of current systems. Further, employers should focus on implementing achievable civics goals, such as encouraging employees to vote or compensating them for jury duty or community service.</code></em></p> +<p>Policymakers confronting a situation in which they find it necessary to consider whether, when, which, and how many nuclear weapons to use will have to answer questions that are at once philosophical and practical, moral and material, urgent and permanent. If they are of stable temperament and rational inclination, then policymakers will seek methodical ways with which to weigh the value of nuclear restraint against that of nuclear action. Such approaches will produce clarity in defining strategic objectives and war aims, intellectual empathy for the adversary’s decision calculus, and creativity in the operational art of designing alternative military courses of action.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Lastly, the guide stresses that outreach should not be limited to large corporations or government institutions. Equal attention should be given to local chambers of commerce, small businesses, community colleges, and trade schools. While concise, this guide serves as a practical starting point for content creators developing or adapting civics resources to engage adults in both their workplaces and communities.</code></em></p> +<p>Scenario analysis is one method for comparing the advantages and disadvantages of alternative courses of action and, for strategists and planners, serves the same purpose as practice does for teams in any discipline: it doesn’t make perfect, but it does make progress. Each phase of a scenario exercises the thought processes involved in aligning military operations with war aims, and war aims with strategic objectives, under conditions in which some variables that might affect the likelihood of success are foreseeable and controllable, and some are not. In this way, scenarios pull assumptions to the surface, inspect their implications, and then test courses of action for consistency of logic, fidelity to principle, and resiliency to changes in condition.</p> -<p>CSIS’s Civics for Adults guide discusses the key civics concepts all Americans should understand (see box above).</p> +<p>Scenario analyses, however, are abstractions of reality accompanied by storytelling — theory, reasoning, and argumentation. This is especially true for nuclear scenarios. There is, therefore, special risk in attending too much to a scenario’s mechanics and not enough to the concepts and commitments it calls into question. If nuclear war does move from being a possibility to being a reality, whatever the specifics, there is no evading the fact that what policymakers will be deciding is which and how many humans will not survive, or if any will survive at all.</p> -<p>Of particular importance in the technology arena is an understanding of civic responsibility — obligations that go beyond oneself and are essential for a functioning democracy based on the then-radical idea of self-governance. Civic responsibility can help inform the “why” of ethics. It can also strengthen the message that security, particularly cybersecurity, is a shared responsibility between the government and the individual.</p> +<h4 id="analytic-assumptions">Analytic Assumptions</h4> -<p>Also important, as noted, is an understanding of how policy decisions are made and at what level(s) of government. Major funding decisions are generally made by the U.S. Congress and the executive branch, but state and local governments can also impact the level of resources available for the development of technology or new engineering projects, for example. Similarly, policies and laws establishing limits or guidelines for scientific or technological research could come from federal, state, or even local governments. Understanding our system of federalism is important for understanding how to bring about change or influence outcomes.</p> +<p>The strategy developed here is premised on analysis of a two-theater, two-adversary, two intra-war nuclear launch scenario (referred to throughout as “the scenario”). Where information is not available — either because it does not exist or because it is not specified in the scenario — the strategy relies on a set of reasonable assumptions. Some assumptions are about the dynamics of nuclear war, because there hasn’t been one from which to draw historical evidence. Some are about decisionmaking in the United States, about which relatively much is known in general, but nothing at all in the context of a two-theater war that involves nuclear use. Other assumptions are made about the scenario’s adversaries, because little information about their respective decisionmaking processes is available in the scenario itself.</p> -<p>Finally, reinforcing a sense of shared values and aspirations captured in the notion of a more perfect union, for which we must always strive, can help strengthen the commitment to using STEM-related expertise to reinforce, rather than undermine, those values.</p> +<p>There is no standard definition of what elevates nuclear use from being limited nuclear war to being general — “all-out” — nuclear war. In the 1960s, the U.S. government planned for its nuclear forces to be of a size and quality to be able to execute a retaliatory strike that would destroy “between 20 and 25 per cent of the enemy’s civilian population and between 50 and 75 per cent of his industrial capacity.” Applying this measure to the scenario means that general nuclear war would produce the immediate deaths of approximately 376–469 million people. A recent study by climate scientists calculates that if the belligerents in the scenario detonated sufficient warheads to achieve this mutual 25 percent casualty rate, then follow-on deaths from post-nuclear famine would reach approximately 2.5 billion people within two years.</p> -<p><em>HOW DO WE GET CIVICS CONCEPTS INTO THE STEM CURRICULUM?</em></p> +<p>In the absence of any less arbitrary threshold, this strategy defines the lower bound of general nuclear war as the detonation by any one state of the number of nuclear weapons needed to produce a total yield sufficient to kill 25 percent of a belligerent’s population. Detonations that occur below that threshold constitute limited, not general, nuclear war. The strategy similarly assumes, based on the above, that general nuclear war in the scenario would destroy modern civilization and might even constitute a species-extinction event for much of biological life on earth, including humans. It assumes that governments would cease to function, and that there would be no meaning attached to the idea of nationhood, as individuals and collectives would instead be left to struggle to survive. In other words, the strategy assumes that the costs of general nuclear war are so extremely negative that they far exceed any benefits derived from the defeat and unconditional surrender of the adversary.</p> -<p>Civics education must be embedded across a variety of subjects, not limited to social studies. Civics concepts should permeate STEM fields, where the intersection of technology, ethics, and policy is increasingly important.</p> +<p>The strategy also is built upon the recognition that there is no empirical basis upon which to make predictions about the dynamics of nuclear war. Specifically, once nuclear exchange has begun, there is no fact-based reason to presume that the likelihood of de-escalation, or of controlled escalation, is greater than the likelihood of unrestrained escalation. The strategy therefore assumes that all nuclear detonations have an unknown probability of creating an escalatory spiral, regardless of variation in their specific features — for example their type, location, yield, casualty rate, and so forth. Even relaxing this assumption and allowing the likelihood of escalation to general nuclear war to be low instead of unknown does not change the basic inequality. The magnitude of the costs of general nuclear war are so great that even very small probability estimates produce very large negative results — ones so destructive that they dwarf any possible positive results of victory.</p> -<p><strong>Leverage Initiatives Such As the 2023 National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy:</strong></p> +<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives-3">U.S. Strategic Objectives</h4> -<p>Among the foundational skills highlighted in the strategy are the following:</p> +<p>The strategy presented here assumes that U.S. policymakers are rational actors. This means they are sensitive to the costs, benefits, and probabilities of various courses of action and base their choice of action on estimates of expected value: the net positive or negative effect on U.S. interests produced by the outcome of each course of action, multiplied by that outcome’s probability of occurring. The strategy also assumes that U.S. decisionmakers assess that the extreme costs of general nuclear war exceed any potential benefits derived from the adversary’s total destruction, and that they are aware that the detonation of any nuclear weapon has the potential to result in an escalatory cycle that ultimately produces general nuclear war.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>“Be Active Participants in Society and the Economy.”</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>“Understand the Social, Technical, &amp; Cultural Dynamics of Computational Technology, including Equity and Inclusion.”</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>“Ethically, Securely, and Safely Use Information” and “Recognize the Rights, Privacy, Responsibilities, &amp; Opportunities of an Interconnected Digital World.”</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Within the set of nonnuclear outcomes, the strategy assumes that policymakers consider the benefits of conventional victory to be greater than those of a negotiated settlement, and that both are greater than the benefits of total defeat. It also assumes policymakers judge the value of maximalist victory — the unconditional surrender of the adversary — and of a negotiated settlement to be greater than the costs of conventional war because, in the absence of this assumption, the incentive would be for the United States to withdraw.</p> -<p>These objectives are all advanced by civics education.</p> +<p>The expected values produced by these combinations of probabilities, costs, and benefits mean that U.S. policymakers will prefer all nonnuclear outcomes to all nuclear outcomes (Table 1).</p> -<p>The strategy also seeks to “Invigorate the Pursuit of Foundational Cyber Skills and Cyber Careers.” As noted earlier, the Commission on Public Service determined that teaching civics was one of the most important and foundational ways to inspire public service and careers with a mission.</p> +<p>In the absence of information to the contrary, this strategy assumes that the scenario’s adversarial decisionmakers also are rational actors whose choices reflect their estimates of expected value. This assumption, however, does not require the adversaries to arrive at the same rank ordering of preferences over outcomes as the United States.</p> -<p>Finally, the strategy notes that “cyber education should be integrated across disciplines so learners can gain the requisite knowledge and skills in relevant and contextualized learning experiences.” Again, the kind of cross-discipline approach advocated in this report meets that objective.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fHthMgu.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ Table 1: Assumed U.S. Preferences over Outcomes</em></p> -<p><strong>Support Teacher Training and Professional Development:</strong> Teachers play a central role in fostering civic engagement among students, but they need better support to effectively incorporate civics and ethics into STEM subjects. Professional development programs should equip educators with the tools to teach the ethical and civic dimensions of technology. Partnerships between schools, universities, and tech companies can also help educators stay up-to-date with the latest technological advancements and their societal implications. Additionally, teacher training schools should place greater emphasis on teaching educators to teach civics, especially in today’s politically polarized environment. This training should include an understanding of the pervasive impact of technology in government. For example, the rollout of the Affordable Care Act and efforts to use technology for a more transparent and accountable government could serve as relevant case studies. Potential STEM teachers should also be required to have a basic understanding of civics and the role of laws and be encouraged to use similar examples in their classes.</p> +<p>In general, preference hierarchies can be classified as one of two types. Type-1 actors estimate that the costs of general nuclear war exceed any benefits derived from the adversary’s total destruction, whether by nuclear or conventional means. A Type-1 actor will therefore prefer all nonuse outcomes to all nuclear-use outcomes.</p> -<p><strong>Inspire STEM-Related Civic Engagement:</strong> Schools across the country should experiment with integrating social studies and STEM concepts. For example, in 2021, U.S. history teachers at South Doyle High School in Knoxville, Tennessee, developed a cross-disciplinary project to explore the city’s lack of sidewalks. This project allowed students to learn about post–World War II history, 1950s building codes, urban planning, civil engineering, and even the health impacts of inadequate walking infrastructure, such as its effects on heart health and obesity rates. Although this is just one example, it demonstrates how some schools are working to bridge the gap between civics and the hard sciences.</p> +<p>Type-2 actors do not consider the costs of general nuclear war to exceed any benefits derived from the adversary’s total destruction, whether by nuclear or conventional means. A Type-2 actor can therefore prefer one or more nuclear-use outcomes to one or more nonuse outcomes. One possibility in the scenario, for example, is that one or both of the adversaries assesses that the expected value of general nuclear war is equal to or greater than the expected value of a defeat that requires conceding their political objectives and surrendering (Table 2).</p> -<p><strong>Integrate Cybersecurity and AI as Use Cases:</strong> AI presents an unparalleled opportunity to engage students and the public in discussions about ethics and civic responsibility. Integrating AI as a focal point in civics education, from K–12 to higher education, can enhance students’ understanding of both historical context and the role technology plays in democracy. Policymakers, educators, and communities must work together to ensure AI is not only a subject of study but also a means to teach critical civics concepts.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ev8PYwk.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ Table 2: Example Rank Ordering of Rational Type-2 Adversary Preferences over Conflict Outcomes</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="national-security-agency-and-department-of-homeland-security-centers-of-academic-excellence-in-cybersecurity-designations"><code class="highlighter-rouge">National Security Agency and Department of Homeland Security Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity Designations</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>If either adversary is a Type-2 actor, and it concludes that the United States has maximalist war aims and estimates the probability of conventional loss to be high, then this preference ordering makes the Type-2 adversary more likely than a Type-1 adversary to initiate nuclear war, and very unlikely to exercise restraint in waging it. Other preference orderings are possible, though for all rank order profiles the key differentiator between adversary type is the relative value placed on nuclear-nonuse outcomes compared to nuclear-use outcomes.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">One way to incentivize higher education to bring civics concepts into more technical areas might be to leverage the National Security Agency (NSA) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity (CAE-C) designations. These official designations, awarded by the NSA and DHS, recognize academic institutions that demonstrate excellence in cybersecurity education and research. Because the cybersecurity standards required to achieve this designation are high, earning it can “enhance [an] institution’s reputation, attract top-tier students and faculty, and open doors to federal funding and partnerships.”</code></em></p> +<p>This strategy makes assumptions about the United States, as outlined above, that define it as a Type-1 actor. This classification might be incorrect. Even if it is correct at conflict initiation, policymaker views might change once war is underway; so long as decisionmaking is driven by humans, the decisions they make will be vulnerable to variations caused by the full range of human biases, frailties, emotions, and impulses. Nonetheless, the United States is assumed here to be a firmly Type-1 actor because this assumption is consistent with the scenario’s emphasis on seeking to deter, rather than to fight, nuclear war. The strategy does not make the same assumption about the adversaries and instead accepts the possibility that each might be either Type-1 or Type-2 — not for lack of hope that they are the former and not the latter, but rather to account for the uncertainty that they are.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There are several designations under the CAE-C umbrella, including Cyber Defense Education (CAE-CDE), Cyber Research (CAE-R), and Cyber Operations (CAE-CO). As a result, incorporating a civics education component into one of these criteria could quickly incentivize academic institutions to invest in and prioritize civics education to attain these prestigious designations. Since civics would suddenly become a government-recognized standard with direct workforce applications — such as clear communication and effective compromise — the field could attain new prestige. This, in turn, could attract more students and adults to civics, fostering a culture of lifelong learning and civic engagement.</code></em></p> +<p>The assumed expected value calculations and resultant rank order establish preventing general nuclear war as the primary U.S. strategic objective. The secondary U.S. strategic objective is for there to be no additional nuclear detonation, of any type or yield, anywhere. This secondary objective is responsive to the horrific effects that all nuclear detonations have on humans, other animal species, and their habitats, and to the risk that additional nuclear launches might escalate to general nuclear war.</p> -<p><strong>Incentivize Civics in STEM through Testing and Hiring:</strong> It’s often said that if you don’t test for it, it won’t be taught. Standardized tests could integrate some basic civics concepts, such as civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law, into questions related to STEM subjects. Additionally, as noted above, schools — particularly in higher education — tend to prioritize education that aligns with hiring demands. If businesses recognized the importance of a civically literate workforce and included this in their hiring decisions, it could significantly influence schools’ decisions on what to teach.</p> +<p>In the scenario, the United States has joined wars in two theaters after adversarial attacks on allies and partners. U.S. political objectives and war aims in both regions are twofold: to demonstrate intolerance for wars of choice and to retain the sovereignty and autonomy of U.S. allies and partners. Because policymakers cannot eliminate the possibility that the adversaries are Type-2 actors, and because the primary U.S. strategic objective is to achieve a nonuse outcome, U.S. warfighting strategy must start from the premise that for all belligerents there is a set of possible, acceptable political outcomes short of maximalism that they can accept. Seeking such an outcome requires implementing a U.S. warfighting strategy that uses diplomatic, economic, and military measures to communicate that the United States does not seek regime change or societal collapse. The strategy must also demonstrate nuclear restraint by not engaging in tit-for-tat nuclear actions, including posture, alert, or deployment changes.</p> -<p><strong>Address Equity and Inclusion in STEM and Civics Education:</strong> It is vital to create pathways for underrepresented groups to engage in both STEM and policymaking roles. Addressing barriers to entry and retention for first-generation and minority students is crucial for building a diverse and inclusive workforce. Programs should encourage these students to see themselves as active participants in both technological innovation and democratic governance, promoting civic responsibility alongside technical skills.</p> +<h4 id="assuring-allies-3">Assuring Allies</h4> -<p><strong>Reframe Civics Education as a Shared Responsibility:</strong> Civics education should be viewed as a collective responsibility involving educators, policymakers, businesses, and the public. Federal, state, and local governments must collaborate to scale ongoing efforts in civics education, while private-sector support can help bridge the resource gap. Additionally, integrating civics education as a criterion for attaining Centers of Excellence designations can incentivize higher education institutions to prioritize this critical area.</p> +<p>U.S. political objectives need to be supported, and its warfighting operations aided, by local allies in both regions in the scenario. Alliance discipline in communicating limited war aims is essential; inconsistent and mixed messages will undermine the ability of the United States to credibly signal both nuclear restraint and its desire to reach a mutually acceptable, negotiated settlement.</p> -<p><strong>Use a Systems-Based Approach to Civics and STEM Integration:</strong> A holistic, systems-based approach is necessary to successfully integrate civics into STEM education. Collaboration across federal, state, and local governments; educational institutions; and tech companies is crucial for creating sustainable change. By aligning resources and goals across sectors, we can build an educational ecosystem that fosters technical expertise and civic engagement, ensuring that democracy and innovation go hand in hand.</p> +<p>As adversary confusion and the likelihood of misperception of U.S. intent increase, so does the likelihood of adversary nuclear use regionally and, ultimately, the likelihood of escalation to general nuclear war. The United States cannot impose signaling consistency upon its allies and partners, but they should regularly be reminded that mixed messages increase the risks of adversary nuclear use and escalation.</p> -<p>To maximize the impact of the integration of civics in STEM education, existing initiatives must be scaled and interconnected. Numerous programs across education, government, and the private sector are working across STEM, ethics, and civic responsibility. However, these efforts often operate in silos, at times also using differing terminology, which further hinders efforts to identify and connect them. By creating stronger connections between these initiatives — whether through partnerships, shared resources, or collaborative platforms — we can amplify their reach and effectiveness.</p> +<p>In the scenario, U.S. allies across and within the two theaters differ in their reasons for entering into conflict, in the type and extent of the material contributions they make, and in their respective war’s immediate effects on their interests. Some allies might be dissatisfied with non-maximalist U.S. political objectives and wish to press for the adversaries to surrender on allied terms. The United States should attempt to address this objection by reinforcing that the purpose of limiting possible actions (e.g., nuclear use or nonuse) is to protect the alliances’ shared interest in averting the least favorable conflict outcomes: concession to the adversaries’ maximalist demands, or an uncontrolled escalatory spiral that begins with nuclear detonations, perhaps on allied territories, and that ultimately leads to general nuclear war.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To maximize the impact of the integration of civics in STEM education, existing initiatives must be scaled and interconnected.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Allies might also take the view that the unwillingness of the United States to make nuclear threats or to use nuclear weapons on their behalf undermines long-standing U.S. policies of extended deterrence, and therefore increases their risk of being a victim of a nuclear strike. This misperceives key features of the post-detonation environment. In the first instance, the United States’ nonuse strategic objectives render as equivalent the security interests of U.S. allies and of the United States itself — nonuse is definitionally an “extended” objective. In the second, an environment in which an adversary has used conventional and nuclear weapons to attack a U.S. ally is one in which U.S. extended nuclear deterrence — adversary inaction produced by the threat of nuclear consequence — has failed.</p> -<p>Similarly, employers should ensure that as they implement initiatives to engage their workforces in ways that build their civic knowledge, skills, and engagement, they include aspects designed specifically to reach employees who are more STEM oriented. This should include finding ways for their employees to use their technical skills in civic engagement activities to strengthen their communities. Leaders should also clearly communicate why civics is important and encourage other tech sector leaders to do the same.</p> +<p>The possible reasons for detonating a U.S. nuclear weapon thereafter are three: to punish the adversary; as an element of a strategy to try to reassure allies by demonstrating that the United States will use nuclear weapons on their behalf; or as one element of a strategy aimed at deterring adversaries from additional nuclear use. Policymakers cannot be confident that the likelihood of producing these effects is greater than the likelihood of producing an escalatory spiral ending in general nuclear war. Because the primary U.S. objective of this strategy is to prevent general nuclear war, this risk of escalation means that the United States cannot use a nuclear weapon to punish the adversary, to try to assure allies, or to try to establish U.S. credibility and, on that basis, implement a new strategy of deterrence. This does not mean that the United States is not committed to its allies and their vital national security interests during the war. It does mean, however, that the United States’ obligation to defend them is addressed by the ongoing conventional fight and the strategic U.S. objectives of preventing additional nuclear detonation and general nuclear war.</p> -<p>A coordinated, system-wide approach that aligns stakeholders at the local, state, and federal levels will allow for the replication of successful models, accelerating progress toward a more civically engaged, technically proficient workforce better prepared to address the challenges and opportunities of rapid innovation in a democracy.</p> +<h4 id="military-response-options-3">Military Response Options</h4> -<hr /> +<p>Achieving a nuclear nonuse outcome is commonly discussed under the rubric of intra-war deterrence. In this scenario, deterrence is applicable because military defeat of the adversaries is not possible. No matter how powerful and effective U.S. diplomatic, political, economic, and military measures are, they cannot render the adversary (or adversaries) incapable of continuing to fight: their nuclear arsenals will remain available for use even under conditions of international isolation, economic collapse, and conventional military defeat.</p> -<p><strong>Suzanne Spaulding</strong> is senior adviser for homeland security and director of the Defending Democratic Institutions project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She also serves as a member of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.</p> +<p>Strategies of deterrence seek to alter adversary perceptions of the likelihood and magnitude of the benefits of an action in relation to the likelihood and magnitude of its costs. This assumes the actor is sensitive to costs, and that it has principles, people, objects, or assets that it values and prefers not to lose.</p> -<p><strong>Paula Reynal</strong> is a program manager and research associate for the Defending Democratic Institutions Project at CSIS, where she supports the project’s research agenda and coordinates events.</p> +<p>The logic of deterrence, however, does not capture the full set of possible motivations for an adversary’s nonuse of nuclear weapons. An actor might choose to exercise nuclear restraint for one or some combination of at least seven reasons (Table 3).</p> -<p><strong>Aosheng Pusztaszeri</strong> is a research assistant for the International Security Program at CSIS, where he supports research on the intersection of emerging technologies, national security, and intelligence.</p>Suzanne Spaulding and Paula ReynalAs technology continues to shape society, it’s essential for tech leaders to recognize their role in strengthening democracy. This report highlights the urgent need to integrate civic knowledge and responsibility into STEM education and careers.Ukraine’s Military AI Ecosystem2024-11-12T12:00:00+08:002024-11-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem<p><em>This report examines the Ukrainian government initiatives and key institutions driving the development of military AI capabilities. It also explores the preconditions that have shaped their adoption in the Ukraine war.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/M7FHeKM.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ Table 3: Possible Reasons for Adversary Nuclear Nonuse and its Applicability in the Near-Term, Two-Theater, Intra-War Nuclear Use Scenario</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Moral or ethical compunction and fear of technical failure can be considered if not impossible then at least highly unlikely to inhibit an actor from nuclear use in any conflict scenario in which that actor has already successfully detonated at least one nuclear weapon. In the scenario, it also is reasonable to assume that none of the belligerents is likely to assess that any one of them has the capability to mount a meaningfully protective defense against a concerted nuclear campaign. The United States therefore can seek to deter additional nuclear use through the threat of cost imposition — a strategy of conventional or nuclear deterrence — or it can seek to convince the adversaries to pursue a mutually acceptable, negotiated, political settlement.</p> -<p>This report is the first part of a series on military artificial intelligence (AI) development and its application in the war in Ukraine. It will focus on two critical aspects of AI adoption in Ukraine’s military:</p> +<p>In the scenario, U.S. adversaries first used conventional war to achieve political aims despite the threat of substantial resistance, continued to fight despite a decreasing likelihood of prevailing, then escalated horizontally by attacking a U.S. defense treaty ally, and finally escalated again vertically through the detonation of a nuclear weapon. The scenario does not contain sufficient information to make any analytically sound inferences about how or why the initial U.S. warfighting strategy failed to deter the adversaries from nuclear use. This strategy therefore interprets these behaviors as indicating that the scenario adversaries are highly cost tolerant, a characteristic that decreases the likelihood that strategies of deterrence through threats of cost-imposition will be effective.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>The conditions and factors that contributed to military AI development from the beginning of the war with Russia in 2014</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The key government institutions and initiatives responsible for driving AI adoption, along with a summary of their major AI-related initiatives</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>The strategy assumes that in both theaters the initial U.S. conventional warfighting strategy was to impose conventional costs meaningful enough and substantial enough either to eliminate the adversary’s ability to continue to fight conventionally or to convince it to sue for peace — that is, to deter it from carrying on fighting. The scenario describes the war as ongoing, meaning that the United States has been unable to destroy the adversary’s conventional capabilities or to threaten the type and severity of costs that would convince it to abandon its war aims. Given that both adversaries detonated a nuclear weapon during the war, moreover, the conventional costs the United States imposed, and those it threatened, also were demonstrably not effective at deterring intra-war nuclear use.</p> -<p>The summary section below presents key findings and insights on both of these aspects.</p> +<p>It is possible that the United States would eventually identify and be able to threaten conventional costs that could hurt the adversary sufficiently in a way it didn’t anticipate and thereby deter further nuclear use or persuade it to concede. Pursuing such a strategy of deterrence, however, is high in uncertainty and, therefore, also in risk. It is not possible to know prior to making the threat or imposing the consequence that it will have the desired effect. Each such attempt has some probability of resulting in escalation to further adversary nuclear use, and there is no way to know if that probability is high or low. Even if the quality of intelligence assessments and other information about the disposition and preference of the adversaries is quite high, such information cannot eliminate uncertainty about the adversary’s likely course of action.</p> -<h4 id="1-ai-is-in-experimental-deployment-and-is-overwhelmingly-geared-toward-supportive-functions">1. AI is in experimental deployment and is overwhelmingly geared toward supportive functions.</h4> +<p>The effects produced by the threat of nuclear cost imposition in a strategy of intra-war deterrence are similarly uncertain. This approach risks cultivating the adversaries’ belief that they might be able to achieve their strategic or political objectives by engaging in nuclear brinkmanship and escalation.</p> -<p>Although AI is frequently discussed in the context of the war in Ukraine, its full deployment on the battlefield remains limited. Numerous AI-driven capabilities and technologies are being tested along the frontlines, in long-range strikes within Russian territory, and across multidomain operations, but these efforts are largely experimental rather than indicative of AI systematically replacing human functions in warfare. AI currently assumes a predominantly supportive and informational role, and even when AI capabilities advance and improve, they are not yet implemented in fully autonomous modes on the battlefield.</p> +<p>The risk of encouraging rather than deterring adversary nuclear use applies equally to threats to and attacks on the adversaries’ nuclear infrastructure, via conventional kinetic or cyber weapons, including on units or sites from which a tactical nuclear strike has been launched. Such an action would not only run the risk of initiating an escalatory spiral, but the possible colocation of tactical with strategic nuclear weapons also means that strikes meant as limited retaliations might be misconstrued as strategic first strikes intended to deplete the adversary’s second-strike capability. In this scenario such a perception would therefore be expected to increase the likelihood that an adversary would launch a nuclear weapon, and perhaps execute a massive attack, possibly against nuclear assets or civilian targets in the U.S. homeland.</p> -<h4 id="2-there-is-growing-government-involvement-in-ai-development-in-ukraine-through-organizational-regulative-and-technological-initiatives-led-by-various-government-stakeholders">2. There is growing government involvement in AI development in Ukraine through organizational, regulative, and technological initiatives led by various government stakeholders.</h4> +<p>U.S. warfighting aims in each region therefore will be limited and focal. In both regions, U.S. warfighting strategy should use conventional forces to try to prevent either adversary from advancing the current lines of contact as described in the scenario, but not to advance the line of contact itself. All kinetic and cyber actions should target only adversary military units and assets. Attacks on the adversaries’ homelands should include only those military units and assets that have been directly engaged in conventional kinetic or confirmed cyber-warfighting activity, and all U.S. military actions should adhere to international humanitarian law. To the extent possible, the United States and allied forces should execute operational concepts that minimize the military utility of adversary tactical nuclear weapons.</p> -<p>Initially, the development of AI-driven technologies in Ukraine was spearheaded by the private sector and volunteer initiatives. However, government institutions and agencies have recently begun to build their own capacities for advancing new technologies. This shift is evident in the creation of new organizational divisions and units within government institutions and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which are specifically dedicated to AI-focused technologies and their deployment. These efforts mark a significant step toward the institutionalization of AI innovation within the public sector.</p> +<p>If an adversary does detonate another nuclear weapon anywhere, then the U.S. intra-war deterrence strategy has failed, and the president will have to assess current conditions and decide whether to continue to fight conventionally or to concede. The United States should not respond with its own use of a nuclear weapon in theater or elsewhere, given the possibility of escalation to general nuclear war. This is true even if the adversary launches one or more nuclear weapons against nuclear assets, industrial facilities, or civilian centers in the U.S. homeland. If the homeland strike is limited, the adversary still cannot be certain that the United States will not use its nuclear weapons in the future and therefore might still be deterred. The president would therefore, again, have to assess current conditions and decide whether to continue to fight conventionally or to concede. If the homeland strike exceeds the lower bound of general nuclear war (an explosive yield that kills 25 percent of the U.S. population), then the United States, insofar as it exists, destroys much but gains nothing by sending a salvo in return.</p> -<h4 id="3-the-ukrainian-government-is-focusing-on-the-adoption-of-commercial-ai-rather-than-on-developing-new-technology-within-government-institutions">3. The Ukrainian government is focusing on the adoption of commercial AI rather than on developing new technology within government institutions.</h4> +<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options-3">Non-Kinetic Response Options</h4> -<p>Ukrainian authorities, having recognized that the speed and quality of technology development in the private sector far exceed those of the government sector, have prioritized creating infrastructure and procedures for the fast adoption of commercial technology. This approach has resulted in simplifying regulations on the adoption of innovation by the AFU, initiating programs for prototype testing, and providing grant funding to early-stage start-ups, among other initiatives. Moreover, most newly established units within Ukraine’s military, such as the Unmanned Systems Forces, are dedicated to integrating new technologies into military operations rather than participating in combat itself.</p> +<p>This strategy assumes that diplomatic and economic instruments — e.g., severe reprimands, changes in standing and status in international institutions, the imposition of economic sanctions, and other restrictions on adversaries’ abilities to participate in the global economy and to access the international financial system — were imposed as part of the initial U.S. warfighting effort. Given that both adversaries detonated a nuclear weapon during the war, the non-kinetic costs the United States imposed and those it threatened were not effective at deterring intra-war nuclear use. Even if the United States did not immediately implement the full retinue of available measures, the adversaries’ initial nuclear detonations suggest that threatening to impose more such costs is likely to have little persuasive effect.</p> -<h4 id="4-the-absence-of-a-long-term-strategy-for-military-ai-development-poses-significant-challenges-to-the-sustained-and-effective-adoption-of-these-technologies">4. The absence of a long-term strategy for military AI development poses significant challenges to the sustained and effective adoption of these technologies.</h4> +<p>Non-kinetic responses should, nonetheless, continue to be elements of the ongoing U.S. warfighting strategy. They are useful insofar as they hinder the adversaries’ kinetic warfighting capacity, and the United States can use the possibility of relaxing these consequences in efforts to convince the adversaries that a mutually acceptable, negotiated, political settlement is possible.</p> -<p>The lack of a long-term strategy for military AI development represents a critical gap within the government’s approach to emerging technologies. Despite Ukraine’s recognized technological potential, there is no unified vision guiding the use of AI in defense. This strategic void is primarily driven by limited management capacity across government institutions and by the inexperience of political leadership in addressing the complexities of warfare. As a result, the focus has been on immediate, tactical solutions rather than on establishing a cohesive, forward-looking strategy to harness the full potential of AI in military operations.</p> +<h4 id="war-termination-on-favorable-terms">War Termination on Favorable Terms</h4> -<h4 id="5-between-2014-and-2022-two-grassroots-applications--analytics-for-situational-awareness-and-drones-for-intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance-isr--laid-the-groundwork-for-the-post-2022-surge-in-military-ai-following-russias-full-scale-invasion-military-ai-expanded-significantly-across-six-major-applications-with-a-growing-number-of-companies-focusing-on-autonomy">5. Between 2014 and 2022, two grassroots applications — analytics for situational awareness and drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) — laid the groundwork for the post-2022 surge in military AI. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, military AI expanded significantly across six major applications, with a growing number of companies focusing on autonomy.</h4> +<p>This strategy is based upon the rational calculation that, in this scenario, the overriding U.S. strategic objective must be to preserve a future in which humans can live in some form of society that permits more than the base struggle for near-term survival. It therefore confines the definition of war termination on favorable terms to those that govern the present moment, not those that might protect U.S. interests beyond it. There is no way to anticipate what U.S. interests after these wars will be, or what geopolitical structures might further them.</p> -<p>This report categorizes AI applications in Ukraine’s military operations into six major areas, listed below. A more detailed analysis of these applications will be provided in subsequent reports in this series.</p> +<p>The temptation when formulating alternative strategies based on nuclear war scenarios like the one considered here is to recommend courses of action that include U.S. nuclear use on the basis that there is some chance that it will succeed in convincing the adversary to do what the United States wishes — to argue, that is, that it just might work. This is precisely the temptation that policymakers must resist. No attachment to any political ideology, nor any idea of nationhood, can justify knowingly endangering humankind. This must certainly be true for any political ideology or nation that purports to hold sacred the inalienable rights of all human beings. What could be more contrary to this commitment than risking nuclear holocaust for entire societies of people who had no direct authorship in the policies of their governments?</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Autonomy.</strong> The most significant advancements have been in autonomous systems, where Ukraine is making strides in areas such as GPS-denied navigation and swarm operations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Open-source intelligence and fighting disinformation.</strong> AI helps to analyze large volumes of digital content from media and social networks and to identify Russian narratives, propaganda, and information campaigns spreading disinformation.</p> - </li> +<p>The urge to destroy adversary governments in such a situation would no doubt be powerful, but it is intolerable under any circumstance to risk the extinction of the human species in order to do so. Nuclear decisionmaking cannot be driven by pride or vengeance, or by the fear that, if the worst comes and the United States perishes, then so too do the values and principles that produced it. Nuclear decisionmaking must instead be guided by the conviction that liberal thought will reemerge, and by the imperative of preserving a world in which that is possible.</p> + +<h3 id="if-deterrence-fails">If Deterrence Fails</h3> + +<p><strong><em>Analyzing U.S. Options for Responding to Adversary Limited Nuclear Use</em></strong></p> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="gregory-weaver">Gregory Weaver</h4> +</blockquote> + +<p>The decision to focus Project Atom 2024 on the issue of how the United States should respond to limited nuclear deterrence failure in a conflict with a peer nuclear adversary was both wise and timely. Wise because doing so helps address key gaps in U.S. strategy development. Timely because the rise of China as a second peer nuclear adversary, and the increasing strategic alignment of Russia and China, create a heightened risk of collaborative or opportunistic aggression in two theaters that requires the development of a strategy and associated enabling capabilities to address this problem.</p> + +<p>Most nongovernmental analyses of the problem of war with a nuclear-armed adversary focus, understandably, on how to deter the initiation of such a conflict or on deterring nuclear escalation in such a conflict. Successful deterrence avoids the much uglier problem of what to do if deterrence fails.</p> + +<p>Focusing on deterrence alone, however, fails to address the very difficult problem of how the United States and its allies and partners can protect their vital interests while avoiding uncontrolled escalation to large-scale nuclear war when the adversary has already escalated to the limited use of nuclear weapons. Focusing on deterrence alone fails to address the complex task of thinking through the military and non-kinetic response options the United States and its allies and partners might require to achieve their objectives while avoiding uncontrolled escalation. Moreover, by failing to identify the range of response options required, perhaps through multiple instances of limited nuclear weapons employment by both sides, such deterrence-focused analysis also risks failing to identify the capabilities required to provide such options credibly and effectively. Finally, the process of thinking through how to address limited nuclear deterrence failure somewhat counterintuitively provides important insights into how to enhance deterrence of both war and limited nuclear escalation in war that an analytic focus on deterrence alone is unlikely to provide.</p> + +<p>Analysis of how to respond to limited nuclear deterrence failure is inherently scenario dependent for a number of reasons. The stakes of the two sides in a conflict have a significant impact on the war aims of the combatants and on their willingness to escalate and counter-escalate in pursuit of those aims. The political circumstances, particularly regarding issues of alliance cohesion and the internal politics of the combatants, also shape the options of both sides. The military circumstances are of course a critical factor in shaping the two sides’ strategic and operational objectives and the military means available to pursue them. Analyses must address a range of questions, including: Who is winning or losing, and why and how? Is one side asymmetrically vulnerable to limited nuclear escalation? Could horizontal escalation alter the military situation to one side’s advantage? Does one side have an endurance advantage in an extended conflict?</p> + +<p>Of course, were the United States to find itself engaged either in a conflict with one nuclear peer while seeking to deter opportunistic aggression by the other, or in simultaneous conflicts with both Russia and China, the interaction of these scenario-specific factors would be far more complex to assess and far more challenging to address.</p> + +<p>Project Atom 2024 asked its participants to conduct their analyses in the context of a single 2027 scenario involving two regional conflicts with Russia and China simultaneously. Thus, this paper addresses only that scenario, providing analysis of the four key issue areas identified by the project’s designers:</p> + +<ol> <li> - <p><strong>Situational awareness and command and control.</strong> AI enhances situational awareness with numerous software platforms used by the military to analyze battlefield and intelligence data and to facilitate real-time efficient decisionmaking.</p> + <p>U.S. Strategic Objectives If Strategic Deterrence Fails</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Demining.</strong> AI-powered analytic software and AI-enabled unmanned ground vehicles improve the efficiency and safety of mine clearance.</p> + <p>Assuring Allies after Strategic Deterrence Failure</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Training and simulation.</strong> AI-driven training simulations are helping soldiers adapt to complex battlefield conditions by playing close-to-real combat scenarios with AI adjustments to address warfighters’ skill gaps.</p> + <p>Military Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Damage assessment.</strong> AI is crucial in damage assessment, utilizing satellite data and drone imagery to analyze damage, losses, and devastation and to estimate future recovery efforts.</p> + <p>Non-Kinetic Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure</p> </li> -</ul> - -<h4 id="6-several-factors-have-facilitated-the-rapid-development-of-military-ai-in-ukraine-creating-a-unique-environment-for-defense-innovation">6. Several factors have facilitated the rapid development of military AI in Ukraine, creating a unique environment for defense innovation.</h4> +</ol> -<p>The situation in Ukraine over the last decade, particularly the ongoing conflict with Russia, has affected all aspects of society and necessitated rapid adaptation in defense and related fields. These factors have enabled Ukraine to test and deploy AI-driven solutions in real battlefield conditions, leading to numerous innovations, particularly in the realm of autonomy and autonomous weapon systems.</p> +<p>As the reader will see, this two-conflict scenario presents U.S. strategists with a complex set of issues. However, a more comprehensive analysis of the overarching two nuclear-armed adversary problem would require asking these same questions across a set of plausible scenarios that span the range of key strategic circumstances the United States might face. Examples of other scenarios that should be examined using the Project Atom 2024 methodology include:</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Existential need for advanced technology.</strong> The Russian invasion of 2022 created an urgent, existential need for Ukraine to develop advanced defense technologies rapidly. The high-stakes environment pushed both government and private sectors to prioritize technological advancements, such as AI, to enhance military capabilities. This urgency also catalyzed a willingness to experiment with AI, leading to quicker deployment of AI-driven capabilities in combat.</p> + <p>Conflict with Russia while deterring Chinese opportunistic aggression</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Active civil society and a robust private sector.</strong> Ukraine’s vibrant civil society and entrepreneurial private sector have been instrumental in driving defense innovation. Even before the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian entrepreneurial spirit, combined with a deep sense of national defense responsibility, led many private companies and start-ups to actively contribute to the war effort. These organizations have developed AI-driven solutions ranging from autonomous drones to advanced surveillance systems, with many innovations coming from small teams responding quickly to military demands. The active participation of nongovernmental actors in AI-enabled defense technology development and the fast deployment of commercial technology have significantly accelerated progress in this area.</p> + <p>Conflict with China while deterring Russian opportunistic aggression</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Permissive regulatory frameworks.</strong> Ukraine’s regulatory environment for military AI was absent before the invasion. Unlike in many other countries, where regulatory bottlenecks can slow down innovation, Ukraine’s government refused to regulate military AI, allowing innovators to respond quickly to frontline needs and develop AI applications that could be immediately deployed in combat settings. The Ministry of Digital Transformation (MDT) prioritizes a soft, business-friendly approach, aiming to avoid overregulation. Instead of imposing strict rules, the ministry uses a bottom-up strategy, offering voluntary guidelines and tools to prepare businesses for future regulations. This approach extends to the defense sector, as the MDT has indicated that it does not plan to introduce regulation of AI in the defense sector.</p> + <p>Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is winning conventionally in one theater and losing in the other when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Direct communication between engineers and military personnel.</strong> One of the most significant accelerators of military AI development in Ukraine has been direct communication between engineers and military personnel. Through a well-established network of technical workshops positioned near the frontline or within military units, including mobile drone repair vans, engineers from private companies are able to closely monitor and assess the performance of their systems in real combat scenarios. This proximity enables engineers working on unmanned systems and autonomous capabilities to receive real-time feedback, allowing for the rapid refinement of their technologies.</p> + <p>Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is losing conventionally in both theaters when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Foreign assistance providing access to new technologies.</strong> International support, from both governments and private companies, has been crucial in allowing Ukraine to leap forward in its technological capabilities. This support has facilitated Ukraine’s adoption of new technologies, such as analytical tools from Palantir, communication infrastructure via Starlink, and the migration of critical government data to Microsoft’s cloud services, to name just a few examples. This external assistance has not only equipped Ukraine with essential tools for innovation but has also fostered opportunities for collaborative development between Ukrainian and foreign companies, thereby strengthening Ukraine’s military and technological capabilities.</p> + <p>The full range of scenarios farther into the future when China is a nuclear peer</p> </li> </ul> -<h4 id="7-collaboration-on-ai-between-ukraine-and-the-us-government-can-be-mutually-beneficial">7. Collaboration on AI between Ukraine and the U.S. government can be mutually beneficial.</h4> +<p>There are bound to be additional important insights from analysis of these alternative scenarios that are needed to formulate a comprehensive U.S. strategy for this problem set.</p> -<p>What follows are several key recommendations for the U.S. government to foster closer collaboration in AI development between the United States and Ukraine in a way that will be beneficial to both countries.</p> +<h4 id="the-scenario-in-question">The Scenario in Question</h4> + +<p>Project Atom 2024 posits a 2027 scenario in which the United States and its allies and partners face collaborative aggression by Russia and China in two theaters simultaneously. The scenario postulates that, despite collaborative Russian-Chinese aggression, U.S. and allied conventional forces far outperform Russian and Chinese conventional forces, almost immediately putting Russia and China in very difficult strategic circumstances 8–10 days after conflict initiation in both theaters. The scenario results in a dire strategic situation in which both Russia and China have initiated limited nuclear escalation, seemingly in response to losing the conventional conflicts they initiated.</p> + +<p>As noted earlier, U.S. objectives and potential response options in such a situation would be highly dependent on the specific political-military circumstances of a conflict. In the case of this scenario, however, several key facts regarding the strategic situation are unclear:</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Strategic support.</strong> The United States should leverage its technological leadership to help Ukraine develop a cohesive long-term strategy for integrating AI into defense operations. By providing strategic guidance, the United States can help to align Ukraine’s national priorities in AI development while gaining valuable insights into AI applications in active warfare.</p> + <p>Has the defeat of the Chinese landing force negated China’s ability to invade Taiwan, and for how long?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Closing the feedback loop.</strong> A structured feedback system for evaluating the performance of U.S.-provided drones and military technologies in Ukraine would benefit both nations. U.S. companies could quickly iterate and improve their technologies, while Ukraine would receive more tailored and effective capabilities, enhancing battlefield operations.</p> + <p>How long will it take Polish forces to seize the city of Kaliningrad and the rest of Kaliningrad oblast?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>AI in U.S. foreign aid.</strong> The United States should integrate AI development into its foreign aid programs for Ukraine, providing essential computing infrastructure to support AI innovation. This would strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities and establish the country as a hub for military AI development, benefiting U.S. strategic interests in global AI leadership.</p> + <p>How much have Russian nuclear strikes damaged NATO’s ability to reinforce Poland and the Baltic states, and to seize Kaliningrad?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>AI-focused training and entrepreneurial development.</strong> The United States should establish AI-related programs for Ukrainian defense entrepreneurs and business leaders. These initiatives would foster Ukraine’s defense tech ecosystem and strengthen U.S.-Ukraine collaboration, positioning both countries to lead in AI-driven defense innovation.</p> + <p>How many Russian ground forces are where? Along the Baltic states’ borders? In Kaliningrad? In Belarus?</p> </li> </ul> -<h3 id="understanding-ukraines-ai-ecosystem">Understanding Ukraine’s AI Ecosystem</h3> +<p>Pointing out these uncertainties is not intended as a criticism of the scenario. But the fact that such details regarding the range of strategic circumstances the United States might face have such a significant effect on the analysis of the central problem does raise an issue for future analysis: How much understanding of the potential impacts of limited nuclear use on the course of a theater conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries is required to formulate an effective strategy for the potential range of such contingencies? It is likely that experts are reaching the end of what they can learn about this central question without detailed wargaming and simulation of twenty-first-century theater warfare that includes the limited use of nuclear weapons by one or both sides in the conflict.</p> -<p>This section provides a comprehensive overview of Ukraine’s military AI ecosystem. It begins by providing a background to Ukraine’s commercial AI sector, which for more than a decade has been quite successful — more than is commonly recognized in the West. Next, the paper examines how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 resulted in major changes to the Ukrainian military’s approach to software and data, changes that were critical to the foundation of the military’s post-2022 introduction of AI technologies. Finally, it provides an overview of the key government organizations responsible for driving AI adoption throughout Ukraine’s military as well as a summary of their AI-related initiatives.</p> +<p>Project Atom 2024 is a first step in this direction, as it effectively examines the issues regarding what to do in the wake of limited nuclear deterrence failure by asking the right first-order questions at the unclassified level. But that is not enough. The Department of Defense needs to take up the challenge of a campaign of wargaming and simulation that will provide the necessary analytic basis for informed strategy development and military capability requirements identification.</p> -<h4 id="commercial-ai-in-ukraine-a-decade-of-quiet-success">Commercial AI in Ukraine: A Decade of Quiet Success</h4> +<p>What follows is an analysis of the four key issue areas in the scenario provided.</p> -<p>In the race for leadership in artificial intelligence, Ukraine may appear an unlikely contender. However, this comparatively small nation is demonstrating significant potential, with a highly skilled and technologically adept population. Notably, nearly two-thirds of Ukrainians express optimism regarding AI’s potential to enhance human life, reflecting widespread public confidence in the transformative capabilities of the technology.</p> +<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives-if-strategic-deterrence-fails">U.S. Strategic Objectives If Strategic Deterrence Fails</h4> -<p>Indeed, for more than a decade, Ukraine has quietly served as a developer of innovative AI capabilities that have captured the world’s imagination. While a full list is beyond the scope of this paper, three companies — Looksery, Respeecher, and Augmented Pixels — provide a helpful illustration of how Ukraine’s commercial AI sector has long been more impactful and more capable than is commonly understood outside technology communities.</p> +<p>For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the U.S. stake in both theater conflicts is sufficient for the United States to risk large-scale nuclear war. Whether either adversary perceives this to be true, however, is unclear. Stakes sufficient to take this risk clearly involve vital national security interests. The United States has historically perceived the sovereignty and security of its NATO allies as meeting this test. The purposeful ambiguity regarding whether the United States would intervene to defend Taiwan against Chinese military aggression makes it less certain that Taiwanese security meets this threshold, though the impact of the forcible incorporation of Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China on U.S. economic interests and U.S. alliances in Asia could well rise to a vital national interest.</p> -<p>First, in 2015, Snap Inc. — a Santa Monica-based technology company and the maker of the popular Snapchat social media app — spent $150 million to acquire Looksery, a two-year-old Ukrainian AI tech firm. Looksery’s AI-based facial recognition and augmented reality technology laid the foundation for Snapchat’s Lens portfolio, which today boasts 250 million daily users. In 2022, Snap Inc. stated that the company still employed 300 Ukrainian staff, almost all of whom are engineers.</p> +<p>Before identifying potential U.S. strategic objectives in this scenario, it is useful to consider for a moment why deterrence of limited nuclear use failed in both theaters and whether there was something that the United States could have done to enhance deterrence of such nuclear use. While the scenario does not provide sufficient information to determine the answers to these questions with much confidence, it does at least hint at Russian and Chinese motivations for crossing the nuclear threshold.</p> -<p>Second, Ukrainian AI companies have also been involved in Hollywood, providing AI technology for audio generation. In 2020, Disney sought to include a younger version of Luke Skywalker in the television series The Mandalorian, but faced a challenge in that Star Wars actor Mark Hamill was 68 years old. Disney contracted with the Ukrainian AI company Respeecher to synthesize a younger voice that was sufficiently high-quality to meet Disney’s exacting standards.</p> +<p>In both theaters, the adversaries’ unexpectedly poor conventional military performance puts them in fairly dire strategic circumstances very early in the conflict. In Europe, the combined effect of Russia’s failure to make any significant inroads into the Baltic states while simultaneously failing to stop the NATO offensive into Kaliningrad and eliciting direct NATO military intervention in Ukraine could hardly be worse. In Asia, the destruction of China’s invasion fleet before it can reach Taiwan denies the Chinese leadership their primary objective and is followed by internal unrest in opposition to the war. Limited nuclear escalation in both theaters offers some prospect of terminating the conflicts on terms Russia and China can accept, but the scenario does not describe Russian or Chinese intent. Neither adversary pairs their limited nuclear escalation with clear coercive political-military demands, making the purpose of their escalation unclear.</p> -<p>Third and finally, Qualcomm acquired Augmented Pixels in 2022. Founded in 2010 in Odesa, Augmented Pixels developed AI navigation technologies, such as 3D mapping and localization, for drones and AI glasses. At the time of purchase, Augmented Pixels’ commercial customers included National Geographic, LG Electronics, Intel, and more.</p> +<p>It is tempting to say that the United States failed to clearly and credibly communicate its stake in defending its allies and partners in both theaters. However, it is also possible that the Russian and Chinese leaderships miscalculated not about U.S. will to intervene but rather regarding the ability of Russian and Chinese conventional forces to achieve their objectives even in the face of U.S. intervention if they both attacked at roughly the same time.</p> -<p>The main takeaway from these cases is that Ukraine’s AI sector was a meaningful player in commercial technology markets — taken seriously even by leading Western companies — long before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. A 2024 study conducted on behalf of Ukraine’s MDT found that Ukraine has 243 AI-focused companies and a broader information technology (IT) and software workforce comprising more than 307,000 specialists. Additionally, Ukrainian universities have launched a remarkable 106 specialized AI and machine learning (ML) programs across 42 institutions, resulting in a 122 percent increase in enrollment over five years. The report found that Ukraine produces more IT graduates than any other Central or Eastern European country, with a quarter of these graduates specializing in AI/ML.</p> +<p>There are four U.S. strategic objectives that should be pursued in both theater conflicts.</p> -<p>Despite Ukraine’s aforementioned strengths, its AI sector continues to encounter substantial challenges. According to the 2023 Government AI Readiness Index by Oxford Insights, Ukraine was ranked 60th out of 193 countries in AI integration into public service. The country’s AI development is hindered by several factors, including insufficient computing infrastructure and a shortage of skilled human capital due to the relocation of IT engineers fleeing the war (although some have continued working remotely for their Ukrainian employers). Additionally, Ukraine’s low government research and development investment further constrains the sector’s growth.</p> +<p>The first is to restore or maintain the territorial status quo ante. This means that no NATO or Taiwanese territory remains under Russian or Chinese control (respectively) at the end of the conflict. This constitutes a fundamental denial of Russia and Chinese strategic objectives.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nzE7KG9.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Comparison of Ukraine and United States in Government AI Readiness Index 2023.</strong> Source: <a href="https://oxfordinsights.com/ai-readiness/ai-readiness-index/">“Government AI Readiness Index 2023,” Oxford Insights</a>.</em></p> +<p>The second U.S. strategic objective should be to restore deterrence of further nuclear use by Russia or China. Doing so would enable the United States and its allies and partners to continue to pursue the first strategic objective at lower risk and with a lower level of violence.</p> -<p>Surprisingly, the Oxford Insights report found that Ukraine matches the United States — the index’s top-ranked country — in one crucial aspect: vision. However, vision alone is not enough to boost AI development and deployment. Ukraine’s position in the index underscores a critical gap between the ambitious plans of its tech sector and the resources needed to execute them.</p> +<p>The third U.S. strategic objective in both conflicts should be to avoid uncontrolled nuclear escalation. This means deterring large-scale nuclear escalation by Russia and China even if restoring deterrence of further limited nuclear use is unachievable.</p> -<h3 id="military-ai-in-ukraine-since-2014-necessary-growth">Military AI in Ukraine since 2014: Necessary Growth</h3> +<p>The fourth U.S. strategic objective should be to demonstrate that the adversaries’ limited nuclear escalation did not result in any meaningful political-military gains. Achieving this objective in one theater could enhance the achievement of the U.S. objectives mentioned above in the second theater. It would also arguably enhance deterrence of future aggression and escalation.</p> -<h4 id="pre-2022-laying-a-digital-foundation">Pre-2022: Laying a Digital Foundation</h4> +<p>The scenario’s description of the Ukraine conflict complicates the establishment of further clear U.S. strategic objectives consistent with the four above objectives. The scenario posits that some eastern NATO allies have begun deploying forces into Ukraine, and NATO airpower is now flying support missions for Ukrainian forces on the offensive in preparation for the liberation of Crimea “within weeks.”</p> -<p>Though the 2022 full-scale invasion shocked the world, for Ukrainians, it was not the start of the war with Russia. Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territories in 2014 was a major wake up call for Ukrainian society — including Ukraine’s tech sector, which became increasingly willing to directly support Ukrainian armed forces.</p> +<p>It is not clear, however, what U.S. territorial objectives should be in the Ukraine conflict post Russian nuclear use. Combined NATO-Ukraine forces pressing to drive Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory might make restoring deterrence of Russian nuclear use significantly more difficult and could increase the risk of uncontrolled escalation. A less risky, but still ambitious, option would be to demand Russian withdrawal from all Ukrainian territory that Russia has seized since the February 2022 invasion in exchange for NATO withdrawal from the portions of Kaliningrad it now occupies. However, this would leave Russia in control of Crimea.</p> -<p>The 2022 full-scale invasion, however, did mark a watershed moment in Ukraine’s approach to military artificial intelligence. Prior to 2022, Kyiv had not prioritized AI in its defense strategy, despite the ongoing war in the Donbas region. However, groundwork laid by volunteer groups since 2014 — focused not on AI but on software for data collection, analysis, and warfighting operational support — has proved instrumental in facilitating rapid military AI development and adoption since 2022.</p> +<p>Regardless of which U.S. objective is chosen regarding Ukraine, U.S. objectives should clearly include termination of all fighting between NATO/Ukraine and Russia, consistent with the achievement of the other U.S. strategic objectives identified above.</p> -<p>This subsection will examine two key military use cases from the 2014–2022 period that enabled AI integration after the full-scale invasion: situational awareness systems and drones. After 2014, volunteers from Ukraine’s tech sector developed systems using modern data and software techniques (though not ML/AI). Over time, these systems dramatically improved Ukraine’s intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities and even overtook competing official systems in adoption and impact.</p> +<p>What is the relative priority of this set of potential U.S. strategic objectives in this strategic context?</p> -<p><em>Situational Awareness</em></p> +<p>Restoring the territorial status quo ante (with a possible modification regarding Ukraine) while avoiding uncontrolled escalation are undoubtedly the two most important objectives. Achieving these two objectives in both theaters would amount to “victory.” Immediately restoring deterrence of nuclear use is not necessary to “win” the conflicts, but doing so would reduce both the cost and the risk of doing so. Achieving the two most important objectives would also arguably result in achieving the fourth objective of denying U.S. adversaries any significant political-military gain through their nuclear escalation, thereby enhancing future deterrence of war and escalation in war.</p> -<p>Between 2014 and 2022, Ukraine’s tech-savvy and patriotic workforce developed and introduced 11 new situational awareness and battlefield management systems to the Ukrainian military. Because they were unofficial and unsanctioned, one might think that these volunteer initiatives would be divorced from real military requirements. In practice, however, the volunteer groups had direct communication with front line operational forces, allowing them to focus their development efforts on high-priority military needs. One of the initiatives, the situational awareness system Delta, was eventually adopted and formally integrated into the Ukrainian military. The remarkable fact is that some unofficial volunteer systems and software have achieved near-universal adoption by the relevant Ukrainian forces, vastly exceeding the adoption rate of some official military technology initiatives that sought (and usually failed) to provide similar capabilities.</p> +<p>In the scenario, there is no clear indication of whether success in one theater is more important to the United States than in the other theater. However, one thing is clear: U.S. and allied successes in achieving their objectives in one theater would be likely to affect the decision calculus of the adversary in the other theater regarding further nuclear escalation.</p> -<p>The diverse capabilities of these systems — generally originating from explicit military requests — ranged from fire control, artillery optimization, and air traffic management to combat command and control. These systems not only significantly enhanced Ukraine’s operational effectiveness but also helped transition the Ukrainian military to a modern data- and software-enabled fighting force.</p> +<h4 id="assuring-allies-after-strategic-deterrence-failure">Assuring Allies after Strategic Deterrence Failure</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">[Early situational awareness and command and control systems] not only significantly enhanced Ukraine’s operational effectiveness but also helped transition the Ukrainian military to a modern data- and software-enabled fighting force.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The second key issue noted by the Project Atom 2024 designers involves how the United States can assure its allies and partners in the wake of a failure to deter limited nuclear escalation by an adversary. This is indeed an important question, as one potential adversary motivation to escalate is to shatter U.S.-led alliance cohesion. Maintaining such cohesion is critically important to the achievement of the highest priority U.S. strategic objectives in both theaters. Thus, effectively assuring U.S. allies after strategic deterrence failure is in effect an enabler of the primary war aims of the United States should a nuclear-armed adversary choose to escalate.</p> -<p>One of the most noteworthy volunteer groups is Aerorozvidka, whose situational awareness system Delta has become a linchpin in Ukraine’s multidomain operations. Started in 2016 and transferred to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (MoD) in 2023, Delta seamlessly integrates NATO ISTAR standards to provide essential situational awareness across all branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Building on this foundation, Aerorozvidka has spearheaded the creation of situational awareness centers in eight cities, each focused on gathering information from its respective section of the front. These centers serve as technological hubs, uniting and coordinating intelligence from a wide variety of sources — drones, satellites, stationary cameras, sensors, field scouts, and data from allies. The system even digitizes information from loyal informants in temporarily occupied territories, who interface with government apps and chatbots. Bringing all these different data sources together in a unified software platform is a challenge even for the United States military, but Delta achieves this and enjoys high user satisfaction among Ukrainian forces. As will be discussed further in this paper, Delta has recently been enhanced with AI/ML-enabled capabilities. At one point, there was an officially sanctioned military system — Dzvin — in development that promised similar capabilities as the volunteer-built Delta. However, this fell victim to bureaucratic hurdles and corruption and never achieved meaningful adoption despite its official introduction into the AFU in 2022. A diverse range of military officials told CSIS that Delta now is the de facto standard and Dzvin is functionally irrelevant. Delta is also of keen interest to NATO, which has described the system as “ground-breaking” following its victory in a 2017 NATO hackathon and prominent testing in NATO military exercises, most recently in 2024.</p> +<p>Assuring allies in the immediate aftermath of adversary nuclear use, particularly if they have been the target of such use, is more complex than assurance while deterring first use. Allies might be concerned the United States will not respond forcefully enough to either restore deterrence and/or continue to defend their vital interests for fear that the conflict might escalate out of control and put the U.S. homeland at risk. Conversely, allies might fear that the U.S. response to adversary nuclear escalation will elicit further adversary nuclear escalation in the theater, putting the allies at increased risk.</p> -<p>The Kropyva artillery software system improves target accuracy and routinely reduces the time between receiving orders and striking targets by up to tenfold. Ukrainian artillerymen access Kropyva through a tablet or mobile phone, then enter enemy coordinates, which are automatically translated to the nearest available artillery battery along with precalculated aiming trajectories. The Army SOS volunteer organization developed Kropyva in 2014, and 90 to 95 percent of Ukrainian artillery units have adopted it as their primary artillery fire control system. Another military system helping to coordinate artillery strikes, GisArta, attracted widespread attention in the Western press as “Uber for artillery,” even though Kropyva is more widely used and impactful according to Ukrainian military officials in conversation with CSIS.</p> +<p>Despite these legitimate concerns, allies and partners in both theaters have no credible alternatives to U.S. nuclear extended deterrence commitments. In NATO, the only non-U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities are French and British. Other NATO allies are unlikely to see those forces as credible alternatives to U.S. nuclear forces in the wake of limited nuclear deterrence failure given the vast superiority of Russian nuclear forces over those of the United Kingdom and France combined. In Asia, there are no existing alternatives to U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities whatsoever.</p> -<p>Kropyva and Delta are just two of dozens of examples demonstrating how systems initially developed by tech industry volunteers changed Ukraine’s armed forces after 2014. Many of these systems began with the modest goal of supporting warfighter decisionmaking and have since evolved into advanced situational awareness and battle management systems routinely used by hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Prior to 2022, the adoption of these modern software and data-driven platforms also laid the groundwork for AI/ML integration. As critical information sources were networked and digitized, the data they generated became the raw material for training AI models and enabling AI-driven capabilities.</p> +<p>If U.S. responses to initial Russian or Chinese escalation make clear that the United States is willing to engage in a competition in dire risk-taking, and that Russia and China must also fear potential uncontrolled escalation, allies are likely to be reassured in the near term. The greatest fear of allies who rely on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is that in extremis the United States will be unwilling to risk strikes on the United States homeland to defend them. A decisive early demonstration that this fear is unfounded would bolster allies’ confidence and potentially convince U.S. adversaries that they had miscalculated about the U.S. stake in the conflict, as well as about U.S. political will to defend that stake resolutely.</p> -<p>The success of volunteer-led grassroots projects underscores a crucial point: in the face of existential threats, innovation in Ukraine has primarily thrived outside traditional channels. However, this decentralized approach is not without its challenges. Many of these teams still operate on shoestring budgets, relying heavily on donations. The lack of systemic support and funding raises concerns about the long-term sustainability and interoperability of this diversity of systems. Ukraine still possesses a hard-won technological edge, but the government needs to ensure that these successful initiatives are put on a more secure long-term foundation and incorporated into official plans and strategies. Unfortunately, multiple executives in Ukraine’s defense technology ecosystem told CSIS that the scale of Ukraine’s technological edge is shrinking as Russian forces improve their own technology and their pace of innovation adoption. Whereas previously Russian forces would take a month or more to adapt to new Ukrainian innovations before adopting countermeasures in the form of new tactics or technologies, now Russian forces may need as little as two or three days.</p> +<p>However, if the U.S. responses result in further Russian or Chinese nuclear use against U.S. allies and partners, allied confidence will likely go down. Once deterrence has failed — as evidenced by limited adversary nuclear use against U.S. allies or partners — allies will want to be reassured about our ability to defend them against such attacks, not just deter them.</p> -<p><em>Drones</em></p> +<p>Decisions about how to respond to limited nuclear deterrence failure will be about how best to achieve U.S. (and allied) political-military objectives while avoiding uncontrolled escalation. If the United States succeeds in achieving its objectives while avoiding uncontrolled escalation, allies are likely to be assured. And those U.S. response decisions may need to be made too quickly to allow for extensive consultation if they are to be effective. For example, if an adversary escalates to limited nuclear use in an effort to coerce war termination on terms it can accept because it is decisively losing the conventional war, how long can we expect them to wait to see if their coercive use has had the desired effect before they decide to escalate further?</p> -<p>Prior to 2022, drones were in use by both sides, mostly for remotely piloted ISR missions and without AI/ML capabilities. Drones have become a ubiquitous feature of the post-2022 war with Russia, widely recognized as a transformational capability for both sides. However, the impact of drones during the 2014–2022 period was considerably more limited.</p> +<h4 id="military-response-options-after-strategic-deterrence-failure">Military Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure</h4> -<p>The war in Donbas served as an early testing ground for commercial drones, with both sides exploring their potential. While Russian forces made early strides in drone warfare, the Ukrainian side’s attempts to leverage commercial drones were met with mixed results. The lack of trained operators, coupled with the high attrition rate of these relatively expensive items for Ukrainian soldiers who usually had to buy them at their own expense, initially dampened enthusiasm for their widespread adoption. Volunteer organizations, which have played a crucial role in supporting Ukraine’s military efforts, did not — prior to 2022 — prioritize drone acquisition. Similarly, official military decisionmakers were slow to recognize the potential of these systems, focusing instead on more traditional assets.</p> +<p>The third key issue raised by the Project Atom 2024 designers involves the range of potential U.S. military responses to adversary limited nuclear escalation. The relevant range of such military options will be a direct function of the political-military objectives they are designed to achieve or support.</p> -<p>In cases where Ukrainian forces did use drones, the priority use case was ISR. China was a major supplier of commercial drones to Ukraine, primarily for civilian purposes such as agriculture and event photography, often referred to as “wedding” drones. However, these also saw usage in combat, even prior to 2022, again mostly for ISR. Hence, Ukrainian defense companies focused their military drone development efforts primarily on medium and long-range reconnaissance and artillery fire correction. Notable examples include the PD-2 from UkrSpecSystems, the Furia from Athlone Avia, the R18 from Aerorozvidka, and the ACS-3M from Skyeton. Companies like DeVIRo also contributed with their Leleka-100, further expanding Ukraine’s domestic drone capabilities, while the Punisher, a strike drone produced by UA Dynamics, represents Ukraine’s foray into offensive drone technology.</p> +<p>A recap of the U.S. strategic objectives identified above allows one to identify sub-objectives and military options to achieve them:</p> -<p>Despite the early use of drones in the war in Donbas, neither Ukrainian nor Russian drones were equipped with ISR AI/ML capabilities. However, increased familiarity with drones would set the stage for later AI adoption.</p> +<p><em>RESTORE OR MAINTAIN THE TERRITORIAL STATUS QUO ANTE</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite the early use of drones in the war in Donbas, neither Ukrainian nor Russian drones were equipped with ISR AI/ML capabilities.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objective:</strong> Restore U.S. or allied conventional superiority following limited adversary nuclear strikes on key U.S. or allied conventional forces.</p> -<h4 id="post-invasion-ai-surge-wide-ranging-military-ai-applications">Post-Invasion AI Surge: Wide-Ranging Military AI Applications</h4> +<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Depends on the exact nature of the military impact of adversary nuclear use and the adversary’s own vulnerability to U.S. response options. Analysis is required to understand the range of potential targets this objective and sub-objective might dictate and to determine whether currently planned military capabilities enable effective strikes on such targets on operationally relevant timelines.</p> -<p>Despite Ukraine having been at war with Russia for nearly a decade, its 2022 full-scale invasion was a shock to the Ukrainian military system. The survival of Ukraine as an independent state was at stake, and leaders across civilian, military, and commercial structures reacted accordingly. Society as a whole mobilized to support the armed forces, and in many cases, everyday citizens volunteered to participate in combat and defend Ukraine.</p> +<p><em>RESTORE DETERRENCE OF FURTHER NUCLEAR USE BY RUSSIA AND CHINA</em></p> -<p>The commercial technology sector of Ukraine was also swept up in this wave. What had been a volunteering side project for many became the dominant focus of their professional life. In numerous cases, these efforts were centered on maintaining and enhancing existing digital platforms like Delta and Kropyva. However, a new suite of volunteer-built capabilities focusing on the opportunities of AI technology also emerged.</p> +<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objective:</strong> Convince adversary that their nuclear escalation was a dire miscalculation regarding how the United States would respond and that further adversary escalation will fail to achieve their objectives while increasing the risk of uncontrolled escalation.</p> -<p>As with the pre-2022 era, there was no centrally guided plan to accelerate the adoption of AI for priority use cases. Rather, experimentation with AI emerged organically, as technically proficient volunteers explored solutions to the diverse security challenges facing all of Ukrainian society — from disinformation to cyberwar to front-line conflict.</p> +<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Must exceed either the level of violence or the strategic impact that the adversary anticipated — likely difficult to know with confidence — in order to shake their confidence in their ability to gauge how the United States might respond to further escalation. There is a potential role here for the calculated revelation of capabilities of which the adversary was previously unaware that have potentially decisive military effects (“You didn’t tell me they could do that. What else don’t I know?”).</p> -<p>While much of the technology development and drive behind Ukrainian AI efforts originated in the private sector and volunteer communities, the Ukrainian government and military responded with significant organizational changes to accelerate and improve the adoption of AI-enabled capabilities.</p> +<p><em>AVOID UNCONTROLLED NUCLEAR ESCALATION</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While much of the technology development and drive behind Ukrainian AI efforts originated in the private sector and volunteer communities, the Ukrainian government and military responded with significant organizational changes to accelerate and improve the adoption of AI-enabled capabilities.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objective:</strong> Convince adversary that U.S. nuclear responses and conventional operations are being conducted in pursuit of limited war aims that do not constitute an immediate threat to state survival and do not constitute the initiation of a large-scale counterforce attack designed to negate their strategic nuclear deterrent.</p> -<h3 id="the-institutional-landscape-for-military-ai-development-in-ukraine">The Institutional Landscape for Military AI Development in Ukraine</h3> +<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Avoid strikes that threaten the adversary’s ability to detect nuclear attacks, command and control their nuclear forces, etc. Pair messaging about the purpose of the U.S. response with promises of U.S. restraint if Russia or China were to cease nuclear use.</p> -<p>The institutional landscape supporting AI development in Ukraine has evolved significantly since 2022, with many government agencies and institutions shifting from initially neglecting AI to actively creating specialized departments and units dedicated to developing AI capabilities. This transformation has been driven largely by the pressing demands of the ongoing war against Russia, where AI technologies have repeatedly demonstrated the potential to provide an advantage on the battlefield.</p> +<p><em>DEMONSTRATE ADVERSARY LIMITED NUCLEAR ESCALATION DID NOT RESULT IN MEANINGFUL POLITICAL-MILITARY GAINS</em></p> -<p>Of special note, Ukraine has gone so far as to create an entirely new branch of its armed forces, the Unmanned Systems Forces. While smaller than the other branches of the Ukrainian military, it is nevertheless technically their peer, and it serves as evidence that Ukrainian leadership views as critical the task of driving organizational reforms to account for new technological realities.</p> +<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objectives:</strong> Send a message to the adversary in the second theater of conflict that limited nuclear escalation is unlikely to have the coercive effects they seek. Send a message to future potential adversaries that there is no nuclear coercive offramp from failed conventional aggression against the United States and its allies.</p> -<p>Other defense and security institutions have also created new organizations and empowered them to accelerate technology innovation, such as Special Unit Typhoon, a new part of the National Guard of Ukraine. One newly created organization within the MoD, the Center for Innovation and Defense Technologies (CIDT), is a direct outgrowth of the tech volunteer community’s efforts. In 2023, the CIDT took official responsibility for upgrading and developing situational awareness technologies, including the Delta system discussed in a previous section. In 2024, the developers began integrating AI/ML capabilities into Delta with an initial focus on video and text processing for the identification of enemy forces in real time.</p> +<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Almost all the options noted above could serve this purpose if effective in denying the adversary their objectives and in making clear that further nuclear escalation increases the risk of uncontrolled escalation. The nature and extent of U.S. and allied resolve must be messaged appropriately.</p> -<p>In other cases, the war has led organizations to reinvent their mandate. Both the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU, a subordinate body of the MoD) and the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) have taken a leading role in developing and executing long-range precision strikes on Russian infrastructure. In previous years, these organizations would not have been responsible for such missions. AI is a useful enabling technology for long-range precision strikes, and both organizations have developed the relevant competencies to be at the forefront of AI adoption. For example, AI-based computer vision is helpful for accurate navigation in GPS-denied environments, such as the territory on both sides of the Russian border. More broadly, both the DIU and the SSU have adopted AI for processing and analyzing vast volumes of battlefield data.</p> +<p><em>TERMINATION OF FIGHTING BETWEEN NATO/UKRAINE AND RUSSIA, CONSISTENT WITH ACHIEVEMENT OF OTHER U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES</em></p> -<p>Beyond creating new institutions and changing the mandate of existing ones, Ukrainian authorities are also implementing regulatory reforms and launching diverse initiatives to make it easier for companies to develop AI — and for military units to adopt it. The MDT, which is responsible for policymaking in AI development, is fostering an innovation-friendly regulatory environment, avoiding overregulation and promoting AI development through initiatives such as the Army of Drones and the Brave1 platform (further discussed below). These initiatives have accelerated the deployment of unmanned systems — including AI-driven ones — by providing essential financial and organizational support to early-stage projects.</p> +<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objective:</strong> Create facts on the ground that provide negotiating leverage that enables termination of the Ukraine conflict.</p> -<h4 id="profiles-of-organizations-in-ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem">Profiles of Organizations in Ukraine’s Military AI Ecosystem</h4> +<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Seize more or all of Kaliningrad to use as a bargaining chip. Escalate level of NATO military intervention in Ukraine conflict.</p> -<p>The development of AI-enabled warfare is not occurring in isolation; it is shaped by a complex institutional landscape of government agencies and stakeholders. This section provides an overview of key institutions, along with their initiatives specifically related to developing military AI and drones, while excluding the broader scope of these institutions’ functions as it falls outside the focus of this research. Due to the classified nature of much of the information on government initiatives, this overview remains general, without going into the technical specifics of the projects and technologies involved. The purpose of this section is to offer a clearer understanding of Ukraine’s somewhat unstructured governmental approach to military AI development, as well as to facilitate the identification of relevant counterparts for collaboration where Ukrainian models or initiatives align with U.S. government objectives.</p> +<p>There are several key issues associated with the military response options outlined above that need to be taken into account.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NM8CBwz.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Map of Military AI Stakeholders in Ukraine.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis.</em></p> +<p><em>NUCLEAR OR NONNUCLEAR RESPONSE?</em></p> -<h4 id="ministry-of-defense">Ministry of Defense</h4> +<p>The first of these is whether the U.S. military responses to Russian or Chinese nuclear use should be nuclear or nonnuclear. If the objective of the U.S. military response is to restore deterrence of nuclear use, then there are several problems with a nonnuclear response. First, if the purpose of the adversary’s escalation was to coerce war termination on terms they can accept because they are decisively losing the conventional war, then a nonnuclear response may convince them that they simply need to hit the United States harder in pursuit of their objective. Further, they may conclude that it safe to escalate because the United States is reluctant to respond in kind for fear of uncontrolled escalation. Second, if restoring deterrence requires that the United States respond in a more severe way than anticipated by the adversary in order to convince them that they cannot be confident in predicting future U.S. responses to further escalation, then a nonnuclear response is less likely to meet this criterion.</p> -<p>The MoD of Ukraine is the government body responsible for overseeing national defense and the AFU. The MoD is headed by the minister of defense, while the president of Ukraine holds the position of supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces.</p> +<p>If the U.S. objective is to restore U.S. or allied conventional superiority following limited adversary nuclear strikes, then the decision to respond with nuclear or nonnuclear weapons should hinge in part on which response is most likely to be more militarily effective. Increasing the range of relevant targets susceptible to a U.S. nuclear or nonnuclear response option would increase the range of options available to the president.</p> -<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> +<p>Finally, for the U.S. objective of avoiding uncontrolled nuclear escalation, at first glance it might seem that nonnuclear military response options may be preferred. And in some circumstances this would be true. However, if the effect of selecting a nonnuclear response to adversary nuclear escalation is to convince the adversary that the United States is so concerned about uncontrolled escalation that it fears responding in kind, then a U.S. nonnuclear response could actually increase the risk of eventual uncontrolled escalation. This may seem counterintuitive, but if a U.S. nonnuclear response to adversary limited nuclear use results in encouraging further adversary nuclear escalation, then the U.S. nuclear responses that may eventually be required to achieve U.S. objectives are likely to be larger in scale and more provocative in their effects. This could well make uncontrolled escalation more likely.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Center for Innovation and Defense Technologies.</strong> In 2021, the MoD established the CIDT to reform its approach to IT project management. Its primary objective is to modernize automated combat management systems and develop future operational-strategic, tactical, and situational awareness systems. A notable achievement in this workstream is the formal adoption of the Delta situational awareness system by the MoD in 2023, which the CIDT inherited from the volunteer organization Aerorozvidka. Public information on the CIDT’s AI-related initiatives is limited, particularly beyond its focus on the Delta platform. However, recent job postings for machine learning engineers, MLOps specialists, and computer vision researchers suggest that the CIDT is prioritizing the integration of AI-enabled solutions into Delta.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Unmanned Systems Forces.</strong> A dedicated branch of the AFU, the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), was established to systematize and expand the experience gained in the deployment of unmanned systems while formalizing a doctrinal approach suited to the realities of asymmetrical warfare. The USF is responsible for operations across all domains and levels, ranging from frontline engagements to deep strikes within enemy territory. Under the leadership of Colonel Vadym Sukharevsky, the USF plays a central role in introducing unmanned systems throughout the AFU, adopting emerging technologies, sharing innovations, and training units and brigades to use new systems. The USF is tasked with identifying the most effective systems to address the diverse challenges faced by the AFU on the battlefield. To date, over 170 models of unmanned systems have been integrated into frontline operations, positioning the USF as a critical driver of technological innovation in combat.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><em>STRIKE RUSSIAN OR CHINESE TERRITORY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS?</em></p> -<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> +<p>The second key issue regarding U.S. military responses to adversary limited nuclear use involves whether to strike targets on Russian or Chinese territory with nuclear weapons given the potentially escalatory nature of such action. On the one hand, strikes on the adversary’s homeland would cross a potential firebreak against uncontrolled escalation. On the other hand, making the adversary’s territory a sanctuary from U.S. limited nuclear responses could create a potentially decisive asymmetry in the ability of the two sides to achieve relevant military effects with nuclear weapons. A limited U.S. nuclear response (or a credibly communicated threat) that makes clear that Russian or Chinese territory will not be a sanctuary if the adversary continues to escalate could be effective in restoring deterrence following adversary first use. This decision in particular will be highly scenario dependent.</p> -<ul> - <li><strong>Innovation Development Accelerator.</strong> The MoD has sought to accelerate the development and adoption of defense technologies through the creation of the Innovation Development Accelerator. Established in 2023, this initiative is designed to streamline and modernize the ministry’s operations by addressing issues of overregulation, lengthy processes, and inefficiencies in collaboration with defense companies. The accelerator aims to reduce the time required for the implementation of weapons and equipment from more than two years to approximately 45 days, while simplifying bureaucratic procedures to enhance operational efficiency. One of its six core priorities is the advancement of robotization and AI tech adoption for unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as ground and water drones.</li> -</ul> +<p><em>RANGE OF AVAILABLE NUCLEAR OPTIONS</em></p> -<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> +<p>The effectiveness of U.S. military response options in the wake of adversary limited nuclear escalation will in part be a function of the range of available nuclear options available to the U.S. president. Identifying future nuclear force and capability requirements first requires development of a future strategy for addressing the two-peer nuclear threat environment, a strategy that is likely to create new operational requirements for nuclear and conventional forces. But strategy development alone is not enough. Detailed wargaming and simulation is needed to analyze the ways in which limited nuclear use by both sides potentially affects the course of twenty-first-century conflict and escalation dynamics across a range of scenarios and strategic circumstances. Without such analysis, U.S. efforts to identify the range of nuclear options needed to address limited nuclear escalation will risk missing key insights.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Doctrine for Unmanned Systems Forces.</strong> The USF has developed a comprehensive doctrine and statute for all branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is currently being tested in operational units. The documentation is developed for every level, from squad to battalion, and it will standardize tactics and procedures for the use of unmanned systems across the AFU. The creation of this statute marks a significant step toward the formalization and regulation of unmanned system deployment, ensuring consistent operational practices across the military.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy.</strong> The only AI-related regulatory initiative in which the MoD is currently involved is the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy, launched in 2023. This provides a framework for the responsible use of military AI and aims to build international consensus, guiding states in the ethical development, deployment, and use of military AI technologies. Besides this international initiative, the MoD has not yet released any public strategies or formalized vision regarding AI implementation or the development of autonomous systems.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><em>HOW TO MESSAGE U.S. INTENT AND WAR AIMS PAIRED WITH A GIVEN MILITARY RESPONSE</em></p> -<h4 id="defense-intelligence-of-the-mod-of-ukraine">Defense Intelligence of the MoD of Ukraine</h4> +<p>As Thomas Schelling first made clear in his book Strategy of Conflict, there are certain strategic circumstances in which deterrence or the avoidance of further escalation can only be achieved if one pairs a credible threat of military response with a credible promise of restraint that provides the adversary with an acceptable, if not desirable, offramp. Given the clear role of coercive limited nuclear use in Russian strategy and doctrine, and the potential for China to adopt a similar strategy and practice when it soon acquires the necessary nuclear capabilities, the United States must determine how it will formulate and implement this pairing of threat with promise to deter such limited nuclear use. This includes not only ensuring that U.S. nuclear forces have the requisite range of capabilities to make the threat element credible and effective, but also determining what forms of restraint the United States is willing to promise and how to make such promises credible and effective in the context of a high-intensity theater conflict in which nuclear weapons have already been employed.</p> -<p>The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the MoD, also known as the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU), serves as the military intelligence agency to the country’s leadership and the AFU. Its portfolio includes intelligence, cyber, technology development, and occasionally direct execution of high-priority missions.</p> +<p><em>RECOMMENDED MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS</em></p> -<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives:</strong></p> +<p>The final step in a scenario-based analysis of this central problem is making recommendations regarding U.S. military responses to Russian and Chinese nuclear escalation in this scenario.</p> -<ul> +<p>Regarding Russian escalation, the United States should simultaneously pursue its objectives of restoring the territorial status quo ante, reestablishing deterrence of further nuclear use, and restoring U.S. and allied conventional superiority following limited Russian nuclear strikes. This could be done by executing low-yield nuclear strikes on key military targets in Kaliningrad paired with clear messaging that Russia must halt further nuclear use and that U.S. war aims are limited to restoring the territorial status quo ante vis-à-vis NATO (and possibly a return to the pre-February 2022 borders in Ukraine). However, should Russia escalate with further nuclear use, U.S. war aims might change, and U.S. military responses will become more severe.</p> + +<p>Regarding China, assuming Chinese forces are no longer capable of conducting a Taiwan invasion due to U.S. and allied conventional actions, simultaneously pursuing the U.S. objectives of restoring deterrence and restoring U.S. and allied conventional superiority following limited Chinese nuclear strikes (as the territorial status quo ante already is intact) could be an appropriate course of action. This could take the form of a U.S. response in kind on three of the militarized islands in the South China Sea: Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross. Such strikes would not affect the Chinese mainland and, given the U.S. position on territorial disputes in the South China Sea, would not constitute attacks on Chinese territory. This response would make clear that the United States will neither tolerate, nor be disadvantaged by, Chinese limited nuclear use. These strikes should be paired with clear messaging that U.S. war aims are limited to defending Taiwan and our regional allies and to achieving an immediate ceasefire. However, it should be kept in mind that should China escalate with further nuclear use, U.S. war aims might change and the Chinese mainland may not be a sanctuary.</p> + +<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options-after-strategic-deterrence-failure">Non-Kinetic Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure</h4> + +<p>There is a wide array of potential non-kinetic response options to adversary limited nuclear use in this scenario that could further the achievement of the U.S. strategic objectives identified above. The most important of these are the following (in descending order):</p> + +<ol> <li> - <p><strong>AI for analytics.</strong> The DIU has emerged as one of the most advanced users and adopters of AI technology within the military. According to Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the DIU, the increasing volume of acquired intelligence data necessitated the enhancement of analytical capabilities. To address this challenge, the analytical branch has been significantly bolstered with technologies for automated data processing, integrating artificial intelligence to improve the efficiency and accuracy of analysis. This integration of AI has been critical in managing large datasets and enhancing the decisionmaking process within the intelligence operations of Ukraine.</p> + <p>Messaging in support of achieving the purposes of U.S. military responses to adversary limited nuclear use. How this might be done has been discussed above. Formulating this kind of messaging should become part of both the political-military planning process and the presidential decision-support process.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Drones for long-range strikes.</strong> The DIU is a leading agency in conducting long-range strikes into Russian territory using drones equipped with some elements of autonomy. These autonomous drones play a crucial role in Ukraine’s ability to carry out precision strikes at extended distances, significantly expanding the operational capabilities of its military. The use of such autonomous systems represents a forward-looking approach to modern warfare, where AI-enabled technologies enhance the effectiveness of long-range operations while minimizing the need for direct human intervention. While the Ukrainian government has not disclosed all of the functions that AI plays in this mission, government officials told CSIS that AI does play an important role. This positions the DIU as a key player in the development and application of autonomous military technologies in Ukraine.</p> + <p>Information actions designed to make the adversary a pariah for having been the first to violate the nuclear taboo since 1945. The purpose of this is to make it difficult, if not impossible, for third parties to side with Russia or China in the wake of their nuclear escalation, and to affect the Russian and Chinese leaderships’ decision calculus regarding further escalation.</p> </li> -</ul> + <li> + <p>Information actions designed to convince both elements of Russian and Chinese political and military leadership, and the Russian and Chinese populations, that their leaders’ actions are risking large-scale nuclear war and the destruction of their nations in a failing pursuit of nonessential objectives. The purpose of this is to put pressure on the leadership to terminate the conflict.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Economic actions designed to make clear that the longer the adversaries continue the war, the more long term the economic damage they will incur. This also serves the purpose of pressuring their leaderships to terminate the conflict, though it is not clear that such economic effects can be imposed on a timeline sufficient to affect relatively near-term adversary decisionmaking.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<h4 id="security-service-of-ukraine">Security Service of Ukraine</h4> +<h4 id="impact-of-the-law-of-armed-conflict-on-us-military-responses">Impact of the Law of Armed Conflict on U.S. Military Responses</h4> -<p>The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) serves as the country’s principal security and intelligence agency, tasked with safeguarding national security, conducting counterintelligence operations and counterterrorism efforts, and combating organized crime. It operates under the authority of the president of Ukraine.</p> +<p>Finally, Project Atom 2024 asked how U.S. policy, when U.S. nuclear planning and operations comply with the law of armed conflict, might affect U.S. military responses in this scenario. Compliance with the law of armed conflict poses no insurmountable barriers to the United States developing effective military response options in support of the array of potential strategic objectives identified in this paper.</p> -<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> +<h4 id="conclusion-4">Conclusion</h4> -<ul> - <li><strong>Naval drones.</strong> One of the SSU’s most innovative contributions to the war effort is its use of naval drones, which have significantly impacted the balance of power in the Black Sea. These drones are not just simple unmanned vessels; due to constant close interaction between the SSU and its drone operators and engineers, they have evolved into multifunctional platforms that are constantly undergoing technological improvements. For example, the Sea Baby drones, initially designed for explosive attacks on Russian naval ships and infrastructure, have been enhanced to perform additional functions such as offensive sea mining. They have successfully laid mines in strategic locations, significantly impacting Russian naval operations. Moreover, due to recent upgrades, the drones are equipped with rocket systems — specifically the Grad multiple rocket launchers, which have already shown effectiveness in targeting Russian positions.</li> -</ul> +<p>The insights derived from this analysis make clear that there is a need to move beyond thinking only about how to deter aggression and subsequent escalation in wars with multiple nuclear-armed adversaries in the twenty-first century. The failure of deterrence of limited nuclear use would create extremely dangerous circumstances, but there are plausible ways to achieve U.S. and allied strategic objectives without automatically triggering large-scale nuclear war.</p> -<h4 id="national-guard-of-ukraine">National Guard of Ukraine</h4> +<p>Having said that, there is a need to expand the scope of the initial Project Atom 2024 analysis to address the full range of plausible scenarios and strategic circumstances in which the United States and its allies and partners might face the challenge of responding to a failure to deter limited nuclear use in a theater conflict with Russia or China. In the scenario addressed here, the United States and its allies find themselves rapidly and decisively winning the conventional war in both theaters simultaneously. As a result, Russian and Chinese nuclear escalation seems to be motivated by a desire to terminate the conflicts on terms they can accept before U.S. and allied conventional success further worsens the outcome. This is a very different strategic circumstance than a scenario in which an adversary is winning the conventional conflict and seeks to secure rapid victory through limited nuclear escalation, or one in which the United States is forced to consider limited nuclear first use to prevent a decisive conventional military defeat. Analysis of those and other scenarios and circumstances would likely produce new and important insights regarding the four key issues addressed in this project.</p> -<p>The National Guard of Ukraine is a military force under the command of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and it is tasked with protecting public order, securing strategically important facilities, and countering illegal paramilitary groups. During martial law periods, the units of the National Guard are subordinate to the AFU.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> +<p><strong>Heather Williams</strong> is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> -<ul> - <li>In 2024, the National Guard of Ukraine established a specialized unit known as Typhoon, which is focused on the deployment of unmanned aerial systems for military operations. This unit, composed of seasoned Special Forces veterans, has been created with the objective of enhancing the operational capabilities of combat brigades by integrating advanced unmanned systems into their strategic and tactical frameworks. The veterans within the unit bring a wealth of combat experience, which is crucial for the effective deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in complex battlefield environments. By integrating unmanned systems into combat operations, the Typhoon unit aims to increase both the flexibility and responsiveness of brigade-level engagements, enhancing operational efficiency and reducing risks to personnel.</li> -</ul> +<p><strong>Reja Younis</strong> is the associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS, where she leads research on nuclear deterrence issues, nuclear strategy, and emerging technologies.</p> -<h4 id="ministry-of-digital-transformation">Ministry of Digital Transformation</h4> +<p><strong>Lachlan MacKenzie</strong> is a research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> -<p>The Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine (MDT), established in 2019, is responsible for shaping and implementing state policy in digitalization, the digital economy, and digital innovation. It focuses on e-government, digital democracy, the development of digital skills and rights, open data, national electronic resources, and broadband infrastructure.</p> +<p><strong>Christopher Ford</strong> is professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University’s Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.</p> -<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> +<p><strong>Rebecca Davis Gibbons</strong> is senior associate (non-resident) with the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS and an assistant professor of political science at the University of Southern Maine.</p> -<ul> - <li><strong>The Expert Committee on AI Development.</strong> The Expert Committee on AI Development, established under the MDT in December 2019, plays an important role in enhancing the country’s competitiveness in the field of AI. Composed predominantly of business and science representatives, the committee’s main task is to drive AI policy recommendations, facilitate research and development, and nurture talent across various domains.</li> -</ul> +<p><strong>Ankit Panda</strong> is the Stanton senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research interests include nuclear strategy, escalation, missiles and missile defense, space security, and U.S. alliances.</p> -<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> +<p><strong>Melanie W. Sisson</strong> is a fellow in the Foreign Policy program’s Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology where she researches the use of the armed forces in international politics, strategies of deterrence, U.S. national security strategy, defense policy, and defense applications of emerging technologies.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Army of Drones.</strong> Launched in July 2022 by the MDT, the Army of Drones initiative represents a significant effort to integrate unmanned aerial vehicles into Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Initially conceived as a fundraising campaign, the initiative quickly evolved into a systematic and comprehensive program aimed at both procuring drones and training operators for their effective deployment on the battlefield. The program’s scope has grown to encompass not only the direct supply of drones to frontline units but also the promotion of domestic UAV production, significantly bolstering Ukraine’s defense industrial base. One of the core objectives of the Army of Drones initiative is to equip Ukrainian armed forces with modern, locally produced UAVs that can be used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and tactical strikes.</p> +<p><strong>Gregory Weaver</strong> is the principal of Strategy to Plans LLC. Prior to this, he was deputy director for strategic stability on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5).</p>Heather Williams, et al.There is a growing risk that U.S. adversaries might resort to nuclear use in a regional conflict. To help address for this threat, the Project on Nuclear Issues invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for responding to strategic deterrence failure.UK Sanctions On Russia2024-11-15T12:00:00+08:002024-11-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uk-sanctions-on-russia<p><em>This report presents findings from the second meeting of the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce, held in October 2024.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>The discussion aimed to identify opportunities to optimise the use of existing sanctions regimes and enhance the effectiveness of sanctions as a strategic tool. Members provided a list of recommendations for the UK to develop a strategy which not only sends a clear signal of UK priorities, but also has a tangible impact.</em></p> - <p>Moreover, the initiative places significant emphasis on the training and skill enhancement of drone operators, ensuring that personnel are proficient in utilizing the advanced technologies embedded in contemporary UAV systems. By the end of 2023, 20,000 operators had successfully completed the training. This comprehensive approach — combining procurement, production, and operator training — has had a transformative impact on the use of drones in frontline operations, making the Army of Drones a pivotal component of Ukraine’s broader defense strategy.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Brave1.</strong> As an effort to support projects and companies in their early stages, a platform dubbed “Brave1” was established in July 2023. It is designed to facilitate collaboration among all major stakeholders in the government’s defense sector, the tech industry, and investors and volunteers. Manufacturers who meet the 12 priority verticals of technological development identified by the general staff of the AFU for the Brave1 cluster and have passed a defense expert review can apply to get military expertise; testing opportunities; and organizational, informational, and financial support for their projects. Brave1 also funds early-stage miltech start-ups, giving grants up to UAH 8,000,000 (approximately USD 194,000). As of September 2024, the program has awarded 299 grants totaling USD 6.5 million.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - <p>In October 2024, the MDT stated that the list of priority verticals of technological development will be revised, with a larger focus on electronic warfare and AI-enabled capabilities.</p> +<p>Following Brexit, the UK had an opportunity to develop its independent sanctions framework to address the evolving geopolitical landscape and its own foreign policy messaging. This framework included a broader range of thematic and geographic sanctions regimes, targeting issues such as corruption, human rights abuses and cyber activities, while countering threats to international peace and security. In an attempt to give substance to this vision, in February 2024, the UK published its first Sanctions Strategy, outlining its approach to ensuring that sanctions are effective, giving the UK more influence in the world, and helping to “keep Britain safe”.</p> - <p>Events organized by Brave1 provide valuable insights into the urgent technological needs and priorities of the AFU, as the topics and competition areas reflect requests gathered by the Brave1 team from various military institutions and agencies. For example, the deputy commander-in-chief of the AFU has identified key areas for technological advancement, including alternative navigation systems, jamming-resistant communications, drone swarm technologies, “friend or foe” identification, and improved target identification and engagement capabilities. Events such as the Precision Hackathon exemplify the immediate demand for AI-driven solutions in defense technology — including advanced targeting systems, real-time data integration, and innovative smart munitions capable of adjusting their trajectories to engage dynamic targets. The emphasis on autonomous and semi-autonomous systems with precision targeting capabilities and network-centric tools for combat operations reflects a broader shift toward AI-enabled autonomy in military applications. Furthermore, events like the AI for Ukraine Recovery Hackathon, which focused on topics such as cybersecurity, damage assessment, and disinformation prevention, underscore the pivotal role of AI in strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities and supporting its recovery efforts.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>In June 2024, RUSI’s Centre for Finance and Security set up the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce, made up of 50 former UK and other government officials, senior sanctions executives from the financial sector and industry, and academics, from the UK and elsewhere. The first meeting highlighted a series of implementation challenges, such as: resourcing and expertise; engagement with industry; alignment with international partners; and the lack of a clear set of objectives for the UK’s sanctions policy. Notably, while Russia has become the focus of the UK’s sanctions response, the Taskforce also emphasised the need for a more comprehensive and flexible approach beyond Russia alone.</p> -<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> +<p>This report presents findings from the second Taskforce meeting, which was held in October 2024. The discussion aimed to identify opportunities to optimise the use of existing sanctions regimes and enhance the effectiveness of sanctions as a strategic tool. Members provided a list of recommendations for the UK to develop a strategy which not only sends a clear signal of UK priorities, but also has a tangible impact. None of the comments made by the Taskforce members are attributable.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Approach to AI regulation.</strong> The MDT is responsible for overseeing Ukraine’s digital development, digital economy, and innovation, with AI being an integral component of this policy. Consequently, the ministry also holds responsibility for AI regulation. However, it has explicitly emphasized a commitment to avoiding overregulation by adopting a soft, business-friendly approach. The MDT plans to implement a bottom-up strategy, initially preparing businesses for future regulations before moving toward formal implementation. In the early stages, the state will provide businesses with tools such as general and sector-specific recommendations, voluntary codes of conduct, a legal assistance platform, and a regulatory sandbox for product testing, all aimed at facilitating compliance with forthcoming legislation.</p> +<h3 id="thematic-sanctions">Thematic Sanctions</h3> - <p>The current regulatory framework includes the Concept of Development of Artificial Intelligence in Ukraine, adopted in 2020, followed by the AI Regulation Roadmap introduced in 2023. While neither document constitutes formal regulation, they provide guiding principles for AI development within the country.</p> +<p>The Taskforce first discussed ways to increase the effectiveness of the UK’s thematic regimes, which had been described in the previous meeting as mostly “presentational” and lacking clear criteria and vision. The discussion focused on three regimes: Global Anti-Corruption (GAC) sanctions; Global Human Rights (GHR) sanctions; and cyber sanctions.</p> - <p>The MDT also plays a significant role in fostering defense innovation, making its approach to AI regulation in the defense sector particularly clear in its white paper “Artificial Intelligence Regulation in Ukraine: Vision of the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine.” The ministry has stated that it does not intend to propose any regulation of AI systems within the defense sector, emphasizing a noninterventionist stance in this domain.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Simplifying regulation for local high-tech defense industry.</strong> To boost local production, the MDT has made some considerable steps in terms of regulatory simplification for private drone companies. By implementing regulatory changes, the allowed profit margin for Ukrainian drone manufacturers was increased from 1 percent to 25 percent. This change makes the drone production business more financially viable and attractive for local companies. Previously, the low profitability cap of 1 percent limited potential earnings, discouraging investment and innovation. By raising the limit to 25 percent, the government aims to stimulate growth in the domestic high-tech defense industry, encouraging companies to scale up production and invest in advanced technologies.</p> +<h3 id="global-anti-corruption-sanctions">Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions</h3> - <p>Furthermore, regulations governing contract negotiations, goods acceptance for military use, operational clearance, and delivery to the front were streamlined. Measures were also implemented to accelerate the operational approval process for UAV manufacturers, facilitating faster integration into state procurement contracts and supply chains for frontline operations. The government eliminated the requirement for export service control documents, simplifying the import of drones and their components, and removed the need for Security Service approvals, significantly expediting the overall approval process. Additionally, drone manufacturers can opt into the special “Diia.City” tax regime for IT companies, which allows up to 50 percent of employees eligible for military service to be exempted from active duty.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The Taskforce recognised the steps the UK has taken to address corruption through its GAC sanctions regime. However, discussions highlighted gaps in the current approach that hinder its legitimacy and credibility, mostly linked to the lack of clarity regarding the criteria and purpose for which these sanctions are deployed, and the strategy for their use.</p> -<h4 id="innovations-development-fund">Innovations Development Fund</h4> +<p>Members reiterated the risk of sanctions targeting corruption in name only without being accompanied by genuine disruption of related networks and criminal enforcement. They described the GAC regime as an “uncomfortable fit” between sanctions and criminal enforcement, with sanctions being prioritised over the actual targeting of corruption. One Taskforce member pointed to the EU’s misappropriation sanctions regimes as a useful cautionary tale for anti-corruption sanctions. Introduced in 2011 to target corruption and financial misappropriation by government officials in Egypt and Tunisia, these sanctions regimes struggled to achieve tangible results, securing no convictions and becoming the subject of political disputes. The failure of these regimes, according to Taskforce members, resulted from a lack of criminal enforcement efforts due to limited resources and political will.</p> -<p>The Innovations Development Fund (previously called the Ukrainian Startup Fund) is the first and only state institution dedicated to helping innovative projects and tech start-ups secure early-stage funding and launch their ventures. Established in 2018 by the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, it has been managed by the MDT since 2023.</p> +<p>The Taskforce warned that without robust investigations, prosecutions and confiscations of the proceeds of corruption accompanying the rollout of anti-corruption sanctions, the GAC regime might face a similar fate and lack credibility. To ensure this does not happen, members recommended appropriate resourcing of law enforcement agencies, and stronger coordination between government agencies responsible for sanctions enforcement and criminal prosecutions. They also argued that better processes for listing and delisting would be useful for more targeted action against corrupt individuals.</p> -<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> +<p>Another Taskforce member stressed the disparity between the UK’s efforts to combat corruption at home and its actions abroad. Noting the UK’s recent decline in international rankings such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, they argued that the lack of focus on domestic corruption weakens the UK’s credibility in the global fight against corruption and its sanctions response.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Program for defense start-ups.</strong> The “Fast Track to Victory” program is an example of Ukraine’s capacity to rapidly adapt and use existing infrastructure to foster innovation in defense technologies. This program streamlines the interaction between the MoD and UAV manufacturers, facilitating a more efficient approval process for drone technologies. By leveraging the fund’s web portal, UAV developers with finished products can apply directly for official ministry approval. This approval is essential as it authorizes the MoD to procure the products and allows the AFU to deploy them.</p> +<p>To increase international credibility, Taskforce members suggested complementing anti-corruption sanctions, measures to tackle domestic corruption, and criminal enforcement with capacity-building in target countries, particularly in the Global South. One member from civil society cautioned that a failure to cooperate with local justice systems could result in sanctions being perceived as neocolonial, undermining their legitimacy and impact.</p> - <p>According to government documents describing the program, the application process is designed to be efficient, with all submissions reviewed by MoD representatives in a timely manner. The program specifically targets UAVs that meet the tactical and technical characteristics required by the military, ensuring that the products are immediately relevant to the operational needs of the AFU. Once approved, the products can be integrated into military service, streamlining the deployment of innovative drone technologies on the battlefield.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h3 id="global-human-rights-sanctions">Global Human Rights Sanctions</h3> -<h4 id="ministry-of-strategic-industries-and-ukrainian-defense-industry">Ministry of Strategic Industries and Ukrainian Defense Industry</h4> +<p>The Taskforce also discussed GHR sanctions, which have become a prominent aspect of the UK’s independent sanctions regime, particularly through the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020. GHR sanctions allow the UK to target individuals and entities involved in serious human rights violations by freezing their assets and restricting their travel. While recognising the value of these sanctions in principle, Taskforce members noted that the sanctions were far from realising their full potential.</p> -<p>The Ministry of Strategic Industries is responsible for overseeing Ukraine’s military-industrial complex, which includes a state-owned enterprise named Ukrainian Defense Industry (formerly known as UkrOboronProm). This entity manages over 100 defense-related enterprises, many of which are remnants of Soviet-era companies. While efforts are underway to modernize some of these enterprises to meet the demands of the current war, the ministry and its associated industries remain predominantly focused on traditional defense platforms — such as artillery production and missile programs — rather than on emerging technologies like software-driven systems and AI, which are increasingly defining modern warfare.</p> +<p>One primary concern raised by Taskforce members was that human rights sanctions often do not serve their intended purpose of deterrence, but are instead adopted as a form of punishment. The discussions highlighted that, similarly to GAC sanctions, GHR sanctions often operate in a vacuum, without the support of additional efforts to promote human rights globally. Some participants suggested including GHR sanctions in a broader human rights strategy, combining them, for instance, with diplomatic efforts and criminal prosecution of human rights abuses.</p> -<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> +<p>Taskforce members from the legal sector also noted that these kinds of sanctions are in place indefinitely, with little evidence that they influence the behaviour of the targeted individuals or regimes. This situation, combined with a lack of clear criteria for lifting human rights sanctions or explanation of the reasoning behind designations, raises questions about the long-term purpose and effectiveness of these sanctions, and risks reducing their overall legitimacy. Taskforce members stressed the need to gather more data on the impact of GHR sanctions on the ground, for instance by establishing collaboration with local organisations to assess whether the sanctions were providing accountability for human rights abusers or deterring further abuses.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>AI implementation together with the MDT.</strong> In 2021, Ukrainian Defense Industry signed a memorandum of intent with the MDT to coordinate efforts in advancing the digital economy and fostering innovation, with a specific focus on AI technology. Formerly, UkrOboronProm had also expressed plans to establish a dedicated unit for AI development. However, Ukrainian Defense Industry sources told CSIS that these initiatives have not yet been realized or advanced, highlighting a gap between stated intentions and actual implementation in the area of digital and AI-driven defense innovation. This suggests that while there is recognition of the importance of emerging technologies, the practical shift toward their integration in Ukraine’s defense industry remains limited.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Cooperation with Helsing.</strong> In 2024, the Ministry for Strategic Industries signed a memorandum with Helsing GmbH, a German company specializing in software development and AI integration in defense technologies. This cooperation aims to enhance Ukrainian defense technologies by integrating AI into drones, particularly Ukrainian-made UAVs. This is probably the only public mention of ministry- or state-owned enterprises introducing AI technology in their production.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h3 id="cyber-sanctions">Cyber Sanctions</h3> -<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> +<p>Cyber sanctions have also emerged as a growing area of focus for the UK, particularly as cybercrime and state-sponsored cyber activities have become more prevalent. These sanctions aim to disrupt the financial operations of cyber-criminals and state-backed actors involved in malicious cyber activities.</p> -<ul> - <li><strong>Upcoming strategic AI project for key economic sectors.</strong> Somewhat unexpectedly, given the ministry’s responsibilities and the current situation in the country, the Ukrainian government has approved a concept for a state program using artificial intelligence in strategic sectors of the economy and has designated the Ministry of Strategic Industries as responsible for the development of a detailed AI program for these priority sectors. The program aims to enhance Ukraine’s economic potential and strengthen its global market position by 2026 in such sectors as machinery, chemicals, defense, nuclear industry, agriculture, healthcare, and scientific activities.</li> -</ul> +<p>Taskforce members noted that compliance with cyber sanctions is not particularly complex for financial institutions (FIs) in terms of screening, but that challenges arise with tracing the broader criminal networks involved in cybercrime. Similarly to GAR and GHR sanctions, the key challenge was the lack of criteria clarifying what it takes for a specific network to be sanctioned. Some members noted that the more cyber sanctions designations there are, the easier it is for the industry to learn and comply. However, for cyber sanctions, as well as for other lists, designations are often the result of the work of pressure groups or the gathering of information found in the public domain, which can be altered. Participants noted that this made it difficult for the private sector to understand why sanctions targeted some groups rather than others. Some Taskforce members from the private sector also argued that FIs do not operate in an active intelligence-sharing community within the sector, with banks only seeing data at their disposal and becoming overreliant on information in the public domain.</p> -<h4 id="money-matters">Money Matters</h4> +<p>According to the Taskforce, any information that authorities can provide will make a difference. An example of new approaches to mitigating this challenge is the US Office of Foreign Assets Control’s move to add IP and virtual wallet addresses to sanctions designation details; FIs can input these addresses into their compliance systems to support their efforts to unveil the networks involved.</p> -<p>The development of the defense industry and the sustainability of military operations are heavily dependent on the government’s purchasing capacity, regardless of the scale and quality of research, development, and production. In FY 2024, the Ukrainian government has allocated UAH 58.8 billion (USD 1.4 billion) for the acquisition of UAVs and an additional UAH 1.5 billion (USD 36 million) to support the Brave1 platform.</p> +<p>Members of the Taskforce also stressed the legal and operational grey areas for insurers. They noted that insurers may face conflicting obligations: on the one hand, they may be required to pay claims to clients affected by ransomware, but on the other hand, if they identify a designated entity to be behind a ransomware attack, they must avoid making payments because that would violate sanctions. To overcome this issue, the Taskforce recommended the UK issues clearer guidelines on how insurers should handle claims related to ransomware attacks, and share best practices on how to identify and prevent cyber-related sanctions violations.</p> -<p>However, Ukrainian defense companies face significant challenges, including export bans imposed since the onset of the full-scale war due to the need to satisfy the demand for weapon systems for the AFU first. As a result, many defense factories remain underutilized due to insufficient funding for weapons procurement in the state budget and the consequent low purchasing capacity from the government. Although the defense industry’s capacity is estimated at around USD 20 billion, the maximum government procurement budget for 2024 is only USD 6 billion. In response, discussions have recently begun regarding the reopening of defense exports. A parliamentary working group is currently evaluating risks and developing a mechanism to enable Ukraine’s reentry into the global arms market.</p> +<h3 id="geographic-sanctions">Geographic Sanctions</h3> -<p>Drone production represents a significant area of expansion. Ukrainian Defense Industry sources told CSIS that the current production output for FPV drones alone exceeds 2 million units in 2024, although only 1 million have been contracted by the government to date. A survey conducted among defense companies revealed that 38 percent of them have more than half of their production capacity idle, while 85 percent are considering relocation abroad. The primary factors that could prevent such relocation include the reopening of exports, an increase in government procurement orders, and the establishment of long-term contracts.</p> +<p>The Taskforce discussed strategies to enhance the effectiveness of the UK’s country-specific sanctions. Members emphasised the importance of maintaining a balanced approach, ensuring that the focus on Russia does not overshadow other critical sanctions regimes, such as those applied to North Korea and Iran. These states continue to pose significant global security threats through their illicit activities and development of nuclear and other weapons programmes. However, the implementation and enforcement of related sanctions regimes have seen reduced focus in recent years.</p> -<p>Besides that, the Ministry of Strategic Industries is actively working to address current challenges in the industry, with a key focus on securing external funding for the purchase of Ukrainian defense products, including UAVs. ZBROYARI: Manufacturing Freedom is a global fundraising campaign aimed at raising USD 10 billion from partner countries to produce Ukrainian weapons in 2024. Of EUR 60 million in Dutch contributions, EUR 20 million is for FPV drones, EUR 22.5 million for Dutch drones, and EUR 17.5 million for Ukrainian-made naval drones.</p> +<p>Taskforce members identified common challenges related to the current geographic regimes. First, they pointed out the persistence across multiple regimes of similar sanctions-evasion practices. For instance, North Korea’s continued use of ship-to-ship oil transfers, flag-hopping, smuggling, and collaboration with other sanctioned countries enable it to evade sanctions and sustain the development of its nuclear weapons programme, while also serving as a blueprint for other sanctioned jurisdictions, such as Russia. According to participants, the cessation of the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea, which previously played a key role in monitoring and reporting on suspicions of sanctions evasion, has also weakened oversight and enforcement, and increased evading activities. Taskforce members agreed that there was an opportunity for the UK to assume a leadership role in ensuring that sanctions violations are properly monitored and addressed. They suggested: expanding sanctions designations to cover individuals and entities involved in facilitating partnerships among sanctioned jurisdictions; ensuring the adequate coordination of geographically divided desks within UK government departments; and implementing measures to cut off access to shared resources and illicit networks.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>Second, as regimes such as North Korea and Russia progressively disengage from Western financial and corporate ecosystems to avoid sanctions, there are fewer opportunities to disrupt evasion activities through the compliance efforts of Western businesses. Some Taskforce members from the insurance community emphasised that overcompliance by the private sector may exacerbate this issue. They noted that, while some government officials view overcompliance as a positive trend that keeps businesses away from high-risk activities, those officials neglect the resulting unintended consequences, such as the creation of parallel structures by sanctioned entities outside the scope of G7 regulatory oversight. Members cited the growing role of Russia’s shadow fleet as an example of this. The oil price cap (OPC) was designed to leverage the fact that 90% of the world’s ocean-going tonnage was insured by Protection and Indemnity (P&amp;I) Clubs in the International Group, all of which are based in G7 countries, and the clubs could therefore police the sanctions. However, Russia has moved away from Western services through the development of the shadow fleet, which now reportedly transports 90% of Russian crude oil, beyond Western oversight. Taskforce members recommended that the UK expand the designations of vessels involved in violations of the OPC to strengthen the enforcement of maritime sanctions.</p> -<p>Military AI in Ukraine underwent a rapid transition from being a secondary concern during almost eight years of war in Donbas to becoming a cornerstone of the country’s survival after the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022. This dramatic transition is reflected in the growth of private companies developing military AI capabilities, which have increased from two dozen or so in the beginning of 2022 to over a thousand in 2024. The Ukrainian government embraced the role of innovation enabler by streamlining the bureaucratic processes for technology adoption, adapting its organizational structures to meet rapidly advancing technological capabilities, and providing funding to the commercial defense sector.</p> +<p>Furthermore, representatives from the P&amp;I insurance community noted that they are largely unconcerned with North Korean sanctions, because vessels associated with the country rarely enter Western ports or rely on major Western insurers. However, this leads to a knowledge gap within the insurance and shipping sectors, where companies have little direct experience dealing with North Korea’s maritime operations, and may therefore be ill-prepared to address the sophisticated evasion techniques being used.</p> -<p>As a result of these efforts, most of the industry representatives and brigade commanders interviewed by CSIS confirmed that numerous AI solutions are currently being tested on the frontline. They expect a transition to semi-autonomous unmanned capabilities in a year or two, wherein the human role will only be in confirmation of a strike. However, Ukraine may not have the luxury of time and must fast-track the realization of this vision.</p> +<p>Third, the current system relies heavily on private data providers for information to conduct sanctions screening, without a guarantee of the accuracy of the data they provide. The absence of centralised oversight or clear competency in the management of entity-screening systems means that many organisations may be operating with outdated or incomplete information, reducing the overall effectiveness of sanctions. Taskforce members reiterated the need for the UK government to expand its collaboration with industry and provide more information about sanctioned entities and suspected involved actors, to support compliance in the private sector, reflecting the national security priority placed on the use of sanctions. To address this, a Taskforce member suggested exploring opportunities for industry secondments, where experienced professionals from the private sector could work within government agencies to improve mutual understanding of industry-specific challenges. Such initiatives could bridge the gap between government and industry, accelerating the development of more effective sanctions policies and improving compliance across sectors.</p> -<p>To achieve this, Ukraine must overcome several challenges that are hindering its military AI development: insufficient funding, the limited capacity of small companies and their fragmented efforts in developing AI capabilities, competition within the government for resources, and a lack of coordination among key defense and military institutions to create a unified approach to military AI. Additionally, there is a shortage of computing power and experienced AI professionals in the country to work on classified technology, which are critical for making military AI a game-changer in the fight against Russia.</p> +<p>Fourth, participants stressed challenges in the enforcement of geographic sanctions similar to those found in the enforcement of thematic regimes. According to one participant, the issue with enforcement is rooted in the lack of proactivity in investigations – the launch of an investigation is often reliant on self-reporting – and the number and amount of fines imposed, which do not act as a deterrent in comparison to the cost of compliance. Members recommended a speedier upscaling and expansion of the remit and resources of agencies responsible for enforcing sanctions. To achieve this, the UK should consider a more collaborative and unified approach to improve information sharing; an increase in resources across the whole sanctions architecture; and greater engagement with industry.</p> -<p>While Russia is investing enormous resources into transitioning to an economy on a war footing with a focus on technological advancement within its military, Ukraine requires support from its international partners to fully leverage the advantages of AI as a competitive edge across all battlefields and frontlines in its fight against a conventionally superior adversary.</p> +<p>Fifth, consistent with the point raised for GAC/GHR sanctions, the Taskforce noted that the UK should lay out a clear series of actions required for the wind-down of sanctions for geographic regimes. While the grounds for which sanctions were adopted against actors such as Russia remain active, planning for the eventuality of a wind-down or an offramp helps to avoid the unintended consequences of overly extended sanctions. Ensuring that sanctions are well-targeted and calibrated, both in the short and the long term, will help maintain the UK’s credibility and the strategic effectiveness of sanctions in achieving a behavioural change in their targets.</p> -<p>The conclusion of this paper presents recommendations on how the U.S. government can collaborate with Ukraine to harness the advantages of military AI development and ensure that both nations remain at the forefront of AI and defense innovation.</p> +<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> -<h4 id="1-providing-strategic-support">1. Providing strategic support</h4> +<p>To improve the credibility and legitimacy of the UK’s thematic and geographic sanctions regimes, Taskforce members provided the following recommendations:</p> -<p>The United States, with its technological superiority and numerous AI-related defense programs, is uniquely positioned to assist Ukraine in addressing its challenge of lacking a cohesive, government-led strategy for defense technology development. Given the United States’ forward-looking and long-term AI development plans, it can collaborate with Ukraine to craft a comprehensive, mid-term strategy for integrating AI into its military for beyond immediate tactical solutions.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Strengthen and unify the UK government architecture.</strong> Effective sanctions implementation and enforcement require greater coordination between the various government departments involved, including the FCDO, the Treasury and the Home Office – and, where relevant, intelligence services. A more unified approach is needed to ensure that sanctions are implemented consistently across departments and that existing programmes are aligned. The UK should consider developing an integrated sanctions “agency” model that would address any inter-institutional competitiveness, gaps and/or opportunities for miscommunication; improve information-sharing; and simplify reporting obligations for the private sector.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Expand and review the list of designated entities and individuals.</strong> The processes and criteria for listing individuals and entities under both thematic and geographic regimes should be reviewed, to ensure sanctions meet the intended goals and are reaching the right targets. The UK should also continue broadening its sanctions on entities and individuals, particularly those involved in facilitating sanctions evasion. This includes targeting and sharing information with the private sector on shell companies, financial intermediaries and other entities that play a role in efforts to circumvent sanctions beyond the Western ecosystem.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Provide more and better data.</strong> The UK government should focus on improving the quality and accessibility of data used in its sanctions regimes. This includes providing FIs and other private sector actors with up-to-date and accurate data, incorporating newer data points such as IP and virtual wallet addresses. Additional training and capacity building should be offered to both government agencies and private sector firms, particularly smaller companies, to ensure their expertise in managing the increasing volume and complexity of data involved in sanctions enforcement.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Improve public-private collaboration.</strong> Regular consultations with FIs, technology companies and other private sector actors are essential to ensure that sanctions are effectively implemented and that their design has the best chance of success. The UK government should establish a formal mechanism for ongoing dialogue with the private sector, focusing on emerging challenges such as cyber sanctions and ransomware, and ensuring that companies have the guidance they need to comply with sanctions regulations.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Balance domestic and international efforts.</strong> The UK government must align its domestic efforts with its international actions. This includes strengthening domestic anti-corruption laws, frameworks and enforcement mechanisms to complement the GAC regime. The UK should also focus on diplomatic engagement and capacity-building initiatives in strategic jurisdictions, such as providing training to law enforcement agencies or supporting the development of local anti-corruption frameworks, recognising that sanctions are one tool in a wider foreign policy toolbox.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Enhance sanctions enforcement capabilities.</strong> Enforcement of sanctions has been inconsistent, with significant gaps in the UK’s ability to investigate and prosecute sanctions violations. The UK government should introduce clearer enforcement guidelines, similar to the framework established under the Bribery Act, to ensure penalties for sanctions violations are appropriate and proportional and focus on genuine sanctions evaders rather than low-hanging fruit. Furthermore, the UK government must increase funding and resources to enable more effective investigations and prosecutions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Enhance maritime enforcement.</strong> Given Russia’s and North Korea’s reliance on maritime sanctions evasion tactics, the UK government should invest in better maritime tracking systems, and coordinate with international partners to improve enforcement in key shipping lanes. It should prioritise targeted actions against vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers and flag-hopping, along with secondary sanctions on facilitators of these activities. The UK government should ensure it takes a leadership role in the newly formed Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, leveraging its expertise in key areas such as maritime sanctions and financial services in support of this renewed initiative.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Combine sanctions with criminal enforcement.</strong> To ensure the effectiveness of sanctions, they must be deployed together with additional tools, such as robust criminal justice responses. Sanctions should be accompanied by more investigations, prosecutions and confiscations of criminal proceeds. Law enforcement agencies such as the Combating Kleptocracy Cell should intensify their efforts to prosecute money laundering and corruption offences, together with sanctions evasion offences.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Improve monitoring and impact assessment.</strong> The UK government should invest in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to assess the impact of its sanctions regimes. For instance, the FCDO could collaborate with international partners and local organisations to gather data on the effects of sanctions on the ground. Regular assessments can both help to ensure that sanctions are achieving their intended outcomes and inform decisions about whether they should remain in place or whether new ones should be adopted.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Establish a roadmap for lifting sanctions.</strong> The UK government should develop a framework for reviewing and potentially rolling back sanctions. This framework should include specific benchmarks for compliance, such as changes in the behaviour of the targeted individuals or regimes. Sanctions should be seen as a tool for encouraging behavioural change, not just as a punishment. Any wind-down needs to be coordinated with international partners to avoid creating loopholes or undermining the overall sanctions regime. This is applicable across all sanctions regimes to ensure that sanctions have a clear endgame that compels targets to change their behaviour in exchange for sanctions relief.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>This support would offer Ukraine much-needed guidance to align its decentralized bottom-up approach with a coherent national vision, allowing volunteer groups, start-ups, the defense sector, and government institutions to operate in synergy with national priorities. This approach could help Ukraine align government stakeholders’ efforts in accordance with a single strategy in order to avoid wasting resources, and it could increase competition by promoting efficient resource allocation and funding for AI-enabled capabilities development.</p> +<p>The Taskforce agreed that sanctions have become a preferred tool in the UK’s foreign policy arsenal, particularly in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, as the scope and complexity of sanctions continues to expand, the Taskforce was clear that the UK government must ensure that the entirety of its sanctions regimes remain effective. By implementing the recommendations outlined in this report, the UK government can enhance the effectiveness of its thematic and geographic sanctions, ensuring that they achieve real impact in both disrupting illicit activities and promoting international security. Failure to address these issues risks reducing the UK’s sanctions regime to a largely symbolic tool, rather than one that drives meaningful change on the global stage.</p> -<p>The benefits for the United States are twofold. First, by collaborating with Ukraine, the United States can access real-time insights into the application of AI technologies in active warfare, gaining valuable data that can enhance its own AI capabilities. Second, support for Ukraine’s efforts is a contribution to strengthening the global security architecture and countering common adversaries.</p> +<hr /> -<h4 id="2-unlocking-battlefield-data-for-innovation">2. Unlocking battlefield data for innovation</h4> +<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter-threat finance. His research focuses on sanctions implementation, circumvention and evasion tactics, and sanctions enforcement, primarily through SIFMANet (Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network). Gonzalo’s reseach on counter-threat finance includes work on the abuse of non-profit organisations for terrorist financing, crime-enabled terrorist financing, and the financing of right-wing extremism.</p> -<p>To harness the full potential of AI in defense, Ukraine must build a collaborative framework that brings government authorities and private sector innovators together on data-sharing strategies. This framework should regulate access to and use of real-world combat data by establishing clear legal procedures and protocols for data collection, storage, and sharing — all while safeguarding national security. Such an environment would streamline access for approved developers and foster sustainable business models, incentivizing private investment in military AI research.</p> +<p><strong>Maria Nizzero</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. Her research examines the UK, EU and global financial crime landscape, asset recovery and sanctions, and the foreign policy dimension of illicit finance. Maria holds a PhD in International Public Law and International Relations from the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, where she was an Associate Professor for four years, teaching EU Politics and Institutions.</p>Gonzalo Saiz and Maria NizzeroThis report presents findings from the second meeting of the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce, held in October 2024.U.S. Public Diplomacy Now2024-11-14T12:00:00+08:002024-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/us-public-diplomacy-now<p><em>The United States needs to rethink public diplomacy in an era dominated by great-power competition. U.S. public diplomacy must work harder than ever to showcase the superior attractiveness and value of the United States and its policies over competing alternatives.</em></p> -<p>The United States could play a pivotal role in enabling this effort, helping Ukraine develop a technical and regulative framework by drawing from its own experience of data exchange within global projects such as the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control, where military data is shared among allied countries and the U.S. military. This initiative could set a global precedent for responsible data sharing in defense technology development. Ukraine could monetize its combat data by offering access to countries, organizations such as NATO, and even private defense companies in order to improve their AI tech and the interoperability of all parties involved.</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="3-closing-a-feedback-loop">3. Closing a feedback loop</h4> +<p>China and Russia leverage technology, social media, and big data as tools to deceptively present information for hostile purposes. The United States must embrace a bold approach to public diplomacy to protect the ideas, values, electoral processes, and all the elements that make a free and open society possible and prevent it from becoming a casualty in the information war.</p> -<p>Currently, the United States sends significant military aid to Ukraine, including drones, and many U.S. start-ups and drone manufacturers are contributing by donating their products through volunteers, NGOs, and Ukrainian government initiatives. However, there is no established system for collecting feedback on the performance and effectiveness of these drones on the battlefield, leaving the feedback loop incomplete. Establishing a more structured and standardized feedback collection process would be highly beneficial for both parties.</p> +<h3 id="from-cold-war-to-information-war-the-evolution-of-us-public-diplomacy">From Cold War to Information War: The Evolution of U.S. Public Diplomacy</h3> -<p>For U.S. companies, faster and more organized feedback would enable them to shorten their iteration cycles, update their platforms and software more rapidly, and scale up production of cutting-edge technology. This is particularly important when it comes to AI, where software updates can be implemented much quicker than hardware — without the need to alter supply chains, source new components, or update manufacturing processes. On the Ukrainian side, this would mean receiving more advanced and better-suited capabilities for their battlefield conditions, as U.S. companies have the resources and capital to accelerate drone and AI development, as well as to scale up production. By closing this feedback loop, both the United States and Ukraine can enhance their technological capabilities and improve the effectiveness of military assistance on the ground.</p> +<p>Discussions of U.S. public diplomacy over the last two decades are often framed around its “failures,” what’s “wrong” with it, what a “mess” it is, and its diminishing returns. The solution is not reorganizing U.S. government institutions or simply increasing congressional appropriations. Rather, it involves refocusing the collective perspective on how the U.S. government should think about public diplomacy in an era dominated by great-power competition. A comprehensive “all of the above” approach to public diplomacy is more appropriate for countering authoritarian states in the context of the Information Age.</p> -<h4 id="4-considering-ukraines-ai-in-us-foreign-aid">4. Considering Ukraine’s AI in U.S. foreign aid</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A comprehensive “all of the above” approach to public diplomacy is more appropriate for countering authoritarian states in the context of the Information Age.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Current U.S. financial assistance to Ukraine, primarily through USAID, has been vital for the digital development of the country. However, by integrating an AI component into this aid, the United States can achieve two key objectives: enhancing Ukraine’s AI capabilities and securing a role in what could become a global AI development hub.</p> +<p>Edmund Gullion coined the term “public diplomacy” in 1965, but deliberate engagements with international audiences had become a prominent component of U.S. peacetime foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War (see Box 1). Initial policy was focused on a bipolar world order, with the Cold War aligning nations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The goal of bipolar public diplomacy was to “win the hearts and minds” in favor of Western values: representative democracy, free speech, religious freedom, gender equality, and capitalistic economies over the only other option — communism.</p> -<p>Ukraine’s regulatory environment for AI is highly permissive, and its political leadership is open to embracing technological risks for significant advancements. This combination creates a unique “laboratory” for AI development that the United States cannot afford to overlook. This approach requires more than just funding; it necessitates providing computing infrastructure to key AI innovation centers in Ukraine, such as the MoD, research institutions, and labs. By equipping these entities with the necessary computational power, AI research and development can accelerate at an unprecedented pace.</p> +<p>Following the end of the Cold War, the Clinton administration disbanded many of the institutions at the core of U.S. public diplomacy. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA), created by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953 as an independent agency to promote U.S. values overseas through information programs, was dissolved in 1999. Many components of the USIA’s public diplomacy were transferred to the Department of State, while an independent Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) was tasked with overseeing international broadcasting networks like Voice of America.</p> -<h4 id="5-offering-ai-focused-training-experience-exchange-and-entrepreneurial-development-programs">5. Offering AI-focused training, experience exchange, and entrepreneurial development programs</h4> +<p>The 9/11 terrorist attacks marked the re-securitization of public diplomacy as the United States sought to “win the hearts and minds of Muslims” across the Muslim world. Like the post–Cold War era, however, there were few media alternatives for audiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, or Somalia.</p> -<p>The U.S. government should establish training and experience exchange programs for Ukraine’s defense entrepreneurs. These programs would focus on developing expertise in AI applications, the specifics of defense industry, and international market and investor relations to build successful defense-oriented enterprises. Given the rapid growth of Ukraine’s defense tech ecosystem, these initiatives would enable entrepreneurs to gain a deeper understanding of how to attract investments, scale innovations, and align with national security objectives. For the United States, such programs offer the opportunity to strengthen collaboration with Ukraine’s emerging defense sector. This partnership would give the United States valuable connections with Ukrainian innovators across the defense industry, benefiting both nations in shaping the future of AI in national security and defense.</p> +<p>In 2018, the Trump administration rebranded the BBG as the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), an independent federal agency that oversees and broadcasts news and information about the United States and the world internationally.</p> -<p>The development and integration of military AI into future weapon systems is inevitable. While the United States leads in technological innovation, it faces limitations in testing these advancements under real combat conditions. Collaboration with Ukraine presents a unique and mutually beneficial opportunity to bridge this gap. By working together with Ukraine, the United States can gain firsthand insights into the practical applications of military AI and autonomous systems without putting “boots on the ground.” Otherwise, real combat environments remain theoretical or simulated for U.S. systems manufacturers. Moreover, this partnership can provide valuable contributions to the international debate on safe and responsible AI deployment, offering concrete evidence from battlefield usage to help construct a global framework for military AI governance. As AI continues to reshape defense landscapes, U.S.-Ukraine collaboration stands to advance technological innovation while setting standards for responsible and ethical AI integration into military systems worldwide.</p> +<p>The Department of State and the USAGM sought to maintain credibility with international audiences as new technologies emerged, allowing other voices to compete with U.S. efforts to promote Western norms and institutions globally.</p> -<hr /> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="box-1-what-is-public-diplomacy"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1. What Is Public Diplomacy?</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Kateryna Bondar</strong> is a fellow with the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.</p>Kateryna BondarThis report examines the Ukrainian government initiatives and key institutions driving the development of military AI capabilities. It also explores the preconditions that have shaped their adoption in the Ukraine war.Too Good To Lose2024-11-12T12:00:00+08:002024-11-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/too-good-to-lose<p><em>When it comes to the future of American semiconductor manufacturing and the success of the CHIPS Act, Intel is not too big to fail, but it is too good to lose.</em></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A challenge in any effort to revamp public diplomacy lies in the fact that there are multiple definitions of the term and competing understandings of what activities fall under its umbrella. A traditional understanding of the term might only include state-to-state activities. More broadly defined, U.S. public diplomacy also encompasses official messaging from the Department of State and the White House; U.S. international broadcasting via USAGM, Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe; and other soft power tools, military operations, and covert actions.</code></em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>U.S. public diplomacy today faces a fundamentally different landscape than it has ever encountered since its inception: a highly digitalized, multipolar world order where audiences can choose where they get their information and what they believe, all in the palm of their hands. Today’s market diversification provides audiences with many choices, including numerous countries with actively engaging foreign ministries and their state-sponsored news networks. Audiences are no longer passive consumers of whatever is available — they get to choose where they invest their time and attention. There are fewer gatekeepers to instant information. Videos, images, and articles no longer have to pass through a newspaper editor or network producer to reach an audience. A caveat, however, is that deepfakes, propaganda, and other forms of unverified information also have direct lines to mass audiences.</p> -<p>In 2022, Congress enacted the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act (CHIPS Act), a pivotal initiative which seeks to ensure U.S. leadership in semiconductor technology — the backbone of everything from cars to household appliances to defense systems. The CHIPS Act represents a national effort to reverse recent trends, driven by major industrial policies of other countries, that have led to the loss of U.S. leadership in the technology needed to manufacture the most advanced semiconductors. The United States has also seen an erosion of onshore chipmaking, which now accounts for only about 10 percent of global capacity. The urgency of the situation was brought into sharp relief by highly disruptive chip shortages during the Covid-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, China — the United States’ most formidable strategic competitor — is making rapid strides in semiconductor technology, particularly in defense-related areas.</p> +<p>This means U.S. public diplomacy must work harder than ever to showcase the superior attractiveness and value of the United States and its policies over competing alternatives. To do this, policymakers and practitioners must reframe their thinking from what public diplomacy was to what it needs to be in the coming century, which will likely be dominated by superpower competition between the United States, China, and Russia. They must refocus on multipolar public diplomacy and fill leadership voids in this space. In other words, the United States needs to reorient public diplomacy policy as a tool of relativity.</p> -<p>In its plan for implementing the CHIPS Act, the U.S. government has earmarked substantial federal assistance for the world’s three most advanced chipmakers, among others, to construct leading-edge manufacturing facilities and grow U.S. regional semiconductor ecosystems. Two of these firms, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and Samsung, are slated to receive substantial funding to support major investments in such ecosystems, which bring manifold opportunities for local growth and employment. Both firms are headquartered outside the United States and have, in the past, kept the lion’s share of their research and development (R&amp;D) and technology development in their respective home countries.</p> +<p>Effective public diplomacy will require appropriate levels of congressional funding and more effective use of that money. As the United States has decreased spending on public diplomacy, China and Russia continue to invest heavily in sophisticated propaganda in the developing world. The underlying goal of the U.S. effort should be not just to make the United States the most attractive and desirable country in the world but to position it as the “partner of choice” in competition with other vying players. Reputational security achieved through public diplomacy is undervalued, as reflected in underinvestment.</p> -<p>The third leading-edge firm is the storied Intel Corporation, the largest and most advanced U.S.-headquartered manufacturer. Intel has an unmatched history of breakthrough semiconductor innovations — including the first programmable microprocessor and the x86 architecture — which have together made an “indelible impact on the world of computing . . . [that] continues to shape the digital landscape of the modern world.”</p> +<h3 id="from-values-to-interests-in-public-diplomacy">From Values to Interests in Public Diplomacy</h3> -<p>While Intel is at present trailing TSMC and Samsung in chip process technology, it is the only U.S.-headquartered firm within striking distance of regaining U.S. capabilities at advanced process nodes. The company has made massive commitments to invest heavily — more than $100 billion over the next five years — in new chipmaking capability and capacity on domestic soil, aiming to develop and manufacture chips at the most advanced process nodes of 2 nanometers (nm) and below. Recognizing the importance of this, the U.S. government has announced plans to award Intel the largest share of federal support under the CHIPS Act. Successful implementation, and the resultant national security benefits, will depend on Intel.</p> +<p>If the United States is to refocus its public diplomacy policy, the central purpose of multipolar public diplomacy must be building alliances. Current U.S. policy underpins the “marketplace of ideas,” which focuses on values and norm-building. The issue is that when the United States advocates for and institutionalizes its values, it often neglects the divergent values held by foreign audiences. Strategic communication is not unidirectional; it is imperative to listen to counterparts when shaping the United States’ image and to avoid actions that contradict the desired perception. This is why the United States continuously struggles to improve its image and reputation in the Middle East. Large majorities in nine Middle Eastern countries report feeling that “the West doesn’t respect Muslim values, nor show concern for the Islamic and Muslim worlds.”</p> -<p>Unfortunately, at this juncture, Intel is experiencing financial and operational turbulence, in no small part due to its ambitious investments pursuant to the CHIPS Act’s objectives. Now, with a recently announced strategic recovery plan, the company appears to be seeking additional investment. Given Intel’s importance to the CHIPS Act’s economic and strategic goals, it is vital that the company remains viable and capable of carrying out its commitments — with even more public support, if necessary, than it has already been given.</p> +<p>Instead, multipolar public diplomacy is underpinned by the “marketplace of loyalties,” which focuses on interests. In this framework, states can work together to pursue their individual and common goals despite contradicting value sets. This is illustrated by the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II. Based on a shared interest in defeating Nazi Germany, two world powers vying for dominance were able to work together for a common goal that benefited both of their interests, despite disagreements on political and economic values. Likewise, the United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia is a modern example. The two countries have markedly different value sets, yet based on mutual security, economic, and energy interests, they work together for mutual advantage, even in the face of starkly contrasting values and continuous tension. The killing of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 is an example of a value-based difference that tested but did not break the U.S.-Saudi relationship, which is underpinned by common geopolitical interests.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Given Intel’s importance to the CHIPS Act’s economic and strategic goals, it is vital that the company remains viable and capable of carrying out its commitments — with even more public support, if necessary, than it has already been given.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Two-way, mutually beneficial relationships that advance respective interests — not values — must drive the U.S. alliance-building for the remainder of the twenty-first century. Per Richard Haass, “Foreign policy is not about virtue signaling; it is about advancing interests. Prioritizing and compartmentalizing are essential.” This is not to say that the United States should give up on promoting democratic values — quite the contrary. U.S. public diplomacy needs to create reputational security by being genuine, authentic, and consistent. However, given the democratic backsliding over the last two decades and the rise of regimes that do not share Western values regarding universal human rights, the cost of pursuing global democratization and a liberal world order is growing exponentially. The United States’ political, social, and economic capital simply cannot afford to re-democratize the international system while also fending off power advances by China and Russia. It becomes a cost-benefit analysis, where interests offer a greater potential for cross-cultural engagement, dialogue, and cooperation than do values.</p> -<h3 id="intels-turnaround-strategy">Intel’s Turnaround Strategy</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">U.S. public diplomacy needs to create reputational security by being genuine, authentic, and consistent.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Intel’s operational and financial difficulties received extensive media coverage in 2024, some of which exaggerated the severity of its challenges and perhaps adversely affected the company’s stock price. Shortly after Intel’s CEO, Pat Gelsinger, took charge in 2021, he announced an ambitious “IDM 2.0” strategy, which included plans for the company to become a major global player in the contract-manufacturing (“foundry”) market. The initial plan called for the establishment of a new business unit, Intel Foundry Services (later rebranded as Intel Foundry), as well as tens of billions of dollars for the construction of new manufacturing facilities to service surging demand. Intel Foundry, when announced, represented a significant expansion beyond Intel’s integrated device manufacturer (IDM) business model, in which the company’s manufacturing capacity was reserved for Intel-designed chips. Intel Foundry, however, allows for the manufacturing of chips designed by other firms, which puts Intel in direct competition with other large foundry providers such as TSMC.</p> +<p>Likewise, the rise of a “post-truth” reality, marked by information overload and rampant disinformation, has created a social ecosystem that significantly bottlenecks the marketplace of ideas. The best ideas do not always rise to the top; even those that do are not always accepted as the best. At a time when the philosophical applicability of the “marketplace of ideas” is failing, the “marketplace of loyalties” offers a viable alternative. The underlying premise of refocusing U.S. public diplomacy is that this new approach focuses on making the United States the partner of choice over China or Russia, based on its superior ability to deliver on the interests of foreign audiences and governments.</p> -<p>In 2024, Gelsinger unveiled the next phase of the firm’s strategy, announcing that it will further separate its design business from Intel Foundry, which will be an independent subsidiary with substantial autonomy, complete with its own board of directors, bylaws, and operating structure. This action is intended to provide foundry services for chip design firms with stronger protection of intellectual property.</p> +<h3 id="the-centrality-of-emerging-technology">The Centrality of Emerging Technology</h3> -<p>Some progress on this front has already been made. In a multibillion-dollar arrangement, Intel Foundry will leverage new process technology to manufacture chips for Amazon’s cloud computing wing beginning in 2025, including customized server devices. Forbes observed that “This can only be looked at as a positive — a strategic, long-term deal that Intel didn’t have before. If you can get the number-one cloud provider to do not just one but two highly custom chips with you, one in the foundry and one in a custom server chip, that portends a very good future.”</p> +<p>Information is the currency of the new world order, so to compete in a multipolar landscape, U.S. public diplomacy must be competitive in telling its narratives to the rest of the world. Technology and buy-in from tech companies are important elements in formulating a public diplomacy strategy suitable for the twenty-first century. The importance of diplomatic ties to and collaboration with tech companies is evidenced by the soaring number of countries that have established dedicated diplomatic missions to Silicon Valley in the San Francisco Bay Area. Luckily, the United States and its private sector already outcompete both China and Russia in technology development, so it simply comes down to leveraging the public and private resources already at play while combating adversarial attempts to weaponize the same technological advances. But how can technology help U.S. public diplomacy in a multipolar world order?</p> -<p>Additionally, backed by a $3 billion federal grant, Intel will develop chip manufacturing infrastructure for the U.S. defense industry. The federal award represents “another win for Intel Foundry, and even more so for the highly secure supply chain that Gelsinger has been intent on building for Intel over the past few years.”</p> +<p>First, technology can provide greater internet access. The United States needs to be able to deliver its content to audiences, even in countries that control or restrict access. Therefore, technology that provides increased access is invaluable. For example, Starlink’s mobile broadband satellite system provides access across the African continent. Likewise, USAGM’s Open Technology Fund programs, which provide virtual private networks and censorship-circumvention tools, are steps in this direction. For example, the agency has worked with nthLink, Psiphon, and Lantern since the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict in 2014 to provide Russians with greater access to Western media.</p> -<p>Despite this progress, profitability will take time, as the high capital costs and lengthy timelines required to bring new fabs online limits near-term revenues. In 2023, for example, the company’s foundry unit brought in $18.9 billion but reported an operating loss of around $7 billion, as well as other operational problems. Intel does not expect the new fabs to generate “meaningful” revenue until 2027.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States needs to be able to deliver its content to audiences, even in countries that control or restrict access. Therefore, technology that provides increased access is invaluable.</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="issues-with-process-technology-and-products">Issues with Process Technology and Products</h4> +<p>Second, technology can provide improved techniques for telling the United States’ story. Even the most credible and authentic narratives can fail if they are not persuasive or never reach their intended audience. Leveraging new technologies to enhance the storytelling context of U.S. public diplomacy, elicit emotional responses, and achieve persuasive outcomes will be vital for outperforming competing narratives from China and Russia. This can range from artificial intelligence to virtual reality, augmented reality, mixed reality, or infotainment.</p> -<p>According to a September 2024 Reuters report, Intel faces difficulties in its upcoming 18A process technology, which is slated for high-volume production in 2025. Reuters indicated that Broadcom, a major fabless firm, had concluded after tests that Intel’s process was not yet ready for such production. Yet the report, even if accurate, may not be indicative of a significant problem, as Intel’s timeline anticipates the 18A technology to be ready for high-volume production in mid-2025, rather than mid- or even late 2024. Moreover, Intel reports that it already has a dozen customers using its 18A tool kit.</p> +<p>Third, technology can aid in countering state-sponsored disinformation and influence operations. U.S. public diplomacy cannot operate on its own merits alone. It must leverage emerging technology to identify, track, counter, and discredit narratives and false information spread through Chinese and Russian active measures. This requires interagency cooperation through initiatives like the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), as well as public-private partnerships with the tech sector, like Facebook’s election integrity program, to employ rapid alert detection networks to identify artificial amplification, deepfakes, content coordination, etc. The European External Action Service (EEAS), for example, employs a rapid alert system to detect disinformation and coordinate multistate responses through the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, EEAS Situation Room, G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, and NATO.</p> -<p>Intel’s 13th- and 14th-generation Intel Core processors are also reportedly encountering problems, which have potentially arisen from manufacturing defects. The company also reported in September 2024 that it would no longer use its Intel 20A process technology in Arrow Lake processors and instead outsource Arrow Lake production to Taiwan’s TSMC, stating that “because of our early success on Intel 18A . . . [we are able] to shift engineering resources from Intel 20A earlier than expected as we near completion of our five-nodes-in-four-years plan.” While some may see this move as a setback, it may reflect a strategic shift to concentrate on the 18A process. Other observers have pointed out that “Intel 20A was always a bridge to the more refined Intel 18A.”</p> +<h3 id="who-is-the-audience-of-a-refocused-public-diplomacy">Who Is the Audience of a Refocused Public Diplomacy?</h3> -<h4 id="shifts-in-demand">Shifts in Demand</h4> +<p>To enhance the competitive edge of U.S. public diplomacy over the next century, the conceptual focus on “foreign audiences” should be broadened operationally to include a range of foreign actors: corporations, nongovernmental organizations, cities, diasporas, influencers, and more. The Department of State’s Office of Global Partnerships is a model for partnering U.S. government staff and resources with nontraditional partners across business, philanthropy, and community organizations that could be mirrored within the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources (R/PPR).</p> -<p>Traditionally, Intel’s main revenue sources have been chips for personal computers and for data centers, which in 2023 accounted for 80 percent of the company’s revenues. The market for these kinds of chips, however, is being affected by a shift in consumer demand toward graphics processing units (GPUs) and central processing units (CPUs) that support applications of artificial intelligence (AI) — a market in which Intel’s presence is relatively limited — plus increasing competition from rivals AMD and Nvidia. As a result of these shifts, the company’s revenues declined from $79 billion in 2021 to $54 billion in 2023. As of mid-August 2024, Intel’s shares were trading below the company’s book value for the first time since 1981.</p> +<p>Additionally, U.S. public diplomacy suffers from a lack of engagement with the domestic public. While Americans frequently see headlines about how China and Russia challenge the United States abroad, they often lack substantive knowledge of how the U.S. government is working to compete in this shifting world order. As public opinion influences both political representation and appropriations, better engaging and informing U.S. residents about the efforts and successes of public diplomacy is crucial for securing public support, congressional recruitment, and greater influence in interagency cooperation.</p> -<p>Gelsinger’s response has been decisive. In August 2024, in order to cut costs, he announced that Intel would reduce its workforce by 15,000 by November, suspend its shareholder dividend, and reduce or eliminate many employee perks. While the company’s stock price declined by roughly two-thirds between February 2021 and September 2024, recent turnaround strategy announcements have led to a modest rebound.</p> +<p>The Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 allowed for greater transparency and access to materials intended for foreign audiences but maintained restrictions on their use for influencing domestic U.S. public opinion. Further revisions to the act should consider eliminating outdated policies and rethinking U.S. public diplomacy’s domestic engagement strategy.</p> -<h4 id="national-security-implications">National Security Implications</h4> +<h3 id="achieving-public-diplomacy-goals-in-the-coming-decades">Achieving Public Diplomacy Goals in the Coming Decades</h3> -<p>While recent accounts of Intel’s difficulties have mostly been confined to the business pages, the company’s future has broad national and global significance far beyond its employees and shareholders. Intel is a critical player in the U.S. government’s efforts to reduce dependency on chips manufactured abroad — notably the significant concentration of production in Taiwan — and regain leadership in semiconductor manufacturing technology. Both capability and capacity are needed to provide an alternative source for the most advanced chips and a more resilient supply chain for foundational chips essential to the automotive, telecommunications, and medical sectors. If Intel’s restructuring efforts fail, larger U.S. efforts are unlikely to achieve their objectives, with significant ramifications for U.S. national security and economic future. Indeed, as Geoff Colvin recently argued in Fortune, “Intel is no longer a conventional company and can no longer be evaluated as one. . . . it’s now a corporate actor on the geopolitical stage.” Policymakers must recognize Intel’s national security importance within this decade’s dramatically changed geopolitical environment.</p> +<p>Refocusing U.S. public diplomacy’s purview requires a whole-of-government approach, interagency exercises to expose resource gaps, and designing a grand strategy that outlines responsibilities and costs associated with expanding capacity. This requires five key first steps to compete in the coming multipolar world. These span leadership, cooperation, evaluation, purpose, and training.</p> -<h3 id="intel-and-the-chips-act">Intel and the CHIPS Act</h3> +<h4 id="1-consistency-in-leadership-and-strategy">1. Consistency in Leadership and Strategy</h4> -<p>The Covid-19 pandemic led to disruptions across the U.S. semiconductor supply chain — most notably in the automotive industry — as well as volatility in other industries and supply chains involving PCs and data centers. While the causes of the shortage are complex, it highlighted the fact that when foreign supply is limited, the United States no longer has the domestic chipmaking capacity to manufacture the most advanced semiconductors which many products demand. Recognizing the national security and economic implications of this vulnerability, Congress enacted the CHIPS Act in 2022, which seeks to support U.S. chipmakers’ efforts to recapture technological leadership and to encourage the expansion of semiconductor manufacturing capacity in the United States. The CHIPS Act deploys a combination of federal grants, loans, and tax incentives for investments in U.S. semiconductor manufacturing, as well as support for R&amp;D and related workforce initiatives.</p> +<p>U.S. public diplomacy has been self-sabotaged out of the gate for over 20 years by a lack of consistent leadership. The position of the undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs (R) was vacant 44 percent of the 22 years between 1999 and 2021 (over nine and a half years), with nine congressional appointees filling the office the other 56 percent of the time (just over 12 years). This lack of institutional continuity has prevented the development of an organized and coherent strategy for implementation across the Department of State, let alone the entire U.S. government. This inconsistency has contributed to China and Russia outperforming the United States in the information and influence domain over the last two decades. If the United States is serious about competing with China and Russia in this space, the White House must prioritize quickly filling this critical office with qualified personnel. However, given the broken Senate confirmation process, creating a role that bypasses the lengthy process would be beneficial.</p> -<p>Beginning in late 2023, the Department of Commerce proposed a series of federal funding awards for companies undertaking capital investments in chipmaking. Intel is the provisional recipient of the largest single federal award package, reflecting both its centrality in the U.S. semiconductor ecosystem and the scale of its investments in chipmaking. The Department of Commerce’s Preliminary Memorandum of Terms (PMT) with Intel, announced in March 2024, included grants of up to $8.5 billion to help finance the construction, expansion, and modernization of wafer fabrication, advanced packaging, and development facilities in Ohio, Arizona, New Mexico, and Oregon. Additionally, the PMT provides up to $11 billion in federal loans to support Intel’s investments. The company also indicated that it would take advantage of the Department of the Treasury’s Investment Tax Credit for fab construction, which is expected cover up to 25 percent of qualifying capital expenditures undertaken by the end of 2026. Furthermore, Intel will receive $3 billion in additional CHIPS Act grants for a Secure Enclave program, which would ensure a protected supply of leading-edge chips for the U.S. government.</p> +<p>That said, in the United States, the executive branch cannot bypass the legislative branch if reputational security advancements are to be achieved. If the Senate confirmation process cannot be streamlined, it is critical for congressional leadership to better address authorizations and appropriations related to public diplomacy.</p> -<h4 id="a-central-role-in-growing-us-technological-capacity">A Central Role in Growing U.S. Technological Capacity</h4> +<p>In contrast, leaders like Xi Jinping in China and Vladimir Putin in Russia can arbitrarily redirect national resources at will.</p> -<p>It would be difficult to overstate Intel’s role in the success or failure of the CHIPS Act. Intel has been described as “the only U.S.-based company with leading-edge semiconductor fabs” capable of developing and manufacturing cutting-edge chips that are necessary to support advanced applications of AI at the 2 nm node and below. While Intel’s 3-nm production and below may be a year or more behind that of global leaders TSMC and Samsung (indeed, Samsung is apparently struggling with technical challenges itself), no other U.S.-owned semiconductor maker is in a position to reignite U.S. semiconductor manufacturing process leadership.</p> +<h4 id="2-centrality-of-leadership-in-interagency-cooperation">2. Centrality of Leadership in Interagency Cooperation</h4> -<p>Despite the near-term cash flow concerns, Intel remains committed to its over $100 billion investment in new U.S. chipmaking capability and capacity over the next five years. No other large chip manufacturer is investing anywhere close to the scale of Intel’s projects in the United States over the same time frame. These plans necessarily require very high levels of capital expenditure, with payoffs only coming in the medium-to-long term. In early 2024, to raise the necessary capital, Intel sold a 49 percent share in its Ireland-based fab to Apollo Global Management for a sum of $11 billion. In addition, Intel has concluded a deal with Brookfield Asset Management, a major investment firm, to funnel $30 billion into two new chipmaking facilities in Arizona. Notwithstanding Intel’s internal layoffs and other setbacks, Gelsinger affirmed in August 2024 that the company remains committed to domestic manufacturing, stating that “Intel is prioritizing our core investments that are laying the groundwork for our future, and . . . our existing U.S. projects in Arizona, New Mexico, Ohio and Oregon.”</p> +<p>U.S. public diplomacy during the Cold War was successful because the USIA was the centralized leader of U.S. government information and influence efforts, with direct access to the White House and the National Security Council. Today, the lack of influential leadership in public diplomacy weakens the U.S. government’s effectiveness in the information domain. Edward R. Murrow, the late director of the USIA, recommended that “public diplomacy be in at the takeoff of foreign policies, not just at the occasional crash landing.” The absence of a prominent agency leader also reduces attention from senior-level policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches.</p> -<p>Intel’s ambitious manufacturing objectives rest on exceptional technological capabilities. Intel remains at the cutting edge of chip manufacturing innovation: its next process technology, Intel 18A, operates at the 1.8 nm node and is expected to compete directly with TSMC’s 2 nm “N2” process. Intel 18A combines multiple process innovations, from 3D hybrid bonding to nanosheet transistors to back-side power delivery. Intel plans to use 18A process technology in its own new server processor, Clearwater Forest.</p> +<p>There is no point in creating a new USIA, as that would be an unhelpful bureaucratic reorganization. However, giving the White House and the National Security Council authority over a singular organization or agency, as the USIA once had when it participated in White House cabinet and National Security Council meetings, would clarify, harmonize, and centralize U.S. government efforts, increasing the efficiency of interagency cooperation and resource allocation. Positioning the GEC as the dedicated central hub, for example, would be ideal, as it is Department of State-focused but enjoys more operational cooperation and buy-in from the national security and intelligence communities than R/PPR. This would require official interagency memoranda of agreement directing other agencies and departments to be accountable to the GEC. It would also necessitate more funding — for example, liaisons to the GEC, GEC liaisons to the tech world, and additional billets within the GEC for analysts, supervisors, and possibly their own software programmers.</p> -<h4 id="still-a-first-mover">Still a First Mover</h4> +<p>Another way to achieve greater impact is by doubling down on performance measurement in U.S. public diplomacy. This would allow practitioners to demonstrate its effectiveness and value as a security tool to policymakers in Congress and the White House. The work done by R/PPR’s Research and Evaluation Unit is the first step in institutionalizing performance measurements across U.S. public diplomacy. However, it is important to stress that psychological and sociological influences are slow processes. No social science programming can yield comprehensive results in a matter of weeks, months, or even years. Policymakers need to understand that public diplomacy measurement and evaluation is a cumulative process, with trends revealing themselves over the course of years, decades, or even generations. Assessment expectations within an annual budget cycle, for example, will do little more than illustrate the fact that individual and societal influence is far from instantaneous. There must be a willingness to consider the compounding evidence of comprehensive mixed-methods research over time.</p> -<p>Despite its recent setbacks, Intel continues to be a first-mover on leveraging technologies that would bring it back to leading-edge manufacturing process leadership. Recently, Intel finalized a deal with the Dutch lithography equipment maker ASML to receive ASML’s first 2024 run of new state-of-the-art High-Numerical Aperture Extreme Ultraviolet (High-NA EUV) lithography machines. High-NA EUV lithography further shortens the wavelength of the ultraviolet light used to etch nanoscale circuits, a crucial process for the next generation of lower-nanometer chipmaking. According to IBM, the ASML machines “can perform a new technique that could pave the way to developing and producing chips at nodes even smaller than 2 nm.” It is important to note these are not just plans. Intel received the world’s first High-NA EUV machine in December 2023, which was installed and calibrated in the spring of 2024 at the company’s technology development fab in Oregon. Moreover, Intel is slated to receive a second machine in late 2024 and, according to reports, has committed to buying ASML’s entire 2024 run of High-NA EUV tools, giving it a head start on deploying this new technology.</p> +<h4 id="3-efficiency-of-dollars-spent">3. Efficiency of Dollars Spent</h4> -<p>While Intel’s principal competitors, TSMC and Samsung, are also making investments in U.S. chipmaking under the CHIPS Act, their new fabs will only represent a small portion of each company’s capacity. TSMC and Samsung remain the national champions for Taiwan and South Korea, respectively, retaining essential know-how and R&amp;D facilities in their home countries, whose governments have well-honed incentive strategies to nurture and sustain leading-edge chipmaking at home. They are responsive, first and foremost, to their own national ecosystems and the needs of their governments. Intel’s decision to pause new chipmaking investments in Europe underscores the limits foreign-owned chipmakers may set on their U.S. manufacturing operations and investments as markets, company strategies, and geopolitical concerns evolve.</p> +<p>Furthermore, the United States does not need to outspend China or Russia in this domain; instead, it must allocate resources and efforts more efficiently. Audience analysis and segmentation are ideal methods to achieve this. The key is to win over moderate and persuadable audiences, so the greatest resources should be focused on countries and regions not already aligned exclusively with China or Russia. This should begin with countries of strategic geopolitical interest to the United States that are being actively courted by either country. For example, Panama was one of China’s first Belt and Road Initiative partners, and the influx of Chinese investments influenced the outcome of Panamanian elections and legislative votes in favor of China’s economic and security priorities over those of the United States. Similarly, the popularity of the Arabic-language RT (Russia’s international news network) has influenced public perception of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in North Africa and the Middle East.</p> -<p>If Intel were to bow out of CHIPS Act initiatives — whether by its own decision, a change in U.S. government policy, or the acquisition of the company’s foundry business by a third party not bound to the CHIPS Act — the act’s successful and timely implementation would be seriously jeopardized. The stakes are high, including for national defense; as writer Mackenzie Hawkins recently pointed out in Bloomberg, “Intel’s woes may . . . jeopardize the government’s ability to reach its policy goals, which include establishing a secure supply of cutting-edge chips for the Pentagon and making a fifth of the world’s advanced processors by 2030.” Finding a U.S.-headquartered replacement to maintain domestic ownership of Intel’s higher-end fabs or to preserve its technological know-how would be nearly impossible.</p> +<p>While an in-depth strategic analysis by regional experts is required to develop a comprehensive list of countries of strategic geopolitical interest to the United States, numerous natural-mineral-rich countries in the Global South are being lobbied by both Chinese and Russian public and private sectors. Some key examples include the following:</p> -<p>As veteran chip industry analyst Dan Hutcheson succinctly put it, “The purpose of the Chips Act was partly to make sure we kept Intel as an American company supported by the American government.” The Biden administration appears to recognize this: The Financial Times reported in September 2024 that Intel and the U.S. government were on track to finalize negotiations on the $8.5 billion grant contract by the end of the year, which “would amount to a vote of confidence in Intel by the U.S. government.”</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Africa:</strong> Zimbabwe (platinum group metals and lithium), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (copper, cobalt, lithium, and petroleum), Mali (iron, lead, chromium, nickel, lithium, and uranium), Guinea (iron and uranium), Mozambique (iron, titanium, graphite, and copper), South Africa (iron, platinum, manganese, and uranium), and Zambia (copper, cobalt, and platinum group metals).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>South America:</strong> Bolivia (petroleum), Chile (lithium and copper), Mexico (iron, copper, and zinc), Peru (iron, manganese, and copper), Jamaica (iron, copper, and zinc), the Dominican Republic (copper, nickel, and zinc), Guatemala (iron, nickel, and zinc), and Panama (access to the canal).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Asia:</strong> India (iron, manganese, graphite, zinc, and copper), Uzbekistan (petroleum, uranium, copper, and zinc), Indonesia (nickel, cobalt, and copper), Kazakhstan (manganese, uranium, iron, copper, zinc, and petroleum), Kyrgyzstan (iron, manganese, petroleum, and zinc), Malaysia (iron, manganese, copper, and bauxite), and Tajikistan (iron, uranium, petroleum, and zinc).</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>In parallel with Intel’s negotiations with the Commerce Department, reports have surfaced that Samsung, Apple, and the fabless design firm Qualcomm are considering taking a stake in Intel or acquiring the company outright. It is not clear that these or other similar reports have much substance. In September 2024, Intel reportedly rebuffed an overture from UK-based, SoftBank-owned Arm Holdings to acquire its product division.</p> +<h4 id="4-purpose-as-informer-or-persuader">4. Purpose as Informer or Persuader</h4> -<p>Moreover, an acquisition of Intel, or pieces of it, by another major chip firm would unquestionably face antitrust scrutiny in the United States and possibly elsewhere, as well as a likely challenge by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) if the investor were foreign. At the very least, takeover of any part of Intel’s business could disrupt the delicate negotiations between the company and the government.</p> +<p>Reinforcing institutional mission sets is also vital. The goal of U.S. public diplomacy might be compared to counterinsurgency’s purpose of winning the “hearts and minds” during military conflict. In the Information Age, public diplomacy should aim to build the United States’ credibility with global audiences. USAGM has spent decades cultivating a reputation for credibility with its various networks, serving as a transparent and objective news outlet. The agency needs to retain its editorial independence to remain a recognized international source of fact-based journalism.</p> -<p>Given the stakes in this global contest, it is unfortunate that the negotiations over Intel’s CHIPS Act funding continue to become more complex, with the CHIPS Program Office reportedly requiring commitments beyond those outlined in the act, and which some suggest are more akin to those required for private equity investments than for a congressionally mandated grant program. Overly stringent government requirements, though designed to ensure CHIPS Act funding meets the program’s goals, could paradoxically compromise Intel’s ability to utilize the grants. For example, Politico recently cited concerns from a number of CHIPS Act recipients that government negotiations are both slow and expansive with conditions on the CHIPS Act awards that have little to do with ensuring the success of the projects. While recognizing the obligation to meet statutory requirements, more than two years after passage of the CHIPS Act, the Commerce Department has yet to distribute major funding.</p> +<p>As Nicholas J. Cull argues, “international broadcasting is powerful but works best at arm’s length.” This necessitates codified barriers to operational interference from the White House or Congress. Politics must stay out of USAGM for it to remain attractive to foreign audiences as a reliable source of information. On the other hand, as a central branch of the executive government, the Department of State should remain the primary tool of political advocacy in advancing the United States’ narratives to the rest of the world. The Department of State is the central hub for engaging, through various soft power means, in persuasive communication that articulates the attractiveness of U.S. policies and engagement.</p> -<h3 id="ensuring-intels-continued-us-manufacturing-presence">Ensuring Intel’s Continued U.S. Manufacturing Presence</h3> +<h4 id="5-advanced-training-and-professional-development">5. Advanced Training and Professional Development</h4> -<p>As noted, having Intel continue as an innovative, internationally competitive U.S. semiconductor manufacturer is a matter not only of economic interest, but of national security. The release of near-term CHIPS Act funding is becoming more important, especially given the scale of Intel’s investments and its ongoing financial difficulties. In response to potential further delay — attributed to the slow disbursement of federal aid — in Intel’s $28 billion Ohio project, Governor Mike DeWine has requested that the Biden administration expedite the necessary funding to Intel. However, the new fabs funded by these grants will not generate significant revenues until 2027, exposing the company to cash-flow challenges in the interim. One recent industry analysis commented that “Intel’s continued struggle begs the question: will the U.S. government need to do more?”</p> +<p>Lastly, communication is a skills-based profession, yet most foreign service officers and many public diplomacy officers are not highly trained communication practitioners. The State Department should model high-level training and strategically oriented professional development programs with academic partners, like the Defense Department’s program for mid-career public affairs officers (PAOs) at San Diego State University’s School of Journalism and Media Studies. This curriculum provides PAOs with advanced theoretical knowledge and practical skills in campaign planning, implementation, and measurement. It also trains PAOs to serve as strategic counselors to commanding officers.</p> -<p>Should the government concur with the assessment that Intel is not too big to fail but too good to lose, there are major recent precedents for federal policy measures to shore up companies whose collapse would bring unacceptable national costs. For example, the 2008 financial crisis posed an existential threat to large U.S. financial and manufacturing companies; confronting the prospect of imminent calamity, the Bush administration implemented the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), providing $426 billion in federal support to stabilize financial and manufacturing institutions, including failing U.S. automakers, that were considered “too big to fail.” TARP was not designed to subsidize or nationalize struggling companies, but rather to give them an interim financial bridge, allowing them to remain solvent while working toward profitability and continuing to serve as pillars of the U.S. economy.</p> +<p>Experienced public diplomacy officers need similar advanced training and professional development to build industry-led skill sets in campaign planning and implementation, program development, audience analysis, measurement, and evaluation, and counseling senior foreign service officers, ambassadors, and policymakers.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Should the government concur with the assessment that Intel is not too big to fail but too good to lose, there are major recent precedents for federal policy measures to shore up companies whose collapse would bring unacceptable national costs.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Options for collaboration with academia include specialized programs in public diplomacy at institutions such as the University of Southern California’s Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Oklahoma State University’s School of Global Studies, and George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs. Another option is to pair the Foreign Service Institute and R/PPR with academic and research partners, facilitated through the Office of Global Partnerships’ Diplomacy Lab program.</p> -<p>Importantly, TARP was executed at scale in several affected industries. In December 2008, the Bush administration announced a $17.4 billion rescue loan for U.S. automakers. President Bush later recalled that he “didn’t want history to look back and say, ‘Bush could have done something but chose not to do it.’” Incoming President Barack Obama defended Bush’s action as a “necessary step to avoid a collapse in our auto industry that would have devastating consequences for our economy and our workers.” Obama augmented the Bush administration’s financial support for U.S. auto firms with federal outlays eventually totaling about $80 billion. Washington subsequently recovered most of these funds, with the net cost to taxpayers amounting to about $10 billion. No major U.S. automaker disappeared during the crisis, and the Big Three auto manufacturers remain a key element in today’s domestic manufacturing economy.</p> +<p>As the U.S. government seeks to contain its adversaries’ influence and geopolitical impact, it is critical to consider lessons from the twentieth century. Public diplomacy was a novel tool that helped tip the Cold War stalemate in the United States’ favor. The White House and Congress must prioritize investments in public diplomacy’s capacity to become a competitive tool in the international information ecosystem and reconsider what twenty-first-century public diplomacy requires for effective global strategic communications. The undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs (R) and USAGM’s lack of centrality in the national security community will continue to handcuff U.S. government efforts if inaction persists. Meanwhile, the United States will watch as China and Russia continue to build alliances across the globe and fortify their legitimacy as superpowers.</p> -<p>Similar measures were extended to ailing financial institutions under the Treasury Department’s 2008 Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which exchanged financial assistance for preferred stock in the companies, along with debt securities and warrants to purchase common and preferred stock. Under the CPP, the Treasury Department acquired $205 billion worth of shares to shore up troubled financial services firms over the short term, of which $200 billion was eventually redeemed by those same institutions. The purpose of the CPP was to enable financial firms to continue supplying essential levels of liquidity to the U.S. economy.</p> +<hr /> -<h4 id="avoiding-disaster">Avoiding Disaster</h4> +<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p>The objective of TARP was to avert a second Great Depression, which could have been triggered by the collapse of the U.S. financial and manufacturing sectors. It not only succeeded but did so at what proved to be a bearable cost to the government. A 2022 Congressional Budget Office study observed that “the U.S. financial system was in a precarious position when the TARP was created, and the transactions envisioned and ultimately undertaken entailed substantial financial risk for the federal government. Nevertheless, the TARP’s net realized costs have proved to be near the low end of the range of possible outcomes anticipated at the program’s outset.”</p> +<p><strong>Phillip Arceneaux</strong> is an assistant professor of strategic communication at Miami University.</p>Daniel F. Runde and Phillip ArceneauxThe United States needs to rethink public diplomacy in an era dominated by great-power competition. U.S. public diplomacy must work harder than ever to showcase the superior attractiveness and value of the United States and its policies over competing alternatives.Countering China And Russia2024-11-14T12:00:00+08:002024-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/countering-china-and-russia<p><em>This brief lays an ana­lytic foundation for considering gender analyses, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) programs, as strategic enablers for accomplishing key Department of Defense (DoD) priorities.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>In order to do so, it first explores the gendered dimensions of authoritarianism and deterrence and then discerns a number of specific ways that WPS programs can be leveraged to give the DoD strategic advantages in critical theaters. CSIS stress-tested these concepts through a tabletop exercise designed to illuminate the conditions under which planners might assess that a gender-informed strategic approach would generate meaningful advantage for the United States. The brief concludes with recommendations for how the DoD might generate enterprise-wide momentum toward meaningfully leveraging WPS tools and incorporating gender perspectives in key processes.</em></p> -<p>Although the specifics of TARP and the CPP fortunately do not align perfectly with Intel’s current challenges, Intel’s current operational problems have important parallels with the crisis of 2008:</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<p>Deterrence — essentially, utilizing instruments of power to convince an adversary to refrain from taking a particular course of action — is a core aspect of the United States’ strategy to halt the advance of authoritarian regimes across multiple domains. In order to better organize the DoD’s deterrent posture, the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) puts forward an intriguing construct: tailored, integrated deterrence. Integrated deterrence is, at its core, a way of reminding the DoD about the fundamentals of deterrence: namely, that it is a psychological calculation rather than a particular widget or program. In order for an adversary to be deterred, it must believe that a course of action that it is considering is not worth pursuing. The key components of strategies that dissuade adversaries from undesirable activities are capabilities, such as the actual military and other elements of national power, and credibility, namely demonstrations of the political will to act in the event a red line is crossed.</p> + +<p>The central challenge before the DoD — and the U.S. government more broadly — is to better tailor its deterrent strategies through more creative employment of military ways and means. This requires a better understanding of the psychologies of power and vulnerabilities within adversary regimes. In other words, building deterrence strategies that actually affect the psychological calculations of most U.S. adversary authoritarian regimes requires taking a much more serious look at their power structures and concepts of power, both of which are heavily gendered.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The central challenge before the DoD — and the U.S. government more broadly — is to better tailor its deterrent strategies through more creative employment of military ways and means.</code></em></strong></p> + +<h3 id="gender-as-a-conceptual-lens">Gender as a Conceptual Lens</h3> + +<p>“Gender” does not mean “women”; rather, gender is a way to express and promulgate core notions of identity and power at individual and structural levels. “Gender” as a conceptual lens is not limited to women and women’s representation. Although women often play important roles in challenging authoritarian power structures — as recent events in Iran demonstrate — they do so in opposition to the reactionary gender roles prescribed for all citizens by authoritarian regimes. While women are often drivers for thinking about gendered aspects of security questions — if not catalysts for social change — analytically focusing on one gender misses the bigger societal and structural pictures of which gender is a key part.</p> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="methodology"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Methodology</code></h4> +</blockquote> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To understand how WPS and gender-related approaches might help illuminate more effective approaches to building tailored, integrated deterrence strategies, CSIS initiated a multipronged project that incorporated a mixed methods analytic approach in its research design. Over the course of one year, CSIS</code></em></p> <ul> <li> - <p>Intel is the central player in the government’s implementation of the CHIPS Act, which is critical for national security and economic well-being. The company could benefit a great deal from federal support to surmount a cash flow pinch in 2025–26, when its new fabs begin to generate revenue in 2027 and beyond. The goal of such a cash flow would be to provide financing to enable Intel to keep the construction and investments on track while signaling a commitment to the company’s success.</p> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">convened six working groups with leading gender, regional, and strategy experts;</code></em></p> </li> <li> - <p>Semiconductor manufacturing is not a waning industrial sector. The demand for advanced chips is robust, due in no small part to the AI boom. The question is not whether the sector is viable, but who will lead its production and reap the rewards, including the revenue necessary to fund the next round of innovation.</p> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">conducted dozens of research interviews;</code></em></p> </li> <li> - <p>Without Intel’s continued participation, achieving the CHIPS Act’s main goals — reestablishing American technological leadership in high-end chip manufacturing and reducing reliance on foreign chipmakers — will be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.</p> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">traveled to both U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) theaters to engage with experts and planners at operational or theater levels; and</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">designed, ran, and analyzed a tabletop exercise to “stress test” and validate insights derived from working group discussions, interviews, and study trips.</code></em></p> </li> </ul> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The demand for advanced chips is robust, due in no small part to the AI boom. The question is not whether the sector is viable, but who will lead its production and reap the rewards, including the revenue necessary to fund the next round of innovation.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Research interviews were conducted utilizing a grounded theory approach; that is, theory was designed based on the information shared by interlocutors. In this case, participants were asked to share their views of the major problems they grappled with on a daily basis without reference to gender or WPS efforts. Theories on the utility of gender analytic approaches and WPS programs were constructed afterward.</code></em></p> -<h4 id="how-could-it-be-done">How Could It Be Done?</h4> +<h3 id="what-do-authoritarians-want">What Do Authoritarians Want?</h3> -<p>Additional federal support for Intel should be envisaged on both national security grounds and to favor domestic R&amp;D investment. This support could come in various forms: an extension of the CHIPS Advanced Manufacturing Investment Credit; the extension of additional loans and loan guarantees; targeted tax measures; and other similar measures taken under TARP and CPP. If the Big Three automakers and major U.S. financial institutions were deemed “too big to fail” in 2008, Intel can be similarly considered “too important to fail” in today’s increasingly perilous geopolitical environment.</p> +<p>What do authoritarians want? The short answer: power. They use gender scripts and repertoires to consolidate and maintain power; however, in so doing, they offer the United States opportunities to fracture, exploit, or contradict those scripts in ways that serve deterrent strategies. Authoritarian scripts often involve the repression of women and marginalized gender groups and the simultaneous promotion of what it means to be a desirable and powerful man, which may reflect both how authoritarian regimes acquire power and what they believe power is.</p> -<p>While the CHIPS Act has been instrumental in laying the groundwork for increased U.S. manufacturing capacity, the existence of new facilities does not guarantee their effective utilization. The U.S. government should thus consider how it can build on the foundational work of the CHIPS Act by focusing on strengthening the domestic supply chain. For example, targeted tax measures that provide incentives for the consumption of U.S.-produced wafers could not only help ensure the best possible return on new manufacturing facilities, but also encourage the building of additional capacity once the CHIPS Act incentives run out. Policies to help onshore the semiconductor supply chain will help to ensure that U.S. development and production of advanced chips is prioritized, thus encouraging periodic technological upgrades and even enabling the co-location of technology developments that are critical to national security.</p> +<h3 id="russia-gender-and-women">Russia, Gender, and Women</h3> -<p>While some will point out — correctly — that government support is inconsistent with traditional laissez-faire principles, historical precedent shows that national security concerns have overridden such principles during major crises such as World Wars I and II, the Cold War, and the 2008 financial crisis. Indeed, Washington has consistently taken steps to invest in and nurture key industries relevant to defense and health (including major investments in vaccine manufacturing during the Covid-19 pandemic).</p> +<p>Women’s equality is written into Russia’s constitution, and women in Russia occupy a relatively more equal social position than their counterparts in other authoritarian contexts. Yet, as of 2024, it is clear that Vladimir Putin’s brand of authoritarianism relies on strict differentiation between men and women. Russian women occupy a significant place in the labor market, and, in general, they are more educated than Russian men, but the legal and social differentiation of men and women has increased in Russia since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Feminist activists and gender equality advocates have been vocal opponents of the invasion.</p> -<p>Similar fears regarding the semiconductor industry’s competitiveness prompted significant federal investment and trade measures in the 1980s, when the U.S. chip industry was at risk of losing technological leadership. Major government investment, matched by the private sector, helped form the successful Sematech research and manufacturing consortium, which enabled the U.S. chip industry to regain competitiveness. Now, the future of Intel — the linchpin of the CHIPS Act — cannot be left to the vagaries of the market, especially one shaped and conditioned by other countries’ industrial policies.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The legal and social differentiation of men and women has increased in Russia since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="perspectives-from-abroad-policies-of-allies-and-competitors">Perspectives from Abroad: Policies of Allies and Competitors</h3> +<p>In the Soviet era, Russian laws supported gender equality, but then, as now, women’s social role was heavily centered on their childbearing and childrearing capacity. Although many women held jobs outside the home, they were banned from professions that might threaten their reproductive health, and pronatalist policies featured heavily in Soviet economic plans. Indeed, especially today, Russian women are encouraged to bear children to counter the nation’s declining birth rate — a statistic associated with decreased competitiveness in the global economy. Cloaked in the language of “traditional values,” Moscow’s sustained campaign against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ+) rights can also be understood in light of its pronatalist stance.</p> -<p>The cyclical nature of the semiconductor industry means it must make substantial investments to maintain and improve production capacity during economic downturns for the eventual recovery in demand. Semiconductor companies require significant capital to maintain their production capacity. To address these industry characteristics, leading manufacturers abroad often receive both direct and indirect government support, frequently on a massive scale.</p> +<p>This emphasis on “traditional values” has not always been a part of Vladimir Putin’s political arsenal. He began emphasizing cultural traditionalism (and restrictive gender roles for men and women) toward the end of his second term as president (2007–2008) and ramped up the rhetoric significantly after returning to the presidency in 2012. Along with his performance of virile masculine virtues in public spaces and photo opportunities, Putin began drawing starker lines of contrast between Russian “civilization” and the West. The close connections and affinity between Putin’s regime and the Russian army — an organization notorious for the brutality not only of its battlefield tactics, but also of its barracks culture — further underlined the importance of aggressive, “macho” behavior in legitimizing Putin’s abrogation of political opposition. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the violence of the war and domestic violence have been mutually reinforcing.</p> -<p>This is not new. The world’s leading semiconductor foundries, TSMC and United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC), were both established with the support of the Taiwanese government when they spun off from the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI). Since 1991, as the foundry concept gained traction, TSMC has experienced rapid growth as the world’s leading semiconductor foundry, acquiring unparalleled expertise and capabilities.</p> +<p>These restrictive visions of gender cut across Russia’s many social, ethnic, and cultural divides. In places where support for Putin might be limited because of his regime’s actions in the past — Chechnya, for example — promoting this version of violent, dominating masculinity is a way to consolidate support in certain quarters (and divide potential opposition by casting the regime’s role in “natural” and “nonpolitical” terms). Public memory of the chaos of the 1990s makes calls for order (even if restrictive) appealing across Russia.</p> -<p>Similarly, SK Hynix, one of the leading South Korean companies in advanced memory semiconductor manufacturing, is now a successful company despite sustaining major losses in the past following sharp declines in DRAM semiconductor prices that began in the mid-1990s. Pressured by the South Korean government, Hyundai Electronics Industries acquired LG Semicon, and their semiconductor division spun off as SK Hynix in 2001. After the spin-off, Hynix faced severe financial pressures from a heavy debt load and low DRAM prices. To restore the firm’s viability, a consortium of private and national financial institutions implemented a comprehensive support program, including debt forgiveness, equity conversion, credit limit expansion, debt maturity extension, and interest rate reductions. Hynix is now a profitable and competitive company.</p> +<h3 id="china-gender-and-women">China, Gender, and Women</h3> -<p>This policy approach remains relevant today. The Japanese government recently allocated $1.3 billion to Kioxia Holdings, Japan’s leading memory semiconductor company, which experienced very significant losses in 2023 primarily due to a cyclical downturn in demand for memory chips. Continuing to address the firm’s financial challenge, the Japanese government has recently allocated $1.3 billion in support of the company. This funding could stabilize Kioxia with the broader goal of ensuring Japan maintains its technological leadership in NAND flash memory, supporting a robust supply network to meet future market demand.</p> +<p>Women in twentieth and twenty-first century China have found their social and legal position highly dependent on the internal politics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): despite robust official rhetoric about communism’s equality principles, men remain socially and legally advantaged over women. As of 2024, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is undergoing a period of rising discrimination against women and inequality between men and women. Indeed, the CCP has been intensifying its crackdown on feminist activists and is increasingly reliant on the subjugation of women to maintain its hold on power. This is evident in the proliferation of unchecked gender-based violence, emphasis on “harmony” in response to dissent, and the performance of stereotypical masculinity by Xi and other high-ranking officials.</p> -<p>As these examples suggest, government policies have often played, and continue to play, major roles in shaping the industrial landscape in semiconductors. Today, many of the world’s leading countries are actively promoting domestic production. Like the United States, these nations are backing their domestic chipmakers with public support for investments in R&amp;D and manufacturing capacity. What is clear, however, is that these governments will not allow these key national enterprises to fail.</p> +<p>Rising economic uncertainty in China in the early 2020s has been accompanied by new policies pushing women into traditional roles of wife and mother in the home and making it far more difficult for women to obtain a divorce. Concern over a “masculinity crisis” has led to crackdowns on certain kinds of popular music, clothing, and other forms of expression deemed too “feminine” for Chinese men. At the same time, official rhetoric in support of Xi Jinping has focused on his paternal and masculine qualities, painting him as an ideal type of husband and father. Mirroring the CCP’s characterization of the Chinese state as a familial unit, this rhetoric makes space both for increasing the centralization of power in the CCP and for collectively enduring potential economic downturns. Sexist elements of Confucianism tend to replace the more egalitarian language of Marxism in these displays.</p> -<p>In fact, reflecting both the China challenge and new efforts of countries such as the United States, policies to support semiconductor manufacturing within national borders have increased in scale and frequency. This list of recent government investments in key domestic manufacturing companies illustrates the scale of financial support for firms in this strategic industry.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As of 2024, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is undergoing a period of rising discrimination against women and inequality between men and women.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>At the same time, China’s economic uncertainty will be directly impacted by women’s choices. Decades of the infamous one-child policy have produced severely declining birthrates in China, threatening a demographic contraction that will likely lead to greater instability. Efforts to both encourage and shame women into marriage and childbearing have had little discernible effect thus far, and, among younger generations, women — and to a lesser extent even men — express solidarity with feminism and gender equality. Most significantly, Chinese women were at the forefront of protests in China against the CCP’s draconian Covid-19 policies. The CCP’s campaign to shut down feminist dissent networks was only partially successful, as their previous anti-dissent campaigns focused on the threat of male dissenters. Women’s criticism of the regime poses a more complicated threat to the CCP’s dominance of the political discourse in China, in part because of the efforts the CCP has made to exclude them from the political realm and because of the growing popularity of feminist ideas among ordinary young women.</p> + +<p>In other words, as Xi strengthens his grip on power in Beijing, the CCP is fomenting concerns that boys are being “feminized,” and it has chosen not to place women in CCP leadership positions, a move that appears to contradict decades of Chinese policy promoting gender equality. Indeed, Beijing’s vision of a strong China now includes returning women to traditional gender roles — such as pushing them into marriage and childbirth — and cracking down on feminist activism. Much more directly, the Xinjiang crackdown has an extremely strong gendered element — specifically the elimination of Uyghur masculinity and the mass sterilization of women, combined with the imposition of Han men on Uyghur households.</p> + +<h3 id="a-dictators-gender-playbook">A Dictator’s Gender Playbook</h3> + +<p>Both Beijing and Moscow are weaponizing aspects of gender to advance their own strategic aims — and in somewhat similar ways. Indeed, there almost appears to be a gender-oriented “Dictator’s Playbook” with the following elements:</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>France:</strong> In June 2023, France announced that it would allocate $3.1 billion in public funding to its most advanced semiconductor manufacturer, STMicroelectronics, to build a semiconductor manufacturing plant in Crolles, in partnership with U.S.-based GlobalFoundries. STMicro, regarded as one of the most innovative firms in Europe, has benefitted from extensive state support since its formation under government auspices in 1968.</p> + <p>Women support national strength by serving as wives and mothers within the politically stabilizing institution of marriage</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Japan:</strong> After taking a largely laissez-faire approach, the Japanese government concluded it could not be economically secure without production of advanced semiconductors, particularly those used by its auto industry. Since 2022, in a major national initiative, the Japanese government has allocated $6 billion to Rapidus, aiming to establish this government- and privately-owned company as the flagship of Japan’s “ambition to catch up in semiconductor manufacturing.” Additionally, the company is expected to receive additional private bank loans and subsidies in its ambitious bid to produce cutting-edge chips.</p> + <p>Western ideas about sexuality are a threat to national strength</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>South Korea:</strong> Samsung and SK Hynix are engaged in discussions with the Korea Development Bank (KDB) about utilizing a low-interest loan program, valued at $12.3 billion, which is aimed at bolstering the semiconductor industry. SK Hynix will again seek government support, reportedly applying for a loan amounting to $2.1 billion. More broadly, South Korea recently enacted the “K-Chips Act,” a major program with significant incentives to promote national high-tech industries, notably semiconductors. The architect of the “K-Chips Act,” a former Samsung executive, sees the stakes as fundamentally shaping national trajectories, emphasizing that “the winner of the global chip battle will control the economic security order, while the loser will end up becoming a technological colony.”</p> + <p>Power means domination over other countries</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>China:</strong> China offers perhaps the leading case of government support for the industry. At the end of 2022, the Chinese government was reportedly planning to spend $143 billion over the next five years to support its semiconductor industry. In 2022, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) received $282.1 million. This continues the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (the “Big Fund”) to support investments in China’s semiconductor value chain, including production capacity, equipment, materials, and advanced packaging. In May 2024, China launched its third semiconductor “Big Fund,” a $45.7 billion investment vehicle to support the country’s domestic semiconductor industry. This figure is roughly on par with the CHIPS Act but more narrowly focused in that these resources will likely primarily benefit Huawei’s chip design and SMIC’s chip manufacturing. These new measures augment China’s already-massive government support for the country’s chip sector, including direct subsidies, preferential loans from government banks, and equity infusions, as well as subsidies from regional and municipal governments involving land, electrical power, and infrastructure. The ability to domestically develop and produce advanced chips is a top priority for China’s leadership, and this comprehensive strategy reflects that commitment. The collective effort of these programs dwarfs the support offered by other countries.</p> + <p>Young people are weaker than the generation the leaders came from, especially young men, and a demographic crisis looms without change</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Taiwan:</strong> Even in Taiwan, arguably the leading center of semiconductor manufacturing today, the government has recently stepped in to provide support. In January 2023, Taiwan enacted its own version of theCHIPS Act that “offers investment tax credits of 25% on R&amp;D and 5% on equipment.” This introduced the country’s largest-ever tax deduction for R&amp;D expenses and related capital investments in semiconductors, designed to benefit eligible semiconductor companies such as TSMC that meet specific criteria. These incentives complement the special benefits that Taiwan grants for research and manufacturing organizations located in science and industrial parks, which include, according to a Boston Consulting Group report, “relatively low-cost access to land, water, electricity, and infrastructure, as well as the possibility of expedited approvals and the elimination of import and export duties.” These multifaceted measures reflect the long-term commitment of the government to ensuring the continued success of its leading firms and the country’s central position in this global industry.</p> + <p>Women in power are deceitful and threatening</p> </li> </ul> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>These gender-driven positions are spilling over into the politics and strategic priorities of third-party states. As elites in Georgia, for example, are expanding cooperation with both Moscow and Beijing, they are simultaneously targeting women political leaders and rolling back progress on gender equity. Conversely, upward of 60,000 Ukrainian women have been on the front lines of the country’s war against Moscow, enhancing the resilience and resistance capabilities of Ukraine overall in the face of an overwhelming adversary. Interviews on the ground in Ukraine in August 2023 suggested that investments in civil society — and in particular women’s groups — since 2014 helped create a sufficiently prodemocratic Ukrainian identity that, in turn, contributed to a ferocious national will to fight. In Iran, which engages in gender apartheid, a powerful protest movement has been challenging the authority and legitimacy of the Ayatollah’s radical Islamic regime — a protest movement that was sparked and carried forward by women and girls.</p> -<p>The United States and its allies confront an unparalleled strategic challenge from China that has the potential to escalate. In any such confrontation, leadership in and access to advanced semiconductor technology — and the AI systems these innovations enable — will play a central role and could even be decisive. Numerous recent analyses conclude that China is investing heavily in the sector and is rapidly gaining on the United States in strategic areas of microelectronic production, a dynamic that raises major national security concerns.</p> +<p>The question is: If U.S. adversaries are using similar gender-conservative playbooks, what might these gendered activities mean for U.S. strategy broadly, and for tailored, integrated deterrence specifically? In other words, gender appears to represent a critical societal fault line for contemporary authoritarian regimes — and a key, if perhaps underappreciated, mechanism for mobilizing prodemocratic forces and national will to fight. This leads to an interesting proposition: might gender-related tools, and primarily those associated with the WPS toolkit, provide the United States and the DoD with key vectors for tailoring its integrated deterrence strategies.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Successful and timely implementation of the CHIPS Act is a critical step to addressing that challenge and deterring conflict — and that cannot happen without Intel.</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="strategic-concepts-using-wps-and-gender-analyses-as-strategic-enablers-for-building-competitive-advantage">Strategic Concepts: Using WPS and Gender Analyses as Strategic Enablers for Building Competitive Advantage</h3> -<p>Successful and timely implementation of the CHIPS Act is a critical step to addressing that challenge and deterring conflict — and that cannot happen without Intel. Accordingly, the U.S. government needs to be proactive, make CHIPS Act resources available as soon as possible, and accept that while there will always be risks, speed and compromise are crucial to achieve the CHIPS Act’s central goals. More broadly, the Departments of Commerce and Defense need to begin using existing tools, contracting mechanisms, and authorities — such as OTA — to support Intel through its current transition and not wait until Intel’s financial position slows its progress and further erodes the country’s competitive position. Prompt and strategic action must be taken to bring the objectives of the CHIPS Act closer to reality. Implementing an array of supportive measures beyond the CHIPS Act would also be a powerful way to underscore that the government wants Intel, and the semiconductor industry, to thrive and grow for decades to come.</p> +<p>As one interlocutor over the course of the study noted: given the manifold strategic advantages that WPS programs and capabilities can present for the United States, it may be time for the DoD enterprise writ large to consider gender as a significant dimension of competition rather than as a set of abstract concepts. While a number of components, for example INDOPACOM, have already taken and are promulgating this conceptual approach, the concept of gender as a domain needs to be understood throughout all of the DoD’s echelons.</p> -<hr /> +<p>If gender is a dimension of competition, WPS tools then logically become a DoD strategic enabler — that is, a mechanism for more effective accomplishment of DoD activities and priorities. Accordingly, by considering the interrelated problems of strategic competition and tailored, integrated deterrence within a gender perspective, this brief underscores a number of ways that the DoD can leverage WPS as a strategic enabler to build advantages:</p> -<p><strong>Sujai Shivakumar</strong> is director and senior fellow of Renewing American Innovation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>WPS as a flanking maneuver.</strong> China and Russia have both ceded this space by ignoring WPS initiatives — that is, by not participating in decisionmaking processes to elevate women’s engagement in peace, political, and security discussions. As a result, this gives the United States, and the DoD specifically, opportunities to outflank Chinese and Russian activities in the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific theaters, if not globally.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>WPS as a mechanism to expand the competitive space.</strong> WPS represents unique opportunities to interact and engage with partner and allied nations in a theater that is entirely absent China’s participation. For instance, WPS opens pathways for enhanced dialogue between the United States and say, Japan, via Track 1.5 dialogues that have positive externalities that span beyond the WPS mission. To that end, WPS represents a key vector for shaping allied and partner perceptions that is presently underutilized.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>WPS as a mechanism for crisis assurance and communication on other non-WPS national security matters.</strong> Among democratic states, WPS creates positive spaces that are often viewed as not politically controversial. Accordingly, the United States ought to consider how WPS spaces might create vectors for communicating broader policy messages to key allies and partners in theater.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>WPS and gender as a strategic offset vis-à-vis Russia’s numerical superiority in a warfighting context.</strong> A recent CSIS report found that “European states are likely to face significant challenges conducting large-scale combat missions, particularly in such areas as heavy maneuver forces, naval combatants, and support capabilities such as logistics and fire support.” Much like during the Cold War, Russia has a vast supply of manpower that it is willing to expend on the front lines in Ukraine (and elsewhere). During the Cold War, that numerical advantage was offset by U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear weapons. As it is unlikely that the United States will want to utilize nuclear weapons in a contemporary contingency unless absolutely necessary, U.S. allies and partners in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) must be able to call upon their entire populations to resist and deter Russian aggression.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>WPS and gender as a tool for societal resilience vis-à-vis an expansionist Russia.</strong> As one strategy expert noted, “deterrence is ” In other words, the ability of a society to withstand attacks by aggressors is a key aspect of deterrence strategies, and it informs issues like continuity of governance and operations planning. As discovered during a research trip in August 2023, women’s groups in Ukraine were — and are — critical in building national-level societal cohesion and resistance to authoritarian aggression. Designing gender-informed strategic offsets and societal resilience strategies requires incorporating gender perspectives centrally into national security and societal resilience planning and preparedness operations, rather than as an afterthought.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Gender treatment as a key strategic competition indicator or warning.</strong> Democratic backsliding in order to cater to authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia is almost always accompanied by gender-based harassment and the undermining of women’s rights. Given that almost all contemporary authoritarian regimes double down on these gender-based playbooks, it is worth exploring how the utilization of gender by U.S. allies, partners, and adversaries can inform indicators and warnings about regime trajectories.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Women fighters as strategic assets.</strong> Much as women in Ukraine have been critical on the front lines in the war against Russia, Kurdish women’s units were fierce fighters against the Islamic State. Further, the reputational damage to misogynistic Islamic State fighters being forced to fight — and lose — to women made such women’s units strategic rather than tactical assets. This suggests the need to more meaningfully consider the utility of women and women’s units within combat formations to create military advantage.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong>Charles Wessner</strong> is a senior adviser (non-resident) with Renewing American Innovation at CSIS.</p> +<p>It is worth underscoring that these concepts are primarily focused on women and the application of the WPS toolkit. However, given that many contemporary authoritarian regimes use a militaristic, misogynistic version of masculinity to consolidate and promulgate power, considerable further work should be done to understand how different masculinities and different genders might intersect with efforts to implement NDS objectives and tailor deterrent strategies.</p> -<p><strong>Thomas Howell</strong> is an international trade attorney specializing in the semiconductor industry and a consultant with Renewing American Innovation at CSIS.</p>Sujai Shivakumar, et al.When it comes to the future of American semiconductor manufacturing and the success of the CHIPS Act, Intel is not too big to fail, but it is too good to lose.Inflection Point2024-11-07T12:00:00+08:002024-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/inflection-point<p><em>The United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer, cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.</em></p> +<h3 id="testing-the-utility-of-wps-informed-approaches-in-dod-scenarios-through-tabletop-exercises">Testing the Utility of WPS-Informed Approaches in DoD Scenarios through Tabletop Exercises</h3> -<excerpt /> +<p>What might applying these concepts in practice look like? How might a WPS or gender-forward approach modify approaches to operations, activities, and investments (OAIs) in key theaters? And do practitioners agree with the premise that such WPS-informed approaches might generate strategic advantage for the United States? To discern answers to these questions, CSIS designed a series of tabletop exercises (TTXs) that allowed players to develop new OAIs associated with global competition against China and Russia. The following insights were gained through that activity.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>First, according to player assessments, gender-linked OAIs produced greater advantages in long-term competition. As one participant noted, “if you have one country or society that is willing to mobilize 100 percent of its people and one that is only willing to mobilize 49 percent of its people, one’s got a big advantage over the other.” In the words of another player, “the quantity that our adversaries have when it comes to an actual contingency . . . given their numerical superiority, just the mass they can throw at these problems . . . ensuring that all of society and our allies and partners [are] able to mobilize, to resist and to deter, [to] defend all these things is going to be essential.”</p> -<p>Developing countries across the globe are installing or upgrading their digital infrastructure. But choosing a telecommunications vendor involves weighing factors such as cost, efficiency, quality, and security. The Covid-19 pandemic drove home the importance of connectivity and secure networks, over which information on e-commerce, education, financial services, and health — as well as national security — must pass. China has initially taken the lead in this sector by providing telecommunications solutions and financing primarily to countries in the Indo-Pacific and Africa. Meanwhile, the United States has fallen behind in addressing this important infrastructure gap. The United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer and cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.</p> +<p>Second, there was no meaningful difference between the treatments with respect to escalation risk. In other words, players believed that gender-informed competition mechanisms and OAIs constituted a net positive. Gender-informed competition, especially activities that linked civil society groups and showed that U.S. partners had a great capacity to mobilize diverse constituencies, supported integrated deterrence and campaigning.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer and cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>During the TTX discussion, participants ultimately concluded that U.S. adversaries, particularly China, were likely to view any action as escalatory by virtue of the fact that Beijing is likely to be hostile to any form of increased U.S. activity. Escalation might therefore be better conceived as a given rather than something to be avoided. Further, one participant noted that the United States might do well to design activities that would force adversaries to respond. A number of participants maintained that a command post exercise that tested whole-of-society mobilization in the INDOPACOM AOR might be one useful way to do this while simultaneously building capacity.</p> -<h3 id="a-high-risk-network">A High-Risk Network</h3> +<p>The discussion of escalation led to contemplating whether supporting women’s groups might lead to authoritarian backlash. Women’s groups, and women individually, are often targets for repression and retaliation; in any number of instances when women rise in status under authoritarian regimes, conspiracy theories circulate that their power is a result of U.S. backing. In order to minimize such risk, efforts to engage women and women’s groups should be treated carefully and with the overall intention to do no harm.</p> -<p>China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) features an initiative that is quickly becoming the country’s most prolific and impactful infrastructure investment: the Digital Silk Road (DSR). The DSR encompasses investments in wireless networks, surveillance cameras, subsea cables, and satellites; it is primarily financed and constructed by state-owned banks and companies such as Huawei, Hengtong, HMN Technologies, Hikvision, Dahua, and BeiDou. The bulk of China’s DSR contracts are with Indo-Pacific and African countries, where companies like Huawei are providing affordable mobile phones, cloud computing, and other types of hardware. Huawei Marine Networks, now known as HMN Technologies, has spearheaded subsea cable network infrastructure. In the last decade, the company has completed 108 projects that have amounted to an estimated 60,000 kilometers of subsea cable; roughly 16 of those projects are in 27 countries in the Indo-Pacific.</p> +<p>Third, there was no major difference with respect to how players assessed long-term competitive effects and regional prioritization for OAIs between the two treatments. Both treatments saw groups prioritize preparing partners as the optimal long-term strategy in support of integrated deterrence and campaigning (48 percent in gender-linked OAI treatments, 45 percent in non-gender-linked treatments). Regionally, across the treatments players focused on activities in INDOPACOM (75 percent in gender-linked OAI treatments, 67 percent in non-gender-linked treatments). Last, there was a similar distribution with respect to complementary interagency activity. Across both treatments, players emphasized combining military competition with diplomacy and measures designed to inform and influence targeted populations.</p> -<p>Chinese companies also have a significant stake in the 5G wireless networks around the world. Huawei and ZTE have engaged in nearly 160 projects in Africa, Asia, and Europe, providing network equipment and infrastructure. Recipient countries have so far welcomed these investments, namely for the speed at which the projects are implemented — but also for the price. Due to Chinese government subsidies, Huawei and ZTE can offer below-market rates, with Huawei offering as much as 30 percent below typical costs.</p> +<p>The only meaningful difference between treatments was with respect to intelligence. In treatments with gender-linked OAIs, players appear to have assessed that working with civil society groups gave them increased situational awareness, as they less frequently selected intelligence activities. This is likely due to a sense that WPS-linked activities helped them better understand the operational environment.</p> -<p>According to a report by the European think tank MERICS, Chinese companies are also involved in providing products in the e-governance, online education, and telehealth sectors. Huawei and ZTE have implemented these projects — predominantly in Africa and Central Asia — with more financing from the Chinese government than from local governments, multilateral development banks, and G7 countries combined.</p> +<p>In other words, what became apparent from the TTX is that planners assess that WPS has a key role to play in great power competition. This is because WPS can help mobilize diverse constituencies in partner states (capacity) and increase the ability of the United States to counter malign actions in the gray zone (capability) — especially since the United States is often blind to adversary operations designed to hijack civil society. WPS represents a way to more effectively counter authoritarian strategies to compete with, if not undermine, U.S. positioning and leadership.</p> -<p>The United States has consistently raised security concerns about China’s digital technology investments, citing questions of national security, cybersecurity, personal security, and intellectual property, as well as the potential for authoritarian nations to surveil their own citizens. Some countries have heeded this advice; telecom carriers in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have replaced Chinese equipment with technology from low-risk vendors, or vendors that adhere to agreed-upon standards on privacy, data collection, surveillance, and intellectual property. The United States and many countries in the European Union have signed onto the Prague Proposals, which call on countries to select carriers and providers that will prioritize safe and secure 5G networks and communication technologies.</p> +<h3 id="applying-the-insights-the-european-and-pacific-deterrence-initiatives">Applying the Insights: The European and Pacific Deterrence Initiatives</h3> -<h3 id="offering-an-alternative">Offering an Alternative</h3> +<p>The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) are flagship programs designed to better organize DoD programs and capabilities intended to communicate U.S. and partner red lines to Moscow and Beijing, respectively. Because they are also theater-specific programs with dedicated congressional authorization, oversight, and funding levels, they provide key insights into how the DoD implements its deterrence strategies over multiple fiscal years. Critically, gender and WPS are rarely, if ever, referenced in discussions about EDI and PDI — which creates opportunities for usefully reconsidering how such approaches might inform OAIs for the EUCOM and INDOPACOM theaters. Combining insights from all the research conducted over the course of the study, some ideas for recalibrating PDI and EDI investments with a gender-informed approach emerge:</p> -<p>The countries that have signed onto China’s BRI and the DSR are doing so for several reasons. A primary motivation is to address critical infrastructure gaps by providing digital connectivity. The Covid-19 pandemic emphasized this need, underscoring its importance to nearly all aspects of daily life for individuals, companies, and governments. The BRI and DSR have stepped into this gap to provide something the United States and its allies have not. Typically, information and communication technology (ICT) projects are approved, deployed, and financed much more quickly by China than they would be through a G7 development bank. Approvals by the latter institutions often are bogged down by long feasibility studies, risk assessments, and other considerations. China, by contrast, offers a more streamlined approach: loans, construction companies, and equipment, all from one source.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Exercising.</strong> Within INDOPACOM, the DoD could increase the number of exercises with partner units that have a higher number of women entering their ranks — such as the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and Philippine forces during the annual Balikatan exercise — to show how to build partner capacity while signaling the expanding role of women in defense, something China will struggle to match.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Increased presence.</strong> The DoD can use permanent and rotational forces to demonstrate to allies and partners in theater the power and utility of women in combat, as well as in combat support and combat service support Likewise, both Moscow and Beijing are utilizing regressive gender roles as mechanisms for consolidating state power. The United States might consider using its increased forward presence to demonstrate other more democratic and meritocratic gender roles that can undermine adversary morale and cohesion.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Network-building.</strong> The DoD can work with women’s groups in countries like Papua New Guinea to build information-gathering mechanisms for monitoring Chinese economic coercion and infrastructure projects that are damaging to the region. Doing so might simultaneously empower women within local societies and create new mechanisms for countering China’s economic expansionism and elite capture strategies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Posture and military construction.</strong> As the United States adjusts its posture in the EUCOM and INDOPACOM theaters, choices of where and how bases and facilities are constructed will have effects on local Conducting a gender analysis, and understanding local gender dynamics, can help inform strategies for using military construction monies in a manner that will engender the greatest level of local support for U.S. presence.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Enhanced prepositioning.</strong> A key aspect of EDI and PDI is the forward stationing of key equipment and materiel that could be utilized in a crisis or contingency. Host nation support — that is, the ability of a given country to support U.S. forces during peacetime and war — includes a nation’s ability to ensure that U.S. forces are able to land, access such equipment, and move in a crisis. Considering women and women’s networks more centrally in prepositioning and host nation support activities may build complementarity between EDI or PDI and building whole-of-society resistance and resilience strategies.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The United States and its partners have struggled to provide an alternative to the DSR; however, in recent years, Washington has established agencies, initiatives, and partnerships to prioritize ICT projects overseas, including investments in wireless networks, Open Radio Access Network (ORAN) technology, surveillance cameras, subsea cables, mobile handsets, and satellites, as well as systems upgrades from 2G and 3G to 5G and beyond. But there are multiple avenues available for additional policies to increase export and development finance of these technologies by trusted suppliers.</p> +<h3 id="conclusions-and-recommendations">Conclusions and Recommendations</h3> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="case-study-mexico"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Case Study: Mexico</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>War is a centrally human endeavor; gender is a core aspect of individual identity and of the human experience. Omitting gender, and gender perspectives, from defense planning and operations creates enormous blind spots toward adversary weaknesses and opportunities with allies and partners. If the DoD is to build its deterrent strategies in a tailored manner, considering gender more centrally in its war and defense planning is essential. A number of recommendations flow from the above analysis:</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Over a decade ago, Mexico reached an inflection point in the development of its digital strategy and connectivity policies. Its experience offers both an example of best practices and a cautionary tale.</code></em></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Additional resources.</strong> Many of the applications of WPS for tailored, integrated deterrence purposes as outlined above are conceptual rather than resource That said, the current funding levels for WPS activities — particularly those involving allies and partners — is unlikely to be sufficient for these purposes. It is outside the scope of this brief to develop a concrete budgetary recommendation; partnering with Congress, the DoD should establish a WPS/Strategic Competition pilot fund for actioning these activities that includes an assessment of the resources required to increase their scale.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Leverage gender advisers.</strong> The DoD has established a cadre of gender advisers (GENADs) across its command structures. In addition to the WPS-related training, education, and partner support work these GENADs perform, components should bring them into key planning and other processes to ensure that their perspective and ideas can be integrated into operational and strategic approaches.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>A broader gender lens.</strong> While women and women’s issues are often the starting point for considerations of gender, at the end of the day “gender” also includes how men view Do men living under repressive authoritarian regimes in Russia, China, or Iran agree with the policies of gender apartheid — and the promotion of hollow, militaristic versions of “manliness”? How do women in these societies relate to men? What are men’s own aspirations and how do they realize them?</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In 2013, Mexico implemented a constitutional reform that created the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (IFT) and the Federal Economic Commission for Competition (COFECE). Both are independent regulators and antitrust authorities with very broad powers. This was born out of a larger reform process in the telecommunication and broadcasting sectors that took place in Mexico and in Latin America more broadly. The reforms reviewed and updated the legislative frameworks and institutions created in the 1990s to boost competition after market liberalization during that decade. As in many Latin American markets, fixed-line telephony in Mexico was provided by the state-owned operator, Teléfonos de México (Telmex), until the early 1990s, when the government gradually divested its assets to national and foreign investors. In 1995, the Mexican government passed the landmark Federal Telecommunications Law (LFT), opening all market segments for competition and removing geographic limitations for fixed and mobile telephony networks.</code></em></p> +<p>Taking the WPS agenda forward toward countering and deterring authoritarian regimes requires situating women within the broader societal context of which men are a part. Considering gender and WPS in this way is not to “weaponize” or “militarize” these toolkits. Rather, it is a way to acknowledge that women have been, and will be, decisive when it comes to countering authoritarian expansionism. Women are active, and at times critical, agents in both war and peace; smart strategy will better incorporate women — and all genders — more fully into the tailored deterrence strategies needed to prevent war from occurring. Many authoritarian adversaries are weaponizing gender against U.S. interests; it is past time for the U.S. government, and the DoD within it, to develop sufficiently gender-informed responses. Viewed in this light, applying a gender perspective to the problem of strategic competition is a necessary step toward accomplishing the UN-supported vision for Women, Peace, and Security.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The IFT promotes and regulates competition and the efficient development of telecommunications and broadcasting, in accordance with its constitutional mandate and the 2014 Federal Law for Telecommunications and Broadcasting, LFTR, as well as the 2014 Federal Law for Economic Competition. The COFECE is responsible for overseeing, promoting, and guaranteeing competition and free market access in Mexico. The COFECE has a board that consists of seven commissioners; a Technical Secretariat that analyzes the market and its competitiveness; a strategic planning and institutional evaluation coordinator; and an internal comptroller that oversees COFECE officials.</code></em></p> +<hr /> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Upon the creation of the IFT, Mexico licensed new national broadcasting networks, designated officials to evaluate carriers and operators, introduced rules for unbundling Telmex, and created a public registry of licenses. Since its creation, IFT has been viewed as a credible authority; as a result, prices have decreased and competition has increased. There are now dozens of new local broadcasting licenses in radio and television, including for indigenous communities. Mexico’s internet penetration rate stood at 83.2 percent of the total population at the start of 2024, up from 44 percent in 2013. In 2015, AT&amp;T undertook a series of local acquisitions, and the U.S.-headquartered company now comprises 16 percent of the market for mobile telephone operators. In December 2021, AT&amp;T Mexico announced it intended to launch a 5G network using its 2.5 GHz spectrum, making it the first mobile network operator in the country to build such a network.</code></em></p> +<p><strong>Kathleen J. McInnis</strong> is a senior fellow and director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite a more competitive ICT market, domestic politics have hindered and threatened progress. Most concerning has been the chipping away of IFT’s independence and operational ability. When former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador entered office in 2018, he sought to undermine the independent IFT. Since February 2022, the agency has operated with only four of its seven presiding commissioners, as President López Obrador refused to nominate any more. This has left the agency without enough commissioners to operate effectively; losing another would render it completely inoperable. The IFT’s budget has also decreased by roughly 41.1 percent since 2014, hampering its ability to implement its mandate. Additionally, the government has set high spectrum fees, which has undercut telecommunications operators’ ability to expand broadband connectivity, particularly in rural areas, and undermined IFT’s efforts to license more spectrum. The country also remains plagued by anticompetitive tendencies, despite the efforts of the IFT and COFECE.</code></em></p> +<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Mexico has stood apart from its Latin American peers in creating and implementing one of the most sophisticated telecommunications regulations. But, before concluding his term, former president López Obrador sent to Congress an initiative for constitutional reform that would disappear IFT and COFECE and assign their responsibilities to different ministries within the executive branch. This initiative is waiting to be analyzed in Congress. In order to build on the progress of the 1990s, Mexico’s new president, Claudia Sheinbaum, will have to undo Obrador’s efforts and reinstitute the authority of these bodies, while also ensuring they are protected from political winds. Mexico is an excellent case study of how a country can succeed in building an effective and laudable regulatory infrastructure and have it subsequently come apart due to politics.</code></em></p> +<p><strong>Audrey Aldisert</strong> is a research associate in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.</p> -<h4 id="us-resources">U.S. RESOURCES</h4> +<p><strong>Alexis Day</strong> is an associate director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS.</p>Kathleen McInnis, et al.This brief lays an ana­lytic foundation for considering gender analyses, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) programs, as strategic enablers for accomplishing key Department of Defense (DoD) priorities.Build A Future Force For UA2024-11-14T12:00:00+08:002024-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/build-a-future-force-for-ukraine<p><em>Ending the war and establishing lasting peace in Ukraine is impossible without implementing practical measures to deter potential future waves of Russian aggression. Crafting an effective deterrence strategy, however, presents its own unique challenges.</em></p> -<p>The United States has established new agencies and tools in recent years to help promote and support U.S. technology — particularly ICT — abroad. These efforts can be further honed to more effectively support U.S. and partner initiatives in the developing world, as well as private company engagement in this sector.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><em>U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)</em></p> +<p>The recent US elections have created a new political reality that will impact global stability in the coming years, including the Russian war in Ukraine. While Donald Trump’s stated goal of ending the war quickly resonates with Ukrainians, achieving a lasting peace requires selecting the right strategies and resources to ensure sustainable results. Apart from dealing with immediate challenges on the battlefield, given Vladimir Putin’s obsession with Ukraine, any solution that lacks this lasting impact risks disastrous consequences, as Russia could recover, rearm, and reignite the conflict.</p> -<p>In October 2018, the U.S. Congress passed the bipartisan Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act to support and finance investments in emerging economies and to boost national security and foreign policy priorities in critical markets. The BUILD Act combined the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Development Credit Authority (DCA) to form the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The DFC has stated that encouraging ICT investments in low and lower-middle-income countries is a key priority for the agency. The agency can provide loans, loan guarantees, equity financing, political risk insurance, and technical assistance to support investments in the telecom industry; it can only work on private sector projects, not ones supported by the public sector. However, the DFC is limited in working in networks that include high-risk vendor equipment. According to the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, U.S. financing agencies investing in networks with this type of equipment must get a waiver from the head of the relevant executive agency or from the Director of National Intelligence and must have a phase-out plan to “rip and replace” the high-risk vendor equipment.</p> +<p>Defining long-term security arrangements for Ukraine requires a comprehensive set of military and strategic measures for maintaining stability and defending Ukraine’s territory, society, economy and rule of law against future foreign aggression. Such measures are widely seen as critical to Ukraine’s post-war recovery and to preventing future escalations.</p> -<p>The DFC and its predecessor OPIC have undertaken several ICT investments in the past two decades, including a network acquisition in the Pacific Islands; renewable power for cell phone towers in Nigeria and the Central African Republic; telecommunications infrastructure in Myanmar; and, in Jordan, infrastructure to provide a critical interconnection point for an internet cable system connecting Europe and Asia. In 2018, the DFC also provided $100 million in financing to Africell for the expansion of affordable mobile voice and data services in The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as upgrades to network equipment in these countries to accommodate increased traffic.</p> +<p>This topic is especially challenging to address while Ukraine’s immediate security remains under severe threat. After enduring nearly three years of active war, Ukraine still needs ongoing support for operations, including additional weapons, funding and domestic mobilisation. Meanwhile, the support from international partners shows signs of wavering, and in the US, assistance to Ukraine has become a point of contentious political debate. With uncertainties around how and when Ukraine will emerge from this war, within what borders and in what economic state, it is understandably difficult to plan for its long-term security.</p> -<p><em>The Export-Import Bank of the U.S. (EXIM)</em></p> +<p>However, long-term strategising remains essential, as lacking a clear security vision creates a void that complicates any future planning. Without this long-term perspective, doubts may arise about Ukraine’s prospects, potentially impacting international support even if its territory is liberated. So long as Russia remains under Putin’s regime, the existential threat to Ukraine will persist, driven by Putin’s personal fixation on the country which may push him beyond rational limits. While some observers suggest that Ukraine should pursue territorial concessions as a path to compromise, this approach misunderstands the existential nature of the conflict. For Putin, territory is not the ultimate goal – ending Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence is. Concessions would not end hostilities but instead encourage further aggression, as they would fail to address the core motives driving Putin’s actions.</p> -<p>EXIM has been mandated by Congress to enact its China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP) to help U.S. exporters facing competition from China, particularly in the fields of AI, wireless communications, and fintech. Established in 2019, CTEP is expected to counter export subsidies and finance provided by China, advance U.S. leadership, and support U.S. innovation, employment, and technological standards. Exporters can take advantage of EXIM’s reduced fees, extended repayment tenors, and exceptions from other EXIM policies to get financing on transactions with at least 51 percent U.S. content. However, to date there have been no ICT deals financed through CTEP.</p> +<p>NATO membership offers a natural path forward. Once active hostilities conclude, Ukraine’s admission to NATO will be crucial to stabilising the region. Ukraine must, however, be treated not merely as a security liability but as an asset. Structuring and strengthening Ukraine’s defences will make this discussion more feasible, as a robust new NATO member will strengthen the alliance.</p> -<p>Additionally, EXIM can also provide loans, loan guarantees, and insurance for the purchase of goods and services shipped or invoiced from any country to facilitate U.S. exports for 5G-related transactions. EXIM has lowered its U.S. content threshold. But the creditworthiness of potential in-country private sector partners has remained a key challenge in many instances, particularly in countering opaque Chinese lending practices.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Under current conditions, with limitations on weapon types and their use, Ukraine is fighting a war that NATO would never choose to fight</code></em></strong></p> -<p><em>Department of Commerce</em></p> +<p>One crucial assumption is that Putin will refrain from attacking Ukraine if Russia lacks either the resources or the likelihood of success. Although the first condition may be difficult to ensure indefinitely, the second can be achieved. Should Ukraine possess or have access to sufficient defensive capabilities to thwart any future invasion, this would significantly reduce the likelihood of renewed aggression. This approach, often called “deterrence by denial”, would serve as an effective defence.</p> -<p>The Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act (CHIPS Act) of 2022 authorized billions of dollars for funding to the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and State to develop onshore domestic manufacturing of semiconductors. It also included appropriations to fund the USA Telecommunications Act to support the global telecom supply chain and counter the expansion of Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE. Provisions from the CHIPS Act are meant to further U.S. software advantages and to develop the Open Radio Access Network (ORAN), which would allow for a more interoperable telecommunications model and enable alternative vendors to enter markets for specific network components, rather than competing with end-to-end packages offered by companies like Huawei.</p> +<p>Other forms of deterrence may be less optimal. For instance, “deterrence by punishment” appears limited in impact. Russia is already incurring staggering losses in the current conflict, allocating over 40% of its state budget to the war and losing close to 700,000 troops as casualties, thousands of weapon systems, and most of its Black Sea fleet. For most regimes, such losses would be unsustainable, but for Putin, they do not appear to have impacted his commitment to the war. To force a resolution, the Kremlin would need to lose strategically – not merely in manpower or equipment, but through a fundamental military failure.</p> -<p>The CHIPS Act provides $1.5 billion through a Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund to the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), in coordination with other agencies, to support investments in ORAN, developments of software-based wireless technologies, and funding for “leap-ahead” innovations in the U.S. mobile broadband market.</p> +<p>Recognising the importance of deterrence, the Ukrainian government has incorporated this strategy into its national military framework, known as the “Victory Plan”. While largely classified, key elements were outlined by President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Verkhovna Rada on 16 October 2024, with “Deterrence” as a central theme addressing long-term security. Zelensky proposed a “strategic non-nuclear deterrence package” within Ukraine, aimed at providing a robust defence against potential Russian aggression. According to Zelensky, “the deterrence package ensures that Russia faces a choice: engage in diplomacy or see its war machine dismantled. Peace through strength”.</p> -<p><em>Department of State</em></p> +<p>The focus should be on building a force capable of repelling future aggression and ensuring that, if Russia attacks, it will face defeat on the battlefield. Such a capability must not only be developed but also maintained at a high state of readiness. It should be evident to Russia that any attack would lead to decisive failure, thereby preventing it from trying.</p> -<p>The CHIPS Act allocates $500 million over five years to a new International Technology Security and Innovation (ITSI) Fund, which gives money to the Department of State to provide for international information and communications technology security and semiconductor supply chain activities, including to support the development and adoption of secure and trusted telecommunications technologies, secure semiconductor supply chains, and other emerging technologies. The State Department can use the fund for its own programming but can also allocate money to USAID, EXIM, and the DFC.</p> +<p>The effectiveness of such deterrence must also be evident to the people of Ukraine, allied governments, and the international business community. Confidence in Ukraine’s military potential should be strong enough to assure investors that they can safely conduct business in the country. The only way to sustain such a force in the long term is to match it with a strong economy. In this respect, the example of South Korea is particularly relevant. Despite the absence of a peace agreement with the North, the deterrent capability of military power has provided the security necessary for sustained social and economic growth.</p> -<p>The focus of the fund has been less on ICT and more on semiconductors. Funding has gone to new hires at the State Department and to partnerships with Costa Rica, Indonesia, Mexico, Panama, the Philippines, and Vietnam to explore opportunities to grow and diversify the global semiconductor ecosystem. In a March 2023 press release, the State Department communicated that $40.7 million in fiscal year 2023 ITSI funding would be used in the ICT space to provide capacity building training as well as technical advice on policy formulation and regulatory frameworks, cybersecurity tools, financing, project preparation support, and other investment de-risking measures to catalyze private sector investments in secure ICT networks, including field testing and pilot deployments of ORAN networks. The full scope and scale of these investments are not yet clear.</p> +<p>Building such a force will be a significant challenge. First, it must deter a Russian force that, despite multiple failures in Ukraine, remains large in numbers. Second, any ceasefire would give Russia the opportunity to rebuild its military capabilities, potentially enhancing its strike power. Russia, after all, spares no resources in producing weapons, with at least 40% of its state budget currently allocated to the military.</p> -<p><em>U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA)</em></p> +<p>The costs of building a credible deterrent force are easy to underestimate. Simply sending older Western equipment to Ukraine will not achieve the necessary deterrent effect. Only competitive capabilities will suffice. For example, the current provision of older F-16s to Ukraine is inadequate to deny Russian air superiority over the frontlines due to outdated radars and missiles. As a result, Russia continues to dominate the airspace in close proximity to the battlefield.</p> -<p>USTDA provides financial tools to support the export of U.S. goods and services for priority infrastructure projects in emerging economies. USTDA funds project preparation, feasibility studies, and partnership-building activities. Though it is typically involved on the front end of projects, USTDA has also financed ICT-related initiatives in the Indo-Pacific and Africa.</p> +<p>The value of tactical air superiority cannot be overstated. Today, Ukraine faces significant challenges in dealing with Russia’s gliding bombs, missiles, and long-range drones. A competitive air force is as essential for Ukraine as it is for any NATO country preparing for war. With NATO membership, these costs could be shared – especially for high-cost capabilities like aviation. Without it membership, Ukraine will have to build and sustain them on its own.</p> -<p>In 2023, the agency awarded a grant to NOW Telecom Company to conduct a feasibility study and pilot project to support the development of a nationwide 5G mobile and fixed-wireless network in the Philippines. The company chose New Jersey-based Bell Labs Consulting, part of the research arm of Nokia, to conduct the study. The USTDA also awarded a grant to Malawian internet service provider Converged Technology Networks Limited (CTN) to conduct a feasibility study on the expansion of digital connectivity to underserved communities in the country. CTN selected California-based Connectivity Capital LLC to conduct the study.</p> +<p>Planning for a future force cannot be based on today’s operational environment. Under current conditions, with limitations on weapon types and their use, Ukraine is fighting a war that NATO would never choose to fight. NATO’s strategy would rely on overwhelming airpower and deep strikes to weaken enemy forces before they reached the frontline. Instead, Ukraine is meeting Russian forces at their strongest, at the front. Lacking adequate air and long-range firepower, Ukraine is compelled to compensate with the lives of its people – at least until a more effective operational model is established. Addressing the shortcomings of the current model is crucial not only for immediate success but also for ensuring future security. Delaying this effort results in the tragic loss of lives on a daily basis, underscoring the urgent need for decisive action. This painful reality demands immediate attention and cannot be overlooked.</p> -<p><em>U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)</em></p> +<p>The costs of building this force could be significantly reduced by leveraging Ukraine’s industrial capabilities, implementing leasing arrangements, and creating international funds with contributions from multiple donors for specific programmes. Ukraine has the potential to close a massive capability gap if its industrial base is engaged in full. Unlike Western defence industries, Ukraine’s industry is operating on a war footing, with many factories running 24/7 and bureaucratic red tape kept to a minimum.</p> -<p>USAID provides grants and technical assistance for an array of programs across the digital sector. In June 2022, the agency launched its Asia ORAN Academy as part of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. The academy brings together officials and representatives from the private and public sectors, as well as academia, with an expectation to expand its initial work in the Philippines to the rest of the region. As of June 2024, USAID was in final negotiations to open an ORAN Lab at the University of the Philippines’ Electrical and Electronics Engineering Institute. USAID’s Better Access and Connectivity (BEACON) Activity is also engaging the Philippine government and industry leaders in the country through a series of workshops and trainings on field testing and through the adoption of legislation and regulations that facilitate ORAN deployment.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Strategically planning Ukraine’s future military force, anticipating evolving trends, and conducting rapid assessments is not just essential for Ukraine’s survival; it is critical for the security of Western allies as well</code></em></strong></p> -<p>USAID is additionally engaged in the Digital Invest initiative, also launched in 2022, which works with investment partners to increase the ability of companies to qualify for commercial funding. Digital Invest provides an average of $500,000 per partner for investments related to resilient digital infrastructure, increased digital inclusion, and stronger economic development. Digital Invest partners have backed over 60 technology companies across 38 countries, with projects ranging from the expansion of broadband connectivity infrastructure in Liberia to a digital payment platform in Uzbekistan to a fund supporting female investors and tech founders across South and Southeast Asia.</p> +<p>However, cost is not the only challenge. In accepting that deterrent capabilities must be competitive, the ongoing need for adaptation and innovation becomes crucial. The speed of technological advancement today is unprecedented. Innovation teams on all sides of the war are working tirelessly, introducing new measures and countermeasures. Technologies such as computer vision, electronic warfare, and long-range communications are poised to profoundly influence future military concepts and capabilities, and we have yet to see how these will ultimately shape weapon systems. The successful implementation of these technologies on the battlefield could render many older weapons and doctrines obsolete, a trend already visible in the current war. Ukraine’s future force must remain competitive in this rapidly evolving operational environment, which makes long-term predictions difficult.</p> -<p><em>Office of Strategic Capital (OSC)</em></p> +<p>For example, small and medium-sized unmanned platforms are challenging the concept of air superiority, operating beyond the reach of traditional aviation and air defence. At the same time, electronic warfare has significantly impacted the effectiveness of these platforms. Current developments in computer vision aim to make these systems immune to electronic warfare, while counter-air drones are being designed to present a new challenge to drone warfare itself. All of these systems are part of an evolving operational landscape, competing for battlefield dominance.</p> -<p>The newly created OSC, established in 2022 within the Department of Defense, is mandated to mobilize and scale private sector capital. Its Fiscal Year 2024 Investment Strategy outlined its initial target priorities, which include ORAN as both a part of the DoD’s FutureG and 5G critical technology area and a mandated field in the FY 2024 National Defense Authorization Act. The OSC’s complete suite of financial tools is still under development, but at this time, it can provide direct loans for capital investment and equipment finance. These loans range from $10 million to $150 million, with long repayment tenor. The OSC announced its first Notice of Funding Availability in September 2024 and will be considering applications through the rest of the fiscal year.</p> +<p>Keeping up the pace of adaptation and technological development is now a critical requirement to remain relevant. Unfortunately, many Western developers and governments have not yet achieved the necessary speed. For example, procurement and export control systems, designed for peacetime conditions, are ill-suited to the fast-paced demands of modern warfare. These bureaucratic hurdles prevent too many innovative platforms from being deployed effectively in the field. Western militaries and governments should not view this as a minor delay in aiding Ukraine. Rather, lengthy supply chains and slow adaptation cycles risk rendering critical platforms obsolete before they can be competitive.</p> -<h4 id="global-partnerships">GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS</h4> +<p>After assessing the ongoing war, former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, co-authored an article warning that the US military is not keeping pace with the fast-changing nature of modern warfare, and this issue is likely even more pronounced in European militaries. Now is the time for faster research and development, more rapid prototyping, and quicker delivery to the battlefield. The multiyear cycles traditionally required for new weapons must be viewed as an unaffordable luxury of the past.</p> -<p>U.S. partners and allies have established several initiatives through the G7 to address critical infrastructure needs. In each of these, digital connectivity — particularly in the Indo-Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America — is a core part of cooperative engagement.</p> - -<p><em>Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI)</em></p> - -<p>The G7 partners announced PGI, known then as Build Back Better World, at the Carbis Bay summit in June 2021. This effort was intended to counter BRI and target critical infrastructure to support health care, gender, climate, and ICT. The United States has set the goal of mobilizing $200 billion in investments over the next three years as part of the larger $600 billion target made by the G7. Much of PGI’s focus has been on developing economic corridors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, and the Philippines’ Luzon Corridor. Yet there have been few announcements on digital connectivity, which suggests that there is more to be done in this sector through this initiative.</p> - -<p>In 2023, as part of PGI, Africa Data Centers received a $300 million loan from the Development Finance Corporation to construct data centers throughout the continent. The DFC, EXIM, USAID, and USTDA also announced they would build on DFC’s existing financing for Africell in Angola, the DRC, The Gambia, and Sierra Leone (all part of the Lobito economic corridor) to support the expansion of wireless services and a digital payments initiative. Additionally, in the DRC, USTDA and USAID announced the provision of programming and financial support for last-mile connectivity and ORAN equipment for the piloting of U.S. firm Parallel Wireless with Vodacom DRC in five villages.</p> - -<p><em>Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership (TIP)</em></p> - -<p>The TIP is a partnership between the DFC, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation ( JBIC), Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and Export Finance Australia (EFA). TIP partners are looking to cofinance infrastructure projects mainly in the Pacific Islands and Southeast Asia. Though there are few projects under the TIP banner, two are in ICT.</p> - -<p>TIP’s first project has been the Palau spur, an approximately $30 million construction project for a subsea fiber optic cable to the Republic of Palau. The project is to connect to a DFC-financed subsea cable, the world’s longest, which stretches from Singapore to the United States. In May 2023, the TIP partners announced their support for the Australian telecom company, Telstra, in its acquisition of Digicel Pacific. The JBIC and DFC provided $50 million each in credit guarantees for EFA’s $1.33 billion financing package to support the acquisition. Telstra’s move is expected to further Digicel’s delivery of high-quality telecommunication services to more than 2.5 million subscribers in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu, Samoa, Tonga, and Nauru.</p> - -<p><em>Quad</em></p> +<p>Strategically planning Ukraine’s future military force, anticipating evolving trends, and conducting rapid assessments is not just essential for Ukraine’s survival; it is critical for the security of Western allies as well. The urgent need to innovate and collaborate in defence capabilities cannot be overstated. Only by embracing change and acting decisively can the West ensure that this conflict does not become a harbinger of greater crises in the future.</p> -<p>The Quad — Australia, India, Japan, and the United States — is also engaged on the ICT front and has announced ICT projects in the Pacific Islands, including on subsea cables and ORAN technology. At the Quad Leaders’ Summit in May 2023, the partners announced the establishment of the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, with the aim of bringing together public and private sector actors to address gaps in this type of infrastructure.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Under this partnership, Australia is to establish a new Indo-Pacific Cable Connectivity and Resilience Program to share best practices and provide technical assistance to Indo-Pacific governments. The United States is providing technical assistance and capacity building on subsea cable system security through its $5 million CABLES program.</p> +<p><strong>Andriy Zagorodnyuk</strong> is the Chairman of the Centre for Defence Strategies. He previously headed the Ukraine MOD’s Reform Projects Office, was appointed as an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and served as his country’s Defence Minister between 2019 and 2020.</p>Andriy ZagorodnyukEnding the war and establishing lasting peace in Ukraine is impossible without implementing practical measures to deter potential future waves of Russian aggression. Crafting an effective deterrence strategy, however, presents its own unique challenges.Power And Planet2024-11-13T12:00:00+08:002024-11-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/power-and-planet<p><em>In July 2024, CSIS’s Energy Security and Climate Change Program, in collaboration with the Scholl Chair in International Business, hosted a one-day trade and climate simulation game titled Power and Planet. The focus was on how players representing key nations make decisions at the intersection of climate and trade policy to reduce emissions, boost economic opportunity, and ensure security.</em></p> -<p>The partners also announced a cooperation with the government of Palau and the Palau National Communications Corporation (PNCC) to design, implement, and operationalize the deployment of ORAN capabilities. The USTDA is expected to fund a technical assistance grant to scope the size and scale of the project. This announcement marked the first planned deployment of ORAN technology in the region.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><em>Global Coalition on Telecommunications (GCOT)</em></p> +<p>The game explored the geopolitical and economic dynamics that arise when a bloc of developed countries establishes a climate club. Will such a club drive greater global cooperation on emissions as it expands, or will it trigger trade wars, creating a bleaker outlook for long-term climate outcomes? How do economic, environmental, geopolitical, or security considerations shape players’ priorities?</p> -<p>GCOT was launched in October 2023 by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Japan to increase cooperation and coordination on shared priorities such as telecommunications supply chain diversification and open network architectures, as well as the building of a broader international consensus on key areas of telecommunications policy and the promotion of innovation and growth opportunities in the sector. The U.S. Departments of State and Commerce are the key agencies involved in this initiative. There have been few details or updates since its launch nearly a year ago.</p> +<p>This report documents the game and how participants navigated the one-day simulation. It outlines the game’s setup, turn-by-turn progression, and key takeaways for policymakers. Additionally, the authors examine the game’s limitations and propose areas for further research.</p> -<h4 id="private-sector">PRIVATE SECTOR</h4> +<h3 id="game-structure-and-rules">Game Structure and Rules</h3> -<p>A major player in the promotion of diversity in digital equipment is the private sector. Private companies can both benefit from government support and mobilize their own capital and resources to be more competitive. One key argument from host countries is the lack of alternatives to Chinese or other high-risk providers for affordable and speedy installation of technology. However, the European Union, United States, Japan, and South Korea have a host of companies available for partnership that share similar values on information security, intellectual property, and high-quality standards.</p> +<p>Each player was assigned to one of three teams: G7+ (representing the Group of Seven countries along with Australia and South Korea), China, or emerging markets. Each player assumed the role of a government leader tasked with achieving their country’s ambitions for climate, economics, and security. Twenty-five experts from the climate and trade communities participated, representing a diverse mix of academic and civil society institutions, private companies, foreign embassies, and trade associations.</p> -<p>The United States and its allies are identifying tools to de-risk markets and promote private sector mobilization and have worked with local governments in the developing world to create enabling environments for high standards of investment, but these efforts still lack the speed and the push for U.S.-based companies to invest. More engagement between the U.S. government and private sector is needed in order to implement tools to support U.S. companies and meet host government needs in faster and more transparent ways.</p> +<p>During the game, each participant represented a country or, in the case of China, a political or administrative entity. The three teams were as follows:</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="case-study-india"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Case Study: India</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>G7+ team.</strong> Each of the 11 participants represented each G7 country (except Italy), Australia, and South Korea. The U.S. delegation had three players, acting as the president, the special presidential envoy for climate, and Congress. And European Union was represented by one player.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Emerging markets team.</strong> The nine participants represented Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>China team.</strong> The five participants represented the following political authorities and administrative entities: Chinese president Xi Jinping and the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; the National Development and Reform Commission and the National Energy Administration; the Ministry of Ecology and Environment; the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Finance, People’s Bank of China, State Administration of Taxation, Security Regulatory Commission, and Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission; and provincial and local governments.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">India is at its own inflection point as it pushes to further its already impressive digital public infrastructure (DPI) efforts, attempting to expand resources and connectivity to more than a billion people. There are opportunities in the market, including in ORAN, but preference for competitive local telecom and ICT companies, as well as some skepticism around ORAN, may hamper major headway.</code></em></p> +<p>Participants received individual motivations outlining objectives to pursue and defensive interests to protect, both within their team’s deliberations and in the broader game context. They were asked to make decisions consistent with that guidance but to be creative in how they realized their goals.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A part of India’s success so far is its regulator, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). TRAI was established in 1997 with the objective of creating a fair and transparent market and pushing the country toward more connectivity. India now has the second-largest wireless and wireline subscriber base in the world: 1.72 billion, as of March 2023. India’s teledensity — the number of telephones per 100 population — stood at 84.15 percent as of March 2023, an increase of 10 percent in a decade. The prices of SIM cards and cellular data have also fallen significantly, allowing many more people to access mobile phone technologies.</code></em></p> +<p>The game covered a five-year time frame from 2027 to 2032 and consisted of three rounds, each lasting between one and one-and-a-half hours. The first round began with instructions to the G7+ to establish a climate club in the first turn. Over the next two turns, exogenous geopolitical and climate conditions continued to worsen as global temperatures passed key global targets, climate-associated extreme events negatively affected different regions, and geopolitical tensions worsened.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Within India, local talent and capable companies have enabled the country to create a strong foundation in data systems. Since India’s DPI endeavor, the country has created a data technology structure known as the “India Stack,” which consists of three different layers: unique identity (Aadhaar); complimentary payments systems (Unified Payments Interface, Aadhaar Payments Bridge, Aadhaar Enabled Payment Service); and data exchange (DigiLocker and Account Aggregator). The layered system enables secure online, paperless, and cashless digital access for a variety of public and private services.</code></em></p> +<p>Teams were assigned separate rooms to strategize, deliberate, and set policies. Teams could submit action forms to make official communications or announce policy decisions. These were publicly announced to all other teams and the game’s moderators (Control). In addition to central moderators, each room had a facilitator answering questions and announcing updates from Control. Control could amend the scenario at any time to introduce events that could shift game dynamics, such as the reestablishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The usage and benefits speak for themselves. United Payments Interface accounts for 68 percent of all payment transactions in the country. As of February 2024, more than 12 billion transactions are completed every month through UPI. In 2020, with this system in place, the Indian government was able to provide pandemic assistance and a platform for vaccinations. Government reports note that the use of digital payments has expanded the customer base of smaller merchants, which in turn has built a record of credit and cash flow, improving access to finance. In 2009, nearly 400 million Indians lacked a unique identity record, but Aadhaar’s campaign to bring about a national ID succeeded in covering roughly 95 percent of the population by 2022. Japan’s NEC, a company with extensive experience in biometric identification, laid the groundwork for Aadhaar with technologies such as facial and fingerprint recognition. DPI has also benefited government coffers: an estimated 8.8 million new taxpayers were registered between July 2017 and March 2022. Citizens can access documents issued by the central and state governments through one platform, which has streamlined bureaucratic procedures and services. The stack has digitized and simplified Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures, lowering the compliance costs to banks using e-KYC from $12 to $0.06. The biometric system ensures that people cannot assume fake identities and that banks have access to reliable and secure data, both of which contribute to the lowering of compliance costs.</code></em></p> +<p>Except for the first hour and the last 30 minutes of the game, when teams deliberated over their opening and closing strategies, written bilateral communications and in-person bilateral and multilateral meetings were allowed between teams. Participants were free to take action independently of their team by submitting individual action forms. There was no limit to the number of forms participants could table per round, though all were encouraged to stay within the scope of trade, economic, and climate policy actions. They were also blocked from declaring war or resorting to kinetic military action.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Even with a strong foundation, India is looking to expand its digital infrastructure to more users in rural and unconnected areas. It is considering ORAN offerings to see if that approach would be cost effective, high quality, scalable, and secure. Official bilateral and multilateral exchanges on this topic are ongoing; Indian national security advisor Ajit Doval and his U.S. counterpart, Jake Sullivan, have discussed engagement in the ORAN space, and the topic has been included in Quad summits. India and the United States have also launched the Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) initiative, which promotes cooperation between the private sector and research and scientific institutions in both countries to advance next-gen technologies such as AI, telecom, ORAN, quantum computing, semiconductors, and space innovation.</code></em></p> +<p>Each team started the game with a score assigned by Control representing their collective standing in 2027 across four categories: economy, emissions, domestic political support, and allies (i.e., the level of cohesion within the group). Control updated the scores after each round based on how each team’s actions had affected these four categories, and facilitators privately distributed these to team members. Teams could choose which categories they wished to prioritize through their actions, consistent with their internal motivations, but they were instructed to consider the long-term effects beyond the game’s five-year time frame. For example, they had no obligation to implement dramatic emissions cuts within five years, as establishing credible long-term climate policies was sufficient to realize climate ambitions, though potentially at the expense of economic outcomes or domestic political support.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">India has already taken steps toward using ORAN technology in its own industries. In 2023, Tata Consulting Services and Tejas Networks formed a consortium to upgrade 4G and 5G networks; TCS will be the system integrator for the entire telecom network, while Tejas will be responsible for equipment and radio access network (RAN). Indian prime minister Narendra Modi has also traveled to the United States to pitch U.S. companies on partnerships with Indian companies that have investment and implementation experience in 4G, 5G, and ORAN, as well as 5G core, mobile edge cloud solutions, base stations, Internet of Things (IoT) sensors, and 5G smartphones. Indian telecom companies Airtel and Reliance Jio have supported ORAN; Airtel has reportedly conducted a trial of the technology and has signed a deal with U.S.-based Mavenir for its deployment to 4G and 5G sites in low-revenue-generating rural areas, with an initial target of 2,500 sites (to be scaled up to 10,000). Reliance Jio is also developing its own ORAN stack.</code></em></p> +<p>Each round was followed by a 30-minute break enabling teams to regroup and participants to address personal business, as well as a 30-minute adjudication session in which all teams reconvened in the main meeting room to receive an update on game progress from Control. The day ended with a one-hour hotwash for organizers to reflect on the decisions participants made throughout the game and for participants to share feedback on the game’s overall design and conduct.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Questions remain around costs and scalability. Indian telecom market watchers have queried whether ORAN works for the higher configurations used for 5G networks by Indian telecom companies, noting that they find the technology neither cost effective nor mature. Scalability and feasibility are issues as well. The country head of Mavenir for India has said that he initially expected ORAN deployments to surge, but that the Indian market has proven to be one of the most complex in the world for ORAN rollouts due to a large user base, high population density in cities, and diverse terrain and temperature conditions. India’s more challenging geographic areas may be a better fit for basic 3G, 4G, or 5G infrastructure. Additionally, there are concerns around technology fragmentation; India has benefited from a global standard in which the whole country is integrated. Issues around equipment “super cycles” are also a concern, as each new technological upgrade — from networks to smartphones — comes with its own specialized equipment. With the advent of AI and the likelihood of related technologies emerging, there will need to be significant public and private investment in managing super cycles; most governments, particularly those in developing countries, will need to attract or support that investment in order to both manage the demand for new devices and technologies and build workforce capacity. Finally, questions remain around the viability of ORAN. Some experts would like to see a larger country like the United States pilot and deploy ORAN on a large scale before India undertakes such an effort. To skeptics, ORAN’s unproven elements seem risky for a billion-person country that is looking to keep costs down, integrate systems seamlessly, and ensure safe and secure connectivity.</code></em></p> +<h3 id="game-progression-and-key-events">Game Progression and Key Events</h3> -<h3 id="recommendations-for-the-united-states-partners-and-the-private-sector">Recommendations for the United States, Partners, and the Private Sector</h3> +<h4 id="round-1-club-formation-and-reactions">Round 1: Club Formation and Reactions</h4> -<p>Communications technology, including ORAN, is a strategic asset that can enable not only innovation and dynamism through competitive markets (including but not limited to ORAN), but also control, surveillance, and repression (including through closed systems with predatory vendor lock-in). As the United States and its partners work to build out telecommunications networks in the developing world, both the technologies themselves and the regulatory frameworks must be centered around principles of interoperability, security, and openness. Each stakeholder has a role to play to create an enabling environment for good governance and standards, creating the conditions for mobilizing private sector capital and providing safe and reliable access to connectivity.</p> +<p>The first round, set in 2027, was devoted to establishing a G7+ climate club and immediate reactions from other participants. The G7+ team was tasked with reaching an agreement on the nature of their climate club within the first hour, while other teams considered their engagement strategies. The emerging markets team made preemptive announcements, expressing concern that wealthy nations would unilaterally impose border measures and undermine multilateral efforts to reduce emissions. They called on the G7+ to adopt collective strategies that accounted for their past emissions and developing countries’ need for financial support and technology for mitigation. China echoed these sentiments, offering support for the emerging markets’ position and inviting an open bilateral discussion.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As the United States and its partners work to build out telecommunications networks in the developing world, both the technologies themselves and the regulatory frameworks must be centered around principles of interoperability, security, and openness.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The G7+ announced the creation of a climate club with the following features:</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Use Guiding Principles for Secure Networks:</strong> Governing frameworks and values are as important as technology itself. Governments are working to shape these frameworks as innovations emerge and new security concerns manifest alongside them. The Prague Proposals, PGI, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement, and others offer guidelines for trusted, safe, and secure networks. Development and export finance institutions of the United States and its allies should embed these principles in their financing operations. CSIS’s own criteria, the CSIS Criteria for Security and Trust in Telecommunications Networks and Services, also provides a foundation for shared principles and could complement the work of the Prague Proposals and the European Union’s 5G Toolbox. The criteria are designed to help governments and network owners and operators to determine trustworthiness and security. They provide a framework to assess potential suppliers and to implement domestic policies to safeguard telecommunications networks.</p> + <p><strong>Carbon-free economy goal.</strong> Members commit to achieving a carbon-free economy by 2050.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Maximize Coordination and Financial Resources among U.S. Agencies and Development Partners:</strong> With the infrastructure finance gap widening and need soaring, DFC, EXIM, and partner development finance and export credit agencies need to work through existing mechanisms such as IPEF, TIP, and the Quad to maximize funds and extend reach. Cofinancing is notoriously difficult, but examples exist in which partners have seen more success when making specific contributions amid a broader project lifecycle, rather than trying to provide general support. Agencies and countries have different strengths that can be applied at various stages. Pooling funds to target specific and focused investments are another way for partners to utilize capital on shared objectives and in regions of shared interest. For example, at the recent Indo-Pacific Business Forum (IPBF) in Singapore, member countries announced the IPEF Catalytic Capital Fund to support the expansion of a clean economy infrastructure project pipeline in the forum’s emerging and upper-middle-income economies. Australia, Japan, Korea, and the United States contributed $33 million in grant funding, with a goal to generate up to $3.3 billion in private investment.</p> + <p><strong>Carbon accounting.</strong> Members gradually implement value chain accounting across all economic sectors.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Reform or Expand EXIM’s CTEP to Support Partner Telecoms:</strong> As CSIS recommended in the report, “The U.S. EXIM Bank in an Age of Great Power Competition,” released this year, CTEP should be more flexible and should include companies interested in participating to be exempt from the EXIM policies that can limit investor competitiveness. EXIM so far has come up short in maximizing CTEP, hampered in part by its requirement to ensure that loans will have a “reasonable assurance of repayment” and its 2 percent loss default ratio cap. To prevent EXIM from self-selecting out of deals and to allow it to take on greater risk (and thus be more competitive), the default cap should be raised in critical industries or on projects that fall under the CTEP umbrella. In line with this, EXIM should lower content requirements for financing. This would allow more U.S. and partner-country companies working in complex supply chains to get more involved in building trusted networks. Some U.S. companies have no choice but to source from abroad, which limits their ability to qualify for EXIM financing. Reasonable conditions for dropping content requirements, particularly for the sake of competitiveness and the promotion of trusted vendors, would almost certainly help the CTEP pipeline and U.S. businesses. The world has changed dramatically in the last 40 years: most supply chains are now global, and competitive manufacturing is a worldwide enterprise. In the same report, CSIS highlighted the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s 2012 report stating that EXIM’s domestic content requirements were too stringent compared to those of other G7 export credit agencies.</p> + <p><strong>Carbon border measures.</strong> Each member establishes its own carbon border measure, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for the European Union or carbon tariffs for the United States under the Foreign Pollution Fee Act.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Focus Resources on Key Strategic Markets:</strong> The ITSI fund and other pledged financial commitments are too small given the necessary financing needed to address the digital infrastructure gap. Focusing these funds in geographies and on technologies in which markets and offerings such as ORAN can be piloted and tested would be a better way to provide proof of concept and could later attract further public funding and mobilize private sector capital. Simultaneously targeting a large market such as India or Indonesia, a medium-sized market such as Kenya or Brazil, and a smaller market such as the Pacific or the Caribbean would offer a way to test different geographies, legal and regulatory systems, and population needs. This would provide lessons on successes and obstacles, as well as a road map for scaling up or moving to similar markets.</p> + <p><strong>Internal trade exemption.</strong> Members assign no climate-related border measures internally, pending the negotiation of an internal green marketplace.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Create Matchmaking Opportunities and Promote Alternatives:</strong> Host countries and local businesses should work through organized business forums and initiatives to solicit public and private sector funding. Initiatives like PGI and relevant government departments and agencies — such as the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, DFC, and EXIM — should work with local chambers of commerce and other business and trade organizations to establish such forums where they do not exist or strengthen those that do. An example to emulate is the recent IPBF that kicked off the Singapore IPEF Clean Economy Investor Forum. The forum acted as a matchmaker between investors and projects as well as a platform for sharing expertise and best practices in climate-related investments. The forum showcased $23 billion in sustainable infrastructure initiatives in IPEF-member economies — $6 billion of which belong to reportedly shovel-ready projects — to investors and interested governments.</p> + <p><strong>Technology transfers.</strong> Members make technology transfers to low- and lower-middle-income countries wishing to join the club.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Maintain Leadership on R&amp;D and Deployment:</strong> Nearly all initiatives and funds, including ITSI, have capacity building and technical assistance components. U.S. departments and agencies should offer training opportunities and foster an ecosystem of players involved in testing and integrating their interfaces and equipment, thus ensuring the openness and interoperability of ORAN solutions and other digital infrastructure efforts from trusted providers. This could build on some of the announced projects from the ITSI Fund, PGI, and IPEF, which include funding testing and integration centers, publishing reports and hosting conferences on proofs of concept, organizing workshops to develop and exchange ideas on new technologies, and helping operators test and verify the interoperability of ORAN equipment from different providers. This would be the first step in bringing down the costs of implementing ORAN and helping telecom companies scale their operations in this area.</p> + <p><strong>Shared oversight.</strong> All members participate in oversight and decisionmaking.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p>China criticized the proposal as vague and likely to undermine global trading rules for protectionist purposes. However, the China team refrained from taking adversarial action, instead calling for more details from the G7+ about the climate club. Meanwhile, China, Brazil, and India announced they would begin discussions on creating a global carbon accounting system open to all countries. The round closed with the United States and Canada communicating Mexico’s decision to join the club.</p> + +<h4 id="round-2-expansion-attempts-and-emerging-market-responses">Round 2: Expansion Attempts and Emerging Market Responses</h4> + +<p>The second round, covering the period of 2028–2029, unfolded as a battle for influence over emerging markets between the G7+ and China, with China scoring some early wins. Talks between China, Brazil, and India on establishing a global carbon accounting system gained momentum as all remaining BRICS members and Saudi Arabia joined. In response, the G7+ offered to collaborate by sharing data and discussing potential common standards.</p> + +<p>In addition, China released a three-pronged strategy designed to counter the G7+ club:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>Reserve the right to “respond appropriately” to any discriminatory measures.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Foster Accountability in Major Initiatives:</strong> The Quad, PGI, IPEF, and other initiatives have all announced major projects and deliverables at summits, conferences, and leader visits. While announcements are relatively easy, implementing projects and maintaining them amid changing political leadership is harder. An accountability tracker that measures the status of announcements and the impact of such initiatives should be put in place to ensure these projects get off the ground and that there is some way to measure if they are viable. This tracker will provide valuable data on government commitments, lessons learned, and the impact of projects on host communities.</p> + <p>Invest RMB 10 trillion over 10 years to speed up the decarbonization of China’s economy.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Promote Good Governance and Transparent Regulatory Regimes:</strong> Businesses often cite corruption and the lack of regulatory transparency as major hindrances to investment in developing economies. Much of this governance work has been done in capacity building programs through USAID and in initiatives like IPEF. The Fair Economy pillar has made significant progress; in a June 2024 IPEF ministerial meeting in Singapore, members announced measures to provide technical assistance and capacity building for fighting financial crimes like money laundering and terrorism financing, promote inclusivity in law enforcement on anticorruption efforts, and develop and implement anticorruption policies and measures. Ongoing efforts at the government-to-government level, as well as engagement with the private sector, will build on this foundation to establish a better environment for high-quality projects.</p> + <p>Launch the Inclusive Green Belt, focused on a fair accounting mechanism for carbon, technology sharing for climate challenges, and promoting free trade in environmental goods and services.</p> </li> </ul> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>China later secured the backing of India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa to pursue a joint dispute settlement case at the WTO against U.S. carbon border tariffs. This decision prompted Control to announce the reestablishment of the WTO Appellate Body based on a coin toss.</p> -<p>Countries across the globe are at an inflection point in deciding the course of digital infrastructure plans. Some are looking to emerging technologies, ensuring their digitalization plans take into account future developments and anticipate the necessary equipment, providers, and workforce. Others are working to ensure that rural communities are connected and can receive important services that foster economic and social development.</p> +<p>However, China’s momentum soon slowed. Crucially, no country chose to join the Inclusive Green Belt. While Russia responded positively to that proposal, China instead started bilateral negotiations on nuclear cooperation and a 30-year gas supply agreement aiming to reduce Chinese coal dependence.</p> -<p>Regardless, any digital infrastructure plan must consider the importance of having a safe, secure, and trusted network. Short-term price and deployment considerations are important, but there are real long-term consequences to hosting personal, business, and government digital traffic on high-risk vendor equipment. The United States and its partners and allies must recognize the need for speed and affordability in host country decisionmaking and make the case that their provisions are a viable alternative. The foundation for doing so exists, but the road map calls for more focus and consistency, as well as further monitoring of results to track accountability and proof of concept.</p> +<p>In contrast, the G7+ successfully enticed Mexico and Turkey to join its climate club, though it had to concede to their demands for preferential conditions. To further strengthen the club, the United States announced a USD 1 trillion fund offering grants and submarket loads for climate investments — exclusively accessible to club members.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Courted on both sides, emerging markets sought to strengthen their negotiating power by leveraging their collective resources. Brazil, Indonesia, Vietnam, and South Africa came together to form the Organization of Critical Minerals Exporters (OCME) to promote inclusive, fair, sustainable, and stable critical minerals markets. In the process, OCME even attracted Australia and Canada to join its ranks.</p> -<p><strong>Erin Murphy</strong> is deputy director of Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics and senior fellow of Emerging Asia Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She has spent her career in several public and private sector roles, including as an analyst on Asian political and foreign policy issues at the Central Intelligence Agency, director for the Indo-Pacific at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, founder and principal of her boutique advisory firm focused on Myanmar, and an English teacher with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program in Saga, Japan.</p>Erin L. MurphyThe United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer, cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.The West Must Stop Russia2024-11-04T12:00:00+08:002024-11-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-west-must-stop-russia<p><em>After more than a decade of the largest war in Europe since the Second World War, the West can no longer ignore the fact that the tipping point of the global balance of power lies in Ukraine.</em></p> +<p>Toward the end of the round, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Plus (OPEC+) coordinated to undermine the green transition within the G7+. They released large quantities of oil into the market, aiming to slow the growth of electric vehicles (EVs) and stall investment in critical minerals. Officially, OPEC+ presented this as a move to ease the global cost of living.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="round-3-final-negotiations-and-outcomes">Round 3: Final Negotiations and Outcomes</h4> -<p>While relentlessly pursuing its genocidal policy to destroy Ukraine as a nation and Ukrainians as a distinct national and ethnic group, Moscow has been pushing an international agenda of a “new world order” to replace the Western-led, rules-based system of international relations.</p> +<p>The third and final round, covering 2030–2032, did not bring any realignment among the teams. The G7+ solidified its climate club by achieving three key milestones. First, it finalized a major internal agreement on the green marketplace, tackling tariffs and nontariff barriers to establish a free market for environmental goods and services, public procurement options, conformity assessment and standards, nondiscriminatory access to incentives programs, and critical minerals. Second, the group tackled inflation concerns by reallocating tariff revenue toward cost transfers, home retrofitting for higher efficiency, and clean vehicles and electricity subsidies. Lastly, the G7+ anchored Turkey into the club, largely through an EU commitment to accelerate Turkey’s accession talks and South Korea’s pledge to invest in Turkey’s nuclear and EV sectors.</p> -<p>The West’s weak response to Russia’s threat to international peace has catalysed an imploding of the global security order. We are facing an emboldened Sino-Russian alliance which strongly believes there is a window of opportunity to gain the power to set the rules for a new, unfree world, ruled by force.</p> +<p>However, the G7+ could not prevent Mexico from leaving the club as inflationary pressures and declining economic opportunities within the club prompted its exit. Additionally, a joint EU-U.S. offer granting OCME members access to climate funds in exchange for preferential access to critical minerals went unanswered.</p> -<p>Russia’s large-scale destruction of Ukraine is tangible evidence of how international peace can crumble in front of our eyes when rogue actors who seek to detonate it demonstrate more determination and resolve than those who purport to defend it. The free world’s demonstrable lack of resolute will to uphold international law is a major factor in the current global crisis and invites further chaos and violence.</p> +<p>China, meanwhile, toughened its opposition to the G7+ club by imposing an export ban on all critical minerals processing technologies. However, China failed to gain traction in emerging markets despite pledging up to RMB 10 trillion in foreign direct investment to countries that would join the Inclusive Green Belt and remove tariffs on Chinese green goods. Additionally, the global carbon accounting discussions from the first and second rounds seemed to stall or fall by the wayside.</p> -<p>This historic moment calls for urgent revision of the current Western course of conspicuously inadequate actions to remove the threat of Russia as the linchpin of the anti-Western, anti-democratic axis. If the world is to avoid a new global conflict, Western policy must be refocused on a full commitment to defending the principles of the liberal rules-based order that is designed to make the world safer.</p> +<p>Among emerging markets, cohesion dissolved as each country pursued its national interests, choosing to negotiate bilaterally — either with other emerging markets or with other teams. India agreed to double its imports of Russian oil and gas in exchange for Indian investment into the Russian energy sector along with enhanced cooperation on decarbonization between the two countries. India further secured public financing from Saudi Arabia for domestic climate and energy transition projects, while Saudi Arabia negotiated a uranium deal with the United States and Australia to facilitate the Gulf region’s development of nuclear energy. OCME welcomed India, Japan, and South Korea within its ranks as “trusted processing and recycling centers,” but no other multilateral agreements emerged.</p> -<h3 id="the-russian-threat">The Russian Threat</h3> +<h3 id="scoring-progression">Scoring Progression</h3> -<p>Vladimir Putin’s Russia is not just an existential threat to Ukraine. Russia’s aggressive, revanchist regime is the origin point of the international anti-Western axis. Just as at other critical moments in its history, Russia is once again redefining itself through confrontation with the West. Moscow is challenging Western primacy in international relations in order to reclaim its status of global power. For the Kremlin, the freedom to act above and outside the limits and restrictions of international law is the symbol of such supremacy.</p> +<p>As the day progressed, each team dealt with advances and setbacks, and its scores in the four categories (economy, political support, emissions, and allies) shifted accordingly. The formation of a climate club by the G7+ team in round 1 improved its members’ emissions outlook, raising their emissions score from 2 to 4. By contrast, the club engendered the threat of trade restrictions and geopolitical hostility, lowering the team’s economy score from 6 to 4 and political support score from 5 to 3. China and emerging markets also saw bleak economic outcomes, with the club’s border adjustments and tariffs creating an economic burden for nonmember states. Round 2 saw general improvements for the G7+ and China teams, with the G7+ team expanding its alliance and China presenting a clear alternative to the G7-led climate club. The emerging markets team, however, was left with worsening natural disasters and inadequate financial commitments, reducing its political, economic, and allied scores.</p> -<p>For the past two decades, the world has been observing an escalating “Russia crisis” – the critical threat posed by a criminal, militarised, totalitarian, aggressive, revanchist and genocidal regime to international peace. Rather than countering the growing threat, Western policy has relied on the “too big to fail” approach in dealing with Moscow. Consequently, Russia has largely enjoyed protection from the consequences of its criminal actions, and has been able to continue pursuing its nefarious strategic course.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/loZ92Lb.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Table 1: Progression of Scores by Team and Round</em></p> -<p>Moscow’s goal is to replace the current liberal, rules-based international system with a “new world order”, where the role of the West is notably reduced. This was Vladimir Putin’s message in speeches given in 2014, 2023 and 2024.</p> +<h3 id="team-analysis">Team Analysis</h3> -<p>In 2014, Putin made a threatening warning which made clear that Russia will have no limits in pursuing this goal:</p> +<p><strong>G7+ team.</strong> The G7+ team proved particularly fractious due to the large number of participants and their diverse domestic approaches to climate policy. Internal differences kept the club from policy alignment. Early on, the EU and U.S. players retreated to separate rooms to coordinate their positions, a practice they continued at regular intervals. These divided sessions slowed overall club negotiations as each prioritized the management of their internal cohesion. The U.S. and EU policy proposals were also in conflict, as the United States had no internal carbon price to secure its climate goals, while the European Union was attached to its emissions trading system, which forced other members to mediate.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>“… changes in the world order – and what we are seeing today are events on this scale – have usually been accompanied by, if not global war and conflict, then by chains of intensive local-level conflicts.”</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Ultimately, the European Union and the United States reached an ungainly compromise and agreed on the main terms and benefits of the club, which they reluctantly extended to the rest of the group. However, the European Union stressed that its agreement was contingent on establishing a shared financing mechanism and access to U.S. subsidies in later rounds, which virtually halted the club’s implementation until all details were finalized in the late stages of the game.</p> -<p>Russia’s hostile ambitions were spelled out formally when, in 2021, Moscow issued an ultimatum to NATO, publicly outlining its far-reaching demands for a dangerous level of influence over the eastern flank of the alliance.</p> +<p>Consumed by internal negotiations throughout the game, the G7+ had little bandwidth to devote to a coherent outreach strategy for membership candidates — or even to consider how its proposals might appeal to them. Unable to tolerate China’s presence within the club, the United States clearly defined the group’s collective stance toward China, though the group’s lack of coordination was evident in the absence of cohesive messaging inside meetings.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Western powers continue to treat Russia as a pillar of the strategic global balance, as a consequence of which their policy towards Russian aggression has been ultimately premised on Kyiv making concessions to Moscow</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>The China team.</strong> The team’s structure was designed to mirror the decisionmaking processes that shape energy and climate policies in China. Each player represented a specific government entity. However, such internal dynamics were largely muted during the gameplay, as players were not assertive in their assigned roles. Instead, the team took a collaborative approach and deferred to the president/politburo when making major decisions. This pattern persisted when a different player assumed the presidency later in the game for logistical reasons.</p> -<p>Moscow’s determination to defy the West has been severely underestimated. The quest for a “new world order”, driven by the Sino-Russian alliance, is changing global dynamics. In essence, the new Eastern-led order is based on taking advantage of the globalised economy while destroying the liberal rules-based international order. Rogue regimes in Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela and Belarus are being legitimised. The expanding BRICS group is building an alternative economic system of the “global majority” to provide shelter from Western sanctions and ensure global political dominance.</p> +<p>In the early stages of the game, players spent significant time aligning their views on two key points: the state of energy and climate in China and the government’s priorities and redlines. Once the team reached a consensus, it acted as a unified block in international proceedings. No player deviated from the agenda during meetings with foreign representatives, the group consulted internally before and after each meeting, and no actions were taken without the group’s consent.</p> -<p>To claim domination, the Sino-Russian alliance is committed to:</p> +<p>Although players were keen to use China’s strengths in technology and state-driven international finance during negotiations, they took a cautious approach, avoiding proposals that might harm China’s economic security. Only in the final turn did China act on its stated opposition to the G7+ club by raising export controls on critical minerals technology. Their other initiatives to compete with the G7+ for global leadership, such as the Inclusive Green Belt and global carbon accounting schemes, stalled.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Advancing an international agenda of creating spheres of influence by instigating conflicts and chaos to fracture global solidarity.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Displacing the universal rules-based order through special bilateral arrangements that advance a global power alignment tilted towards their alliance, with Beijing being the biggest beneficiary.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Reversing humanity’s progress by challenging the universal nature of human rights and political freedoms.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Reducing the global domain of freedom by subverting democracies and by corrupting political and economic establishments to foment authoritarianism.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Diminishing the influence of Western democracies in international relations by subverting international organisations.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><strong>The emerging markets team.</strong> In the initial stages of the game, India and South Africa sought to lead a preemptive strategy to deter or at least mitigate the impact of the anticipated G7+ climate club. However, discussions broke down due to competing national interests. Turkey’s economic ties with Europe, as well as Mexico’s trade relationship with the United States, made them more conciliatory toward the G7+, culminating in their decision to join the G7+ club. However, Mexico later withdrew after determining the cost of membership was too high. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were wary of antagonizing or overly depending on China, which hindered unification efforts.</p> -<p>The objective of the Sino-Russian strategy is a return to an inherently dangerous and divisive “might makes right” reality in international relations. While disguised as a universal order of sovereign and equal states, such a system defies the equal application of international law to exempt the great powers from any restrictions imposed by universal rules.</p> +<p>Natural resources also played a major role for players on the emerging markets team, as seen in the establishment of the OCME. Russia, meanwhile, pursued a natural gas and nuclear agreement with China, though its primary strategy was disruption. Russia used its cyber capabilities and natural resources to sow discord, particularly within the G7+, and to deter any actions that might threaten demand for its hydrocarbon exports. By the end of the game, the emerging markets team was too fragmented to resemble a cohesive economic bloc.</p> -<p>The new Eastern-led order will privilege major international actors with influence and power to coerce smaller countries. While talking about “multipolarity” and “multilateralism”, both Moscow and Beijing share the position of denying smaller countries equal standing in international relations. This essence of the “new order” is illustrated perfectly by the policy of the anti-Western axis towards Ukraine, which promotes and serves Russian interests.</p> +<h3 id="key-outcomes-and-insights">Key Outcomes and Insights</h3> -<h3 id="the-wests-self-defeating-russia-policy">The West’s Self-Defeating Russia Policy</h3> +<p><strong>The outcomes highlighted the risks of a trade-based climate strategy.</strong> The game ended with escalating trade tensions, a worsening economic outlook for many countries, and only a modest increase in global ambitions for climate change. Despite mounting pressure from the public and increasingly visible climate effects, players prioritized economic and geopolitical goals over emissions reductions. Throughout the simulation, U.S.-China relations remained distant, and even the threat of a trade war failed to inspire rapprochement on carbon accounting standards, green development spending, or a common approach to climate and trade. The potential benefits of joining the G7+ climate club were not compelling enough to attract major emitters such as India, Brazil, or Indonesia.</p> -<p>At its core, Western Russia policy – especially since Vladimir Putin’s revanchist speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference – has been mostly focused on global strategic stability.</p> +<p><strong>Ambiguity prevented teams from taking decisive action in early rounds.</strong> As China and the emerging markets awaited details about the nascent club, they cautioned the G7+ against adopting protectionist measures but did not oppose the creation of a climate club outright or threaten direct retaliation. This left the G7+ team relatively free to act without external pressure. Most notably, China and the emerging markets failed to unite around a credible alternative to the G7+ effort. This could reflect a lack of appetite for climate clubs, or it could stem from emerging markets hedging their bets between potentially attractive options. In any case, the G7+ team appeared too preoccupied with its internal divisions to capitalize on opportunities to bring large emitters from the emerging markets team (such as Brazil, India, or Indonesia) into the fold or pressure China to increase its internal ambitions for climate.</p> -<p>The US’s reset of relations with Russia after the latter’s 2008 war on Georgia ushered in a period of a doomed appeasement strategy. Instead of taming Moscow’s aggression by firmly upholding international law, Putin’s quest to satisfy revanchist “grievances” was tolerated. This policy resulted in destructive consequences for the world. An emboldened Kremlin unleashed disinformation, interference, corruption, subversion and violence on a scale which affects the entire trajectory of global affairs.</p> +<p><strong>Economic imperatives appeared to have a stabilizing effect on Chinese decisionmaking.</strong> Appearing hesitant to jeopardize economic opportunities through retaliatory measures, the China team explored alternative options ranging from warning the G7+ against discriminatory measures to engaging with emerging markets in various formats and appealing to the WTO. When these efforts failed, China finally opted for retaliation, the scope of which was narrow, focusing on critical minerals and WTO litigation. The China team calculated that persistent macroeconomic difficulties would make it unfeasible to sustain a large-scale trade war that could compromise other priorities, including national security and climate goals.</p> -<p>Russia’s war on Ukraine has been the main point of its attack on international peace and security in its efforts to re-establish global dominance.</p> +<p><strong>Geopolitical considerations, as well as regional and economic proximity, strongly influenced decisionmaking.</strong> After the G7+ formally established its club, the United States and Canada swiftly approached Mexico, and the European Union approached Turkey. These moves seemed low risk and logical given the nations’ geographic proximity, political ties, and significant trade flows. By contrast, India was never directly courted to join either the G7+ club or China’s Inclusive Green Belt. The country’s ambivalent geopolitical positioning, as well as its low-ambition trade and climate mitigation policies, may have acted as deterrents.</p> -<p>From the beginning of Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war of aggression on Ukraine in 2014, the West misdefined this interstate war as a “Ukraine crisis” to diminish the international threat of an aggressive Russia. The horrific images of Moscow’s 2022 large-scale offensive and consequent massacres of Ukrainian civilians forced Western leaders to face the grim reality of the actual “Russia crisis”. Now, in 2024, there is finally a growing understanding that Moscow is using its war against Ukraine as a system-changing conflict within a global confrontation driven by the Sino-Russian alliance to bring down the Western-led rules based order.</p> +<p>Notably, both Mexico and Turkey sought access to the G7+ club in a manner that would permit continued Chinese investment in their economies. They requested that goods produced by Chinese companies on their soil, like BYD EVs, not be excluded from the internal green marketplace. Meanwhile, bilateral deals — such as those between China and Russia, Russia and India, or Saudi Arabia and the United States — aligned with existing geopolitical and sectoral relationships.</p> -<p>Despite committing grave violations of international law and undermining world peace, Russia has largely enjoyed protection from the consequences of its criminal actions. At the same time, Ukraine – the victim of Russia’s unprovoked and illegal aggression – has been bound hand and foot in exercising its legal right to self-defence.</p> +<p><strong>Trade liberalization and energy supplies were the most effective tools for driving collaboration and realignment.</strong> Both the G7+ and China made technology transfer and investment central to their efforts to entice other countries to cooperate, but they met with little success. Attempts by China and the emerging markets to exert influence through tighter controls on critical minerals or fossil fuels were also of limited influence. In contrast, trade liberalization played a significant role in supporting and dissuading club membership. Access to the green marketplace was key in attracting Mexico and Turkey to the G7+ club, while market access for Chinese green goods deterred emerging markets from embracing the Inclusive Green Belt. Energy supply played a significant role in bilateral deals between teams but was not a driver for clubs.</p> -<p>Russia – a country with nuclear capabilities and an army, territory and economy many times larger than that of Ukraine – continues to be shielded from concerted international action to counteract its genocidal war of aggression, while Ukraine – a country which gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security – has been struggling to receive sufficient international support to defend itself against genocide and safeguard international principles that benefit all.</p> +<h3 id="lessons-for-policymakers">Lessons for Policymakers</h3> -<p>The inept international response to Russia’s war against Ukraine exposes the grotesque design of the international security system. Eight decades on from the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the peace and security of humanity is still at the mercy of the two totalitarian, genocidal regimes in Moscow and Beijing, and critically depends on the political resolve in three Western capitals – Washington, London and Paris. In Ukraine’s case, the political position in Berlin also bears influence, considering Germany’s important role in the EU and NATO.</p> +<p><strong>Clear policy communication is paramount in multilateral negotiations — both in the run-up to a major policy pronouncement and upon its enactment.</strong> Slow, cautious play characterized the game’s opening turns as all three teams appeared unsure of how to proceed or respond. After the G7+ and China teams published their proposals, they spent considerable time dispelling misunderstandings and clarifying their terms. Without clearly articulated goals and terms, club members had little opportunity to market membership to large emitters or potential geopolitical allies.</p> -<p>Western powers continue to treat Russia as a pillar of the strategic global balance. It is as a direct consequence of this radically flawed approach that Western policy towards Russian aggression has been ultimately premised on Kyiv making concessions to Moscow.</p> +<p><strong>Climate clubs are contingent on flexible mechanisms that accommodate diverse national interests.</strong> The G7+ team struggled to overcome its members’ disparate policy approaches but struck compromises to clinch an ambitious agreement based on long-term decarbonization. For example, the European Union exempted U.S. products from CBAM, even in the absence of a U.S. carbon market, in exchange for access to Inflation Reduction Act–style subsidies and expanded trade in green goods. The members also did not create a unified border measure, instead allowing each country to follow its national preference. Flexibility was crucial in expanding the club in later turns, as demonstrated in Mexico’s and Turkey’s attempts to protect Chinese investment in their territories.</p> -<p>From 2014, Russian interests were accommodated by ever-shifting Western red lines on the invasion; by the position of there being “no military solution” to the conflict which invited bolder Russian aggression; by Washington’s “leading from behind” to avoid a more active role in fulfilling its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum; by symbolic sanctions incommensurate with Moscow’s transgressions; by the Berlin- and Paris-mediated “peace process” which implied concessions from Ukraine by design; and by the policy of “de-escalation” which denied military assistance for Ukraine to mount an effective defence.</p> +<p><strong>Climate clubs must be aggressively marketed to emerging markets and geopolitical allies.</strong> Neither the G7+ team nor the China team succeeded in attracting development economies to their club. This failure appears to stem from a lack of coordination among emerging markets as well as the one-size-fits-all approaches of the G7+ and China. Participants did not form any transactional arrangements, such as exchanging access to critical minerals for industrial investment or market access.</p> -<p>While Western support for Ukraine has dramatically increased since 2022, when Russia’s role as the aggressor was finally recognised by the UN, the policy approach has remained stuck in the logic that “Russia is too big to fail”.</p> +<p><strong>Trade has the potential to drive, as well as deter, climate action.</strong> Conventional climate club designs feature a common border measure to encourage nonmembers to join and adopt emissions targets. This is precisely what drove Mexico and Turkey to seek accession to the G7+ club. Yet trade policy considerations also complicated the search for solutions. The debate over the nature and extent of the border measure almost derailed the formation of the G7+ club, as the European Union and the United States disagreed on whether to adhere to WTO rules for raising border adjustments or selectively liberalize trade within the club. Later in the game, China’s demand for tariff-free treatment of its exports as a condition for participating in its Inclusive Green Belt deterred emerging markets from joining.</p> -<p>All the major points of Western policy, such as the refusal to deploy NATO troops in Ukraine; the limitations on the use of Western-supplied weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory (and for some, even in Ukraine’s Crimea); and statements like “Russia cannot win in Ukraine”, “we will support Ukraine for as long as it takes”, “we must help Ukraine to strengthen its position at the negotiating table” or “Ukraine will be able to join NATO after winning the war” reflect the underlying reality that Russia’s interests, however illegitimate, play a weighty role in Western decision-making.</p> +<h3 id="priorities-for-future-research">Priorities for Future Research</h3> -<p>Instead of fully committing to helping Kyiv repel Russian aggression, the West chose to pursue “escalation management”, enabling Moscow to wreak havoc in Ukraine and largely protecting Russia from the war.</p> +<p><strong>Improve modeling of climate-focused trade mechanisms.</strong> A key shortfall in this game was the inability to model or quantitatively understand the economic, trade, emissions, and political stakes of different decisions. Participants had to reason about decisions using intuition or by asking questions of Control. They were also limited in their ability to compare options or grapple with the outcomes of different actions. Although policymakers in the real world face substantial uncertainty in the outcomes of their decisions, they must enter negotiations with some quantitative understanding of how to achieve their climate and economic goals.</p> -<p>The limited support for Ukraine makes clear that the West never truly had a strategy for Russia’s defeat – which would entail complete unconditional withdrawal of Russian military formations from all of Ukraine, the renunciation of Moscow’s territorial claims, justice for war criminals, and reparations. Without Russia’s defeat, there cannot be a Ukrainian victory, only de facto or de jure concessions by Kyiv.</p> +<p><strong>Understand the priorities of emerging markets in climate and trade negotiations.</strong> Future research on climate clubs should focus on devising a coherent approach that enables the identification and harmonization of the diverse and often conflicting security, climate, and economic priorities of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). Research could explore how climate clubs can tailor membership incentives, such as market access, technology transfer, and political support, to attract EMDE participation. This could alleviate the shortcomings of the narrow, one-size-fits-all approaches observed in this simulation.</p> -<p>A defeated Russia is an infinitely lesser threat than an undefeated Russia. Sacrificing Ukraine will not solve the problem of the aggressive, revanchist, totalitarian Russian state. If the black hole of Putin’s Russia swallows Ukraine, it will increase its gravitational pull. The West will face the consequences of the new global power re-alignment, consisting first and foremost of Sino-Russian domination in Europe.</p> +<p><strong>Develop a standardized and adaptable global carbon accounting framework.</strong> Lack of consensus on carbon accounting standards and other evaluative criteria emerged as a major obstacle to cooperation during the simulation. Future research should focus on identifying carbon accounting procedures that meet enough needs to become standardized, such as accounting for data access and validation procedures. Proactive multilateral engagement is critical to effectively integrating these global standards into trade negotiations and carbon border mechanisms.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The West’s obsessive and unjustifiable avoidance of confrontation with Russia in fact increases the risk of direct engagement becoming the only option</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Identify and navigate geopolitical and security redlines in climate negotiations.</strong> The simulation illustrated that bilateral and multilateral agreements that align with existing geopolitical relationships or shared economic and security interests have higher rates of success. Future research should focus on identifying geopolitical and security redlines that hinder climate negotiations, as well as the ways climate clubs can mitigate these obstacles through measures such as public diplomacy, economic incentives, and security guarantees.</p> -<p>In fact, by refusing to shoot down Russian missiles and drones in NATO airspace; by refusing to implement a humanitarian military mission to protect Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, especially its nuclear power plants; by drip-feeding military aid to Kyiv, withholding critically needed weapons and imposing restrictions on Ukrainian strikes against Russia; by stalling on NATO membership for Ukraine; and by accepting China’s say on the security of Europe, the West – and the US in particular – has already manifestly relinquished its leadership role in international relations.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The self-defeating policy of risk aversion has also severely damaged the credibility of NATO’s own deterrence. NATO is projecting the image of a panic room, not that of an actionable force capable of providing security – even for its own members.</p> +<p><strong>Joseph Majkut</strong> is the director of the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<h3 id="the-cost-of-inertia-is-rapidly-rising">The Cost of Inertia is Rapidly Rising</h3> +<p><strong>Guillaume Ferlet</strong> is an external consultant on trade and climate issues with CSIS.</p> -<p>The alarming lack of resolute political will in Western capitals to uphold the fundamental rules of global security is giving oxygen to Russia’s and its anti-Western allies’ ambition to reshape our world according to their oppressive vision.</p> +<p><strong>William Reinsch</strong> holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p>Joseph Majkut, et al.In July 2024, CSIS’s Energy Security and Climate Change Program, in collaboration with the Scholl Chair in International Business, hosted a one-day trade and climate simulation game titled Power and Planet. The focus was on how players representing key nations make decisions at the intersection of climate and trade policy to reduce emissions, boost economic opportunity, and ensure security.Collaborative AI Governance2024-11-13T12:00:00+08:002024-11-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/collaborative-ai-governance<p><em>The UK and Canada, leveraging their strengths as trusted middle powers, are well-positioned to lead in setting global AI standards, fostering ethical, responsible and innovative AI governance.</em></p> -<p>The West cannot isolate itself from the outcome of Russia’s war. This is no longer about “helping Ukraine”, but about the responsibility of Western governments to their own citizens to ensure a peaceful future.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The West’s obsessive and unjustifiable avoidance of confrontation with Russia in fact increases the risk of direct engagement becoming the only option. For now, while the Ukrainian army maintains high combat readiness, NATO countries can still avoid a direct face-off with Russia by deploying their troops away from the frontline to help Ukraine protect civilian areas and critical infrastructure and deter invasion from Belarus or, potentially, Russia-occupied Transnistria in Moldova if Russia succeeds in subverting the pro-Western course of Chișinău.</p> +<p>AI has moved out of the academic sphere and is rapidly becoming a “general-purpose” technology with a significant impact on industry, government and society. As a result, there is an urgent need to develop a cross-sectoral environment for AI within countries to attract foreign direct investment, and actively participate in global trade and meet both economic and national security goals.</p> -<p>With North Korea sending troops to fight Ukraine, the West’s response to Russia’s war is a watershed moment for the future of humanity. Ukrainians shouldn’t be fighting alone to defend the rules-based order. Not fighting alongside Ukraine means helping Russia to achieve its nefarious goals.</p> +<p>However, in parallel to the technological investment in and development of this capability, robust governance systems must be in place to ensure the development and application of AI is trustworthy.</p> -<p>If the West fails to defend the universality of the values of freedom and justice in Ukraine, it will eventually find itself in the role of the global “minority”, while the Sino-Russian alliance will be legitimised as the voice of the “global majority” and proceed to impose its will over the entirety of the international system.</p> +<p>These levels of trust, predictability and protection are particularly important at a time when collaboration between global powers and economies of a lesser magnitude is vital, but when different forms of regulation may be better suited to smaller economies and political structures. Moreover, the so-called “rules-based order” that once governed global interactions is now inconsistently applied. This presents a unique opportunity for like-minded middle economies to unite and collectively set the highest standards for AI’s ethical and responsible use in ways that uphold their strong commitment to democratic principles, human rights and freedoms.</p> -<p>The free world urgently needs leadership from both sides of the Atlantic to safeguard the vision of the rules-based order, where countries are protected from spheres of influence and oppressive domination. Rogue states breaking the foundational rules of global security and peace must face a commensurate response. The world needs united and devoted action to save Ukraine in order to save the world.</p> +<p>In times of global uncertainty, the UK and Canada have consistently been viewed as trusted partners and “safe pairs of hands”. Both countries have respected political systems, strong higher education institutions, a shared monarchy, similarities in the legal and regulatory regimes, and military alliances (NATO and the “Five Eyes”). While many middle economies wait for powers like the US and the EU to set data and AI standards rules in the digital world, progress has been slow. Therefore, taking stock of the milestones and progress achieved in countries such as Canada and the UK is crucial, as well as considering the formation of a coalition of middle economies to set and influence global standards in this area.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Both countries are navigating their roles as middle powers in the global AI race, which is dominated by the US, the EU and China. Ranked third (UK) and fifth (Canada) in the 2024 top 10 countries leading in AI research and technology, with a market value of $21 billion for the UK and 144 generative AI-related startups in Canada, and scores of 38.1 (UK) and 34 (Canada) in the leading 20 AI countries in 2023 by research capacity, these countries have significant potential to collaborate on AI governance and the establishment of trustworthy and responsible AI cooperation. Demis Hassabis and Geoffrey Hinton, two thought leaders in AI research and practice, are both British, with Hinton having spent a significant part of his career in Canada – which is also home to other leading global AI scholars like Yoshua Bengio.</p> -<p><strong>Volodymyr Ohryzko</strong> is Director of the Centre for Russian Studies in Ukraine. He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine from 2007-2009 and the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Austria from 1999-2004.</p> +<h3 id="canada-and-the-uks-progress-and-existing-challenges">Canada and the UK’s Progress and Existing Challenges</h3> -<p><strong>Roman Sohn</strong> is an international law expert and researcher on the Russian war on Ukraine and Russia’s genocide against Ukrainians.</p> +<p>Progress in data privacy and protection in the UK is an excellent example of progressive national efforts in the data-driven and digitalised world. These efforts have already resulted in comprehensive legislative frameworks like the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK-GDPR, both of which align with the EU’s GDPR to safeguard personal data across various sectors. The UK has also made progress in sector-specific privacy advancements, particularly in health informatics, with initiatives such as NHS Digital implementing stricter controls on patient data access through the Data Security and Protection Toolkit. Innovations like the UK National Data Strategy and the UK National AI Strategy highlight the government’s commitment to ensuring the responsible use of data while fostering innovation in digital services and AI applications. The Alan Turing Institute, which is the UK’s National Institute for Data Science and AI, focuses on advancing world-class research and applying it to national and global challenges, developing skills and training for the future, and driving informed public conversation. The Ada Lovelace Institute develops research, policy and practice to ensure that data and AI is used and harnessed in ways that maximise social wellbeing and put technology at the service of humanity.</p> -<p><strong>Ariana Gic</strong> is the Director of the Direct Initiative International Centre for Ukraine and a Senior Advisor at the Centre for Eastern European Democracy. Ms Gic is sanctioned by the Russian Federation.</p>Volodymyr Ohryzko, et al.After more than a decade of the largest war in Europe since the Second World War, the West can no longer ignore the fact that the tipping point of the global balance of power lies in Ukraine.SIFMANet Pretoria Report2024-11-01T12:00:00+08:002024-11-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sifmanet-pretoria-report<p><em>This report details the roundtable discussions in Pretoria to share views on South African policy relating to the sanctions on Russia and Belarus, as well as other issues of financial integrity.</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is a unique opportunity for like-minded middle economies to unite and collectively set the highest standards for AI’s ethical and responsible use</code></em></strong></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Canadian progress in AI ethics and regulation is also worthy of note. Canada has been at the forefront of promoting ethical AI through the Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Algorithmic Impact Assessment tools. In 2018, as Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commissioner, Dr Ann Cavoukian introduced the seven foundational principles of “Privacy by Design”. These principles directly informed the development of the EU’s GDPR. Currently, the Canadian government is actively working on regulations – including the proposed AI and Data Act (AIDA) – to ensure transparency, fairness and accountability in developing and using AI systems. Canada’s strength in AI research, notably through the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research and Center for International Governance Innovation, has positioned the country as a global leader in AI ethics and governance, encouraging responsible innovation. Programmes including the Vector Institute (Ontario) and Mila (Quebec AI Institute) contribute significantly to research on ethical AI and developing tools for assessing algorithmic fairness.</p> -<p>In mid-September 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI, with the support of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), hosted a roundtable in Pretoria. The roundtable provided a forum for private and public sector participants, including banks and government departments (as detailed below), to share views on South African policy relating to the sanctions levied by G7 states on Russia and Belarus, as well as other issues of financial integrity. Identities of participants are confidential.</p> +<p>The key challenge lies in integrating these ethical standards into broader legal frameworks and ensuring uniform implementation across provinces, particularly given Canada’s decentralised governance. There are also significant concerns regarding the ethical use of AI in public services, such as law enforcement, where algorithmic bias and surveillance risks must be carefully managed. Balancing the rapid development of AI technologies with ethical considerations and privacy preservation remains a complex and ongoing issue, particularly as AI systems become more pervasive in sectors like healthcare, education and finance. Despite progress on ethical frameworks, the lack of comprehensive national AI legislation presents hurdles in ensuring consistent oversight across industries.</p> -<p>This roundtable was accompanied by a series of additional meetings in Johannesburg and Cape Town with representatives from the financial services industry, academics, policy analysts and government stakeholders, covering expertise in foreign policy, financial services regulation, and sanctions and compliance. These included, among others, the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), the State Security Agency (SSA) and the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC). This event is part of the in-country engagements conducted by the CFS-led Sanctions and the Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.</p> +<h3 id="current-collaborations-and-joint-efforts">Current Collaborations and Joint Efforts</h3> -<p>Participants in the discussions fell into two general categories, which steered the conversations in the following ways:</p> +<p>This progress notwithstanding, challenges remain, particularly in balancing innovation with compliance, as industries such as health informatics seek more flexible use of personal data while maintaining privacy. The issue of cross-border data flows post-Brexit presents regulatory complexities, especially with potential data adequacy rulings from the EU. The rapid advancement of AI and big data analytics in sectors like finance and healthcare tests the limits of existing frameworks, prompting ongoing discussions about updating privacy laws to cover emerging technologies like AI-driven decision-making systems and biometric data usage.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Academics and policy analysts: South Africa has limited direct trade with Russia, but for many reasons the political relationship is stronger than the figures imply. As a result, many representatives of the academic and policy research communities have travelled to Russia since 2022 to attend trade fairs and other economic and political events. These participants tended to focus on local policymaking sovereignty and political matters, rather than assessing South Africa’s position on Russia sanctions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Financial services: Many participants in the meetings worked in compliance and legal functions in banks, or in supervisory and regulatory roles relating to the sector. In contrast to the academics and policy analysts, these participants expressed considerable concern about the need to balance international regulators’ and banking partners’ expectations against South Africa’s policy of neutrality, non-alignment and multilateralism.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>Canada and the UK have been actively fostering collaboration on AI-related initiatives. For example, in 2019, the UK-Canada AI Initiative was launched to fund collaborative research projects between the two countries. This initiative focuses on AI’s application in areas like health and environmental sustainability and on the ethical challenges posed by AI technologies. The goal is to leverage the AI expertise of both countries while promoting research that aligns with their shared values of transparency, fairness and privacy protection. The 2024 UK-Canada science of AI safety partnership serves as another collaborative initiative.</p> -<p>As a result, the discussions covered a wide range of topics, but generally were concerned thematically with how South Africa can create its own independent diplomatic and political path while also benefiting from cooperation with competing great powers.</p> +<p>The UK and Canada are both active internationally in advocating for the responsible use of AI. They are co-signatories of the 2019 OECD AI Principles, the 2022–2024 Council of Europe AI Convention drafting group, the 2023 G7 Ministers’ Statement, the 2023 Bletchley Declaration and the 2024 Seoul Ministerial Declaration. They have also both participated in the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence. This multilateral engagement runs in parallel with national legislative frameworks such as the Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy and the UK National AI Strategy, both of which are oriented towards building AI ecosystems that prioritise ethical standards, transparency and fairness.</p> -<h3 id="non-alignment-and-the-material-consequences-of-sanctions">Non-alignment and the Material Consequences of Sanctions</h3> +<h3 id="how-can-canada-and-the-uk-make-a-difference">How Can Canada and the UK Make a Difference?</h3> -<p>Participants’ initial reactions to engagement regarding sanctions focused on South Africa’s policies of multilateralism and neutrality. The government’s policy is to enforce only UN sanctions, rejecting what it sees as unilaterally applied restrictive measures on Russia and Belarus. As one government representative put it: “We value our relations with our partners whether it’s where the sun rises or where the sun sets.”</p> +<p>Building on a long history of collaboration between the UK and Canada in emerging technologies, shared values and similarities in political cultures and the diversity of their populations, as well as the novel approaches and practices established and implemented in both countries, joint efforts could be enhanced in the following areas:</p> -<p>Participants frequently referred to the theoretical dimensions of the fallout of this stance, and a sense of being stuck in the middle between fighting factions. A failure to apply sanctions would worsen relationships with the G7, while applying them would cause political (if not trading) difficulties with Russia. “Being forced to choose sides between Russia and the West – this is not something we should be asked to do”, one academic participant noted. Several participants described the situation as similar to Cold War-era divisions. As a result, some noted that government decisions are rooted at times not in a policy’s merit, but its perceived geopolitical alignment.</p> +<h4 id="data-governance-and-data-protection">Data Governance and Data Protection</h4> -<p>At the same time, private sector participants noted that South Africa’s historically close ties to Russia had led some leaders to make statements that undermined its neutral position. According to one participant, “sometimes what comes out of politicians’ mouths is not non-alignment, and that does affect perceptions of the country”.</p> +<p>Both countries could build a bilateral data governance framework that enhances data protection while facilitating secure data sharing for research, public health, and economic growth. This would ensure that data governance aligns with ethical standards and that personal data is protected across both countries while enabling the flow of information critical to innovation and commerce.</p> -<p>The conversation then focused on sanctions’ effects in South Africa, with participants highlighting numerous developmental dilemmas that South African policymakers face. For example, government representatives cited the need for economic growth and new jobs for a growing and ambitious population, with one saying, “we would like to see a safer Africa in a better world that is peaceful”.</p> +<p>For example, the US–EU Privacy Shield Framework offers a reference point for cross-border data governance. Although invalidated in 2020, it was initially designed to facilitate data transfers while ensuring compliance with stringent privacy laws on both sides of the Atlantic. A UK–Canada data governance initiative could draw lessons from this experience to build a framework that maintains high data privacy standards without impeding cross-border innovation and AI research.</p> -<p>Academic participants noted the developmental impact of the sanctions, highlighting the timing immediately following the Covid-19 pandemic. They noted the inflationary pressures and resulting interest rate increases, which one participant observed “led to a significant effect on the masses, particularly on the poor indebted”. Another academic agreed, highlighting the sanctions’ impact on the “debt crisis in the African continent”.</p> +<h4 id="development-of-cybersecurity-and-defence-against-hybrid-informational-threats">Development of Cybersecurity and Defence Against Hybrid Informational Threats</h4> -<p>Another issue discussed was energy, with one policy analyst noting that South Africa is likely to face a gas crisis after 2026. Gazprom, they said, was one solution to this issue. Other participants saw opportunities for building stronger intra-African supply chains, rather than relying on imports from other continents. Fertiliser and energy were cited as areas where this had been discussed.</p> +<p>Joint investments in cybersecurity systems include cooperation on AI-driven threat detection, defensive measures against cyberattacks and developing countermeasures to combat disinformation and hybrid attacks. This could involve research collaborations between top universities in both countries, pooling expertise to create cutting-edge tools that protect national digital infrastructure.</p> -<p>Participants also assessed the importance of engaging with G7 countries on these material and developmental impacts of sanctions. In addition to emphasising the country’s overall policy of multilateralism, it may be important to identify the problematic consequences of sanctions in South Africa and seek potential diplomatic solutions that would ease these effects.</p> +<p>Australia and Singapore’s cybersecurity cooperation is a strong example of two countries collaborating to enhance cyber defences. Under their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Australia and Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2017 to cooperate on cybersecurity initiatives. This partnership includes joint cyber threat exercises, collaboration on cyber capacity building, sharing good practice on cybersecurity governance, and developing common frameworks for cyber risk management. The UK and Canada could adopt a similar model by establishing a formal cybersecurity cooperation framework focusing on joint threat intelligence sharing, collaborative defence against cyberattacks, and coordinated responses to disinformation and hybrid informational threats.</p> -<h3 id="using-other-financial-crime-compliance-tools-to-address-sanctions-risks">Using Other Financial Crime Compliance Tools to Address Sanctions Risks</h3> +<h4 id="investment-in-ai-startups-and-innovation">Investment in AI Startups and Innovation</h4> -<p>Participants from the banking sector said they lacked detailed guidance from the government to support them with their concerns about international regulators’ and business partners’ sanctions compliance expectations. The conversations took on greater urgency because of the greylisting of South Africa by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in February 2023, as a result of which South Africa began work on a 22-point mutually agreed Action Plan to address the deficiencies identified by FATF. Private sector participants worried that the country’s financial crime reputation would be further hampered if secondary sanctions were placed on a South African bank, and/or if correspondent banks – those global banks that connect South African banks to the international financial system – were no longer willing to process transactions with the country’s financial institutions as a result of perceived sanctions circumvention risks.</p> +<p>The AI ecosystem in the UK and Canada is thriving, with solid support for startups and innovation hubs. The UK’s Alan Turing Institute and Canada’s Vector Institute are global leaders in AI research, and both countries have numerous AI startups working on cutting-edge innovations. Earlier this year, Innovate UK invited UK companies developing AI for improving healthcare to apply to join its Global Incubator Programme in collaboration with MaRS Discovery District in Toronto, Canada. However, more can be done to foster cross-border investment and collaboration in this space. A bilateral initiative to increase investment in AI startups could include creating joint AI venture capital funds, protection for creator rights and intellectual property, support for incubators, and cross-border mentorship programmes.</p> -<p>Representatives from South Africa’s supervisory and regulatory bodies agreed that, because the stated policy was one of neutrality, they were unable to provide detailed guidance for complying with G7 sanctions. However, many of these representatives also emphasised the importance of ensuring other financial crime controls were robust in order to mitigate some aspects of sanctions risks and concerns. They felt that some of South Africa’s improvements to meet the FATF Action Plan agenda – particularly around identifying beneficial ownership – would also improve banks’ ability to manage sanctions risk. To that end, South Africa updated its beneficial ownership regime in 2023. SARB has recently imposed administrative penalties on some banks and insurance companies for failures in relation to beneficial owner identification and other financial crime deficiencies, measures that should lead to great focus on these issues across the regulated sector.</p> +<p>Franco-German AI collaboration is a prime example of bilateral cooperation aimed at fostering innovation. By signing the Aachen Treaty in 2019, the two countries solidified their collaboration in research and digital transformation.</p> -<p>Terrorism financing (TF) and proliferation finance (PF) were also highlighted as areas of concern, with representatives from financial regulators highlighting the results of the June 2024 Terror Financing National Risk Assessment (known as the TF NRA). The TF NRA primarily focused on Islamic State and right-wing terrorism, rather than the activities of Wagner Group or other Russian-backed military groups. However, representatives from the supervisory authorities said that “the financial aspect of foreign military training” had been taken into consideration in the TF NRA.</p> +<h4 id="fostering-responsible-ai-talent-and-establishing-educational-exchange-projects">Fostering Responsible AI Talent and Establishing Educational Exchange Projects</h4> -<p>Participants noted the potential overlap between the TF and PF regimes, on one hand, and the Russia sanctions regimes, on the other. They noted similarities to the May 2024 Mutual Evaluation Report for Jersey, released by the Council of Europe’s permanent monitoring body, the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL). The evaluation reported few TF and PF regimes in relation to UN sanctions, but highlighted the significant action undertaken by the Jersey authorities on Russia sanctions implementation, which assured assessors that the relevant systems and controls are in place.</p> +<p>As AI continues to grow, the need for a skilled AI workforce has become critical. The UK and Canada are home to world-class universities and AI research institutions that have already made strides in educating the next generation of AI talent. However, the demand for responsible AI practitioners is rising, and there is room for deeper cooperation in building the skills pipeline.</p> -<p>Participants from government bodies also discussed the closer relationship between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia, and the potential conventional weapons and nuclear weapons proliferation implications of that relationship. One participant asked, “Do you start coming to Russia sanctions through DPRK or vice versa?”, suggesting that the growing nexus between Russia and the DPRK, in breach of UN Security Council sanctions on the DPRK, might play a future role in assessing South Africa’s response to Russia sanctions. Reflecting this perspective, participants said that South African government bodies responsible for counter-proliferation controls had become more active recently, but that they needed to widen their focus: “They’re looking at a very narrow aspect of PF, so we need to refresh the PF risk assessments.”</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The UK and Canada could build a bilateral data governance framework that enhances data protection while facilitating secure data sharing for research, public health, and economic growth</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Nonetheless, both private and public sector representatives accepted that banks’ focus on beneficial ownership, as well as improving their TF and PF controls, would not solve their geopolitical dilemma. “The implications of things that are not [UN Security Council-endorsed] sanctions would be a problem for us to manage”, a government representative said.</p> +<p>The MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab is an example of collaboration between academia and industry on AI. Through this partnership, researchers from both institutions work together on AI research, focusing on responsible AI development.</p> -<h3 id="secondary-sanctions-and-correspondent-banking-relationships">Secondary Sanctions and Correspondent Banking Relationships</h3> +<h4 id="enhancing-healthcare-and-public-health-systems-with-trustworthy-ai">Enhancing Healthcare and Public Health Systems with Trustworthy AI</h4> -<p>While needing to balance these policy concerns, banks said they were aware of the sanctions risks and demonstrated their commitment to improving their controls in order to maintain strong relationships with overseas partners.</p> +<p>Canada and the UK have advanced healthcare systems and have increasingly adopted AI to improve healthcare delivery, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic. AI technologies in healthcare can enhance diagnostics, predict patient outcomes, and streamline public health responses. However, AI’s use in healthcare must be carefully regulated to ensure it is trustworthy, ethical and aligned with public trust.</p> -<p>To the degree possible, regulators also sought to support banks to get the information they require. Government representatives said they were committed to awareness raising, outreach and training for compliance personnel, although “we don’t prescribe any search criteria”. As noted previously, much of this guidance refers to general controls, rather than sanctions-specific guidance.</p> +<p>Canadian-French health cooperation, including the Future of Healthcare using Artificial Intelligence mission, is focused on establishing industrial R&amp;D collaboration opportunities (specifically for technology co-development validation and adaption) in the digital health sector, and has been designed to promote discussions on commercialisation-oriented R&amp;D collaboration opportunities.</p> -<p>Banking representatives also criticised international private and public sector partners for a lack of guidance relevant to the South African context. Private sector representatives said that many case studies and typologies for evasion and circumvention were focused on Russian evasion activities in or from Europe or the US, rather than reflecting the African context. Similarly, banks said they would be able to carry out better risk assessments of their customers and transactions if they received more detailed information from correspondent banks, which often change their criteria without notification or explanation. They said they may be able to proactively identify potential clients or transaction patterns of concern if they had more detailed information.</p> +<h3 id="towards-a-deeper-future-ukcanada-cooperative-initiative-on-ai">Towards a Deeper Future UK–Canada Cooperative Initiative on AI</h3> -<p>There were also concerns about new financial technologies (including cryptocurrencies and stable coins) and smaller banks, which were seen to have less mature financial crime compliance systems. The regulatory participants said they were aware of and considering the implications of these and were working to align their standards. However, one private sector representative said that they noted a large difference in compliance maturity between the country’s few larger banks, when compared to smaller (“Tier 2”) banks. Most illicit actors, they said, would not carry out transactions through the larger banks, but instead through the mid-sized and smaller institutions.</p> +<p>A proposed cooperative initiative must grow to encompass more countries than just the UK and Canada. It must include other leading middle economies that are deeply committed to these issues and working to develop national capacities for AI- and data-driven systems. Such a cooperation framework could serve as a model for establishing bilateral agreements and enhancing collaboration among other middle economies within the G20 and beyond. It could also encourage countries like the Netherlands, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand and Japan to strengthen their efforts in developing ethical frameworks for responsible and efficient AI governance.</p> -<p>Another issue, one participant said, was the lack of knowledge within South African banks about how to consider trade-related sanctions and restrictive measures. There was little discussion, they said, between the trade finance and sanctions teams. As a result, “a lot of the banking industry doesn’t know how to apply sanctions in a trade environment”.</p> +<hr /> -<h3 id="aligning-financial-services-supervision">Aligning Financial Services Supervision</h3> +<p><strong>Ann Fitz-Gerald</strong> is a Professor of International Security and the Director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada.</p> -<p>Another theme from the engagement with government representatives was that supervision was spread across several departments spanning banking and non-banking financial services, financial surveillance and the SARB payments department. Participants said that there was an “imbalance” in the capacity and coverage of the sectors.</p> +<p><strong>Carsten Maple</strong> is a Professor of Cyber Systems Engineering at the University of Warwick’s Cyber Security Centre.</p> -<p>Participants said they had been surprised by the Jersey MONEYVAL evaluation because the jurisdiction had one main supervisor, causing them to consider their own supervision architecture. The participants said they were also engaging with other international regulatory bodies to understand their supervision model. The key, participants agreed, was to have consistency and communication between them.</p> +<p><strong>Halyna Padalko</strong> is a PhD student in Computer Science at the National Aerospace University (KhAI) and a Fellow at the Balsillie School of International Affairs.</p>Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, et al.The UK and Canada, leveraging their strengths as trusted middle powers, are well-positioned to lead in setting global AI standards, fostering ethical, responsible and innovative AI governance.Build Civic Tech2024-11-13T12:00:00+08:002024-11-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/build-civic-tech<p><em>As technology continues to shape society, it’s essential for tech leaders to recognize their role in strengthening democracy. This report highlights the urgent need to integrate civic knowledge and responsibility into STEM education and careers.</em></p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<excerpt /> -<p>Based on these discussions, it was clear that the South African government had a clear policy of non-alignment and neutrality when it comes to G7 sanctions on Russia, despite trade relations favouring closer alignment with the West. At the same time, there appears to be room for open and pragmatic conversations on both sides: for South African policymakers to express their reservations and material concerns about the financial impacts of sanctions for their economic security, stability and development, and for G7 governments to provide greater information about their priorities. There may also be an opportunity for G7 countries to consider the specific concerns of South Africa (and other non-aligned countries) – for example, how to support both alternative resolutions to energy supply issues (notably the forthcoming gas supply issue), and intra-African trade. Even within the South African framing regarding its neutrality, discussions emphasised that Russia sanctions had implications for South Africa’s economic stability. Where impacts on particular sectors were keenly felt, participants highlighted a greater need for dialogue with the EU, the US and the UK, as well as potentially some coordination with regional African organisations, to raise similar concerns. This may be particularly relevant for issues around the debt crisis and evidencing any impacts of the sanctions on the population. Even within the South African framing regarding its neutrality, discussions emphasised that Russia sanctions had implications for South Africa’s economic stability. Where impacts on particular sectors were keenly felt, participants highlighted a greater need for dialogue with the EU, the US and the UK, as well as potentially some coordination with regional African organisations, to raise similar concerns. This may be particularly relevant for issues around the debt crisis and evidencing any impacts of the sanctions on the population.</p> +<p>There is an urgent need to strengthen civic knowledge, skills, and engagement across all ages, including adults. This includes those who study and work in STEM fields. Technology plays an increasingly central role in our lives and society, in ways that are both constructive and destructive. Tech innovators must understand the concept of civic responsibility inherent in “we the people,” and think critically about the impact of the work they do. At the same time, we need to inspire tech and science experts to help ensure that decisions by government, at all levels and across all three branches, are informed.</p> -<p>Many of the concerns raised by the private sector centred on how to obtain better information relevant to their context to improve their financial crime compliance (including but not limited to information related to Russian sanctions). This may include G7 countries providing country- or region-specific typologies for Russian evasion and circumvention. It may also include better communication between correspondent banks and their partners in South Africa. At the same time, private sector representatives remain legally bound to comply with South African law, which excludes the G7 sanctions.</p> +<p>This report focuses on the integration of civic knowledge and responsibility into STEM education and careers, and how individuals in STEM fields can and must hold institutions accountable and move us toward a more perfect union. Reinvigorating civics knowledge and civic skills has become a national and economic security imperative. The urgency requires reaching not just K-12 students but also adults. This report also offers actionable recommendations for businesses and government, and other organizations committed to equipping employees, partners, and associates with essential civic knowledge and skills.</p> -<p>One partial solution to this tension may be to improve wider financial crime controls, highlighted by South Africa’s focus on better beneficial owner identification, which was driven by the country’s effort to escape the FATF greylist. However, this can only be a partial solution at best: banks will face the same dilemmas if they receive beneficial ownership information indicating that an account is held by a sanctioned Russian individual.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>In sum, when it comes to sanctions on Russia, the private sector in South Africa finds itself caught in an invidious position between stewarding critical international relationships (notably with correspondent banks) that are central to the country’s economic security and a government that for political – not economic – reasons, chooses a policy of non-alignment with the West.</p> +<p>Compared to any other period of human history, the pace of technological advancement over the last few decades is unmatched. The era we currently find ourselves in is marked by exponential growth in areas such as biotechnology, the internet, data analytics, quantum computing, machine learning, and artificial intelligence (AI). Each of these holds the power to change the world completely, for better or for worse.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Humanity and technology are inextricably linked. The 2023 National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy aptly states, “technology itself does not have a value system; rather, it carries the values of its owners and operators.”</p> -<p><strong>Olivia Allison</strong> is an Associate Fellow at RUSI and an independent consultant. She has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies and international financial institutions. She has a wide range of financial crime and asset-tracing experience from leadership roles held in London, Moscow, Kyiv and Kazakhstan.</p>Olivia AllisonThis report details the roundtable discussions in Pretoria to share views on South African policy relating to the sanctions on Russia and Belarus, as well as other issues of financial integrity.Crossing Deepfake Rubicon2024-11-01T12:00:00+08:002024-11-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/crossing-deepfake-rubicon<p><em>New research finds that we can now no longer trust our eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between real and AI-generated images, audio, and video. What does this mean in a world where the weaponization of synthetic media is becoming increasingly prevalent?</em></p> +<p>The release of AI technology widely available to the public has highlighted that today’s technology can be used both as a tool and as a weapon. It is vital to encourage developments that promote innovation while intentionally maximizing the potential for technologies to be used in positive ways. Foundational to this goal is the need to strengthen civic responsibility, respect for the rule of law, and an understanding of the role of government — and, most importantly, the role of citizens — in a healthy democracy. That is the function of civics education.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>CivxNow defines civics as “the lifelong process that makes people into informed and engaged members of their communities — which range from schools and towns or neighborhoods to the whole nation and even the world.” Today, civics education is crucial for understanding and addressing the broader implications of technology. It must be provided at all education levels — K–12, colleges and universities, and even for adults. Strengthening civic knowledge and skills can help build system and societal resilience against tech-enabled threats, actively counter divisiveness and cynicism in society by reinvigorating shared aspirations and empowering citizens, and even strengthen workforce cohesion. Beyond that, incorporating civics concepts into science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education and the technology sector can better position our democracy to benefit from all that technology offers.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>In recent years, threat actors have increasingly used synthetic media — digital content produced or manipulated by artificial intelligence (AI) — to enhance their deceptive activities, harming individuals and organizations worldwide with growing frequency.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In addition, the weaponization of synthetic media has also begun to undermine people’s trust in information integrity more widely, posing concerning implications for the stability and resilience of the U.S.’s information environment.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>At present, an individual’s ability to recognize AI-generated content remains the primary defense against people falling prey to deceptively presented synthetic media.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>However, a recent experimental study by CSIS found that people are no longer able to reliably distinguish between authentic and AI-generated images, audio, and video sourced from publicly available tools.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>That human detection has ceased to be a reliable method for identifying synthetic media only heightens the dangers posed by the technology’s misuse, underscoring the pressing need to implement alternative countermeasures to address this emerging threat.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Today, civics education is crucial for understanding and addressing the broader implications of technology. It must be provided at all education levels — K–12, colleges and universities, and even for adults.</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>This is the goal of the Defending Democratic Institutions (DDI) project’s Civics in STEM initiative. As part of this effort, DDI has already hosted two private roundtables — on June 17 and July 23, 2024 — bringing together distinguished leaders from the private sector, government, and academia. These discussions explored why incorporating civics education into STEM is critical for society, as well as the challenges and strategies associated with promoting civics within the technology sector.</p> -<p>Synthetic media, which refers to text, images, audio, and video generated or manipulated by AI, presents both significant opportunities and risks. Recent advancements in generative AI technology have considerably reduced the data, computing power, and cost required to create highly realistic synthetic content. Coupled with the technology’s growing accessibility, as evident from the rapidly expanding constellation of widely available user-friendly offerings, it has become easier than ever for anyone to manufacture genuine-seeming digital content using AI. The uses of such technology are seemingly endless, from the humorous, such as making fictional images of the pope wearing Balenciaga or videos of Tom Cruise dancing, to the commercial, such as streamlining work by assisting in email writing or creating digital avatars of people to use in training videos, news stories, or even for speaking with simulations of deceased loved ones. There has also been significant interest in harnessing generative AI’s transformative potential for the greater good, from accelerating critical scientific research to making sophisticated disability aids like glasses that translate speech to text for the hard of hearing.</p> +<p>By embedding civics education into STEM curricula, we help ensure that future innovators are not only skilled in their technical disciplines but also equipped with the knowledge and values necessary to contribute to a just, inclusive, and democratic society. This integration bridges the gap between technical expertise and policy, helping to ensure that the innovations of tomorrow are guided by principles and policies that strengthen democracy and uphold ethical standards.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5iB2pou.jpeg" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Synthetic images of Pope Francis wearing Balenciaga, first shared on Reddit by creator Pablo Xavier, which quickly went viral across social media platforms. To this day, many viewers still do not realize this is AI-generated.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/midjourney/comments/120vhdc/the_pope_drip/">Pablo Xavier, “The Pope Drip,” Reddit, March 24, 2023</a>.</em></p> +<h3 id="background">Background</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/x5mAyuM.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>One of the many videos featured on the now widely notorious Tom Cruise deepfake account on TikTok.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@deeptomcruise/video/7181490100314885382?lang=en">deeptomcruise, TikTok video, December 26, 2022, 00:19</a>.</em></p> +<p>The unparalleled pace of technological advancements in recent history has often caught us off guard, leading to a growing recognition of the need to include ethical and policy considerations alongside technological innovation.</p> -<p>Yet, generative AI has also become a potent tool for misuse. On the morning of May 22, 2023, an AI-generated photograph reportedly showing an explosion near the Pentagon began to circulate extensively on social media platforms, causing widespread confusion and panic as well as a temporary but meaningful dip in the U.S. stock market. While any adverse effects from this particular incident, in the end, were nominal, its occurrence nonetheless is illustrative of a broader trend of synthetic media being utilized to damaging ends. From criminal activities to adversarial military and intelligence operations, generative AI has more and more empowered the deception capabilities of threat actors, permitting them to manufacture convincingly realistic but fake digital content (colloquially known by many as “deepfakes”) at unprecedented speed, scale, and degrees of precision. The rising ease of use and utility of the technology has led to a boom of AI-enabled deception incidents taking place over recent years, with the technology’s abuse inflicting a growing amount of financial, reputational, physical, and mental harm to individuals and organizations worldwide. Already, the dangers posed by weaponized synthetic media have begun to shift from the theoretical to the realized.</p> +<p>Rapid technological development has significantly impacted U.S. democracy in both positive and negative ways. Technology has enabled increased voter engagement, enhanced transparency, efficient communication, and the rapid dissemination of information. Yet, it has also contributed to a growing digital divide, rampant misinformation and disinformation, and mounting cybersecurity threats.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xvc9yZI.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>This synthetic image was falsely reported as a photograph of an explosion near the Pentagon. It was widely circulated before being debunked as fake, causing widespread confusion and even a temporary dip in the U.S. stock market.</strong> Source: <a href="https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1660650575569059840/photo/1">OSINTdefender (@sentdefender), X post, May 22, 2023, 09:04 am</a>.</em></p> +<p>At the societal level, the internet has enabled unprecedented connectivity, yet it has also contributed to a disconnect between the individual and their respective communities. Social media has empowered civil society and historically marginalized groups, revolutionizing social movements and increasing accessibility to information. However, it has helped enable the rise of tribalism and deepened polarization. Similarly, while there will be many benefits from embedding AI into our daily lives, we must remain aware of both the visible and unforeseen implications, which may carry significant consequences.</p> -<p>Thus far, the threat that has garnered the most public attention and alarm has been the risk of AI-enabled deceptions disrupting political elections by influencing voting outcomes, instigating unrest and violence, or damaging trust in the electoral process. Among the record number of elections held in 2024, the majority have already been subject to widely-circulated synthetic content that falsely depicts politicians or famous figures engaging in inappropriate or controversial behavior, criticizing their opposition, and promising policy changes. With the U.S. presidential election only a week away, widespread concerns have been understandably raised about the dangers of a flood of AI-generated content amplifying misinformation, or of an opportunely timed viral synthetic image or video of a political candidate influencing voters’ decisions.</p> +<p><em>“Cyberspace is composed of not only technology and protocols but also people. People are an integral part of cyberspace, both in creating and using it. In less than a generation, technology has transformed our daily lives …. We rely on [it] for our national security, economic development, and innovation. More than any other domain — air, space, sea, or land — people conceived of and created cyberspace and will continue to improve it.”</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="kemba-walden-former-national-cyber-director">Kemba Walden, Former National Cyber Director</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Today’s synthetic media threat landscape extends far beyond the realm of political elections. AI-enabled financial fraud was found to have risen by 700 percent in 2023, and experts have predicted it will result in losses of up to $40 billion by 2027. Meanwhile, AI nonconsensual intimate media, accounting for 96 percent of all synthetic videos online as of 2019, has already claimed what is estimated to be millions of adults and children as victims — with that number expected to rise swiftly. Other AI-enabled deception incidents have also occurred with increasing frequency, spanning gray zone warfare such as influence operations and cyberattacks, espionage and surveillance, military deception operations, domestic disinformation, and more. As improvements in the technology’s capabilities and accessibility continue, the volume and breadth of deception activity will likely grow.</p> +<p>Given the double-edged nature of technological innovation, it is important to incorporate civics education to ensure that technology’s impact on society is understood and responsibly managed. Over the past several years, there has been a growing emphasis on including ethics in STEM education. (See, e.g., the work of roundtable participants listed in Appendix A.) Civics, particularly the concept of civic responsibility, can provide an important “why” to that ethics discussion. Democracy only works if individuals understand their obligations as part of “we the people.”</p> -<p>The discrete harms arising from these incidents are further compounded by a more insidious danger: AI-enabled deception threatens to corrode the public’s trust in the integrity of all information more broadly. There is already evidence that this has started to occur. In turn, this risks imperiling the foundations of the U.S.’s information environment, a vital pillar of societal stability and resilience.</p> +<p>Civic knowledge and skills should not be limited to students interested in the social sciences; they should be considered essential for those working in the technology sector. Integrating key civics concepts, such as civic responsibility, into STEM education and the tech sector can challenge students and professionals alike to think critically about their responsibilities regarding the work they either hope to do or are already doing. Hopefully, this will inspire them to contribute constructively to their workplaces, communities, nation, and world.</p> -<p>Today, the principal defense against AI-enabled deceptions is people’s ability to recognize synthetic media when encountering it in their day-to-day lives. However, rapid advancements in generative AI have increasingly constrained human detection capabilities as synthetic media has become more convincingly realistic. While the necessity of adopting alternative countermeasures, spanning from the technological to the regulatory, to compensate has been widely recognized as critical, in practice, implementation of these measures remains largely nascent. As such, this growing vulnerability means that awareness of when people are no longer able to depend solely on their eyes and ears to detect AI-generated content is critical in order to better recognize when human detection is no longer an effective safeguard against the technology’s misuse.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Integrating key civics concepts, such as civic responsibility, into STEM education and the tech sector can challenge students and professionals alike to think critically about their responsibilities regarding the work they either hope to do or are already doing.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>To determine the current level of human detection capabilities, CSIS conducted a large-scale experimental study testing individuals’ ability to differentiate between authentic media and synthetic images, audio, and videos sourced from publicly accessible generative AI technology. Overall, the study found that people struggled to accurately identify AI-generated content to any meaningful degree, with some demographics being more susceptible to certain types of synthetic media than others. This brief reviews the study’s key findings and offers an overview of the current synthetic media threat landscape, examining both ongoing and speculative harms in areas in which the abuse of this technology has become more prevalent. It is clear that weaponized synthetic media has begun to mature from an emergent to an established national security threat. That the inflection point has now been reached where human detection capabilities are unreliable only serves to underscore the pressing need to implement robust alternative countermeasures to address this growing danger.</p> +<p>Having individuals who are both tech savvy and policy sensitive is a prerequisite for developing effective laws, policies, and norms to guide our democracy in an increasingly tech-driven world. Bringing civics concepts into STEM training can help drive more informed policies around the development and use of technology by building a pipeline of technology-oriented individuals interested in public service, the military, and even private sector work that provides a sense of mission.</p> -<h3 id="the-study-results">The Study Results</h3> +<p>“Inspired to Serve,” the report of the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, made reinvigorating civics its number one recommendation for inspiring young people to serve:</p> -<p>To assess how well people were able to detect AI-generated content, CSIS conducted a perceptual study involving nearly 1,300 North Americans aged from 18 to 85. Participants were asked to distinguish between synthetic and authentic media items, including images, audio, and videos both silent and fully audiovisual. The study also examined how other factors affected detection performance, including authenticity, language, modality, image subject matter, age, and participants’ preexisting familiarity with synthetic media. To ensure that the AI-generated content would be representative of the quality and type of synthetic media people were likely to come across “in the wild”, or in their daily lives, all synthetic test items were sourced from publicly available products and services.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Widespread and effective civic education is an essential requirement for fostering a culture of service in which Americans can identify how their own strengths, skills, and interests could contribute to the public good by addressing needs in their communities and Nation. When 22 percent of American adults cannot name any of the three branches of government, it is well past time for the country to take action.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FZ4l7RX.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Average Detection Accuracy by Media Type.</strong> Source: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16760">Di Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss: Human detection of AI-generated images, videos, audio, and audiovisual stimuli,” March 25, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<p>STEM education has rightly been viewed over the last several decades as a national security imperative. Yet, teaching civics is also a national security imperative. Integrating civics concepts into STEM is critical as society and technology continue to evolve together. The last several decades have seen a decline in civics education that has left too many without a clear understanding of the importance of democracy, the rule of law, or their role in it. This gap exists beyond STEM fields but is particularly consequential for individuals who will help shape innovation moving forward.</p> -<p>Altogether, the study’s findings paint a bleak picture of people’s ability to discern the legitimacy of digital content in today’s world. On average, participants correctly distinguished between synthetic and authentic media 51.2 percent of the time — roughly equivalent in accuracy to a coin toss. Images were the most difficult for participants to identify (49 percent average accuracy), with better detection performance on silent videos (51 percent) and audio clips (54 percent). Participants were the most successful at determining the authenticity of fully audiovisual clips (55 percent). These results are relatively unsurprising since public discourse and scientific research have closely monitored people’s diminishing detection capabilities as generative AI has advanced in recent years. Nonetheless, it is valuable to confirm that this critical watershed moment has indeed been reached: humans can no longer depend solely on their own eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between reality and AI-generated falsehoods.</p> +<p>The future of technology will play a pivotal role in determining whether societies evolve toward greater democracy or slide into authoritarianism. Take AI as an example. AI has the potential to enhance democratic processes by enabling more efficient governance, increasing transparency, and empowering citizens through better access to information. Yet, if AI is left unchecked or misused, it could easily concentrate power in the hands of a few, enabling surveillance, manipulation, and control on an unprecedented scale.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K4iLc5K.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>The study’s most convincing synthetic image: Only 10.7 percent of all participants correctly identified this as an AI-generated image, with the rest believing it to be a photograph of a real person.</strong> Source: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16760">Di Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss: Human detection of AI-generated images, videos, audio, and audiovisual stimuli,” March 25, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<p>An expert in one of our roundtable discussions highlighted the importance of securing market democracy, warning that without public action, big data and AI could lead to a drift toward “totalitarian surveillance [and] oppression.” If the public does not actively shape industrial and government policy “toward [ensuring] diversity, competition, and every individual having a voice,” the system risks tilting in the opposite direction, following the models of Russia and China. Technological advances could instead be used for surveillance, censorship, and repression. China is already exporting this model globally through its Belt and Road Initiative. Its recent sale of Huawei surveillance equipment to Uganda’s military regime is an example of moving a nation toward a surveillance society. The governance structures we establish today will be critical in ensuring that technology serves as a force for democratic empowerment rather than a tool for authoritarian control.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b2dj9kL.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>The study’s most convincing synthetic audiovisual clip: When participants were presented with the AI-manipulated video clip (of comedian Nora Tschirner) on the right, 75.8 percent incorrectly labeled it as authentic. In comparison, the original video (of anchorwoman Marietta Slomka) is on the left.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4ln4SyVNjg&amp;list=PL8ax9s9DVKClTiPm9c5Wkq9wOG4hGKyVH&amp;index=5">Deepfacelabfan, “Deepfake — Marietta Slomka zu Nora Tschirner — 128 LIAE 15k RW only — 90min FAKE,” YouTube video, April 7, 2022, 00:46</a>.</em></p> +<p>AI is already being used to refine social media and content algorithms, keeping users engaged in a continuous stream of personalized content. While this may not always be harmful, increasingly personalized feeds can lead to more segmented thinking, the extremization of opinions, and, in some cases, heightened polarization that could escalate into violence. Furthermore, according to Harvard Business Review, AI has the potential to exacerbate existing biases in data, including those against minorities. A 2024 National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine study on facial recognition points out multiple examples of where the systems have misidentified innocent Black Americans, causing them to be arrested. Further, a criminal justice algorithm used in Broward County, Florida, was found to be twice as likely to mislabel African American defendants as “high risk” compared to White defendants.</p> -<p>This does not mean that all AI-generated content being produced today is now indistinguishable from authentic media. Low- and mid-quality synthetic media still contains artifacts, or observable AI glitches such as bizarre-looking hands or illegible text, which make their provenance apparent. Regardless, our study demonstrates that numerous generative AI tools which are easily accessible to the public today can produce sufficiently realistic synthetic content that is relatively indistinguishable from authentic content to the human senses. Moreover, as the average quality of synthetic media improves while the technology matures, even low- and mid-quality outputs will become more realistic. For example, later iterations of AI image generators have already become increasingly capable of rendering real-looking hands, which makes relying on them as a potential “tell” of AI-generated content being present decreasingly useful.</p> +<p>Our choices now — both at home and as a global society — will influence whether AI becomes a catalyst for a more open, participatory society or a mechanism for exacerbating injustice and reinforcing autocratic regimes. Understanding the role of governance and governance structures is crucial, as these structures, institutions, and processes will have a huge impact on the outcomes.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xiDUnsF.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Detection Performance by Language Familiarity.</strong> Source: Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss.”</em></p> +<p><em>“We can look at what is happening to society as a result of innovation, and right now, around the AI conversations, there is a sense of we should build what we can, not what we should.… You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, but you can help people holding the bottle understand what the implications may be. The important question to address is: How do we empower people to better understand what the implications are and what role they can play?”</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="jen-ellis-founder-nextjensecurity">Jen Ellis, Founder, NextJenSecurity</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/e0GPfI7.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Detection Performance by Age.</strong> Source: Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss.”</em></p> +<h3 id="how-did-we-get-here">How Did We Get Here?</h3> -<p>The study’s other findings offer more nuanced insights into people’s vulnerabilities to different types of AI-enabled deceptions, examining how various elements may impact an individual’s detection capabilities. For instance, participants’ average detection accuracy was found to be significantly lower for audio, video, and audiovisual items featuring a foreign language than for items featuring languages in which they were fluent (Figure 2). Meanwhile, younger participants outperformed their older counterparts to the greatest degree when tested on audiovisual and audio-only clips (Figure 3). These findings indicate that people are more likely to misidentify synthetic media presented in a foreign language, and that older individuals are less sensitive to recognizing synthetic audio-based media. Given the rise of multilingual synthetic misinformation as well as the growing popularity of AI phone scams which often target older generations, these findings suggest that these two demographics may be more vulnerable to certain types of AI-enabled deceptions than previously realized.</p> +<p>The launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 1957 had a profound impact on the United States, particularly on its education system, leading to a dramatic shift toward STEM education. The shock of Sputnik created a sense of urgency, motivating policymakers, educators, and students to prioritize STEM. Numerous public awareness campaigns highlighted the importance of scientific achievement and encouraged a generation of young people to pursue careers in STEM.</p> -<h3 id="the-threat-landscape">The Threat Landscape</h3> +<p>In 1958, Congress passed the National Defense Education Act, providing substantial federal funding for STEM education. The act aimed to produce more scientists, engineers, and mathematicians to help the United States maintain its technological superiority and enhance national security. On May 10, 1950, U.S. president Harry S. Truman signed the National Science Foundation Act, creating the first federal agency dedicated to supporting education and fundamental research across all scientific disciplines. Since this pivot, the U.S. education system has undergone significant curriculum reforms to emphasize STEM subjects and create a more technically skilled and scientifically literate workforce.</p> -<p>The proliferation of weaponized synthetic media presents a clear and present danger to national security. To more effectively address these dangers, a more comprehensive understanding of the risks posed by its misuse and the various ways it has already been weaponized is required. Within only a few short years, the synthetic media threat landscape has expanded rapidly, with generative AI increasingly being exploited for nefarious purposes. Consequently, this rise in AI-enabled deception incidents has resulted in individuals and organizations around the world suffering financial, reputational, physical, and mental harm, even death, and countries worldwide experiencing detrimental effects on their societal stability and resilience. Now that it is clear publicly available generative AI tools can produce highly realistic synthetic media capable of deceiving even the most discerning of observers, these dangers have only become even more acute.</p> +<p>These curriculum reforms extended beyond K–12 and into higher education. The launch of Sputnik led to increased support for higher education institutions in the form of funding for research and development programs in STEM fields, leading to the expansion of graduate programs and the establishment of new research facilities.</p> -<p>Generative AI has become an increasingly powerful force multiplier for deception, making it easier, faster, and cheaper to conduct more sophisticated stratagems than ever before — from producing synthetic content at an industrial scale to more precisely tailoring it to a target’s specific vulnerabilities. These lowering barriers have, in turn, expanded the pool of threat actors who now are able to leverage this technology, from extremist organizations and organized crime groups to lone individuals with malicious intent. As of today, it costs less than $10 to create 30 minutes of customized synthetic audio featuring a target’s voice or to manufacture a batch of over 1,000 individually personalized spear-phishing emails. Efforts to prevent the misuse of commercial products and services have been inconsistent in both their implementation and effectiveness, enabling the circumnavigation of guardrails to varying degrees of success. Meanwhile, open-source generative AI tools, which by their nature have more easily removable safeguards, have also furnished threat actors with a diverse and customizable toolkit, such as live face-swapping and voice-masking software, found to be used in real-time impersonation schemes. In addition, a shadow industry has begun to quickly develop to address this growing demand for purpose-built deception technologies. Spreading throughout the dark web and encrypted messaging platforms, it sells everything from prebuilt custom software to more bespoke services for explicitly abusive purposes.</p> +<p>The focus on STEM education had several implications for civics education in the United States, as the Sputnik-induced shift initially diverted attention and, ultimately, resources from it. As noted in a 2020 commentary, in the decades following Sputnik’s launch, the desire to maintain superiority in STEM-related fields remained a priority as the world grew more connected and complex. Over time, this resulted in less class time and fewer resources available for civics education.</p> -<p>However, the rise in AI-enabled deceptions has not been uniform. Rather, generative AI tools have been co-opted to greater degrees in scenarios where they currently provide a significant offensive edge to threat actors’ stratagems over existing non-AI methods. For instance, the sharp rise of AI-enabled financial fraud over the past few years is a direct result of the substantial advantage afforded by AI technology, as AI text and audio generation tools are able to produce compelling synthetic content in less resource-intensive manners than when utilizing non-AI techniques. Conversely, AI-enabled deception incidents have been less prevalent in areas where synthetic media presently does not provide a similarly significant offensive edge. This has been found to be the case with deceptions involving the dissemination of false narratives, where conventional techniques such as manipulatively editing authentic media or sharing it out of context still remain highly effective and relatively easy to accomplish, limiting the comparative utility of generative AI tools. Regardless, as the technology’s capabilities improve and barriers to using it decrease, it will undoubtedly be more extensively adopted for all manner of stratagems.</p> +<p>Other factors have likely contributed to this dynamic. For instance, STEM metrics and outcomes can be easily and uniformly tracked across different countries, reinforcing and intensifying competition between nations. Moreover, civics education is sometimes viewed as a subjective, politically sensitive area of study. It is also difficult for the general public to conceptualize, internalize, and actively prioritize the importance of a good civics education, which means there is less public pressure for it. In comparison, STEM fields appear straightforward, apolitical, and noncontroversial.</p> -<p>Compounding these harms is the second-order risk posed by weaponized synthetic media: the corrosion of information integrity. The proliferation of deceptive AI-generated content risks damaging the public’s trust in the veracity of any information they encounter more generally as they become increasingly unable to trust their eyes and ears to reliably inform them as to what is real and what is fake. This degradation of trust in the truth jeopardizes the resilience of the U.S.’s information environment, or its “epistemic security” — which risks heightening its vulnerability to political and economic instability and constraining national security capabilities. Less epistemically secure societies are more limited in their ability to engage in collective and timely decision-making, making them more susceptible to adversarial manipulation, reducing their capacity for effective crisis response, and constraining critical defense and intelligence capabilities. This threat is not a novel one. Instances of widespread conventional misinformation have already been found to have diminished public trust in information from media and government institutions, resulting in decreased faith in political election integrity, weakened confidence in national security organizations, and led to violence and unrest. For example, pervasive false anti-vaccination narratives during the Covid-19 pandemic undermined vaccine confidence and institutional trust in the United States. The proliferation of these falsehoods, in turn, stymied economic growth, trade, and diplomacy, damaged education, and increased the number of vaccine-preventable outbreaks.</p> +<p>In recent decades, the difference in career paths and salaries in STEM versus non-STEM fields has substantially changed. When high school students and college freshmen consider their career paths, STEM fields often offer a clearer sense of direction — leading to roles like doctors and software engineers — frequently with attractive salaries. In contrast, the career path in civics is less defined, though equally important, which may partly explain the increasing preference for STEM among younger generations.</p> -<p>Synthetic media misuse risks intensifying the damage done to the public’s trust in information by making it harder to distinguish fact from fiction. One can easily imagine how the viral AI-generated image of an explosion near the Pentagon, mentioned at the beginning of this brief, may have resulted in more significant adverse effects in a less epistemically secure society. Decreased public trust in information from institutional sources could have made later debunking by authorities less successful or take longer, enabling the falsehood to disseminate further and permitting greater knock-on effects to occur, such as more extensive financial volatility than just a brief dip in the stock market, which in turn could have led to civil unrest or facilitated the ability of foreign adversaries to leverage the unrest to their benefit.</p> +<h4 id="the-current-state-of-play-in-civics-education">The Current State of Play in Civics Education</h4> -<p>There are signs that the increased prevalence of synthetic media has already begun to damage the public’s epistemic trust. Research shows that repeated exposure to unlabelled synthetic media makes individuals more susceptible to misidentifying future synthetic content as well as reduces individuals’ confidence in the truthfulness of all information. More recently, it was discovered that Russia’s extensive use of AI-enabled deceptions throughout the still ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict has had a detrimental effect on Ukrainian citizens’ confidence in information, making them significantly more skeptical of the truthfulness of all digital content they encounter online. Even just the existence of synthetic media itself has begun to erode aspects of the public’s trust, as evident in the increasing frequency of authentic media being wrongly dismissed as AI-generated. The trend has become especially prevalent in information-contested spaces, such as political elections or the Israel-Hamas conflict, where both sides have frequently decried real digital content as being fake. As the synthetic media threat landscape continues to expand, these adverse effects will likely only grow stronger. Ultimately, it is the convergence of these immediate and systemic threats that makes countering weaponized synthetic media a national security imperative.</p> +<p>The last several decades have seen a drastic decline in civics education in the United States, which has left too many without a clear understanding of the importance of democracy or their role in it. A report by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation found that “more than 70% of Americans fail a basic civics literacy quiz on topics like the three branches of government, the number of Supreme Court justices, and other basic functions of our democracy.” According to the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), in 2022, 22 percent of eighth-graders “scored at or above the NAEP Proficient level in civics.” The 2023 Annenberg Civics Knowledge Survey also found that many adults did not know what rights the First Amendment protected, and only 65 percent of respondents could name the three branches of government.</p> -<h3 id="types-of-ai-enabled-deceptions">Types of AI-Enabled Deceptions</h3> +<p>Funding for civics remains an ongoing issue. Federal funding for K–12 STEM education is roughly $50 per student, while funding for civics is closer to 50 cents. The lack of funding and attention paid to the humanities affects higher education as well. Facing budget constraints, many public universities target humanities and liberal arts programs first in their attempts to balance their budgets. At private universities, prestige and lack of tangible vocational benefits seem to have played a role in this trend. Other factors also contribute to this trend, such as the perceived value of a humanities-centered education and job prospects after graduation. This trend transcends borders. According to Ben Goldstein, “humanities and social science fields without a clear pre-professional connection — disciplines classifiable as ‘qualitative academia’ — have been falling out of favor worldwide. Between 2015 and 2018, the share of bachelors, masters, and doctoral degrees awarded in humanities fields fell 5%, 11%, and 9% respectively on average throughout the OECD, with drops of varying proportions detected in 24 of the 36 OECD countries.”</p> -<p>The current synthetic media threat landscape can be broadly divided into six categories of AI-enabled deceptions: gray zone warfare, espionage and surveillance, military deception, domestic politics, nonconsensual intimate media, and financial crime. However, with the technology’s continued advancement, it is anticipated that the depth and breadth of AI-enabled deception incidents will also expand and diversify, including hate crimes, falsification of evidence in legal proceedings, corporate espionage or sabotage, and more. To better illustrate the contours of today’s landscape, a selection of particularly noteworthy AI deception incidents that have taken place across the six major categories have been shared below.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Funding for civics remains an ongoing issue. Federal funding for K–12 STEM education is roughly $50 per student, while funding for civics is closer to 50 cents.</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="gray-zone-warfare">Gray Zone Warfare</h4> +<p>The decline of civics education is matched by a decline of trust in U.S. democracy and democratic institutions, such as the U.S. Congress and the justice system. A 2024 Gallup poll found that only 28 percent of U.S. adults are “satisfied” with how democracy is working in the United States — a new 40-year low. A similar poll found that only 9 percent of U.S. adults have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the U.S. Congress and 30 percent have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court. Similarly, the 2022 Annenberg Civics Knowledge Survey found that nearly 7 in 10 people (67 percent) agreed with the statement that the Supreme Court “gets too messed up in politics,” an increase of 12 percent since 2019. In 2024, another poll found that “7 in 10 Americans think the high court’s justices are more influenced by ideology.” This perspective is not limited to the highest courts. For example, a 2023 survey by the National Center for State Courts found that 61 percent of respondents believed state courts are “political.”</p> -<p>Synthetic media has been increasingly weaponized within gray zone warfare, or actions that take place in the murky waters between regular statecraft and outright warfare, such as information warfare, cyberattacks, and political and economic coercion. Examples of AI-enabled deception incidents that have occurred in the gray zone include the following:</p> +<h4 id="meeting-an-urgent-need--civics-for-adults">Meeting an Urgent Need — Civics for Adults</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p>State-affiliated influence operations have disseminated synthetic images and videos as part of propaganda or information campaigns surrounding major political focal points or noteworthy events, including elections in Europe and Taiwan, U.S. politics, the Russo-Ukrainian and Israeli-Hamas conflicts, and the 2023 Maui wildfires.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Real-time face-swapping software was used to successfully impersonate Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko in a series of video calls with several mayors of major European cities as part of a targeted influence operation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>An alleged AI-generated sex tape of a presidential candidate in the 2023 Turkish elections, purportedly published by an adversarial state, was widely circulated, leading to the candidate’s withdrawal from the race.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Chinese, Iranian, North Korean, and Russian state-affiliated actors were found to have been manufacturing synthetic content for spear phishing as part of cyberattacks they were planning to conduct.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Democracy depends on informed and engaged citizens. Americans today live in one of the most polarized eras in our nation’s history, a pattern that continues to grow exponentially due to information operations by foreign adversaries, declining trust in our democratic institutions, and a lack of civic understanding of how to engage effectively with our democracy. With civics education having been underresourced and undervalued for decades, we now see a resulting lack of civic knowledge and skills that has left many adults ill equipped to fulfill their essential roles within our democracy.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kW7uO1I.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Fake news channel clips featuring AI-generated TV anchors were shared by bot accounts online as a part of pro-Chinese information campaigns.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/07/technology/artificial-intelligence-training-deepfake.html">Adam Satariano and Paul Mozur, “The People Onscreen Are Fake. The Disinformation Is Real.,” New York Times, February 7, 2022</a>.</em></p> +<p>K–12 and higher education reform are critical to rebuilding a foundation of civics knowledge but require significant time to implement before we see results. Given the urgency of the issues, we cannot wait for this long-term investment. There is an immediate need to remedy the current civics knowledge gap among adults.</p> -<h4 id="espionage-and-surveillance">Espionage and Surveillance</h4> +<p>Empowering adults with civics knowledge can strengthen democratic participation and counter the growing influence of misinformation, enabling a more resilient and informed electorate. In the technology sector, where professionals are shaping the digital infrastructure of society, understanding the values and aspirations of democracy and the responsibility of individuals in a democracy is even more crucial.</p> -<p>Synthetic media has also been leveraged to a lesser extent, at least to public knowledge, for espionage and surveillance operations by states and the private cyber surveillance industry, strengthening online impersonations of real or fictitious individuals to obtain confidential information from targets. Examples of AI-enabled espionage and surveillance incidents include the following:</p> +<p>In May 2022, CSIS launched its Civics at Work (CaW) initiative, a partnership with leading civics groups, national security practitioners, and business leaders looking to reinvigorate civics literacy as a national and economic security imperative, both through their respective workforces and in their larger communities. Business leaders, in particular, are optimally positioned to take on this role. As leaders, employers, community members, and patriots, businesses must be at the heart of any effort to reinvigorate the public’s civics awareness and engagement. Commerce, innovation, and U.S. competitiveness all depend on a healthy democracy and continuing commitment to the rule of law. Civics literacy is a fundamental part of a successful and thriving community, and businesses have a unique ability to contribute by investing in their workforces. Furthermore, a Harvard Business Review paper notes that free markets rely on free and stable political systems to thrive, which can be reinforced through stronger civics education.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Synthetic media was used in a fictitious Washington think tank employee’s made-up LinkedIn account, which was suspected of being run as part of a Russian espionage operation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Private cyber-intelligence companies used hundreds of fake accounts of social media content, impersonating activists, journalists, and young women, to covertly gather information from targets, including IP addresses and personal contact information.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>State-affiliated actors used social engineering assisted by large language models (LLM) to manipulate targets and facilitate the collection and analysis of open-source information.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Importantly, because people today trust their employers more than the government or the media, companies remain one of the few institutions with broad public support and are equipped with the “resources, political power, incentives, and responsibility” to help protect democracy. In another Harvard Business Review white paper, BET Networks president Scott Mills notes that companies also recognize the need to foster environments where employees from diverse backgrounds can collaborate and communicate effectively. As such, skills such as strong collaboration, clear and regular communication, compromise, and mutual respect — areas that can be strengthened by increasing civic skills such as civil discourse and renewing a sense of shared aspirations — are crucial for creating these successful business environments.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/easgrTO.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>This fake LinkedIn account of a fictitious Washington think tank employee, suspected of being used for a Russian espionage operation, was found to have used a synthetic image for the profile photo.</strong> Source: <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-artificial-intelligence-social-platforms-think-tanks-politics-bc2f19097a4c4fffaa00de6770b8a60d">Raphael Satter, “Experts: Spy used AI-generated face to connect with targets,” AP News, June 13, 2019</a>.</em></p> +<p>The private sector plays a critical role in its ability to leverage investment for good — directing financial resources toward initiatives that not only generate profits but also contribute to society. This approach aligns with global policies aimed at mitigating risks associated with new and emerging technologies while also addressing the need to move from a first-to-market mentality to a best-to-market imperative. In this context, the business case for promoting civics education has never been stronger or more critical.</p> -<h4 id="military-deception">Military Deception</h4> +<p><em>“Teaching the discipline of law to those seeking technical graduate degrees in cybersecurity has been highly rewarding. The students are usually intimidated to begin the class but then embrace the study as they begin to understand the “system” of the rule of law in our country - the Separation of Powers; the role of courts; the distinction between legislation and regulation; etc. I am convinced that we can and must cultivate a commitment within science and technology communities to understand the rule of law, to embrace it, to defend it and proselytize about it.”</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="dan-sutherland-professor-of-cybersecurity-law-and-policy-george-washington-university">Dan Sutherland, Professor of Cybersecurity Law and Policy, George Washington University</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Although the adversarial use of synthetic media for targeted military operations has so far been limited in practice, AI-enabled military deception remains a topic of great concern due to the large number of ways in which the technology could be leveraged to gain a battlefield advantage. This includes creating entirely fictitious events to alter or skew enemy intelligence, impersonating military personnel to falsify or muddle orders, and manufacturing noise to mask one’s actions from an adversary or to overwhelm and confuse them. There are two particularly noteworthy examples of AI-enabled military deception incidents:</p> +<p>As part of CaW, DDI developed Civics for Adults: An Implementation Guide for Businesses, Civics for Adults: A Guide for Civics Content Providers, and hosted discussions on how civics can promote the role of businesses in U.S. democracy. The first business leader to sign up to participate in CSIS’s CaW was Brad Smith, president of Microsoft. During a January 2021 CSIS program on the importance of equipping STEM students with civics education, Smith said:</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>AI-generated content featuring Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky has been published and circulated extensively on social media to sow confusion and discord, including a synthetic video of him calling for his troops to immediately lay down their arms and surrender to Russian forces.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Russian radio and TV networks were hacked to air fictitious AI-generated emergency broadcasts of Russian president Vladimir Putin declaring martial law due to Ukrainian forces invading Russian territory, causing some to actually evacuate in confusion.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<blockquote> + <p>Technology has become a multidisciplinary activity and every engineer at a company like Microsoft needs a bigger dose of the liberal arts and civics in particular … and what is true at a place like Microsoft is true across the tech sector …. At the end of the day, the heart of our society is our democratic foundation and therefore civics education always has to be at the heart of this multidisciplinary approach.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DbhTCki.png" alt="image11" /> -<em>▲ <strong>A social media post shows the airing of an emergency Russian TV broadcast featuring an AI-generated video that falsely depicted Russian president Vladamir Putin declaring martial law and calling for evacuation due to the Ukrainian invasion.</strong> Source: <a href="https://x.com/AlexKokcharov/status/1665709387648827397">Alex Kokcharov (@Alex Kokcharov), X post, June 15, 2023, 6:17 am</a>.</em></p> +<h4 id="ongoing-challenges">Ongoing Challenges</h4> -<h4 id="domestic-politics">Domestic Politics</h4> +<p>Incorporating civics concepts into the STEM and tech worlds faces several ongoing challenges, primarily stemming from a disconnect between scientific and policy communities. Yet, a grasp of how our system works is essential for those entering technology and science-oriented fields; governmental decisions not only directly influence innovation and discovery, but, perhaps even more importantly, directly affect implementation. Teaching scientists and engineers that considering social impact and learning about taking a scientific or engineering concept from idea to use requires understanding — and, quite possibly, acting within a civics context — in order to achieve success; this should be an important aspect of science and engineering education.</p> -<p>In recent years, there has been a surge in synthetic media being employed by domestic actors to create deceptive political content, predominately in regard to political elections. A selection of AI-enabled incidents include the following:</p> +<p>Bridging the gap between “techies” and policymakers is difficult, as it entails encouraging technologists to navigate the nuanced “gray areas” of societal and policy issues, as well as the equally challenging task of teaching policy professionals that there can be clear right and wrong answers in technical realms. Failure to do so means failed public policy due to a mismatch between legislators and regulators intents and what is technically feasible. It also means failure of scientists and engineers to take into account societal issues as they design the technology. Teaching the two communities to be speak a common language is thus really important for society’s health and wellbeing.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The Venezuelan government ran fake news stories featuring AI-generated newscasters as part of a widespread domestic propaganda campaign to influence its citizens.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Both pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian social media accounts shared synthetic images of the ongoing Gaza conflict, such as AI-generated photos of a crying baby among bomb wreckage, to further false narratives.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>An AI-generated nonconsensual pornographic video of a senior U.S. government official at the Department of Homeland Security was circulated online as part of an ongoing smear campaign.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Synthetic images of former president Donald Trump, portrayed as being real, were used in an attack ad by an opposition candidate during the U.S. presidential primaries.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Synthetic media of politicians were falsely portrayed as authentic, including videos of UK prime minister Keir Starmer shouting at staff, U.S. president Joe Biden calling for a military draft, and a Slovakian presidential candidate discussing vote rigging during the election’s final days.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>A robocall campaign used a synthetic audio clip of President Biden’s voice to urge thousands of New Hampshire residents not to vote in the state’s primary.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>UK far-right actors and politicians widely circulated anti-immigrant and Islamophobic synthetic content across social media ahead of the 2024 elections.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Fictitious videos and images of celebrities such as Taylor Swift, as well as entirely AI-generated Black voters, endorsing former president Trump’s 2024 U.S. presidential campaign have been frequently shared online by political supporters in the run up to the 2024 elections.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>For example, a potential use case could be the accreditation requirements of the British Computer Society (BCS) in the United Kingdom. Founded in 1957, BCS is a charity dedicated to “[raising] standards of competence and conduct across the IT industry.” To achieve this, BCS provides a wide range of accreditation, qualification, and certification services for IT professionals, higher education programs, and at-home education. Due to its international recognition, BCS accreditations and qualifications are highly sought after by employers in the IT sector and academic programs.</p> -<h4 id="nonconsensual-intimate-media">Nonconsensual Intimate Media</h4> +<p>To obtain official BCS accreditation, programs and courses must satisfy BCS’s “Criteria for Accreditation.” One such criterion is “the ability to [recognize] the legal, social, ethical and professional issues involved in the exploitation of computer technology and be guided by the adoption of appropriate professional, ethical and legal practices.”</p> -<p>One of the most prolific abuses of generative AI to date has been the production of AI-generated nonconsensual intimate media of adults and children. Accounting for 96 percent of all synthetic media videos in existence in 2019, the adult nonconsensual pornography industry and the online trafficking of child sexual abuse materials have exploded in the years since, claiming millions of adult and child victims to date. Examples of incidents include the following:</p> +<p>The BCS use case has been studied to assess its effectiveness in implementing a nationwide ethics requirement in educational curricula. A study by Tom McEwan and Sandra Cairncross from Edinburgh Napier University notes some challenges in implementing BCS’s Legal, Social, Ethical and Professional Issues (LSEPIs) criteria in higher education. In their paper, the authors observed that “technically-oriented undergraduate students are often reluctant to engage with [BCS’s] ‘Legal, Social, Ethical and Professional Issues (LSEPI).’” They further noted that, after a decade of increasingly relaxed social and ethical standards in certain media, such as widespread illegal downloading of music, video, and software, many current UK undergraduates “appear to have an increasingly cavalier attitude to intellectual property in digital media” despite receiving BCS training.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>An Indian journalist investigating the rape of a young girl was the target of an extensive hate campaign, which included synthetic pornography of her being circulated online.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>An automated Telegram bot service created and published sexual images of an estimated 24,000 women and girls.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Sexually explicit images and videos of school girls and female teachers being produced and shared online by male students in Korea, Brazil, Spain, and the United States, among others.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>A recently uncovered worldwide trafficking ring producing and selling sexually synthetic images depicting photorealistic children on a reported “industrial scale.”</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>A deluge of synthetic pornography featuring Taylor Swift spread across the social media platform X, forcing the online platform to block searches of the celebrity temporarily.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>While this is just one paper examining the efficacy of BCS’s LSEPI requirements, it presents a mixed picture. The requirements are well intentioned and capable of being implemented on a national scale, but they still encounter many of the same challenges faced by traditional general education and undergraduate requirements in the United Kingdom. Fundamentally, the results may point toward the importance of instilling a sense of civic responsibility to help explain why students should care about ethics.</p> -<h4 id="financial-crime">Financial Crime</h4> +<p>Another challenge lies in educating teachers on how to integrate civics into STEM curricula. Education schools are not adequately preparing teachers to teach civics, let alone equipping STEM teachers to integrate civics concepts into their lessons. Political polarization exacerbates the challenge. For example, a study by Daniela Kruel DiGiacomo et al. found that only 28 percent of teachers believe parents would support them teaching about contemporary elections, even though 81 percent report that doing so would help meet state curriculum standards. This impacts both the content teachers feel comfortable covering and the overall quality of civics education students receive. Additionally, the same study found that schools lack training for teachers on handling polarization, largely due to insufficient administrative support. As a result, 92 percent of teachers said they will “shut down” student discussions on contentious topics to avoid partisan conflicts, rather than encouraging constructive dialogue and working on civil discourse.</p> -<p>AI-enabled financial crime has quickly become one of the most widespread misuses of synthetic media. Criminals have employed generative AI tools to impersonate, extort, and hack for a multitude of fraudulent activities, with personalized AI spear-phishing emails and voice phone scams experiencing the largest growth. With an estimated 700 percent increase in incidents in 2023 from the previous year, financial experts predict that AI-enabled financial fraud could lead to losses of $40 billion by 2027. Noteworthy incidents include the following:</p> +<p>Moreover, an expert in one of our roundtable discussions noted the ongoing challenge of engaging some first-generation students, and other minorities that are underrepresented in STEM fields, with civics because they often feel disenfranchised by the very system we ask them to study and value. A potential solution could be to emphasize that civics can empower them to become effective agents of change, helping to dismantle barriers and injustices that prevent more students from advancing in STEM careers.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The head of a UK energy firm was personally tricked into transferring nearly $250,000 by fraudsters who used voice cloning to impersonate the parent company’s CEO.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Reportedly the largest AI-generated scam to date, thousands of synthetic videos of celebrities such as Elon Musk and MrBeast promoting fake financial schemes have been widely circulated on social media platforms.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>An Arizona woman was the target of a fake ransoming scheme in which fraudsters impersonated her daughter over the phone using voice-cloning technology.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>An employee of a financial firm was tricked during a week-long ruse into paying out $25 million to fraudsters after the scammers used real-time synthetic audiovisual software to impersonate the employee’s senior personnel and colleagues through a series of group video conferences, emails, and calls.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The Yahoo Boys, a crime collective, have widely adopted AI tools for romance scams and sextortion, employing live face and voice impersonation software and “nudification” apps to trick and blackmail targets. This has led not only to financial loss but also to tragic deaths in which some targets, frequently teenagers, took their own lives.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Moreover, the binary thinking often characteristic of STEM fields — and the focus on solving technical problems — leads many to avoid political discourse and civic engagement, mistakenly believing it doesn’t apply to them. Many in the field are drawn to STEM subjects precisely to avoid the messiness of civil society, preferring a world seen through the binary lens of 0s and 1s. Teaching STEM students that it is not only acceptable to engage in discussions that involve ethics and values, but that it is in fact necessary and valuable in developing acceptable technical solutions to societal problems, is thus critical.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>Understanding the variety of motivations of tech professionals is important. An expert in one of our roundtable discussions described the four Ps of motivation guiding people in the field: protection, prestige, patriotism, and puzzle-solving. The challenge — and the opportunity — lies in finding the commonality between those motivations and being civically literate.</p> -<p>As generative AI technology continues to advance, so does the potential for its misuse. In only a few short years, the synthetic media threat landscape has changed dramatically. AI-enabled deceptions have become increasingly complex and varied, ranging from gray zone warfare to financial fraud and beyond. Not only has the weaponization of synthetic media already begun to cause real and substantial harm to people and organizations worldwide, but it also threatens to undermine public trust in all information online, regardless of the truth. Overall, these developments present troubling implications for U.S. national security.</p> +<p>Finally, incentives within the business world are not always in sync with broader societal good. While corporate responsibilities lie with shareholders and employees, the right decision for business is not always seen as aligned with what’s best for society. Framing democracy as a business asset is a critical step in aligning private sector incentives with public good. Although the tension between societal good and corporate responsibilities is an issue that we will continue to grapple with, there are numerous cases in which the private sector leverages its influence to safeguard democracy and incentivize civic-minded investment. These companies recognize the importance of civics education as a business imperative and have incorporated it into their programs, demonstrating the societal impact of technology and its alignment with democratic principles.</p> -<p>These dangers have become even more severe as it has been made clear that widely available generative AI technology has progressed to the point that people can no longer depend on their eyes and ears to reliably detect the synthetic content they might encounter in their everyday lives. With this primary line of defense compromised, pursuing alternative solutions has never been so vital. Now more than ever, stakeholders across the private and public sectors must work together to implement multifaceted countermeasures that bridge the technological, regulatory, and educational domains to oppose the growing threat posed by weaponized synthetic media.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion-and-recommendations">Conclusion and Recommendations</h3> -<hr /> +<p>Democracy is neither invincible nor inevitable. It can only be sustained by a civically informed and engaged citizenry that comes together with a common purpose. However, this fundamental prerequisite is threatened by the decades-long decline in civics education, which has left Americans lacking the skills to fulfill their essential role in moving us toward a more perfect union.</p> -<p><strong>Di Cooke</strong> is a horizon fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>As we move to reinvigorate civics education, we cannot afford to leave anyone behind. We cannot settle for reaching only those who are already interested in government and the role of the individual in a democracy. We must find ways to also engage those whose interests lie in more technological and scientific fields. And we must reach adults as well as students.</p> -<p><strong>Abby Edwards</strong> is a former research associate in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> +<p>The challenges we face today — polarization, misinformation, and a lack of trust in our institutions — underscore the urgent need for a reinvigorated focus on civics education. As democracy’s survival hinges upon informed participation, it is essential that education systems empower citizens to understand their role in shaping our more perfect union. Nowhere is this more important than in the STEM and tech world. Science and technology have an undisputed influence on society, and the decisions made by tech professionals shape not only the future of innovation but also the fabric of society and its democratic institutions.</p> -<p><strong>Alexis Day</strong> is an associate director for the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS.</p> +<p>Infusing civics concepts into STEM education can ensure that the next generation of technologists understands that they have a civic responsibility to think about the societal impact of their innovations. This interdisciplinary approach is key to preparing a workforce that is technically skilled and civically engaged, including engagement in the development of norms, policies, and laws.</p> -<p><strong>Devi Nair</strong> is a former associate director and associate fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> +<p>Integrating civics concepts into the STEM and tech world is not just an educational priority — it is a democratic imperative. As technology continues to shape the world, those at the forefront of innovation must be equipped with the civic knowledge and ethical grounding to guide their work responsibly. And those making governance decisions must be equally prepared to meet the demands of a complex and technological future.</p> -<p><strong>Sophia Barkoff</strong> is a former research intern in Defending Democratic Institutions in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Integrating civics concepts into the STEM and tech world is not just an educational priority — it is a democratic imperative.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>Katie Kelly</strong> is a former social media and outreach intern in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>Di Cooke, et al.New research finds that we can now no longer trust our eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between real and AI-generated images, audio, and video. What does this mean in a world where the weaponization of synthetic media is becoming increasingly prevalent?SIFMANet Budapest Report2024-10-31T12:00:00+08:002024-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sifmanet-budapest-report<p><em>Discussions held in Budapest in September 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Hungary.</em></p> +<p><em>HOW DO WE INTEREST STEM STUDENTS AND TECH WORKERS IN CIVICS?</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong>Reveal Impact:</strong> Herbert Lin, a fellow in cyber policy at Stanford University, often tells his students that it behooves them to understand how government works because it is government that effectively dictates what we can know and understand about the universe, primarily through decisions about how to allocate its massive funding. AI and cybersecurity are good examples of how governments are developing rules, regulations, and policies that will impact the development and deployment of technology. But technical experts are not just impacted — they can and should also have an impact. They are members of society with valuable experience and skills to bring to societal problems, and thus they should participate in the discussions both as experts and as members of society.</p> -<p>In September 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI convened a roundtable discussion with public and private sector representatives from Hungary to discuss the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in the country. The roundtable was organised with the support of the Budapest-based think tank Equilibrium Institute. Participants included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Hungarian Financial Intelligence Unit and the Customs Unit of the National Tax and Customs Administration, the Hungarian National Bank, the Government Office of the Capital City Budapest, professional associations, companies, law firms and financial institutions.</p> +<p><strong>Elevate the Role of Translators Between STEM and Policy:</strong> There is a critical need for individuals who can bridge the gap between STEM and policy by getting involved in the process and acting as “translators.” These professionals must understand both technical concepts and policy implications, enabling them to communicate effectively between the two communities. Teaching policymakers the technical aspect of emerging technologies, while helping technologists navigate the complexities of policy, is essential for fostering collaboration and innovation. To strengthen this vital role, we must create programs and positions that elevate these “translators” by raising awareness of their importance, making these roles more prestigious, and incentivizing individuals to pursue them. By recognizing and investing in these positions, we can ensure that the intersection of technology and policy is more effectively navigated, driving ethical innovation and informed decisionmaking. There are several examples of Master of Science (MS) degrees in tech and public policy, but there is still room for more. In the field of cybersecurity, Tufts University offers a degree in Cybersecurity and Public Policy and the University of Texas at Austin offers a Master of Public Affairs (MPAff ) dual degree program between its Cockrell School of Engineering and its Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs.</p> -<p>The event was part of RUSI’s work to understand and highlight key challenges for sanctions implementation through its Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), funded by the National Endowment for Democracy. This conference report represents the findings gathered during the Budapest engagement. None of the discussions from the event are attributable.</p> +<p><strong>Connect to the Scientific Revolution and the Age of Enlightenment:</strong> STEM students may be interested in the connections between the Scientific Revolution, with its questioning of established concepts and structures, and its influence on the Age of Enlightenment, which in turn informed the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, with the framers developing our radical system of government in the same breath, and in much the same way, that a new world of scientific discovery and understanding was helping inform new ways of thinking. The framers did not see a bright distinction between what today we might call “hard science” and “soft science.”</p> -<h3 id="the-legal-and-institutional-sanctions-framework-in-hungary">The Legal and Institutional Sanctions Framework in Hungary</h3> +<p><strong>Bridge the Gap between Binary and Shades of Gray:</strong> We must explore how the mathematical and scientific principles and “answers” that seem so black and white today actually arrived through a process — a process of discernment and discovery that did not always yield societal acceptance at first. Similarly, the framers of the Constitution set up not just institutions but a process for arriving at the “right” answer for the advancement of individuals, society, and the nation. And just as science is constantly raising new questions about long-held answers or assumptions about the universe, democracy is always moving toward a more perfect union, with change coming about through the work of informed and engaged citizens.</p> -<p>Throughout the workshop, participants highlighted the fact that the current sanctions implementation landscape in Hungary is decentralised, involving multiple authorities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the National Tax and Customs Administration’s FIU and Customs Unit, the National Bank and the BFKH, along with other relevant agencies. Below follows a description of the relevant national competent authorities as described by participants.</p> +<p><strong>Leverage the Scientific Method to Strengthen Civic Engagement:</strong> The principles of the scientific method — critical thinking, evidence-based reasoning, and an iterative approach to problem-solving — offer a powerful framework for enhancing civic engagement. By teaching students to apply the scientific method to democratic participation, we can cultivate a more informed and thoughtful citizenry. Encouraging students to evaluate information with the same rigor they would in a scientific setting allows them to engage in civil discourse and embrace differing perspectives. This connection between scientific inquiry and the democratic process helps foster collaboration and critical thinking, empowering students who are driven to solve problems to apply their skills to civic challenges. Embedding these principles into civics education not only reinforces a sense of civic responsibility but also ensures that the next generation is equipped to address complex societal issues with thoughtful, evidence-based approaches.</p> -<p>The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade only established its Sanctions Department in March 2024. The Sanctions Department engages in policymaking in European Council working groups, develops expert opinions on sanctions proposals, coordinates implementation with the competent authorities, and participates in sanctions enforcement and export authorisation procedures. The department can also veto the decisions of the BFKH on the export of dual-use goods and military technology. Furthermore, it can issue opinions on the decisions of the BFKH regarding the provision of services, and the import of goods generating significant revenues for Russia, among other decisions. The department also provides opinions on large-scale government projects and bilateral protocols, and can offer, on request, opinions for companies on sanctions implementation issues.</p> +<p><em>WHAT ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT CIVICS CONCEPTS TO CONVEY?</em></p> -<p>The responsibility for implementing targeted financial sanctions primarily rests with the FIU, which is part of the National Tax and Customs Administration. As a result of the need to heighten Hungary’s sanctions response following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the FIU underwent a significant reorganisation to enhance its operational capabilities. This restructuring has allowed the FIU to gain practical experience in sanctions enforcement, a process that had been somewhat limited prior to this period. The volume of transactions screened for sanctions purposes by the FIU increased following the invasion, and its sanctions responsibilities expanded. Since August 2024, the FIU has been responsible for screening any transfer of funds exceeding €100,000 out of the EU by any entity of which more than 40% is owned by Russia-linked entities or persons.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="csiss-civics-for-adults"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CSIS’s Civics for Adults</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The institutional framework for sanctions enforcement in Hungary requires FIs and companies to report any transactions or assets suspected of violating sanctions directly to the FIU. The FIU is tasked with analysing these reports and determining whether any violations have occurred. If a potential violation is identified, the matter is escalated to the court, which holds the authority to freeze the assets or block the transactions in question. This dual role of the FIU – as both an administrative and a police unit – has increased its prominence within the sanctions implementation landscape. However, despite the improvements in reporting mechanisms and operational frameworks, the FIU acknowledges the need for a clearer demarcation between its traditional financial intelligence functions and its new responsibilities concerning sanctions implementation. To facilitate information exchange regarding sanctions cases, the FIU utilises FIU. net to ensure that international stakeholders can access relevant data efficiently.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Developed in partnership with the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania, CSIS’s Civics for Adults guide aims to help civics experts and content providers create resources for business, government, and higher education leaders. The goal is to enhance civic understanding among adults and improve the functioning of democratic institutions within communities by identifying existing resources suitable for adults and adapting civics materials originally designed for schools.</code></em></p> -<p>The Hungarian National Bank plays a critical role in the prudential supervision of FIs, ensuring that they maintain capital adequacy and liquidity. The National Bank had to adapt its operational protocols to account for the impact of sanctions on FIs, integrating sanctions compliance into its anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing (AML/CTF) supervisory framework. The sanctions-related responsibilities have intensified the bank’s Anti-Money Laundering Supervision Department’s cooperation with the bank’s Regulatory Department, the relevant Hungarian authorities, and professional associations.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">First, the guide emphasizes that civic knowledge alone is insufficient; it must be paired with civic skills that can produce positive outcomes for both institutions and communities. Second, it offers actionable guidance on developing civics content for adults, ensuring they grasp the importance of the federal system, the roles of each branch of government, the separation of powers, the rule of law, and civilian control of the armed forces. Additionally, it highlights the importance of promoting civic engagement and fostering a sense of civic responsibility in learners. Only when individuals take ownership of their work and are invested in the success of their institutions and communities can they consistently make decisions that contribute to the long-term health of democracy.</code></em></p> -<p>The BFKH’s Department of Trade, Defence Industry, Export Control and Precious Metal Assay is responsible for licensing dual-use and military goods, as well as the implementation of certain sectoral sanctions. These include sanctions related to investments in the Russian energy sector, the re-export of fuel to Russia, the export of luxury goods and the provision of services, among others. The BFKH is also responsible for implementing certain financial sanctions, such as the prohibitions on transactions with the Central Bank of Russia and on accepting bank deposits over €100,000. Through its participation in the COARM and Dual-Use Goods working parties of the European Council, the BFKH is also integrated into the policy aspect of sanctions in Brussels. While taking on additional sanctions responsibilities since February 2022, the BFKH still operates with the same resources as before the full-scale invasion, putting it under increased pressure.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The guide also provides advice on how to effectively tailor civics to adults, noting that adults are typically self-directed learners who engage more with content when it has immediate relevance to their lives or careers. It emphasizes that materials should include narratives that resonate with adults’ work experiences and lived realities, sparking discussions about both the strengths and shortcomings of current systems. Further, employers should focus on implementing achievable civics goals, such as encouraging employees to vote or compensating them for jury duty or community service.</code></em></p> -<p>The Hungarian Customs Unit, part of the National Tax and Customs Administration, is charged with overseeing import–export activities related to Russia. Given the high volumes of trade with countries regarded as circumvention hubs, the increased burden on customs officials, coupled with limited resources, has hampered effective enforcement. Currently, only a few staff members are dedicated to sanctions-related oversight within the Customs Unit, and they are reliant on information from the European Commission due to their limited capacity for independent intelligence production.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Lastly, the guide stresses that outreach should not be limited to large corporations or government institutions. Equal attention should be given to local chambers of commerce, small businesses, community colleges, and trade schools. While concise, this guide serves as a practical starting point for content creators developing or adapting civics resources to engage adults in both their workplaces and communities.</code></em></p> -<p>Several other authorities are responsible for implementing sectoral and targeted sanctions: the Aviation Supervisory Authority Department of the Ministry of Construction and Transport implements bans on private and charter flights; the National Media and Infocommunications Authority is responsible for media bans; and the National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing implements entry bans.</p> +<p>CSIS’s Civics for Adults guide discusses the key civics concepts all Americans should understand (see box above).</p> -<p>For a complete understanding of the sanctions framework in Hungary, it is important to highlight that Hungary has been granted several exemptions in EU sanctions packages. Together with Slovakia and Czechia, the country has a temporary exemption from the prohibition of imports of crude oil by pipeline; the Rosatom-led Paks II nuclear power plant’s construction was also granted exemption; and the import of certain, otherwise sanctioned, goods remains authorised for the maintenance of Russian metro cars in Budapest.</p> +<p>Of particular importance in the technology arena is an understanding of civic responsibility — obligations that go beyond oneself and are essential for a functioning democracy based on the then-radical idea of self-governance. Civic responsibility can help inform the “why” of ethics. It can also strengthen the message that security, particularly cybersecurity, is a shared responsibility between the government and the individual.</p> -<h3 id="sanctions-compliance-in-the-hungarian-private-sector">Sanctions Compliance in the Hungarian Private Sector</h3> +<p>Also important, as noted, is an understanding of how policy decisions are made and at what level(s) of government. Major funding decisions are generally made by the U.S. Congress and the executive branch, but state and local governments can also impact the level of resources available for the development of technology or new engineering projects, for example. Similarly, policies and laws establishing limits or guidelines for scientific or technological research could come from federal, state, or even local governments. Understanding our system of federalism is important for understanding how to bring about change or influence outcomes.</p> -<p>Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine prompted a political debate in Hungary, marked by a critical governmental narrative on sanctions and their financial and economic impact on the country. Participants at the roundtable described the collapse of Sberbank Europe AG due to asset freezes under the initial sanctions packages as a key example. This case reverberated through the banking sector, leading to considerable deposit outflows and heightened sensitivity among FIs regarding liquidity and capital management.</p> +<p>Finally, reinforcing a sense of shared values and aspirations captured in the notion of a more perfect union, for which we must always strive, can help strengthen the commitment to using STEM-related expertise to reinforce, rather than undermine, those values.</p> -<p>In the wake of the sanctions imposed after the invasion, FIs in Hungary faced an urgent need to adapt to new requirements. Representatives from the Hungarian financial sector noted that although they had previous experience with sanctions stemming from Russia’s initial invasion of Eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014 – primarily focusing on name-/entity screening – the heightened and more complex restrictive measures on Russia necessitated more rigorous and manual work. FIs must now screen transactions comprehensively and assess whether the goods or end users involved are subject to sanctions, rather than simply screening for name matches. The absence of automated tools for monitoring financial flows related to sanctions violations poses significant challenges for Hungarian banks. While some tools, such as Swift’s Compliance Analytics, assist in analysing changes in financial flows that might be indicative of sanctions evasion activity, they often fall short of providing the depth of analysis required for transactions with high risks, and cannot provide the granular insights necessary for effective compliance. As it stands, compliance teams must often screen transactions manually on a case-by-case basis, which includes evaluating complex scenarios such as the export of aluminium wires to Russia or the import of salmon from the country.</p> +<p><em>HOW DO WE GET CIVICS CONCEPTS INTO THE STEM CURRICULUM?</em></p> -<p>To better safeguard against non-compliance, participants from the financial sector argue that rather than simply rejecting transactions, FIs should adopt a US-style approach that allows for the blocking of funds within FIs until sufficient documentation confirming the lawfulness of transactions is provided. This shift would ensure that, while banks are still held accountable for compliance, additional pressure would be placed on corporates to bolster their sanctions awareness, as they would lose access to funds submitted for processing that are not properly documented. Enhanced technological capabilities in monitoring and reporting on sanctions-related activities are therefore needed to ease the burden of manual review processes.</p> +<p>Civics education must be embedded across a variety of subjects, not limited to social studies. Civics concepts should permeate STEM fields, where the intersection of technology, ethics, and policy is increasingly important.</p> -<p>Private sector representatives also highlighted the compliance challenges posed by the current fragmented sanctions reporting landscape in Hungary, involving multiple authorities and duplicating reporting lines. This creates confusion and inefficiencies. Banks in Hungary can self-report compliance failings to the FIU, but they also have obligations to report to the Hungarian National Bank. This dual reporting structure underscores the need for a clearer, more integrated approach to sanctions enforcement.</p> +<p><strong>Leverage Initiatives Such As the 2023 National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy:</strong></p> -<p>In the corporate sector, firms that have longstanding practices in managing export controls for dual-use goods are well prepared to follow sanctions regulations. However, the broader corporate sector remains ill-equipped to handle the complexities introduced by recent sanctions. SMEs find it especially challenging to navigate sanctions compliance.</p> +<p>Among the foundational skills highlighted in the strategy are the following:</p> -<p>Last, legislators and regulatory bodies in Hungary appear to have struggled to coordinate their efforts, particularly given the complexity of sanctions legislation. Existing interdepartmental collaboration has proven challenging, complicating compliance for businesses and FIs. A centralised sanctions authority could streamline processes and facilitate better communication among stakeholders.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>“Be Active Participants in Society and the Economy.”</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>“Understand the Social, Technical, &amp; Cultural Dynamics of Computational Technology, including Equity and Inclusion.”</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>“Ethically, Securely, and Safely Use Information” and “Recognize the Rights, Privacy, Responsibilities, &amp; Opportunities of an Interconnected Digital World.”</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h3 id="interpretation-of-eu-sanctions-regulations">Interpretation of EU Sanctions Regulations</h3> +<p>These objectives are all advanced by civics education.</p> -<p>Interpreting EU sanctions regulations has proven to be a challenge for Hungarian businesses and authorities alike. Participants at the roundtable discussed how the complexity of EU sanctions regulations – characterised by frequent updates and inaccessible language – creates a significant burden for compliance teams, which must navigate a constantly shifting landscape. The rapid pace of change means that organisations often lack the time and resources needed to allow them to adapt their compliance frameworks.</p> +<p>The strategy also seeks to “Invigorate the Pursuit of Foundational Cyber Skills and Cyber Careers.” As noted earlier, the Commission on Public Service determined that teaching civics was one of the most important and foundational ways to inspire public service and careers with a mission.</p> -<p>In this context, private sector participants expressed concerns regarding the interpretation of EU sanctions law, perceiving it as not clear enough. They agreed that language used in these regulations often lacks clarity and coherence, making it difficult for key stakeholders in both the public and private sectors (such as customs officials and FIs) to implement them effectively. Beyond the lack of clarity, rapid modifications to sanctions regulations also pose a challenge. Corporate sector participants noted that a change in the rules can create immediate barriers for goods in transit.</p> +<p>Finally, the strategy notes that “cyber education should be integrated across disciplines so learners can gain the requisite knowledge and skills in relevant and contextualized learning experiences.” Again, the kind of cross-discipline approach advocated in this report meets that objective.</p> -<p>Furthermore, the inconsistent application of sanctions across different EU member states complicates compliance, as varying interpretations can lead to confusion and misalignment. The expectation of uniform application of EU regulations is often undermined by practical realities on the ground. For example, a participant noted that there have been instances of Hungarian export licences not being accepted by EU member states at the eastern border. The agreement between the customs authorities of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Poland since May 2024 on the uniform implementation of trade sanctions sought to enhance regional coordination, but it has also reportedly led to a redirection of trade flows through Hungary, which is not currently party to this agreement. Due to the redirection of trade flows, the Hungarian Customs Unit’s workload, which includes managing flows at the external borders of the EU with Serbia and Ukraine, has increased, according to participants.</p> +<p><strong>Support Teacher Training and Professional Development:</strong> Teachers play a central role in fostering civic engagement among students, but they need better support to effectively incorporate civics and ethics into STEM subjects. Professional development programs should equip educators with the tools to teach the ethical and civic dimensions of technology. Partnerships between schools, universities, and tech companies can also help educators stay up-to-date with the latest technological advancements and their societal implications. Additionally, teacher training schools should place greater emphasis on teaching educators to teach civics, especially in today’s politically polarized environment. This training should include an understanding of the pervasive impact of technology in government. For example, the rollout of the Affordable Care Act and efforts to use technology for a more transparent and accountable government could serve as relevant case studies. Potential STEM teachers should also be required to have a basic understanding of civics and the role of laws and be encouraged to use similar examples in their classes.</p> -<p>To navigate interpretation, some private sector participants have attempted to draw parallels between EU regulations and the more straightforward frameworks of US sanctions. One participant noted that they visit the FAQs page on the website of the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and use analogues to interpret EU sanctions packages. Participants highlighted that the sanctions advisories published by the US were much clearer and more accessible than EU FAQs, which do not serve as sufficient guidance and have on occasion been contradicted in rulings by the European Court of Justice. Indeed, private sector participants noted that becoming acquainted with US sanctions is rising among the priorities of EU businesses as the potential for US secondary sanctions increases. This heightened scrutiny has forced FIs to reassess their risk profiles and enhance their compliance mechanisms, particularly for contracts involving non-EU entities.</p> +<p><strong>Inspire STEM-Related Civic Engagement:</strong> Schools across the country should experiment with integrating social studies and STEM concepts. For example, in 2021, U.S. history teachers at South Doyle High School in Knoxville, Tennessee, developed a cross-disciplinary project to explore the city’s lack of sidewalks. This project allowed students to learn about post–World War II history, 1950s building codes, urban planning, civil engineering, and even the health impacts of inadequate walking infrastructure, such as its effects on heart health and obesity rates. Although this is just one example, it demonstrates how some schools are working to bridge the gap between civics and the hard sciences.</p> -<p>Participants highlighted that a critical need has emerged for the European Commission to issue much clearer interpretative notices similar to those from US regulatory bodies. The current approach to introducing FAQs lacks legal standing and their phrasing still often fails to provide the clarity necessary for effective compliance. Clear, consistent guidelines from the Commission would help mitigate these challenges.</p> +<p><strong>Integrate Cybersecurity and AI as Use Cases:</strong> AI presents an unparalleled opportunity to engage students and the public in discussions about ethics and civic responsibility. Integrating AI as a focal point in civics education, from K–12 to higher education, can enhance students’ understanding of both historical context and the role technology plays in democracy. Policymakers, educators, and communities must work together to ensure AI is not only a subject of study but also a means to teach critical civics concepts.</p> -<h3 id="awareness-raising-of-compliance-obligations-in-hungary">Awareness-Raising of Compliance Obligations in Hungary</h3> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="national-security-agency-and-department-of-homeland-security-centers-of-academic-excellence-in-cybersecurity-designations"><code class="highlighter-rouge">National Security Agency and Department of Homeland Security Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity Designations</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>In an environment where compliance obligations are often viewed as ambiguous, FIs and businesses must have a clear understanding of the start and end points of their due diligence responsibilities. Overcompliance has become a prevalent strategy for mitigating risk, whereby institutions screen every transaction meticulously and often reject them when they remain unconvinced of their legitimacy. However, this approach can lead to operational inefficiencies and increased costs. To mitigate this, participants discussed the need to enhance industry’s understanding of compliance obligations, and some of the actions already being taken to improve awareness.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">One way to incentivize higher education to bring civics concepts into more technical areas might be to leverage the National Security Agency (NSA) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity (CAE-C) designations. These official designations, awarded by the NSA and DHS, recognize academic institutions that demonstrate excellence in cybersecurity education and research. Because the cybersecurity standards required to achieve this designation are high, earning it can “enhance [an] institution’s reputation, attract top-tier students and faculty, and open doors to federal funding and partnerships.”</code></em></p> -<p>The government and various industry associations in Hungary have made efforts to raise awareness, but resources for education on compliance are often scarce. The BFKH has organised export control forums and participates in webinars, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade engages in events dedicated to raising awareness about sanctions compliance. However, the authorities’ efforts need more support from the private sector, as few industry associations are involved. More associations could contribute to awareness-raising efforts.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There are several designations under the CAE-C umbrella, including Cyber Defense Education (CAE-CDE), Cyber Research (CAE-R), and Cyber Operations (CAE-CO). As a result, incorporating a civics education component into one of these criteria could quickly incentivize academic institutions to invest in and prioritize civics education to attain these prestigious designations. Since civics would suddenly become a government-recognized standard with direct workforce applications — such as clear communication and effective compromise — the field could attain new prestige. This, in turn, could attract more students and adults to civics, fostering a culture of lifelong learning and civic engagement.</code></em></p> -<p>The National Bank’s AML/CTF department aims to contribute to these efforts and sends out a daily newsletter to supervised entities on relevant legislative changes and responds to questions. Participants welcomed this support, and pointed out that the volume of emails received from the National Bank is so high that recipients’ systems occasionally mark them as spam.</p> +<p><strong>Incentivize Civics in STEM through Testing and Hiring:</strong> It’s often said that if you don’t test for it, it won’t be taught. Standardized tests could integrate some basic civics concepts, such as civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law, into questions related to STEM subjects. Additionally, as noted above, schools — particularly in higher education — tend to prioritize education that aligns with hiring demands. If businesses recognized the importance of a civically literate workforce and included this in their hiring decisions, it could significantly influence schools’ decisions on what to teach.</p> -<p>Furthermore, according to one participant, the National Bank’s successful awareness-raising campaign on online fraud, CyberShield, could offer a template for a campaign on sanctions violations risks. The campaign is supported by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of National Economy, as well as several other authorities, such as the police and the Hungarian Banking Association, the main advocacy group for FIs. Beyond raising customers’ awareness of online fraud, the campaign aims to foster the exchange of information and best practices between FIs, law enforcement and other authorities.</p> +<p><strong>Address Equity and Inclusion in STEM and Civics Education:</strong> It is vital to create pathways for underrepresented groups to engage in both STEM and policymaking roles. Addressing barriers to entry and retention for first-generation and minority students is crucial for building a diverse and inclusive workforce. Programs should encourage these students to see themselves as active participants in both technological innovation and democratic governance, promoting civic responsibility alongside technical skills.</p> -<p>Another challenge highlighted by participants as facing compliance professionals in Hungary is the limited access to information about enforcement actions and case studies that could inform best practices. In the US, open communication about sanctions violations offers valuable learning opportunities for FIs and businesses. Conversely, the lack of similar transparency in the EU is a missed opportunity to showcase valuable lessons to the business community, and hinders the ability to learn from others’ mistakes.</p> +<p><strong>Reframe Civics Education as a Shared Responsibility:</strong> Civics education should be viewed as a collective responsibility involving educators, policymakers, businesses, and the public. Federal, state, and local governments must collaborate to scale ongoing efforts in civics education, while private-sector support can help bridge the resource gap. Additionally, integrating civics education as a criterion for attaining Centers of Excellence designations can incentivize higher education institutions to prioritize this critical area.</p> -<p>In addition to awareness-raising on implementation, strengthened strategic communications are also necessary to highlight the aim of sanctions. Some private sector representatives raised the question of compensation for loss of business income due to sanctions, which underlines the need to further explain the importance of burden-sharing in the efforts to limit the Russian military complex’s access to funding and materials in its war of aggression on Ukraine.</p> +<p><strong>Use a Systems-Based Approach to Civics and STEM Integration:</strong> A holistic, systems-based approach is necessary to successfully integrate civics into STEM education. Collaboration across federal, state, and local governments; educational institutions; and tech companies is crucial for creating sustainable change. By aligning resources and goals across sectors, we can build an educational ecosystem that fosters technical expertise and civic engagement, ensuring that democracy and innovation go hand in hand.</p> -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> +<p>To maximize the impact of the integration of civics in STEM education, existing initiatives must be scaled and interconnected. Numerous programs across education, government, and the private sector are working across STEM, ethics, and civic responsibility. However, these efforts often operate in silos, at times also using differing terminology, which further hinders efforts to identify and connect them. By creating stronger connections between these initiatives — whether through partnerships, shared resources, or collaborative platforms — we can amplify their reach and effectiveness.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To maximize the impact of the integration of civics in STEM education, existing initiatives must be scaled and interconnected.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>Similarly, employers should ensure that as they implement initiatives to engage their workforces in ways that build their civic knowledge, skills, and engagement, they include aspects designed specifically to reach employees who are more STEM oriented. This should include finding ways for their employees to use their technical skills in civic engagement activities to strengthen their communities. Leaders should also clearly communicate why civics is important and encourage other tech sector leaders to do the same.</p> + +<p>A coordinated, system-wide approach that aligns stakeholders at the local, state, and federal levels will allow for the replication of successful models, accelerating progress toward a more civically engaged, technically proficient workforce better prepared to address the challenges and opportunities of rapid innovation in a democracy.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Suzanne Spaulding</strong> is senior adviser for homeland security and director of the Defending Democratic Institutions project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She also serves as a member of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.</p> + +<p><strong>Paula Reynal</strong> is a program manager and research associate for the Defending Democratic Institutions Project at CSIS, where she supports the project’s research agenda and coordinates events.</p> + +<p><strong>Aosheng Pusztaszeri</strong> is a research assistant for the International Security Program at CSIS, where he supports research on the intersection of emerging technologies, national security, and intelligence.</p>Suzanne Spaulding and Paula ReynalAs technology continues to shape society, it’s essential for tech leaders to recognize their role in strengthening democracy. This report highlights the urgent need to integrate civic knowledge and responsibility into STEM education and careers.Ukraine’s Military AI Ecosystem2024-11-12T12:00:00+08:002024-11-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem<p><em>This report examines the Ukrainian government initiatives and key institutions driving the development of military AI capabilities. It also explores the preconditions that have shaped their adoption in the Ukraine war.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>This report is the first part of a series on military artificial intelligence (AI) development and its application in the war in Ukraine. It will focus on two critical aspects of AI adoption in Ukraine’s military:</p> + +<ol> + <li> + <p>The conditions and factors that contributed to military AI development from the beginning of the war with Russia in 2014</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The key government institutions and initiatives responsible for driving AI adoption, along with a summary of their major AI-related initiatives</p> + </li> +</ol> + +<p>The summary section below presents key findings and insights on both of these aspects.</p> + +<h4 id="1-ai-is-in-experimental-deployment-and-is-overwhelmingly-geared-toward-supportive-functions">1. AI is in experimental deployment and is overwhelmingly geared toward supportive functions.</h4> + +<p>Although AI is frequently discussed in the context of the war in Ukraine, its full deployment on the battlefield remains limited. Numerous AI-driven capabilities and technologies are being tested along the frontlines, in long-range strikes within Russian territory, and across multidomain operations, but these efforts are largely experimental rather than indicative of AI systematically replacing human functions in warfare. AI currently assumes a predominantly supportive and informational role, and even when AI capabilities advance and improve, they are not yet implemented in fully autonomous modes on the battlefield.</p> + +<h4 id="2-there-is-growing-government-involvement-in-ai-development-in-ukraine-through-organizational-regulative-and-technological-initiatives-led-by-various-government-stakeholders">2. There is growing government involvement in AI development in Ukraine through organizational, regulative, and technological initiatives led by various government stakeholders.</h4> + +<p>Initially, the development of AI-driven technologies in Ukraine was spearheaded by the private sector and volunteer initiatives. However, government institutions and agencies have recently begun to build their own capacities for advancing new technologies. This shift is evident in the creation of new organizational divisions and units within government institutions and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which are specifically dedicated to AI-focused technologies and their deployment. These efforts mark a significant step toward the institutionalization of AI innovation within the public sector.</p> + +<h4 id="3-the-ukrainian-government-is-focusing-on-the-adoption-of-commercial-ai-rather-than-on-developing-new-technology-within-government-institutions">3. The Ukrainian government is focusing on the adoption of commercial AI rather than on developing new technology within government institutions.</h4> + +<p>Ukrainian authorities, having recognized that the speed and quality of technology development in the private sector far exceed those of the government sector, have prioritized creating infrastructure and procedures for the fast adoption of commercial technology. This approach has resulted in simplifying regulations on the adoption of innovation by the AFU, initiating programs for prototype testing, and providing grant funding to early-stage start-ups, among other initiatives. Moreover, most newly established units within Ukraine’s military, such as the Unmanned Systems Forces, are dedicated to integrating new technologies into military operations rather than participating in combat itself.</p> + +<h4 id="4-the-absence-of-a-long-term-strategy-for-military-ai-development-poses-significant-challenges-to-the-sustained-and-effective-adoption-of-these-technologies">4. The absence of a long-term strategy for military AI development poses significant challenges to the sustained and effective adoption of these technologies.</h4> + +<p>The lack of a long-term strategy for military AI development represents a critical gap within the government’s approach to emerging technologies. Despite Ukraine’s recognized technological potential, there is no unified vision guiding the use of AI in defense. This strategic void is primarily driven by limited management capacity across government institutions and by the inexperience of political leadership in addressing the complexities of warfare. As a result, the focus has been on immediate, tactical solutions rather than on establishing a cohesive, forward-looking strategy to harness the full potential of AI in military operations.</p> + +<h4 id="5-between-2014-and-2022-two-grassroots-applications--analytics-for-situational-awareness-and-drones-for-intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance-isr--laid-the-groundwork-for-the-post-2022-surge-in-military-ai-following-russias-full-scale-invasion-military-ai-expanded-significantly-across-six-major-applications-with-a-growing-number-of-companies-focusing-on-autonomy">5. Between 2014 and 2022, two grassroots applications — analytics for situational awareness and drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) — laid the groundwork for the post-2022 surge in military AI. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, military AI expanded significantly across six major applications, with a growing number of companies focusing on autonomy.</h4> + +<p>This report categorizes AI applications in Ukraine’s military operations into six major areas, listed below. A more detailed analysis of these applications will be provided in subsequent reports in this series.</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Consult industry stakeholders:</strong> To enhance the efficacy of sanctions enforcement, national policymakers in Hungary and the European Commission should engage further with industry stakeholders before, during and after issuing sanctions. Participants noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade consults strategic industries, and the Commission also takes a consultative approach. However, further fostering of public–private collaboration throughout all stages of sanctions policymaking would ensure that the applicability and potential consequences of sanctions are thoroughly assessed. This would also help minimise unintended consequences for businesses, and support their implementation efforts to achieve the effect policymakers are seeking.</p> + <p><strong>Autonomy.</strong> The most significant advancements have been in autonomous systems, where Ukraine is making strides in areas such as GPS-denied navigation and swarm operations.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Increase clarity and transparency in regulations:</strong> Regulations should be formulated in a way that eliminates ambiguity and provides clear directives to stakeholders. While strategic ambiguity creates a sense of unease that might bolster overcompliance, clarity will foster more precise compliance that minimises the potential for misunderstandings that can then lead to inadvertent violations and unintended effects.</p> + <p><strong>Open-source intelligence and fighting disinformation.</strong> AI helps to analyze large volumes of digital content from media and social networks and to identify Russian narratives, propaganda, and information campaigns spreading disinformation.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Centralise competences and simplify processes:</strong> The involvement of numerous authorities in Hungary requires a high degree of coordination that is often difficult to manage effectively. Fragmentation creates uncertainty and leads to a duplication of effort for the private sector. Centralising domestic sanctions competences into a single agency would mitigate these challenges and facilitate implementation.</p> + <p><strong>Situational awareness and command and control.</strong> AI enhances situational awareness with numerous software platforms used by the military to analyze battlefield and intelligence data and to facilitate real-time efficient decisionmaking.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Enhance sanctions expertise:</strong> The level of understanding of sanctions regulations and obligations remains low, particularly among non-financial corporates. Awareness-raising initiatives should be prioritised and strengthened, by both the public and private sectors. Existing campaigns such as the Hungarian National Bank’s CyberShield programme on fraud could offer a template for wider awareness-raising efforts on sanctions. Furthermore, participants called for a central source of information on sanctions, such as a sanctions hotline.</p> + <p><strong>Demining.</strong> AI-powered analytic software and AI-enabled unmanned ground vehicles improve the efficiency and safety of mine clearance.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Invest in IT and data tools:</strong> Investing in improved IT systems and data analytics tools within customs and regulatory authorities would boost effective sanctions enforcement. This investment would enable better tracking and analysis of financial flows, as well as improved engagement with the private sector, thereby enhancing compliance capabilities across the board.</p> + <p><strong>Training and simulation.</strong> AI-driven training simulations are helping soldiers adapt to complex battlefield conditions by playing close-to-real combat scenarios with AI adjustments to address warfighters’ skill gaps.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Harmonise sanctions implementation:</strong> Hungarian customs authorities highlighted the challenge of managing an increased flow of goods through the country, linked to the enhanced customs cooperation between the Baltic countries, Finland and Poland. Hungary could benefit from joining this agreement, as it would help to prevent making the country attractive for the rerouting of trade flows. This challenge further underscores the need for the EU to work towards better alignment and harmonisation of sanctions implementation across member states.</p> + <p><strong>Damage assessment.</strong> AI is crucial in damage assessment, utilizing satellite data and drone imagery to analyze damage, losses, and devastation and to estimate future recovery efforts.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>SIFMANet has repeatedly observed similar challenges across the 14 EU member states it has visited so far, and regularly shares recommendations with policymakers in Brussels to support the improved implementation of sanctions against Russia. These recommendations amplify the suggestions gathered from the public and private sectors, including in Hungary. Yet despite the clear and widespread understanding of these challenges, they persist. As we approach the third anniversary of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the EU must redouble its efforts to ensure that governments and the private sector take all necessary steps to restrict the resourcing and funding of Russia’s war of aggression.</p> +<h4 id="6-several-factors-have-facilitated-the-rapid-development-of-military-ai-in-ukraine-creating-a-unique-environment-for-defense-innovation">6. Several factors have facilitated the rapid development of military AI in Ukraine, creating a unique environment for defense innovation.</h4> -<hr /> +<p>The situation in Ukraine over the last decade, particularly the ongoing conflict with Russia, has affected all aspects of society and necessitated rapid adaptation in defense and related fields. These factors have enabled Ukraine to test and deploy AI-driven solutions in real battlefield conditions, leading to numerous innovations, particularly in the realm of autonomy and autonomous weapon systems.</p> -<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Finance and Security research team at RUSI.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Existential need for advanced technology.</strong> The Russian invasion of 2022 created an urgent, existential need for Ukraine to develop advanced defense technologies rapidly. The high-stakes environment pushed both government and private sectors to prioritize technological advancements, such as AI, to enhance military capabilities. This urgency also catalyzed a willingness to experiment with AI, leading to quicker deployment of AI-driven capabilities in combat.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Active civil society and a robust private sector.</strong> Ukraine’s vibrant civil society and entrepreneurial private sector have been instrumental in driving defense innovation. Even before the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian entrepreneurial spirit, combined with a deep sense of national defense responsibility, led many private companies and start-ups to actively contribute to the war effort. These organizations have developed AI-driven solutions ranging from autonomous drones to advanced surveillance systems, with many innovations coming from small teams responding quickly to military demands. The active participation of nongovernmental actors in AI-enabled defense technology development and the fast deployment of commercial technology have significantly accelerated progress in this area.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Permissive regulatory frameworks.</strong> Ukraine’s regulatory environment for military AI was absent before the invasion. Unlike in many other countries, where regulatory bottlenecks can slow down innovation, Ukraine’s government refused to regulate military AI, allowing innovators to respond quickly to frontline needs and develop AI applications that could be immediately deployed in combat settings. The Ministry of Digital Transformation (MDT) prioritizes a soft, business-friendly approach, aiming to avoid overregulation. Instead of imposing strict rules, the ministry uses a bottom-up strategy, offering voluntary guidelines and tools to prepare businesses for future regulations. This approach extends to the defense sector, as the MDT has indicated that it does not plan to introduce regulation of AI in the defense sector.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Direct communication between engineers and military personnel.</strong> One of the most significant accelerators of military AI development in Ukraine has been direct communication between engineers and military personnel. Through a well-established network of technical workshops positioned near the frontline or within military units, including mobile drone repair vans, engineers from private companies are able to closely monitor and assess the performance of their systems in real combat scenarios. This proximity enables engineers working on unmanned systems and autonomous capabilities to receive real-time feedback, allowing for the rapid refinement of their technologies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Foreign assistance providing access to new technologies.</strong> International support, from both governments and private companies, has been crucial in allowing Ukraine to leap forward in its technological capabilities. This support has facilitated Ukraine’s adoption of new technologies, such as analytical tools from Palantir, communication infrastructure via Starlink, and the migration of critical government data to Microsoft’s cloud services, to name just a few examples. This external assistance has not only equipped Ukraine with essential tools for innovation but has also fostered opportunities for collaborative development between Ukrainian and foreign companies, thereby strengthening Ukraine’s military and technological capabilities.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong>Balázs Gyimesi</strong> is the Communications Manager of RUSI Europe in Brussels.</p>Gonzalo Saiz and Balázs GyimesiDiscussions held in Budapest in September 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Hungary.More Than Meets The Eye2024-10-31T12:00:00+08:002024-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/more-than-meets-the-eye<p><em>Though U.S.-Philippine economic ties are well documented, the day-to-day impact of the relationship in the Philippines is often underreported. The United States must enhance public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.</em></p> +<h4 id="7-collaboration-on-ai-between-ukraine-and-the-us-government-can-be-mutually-beneficial">7. Collaboration on AI between Ukraine and the U.S. government can be mutually beneficial.</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>What follows are several key recommendations for the U.S. government to foster closer collaboration in AI development between the United States and Ukraine in a way that will be beneficial to both countries.</p> -<p>The size and scope of U.S.-Philippine economic cooperation is well documented; however, the quantitative and qualitative impacts on the Philippines are poorly understood. Without comprehensive, accurate, and easily accessible data on U.S. investments and their effects in the Philippines, malign actors may promote false or harmful narratives, thereby weakening public support for the U.S.-Philippine alliance. It is crucial for the United States to improve public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Strategic support.</strong> The United States should leverage its technological leadership to help Ukraine develop a cohesive long-term strategy for integrating AI into defense operations. By providing strategic guidance, the United States can help to align Ukraine’s national priorities in AI development while gaining valuable insights into AI applications in active warfare.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Closing the feedback loop.</strong> A structured feedback system for evaluating the performance of U.S.-provided drones and military technologies in Ukraine would benefit both nations. U.S. companies could quickly iterate and improve their technologies, while Ukraine would receive more tailored and effective capabilities, enhancing battlefield operations.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>AI in U.S. foreign aid.</strong> The United States should integrate AI development into its foreign aid programs for Ukraine, providing essential computing infrastructure to support AI innovation. This would strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities and establish the country as a hub for military AI development, benefiting U.S. strategic interests in global AI leadership.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>AI-focused training and entrepreneurial development.</strong> The United States should establish AI-related programs for Ukrainian defense entrepreneurs and business leaders. These initiatives would foster Ukraine’s defense tech ecosystem and strengthen U.S.-Ukraine collaboration, positioning both countries to lead in AI-driven defense innovation.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<h3 id="understanding-ukraines-ai-ecosystem">Understanding Ukraine’s AI Ecosystem</h3> -<p>The United States and the Philippines share a robust and enduring relationship based on shared values, national interest, and dense people-to-people connections. Filipinos regularly identify the United States as one of the country’s most trusted partners. Traditionally, the United States has been a key military partner for the Philippines, and since the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the two countries have stood together in defense of their common interests. The alliance is the United States’ oldest in the Indo-Pacific. While the military relationship between the two countries is often at the forefront of policy conversations, the United States’ economic relationship with the Philippines is also of great significance. Creating strong economic linkages between like-minded partners throughout the region, such as the Philippines, is crucial to upholding a rules-based order and meeting countries’ demands for tangible benefits to cooperation.</p> +<p>This section provides a comprehensive overview of Ukraine’s military AI ecosystem. It begins by providing a background to Ukraine’s commercial AI sector, which for more than a decade has been quite successful — more than is commonly recognized in the West. Next, the paper examines how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 resulted in major changes to the Ukrainian military’s approach to software and data, changes that were critical to the foundation of the military’s post-2022 introduction of AI technologies. Finally, it provides an overview of the key government organizations responsible for driving AI adoption throughout Ukraine’s military as well as a summary of their AI-related initiatives.</p> -<p>The economic relationship between the United States and the Philippines dates to the early twentieth century, when the Philippines was a U.S. territory. After the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the Philippines came under the administration of the United States and remained so for nearly 50 years. During this time, the Philippine economy was strongly tethered to the United States and remained deeply intertwined even after Philippine independence in 1946. The Bell Trade Act of 1946, for instance, coupled the newly independent Philippine economy to that of the United States by allowing for free trade for 8 years and implementing a gradual application of tariffs over the next 20. U.S.-Philippine efforts at economic cooperation paved the way for future advancement, with U.S. investments playing a key role in the development of the Philippine manufacturing, agricultural, and services sectors. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has collaborated with the Philippine government since 1961, investing nearly $5 billion over the past 60 years.</p> +<h4 id="commercial-ai-in-ukraine-a-decade-of-quiet-success">Commercial AI in Ukraine: A Decade of Quiet Success</h4> -<p>Under President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., the Philippines became one of 14 negotiating parties in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). More significant for the time being, the United States and Philippines have launched a series of bilateral economic initiatives under the administrations of Marcos and President Joe Biden. These include the Luzon Economic Corridor, meant to develop critical infrastructure in the Philippines, the first-ever Presidential Trade and Investment Mission to Manila in March 2024, and the U.S.-Philippines Agreement for Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (or the 123 Agreement) that entered into force in July 2024.</p> +<p>In the race for leadership in artificial intelligence, Ukraine may appear an unlikely contender. However, this comparatively small nation is demonstrating significant potential, with a highly skilled and technologically adept population. Notably, nearly two-thirds of Ukrainians express optimism regarding AI’s potential to enhance human life, reflecting widespread public confidence in the transformative capabilities of the technology.</p> -<p>Though the direct trade, investment, and aid figures between the United States and Philippines are well documented, the quantitative and qualitative impacts of this deep economic relationship are not. Information on the effects of the United States’ investment efforts in the Philippines is often difficult to find, obscuring the depth of this partnership. Furthermore, this underreporting creates opportunity for malign actors to minimize or mischaracterize U.S. initiatives in order to manipulate Philippine public opinion. Already, disinformation regarding the U.S. defense commitment to Filipino forces in the South China Sea is pervasive on Philippine social media. Discrediting the accomplishments made possible by close cooperation between the two governments has the potential to weaken decades of collaboration and jeopardize the current renaissance in the alliance. In an attempt to illuminate the results of the U.S.-Philippine relationship, this brief explores the ways in which significant U.S. investments in several sectors deliver wide-ranging benefits for the Philippine public.</p> +<p>Indeed, for more than a decade, Ukraine has quietly served as a developer of innovative AI capabilities that have captured the world’s imagination. While a full list is beyond the scope of this paper, three companies — Looksery, Respeecher, and Augmented Pixels — provide a helpful illustration of how Ukraine’s commercial AI sector has long been more impactful and more capable than is commonly understood outside technology communities.</p> -<h3 id="state-of-us-philippine-economic-ties">State of U.S.-Philippine Economic Ties</h3> +<p>First, in 2015, Snap Inc. — a Santa Monica-based technology company and the maker of the popular Snapchat social media app — spent $150 million to acquire Looksery, a two-year-old Ukrainian AI tech firm. Looksery’s AI-based facial recognition and augmented reality technology laid the foundation for Snapchat’s Lens portfolio, which today boasts 250 million daily users. In 2022, Snap Inc. stated that the company still employed 300 Ukrainian staff, almost all of whom are engineers.</p> -<p>Goods and services trade between the United States and the Philippines reached an estimated $36.1 billion in 2022, with exports to the Philippines accounting for $12.8 billion and imports into the United States $23.3 billion. In 2022, the United States was the Philippines’ top export destination, accounting for 14.1 percent of Philippine exports at $15.5 billion; China follows at 13.9 percent, Hong Kong at 11.5, Japan at 10.2, and Singapore at 6.42, respectively. In contrast, in import terms, China’s supply of imported goods to the country is valued at $53.6 billion, amounting to 32.1 percent of the Philippines’ total imports; Indonesia trails behind at 8.15 percent, South Korea at 7.49, the United States at 5.02, and Taiwan at 4.52, respectively. Trade figures from May 2024 demonstrate that the United States remains the Philippines’ top export destination, and that the economic growth trend between the two countries continues to grow.</p> +<p>Second, Ukrainian AI companies have also been involved in Hollywood, providing AI technology for audio generation. In 2020, Disney sought to include a younger version of Luke Skywalker in the television series The Mandalorian, but faced a challenge in that Star Wars actor Mark Hamill was 68 years old. Disney contracted with the Ukrainian AI company Respeecher to synthesize a younger voice that was sufficiently high-quality to meet Disney’s exacting standards.</p> -<p>In terms of investment, between 2013 and the first quarter of 2024, the Philippine Statistics Authority recorded the United States as the fifth-largest source of approved foreign investment, accounting for 7 percent, or roughly $3.6 billion. The United States is trailed closely by China, the sixth-largest source of approved foreign investment, clocking in at $3.2 billion. In 2022, U.S. foreign investment in the Philippines rose 15.7 percent year over year from 2021 to $6.2 billion, led by a combination of manufacturing and professional, scientific, and technical services, along with wholesale trade.</p> +<p>Third and finally, Qualcomm acquired Augmented Pixels in 2022. Founded in 2010 in Odesa, Augmented Pixels developed AI navigation technologies, such as 3D mapping and localization, for drones and AI glasses. At the time of purchase, Augmented Pixels’ commercial customers included National Geographic, LG Electronics, Intel, and more.</p> -<p>Since the launch of IPEF in 2022, the United States and the Philippines have continued to mark significant accomplishments in their economic partnership. During President Marcos’ visit to Washington in April 2024 for trilateral discussions with President Biden and Japanese prime minister Kishida Fumio, the three countries announced the first Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) corridor in the Indo-Pacific, the Luzon Economic Corridor. Aiming to support connectivity between Subic Bay, Clark, Manila, and Batangas, the Luzon Economic Corridor is the first project of the PGI-IPEF Investment Accelerator and will allow the three countries to coordinate investments in infrastructure projects, clean energy, and semiconductor supply chains. Through this larger policy, the United States can work with IPEF partners to develop country-specific investment approaches in key sectors as targeted by each IPEF partner. In the same document, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation announced a $20 million loan for affordable housing throughout the country as well as its intent to open a regional office in the Philippines.</p> +<p>The main takeaway from these cases is that Ukraine’s AI sector was a meaningful player in commercial technology markets — taken seriously even by leading Western companies — long before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. A 2024 study conducted on behalf of Ukraine’s MDT found that Ukraine has 243 AI-focused companies and a broader information technology (IT) and software workforce comprising more than 307,000 specialists. Additionally, Ukrainian universities have launched a remarkable 106 specialized AI and machine learning (ML) programs across 42 institutions, resulting in a 122 percent increase in enrollment over five years. The report found that Ukraine produces more IT graduates than any other Central or Eastern European country, with a quarter of these graduates specializing in AI/ML.</p> -<p>When it comes to development assistance, USAID invests some $120 million annually to support market-driven growth in the Philippines, as well as to foster stronger democratic systems and improve education and health services. The Philippines has also been a major beneficiary of other assistance programs, such as Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grants. In February 2024, the MCC began talks with Philippine officials about restarting threshold programs, smaller scale grants aimed at improving policies. The Philippines previously had received MCC threshold grants (2006–2009) amounting to $20.7 million; in 2016, it received its first compact grant — aimed at poverty reduction and economic stimulus — for $434 million.</p> +<p>Despite Ukraine’s aforementioned strengths, its AI sector continues to encounter substantial challenges. According to the 2023 Government AI Readiness Index by Oxford Insights, Ukraine was ranked 60th out of 193 countries in AI integration into public service. The country’s AI development is hindered by several factors, including insufficient computing infrastructure and a shortage of skilled human capital due to the relocation of IT engineers fleeing the war (although some have continued working remotely for their Ukrainian employers). Additionally, Ukraine’s low government research and development investment further constrains the sector’s growth.</p> -<p>Beyond traditional channels of economic engagement, since 2015, the U.S. Department of State has provided the Philippines with $463 million in security assistance through Foreign Military Financing (FMF), international military education and training, as well as peacekeeping operations funded through the Global Peace Operations Initiative. FMF figures are growing rapidly, with the United States providing $100 million in FY 2022 to potentially quintupling FMF to $500 million each year from FY 2025–2029. Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the United States has already allotted $109 million in support of base facility improvements, supplies, and military equipment, with an additional $128 million planned in the 2025 fiscal year. In the 2+2 talks held in the Philippines in July 2024, U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin pledged an additional $500 million in military financing from the FY 2024 budget.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nzE7KG9.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Comparison of Ukraine and United States in Government AI Readiness Index 2023.</strong> Source: <a href="https://oxfordinsights.com/ai-readiness/ai-readiness-index/">“Government AI Readiness Index 2023,” Oxford Insights</a>.</em></p> -<h3 id="benefits-of-us-private-investment-in-the-philippines">Benefits of U.S. Private Investment in the Philippines</h3> +<p>Surprisingly, the Oxford Insights report found that Ukraine matches the United States — the index’s top-ranked country — in one crucial aspect: vision. However, vision alone is not enough to boost AI development and deployment. Ukraine’s position in the index underscores a critical gap between the ambitious plans of its tech sector and the resources needed to execute them.</p> -<p>Foreign and domestic businesses may register with one of the Philippines’ 19 investment promotion authorities, including the Philippine Board of Investment and the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). These authorities are split based on geographic regions and industry strengths, such as the manufacturing and logistics network in Luzon, the tourism cluster throughout Luzon and Mindanao, and the agro-industrial cluster in Mindanao.</p> +<h3 id="military-ai-in-ukraine-since-2014-necessary-growth">Military AI in Ukraine since 2014: Necessary Growth</h3> -<p>Much of the foreign investment into the Philippines’ export-oriented manufacturing and services industries is routed through special economic zones managed by PEZA, which works to facilitate investor operations all the way down to registration and paperwork filing. As of April 2023, the Philippines was operating 419 different special economic zones throughout the country, ranging from manufacturing zones and information technology parks to agro-industrial economic zones and tourist export enterprises. Within the zones, the Philippine government can dole out tax incentives while sparing foreign businesses from lengthy bureaucratic procedures.</p> +<h4 id="pre-2022-laying-a-digital-foundation">Pre-2022: Laying a Digital Foundation</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As of April 2023, the Philippines was operating 419 different special economic zones throughout the country, ranging from manufacturing zones and information technology parks to agro-industrial economic zones and tourist export enterprises.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Though the 2022 full-scale invasion shocked the world, for Ukrainians, it was not the start of the war with Russia. Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territories in 2014 was a major wake up call for Ukrainian society — including Ukraine’s tech sector, which became increasingly willing to directly support Ukrainian armed forces.</p> -<p>More important than investment from U.S. government programs is the U.S. private investment that flourishes in and beyond the PEZA zones, covering a variety of sectors of the Philippine economy. The CSIS Southeast Asia Program selected seven of these sectors for study based on their growth and importance to the Philippines. Ranging from renewable energy investments to aerospace engineering, the following case studies examine how U.S. private investment delivers tangible benefits for the Philippines that go beyond simply reporting overall investment and trade figures.</p> - -<h4 id="renewable-energy">Renewable Energy</h4> - -<p>The Philippine government under President Marcos has identified clean energy development as a top priority and embraced cooperation with partner nations on that front, including through the clean economy pillar of IPEF. As one of the countries most affected by increasingly severe weather events, this is necessary not only to meet the Philippines’ net-zero goals, but also to grow other industries, like semiconductor manufacturing, in which foreign investors are seeking access to renewable energy. This is why the development of renewable energy is one of the three initial priorities of the Luzon Economic Corridor, announced in April 2024, the other two being rail and port modernization and the advancement of commercial enterprises at Subic Bay.</p> - -<p>Collaboration between the United States and the Philippines in establishing clean, sustainable power grids is of great importance to local Philippine communities. An archipelagic nation, the Philippine energy grid is deeply reliant on imported fossil fuels. Though 97.5 percent of Philippine households are electrified, the mountainous and archipelagic nature of the country’s geography presents significant challenges to consistent, inexpensive power. Successive Philippine administrations have prioritized a more resilient regional grid based on modular renewable energy. The 2020 census indicated that there were about 26.39 million households throughout the country. U.S. investments in Philippine nuclear power would be of great benefit to local communities isolated from main power grids and for improving quality of life and maintaining consistent, cheap electrification in major cities. Geothermal, solar, and wind energy account for 32.7 percent of the country’s energy sources. The Philippines aims to reach 50 percent renewable energy by 2050. Under the previous administration of President Rodrigo Duterte, lawmakers amended the Public Services Act to allow for 100 percent ownership by foreign investors of utilities ranging from power to telecoms, opening the door to more foreign investment in the Philippine energy grid. As a result of this and other reforms, the Philippines has become one of the most attractive emerging markets for investment in renewables, according to BloombergNEF’s 2023 climate report.</p> - -<p>Given its geographic location, the Philippines has immense solar energy potential. U.S.-based BrightNight Power, in collaboration with the Ayala Group’s ACEN, has agreed to jointly invest $1.2 billion over the next five years to develop the Philippines’ renewable energy capacity. U.S. solar panel manufacturers are increasingly looking to the Philippines for production, allowing Filipinos easier access to domestically produced, cheaper solar panels while also exporting those panels to countries like the United States and Canada. Sol-Go Inc., participating in Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s Presidential Trade and Investment Mission in March 2024, announced that it will build a new solar panel factory in the Philippines in addition to its current factory operating in Batangas. This additional investment will allow Sol-Go to triple its locally sourced workforce and increase its capacity so that it can produce 50 megawatts (MW) of solar panels. With the average Filipino household using 200 kilowatt-hours of energy per month, 50 MW could easily power 180,000 homes.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Collaboration between the United States and the Philippines in establishing clean, sustainable power grids is of great importance to local Philippine communities.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The 123 Agreement between the United States and the Philippines sets the stage for nuclear energy collaboration between the two countries moving forward by allowing U.S. companies to invest in nuclear projects throughout the country. NuScale Power, for instance, aims to invest up to $7.5 billion through 2031 to build small modular reactors in the Philippines. These reactors would greatly benefit more geographically isolated communities with tenuous connections to main power grids, while also touting smaller footprints, reduced cost, and locational flexibility in comparison to traditional nuclear reactors.</p> +<p>The 2022 full-scale invasion, however, did mark a watershed moment in Ukraine’s approach to military artificial intelligence. Prior to 2022, Kyiv had not prioritized AI in its defense strategy, despite the ongoing war in the Donbas region. However, groundwork laid by volunteer groups since 2014 — focused not on AI but on software for data collection, analysis, and warfighting operational support — has proved instrumental in facilitating rapid military AI development and adoption since 2022.</p> -<h4 id="information-technology-and-business-process-management">Information Technology and Business Process Management</h4> +<p>This subsection will examine two key military use cases from the 2014–2022 period that enabled AI integration after the full-scale invasion: situational awareness systems and drones. After 2014, volunteers from Ukraine’s tech sector developed systems using modern data and software techniques (though not ML/AI). Over time, these systems dramatically improved Ukraine’s intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities and even overtook competing official systems in adoption and impact.</p> -<p>The information technology and business process management (IT-BPM) sector covers a wide range of services in the Philippines, all aimed at managing certain aspects of business operations for third parties.</p> +<p><em>Situational Awareness</em></p> -<p>During the 2008 global recession, demand for overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) decreased significantly, prompting the Philippine government to provide training for OFWs to become call center agents. By 2010, the Philippines had surpassed India in voice-based IT-BPM services. As of 2023, the IT-BPM industry had reached 1.57 million employees, and it is forecast to employ 2.5 million by 2028. In April 2024, the ubiquity of Philippine IT-BPM services went viral on social media when a Philippines-based IT-BPM employee worked as a virtual cashier in a New York City restaurant thousands of miles away.</p> +<p>Between 2014 and 2022, Ukraine’s tech-savvy and patriotic workforce developed and introduced 11 new situational awareness and battlefield management systems to the Ukrainian military. Because they were unofficial and unsanctioned, one might think that these volunteer initiatives would be divorced from real military requirements. In practice, however, the volunteer groups had direct communication with front line operational forces, allowing them to focus their development efforts on high-priority military needs. One of the initiatives, the situational awareness system Delta, was eventually adopted and formally integrated into the Ukrainian military. The remarkable fact is that some unofficial volunteer systems and software have achieved near-universal adoption by the relevant Ukrainian forces, vastly exceeding the adoption rate of some official military technology initiatives that sought (and usually failed) to provide similar capabilities.</p> -<p>U.S. businesses have increasingly outsourced services to the Philippines in the last few decades, and U.S. investment has played a crucial role in the development of the sector. From 2014 to 2023, the Philippines has benefitted from nearly $5.2 billion worth of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the United States in general professional, scientific, and technical services. With its young, tech-literate, and largely English-proficient population, the Philippines presents an ideal location for U.S. IT-BPM investments. Government initiatives, including Republic Act No. 7916, which established Special Economic Zones through PEZA, offer tax incentives and ease the ability to conduct business for foreign investors. From 2003 to 2021, 395 U.S.-based firms invested $22.4 billion in the Philippines, 35 percent of which, or around $7.8 billion, went to the IT-BPM sector, one of the key growth drivers for PEZA, bringing in nearly $260 million of investments from the first quarter of 2024 alone.</p> +<p>The diverse capabilities of these systems — generally originating from explicit military requests — ranged from fire control, artillery optimization, and air traffic management to combat command and control. These systems not only significantly enhanced Ukraine’s operational effectiveness but also helped transition the Ukrainian military to a modern data- and software-enabled fighting force.</p> -<p>IT-BPM companies are often desirable places of employment for Filipinos. U.S.-owned companies ranging from American Express to Synchrony and Accenture rank near the top of a “best workplaces” list compiled by the Information Technology and Business Process Association of the Philippines and Great Place to Work. Surveys undertaken by Great Place to Work, a platform that uses employee data to certify workplaces with good levels of trust and work culture, indicate that from January 2022 to May 2023, “94 percent of IT-BPM employees in best workplaces experience a high-trust workplace culture.” The schedule flexibility offered by IT-BPM companies, paired with the flexibility to work from home that such jobs involve, makes the sector particularly attractive to recent graduates. The Philippines produces about 850,000 college graduates yearly, 87,000 of whom have degrees in fields suited to the IT-BPM sector.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">[Early situational awareness and command and control systems] not only significantly enhanced Ukraine’s operational effectiveness but also helped transition the Ukrainian military to a modern data- and software-enabled fighting force.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Both foreign and domestic investment in the Philippines has historically been concentrated within the Metro Manila National Capital Region and the surrounding regions of Luzon. Investments are slowly flowing to other emerging regions, particularly northern Luzon and the Visayas. Moreover, even though the IT-BPM sector is more widely distributed than most, it is still concentrated in a few urban centers; Bacolod, Cebu, Clark, Davao, and Iloilo are the main hubs. Nationwide broadband speeds, while improving, still lag behind those of other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Through the Digital Cities 2025 Initiative, the Philippine government is providing basic digital literacy and skills training in more rural provinces. These initiatives will likely pay dividends as the Philippines continues to advertise itself as an IT-BPM hub to U.S. investors.</p> +<p>One of the most noteworthy volunteer groups is Aerorozvidka, whose situational awareness system Delta has become a linchpin in Ukraine’s multidomain operations. Started in 2016 and transferred to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (MoD) in 2023, Delta seamlessly integrates NATO ISTAR standards to provide essential situational awareness across all branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Building on this foundation, Aerorozvidka has spearheaded the creation of situational awareness centers in eight cities, each focused on gathering information from its respective section of the front. These centers serve as technological hubs, uniting and coordinating intelligence from a wide variety of sources — drones, satellites, stationary cameras, sensors, field scouts, and data from allies. The system even digitizes information from loyal informants in temporarily occupied territories, who interface with government apps and chatbots. Bringing all these different data sources together in a unified software platform is a challenge even for the United States military, but Delta achieves this and enjoys high user satisfaction among Ukrainian forces. As will be discussed further in this paper, Delta has recently been enhanced with AI/ML-enabled capabilities. At one point, there was an officially sanctioned military system — Dzvin — in development that promised similar capabilities as the volunteer-built Delta. However, this fell victim to bureaucratic hurdles and corruption and never achieved meaningful adoption despite its official introduction into the AFU in 2022. A diverse range of military officials told CSIS that Delta now is the de facto standard and Dzvin is functionally irrelevant. Delta is also of keen interest to NATO, which has described the system as “ground-breaking” following its victory in a 2017 NATO hackathon and prominent testing in NATO military exercises, most recently in 2024.</p> -<h4 id="semiconductor-manufacturing">Semiconductor Manufacturing</h4> +<p>The Kropyva artillery software system improves target accuracy and routinely reduces the time between receiving orders and striking targets by up to tenfold. Ukrainian artillerymen access Kropyva through a tablet or mobile phone, then enter enemy coordinates, which are automatically translated to the nearest available artillery battery along with precalculated aiming trajectories. The Army SOS volunteer organization developed Kropyva in 2014, and 90 to 95 percent of Ukrainian artillery units have adopted it as their primary artillery fire control system. Another military system helping to coordinate artillery strikes, GisArta, attracted widespread attention in the Western press as “Uber for artillery,” even though Kropyva is more widely used and impactful according to Ukrainian military officials in conversation with CSIS.</p> -<p>With highly educated, English-proficient workers, the Philippines is an appealing location for semiconductor manufacturing. Concentrated in Metro Manila, Calabarzon (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon), northern and central Luzon, and Cebu, the Philippine electronics industry is split between 73 percent semiconductor manufacturing and 27 percent electronics manufacturing. Electronics exports reached $12.9 billion in 2023, nearly 60 percent of total Philippine exports. From 2014 to 2023, the United States invested roughly $7.91 billion in Philippine computer and electronic manufacturing.</p> +<p>Kropyva and Delta are just two of dozens of examples demonstrating how systems initially developed by tech industry volunteers changed Ukraine’s armed forces after 2014. Many of these systems began with the modest goal of supporting warfighter decisionmaking and have since evolved into advanced situational awareness and battle management systems routinely used by hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Prior to 2022, the adoption of these modern software and data-driven platforms also laid the groundwork for AI/ML integration. As critical information sources were networked and digitized, the data they generated became the raw material for training AI models and enabling AI-driven capabilities.</p> -<p>Given the number of Filipinos employed in the semiconductor industry, disruptions in U.S. investment can and have proven damaging to local communities. At its peak in 2008, Intel employed 5,000 direct workers and around 36,000 indirect workers in the Philippines. In the aftermath of the 2008 global recession, however, Intel shut down its Cavite-based chip assembly, testing, and packaging facility. As the global semiconductor manufacturing supply chain continues to evolve and mature, it is important to recognize the value of these private investments to local communities. As of April 2023, the semiconductor industry employed 2.5 million Filipinos.</p> +<p>The success of volunteer-led grassroots projects underscores a crucial point: in the face of existential threats, innovation in Ukraine has primarily thrived outside traditional channels. However, this decentralized approach is not without its challenges. Many of these teams still operate on shoestring budgets, relying heavily on donations. The lack of systemic support and funding raises concerns about the long-term sustainability and interoperability of this diversity of systems. Ukraine still possesses a hard-won technological edge, but the government needs to ensure that these successful initiatives are put on a more secure long-term foundation and incorporated into official plans and strategies. Unfortunately, multiple executives in Ukraine’s defense technology ecosystem told CSIS that the scale of Ukraine’s technological edge is shrinking as Russian forces improve their own technology and their pace of innovation adoption. Whereas previously Russian forces would take a month or more to adapt to new Ukrainian innovations before adopting countermeasures in the form of new tactics or technologies, now Russian forces may need as little as two or three days.</p> -<p>Through the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, the United States seeks to diversify and de-risk the global semiconductor ecosystem by boosting manufacturing and research both at home and in trusted partner countries. The International Technology Security and Innovation Fund, under the CHIPS Act, earmarked $500 million over five years to promote a secure, trustworthy telecommunications network aimed at ensuring semiconductor supply chain security by spreading out the traditionally concentrated semiconductor supply chain among friendly partners, including the Philippines.</p> +<p><em>Drones</em></p> -<p>In 2023, the Department of State announced that it would collaborate with the Philippine government to explore further cooperation in semiconductor supply chain security. During the Presidential Trade and Investment Mission in March 2024, Secretary Raimondo announced an investment of over $1 billion in the Philippine technology sector, aiming to double the number of semiconductor factories in the country; currently, there are 13 semiconductor factories focused on the assembly, testing, and packaging segment of the semiconductor supply chain.</p> +<p>Prior to 2022, drones were in use by both sides, mostly for remotely piloted ISR missions and without AI/ML capabilities. Drones have become a ubiquitous feature of the post-2022 war with Russia, widely recognized as a transformational capability for both sides. However, the impact of drones during the 2014–2022 period was considerably more limited.</p> -<p>In November 2023, President Marcos stressed that semiconductors and electronics remain top-priority sectors for his administration. PEZA aims to aggressively promote the Philippines as a site for overseas electronic and semiconductor manufacturing. Together with IT-BPM, electronics and semiconductors have been among the Philippines’ top exports in 2024.</p> +<p>The war in Donbas served as an early testing ground for commercial drones, with both sides exploring their potential. While Russian forces made early strides in drone warfare, the Ukrainian side’s attempts to leverage commercial drones were met with mixed results. The lack of trained operators, coupled with the high attrition rate of these relatively expensive items for Ukrainian soldiers who usually had to buy them at their own expense, initially dampened enthusiasm for their widespread adoption. Volunteer organizations, which have played a crucial role in supporting Ukraine’s military efforts, did not — prior to 2022 — prioritize drone acquisition. Similarly, official military decisionmakers were slow to recognize the potential of these systems, focusing instead on more traditional assets.</p> -<p>U.S. companies have been increasingly investing in the Philippine semiconductor space. In May 2023, Analog Devices announced an investment of $200 million in a research and development facility in Cavite. In August 2023, Texas Instruments announced that it would invest up to $1 billion in facility expansion in Clark and Baguio City. The Philippines aims to move up the semiconductor value chain, hoping to establish a lab-scale wafer fabrication plant by 2028.</p> +<p>In cases where Ukrainian forces did use drones, the priority use case was ISR. China was a major supplier of commercial drones to Ukraine, primarily for civilian purposes such as agriculture and event photography, often referred to as “wedding” drones. However, these also saw usage in combat, even prior to 2022, again mostly for ISR. Hence, Ukrainian defense companies focused their military drone development efforts primarily on medium and long-range reconnaissance and artillery fire correction. Notable examples include the PD-2 from UkrSpecSystems, the Furia from Athlone Avia, the R18 from Aerorozvidka, and the ACS-3M from Skyeton. Companies like DeVIRo also contributed with their Leleka-100, further expanding Ukraine’s domestic drone capabilities, while the Punisher, a strike drone produced by UA Dynamics, represents Ukraine’s foray into offensive drone technology.</p> -<h4 id="agriculture">Agriculture</h4> +<p>Despite the early use of drones in the war in Donbas, neither Ukrainian nor Russian drones were equipped with ISR AI/ML capabilities. However, increased familiarity with drones would set the stage for later AI adoption.</p> -<p>The United States and the Philippines are longtime partners in the agricultural sector — in 2022, U.S.-Philippine bilateral agricultural trade exceeded $4 billion. With its growing population, expanding middle class, and increasing household income, the Philippines is an important destination for U.S. agricultural goods. The United States and the Philippines convened their first Food Security Dialogue in May 2023. Ongoing U.S. projects in the Philippines aim to support capacity building in food regulatory agencies and agricultural industries while digitizing the connection between farmers and buyers. A plurality of Philippine agriculture (39 percent) is based in Luzon, followed by Mindanao and Visayas at 33.4 and 27.4 percent, respectively.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite the early use of drones in the war in Donbas, neither Ukrainian nor Russian drones were equipped with ISR AI/ML capabilities.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Despite this, the Philippines is vulnerable to food insecurity, a situation further exacerbated by climate change. Its reliance on imported food makes the Philippines the most food-insecure country in the region. Due to the country’s limited infrastructure linking its farmers to markets and its vulnerability to external food supply shocks, improving food production is crucial to securing Philippine agricultural supply chains. President Marcos has made the strengthening of the Philippines’ food supply a key priority of his administration, boosting the budget for agricultural programs. Under the Marcos administration, the Department of Agriculture’s budget was boosted by nearly 70 percent from 2022 to 2024 compared to the 2017–2021 appropriation under the previous administration.</p> +<h4 id="post-invasion-ai-surge-wide-ranging-military-ai-applications">Post-Invasion AI Surge: Wide-Ranging Military AI Applications</h4> -<p>From September to October 2023, the United States’ first Agricultural Technology Trade Mission explored opportunities to help support the Philippine agricultural supply chain as it traveled to Davao and Manila. The trade mission brought together various Philippine companies, government agencies, local businesses, and U.S. companies to discuss the importance of food security collaboration. The trade mission highlighted innovations in agricultural technology that have the potential to enhance the country’s agricultural productivity.</p> +<p>Despite Ukraine having been at war with Russia for nearly a decade, its 2022 full-scale invasion was a shock to the Ukrainian military system. The survival of Ukraine as an independent state was at stake, and leaders across civilian, military, and commercial structures reacted accordingly. Society as a whole mobilized to support the armed forces, and in many cases, everyday citizens volunteered to participate in combat and defend Ukraine.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Due to the country’s limited infrastructure linking its farmers to markets and its vulnerability to external food supply shocks, improving food production is crucial to securing Philippine agricultural supply chains.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The commercial technology sector of Ukraine was also swept up in this wave. What had been a volunteering side project for many became the dominant focus of their professional life. In numerous cases, these efforts were centered on maintaining and enhancing existing digital platforms like Delta and Kropyva. However, a new suite of volunteer-built capabilities focusing on the opportunities of AI technology also emerged.</p> -<p>U.S. investors, including Cargill, John Deere, and PepsiCo, have a long history of investment in the Philippine agricultural space. Cargill, which has had a presence in the Philippines since 1947, has made several key investments over the past decade. It collaborated with the Jollibee Foods Corporation to create a joint-venture poultry processing facility in Batangas in 2017, creating 1,000 new jobs. As of 2022, the facility employs 1,200 workers. Similarly, Cargill operates a joint-venture plant in Laguna that produces carrageenan, a common food additive and thickener. In 2018, the company announced that it would invest $235 million over two years to help the country meet the increasing demand for chicken and pork. As of 2024, Cargill directly employs over 950 people throughout the country.</p> +<p>As with the pre-2022 era, there was no centrally guided plan to accelerate the adoption of AI for priority use cases. Rather, experimentation with AI emerged organically, as technically proficient volunteers explored solutions to the diverse security challenges facing all of Ukrainian society — from disinformation to cyberwar to front-line conflict.</p> -<h4 id="defense-and-aerospace-manufacturing">Defense and Aerospace Manufacturing</h4> +<p>While much of the technology development and drive behind Ukrainian AI efforts originated in the private sector and volunteer communities, the Ukrainian government and military responded with significant organizational changes to accelerate and improve the adoption of AI-enabled capabilities.</p> -<p>Given its strategic location and well-educated workforce, the Philippines is in a prime position to contribute to defense and aerospace supply chains. The defense and aerospace sectors, made especially pertinent due to ongoing tensions between the Philippines and China over disputed territories in the South China Sea, are critical to the Philippines’ defense modernization initiatives. To support foreign investments in national defense, Philippine senators have proposed spending roughly $17.5 million under the Self-Reliant Defense Posture Revitalization Act aimed at encouraging investment in the local manufacturing of defense equipment.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While much of the technology development and drive behind Ukrainian AI efforts originated in the private sector and volunteer communities, the Ukrainian government and military responded with significant organizational changes to accelerate and improve the adoption of AI-enabled capabilities.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The Philippines hosts two prominent U.S. aerospace and defense manufacturing companies: RTX’s Collins Aerospace and Moog Controls Corporation. Collins Aerospace manufactures airplane parts and interiors within the Philippines, supplying both Airbus and Boeing. Collins Aerospace established a facility in Tanauan City, Batangas, in 2012, manufacturing myriad cabin interior products ranging from airplane galleys and galley inserts to oxygen equipment and lavatories. The facility has expanded from task-based engineering to design drawing and process refinement; by 2018, the Philippines-based engineering team was supporting the design of complex galleys and had already designed a head of version shipset, or the first configured and manufactured aircraft of the order. In 2023, the company began producing seats for Boeing, Airbus, and Embraer.</p> +<h3 id="the-institutional-landscape-for-military-ai-development-in-ukraine">The Institutional Landscape for Military AI Development in Ukraine</h3> -<p>As of 2024, Collins Aerospace plans to expand its existing operations in the Philippines — hoping to add 300,000 sq. ft. to its existing 400,000 sq. ft. complex in Tanauan City. Collins Aerospace’s community outreach to regional universities has the potential to create a significant impact. In 2023, for example, the company challenged students from the De La Salle College of Saint Benilde to develop and design aircraft cabin proposals under the university’s Benilde Industrial Design program. The same year, Collins explored potential partnerships with Batangas State University-Lipa.</p> +<p>The institutional landscape supporting AI development in Ukraine has evolved significantly since 2022, with many government agencies and institutions shifting from initially neglecting AI to actively creating specialized departments and units dedicated to developing AI capabilities. This transformation has been driven largely by the pressing demands of the ongoing war against Russia, where AI technologies have repeatedly demonstrated the potential to provide an advantage on the battlefield.</p> -<p>Moog Controls Corporation, a U.S. designer and manufacturer of precision control products found in military and commercial aircraft, has been established in Baguio City since 1984. Spread out over two campuses, one for servovalves (a type of valve used to regulate control or pressure of fluid in response to an electrical signal) and actuation systems for commercial aircraft applications and the other for high-performance motion control solutions, Moog employs about 1,400 personnel. In 2018, the company announced their intention to boost aerospace industry output in the Philippines, citing the growth of the aerospace market. Moog received a PEZA Excellence Award in 2023 as an outstanding employer behind community projects.</p> +<p>Of special note, Ukraine has gone so far as to create an entirely new branch of its armed forces, the Unmanned Systems Forces. While smaller than the other branches of the Ukrainian military, it is nevertheless technically their peer, and it serves as evidence that Ukrainian leadership views as critical the task of driving organizational reforms to account for new technological realities.</p> -<h4 id="critical-minerals-and-electric-vehicles">Critical Minerals and Electric Vehicles</h4> +<p>Other defense and security institutions have also created new organizations and empowered them to accelerate technology innovation, such as Special Unit Typhoon, a new part of the National Guard of Ukraine. One newly created organization within the MoD, the Center for Innovation and Defense Technologies (CIDT), is a direct outgrowth of the tech volunteer community’s efforts. In 2023, the CIDT took official responsibility for upgrading and developing situational awareness technologies, including the Delta system discussed in a previous section. In 2024, the developers began integrating AI/ML capabilities into Delta with an initial focus on video and text processing for the identification of enemy forces in real time.</p> -<p>The Philippines’ critical mineral wealth, which has largely gone untapped, makes it an ideal partner in electrical vehicle (EV) battery and component supply chains. Only 5 percent of the Philippines’ $1 trillion worth of gold, nickel, zinc, and silver reserves has been explored. Moreover, with the growing importance of electric vehicles (EVs) in international decarbonization efforts, the Philippines’ critical mineral wealth makes it an ideal partner for EV battery and component supply chains. As of 2023, PEZA remains in talks with several EV manufacturers, including one U.S. firm, Envirotech Vehicles, to manufacture electric buses, cars, and heavy equipment in-country. In September 2023, Envirotech Vehicles announced its acquisition of a 3,000 square meter final assembly facility in the Clark Free Trade Zone; it eventually plans to open two manufacturing lines capable of producing more than 2,000 vehicles per year at the plant.</p> +<p>In other cases, the war has led organizations to reinvent their mandate. Both the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU, a subordinate body of the MoD) and the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) have taken a leading role in developing and executing long-range precision strikes on Russian infrastructure. In previous years, these organizations would not have been responsible for such missions. AI is a useful enabling technology for long-range precision strikes, and both organizations have developed the relevant competencies to be at the forefront of AI adoption. For example, AI-based computer vision is helpful for accurate navigation in GPS-denied environments, such as the territory on both sides of the Russian border. More broadly, both the DIU and the SSU have adopted AI for processing and analyzing vast volumes of battlefield data.</p> -<h4 id="logistics-and-shipping">Logistics and Shipping</h4> +<p>Beyond creating new institutions and changing the mandate of existing ones, Ukrainian authorities are also implementing regulatory reforms and launching diverse initiatives to make it easier for companies to develop AI — and for military units to adopt it. The MDT, which is responsible for policymaking in AI development, is fostering an innovation-friendly regulatory environment, avoiding overregulation and promoting AI development through initiatives such as the Army of Drones and the Brave1 platform (further discussed below). These initiatives have accelerated the deployment of unmanned systems — including AI-driven ones — by providing essential financial and organizational support to early-stage projects.</p> -<p>With convenient access to markets in Southeast Asia, China, Japan, and South Korea, as well as its proximity to Australia and India, the Philippines is in a prime location for logistics, transportation, and shipping services. As of March 2023, the Philippine freight and logistics market was valued at $16.8 billion. The growing ubiquity of e-commerce within the country, and throughout the region, necessitates not only strong general infrastructure in ports, roads, and rail connections, but also robust freight and logistics networks.</p> +<h4 id="profiles-of-organizations-in-ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem">Profiles of Organizations in Ukraine’s Military AI Ecosystem</h4> -<p>In the aftermath of the global Covid-19 pandemic, e-commerce grew more popular within the country — from March 2020 to January 2021, the number of Philippine online vendors increased from 1,700 to 93,818. Leading e-commerce sites like Shoppee, Lazada, Zalora, and Beauty MNL brought in $17 billion in revenue from 73 million monthly, active users. To handle this flow, the Philippine government has partnered with foreign investors for infrastructure investments as well as freight and logistics services.</p> +<p>The development of AI-enabled warfare is not occurring in isolation; it is shaped by a complex institutional landscape of government agencies and stakeholders. This section provides an overview of key institutions, along with their initiatives specifically related to developing military AI and drones, while excluding the broader scope of these institutions’ functions as it falls outside the focus of this research. Due to the classified nature of much of the information on government initiatives, this overview remains general, without going into the technical specifics of the projects and technologies involved. The purpose of this section is to offer a clearer understanding of Ukraine’s somewhat unstructured governmental approach to military AI development, as well as to facilitate the identification of relevant counterparts for collaboration where Ukrainian models or initiatives align with U.S. government objectives.</p> -<p>New Clark City, a planned municipality built about fifty miles from Metro Manila, has emerged as an ideal location within the Philippines for logistics investments. After 36 years in the Philippines, FedEx opened a $30 million gateway facility in Clark City, aimed at improving the company’s ability to operate within the country and in the region at large. Manila’s main airport, the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, is notorious for congestion and inefficiency, prompting government agencies to consider outlying areas around the capital, such as Clark, as new logistics and transportation hubs. FedEx’s Clark investments followed up on refurbishments to the company’s headquarters in Makati in 2018, as well as making an additional $2.2 million worth of investments in two facilities in 2017.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NM8CBwz.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Map of Military AI Stakeholders in Ukraine.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis.</em></p> -<p>UPS, another major global logistics company, announced in 2024 that it would build a new hub at Clark International Airport by 2025 to strengthen its supply chain and logistics services, which is necessary given the growth of e-commerce. In partnership with the Luzon International Premiere Airport Development Group, this is part of a $250 million investment push UPS is making throughout the region.</p> +<h4 id="ministry-of-defense">Ministry of Defense</h4> -<h3 id="institutional-barriers-to-us-philippine-trade-and-investment">Institutional Barriers to U.S.-Philippine Trade and Investment</h3> +<p>The MoD of Ukraine is the government body responsible for overseeing national defense and the AFU. The MoD is headed by the minister of defense, while the president of Ukraine holds the position of supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces.</p> -<p>The current Philippine constitution, ratified in 1987, includes several economic provisions that have negatively impacted the Philippines’ net inflow of foreign direct investment, notably restrictions on foreign ownership in certain sectors. In the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s World Investment Report 2023, the Philippines ranked sixth among its Southeast Asian peers in FDI inflows. Under the Marcos administration, the Philippines now aims to improve its standing to second by 2028. A 2022 amendment to the Public Service Act, made effective in 2023, allowed full public ownership of industries such as airports, railways, and telecommunications, creating a new area of opportunity for foreign investors. The same year, an amendment to the Foreign Investment Act allowed foreign investors to set up and fully own domestic enterprises, easing access to the Philippine market. The Philippine House of Representatives and Senate are currently debating whether to amend the constitution to further promote foreign economic investment, though similar efforts in previous administrations have failed. Talks of amendment have stalled at least until the 2025 midterm elections.</p> +<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> -<h3 id="key-findings-and-recommendations">Key Findings and Recommendations</h3> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Center for Innovation and Defense Technologies.</strong> In 2021, the MoD established the CIDT to reform its approach to IT project management. Its primary objective is to modernize automated combat management systems and develop future operational-strategic, tactical, and situational awareness systems. A notable achievement in this workstream is the formal adoption of the Delta situational awareness system by the MoD in 2023, which the CIDT inherited from the volunteer organization Aerorozvidka. Public information on the CIDT’s AI-related initiatives is limited, particularly beyond its focus on the Delta platform. However, recent job postings for machine learning engineers, MLOps specialists, and computer vision researchers suggest that the CIDT is prioritizing the integration of AI-enabled solutions into Delta.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Unmanned Systems Forces.</strong> A dedicated branch of the AFU, the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), was established to systematize and expand the experience gained in the deployment of unmanned systems while formalizing a doctrinal approach suited to the realities of asymmetrical warfare. The USF is responsible for operations across all domains and levels, ranging from frontline engagements to deep strikes within enemy territory. Under the leadership of Colonel Vadym Sukharevsky, the USF plays a central role in introducing unmanned systems throughout the AFU, adopting emerging technologies, sharing innovations, and training units and brigades to use new systems. The USF is tasked with identifying the most effective systems to address the diverse challenges faced by the AFU on the battlefield. To date, over 170 models of unmanned systems have been integrated into frontline operations, positioning the USF as a critical driver of technological innovation in combat.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong>Finding:</strong> U.S. companies operating in the Philippines demonstrate varying degrees of transparency in their official databases and on their websites. Investment and employment figures are quite vague, effectively obscuring the impact of these investments.</p> +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> <ul> - <li><strong>Recommendation 1:</strong> The United States should work with the private sector and other stakeholders to develop a comprehensive database outlining U.S. investment in the Philippines, clearly and transparently listing the specific impacts of such investments, including employment figures. Though press releases offer insight into ongoing and future projects initiated by foreign businesses, they do not paint a cohesive picture of the community impact made by such investments.</li> + <li><strong>Innovation Development Accelerator.</strong> The MoD has sought to accelerate the development and adoption of defense technologies through the creation of the Innovation Development Accelerator. Established in 2023, this initiative is designed to streamline and modernize the ministry’s operations by addressing issues of overregulation, lengthy processes, and inefficiencies in collaboration with defense companies. The accelerator aims to reduce the time required for the implementation of weapons and equipment from more than two years to approximately 45 days, while simplifying bureaucratic procedures to enhance operational efficiency. One of its six core priorities is the advancement of robotization and AI tech adoption for unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as ground and water drones.</li> </ul> -<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Current resources for collating the impact of U.S. investment in the Philippines, or even foreign investment generally, are not user friendly. Further complicating matters, U.S. and Philippine numbers vary significantly, which obscures the impact of U.S.-Philippine economic cooperation. Data from the Philippine Statistics Authority only accounts for investments through investment promotion agencies that have been granted incentives from the Philippine government, reflecting just a fraction of total U.S. investments. Meanwhile, data from the various investment promotion authorities only account for those investments granted incentives by the Philippine government.</p> +<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Recommendation 2:</strong> The U.S. and Philippine governments should partner closely in collating their data and making both sets mutually intelligible. Consistency among the two countries’ platforms and datasets would help create a more cohesive, easily accessible narrative. It would be to the benefit of the United States and the Philippines to create a joint resource with which to harmonize their datasets and investment figures.</p> + <p><strong>Doctrine for Unmanned Systems Forces.</strong> The USF has developed a comprehensive doctrine and statute for all branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is currently being tested in operational units. The documentation is developed for every level, from squad to battalion, and it will standardize tactics and procedures for the use of unmanned systems across the AFU. The creation of this statute marks a significant step toward the formalization and regulation of unmanned system deployment, ensuring consistent operational practices across the military.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Recommendation 3:</strong> PEZA and the Philippine Statistics Authority should better aggregate incoming investments into the Philippines’ many economic zones and investment promotion authorities within unified charts, demonstrating aggregate total investments from specific countries in specific sectors. For example, it is currently not possible to filter foreign investments by country of investor, industry, promotion authority, or region within the same table.</p> + <p><strong>Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy.</strong> The only AI-related regulatory initiative in which the MoD is currently involved is the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy, launched in 2023. This provides a framework for the responsible use of military AI and aims to build international consensus, guiding states in the ethical development, deployment, and use of military AI technologies. Besides this international initiative, the MoD has not yet released any public strategies or formalized vision regarding AI implementation or the development of autonomous systems.</p> </li> </ul> -<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Neither businesses nor the U.S. government adequately socialize the impacts of their investments on local communities, missing a key opportunity to point the narrative toward the efficacy of the U.S.-Philippine economic partnership. Most announcements are limited to business press briefings that are not often accessible to the audiences they are targeting.</p> +<h4 id="defense-intelligence-of-the-mod-of-ukraine">Defense Intelligence of the MoD of Ukraine</h4> -<ul> - <li><strong>Recommendation 4:</strong> Businesses and the U.S. government should expand their online presences to counter rising disinformation and counter narratives that threaten to sway public opinion. U.S. companies should more actively use popular social media platforms in the Philippines to highlight the benefits brought by their investments.</li> -</ul> +<p>The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the MoD, also known as the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU), serves as the military intelligence agency to the country’s leadership and the AFU. Its portfolio includes intelligence, cyber, technology development, and occasionally direct execution of high-priority missions.</p> -<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Despite the longstanding economic partnership, relatively few U.S. business leaders have traveled to the Philippines or have become aware of the potential of its rapidly growing and increasingly open economy. The 2024 Presidential Trade and Investment Mission was successful in bringing representatives from 22 U.S. businesses to the Philippines. In a similar vein, the 2023 Agricultural Technology Trade Mission to Mindanao brought together key stakeholders from throughout the private sector and government to brainstorm future opportunities for improving the Philippines’ agricultural supply chain.</p> +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives:</strong></p> <ul> - <li><strong>Recommendation 5:</strong> Person-to-person exchanges should remain consistent throughout administrations. Both recent U.S. government–led trade missions were the first of their kind. The United States, regardless of administration, should ensure the continuation of such exchanges.</li> + <li> + <p><strong>AI for analytics.</strong> The DIU has emerged as one of the most advanced users and adopters of AI technology within the military. According to Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the DIU, the increasing volume of acquired intelligence data necessitated the enhancement of analytical capabilities. To address this challenge, the analytical branch has been significantly bolstered with technologies for automated data processing, integrating artificial intelligence to improve the efficiency and accuracy of analysis. This integration of AI has been critical in managing large datasets and enhancing the decisionmaking process within the intelligence operations of Ukraine.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Drones for long-range strikes.</strong> The DIU is a leading agency in conducting long-range strikes into Russian territory using drones equipped with some elements of autonomy. These autonomous drones play a crucial role in Ukraine’s ability to carry out precision strikes at extended distances, significantly expanding the operational capabilities of its military. The use of such autonomous systems represents a forward-looking approach to modern warfare, where AI-enabled technologies enhance the effectiveness of long-range operations while minimizing the need for direct human intervention. While the Ukrainian government has not disclosed all of the functions that AI plays in this mission, government officials told CSIS that AI does play an important role. This positions the DIU as a key player in the development and application of autonomous military technologies in Ukraine.</p> + </li> </ul> -<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Investments in the Philippines remain strongly centered in Luzon, and particularly in and around Metro Manila and its surrounding areas. Business interest in areas such as Cebu and Davao are growing, but Manila remains oversaturated with investment. Moreover, with limited availability and bureaucratic red tape preventing easy access to cheap land, both business owners and potential employees are thus at a disadvantage.</p> +<h4 id="security-service-of-ukraine">Security Service of Ukraine</h4> + +<p>The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) serves as the country’s principal security and intelligence agency, tasked with safeguarding national security, conducting counterintelligence operations and counterterrorism efforts, and combating organized crime. It operates under the authority of the president of Ukraine.</p> + +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> <ul> - <li><strong>Recommendation 6:</strong> The United States should work to diversify the span of its investments throughout the Philippines. The unitary nature of the Philippine government and the ongoing narrative of “Imperial Manila,” that is, that most of the country’s progress is concentrated in the capital region, makes this difficult to achieve. Expanding investment projects into emerging regions — from Iloilo and Cebu in the central Philippines to Davao and its surroundings in the south — would offer excellent opportunities for Filipinos. The expansion of the IT-BPM sector throughout the Philippines, for instance, helped to more evenly distribute work away from Manila, leading to the development and revitalization of other urban hubs.</li> + <li><strong>Naval drones.</strong> One of the SSU’s most innovative contributions to the war effort is its use of naval drones, which have significantly impacted the balance of power in the Black Sea. These drones are not just simple unmanned vessels; due to constant close interaction between the SSU and its drone operators and engineers, they have evolved into multifunctional platforms that are constantly undergoing technological improvements. For example, the Sea Baby drones, initially designed for explosive attacks on Russian naval ships and infrastructure, have been enhanced to perform additional functions such as offensive sea mining. They have successfully laid mines in strategic locations, significantly impacting Russian naval operations. Moreover, due to recent upgrades, the drones are equipped with rocket systems — specifically the Grad multiple rocket launchers, which have already shown effectiveness in targeting Russian positions.</li> </ul> -<hr /> +<h4 id="national-guard-of-ukraine">National Guard of Ukraine</h4> -<p><strong>Japhet Quitzon</strong> is an associate fellow for the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>The National Guard of Ukraine is a military force under the command of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and it is tasked with protecting public order, securing strategically important facilities, and countering illegal paramilitary groups. During martial law periods, the units of the National Guard are subordinate to the AFU.</p> -<p><strong>Gregory B. Poling</strong> is a senior fellow and director of the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS.</p>Japhet Quitzon and Gregory B. PolingThough U.S.-Philippine economic ties are well documented, the day-to-day impact of the relationship in the Philippines is often underreported. The United States must enhance public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.China In Global South Ports2024-10-30T12:00:00+08:002024-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-global-south-ports<p><em>Port infrastructure is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South.</em></p> +<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> -<excerpt /> +<ul> + <li>In 2024, the National Guard of Ukraine established a specialized unit known as Typhoon, which is focused on the deployment of unmanned aerial systems for military operations. This unit, composed of seasoned Special Forces veterans, has been created with the objective of enhancing the operational capabilities of combat brigades by integrating advanced unmanned systems into their strategic and tactical frameworks. The veterans within the unit bring a wealth of combat experience, which is crucial for the effective deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in complex battlefield environments. By integrating unmanned systems into combat operations, the Typhoon unit aims to increase both the flexibility and responsiveness of brigade-level engagements, enhancing operational efficiency and reducing risks to personnel.</li> +</ul> -<p>Port infrastructure around the world is critical to U.S. economic and military security. Although vitally important, it is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. China now dominates maritime trade in terms of volume, shipbuilding activity, and construction and ownership of ports around the world. China’s position puts U.S. economic interests and national security priorities at risk.</p> +<h4 id="ministry-of-digital-transformation">Ministry of Digital Transformation</h4> -<p>A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South. Actions include creating a port infrastructure strategy, promoting transparency in global port infrastructure procurement, and using other tools to better compete against China. Several policy recommendations are not unique to ports but apply to other infrastructure investment areas, such as undersea cables or digital architecture. China’s dominance of overseas ports is well established, but the U.S. policy response is lacking. This policy brief initiates a much-needed conversation and offers preliminary suggestions for consideration and further assessment.</p> +<p>The Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine (MDT), established in 2019, is responsible for shaping and implementing state policy in digitalization, the digital economy, and digital innovation. It focuses on e-government, digital democracy, the development of digital skills and rights, open data, national electronic resources, and broadband infrastructure.</p> -<h3 id="the-global-souths-demand-for-port-infrastructure">The Global South’s Demand for Port Infrastructure</h3> +<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> -<p>During the past 25 years, international trade patterns have shifted in favor of the Global South. Even though North-North trade is responsible for the biggest share of international trade (37.1 percent), South-South trade has increased by 14.1 percent since 1995, reaching a 25 percent share. Trade between developing countries has increased by an average annual rate of 9.8 percent since 2000, reaching $5.3 trillion in 2021. Over the same period, world trade grew at an annual rate of 5.5 percent. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2024 World Economic Outlook, world trade is expected to increase by 3 percent in 2024 and by 3.3 percent in 2025. As a result, the demand for port infrastructure from the Global South will continue to rise as these countries seek to develop and integrate into global trade.</p> +<ul> + <li><strong>The Expert Committee on AI Development.</strong> The Expert Committee on AI Development, established under the MDT in December 2019, plays an important role in enhancing the country’s competitiveness in the field of AI. Composed predominantly of business and science representatives, the committee’s main task is to drive AI policy recommendations, facilitate research and development, and nurture talent across various domains.</li> +</ul> -<p>Maritime transport is the backbone of international trade. Around 80 percent of the volume of international trade in goods is carried by sea; this figure is even greater for developing countries. Lower-income countries and small islands are 1.5 to 2 times more reliant on their ports for global trade than the global average. High-quality port infrastructure supports successful economic growth, especially in export-driven economies in developing regions. It attracts investment in production and distribution systems, supports the growth of manufacturing and logistics, and generates more employment. Port development supports supply chain diversification, which is particularly important in the face of shutdown due to accidents, pandemics, or wars.</p> +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> -<p>In 2000, the United States was the top trading partner for over 80 percent of countries. As of today, this figure has shrunk to 30 percent, while China has now become the top trading partner for more than 120 countries. China is South America’s top trading partner, and it is Africa’s largest trading partner in terms of total volume, dwarfing U.S.-Africa trade by a factor of four, according to the United States Institute of Peace.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Army of Drones.</strong> Launched in July 2022 by the MDT, the Army of Drones initiative represents a significant effort to integrate unmanned aerial vehicles into Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Initially conceived as a fundraising campaign, the initiative quickly evolved into a systematic and comprehensive program aimed at both procuring drones and training operators for their effective deployment on the battlefield. The program’s scope has grown to encompass not only the direct supply of drones to frontline units but also the promotion of domestic UAV production, significantly bolstering Ukraine’s defense industrial base. One of the core objectives of the Army of Drones initiative is to equip Ukrainian armed forces with modern, locally produced UAVs that can be used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and tactical strikes.</p> -<h3 id="chinas-leadership-in-port-infrastructure">China’s Leadership in Port Infrastructure</h3> + <p>Moreover, the initiative places significant emphasis on the training and skill enhancement of drone operators, ensuring that personnel are proficient in utilizing the advanced technologies embedded in contemporary UAV systems. By the end of 2023, 20,000 operators had successfully completed the training. This comprehensive approach — combining procurement, production, and operator training — has had a transformative impact on the use of drones in frontline operations, making the Army of Drones a pivotal component of Ukraine’s broader defense strategy.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Brave1.</strong> As an effort to support projects and companies in their early stages, a platform dubbed “Brave1” was established in July 2023. It is designed to facilitate collaboration among all major stakeholders in the government’s defense sector, the tech industry, and investors and volunteers. Manufacturers who meet the 12 priority verticals of technological development identified by the general staff of the AFU for the Brave1 cluster and have passed a defense expert review can apply to get military expertise; testing opportunities; and organizational, informational, and financial support for their projects. Brave1 also funds early-stage miltech start-ups, giving grants up to UAH 8,000,000 (approximately USD 194,000). As of September 2024, the program has awarded 299 grants totaling USD 6.5 million.</p> -<p>Within this context, China has significantly invested in the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) to increase trade route options and bypass choke points, posing a significant challenge for U.S. trade. In 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping unveiled the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious political-economic infrastructure initiative to link East Asia and Europe through land, sea and air under China’s leadership and with the backing of its resources. The twenty-first-century MSR is responsible for the BRI maritime routes that connect China to Europe and the Arctic Ocean via the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. President Xi has repeatedly emphasized that economic powers must be maritime and shipping powers. As China now positions itself as the world’s top exporter, top shipbuilder, and largest trading nation, with around 95 percent of its international trade carried out through sea-lanes, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will soon dominate global maritime trade.</p> + <p>In October 2024, the MDT stated that the list of priority verticals of technological development will be revised, with a larger focus on electronic warfare and AI-enabled capabilities.</p> -<p>The Indo-Pacific is a major hub of global commerce and will continue to be the main target for China’s maritime control. The 10 busiest container ports in the world are located along the shores of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Indian Ocean hosts 80 percent of China’s imported oil and 95 percent of China’s trade with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. China also has a strong presence in port construction in the developing world: it operates or has ownership of 91 active port projects across the globe where military use is a possibility, providing it with a foothold in every continent except Antarctica. These projects are part of the MSR network, which, according to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Council Information Office, has reached 117 ports across 43 countries, mostly in the Global South. China’s position of control and influence over the majority of port infrastructure globally poses a significant economic and military security threat to the United States. Simply put, China could use its power to interfere with operations that rely on port access – including military and economic operations – and are vital to U.S. interests.</p> + <p>Events organized by Brave1 provide valuable insights into the urgent technological needs and priorities of the AFU, as the topics and competition areas reflect requests gathered by the Brave1 team from various military institutions and agencies. For example, the deputy commander-in-chief of the AFU has identified key areas for technological advancement, including alternative navigation systems, jamming-resistant communications, drone swarm technologies, “friend or foe” identification, and improved target identification and engagement capabilities. Events such as the Precision Hackathon exemplify the immediate demand for AI-driven solutions in defense technology — including advanced targeting systems, real-time data integration, and innovative smart munitions capable of adjusting their trajectories to engage dynamic targets. The emphasis on autonomous and semi-autonomous systems with precision targeting capabilities and network-centric tools for combat operations reflects a broader shift toward AI-enabled autonomy in military applications. Furthermore, events like the AI for Ukraine Recovery Hackathon, which focused on topics such as cybersecurity, damage assessment, and disinformation prevention, underscore the pivotal role of AI in strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities and supporting its recovery efforts.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Ports are one strategic infrastructure investment area where China is outpacing the United States. In addition to technology, digital infrastructure, and energy infrastructure, China has made significant and strategic investments in ports that are highly connected to global trade networks and critical to the global flow of goods. It has invested in port projects in 16 of the top 20 countries or territories for shipping connectivity. Six of those countries are from the Global South: Egypt, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. More than 27 percent of global container trade last year passed through terminals where leading Chinese and Hong Kong–based firms held direct stakes.</p> +<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> -<p>China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) also dominate in financing, design, construction, and management of overseas port infrastructure. Between 2010 and 2019, Chinese companies invested roughly $11 billion into overseas ports. China’s two main SOEs involved in port infrastructure are COSCO Shipping Ports, the world’s largest shipping company and port terminal operator, operating and managing 371 berths globally, and China Merchants Ports, the sixth-largest port terminal operator globally. Additionally, the China Communications Construction Company Limited (CCCC) is the biggest port design and construction enterprise in the world. It shapes more than 70 percent of the national standards for the water transportation industry and designed 7 of the top 10 ports. State support to Chinese shipping companies in their endeavors totaled an estimated $132 billion between 2010 and 2018.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Approach to AI regulation.</strong> The MDT is responsible for overseeing Ukraine’s digital development, digital economy, and innovation, with AI being an integral component of this policy. Consequently, the ministry also holds responsibility for AI regulation. However, it has explicitly emphasized a commitment to avoiding overregulation by adopting a soft, business-friendly approach. The MDT plans to implement a bottom-up strategy, initially preparing businesses for future regulations before moving toward formal implementation. In the early stages, the state will provide businesses with tools such as general and sector-specific recommendations, voluntary codes of conduct, a legal assistance platform, and a regulatory sandbox for product testing, all aimed at facilitating compliance with forthcoming legislation.</p> -<h3 id="concerns-about-chinas-port-infrastructure">Concerns about China’s Port Infrastructure</h3> + <p>The current regulatory framework includes the Concept of Development of Artificial Intelligence in Ukraine, adopted in 2020, followed by the AI Regulation Roadmap introduced in 2023. While neither document constitutes formal regulation, they provide guiding principles for AI development within the country.</p> -<p>China-backed infrastructure projects permeate the Global South. However, these projects often come with unsustainable financing terms, a lack of transparency, and a clear disregard for environmental and social norms. China even imports its workforce and prevents locals from profiting from the investment projects. In its first 10 years, cumulative BRI engagement surpassed $1 trillion, and the developing world amassed an estimated $385 billion in “hidden debt” to China. For each dollar of aid to low- and middle-income countries, China has provided $9 of debt.</p> + <p>The MDT also plays a significant role in fostering defense innovation, making its approach to AI regulation in the defense sector particularly clear in its white paper “Artificial Intelligence Regulation in Ukraine: Vision of the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine.” The ministry has stated that it does not intend to propose any regulation of AI systems within the defense sector, emphasizing a noninterventionist stance in this domain.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Simplifying regulation for local high-tech defense industry.</strong> To boost local production, the MDT has made some considerable steps in terms of regulatory simplification for private drone companies. By implementing regulatory changes, the allowed profit margin for Ukrainian drone manufacturers was increased from 1 percent to 25 percent. This change makes the drone production business more financially viable and attractive for local companies. Previously, the low profitability cap of 1 percent limited potential earnings, discouraging investment and innovation. By raising the limit to 25 percent, the government aims to stimulate growth in the domestic high-tech defense industry, encouraging companies to scale up production and invest in advanced technologies.</p> -<p>Sri Lanka has accumulated more than $8 billion in debt to Chinese SOEs, of which $1.1 billion was used to construct Hambantota Port. In 2017, when the Sri Lankan government was struggling to repay its debts, it had agreed to lease the port to China for 99 years in exchange for debt reduction. However, in 2024, Sri Lanka had to renegotiate its debt after it defaulted on its foreign loans in 2022. The situation raised concerns about China’s economic and geopolitical influence through predatory lending and the risks for smaller countries that undertake infrastructure deals with China.</p> + <p>Furthermore, regulations governing contract negotiations, goods acceptance for military use, operational clearance, and delivery to the front were streamlined. Measures were also implemented to accelerate the operational approval process for UAV manufacturers, facilitating faster integration into state procurement contracts and supply chains for frontline operations. The government eliminated the requirement for export service control documents, simplifying the import of drones and their components, and removed the need for Security Service approvals, significantly expediting the overall approval process. Additionally, drone manufacturers can opt into the special “Diia.City” tax regime for IT companies, which allows up to 50 percent of employees eligible for military service to be exempted from active duty.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China-backed infrastructure projects permeate the Global South. However, these projects often come with unsustainable financing terms, a lack of transparency, and a clear disregard for environmental and social norms.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="innovations-development-fund">Innovations Development Fund</h4> -<p>Similarly, as of 2022, Pakistan owed $23 billion to China. After large-scale borrowing, particularly in relation to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Pakistan is struggling to repay its debt and faces an economic crisis. These loans may have contained hidden terms that hinder Pakistan’s economy and force the country to depend on China. Although some analysis dismisses accusations of China’s debt-trap diplomacy, other issues surrounding Chinese lending remain, including lack of transparency, economic viability, social and environmental concerns, and wielding debt for political leverage.</p> +<p>The Innovations Development Fund (previously called the Ukrainian Startup Fund) is the first and only state institution dedicated to helping innovative projects and tech start-ups secure early-stage funding and launch their ventures. Established in 2018 by the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, it has been managed by the MDT since 2023.</p> -<p>Additional concerns remain about China’s port infrastructure due to its potential dual use for commercial and military purposes. Out of the 70 commercial port projects in the Global South, an estimated 55 projects have the potential for naval use as well. That said, naval use is more likely to occur in ports where China owns the majority share – currently 10 port projects.</p> +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> -<p>There is growing reason for concern as Chinese port projects become more ambitious in terms of uses and strategic location. In 2017, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti at the entrance of the Red Sea, one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, six miles from a U.S. military base. There are concerns about similar attempts to establish a military presence in other parts of the Global South. U.S. officials suspect that China and Cambodia made a deal allowing Chinese armed forces to use Ream Naval Base, strategically located on the country’s southern coast facing the Gulf of Thailand, on the heels of elevated conflict with the Philippines and others in the South Sea. The Cambodian government has denied these accusations. Similarly, in the United Arab Emirates, China is accused of attempting to construct a clandestine military facility in the port of Khalifa, outside Abu Dhabi. China is also attempting to build a military base on the Atlantic coast of Africa.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Program for defense start-ups.</strong> The “Fast Track to Victory” program is an example of Ukraine’s capacity to rapidly adapt and use existing infrastructure to foster innovation in defense technologies. This program streamlines the interaction between the MoD and UAV manufacturers, facilitating a more efficient approval process for drone technologies. By leveraging the fund’s web portal, UAV developers with finished products can apply directly for official ministry approval. This approval is essential as it authorizes the MoD to procure the products and allows the AFU to deploy them.</p> -<p>In addition to commercial and military use, port infrastructure could also be used for spying and intelligence gathering. With access to the business trade hubs, China could spy on U.S. commercial and military movements. A 2024 congressional probe showed communications equipment in Chinese-made cranes at U.S. ports, suggesting vulnerabilities to supply chains, trade data, and other sensitive information. China has secured a commanding position through Logink (also known as the National Transportation and Logistics Public Information Platform), a Chinese state-owned digital logistics platform. At least 24 ports worldwide have adopted the Logink system, which could allow China to access significant amounts of confidential information related to transportation, pricing, and management of goods (including military equipment), threatening U.S. economic and military security.</p> + <p>According to government documents describing the program, the application process is designed to be efficient, with all submissions reviewed by MoD representatives in a timely manner. The program specifically targets UAVs that meet the tactical and technical characteristics required by the military, ensuring that the products are immediately relevant to the operational needs of the AFU. Once approved, the products can be integrated into military service, streamlining the deployment of innovative drone technologies on the battlefield.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>China is also exporting container cranes from Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company Limited (ZPMC). ZPMC dominates the global market for container cranes with a staggering 70 percent market share. For example, ZPMC manufactures 80 percent of the cranes used in U.S. ports; this includes 10 strategic seaports. These cranes come equipped with sensors that can track container details, which raises concerns about Chinese access to information about shipped goods, including U.S. military equipment.</p> +<h4 id="ministry-of-strategic-industries-and-ukrainian-defense-industry">Ministry of Strategic Industries and Ukrainian Defense Industry</h4> -<h3 id="us-activity-in-port-infrastructure">U.S. Activity in Port Infrastructure</h3> +<p>The Ministry of Strategic Industries is responsible for overseeing Ukraine’s military-industrial complex, which includes a state-owned enterprise named Ukrainian Defense Industry (formerly known as UkrOboronProm). This entity manages over 100 defense-related enterprises, many of which are remnants of Soviet-era companies. While efforts are underway to modernize some of these enterprises to meet the demands of the current war, the ministry and its associated industries remain predominantly focused on traditional defense platforms — such as artillery production and missile programs — rather than on emerging technologies like software-driven systems and AI, which are increasingly defining modern warfare.</p> -<p>Today China strongly outperforms the United States in the financing, building, and management of ports. The United States has a limited number of ports, and its infrastructure is deficient and vulnerable to inclement weather. Currently, the United States has 208 commercial ports – up from 178 in 2010. U.S. ports are either privately owned and operated, or they are managed by federal, state, or local government or quasi-governmental authorities. The owner of a U.S. port might lease port infrastructure to a terminal operator in charge of maintaining equipment and buildings. In comparison, China has over 2,000 commercial ports domestically and nearly 100 ports abroad. Furthermore, U.S. port companies do not score well in global rankings. None of the world’s top 10 shipping companies or top 10 seaport operators are American, and only four U.S. ports are among the top 50 busiest ports in the world. None of the U.S. ports make it into the Container Port Performance Index top 20 list.</p> +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> -<p>In addition, U.S. port infrastructure is largely outdated. The 2021 Report Card for American Infrastructure by the American Society of Civil Engineers gives a B-minus to U.S. port infrastructure. According to the Freight Intermodal Connectors Study, 91 percent of U.S. ports have a fair, mediocre, or poor rating: 35 percent are fair, 19 percent are mediocre, and 37 percent are poor. At the same time, U.S. ports have been increasingly vulnerable to climate. In 2022, Hurricane Ian forced temporary closures of seven major U.S. ports. Droughts in the Panama Canal disrupted vessels serving U.S. East Coast ports. Besides, many U.S. ports have infrastructure limitations that do not allow them to receive larger vessels, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>AI implementation together with the MDT.</strong> In 2021, Ukrainian Defense Industry signed a memorandum of intent with the MDT to coordinate efforts in advancing the digital economy and fostering innovation, with a specific focus on AI technology. Formerly, UkrOboronProm had also expressed plans to establish a dedicated unit for AI development. However, Ukrainian Defense Industry sources told CSIS that these initiatives have not yet been realized or advanced, highlighting a gap between stated intentions and actual implementation in the area of digital and AI-driven defense innovation. This suggests that while there is recognition of the importance of emerging technologies, the practical shift toward their integration in Ukraine’s defense industry remains limited.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Cooperation with Helsing.</strong> In 2024, the Ministry for Strategic Industries signed a memorandum with Helsing GmbH, a German company specializing in software development and AI integration in defense technologies. This cooperation aims to enhance Ukrainian defense technologies by integrating AI into drones, particularly Ukrainian-made UAVs. This is probably the only public mention of ministry- or state-owned enterprises introducing AI technology in their production.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>In terms of overseas ports, the United States severely lags China, as the United States does not manage or own any commercial ports outside its territories. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), however, is beginning to invest in some port infrastructure abroad. In May 2023, the DFC announced a $150 million commitment to Yilport Terminal Operations to expand and modernize the Puerto Bolívar container port in Ecuador. This is a significant step forward, but a more robust pipeline of projects must be developed.</p> +<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> -<p>In November 2021, the White House announced the Biden-Harris Action Plan for America’s Ports and Waterways, recognizing that U.S. ports are underfunded and that poor infrastructure has important costs for the U.S. economy and global competitiveness. The administration under President Joe Biden developed the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal (BID) and the Port Infrastructure Development Grant (PIDG) program, which both allocate investment to improve port infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Transportation will award $230 million to the PIDG, and the Biden administration committed $17 billion to the BID. While this is a good start, much more funding should be allocated, with a specific strategy focusing on the Global South. Currently, the U.S. government does not consider the commercial maritime industry as critical infrastructure, making it even more difficult to prioritize the sector.</p> +<ul> + <li><strong>Upcoming strategic AI project for key economic sectors.</strong> Somewhat unexpectedly, given the ministry’s responsibilities and the current situation in the country, the Ukrainian government has approved a concept for a state program using artificial intelligence in strategic sectors of the economy and has designated the Ministry of Strategic Industries as responsible for the development of a detailed AI program for these priority sectors. The program aims to enhance Ukraine’s economic potential and strengthen its global market position by 2026 in such sectors as machinery, chemicals, defense, nuclear industry, agriculture, healthcare, and scientific activities.</li> +</ul> -<p>Moreover, the United States could also draw on the financing and expertise of multilateral development banks (MDBs) and international financial institutions (IFIs) when it comes to ports infrastructure. These institutions provide financing and technical assistance to the private sector in middle- and low-income countries, help de-risk investments, and catalyze private capital. In 2021, MDBs were the second-largest financier in these countries and financed 9 percent of the total value of private investment in infrastructure projects. From 2010 to 2021, the largest share of MDB financing of private investment in infrastructure projects went to the transport sector and represented 38 percent of all financing. In 2023, a total of 18 port projects in 11 countries received investments worth $4.9 billion, twice the amount in 2022, according to a World Bank report. The Latin America-Caribbean region had the highest level of private investments for ports, reaching $1.5 billion in five ports in Brazil and $975 million in one port in Peru.</p> +<h4 id="money-matters">Money Matters</h4> -<p>However, the U.S.-led multilateral lending process has discouraged developing countries. Compared to Chinese lending under the BRI, Western MDB loans tend to be less attractive, as they are more difficult to apply for and are contingent on more rigorous vetting requirements and standards for bankability. China, by contrast, is often involved in predatory lending, which imposes unfair terms on the borrower and makes its deals look more attractive on the surface. To compete with China, Western MDBs must streamline their services and strike a better balance between managing risk and delivering results.</p> +<p>The development of the defense industry and the sustainability of military operations are heavily dependent on the government’s purchasing capacity, regardless of the scale and quality of research, development, and production. In FY 2024, the Ukrainian government has allocated UAH 58.8 billion (USD 1.4 billion) for the acquisition of UAVs and an additional UAH 1.5 billion (USD 36 million) to support the Brave1 platform.</p> -<p>China also has a growing influence in these traditionally U.S.-led institutions. China now has the second-highest aggregate voting power in the IFIs it supports, even though it significantly trails the United States. Despite many Chinese firms being sanctioned or debarred from the World Bank for fraud and corruption, China has consistently ranked among the top countries receiving MDB contracts, and Chinese firms easily outperform firms of other countries in securing contracts, according to the Center for Global Development.</p> +<p>However, Ukrainian defense companies face significant challenges, including export bans imposed since the onset of the full-scale war due to the need to satisfy the demand for weapon systems for the AFU first. As a result, many defense factories remain underutilized due to insufficient funding for weapons procurement in the state budget and the consequent low purchasing capacity from the government. Although the defense industry’s capacity is estimated at around USD 20 billion, the maximum government procurement budget for 2024 is only USD 6 billion. In response, discussions have recently begun regarding the reopening of defense exports. A parliamentary working group is currently evaluating risks and developing a mechanism to enable Ukraine’s reentry into the global arms market.</p> -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> +<p>Drone production represents a significant area of expansion. Ukrainian Defense Industry sources told CSIS that the current production output for FPV drones alone exceeds 2 million units in 2024, although only 1 million have been contracted by the government to date. A survey conducted among defense companies revealed that 38 percent of them have more than half of their production capacity idle, while 85 percent are considering relocation abroad. The primary factors that could prevent such relocation include the reopening of exports, an increase in government procurement orders, and the establishment of long-term contracts.</p> -<p>The United States cannot respond on its own to the increasing Chinese presence in Global South ports; it must rely on the MDB system, a strong interagency process, and allies and partners to offer better terms and financing to counter China’s growing influence in port infrastructure in the Global South. Some initial recommendations are put forward in this paper, but further dialogue and research are needed to devise specific actions so the United States can lead on this important infrastructure.</p> +<p>Besides that, the Ministry of Strategic Industries is actively working to address current challenges in the industry, with a key focus on securing external funding for the purchase of Ukrainian defense products, including UAVs. ZBROYARI: Manufacturing Freedom is a global fundraising campaign aimed at raising USD 10 billion from partner countries to produce Ukrainian weapons in 2024. Of EUR 60 million in Dutch contributions, EUR 20 million is for FPV drones, EUR 22.5 million for Dutch drones, and EUR 17.5 million for Ukrainian-made naval drones.</p> -<h4 id="1-devise-a-clear-national-security-strategy-on-international-ports">1. Devise a Clear National Security Strategy on International Ports</h4> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>The next U.S. presidential administration should develop a clear port infrastructure strategy to convey why a Global South port infrastructure presence is in the U.S. security interest. The strategy should focus on immediate concerns and a long-term vision for working with allies and becoming an effective competitor and alternative to Chinese investments. This strategy must be followed by a streamlined interagency approach throughout the whole government. Currently, U.S. government efforts on the matter are siloed, but the administration can fix this situation if it provides a clear strategy and elevates ports to a top priority. Consolidated interagency efforts will provide more focus and avoid redundant efforts.</p> +<p>Military AI in Ukraine underwent a rapid transition from being a secondary concern during almost eight years of war in Donbas to becoming a cornerstone of the country’s survival after the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022. This dramatic transition is reflected in the growth of private companies developing military AI capabilities, which have increased from two dozen or so in the beginning of 2022 to over a thousand in 2024. The Ukrainian government embraced the role of innovation enabler by streamlining the bureaucratic processes for technology adoption, adapting its organizational structures to meet rapidly advancing technological capabilities, and providing funding to the commercial defense sector.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The next U.S. presidential administration should develop a clear port infrastructure strategy to convey why a Global South port infrastructure presence is in the U.S. security interest.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>As a result of these efforts, most of the industry representatives and brigade commanders interviewed by CSIS confirmed that numerous AI solutions are currently being tested on the frontline. They expect a transition to semi-autonomous unmanned capabilities in a year or two, wherein the human role will only be in confirmation of a strike. However, Ukraine may not have the luxury of time and must fast-track the realization of this vision.</p> -<p>The strategy should focus not on the hundreds of ports across the Global South but on the top 15–20 most strategic locations and then establish a U.S. strategy on how to better compete in each of those ports in the long run. The United States should then use all its available soft-power tools to establish a strong presence in those ports and the surrounding region.</p> +<p>To achieve this, Ukraine must overcome several challenges that are hindering its military AI development: insufficient funding, the limited capacity of small companies and their fragmented efforts in developing AI capabilities, competition within the government for resources, and a lack of coordination among key defense and military institutions to create a unified approach to military AI. Additionally, there is a shortage of computing power and experienced AI professionals in the country to work on classified technology, which are critical for making military AI a game-changer in the fight against Russia.</p> -<h4 id="2-partner-with-allies-and-locals">2. Partner with Allies and Locals</h4> +<p>While Russia is investing enormous resources into transitioning to an economy on a war footing with a focus on technological advancement within its military, Ukraine requires support from its international partners to fully leverage the advantages of AI as a competitive edge across all battlefields and frontlines in its fight against a conventionally superior adversary.</p> -<p>The United States needs to develop a strategy and partnerships with allies to secure safe access to ports abroad while also ensuring allies have a stake in building new ports for the Global South (see annex). For example, in Rijeka, Croatia, the United States used diplomacy to sway Croatia to negotiate a contract with Maersk instead of a Chinese operator. Rijeka is strategically valuable because the U.S. military and NATO use the port to move equipment, and it provides access to central European markets.</p> +<p>The conclusion of this paper presents recommendations on how the U.S. government can collaborate with Ukraine to harness the advantages of military AI development and ensure that both nations remain at the forefront of AI and defense innovation.</p> -<p>The United States should further rely on commercial diplomacy to engage in government-to-government trade assistance with foreign officials on behalf of U.S. companies’ interests. The Advocacy Center, part of the International Trade Administration, offers support to U.S. businesses to win foreign government procurements. The Transaction Advisory Fund (TAF), a function of the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network (ITAN), launched in 2018, provides support to government agencies in the Indo-Pacific region, the Western Hemisphere, and sub-Saharan Africa for developing sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure. International legal funds like the TAF are vital in helping ministries negotiate transparent and fair contracts. TAF funding helped Myanmar renegotiate the Kyaukphyu port, a prime example of promoting transparency and quality in instances where the U.S. private sector does not offer a competitive alternative.</p> +<h4 id="1-providing-strategic-support">1. Providing strategic support</h4> -<h4 id="3-envision-new-tools-and-streamline-financing-for-port-infrastructure">3. Envision New Tools and Streamline Financing for Port Infrastructure</h4> +<p>The United States, with its technological superiority and numerous AI-related defense programs, is uniquely positioned to assist Ukraine in addressing its challenge of lacking a cohesive, government-led strategy for defense technology development. Given the United States’ forward-looking and long-term AI development plans, it can collaborate with Ukraine to craft a comprehensive, mid-term strategy for integrating AI into its military for beyond immediate tactical solutions.</p> -<p>Competing with China within the global port infrastructure does not mean owning, building, and financing every port. Instead, U.S. companies can become shareholders or board members at international ports. Alternatively, the United States can offer attractive deals that are not directly related to a port but within the same city, thereby providing more value to the municipal government. Other strategies for effectively competing with China’s influence in the region include buying land surrounding the ports, engaging the private sector, and financing alternative ports in the surrounding region.</p> +<p>This support would offer Ukraine much-needed guidance to align its decentralized bottom-up approach with a coherent national vision, allowing volunteer groups, start-ups, the defense sector, and government institutions to operate in synergy with national priorities. This approach could help Ukraine align government stakeholders’ efforts in accordance with a single strategy in order to avoid wasting resources, and it could increase competition by promoting efficient resource allocation and funding for AI-enabled capabilities development.</p> -<p>In this regard, U.S. corporations often hesitate to invest in ports because there is limited commercial return – unless the government can guarantee access to capital. This is where the U.S. government can step in. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) can play a role in catalyzing private sector investment in critical infrastructure. The DFC and U.S. Export-Import Bank can also be valuable tools in countering China’s influence. For example, DFC agreed in November 2023 to fund Colombo West International Terminal Pvt. Ltd. (CWIT), a consortium of India’s largest port operator, Adani Ports and SEZ Ltd., for $553 million in Sri Lanka. In 2019, the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed the Cooperation Framework to Strengthen Infrastructure Finance, aimed to support infrastructure development through market-oriented and private sector investment. The governments committed to remove regulatory, market, and legal barriers to private sector investment and prioritize development of financial instruments, project finance, the local debt market, capital markets, and analysis of government liabilities.</p> +<p>The benefits for the United States are twofold. First, by collaborating with Ukraine, the United States can access real-time insights into the application of AI technologies in active warfare, gaining valuable data that can enhance its own AI capabilities. Second, support for Ukraine’s efforts is a contribution to strengthening the global security architecture and countering common adversaries.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) can play a role in catalyzing private sector investment in critical infrastructure. The DFC and U.S. Export-Import Bank can also be valuable tools in countering China’s influence.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="2-unlocking-battlefield-data-for-innovation">2. Unlocking battlefield data for innovation</h4> -<p>The United States can increase the overall funding available for the private sector to invest in the space by pulling together resources within capital markets. The United States should incentivize IFIs and MDBs, such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Finance Corporation, to invest in Global South port projects, which will attract U.S. companies and other private sector engagement. Teaming up with other countries will allow the United States to pool funding through a consortium focused specifically on Global South ports.</p> +<p>To harness the full potential of AI in defense, Ukraine must build a collaborative framework that brings government authorities and private sector innovators together on data-sharing strategies. This framework should regulate access to and use of real-world combat data by establishing clear legal procedures and protocols for data collection, storage, and sharing — all while safeguarding national security. Such an environment would streamline access for approved developers and foster sustainable business models, incentivizing private investment in military AI research.</p> -<h4 id="4-establish-procurement-best-practices">4. Establish Procurement Best Practices</h4> +<p>The United States could play a pivotal role in enabling this effort, helping Ukraine develop a technical and regulative framework by drawing from its own experience of data exchange within global projects such as the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control, where military data is shared among allied countries and the U.S. military. This initiative could set a global precedent for responsible data sharing in defense technology development. Ukraine could monetize its combat data by offering access to countries, organizations such as NATO, and even private defense companies in order to improve their AI tech and the interoperability of all parties involved.</p> -<p>The United States should strive to promote transparency in global port infrastructure procurement. The rule of law, transparency, public engagement, and better awareness about how to govern ports will inform the public and ensure ports follow best practices. The United States and its allies can establish a market standard by picking 10–15 ports and reforming them thoroughly. For example, most economic coercion comes out of port terminal operating contracts and procurement. After reforming a select group of ports, companies will be more interested in operating in the ports that are more transparent.</p> +<h4 id="3-closing-a-feedback-loop">3. Closing a feedback loop</h4> -<p>China is quick with financing port construction and maintenance, but its BRI contracts lack transparency and impose questionable and opaque confidentiality clauses that are predatory in nature. In a report analyzing 100 debt contracts between China and foreign governments, 100 percent of China Development Bank contracts and 43 percent of contracts held by the Export-Import Bank of China required such clauses. Unfortunately, the U.S.-led multilateral lending process does not offer attractive counteroffers, as they tend to be less user friendly and have more rigorous vetting requirements and standards for bankability, leaving developing countries vulnerable to using China as a lender of last resort.</p> +<p>Currently, the United States sends significant military aid to Ukraine, including drones, and many U.S. start-ups and drone manufacturers are contributing by donating their products through volunteers, NGOs, and Ukrainian government initiatives. However, there is no established system for collecting feedback on the performance and effectiveness of these drones on the battlefield, leaving the feedback loop incomplete. Establishing a more structured and standardized feedback collection process would be highly beneficial for both parties.</p> -<p>The U.S. government could use platforms such as the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism to enable the private sector to share information on unfair practices with governments suffering from predatory circumstances. The Department of Justice could offer technical legal assistance to foreign countries to help litigate such matters. The United States helped the Congolese mining company Gécamines reach a settlement with a Chinese mining company over royalties owed over a copper and cobalt mine.</p> +<p>For U.S. companies, faster and more organized feedback would enable them to shorten their iteration cycles, update their platforms and software more rapidly, and scale up production of cutting-edge technology. This is particularly important when it comes to AI, where software updates can be implemented much quicker than hardware — without the need to alter supply chains, source new components, or update manufacturing processes. On the Ukrainian side, this would mean receiving more advanced and better-suited capabilities for their battlefield conditions, as U.S. companies have the resources and capital to accelerate drone and AI development, as well as to scale up production. By closing this feedback loop, both the United States and Ukraine can enhance their technological capabilities and improve the effectiveness of military assistance on the ground.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Unfortunately, the U.S.-led multilateral lending process does not offer attractive counteroffers, as they tend to be less user friendly and have more rigorous vetting requirements and standards for bankability, leaving developing countries vulnerable to using China as a lender of last resort.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="4-considering-ukraines-ai-in-us-foreign-aid">4. Considering Ukraine’s AI in U.S. foreign aid</h4> -<p>Furthermore, the role of investigative journalists is crucial in exposing corruption within the ports sector. The market does not have the best reputation, and it is important to expose collusion, human trafficking, and monopoly. Also, the United States can support public financial management education within the governments that oversee port infrastructure so they can identify deals that are too good to be true.</p> +<p>Current U.S. financial assistance to Ukraine, primarily through USAID, has been vital for the digital development of the country. However, by integrating an AI component into this aid, the United States can achieve two key objectives: enhancing Ukraine’s AI capabilities and securing a role in what could become a global AI development hub.</p> -<h4 id="5-provide-cutting-edge-technology">5. Provide Cutting-Edge Technology</h4> +<p>Ukraine’s regulatory environment for AI is highly permissive, and its political leadership is open to embracing technological risks for significant advancements. This combination creates a unique “laboratory” for AI development that the United States cannot afford to overlook. This approach requires more than just funding; it necessitates providing computing infrastructure to key AI innovation centers in Ukraine, such as the MoD, research institutions, and labs. By equipping these entities with the necessary computational power, AI research and development can accelerate at an unprecedented pace.</p> -<p>The maritime sector is dangerously reliant on the PRC for equipment and technology. The U.S. Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party released an investigative report that showed extreme vulnerabilities in ZPMC crane control systems produced in the PRC, software used at U.S. maritime facilities, and other maritime infrastructure components. The United States has a competitive advantage over China in advanced technology, such as within the green energy transition, that can be applied within the port infrastructure space. If the United States can transform a port through technology that improves efficiency and saves on transaction costs, then it can offer something China cannot. The United States’ advantage over China should be its ability to compete for better maintenance and product quality.</p> +<h4 id="5-offering-ai-focused-training-experience-exchange-and-entrepreneurial-development-programs">5. Offering AI-focused training, experience exchange, and entrepreneurial development programs</h4> -<hr /> +<p>The U.S. government should establish training and experience exchange programs for Ukraine’s defense entrepreneurs. These programs would focus on developing expertise in AI applications, the specifics of defense industry, and international market and investor relations to build successful defense-oriented enterprises. Given the rapid growth of Ukraine’s defense tech ecosystem, these initiatives would enable entrepreneurs to gain a deeper understanding of how to attract investments, scale innovations, and align with national security objectives. For the United States, such programs offer the opportunity to strengthen collaboration with Ukraine’s emerging defense sector. This partnership would give the United States valuable connections with Ukrainian innovators across the defense industry, benefiting both nations in shaping the future of AI in national security and defense.</p> -<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>The development and integration of military AI into future weapon systems is inevitable. While the United States leads in technological innovation, it faces limitations in testing these advancements under real combat conditions. Collaboration with Ukraine presents a unique and mutually beneficial opportunity to bridge this gap. By working together with Ukraine, the United States can gain firsthand insights into the practical applications of military AI and autonomous systems without putting “boots on the ground.” Otherwise, real combat environments remain theoretical or simulated for U.S. systems manufacturers. Moreover, this partnership can provide valuable contributions to the international debate on safe and responsible AI deployment, offering concrete evidence from battlefield usage to help construct a global framework for military AI governance. As AI continues to reshape defense landscapes, U.S.-Ukraine collaboration stands to advance technological innovation while setting standards for responsible and ethical AI integration into military systems worldwide.</p> -<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong>Clara Bonin</strong> is a former intern for the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p>Daniel F. Runde, et al.Port infrastructure is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South.AI Safety Institute Network2024-10-30T12:00:00+08:002024-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ai-safety-institute-network<p><em>The AI Seoul Summit launched an international network of AI safety institutes in May 2024. Now, they must work to define their goals, mechanisms, and the strategy to accelerate AI safety science.</em></p> +<p><strong>Kateryna Bondar</strong> is a fellow with the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.</p>Kateryna BondarThis report examines the Ukrainian government initiatives and key institutions driving the development of military AI capabilities. It also explores the preconditions that have shaped their adoption in the Ukraine war.Too Good To Lose2024-11-12T12:00:00+08:002024-11-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/too-good-to-lose<p><em>When it comes to the future of American semiconductor manufacturing and the success of the CHIPS Act, Intel is not too big to fail, but it is too good to lose.</em></p> <excerpt /> -<h3 id="overview">OVERVIEW</h3> +<p>In 2022, Congress enacted the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act (CHIPS Act), a pivotal initiative which seeks to ensure U.S. leadership in semiconductor technology — the backbone of everything from cars to household appliances to defense systems. The CHIPS Act represents a national effort to reverse recent trends, driven by major industrial policies of other countries, that have led to the loss of U.S. leadership in the technology needed to manufacture the most advanced semiconductors. The United States has also seen an erosion of onshore chipmaking, which now accounts for only about 10 percent of global capacity. The urgency of the situation was brought into sharp relief by highly disruptive chip shortages during the Covid-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, China — the United States’ most formidable strategic competitor — is making rapid strides in semiconductor technology, particularly in defense-related areas.</p> -<p>On November 21 and 22, 2024, technical artificial intelligence (AI) experts from nine countries and the European Union will meet for the first time in San Francisco. The agenda: starting the next phase of international cooperation on AI safety science through a network of AI safety institutes (AISIs). The United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Canada, France, Kenya, and Australia make up the initial members of the network, which was first launched by U.S. secretary of commerce Gina Raimondo at the May 2024 AI Seoul Summit. At the time of the launch, Italy and Germany were also potential members of the network, as signatories to the Seoul Statement of Intent toward International Cooperation on AI Safety Science, or Seoul Statement, the network’s founding document. However, a September announcement by Raimondo and U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken confirmed that Kenya would instead be the final member of the AISI International Network at this stage.</p> +<p>In its plan for implementing the CHIPS Act, the U.S. government has earmarked substantial federal assistance for the world’s three most advanced chipmakers, among others, to construct leading-edge manufacturing facilities and grow U.S. regional semiconductor ecosystems. Two of these firms, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and Samsung, are slated to receive substantial funding to support major investments in such ecosystems, which bring manifold opportunities for local growth and employment. Both firms are headquartered outside the United States and have, in the past, kept the lion’s share of their research and development (R&amp;D) and technology development in their respective home countries.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">On November 21 and 22, 2024, technical artificial intelligence (AI) experts from nine countries and the European Union will meet for the first time in San Francisco. The agenda: starting the next phase of international cooperation on AI safety science through a network of AI safety institutes (AISIs).</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The third leading-edge firm is the storied Intel Corporation, the largest and most advanced U.S.-headquartered manufacturer. Intel has an unmatched history of breakthrough semiconductor innovations — including the first programmable microprocessor and the x86 architecture — which have together made an “indelible impact on the world of computing . . . [that] continues to shape the digital landscape of the modern world.”</p> -<p>According to the Seoul Statement, the international network will serve to “accelerate the advancement of the science of AI safety” at a global level by promoting “complementarity and interoperability” between institutes and fostering a “common international understanding” of AI safety approaches. While the statement does not define specific goals or mechanisms for AISI collaboration, it suggests that they “may include” coordinating research, sharing resources and relevant information, developing best practices, and exchanging or codeveloping AI model evaluations. Now, in the months following the AI Seoul Summit, AISI network members must begin to articulate the objectives, deliverables, timelines, and avenues for cooperation that will put the promise of AISI cooperation into action.</p> +<p>While Intel is at present trailing TSMC and Samsung in chip process technology, it is the only U.S.-headquartered firm within striking distance of regaining U.S. capabilities at advanced process nodes. The company has made massive commitments to invest heavily — more than $100 billion over the next five years — in new chipmaking capability and capacity on domestic soil, aiming to develop and manufacture chips at the most advanced process nodes of 2 nanometers (nm) and below. Recognizing the importance of this, the U.S. government has announced plans to award Intel the largest share of federal support under the CHIPS Act. Successful implementation, and the resultant national security benefits, will depend on Intel.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the months following the AI Seoul Summit, AISI network members must begin to articulate the objectives, deliverables, timelines, and avenues for cooperation that will put the promise of AISI cooperation into action.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Unfortunately, at this juncture, Intel is experiencing financial and operational turbulence, in no small part due to its ambitious investments pursuant to the CHIPS Act’s objectives. Now, with a recently announced strategic recovery plan, the company appears to be seeking additional investment. Given Intel’s importance to the CHIPS Act’s economic and strategic goals, it is vital that the company remains viable and capable of carrying out its commitments — with even more public support, if necessary, than it has already been given.</p> -<p>This paper examines next steps for developing the International Network of AI Safety Institutes from the Seoul Statement. It provides recommendations to members ahead of the inaugural network meeting in San Francisco this November and the AI Action Summit in Paris in February 2025. These recommendations fall in line with three key questions:</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Given Intel’s importance to the CHIPS Act’s economic and strategic goals, it is vital that the company remains viable and capable of carrying out its commitments — with even more public support, if necessary, than it has already been given.</code></em></strong></p> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Goals of collaboration: What is the AISI network trying to achieve and when?</strong></p> +<h3 id="intels-turnaround-strategy">Intel’s Turnaround Strategy</h3> - <p>While there are many potential benefits to international collaboration, there are also real costs that should not be ignored. At a minimum, collaboration demands staff time, capacity, and possibly money from partners. The AISI network should therefore have clear goals for which type of international cooperation between safety institutes offers the maximum return on investment. These goals should be supported by specific priorities, deliverables, and timelines that steer the network’s efforts toward a meaningful return on investment.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Mechanisms of collaboration: What will the AISI network do and how will it work?</strong></p> +<p>Intel’s operational and financial difficulties received extensive media coverage in 2024, some of which exaggerated the severity of its challenges and perhaps adversely affected the company’s stock price. Shortly after Intel’s CEO, Pat Gelsinger, took charge in 2021, he announced an ambitious “IDM 2.0” strategy, which included plans for the company to become a major global player in the contract-manufacturing (“foundry”) market. The initial plan called for the establishment of a new business unit, Intel Foundry Services (later rebranded as Intel Foundry), as well as tens of billions of dollars for the construction of new manufacturing facilities to service surging demand. Intel Foundry, when announced, represented a significant expansion beyond Intel’s integrated device manufacturer (IDM) business model, in which the company’s manufacturing capacity was reserved for Intel-designed chips. Intel Foundry, however, allows for the manufacturing of chips designed by other firms, which puts Intel in direct competition with other large foundry providers such as TSMC.</p> - <p>The success of the network depends on how effectively its members can act upon shared goals. There are many different ways for the members to “collaborate,” and not all of them are equally attractive. Network members should consider what the mechanisms of collaboration will be — for example, leadership structures, research exchanges, shared platforms, and annual conferences.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>International strategy: How will the AISI network fit into and engage with other international AI efforts?</strong></p> +<p>In 2024, Gelsinger unveiled the next phase of the firm’s strategy, announcing that it will further separate its design business from Intel Foundry, which will be an independent subsidiary with substantial autonomy, complete with its own board of directors, bylaws, and operating structure. This action is intended to provide foundry services for chip design firms with stronger protection of intellectual property.</p> - <p>The AI governance landscape is increasingly crowded with international initiatives, including from the Group of Seven (G7), the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and more. All of these demand time from a small (though growing) community of government staff from member countries who can credibly claim to have some expertise on AI governance and safety issues. AISI network members should be able to articulate how their grouping is different from these preexisting initiatives, how it will effectively engage with them (or not), and for what purpose.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>Some progress on this front has already been made. In a multibillion-dollar arrangement, Intel Foundry will leverage new process technology to manufacture chips for Amazon’s cloud computing wing beginning in 2025, including customized server devices. Forbes observed that “This can only be looked at as a positive — a strategic, long-term deal that Intel didn’t have before. If you can get the number-one cloud provider to do not just one but two highly custom chips with you, one in the foundry and one in a custom server chip, that portends a very good future.”</p> -<p>This paper begins with background on the AISI network and explains its importance. Next, it offers an overview of network members’ organizations and stated functions. It concludes with recommendations regarding nine further questions for developing the goals, collaboration mechanisms, and international strategy of the network.</p> +<p>Additionally, backed by a $3 billion federal grant, Intel will develop chip manufacturing infrastructure for the U.S. defense industry. The federal award represents “another win for Intel Foundry, and even more so for the highly secure supply chain that Gelsinger has been intent on building for Intel over the past few years.”</p> -<h3 id="background">BACKGROUND</h3> +<p>Despite this progress, profitability will take time, as the high capital costs and lengthy timelines required to bring new fabs online limits near-term revenues. In 2023, for example, the company’s foundry unit brought in $18.9 billion but reported an operating loss of around $7 billion, as well as other operational problems. Intel does not expect the new fabs to generate “meaningful” revenue until 2027.</p> -<h4 id="what-is-ai-safety-and-why-does-it-matter">What Is AI Safety and Why Does It Matter?</h4> +<h4 id="issues-with-process-technology-and-products">Issues with Process Technology and Products</h4> -<p>As defined by the Bletchley Declaration, issued by attendees of the UK AI Safety Summit in November 2023, AI safety is a scientific field of research focused on evaluating, preventing, and mitigating risks from advanced AI systems. In this case, it refers narrowly to AI systems at or beyond the current state of the art. These risks can range from deepfakes to the use of AI for bioterrorism; new risks will emerge as AI’s capabilities continue to evolve. Somewhat confusingly, other individuals and organizations may define AI safety more broadly to include lower-performing systems that are not operating at the technical frontier. Still others may or may not include issues around ethics and bias when using the term “AI safety.” This paper’s use of the term “AI safety” follows the U.S. AI Safety Institute’s example of focusing exclusively on safety issues related to advanced AI systems.</p> +<p>According to a September 2024 Reuters report, Intel faces difficulties in its upcoming 18A process technology, which is slated for high-volume production in 2025. Reuters indicated that Broadcom, a major fabless firm, had concluded after tests that Intel’s process was not yet ready for such production. Yet the report, even if accurate, may not be indicative of a significant problem, as Intel’s timeline anticipates the 18A technology to be ready for high-volume production in mid-2025, rather than mid- or even late 2024. Moreover, Intel reports that it already has a dozen customers using its 18A tool kit.</p> -<p>AI safety science can be split into two main streams of research: technical safety, or improving the internal “machinery” of AI models; and process-based safety, or improving how people build, develop, and interact with AI models.</p> +<p>Intel’s 13th- and 14th-generation Intel Core processors are also reportedly encountering problems, which have potentially arisen from manufacturing defects. The company also reported in September 2024 that it would no longer use its Intel 20A process technology in Arrow Lake processors and instead outsource Arrow Lake production to Taiwan’s TSMC, stating that “because of our early success on Intel 18A . . . [we are able] to shift engineering resources from Intel 20A earlier than expected as we near completion of our five-nodes-in-four-years plan.” While some may see this move as a setback, it may reflect a strategic shift to concentrate on the 18A process. Other observers have pointed out that “Intel 20A was always a bridge to the more refined Intel 18A.”</p> -<p>Technical AI safety focuses on understanding how the engineering and science behind AI models works, and how to make models perform reliably and in the scope of their intended use cases. These three areas of research are known as:</p> +<h4 id="shifts-in-demand">Shifts in Demand</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Assurance:</strong> Understanding how a model makes decisions and why it behaves the way it does</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Robustness:</strong> Ensuring a model operates reliably under adverse contexts</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Specification:</strong> Designing a model that produces desired results as intended.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Traditionally, Intel’s main revenue sources have been chips for personal computers and for data centers, which in 2023 accounted for 80 percent of the company’s revenues. The market for these kinds of chips, however, is being affected by a shift in consumer demand toward graphics processing units (GPUs) and central processing units (CPUs) that support applications of artificial intelligence (AI) — a market in which Intel’s presence is relatively limited — plus increasing competition from rivals AMD and Nvidia. As a result of these shifts, the company’s revenues declined from $79 billion in 2021 to $54 billion in 2023. As of mid-August 2024, Intel’s shares were trading below the company’s book value for the first time since 1981.</p> -<p>Meanwhile, process-based safety is concerned with the policies, practices, and procedures that surround AI. This stream of AI safety is more operational in nature. It focuses on how frontier AI developers, deployers, and users build, manage, and monitor AI models, including by evaluating models for capabilities, limitations, and risks, and documenting and reporting model information. It may also include processes that are implemented by the users of AI.</p> +<p>Gelsinger’s response has been decisive. In August 2024, in order to cut costs, he announced that Intel would reduce its workforce by 15,000 by November, suspend its shareholder dividend, and reduce or eliminate many employee perks. While the company’s stock price declined by roughly two-thirds between February 2021 and September 2024, recent turnaround strategy announcements have led to a modest rebound.</p> -<p>Beyond preventing adverse risks, AI safety serves to accelerate adoption and innovation by building public trust. As Elizabeth Kelly, director of the U.S. AI Safety Institute, said in a CSIS interview, “safety promotes trust, which promotes adoption, which drives innovation.” AI safety boosts public trust by allowing people to pause, stop, or change course as needed.</p> +<h4 id="national-security-implications">National Security Implications</h4> -<p>A helpful analogy, one frequently used in the risk management sector, compares AI safety capabilities with the brakes on a car. At first consideration, the purpose of brakes seems obvious and narrow: to make the car go slower. However, the existence of brakes also allows cars to go faster. As a thought experiment, imagine how fast drivers would be willing to go if no car came equipped with any brakes. How easy would it be to avoid a crash or turn a corner if drivers could never change their speed? How might one pause to change tires or fix a problem? Navigating such scenarios would almost certainly be a disaster. Even with speed limit regulations in place, a world without brakes would be a world in which drivers went much, much slower.</p> +<p>While recent accounts of Intel’s difficulties have mostly been confined to the business pages, the company’s future has broad national and global significance far beyond its employees and shareholders. Intel is a critical player in the U.S. government’s efforts to reduce dependency on chips manufactured abroad — notably the significant concentration of production in Taiwan — and regain leadership in semiconductor manufacturing technology. Both capability and capacity are needed to provide an alternative source for the most advanced chips and a more resilient supply chain for foundational chips essential to the automotive, telecommunications, and medical sectors. If Intel’s restructuring efforts fail, larger U.S. efforts are unlikely to achieve their objectives, with significant ramifications for U.S. national security and economic future. Indeed, as Geoff Colvin recently argued in Fortune, “Intel is no longer a conventional company and can no longer be evaluated as one. . . . it’s now a corporate actor on the geopolitical stage.” Policymakers must recognize Intel’s national security importance within this decade’s dramatically changed geopolitical environment.</p> -<p>Policymakers should approach AI safety with this parallel in mind. Like the brakes of a car, building technical and management capabilities for AI can help boost confidence in the technology and ultimately accelerate the pace of adoption and innovation.</p> +<h3 id="intel-and-the-chips-act">Intel and the CHIPS Act</h3> -<h4 id="what-are-ai-safety-institutes-and-what-will-they-do">What Are AI Safety Institutes and What Will They Do?</h4> +<p>The Covid-19 pandemic led to disruptions across the U.S. semiconductor supply chain — most notably in the automotive industry — as well as volatility in other industries and supply chains involving PCs and data centers. While the causes of the shortage are complex, it highlighted the fact that when foreign supply is limited, the United States no longer has the domestic chipmaking capacity to manufacture the most advanced semiconductors which many products demand. Recognizing the national security and economic implications of this vulnerability, Congress enacted the CHIPS Act in 2022, which seeks to support U.S. chipmakers’ efforts to recapture technological leadership and to encourage the expansion of semiconductor manufacturing capacity in the United States. The CHIPS Act deploys a combination of federal grants, loans, and tax incentives for investments in U.S. semiconductor manufacturing, as well as support for R&amp;D and related workforce initiatives.</p> -<p>Since 2023, governments around the world have mobilized around AI’s rapidly growing capabilities and potential risks. As part of this effort, several governments have launched AI safety institutes, publicly funded research institutions focused on mitigating risks from the frontier of AI development. AISIs provide governments with in-house technical expertise and organizational capacity to evaluate and monitor cutting-edge AI models for risks to public and national security.</p> +<p>Beginning in late 2023, the Department of Commerce proposed a series of federal funding awards for companies undertaking capital investments in chipmaking. Intel is the provisional recipient of the largest single federal award package, reflecting both its centrality in the U.S. semiconductor ecosystem and the scale of its investments in chipmaking. The Department of Commerce’s Preliminary Memorandum of Terms (PMT) with Intel, announced in March 2024, included grants of up to $8.5 billion to help finance the construction, expansion, and modernization of wafer fabrication, advanced packaging, and development facilities in Ohio, Arizona, New Mexico, and Oregon. Additionally, the PMT provides up to $11 billion in federal loans to support Intel’s investments. The company also indicated that it would take advantage of the Department of the Treasury’s Investment Tax Credit for fab construction, which is expected cover up to 25 percent of qualifying capital expenditures undertaken by the end of 2026. Furthermore, Intel will receive $3 billion in additional CHIPS Act grants for a Secure Enclave program, which would ensure a protected supply of leading-edge chips for the U.S. government.</p> -<p>AISIs have been tasked by governments with a wide-ranging mandate to address the complex challenges posed by advanced AI systems. They will perform foundational technical research, develop guidance for the public and private sectors, and work closely with companies to test models before deployment. While it is unusual for a single government entity to tackle all three of these functions at once, the breakneck speed of AI development and the staggering number of open questions in the field of AI safety research mean that governments require in-house capacity on each of them. According to Kelly, it is important that these three functions — research, testing, and guidance — reinforce each other to form a “virtuous” cycle (Figure 1):</p> +<h4 id="a-central-role-in-growing-us-technological-capacity">A Central Role in Growing U.S. Technological Capacity</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/U1n4i1Y.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: AISI Core Functions.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-vision-ai-safety-conversation-elizabeth-kelly-director-us-ai-safety-institute">“The U.S. Vision for AI Safety: A Conversation with Elizabeth Kelly, Director of the U.S. AI Safety Institute,” CSIS, July 31, 2024</a>; and <a href="https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2024/05/21/AISI-vision-21May2024.pdf">“The United States Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute: Vision, Mission, and Strategic Goals,” U.S. Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute, May 21, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<p>It would be difficult to overstate Intel’s role in the success or failure of the CHIPS Act. Intel has been described as “the only U.S.-based company with leading-edge semiconductor fabs” capable of developing and manufacturing cutting-edge chips that are necessary to support advanced applications of AI at the 2 nm node and below. While Intel’s 3-nm production and below may be a year or more behind that of global leaders TSMC and Samsung (indeed, Samsung is apparently struggling with technical challenges itself), no other U.S.-owned semiconductor maker is in a position to reignite U.S. semiconductor manufacturing process leadership.</p> -<p>To keep pace with the cutting edge of AI safety research, AISIs have prioritized the hiring of technical staff and opened offices in cities with deep pools of AI talent like San Francisco. In addition to developing expertise internally, AISIs aim to cultivate a robust ecosystem of AI safety researchers in labs, industry, and academia through their guidance on best-in-class evaluation methods.</p> +<p>Despite the near-term cash flow concerns, Intel remains committed to its over $100 billion investment in new U.S. chipmaking capability and capacity over the next five years. No other large chip manufacturer is investing anywhere close to the scale of Intel’s projects in the United States over the same time frame. These plans necessarily require very high levels of capital expenditure, with payoffs only coming in the medium-to-long term. In early 2024, to raise the necessary capital, Intel sold a 49 percent share in its Ireland-based fab to Apollo Global Management for a sum of $11 billion. In addition, Intel has concluded a deal with Brookfield Asset Management, a major investment firm, to funnel $30 billion into two new chipmaking facilities in Arizona. Notwithstanding Intel’s internal layoffs and other setbacks, Gelsinger affirmed in August 2024 that the company remains committed to domestic manufacturing, stating that “Intel is prioritizing our core investments that are laying the groundwork for our future, and . . . our existing U.S. projects in Arizona, New Mexico, Ohio and Oregon.”</p> -<p>AISIs are engaging a wide range of stakeholders on each of their core functions. Far from fearing the launch of AISIs worldwide, firms and universities engaged in advanced AI have called for governments to increase their capacity to perform AI research, conduct testing, and issue guidance. Earlier this year, top U.S. AI companies such as Google, Microsoft, Anthropic, and Amazon joined the U.S. AISI Consortium (AISIC) as part of its inaugural cohort of members. AISIC is composed of over 200 organizations from across the private sector, academia, civil society, and government and facilitates collaboration on AI safety research and evaluations. Members are expected to contribute to one of nine key areas of guidance, reproduced verbatim below:</p> +<p>Intel’s ambitious manufacturing objectives rest on exceptional technological capabilities. Intel remains at the cutting edge of chip manufacturing innovation: its next process technology, Intel 18A, operates at the 1.8 nm node and is expected to compete directly with TSMC’s 2 nm “N2” process. Intel 18A combines multiple process innovations, from 3D hybrid bonding to nanosheet transistors to back-side power delivery. Intel plans to use 18A process technology in its own new server processor, Clearwater Forest.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Develop new guidelines, tools, methods, protocols, and best practices to facilitate the evolution of industry standards for developing or deploying AI in safe, secure, and trustworthy ways</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Develop guidance and benchmarks for identifying and evaluating AI capabilities, with a focus on capabilities that could potentially cause harm</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Develop approaches to incorporate secure-development practices for generative AI, including special considerations for dual-use foundation models, including:</p> - </li> -</ol> +<h4 id="still-a-first-mover">Still a First Mover</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Guidance related to assessing and managing the safety, security, and trustworthiness of models and related to privacy-preserving machine learning</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Guidance to ensure the availability of testing environments</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Despite its recent setbacks, Intel continues to be a first-mover on leveraging technologies that would bring it back to leading-edge manufacturing process leadership. Recently, Intel finalized a deal with the Dutch lithography equipment maker ASML to receive ASML’s first 2024 run of new state-of-the-art High-Numerical Aperture Extreme Ultraviolet (High-NA EUV) lithography machines. High-NA EUV lithography further shortens the wavelength of the ultraviolet light used to etch nanoscale circuits, a crucial process for the next generation of lower-nanometer chipmaking. According to IBM, the ASML machines “can perform a new technique that could pave the way to developing and producing chips at nodes even smaller than 2 nm.” It is important to note these are not just plans. Intel received the world’s first High-NA EUV machine in December 2023, which was installed and calibrated in the spring of 2024 at the company’s technology development fab in Oregon. Moreover, Intel is slated to receive a second machine in late 2024 and, according to reports, has committed to buying ASML’s entire 2024 run of High-NA EUV tools, giving it a head start on deploying this new technology.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Develop and ensure the availability of testing environments</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Develop guidance, methods, skills, and practices for successful red-teaming and privacy-preserving machine learning</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Develop guidance and tools for authenticating digital content</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Develop guidance and criteria for AI workforce skills, including risk identification and management; test, evaluation, validation, and verification (TEVV); and domain-specific expertise</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Explore the complexities at the intersection of society and technology, including the science of how humans make sense of and engage with AI in different contexts</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Develop guidance for understanding and managing the interdependencies between and among AI actors along the lifecycle.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>While Intel’s principal competitors, TSMC and Samsung, are also making investments in U.S. chipmaking under the CHIPS Act, their new fabs will only represent a small portion of each company’s capacity. TSMC and Samsung remain the national champions for Taiwan and South Korea, respectively, retaining essential know-how and R&amp;D facilities in their home countries, whose governments have well-honed incentive strategies to nurture and sustain leading-edge chipmaking at home. They are responsive, first and foremost, to their own national ecosystems and the needs of their governments. Intel’s decision to pause new chipmaking investments in Europe underscores the limits foreign-owned chipmakers may set on their U.S. manufacturing operations and investments as markets, company strategies, and geopolitical concerns evolve.</p> -<p>Note that while these nine areas of guidance overlap with the nine core functions of an AI safety institute identified in Section 4 of this paper, they do not cover the full breadth of AISIs’ operations. As Section 4 will discuss, AISIs perform functions such as forming consortia of AI researchers, stakeholders, and experts and promoting the international adoption of AI safety guidelines that are outside the scope of the AISIC.</p> +<p>If Intel were to bow out of CHIPS Act initiatives — whether by its own decision, a change in U.S. government policy, or the acquisition of the company’s foundry business by a third party not bound to the CHIPS Act — the act’s successful and timely implementation would be seriously jeopardized. The stakes are high, including for national defense; as writer Mackenzie Hawkins recently pointed out in Bloomberg, “Intel’s woes may . . . jeopardize the government’s ability to reach its policy goals, which include establishing a secure supply of cutting-edge chips for the Pentagon and making a fifth of the world’s advanced processors by 2030.” Finding a U.S.-headquartered replacement to maintain domestic ownership of Intel’s higher-end fabs or to preserve its technological know-how would be nearly impossible.</p> -<p>In August, OpenAI chief executive officer Sam Altman stated that his company has been working closely with the U.S. AISI on an agreement to provide early access to its next foundation model for safety testing and evaluations. OpenAI is not alone in providing the U.S. AISI access to its models for testing. Director Kelly said that the institute has “commitments from all of the leading frontier model developers to work with them on these tests.” These commitments demonstrate that leading companies understand the need for AI safety research and recognize the important role that the U.S. AISI has to play. While critics have questioned how industry will balance competition and safety, AISIs are free from the financial self-interest which has caused some to question the adequacy of private AI safety efforts in the past.</p> +<p>As veteran chip industry analyst Dan Hutcheson succinctly put it, “The purpose of the Chips Act was partly to make sure we kept Intel as an American company supported by the American government.” The Biden administration appears to recognize this: The Financial Times reported in September 2024 that Intel and the U.S. government were on track to finalize negotiations on the $8.5 billion grant contract by the end of the year, which “would amount to a vote of confidence in Intel by the U.S. government.”</p> -<p>On October 21, top AI developers including Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, and OpenAI signed a letter to Congress calling on lawmakers to authorize the U.S. AISI before the end of the year. The letter, which was led by Americans for Responsible Innovation and the Information Technology Industry Council (ITI), states that “[a]s other nations around the world are establishing their own AI Safety Institutes, furthering NIST’s ongoing efforts is essential to advancing U.S. AI innovation, leadership, and national security.” “Authorizing legislation, and the accompanying necessary resources,” it argues, “will give much needed certainty to NIST’s role in AI safety and reliability.”</p> +<p>In parallel with Intel’s negotiations with the Commerce Department, reports have surfaced that Samsung, Apple, and the fabless design firm Qualcomm are considering taking a stake in Intel or acquiring the company outright. It is not clear that these or other similar reports have much substance. In September 2024, Intel reportedly rebuffed an overture from UK-based, SoftBank-owned Arm Holdings to acquire its product division.</p> -<p>The letter echoes similar calls for Congress to authorize the AISI by Scale AI Founder and CEO Alexandr Wang earlier in October, as well as a letter from top AI companies to establish the AISI on a statutory basis in July. The July letter, also published by Americans for Responsible Innovation and ITI, argues that authorizing the AISI “provides a venue to convene the leading experts across industry and government to contribute to the development of voluntary standards that ultimately assist in de-risking adoption of AI technologies.” It’s not just the biggest companies that stand to benefit from the U.S. AISI — crucially, the letter argued that the institute may level the playing field for enterprises that use or develop AI but are unable to perform robust testing and evaluation in-house due to their size or the technical ability of their staff.</p> +<p>Moreover, an acquisition of Intel, or pieces of it, by another major chip firm would unquestionably face antitrust scrutiny in the United States and possibly elsewhere, as well as a likely challenge by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) if the investor were foreign. At the very least, takeover of any part of Intel’s business could disrupt the delicate negotiations between the company and the government.</p> -<p>While the concept of a government organization that works closely with AI companies on safety is still new, history shows that this kind of arrangement between government and industry can be highly successful. One good example is the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), a U.S. federal agency that performs safety tests of new motor vehicle models for manufacturers. Established in the 1970s to reduce accidents and deaths by encouraging manufacturers to produce safer vehicles, NHTSA led what has become today an industry standard of crash testing and rating vehicles out of five stars according to their safety. Some 50 years since its launch, NHTSA continues to perform crash tests and produce star ratings, as well as issue government safety ratings, safety information, and best practices.</p> +<p>Given the stakes in this global contest, it is unfortunate that the negotiations over Intel’s CHIPS Act funding continue to become more complex, with the CHIPS Program Office reportedly requiring commitments beyond those outlined in the act, and which some suggest are more akin to those required for private equity investments than for a congressionally mandated grant program. Overly stringent government requirements, though designed to ensure CHIPS Act funding meets the program’s goals, could paradoxically compromise Intel’s ability to utilize the grants. For example, Politico recently cited concerns from a number of CHIPS Act recipients that government negotiations are both slow and expansive with conditions on the CHIPS Act awards that have little to do with ensuring the success of the projects. While recognizing the obligation to meet statutory requirements, more than two years after passage of the CHIPS Act, the Commerce Department has yet to distribute major funding.</p> -<p>NHTSA is a useful model of a third-party government arbiter that has produced substantial win-win results for the public and for companies. The administration’s rating system lowers costs to consumers by supplying accurate, reliable, and simple safety information for free. Meanwhile, companies are incentivized to adopt new and better safety measures into their vehicles. As NHTSA’s acting administrator has stated, “[o]ur 5-Star Safety Ratings system continues to give Americans the information they need to choose the vehicle that’s right for them. The program also encourages vehicle manufacturers to incorporate advanced vehicle safety technologies into more makes and models, ultimately reducing injuries and deaths on America’s roads.” Because safety is a selling point for customers, most of the United States’ manufacturers willingly sign up for the NHTSA’s 5-star system and use the results in advertising new vehicle models.</p> +<h3 id="ensuring-intels-continued-us-manufacturing-presence">Ensuring Intel’s Continued U.S. Manufacturing Presence</h3> -<p>As AISIs mature organizationally, they could fulfill a similar arbiter role for AI models as the NHTSA has for motor vehicles. As has been the case with motor vehicles, testing AI models could lead to innovation in which safety is a key competitive feature. AI companies could communicate to customers that their model has passed AISI testing and evaluations, which could in turn help to build public trust and make AI models with higher safety standards more commercially competitive among consumers. Top frontier AI developers’ willingness to work with the U.S. AISI on testing their models before deployment is a good first step to making safety a key feature of AI industry standards, as the NHTSA has done with the U.S. motor vehicle industry over the last 50 years.</p> +<p>As noted, having Intel continue as an innovative, internationally competitive U.S. semiconductor manufacturer is a matter not only of economic interest, but of national security. The release of near-term CHIPS Act funding is becoming more important, especially given the scale of Intel’s investments and its ongoing financial difficulties. In response to potential further delay — attributed to the slow disbursement of federal aid — in Intel’s $28 billion Ohio project, Governor Mike DeWine has requested that the Biden administration expedite the necessary funding to Intel. However, the new fabs funded by these grants will not generate significant revenues until 2027, exposing the company to cash-flow challenges in the interim. One recent industry analysis commented that “Intel’s continued struggle begs the question: will the U.S. government need to do more?”</p> -<h4 id="timeline-of-ai-safety-institutes">Timeline of AI Safety Institutes</h4> +<p>Should the government concur with the assessment that Intel is not too big to fail but too good to lose, there are major recent precedents for federal policy measures to shore up companies whose collapse would bring unacceptable national costs. For example, the 2008 financial crisis posed an existential threat to large U.S. financial and manufacturing companies; confronting the prospect of imminent calamity, the Bush administration implemented the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), providing $426 billion in federal support to stabilize financial and manufacturing institutions, including failing U.S. automakers, that were considered “too big to fail.” TARP was not designed to subsidize or nationalize struggling companies, but rather to give them an interim financial bridge, allowing them to remain solvent while working toward profitability and continuing to serve as pillars of the U.S. economy.</p> -<p>The first AISIs were announced last year, with the United States and United Kingdom launching initiatives at the UK AI Safety Summit in November 2023. Japan, Singapore, and the European Union’s EU AI Office followed in early 2024. Since then, Canada and South Korea have revealed plans for their own AISIs. The inclusion of France, Kenya, and Australia in the AISI network suggests that more institutes are still to come. For instance, in May French research institutions Laboratoire National de Métrologie et d’Essais (LNE) and National Institute for Research in Digital Science and Technology (Inria) announced a partnership to set up an “AI Evaluation” program that will advance research and the development of testing and evaluation methods for general-purpose AI models at the national level. While this program has not yet been named as an official AI safety institute for France, an announcement may take place at the AI Action Summit in France in February 2025, similar to the announcement made by South Korea at the AI Seoul Summit in May.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Should the government concur with the assessment that Intel is not too big to fail but too good to lose, there are major recent precedents for federal policy measures to shore up companies whose collapse would bring unacceptable national costs.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The AISI International Network marks a logical next step in a series of recent bilateral agreements between institutes. In April 2024, the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Kingdom for close collaboration between institutes and established a dialogue with the EU AI Office to jointly develop evaluation tools for AI models. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, for its part, has established additional partnerships with Canada and France on AI safety, and the European Union and Japan have indicated future cooperation between safety institutes in the coming months.</p> +<p>Importantly, TARP was executed at scale in several affected industries. In December 2008, the Bush administration announced a $17.4 billion rescue loan for U.S. automakers. President Bush later recalled that he “didn’t want history to look back and say, ‘Bush could have done something but chose not to do it.’” Incoming President Barack Obama defended Bush’s action as a “necessary step to avoid a collapse in our auto industry that would have devastating consequences for our economy and our workers.” Obama augmented the Bush administration’s financial support for U.S. auto firms with federal outlays eventually totaling about $80 billion. Washington subsequently recovered most of these funds, with the net cost to taxpayers amounting to about $10 billion. No major U.S. automaker disappeared during the crisis, and the Big Three auto manufacturers remain a key element in today’s domestic manufacturing economy.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XvdrSKG.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Timeline of Major Events in AI Safety Since 2019.</strong></em></p> +<p>Similar measures were extended to ailing financial institutions under the Treasury Department’s 2008 Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which exchanged financial assistance for preferred stock in the companies, along with debt securities and warrants to purchase common and preferred stock. Under the CPP, the Treasury Department acquired $205 billion worth of shares to shore up troubled financial services firms over the short term, of which $200 billion was eventually redeemed by those same institutions. The purpose of the CPP was to enable financial firms to continue supplying essential levels of liquidity to the U.S. economy.</p> -<h3 id="why-the-aisi-international-network-matters">WHY THE AISI INTERNATIONAL NETWORK MATTERS</h3> +<h4 id="avoiding-disaster">Avoiding Disaster</h4> -<p>The AISI International Network is important for several reasons:</p> +<p>The objective of TARP was to avert a second Great Depression, which could have been triggered by the collapse of the U.S. financial and manufacturing sectors. It not only succeeded but did so at what proved to be a bearable cost to the government. A 2022 Congressional Budget Office study observed that “the U.S. financial system was in a precarious position when the TARP was created, and the transactions envisioned and ultimately undertaken entailed substantial financial risk for the federal government. Nevertheless, the TARP’s net realized costs have proved to be near the low end of the range of possible outcomes anticipated at the program’s outset.”</p> + +<p>Although the specifics of TARP and the CPP fortunately do not align perfectly with Intel’s current challenges, Intel’s current operational problems have important parallels with the crisis of 2008:</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>The network provides a much-needed venue for building international consensus on definitions, procedures, and best practices around AI safety.</strong> The science of evaluating AI models is a nascent yet vital field of research that underpins global efforts to develop safe and responsible AI. Currently, these efforts are limited by a lack of consensus on key definitions (for instance, what constitutes a “frontier” AI model or a “secure” system) and on the steps involved in testing, evaluation, and monitoring procedures.</p> - - <p>International consensus would increase regulatory interoperability, or the degree to which different domestic regulatory systems can smoothly interface and interact. Interoperability allows for the even implementation of international AI governance efforts. One such effort is the G7 Hiroshima AI Process Code of Conduct, which calls for “robust” and “trustworthy” AI systems but lacks technical definitions of the terms. Shared definitions would help create a common measuring stick by which regulators gauge these characteristics. Countries could choose policy options along such a ruler based on their risk tolerance for given AI applications. In this example, governments would require different levels of robustness and trustworthiness along the same underlying scale, as is the case for safety in the automobile and aviation industries. A common understanding of AI safety concepts would help clarify the steps countries must take to honor the G7 code of conduct and other international commitments.</p> - - <p>In this way, interoperability based on common definitions, procedures, and best practices can help to facilitate trade in the future. As a previous CSIS paper argued, fragmented legal frameworks that require company compliance with many different obligations can create technical barriers to the free flow of goods and services. Diverging regulatory approaches that require companies to demonstrate that a product is “safe” according to 10 different metrics from 10 different jurisdictions, for instance, is not only highly inefficient but often prohibitively costly. Instead, the AISI International Network could serve as one venue in which to develop a coherent language around AI safety, helping to lower future potential barriers to trade.</p> + <p>Intel is the central player in the government’s implementation of the CHIPS Act, which is critical for national security and economic well-being. The company could benefit a great deal from federal support to surmount a cash flow pinch in 2025–26, when its new fabs begin to generate revenue in 2027 and beyond. The goal of such a cash flow would be to provide financing to enable Intel to keep the construction and investments on track while signaling a commitment to the company’s success.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>International collaboration will help governments achieve economies of scale in AI safety research.</strong> Thus far, AISIs have cooperated on a bilateral basis, which, while useful, can limit the impact and scope of AI safety efforts. By sharing priorities, resources, and expertise through a multilateral configuration, the AISI International Network aims to be more than the sum of its parts. AISIs can contribute strategically to the goals of the network by coordinating roles and responsibilities, de-duplicating research and therefore saving time, capacity, and money.</p> + <p>Semiconductor manufacturing is not a waning industrial sector. The demand for advanced chips is robust, due in no small part to the AI boom. The question is not whether the sector is viable, but who will lead its production and reap the rewards, including the revenue necessary to fund the next round of innovation.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>The network offers an opportunity to extend U.S. leadership in global AI governance.</strong> The United States has already demonstrated significant leadership in AI safety by being one of the first to launch its AISI in 2023 and by spearheading the AISI network initiative in 2024. It should maintain this leadership going forward with the view that the network will help shape global AI safety practices that will predominantly affect U.S. companies.</p> - - <p>This is important for not only setting safety norms at home, but also advocating for U.S. interests abroad. Consider, for instance, the EU AI Act: while the first wave of the act came into force on August 1, the requirements for developers of frontier AI models above 10^25 floating operation points (FLOPS) of compute power have yet to be defined. Rather, the EU AI Office — the European Union’s representation to the AISI International Network — is tasked with developing codes of practice for the developers of these models, almost all of which are S. companies.</p> - - <p>According to Article 56 of the AI Act, the EU AI Office must develop codes of practice for frontier AI companies to identify, assess, manage, and report “systemic” risks by May 2, 2025. To meet this tight deadline, it may look to the work of the AISI International Network if it deems it sufficiently mature to draw upon. Having a seat at the same table as the EU AI Office is therefore a valuable opportunity to help develop safety norms that the European Union may apply to U.S. companies. Even if the European Union ultimately decides to develop its codes of practice alone, the network will still provide the United States with a direct line of communication to the EU AI Office for articulating AI safety best practices in the future.</p> + <p>Without Intel’s continued participation, achieving the CHIPS Act’s main goals — reestablishing American technological leadership in high-end chip manufacturing and reducing reliance on foreign chipmakers — will be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.</p> </li> </ul> -<h3 id="overview-of-aisi-network-members">OVERVIEW OF AISI NETWORK MEMBERS</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The demand for advanced chips is robust, due in no small part to the AI boom. The question is not whether the sector is viable, but who will lead its production and reap the rewards, including the revenue necessary to fund the next round of innovation.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>It is still early days for AI safety institutes, both as organizations and as concepts. Members of the AISI International Network are highly varied in their organizational maturity, which can be expected given that most are only months old. Even the U.S. AISI, one of the most established institutes, was announced only in November 2023 and became operational in early 2024. Other AISIs, such as those of Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and the European Union, are still in the process of hiring and setting out the priorities of their institutes, according to public documents and conversations by CSIS with officials. Still other network members, like Kenya and Australia, have yet to clearly state whether their governments will even establish an AISI.</p> +<h4 id="how-could-it-be-done">How Could It Be Done?</h4> -<p>Nevertheless, established AISIs report strong similarities in funding and staff size thus far. As Table 1 illustrates, the annual budgets of network members currently hover around $10 million, with some notable exceptions. First, the UK AISI is already an outlier with a budget of approximately £50 million ($65 million) per year, according to CSIS sources. Second, the United States’ fiscal year 2025 budget requests an increase of $47.7 million for investment into the U.S. AISI and the advancement of AI research, standards, and testing in line with President Biden’s October 2023 AI executive order, which, if approved, would greatly boost the average network budget. Finally, an announcement by the Canadian government in April pledges C$50 million (approximately US$36 million) for a Canadian AISI, though the funding period is unspecified.</p> +<p>Additional federal support for Intel should be envisaged on both national security grounds and to favor domestic R&amp;D investment. This support could come in various forms: an extension of the CHIPS Advanced Manufacturing Investment Credit; the extension of additional loans and loan guarantees; targeted tax measures; and other similar measures taken under TARP and CPP. If the Big Three automakers and major U.S. financial institutions were deemed “too big to fail” in 2008, Intel can be similarly considered “too important to fail” in today’s increasingly perilous geopolitical environment.</p> -<p>Public statements and private conversations between CSIS and government officials reveal that staff sizes will also be comparable between institutes. More established AISIs currently employ approximately 20 to 30 staff, most of whom are technical experts. Private conversations with CSIS indicate that the EU AI Office’s AI safety unit, which will fulfill most of the same functions as an AISI (Table 2), will likely hold approximately 50 staff members.</p> +<p>While the CHIPS Act has been instrumental in laying the groundwork for increased U.S. manufacturing capacity, the existence of new facilities does not guarantee their effective utilization. The U.S. government should thus consider how it can build on the foundational work of the CHIPS Act by focusing on strengthening the domestic supply chain. For example, targeted tax measures that provide incentives for the consumption of U.S.-produced wafers could not only help ensure the best possible return on new manufacturing facilities, but also encourage the building of additional capacity once the CHIPS Act incentives run out. Policies to help onshore the semiconductor supply chain will help to ensure that U.S. development and production of advanced chips is prioritized, thus encouraging periodic technological upgrades and even enabling the co-location of technology developments that are critical to national security.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IYd2imR.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Organizational Overview of AISI Network Members.</strong> Source: Public statements from AISI network members and relevant government officials and bodies.</em></p> +<p>While some will point out — correctly — that government support is inconsistent with traditional laissez-faire principles, historical precedent shows that national security concerns have overridden such principles during major crises such as World Wars I and II, the Cold War, and the 2008 financial crisis. Indeed, Washington has consistently taken steps to invest in and nurture key industries relevant to defense and health (including major investments in vaccine manufacturing during the Covid-19 pandemic).</p> -<p>AISI network members also intend to fulfill similar functions. Based on a document review of all public statements from AISIs and relevant government officials, this paper provides a list of the nine areas of AI safety in which institutes may operate (see Table 2). These functions are:</p> +<p>Similar fears regarding the semiconductor industry’s competitiveness prompted significant federal investment and trade measures in the 1980s, when the U.S. chip industry was at risk of losing technological leadership. Major government investment, matched by the private sector, helped form the successful Sematech research and manufacturing consortium, which enabled the U.S. chip industry to regain competitiveness. Now, the future of Intel — the linchpin of the CHIPS Act — cannot be left to the vagaries of the market, especially one shaped and conditioned by other countries’ industrial policies.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Performing (technical) research on AI safety tools</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Developing and disseminating evaluation tools and products</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Testing and evaluating AI systems</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Publishing AI safety standards and guidelines</p> - </li> +<h3 id="perspectives-from-abroad-policies-of-allies-and-competitors">Perspectives from Abroad: Policies of Allies and Competitors</h3> + +<p>The cyclical nature of the semiconductor industry means it must make substantial investments to maintain and improve production capacity during economic downturns for the eventual recovery in demand. Semiconductor companies require significant capital to maintain their production capacity. To address these industry characteristics, leading manufacturers abroad often receive both direct and indirect government support, frequently on a massive scale.</p> + +<p>This is not new. The world’s leading semiconductor foundries, TSMC and United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC), were both established with the support of the Taiwanese government when they spun off from the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI). Since 1991, as the foundry concept gained traction, TSMC has experienced rapid growth as the world’s leading semiconductor foundry, acquiring unparalleled expertise and capabilities.</p> + +<p>Similarly, SK Hynix, one of the leading South Korean companies in advanced memory semiconductor manufacturing, is now a successful company despite sustaining major losses in the past following sharp declines in DRAM semiconductor prices that began in the mid-1990s. Pressured by the South Korean government, Hyundai Electronics Industries acquired LG Semicon, and their semiconductor division spun off as SK Hynix in 2001. After the spin-off, Hynix faced severe financial pressures from a heavy debt load and low DRAM prices. To restore the firm’s viability, a consortium of private and national financial institutions implemented a comprehensive support program, including debt forgiveness, equity conversion, credit limit expansion, debt maturity extension, and interest rate reductions. Hynix is now a profitable and competitive company.</p> + +<p>This policy approach remains relevant today. The Japanese government recently allocated $1.3 billion to Kioxia Holdings, Japan’s leading memory semiconductor company, which experienced very significant losses in 2023 primarily due to a cyclical downturn in demand for memory chips. Continuing to address the firm’s financial challenge, the Japanese government has recently allocated $1.3 billion in support of the company. This funding could stabilize Kioxia with the broader goal of ensuring Japan maintains its technological leadership in NAND flash memory, supporting a robust supply network to meet future market demand.</p> + +<p>As these examples suggest, government policies have often played, and continue to play, major roles in shaping the industrial landscape in semiconductors. Today, many of the world’s leading countries are actively promoting domestic production. Like the United States, these nations are backing their domestic chipmakers with public support for investments in R&amp;D and manufacturing capacity. What is clear, however, is that these governments will not allow these key national enterprises to fail.</p> + +<p>In fact, reflecting both the China challenge and new efforts of countries such as the United States, policies to support semiconductor manufacturing within national borders have increased in scale and frequency. This list of recent government investments in key domestic manufacturing companies illustrates the scale of financial support for firms in this strategic industry.</p> + +<ul> <li> - <p>Disseminating AISI research and guidelines to the public</p> + <p><strong>France:</strong> In June 2023, France announced that it would allocate $3.1 billion in public funding to its most advanced semiconductor manufacturer, STMicroelectronics, to build a semiconductor manufacturing plant in Crolles, in partnership with U.S.-based GlobalFoundries. STMicro, regarded as one of the most innovative firms in Europe, has benefitted from extensive state support since its formation under government auspices in 1968.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Forming consortia of AI researchers, stakeholders, and experts</p> + <p><strong>Japan:</strong> After taking a largely laissez-faire approach, the Japanese government concluded it could not be economically secure without production of advanced semiconductors, particularly those used by its auto industry. Since 2022, in a major national initiative, the Japanese government has allocated $6 billion to Rapidus, aiming to establish this government- and privately-owned company as the flagship of Japan’s “ambition to catch up in semiconductor manufacturing.” Additionally, the company is expected to receive additional private bank loans and subsidies in its ambitious bid to produce cutting-edge chips.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Promoting the international adoption of AI safety guidelines</p> + <p><strong>South Korea:</strong> Samsung and SK Hynix are engaged in discussions with the Korea Development Bank (KDB) about utilizing a low-interest loan program, valued at $12.3 billion, which is aimed at bolstering the semiconductor industry. SK Hynix will again seek government support, reportedly applying for a loan amounting to $2.1 billion. More broadly, South Korea recently enacted the “K-Chips Act,” a major program with significant incentives to promote national high-tech industries, notably semiconductors. The architect of the “K-Chips Act,” a former Samsung executive, sees the stakes as fundamentally shaping national trajectories, emphasizing that “the winner of the global chip battle will control the economic security order, while the loser will end up becoming a technological colony.”</p> </li> <li> - <p>Investigating infringements of domestic regulations</p> + <p><strong>China:</strong> China offers perhaps the leading case of government support for the industry. At the end of 2022, the Chinese government was reportedly planning to spend $143 billion over the next five years to support its semiconductor industry. In 2022, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) received $282.1 million. This continues the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (the “Big Fund”) to support investments in China’s semiconductor value chain, including production capacity, equipment, materials, and advanced packaging. In May 2024, China launched its third semiconductor “Big Fund,” a $45.7 billion investment vehicle to support the country’s domestic semiconductor industry. This figure is roughly on par with the CHIPS Act but more narrowly focused in that these resources will likely primarily benefit Huawei’s chip design and SMIC’s chip manufacturing. These new measures augment China’s already-massive government support for the country’s chip sector, including direct subsidies, preferential loans from government banks, and equity infusions, as well as subsidies from regional and municipal governments involving land, electrical power, and infrastructure. The ability to domestically develop and produce advanced chips is a top priority for China’s leadership, and this comprehensive strategy reflects that commitment. The collective effort of these programs dwarfs the support offered by other countries.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Encouraging domestic innovation in AI</p> + <p><strong>Taiwan:</strong> Even in Taiwan, arguably the leading center of semiconductor manufacturing today, the government has recently stepped in to provide support. In January 2023, Taiwan enacted its own version of theCHIPS Act that “offers investment tax credits of 25% on R&amp;D and 5% on equipment.” This introduced the country’s largest-ever tax deduction for R&amp;D expenses and related capital investments in semiconductors, designed to benefit eligible semiconductor companies such as TSMC that meet specific criteria. These incentives complement the special benefits that Taiwan grants for research and manufacturing organizations located in science and industrial parks, which include, according to a Boston Consulting Group report, “relatively low-cost access to land, water, electricity, and infrastructure, as well as the possibility of expedited approvals and the elimination of import and export duties.” These multifaceted measures reflect the long-term commitment of the government to ensuring the continued success of its leading firms and the country’s central position in this global industry.</p> </li> -</ol> +</ul> -<p>Table 2 demonstrates that most AISI network members will principally focus on the first seven of these nine functions, with notably only the European Union performing a regulatory role as part of the EU AI Office. This overlap between network members’ stated functions points to a strong basis for collaboration between AISIs.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>It also shows that some institutes have already begun to produce work related to their stated functions. Some deliverables predate the AISI, such as the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s AI Business Guidelines, but have been incorporated and built upon by current AISI efforts. Others are novel efforts by institutes since their launch, such as the U.S. AISI’s guidance for Managing Misuse Risk for Dual-Use Foundation Models, and the UK AISI’s Inspect and Singapore’s Project Moonshot, two testing and evaluation toolkits for large language models (LLMs).</p> +<p>The United States and its allies confront an unparalleled strategic challenge from China that has the potential to escalate. In any such confrontation, leadership in and access to advanced semiconductor technology — and the AI systems these innovations enable — will play a central role and could even be decisive. Numerous recent analyses conclude that China is investing heavily in the sector and is rapidly gaining on the United States in strategic areas of microelectronic production, a dynamic that raises major national security concerns.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CTxpjph.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Overview of AISI Network Members’ Stated Functions.</strong> Source: Public statements from AISI network members and relevant government officials and bodies.</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Successful and timely implementation of the CHIPS Act is a critical step to addressing that challenge and deterring conflict — and that cannot happen without Intel.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>It is worth noting, however, that while institutes share many similarities in funding, size, and functions, they are housed under different kinds of public bodies. Several institutes are located within government agencies focused on technological innovation and standards, including the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); the UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT); and the Japanese Information Technology Promotion Agency (IPA). Others are housed in government-funded research organizations, like the South Korean Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) and the Singaporean Digital Trust Centre, itself a part of Nanyang Technological University. Finally, as Table 2 illustrates, the EU AI Office has the largest set of functions as an institution that promotes innovation, research, and regulatory compliance to the EU AI Act. The different kinds of home institutions in which AISIs are housed may have implications for the focus and capacity of different network members, and therefore the strengths that each member may bring to the network.</p> +<p>Successful and timely implementation of the CHIPS Act is a critical step to addressing that challenge and deterring conflict — and that cannot happen without Intel. Accordingly, the U.S. government needs to be proactive, make CHIPS Act resources available as soon as possible, and accept that while there will always be risks, speed and compromise are crucial to achieve the CHIPS Act’s central goals. More broadly, the Departments of Commerce and Defense need to begin using existing tools, contracting mechanisms, and authorities — such as OTA — to support Intel through its current transition and not wait until Intel’s financial position slows its progress and further erodes the country’s competitive position. Prompt and strategic action must be taken to bring the objectives of the CHIPS Act closer to reality. Implementing an array of supportive measures beyond the CHIPS Act would also be a powerful way to underscore that the government wants Intel, and the semiconductor industry, to thrive and grow for decades to come.</p> -<h3 id="questions-and-recommendations">QUESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</h3> +<hr /> -<p>Similarities between AISI network members in terms of funding, size, and stated functions are a strong foundation for international cooperation on AI safety. However, ensuring that the AISI International Network maintains momentum requires translating the high-level Seoul Statement into a concrete set of priorities, deliverables, and timelines. To do so, this paper poses the following nine questions and recommendations to network members:</p> +<p><strong>Sujai Shivakumar</strong> is director and senior fellow of Renewing American Innovation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<h4 id="goals-of-collaboration-what-is-the-aisi-network-trying-to-achieve-and-when">Goals of Collaboration: What Is the AISI Network Trying to Achieve and When?</h4> +<p><strong>Charles Wessner</strong> is a senior adviser (non-resident) with Renewing American Innovation at CSIS.</p> -<p><em>1. What areas of collaboration should the AISI network prioritize in the near term?</em></p> +<p><strong>Thomas Howell</strong> is an international trade attorney specializing in the semiconductor industry and a consultant with Renewing American Innovation at CSIS.</p>Sujai Shivakumar, et al.When it comes to the future of American semiconductor manufacturing and the success of the CHIPS Act, Intel is not too big to fail, but it is too good to lose.Inflection Point2024-11-07T12:00:00+08:002024-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/inflection-point<p><em>The United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer, cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.</em></p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> The AISI International Network does not have the capacity or resources to effectively collaborate on every domain of AI safety. For some domains, such as sharing sensitive information about models, AISIs may even face legal limitations to collaboration. Rather than spreading finite resources thinly in an effort to achieve everything all at once, network members should first focus on executing a few specific projects well. These should be attainable in the near future to demonstrate continued momentum from the AI Seoul Summit.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>When selecting priority areas, members should consider areas with the greatest overlap in AISI’s functions, capacity, and expertise, and deliverables that are both impactful and realistic. To start, they should establish a research agenda for the network’s technical and guidance safety work going forward. This will help to set the scope of the network’s efforts and to keep members on track as they and the network mature. As discussed in this paper’s recommendation to Question 3, the AISI network conference in November may be a good place to set and present this agenda to the public.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>In the medium term, network members should look to develop a common, evidence-based approach to AISIs’ testing and evaluation methodologies. While not all AISIs may necessarily have the same requirements for assessing models, they should at least have a common understanding of what methodologies such as “red teaming” comprise. Developing a consensus on testing and evaluation methods would help to deconflict and de-duplicate efforts between AISIs and to facilitate other areas of collaboration in the future, such as promoting safety guidelines or developing joint evaluation tools. If the AISI network can start by ensuring that AISIs all speak the same language in AI safety, more elaborate collaboration projects can take place.</p> +<p>Developing countries across the globe are installing or upgrading their digital infrastructure. But choosing a telecommunications vendor involves weighing factors such as cost, efficiency, quality, and security. The Covid-19 pandemic drove home the importance of connectivity and secure networks, over which information on e-commerce, education, financial services, and health — as well as national security — must pass. China has initially taken the lead in this sector by providing telecommunications solutions and financing primarily to countries in the Indo-Pacific and Africa. Meanwhile, the United States has fallen behind in addressing this important infrastructure gap. The United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer and cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.</p> -<p><em>2. What deliverables should the AISI network aim to produce?</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer and cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Although the AISI network is very new, members should still consider what the end products of their collaboration might be. One of the first deliverables that the network could produce is a clear statement of its intended goals, functions, research agenda, and mechanisms of collaboration that builds on the Seoul Statement. In as much detail as possible, the statement should articulate the mission of the network, its intended scope of work, and how it will relate to other international organizations working on AI. Network members may also consider developing a comprehensive list of the specific risks that they will test. This statement would not only help network members set the agenda for collaboration, but it would also help external governments and organizations to understand the value of the AISI network and how the network can support their efforts.</p> +<h3 id="a-high-risk-network">A High-Risk Network</h3> -<p><em>3. What are some key dates for these deliverables?</em></p> +<p>China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) features an initiative that is quickly becoming the country’s most prolific and impactful infrastructure investment: the Digital Silk Road (DSR). The DSR encompasses investments in wireless networks, surveillance cameras, subsea cables, and satellites; it is primarily financed and constructed by state-owned banks and companies such as Huawei, Hengtong, HMN Technologies, Hikvision, Dahua, and BeiDou. The bulk of China’s DSR contracts are with Indo-Pacific and African countries, where companies like Huawei are providing affordable mobile phones, cloud computing, and other types of hardware. Huawei Marine Networks, now known as HMN Technologies, has spearheaded subsea cable network infrastructure. In the last decade, the company has completed 108 projects that have amounted to an estimated 60,000 kilometers of subsea cable; roughly 16 of those projects are in 27 countries in the Indo-Pacific.</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> There are two big international events related to AI safety on the horizon that offer some initial deadlines for AISI network deliverables. First, the November 2024 San Francisco convening is an obvious date to publicly initiate international collaboration on AI safety. In September, the U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Department of State announced that “the goal of this convening is to kickstart the Network’s technical collaboration ahead of the AI Action Summit in Paris in February 2025,” starting with aligning “on priority work areas for the Network,” as the recommendation above supports. The February summit, therefore, is an important second date for network deliverables. The AI Action Summit will be the third of its kind since the UK AI Safety Summit last year and offers a high-profile, public venue in which to showcase the AISI network and its work. These two events — in November 2024 and February 2025 — are mere moments away in the context of international collaboration. If AISI members can capitalize on their opportunities, however, they could significantly contribute to the network’s mission of accelerating AI safety science.</p> - -<h4 id="mechanisms-of-collaboration-what-will-the-aisi-network-do-and-how-will-it-work">Mechanisms of Collaboration: What Will the AISI Network Do and How Will It Work?</h4> - -<p><em>4. How will network members collaborate?</em></p> - -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> AISIs should aim to have a regular cadence of meetings, perhaps every six months, to sustain momentum and keep collaboration moving forward. AISIs could collaborate through any number of venues, including research exchanges, annual conferences, shared digital platforms, and more. Network members will likely use a mix of these and other venues in different combinations as the network matures over time. To start, research exchanges between AISIs may be one of the first mechanisms of collaboration given that it is relatively inexpensive.</p> - -<p><em>5. Will network members specialize in their work, or will they share equal responsibilities?</em></p> - -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> It would be premature to assign specific responsibilities to AISI network members today given that most are only months old, if established at all. However, members should consider the benefits and drawbacks of different organizational structures as the network develops. Currently, AISI network members share equal responsibilities by default. While this can be useful for promoting equal participation and accountability from members, it can also add unnecessary costs to collaboration. If each member were to take charge on a different project, for instance, the network could risk losing time, capacity, and focus. This kind of structure could also place undue pressure on the capacity and expertise of each of the AISIs to contribute before they are ready.</p> - -<p>Instead, the AISI network may consider leveraging each member’s comparative advantages in expertise, capacity, and funding. Those that are most able to contribute to projects, for instance, should be able and incentivized to do so, as is discussed in Question 7. For now, more mature AISIs like those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Singapore could have greater responsibilities within the network while other members, such as Kenya or Australia, contribute through more specialized ways. These roles could shift over time as AISIs mature, however.</p> - -<p><em>6. Will the AI safety summits continue to serve as the principal international venue for AISIs and the AISI network?</em></p> - -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Since the first AISIs were announced at Bletchley Park in November 2023, AISIs have been closely tied to the AI safety summits. However, the summit series is steadily shifting its focus from AI safety to AI adoption and innovation; in May, the AI Seoul Summit placed AI innovation and inclusiveness firmly on the agenda. The next summit, the AI Action Summit in February 2025, will reportedly include AI safety as only one of five topic areas.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, a shift in focus does not mean that summits are not a good international venue for AISIs and the AISI network. In fact, it may make it an even better venue for helping to shift the rhetoric around AI safety from “doom and gloom” to “safety for trust, adoption, and innovation” — a far more politically salient message. This paper therefore recommends that AISIs and the AISI network continue to use the AI safety summits as a high-profile international venue for their efforts for as long as the summit series continues.</p> +<p>Chinese companies also have a significant stake in the 5G wireless networks around the world. Huawei and ZTE have engaged in nearly 160 projects in Africa, Asia, and Europe, providing network equipment and infrastructure. Recipient countries have so far welcomed these investments, namely for the speed at which the projects are implemented — but also for the price. Due to Chinese government subsidies, Huawei and ZTE can offer below-market rates, with Huawei offering as much as 30 percent below typical costs.</p> -<p><em>7. What will the network’s leadership and voting structure look like?</em></p> +<p>According to a report by the European think tank MERICS, Chinese companies are also involved in providing products in the e-governance, online education, and telehealth sectors. Huawei and ZTE have implemented these projects — predominantly in Africa and Central Asia — with more financing from the Chinese government than from local governments, multilateral development banks, and G7 countries combined.</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Currently, the AISI network has a horizontal leadership and consensus or opt-in only voting structure by default. Given that the Seoul Statement makes no indication of leadership and voting structure, however, network members are open to consider different possibilities and their trade-offs. For example, a consensus-based structure can help to foster good intentions for international cooperation, but it can also make it challenging to take meaningful collective action. Similarly, having just one member serve as a leader may seem unfair, but a rotating leadership structure can be ineffectual and prioritize the interests of that country (or bloc) for that period.</p> +<p>The United States has consistently raised security concerns about China’s digital technology investments, citing questions of national security, cybersecurity, personal security, and intellectual property, as well as the potential for authoritarian nations to surveil their own citizens. Some countries have heeded this advice; telecom carriers in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have replaced Chinese equipment with technology from low-risk vendors, or vendors that adhere to agreed-upon standards on privacy, data collection, surveillance, and intellectual property. The United States and many countries in the European Union have signed onto the Prague Proposals, which call on countries to select carriers and providers that will prioritize safe and secure 5G networks and communication technologies.</p> -<p>The network’s leadership and voting structures need not be zero sum, however. In the long run, members’ representation within the network should be proportionate to their contributions; those that invest more time, money, expertise, and resources should be rewarded with a greater say in its direction. This means that the U.S. and UK AISIs would likely be rewarded with leadership of the network due to their organizational capacity. The United States, for its part, should aspire to lead the AISI network, as discussed in the third section of this paper. Rather than merely insisting on leading, however, it should commit the resources and time that positions it to deserve to lead. Leadership should be earned based on the scale of meaningful contributions to the field of AI safety science, a structure that also incentivizes on other network members to participate and invest more into AI safety and the AISI network as well.</p> +<h3 id="offering-an-alternative">Offering an Alternative</h3> -<h4 id="international-strategy-how-will-the-aisi-network-fit-into-and-engage-with-other-international-ai-efforts">International Strategy: How Will the AISI Network Fit into and Engage with Other International AI Efforts?</h4> +<p>The countries that have signed onto China’s BRI and the DSR are doing so for several reasons. A primary motivation is to address critical infrastructure gaps by providing digital connectivity. The Covid-19 pandemic emphasized this need, underscoring its importance to nearly all aspects of daily life for individuals, companies, and governments. The BRI and DSR have stepped into this gap to provide something the United States and its allies have not. Typically, information and communication technology (ICT) projects are approved, deployed, and financed much more quickly by China than they would be through a G7 development bank. Approvals by the latter institutions often are bogged down by long feasibility studies, risk assessments, and other considerations. China, by contrast, offers a more streamlined approach: loans, construction companies, and equipment, all from one source.</p> -<p><em>8. How will the network be different from and engage with other international organizations working on AI issues, such as the ISO, G7, United Nations, GPAI, or OECD?</em></p> +<p>The United States and its partners have struggled to provide an alternative to the DSR; however, in recent years, Washington has established agencies, initiatives, and partnerships to prioritize ICT projects overseas, including investments in wireless networks, Open Radio Access Network (ORAN) technology, surveillance cameras, subsea cables, mobile handsets, and satellites, as well as systems upgrades from 2G and 3G to 5G and beyond. But there are multiple avenues available for additional policies to increase export and development finance of these technologies by trusted suppliers.</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Just as one of the objectives of the AISI network is to avoid duplicating work between AISIs, the network itself should avoid duplicating the work of other international organizations. Considering how the AISI network will fit into the broader landscape of these organizations from the start will help members think more strategically about what role this forum plays on the global AI governance stage.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="case-study-mexico"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Case Study: Mexico</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>To do this, the AISI network should emphasize its unique position to provide technical expertise and capacity to governments working on wider AI governance efforts. In the past year alone, numerous government initiatives have been launched to ensure responsible frontier AI development, including the Biden administration’s AI executive order, the EU AI Act, the G7 Hiroshima AI Process Code of Conduct, and the March 2024 UN resolution on AI. These initiatives, though commendable, are often staffed by diplomats who lack the depth of in-house technical expertise that the AISI network has demonstrated an ability to amass. It is this expertise that could turn what are currently high-level principles and frameworks into practical implementation for developers.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Over a decade ago, Mexico reached an inflection point in the development of its digital strategy and connectivity policies. Its experience offers both an example of best practices and a cautionary tale.</code></em></p> -<p>For instance, the G7’s code of conduct instructs developers to “identify, evaluate, and mitigate risks across the AI lifecycle,” but provides little guidance as to how. While the G7 has partnered with the OECD to develop this level of specificity for the code of conduct, it would greatly benefit from the testing and evaluation tools that the Seoul Statement names as one of the potential areas for collaboration within the AISI International Network. Network members should consider how to engage with other international organizations’ AI efforts with these synergies in mind.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In 2013, Mexico implemented a constitutional reform that created the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (IFT) and the Federal Economic Commission for Competition (COFECE). Both are independent regulators and antitrust authorities with very broad powers. This was born out of a larger reform process in the telecommunication and broadcasting sectors that took place in Mexico and in Latin America more broadly. The reforms reviewed and updated the legislative frameworks and institutions created in the 1990s to boost competition after market liberalization during that decade. As in many Latin American markets, fixed-line telephony in Mexico was provided by the state-owned operator, Teléfonos de México (Telmex), until the early 1990s, when the government gradually divested its assets to national and foreign investors. In 1995, the Mexican government passed the landmark Federal Telecommunications Law (LFT), opening all market segments for competition and removing geographic limitations for fixed and mobile telephony networks.</code></em></p> -<p><em>9. Will the network remain a closed group of high-capacity countries, or will it be open to any country that wants to join?</em></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The IFT promotes and regulates competition and the efficient development of telecommunications and broadcasting, in accordance with its constitutional mandate and the 2014 Federal Law for Telecommunications and Broadcasting, LFTR, as well as the 2014 Federal Law for Economic Competition. The COFECE is responsible for overseeing, promoting, and guaranteeing competition and free market access in Mexico. The COFECE has a board that consists of seven commissioners; a Technical Secretariat that analyzes the market and its competitiveness; a strategic planning and institutional evaluation coordinator; and an internal comptroller that oversees COFECE officials.</code></em></p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> The AISI International Network was born out of recognition that AI risks do not stop at national borders. It therefore makes sense that the network should be open to more members that want to join. A wider membership would help to build international agreement on AI safety science and potentially to continue to reach economies of scale on AI safety institutes. Furthermore, incorporating more developing countries’ perspectives early on — either through full membership or agreements — could bring new insight into AI safety risks that current AISI network members and their companies may have missed.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Upon the creation of the IFT, Mexico licensed new national broadcasting networks, designated officials to evaluate carriers and operators, introduced rules for unbundling Telmex, and created a public registry of licenses. Since its creation, IFT has been viewed as a credible authority; as a result, prices have decreased and competition has increased. There are now dozens of new local broadcasting licenses in radio and television, including for indigenous communities. Mexico’s internet penetration rate stood at 83.2 percent of the total population at the start of 2024, up from 44 percent in 2013. In 2015, AT&amp;T undertook a series of local acquisitions, and the U.S.-headquartered company now comprises 16 percent of the market for mobile telephone operators. In December 2021, AT&amp;T Mexico announced it intended to launch a 5G network using its 2.5 GHz spectrum, making it the first mobile network operator in the country to build such a network.</code></em></p> -<p>However, network members will have to consider the serious trade-offs between expanding the network’s membership and diluting its current nimbleness and consensus as a small group. Even countries or blocs that are closely aligned in values to current members may lack the technical expertise to meaningfully contribute to the network, thus raising the costs of collaboration and possibly reducing its impact.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite a more competitive ICT market, domestic politics have hindered and threatened progress. Most concerning has been the chipping away of IFT’s independence and operational ability. When former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador entered office in 2018, he sought to undermine the independent IFT. Since February 2022, the agency has operated with only four of its seven presiding commissioners, as President López Obrador refused to nominate any more. This has left the agency without enough commissioners to operate effectively; losing another would render it completely inoperable. The IFT’s budget has also decreased by roughly 41.1 percent since 2014, hampering its ability to implement its mandate. Additionally, the government has set high spectrum fees, which has undercut telecommunications operators’ ability to expand broadband connectivity, particularly in rural areas, and undermined IFT’s efforts to license more spectrum. The country also remains plagued by anticompetitive tendencies, despite the efforts of the IFT and COFECE.</code></em></p> -<p>One way to address this could be requiring prospective members to demonstrate their ability to meaningfully contribute to the network — such as through a minimum degree of expertise and capacity — before they can join. The purpose here is not to make the AISI network into an elite club, but to recognize that the network’s goal of accelerating AI safety science cannot be realistically achieved by expanding membership to everyone who wants it. The AISI network could consider partnership programs with other international organizations like GPAI, the OECD, or the Group of 20 (G20) in order to collaborate with interested countries that do not necessarily have the depth of AI safety expertise to join the network. Such partnerships could help to foster wider international cooperation on AI safety and engage more developing countries on the AISI network’s efforts in particular.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Mexico has stood apart from its Latin American peers in creating and implementing one of the most sophisticated telecommunications regulations. But, before concluding his term, former president López Obrador sent to Congress an initiative for constitutional reform that would disappear IFT and COFECE and assign their responsibilities to different ministries within the executive branch. This initiative is waiting to be analyzed in Congress. In order to build on the progress of the 1990s, Mexico’s new president, Claudia Sheinbaum, will have to undo Obrador’s efforts and reinstitute the authority of these bodies, while also ensuring they are protected from political winds. Mexico is an excellent case study of how a country can succeed in building an effective and laudable regulatory infrastructure and have it subsequently come apart due to politics.</code></em></p> -<h3 id="conclusion">CONCLUSION</h3> +<h4 id="us-resources">U.S. RESOURCES</h4> -<p>The AISI International Network marks a significant next step in global AI safety efforts. The network provides an opportunity to build international consensus on definitions, procedures, and best practices around AI safety; reach economies of scale in AI safety research; and extend U.S. leadership in international AI governance. The similarities between currently established AISIs in terms of size, funding, and functions provide a strong basis for cooperation, though network members must be aware of the different institutions in which different AISIs are housed.</p> +<p>The United States has established new agencies and tools in recent years to help promote and support U.S. technology — particularly ICT — abroad. These efforts can be further honed to more effectively support U.S. and partner initiatives in the developing world, as well as private company engagement in this sector.</p> -<p>While the Seoul Statement is a good start for multilateralizing cooperation between AISIs, network members must now decide how to turn intent into action. At the November convening in San Francisco, they should strive to set the network’s goals, mechanisms, and international strategy in preparation for the AI Action Summit in February 2025. In doing so, they must ask tough questions, including about priorities, leadership, and membership.</p> +<p><em>U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)</em></p> -<hr /> +<p>In October 2018, the U.S. Congress passed the bipartisan Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act to support and finance investments in emerging economies and to boost national security and foreign policy priorities in critical markets. The BUILD Act combined the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Development Credit Authority (DCA) to form the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The DFC has stated that encouraging ICT investments in low and lower-middle-income countries is a key priority for the agency. The agency can provide loans, loan guarantees, equity financing, political risk insurance, and technical assistance to support investments in the telecom industry; it can only work on private sector projects, not ones supported by the public sector. However, the DFC is limited in working in networks that include high-risk vendor equipment. According to the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, U.S. financing agencies investing in networks with this type of equipment must get a waiver from the head of the relevant executive agency or from the Director of National Intelligence and must have a phase-out plan to “rip and replace” the high-risk vendor equipment.</p> -<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is the director of the Wadhwani AI Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>The DFC and its predecessor OPIC have undertaken several ICT investments in the past two decades, including a network acquisition in the Pacific Islands; renewable power for cell phone towers in Nigeria and the Central African Republic; telecommunications infrastructure in Myanmar; and, in Jordan, infrastructure to provide a critical interconnection point for an internet cable system connecting Europe and Asia. In 2018, the DFC also provided $100 million in financing to Africell for the expansion of affordable mobile voice and data services in The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as upgrades to network equipment in these countries to accommodate increased traffic.</p> -<p><strong>Georgia Adamson</strong> is a research associate with the Wadhwani AI Center at CSIS.</p>Gregory C. Allen and Georgia AdamsonThe AI Seoul Summit launched an international network of AI safety institutes in May 2024. Now, they must work to define their goals, mechanisms, and the strategy to accelerate AI safety science.Stay Ahead2024-10-29T12:00:00+08:002024-10-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/stay-ahead<p><em>This report gives recommendations on export controls, global tech governance, domestic incentives for building tech capabilities in chips and clean technologies, and the future of international tech cooperation and competition.</em></p> +<p><em>The Export-Import Bank of the U.S. (EXIM)</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>EXIM has been mandated by Congress to enact its China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP) to help U.S. exporters facing competition from China, particularly in the fields of AI, wireless communications, and fintech. Established in 2019, CTEP is expected to counter export subsidies and finance provided by China, advance U.S. leadership, and support U.S. innovation, employment, and technological standards. Exporters can take advantage of EXIM’s reduced fees, extended repayment tenors, and exceptions from other EXIM policies to get financing on transactions with at least 51 percent U.S. content. However, to date there have been no ICT deals financed through CTEP.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">INTRODUCTION</h3> +<p>Additionally, EXIM can also provide loans, loan guarantees, and insurance for the purchase of goods and services shipped or invoiced from any country to facilitate U.S. exports for 5G-related transactions. EXIM has lowered its U.S. content threshold. But the creditworthiness of potential in-country private sector partners has remained a key challenge in many instances, particularly in countering opaque Chinese lending practices.</p> -<p><strong><em>Resolving the Emerging Economic Security Trilemma</em></strong></p> +<p><em>Department of Commerce</em></p> -<p>The United States is in the midst of a generational shift in economic policy and its role in national security planning. Even in these polarized times, there is surprising consensus across the American political spectrum that the economic policies and global institutions fostered since World War II are no longer adequate. They have left the United States vulnerable to competition with non-market actors, principally China; domestic economic dislocations; and global crises such as climate change and pandemics. These vulnerabilities persist and will await the next administration.</p> +<p>The Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act (CHIPS Act) of 2022 authorized billions of dollars for funding to the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and State to develop onshore domestic manufacturing of semiconductors. It also included appropriations to fund the USA Telecommunications Act to support the global telecom supply chain and counter the expansion of Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE. Provisions from the CHIPS Act are meant to further U.S. software advantages and to develop the Open Radio Access Network (ORAN), which would allow for a more interoperable telecommunications model and enable alternative vendors to enter markets for specific network components, rather than competing with end-to-end packages offered by companies like Huawei.</p> -<p>Global technology competition continues to gather pace. Earlier this year, U.S. secretary of commerce Gina Raimondo compared the contemporary chips race to the space race of the 1960s: a new Sputnik moment. Indeed, we may be living through five Sputnik moments at the same time across semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, climate technologies, and biotechnologies. Losing our edge in any one of these areas – especially, the triad of chips, AI, and quantum – could meaningfully diminish the United States’ economic prospects and national security. As Darío Gil, chair of the National Science Board and senior vice president and director at IBM Research, noted at the board’s 490th Meeting, “science and technology are the new currency of global power.”</p> +<p>The CHIPS Act provides $1.5 billion through a Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund to the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), in coordination with other agencies, to support investments in ORAN, developments of software-based wireless technologies, and funding for “leap-ahead” innovations in the U.S. mobile broadband market.</p> -<p>Staying ahead of the technology race is more challenging than ever. The United States and its allies must contend with a primary competitor that uses its scale and prowess to weaponize innovation, flout fair competition, exercise control over vital value chains, and engage in economic coercion. Meanwhile, China continues to reap the benefits of having played the long game with countries around the world, particularly in the Global South. At stake for the United States and its allies is their long-term prosperity, the resilience and security of their markets and democracies, and the rules-based economic order they fostered for three generations.</p> +<p><em>Department of State</em></p> -<p>As these realities have come into clearer view in recent years, the past two U.S. administrations have put their respective stamps – in design and tenor – on “economic security,” rewriting the implicit contract between governments and markets. Under the Biden administration, U.S. economic security policy evolved dramatically in pursuit of competitiveness, resilience, and national security goals. G7 and other allies followed suit, with policymakers in Japan and the European Union codifying formal economic security frameworks, creating mandates within their respective governments, and developing similar policies.</p> +<p>The CHIPS Act allocates $500 million over five years to a new International Technology Security and Innovation (ITSI) Fund, which gives money to the Department of State to provide for international information and communications technology security and semiconductor supply chain activities, including to support the development and adoption of secure and trusted telecommunications technologies, secure semiconductor supply chains, and other emerging technologies. The State Department can use the fund for its own programming but can also allocate money to USAID, EXIM, and the DFC.</p> -<p>The United States, in pursuit of competitiveness and resilience goals, has implemented promote measures entailing unprecedented public and private investments in reviving U.S. chipmaking and building capabilities across clean tech and other technologies. A second set of measures has sought to align competitiveness and national security goals by protecting technologies and markets by expanding export controls, sanctions, and investment screening, as well as a continuation of strategic tariffs. A third, in part to counter China, has involved plurilateral economic cooperation agreements with partners on supply chain resilience and the energy transition, as well as bilateral initiatives on technology innovation.</p> +<p>The focus of the fund has been less on ICT and more on semiconductors. Funding has gone to new hires at the State Department and to partnerships with Costa Rica, Indonesia, Mexico, Panama, the Philippines, and Vietnam to explore opportunities to grow and diversify the global semiconductor ecosystem. In a March 2023 press release, the State Department communicated that $40.7 million in fiscal year 2023 ITSI funding would be used in the ICT space to provide capacity building training as well as technical advice on policy formulation and regulatory frameworks, cybersecurity tools, financing, project preparation support, and other investment de-risking measures to catalyze private sector investments in secure ICT networks, including field testing and pilot deployments of ORAN networks. The full scope and scale of these investments are not yet clear.</p> -<p>Early implementation has shown signs of industrial revival across the United States: private sector investment commitments – domestic and foreign – in strategic sectors such as chips, clean power, clean-tech manufacturing, and others totaled over $900 billion over the past four years. And protect measures such as export controls have blunted Chinese and Russian acquisition of dual-use technologies. And yet, implemenation challenges have emerged, along with second-order effects.</p> +<p><em>U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA)</em></p> -<p>While export controls on Russia degraded Putin’s war machine in the early days, their efficacy has been tested by transshipment from third countries and Russia’s continued reliance on Chinese chips and chipmaking materials. Similarly, while new U.S. export controls initiated in 2022 and 2023 blunted China’s access to sensitive AI chips, Beijing has responded with its own industrial policies to “design out” and circumvent U.S. controls and standards. It has also enacted tit-for-tat trade restrictions on processed critical minerals – a key chokepoint in the chips and electric vehicle value chains.</p> +<p>USTDA provides financial tools to support the export of U.S. goods and services for priority infrastructure projects in emerging economies. USTDA funds project preparation, feasibility studies, and partnership-building activities. Though it is typically involved on the front end of projects, USTDA has also financed ICT-related initiatives in the Indo-Pacific and Africa.</p> -<p>Tensions between the protect, promote, and partner strategies have emerged, particularly regarding the use of subsidies, tax breaks, and domestic sourcing requirements aimed at promoting U.S. chipmaking and clean technologies. These policies have sparked concerns among key allies – Japan, South Korea, and the European Union – over a subsidy race that could disadvantage their own industries. Similarly, the U.S. government has led efforts to engage partners via new economic cooperation agreements such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP). These agreements, however, do not come with either increased market access or meaningful financing benefits that partners seek, in part due to U.S. domestic political considerations. These do not fare well relative to China’s long-term play in the Global South, notwithstanding concerns about the Belt and Road Initiative’s flaws, including debt overhang and poor standards in some countries.</p> +<p>In 2023, the agency awarded a grant to NOW Telecom Company to conduct a feasibility study and pilot project to support the development of a nationwide 5G mobile and fixed-wireless network in the Philippines. The company chose New Jersey-based Bell Labs Consulting, part of the research arm of Nokia, to conduct the study. The USTDA also awarded a grant to Malawian internet service provider Converged Technology Networks Limited (CTN) to conduct a feasibility study on the expansion of digital connectivity to underserved communities in the country. CTN selected California-based Connectivity Capital LLC to conduct the study.</p> -<p>Given these limitations, the bigger question is whether the promote-protect-partner framework adds up to a long-term economic security strategy. The answer to that question will depend on how effectively the next administration navigates the emerging “economic security policy trilemma.” While not quite an impossible trinity, the trilemma means that policymakers will be able to pursue any two sets of measures (for example, promoting domestic industries and protecting dual-use technologies) but not without sacrificing the third (for example, deep integration with supply chain partners). This collection of essays from leading experts at CSIS’s newly formed Economic Security and Technology Department is our contribution to this debate.</p> +<p><em>U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zr0zDJW.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>An Emerging Economic Security Trilemma.</strong> Source: Author’s own creation.</em></p> +<p>USAID provides grants and technical assistance for an array of programs across the digital sector. In June 2022, the agency launched its Asia ORAN Academy as part of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. The academy brings together officials and representatives from the private and public sectors, as well as academia, with an expectation to expand its initial work in the Philippines to the rest of the region. As of June 2024, USAID was in final negotiations to open an ORAN Lab at the University of the Philippines’ Electrical and Electronics Engineering Institute. USAID’s Better Access and Connectivity (BEACON) Activity is also engaging the Philippine government and industry leaders in the country through a series of workshops and trainings on field testing and through the adoption of legislation and regulations that facilitate ORAN deployment.</p> -<p>An immediate priority is to assess the impact of protect measures such as export controls, sanctions, investment screening, and strategic tariffs, including their second-order effects. Greg Allen and Barath Harithas underscore the importance of building the capabilities of the Department of Commerce and related departments. But that alone will not be enough: the United States must work effectively with allies, as James Andrew Lewis argues, on forging a post–Wassenaar Arrangement technology alliance with meaningful European and Asian buy-in. At some point, though, Scott Kennedy warns, the administration’s use of defensive measures will stretch the United States’ ability to militate the rules-based economic order that it has fostered for decades.</p> +<p>USAID is additionally engaged in the Digital Invest initiative, also launched in 2022, which works with investment partners to increase the ability of companies to qualify for commercial funding. Digital Invest provides an average of $500,000 per partner for investments related to resilient digital infrastructure, increased digital inclusion, and stronger economic development. Digital Invest partners have backed over 60 technology companies across 38 countries, with projects ranging from the expansion of broadband connectivity infrastructure in Liberia to a digital payment platform in Uzbekistan to a fund supporting female investors and tech founders across South and Southeast Asia.</p> -<p>Ultimately, the most critical long-term path for the United States is to out-innovate China across advanced technologies. The CHIPS and Science Act as well as Inflation Reduction Acts put in place a number of building blocks of a strategy – investments in industrial infrastructure, research and development (R&amp;D), and the workforce; a creative capital and investment attraction program; and partnerships with supply chain partners. As Sujai Shivakumar notes, the United States will need to finish the swing with investments in technology clusters and R&amp;D cooperation that will require a sustained bipartisan effort to bear fruit. Adam Frost calls for a national security–focused approach to directing U.S. government financing in critical and emerging technologies. In addition, Joseph Majkut highlights the need for technology enablers such as access to clean power, along with a large transmission infrastructure, to fuel AI and advanced manufacturing.</p> +<p><em>Office of Strategic Capital (OSC)</em></p> -<p>Promote tools alone are limited: innovation does not happen in isolation, not to mention the cost of promote tools to the taxpayer amid already unprecedented levels of federal debt. Rather the time- and stress-tested drivers of innovation are competition in secure, trusted international technology markets and cooperation with allies, including on research and development and supply chains. Strong enforcement of intellectual property rights, Kirti Gupta argues, is essential if innovators are to enter markets. Given the global and distributed nature of technology value chains (from base materials to end products), Ilaria Mazzocco reminds us of the productivity benefits that will accrue to U.S. clean tech firms that take risks, compete in global markets, and integrate into value chains.</p> +<p>The newly created OSC, established in 2022 within the Department of Defense, is mandated to mobilize and scale private sector capital. Its Fiscal Year 2024 Investment Strategy outlined its initial target priorities, which include ORAN as both a part of the DoD’s FutureG and 5G critical technology area and a mandated field in the FY 2024 National Defense Authorization Act. The OSC’s complete suite of financial tools is still under development, but at this time, it can provide direct loans for capital investment and equipment finance. These loans range from $10 million to $150 million, with long repayment tenor. The OSC announced its first Notice of Funding Availability in September 2024 and will be considering applications through the rest of the fiscal year.</p> -<p>Nowhere are competitive markets and a favorable investment climate more important than in the Global South. Without meaningful market access or substantial financing commitments, Bill Reinsch and Erin Murphy argue, agreements such as IPEF are unlikely to attract long-term buy-in from partners. As a reminder of what is possible, Rick Rossow points out that the U.S.-India commercial partnership, including its focus on chips, critical minerals, and other critical and emerging technologies, could prove pivotal for both countries, with potential spillovers for others.</p> +<h4 id="global-partnerships">GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS</h4> -<p>We are well into the era of economic security. The need for an allied approach is now axiomatic, but it will require the United States to lead and partner in equal measures. The challenge for the next administration is to build on the early lessons of recent years and devise a long-term, bipartisan economic security strategy that balances domestic goals with international cooperation and the complexities of the global markets.</p> +<p>U.S. partners and allies have established several initiatives through the G7 to address critical infrastructure needs. In each of these, digital connectivity — particularly in the Indo-Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America — is a core part of cooperative engagement.</p> -<h2 id="protecting-sensitive-technologies-preserving-us-advantage">Protecting Sensitive Technologies, Preserving U.S. Advantage</h2> +<p><em>Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI)</em></p> -<h3 id="mismatch-of-strategy-and-budgets-in-ai-chip-export-controls">Mismatch of Strategy and Budgets in AI Chip Export Controls</h3> +<p>The G7 partners announced PGI, known then as Build Back Better World, at the Carbis Bay summit in June 2021. This effort was intended to counter BRI and target critical infrastructure to support health care, gender, climate, and ICT. The United States has set the goal of mobilizing $200 billion in investments over the next three years as part of the larger $600 billion target made by the G7. Much of PGI’s focus has been on developing economic corridors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, and the Philippines’ Luzon Corridor. Yet there have been few announcements on digital connectivity, which suggests that there is more to be done in this sector through this initiative.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="gregory-c-allen">Gregory C. Allen</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>In 2023, as part of PGI, Africa Data Centers received a $300 million loan from the Development Finance Corporation to construct data centers throughout the continent. The DFC, EXIM, USAID, and USTDA also announced they would build on DFC’s existing financing for Africell in Angola, the DRC, The Gambia, and Sierra Leone (all part of the Lobito economic corridor) to support the expansion of wireless services and a digital payments initiative. Additionally, in the DRC, USTDA and USAID announced the provision of programming and financial support for last-mile connectivity and ORAN equipment for the piloting of U.S. firm Parallel Wireless with Vodacom DRC in five villages.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Regardless of who wins the November 2024 election, export control represents a great deal of unfinished business for the next presidential administration to take on.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><em>Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership (TIP)</em></p> -<p>Two dates from 2022 are likely to echo in geopolitical history. The first, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, hardly needs further explanation. The second is one that many Americans may not recognize. On October 7, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued new export control regulations that placed a de facto ban on U.S. sales to China of the most advanced computer chip hardware that powers modern artificial intelligence (AI) models.</p> +<p>The TIP is a partnership between the DFC, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation ( JBIC), Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and Export Finance Australia (EFA). TIP partners are looking to cofinance infrastructure projects mainly in the Pacific Islands and Southeast Asia. Though there are few projects under the TIP banner, two are in ICT.</p> -<p>The United States and China agree that leadership in AI technology is critical to the future of military power. For years, Chinese government and military procurement records openly advertised the desire for U.S. chips to power Chinese AI surveillance systems and new AI military supercomputing facilities. Since more than 90 percent of AI chips used in Chinese data centers are designed by U.S. semiconductor companies and are therefore subject to U.S. export controls, loss of access to the U.S. chip market could put China’s entire future as an AI superpower in jeopardy.</p> +<p>TIP’s first project has been the Palau spur, an approximately $30 million construction project for a subsea fiber optic cable to the Republic of Palau. The project is to connect to a DFC-financed subsea cable, the world’s longest, which stretches from Singapore to the United States. In May 2023, the TIP partners announced their support for the Australian telecom company, Telstra, in its acquisition of Digicel Pacific. The JBIC and DFC provided $50 million each in credit guarantees for EFA’s $1.33 billion financing package to support the acquisition. Telstra’s move is expected to further Digicel’s delivery of high-quality telecommunication services to more than 2.5 million subscribers in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu, Samoa, Tonga, and Nauru.</p> -<p>Grand historical turning points rarely take the form of long bureaucratic documents, but the October 7 export controls were one of those rare times. Ten days after the new regulations came out, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said: “We are at an inflection point. The post–Cold War world has come to an end, and there is an intense competition underway to shape what comes next. And at the heart of that competition is technology.”</p> +<p><em>Quad</em></p> -<p>Blinken is right. Even though the October 7 export controls were in many ways narrowly targeted on only the most advanced AI chips and chipmaking tools, as a whole, the policy marked a major reversal of over 25 years of trade and technology policy toward China in at least three ways.</p> +<p>The Quad — Australia, India, Japan, and the United States — is also engaged on the ICT front and has announced ICT projects in the Pacific Islands, including on subsea cables and ORAN technology. At the Quad Leaders’ Summit in May 2023, the partners announced the establishment of the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, with the aim of bringing together public and private sector actors to address gaps in this type of infrastructure.</p> -<p>First, the controls were targeted at multiple chokepoints across the semiconductor supply chain, blocking sales not only of the advanced AI chips being used by the Chinese military but also the advanced software and equipment required to make them. The United States is trying to ensure that China cannot replace what the United States is no longer willing to sell.</p> +<p>Under this partnership, Australia is to establish a new Indo-Pacific Cable Connectivity and Resilience Program to share best practices and provide technical assistance to Indo-Pacific governments. The United States is providing technical assistance and capacity building on subsea cable system security through its $5 million CABLES program.</p> -<p>Second, the export controls apply on a geographic basis for China as a whole, not just to the Chinese military. That is a response to China’s strategy of military-civil fusion, which has worked to deepen and obscure the linkages between China’s commercial technology companies and China’s military.</p> +<p>The partners also announced a cooperation with the government of Palau and the Palau National Communications Corporation (PNCC) to design, implement, and operationalize the deployment of ORAN capabilities. The USTDA is expected to fund a technical assistance grant to scope the size and scale of the project. This announcement marked the first planned deployment of ORAN technology in the region.</p> -<p>Third, previous U.S. export controls were designed to allow China to progress technologically but to restrict the pace so that the United States and its allies retained a durable lead. The new policy, by contrast, in some cases aims to actively degrade China’s technological capabilities. Without access to the United States’ enabling technology, many leading Chinese semiconductor firms have been set back years.</p> +<p><em>Global Coalition on Telecommunications (GCOT)</em></p> -<p>It took a long time for the United States to get here. After decades of ratcheting Chinese government provocations, the Biden administration basically said, “enough is enough.”</p> +<p>GCOT was launched in October 2023 by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Japan to increase cooperation and coordination on shared priorities such as telecommunications supply chain diversification and open network architectures, as well as the building of a broader international consensus on key areas of telecommunications policy and the promotion of innovation and growth opportunities in the sector. The U.S. Departments of State and Commerce are the key agencies involved in this initiative. There have been few details or updates since its launch nearly a year ago.</p> -<p>This is not a policy of decoupling (yet), but it is proof of the United States’ unwillingness to remain tightly coupled to the Chinese technology sector under previous conditions. Subsequent policies, such as the Treasury Department’s outbound investment restrictions on China’s AI and semiconductor industries, hint at the United States’ desire for more comprehensive economic security and technology.</p> +<h4 id="private-sector">PRIVATE SECTOR</h4> -<p>But there is a critical gap between the strategic importance and sophistication of the policy’s design and the resources that the government is allocating to enforce it.</p> +<p>A major player in the promotion of diversity in digital equipment is the private sector. Private companies can both benefit from government support and mobilize their own capital and resources to be more competitive. One key argument from host countries is the lack of alternatives to Chinese or other high-risk providers for affordable and speedy installation of technology. However, the European Union, United States, Japan, and South Korea have a host of companies available for partnership that share similar values on information security, intellectual property, and high-quality standards.</p> -<p>The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the U.S. Department of Commerce is the agency charged with enforcing export controls, not just on semiconductors bound for China but for all U.S. dual-use technology exports that might end up in Russia, Iran, North Korea, or other restricted destinations. To implement its work overseeing trillions of dollars in economic activity and policing smuggling operations worldwide, BIS has fewer than 600 employees and a relatively paltry budget of just under $200 million. Semiconductors are just one technology category out of hundreds that this organization is responsible for enforcing.</p> +<p>The United States and its allies are identifying tools to de-risk markets and promote private sector mobilization and have worked with local governments in the developing world to create enabling environments for high standards of investment, but these efforts still lack the speed and the push for U.S.-based companies to invest. More engagement between the U.S. government and private sector is needed in order to implement tools to support U.S. companies and meet host government needs in faster and more transparent ways.</p> -<p>Reporting by The Information found at least eight Chinese AI chip-smuggling networks, with each engaging in transactions valued at more than $100 million. China is betting that its network of smugglers and shell companies can find the leaks in the BIS export control enforcement barrier. As long as Congress continues to neglect BIS by providing grossly inadequate resources compared to the size and importance of its mission, China has a reasonable expectation of success. BIS needs not only more money, but also more skilled staff, more enforcement agents, and better enabling technology, especially for data analysis.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="case-study-india"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Case Study: India</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Moreover, the Department of Commerce needs more help from the rest of the government, in particular the U.S. intelligence community. Declassified Central Intelligence Agency documents show that the intelligence community was deeply involved in assisting export control enforcement during the Cold War and delivered solid results by doing so. These are capabilities and priorities that have significantly atrophied in the post–Cold War era but urgently need to be restored.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">India is at its own inflection point as it pushes to further its already impressive digital public infrastructure (DPI) efforts, attempting to expand resources and connectivity to more than a billion people. There are opportunities in the market, including in ORAN, but preference for competitive local telecom and ICT companies, as well as some skepticism around ORAN, may hamper major headway.</code></em></p> -<p>Regardless of who wins the November 2024 election, export control represents a great deal of unfinished business for the next presidential administration to take on.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A part of India’s success so far is its regulator, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). TRAI was established in 1997 with the objective of creating a fair and transparent market and pushing the country toward more connectivity. India now has the second-largest wireless and wireline subscriber base in the world: 1.72 billion, as of March 2023. India’s teledensity — the number of telephones per 100 population — stood at 84.15 percent as of March 2023, an increase of 10 percent in a decade. The prices of SIM cards and cellular data have also fallen significantly, allowing many more people to access mobile phone technologies.</code></em></p> -<p>Finally, the United States cannot do this alone. U.S. allies need to take a good look at their own export controls and broader economic security toolboxes. There are some innovative economic security policy experiments going on in places like Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Allies need to share information on best practices, align approaches, and devote appropriate resources to have a reasonable chance of success.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Within India, local talent and capable companies have enabled the country to create a strong foundation in data systems. Since India’s DPI endeavor, the country has created a data technology structure known as the “India Stack,” which consists of three different layers: unique identity (Aadhaar); complimentary payments systems (Unified Payments Interface, Aadhaar Payments Bridge, Aadhaar Enabled Payment Service); and data exchange (DigiLocker and Account Aggregator). The layered system enables secure online, paperless, and cashless digital access for a variety of public and private services.</code></em></p> -<h3 id="from-reaction-to-strategy">From Reaction to Strategy</h3> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The usage and benefits speak for themselves. United Payments Interface accounts for 68 percent of all payment transactions in the country. As of February 2024, more than 12 billion transactions are completed every month through UPI. In 2020, with this system in place, the Indian government was able to provide pandemic assistance and a platform for vaccinations. Government reports note that the use of digital payments has expanded the customer base of smaller merchants, which in turn has built a record of credit and cash flow, improving access to finance. In 2009, nearly 400 million Indians lacked a unique identity record, but Aadhaar’s campaign to bring about a national ID succeeded in covering roughly 95 percent of the population by 2022. Japan’s NEC, a company with extensive experience in biometric identification, laid the groundwork for Aadhaar with technologies such as facial and fingerprint recognition. DPI has also benefited government coffers: an estimated 8.8 million new taxpayers were registered between July 2017 and March 2022. Citizens can access documents issued by the central and state governments through one platform, which has streamlined bureaucratic procedures and services. The stack has digitized and simplified Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures, lowering the compliance costs to banks using e-KYC from $12 to $0.06. The biometric system ensures that people cannot assume fake identities and that banks have access to reliable and secure data, both of which contribute to the lowering of compliance costs.</code></em></p> -<p><strong><em>A New Framework for U.S. Export Control Enforcement</em></strong></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Even with a strong foundation, India is looking to expand its digital infrastructure to more users in rural and unconnected areas. It is considering ORAN offerings to see if that approach would be cost effective, high quality, scalable, and secure. Official bilateral and multilateral exchanges on this topic are ongoing; Indian national security advisor Ajit Doval and his U.S. counterpart, Jake Sullivan, have discussed engagement in the ORAN space, and the topic has been included in Quad summits. India and the United States have also launched the Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) initiative, which promotes cooperation between the private sector and research and scientific institutions in both countries to advance next-gen technologies such as AI, telecom, ORAN, quantum computing, semiconductors, and space innovation.</code></em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="barath-harithas">Barath Harithas</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">India has already taken steps toward using ORAN technology in its own industries. In 2023, Tata Consulting Services and Tejas Networks formed a consortium to upgrade 4G and 5G networks; TCS will be the system integrator for the entire telecom network, while Tejas will be responsible for equipment and radio access network (RAN). Indian prime minister Narendra Modi has also traveled to the United States to pitch U.S. companies on partnerships with Indian companies that have investment and implementation experience in 4G, 5G, and ORAN, as well as 5G core, mobile edge cloud solutions, base stations, Internet of Things (IoT) sensors, and 5G smartphones. Indian telecom companies Airtel and Reliance Jio have supported ORAN; Airtel has reportedly conducted a trial of the technology and has signed a deal with U.S.-based Mavenir for its deployment to 4G and 5G sites in low-revenue-generating rural areas, with an initial target of 2,500 sites (to be scaled up to 10,000). Reliance Jio is also developing its own ORAN stack.</code></em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is critical that the U.S government does not engage in a reactive dance that leads to overstretch and inevitable failure. Crucially, the United States must more effectively rally allies to join the fray, transforming a fragmented response into a united front.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Questions remain around costs and scalability. Indian telecom market watchers have queried whether ORAN works for the higher configurations used for 5G networks by Indian telecom companies, noting that they find the technology neither cost effective nor mature. Scalability and feasibility are issues as well. The country head of Mavenir for India has said that he initially expected ORAN deployments to surge, but that the Indian market has proven to be one of the most complex in the world for ORAN rollouts due to a large user base, high population density in cities, and diverse terrain and temperature conditions. India’s more challenging geographic areas may be a better fit for basic 3G, 4G, or 5G infrastructure. Additionally, there are concerns around technology fragmentation; India has benefited from a global standard in which the whole country is integrated. Issues around equipment “super cycles” are also a concern, as each new technological upgrade — from networks to smartphones — comes with its own specialized equipment. With the advent of AI and the likelihood of related technologies emerging, there will need to be significant public and private investment in managing super cycles; most governments, particularly those in developing countries, will need to attract or support that investment in order to both manage the demand for new devices and technologies and build workforce capacity. Finally, questions remain around the viability of ORAN. Some experts would like to see a larger country like the United States pilot and deploy ORAN on a large scale before India undertakes such an effort. To skeptics, ORAN’s unproven elements seem risky for a billion-person country that is looking to keep costs down, integrate systems seamlessly, and ensure safe and secure connectivity.</code></em></p> -<p>The United States has relied on a “siege wall” of export controls to keep critical technologies (e.g., advanced semiconductors) out of Chinese hands. There have been increasing reports highlighting the leakiness of export controls, calling into question the efficacy of what increasingly appears to be a technology Maginot Line for the United States. In light of selective failures, critics have rushed to declare export controls ineffective, overlooking the complexities that inform their enforcement and impact.</p> +<h3 id="recommendations-for-the-united-states-partners-and-the-private-sector">Recommendations for the United States, Partners, and the Private Sector</h3> -<p>The effectiveness of export controls cannot be reduced to a simple binary assessment; it is contingent upon the specific product categories in question. For instance, the smuggling of chips has proven alarmingly straightforward. In 2023, NVIDIA shipped over a million leading-edge chips, each valued at approximately $40,000 and portable enough that 609 units can fit into a single freight box. Conversely, ASML sold only 53 state-of-the-art extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines in 2023, each costing $350 million and requiring 13 truck-sized containers and 250 crates for transportation, with extensive logistics and post-sales support needed. The latter product category has shown far less evidence of smuggling compared to chips, which have reportedly been smuggled in bulk orders valued over $100 million.</p> +<p>Communications technology, including ORAN, is a strategic asset that can enable not only innovation and dynamism through competitive markets (including but not limited to ORAN), but also control, surveillance, and repression (including through closed systems with predatory vendor lock-in). As the United States and its partners work to build out telecommunications networks in the developing world, both the technologies themselves and the regulatory frameworks must be centered around principles of interoperability, security, and openness. Each stakeholder has a role to play to create an enabling environment for good governance and standards, creating the conditions for mobilizing private sector capital and providing safe and reliable access to connectivity.</p> -<p>This essay offers three recommendations for improving export control enforcement:</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As the United States and its partners work to build out telecommunications networks in the developing world, both the technologies themselves and the regulatory frameworks must be centered around principles of interoperability, security, and openness.</code></em></strong></p> -<ol> +<ul> <li> - <p>Enforcement efforts must prioritize areas where compliance is most tractable. This requires a clear-eyed understanding of the objectives behind export controls. The goal is not merely to prevent specific end products from reaching China; rather, the true litmus test of these controls lies in their ability to impede China’s indigenization campaign.</p> - - <p>For instance, while preventing advanced semiconductors from reaching China is crucial, the greater concern is ensuring that China cannot manufacture these technologies at scale. Controls should target more strongly critical chokepoints such as semiconductor manufacturing equipment, especially EUV machines, service and repair components, and electronic design software. Given the inherent leakiness of export controls for chips, it is crucial to recognize that these measures are at best a tool to increase acquisition costs for China in the short run. The ultimate long-term objective, however, must focus on undermining China’s efforts toward technological indigenization and self-sufficiency.</p> + <p><strong>Use Guiding Principles for Secure Networks:</strong> Governing frameworks and values are as important as technology itself. Governments are working to shape these frameworks as innovations emerge and new security concerns manifest alongside them. The Prague Proposals, PGI, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement, and others offer guidelines for trusted, safe, and secure networks. Development and export finance institutions of the United States and its allies should embed these principles in their financing operations. CSIS’s own criteria, the CSIS Criteria for Security and Trust in Telecommunications Networks and Services, also provides a foundation for shared principles and could complement the work of the Prague Proposals and the European Union’s 5G Toolbox. The criteria are designed to help governments and network owners and operators to determine trustworthiness and security. They provide a framework to assess potential suppliers and to implement domestic policies to safeguard telecommunications networks.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The current approach to export control enforcement resembles a game of “whack-a-mole,” where smuggling networks emerge, vanish, and reemerge faster than they can be addressed. To overcome this cycle, regulators need to move from the reactive blacklisting of suspicious entities to implementing a preapprovals regime. In other words, instead of fixating on whom to bar from the game, authorities should shift their focus toward who gets to play. By so doing, regulators can more effectively limit the avenues available for smuggling.</p> - - <p>This can be operationalized through: (1) establishing a certification process during initial procurement to create a marketplace of trusted sellers and to enhance compliance knowledge among stakeholders; (2) implementing digital waybills to reduce documentation fraud and improve traceability, thereby addressing customs evasion; and (3) mandating the use of preapproved logistics providers who are required to report any consignments not received within a specified timeframe to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the Department of Commerce. This measure will help identify suspicious entities and facilitate timely spot checks, creating a more effective feedback loop for detection and enforcement.</p> + <p><strong>Maximize Coordination and Financial Resources among U.S. Agencies and Development Partners:</strong> With the infrastructure finance gap widening and need soaring, DFC, EXIM, and partner development finance and export credit agencies need to work through existing mechanisms such as IPEF, TIP, and the Quad to maximize funds and extend reach. Cofinancing is notoriously difficult, but examples exist in which partners have seen more success when making specific contributions amid a broader project lifecycle, rather than trying to provide general support. Agencies and countries have different strengths that can be applied at various stages. Pooling funds to target specific and focused investments are another way for partners to utilize capital on shared objectives and in regions of shared interest. For example, at the recent Indo-Pacific Business Forum (IPBF) in Singapore, member countries announced the IPEF Catalytic Capital Fund to support the expansion of a clean economy infrastructure project pipeline in the forum’s emerging and upper-middle-income economies. Australia, Japan, Korea, and the United States contributed $33 million in grant funding, with a goal to generate up to $3.3 billion in private investment.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The United States must work more closely with allied partners to multilateralize export controls. U.S. export restrictions on their own are insufficient. They must be the portcullis of the castle, not its keep. The current stalemate stems from the United States expecting allies to mirror its controls, while partners have been overly cautious, fearing such actions might set a precedent for future expectations. This dynamic is unsustainable. The United States must acknowledge the economic concerns of its allies, while allies must recognize that failure to act could result in the United States imposing stricter measures in bilateral settings. There is common interest on both sides to accept a “highest-common-denominator” approach to multilateral controls. By aligning interests, even imperfectly, the United States can enhance collective enforcement capabilities, thereby flushing out the smuggling quarry from remaining avenues.</p> + <p><strong>Reform or Expand EXIM’s CTEP to Support Partner Telecoms:</strong> As CSIS recommended in the report, “The U.S. EXIM Bank in an Age of Great Power Competition,” released this year, CTEP should be more flexible and should include companies interested in participating to be exempt from the EXIM policies that can limit investor competitiveness. EXIM so far has come up short in maximizing CTEP, hampered in part by its requirement to ensure that loans will have a “reasonable assurance of repayment” and its 2 percent loss default ratio cap. To prevent EXIM from self-selecting out of deals and to allow it to take on greater risk (and thus be more competitive), the default cap should be raised in critical industries or on projects that fall under the CTEP umbrella. In line with this, EXIM should lower content requirements for financing. This would allow more U.S. and partner-country companies working in complex supply chains to get more involved in building trusted networks. Some U.S. companies have no choice but to source from abroad, which limits their ability to qualify for EXIM financing. Reasonable conditions for dropping content requirements, particularly for the sake of competitiveness and the promotion of trusted vendors, would almost certainly help the CTEP pipeline and U.S. businesses. The world has changed dramatically in the last 40 years: most supply chains are now global, and competitive manufacturing is a worldwide enterprise. In the same report, CSIS highlighted the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s 2012 report stating that EXIM’s domestic content requirements were too stringent compared to those of other G7 export credit agencies.</p> </li> -</ol> - -<p>In conclusion, as any middling tactician knows, eventually all walls are outflanked. The real question is how easily, and therefore which ones truly deserve our focus. Moreover, given the leanness of BIS, it is critical that the U.S government does not engage in a reactive dance that leads to overstretch and inevitable failure. Crucially, the United States must more effectively rally allies to join the fray, transforming a fragmented response into a united front. By clarifying objectives, refining enforcement strategies, and fostering multilateral cooperation, the United States can reclaim control over the rules of the game and tilt the odds in favor of success against slippery evasion strategies. These recommendations not only address the immediate challenges posed by export control enforcement but also contribute to a more coherent and effective strategy in the long term against technology transfer to adversarial nations.</p> - -<h3 id="defensive-measures-against-china">Defensive Measures Against China</h3> - -<p><strong><em>Time for a Reevaluation</em></strong></p> + <li> + <p><strong>Focus Resources on Key Strategic Markets:</strong> The ITSI fund and other pledged financial commitments are too small given the necessary financing needed to address the digital infrastructure gap. Focusing these funds in geographies and on technologies in which markets and offerings such as ORAN can be piloted and tested would be a better way to provide proof of concept and could later attract further public funding and mobilize private sector capital. Simultaneously targeting a large market such as India or Indonesia, a medium-sized market such as Kenya or Brazil, and a smaller market such as the Pacific or the Caribbean would offer a way to test different geographies, legal and regulatory systems, and population needs. This would provide lessons on successes and obstacles, as well as a road map for scaling up or moving to similar markets.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Create Matchmaking Opportunities and Promote Alternatives:</strong> Host countries and local businesses should work through organized business forums and initiatives to solicit public and private sector funding. Initiatives like PGI and relevant government departments and agencies — such as the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, DFC, and EXIM — should work with local chambers of commerce and other business and trade organizations to establish such forums where they do not exist or strengthen those that do. An example to emulate is the recent IPBF that kicked off the Singapore IPEF Clean Economy Investor Forum. The forum acted as a matchmaker between investors and projects as well as a platform for sharing expertise and best practices in climate-related investments. The forum showcased $23 billion in sustainable infrastructure initiatives in IPEF-member economies — $6 billion of which belong to reportedly shovel-ready projects — to investors and interested governments.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Maintain Leadership on R&amp;D and Deployment:</strong> Nearly all initiatives and funds, including ITSI, have capacity building and technical assistance components. U.S. departments and agencies should offer training opportunities and foster an ecosystem of players involved in testing and integrating their interfaces and equipment, thus ensuring the openness and interoperability of ORAN solutions and other digital infrastructure efforts from trusted providers. This could build on some of the announced projects from the ITSI Fund, PGI, and IPEF, which include funding testing and integration centers, publishing reports and hosting conferences on proofs of concept, organizing workshops to develop and exchange ideas on new technologies, and helping operators test and verify the interoperability of ORAN equipment from different providers. This would be the first step in bringing down the costs of implementing ORAN and helping telecom companies scale their operations in this area.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Foster Accountability in Major Initiatives:</strong> The Quad, PGI, IPEF, and other initiatives have all announced major projects and deliverables at summits, conferences, and leader visits. While announcements are relatively easy, implementing projects and maintaining them amid changing political leadership is harder. An accountability tracker that measures the status of announcements and the impact of such initiatives should be put in place to ensure these projects get off the ground and that there is some way to measure if they are viable. This tracker will provide valuable data on government commitments, lessons learned, and the impact of projects on host communities.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Promote Good Governance and Transparent Regulatory Regimes:</strong> Businesses often cite corruption and the lack of regulatory transparency as major hindrances to investment in developing economies. Much of this governance work has been done in capacity building programs through USAID and in initiatives like IPEF. The Fair Economy pillar has made significant progress; in a June 2024 IPEF ministerial meeting in Singapore, members announced measures to provide technical assistance and capacity building for fighting financial crimes like money laundering and terrorism financing, promote inclusivity in law enforcement on anticorruption efforts, and develop and implement anticorruption policies and measures. Ongoing efforts at the government-to-government level, as well as engagement with the private sector, will build on this foundation to establish a better environment for high-quality projects.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="scott-kennedy">Scott Kennedy</h4> -</blockquote> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">If current trends continue, the U.S. and Chinese economies will be decoupled in many areas, not just advanced technologies with military applications. And it is just as likely that the result of this division will be either global fragmentation or an isolated United States.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Countries across the globe are at an inflection point in deciding the course of digital infrastructure plans. Some are looking to emerging technologies, ensuring their digitalization plans take into account future developments and anticipate the necessary equipment, providers, and workforce. Others are working to ensure that rural communities are connected and can receive important services that foster economic and social development.</p> -<p>On a recent trip to China, I visited a Chinese firm that is on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List. When discussion turned to their designation, they claimed utter disbelief and surprise; they could not fathom what prompted Washington’s action. It is possible that their claims of innocence are genuine, but given their place in an important high-tech sector, likely links to the Chinese party-state, and the nature of some of their customers, one can also see why the U.S. government would have taken this step.</p> +<p>Regardless, any digital infrastructure plan must consider the importance of having a safe, secure, and trusted network. Short-term price and deployment considerations are important, but there are real long-term consequences to hosting personal, business, and government digital traffic on high-risk vendor equipment. The United States and its partners and allies must recognize the need for speed and affordability in host country decisionmaking and make the case that their provisions are a viable alternative. The foundation for doing so exists, but the road map calls for more focus and consistency, as well as further monitoring of results to track accountability and proof of concept.</p> -<p>In fact, it may be difficult to disagree with most, if not every, individual decision the U.S. government has taken in the last five years to protect itself in the face of the broad national security challenge China presents to the United States, its allies, and the rules-based global order. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of all of this action deserves careful evaluation. And where the result is not as intended, Washington needs to recalibrate its policy approach.</p> +<hr /> -<p>There are now around 1,000 Chinese companies and institutions blacklisted by the United States for national security or human rights reasons. The list of “controlled items” that require a license to be exported to China has ballooned, and in the case of advanced semiconductors and semiconductor equipment, the restrictions are country-wide. Extremely high U.S. tariffs – far above standard most favored nation (MFN) levels – are now applied to most Chinese goods, even those with no strategic value. The coverage of sectors in which screening of inward investment deals apply has expanded dramatically, while the United States and its allies have started developing new regulations for outward investment to China. As a result of a law passed in the spring of 2024, social media app TikTok will be banned in the United States unless ByteDance, its parent company, sells the platform to a non-Chinese owner. The Biden administration recently adopted a draft executive order that would ban Chinese connected and autonomous vehicles and their components from the U.S. market starting with the 2027 model year. The administration and Congress are considering a wide range of other defensive measures as well.</p> +<p><strong>Erin Murphy</strong> is deputy director of Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics and senior fellow of Emerging Asia Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She has spent her career in several public and private sector roles, including as an analyst on Asian political and foreign policy issues at the Central Intelligence Agency, director for the Indo-Pacific at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, founder and principal of her boutique advisory firm focused on Myanmar, and an English teacher with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program in Saga, Japan.</p>Erin L. MurphyThe United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer, cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.The West Must Stop Russia2024-11-04T12:00:00+08:002024-11-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-west-must-stop-russia<p><em>After more than a decade of the largest war in Europe since the Second World War, the West can no longer ignore the fact that the tipping point of the global balance of power lies in Ukraine.</em></p> -<p>What does all of this activity add up to? Is it worth it? And might there be a better way? It is time to ask – and answer – these and many other questions. There are at least four potential negative consequences that emerge from this tidal wave.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The Biden administration argues that it is pursuing a “small yard, high fence strategy,” meaning that it aims to protect national security while having as limited an impact on commerce as possible. Mitigating national security vulnerabilities from commerce with China – known as de-risking – may have been the original goal and still may be the overall purpose. But the breadth of the actions and the tit-for-tat, action-reaction by Washington, Beijing, and others is resulting in a far greater reduction of bilateral business and rerouting of supply chains than is reflected in the official policy framing. If current trends continue, the U.S. and Chinese economies will be decoupled in many areas, not just advanced technologies with military applications. And it is just as likely that the result of this division will be either global fragmentation or an isolated United States.</p> +<p>While relentlessly pursuing its genocidal policy to destroy Ukraine as a nation and Ukrainians as a distinct national and ethnic group, Moscow has been pushing an international agenda of a “new world order” to replace the Western-led, rules-based system of international relations.</p> -<p>Second, and relatedly, while individual measures, such as those on advanced semiconductors and equipment, may initially work or be effective for several years, this is far from guaranteed. Although China has long aimed for greater technological self-reliance, there is ample evidence that the industries it has prioritized, the extent of its financial support and other measures, and the willingness of Chinese industry to actively participate has in part been in reaction to this U.S.-led technology boycott. It is possible that in some areas China will advance faster than it otherwise would have in individual technologies and in occupying the leadership of technology ecosystems. Moreover, as a result of less connectivity with Chinese industry and researchers, U.S. innovation may also suffer. If so, instead of mitigating national security risks, the United States may end making the problem worse.</p> +<p>The West’s weak response to Russia’s threat to international peace has catalysed an imploding of the global security order. We are facing an emboldened Sino-Russian alliance which strongly believes there is a window of opportunity to gain the power to set the rules for a new, unfree world, ruled by force.</p> -<p>Third, less connectivity with China means a slower energy transition. Yes, China has unfairly subsidized clean-energy products such as solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and electric vehicles. And, yes, it sold a substantial portion of overproduction on global markets, threatening competitors in many countries. That said, a straight-out ban of such goods from other markets will necessarily mean less products in the short term. Additionally, if protection is not made conditional on the rapid development of high-quality domestic alternatives at prices the middle class can afford, these restrictions will be for naught.</p> +<p>Russia’s large-scale destruction of Ukraine is tangible evidence of how international peace can crumble in front of our eyes when rogue actors who seek to detonate it demonstrate more determination and resolve than those who purport to defend it. The free world’s demonstrable lack of resolute will to uphold international law is a major factor in the current global crisis and invites further chaos and violence.</p> -<p>And fourth, the U.S. approach is changing the nature of the international economic order in front of our eyes. In the 1960s, in the face of growing competition from Japan and other East Asian countries, the United States and its allies developed the rules and tools for anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and with them the underlying principles of “fair trade.” Although these tools have various biases and are subject to widespread abuse, they did provide compensation to industries that were suffering from greater international competition and, as a result, kept the greater project of globalization alive. The expansion of export controls and other defensive measures is fundamentally challenging the notion – embedded in the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – that national security justifications to restrict international commerce should be limited and the exception to the rule. The rise of “economic security” as a rationale for policy even more directly threatens to make open commerce and financial flows a thing of the past.</p> +<p>This historic moment calls for urgent revision of the current Western course of conspicuously inadequate actions to remove the threat of Russia as the linchpin of the anti-Western, anti-democratic axis. If the world is to avoid a new global conflict, Western policy must be refocused on a full commitment to defending the principles of the liberal rules-based order that is designed to make the world safer.</p> -<p>The seriousness of the Chinese challenge to the United States and the rules-based order requires definitive policies, but it does not justify any and all policies. The United States and its allies need to reassess their approach and adapt as needed. Here are three recommendations:</p> +<h3 id="the-russian-threat">The Russian Threat</h3> -<ol> - <li> - <p>The United States needs to decide precisely what kind of outcomes it wants and what kind of outcomes it is unwilling to accept. Is bifurcation of the global economy, even if the United States is relatively isolated, acceptable simply because it means less connectivity with China? Would it be acceptable for the United States to maintain technological advantage over China if it means the elimination of a rules-based order and a race to the bottom in the use of tools to restrict global commerce?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Washington needs to include cost-benefit analysis for its overall approach and for each policy initiative. The presence of a national security risk does not mean the costs of any one policy are irrelevant. In fact, there are usually multiple possible options to address a risk, and their relative costs and benefits should be weighed, and done so with transparency.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>And finally, because this overall shift is so consequential to the U.S. national security and economy, more information about individual cases and the broader national security threat China poses to the United States needs to be shared with the U.S. public. The U.S. government should consider how much more information could be shared without compromising U.S. intelligence methods and sources. The Chinese interlocutors I met during a recent trip may not deserve a clearer explanation, but as a part of a democracy, the American people deserve to know more.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>Vladimir Putin’s Russia is not just an existential threat to Ukraine. Russia’s aggressive, revanchist regime is the origin point of the international anti-Western axis. Just as at other critical moments in its history, Russia is once again redefining itself through confrontation with the West. Moscow is challenging Western primacy in international relations in order to reclaim its status of global power. For the Kremlin, the freedom to act above and outside the limits and restrictions of international law is the symbol of such supremacy.</p> -<p>It is possible that taking these steps could yield the conclusion that substantial changes in policy are needed. But it is also possible that the current approach could be reaffirmed. Hence, there should be a consensus in favor of being more careful, deliberate, and transparent.</p> +<p>For the past two decades, the world has been observing an escalating “Russia crisis” – the critical threat posed by a criminal, militarised, totalitarian, aggressive, revanchist and genocidal regime to international peace. Rather than countering the growing threat, Western policy has relied on the “too big to fail” approach in dealing with Moscow. Consequently, Russia has largely enjoyed protection from the consequences of its criminal actions, and has been able to continue pursuing its nefarious strategic course.</p> -<h2 id="the-investing-in-america-agenda">The Investing in America Agenda</h2> +<p>Moscow’s goal is to replace the current liberal, rules-based international system with a “new world order”, where the role of the West is notably reduced. This was Vladimir Putin’s message in speeches given in 2014, 2023 and 2024.</p> -<h3 id="clustering-for-innovation">Clustering for Innovation</h3> +<p>In 2014, Putin made a threatening warning which made clear that Russia will have no limits in pursuing this goal:</p> <blockquote> - <h4 id="sujai-shivakumar">Sujai Shivakumar</h4> + <p>“… changes in the world order – and what we are seeing today are events on this scale – have usually been accompanied by, if not global war and conflict, then by chains of intensive local-level conflicts.”</p> </blockquote> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">By fostering the growth of thick regional ecosystems, partnerships encourage more Americans to connect to and have a stake in the nation’s economic future – securing the nation from within.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Russia’s hostile ambitions were spelled out formally when, in 2021, Moscow issued an ultimatum to NATO, publicly outlining its far-reaching demands for a dangerous level of influence over the eastern flank of the alliance.</p> -<p>Last month, the Elevate Quantum Tech Hub broke ground on the new Quantum Tech Park in Arvada, Colorado. It is one of 31 Tech Hubs designated by the U.S. Department of Commerce to stimulate innovation-based regional economic growth. This initiative is one part of a larger effort across the federal government to expand and connect innovation networks across the nation.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Western powers continue to treat Russia as a pillar of the strategic global balance, as a consequence of which their policy towards Russian aggression has been ultimately premised on Kyiv making concessions to Moscow</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="the-push-from-the-chips-and-science-act">The Push from the CHIPS and Science Act</h4> +<p>Moscow’s determination to defy the West has been severely underestimated. The quest for a “new world order”, driven by the Sino-Russian alliance, is changing global dynamics. In essence, the new Eastern-led order is based on taking advantage of the globalised economy while destroying the liberal rules-based international order. Rogue regimes in Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela and Belarus are being legitimised. The expanding BRICS group is building an alternative economic system of the “global majority” to provide shelter from Western sanctions and ensure global political dominance.</p> -<p>The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 established a suite of grant programs designed to catalyze technology cluster development, including the Tech Hubs Program through the Economic Development Administration at the Department of Commerce, the Microelectronics Commons Hubs through the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Innovation Engines through the National Science Foundation (NSF):</p> +<p>To claim domination, the Sino-Russian alliance is committed to:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>The Department of Commerce’s Tech Hubs envisions 31 regional consortia that focus on specific emerging technologies. Starting in July 2024, 12 hubs have each received “implementation funding” between $19 million and $51 million for workforce development and manufacturing initiatives.</p> + <p>Advancing an international agenda of creating spheres of influence by instigating conflicts and chaos to fracture global solidarity.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The DOD’s Microelectronics Commons Hubs consists of eight networks that aim to close the “lab-to-fab” gap in microelectronics for commercial and defense applications, each receiving between $15 million and $40 million.</p> + <p>Displacing the universal rules-based order through special bilateral arrangements that advance a global power alignment tilted towards their alliance, with Beijing being the biggest beneficiary.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The NSF’s Innovation Engines include 10 regions that each have received an initial $15 million in grants covering multiple technology domains, such as robotics, advanced materials, and artificial intelligence.</p> + <p>Reversing humanity’s progress by challenging the universal nature of human rights and political freedoms.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Reducing the global domain of freedom by subverting democracies and by corrupting political and economic establishments to foment authoritarianism.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Diminishing the influence of Western democracies in international relations by subverting international organisations.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>The largest awards, at $51 million each, went to four of the Department of Commerce’s Tech Hubs: Heartland Bioworks in Indianapolis, Indiana; iFAB TechHub in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois; Sustainable Polymers Tech Hub in Akron, Ohio; and Tulsa Hub for Equitable and Trustworthy Autonomy in Tulsa, Oklahoma.</p> +<p>The objective of the Sino-Russian strategy is a return to an inherently dangerous and divisive “might makes right” reality in international relations. While disguised as a universal order of sovereign and equal states, such a system defies the equal application of international law to exempt the great powers from any restrictions imposed by universal rules.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZTR7iH7.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Federal Investments in Regional Emerging Technology Hubs Under the CHIPS Act, 2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.eda.gov/funding/programs/regional-technology-and-innovation-hubs">“Regional Technology and Innovation Hubs (Tech Hubs),“ U.S. Economic Development Administration, accessed October 22, 2024</a>; <a href="https://microelectronicscommons.org/">“The Microelectronics Commons: A National Network of Prototyping Innovation Hubs,“ Microelectronics Commons, accessed October 22, 2024</a>; and <a href="https://new.nsf.gov/funding/initiatives/regional-innovation-engines">“Regional Innovation Engines,“ U.S. National Science Foundation, accessed October 22, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<p>The new Eastern-led order will privilege major international actors with influence and power to coerce smaller countries. While talking about “multipolarity” and “multilateralism”, both Moscow and Beijing share the position of denying smaller countries equal standing in international relations. This essence of the “new order” is illustrated perfectly by the policy of the anti-Western axis towards Ukraine, which promotes and serves Russian interests.</p> -<h4 id="drawing-in-additional-investments">Drawing in Additional Investments</h4> +<h3 id="the-wests-self-defeating-russia-policy">The West’s Self-Defeating Russia Policy</h3> -<p>These federal awards are expected to induce investment from the private sector and local governments, and in some cases already have. In addition to their $40.5 million implementation grant from the Department of Commerce, Elevate Quantum received $77 million from the state of Colorado and $10 million from New Mexico, including a portion dedicated to a loan guarantee program. Additionally, Elevate Quantum has attracted over $1 billion in private and venture capital investment. These stacked investments facilitate the creation and expansion of innovation and industrial networks that connect researchers, designers, manufacturers, equipment suppliers, materials suppliers, and end users.</p> +<p>At its core, Western Russia policy – especially since Vladimir Putin’s revanchist speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference – has been mostly focused on global strategic stability.</p> -<h4 id="fostering-workforce-training-and-development">Fostering Workforce Training and Development</h4> +<p>The US’s reset of relations with Russia after the latter’s 2008 war on Georgia ushered in a period of a doomed appeasement strategy. Instead of taming Moscow’s aggression by firmly upholding international law, Putin’s quest to satisfy revanchist “grievances” was tolerated. This policy resulted in destructive consequences for the world. An emboldened Kremlin unleashed disinformation, interference, corruption, subversion and violence on a scale which affects the entire trajectory of global affairs.</p> -<p>Next, by centering workforce development and training, these hubs also help meet the high demand for a skilled technical workforce while ensuring that regional and local communities benefit from their activities. With a sustained focus on education, including vocational training at community colleges, as well as the development of pathways to high-quality jobs, these investments are needed to sustain more inclusive growth within local and regional ecosystems. The new National Science and Technology Council Workforce Center of Excellence, supported by a $250 million investment from the U.S. Department of Commerce, plays a similar role in prioritizing workforce development.</p> +<p>Russia’s war on Ukraine has been the main point of its attack on international peace and security in its efforts to re-establish global dominance.</p> -<h4 id="connecting-resources">Connecting Resources</h4> +<p>From the beginning of Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war of aggression on Ukraine in 2014, the West misdefined this interstate war as a “Ukraine crisis” to diminish the international threat of an aggressive Russia. The horrific images of Moscow’s 2022 large-scale offensive and consequent massacres of Ukrainian civilians forced Western leaders to face the grim reality of the actual “Russia crisis”. Now, in 2024, there is finally a growing understanding that Moscow is using its war against Ukraine as a system-changing conflict within a global confrontation driven by the Sino-Russian alliance to bring down the Western-led rules based order.</p> -<p>Finally, these grant programs actively connect existing and new public and private resources. Some programs span several consortia, allowing for synergies to form across firms, universities, and research organizations engaged in a variety of emerging technologies. For example, the Elevate Quantum Tech Hub is just down the road from the Rocky Mountain Innovation Engine, easing potential collaboration across teams working on quantum, AI, renewable energy, and robotics. Likewise, both the Southwest Advanced Prototyping Microelectronics Commons Hub and Southwest Sustainability Innovation Engine will be hosted by Arizona State University, accelerating mutual advances in fields including advanced manufacturing, 5G/6G, disaster mitigation, and products for end users.</p> +<p>Despite committing grave violations of international law and undermining world peace, Russia has largely enjoyed protection from the consequences of its criminal actions. At the same time, Ukraine – the victim of Russia’s unprovoked and illegal aggression – has been bound hand and foot in exercising its legal right to self-defence.</p> -<h4 id="going-beyond-proximity">Going Beyond Proximity</h4> +<p>Russia – a country with nuclear capabilities and an army, territory and economy many times larger than that of Ukraine – continues to be shielded from concerted international action to counteract its genocidal war of aggression, while Ukraine – a country which gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security – has been struggling to receive sufficient international support to defend itself against genocide and safeguard international principles that benefit all.</p> -<p>This all-of-government strategy to develop a network of connected regional innovation ecosystems recognizes that economically dynamic innovation clusters are an outcome of active and interlinked networks of cooperation among entrepreneurs, investors, educational and research organizations, small and large firms, public agencies, and philanthropies. While successful technology clusters are one outcome of networking, collaboration requires more than simply locating assets in proximity to one another. Multiple actors spread across different organizations need incentives to work together in complex ways to fund, research, develop, scale up, and bring new products and services to the marketplace.</p> +<p>The inept international response to Russia’s war against Ukraine exposes the grotesque design of the international security system. Eight decades on from the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the peace and security of humanity is still at the mercy of the two totalitarian, genocidal regimes in Moscow and Beijing, and critically depends on the political resolve in three Western capitals – Washington, London and Paris. In Ukraine’s case, the political position in Berlin also bears influence, considering Germany’s important role in the EU and NATO.</p> -<p>A suite of public-private partnerships that address the specific challenges of cooperation provides this alignment. The programs discussed above will need to work in complement with other federal and state programs – including partnerships such as the Small Business Innovation Research program, the Manufacturing USA centers, and the Manufacturing Extension Partnership – to grow connective tissue across the innovation ecosystem.</p> +<p>Western powers continue to treat Russia as a pillar of the strategic global balance. It is as a direct consequence of this radically flawed approach that Western policy towards Russian aggression has been ultimately premised on Kyiv making concessions to Moscow.</p> -<h4 id="need-for-continuity">Need for Continuity</h4> +<p>From 2014, Russian interests were accommodated by ever-shifting Western red lines on the invasion; by the position of there being “no military solution” to the conflict which invited bolder Russian aggression; by Washington’s “leading from behind” to avoid a more active role in fulfilling its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum; by symbolic sanctions incommensurate with Moscow’s transgressions; by the Berlin- and Paris-mediated “peace process” which implied concessions from Ukraine by design; and by the policy of “de-escalation” which denied military assistance for Ukraine to mount an effective defence.</p> -<p>By fostering the growth of thick regional ecosystems, partnerships encourage more Americans to connect to and have a stake in the nation’s economic future – securing the nation from within. They are also essential to drive the nation’s technological competitiveness in global markets and ensure security from external threats.</p> +<p>While Western support for Ukraine has dramatically increased since 2022, when Russia’s role as the aggressor was finally recognised by the UN, the policy approach has remained stuck in the logic that “Russia is too big to fail”.</p> -<p>To be successful, partnerships must address the challenges of collaboration across multiple actors, operate at sufficient scale, and be seen as dependable and durable. This means that partnerships need to be evaluated and recalibrated regularly to ensure that they are well focused operationally. It is also important to recognize that innovation partnership programs work in complement with each other, forming mutually reinforcing networks of institutions that solve diverse problems requiring collective action. Moreover, if partnerships are to grow this connective tissue of collaboration, it requires policy patience. Long-term, sustained investments are needed for connections to take root. In this regard, policymakers need to recognize that the CHIPS and Science Act is not a one-and-done deal. Especially in this era of intense innovation-based competition for markets and national power, securing technological leadership must be a substantial and sustained bipartisan effort.</p> +<p>All the major points of Western policy, such as the refusal to deploy NATO troops in Ukraine; the limitations on the use of Western-supplied weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory (and for some, even in Ukraine’s Crimea); and statements like “Russia cannot win in Ukraine”, “we will support Ukraine for as long as it takes”, “we must help Ukraine to strengthen its position at the negotiating table” or “Ukraine will be able to join NATO after winning the war” reflect the underlying reality that Russia’s interests, however illegitimate, play a weighty role in Western decision-making.</p> -<h3 id="meeting-the-energy-demands-of-economic-competition">Meeting the Energy Demands of Economic Competition</h3> +<p>Instead of fully committing to helping Kyiv repel Russian aggression, the West chose to pursue “escalation management”, enabling Moscow to wreak havoc in Ukraine and largely protecting Russia from the war.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="joseph-majkut">Joseph Majkut</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The limited support for Ukraine makes clear that the West never truly had a strategy for Russia’s defeat – which would entail complete unconditional withdrawal of Russian military formations from all of Ukraine, the renunciation of Moscow’s territorial claims, justice for war criminals, and reparations. Without Russia’s defeat, there cannot be a Ukrainian victory, only de facto or de jure concessions by Kyiv.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">By pursuing immediately available options today and zero-carbon options in the medium term, the United States can realize progress toward strategic goals and improve its competitiveness without sacrificing climate outcomes.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>A defeated Russia is an infinitely lesser threat than an undefeated Russia. Sacrificing Ukraine will not solve the problem of the aggressive, revanchist, totalitarian Russian state. If the black hole of Putin’s Russia swallows Ukraine, it will increase its gravitational pull. The West will face the consequences of the new global power re-alignment, consisting first and foremost of Sino-Russian domination in Europe.</p> -<p>As the United States adopts a more assertive approach to economic security and technological competition, it must adapt its energy policy. These efforts promise an economy that will be better able to weather global challenges, revitalizing regions with innovative technology and productive jobs and establishing a strong lead in twenty-first-century technologies. However, realizing the potential of these industries will require more energy, placing demands on the electric grid and necessitating a smart approach in order to be successful.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The West’s obsessive and unjustifiable avoidance of confrontation with Russia in fact increases the risk of direct engagement becoming the only option</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Under current policies, the United States is building a new industrial base in strategic technologies. Enabled by recent legislation – the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act – semiconductor fabs and battery factories now account for 60 percent of manufacturing investment. As these factories come online, they will introduce substantial new power requirements, as documented in a recent report from CSIS. The new TSMC semiconductor fabrication facility in Arizona will require more than a gigawatt of power. In Georgia, where manufacturing is a key driver of economic growth, planners are expecting six gigawatts of additional demand, more than twice what was added by the recently finished Units 3 and 4 at the Vogtle nuclear plant.</p> +<p>In fact, by refusing to shoot down Russian missiles and drones in NATO airspace; by refusing to implement a humanitarian military mission to protect Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, especially its nuclear power plants; by drip-feeding military aid to Kyiv, withholding critically needed weapons and imposing restrictions on Ukrainian strikes against Russia; by stalling on NATO membership for Ukraine; and by accepting China’s say on the security of Europe, the West – and the US in particular – has already manifestly relinquished its leadership role in international relations.</p> -<p>For a sector that has seen negligible growth over the past two decades, these are substantial increases, and they do not even account for the rapidly growing power demands involved in artificial intelligence (AI). Akin to factories, AI datacenters transform data and electricity into valuable tokens. The more value AI creates, the greater its associated power demands become. Optimistic projections suggest AI datacenters could consume up to 10 percent of grid capacity by the end of the decade. Such an expansion has the potential to generate immense value but could be hindered by an inability to provide sufficient energy.</p> +<p>The self-defeating policy of risk aversion has also severely damaged the credibility of NATO’s own deterrence. NATO is projecting the image of a panic room, not that of an actionable force capable of providing security – even for its own members.</p> -<p>To achieve these goals, it is important to continue reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The companies driving growth in AI and advanced manufacturing are committed to clean power. And policymakers, on a bipartisan basis, recognize the advantages of producing goods with lower emissions. Compared to adversaries like Russia and China, the United States produces key strategic goods with fewer emissions. As global markets increasingly prioritize sustainability, cleanliness will become synonymous with competitiveness.</p> +<h3 id="the-cost-of-inertia-is-rapidly-rising">The Cost of Inertia is Rapidly Rising</h3> -<p>The next administration will be well-positioned to build upon recent industry innovations and policy developments, leveraging U.S. natural resources and ingenuity. Three key areas are particularly important to unlocking the United States’ economic and strategic potential:</p> +<p>The alarming lack of resolute political will in Western capitals to uphold the fundamental rules of global security is giving oxygen to Russia’s and its anti-Western allies’ ambition to reshape our world according to their oppressive vision.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Transmission:</strong> Building extensive transmission infrastructure reduces power grid costs by increasing efficiency and better utilizing assets. Transmission infrastructure connects markets to geographically diverse power plants, reducing costs during normal operations, keeping the lights on during emergencies, and delivering renewable power from remote regions to manufacturing hubs, thereby reducing both costs and emissions while also contributing to carbon competitiveness. Accelerating the build out of transmission capability requires political leadership to create urgency for delivering these complicated projects, particularly at the state level and through federal permitting reform, which will pay off in future economic opportunities. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law authorized the Department of Energy (DOE) $2.5 billion for transmission, which will spur a few projects, but the large societal benefits from increased transmission justify tax credit support akin to what is already offered for wind and solar projects.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Nuclear Energy:</strong> Expanding the nuclear fleet is a medium-term option for meeting new demand. Nuclear power emits no greenhouse gas emissions and is highly reliable, making it a key target for technology companies, which are already contracting to restart old reactors. Building new nuclear power plants will be challenging, and potentially expensive, but necessary to achieve national goals. New projects face substantial costs and the risk of budget overruns, but new subsidies are meant to solidify the business case for nuclear energy production and to support project development. As new ventures are deployed, the consequent supply chains and worker experience will reduce costs for later projects and also decrease the timeline and project uncertainty that has plagued projects in the past.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Natural Gas:</strong> Following the shale revolution, natural gas has become the mainstay of the U.S. energy mix. High supplies and low prices mean that at least part of new demand will be met by new gas power plants, the building of which can be left to the market. However, to ensure the gas industry’s longevity and to address related climate concerns, policymakers will need to prioritize carbon capture technology, especially by supporting the development of CO2 pipelines linking new generators with storage reservoirs. Congress has already created the 45Q tax credits to incentivize the capturing of carbon, and the DOE is supporting first-of-a-kind projects to reduce costs. Getting ahead on this infrastructure will enable the United States to meet immediate demands for natural gas in a way that supports longer-term ambitions for sustainability.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The West cannot isolate itself from the outcome of Russia’s war. This is no longer about “helping Ukraine”, but about the responsibility of Western governments to their own citizens to ensure a peaceful future.</p> -<p>To seize these new opportunities, the United States must confront familiar challenges: maintaining affordability, reducing emissions, and protecting reliability. By pursuing immediately available options today and zero-carbon options in the medium term, the United States can realize progress toward strategic goals and improve its competitiveness without sacrificing climate outcomes. By uniting bipartisan support and implementing smart, regionally adaptable solutions, the United States can seize this opportunity to ensure a sustainable and prosperous future for all.</p> +<p>The West’s obsessive and unjustifiable avoidance of confrontation with Russia in fact increases the risk of direct engagement becoming the only option. For now, while the Ukrainian army maintains high combat readiness, NATO countries can still avoid a direct face-off with Russia by deploying their troops away from the frontline to help Ukraine protect civilian areas and critical infrastructure and deter invasion from Belarus or, potentially, Russia-occupied Transnistria in Moldova if Russia succeeds in subverting the pro-Western course of Chișinău.</p> -<h3 id="intellectual-property-rights-and-the-future-of-us-technological-leadership">Intellectual Property Rights and the Future of U.S. Technological Leadership</h3> +<p>With North Korea sending troops to fight Ukraine, the West’s response to Russia’s war is a watershed moment for the future of humanity. Ukrainians shouldn’t be fighting alone to defend the rules-based order. Not fighting alongside Ukraine means helping Russia to achieve its nefarious goals.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="kirti-gupta">Kirti Gupta</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>If the West fails to defend the universality of the values of freedom and justice in Ukraine, it will eventually find itself in the role of the global “minority”, while the Sino-Russian alliance will be legitimised as the voice of the “global majority” and proceed to impose its will over the entirety of the international system.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Policymakers face the challenge of striking the appropriate balance between incentivizing investment in risky R&amp;D while ensuring that any social cost due to potential misuse of the IP system is minimized.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The free world urgently needs leadership from both sides of the Atlantic to safeguard the vision of the rules-based order, where countries are protected from spheres of influence and oppressive domination. Rogue states breaking the foundational rules of global security and peace must face a commensurate response. The world needs united and devoted action to save Ukraine in order to save the world.</p> -<p>The global competition for leadership in technologies critical for the economic and national security of nation states – from semiconductors to artificial intelligence and quantum computing – is well understood. A less well-known pillar is the intellectual property (IP) system, which is crucial for incentivizing and enabling the innovation necessary for this technological leadership. This article sheds a spotlight on why and how IP plays that essential role.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The IP system is designed to incentivize innovation by granting the investor temporary property rights for an invention or a creation. The patent system is critical to incentivizing research and development (R&amp;D) in some areas that require massive upfront investment and have uncertain prospects for success. One example is biopharmaceuticals, which requires years of R&amp;D for discovery, in addition to a long regulatory process to get approval for a new drug to enter the market. The design of semiconductor chips is another example, as it requires highly skilled and specialized workers and large upfront costs to develop new and improved cutting-edge circuit design for specific functionalities.</p> +<p><strong>Volodymyr Ohryzko</strong> is Director of the Centre for Russian Studies in Ukraine. He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine from 2007-2009 and the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Austria from 1999-2004.</p> -<p>If an invention is finally successful in the marketplace, the patent owner enjoys a temporary right to exclude others from making, using, or selling that invention. Patent owners can also license their invention and grant these rights to another, thereby generating revenues from the initial R&amp;D investment and enabling the diffusion of new technology. On the flip side, there have been concerns about misuse of the patent system by patent aggregators who allegedly amass a number of patents that may not be valid (i.e., erroneously granted in the first place), invoke patent protections in instances where they do not apply, or amass patents of limited value. These patent aggregators are not seeking to develop or market inventions but rather aim to extract quick monetary settlements from the patent implementers, who are seeking to avoid litigation costs or a temporary disruption of their products.</p> +<p><strong>Roman Sohn</strong> is an international law expert and researcher on the Russian war on Ukraine and Russia’s genocide against Ukrainians.</p> -<p>Policymakers face the challenge of striking the appropriate balance between incentivizing investment in risky R&amp;D while ensuring that any social cost due to potential misuse of the IP system is minimized. The United States’ IP system goes through phases. It is sometimes characterized as too strong, granting property rights for “weak” inventions and creating unnecessary costs and uncertainty for implementers. At other times, it is seen as too weak, lacking the tools for proper enforcement of the property rights that incentivize innovation.</p> +<p><strong>Ariana Gic</strong> is the Director of the Direct Initiative International Centre for Ukraine and a Senior Advisor at the Centre for Eastern European Democracy. Ms Gic is sanctioned by the Russian Federation.</p>Volodymyr Ohryzko, et al.After more than a decade of the largest war in Europe since the Second World War, the West can no longer ignore the fact that the tipping point of the global balance of power lies in Ukraine.SIFMANet Pretoria Report2024-11-01T12:00:00+08:002024-11-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sifmanet-pretoria-report<p><em>This report details the roundtable discussions in Pretoria to share views on South African policy relating to the sanctions on Russia and Belarus, as well as other issues of financial integrity.</em></p> -<p>If history serves as a guide, it is pointing in the direction of a revival of the IP regime in the United States. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce maintains the Global IP Index, which ranks countries based on the robustness of their IP system; in recent years, the United States slid to number 13, before climbing back up again to first position. A 2011 study on the economic cost to the United States of IP infringement from China received a lot of attention. Moreover, injunctive relief – sought by patent owners in courtrooms to stop infringers from copying their inventions or copyrighted material – has become increasingly rare. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), responsible for granting patents, can also invalidate patents via serial rounds of challenges on the validity of a patent while such litigation is pending. In response to this environment, several legislative proposals are currently in different phases of markup in Congress. These pieces of legislation involve expanding the eligibility of patentable subject matter, strengthening the enforceability of patents, and limiting serial challenges to a granted patent while it is in the process of a legal challenge based on potential infringement.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The U.S. IP regime does not exist in isolation. Recently, the European Union established the Unified Patent Court, with one of its goals being fast-tracking patent-challenge trials. China has been strengthening its IP regime, including by establishing four specialized IP courts in the last two decades. Since IP rights are often licensed on a global basis to reduce transaction costs, how one country enforces those rights directly impacts others. The IP enforcement regime of the United States needs to become stronger and faster to avoid litigation of disputes around global IP portfolios moving to other jurisdictions.</p> +<p>In mid-September 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI, with the support of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), hosted a roundtable in Pretoria. The roundtable provided a forum for private and public sector participants, including banks and government departments (as detailed below), to share views on South African policy relating to the sanctions levied by G7 states on Russia and Belarus, as well as other issues of financial integrity. Identities of participants are confidential.</p> -<p>The United States is currently a leader in several critical technologies that rely on revenues generated from the licensing of IP rights in global markets. Most of the innovation in the United States is driven by R&amp;D investments from the private sector, which must be incentivized to invest in long-term R&amp;D. Technological leadership is the result of long-term, consistent R&amp;D investment, and the United States must continue incentivizing the private sector so that the country remains a technological leader going forward.</p> +<p>This roundtable was accompanied by a series of additional meetings in Johannesburg and Cape Town with representatives from the financial services industry, academics, policy analysts and government stakeholders, covering expertise in foreign policy, financial services regulation, and sanctions and compliance. These included, among others, the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), the State Security Agency (SSA) and the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC). This event is part of the in-country engagements conducted by the CFS-led Sanctions and the Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.</p> -<p>If the United States has an innovation agenda – that is, if it aims to invest and lead in critical emerging technologies to bolster U.S. economic and national security – IP must have a prominent role. A strong IP enforcement regime, with clear boundaries around IP rights and which can ensure quality inventions are granted those rights, helps the inventors and implementers, who are both needed for an innovation ecosystem to thrive. The next administration should consider IP as a part of the broader innovation agenda and not view it as an issue of technical obscurity to be treated in isolation. A strong IP system works for everyone. The United States can continue to lead in R&amp;D-intensive innovation and product development and minimize infringement, especially outside of U.S. borders, by pursuing three key actions: (1) strengthening the USPTO with resources to ensure that only quality (and valid) inventions get the appropriate IP protection; (2) streamlining the system of repeat validity challenges on already granted inventions; and (3) making progress on the legislative proposals for enhancing the enforceability of legitimate IP rights.</p> +<p>Participants in the discussions fell into two general categories, which steered the conversations in the following ways:</p> -<h3 id="the-necessity-of-a-national-interest-account">The Necessity of a National Interest Account</h3> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Academics and policy analysts: South Africa has limited direct trade with Russia, but for many reasons the political relationship is stronger than the figures imply. As a result, many representatives of the academic and policy research communities have travelled to Russia since 2022 to attend trade fairs and other economic and political events. These participants tended to focus on local policymaking sovereignty and political matters, rather than assessing South Africa’s position on Russia sanctions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Financial services: Many participants in the meetings worked in compliance and legal functions in banks, or in supervisory and regulatory roles relating to the sector. In contrast to the academics and policy analysts, these participants expressed considerable concern about the need to balance international regulators’ and banking partners’ expectations against South Africa’s policy of neutrality, non-alignment and multilateralism.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="adam-frost">Adam Frost</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>As a result, the discussions covered a wide range of topics, but generally were concerned thematically with how South Africa can create its own independent diplomatic and political path while also benefiting from cooperation with competing great powers.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The next administration should therefore make a counterintuitive move and immediately propose structural changes that increase its options for execution. This is where a National Interest Account should be a top priority.</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="non-alignment-and-the-material-consequences-of-sanctions">Non-alignment and the Material Consequences of Sanctions</h3> -<p>It is no surprise that the next administration will immediately confront a knot of challenges at the intersection of economic growth, technological advantage, national security, and foreign policy. Right now, excellent thinkers are searching for new frameworks to conceptualize this complexity and to inform the strategies and policies of the next president. This is important intellectual work.</p> +<p>Participants’ initial reactions to engagement regarding sanctions focused on South Africa’s policies of multilateralism and neutrality. The government’s policy is to enforce only UN sanctions, rejecting what it sees as unilaterally applied restrictive measures on Russia and Belarus. As one government representative put it: “We value our relations with our partners whether it’s where the sun rises or where the sun sets.”</p> -<p>The more urgent work for the next administration, however, involves immediately proposing reforms that increase the government’s options for executing its strategies, whenever they are determined.</p> +<p>Participants frequently referred to the theoretical dimensions of the fallout of this stance, and a sense of being stuck in the middle between fighting factions. A failure to apply sanctions would worsen relationships with the G7, while applying them would cause political (if not trading) difficulties with Russia. “Being forced to choose sides between Russia and the West – this is not something we should be asked to do”, one academic participant noted. Several participants described the situation as similar to Cold War-era divisions. As a result, some noted that government decisions are rooted at times not in a policy’s merit, but its perceived geopolitical alignment.</p> -<p>And a National Interest Account should be proposal number one.</p> +<p>At the same time, private sector participants noted that South Africa’s historically close ties to Russia had led some leaders to make statements that undermined its neutral position. According to one participant, “sometimes what comes out of politicians’ mouths is not non-alignment, and that does affect perceptions of the country”.</p> -<h4 id="execution-before-strategy">Execution Before Strategy?</h4> +<p>The conversation then focused on sanctions’ effects in South Africa, with participants highlighting numerous developmental dilemmas that South African policymakers face. For example, government representatives cited the need for economic growth and new jobs for a growing and ambitious population, with one saying, “we would like to see a safer Africa in a better world that is peaceful”.</p> -<p>The “usual path” of strategy development is well travelled. After a new administration takes office, it formally begins translating the president’s platform into specific strategies, plans, and policies.</p> +<p>Academic participants noted the developmental impact of the sanctions, highlighting the timing immediately following the Covid-19 pandemic. They noted the inflationary pressures and resulting interest rate increases, which one participant observed “led to a significant effect on the masses, particularly on the poor indebted”. Another academic agreed, highlighting the sanctions’ impact on the “debt crisis in the African continent”.</p> -<p>How you define the question dictates the answer. And how the next administration conceptualizes and then articulates a strategic approach to the complex and interdependent challenges of competition for economic growth, technological advantage, national security, and foreign influence is no easy task. This is far from settled, and the task of getting the ideas right should not be underestimated.</p> +<p>Another issue discussed was energy, with one policy analyst noting that South Africa is likely to face a gas crisis after 2026. Gazprom, they said, was one solution to this issue. Other participants saw opportunities for building stronger intra-African supply chains, rather than relying on imports from other continents. Fertiliser and energy were cited as areas where this had been discussed.</p> -<p>But in government, ideas are insufficient and federal strategy development is a long process. Beneath every national security strategy or executive order lie months of intellectual and bureaucratic work. Moreover, for new officials, there is the addition of discovery – learning the myriad stakeholders that require coordination, which adds months of meetings and memos.</p> +<p>Participants also assessed the importance of engaging with G7 countries on these material and developmental impacts of sanctions. In addition to emphasising the country’s overall policy of multilateralism, it may be important to identify the problematic consequences of sanctions in South Africa and seek potential diplomatic solutions that would ease these effects.</p> -<p>In the end, the “usual path” will produce the way ahead. And the president will endorse or sign the bureaucratic manifestations of their will.</p> +<h3 id="using-other-financial-crime-compliance-tools-to-address-sanctions-risks">Using Other Financial Crime Compliance Tools to Address Sanctions Risks</h3> -<p>Then the usual thing will happen. An authority will call a meeting synonymous with “next steps” and begin to inventory all the interagency “tools” – existing authorities and resources – needed to execute the just-signed strategy. These will inevitably include existing innovations such as the CHIPS Act Program Office; the rechartered Development Finance Corporation (DFC); the reauthorized Export–Import Bank (EXIM), with its China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP); the revitalized Loan Program Office at the Department of Energy; and the always-included Defense Production Act (DPA).</p> +<p>Participants from the banking sector said they lacked detailed guidance from the government to support them with their concerns about international regulators’ and business partners’ sanctions compliance expectations. The conversations took on greater urgency because of the greylisting of South Africa by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in February 2023, as a result of which South Africa began work on a 22-point mutually agreed Action Plan to address the deficiencies identified by FATF. Private sector participants worried that the country’s financial crime reputation would be further hampered if secondary sanctions were placed on a South African bank, and/or if correspondent banks – those global banks that connect South African banks to the international financial system – were no longer willing to process transactions with the country’s financial institutions as a result of perceived sanctions circumvention risks.</p> -<p>The laws, policies, and regulations that govern how the executive branch executes its authorities and allots the funds granted are, to put it mildly, labyrinthine. Every “tool” has its own independent constraints, and months will be spent divining workarounds or exceptions, all of which carry risks. Thus, execution inevitably becomes a compromise between the ideas and what can actually be done or, worse, a mere rebranding of what is already being done.</p> +<p>Representatives from South Africa’s supervisory and regulatory bodies agreed that, because the stated policy was one of neutrality, they were unable to provide detailed guidance for complying with G7 sanctions. However, many of these representatives also emphasised the importance of ensuring other financial crime controls were robust in order to mitigate some aspects of sanctions risks and concerns. They felt that some of South Africa’s improvements to meet the FATF Action Plan agenda – particularly around identifying beneficial ownership – would also improve banks’ ability to manage sanctions risk. To that end, South Africa updated its beneficial ownership regime in 2023. SARB has recently imposed administrative penalties on some banks and insurance companies for failures in relation to beneficial owner identification and other financial crime deficiencies, measures that should lead to great focus on these issues across the regulated sector.</p> -<p>To explicitly state the open secret: good ideas are hard, but executing is harder.</p> +<p>Terrorism financing (TF) and proliferation finance (PF) were also highlighted as areas of concern, with representatives from financial regulators highlighting the results of the June 2024 Terror Financing National Risk Assessment (known as the TF NRA). The TF NRA primarily focused on Islamic State and right-wing terrorism, rather than the activities of Wagner Group or other Russian-backed military groups. However, representatives from the supervisory authorities said that “the financial aspect of foreign military training” had been taken into consideration in the TF NRA.</p> -<p>The next administration should therefore make a counterintuitive move and immediately propose structural changes that increase its options for execution.</p> +<p>Participants noted the potential overlap between the TF and PF regimes, on one hand, and the Russia sanctions regimes, on the other. They noted similarities to the May 2024 Mutual Evaluation Report for Jersey, released by the Council of Europe’s permanent monitoring body, the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL). The evaluation reported few TF and PF regimes in relation to UN sanctions, but highlighted the significant action undertaken by the Jersey authorities on Russia sanctions implementation, which assured assessors that the relevant systems and controls are in place.</p> -<p>This is where a National Interest Account should be a top priority.</p> +<p>Participants from government bodies also discussed the closer relationship between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia, and the potential conventional weapons and nuclear weapons proliferation implications of that relationship. One participant asked, “Do you start coming to Russia sanctions through DPRK or vice versa?”, suggesting that the growing nexus between Russia and the DPRK, in breach of UN Security Council sanctions on the DPRK, might play a future role in assessing South Africa’s response to Russia sanctions. Reflecting this perspective, participants said that South African government bodies responsible for counter-proliferation controls had become more active recently, but that they needed to widen their focus: “They’re looking at a very narrow aspect of PF, so we need to refresh the PF risk assessments.”</p> -<h4 id="what-is-a-national-interest-account">What Is a National Interest Account?</h4> +<p>Nonetheless, both private and public sector representatives accepted that banks’ focus on beneficial ownership, as well as improving their TF and PF controls, would not solve their geopolitical dilemma. “The implications of things that are not [UN Security Council-endorsed] sanctions would be a problem for us to manage”, a government representative said.</p> -<p>The concept is simple, and shamelessly plagiarized from Australia, a close U.S. ally.</p> +<h3 id="secondary-sanctions-and-correspondent-banking-relationships">Secondary Sanctions and Correspondent Banking Relationships</h3> -<p>Were Congress to authorize a tightly scoped, time-limited, and dollar-capped National Interest Account with strenuous reporting requirements, a president could direct government agencies, like those listed above, to support loans deemed in the national interest.</p> +<p>While needing to balance these policy concerns, banks said they were aware of the sanctions risks and demonstrated their commitment to improving their controls in order to maintain strong relationships with overseas partners.</p> -<p>Why? Restrictive laws and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations govern the lending of the various federal departments and agencies. Every loan carries the risk of nonpayment, and those who approve the loans must be conservative in the credit risks they accept on behalf of the taxpayers. This is right and proper.</p> +<p>To the degree possible, regulators also sought to support banks to get the information they require. Government representatives said they were committed to awareness raising, outreach and training for compliance personnel, although “we don’t prescribe any search criteria”. As noted previously, much of this guidance refers to general controls, rather than sanctions-specific guidance.</p> -<p>But many regulations were created in a different time, and for different problems. In today’s competition for economic growth, technological advantage, national security, and foreign influence, our challenges cross old models, while our tools do not – yet.</p> +<p>Banking representatives also criticised international private and public sector partners for a lack of guidance relevant to the South African context. Private sector representatives said that many case studies and typologies for evasion and circumvention were focused on Russian evasion activities in or from Europe or the US, rather than reflecting the African context. Similarly, banks said they would be able to carry out better risk assessments of their customers and transactions if they received more detailed information from correspondent banks, which often change their criteria without notification or explanation. They said they may be able to proactively identify potential clients or transaction patterns of concern if they had more detailed information.</p> -<p>With a good interagency process, a National Interest Account responsibly shifts approving riskier loans and their related issues to the wider perspectives of Senate-confirmed Cabinet members, including the Department of the Treasury and OMB, from the more insular individual agencies. With a National Interest Account, both determinations – whether a loan actually is in the national interest and whether the risk of that loan is acceptable – would be made with the larger policy and national-interest pictures in mind. Meanwhile, the government lenders would remain within their remit and simply execute their authorities – providing credit assessments, portfolio management, and finance.</p> +<p>There were also concerns about new financial technologies (including cryptocurrencies and stable coins) and smaller banks, which were seen to have less mature financial crime compliance systems. The regulatory participants said they were aware of and considering the implications of these and were working to align their standards. However, one private sector representative said that they noted a large difference in compliance maturity between the country’s few larger banks, when compared to smaller (“Tier 2”) banks. Most illicit actors, they said, would not carry out transactions through the larger banks, but instead through the mid-sized and smaller institutions.</p> -<p>For example, if China’s economic coercion of an ally or partner is to be effective, the impact of refusal must be severe enough to coerce the political outcome. This affects the macroeconomic outlook of the coerced, thereby raising the risk of any loan to that market. Today, good credit analysis would likely tell the lender to walk away. And I frequently had to tell my colleagues at the Departments of State and Defense precisely that. But a National Interest Account could allow agencies like EXIM to refer such cases to the cabinet, where the merits and risks could be deliberated, thereby creating an option for action that today simply does not exist.</p> +<p>Another issue, one participant said, was the lack of knowledge within South African banks about how to consider trade-related sanctions and restrictive measures. There was little discussion, they said, between the trade finance and sanctions teams. As a result, “a lot of the banking industry doesn’t know how to apply sanctions in a trade environment”.</p> -<h4 id="the-urgency-of-optionality">The Urgency of Optionality</h4> +<h3 id="aligning-financial-services-supervision">Aligning Financial Services Supervision</h3> -<p>It is counterintuitive to prioritize reforming the ways and means before we know the ends. But whatever an administrations strategy, it will rise or fall on execution. Concepts such as a National Interest Account create options to achieve the president’s ends where today there are few. Thus, the next administration should urgently prioritize structural reforms that affect implementation concurrent with the development of strategy – or the best of ideas risk remaining only that.</p> +<p>Another theme from the engagement with government representatives was that supervision was spread across several departments spanning banking and non-banking financial services, financial surveillance and the SARB payments department. Participants said that there was an “imbalance” in the capacity and coverage of the sectors.</p> -<h2 id="technology-cooperation-competition-and-economic-relations">Technology Cooperation, Competition, and Economic Relations</h2> +<p>Participants said they had been surprised by the Jersey MONEYVAL evaluation because the jurisdiction had one main supervisor, causing them to consider their own supervision architecture. The participants said they were also engaging with other international regulatory bodies to understand their supervision model. The key, participants agreed, was to have consistency and communication between them.</p> -<h3 id="indias-ascending-role-for-us-economic-security">India’s Ascending Role for U.S. Economic Security</h3> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="richard-rossow">Richard Rossow</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Based on these discussions, it was clear that the South African government had a clear policy of non-alignment and neutrality when it comes to G7 sanctions on Russia, despite trade relations favouring closer alignment with the West. At the same time, there appears to be room for open and pragmatic conversations on both sides: for South African policymakers to express their reservations and material concerns about the financial impacts of sanctions for their economic security, stability and development, and for G7 governments to provide greater information about their priorities. There may also be an opportunity for G7 countries to consider the specific concerns of South Africa (and other non-aligned countries) – for example, how to support both alternative resolutions to energy supply issues (notably the forthcoming gas supply issue), and intra-African trade. Even within the South African framing regarding its neutrality, discussions emphasised that Russia sanctions had implications for South Africa’s economic stability. Where impacts on particular sectors were keenly felt, participants highlighted a greater need for dialogue with the EU, the US and the UK, as well as potentially some coordination with regional African organisations, to raise similar concerns. This may be particularly relevant for issues around the debt crisis and evidencing any impacts of the sanctions on the population. Even within the South African framing regarding its neutrality, discussions emphasised that Russia sanctions had implications for South Africa’s economic stability. Where impacts on particular sectors were keenly felt, participants highlighted a greater need for dialogue with the EU, the US and the UK, as well as potentially some coordination with regional African organisations, to raise similar concerns. This may be particularly relevant for issues around the debt crisis and evidencing any impacts of the sanctions on the population.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The next U.S. administration should take the time to meet with international partners such as India before staking out policy positions related to domestic industrial and trade policy. Ignoring U.S. partners in the early days could have repercussions when U.S. officials engage on vital global issues later.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Many of the concerns raised by the private sector centred on how to obtain better information relevant to their context to improve their financial crime compliance (including but not limited to information related to Russian sanctions). This may include G7 countries providing country- or region-specific typologies for Russian evasion and circumvention. It may also include better communication between correspondent banks and their partners in South Africa. At the same time, private sector representatives remain legally bound to comply with South African law, which excludes the G7 sanctions.</p> -<p>While U.S. elections are primarily driven by domestic issues, the policy positions taken by the winner are relevant for a wide array of global partners. In the case of India, for example, the United States and India share concerns about overreliance on China as a dominant supplier of manufactured goods. Consequently, Indian firms have been ramping up investments in the United States, actions significant for both countries moving forward. The next U.S. administration should take the time to meet with international partners such as India before staking out policy positions related to domestic industrial and trade policy. Ignoring U.S. partners in the early days could have repercussions when U.S. officials engage on vital global issues later.</p> +<p>One partial solution to this tension may be to improve wider financial crime controls, highlighted by South Africa’s focus on better beneficial owner identification, which was driven by the country’s effort to escape the FATF greylist. However, this can only be a partial solution at best: banks will face the same dilemmas if they receive beneficial ownership information indicating that an account is held by a sanctioned Russian individual.</p> -<p>A deeper economic relationship with India is in the United States’ interests for several reasons. First, India is expected to continue growing faster than any other large nation in the foreseeable future, with growth expected to top 7 percent in 2024. BlackRock recently predicted that India will leap over Japan and Germany to become the world’s third-largest economy in just three years. In 2023, Goldman Sachs predicted that the Indian economy will be the world’s second-largest by 2075, at an estimated $52.5 trillion. For U.S. companies looking to grow, India’s topline numbers draw attention – even if the practicalities of doing business in India remain challenging at times.</p> +<p>In sum, when it comes to sanctions on Russia, the private sector in South Africa finds itself caught in an invidious position between stewarding critical international relationships (notably with correspondent banks) that are central to the country’s economic security and a government that for political – not economic – reasons, chooses a policy of non-alignment with the West.</p> -<p>Second, Indian companies compose a growing source of investment into the United States. As the Confederation of Indian Industry highlighted in their Indian Roots, American Soil report in 2023, India has invested $80 billion into the United States, employing over 400,000 people. In 2023 alone, India added $4.7 billion in fresh foreign direct investment (FDI) into the United States, about 3 percent of inward FDI from all sources that year. In the coming years, as the Indian economy continues to grow, this number will also likely grow substantially as well. Indian firms are even taking advantage of U.S. industrial programs like the Inflation Reduction Act. India’s Vikram Solar, for example, last year announced plans for a $1.5 billion solar-manufacturing footprint in the United States. Policy stability is key to ensuring that investment plans can be executed, and continue to be made.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Securing a strong commercial relationship with India is vital for another critical reason. Akin to how the U.S. defense industrial base has looked at ways to improve India’s domestic defense production to help India wean itself off Russian equipment, the United States can support India’s interests in weaning its technology sector off of Chinese imports. China (plus Hong Kong) is India’s largest goods trade partner, with $148 billion in bilateral trade in FY 2023, resulting in a trade deficit for India of nearly $100 billion. Paired with India’s expected growth rates outlined above, helping India reduce imports from China will impair China’s industrial expansion significantly. To Chinese officials, India must be considered a vital economic engine to maintain export-led growth in the future. The United States can be a strong partner to “Make in India” and avoid this fate.</p> +<p><strong>Olivia Allison</strong> is an Associate Fellow at RUSI and an independent consultant. She has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies and international financial institutions. She has a wide range of financial crime and asset-tracing experience from leadership roles held in London, Moscow, Kyiv and Kazakhstan.</p>Olivia AllisonThis report details the roundtable discussions in Pretoria to share views on South African policy relating to the sanctions on Russia and Belarus, as well as other issues of financial integrity.Crossing Deepfake Rubicon2024-11-01T12:00:00+08:002024-11-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/crossing-deepfake-rubicon<p><em>New research finds that we can now no longer trust our eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between real and AI-generated images, audio, and video. What does this mean in a world where the weaponization of synthetic media is becoming increasingly prevalent?</em></p> -<p>Finally, U.S. policymakers should seek new platforms to share practical experiences, and possibly some level of policy equivalence, in screening Chinese investments in advanced technologies. While India may be years away from becoming a significant producer of advanced technologies – such as quantum computers, robotics, leading-edge semiconductors, and 6G communications equipment – India is already at the forefront of the research and engineering that fuels these sectors. For example, India’s information technology services exports are expected to reach $199 billion this year. The U.S. government continues to build new programs with India that will further enhance a shared research and development agenda in key technologies such as the 2023 collaboration between the U.S. National Science Foundation and India’s Department of Biotechnology. While such steps expand bilateral cooperation, they may also introduce new vulnerabilities without appropriate oversight measures.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Successive U.S. administrations have built a unique architecture of high-level dialogues that provide a vital platform for discussing trade and technology issues, including the U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies and the many workstreams under the Quad framework. These forums have resulted in important agreements such as the 2023 U.S.-India Semiconductor Supply Chain and Innovation Partnership memorandum of understanding.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>In recent years, threat actors have increasingly used synthetic media — digital content produced or manipulated by artificial intelligence (AI) — to enhance their deceptive activities, harming individuals and organizations worldwide with growing frequency.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In addition, the weaponization of synthetic media has also begun to undermine people’s trust in information integrity more widely, posing concerning implications for the stability and resilience of the U.S.’s information environment.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>At present, an individual’s ability to recognize AI-generated content remains the primary defense against people falling prey to deceptively presented synthetic media.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>However, a recent experimental study by CSIS found that people are no longer able to reliably distinguish between authentic and AI-generated images, audio, and video sourced from publicly available tools.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>That human detection has ceased to be a reliable method for identifying synthetic media only heightens the dangers posed by the technology’s misuse, underscoring the pressing need to implement alternative countermeasures to address this emerging threat.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>India is not the only fast-growing, nontraditional U.S. partner that will require the attention of policymakers as U.S. industrial strategy and trade policy is reviewed. For example, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines – large and fast-growing countries – together have nearly 500 million people and a combined GDP that is over 60 percent of India’s.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>The next U.S. administration will likely enjoy a full four-year term with its counterpart government in India, which has its next national election in 2029. According to the Pew Research Center, the economy continues to be the primary concern for supporters of both presidential candidates. Initial policy pushes would understandably seek to further improve domestic economic prospects, particularly in manufacturing. Yet foreign policy also ranks relatively high for supporters of both candidates. With key partners across the Indo-Pacific, policy stability, particularly in ways that encourage two-way economic integration with key partners, is important. The last four years have seen a range of important new agreements and robust commercial announcements that both widen and deepen the United States’ economic partnership, ranging from microchips to vaccines. While the days of free trade agreements may not be returning any time soon, the United States can forge meaningful linkages with like-minded nations by avoiding protectionism and encouraging bilateral investment.</p> +<p>Synthetic media, which refers to text, images, audio, and video generated or manipulated by AI, presents both significant opportunities and risks. Recent advancements in generative AI technology have considerably reduced the data, computing power, and cost required to create highly realistic synthetic content. Coupled with the technology’s growing accessibility, as evident from the rapidly expanding constellation of widely available user-friendly offerings, it has become easier than ever for anyone to manufacture genuine-seeming digital content using AI. The uses of such technology are seemingly endless, from the humorous, such as making fictional images of the pope wearing Balenciaga or videos of Tom Cruise dancing, to the commercial, such as streamlining work by assisting in email writing or creating digital avatars of people to use in training videos, news stories, or even for speaking with simulations of deceased loved ones. There has also been significant interest in harnessing generative AI’s transformative potential for the greater good, from accelerating critical scientific research to making sophisticated disability aids like glasses that translate speech to text for the hard of hearing.</p> -<h3 id="making-infrastructure-in-the-indo-pacific-a-success">Making Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific a Success</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5iB2pou.jpeg" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Synthetic images of Pope Francis wearing Balenciaga, first shared on Reddit by creator Pablo Xavier, which quickly went viral across social media platforms. To this day, many viewers still do not realize this is AI-generated.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/midjourney/comments/120vhdc/the_pope_drip/">Pablo Xavier, “The Pope Drip,” Reddit, March 24, 2023</a>.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="erin-murphy">Erin Murphy</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/x5mAyuM.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>One of the many videos featured on the now widely notorious Tom Cruise deepfake account on TikTok.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@deeptomcruise/video/7181490100314885382?lang=en">deeptomcruise, TikTok video, December 26, 2022, 00:19</a>.</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Infrastructure requires patient capital and investing. The lifecycle of an infrastructure project can take years and does not follow the neat timelines of summits and high-level meetings that crave big announcements.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Yet, generative AI has also become a potent tool for misuse. On the morning of May 22, 2023, an AI-generated photograph reportedly showing an explosion near the Pentagon began to circulate extensively on social media platforms, causing widespread confusion and panic as well as a temporary but meaningful dip in the U.S. stock market. While any adverse effects from this particular incident, in the end, were nominal, its occurrence nonetheless is illustrative of a broader trend of synthetic media being utilized to damaging ends. From criminal activities to adversarial military and intelligence operations, generative AI has more and more empowered the deception capabilities of threat actors, permitting them to manufacture convincingly realistic but fake digital content (colloquially known by many as “deepfakes”) at unprecedented speed, scale, and degrees of precision. The rising ease of use and utility of the technology has led to a boom of AI-enabled deception incidents taking place over recent years, with the technology’s abuse inflicting a growing amount of financial, reputational, physical, and mental harm to individuals and organizations worldwide. Already, the dangers posed by weaponized synthetic media have begun to shift from the theoretical to the realized.</p> -<p>Though U.S. administrations have continuously railed against China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), they have been very slow in offering a clear alternative to the quick contracts and massive financing offered by China to infrastructure projects globally. Recently, however, a proliferation of initiatives and partnerships have been introduced that aim to bring together partners and allies, leverage their respective tools and strengths, and convince the private sector to mobilize their own capital into developing economies. Though laudable, the United States – and the Biden administration in particular – will have to ensure a politically transition-proof strategy that is concerted, committed, focused, and continuous in order to provide the trillions of dollars in infrastructure funding needed in just the Indo-Pacific alone, as well as to future-proof these economies from debt sustainability, climate change, and labor and industry transformations.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xvc9yZI.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>This synthetic image was falsely reported as a photograph of an explosion near the Pentagon. It was widely circulated before being debunked as fake, causing widespread confusion and even a temporary dip in the U.S. stock market.</strong> Source: <a href="https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1660650575569059840/photo/1">OSINTdefender (@sentdefender), X post, May 22, 2023, 09:04 am</a>.</em></p> -<p>Inducive economic tools and strategic investments are now key elements in engaging in economic security in the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), the Quad, and the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership (TIP), to name just a few, all feature efforts to target collaborative infrastructure financing, manifest tangible U.S. commitment to the region, and compete effectively with the BRI.</p> +<p>Thus far, the threat that has garnered the most public attention and alarm has been the risk of AI-enabled deceptions disrupting political elections by influencing voting outcomes, instigating unrest and violence, or damaging trust in the electoral process. Among the record number of elections held in 2024, the majority have already been subject to widely-circulated synthetic content that falsely depicts politicians or famous figures engaging in inappropriate or controversial behavior, criticizing their opposition, and promising policy changes. With the U.S. presidential election only a week away, widespread concerns have been understandably raised about the dangers of a flood of AI-generated content amplifying misinformation, or of an opportunely timed viral synthetic image or video of a political candidate influencing voters’ decisions.</p> -<p>But the United States is contending with an actor that does not play by the rules. China can offer projects and products at attractive prices and speeds, directing its state-owned companies and banks to strategic markets. Though the BRI has had some initial successes in the race for infrastructure, the United States need not mimic the way China does business. Yet the United States does need to reform its own operations. The BRI’s ballooning debt and unhappy customers reveal why that approach is problematic, and those issues are pushing China to change how it invests. In contending with the challenge offered by China in infrastructure project investments globally, the United States must maintain standards and act with transparency, especially with taxpayer (or anyone’s) dollars.</p> +<p>Today’s synthetic media threat landscape extends far beyond the realm of political elections. AI-enabled financial fraud was found to have risen by 700 percent in 2023, and experts have predicted it will result in losses of up to $40 billion by 2027. Meanwhile, AI nonconsensual intimate media, accounting for 96 percent of all synthetic videos online as of 2019, has already claimed what is estimated to be millions of adults and children as victims — with that number expected to rise swiftly. Other AI-enabled deception incidents have also occurred with increasing frequency, spanning gray zone warfare such as influence operations and cyberattacks, espionage and surveillance, military deception operations, domestic disinformation, and more. As improvements in the technology’s capabilities and accessibility continue, the volume and breadth of deception activity will likely grow.</p> -<p>Sustaining the continuity and efficacy of the infrastructure initiatives that the Biden administration has begun requires a change in mindset and the deployment of the tapestry of tools available in a coordinated and cohesive way.</p> +<p>The discrete harms arising from these incidents are further compounded by a more insidious danger: AI-enabled deception threatens to corrode the public’s trust in the integrity of all information more broadly. There is already evidence that this has started to occur. In turn, this risks imperiling the foundations of the U.S.’s information environment, a vital pillar of societal stability and resilience.</p> -<p>Infrastructure requires patient capital and investing. The lifecycle of an infrastructure project can take years and does not follow the neat timelines of summits and high-level meetings that crave big announcements. Feasibility studies, permitting, due diligence, securing financing, and then getting the actual project started and completed all take a lot of time and money. There are ways to speed up the process, including ensuring transparency; lowering costs around undertaking environmental and social impact assessments in developing countries; and ensuring the host country has clear rules and regulations. Some of that work is already being done – working with IPEF signatories on tax and rule-of-law transparency and encouraging the Blue Dot Network that promotes high-quality standards in infrastructure – and the United States should double down on these efforts.</p> +<p>Today, the principal defense against AI-enabled deceptions is people’s ability to recognize synthetic media when encountering it in their day-to-day lives. However, rapid advancements in generative AI have increasingly constrained human detection capabilities as synthetic media has become more convincingly realistic. While the necessity of adopting alternative countermeasures, spanning from the technological to the regulatory, to compensate has been widely recognized as critical, in practice, implementation of these measures remains largely nascent. As such, this growing vulnerability means that awareness of when people are no longer able to depend solely on their eyes and ears to detect AI-generated content is critical in order to better recognize when human detection is no longer an effective safeguard against the technology’s misuse.</p> -<p>This leads to another aspect in need of attention: trade and market access. Though the pendulum on trade in the United States has swung against it, this – especially market access – is what Asian countries want, particularly IPEF signatories. Trade with market access can be provided to those that meet IPEF standards and thus encourage domestic regulatory and governance reforms. This is a more inducive carrot than providing capacity building for tax reform. IPEF’s Latin American counterpart, the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP), mirrors much of IPEF. Though it also does not offer market access, the United States has bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with 8 of the 11 APEP countries, making economic partnerships more holistic and durable. Although former president Trump has threatened to get rid of IPEF and could do the same with APEP, the FTAs will remain in place, thereby guaranteeing ongoing economic engagement. These agreements shape the framework for addressing developments in critical sectors, such as decarbonization and digital trade, but in order to be politically transition-proof, they will have to include more tangible carrots and durability.</p> +<p>To determine the current level of human detection capabilities, CSIS conducted a large-scale experimental study testing individuals’ ability to differentiate between authentic media and synthetic images, audio, and videos sourced from publicly accessible generative AI technology. Overall, the study found that people struggled to accurately identify AI-generated content to any meaningful degree, with some demographics being more susceptible to certain types of synthetic media than others. This brief reviews the study’s key findings and offers an overview of the current synthetic media threat landscape, examining both ongoing and speculative harms in areas in which the abuse of this technology has become more prevalent. It is clear that weaponized synthetic media has begun to mature from an emergent to an established national security threat. That the inflection point has now been reached where human detection capabilities are unreliable only serves to underscore the pressing need to implement robust alternative countermeasures to address this growing danger.</p> -<p>Another obstacle to the U.S. initiatives involves debt sustainability, particularly as the majority of BRI recipient countries are in debt distress. Indebted countries do not want to take on hundreds of millions of dollars in additional debt financing, even with concessional lending or generous repayment terms. In order to address these debt sustainability issues and critical infrastructure needs, the United States will need to work with the Paris Club through various multilateral debt treatment initiatives and via blended financing opportunities.</p> +<h3 id="the-study-results">The Study Results</h3> -<p>Concerns about debt and debt sustainability also influence how the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) is able to build out its pipeline and be more competitive in the telecommunications, renewable energy, and semiconductor arenas. EXIM so far has come up short in maximizing its China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP), partly hampered by statutory requirements to (1) ensure that loans will have a “reasonable assurance of repayment” and (2) maintain a 2 percent statutory default cap. For EXIM to be more competitive, take on greater risks, and not self-select out of deals, the default cap should be raised on critical industries, or at least on those projects that fall under the CTEP umbrella.</p> +<p>To assess how well people were able to detect AI-generated content, CSIS conducted a perceptual study involving nearly 1,300 North Americans aged from 18 to 85. Participants were asked to distinguish between synthetic and authentic media items, including images, audio, and videos both silent and fully audiovisual. The study also examined how other factors affected detection performance, including authenticity, language, modality, image subject matter, age, and participants’ preexisting familiarity with synthetic media. To ensure that the AI-generated content would be representative of the quality and type of synthetic media people were likely to come across “in the wild”, or in their daily lives, all synthetic test items were sourced from publicly available products and services.</p> -<p>Cofinancing or collaborative financing is nice on paper but nearly impossible in practice. No host government or project lead wants to sign multiterm contracts with governments and multilateral financing agencies. There is also competition for a small number of viable projects. Overcoming this concern involves aligning due diligence practices and deploying single joint-term sheets to cut down on paperwork and bureaucracy. The United States and its partners should also find where they best fit along the project lifecycle. As noted above, infrastructure projects have multiple phases and angles, each of which could play to the different strengths of each player.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FZ4l7RX.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Average Detection Accuracy by Media Type.</strong> Source: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16760">Di Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss: Human detection of AI-generated images, videos, audio, and audiovisual stimuli,” March 25, 2024</a>.</em></p> -<p>Mobilizing private sector capital has been, and will continue to be, a challenge. The U.S. government needs to more deeply engage with the private sector to determine what it would take for private actors to invest in strategic markets, instead of focusing solely on implementing policy it thinks will move that capital. Private sector financing already is being carried out in the energy transition space, most notably in Indonesia’s Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), with potential JETP programs extending to Vietnam and the Philippines. The partnership intends to mobilize an initial $20 billion in public and private financing over a three-to-five-year period using a mix of grants, concessional loans, market-rate loans, guarantees, and private investments. The JETP includes $10 billion in public sector pledges and a $126 million commitment from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to an Indonesian geothermal company. The signatories of the JETP also committed to help mobilize and facilitate $10 billion in private investments from an initial set of private financial institutions, including some of the world’s largest private banks. Since the launch, a total of approximately $281.6 million has been allocated as grants or technical assistance across roughly 40 programs, managed across five financial institutions and implemented by eight different executing agencies.</p> +<p>Altogether, the study’s findings paint a bleak picture of people’s ability to discern the legitimacy of digital content in today’s world. On average, participants correctly distinguished between synthetic and authentic media 51.2 percent of the time — roughly equivalent in accuracy to a coin toss. Images were the most difficult for participants to identify (49 percent average accuracy), with better detection performance on silent videos (51 percent) and audio clips (54 percent). Participants were the most successful at determining the authenticity of fully audiovisual clips (55 percent). These results are relatively unsurprising since public discourse and scientific research have closely monitored people’s diminishing detection capabilities as generative AI has advanced in recent years. Nonetheless, it is valuable to confirm that this critical watershed moment has indeed been reached: humans can no longer depend solely on their own eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between reality and AI-generated falsehoods.</p> -<p>Even if a project, an initiative, or even a policy is a strategic imperative for the U.S. government, the same may not be true for the private sector. Some markets will still be too risky and the return on investment too unlikely for the private sector, which looks to ensure its investments are repaid and profitable. Working with the private sector, either locally or multinationally, on their needs in undertaking these projects is a critical step in shaping the correct tools to pursue infrastructure investments globally.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K4iLc5K.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>The study’s most convincing synthetic image: Only 10.7 percent of all participants correctly identified this as an AI-generated image, with the rest believing it to be a photograph of a real person.</strong> Source: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16760">Di Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss: Human detection of AI-generated images, videos, audio, and audiovisual stimuli,” March 25, 2024</a>.</em></p> -<p>Pieces of the foundation for addressing critical infrastructure needs are there, but it will take sustained focus, leadership, and telling a good story to get it done.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b2dj9kL.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>The study’s most convincing synthetic audiovisual clip: When participants were presented with the AI-manipulated video clip (of comedian Nora Tschirner) on the right, 75.8 percent incorrectly labeled it as authentic. In comparison, the original video (of anchorwoman Marietta Slomka) is on the left.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4ln4SyVNjg&amp;list=PL8ax9s9DVKClTiPm9c5Wkq9wOG4hGKyVH&amp;index=5">Deepfacelabfan, “Deepfake — Marietta Slomka zu Nora Tschirner — 128 LIAE 15k RW only — 90min FAKE,” YouTube video, April 7, 2022, 00:46</a>.</em></p> -<h3 id="can-the-united-states-have-a-trade-policy-without-market-access">Can the United States Have a Trade Policy Without Market Access?</h3> +<p>This does not mean that all AI-generated content being produced today is now indistinguishable from authentic media. Low- and mid-quality synthetic media still contains artifacts, or observable AI glitches such as bizarre-looking hands or illegible text, which make their provenance apparent. Regardless, our study demonstrates that numerous generative AI tools which are easily accessible to the public today can produce sufficiently realistic synthetic content that is relatively indistinguishable from authentic content to the human senses. Moreover, as the average quality of synthetic media improves while the technology matures, even low- and mid-quality outputs will become more realistic. For example, later iterations of AI image generators have already become increasingly capable of rendering real-looking hands, which makes relying on them as a potential “tell” of AI-generated content being present decreasingly useful.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="william-a-reinsch">William A. Reinsch</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xiDUnsF.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Detection Performance by Language Familiarity.</strong> Source: Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss.”</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">More market access for U.S. products can only be obtained by providing more access for imports into the United States. There is no free lunch in trade negotiations.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/e0GPfI7.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Detection Performance by Age.</strong> Source: Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss.”</em></p> -<p>A hallmark of the Biden administration’s trade policy has been its refusal to negotiate trade agreements that include market access – the reduction of tariffs or non-tariff barriers to facilitate trade. The administration has occasionally said it supports more market access for U.S. products, but it has failed to accept the reality that trade negotiations are inevitably reciprocal. More market access for U.S. products can only be obtained by providing more access for imports into the United States. There is no free lunch in trade negotiations.</p> +<p>The study’s other findings offer more nuanced insights into people’s vulnerabilities to different types of AI-enabled deceptions, examining how various elements may impact an individual’s detection capabilities. For instance, participants’ average detection accuracy was found to be significantly lower for audio, video, and audiovisual items featuring a foreign language than for items featuring languages in which they were fluent (Figure 2). Meanwhile, younger participants outperformed their older counterparts to the greatest degree when tested on audiovisual and audio-only clips (Figure 3). These findings indicate that people are more likely to misidentify synthetic media presented in a foreign language, and that older individuals are less sensitive to recognizing synthetic audio-based media. Given the rise of multilingual synthetic misinformation as well as the growing popularity of AI phone scams which often target older generations, these findings suggest that these two demographics may be more vulnerable to certain types of AI-enabled deceptions than previously realized.</p> -<p>When asked what they wanted out of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) agreement, Asian participants in CSIS’s research responded politely that they were looking for “tangible benefits.” This is code for “what’s in it for us?,”which is exactly what every experienced trade negotiator asks. The answer from the Biden administration has been “very little.” The same thing has happened with other ongoing regional negotiations – the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP) and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC).</p> +<h3 id="the-threat-landscape">The Threat Landscape</h3> -<p>There are two reasons for this reluctance to take up market access. One is political – a desire to avoid intraparty warfare between the Democratic left and center. (The former sees trade as imports that harm U.S. workers. The latter views it as exports that promote growth and jobs.) The second reason is philosophical – past trade agreements are perceived as having primarily benefited large corporations and their executives at the expense of workers.</p> +<p>The proliferation of weaponized synthetic media presents a clear and present danger to national security. To more effectively address these dangers, a more comprehensive understanding of the risks posed by its misuse and the various ways it has already been weaponized is required. Within only a few short years, the synthetic media threat landscape has expanded rapidly, with generative AI increasingly being exploited for nefarious purposes. Consequently, this rise in AI-enabled deception incidents has resulted in individuals and organizations around the world suffering financial, reputational, physical, and mental harm, even death, and countries worldwide experiencing detrimental effects on their societal stability and resilience. Now that it is clear publicly available generative AI tools can produce highly realistic synthetic media capable of deceiving even the most discerning of observers, these dangers have only become even more acute.</p> -<p>Both arguments lead to the same safe choice: pursuing trade agreements that do not contain “tangible benefits.” The dilemma for the current administration has been that trade agreements are not just about trade – they are symbols of the relationship between the participants, and symbols have power. An ambitious, binding agreement is proof that the United States is committed to ongoing engagement with the other party (or parties) on equitable terms, proof that would be welcomed in Asia, Latin America, and Europe. That was the rationale for the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, and the Trump administration’s rejection of it was widely seen in Asia as indicating a lack of interest in and commitment to the region on the part of the United States. That action left the United States without a policy and led to pressure on the Biden administration to develop a new economic approach to Asia, and subsequently to the Americas.</p> +<p>Generative AI has become an increasingly powerful force multiplier for deception, making it easier, faster, and cheaper to conduct more sophisticated stratagems than ever before — from producing synthetic content at an industrial scale to more precisely tailoring it to a target’s specific vulnerabilities. These lowering barriers have, in turn, expanded the pool of threat actors who now are able to leverage this technology, from extremist organizations and organized crime groups to lone individuals with malicious intent. As of today, it costs less than $10 to create 30 minutes of customized synthetic audio featuring a target’s voice or to manufacture a batch of over 1,000 individually personalized spear-phishing emails. Efforts to prevent the misuse of commercial products and services have been inconsistent in both their implementation and effectiveness, enabling the circumnavigation of guardrails to varying degrees of success. Meanwhile, open-source generative AI tools, which by their nature have more easily removable safeguards, have also furnished threat actors with a diverse and customizable toolkit, such as live face-swapping and voice-masking software, found to be used in real-time impersonation schemes. In addition, a shadow industry has begun to quickly develop to address this growing demand for purpose-built deception technologies. Spreading throughout the dark web and encrypted messaging platforms, it sells everything from prebuilt custom software to more bespoke services for explicitly abusive purposes.</p> -<p>Caught between demands for a policy that demonstrated U.S. commitment and reluctance to pursue an agreement that involved any meaningful market concessions, the administration came up with IPEF and APEP, both of which have been derided as unambitious agreements. The situation was made worse in November 2023 when the administration pulled back its support for the trade pillar of the IPEF agreement in the face of opposition from progressive Democratic members of Congress. While the trade pillar is technically not dead; it is on life support, and it appears that only the other three pillars – supply chains, decarbonization and sustainability, and anti-corruption and taxation – will survive. Those are not unimportant, but they are also not trade agreements. The origin story of the TTC is different, but the result is the same – much talk about cooperation with few tangible results beyond an impressive display of unity in sanctioning Russia.</p> +<p>However, the rise in AI-enabled deceptions has not been uniform. Rather, generative AI tools have been co-opted to greater degrees in scenarios where they currently provide a significant offensive edge to threat actors’ stratagems over existing non-AI methods. For instance, the sharp rise of AI-enabled financial fraud over the past few years is a direct result of the substantial advantage afforded by AI technology, as AI text and audio generation tools are able to produce compelling synthetic content in less resource-intensive manners than when utilizing non-AI techniques. Conversely, AI-enabled deception incidents have been less prevalent in areas where synthetic media presently does not provide a similarly significant offensive edge. This has been found to be the case with deceptions involving the dissemination of false narratives, where conventional techniques such as manipulatively editing authentic media or sharing it out of context still remain highly effective and relatively easy to accomplish, limiting the comparative utility of generative AI tools. Regardless, as the technology’s capabilities improve and barriers to using it decrease, it will undoubtedly be more extensively adopted for all manner of stratagems.</p> -<p>Meanwhile, China is not standing still in the competition for regional influence. It has applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership and is using its membership in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership to expand its market access while the United States is, essentially, “just watching.”</p> +<p>Compounding these harms is the second-order risk posed by weaponized synthetic media: the corrosion of information integrity. The proliferation of deceptive AI-generated content risks damaging the public’s trust in the veracity of any information they encounter more generally as they become increasingly unable to trust their eyes and ears to reliably inform them as to what is real and what is fake. This degradation of trust in the truth jeopardizes the resilience of the U.S.’s information environment, or its “epistemic security” — which risks heightening its vulnerability to political and economic instability and constraining national security capabilities. Less epistemically secure societies are more limited in their ability to engage in collective and timely decision-making, making them more susceptible to adversarial manipulation, reducing their capacity for effective crisis response, and constraining critical defense and intelligence capabilities. This threat is not a novel one. Instances of widespread conventional misinformation have already been found to have diminished public trust in information from media and government institutions, resulting in decreased faith in political election integrity, weakened confidence in national security organizations, and led to violence and unrest. For example, pervasive false anti-vaccination narratives during the Covid-19 pandemic undermined vaccine confidence and institutional trust in the United States. The proliferation of these falsehoods, in turn, stymied economic growth, trade, and diplomacy, damaged education, and increased the number of vaccine-preventable outbreaks.</p> -<p>What does this mean for the future? Neither presidential candidate is likely to return to conventional trade agreements, although, ironically, Trump may be more willing to start new negotiations than Harris. Instead, there is discussion about alternatives to what is currently on the table. One possibility is to focus negotiations on regulatory harmonization or mutual recognition on the theory that aligning regulations on commerce will increase trade. There is something to that. Standards conformance would make it easier for products to cross borders. Moreover, such mutual recognition could allow professionals like lawyers and accountants to work in partner countries and thus increase services trade. The problem is that those negotiations are not easy. Regulators in every country like the way they do things and resist being told that they must do them differently, or that they have to recognize that someone else’s rules are as good as theirs.</p> +<p>Synthetic media misuse risks intensifying the damage done to the public’s trust in information by making it harder to distinguish fact from fiction. One can easily imagine how the viral AI-generated image of an explosion near the Pentagon, mentioned at the beginning of this brief, may have resulted in more significant adverse effects in a less epistemically secure society. Decreased public trust in information from institutional sources could have made later debunking by authorities less successful or take longer, enabling the falsehood to disseminate further and permitting greater knock-on effects to occur, such as more extensive financial volatility than just a brief dip in the stock market, which in turn could have led to civil unrest or facilitated the ability of foreign adversaries to leverage the unrest to their benefit.</p> -<p>A second alternative is to focus on individual sectors – such as critical minerals – when making trade agreements. This is also a good idea, but like the first, it will be more difficult in practice than in theory. Countries that have minerals are, of course, interested in selling them, but they also want to capture more of the value added by processing the resources and manufacturing the products that contain them. If the United States is only interested in extraction, the negotiations may not get far.</p> +<p>There are signs that the increased prevalence of synthetic media has already begun to damage the public’s epistemic trust. Research shows that repeated exposure to unlabelled synthetic media makes individuals more susceptible to misidentifying future synthetic content as well as reduces individuals’ confidence in the truthfulness of all information. More recently, it was discovered that Russia’s extensive use of AI-enabled deceptions throughout the still ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict has had a detrimental effect on Ukrainian citizens’ confidence in information, making them significantly more skeptical of the truthfulness of all digital content they encounter online. Even just the existence of synthetic media itself has begun to erode aspects of the public’s trust, as evident in the increasing frequency of authentic media being wrongly dismissed as AI-generated. The trend has become especially prevalent in information-contested spaces, such as political elections or the Israel-Hamas conflict, where both sides have frequently decried real digital content as being fake. As the synthetic media threat landscape continues to expand, these adverse effects will likely only grow stronger. Ultimately, it is the convergence of these immediate and systemic threats that makes countering weaponized synthetic media a national security imperative.</p> -<p>Ultimately, success on any of these fronts will require an attitude change. If the United States only wants to receive and not give, any negotiation is doomed. The important word here is an old one – reciprocity. It was popular in trade debates in the 1980s when it meant that the United States should insist that other countries match concessions with its own. Today, the situation is reversed: other countries are demanding that the United States match their concessions with some of its own. Until the United States is willing to do that, progress on trade agreements will remain elusive.</p> +<h3 id="types-of-ai-enabled-deceptions">Types of AI-Enabled Deceptions</h3> -<h3 id="rethinking-competition-with-china-on-clean-technologies">Rethinking Competition with China on Clean Technologies</h3> +<p>The current synthetic media threat landscape can be broadly divided into six categories of AI-enabled deceptions: gray zone warfare, espionage and surveillance, military deception, domestic politics, nonconsensual intimate media, and financial crime. However, with the technology’s continued advancement, it is anticipated that the depth and breadth of AI-enabled deception incidents will also expand and diversify, including hate crimes, falsification of evidence in legal proceedings, corporate espionage or sabotage, and more. To better illustrate the contours of today’s landscape, a selection of particularly noteworthy AI deception incidents that have taken place across the six major categories have been shared below.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="ilaria-mazzocco">Ilaria Mazzocco</h4> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="gray-zone-warfare">Gray Zone Warfare</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While China’s industrial policy does create significant market distortions, policymakers should spend more resources identifying gaps in the U.S. innovation ecosystem and focus more on U.S. competitive advantages.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Synthetic media has been increasingly weaponized within gray zone warfare, or actions that take place in the murky waters between regular statecraft and outright warfare, such as information warfare, cyberattacks, and political and economic coercion. Examples of AI-enabled deception incidents that have occurred in the gray zone include the following:</p> -<p>U.S.-China technological competition is widespread and complex, but there is one technological sphere with a clear leader: Chinese companies are increasingly outperforming competitors in cost and quality when it comes to established clean technologies ranging from solar panels and lithium-ion batteries to electric vehicles (EVs). While the United States erects more barriers to keep out Chinese firms, it also needs to avoid technological isolation, contend with more competition on the international stage, and be prepared to compete in emerging and next-generation clean technologies.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>State-affiliated influence operations have disseminated synthetic images and videos as part of propaganda or information campaigns surrounding major political focal points or noteworthy events, including elections in Europe and Taiwan, U.S. politics, the Russo-Ukrainian and Israeli-Hamas conflicts, and the 2023 Maui wildfires.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Real-time face-swapping software was used to successfully impersonate Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko in a series of video calls with several mayors of major European cities as part of a targeted influence operation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An alleged AI-generated sex tape of a presidential candidate in the 2023 Turkish elections, purportedly published by an adversarial state, was widely circulated, leading to the candidate’s withdrawal from the race.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Chinese, Iranian, North Korean, and Russian state-affiliated actors were found to have been manufacturing synthetic content for spear phishing as part of cyberattacks they were planning to conduct.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Many of Washington’s current policies vis-à-vis Chinese clean technology companies assume thattheir rise is predominantly, if not solely, driven by subsidies. However, this overlooks the broader context that enabled the development of these companies and technologies, including China’s massive effort to create markets for these goods over the past two decades and the role played by innovative companies integrated into global value chains. Focusing solely on overcapacity, for example, might lead observers to miss that it is the most successful and competitive manufacturers that are leading the export boom – such as EV maker BYD.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kW7uO1I.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Fake news channel clips featuring AI-generated TV anchors were shared by bot accounts online as a part of pro-Chinese information campaigns.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/07/technology/artificial-intelligence-training-deepfake.html">Adam Satariano and Paul Mozur, “The People Onscreen Are Fake. The Disinformation Is Real.,” New York Times, February 7, 2022</a>.</em></p> -<p>While China’s industrial policy does create significant market distortions, policymakers should spend more resources identifying gaps in the U.S. innovation ecosystem and focus more on U.S. competitive advantages. As it implements its own industrial policy strategy, the United States should learn from its main competitor. For example, few policymakers focus on the high levels of automation in Chinese factories as a source of advantage even though the Chinese government has been explicitly supporting a shift toward more automation and the digitalization of manufacturing – and encouraging the use of Chinese-made industrial robots in the process. Talent, financing, and regional clusters also matter, as does stable policy committed to creating demand for these emerging technologies.</p> +<h4 id="espionage-and-surveillance">Espionage and Surveillance</h4> -<p>The demand piece will be crucial moving forward for the technologies where the U.S. government hopes to compete with incumbent Chinese firms, such as batteries and next-generation technologies like green hydrogen and carbon capture and storage. There are ways to bolster demand in the United States, for example, by building out more infrastructure for charging, promoting grid modernization and expansion, and engaging in permitting reform. Yet, a protected market often lacks incentives for innovation and efficiency, which is why Washington should encourage U.S. companies to engage in head-to-head competition with Chinese firms.</p> +<p>Synthetic media has also been leveraged to a lesser extent, at least to public knowledge, for espionage and surveillance operations by states and the private cyber surveillance industry, strengthening online impersonations of real or fictitious individuals to obtain confidential information from targets. Examples of AI-enabled espionage and surveillance incidents include the following:</p> -<p>Chinese cleantech companies are already rapidly expanding internationally both in terms of exports and, increasingly, investment in third markets. Chinese firms are establishing factories beyond China’s borders for refined minerals, components, and final goods, including solar panels and EVs. Far from a hostile takeover, these types of investments are often in direct response to demands by host countries.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Synthetic media was used in a fictitious Washington think tank employee’s made-up LinkedIn account, which was suspected of being run as part of a Russian espionage operation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Private cyber-intelligence companies used hundreds of fake accounts of social media content, impersonating activists, journalists, and young women, to covertly gather information from targets, including IP addresses and personal contact information.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>State-affiliated actors used social engineering assisted by large language models (LLM) to manipulate targets and facilitate the collection and analysis of open-source information.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The United States is not unique in deploying tariffs against Chinese-made goods, but it looks more isolated in seeking to contain, rather than attract, Chinese investment. European, Southeast Asian, Latin American, and various other governments have explicitly invited Chinese companies to localize their production, something firms are eager to do in order to access these countries’ markets or to export to third markets, including the United States.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/easgrTO.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>This fake LinkedIn account of a fictitious Washington think tank employee, suspected of being used for a Russian espionage operation, was found to have used a synthetic image for the profile photo.</strong> Source: <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-artificial-intelligence-social-platforms-think-tanks-politics-bc2f19097a4c4fffaa00de6770b8a60d">Raphael Satter, “Experts: Spy used AI-generated face to connect with targets,” AP News, June 13, 2019</a>.</em></p> -<p>Another trend is also at play internationally. To improve their competitiveness, international companies are seeking to access Chinese clean technology through joint ventures, licensing deals, and even by acquiring shares in Chinese startup companies (as in the case of Stellantis and Volkswagen). This raises the possibility that much of the world, including some U.S. allies, may become more technologically integrated with China, not least because Chinese firms have some of the most advanced clean technologies on the market.</p> +<h4 id="military-deception">Military Deception</h4> -<p>Ultimately, if the United States wants to compete with China, it will need to draw the correct lessons from history. The successes of clean technology today owe much to globalized value chains that took advantage of China’s manufacturing ecosystem and large market in the past. If national security demands the exclusion of China from some or all of the United States’ clean technology value chains, policymakers will need to be clear-eyed about the costs and trade-offs and must identify strategic priorities. In some technologies, derisking may be possible in a limited fashion; in others, Washington may need to strengthen its linkages with other countries. Sectoral agreements on steel or critical minerals may provide interesting formats for potential partnerships on a sectoral basis. Still, the United States will need to think strategically about concessions over market access or joint research and development. Finally, a world where the largest economies engage in green industrial policy may eventually require finding a credible multilateral platform to discuss potential solutions to increasing trade disputes and distortions.</p> +<p>Although the adversarial use of synthetic media for targeted military operations has so far been limited in practice, AI-enabled military deception remains a topic of great concern due to the large number of ways in which the technology could be leveraged to gain a battlefield advantage. This includes creating entirely fictitious events to alter or skew enemy intelligence, impersonating military personnel to falsify or muddle orders, and manufacturing noise to mask one’s actions from an adversary or to overwhelm and confuse them. There are two particularly noteworthy examples of AI-enabled military deception incidents:</p> -<h2 id="technology-statecraft-and-global-governance">Technology Statecraft and Global Governance</h2> +<ul> + <li> + <p>AI-generated content featuring Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky has been published and circulated extensively on social media to sow confusion and discord, including a synthetic video of him calling for his troops to immediately lay down their arms and surrender to Russian forces.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russian radio and TV networks were hacked to air fictitious AI-generated emergency broadcasts of Russian president Vladimir Putin declaring martial law due to Ukrainian forces invading Russian territory, causing some to actually evacuate in confusion.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h3 id="building-a-tech-alliance">Building a Tech Alliance</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DbhTCki.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ <strong>A social media post shows the airing of an emergency Russian TV broadcast featuring an AI-generated video that falsely depicted Russian president Vladamir Putin declaring martial law and calling for evacuation due to the Ukrainian invasion.</strong> Source: <a href="https://x.com/AlexKokcharov/status/1665709387648827397">Alex Kokcharov (@Alex Kokcharov), X post, June 15, 2023, 6:17 am</a>.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="james-a-lewis">James A. Lewis</h4> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="domestic-politics">Domestic Politics</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Europe is the crux of the tech-alliance problem. Countries like Japan and Australia are ready to work together with the United States, but there is a degree of ambivalence in Europe.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>In recent years, there has been a surge in synthetic media being employed by domestic actors to create deceptive political content, predominately in regard to political elections. A selection of AI-enabled incidents include the following:</p> -<p>Calls to create some kind of technology alliance among democracies can be grounded in experience. We can identify requirements for developing an alliance and the actions needed to turn proposals into agreement. However, while alliances are easy to propose, they are hard to build.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>The Venezuelan government ran fake news stories featuring AI-generated newscasters as part of a widespread domestic propaganda campaign to influence its citizens.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Both pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian social media accounts shared synthetic images of the ongoing Gaza conflict, such as AI-generated photos of a crying baby among bomb wreckage, to further false narratives.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An AI-generated nonconsensual pornographic video of a senior U.S. government official at the Department of Homeland Security was circulated online as part of an ongoing smear campaign.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Synthetic images of former president Donald Trump, portrayed as being real, were used in an attack ad by an opposition candidate during the U.S. presidential primaries.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Synthetic media of politicians were falsely portrayed as authentic, including videos of UK prime minister Keir Starmer shouting at staff, U.S. president Joe Biden calling for a military draft, and a Slovakian presidential candidate discussing vote rigging during the election’s final days.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A robocall campaign used a synthetic audio clip of President Biden’s voice to urge thousands of New Hampshire residents not to vote in the state’s primary.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>UK far-right actors and politicians widely circulated anti-immigrant and Islamophobic synthetic content across social media ahead of the 2024 elections.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Fictitious videos and images of celebrities such as Taylor Swift, as well as entirely AI-generated Black voters, endorsing former president Trump’s 2024 U.S. presidential campaign have been frequently shared online by political supporters in the run up to the 2024 elections.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The first, and most important, of these requirements is there must be a shared problem that potential partners wish to address through collective action. Maintaining U.S. technological dominance is not a shared problem and probably not the best appeal for partnership. Similarly, calling for a crusade against China is not universally appealing in Europe or Asia.</p> +<h4 id="nonconsensual-intimate-media">Nonconsensual Intimate Media</h4> -<p>Europe is the crux of the tech-alliance problem. Countries like Japan and Australia are ready to work together with the United States, but there is a degree of ambivalence in Europe. There is also a degree of envy over U.S. technological success. European political culture is still shaped by the traumas of the twentieth century, and one explanation for extraterritorial regulation of U.S. technology companies is that Americans should “remember Europe’s history” and how it creates deep concerns for fundamental rights such as privacy. Others say that the purpose of technology regulation is, at least partially, to slow down U.S. companies so that European companies can catch up.</p> +<p>One of the most prolific abuses of generative AI to date has been the production of AI-generated nonconsensual intimate media of adults and children. Accounting for 96 percent of all synthetic media videos in existence in 2019, the adult nonconsensual pornography industry and the online trafficking of child sexual abuse materials have exploded in the years since, claiming millions of adult and child victims to date. Examples of incidents include the following:</p> -<p>Two phrases from Brussels highlight the problem: “European values” and “tech sovereignty” (or “digital sovereignty”). The first implies somewhat simplistically that there are different values in the United States and Europe. The second is more problematic. European sources say that tech sovereignty means not only independence from China, but also from the United States. Any proposal for a new alliance needs to show how it aligns with this EU goal of increased sovereignty.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>An Indian journalist investigating the rape of a young girl was the target of an extensive hate campaign, which included synthetic pornography of her being circulated online.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An automated Telegram bot service created and published sexual images of an estimated 24,000 women and girls.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Sexually explicit images and videos of school girls and female teachers being produced and shared online by male students in Korea, Brazil, Spain, and the United States, among others.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A recently uncovered worldwide trafficking ring producing and selling sexually synthetic images depicting photorealistic children on a reported “industrial scale.”</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A deluge of synthetic pornography featuring Taylor Swift spread across the social media platform X, forcing the online platform to block searches of the celebrity temporarily.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>One way to overcome sovereignty issues is to build a new technology alliance upon existing structures such as the G7 or the Wassenaar Arrangement, but both would need to be modified – the G7 by adding counties like Australia, South Korea, and the Netherlands and Wassenaar by removing Russia and perhaps Hungary. Other groups, including AUKUS, the Quad, and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, are too narrow to serve as a foundation.</p> +<h4 id="financial-crime">Financial Crime</h4> -<p>Wassenaar, the current tech regime, has shortcomings. It is 30 years old, technological change challenges the scope of its controls, and it now lacks the strategic underpinnings that led to its creation (and Russia’s membership). Wassenaar was a response to the end of the Cold War and was designed for that context. While it is not in Western interests to dismantle Wassenaar, it does need to be supplemented by measures that go beyond export controls. Judging from past experience, the best route might start with the G7 and then add additional countries, since the Wassenaar Arrangement itself grew out of G7 talks.</p> +<p>AI-enabled financial crime has quickly become one of the most widespread misuses of synthetic media. Criminals have employed generative AI tools to impersonate, extort, and hack for a multitude of fraudulent activities, with personalized AI spear-phishing emails and voice phone scams experiencing the largest growth. With an estimated 700 percent increase in incidents in 2023 from the previous year, financial experts predict that AI-enabled financial fraud could lead to losses of $40 billion by 2027. Noteworthy incidents include the following:</p> -<p>Who in the U.S. government makes the appeal for an alliance is also important. It must be a senior political figure from either the White House (preferably the president) or the secretary of state or treasury. In the past, the Department of Commerce has not been considered by other countries to have sufficient heft, although this may have changed in the Biden administration. In addition, many countries do not consider the Department of Defense the right counterpart for economic security issues. Other departments or staff-level proposals will not be taken seriously (remember that every government starts its review of a proposal by asking its embassy if the Americans are serious, and the embassies look for signs like senior-level interest, funding, and follow-through). Working an announcement into a presidential speech, even a single sentence, would help kickstart a technology alliance.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>The head of a UK energy firm was personally tricked into transferring nearly $250,000 by fraudsters who used voice cloning to impersonate the parent company’s CEO.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Reportedly the largest AI-generated scam to date, thousands of synthetic videos of celebrities such as Elon Musk and MrBeast promoting fake financial schemes have been widely circulated on social media platforms.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An Arizona woman was the target of a fake ransoming scheme in which fraudsters impersonated her daughter over the phone using voice-cloning technology.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An employee of a financial firm was tricked during a week-long ruse into paying out $25 million to fraudsters after the scammers used real-time synthetic audiovisual software to impersonate the employee’s senior personnel and colleagues through a series of group video conferences, emails, and calls.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The Yahoo Boys, a crime collective, have widely adopted AI tools for romance scams and sextortion, employing live face and voice impersonation software and “nudification” apps to trick and blackmail targets. This has led not only to financial loss but also to tragic deaths in which some targets, frequently teenagers, took their own lives.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>A formal proposal must immediately follow a presidential announcement. It must lay out initial thinking on which technologies are covered and the security rationale for the alliance, as well as provide details on membership criteria, frequency of meetings, secretarial functions, and what a commitment would entail in terms of time, money, and personnel. The proposal cannot be set in stone but rather should be presented as a discussion paper, open to amendment by other participants. Further, the United States must go into discussions knowing the minimum it can accept and what is essential. Ideally this would be joint effort, specifically, a joint proposal coming from the United States, Japan, and a G7 European member.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>A technology alliance may need to have both positive and defensive goals to attract wide support, but combining these two ends can be difficult. For example, managing technology transfer to China is a central strategic consideration, but so is coordinating policies and promoting the development of emerging technologies. While AUKUS is too focused on defense to easily translate into a broader tech alliance, Pillars 1 (advanced capabilities, including cyber, AI, and quantum and 2 (industrial base cooperation) could provide useful precedent. The most challenging issue in any joint effort to jointly create new technologies is how the members will share funding and intellectual property rights.</p> +<p>As generative AI technology continues to advance, so does the potential for its misuse. In only a few short years, the synthetic media threat landscape has changed dramatically. AI-enabled deceptions have become increasingly complex and varied, ranging from gray zone warfare to financial fraud and beyond. Not only has the weaponization of synthetic media already begun to cause real and substantial harm to people and organizations worldwide, but it also threatens to undermine public trust in all information online, regardless of the truth. Overall, these developments present troubling implications for U.S. national security.</p> -<p>A final point to bear in mind is that it will take months, perhaps years, to create a new tech regime. An ideal time to start such an initiative is at the start of a new administration. The spring of 2025 could be the launch point.</p> +<p>These dangers have become even more severe as it has been made clear that widely available generative AI technology has progressed to the point that people can no longer depend on their eyes and ears to reliably detect the synthetic content they might encounter in their everyday lives. With this primary line of defense compromised, pursuing alternative solutions has never been so vital. Now more than ever, stakeholders across the private and public sectors must work together to implement multifaceted countermeasures that bridge the technological, regulatory, and educational domains to oppose the growing threat posed by weaponized synthetic media.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Navin Girishankar</strong> is president of the Economic Security and Technology Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He leads a bipartisan team of over 40 resident staff and an extensive network of non-resident affiliates dedicated to providing independent research and strategic insights on economic and technology policies and their critical role in competitiveness as well as national security.</p> +<p><strong>Di Cooke</strong> is a horizon fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is the director of the Wadhwani AI Center at CSIS. Mr. Allen’s expertise and professional experience spans AI, robotics, semiconductors, space technology, and national security.</p> +<p><strong>Abby Edwards</strong> is a former research associate in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> -<p><strong>Adam Frost</strong> is the former senior vice president for the China and Transformational Exports Program at the Export-Import Bank of the United States.</p> +<p><strong>Alexis Day</strong> is an associate director for the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS.</p> -<p><strong>Kirti Gupta</strong> is a noted economist and expert specializing in global matters related to technology, antitrust, and intellectual property (IP). Dr. Gupta’s diverse expertise spans engineering, product, litigation, and policy issues in the technology sector. She currently serves as vice president and chief economist of global technology at Cornerstone Research, leading their technology, digital economy, and artificial intelligence practice.</p> +<p><strong>Devi Nair</strong> is a former associate director and associate fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> -<p><strong>Barath Harithas</strong> is a senior fellow with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS, focusing on issues at the intersection of national security, trade, and technology. He has held diverse public service roles in Singapore spanning the U.S.-China relationship, international trade, and AI standards.</p> +<p><strong>Sophia Barkoff</strong> is a former research intern in Defending Democratic Institutions in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> -<p><strong>Scott Kennedy</strong> is senior adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at CSIS. A leading authority on Chinese economic policy and U.S.-China commercial relations, Kennedy has traveled to China for 36 years. Ongoing focuses include China’s innovation drive, Chinese industrial policy, U.S.-China relations, and global economic governance.</p> +<p><strong>Katie Kelly</strong> is a former social media and outreach intern in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>Di Cooke, et al.New research finds that we can now no longer trust our eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between real and AI-generated images, audio, and video. What does this mean in a world where the weaponization of synthetic media is becoming increasingly prevalent?SIFMANet Budapest Report2024-10-31T12:00:00+08:002024-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sifmanet-budapest-report<p><em>Discussions held in Budapest in September 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Hungary.</em></p> -<p><strong>James Lewis</strong> writes on technology and strategy at CSIS. Lewis has a track record of being among the first to identify new tech and security issues and devise polices to address them. He leads a long-running track 2 dialogue with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. His current work looks at how countries innovate and at digitalization and its political, economic, and security effects.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><strong>Joseph Majkut</strong> is director of the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at CSIS. In this role, he leads the program’s work understanding the geopolitics of energy and climate change and working to ensure a global energy transition that is responsive to the risks of climate change and the economic and strategic priorities of the United States and the world. Joseph is an expert in climate science, climate policy, and risk and uncertainty analysis for decisionmaking.</p> +<p>In September 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI convened a roundtable discussion with public and private sector representatives from Hungary to discuss the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in the country. The roundtable was organised with the support of the Budapest-based think tank Equilibrium Institute. Participants included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Hungarian Financial Intelligence Unit and the Customs Unit of the National Tax and Customs Administration, the Hungarian National Bank, the Government Office of the Capital City Budapest, professional associations, companies, law firms and financial institutions.</p> -<p><strong>Ilaria Mazzocco</strong> is a deputy director and a senior fellow with the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at CSIS. She has over a decade of experience researching industrial policy, Chinese climate policy, and the intersection between the energy transition and economic and national security.</p> +<p>The event was part of RUSI’s work to understand and highlight key challenges for sanctions implementation through its Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), funded by the National Endowment for Democracy. This conference report represents the findings gathered during the Budapest engagement. None of the discussions from the event are attributable.</p> -<p><strong>Erin Murphy</strong> is deputy director and a senior fellow for emerging Asia economics with the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics at CSIS. She has spent her career in several public and private sector roles, including as an analyst on Asian political and foreign policy issues at the Central Intelligence Agency, director for the Indo-Pacific at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, founder and principal of her boutique advisory firm focused on Myanmar, and an English teacher with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program in Saga, Japan.</p> +<h3 id="the-legal-and-institutional-sanctions-framework-in-hungary">The Legal and Institutional Sanctions Framework in Hungary</h3> -<p><strong>William Alan Reinsch</strong> holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS. He is also an adjunct assistant professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, teaching a course in trade policy and politics.</p> +<p>Throughout the workshop, participants highlighted the fact that the current sanctions implementation landscape in Hungary is decentralised, involving multiple authorities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the National Tax and Customs Administration’s FIU and Customs Unit, the National Bank and the BFKH, along with other relevant agencies. Below follows a description of the relevant national competent authorities as described by participants.</p> -<p><strong>Richard Rossow</strong> is a senior adviser and holds the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics at CSIS. In this role, he helps frame and shape policies to promote greater business and economic engagement between the two countries, with a unique focus on tracking and engaging Indian states.</p> +<p>The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade only established its Sanctions Department in March 2024. The Sanctions Department engages in policymaking in European Council working groups, develops expert opinions on sanctions proposals, coordinates implementation with the competent authorities, and participates in sanctions enforcement and export authorisation procedures. The department can also veto the decisions of the BFKH on the export of dual-use goods and military technology. Furthermore, it can issue opinions on the decisions of the BFKH regarding the provision of services, and the import of goods generating significant revenues for Russia, among other decisions. The department also provides opinions on large-scale government projects and bilateral protocols, and can offer, on request, opinions for companies on sanctions implementation issues.</p> -<p><strong>Sujai Shivakumar</strong> directs Renewing American Innovation (RAI) at CSIS, where he also serves as a senior fellow. Dr. Shivakumar brings over two decades of experience in policy studies related to U.S. competitiveness and innovation.</p>Navin Girishankar, et al.This report gives recommendations on export controls, global tech governance, domestic incentives for building tech capabilities in chips and clean technologies, and the future of international tech cooperation and competition.Cockpit Or Command Center?2024-10-29T12:00:00+08:002024-10-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/cockpit-or-command-center<p><em>The future of airpower hinges on the U.S. Air Force’s ability to integrate autonomous drones into manned formations. This analysis explores the trade-offs between cockpit and command center–based control in shaping the next era of combat operations.</em></p> +<p>The responsibility for implementing targeted financial sanctions primarily rests with the FIU, which is part of the National Tax and Customs Administration. As a result of the need to heighten Hungary’s sanctions response following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the FIU underwent a significant reorganisation to enhance its operational capabilities. This restructuring has allowed the FIU to gain practical experience in sanctions enforcement, a process that had been somewhat limited prior to this period. The volume of transactions screened for sanctions purposes by the FIU increased following the invasion, and its sanctions responsibilities expanded. Since August 2024, the FIU has been responsible for screening any transfer of funds exceeding €100,000 out of the EU by any entity of which more than 40% is owned by Russia-linked entities or persons.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The institutional framework for sanctions enforcement in Hungary requires FIs and companies to report any transactions or assets suspected of violating sanctions directly to the FIU. The FIU is tasked with analysing these reports and determining whether any violations have occurred. If a potential violation is identified, the matter is escalated to the court, which holds the authority to freeze the assets or block the transactions in question. This dual role of the FIU – as both an administrative and a police unit – has increased its prominence within the sanctions implementation landscape. However, despite the improvements in reporting mechanisms and operational frameworks, the FIU acknowledges the need for a clearer demarcation between its traditional financial intelligence functions and its new responsibilities concerning sanctions implementation. To facilitate information exchange regarding sanctions cases, the FIU utilises FIU. net to ensure that international stakeholders can access relevant data efficiently.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Networks of manned and unmanned aircraft will command the skies.</strong> These teams will be increasingly modular and optimized for counterair, interdiction, and close air support missions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>A mix of war games, Red Flag exercises, and dynamic home station simulations will test the ability of airmen – on the ground and in the skies – to execute mission command through networks of unmanned aircraft</strong> and respond to rapid changes in the threat environment. Together, these experiments will help guide not just airpower, but the entire joint planning and targeting cycle, into an era of algorithmic warfare.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The Hungarian National Bank plays a critical role in the prudential supervision of FIs, ensuring that they maintain capital adequacy and liquidity. The National Bank had to adapt its operational protocols to account for the impact of sanctions on FIs, integrating sanctions compliance into its anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing (AML/CTF) supervisory framework. The sanctions-related responsibilities have intensified the bank’s Anti-Money Laundering Supervision Department’s cooperation with the bank’s Regulatory Department, the relevant Hungarian authorities, and professional associations.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>The BFKH’s Department of Trade, Defence Industry, Export Control and Precious Metal Assay is responsible for licensing dual-use and military goods, as well as the implementation of certain sectoral sanctions. These include sanctions related to investments in the Russian energy sector, the re-export of fuel to Russia, the export of luxury goods and the provision of services, among others. The BFKH is also responsible for implementing certain financial sanctions, such as the prohibitions on transactions with the Central Bank of Russia and on accepting bank deposits over €100,000. Through its participation in the COARM and Dual-Use Goods working parties of the European Council, the BFKH is also integrated into the policy aspect of sanctions in Brussels. While taking on additional sanctions responsibilities since February 2022, the BFKH still operates with the same resources as before the full-scale invasion, putting it under increased pressure.</p> -<p>There is a new theory of airpower on the horizon. Over the next five years, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) plans to invest billions in research and development for a force of over 1,000 collaborative combat aircraft (CCA). The vision includes working with allies and partners to pair fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft with versatile unmanned systems, creating aerial networks that can rapidly adapt to changes in the battlespace. Multiple reports and war games portend a new future in which unmanned systems will replace an aging, expensive manned aircraft and create entirely new mission profiles optimized for peer conflict. The fate of these unmanned systems is critical, given both the Air Force’s decision in July 2024 to reevaluate its sixth-generation aircraft and the emergence of new Air Task Forces.</p> +<p>The Hungarian Customs Unit, part of the National Tax and Customs Administration, is charged with overseeing import–export activities related to Russia. Given the high volumes of trade with countries regarded as circumvention hubs, the increased burden on customs officials, coupled with limited resources, has hampered effective enforcement. Currently, only a few staff members are dedicated to sanctions-related oversight within the Customs Unit, and they are reliant on information from the European Commission due to their limited capacity for independent intelligence production.</p> -<p>Yet how will military organizations command and control distributed networks of CCAs in future air operations? Will such networks be proverbial “loyal wingmen,” subject only to the tactical commands of a pilot in a cockpit? Or will drones do the bidding of the command centers, like Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs)? The command and control (C2) architecture surrounding CCAs will almost certainly prove to be as consequential as the systems themselves in forging the future of air power. The U.S. military needs a clear concept of mission command for autonomous aircraft, executed across multidomain battle networks and tailored to different mission types.</p> +<p>Several other authorities are responsible for implementing sectoral and targeted sanctions: the Aviation Supervisory Authority Department of the Ministry of Construction and Transport implements bans on private and charter flights; the National Media and Infocommunications Authority is responsible for media bans; and the National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing implements entry bans.</p> -<p>There is a fundamental tradeoff between tactical responsiveness and operational effectiveness. Where missions require time-sensitive adjustments, CCA C2 should center on the mission leader and ensure pilots have the right mix of high-bandwidth, low-latency comms and human-factor-optimized software to help them respond to the chaos and complexity of aerial combat. Where missions require concentration and unity of effort – the alignment of mass and objective – CCA C2 should focus on operational planning and mission execution directed from command centers. The Air Force and other aviation arms across the services need to invest in flexible battle networks and in concepts and training regimes that help adapt the core processes of command and control to the realities of modern warfare. To achieve this, the USAF should start conducting more robust studies and war games involving C2, alongside an accelerated series of experiments. It is one thing to pick a new piece of equipment; it is another to forge new doctrines and processes around the equipment.</p> +<p>For a complete understanding of the sanctions framework in Hungary, it is important to highlight that Hungary has been granted several exemptions in EU sanctions packages. Together with Slovakia and Czechia, the country has a temporary exemption from the prohibition of imports of crude oil by pipeline; the Rosatom-led Paks II nuclear power plant’s construction was also granted exemption; and the import of certain, otherwise sanctioned, goods remains authorised for the maintenance of Russian metro cars in Budapest.</p> -<h3 id="the-third-offset-takes-flight">The Third Offset Takes Flight</h3> +<h3 id="sanctions-compliance-in-the-hungarian-private-sector">Sanctions Compliance in the Hungarian Private Sector</h3> -<p>The concept of pairing unmanned combat aircraft with traditional air formations dates back to the notions of “the Third Offset” and “the loyal wingman.” The Third Offset – a term coined by former deputy secretary of defense Robert Work in 2014 – proposes the use of technological advantages to offset Russia’s and China’s abilities to amass combat power. Its theory of victory was to ensure that the United States retained a generational lead in weaponry. As part of this strategy, defense analysts envisioned a new, unmanned “loyal wingman” that could increase the performance of fourth- and fifth-generation combat aircraft.</p> +<p>Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine prompted a political debate in Hungary, marked by a critical governmental narrative on sanctions and their financial and economic impact on the country. Participants at the roundtable described the collapse of Sberbank Europe AG due to asset freezes under the initial sanctions packages as a key example. This case reverberated through the banking sector, leading to considerable deposit outflows and heightened sensitivity among FIs regarding liquidity and capital management.</p> -<p>Many of the initial loyal wingman tests involved turning fourth-generation fighter aircraft into remotely piloted vehicles. For example, during the 2017 Have Raider II experiments, Lockheed Martin Skunk Works paired an unmanned F-16 with a manned ground station to test autonomous flight during simulated air-ground strikes. In 2023, the USAF unveiled Project Venom, a series of experiments designed to load autonomous code into six F-16s and test the systems’ operation across a range of missions. These efforts built on earlier experiments that focused on perfecting the software necessary for autonomous flight. These experiments continue today through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)’s Air Combat Evolution program, which tests prototypes like the X-62A.</p> +<p>In the wake of the sanctions imposed after the invasion, FIs in Hungary faced an urgent need to adapt to new requirements. Representatives from the Hungarian financial sector noted that although they had previous experience with sanctions stemming from Russia’s initial invasion of Eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014 – primarily focusing on name-/entity screening – the heightened and more complex restrictive measures on Russia necessitated more rigorous and manual work. FIs must now screen transactions comprehensively and assess whether the goods or end users involved are subject to sanctions, rather than simply screening for name matches. The absence of automated tools for monitoring financial flows related to sanctions violations poses significant challenges for Hungarian banks. While some tools, such as Swift’s Compliance Analytics, assist in analysing changes in financial flows that might be indicative of sanctions evasion activity, they often fall short of providing the depth of analysis required for transactions with high risks, and cannot provide the granular insights necessary for effective compliance. As it stands, compliance teams must often screen transactions manually on a case-by-case basis, which includes evaluating complex scenarios such as the export of aluminium wires to Russia or the import of salmon from the country.</p> -<p>CCA concepts have since evolved beyond adapting fourth-generation platforms to building unmanned aircraft with treaty allies. Over the past year, five companies submitted CCA designs, two of which – General Atomics and Anduril – the Air Force is now considering. The General Atomics candidate is the Gambit, built to change configurations for different mission profiles to maximize fungibility. Anduril entered the CCA contest via its 2023 acquisition of Blue Force, whose group 5 vehicle, Fury, will be integrated with Anduril’s family of autonomous vehicles.</p> +<p>To better safeguard against non-compliance, participants from the financial sector argue that rather than simply rejecting transactions, FIs should adopt a US-style approach that allows for the blocking of funds within FIs until sufficient documentation confirming the lawfulness of transactions is provided. This shift would ensure that, while banks are still held accountable for compliance, additional pressure would be placed on corporates to bolster their sanctions awareness, as they would lose access to funds submitted for processing that are not properly documented. Enhanced technological capabilities in monitoring and reporting on sanctions-related activities are therefore needed to ease the burden of manual review processes.</p> -<p>Both firms share a vision of using software to optimize hardware performance and interoperability – an idea that grows out of earlier work by DARPA, including the Adapting Cross-Domain Kill-Webs (ACK) program and the larger concept of mosaic warfare. In line with this vision, CCAs will not only increase the survival of manned aircraft, but also enhance lethality by enabling software-defined kill webs.</p> +<p>Private sector representatives also highlighted the compliance challenges posed by the current fragmented sanctions reporting landscape in Hungary, involving multiple authorities and duplicating reporting lines. This creates confusion and inefficiencies. Banks in Hungary can self-report compliance failings to the FIU, but they also have obligations to report to the Hungarian National Bank. This dual reporting structure underscores the need for a clearer, more integrated approach to sanctions enforcement.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4XuCgo9.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Advanced Battle Management System.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.aflcmc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2432103/emerald-flag-exercise-begins/">“Emerald Flag exercise begins,” Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, December 1, 2020</a>.</em></p> +<p>In the corporate sector, firms that have longstanding practices in managing export controls for dual-use goods are well prepared to follow sanctions regulations. However, the broader corporate sector remains ill-equipped to handle the complexities introduced by recent sanctions. SMEs find it especially challenging to navigate sanctions compliance.</p> -<p>This vision also extends to allies and partners. Building on their own experiments with the Boeing Ghost Bat, the Australians are looking to establish trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan on CCAs. Japan is increasing its investments in multiple unmanned programs, including the Global Combat Air Platform, which is under development with Italy and the United Kingdom. Not to be outdone, India is on schedule to start flight testing its CCA variant later in 2024. In December 2022, France, Spain, and Germany sealed a 3.2-billion-euro agreement for Europe’s Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program. In February 2024, the United Kingdom released its Defence Drone Strategy, highlighting the country’s efforts with unmanned aircraft systems.</p> +<p>Last, legislators and regulatory bodies in Hungary appear to have struggled to coordinate their efforts, particularly given the complexity of sanctions legislation. Existing interdepartmental collaboration has proven challenging, complicating compliance for businesses and FIs. A centralised sanctions authority could streamline processes and facilitate better communication among stakeholders.</p> -<p>China and Russia have introduced similar concepts and prototypes. In 2022, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) unveiled its FH-97A “Loyal Wingman” drone, designed to operate alongside fifth-generation fighters like the J-20 and J-31, which are currently undergoing extensive upgrades. The PLAAF approach to CCAs seems to be to replicate existing low-cost U.S. prototypes like the XQ-58A Valkyrie, which is currently being developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory and the Marine Corps. The Russian defense establishment, led by the Advanced Research Foundation, has long pursued unmanned aerial systems with advanced features and integration capabilities. The development of the Altius and S-70 Okhotnik-B – the latter integrated with the Su-57, Russia’s fifth-generation multirole aircraft – provide compelling evidence of Russian CCA endeavors.</p> +<h3 id="interpretation-of-eu-sanctions-regulations">Interpretation of EU Sanctions Regulations</h3> -<p>Taken together, these initiatives point to a prevailing trend across multiple countries: the addition of unmanned aircraft as key nodes in multidomain networks designed to execute traditional airpower missions like counterair operations, interdiction, and close air support. Similar to earlier DARPA concepts, these nodes enable the delegation of key tasks and support missions across a software-defined kill web. This pairing of manned and unmanned systems puts a premium on command and control, prioritizing the execution of mission command through algorithms that guide autonomous systems.</p> +<p>Interpreting EU sanctions regulations has proven to be a challenge for Hungarian businesses and authorities alike. Participants at the roundtable discussed how the complexity of EU sanctions regulations – characterised by frequent updates and inaccessible language – creates a significant burden for compliance teams, which must navigate a constantly shifting landscape. The rapid pace of change means that organisations often lack the time and resources needed to allow them to adapt their compliance frameworks.</p> -<h3 id="command-and-control">Command and Control</h3> +<p>In this context, private sector participants expressed concerns regarding the interpretation of EU sanctions law, perceiving it as not clear enough. They agreed that language used in these regulations often lacks clarity and coherence, making it difficult for key stakeholders in both the public and private sectors (such as customs officials and FIs) to implement them effectively. Beyond the lack of clarity, rapid modifications to sanctions regulations also pose a challenge. Corporate sector participants noted that a change in the rules can create immediate barriers for goods in transit.</p> -<p>As states race to integrate CCAs into their air forces, a question remains: How will militaries command and control new formations?</p> +<p>Furthermore, the inconsistent application of sanctions across different EU member states complicates compliance, as varying interpretations can lead to confusion and misalignment. The expectation of uniform application of EU regulations is often undermined by practical realities on the ground. For example, a participant noted that there have been instances of Hungarian export licences not being accepted by EU member states at the eastern border. The agreement between the customs authorities of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Poland since May 2024 on the uniform implementation of trade sanctions sought to enhance regional coordination, but it has also reportedly led to a redirection of trade flows through Hungary, which is not currently party to this agreement. Due to the redirection of trade flows, the Hungarian Customs Unit’s workload, which includes managing flows at the external borders of the EU with Serbia and Ukraine, has increased, according to participants.</p> -<p>Command is a continuous function that consists of key subtasks: collecting and distinguishing relevant information, translating it into estimates to determine objectives and courses of action, converting these plans into orders, and monitoring progress through assessments. Command takes the form of a system that links together a focal point – the commander – with a staff that aligns its intent with the commander’s key decisions. In Marine Corps doctrine, command encompasses decisionmaking as well as the directing of others; control concerns feedback loops and the management of a “continuous flow of information about [an] unfolding situation.” As a result, the C2 architecture for CCAs must factor in who directs the platforms and how feedback loops are analyzed in a fluid environment with shifting objectives.</p> +<p>To navigate interpretation, some private sector participants have attempted to draw parallels between EU regulations and the more straightforward frameworks of US sanctions. One participant noted that they visit the FAQs page on the website of the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and use analogues to interpret EU sanctions packages. Participants highlighted that the sanctions advisories published by the US were much clearer and more accessible than EU FAQs, which do not serve as sufficient guidance and have on occasion been contradicted in rulings by the European Court of Justice. Indeed, private sector participants noted that becoming acquainted with US sanctions is rising among the priorities of EU businesses as the potential for US secondary sanctions increases. This heightened scrutiny has forced FIs to reassess their risk profiles and enhance their compliance mechanisms, particularly for contracts involving non-EU entities.</p> -<p>A recurring theme in the evolution of airpower has been the usage of C2 to concentrate and sequence tactical air effects in time and space while also allowing the airman in the cockpit flexibility in emerging situations. In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, a historical study by James Winnefeld and Dana Johnson defined C2 as “unity of effort.” The study analyzed a joint air operation between the Army Air Corps, Marines, and Navy to thwart Japan’s invasion of Midway. While strategically successful, the Battle of Midway revealed a lack of operational unity of effort between land-based and sea-based air campaigns. This absence of coordination persisted through the Korean War, where service rivalries hindered joint air operations.</p> +<p>Participants highlighted that a critical need has emerged for the European Commission to issue much clearer interpretative notices similar to those from US regulatory bodies. The current approach to introducing FAQs lacks legal standing and their phrasing still often fails to provide the clarity necessary for effective compliance. Clear, consistent guidelines from the Commission would help mitigate these challenges.</p> -<p>The Battle of Midway had a single commander overseeing all air assets. In Korea, the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy were divided in their command structures. Despite efforts at coordination, joint operations continued to be plagued by interservice rivalries, conflicting doctrines, and poor communication. The Vietnam War further exposed these issues, demonstrating the need for significant changes to achieve true unity of effort.</p> +<h3 id="awareness-raising-of-compliance-obligations-in-hungary">Awareness-Raising of Compliance Obligations in Hungary</h3> -<p>The process of managing joint airpower has evolved since World War II, largely due to the Joint Targeting Coordination Board’s efforts to deconflict service perspectives on mission priorities. In the 1970s, the military streamlined the chain of command by giving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) greater authority and by emphasizing the role of combatant commanders (COCOM) in joint operations. This move toward greater coordination was further solidified by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The result was the introduction of a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), as well as the development of the master attack plan (MAP) and air tasking order (ATO), which improved centralized control and coordination of air assets and was used to great effect in Desert Storm.</p> +<p>In an environment where compliance obligations are often viewed as ambiguous, FIs and businesses must have a clear understanding of the start and end points of their due diligence responsibilities. Overcompliance has become a prevalent strategy for mitigating risk, whereby institutions screen every transaction meticulously and often reject them when they remain unconvinced of their legitimacy. However, this approach can lead to operational inefficiencies and increased costs. To mitigate this, participants discussed the need to enhance industry’s understanding of compliance obligations, and some of the actions already being taken to improve awareness.</p> -<p>Yet operational unity of effort must also accommodate the fluidity of tactical combat, where the unforeseen can create new and unforgiving realities. When not accompanied by tactical flexibility, centralized C2 can create brittle systems.</p> +<p>The government and various industry associations in Hungary have made efforts to raise awareness, but resources for education on compliance are often scarce. The BFKH has organised export control forums and participates in webinars, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade engages in events dedicated to raising awareness about sanctions compliance. However, the authorities’ efforts need more support from the private sector, as few industry associations are involved. More associations could contribute to awareness-raising efforts.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/aQkOFs5.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Photo: Connecticut State Library Federal Documents, W 2.6:F 45/2</em></p> +<p>The National Bank’s AML/CTF department aims to contribute to these efforts and sends out a daily newsletter to supervised entities on relevant legislative changes and responds to questions. Participants welcomed this support, and pointed out that the volume of emails received from the National Bank is so high that recipients’ systems occasionally mark them as spam.</p> -<p>This dilemma is addressed in the doctrines of multiple services, which emphasize the need to balance centralized control with decentralized execution. Air Force doctrine, for example, dictates the conduct of operations through centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution (CC-DC-DE). In this framework, mission flexibility and combat lethality are maximized through the generation of mission-appropriate sorties, allowing the commander to adapt to circumstances. In Marine Corps antiair warfare, this is referred to as the principle of centralized command and decentralized control.</p> +<p>Furthermore, according to one participant, the National Bank’s successful awareness-raising campaign on online fraud, CyberShield, could offer a template for a campaign on sanctions violations risks. The campaign is supported by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of National Economy, as well as several other authorities, such as the police and the Hungarian Banking Association, the main advocacy group for FIs. Beyond raising customers’ awareness of online fraud, the campaign aims to foster the exchange of information and best practices between FIs, law enforcement and other authorities.</p> -<p>Both ideas center on the concept of mission command. The core of mission command is a culture of trust and a blueprint for disciplined initiative at all echelons based on the commander’s intent. While the concept dates back to nineteenth-century operational art, mission command entered U.S. military writings formally in 1905. The concept evolved over the years, eventually giving rise to a core idea adapted for airpower in 1962: centralized command and decentralized execution.</p> +<p>Another challenge highlighted by participants as facing compliance professionals in Hungary is the limited access to information about enforcement actions and case studies that could inform best practices. In the US, open communication about sanctions violations offers valuable learning opportunities for FIs and businesses. Conversely, the lack of similar transparency in the EU is a missed opportunity to showcase valuable lessons to the business community, and hinders the ability to learn from others’ mistakes.</p> -<blockquote> - <p><em>In the chaos of battle, it is essential to decentralize decision authority to the lowest practical level because over centralization slows action and leads to inertia.</em></p> - <h4 id="-fm-100-5-1986">– FM 100-5 (1986)</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>In addition to awareness-raising on implementation, strengthened strategic communications are also necessary to highlight the aim of sanctions. Some private sector representatives raised the question of compensation for loss of business income due to sanctions, which underlines the need to further explain the importance of burden-sharing in the efforts to limit the Russian military complex’s access to funding and materials in its war of aggression on Ukraine.</p> -<p>As an approach to command and control, mission command represents both a philosophical tenet and a set of planning and operation processes designed to foster a culture of initiative. For generations, Army and Marine Corps doctrines have grounded the concept in a belief that war is an inherently chaotic contest (Zweikampf) defined by friction, uncertainty, and fluidity. As a result, combatants must balance operational synchronization – the movement of large formations to fight decisive battles in time and space – with tactical adaptations that allow subordinates to anticipate and respond to changing circumstances. Applied to CCAs, this means that networks of autonomous aircraft will have to balance operational effectiveness and tactical efficiency. Mission command will need to be integrated into algorithms to make it possible for pilots to delegate aspects of air-to-air combat to drones and react to feedback from the edge of the battlefield – whether they’re in a ground command center or in an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.</p> +<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> -<p>While airmen are highly capable of decentralized execution, the modern joint air tasking cycle also codifies principles of centralized command and operational synchronization. This six-stage cycle matches air capabilities and effects against larger, operational objectives – as defined by the Joint Force Commander – and results in an ATO that shape the joint air operations.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Consult industry stakeholders:</strong> To enhance the efficacy of sanctions enforcement, national policymakers in Hungary and the European Commission should engage further with industry stakeholders before, during and after issuing sanctions. Participants noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade consults strategic industries, and the Commission also takes a consultative approach. However, further fostering of public–private collaboration throughout all stages of sanctions policymaking would ensure that the applicability and potential consequences of sanctions are thoroughly assessed. This would also help minimise unintended consequences for businesses, and support their implementation efforts to achieve the effect policymakers are seeking.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Increase clarity and transparency in regulations:</strong> Regulations should be formulated in a way that eliminates ambiguity and provides clear directives to stakeholders. While strategic ambiguity creates a sense of unease that might bolster overcompliance, clarity will foster more precise compliance that minimises the potential for misunderstandings that can then lead to inadvertent violations and unintended effects.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Centralise competences and simplify processes:</strong> The involvement of numerous authorities in Hungary requires a high degree of coordination that is often difficult to manage effectively. Fragmentation creates uncertainty and leads to a duplication of effort for the private sector. Centralising domestic sanctions competences into a single agency would mitigate these challenges and facilitate implementation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Enhance sanctions expertise:</strong> The level of understanding of sanctions regulations and obligations remains low, particularly among non-financial corporates. Awareness-raising initiatives should be prioritised and strengthened, by both the public and private sectors. Existing campaigns such as the Hungarian National Bank’s CyberShield programme on fraud could offer a template for wider awareness-raising efforts on sanctions. Furthermore, participants called for a central source of information on sanctions, such as a sanctions hotline.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Invest in IT and data tools:</strong> Investing in improved IT systems and data analytics tools within customs and regulatory authorities would boost effective sanctions enforcement. This investment would enable better tracking and analysis of financial flows, as well as improved engagement with the private sector, thereby enhancing compliance capabilities across the board.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Harmonise sanctions implementation:</strong> Hungarian customs authorities highlighted the challenge of managing an increased flow of goods through the country, linked to the enhanced customs cooperation between the Baltic countries, Finland and Poland. Hungary could benefit from joining this agreement, as it would help to prevent making the country attractive for the rerouting of trade flows. This challenge further underscores the need for the EU to work towards better alignment and harmonisation of sanctions implementation across member states.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The first stage of the joint air tasking cycle is “Objectives, Effects and Guidance,” which provides guidance on objectives and desired effects. The final product for this stage is the air apportionment recommendation, which is provided by the JFACC in consultation with other component commanders.</p> +<p>SIFMANet has repeatedly observed similar challenges across the 14 EU member states it has visited so far, and regularly shares recommendations with policymakers in Brussels to support the improved implementation of sanctions against Russia. These recommendations amplify the suggestions gathered from the public and private sectors, including in Hungary. Yet despite the clear and widespread understanding of these challenges, they persist. As we approach the third anniversary of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the EU must redouble its efforts to ensure that governments and the private sector take all necessary steps to restrict the resourcing and funding of Russia’s war of aggression.</p> -<p>The next stage, “Target Development,” matches targets to air taskings and aimpoints, which are fed to the Targeting Effects Team (TET). The TET then reviews, nominates, and prioritizes targets, ensuring that each attack meets JFC guidance. The product of this effort, when approved by the JFC, is the joint integrated prioritized targeting list.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Next, in the “Weaponeering and Allocation” stage, the Joint Air Operations Center quantifies the expected results of employing all available means in every domain against prioritized targets. The final targets are then delivered to the master air attack plan team. Following the JFC’s air apportionment decision, a final number of sorties by weapon system is developed for each objective and task.</p> +<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Finance and Security research team at RUSI.</p> -<p>The fourth stage is “ATO Production and Dissemination,” in which the ATO production team constructs, publishes, and disseminates the daily ATO and Special Instructions to appropriate forces. The ATO includes information such as the order of battle, target worksheets, and component requirements.</p> +<p><strong>Balázs Gyimesi</strong> is the Communications Manager of RUSI Europe in Brussels.</p>Gonzalo Saiz and Balázs GyimesiDiscussions held in Budapest in September 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Hungary.More Than Meets The Eye2024-10-31T12:00:00+08:002024-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/more-than-meets-the-eye<p><em>Though U.S.-Philippine economic ties are well documented, the day-to-day impact of the relationship in the Philippines is often underreported. The United States must enhance public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.</em></p> -<p>In the fifth stage, “Execution Planning and Force Execution,” the JFACC directs air capabilities and forces in joint air operations. During this stage, the JFACC has the ability to redirect air assets and coordinate with component commanders.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>During the final stage, “Assessment,” a continuous process measures the overall effectiveness of joint force capabilities at both the tactical and operational levels. Assessment is not the end of the cycle, but rather a continuous activity that provides input at all the stages of the cycle.</p> +<p>The size and scope of U.S.-Philippine economic cooperation is well documented; however, the quantitative and qualitative impacts on the Philippines are poorly understood. Without comprehensive, accurate, and easily accessible data on U.S. investments and their effects in the Philippines, malign actors may promote false or harmful narratives, thereby weakening public support for the U.S.-Philippine alliance. It is crucial for the United States to improve public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/T7rul0r.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Contingency and Crisis Execution: The Tasking Cycle.</strong> Note: JOPP is Joint Operational Planning Process and JOPPA is Joint Operational Planning Process for Air. Source: <a href="https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-0/3-0-D29-I-OPS-The-Tasking-Cycle.pdf">“Contingency and Crisis Execution: Tasking Cycle,” Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-0: Operations and Planning, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, November 4, 2016</a>.</em></p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Even this carefully choreographed process, however, cannot match the infinite range of possibilities that emerge in war. Air operations require decentralized execution as pilots respond to the friction, uncertainty, and fluidity of war. The loadout of CCAs will be determined by the air tasking cycle – with airmen loading different payloads and sensor arrays – but their employment may have to adjust to sudden changes at both operational and tactical levels.</p> +<p>The United States and the Philippines share a robust and enduring relationship based on shared values, national interest, and dense people-to-people connections. Filipinos regularly identify the United States as one of the country’s most trusted partners. Traditionally, the United States has been a key military partner for the Philippines, and since the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the two countries have stood together in defense of their common interests. The alliance is the United States’ oldest in the Indo-Pacific. While the military relationship between the two countries is often at the forefront of policy conversations, the United States’ economic relationship with the Philippines is also of great significance. Creating strong economic linkages between like-minded partners throughout the region, such as the Philippines, is crucial to upholding a rules-based order and meeting countries’ demands for tangible benefits to cooperation.</p> -<p>At the operational level, situations may emerge that demand a sudden realignment of missions, leading the CAOG commander to override the ATO to respond to a new threat. For example, imagine a squadron of F-35s operating with CCAs to conduct a fight sweep to seek out and destroy enemy aircraft. The command post receives indications that a squadron of enemy fifth-generation fighters are moving to attack a high-value air asset (HVAA) and are likely to overwhelm friendly fighters. The HVAA is hundreds of miles from the intended fighter sweep. To the extent that CCAs are capable of remote-split operations separate from the flight leader, they are operationally effective and the CCAs can be redirected to support HVAA protection, leaving the F-35s to continue the sweep – albeit at greater risk than originally planned.</p> +<p>The economic relationship between the United States and the Philippines dates to the early twentieth century, when the Philippines was a U.S. territory. After the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the Philippines came under the administration of the United States and remained so for nearly 50 years. During this time, the Philippine economy was strongly tethered to the United States and remained deeply intertwined even after Philippine independence in 1946. The Bell Trade Act of 1946, for instance, coupled the newly independent Philippine economy to that of the United States by allowing for free trade for 8 years and implementing a gradual application of tariffs over the next 20. U.S.-Philippine efforts at economic cooperation paved the way for future advancement, with U.S. investments playing a key role in the development of the Philippine manufacturing, agricultural, and services sectors. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has collaborated with the Philippine government since 1961, investing nearly $5 billion over the past 60 years.</p> -<p>At the tactical level, CCAs must support delegations by pilots already overwhelmed by the massive amount of information generated by modern aircraft. This delegation should be an extension of commanders’ intents and allow the CCAs to perform with initiative within the limits of the mission. CCAs need to be able to respond to changing tactical situations noticed either by the pilot or by sensors feeding algorithms supporting autonomous systems. This kind of feedback loop is the essence of decentralized execution; if CCAs lack it, they are likely to render missions brittle, causing overwhelmed pilots to have to manage more information – in their cockpit and on devices controlling CCAs – than the human mind can process, especially amid physical stress and fear. According to the Mike Tyson retelling of Moltke and Eisenhower quotes, “everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face.” Seeing, dodging, or taking the blow to set up a counterstrike are the essence of being tactically responsive.</p> +<p>Under President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., the Philippines became one of 14 negotiating parties in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). More significant for the time being, the United States and Philippines have launched a series of bilateral economic initiatives under the administrations of Marcos and President Joe Biden. These include the Luzon Economic Corridor, meant to develop critical infrastructure in the Philippines, the first-ever Presidential Trade and Investment Mission to Manila in March 2024, and the U.S.-Philippines Agreement for Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (or the 123 Agreement) that entered into force in July 2024.</p> -<p>Moreover, CCAs will need to be capable of executing mission command at both operational and tactical levels, with optimal C2s determined by mission type. In some missions, the value of operational effectiveness outweighs the utility of tactical responsiveness. The inverse is also true; other missions require tactical responsiveness to a degree that outweighs the benefits of perfect operational effectiveness. Much of the modern air tasking cycle is built around a C2 architecture that links CCAs to the command center, rather than to the pilot in the cockpit. From the development of objectives, effects, and guidance to target development to master attack planning, the majority of flight planning takes place in command centers, even when orchestrated through nodes like AWACS. Since a command center has a wider perspective than any individual mission leader, nesting C2 for CCAs there ensures that assessments are indeed a continuous activity. Economies of scale afforded by centralized control should not be immediately discounted due to the lure of the fighter pilot.</p> +<p>Though the direct trade, investment, and aid figures between the United States and Philippines are well documented, the quantitative and qualitative impacts of this deep economic relationship are not. Information on the effects of the United States’ investment efforts in the Philippines is often difficult to find, obscuring the depth of this partnership. Furthermore, this underreporting creates opportunity for malign actors to minimize or mischaracterize U.S. initiatives in order to manipulate Philippine public opinion. Already, disinformation regarding the U.S. defense commitment to Filipino forces in the South China Sea is pervasive on Philippine social media. Discrediting the accomplishments made possible by close cooperation between the two governments has the potential to weaken decades of collaboration and jeopardize the current renaissance in the alliance. In an attempt to illuminate the results of the U.S.-Philippine relationship, this brief explores the ways in which significant U.S. investments in several sectors deliver wide-ranging benefits for the Philippine public.</p> -<p>Yet in complex missions that require tactical-level delegation, CCAs have the capability to reduce the cognitive burden on pilots, thus extending their reach. This increase in efficiency should translate into superior mission performance. An F-35 accompanied by two CCAs loaded with air-to-air missiles and decoys will likely produce more air-to-air kills than a single aircraft, even if the two have comparable weapons loadouts. Likewise, a group of 10 F-35s and F-15Xs flying alongside 100 CCAs would be even more effective. To the extent that algorithms are an extension of mission command, the pilot is free to see and respond to change based on mission command.</p> +<h3 id="state-of-us-philippine-economic-ties">State of U.S.-Philippine Economic Ties</h3> -<p>The future of air power, as waged through networks of manned and unmanned systems, will depend on tailoring CCA algorithms to the logic of each mission. Unlocking the full potential of CCAs will require wargames, experiments, and studies that explore mission command in various scenarios and new C2 models by mission type. These experiments will need to incorporate new concepts for generating Air Task Forces based on new combat wings optimized for great power competition. Furthermore, the experiments will need to stress-test new task forces employing Agile Combat Employment (ACE), an operational scheme of maneuver, and multidomain pulse operations. In other words, distributed networks of aircraft will have to come together from distributed airfields and synchronize airpower with cyber warfare – and other technical means – to create windows of opportunity. To be operational, these efforts must take into account multiple pulse operations, as well as the ability to generate combat power in and through the air over the course of a campaign. That task will require deeper digital integration and data synthesis – using artificial intelligence and machine learning – from multiple warfighting functions, as well as the imagining of entirely new ATOs that are more joint and dynamic. Software will be as important as hardware in this vision of future airpower.</p> +<p>Goods and services trade between the United States and the Philippines reached an estimated $36.1 billion in 2022, with exports to the Philippines accounting for $12.8 billion and imports into the United States $23.3 billion. In 2022, the United States was the Philippines’ top export destination, accounting for 14.1 percent of Philippine exports at $15.5 billion; China follows at 13.9 percent, Hong Kong at 11.5, Japan at 10.2, and Singapore at 6.42, respectively. In contrast, in import terms, China’s supply of imported goods to the country is valued at $53.6 billion, amounting to 32.1 percent of the Philippines’ total imports; Indonesia trails behind at 8.15 percent, South Korea at 7.49, the United States at 5.02, and Taiwan at 4.52, respectively. Trade figures from May 2024 demonstrate that the United States remains the Philippines’ top export destination, and that the economic growth trend between the two countries continues to grow.</p> -<p>The following exploration analyzes hypothetical air campaigns through the lens of the fundamental tradeoff between operational effectiveness and tactical responsiveness. From reflecting on the combined bomber offenses in World War II and air war over Vietnam to John Warden and the Gulf War and the Balkans, the air campaign is the preferred unit of analysis for operational study. While air campaigns tend to involve a mix of missions, the scenarios below will visualize and describe three campaigns that are each oriented around a mission area: counterair operations, interdiction – including both counterland and countersea operations – and close air support.</p> +<p>In terms of investment, between 2013 and the first quarter of 2024, the Philippine Statistics Authority recorded the United States as the fifth-largest source of approved foreign investment, accounting for 7 percent, or roughly $3.6 billion. The United States is trailed closely by China, the sixth-largest source of approved foreign investment, clocking in at $3.2 billion. In 2022, U.S. foreign investment in the Philippines rose 15.7 percent year over year from 2021 to $6.2 billion, led by a combination of manufacturing and professional, scientific, and technical services, along with wholesale trade.</p> -<p>This analytical framing is frequently used in Air Force studies. The Battle of Britain, for instance, has been used to study counterair operations; a wide range of cases – from World War II to the wars in Korea and Vietnam – have been used to study the development of close air support and interdiction.</p> +<p>Since the launch of IPEF in 2022, the United States and the Philippines have continued to mark significant accomplishments in their economic partnership. During President Marcos’ visit to Washington in April 2024 for trilateral discussions with President Biden and Japanese prime minister Kishida Fumio, the three countries announced the first Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) corridor in the Indo-Pacific, the Luzon Economic Corridor. Aiming to support connectivity between Subic Bay, Clark, Manila, and Batangas, the Luzon Economic Corridor is the first project of the PGI-IPEF Investment Accelerator and will allow the three countries to coordinate investments in infrastructure projects, clean energy, and semiconductor supply chains. Through this larger policy, the United States can work with IPEF partners to develop country-specific investment approaches in key sectors as targeted by each IPEF partner. In the same document, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation announced a $20 million loan for affordable housing throughout the country as well as its intent to open a regional office in the Philippines.</p> -<p>Below, a fictional planning scenario is used to analyze three future campaigns: counterair operations, interdiction in littoral environments, and close air support. In each, the adversary is intentionally kept abstract in order to focus the analysis on the C2 character of the mission sets, which are evaluated in terms of operational effectiveness and tactical responsiveness. The adversary is held constant across all three scenarios and assumed to be a peer competitor capable of contesting U.S. power across multiple domains, including air. Other major assumptions include:</p> +<p>When it comes to development assistance, USAID invests some $120 million annually to support market-driven growth in the Philippines, as well as to foster stronger democratic systems and improve education and health services. The Philippines has also been a major beneficiary of other assistance programs, such as Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grants. In February 2024, the MCC began talks with Philippine officials about restarting threshold programs, smaller scale grants aimed at improving policies. The Philippines previously had received MCC threshold grants (2006–2009) amounting to $20.7 million; in 2016, it received its first compact grant — aimed at poverty reduction and economic stimulus — for $434 million.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The United States is fighting as part of a larger coalition of partners and allies (the norm throughout its history).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The conflict involves nuclear powers but has not crossed the threshold where either side uses nuclear weapons in pursuit of strategic or operational objectives.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>While there have been large exchanges in space and cyberspace, all sides retain the ability to support air, ground, and maritime operations with space and cyber capabilities.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Beyond traditional channels of economic engagement, since 2015, the U.S. Department of State has provided the Philippines with $463 million in security assistance through Foreign Military Financing (FMF), international military education and training, as well as peacekeeping operations funded through the Global Peace Operations Initiative. FMF figures are growing rapidly, with the United States providing $100 million in FY 2022 to potentially quintupling FMF to $500 million each year from FY 2025–2029. Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the United States has already allotted $109 million in support of base facility improvements, supplies, and military equipment, with an additional $128 million planned in the 2025 fiscal year. In the 2+2 talks held in the Philippines in July 2024, U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin pledged an additional $500 million in military financing from the FY 2024 budget.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bJKYjsJ.png" alt="image04" /></p> +<h3 id="benefits-of-us-private-investment-in-the-philippines">Benefits of U.S. Private Investment in the Philippines</h3> -<h3 id="campaign-scenario-20xx">Campaign Scenario: 20XX</h3> +<p>Foreign and domestic businesses may register with one of the Philippines’ 19 investment promotion authorities, including the Philippine Board of Investment and the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). These authorities are split based on geographic regions and industry strengths, such as the manufacturing and logistics network in Luzon, the tourism cluster throughout Luzon and Mindanao, and the agro-industrial cluster in Mindanao.</p> -<p>It is 20XX, and the United States finds itself engaged in a regional war as part of a coalition seeking to stop an authoritarian state from illegally annexing the territory of one of its neighbors. After a series of space, cyber, air, and maritime operations over the initial thirty days, there is now a forward line of troops (FLOT), with the United States providing air support to partner ground forces as additional units mobilize. This leads to a series of battles in air, at sea, and on land as each side seeks to gain a position of advantage along the FLOT.</p> +<p>Much of the foreign investment into the Philippines’ export-oriented manufacturing and services industries is routed through special economic zones managed by PEZA, which works to facilitate investor operations all the way down to registration and paperwork filing. As of April 2023, the Philippines was operating 419 different special economic zones throughout the country, ranging from manufacturing zones and information technology parks to agro-industrial economic zones and tourist export enterprises. Within the zones, the Philippine government can dole out tax incentives while sparing foreign businesses from lengthy bureaucratic procedures.</p> -<p>In planning the next phase and delineating how best to sequence major operations in pursuit of objectives, the Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) is exploring options for three different air campaigns: (1) counterair, (2) interdiction, and (3) close air support.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As of April 2023, the Philippines was operating 419 different special economic zones throughout the country, ranging from manufacturing zones and information technology parks to agro-industrial economic zones and tourist export enterprises.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The counterair campaign would prioritize gaining air superiority to open up a ground or maritime counteroffensive. At present, there is air parity, and each side has yet to roll back the other side’s air defense network or sufficiently attrite the other side’s air force to establish air superiority. The resulting air parity makes it difficult to achieve more than a tactical breakthrough on the ground or to forward-deploy naval surface combatants integrated into CJTF operations. This results in a static FLOT and long lines of communication that burn readiness and risk creating a protracted conflict. The counterair campaign would dedicate all available air assets to establishing air control, if not supremacy, before transitioning to major operations in other domains.</p> +<p>More important than investment from U.S. government programs is the U.S. private investment that flourishes in and beyond the PEZA zones, covering a variety of sectors of the Philippine economy. The CSIS Southeast Asia Program selected seven of these sectors for study based on their growth and importance to the Philippines. Ranging from renewable energy investments to aerospace engineering, the following case studies examine how U.S. private investment delivers tangible benefits for the Philippines that go beyond simply reporting overall investment and trade figures.</p> -<p>The interdiction campaign would prioritize striking targets across the depth of the littorals to shock the enemy system and create conditions for a localized counterattack. The mission would establish temporary air control to enable air interdiction against both enemy lines of communication and logistical nodes just beyond the FLOT, which are critical to projecting power through littorals. By strangling the enemy and channeling its movement into a series of kill boxes in the joint fires area, the campaign would set conditions for a simultaneous air and ground counteroffensive. This emphasis on simultaneity differentiates the interdiction campaign from the phasing and sequencing of the counterair campaign.</p> +<h4 id="renewable-energy">Renewable Energy</h4> -<p>The close air support campaign would prioritize generating effects on the FLOT to enable a breakthrough. Unlike the interdiction campaign, the priority of air control is along the FLOT and enabling terminal attack control (TAC) based on guidance given by the ground commander to joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC). This campaign would combine type 1, 2, and 3 controls to enable close coordination between coalition ground forces and aircraft. This coordination, and the ability to mass air effects on key ground objectives, sets conditions for an operational envelopment along the FLOT. Like the interdiction campaign, the emphasis is on simultaneity. Unlike the interdiction concept, the CAS campaign would focus on principles of objective and mass, using tightly coupled air and ground effects – including attack helicopters and loitering munitions in the air-ground littoral – to enable a decisive ground maneuver.</p> +<p>The Philippine government under President Marcos has identified clean energy development as a top priority and embraced cooperation with partner nations on that front, including through the clean economy pillar of IPEF. As one of the countries most affected by increasingly severe weather events, this is necessary not only to meet the Philippines’ net-zero goals, but also to grow other industries, like semiconductor manufacturing, in which foreign investors are seeking access to renewable energy. This is why the development of renewable energy is one of the three initial priorities of the Luzon Economic Corridor, announced in April 2024, the other two being rail and port modernization and the advancement of commercial enterprises at Subic Bay.</p> -<h4 id="tradeoffs-in-the-counterair-campaign">Tradeoffs in the Counterair Campaign</h4> +<p>Collaboration between the United States and the Philippines in establishing clean, sustainable power grids is of great importance to local Philippine communities. An archipelagic nation, the Philippine energy grid is deeply reliant on imported fossil fuels. Though 97.5 percent of Philippine households are electrified, the mountainous and archipelagic nature of the country’s geography presents significant challenges to consistent, inexpensive power. Successive Philippine administrations have prioritized a more resilient regional grid based on modular renewable energy. The 2020 census indicated that there were about 26.39 million households throughout the country. U.S. investments in Philippine nuclear power would be of great benefit to local communities isolated from main power grids and for improving quality of life and maintaining consistent, cheap electrification in major cities. Geothermal, solar, and wind energy account for 32.7 percent of the country’s energy sources. The Philippines aims to reach 50 percent renewable energy by 2050. Under the previous administration of President Rodrigo Duterte, lawmakers amended the Public Services Act to allow for 100 percent ownership by foreign investors of utilities ranging from power to telecoms, opening the door to more foreign investment in the Philippine energy grid. As a result of this and other reforms, the Philippines has become one of the most attractive emerging markets for investment in renewables, according to BloombergNEF’s 2023 climate report.</p> -<p>In the fictional scenario above, the counterair campaign would mix offensive and defensive counterair to establish air superiority. There are historical precedents in multiple World War II cases, in which novel methods were used to bait German fighters as part of the Royal Air Force (RAF) circus offensive that followed the Battle of Britain.</p> +<p>Given its geographic location, the Philippines has immense solar energy potential. U.S.-based BrightNight Power, in collaboration with the Ayala Group’s ACEN, has agreed to jointly invest $1.2 billion over the next five years to develop the Philippines’ renewable energy capacity. U.S. solar panel manufacturers are increasingly looking to the Philippines for production, allowing Filipinos easier access to domestically produced, cheaper solar panels while also exporting those panels to countries like the United States and Canada. Sol-Go Inc., participating in Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s Presidential Trade and Investment Mission in March 2024, announced that it will build a new solar panel factory in the Philippines in addition to its current factory operating in Batangas. This additional investment will allow Sol-Go to triple its locally sourced workforce and increase its capacity so that it can produce 50 megawatts (MW) of solar panels. With the average Filipino household using 200 kilowatt-hours of energy per month, 50 MW could easily power 180,000 homes.</p> -<p>In a campaign setting, which involves longer time periods and multiple major operations, planners must focus on attrition rates and how best to pull an adversary into air operations that produce diminishing marginal returns. Every sortie generates losses that exceed the value of the mission. Losses inhibit the enemy’s ability to generate air power, changing how the adversary fights (i.e., assigning aircraft to missions) while reducing the time and space required to achieve air superiority.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Collaboration between the United States and the Philippines in establishing clean, sustainable power grids is of great importance to local Philippine communities.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jM1kOEM.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>A Spitfire Mark VB from the United Kingdom Royal Air Force in 1940.</strong> Photo: G. Woodbine/Second World War Official Collection/Imperial War Museums.</em></p> +<p>The 123 Agreement between the United States and the Philippines sets the stage for nuclear energy collaboration between the two countries moving forward by allowing U.S. companies to invest in nuclear projects throughout the country. NuScale Power, for instance, aims to invest up to $7.5 billion through 2031 to build small modular reactors in the Philippines. These reactors would greatly benefit more geographically isolated communities with tenuous connections to main power grids, while also touting smaller footprints, reduced cost, and locational flexibility in comparison to traditional nuclear reactors.</p> -<p>This notional counterair campaign would almost certainly rely on a mix of SEAD and fighter sweeps to establish air superiority. Modern radars, especially when connected to space effects, enable situational awareness and tracking. Establishing air superiority first requires blinding the enemy and destroying its ability to track and target friendly aircraft. Second, if enemy planes cannot be destroyed on the ground – the best place to kill an aircraft – they must be engaged in a series of operations designed to change the balance of air power.</p> +<h4 id="information-technology-and-business-process-management">Information Technology and Business Process Management</h4> -<p>These missions, even with intelligence over-match, would likely require CCAs that are more tactically responsive. Air-to-air combat and the adjustment to unforeseen aspects of an adversary’s air defenses – as seen in the evolution of SEAD missions since Vietnam – require the ability to recognize and respond to changes in the tactical environment. Feedback loops create a fluid environment prone to sudden changes.</p> +<p>The information technology and business process management (IT-BPM) sector covers a wide range of services in the Philippines, all aimed at managing certain aspects of business operations for third parties.</p> -<p>Mission command for CCAs in these situations takes the form of pilots directly adjusting mission parameters in response to a changing environment. This would likely require building in preconstructed mission sets that the pilot can rapidly assign as the threat environment changes. For example, consider a fighter sweep in which two F-35s are each paired with four CCAs, mixing electronic countermeasures and air-to-air weapons. The flight leader receives confirmation that there are more enemy aircraft than originally anticipated and relative to the payload. She could dynamically retask the CCAs to jam and harass the enemy combat air patrol while the manned aircraft pull back to regroup and assess the situation with an AWACS and/or the command center (e.g., CAOG). Decentralized execution takes the form of an ability to assign missions to networked CCAs in order to free up time and space for pilots to adjust to new information.</p> +<p>During the 2008 global recession, demand for overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) decreased significantly, prompting the Philippine government to provide training for OFWs to become call center agents. By 2010, the Philippines had surpassed India in voice-based IT-BPM services. As of 2023, the IT-BPM industry had reached 1.57 million employees, and it is forecast to employ 2.5 million by 2028. In April 2024, the ubiquity of Philippine IT-BPM services went viral on social media when a Philippines-based IT-BPM employee worked as a virtual cashier in a New York City restaurant thousands of miles away.</p> -<p>Alternatively, DCA would focus more on a mix of active and passive defenses. In modern war, these cut across multiple domains and include everything from space-based sensors to AEGIS destroyers and patriot missile sites. Aircraft play a role that includes shooting down cruise and loitering munitions – as seen both in the April 2024 defense of Israel from an Iranian strike and in the skies of Ukraine – but that role tends to be supporting as opposed to supported. This dynamic puts a premium on operational effectiveness and on empowering an air defense commander to integrate air and missile defense to include a larger number of land platforms (e.g., surface-to-air missiles, radars, directed energy, high-powered microwave) and sea platforms (e.g., naval cruisers, destroyers, and frigates) alongside airborne networks of manned and unmanned aircraft. Mission command applies here, but managing air and missile threats across large areas requires more centralized control measures, whether in an AWAC or a ground-based command center.</p> +<p>U.S. businesses have increasingly outsourced services to the Philippines in the last few decades, and U.S. investment has played a crucial role in the development of the sector. From 2014 to 2023, the Philippines has benefitted from nearly $5.2 billion worth of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the United States in general professional, scientific, and technical services. With its young, tech-literate, and largely English-proficient population, the Philippines presents an ideal location for U.S. IT-BPM investments. Government initiatives, including Republic Act No. 7916, which established Special Economic Zones through PEZA, offer tax incentives and ease the ability to conduct business for foreign investors. From 2003 to 2021, 395 U.S.-based firms invested $22.4 billion in the Philippines, 35 percent of which, or around $7.8 billion, went to the IT-BPM sector, one of the key growth drivers for PEZA, bringing in nearly $260 million of investments from the first quarter of 2024 alone.</p> -<h4 id="tradeoffs-in-the-interdiction-campaign">Tradeoffs in the Interdiction Campaign</h4> +<p>IT-BPM companies are often desirable places of employment for Filipinos. U.S.-owned companies ranging from American Express to Synchrony and Accenture rank near the top of a “best workplaces” list compiled by the Information Technology and Business Process Association of the Philippines and Great Place to Work. Surveys undertaken by Great Place to Work, a platform that uses employee data to certify workplaces with good levels of trust and work culture, indicate that from January 2022 to May 2023, “94 percent of IT-BPM employees in best workplaces experience a high-trust workplace culture.” The schedule flexibility offered by IT-BPM companies, paired with the flexibility to work from home that such jobs involve, makes the sector particularly attractive to recent graduates. The Philippines produces about 850,000 college graduates yearly, 87,000 of whom have degrees in fields suited to the IT-BPM sector.</p> -<p>In the fictional planning scenario above, the interdiction campaign would combine both counterland and countersea air operations focused on denying the enemy power projection in the seams of the air, sea, and ground. In U.S. joint doctrine, this littoral environment includes “those land areas (and their adjacent sea and associated air space) that are predominantly susceptible to engagement and influence from the sea and may reach far inland.” Modern battle networks and long-range precision fires extend the segments of air, ground, and sea that constitute the site of modern littoral warfare.</p> +<p>Both foreign and domestic investment in the Philippines has historically been concentrated within the Metro Manila National Capital Region and the surrounding regions of Luzon. Investments are slowly flowing to other emerging regions, particularly northern Luzon and the Visayas. Moreover, even though the IT-BPM sector is more widely distributed than most, it is still concentrated in a few urban centers; Bacolod, Cebu, Clark, Davao, and Iloilo are the main hubs. Nationwide broadband speeds, while improving, still lag behind those of other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Through the Digital Cities 2025 Initiative, the Philippine government is providing basic digital literacy and skills training in more rural provinces. These initiatives will likely pay dividends as the Philippines continues to advertise itself as an IT-BPM hub to U.S. investors.</p> -<p>The most likely targets of the interdiction campaign would be logistics nodes and lines of communication. The theory of victory is that reducing the enemy’s supplies reduces its combat power, creating a more favorable correlation of forces for offensive action and/or limiting the ability of the enemy to project power. This logic is evident across multiple, historical interdiction campaigns, which carry a different theory of victory than strategic attack and which are built around decisive blows against enemy C2.</p> +<h4 id="semiconductor-manufacturing">Semiconductor Manufacturing</h4> -<p>During the Italian campaign, allied planners designed Operation Strangle as an independent air interdiction campaign targeting German supply lines, intended to render the planned ground offensive (Operation Diadem) unnecessary. The effort had mixed results and led to an enduring debate about whether to target enemy supplies or mobility. This debate shaped air interdiction campaigns in Korea. For example, the Saturate interdiction campaign targeted North Korean rail lines to reduce supply, focusing on a narrow corridor on a continuous basis.</p> +<p>With highly educated, English-proficient workers, the Philippines is an appealing location for semiconductor manufacturing. Concentrated in Metro Manila, Calabarzon (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon), northern and central Luzon, and Cebu, the Philippine electronics industry is split between 73 percent semiconductor manufacturing and 27 percent electronics manufacturing. Electronics exports reached $12.9 billion in 2023, nearly 60 percent of total Philippine exports. From 2014 to 2023, the United States invested roughly $7.91 billion in Philippine computer and electronic manufacturing.</p> -<p>The effects are not limited to counterland operations. Maritime interdiction played a key role in World War II. The RAF Coastal Command, for instance, was pivotal to the Battle of the Atlantic, in sub-hunting missions in the Bay of Biscay, and in attacks on marine lines of communication connecting Germany to key industrial materials in Scandinavia. Of note, many of these efforts benefitted from work by technical experts who integrated new technologies, including air-to-surface radar and applied operations research – the use of formal mathematical models and statistics to analyze patterns and trends in armed combat. The Luftwaffe replicated this maritime interdiction capability through its Fliegerführer Atlantik.</p> +<p>Given the number of Filipinos employed in the semiconductor industry, disruptions in U.S. investment can and have proven damaging to local communities. At its peak in 2008, Intel employed 5,000 direct workers and around 36,000 indirect workers in the Philippines. In the aftermath of the 2008 global recession, however, Intel shut down its Cavite-based chip assembly, testing, and packaging facility. As the global semiconductor manufacturing supply chain continues to evolve and mature, it is important to recognize the value of these private investments to local communities. As of April 2023, the semiconductor industry employed 2.5 million Filipinos.</p> -<p>In Vietnam, Operation Rolling Thunder (1965–1968) was largely an air interdiction campaign, with over 90 percent of the targets consisting of transportation nodes. In addition to destroying combat potential by targeting supplies and lines of communication, interdiction can channel the enemy’s movements, attriting its forces. Of Desert Storm’s 40,000 strike sorties, roughly 38,000 were air interdiction. Some of these missions included the attack on the infamous “Highway of Death,” where coalition aircraft destroyed Iraqi forces retreating from Kuwait into Iraq.</p> +<p>Through the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, the United States seeks to diversify and de-risk the global semiconductor ecosystem by boosting manufacturing and research both at home and in trusted partner countries. The International Technology Security and Innovation Fund, under the CHIPS Act, earmarked $500 million over five years to promote a secure, trustworthy telecommunications network aimed at ensuring semiconductor supply chain security by spreading out the traditionally concentrated semiconductor supply chain among friendly partners, including the Philippines.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/coMD2bv.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>The “Highway of Death,” the result of U.S. forces bombing retreating Iraqi forces, Kuwait, 1991.</strong> Photo: Photo 12/Universal Images Group via Getty Images.</em></p> +<p>In 2023, the Department of State announced that it would collaborate with the Philippine government to explore further cooperation in semiconductor supply chain security. During the Presidential Trade and Investment Mission in March 2024, Secretary Raimondo announced an investment of over $1 billion in the Philippine technology sector, aiming to double the number of semiconductor factories in the country; currently, there are 13 semiconductor factories focused on the assembly, testing, and packaging segment of the semiconductor supply chain.</p> -<p>Interdiction requires operational-level coordination and careful target selection. These missions naturally lend themselves to a C2 architecture that executes mission command through a command center. CCAs could become part of a larger joint fires scheme for interdicting lines of communication; they could carry a mix of electronic attack payloads and air-ground (or air-sea) munitions, which work alongside long-range strike assets currently fielded by the Marine Littoral Regiment and the Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force.</p> +<p>In November 2023, President Marcos stressed that semiconductors and electronics remain top-priority sectors for his administration. PEZA aims to aggressively promote the Philippines as a site for overseas electronic and semiconductor manufacturing. Together with IT-BPM, electronics and semiconductors have been among the Philippines’ top exports in 2024.</p> -<p>In addition, CCAs could act as escorts for long-range strike munitions targeting naval logistics vessels and amphibious shipping, protecting the missiles from being shot down by enemy air patrols. Consider an MDTF Typhon battery and an AEGIS Destroyer firing a salvo of Tomahawk missiles at a key target. Through joint fires coordination, the CAOG could task on-call CCAs to carry a mix of payloads to support the mission, freeing up human pilots for other missions. While the same salvo could be supported by a manned-unmanned team, the theater-level fires synchronization makes it more aligned with C2 oriented toward operational effectiveness.</p> +<p>U.S. companies have been increasingly investing in the Philippine semiconductor space. In May 2023, Analog Devices announced an investment of $200 million in a research and development facility in Cavite. In August 2023, Texas Instruments announced that it would invest up to $1 billion in facility expansion in Clark and Baguio City. The Philippines aims to move up the semiconductor value chain, hoping to establish a lab-scale wafer fabrication plant by 2028.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ELsBrJb.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Mid-Range Capability Supporting Multidomain Operations.</strong> Source: Typhon briefing slide, Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office presentation, U.S. Army.</em></p> +<h4 id="agriculture">Agriculture</h4> -<p>One exception is strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR). These missions are the interdiction equivalent of a movement to contact. They are flown to detect and target enemy units in a defined geographic area where “potential targets are known or suspected to exist, or where mobile enemy ground units have relocated because of ground fighting.” This uncertainty and fluidity put a premium on tactical responsiveness. A network of manned and unmanned aircraft can – consistent with Joint Interdiction doctrine – cycle “multiple attacking flights through the target area and provid[e] prioritized targeting guidance and enemy air defense updates to maximize the effect of each sortie.” In this case, mission command extends through the cockpit to the CCA for decentralized execution as the flight leader responds to unforeseen changes. For example, an F-15X or F-35 flying alongside 10 CCAs would be able to respond not just to its own sensors but to a larger constellation of joint and interagency capabilities in order to identify and disrupt enemy targets.</p> +<p>The United States and the Philippines are longtime partners in the agricultural sector — in 2022, U.S.-Philippine bilateral agricultural trade exceeded $4 billion. With its growing population, expanding middle class, and increasing household income, the Philippines is an important destination for U.S. agricultural goods. The United States and the Philippines convened their first Food Security Dialogue in May 2023. Ongoing U.S. projects in the Philippines aim to support capacity building in food regulatory agencies and agricultural industries while digitizing the connection between farmers and buyers. A plurality of Philippine agriculture (39 percent) is based in Luzon, followed by Mindanao and Visayas at 33.4 and 27.4 percent, respectively.</p> -<p>As in counterair operations, CCAs performing interdiction roles would need preplanned mission profiles to support autonomous execution. Humans will still be in the loop, encoding rules of engagement and strike deconfliction when necessary. At the same time, the entire joint fires doctrine and framework will need to test how new campaign concepts relate to existing doctrine and to the targeting cycle. Again, it is one thing to enable CCAs to fly. It is another to integrate them into planning and staff processes that took decades, if not centuries, to emerge in the military profession. There will need to be new, flatter joint architectures optimized for multidomain effects and dynamic joint targeting cycles.</p> +<p>Despite this, the Philippines is vulnerable to food insecurity, a situation further exacerbated by climate change. Its reliance on imported food makes the Philippines the most food-insecure country in the region. Due to the country’s limited infrastructure linking its farmers to markets and its vulnerability to external food supply shocks, improving food production is crucial to securing Philippine agricultural supply chains. President Marcos has made the strengthening of the Philippines’ food supply a key priority of his administration, boosting the budget for agricultural programs. Under the Marcos administration, the Department of Agriculture’s budget was boosted by nearly 70 percent from 2022 to 2024 compared to the 2017–2021 appropriation under the previous administration.</p> -<h4 id="tradeoffs-in-the-close-air-support-campaign">Tradeoffs in the Close Air Support Campaign</h4> +<p>From September to October 2023, the United States’ first Agricultural Technology Trade Mission explored opportunities to help support the Philippine agricultural supply chain as it traveled to Davao and Manila. The trade mission brought together various Philippine companies, government agencies, local businesses, and U.S. companies to discuss the importance of food security collaboration. The trade mission highlighted innovations in agricultural technology that have the potential to enhance the country’s agricultural productivity.</p> -<p>In the fictional planning scenario above, focusing air power at the FLOT would require deep air-ground integration. In the chaos of combat, changing planned missions to take advantage of emerging ground conditions also requires a great degree of flexibility. This defining requirement puts the C2 architecture squarely in the tactical responsiveness camp, albeit with a twist. The JTAC on the ground becomes a kind of cockpit.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Due to the country’s limited infrastructure linking its farmers to markets and its vulnerability to external food supply shocks, improving food production is crucial to securing Philippine agricultural supply chains.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Procedures for CAS have evolved since World War II. Following the fall of France, the Wann/Woodall Report recommended creating a distinct communication network to connect ground radios to aircraft under special circumstances. This concept laid the foundation for the emergence of CAS C2 and the Tactical Air Force task organization used in experiments in North Africa (e.g., the Desert Air Force). Failures during the 1942 Dieppe Raid (Operation Jubilee) further showed the need for new C2 constructs that integrated tactical air and army formations. Close air support concepts continued to evolve between 1943 and 1945 in campaigns in Italy and Northwest Europe. By the Normandy Campaign, air-ground integration procedures had matured to differentiate between indirect and direct support, setting the foundation for modern CAS. These procedures played a critical role in the Battle of the Falaise Pocket, to which RAF hurricanes made essential contributions.</p> +<p>U.S. investors, including Cargill, John Deere, and PepsiCo, have a long history of investment in the Philippine agricultural space. Cargill, which has had a presence in the Philippines since 1947, has made several key investments over the past decade. It collaborated with the Jollibee Foods Corporation to create a joint-venture poultry processing facility in Batangas in 2017, creating 1,000 new jobs. As of 2022, the facility employs 1,200 workers. Similarly, Cargill operates a joint-venture plant in Laguna that produces carrageenan, a common food additive and thickener. In 2018, the company announced that it would invest $235 million over two years to help the country meet the increasing demand for chicken and pork. As of 2024, Cargill directly employs over 950 people throughout the country.</p> -<p>This iterated approach to developing deeper air-ground integration continued across multiple conflicts in the late twentieth century. Each major war, according to historian I.B. Holley Jr., saw the military profession relearn the importance of air-ground teamwork. Whether in Korea or Vietnam – or in Israel’s experience across multiple conflicts – practitioners had to adapt air-ground communications, liaison relationships, and procedures to new technologies and air defense schemes. In Holley Jr.’s view, analyzing this history and learning the lessons of past air campaigns is a requirement for updating future CAS doctrine.</p> +<h4 id="defense-and-aerospace-manufacturing">Defense and Aerospace Manufacturing</h4> -<p>CCAs offer a new opportunity to refine close air support concepts and doctrine in a manner that reflects deeper service integration than in previous wars. In other words, CCA design features and USAF doctrine should integrate with Army, Navy, and Marine Corps concepts, leading to potential change in joint doctrine. If CCAs are built to only perform counterair missions, they miss an opportunity to realize their full potential.</p> +<p>Given its strategic location and well-educated workforce, the Philippines is in a prime position to contribute to defense and aerospace supply chains. The defense and aerospace sectors, made especially pertinent due to ongoing tensions between the Philippines and China over disputed territories in the South China Sea, are critical to the Philippines’ defense modernization initiatives. To support foreign investments in national defense, Philippine senators have proposed spending roughly $17.5 million under the Self-Reliant Defense Posture Revitalization Act aimed at encouraging investment in the local manufacturing of defense equipment.</p> -<p>This potential could see the emergence of new procedures in which JTACs on the ground take control of CCAs to conduct CAS and to deconflict airspace, thus maximizing joint effects against key targets. In the aforementioned fictional scenario, consider an enemy force attempting to break out of a beach landing site and seize an airport. This breakout would likely involve a concentration of artillery and air defense moved forward to support ground formations, with air-launched effects and loitering munitions serving as an advanced guard. Containing the breakthrough would require forward JTACs coordinating CAS and other joint fire support to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or delay advancing enemy columns in support of the ground commander’s defensive plan. The fog, friction, and chaos of the ground battle undermine operational effectiveness and put a premium on tactical responsiveness. In a major ground campaign, operational art for joint fires is about logistics and building a C5ISR-T network able to support dynamic targeting and operational reach.</p> +<p>The Philippines hosts two prominent U.S. aerospace and defense manufacturing companies: RTX’s Collins Aerospace and Moog Controls Corporation. Collins Aerospace manufactures airplane parts and interiors within the Philippines, supplying both Airbus and Boeing. Collins Aerospace established a facility in Tanauan City, Batangas, in 2012, manufacturing myriad cabin interior products ranging from airplane galleys and galley inserts to oxygen equipment and lavatories. The facility has expanded from task-based engineering to design drawing and process refinement; by 2018, the Philippines-based engineering team was supporting the design of complex galleys and had already designed a head of version shipset, or the first configured and manufactured aircraft of the order. In 2023, the company began producing seats for Boeing, Airbus, and Embraer.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qhShwI6.png" alt="image08" /></p> +<p>As of 2024, Collins Aerospace plans to expand its existing operations in the Philippines — hoping to add 300,000 sq. ft. to its existing 400,000 sq. ft. complex in Tanauan City. Collins Aerospace’s community outreach to regional universities has the potential to create a significant impact. In 2023, for example, the company challenged students from the De La Salle College of Saint Benilde to develop and design aircraft cabin proposals under the university’s Benilde Industrial Design program. The same year, Collins explored potential partnerships with Batangas State University-Lipa.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion-exercises-wargames-and-doctrine">Conclusion: Exercises, Wargames, and Doctrine</h3> +<p>Moog Controls Corporation, a U.S. designer and manufacturer of precision control products found in military and commercial aircraft, has been established in Baguio City since 1984. Spread out over two campuses, one for servovalves (a type of valve used to regulate control or pressure of fluid in response to an electrical signal) and actuation systems for commercial aircraft applications and the other for high-performance motion control solutions, Moog employs about 1,400 personnel. In 2018, the company announced their intention to boost aerospace industry output in the Philippines, citing the growth of the aerospace market. Moog received a PEZA Excellence Award in 2023 as an outstanding employer behind community projects.</p> -<p>Looking across the three fictional planning scenarios provides an insight into the refinement of C2 requirements for CCAs.</p> +<h4 id="critical-minerals-and-electric-vehicles">Critical Minerals and Electric Vehicles</h4> -<p>This will require testing different cockpit C2 interfaces in dynamic settings like Red Flag Exercises, along with the introduction of enhanced simulation capabilities in the USAF’s new command wings. Replicating the stress of counterair, SCAR and CAS missions will be the only way to gauge the optimal cockpit C2 structure for connecting the best of the human pilot with the functionality of the CCA.</p> +<p>The Philippines’ critical mineral wealth, which has largely gone untapped, makes it an ideal partner in electrical vehicle (EV) battery and component supply chains. Only 5 percent of the Philippines’ $1 trillion worth of gold, nickel, zinc, and silver reserves has been explored. Moreover, with the growing importance of electric vehicles (EVs) in international decarbonization efforts, the Philippines’ critical mineral wealth makes it an ideal partner for EV battery and component supply chains. As of 2023, PEZA remains in talks with several EV manufacturers, including one U.S. firm, Envirotech Vehicles, to manufacture electric buses, cars, and heavy equipment in-country. In September 2023, Envirotech Vehicles announced its acquisition of a 3,000 square meter final assembly facility in the Clark Free Trade Zone; it eventually plans to open two manufacturing lines capable of producing more than 2,000 vehicles per year at the plant.</p> -<p>There is also a need to develop new experiments that test the current planning and air tasking cycle, ideally through wargames that inform new concept development and doctrine for tasking CCAs through command posts. These wargames should parallel ongoing experiments like the Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE) and Project Convergence. The more services and coalition partners involved in stress-testing the current approach to planning and coordinating the delivery of joint effects, the better the insights will be. These experiments offer a valuable forum to test emerging ideas, from the Joint Warfighting Concept and related priorities to service-level force design and development initiatives. In other words, proper C2 architecture for CCAs has the potential to unlock innovation across the U.S. military. And that innovation will require a mix of exercises, wargames, and even study groups that will act as incubators for developing new concepts and capabilities. In all likelihood, an entirely new planning and tasking process for joint effects could emerge from this experimentation campaign, closing the deterrent gap.</p> +<h4 id="logistics-and-shipping">Logistics and Shipping</h4> -<p>These experiments will need to stress-test the ability of new software architectures to connect networks and evaluate data streams from disparate sources. Consistent with prior recommendations, these efforts should also include options for democratizing and digitizing C2 to allow for the rapid upload and transfer of data packets from a wide mix of civilian and military sensor networks. Again, there is as much art as there is science in the development of these mosaic-like systems, and in the balancing of tactical responsiveness and operational effectiveness.</p> +<p>With convenient access to markets in Southeast Asia, China, Japan, and South Korea, as well as its proximity to Australia and India, the Philippines is in a prime location for logistics, transportation, and shipping services. As of March 2023, the Philippine freight and logistics market was valued at $16.8 billion. The growing ubiquity of e-commerce within the country, and throughout the region, necessitates not only strong general infrastructure in ports, roads, and rail connections, but also robust freight and logistics networks.</p> -<p>The modern American way of war is defined as much by mission command as by massing effects. Because modern combat takes place along complex battle networks, centralized command and decentralized execution must work in and through algorithms. The challenge of twenty-first century operational art, therefore, will be deciding how best to pair human judgment with the precision and speed of machines. As a result, determining the optimal C2 architecture for executing mission command through CCA networks should be a national security priority.</p> +<p>In the aftermath of the global Covid-19 pandemic, e-commerce grew more popular within the country — from March 2020 to January 2021, the number of Philippine online vendors increased from 1,700 to 93,818. Leading e-commerce sites like Shoppee, Lazada, Zalora, and Beauty MNL brought in $17 billion in revenue from 73 million monthly, active users. To handle this flow, the Philippine government has partnered with foreign investors for infrastructure investments as well as freight and logistics services.</p> -<hr /> +<p>New Clark City, a planned municipality built about fifty miles from Metro Manila, has emerged as an ideal location within the Philippines for logistics investments. After 36 years in the Philippines, FedEx opened a $30 million gateway facility in Clark City, aimed at improving the company’s ability to operate within the country and in the region at large. Manila’s main airport, the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, is notorious for congestion and inefficiency, prompting government agencies to consider outlying areas around the capital, such as Clark, as new logistics and transportation hubs. FedEx’s Clark investments followed up on refurbishments to the company’s headquarters in Makati in 2018, as well as making an additional $2.2 million worth of investments in two facilities in 2017.</p> -<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., as well as the Petersen Chair of Emerging Technology and a professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting.</p> +<p>UPS, another major global logistics company, announced in 2024 that it would build a new hub at Clark International Airport by 2025 to strengthen its supply chain and logistics services, which is necessary given the growth of e-commerce. In partnership with the Luzon International Premiere Airport Development Group, this is part of a $250 million investment push UPS is making throughout the region.</p> -<p><strong>Christopher Koeltzow</strong>, USAF Colonel, was 2024 military fellow at CSIS.</p> +<h3 id="institutional-barriers-to-us-philippine-trade-and-investment">Institutional Barriers to U.S.-Philippine Trade and Investment</h3> -<p><strong>Allen Agnes</strong>, USAF Colonel, was 2024 military fellow at CSIS.</p> +<p>The current Philippine constitution, ratified in 1987, includes several economic provisions that have negatively impacted the Philippines’ net inflow of foreign direct investment, notably restrictions on foreign ownership in certain sectors. In the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s World Investment Report 2023, the Philippines ranked sixth among its Southeast Asian peers in FDI inflows. Under the Marcos administration, the Philippines now aims to improve its standing to second by 2028. A 2022 amendment to the Public Service Act, made effective in 2023, allowed full public ownership of industries such as airports, railways, and telecommunications, creating a new area of opportunity for foreign investors. The same year, an amendment to the Foreign Investment Act allowed foreign investors to set up and fully own domestic enterprises, easing access to the Philippine market. The Philippine House of Representatives and Senate are currently debating whether to amend the constitution to further promote foreign economic investment, though similar efforts in previous administrations have failed. Talks of amendment have stalled at least until the 2025 midterm elections.</p> -<p><strong>Eric Williams</strong>, USMC Colonel, was 2024 military fellow at CSIS.</p>Benjamin Jensen, et al.The future of airpower hinges on the U.S. Air Force’s ability to integrate autonomous drones into manned formations. This analysis explores the trade-offs between cockpit and command center–based control in shaping the next era of combat operations.Operation Days Of Repentance2024-10-28T12:00:00+08:002024-10-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/operation-days-of-repentance<p><em>Israel’s recent strikes on Iran’s military infrastructure signal the vulnerability of Tehran’s air defences and expose the limitations of its regional deterrence strategy.</em></p> +<h3 id="key-findings-and-recommendations">Key Findings and Recommendations</h3> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> U.S. companies operating in the Philippines demonstrate varying degrees of transparency in their official databases and on their websites. Investment and employment figures are quite vague, effectively obscuring the impact of these investments.</p> -<p>In the early hours of 26 October, Israel announced that it had launched “precise and targeted” strikes on “military targets” in Iran, as part of Operation Days of Repentance, its much-awaited response to the Iranian ballistic missile attack at the start of the month.</p> +<ul> + <li><strong>Recommendation 1:</strong> The United States should work with the private sector and other stakeholders to develop a comprehensive database outlining U.S. investment in the Philippines, clearly and transparently listing the specific impacts of such investments, including employment figures. Though press releases offer insight into ongoing and future projects initiated by foreign businesses, they do not paint a cohesive picture of the community impact made by such investments.</li> +</ul> -<p>Video from Iran appeared to show air defences active over Tehran. The Israelis have briefed that there were three waves of strikes, apparently involving around 100 aircraft, including drones, all of which returned home safely. Footage being shown on Israeli television shows a mixture of F-15 and F-16 aircraft preparing to launch, though there is speculation that Israeli F-35I were also involved. It does not sound like Israeli ground-launched ballistic missiles were used; the leaked US assessment released online recently suggested that air-launched ballistic missiles were being readied for use by the Israeli Air Force. These are suspected to have been used in the April attack near Esfahan, and their range means they could have been launched from well outside Iranian airspace. At least one journalist has been briefed that Israeli aircraft breached Iranian airspace, a claim that lends weight to the use of F-35Is.</p> +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Current resources for collating the impact of U.S. investment in the Philippines, or even foreign investment generally, are not user friendly. Further complicating matters, U.S. and Philippine numbers vary significantly, which obscures the impact of U.S.-Philippine economic cooperation. Data from the Philippine Statistics Authority only accounts for investments through investment promotion agencies that have been granted incentives from the Philippine government, reflecting just a fraction of total U.S. investments. Meanwhile, data from the various investment promotion authorities only account for those investments granted incentives by the Philippine government.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The scale of the strike and (apparent) avoidance of civilian areas makes this look far more precise than the equivalent Iranian attack, as well as justifying it as a defensive measure</code></em></strong></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Recommendation 2:</strong> The U.S. and Philippine governments should partner closely in collating their data and making both sets mutually intelligible. Consistency among the two countries’ platforms and datasets would help create a more cohesive, easily accessible narrative. It would be to the benefit of the United States and the Philippines to create a joint resource with which to harmonize their datasets and investment figures.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Recommendation 3:</strong> PEZA and the Philippine Statistics Authority should better aggregate incoming investments into the Philippines’ many economic zones and investment promotion authorities within unified charts, demonstrating aggregate total investments from specific countries in specific sectors. For example, it is currently not possible to filter foreign investments by country of investor, industry, promotion authority, or region within the same table.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>It now seems likely that the route used by the Israeli Air Force involved flying through Syrian airspace and launching from over Iraq, although there would have been a risk of giving early warning to Iran if detected by Syrian radar (or Russian radar based in Syria). Recent regional diplomacy by Iran might have resulted in the Gulf states not wanting their airspace to be used by Israeli aircraft. Israeli officials briefing that the waves of strikes included hitting targets in Syria and Iraq could be misdirection, but more likely indicates that this was indeed the route taken, and that radars and threats along the way were suppressed or destroyed to clear a path. Iraq has since complained to the UN about violations of its airspace. The alternative route would have been a very long diversion down the Red Sea and around the Arabian peninsula: this would have required multiple mid-air refuelling operations, although the Israelis have demonstrated this capability recently when striking Houthi targets in Yemen, and have rehearsed it extensively over the years.</p> +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Neither businesses nor the U.S. government adequately socialize the impacts of their investments on local communities, missing a key opportunity to point the narrative toward the efficacy of the U.S.-Philippine economic partnership. Most announcements are limited to business press briefings that are not often accessible to the audiences they are targeting.</p> -<h3 id="the-goldilocks-option-what-was-struck">The “Goldilocks Option”: What was Struck?</h3> +<ul> + <li><strong>Recommendation 4:</strong> Businesses and the U.S. government should expand their online presences to counter rising disinformation and counter narratives that threaten to sway public opinion. U.S. companies should more actively use popular social media platforms in the Philippines to highlight the benefits brought by their investments.</li> +</ul> -<p>The Israelis claim to have struck air defences, missile production and “additional aerial capabilities”. There are no current nuclear targets in the areas identified (other than a research facility and reactor in Tehran), nor have we seen suggestions yet that oil refining or production facilities were struck directly. Details now being briefed to US media suggest that air defence systems (Russian-supplied S-300s, including radars) were struck, including those protecting facilities like the Abadan oil refinery and the Bandar Imam Khomeini petrochemical complex. In addition, there are images suggesting that some missile development and drone facilities operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at Khojir and Parchin (in and around Tehran) were also struck, as well as possibly the missile test facility at Shahroud. Parchin also included facilities previously identified as being part of Iran’s research into nuclear weapons development before it was suspended.</p> +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Despite the longstanding economic partnership, relatively few U.S. business leaders have traveled to the Philippines or have become aware of the potential of its rapidly growing and increasingly open economy. The 2024 Presidential Trade and Investment Mission was successful in bringing representatives from 22 U.S. businesses to the Philippines. In a similar vein, the 2023 Agricultural Technology Trade Mission to Mindanao brought together key stakeholders from throughout the private sector and government to brainstorm future opportunities for improving the Philippines’ agricultural supply chain.</p> -<h3 id="impact-and-implications-iran-is-vulnerable">Impact and Implications: Iran is Vulnerable</h3> +<ul> + <li><strong>Recommendation 5:</strong> Person-to-person exchanges should remain consistent throughout administrations. Both recent U.S. government–led trade missions were the first of their kind. The United States, regardless of administration, should ensure the continuation of such exchanges.</li> +</ul> -<p>This Israeli operation was considerably more extensive than April, but was still a restrained response aimed at emphasising Israel’s conventional military superiority and removing threats in the form of missile production facilities, while not appearing “escalatory”. Striking Tehran makes public the Israeli ability to hit Iran’s capital and defeat its air defences, but the scale of the strike and (apparent) avoidance of civilian areas makes this look far more precise than the equivalent Iranian attack, as well as justifying it as a defensive measure. The picture that is emerging is one of significant damage to Iranian air defences as well as missile launch facilities, both of which would be intended to show the Iranians that they are vulnerable to further strikes if they attempt retaliation. There is some speculation that all of Iran’s S-300 batteries have now been struck and possibly destroyed. These have hardly performed well to date, but if they have been stripped away entirely – leaving Iran with only domestically produced systems – this will increase the sense of vulnerability the regime feels. It is also hardly a resounding success for Russian military exports, especially following similar Ukrainian successes against the S-300).</p> +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Investments in the Philippines remain strongly centered in Luzon, and particularly in and around Metro Manila and its surrounding areas. Business interest in areas such as Cebu and Davao are growing, but Manila remains oversaturated with investment. Moreover, with limited availability and bureaucratic red tape preventing easy access to cheap land, both business owners and potential employees are thus at a disadvantage.</p> -<p>Moreover, the complexity of the operation should not be underestimated. Over 100 aircraft would be a significant proportion of the Israeli Air Force’s combat fleet (estimated at between 270 and 300), which has been operating at a ferocious tempo for over a year, especially during its campaign in Lebanon. This is alongside the deployment of airborne refuelling, surveillance, and command and control capabilities over a round trip claimed to be 1,600 km.</p> +<ul> + <li><strong>Recommendation 6:</strong> The United States should work to diversify the span of its investments throughout the Philippines. The unitary nature of the Philippine government and the ongoing narrative of “Imperial Manila,” that is, that most of the country’s progress is concentrated in the capital region, makes this difficult to achieve. Expanding investment projects into emerging regions — from Iloilo and Cebu in the central Philippines to Davao and its surroundings in the south — would offer excellent opportunities for Filipinos. The expansion of the IT-BPM sector throughout the Philippines, for instance, helped to more evenly distribute work away from Manila, leading to the development and revitalization of other urban hubs.</li> +</ul> -<p>The nature of the operation looks like a win for US leverage, albeit bought with the deployment of THAAD and 100 personnel to Israel. In addition, the restraint on display has probably been met with a sense of relief among Gulf oil producers, as the measured nature of the attack avoided disruptions to regional energy supply chains, which had been a growing concern during the weeks of heightened speculation. They have also avoided being directly implicated in the attacks (and have issued the predictable responses criticising them), while benefitting from Iranian military capabilities being further degraded. Meanwhile, Israel’s use of Syrian and Iraqi airspace comes at little cost, as Iran is unlikely to retaliate against either country, while Israel has been able to reaffirm its dominance of regional air activity.</p> +<hr /> -<h3 id="the-iranian-response">The Iranian Response</h3> +<p><strong>Japhet Quitzon</strong> is an associate fellow for the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p>Iranian media tried to immediately downplay the impact – despite reports of four Iranian military personnel being killed – but the regime is probably still evaluating the attacks, and the Supreme Leader issued an equivocal statement on 27 October. Iranian officials admitted there had been attacks on border radar stations in the provinces of Tehran, Ilam and Khuzestan but claimed that these had been “successfully countered” and that Israel’s long-range, air-launched missiles carried “very light warheads – about one-fifth the size of Iranian ballistic missile warheads”. The Iranian regime appears to be trying to limit public demand for a military retaliation against Israel. But regardless of how well it can hide any damage, this is the largest direct conventional attack on Iranian territory since the Iran–Iraq War (including both fighting with the Iraqis and the US strikes on the Iranian navy under Operation Praying Mantis). This needs to be factored in to understanding the psychological impact, especially if the taboo on direct strikes on Iran that are formally declared appears to have been shattered (the April attack on Esfahan was never formally acknowledged by Israel).</p> +<p><strong>Gregory B. Poling</strong> is a senior fellow and director of the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS.</p>Japhet Quitzon and Gregory B. PolingThough U.S.-Philippine economic ties are well documented, the day-to-day impact of the relationship in the Philippines is often underreported. The United States must enhance public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.China In Global South Ports2024-10-30T12:00:00+08:002024-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-global-south-ports<p><em>Port infrastructure is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South.</em></p> -<h3 id="what-next">What Next?</h3> +<excerpt /> -<p>Iranian proxy response options have been limited by the damage done to both Hamas and Hezbollah, while the US has bolstered Israeli air defences with the deployment of additional ballistic missile defences (though the reported arrival of yet another THAAD battery has been disputed). However, beyond this set of direct exchanges, the progress of the fighting in Gaza and Lebanon remains a potential trigger for further confrontation. Iran is reportedly still trying to help Hezbollah rebuild, and there is still the possibility that the Israelis will choose to launch attacks that kill (for example) IRGC Qods Force personnel in Lebanon or Syria; there has been no confirmation of the condition of the head of the Qods Force for several weeks.</p> +<p>Port infrastructure around the world is critical to U.S. economic and military security. Although vitally important, it is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. China now dominates maritime trade in terms of volume, shipbuilding activity, and construction and ownership of ports around the world. China’s position puts U.S. economic interests and national security priorities at risk.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Regardless of how well the regime in Tehran can hide any damage, this is the largest direct conventional attack on Iranian territory since the Iran–Iraq War</code></em></strong></p> +<p>A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South. Actions include creating a port infrastructure strategy, promoting transparency in global port infrastructure procurement, and using other tools to better compete against China. Several policy recommendations are not unique to ports but apply to other infrastructure investment areas, such as undersea cables or digital architecture. China’s dominance of overseas ports is well established, but the U.S. policy response is lacking. This policy brief initiates a much-needed conversation and offers preliminary suggestions for consideration and further assessment.</p> -<p>Iran is still caught in a dilemma about how to respond to the stripping away of its deterrent in the form of its regional partners, and harassing attacks by Hezbollah or the Houthis could still provoke a response if they hit a sensitive target or cause high-profile civilian casualties. We still don’t know the extent to which more aggressive elements in the Iranian system might be advising the Supreme Leader, and media reporting and government briefings in Europe and the Middle East continue to highlight Iranian covert influence and assassination planning or operations. Tehran’s latest messaging hints at a pause for recalibration now that Israel’s anticipated retaliation has played out. This is reinforced by statements from the Iranian military, which have affirmed Tehran’s “right to take lawful and legitimate action at an appropriate time”, while also emphasising the need for a “lasting ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon”.</p> +<h3 id="the-global-souths-demand-for-port-infrastructure">The Global South’s Demand for Port Infrastructure</h3> -<p>Israel’s strikes have exposed Iran’s vulnerabilities, particularly the apparent degradation of its air defence systems. This also underscores the limitations of Tehran’s forward-defence doctrine, which relies on proxies to shield Iran from direct conflict. Given these setbacks, Iran is probably keen to avoid an extended period of direct confrontation with Israel. While Tehran cannot feasibly abandon its support for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas in the near term, it is likely to recalibrate its strategy to reinforce internal stability and safeguard its broader regional interests. Moreover, the debate over the status and role of its nuclear programme will continue to rage, especially around whether or not there is utility in maintaining its threshold status, or whether – given the vast gap in conventional capabilities – further steps might be necessary to try to bolster any deterrent effect.</p> +<p>During the past 25 years, international trade patterns have shifted in favor of the Global South. Even though North-North trade is responsible for the biggest share of international trade (37.1 percent), South-South trade has increased by 14.1 percent since 1995, reaching a 25 percent share. Trade between developing countries has increased by an average annual rate of 9.8 percent since 2000, reaching $5.3 trillion in 2021. Over the same period, world trade grew at an annual rate of 5.5 percent. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2024 World Economic Outlook, world trade is expected to increase by 3 percent in 2024 and by 3.3 percent in 2025. As a result, the demand for port infrastructure from the Global South will continue to rise as these countries seek to develop and integrate into global trade.</p> -<p>An initial judgement might therefore be that this operation looks to have put a cap on this bout between Israel and Iran, but the underlying points of friction remain: the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme, the scale of the threat to Israel, proxy activity across the region, and the status of Israeli hostages.</p> +<p>Maritime transport is the backbone of international trade. Around 80 percent of the volume of international trade in goods is carried by sea; this figure is even greater for developing countries. Lower-income countries and small islands are 1.5 to 2 times more reliant on their ports for global trade than the global average. High-quality port infrastructure supports successful economic growth, especially in export-driven economies in developing regions. It attracts investment in production and distribution systems, supports the growth of manufacturing and logistics, and generates more employment. Port development supports supply chain diversification, which is particularly important in the face of shutdown due to accidents, pandemics, or wars.</p> -<hr /> +<p>In 2000, the United States was the top trading partner for over 80 percent of countries. As of today, this figure has shrunk to 30 percent, while China has now become the top trading partner for more than 120 countries. China is South America’s top trading partner, and it is Africa’s largest trading partner in terms of total volume, dwarfing U.S.-Africa trade by a factor of four, according to the United States Institute of Peace.</p> -<p><strong>Matthew Savill</strong> is the Director of Military Sciences at RUSI, focussing on developments and trends in modern conflict, and the use of force in the 21st Century.</p> +<h3 id="chinas-leadership-in-port-infrastructure">China’s Leadership in Port Infrastructure</h3> -<p><strong>Burcu Ozcelik</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security within the International Security department at RUSI.</p>Matthew Savill and Dr Burcu OzcelikIsrael’s recent strikes on Iran’s military infrastructure signal the vulnerability of Tehran’s air defences and expose the limitations of its regional deterrence strategy.Japan-U.S. Cybersecurity2024-10-25T12:00:00+08:002024-10-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/japan-us-cybersecurity<p><em>Cybersecurity is the foundation for a robust U.S.-Japan alliance. This report analyzes the cybersecurity policies of both countries and the prospects for future collaboration on critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience.</em></p> +<p>Within this context, China has significantly invested in the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) to increase trade route options and bypass choke points, posing a significant challenge for U.S. trade. In 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping unveiled the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious political-economic infrastructure initiative to link East Asia and Europe through land, sea and air under China’s leadership and with the backing of its resources. The twenty-first-century MSR is responsible for the BRI maritime routes that connect China to Europe and the Arctic Ocean via the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. President Xi has repeatedly emphasized that economic powers must be maritime and shipping powers. As China now positions itself as the world’s top exporter, top shipbuilder, and largest trading nation, with around 95 percent of its international trade carried out through sea-lanes, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will soon dominate global maritime trade.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The Indo-Pacific is a major hub of global commerce and will continue to be the main target for China’s maritime control. The 10 busiest container ports in the world are located along the shores of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Indian Ocean hosts 80 percent of China’s imported oil and 95 percent of China’s trade with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. China also has a strong presence in port construction in the developing world: it operates or has ownership of 91 active port projects across the globe where military use is a possibility, providing it with a foothold in every continent except Antarctica. These projects are part of the MSR network, which, according to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Council Information Office, has reached 117 ports across 43 countries, mostly in the Global South. China’s position of control and influence over the majority of port infrastructure globally poses a significant economic and military security threat to the United States. Simply put, China could use its power to interfere with operations that rely on port access – including military and economic operations – and are vital to U.S. interests.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Ports are one strategic infrastructure investment area where China is outpacing the United States. In addition to technology, digital infrastructure, and energy infrastructure, China has made significant and strategic investments in ports that are highly connected to global trade networks and critical to the global flow of goods. It has invested in port projects in 16 of the top 20 countries or territories for shipping connectivity. Six of those countries are from the Global South: Egypt, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. More than 27 percent of global container trade last year passed through terminals where leading Chinese and Hong Kong–based firms held direct stakes.</p> -<p>Cybersecurity has long been regarded as a critical part of national security. The sophistication, complexity, and scale of cyberattacks have increased, with state-sponsored actors posing significant threats to nations and international cybercriminal groups conducting massive attacks globally. Meanwhile, the ongoing digitalization of society is expanding cyberspace, leading to the complicated and expanded interdependencies among infrastructures, services, and functions. It is, therefore, becoming more important to ensure the cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructures that people and nations rely on every day. This is considered a national priority in most countries and a global issue where international cooperation is essential.</p> +<p>China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) also dominate in financing, design, construction, and management of overseas port infrastructure. Between 2010 and 2019, Chinese companies invested roughly $11 billion into overseas ports. China’s two main SOEs involved in port infrastructure are COSCO Shipping Ports, the world’s largest shipping company and port terminal operator, operating and managing 371 berths globally, and China Merchants Ports, the sixth-largest port terminal operator globally. Additionally, the China Communications Construction Company Limited (CCCC) is the biggest port design and construction enterprise in the world. It shapes more than 70 percent of the national standards for the water transportation industry and designed 7 of the top 10 ports. State support to Chinese shipping companies in their endeavors totaled an estimated $132 billion between 2010 and 2018.</p> -<p>With regard to the Japan-U.S. relationship, the alliance has become more important than ever in light of rising geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, and cyberspace is playing a key role as a foundation for a robust alliance. Both countries are currently at a pivotal point in their national cybersecurity. In the United States, the National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS), released in March 2023, represents a significant shift from previous policies. This includes further government involvement in the private sector, including regulatory approaches, and a shift of the cybersecurity burden away from end users to providers. In Japan, the National Security Strategy (NSS), released in December 2022, puts a strong emphasis on fundamentally enhancing the country’s cybersecurity posture, including the implementation of its own “active cyber defense” (ACD). Furthermore, the recent passage of key legislations enhancing Japan’s security clearance system and economic security will have a positive impact on cybersecurity. Taking these evolutions as an opportunity, it is the right time to reassess the current state of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation and explore ways forward for further collaboration.</p> +<h3 id="concerns-about-chinas-port-infrastructure">Concerns about China’s Port Infrastructure</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Taking these evolutions as an opportunity, it is the right time to reassess the current state of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation and explore ways forward for further collaboration.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>China-backed infrastructure projects permeate the Global South. However, these projects often come with unsustainable financing terms, a lack of transparency, and a clear disregard for environmental and social norms. China even imports its workforce and prevents locals from profiting from the investment projects. In its first 10 years, cumulative BRI engagement surpassed $1 trillion, and the developing world amassed an estimated $385 billion in “hidden debt” to China. For each dollar of aid to low- and middle-income countries, China has provided $9 of debt.</p> -<p>There are two key areas for consideration in promoting holistic and effective Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation. First, both countries’ cybersecurity authorities, roles, and responsibilities are highly decentralized, making it challenging to gain a comprehensive overview of the subject. Second, while there are a number of high-level frameworks and agreements for cooperation between both governments, there is still a need for more specific and operational collaboration. To address these issues, this paper begins by providing a comprehensive overview of the cybersecurity postures in both countries, including the basic policies, organizational structures, and functions, with a focus on recent developments. It then reviews Japan-U.S. cooperation to date, discusses the current state of critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience in both countries, and offers recommendations for operationalizing cooperation in this area.</p> +<p>Sri Lanka has accumulated more than $8 billion in debt to Chinese SOEs, of which $1.1 billion was used to construct Hambantota Port. In 2017, when the Sri Lankan government was struggling to repay its debts, it had agreed to lease the port to China for 99 years in exchange for debt reduction. However, in 2024, Sri Lanka had to renegotiate its debt after it defaulted on its foreign loans in 2022. The situation raised concerns about China’s economic and geopolitical influence through predatory lending and the risks for smaller countries that undertake infrastructure deals with China.</p> -<h3 id="fundamentals-of-cybersecurity-in-the-united-states-and-japan">Fundamentals of Cybersecurity in the United States and Japan</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China-backed infrastructure projects permeate the Global South. However, these projects often come with unsustainable financing terms, a lack of transparency, and a clear disregard for environmental and social norms.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The United States and Japan have highly decentralized and complicated cybersecurity structures and functions across their governments, which results in overlapping authorities, roles, and responsibilities. While several cybersecurity experts focus on specific areas of cooperation, there is a lack of comprehensive and accurate understanding of the cybersecurity postures in both countries. To pursue effective Japan-U.S. cooperation in specific areas, it would be essential, as a prerequisite, to have a clear understanding of these cybersecurity postures and to be able to map both countries’ policies, structures, functions, initiatives, and so on. The following provides an overview of cybersecurity postures in both countries, focusing on recent developments and future direction.</p> +<p>Similarly, as of 2022, Pakistan owed $23 billion to China. After large-scale borrowing, particularly in relation to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Pakistan is struggling to repay its debt and faces an economic crisis. These loans may have contained hidden terms that hinder Pakistan’s economy and force the country to depend on China. Although some analysis dismisses accusations of China’s debt-trap diplomacy, other issues surrounding Chinese lending remain, including lack of transparency, economic viability, social and environmental concerns, and wielding debt for political leverage.</p> -<h4 id="cybersecurity-in-the-united-states">Cybersecurity in the United States</h4> +<p>Additional concerns remain about China’s port infrastructure due to its potential dual use for commercial and military purposes. Out of the 70 commercial port projects in the Global South, an estimated 55 projects have the potential for naval use as well. That said, naval use is more likely to occur in ports where China owns the majority share – currently 10 port projects.</p> -<p><em>Basic Strategy and Policy</em></p> +<p>There is growing reason for concern as Chinese port projects become more ambitious in terms of uses and strategic location. In 2017, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti at the entrance of the Red Sea, one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, six miles from a U.S. military base. There are concerns about similar attempts to establish a military presence in other parts of the Global South. U.S. officials suspect that China and Cambodia made a deal allowing Chinese armed forces to use Ream Naval Base, strategically located on the country’s southern coast facing the Gulf of Thailand, on the heels of elevated conflict with the Philippines and others in the South Sea. The Cambodian government has denied these accusations. Similarly, in the United Arab Emirates, China is accused of attempting to construct a clandestine military facility in the port of Khalifa, outside Abu Dhabi. China is also attempting to build a military base on the Atlantic coast of Africa.</p> -<p>Cybersecurity policy in the United States is commonly believed to be relatively bipartisan. The two major political parties have been pursuing a similar direction in general, although they have minor differences. The U.S. government has historically strongly emphasized prioritizing and reinforcing voluntary public-private partnerships (PPPs) to enhance the national cybersecurity posture. However, recent significant cyber incidents, such as those at SolarWinds in 2020 and Colonial Pipeline in 2021, as well as growing geopolitical tensions, have resulted in a major change in this policy. Recognizing cybersecurity as a matter of national security, the Biden administration has made a significant shift in policy to strengthen government involvement in the private sector. This includes strengthening the federal government’s organizational structure by creating high-level government posts responsible for cybersecurity; introducing and updating laws and regulations; and expanding government-led initiatives.</p> +<p>In addition to commercial and military use, port infrastructure could also be used for spying and intelligence gathering. With access to the business trade hubs, China could spy on U.S. commercial and military movements. A 2024 congressional probe showed communications equipment in Chinese-made cranes at U.S. ports, suggesting vulnerabilities to supply chains, trade data, and other sensitive information. China has secured a commanding position through Logink (also known as the National Transportation and Logistics Public Information Platform), a Chinese state-owned digital logistics platform. At least 24 ports worldwide have adopted the Logink system, which could allow China to access significant amounts of confidential information related to transportation, pricing, and management of goods (including military equipment), threatening U.S. economic and military security.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Recognizing cybersecurity as a matter of national security, the Biden administration has made a significant shift in policy to strengthen government involvement in the private sector.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>China is also exporting container cranes from Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company Limited (ZPMC). ZPMC dominates the global market for container cranes with a staggering 70 percent market share. For example, ZPMC manufactures 80 percent of the cranes used in U.S. ports; this includes 10 strategic seaports. These cranes come equipped with sensors that can track container details, which raises concerns about Chinese access to information about shipped goods, including U.S. military equipment.</p> -<p>The Biden administration’s cybersecurity policies are largely based on the recommendations from the Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC), established under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019. In addition, Executive Order (EO) 14028: Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity, signed in May 2021, has served as the foundation for numerous federal cybersecurity initiatives to date. In March 2023, the NCS was released for the first time in four and a half years. The strategy is composed of five key pillars: (1) “defend critical infrastructure,” (2) “disrupt and dismantle threat actors,” (3) “shape market forces to drive security and resilience,” (4) “invest in a resilient future,” and (5) “forge international partnerships to pursue shared goals.” The NCS acknowledges the continued importance of voluntary PPPs, but also points out that this alone is not sufficient. It highlights the need for baseline requirements for critical infrastructure and the shift of accountability for cybersecurity away from end users to more capable manufacturers and providers. This demonstrates the administration’s clear intention to increase government involvement. The Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) publishes an annual National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan (NCSIP) to ensure transparency and accountability for the implementation of the strategy. This plan outlines the specific implementation items, responsible agency, contributing entities, and deadlines for each strategic objective. The second edition, published in May 2024, is the most recent version of the plan. Federal cybersecurity measures are being implemented in accordance with the plan.</p> +<h3 id="us-activity-in-port-infrastructure">U.S. Activity in Port Infrastructure</h3> -<p><em>Organizational Structure</em></p> +<p>Today China strongly outperforms the United States in the financing, building, and management of ports. The United States has a limited number of ports, and its infrastructure is deficient and vulnerable to inclement weather. Currently, the United States has 208 commercial ports – up from 178 in 2010. U.S. ports are either privately owned and operated, or they are managed by federal, state, or local government or quasi-governmental authorities. The owner of a U.S. port might lease port infrastructure to a terminal operator in charge of maintaining equipment and buildings. In comparison, China has over 2,000 commercial ports domestically and nearly 100 ports abroad. Furthermore, U.S. port companies do not score well in global rankings. None of the world’s top 10 shipping companies or top 10 seaport operators are American, and only four U.S. ports are among the top 50 busiest ports in the world. None of the U.S. ports make it into the Container Port Performance Index top 20 list.</p> -<p>Figure 1 shows an overview of the cybersecurity organizational structure centered on the U.S. federal government. ONCD leads and coordinates federal cybersecurity strategy and policy in the White House. The deputy national security advisor for cyber and emerging technology in the National Security Council (NSC) serves as an adviser to the president on national security issues related to cyber. Although the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is not a cybersecurity-focused organization, it issues specific instructions to government agencies to implement policies such as EOs and manages and oversees their processes of implementation, including budgetary aspects.</p> +<p>In addition, U.S. port infrastructure is largely outdated. The 2021 Report Card for American Infrastructure by the American Society of Civil Engineers gives a B-minus to U.S. port infrastructure. According to the Freight Intermodal Connectors Study, 91 percent of U.S. ports have a fair, mediocre, or poor rating: 35 percent are fair, 19 percent are mediocre, and 37 percent are poor. At the same time, U.S. ports have been increasingly vulnerable to climate. In 2022, Hurricane Ian forced temporary closures of seven major U.S. ports. Droughts in the Panama Canal disrupted vessels serving U.S. East Coast ports. Besides, many U.S. ports have infrastructure limitations that do not allow them to receive larger vessels, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation.</p> -<p>In the executive departments, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a central role as the operational lead for federal cybersecurity and the national coordinator for critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the Department of Justice (DOJ) serves as a law enforcement entity for cybercrimes. The National Security Agency (NSA) in the Department of Defense (DOD) is tasked with protecting U.S. national security systems, the DOD, and the defense industrial base. It is also one of the key agencies for cyber intelligence. The U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in the DOD is a military wing responsible for cyber operations to defend against and respond to cyberattacks on the nation. The Department of State (DOS) focuses on cyber diplomacy. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the Department of Commerce (DOC) plays a key role in developing cybersecurity resources such as standards, frameworks, guidance, and practices. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) serves as the principal adviser to the president on telecommunications and information policy, including cybersecurity. There are designated Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) that are responsible for managing critical infrastructure sectors. Further details can be found in Chapter 4. Independent regulatory entities, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), are also increasingly involved in the cybersecurity field, leveraging their respective existing authorities.</p> +<p>In terms of overseas ports, the United States severely lags China, as the United States does not manage or own any commercial ports outside its territories. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), however, is beginning to invest in some port infrastructure abroad. In May 2023, the DFC announced a $150 million commitment to Yilport Terminal Operations to expand and modernize the Puerto Bolívar container port in Ecuador. This is a significant step forward, but a more robust pipeline of projects must be developed.</p> -<p>The U.S. federal government’s cybersecurity budget request for FY 2025 is $27.5 billion, with $13 billion allocated for civilian agencies and $14.5 billion for the DOD. The number of employees in CISA, the operational core of the federal government, was 3,161 as of August 2023.</p> +<p>In November 2021, the White House announced the Biden-Harris Action Plan for America’s Ports and Waterways, recognizing that U.S. ports are underfunded and that poor infrastructure has important costs for the U.S. economy and global competitiveness. The administration under President Joe Biden developed the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal (BID) and the Port Infrastructure Development Grant (PIDG) program, which both allocate investment to improve port infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Transportation will award $230 million to the PIDG, and the Biden administration committed $17 billion to the BID. While this is a good start, much more funding should be allocated, with a specific strategy focusing on the Global South. Currently, the U.S. government does not consider the commercial maritime industry as critical infrastructure, making it even more difficult to prioritize the sector.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iH7CUeK.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Cybersecurity Organizational Structure Centered on the U.S. Federal Government.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> +<p>Moreover, the United States could also draw on the financing and expertise of multilateral development banks (MDBs) and international financial institutions (IFIs) when it comes to ports infrastructure. These institutions provide financing and technical assistance to the private sector in middle- and low-income countries, help de-risk investments, and catalyze private capital. In 2021, MDBs were the second-largest financier in these countries and financed 9 percent of the total value of private investment in infrastructure projects. From 2010 to 2021, the largest share of MDB financing of private investment in infrastructure projects went to the transport sector and represented 38 percent of all financing. In 2023, a total of 18 port projects in 11 countries received investments worth $4.9 billion, twice the amount in 2022, according to a World Bank report. The Latin America-Caribbean region had the highest level of private investments for ports, reaching $1.5 billion in five ports in Brazil and $975 million in one port in Peru.</p> -<p><em>Current State</em></p> +<p>However, the U.S.-led multilateral lending process has discouraged developing countries. Compared to Chinese lending under the BRI, Western MDB loans tend to be less attractive, as they are more difficult to apply for and are contingent on more rigorous vetting requirements and standards for bankability. China, by contrast, is often involved in predatory lending, which imposes unfair terms on the borrower and makes its deals look more attractive on the surface. To compete with China, Western MDBs must streamline their services and strike a better balance between managing risk and delivering results.</p> -<ul> - <li>Defense</li> -</ul> +<p>China also has a growing influence in these traditionally U.S.-led institutions. China now has the second-highest aggregate voting power in the IFIs it supports, even though it significantly trails the United States. Despite many Chinese firms being sanctioned or debarred from the World Bank for fraud and corruption, China has consistently ranked among the top countries receiving MDB contracts, and Chinese firms easily outperform firms of other countries in securing contracts, according to the Center for Global Development.</p> -<p>In September 2023, the DOD released the overview version of the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy for the first time since 2018. The strategy aligns with the priorities set out in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy released in 2022, as well as the NCS. It includes four lines of effort: (1) “defend the nation,” (2) “prepare to fight and win the nation’s wars,” (3) “protect the cyber domain with allies and partners,” and (4) “build enduring advantages in cyberspace.” In March 2024, the new Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy was established to enhance defense cyber policy.</p> +<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> -<p>USCYBERCOM is the primary entity responsible for cyber operations related to national defense. While its missions and activities are not necessarily all publicly available, one of its recent priorities has been to work with allies to respond to potential cyber activities from outside the country that pose a threat to the United States. This is represented by the concept “defend forward,” which defends against malicious cyber activities at their source. One form of this concept is the implementation of “hunt forward operations.” This initiative contributes to the cyber defense of the host country by monitoring and detecting malicious cyber activities on the host country’s network while also contributing to the defense of the United States against attacks from foreign adversaries. USCYBERCOM has shared leadership with the NSA since its establishment. The two organizations work together on cyber operations, with the NSA providing its own cyber intelligence insights and resources to support USCYBERCOM.</p> +<p>The United States cannot respond on its own to the increasing Chinese presence in Global South ports; it must rely on the MDB system, a strong interagency process, and allies and partners to offer better terms and financing to counter China’s growing influence in port infrastructure in the Global South. Some initial recommendations are put forward in this paper, but further dialogue and research are needed to devise specific actions so the United States can lead on this important infrastructure.</p> -<ul> - <li>Intelligence</li> -</ul> +<h4 id="1-devise-a-clear-national-security-strategy-on-international-ports">1. Devise a Clear National Security Strategy on International Ports</h4> -<p>The U.S. intelligence community is led by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), with the NSA playing a major role, particularly in the area of cybersecurity. The NSA collects foreign signals intelligence and provides it to U.S. policymakers and military forces. In the past, the NSA’s operations were less transparent and accessible to the public. However, in recent years, the NSA has been moving away from its historical secrecy and becoming more open to the public. It is actively promoting collaboration with the private sector as well as federal agencies, including strengthening its partnership with the defense industrial base through the Cybersecurity Collaboration Center (CCC) and developing and providing technical guidance in collaboration with CISA, the FBI, and other agencies. In recent years, the government has adopted a policy of sharing threat intelligence in a timely manner with a broad range of stakeholders by declassifying the information as much as possible. This has led to closer cooperation between government and critical infrastructure.</p> +<p>The next U.S. presidential administration should develop a clear port infrastructure strategy to convey why a Global South port infrastructure presence is in the U.S. security interest. The strategy should focus on immediate concerns and a long-term vision for working with allies and becoming an effective competitor and alternative to Chinese investments. This strategy must be followed by a streamlined interagency approach throughout the whole government. Currently, U.S. government efforts on the matter are siloed, but the administration can fix this situation if it provides a clear strategy and elevates ports to a top priority. Consolidated interagency efforts will provide more focus and avoid redundant efforts.</p> -<ul> - <li>Law Enforcement</li> -</ul> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The next U.S. presidential administration should develop a clear port infrastructure strategy to convey why a Global South port infrastructure presence is in the U.S. security interest.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The FBI is the lead federal agency investigating cybercrimes, working with other agencies such as CISA and the NSA, foreign partners and law enforcement entities, and the private sector. The National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) is a government-wide initiative that integrates investigative efforts against cyber threats. The FBI is responsible for organizing and leading this, with the participation of over 30 agencies in the intelligence community and law enforcement. The Internet Crime Complaint Center is a resource for the general public to report internet crimes. The FBI has recently assigned cyber assistant legal attachés to embassies worldwide to work closely with international authorities.</p> +<p>The strategy should focus not on the hundreds of ports across the Global South but on the top 15–20 most strategic locations and then establish a U.S. strategy on how to better compete in each of those ports in the long run. The United States should then use all its available soft-power tools to establish a strong presence in those ports and the surrounding region.</p> -<p>In recent years, the FBI and DOJ have shifted their focus from traditional criminal investigations (e.g., establishing a case, arresting, prosecuting, convicting, and sending criminals to prison) to the disruption of cybercriminals. This shift could make it more challenging to prosecute crimes without sufficient evidence. However, the government has prioritized proactive measures, including the prevention of crimes, early detection, and the prevention of the spread of damage. The government has been implementing this policy aggressively, conducting a series of law enforcement operations. These include disrupting international ransomware groups such as ALPHV/BlackCat and LockBit, as well as the botnets used by state-sponsored actors such as Volt Typhoon, Flax Typhoon, and 911 S5. The case of LockBit is one of the largest coordinated operations in recent years, involving law enforcement agencies from around the world. The National Police Agency (NPA) of Japan also participated in the operation, along with the Five Eyes countries (an intelligence alliance composed of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and other international partners.</p> +<h4 id="2-partner-with-allies-and-locals">2. Partner with Allies and Locals</h4> -<ul> - <li>Diplomacy</li> -</ul> +<p>The United States needs to develop a strategy and partnerships with allies to secure safe access to ports abroad while also ensuring allies have a stake in building new ports for the Global South (see annex). For example, in Rijeka, Croatia, the United States used diplomacy to sway Croatia to negotiate a contract with Maersk instead of a Chinese operator. Rijeka is strategically valuable because the U.S. military and NATO use the port to move equipment, and it provides access to central European markets.</p> -<p>The DOS is responsible for coordinating diplomatic engagement on the security of international cyberspace in bilateral, multilateral, and regional forums. It also leads intergovernmental cyber dialogues with international partners, including Japan. The Biden administration has enhanced its system for promoting national and economic security in cyberspace and digital technology from a diplomatic perspective through the establishment of the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy in April 2022, the appointment of the first-ever ambassador-at-large for it in September of the same year, and other measures. Furthermore, in May 2024, the DOS published its first United States International Cyberspace and Digital Policy Strategy. The strategy outlines four key areas of action to build digital solidarity. These include promoting a secure and resilient digital ecosystem, aligning rights-respecting approaches with international partners, building coalitions and engaging partners to counter threats to cyberspace, and strengthening international partners’ digital and cyber capacity. There is also a plan to have trained cyber and digital officers in every U.S. embassy around the world by the end of 2024. The White House is also leading international cooperation on cybersecurity through initiatives such as the International Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI). The current status of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation is outlined in Chapter 3.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Government System Protection</li> -</ul> - -<p>The federal Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) oversees cybersecurity policy, planning, and implementation for the executive branch. OMB provides instructions on specific cybersecurity measures to be implemented by federal agencies with a deadline through the issuance of memoranda and other means. CISA serves as the operational lead for cybersecurity in the Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB). The Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 requires government agencies to include incident detection, reporting, and response procedures in their information security programs. FISMA also requires OMB to publish an annual report on the progress and state of implementation in federal agencies. EO 14028 of May 2021 is based on FISMA. One of the sections notes the modernization of federal government cybersecurity. It includes a number of directives for FCEB, such as the use of secure cloud services, transition to zero trust architecture, and deployment of multi-factor authentication and data encryption. CISA maintains and publishes a Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog as part of its operational support to federal agencies. The Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog includes recommended actions that agencies must take by specified dates, which serves as a binding operational directive. CISA also offers the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program, which provides cybersecurity tools, integration services, and dashboards to assist agencies in enhancing their security posture. Note that the NSA is primarily responsible for the protection of government agencies with respect to the national security system (NSS). While EO 14028 is a directive for the FECB, a separate National Security Memorandum (NSM), NSM-8, was issued in January 2022 that requires the NSS to meet equivalent or greater cybersecurity requirements than those defined in the EO.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Critical Infrastructure Protection</li> -</ul> - -<p>The Biden administration considers critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience a national security priority. The national framework for critical infrastructure protection has long been based on the 2013 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-21). However, the National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22), the first revision in 11 years, was signed by the president in April 2024. NSM-22 designates 16 critical infrastructure sectors, which is the same as PPD-21. CISA, as the national coordinator, is responsible for the cybersecurity and resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Each sector is overseen by a designated SRMA, which is the competent agency related to that industry and responsible for risk management and mitigation in the sector.</p> - -<p>Given that the majority of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, it is the responsibility of these entities to ensure their own cybersecurity. The government also plays a supporting role in these efforts. The specifics of PPPs vary by sector. In general, critical infrastructure owners and operators cooperate with the SRMA of the sector. In addition, the Sector Coordinating Council (SCC), which comprises critical infrastructure owners and operators, trade associations, and other entities within the sector, serves as a forum for discussing sector-specific strategies, policies, and plans. SCC also works closely with the Government Coordinating Council (GCC), which is the corresponding government entity for the sector. Technical and operational activities are typically managed through Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which are established in each industry. The National Council of ISACs (NCI) facilitates cross-sector operational coordination among ISACs. In addition, there are several specific initiatives related to critical infrastructure protection. One of the most notable initiatives to date is the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC), which was launched in August 2021. It is a framework of cross-sector collaboration between selected private-sector entities and key government agencies, including CISA, the NSA, and the FBI.</p> - -<p>The United States has long relied on voluntary PPPs as a primary policy approach. However, there has been a notable increase in legislative and regulatory approaches under the Biden administration. In March 2022, the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA) was passed, requiring critical infrastructure owners and operators to report significant incidents and ransomware payments to the government. The rule-making process is currently underway. In addition, as indicated in the NCS and NSM-22, further cybersecurity requirements and regulations are being considered for each sector. Further details on critical infrastructure protection can be found in Chapter 4 and beyond.</p> +<p>The United States should further rely on commercial diplomacy to engage in government-to-government trade assistance with foreign officials on behalf of U.S. companies’ interests. The Advocacy Center, part of the International Trade Administration, offers support to U.S. businesses to win foreign government procurements. The Transaction Advisory Fund (TAF), a function of the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network (ITAN), launched in 2018, provides support to government agencies in the Indo-Pacific region, the Western Hemisphere, and sub-Saharan Africa for developing sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure. International legal funds like the TAF are vital in helping ministries negotiate transparent and fair contracts. TAF funding helped Myanmar renegotiate the Kyaukphyu port, a prime example of promoting transparency and quality in instances where the U.S. private sector does not offer a competitive alternative.</p> -<ul> - <li>Small- and Medium-sized Businesses Protection</li> -</ul> +<h4 id="3-envision-new-tools-and-streamline-financing-for-port-infrastructure">3. Envision New Tools and Streamline Financing for Port Infrastructure</h4> -<p>In general, small- and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) often have smaller budgets, fewer employees, and less cybersecurity expertise than large corporations. These companies are often part of key supply chains, large corporate groups, or critical infrastructure and have been increasingly targeted by attackers as the weakest link. The government has identified the need to enhance the cybersecurity posture of SMBs as a critical issue. CISA assists SMBs in reducing their cyber risks by providing guidance tailored to their needs and free services and tools. NIST also plays an important role in this effort. It has launched a website, Small Business Cybersecurity Corner, which provides a centralized collection of cybersecurity guidance, training, and other resources for SMBs, including NIST IR 7621. Additionally, the Small Business Cybersecurity Community of Interest was established to facilitate the exchange of information and resources. To date, over 1,000 small businesses have participated in this initiative.</p> +<p>Competing with China within the global port infrastructure does not mean owning, building, and financing every port. Instead, U.S. companies can become shareholders or board members at international ports. Alternatively, the United States can offer attractive deals that are not directly related to a port but within the same city, thereby providing more value to the municipal government. Other strategies for effectively competing with China’s influence in the region include buying land surrounding the ports, engaging the private sector, and financing alternative ports in the surrounding region.</p> -<ul> - <li>Consumers and the General Public</li> -</ul> +<p>In this regard, U.S. corporations often hesitate to invest in ports because there is limited commercial return – unless the government can guarantee access to capital. This is where the U.S. government can step in. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) can play a role in catalyzing private sector investment in critical infrastructure. The DFC and U.S. Export-Import Bank can also be valuable tools in countering China’s influence. For example, DFC agreed in November 2023 to fund Colombo West International Terminal Pvt. Ltd. (CWIT), a consortium of India’s largest port operator, Adani Ports and SEZ Ltd., for $553 million in Sri Lanka. In 2019, the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed the Cooperation Framework to Strengthen Infrastructure Finance, aimed to support infrastructure development through market-oriented and private sector investment. The governments committed to remove regulatory, market, and legal barriers to private sector investment and prioritize development of financial instruments, project finance, the local debt market, capital markets, and analysis of government liabilities.</p> -<p>It is important to raise cybersecurity awareness among the general public in order to build nationwide cybersecurity capabilities. In the United States, CISA has taken a leading role in working with the federal government; state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; and the private sector to disseminate information and conduct campaigns to ensure that the public is aware of cyber threats and can safely use the digital space. October has been designated as National Cybersecurity Awareness Month since 2004. In 2023, the initiative celebrated its 20th anniversary, and CISA launched a new permanent cybersecurity awareness program, Secure Our World. The program is focused on four key actions: use strong passwords, enable multi-factor authentication, recognize and report phishing, and update software. These actions are designed to encourage behavioral change throughout the year.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) can play a role in catalyzing private sector investment in critical infrastructure. The DFC and U.S. Export-Import Bank can also be valuable tools in countering China’s influence.</code></em></strong></p> -<ul> - <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> -</ul> +<p>The United States can increase the overall funding available for the private sector to invest in the space by pulling together resources within capital markets. The United States should incentivize IFIs and MDBs, such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Finance Corporation, to invest in Global South port projects, which will attract U.S. companies and other private sector engagement. Teaming up with other countries will allow the United States to pool funding through a consortium focused specifically on Global South ports.</p> -<p>The security of technologies, products, and services is a broad topic. This paper does not cover all aspects of the topic, but one of the Biden administration’s key interests is the promotion of secure by design and secure by default. This is the concept of ensuring that products and services are secure from the design phase and that security features are built in by default for the products and services. This aligns with the NCS’s primary objective of shifting cybersecurity accountability to manufacturers and providers. CISA, in collaboration with federal agencies and international partners, including Japan, has been actively promoting the adoption of these principles. In May 2024, 68 of the world’s leading software manufacturers made a voluntary commitment to CISA’s Secure by Design Pledge, pledging to design products with better security built in. Furthermore, CISA is advancing this principle, shifting the concept of secure by design to secure by demand, to ensure that customers understand the necessity of the security and safety of the products and push vendors to improve their products. In March 2024, CISA and OMB released a Secure Software Development Attestation Form, which requires producers of software used by the federal government to attest to the adoption of secure development practices aligned with NIST’s Secure Software Development Framework. Subsequently, in August 2024, CISA released a software acquisition guide for federal agencies, which can be used by a broader range of stakeholders, including the private sector. The guide provides recommendations for software assurance in the cybersecurity supply chain risk management life cycle, focusing on the secure by demand concept. In a related effort, CISA has been facilitating community discussions to promote the use of the Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) to increase software transparency. The government has also been calling for the use of memory-safe languages for secure software development. Additionally, as indicated in the NCS, a legal framework for holding software producers accountable is also being considered. Regarding consumer devices, the White House announced a plan for an internet of things (IoT) labeling program in July 2023. The objective is to make secure IoT devices widely available through a voluntary approach that leverages market forces. The program is currently being prepared under the leadership of the FCC with the aim of becoming operational by the end of 2024. Several government initiatives are being developed under the common concept of secure by design.</p> +<h4 id="4-establish-procurement-best-practices">4. Establish Procurement Best Practices</h4> -<p>Another key issue is the safety and security of artificial intelligence (AI), which is considered a foundation of the use of AI in EO 14110: Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence, signed in October 2023. The EO addresses a wide range of issues, including risk assessment and mitigation for the use of AI in critical infrastructure, the security of the foundation models, and the detection and labeling of synthetic content. These tasks have been assigned to CISA, NIST, and other government agencies.</p> +<p>The United States should strive to promote transparency in global port infrastructure procurement. The rule of law, transparency, public engagement, and better awareness about how to govern ports will inform the public and ensure ports follow best practices. The United States and its allies can establish a market standard by picking 10–15 ports and reforming them thoroughly. For example, most economic coercion comes out of port terminal operating contracts and procurement. After reforming a select group of ports, companies will be more interested in operating in the ports that are more transparent.</p> -<ul> - <li>Workforce</li> -</ul> +<p>China is quick with financing port construction and maintenance, but its BRI contracts lack transparency and impose questionable and opaque confidentiality clauses that are predatory in nature. In a report analyzing 100 debt contracts between China and foreign governments, 100 percent of China Development Bank contracts and 43 percent of contracts held by the Export-Import Bank of China required such clauses. Unfortunately, the U.S.-led multilateral lending process does not offer attractive counteroffers, as they tend to be less user friendly and have more rigorous vetting requirements and standards for bankability, leaving developing countries vulnerable to using China as a lender of last resort.</p> -<p>A shortage of cybersecurity professionals is a common challenge for both the public and private sectors globally. In July 2023, the United States published the National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy (NCWES), which focuses on four pillars: (1) “equip every American with foundational cyber skills,” (2) “transform cyber education,” (3) “expand and enhance America’s cyber workforce,” and (4) “strengthen the federal cyber workforce.” In releasing the strategy, government agencies, industry, academia, and nonprofit organizations have committed to working together to implement the strategy through training, apprenticeship programs, and partnerships. ONCD is leading this national initiative. In June 2024, ONCD released a report outlining its progress to date and future work plans for implementing NCWES.</p> +<p>The U.S. government could use platforms such as the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism to enable the private sector to share information on unfair practices with governments suffering from predatory circumstances. The Department of Justice could offer technical legal assistance to foreign countries to help litigate such matters. The United States helped the Congolese mining company Gécamines reach a settlement with a Chinese mining company over royalties owed over a copper and cobalt mine.</p> -<h4 id="cybersecurity-in-japan">Cybersecurity in Japan</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Unfortunately, the U.S.-led multilateral lending process does not offer attractive counteroffers, as they tend to be less user friendly and have more rigorous vetting requirements and standards for bankability, leaving developing countries vulnerable to using China as a lender of last resort.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><em>Basic Strategy and Policy</em></p> +<p>Furthermore, the role of investigative journalists is crucial in exposing corruption within the ports sector. The market does not have the best reputation, and it is important to expose collusion, human trafficking, and monopoly. Also, the United States can support public financial management education within the governments that oversee port infrastructure so they can identify deals that are too good to be true.</p> -<p>The Japanese political system has been relatively stable and consistent in terms of the parliamentary cabinet system, with the Liberal Democratic Party having been in power for a long time, except for a few periods. With regard to cybersecurity policy, there are some similarities with the United States in terms of a decentralized government organizational structure and the basis of voluntary PPPs.</p> +<h4 id="5-provide-cutting-edge-technology">5. Provide Cutting-Edge Technology</h4> -<p>The current cybersecurity policy is based on the Cybersecurity Basic Act, which went into full effect in January 2015. The act outlines the fundamental principles and responsibilities of the nation in advancing cybersecurity policies. It also establishes the framework for developing a national cybersecurity strategy and other policy initiatives. In January 2015, the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters was established in the cabinet under the act, and the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) was established in the Cabinet Secretariat as the national cybersecurity center. The national Cybersecurity Strategy has been updated approximately once every three years since its initial version in 2013, with the latest version released in September 2021. The latest strategy sets “Cybersecurity for All” as its main theme and outlines three key directions: (1) “advancing digital transformation (DX) and cybersecurity simultaneously,” (2) “ensuring the overall safety and security of cyberspace as it becomes increasingly public, interconnected and interrelated,” and (3) “enhancing initiatives from the perspective of Japan’s national security.” The strategy reflects the current geopolitical landscape, naming China, Russia, and North Korea as countries of concern for the first time. It also indicates the importance of international cooperation with the United States, the Quad (a strategic security grouping that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and other like-minded countries, as well as the importance of economic security and supply chains. Additionally, the government releases an annual report that serves as both a review of the previous fiscal year and a plan for the current year, outlining the key achievements and implementation plan based on the strategy.</p> +<p>The maritime sector is dangerously reliant on the PRC for equipment and technology. The U.S. Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party released an investigative report that showed extreme vulnerabilities in ZPMC crane control systems produced in the PRC, software used at U.S. maritime facilities, and other maritime infrastructure components. The United States has a competitive advantage over China in advanced technology, such as within the green energy transition, that can be applied within the port infrastructure space. If the United States can transform a port through technology that improves efficiency and saves on transaction costs, then it can offer something China cannot. The United States’ advantage over China should be its ability to compete for better maintenance and product quality.</p> -<p>Japan’s cybersecurity is now at a pivotal point. Most recently, the NSS of Japan, released in December 2022, outlined a strategy to fundamentally enhance the nation’s cybersecurity posture. While the ACD in general includes a wide range of proactive cyber operations, the strategy focuses on three key areas as its own ACD: enhanced PPPs, detection of attack sources using information provided by telecommunication service providers, and government operations against attack sources. It also includes the strengthening of the government’s organizational structure, including the restructuring of NISC and a significant increase in government staff for cyber. The implementation of the strategy, including the introduction of legislation, is currently underway. Furthermore, the position of minister of state for economic security was established in the cabinet in October 2021, and the Economic Security Promotion Act was passed in May 2022. In May 2024, a new regulation based on the act came into effect to ensure the safety and reliability of essential infrastructure. In the same month, a bill on a new security clearance system was passed. This will include cybersecurity information in the protected information and greatly expand the scope of clearance to the nondefense private sector. These developments will have a positive impact on further enhancing the nation’s cybersecurity.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Japan’s cybersecurity is now at a pivotal point. Most recently, the NSS of Japan, released in December 2022, outlined a strategy to fundamentally enhance the nation’s cybersecurity posture.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p><em>Organizational Structure</em></p> +<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p> -<p>Figure 2 provides an overview of the organizational structure of cybersecurity centered on the Japanese government. The Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters in the cabinet is the highest decisionmaking body for national cybersecurity. The headquarters comprises the chief cabinet secretary, the ministers related to cybersecurity, and external experts. The headquarters works closely with the National Security Council (NSC) in the cabinet. NISC serves as the secretariat for the headquarters and plays a coordinating role for government agencies involved in cybersecurity and critical infrastructure.</p> +<p><strong>Clara Bonin</strong> is a former intern for the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p>Daniel F. Runde, et al.Port infrastructure is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South.AI Safety Institute Network2024-10-30T12:00:00+08:002024-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ai-safety-institute-network<p><em>The AI Seoul Summit launched an international network of AI safety institutes in May 2024. Now, they must work to define their goals, mechanisms, and the strategy to accelerate AI safety science.</em></p> -<p>The NPA is a law enforcement agency responsible for investigating cybercrimes. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is responsible for cybersecurity in the field of national defense, and the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) is in charge of cyber defense for its own organization, including MOD. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) is responsible for cybersecurity policy related to information and communications networks. It also serves as a regulatory body for the communications industry. The National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), which is under the jurisdiction of MIC, conducts research and development (R&amp;D) for cybersecurity in the information and communications technology (ICT) field. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) develops cybersecurity policies for private companies across a range of industries. The Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), which is under the jurisdiction of METI, maintains a national certification system of information security and conducts studies and research in the field to support the national information technology strategy from a technical and human resources perspective. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is responsible for managing diplomatic relations in the cyber domain. The Digital Agency is a relatively new agency, established in September 2021 to promote the digitalization of national and local government. It is also involved in cybersecurity from the perspective of DX. Moreover, as in the United States, critical infrastructure sectors are overseen by designated government agencies. Further details can be found in Chapter 4.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The Japanese government’s cybersecurity-related budget for FY 2024 is ¥212.86 billion, with approximately ¥152 billion allocated to MOD and the remainder distributed among non-MOD agencies. This represents an increase of approximately 54 percent from the FY 2023 initial budget. It should be noted that the cybersecurity-related budgets released by governments cannot be directly compared due to differences in the definition and scope of cybersecurity. While the exact number of NISC employees is not made public, as of FY 2023, it is made up of approximately 100 government officials and employees with specialized expertise from the private sector. Additionally, NISC plans to double the number of staff in FY 2024. Further expansion is anticipated in the coming years through organizational restructuring based on the NSS of Japan.</p> +<h3 id="overview">OVERVIEW</h3> -<p>While it is not easy to precisely map out the roles and responsibilities of cybersecurity-related government agencies in the United States and Japan, a rough relationship may be expressed as in Figure 3. Please note that this simplified mapping does not necessarily define a complete and exhaustive relationship between the two.</p> +<p>On November 21 and 22, 2024, technical artificial intelligence (AI) experts from nine countries and the European Union will meet for the first time in San Francisco. The agenda: starting the next phase of international cooperation on AI safety science through a network of AI safety institutes (AISIs). The United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Canada, France, Kenya, and Australia make up the initial members of the network, which was first launched by U.S. secretary of commerce Gina Raimondo at the May 2024 AI Seoul Summit. At the time of the launch, Italy and Germany were also potential members of the network, as signatories to the Seoul Statement of Intent toward International Cooperation on AI Safety Science, or Seoul Statement, the network’s founding document. However, a September announcement by Raimondo and U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken confirmed that Kenya would instead be the final member of the AISI International Network at this stage.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eC5noNH.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Cybersecurity Organizational Structure Centered on the Japanese Government.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis; and <a href="https://www.nisc.go.jp/pdf/policy/kihon-s/cs-senryaku2021-gaiyou-en.pdf">National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), Japan’s Cybersecurity Strategy 2021 (overview) (Tokyo: NISC, September 28, 2021), 8</a>.</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">On November 21 and 22, 2024, technical artificial intelligence (AI) experts from nine countries and the European Union will meet for the first time in San Francisco. The agenda: starting the next phase of international cooperation on AI safety science through a network of AI safety institutes (AISIs).</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/POENk7X.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Mapping of Cybersecurity-Related Government Agencies in Japan and the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> +<p>According to the Seoul Statement, the international network will serve to “accelerate the advancement of the science of AI safety” at a global level by promoting “complementarity and interoperability” between institutes and fostering a “common international understanding” of AI safety approaches. While the statement does not define specific goals or mechanisms for AISI collaboration, it suggests that they “may include” coordinating research, sharing resources and relevant information, developing best practices, and exchanging or codeveloping AI model evaluations. Now, in the months following the AI Seoul Summit, AISI network members must begin to articulate the objectives, deliverables, timelines, and avenues for cooperation that will put the promise of AISI cooperation into action.</p> -<p><em>Current State</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the months following the AI Seoul Summit, AISI network members must begin to articulate the objectives, deliverables, timelines, and avenues for cooperation that will put the promise of AISI cooperation into action.</code></em></strong></p> -<ul> - <li>Defense</li> -</ul> +<p>This paper examines next steps for developing the International Network of AI Safety Institutes from the Seoul Statement. It provides recommendations to members ahead of the inaugural network meeting in San Francisco this November and the AI Action Summit in Paris in February 2025. These recommendations fall in line with three key questions:</p> -<p>As highlighted in the NSS of Japan, Japan’s national cyber defense is undergoing a significant transformation. To date, the scope of JSDF defenses has been limited primarily to MOD and JSDF network systems, but the strategy will expand this to include critical infrastructure. Japan’s ACD, a key focus of the strategy, also includes relatively offensive-leaning cyber operations, such as “to penetrate and neutralize attacker’s servers.” While the strategy is still in the process of implementation, it is anticipated that JSDF, NPA, or equivalent organizations will play a key role in conducting such operations. To enable the government to fulfill this role, it is essential to expand and strengthen the government’s cyber staff. JSDF has already initiated this process in advance of the strategy. As of the end of FY 2022, the number of cyber professionals was approximately 890. The goal is to increase this number to 4,000 by the end of FY 2027. In addition, the number of operators for cyber-related systems in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces is planned to be expanded to 20,000. To support this plan, the educational system of the JSDF is being enhanced, including through the reorganization of Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Signal School into the System &amp; Signal/Cyber School with a new cyber department, introduction of a cyber course at the JGSDF High Technical School, and establishment of a cyber specialized department at the National Defense Academy. Additionally, a new system for hiring private-sector professionals for a limited period has been implemented. Furthermore, Japan has been engaged in the activities of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) since 2019 and has participated in the cyber defense exercises (Locked Shields) hosted by the CCDCOE. Japan is expanding its international cooperation in cyber defense operations.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Goals of collaboration: What is the AISI network trying to achieve and when?</strong></p> -<ul> - <li>Intelligence</li> -</ul> + <p>While there are many potential benefits to international collaboration, there are also real costs that should not be ignored. At a minimum, collaboration demands staff time, capacity, and possibly money from partners. The AISI network should therefore have clear goals for which type of international cooperation between safety institutes offers the maximum return on investment. These goals should be supported by specific priorities, deliverables, and timelines that steer the network’s efforts toward a meaningful return on investment.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Mechanisms of collaboration: What will the AISI network do and how will it work?</strong></p> -<p>The Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO) is an intelligence agency directly under the Prime Minister’s Office responsible for collecting, consolidating, and analyzing information on important cabinet policies. The government intelligence community includes the CIRO, MOD, NPA, MOFA, and the Public Security Intelligence Agency, which work closely together in intelligence collection and analysis.</p> + <p>The success of the network depends on how effectively its members can act upon shared goals. There are many different ways for the members to “collaborate,” and not all of them are equally attractive. Network members should consider what the mechanisms of collaboration will be — for example, leadership structures, research exchanges, shared platforms, and annual conferences.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>International strategy: How will the AISI network fit into and engage with other international AI efforts?</strong></p> -<p>Japan operates a security clearance system based on the Specially Designated Secrets Act, which designates the four fields (defense, diplomacy, reconnaissance, and terrorism) as classified national security information. The current system has subjected primarily government officials and a smaller number of private-sector employees engaged in defense fields to eligibility screening. A new security clearance legislation, passed in May 2024, significantly expands the scope of the existing system. The new system will expand the scope of information to be protected to a wider range of economic security information, including cybersecurity. It will also greatly expand the scope of eligibility screening to the private sector. The government is currently developing detailed operational rules for implementation in 2025. The new system will also have a significant impact on the cybersecurity field, further promoting classified information sharing with like-minded countries and stricter management of it.</p> + <p>The AI governance landscape is increasingly crowded with international initiatives, including from the Group of Seven (G7), the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and more. All of these demand time from a small (though growing) community of government staff from member countries who can credibly claim to have some expertise on AI governance and safety issues. AISI network members should be able to articulate how their grouping is different from these preexisting initiatives, how it will effectively engage with them (or not), and for what purpose.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<ul> - <li>Law Enforcement</li> -</ul> +<p>This paper begins with background on the AISI network and explains its importance. Next, it offers an overview of network members’ organizations and stated functions. It concludes with recommendations regarding nine further questions for developing the goals, collaboration mechanisms, and international strategy of the network.</p> -<p>In April 2022, NPA established the Cyber Affairs Bureau to streamline and reinforce cybersecurity roles and responsibilities distributed across various sections within the organization. The new bureau is responsible for developing and implementing cyber policies within NPA in a centralized manner. In addition, the National Cyber Unit was established as a centralized national investigative agency to address cyber cases that have a significant impact, are highly technical, and involve international criminal groups. It also serves as a central point of contact for international law enforcement agencies. In line with these developments, the number of public attributions has been increasing in recent years. These are conducted solely by Japan and in cooperation with like-minded countries, including the United States. Furthermore, Japan has conducted disruptive operations against cybercrime infrastructure in coordination with international law enforcement agencies, including the United States. NPA played an important role in providing technical expertise in the international coordinated operation against LockBit, one of the world’s largest ransomware groups, in February 2024. It developed and provided ransomware decryption tools, which were used by over 6 million victims.</p> +<h3 id="background">BACKGROUND</h3> -<p>Furthermore, the Japan Cybercrime Control Center (JC3), a nonprofit PPP, facilitates the sharing and analysis of threat and crime information among industry, academia, and law enforcement entities to identify and reduce risks related to cybercrime. In addition to NPA, major companies across sectors participate in the center and collaborate closely under confidentiality agreements. The organization also collaborates with the National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance of the United States.</p> +<h4 id="what-is-ai-safety-and-why-does-it-matter">What Is AI Safety and Why Does It Matter?</h4> -<ul> - <li>Diplomacy</li> -</ul> +<p>As defined by the Bletchley Declaration, issued by attendees of the UK AI Safety Summit in November 2023, AI safety is a scientific field of research focused on evaluating, preventing, and mitigating risks from advanced AI systems. In this case, it refers narrowly to AI systems at or beyond the current state of the art. These risks can range from deepfakes to the use of AI for bioterrorism; new risks will emerge as AI’s capabilities continue to evolve. Somewhat confusingly, other individuals and organizations may define AI safety more broadly to include lower-performing systems that are not operating at the technical frontier. Still others may or may not include issues around ethics and bias when using the term “AI safety.” This paper’s use of the term “AI safety” follows the U.S. AI Safety Institute’s example of focusing exclusively on safety issues related to advanced AI systems.</p> -<p>MOFA’s approach to cyber diplomacy is based on three pillars: the promotion of the rule of law in cyberspace, the promotion of confidence-building measures, and capacity-building support. Japan, along with the United States and other like-minded countries, takes the position that conventional international law applies in cyberspace. It is actively engaged in international discussions through participation in government expert meetings at the United Nations, among other venues. Additionally, as the first Asian member of the Convention on Cybercrime, Japan is actively engaged in discussions to expand the number of signatory countries to this convention.</p> +<p>AI safety science can be split into two main streams of research: technical safety, or improving the internal “machinery” of AI models; and process-based safety, or improving how people build, develop, and interact with AI models.</p> -<p>The Japanese government has been conducting intergovernmental cyber dialogues with countries and regions, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and ASEAN. On capacity building, MOFA has coordinated initiatives to provide cooperation and support in a number of key areas, including awareness-raising, critical infrastructure protection, incident response, and cybercrime countermeasures, with a particular focus on ASEAN. Furthermore, MOFA has long had the post of ambassador for cyber policy, which oversees consultations with foreign governments and the government-wide cyber foreign policy. For further information on existing Japan-U.S. cooperation in this area, please refer to Chapter 3.</p> +<p>Technical AI safety focuses on understanding how the engineering and science behind AI models works, and how to make models perform reliably and in the scope of their intended use cases. These three areas of research are known as:</p> <ul> - <li>Government System Protection</li> + <li> + <p><strong>Assurance:</strong> Understanding how a model makes decisions and why it behaves the way it does</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Robustness:</strong> Ensuring a model operates reliably under adverse contexts</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Specification:</strong> Designing a model that produces desired results as intended.</p> + </li> </ul> -<p>NISC, which leads the defense of government agencies, includes the Government Security Operation Coordination (GSOC) team. GSOC centrally monitors information collected from sensors installed in each agency 24/7. It also collects and analyzes data on cyberattacks and threats and shares that information with agencies to help improve the government’s overall response capabilities.</p> - -<p>The government has established the Common Standards for Cybersecurity Measures for Government Agencies and Related Agencies as a common framework to enhance the cybersecurity posture of government agencies. The standards are reviewed regularly, with the latest version released in July 2023. The document specifies a common baseline that all agencies must meet and additional optional measures to ensure a higher level of security. This allows risk-based measures to be implemented continuously in accordance with each agency’s specific situation. The latest version includes a new requirement for government contractors to implement measures in accordance with NIST SP 800-171 for managing cybersecurity risk in the supply chain.</p> +<p>Meanwhile, process-based safety is concerned with the policies, practices, and procedures that surround AI. This stream of AI safety is more operational in nature. It focuses on how frontier AI developers, deployers, and users build, manage, and monitor AI models, including by evaluating models for capabilities, limitations, and risks, and documenting and reporting model information. It may also include processes that are implemented by the users of AI.</p> -<p>While each agency has had a CISO for many years, starting in FY 2016, a deputy director general for cybersecurity and information technology has been assigned to each organization as a full-time position to assist the CISO. The agencies are coordinated with one another through interagency CISO meetings.</p> +<p>Beyond preventing adverse risks, AI safety serves to accelerate adoption and innovation by building public trust. As Elizabeth Kelly, director of the U.S. AI Safety Institute, said in a CSIS interview, “safety promotes trust, which promotes adoption, which drives innovation.” AI safety boosts public trust by allowing people to pause, stop, or change course as needed.</p> -<ul> - <li>Critical Infrastructure Protection</li> -</ul> +<p>A helpful analogy, one frequently used in the risk management sector, compares AI safety capabilities with the brakes on a car. At first consideration, the purpose of brakes seems obvious and narrow: to make the car go slower. However, the existence of brakes also allows cars to go faster. As a thought experiment, imagine how fast drivers would be willing to go if no car came equipped with any brakes. How easy would it be to avoid a crash or turn a corner if drivers could never change their speed? How might one pause to change tires or fix a problem? Navigating such scenarios would almost certainly be a disaster. Even with speed limit regulations in place, a world without brakes would be a world in which drivers went much, much slower.</p> -<p>There are similarities in the organizational framework for critical infrastructure protection in Japan and the United States. The basic policy and framework are defined in the Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CPCIP), which is approved by the Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters and published by NISC. The initial version was released in 2005, and subsequent regular updates have led to the most recent edition, released in March 2024. The latest version added the ports and harbors industry as a new 15th critical infrastructure sector in response to the cyberattack on the Port of Nagoya in 2023. NISC, as the national coordinator, is responsible for critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience across the nation. In line with the NSS of Japan, NISC plans to double its staff in FY 2024, strengthening its structure in preparation for future restructuring into a new national cybersecurity agency. Five government agencies have been designated responsible organizations for overseeing respective industries and managing and mitigating risks specific to their sectors.</p> +<p>Policymakers should approach AI safety with this parallel in mind. Like the brakes of a car, building technical and management capabilities for AI can help boost confidence in the technology and ultimately accelerate the pace of adoption and innovation.</p> -<p>In Japan, as in other countries, the majority of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. It is, therefore, essential to foster PPPs to enhance the nation’s collective cyber defense capabilities. In general, critical infrastructure owners and operators share information directly with the agencies responsible for the sector as well as with NISC. There is also an organization called Capability for Engineering of Protection, Technical Operation, Analysis and Response (CEPTOAR), which represents each sector and subsector. Major sectors, such as ICT, finance, power, and transportation, have ISACs in place to facilitate technical and operational cooperation within their respective sector. NISC leads an annual cross-sector exercise program to enhance collective response capabilities across sectors. Most recently, in April 2019, the Cybersecurity Council was established with the cross-sector participation of government agencies and selected private companies related to critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. The objective of this council is to facilitate rapid information sharing and analysis between the public and private sectors.</p> +<h4 id="what-are-ai-safety-institutes-and-what-will-they-do">What Are AI Safety Institutes and What Will They Do?</h4> -<p>In May 2024, a new regulation was initiated based on the Economic Security Promotion Act. This requires the government to conduct a prior review of the installation and outsourced operation of critical facilities of designated essential infrastructure owners and operators. The objective is to ensure the safety and reliability of critical infrastructure services against threats posed by foreign adversaries. Currently, there is no law similar to CIRCIA mandating incident reporting across all sectors. However, the potential advantages of implementing such a measure are being discussed at a panel of experts hosted by the Japanese government. In addition, sector-specific reporting requirements are currently in place as regulations and other means. Further details on critical infrastructure protection can be found in Chapter 4.</p> +<p>Since 2023, governments around the world have mobilized around AI’s rapidly growing capabilities and potential risks. As part of this effort, several governments have launched AI safety institutes, publicly funded research institutions focused on mitigating risks from the frontier of AI development. AISIs provide governments with in-house technical expertise and organizational capacity to evaluate and monitor cutting-edge AI models for risks to public and national security.</p> -<ul> - <li>SMBs’ Protection</li> -</ul> +<p>AISIs have been tasked by governments with a wide-ranging mandate to address the complex challenges posed by advanced AI systems. They will perform foundational technical research, develop guidance for the public and private sectors, and work closely with companies to test models before deployment. While it is unusual for a single government entity to tackle all three of these functions at once, the breakneck speed of AI development and the staggering number of open questions in the field of AI safety research mean that governments require in-house capacity on each of them. According to Kelly, it is important that these three functions — research, testing, and guidance — reinforce each other to form a “virtuous” cycle (Figure 1):</p> -<p>Cybersecurity for SMBs is a major concern in Japan as well. METI and IPA have been leading initiatives in this area. IPA has established a website to provide SMBs with a centralized access point for resources, tools, and services of information security. In addition, it has published guidelines for SMBs, outlining the actions that both senior management and operational managers should take from their respective perspectives. It also introduced a comprehensive support package for SMBs at a low cost, offering a range of services, including consultation, anomaly monitoring, emergency response support, cyber insurance, and more. In addition, a self-declaration program has been implemented, enabling organizations to self-declare their cybersecurity actions taken according to their maturity level. This is also used as a prerequisite for applying for the government’s IT subsidy program.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/U1n4i1Y.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: AISI Core Functions.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-vision-ai-safety-conversation-elizabeth-kelly-director-us-ai-safety-institute">“The U.S. Vision for AI Safety: A Conversation with Elizabeth Kelly, Director of the U.S. AI Safety Institute,” CSIS, July 31, 2024</a>; and <a href="https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2024/05/21/AISI-vision-21May2024.pdf">“The United States Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute: Vision, Mission, and Strategic Goals,” U.S. Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute, May 21, 2024</a>.</em></p> -<p>Furthermore, in November 2020, the Supply-Chain Cybersecurity Consortium (SC3) was established as an industry-led initiative to promote cybersecurity measures for the entire supply chain, including SMBs, with the industry stakeholders working together. Cybersecurity for SMBs is a key area of focus discussed in a working group of the consortium.</p> +<p>To keep pace with the cutting edge of AI safety research, AISIs have prioritized the hiring of technical staff and opened offices in cities with deep pools of AI talent like San Francisco. In addition to developing expertise internally, AISIs aim to cultivate a robust ecosystem of AI safety researchers in labs, industry, and academia through their guidance on best-in-class evaluation methods.</p> -<ul> - <li>Consumers and the General Public</li> -</ul> +<p>AISIs are engaging a wide range of stakeholders on each of their core functions. Far from fearing the launch of AISIs worldwide, firms and universities engaged in advanced AI have called for governments to increase their capacity to perform AI research, conduct testing, and issue guidance. Earlier this year, top U.S. AI companies such as Google, Microsoft, Anthropic, and Amazon joined the U.S. AISI Consortium (AISIC) as part of its inaugural cohort of members. AISIC is composed of over 200 organizations from across the private sector, academia, civil society, and government and facilitates collaboration on AI safety research and evaluations. Members are expected to contribute to one of nine key areas of guidance, reproduced verbatim below:</p> -<p>NISC is leading awareness-raising initiatives in cooperation with other government agencies. Since 2010, February has been designated as Cybersecurity Month, with the objective of promoting public awareness and understanding of cybersecurity. NISC has created a dedicated website for public awareness, which provides a centralized set of resources. These include a handbook for safe and secure use of the internet, FAQs on cybersecurity-related laws and regulations, and educational video content.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Develop new guidelines, tools, methods, protocols, and best practices to facilitate the evolution of industry standards for developing or deploying AI in safe, secure, and trustworthy ways</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Develop guidance and benchmarks for identifying and evaluating AI capabilities, with a focus on capabilities that could potentially cause harm</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Develop approaches to incorporate secure-development practices for generative AI, including special considerations for dual-use foundation models, including:</p> + </li> +</ol> <ul> - <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> + <li> + <p>Guidance related to assessing and managing the safety, security, and trustworthiness of models and related to privacy-preserving machine learning</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Guidance to ensure the availability of testing environments</p> + </li> </ul> -<p>Japan has a long history of implementing robust IoT security measures. In 2019, the government-led NOTICE project, which scans IoT devices connected to the internet in Japan to identify vulnerable devices and report them to users for remediation, launched in cooperation with the private sector. In addition, in 2020, the technical standard for devices connected to the internet was revised to mandate minimum security requirements for devices. Security measures are being implemented for both devices before introduction to the market and those already deployed. Most recently, METI has led discussions to introduce an IoT-labeling scheme similar to that in the United States. The program is expected to be partially launched during FY 2024. A working group will be established between the governments of the United States and Japan to develop an action plan for the mutual recognition of schemes.</p> - -<p>Secure by design and secure by default is also a key theme in Japan. The Japanese government is a cosignatory to the joint guidance on secure by design issued in October 2023 by international partners, including CISA. In the area of SBOM, METI has developed guidance on SBOM implementation based on the results of a multiyear testing project. MIC is also studying the use of SBOM in the communications sector, conducting a pilot project to install SBOM in selected facilities of communications carriers to evaluate its effectiveness and identify any issues that may arise.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Develop and ensure the availability of testing environments</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Develop guidance, methods, skills, and practices for successful red-teaming and privacy-preserving machine learning</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Develop guidance and tools for authenticating digital content</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Develop guidance and criteria for AI workforce skills, including risk identification and management; test, evaluation, validation, and verification (TEVV); and domain-specific expertise</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Explore the complexities at the intersection of society and technology, including the science of how humans make sense of and engage with AI in different contexts</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Develop guidance for understanding and managing the interdependencies between and among AI actors along the lifecycle.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>Regarding AI, the Hiroshima AI Process, a Group of Seven (G7)-led initiative to develop international rules for the use of AI, was launched at the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023. Japan, as the chairing country, led the discussion. In December 2023, the Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework, Hiroshima Process International Guiding Principles for All AI Actors, and Hiroshima Process International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems were developed as deliverables of the Hiroshima AI Process. Within the government, there is a growing focus on the use of AI with safety and security. In February 2024, the Japan AI Safety Institute (AISI) was established. In April 2024, the AI Guidelines for Business was published, consolidating AI-related guidance previously dispersed across multiple agencies. The Japan AISI and NIST have completed a mapping of the AI Guidelines for Business and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework to ensure consistency with international discussions and to promote interoperability of AI policy frameworks between the United States and Japan.</p> +<p>Note that while these nine areas of guidance overlap with the nine core functions of an AI safety institute identified in Section 4 of this paper, they do not cover the full breadth of AISIs’ operations. As Section 4 will discuss, AISIs perform functions such as forming consortia of AI researchers, stakeholders, and experts and promoting the international adoption of AI safety guidelines that are outside the scope of the AISIC.</p> -<ul> - <li>Workforce</li> -</ul> +<p>In August, OpenAI chief executive officer Sam Altman stated that his company has been working closely with the U.S. AISI on an agreement to provide early access to its next foundation model for safety testing and evaluations. OpenAI is not alone in providing the U.S. AISI access to its models for testing. Director Kelly said that the institute has “commitments from all of the leading frontier model developers to work with them on these tests.” These commitments demonstrate that leading companies understand the need for AI safety research and recognize the important role that the U.S. AISI has to play. While critics have questioned how industry will balance competition and safety, AISIs are free from the financial self-interest which has caused some to question the adequacy of private AI safety efforts in the past.</p> -<p>The 2021 national Cybersecurity Strategy highlights the need for a more robust cybersecurity workforce in terms of both quality and quantity through cooperation between the public and private sectors. This is one of the cross-cutting measures in the strategy to secure and train human resources. Cybersecurity-related agencies are implementing specific measures. For instance, MIC/NICT has operated the National Cyber Training Center since 2017. The center offers a range of training programs, including hands-on practical exercises for government agencies, local governments, and critical infrastructure owners and operators, as well as technical R&amp;D programs to train young people and practical defense exercises intended for national events such as the Olympics and World Expo. In 2017, METI and IPA established the Industrial Cyber Security Center of Excellence, which offers a one-year program to train IT and operational technology professionals with technology, management, and business perspectives. The lecturers are world-leading experts in control system security.</p> +<p>On October 21, top AI developers including Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, and OpenAI signed a letter to Congress calling on lawmakers to authorize the U.S. AISI before the end of the year. The letter, which was led by Americans for Responsible Innovation and the Information Technology Industry Council (ITI), states that “[a]s other nations around the world are establishing their own AI Safety Institutes, furthering NIST’s ongoing efforts is essential to advancing U.S. AI innovation, leadership, and national security.” “Authorizing legislation, and the accompanying necessary resources,” it argues, “will give much needed certainty to NIST’s role in AI safety and reliability.”</p> -<p>Regarding industry-led initiatives, a cross-industry cybersecurity study group has been active since 2015, with participation from companies in the critical infrastructure sectors. It has been engaged in discussions on how to strengthen the human resources ecosystem through collaboration between industry, academia, and government. The group has developed a reference defining human resources that aligns with NIST SP800-181, while taking into account the organizational structure and business practices of Japanese companies.</p> +<p>The letter echoes similar calls for Congress to authorize the AISI by Scale AI Founder and CEO Alexandr Wang earlier in October, as well as a letter from top AI companies to establish the AISI on a statutory basis in July. The July letter, also published by Americans for Responsible Innovation and ITI, argues that authorizing the AISI “provides a venue to convene the leading experts across industry and government to contribute to the development of voluntary standards that ultimately assist in de-risking adoption of AI technologies.” It’s not just the biggest companies that stand to benefit from the U.S. AISI — crucially, the letter argued that the institute may level the playing field for enterprises that use or develop AI but are unable to perform robust testing and evaluation in-house due to their size or the technical ability of their staff.</p> -<h3 id="current-status-of-japan-us-cooperation">Current Status of Japan-U.S. Cooperation</h3> +<p>While the concept of a government organization that works closely with AI companies on safety is still new, history shows that this kind of arrangement between government and industry can be highly successful. One good example is the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), a U.S. federal agency that performs safety tests of new motor vehicle models for manufacturers. Established in the 1970s to reduce accidents and deaths by encouraging manufacturers to produce safer vehicles, NHTSA led what has become today an industry standard of crash testing and rating vehicles out of five stars according to their safety. Some 50 years since its launch, NHTSA continues to perform crash tests and produce star ratings, as well as issue government safety ratings, safety information, and best practices.</p> -<h4 id="japan-as-a-trusted-partner">Japan as a Trusted Partner</h4> +<p>NHTSA is a useful model of a third-party government arbiter that has produced substantial win-win results for the public and for companies. The administration’s rating system lowers costs to consumers by supplying accurate, reliable, and simple safety information for free. Meanwhile, companies are incentivized to adopt new and better safety measures into their vehicles. As NHTSA’s acting administrator has stated, “[o]ur 5-Star Safety Ratings system continues to give Americans the information they need to choose the vehicle that’s right for them. The program also encourages vehicle manufacturers to incorporate advanced vehicle safety technologies into more makes and models, ultimately reducing injuries and deaths on America’s roads.” Because safety is a selling point for customers, most of the United States’ manufacturers willingly sign up for the NHTSA’s 5-star system and use the results in advertising new vehicle models.</p> -<p>The United States is an important ally of Japan, and both countries have had a long-standing alliance built on mutual trust and cooperation for many years. While the alliance covers a wide range of areas, including national and economic security, many of today’s cooperative activities rely on cyberspace as their foundation. For instance, the digital infrastructure that serves as the foundation for intelligence and information sharing; Japan’s critical infrastructure, which U.S. military bases in Japan depend on; the supply chain that broadly covers both countries, including the defense industry; and the international business environment are all closely related to cyberspace. It is, therefore, essential to ensure the security and resilience of cyberspace if the two countries are to facilitate effective cooperation.</p> +<p>As AISIs mature organizationally, they could fulfill a similar arbiter role for AI models as the NHTSA has for motor vehicles. As has been the case with motor vehicles, testing AI models could lead to innovation in which safety is a key competitive feature. AI companies could communicate to customers that their model has passed AISI testing and evaluations, which could in turn help to build public trust and make AI models with higher safety standards more commercially competitive among consumers. Top frontier AI developers’ willingness to work with the U.S. AISI on testing their models before deployment is a good first step to making safety a key feature of AI industry standards, as the NHTSA has done with the U.S. motor vehicle industry over the last 50 years.</p> -<p>The recent rise in geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and the increasing cyber threats posed by state-sponsored actors make Japan’s position in cybersecurity increasingly important. It is also important to note that a robust cybersecurity partnership between the United States and Japan, like-minded countries that share the common values of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, serves as deterrence against these foreign adversaries.</p> +<h4 id="timeline-of-ai-safety-institutes">Timeline of AI Safety Institutes</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The recent rise in geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and the increasing cyber threats posed by state-sponsored actors make Japan’s position in cybersecurity increasingly important.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The first AISIs were announced last year, with the United States and United Kingdom launching initiatives at the UK AI Safety Summit in November 2023. Japan, Singapore, and the European Union’s EU AI Office followed in early 2024. Since then, Canada and South Korea have revealed plans for their own AISIs. The inclusion of France, Kenya, and Australia in the AISI network suggests that more institutes are still to come. For instance, in May French research institutions Laboratoire National de Métrologie et d’Essais (LNE) and National Institute for Research in Digital Science and Technology (Inria) announced a partnership to set up an “AI Evaluation” program that will advance research and the development of testing and evaluation methods for general-purpose AI models at the national level. While this program has not yet been named as an official AI safety institute for France, an announcement may take place at the AI Action Summit in France in February 2025, similar to the announcement made by South Korea at the AI Seoul Summit in May.</p> -<p>There are multiple public reports that assess Japan’s national cybersecurity capabilities, and each has a different methodology for its assessment. It is, therefore, important to have an in-depth understanding of the assessment methodologies when citing these reports. The author views Japan’s national cybersecurity capabilities as being on par with those of other like-minded countries. For example, the National Cyber Power Index 2022 assesses countries based on a range of indicators, including malicious activities such as external destructive attacks, reconnaissance, and financial crimes. Japan, with a low score in such indicators, is ranked 16th among all 30 countries. The report’s overall evaluation is based on two major elements: the cyber capabilities of a nation and its intentions to exercise those capabilities, including misuse. Japan is categorized as a nation with high capabilities and low intentions. In particular, Japan’s capabilities in the area of commercial cybersecurity technology and R&amp;D, which is one of the evaluation indicators, are rated highly. Similarly, in Cyber Capabilities and National Power, Japan is not ranked in the top category, but it is still evaluated as “a world leader in cyberspace technologies.” This indicates that cybersecurity technology and capabilities in the private sector are highly regarded. A security firm’s survey found that only 32 percent of organizations in Japan paid a ransom in 2023 after being infected with ransomware. The average rate across 15 countries, including the United States and Japan, was 54 percent, with the United States at 77 percent. The report indicates that Japan’s relatively low rate may be due to the nature of Japan as a disaster-prone country and the implementation of advanced backup measures to mitigate such risks. This could be another example of the advanced technological capabilities of Japanese companies, with their thorough preparedness in normal times and ability to quickly respond to and recover from incidents.</p> +<p>The AISI International Network marks a logical next step in a series of recent bilateral agreements between institutes. In April 2024, the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Kingdom for close collaboration between institutes and established a dialogue with the EU AI Office to jointly develop evaluation tools for AI models. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, for its part, has established additional partnerships with Canada and France on AI safety, and the European Union and Japan have indicated future cooperation between safety institutes in the coming months.</p> -<p>Furthermore, Japan has achieved remarkable success in cyber operations, with no significant incidents during national events that can often be attractive targets for global attackers. These include the Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympics and Paralympic Games, the 2019 Rugby World Cup, the 2019 G20 Summit, and the 2023 G7 Summit. In particular, more than 450 million attack events were observed during the Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympics, which was more than twice the number observed during the London 2012 Summer Olympics, but through the implementation of appropriate measures, the games were able to conclude without any major incidents. This success was made possible by the significant contribution of Japanese companies with advanced technological capabilities as well as the close PPPs. Furthermore, in January 2023, NTT, a major Japanese telecommunications operator, became the first Asian member of JCDC in the United States. This could be further evidence of the high level of capability and international credibility of Japanese companies.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XvdrSKG.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Timeline of Major Events in AI Safety Since 2019.</strong></em></p> -<p>The NSS of Japan demonstrates the government’s strong intention to fundamentally enhance national cybersecurity capabilities with sufficient authorities and resources. This is not only a strategic goal for Japan but also a strong commitment to the international community, especially like-minded countries. The implementation of this strategy is expected to facilitate robust and operational public-private bidirectional cooperation by further enhancing government capabilities and deepening the engagement of the private sector for national cybersecurity. This nationwide evolution will significantly enhance Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation.</p> +<h3 id="why-the-aisi-international-network-matters">WHY THE AISI INTERNATIONAL NETWORK MATTERS</h3> -<h4 id="existing-framework">Existing Framework</h4> +<p>The AISI International Network is important for several reasons:</p> -<p>Cybersecurity has been identified as a key area of cooperation for the Japan-U.S. alliance. At the summit level, cybersecurity cooperation is regarded as a foundation for expanding and deepening security and defense cooperation. The joint statement issued in April 2024 highlighted the two countries’ commitment to strengthening cooperation in the areas of information and cybersecurity, as well as critical infrastructure protection. The U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership, a collaborative framework between the two countries agreed at the Japan-U.S. Summit in April 2021, identifies cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience as key areas of cooperation, along with the digital economy and economic security. Similarly, at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) held in July 2024, the two countries reaffirmed “the foundational importance of cyber and information security for the Alliance,” as well as “the importance of enhancing the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure.”</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>The network provides a much-needed venue for building international consensus on definitions, procedures, and best practices around AI safety.</strong> The science of evaluating AI models is a nascent yet vital field of research that underpins global efforts to develop safe and responsible AI. Currently, these efforts are limited by a lack of consensus on key definitions (for instance, what constitutes a “frontier” AI model or a “secure” system) and on the steps involved in testing, evaluation, and monitoring procedures.</p> -<p>There are several government-wide bilateral dialogue frameworks in place. The Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue has been in place since 2013, with Japan’s MOFA and the U.S. DOS leading discussions on a wide range of topics, including situational awareness, cyber policy, cooperation in international fora, and capacity building. These discussions are attended by representatives from multiple government agencies with cybersecurity responsibilities from both countries. The U.S.-Japan Dialogue on the Digital Economy, formerly the U.S.-Japan Policy Cooperation Dialogue on the Internet Economy, has been held on a regular basis since 2010. The dialogue addresses a wide range of policy issues related to the digital economy, including cybersecurity. The dialogue, led by MIC and the DOS, is composed of two parts: an intergovernmental meeting and a public-private meeting. This meeting is also designed to serve as a framework to promote the CoRe Partnership. Furthermore, the U.S.-Japan Cyber Defense Policy Working Group, an intergovernmental cyber dialogue focused on defense policy, has been held since 2014 between MOD and the DOD. Other interagency dialogues and cooperative efforts are also underway, such as the memorandum of cooperation on cybersecurity signed between DHS and METI in January 2023.</p> + <p>International consensus would increase regulatory interoperability, or the degree to which different domestic regulatory systems can smoothly interface and interact. Interoperability allows for the even implementation of international AI governance efforts. One such effort is the G7 Hiroshima AI Process Code of Conduct, which calls for “robust” and “trustworthy” AI systems but lacks technical definitions of the terms. Shared definitions would help create a common measuring stick by which regulators gauge these characteristics. Countries could choose policy options along such a ruler based on their risk tolerance for given AI applications. In this example, governments would require different levels of robustness and trustworthiness along the same underlying scale, as is the case for safety in the automobile and aviation industries. A common understanding of AI safety concepts would help clarify the steps countries must take to honor the G7 code of conduct and other international commitments.</p> -<p>Regarding the multilateral framework, the Quad has established a cooperation agenda in cybersecurity, focusing on four key areas: critical infrastructure cybersecurity, supply chain risk management, software security, and human resource development and training. This is known as the Quad Cybersecurity Partnership: Joint Principles. The topics have been regularly discussed among senior government cyber officials through the Quad Senior Cyber Group. At the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Tokyo in July 2024, the four member countries announced the establishment of the Quad Cyber Ambassadors Meeting to discuss the cyber capacity-building projects in the Indo-Pacific region and responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Furthermore, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have been working together through the Trilateral Diplomacy Working Group for Foreign Ministry Cooperation on North Korea’s Cyber Threats since December 2023. The NCS of the United States also emphasizes the importance of international cooperation, leveraging frameworks such as the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. At the G7, it has been confirmed that the seven countries should pursue four key approaches through the Cyber Working Group: (1) “promoting responsible state behavior,” (2) “improving cybersecurity, including in the private sector,” (3) “developing and using tools to deter and respond to malicious (state) behavior” and disrupt the attacker’s infrastructure, and (4) “strengthening our partners’ cyber security capacity.” The group has also agreed to work on countering ransomware, developing critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience, mutual recognition of schemes for secure IoT devices, and secure by design. At the United Nations, both the United States and Japan have taken the position that existing international law applies to cyberspace and have engaged in discussions to reinforce cyber norms of responsible state behavior. In recent years, following Japan’s official membership in the NATO CCDCOE, there has been an increase in the level of cooperation between the United States and Japan in multilateral cyber exercises. At the NATO Summit in Washington, D.C., in July 2024, NATO and its Indo-Pacific partner countries, including Japan, confirmed their intention to enhance practical cooperation in four key areas, including cyber defense. In the White House-led CRI, Japan, as an original member, has also contributed to international initiatives to counter ransomware.</p> + <p>In this way, interoperability based on common definitions, procedures, and best practices can help to facilitate trade in the future. As a previous CSIS paper argued, fragmented legal frameworks that require company compliance with many different obligations can create technical barriers to the free flow of goods and services. Diverging regulatory approaches that require companies to demonstrate that a product is “safe” according to 10 different metrics from 10 different jurisdictions, for instance, is not only highly inefficient but often prohibitively costly. Instead, the AISI International Network could serve as one venue in which to develop a coherent language around AI safety, helping to lower future potential barriers to trade.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>International collaboration will help governments achieve economies of scale in AI safety research.</strong> Thus far, AISIs have cooperated on a bilateral basis, which, while useful, can limit the impact and scope of AI safety efforts. By sharing priorities, resources, and expertise through a multilateral configuration, the AISI International Network aims to be more than the sum of its parts. AISIs can contribute strategically to the goals of the network by coordinating roles and responsibilities, de-duplicating research and therefore saving time, capacity, and money.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>The network offers an opportunity to extend U.S. leadership in global AI governance.</strong> The United States has already demonstrated significant leadership in AI safety by being one of the first to launch its AISI in 2023 and by spearheading the AISI network initiative in 2024. It should maintain this leadership going forward with the view that the network will help shape global AI safety practices that will predominantly affect U.S. companies.</p> -<p>With regard to cooperation in industry, for example, ICT-ISAC Japan and Communications ISAC/IT-ISAC in the United States have been cooperating since 2016. The ISAC members have been exchanging threat information and best practices, as well as discussing operational collaboration, through regularly scheduled workshops. In 2019, a memorandum of cooperation was also signed between ICT-ISAC Japan and IT-ISAC to further strengthen cooperation. Furthermore, other collaborative efforts between ISACs in both countries are in place in key sectors such as finance and electricity.</p> + <p>This is important for not only setting safety norms at home, but also advocating for U.S. interests abroad. Consider, for instance, the EU AI Act: while the first wave of the act came into force on August 1, the requirements for developers of frontier AI models above 10^25 floating operation points (FLOPS) of compute power have yet to be defined. Rather, the EU AI Office — the European Union’s representation to the AISI International Network — is tasked with developing codes of practice for the developers of these models, almost all of which are S. companies.</p> -<p>While there are several policy cooperation initiatives between Japan and the United States at various levels and entities, there is still room for improvement in the actual implementation of these items. In recent years, there has been an increase in practical cooperation between both governments, including the release of joint guidance and advisories, law enforcement coordination, and capacity-building support in third countries. While this is a positive development, the number of such efforts would not necessarily be as large as that of the various cooperation agendas described above. There is still much to be done. To achieve deeper collaboration between the two countries, it is essential to operationalize and accelerate these agendas with greater involvement of the private sector.</p> + <p>According to Article 56 of the AI Act, the EU AI Office must develop codes of practice for frontier AI companies to identify, assess, manage, and report “systemic” risks by May 2, 2025. To meet this tight deadline, it may look to the work of the AISI International Network if it deems it sufficiently mature to draw upon. Having a seat at the same table as the EU AI Office is therefore a valuable opportunity to help develop safety norms that the European Union may apply to U.S. companies. Even if the European Union ultimately decides to develop its codes of practice alone, the network will still provide the United States with a direct line of communication to the EU AI Office for articulating AI safety best practices in the future.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To achieve deeper collaboration between the two countries, it is essential to operationalize and accelerate these agendas with greater involvement of the private sector.</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="overview-of-aisi-network-members">OVERVIEW OF AISI NETWORK MEMBERS</h3> -<h3 id="cooperation-on-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity-and-resilience">Cooperation on Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and Resilience</h3> +<p>It is still early days for AI safety institutes, both as organizations and as concepts. Members of the AISI International Network are highly varied in their organizational maturity, which can be expected given that most are only months old. Even the U.S. AISI, one of the most established institutes, was announced only in November 2023 and became operational in early 2024. Other AISIs, such as those of Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and the European Union, are still in the process of hiring and setting out the priorities of their institutes, according to public documents and conversations by CSIS with officials. Still other network members, like Kenya and Australia, have yet to clearly state whether their governments will even establish an AISI.</p> -<h4 id="global-challenges">Global Challenges</h4> +<p>Nevertheless, established AISIs report strong similarities in funding and staff size thus far. As Table 1 illustrates, the annual budgets of network members currently hover around $10 million, with some notable exceptions. First, the UK AISI is already an outlier with a budget of approximately £50 million ($65 million) per year, according to CSIS sources. Second, the United States’ fiscal year 2025 budget requests an increase of $47.7 million for investment into the U.S. AISI and the advancement of AI research, standards, and testing in line with President Biden’s October 2023 AI executive order, which, if approved, would greatly boost the average network budget. Finally, an announcement by the Canadian government in April pledges C$50 million (approximately US$36 million) for a Canadian AISI, though the funding period is unspecified.</p> -<p>This and subsequent chapters shift the focus of discussions to critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience, which is one of the priority areas for Japan-U.S. cooperation. In light of the growing threats to critical infrastructure, it has become increasingly important for nations to ensure the cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructure, which people and nations rely on every day. This is a universal challenge for governments worldwide, requiring cooperation with a wide range of domestic and international stakeholders.</p> +<p>Public statements and private conversations between CSIS and government officials reveal that staff sizes will also be comparable between institutes. More established AISIs currently employ approximately 20 to 30 staff, most of whom are technical experts. Private conversations with CSIS indicate that the EU AI Office’s AI safety unit, which will fulfill most of the same functions as an AISI (Table 2), will likely hold approximately 50 staff members.</p> -<p>The majority of infrastructure is owned and operated by private companies, and they are primarily responsible for protecting their own organizations. At the same time, the government plays a key role in empowering them through various means, including its own intelligence, law enforcement authorities, international coordination, policy tools (e.g., grants, incentives), and regulations, as infrastructure cybersecurity is a matter of national defense. Private companies also cooperate with the government in providing technical and operational expertise with their unique threat and risk information, as well as cybersecurity products and services. This is a shared responsibility among a diverse range of stakeholders.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IYd2imR.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Organizational Overview of AISI Network Members.</strong> Source: Public statements from AISI network members and relevant government officials and bodies.</em></p> -<p>Furthermore, international cooperation is also essential, given the global nature of cyberspace. The fundamental principle is, of course, that nations should cooperate to reinforce international cyber norms of responsible state behavior. However, in practice, this approach alone cannot address all issues. There are a number of other considerations that leave room for international cooperation, including infrastructure interdependencies, global supply chains, regulatory harmonization, and the resilience of like-minded countries as a whole. These are still developing areas of discussion. No country is yet perfect, and all are still developing through a process of trial and error. Given the global nature of these challenges, it is imperative that countries work together to address them.</p> +<p>AISI network members also intend to fulfill similar functions. Based on a document review of all public statements from AISIs and relevant government officials, this paper provides a list of the nine areas of AI safety in which institutes may operate (see Table 2). These functions are:</p> -<h4 id="opportunity-for-japan-us-alliance">Opportunity for Japan-U.S. Alliance</h4> - -<p>As previously stated, the Japan-U.S. alliance is founded on cyberspace, with critical infrastructure being a central element of this. For instance, there are interdependencies in critical infrastructure between the two countries. The failure of essential national functions, such as power, communications, and transportation, directly impacts information and intelligence sharing between the two countries, as well as the transportation of goods and personnel for defense. In addition, globally interconnected infrastructures such as the internet can rapidly propagate the effects of a failure in one country to others. Both countries have world-class internet service providers (ISPs), which account for approximately half of the world’s Tier 1 carriers. These companies have a significant impact on the global network infrastructure.</p> - -<p>Today, the United States and Japan are facing a common significant threat to their critical infrastructure. In January 2024, the heads of ONCD, CISA, the FBI, and USCYBERCOM testified at a hearing of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, warning of the threat posed by suspected Chinese-sponsored actors known as Volt Typhoon. The group has been targeting U.S. critical infrastructure, with a particular focus on the nation’s essential sectors, including communications, energy, transportation, and water. This is being done through tactics known as “living off the land,” where the attacker gains access to infrastructure and remains undetected for an extended period of time to pre-position itself to immediately trigger a destructive action in the event of an emergency. This is not only a threat to the United States but also to Japan, a U.S. ally in the Indo-Pacific region. This is an extremely deep-rooted problem, with such activities expected to continue for at least five years. Even the United States, which is at the center of the problem, has not yet been able to fully “uncover and eradicate” the threat. In light of this common threat posed by advanced state-sponsored actors, it is imperative that allied countries leverage their respective information and expertise to jointly analyze the threat and risk and develop countermeasures. It is also crucial to ensure that Japan and the United States can collectively respond to such activities in order to maintain the resilience of their alliance as a whole in the event of an attack.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is also crucial to ensure that Japan and the United States can collectively respond to such activities in order to maintain the resilience of their alliance as a whole in the event of an attack.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Both governments recognize the importance of Japan-U.S. cooperation in the field of critical infrastructure and have made it a high priority on the agendas of the Japan-U.S. Summit, bilateral cyber dialogue, and the Quad. However, both countries’ efforts tend to focus on domestic issues, and concrete and tangible operational collaboration between the two countries is not necessarily sufficient. As previously stated, Japan and the United States have recently been implementing more practical cooperation initiatives, but there is still a need for both countries to further expand these efforts and operationalize them with speed and scale while ensuring greater involvement of critical infrastructure owners and operators in both countries.</p> - -<h4 id="recent-developments">Recent Developments</h4> - -<p>This section outlines frameworks and efforts related to critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience in the United States and Japan, with a focus on recent developments.</p> - -<p><em>THE UNITED STATES</em></p> - -<ul> - <li>Basic Strategy and Policy</li> -</ul> - -<p>The fundamental policy framework for critical infrastructure protection is based on NSM-22. This memorandum replaced PPD-21 of 2013, making the first update to the framework in 11 years. The document is also intended to formalize the efforts made by the U.S. government during this period. This includes defining the role and responsibilities of CISA as the national coordinator for critical infrastructure protection, which did not exist at the time, as well as defining the role and responsibilities of the SRMAs. This requires SRMAs to conduct sector-specific risk assessments and develop sector-specific risk management plans every two years. CISA/DHS is required to conduct cross-sector risk assessments based on input from the SRMAs and develop a National Infrastructure Risk Management Plan (NIRMP) every two years. It is assumed that the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 2013, developed under PPD-21, will remain effective until the release of NIRMP, which is due by April 2025. NSM-22 also requires the development of minimum cybersecurity and resilience requirements for critical infrastructure and the implementation of these requirements using regulatory and other authorities. In addition, it requires the government to understand critical infrastructure interdependencies, analyze systemic risk, identify systemically important entities (SIEs), and enhance collaboration with the intelligence community, including the timely sharing of declassified information.</p> - -<p>In June 2024, DHS released the Strategic Guidance and National Priorities for U.S. Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. This guidance aligns with NSM-22 and identifies risk areas that the nation should prioritize over the next two years to build secure and resilient critical infrastructure. The priority areas include addressing cyber threats posed by China, managing the evolving risks presented by AI, and identifying and mitigating supply chain vulnerabilities. The document then outlines the priorities for mitigating those risks, including adopting baseline requirements, incentivizing service providers to reduce risk, and identifying SIEs.</p> - -<p>The National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) was developed in 2016 as a document outlining a national approach to addressing large-scale cyber incidents. In accordance with the NCS, CISA is currently leading the revision of this plan, which is scheduled for release by the end of 2024. The U.S. critical infrastructure protection effort is in the midst of a major renewal, with anticipated developments over the next year.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Sectors</li> -</ul> - -<p>NSM-22 defines 16 critical infrastructure sectors and SRMAs for the sectors (Figure 4). While there has been discussion about whether cloud infrastructure, on which all sectors depend, and space systems, which have become more strategic for both commercial and military use, should be added as new sectors, NSM-22 does not change the sector designation of the previous directive. However, NSM-22 requires DHS to develop recommendations for the president regarding the list of critical infrastructure sectors and subsectors, leaving the potential for future designation.</p> - -<p>There is a wide range of sector types, from those with strict cybersecurity regulations to those with few such regulations, and the maturity of cybersecurity varies from sector to sector. Even within a sector, there is a large gap in maturity between large and small companies. The government has identified water, healthcare, and K-12 educational institutions as sectors that are particularly vulnerable to attack and under-resourced. It is, therefore, providing support through the provision of sector-specific guidance and shared services. The significant cyber incident at Change Healthcare in February 2024, which reportedly affected the patient records of one in three Americans and had a broad impact on the entire sector, was a clear example of the urgent need to elevate the cybersecurity posture of these sectors. This has led to accelerated discussions on the development of minimum cybersecurity requirements and legislation in the healthcare sector. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), as the SRMA, has also published a sector-specific strategy that includes setting sector-specific performance goals, encouraging best practices, and providing financial support and incentives to strengthen sector-wide cybersecurity. The water sector has also been engaged in discussions on developing cybersecurity requirements and regulations in light of the widespread cyberattacks by Iranian-supported actors as well as growing concerns about being a potential target of Volt Typhoon.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eIO1vYk.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Critical Infrastructure Sectors in the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s compilation based on <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/04/30/national-security-memorandum-on-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/">“National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” White House, April 30, 2024</a>.</em></p> - -<ul> - <li>Structure of Information Sharing and Incident Response</li> -</ul> - -<p>Figure 5 shows the nationwide information-sharing and incident response structure, including both public and private sectors, in relation to critical infrastructure. Please note that this figure is created based on publicly available information, including NCIRP, and has been generalized to provide a comprehensive overview rather than specific details. Therefore, it should be noted that the information provided may not be entirely precise or applicable to all cases.</p> - -<p>CISA serves as the national coordinator for critical infrastructure protection. The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) within CISA serves as the operational center for critical infrastructure protection, coordinating and sharing information on vulnerabilities, incidents, risk mitigations, and others in cooperation with public and private organizations. The National Coordinating Center for Communications (NCC), under the NCCIC, monitors events affecting telecommunications services and infrastructure and leads incident response in cooperation with the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)/the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), government agencies, and private operators, mainly in the communications sector. Unlike other ISACs established independently in the private sector, the Communications ISAC is an operational function of NCC. It facilitates information sharing and analysis in the private sector while operating within the government. The Office of the National Coordinator, which serves as a single coordination point for SRMAs, will be established within CISA under the direction of NSM-22. The Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) is operated by ODNI and serves as the central hub for cyber threat intelligence, integrating and analyzing information collected from intelligence communities such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the NSA to support incident response. NCIJTF is hosted by the FBI and serves as the primary coordinating body for law enforcement operations, including cybercriminal investigations and prosecutions. In the event of significant incidents, the Cyber Unified Coordination Group (UCG) is formed to facilitate the coordination of incident response among NCCIC, CTIIC, NCIJTF, and other relevant agencies. The Cyber Response Group, which is organized under the NSC, coordinates the incident response at the policy level. Sector-specific coordination is conducted through SRMAs.</p> - -<p>Each sector has a self-organized and self-governed SCC. It comprises critical infrastructure owners and operators, trade associations, and other relevant entities. SCC serves as the primary coordinating body within the sector, facilitating information sharing and the discussions of sector-specific strategies and risks. It also serves as a point of contact for the corresponding GCC and SRMA within the government. Cross-sector cooperation among SCCs is facilitated by the Critical Infrastructure Cross-Sector Council (CICSC). The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) serves as a framework for cross-sector cooperation between the public and private sectors (both SCCs and GCCs). Additionally, ISACs have been established in the private sector as industry-led organizations for day-to-day operational cooperation. There are more than 20 ISACs in the United States. While they are not necessarily mapped with sectors on a one-to-one basis, there is an ISAC that covers each sector, such as the Communications ISAC, Financial Services ISAC (FS-ISAC), Electricity ISAC (E-ISAC), and so on. NCI facilitates cross-sector operational cooperation among ISACs. These ISACs also cooperate with CISA and SRMAs at the operational level. Moreover, several cross-sector initiatives exist, such as JCDC, where major companies and government agencies engage in operational cooperation on specific issues. As outlined above, collaboration between critical infrastructure owners and operators and government agencies is being implemented at various levels, from strategic and planning aspects to operational aspects through various channels, including SCC and ISAC, as well as direct communication with CISA and SRMAs.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Jh0eb5j.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Information-Sharing and Incident Response Structure in the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis based on <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/national_cyber_incident_response_plan.pdf">U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Cyber Incident Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: DHS, December 2016)</a>.</em></p> - -<ul> - <li>Public and Private Initiatives</li> -</ul> - -<p>The United States has a long history of close PPPs in critical infrastructure protection, with a variety of collaborative initiatives currently in place. JCDC, one of the most notable initiatives in recent years, is a cross-sector, operational collaborative framework composed of key government agencies and selected private-sector companies. This enables members to share and analyze unique threat intelligence and information from both the government and the private sector, as well as jointly develop countermeasures in a timely manner. The initiative was launched in 2021 with the participation of approximately 10 companies, primarily in the IT, communications, and cybersecurity industries. The number of participating companies has since expanded to other sectors, and there are now over 300 members, including NTT, a major telecommunications carrier in Japan, as the first member in the Asian region. As indicated in the NCS, one of the current focuses is to enhance the speed and scale of operations. This would need to include cooperation with major foreign companies to address growing global-scale threats posed by state-sponsored actors. Other sector-based operational cooperation includes the Department of Energy’s Energy Threat Analysis Center, the DOD’s Defense Industrial Base Collaborative Information Sharing Environment, and the NSA’S CCC. The government plans to further strengthen and integrate these individual efforts into a federal cybersecurity center.</p> - -<p>Another key initiative is the ICT Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Task Force, which was launched in 2018. It is a PPP program that identifies challenges and develops solutions to enhance the resilience of the global ICT supply chain. The group is primarily composed of private companies in the communications and IT sectors, as well as CISA, and works on specific topics such as AI, SMBs, and software, providing guidance and other deliverables to the public.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Laws and Regulations</li> -</ul> - -<p>As previously stated, the Biden administration has acknowledged the importance of long-lasting voluntary PPPs. However, it has also recognized that this alone is not sufficient and has taken a major step in strengthening laws, regulations, and requirements for critical infrastructure.</p> - -<p>CIRCIA is one of the examples that highlights this approach. This is the first cross-sector legislation requiring critical infrastructure owners and operators to report significant cyber incidents to the government within 72 hours and ransomware payments within 24 hours. The Notice of Proposed Rule Making was released in April 2024, and the final rule is expected to take effect in 2025. In addition, the White House is currently leading a review and reinforcement of sector-specific cybersecurity requirements as part of existing regulations. The pipeline, rail, and airline industries have made notable progress in recent years in enhancing and refining their cybersecurity requirements, overseen by the Transportation Security Administration. Furthermore, in February 2024, an EO was issued to reinforce cybersecurity in the ports industry, with requirements currently under development. In the healthcare sector, the NDAA of FY 2023 included enhanced security requirements for medical devices, and further requirements and regulations for organizations are also under discussion. In the communications sector, FCC is exploring the potential use of its existing regulatory authority over communications carriers to establish and expand cybersecurity rules. Congress is also considering a legislative approach for certain sectors, such as the water sector, where regulators have limited authority to build additional cybersecurity requirements on existing regulations. The variation from highly regulated to largely unregulated sectors is a significant concern, and the NCS and NSM-22 have emphasized the need to develop common baseline requirements for entire sectors. Moreover, as a broader regulation beyond critical infrastructure, SEC’s updated rule of December 2023 requires listed companies to disclose material incidents within four business days and to annually disclose the cybersecurity posture of their organizations. As previously stated, there are a number of regulations across sectors, and some of these are said to be duplicative and inefficient, leading to unnecessary burdens for companies. ONCD is now taking the lead in studying ways to harmonize these regulations.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Other Policy Approaches</li> -</ul> - -<p>There are several ways to encourage companies to meet cybersecurity requirements, including not only regulations but also various policy approaches, such as the use of government procurement power and grants. This is a strategic objective included in pillar 3 of the NCS, as well as a policy objective incorporated into NSM-22. For instance, while not necessarily limited to critical infrastructure, the proposed revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation include relatively strong requirements for federal contractors to report cyber incidents within eight hours, provide SBOM information for systems involved in contracted services, and allow government agencies access to their network systems in the event of an incident. For cloud services, the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) is in operation as a federal procurement requirement. This requires cloud providers to comply with cybersecurity requirements based on NIST SP 800-53 and obtain certification. In the defense industry, the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification 2.0 is being developed to certify the cybersecurity maturity of contractors based on NIST SP 800-171. Moreover, it has become more common in recent years for certain cybersecurity requirements to be incorporated into the application process for federal grant programs.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Voluntary Framework and Guidance</li> -</ul> - -<p>Government agencies frequently publish cybersecurity frameworks, guidance, best practices, and other resources, with NIST playing a central role. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) would be the most central document of them all. The CSF 1.0 was initially developed in 2013 for critical infrastructure, and the CSF 2.0, the latest version, was released in February 2024. The CSF has been widely adopted internationally as a common framework that can be used by a wide variety of organizations, regardless of size or industry. The CSF 2.0 is a voluntary, risk-based, and global consensus-based framework that was developed through a two-year revision process, incorporating stakeholders’ comments and feedback. Japanese companies have been actively involved in the revision process, providing comments, participating in workshops, and engaging in individual discussions. In addition, the framework concept has recently gained recognition even in the regulatory environment. In regulatory discussions, there is a clear need for a risk-based approach rather than prescriptive checklist-based requirements. There is also a need for a common framework that all industries can rely on to help avoid duplicative requirements, as well as a common language that facilitates communication with stakeholders at all levels. The CSFs are increasingly being brought up as a potential solution to the needs. Furthermore, CISA has developed voluntary Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs), which are based on the CSF and summarize the minimum practices that should be implemented by critical infrastructure owners and operators in all sectors. Moreover, sector-specific goals are being developed based on these CPGs under the leadership of CISA and SRMAs.</p> - -<p>CISA and SRMAs provide sector-specific guidance and best practices, such as for the water and healthcare sectors. CISA, NIST, ICT SCRM Task Force, and other entities also provide resources to support SMBs that lack the resources to implement cybersecurity measures. In addition, industry-led guidance is also being developed in each sector. For instance, the Cyber Risk Institute in the financial sector provides resources to assist financial organizations in implementing risk management aligned with the CSF, which takes into account sector-specific risk and regulatory environments.</p> - -<p>In addition, technical and operational advisories and guidance, including those for significant threats such as severe vulnerabilities and large-scale attacks by state-sponsored actors, are being published by major government agencies such as CISA, the FBI, and the NSA, in cooperation with international partners. The partners are primarily Five Eyes countries, with some EU countries, but there have been cases where the United States and Japan have collaborated on the release of advisories, such as the joint advisory on BlackTech in September 2023.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Performing (technical) research on AI safety tools</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Developing and disseminating evaluation tools and products</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Testing and evaluating AI systems</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Publishing AI safety standards and guidelines</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Disseminating AISI research and guidelines to the public</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Forming consortia of AI researchers, stakeholders, and experts</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Promoting the international adoption of AI safety guidelines</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Investigating infringements of domestic regulations</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Encouraging domestic innovation in AI</p> + </li> +</ol> -<ul> - <li>Plan and Preparedness</li> -</ul> +<p>Table 2 demonstrates that most AISI network members will principally focus on the first seven of these nine functions, with notably only the European Union performing a regulatory role as part of the EU AI Office. This overlap between network members’ stated functions points to a strong basis for collaboration between AISIs.</p> -<p>As part of the NIPP, a Sector-Specific Plan is developed in each sector, which outlines the sector-specific environment and risks, along with goals and priorities for addressing those risks. Going forward, SRMAs will conduct sector-specific risk assessments in accordance with NSM-22 guidance. The assessments will identify major risks within a sector, taking into account any interdependencies with other sectors. The Sector Specific Risk Management Plan will be updated based on the assessment every two years. CISA will also conduct a cross-sector risk assessment based on each sector’s risk assessment and input from the intelligence community and identify cross-sector critical risks. The NIRMP will then be developed every two years based on the work completed. These plans will serve as the foundation for risk management across the entire critical infrastructure.</p> +<p>It also shows that some institutes have already begun to produce work related to their stated functions. Some deliverables predate the AISI, such as the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s AI Business Guidelines, but have been incorporated and built upon by current AISI efforts. Others are novel efforts by institutes since their launch, such as the U.S. AISI’s guidance for Managing Misuse Risk for Dual-Use Foundation Models, and the UK AISI’s Inspect and Singapore’s Project Moonshot, two testing and evaluation toolkits for large language models (LLMs).</p> -<p>In an advanced effort, the National Risk Management Center (NRMC) under CISA has developed the National Critical Functions (NCFs), which analyze critical infrastructure in terms of functions essential to national operations rather than sectors or companies. The NCFs have a set of 55 functions in four categories: “connect,” “distribute,” “manage,” and “supply.” The NCFs are designed to assist CISA in examining interdependencies and systemic risk among critical infrastructure entities as functions. The NCF Risk Architecture is being developed under the leadership of NRMC to structure dependencies between sub-functions, systems, and assets and components by decomposing the NCFs. The results will be used for more advanced risk analysis, such as identifying the critical elements and entities on which the NCFs depend. The initial set of NCFs was released in 2019, but subsequent studies, such as the development of the NCF Risk Architecture, have taken time due to the complexity of the task. The NCFs can be utilized as a tool for advanced risk analysis of critical infrastructure. However, at this point, there is still a need to increase awareness of NCFs among stakeholders and ensure that they are being fully utilized in actual operations. Another related concept is the one proposed by the CSC, which is to identify and support systemically important entities among a wide range of critical infrastructure owners and operators in exchange for higher-security requirements. Although several attempts to legislate this idea have failed, the administration is currently pursuing the work to identify and prioritize these entities as SIEs. This effort is also formalized in NSM-22. While the list will not be publicly available, it is expected to be used for a variety of purposes, including national incident response, prioritization of government efforts, and consideration of the applicability of regulatory requirements.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CTxpjph.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Overview of AISI Network Members’ Stated Functions.</strong> Source: Public statements from AISI network members and relevant government officials and bodies.</em></p> -<p>Regarding national-level cyber exercises, the Cyber Storm initiative, hosted by CISA, has been conducted every other year since 2006. This cross-sector, public-private, operational-based functional exercise brings together over 2,000 participants, including federal agencies, local governments, multi-sectoral critical infrastructure owners and operators, ISACs, and international partners. The exercise simulates responses to significant cyber incident scenarios in critical infrastructure. While this exercise is primarily for public and private-sector participants in the United States, Japan participates in the information-sharing and incident response coordination exercise as a member of the International Watch and Warning Network with like-minded countries. Another industry-led initiative is the tri-sector exercise, which brings together owners and operators in the financial, power, and communications sectors. Participants are divided into attack and defense teams. Previously, the lessons learned from the exercise were shared with the government after the event, but government officials have directly participated in the exercise since the third event held in March 2024.</p> +<p>It is worth noting, however, that while institutes share many similarities in funding, size, and functions, they are housed under different kinds of public bodies. Several institutes are located within government agencies focused on technological innovation and standards, including the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); the UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT); and the Japanese Information Technology Promotion Agency (IPA). Others are housed in government-funded research organizations, like the South Korean Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) and the Singaporean Digital Trust Centre, itself a part of Nanyang Technological University. Finally, as Table 2 illustrates, the EU AI Office has the largest set of functions as an institution that promotes innovation, research, and regulatory compliance to the EU AI Act. The different kinds of home institutions in which AISIs are housed may have implications for the focus and capacity of different network members, and therefore the strengths that each member may bring to the network.</p> -<ul> - <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> -</ul> +<h3 id="questions-and-recommendations">QUESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</h3> -<p>The critical infrastructure is based on a diverse range of technologies, products, and services. While this paper does not cover all topics in detail, it does briefly address two recent developments of note: AI and internet routing security.</p> +<p>Similarities between AISI network members in terms of funding, size, and stated functions are a strong foundation for international cooperation on AI safety. However, ensuring that the AISI International Network maintains momentum requires translating the high-level Seoul Statement into a concrete set of priorities, deliverables, and timelines. To do so, this paper poses the following nine questions and recommendations to network members:</p> -<p>A number of AI-related initiatives are being undertaken in line with EO 14110, which places the safety and security of AI at the forefront of all considerations. One of the key areas of the EO is to manage AI risks in critical infrastructure. A cross-sector and sector-specific risk assessment related to the use of AI in critical infrastructure was conducted, and based on the results, guidelines on AI safety and security for critical infrastructure owners and operators were developed in April 2024. Furthermore, the EO directs federal agencies to utilize these guidelines to consider mandating certain guidance for critical infrastructure. In April 2024, DHS established the AI Safety and Security Board, which brings together AI experts from industry, academia, and government based on the EO’s direction. The board will provide recommendations to DHS and SRMAs on security, resilience, and incident response related to the use of AI in critical infrastructure.</p> +<h4 id="goals-of-collaboration-what-is-the-aisi-network-trying-to-achieve-and-when">Goals of Collaboration: What Is the AISI Network Trying to Achieve and When?</h4> -<p>Another area of growing government concern in recent years is internet routing security. The security challenges associated with internet technologies have been well known for many years. However, with the recent increase in threats posed by state-sponsored actors, security issues on Border Gateway Protocol and the potential attacks, such as route hijacking, are now considered part of the national security problem. The NCS has identified this as an area for improvement. Furthermore, FCC is considering implementing regulations that would encourage ISPs to adopt Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) as a technical measure. ONCD released a roadmap outlining measures for both the public and private sectors to enhance internet routing security. Given the nature of the internet, this issue cannot be resolved by U.S. carriers alone. It is essential to coordinate with a broader range of stakeholders involved in internet routing.</p> +<p><em>1. What areas of collaboration should the AISI network prioritize in the near term?</em></p> -<p><em>JAPAN</em></p> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> The AISI International Network does not have the capacity or resources to effectively collaborate on every domain of AI safety. For some domains, such as sharing sensitive information about models, AISIs may even face legal limitations to collaboration. Rather than spreading finite resources thinly in an effort to achieve everything all at once, network members should first focus on executing a few specific projects well. These should be attainable in the near future to demonstrate continued momentum from the AI Seoul Summit.</p> -<ul> - <li>Basic Strategy and Policy</li> -</ul> +<p>When selecting priority areas, members should consider areas with the greatest overlap in AISI’s functions, capacity, and expertise, and deliverables that are both impactful and realistic. To start, they should establish a research agenda for the network’s technical and guidance safety work going forward. This will help to set the scope of the network’s efforts and to keep members on track as they and the network mature. As discussed in this paper’s recommendation to Question 3, the AISI network conference in November may be a good place to set and present this agenda to the public.</p> -<p>The basic policy framework for critical infrastructure protection in Japan is based on the CPCIP. The document outlines the designation of critical infrastructure sectors, the roles and responsibilities of government agencies and critical infrastructure owners and operators, and the basic framework for public-private information sharing and incident response. The CPCIP is reviewed every few years to reflect changes in the threat landscape and cyber environment. The latest version was released in March 2024. It puts a strong emphasis on cybersecurity as a business management issue, organizational governance, risk-based management tailored to specific organizations and sectors, and comprehensive measures throughout the supply chain, including critical infrastructure owners and operators.</p> +<p>In the medium term, network members should look to develop a common, evidence-based approach to AISIs’ testing and evaluation methodologies. While not all AISIs may necessarily have the same requirements for assessing models, they should at least have a common understanding of what methodologies such as “red teaming” comprise. Developing a consensus on testing and evaluation methods would help to deconflict and de-duplicate efforts between AISIs and to facilitate other areas of collaboration in the future, such as promoting safety guidelines or developing joint evaluation tools. If the AISI network can start by ensuring that AISIs all speak the same language in AI safety, more elaborate collaboration projects can take place.</p> -<ul> - <li>Sectors</li> -</ul> +<p><em>2. What deliverables should the AISI network aim to produce?</em></p> -<p>The CPCIP designates 15 critical infrastructure sectors and government agencies responsible for overseeing sectors (Figure 6). In response to the cyber incident caused by suspected state-sponsored actors in the Port of Nagoya in 2023, the government elevated ports and harbors as the fifteenth sector, previously part of the logistics sector. The sector designation is subject to ongoing review, with the policy document revised in light of the evolving threat landscape. This has resulted in an expansion from the original 10 sectors in 2005 to 13 sectors in 2014, 14 sectors in 2018, and 15 sectors in 2024. There is a discussion about whether cloud infrastructure should be included in the list of sectors due to other sectors’ high degree of dependence on it for a digital infrastructure. While the space system is not currently included in the sector, due to its importance, discussions on space cybersecurity are ongoing, led by METI, including the release of voluntary guidelines to encourage commercial space operators to take measures.</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Although the AISI network is very new, members should still consider what the end products of their collaboration might be. One of the first deliverables that the network could produce is a clear statement of its intended goals, functions, research agenda, and mechanisms of collaboration that builds on the Seoul Statement. In as much detail as possible, the statement should articulate the mission of the network, its intended scope of work, and how it will relate to other international organizations working on AI. Network members may also consider developing a comprehensive list of the specific risks that they will test. This statement would not only help network members set the agenda for collaboration, but it would also help external governments and organizations to understand the value of the AISI network and how the network can support their efforts.</p> -<p>In Japan, as in the United States, cybersecurity requirements and regulations for critical infrastructure vary by sector, and there are variations in maturity levels across sectors and among companies of different sizes within the same sector. For example, ransomware attacks on healthcare organizations have been a particular challenge in recent years.</p> +<p><em>3. What are some key dates for these deliverables?</em></p> -<p>Figure 7 provides the mapping of the critical infrastructure sectors in the United States and Japan. Note, however, that this is a simplified overview and that the industries and services included in the sectors in the two countries may not be identical or perfectly aligned.</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> There are two big international events related to AI safety on the horizon that offer some initial deadlines for AISI network deliverables. First, the November 2024 San Francisco convening is an obvious date to publicly initiate international collaboration on AI safety. In September, the U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Department of State announced that “the goal of this convening is to kickstart the Network’s technical collaboration ahead of the AI Action Summit in Paris in February 2025,” starting with aligning “on priority work areas for the Network,” as the recommendation above supports. The February summit, therefore, is an important second date for network deliverables. The AI Action Summit will be the third of its kind since the UK AI Safety Summit last year and offers a high-profile, public venue in which to showcase the AISI network and its work. These two events — in November 2024 and February 2025 — are mere moments away in the context of international collaboration. If AISI members can capitalize on their opportunities, however, they could significantly contribute to the network’s mission of accelerating AI safety science.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sImzF8d.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Critical Infrastructure Sectors in Japan.</strong> Source: Author’s compilation based on <a href="https://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/cip_policy_2024_eng.pdf">National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), The Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Tokyo: Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters, Government of Japan, March 8, 2024), 55</a>.</em></p> +<h4 id="mechanisms-of-collaboration-what-will-the-aisi-network-do-and-how-will-it-work">Mechanisms of Collaboration: What Will the AISI Network Do and How Will It Work?</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TeLkr3F.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Mapping of Critical Infrastructure Sectors in Japan and the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> +<p><em>4. How will network members collaborate?</em></p> -<ul> - <li>Structure of Information Sharing and Incident Response</li> -</ul> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> AISIs should aim to have a regular cadence of meetings, perhaps every six months, to sustain momentum and keep collaboration moving forward. AISIs could collaborate through any number of venues, including research exchanges, annual conferences, shared digital platforms, and more. Network members will likely use a mix of these and other venues in different combinations as the network matures over time. To start, research exchanges between AISIs may be one of the first mechanisms of collaboration given that it is relatively inexpensive.</p> -<p>Figure 8 shows the nationwide information-sharing and incident response structure, including both public and private sectors, in relation to critical infrastructure. Please note that this figure is created based on publicly available sources, including CPCIP, and has been generalized to provide a comprehensive overview rather than specific details. Therefore, it should be noted that the information provided may not be entirely precise or applicable to all cases.</p> +<p><em>5. Will network members specialize in their work, or will they share equal responsibilities?</em></p> -<p>NISC is the national coordinator for critical infrastructure protection, acting as a counterpart to CISA. NISC serves as a government Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) as well as the national CSIRT, which is operated jointly with the Japan Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (JPCERT/CC) that coordinates with the private sector. NISC leads the coordination and sharing of information on vulnerabilities, incidents, and risk mitigation in cooperation with private-sector and government agencies, including NPA, MOD, MOFA, MIC, METI, Digital Agency, and agencies responsible for sector risk management, crisis management, and disaster prevention. Sector-specific coordination is conducted through relevant agencies, which is similar to SRMAs in the United States. NISC is more focused on coordination, and the substantive measures are being developed and implemented primarily by agencies responsible for cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection.</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> It would be premature to assign specific responsibilities to AISI network members today given that most are only months old, if established at all. However, members should consider the benefits and drawbacks of different organizational structures as the network develops. Currently, AISI network members share equal responsibilities by default. While this can be useful for promoting equal participation and accountability from members, it can also add unnecessary costs to collaboration. If each member were to take charge on a different project, for instance, the network could risk losing time, capacity, and focus. This kind of structure could also place undue pressure on the capacity and expertise of each of the AISIs to contribute before they are ready.</p> -<p>Each sector and subsector has an organization called CEPTOAR, which comprises critical infrastructure owners and operators and trade associations (e.g., general incorporated associations) as a point of contact for NISC. The CEPTOAR Council is a cross-sector council comprising representatives of CEPTOAR in each sector. In Japan, as in the United States, ISACs exist as industry-led organizations for day-to-day operational cooperation. In contrast to the United States, ISACs in Japan are not necessarily established in all sectors, but there are ISACs in major sectors such as ICT, finance, power, and transportation. The ICT-ISAC Japan, previously known as the Telecom-ISAC Japan, is the oldest ISAC in Japan, established in 2002. Additionally, there are ISACs that focus on specific industries, including software, automotive, and trade. In recent years, there has been a growing movement to establish new ISACs in other sectors, including the medical sector. While there is no formal organization like NCI in the United States, regular inter-ISAC meetings are held to facilitate cooperation among ISACs to address cross-sector issues.</p> +<p>Instead, the AISI network may consider leveraging each member’s comparative advantages in expertise, capacity, and funding. Those that are most able to contribute to projects, for instance, should be able and incentivized to do so, as is discussed in Question 7. For now, more mature AISIs like those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Singapore could have greater responsibilities within the network while other members, such as Kenya or Australia, contribute through more specialized ways. These roles could shift over time as AISIs mature, however.</p> -<p>Furthermore, there are several initiatives, such as the Cybersecurity Council, where selected major companies and government agencies gather across sectors to share information, conduct analysis, and develop countermeasures. The collaboration between critical infrastructure owners and operators and government agencies, which is similar to that in the United States in terms of organizational structure, is conducted through various channels, including ISAC, as well as direct communications with NISC and agencies responsible for the sector.</p> +<p><em>6. Will the AI safety summits continue to serve as the principal international venue for AISIs and the AISI network?</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2tPB9Zx.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: Information-Sharing and Incident Response Structure in Japan.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis based on <a href="https://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/cip_policy_2024_eng.pdf">National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), The Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Tokyo: Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters, Government of Japan, March 8, 2024), 62–64</a>.</em></p> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Since the first AISIs were announced at Bletchley Park in November 2023, AISIs have been closely tied to the AI safety summits. However, the summit series is steadily shifting its focus from AI safety to AI adoption and innovation; in May, the AI Seoul Summit placed AI innovation and inclusiveness firmly on the agenda. The next summit, the AI Action Summit in February 2025, will reportedly include AI safety as only one of five topic areas.</p> -<ul> - <li>Public and Private Initiatives</li> -</ul> +<p>Nevertheless, a shift in focus does not mean that summits are not a good international venue for AISIs and the AISI network. In fact, it may make it an even better venue for helping to shift the rhetoric around AI safety from “doom and gloom” to “safety for trust, adoption, and innovation” — a far more politically salient message. This paper therefore recommends that AISIs and the AISI network continue to use the AI safety summits as a high-profile international venue for their efforts for as long as the summit series continues.</p> -<p>Japan’s approach to critical infrastructure protection is also based on a voluntary PPP, as outlined in the CPCIP. While there have been several information-sharing frameworks, including the Initiative for Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership of Japan (J-CSIP) and JC3, in 2019, the Cybersecurity Council was established to further strengthen public-private information sharing. The council is composed of three tiers of memberships: Category 1, Category 2, and General. Its objective is to facilitate the sharing and analysis of threat information and the development of countermeasures in a timely manner while establishing nondisclosure agreements within a membership tier. Category 1 members bring predictive, undetermined, or undisclosed threat information under a strong obligation of confidentiality with legal penalties for noncompliance. The members then analyze the information, provide feedback to each other, and develop countermeasures. NISC serves as the secretariat, while JPCERT/CC serves as the operational coordinator. Finally, developed countermeasures are shared with the entire council if there is a high degree of certainty. If this is not the case, only Category 2 members receive the information in advance of the general members under a strong obligation of confidentiality and provide their own feedback, thereby contributing to improving the degree of accuracy of the information. The council started with 91 members and has since grown to over 300.</p> +<p><em>7. What will the network’s leadership and voting structure look like?</em></p> -<p>Another major initiative, SC3, has been in place since 2020, aiming to enhance cybersecurity throughout the supply chain, including critical infrastructure. This is an industry-led consortium comprising private companies of all sizes across various sectors. It is structured around several working groups, each focusing on a specific topic related to supply chain cybersecurity, including SMBs, attack trends and countermeasures, industry-academia-government collaboration, and international collaboration. Furthermore, the Cyber Risk Intelligence Center-Cross Sectors Forum (CRIC CSF), established in 2015, is another industry-led cross-sector initiative comprising companies primarily in the critical infrastructure sector. The forum is focused on specific themes related to cross-sector issues in the industry, including the definition of cybersecurity human resources, cybersecurity as business management, laws and regulations, and cybersecurity in DX. In Japan, there are a number of examples, such as SC3 and CRIC CSF, where private companies in the critical infrastructure sectors have taken the initiative to lead discussions on national-level cybersecurity issues. This would indicate a high degree of industry independence and the maturity of mutual aid. This may be a distinctive feature of Japan, in contrast to Western countries where the government typically plays a more prominent role.</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Currently, the AISI network has a horizontal leadership and consensus or opt-in only voting structure by default. Given that the Seoul Statement makes no indication of leadership and voting structure, however, network members are open to consider different possibilities and their trade-offs. For example, a consensus-based structure can help to foster good intentions for international cooperation, but it can also make it challenging to take meaningful collective action. Similarly, having just one member serve as a leader may seem unfair, but a rotating leadership structure can be ineffectual and prioritize the interests of that country (or bloc) for that period.</p> -<ul> - <li>Laws and Regulations</li> -</ul> +<p>The network’s leadership and voting structures need not be zero sum, however. In the long run, members’ representation within the network should be proportionate to their contributions; those that invest more time, money, expertise, and resources should be rewarded with a greater say in its direction. This means that the U.S. and UK AISIs would likely be rewarded with leadership of the network due to their organizational capacity. The United States, for its part, should aspire to lead the AISI network, as discussed in the third section of this paper. Rather than merely insisting on leading, however, it should commit the resources and time that positions it to deserve to lead. Leadership should be earned based on the scale of meaningful contributions to the field of AI safety science, a structure that also incentivizes on other network members to participate and invest more into AI safety and the AISI network as well.</p> -<p>Currently, Japan does not have a legal requirement for sector-wide incident reporting like CIRCIA in the United States, although the necessity of such a mandate is being discussed. Some sectors have sector-specific regulations in place to maintain critical infrastructure services that require incident reporting to the relevant agencies. For instance, in the case of the information and telecommunications sector, carriers are obliged to report both the physical failure and cyber incident to MIC if the impact exceeds the threshold defined in the Telecommunications Business Act.</p> +<h4 id="international-strategy-how-will-the-aisi-network-fit-into-and-engage-with-other-international-ai-efforts">International Strategy: How Will the AISI Network Fit into and Engage with Other International AI Efforts?</h4> -<p>Furthermore, the Economic Security Promotion Act introduced a new rule in May 2024 to ensure the safety and reliability of essential infrastructure. The government designates essential infrastructure sectors and operators within these sectors based on specific criteria. Prior to the introduction of designated critical facilities and the outsourcing of their maintenance to third parties, covered operators are required to submit plans to the government for screening. Although there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the 15 essential infrastructure sectors and the 15 critical infrastructure sectors, there is a large overlap between them. Currently, over 200 companies have been designated based on criteria such as service scale, coverage, and number of customers. The plans that covered operators submit must include an outline of the facilities (e.g., function, purpose, and location); information on all contractors, including cascaded subcontractors, involved in the equipment or outsourced maintenance (e.g., country of establishment, nationality of board members, country of manufacture, business relationship with foreign governments); and a risk management plan, including cybersecurity measures. If the government determines that there is a significant risk that the facilities may be used as a means of disruptive attacks by foreign adversaries, it may recommend or order the operators to take necessary preventive measures. The rule is risk-based, with covered operators and facilities limited based on criteria from an economic security standpoint. However, it could have a broad impact on major critical infrastructure owners and operators across sectors.</p> +<p><em>8. How will the network be different from and engage with other international organizations working on AI issues, such as the ISO, G7, United Nations, GPAI, or OECD?</em></p> -<ul> - <li>Other Policy Approaches</li> -</ul> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Just as one of the objectives of the AISI network is to avoid duplicating work between AISIs, the network itself should avoid duplicating the work of other international organizations. Considering how the AISI network will fit into the broader landscape of these organizations from the start will help members think more strategically about what role this forum plays on the global AI governance stage.</p> -<p>The government is implementing enhanced cybersecurity requirements for both government agencies and contractors. The Common Standards for Cybersecurity Measures for Government Agencies and Related Agencies, issued by NISC, outlines the cybersecurity standards that government agencies must meet. The July 2023 revision reinforced the standards required for contractors based on NIST SP 800-171 to address supply chain risks. In the defense industry, the Acquisition, Technology &amp; Logistics Agency under the DOD introduced a new cybersecurity standard for defense contractors in 2023 that incorporates the requirements of NIST SP 800-171, aligning it with the U.S. standards for the defense industry. Regarding cloud services, the Information system Security Management and Assessment Program (ISMAP), a program similar to the FedRAMP of the United States, has been operational since 2020. Furthermore, government funding programs include cybersecurity requirements, such as IT implementation subsidies, in their application requirements. Additionally, there is discussion on a potential tax incentive program for companies in the defense industry that meet certain cybersecurity requirements.</p> +<p>To do this, the AISI network should emphasize its unique position to provide technical expertise and capacity to governments working on wider AI governance efforts. In the past year alone, numerous government initiatives have been launched to ensure responsible frontier AI development, including the Biden administration’s AI executive order, the EU AI Act, the G7 Hiroshima AI Process Code of Conduct, and the March 2024 UN resolution on AI. These initiatives, though commendable, are often staffed by diplomats who lack the depth of in-house technical expertise that the AISI network has demonstrated an ability to amass. It is this expertise that could turn what are currently high-level principles and frameworks into practical implementation for developers.</p> -<ul> - <li>Voluntary Framework and Guidance</li> -</ul> +<p>For instance, the G7’s code of conduct instructs developers to “identify, evaluate, and mitigate risks across the AI lifecycle,” but provides little guidance as to how. While the G7 has partnered with the OECD to develop this level of specificity for the code of conduct, it would greatly benefit from the testing and evaluation tools that the Seoul Statement names as one of the potential areas for collaboration within the AISI International Network. Network members should consider how to engage with other international organizations’ AI efforts with these synergies in mind.</p> -<p>NISC publishes the guidelines for establishing safety principles for ensuring the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure as a document based on the CPCIP, which outlines common cybersecurity measures required for all sectors. Based on this document, agencies responsible for the sectors and industry develop their own cybersecurity standards and guidelines, taking into account sector-specific features. It is the responsibility of critical infrastructure owners and operators to ensure the cybersecurity of their infrastructure by utilizing these standards and guidelines, or in some cases, complying with them in accordance with relevant regulations. NISC’s guidelines are reviewed on a regular basis, and the latest version, released in July 2023, have focused on strengthening organizational governance and supply chain risk management in cybersecurity as well as clarifying the minimum baseline standards to be implemented and additional ones as recommended options.</p> +<p><em>9. Will the network remain a closed group of high-capacity countries, or will it be open to any country that wants to join?</em></p> -<p>Regarding the NIST CSF, IPA has been providing Japanese translations since the initial release. NISC’s guidelines and their supplementary documents also reflect the CSF concept as the basis for the risk-based approach. In addition, the Cybersecurity Management Guidelines for Japanese Enterprise Executives, published by METI, also reflect the basic concepts of the CSF. As previously noted, Japan has been engaged in the CSF revision process, providing comments and participating in workshops. The CSF has been increasingly adopted in Japanese industry, particularly among multinational companies, as a way to ensure consistent and aligned risk management with international stakeholders.</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> The AISI International Network was born out of recognition that AI risks do not stop at national borders. It therefore makes sense that the network should be open to more members that want to join. A wider membership would help to build international agreement on AI safety science and potentially to continue to reach economies of scale on AI safety institutes. Furthermore, incorporating more developing countries’ perspectives early on — either through full membership or agreements — could bring new insight into AI safety risks that current AISI network members and their companies may have missed.</p> -<p>In addition to sector-specific guidance and best practices developed by government agencies and industry associations, METI, IPA, MIC, and others also provide guidance that can be used by a wide range of companies, including critical infrastructure owners and operators across sectors, including those focusing on industrial control systems, cloud infrastructure, corporate management, and SMBs. IPA is also working with NIST and CISA to disseminate key frameworks and guidance from the United States. This includes publishing Japanese translations of CISA’s CPGs and other NIST publications, in addition to the CSF.</p> +<p>However, network members will have to consider the serious trade-offs between expanding the network’s membership and diluting its current nimbleness and consensus as a small group. Even countries or blocs that are closely aligned in values to current members may lack the technical expertise to meaningfully contribute to the network, thus raising the costs of collaboration and possibly reducing its impact.</p> -<p>With regard to the government’s releases of technical and operational advisories and guidance on critical threats, it is likely that the frequency of release and level of detail would be lower than in the United States, although it is not easy to make comparisons given that not all information is necessarily publicly available. The government is expected to expand its operational staff in the coming years along with the restructuring of NISC. This will enable the government to release more detailed, actionable guidance with technical and operational aspects in a timelier manner. It is also encouraging to note that the United States and Japan are increasingly issuing advisories in cooperation, as in the case of the joint advisories issued in September 2023 and July 2024.</p> +<p>One way to address this could be requiring prospective members to demonstrate their ability to meaningfully contribute to the network — such as through a minimum degree of expertise and capacity — before they can join. The purpose here is not to make the AISI network into an elite club, but to recognize that the network’s goal of accelerating AI safety science cannot be realistically achieved by expanding membership to everyone who wants it. The AISI network could consider partnership programs with other international organizations like GPAI, the OECD, or the Group of 20 (G20) in order to collaborate with interested countries that do not necessarily have the depth of AI safety expertise to join the network. Such partnerships could help to foster wider international cooperation on AI safety and engage more developing countries on the AISI network’s efforts in particular.</p> -<ul> - <li>Plan and Preparedness</li> -</ul> +<h3 id="conclusion">CONCLUSION</h3> -<p>As previously stated, based on the guidelines published by NISC, agencies responsible for the sectors and industry have developed sector-specific standards and guidelines on which organizations implement and maintain their cybersecurity posture. With regard to further study on critical infrastructure protection, the Japanese government is aware of the need to address the increasingly complex interdependencies among infrastructures. The CPCIP indicates that the Cabinet Secretariat plans to conduct interdependency analysis, which will help it identify systemic risks of infrastructure, including both physical and cyber aspects. The designation of essential infrastructure owners and operators and critical facilities under the new rule based on the Economic Security Promotion Act may have certain similarities with the concept of NCFs and SIEs in terms of identifying especially important entities and functions across sectors.</p> +<p>The AISI International Network marks a significant next step in global AI safety efforts. The network provides an opportunity to build international consensus on definitions, procedures, and best practices around AI safety; reach economies of scale in AI safety research; and extend U.S. leadership in international AI governance. The similarities between currently established AISIs in terms of size, funding, and functions provide a strong basis for cooperation, though network members must be aware of the different institutions in which different AISIs are housed.</p> -<p>Regarding national-level cyber exercises, a cross-sector exercise hosted by NISC has been held annually since 2006. This exercise involves over 6,000 participants from critical infrastructure owners and operators, government agencies, and commercial cybersecurity companies across all sectors and verifies the effectiveness of cross-sector incident response processes through tabletop exercises. In addition, sector-specific cyber exercises are conducted by ISACs, such as those in the ICT sector and the electric power sector, as well as by government agencies, such as those in the financial sector.</p> +<p>While the Seoul Statement is a good start for multilateralizing cooperation between AISIs, network members must now decide how to turn intent into action. At the November convening in San Francisco, they should strive to set the network’s goals, mechanisms, and international strategy in preparation for the AI Action Summit in February 2025. In doing so, they must ask tough questions, including about priorities, leadership, and membership.</p> -<ul> - <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> -</ul> +<hr /> -<p>While Japan has not received as much policy attention for internet routing security as the United States, the implementation of RPKI, a key technology to address the issue, is progressing. As of September 2024, approximately 48 percent of routes in Japan have been implemented with Route Origin Authorization, a key technical component of RPKI, compared to approximately 40 percent in the United States.</p> +<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is the director of the Wadhwani AI Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jpGy7f2.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Mapping of Critical Infrastructure Protection Framework between Japan and the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> +<p><strong>Georgia Adamson</strong> is a research associate with the Wadhwani AI Center at CSIS.</p>Gregory C. Allen and Georgia AdamsonThe AI Seoul Summit launched an international network of AI safety institutes in May 2024. Now, they must work to define their goals, mechanisms, and the strategy to accelerate AI safety science.Stay Ahead2024-10-29T12:00:00+08:002024-10-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/stay-ahead<p><em>This report gives recommendations on export controls, global tech governance, domestic incentives for building tech capabilities in chips and clean technologies, and the future of international tech cooperation and competition.</em></p> -<p>With regard to IoT security, Japan has a long history of proactive and advanced efforts focused on protecting its communications infrastructure. As previously stated, since 2019, the country has been implementing the NOTICE project, which extensively scans IoT devices connected to the internet in Japan, identifies devices with weak passwords, and encourages users to correct their settings. This has been made possible by the amendment of the law to authorize NICT to conduct the scan, and ICT-ISAC and over 80 domestic ISPs are cooperating to identify and notify the owners of vulnerable devices. This is a truly nationwide initiative to mitigate botnet risks through public-private cooperation. Additionally, NICT monitors communications flowing into the domestic darknet. By analyzing communications that are presumed to originate from botnet devices, NICT identifies infected IoT devices, followed by the same process as NOTICE. Furthermore, in 2020, the technical standards for IoT devices connected to the internet were revised to require devices to meet minimum cybersecurity requirements, such as prohibiting default passwords and implementing access control functions. METI is also developing a voluntary conformity assessment program for a broader range of IoT devices, with the aim of launching the program during FY 2024. A dialogue has been initiated with the U.S. government to establish mutual recognition with the U.S. labeling scheme.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Japan is at the forefront of the commercial 5G network deployment using the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN). NTT DOCOMO started the world’s first nationwide deployment of 5G commercial services using O-RAN in 2020. One of the key concerns in the international deployment of secure and reliable 5G networks is the security of O-RAN. In May 2023, a report on O-RAN security was published by a Quad working group. The study found that O-RAN-specific security risks in 5G networks are only 4 percent of the total, and do not fundamentally alter the security environment of wireless communication networks compared to conventional networks. Recently, through the NTIA grant program, testing projects have been conducted by international partners, including operators from Japan, the United States, and India, to evaluate interoperability and security. Furthermore, a joint effort between companies in both countries has been made to conduct interoperability testing using test beds provided by NTT DOCOMO and other companies.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">INTRODUCTION</h3> -<p>Figure 9 provides a simplified mapping of the critical infrastructure protection frameworks of the United States and Japan. It should be noted that this mapping is intended to provide a comprehensive overview and does not necessarily represent a complete one-to-one relationship in terms of roles and responsibilities, scale, and operational maturities.</p> +<p><strong><em>Resolving the Emerging Economic Security Trilemma</em></strong></p> -<h3 id="recommendations-for-japan-us-cooperation-on-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity-and-resilience">Recommendations for Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and Resilience</h3> +<p>The United States is in the midst of a generational shift in economic policy and its role in national security planning. Even in these polarized times, there is surprising consensus across the American political spectrum that the economic policies and global institutions fostered since World War II are no longer adequate. They have left the United States vulnerable to competition with non-market actors, principally China; domestic economic dislocations; and global crises such as climate change and pandemics. These vulnerabilities persist and will await the next administration.</p> -<p>Based on the discussions so far, this chapter outlines recommendations for Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation in the areas of critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience. The recommendations are divided into two main categories: basic prerequisites for enhancing operational collaboration and specific areas of collaboration based on these prerequisites.</p> +<p>Global technology competition continues to gather pace. Earlier this year, U.S. secretary of commerce Gina Raimondo compared the contemporary chips race to the space race of the 1960s: a new Sputnik moment. Indeed, we may be living through five Sputnik moments at the same time across semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, climate technologies, and biotechnologies. Losing our edge in any one of these areas – especially, the triad of chips, AI, and quantum – could meaningfully diminish the United States’ economic prospects and national security. As Darío Gil, chair of the National Science Board and senior vice president and director at IBM Research, noted at the board’s 490th Meeting, “science and technology are the new currency of global power.”</p> -<h4 id="prerequisites-for-operational-collaboration">Prerequisites for Operational Collaboration</h4> +<p>Staying ahead of the technology race is more challenging than ever. The United States and its allies must contend with a primary competitor that uses its scale and prowess to weaponize innovation, flout fair competition, exercise control over vital value chains, and engage in economic coercion. Meanwhile, China continues to reap the benefits of having played the long game with countries around the world, particularly in the Global South. At stake for the United States and its allies is their long-term prosperity, the resilience and security of their markets and democracies, and the rules-based economic order they fostered for three generations.</p> -<p><em>Obtain a comprehensive overview of national cybersecurity posture in both countries and comparatively map the postures</em></p> +<p>As these realities have come into clearer view in recent years, the past two U.S. administrations have put their respective stamps – in design and tenor – on “economic security,” rewriting the implicit contract between governments and markets. Under the Biden administration, U.S. economic security policy evolved dramatically in pursuit of competitiveness, resilience, and national security goals. G7 and other allies followed suit, with policymakers in Japan and the European Union codifying formal economic security frameworks, creating mandates within their respective governments, and developing similar policies.</p> -<p>A comprehensive cybersecurity strategy requires a unified approach across the entire society. As previously discussed, the organizations and functions of national cybersecurity in the United States and Japan are highly decentralized and complex, with multiple stakeholders interacting with each other. All those involved in cybersecurity cooperation between the two countries should first have a comprehensive common understanding of the overall picture, including how cybersecurity is structured and functions in both countries, as well as what is taking place in the nation as a whole. This should be a prerequisite to pursuing specific areas of cooperation. It helps everyone understand how each specific area of cooperation fits into the broader picture and how it relates to other areas and stakeholders. It also facilitates whole-optimal and effective national-level cooperation, avoiding the creation of silos. Then, all stakeholders should have a shared understanding of mapping counterparts in both countries at the respective levels of the public and private sectors and establish the appropriate channels for structured collaboration. Regardless of the form of relationship (e.g., one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-many), it is important to eliminate as much duplication as possible in each channel.</p> +<p>The United States, in pursuit of competitiveness and resilience goals, has implemented promote measures entailing unprecedented public and private investments in reviving U.S. chipmaking and building capabilities across clean tech and other technologies. A second set of measures has sought to align competitiveness and national security goals by protecting technologies and markets by expanding export controls, sanctions, and investment screening, as well as a continuation of strategic tariffs. A third, in part to counter China, has involved plurilateral economic cooperation agreements with partners on supply chain resilience and the energy transition, as well as bilateral initiatives on technology innovation.</p> -<p>In particular, Japan is currently in the process of reinforcing its government cybersecurity posture. This is being done through a review of its organizational structure and authorities, roles, and responsibilities, including the establishment of a new cybersecurity agency and the enhancement of JSDF’s capabilities. In the United States, the government structure and functions have evolved over the past several years, including the establishment of ONCD. Taking these changes as great opportunity, it is worthwhile to undertake a comprehensive review of the relationship between the two countries’ systems at all levels, including the public and private sectors, as well as policies and initiatives. The information presented in this paper would help all stakeholders obtain these aspects and serves as a first step in implementing the following recommendations.</p> +<p>Early implementation has shown signs of industrial revival across the United States: private sector investment commitments – domestic and foreign – in strategic sectors such as chips, clean power, clean-tech manufacturing, and others totaled over $900 billion over the past four years. And protect measures such as export controls have blunted Chinese and Russian acquisition of dual-use technologies. And yet, implemenation challenges have emerged, along with second-order effects.</p> -<p><em>Expand and operationalize the interoperable mechanism for classified and unclassified cyber information sharing</em></p> +<p>While export controls on Russia degraded Putin’s war machine in the early days, their efficacy has been tested by transshipment from third countries and Russia’s continued reliance on Chinese chips and chipmaking materials. Similarly, while new U.S. export controls initiated in 2022 and 2023 blunted China’s access to sensitive AI chips, Beijing has responded with its own industrial policies to “design out” and circumvent U.S. controls and standards. It has also enacted tit-for-tat trade restrictions on processed critical minerals – a key chokepoint in the chips and electric vehicle value chains.</p> -<p>Now that cybersecurity has become a matter of national security, it is becoming increasingly important to establish a secure and efficient mechanism for sharing sensitive or classified cybersecurity information between Japan and the United States. While a framework for sharing classified information between the two countries already exists, it is limited in terms of the types of information protected and the level of classification and has not necessarily been sufficient in the area of cybersecurity. The recently passed security clearance legislation in Japan will greatly expand the scope of the existing system by extending the scope of information to include cybersecurity, the level of classified classification, and the scope of clearance to a broader private sector, which had previously been focused on government officials. This would be a major step forward in the exchange of classified information in the cybersecurity field. The government is currently developing operational standards in preparation for the launch of the system in 2025. This preparation should include ensuring interoperability with like-minded countries, including the United States, as a key area of focus. Looking ahead, it would be beneficial for both governments to engage in specific discussions on how to expand and operationalize the existing interoperable mechanism to cover the cyber domain. While Japan is not necessarily required to join the Five Eyes alliance, it is important to establish a trusted framework with the new clearance system defining procedures and protocols for cyber intelligence sharing. It is also necessary for the Japanese and U.S. governments to clearly define and agree on a centralized point of contact between them so that cyber intelligence sharing can be conducted through a single channel.</p> +<p>Tensions between the protect, promote, and partner strategies have emerged, particularly regarding the use of subsidies, tax breaks, and domestic sourcing requirements aimed at promoting U.S. chipmaking and clean technologies. These policies have sparked concerns among key allies – Japan, South Korea, and the European Union – over a subsidy race that could disadvantage their own industries. Similarly, the U.S. government has led efforts to engage partners via new economic cooperation agreements such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP). These agreements, however, do not come with either increased market access or meaningful financing benefits that partners seek, in part due to U.S. domestic political considerations. These do not fare well relative to China’s long-term play in the Global South, notwithstanding concerns about the Belt and Road Initiative’s flaws, including debt overhang and poor standards in some countries.</p> -<p>At the same time, it is important to note that today’s cybersecurity information sharing has been focused more on providing useful information in a timely manner and as broadly as possible through declassification. There are multiple ways for information sharing, including the security clearance system and the Traffic Light Protocol, for instance. It is, therefore, important for Japan and the United States to identify and clarify the various means of information exchange tailored to the specific type of information to be handled.</p> +<p>Given these limitations, the bigger question is whether the promote-protect-partner framework adds up to a long-term economic security strategy. The answer to that question will depend on how effectively the next administration navigates the emerging “economic security policy trilemma.” While not quite an impossible trinity, the trilemma means that policymakers will be able to pursue any two sets of measures (for example, promoting domestic industries and protecting dual-use technologies) but not without sacrificing the third (for example, deep integration with supply chain partners). This collection of essays from leading experts at CSIS’s newly formed Economic Security and Technology Department is our contribution to this debate.</p> -<p><em>Japan to take further steps to enhance government cybersecurity posture through implementation of the NSS</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zr0zDJW.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>An Emerging Economic Security Trilemma.</strong> Source: Author’s own creation.</em></p> -<p>In the NSS of Japan, Japan has committed to fundamentally enhance the government’s cybersecurity capabilities, including the implementation of proactive cyber operations. This can be achieved by enhancing both the operational authorities and capabilities of the government.</p> +<p>An immediate priority is to assess the impact of protect measures such as export controls, sanctions, investment screening, and strategic tariffs, including their second-order effects. Greg Allen and Barath Harithas underscore the importance of building the capabilities of the Department of Commerce and related departments. But that alone will not be enough: the United States must work effectively with allies, as James Andrew Lewis argues, on forging a post–Wassenaar Arrangement technology alliance with meaningful European and Asian buy-in. At some point, though, Scott Kennedy warns, the administration’s use of defensive measures will stretch the United States’ ability to militate the rules-based economic order that it has fostered for decades.</p> -<p>Japan is currently focusing on potential amendments to existing laws, including the Telecommunications Business Act and the Unauthorized Computer Access Prohibition Act, to grant operational authorities. While some of the legislative issues are complex, given their constitutional implications, it is essential for Japanese policymakers to accelerate the discussion to clarify the government’s strategic objectives at the operational level and identify the means to achieve them in reality. The strategy primarily outlines the government’s intended actions. However, it also assumes that telecommunication carriers and other private companies will be positioned to indirectly support government operations by providing information on communications and threat intelligence as well as analysis expertise. It is, therefore, important, in legislative discussions, to define the roles and responsibilities of private companies in national cyber defense, legal protection, and financial support for the cost of facilities, people, and operations.</p> +<p>Ultimately, the most critical long-term path for the United States is to out-innovate China across advanced technologies. The CHIPS and Science Act as well as Inflation Reduction Acts put in place a number of building blocks of a strategy – investments in industrial infrastructure, research and development (R&amp;D), and the workforce; a creative capital and investment attraction program; and partnerships with supply chain partners. As Sujai Shivakumar notes, the United States will need to finish the swing with investments in technology clusters and R&amp;D cooperation that will require a sustained bipartisan effort to bear fruit. Adam Frost calls for a national security–focused approach to directing U.S. government financing in critical and emerging technologies. In addition, Joseph Majkut highlights the need for technology enablers such as access to clean power, along with a large transmission infrastructure, to fuel AI and advanced manufacturing.</p> -<p>Furthermore, a new cybersecurity agency, built on NISC, should become the primary entity for coordinating, operating, and enforcing national cyber resilience. It should also serve as a centralized point of contact for international cooperation. As the government’s technical and operational activities increase in this evolution, the new agency, as a national CSIRT, needs to secure additional cyber professionals. While the government’s cyber workforce is being expanded at NISC, NPA, JSDF, and other agencies, further expansion should be considered for the new agency to be fully operational. This could be done through hiring professionals from the private sector as well as leveraging capacity-building programs offered by the private sector.</p> +<p>Promote tools alone are limited: innovation does not happen in isolation, not to mention the cost of promote tools to the taxpayer amid already unprecedented levels of federal debt. Rather the time- and stress-tested drivers of innovation are competition in secure, trusted international technology markets and cooperation with allies, including on research and development and supply chains. Strong enforcement of intellectual property rights, Kirti Gupta argues, is essential if innovators are to enter markets. Given the global and distributed nature of technology value chains (from base materials to end products), Ilaria Mazzocco reminds us of the productivity benefits that will accrue to U.S. clean tech firms that take risks, compete in global markets, and integrate into value chains.</p> -<p>The strategy is already in place and further implementation would enhance the government’s cybersecurity capabilities, which in turn will stimulate more bidirectional operational cooperation between the public and private sectors than ever before. This would further reinforce Japan’s overall cybersecurity posture and facilitate international collaboration and coordination. While the strategy is currently being implemented, it would be beneficial for Japan and the United States to proceed now with discussions on potential ways for to enhance cooperation built on the implementation.</p> +<p>Nowhere are competitive markets and a favorable investment climate more important than in the Global South. Without meaningful market access or substantial financing commitments, Bill Reinsch and Erin Murphy argue, agreements such as IPEF are unlikely to attract long-term buy-in from partners. As a reminder of what is possible, Rick Rossow points out that the U.S.-India commercial partnership, including its focus on chips, critical minerals, and other critical and emerging technologies, could prove pivotal for both countries, with potential spillovers for others.</p> -<h4 id="collaboration-on-plans-preparedness-and-operations">Collaboration on Plans, Preparedness, and Operations</h4> - -<p><em>Engage in national-level advanced risk analysis focusing on critical infrastructures of both countries</em></p> - -<p>The cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructure is a matter of national concern, affecting not just one organization or sector but the entire nation, as a failure in one organization can have cascading effects on that sector, other sectors, and the entire nation. It is, therefore, becoming increasingly important to conduct a national-level risk analysis that focuses on understanding the interdependencies of critical infrastructure sectors and functions, analyzing their systemic risks, and identifying the most critical entities and functions with a risk-based approach. The United States has been working in this area for several years, beginning with the development of NCFs, while Japan is currently in the early stages of conducting interdependency analysis. However, neither has necessarily focused on the international perspective but rather on the domestic one. In reality, however, the interdependencies and systemic risks have an international reach. These interconnectivities are particularly strong between nations that are allied as well as economically tied to each other.</p> - -<p>It would, therefore, be beneficial to pursue cooperation in the area of national-level risk analysis, including critical infrastructures for which both countries rely on each other. This could include mapping out the interdependencies of both countries’ infrastructures as a whole, including, but not limited to, communications and digital infrastructure as a foundation for intelligence and information sharing; communications, power, water, and transportation infrastructure on which U.S. military bases in Japan depend; and financial and logistics infrastructure that is key to their economic activities. This would also include analyzing their systemic risks, taking into account the timescale of impacts, and identifying the sectors, operators, and functions that are particularly important. This will greatly assist both countries in responding collectively to national-scale incidents and ensuring the resilience of the alliance as a whole.</p> - -<p>In today’s digitally interconnected world, interdependencies have become so complex that even a domestic-focused analysis is challenging. Even in the United States, which is a leader in this field, the study has not yet been fully completed. Bringing together the analytical methodologies and practices of both countries can add value to existing studies in both countries. For instance, the NCFs in the United States could be leveraged in Japan’s interdependency analysis while the concept of designating essential infrastructure owners and operators and critical facilities in Japan’s new regulation could provide insights for the study of SIEs in the United States. From this perspective as well, it would be mutually beneficial for the two countries to collaborate on risk analysis at the national level.</p> - -<p>While this initiative should be led by key government agencies responsible for national security and critical infrastructure protection (NSC and CISA of the United States and the National Security Secretariat and NISC of Japan), it is crucial to expand the involvement of critical infrastructure owners and operators more than ever. It is clear that the owners and operators have the most accurate understanding of the functions and services on which they depend, and they are responsible for managing their own risks, including interdependencies. To be more effective, the study would need to include at least the major operators in each sector in both countries.</p> - -<p><em>Regularly conduct cross-sector public-private joint cyber exercises</em></p> - -<p>In the event of a significant cyber incident that could affect national security, all stakeholders across the public and private sectors, including international partners, must work together to respond. It is essential to prioritize preparedness and exercises in peacetime. While both countries have conducted cross-sector public-private cyber exercises, they have not necessarily focused primarily on collaboration with international partners, as seen in joint exercises between defense authorities.</p> - -<p>As a first step toward conducting a joint large-scale cyber exercise, both countries, led by CISA and NISC, should work together to develop national response plans and exercise scenarios at both the national and alliance levels, with a particular focus on cross-border considerations, to enable a coordinated collective response. The plan should include the incident response procedure, its prioritization, the counterparts of each entity, and communication channels based on the national-level risk analysis. The scenario could involve a cyberattack impacting multiple critical infrastructure sectors simultaneously, assuming a significant national-level threat from state-sponsored actors. This will verify how both countries and their respective entities can collectively respond to incidents. This may be a too large-scale, near-worst-case scenario exercise, but as previously mentioned, the United States and Japan have been facing a common geopolitical threat, and the risk of both countries’ critical infrastructure being affected strategically at the same time can no longer be ignored.</p> - -<p>It is recommended that such an exercise be conducted on an annual basis to review and reinforce the plan in response to evolving threats and to ensure its continued effectiveness. It is essential that all entities involved in the developed scenario, from both the public and private sectors, are included as participants.</p> - -<p><em>Expand overarching public-private operational collaboration in the United States and Japan</em></p> - -<p>It is recommended that both countries establish a centralized framework for cross-sector operational collaboration that includes key private companies and government agencies responsible for critical infrastructure protection. While both countries have public-private cooperation frameworks in place at the domestic level, as well as operational cooperation between the two countries locally or partially in certain areas, there is an opportunity to further expand and integrate these initiatives into an environment where all necessary players can come together and cooperate in a flexible and timely manner. For instance, while NTT is involved in JCDC from Japan, there are several other companies in Japan with a high level of technical and operational expertise. Furthermore, U.S.-based companies are individually engaged in collaborative efforts with Japan. For example, Microsoft has partnered with the Japanese government, while Google has established a cybersecurity research center in Tokyo. By incorporating some of these into a larger Japan-U.S. PPP framework, the level of operational collaboration could be further enhanced. The centralized framework would enable the public and private sectors of both countries to enhance activities such as threat intelligence and information sharing, joint analysis, and the development of countermeasures. While not all information handled in operational collaboration is necessarily classified, the passage of Japan’s security clearance legislation would also greatly facilitate collaboration. This would consequently assist both countries in issuing joint attribution and advisories with greater frequency than ever before, which would contribute to reinforcing international deterrence as well as providing actionable cybersecurity measures to the public at large.</p> - -<p>In cross-border public-private operational collaboration, it is crucial to build trust among members. It is advisable to begin with a small, limited number of the most capable companies that can interact with each other with sufficient trust and agility. This can then be expanded gradually. While the private sector plays an important role in collaboration, the role of CISA and NISC as lead agencies is also crucial to effectively promote top-down nationwide cooperation. It is essential to maintain a robust channel of collaboration between the two. One potential step would be to assign liaisons with cybersecurity expertise in CISA and NISC to each other. This would clarify the point of contact as well as build trust between the two organizations, promoting closer collaboration on a daily basis. CISA’s liaison office in the United Kingdom and the JSDF’s liaison officers at the Pentagon may be suitable models for consideration.</p> - -<p><em>Deepen sector-to-sector collaboration</em></p> - -<p>The United States and Japan face similar challenges in sectors that are vulnerable to being targeted by state-sponsored actors, such as the electricity, communications, transportation, and water sectors, as well as sectors that are vulnerable to ransomware attacks, such as the healthcare sector. It is, therefore, recommended that the two countries deepen direct sector-to-sector collaboration to address sector-specific cyber and physical security and resilience. In addition to the common cybersecurity standards and requirements across sectors, each sector requires sector-specific risk management and resilience that takes into account its unique ecosystems with supply chains, business practices, systems, facilities, and other specific components. This requires different expertise in different industries and sectors. Fortunately, the sector designations in both countries are similar and can be relatively easily mapped. It would be beneficial to collaborate on developing and sharing guidance, best practices, and tools between sectors in both countries to enhance sector-specific capabilities. This would also be beneficial for under-resourced sectors to optimize their limited cyber resources. Moreover, establishing an environment where sector-specific threats and vulnerabilities are directly shared between the sectors would be a significant operational benefit.</p> - -<p>In the context of sector-to-sector collaboration, Japan and the United States can focus more on industry-specific characteristics beyond cybersecurity, including physical security and disaster management. Since the interdependency extends beyond cyberspace, it is important to consider physical security when identifying systemic risk. Japan has a long history of experiencing several national-scale disasters, including typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis. As a result, the country has developed a wealth of experience and expertise in dealing with such events, ensuring cyber and physical resilience. In particular, Japan’s major companies, which provide essential infrastructure services that support the functioning of the nation, are well-versed in integrated resilience measures specific to their industry. This is the source of Japan’s ability to provide infrastructure services with a high degree of stability and accuracy, and its practices can be highly beneficial for improving resilience and ensuring business continuity in sectors with similar characteristics in the United States.</p> - -<p>Specific forms of cooperation could include operational collaboration between ISACs. While cooperation between government agencies is essential, it is also crucial to involve private companies, which own and operate the majority of critical infrastructure. It is, therefore, beneficial to facilitate direct collaboration between major companies representing sectors in both countries. One potential approach to advance this is to exchange a few selected cybersecurity staff from major companies in each sector in both countries for a certain period. Such an initiative would not only facilitate the exchange of valuable insights between the two sectors; it would also lay the foundation for the trust needed to facilitate operational collaboration.</p> - -<p><em>Enhance coordinated operations to disrupt threat actors</em></p> - -<p>As the number of borderless cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure continues to grow, it is becoming increasingly clear that international law enforcement agencies must take a more coordinated approach to countermeasures, including the takedown of botnets, shutdown of cryptocurrency infrastructures, recovery of ransom, and assistance to victims. The United States and Japan have a collaborative relationship in this area, with a particularly strong partnership in recent years, including in the coordinated response to the LockBit ransomware group. However, the number of such operations is smaller than that of the United States and European countries, and there is still room to expand cooperation in this area. As NPA demonstrated its high technical capabilities with the LockBit operation, Japan can make a further contribution with these capabilities. Furthermore, with the growing geopolitical tensions, Japan’s strategic location at the center of the Indo-Pacific region presents an opportunity for Japan to contribute to criminal investigations with the unique information it gathers in the region. Japan can also serve as a hub state for cooperation with other countries in the region, working with the United States.</p> - -<p>The FBI and NPA are responsible for the enforcement of countermeasures. However, since the cloud, networks, and cryptocurrency infrastructure utilized by attackers are tied to private providers internationally, it is necessary for companies in both countries to cooperate with law enforcement agencies within the legal framework. Further collaboration between law enforcement agencies and increased opportunities for coordinated operations involving private organizations in both countries would reinforce deterrence and demonstrate Japan-U.S. solidarity against foreign adversaries.</p> - -<h4 id="additional-areas-of-collaboration">Additional Areas of Collaboration</h4> - -<p><em>Harmonize rules, standards, and framework</em></p> - -<p>One key objective of Japan-U.S. collaboration is to harmonize the various cybersecurity processes in both countries. While there is a wide range of approaches to cybersecurity, from mandatory requirements to voluntary standards and frameworks, it is important to harmonize these internationally to streamline processes and ensure consistency. This is of particular importance for allied countries to ensure the interoperability of rules and frameworks, reduce the burden on multinational companies located in both countries, and ensure the same levels of cybersecurity.</p> - -<p>There is currently a growing discussion in Japan on the potential requirement for critical infrastructure owners and operators across sectors to report significant cyber incidents. As this discussion continues, it will be necessary for Japan to investigate and analyze similar regulations in other countries, including the U.S. CIRCIA, to achieve greater effectiveness and alignment. Furthermore, as a voluntary guideline for critical infrastructure, it would be beneficial to crosswalk and map between a series of Japan’s guidelines and the U.S. CSF and CPGs. It would also be beneficial for both countries to develop and standardize basic principles with international partners, such as minimum baseline requirements that may be developed in the United States in the near future, as baseline requirements should not differ significantly across nations. It is also recommended that government procurement and certification requirements be standardized to reduce the administrative burden on companies in both countries. For example, although FedRAMP and ISMAP, certification programs for cloud services, are said to be equivalent to some extent, providers need to obtain certification separately from each. There is an opportunity to explore the possibility of mutual recognition.</p> - -<p>It would also be beneficial for both countries to further promote the adoption of the NIST CSF as a risk-based, standards-based, flexible, technology-neutral, and global consensus-based framework. Japan has a long history of international partners engaging in CSF development and implementation. The release of CSF 2.0 is an opportunity for the private sector to take the lead in the transition to the new version, the development of supplementary resources, the sharing of use cases and lessons learned, and the expansion of application to a wide range of organizations, including SMBs. These should continue to be promoted through cooperation with NIST and the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) community. The use of a common framework for cybersecurity risk management enables organizations in both countries to visualize risks and their management plans and communicate in a common language, facilitating discussions on operational collaboration. Furthermore, in recent years, the CSF has been frequently brought up in regulatory discussions, with a growing consensus that it should serve as a common foundation for all involved. Thus, the adoption of the CSF has become a crucial step in facilitating international regulatory harmonization as well.</p> - -<p><em>Cooperate on specific technologies and services</em></p> - -<p>The United States and Japan have world-leading technological capabilities and much to gain from cooperating in specific technological areas. This paper does not address all of them, as its focus is on critical infrastructure protection, but briefly outlines some of the potential areas of cooperation.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Internet routing security</li> -</ul> - -<p>The internet is an inherently open and internationally interconnected infrastructure. In particular, routing security, which is currently a key area of focus, requires a collaborative approach involving multiple stakeholders internationally. The United States and Japan have a number of global leading providers of telecommunications, data centers, and cloud services. Many of these entities may have already implemented RPKI and other routing security measures in their infrastructure, but they could further influence the entire internet ecosystem, including SMBs and customer networks, by advocating their practices through the international community of internet operations. As the United States shifts its focus to a domestic regulatory approach, it would be highly beneficial for U.S. and Japanese operators to spearhead industry-led initiatives as a model for the community and to promote international stakeholder approaches.</p> - -<ul> - <li>5G/O-RAN security</li> -</ul> - -<p>The United States and Japan are in relatively similar positions with regard to the development and deployment of 5G networks using O-RAN, as there are no traditional wireless communications equipment vendors with a significant global market share, such as Nokia and Ericsson in Europe. In the international deployment of secure and reliable 5G networks, O-RAN security is a key area of focus and an opportunity for mutually beneficial collaboration between the United States and Japan. The O-RAN security report published by Quad states that networks using O-RAN do not fundamentally alter the security environment of wireless communication networks compared to conventional networks. Moving forward, it would be beneficial for the two countries to showcase their achievements in building secure networks by conducting joint tests focusing on cybersecurity in a phase closer to commercial implementation. This can be achieved through NTIA grant programs in which both Japanese and U.S. carriers participate, as well as test beds provided by carriers.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Vulnerability scanning</li> -</ul> - -<p>The NOTICE project, which has been in operation in Japan for over five years, extensively scans vulnerabilities in internet-facing IoT devices in Japan and encourages users to take corrective action. Meanwhile, CISA has been providing a Cyber Hygiene Vulnerability Scanning service since 2022 that scans vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices owned by registered companies and issues reports and alerts. There are similarities between the two programs. Through cooperation, both programs could provide insights on how to enhance their programs from various perspectives, including technical implementations and user outreach methods. Moreover, there could be an opportunity for collaboration in sharing services, tools, and resources of the programs.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Space system security</li> -</ul> - -<p>While space systems have not been designated as critical infrastructure in either country, it is clear that space has already become a strategic domain for both commercial and military use. While there is a growing concern about the cybersecurity of space systems, including from a national security perspective, both countries are still in the early stages of addressing the specific risk. In the United States, CISA, the NSC, and the National Space Council are taking the lead in studying minimum cybersecurity requirements for space systems. CISA, in cooperation with the private sector, recently released a paper outlining recommendations for space system operators. In Japan, METI has published cybersecurity guidelines for commercial space systems. As this is a new and evolving area, there may be an opportunity for the two countries to cooperate in assessing space-specific threats and risks and developing a risk management plan. In January 2023, the United States and Japan signed a framework agreement on comprehensive space cooperation. It would be worthwhile for both countries to prioritize cybersecurity as a key area of cooperation in anticipation of the potential designation of space systems as critical infrastructure in the future.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Post-quantum cryptography</li> -</ul> - -<p>Cryptography is a foundational technology for ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of data. It is a critical element of cybersecurity. The release of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards by NIST this year further accelerates global efforts around PQC migration. In the United States, the goal is to complete the migration in federal agencies by 2035, as outlined in NSM-10 and a subsequent OMB directive. During the long-term transition, it is essential to ensure connectivity and interoperability between organizations and systems, as there will be a mixed environment of systems with both existing and PQC algorithms. This is also true for the Japan-U.S. alliance. There is an opportunity for both governments to collaborate on coordinating migration road maps for government agencies and critical infrastructure and aligning their efforts on deployment to ensure cybersecurity and interoperability of the digital infrastructure and operational environment on which both countries depend. Moreover, Japanese companies could further contribute to the advancement of international PQC migration initiatives by actively engaging with relevant communities, such as the NCCoE’s project, where they can share best practices and develop guidance on PQC migration.</p> - -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> - -<p>The Japan-U.S. alliance is more important than ever in light of the growing geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region. Much of today’s alliance activities are based on cyberspace, with critical infrastructure for which both countries rely on each other being a central element. Given the shared significant threat to critical infrastructure posed by state-sponsored actors, it is imperative for the two countries to cooperate in critical infrastructure protection to ensure the cybersecurity and resilience of the alliance as a whole and demonstrate their robust solidarity against foreign adversaries.</p> - -<p>While there are a number of policy cooperation agendas between the two countries at various levels and entities, including critical infrastructure protection, there is still room for improvement in implementing concrete and tangible operational collaboration. It is crucial for both countries to further expand and operationalize these efforts with speed and scale while ensuring further involvement of critical infrastructure owners and operators. There are several potential avenues for collaboration, including engaging in national and alliance-level risk analysis, conducting cross-sector public-private joint cyber exercises, expanding the public-private operational collaboration environment, deepening sector-to-sector collaboration, enhancing coordinated operations to disrupt threat actors, harmonizing cybersecurity processes, and cooperating in specific technologies and services. To facilitate these specific operational collaborations efficiently, it is also important for all parties involved in Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation to have a comprehensive understanding of both countries’ highly decentralized and complicated cybersecurity structures and their roles, responsibilities, and authorities.</p> - -<p>Japan and the United States are currently at a pivotal point in their national cybersecurity policies, with key national security and cybersecurity strategies and legislation being implemented. Taking these evolutions as an opportunity, it is the right time to reassess the current state of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation and explore ways forward for further collaboration.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Taro Hashimoto</strong> is a visiting fellow with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has been with Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) Group for over 15 years, where he has held various roles in cybersecurity and telecommunication businesses, including service planning, development and operation, research and development, corporate risk management, and human resource development from both technology and management perspectives.</p>Taro HashimotoCybersecurity is the foundation for a robust U.S.-Japan alliance. This report analyzes the cybersecurity policies of both countries and the prospects for future collaboration on critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience.Trusted Chips2024-10-24T12:00:00+08:002024-10-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trusted-chips<p><em>A quest for “trusted chips” risks sidetracking crucial semiconductor policy solutions. Aligned policy goals are needed to truly secure and de-risk supply chains, balancing national security, economic viability, and technological feasibility.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>The United States and its allies have taken significant actions to promote the de-risking of semiconductor supply chains. Protecting and controlling these supply chains also remain critical components of national and economic security discussions. To achieve this holistically, several sometimes-conflicting goals need to be met:</p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p>Critical technologies and products need to be controlled.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Export control sanctions must be enforced.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Sensitive information must be safeguarded against attacks through compromised chips.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Overreliance on nonmarket actors must be avoided.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>A competitive, commercially viable semiconductor supply must be ensured.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<p>Many of these policy goals have been recently subsumed under a general call for “trusted” or “trustworthy” chips. In reality, the goals are varied and complex, and trade-offs are unavoidable. For example, adding security features will increase costs and might not be technically feasible for most semiconductors.</p> - -<p>Without specific, clearly defined, and aligned policy goals – along with an appreciation of the technological boundary conditions and an understanding of the economic impacts along the supply chain – the discussions among the United States and its allies are unlikely to yield meaningful results. “Trusted chips” will continue to mean different things to different stakeholders, detracting from solving the underlying issues.</p> - -<p>This white paper offers three recommendations for policymakers to address pertinent questions about the semiconductor supply chain:</p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p>Align on specific policy objectives rather than definitions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Use, refine, and align existing policy tools devised for specific objectives.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Enable and seek industry involvement to ensure commercial viability and promote fast adoption.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<h3 id="mapping-wide-ranging-policy-objectives-onto-a-trusted-chip-concept-will-fail">Mapping Wide-Ranging Policy Objectives onto a “Trusted Chip” Concept Will Fail</h3> - -<p>Security typically deals with technical controls and processes, whereas trust is a social concept that goes a step further: It is fundamentally about relationship dynamics and the expectations that come with them.</p> - -<p>The term “trusted chip” thus sets a high bar. It might imply, for example, the confidence that the semiconductor will perform according to its specifications under all conditions and be free of unintended defects or malicious manipulation. It could also signal awareness or control over the product’s provenance – transparency about the chip’s exact supply chain, or at least certainty that critical steps in the supply chain took place outside the control of adversaries.</p> - -<p>Among semiconductor industry experts, the term “trust” historically means one of two narrowly defined concepts:</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="trusted-microcontrollers">Trusted Microcontrollers</h4> -</blockquote> - -<blockquote> - <p>A dedicated microcontroller (MCU), or parts of an MCU designed to secure hardware through integrated cryptographic features, is called a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). TPMs have proliferated from sensitive defense or government applications to high-volume consumer devices such as personal computers and mobile phones. An ISO/IEC 11889 standard was published in 2009. Trusted MCUs are instrumental in achieving high system-level cybersecurity standards, such as those called for by the U.S. Cybersecurity Label for consumer and Internet of Things devices or the European Union’s Cyber Resilience Act.</p> -</blockquote> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="trusted-supply-chains">Trusted Supply Chains</h4> -</blockquote> - -<blockquote> - <p>In 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense initiated a Trusted Foundry Program, now part of the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA)’s Trusted Supplier Program. As of early 2024, 16 out of 82 accredited trusted suppliers were also accredited for semiconductor foundry services, to provide services for advanced and foundational chips. The program is tailored to critical but less cost-sensitive defense and national security applications.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>The two concepts can be applied simultaneously. However, while the latter can be applied to all semiconductors, the former is limited to a specific product category.</p> - -<p>There are more recent attempts to broaden the concept of trusted semiconductors. Examples can be found in the 2023 European Chips Act, which advocates for “trusted, secure and green chips.” However, a clear definition remains elusive.</p> - -<p>In the context of controlling access to the most advanced artificial intelligence (AI) hardware, secure and governable AI chips have been proposed, expanding on the concept of trusted MCUs.</p> - -<p>Some policymakers even proposed the concept of trusted semiconductors as a trade remedy – that is, restricting access to U.S. and allied markets to trade with trusted chips. Lastly, it has been suggested that trusted chips could aid in verifying export control compliance.</p> - -<p>This short overview illustrates how the concept of trust, broadly applied to semiconductor markets, glosses over crucial details: Should it apply to all chips or only some? Should it benefit broad consumer markets or defense contractors? Do the costs of implementing a technical solution matter or not? Mapping wide-ranging policy objectives – such as export control, supply risk mitigation, trade policy, cybersecurity, and integrity of critical microelectronic systems – onto the “trust” concept is bound to fail. Worse, it will distract from meaningful discussions.</p> - -<h3 id="answering-four-questions-can-structure-and-focus-the-discussion">Answering Four Questions Can Structure and Focus the Discussion</h3> - -<p>Policy solutions to guide semiconductor export control, supply risk mitigation, trade policy, and cybersecurity are nevertheless pertinent. They need to be coupled with an appreciation for technological feasibility and private sector commercial incentives.</p> - -<p>Answering four questions will help to structure and focus the discussion (Figure 1).</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AcVHFqr.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: Option Space for Key Semiconductor Policy Questions</em></p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Which semiconductors should be covered?</strong> MCUs and microprocessors (MPUs) allow, in principle, the implementation of on-chip security features to establish trust, traceability, and, potentially, governance features. However, MCUs and MPUs combined cover less than 15 percent of the semiconductor market. On-chip security features are not technically feasible for much of the remaining 85 percent (e.g., sensors, power semiconductors, other discrete semiconductors). These devices lack the compute and memory capabilities to execute trust functionality.</p> - - <p>A unique, tamper-proof, chip-level identification for all semiconductors would be commercially prohibitive in most cases. Printing a unique marker on every semiconductor’s packaging would be cheaper, but it would still need to be backed by an industry-wide global database to detect misuse reliably.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Which systems should be covered?</strong> Critical applications – such as military command, control, communications, and computing equipment – require the highest technical level of device security and supply chain provenance. Additionally, the export of these application-specific or dual-use chips to adversaries often needs to be controlled. At the same time, the universe of parties that are affected by stringent requirements is relatively small: government agencies or prime contractors as buyers and a small number of accredited suppliers. Their willingness to shoulder the additional compliance and risk mitigation costs is high.</p> - - <p>Another example involves high-volume consumer devices, which can indeed provide a high level of trust. For instance, a laptop or mobile phone must protect personal information and securely execute payment transactions. While this can be achieved with on-chip hardware security (available to retail consumers as aftermarket products for less than $30), full end-to-end control of a mobile phone or laptop supply chain is not commercially viable. For instance, one major U.S. consumer electronics company’s supplier list includes 200 suppliers with 600 sites at locations across the globe.</p> - - <p>Basic connected consumer devices often fall short of any digital security standards, something the EU Cyber Resilience Act and the S. Cybersecurity Label seek to address.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>What are the policy requirements?</strong> After deciding which parts of the semiconductor market and which systems should be covered, policymakers need to agree on who or what they are trying to protect and what degree of certainty constitutes success in achieving their goals.</p> - - <p>At the level of a single chip or microelectronic system, policy goals might include the control of exports and protecting the system (or data) from unauthorized access or manipulation. Alternatively, labeling trusted semiconductors could serve as a trade action in disguise to restrict imports from suppliers or countries engaging in nonmarket state practices and policies.</p> - - <p>At the level of the entire supply chain, policy goals may include the reliable supply of commercial semiconductor goods and supply chain transparency. In the case of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Trusted Supplier Program, the goal is very tight control over every step of the semiconductor supply chain.</p> - - <p>Along with these requirements come different definitions of what constitutes success. Trade remedies might be considered successful at the 80 percent level, an export control agency might be satisfied with 95 percent compliance, and defense-critical applications could demand an even higher level of confidence in the integrity of the respective semiconductor supply.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Is the solution commercially viable?</strong> If governments procure trusted chips for critical applications, they can set the economic incentives directly and compensate suppliers for the costs of manufacturing and controlled supply chains. Suppliers can price in the opportunity cost of export controls, that is, the fact that application-specific products cannot be sold in certain markets.</p> - - <p>The economics will play out very differently in the case of high-volume consumer applications, where end customers may or may not be willing to pay a premium for security or availability. In those scenarios, governments must work closely with industry and gradually influence economic incentives to steer commercial actors toward policy goals.</p> - - <p>Answering these questions theoretically results in a large number of different scenarios. However, these scenarios can be distilled into a limited number of practical policy challenges – and the tools to address those challenges are often already available. Policymakers should focus on refining these tools and achieving better alignment among allies regarding their use.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<h3 id="solve-practical-policy-challenges-instead-of-an-overarching-definition">Solve Practical Policy Challenges Instead of an Overarching Definition</h3> - -<p>In reality, solving practical policy challenges is less complex. Semiconductor devices date back to 1947, as do the challenges to safeguard the technology, protect critical electronic systems and sensitive information from unreliable or malicious chips, and ensure a commercially viable supply of semiconductors. Even the risks of overreliance and state-subsidized industrial production are not new – although the scale of this risk might well be.</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Critical Electronic Systems:</strong> For national security reasons, the United States and its allies have long controlled the semiconductor supply chain for critical electronic systems, such as those used in defense applications. This may involve both hardware and supply chain solutions. Given the sensitive nature of the applications, tools like DMEA’s Trusted Supplier Program are typically deployed on a national level. In addition to whitelisting trustworthy suppliers, blacklisting certain entities is an effective option with a strong forward-signaling impact. Examples include the EU toolbox for 5G security (though deployed with varying urgency among member states) and the more targeted Section 5949 of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act of 2023.</p> - - <p>Commercial viability can typically be achieved due to the limited scope of applications, semiconductor volumes, and involved parties.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Cybersecurity of Electronic (Sub-)Systems:</strong> This is another area where technical and commercially viable solutions either already exist (e.g., ISO/IEC 11889 for secure crypto-processors, ISO/SAE 21434 for automotive cybersecurity) or are being implemented (e.g., the S. Cybersecurity Label and the EU Cyber Resilience Act). More recently, the U.S. government proposed a rule to secure information and communications technology for connected vehicles. The rule would regulate hardware “designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by a person owned by, controlled by . . . the PRC or Russia.” Effectively, a concept of “non-trusted” semiconductors is being established, though without explicitly calling it that.</p> - - <p>Therefore, policy and commercial solutions are available or have been proposed for these use cases.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Export Controls:</strong> Limiting the export of certain types of semiconductors, their underlying technology, and manufacturing equipment is an established practice for the United States and its allies. New frameworks might be needed to address shortcomings of existing multilateral export control regimes. Still, in the meantime, multilateral, case-by-case agreements have been successfully achieved (e.g., the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands reaching a deal to curb chipmaking exports to China). Enforcing export controls for advanced AI MPUs is challenging, and stopping the illicit flow of legacy semiconductors to Russia is even harder. Solutions have been proposed to improve export control compliance, but introducing the concept of trusted MCUs or trusted supply chains is not among them. Export control is not an inbound issue – ensuring the United States and its allies get trusted products – but an outbound issue – ensuring adversaries do not obtain them.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Supply Chain Provenance Law:</strong> Various supply chain provenance requirements have been introduced in recent years. Examples include the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. In response to these requirements, companies – including semiconductor manufacturers – are implementing rigorous supply chain monitoring and verification systems, which, by definition, will apply to all their products. Introducing a “trusted chip” certification based on a geography- or entity-specific listing would be possible and might – considering the forward-signaling effect of various U.S. rulemaking proposals – already be expected by industry participants. Policymakers, however, need to carefully weigh the additional reporting burden on the industry against national and economic security goals.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Trade Remedies:</strong> There is mounting concern that Chinese industrial policy, including in the semiconductor market, supports domestic firms that do not operate according to market principles. The United States and its allies can use tools – principally tariffs – to counter nonmarket policies and practices. However, these remedies often amount to too little, too late, especially if lengthy negotiations among allies precede them. Moreover, tariffs are applied to the end product entering a market – such as a computer, mobile phone, or industrial machinery control system. Relatively few chips enter the U.S. and allied markets as components; instead, they are part of a microelectronic system (which is predominantly assembled in Asia). In those cases, the amount of the subsidy on the chip is a very small percentage of the total value of the end product and thus not much of a deterrent. Other, more targeted, entity-based policies might be more effective in countering the threat of overreliance, but such discussions are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that introducing a “trusted chip buyers alliance” to exclude countries of concern from allied markets broadly would face significant legal and practical hurdles, in addition to the abovementioned technical and commercial challenges of providing supply chain provenance.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<h3 id="policy-recommendations">Policy Recommendations</h3> - -<p>Each of the above challenges must be addressed with specific policy solutions. Some, like secure MCUs, are specific to the semiconductor industry. Others, such as export controls or transparency and certification of supply chains, extend beyond semiconductors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to make recommendations for each of them. As it pertains to the discussion about “trusted” or “trustworthy” chips, this paper offers the following recommendations to policymakers:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Align on specific policy objectives rather than definitions.</strong> Acknowledging that challenges, tools, and policy prerogatives may differ, aligning on clear, specific policy goals is important. A shared understanding is key to enabling problem-specific solutions. Often, the implementation will have to be country-specific, but integrated and aligned measures are needed to avoid negative spillover effects or loopholes. This is easier to achieve for discrete policy challenges than for a broad concept like “trusted chips.”</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Use, refine, and align existing policy tools devised for specific objectives.</strong> Rules and tools already exist to address many of the current technical and geopolitical challenges facing the semiconductor industry. Policymakers should focus on jointly deploying these tools toward a common goal and augmenting national tool kits where there are gaps.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enable and seek industry involvement to ensure commercial viability and promote fast adoption.</strong> An innovative and competitive semiconductor ecosystem is essential for the United States and its allies. Implementing both “promote” and “protect” policies through regular exchanges with industry representatives is key. Moreover, industry compliance with those policies is crucial for their effectiveness.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Andreas Schumacher</strong> is a visiting technology fellow in the Economic Security and Technology Department and the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.</p>Andreas SchumacherA quest for “trusted chips” risks sidetracking crucial semiconductor policy solutions. Aligned policy goals are needed to truly secure and de-risk supply chains, balancing national security, economic viability, and technological feasibility.NATO’s Airborne EW2024-10-24T12:00:00+08:002024-10-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/natos-airborne-electromagnetic-warfare<p><em>Long overlooked in mainstream defence circles as a “niche” capability reserved for deep specialists, airborne electronic warfare capabilities are an increasingly essential component in NATO’s ability to deter and defeat Russian aggression in Europe.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>As the UK and other European NATO members attempt to adapt their air forces to better meet the threat of wider Russian military aggression in the coming years, airborne electromagnetic warfare (EW) is a key area where non-US capabilities are in worryingly short supply across the Alliance. Investment in European airborne electromagnetic attack (EA) can, if done correctly, offer rapid increases in the survivability and lethality of existing air force aircraft and weapon systems. By the same token, however, significant expansion of capacity in Europe to rapidly update EW mission data is also essential in order to maintain current air capabilities in the face of an increasingly rapid pace of Russian radar and EW system adaptation – in part driven by the pressures Russia faces in its war against Ukraine.</p> - -<p>Airborne EW capabilities play several key roles in high-intensity air operations, and are especially important for the vital suppression and destruction of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD) mission set. The first role is defensive electronic countermeasures (ECM), where aircraft employ directed jamming effects to try to degrade and break the lock of either the radar of a hostile aircraft or surface-to-air missile system that is targeting them. The second role is offensive stand-off escort jamming, where specialised aircraft with high-powered jamming arrays either mounted in the airframe or in underwing pods degrade hostile airborne and ground-based radar threats from much further back. This enables them to significantly increase the survivability of other attack aircraft or weapons in a strike package that is closer to the threat. The third role is offensive stand-in jamming, where stealth aircraft or advanced decoys, missiles or UAVs conduct suppressive jamming on specific high-priority threat systems from comparatively close range. This is done to provide a temporary window of access for other aircraft or weapons to get through to targets in the area.</p> - -<h3 id="dependency-on-the-us">Dependency on the US</h3> - -<p>Currently, NATO’s air forces are heavily dependent on US Air Force (USAF) and US Navy (USN) aircraft to provide both stand-off and stand-in jamming against a high-end threat like Russia, although several other countries’ fighter fleets have impressive ECM capabilities already for close-range self-defence. NATO’s primary stand-off jamming capability is provided by USN EA-18G Growler aircraft and the USAF EC-130H Compass Call, which is now being replaced by the new EA-37B. SEAD support is also provided by the Tornado electronic combat/reconnaissance (ECR) aircraft of the Italian Air Force and German Air Force, as well as the F-16CM “Wild Weasels” of the USAF’s 480th Fighter Squadron in Germany. However, in terms of EA systems, these Cold War-era aircraft only carry self-protection jamming equipment that is increasingly obsolescent against the more modern Russian threats if used without cover from the more powerful US stand-off systems like the EA-18G and EA-37B. The Tornado ECRs are also only available in small numbers, and the majority of the USAF F-16CM fleet is based in South Korea and Japan. It is notable that in almost any high-end NATO SEAD/DEAD exercise, USN EA-18Gs perform the majority of the EA support, since they offer by far the greatest capability in their class.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Significant expansion of capacity in Europe to rapidly update electronic warfare mission data is essential in order to maintain current air capabilities in the face of an increasingly rapid pace of Russian adaptation</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>However, the USN attempted to withdraw its land-based EA-18G units from the European theatre in mid-2022 to bolster its presence in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East. The Growler is a critical part of the Carrier Air Wing force structure, and demand for its capabilities greatly outstrips the number of squadrons available to deploy at any given time. That attempt did not immediately lead to withdrawal, but relying on US EA support as a lynchpin of European NATO SEAD/DEAD capabilities remains a high-risk posture. One of the most likely scenarios in which Russia might risk direct conflict with a NATO member is if the US is drawn into either a serious military standoff or an actual conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific. In any clash over Taiwan or in the South China Sea, airborne EA assets would be some of the most in-demand in the entire US arsenal, meaning few if any EA-18G Growlers or USAF EA-37B Compass Call aircraft would be made available to respond to a Russian threat in Europe during a concurrent crisis. This means a much greater burden of the high-end EW effort would fall on European capabilities than in any previous post-Cold War conflict.</p> - -<h3 id="european-and-uk-airborne-ew-hardware">European and UK Airborne EW Hardware</h3> - -<p>The French Rafale and Swedish Gripen both offer impressive ECM self-protection capabilities, but neither are currently equipped for dedicated stand-off or stand-in jamming. This follows a pattern across NATO air forces where EW in the air domain was primarily thought of as an aircraft self-defence capability outside of specialist units during decades of counterinsurgency operations. However, faced with the challenge of the extensive Russian integrated air defence system, European air forces now face a requirement for much greater offensive stand-off and stand-in jamming capabilities to support SEAD/DEAD operations at scale. Germany has ordered the development of 15 “Eurofighter EK” aircraft from existing airframes, designed to replace its ageing Tornado ECRs in the SEAD role. The EK will use an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar developed by Hensoldt; the Aeraxis EW sensor suit from Saab; and AI-enabled software and mission data by Helsing. However, it will not be certified as combat ready until 2030, and that timeline assumes that the programme faces no delays.</p> - -<p>The F-35 is also a potent airborne EW asset, and one that has been purchased by a large number of NATO members including the UK, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Poland, Germany and Czechia. Despite being primarily designed for low-observable strike and SEAD/DEAD operations, its APG-81 radar and advanced mission systems enable highly effective ECM for self-defence and also provide potent stand-in jamming and potentially limited stand-off jamming capabilities against both airborne and surface threats. Even a few F-35s can greatly enhance the survivability of not only their own formation but also allied assets operating alongside them as part of composite air operations. However, the F-35 still faces tactical limitations that make it difficult to generate sustained EW effects for more than short bursts, and pilots potentially risk compromising their position to hostile sensors when emitting in this way. More advanced EA capabilities that formed part of the intended Block 4 upgrade have in many cases been delayed until at least 2029 by issues with the electrical power generation capacity of the existing F-135 engine and hardware manufacturing bottlenecks. Most countries that have bought F-35s also lack the capacity or rights to modify or create their own mission data sets, and instead rely on the US for their mission data and threat library updates.</p> - -<p>However, this does not fully apply to the UK since it is part of the Australian, Canadian and United Kingdom Reprogramming Laboratory (ACURL), which enables it to generate UK-specific mission data. Beyond the ACURL for its F-35B fleet, the UK has several national airborne EW development and procurement programmes. For stand-in jamming effects, the RAF is exploring options for stand-in jamming payloads for its Autonomous Collaborative Platform (ACP) programme, and continues to fund development work on a stand-in jamming variant of the MBDA SPEAR 3 miniature cruise missile called SPEAR EW. Potent ECM capabilities are also a core feature of the new ECRS Mk2 AESA radar, which is being procured to eventually be retrofitted onto the 40 Tranche 3 aircraft in the RAF Typhoon fleet. However, SPEAR EW has not actually been ordered so far, and the ECRS Mk2 has been developed very slowly compared to AESA radar development programmes for comparable fighters. On current timeframes, RAF Typhoons with the new radar are unlikely to be in service on the frontlines before the late 2020s. The threat outlook in Europe, therefore, would seem to suggest that allocating increased funding and priority to whichever of these existing programmes can offer the most rapid path to procurement and introduction to service is something that should be seriously considered. Given the lack of funding so far for ECRS Mk2 radar sets for the remaining 77 RAF Tranche 2 Typhoons, urgent updates to the capability of their existing ESM and Defensive Aid Sub-System (DASS) suites should also be examined – especially if novel software techniques could improve capability faster than hardware upgrades planned but not yet funded within the Typhoon LTE construct.</p> - -<h3 id="the-crucial-role-of-mission-data-and-software">The Crucial Role of Mission Data and Software</h3> - -<p>Investment in platforms, sensors and effectors – however important – is also insufficient by itself. EW effectiveness requires electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection capabilities to record hostile radar emissions and covert intelligence collection in order to help understand enemy systems in depth. Many of these ELINT gathering capabilities can be and are mounted on a variety of assets besides fighter aircraft, with the RC-135W Rivet Joint and P-8 Poseidon being notable but by no means exclusive examples. One key objective must be to make better use of the huge amount of such data that is naturally collected by the increasingly capable digital sensors on most airborne and some land and maritime platforms during everyday training and on operations, since the vast majority of this data is not currently captured and fed into the EW analysis and mission data cycle. Beyond improving collection, however, making use of ELINT also requires the ability to rapidly convert collected data on hostile systems into frequent mission data updates in order to enable aircraft and EW systems to remain effective once a conflict starts. Outside the US, where once again the vast majority of NATO capacity and capability resides, the three most capable countries in terms of collection, ELINT analysis and mission data update generation are France, Sweden and the UK. Other countries such as Germany, Italy and Czechia also have centres of expertise and capability, but at a significantly smaller scale.</p> - -<p>The UK has long maintained greater mission data generation capacity than most other NATO allies, largely through the Joint Electronic Warfare Operational Support Centre (JEWOSC) – a Strategic Command asset that is located within the RAF Air and Space Warfare Centre at RAF Waddington. However, dependency on data collected by the US for the JEWOSC’s work is still high, and budgetary and personnel limitations prevent major expansion of capacity without leveraging new techniques such as those offered by machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) toolsets. The task is more complex and simultaneously more essential than ever before, as Russian forces already make widespread use of sophisticated digital radar and EW systems with advanced processing capabilities that can very rapidly alter their signal patterns, energy levels and even frequency bands. This means that not only are they more difficult to detect within the background “noise” of any battlespace, but they are also difficult to identify from their emission signature and can rapidly adapt their signal to reduce the ability of EW to degrade their effectiveness. Consequently, mission data for aircraft, defensive aid suites, weapon seekers and EW systems must be updated far more rapidly than ever before to remain effective in any conflict involving a major power like Russia.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Faced with the challenge of Russia’s extensive integrated air defence system, European air forces now face a requirement for much greater offensive stand-off and stand-in jamming capabilities to support SEAD/DEAD operations at scale</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>ML and AI technologies are likely to further increase the speed at which adversary systems adapt and change their behaviour in the coming years. However, these technologies also offer a path for the UK (and other NATO members) to greatly increase the speed and power of collection and mission data update cycles – especially by multiplying the capacity of relatively small teams of specialists. Therefore, the question of how to most efficiently and rapidly integrate advanced ML and AI capabilities into the JEWOSC in order to enhance its capacity and the speed at which it can generate new mission data should be a priority for the Ministry of Defence, even in a budgetary and strategic context where there are a huge variety of competing ones.</p> - -<p>In February 2022, USAF F-35s found that even with the aircraft’s unmatched ELINT gathering sensor and analysis capabilities as a SEAD asset, some Russian radars were able to evade accurate identification by using previously unseen “war reserve modes”. The pace of Russian EW and radar signal adaptation has increased many times since then thanks to the pressure of the conflict against Ukraine. Without the capacity to update airborne mission data at a comparable pace, the UK will not only miss the opportunity to develop effective airborne EW capabilities that can help improve NATO’s SEAD/DEAD capabilities and thus its deterrence posture, but it will also risk seeing its existing combat air fleets lose survivability and lethality against Russia and other state threats over time.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Justin Bronk</strong> is the Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology in the Military Sciences team at RUSI, and the Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal. His particular areas of expertise include the modern combat air environment, Russian and Chinese ground-based air defences and fast jet capabilities, the air war during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and novel weapons technology.</p>Justin BronkLong overlooked in mainstream defence circles as a “niche” capability reserved for deep specialists, airborne electronic warfare capabilities are an increasingly essential component in NATO’s ability to deter and defeat Russian aggression in Europe.Democracy And Human Rights2024-10-24T12:00:00+08:002024-10-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/democracy-and-human-rights<p><em>Authoritarian states are targeting weaknesses in democratic governance to undermine U.S. interests across the globe. It is time for a bipartisan strategy that rallies alliances, business, and civil society actors in defense of democratic governance and human rights.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>Throughout its history, the United States has emphasized human rights and democracy as core tenets of global engagement but struggled to balance those priorities against the exigencies of immediate geopolitical threats. At home, the definition of democracy itself is increasingly contested in a hyper-partisan political environment that foreign adversaries seek to exploit for their own strategic gain. Both at home and abroad, key foreign policy strategists are questioning whether the United States and its allies have the consensus or capacity necessary to put values at the core of their resistance to coercion and cooption by aggrieved and autocratic adversaries.</p> - -<p>This report argues that the United States can – and must – do more to promote democracy and democratic norms internationally if it is to secure a favorable international order that preserves common prosperity and security as well as a dignified way of life for people everywhere in the twenty-first century. It further argues that it is precisely because of, not in spite of, the aggressive ambitions and methods of the autocratic powers that the United States must integrate defense of democracy and human rights into its national security strategy. It notes that despite divisions at home, a broad bipartisan commitment exists to defend and advance democratic values that can be harnessed to sustain such a strategy. The report further illustrates that in key regions of the world, U.S. allies and partners are themselves recognizing that both their security and their economic interests depend on the democratic resilience of vulnerable states in their near abroad. Many are articulating strategies and preparing tools that align with or complement U.S. approaches.</p> - -<p>The United States therefore has a requirement and opportunities to develop an integrated democracy strategy. The point is not that military, economic, or diplomatic objectives should be subordinated to human rights or democracy priorities, but rather that these strategies should be integrated in national security planning alongside diplomatic, military, and economic objectives. Key elements would include the following efforts:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Harness democratic allies and partners:</strong> It is important that any democratic agenda not be seen as a special interest of the United States but as one shared by a diverse array of nations globally. This is not a matter of recruiting allies and partners to a singular strategy but rather empowering them to shape debates and reinforce democratic norms internationally and in their own regions. The best framing for this effort in Asia, Africa, or Latin America is around sovereignty, prosperity, resilience, and national self-strengthening rather than justice or strategic competition with China and Russia. Empirical demonstrations, for example, that accountability, transparency, rule of law mechanisms, and women’s empowerment enhance national wealth and strength will be powerful. One successful example of such a regional approach is the National Endowment for Democracy’s Sunnylands Initiative on Enhancing Democratic Partnership in the Indo-Pacific.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Harness the business community:</strong> The U.S. business community should understand the competitive advantage of promoting a normative agenda that enhances openness and rules given their need for a level playing field in overseas markets and to counter the corruption and kleptocracy that have become business models for the modern-day authoritarian. Private sector engagement and trade policy levers can have significant impact on transparency and good governance that in turn reinforce accountability to the governed.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Harness civil society and support democrats at risk:</strong> The United States should continue to underwrite the development of democratic institutions worldwide, including an independent civil society. U.S. leaders should be consistent in meeting with and speaking out on behalf of dissidents and champions of freedom to encourage those struggling on the front lines of the normative democratic challenge. State Department reporting on democracy and human rights, and the work of U.S. Agency for Global Media components such as Radio Free Asia and Voice of America, also promote norms of openness and free expression and protect democrats at risk.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhance resilience of international institutions:</strong> China’s growing diplomatic influence in bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council has proven frustrating for U.S. interests. Efforts by autocracies to neuter or reshape international institutions should be a reason to increase U.S. diplomatic efforts rather than allow UN and regional bodies to become advocates for an authoritarian vision of regional and global order inconsistent with their origins.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhance U.S. strategic communications:</strong> Authoritarian regimes can often prove more agile than democracies at disseminating information and maintaining message discipline, but democratic allies enjoy the advantage of representing norms desired by billions of people worldwide. The United States and its allies should develop a global information strategy that supports local independent media, facilitates access to balanced news and analysis, and actively counters false and self-interested narratives advanced by authoritarians.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Harness digital technology:</strong> Digital technologies, particularly social media and artificial intelligence (AI), are playing an increasingly important role in enhancing the threat of algorithmically proliferated attacks on democracies and on the idea of democracy itself. Digital literacy, social media regulation, and support for those seeking to develop digital tools that are explicitly designed to enhance conversation and compromise (i.e., democratic norms), should be enhanced. The United States and its allies should also lead on establishing international principles on AI, oppose the unauthorized and unlabeled use of deep fakes, and establish digital norms, particularly around elections.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Sustain bipartisan consensus:</strong> As with most foreign policy issues, bipartisan unity and executive-congressional consensus will ensure strategic continuity and enhance prospects for success in advancing U.S. interests. A deliberate bipartisan coalition would help advance a values-based foreign policy that reflects the best traditions of the United States and defend U.S. security, while demonstrating to allies, partners, democratic activists, and autocratic adversaries alike that American unity, solidarity, and sustained commitment to the issue is strategic and unshakable.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>Democracy is said to be in decline. But it is better understood to be under attack. Citizens today who are unhappy with their leaders, in democracies and autocracies alike, seek not less of a voice in political affairs, but more. Not fewer rights and protections, but more. Not less democracy, but better democracy. And they’re looking for allies.</p> - -<p>The good news is supporting democratic development is not financially costly and plays to America’s strengths. But some creativity and urgency in developing a coherent democracy support strategy is needed. Failing to do so while watching our adversaries shape global norms that conform to their illiberal model will have profound effects on U.S. and allied security.</p> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>The essence of grand strategy is the ability to reconcile two seemingly contradictory objectives in the pursuit of national interest. No objective has been more fundamental to the founding of the American republic and the United States’ role in the world than the advancement of democracy and individual rights. And no objective has proven more vexing to those who have sought to secure the republic through balance of power strategies that pursue alignments and projection of power unencumbered by debates about the political nature of other states in the system. This tension is as old as the United States itself, but it has resurfaced in the context of renewed great power geopolitical competition.</p> - -<p>Can the United States formulate a grand strategy that incorporates liberal democratic values, avoids charges of hypocrisy, and withstands intensifying geopolitical fragmentation? This essay argues that we can – and must – do so if we are to secure a favorable international order that preserves common prosperity and security as well as the American way of life in the twenty-first century. Far from ignoring the complex realities of our times, such a strategy accounts for them. And while U.S. democracy itself is under unprecedented stress, and its return to health essential to any strategy’s success, addressing that urgent challenge should not distract us from the strategic importance of promoting international norms that support human dignity and have proved in both logic and empirical study to foster international peace, security, and development. Doing so can also help knit together common threads that have traditionally united Americans across the political divide and been a source of national strength.</p> - -<p>The premise of this report is that the United States and its allies and partners are engaged in a systems-level contest in which they must prevail. It begins with a review of the U.S. historical context and an assessment of the emerging conceptual obstacles and opportunities at home and abroad that confront any values-based foreign policy strategy. The report concludes by introducing a framework for integrating “democracy” and democratic values across all instruments of U.S. national power, not to the exclusion of realpolitik, hard power considerations but in thoughtful, creative, and effective combination with them.</p> - -<h3 id="values-and-the-american-way-of-statecraft">Values and the American Way of Statecraft</h3> - -<p>Americans have long struggled to find the proper balance between our transformational democratic values and our more risk-averse pursuit of commercial and diplomatic advantage. When the Empress of China set sail from New York in 1784 to open commerce with the Qing Empire for the newly independent United States, Major Samuel Shaw was sent along as the country’s first diplomatic representative to what was then called the East Indies. Shaw was instructed not to emphasize U.S. democracy, which might offend the Celestial Emperor, but instead to emphasize the new republic’s support for anticolonialism as a contrast to the United States’ major geopolitical rival, Great Britain. Similar geopolitical concerns prompted top U.S. diplomats to downplay democratic norms well into the twentieth century, including the approach to China by Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, and Brent Scowcroft in the 1970s through the 1990s, as well as the stance of multiple administrations toward Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations.</p> - -<p>Other U.S. leaders have moved sharply in the opposite direction, prioritizing democracy, self-rule, and human rights over security and business interests. President Woodrow Wilson stunned the U.S. business and foreign policy establishments in 1913 by moving quickly to recognize the new Republic of China and simultaneously pushing out the Mexican junta of General Victoriano Huerta. In a similar vein, President Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s rejected two decades of support for anticommunist allies and chose to condition security cooperation in Asia – namely with South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan – on improvements in human rights.</p> - -<p>Neither of these contrasting approaches – the hard power realpolitik of Shaw, Kissinger, and Scowcroft nor the undisciplined idealism of Wilson and Carter – proved durable. Kissinger’s realism invited the pendulum swing of the Carter administration, while President George H.W. Bush’s approach to the Tiananmen Square massacre invited a debilitating congressional backlash on trade relations with China that took a year to resolve. On the other side, Wilson retreated from his early idealism and rejected self-determination for non-European peoples at Versailles at the end of World War I, in the process turning a generation of idealistic nationalists into anti-American revolutionaries (including Ho Chi Minh). Carter’s clashes with the leaders of South Korea, the Philippines, and Central American republics in the late 1970s proved untenable in the face of Soviet expansionism in the less-developed world, and he was forced to drop human rights pressure on allies. Idealism divorced from realism proved no more enduring than realism divorced from idealism.</p> - -<p>Some leaders in U.S. history have been notably more successful at integrating values and power politics and avoiding these pendulum swings. Thomas Jefferson and later Commodore Matthew Perry, who opened Japan in 1853, both argued that the United States had a strategic interest in supporting independent, well-governed republics in the Pacific because they would be more resistant to the hegemonic aspirations of America’s expanding European rivals (this was based on the assumption, of course, that these independent republics would give the vote to white men only). The most influential strategic thinker in American history, Alfred Thayer Mahan, wrote in the 1890s that the United States needed both commercial and “moral” influence in Asia and the Caribbean. However, his idealism was limited by a recognition of the limits to the scope of this influence, and thus he discouraged extending this policy to further reaches of South America or the continent of Asia, where U.S. power and interests began to fade. Some would see this self-restraint as cynical, but Mahan saw it as a pragmatic form of a moral foreign policy.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Idealism divorced from realism proved no more enduring than realism divorced from idealism.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>After witnessing the counterproductive swings between idealism and realpolitik of the Wilson administration, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt sought a better balance during World War II. He championed the Atlantic Charter and the “Four Freedoms” (freedom of speech and worship, and freedom from fear and want) and set the stage for inclusion of those norms in postwar international institutions. But he was also willing to accept close relations with dictatorships in Latin America and with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in order to keep them on side against Hitler – allegedly stating that “they may be SOBs, but they’re my SOBs.”</p> - -<p>These cycles of American enthusiasm for and against a values-based foreign policy have consistently been shaped – and often distorted by – geopolitical setbacks. The American entry into World War I, escalation in Vietnam, and the invasion of Iraq were all ostensibly driven primarily by hard-power considerations (restoring balance in the Euro-Atlantic, preventing the expansion of international communism, and reshaping Middle East security, respectively). However, presidents at the time framed the war efforts in moralistic terms that they believed the U.S. public would support. When the public turned against those wars in the 1920s, 1970s, and 2000s, the democratic imperative in U.S. foreign policy also became a casualty. The horrific battlefield experiences of the Great War fueled the isolationist America First movement and a distasteful tolerance on the right for Hitlerism that split the Republican Party before Pearl Harbor. The moral confusion of the Vietnam War prompted a backlash against democratic allies and a softer line toward the Soviet Union that split the Democratic Party in the 1970s (and gave birth to the neoconservative movement). The sagging enthusiasm for democracy promotion after the Iraq War had a similar effect. CSIS surveys of foreign policy specialists in the United States and Asia in 2014 found that the U.S. respondents’ prioritization of democracy, rule of law, women’s empowerment, and human rights briefly aligned more closely with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Singapore than democratic Japan, India, or South Korea. This same hangover from Iraq helps to explain why President Barack Obama expressed explicit appreciation of the realpolitik approach of Scowcroft and the George H.W. Bush administration during the 2008 campaign despite discomfort among prodemocracy advocates in his own party.</p> - -<p>After each of these instances, the American people’s support for values-based foreign policy reverted to the norm with the rise of new authoritarian threats. Roosevelt’s January 1941 Four Freedoms speech and August 1941 Atlantic Charter took hold because the pact between Axis powers had metastasized the spreading cancers of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The Truman Doctrine emerged from the early post–World War II clashes with Soviet ambitions in Greece and Eastern Europe. Ronald Reagan’s June 1982 Westminster Speech championing international democracy promotion was embraced at home and abroad because of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev’s invasion of Afghanistan three years earlier. And Joe Biden’s framing of a world clash between authoritarian and democratic states resonated in ways it would not have when he was vice president because of the menacing turns and growing strategic alignment of China and Russia.</p> - -<p>Ultimately, for all its inconsistency, hypocrisy, and vacillation over the years, no power in the history of the world has done more to advance human freedom and dignity than the United States of America. However, the United States cannot afford to continue framing its approach to democracy and human rights as a reaction to world events in a series of undisciplined pendulum swings – not if the goal is to shape global norms and the balance of power, build alliances, and deter authoritarian aggression, kinetic and otherwise – over the course of a multigenerational contest. History teaches that there is risk in overplaying values as the defining characteristic of strategic competition and even greater risk in failing to understand how fundamental democratic values are to the longer-term security of the United States.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States cannot afford to continue framing its approach to democracy and human rights as a reaction to world events.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Realist scholars have long associated democracy with “idealism” and contrasted that with “realism.” But a “realist” foreign policy must recognize that competition over what – and whose – governance norms, rules, and standards will prevail in the twenty-first century is no less important than the more traditional competition for predominance in outer space, cyberspace, or undersea warfare. And as with those other domains, the United States will require a strategy that is premised on an understanding of the nature of the challenges of our time, including the ideational fight we face both abroad and at home.</p> - -<h3 id="difficult-terrain">Difficult Terrain</h3> - -<p><strong><em>Democracy’s Strategic Logic, Challenges, and Opportunities Abroad</em></strong></p> - -<h4 id="why-democracy-matters">Why Democracy Matters</h4> - -<p>The logic of democracy – transparent, accountable, inclusive, and representative governance under law – is instinctive to most Americans. Without transparency and rule of law, corruption festers. When national leaders are accountable to their citizens, they have an incentive to deliver public goods and practical solutions to national problems and less motivation to engage in foreign adventures. This is the logic behind democratic peace theory: that democracies do not go to war with one another. When citizens are treated with dignity, when they have a voice in how they are governed and who governs them, and when they have reasonable confidence in equal protection under law, they are less prone to resort to extralegal means of redress, including violence. And when they have agency at home, they have less reason to flee across borders in desperation to escape political and economic injustice, affecting the security and stability of neighbors.</p> - -<p>Overall, while some nondemocratic states may deliver positive outcomes in the short run, often by mortgaging the future for the present, the track record of autocrats is grim (see, for example, Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Myanmar, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, Venezuela, or Zimbabwe), while the benefits of democracy are increasingly borne out in the data. Recent studies by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, Sweden’s V-Dem Institute, and others, for instance, have shown that democratic governance leads to better health, security, peace, and development outcomes.</p> - -<p>Equally important, there is also ample empirical evidence that how nations organize themselves internally will go a long way in determining how they seek to shape the environment outside their borders. If a nation’s leaders are afraid of the free flow of information at home, they will feel the same way internationally. If they rule by kleptocracy, they will welcome opaque systems of elite corruption elsewhere. If they prefer rule by law rather than rule of law domestically, odds are they will support the shaping of a similar system abroad. Allied with other powerful nations with similar illiberal values, these states can leverage their collective power to try to reshape the international system consistent with those values and their narrow self-interest rather than for the global good.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">How nations organize themselves internally will go a long way in determining how they seek to shape the environment outside their borders.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>But the reverse is equally true: the alliance of common values and interests between the United States and democratic-minded citizens globally can have powerful strategic potential in the twenty-first century, particularly in the Global South with its rapidly growing, restless, and relatively youthful demographic demanding a greater voice in their future.</p> - -<h4 id="the-challenges-internationally">The Challenges Internationally</h4> - -<p>While some criticize Biden and members of Congress for framing strategic competition with China in ideational terms, the reality is that Beijing and Moscow have long viewed the spread of democracy as an existential threat, and seen strategic advantage in sowing doubts about, if not actively undermining, democratic practices. While China or Russia might have taken a more defensive stance in response to the color revolutions of the early 2000s, both have gone on the offensive in recent years. Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections is well documented even if the effects are debated. Around the same time, Beijing was caught pouring money into Australia’s parliament, which led to strict foreign interference laws by Canberra (Canada and New Zealand have since had the same experience). China’s foreign interference and elite capture strategies have had more success in Australia’s neighborhood, most notably with the 2022 security pact that China convinced the strategically situated Solomon Islands to sign after well-funded “study tours” for its leaders to Beijing. Leaders in China and Russia have also aligned in championing a counter-democracy coalition through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meetings and the expansion of the BRICS grouping to include Iran.</p> - -<p>In a kind of backhanded compliment, the PRC and Russia in recent years have even referred to themselves as democracies, albeit on their own illiberal terms. While seemingly absurd on its face, this is the latest of their attempts to redefine and thus frontally challenge accepted international norms, as witnessed in Chinese activity within UN agencies and other international institutions. The United States and its allies snicker at these subversive efforts at their own peril – even if in seeking to wrap themselves in democratic cloth, China and Russia inadvertently show their hand: their recognition of the power of the democratic idea, their fear of a world that conforms to true democratic norms, and their deep insecurity over the reality of their own systems.</p> - -<p>Under its new Global Civilization Initiative, Beijing asserts that ancient civilizations like China’s provide a superior cultural legitimacy over the democratic norms advocated by the United States and its allies and partners, and reflected in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Their message is that thinkers like John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Jefferson have no place in non-Western culture and emphasize wherever possible shortcomings in Western democratic practice. And even where Beijing and Moscow are not actively intervening, they offer diplomatic support to those resisting international pressure on democracy and human rights – most egregiously in the cases of North Korea, Myanmar, Iran, and Syria.</p> - -<p>This combination of cultural narratives, disparagement (or malign appropriation) of democracy, support for brutal dictatorships, and elite capture in weakly governed states is backed by an increasingly well-resourced and effective strategy of disinformation by Beijing and Moscow. In its first public report on Chinese interference and disinformation, the State Department found that:</p> - -<blockquote> - <p>The PRC’s information manipulation efforts feature five primary elements: leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing co-optation and pressure, and exercising control over Chinese-language media.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>It is becoming evident that the next phase of the PRC’s strategy is to harness the emerging information technology ecosystem to capture entire communities within a data environment that Beijing can control and manipulate. As the State Department report notes, Beijing is now offering to help developing countries to establish their own “smart cities” complete with Chinese technology for surveillance and one-way flows of data to Beijing. The technology competition of the twenty-first century is also fundamentally a competition about democratic norms of openness, transparency, and accountability. Beijing and Moscow’s aims are being abetted by the use of bots, deepfakes, and other tools of disinformation being made available in the digital space by artificial intelligence (AI).</p> - -<p>While Beijing and Moscow did not create all the conditions for deteriorating democratic norms globally, these powers have accelerated negative trend lines by actively exploiting and exacerbating areas of societal divisions and weak governance. According to Freedom House, 2023 was the 18th straight year of decline in global freedom. Freedom House noted that the key drivers globally were denial of press freedoms and increased risk of harm for expressing personal beliefs, coupled with increasing extremism and intolerance online. Put another way, it is the ability of the governed to hold their leaders accountable that is under assault while intolerance is being manipulated to divide, demonize, and marginalize legitimate debate – and these factors in turn create even more favorable conditions for strategies of foreign interference and elite capture by malign revisionist powers like China.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While Beijing and Moscow did not create all the conditions for deteriorating democratic norms globally, these powers have accelerated negative trend lines.</code></em></strong></p> - -<h4 id="the-opportunities-abroad">The Opportunities Abroad</h4> - -<p>Freedom House’s 2024 report notes that 2023 marked the 18th consecutive year of democratic decline, yet the world has more freedom today than it had 50 years ago, and in 2024 more people will have voted around the world than ever before in history – over half of all adults on the planet. And in Asia – the major arena for great power competition – Freedom House found that freedom began growing again in 2022. This finding is consistent with surveys of regional elites in the Indo-Pacific conducted by CSIS since 2009, which consistently found that thought leaders from India to Japan associated themselves more with democracy, rule of law, good governance, and human rights than contrasting themes offered by China such as “noninterference” or any sort of “Beijing consensus” around authoritarian development. This aspirational map does not mean that elites within less developed countries will automatically forego bribes on offer from Beijing (so-called elite capture) or that leaders of postcolonial states will instinctively look to the former imperial powers for lessons on democracy. But it does reinforce the point that citizens in China’s own region – and perhaps in China itself – expect greater empowerment and accountability of their governments and associate their own national success with democracy, good governance, and protection of human rights.</p> - -<p>There are indications that democratic governments are increasingly reflecting those norms in foreign policy strategies, while younger civil society activists are also taking action. In 2020, youth across East Asia formed the Milk Tea Alliance to support students marching for democracy in Hong Kong. In 2022, Japanese civil society groups reached out to form the Indo-Pacific Platform for Universal Values and established the first regional network to host political dissidents at risk. Through the Sunnylands Initiative started by CSIS and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 2019, thought leaders from across the Indo-Pacific have gathered each year to push for greater alignment of efforts in support of democratic norms.</p> - -<p>Once-reticent governments have also become more forward-leaning about the importance of democracy to their security. Japan incorporated support for universal values in its 2022 National Security Strategy and 2023 Development Cooperation Charter. South Korea has committed to reflecting universal values in its overall foreign policy, emphasized human rights and the rule of law in its 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, and hosted the third global Summit for Democracy in 2024. Australia launched a new International Development Policy that focused on supporting accountability, while its Home Affairs Ministry launched a Democracy Task Force to guard against foreign interference at home and in the region. While Australian diplomats sometimes caution their American counterparts against over-emphasizing democracy and human rights in the Pacific Islands, a 2024 public opinion survey by the University of Sydney’s U.S. Studies Centre found that average Australian and Japanese citizens were actually more likely than Americans to want their government to push for improvements in democracy abroad (72 percent of Australians, 69 percent of Japanese, and 61 percent of Americans).</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Once-reticent governments have also become more forward-leaning about the importance of democracy to their security.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>To be clear, even close U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea, or Australia will take a lighter approach on human rights or democracy issues with other states than the U.S. government or Congress. Part of this difference is size – few nations can withstand retaliation by China like the United States can. Part of the difference is cultural, since few went through anything like the American Revolution or the Civil War to define and safeguard the future of democracy. And part of the explanation is free-riding, since it has often been useful for the Americans to be the bad cop on human rights at times when Japan or South Korea were seeking relative economic gains in the region and around the world.</p> - -<p>Yet China’s coercive revisionism, foreign interference, and successful elite capture in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific have alerted the maritime democracies to an ideational threat to their strategic interests and national sovereignty. There is a pronounced alignment of government declaratory policy and civil society efforts across the region that could be harnessed as part of a grand strategy on democracy, if that strategy is iterative and not imposed from Washington.</p> - -<p>Since the Atlantic Charter, Europe has always been the natural partner for the United States in advancing democratic norms globally, but this transatlantic alignment has grown barnacles since Brexit and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Europeans are now less likely than publics in America’s Asian alliances to say that they share common democratic norms with the United States. The European Union has also been beset by internal democratic challenges and extremism from Hungary’s suppression of press and civil liberties to the electoral successes of the far right in Germany, as the round of European and then French elections demonstrated in the summer of 2024. Some member states like Denmark have long been active in advancing democracy abroad, but a lack of internal consensus on priorities has meant that most EU democracy support comes in the form of technical assistance when requested from host governments. And even with effective transatlantic alignment on democracy and human rights, Beijing or Moscow will be quick to paint those efforts as the return of the imperial masters (as China’s Global Times did in 2022 with a doctored photo of the G7 foreign ministers clad in the khaki uniforms and pith helmets of their armies during the Boxer Rebellion).</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, the combination of Russian and Chinese political interference and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has raised the focus of European governments and thought leaders on the democratic challenge facing the free world. The participation of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand (known as the IP4) in NATO summits indicates the possibility for greater unity of effort globally by the net exporters of security in the international system. Europeans may have soured on American democracy, but polls indicate they have soured on China more and are looking to expand strategic partnerships with Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia in ways they would not have five years ago. The coalition-building opportunity is to strengthen the Euro-Pacific link as much as it is to reenergize the transatlantic one. The American approach to sub-Saharan Africa also requires European partnership to be effective, and there is growing recognition in Brussels that democratic backsliding requires new efforts to keep open civil society space, broaden political participation to women and other groups, and beat China in the digital game to ensure a clean and open information environment.</p> - -<p>Latin America continues to hold democratic elections, but monitoring by Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Bertlesmann Stiftung Transformation Index in 2023 all found overall negative trends, including rising authoritarianism and political strife. China and Russia have enabled authoritarian sustainability in countries like Cuba and Venezuela and have largely been given a pass by democracies like Mexico or Brazil. Yet Latin America’s democracies continue to hold elections and maintain the key institutions of democratic governance and accountability, including functioning legislatures and courts and high levels of public education. The opportunity lies in international support for strengthening those institutions.</p> - -<p>In summary, despite a disturbing global landscape of democratic backsliding and closing civic space, there are multiple opportunities emerging for coalitions to form in support of democratic norms. When the Biden administration hosted the first Summit for Democracy in 2021, the aim was to harness just such a coalition. However, the terms of participation were largely dictated from the White House, and key partners ranging from Japan to India attended with trepidation at the signal being sent by excluding strategic swing states like Thailand and Singapore.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite a disturbing global landscape of democratic backsliding and closing civic space, there are multiple opportunities emerging for coalitions to form in support of democratic norms.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The second Summit for Democracy in 2023 was cohosted with South Korea, the Netherlands, Costa Rica, and Zambia, giving a stronger sense of empowerment to regional – and, importantly, non-Western – democracies. The second summit faced some criticism because the host countries narrowed the focus of democratic challenges to fit their respective regional vantage points ratherthan addressing universal concerns. However, its efforts to provide a more inclusive space for discussions on addressing global democratic challenges were received as a much-welcomed approach by the participants, including those from Africa – where at least 24 countries, including many summit participants, held elections that year. The opportunity abroad is not to form what Robert Kaplan once called a “League of Democracies” under U.S. leadership, but rather to develop a strategy that recognizes the variable geometry of regional relations and looks for leadership within regions and civil society.</p> - -<p>By the time of the third summit, hosted by South Korea in March 2024, however, it was clear that an opportunity was missed to play to democracy’s strengths – its vibrancy, creativity, and direct connection to protecting human dignity. What could have been an opportunity to celebrate the fruits of free, democratic expression, such as music, art, literature, and debate, became a dreary long march of scripted panel discussions, leader statements, and commitments to “be better.” Nowhere was democracy precisely defined, an oversight when its definition is unclear to many and under attack by others.</p> - -<p>This requires a level of sophistication, nuance, and volume control that does not come naturally to American political discourse. But of course, domestic political support is essential.</p> - -<h3 id="the-challenges-and-opportunities-at-home">The Challenges and Opportunities at Home</h3> - -<p>Formulating a strategy to counter these trends would be challenging enough if the threats were exogenous, but American democracy itself is also being corroded in the current environment by forces both international and domestic. In 2023, the Pew Research Center found that public trust in the federal government was ticking downward again after a brief uptick in 2020 and 2021, with fewer than 20 percent of Americans saying they trusted the government in Washington to do what is right.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">American democracy itself is also being corroded in the current environment by forces both international and domestic.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Declining trust in democratic governance is a problem across many of the societies that should be part of an international coalition to defend and advance democratic norms. Cambridge University’s Bennet Institute found in surveys that across the Western democracies, majorities of young respondents expressed lack of confidence in their own democracies. However, the United States suffers from particular structural factors at present, including gerrymandered districts, the rise of “angertainment” programs, the demise of local journalism, and the lack of compulsory voting – all of which tend to skew election results away from the ideological center and exacerbate partisanship. Partisanship has also infected the ability of Congress and the American people to rally around a common national vision for protecting and advancing democracy internationally. In 2023, a narrow majority of Republicans for the first time said that they favor less U.S. involvement in global affairs, reflecting a “make America great again” repudiation of Reagan’s vision in the 1982 Westminster speech. Yet Republicans are also far more likely than Democrats to believe that the United States is the greatest country in the world, given the left’s own growing penchant for casting the West and capitalism as illegitimate, a 2021 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found. This polarization between the increasingly vocal left and right wings of politics makes the very definition of a democracy agenda more complicated. Older Republican supporters of former president Donald Trump are far less likely to support democratic Ukraine, for example, while younger Democratic voters are equally less likely to support democratic Israel.</p> - -<p>Yet division at home is no reason to retreat from a robust strategy of supporting freedom abroad. The Founding Fathers did not promise the world a perfect government, just a system of government that would provide the opportunity to work toward a “more perfect union.” There are opportunities to forge a common national purpose around democracy at home because majorities of the American people also recognize what is at stake – and because the United States’ most important allies and partners do as well.</p> - -<h4 id="the-opportunities-for-consensus-at-home">The Opportunities for Consensus at Home</h4> - -<p>Despite polarization overall, Americans agree on some key elements of what would constitute a strategy to advance democratic values globally. In the Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey cited above, Americans listed “strengthening democracy at home” as second only to “strengthening education” as a necessary tool to remain a leading power. In the same survey, 86 percent of Americans listed strengthening democracy abroad as either “important” or “very important,” with only 4 percent replying that it was “not important at all.” Congressional funding for the major tools of democracy promotion has increased over the past few years, with budgets for the NED and its affiliate institutes, the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), and internal State Department programs to counter Chinese and Russian disinformation all expanding at double-digit rates.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite polarization overall, Americans agree on some key elements of what would constitute a strategy to advance democratic values globally.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Congressional support for the tools of democracy promotion reflects the growing recognition that democracy is at risk abroad, but perhaps the greatest driver is the national consensus that the United States must rally to defend its interests against an increasingly coercive and revisionist China. Indeed, China policy is one of the few areas of real bipartisan consensus in Washington today, as indicated by the comity of the cochairs and the activism of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Even the Heritage Foundation, which has attracted criticism from Democrats and many independent media for proposals in its Project 2025 to supercharge presidential authority in a second Trump administration, issued a report on China calling for an emphasis on democracy and human rights. This political consensus will prove a double-edged sword, though. On one side, the clarity of purpose around strategic competition with China is yielding resources, focus, and presidential-level attention. On the other side, casting this fight for democracy as a contest with China can alienate key allies and partners that will be critical to forming a coalition in support of democratic norms, and perhaps distract governments from problems with democratic governance that are important on their own merit and not just derivative of competition with China.</p> - -<p>It is also important to emphasize that despite the fascination with culture wars and authoritarianism on the right wing of the Republican Party, the mainstream Republican leadership includes some of the most vocal and active leaders on democracy and human rights in Congress, such as Senators Dan Sullivan and Marco Rubio. Similarly, while the progressive wing of the Democratic Party may criticize democratic nations such as Israel or India for perceived democratic regression (among other issues), the party overall sees no contradiction between speaking frankly with friends and allies about concerns – and accepting the same in return – and pursuing a strategic foreign policy. In short, there are leaders in Congress who could play a central role in forging a bipartisan consensus around championing democracy and human rights in U.S. foreign policy despite the polarization that besets the country and both parties. The key is for leaders in both parties to frame the strategy in ways that are inclusive of common values shared across the aisle and that reflect the interests of the American people regardless of party.</p> - -<h3 id="toward-an-integrated-democracy-strategy">Toward an Integrated Democracy Strategy</h3> - -<p>A successful U.S. values-based foreign policy must move away from the historic pendulum swings between idealism and realism if it is to sustain domestic and international support and have strategic effects. Just as “integrated deterrence” has emerged as an essential component of defense strategy, so too the United States and its allies will need a new “integrated democracy strategy” to prevail in the battle of norms. The point is not that military, economic, or diplomatic objectives should be subordinated to human rights or democracy priorities, but rather that these strategies should be integrated in national security planning alongside diplomatic, military, and economic objectives.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A successful U.S. values-based foreign policy must move away from the historic pendulum swings between idealism and realism.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>One useful point of reference is the U.S. military’s traditional “DIME” construct for assessing threats and instruments of power. The diplomatic, military, and economic pillars have been fairly consistent over time, but the “I” has evolved from “intelligence” to “information.” One more evolution is needed, and that is to consider the ideational – that is not just the competition of information and narratives but the much more foundational competition of norms and ideas. This would reflect the reality that ideational contests, whether in the United States, Asia, Europe, or the Global South more broadly, are closely related to Chinese and Russian efforts to undermine U.S. power: its alliances, forward presence, economic interests, and political principles alike. If realism is about accurately assessing power dynamics, then it should be clear – as Joseph Nye noted in conceiving the concept of “soft power” – that the ideational dimension of competition is becoming as important as the diplomatic, military, or economic. Asserting the importance of information in the Information Age should not be a stunning insight. In the end, this is a matter of power and realism and not just à la carte idealism.</p> - -<p>An integrated democracy strategy would harness all tools of national power in an all-of-government but also all-of-society framework. Coalition building with democratic allies and partners along with businesses and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) would reinforce the traditional approach of outreach to civil society groups. The incentives and risk tolerance for business, allies, civil society, and different government agencies will vary, so this is not a matter of a single operational plan to be implemented by all actors so much as a variable geometry of coalitions to attack key problems, such as corruption, free speech, electoral integrity, government oversight and accountability, information integrity, and rule of law. The strategy would have to be authorized by the president, drafted by the National Security Council, coordinated with Congress, overseen from within the White House, and ultimately operationalized by individual agencies in support and coordination with one another. The following are key elements of this strategy that would need to be implemented by the United States.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">An integrated democracy strategy would harness all tools of national power in an all-of-government but also all-of-society framework.</code></em></strong></p> - -<h4 id="harness-democratic-allies-and-partners">Harness Democratic Allies and Partners</h4> - -<p>This is not a matter of recruiting allies and partners to a singular strategy but rather empowering them to shape debates and reinforce democratic norms internationally and in their own regions. The best framing for this effort in Asia, Africa, or Latin America is around sovereignty, prosperity, resilience, and national self-strengthening rather than justice or strategic competition with China and Russia. Empirical demonstrations that accountability, transparency, rule of law mechanisms, and women’s empowerment enhance national wealth and strength will be powerful.</p> - -<p>The NED’s Sunnylands Initiative on democracy in the Indo-Pacific is a useful example of how thought leaders in a region can help to validate and align a democracy strategy to their unique context while reinforcing that universal norms are indeed universal. First started in Sunnylands, California, by the NED and CSIS in 2020 and continued in Odawara, Japan, in 2022 and other locations in the Indo-Pacific, each Sunnylands meeting culminates in diverse regional thought leaders drafting and signing a joint statement with a vision and action plan for broad regional cooperation on advancing democratic norms and governance, including expanding support for democracy advocates at risk, grants to regional civil society organizations, and early warning of regional democratic setbacks.</p> - -<p>Similar initiatives in other regions would yield results. It is critical that democratic values be owned and advanced not just by Euro-Atlantic peoples but by a broad range of cultures and contexts to prevent self-interested autocrats from speciously claiming cultural alienation from those values.</p> - -<p>Critics of a democracy agenda often assume such a policy must entail dividing the world into strict blocs – democratic vs. authoritarian – and jettisoning relationships with those that are deemed nondemocratic. Admittedly, some talk in those terms, and there is little question that relationships among fellow democracies are fundamentally stronger and more sustainable than those with poor or deteriorating human rights records. But ultimately there is no reason one cannot promote democratic norms and still work closely and constructively with nondemocratic nations in areas of common purpose and strategic interest, including in the normative sphere.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is no reason one cannot promote democratic norms and still work closely and constructively with nondemocratic nations in areas of common purpose and strategic interest.</code></em></strong></p> - -<h4 id="harness-the-business-community">Harness the Business Community</h4> - -<p>The business community should be particularly inclined to see the merit of this approach and positioned to shape outcomes based on the need for a level playing field in overseas markets. As a 2021 task force report by CSIS, the McCain Institute, and Freedom House put it:</p> - -<blockquote> - <p>Any serious effort to promote democracy and counter authoritarianism must include measures to combat corruption and kleptocracy, which have become business models for modern-day authoritarians. Corruption and its weaponization by authoritarians harms effective governance, undermines economic growth, and weakens the rule of law. It corrodes public trust and is interwoven with security issues like organized and transnational crime, terrorism, human rights abuses, and conflict.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>U.S. trade policy, though anemic compared with years past, can still provide an important tool to reinforce good governance and accountability. The Trans-Pacific Partnership agreements provided market access that incentivized Vietnam to improve labor rights and transparency. The current Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) offers no such market access opportunities but could still be utilized to strengthen rules on digital trade, labor rights, and the environment where those priorities align with other key partners like Japan, Australia, or South Korea. Global standards on anti-corruption can also be compelling for governments because of the clear link to improved investment and growth, as the Financial Action Task Force has demonstrated. The business community will be less well positioned to use its leverage to protect democrats at risk or impose punishments for human rights abuses, except when legislation, national policy, or reputational risk compel them to do so – as occurred with the Uyghur Forced Labor Protection Act signed into law in 2022. Nevertheless, private sector and trade policy levers can have significant impacts on anti-corruption, transparency, and good governance that in turn reinforce accountability to the governed.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The business community should be particularly inclined to see the merit of this approach and positioned to shape outcomes based on the need for a level playing field in overseas markets.</code></em></strong></p> - -<h4 id="harness-civil-society-and-support-democrats-at-risk">Harness Civil Society and Support Democrats at Risk</h4> - -<p>An effective integrated democracy strategy would be an “all of the above” strategy. Companies or smaller allies might not be able to accept the risk associated with condemning human rights abuses or protecting democrats at risk. Size does matter, and the U.S. government can absorb retaliation in a ways no other state or firm can. Consequently, the president and the secretary of state should meet with and speak out for dissidents or champions of freedom like the Dalai Lama even when that carries diplomatic risk. Legislation passed in Congress by a wide margin in 2024 to counter disinformation against the Dalai Lama is another example of the bipartisanship that is possible on such issues.</p> - -<p>Consistency in this regard is critical: it encourages those on the front lines of freedom, it sets an example for other world leaders, it keeps authoritarian states on notice, and it prevents a backlash at home that could force overcompensation that proves more destabilizing for diplomacy. It is worth noting that Reagan developed a strong dialogue with Mikhail Gorbachev despite years of support for dissidents and George W. Bush did the same with former Chinese president Hu Jintao despite regular meetings with the Dalai Lama. The key was that these presidents did so out of conviction and not political calculation. That conviction must remain consistently in evidence to avoid the appearance that support for dissidents is gratuitous, episodic, or politically motivated.</p> - -<p>U.S. support for accurate reporting of democracy and human rights conditions is equally important. The organizations under the USAGM (such as Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Radio Marti) should remain robustly resourced and free to spotlight conditions as they find them. In the same vein, U.S. ambassadors need to understand the strategic value of democratic norms and be both authorized and equipped to speak confidently and assertively about them in their assigned countries. Likewise, officers in U.S. embassies must be authorized to report fully and accurately on issues such as trafficking, human rights, or women’s rights as they find them.</p> - -<p>Finally, U.S. funding of global democracy support work should continue to increase and U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funding should continue going toward building capacity of democratic institutions, including domestic civil society groups. The funding should not – as most Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) donors choose – be based on host government preferences. In fact, Japan and South Korea have begun debating how to delink some grants so that they can go directly to civil society groups. The U.S. government should encourage this trend and allies’ broader support of democratic institutions internationally. Support for marginalized groups may not always be popular with host governments, but it builds more resilient and accountable societies. For example, empowering women has proven an effective tool for achieving accountability in ceasefires and trade agreements, sustaining the peace once achieved, and increasing economic productivity.</p> - -<h4 id="do-not-cede-international-institutions">Do Not Cede International Institutions</h4> - -<p>China’s growing diplomatic influence in bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council has proven frustrating for U.S. diplomacy. However, it is worth remembering these and other major international institutions are fundamentally American in origin. Eleanor Roosevelt herself lobbied to integrate her husband’s Four Freedoms into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, international institutions have proven useful in ways not originally envisioned. The Helsinki Accords were signed in 1975 with one basket (of four) focused on emigration, press freedom, and social issues. Most negotiators at the time had low expectations that these areas would be implemented, but they ultimately proved crucial to holding the Soviet Union to account for the free emigration of Jews and other human rights issues over the next 15 years.</p> - -<p>The United States cannot cede the field in these international institutions; rather, it should engage and seek to shape them in normative directions for which they were originally conceived. The position of the democracies is stronger than the results reveal. Beijing’s influence is a result of effort and not just size. When the Human Rights Council debated whether to put the UN Human Rights Commissioner’s report on crimes against humanity in Xinjiang on its agenda in 2022, President Xi Jinping personally called members of the council to persuade them to vote against the move. The United States relied on its ambassador in Geneva to rustle support and even then, China won by only two votes.</p> - -<p>Stepping up the effort on these battles is important, as retreat would</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>allow China, Russia, or Iran to increasingly turn these institutions into mouthpieces for their values and norms and against the United States and its allies with the Global South, while advancing resolutions endorsing China’s Global Civilization Initiative, defending Russia’s war in Ukraine, and reflexively condemning Israel</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>make it much more difficult to use these institutions to address true human rights violations</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>deny the United States a key forum for aligning positions on crucial human rights and democracy issues with allies and partners and to coordinate international approaches</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>It will also be important to look beyond the UN institutions to consider regional organizations. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) established an Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights in 2009, which has underperformed in the face of coups in Thailand and Myanmar and shows a general division over values. Yet capacity building and engagement with the commission could yield future dividends in the ways the Helsinki Accords surprised many. The African Union established the Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1987 (when the grouping was still the Organization of African Unity). That commission is more active than ASEAN’s and regularly calls out member states for human rights violations. The United States has been relatively unengaged with the Pacific Islands Forum, which also has a secretariat with a charter to advance good governance and democracy. These regional organizations can be far more effective venues for advancing human rights and democracy for the obvious reason that they reflect regional values and priorities. Beijing is stepping up its own diplomatic engagement and offering significant funding to these regional organizations, for example, building the African Union’s new headquarters building in Addis Ababa. The United States and its allies should not be constructing buildings, but they can do more to invest in work on democracy, good governance, and human rights.</p> - -<h4 id="enhance-us-strategic-communications">Enhance U.S. Strategic Communications</h4> - -<p>Authoritarian regimes can often prove more agile than democracies at disseminating information and maintaining message discipline, but they also have a far weaker brand to sell. Democratic allies enjoy the advantage of representing norms – including open access to quality information – that are desired by billions of people worldwide, along with an honest interest in the sovereignty and well-being of others. The United States and its allies ought to play to these strengths by developing an information strategy that supports local independent media, facilitates access to balanced news and analysis, and actively counters false and self-interested narratives advanced by authoritarians. In addition to ensuring adequate resourcing of existing USAGM global media entities, a new entity ought to be established to provide free-of-charge, fact-based information to Global South countries whose media are littered with PRC and other authoritarian-influenced propaganda.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Democratic allies enjoy the advantage of representing norms – including open access to quality information – that are desired by billions of people worldwide.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The U.S. government has long suffered from an inability to develop, let alone coordinate, a disciplined strategic communications strategy, with the Pentagon focused on “cognitive warfare” and the State Department on “public diplomacy.” While strategic oversight from Washington is required, there is a risk of overcentralizing implementation. U.S. ambassadors in the field, in partnership with local embassy staff and civic partners, are likely to have a far more nuanced and effective understanding of local media and narrative environments.</p> - -<p>While in recent years the United States has become adept at using instruments such as the State Department’s Global Engagement Center to better understand how and where PRC and Russian disinformation have made inroads in third countries, the United States needs more tools to address the challenge, including those outside of government. One successful example is the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, which demonstrated how independent research institutions can sometimes move more nimbly, with more credibility, and have broader impact than the U.S. government can. In the democratic space, think tanks and independent NGOs have the reach to not only assess the challenge and be effective messengers on disinformation but also to build capacity, jointly develop solutions, and create networks among countries facing similar challenges. At the same time, it will be important that these institutions retain their independence and not be used as mouthpieces for U.S. or other governments’ national narratives.</p> - -<p>In short, while an “all of government” approach to countering disinformation has proven challenging, an “all of society” approach will bring certain advantages that closed, authoritarian states will not enjoy.</p> - -<h4 id="harness-digital-technology">Harness Digital Technology</h4> - -<p>The State Department’s recent report on PRC disinformation activities highlighted the important role of digital technologies, particularly social media, in enhancing the growing threat of AI-enhanced deepfakes and algorithmically proliferated attacks on democracies and the idea of democracy itself. Those organizations working for democratic governance, particularly international NGOs, need support to develop and share the digital tools necessary to fight back. The conflict in Gaza has offered an alarming picture of what losing the digital information battle looks like, with one poll showing that the majority of young people who claim to support the slogan “from the river to the sea” do not know which river or which sea to which it refers.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States and its allies must support digital literacy</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The United States and its allies must support digital literacy not only at home but also in third countries. The U.S. government should partner with, and as needed regulate, social media giants to ensure that they take responsibility for the disinformation on their platforms. Governments should actively support those seeking to develop digital tools that are explicitly (and algorithmically) designed to enhance conversation and compromise – in other words, democratic norms – and not hate and division. The Open Technology Fund and similar democracy-affirming organizations should receive increased funding to this end. This is crucial in societies with relatively higher levels of political polarization and citizen mistrust toward traditional news media, which are more vulnerable to disinformation activities by domestic and foreign actors alike. In more open economies with a larger and more diverse set of competing advertising and social media markets, exposure and susceptibility to disinformation content is especially concerning. David Lauer’s study of social media platforms like Facebook, for example, underscores that their algorithms can exacerbate societal divisions and polarization by often promoting eye-catching and inflammatory content such as disinformation, extreme political views, and conspiracy theories to garner greater public engagement over their commercial rivals.</p> - -<p>The United States and its allies should also lead on establishing international principles on AI, oppose the unauthorized and unlabeled use of deep fakes, and establish norms that may be adopted in nations most vulnerable to Chinese or Russian disinformation, particularly around elections. The United States has already made significant strides in this area. In February 2024, the Biden administration launched the Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute Consortium (AISIC), fulfilling its commitment from the first global AI Safety Summit in the United Kingdom in November 2023. Collaborating with over 200 technology companies and organizations, including Apple, the consortium is housed within the U.S. AI Safety Institute and ensures that the U.S. government plays a pivotal role in setting national AI standards and developing tools to mitigate potential risks from the emerging technology. The U.S. AI Safety Institute will also collaborate with its international counterparts, already including the United Kingdom’s AI Safety Institute, on developing methods of evaluating the safety of AI tools and the systems that underpin them.</p> - -<p>Additionally, in July 2024 members of Congress proposed the Content Origin Protection and Integrity from Edited and Deepfaked Media Act (COPIED Act) to protect original content from unauthorized use in AI training. These moves reflect the increasing recognition among U.S. political and private industry leaders of the need for a robust approach to AI safety, both domestically and internationally.</p> - -<h4 id="sustain-bipartisan-consensus">Sustain Bipartisan Consensus</h4> - -<p>As with most foreign policy issues, bipartisan unity and executive-congressional consensus will ensure strategic continuity and enhance prospects for success in advancing U.S. interests. As noted, leading members of both parties in the Senate and the House have expressed strong commitment to defending and promoting democratic values globally to counteract the malign influence of China, Russia, and others. While differences remain between and within political parties on specific policies, their unity of principle offers a critical strategic opportunity that must be cultivated. In partnership with a compliant White House going forward, a bipartisan coalition could help frame, fund, and overcome political logjams to advance a values-based foreign policy that reflects the best traditions of the United States and defends U.S. security against the authoritarian onslaught, while demonstrating to allies, partners, democratic activists, and autocratic adversaries alike that American unity, solidarity, and sustained commitment to the issue are as strong as ever.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Leading members of both parties in the Senate and the House have expressed strong commitment to defending and promoting democratic values globally to counteract the malign influence of China, Russia, and others.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p><em>FINAL NOTE: DEMOCRACY AT HOME</em></p> - -<p>Some will charge that the United States has little credibility to promote democratic values globally when its own democracy is in such disrepair. This is a false dichotomy. There is no doubt that the American example matters. The United States does the authoritarians’ work for them when democratic practices are undermined at home or its politicians mirror the rhetoric, actions, and attitudes of authoritarians in their conduct. The U.S. democratic model is often considered the ultimate standard – despite endemic flaws throughout its history – so when egregiously dysfunctional, it can degrade the democratic brand overall.</p> - -<p>But the logic behind the intrinsic value of democracy and democratic norms in international affairs stands on its own, independent of the health of U.S. political society at any given time. America’s domestic challenges, if anything, only make it more urgent that other democratic nations step forward to fill gaps or complement U.S. democracy promotion work. Struggling populations around the world are not waiting for the United States to get its house in order before seeking dignity and rights for themselves. To the contrary, they are seeking international solidarity and support more than ever. Regardless of what is happening at home, the institutionalization of democratic norms globally will remain critical to U.S. strategic interests and those of other like-minded peoples around the world.</p> - -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> - -<p>If a strategist were told that a single factor would advance global peace, development, health, and security outcomes while making one the natural ally of billions of people worldwide, one would think that issue would be considered a strategic priority. But dismissal of – if not hostility toward – considering a twenty-first-century democracy agenda remains far too prevalent. Saddled with mental baggage fortified by excesses from the recent past, too many policymakers and strategists resolutely avoid considering a careful and creative approach to integrating democracy promotion into the U.S. foreign policy tool box.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">If a strategist were told that a single factor would advance global peace, development, health, and security outcomes while making one the natural ally of billions of people worldwide, one would think that issue would be considered a strategic priority.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>In many ways this is odd. For decades the United States and its allies have celebrated the advantages of a forward-leaning U.S. global posture to help shape the international security environment. It should not be a substantial conceptual leap, then, to pursuing a more active, forward-leaning, and thoughtful “shaping” policy in the political realm given the ever-increasing empirical data connecting a more democratic world to global security and development.</p> - -<p>Ultimately, a smartly implemented democracy agenda would play to one of the most valuable strategic assets in the U.S. arsenal: the power to inspire and attract billions of people worldwide who seek the same rights and dignity reflected in the American ideal. To that end, the concept of “democracy promotion” must never again be connected to the offensive application of U.S. military power, but instead conducted peacefully and confidently in support of the aspirations of billions around the world for more transparent, accountable, inclusive, representative governance under law. In so doing, democratically empowered citizens globally – in defense of their own interests, protecting their own sovereignty – may become force multipliers in the defining normative competition of the coming century. They can help counter China and Russia as those countries seek to unapologetically shape norms within their own countries and internationally – where might makes right, elite corruption is tolerated if not encouraged, individual freedom is suppressed, information is controlled or manipulated, and strongman rule replaces rule of law.</p> - -<p>Democracy is said to be in decline. But it is better understood to be under attack. From Myanmar to Belarus, Nicaragua to Hong Kong, Venezuela to Zimbabwe to Ukraine and beyond, millions of citizens in every corner of the globe continue to fight for their political rights and liberties even in the face of unspeakable violence. Those frustrated with the quality of their politics – including in troubled democracies – are seeking not less of a voice in political affairs but more. Not fewer rights and protections, but more. Not less democracy, but better democracy. And they’re looking for allies.</p> - -<p>The good news is supporting democratic development is not financially costly and plays to America’s strengths. But some creativity and urgency in developing a coherent democracy support strategy is needed. Failing to do so while watching American adversaries shape global norms that conform to their illiberal model will have profound effects on U.S. and allied security.</p> - -<p>In short, focusing only on the “three D’s” of U.S. foreign policy – defense, diplomacy and (economic) development – will be insufficient to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. A fourth “D” – democracy – must be added as the essential foundation for the rest.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Michael J. Green</strong> is a non-resident senior adviser and Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and professor and CEO of the United States Studies Centre Sydney.</p> - -<p><strong>Derek Mitchell</strong> is a non-resident senior advisor with the Presidential Office and Asia Program at CSIS. Between 2018 and 2023, Ambassador Mitchell was president of the National Democratic Institute, a U.S.-based nonprofit, nongovernment organization dedicated to supporting democratic development worldwide.</p>Michael J. Green and Derek MitchellAuthoritarian states are targeting weaknesses in democratic governance to undermine U.S. interests across the globe. It is time for a bipartisan strategy that rallies alliances, business, and civil society actors in defense of democratic governance and human rights.China In Multilateral System2024-10-23T12:00:00+08:002024-10-23T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-multilateral-system<p><em>China is gaining influence within the international institutions that the United States has created, funded, and legitimized. China’s strategic positioning in multilateral bodies has allowed it to exert considerable influence, particularly within the UN system.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>The landscape of great power competition within multilateral institutions has significantly evolved over the past few decades, reflecting broader shifts in global power dynamics. The United States, historically dominant in these forums, now faces increasing competition from China and other emerging powers. Absent of a challenger, China is gaining influence within the international institutions that the United States has created, funded, and legitimized. China’s strategic positioning and substantial investments in multilateral bodies have allowed it to exert considerable influence, particularly within the United Nations system.</p> - -<p>China’s approach includes placing its citizens in key leadership positions, increasing staffing, and boosting unearmarked financial contributions to multilateral institutions. This strategy not only enhances China’s influence over global policies but also promotes its development model and geopolitical interests in the Global South. Despite being the largest financial contributor to many international organizations, the United States has seen a relative decline in its influence, partly due to financial constraints, strategic missteps, and underrepresentation in staffing. Building on the 2021 CSIS report The Future of U.S. Leadership in Multilateral Development Institutions: A Playbook for the Next 10 Years, this policy brief presents recent trends regarding the Global South’s growing alignment with China and suggests ways for the United States to reclaim its influence within the multilateral system.</p> - -<h3 id="chinas-rising-influence-in-the-multilateral-system">China’s Rising Influence in the Multilateral System</h3> - -<p>Multilateral institutions play a crucial role in collaborative governance and consensus building, reflecting broader shifts in global power structures. Since their inception nearly eight decades ago, the United States has maintained a preeminent norm-setting role in these institutions, leveraging its economic and political influence to shape international agendas and advocate for Western values. However, this influence has been steadily declining, coinciding with the rise of China as a formidable player on the global stage. At the same time, developing countries have demanded a greater voice in shaping these institutions in ways that are distinct from the priorities of both the United States and China.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="box-1-exerting-influence-in-multilateral-organizations"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1. Exerting Influence in Multilateral Organizations</code></h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China has a track record of using multilateral institutions to promote its interests under the guise of the UN flag and in contravention of UN rules requiring agency heads to act as neutral international civil servants rather than agents of their home country.</code></em></p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Under Chinese leadership, the International Civil Aviation Organization, which decides global flight paths and which airspace belongs to what countries, has excluded Taiwan from the organization.</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A UN whistleblower, a former employee of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), has alleged China’s use of intimidation of human rights defenders, bribery, and edited documents to remove mention of unflattering realities, such as facts about the origins of the Covid-19 virus and human rights abuses in China.</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In October 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted on whether to hold a debate on human rights violations against Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang after the OHCHR released an assessment that found evidence of serious abuses, including possible crimes against humanity. China managed to garner enough support to kill the resolution, with 19 votes against it, 17 in favor, and 11 abstentions. China successfully avoided further discussions and accountability for its human rights violations, including “mass arbitrary detention, widespread torture, sexual violence, coercive birth suppression, family separation, forced labor, and repression of religious and cultural practices in Xinjiang.”</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">By placing Chinese nationals in senior positions, China aims to boost the presence of Chinese tech companies, garner support for Chinese state-backed initiatives, and push the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s authoritarian norms. After being reelected unopposed as the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) secretary general, Houlin Zhao, whose previous experience includes developing telecommunications standards for the Chinese government, insisted that allegations of Huawei’s 5G equipment being used for espionage were baseless and politically motivated. Under the pretense of digital inclusion, the ITU touted its role in Huawei’s rollout of digital infrastructure in nearly 80 countries, impacting 90 million people in remote areas. Huawei is the same Chinese corporation responsible for developing and implementing surveillance technology, including facial recognition and a “Uighur alert” system, to enable China’s techno-authoritarian model of governance. The CCP leverages the United Nations’ specialized agency for digital technologies to push for authoritarian norms and sell its mobile network equipment and surveillance systems to train its own artificial intelligence. The ITU has adopted dozens of standards proposals from Chinese companies such as Huawei. The ITU’s standards are then adopted by developing countries that lack regulatory agencies of their own. that lack regulatory agencies of their own.</code></em></p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>China was largely uninvolved in the affairs of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations until the 1990s. Apart from issues relating to Taiwan, China rarely exercised interest or made voluntary contributions to the United Nations. China’s engagement increased rapidly once it started on the path toward globalizing its economy (see Box 1). China’s increasing influence in the United Nations has become evident through several trends:</p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Competing for Leadership Positions:</strong> Through its leadership roles in multilateral forums, China promotes efforts that support its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), influencing global standards and practices in ways that favor its economic and political values and interests. Beijing has cultivated UN leaders, such as Secretary-General António Guterres, to champion the BRI and align it with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Under Chinese leadership, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has emphasized projects that dovetail with BRI objectives, raising concerns among Western leaders about China’s potential to undermine the integrity of multilateral institutions.</p> - - <p>In 2021, Chinese nationals led 4 of the 15 major UN specialized agencies: the FAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Additionally, China sought leadership of a fifth agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization, but that effort was successfully thwarted. Nevertheless, the leadership positions held by Chinese nationals in key agencies underscore China’s strategic positioning within the UN system and its intent to influence global policies and priorities in critical areas such as international development and technological advancement.</p> - - <p>African nations, as the largest regional bloc in the United Nations, with a 28 percent voting share, have played a crucial role in supporting China’s rise within multilateral institutions. A robust focus on Africa continues to pay dividends for China in multilateral fora, as evidenced by African support in electing Chinese nationals to the lead positions in four UN principal agencies, as well as securing deputy slots in nine others. African votes have also been pivotal in the passage of U.S.-opposed Chinese resolutions and increasing China’s representation within the UN Secretariat and various UN funds and programs, further solidifying Beijing’s influence.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Increasing Its Personnel Footprint:</strong> China has strategically increased its presence within multilateral institutions by boosting staff numbers. The number of Chinese nationals employed by the United nations nearly doubled from 2009 to 2022, reaching 1,564 personnel in 2022. In tandem, China sponsored 32 UN junior professional officers (JPOs) and 590 other professional staff between 2015 and 2021, achieving rapid growth in just five years. To counterbalance China’s growing personnel footprint and increase the number of U.S. nationals in international organizations, the U.S. Department of State has made efforts over the past three years to publicize JPO vacancies in international institutions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Flexing Its Financial Muscle:</strong> Over the past decade, China has more than quadrupled its discretionary contributions to multilateral development institutions, including significant voluntary funding directed to multilateral development bank (MDB) concessional financing windows and specialized UN entities.China’s role in the World Bank has also expanded significantly since it joined in 1980. By 2013, it had become the third-largest shareholder in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank’s lending arm, with 5.03 percent of the voting power. This not only reflects China’s economic growth but also deliberate policy choices aimed at enhancing its global influence. China’s level of funding is still a fraction of that provided by the United States, but China has been able to mobilize this funding to advance national priorities in ways that the United States has not.</p> - - <p>China’s financial influence also includes substantial contributions to the World Bank’s International Development Association and specialized UN entities such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the World Food Programme, and UNICEF. In addition, within the UN system, China created the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund in 2016 with a $200 million contribution over 10 years, supporting peacekeeping, rapid response, and conflict prevention and mediation. It remains the only donor to this fund and has explicitly stated that the fund is intended to align the United Nations’ Agenda 2030 with the BRI. Additionally, in 2018, due in part to African lobbying, China placed an 8,000-strong standby force at the United Nations’ disposal for crisis deployment, and China is now the largest troop contributor among the UN Security Council’s permanent members.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Leveraging New Institutions to Pursue Commercial Interests:</strong> To challenge the current global order, or to respond to what it sees as unfair treatment, China has established new multilateral organizations and partnerships, particularly with the Global South, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank, where it is the largest or co-largest shareholder and which exclude the United States. These institutions not only enhance China’s financial and strategic reach but also provide a platform for promoting its development model and policy preferences.</p> - - <p>The strategic engagement of Chinese firms in multilateral institutions further underscores China’s expanding influence. China’s ability to integrate its commercial interests with its strategic objectives has led to the prominence of Chinese firms in MDB contracts. In 2019 alone, Chinese firms won contracts worth $7.4 billion from major MDBs, representing 14 percent of total contracts by value. In recent years, Chinese firms have continued to rise to be the top or near-top recipients of contracts from MDBs. Between fiscal years 2013 and 2022, Chinese businesses were awarded around 20 percent of all contracts from the World Bank, positioning them as its top contract recipients. This dominance in procurement reflects institutional rules favoring the lowest bids and the substantial presence of Chinese firms in infrastructure sectors. China’s commercial benefits from these contracts align with its broader strategy of leveraging economic tools to gain political and strategic advantages within multilateral frameworks.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<h3 id="chinas-strategic-engagement-with-the-global-south">China’s Strategic Engagement with the Global South</h3> - -<p>China’s strategy extends beyond merely filling top positions and personnel in the multilateral system; it actively shapes the norms and policies of these institutions to align with its broader geopolitical goals. More importantly, China presents itself as a developing country and leading advocate for the Global South.</p> - -<p>Beijing has articulated a doctrine that places development and multilateralism at the forefront of Chinese foreign policy: “Big powers are the key, China’s periphery the priority, developing countries the foundation, and multilateral platforms the stage.” Through platforms such as the AIIB and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), Global South nations gain access to substantial economic aid, infrastructure development, and investment – critical for their development goals. China has had a long-standing relationship with the IsDB and, in recent years, established a partnership to assist bank members in constructing anti-pandemic infrastructure. China’s involvement provides these countries alternatives to Western-led financial institutions, often with more favorable terms and less-stringent conditions regarding governance and human rights standards.</p> - -<p>Additionally, China’s diplomatic strategy includes steering nations toward its commercial sector. In recent years, China has significantly increased its presence in countries such as Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Djibouti, Venezuela, Laos, and others through strategic and significant foreign direct investment and foreign aid. Many of these countries now align themselves more closely with China’s geopolitical interests, resulting in diminished reliance on traditional Western partners, including the United States. Nations that engage in deals with China do not face consequences from the United States, even when the United States is a major donor or trading partner.</p> - -<p>China is actively using personal engagement to strengthen ties and leverage its position, often filling the vacuum left by U.S. neglect in various regions. In Africa, for example, where U.S. influence has been waning in recent years, China has maintained leading engagement among the continent’s central, eastern, and southern countries. In these regions, China fosters visits and interactions with senior security leaders across various sectors, including the army, air force, navy, and police, supporting Beijing’s strategic goals and agenda on the continent. China has also established 53 embassies in Africa – three more than the United States.</p> - -<p>Moreover, high-level visits have not been a regular feature of U.S.-Africa relations. However, the Biden administration has recently increased its focus on China, leading to more high-level engagements with African nations. In 2023, 17 cabinet members and leaders of U.S. government departments and agencies visited 26 African countries. Despite this uptick, these efforts pale in comparison to China’s sustained attention to Africa. For 33 years, Chinese foreign ministers have consistently made Africa their first stop in annual overseas travel, a standard practice so routine it garners no special media attention. Xi Jinping personally made 10 visits to Africa between 2014 and 2020.</p> - -<p>As a result of these trends, China’s influence within multilateral institutions has profoundly shaped the positions and voting behaviors of Global South countries on key global issues. This influence became particularly evident through their voting patterns on critical matters such as the war in Ukraine, human rights violations, and the status of Taiwan.</p> - -<h4 id="russias-full-scale-invasion-of-ukraine">Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine</h4> - -<p>Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many African, Asian, and Latin American countries have abstained from voting on resolutions condemning Russia’s actions. During the March 2022 emergency voting session on the “Aggression against Ukraine” resolution in the UN General Assembly, 17 African countries abstained from voting and an additional eight declined participation. This abstention reflects a diplomatic balancing act, influenced by economic and political ties with the West, China, and Russia. It demonstrates the nuanced positions these countries adopt to maintain favorable relations and avoid jeopardizing economic partnerships.</p> - -<p>The abstentions and opposition to the resolutions against Russian aggression may reveal a growing assertiveness among countries of the Global South in shaping their foreign policies independently of traditional power blocs. Alternatively, the abstentions could be a reaction against what is seen as “the West” prioritizing a war in Europe over deadly conflicts in the Global South. The abstentions may also reflect countries’ unwillingness to involve themselves in a conflict that does not concern them. Regardless, this trend is indicative of a broader shift toward a multipolar world where Global South countries seek to assert their independence and protect their interests on the global stage.</p> - -<h4 id="human-rights-violations">Human Rights Violations</h4> - -<p>In addition, China’s influence extends to human rights issues, where many Global South countries align with China’s positions on sensitive topics such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong. During the 2022 vote on holding a Human Rights Council debate on human rights violations in Xinjiang, most African countries abstained or voted against the resolution in a show of support for China. This alignment stems from China’s extensive economic engagements and development assistance, which create an implicit expectation of political backing in international forums. China’s strategic investment and aid allow it to build a network of allies that support its positions in multilateral organizations.</p> - -<h4 id="status-of-taiwan">Status of Taiwan</h4> - -<p>China’s influence also plays a critical role in issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly concerning Taiwan. Most Global South countries, influenced by their economic and diplomatic ties with China, not only profess adherence to the One China policy but go further by adopting Beijing’s preferred language of the “One China principle.” For example, Eswatini is the only African nation to recognize Taiwan. This diplomatic stance is crucial for China as it seeks to isolate Taiwan internationally. Support from these countries in international forums ensures that resolutions or statements potentially supportive of Taiwan rarely pass, consolidating China’s position and preventing any diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.</p> - -<p>The alignment of Global South countries with China often results in the dilution of Western-led efforts to address issues such as human rights abuses, democratic governance, and territorial disputes. This shift complicates the balance of power within multilateral institutions, making it more challenging for Western nations to garner support for their initiatives. Consequently, this dynamic can lead to a fragmented international order where achieving consensus on critical global issues becomes increasingly difficult, impacting the effectiveness of global governance.</p> - -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> - -<p>The change in landscape discussed above may have initially caused some challenges, but it is time to reflect inward, assessing U.S. shortcomings in strategy and execution more than focusing on what others have done. An urgent mission objective for the United States and its allies should be to restore primacy in the multilateral system. Many of the actionable steps the United States can take toward reclaiming power ceded to China are connected and more complicated than they may appear, but they are critical to achieving foreign policy objectives through the multilateral system.</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Establish priorities, align resources, and coordinate across U.S. missions.</strong></p> - - <p>To regain leadership in international organizations and counter China’s growing influence, the United States should establish regular communication channels between U.S. representatives at international organizations, relevant home bureaus at the State Department, and U.S. country missions worldwide. This will help the United States better understand the domestic environments and specific needs of Global South countries, enabling it to build support in capitals for its preferences, address reasons for their alignment with China, and strengthen bilateral and multilateral relationships.</p> - - <p>Improving interagency cooperation within the U.S. government is another crucial step for achieving foreign policy goals and enhancing overall diplomatic effectiveness. Utilizing integrated digital platforms for communication and management of policy implementation, which allow for real-time sharing of data and insights, can significantly improve interagency workflow and efficiency.</p> - - <p>However, enhanced communication and coordination are meaningless without established priorities. The United States should develop a priority list of top multilateral issues for missions to focus on. This prioritization will help guide missions in addressing the most pressing global challenges and ensure that U.S. efforts are concentrated where they will have the greatest impact. This approach will enable the United States to effectively mobilize resources, advocate for key initiatives, and foster partnerships that align with its values and interests, countering the influence of other major players such as China in the Global South. Matching resources and communication channels to prioritizations will prevent wasted political capital and maximize the weight of influence wielded in multilateral organizations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Invest in the diplomatic corps.</strong></p> - - <p>The United States should prioritize developing personal relationships with political leaders and decisionmakers to enhance its soft power in international diplomacy. This means prioritizing a personal, on-the-ground presence to build relationships and understand the interests and needs of other nations. These relationships are crucial, as they often influence decisions and ensure diplomats remain well informed through regular information sharing. The United States is already moving in this direction by opening new embassies in Pacific Island nations such as Tonga and Kiribati, demonstrating a commitment to foster closer ties. However, more needs to be done on this front.</p> - - <p>The United States should also prioritize improving training and providing incentives for diplomats to gain experience in multilateral institutions, with a focus on refining diplomacy skills. Training programs should be enhanced to include comprehensive modules on modern diplomacy, incorporating digital literacy, strategic communications, and crisis management.</p> - - <p>The United States is currently undergoing a major overhaul in its approach to training diplomats, making more training a career requirement and developing additional courses for diplomats at all career stages. The U.S. Congress has also mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2024 that training related to multilateral diplomacy be included and strengthened. This action recognizes that incentives, such as career advancement opportunities, financial rewards, and recognition, should be provided to encourage diplomats to take on challenging assignments within multilateral institutions.</p> - - <p>Establishing a multilateral “cone” for diplomats should be a part of the training overhaul. By having an entire portion of officers specializing in this niche of foreign affairs, diplomats will become knowledgeable of processes unique to these systems and will have already formed valuable personal relationships with diplomats from other countries in the same field. Formalizing a multilateral track within the Foreign Service would produce stronger personnel in vital roles within the multilateral system.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Leverage technology and data.</strong></p> - - <p>The United States should leverage advanced technology and data management systems to improve coordination and strategic decisionmaking in multilateral forums. As diplomacy increasingly demands data-driven insights, integrating technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and big data analytics will enable the United States to process and analyze vast amounts of information swiftly and accurately, identify patterns, predict trends, and respond to emerging issues more effectively.</p> - - <p>Incorporating these technologies can significantly enhance various diplomatic functions. For instance, AI can sift through social media data to conduct sentiment analysis, allowing diplomats to gauge public opinion and measure the impact of their diplomatic efforts. Big data analytics can also aid in negotiations by removing bias and developing possible scenarios, providing diplomats with a strategic edge. By ensuring continuity and efficiency, information can easily be passed from outgoing to incoming representatives, preventing years of work from being wasted.</p> - - <p>In 2021, the State Department released its first-ever enterprise data strategy, Enterprise Data Strategy – Empowering Data Informed Diplomacy, marking a significant step in the department’s shift toward a data-centric approach. This strategy aims to equip the department’s workforce with timely, data-driven insights crucial for making important mission and management decisions. Since 2021, U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken has pressed to hire hundreds of data specialists and to build collaboration with the “policy” bureaus in what the State Department calls “Data Informed Diplomacy.” The State Department is now in the midst of deploying AI and considering the range of tasks where it can be of use, as Blinken discussed publicly in late June 2024.</p> - - <p>By investing in data analysis initiatives, equipping diplomats with the necessary skills, and fostering a data-centric culture, the United States can enhance its strategic capabilities. This approach will not only improve coordination and information sharing among U.S. diplomatic missions and international organizations but also offer a compelling alternative to the authoritarian models promoted by China.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Prioritize strategic engagement with influential UN members.</strong></p> - - <p>Prioritizing engagement with influential countries in the United Nations can help the United States build strategic alliances and regain leadership in international organizations. By understanding and addressing the unique interests and needs of these countries, the United States can foster stronger bilateral and multilateral relationships, thereby enhancing its diplomatic influence.</p> - - <p>Understanding the objectives of others helps the United States to be a better partner. For instance, Brazil seeks to lead initiatives focused on revitalizing multilateral organizations such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and the India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum. Brazil has also been advocating for UN Security Council reform to gain a permanent seat. By supporting these efforts, the United States can align with Brazil’s strategic goals, promoting cooperation on regional stability, economic development, and social progress. Additionally, Brazil is a key player in environmental issues and sustainable development, particularly given its stewardship of the Amazon rainforest. Collaborating on environmental issues could strengthen U.S.-Brazil relations while contributing to global climate goals.</p> - - <p>Similarly, involving Pakistan in dialogues about security, counterterrorism, and economic development can also open new avenues for cooperation and reinforce the United States’ commitment to stability in South Asia. The International Monetary Fund recently approved a $7 billion loan to Pakistan. Pakistan plays a key role in regional security, especially concerning the situation in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Pakistan is a significant participant in China’s BRI, with projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. By addressing Pakistan’s economic development needs and offering alternative partnerships, the United States can counterbalance China’s influence and strengthen bilateral ties.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Increase U.S. leadership and staffing in multilateral organizations.</strong></p> - - <p>As recommended in the 2021 CSIS report, actively advocating for U.S. candidates in leadership positions within multilateral organizations is essential for advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives and fostering cooperation on shared challenges. The United States must identify and develop qualified U.S. candidates with extensive experience and a deep understanding of international affairs.</p> - - <p>Public endorsements from high-ranking officials, such as the secretary of state, can significantly enhance the visibility and credibility of these candidates. For example, the early endorsement of Doreen Bogdan-Martin for the ITU secretary-general position by the State Department and USAID administrator Samantha Power highlighted a forward-looking strategy that should be emulated. Furthermore, the groundwork for Bogan-Martin was laid years prior under the Trump administration with a successful deputy secretary-general campaign, followed by strong efforts to clear the campaign field so that it was only the U.S. candidate running against Russia’s Rashid Ismailov.</p> - - <p>Such diplomatic efforts are vital in garnering support for U.S. candidates. Utilizing diplomatic channels, including embassies and international forums, to lobby for U.S. candidates is critical. Focusing on organizations where leadership positions are becoming vacant and where U.S. strategic interests are most significant – such as the ITU, International Maritime Organization, FAO, and World Bank – is essential. Collaborating with like-minded countries to counterbalance undemocratic competitors’ influence and maintaining engagement with organizations, even if U.S. candidates are not elected, will further secure U.S. interests.</p> - - <p>In addition, seconding staff to key UN agencies allows for the development of relationships with counterparts from other countries, fostering networks that can be leveraged to support U.S. initiatives and candidates for leadership positions. Such positions provide an opportunity to build a cadre of U.S. experts experienced in multilateral settings, improving the United States’ ability to navigate and influence these organizations in the long term. These seconded positions should be targeted toward strategic UN roles that align with U.S. foreign policy objectives and areas of interest.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Invest in economic development to complement diplomatic efforts.</strong></p> - - <p>Investing in economic development abroad is crucial for the United States to maintain its leadership role in the international arena and address global challenges effectively. By strengthening development efforts, the United States enhances its ability to shape international norms and standards. In this context, Africa emerges as a critical region where increased U.S. engagement can yield significant geopolitical and economic benefits. One critical aspect is increasing the frequency of visits by senior U.S. government officials and commercial officers to African countries, which can address mutual interests and foster stronger bilateral relationships.</p> - - <p>Enhancing trade and investment is another critical aspect. Reauthorizing initiatives such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act promotes stronger trade ties between the United States and African nations by offering African countries better access to the U.S. market and encouraging economic growth.</p> - - <p>Maintaining strategic dialogue with key African regional organizations, such as the African Union, is also crucial for fostering collaborative relationships and understanding regional priorities and challenges. This dialogue can lead to more effective cooperation on issues such as security, development, and governance, aligning U.S. and African interests.</p> - - <p>By committing to a more robust and consistent diplomatic presence, the United States can build long-term partnerships and counter China’s influence. This approach will not only support U.S. foreign policy objectives but also contribute to the stability and prosperity of developing regions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Promote modernization in the UN System.</strong></p> - - <p>The United States should prioritize modernization and reform efforts within multilateral forums to ensure these institutions remain relevant and effective in addressing global challenges. As a major contributor to the UN budget, the United States has a vested interest in ensuring that funds are used appropriately. The United States should advocate for various reforms:</p> - - <ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Investing in the Latest Digital Tools and AI:</strong> Modernizing with the latest digital tools and AI is crucial for streamlining data sharing, analyzing global trends, and predicting crises. Such technological advancements can enhance the ability of multilateral organizations to respond swiftly and effectively to emerging issues under U.S. leadership.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhancing Transparency and Accountability:</strong> This can be achieved through regular independent audits, public reporting of financial statements, and encouraging whistleblower protections within the United Nations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Supporting Security Council Reform:</strong> Advocating for the inclusion of new permanent seats for African and Latin American countries will help better reflect global power shifts. Reform to the UN Security Council regarding the permanent members is unlikely to be significant due to ongoing regional competition. Conflicts such as Brazil versus Mexico, Japan versus China, and the challenge of selecting a single African country for a permanent seat make substantial changes improbable. Instead, any changes that occur will remain at the margins, reflecting incremental adjustments rather than comprehensive reform. Additional proposals, such as expanding the G7 to include Australia, South Korea, and the European Union, have been put forward to form a “formal Democracies 10,” or D10, that would promote coordinated actions among democracies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Reforming the Human Rights Council:</strong> The current incentive structure allows bad actors to seek Human Rights Council membership to pursue their own immunity and protect fellow violators. There are no negative consequences for countries with low human rights standards sitting on the council. This is unacceptable. There must be increased accountability for those with poor marks on the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Reviewing UN Procurement Policies:</strong> This ensures fair contract distribution, preventing a disproportionate allocation to countries such as China. Although China may not win the majority of UN contracts, its success rate appears higher compared to others, similar to its performance with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. This trend highlights the need for more transparent and equitable procurement practices within the United Nations to maintain a balanced and fair competitive environment for all participating countries.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Introducing Clear Performance Metrics:</strong> Regular evaluations of UN agencies are essential to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations. The United States can support these efforts by advocating for the definition of key performance indicators, conducting regular impact assessments, and implementing feedback mechanisms involving beneficiaries and stakeholders.</p> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Pay late dues and leverage funding in the future.</strong></p> - - <p>The United States should address the recurring issue of late payments to the United Nations. This may require paying double in one year to rectify the situation when Congress approves the following year. The Chinese Communist Party does not have the same appropriations process as the U.S. Congress. In pursuit of enabling the secretary of state, a designee of the secretary, or the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations to do their job from a position of strength, rather than constantly playing catch-up, an effort to reconcile the currently incongruent fiscal cycles of the U.S. government and the United Nations would be a worthy endeavor.</p> - - <p>Resolving late payments in Congress should be paired with empowering the secretary of state with clearer, more subjective control over the funds to establish greater diplomatic leverage at their disposal. To be clear, leveraging finances is a separate issue from paying dues on time, but the goal should be to have nothing potentially tainting the authority or credibility of the United States. As it now stands, U.S. diplomats have little to no flexibility in both authority and resource allocation to effectively administer repercussions for bad actors.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> - -<p>The United States cannot abandon its leadership role in the United Nations and other multilateral institutions despite legitimate criticisms of their performance, transparency, and oversight. The United States must “ride herd” on the multilateral system. To counterbalance China’s growing influence, the United States must enhance communication and coordination across its diplomatic missions, invest in training and incentives for its diplomats, leverage advanced technology and data, and prioritize personal diplomacy. Strengthening partnerships with influential UN members and increasing U.S. leadership in multilateral organizations are also critical. Additionally, promoting modernization and accountability within multilateral forums can ensure these institutions remain effective and aligned with democratic values.</p> - -<p>Implementing these recommendations is crucial for the United States to regain and sustain its influence, especially in the Global South. This region is becoming an increasingly significant arena in the great power competition between the United States and China, with its large voting blocs and strategic partnerships. For the next U.S. administration, prioritizing these actions will be essential to countering China’s growing dominance and ensuring that U.S. values and interests are upheld in the international arena.</p> - -<p>In this era of great power competition, it is imperative for the United States to adapt and reinforce its leadership within multilateral institutions. By doing so, the United States can better address global challenges, promote sustainable development, and maintain a balanced international order. Taking a proactive stance will enable the United States to effectively navigate the complexities of global diplomacy and secure a leading role in shaping the future of international relations.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> - -<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p>Daniel F. Runde and Austin HardmanChina is gaining influence within the international institutions that the United States has created, funded, and legitimized. China’s strategic positioning in multilateral bodies has allowed it to exert considerable influence, particularly within the UN system.The Military Use Of AI2024-10-22T12:00:00+08:002024-10-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-military-use-of-ai<p><em>Increasing cross-strait tensions between China and Taiwan suggest the need for the latter to look into the advantages offered by new defence approaches. With a defence budget vastly outpaced by China, Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept recognises a need to look to cutting-edge technologies to offset scale imbalances.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>This paper examines the challenges and opportunities Taiwan will need to consider for the military application of one such emerging technology: AI.</em></p> - -<p>Key challenges in the use of AI include: data-security concerns; ethical implications of autonomous weapons; unpredictability and unreliability of systems; high costs of implementation and maintenance; potential for increased use of armed force; issues of accountability and responsibility; risks associated with deepfake technology; and the danger of over-reliance on AI systems leading to a loss of traditional human military skills.</p> - -<p>In terms of opportunities, the paper discusses the potential benefits of AI in enhancing situational awareness, improving command-and-control capabilities, and enabling advanced simulations for military training and strategy development. AI-powered systems can process vast amounts of data quickly, providing comprehensive battlefield intelligence and enabling faster, more accurate decision-making.</p> - -<p>The paper emphasises the importance of carefully considering ethical, security and operational factors when integrating AI into Taiwan’s defence strategy. It suggests that effective use of AI could serve as a force multiplier for Taiwan’s military, potentially helping to offset China’s numerical and resource advantages.</p> - -<p>The research underscores the potential of AI to significantly enhance Taiwan’s defence capabilities, while also cautioning about the risks and challenges associated with its implementation. The paper advocates for a balanced approach that maximises the benefits of AI in military applications while mitigating potential drawbacks and ethical concerns.</p> - -<h3 id="introduction">INTRODUCTION</h3> - -<p>Scholars may differ on the probability of a Taiwan contingency, but cross-strait tensions between Taiwan and China are rising, and Beijing refuses to exclude the use of military force. The “One China” policy that many countries have adopted limits Taiwan’s ability to rely on collective defence or alliances. Taiwan can expect US support, but as the experience of Ukraine suggests, it needs to be resolute and prepared to defend itself. US allies in the region that are friendly to Taiwan (Japan, South Korea, Australia) may become involved, but there are no legally binding agreements or authoritative policy statements that would make that a reliable planning assumption. Given limitations in resources and difficulties in resupply to the island, to deter China and defend itself, Taiwan must seek advantage from emerging technologies and strategies, such as the military use of AI, while preserving interoperability with its sole security guarantor, the US, through alignment on concepts and systems.</p> - -<p>China’s economic growth over recent decades has given the country a defence budget more than 20 times that of Taiwan, changing the balance of military power across the Taiwan Strait. How can Taiwan respond? The answer lies in the asymmetric strategy of Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept (ODC), which uses the small to control the big, leveraging Taiwan’s lead in cutting-edge technologies to gain advantage through the military use of AI. The transformation of modern warfare relies on the collection, organisation and manipulation of data: the ODC attempts to maximise Taiwan’s defence advantages by matching the characteristics of the battlefield environment in the Taiwan Strait to the development and application of low-cost, high-efficiency, high-quantity and high-survival weapons. The ODC envisions a large number of miniature missile assault boats, land-launched missiles, mines, attack drones and anti-armour rockets. Its effectiveness requires the use of AI to synchronise situational awareness with kinetic and electromagnetic effects. AI can enhance Taiwan’s defence and operational capabilities, serving as a multidomain force multiplier for other combat platforms and formations. This paper explores the opportunities and challenges associated with the effective use and implementation of AI in Taiwan’s military.</p> - -<h4 id="methodology-and-structure">METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE</h4> - -<p>The paper’s methodology primarily relied on a review of English-language literature from 2019 to 2024. This is due in part to the scarcity of Chinese-language publications on the subject. However, the main reason for a focus on English-language and in particular US literature is that the US is the only country legally obliged to support Taiwan in securing the means for its defence and committed by leadership statements to come to its assistance. Given Taiwan’s unusual diplomatic status, alignment with US concepts and initiatives is thus of particular importance.</p> - -<p>The paper has three main sections. The first offers a general outline of the advantages and disadvantages of military adoption of AI. The second explores starting points for the use of AI by Taiwan’s military and addresses the imperative to advance further. The third section evaluates AI prospects for Taiwan’s military and proposes solutions to overcome obstacles. The paper concludes with some key considerations for Taiwan’s government.</p> - -<h3 id="challenges-and-opportunities-for-the-military-use-of-ai">CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE MILITARY USE OF AI</h3> - -<p>Coined by US computer scientist John McCarthy in 1956, the term “AI” referred to “the potential for creating machines that could simulate human intelligence”. AI denotes a machine’s capability to perform cognitive functions typically associated with the human mind. While there are risks associated with its use in a range of industries, from healthcare to finance, its application in the military domain carries unique challenges.</p> - -<h4 id="risks-and-challenges">RISKS AND CHALLENGES</h4> - -<p>Miliary use of AI presents concerns particular to the risks that accompany the use of lethal force. These disadvantages highlight challenges and risks associated with military use of AI, and the importance of carefully considering the ethical, security, financial and human factors involved in leveraging AI technologies in defence strategies.</p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Data security:</strong> AI – like any other digital technology – can be hacked or manipulated. When systems are breached, sensitive information can be stolen and exploited, to the advantage of the adversary. In 2015, the US Office of Personnel Management suffered large-scale breaches of government data in the form of theft of confidential data affecting millions of federal employees and contractors. Sensitive personal information of approximately 21.5 million individuals who had undergone background checks, including 5.6 million fingerprint records, was stolen. The vulnerability of systems used to store and process sensitive information raises serious concerns about the ability to safeguard the systems on which AI would depend.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Ethics:</strong> While using robots in combat can reduce the number of human casualties and enhance operational efficiency, ethical questions arise when considering fully autonomous robotic soldiers. The concern is whether it is morally acceptable to allow machines to make life-and-death decisions without human oversight. The South Korean military considered deploying AI-powered sentry robots along the border with North Korea. These robots were equipped with automatic targeting and firing capabilities, raising significant ethical concerns about excluding human judgement. The prospect that they could engage and kill human targets without direct human oversight sparked widespread debate. Critics argued that delegating life-and-death decisions to autonomous machines inherently undermines human dignity and the principles of just war. The use of such AI-powered “killer robots” could lead to wars being fought entirely between autonomous systems, rather than between human soldiers, posing profound ethical questions about the role of human agency in warfare. Further challenges arose regarding accountability and responsibility if a malfunction in these robots were to cause civilian casualties. The “black box” non-transparent nature of the AI algorithms controlling the systems complicated the determination of accountability.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Unpredictability/unreliability:</strong> In 2021, an AI-powered drone strike carried out by the US military in Kabul, Afghanistan resulted in the deaths of 10 civilians, of whom seven were children, instead of the intended Islamic State in Khorasan target. The AI algorithms powering the drone’s target identification and engagement systems had failed to adequately discriminate between military and civilian targets, leading to the terrible loss of innocent and young life. The unpredictability of AI arises from the complexity and adaptability of these algorithms, which can learn, evolve and make decisions in ways that are not fully transparent in or constrained by their initial programming. As they encounter new situations and environments, their actions become increasingly difficult to anticipate with certainty, even when their ultimate goals are known.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Costs and maintenance:</strong> Building and maintaining AI systems in the military sector can incur significant costs, due to the systems’ complexity. Repair, maintenance and frequent upgrades add to the financial burden. In 2019, the US Department of Defense (DoD) awarded Microsoft a $10-billion cloud computing contract as part of its Cloud Strategy; known as the Joint Enterprise Defence Infrastructure (JEDI) project, it used AI to make it more effective. However, significant delays and cost overruns arose due to the complex engineering of the required AI systems. The “opaque nature” of the AI algorithms used in the JEDI project also “raised worries about unintended consequences” and the ability to properly test, validate and maintain these advanced technologies, which resulted in the Pentagon cancelling the contract. The need to ensure the security, reliability and transparency of these AI systems adds further to the complexity and cost of military modernisation, which can hamper the military’s efforts to integrate cutting-edge AI technologies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Increased use of armed force:</strong> AI-driven information-processing systems could enable a proliferation of target information, broadening the use of force and potentially leading to more civilian casualties. According to a 2023 media report, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) used an AI system known as Habsora (“the Gospel”) to rapidly identify and recommend targets for airstrikes in Gaza. According to the IDF, by extracting information quickly and automatically, Habsora provides targeted recommendations that match exactly to the identifications made by humans. Habsora and Israel’s Target Division have helped to build a database of between 30,000 and 40,000 people suspected of being Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants. To put it another way, AI-driven systems have accelerated the compilation of a vast potential kill list. Before Habsora, it would take Israel up to a year to identify 50 potential targets in Gaza. During the May 2021 conflict, the AI system identified around 100 targets per day.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Accountability and responsibility:</strong> AI in the military raises both C2 and legal questions about accountability. Current research suggests AI systems need more rigorous testing to be validated and considered safe in risky military situations. Such systems often involve a complex network of stakeholders, including developers, data providers, users and regulators. Attributing responsibility can be challenging, as each stakeholder is likely to contribute to the operation of the system in different ways. Aside from humanitarian issues, the unpredictability of AI can, as the above example on unpredictability demonstrates, obscure who should be held accountable when things go wrong. The more AI systems become autonomous and capable of independent decisions, the more difficult it becomes to determine who should be held accountable for their actions. Should it be the AI system itself, its developers or its users? Developing and adapting C2 and legal structures to govern the use of AI is essential to maintain the military chain of command and establish lines of accountability.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Deepfake technology risks:</strong> In March 2023, The Intercept uncovered a US Special Operations Command procurement document that suggests the US military is seeking to develop deepfake or other AI-based technologies to deceive its adversaries. The document showed that the military wishes to use deepfakes to mislead enemies on the battlefield. However, there is a risk that use of deepfakes in combat could percolate up to the field of foreign relations. Militaries serving societies that believe in the principle of democratic control of armed forces should be wary of capabilities such as deepfakes that can undermine trust and the principle of truth, without which their democracies cannot function.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Path dependency:</strong> As militaries adopt AI-powered systems, there is a risk over time that they will lose the institutional memory of performing tasks the “old-fashioned” way (without AI support). Ultimately, the more reliant on AI systems a military becomes, the greater the cost when that system is penetrated.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<h4 id="opportunities">OPPORTUNITIES</h4> - -<p>AI offers potentially significant advantages to military capability in terms of increased speed and accuracy, enhanced battlefield awareness and enhanced decision-making capabilities. Some of the examples examined below reflect bold claims, and it must be noted that technologies under development frequently fail to live up to early ambitions. However, given the immaturity and fast-moving nature of the AI field, it is appropriate to evaluate opportunities with an open mind about the potential range of utility.</p> - -<p>AI is changing not just how the military fights, but how it works from head to tail. It potentially offers better situational understanding, faster decisions, improved targeting, less risk to military personnel, and more efficient recruitment, training and logistics, gifting militaries cost savings and advantages in planning, executing and sustaining missions. Some of these benefits are unproven, others may never materialise in the form projected, and many are accompanied by vulnerabilities and risks of over-dependence. While there is a cost–benefit balance to be struck, no matter how much AI is adopted for a force, understanding how these systems may work and shape the way an adversary thinks and acts has become indispensable.</p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Situational awareness:</strong> With AI-powered sensors and technologies, military intelligence organisations can better understand battlefield conditions and provide a more comprehensive picture of adversary capabilities and intent. US Army researchers have developed machine learning algorithms that can operate in bandwidth-constrained environments to rapidly update situational awareness. These algorithms can compress data while maintaining near-optimal performance, allowing models to be frequently retrained on decentralised data sources, helping soldiers gain real-time analysis in a rapidly changing battlefield. The US Army is planning to integrate AI into tactical command posts by integrating disparate data sources into a common operational picture. AI systems can predict enemy actions, identify weaknesses, assess the environment, plan missions and suggest ways to avoid problems. By rapidly analysing disparate data sources, AI can provide precise intelligence forecasts, mission planning recommendations and situational assessments far quicker than human analysts alone.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhanced C2:</strong> AI systems allow the military to swiftly and precisely process large volumes of data and acquire nuanced insights, bringing unprecedented efficiency and accuracy to their decision-making process. The US DoD is creating an AI-powered system to combine data from different sensors into a single picture to help the joint force make better decisions. The US military has developed the CJADC2 (Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control) concept, which aims to increase interoperability and AI integration across all domains. By leveraging AI to rapidly collect, analyse and disseminate information on the battlefield, CJADC2 can identify and engage targets faster to create a well-informed force capable of defeating adversaries through accelerated decision-making cycles. By employing AI algorithms for predictive analytics and scenario modelling, the military can anticipate evolving threats and make immediate strategic adjustments to ensure agile, responsive C2. This capability is viewed by military strategists in both the US and China as a critical determinant that could prove decisive in shaping the outcomes of future armed conflicts and warfare scenarios.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Simulations and modelling:</strong> AI enables highly realistic simulations and modelling of complex military scenarios, systems and environments. This lets militaries test new ideas, strategies and equipment in a virtual environment before trying them in the real world. For example, the US Air Force is using AI-powered digital twins and simulations to model performance and maintenance requirements of aircraft such as the F-35 fighter. This helps accelerate innovation in areas such as predictive maintenance and mission planning. By personalising training regimens, AI enables more effective preparation of forces for dynamic real-world scenarios without compromising the safety of personnel. In the long term, AI-driven simulation training could be more cost effective than other kinds of realistic training simulations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Lethal autonomous weapon systems:</strong> The integration of weaponry equipped with advanced sensors and algorithms offers a significant advance in military capability. These systems autonomously identify targets while ensuring human oversight for specific engagements, thereby enhancing precision, speed and efficiency. AI-supported autonomous systems have the processing power to draw on all the data-rich systems mentioned above to form an integrated, rapidly functional “kill chain” that can predict enemy actions, identify vulnerabilities, assess environmental conditions, evaluate mission strategies and recommend mitigation plans. By anticipating threats, optimising tactics and streamlining decision-making through AI-powered analytics, military forces can stay one step ahead of their targets, increasing operational effectiveness and mission success rates.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Training and recruitment:</strong> The US Air Force and the US Army have used AI-powered training tools that can reduce the time needed to complete training materials by up to 40%. AI-based chatbots have been used to assist with military recruitment, for example the US Army’s chatbot, Sergeant Star, which officially came into operation in 2006. The US Navy is deploying a conversational AI system called “Amelia” to handle and resolve the most common technical support questions from naval and civilian personnel, reducing the need for human support agents. The rollout of Amelia is part of the Navy’s $136-million Navy Enterprise Service Desk initiative to update and merge more than 90 IT support centres into a unified assistance platform.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Logistics:</strong> AI-driven solutions hold immense potential for streamlining logistics processes within the military domain. AI algorithms can analyse historical data on equipment use, maintenance schedules and operational rhythms to predict future demand for spare parts, ammunition, fuel and so on, enabling more proactive inventory management with the aim of avoiding stock-outs or surpluses of critical supplies. The US Army is using AI for predictive logistics, leveraging the technology to help forecast and manage the supply of parts and equipment more efficiently.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<h3 id="taiwans-military-use-of-ai">TAIWAN’S MILITARY USE OF AI</h3> - -<p>Taiwan is in a strategically central and commanding position in the Western Pacific. Its location across sea lanes connecting large economies and its proximity to the Chinese mainland make Taiwan vital in terms of defence and power projection for the major powers. Taiwan is also an important international trade hub and a partner in global supply chains.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mSF50vm.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Taiwan’s Location in the First Island Chain.</strong> Source: AndreaNicolini/Adobe Stock.</em></p> - -<p>Figures from 2023 show Taiwan as the 17th-largest trading economy globally, with a trade volume of more than $900 billion in that year. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced ones. One Taiwanese company, TSMC, dominates the global semiconductor market, with 57% of the market share of semiconductor foundries in 2021. If Taiwan were to be attacked and production disrupted, no country could fill the void, and a halt in the manufacture and distribution of semiconductors would cause a shortage of technology products such as smartphones, computers and cars, along with company closures.</p> - -<p>China expresses a preference for peaceful unification but has spent the past 20 years developing its military to conquer Taiwan. China’s leaders consistently communicate that Taiwan should be under Beijing’s control, and that they are willing to use force to achieve this. As Taiwan becomes more independent and less interested in unifying with China, Beijing may decide that force is the only way to achieve its political goals regarding Taiwan.</p> - -<h4 id="taiwans-starting-points">TAIWAN’S STARTING POINTS</h4> - -<p>Currently, the Taiwanese military is actively exploring and utilising AI technology to enhance military efficiency and strengthen defence capabilities. For example, the Tri-Service General Hospital, one of the largest teaching hospitals in Taiwan, receives more than 2 million visits per year. By combining a Microsoft large-scale language model with AI and the technical support of Microsoft’s Taiwan R&amp;D centre, the hospital has brought together medical big data and Azure OpenAI to improve the accuracy of medical audio-visual recognition, to be automatically generated by AI to enable doctors and caregivers to improve the quality of diagnosis and care. The hospital’s medical information team will extend its technology development to record reports of doctors’ check-ups, outpatient clinics and surgeries, and the research results from medical image recognition, while reports of disease signs and symptoms and diagnoses will be generated and shared with the 13 military hospitals in the area of electrocardiography, to improve the speed of first aid through AI technology.</p> - -<p>China is rapidly increasing its intelligence-gathering capabilities against Taiwan, including through cyber attacks, surveillance aircraft (drones) and electronic warfare. A significant challenge for Taiwan is to monitor and analyse these multidomain threats. Taiwan is seeking to learn from countries such as Israel to improve its own use of these technologies to counter the growing Chinese threat. By leveraging AI algorithms for data fusion and pattern recognition, Taiwan can gain actionable insights into adversary intentions and activities. This includes using signal intelligence from communications and radar transmissions to understand China’s capabilities and intentions. Social media monitoring to detect disinformation campaigns or indications of impending military activity enables proactive decision-making and threat-mitigation strategies.</p> - -<p>As cyber threats become increasingly complex and pervasive, Taiwan must strengthen its cyber-defence capabilities to protect critical infrastructure and sensitive information. Taiwan has elevated cyber security as a national security priority and is taking proactive measures through initiatives such as the National Institute of Cyber Security and the Administration for Cyber Security of the Ministry of Digital Affairs, which is developing cutting-edge AI tools to detect fraudulent online activities, analyse suspicious messages and combat misinformation or false information campaigns. By further leveraging AI for threat hunting, anomaly detection and incident response, Taiwan can enhance its ability to defend against cyber attacks and minimise the impact of cyber incidents on military operations.</p> - -<p>In the ongoing Ukraine–Russia war, UAVs, especially smaller, low-cost drones adapted for combat roles, have demonstrated astonishing operational effectiveness in missions such as surveillance, targeting and precision-strike operations, enabling the outgunned Ukrainian army to deliver precise strikes and inflict significant damage against the quantitively superior Russian army.</p> - -<p>The ability to use missiles, drones and mines is critical for the defence of Taiwan, which needs to signal the ability to destroy invading ships and aircraft before they reach the main island. Taiwan could use drones with large payloads to attack China’s amphibious fleet, strike strategic targets and supplement crewed aircraft. They could also be used to serve as missile decoys and enable dispersed operations from roads if airbases are attacked. The use of multi-layered deterrence to maintain a solid defence posture is particularly suitable for Taiwan’s national defence strategy, which assumes lean military strength and tight procurement budget allocation. Taiwan’s drone capabilities are currently inferior to those of China. To catch up, Taiwan has set up the Drone National Team programme, which by mid-2024 had brought together companies and the military to produce more than 3,200 drones.</p> - -<p>The National Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) in Taoyuan City has indicated its plans to integrate AI and deep learning to develop an intelligent training environment that integrates live, virtual and constructive simulation into the more than 240 sets of simulation systems it has established for Taiwan’s army, including a drone-operated training simulator and the Brave Eagle training system, which has the potential to improve the comprehensive effectiveness of the army’s combat power. This year, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense established a National Defense Innovation Group. The ministry has demonstrated its determination to strengthen its asymmetric warfare capabilities, and has begun in-depth cooperation with the US Department of Commerce to promote projects such as drone systems, anti-drone systems, and AI use.</p> - -<h4 id="current-use-of-ai-in-chinas-military">CURRENT USE OF AI IN CHINA’S MILITARY</h4> - -<p>China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been actively developing and deploying AI since the mid-2010s. These efforts are in line with China’s broader strategic initiatives, such as the Made in China 2025 plan from 2015 and the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, released in 2017.</p> - -<p>In July 2017, China’s State Council released a policy document, the “Developmental Regulations on a New Artificial Intelligence Generation”, which outlines the country’s AI development plan. The document demonstrates China’s ambition to become a world leader in AI by 2030. It stipulates that AI will be used for defence purposes, including command decision-making, military simulation and defence equipment. Since the release of the document, China has started to use AI more extensively in its military, particularly in the following areas:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Unmanned combat systems:</strong> The PLA has been developing and using unmanned AI systems since 2015. These include drones for air, ground, sea and subsea operations. China has world-class capabilities in AI-dependent drone swarms with military potential. In April 2023, the PLA tested an AI system to help with artillery targeting, showing how AI is used in weapons.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Battlefield awareness and decision-making:</strong> The PLA is using AI to improve awareness on the battlefield and in decision-making. This means combining data from different sources to get a complete up-to-date picture. Chinese military experts have discussed the idea of a “command brain”, to use AI for making plans at the tactical and operational levels.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Multidomain operations:</strong> AI has been employed by China to conduct and coordinate actions across the domains of land, sea, air, space and cyber since at least 2020. AI helps to combine and analyse data from different domains to improve effectiveness.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Predictive maintenance and logistics:</strong> China is using AI to maintain equipment and improve logistics. AI can predict when equipment might fail and help with decisions about where to put resources. China has been using AI in this area since at least 2020. This is part of a broader strategy to leverage AI for military advantage and modernisation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Information and electronic warfare:</strong> AI is being used in information and electronic warfare to help the PLA in modern conflict. For example, the PLA Navy Submarine Academy has awarded contracts related to AI-based adaptive beamforming techniques.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Simulation and training:</strong> The PLA is using AI in training its military personnel through realistic and effective simulations of warfare. The PLA has been integrating AI technologies into various aspects of military training and operations as part of a shift towards “intelligentized warfare”. This shift began gaining significant momentum around 2015, when China emphasised the importance of AI Informatisation in its defence strategy.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Command, control and communication:</strong> AI is being added to the PLA’s command, control and communication systems to improve military operations. This includes applications at all levels of warfare.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>China has ambitious plans to employ AI in the military, but limited transparency means that it is not always clear how advanced these systems are. The PLA is still working on overcoming challenges in testing, training and developing concepts for these AI-enabled systems. The development of military AI in the PLA is certainly changing. In the near future, changes will probably be small, but in the long term, they could be substantial.</p> - -<h4 id="taiwans-necessary-tilt-towards-ai">TAIWAN’S NECESSARY TILT TOWARDS AI</h4> - -<p>Four areas that shape Taiwan’s defence are connected to the kinds of capability advantages presented by the military application of AI.</p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p>AI’s centrality to China–US rivalry and the PLA’s modernisation make it a major consideration in Taiwan’s defence strategy. In 2021, veteran US diplomat Henry Kissinger warned that, among other things, a mutual failure to understand each other’s AI capability could lead to conflict. China’s President Xi Jinping talked about “emerging domain strategic capabilities” at the National People’s Congress on 11 March 2024, calling on the military to deepen reforms, promote innovation and enhance emerging strategic capabilities. AI is a source as well as an instrument of conflict between Taiwan’s principal ally and its principal adversary, so even if a resource imbalance makes it difficult for Taiwan to acquire capabilities at the same level as China, there is no escaping the need for it to understand the AI capabilities of both ally and adversary, and how those are shaping the future of warfare.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>US forces that might be available to defend Taiwan are based some distance away in Japan, Guam and elsewhere, making early warning of preparations for invasion essential to a successful defence strategy. It is equally important that decision-makers in Taiwan and the US base their judgements on sources of information that both can trust. The more AI and machine learning are adopted by the US to monitor and assess China’s intentions towards Taiwan, including any indications of a possible military build-up or preparations for invasion, the more important it becomes for Taiwan to keep pace and not allow a gap to open in terms of a common standard for indications and warnings.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>A successful invasion of Taiwan would require large amounts of materiel to cross the Taiwan Strait, making the underwater battlefield of particular importance. It is therefore natural that Taiwan is strongly incentivised to develop autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) powered by AI technology. The National Sun Yat-sen University successfully built Taiwan’s first marine-specific AUV with AI capabilities in 2020. It leverages AI and deep learning for object recognition, tracking, obstacle avoidance and self-correction during underwater operations. By integrating AI into autonomous systems, Taiwan can extend its operational reach and capabilities, enabling unmanned platforms to operate in contested environments and execute missions with minimal human oversight.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The air domain has a twofold importance for Taiwan’s defence – as a means by which an invasion force could arrive, and as a means by which Taiwan’s own forces could be degraded or destroyed in advance of an invasion. According to the 2022 National Defense Technology Trend Assessment Report published in late 2022 by Taiwan’s defense think tank, the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense believes that drones should be the focus of Taiwan’s asymmetric warfare weaponry development. NCSIST, the main R&amp;D organisation of the Armament Bureau of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, is developing AI-enabled weapon systems related to the use of drones.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<p>In conclusion, the integration of AI into Taiwan’s military is already offering many opportunities to enhance operational effectiveness and strengthen deterrence. As AI continues to advance, Taiwan must invest in R&amp;D, talent acquisition and international collaboration to harness the full potential of AI technologies and secure its position as a resilient and capable force for peace and stability in the region.</p> - -<h3 id="challenges-and-recommendations-for-taiwans-future-military-use-of-ai">CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TAIWAN’S FUTURE MILITARY USE OF AI</h3> - -<p>This section lays out seven principal challenges faced by Taiwan in advancing the implementation of AI for military functions, and makes recommendations for how to address them to continue its necessary tilt towards AI.</p> - -<h4 id="challenge-1-data-security-and-privacy-concerns">CHALLENGE 1: DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONCERNS</h4> - -<p>Information has always been vital in war, but in modern warfare, information – data – is the foundation for leveraging the power of AI to deliver military advantage. Implementing AI in military operations requires vast amounts of data, including information about tactics, personnel and equipment. Military drones with the latest sensors capture live intelligence on enemy movements and send the data to command centres for analysis.</p> - -<p>More data can only be beneficial if the problems of information overload can be managed and the data can be reliably fused into a single picture. Algorithms and machine learning find patterns, trends and problems in big data, helping to turn raw data into useful information, and helping leaders to make decisions and plan ahead. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense is implementing standardised protocols and secure cloud infrastructure to overcome information silos. This network lets data flow between different organisations, helping them work together and understand the operational landscape better.</p> - -<p>However, ensuring the security and privacy of this data presents a significant challenge. Concerns include unauthorised access, data breaches and exploitation by adversaries. Military personnel are encouraged to share information through user-friendly tools and platforms that let people in different places work together. But it is vital to ensure sharing technology is used properly.</p> - -<h4 id="recommendations">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>Use encryption to protect data stored on computers and sent over the internet.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Implement secure communication protocols to ensure that data transmitted between systems remains protected from interception or tampering.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Restrict access to data to authorised personnel.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Verify user identities for accessing sensitive information.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Prioritise anonymisation and pseudonymisation techniques to de-identify sensitive data, reducing the risk of exposure in the event of a breach while still allowing for meaningful analysis and use.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Engage advanced encryption to protect sensitive data during transmission and storage.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Use secure cloud infrastructure for scalable processing with robust access controls and data isolation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Use strict data-handling protocols, such as applying anonymisation and secure deletion procedures.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Ensure continuous improvement based on feedback from military units, enhancing both performance and security.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>We are well into the era of economic security. The need for an allied approach is now axiomatic, but it will require the United States to lead and partner in equal measures. The challenge for the next administration is to build on the early lessons of recent years and devise a long-term, bipartisan economic security strategy that balances domestic goals with international cooperation and the complexities of the global markets.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US DoD’s Project Maven, which uses AI for object recognition in military imagery and video data, makes use of advanced encryption and secure cloud infrastructure to protect the sensitive data used in its AI-powered object recognition systems for military intelligence.</code></em></p> +<h2 id="protecting-sensitive-technologies-preserving-us-advantage">Protecting Sensitive Technologies, Preserving U.S. Advantage</h2> -<h4 id="challenge-2-transparency-and-explainability">CHALLENGE 2: TRANSPARENCY AND EXPLAINABILITY</h4> +<h3 id="mismatch-of-strategy-and-budgets-in-ai-chip-export-controls">Mismatch of Strategy and Budgets in AI Chip Export Controls</h3> -<p>Many AI techniques, such as deep learning, are “black boxes”, in which the decision-making process is not transparent or easily explainable to human operators and decision-makers. Interpretable AI can help to identify potential biases or errors in the decision-making process, which is crucial for high-stakes military applications.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="gregory-c-allen">Gregory C. Allen</h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="recommendations-1">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Regardless of who wins the November 2024 election, export control represents a great deal of unfinished business for the next presidential administration to take on.</code></em></strong></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Develop more transparent and interpretable AI models that allow military personnel to understand the “reasoning” behind the system’s decisions, enabling better oversight and trust in the technology.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Utilise research on AI explainability and visualisation techniques to improve the understandability of military AI systems. Visualisation techniques such as saliency maps and feature importance plots can help human operators quickly comprehend the factors influencing an AI system’s outputs.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Two dates from 2022 are likely to echo in geopolitical history. The first, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, hardly needs further explanation. The second is one that many Americans may not recognize. On October 7, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued new export control regulations that placed a de facto ban on U.S. sales to China of the most advanced computer chip hardware that powers modern artificial intelligence (AI) models.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Explainable AI (XAI) programme, which ended in 2021, aimed to produce more transparent machine learning models while maintaining high performance, applicable to military decision-support systems.</code></em></p> +<p>The United States and China agree that leadership in AI technology is critical to the future of military power. For years, Chinese government and military procurement records openly advertised the desire for U.S. chips to power Chinese AI surveillance systems and new AI military supercomputing facilities. Since more than 90 percent of AI chips used in Chinese data centers are designed by U.S. semiconductor companies and are therefore subject to U.S. export controls, loss of access to the U.S. chip market could put China’s entire future as an AI superpower in jeopardy.</p> -<h4 id="challenge-3-robustness-and-reliability">CHALLENGE 3: ROBUSTNESS AND RELIABILITY</h4> +<p>Grand historical turning points rarely take the form of long bureaucratic documents, but the October 7 export controls were one of those rare times. Ten days after the new regulations came out, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said: “We are at an inflection point. The post–Cold War world has come to an end, and there is an intense competition underway to shape what comes next. And at the heart of that competition is technology.”</p> -<p>AI systems have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks that can drastically reduce their performance, posing risks in high-stakes military applications. Robust security measures, such as adversarial training and model hardening, can help harden AI systems against intentional attacks designed to deceive or disable them.</p> +<p>Blinken is right. Even though the October 7 export controls were in many ways narrowly targeted on only the most advanced AI chips and chipmaking tools, as a whole, the policy marked a major reversal of over 25 years of trade and technology policy toward China in at least three ways.</p> -<h4 id="recommendations-2">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p>First, the controls were targeted at multiple chokepoints across the semiconductor supply chain, blocking sales not only of the advanced AI chips being used by the Chinese military but also the advanced software and equipment required to make them. The United States is trying to ensure that China cannot replace what the United States is no longer willing to sell.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Implement robust security measures to protect AI models from external manipulation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Continuously monitor for new vulnerabilities and develop countermeasures.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Use continuous monitoring and rapid response to emerging vulnerabilities. This is crucial to maintaining the reliability of military AI systems in the face of evolving threats.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Limit external access to critical AI models and defence techniques, which can help prevent adversaries from reverse-engineering or exploiting these systems.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Second, the export controls apply on a geographic basis for China as a whole, not just to the Chinese military. That is a response to China’s strategy of military-civil fusion, which has worked to deepen and obscure the linkages between China’s commercial technology companies and China’s military.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US Army Research Laboratory is developing AI systems that can detect and resist adversarial attacks, particularly for image recognition systems used in military applications.</code></em></p> +<p>Third, previous U.S. export controls were designed to allow China to progress technologically but to restrict the pace so that the United States and its allies retained a durable lead. The new policy, by contrast, in some cases aims to actively degrade China’s technological capabilities. Without access to the United States’ enabling technology, many leading Chinese semiconductor firms have been set back years.</p> -<h4 id="challenge-4-technological-limitations-and-integration-complexity">CHALLENGE 4: TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS AND INTEGRATION COMPLEXITY</h4> +<p>It took a long time for the United States to get here. After decades of ratcheting Chinese government provocations, the Biden administration basically said, “enough is enough.”</p> -<p>Deploying AI systems in military environments often involves integrating complex technologies across diverse platforms and systems. Compatibility issues, interoperability challenges and limitations in AI capabilities may hinder seamless integration and adoption.</p> +<p>This is not a policy of decoupling (yet), but it is proof of the United States’ unwillingness to remain tightly coupled to the Chinese technology sector under previous conditions. Subsequent policies, such as the Treasury Department’s outbound investment restrictions on China’s AI and semiconductor industries, hint at the United States’ desire for more comprehensive economic security and technology.</p> -<h4 id="recommendations-3">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p>But there is a critical gap between the strategic importance and sophistication of the policy’s design and the resources that the government is allocating to enforce it.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Design AI systems with modular and scalable architectures to facilitate integration with existing military infrastructure.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Prioritise interoperability standards and protocols to ensure compatibility across different platforms and systems.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Conduct rigorous testing and evaluation of AI systems in realistic operational environments to identify and address technological limitations and performance gaps.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Implement iterative development processes to refine AI algorithms and improve system capabilities over time.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Pool resources and share knowledge, which can accelerate technological advances and facilitate smoother integration of AI into military operations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Foster collaboration and partnerships with industry, academia and allies to leverage expertise and resources in AI research and development.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the U.S. Department of Commerce is the agency charged with enforcing export controls, not just on semiconductors bound for China but for all U.S. dual-use technology exports that might end up in Russia, Iran, North Korea, or other restricted destinations. To implement its work overseeing trillions of dollars in economic activity and policing smuggling operations worldwide, BIS has fewer than 600 employees and a relatively paltry budget of just under $200 million. Semiconductors are just one technology category out of hundreds that this organization is responsible for enforcing.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System uses a modular, open-systems approach to integrate AI capabilities across multiple platforms and domains. This approach enables rapid adaptation to new technologies and threats while maintaining cross-branch and allied forces interoperability.</code></em></p> +<p>Reporting by The Information found at least eight Chinese AI chip-smuggling networks, with each engaging in transactions valued at more than $100 million. China is betting that its network of smugglers and shell companies can find the leaks in the BIS export control enforcement barrier. As long as Congress continues to neglect BIS by providing grossly inadequate resources compared to the size and importance of its mission, China has a reasonable expectation of success. BIS needs not only more money, but also more skilled staff, more enforcement agents, and better enabling technology, especially for data analysis.</p> -<h4 id="challenge-5-insufficient-training-data">CHALLENGE 5: INSUFFICIENT TRAINING DATA</h4> +<p>Moreover, the Department of Commerce needs more help from the rest of the government, in particular the U.S. intelligence community. Declassified Central Intelligence Agency documents show that the intelligence community was deeply involved in assisting export control enforcement during the Cold War and delivered solid results by doing so. These are capabilities and priorities that have significantly atrophied in the post–Cold War era but urgently need to be restored.</p> -<p>Many military applications lack the large, high-quality datasets typically required to train effective AI models using machine learning.</p> +<p>Regardless of who wins the November 2024 election, export control represents a great deal of unfinished business for the next presidential administration to take on.</p> -<h4 id="recommendations-4">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p>Finally, the United States cannot do this alone. U.S. allies need to take a good look at their own export controls and broader economic security toolboxes. There are some innovative economic security policy experiments going on in places like Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Allies need to share information on best practices, align approaches, and devote appropriate resources to have a reasonable chance of success.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>When dealing with limited training data, techniques such as data augmentation can be employed to artificially expand the dataset. This includes methods such as cropping, flipping, rotating or adding noise to existing data samples. While not a complete solution, data augmentation can help increase the diversity and size of training datasets.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Instead of training models from scratch on limited data, transfer learning allows leveraging of models pre-trained on large, general datasets and then fine-tuning them on the smaller, domain-specific military datasets. This can significantly reduce data requirements while still achieving good performance.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>For certain military use cases such as simulations or scenario modelling, it may be possible to generate synthetic training data using rule-based systems, physics engines or generative adversarial networks. While ensuring realism is crucial, synthetic data can supplement real-world data to increase the overall training dataset size.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h3 id="from-reaction-to-strategy">From Reaction to Strategy</h3> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US Air Force’s Dataworks initiative aims to create high-quality diverse datasets for AI training in military applications, addressing the challenge of limited data in sensitive contexts. This initiative is crucial for overcoming data-scarcity challenges in developing AI for sensitive military applications.</code></em></p> +<p><strong><em>A New Framework for U.S. Export Control Enforcement</em></strong></p> -<h4 id="challenge-6-keeping-pace-with-rapid-ai-advances">CHALLENGE 6: KEEPING PACE WITH RAPID AI ADVANCES</h4> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="barath-harithas">Barath Harithas</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>AI is changing fast, so it is challenging for the military’s testing and use to keep pace with developments in the technology.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is critical that the U.S government does not engage in a reactive dance that leads to overstretch and inevitable failure. Crucially, the United States must more effectively rally allies to join the fray, transforming a fragmented response into a united front.</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="recommendations-5">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p>The United States has relied on a “siege wall” of export controls to keep critical technologies (e.g., advanced semiconductors) out of Chinese hands. There have been increasing reports highlighting the leakiness of export controls, calling into question the efficacy of what increasingly appears to be a technology Maginot Line for the United States. In light of selective failures, critics have rushed to declare export controls ineffective, overlooking the complexities that inform their enforcement and impact.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Agile development allows the military to be more responsive to the fast-paced changes in AI, rather than relying on traditional, lengthy procurement processes.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Continuous integration and testing help ensure new AI systems are thoroughly vetted before being deployed in operational environments.</p> - </li> +<p>The effectiveness of export controls cannot be reduced to a simple binary assessment; it is contingent upon the specific product categories in question. For instance, the smuggling of chips has proven alarmingly straightforward. In 2023, NVIDIA shipped over a million leading-edge chips, each valued at approximately $40,000 and portable enough that 609 units can fit into a single freight box. Conversely, ASML sold only 53 state-of-the-art extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines in 2023, each costing $350 million and requiring 13 truck-sized containers and 250 crates for transportation, with extensive logistics and post-sales support needed. The latter product category has shown far less evidence of smuggling compared to chips, which have reportedly been smuggled in bulk orders valued over $100 million.</p> + +<p>This essay offers three recommendations for improving export control enforcement:</p> + +<ol> <li> - <p>Investing in internal AI R&amp;D helps the military stay ahead of the curve and develop custom solutions tailored to its specific needs.</p> + <p>Enforcement efforts must prioritize areas where compliance is most tractable. This requires a clear-eyed understanding of the objectives behind export controls. The goal is not merely to prevent specific end products from reaching China; rather, the true litmus test of these controls lies in their ability to impede China’s indigenization campaign.</p> + + <p>For instance, while preventing advanced semiconductors from reaching China is crucial, the greater concern is ensuring that China cannot manufacture these technologies at scale. Controls should target more strongly critical chokepoints such as semiconductor manufacturing equipment, especially EUV machines, service and repair components, and electronic design software. Given the inherent leakiness of export controls for chips, it is crucial to recognize that these measures are at best a tool to increase acquisition costs for China in the short run. The ultimate long-term objective, however, must focus on undermining China’s efforts toward technological indigenization and self-sufficiency.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Attracting and retaining skilled AI researchers and engineers ensures the military has the necessary expertise to effectively leverage the latest advances.</p> + <p>The current approach to export control enforcement resembles a game of “whack-a-mole,” where smuggling networks emerge, vanish, and reemerge faster than they can be addressed. To overcome this cycle, regulators need to move from the reactive blacklisting of suspicious entities to implementing a preapprovals regime. In other words, instead of fixating on whom to bar from the game, authorities should shift their focus toward who gets to play. By so doing, regulators can more effectively limit the avenues available for smuggling.</p> + + <p>This can be operationalized through: (1) establishing a certification process during initial procurement to create a marketplace of trusted sellers and to enhance compliance knowledge among stakeholders; (2) implementing digital waybills to reduce documentation fraud and improve traceability, thereby addressing customs evasion; and (3) mandating the use of preapproved logistics providers who are required to report any consignments not received within a specified timeframe to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the Department of Commerce. This measure will help identify suspicious entities and facilitate timely spot checks, creating a more effective feedback loop for detection and enforcement.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Collaborating with academic and industry partners can help the military access the latest AI innovations and knowledge.</p> + <p>The United States must work more closely with allied partners to multilateralize export controls. U.S. export restrictions on their own are insufficient. They must be the portcullis of the castle, not its keep. The current stalemate stems from the United States expecting allies to mirror its controls, while partners have been overly cautious, fearing such actions might set a precedent for future expectations. This dynamic is unsustainable. The United States must acknowledge the economic concerns of its allies, while allies must recognize that failure to act could result in the United States imposing stricter measures in bilateral settings. There is common interest on both sides to accept a “highest-common-denominator” approach to multilateral controls. By aligning interests, even imperfectly, the United States can enhance collective enforcement capabilities, thereby flushing out the smuggling quarry from remaining avenues.</p> </li> -</ul> +</ol> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US DoD’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) uses an agile development approach, allowing for rapid prototyping and iteration of AI systems. This approach allows JAIC to keep pace with rapid advancements in AI technology while ensuring that developed systems meet the specific needs of the military.</code></em></p> +<p>In conclusion, as any middling tactician knows, eventually all walls are outflanked. The real question is how easily, and therefore which ones truly deserve our focus. Moreover, given the leanness of BIS, it is critical that the U.S government does not engage in a reactive dance that leads to overstretch and inevitable failure. Crucially, the United States must more effectively rally allies to join the fray, transforming a fragmented response into a united front. By clarifying objectives, refining enforcement strategies, and fostering multilateral cooperation, the United States can reclaim control over the rules of the game and tilt the odds in favor of success against slippery evasion strategies. These recommendations not only address the immediate challenges posed by export control enforcement but also contribute to a more coherent and effective strategy in the long term against technology transfer to adversarial nations.</p> -<h4 id="challenge-7-ethical-and-legal-implications">CHALLENGE 7: ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS</h4> +<h3 id="defensive-measures-against-china">Defensive Measures Against China</h3> -<p>AI raises complex ethical and legal issues around autonomy, compliance with international law and accountability for AI-driven decisions and actions.</p> +<p><strong><em>Time for a Reevaluation</em></strong></p> -<h4 id="recommendations-6">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="scott-kennedy">Scott Kennedy</h4> +</blockquote> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Develop comprehensive ethical guidelines and frameworks specific to the use of AI in military contexts. Ensure that these guidelines address issues such as human oversight, accountability and the responsible use of autonomous systems.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Engage with and draw on the work of international processes set up to explore and develop regulation on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) in the context of international humanitarian law, such as the Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS at the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Ensure military AI applications comply with national and international regulations, including regulations governing the use of force, data protection and human rights.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Conduct legal reviews and assessments to identify and mitigate potential legal risks.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Foster transparency in AI systems by providing clear documentation of their capabilities, limitations and decision-making processes.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Establish mechanisms for accountability, including processes for reviewing and auditing AI-related decisions and actions.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">If current trends continue, the U.S. and Chinese economies will be decoupled in many areas, not just advanced technologies with military applications. And it is just as likely that the result of this division will be either global fragmentation or an isolated United States.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The UK Ministry of Defence has established an AI Ethics Advisory Panel to provide external advice and scrutiny of its AI development and deployment, ensuring alignment with ethical principles and legal requirements.</code></em></p> +<p>On a recent trip to China, I visited a Chinese firm that is on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List. When discussion turned to their designation, they claimed utter disbelief and surprise; they could not fathom what prompted Washington’s action. It is possible that their claims of innocence are genuine, but given their place in an important high-tech sector, likely links to the Chinese party-state, and the nature of some of their customers, one can also see why the U.S. government would have taken this step.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">CONCLUSION</h3> +<p>In fact, it may be difficult to disagree with most, if not every, individual decision the U.S. government has taken in the last five years to protect itself in the face of the broad national security challenge China presents to the United States, its allies, and the rules-based global order. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of all of this action deserves careful evaluation. And where the result is not as intended, Washington needs to recalibrate its policy approach.</p> -<p>AI appears to offer significant military advantages in terms of strategy (especially information processing and C2), operational capabilities, logistics and support. However, navigating the complexities of implementing AI in the military field requires careful consideration of not only technological capabilities but also ethical and organisational challenges.</p> +<p>There are now around 1,000 Chinese companies and institutions blacklisted by the United States for national security or human rights reasons. The list of “controlled items” that require a license to be exported to China has ballooned, and in the case of advanced semiconductors and semiconductor equipment, the restrictions are country-wide. Extremely high U.S. tariffs – far above standard most favored nation (MFN) levels – are now applied to most Chinese goods, even those with no strategic value. The coverage of sectors in which screening of inward investment deals apply has expanded dramatically, while the United States and its allies have started developing new regulations for outward investment to China. As a result of a law passed in the spring of 2024, social media app TikTok will be banned in the United States unless ByteDance, its parent company, sells the platform to a non-Chinese owner. The Biden administration recently adopted a draft executive order that would ban Chinese connected and autonomous vehicles and their components from the U.S. market starting with the 2027 model year. The administration and Congress are considering a wide range of other defensive measures as well.</p> -<p>In Taiwan’s case, where material imbalances and political dependencies dominate the risks of conflict, those responsible for the island’s defence cannot afford to neglect any aspect of AI’s potential to gain time and level the playing field. Embracing AI in the military fosters a culture of innovation and adaptability to stay ahead of emerging threats and technological advances. By investing in R&amp;D and fostering collaboration with international partners, Taiwan can design military AI systems with modular and scalable architectures that can accommodate updates and upgrades as the technology evolves, as well as remaining interoperable with its key ally, the US.</p> +<p>What does all of this activity add up to? Is it worth it? And might there be a better way? It is time to ask – and answer – these and many other questions. There are at least four potential negative consequences that emerge from this tidal wave.</p> -<p>By identifying and mitigating risks proactively, Taiwan’s military can make gains beyond enhancing its own defensive capabilities. Keeping up with the rapid pace of AI development through the recommendations in this paper will enable the military to more effectively integrate and leverage the latest AI innovations to maintain a world-class technological edge, making Taiwan a globally more attractive defence industry partner. The combination of Taiwan’s industrial and technological and skills base, experience in AI research and experimentation, and the pressures of its defence challenges position it to take a lead on the military application of AI.</p> +<p>The Biden administration argues that it is pursuing a “small yard, high fence strategy,” meaning that it aims to protect national security while having as limited an impact on commerce as possible. Mitigating national security vulnerabilities from commerce with China – known as de-risking – may have been the original goal and still may be the overall purpose. But the breadth of the actions and the tit-for-tat, action-reaction by Washington, Beijing, and others is resulting in a far greater reduction of bilateral business and rerouting of supply chains than is reflected in the official policy framing. If current trends continue, the U.S. and Chinese economies will be decoupled in many areas, not just advanced technologies with military applications. And it is just as likely that the result of this division will be either global fragmentation or an isolated United States.</p> -<p>Ultimately, Taiwan must embrace military AI because its adversary uses it, and so does its ally, and Taiwan must align with them on critical defence judgements and for interoperability. Taiwan needs AI to offset its scale disadvantages in demographics and material capability. AI-powered automation can multiply the number of platforms without the need for large personnel outlays. Gains in administrative and logistic efficiency permit scarce military personnel to focus their efforts on more critical missions and tasks, thereby maximising operational effectiveness.</p> +<p>Second, and relatedly, while individual measures, such as those on advanced semiconductors and equipment, may initially work or be effective for several years, this is far from guaranteed. Although China has long aimed for greater technological self-reliance, there is ample evidence that the industries it has prioritized, the extent of its financial support and other measures, and the willingness of Chinese industry to actively participate has in part been in reaction to this U.S.-led technology boycott. It is possible that in some areas China will advance faster than it otherwise would have in individual technologies and in occupying the leadership of technology ecosystems. Moreover, as a result of less connectivity with Chinese industry and researchers, U.S. innovation may also suffer. If so, instead of mitigating national security risks, the United States may end making the problem worse.</p> -<p>Given the complex geopolitical situation and rapid advances in military AI, Taiwan faces a critical decision regarding the immediate development of AI for military use.</p> +<p>Third, less connectivity with China means a slower energy transition. Yes, China has unfairly subsidized clean-energy products such as solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and electric vehicles. And, yes, it sold a substantial portion of overproduction on global markets, threatening competitors in many countries. That said, a straight-out ban of such goods from other markets will necessarily mean less products in the short term. Additionally, if protection is not made conditional on the rapid development of high-quality domestic alternatives at prices the middle class can afford, these restrictions will be for naught.</p> -<h4 id="key-considerations">KEY CONSIDERATIONS</h4> +<p>And fourth, the U.S. approach is changing the nature of the international economic order in front of our eyes. In the 1960s, in the face of growing competition from Japan and other East Asian countries, the United States and its allies developed the rules and tools for anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and with them the underlying principles of “fair trade.” Although these tools have various biases and are subject to widespread abuse, they did provide compensation to industries that were suffering from greater international competition and, as a result, kept the greater project of globalization alive. The expansion of export controls and other defensive measures is fundamentally challenging the notion – embedded in the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – that national security justifications to restrict international commerce should be limited and the exception to the rule. The rise of “economic security” as a rationale for policy even more directly threatens to make open commerce and financial flows a thing of the past.</p> -<p>Key considerations for the Taiwanese government include:</p> +<p>The seriousness of the Chinese challenge to the United States and the rules-based order requires definitive policies, but it does not justify any and all policies. The United States and its allies need to reassess their approach and adapt as needed. Here are three recommendations:</p> <ol> <li> - <p>Strategic necessity: AI development is likely to be crucial for Taiwan’s asymmetric defence strategy against potential threats from China. As China continues to advance its military AI capabilities, Taiwan needs to develop countermeasures to maintain a credible deterrent. AI could significantly enhance Taiwan’s surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning systems, providing a vital edge in situational awareness and response time.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Technological readiness: Taiwan has a strong technological foundation, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing, which could support AI development. However, it may face challenges in terms of data availability, computational power and specialised expertise for military AI applications. Careful assessment of these capabilities is necessary to ensure effective development and deployment.</p> + <p>The United States needs to decide precisely what kind of outcomes it wants and what kind of outcomes it is unwilling to accept. Is bifurcation of the global economy, even if the United States is relatively isolated, acceptable simply because it means less connectivity with China? Would it be acceptable for the United States to maintain technological advantage over China if it means the elimination of a rules-based order and a race to the bottom in the use of tools to restrict global commerce?</p> </li> <li> - <p>Economic considerations: Given Taiwan’s limited defence budget compared to China’s, investing in AI could be a cost-effective way to enhance military capabilities. AI systems could potentially provide force multiplication effects, allowing Taiwan to do more with less. However, the initial investment and ongoing maintenance costs must be carefully weighed against other defence priorities.</p> + <p>Washington needs to include cost-benefit analysis for its overall approach and for each policy initiative. The presence of a national security risk does not mean the costs of any one policy are irrelevant. In fact, there are usually multiple possible options to address a risk, and their relative costs and benefits should be weighed, and done so with transparency.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Operational impact: Integrating AI into military operations will require significant changes in training, doctrine and organisational structure. Taiwan’s military will need to develop new skills and competencies to effectively utilise AI systems. Additionally, robust cyber-security measures must be implemented to protect AI systems from potential attacks or manipulation.</p> + <p>And finally, because this overall shift is so consequential to the U.S. national security and economy, more information about individual cases and the broader national security threat China poses to the United States needs to be shared with the U.S. public. The U.S. government should consider how much more information could be shared without compromising U.S. intelligence methods and sources. The Chinese interlocutors I met during a recent trip may not deserve a clearer explanation, but as a part of a democracy, the American people deserve to know more.</p> </li> </ol> -<p>To mitigate risks and accelerate the development and integration of AI capabilities in the military, Taiwan should consider:</p> +<p>It is possible that taking these steps could yield the conclusion that substantial changes in policy are needed. But it is also possible that the current approach could be reaffirmed. Hence, there should be a consensus in favor of being more careful, deliberate, and transparent.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Focusing on specific AI applications that address critical defence needs.</p> - </li> +<h2 id="the-investing-in-america-agenda">The Investing in America Agenda</h2> + +<h3 id="clustering-for-innovation">Clustering for Innovation</h3> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="sujai-shivakumar">Sujai Shivakumar</h4> +</blockquote> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">By fostering the growth of thick regional ecosystems, partnerships encourage more Americans to connect to and have a stake in the nation’s economic future – securing the nation from within.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>Last month, the Elevate Quantum Tech Hub broke ground on the new Quantum Tech Park in Arvada, Colorado. It is one of 31 Tech Hubs designated by the U.S. Department of Commerce to stimulate innovation-based regional economic growth. This initiative is one part of a larger effort across the federal government to expand and connect innovation networks across the nation.</p> + +<h4 id="the-push-from-the-chips-and-science-act">The Push from the CHIPS and Science Act</h4> + +<p>The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 established a suite of grant programs designed to catalyze technology cluster development, including the Tech Hubs Program through the Economic Development Administration at the Department of Commerce, the Microelectronics Commons Hubs through the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Innovation Engines through the National Science Foundation (NSF):</p> + +<ul> <li> - <p>Leveraging international partnerships, particularly with the US, for technology sharing and expertise.</p> + <p>The Department of Commerce’s Tech Hubs envisions 31 regional consortia that focus on specific emerging technologies. Starting in July 2024, 12 hubs have each received “implementation funding” between $19 million and $51 million for workforce development and manufacturing initiatives.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Investing in education and training programmes to build a skilled workforce for AI development and implementation.</p> + <p>The DOD’s Microelectronics Commons Hubs consists of eight networks that aim to close the “lab-to-fab” gap in microelectronics for commercial and defense applications, each receiving between $15 million and $40 million.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Prioritising cyber security and resilience in AI system design and deployment.</p> + <p>The NSF’s Innovation Engines include 10 regions that each have received an initial $15 million in grants covering multiple technology domains, such as robotics, advanced materials, and artificial intelligence.</p> </li> -</ol> +</ul> -<p>In conclusion, while there are challenges and risks associated with rapidly developing military AI, the strategic necessity for Taiwan appears to outweigh these concerns. In addition, China’s growing military capabilities, its future ambitions and the potential for AI to serve as a force multiplier make it crucial for Taiwan to consider prioritising the development of military AI applications. However, this should be done thoughtfully, with careful consideration of ethical implications, international norms and the need for robust security measures.</p> +<p>The largest awards, at $51 million each, went to four of the Department of Commerce’s Tech Hubs: Heartland Bioworks in Indianapolis, Indiana; iFAB TechHub in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois; Sustainable Polymers Tech Hub in Akron, Ohio; and Tulsa Hub for Equitable and Trustworthy Autonomy in Tulsa, Oklahoma.</p> -<hr /> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZTR7iH7.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Federal Investments in Regional Emerging Technology Hubs Under the CHIPS Act, 2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.eda.gov/funding/programs/regional-technology-and-innovation-hubs">“Regional Technology and Innovation Hubs (Tech Hubs),“ U.S. Economic Development Administration, accessed October 22, 2024</a>; <a href="https://microelectronicscommons.org/">“The Microelectronics Commons: A National Network of Prototyping Innovation Hubs,“ Microelectronics Commons, accessed October 22, 2024</a>; and <a href="https://new.nsf.gov/funding/initiatives/regional-innovation-engines">“Regional Innovation Engines,“ U.S. National Science Foundation, accessed October 22, 2024</a>.</em></p> -<p><strong>Cheng-Hung Hsu</strong> is the Chief of Operations Control at Taiwan’s Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command. His research interests include cyber security, defence strategy and Indo-Pacific policy. He holds a BA in Electronic Engineering and is a graduate of the Republic of China Air Force Air Command and Staff College.</p>Cheng-Hung HsuIncreasing cross-strait tensions between China and Taiwan suggest the need for the latter to look into the advantages offered by new defence approaches. With a defence budget vastly outpaced by China, Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept recognises a need to look to cutting-edge technologies to offset scale imbalances.Russia’s Sarmat Test Failure2024-10-22T12:00:00+08:002024-10-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/russias-sarmat-test-failure<p><em>The failure of Russia’s recent RS-28 Sarmat ICBM test points to potential propulsion issues, complicating Moscow’s strategic deterrent and future nuclear balance calculations.</em></p> +<h4 id="drawing-in-additional-investments">Drawing in Additional Investments</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>These federal awards are expected to induce investment from the private sector and local governments, and in some cases already have. In addition to their $40.5 million implementation grant from the Department of Commerce, Elevate Quantum received $77 million from the state of Colorado and $10 million from New Mexico, including a portion dedicated to a loan guarantee program. Additionally, Elevate Quantum has attracted over $1 billion in private and venture capital investment. These stacked investments facilitate the creation and expansion of innovation and industrial networks that connect researchers, designers, manufacturers, equipment suppliers, materials suppliers, and end users.</p> -<p>On 24 September 2024, Russia conducted a test of the RS-28 Sarmat heavy liquid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which was likely a catastrophic failure. Satellite imagery showed heavy damage to the Plesetsk Cosmodrome as well as fires in the woods surrounding the test site. This commentary will assess the potential causes of the test failure as well as its ramifications.</p> +<h4 id="fostering-workforce-training-and-development">Fostering Workforce Training and Development</h4> -<h3 id="causes-of-the-test-failure">Causes of the Test Failure</h3> +<p>Next, by centering workforce development and training, these hubs also help meet the high demand for a skilled technical workforce while ensuring that regional and local communities benefit from their activities. With a sustained focus on education, including vocational training at community colleges, as well as the development of pathways to high-quality jobs, these investments are needed to sustain more inclusive growth within local and regional ecosystems. The new National Science and Technology Council Workforce Center of Excellence, supported by a $250 million investment from the U.S. Department of Commerce, plays a similar role in prioritizing workforce development.</p> -<p>At this point, it cannot be known with any degree of certainty precisely why the test launch failed, though some early analysis suggests that the first stage booster of the missile suffered a catastrophic mechanical failure. However, it is possible to extrapolate from what is known about the missile and its design to generate hypotheses for further discussion.</p> +<h4 id="connecting-resources">Connecting Resources</h4> -<p>At first blush, it would seem odd that a failure of the propulsion system should have occurred. The PDU-99 rocket engine of the RS-28 is understood by many to be a derivative of the RD-274 employed on the R-36M2, Russia’s current silo-based ICBM. The RD-274 is a mature design, variants of which have been employed since the mid-1980s. The fuel mix of UDMH (unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine) and N202 is not especially volatile by the standards of liquid fuel, and has been employed on the R-36 series for several decades. On first inspection, then, the poor performance of the three-stage Sarmat vis the two-stage R-36 is a puzzle.</p> +<p>Finally, these grant programs actively connect existing and new public and private resources. Some programs span several consortia, allowing for synergies to form across firms, universities, and research organizations engaged in a variety of emerging technologies. For example, the Elevate Quantum Tech Hub is just down the road from the Rocky Mountain Innovation Engine, easing potential collaboration across teams working on quantum, AI, renewable energy, and robotics. Likewise, both the Southwest Advanced Prototyping Microelectronics Commons Hub and Southwest Sustainability Innovation Engine will be hosted by Arizona State University, accelerating mutual advances in fields including advanced manufacturing, 5G/6G, disaster mitigation, and products for end users.</p> -<p>Part of the answer for the difficulties that the Russians are facing may be available in the statements made by Vladimir Putin when the project was announced. Putin claimed that the missile has a shorter boost stage than previous generations of liquid-fuelled ICBMs, ostensibly a means of making interception by missile defences more difficult. While no missile could entirely avoid detection by the US’s Space-Based Infrared System in its boost phase, a shorter boost phase could compress the time available for detection, classification and cueing sensors associated with midcourse intercept. This might represent a hedge against a future development such as the fielding of a US space-based sensor layer capable of tracking Russian ICBMs, the deployment of space-based interceptors (which would theoretically be capable of boost phase intercept) or the placement of longer-range ballistic missile interceptors such as those used by the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system (which was once considered) in Europe.</p> +<h4 id="going-beyond-proximity">Going Beyond Proximity</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The difficulties faced by the Russian nuclear enterprise with respect to Sarmat may be a reflection of the inherent complexity of the new system’s propulsion and its lighter structure</code></em></strong></p> +<p>This all-of-government strategy to develop a network of connected regional innovation ecosystems recognizes that economically dynamic innovation clusters are an outcome of active and interlinked networks of cooperation among entrepreneurs, investors, educational and research organizations, small and large firms, public agencies, and philanthropies. While successful technology clusters are one outcome of networking, collaboration requires more than simply locating assets in proximity to one another. Multiple actors spread across different organizations need incentives to work together in complex ways to fund, research, develop, scale up, and bring new products and services to the marketplace.</p> -<p>From an engineering standpoint, what is noteworthy is that the viable approaches to shortening a missile’s boost phase could explain the complications faced by the RS-28. One approach to optimising the efficiency which some commentators have suggested has been used for the RS-28 is the use of a stepped liquid engine which utilises multiple combustion chambers with different pressure levels and mixes of fuel and oxidiser to optimise the acceleration of the missile for different stages in its flight. This would pose several challenges, including the fact that staged combustion creates the risk of combustion instabilities because of the variable rate of combustion which can lead to varying vibrational loads (and thus a risk of mechanical failure) as well as pogo oscillations. The latter are self-sustaining oscillations driven by resonance between pressure pulsation in the propulsion system and mechanical vibration, leading to a positive feedback loop which can result in structural damage. If a fuel-rich mix (with a high fuel to oxidiser ratio) is used in early stages, this also raises the possibility of higher levels of mechanical stress early in a missile’s launch. Similarly, higher chamber pressures in the early stages would also pose some risk of structural damage. This can interact with the decision to employ a lighter orthogrid structure for the missile’s booster casing. This structure has the advantage of cutting the booster’s weight and can add to a missile’s resilience. However, orthogrid structures can be sensitive to localised changes in the axial load, which can impact different parts of the grid asymmetrically, creating stress concentrations near weld lands. This phenomenon would be associated with a stepped engine with a high rate of combustion at earlier stages.</p> +<p>A suite of public-private partnerships that address the specific challenges of cooperation provides this alignment. The programs discussed above will need to work in complement with other federal and state programs – including partnerships such as the Small Business Innovation Research program, the Manufacturing USA centers, and the Manufacturing Extension Partnership – to grow connective tissue across the innovation ecosystem.</p> -<p>A second (albeit less likely) possibility which has been proposed by some analysts is that the RS-28 employs a pulse detonation engine which relies on distinct rapid combustion cycles (as opposed to the continuous combustion of traditional engines) to generate thermal efficiency. While Rostec has conducted tests of pulse detonation engines in the last decade, their employment on the Sarmat is uncertain. If this was attempted, however, this would provide another explanation for the missile’s failure. The challenge of employing a pulse detonation engine is that components are subjected to even more extreme stress by repeated intense detonations, which also produce a great deal more mechanical vibration than is seen in a continuous combustion engine. Although the Russian fuel mix of UDMH and N202 is relatively stable for a liquid fuel mix, any liquid-fuelled engine will be to an extent sensitive to mechanical vibrations, which can impact the stability of fuel flow to a chamber (with unpredictable effects) and can also damage the turbopumps which pressurise and deliver fuel, among other things.</p> +<h4 id="need-for-continuity">Need for Continuity</h4> -<p>On first examination, then, some of the plausible reasons for the Sarmat’s repeated test failures would suggest that Russia’s efforts to shorten the missile’s boost phase created complications which would not otherwise have existed, particularly if the missile uses a variant of the tried and tested RD-274 engine. If this is the case, it would be illustrative of the degree to which Russian planners regard future developments in air and missile defence as credible threats, as they will have paid a considerable price in system complexity in order to overcome these challenges. Combined with somewhat puzzling Russian investments such as the Posideon nuclear torpedo, this would suggest that Russia’s stated fears regarding missile defences were more than just a source of diplomatic leverage in engagement with the West. It would also follow that these concerns can be instrumentalised as part of a competitive strategies approach to compel less than astute choices on the part of the Russians.</p> +<p>By fostering the growth of thick regional ecosystems, partnerships encourage more Americans to connect to and have a stake in the nation’s economic future – securing the nation from within. They are also essential to drive the nation’s technological competitiveness in global markets and ensure security from external threats.</p> -<h3 id="the-significance-of-the-latest-issues-in-a-troubled-program">The Significance of the Latest Issues in a Troubled Program</h3> +<p>To be successful, partnerships must address the challenges of collaboration across multiple actors, operate at sufficient scale, and be seen as dependable and durable. This means that partnerships need to be evaluated and recalibrated regularly to ensure that they are well focused operationally. It is also important to recognize that innovation partnership programs work in complement with each other, forming mutually reinforcing networks of institutions that solve diverse problems requiring collective action. Moreover, if partnerships are to grow this connective tissue of collaboration, it requires policy patience. Long-term, sustained investments are needed for connections to take root. In this regard, policymakers need to recognize that the CHIPS and Science Act is not a one-and-done deal. Especially in this era of intense innovation-based competition for markets and national power, securing technological leadership must be a substantial and sustained bipartisan effort.</p> -<p>The RS-28 has had a relatively troubled history in programmatic terms. This has included repeated delays to its ejection tests (which demonstrate the ability to “cold launch” a missile from its silo with pressurised gas). The flight testing of the missile was also repeatedly delayed, and the first test launch of the Sarmat, which was meant to occur in 2020, was carried out two years later. Since this point, Sarmat has had at least one other failed flight test (as well as two tests cancelled) before September’s catastrophic failure.</p> +<h3 id="meeting-the-energy-demands-of-economic-competition">Meeting the Energy Demands of Economic Competition</h3> -<p>The difficulties faced by the Russian nuclear enterprise with respect to Sarmat may be a reflection of the inherent complexity of the new system’s propulsion and its lighter structure. However, structural fragilities within the Russian missile design and manufacturing ecosystem have also been cited as possible causes, something exemplified by personnel shortages at Proton-PM, which manufactures the Sarmat’s propulsion system.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="joseph-majkut">Joseph Majkut</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Irrespective of its causes, the troubled history of the RS-28 programme is significant. While Russia has a large and diversified nuclear arsenal, its silo-based ICBMs are of particular significance. Because of their size and fuel efficiency, liquid-fuelled ICBMs can carry considerably larger payloads than solid-fuelled missiles. This comes at a cost both in terms of system complexity and the time taken to prepare a missile for launch, but it also means considerable increases in the payload a missile can carry. Both the RS-28 and its predecessor, the R-36M2, can carry 10 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVS). For reference, this is three times as many as the solid-fuelled RS-24 Yars. Moreover, while silo-based missiles are static targets, they also benefit from hardening (reportedly up to 4,000 psi for R-36 silos) as well as reliable communications. Finally, unlike most other means of delivery, silo-based systems do not require as many visible preparatory steps to launch.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">By pursuing immediately available options today and zero-carbon options in the medium term, the United States can realize progress toward strategic goals and improve its competitiveness without sacrificing climate outcomes.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The balance of first strike-capable systems has a psychological effect, and can shape perceptions of the strategic balance of forces as well as crisis behaviour</code></em></strong></p> +<p>As the United States adopts a more assertive approach to economic security and technological competition, it must adapt its energy policy. These efforts promise an economy that will be better able to weather global challenges, revitalizing regions with innovative technology and productive jobs and establishing a strong lead in twenty-first-century technologies. However, realizing the potential of these industries will require more energy, placing demands on the electric grid and necessitating a smart approach in order to be successful.</p> -<p>For Russia, this is important for several reasons. Firstly, the throw weight of the RS-28 is a hedge against a rapid future improvement in US strike capabilities and missile defences. According to some authors, improvements in accurate low-fallout targeting of nuclear weapons as well as the speed and penetrative capacity of conventional prompt strike weapons can allow many Russian delivery systems to be destroyed prior to launch. The challenge for missile defences would then be simplified to mopping up the remnants of Russia’s strategic forces – a task potentially made easier by space-based sensors which can enable birth-to-death tracking. The technical viability and affordability of such a counterforce strategy is highly debatable, but it seems clear that Russian leaders believe it – something evidenced by their considerable investments in novel delivery systems meant to evade missile defences. In this context, silo-based missiles are a major hedge against a first strike, since they ensure that even a small number of surviving missiles can carry considerable throw weight. This function, delivering a “deep second strike”, was a driver for MIRVing ICBMs in the Soviet era. Relatedly, the RS-28 was meant to be a delivery system for the YU-71 Avangaard hypersonic glide vehicle, itself a major part of Russia’s efforts to hedge against future US missile defences (although other missiles such as the RS-18 can also carry Avangaard).</p> +<p>Under current policies, the United States is building a new industrial base in strategic technologies. Enabled by recent legislation – the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act – semiconductor fabs and battery factories now account for 60 percent of manufacturing investment. As these factories come online, they will introduce substantial new power requirements, as documented in a recent report from CSIS. The new TSMC semiconductor fabrication facility in Arizona will require more than a gigawatt of power. In Georgia, where manufacturing is a key driver of economic growth, planners are expecting six gigawatts of additional demand, more than twice what was added by the recently finished Units 3 and 4 at the Vogtle nuclear plant.</p> -<p>Secondly, MIRVed silo-based missiles represent an important factor in the balance of first strike capabilities between Russia and the US, given that these missiles can be launched with comparatively little visible preparation. Though the question of whether the Russians have ever viewed MIRVed ICBMs in these terms is the subject of considerable debate, they nonetheless play a role in US decision-makers’ perceptions of what Albert Wohlstetter memorably called the “delicate balance of terror”. We might consider, for example, how the development of the R-36 during the Cold War influenced US perceptions of the strategic vulnerability of Minuteman silos. Even assuming that a nuclear first strike of any kind is an act of suicidal folly in all circumstances, particularly given that the US maintains a large fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, the risk of one has always been factored into US planning. The US’s most recent Nuclear Posture Review rejects the notion of forces being on a “hair trigger alert”, but reaffirms the need to minimise the risk of either a first strike or nuclear blackmail, suggesting that these are viewed as plausible outcomes. At a minimum, the balance of first strike-capable systems has a psychological effect, and can shape perceptions of the strategic balance of forces as well as crisis behaviour.</p> +<p>For a sector that has seen negligible growth over the past two decades, these are substantial increases, and they do not even account for the rapidly growing power demands involved in artificial intelligence (AI). Akin to factories, AI datacenters transform data and electricity into valuable tokens. The more value AI creates, the greater its associated power demands become. Optimistic projections suggest AI datacenters could consume up to 10 percent of grid capacity by the end of the decade. Such an expansion has the potential to generate immense value but could be hindered by an inability to provide sufficient energy.</p> -<p>Despite Russia’s robust nuclear deterrent, the difficulties that it is facing with respect to fielding a successor to the ageing R-36 are thus not insignificant. For this reason, it is likely that the RS-28 was accepted into service despite its patchy test record – a relatively unusual occurrence. For illustration, the R-36M2 underwent 20 successful flight tests before acceptance into service.</p> +<p>To achieve these goals, it is important to continue reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The companies driving growth in AI and advanced manufacturing are committed to clean power. And policymakers, on a bipartisan basis, recognize the advantages of producing goods with lower emissions. Compared to adversaries like Russia and China, the United States produces key strategic goods with fewer emissions. As global markets increasingly prioritize sustainability, cleanliness will become synonymous with competitiveness.</p> -<p>This impacts the strategic balance in several ways. First, should challenges with the RS-28 persist to a degree that calls its reliability into question, Russian leaders’ behaviour in an escalating crisis may be impacted. For example, it may be deemed necessary to take steps such as dispersing mobile missiles earlier in a crisis than would normally be the case. Parsing and contextualising this behaviour will be important. On a more positive note, given the US’s own issues with the ageing Minuteman arsenal (due to be replaced in 2030 by Sentinel), the challenges faced by the RS-28 further limit the risk that Russia perceives itself as enjoying a relative advantage with respect to first strike capabilities. Though unlikely to lead to any form of use, such an imbalance could incentivise brinkmanship, particularly if Russian planners perceive the imbalance as a factor in US calculations of the balance of power. These assessments of how the other side views the strategic balance will become all the more complex in a context where the US will also be compelled to balance China’s growing nuclear arsenal later in the decade and beyond. The additional time bought by delays to the RS-28 can be employed to modernise the US’s silo-based ICBMs, as well as to field conventional prompt strike options and carry out future improvements in strategic missile defences. These could, collectively, be used to ensure that systems such as the RS-28 remain a Russian backstop against a Western counterforce strategy and do not come to be viewed as a means of underwriting conventional aggression backed by nuclear blackmail.</p> +<p>The next administration will be well-positioned to build upon recent industry innovations and policy developments, leveraging U.S. natural resources and ingenuity. Three key areas are particularly important to unlocking the United States’ economic and strategic potential:</p> -<hr /> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Transmission:</strong> Building extensive transmission infrastructure reduces power grid costs by increasing efficiency and better utilizing assets. Transmission infrastructure connects markets to geographically diverse power plants, reducing costs during normal operations, keeping the lights on during emergencies, and delivering renewable power from remote regions to manufacturing hubs, thereby reducing both costs and emissions while also contributing to carbon competitiveness. Accelerating the build out of transmission capability requires political leadership to create urgency for delivering these complicated projects, particularly at the state level and through federal permitting reform, which will pay off in future economic opportunities. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law authorized the Department of Energy (DOE) $2.5 billion for transmission, which will spur a few projects, but the large societal benefits from increased transmission justify tax credit support akin to what is already offered for wind and solar projects.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Nuclear Energy:</strong> Expanding the nuclear fleet is a medium-term option for meeting new demand. Nuclear power emits no greenhouse gas emissions and is highly reliable, making it a key target for technology companies, which are already contracting to restart old reactors. Building new nuclear power plants will be challenging, and potentially expensive, but necessary to achieve national goals. New projects face substantial costs and the risk of budget overruns, but new subsidies are meant to solidify the business case for nuclear energy production and to support project development. As new ventures are deployed, the consequent supply chains and worker experience will reduce costs for later projects and also decrease the timeline and project uncertainty that has plagued projects in the past.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Natural Gas:</strong> Following the shale revolution, natural gas has become the mainstay of the U.S. energy mix. High supplies and low prices mean that at least part of new demand will be met by new gas power plants, the building of which can be left to the market. However, to ensure the gas industry’s longevity and to address related climate concerns, policymakers will need to prioritize carbon capture technology, especially by supporting the development of CO2 pipelines linking new generators with storage reservoirs. Congress has already created the 45Q tax credits to incentivize the capturing of carbon, and the DOE is supporting first-of-a-kind projects to reduce costs. Getting ahead on this infrastructure will enable the United States to meet immediate demands for natural gas in a way that supports longer-term ambitions for sustainability.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong>Sidharth Kaushal</strong> is the Research Fellow for Sea Power at RUSI. His research at RUSI covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century, and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.</p>Sidharth KaushalThe failure of Russia’s recent RS-28 Sarmat ICBM test points to potential propulsion issues, complicating Moscow’s strategic deterrent and future nuclear balance calculations.Salmon Swimming Upstream2024-10-21T12:00:00+08:002024-10-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/salmon-swimming-upstream<p><em>More and more nations and companies will send mission towards the Moon over the next several years. What challenges do these space operators face and how can they be addressed?</em></p> +<p>To seize these new opportunities, the United States must confront familiar challenges: maintaining affordability, reducing emissions, and protecting reliability. By pursuing immediately available options today and zero-carbon options in the medium term, the United States can realize progress toward strategic goals and improve its competitiveness without sacrificing climate outcomes. By uniting bipartisan support and implementing smart, regionally adaptable solutions, the United States can seize this opportunity to ensure a sustainable and prosperous future for all.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h3 id="intellectual-property-rights-and-the-future-of-us-technological-leadership">Intellectual Property Rights and the Future of U.S. Technological Leadership</h3> <blockquote> - <p><em>“I think we’re going to the moon because it’s in the nature of the human being to face challenges. It’s by the nature of his deep inner soul . . . we’re required to do these things just as salmon swim upstream.”</em></p> - <h4 id="-neil-armstrong-1969">— Neil Armstrong, 1969</h4> + <h4 id="kirti-gupta">Kirti Gupta</h4> </blockquote> -<p>Humankind has had an on-again, off-again relationship with the Moon. During the 1960s, over 63 spacecraft, including several crewed Apollo missions, launched to the Moon. In contrast, during the 1980s, no nation launched a lunar mission. Over the course of the following decades, however, the world gradually fell back in love with our closest celestial neighbor. During the last four years alone, 11 nations and the European Space Agency have all sent payloads and spacecraft to the Moon.</p> - -<p>Most of these missions were operated by government agencies and focused on scientific research and exploration. However, a few were carried out by companies such as Intuitive Machines and Astrobotic. A number of countries plan to send humans to the lunar surface within the next 10 years, and some have plans to establish a long-term human presence either in lunar orbit or on the Moon’s surface. At the time of writing, there was probably just one active mission on the lunar surface, a Chinese lander and associated rover, and several active spacecraft in lunar orbits.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Policymakers face the challenge of striking the appropriate balance between incentivizing investment in risky R&amp;D while ensuring that any social cost due to potential misuse of the IP system is minimized.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>While the majority of future space endeavors will undoubtedly take place near Earth, more and more activities will likely happen in cislunar space, or the area between geosynchronous Earth orbit and the Moon. From the perspective of the United States, reasons to focus attention on cislunar space include lunar science and exploration, future crewed missions, and concerns about China’s space ambitions.</p> +<p>The global competition for leadership in technologies critical for the economic and national security of nation states – from semiconductors to artificial intelligence and quantum computing – is well understood. A less well-known pillar is the intellectual property (IP) system, which is crucial for incentivizing and enabling the innovation necessary for this technological leadership. This article sheds a spotlight on why and how IP plays that essential role.</p> -<h4 id="cislunar-challenges">CISLUNAR CHALLENGES</h4> +<p>The IP system is designed to incentivize innovation by granting the investor temporary property rights for an invention or a creation. The patent system is critical to incentivizing research and development (R&amp;D) in some areas that require massive upfront investment and have uncertain prospects for success. One example is biopharmaceuticals, which requires years of R&amp;D for discovery, in addition to a long regulatory process to get approval for a new drug to enter the market. The design of semiconductor chips is another example, as it requires highly skilled and specialized workers and large upfront costs to develop new and improved cutting-edge circuit design for specific functionalities.</p> -<p>Operating in cislunar space presents new technical and policy challenges that the United States will want to consider. While exponential growth in cislunar activities is unlikely over the next 10 years, there will be modest expansion. To maximize the chances of success for U.S. cislunar missions and ensure the long-term sustainability and safety of cislunar space, the United States should assume a global leadership role and take actions, sooner rather than later, to address the anticipated cislunar challenges discussed in this report.</p> +<p>If an invention is finally successful in the marketplace, the patent owner enjoys a temporary right to exclude others from making, using, or selling that invention. Patent owners can also license their invention and grant these rights to another, thereby generating revenues from the initial R&amp;D investment and enabling the diffusion of new technology. On the flip side, there have been concerns about misuse of the patent system by patent aggregators who allegedly amass a number of patents that may not be valid (i.e., erroneously granted in the first place), invoke patent protections in instances where they do not apply, or amass patents of limited value. These patent aggregators are not seeking to develop or market inventions but rather aim to extract quick monetary settlements from the patent implementers, who are seeking to avoid litigation costs or a temporary disruption of their products.</p> -<p>The list of related operational challenges is long. There is little space situational awareness (SSA) in cislunar space. The Global Positioning System (GPS) was not designed for this region, so without enhancements it cannot reliably provide cislunar navigation and timing services. In classical orbital mechanics, the motion of a near-Earth satellite can be predicted as part of a two-body problem (i.e., Earth and the spacecraft). In cislunar space, this two-body problem poorly predicts motion. Other issues, such as the impacts of cosmic radiation and lunar dust on equipment and humans, also pose hazards to cislunar missions.</p> +<p>Policymakers face the challenge of striking the appropriate balance between incentivizing investment in risky R&amp;D while ensuring that any social cost due to potential misuse of the IP system is minimized. The United States’ IP system goes through phases. It is sometimes characterized as too strong, granting property rights for “weak” inventions and creating unnecessary costs and uncertainty for implementers. At other times, it is seen as too weak, lacking the tools for proper enforcement of the property rights that incentivize innovation.</p> -<p>The space governance and operator coordination issues concerning cislunar activities are equally complex. Internationally, there are no agreed-upon rules of the road for operating in cislunar space or best practices for cislunar debris mitigation. Though cislunar space is covered by the treaties that underpin international space law, these treaties have sizable gaps and are subject to conflicting interpretations. Fortunately, while not focused on space, there are other non-space international treaties and frameworks that could offer lessons for space governance.</p> +<p>If history serves as a guide, it is pointing in the direction of a revival of the IP regime in the United States. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce maintains the Global IP Index, which ranks countries based on the robustness of their IP system; in recent years, the United States slid to number 13, before climbing back up again to first position. A 2011 study on the economic cost to the United States of IP infringement from China received a lot of attention. Moreover, injunctive relief – sought by patent owners in courtrooms to stop infringers from copying their inventions or copyrighted material – has become increasingly rare. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), responsible for granting patents, can also invalidate patents via serial rounds of challenges on the validity of a patent while such litigation is pending. In response to this environment, several legislative proposals are currently in different phases of markup in Congress. These pieces of legislation involve expanding the eligibility of patentable subject matter, strengthening the enforceability of patents, and limiting serial challenges to a granted patent while it is in the process of a legal challenge based on potential infringement.</p> -<h4 id="report-objectives-and-approach">REPORT OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH</h4> +<p>The U.S. IP regime does not exist in isolation. Recently, the European Union established the Unified Patent Court, with one of its goals being fast-tracking patent-challenge trials. China has been strengthening its IP regime, including by establishing four specialized IP courts in the last two decades. Since IP rights are often licensed on a global basis to reduce transaction costs, how one country enforces those rights directly impacts others. The IP enforcement regime of the United States needs to become stronger and faster to avoid litigation of disputes around global IP portfolios moving to other jurisdictions.</p> -<p>The goal of this report is to examine and assess oft-heard claims of a new Moon race, growing lunar economy, and need to extend military power into cislunar space. To write this report, the authors researched government and private sector activities planned for cislunar space by over 10 nations, covering the next decade. They interviewed cislunar stakeholders from government agencies, private companies, and academia. Additionally, the authors assessed cislunar reports prepared by other researchers.</p> +<p>The United States is currently a leader in several critical technologies that rely on revenues generated from the licensing of IP rights in global markets. Most of the innovation in the United States is driven by R&amp;D investments from the private sector, which must be incentivized to invest in long-term R&amp;D. Technological leadership is the result of long-term, consistent R&amp;D investment, and the United States must continue incentivizing the private sector so that the country remains a technological leader going forward.</p> -<p>Though there is certainly a lot of buzz about cislunar growth, the authors of this report found evidence of only a modest increase in cislunar activities over the next decade compared to the past 10 years. Additionally, the authors found little sign of a business case for cislunar activities that is not closely tied to government funding and support. Almost all cislunar activities, no matter the mission’s nation of origin, have a civilian focus. The authors also could not identify any compelling strategic military value from cislunar space and did not foresee one developing in the next decade that could make a decisive difference in any conflict between the United States and China, Russia, or another nation-state. However, national security organizations may want access to cislunar SSA data for surveillance purposes.</p> +<p>If the United States has an innovation agenda – that is, if it aims to invest and lead in critical emerging technologies to bolster U.S. economic and national security – IP must have a prominent role. A strong IP enforcement regime, with clear boundaries around IP rights and which can ensure quality inventions are granted those rights, helps the inventors and implementers, who are both needed for an innovation ecosystem to thrive. The next administration should consider IP as a part of the broader innovation agenda and not view it as an issue of technical obscurity to be treated in isolation. A strong IP system works for everyone. The United States can continue to lead in R&amp;D-intensive innovation and product development and minimize infringement, especially outside of U.S. borders, by pursuing three key actions: (1) strengthening the USPTO with resources to ensure that only quality (and valid) inventions get the appropriate IP protection; (2) streamlining the system of repeat validity challenges on already granted inventions; and (3) making progress on the legislative proposals for enhancing the enforceability of legitimate IP rights.</p> -<p>But even under these conditions — modest growth in overall cislunar activities, no clear cislunar use cases without governments as a customer, and no clear strategic military value of cislunar space — there are reasons to focus on cislunar space and identify and address challenges facing cislunar operators. Through the Artemis program, the United States is establishing significant cislunar equities, building the foundation for sustainable human activity in cislunar space, investing in lunar infrastructure, and creating an ecosystem of commercial cislunar services. Addressing cislunar challenges discussed in this report is critical to the success of these endeavors. This report specifically seeks to analyze and recommend ways U.S. decisionmakers can address cislunar governance, coordination, and infrastructure challenges.</p> +<h3 id="the-necessity-of-a-national-interest-account">The Necessity of a National Interest Account</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In conclusion, this report’s authors could find no evidence of a lunar gold rush and no indication of a real commer cial lunar economy. Cislunar activity is supported almost exclusively by government spending.</code></em></strong></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="adam-frost">Adam Frost</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>On governance challenges, the report first provides background on international treaties and national U.S. space policies, laws, and regulations. Later, the report discusses specific policy and governance gaps that should be addressed to promote a safe and sustainable cislunar environment. The report also introduces and provides background on several non-space international frameworks that govern other areas with similar characteristics as cislunar space, such as Antarctica, the Arctic, and international air and maritime domains. The authors frequently cite these existing frameworks when describing models and approaches that could apply to cislunar space.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The next administration should therefore make a counterintuitive move and immediately propose structural changes that increase its options for execution. This is where a National Interest Account should be a top priority.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The report also outlines operational and infrastructure challenges confronting operators of cislunar missions, explaining why these cislunar challenges are both different and similar to those confronting operators with missions in orbits closer to Earth. The authors note that infrastructure challenges, such as generating power and ensuring communications, are primarily solved by hardware and equipment — whereas operational challenges, such as traffic coordination and collision avoidance, require both technical solutions and operator-to-operator coordination.</p> +<p>It is no surprise that the next administration will immediately confront a knot of challenges at the intersection of economic growth, technological advantage, national security, and foreign policy. Right now, excellent thinkers are searching for new frameworks to conceptualize this complexity and to inform the strategies and policies of the next president. This is important intellectual work.</p> -<h4 id="report-recommendations">REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p>The more urgent work for the next administration, however, involves immediately proposing reforms that increase the government’s options for executing its strategies, whenever they are determined.</p> -<p>Finally, the report offers several key recommendations for consideration by U.S. policymakers. First, the United States should work to find understanding with China on addressing international space governance and operational coordination challenges related to cislunar space, because the vast majority of cislunar activity over the next decade will be tied to these two nations. Second, the United States should consider whether it furthers U.S. interests to keep cislunar space nonmilitarized, taking an approach from the U.S. playbook toward Antarctica in the 1950s. Third, the United States should consider international approaches to building and operating cislunar infrastructure, combining resources, preventing duplication, and maximizing the gain for the cost to U.S. taxpayers.</p> +<p>And a National Interest Account should be proposal number one.</p> -<p>In conclusion, this report’s authors could find no evidence of a lunar gold rush and no indication of a real commercial lunar economy. Cislunar activity is supported almost exclusively by government spending. Certainly, Britain’s famed eighteenth-century economist Adam Smith would not characterize the cislunar environment as a market-based economy. There are currently no clear strategic military benefits derived from cislunar space derived from cislunar space, with little chance a cislunar space system could influence the outcome of a conflict on Earth.</p> +<h4 id="execution-before-strategy">Execution Before Strategy?</h4> -<h4 id="evolving-future-considerations">EVOLVING FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS</h4> +<p>The “usual path” of strategy development is well travelled. After a new administration takes office, it formally begins translating the president’s platform into specific strategies, plans, and policies.</p> -<p>Maybe someday, in the distant future, there will be a market-based lunar economy and a reason to have a military presence in cislunar space. This may happen if a cislunar activity could unexpectedly produce significant commercial value, such as mining of rare earth elements that could cost-effectively be returned and sold on Earth. This may also happen if the United States and China, ignoring the precedent of Antarctica, cannot agree to forestall the equivalent of a cislunar colonial land grab and resulting rush of military assets to the cislunar region. Additionally, dramatically lowering transportation costs to the Moon may also generate new lunar business cases.</p> +<p>How you define the question dictates the answer. And how the next administration conceptualizes and then articulates a strategic approach to the complex and interdependent challenges of competition for economic growth, technological advantage, national security, and foreign influence is no easy task. This is far from settled, and the task of getting the ideas right should not be underestimated.</p> -<p>Ultimately, the calculus fundamentally changes if — probably when — large numbers of humans start living on the Moon and in other parts of the solar system. Many of us, these authors included, foresee that future. But that is not on the 10-year plan, probably not even on the 25-year one. There are, however, strong reasons to go to the Moon today and in the foreseeable future: to explore the unknown, learn, and advance science for the sake of all humankind. That is reason enough to address the challenges described in this report.</p> +<p>But in government, ideas are insufficient and federal strategy development is a long process. Beneath every national security strategy or executive order lie months of intellectual and bureaucratic work. Moreover, for new officials, there is the addition of discovery – learning the myriad stakeholders that require coordination, which adds months of meetings and memos.</p> -<h3 id="introduction-and-background">INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND</h3> +<p>In the end, the “usual path” will produce the way ahead. And the president will endorse or sign the bureaucratic manifestations of their will.</p> -<h4 id="defining-cislunar-space">DEFINING “CISLUNAR SPACE”</h4> +<p>Then the usual thing will happen. An authority will call a meeting synonymous with “next steps” and begin to inventory all the interagency “tools” – existing authorities and resources – needed to execute the just-signed strategy. These will inevitably include existing innovations such as the CHIPS Act Program Office; the rechartered Development Finance Corporation (DFC); the reauthorized Export–Import Bank (EXIM), with its China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP); the revitalized Loan Program Office at the Department of Energy; and the always-included Defense Production Act (DPA).</p> -<p>In this report, “cislunar space” refers to the area between geosynchronous orbit around Earth (about 36,000 kilometers from Earth’s surface) and the Moon (approximately 384,000 kilometers from Earth’s surface, on average). Orbits around the Moon, trajectories to and from the Moon, the five Earth–Moon Lagrange points (L1, L2, L3, L4, and L5), and the Moon itself are also included in this report’s definition. Effectively, three different environments in which space operations can occur are included in this definition: the Moon’s surface, lunar orbits, and Earth orbits and trajectories to and from the Moon.</p> +<p>The laws, policies, and regulations that govern how the executive branch executes its authorities and allots the funds granted are, to put it mildly, labyrinthine. Every “tool” has its own independent constraints, and months will be spent divining workarounds or exceptions, all of which carry risks. Thus, execution inevitably becomes a compromise between the ideas and what can actually be done or, worse, a mere rebranding of what is already being done.</p> -<p>Like the Moon itself, most objects in cislunar space are orbiting Earth, though some objects are also orbiting the Moon. However, due to Earth’s gravitational pull, orbits higher than 700 kilometers above the lunar surface are not stable. To further complicate matters, the mass of the Moon is irregularly distributed, which renders its gravitational field uneven. This means that at altitudes lower than 100 kilometers from the Moon’s surface, only four lunar orbital inclinations support stable orbits. Objects attempting to orbit the Moon below 100 kilometers at other inclinations must perform frequent station-keeping maneuvers and expend fuel to remain in orbit.</p> +<p>To explicitly state the open secret: good ideas are hard, but executing is harder.</p> -<p>Objects in cislunar space are affected not only by Earth’s gravitational effects but also by the Moon’s gravity. As with any two large celestial bodies, there are five Lagrange points around the Earth and Moon at which the gravitational pull of the Earth and Moon is exactly equal to the amount of centripetal force needed for a small object, such as a satellite or spacecraft, to move with them. Due to these gravitational dynamics, the Lagrange points are nearly stationary relative to the Earth-Moon rotating frame.</p> +<p>The next administration should therefore make a counterintuitive move and immediately propose structural changes that increase its options for execution.</p> -<h4 id="history-of-cislunar-space">HISTORY OF CISLUNAR SPACE</h4> +<p>This is where a National Interest Account should be a top priority.</p> -<p>Since Russia’s Luna 1 became the first spacecraft to reach the vicinity of the Moon in January 1959, approximately 140 missions have been launched to the Moon, either landing on the lunar surface, entering lunar orbit, or conducting a lunar flyby. Thirteen countries and the the European Space Agency (ESA) have launched spacecraft toward the Moon. The first U.S. spacecraft to reach the vicinity of the Moon was Pioneer 4, which conducted a lunar flyby in March 1959. In 1990, Japan became the third nation to launch a lunar probe, called Hiten, and the third nation to reach the lunar surface when Hiten’s small orbiter, Hagoromo, was intentionally crashed into the Moon in 1993 after completing several lunar orbits.</p> +<h4 id="what-is-a-national-interest-account">What Is a National Interest Account?</h4> -<p>The majority of lunar missions have been launched and managed by government entities, with only four spacecraft ever sent to the Moon operated by private sector organizations. Cislunar space saw the most activity at the height of the space race between the 1950s and 1970s. Interest in the Moon quickly declined by the 1980s; as already noted, there were zero missions to the Moon from 1980 to 1989. Although there has been a steady increase in cislunar activity since 1990, the total number of lunar missions since then is only about two-thirds that of missions in just the 1960s. Almost all cislunar traffic to date has resulted from spacecraft traveling to the Moon, though spacecraft bound for other locations in the solar system have passed through cislunar space.</p> +<p>The concept is simple, and shamelessly plagiarized from Australia, a close U.S. ally.</p> -<p>Over the past decade, between 2014 and 2024, about 20 missions sent from Earth have transited cislunar space on their way to the Moon. To place this number into context, over 12,000 objects — including satellites, scientific probes, landers, crewed spacecraft, and components of space stations — have been launched into space during this same period. While the number of missions through cislunar space has increased over the past four decades, the increase is small compared to the exponential growth in the number of satellites launched into orbits closer to Earth. Overall, missions through cislunar space are just a small fraction of the total number of spacecraft launched from Earth.</p> +<p>Were Congress to authorize a tightly scoped, time-limited, and dollar-capped National Interest Account with strenuous reporting requirements, a president could direct government agencies, like those listed above, to support loans deemed in the national interest.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mDgOqKV.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Cislunar Region wih Cone Denoting the Area of Greatest Cislunar Activity.</strong> Source: CSIS Aerospace Security Project.</em></p> +<p>Why? Restrictive laws and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations govern the lending of the various federal departments and agencies. Every loan carries the risk of nonpayment, and those who approve the loans must be conservative in the credit risks they accept on behalf of the taxpayers. This is right and proper.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K8hSQJq.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Launches to the Moon by Decade.</strong> Source: <a href="https://science.nasa.gov/moon/missions/">“Moon Missions,” NASA, accessed August 17, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<p>But many regulations were created in a different time, and for different problems. In today’s competition for economic growth, technological advantage, national security, and foreign influence, our challenges cross old models, while our tools do not – yet.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LqesqYZ.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: New Space Objects by Year.</strong> Note: Data is current as of September 26, 2024. Source: <a href="https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/index.jspx">“Outer Space Objects Index,” UN Office for Outer Space Affairs</a>.</em></p> +<p>With a good interagency process, a National Interest Account responsibly shifts approving riskier loans and their related issues to the wider perspectives of Senate-confirmed Cabinet members, including the Department of the Treasury and OMB, from the more insular individual agencies. With a National Interest Account, both determinations – whether a loan actually is in the national interest and whether the risk of that loan is acceptable – would be made with the larger policy and national-interest pictures in mind. Meanwhile, the government lenders would remain within their remit and simply execute their authorities – providing credit assessments, portfolio management, and finance.</p> -<h3 id="national-cislunar-policies-and-activities">NATIONAL CISLUNAR POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES</h3> +<p>For example, if China’s economic coercion of an ally or partner is to be effective, the impact of refusal must be severe enough to coerce the political outcome. This affects the macroeconomic outlook of the coerced, thereby raising the risk of any loan to that market. Today, good credit analysis would likely tell the lender to walk away. And I frequently had to tell my colleagues at the Departments of State and Defense precisely that. But a National Interest Account could allow agencies like EXIM to refer such cases to the cabinet, where the merits and risks could be deliberated, thereby creating an option for action that today simply does not exist.</p> -<p>Today, cislunar activity remains limited because there are few commercial cislunar use cases and requirements that are independent of a government operator or customer. Most lunar activities are funded and operated by governments, primarily for scientific research and exploration to better understand the Moon and its environs. Most commercial lunar missions are also closely tied to government science and research requirements and funding. For example, Japanese company ispace and U.S. companies Astrobotic and Intuitive Machines have already launched and are planning more commercial missions to carry government-sponsored scientific payloads to the Moon, as well as nongovernment payloads.</p> +<h4 id="the-urgency-of-optionality">The Urgency of Optionality</h4> -<p>In addition to conducting scientific research, many Moon missions aim to demonstrate technologies such as lunar rovers that could be used on future missions. Two upcoming lunar missions, part of the Chang’e program operated by China’s national space agency, will test technologies intended to support a future long-term uncrewed lunar base. In addition to supporting NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program, future missions from Astrobotic, Firefly Aerospace, and Intuitive Machines, among others, will carry a variety of payloads, including rovers, hoppers, sensors, scien tific experiments, and small satellites for private sector organizations and space agencies from around the world looking to test their technologies on and in orbit around the Moon.</p> +<p>It is counterintuitive to prioritize reforming the ways and means before we know the ends. But whatever an administrations strategy, it will rise or fall on execution. Concepts such as a National Interest Account create options to achieve the president’s ends where today there are few. Thus, the next administration should urgently prioritize structural reforms that affect implementation concurrent with the development of strategy – or the best of ideas risk remaining only that.</p> -<p>Other organizations are looking at using the Moon to preserve Earth’s cultural heritage and biodiversity. For example, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) intends to send a memory disk containing the UNESCO preamble in 275 human languages to the lunar surface on ispace’s upcoming Hakuto-R 2. Additionally, a group of scientists wants to use the Moon to create a biorepository of cryopreserved seeds and living cells as a safeguard against possible threats to life on Earth. In a similar vein, Interstellar Lab’s Mission Little Prince aims to grow flowers on the Moon in an environment-controlled plant pod.</p> +<h2 id="technology-cooperation-competition-and-economic-relations">Technology Cooperation, Competition, and Economic Relations</h2> -<p>For the near future, use cases such as scientific research, technology demonstrations, and, on a smaller scale, disaster planning are the drivers for cislunar traffic. Notably, the United States and China are pursuing ambitious agendas to create human habitats in lunar orbit and land people on the Moon. Over the next several years, the authors of this report anticipate around 40 significant missions launching toward cislunar space, not including missions that merely transit cislunar space bound for deep space destinations.</p> +<h3 id="indias-ascending-role-for-us-economic-security">India’s Ascending Role for U.S. Economic Security</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/hbDibDj.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Significant Future Cislunar Missions.</strong> Source: Authors’ research and analysis.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="richard-rossow">Richard Rossow</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>At this point, the report authors should acknowledge the challenges in counting cislunar missions. Rather than attempting to count all missions, the authors identified significant future missions that represented the most considerable and impactful cislunar undertakings.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The next U.S. administration should take the time to meet with international partners such as India before staking out policy positions related to domestic industrial and trade policy. Ignoring U.S. partners in the early days could have repercussions when U.S. officials engage on vital global issues later.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Many future cislunar missions look like matryoshka, or Russian nesting, dolls; they are complex systems of systems, with some providing lunar ridesharing. Most Artemis missions have many moving parts, including the Orion spacecraft, modules of the Lunar Gateway, and space vehicles associated with the Starship Human Landing System (HLS). Additionally, China’s Chang’e 6 mission included a lander, ascender, return vehicle, mini rover, and an orbiter built by Pakistan. The future Chang’e 8 mission is also expected to include international payloads. Each Chang’e and Artemis mission is included in the significant mission list.</p> +<p>While U.S. elections are primarily driven by domestic issues, the policy positions taken by the winner are relevant for a wide array of global partners. In the case of India, for example, the United States and India share concerns about overreliance on China as a dominant supplier of manufactured goods. Consequently, Indian firms have been ramping up investments in the United States, actions significant for both countries moving forward. The next U.S. administration should take the time to meet with international partners such as India before staking out policy positions related to domestic industrial and trade policy. Ignoring U.S. partners in the early days could have repercussions when U.S. officials engage on vital global issues later.</p> -<p>The CLPS program epitomizes the concept of lunar ridesharing, transporting NASA payloads and creating opportunities for smaller companies, international partners, and other organizations to send missions, including scientific instruments, rovers, and orbiters, to the Moon. This approach is diversifying the types of entities launching to cislunar space and increasing the number of individual organizations with payloads in lunar orbit and on the Moon’s surface.</p> +<p>A deeper economic relationship with India is in the United States’ interests for several reasons. First, India is expected to continue growing faster than any other large nation in the foreseeable future, with growth expected to top 7 percent in 2024. BlackRock recently predicted that India will leap over Japan and Germany to become the world’s third-largest economy in just three years. In 2023, Goldman Sachs predicted that the Indian economy will be the world’s second-largest by 2075, at an estimated $52.5 trillion. For U.S. companies looking to grow, India’s topline numbers draw attention – even if the practicalities of doing business in India remain challenging at times.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Many future cislunar missions look like matryoshka, or Russian nesting, dolls; they are complex systems of systems, with some providing lunar ridesharing.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Second, Indian companies compose a growing source of investment into the United States. As the Confederation of Indian Industry highlighted in their Indian Roots, American Soil report in 2023, India has invested $80 billion into the United States, employing over 400,000 people. In 2023 alone, India added $4.7 billion in fresh foreign direct investment (FDI) into the United States, about 3 percent of inward FDI from all sources that year. In the coming years, as the Indian economy continues to grow, this number will also likely grow substantially as well. Indian firms are even taking advantage of U.S. industrial programs like the Inflation Reduction Act. India’s Vikram Solar, for example, last year announced plans for a $1.5 billion solar-manufacturing footprint in the United States. Policy stability is key to ensuring that investment plans can be executed, and continue to be made.</p> -<p>This report considers each CLPS mission a significant mission but not individual payloads, though many of these payloads are described in the report. In general, this report does not count instruments or experiments that remain associated with or near another spacecraft, lander, or rover as a significant mission. For example, a memory disk sponsored by UNESCO that will be carried on Hakuto-R 2 is not included in the significant mission tally.</p> +<p>Securing a strong commercial relationship with India is vital for another critical reason. Akin to how the U.S. defense industrial base has looked at ways to improve India’s domestic defense production to help India wean itself off Russian equipment, the United States can support India’s interests in weaning its technology sector off of Chinese imports. China (plus Hong Kong) is India’s largest goods trade partner, with $148 billion in bilateral trade in FY 2023, resulting in a trade deficit for India of nearly $100 billion. Paired with India’s expected growth rates outlined above, helping India reduce imports from China will impair China’s industrial expansion significantly. To Chinese officials, India must be considered a vital economic engine to maintain export-led growth in the future. The United States can be a strong partner to “Make in India” and avoid this fate.</p> -<p>If the report authors could not find clear indications of funding or recent progress for a future concept or mission — meaning the mission’s existence is based only on a press release — the authors did not include the mission in Figure 1. For missions beyond 2030, it was often difficult to differentiate real plans from aspirations, as many decisions on government funding for activities so far into the future have yet to be made. The authors also questioned whether Russia has the financial resources to execute its upcoming cislunar plans, which include at least three lunar missions, but still includes those on the significant mission list.</p> +<p>Finally, U.S. policymakers should seek new platforms to share practical experiences, and possibly some level of policy equivalence, in screening Chinese investments in advanced technologies. While India may be years away from becoming a significant producer of advanced technologies – such as quantum computers, robotics, leading-edge semiconductors, and 6G communications equipment – India is already at the forefront of the research and engineering that fuels these sectors. For example, India’s information technology services exports are expected to reach $199 billion this year. The U.S. government continues to build new programs with India that will further enhance a shared research and development agenda in key technologies such as the 2023 collaboration between the U.S. National Science Foundation and India’s Department of Biotechnology. While such steps expand bilateral cooperation, they may also introduce new vulnerabilities without appropriate oversight measures.</p> -<p>Additionally, the fully assembled Lunar Gateway is not specifically listed in the table, though completion of the station will be a significant achievement. Finally, one mission in the table — DESTINY+ — has a lengthly transit time through cislunar space on its way to the parent body of the Geminids meteor shower.</p> +<p>Successive U.S. administrations have built a unique architecture of high-level dialogues that provide a vital platform for discussing trade and technology issues, including the U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies and the many workstreams under the Quad framework. These forums have resulted in important agreements such as the 2023 U.S.-India Semiconductor Supply Chain and Innovation Partnership memorandum of understanding.</p> -<p><em>United States</em></p> +<p>India is not the only fast-growing, nontraditional U.S. partner that will require the attention of policymakers as U.S. industrial strategy and trade policy is reviewed. For example, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines – large and fast-growing countries – together have nearly 500 million people and a combined GDP that is over 60 percent of India’s.</p> -<p><strong>Policies</strong></p> +<p>The next U.S. administration will likely enjoy a full four-year term with its counterpart government in India, which has its next national election in 2029. According to the Pew Research Center, the economy continues to be the primary concern for supporters of both presidential candidates. Initial policy pushes would understandably seek to further improve domestic economic prospects, particularly in manufacturing. Yet foreign policy also ranks relatively high for supporters of both candidates. With key partners across the Indo-Pacific, policy stability, particularly in ways that encourage two-way economic integration with key partners, is important. The last four years have seen a range of important new agreements and robust commercial announcements that both widen and deepen the United States’ economic partnership, ranging from microchips to vaccines. While the days of free trade agreements may not be returning any time soon, the United States can forge meaningful linkages with like-minded nations by avoiding protectionism and encouraging bilateral investment.</p> -<p>In December 2021, the White House released the United States Space Priorities Framework, which outlined various goals related to national and economic security and scientific advancement for U.S. activities in space. Those goals include:</p> +<h3 id="making-infrastructure-in-the-indo-pacific-a-success">Making Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific a Success</h3> -<ul> - <li> - <p>maintaining “leadership in space exploration and space science”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>advancing “the development and use of space-based Earth observation capabilities that support action on climate change”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>fostering “a policy and regulatory environment that enables a competitive and burgeoning U.S. commercial space sector”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>protecting “space-related critical infrastructure” and strengthening “the security of the U.S. space industrial base”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>defending “national security interests from the growing scope and scale of space and counterspace threats”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>investing in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>playing a lead role in “strengthening global governance of space activities”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>bolstering “space situational awareness sharing and space traffic coordination”; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>prioritizing “space sustainability and planetary protection.”</p> - </li> -</ul> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="erin-murphy">Erin Murphy</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The framework emphasizes retaining U.S. leadership in space and broadening and deepening international space collaboration. Though this document does not focus on cislunar space specifically, its priorities apply to all U.S. activities and initiatives in space.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Infrastructure requires patient capital and investing. The lifecycle of an infrastructure project can take years and does not follow the neat timelines of summits and high-level meetings that crave big announcements.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7VjOCg7.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Example Commercial Lunar Mission Supporting CLPS - Intuitive Machines IM-2.</strong> Source: Intuitive Machines (reprinted with permission).</em></p> +<p>Though U.S. administrations have continuously railed against China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), they have been very slow in offering a clear alternative to the quick contracts and massive financing offered by China to infrastructure projects globally. Recently, however, a proliferation of initiatives and partnerships have been introduced that aim to bring together partners and allies, leverage their respective tools and strengths, and convince the private sector to mobilize their own capital into developing economies. Though laudable, the United States – and the Biden administration in particular – will have to ensure a politically transition-proof strategy that is concerted, committed, focused, and continuous in order to provide the trillions of dollars in infrastructure funding needed in just the Indo-Pacific alone, as well as to future-proof these economies from debt sustainability, climate change, and labor and industry transformations.</p> -<p>In addition to these national space priorities, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), together with the National Science and Technology Council, developed and published the National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy in 2022. The strategy seeks to foster interagency cooperation and advance U.S. cislunar science and technology leadership. It defines four objectives: “support research and development to enable long-term growth in Cislunar space”; “expand international S&amp;T [science and technology] cooperation in Cislunar space”; “extend U.S. space situational awareness capabilities into Cislunar space”; and “implement Cislunar communications and PNT [positioning, navigation, and timing] capabilities.” Though OSTP does not itself direct funding or administer space programs, its cislunar strategy will likely influence spending and priorities across the U.S. federal government.</p> +<p>Inducive economic tools and strategic investments are now key elements in engaging in economic security in the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), the Quad, and the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership (TIP), to name just a few, all feature efforts to target collaborative infrastructure financing, manifest tangible U.S. commitment to the region, and compete effectively with the BRI.</p> -<p>Although China is not specifically mentioned in the United States Space Policy Framework or National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy, Beijing’s central role as a motivator for U.S. cislunar activities is undeniable. Some U.S. experts have argued that China could obtain a first-mover advantage and become the dominant power in cislunar space, to the detriment of U.S. interests. Additionally, the current NASA administrator, Bill Nelson, has expressed concern that China could try to restrict U.S. access to lunar resources if it establishes a long-term presence on the Moon before the United States does. Other U.S. experts worry about the impacts of China’s cislunar activities on U.S. prestige and influence, framing cislunar plans within the context of broader geopolitical competition between the two powers.</p> +<p>But the United States is contending with an actor that does not play by the rules. China can offer projects and products at attractive prices and speeds, directing its state-owned companies and banks to strategic markets. Though the BRI has had some initial successes in the race for infrastructure, the United States need not mimic the way China does business. Yet the United States does need to reform its own operations. The BRI’s ballooning debt and unhappy customers reveal why that approach is problematic, and those issues are pushing China to change how it invests. In contending with the challenge offered by China in infrastructure project investments globally, the United States must maintain standards and act with transparency, especially with taxpayer (or anyone’s) dollars.</p> -<p>Finally, many government actors — including the United States, China, Russia, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — have stated that space could be used for warfighting. Though cislunar space is not the primary focus of U.S. military attention on the space domain, the Department of Defense (DoD) is leading several initiatives, described later in this report, focused on cislunar space. However, it is not clear how cislunar space fits into the overall national security strategy, because the DoD has neither articulated broad cislunar goals nor put forward a cislunar strategy.</p> +<p>Sustaining the continuity and efficacy of the infrastructure initiatives that the Biden administration has begun requires a change in mindset and the deployment of the tapestry of tools available in a coordinated and cohesive way.</p> -<p><strong>Enacted Law</strong></p> +<p>Infrastructure requires patient capital and investing. The lifecycle of an infrastructure project can take years and does not follow the neat timelines of summits and high-level meetings that crave big announcements. Feasibility studies, permitting, due diligence, securing financing, and then getting the actual project started and completed all take a lot of time and money. There are ways to speed up the process, including ensuring transparency; lowering costs around undertaking environmental and social impact assessments in developing countries; and ensuring the host country has clear rules and regulations. Some of that work is already being done – working with IPEF signatories on tax and rule-of-law transparency and encouraging the Blue Dot Network that promotes high-quality standards in infrastructure – and the United States should double down on these efforts.</p> -<p>Over the past 90 years, the United States has enacted numerous laws related to military, civilian, and commercial space activities, which would apply not only to near-Earth orbits but also to cislunar space. Title 51 of U.S. Code contains laws related to national and commercial space programs. Applicable laws related to defense and military space programs are mostly found in Title 10.</p> +<p>This leads to another aspect in need of attention: trade and market access. Though the pendulum on trade in the United States has swung against it, this – especially market access – is what Asian countries want, particularly IPEF signatories. Trade with market access can be provided to those that meet IPEF standards and thus encourage domestic regulatory and governance reforms. This is a more inducive carrot than providing capacity building for tax reform. IPEF’s Latin American counterpart, the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP), mirrors much of IPEF. Though it also does not offer market access, the United States has bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with 8 of the 11 APEP countries, making economic partnerships more holistic and durable. Although former president Trump has threatened to get rid of IPEF and could do the same with APEP, the FTAs will remain in place, thereby guaranteeing ongoing economic engagement. These agreements shape the framework for addressing developments in critical sectors, such as decarbonization and digital trade, but in order to be politically transition-proof, they will have to include more tangible carrots and durability.</p> -<p>The <strong>Communications Act</strong> of 1934 provided the basis for federal regulation of telephone, telegraph, and radio communications and was later amended to include requirements for commercial satellite licensing and use of radio spectrum. The act established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate use of these technologies in the United States. This law also applies to U.S. entities wanting to use spectrum to communicate from, to, and in cislunar space.</p> +<p>Another obstacle to the U.S. initiatives involves debt sustainability, particularly as the majority of BRI recipient countries are in debt distress. Indebted countries do not want to take on hundreds of millions of dollars in additional debt financing, even with concessional lending or generous repayment terms. In order to address these debt sustainability issues and critical infrastructure needs, the United States will need to work with the Paris Club through various multilateral debt treatment initiatives and via blended financing opportunities.</p> -<p>The <strong>National Aeronautics and Space Act</strong> of 1958 separated military and civilian space government functions and emphasized the peaceful character of U.S. pursuits in space. The act also established NASA, the first U.S. government organization dedicated to the civilian use of space.</p> +<p>Concerns about debt and debt sustainability also influence how the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) is able to build out its pipeline and be more competitive in the telecommunications, renewable energy, and semiconductor arenas. EXIM so far has come up short in maximizing its China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP), partly hampered by statutory requirements to (1) ensure that loans will have a “reasonable assurance of repayment” and (2) maintain a 2 percent statutory default cap. For EXIM to be more competitive, take on greater risks, and not self-select out of deals, the default cap should be raised on critical industries, or at least on those projects that fall under the CTEP umbrella.</p> -<p>The <strong>Commercial Space Launch Act</strong> of 1984 provided the Department of Transportation authority to regulate commercial spaceflight, including commercial launch services; required the government to assume responsibility for large third-party damages that could arise from U.S. commercial space activities; and laid the foundation for future regulation of commercial human spaceflight.</p> +<p>Cofinancing or collaborative financing is nice on paper but nearly impossible in practice. No host government or project lead wants to sign multiterm contracts with governments and multilateral financing agencies. There is also competition for a small number of viable projects. Overcoming this concern involves aligning due diligence practices and deploying single joint-term sheets to cut down on paperwork and bureaucracy. The United States and its partners should also find where they best fit along the project lifecycle. As noted above, infrastructure projects have multiple phases and angles, each of which could play to the different strengths of each player.</p> -<p>The <strong>U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act</strong> of 2015 extended the moratorium until 2023 on regulation of commercial human spaceflight activities, which has since been extended to early 2025. The law also explicitly allowed U.S. citizens and companies to own and sell any resources extracted from bodies in space, such as asteroids and the Moon, permitting them to “facilitate commercial exploration for and commercial recovery of space resources.” The text also states that the United States, in accordance with the Outer Space Treaty, cannot use this law to “assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.” Notably, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Luxembourg, and Japan have all enacted similar laws that allow the ownership and transfer of ownership of space resources.</p> +<p>Mobilizing private sector capital has been, and will continue to be, a challenge. The U.S. government needs to more deeply engage with the private sector to determine what it would take for private actors to invest in strategic markets, instead of focusing solely on implementing policy it thinks will move that capital. Private sector financing already is being carried out in the energy transition space, most notably in Indonesia’s Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), with potential JETP programs extending to Vietnam and the Philippines. The partnership intends to mobilize an initial $20 billion in public and private financing over a three-to-five-year period using a mix of grants, concessional loans, market-rate loans, guarantees, and private investments. The JETP includes $10 billion in public sector pledges and a $126 million commitment from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to an Indonesian geothermal company. The signatories of the JETP also committed to help mobilize and facilitate $10 billion in private investments from an initial set of private financial institutions, including some of the world’s largest private banks. Since the launch, a total of approximately $281.6 million has been allocated as grants or technical assistance across roughly 40 programs, managed across five financial institutions and implemented by eight different executing agencies.</p> -<p><strong>Regulations</strong></p> +<p>Even if a project, an initiative, or even a policy is a strategic imperative for the U.S. government, the same may not be true for the private sector. Some markets will still be too risky and the return on investment too unlikely for the private sector, which looks to ensure its investments are repaid and profitable. Working with the private sector, either locally or multinationally, on their needs in undertaking these projects is a critical step in shaping the correct tools to pursue infrastructure investments globally.</p> -<p>Today, the U.S. government regulates elements of every private U.S. space activity. The Department of Transportation oversees private spaceports and licenses launch and reentry of spacecraft, requiring information about the space payload as part of the licensing process. The FCC licenses spectrum use and imposes associated requirements regarding space sustainability on licensees. Any satellite or spacecraft wishing to broadcast radio frequencies to or from any territory of the United States must receive a license from the FCC, including foreign satellites seeking to serve the U.S. market. The Department of Commerce licenses remote-sensing satellites, including ones conducting non-Earth imaging, such as imaging of other satellites in space.</p> +<p>Pieces of the foundation for addressing critical infrastructure needs are there, but it will take sustained focus, leadership, and telling a good story to get it done.</p> -<p>Beyond these regulations, the United States is considering proposals to regulate novel private sector space activities, a process often referred to as “mission authorization.” These novel activities include commercial habitats, in-space manufacturing, and on-orbit refueling, none of which are clearly addressed by existing licensing schemes.</p> +<h3 id="can-the-united-states-have-a-trade-policy-without-market-access">Can the United States Have a Trade Policy Without Market Access?</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dVNOUtq.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: NASA Crewed Lunar Missions Milestone Timeline.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/fy-2025-budget-request/">“Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request,” NASA, last updated August 29, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="william-a-reinsch">William A. Reinsch</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Activities</strong></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">More market access for U.S. products can only be obtained by providing more access for imports into the United States. There is no free lunch in trade negotiations.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>To date and for the foreseeable future, the majority of U.S. missions that transit cislunar space, reach lunar orbit, or land on the Moon are directly or indirectly funded by NASA and focus on space exploration. Today, most NASA funding for cislunar missions supports the Artemis program, an initiative to reestablish a human presence and build a long-term base on the Moon, as well as lay the foundations for a future crewed mission to Mars. According to NASA, the goals of the Artemis program are to make new scientific discoveries, realize economic benefits from returning to the Moon, and inspire a new generation of explorers.</p> +<p>A hallmark of the Biden administration’s trade policy has been its refusal to negotiate trade agreements that include market access – the reduction of tariffs or non-tariff barriers to facilitate trade. The administration has occasionally said it supports more market access for U.S. products, but it has failed to accept the reality that trade negotiations are inevitably reciprocal. More market access for U.S. products can only be obtained by providing more access for imports into the United States. There is no free lunch in trade negotiations.</p> -<p>Achieving those goals will come at a high cost. According to the NASA Office of Inspector General, the agency will have spent approximately $93 billion on the Artemis program (including work on the Space Launch System) between 2012 and 2025. In 2022, NASA launched the uncrewed Artemis I mission, which placed the Orion capsule into lunar orbit and returned the craft to Earth. The first crewed Artemis mission, Artemis II, will take four astronauts into Earth orbit and a free-return trajectory around the Moon no earlier than 2025. The subsequent Artemis III mission, planned for no earlier than 2026, will take astronauts to the lunar surface and target a landing site near the Moon’s south pole.</p> +<p>When asked what they wanted out of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) agreement, Asian participants in CSIS’s research responded politely that they were looking for “tangible benefits.” This is code for “what’s in it for us?,”which is exactly what every experienced trade negotiator asks. The answer from the Biden administration has been “very little.” The same thing has happened with other ongoing regional negotiations – the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP) and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC).</p> -<p>In addition to facilitating the Artemis program’s second human landing on the Moon, the third crewed Artemis mission, Artemis IV, will dock with the Lunar Gateway, a planned space station that will provide habitation space for astronauts and serve as a communications hub and science laboratory. NASA plans for the station to use a near-rectilinear halo orbit (NRHO) associated with the Earth–Moon L2 Lagrange point. In-space assembly of the Lunar Gateway is planned to start in 2028. NASA is collaborating with ESA, the Canadian Space Agency, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), the UAE, and commercial partners on the project. Planned for no earlier than 2030 and 2031, respectively, Artemis V and VI will also complete lunar landings and continue efforts to construct the Lunar Gateway.</p> +<p>There are two reasons for this reluctance to take up market access. One is political – a desire to avoid intraparty warfare between the Democratic left and center. (The former sees trade as imports that harm U.S. workers. The latter views it as exports that promote growth and jobs.) The second reason is philosophical – past trade agreements are perceived as having primarily benefited large corporations and their executives at the expense of workers.</p> -<p>To enhance its Deep Space Network to support upcoming lunar missions, NASA is building and expanding a network of Lunar Exploration Ground Sites (LEGS) so the agency can remain in continuous communications with the Moon during its orbit around Earth. NASA is also developing the LunaNet framework and Lunar Communications Relay and Navigation Systems (LCRNS) project to enable cislunar networking and connectivity services.</p> +<p>Both arguments lead to the same safe choice: pursuing trade agreements that do not contain “tangible benefits.” The dilemma for the current administration has been that trade agreements are not just about trade – they are symbols of the relationship between the participants, and symbols have power. An ambitious, binding agreement is proof that the United States is committed to ongoing engagement with the other party (or parties) on equitable terms, proof that would be welcomed in Asia, Latin America, and Europe. That was the rationale for the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, and the Trump administration’s rejection of it was widely seen in Asia as indicating a lack of interest in and commitment to the region on the part of the United States. That action left the United States without a policy and led to pressure on the Biden administration to develop a new economic approach to Asia, and subsequently to the Americas.</p> -<p>In addition to the Artemis program, NASA is currently funding missions to the Moon as part of the CLPS program, an initiative through which the agency contracts with companies to deliver freight to the lunar surface. Two CLPS awardees, Astrobotic and Intuitive Machines, have already sent commercial spacecraft to the Moon carrying NASA payloads. While the Astrobotic spacecraft suffered a malfunction en route and was not able to complete its mission, the Intuitive Machines spacecraft touched down on the Moon in February 2024, completing the world’s first successful commercial lunar landing. Currently, NASA has several CLPS contracts (i.e., trips to the Moon) on the books to deliver payloads to the lunar surface. Many NASA payloads planned for CLPS missions were built through the Lunar Surface Instrument and Technology Payloads (LSITP) program.</p> +<p>Caught between demands for a policy that demonstrated U.S. commitment and reluctance to pursue an agreement that involved any meaningful market concessions, the administration came up with IPEF and APEP, both of which have been derided as unambitious agreements. The situation was made worse in November 2023 when the administration pulled back its support for the trade pillar of the IPEF agreement in the face of opposition from progressive Democratic members of Congress. While the trade pillar is technically not dead; it is on life support, and it appears that only the other three pillars – supply chains, decarbonization and sustainability, and anti-corruption and taxation – will survive. Those are not unimportant, but they are also not trade agreements. The origin story of the TTC is different, but the result is the same – much talk about cooperation with few tangible results beyond an impressive display of unity in sanctioning Russia.</p> -<p>Focused on planetary exploration, NASA’s Small Innovative Missions for Planetary Exploration (SIMPLEx) program is also funding missions to the Moon. The aim of SIMPLEx is to build small, low-cost spacecraft for launches as secondary payloads on other missions. For example, a SIMPLEx mission called LunaH-Map was launched on Artemis I in 2022. Though the LunaH-Map mission experienced propulsion problems after deployment, it did conduct a lunar flyby and returned some data to Earth. The only other SIMPLEx mission to the Moon, a lunar orbiter called Lunar Trailblazer, is currently scheduled to launch in 2025.</p> +<p>Meanwhile, China is not standing still in the competition for regional influence. It has applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership and is using its membership in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership to expand its market access while the United States is, essentially, “just watching.”</p> -<p>The DoD is also funding work related to cislunar space. Specifically, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is leading a project that aims to move large payloads in cislunar space using a nuclear thermal rocket (NTR). The Demonstration Rocket for Agile Cislunar Operations (DRACO) program will produce a baseline design for the NTR reactor, build the reactor, and launch it into space to conduct experiments on the technologies in orbit. The DRACO flight experiment could take place as soon as 2027. DARPA is also funding the 10-Year Lunar Architecture (LunA-10) Capability Study, through which 14 companies are proposing architectures for future lunar infrastructure. Initial study results were presented in June 2024.</p> +<p>What does this mean for the future? Neither presidential candidate is likely to return to conventional trade agreements, although, ironically, Trump may be more willing to start new negotiations than Harris. Instead, there is discussion about alternatives to what is currently on the table. One possibility is to focus negotiations on regulatory harmonization or mutual recognition on the theory that aligning regulations on commerce will increase trade. There is something to that. Standards conformance would make it easier for products to cross borders. Moreover, such mutual recognition could allow professionals like lawyers and accountants to work in partner countries and thus increase services trade. The problem is that those negotiations are not easy. Regulators in every country like the way they do things and resist being told that they must do them differently, or that they have to recognize that someone else’s rules are as good as theirs.</p> -<p>Additionally, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is developing two satellites, Oracle-Mobility and Oracle-Prime, designed to provide SSA information on objects in cislunar space. The Oracle-Mobility satellite will test new navigational techniques needed for cislunar operations and object tracking and is expected to launch no earlier than 2025. Applying lessons learned from the Oracle-Mobility mission, the Oracle-Prime satellite will operate in a halo orbit associated with the Earth–Moon L1 Lagrange point and test techniques to monitor space objects that transit cislunar space.</p> +<p>A second alternative is to focus on individual sectors – such as critical minerals – when making trade agreements. This is also a good idea, but like the first, it will be more difficult in practice than in theory. Countries that have minerals are, of course, interested in selling them, but they also want to capture more of the value added by processing the resources and manufacturing the products that contain them. If the United States is only interested in extraction, the negotiations may not get far.</p> -<p>There are also several U.S. companies attempting to build and launch missions to the Moon for commercial purposes. For example, Astrolab is developing the Flexible Logistics and Exploration (FLEX) lunar rover, which will be launched on SpaceX’s Starship rocket. Astrolab has agreements from eight customers to carry commercial payloads on the rover to the Moon’s surface in 2026.</p> +<p>Ultimately, success on any of these fronts will require an attitude change. If the United States only wants to receive and not give, any negotiation is doomed. The important word here is an old one – reciprocity. It was popular in trade debates in the 1980s when it meant that the United States should insist that other countries match concessions with its own. Today, the situation is reversed: other countries are demanding that the United States match their concessions with some of its own. Until the United States is willing to do that, progress on trade agreements will remain elusive.</p> -<p><strong>Australia</strong></p> +<h3 id="rethinking-competition-with-china-on-clean-technologies">Rethinking Competition with China on Clean Technologies</h3> -<p>In partnership with NASA, Australia plans to build and send a rover to the surface of the Moon on an upcoming Artemis mission, perhaps as early as 2026. Support for the development of the rover comes in part from Australia’s Moon to Mars initiative, which awards grants to Australian space companies, aiming to grow the country’s space economy and give it a greater role in future missions to the Moon. Moon to Mars additionally funded the development of scientific instruments to be used for other U.S.-led lunar missions. However, Australia does not currently have an agreement with the United States to send an Australian astronaut to the Moon as part of the Artemis program.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="ilaria-mazzocco">Ilaria Mazzocco</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ikfWg36.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Commercial Lunar Payload Services Landing Sites.</strong> Source: <a href="https://science.nasa.gov/lunar-science/clps-deliveries/">“Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) Deliveries,” NASA</a>.</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While China’s industrial policy does create significant market distortions, policymakers should spend more resources identifying gaps in the U.S. innovation ecosystem and focus more on U.S. competitive advantages.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>Canada</strong></p> +<p>U.S.-China technological competition is widespread and complex, but there is one technological sphere with a clear leader: Chinese companies are increasingly outperforming competitors in cost and quality when it comes to established clean technologies ranging from solar panels and lithium-ion batteries to electric vehicles (EVs). While the United States erects more barriers to keep out Chinese firms, it also needs to avoid technological isolation, contend with more competition on the international stage, and be prepared to compete in emerging and next-generation clean technologies.</p> -<p>The Canadian Space Agency has two programs focused on the Moon: the Lunar Exploration Accelerator Program (LEAP), which manages the science, technology, and commercial lunar payloads opportunities for Canadian industry and academic partners, and Canadarm3, a robotic arm built by Canadian company MDA Space that will be installed on the Lunar Gateway to manipulate and maneuver objects on the exterior of the station. Canadarm3 will perform a similar role to the first Canadarm, used on the Space Shuttle orbiter, and Canadarm2, currently installed on the International Space Station (ISS). In return for supplying Canadarm3, NASA offered Canada the opportunity to send science, technology, and commercial lunar payloads and fly two Canadian astronauts to the Moon on Artemis missions.</p> +<p>Many of Washington’s current policies vis-à-vis Chinese clean technology companies assume thattheir rise is predominantly, if not solely, driven by subsidies. However, this overlooks the broader context that enabled the development of these companies and technologies, including China’s massive effort to create markets for these goods over the past two decades and the role played by innovative companies integrated into global value chains. Focusing solely on overcapacity, for example, might lead observers to miss that it is the most successful and competitive manufacturers that are leading the export boom – such as EV maker BYD.</p> -<p><strong>China</strong></p> +<p>While China’s industrial policy does create significant market distortions, policymakers should spend more resources identifying gaps in the U.S. innovation ecosystem and focus more on U.S. competitive advantages. As it implements its own industrial policy strategy, the United States should learn from its main competitor. For example, few policymakers focus on the high levels of automation in Chinese factories as a source of advantage even though the Chinese government has been explicitly supporting a shift toward more automation and the digitalization of manufacturing – and encouraging the use of Chinese-made industrial robots in the process. Talent, financing, and regional clusters also matter, as does stable policy committed to creating demand for these emerging technologies.</p> -<p>In 2004, China announced the Chinese Lunar Exploration Program (CLEP) — also known as the Chang’e Project — which would consist of a series of robotic lunar missions built and operated by the China National Space Administration. As originally envisioned, China planned for eight Chang’e missions, six of which have been completed. The series of Chang’e missions has operated lunar landers, rovers, orbiters, and sample-return activities. In 2024, China’s most recent CLEP mission, Chang’e 6, successfully landed on the Moon’s south pole and returned a sample of the lunar regolith (a layer of loose, dust-like material that covers the Moon’s surface). The last two missions, Chang’e 7 and Chang’e 8, are expected to launch in 2026 and 2028, respectively. Chang’e 8 will test technologies required to build a permanent base and could be powered by nuclear technology. Both missions would land in the lunar south pole.</p> +<p>The demand piece will be crucial moving forward for the technologies where the U.S. government hopes to compete with incumbent Chinese firms, such as batteries and next-generation technologies like green hydrogen and carbon capture and storage. There are ways to bolster demand in the United States, for example, by building out more infrastructure for charging, promoting grid modernization and expansion, and engaging in permitting reform. Yet, a protected market often lacks incentives for innovation and efficiency, which is why Washington should encourage U.S. companies to engage in head-to-head competition with Chinese firms.</p> -<p>In July 2023, China declared that crewed missions would be added to CLEP, with a crewed landing on the lunar surface planned for 2030. Separately, China also announced plans in 2019 for a future scientific research station to be constructed within the next 10 years at the Moon’s south pole. This vision has likely evolved into the planned International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), a joint venture between China and Russia announced in 2021. At least 10 additional countries have signed up to support the ILRS, including Venezuela, Belarus, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, South Africa, Egypt, Nicaragua, Thailand, Serbia, and Kazakhstan. China is also planning a GPS-like constellation for lunar orbit that will provide satellite navigation for the Moon. To recruit international partners for its crewed research station, China announced the creation of the International Lunar Research Station Cooperation Organization (ILRSCO) in 2023.</p> +<p>Chinese cleantech companies are already rapidly expanding internationally both in terms of exports and, increasingly, investment in third markets. Chinese firms are establishing factories beyond China’s borders for refined minerals, components, and final goods, including solar panels and EVs. Far from a hostile takeover, these types of investments are often in direct response to demands by host countries.</p> -<p>China is currently operating the Queqiao 1 relay satellite in a halo orbit associated with the Earth–Moon L2 Lagrange point, providing communications for China’s missions to the side of the Moon not facing Earth. Operating in a frozen elliptical orbit around the Moon, the Queqiao 2 satellite also serves as a communications relay for lunar missions.</p> +<p>The United States is not unique in deploying tariffs against Chinese-made goods, but it looks more isolated in seeking to contain, rather than attract, Chinese investment. European, Southeast Asian, Latin American, and various other governments have explicitly invited Chinese companies to localize their production, something firms are eager to do in order to access these countries’ markets or to export to third markets, including the United States.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1ovzmz1.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Chang’e Timeline.</strong> Source: <a href="https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/lunar/cnsa_moon_future.html">David R. Williams, “Future Chinese Lunar Missions,” NASA</a>.</em></p> +<p>Another trend is also at play internationally. To improve their competitiveness, international companies are seeking to access Chinese clean technology through joint ventures, licensing deals, and even by acquiring shares in Chinese startup companies (as in the case of Stellantis and Volkswagen). This raises the possibility that much of the world, including some U.S. allies, may become more technologically integrated with China, not least because Chinese firms have some of the most advanced clean technologies on the market.</p> -<p>In June 2024, China released a road map for a series of projects aimed at building lunar infrastructure, including elements related to communications and SSA, as well as GPS-equivalent services for lunar and deep-space users.</p> +<p>Ultimately, if the United States wants to compete with China, it will need to draw the correct lessons from history. The successes of clean technology today owe much to globalized value chains that took advantage of China’s manufacturing ecosystem and large market in the past. If national security demands the exclusion of China from some or all of the United States’ clean technology value chains, policymakers will need to be clear-eyed about the costs and trade-offs and must identify strategic priorities. In some technologies, derisking may be possible in a limited fashion; in others, Washington may need to strengthen its linkages with other countries. Sectoral agreements on steel or critical minerals may provide interesting formats for potential partnerships on a sectoral basis. Still, the United States will need to think strategically about concessions over market access or joint research and development. Finally, a world where the largest economies engage in green industrial policy may eventually require finding a credible multilateral platform to discuss potential solutions to increasing trade disputes and distortions.</p> -<p><strong>Europe</strong></p> +<h2 id="technology-statecraft-and-global-governance">Technology Statecraft and Global Governance</h2> -<p>Through ESA, Europe is closely involved in NASA’s Artemis missions. Most notably, ESA produces the European Service Module (ESM) for the Orion crewed capsule. Already tested on Artemis I, the ESM will be used on all Artemis missions. In addition, ESA will be providing several components for the Lunar Gateway, specifically a habitation module, a refueling and storage module, and a module that will contain communications equipment for linking with the lunar surface and satellites in lunar orbit. In return for these contributions, ESA will be able to send two European astronauts to the Moon as part of the Artemis program.</p> +<h3 id="building-a-tech-alliance">Building a Tech Alliance</h3> -<p>ESA is also designing Argonaut, a lunar lander that can perform a variety of different missions. Argonaut will be able to carry cargo such as scientific payloads, power-generation and -storage equipment, and lunar rovers to the Moon’s surface. Currently, ESA is planning to use the Ariane 6 rocket to launch Argonaut missions.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="james-a-lewis">James A. Lewis</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>To support Artemis, Argonaut, and other lunar missions, ESA established a program called Moonlight to provide PNT services for the Moon, as well as communication and data relay services between the Earth and Moon. Currently scheduled to launch in 2026, the Lunar Pathfinder is the first spacecraft developed as part of this initiative. The satellite will orbit the Moon, communicating with Earth using an X-band link and with missions on the Moon using S-band and ultra-high frequency links. It will be launched with the CLPS Blue Ghost M2.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Europe is the crux of the tech-alliance problem. Countries like Japan and Australia are ready to work together with the United States, but there is a degree of ambivalence in Europe.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>India</strong></p> +<p>Calls to create some kind of technology alliance among democracies can be grounded in experience. We can identify requirements for developing an alliance and the actions needed to turn proposals into agreement. However, while alliances are easy to propose, they are hard to build.</p> -<p>In August 2023, India became the fourth nation to successfully land on the Moon, landing the Chandrayaan-3 probe in the lunar south pole region. India is working with Japan on the Lunar Polar Exploration (LUPEX) mission, expected to be launched no earlier than 2025. Japan agreed to provide the rover and launcher for LUPEX, while India agreed to provide the mission’s lander. Additionally, India is in the early stages of planning its Chandrayaan-4 mission with the aim of returning a sample of lunar regolith to Earth.</p> +<p>The first, and most important, of these requirements is there must be a shared problem that potential partners wish to address through collective action. Maintaining U.S. technological dominance is not a shared problem and probably not the best appeal for partnership. Similarly, calling for a crusade against China is not universally appealing in Europe or Asia.</p> -<p><strong>Israel</strong></p> +<p>Europe is the crux of the tech-alliance problem. Countries like Japan and Australia are ready to work together with the United States, but there is a degree of ambivalence in Europe. There is also a degree of envy over U.S. technological success. European political culture is still shaped by the traumas of the twentieth century, and one explanation for extraterritorial regulation of U.S. technology companies is that Americans should “remember Europe’s history” and how it creates deep concerns for fundamental rights such as privacy. Others say that the purpose of technology regulation is, at least partially, to slow down U.S. companies so that European companies can catch up.</p> -<p>In 2019, two private entities from Israel — SpaceIL and Israel Aerospace Industries — launched the Beresheet lunar lander, the first privately funded attempt to reach the Moon. The lander ultimately crashed into the Moon after its gyroscopes failed on approach to the landing site. SpaceIL announced plans in 2020 to build a second Beresheet lander for launch in 2024, but there is no public indication of subsequent progress on this mission. Israel Aerospace Industries is also partnering with OHB SE, a German aerospace technologies group, on the Lunar Surface Access Service (LSAS) program, which supports commercial lunar payload delivery. The first LSAS mission is planned for 2025.</p> +<p>Two phrases from Brussels highlight the problem: “European values” and “tech sovereignty” (or “digital sovereignty”). The first implies somewhat simplistically that there are different values in the United States and Europe. The second is more problematic. European sources say that tech sovereignty means not only independence from China, but also from the United States. Any proposal for a new alliance needs to show how it aligns with this EU goal of increased sovereignty.</p> -<p><strong>Japan</strong></p> +<p>One way to overcome sovereignty issues is to build a new technology alliance upon existing structures such as the G7 or the Wassenaar Arrangement, but both would need to be modified – the G7 by adding counties like Australia, South Korea, and the Netherlands and Wassenaar by removing Russia and perhaps Hungary. Other groups, including AUKUS, the Quad, and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, are too narrow to serve as a foundation.</p> -<p>Japan has maintained an active lunar exploration program for over 30 years. In 1990, it sent the Hiten spacecraft to the Moon, making it the third country after the Soviet Union and United States to launch a lunar mission. Japan did not send another spacecraft to the Moon until 2007, when it launched the SELENE mission, also called Kaguya, composed of three separate spacecraft: a main orbiter, a relay satellite, and another satellite designed to map the Moon’s gravity field.</p> +<p>Wassenaar, the current tech regime, has shortcomings. It is 30 years old, technological change challenges the scope of its controls, and it now lacks the strategic underpinnings that led to its creation (and Russia’s membership). Wassenaar was a response to the end of the Cold War and was designed for that context. While it is not in Western interests to dismantle Wassenaar, it does need to be supplemented by measures that go beyond export controls. Judging from past experience, the best route might start with the G7 and then add additional countries, since the Wassenaar Arrangement itself grew out of G7 talks.</p> -<p>Japan’s most recent lunar mission was the Smart Lander for Investigating Moon (SLIM), designed to demonstrate precision lunar landings. As it descended to the lunar surface in January 2024, SLIM successfully deployed two lunar landers. Unfortunately, the lander touched down with its solar arrays misoriented away from the Sun, which meant that it could not generate the amount of power required for normal operations. Even in this state, SLIM survived several lunar nights — but has not communicated with ground controllers on Earth since April 2024.</p> +<p>Who in the U.S. government makes the appeal for an alliance is also important. It must be a senior political figure from either the White House (preferably the president) or the secretary of state or treasury. In the past, the Department of Commerce has not been considered by other countries to have sufficient heft, although this may have changed in the Biden administration. In addition, many countries do not consider the Department of Defense the right counterpart for economic security issues. Other departments or staff-level proposals will not be taken seriously (remember that every government starts its review of a proposal by asking its embassy if the Americans are serious, and the embassies look for signs like senior-level interest, funding, and follow-through). Working an announcement into a presidential speech, even a single sentence, would help kickstart a technology alliance.</p> -<p>Japan has several missions planned over the next few years. This includes the Hakuto-R 2 mission, planned by Japanese company ispace scheduled for late 2024, which will carry a lunar lander and micro rover. Toyota and JAXA are currently developing a crewed, pressurized lunar rover that will be flown to the Moon on a future Artemis mission. As part of the NASA CLPS initiative, the Japanese company Dymon is also planning to launch a lunar rover called Yaoki on an upcoming Intuitive Machines mission to demonstrate its ability to support future NASA missions. Additionally, Japan will cooperate with India on the aforementioned joint LUPEX mission.</p> +<p>A formal proposal must immediately follow a presidential announcement. It must lay out initial thinking on which technologies are covered and the security rationale for the alliance, as well as provide details on membership criteria, frequency of meetings, secretarial functions, and what a commitment would entail in terms of time, money, and personnel. The proposal cannot be set in stone but rather should be presented as a discussion paper, open to amendment by other participants. Further, the United States must go into discussions knowing the minimum it can accept and what is essential. Ideally this would be joint effort, specifically, a joint proposal coming from the United States, Japan, and a G7 European member.</p> -<p>As part of the Artemis program, Washington and Tokyo signed an agreement in April 2024 for a Japanese astronaut to be the first non-U.S. national to crew an Artemis mission to the lunar surface.</p> +<p>A technology alliance may need to have both positive and defensive goals to attract wide support, but combining these two ends can be difficult. For example, managing technology transfer to China is a central strategic consideration, but so is coordinating policies and promoting the development of emerging technologies. While AUKUS is too focused on defense to easily translate into a broader tech alliance, Pillars 1 (advanced capabilities, including cyber, AI, and quantum and 2 (industrial base cooperation) could provide useful precedent. The most challenging issue in any joint effort to jointly create new technologies is how the members will share funding and intellectual property rights.</p> -<p><strong>Russia</strong></p> +<p>A final point to bear in mind is that it will take months, perhaps years, to create a new tech regime. An ideal time to start such an initiative is at the start of a new administration. The spring of 2025 could be the launch point.</p> -<p>Russia’s most recent mission to the Moon, the uncrewed Luna 25 lunar lander, failed when the probe crashed into the Moon’s surface in 2023. Several more Luna missions are in various stages of planning and development, with some scheduled for launch in the next five years. These upcoming uncrewed missions are part of the Luna-Glob program, which aims to create a fully robotic lunar base based on plans from 1997. This program would set the stage for later crewed missions to the Moon.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Planned for launch in 2027, the lunar orbiter Luna 26 is the next Russian mission to the Moon. It will carry a scientific payload, as well as serve as a communications relay between the Moon and Earth. In 2019, Beijing and Moscow agreed to cooperate on both Russia’s Luna 26 mission and China’s Chang’e 7 mission. Originally, ESA had also intended to collaborate with Russia on Luna 26; however, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the agency canceled these plans and withdrew from work with Russia on the Luna 27 mission, a lander planned for the lunar south pole. Russia has claimed it will complete Luna 26 and Luna 27 independently, with the latter consisting of a primary mission (Luna 27a) and a backup (Luna 27b) in the event Luna 27a fails.</p> +<p><strong>Navin Girishankar</strong> is president of the Economic Security and Technology Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He leads a bipartisan team of over 40 resident staff and an extensive network of non-resident affiliates dedicated to providing independent research and strategic insights on economic and technology policies and their critical role in competitiveness as well as national security.</p> -<p>As early as 2009, Russia had been planning a new, reusable, crewed space capsule for use in low Earth orbit (LEO) and for transportation to the Moon. This new Orel spacecraft would be designed to transport up to four humans. In 2020, Russian officials announced plans for an uncrewed test launch of Orel in 2023 that never happened. Russia also said it was planning an uncrewed mission to the Moon in 2028, but there are no signs that it remains on track tomeet this goal. And although it announced in 2007 that it aimed to field its own Lunar Orbital Station, there has been no subsequent indication of work on its development.</p> +<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is the director of the Wadhwani AI Center at CSIS. Mr. Allen’s expertise and professional experience spans AI, robotics, semiconductors, space technology, and national security.</p> -<p>Given budget constraints — and the failure of Luna 25 in 2023 — it is unlikely that Russia will be able to launch any of these proposed missions. Sanctions imposed on Russia since its invasion of Ukraine have severely limited its access to Western technologies and microelectronics, further stalling Russian efforts to start or continue work on future Moon missions.</p> +<p><strong>Adam Frost</strong> is the former senior vice president for the China and Transformational Exports Program at the Export-Import Bank of the United States.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Given budget constraints — and the failure of Luna 25 in 2023 — it is unlikely that Russia will be able to launch any of these proposed missions.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Kirti Gupta</strong> is a noted economist and expert specializing in global matters related to technology, antitrust, and intellectual property (IP). Dr. Gupta’s diverse expertise spans engineering, product, litigation, and policy issues in the technology sector. She currently serves as vice president and chief economist of global technology at Cornerstone Research, leading their technology, digital economy, and artificial intelligence practice.</p> -<p><strong>South Korea</strong></p> +<p><strong>Barath Harithas</strong> is a senior fellow with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS, focusing on issues at the intersection of national security, trade, and technology. He has held diverse public service roles in Singapore spanning the U.S.-China relationship, international trade, and AI standards.</p> -<p>Launched in 2022, the Korea Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter (KPLO), also known as Danuri, is South Korea’s first spacecraft to operate beyond geostationary Earth orbit (GEO). The KPLO was designed to survey the lunar surface and help identify possible landing sites for future missions. It is currently orbiting the Moon. The South Korean space agency is planning an uncrewed mission to the lunar surface in 2032 and actively participates in UN discussions on lunar norms and sustainability.</p> +<p><strong>Scott Kennedy</strong> is senior adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at CSIS. A leading authority on Chinese economic policy and U.S.-China commercial relations, Kennedy has traveled to China for 36 years. Ongoing focuses include China’s innovation drive, Chinese industrial policy, U.S.-China relations, and global economic governance.</p> -<p><strong>Other Countries</strong></p> +<p><strong>James Lewis</strong> writes on technology and strategy at CSIS. Lewis has a track record of being among the first to identify new tech and security issues and devise polices to address them. He leads a long-running track 2 dialogue with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. His current work looks at how countries innovate and at digitalization and its political, economic, and security effects.</p> -<p>Additional countries have flown payloads on another nation’s lunar missions in the past several years or have plans to do so in the next decade. For example, the UAE is sponsoring an experiment created by students at AGH University of Science and Technology in Poland for inclusion as a rideshare payload on an upcoming Astrobotic CLPS mission. The UAE also developed a lunar rover that flew aboard ispace’s Hakuto-R 1 mission but was lost in the lander’s crash. Following the crash, Prime Minister and Vice President Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum signaled that the country will make another attempt at a lunar landing. Additionally, the UAE has other lunar plans, providing an airlock for the Lunar Gateway and making the UAE the only non-ISS partner nation providing hardware for the new station.</p> +<p><strong>Joseph Majkut</strong> is director of the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at CSIS. In this role, he leads the program’s work understanding the geopolitics of energy and climate change and working to ensure a global energy transition that is responsive to the risks of climate change and the economic and strategic priorities of the United States and the world. Joseph is an expert in climate science, climate policy, and risk and uncertainty analysis for decisionmaking.</p> -<p>Similarly, in May 2024, Pakistan sent the iCube Qamar, a CubeSat designed to orbit the Moon and take photos of the lunar surface, as a payload on board China’s Chang’e 6 mission. In 2022, Mexico initiated its Colmena project, an effort to promote Mexican participation in lunar exploration through the development of microrobots, five of which were launched aboard Astrobotic’s Peregrine 1 mission. While the mission’s failure destroyed the payload, a second Colmena mission is slated for 2027. Turkey is planning on launching its lunar orbiter AYAP 1 in 2026, followed by AYAP 2, which aims to land a rover on the Moon in 2028. Finally, New Zealand plans to conduct SSA research and create a cislunar SSA capability in partnership with NASA.</p> +<p><strong>Ilaria Mazzocco</strong> is a deputy director and a senior fellow with the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at CSIS. She has over a decade of experience researching industrial policy, Chinese climate policy, and the intersection between the energy transition and economic and national security.</p> -<h3 id="international-space-governance-frameworks">INTERNATIONAL SPACE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS</h3> +<p><strong>Erin Murphy</strong> is deputy director and a senior fellow for emerging Asia economics with the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics at CSIS. She has spent her career in several public and private sector roles, including as an analyst on Asian political and foreign policy issues at the Central Intelligence Agency, director for the Indo-Pacific at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, founder and principal of her boutique advisory firm focused on Myanmar, and an English teacher with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program in Saga, Japan.</p> -<p>There are several space-specific international treaties and other international agreements that address space issues, as well as the U.S.-led Artemis Accords. While no treaty deals solely with cislunar space, the provisions of the space-specific agreements cover cislunar space no differently than any other domain.</p> +<p><strong>William Alan Reinsch</strong> holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS. He is also an adjunct assistant professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, teaching a course in trade policy and politics.</p> -<h4 id="the-outer-space-treaty-and-related-agreements">THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND RELATED AGREEMENTS</h4> +<p><strong>Richard Rossow</strong> is a senior adviser and holds the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics at CSIS. In this role, he helps frame and shape policies to promote greater business and economic engagement between the two countries, with a unique focus on tracking and engaging Indian states.</p> -<p>Evolving from several arms control resolutions debated in the United Nations during 1966, the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 was the first international treaty concerning space. It serves as the foundation for international space law and addresses all government and private sector space activities carried out by parties to the treaty. Although the treaty does not reference cislunar space, it does specifically reference the Moon — and thus, due to its broad applicability to all space activities, does apply to cislunar space.</p> +<p><strong>Sujai Shivakumar</strong> directs Renewing American Innovation (RAI) at CSIS, where he also serves as a senior fellow. Dr. Shivakumar brings over two decades of experience in policy studies related to U.S. competitiveness and innovation.</p>Navin Girishankar, et al.This report gives recommendations on export controls, global tech governance, domestic incentives for building tech capabilities in chips and clean technologies, and the future of international tech cooperation and competition.Cockpit Or Command Center?2024-10-29T12:00:00+08:002024-10-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/cockpit-or-command-center<p><em>The future of airpower hinges on the U.S. Air Force’s ability to integrate autonomous drones into manned formations. This analysis explores the trade-offs between cockpit and command center–based control in shaping the next era of combat operations.</em></p> -<p>There are currently 114 parties to the OST, including all major spacefaring nations. Key provisions of the treaty state that</p> +<excerpt /> <ul> <li> - <p>“the exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries . . . and shall be the province of all mankind”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>outer space shall be “free for exploration and use by all States”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>outer space is “not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>states shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies, or “station such weapons in outer space;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>“the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used . . . exclusively for peaceful purposes,” with no weapons testing of any kind, military maneuvers, or the establishment of military bases;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>astronauts shall be regarded “as envoys of mankind”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>states shall be responsible for national space activities, whether carried out by “governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>states shall be liable for damage caused by their space objects; and</p> + <p><strong>Networks of manned and unmanned aircraft will command the skies.</strong> These teams will be increasingly modular and optimized for counterair, interdiction, and close air support missions.</p> </li> <li> - <p>states shall avoid “harmful contamination” of space and celestial bodies.</p> + <p><strong>A mix of war games, Red Flag exercises, and dynamic home station simulations will test the ability of airmen – on the ground and in the skies – to execute mission command through networks of unmanned aircraft</strong> and respond to rapid changes in the threat environment. Together, these experiments will help guide not just airpower, but the entire joint planning and targeting cycle, into an era of algorithmic warfare.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which played a key role in creating the OST, was originally established by the UN General Assembly in 1958 as an ad hoc committee that became a permanent body in 1959 tasked with addressing the exploration and use of space for the benefit of all humanity. The UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) acts as the secretariat for COPUOS, helping to implement space treaties and General Assembly resolutions that form the basis of international space law.</p> - -<p>Other than the OST, there are four other legally binding international agreements that govern space. Each applies to spacecraft, people, and activities in cislunar space.</p> - -<p>The <strong>Rescue Agreement</strong> of 1968 requires that parties to the agreement provide assistance, when possible, to spacecraft personnel in distress or in the event of an accident or emergency landing. Additionally, should a party to the agreement become aware of spacecraft personnel in distress, they are required to notify the launching nation and the UN secretary general. The agreement also permits nations to request assistance recovering their space objects that land in territories outside of their jurisdiction. The launching nation is required to cover any costs incurred during recovery efforts.</p> - -<p>The <strong>Liability Convention</strong> of 1972 states that countries are liable for any damages incurred from all space objects launched from their territories. The crash of a nuclear-powered Soviet satellite onto Canadian territory in 1978 resulted in the only claim to date made under this convention.</p> - -<p>The <strong>Registration Convention</strong> of 1976 requires that states submit details to the United Nations about their spacecraft and satellites launched into space. The associated UN registry of space objects contains information such as the name of the launching nation, an appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number, date and location of launch, basic orbital parameters, and general function of the space object.</p> - -<p>Though most of the <strong>Moon Agreement</strong> of 1984 merely reemphasizes provisions of the OST, it also includes new language specifying that the Moon is “the common heritage of mankind” and providing clarity on the use of lunar resources. The treaty specifies that all references to the Moon also apply to all other celestial bodies in the Solar System, including orbits and trajectories to, from, and around them. Regarding the lawful use of lunar resources, the treaty planned to establish an international regime to administer the exploitation of resources on the Moon, other planets, asteroids, and any of the Solar System’s other celestial bodies. The regime was never implemented because there are only 17 parties to the treaty as of October 2024. The Moon Agreement has had little impact on international space law, as most spacefaring nations, including the United States, Russia, and China, decided not to sign it.</p> - -<p>In addition to these five legally binding international space agreements, UNOOSA often highlights five non-binding resolutions approved by the General Assembly that articulate key principles of international space law. The earliest of these resolutions is the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which predates the OST and was passed in 1963. The other resolutions, passed in the 1980s and 1990s, present principles for international television broadcasting from satellites, remote sensing of Earth from space, and nuclear power sources in space, as well as a declaration on the importance of international cooperation in space for the benefit of all people, with a particular focus on developing nations.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>In 2010, COPUOS established the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities to identify issues impacting space sustainability — such as space debris, SSA, space weather, and national regulatory regimes for space — and develop ideas and voluntary guidelines to improve them. In 2019, COPUOS adopted a set of 21 voluntary best-practice guidelines for long-term sustainability that had been negotiated and approved by the working group.</p> +<p>There is a new theory of airpower on the horizon. Over the next five years, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) plans to invest billions in research and development for a force of over 1,000 collaborative combat aircraft (CCA). The vision includes working with allies and partners to pair fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft with versatile unmanned systems, creating aerial networks that can rapidly adapt to changes in the battlespace. Multiple reports and war games portend a new future in which unmanned systems will replace an aging, expensive manned aircraft and create entirely new mission profiles optimized for peer conflict. The fate of these unmanned systems is critical, given both the Air Force’s decision in July 2024 to reevaluate its sixth-generation aircraft and the emergence of new Air Task Forces.</p> -<p>To address the use of space resources, including those on the Moon, the legal subcommittee of COPUOS also created the Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities in 2022, giving it a five-year mandate to examine the benefits of establishing a framework for use of space resources and whether such a framework might require new international agreements. Establishment of this working group represents a consensus view of COPUOS members that the OST does not adequately address the issue of space resource use and denotes members’ willingness to consider new international instruments to tackle it.</p> +<p>Yet how will military organizations command and control distributed networks of CCAs in future air operations? Will such networks be proverbial “loyal wingmen,” subject only to the tactical commands of a pilot in a cockpit? Or will drones do the bidding of the command centers, like Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs)? The command and control (C2) architecture surrounding CCAs will almost certainly prove to be as consequential as the systems themselves in forging the future of air power. The U.S. military needs a clear concept of mission command for autonomous aircraft, executed across multidomain battle networks and tailored to different mission types.</p> -<p>Finally, during their official annual meetings in June 2024, COPUOS members agreed to establish the Action Team on Lunar Activities Consultation (ATLAC), which aims to provide recommendations for international consultative mechanisms on sharing information and best practices, ensuring safety, facilitating interoperability for lunar activities, protecting the lunar environment, and mitigating the creation of debris in lunar orbit. ATLAC membership is open to any COPUOS member, though key participants will include the United States and China. One expert involved in the establishment of the action team noted to this report’s authors that it was designed to facilitate such discussions between the United States, China, and Russia on lunar governance and coordination. The group will share its final recommendations during COPUOS meetings in 2027.</p> +<p>There is a fundamental tradeoff between tactical responsiveness and operational effectiveness. Where missions require time-sensitive adjustments, CCA C2 should center on the mission leader and ensure pilots have the right mix of high-bandwidth, low-latency comms and human-factor-optimized software to help them respond to the chaos and complexity of aerial combat. Where missions require concentration and unity of effort – the alignment of mass and objective – CCA C2 should focus on operational planning and mission execution directed from command centers. The Air Force and other aviation arms across the services need to invest in flexible battle networks and in concepts and training regimes that help adapt the core processes of command and control to the realities of modern warfare. To achieve this, the USAF should start conducting more robust studies and war games involving C2, alongside an accelerated series of experiments. It is one thing to pick a new piece of equipment; it is another to forge new doctrines and processes around the equipment.</p> -<p>While not directly related to cislunar space or the Moon, it is worth noting that UNOOSA supports the work of the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG). The ICG serves as a coordinating body for operators of such systems, working to facilitate compatibility, interoperability, communications, and transparency to benefit all global users of PNT services.</p> +<h3 id="the-third-offset-takes-flight">The Third Offset Takes Flight</h3> -<h4 id="the-international-telecommunication-union">THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION</h4> +<p>The concept of pairing unmanned combat aircraft with traditional air formations dates back to the notions of “the Third Offset” and “the loyal wingman.” The Third Offset – a term coined by former deputy secretary of defense Robert Work in 2014 – proposes the use of technological advantages to offset Russia’s and China’s abilities to amass combat power. Its theory of victory was to ensure that the United States retained a generational lead in weaponry. As part of this strategy, defense analysts envisioned a new, unmanned “loyal wingman” that could increase the performance of fourth- and fifth-generation combat aircraft.</p> -<p>Originally established by the International Telegraph Convention of 1865, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is now a UN agency responsible for issues pertaining to information and communications technologies. Most of its mission is focused on Earth, but a key part of its responsibilities relates to the space environment. The ITU is responsible for international coordination of radio spectrum use, including spectrum used by satellites. It facilitates international coordination of spectrum use for spacecraft orbiting Earth — meaning the ITU has effectively had a regulatory role for most spacecraft, since every crewed and uncrewed spacecraft in orbit since Sputnik 1 in 1957 has relied on radio communications.</p> +<p>Many of the initial loyal wingman tests involved turning fourth-generation fighter aircraft into remotely piloted vehicles. For example, during the 2017 Have Raider II experiments, Lockheed Martin Skunk Works paired an unmanned F-16 with a manned ground station to test autonomous flight during simulated air-ground strikes. In 2023, the USAF unveiled Project Venom, a series of experiments designed to load autonomous code into six F-16s and test the systems’ operation across a range of missions. These efforts built on earlier experiments that focused on perfecting the software necessary for autonomous flight. These experiments continue today through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)’s Air Combat Evolution program, which tests prototypes like the X-62A.</p> -<p>The ITU groups satellites orbiting Earth into two categories: GEO, also called GSO, or non-geostationary orbit (non-GSO). Due to the finite space for satellites in GEO — sometimes compared to beachfront property on Earth — the ITU has developed rules that balance the access of all nations to these valuable slots and approval of new systems on a first-come, first-served basis.</p> +<p>CCA concepts have since evolved beyond adapting fourth-generation platforms to building unmanned aircraft with treaty allies. Over the past year, five companies submitted CCA designs, two of which – General Atomics and Anduril – the Air Force is now considering. The General Atomics candidate is the Gambit, built to change configurations for different mission profiles to maximize fungibility. Anduril entered the CCA contest via its 2023 acquisition of Blue Force, whose group 5 vehicle, Fury, will be integrated with Anduril’s family of autonomous vehicles.</p> -<p>To date, there are very few ITU rules or decisions that relate specifically to cislunar space or the Moon. The union’s first foray into regulating spectrum use in cislunar space happened in 1971, when it added a provision to the Radio Regulations, the ITU’s legally binding spectrum rules, limiting the potential for interference to radio astronomy in the shielded zone of the Moon (SZM). The SZM is defined as the lunar surface area and adjacent part of space that are shielded from emissions originating from within 100,000 kilometers of Earth’s center (i.e., the far side of the Moon). The rule was designed to keep this naturally quiet zone free from human-made radio-signal interference so that the SZM could be used for radio astronomy in the future.</p> +<p>Both firms share a vision of using software to optimize hardware performance and interoperability – an idea that grows out of earlier work by DARPA, including the Adapting Cross-Domain Kill-Webs (ACK) program and the larger concept of mosaic warfare. In line with this vision, CCAs will not only increase the survival of manned aircraft, but also enhance lethality by enabling software-defined kill webs.</p> -<p>Since then, the ITU has not promulgated additional formal rules focused on cislunar space or the Moon. In 1997, it urged members to carefully assess the impacts of communications relay systems between the Earth and Moon. More recently, attendees at the 2023 World Radio Conference, a gathering organized by the ITU every three to four years to update the Radio Regulations, approved studies to look at frequency bands for lunar and cislunar communications. The results of the studies will be presented and debated at the 2027 conference.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4XuCgo9.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Advanced Battle Management System.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.aflcmc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2432103/emerald-flag-exercise-begins/">“Emerald Flag exercise begins,” Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, December 1, 2020</a>.</em></p> -<h4 id="the-artemis-accords">THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS</h4> +<p>This vision also extends to allies and partners. Building on their own experiments with the Boeing Ghost Bat, the Australians are looking to establish trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan on CCAs. Japan is increasing its investments in multiple unmanned programs, including the Global Combat Air Platform, which is under development with Italy and the United Kingdom. Not to be outdone, India is on schedule to start flight testing its CCA variant later in 2024. In December 2022, France, Spain, and Germany sealed a 3.2-billion-euro agreement for Europe’s Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program. In February 2024, the United Kingdom released its Defence Drone Strategy, highlighting the country’s efforts with unmanned aircraft systems.</p> -<p>The Artemis Accords are non-binding multilateral agreements between the United States and 43 other countries that contain various provisions related to norms of behavior in space. The United States has stated that these accords are intended to help facilitate operational implementation of obligations derived from the OST and other international space agreements.</p> +<p>China and Russia have introduced similar concepts and prototypes. In 2022, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) unveiled its FH-97A “Loyal Wingman” drone, designed to operate alongside fifth-generation fighters like the J-20 and J-31, which are currently undergoing extensive upgrades. The PLAAF approach to CCAs seems to be to replicate existing low-cost U.S. prototypes like the XQ-58A Valkyrie, which is currently being developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory and the Marine Corps. The Russian defense establishment, led by the Advanced Research Foundation, has long pursued unmanned aerial systems with advanced features and integration capabilities. The development of the Altius and S-70 Okhotnik-B – the latter integrated with the Su-57, Russia’s fifth-generation multirole aircraft – provide compelling evidence of Russian CCA endeavors.</p> -<p>The Artemis Accords established new norms among signatories aimed at improving the transparency, peacefulness, and interoperability of space activities. Among other commitments, signatories agree to release scientific information gathered through civil space exploration to the public and other Artemis signatories; make reasonable efforts to adhere to existing interoperability standards for space infrastructure; protect space sites considered significant to human heritage; and prevent the accumulation of orbital debris around the Moon.</p> +<p>Taken together, these initiatives point to a prevailing trend across multiple countries: the addition of unmanned aircraft as key nodes in multidomain networks designed to execute traditional airpower missions like counterair operations, interdiction, and close air support. Similar to earlier DARPA concepts, these nodes enable the delegation of key tasks and support missions across a software-defined kill web. This pairing of manned and unmanned systems puts a premium on command and control, prioritizing the execution of mission command through algorithms that guide autonomous systems.</p> -<p>Though legal experts continue to disagree on the meaning of OST language related to using space resources, the Artemis Accords assert that the extraction and utilization of space resources can be done without violating the OST. Specifically, they state that the use of space “does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II” of the OST. Furthermore, they call for the development of international practices and rules governing the extraction and use of space resources.</p> +<h3 id="command-and-control">Command and Control</h3> -<p>The Artemis Accords are the first international agreement to implement a concept referred to as “safety zones,” which are designed to prevent the activities of one nation from causing harmful interference to the activities of other countries — for example, to or by lunar launch and landing sites. Both launches and landings on the Moon’s surface create plumes of regolith and debris, which may damage or blind nearby spacecraft. Artemis signatories are expected to notify and coordinate with the creators of safety zones before conducting space activities within these areas. However, some experts have suggested safety zones may constitute “national appropriation” in violation of Article II of the OST. But it can be noted that international maritime law does provide precedent for safety zones, albeit in a different domain.</p> +<p>As states race to integrate CCAs into their air forces, a question remains: How will militaries command and control new formations?</p> -<p>Russia has criticized various elements of the Artemis Accords for being U.S.-centric. China has said the accords reinforce competition rather than cooperation in space. Neither nation has signed the Artemis Accords nor signaled an interest in supporting the Artemis program. Conversely, there is no indication that the United States would collaborate with China or Russia on the ILRS. China suggested during a presentation at the International Astronautical Congress in 2023 that the ILRS framework would eventually include space sustainability principles akin to the Artemis Accords.</p> +<p>Command is a continuous function that consists of key subtasks: collecting and distinguishing relevant information, translating it into estimates to determine objectives and courses of action, converting these plans into orders, and monitoring progress through assessments. Command takes the form of a system that links together a focal point – the commander – with a staff that aligns its intent with the commander’s key decisions. In Marine Corps doctrine, command encompasses decisionmaking as well as the directing of others; control concerns feedback loops and the management of a “continuous flow of information about [an] unfolding situation.” As a result, the C2 architecture for CCAs must factor in who directs the platforms and how feedback loops are analyzed in a fluid environment with shifting objectives.</p> -<h3 id="non-space-international-frameworks-with-analogues-to-space-governance">NON-SPACE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS WITH ANALOGUES TO SPACE GOVERNANCE</h3> +<p>A recurring theme in the evolution of airpower has been the usage of C2 to concentrate and sequence tactical air effects in time and space while also allowing the airman in the cockpit flexibility in emerging situations. In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, a historical study by James Winnefeld and Dana Johnson defined C2 as “unity of effort.” The study analyzed a joint air operation between the Army Air Corps, Marines, and Navy to thwart Japan’s invasion of Midway. While strategically successful, the Battle of Midway revealed a lack of operational unity of effort between land-based and sea-based air campaigns. This absence of coordination persisted through the Korean War, where service rivalries hindered joint air operations.</p> -<p>There are several domains on Earth that have similar jurisdictional characteristics as space, including Antarctica, the Arctic, the high seas, and international airspace. Each of these areas possesses its own established international governance mechanisms, which can provide lessons for future space governance frameworks and evolutions of current international space law. This section provides an overview of these non-space agreements and frameworks, and the subsequent section draws parallels to space governance and identifies lessons that could be used to help address associated gaps.</p> +<p>The Battle of Midway had a single commander overseeing all air assets. In Korea, the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy were divided in their command structures. Despite efforts at coordination, joint operations continued to be plagued by interservice rivalries, conflicting doctrines, and poor communication. The Vietnam War further exposed these issues, demonstrating the need for significant changes to achieve true unity of effort.</p> -<h4 id="the-law-of-the-sea-treaty">THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY</h4> +<p>The process of managing joint airpower has evolved since World War II, largely due to the Joint Targeting Coordination Board’s efforts to deconflict service perspectives on mission priorities. In the 1970s, the military streamlined the chain of command by giving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) greater authority and by emphasizing the role of combatant commanders (COCOM) in joint operations. This move toward greater coordination was further solidified by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The result was the introduction of a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), as well as the development of the master attack plan (MAP) and air tasking order (ATO), which improved centralized control and coordination of air assets and was used to great effect in Desert Storm.</p> -<p>Signed in 1982, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the “Law of the Sea Treaty,” established the international legal framework for maritime activities and uses of ocean resources. Key provisions of the treaty include granting nations the right to assert sovereignty up to 12 nautical miles from shore, giving all states freedom of navigation and overflight of the high seas, and setting up rules for exploring and exploiting sea-floor resources. Currently, 167 parties and the European Union have ratified the treaty — with the notable exception of the United States, which has cited concerns that treaty provisions on the use of seabed resources were not free-market friendly.</p> +<p>Yet operational unity of effort must also accommodate the fluidity of tactical combat, where the unforeseen can create new and unforgiving realities. When not accompanied by tactical flexibility, centralized C2 can create brittle systems.</p> -<p>Established in 1994 in accordance with UNCLOS provisions, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) authorizes and controls seabed mineral extraction and works to protect the seafloor environment. To justify such regulation, UNCLOS asserts that ocean resources, outside of those under national jurisdiction, are the “common heritage of mankind.” The work and policies of the ISA are governed by an assembly made up by representatives of all parties to UNCLOS, a 36-person council elected by the assembly, and a secretary-general elected by the assembly for a four-year term. To date, it has authorized over 30 seabed mining-exploration contracts. As the ISA has not yet finalized regulations for commercial mining, held up by calls for a global moratorium due to alleged environmental impacts, it has yet to issue any approvals for commercial deep-sea mining projects.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/aQkOFs5.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ Photo: Connecticut State Library Federal Documents, W 2.6:F 45/2</em></p> -<p>At the same time as the original UNCLOS negotiations in the 1980s, the United States enacted the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act to provide a licensing framework for U.S. companies wanting to mine the seafloor. Though the United States has issued licenses for seafloor mining, some experts argue that U.S. companies could face international legal risks should they begin commercial mining without ISA approval.</p> +<p>This dilemma is addressed in the doctrines of multiple services, which emphasize the need to balance centralized control with decentralized execution. Air Force doctrine, for example, dictates the conduct of operations through centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution (CC-DC-DE). In this framework, mission flexibility and combat lethality are maximized through the generation of mission-appropriate sorties, allowing the commander to adapt to circumstances. In Marine Corps antiair warfare, this is referred to as the principle of centralized command and decentralized control.</p> -<h4 id="the-antarctic-treaty-and-antarctic-treaty-system">THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AND ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM</h4> +<p>Both ideas center on the concept of mission command. The core of mission command is a culture of trust and a blueprint for disciplined initiative at all echelons based on the commander’s intent. While the concept dates back to nineteenth-century operational art, mission command entered U.S. military writings formally in 1905. The concept evolved over the years, eventually giving rise to a core idea adapted for airpower in 1962: centralized command and decentralized execution.</p> -<p>Antarctica is the only continent without an indigenous human population. No human is believed to have seen Antarctica or its ice shelf until 1820. Since that first sighting, seven countries have made territorial claims on the continent, with some national claims overlapping with others. The Cold War added another dimension to the geopolitics of Antarctica: though neither the United States nor the Soviet Union made territorial claims, both operated research stations there. Additionally, neither saw Antarctica as having strategic military value, with both nations seeking to prevent the militarization of the continent.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><em>In the chaos of battle, it is essential to decentralize decision authority to the lowest practical level because over centralization slows action and leads to inertia.</em></p> + <h4 id="-fm-100-5-1986">– FM 100-5 (1986)</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Though some claimant nations to territory on Antarctica initially objected, the United States pursued the development of and eventually succeeded in establishing an international treaty that preserved the freedom of scientific research and peaceful use of the continent without adjudicating or deciding on any territorial claims. Convened by the United States in 1958, the Antarctic Conference, which produced the Antarctic Treaty, only included the 12 nations with contemporary scientific equities in Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957 to 1958. Signed in 1959, the Antarctic Treaty serves as the foundation for a system of treaties and agreements that today provide the international governance framework for the continent.</p> +<p>As an approach to command and control, mission command represents both a philosophical tenet and a set of planning and operation processes designed to foster a culture of initiative. For generations, Army and Marine Corps doctrines have grounded the concept in a belief that war is an inherently chaotic contest (Zweikampf) defined by friction, uncertainty, and fluidity. As a result, combatants must balance operational synchronization – the movement of large formations to fight decisive battles in time and space – with tactical adaptations that allow subordinates to anticipate and respond to changing circumstances. Applied to CCAs, this means that networks of autonomous aircraft will have to balance operational effectiveness and tactical efficiency. Mission command will need to be integrated into algorithms to make it possible for pilots to delegate aspects of air-to-air combat to drones and react to feedback from the edge of the battlefield – whether they’re in a ground command center or in an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.</p> -<p>As part of the treaty framework, signatories began meeting regularly to discuss issues related to Antarctica, such as environmental protection and cooperation on research. Officially called the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) process, these meetings now occur each year, and participants make decisions by consensus. These annual meetings have provided opportunities for treaty Consultative Parties to develop specific, legally binding agreements, with greater precision than the original treaty on rules covering specific activities in Antarctica. The ATCM process has also been a mechanism for treaty parties to update and address contemporary issues that were not foreseen at the time the treaty was drafted.</p> +<p>While airmen are highly capable of decentralized execution, the modern joint air tasking cycle also codifies principles of centralized command and operational synchronization. This six-stage cycle matches air capabilities and effects against larger, operational objectives – as defined by the Joint Force Commander – and results in an ATO that shape the joint air operations.</p> -<p>Currently, key legally binding documents of the Antarctic Treaty System include the original 1959 treaty, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, and the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. These documents and resolutions, decisions, recommendations, and other measures adopted by past ATCMs cover many topics, such as peaceful use and scientific collaboration, environmental protections, preservation of historic sites, management of tourism, designation and management of protected areas, mapping, safety, information sharing, logistical cooperation, and weather and meteorological cooperation.</p> +<p>The first stage of the joint air tasking cycle is “Objectives, Effects and Guidance,” which provides guidance on objectives and desired effects. The final product for this stage is the air apportionment recommendation, which is provided by the JFACC in consultation with other component commanders.</p> -<p>Since 1998, commercial mining in Antarctica has been prohibited. Prior to this ban, several treaty parties had been working on a treaty addendum that would have regulated future resource extraction. Growing concerns about impacts of human activities to Earth, not just in Antarctica but around the world, and the rise of the environmental movement in the 1980s led to the abandonment of the addendum. At that time, Australia and France initiated efforts to oppose plans to allow future mining. Even today, there is limited interest in Antarctic mining, as experts question its business viability.</p> +<p>The next stage, “Target Development,” matches targets to air taskings and aimpoints, which are fed to the Targeting Effects Team (TET). The TET then reviews, nominates, and prioritizes targets, ensuring that each attack meets JFC guidance. The product of this effort, when approved by the JFC, is the joint integrated prioritized targeting list.</p> -<h4 id="the-international-regulations-for-preventing-collisions-at-sea">THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR PREVENTING COLLISIONS AT SEA</h4> +<p>Next, in the “Weaponeering and Allocation” stage, the Joint Air Operations Center quantifies the expected results of employing all available means in every domain against prioritized targets. The final targets are then delivered to the master air attack plan team. Following the JFC’s air apportionment decision, a final number of sorties by weapon system is developed for each objective and task.</p> -<p>Until the 1860s, most maritime nations developed and used their own navigation rules and practices. In 1863, the United Kingdom and France agreed on a set of maritime rules that were eventually adopted by 30 countries, including the United States. A well-known guide to these regulations, published in 1867 by British official Thomas Gray, was called The Rule of the Road, the progenitor of all future references to such guidelines as “rules of the road.” To expand on these regulations, the United States convened the first International Maritime Conference in 1889 to discuss additional measures needed to prevent maritime collisions. Throughout the next 70 years, a regular cadence of major international maritime conferences updated and revised these rules.</p> +<p>The fourth stage is “ATO Production and Dissemination,” in which the ATO production team constructs, publishes, and disseminates the daily ATO and Special Instructions to appropriate forces. The ATO includes information such as the order of battle, target worksheets, and component requirements.</p> -<p>Then in 1972, all contemporary international navigation and maritime rules were replaced entirely by the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, also known as Collision Regulations (COLREGs), which specify the rules of the road for ships at sea with the aim of preventing accidents. The COLREGs are published and maintained by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a UN agency established in 1948 that focuses on ensuring safety at sea. Nations become a member of the IMO by ratifying the Convention on the International Maritime Organization, whereupon they are required to enact the COLREGs as national law within their own jurisdictions.</p> +<p>In the fifth stage, “Execution Planning and Force Execution,” the JFACC directs air capabilities and forces in joint air operations. During this stage, the JFACC has the ability to redirect air assets and coordinate with component commanders.</p> -<h4 id="the-arctic-council">THE ARCTIC COUNCIL</h4> +<p>During the final stage, “Assessment,” a continuous process measures the overall effectiveness of joint force capabilities at both the tactical and operational levels. Assessment is not the end of the cycle, but rather a continuous activity that provides input at all the stages of the cycle.</p> -<p>The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum established in 1996 to promote cooperation, coordination, and engagement between countries with territory in the Arctic. Only nations with Arctic territory — Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States — are members of the council, though representatives of Indigenous peoples can join as permanent participants. Additionally, non-Arctic nations can be admitted as observers. Senior officials representing each member nation convene every six months to discuss past accomplishments and future work of the council, as well as issue a nonbinding declaration. Every two years, the council holds ministerial-level meetings.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/T7rul0r.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Contingency and Crisis Execution: The Tasking Cycle.</strong> Note: JOPP is Joint Operational Planning Process and JOPPA is Joint Operational Planning Process for Air. Source: <a href="https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-0/3-0-D29-I-OPS-The-Tasking-Cycle.pdf">“Contingency and Crisis Execution: Tasking Cycle,” Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-0: Operations and Planning, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, November 4, 2016</a>.</em></p> -<p>The council itself was not established by a formal international treaty but rather by the Ottawa Declaration, signed by representatives of the future council’s membership. Its mandate covers a wide range of topics, including sustainable development of the Arctic region and environmental protection, but specifically excludes one topic: military security.</p> +<p>Even this carefully choreographed process, however, cannot match the infinite range of possibilities that emerge in war. Air operations require decentralized execution as pilots respond to the friction, uncertainty, and fluidity of war. The loadout of CCAs will be determined by the air tasking cycle – with airmen loading different payloads and sensor arrays – but their employment may have to adjust to sudden changes at both operational and tactical levels.</p> -<p>There is no budget or secretariat for the Arctic Council. The council is only a forum and lacks the ability to implement or enforce any of the guidelines or recommendations approved during council meetings. However, council members negotiated and concluded the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement in 2011, which addresses responsibilities and coordination for international search and rescue activities in the region.</p> +<p>At the operational level, situations may emerge that demand a sudden realignment of missions, leading the CAOG commander to override the ATO to respond to a new threat. For example, imagine a squadron of F-35s operating with CCAs to conduct a fight sweep to seek out and destroy enemy aircraft. The command post receives indications that a squadron of enemy fifth-generation fighters are moving to attack a high-value air asset (HVAA) and are likely to overwhelm friendly fighters. The HVAA is hundreds of miles from the intended fighter sweep. To the extent that CCAs are capable of remote-split operations separate from the flight leader, they are operationally effective and the CCAs can be redirected to support HVAA protection, leaving the F-35s to continue the sweep – albeit at greater risk than originally planned.</p> -<h4 id="the-convention-on-international-civil-aviation">THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION</h4> +<p>At the tactical level, CCAs must support delegations by pilots already overwhelmed by the massive amount of information generated by modern aircraft. This delegation should be an extension of commanders’ intents and allow the CCAs to perform with initiative within the limits of the mission. CCAs need to be able to respond to changing tactical situations noticed either by the pilot or by sensors feeding algorithms supporting autonomous systems. This kind of feedback loop is the essence of decentralized execution; if CCAs lack it, they are likely to render missions brittle, causing overwhelmed pilots to have to manage more information – in their cockpit and on devices controlling CCAs – than the human mind can process, especially amid physical stress and fear. According to the Mike Tyson retelling of Moltke and Eisenhower quotes, “everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face.” Seeing, dodging, or taking the blow to set up a counterstrike are the essence of being tactically responsive.</p> -<p>The Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in 1944, established rules for airspace, aircraft registration, safety and security, personnel licensing, aircraft communications, customs and duties, and environmental protections and addressed national jurisdictional questions related to air travel. It recognizes states’ sovereignty over the airspace directly above their territory, which includes land areas and territorial waters. Parties to the convention must enact national laws that enforce convention rules and regulations and provide aircraft navigation services in their sovereign territories. Convention rules apply in the airspace above international waters, known as “high-seas airspace.”</p> +<p>Moreover, CCAs will need to be capable of executing mission command at both operational and tactical levels, with optimal C2s determined by mission type. In some missions, the value of operational effectiveness outweighs the utility of tactical responsiveness. The inverse is also true; other missions require tactical responsiveness to a degree that outweighs the benefits of perfect operational effectiveness. Much of the modern air tasking cycle is built around a C2 architecture that links CCAs to the command center, rather than to the pilot in the cockpit. From the development of objectives, effects, and guidance to target development to master attack planning, the majority of flight planning takes place in command centers, even when orchestrated through nodes like AWACS. Since a command center has a wider perspective than any individual mission leader, nesting C2 for CCAs there ensures that assessments are indeed a continuous activity. Economies of scale afforded by centralized control should not be immediately discounted due to the lure of the fighter pilot.</p> -<p>The convention also set up the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the UN agency charged with coordinating standards and best practices for international air travel regarding topics such as air navigation, navigational infrastructure, flight procedures, cross-border aviation, and air-accident investigations. The ICAO is governed by a council — consisting of 36 members elected from the 193-member nations of the organization — that is responsible for adopting new standards and rules.</p> +<p>Yet in complex missions that require tactical-level delegation, CCAs have the capability to reduce the cognitive burden on pilots, thus extending their reach. This increase in efficiency should translate into superior mission performance. An F-35 accompanied by two CCAs loaded with air-to-air missiles and decoys will likely produce more air-to-air kills than a single aircraft, even if the two have comparable weapons loadouts. Likewise, a group of 10 F-35s and F-15Xs flying alongside 100 CCAs would be even more effective. To the extent that algorithms are an extension of mission command, the pilot is free to see and respond to change based on mission command.</p> -<h3 id="cislunar-governance-and-policy-challenges">CISLUNAR GOVERNANCE AND POLICY CHALLENGES</h3> +<p>The future of air power, as waged through networks of manned and unmanned systems, will depend on tailoring CCA algorithms to the logic of each mission. Unlocking the full potential of CCAs will require wargames, experiments, and studies that explore mission command in various scenarios and new C2 models by mission type. These experiments will need to incorporate new concepts for generating Air Task Forces based on new combat wings optimized for great power competition. Furthermore, the experiments will need to stress-test new task forces employing Agile Combat Employment (ACE), an operational scheme of maneuver, and multidomain pulse operations. In other words, distributed networks of aircraft will have to come together from distributed airfields and synchronize airpower with cyber warfare – and other technical means – to create windows of opportunity. To be operational, these efforts must take into account multiple pulse operations, as well as the ability to generate combat power in and through the air over the course of a campaign. That task will require deeper digital integration and data synthesis – using artificial intelligence and machine learning – from multiple warfighting functions, as well as the imagining of entirely new ATOs that are more joint and dynamic. Software will be as important as hardware in this vision of future airpower.</p> -<p>There are policy, legal, and regulatory questions that impact current activities, as well as the future evolution of human activities, in cislunar space. These cislunar questions are generally the same ones that exist today for all other areas of space, whether in near-Earth orbits or beyond the Moon. Governance questions applicable to cislunar space, therefore, should be addressed as much as possible so that resulting frameworks apply broadly to all regions of space.</p> +<p>The following exploration analyzes hypothetical air campaigns through the lens of the fundamental tradeoff between operational effectiveness and tactical responsiveness. From reflecting on the combined bomber offenses in World War II and air war over Vietnam to John Warden and the Gulf War and the Balkans, the air campaign is the preferred unit of analysis for operational study. While air campaigns tend to involve a mix of missions, the scenarios below will visualize and describe three campaigns that are each oriented around a mission area: counterair operations, interdiction – including both counterland and countersea operations – and close air support.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">These cislunar questions are generally the same ones that exist today for all other areas of space, whether in near-Earth orbits or beyond the Moon.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>This analytical framing is frequently used in Air Force studies. The Battle of Britain, for instance, has been used to study counterair operations; a wide range of cases – from World War II to the wars in Korea and Vietnam – have been used to study the development of close air support and interdiction.</p> -<p>To tackle cislunar governance questions, this report examines broader space governance matters, identifying key unresolved issues that resulted from either gaps in national and international frameworks or technological advancements that were not foreseen when space treaties were negotiated. Today, there are three main deficits in international space governance, which the report authors assert should be addressed to facilitate the safe, sustainable, and secure development of cislunar space. Governments should</p> +<p>Below, a fictional planning scenario is used to analyze three future campaigns: counterair operations, interdiction in littoral environments, and close air support. In each, the adversary is intentionally kept abstract in order to focus the analysis on the C2 character of the mission sets, which are evaluated in terms of operational effectiveness and tactical responsiveness. The adversary is held constant across all three scenarios and assumed to be a peer competitor capable of contesting U.S. power across multiple domains, including air. Other major assumptions include:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>modify and elaborate upon rules regarding permissible activities in space,</p> + <p>The United States is fighting as part of a larger coalition of partners and allies (the norm throughout its history).</p> </li> <li> - <p>further define property rights in space and use of space resources, and</p> + <p>The conflict involves nuclear powers but has not crossed the threshold where either side uses nuclear weapons in pursuit of strategic or operational objectives.</p> </li> <li> - <p>establish rules of the road for human-made objects in space.</p> + <p>While there have been large exchanges in space and cyberspace, all sides retain the ability to support air, ground, and maritime operations with space and cyber capabilities.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>As the Moon is likely the first celestial body other than Earth on which humans might live and work, new space governance rules applying to cislunar space will not only involve spacecraft in space but also probably people and equipment interacting on the lunar surface.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bJKYjsJ.png" alt="image04" /></p> -<p>The OST and three related space agreements — the Rescue and Liability Conventions and Rescue Agreement (not including the Moon Agreement due to its low number of signatories) — that established the foundations for international space law somewhat address these issues. However, there are no consensus definitions or meanings of certain key treaty phrases.</p> +<h3 id="campaign-scenario-20xx">Campaign Scenario: 20XX</h3> -<p>Though there are few similarities between life on Earth and the harsh vacuum of space or surface of the Moon, elements of governance frameworks used to regulate areas on Earth beyond national borders, such as Antarctica and the high seas, should be assessed when considering how to update international space governance frameworks. The non-space governance frameworks described earlier in this report, some of which date to before the founding of the United Nations, have proven durable.</p> +<p>It is 20XX, and the United States finds itself engaged in a regional war as part of a coalition seeking to stop an authoritarian state from illegally annexing the territory of one of its neighbors. After a series of space, cyber, air, and maritime operations over the initial thirty days, there is now a forward line of troops (FLOT), with the United States providing air support to partner ground forces as additional units mobilize. This leads to a series of battles in air, at sea, and on land as each side seeks to gain a position of advantage along the FLOT.</p> -<p>This section attempts to understand the reasons for that durability and discern lessons that can be applied to future space governance. For example, unlike the Antarctic Treaty System or UNCLOS, the OST did not establish a consultative mechanism or process for treaty parties to update space governance rules or address new issues that have arisen due to technological change, increasing commercial activities, and increased military interests in space. The report authors discuss international space governance gaps and describe how non-space international agreements and frameworks have addressed similar concerns and considerations in their respective domains. Though the Moon Agreement is effectively not relevant to international space law, it is discussed as a reference that could help serve as a guide for a new agreement.</p> +<p>In planning the next phase and delineating how best to sequence major operations in pursuit of objectives, the Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) is exploring options for three different air campaigns: (1) counterair, (2) interdiction, and (3) close air support.</p> -<h4 id="permissible-activities-in-space">PERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES IN SPACE</h4> +<p>The counterair campaign would prioritize gaining air superiority to open up a ground or maritime counteroffensive. At present, there is air parity, and each side has yet to roll back the other side’s air defense network or sufficiently attrite the other side’s air force to establish air superiority. The resulting air parity makes it difficult to achieve more than a tactical breakthrough on the ground or to forward-deploy naval surface combatants integrated into CJTF operations. This results in a static FLOT and long lines of communication that burn readiness and risk creating a protracted conflict. The counterair campaign would dedicate all available air assets to establishing air control, if not supremacy, before transitioning to major operations in other domains.</p> -<p>Broadly speaking, activities in cislunar space could include government activities of either a civilian or military character and commercial, private sector activities. The OST and Moon Agreement provide some, albeit broad, direction on permissible uses of space, including cislunar space. The OST calls for the exploration and use of space for the benefit of all nations but does not provide a comprehensive list of permissible activities. However, it does enumerate various non-permissible space activities, such as national appropriation of space and the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in space. Without referencing outer space writ large, the OST says that the Moon and other celestial bodies should only be used for peaceful purposes.</p> +<p>The interdiction campaign would prioritize striking targets across the depth of the littorals to shock the enemy system and create conditions for a localized counterattack. The mission would establish temporary air control to enable air interdiction against both enemy lines of communication and logistical nodes just beyond the FLOT, which are critical to projecting power through littorals. By strangling the enemy and channeling its movement into a series of kill boxes in the joint fires area, the campaign would set conditions for a simultaneous air and ground counteroffensive. This emphasis on simultaneity differentiates the interdiction campaign from the phasing and sequencing of the counterair campaign.</p> -<p>The OST and Moon Agreement language relating to permissible activities drew upon the Antarctic Treaty, which placed similar, but not identical, constraints on what nations could do in Antarctica. Like outer space, Antarctica was reserved for peaceful purposes, with an emphasis on scientific exploration and research. Any activities of a military nature are prohibited. Similarly, the OST prohibits military activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies, but not in outer space.</p> +<p>The close air support campaign would prioritize generating effects on the FLOT to enable a breakthrough. Unlike the interdiction campaign, the priority of air control is along the FLOT and enabling terminal attack control (TAC) based on guidance given by the ground commander to joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC). This campaign would combine type 1, 2, and 3 controls to enable close coordination between coalition ground forces and aircraft. This coordination, and the ability to mass air effects on key ground objectives, sets conditions for an operational envelopment along the FLOT. Like the interdiction campaign, the emphasis is on simultaneity. Unlike the interdiction concept, the CAS campaign would focus on principles of objective and mass, using tightly coupled air and ground effects – including attack helicopters and loitering munitions in the air-ground littoral – to enable a decisive ground maneuver.</p> -<p>Since signing the Antarctic Treaty, signatories have refrained from militarizing the continent, though experts disagree on what constitutes militarization. In contrast, there are military interests in space today. However, it is not clear what military advantages could be obtained specifically in or from cislunar space. Advocates for extending military operations into cislunar space acknowledge that the Moon’s distance precludes it from having any direct and meaningful impact on terrestrial operations but suggest actions from cislunar space could affect space systems nearer to Earth. In particular, these arguments assert that cislunar space is a high ground that can be used for deploying weapons against satellites in lower orbits and conducting space observation and surveillance.</p> +<h4 id="tradeoffs-in-the-counterair-campaign">Tradeoffs in the Counterair Campaign</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">However, it is not clear what military advantages could be obtained specifically in or from cislunar space.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>In the fictional scenario above, the counterair campaign would mix offensive and defensive counterair to establish air superiority. There are historical precedents in multiple World War II cases, in which novel methods were used to bait German fighters as part of the Royal Air Force (RAF) circus offensive that followed the Battle of Britain.</p> -<p>For example, one report expressed concerns that China might use the Moon’s gravity to slingshot hostile spacecraft around the Moon and into position to attack satellites in GEO or other orbits. While technically possible, such technology — if developed and deployed — offers no strategic advantage over the myriad of counterspace weapons that could be launched today. It would also be a much more time-consuming way to deliver a weapon targeting a satellite in GEO than other possible methods. Slingshotting around the Moon to reach GEO takes a lot of time and is designed to save spacecraft fuel — not the kind of maneuvering that would underpin a successful military attack.</p> +<p>In a campaign setting, which involves longer time periods and multiple major operations, planners must focus on attrition rates and how best to pull an adversary into air operations that produce diminishing marginal returns. Every sortie generates losses that exceed the value of the mission. Losses inhibit the enemy’s ability to generate air power, changing how the adversary fights (i.e., assigning aircraft to missions) while reducing the time and space required to achieve air superiority.</p> -<p>One could argue that launching a counterspace weapon from cislunar space toward a satellite in GEO or lower orbits could offer a way to stage a surprise attack from an unexpected direction. While true, this advantage dissipates once it becomes known that such weapons are being deployed and possibly used. Improved cislunar SSA could certainly help provide advance warning of such activities, but since the vast majority of expected future cislunar missions are civilian, these SSA improvements should be the responsibility of civilian and commercial operators. However, military users could acquire cislunar SSA data from these sources, like they acquire other commercial space services like satellite communications.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jM1kOEM.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>A Spitfire Mark VB from the United Kingdom Royal Air Force in 1940.</strong> Photo: G. Woodbine/Second World War Official Collection/Imperial War Museums.</em></p> -<p>Another reason given by proponents of conducting military activities in cislunar space is that it affords an ideal vantage to conduct space observation and surveillance and to assess counterspace operations at lower orbits. In reality, a system placed on the Moon or in halo orbits associated with the Earth–Moon L1 and L2 points could not provide continuous, persistent surveillance of any point on Earth or in lower Earth orbits. Earth itself would block cislunar observation platforms from having a persistent view of activities in near-Earth orbits.</p> +<p>This notional counterair campaign would almost certainly rely on a mix of SEAD and fighter sweeps to establish air superiority. Modern radars, especially when connected to space effects, enable situational awareness and tracking. Establishing air superiority first requires blinding the enemy and destroying its ability to track and target friendly aircraft. Second, if enemy planes cannot be destroyed on the ground – the best place to kill an aircraft – they must be engaged in a series of operations designed to change the balance of air power.</p> -<p>Additionally, the Moon rotates around Earth about every 28 days, so it is not a static observation point relative to Earth. A system in cislunar space would lose track of areas for long periods of time. Plus, a spacecraft near the Moon is 10 times further from Earth (nearly 400,000 kilometers) than a spacecraft in GEO (about 36,000 kilometers). A network of sensors located on Earth, however, can provide persistent monitoring of activities in GEO, as is done today.</p> +<p>These missions, even with intelligence over-match, would likely require CCAs that are more tactically responsive. Air-to-air combat and the adjustment to unforeseen aspects of an adversary’s air defenses – as seen in the evolution of SEAD missions since Vietnam – require the ability to recognize and respond to changes in the tactical environment. Feedback loops create a fluid environment prone to sudden changes.</p> -<p>Scientists in China have proposed another cislunar use for space monitoring, publishing a paper on using a lunar gravity assist for placement into retrograde GEO, along the same plane on the same plane as Earth’s equator. Such an orbit, which would run in the opposite direction of standard drift, would allow a spacecraft to get a view of the entire GEO belt every 12 hours but pose significant collision risks to other satellites in GEO, with one expert noting it would be akin to driving a car the wrong way on a highway. Additionally, a retrograde GEO system would not be able to examine any one spacecraft in detail due to the high relative velocities between such a monitoring system and other satellites in GEO drift orbits. There is also no clear benefit to using such a monitoring satellite rather than existing SSA sensors placed on Earth.</p> +<p>Mission command for CCAs in these situations takes the form of pilots directly adjusting mission parameters in response to a changing environment. This would likely require building in preconstructed mission sets that the pilot can rapidly assign as the threat environment changes. For example, consider a fighter sweep in which two F-35s are each paired with four CCAs, mixing electronic countermeasures and air-to-air weapons. The flight leader receives confirmation that there are more enemy aircraft than originally anticipated and relative to the payload. She could dynamically retask the CCAs to jam and harass the enemy combat air patrol while the manned aircraft pull back to regroup and assess the situation with an AWACS and/or the command center (e.g., CAOG). Decentralized execution takes the form of an ability to assign missions to networked CCAs in order to free up time and space for pilots to adjust to new information.</p> -<p>The larger question is: Under what circumstances should utilizing cislunar space for observation or collecting SSA data be characterized as a military use? Certainly, a military-owned and -operated satellite presumes a military use. But, as noted earlier in this section, improvements to cislunar SSA systems should be the focus of civilian and commercial operators. Civil-government or commercial cislunar capabilities that observe and characterize space activities, including a retrograde GEO system, could collect the same information and data as military-operated systems but would not carry the same militarization concerns. However, there is no reason military users should not have access to SSA data available from civilian and commercial sources.</p> +<p>Alternatively, DCA would focus more on a mix of active and passive defenses. In modern war, these cut across multiple domains and include everything from space-based sensors to AEGIS destroyers and patriot missile sites. Aircraft play a role that includes shooting down cruise and loitering munitions – as seen both in the April 2024 defense of Israel from an Iranian strike and in the skies of Ukraine – but that role tends to be supporting as opposed to supported. This dynamic puts a premium on operational effectiveness and on empowering an air defense commander to integrate air and missile defense to include a larger number of land platforms (e.g., surface-to-air missiles, radars, directed energy, high-powered microwave) and sea platforms (e.g., naval cruisers, destroyers, and frigates) alongside airborne networks of manned and unmanned aircraft. Mission command applies here, but managing air and missile threats across large areas requires more centralized control measures, whether in an AWAC or a ground-based command center.</p> -<p>Ultimately, the raison d’être for extending military forces into cislunar space seems tied more to national honor and fear that China might do something there first than to a real strategic military goal. If this is true, the situation looks no different than Antarctica in the 1950s. To save time and military resources that could best be used elsewhere, the two superpowers of that day wisely made the decision to keep military interests and the Cold War out of Antarctica.</p> +<h4 id="tradeoffs-in-the-interdiction-campaign">Tradeoffs in the Interdiction Campaign</h4> -<p>In addition to questions about military uses of cislunar space, this report examines commercial, private sector uses. Like the Antarctic Treaty, the OST is silent on commercial, for-profit activities in cislunar or any part of space. But the OST does create room for broadly nongovernmental space activities by including a clause requiring nations to authorize and continuously supervise all national space activities by governmental and nongovernmental entities. This language satisfied both the Soviet Union, which sought to limit space to government-only missions, and the United States, which sought to permit commercial space developments.</p> +<p>In the fictional planning scenario above, the interdiction campaign would combine both counterland and countersea air operations focused on denying the enemy power projection in the seams of the air, sea, and ground. In U.S. joint doctrine, this littoral environment includes “those land areas (and their adjacent sea and associated air space) that are predominantly susceptible to engagement and influence from the sea and may reach far inland.” Modern battle networks and long-range precision fires extend the segments of air, ground, and sea that constitute the site of modern littoral warfare.</p> -<p>In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was arguably little commercial appetite for space beyond nascent plans for commercial communications satellites — and certainly no business plans built around the extraction of space resources from the Moon, asteroids, or other space objects.</p> +<p>The most likely targets of the interdiction campaign would be logistics nodes and lines of communication. The theory of victory is that reducing the enemy’s supplies reduces its combat power, creating a more favorable correlation of forces for offensive action and/or limiting the ability of the enemy to project power. This logic is evident across multiple, historical interdiction campaigns, which carry a different theory of victory than strategic attack and which are built around decisive blows against enemy C2.</p> -<p>Space activity is now dominated by the private sector, though a significant percentage of commercial space activities are financed by governments. However, few of these current private sector space activities are related to the extraction or use of space resources.</p> +<p>During the Italian campaign, allied planners designed Operation Strangle as an independent air interdiction campaign targeting German supply lines, intended to render the planned ground offensive (Operation Diadem) unnecessary. The effort had mixed results and led to an enduring debate about whether to target enemy supplies or mobility. This debate shaped air interdiction campaigns in Korea. For example, the Saturate interdiction campaign targeted North Korean rail lines to reduce supply, focusing on a narrow corridor on a continuous basis.</p> -<p>Once it is possible to realize economic gains from resource extraction (or some other activity) on the Moon or other celestial bodies, nations will want a way to claim and protect their shares, as well as their national entities involved in those activities. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) established by the UNCLOS is an attempt to internationally regulate seabed mining, partly to avoid a rush to grab seafloor territory and bypass any motivations for a country to use armed force to assert national rights to ocean resources. The question, discussed in the next section, is whether a similar arrangement could work for space.</p> +<p>The effects are not limited to counterland operations. Maritime interdiction played a key role in World War II. The RAF Coastal Command, for instance, was pivotal to the Battle of the Atlantic, in sub-hunting missions in the Bay of Biscay, and in attacks on marine lines of communication connecting Germany to key industrial materials in Scandinavia. Of note, many of these efforts benefitted from work by technical experts who integrated new technologies, including air-to-surface radar and applied operations research – the use of formal mathematical models and statistics to analyze patterns and trends in armed combat. The Luftwaffe replicated this maritime interdiction capability through its Fliegerführer Atlantik.</p> -<h4 id="property-rights-in-space-and-use-of-space-resources">PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SPACE AND USE OF SPACE RESOURCES</h4> +<p>In Vietnam, Operation Rolling Thunder (1965–1968) was largely an air interdiction campaign, with over 90 percent of the targets consisting of transportation nodes. In addition to destroying combat potential by targeting supplies and lines of communication, interdiction can channel the enemy’s movements, attriting its forces. Of Desert Storm’s 40,000 strike sorties, roughly 38,000 were air interdiction. Some of these missions included the attack on the infamous “Highway of Death,” where coalition aircraft destroyed Iraqi forces retreating from Kuwait into Iraq.</p> -<p>Property rights stipulate how a resource can be owned and used and have existed in some form since ancient times. Today, property rights are closely tied to national sovereignty, determined by national law, and provided by the nation-state to entities under its jurisdiction. The one notable instance in which property rights originate from an authority other than the nation-state is the bottom of the ocean, which is defined by UNCLOS as the “common heritage of mankind.” In this case, property rights to the seabed and ocean floor, including to resources within those areas, are shared by all nations and people. According to this principle, no nation or entity can unilaterally claim or distribute those resources. Only the ISA, as established by UNCLOS, has that right.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/coMD2bv.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>The “Highway of Death,” the result of U.S. forces bombing retreating Iraqi forces, Kuwait, 1991.</strong> Photo: Photo 12/Universal Images Group via Getty Images.</em></p> -<p>The use of resources in any domain is closely tied to property rights, namely that the decision to use a resource is predicated on the ability of that entity to first assert ownership of it. In space, property rights and national sovereignty are somewhat constrained by the OST. Specifically, Article II of the OST states that space, “including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” As already noted, legal scholars disagree on the meaning of “national appropriation,” with some arguing it prohibits any property claims while others assert it allows for private appropriations of space resources.</p> +<p>Interdiction requires operational-level coordination and careful target selection. These missions naturally lend themselves to a C2 architecture that executes mission command through a command center. CCAs could become part of a larger joint fires scheme for interdicting lines of communication; they could carry a mix of electronic attack payloads and air-ground (or air-sea) munitions, which work alongside long-range strike assets currently fielded by the Marine Littoral Regiment and the Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force.</p> -<p>The OST does not provide clear direction on how national laws and regulations apply to space, but it does tacitly permit nations to exercise a degree of sovereignty in authorizing and continuously supervising their national space activities. Since the OST did not establish consultative bodies that regularly meet to discuss treaty implementation issues, like UNCLOS did with the ISA and the Antarctic Treaty System with its consultative meetings, there has not been an easy way to clarify this ambiguity.</p> +<p>In addition, CCAs could act as escorts for long-range strike munitions targeting naval logistics vessels and amphibious shipping, protecting the missiles from being shot down by enemy air patrols. Consider an MDTF Typhon battery and an AEGIS Destroyer firing a salvo of Tomahawk missiles at a key target. Through joint fires coordination, the CAOG could task on-call CCAs to carry a mix of payloads to support the mission, freeing up human pilots for other missions. While the same salvo could be supported by a manned-unmanned team, the theater-level fires synchronization makes it more aligned with C2 oriented toward operational effectiveness.</p> -<p>Experts generally agree that the OST prohibits national claims to territory in space, including territory on a celestial body, such as the Moon or an asteroid. But nations may still want to use these locations for their own national purposes. And the issue is that although outer space is large, there are certain locations, trajectories, or orbits that will have more value than others. There are probably only so many space objects that can safely occupy a given location, trajectory, or orbit at the same time. For orbits, this is sometimes called “orbital carrying capacity.” The Artemis Accords somewhat address this issue by creating safety zones, though the original intention of safety zones was to prevent harmful interference from one nation’s space activity on another nation’s space mission.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ELsBrJb.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Mid-Range Capability Supporting Multidomain Operations.</strong> Source: Typhon briefing slide, Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office presentation, U.S. Army.</em></p> -<p>In cislunar space, many users will probably want to operate around the Earth–Moon Lagrange points, particularly L1 and L2. Though only points in empty space, the Lagrange points are special due to the gravitational balance between the Moon and Earth at these locations. Spacecraft can orbit these points using a Lissajous orbit or halo orbit. Halo orbits associated with the L2 point are particularly useful because they provide a spacecraft a continuous line of sight to Earth and the far side of the Moon. Orbits associated with the L1 point are useful because they provide a spacecraft a continuous line of sight to both Earth and the near side of the Moon.</p> +<p>One exception is strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR). These missions are the interdiction equivalent of a movement to contact. They are flown to detect and target enemy units in a defined geographic area where “potential targets are known or suspected to exist, or where mobile enemy ground units have relocated because of ground fighting.” This uncertainty and fluidity put a premium on tactical responsiveness. A network of manned and unmanned aircraft can – consistent with Joint Interdiction doctrine – cycle “multiple attacking flights through the target area and provid[e] prioritized targeting guidance and enemy air defense updates to maximize the effect of each sortie.” In this case, mission command extends through the cockpit to the CCA for decentralized execution as the flight leader responds to unforeseen changes. For example, an F-15X or F-35 flying alongside 10 CCAs would be able to respond not just to its own sensors but to a larger constellation of joint and interagency capabilities in order to identify and disrupt enemy targets.</p> -<p>In addition to orbits associated with Earth–Moon Lagrange points, space in low lunar orbit (LLO) around the Moon will also be valuable. Only certain inclinations in LLO are stable. Finally, the “peaks of eternal light” — the locations near the lunar poles exposed to the most sunlight each day — will also be valuable because they will be the best locations to build solar power infrastructure.</p> +<p>As in counterair operations, CCAs performing interdiction roles would need preplanned mission profiles to support autonomous execution. Humans will still be in the loop, encoding rules of engagement and strike deconfliction when necessary. At the same time, the entire joint fires doctrine and framework will need to test how new campaign concepts relate to existing doctrine and to the targeting cycle. Again, it is one thing to enable CCAs to fly. It is another to integrate them into planning and staff processes that took decades, if not centuries, to emerge in the military profession. There will need to be new, flatter joint architectures optimized for multidomain effects and dynamic joint targeting cycles.</p> -<p>Due to this legal uncertainty, there is currently no framework for adjudicating competing national claims to valuable locations in cislunar space, such as halo orbits associated with the Earth–Moon L2 Lagrange point or high-value crater-ridge real estate (i.e., peaks of eternal light) on the Moon. There is also no universally agreed-to framework among all spacefaring nations on the legality of exploiting lunar resources such as ice and minerals. To date, nations have extracted small amounts of material from the lunar surface for analysis, sometimes bringing those samples back to Earth. But the salient question is how to address space resource use at scale, potentially for commercial gain. There is no space equivalent to the ISA for internationally licensing and regulating resource extraction (though the Moon Agreement would have established such a mechanism). This ambiguity creates significant uncertainty for legal protections for space activities and may hinder private sector space investments.</p> +<h4 id="tradeoffs-in-the-close-air-support-campaign">Tradeoffs in the Close Air Support Campaign</h4> -<p>Most nations, including the United States, did not support the approach taken by the Moon Agreement on space resources. The United States criticized UNCLOS and the Moon Agreement for designating a region as the “common heritage of all mankind” as counter to free market principles. This language was a main reason the United States decided not to ratify UNCLOS. Opponents of the Moon Treaty also expressed concerns that one of the goals of the agreement’s proposed regulatory regime would be equitable sharing of benefits from lunar resources, as they worried this approach could disadvantage private sector initiatives. This precedent suggests that a workable international framework for distributing space resources should not mirror such an approach.</p> +<p>In the fictional planning scenario above, focusing air power at the FLOT would require deep air-ground integration. In the chaos of combat, changing planned missions to take advantage of emerging ground conditions also requires a great degree of flexibility. This defining requirement puts the C2 architecture squarely in the tactical responsiveness camp, albeit with a twist. The JTAC on the ground becomes a kind of cockpit.</p> -<p>To address the ambiguity of the OST language, the United States asserts through the Artemis Accords that the extraction and utilization of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation and can be accomplished in compliance with the OST. By signing the Artemis Accords, many other nations have supported this interpretation. But there is no international consensus on the term “space resource,” which does not appear in the OST text. As noted earlier, COPUOS has established a special working group to discuss the legal uncertainties around the term.</p> +<p>Procedures for CAS have evolved since World War II. Following the fall of France, the Wann/Woodall Report recommended creating a distinct communication network to connect ground radios to aircraft under special circumstances. This concept laid the foundation for the emergence of CAS C2 and the Tactical Air Force task organization used in experiments in North Africa (e.g., the Desert Air Force). Failures during the 1942 Dieppe Raid (Operation Jubilee) further showed the need for new C2 constructs that integrated tactical air and army formations. Close air support concepts continued to evolve between 1943 and 1945 in campaigns in Italy and Northwest Europe. By the Normandy Campaign, air-ground integration procedures had matured to differentiate between indirect and direct support, setting the foundation for modern CAS. These procedures played a critical role in the Battle of the Falaise Pocket, to which RAF hurricanes made essential contributions.</p> -<p>As another reference, the Antarctic Treaty System currently bans commercial resource extraction from Antarctica, though there was a failed attempt in the 1980s to add a new agreement establishing a mineral extraction regime. But the Antarctic Treaty never claimed that Antarctica was the common heritage of humankind. Spectrum is another finite resource, albeit somewhat different from seabed minerals or Antarctic oil deposits. To optimize the use of spectrum, the ITU facilitates international coordination — but does not license spectrum, a role performed by national regulators.</p> +<p>This iterated approach to developing deeper air-ground integration continued across multiple conflicts in the late twentieth century. Each major war, according to historian I.B. Holley Jr., saw the military profession relearn the importance of air-ground teamwork. Whether in Korea or Vietnam – or in Israel’s experience across multiple conflicts – practitioners had to adapt air-ground communications, liaison relationships, and procedures to new technologies and air defense schemes. In Holley Jr.’s view, analyzing this history and learning the lessons of past air campaigns is a requirement for updating future CAS doctrine.</p> -<p>Ultimately, though the United States has made clear it has no intention of claiming territory in space, whether on the Moon or anywhere else, its position on the use of space resources and concepts like safety zones could be disingenuously used by China and Russia to grab territory, claiming they were only following U.S. precedent. Opening this door has the potential to create a rush to claim resources, which effectively means claims on associated lunar real estate by designating safety zones. This is exactly what the OST aimed to prevent, as well as what the Antarctic Treaty, the UNCLOS through the ISA, and the ITU sought to avoid in their own domains.</p> +<p>CCAs offer a new opportunity to refine close air support concepts and doctrine in a manner that reflects deeper service integration than in previous wars. In other words, CCA design features and USAF doctrine should integrate with Army, Navy, and Marine Corps concepts, leading to potential change in joint doctrine. If CCAs are built to only perform counterair missions, they miss an opportunity to realize their full potential.</p> -<h4 id="space-rules-of-the-road">SPACE RULES OF THE ROAD</h4> +<p>This potential could see the emergence of new procedures in which JTACs on the ground take control of CCAs to conduct CAS and to deconflict airspace, thus maximizing joint effects against key targets. In the aforementioned fictional scenario, consider an enemy force attempting to break out of a beach landing site and seize an airport. This breakout would likely involve a concentration of artillery and air defense moved forward to support ground formations, with air-launched effects and loitering munitions serving as an advanced guard. Containing the breakthrough would require forward JTACs coordinating CAS and other joint fire support to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or delay advancing enemy columns in support of the ground commander’s defensive plan. The fog, friction, and chaos of the ground battle undermine operational effectiveness and put a premium on tactical responsiveness. In a major ground campaign, operational art for joint fires is about logistics and building a C5ISR-T network able to support dynamic targeting and operational reach.</p> -<p>The main reason to develop rules of the road for space, including cislunar space, is to prevent collisions between space objects. In the sea domain, this was the same goal that drove the development and introduction of the COLREGs designed to prevent collisions of ships. There is no internationally agreed-to set of rules or regulations on spacecraft behaviors or collision avoidance, though some nongovernmental organizations — such as the Space Safety Coalition, which has international participation — have put forward guidelines for space behaviors.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qhShwI6.png" alt="image08" /></p> -<p>The only reference to space behaviors is contained in Article IX of the OST. This section stipulates that treaty parties must conduct their space activities “with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the treaty” and should consult with each other in cases where one nation’s activities could “cause potentially harmful interference” to another’s. As with other terms used in the OST, there is no definition of “due regard” or “harmful interference” in the text and no treaty-specific mechanism or venue to provide the needed clarifications.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion-exercises-wargames-and-doctrine">Conclusion: Exercises, Wargames, and Doctrine</h3> -<p>Outside the United Nations, the United States has tried to make progress on space safety through the Artemis Accords. Helpfully, the Artemis Accords establish a “safety zone” concept — originally envisioned by the Hague Space Resources Working Group Building Blocks — intended to prevent harmful interference between national space activities. However, the Artemis Accords do not create new obligations for parties to the OST, which already requires signatories to coordinate when they expect “harmful interference” — a term that remains undefined in either treaty.</p> +<p>Looking across the three fictional planning scenarios provides an insight into the refinement of C2 requirements for CCAs.</p> -<p>The long-term sustainability guidelines developed by COPUOS could help shape future efforts to develop COLREG-like rules for space, but the guidelines themselves lack the required specificity to serve as rules of the road for space operations. The ATLAC recently established by COPUOS also could develop the foundation for future rules of the road for lunar space activities.</p> +<p>This will require testing different cockpit C2 interfaces in dynamic settings like Red Flag Exercises, along with the introduction of enhanced simulation capabilities in the USAF’s new command wings. Replicating the stress of counterair, SCAR and CAS missions will be the only way to gauge the optimal cockpit C2 structure for connecting the best of the human pilot with the functionality of the CCA.</p> -<h3 id="cislunar-operational-and-infrastructure-challenges">CISLUNAR OPERATIONAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGES</h3> +<p>There is also a need to develop new experiments that test the current planning and air tasking cycle, ideally through wargames that inform new concept development and doctrine for tasking CCAs through command posts. These wargames should parallel ongoing experiments like the Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE) and Project Convergence. The more services and coalition partners involved in stress-testing the current approach to planning and coordinating the delivery of joint effects, the better the insights will be. These experiments offer a valuable forum to test emerging ideas, from the Joint Warfighting Concept and related priorities to service-level force design and development initiatives. In other words, proper C2 architecture for CCAs has the potential to unlock innovation across the U.S. military. And that innovation will require a mix of exercises, wargames, and even study groups that will act as incubators for developing new concepts and capabilities. In all likelihood, an entirely new planning and tasking process for joint effects could emerge from this experimentation campaign, closing the deterrent gap.</p> -<p>There are several cislunar operational and infrastructure challenges that, if unaddressed, will cause increasingly significant impediments to the safety, sustainability, and efficiency of cislunar operations. Though some of these challenges result from a lack of physical infrastructure and equipment needed to support a sustained crewed and uncrewed lunar presence, others stem from gaps in coordination mechanisms and agreed-to processes for operating in cislunar space. This section outlines several of these challenges, attempting to describe specifically whether the problem stems primarily from inadequate infrastructure or a lack of operator coordination processes.</p> +<p>These experiments will need to stress-test the ability of new software architectures to connect networks and evaluate data streams from disparate sources. Consistent with prior recommendations, these efforts should also include options for democratizing and digitizing C2 to allow for the rapid upload and transfer of data packets from a wide mix of civilian and military sensor networks. Again, there is as much art as there is science in the development of these mosaic-like systems, and in the balancing of tactical responsiveness and operational effectiveness.</p> -<h4 id="space-situational-awareness">SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS</h4> +<p>The modern American way of war is defined as much by mission command as by massing effects. Because modern combat takes place along complex battle networks, centralized command and decentralized execution must work in and through algorithms. The challenge of twenty-first century operational art, therefore, will be deciding how best to pair human judgment with the precision and speed of machines. As a result, determining the optimal C2 architecture for executing mission command through CCA networks should be a national security priority.</p> -<p>Fundamentally, SSA is knowledge of the current and predicted future locations of objects in space. Objects in space can be detected and tracked using a variety of sensors, such as radar, optical, laser-ranging, and radio-frequency (RF) technologies. Terrestrial radar systems are typically used for detecting and tracking objects in LEO, including operational and non-operational spacecraft and debris fragments. For GEO, terrestrial optical telescopes are usually used for detecting and tracking objects, as radar signals are usually not powerful enough to track objects at such distances. Satellites equipped with optical sensors and cameras can also provide SSA data. Since virtually all operational spacecraft emit RF signals, RF receivers on Earth or other spacecraft can be used to detect and track active spacecraft in all orbits.</p> +<hr /> -<p>In addition to data derived from these sensor systems, many satellites are equipped with GPS receivers, allowing operators to know the precise location of their satellites at any time. Some operators choose to share location information for their satellites with other operators, government entities, or third parties such as the Space Data Association, an international nongovernmenal organization that facilitates operator-to-operator information sharing.</p> +<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., as well as the Petersen Chair of Emerging Technology and a professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting.</p> -<p>All these SSA technologies were designed to track objects in lower Earth orbits, though most could be used for tracking objects in cislunar space. For example, terrestrial optical telescopes and RF sensors could track operational spacecraft. Spacecraft with optical sensors and cameras in cislunar space could likely also be used for cislunar SSA purposes. However, just as it is not feasible to use radar for tracking objects in GEO, power requirements make it difficult to use terrestrial radar systems to track cislunar objects. Laser-ranging systems might be feasible for tracking objects in cislunar space.</p> +<p><strong>Christopher Koeltzow</strong>, USAF Colonel, was 2024 military fellow at CSIS.</p> -<p>An object in GEO can be tracked by an optical telescope or RF receiver at a fixed location on Earth’s surface. Objects in LEO are tracked by ground-based radars that do not maintain positive custody of each tracked object as it orbits Earth. Rather, an object’s position is confirmed when it passes over a radar site. At all other times, its position is predicted based on Keplerian orbital dynamics.</p> +<p><strong>Allen Agnes</strong>, USAF Colonel, was 2024 military fellow at CSIS.</p> -<p>Irrespective of the sensor phenomenology, detecting and tracking objects in cislunar space requires, at a minimum, a network of terrestrial sensors located around the globe. Unlike objects in GEO, whose orbital period is the same as Earth’s rotation, objects in cislunar space, as well as in LEO and medium Earth orbit (MEO), orbit Earth at a rate different from the speed at which Earth revolves on its axis.</p> +<p><strong>Eric Williams</strong>, USMC Colonel, was 2024 military fellow at CSIS.</p>Benjamin Jensen, et al.The future of airpower hinges on the U.S. Air Force’s ability to integrate autonomous drones into manned formations. This analysis explores the trade-offs between cockpit and command center–based control in shaping the next era of combat operations.Operation Days Of Repentance2024-10-28T12:00:00+08:002024-10-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/operation-days-of-repentance<p><em>Israel’s recent strikes on Iran’s military infrastructure signal the vulnerability of Tehran’s air defences and expose the limitations of its regional deterrence strategy.</em></p> -<p>Objects in LEO and MEO orbit Earth at a speed faster than the rotation of Earth on its axis, while objects in cislunar orbit at a slower rate than Earth’s rotation. Terrestrial sensors tracking objects in cislunar space need to hand off and receive custody of tracked objects as cislunar space rotates from and into the sensors’ fields of view. Detecting and tracking objects in cislunar space will require a new approach that differs from the ones used for LEO, MEO, and GEO objects. Additionally, the power requirements for ground-based radar to reach cislunar space would likely rule out its use for detecting and tracking cislunar objects.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Finally, any Earth-based sensor would lose custody of objects in lunar orbit as they transit around the side of the Moon that is always facing away from Earth. Given that the rotational period of an object in stable lunar orbit is as little as two hours, it would be possible to quickly reacquire the position of space objects once they reappear on the Earth-facing side. Keplerian orbital dynamics would apply to stable lunar orbits, so it would be possible to predict the position of objects during transit around the Moon’s far side.</p> +<p>In the early hours of 26 October, Israel announced that it had launched “precise and targeted” strikes on “military targets” in Iran, as part of Operation Days of Repentance, its much-awaited response to the Iranian ballistic missile attack at the start of the month.</p> -<h4 id="space-object-tracking-and-traffic-coordination">SPACE OBJECT TRACKING AND TRAFFIC COORDINATION</h4> +<p>Video from Iran appeared to show air defences active over Tehran. The Israelis have briefed that there were three waves of strikes, apparently involving around 100 aircraft, including drones, all of which returned home safely. Footage being shown on Israeli television shows a mixture of F-15 and F-16 aircraft preparing to launch, though there is speculation that Israeli F-35I were also involved. It does not sound like Israeli ground-launched ballistic missiles were used; the leaked US assessment released online recently suggested that air-launched ballistic missiles were being readied for use by the Israeli Air Force. These are suspected to have been used in the April attack near Esfahan, and their range means they could have been launched from well outside Iranian airspace. At least one journalist has been briefed that Israeli aircraft breached Iranian airspace, a claim that lends weight to the use of F-35Is.</p> -<p>The DoD began tracking and cataloging satellites with the launch of Sputnik in 1957. In the 1960s, it started developing mathematical equations and source code used to predict the positions of satellites in Earth orbit. By the 1970s, the DoD and NASA adopted a standardized model and the two-line element (TLE) set format for space object tracking and position predictions. After the public release of the models, the TLE format became the industry standard for predicting satellite position.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The scale of the strike and (apparent) avoidance of civilian areas makes this look far more precise than the equivalent Iranian attack, as well as justifying it as a defensive measure</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Today, TLE datasets are used for various purposes. In conjunction with operator-to-operator information and maneuver plan sharing, government and private sector satellite operators use TLE data for planning and managing daily satellite operations. Militaries use TLE data to track the satellites and spacecraft of other nations as part of SSA operations. Astronomers and amateur space object trackers on Earth use TLE datasets to plan space observations. Launch operators and government and commercial operators planning on-orbit activities also use TLE data for planning purposes.</p> +<p>It now seems likely that the route used by the Israeli Air Force involved flying through Syrian airspace and launching from over Iraq, although there would have been a risk of giving early warning to Iran if detected by Syrian radar (or Russian radar based in Syria). Recent regional diplomacy by Iran might have resulted in the Gulf states not wanting their airspace to be used by Israeli aircraft. Israeli officials briefing that the waves of strikes included hitting targets in Syria and Iraq could be misdirection, but more likely indicates that this was indeed the route taken, and that radars and threats along the way were suppressed or destroyed to clear a path. Iraq has since complained to the UN about violations of its airspace. The alternative route would have been a very long diversion down the Red Sea and around the Arabian peninsula: this would have required multiple mid-air refuelling operations, although the Israelis have demonstrated this capability recently when striking Houthi targets in Yemen, and have rehearsed it extensively over the years.</p> -<p>Keplerian orbital mechanics, used to model objects in GEO or lower orbits, assume any two objects with mass — for example, Earth and a spacecraft — will impact each other’s orbital position. This is called a “two-body problem.” Unlike objects in these lower orbits, objects in cislunar space are also affected by the mass and gravity of the Moon. This is called a “three-body problem.” This means that cislunar trajectories cannot be effectively approximated or predicted using equations designed for Keplerian orbital mechanics. Object predictions from models used today for objects in GEO or lower orbits would remain accurate for only a very short period because the TLE format and its underlying equations are not suitable for non-Keplerian, three-body-problem conditions.</p> +<h3 id="the-goldilocks-option-what-was-struck">The “Goldilocks Option”: What was Struck?</h3> -<p>Since 2011, NASA has relied on the Multimission Automated Deepspace Conjunction Assessment Process (MADCAP), managed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, to assess the risks of collision for spacecraft orbiting the Moon and Mars. Given the lack of SSA infrastructure beyond GEO, the positions of spacecraft orbiting the Moon and Mars are provided by operators using radiometric tracking involving ground-based antennas. Some scientists are also trying to use very long baseline interferometry (VLBI) to track objects in cislunar space. Both of these techniques require that the object being tracked emit a radio signal, so this method could not be used to track non-operational satellites or inert space debris or fragments.</p> +<p>The Israelis claim to have struck air defences, missile production and “additional aerial capabilities”. There are no current nuclear targets in the areas identified (other than a research facility and reactor in Tehran), nor have we seen suggestions yet that oil refining or production facilities were struck directly. Details now being briefed to US media suggest that air defence systems (Russian-supplied S-300s, including radars) were struck, including those protecting facilities like the Abadan oil refinery and the Bandar Imam Khomeini petrochemical complex. In addition, there are images suggesting that some missile development and drone facilities operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at Khojir and Parchin (in and around Tehran) were also struck, as well as possibly the missile test facility at Shahroud. Parchin also included facilities previously identified as being part of Iran’s research into nuclear weapons development before it was suspended.</p> -<h4 id="positioning-navigation-and-timing">POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING</h4> +<h3 id="impact-and-implications-iran-is-vulnerable">Impact and Implications: Iran is Vulnerable</h3> -<p>Currently, global PNT data from satellites is provided by four different navigation satellite systems: the United States’ GPS, Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, and the European Union’s Galileo. The systems are all located in MEO at altitudes between 19,000 kilometers and 24,000 kilometers. There are also two regional PNT systems: the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (NavIC) and Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS).</p> +<p>This Israeli operation was considerably more extensive than April, but was still a restrained response aimed at emphasising Israel’s conventional military superiority and removing threats in the form of missile production facilities, while not appearing “escalatory”. Striking Tehran makes public the Israeli ability to hit Iran’s capital and defeat its air defences, but the scale of the strike and (apparent) avoidance of civilian areas makes this look far more precise than the equivalent Iranian attack, as well as justifying it as a defensive measure. The picture that is emerging is one of significant damage to Iranian air defences as well as missile launch facilities, both of which would be intended to show the Iranians that they are vulnerable to further strikes if they attempt retaliation. There is some speculation that all of Iran’s S-300 batteries have now been struck and possibly destroyed. These have hardly performed well to date, but if they have been stripped away entirely – leaving Iran with only domestically produced systems – this will increase the sense of vulnerability the regime feels. It is also hardly a resounding success for Russian military exports, especially following similar Ukrainian successes against the S-300).</p> -<p>Since these satellite networks are designed to provide PNT data to terrestrial users, their signals are directed toward Earth and not deep space. Unless PNT signals are received on Earth and redirected into cislunar space or PNT satellite systems are redesigned to transmit into space as well as toward Earth, spacecraft in cislunar space would need some other way to reliably determine their position and establish timing. As described in earlier chapters, the United States, China, and Europe have plans to create lunar PNT infrastructure.</p> +<p>Moreover, the complexity of the operation should not be underestimated. Over 100 aircraft would be a significant proportion of the Israeli Air Force’s combat fleet (estimated at between 270 and 300), which has been operating at a ferocious tempo for over a year, especially during its campaign in Lebanon. This is alongside the deployment of airborne refuelling, surveillance, and command and control capabilities over a round trip claimed to be 1,600 km.</p> -<p>It is worth recalling that the Apollo missions were able to use two different navigation methods on their journeys to the Moon and back. Their main source of navigation data came from radio signals exchanged between the Apollo spacecraft and ground stations on Earth. The position of the Apollo Command Module could be calculated by measuring the Doppler shift of signals from the spacecraft, transmitting and analyzing ranging signals sent to the spacecraft, and using two receivers on Earth to conduct VLBI analysis on Apollo signals. Additionally, the Apollo spacecraft were equipped with inertial guidance systems, which do not require external signals to operate. For Artemis missions, NASA’s Orion capsule uses an inertial guidance system, GPS receivers, star-tracking technology, and an optical camera-based navigation system. Like Apollo, Orion — or any cislunar spacecraft emitting radio signals — can be tracked from Earth using VLBI techniques.</p> +<p>The nature of the operation looks like a win for US leverage, albeit bought with the deployment of THAAD and 100 personnel to Israel. In addition, the restraint on display has probably been met with a sense of relief among Gulf oil producers, as the measured nature of the attack avoided disruptions to regional energy supply chains, which had been a growing concern during the weeks of heightened speculation. They have also avoided being directly implicated in the attacks (and have issued the predictable responses criticising them), while benefitting from Iranian military capabilities being further degraded. Meanwhile, Israel’s use of Syrian and Iraqi airspace comes at little cost, as Iran is unlikely to retaliate against either country, while Israel has been able to reaffirm its dominance of regional air activity.</p> -<p>In addition to the provision of real-time data on position, a spatial reference and associated coordinate system is needed for both cislunar space and the surface of the Moon to precisely measure locations within the given reference framework. A three-dimensional reference system would be needed for cislunar space, while a two-dimensional system would suffice for the lunar surface.</p> +<h3 id="the-iranian-response">The Iranian Response</h3> -<p>Commonly used for objects in Earth orbit, an Earth-fixed coordinate system using x, y, and z measurements from Earth’s center could be used for objects in cislunar space. Alternatively, a Moon-fixed coordinate system could be created using x, y, and z measurements from the center of the Moon. Either a spherical coordinate system using latitude and longitude or a standardized Cartesian coordinate system that models the Moon as a flat plane would work for the Moon’s surface. An example of a Cartesian coordinate system used for Earth is the Universal Transverse Mercator. Currently, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, NASA, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the U.S. Space Force are collaborating on an effort to design a reference system for the Moon.</p> +<p>Iranian media tried to immediately downplay the impact – despite reports of four Iranian military personnel being killed – but the regime is probably still evaluating the attacks, and the Supreme Leader issued an equivocal statement on 27 October. Iranian officials admitted there had been attacks on border radar stations in the provinces of Tehran, Ilam and Khuzestan but claimed that these had been “successfully countered” and that Israel’s long-range, air-launched missiles carried “very light warheads – about one-fifth the size of Iranian ballistic missile warheads”. The Iranian regime appears to be trying to limit public demand for a military retaliation against Israel. But regardless of how well it can hide any damage, this is the largest direct conventional attack on Iranian territory since the Iran–Iraq War (including both fighting with the Iraqis and the US strikes on the Iranian navy under Operation Praying Mantis). This needs to be factored in to understanding the psychological impact, especially if the taboo on direct strikes on Iran that are formally declared appears to have been shattered (the April attack on Esfahan was never formally acknowledged by Israel).</p> -<p>In addition to the difficulties receiving timing data from GPS or other existing PNT systems in cislunar space, time itself behaves differently on the Moon due to the theory of relativity. The motion of the Moon relative to Earth, as well as its lower gravity, means that time actually moves 56 microseconds faster on the Moon than on Earth each day. While this difference may seem unimportant on the surface, precision time measured to nanoseconds is typically needed for navigation. Even if the moon had its own PNT constellation, potentially like what ESA envisioned as part of its Moonlight initiative, there would still be a 56-microsecond discrepancy per day between lunar time and Earth time. In April 2024, as part of the National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy, the White House directed NASA to lead and coordinate with other federal agencies on efforts to establish a lunar time standard.</p> +<h3 id="what-next">What Next?</h3> -<h4 id="debris-and-detritus">DEBRIS AND DETRITUS</h4> +<p>Iranian proxy response options have been limited by the damage done to both Hamas and Hezbollah, while the US has bolstered Israeli air defences with the deployment of additional ballistic missile defences (though the reported arrival of yet another THAAD battery has been disputed). However, beyond this set of direct exchanges, the progress of the fighting in Gaza and Lebanon remains a potential trigger for further confrontation. Iran is reportedly still trying to help Hezbollah rebuild, and there is still the possibility that the Israelis will choose to launch attacks that kill (for example) IRGC Qods Force personnel in Lebanon or Syria; there has been no confirmation of the condition of the head of the Qods Force for several weeks.</p> -<p>Only 12 humans have been to the Moon, but humankind has already left a significant amount of trash on the lunar surface. The current tally includes boosters from over 50 crashed landings, almost 100 bags of human waste, and miscellaneous items such as golf balls, boots, and a feather. In total, it is about 200 tons of trash.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Regardless of how well the regime in Tehran can hide any damage, this is the largest direct conventional attack on Iranian territory since the Iran–Iraq War</code></em></strong></p> -<p>To date, according to experts, there are only a few dozen pieces of human-made space debris in cislunar space. But it may prove difficult to keep debris levels low, as there are no internationally agreed-to, end-of-life disposal guidelines for spacecraft operating in cislunar space and no standard debris-mitigation procedures. Additionally cislunar operators are already facing increased collision risks between the few spacecraft in lunar orbit, heightening the risk that collisions produce debris fragments. A lack of agreed-to, cislunar, operator-to-operator, space-safety, coordination, and data-sharing mechanisms — particularly ones that include China — probably leads to increasing collision risk and debris-fragment creation.</p> +<p>Iran is still caught in a dilemma about how to respond to the stripping away of its deterrent in the form of its regional partners, and harassing attacks by Hezbollah or the Houthis could still provoke a response if they hit a sensitive target or cause high-profile civilian casualties. We still don’t know the extent to which more aggressive elements in the Iranian system might be advising the Supreme Leader, and media reporting and government briefings in Europe and the Middle East continue to highlight Iranian covert influence and assassination planning or operations. Tehran’s latest messaging hints at a pause for recalibration now that Israel’s anticipated retaliation has played out. This is reinforced by statements from the Iranian military, which have affirmed Tehran’s “right to take lawful and legitimate action at an appropriate time”, while also emphasising the need for a “lasting ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon”.</p> -<p>Any debris fragments near the Earth–Moon L 4 and L5 Lagrange points might produce particularly acute risks to cislunar operators in these areas. At these stable equilibria, balanced gravitational forces trap both natural and artificial debris into clouds, posing physical risks to satellites stationed at or around these points. This same problem does not exist at L1, L2, or L3, all of which are unstable equilibria and thus allow debris to dissipate more easily.</p> +<p>Israel’s strikes have exposed Iran’s vulnerabilities, particularly the apparent degradation of its air defence systems. This also underscores the limitations of Tehran’s forward-defence doctrine, which relies on proxies to shield Iran from direct conflict. Given these setbacks, Iran is probably keen to avoid an extended period of direct confrontation with Israel. While Tehran cannot feasibly abandon its support for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas in the near term, it is likely to recalibrate its strategy to reinforce internal stability and safeguard its broader regional interests. Moreover, the debate over the status and role of its nuclear programme will continue to rage, especially around whether or not there is utility in maintaining its threshold status, or whether – given the vast gap in conventional capabilities – further steps might be necessary to try to bolster any deterrent effect.</p> -<h4 id="radiation">RADIATION</h4> +<p>An initial judgement might therefore be that this operation looks to have put a cap on this bout between Israel and Iran, but the underlying points of friction remain: the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme, the scale of the threat to Israel, proxy activity across the region, and the status of Israeli hostages.</p> -<p>Objects in cislunar space are exposed to higher levels of solar radiation (also called “solar energetic particles”) and cosmic radiation (also called “galactic cosmic rays”) than those experienced nearer to Earth, posing a risk to microelectronics and human safety. Unprotected by either an appreciable atmosphere or magnetic field, the lunar surface is battered by intense solar radiation when facing the Sun.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Due to the orbit of the Lunar Gateway around the Moon, it will be positioned in interplanetary space 80 percent of the time. This is a very different environment than near-Earth orbit — the location of every other long-term habitable space station to date, where the main source of radiation is the inner Van Allen belt, produced when cosmic radiation interacts with Earth’s magnetic field. When compared to past stations, the Lunar Gateway will experience notably higher levels and greater intensities of cosmic radiation, which has a higher relative biological effectiveness (i.e., to what extent a dose of radiation affects human tissue) than Van Allen–belt radiation.</p> +<p><strong>Matthew Savill</strong> is the Director of Military Sciences at RUSI, focussing on developments and trends in modern conflict, and the use of force in the 21st Century.</p> -<p>Microelectronics can unexpectedly fail if they are not appropriately designed to withstand the expected levels of radiation in cislunar space. In July 2024, NASA revealed that microelectronics in the Europa Clipper spacecraft probably do not have sufficient radiation hardening to survive the radiation environment around Jupiter; however, NASA later cleared the spacecraft for launch, determining it could withstand the expected radiation. Meanwhile, Firefly’s first CLPS mission, slated for launch in 2024, will carry the RadPC-Lunar payload, a radiation-tolerant computing system built under the LSITP program, to test the architecture’s ability to operate in high-radiation environments.</p> +<p><strong>Burcu Ozcelik</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security within the International Security department at RUSI.</p>Matthew Savill and Dr Burcu OzcelikIsrael’s recent strikes on Iran’s military infrastructure signal the vulnerability of Tehran’s air defences and expose the limitations of its regional deterrence strategy.Japan-U.S. Cybersecurity2024-10-25T12:00:00+08:002024-10-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/japan-us-cybersecurity<p><em>Cybersecurity is the foundation for a robust U.S.-Japan alliance. This report analyzes the cybersecurity policies of both countries and the prospects for future collaboration on critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience.</em></p> -<p>Existing technologies can be used to shield equipment and spacecraft from radiation levels expected on and near the Moon; however, since shielding adds costs and weight, engineers designing lunar systems will need to carefully balance requirements for radiation protection with other considerations impacting overall system requirements.</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="lunar-regolith">LUNAR REGOLITH</h4> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>The solid rock of the Moon’s surface is covered in regolith, a layer of loose, dust-like material composed of small, electrostatically charged particles made by meteor impacts. The average particle size of this lunar dust is about 72 micrometers. For comparison, the width of a human hair is on average about 100 micrometers and the size of a particle of grass pollen is about 25 micrometers. Medium-grain sand is about 500 micrometers in size.</p> +<p>Cybersecurity has long been regarded as a critical part of national security. The sophistication, complexity, and scale of cyberattacks have increased, with state-sponsored actors posing significant threats to nations and international cybercriminal groups conducting massive attacks globally. Meanwhile, the ongoing digitalization of society is expanding cyberspace, leading to the complicated and expanded interdependencies among infrastructures, services, and functions. It is, therefore, becoming more important to ensure the cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructures that people and nations rely on every day. This is considered a national priority in most countries and a global issue where international cooperation is essential.</p> -<p>As there is virtually no air on the moon, wind does not disturb the regolith. Rather, the regolith can be disturbed by electrical force (since it is composed of charged particles), micrometeoroid impacts, and engine landing and launch plumes. Due to the low gravity of the Moon and lack of air to slow down the particles by drag, engine plumes can eject regolith at very high speeds (measured in several kilometers per second) over very large distances. Additionally, these plume–surface interactions are presently poorly understood, making the effects that lunar landings may have on surrounding spacecraft unpredictable. A payload built by NASA flying aboard Firefly’s first CLPS mission, known as Stereo Cameras for Lunar Plume Surface Studies (SCALPSS) 1.1, will image the behavior of the regolith as the lander touches down on the Moon to better understand the surface effects of lunar landings. The collection of in situ data will complement NASA’s existing efforts to model and predict these interactions.</p> +<p>With regard to the Japan-U.S. relationship, the alliance has become more important than ever in light of rising geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, and cyberspace is playing a key role as a foundation for a robust alliance. Both countries are currently at a pivotal point in their national cybersecurity. In the United States, the National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS), released in March 2023, represents a significant shift from previous policies. This includes further government involvement in the private sector, including regulatory approaches, and a shift of the cybersecurity burden away from end users to providers. In Japan, the National Security Strategy (NSS), released in December 2022, puts a strong emphasis on fundamentally enhancing the country’s cybersecurity posture, including the implementation of its own “active cyber defense” (ACD). Furthermore, the recent passage of key legislations enhancing Japan’s security clearance system and economic security will have a positive impact on cybersecurity. Taking these evolutions as an opportunity, it is the right time to reassess the current state of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation and explore ways forward for further collaboration.</p> -<p>Previous operations on the Moon have demonstrated that regolith can harm electrical and mechanical systems. Lunar regolith and dust also pose a risk to humans, causing issues with respiration. Since the early days of the space race, operators of missions to the Moon have had to contend with the impacts of lunar regolith on their missions. In fact, as Apollo 17 commander Gene Cernan observed, “Dust is probably one of our greatest inhibitors to a nominal operation on the Moon.” Lunar activities that disturb and generate plumes of regolith have the potential to cause problems, especially in areas such as the lunar south pole, where there is expected to be a relatively high density of missions from a variety of nations.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Taking these evolutions as an opportunity, it is the right time to reassess the current state of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation and explore ways forward for further collaboration.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EGvAHGC.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Regolith Size.</strong> Source: <a href="https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20220008062/downloads/The%20Challenge%20of%20Lunar%20Dust%20-%20v4.pdf">Kristen John, “The Challenge of Lunar Dust,” NASA, June 8, 2022</a>.</em></p> +<p>There are two key areas for consideration in promoting holistic and effective Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation. First, both countries’ cybersecurity authorities, roles, and responsibilities are highly decentralized, making it challenging to gain a comprehensive overview of the subject. Second, while there are a number of high-level frameworks and agreements for cooperation between both governments, there is still a need for more specific and operational collaboration. To address these issues, this paper begins by providing a comprehensive overview of the cybersecurity postures in both countries, including the basic policies, organizational structures, and functions, with a focus on recent developments. It then reviews Japan-U.S. cooperation to date, discusses the current state of critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience in both countries, and offers recommendations for operationalizing cooperation in this area.</p> -<p>To address concerns about lunar dust, many experts cite the need for greater coordination between lunar operators to prevent harmful interference between space systems, particularly around spacecraft launch and landing sites. The concept of a safety zone enshrined in the Artemis Accords is one such effort to establish a coordination approach to mitigate impacts of lunar dust on lunar operations.</p> +<h3 id="fundamentals-of-cybersecurity-in-the-united-states-and-japan">Fundamentals of Cybersecurity in the United States and Japan</h3> -<p>In addition to policy solutions, experts have raised technical solutions to the hazards posed by dust. To this end, NASA has developed an electrodynamic dust shield, which prevents dust accumulation using electric fields, and plans to send this payload to the Moon in 2024 aboard the Blue Ghost M1 mission. NASA is also exploring the use of different materials to prevent dust accumulation on sensitive surfaces such as solar panels, sensors, and optical systems. To test the “stickiness” of lunar regolith to different objects, NASA is launching its Regolith Adherence Characterization payload aboard Blue Ghost M1 to measure regolith accumulation rates across different test materials.</p> +<p>The United States and Japan have highly decentralized and complicated cybersecurity structures and functions across their governments, which results in overlapping authorities, roles, and responsibilities. While several cybersecurity experts focus on specific areas of cooperation, there is a lack of comprehensive and accurate understanding of the cybersecurity postures in both countries. To pursue effective Japan-U.S. cooperation in specific areas, it would be essential, as a prerequisite, to have a clear understanding of these cybersecurity postures and to be able to map both countries’ policies, structures, functions, initiatives, and so on. The following provides an overview of cybersecurity postures in both countries, focusing on recent developments and future direction.</p> -<h4 id="heat-and-power">HEAT AND POWER</h4> +<h4 id="cybersecurity-in-the-united-states">Cybersecurity in the United States</h4> -<p>Temperatures on the lunar surface range from 250 degrees Fahrenheit (121°C) during the lunar daytime to −208 degrees Fahrenheit (−133°C) at night. There are some places on the Moon where temperatures can drop to −410 degrees Fahrenheit (−246°C) or lower. Microelectronics cannot typically survive these extreme temperature swings, which can make materials brittle and damage connections. To survive the intense cold and heat, electronic equipment on the lunar surface needs to have power to regulate temperature.</p> +<p><em>Basic Strategy and Policy</em></p> -<p>The lunar night itself also creates power-generation and power-storage challenges that will need to be addressed for sustained operations. For example, spacecraft orbiting the Moon and on the lunar surface using solar power must have sufficient battery capacity (or another form of power storage) to operate throughout the lunar night.</p> +<p>Cybersecurity policy in the United States is commonly believed to be relatively bipartisan. The two major political parties have been pursuing a similar direction in general, although they have minor differences. The U.S. government has historically strongly emphasized prioritizing and reinforcing voluntary public-private partnerships (PPPs) to enhance the national cybersecurity posture. However, recent significant cyber incidents, such as those at SolarWinds in 2020 and Colonial Pipeline in 2021, as well as growing geopolitical tensions, have resulted in a major change in this policy. Recognizing cybersecurity as a matter of national security, the Biden administration has made a significant shift in policy to strengthen government involvement in the private sector. This includes strengthening the federal government’s organizational structure by creating high-level government posts responsible for cybersecurity; introducing and updating laws and regulations; and expanding government-led initiatives.</p> -<p>There are several locations on the Moon that, while not always receiving light, are exposed to longer periods of sunlight than most locations on the lunar surface. Referenced earlier in the report, these are called peaks of eternal light, a term whose original meaning referred to theoretical points on any celestial body that are always lit by the Sun. On the Moon, these points are located on the ridges of craters in both the north and south poles.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Recognizing cybersecurity as a matter of national security, the Biden administration has made a significant shift in policy to strengthen government involvement in the private sector.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Placement of solar power generation equipment at these locations would have the advantage of being able to produce electricity more consistently. These locations will undoubtedly become valuable lunar real estate, and infrastructure built by one nation on these ridges could influence the value of nearby positions. Specifically, construction of equipment at one location may impact the ability of other nearby locations to see the Sun, possibly creating shadowing over what had previously been a peak of eternal light. Currently, there is no lunar power grid to transmit electricity from these locations near the poles to other parts of the Moon. Additionally, the accumulation of lunar dust and regolith on the surface of solar panels risks dampening electricity generation. This risk will be particularly pronounced in areas of potentially high landing activity, such as the lunar south pole, due to plume–surface interactions.</p> +<p>The Biden administration’s cybersecurity policies are largely based on the recommendations from the Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC), established under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019. In addition, Executive Order (EO) 14028: Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity, signed in May 2021, has served as the foundation for numerous federal cybersecurity initiatives to date. In March 2023, the NCS was released for the first time in four and a half years. The strategy is composed of five key pillars: (1) “defend critical infrastructure,” (2) “disrupt and dismantle threat actors,” (3) “shape market forces to drive security and resilience,” (4) “invest in a resilient future,” and (5) “forge international partnerships to pursue shared goals.” The NCS acknowledges the continued importance of voluntary PPPs, but also points out that this alone is not sufficient. It highlights the need for baseline requirements for critical infrastructure and the shift of accountability for cybersecurity away from end users to more capable manufacturers and providers. This demonstrates the administration’s clear intention to increase government involvement. The Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) publishes an annual National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan (NCSIP) to ensure transparency and accountability for the implementation of the strategy. This plan outlines the specific implementation items, responsible agency, contributing entities, and deadlines for each strategic objective. The second edition, published in May 2024, is the most recent version of the plan. Federal cybersecurity measures are being implemented in accordance with the plan.</p> -<p>Looking beyond solar power, nuclear power systems offer attractive solutions for the Moon because they are not dependent on the Sun and can provide consistent generation throughout the lunar day and night. In 2022, NASA and the U.S. Department of Energy announced contracts with three companies to begin work designing concepts for nuclear power systems to be placed on the Moon. Additionally, Roscosmos announced in May 2024 that it is considering building a nuclear power plant on the Moon in partnership with China.</p> +<p><em>Organizational Structure</em></p> -<h4 id="communications">COMMUNICATIONS</h4> +<p>Figure 1 shows an overview of the cybersecurity organizational structure centered on the U.S. federal government. ONCD leads and coordinates federal cybersecurity strategy and policy in the White House. The deputy national security advisor for cyber and emerging technology in the National Security Council (NSC) serves as an adviser to the president on national security issues related to cyber. Although the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is not a cybersecurity-focused organization, it issues specific instructions to government agencies to implement policies such as EOs and manages and oversees their processes of implementation, including budgetary aspects.</p> -<p>A spacecraft in orbit around Earth can only communicate when it has line of sight to ground stations, also called “gateways,” that are configured to support communications for that particular spacecraft. Often, a spacecraft is not in continuous communications with Earth, as there are times during its orbit when there are no suitable ground stations within line of sight. In some cases, satellites in orbit share ground station infrastructure, so satellite operators have to preschedule transmission times on specific ground-based antennas.</p> +<p>In the executive departments, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a central role as the operational lead for federal cybersecurity and the national coordinator for critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the Department of Justice (DOJ) serves as a law enforcement entity for cybercrimes. The National Security Agency (NSA) in the Department of Defense (DOD) is tasked with protecting U.S. national security systems, the DOD, and the defense industrial base. It is also one of the key agencies for cyber intelligence. The U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in the DOD is a military wing responsible for cyber operations to defend against and respond to cyberattacks on the nation. The Department of State (DOS) focuses on cyber diplomacy. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the Department of Commerce (DOC) plays a key role in developing cybersecurity resources such as standards, frameworks, guidance, and practices. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) serves as the principal adviser to the president on telecommunications and information policy, including cybersecurity. There are designated Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) that are responsible for managing critical infrastructure sectors. Further details can be found in Chapter 4. Independent regulatory entities, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), are also increasingly involved in the cybersecurity field, leveraging their respective existing authorities.</p> -<p>However, satellites in GEO can maintain continuous communications with one ground station, rather than having to hand off communications between ground stations, because the orbits of those satellites mean they are always stationary relative to a point on Earth’s surface. For this reason, NASA operates a constellation of satellites in GEO that can maintain communications with specific ground stations while serving as a data relay for spacecraft in lower Earth orbits.</p> +<p>The U.S. federal government’s cybersecurity budget request for FY 2025 is $27.5 billion, with $13 billion allocated for civilian agencies and $14.5 billion for the DOD. The number of employees in CISA, the operational core of the federal government, was 3,161 as of August 2023.</p> -<p>Due to the large distances, communications between Earth and spacecraft beyond GEO require larger ground-based antennas with higher gain than those used for communications with spacecraft in near-Earth orbits. This means that NASA equipment and other similar infrastructure designed for communications with spacecraft beyond GEO, such as NASA’s Deep Space Network (DSN), is limited and usually in high demand. Communications are scheduled for short windows dependent not only on the availability of bandwidth, but also on when the ground infrastructure has line of sight to the spacecraft. Like the DSN, China operates a deep-space communications network that could support lunar communications. The European Union also operates a deep-space communications system called European Space Tracking (ESTRACK).</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iH7CUeK.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Cybersecurity Organizational Structure Centered on the U.S. Federal Government.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> -<p>Any increase in cislunar activities will place additional strain on already taxed communications capacity able to support lunar missions. In addition, given that one side of the Moon always faces away from Earth, connectivity for all parts of the Moon will also require a way to relay data from the far side of the Moon. This will necessitate a relay satellite or infrastructure on the lunar surface to transmit data around the Moon. As noted earlier, China is currently operating two lunar relay satellites and has plans to build additional lunar communications infrastructure. Described in earlier sections, the U.S. LunaNet framework and the European Moonlight initiative are also focused on fielding new lunar communications capabilities.</p> +<p><em>Current State</em></p> -<p>Several private companies are currently attempting to establish private communications networks in hopes of supplying lunar communication capabilities as a service to lunar and cislunar operators. Intuitive Machines is planning on launching its Khon-series relay satellites aboard its CLPS missions. These satellites will form the core of Intuitive Machines’ Khonstellation, its cislunar data-relay service. In 2024, NASA awarded Intuitive Machines a contract for providing lunar communications and navigation services, in addition to awarding Intuitive Machines a study contract for a lunar communications and navigation user terminal and Aalyria Technologies a study contract on lunar networking. Also slated to launch aboard an Intuitive Machines mission is a Nokia cellular network funded through NASA’s Tipping Point initiative that will enable communication between the Nova-C lander, the Micro-Nova hopper, and Lunar Outpost’s rover, establishing the first cellular network on the Moon in order to demonstrate the feasibility of such a network for future missions. Additionally, ispace is planning on deploying two relay satellites during its APEX 1.0 mission, slated for 2026, as part of a future data-relay service.</p> +<ul> + <li>Defense</li> +</ul> -<h3 id="key-considerations-for-next-steps">KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEXT STEPS</h3> +<p>In September 2023, the DOD released the overview version of the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy for the first time since 2018. The strategy aligns with the priorities set out in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy released in 2022, as well as the NCS. It includes four lines of effort: (1) “defend the nation,” (2) “prepare to fight and win the nation’s wars,” (3) “protect the cyber domain with allies and partners,” and (4) “build enduring advantages in cyberspace.” In March 2024, the new Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy was established to enhance defense cyber policy.</p> -<p>Looking forward, it is worth restating the anticipated amount of U.S. and foreign cislunar activity expected in the decade ahead. In total, there are about 40 significant missions, though often several payloads are associated with each mission, from all nations headed to the Moon over the next several years, with many of those missions associated with NASA’s Artemis program and CLPS initiative.</p> +<p>USCYBERCOM is the primary entity responsible for cyber operations related to national defense. While its missions and activities are not necessarily all publicly available, one of its recent priorities has been to work with allies to respond to potential cyber activities from outside the country that pose a threat to the United States. This is represented by the concept “defend forward,” which defends against malicious cyber activities at their source. One form of this concept is the implementation of “hunt forward operations.” This initiative contributes to the cyber defense of the host country by monitoring and detecting malicious cyber activities on the host country’s network while also contributing to the defense of the United States against attacks from foreign adversaries. USCYBERCOM has shared leadership with the NSA since its establishment. The two organizations work together on cyber operations, with the NSA providing its own cyber intelligence insights and resources to support USCYBERCOM.</p> -<p>There is no indication of a lunar gold rush because there are no strong revenue-generating businesses centered around cislunar activities anchored by commercial customers. The Moon’s surge in commercial activity is tied mostly to NASA’s CLPS program, where many payloads ferried to the lunar surface are for NASA and commercial rideshare payloads are effectively subsidized by NASA. Truly commercial uses of the Moon remain a chimera, with no obvious sign this could change in the next several years. The cislunar domain is dominated by government activities, with the missions planned for the next decade operated by governments, strongly tied to government funding and use, or taking advantage of government-subsidized rideshare missions.</p> +<ul> + <li>Intelligence</li> +</ul> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is no indication of a lunar gold rush because there are no strong revenue-generating businesses centered around cislunar activities anchored by commercial customers.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The U.S. intelligence community is led by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), with the NSA playing a major role, particularly in the area of cybersecurity. The NSA collects foreign signals intelligence and provides it to U.S. policymakers and military forces. In the past, the NSA’s operations were less transparent and accessible to the public. However, in recent years, the NSA has been moving away from its historical secrecy and becoming more open to the public. It is actively promoting collaboration with the private sector as well as federal agencies, including strengthening its partnership with the defense industrial base through the Cybersecurity Collaboration Center (CCC) and developing and providing technical guidance in collaboration with CISA, the FBI, and other agencies. In recent years, the government has adopted a policy of sharing threat intelligence in a timely manner with a broad range of stakeholders by declassifying the information as much as possible. This has led to closer cooperation between government and critical infrastructure.</p> -<p>Though the United States has released a cislunar technology strategy, it has not articulated a comprehensive national cislunar strategy or goals, nor a cislunar national security strategy. However, the U.S. Space Priorities Framework provides sufficient guidance to help shape U.S. cislunar efforts. Given the lack of clear commercial business cases for cislunar space, with no indication this absence is due to government action or inaction, efforts aimed at addressing the cislunar challenges identified in this report should primarily focus on furthering U.S. government requirements and not premature — or potentially imaginary — commercial ones.</p> +<ul> + <li>Law Enforcement</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="addressing-cislunar-governance-gaps">ADDRESSING CISLUNAR GOVERNANCE GAPS</h4> +<p>The FBI is the lead federal agency investigating cybercrimes, working with other agencies such as CISA and the NSA, foreign partners and law enforcement entities, and the private sector. The National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) is a government-wide initiative that integrates investigative efforts against cyber threats. The FBI is responsible for organizing and leading this, with the participation of over 30 agencies in the intelligence community and law enforcement. The Internet Crime Complaint Center is a resource for the general public to report internet crimes. The FBI has recently assigned cyber assistant legal attachés to embassies worldwide to work closely with international authorities.</p> -<p>This report asserts that international space governance frameworks lack needed clarity and definition in three main areas: space rules of the road, property rights and resource use, and permissible activities. These governance gaps are not unique to cislunar space. The same lack of clarity and definition for these areas in current space treaties equally applies to activities in other parts of space.</p> +<p>In recent years, the FBI and DOJ have shifted their focus from traditional criminal investigations (e.g., establishing a case, arresting, prosecuting, convicting, and sending criminals to prison) to the disruption of cybercriminals. This shift could make it more challenging to prosecute crimes without sufficient evidence. However, the government has prioritized proactive measures, including the prevention of crimes, early detection, and the prevention of the spread of damage. The government has been implementing this policy aggressively, conducting a series of law enforcement operations. These include disrupting international ransomware groups such as ALPHV/BlackCat and LockBit, as well as the botnets used by state-sponsored actors such as Volt Typhoon, Flax Typhoon, and 911 S5. The case of LockBit is one of the largest coordinated operations in recent years, involving law enforcement agencies from around the world. The National Police Agency (NPA) of Japan also participated in the operation, along with the Five Eyes countries (an intelligence alliance composed of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and other international partners.</p> -<p>As international space activities increase, particularly by the United States and China, space will become less safe and secure if these deficits are not addressed. A lack of agreed-to and followed space rules of the road will increase spacecraft collision risks. A lack of consensus by spacefaring nations on property rights, space resources, and permissible activities will lead to a greater chance of misunderstandings and miscalculations by space powers, potentially increasing geopolitical tensions and sparking conflict on Earth. Ultimately, a lack of consensus increases many dimensions of risk: risk of misunderstandings, risk of collisions, risk to businesses and investment decisions, risk to life and property, and risk of conflict.</p> +<ul> + <li>Diplomacy</li> +</ul> -<p>These hazards are particularly acute for cislunar space. Fortunately, there are various international efforts trying to fill these gaps, some by the United Nations and another, potentially complementary initiative in the United States’ Artemis Accords. No matter the forum or agreement, the solution should involve both the United States and China. In 2023, the United States and China together accounted for around 80 percent of the world’s space launches. Most of the planned missions to cislunar space over the next decade are sponsored or supported by these two countries.</p> +<p>The DOS is responsible for coordinating diplomatic engagement on the security of international cyberspace in bilateral, multilateral, and regional forums. It also leads intergovernmental cyber dialogues with international partners, including Japan. The Biden administration has enhanced its system for promoting national and economic security in cyberspace and digital technology from a diplomatic perspective through the establishment of the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy in April 2022, the appointment of the first-ever ambassador-at-large for it in September of the same year, and other measures. Furthermore, in May 2024, the DOS published its first United States International Cyberspace and Digital Policy Strategy. The strategy outlines four key areas of action to build digital solidarity. These include promoting a secure and resilient digital ecosystem, aligning rights-respecting approaches with international partners, building coalitions and engaging partners to counter threats to cyberspace, and strengthening international partners’ digital and cyber capacity. There is also a plan to have trained cyber and digital officers in every U.S. embassy around the world by the end of 2024. The White House is also leading international cooperation on cybersecurity through initiatives such as the International Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI). The current status of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation is outlined in Chapter 3.</p> -<p>Agreement between the United States and China on an approach to address the cislunar space governance gaps discussed in this report would de facto establish the international standard. But neither the United States nor China can unilaterally fill those gaps, as each nation will throw sand in the gears of any attempt by the other to impose its will on the world. This is no different than U.S. and Soviet behavior during the Cold War. Other entities such as Russia, India, and ESA are still important, but they are not kingmakers.</p> +<ul> + <li>Government System Protection</li> +</ul> -<p>While there is no need to disregard or contradict the OST and other international space agreements, addressing the identified space governance gaps need not happen as part of UN processes. There are over 100 nations in COPUOS, only a small fraction of which operate spacecraft. An even smaller fraction has a space launch capability, and fewer still have cislunar plans. The COPUOS ATLAC could provide a forum for U.S. and Chinese dialogue on cislunar governance questions, though it is too early to predict its chances of success — especially as COPUOS members continue to disagree on whom to name as vice chairs of the body.</p> +<p>The federal Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) oversees cybersecurity policy, planning, and implementation for the executive branch. OMB provides instructions on specific cybersecurity measures to be implemented by federal agencies with a deadline through the issuance of memoranda and other means. CISA serves as the operational lead for cybersecurity in the Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB). The Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 requires government agencies to include incident detection, reporting, and response procedures in their information security programs. FISMA also requires OMB to publish an annual report on the progress and state of implementation in federal agencies. EO 14028 of May 2021 is based on FISMA. One of the sections notes the modernization of federal government cybersecurity. It includes a number of directives for FCEB, such as the use of secure cloud services, transition to zero trust architecture, and deployment of multi-factor authentication and data encryption. CISA maintains and publishes a Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog as part of its operational support to federal agencies. The Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog includes recommended actions that agencies must take by specified dates, which serves as a binding operational directive. CISA also offers the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program, which provides cybersecurity tools, integration services, and dashboards to assist agencies in enhancing their security posture. Note that the NSA is primarily responsible for the protection of government agencies with respect to the national security system (NSS). While EO 14028 is a directive for the FECB, a separate National Security Memorandum (NSM), NSM-8, was issued in January 2022 that requires the NSS to meet equivalent or greater cybersecurity requirements than those defined in the EO.</p> -<p>Looking for ways to address thorny international issues outside of UN processes is not a new idea. Consider the Antarctic Treaty, whose groundwork was laid not at the United Nations but by the IGY and a subsequent conference organized by the United States that included only 12 nations. Interestingly, the United States has endorsed a concept for an International Lunar Year, taking inspiration from the IGY and International Polar Year of 2007 to 2008, possibly opening the door for an approach to cislunar space modeled after Antarctica. Additionally, the Arctic Council was formed using a similar mindset; only nations with Arctic territory have a vote. These models could be applied to new cislunar space governance negotiations. This might mean setting criteria for participation in a new international convention on space issues that relates to a nation’s stake and existing presence in space. Only nations that meet the criteria get a seat at the table.</p> +<ul> + <li>Critical Infrastructure Protection</li> +</ul> -<p>At a minimum, the United States and China need a seat, particularly on measures and frameworks designed to ensure the safe and sustainable use of the space environment. Approaches that produce multiple governance frameworks overlapping with the same operational environments and geographical regions of space increase risks for space operators. International air travel and maritime shipping only work as well as they do because national leaders negotiated and agreed to one set of rules governing global air travel and one for maritime traffic.</p> +<p>The Biden administration considers critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience a national security priority. The national framework for critical infrastructure protection has long been based on the 2013 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-21). However, the National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22), the first revision in 11 years, was signed by the president in April 2024. NSM-22 designates 16 critical infrastructure sectors, which is the same as PPD-21. CISA, as the national coordinator, is responsible for the cybersecurity and resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Each sector is overseen by a designated SRMA, which is the competent agency related to that industry and responsible for risk management and mitigation in the sector.</p> -<p>It would not be a good outcome to have more than one set of rules of the road for space — for example, one agreed upon by the United States and its traditional allies and one agreed upon by China and perhaps Russia. That would be like having cars on the same highway following different sets of traffic rules. There is no reason to think China could unilaterally impose its own rules on the United States or that the United States could impose its own rules on China. This is arguably the limit of the Artemis Accords, as China is unlikely to sign onto it. But the principles outlined in the accords could be used during any future discussions and negotiations with China on new cislunar space governance rules.</p> +<p>Given that the majority of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, it is the responsibility of these entities to ensure their own cybersecurity. The government also plays a supporting role in these efforts. The specifics of PPPs vary by sector. In general, critical infrastructure owners and operators cooperate with the SRMA of the sector. In addition, the Sector Coordinating Council (SCC), which comprises critical infrastructure owners and operators, trade associations, and other entities within the sector, serves as a forum for discussing sector-specific strategies, policies, and plans. SCC also works closely with the Government Coordinating Council (GCC), which is the corresponding government entity for the sector. Technical and operational activities are typically managed through Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which are established in each industry. The National Council of ISACs (NCI) facilitates cross-sector operational coordination among ISACs. In addition, there are several specific initiatives related to critical infrastructure protection. One of the most notable initiatives to date is the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC), which was launched in August 2021. It is a framework of cross-sector collaboration between selected private-sector entities and key government agencies, including CISA, the NSA, and the FBI.</p> -<h4 id="learning-from-existing-governance-frameworks">LEARNING FROM EXISTING GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS</h4> +<p>The United States has long relied on voluntary PPPs as a primary policy approach. However, there has been a notable increase in legislative and regulatory approaches under the Biden administration. In March 2022, the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA) was passed, requiring critical infrastructure owners and operators to report significant incidents and ransomware payments to the government. The rule-making process is currently underway. In addition, as indicated in the NCS and NSM-22, further cybersecurity requirements and regulations are being considered for each sector. Further details on critical infrastructure protection can be found in Chapter 4 and beyond.</p> -<p>To frame and inform initiatives aimed at filling cislunar space governance gaps, this report introduced and discussed existing treaties and arrangements covering non-space domains that could offer lessons for space. Since no existing non-space framework has every element needed to cover all space governance gaps, the report’s authors have described which parts of each system could apply to space and cislunar activities.</p> +<ul> + <li>Small- and Medium-sized Businesses Protection</li> +</ul> -<p>One lesson from the non-space examples is that national leaders did not let unbridgeable differences on issues tangential to core topics undermine efforts to negotiate consensus positions. For example, the Antarctic Treaty avoids any position on territorial claims, as the treaty drafters realized that no consensus on that issue was possible. Insistence on addressing claims would have torpedoed the agreement. In a similar vein, the Arctic Council excludes military matters from its agenda, recognizing that all nations with Arctic territory already use the region for military purposes and have no desire to coordinate on that topic with potential adversaries. The council’s founders instead focused on areas where member interests overlapped, such as sustainable development and environmental protection of the region.</p> +<p>In general, small- and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) often have smaller budgets, fewer employees, and less cybersecurity expertise than large corporations. These companies are often part of key supply chains, large corporate groups, or critical infrastructure and have been increasingly targeted by attackers as the weakest link. The government has identified the need to enhance the cybersecurity posture of SMBs as a critical issue. CISA assists SMBs in reducing their cyber risks by providing guidance tailored to their needs and free services and tools. NIST also plays an important role in this effort. It has launched a website, Small Business Cybersecurity Corner, which provides a centralized collection of cybersecurity guidance, training, and other resources for SMBs, including NIST IR 7621. Additionally, the Small Business Cybersecurity Community of Interest was established to facilitate the exchange of information and resources. To date, over 1,000 small businesses have participated in this initiative.</p> -<p>Another lesson from the non-space frameworks is that there is no one-size-fits-all approach for structuring negotiations or the final form of an agreement. Except for the Arctic Council, all of the non-space frameworks discussed originate from official treaties. Though it is merely an inter-governmental forum, deliberations in the Arctic Council have produced three official treaties and been effective at maintaining dialogue and coordination between Arctic nations. Of the non-space frameworks, only UNCLOS originated directly from a UN-facilitated process. For example, the negotiations that produced the Convention on International Civil Aviation pre-dated the creation of the United Nations. The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated specifically outside of the United Nations so that the agreement would not be influenced by the UN General Assembly and members with no contemporary presence on the continent.</p> +<ul> + <li>Consumers and the General Public</li> +</ul> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Another lesson from the non-space frameworks is that there is no one-size-fits-all approach for structuring negotiations or the final form of an agreement.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>It is important to raise cybersecurity awareness among the general public in order to build nationwide cybersecurity capabilities. In the United States, CISA has taken a leading role in working with the federal government; state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; and the private sector to disseminate information and conduct campaigns to ensure that the public is aware of cyber threats and can safely use the digital space. October has been designated as National Cybersecurity Awareness Month since 2004. In 2023, the initiative celebrated its 20th anniversary, and CISA launched a new permanent cybersecurity awareness program, Secure Our World. The program is focused on four key actions: use strong passwords, enable multi-factor authentication, recognize and report phishing, and update software. These actions are designed to encourage behavioral change throughout the year.</p> -<p>A final lesson — perhaps the most important of the three — is that the non-space frameworks described in this report are durable because they can evolve over time. Each of the frameworks has consultative mechanisms baked into its structure so there is no need to negotiate a new treaty or agreement and involve the entire UN General Assembly or the 102-member COPUOS to make decisions. These mechanisms have allowed framework parties to update and clarify aspects of their governance structures to keep up with changes in technologies, societal preferences, business use cases, environmental considerations, and other factors that have changed over time. Some of these agreement-specific mechanisms take the form of annual or regular meetings at which binding and non-binding decisions can be made. Of the space-specific treaties and frameworks noted in this report, only the ITU has such a mechanism, which has probably contributed to the union’s longevity.</p> +<ul> + <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="building-lunar-infrastructure">BUILDING LUNAR INFRASTRUCTURE</h4> +<p>The security of technologies, products, and services is a broad topic. This paper does not cover all aspects of the topic, but one of the Biden administration’s key interests is the promotion of secure by design and secure by default. This is the concept of ensuring that products and services are secure from the design phase and that security features are built in by default for the products and services. This aligns with the NCS’s primary objective of shifting cybersecurity accountability to manufacturers and providers. CISA, in collaboration with federal agencies and international partners, including Japan, has been actively promoting the adoption of these principles. In May 2024, 68 of the world’s leading software manufacturers made a voluntary commitment to CISA’s Secure by Design Pledge, pledging to design products with better security built in. Furthermore, CISA is advancing this principle, shifting the concept of secure by design to secure by demand, to ensure that customers understand the necessity of the security and safety of the products and push vendors to improve their products. In March 2024, CISA and OMB released a Secure Software Development Attestation Form, which requires producers of software used by the federal government to attest to the adoption of secure development practices aligned with NIST’s Secure Software Development Framework. Subsequently, in August 2024, CISA released a software acquisition guide for federal agencies, which can be used by a broader range of stakeholders, including the private sector. The guide provides recommendations for software assurance in the cybersecurity supply chain risk management life cycle, focusing on the secure by demand concept. In a related effort, CISA has been facilitating community discussions to promote the use of the Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) to increase software transparency. The government has also been calling for the use of memory-safe languages for secure software development. Additionally, as indicated in the NCS, a legal framework for holding software producers accountable is also being considered. Regarding consumer devices, the White House announced a plan for an internet of things (IoT) labeling program in July 2023. The objective is to make secure IoT devices widely available through a voluntary approach that leverages market forces. The program is currently being prepared under the leadership of the FCC with the aim of becoming operational by the end of 2024. Several government initiatives are being developed under the common concept of secure by design.</p> -<p>Improving cislunar infrastructure can optimize U.S. cislunar efforts, particularly activities aiming for a long-term, sustained presence on the lunar surface. Specifically, NASA’s vision for the Moon will require processes and systems that can provide power and communications, protect electronics and humans from radiation, provide positioning and navigation services, collect cislunar SSA information, manage cislunar space traffic to minimize spacecraft collision risks, and mitigate the risks to lunar operations from regolith dust.</p> +<p>Another key issue is the safety and security of artificial intelligence (AI), which is considered a foundation of the use of AI in EO 14110: Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence, signed in October 2023. The EO addresses a wide range of issues, including risk assessment and mitigation for the use of AI in critical infrastructure, the security of the foundation models, and the detection and labeling of synthetic content. These tasks have been assigned to CISA, NIST, and other government agencies.</p> -<p>Many planned lunar activities will happen in the same areas, specifically in the south pole, so there will be a need for one nation’s systems to coexist near other nations’ missions. Effective solutions for this issue are not primarily technical ones but depend on the development of coordination mechanisms and baseline agreement regarding how to behave on the Moon and in lunar orbit. Improved coordination mechanisms between spacecraft operators, both transiting space between GEO and the Moon and in lunar orbit, would likely go a long way toward mitigating the threat of cislunar spacecraft collisions and minimizing risks of new debris creation.</p> +<ul> + <li>Workforce</li> +</ul> -<p>As noted, efficiently supporting upcoming U.S. lunar activities will require certain technological solutions, including communications, power, and navigation and positioning information. Though the United States, ESA, China, and other spacefaring entities can continue to pursue their own cislunar goals, there is an opportunity to address infrastructure challenges using an international model. The United States is already thinking internationally by developing the LunaNet communications framework, an open-architecture approach intended to facilitate allied collaboration around lunar connectivity.</p> +<p>A shortage of cybersecurity professionals is a common challenge for both the public and private sectors globally. In July 2023, the United States published the National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy (NCWES), which focuses on four pillars: (1) “equip every American with foundational cyber skills,” (2) “transform cyber education,” (3) “expand and enhance America’s cyber workforce,” and (4) “strengthen the federal cyber workforce.” In releasing the strategy, government agencies, industry, academia, and nonprofit organizations have committed to working together to implement the strategy through training, apprenticeship programs, and partnerships. ONCD is leading this national initiative. In June 2024, ONCD released a report outlining its progress to date and future work plans for implementing NCWES.</p> -<p>There are several helpful examples for structuring international cooperation in space. One is the ISS model, which assigned responsibilities for the provisions of certain space-station components to individual countries. A nearly identical model is the Artemis program, which trades opportunities to fly payloads and astronauts on Artemis missions for equipment, systems, and components provided by other countries for use in the Artemis architecture and Lunar Gateway. Notably, other than the UAE, all other nations contributing to the Lunar Gateway are also ISS partners. A third model is ESA’s Ariane project, which led to the development of the Ariane 1 rocket and creation of Arianespace, a company that operates this family of launch vehicles.</p> +<h4 id="cybersecurity-in-japan">Cybersecurity in Japan</h4> -<p>It is worth taking a closer look at the approach used for the Ariane project, which is the same way that ESA funds and manages all its projects. For the original Ariane project, about 10 partner nations pooled funds and assigned one organization to act as project manager. Each partner nation signed up for the project knowing it would receive a certain rate of return on national funding provided to the project. Specifically, domestic firms in each partner country received contracts totaling 80 percent of the amount invested by their governments. This approach allows partners to invest in their own domestic industries and pool resources for greater impact.</p> +<p><em>Basic Strategy and Policy</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K1mObCW.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: Selected Planned Activities in the Lunar South Pole Area.</strong> Source: Authors’ research based on multiple sources.</em></p> +<p>The Japanese political system has been relatively stable and consistent in terms of the parliamentary cabinet system, with the Liberal Democratic Party having been in power for a long time, except for a few periods. With regard to cybersecurity policy, there are some similarities with the United States in terms of a decentralized government organizational structure and the basis of voluntary PPPs.</p> -<p>There are several benefits to modeling an effort on the Ariane project for building and operating lunar infrastructure. The first is that it allows for cost sharing across many nations interested in developing and using lunar infrastructure for their own national efforts. If there were commercial use cases for developing such infrastructure on the Moon, there would be no need for an international, government-sponsored activity, as market forces would be driving the development of lunar infrastructure. But government missions and missions primarily supported or subsidized by government funding are the only real customers for lunar infrastructure services. An international, government-funded and -driven approach would thus ensure the final product matches space agencies’ science and exploration needs.</p> +<p>The current cybersecurity policy is based on the Cybersecurity Basic Act, which went into full effect in January 2015. The act outlines the fundamental principles and responsibilities of the nation in advancing cybersecurity policies. It also establishes the framework for developing a national cybersecurity strategy and other policy initiatives. In January 2015, the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters was established in the cabinet under the act, and the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) was established in the Cabinet Secretariat as the national cybersecurity center. The national Cybersecurity Strategy has been updated approximately once every three years since its initial version in 2013, with the latest version released in September 2021. The latest strategy sets “Cybersecurity for All” as its main theme and outlines three key directions: (1) “advancing digital transformation (DX) and cybersecurity simultaneously,” (2) “ensuring the overall safety and security of cyberspace as it becomes increasingly public, interconnected and interrelated,” and (3) “enhancing initiatives from the perspective of Japan’s national security.” The strategy reflects the current geopolitical landscape, naming China, Russia, and North Korea as countries of concern for the first time. It also indicates the importance of international cooperation with the United States, the Quad (a strategic security grouping that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and other like-minded countries, as well as the importance of economic security and supply chains. Additionally, the government releases an annual report that serves as both a review of the previous fiscal year and a plan for the current year, outlining the key achievements and implementation plan based on the strategy.</p> -<p>Another benefit to an internationalized initiative is that it could attenuate national pressure to compete for certain lunar real estate, such as peaks of eternal light (ideal for solar power infrastructure) or Earth–Moon Lagrange points (ideal for communications nodes). Internationalized cislunar architecture could also be an anchor for peaceful coexistence in space, just as the ISS maintains a peaceful link between the United States and Russia today. Finally, an international approach can be structured to provide benefits to national industries. The Ariane 1 and ESA models guarantee national governments’ return on investment that gets funneled directly back to their domestic industrial bases. The ISS and Artemis programs, while structured differently, do the same thing. These models effectively offer protectionist returns to domestic industries while pursuing international collaboration.</p> +<p>Japan’s cybersecurity is now at a pivotal point. Most recently, the NSS of Japan, released in December 2022, outlined a strategy to fundamentally enhance the nation’s cybersecurity posture. While the ACD in general includes a wide range of proactive cyber operations, the strategy focuses on three key areas as its own ACD: enhanced PPPs, detection of attack sources using information provided by telecommunication service providers, and government operations against attack sources. It also includes the strengthening of the government’s organizational structure, including the restructuring of NISC and a significant increase in government staff for cyber. The implementation of the strategy, including the introduction of legislation, is currently underway. Furthermore, the position of minister of state for economic security was established in the cabinet in October 2021, and the Economic Security Promotion Act was passed in May 2022. In May 2024, a new regulation based on the act came into effect to ensure the safety and reliability of essential infrastructure. In the same month, a bill on a new security clearance system was passed. This will include cybersecurity information in the protected information and greatly expand the scope of clearance to the nondefense private sector. These developments will have a positive impact on further enhancing the nation’s cybersecurity.</p> -<h4 id="improving-operator-coordination-and-data-sharing">IMPROVING OPERATOR COORDINATION AND DATA SHARING</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Japan’s cybersecurity is now at a pivotal point. Most recently, the NSS of Japan, released in December 2022, outlined a strategy to fundamentally enhance the nation’s cybersecurity posture.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Ideally, new cislunar monitoring infrastructure, possibly comprising systems on Earth and the Moon as well as spacecraft in cislunar space, will provide comprehensive SSA services for operators of cislunar spacecraft. Infrastructure could also provide positioning and tracking data about spacecraft and human-made systems operating on the Moon’s surface. There are plans in the next 10 years to build and launch space systems to collect SSA data in cislunar space. One or two SSA data-collecting satellites, however, would only be able to provide coverage on a very small portion of cislunar space — just a drop in the ocean.</p> +<p><em>Organizational Structure</em></p> -<p>Building robust and comprehensive SSA infrastructure will be costly and take time. As noted in the previous section, one idea to address this need would be to create an international partnership to build cislunar infrastructure, such as an SSA network. The authors of this report think this approach has merit but recognize that it would take time to negotiate and establish the foundations for an internationalized cislunar infrastructure operator, effectively equivalent to a lunar public utility company.</p> +<p>Figure 2 provides an overview of the organizational structure of cybersecurity centered on the Japanese government. The Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters in the cabinet is the highest decisionmaking body for national cybersecurity. The headquarters comprises the chief cabinet secretary, the ministers related to cybersecurity, and external experts. The headquarters works closely with the National Security Council (NSC) in the cabinet. NISC serves as the secretariat for the headquarters and plays a coordinating role for government agencies involved in cybersecurity and critical infrastructure.</p> -<p>In the meantime, something should be done to reduce the risk of collisions for spacecraft operating in cislunar space, including in lunar orbit. There is also a need to coordinate activities on the lunar surface, particularly in the Moon’s south pole due to the amount of expected activity there (see Figure 8). Even with the paltry number of active spacecraft orbiting the Moon — only about a handful today — there are increasing collision risks. Fortunately, unlike orbits closer to Earth, there are very few known human-made debris objects or fragments in cislunar space and only one recent example of human-made debris unintentionally hitting the Moon’s surface. International agreed-to rules and norms on mitigating the creation of cislunar debris — accepted by both the United States and China, as well as other lunar operators — could go a long way in protecting the cislunar environment from new human-made debris.</p> +<p>The NPA is a law enforcement agency responsible for investigating cybercrimes. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is responsible for cybersecurity in the field of national defense, and the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) is in charge of cyber defense for its own organization, including MOD. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) is responsible for cybersecurity policy related to information and communications networks. It also serves as a regulatory body for the communications industry. The National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), which is under the jurisdiction of MIC, conducts research and development (R&amp;D) for cybersecurity in the information and communications technology (ICT) field. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) develops cybersecurity policies for private companies across a range of industries. The Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), which is under the jurisdiction of METI, maintains a national certification system of information security and conducts studies and research in the field to support the national information technology strategy from a technical and human resources perspective. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is responsible for managing diplomatic relations in the cyber domain. The Digital Agency is a relatively new agency, established in September 2021 to promote the digitalization of national and local government. It is also involved in cybersecurity from the perspective of DX. Moreover, as in the United States, critical infrastructure sectors are overseen by designated government agencies. Further details can be found in Chapter 4.</p> -<p>One way to address both cislunar space traffic coordination and deconfliction and prevent the creation of new cislunar debris is to incorporate these elements into international space governance frameworks. Though the authors of this report believe that negotiators and diplomats, especially U.S. and Chinese ones, can ultimately find common ground on these and other space governance issues, the authors recognize this may take time. Until then, cislunar governmental and private sector spacecraft operators from all nations can do a lot on their own, taking matters somewhat into their own hands.</p> +<p>The Japanese government’s cybersecurity-related budget for FY 2024 is ¥212.86 billion, with approximately ¥152 billion allocated to MOD and the remainder distributed among non-MOD agencies. This represents an increase of approximately 54 percent from the FY 2023 initial budget. It should be noted that the cybersecurity-related budgets released by governments cannot be directly compared due to differences in the definition and scope of cybersecurity. While the exact number of NISC employees is not made public, as of FY 2023, it is made up of approximately 100 government officials and employees with specialized expertise from the private sector. Additionally, NISC plans to double the number of staff in FY 2024. Further expansion is anticipated in the coming years through organizational restructuring based on the NSS of Japan.</p> -<p>Spacecraft operators can vastly reduce the risk of collisions and events that could cause new cislunar debris by increasing coordination and data sharing. No operator wants its satellite to collide with another or to hit a piece of space debris, so arguably all operators share a common goal, one of self-interest.</p> +<p>While it is not easy to precisely map out the roles and responsibilities of cybersecurity-related government agencies in the United States and Japan, a rough relationship may be expressed as in Figure 3. Please note that this simplified mapping does not necessarily define a complete and exhaustive relationship between the two.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Spacecraft operators can vastly reduce the risk of collisions and events that could cause new cislunar debris by increasing operator-to-operator coordination and data sharing.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eC5noNH.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Cybersecurity Organizational Structure Centered on the Japanese Government.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis; and <a href="https://www.nisc.go.jp/pdf/policy/kihon-s/cs-senryaku2021-gaiyou-en.pdf">National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), Japan’s Cybersecurity Strategy 2021 (overview) (Tokyo: NISC, September 28, 2021), 8</a>.</em></p> -<p>Outside of diplomatic channels or government-to-government negotiations, operators and other space stakeholders from the United States, China, and other nations are working together in forums such as the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems and International Organization for Standards to establish mechanisms and best practices for improved information sharing. These efforts are not tied specifically to cislunar space, but to space operations more broadly and touch on issues such as data standards, sharing spacecraft position information, and operator notification procedures to forestall collisions. Such discussions could eventually include elements important to cislunar operators, particularly considerations for landing and launch from the Moon’s surface and measures to prevent the creation of new cislunar debris. These discussions can also help build trust between U.S. and Chinese space stakeholders.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/POENk7X.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Mapping of Cybersecurity-Related Government Agencies in Japan and the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> -<h4 id="military-use-and-national-security">MILITARY USE AND NATIONAL SECURITY</h4> +<p><em>Current State</em></p> -<p>Outer space up to GEO is widely used for military purposes, with significant national security equities in those regions of space. The U.S. military relies on space to fight and win wars, with satellites between LEO and GEO performing all or parts of critical missions, such as navigation, missile warning, and communications. Additionally, the U.S. economy depends on space, with power utilities, communications networks, and financial institutions using precision timing derived from GPS satellites. Commercial air travel is increasingly dependent on GPS. Many American households, businesses, and first responders use satellites for broadband connectivity. In these regions of space, the United States has many reasons to protect and defend its equities — which do face counterspace threats.</p> +<ul> + <li>Defense</li> +</ul> -<p>But beyond GEO, things start to look very different. There are no current cislunar assets that enable joint operations. The United States would gain no clear strategic military advantage over China or any potential adversary from military activities in cislunar space. No technology that could be conceivably deployed within the next few decades could influence military outcomes on Earth. There is also no appreciable economic activity or national presence to defend and protect other than initiatives focused on science and exploration. Though future human habitation or significant economic activities on other planets could change these dynamics, there is no sign this will happen anytime soon. If the military needed SSA data on cislunar space, it could obtain that from systems operated by civilian or commercial entities.</p> +<p>As highlighted in the NSS of Japan, Japan’s national cyber defense is undergoing a significant transformation. To date, the scope of JSDF defenses has been limited primarily to MOD and JSDF network systems, but the strategy will expand this to include critical infrastructure. Japan’s ACD, a key focus of the strategy, also includes relatively offensive-leaning cyber operations, such as “to penetrate and neutralize attacker’s servers.” While the strategy is still in the process of implementation, it is anticipated that JSDF, NPA, or equivalent organizations will play a key role in conducting such operations. To enable the government to fulfill this role, it is essential to expand and strengthen the government’s cyber staff. JSDF has already initiated this process in advance of the strategy. As of the end of FY 2022, the number of cyber professionals was approximately 890. The goal is to increase this number to 4,000 by the end of FY 2027. In addition, the number of operators for cyber-related systems in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces is planned to be expanded to 20,000. To support this plan, the educational system of the JSDF is being enhanced, including through the reorganization of Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Signal School into the System &amp; Signal/Cyber School with a new cyber department, introduction of a cyber course at the JGSDF High Technical School, and establishment of a cyber specialized department at the National Defense Academy. Additionally, a new system for hiring private-sector professionals for a limited period has been implemented. Furthermore, Japan has been engaged in the activities of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) since 2019 and has participated in the cyber defense exercises (Locked Shields) hosted by the CCDCOE. Japan is expanding its international cooperation in cyber defense operations.</p> -<p>Every dollar the U.S. military spends on a cislunar-focused project is a dollar taken away from another effort that likely has more effect on U.S. national security. In particular, if U.S. defense and military officials are concerned about fielding capabilities to deter and address threats from China by 2027, any resources spent today on cislunar national security capabilities could be better spent elsewhere. Nothing the U.S. military deploys to cislunar space can help win a war on Earth, whether with China or anybody else. Technological developments and other circumstances could cause a reevaluation of this calculus, but that does not rule out the consideration that a nonmilitarized cislunar space is the right answer now. And “right answer now” means “for the foreseeable future” — a span measured in many decades. In the far distant future, realistic plans for human colonies on the Moon and other planets, lunar economic equities threatened by space piracy, cislunar deployment of weapons of mass destruction targeting Earth or non-Earth locations would mean reevaluating the wisdom of keeping military activities out of cislunar space.</p> +<ul> + <li>Intelligence</li> +</ul> -<p>The United States faced similar considerations regarding Antarctica in the 1950s. At that time, Washington was concerned that the Cold War could extend to Antarctica, sparking both a territorial land grab and race to establish military dominance there. Smartly, the United States saw no benefit from that development and worked diplomatically to preserve the status quo, which meant keeping military activities out and preserving the region for scientific research. Fortunately, the Soviet Union agreed to insulate Antarctica from military activities as long as it could be a party to the negotiation and subsequent agreement. It is critical to highlight that this arrangement only worked because the United States gave the Soviet Union a seat at the negotiating table.</p> +<p>The Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO) is an intelligence agency directly under the Prime Minister’s Office responsible for collecting, consolidating, and analyzing information on important cabinet policies. The government intelligence community includes the CIRO, MOD, NPA, MOFA, and the Public Security Intelligence Agency, which work closely together in intelligence collection and analysis.</p> -<p>Both the United States and China talk publicly about national security considerations for cislunar space. But the core considerations on both sides are national prestige and fears about getting shut out of cislunar opportunities, rather than strategic military advantage. As with Antarctica, it may be better for the United States and China to keep military uses and activities away from cislunar space for as long as possible.</p> +<p>Japan operates a security clearance system based on the Specially Designated Secrets Act, which designates the four fields (defense, diplomacy, reconnaissance, and terrorism) as classified national security information. The current system has subjected primarily government officials and a smaller number of private-sector employees engaged in defense fields to eligibility screening. A new security clearance legislation, passed in May 2024, significantly expands the scope of the existing system. The new system will expand the scope of information to be protected to a wider range of economic security information, including cybersecurity. It will also greatly expand the scope of eligibility screening to the private sector. The government is currently developing detailed operational rules for implementation in 2025. The new system will also have a significant impact on the cybersecurity field, further promoting classified information sharing with like-minded countries and stricter management of it.</p> -<p>What happens if the United States seeks to preserve the nonmilitarized cislunar status quo through an agreement with China and other nations, with compliance monitored via new civil and commercial cislunar SSA capabilities? Achieving this outcome would free up U.S. defense funding and resources for better use elsewhere, possibly on other military space capabilities closer to Earth. China, like the Soviet Union regarding Antarctica, might be receptive to preserving a nonmilitarized cislunar environment. But if China does not agree on that goal, the United States should let China waste resources. Every renminbi spent on a Chinese military cislunar development — to win a race that would grant it no strategic advantage — is a renminbi not spent on some other system that could truly harm U.S. national security. For the foreseeable future, nothing China could do in cislunar space would alter the military calculus on Earth should it ever find itself in a direct conflict with the United States.</p> +<ul> + <li>Law Enforcement</li> +</ul> -<p>In the interest of optimizing the use of military resources, the United States may want to consider whether DoD cislunar programs, such as those at DARPA and AFRL, should be funded from the defense or non-defense budgets. Programs like AFRL’s Oracle-Mobility and Oracle-Prime are designed to test cislunar SSA and tracking technologies, which could support civilian and commercial cislunar activities and align with NASA’s cislunar infrastructure needs. There is no reason such programs could not be managed and funded by NASA or another civilian agency. Additionally, the U.S. government could contract with companies, who could build and operate commercial systems, to provide cislunar SSA data and services. Alternatively or concurrently, the United States could undertake an international approach to building such cislunar infrastructure. In either case, DoD and other national security users who want SSA data for cislunar space domain awareness, such as for monitoring China’s cislunar activities, could obtain such data from civilian or commercial systems.</p> +<p>In April 2022, NPA established the Cyber Affairs Bureau to streamline and reinforce cybersecurity roles and responsibilities distributed across various sections within the organization. The new bureau is responsible for developing and implementing cyber policies within NPA in a centralized manner. In addition, the National Cyber Unit was established as a centralized national investigative agency to address cyber cases that have a significant impact, are highly technical, and involve international criminal groups. It also serves as a central point of contact for international law enforcement agencies. In line with these developments, the number of public attributions has been increasing in recent years. These are conducted solely by Japan and in cooperation with like-minded countries, including the United States. Furthermore, Japan has conducted disruptive operations against cybercrime infrastructure in coordination with international law enforcement agencies, including the United States. NPA played an important role in providing technical expertise in the international coordinated operation against LockBit, one of the world’s largest ransomware groups, in February 2024. It developed and provided ransomware decryption tools, which were used by over 6 million victims.</p> -<h3 id="recommendations">RECOMMENDATIONS</h3> +<p>Furthermore, the Japan Cybercrime Control Center (JC3), a nonprofit PPP, facilitates the sharing and analysis of threat and crime information among industry, academia, and law enforcement entities to identify and reduce risks related to cybercrime. In addition to NPA, major companies across sectors participate in the center and collaborate closely under confidentiality agreements. The organization also collaborates with the National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance of the United States.</p> -<p>Based on the preceding observations on potential paths forward, the authors offer the following recommendations for consideration by U.S. policymakers:</p> +<ul> + <li>Diplomacy</li> +</ul> -<p><strong>Address governance gaps and coordination with China:</strong> To create a safe and sustainable cislunar environment so that the United States can achieve its national objectives, the United States should address cislunar space governance and coordination gaps in a manner that includes input from China. These governance gaps include agreement on permissible activities, property rights and space resources, and space rules of the road. Additionally, the United States should work with China to increase operator-to-operator data and information sharing related to space safety. Other nations should be included, but coordination protocols and governance agreements and principles negotiated without China are not worth the time. Ideally, solutions to address these issues for cislunar space can address these issues across all of space too.</p> +<p>MOFA’s approach to cyber diplomacy is based on three pillars: the promotion of the rule of law in cyberspace, the promotion of confidence-building measures, and capacity-building support. Japan, along with the United States and other like-minded countries, takes the position that conventional international law applies in cyberspace. It is actively engaged in international discussions through participation in government expert meetings at the United Nations, among other venues. Additionally, as the first Asian member of the Convention on Cybercrime, Japan is actively engaged in discussions to expand the number of signatory countries to this convention.</p> -<p>There are several possible approaches that could be used by the United States to address cislunar governance gaps. An approach modeled on the Arctic Council — not a treaty but an intergovernmental agreement — could provide a body through which the United States and China, as well as other spacefaring nations meeting certain membership criteria, could discuss cislunar space governance and coordination. As with the Arctic Council, this approach would exclude direct involvement with the United Nations and its full membership. In taking the first steps in establishing such a cislunar space council, the United States could look to the Ottawa Declaration, which established the Arctic Council, for guidance. An International Lunar Year conference — already being discussed by the United States — could also aim to facilitate discussions on cislunar governance among nations with lunar equities. Should it pursue any of these paths, the United States could base its negotiating positions on the Artemis principles. But as the report’s authors have already noted, it is not realistic to expect that China would sign the Artemis Accords, since it was not consulted during their formulation.</p> +<p>The Japanese government has been conducting intergovernmental cyber dialogues with countries and regions, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and ASEAN. On capacity building, MOFA has coordinated initiatives to provide cooperation and support in a number of key areas, including awareness-raising, critical infrastructure protection, incident response, and cybercrime countermeasures, with a particular focus on ASEAN. Furthermore, MOFA has long had the post of ambassador for cyber policy, which oversees consultations with foreign governments and the government-wide cyber foreign policy. For further information on existing Japan-U.S. cooperation in this area, please refer to Chapter 3.</p> -<p>Additionally, the United States could try to find consensus with China on cislunar coordination issues through UN arrangements such as the ATLAC. As noted in an earlier section, this action team was established to provide a forum for U.S.-Chinese discussions on cislunar space coordination. Ultimately, a modest goal for the ATLAC may be to build trust between the two powers. Trust is needed for both sides to grow more comfortable directly engaging with each other on cislunar space safety, coordination, and governance issues — and later in drafting more comprehensive agreements on broader space governance, coordination, and safety issues.</p> +<ul> + <li>Government System Protection</li> +</ul> -<p><strong>Ensure nonmilitarized status:</strong> The United States should assess whether there are compelling strategic cislunar military uses or goals. The authors of this report assert that this report do not see any now or in the foreseeable future and assert that cislunar space looks like Antarctica did in the 1950s. If it does not foresee any strategic national security objectives, the United States should advocate for the same approach taken in Antarctica, meaning no military uses of cislunar space, reinforcing the OST provisions already prohibiting military activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies. This would require an agreement between the United States and China, ideally including other spacefaring nations, to keep military interests out of cislunar space. Such an agreement could be negotiated outside of the United Nations, mirroring the approach taken for the Antarctic Treaty. Arguably, this process could proceed hand in hand with the first recommendation in this section, meaning that part of the effort to create a cislunar space council might involve efforts to ensure the nonmilitarized status of cislunar space. This approach does not rule out U.S. national security interest in monitoring cislunar space and assumes DoD and other national security users could acquire cislunar SSA data from civilian or commercial sources for such purposes.</p> +<p>NISC, which leads the defense of government agencies, includes the Government Security Operation Coordination (GSOC) team. GSOC centrally monitors information collected from sensors installed in each agency 24/7. It also collects and analyzes data on cyberattacks and threats and shares that information with agencies to help improve the government’s overall response capabilities.</p> -<p><strong>Pursue international collaboration on infrastructure:</strong> Solutions to address cislunar infrastructure requirements can best be addressed internationally by pooling resources and creating shared capabilities that potentially lessen the motivations for friction over desirable lunar real estate such as the peaks of eternal light. An international approach that allows partner nations to earn returns on their investments and support domestic industries provides an incentive to participate. The Ariane project offers one model for consideration. Such internationalized infrastructure could help preserve the peaceful, scientific use of the Moon and cislunar space, creating a strong foundation for the United States and other nations to pursue their scientific research and exploration goals. Shared international ownership of cislunar architecture could also form the sinews of peace between nations with cislunar activities, even in times of tension. Arguably, the ISS has served that purpose, remaining one of the last places of peaceful collaboration between the West and Russia over the past two years. Future internationalized cislunar infrastructure could serve the same purpose and advance not only U.S. national interests, but the interests of all humankind.</p> +<p>The government has established the Common Standards for Cybersecurity Measures for Government Agencies and Related Agencies as a common framework to enhance the cybersecurity posture of government agencies. The standards are reviewed regularly, with the latest version released in July 2023. The document specifies a common baseline that all agencies must meet and additional optional measures to ensure a higher level of security. This allows risk-based measures to be implemented continuously in accordance with each agency’s specific situation. The latest version includes a new requirement for government contractors to implement measures in accordance with NIST SP 800-171 for managing cybersecurity risk in the supply chain.</p> -<p>The report’s authors also want to reiterate a few things that the United States does not need to do. There is presently no need for a specific U.S. cislunar strategy or national security cislunar strategy. Existing U.S. space goals and strategy documents are sufficient, though U.S. government implementation plans will prove useful. While investments in new cislunar SSA technologies and systems are important, improved coordination mechanisms and operator data sharing can vastly improve cislunar space safety and sustainability. Incremental steps today to improve cislunar SSA data collection are sufficient to meet the anticipated traffic, giving the United States time to develop a holistic and thoughtful architecture for a future cislunar SSA network. Taking steps to create agreed-to rules to prevent the creation of new cislunar space debris further lessens any urgency to build cislunar SSA infrastructure. Additionally, there is no need for U.S. military projects focused on cislunar space.</p> +<p>While each agency has had a CISO for many years, starting in FY 2016, a deputy director general for cybersecurity and information technology has been assigned to each organization as a full-time position to assist the CISO. The agencies are coordinated with one another through interagency CISO meetings.</p> -<p>Ultimately, the authors acknowledge that these recommendations — collaborating with China, limiting military activities beyond GEO, and internationalizing lunar infrastructure — challenge aspects of conventional U.S. thinking on space. This means that implementing one or all of these recommendations will require significant political will. But the United States should not be afraid to make a course correction resulting in an outcome that better aligns with U.S. interests, even if that path seems hard.</p> +<ul> + <li>Critical Infrastructure Protection</li> +</ul> -<h3 id="conclusion">CONCLUSION</h3> +<p>There are similarities in the organizational framework for critical infrastructure protection in Japan and the United States. The basic policy and framework are defined in the Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CPCIP), which is approved by the Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters and published by NISC. The initial version was released in 2005, and subsequent regular updates have led to the most recent edition, released in March 2024. The latest version added the ports and harbors industry as a new 15th critical infrastructure sector in response to the cyberattack on the Port of Nagoya in 2023. NISC, as the national coordinator, is responsible for critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience across the nation. In line with the NSS of Japan, NISC plans to double its staff in FY 2024, strengthening its structure in preparation for future restructuring into a new national cybersecurity agency. Five government agencies have been designated responsible organizations for overseeing respective industries and managing and mitigating risks specific to their sectors.</p> -<blockquote> - <p><em>“We choose to go to the Moon. . . . We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard.”</em></p> - <h4 id="-president-john-f-kennedy-1962">— President John F. Kennedy, 1962</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>In Japan, as in other countries, the majority of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. It is, therefore, essential to foster PPPs to enhance the nation’s collective cyber defense capabilities. In general, critical infrastructure owners and operators share information directly with the agencies responsible for the sector as well as with NISC. There is also an organization called Capability for Engineering of Protection, Technical Operation, Analysis and Response (CEPTOAR), which represents each sector and subsector. Major sectors, such as ICT, finance, power, and transportation, have ISACs in place to facilitate technical and operational cooperation within their respective sector. NISC leads an annual cross-sector exercise program to enhance collective response capabilities across sectors. Most recently, in April 2019, the Cybersecurity Council was established with the cross-sector participation of government agencies and selected private companies related to critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. The objective of this council is to facilitate rapid information sharing and analysis between the public and private sectors.</p> -<p>There is a lot of promise — and hype — around the future of humankind in cislunar space. But there are also hard realities. Only the United States and China are positioned to develop and launch crewed spacecraft to the Moon. Russia has ambitious plans for crewed lunar missions but insufficient resources to make them happen. Without the United States and China, there would be very few missions to cislunar space over the next decade. Several other nations are planning uncrewed missions to the Moon, but most of these missions are hitching a ride on a U.S. spacecraft. While some of these future missions will be operated by companies, they are still inextricably tied to government funding and objectives — particularly to NASA funding. Today, there are few, if any, realized business cases separate from the government for cislunar activities.</p> +<p>In May 2024, a new regulation was initiated based on the Economic Security Promotion Act. This requires the government to conduct a prior review of the installation and outsourced operation of critical facilities of designated essential infrastructure owners and operators. The objective is to ensure the safety and reliability of critical infrastructure services against threats posed by foreign adversaries. Currently, there is no law similar to CIRCIA mandating incident reporting across all sectors. However, the potential advantages of implementing such a measure are being discussed at a panel of experts hosted by the Japanese government. In addition, sector-specific reporting requirements are currently in place as regulations and other means. Further details on critical infrastructure protection can be found in Chapter 4.</p> -<p>Almost all activities in cislunar space, including in orbit and on the surface of the Moon, focus on science and research. As with Antarctica, there is no clear or obvious strategic military benefit derived from cislunar space. Militarily “winning” in cislunar space, no matter how one defines it, would do nothing to alter the outcome of a conflict between the United States and China — or any other possible adversary. Military funding and resources can be better spent elsewhere. It is in the interests of the United States to keep military uses out of cislunar space as long as possible and to retain the focus on science, leaving open the door to future business use cases such as mining.</p> +<ul> + <li>SMBs’ Protection</li> +</ul> -<p>There is no indication of a lunar gold rush, though cislunar traffic has steadily increased since the 1980s. If there is one area of increased activity deserving of attention, it is the lunar south pole. There will likely be more overlapping activities from various nations at the lunar south pole than anywhere else on the Moon. Governments’ investments in technologies and infrastructure and their efforts to address space governance gaps should be aimed at making sure that activity in this region and in lunar orbits can be done safely, sustainably, and efficiently. Given that the current focus is science and exploration, the United States should continue to collaborate with partners worldwide, potentially taking an international approach to building and operating cislunar infrastructure to meet these goals. Furthermore, the United States should try to collaborate with China, particularly on cislunar space governance and operational space safety coordination.</p> +<p>Cybersecurity for SMBs is a major concern in Japan as well. METI and IPA have been leading initiatives in this area. IPA has established a website to provide SMBs with a centralized access point for resources, tools, and services of information security. In addition, it has published guidelines for SMBs, outlining the actions that both senior management and operational managers should take from their respective perspectives. It also introduced a comprehensive support package for SMBs at a low cost, offering a range of services, including consultation, anomaly monitoring, emergency response support, cyber insurance, and more. In addition, a self-declaration program has been implemented, enabling organizations to self-declare their cybersecurity actions taken according to their maturity level. This is also used as a prerequisite for applying for the government’s IT subsidy program.</p> -<p>The current geopolitical environment makes it harder to work collaboratively with China. The Cold War provided a similarly tense environment — yet it was against this backdrop that the United States, Soviet Union, and dozens of nations produced the OST and several subsequent space agreements. This context produced the Apollo-Soyuz mission, laying the groundwork for the ISS decades later. Cislunar space and beyond is probably the best environment — maybe the only environment today — where the United States and China, as well as many other nations, can find common ground on shared interests. The United States should seize this opportunity, both for U.S. national interests and for humankind more broadly.</p> +<p>Furthermore, in November 2020, the Supply-Chain Cybersecurity Consortium (SC3) was established as an industry-led initiative to promote cybersecurity measures for the entire supply chain, including SMBs, with the industry stakeholders working together. Cybersecurity for SMBs is a key area of focus discussed in a working group of the consortium.</p> -<hr /> +<ul> + <li>Consumers and the General Public</li> +</ul> -<p><strong>Clayton Swope</strong> is the deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> +<p>NISC is leading awareness-raising initiatives in cooperation with other government agencies. Since 2010, February has been designated as Cybersecurity Month, with the objective of promoting public awareness and understanding of cybersecurity. NISC has created a dedicated website for public awareness, which provides a centralized set of resources. These include a handbook for safe and secure use of the internet, FAQs on cybersecurity-related laws and regulations, and educational video content.</p> -<p><strong>Louis Gleason</strong> is a former research intern for the CSIS Aerospace Security Project.</p>Clayton Swope and Louis GleasonMore and more nations and companies will send mission towards the Moon over the next several years. What challenges do these space operators face and how can they be addressed?Philippine Energy Security2024-10-21T12:00:00+08:002024-10-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/philippine-energy-security<ul> - <li><em>The Philippines’ fragile energy outlook threatens to undermine efforts to secure its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis an assertive China.</em></li> +<ul> + <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> </ul> -<excerpt /> +<p>Japan has a long history of implementing robust IoT security measures. In 2019, the government-led NOTICE project, which scans IoT devices connected to the internet in Japan to identify vulnerable devices and report them to users for remediation, launched in cooperation with the private sector. In addition, in 2020, the technical standard for devices connected to the internet was revised to mandate minimum security requirements for devices. Security measures are being implemented for both devices before introduction to the market and those already deployed. Most recently, METI has led discussions to introduce an IoT-labeling scheme similar to that in the United States. The program is expected to be partially launched during FY 2024. A working group will be established between the governments of the United States and Japan to develop an action plan for the mutual recognition of schemes.</p> + +<p>Secure by design and secure by default is also a key theme in Japan. The Japanese government is a cosignatory to the joint guidance on secure by design issued in October 2023 by international partners, including CISA. In the area of SBOM, METI has developed guidance on SBOM implementation based on the results of a multiyear testing project. MIC is also studying the use of SBOM in the communications sector, conducting a pilot project to install SBOM in selected facilities of communications carriers to evaluate its effectiveness and identify any issues that may arise.</p> + +<p>Regarding AI, the Hiroshima AI Process, a Group of Seven (G7)-led initiative to develop international rules for the use of AI, was launched at the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023. Japan, as the chairing country, led the discussion. In December 2023, the Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework, Hiroshima Process International Guiding Principles for All AI Actors, and Hiroshima Process International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems were developed as deliverables of the Hiroshima AI Process. Within the government, there is a growing focus on the use of AI with safety and security. In February 2024, the Japan AI Safety Institute (AISI) was established. In April 2024, the AI Guidelines for Business was published, consolidating AI-related guidance previously dispersed across multiple agencies. The Japan AISI and NIST have completed a mapping of the AI Guidelines for Business and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework to ensure consistency with international discussions and to promote interoperability of AI policy frameworks between the United States and Japan.</p> <ul> - <li> - <p><em>A tabletop exercise held at CSIS this spring with U.S. and Philippine participants explored the strategic implications of different energy investments and their vulnerability to disruption.</em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>Bringing online renewable and clean energy sources is an imperative to providing for Philippine energy security in the long term, but fossil fuels will have a critical stabilizing role in the near term.</em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>The United States can support its ally through enhanced alliance programing, technical assistance, and new approaches to interagency cooperation.</em></p> - </li> + <li>Workforce</li> </ul> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>The 2021 national Cybersecurity Strategy highlights the need for a more robust cybersecurity workforce in terms of both quality and quantity through cooperation between the public and private sectors. This is one of the cross-cutting measures in the strategy to secure and train human resources. Cybersecurity-related agencies are implementing specific measures. For instance, MIC/NICT has operated the National Cyber Training Center since 2017. The center offers a range of training programs, including hands-on practical exercises for government agencies, local governments, and critical infrastructure owners and operators, as well as technical R&amp;D programs to train young people and practical defense exercises intended for national events such as the Olympics and World Expo. In 2017, METI and IPA established the Industrial Cyber Security Center of Excellence, which offers a one-year program to train IT and operational technology professionals with technology, management, and business perspectives. The lecturers are world-leading experts in control system security.</p> -<h4 id="an-alliance-reborn">An Alliance Reborn</h4> +<p>Regarding industry-led initiatives, a cross-industry cybersecurity study group has been active since 2015, with participation from companies in the critical infrastructure sectors. It has been engaged in discussions on how to strengthen the human resources ecosystem through collaboration between industry, academia, and government. The group has developed a reference defining human resources that aligns with NIST SP800-181, while taking into account the organizational structure and business practices of Japanese companies.</p> -<p>The U.S.-Philippine alliance is experiencing a renaissance. Driven by unrelenting pressure from Beijing on Philippine activities in the South China Sea, Manila has pushed forward with Washington on a range of measures to modernize the alliance and give substance to the commitments outlined in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. The once-stalled Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) — which provides for U.S. construction of joint facilities, pre-positioning of equipment, and rotational deployment of troops at designated Philippine military sites — has been given new life amid a flurry of military-to-military cooperation, and was expanded from five to nine sites in 2023. This July, the United States quintupled foreign military financing to the Philippines, announcing that $500 million would be made available in the 2024 fiscal year by the Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act. And in April 2024, recognizing that economic independence plays an equal part in securing the Philippines’ strategic autonomy, leaders of the United States, the Philippines, and Japan announced the Luzon Economic Corridor, an initiative under the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) to accelerate coordinated investments in high-impact infrastructure connecting four locations: Subic Bay, Clark Freeport and Special Economic Zone, Manila, and Batangas.</p> +<h3 id="current-status-of-japan-us-cooperation">Current Status of Japan-U.S. Cooperation</h3> -<p>But despite substantial progress, the alliance still faces tremendous challenges in securing the Philippines’ freedom from coercion. The country is on the wrong end of a significant capacity gap with China in the South China Sea. Outmatched by tens of China Coast Guard ships and hundreds of Chinese maritime militia vessels, the Philippines struggles to maintain access to outposts in disputed areas, even within its own exclusive economic zone. Regular confrontations with Chinese ships — and, more recently, aircraft — have injured Philippine troops, damaged vessels and equipment, and come dangerously close to resulting in the death of a service member, a contingency that could force Manila to invoke U.S. alliance commitments.</p> +<h4 id="japan-as-a-trusted-partner">Japan as a Trusted Partner</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ndUB05w.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>The United States is an important ally of Japan, and both countries have had a long-standing alliance built on mutual trust and cooperation for many years. While the alliance covers a wide range of areas, including national and economic security, many of today’s cooperative activities rely on cyberspace as their foundation. For instance, the digital infrastructure that serves as the foundation for intelligence and information sharing; Japan’s critical infrastructure, which U.S. military bases in Japan depend on; the supply chain that broadly covers both countries, including the defense industry; and the international business environment are all closely related to cyberspace. It is, therefore, essential to ensure the security and resilience of cyberspace if the two countries are to facilitate effective cooperation.</p> -<p>There are also challenges to the alliance from within the Philippines. While the current administration, political-military establishment, and a majority of public opinion support strong U.S. ties, there remains a vocal anti-U.S. coalition of politicians and elites with ties to the Duterte administration or China. Pro-China and anti-U.S. narratives are widespread in a fractured information environment susceptible to disinformation campaigns by China-linked media outlets. Cynics argue that Washington is only using the Philippines as a tool to contain China and defend Taiwan. Even among those who support stronger U.S.-Philippine ties, the shadow of past failures — particularly China’s 2012 seizure of Scarborough Shoal — looms large. Commitments to defense spending, military cooperation, and economic support do not necessarily answer the lingering concern that in a critical moment, the United States may not be willing or able to protect the Philippines.</p> +<p>The recent rise in geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and the increasing cyber threats posed by state-sponsored actors make Japan’s position in cybersecurity increasingly important. It is also important to note that a robust cybersecurity partnership between the United States and Japan, like-minded countries that share the common values of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, serves as deterrence against these foreign adversaries.</p> -<h4 id="a-critical-vulnerability-energy">A Critical Vulnerability: Energy</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The recent rise in geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and the increasing cyber threats posed by state-sponsored actors make Japan’s position in cybersecurity increasingly important.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Even as Washington and Manila work to modernize their alliance and solidify its foundations, an emerging vulnerability threatens to undermine its potential: the Philippines’ fragile energy outlook.</p> +<p>There are multiple public reports that assess Japan’s national cybersecurity capabilities, and each has a different methodology for its assessment. It is, therefore, important to have an in-depth understanding of the assessment methodologies when citing these reports. The author views Japan’s national cybersecurity capabilities as being on par with those of other like-minded countries. For example, the National Cyber Power Index 2022 assesses countries based on a range of indicators, including malicious activities such as external destructive attacks, reconnaissance, and financial crimes. Japan, with a low score in such indicators, is ranked 16th among all 30 countries. The report’s overall evaluation is based on two major elements: the cyber capabilities of a nation and its intentions to exercise those capabilities, including misuse. Japan is categorized as a nation with high capabilities and low intentions. In particular, Japan’s capabilities in the area of commercial cybersecurity technology and R&amp;D, which is one of the evaluation indicators, are rated highly. Similarly, in Cyber Capabilities and National Power, Japan is not ranked in the top category, but it is still evaluated as “a world leader in cyberspace technologies.” This indicates that cybersecurity technology and capabilities in the private sector are highly regarded. A security firm’s survey found that only 32 percent of organizations in Japan paid a ransom in 2023 after being infected with ransomware. The average rate across 15 countries, including the United States and Japan, was 54 percent, with the United States at 77 percent. The report indicates that Japan’s relatively low rate may be due to the nature of Japan as a disaster-prone country and the implementation of advanced backup measures to mitigate such risks. This could be another example of the advanced technological capabilities of Japanese companies, with their thorough preparedness in normal times and ability to quickly respond to and recover from incidents.</p> -<p>The Philippine energy mix is heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels, with coal accounting for 60 percent of power generation in 2022, up from 34 percent in 2010. This reliance on fossil fuels increases vulnerability to supply disruptions, a risk amplified by the nation’s archipelagic geography. The country suffers from some of the highest electricity prices in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). These vulnerabilities are compounded by operational challenges, including frequent blackouts, with most Filipinos experiencing power outages at least once a month.</p> +<p>Furthermore, Japan has achieved remarkable success in cyber operations, with no significant incidents during national events that can often be attractive targets for global attackers. These include the Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympics and Paralympic Games, the 2019 Rugby World Cup, the 2019 G20 Summit, and the 2023 G7 Summit. In particular, more than 450 million attack events were observed during the Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympics, which was more than twice the number observed during the London 2012 Summer Olympics, but through the implementation of appropriate measures, the games were able to conclude without any major incidents. This success was made possible by the significant contribution of Japanese companies with advanced technological capabilities as well as the close PPPs. Furthermore, in January 2023, NTT, a major Japanese telecommunications operator, became the first Asian member of JCDC in the United States. This could be further evidence of the high level of capability and international credibility of Japanese companies.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9jVDUze.png" alt="image02" /></p> +<p>The NSS of Japan demonstrates the government’s strong intention to fundamentally enhance national cybersecurity capabilities with sufficient authorities and resources. This is not only a strategic goal for Japan but also a strong commitment to the international community, especially like-minded countries. The implementation of this strategy is expected to facilitate robust and operational public-private bidirectional cooperation by further enhancing government capabilities and deepening the engagement of the private sector for national cybersecurity. This nationwide evolution will significantly enhance Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation.</p> -<p>The inadequacies of the power grid, including issues of transmission, storage, and inter-island connectivity, are concerns that the Philippines’ Department of Energy (PDOE) is keenly focused on. The grid also harbors a strategic vulnerability: its operator, the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP), is 40 percent owned by the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC). Fears in both Manila and Washington that Beijing could disable the grid in a time of crisis have lent urgency to efforts to reform its ownership and operational structure.</p> +<h4 id="existing-framework">Existing Framework</h4> -<p>Parallel to addressing immediate challenges, the Philippines is setting ambitious long-term goals under its Philippine Energy Plan 2023-2050 (PEP), which envisions a significant transition to renewable energy. The PEP aims to increase the share of renewables in the energy mix to over 50 percent by 2050, a substantial shift. Key legislative changes, such as a recent bill allowing 100 percent foreign ownership of renewable energy projects, are steps toward reaching this goal.</p> +<p>Cybersecurity has been identified as a key area of cooperation for the Japan-U.S. alliance. At the summit level, cybersecurity cooperation is regarded as a foundation for expanding and deepening security and defense cooperation. The joint statement issued in April 2024 highlighted the two countries’ commitment to strengthening cooperation in the areas of information and cybersecurity, as well as critical infrastructure protection. The U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership, a collaborative framework between the two countries agreed at the Japan-U.S. Summit in April 2021, identifies cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience as key areas of cooperation, along with the digital economy and economic security. Similarly, at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) held in July 2024, the two countries reaffirmed “the foundational importance of cyber and information security for the Alliance,” as well as “the importance of enhancing the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure.”</p> -<p>However, the country’s heavy reliance on energy imports continues to be a pressing issue, with over 50 percent of its energy supply sourced through net imports. The impending depletion of the Malampaya gas fields in the South China Sea, which currently supply about 30 percent of Luzon’s electricity, further exacerbates this problem. China’s willingness to use its coast guard to contest any new exploration or development in disputed areas has created reluctance within the private sector to invest in such a high-risk environment.</p> +<p>There are several government-wide bilateral dialogue frameworks in place. The Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue has been in place since 2013, with Japan’s MOFA and the U.S. DOS leading discussions on a wide range of topics, including situational awareness, cyber policy, cooperation in international fora, and capacity building. These discussions are attended by representatives from multiple government agencies with cybersecurity responsibilities from both countries. The U.S.-Japan Dialogue on the Digital Economy, formerly the U.S.-Japan Policy Cooperation Dialogue on the Internet Economy, has been held on a regular basis since 2010. The dialogue addresses a wide range of policy issues related to the digital economy, including cybersecurity. The dialogue, led by MIC and the DOS, is composed of two parts: an intergovernmental meeting and a public-private meeting. This meeting is also designed to serve as a framework to promote the CoRe Partnership. Furthermore, the U.S.-Japan Cyber Defense Policy Working Group, an intergovernmental cyber dialogue focused on defense policy, has been held since 2014 between MOD and the DOD. Other interagency dialogues and cooperative efforts are also underway, such as the memorandum of cooperation on cybersecurity signed between DHS and METI in January 2023.</p> -<p>Without smart mitigation, the Philippines’ current energy challenges threaten to leave it economically stunted and vulnerable to global supply shocks, economic coercion, physical and cyberattacks on infrastructure, and information operations that seek to undermine its strategic autonomy. How Manila calibrates its energy policy in the next several years will have critical ramifications for Philippine national security, the U.S.-Philippine alliance, and the Indo-Pacific at large.</p> +<p>Regarding the multilateral framework, the Quad has established a cooperation agenda in cybersecurity, focusing on four key areas: critical infrastructure cybersecurity, supply chain risk management, software security, and human resource development and training. This is known as the Quad Cybersecurity Partnership: Joint Principles. The topics have been regularly discussed among senior government cyber officials through the Quad Senior Cyber Group. At the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Tokyo in July 2024, the four member countries announced the establishment of the Quad Cyber Ambassadors Meeting to discuss the cyber capacity-building projects in the Indo-Pacific region and responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Furthermore, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have been working together through the Trilateral Diplomacy Working Group for Foreign Ministry Cooperation on North Korea’s Cyber Threats since December 2023. The NCS of the United States also emphasizes the importance of international cooperation, leveraging frameworks such as the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. At the G7, it has been confirmed that the seven countries should pursue four key approaches through the Cyber Working Group: (1) “promoting responsible state behavior,” (2) “improving cybersecurity, including in the private sector,” (3) “developing and using tools to deter and respond to malicious (state) behavior” and disrupt the attacker’s infrastructure, and (4) “strengthening our partners’ cyber security capacity.” The group has also agreed to work on countering ransomware, developing critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience, mutual recognition of schemes for secure IoT devices, and secure by design. At the United Nations, both the United States and Japan have taken the position that existing international law applies to cyberspace and have engaged in discussions to reinforce cyber norms of responsible state behavior. In recent years, following Japan’s official membership in the NATO CCDCOE, there has been an increase in the level of cooperation between the United States and Japan in multilateral cyber exercises. At the NATO Summit in Washington, D.C., in July 2024, NATO and its Indo-Pacific partner countries, including Japan, confirmed their intention to enhance practical cooperation in four key areas, including cyber defense. In the White House-led CRI, Japan, as an original member, has also contributed to international initiatives to counter ransomware.</p> -<h3 id="tabletop-exercise-design">Tabletop Exercise Design</h3> +<p>With regard to cooperation in industry, for example, ICT-ISAC Japan and Communications ISAC/IT-ISAC in the United States have been cooperating since 2016. The ISAC members have been exchanging threat information and best practices, as well as discussing operational collaboration, through regularly scheduled workshops. In 2019, a memorandum of cooperation was also signed between ICT-ISAC Japan and IT-ISAC to further strengthen cooperation. Furthermore, other collaborative efforts between ISACs in both countries are in place in key sectors such as finance and electricity.</p> -<p>To better understand the challenges, opportunities, and trade-offs facing Manila and Washington as they try to provide for Philippine energy security, CSIS conducted a tabletop exercise (TTX) with participants from U.S. government agencies, think tanks, and private sector energy companies, plus Philippine academics, national security experts, and former government officials. The TTX was conducted in person in April 2024 over two days, facilitating candid discussions under the Chatham House Rule.</p> +<p>While there are several policy cooperation initiatives between Japan and the United States at various levels and entities, there is still room for improvement in the actual implementation of these items. In recent years, there has been an increase in practical cooperation between both governments, including the release of joint guidance and advisories, law enforcement coordination, and capacity-building support in third countries. While this is a positive development, the number of such efforts would not necessarily be as large as that of the various cooperation agendas described above. There is still much to be done. To achieve deeper collaboration between the two countries, it is essential to operationalize and accelerate these agendas with greater involvement of the private sector.</p> -<p>The TTX took players through three interconnected modules focusing on energy, competition, and conflict, with the goal of determining optimal investments for different stakeholders within the context of strategic competition. Teams of participants representing the United States, the Philippines, China, and the private sector worked together to develop investment strategies and ranked seven areas of energy investment by priority: transmission and distribution, storage, renewables, nuclear, domestic oil and gas, imported oil and gas, and coal. The energy module was run three times over the course of the exercise, creating three sets of investment preferences: one after initial strategy discussions within players’ own teams, a second after each team’s preferences were shared with all other teams in a group discussion, and a third after teams had participated in competition and conflict modules.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To achieve deeper collaboration between the two countries, it is essential to operationalize and accelerate these agendas with greater involvement of the private sector.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Additionally, in advance of the TTX, a survey of Philippine public opinion was conducted by CSIS in cooperation with Philippine public opinion research firm WR Numero Research. This March 2024 in-person survey of 1,765 Filipinos informed the scenarios and design of the modules within the TTX, and results were used to inform participants of baseline attitudes among the Philippine public on key issues.</p> +<h3 id="cooperation-on-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity-and-resilience">Cooperation on Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and Resilience</h3> -<h4 id="exercise-results-and-key-findings">Exercise Results and Key Findings</h4> +<h4 id="global-challenges">Global Challenges</h4> -<p>The energy investment preferences of each team are summarized in the table below, which lists the top three priorities for each team by round.</p> +<p>This and subsequent chapters shift the focus of discussions to critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience, which is one of the priority areas for Japan-U.S. cooperation. In light of the growing threats to critical infrastructure, it has become increasingly important for nations to ensure the cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructure, which people and nations rely on every day. This is a universal challenge for governments worldwide, requiring cooperation with a wide range of domestic and international stakeholders.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RqpXhde.png" alt="image03" /></p> +<p>The majority of infrastructure is owned and operated by private companies, and they are primarily responsible for protecting their own organizations. At the same time, the government plays a key role in empowering them through various means, including its own intelligence, law enforcement authorities, international coordination, policy tools (e.g., grants, incentives), and regulations, as infrastructure cybersecurity is a matter of national defense. Private companies also cooperate with the government in providing technical and operational expertise with their unique threat and risk information, as well as cybersecurity products and services. This is a shared responsibility among a diverse range of stakeholders.</p> -<p>Over the course of the TTX, several key themes emerged.</p> +<p>Furthermore, international cooperation is also essential, given the global nature of cyberspace. The fundamental principle is, of course, that nations should cooperate to reinforce international cyber norms of responsible state behavior. However, in practice, this approach alone cannot address all issues. There are a number of other considerations that leave room for international cooperation, including infrastructure interdependencies, global supply chains, regulatory harmonization, and the resilience of like-minded countries as a whole. These are still developing areas of discussion. No country is yet perfect, and all are still developing through a process of trial and error. Given the global nature of these challenges, it is imperative that countries work together to address them.</p> -<p><em>The Battle for the Grid</em></p> +<h4 id="opportunity-for-japan-us-alliance">Opportunity for Japan-U.S. Alliance</h4> -<p>Transmission and distribution (T+D), and to a lesser extent storage, were key focuses of the U.S., Philippine, and Chinese teams from the beginning to the end of the game. The focus on transmission and distribution — with transmission referring to large-scale movement of high-voltage power from plants to substations, and distribution referring to smaller-scale movement of lower-voltage power from substations to consumers — was particularly acute given the contested status of the NGCP’s Chinese ownership stake. The Chinese team viewed its involvement in the Philippine electrical grid as a lever of power that it could employ in a crisis to cause paralysis among Philippine decisionmakers and, potentially, military forces. The United States and the Philippines both recognized that threat, which contributed to their own prioritization of T+D. Both additionally expressed an interest to enhance the grid and expand it to more remote areas, seeing its current state as a key bottleneck in delivering reliable power across the Philippines.</p> +<p>As previously stated, the Japan-U.S. alliance is founded on cyberspace, with critical infrastructure being a central element of this. For instance, there are interdependencies in critical infrastructure between the two countries. The failure of essential national functions, such as power, communications, and transportation, directly impacts information and intelligence sharing between the two countries, as well as the transportation of goods and personnel for defense. In addition, globally interconnected infrastructures such as the internet can rapidly propagate the effects of a failure in one country to others. Both countries have world-class internet service providers (ISPs), which account for approximately half of the world’s Tier 1 carriers. These companies have a significant impact on the global network infrastructure.</p> -<p>Philippine participants emphasized that while the future of SGCC’s ownership stake in the grid is a political question, there are also practical concerns about the operation of the grid. Although the NGCP concession agreement mandates that Philippine nationals remain in charge of all operational functions of the grid, SGCC has been accused of instead hiring Chinese personnel and even having systems and operator instructions exclusively in Chinese, raising questions about whether the Philippines can easily replace Chinese functions inside the NGCP.</p> +<p>Today, the United States and Japan are facing a common significant threat to their critical infrastructure. In January 2024, the heads of ONCD, CISA, the FBI, and USCYBERCOM testified at a hearing of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, warning of the threat posed by suspected Chinese-sponsored actors known as Volt Typhoon. The group has been targeting U.S. critical infrastructure, with a particular focus on the nation’s essential sectors, including communications, energy, transportation, and water. This is being done through tactics known as “living off the land,” where the attacker gains access to infrastructure and remains undetected for an extended period of time to pre-position itself to immediately trigger a destructive action in the event of an emergency. This is not only a threat to the United States but also to Japan, a U.S. ally in the Indo-Pacific region. This is an extremely deep-rooted problem, with such activities expected to continue for at least five years. Even the United States, which is at the center of the problem, has not yet been able to fully “uncover and eradicate” the threat. In light of this common threat posed by advanced state-sponsored actors, it is imperative that allied countries leverage their respective information and expertise to jointly analyze the threat and risk and develop countermeasures. It is also crucial to ensure that Japan and the United States can collectively respond to such activities in order to maintain the resilience of their alliance as a whole in the event of an attack.</p> -<p>In contrast to the national teams, the private sector team remained hesitant about investing in the grid. The concession agreement with SGCC was seen as a fundamental obstacle, as all cooperative projects would need to involve the Chinese company, which would preclude involvement from most other private partners, particularly U.S. companies. The Philippines’ archipelagic geography was also seen as making transmission or distribution development in Mindanao and the Visayas economically unattractive — a problem compounded by fears that any investment would be subject to the approval of local political leaders who sometimes have personal interests in utility markets, introducing a high level of political risk for the life of the project.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is also crucial to ensure that Japan and the United States can collectively respond to such activities in order to maintain the resilience of their alliance as a whole in the event of an attack.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><em>Competing Priorities: Imported Oil and Gas vs. Renewables</em></p> +<p>Both governments recognize the importance of Japan-U.S. cooperation in the field of critical infrastructure and have made it a high priority on the agendas of the Japan-U.S. Summit, bilateral cyber dialogue, and the Quad. However, both countries’ efforts tend to focus on domestic issues, and concrete and tangible operational collaboration between the two countries is not necessarily sufficient. As previously stated, Japan and the United States have recently been implementing more practical cooperation initiatives, but there is still a need for both countries to further expand these efforts and operationalize them with speed and scale while ensuring greater involvement of critical infrastructure owners and operators in both countries.</p> -<p>Strong interest in renewable energy solutions for the Philippines was evident, consistently ranking among the top four priority areas for all teams. But notable shifts in priorities occurred over the course of the game, with more groups placing a higher priority on imported oil and gas (IO&amp;G) than renewable energy (RE) by the end of the TTX.</p> +<h4 id="recent-developments">Recent Developments</h4> -<p>In round one, renewables enjoyed high interest from all teams, but did not make the top three of the Philippines team, which placed IO&amp;G as their number one priority. The Philippine team explained that its preference was driven by the necessities of timing: only IO&amp;G was perceived to be able to meet rising energy demand over the next 10–15 years. Following this discussion, other teams responded: IO&amp;G rose above renewable energy for the United States in round two, and the private sector also mildly elevated priority on IO&amp;G. After the teams played through competition and conflict scenarios, the shift became even more pronounced, with the United States elevating IO&amp;G to its top priority. Renewables remained in the top three only for China, which continued to think that their adoption would present opportunities for increased influence in the Philippines through the provision of renewable equipment and technology. Renewables remained a close fourth, however, for both the Philippines and the United States, who both saw a transition to renewable energy as inevitable for the Philippines, current strategic exigencies notwithstanding.</p> +<p>This section outlines frameworks and efforts related to critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience in the United States and Japan, with a focus on recent developments.</p> -<p><em>Mirrored Image Problems: Nuclear Energy and Domestic Oil and Gas</em></p> +<p><em>THE UNITED STATES</em></p> -<p>Despite official efforts to accelerate cooperation between the United States and the Philippines on civil nuclear technology, nuclear energy was deprioritized by the national teams. Philippine participants placed a low priority on nuclear energy, citing popular fears of a nuclear disaster given the frequency of extreme weather events in the Philippines. The Fukushima accident in Japan, brought on by an extreme weather event itself, has remained in the public eye in the Philippines as maritime communities have voiced concerns over the potential impact of treated nuclear wastewater released into the Pacific Ocean.</p> +<ul> + <li>Basic Strategy and Policy</li> +</ul> -<p>The reverse disparity was observed for domestic oil and gas: though it is unclear whether untapped gas reserves in the South China Sea would make a critical difference in meeting Philippine energy needs over the coming decades, it remained a major topic of discussion almost entirely for its symbolic importance. The national teams ultimately deprioritized it, with Philippine and U.S. teams citing the risk of interference by China as a critical barrier to development. However, due in part to extensive media coverage over the last decade, oil and gas in the South China Sea are widely seen in the Philippines as valuable resources that have been unjustly denied by China.</p> +<p>The fundamental policy framework for critical infrastructure protection is based on NSM-22. This memorandum replaced PPD-21 of 2013, making the first update to the framework in 11 years. The document is also intended to formalize the efforts made by the U.S. government during this period. This includes defining the role and responsibilities of CISA as the national coordinator for critical infrastructure protection, which did not exist at the time, as well as defining the role and responsibilities of the SRMAs. This requires SRMAs to conduct sector-specific risk assessments and develop sector-specific risk management plans every two years. CISA/DHS is required to conduct cross-sector risk assessments based on input from the SRMAs and develop a National Infrastructure Risk Management Plan (NIRMP) every two years. It is assumed that the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 2013, developed under PPD-21, will remain effective until the release of NIRMP, which is due by April 2025. NSM-22 also requires the development of minimum cybersecurity and resilience requirements for critical infrastructure and the implementation of these requirements using regulatory and other authorities. In addition, it requires the government to understand critical infrastructure interdependencies, analyze systemic risk, identify systemically important entities (SIEs), and enhance collaboration with the intelligence community, including the timely sharing of declassified information.</p> -<p>These sensibilities were also observed in the public opinion survey conducted prior to the TTX.</p> +<p>In June 2024, DHS released the Strategic Guidance and National Priorities for U.S. Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. This guidance aligns with NSM-22 and identifies risk areas that the nation should prioritize over the next two years to build secure and resilient critical infrastructure. The priority areas include addressing cyber threats posed by China, managing the evolving risks presented by AI, and identifying and mitigating supply chain vulnerabilities. The document then outlines the priorities for mitigating those risks, including adopting baseline requirements, incentivizing service providers to reduce risk, and identifying SIEs.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QfJwdlo.png" alt="image04" /></p> +<p>The National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) was developed in 2016 as a document outlining a national approach to addressing large-scale cyber incidents. In accordance with the NCS, CISA is currently leading the revision of this plan, which is scheduled for release by the end of 2024. The U.S. critical infrastructure protection effort is in the midst of a major renewal, with anticipated developments over the next year.</p> -<p>While survey participants favored energy transmission and grid development as the top targets for U.S. energy investment in the Philippines, over 40 percent also supported oil and gas exploration, while less than 25 percent expressed support for nuclear power.</p> +<ul> + <li>Sectors</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="planning-for-a-secure-transition">Planning for a Secure Transition</h4> +<p>NSM-22 defines 16 critical infrastructure sectors and SRMAs for the sectors (Figure 4). While there has been discussion about whether cloud infrastructure, on which all sectors depend, and space systems, which have become more strategic for both commercial and military use, should be added as new sectors, NSM-22 does not change the sector designation of the previous directive. However, NSM-22 requires DHS to develop recommendations for the president regarding the list of critical infrastructure sectors and subsectors, leaving the potential for future designation.</p> -<p>The U.S. and Philippine teams were aligned in their goal of enabling the Philippines to resist coercion. To do this, their final energy investment strategies sought to balance competing priorities in several dimensions:</p> +<p>There is a wide range of sector types, from those with strict cybersecurity regulations to those with few such regulations, and the maturity of cybersecurity varies from sector to sector. Even within a sector, there is a large gap in maturity between large and small companies. The government has identified water, healthcare, and K-12 educational institutions as sectors that are particularly vulnerable to attack and under-resourced. It is, therefore, providing support through the provision of sector-specific guidance and shared services. The significant cyber incident at Change Healthcare in February 2024, which reportedly affected the patient records of one in three Americans and had a broad impact on the entire sector, was a clear example of the urgent need to elevate the cybersecurity posture of these sectors. This has led to accelerated discussions on the development of minimum cybersecurity requirements and legislation in the healthcare sector. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), as the SRMA, has also published a sector-specific strategy that includes setting sector-specific performance goals, encouraging best practices, and providing financial support and incentives to strengthen sector-wide cybersecurity. The water sector has also been engaged in discussions on developing cybersecurity requirements and regulations in light of the widespread cyberattacks by Iranian-supported actors as well as growing concerns about being a potential target of Volt Typhoon.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eIO1vYk.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Critical Infrastructure Sectors in the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s compilation based on <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/04/30/national-security-memorandum-on-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/">“National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” White House, April 30, 2024</a>.</em></p> <ul> - <li> - <p>Near-term stability vs. long-term sustainability</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Economic efficiency vs. strategic preparedness</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Energy sourcing vs. power infrastructure</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Grid resilience vs. grid expansion</p> - </li> + <li>Structure of Information Sharing and Incident Response</li> </ul> -<p>IO&amp;G, especially liquidified natural gas (LNG), was seen to be a critical component of the Philippines’ energy mix over the coming decades and one of the only energy sources that could meet growing demand in the near term. Both teams sought to make investments in LNG terminals and plants to connect this resource to the transmission grid and to distribute these terminals geographically such that, in the event of a conflict, cargoes could still be delivered.</p> +<p>Figure 5 shows the nationwide information-sharing and incident response structure, including both public and private sectors, in relation to critical infrastructure. Please note that this figure is created based on publicly available information, including NCIRP, and has been generalized to provide a comprehensive overview rather than specific details. Therefore, it should be noted that the information provided may not be entirely precise or applicable to all cases.</p> -<p>The power grid was also a top priority. The Philippine team aimed to implement an urgent review and elimination of Chinese involvement in grid systems and operations such that, even if the SGCC concession agreement itself was not altered or canceled, grid operations would remain firmly under Philippine control. Teams also identified a need to develop grid infrastructure to integrate renewable energy resources. In doing so, participants saw an opportunity to enhance the resilience of the power system by developing microgrids that would not be integrated directly into the NGCP-run central grid. This was seen as a better fit for the Philippines’ archipelagic geography as well as an opportunity for U.S. and other companies to contribute to developing the Philippine power system in a way that would avoid the difficulties of partnering with the Chinese-invested NGCP.</p> +<p>CISA serves as the national coordinator for critical infrastructure protection. The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) within CISA serves as the operational center for critical infrastructure protection, coordinating and sharing information on vulnerabilities, incidents, risk mitigations, and others in cooperation with public and private organizations. The National Coordinating Center for Communications (NCC), under the NCCIC, monitors events affecting telecommunications services and infrastructure and leads incident response in cooperation with the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)/the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), government agencies, and private operators, mainly in the communications sector. Unlike other ISACs established independently in the private sector, the Communications ISAC is an operational function of NCC. It facilitates information sharing and analysis in the private sector while operating within the government. The Office of the National Coordinator, which serves as a single coordination point for SRMAs, will be established within CISA under the direction of NSM-22. The Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) is operated by ODNI and serves as the central hub for cyber threat intelligence, integrating and analyzing information collected from intelligence communities such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the NSA to support incident response. NCIJTF is hosted by the FBI and serves as the primary coordinating body for law enforcement operations, including cybercriminal investigations and prosecutions. In the event of significant incidents, the Cyber Unified Coordination Group (UCG) is formed to facilitate the coordination of incident response among NCCIC, CTIIC, NCIJTF, and other relevant agencies. The Cyber Response Group, which is organized under the NSC, coordinates the incident response at the policy level. Sector-specific coordination is conducted through SRMAs.</p> -<p>Storage was a key piece of each team’s final strategy, and was linked with plans to both import hydrocarbons in the near term and bring online renewable energy in the long term. The Philippine team aimed to fast-track the creation of a strategic petroleum reserve that would provide for 90 days of the country’s energy consumption, a measure that the Philippine government started in 2019 but put on hold in 2022. Teams also sought to invest in power storage for the energy grid as a prerequisite for the connection of renewable energy sources — without it, the variable output of renewables could contribute to grid instability.</p> +<p>Each sector has a self-organized and self-governed SCC. It comprises critical infrastructure owners and operators, trade associations, and other relevant entities. SCC serves as the primary coordinating body within the sector, facilitating information sharing and the discussions of sector-specific strategies and risks. It also serves as a point of contact for the corresponding GCC and SRMA within the government. Cross-sector cooperation among SCCs is facilitated by the Critical Infrastructure Cross-Sector Council (CICSC). The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) serves as a framework for cross-sector cooperation between the public and private sectors (both SCCs and GCCs). Additionally, ISACs have been established in the private sector as industry-led organizations for day-to-day operational cooperation. There are more than 20 ISACs in the United States. While they are not necessarily mapped with sectors on a one-to-one basis, there is an ISAC that covers each sector, such as the Communications ISAC, Financial Services ISAC (FS-ISAC), Electricity ISAC (E-ISAC), and so on. NCI facilitates cross-sector operational cooperation among ISACs. These ISACs also cooperate with CISA and SRMAs at the operational level. Moreover, several cross-sector initiatives exist, such as JCDC, where major companies and government agencies engage in operational cooperation on specific issues. As outlined above, collaboration between critical infrastructure owners and operators and government agencies is being implemented at various levels, from strategic and planning aspects to operational aspects through various channels, including SCC and ISAC, as well as direct communication with CISA and SRMAs.</p> -<p>Renewables themselves were seen as the final essential component of a Philippine energy security strategy. Transition to renewables was seen as the best way to reduce the Philippines’ external dependencies and vulnerabilities to price shocks, blockades, and resource depletion. Solar, offshore wind, and hydropower were all raised as important sources to explore, with all likely to play some role in a renewables mix. While the Philippines is already a significant producer of geothermal energy, little opportunity was seen to expand this production, which is heavily dependent on localized areas of geothermal activity. Biomass was also dismissed as having little potential to play a major role in a future renewable energy mix, though smaller-scale efforts to incorporate biofuels for vehicles were seen as having some potential utility.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Jh0eb5j.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Information-Sharing and Incident Response Structure in the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis based on <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/national_cyber_incident_response_plan.pdf">U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Cyber Incident Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: DHS, December 2016)</a>.</em></p> -<h4 id="potential-for-disruption">Potential for Disruption</h4> +<ul> + <li>Public and Private Initiatives</li> +</ul> -<p>The China team’s strategy revolved around different end goals: maintaining influence over Philippine energy sectors, displacing the United States as a provider and partner in these areas, and ultimately disrupting the U.S.-Philippine alliance. To this end, its prioritization of different energy investments was not based on any desired end state for the Philippines’ energy outlook, but instead largely sought to follow whichever area the Philippines was interested in and outcompete the United States in order to establish or maintain influence. The ability of China’s government to directly control the investment or operations of both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and nominally private Chinese companies was seen as an advantage that would allow China to outbid U.S. or other companies on renewable projects. Facing a Philippine team that declared a clear interest in working with the United States, the China team also turned to investing in renewables and microgrids in the provinces, hoping to foster the narrative that China was in fact doing more for Philippine public good than the United States. And in response to Philippine efforts to limit Chinese involvement in the power grid, the China team aimed to leverage connections with provincial governments and local authorities to impede those efforts and prevent Philippine leadership from uniting to execute its planned strategy.</p> +<p>The United States has a long history of close PPPs in critical infrastructure protection, with a variety of collaborative initiatives currently in place. JCDC, one of the most notable initiatives in recent years, is a cross-sector, operational collaborative framework composed of key government agencies and selected private-sector companies. This enables members to share and analyze unique threat intelligence and information from both the government and the private sector, as well as jointly develop countermeasures in a timely manner. The initiative was launched in 2021 with the participation of approximately 10 companies, primarily in the IT, communications, and cybersecurity industries. The number of participating companies has since expanded to other sectors, and there are now over 300 members, including NTT, a major telecommunications carrier in Japan, as the first member in the Asian region. As indicated in the NCS, one of the current focuses is to enhance the speed and scale of operations. This would need to include cooperation with major foreign companies to address growing global-scale threats posed by state-sponsored actors. Other sector-based operational cooperation includes the Department of Energy’s Energy Threat Analysis Center, the DOD’s Defense Industrial Base Collaborative Information Sharing Environment, and the NSA’S CCC. The government plans to further strengthen and integrate these individual efforts into a federal cybersecurity center.</p> -<h3 id="ongoing-efforts-and-potential-tools">Ongoing Efforts and Potential Tools</h3> +<p>Another key initiative is the ICT Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Task Force, which was launched in 2018. It is a PPP program that identifies challenges and develops solutions to enhance the resilience of the global ICT supply chain. The group is primarily composed of private companies in the communications and IT sectors, as well as CISA, and works on specific topics such as AI, SMBs, and software, providing guidance and other deliverables to the public.</p> -<p>Public and private actors in the Philippines and the United States are actively pursuing many of the secure transition strategies identified during the TTX. This section will outline ongoing, high-value U.S. initiatives that are aimed at improving Philippine energy security or that have strong potential to serve as vehicles for future efforts.</p> +<ul> + <li>Laws and Regulations</li> +</ul> -<p><em>Energy Policy Dialogue</em></p> +<p>As previously stated, the Biden administration has acknowledged the importance of long-lasting voluntary PPPs. However, it has also recognized that this alone is not sufficient and has taken a major step in strengthening laws, regulations, and requirements for critical infrastructure.</p> -<p>In August 2023, the United States and the Philippines launched the first U.S.-Philippines Energy Policy Dialogue. A product of agreements made during Vice President Kamala Harris’s visit to the Philippines in November 2022, the dialogue brought together representatives from the Department of State’s Bureau of Energy Resources, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the PDOE to discuss the acceleration of renewable energy, transmission modernization and expansion, and reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels. The dialogue also established priorities for future technical support and discussed nuclear energy cooperation opportunities, likely aiding in the signing of a 123 Agreement the following year.</p> +<p>CIRCIA is one of the examples that highlights this approach. This is the first cross-sector legislation requiring critical infrastructure owners and operators to report significant cyber incidents to the government within 72 hours and ransomware payments within 24 hours. The Notice of Proposed Rule Making was released in April 2024, and the final rule is expected to take effect in 2025. In addition, the White House is currently leading a review and reinforcement of sector-specific cybersecurity requirements as part of existing regulations. The pipeline, rail, and airline industries have made notable progress in recent years in enhancing and refining their cybersecurity requirements, overseen by the Transportation Security Administration. Furthermore, in February 2024, an EO was issued to reinforce cybersecurity in the ports industry, with requirements currently under development. In the healthcare sector, the NDAA of FY 2023 included enhanced security requirements for medical devices, and further requirements and regulations for organizations are also under discussion. In the communications sector, FCC is exploring the potential use of its existing regulatory authority over communications carriers to establish and expand cybersecurity rules. Congress is also considering a legislative approach for certain sectors, such as the water sector, where regulators have limited authority to build additional cybersecurity requirements on existing regulations. The variation from highly regulated to largely unregulated sectors is a significant concern, and the NCS and NSM-22 have emphasized the need to develop common baseline requirements for entire sectors. Moreover, as a broader regulation beyond critical infrastructure, SEC’s updated rule of December 2023 requires listed companies to disclose material incidents within four business days and to annually disclose the cybersecurity posture of their organizations. As previously stated, there are a number of regulations across sectors, and some of these are said to be duplicative and inefficient, leading to unnecessary burdens for companies. ONCD is now taking the lead in studying ways to harmonize these regulations.</p> -<p>During the fourth 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue between foreign and defense secretaries of the United States and the Philippines on July 30, 2024, the two sides committed to convening a second energy policy dialogue in Manila later this year, noting that the dialogue will provide “a platform to accelerate efforts to diversify critical minerals supply chains, promote renewable energy deployment, foster reliable and resilient power grids, and elevate energy security.”</p> +<ul> + <li>Other Policy Approaches</li> +</ul> -<p><em>Civil Nuclear Cooperation</em></p> +<p>There are several ways to encourage companies to meet cybersecurity requirements, including not only regulations but also various policy approaches, such as the use of government procurement power and grants. This is a strategic objective included in pillar 3 of the NCS, as well as a policy objective incorporated into NSM-22. For instance, while not necessarily limited to critical infrastructure, the proposed revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation include relatively strong requirements for federal contractors to report cyber incidents within eight hours, provide SBOM information for systems involved in contracted services, and allow government agencies access to their network systems in the event of an incident. For cloud services, the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) is in operation as a federal procurement requirement. This requires cloud providers to comply with cybersecurity requirements based on NIST SP 800-53 and obtain certification. In the defense industry, the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification 2.0 is being developed to certify the cybersecurity maturity of contractors based on NIST SP 800-171. Moreover, it has become more common in recent years for certain cybersecurity requirements to be incorporated into the application process for federal grant programs.</p> -<p>In November 2023, the United States and the Philippines signed a 123 Agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. Entered into force on July 2, 2024, the agreement provides the legal framework for exports to the Philippines of nuclear material, equipment, components, and information for nuclear research and civil nuclear energy production. Even before the signing of the agreement, the PEP had targeted 1,200 MW of nuclear power generation by 2032, increasing to 2,400 MW by 2035, and up to a total of 4,800 MW by 2050. The initial 1,200 MW is envisioned to come from eight 150 MW small modular reactors (SMRs). Several Philippine companies are already exploring cooperation with U.S. SMR firms, including Ultra Safe Nuclear and NuScale Power. The United States is facilitating further connections through a civil nuclear industry working group based in Manila, which held its first virtual meeting between U.S. companies and the Philippine government on July 31.</p> +<ul> + <li>Voluntary Framework and Guidance</li> +</ul> -<p>In addition to SMRs, the Philippines is also considering the possibility of conventional nuclear reactors, including the potential restoration of the existing Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. The plant was completed in 1986 but shuttered before it was ever fired, amid public protests and concerns that it was built near a major fault line in an earthquake-prone region. Nevertheless, the PDOE is in discussions with Korea Hydro &amp; Nuclear Power about a feasibility study on reviving the plant, which was originally engineered to provide an output of 621 MW.</p> +<p>Government agencies frequently publish cybersecurity frameworks, guidance, best practices, and other resources, with NIST playing a central role. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) would be the most central document of them all. The CSF 1.0 was initially developed in 2013 for critical infrastructure, and the CSF 2.0, the latest version, was released in February 2024. The CSF has been widely adopted internationally as a common framework that can be used by a wide variety of organizations, regardless of size or industry. The CSF 2.0 is a voluntary, risk-based, and global consensus-based framework that was developed through a two-year revision process, incorporating stakeholders’ comments and feedback. Japanese companies have been actively involved in the revision process, providing comments, participating in workshops, and engaging in individual discussions. In addition, the framework concept has recently gained recognition even in the regulatory environment. In regulatory discussions, there is a clear need for a risk-based approach rather than prescriptive checklist-based requirements. There is also a need for a common framework that all industries can rely on to help avoid duplicative requirements, as well as a common language that facilitates communication with stakeholders at all levels. The CSFs are increasingly being brought up as a potential solution to the needs. Furthermore, CISA has developed voluntary Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs), which are based on the CSF and summarize the minimum practices that should be implemented by critical infrastructure owners and operators in all sectors. Moreover, sector-specific goals are being developed based on these CPGs under the leadership of CISA and SRMAs.</p> -<p><em>Energy Secure Philippines</em></p> +<p>CISA and SRMAs provide sector-specific guidance and best practices, such as for the water and healthcare sectors. CISA, NIST, ICT SCRM Task Force, and other entities also provide resources to support SMBs that lack the resources to implement cybersecurity measures. In addition, industry-led guidance is also being developed in each sector. For instance, the Cyber Risk Institute in the financial sector provides resources to assist financial organizations in implementing risk management aligned with the CSF, which takes into account sector-specific risk and regulatory environments.</p> -<p>The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) primary workstream on Philippine energy is Energy Secure Philippines, a five-year, $34 million project that aims to improve the reliability and resilience of the Philippine power system. Running from 2020 to 2025, the program focuses on digitization of distribution and utilities, development of financing platforms for utility resiliency investments, development of a resiliency assessment system, and implementation of cybersecurity standards and best practices across the power sector.</p> +<p>In addition, technical and operational advisories and guidance, including those for significant threats such as severe vulnerabilities and large-scale attacks by state-sponsored actors, are being published by major government agencies such as CISA, the FBI, and the NSA, in cooperation with international partners. The partners are primarily Five Eyes countries, with some EU countries, but there have been cases where the United States and Japan have collaborated on the release of advisories, such as the joint advisory on BlackTech in September 2023.</p> -<p><em>Competitive Renewable Energy Zones</em></p> +<ul> + <li>Plan and Preparedness</li> +</ul> -<p>In September of 2018, the PDOE authorized the study and designation of Competitive Renewable Energy Zones (CREZ) in the Philippines. Conducted by the PDOE and the NGCP with support from USAID and the DOE’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), CREZ is a transmission planning tool that seeks to identify high concentrations of renewable resources and plan for corresponding transmission infrastructure that would maximize efficiencies and provide the groundwork for investment in renewables generation. The process is chaired by the PDOE but also involves the NGCP as well as numerous organizations and departments associated with energy, the electricity market, and the grid. USAID and NREL have provided training and assistance to the PDOE and the NGCP in identifying CREZ and conducting load modeling, forecasting, and power system planning. The model is based on Texas’s implementation of CREZ from 2005 to 2014 to bring wind power into the state’s grid but currently incorporates only the analysis and planning phases, with no commitment to construct the planned transmission infrastructure. The project does, however, provide assistance to the PDOE in preparing and submitting new renewable transmission projects to the Energy Regulatory Commission, as well as training for the commission on how to assess those submissions. CREZ is currently in phase three, which spans from 2023 to 2025 and focuses on implementing plans from phases one and two as well as mapping offshore wind resources for future implementation.</p> +<p>As part of the NIPP, a Sector-Specific Plan is developed in each sector, which outlines the sector-specific environment and risks, along with goals and priorities for addressing those risks. Going forward, SRMAs will conduct sector-specific risk assessments in accordance with NSM-22 guidance. The assessments will identify major risks within a sector, taking into account any interdependencies with other sectors. The Sector Specific Risk Management Plan will be updated based on the assessment every two years. CISA will also conduct a cross-sector risk assessment based on each sector’s risk assessment and input from the intelligence community and identify cross-sector critical risks. The NIRMP will then be developed every two years based on the work completed. These plans will serve as the foundation for risk management across the entire critical infrastructure.</p> -<p><em>Luzon Economic Corridor</em></p> +<p>In an advanced effort, the National Risk Management Center (NRMC) under CISA has developed the National Critical Functions (NCFs), which analyze critical infrastructure in terms of functions essential to national operations rather than sectors or companies. The NCFs have a set of 55 functions in four categories: “connect,” “distribute,” “manage,” and “supply.” The NCFs are designed to assist CISA in examining interdependencies and systemic risk among critical infrastructure entities as functions. The NCF Risk Architecture is being developed under the leadership of NRMC to structure dependencies between sub-functions, systems, and assets and components by decomposing the NCFs. The results will be used for more advanced risk analysis, such as identifying the critical elements and entities on which the NCFs depend. The initial set of NCFs was released in 2019, but subsequent studies, such as the development of the NCF Risk Architecture, have taken time due to the complexity of the task. The NCFs can be utilized as a tool for advanced risk analysis of critical infrastructure. However, at this point, there is still a need to increase awareness of NCFs among stakeholders and ensure that they are being fully utilized in actual operations. Another related concept is the one proposed by the CSC, which is to identify and support systemically important entities among a wide range of critical infrastructure owners and operators in exchange for higher-security requirements. Although several attempts to legislate this idea have failed, the administration is currently pursuing the work to identify and prioritize these entities as SIEs. This effort is also formalized in NSM-22. While the list will not be publicly available, it is expected to be used for a variety of purposes, including national incident response, prioritization of government efforts, and consideration of the applicability of regulatory requirements.</p> -<p>In April 2024, U.S., Philippine, and Japanese leaders together launched the Luzon Economic Corridor (LEC) as an initiative of the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI). To be coordinated by the State Department, the LEC is aimed at supporting connectivity between Subic Bay, Clark Freeport and Special Economic Zone, Manila, and Batangas, with $14.75 million to support project preparation and technical assistance for infrastructure and other strategic investments.</p> +<p>Regarding national-level cyber exercises, the Cyber Storm initiative, hosted by CISA, has been conducted every other year since 2006. This cross-sector, public-private, operational-based functional exercise brings together over 2,000 participants, including federal agencies, local governments, multi-sectoral critical infrastructure owners and operators, ISACs, and international partners. The exercise simulates responses to significant cyber incident scenarios in critical infrastructure. While this exercise is primarily for public and private-sector participants in the United States, Japan participates in the information-sharing and incident response coordination exercise as a member of the International Watch and Warning Network with like-minded countries. Another industry-led initiative is the tri-sector exercise, which brings together owners and operators in the financial, power, and communications sectors. Participants are divided into attack and defense teams. Previously, the lessons learned from the exercise were shared with the government after the event, but government officials have directly participated in the exercise since the third event held in March 2024.</p> -<p>The original announcement of the LEC mentioned energy only in the context of “clean energy and semiconductor supply chains and deployments,” one of four target investment areas that also include rail, ports modernization, and agribusiness. But a PGI fact sheet released by the White House on June 13 during the G7 summit in Fasano, Italy, touted more specific developments, including a U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) grant for a private energy developer in the Philippines to evaluate the use of a U.S. geothermal firm’s technology to increase power production. The fact sheet also lists a grant for a feasibility study and pilot for a Philippine telecom operator to develop a 5G mobile and fixed wireless network in the Philippines — a project that does not clearly fall within the specified focuses of the original LEC launch announcement. Given the broad scope of investments covered by the LEC’s stated goals and the apparent flexibility in incorporating new ones, it is likely that the LEC could function as a vehicle for further activities related to energy security.</p> +<ul> + <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> +</ul> -<p><em>Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement</em></p> +<p>The critical infrastructure is based on a diverse range of technologies, products, and services. While this paper does not cover all topics in detail, it does briefly address two recent developments of note: AI and internet routing security.</p> -<p>Signed in 2014, EDCA provides for the U.S. construction of joint facilities, pre-positioning of equipment, and rotational deployment of troops at designated Philippine military sites. EDCA projects to date have been focused on improving Philippine military facilities, but there have also been mentions of potential expansion of programming to include efforts aimed at benefiting surrounding communities. A May 2023 White House fact sheet on the U.S.-Philippine alliance noted that the United States was working with communities near EDCA sites to drive sustainable development and investment. A joint statement from the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in July mentions plans for USAID to pre-position humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) commodities for use by Philippine civilian disaster response authorities at one EDCA site. Given the interest in providing public goods to local communities, EDCA programming that could provide local energy solutions has the potential to both contribute to energy resiliency and counter anti-EDCA and anti-U.S. narratives.</p> +<p>A number of AI-related initiatives are being undertaken in line with EO 14110, which places the safety and security of AI at the forefront of all considerations. One of the key areas of the EO is to manage AI risks in critical infrastructure. A cross-sector and sector-specific risk assessment related to the use of AI in critical infrastructure was conducted, and based on the results, guidelines on AI safety and security for critical infrastructure owners and operators were developed in April 2024. Furthermore, the EO directs federal agencies to utilize these guidelines to consider mandating certain guidance for critical infrastructure. In April 2024, DHS established the AI Safety and Security Board, which brings together AI experts from industry, academia, and government based on the EO’s direction. The board will provide recommendations to DHS and SRMAs on security, resilience, and incident response related to the use of AI in critical infrastructure.</p> -<p><em>Millennium Challenge Corporation</em></p> +<p>Another area of growing government concern in recent years is internet routing security. The security challenges associated with internet technologies have been well known for many years. However, with the recent increase in threats posed by state-sponsored actors, security issues on Border Gateway Protocol and the potential attacks, such as route hijacking, are now considered part of the national security problem. The NCS has identified this as an area for improvement. Furthermore, FCC is considering implementing regulations that would encourage ISPs to adopt Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) as a technical measure. ONCD released a roadmap outlining measures for both the public and private sectors to enhance internet routing security. Given the nature of the internet, this issue cannot be resolved by U.S. carriers alone. It is essential to coordinate with a broader range of stakeholders involved in internet routing.</p> -<p>In December 2023, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) selected the Philippines for a threshold program, a grant “designed to support policy and institutional reforms that address economic growth constraints.” As of February 2024, no focus area for the grant had been decided. The July joint statement from the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue directly referenced the threshold program agreement, urging both sides to work toward its completion as soon as possible. Given the variety of possible focus areas, it is difficult to speculate whether energy is under consideration. But the Philippines’ high electricity costs and unreliable power likely qualify as economic growth constraints that would at least lead the MCC to consider a focus on energy policy reforms.</p> +<p><em>JAPAN</em></p> -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> +<ul> + <li>Basic Strategy and Policy</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="secure-near-term-stability">Secure Near-Term Stability</h4> +<p>The basic policy framework for critical infrastructure protection in Japan is based on the CPCIP. The document outlines the designation of critical infrastructure sectors, the roles and responsibilities of government agencies and critical infrastructure owners and operators, and the basic framework for public-private information sharing and incident response. The CPCIP is reviewed every few years to reflect changes in the threat landscape and cyber environment. The latest version was released in March 2024. It puts a strong emphasis on cybersecurity as a business management issue, organizational governance, risk-based management tailored to specific organizations and sectors, and comprehensive measures throughout the supply chain, including critical infrastructure owners and operators.</p> -<p>Facing rapidly rising energy demand, continuous threats of maritime coercion, and the very real risk of near-term conflict, the Philippines needs help to stabilize its energy outlook and prepare for crisis scenarios. Hydrocarbons, though they may be destined to be replaced by cleaner, renewable alternatives, will remain an important component of the Philippines’ energy mix for the next several decades. They will be especially vital over the next 10–15 years, before nuclear and renewable sources can begin to contribute at sufficient scale. LNG, as a cleaner alternative to other fossil fuels, will play an important role in this context.</p> +<ul> + <li>Sectors</li> +</ul> -<p>Washington should reconsider recent efforts to curb U.S. LNG exports, such as the pause implemented on LNG export project approvals in January 2024. While a federal court issued a stay in July that ended the pause, such efforts create uncertainty about the future of U.S. LNG that undermines investing and contracting processes. For European allies, U.S. LNG exports have been a critical backstop for sanctioned Russian gas since the invasion of Ukraine. Japan, the world’s second-largest importer of LNG, has also been a foundational buyer for several U.S. export projects. While the Philippines’ current LNG imports are not coming from the United States, future supplies almost certainly will. Given the importance of Philippine energy security to the United States’ own national security, Washington should aim to facilitate, not jeopardize, future purchases of U.S. LNG by the Philippines.</p> +<p>The CPCIP designates 15 critical infrastructure sectors and government agencies responsible for overseeing sectors (Figure 6). In response to the cyber incident caused by suspected state-sponsored actors in the Port of Nagoya in 2023, the government elevated ports and harbors as the fifteenth sector, previously part of the logistics sector. The sector designation is subject to ongoing review, with the policy document revised in light of the evolving threat landscape. This has resulted in an expansion from the original 10 sectors in 2005 to 13 sectors in 2014, 14 sectors in 2018, and 15 sectors in 2024. There is a discussion about whether cloud infrastructure should be included in the list of sectors due to other sectors’ high degree of dependence on it for a digital infrastructure. While the space system is not currently included in the sector, due to its importance, discussions on space cybersecurity are ongoing, led by METI, including the release of voluntary guidelines to encourage commercial space operators to take measures.</p> -<p>Within the Philippines, the United States should support the country’s efforts to develop LNG terminal infrastructure and connect LNG plants to the grid. It can also support efforts to improve port infrastructure and to diversify delivery points, which would ensure shipments of LNG or other hydrocarbons could continue to reach the Philippines in the event of conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait.</p> +<p>In Japan, as in the United States, cybersecurity requirements and regulations for critical infrastructure vary by sector, and there are variations in maturity levels across sectors and among companies of different sizes within the same sector. For example, ransomware attacks on healthcare organizations have been a particular challenge in recent years.</p> -<p>While LNG is a priority, other hydrocarbons may have a role to play in preparing for crisis scenarios. The United States should support the revival of a strategic petroleum reserve for the Philippines. The two countries should also conduct a cost-benefit analysis on the construction of an additional oil refinery. Following the closure of the Tabangao Refinery in Batangas in August 2020, the Philippines only has one refinery in operation, which could prove to be a vulnerability.</p> +<p>Figure 7 provides the mapping of the critical infrastructure sectors in the United States and Japan. Note, however, that this is a simplified overview and that the industries and services included in the sectors in the two countries may not be identical or perfectly aligned.</p> -<p>Investments in hydrocarbons, including LNG, will be difficult to coordinate through agencies like USAID, the Development Finance Corporation, or MCC, given strong funding preferences for clean and renewable energy. And high-profile initiatives such as the LEC may be better received by an environmentally conscious Philippine public if they avoid association with hydrocarbons. But given the strategic value of such investments, there may be opportunity for funds earmarked for regional deterrence to be channeled into energy security, or for projects to be funded through alliance programming like EDCA.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sImzF8d.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Critical Infrastructure Sectors in Japan.</strong> Source: Author’s compilation based on <a href="https://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/cip_policy_2024_eng.pdf">National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), The Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Tokyo: Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters, Government of Japan, March 8, 2024), 55</a>.</em></p> -<p>Nevertheless, in many of these areas, even Department of Defense (DOD) budgets may be insufficient to make direct contributions to infrastructure. For reference, three Philippine energy companies announced an investment in March of $3.3 billion to develop an LNG terminal in Batangas. In these cases, the United States may be able to aid by instead providing technical assistance and planning in a process that could draw from the CREZ model, focusing not on renewable energy but on determining the most efficient investments to fulfill basic crisis preparations through construction of hydrocarbon infrastructure.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TeLkr3F.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Mapping of Critical Infrastructure Sectors in Japan and the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> -<h4 id="prepare-for-a-sustainable-future">Prepare for a Sustainable Future</h4> +<ul> + <li>Structure of Information Sharing and Incident Response</li> +</ul> -<p>Renewable energy is envisioned to form the backbone of the Philippines energy mix, with the PEP calling for renewables to provide 35 percent of electricity generation by 2030 and over 50 percent by 2050. While renewables have the obvious benefit of reducing carbon emissions, they also have many advantages over fossil fuels in terms of energy security, especially in reducing exposure to external supply shocks.</p> +<p>Figure 8 shows the nationwide information-sharing and incident response structure, including both public and private sectors, in relation to critical infrastructure. Please note that this figure is created based on publicly available sources, including CPCIP, and has been generalized to provide a comprehensive overview rather than specific details. Therefore, it should be noted that the information provided may not be entirely precise or applicable to all cases.</p> -<p>The United States should continue to support renewable energy investments in the Philippines. USAID and DOE cooperation with the PDOE and other Philippine stakeholders on the CREZ model is a prime example of how technical assistance programs can help attract and direct private capital to maximize public gains and achieve the Philippines’ goal of creating a secure and resilient renewable power grid. Though technical in nature and perhaps less eye-catching than traditional infrastructure in rail or ports, the CREZ program is setting the foundation for the Philippines’ renewable energy future and demonstrates a high level of trust between U.S. and Philippine energy policy counterparts. U.S. and Philippine leaders should consider providing additional visibility for the CREZ program in joint statements and press releases on U.S.-Philippine economic and strategic achievements. Demonstrating high-level support for CREZ would amplify the program’s ability to attract investment and highlight a critical area of U.S.-Philippine cooperation.</p> +<p>NISC is the national coordinator for critical infrastructure protection, acting as a counterpart to CISA. NISC serves as a government Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) as well as the national CSIRT, which is operated jointly with the Japan Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (JPCERT/CC) that coordinates with the private sector. NISC leads the coordination and sharing of information on vulnerabilities, incidents, and risk mitigation in cooperation with private-sector and government agencies, including NPA, MOD, MOFA, MIC, METI, Digital Agency, and agencies responsible for sector risk management, crisis management, and disaster prevention. Sector-specific coordination is conducted through relevant agencies, which is similar to SRMAs in the United States. NISC is more focused on coordination, and the substantive measures are being developed and implemented primarily by agencies responsible for cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection.</p> -<p>At the same time, renewables should not be overly securitized. Unlike in the case of fossil fuels, there is significant opportunity for investments in renewable energy to receive funding from development finance institutions. Multilateral development banks (Asian Development Bank, World Bank) and U.S. development agencies have energy transition and climate finance as priority lending areas. These same lenders, however, can have difficulty funding projects if they are overtly associated with security. Development of renewable transmission and generation, even when facilitated by smart planning efforts like CREZ, will require tens of billions of dollars in capital investment over the next several decades; efforts to champion U.S.-Philippine cooperation in these areas should be careful not to lose any funding opportunities through an over-association with military or strategic goals.</p> +<p>Each sector and subsector has an organization called CEPTOAR, which comprises critical infrastructure owners and operators and trade associations (e.g., general incorporated associations) as a point of contact for NISC. The CEPTOAR Council is a cross-sector council comprising representatives of CEPTOAR in each sector. In Japan, as in the United States, ISACs exist as industry-led organizations for day-to-day operational cooperation. In contrast to the United States, ISACs in Japan are not necessarily established in all sectors, but there are ISACs in major sectors such as ICT, finance, power, and transportation. The ICT-ISAC Japan, previously known as the Telecom-ISAC Japan, is the oldest ISAC in Japan, established in 2002. Additionally, there are ISACs that focus on specific industries, including software, automotive, and trade. In recent years, there has been a growing movement to establish new ISACs in other sectors, including the medical sector. While there is no formal organization like NCI in the United States, regular inter-ISAC meetings are held to facilitate cooperation among ISACs to address cross-sector issues.</p> -<p>Nuclear energy is another important potential source of clean power. U.S.-Philippine cooperation on nuclear is further along than other areas and, in some ways, has a clearer trajectory. Targets for the number of SMRs and the resulting level of power generation have been set by the PEP; high-level support from leadership in both countries has been made clear in numerous announcements over the past two years; and public discussions are already occurring between Philippine firms and potential U.S. SMR providers.</p> +<p>Furthermore, there are several initiatives, such as the Cybersecurity Council, where selected major companies and government agencies gather across sectors to share information, conduct analysis, and develop countermeasures. The collaboration between critical infrastructure owners and operators and government agencies, which is similar to that in the United States in terms of organizational structure, is conducted through various channels, including ISAC, as well as direct communications with NISC and agencies responsible for the sector.</p> -<p>Though progress has been rapid, the installation of SMRs in the Philippines is certain to be a long process that, given the relative nascency of the technologies involved, comes with a risk of delays and cost overruns. In late 2023, one of the leading SMR firms in talks to work with the Philippines, NuScale Power, saw its planned SMR project in the state of Utah canceled after costs had grown from an initial $3 billion in 2015 to $9.3 billion by 2023. In facilitating talks between the Philippines and U.S. nuclear firms, the State Department’s Bureau of Energy Resources and the DOE should help the Philippines critically evaluate proposals and compare options to ensure that any eventual agreement is based on realistic estimates. The unpopularity of nuclear power among the Philippine public means that if U.S.-provided SMRs in the country get saddled with significant delays, cost overruns, or other issues, the resulting negative impact on U.S.-Philippine relations would be substantial. Even if projects proceed as planned, U.S. energy officials should prepare to help Philippine counterparts demonstrate the benefits of clean nuclear power and prove its safety to the public.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2tPB9Zx.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: Information-Sharing and Incident Response Structure in Japan.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis based on <a href="https://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/cip_policy_2024_eng.pdf">National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), The Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Tokyo: Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters, Government of Japan, March 8, 2024), 62–64</a>.</em></p> -<h4 id="prevent-disruption">Prevent Disruption</h4> +<ul> + <li>Public and Private Initiatives</li> +</ul> -<p>The addition of new power sources is crucial to ensuring Philippine energy security, but the reliability and resilience of transmission and distribution infrastructure is just as important.</p> +<p>Japan’s approach to critical infrastructure protection is also based on a voluntary PPP, as outlined in the CPCIP. While there have been several information-sharing frameworks, including the Initiative for Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership of Japan (J-CSIP) and JC3, in 2019, the Cybersecurity Council was established to further strengthen public-private information sharing. The council is composed of three tiers of memberships: Category 1, Category 2, and General. Its objective is to facilitate the sharing and analysis of threat information and the development of countermeasures in a timely manner while establishing nondisclosure agreements within a membership tier. Category 1 members bring predictive, undetermined, or undisclosed threat information under a strong obligation of confidentiality with legal penalties for noncompliance. The members then analyze the information, provide feedback to each other, and develop countermeasures. NISC serves as the secretariat, while JPCERT/CC serves as the operational coordinator. Finally, developed countermeasures are shared with the entire council if there is a high degree of certainty. If this is not the case, only Category 2 members receive the information in advance of the general members under a strong obligation of confidentiality and provide their own feedback, thereby contributing to improving the degree of accuracy of the information. The council started with 91 members and has since grown to over 300.</p> -<p>One paramount concern is China’s involvement in the transmission grid through its ownership stake and operational involvement in the NGCP. Its 25-year concession agreement means that the NGCP will, in theory, continue to operate the grid through at least 2034. But concerns over the NGCP’s performance and Chinese ownership have led media and Philippine legislators to push for a review of the company’s activities and the nature of Chinese involvement in its operations. President Marcos himself said in May 2023 that the government would “take back control” of the NGCP if necessary.</p> +<p>Another major initiative, SC3, has been in place since 2020, aiming to enhance cybersecurity throughout the supply chain, including critical infrastructure. This is an industry-led consortium comprising private companies of all sizes across various sectors. It is structured around several working groups, each focusing on a specific topic related to supply chain cybersecurity, including SMBs, attack trends and countermeasures, industry-academia-government collaboration, and international collaboration. Furthermore, the Cyber Risk Intelligence Center-Cross Sectors Forum (CRIC CSF), established in 2015, is another industry-led cross-sector initiative comprising companies primarily in the critical infrastructure sector. The forum is focused on specific themes related to cross-sector issues in the industry, including the definition of cybersecurity human resources, cybersecurity as business management, laws and regulations, and cybersecurity in DX. In Japan, there are a number of examples, such as SC3 and CRIC CSF, where private companies in the critical infrastructure sectors have taken the initiative to lead discussions on national-level cybersecurity issues. This would indicate a high degree of industry independence and the maturity of mutual aid. This may be a distinctive feature of Japan, in contrast to Western countries where the government typically plays a more prominent role.</p> -<p>From a strategic perspective, having 40 percent of the Philippines’ grid operator owned by a Chinese SOE is far from ideal. While it may not significantly affect day-to-day operations, it likely means that Beijing has access to intimate details about the Philippine power system that could be exploited in a time of conflict to disable key functions via kinetic or cyberattack. But at this point, ousting SGCC’s minority stake would not necessarily reduce these risks, as the vulnerabilities would likely persist unless key infrastructure and grid management systems were entirely replaced. At the same time, nationalization of SGCC’s stake would almost certainly provoke a response from China in the form of economic retaliation or, potentially, escalation over maritime disputes. The operational effectiveness of the NGCP is another question: the corporation has been the subject of pointed criticism from Marcos and others over failures to adequately manage the grid.</p> +<ul> + <li>Laws and Regulations</li> +</ul> -<p>USAID programs to enhance Philippine grid management capacity, assess resilience, and improve utility markets are valuable tools that allow the United States to contribute to positive outcomes without getting too deeply involved in highly politicized discussions about the performance and role of the NGCP. It would be wise for Washington to allow Manila to take the lead on managing the NGCP and determining what, if anything, to do about China’s stake in it while continuing technical assistance for grid management and cybersecurity.</p> +<p>Currently, Japan does not have a legal requirement for sector-wide incident reporting like CIRCIA in the United States, although the necessity of such a mandate is being discussed. Some sectors have sector-specific regulations in place to maintain critical infrastructure services that require incident reporting to the relevant agencies. For instance, in the case of the information and telecommunications sector, carriers are obliged to report both the physical failure and cyber incident to MIC if the impact exceeds the threshold defined in the Telecommunications Business Act.</p> -<p>Where Washington can play a larger role is in showing the value that U.S.-Philippine cooperation is bringing to the Filipino people. Military cooperation, and especially the presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines via EDCA, remains a focal point of counternarratives promoted by anti-U.S. media and politicians. While the provision of HADR resources for communities near EDCA sites is an excellent project that should be expanded, efforts on local energy resilience (such as small-scale solar generation or other shared facilities that contribute to the local grid) can also be a cost-effective way to reach out to local communities and associate U.S. presence with improvements not just to peace and security, but to day-to-day life.</p> +<p>Furthermore, the Economic Security Promotion Act introduced a new rule in May 2024 to ensure the safety and reliability of essential infrastructure. The government designates essential infrastructure sectors and operators within these sectors based on specific criteria. Prior to the introduction of designated critical facilities and the outsourcing of their maintenance to third parties, covered operators are required to submit plans to the government for screening. Although there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the 15 essential infrastructure sectors and the 15 critical infrastructure sectors, there is a large overlap between them. Currently, over 200 companies have been designated based on criteria such as service scale, coverage, and number of customers. The plans that covered operators submit must include an outline of the facilities (e.g., function, purpose, and location); information on all contractors, including cascaded subcontractors, involved in the equipment or outsourced maintenance (e.g., country of establishment, nationality of board members, country of manufacture, business relationship with foreign governments); and a risk management plan, including cybersecurity measures. If the government determines that there is a significant risk that the facilities may be used as a means of disruptive attacks by foreign adversaries, it may recommend or order the operators to take necessary preventive measures. The rule is risk-based, with covered operators and facilities limited based on criteria from an economic security standpoint. However, it could have a broad impact on major critical infrastructure owners and operators across sectors.</p> -<h4 id="align-efforts">Align Efforts</h4> +<ul> + <li>Other Policy Approaches</li> +</ul> -<p>U.S. tools and efforts involved in improving the Philippines’ energy security are spread across numerous agencies and departments. To date, there exists no cohesive platform for coordinating efforts, such that many U.S. government employees who attended the TTX were unaware of projects being pursued by other agencies that had the potential to synergize with their own work. Among the currently existing mechanisms, the Energy Security Dialogue comes closest in that it theoretically covers the full range of U.S.-Philippine energy cooperation. But its inaugural iteration lacked participation from several important implementers, including USAID, USTDA, and DOD. As a merely annual meeting between U.S. and Philippine counterparts, it fails to stimulate year-round coordination within Washington on disparate efforts that impact Philippine energy security.</p> +<p>The government is implementing enhanced cybersecurity requirements for both government agencies and contractors. The Common Standards for Cybersecurity Measures for Government Agencies and Related Agencies, issued by NISC, outlines the cybersecurity standards that government agencies must meet. The July 2023 revision reinforced the standards required for contractors based on NIST SP 800-171 to address supply chain risks. In the defense industry, the Acquisition, Technology &amp; Logistics Agency under the DOD introduced a new cybersecurity standard for defense contractors in 2023 that incorporates the requirements of NIST SP 800-171, aligning it with the U.S. standards for the defense industry. Regarding cloud services, the Information system Security Management and Assessment Program (ISMAP), a program similar to the FedRAMP of the United States, has been operational since 2020. Furthermore, government funding programs include cybersecurity requirements, such as IT implementation subsidies, in their application requirements. Additionally, there is discussion on a potential tax incentive program for companies in the defense industry that meet certain cybersecurity requirements.</p> -<p>There is room for a more flexible, cross-cutting mechanism to organize efforts targeted at energy security. In analyzing this problem, the Energy for Growth Hub has proposed the implementation of Energy Security Compacts, a five-year agreement on joint investments between the United States and a partner nation. Based on the structure of MCC compact agreements, an Energy Security Compact would be rooted in an initial constraints analysis and report to both Congress and the National Security Council (NSC), which would play a significant role in facilitating cooperation across agencies. The program would require legislation to establish it within either MCC or USAID; it could be made even more effective by the introduction of a mandate for global energy security at the MCC and the extension, per the Energy for Growth Hub, of certain “DOD loan and loan guarantee authorities under the Defense Production Act to specific investments in allied nations.” This last provision would be particularly useful in the Philippine case to mobilize funding for measures such as a petroleum stockpile, refinery redundancy, and other strategic energy projects that don’t meet the requirements of development lenders focused primarily on energy transition initiatives.</p> +<ul> + <li>Voluntary Framework and Guidance</li> +</ul> -<p>While an Energy Security Compact authority enacted through legislation would be ideal, the executive branch can also try to approximate some of these functions through existing authorities and workstreams. While the DOE and Department of State should continue to play a leading role, agency representation at the forthcoming second annual Energy Policy Dialogue should be increased. The two countries should also consider creating a working group subordinate to the Energy Policy Dialogue that would meet quarterly to discuss progress toward shared goals and provide a motivational mechanism for energy stakeholders across U.S. agencies to regularly harmonize efforts related to the Philippines. The NSC can also play an important coordinating role. Some projects to shore up strategic energy vulnerabilities in the Philippines may be able to be addressed through additional EDCA programming. But without additional authorizations, there will likely remain a disconnect between the deterrence value of energy security in the Philippines and the ability of DOD resources to contribute to it.</p> +<p>NISC publishes the guidelines for establishing safety principles for ensuring the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure as a document based on the CPCIP, which outlines common cybersecurity measures required for all sectors. Based on this document, agencies responsible for the sectors and industry develop their own cybersecurity standards and guidelines, taking into account sector-specific features. It is the responsibility of critical infrastructure owners and operators to ensure the cybersecurity of their infrastructure by utilizing these standards and guidelines, or in some cases, complying with them in accordance with relevant regulations. NISC’s guidelines are reviewed on a regular basis, and the latest version, released in July 2023, have focused on strengthening organizational governance and supply chain risk management in cybersecurity as well as clarifying the minimum baseline standards to be implemented and additional ones as recommended options.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Regarding the NIST CSF, IPA has been providing Japanese translations since the initial release. NISC’s guidelines and their supplementary documents also reflect the CSF concept as the basis for the risk-based approach. In addition, the Cybersecurity Management Guidelines for Japanese Enterprise Executives, published by METI, also reflect the basic concepts of the CSF. As previously noted, Japan has been engaged in the CSF revision process, providing comments and participating in workshops. The CSF has been increasingly adopted in Japanese industry, particularly among multinational companies, as a way to ensure consistent and aligned risk management with international stakeholders.</p> + +<p>In addition to sector-specific guidance and best practices developed by government agencies and industry associations, METI, IPA, MIC, and others also provide guidance that can be used by a wide range of companies, including critical infrastructure owners and operators across sectors, including those focusing on industrial control systems, cloud infrastructure, corporate management, and SMBs. IPA is also working with NIST and CISA to disseminate key frameworks and guidance from the United States. This includes publishing Japanese translations of CISA’s CPGs and other NIST publications, in addition to the CSF.</p> -<p><strong>Harrison Prétat</strong> is a fellow and deputy director for the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>With regard to the government’s releases of technical and operational advisories and guidance on critical threats, it is likely that the frequency of release and level of detail would be lower than in the United States, although it is not easy to make comparisons given that not all information is necessarily publicly available. The government is expected to expand its operational staff in the coming years along with the restructuring of NISC. This will enable the government to release more detailed, actionable guidance with technical and operational aspects in a timelier manner. It is also encouraging to note that the United States and Japan are increasingly issuing advisories in cooperation, as in the case of the joint advisories issued in September 2023 and July 2024.</p> -<p><strong>Yasir Atalan</strong> is an associate data fellow for the Futures Lab in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> +<ul> + <li>Plan and Preparedness</li> +</ul> -<p><strong>Gregory B. Poling</strong> is a senior fellow and director for the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS.</p> +<p>As previously stated, based on the guidelines published by NISC, agencies responsible for the sectors and industry have developed sector-specific standards and guidelines on which organizations implement and maintain their cybersecurity posture. With regard to further study on critical infrastructure protection, the Japanese government is aware of the need to address the increasingly complex interdependencies among infrastructures. The CPCIP indicates that the Cabinet Secretariat plans to conduct interdependency analysis, which will help it identify systemic risks of infrastructure, including both physical and cyber aspects. The designation of essential infrastructure owners and operators and critical facilities under the new rule based on the Economic Security Promotion Act may have certain similarities with the concept of NCFs and SIEs in terms of identifying especially important entities and functions across sectors.</p> -<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow for the Futures Lab in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>Harrison Prétat, et al.The Philippines’ fragile energy outlook threatens to undermine efforts to secure its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis an assertive China.State Behav. &amp; Cyber Security2024-10-18T12:00:00+08:002024-10-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/state-behaviours-and-cyber-security<p><em>This paper seeks to identify how state “permissive” behaviours can contribute to the proliferation of offensive-cyber tools and services.</em></p> +<p>Regarding national-level cyber exercises, a cross-sector exercise hosted by NISC has been held annually since 2006. This exercise involves over 6,000 participants from critical infrastructure owners and operators, government agencies, and commercial cybersecurity companies across all sectors and verifies the effectiveness of cross-sector incident response processes through tabletop exercises. In addition, sector-specific cyber exercises are conducted by ISACs, such as those in the ICT sector and the electric power sector, as well as by government agencies, such as those in the financial sector.</p> -<excerpt /> +<ul> + <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> +</ul> -<p>Commercial cyber tools and services have many legitimate applications, from corporate penetration testing (an authorised simulated cyber attack on an IT system) to law enforcement and national security operations. But they are also subject to misuse and abuse, when they are used in ways that are contrary to national or international law, violate the human rights of their targets, or pose risks to international security. Some states are currently grappling with this policy challenge. Meanwhile, collective international initiatives for action are underway.</p> +<p>While Japan has not received as much policy attention for internet routing security as the United States, the implementation of RPKI, a key technology to address the issue, is progressing. As of September 2024, approximately 48 percent of routes in Japan have been implemented with Route Origin Authorization, a key technical component of RPKI, compared to approximately 40 percent in the United States.</p> -<p>For example, there is the US’s 2023 Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware and the UK- and France-led Pall Mall Process of 2024. Ultimately, one aim of these initiatives is to enable states to harmonise their policy interventions where possible.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jpGy7f2.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Mapping of Critical Infrastructure Protection Framework between Japan and the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> -<p>To inform principles and policies for intervention at national and international levels, it is necessary to understand the dynamics that encourage or facilitate offensive-cyber proliferation. This paper identifies a range of “non-state proliferating factors” (NPFs) and “state permissive behaviours” (SPBs), and its findings draw on desk-based research on the international commercial offensive-cyber market. These findings were supplemented by a data validation and consultative workshop with industry stakeholders held in person at Chatham House in March 2024. This half-day validation workshop drew on the expertise and insights of 44 participants predominantly based in the UK, the US and Western Europe. To facilitate candid discussion, remarks made at the workshop are not attributable, and the identities of participants are not referenced here.</p> +<p>With regard to IoT security, Japan has a long history of proactive and advanced efforts focused on protecting its communications infrastructure. As previously stated, since 2019, the country has been implementing the NOTICE project, which extensively scans IoT devices connected to the internet in Japan, identifies devices with weak passwords, and encourages users to correct their settings. This has been made possible by the amendment of the law to authorize NICT to conduct the scan, and ICT-ISAC and over 80 domestic ISPs are cooperating to identify and notify the owners of vulnerable devices. This is a truly nationwide initiative to mitigate botnet risks through public-private cooperation. Additionally, NICT monitors communications flowing into the domestic darknet. By analyzing communications that are presumed to originate from botnet devices, NICT identifies infected IoT devices, followed by the same process as NOTICE. Furthermore, in 2020, the technical standards for IoT devices connected to the internet were revised to require devices to meet minimum cybersecurity requirements, such as prohibiting default passwords and implementing access control functions. METI is also developing a voluntary conformity assessment program for a broader range of IoT devices, with the aim of launching the program during FY 2024. A dialogue has been initiated with the U.S. government to establish mutual recognition with the U.S. labeling scheme.</p> -<p>In this paper, NPFs and SPBs are categorised into five areas:</p> +<p>Japan is at the forefront of the commercial 5G network deployment using the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN). NTT DOCOMO started the world’s first nationwide deployment of 5G commercial services using O-RAN in 2020. One of the key concerns in the international deployment of secure and reliable 5G networks is the security of O-RAN. In May 2023, a report on O-RAN security was published by a Quad working group. The study found that O-RAN-specific security risks in 5G networks are only 4 percent of the total, and do not fundamentally alter the security environment of wireless communication networks compared to conventional networks. Recently, through the NTIA grant program, testing projects have been conducted by international partners, including operators from Japan, the United States, and India, to evaluate interoperability and security. Furthermore, a joint effort between companies in both countries has been made to conduct interoperability testing using test beds provided by NTT DOCOMO and other companies.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Regulation of corporate structure and governance.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Legal frameworks for product development, sale and transfer.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Diplomatic support and engagement.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Development of cyber-security ecosystem and workforce.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Integration with defence and security industrial base.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>Figure 9 provides a simplified mapping of the critical infrastructure protection frameworks of the United States and Japan. It should be noted that this mapping is intended to provide a comprehensive overview and does not necessarily represent a complete one-to-one relationship in terms of roles and responsibilities, scale, and operational maturities.</p> -<p>Using these categories, this research analyses the roles of both state and non-state actors. It identifies critical inter-relationships between different SPBs and NPFs that serve to facilitate or enable potentially irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation.</p> +<h3 id="recommendations-for-japan-us-cooperation-on-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity-and-resilience">Recommendations for Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and Resilience</h3> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Based on the discussions so far, this chapter outlines recommendations for Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation in the areas of critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience. The recommendations are divided into two main categories: basic prerequisites for enhancing operational collaboration and specific areas of collaboration based on these prerequisites.</p> -<p>Commercial cyber tools enable a variety of capabilities, including gaining access to technical systems, moving through technical ecosystems, providing visibility of user activity, and exfiltrating data. The goals of users of these tools vary greatly. In the mass market, cyber-security professionals use them to determine where an organisation or individual may be susceptible to attack so that necessary steps can be taken to mitigate this risk. In the more limited law enforcement market, governments may use these kinds of tools to monitor criminal activity and capture evidence for prosecution, or to gain access to technical assets to investigate or prevent crime. There is also a variety of commercial services that offer offensive capabilities along similar lines, for example penetration testers, which intentionally emulate the behaviour of attackers in order to report to clients the opportunities for and impact of an intrusion into their systems.</p> +<h4 id="prerequisites-for-operational-collaboration">Prerequisites for Operational Collaboration</h4> -<p>The demand for commercially accessible offensive-cyber tools and services has expanded markedly in recent years, with at least 80 states having purchased offensive tools. Unfortunately, these commercial cyber products and services are also subject to misuse and abuse. There are broad reports of these tools and services being used in ways that are contrary to national or international law, violating the human rights of their targets, and posing risks to international security. The proliferation of these products and services presents an expanding set of risks to states and, in some cases, challenges commitments to protecting openness, security and stability in cyberspace. From selling products to conducting operations, paid attackers and companies are routinely hired on behalf of governments or other customers.</p> +<p><em>Obtain a comprehensive overview of national cybersecurity posture in both countries and comparatively map the postures</em></p> -<p>“Offensive-cyber proliferation” refers to the increasing access that a wider range of actors has to increasingly advanced cyber capabilities. Proliferation may occur purposely and legally as a market process: for example, a law enforcement agency may purchase a licence for a phone-cracking tool, subject to local laws and import/export controls. Other proliferation may be legal but unethical or abusive: for example a law enforcement agency using licensed offensive-cyber tools in a way that either directly breaches human rights or facilitates later human rights violations. Proliferation may also occur unintentionally and/or illegally, including instances of software piracy.</p> +<p>A comprehensive cybersecurity strategy requires a unified approach across the entire society. As previously discussed, the organizations and functions of national cybersecurity in the United States and Japan are highly decentralized and complex, with multiple stakeholders interacting with each other. All those involved in cybersecurity cooperation between the two countries should first have a comprehensive common understanding of the overall picture, including how cybersecurity is structured and functions in both countries, as well as what is taking place in the nation as a whole. This should be a prerequisite to pursuing specific areas of cooperation. It helps everyone understand how each specific area of cooperation fits into the broader picture and how it relates to other areas and stakeholders. It also facilitates whole-optimal and effective national-level cooperation, avoiding the creation of silos. Then, all stakeholders should have a shared understanding of mapping counterparts in both countries at the respective levels of the public and private sectors and establish the appropriate channels for structured collaboration. Regardless of the form of relationship (e.g., one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-many), it is important to eliminate as much duplication as possible in each channel.</p> -<p>Like-minded states have engaged in international discourse on offensive-cyber proliferation in a range of forums. In March 2023, a group of 11 states made a joint statement on the proliferation and misuse of spyware, with a further six signing in 2024. In February 2024, the UK- and France-led Pall Mall Process kicked off with a declaration on commercial cyber-intrusion capabilities, signed by a larger collection of states and regional bodies. As part of an ongoing and evolutionary process, further discussions on offensive-cyber proliferation are anticipated at future events, including in Paris in 2025.</p> +<p>In particular, Japan is currently in the process of reinforcing its government cybersecurity posture. This is being done through a review of its organizational structure and authorities, roles, and responsibilities, including the establishment of a new cybersecurity agency and the enhancement of JSDF’s capabilities. In the United States, the government structure and functions have evolved over the past several years, including the establishment of ONCD. Taking these changes as great opportunity, it is worthwhile to undertake a comprehensive review of the relationship between the two countries’ systems at all levels, including the public and private sectors, as well as policies and initiatives. The information presented in this paper would help all stakeholders obtain these aspects and serves as a first step in implementing the following recommendations.</p> -<p>This paper seeks to inform these ongoing deliberations by identifying how state “permissive” behaviours can contribute to the proliferation of offensive-cyber tools and services. “State permissive behaviours” refers to state action (or inaction) that directly or indirectly shapes offensive-cyber market conditions. For example, in this context, “behaviour” may include active diplomacy on behalf of firms (active), but it could also include insufficient guidance or regulation (inactive). The identification of these permissive behaviours is intended to facilitate constructive analysis and discussion about the scope for targeted interventions and recalibration of the market.</p> +<p><em>Expand and operationalize the interoperable mechanism for classified and unclassified cyber information sharing</em></p> -<p>This is one of two papers on this topic. The other paper, authored by the researchers and published by Chatham House in October 2024, draws on the findings in this paper and identifies a range of “principles” that could be used to build a code of conduct that governments could use to counter irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation.</p> +<p>Now that cybersecurity has become a matter of national security, it is becoming increasingly important to establish a secure and efficient mechanism for sharing sensitive or classified cybersecurity information between Japan and the United States. While a framework for sharing classified information between the two countries already exists, it is limited in terms of the types of information protected and the level of classification and has not necessarily been sufficient in the area of cybersecurity. The recently passed security clearance legislation in Japan will greatly expand the scope of the existing system by extending the scope of information to include cybersecurity, the level of classified classification, and the scope of clearance to a broader private sector, which had previously been focused on government officials. This would be a major step forward in the exchange of classified information in the cybersecurity field. The government is currently developing operational standards in preparation for the launch of the system in 2025. This preparation should include ensuring interoperability with like-minded countries, including the United States, as a key area of focus. Looking ahead, it would be beneficial for both governments to engage in specific discussions on how to expand and operationalize the existing interoperable mechanism to cover the cyber domain. While Japan is not necessarily required to join the Five Eyes alliance, it is important to establish a trusted framework with the new clearance system defining procedures and protocols for cyber intelligence sharing. It is also necessary for the Japanese and U.S. governments to clearly define and agree on a centralized point of contact between them so that cyber intelligence sharing can be conducted through a single channel.</p> -<h4 id="methodology">Methodology</h4> +<p>At the same time, it is important to note that today’s cybersecurity information sharing has been focused more on providing useful information in a timely manner and as broadly as possible through declassification. There are multiple ways for information sharing, including the security clearance system and the Traffic Light Protocol, for instance. It is, therefore, important for Japan and the United States to identify and clarify the various means of information exchange tailored to the specific type of information to be handled.</p> -<p>The findings of this paper draw on desk-based research on the international commercial offensive-cyber market. This research included non-academic sources (for example, news reports) and interdisciplinary academic literature. Given the dynamic nature of the commercial offensive-cyber market, relatively contemporary literature (sources published within the past five years) has been favoured. However, historical sources have been included where useful: for example, where contemporary equivalents are unavailable or need contextualisation. The desk-based research phase ran from November 2023 to early March 2024 and mainly covered literature from 2019 to March 2024. The findings for this research were validated by a half-day data-validation and consultative workshop with commercial offensive-cyber industry stakeholders held in person at Chatham House in March 2024. The workshop drew on the expertise and insights of 44 participants, predominantly based in the UK, the US and Western Europe. Attendees represented a broad spectrum of the commercial offensive-cyber industry, including developers, brokers, contractors and government entities. To facilitate candid discussion, remarks made at the workshop are not attributable, and the identities of participants are not referenced here.</p> +<p><em>Japan to take further steps to enhance government cybersecurity posture through implementation of the NSS</em></p> -<h4 id="limitations">Limitations</h4> +<p>In the NSS of Japan, Japan has committed to fundamentally enhance the government’s cybersecurity capabilities, including the implementation of proactive cyber operations. This can be achieved by enhancing both the operational authorities and capabilities of the government.</p> -<p>Some limitations of this research should be noted. First, the diffuse and dynamic nature of the commercial offensive-cyber market means that the endeavour to succinctly map and analyse a wide range of indicative behaviours may lack depth and nuance. A single paper could focus on any one of the behaviours detailed here. Second, although the research team significantly revised the paper and its framing(s) following the validation phase, the dynamic nature of the market – as well as ongoing national and international efforts to calibrate market behaviours – means that some findings may become outdated. Third, the paper focuses on analysing the state of play in market behaviours that influence proliferation. The paper does not identify possible interventions. “Principles” of possible interventions are proposed at length in the companion paper published by Chatham House. However, further interdisciplinary research from academics, researchers, policy stakeholders and industry could assess and substantiate this paper’s findings, and identify opportunities for calibration or intervention in the market.</p> +<p>Japan is currently focusing on potential amendments to existing laws, including the Telecommunications Business Act and the Unauthorized Computer Access Prohibition Act, to grant operational authorities. While some of the legislative issues are complex, given their constitutional implications, it is essential for Japanese policymakers to accelerate the discussion to clarify the government’s strategic objectives at the operational level and identify the means to achieve them in reality. The strategy primarily outlines the government’s intended actions. However, it also assumes that telecommunication carriers and other private companies will be positioned to indirectly support government operations by providing information on communications and threat intelligence as well as analysis expertise. It is, therefore, important, in legislative discussions, to define the roles and responsibilities of private companies in national cyber defense, legal protection, and financial support for the cost of facilities, people, and operations.</p> -<p>The paper has two chapters. Chapter I offers an overview of the offensive-cyber industry. Chapter II draws on examples of state permissive behaviours that interact with proliferating market practices. The paper concludes with reflections on the challenges and opportunities that these permissive behaviours present for policy interventions.</p> +<p>Furthermore, a new cybersecurity agency, built on NISC, should become the primary entity for coordinating, operating, and enforcing national cyber resilience. It should also serve as a centralized point of contact for international cooperation. As the government’s technical and operational activities increase in this evolution, the new agency, as a national CSIRT, needs to secure additional cyber professionals. While the government’s cyber workforce is being expanded at NISC, NPA, JSDF, and other agencies, further expansion should be considered for the new agency to be fully operational. This could be done through hiring professionals from the private sector as well as leveraging capacity-building programs offered by the private sector.</p> -<h3 id="i-overview-of-the-offensive-cyber-industry">I. Overview of the Offensive-Cyber Industry</h3> +<p>The strategy is already in place and further implementation would enhance the government’s cybersecurity capabilities, which in turn will stimulate more bidirectional operational cooperation between the public and private sectors than ever before. This would further reinforce Japan’s overall cybersecurity posture and facilitate international collaboration and coordination. While the strategy is currently being implemented, it would be beneficial for Japan and the United States to proceed now with discussions on potential ways for to enhance cooperation built on the implementation.</p> -<p>The commercial offensive-cyber industry is an overlapping supply chain and can be divided into different operational elements. For example, research from 2021 distinguished between “vulnerability research and exploit development”, “malware payload generation”, “technical command and control”, “operational management” and “training and support”. These capabilities are common across both legitimate (security testing and law enforcement) and illegitimate or malicious activity, and it is not possible to draw a distinction between these activities at a purely technical level. In addition, these elements are linked, rather than existing in a vacuum, with resources and knowledge shared or exchanged within and between market actors. A single “zero-day” chain may draw components from multiple sources and may itself operate as a component of a product comprising a broader set of capabilities. The supply chain is highly complex and interdependent. Figure 1 presents a simplified representation of the commercial hacking market. Table 1 complements this figure, highlighting contextual characteristics of different tools and services. It is also a simplified representation of a complex market. For example, although the target market for surveillance capabilities is likely to be government entities, there are secondary markets, such as the mass and criminal markets.</p> +<h4 id="collaboration-on-plans-preparedness-and-operations">Collaboration on Plans, Preparedness, and Operations</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/g0ggd5E.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: Complexity and Interdependence of Commercial Hacking Markets</em></p> +<p><em>Engage in national-level advanced risk analysis focusing on critical infrastructures of both countries</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jqWrZJL.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Table 1: Contextual Characteristics of Goods and Services of the Commercial Hacking Market</em></p> +<p>The cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructure is a matter of national concern, affecting not just one organization or sector but the entire nation, as a failure in one organization can have cascading effects on that sector, other sectors, and the entire nation. It is, therefore, becoming increasingly important to conduct a national-level risk analysis that focuses on understanding the interdependencies of critical infrastructure sectors and functions, analyzing their systemic risks, and identifying the most critical entities and functions with a risk-based approach. The United States has been working in this area for several years, beginning with the development of NCFs, while Japan is currently in the early stages of conducting interdependency analysis. However, neither has necessarily focused on the international perspective but rather on the domestic one. In reality, however, the interdependencies and systemic risks have an international reach. These interconnectivities are particularly strong between nations that are allied as well as economically tied to each other.</p> -<p>Additionally, it should be recognised that there is significant scope for supply chain and/or operational overlap between market actors (government agencies, commercial firms and criminal entities). Ultimately, this interdependency, combined with the inherently international nature of the market and the intangible nature of software products, arguably provides fertile ground for proliferation.</p> +<p>It would, therefore, be beneficial to pursue cooperation in the area of national-level risk analysis, including critical infrastructures for which both countries rely on each other. This could include mapping out the interdependencies of both countries’ infrastructures as a whole, including, but not limited to, communications and digital infrastructure as a foundation for intelligence and information sharing; communications, power, water, and transportation infrastructure on which U.S. military bases in Japan depend; and financial and logistics infrastructure that is key to their economic activities. This would also include analyzing their systemic risks, taking into account the timescale of impacts, and identifying the sectors, operators, and functions that are particularly important. This will greatly assist both countries in responding collectively to national-scale incidents and ensuring the resilience of the alliance as a whole.</p> -<p>The purpose of this paper is to identify state permissive behaviours (SPBs) and non-state proliferation factors (NPFs). To do this, it is necessary to outline a clear and accessible understanding of which market phenomena are in scope. This is achieved by: defining cyber intrusion capabilities; narrowing the focus to “commercial” practices; and drawing a dichotomy between “authorised” and “unauthorised” cyber intrusion.</p> +<p>In today’s digitally interconnected world, interdependencies have become so complex that even a domestic-focused analysis is challenging. Even in the United States, which is a leader in this field, the study has not yet been fully completed. Bringing together the analytical methodologies and practices of both countries can add value to existing studies in both countries. For instance, the NCFs in the United States could be leveraged in Japan’s interdependency analysis while the concept of designating essential infrastructure owners and operators and critical facilities in Japan’s new regulation could provide insights for the study of SIEs in the United States. From this perspective as well, it would be mutually beneficial for the two countries to collaborate on risk analysis at the national level.</p> -<p>This research project was an evolutionary process. The description of the markets that appears in this paper is the final version that was decided on by the research team following both the data-validation workshop in March 2024 and follow-up consultative discussions with industry stakeholders. The research team recognises that providing an overview of such a highly diverse, dynamic and inter-/intra-layered industry in the broad-brush strokes necessary for a research paper is, in part, a process of simplification that may not capture fine-grained nuance. Nonetheless, doing so offers a common framing that is intended to be accessible to a wide audience and serves as an important foundation for subsequent analysis. This framing is also applied in the companion research paper, published by Chatham House, which outlines principles for international intervention.</p> +<p>While this initiative should be led by key government agencies responsible for national security and critical infrastructure protection (NSC and CISA of the United States and the National Security Secretariat and NISC of Japan), it is crucial to expand the involvement of critical infrastructure owners and operators more than ever. It is clear that the owners and operators have the most accurate understanding of the functions and services on which they depend, and they are responsible for managing their own risks, including interdependencies. To be more effective, the study would need to include at least the major operators in each sector in both countries.</p> -<p>The three stages of framing are:</p> +<p><em>Regularly conduct cross-sector public-private joint cyber exercises</em></p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Scoping cyber-intrusion capabilities to varied components, which contribute to the ability of an actor to gain remote access to a target host or network. The components include: vulnerability discovery and exploitation; development of a functional exploit for a vulnerability; the technical infrastructure for command and control of that malware; and broader training and support.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Focusing on commercial activity where at least one of the components is obtained through a financial transaction. This could include, for example, the sale of a product or the provision of licensed services. Commercial cyber-intrusion capabilities may be traded either on the open market or to exclusive clientele. A range of actors are involved in the commercial offensive-cyber ecosystem, including developers, vendors, service providers, brokers, resellers and system integrators. All of these actors are in scope in this paper. Their activities take place in an interlinked nexus, which may be mapped from the point of “initial research”, where raw novel exploits are identified, to implementation, and finally, in some cases, to a product that a client can acquire and use. This nexus is both nuanced and complex.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Distinguishing between authorised and unauthorised cyber intrusion. In cyber security, tools developed and sold primarily for defensive testing purposes can often be abused for offensive purposes. Likewise, activities undertaken for security research or good-faith hacking services are often the same as those undertaken for more malicious purposes. As such, a distinction drawn on how tools or services operate will be moot, and will not help understanding of SPBs and NPFs. Rather, use cases must be examined to better understand behaviours in the market, which leads to a distinction between authorised and unauthorised cyber intrusion.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>In the event of a significant cyber incident that could affect national security, all stakeholders across the public and private sectors, including international partners, must work together to respond. It is essential to prioritize preparedness and exercises in peacetime. While both countries have conducted cross-sector public-private cyber exercises, they have not necessarily focused primarily on collaboration with international partners, as seen in joint exercises between defense authorities.</p> -<p>Authorised intrusion takes place with the permission of the owner/lessee, operator or manufacturer of a device, system or network. An example could be corporate penetration testing, participation in a bug bounty program, or employee workstation surveillance tools. If the use of a cyber-intrusion capability is not approved by the owner/lessee, operator or manufacturer, it is categorised as unauthorised. There are exceptions, particularly with regard to national security and law enforcement operations. For example, in the UK, a minister and a judge may authorise offensive-cyber operations.</p> +<p>As a first step toward conducting a joint large-scale cyber exercise, both countries, led by CISA and NISC, should work together to develop national response plans and exercise scenarios at both the national and alliance levels, with a particular focus on cross-border considerations, to enable a coordinated collective response. The plan should include the incident response procedure, its prioritization, the counterparts of each entity, and communication channels based on the national-level risk analysis. The scenario could involve a cyberattack impacting multiple critical infrastructure sectors simultaneously, assuming a significant national-level threat from state-sponsored actors. This will verify how both countries and their respective entities can collectively respond to incidents. This may be a too large-scale, near-worst-case scenario exercise, but as previously mentioned, the United States and Japan have been facing a common geopolitical threat, and the risk of both countries’ critical infrastructure being affected strategically at the same time can no longer be ignored.</p> -<p>Although this paper categorises the landscape into authorised and unauthorised markets, in truth there is a vast array of products and services included in the ecosystem, and a range of attitudes, approaches and priorities among vendors. Tools and services offered specifically for unauthorised intrusion are most often the ones that are discussed in research disclosures, news stories or lawsuits relating to malicious campaigns against journalists, activists or governments. Tools and services in this market are typically designed to avoid detection. For this reason, and due to the go-to-market dynamics discussed in Chapter II, vendors in this market tend to operate in relative secrecy. As a result of all these factors, many public sources on proliferation and abuses of commercial cyber tools focus on just a few vendors and tools. This is reflected in the references quoted in this paper, and while the researchers believe the points highlighted are also true beyond the limited examples cited, the hidden nature of this market makes it challenging to present broader public examples.</p> +<p>It is recommended that such an exercise be conducted on an annual basis to review and reinforce the plan in response to evolving threats and to ensure its continued effectiveness. It is essential that all entities involved in the developed scenario, from both the public and private sectors, are included as participants.</p> -<p>Understanding the diversity of the two markets is critical to examining the dynamics at play, and potentially developing mitigation strategies or policy proposals. While the examples and public analysis in this paper often focus on the more extreme and secretive vendors and offerings, it is important to recognise that they are only one part of the picture. These markets also include well-established defence contractors, and cyber-security vendors offering broad market offerings. These organisations are themselves highly varied, generally operate in legitimate markets and are answerable to investors, customers and employees. These organisations are more likely to adopt new, or adapt existing, behaviours in response to calls for more responsible approaches to the sale and development of commercial cyber tools.</p> +<p><em>Expand overarching public-private operational collaboration in the United States and Japan</em></p> -<h3 id="ii-the-role-of-permissive-behaviours-in-commercial-offensive-cyber-proliferation">II. The Role of Permissive Behaviours in Commercial Offensive-Cyber Proliferation</h3> +<p>It is recommended that both countries establish a centralized framework for cross-sector operational collaboration that includes key private companies and government agencies responsible for critical infrastructure protection. While both countries have public-private cooperation frameworks in place at the domestic level, as well as operational cooperation between the two countries locally or partially in certain areas, there is an opportunity to further expand and integrate these initiatives into an environment where all necessary players can come together and cooperate in a flexible and timely manner. For instance, while NTT is involved in JCDC from Japan, there are several other companies in Japan with a high level of technical and operational expertise. Furthermore, U.S.-based companies are individually engaged in collaborative efforts with Japan. For example, Microsoft has partnered with the Japanese government, while Google has established a cybersecurity research center in Tokyo. By incorporating some of these into a larger Japan-U.S. PPP framework, the level of operational collaboration could be further enhanced. The centralized framework would enable the public and private sectors of both countries to enhance activities such as threat intelligence and information sharing, joint analysis, and the development of countermeasures. While not all information handled in operational collaboration is necessarily classified, the passage of Japan’s security clearance legislation would also greatly facilitate collaboration. This would consequently assist both countries in issuing joint attribution and advisories with greater frequency than ever before, which would contribute to reinforcing international deterrence as well as providing actionable cybersecurity measures to the public at large.</p> -<p>The proliferation of offensive-cyber tools is fed by supply and demand. Given the relative novelty of offensive-cyber activities and their relationship with states, the proliferation is also dependent on a range of “permissive behaviours”. These are behaviours that encourage or stimulate other actors to enter or expand the market. The research for this paper scopes these permissivebehaviours to states, focusing on the interaction of a range of SPBs in relation to NPFs. The paper also addresses behaviours of other stakeholders, for example vendors, but only inasmuch as they reflect the permissive behaviours of states.</p> +<p>In cross-border public-private operational collaboration, it is crucial to build trust among members. It is advisable to begin with a small, limited number of the most capable companies that can interact with each other with sufficient trust and agility. This can then be expanded gradually. While the private sector plays an important role in collaboration, the role of CISA and NISC as lead agencies is also crucial to effectively promote top-down nationwide cooperation. It is essential to maintain a robust channel of collaboration between the two. One potential step would be to assign liaisons with cybersecurity expertise in CISA and NISC to each other. This would clarify the point of contact as well as build trust between the two organizations, promoting closer collaboration on a daily basis. CISA’s liaison office in the United Kingdom and the JSDF’s liaison officers at the Pentagon may be suitable models for consideration.</p> -<p>Some caveats and clarifications are needed. First, both supply and demand factors are in scope. Second, the term “permissive behaviour” is not used as a synonym for “negative behaviour”, nor is there an implication that behaviours will always lead to harmful or unwarranted proliferation. Third, permissive behaviours can refer to both action and inaction. Fourth, it should be noted that while the behaviours described have been observed and documented, this does not imply that they are widespread across all stakeholders in each category. In some cases, behaviours will likely be associated with only specific types of stakeholder; nevertheless, their impact is significant enough to be worth noting. Last, it should be acknowledged that a degree of permissive behaviour is required for the offensive-cyber market to be viable. As states seek to identify ways to scrutinise and/or regulate the proliferation of offensive-cyber tools, it may be assumed that “fully permissive” or “fully restrictive” regimes would not be desirable.</p> +<p><em>Deepen sector-to-sector collaboration</em></p> -<p>Context is important. It is necessary to understand the crossover and functional overlap between behaviours and market actors. Additionally, while behaviours may be individually influential, it is likely that the cumulative effect of multiple permissive behaviours can markedly increase scope for unchecked proliferation and irresponsible behaviour. NPFs and permissive behaviours are categorised into five distinct areas:</p> +<p>The United States and Japan face similar challenges in sectors that are vulnerable to being targeted by state-sponsored actors, such as the electricity, communications, transportation, and water sectors, as well as sectors that are vulnerable to ransomware attacks, such as the healthcare sector. It is, therefore, recommended that the two countries deepen direct sector-to-sector collaboration to address sector-specific cyber and physical security and resilience. In addition to the common cybersecurity standards and requirements across sectors, each sector requires sector-specific risk management and resilience that takes into account its unique ecosystems with supply chains, business practices, systems, facilities, and other specific components. This requires different expertise in different industries and sectors. Fortunately, the sector designations in both countries are similar and can be relatively easily mapped. It would be beneficial to collaborate on developing and sharing guidance, best practices, and tools between sectors in both countries to enhance sector-specific capabilities. This would also be beneficial for under-resourced sectors to optimize their limited cyber resources. Moreover, establishing an environment where sector-specific threats and vulnerabilities are directly shared between the sectors would be a significant operational benefit.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Regulation of corporate structure and governance.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Legal frameworks for product development, sale and transfer.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Diplomatic support and engagement.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Development of cyber-security ecosystem and workforce.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Integration with defence and security industrial base.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>In the context of sector-to-sector collaboration, Japan and the United States can focus more on industry-specific characteristics beyond cybersecurity, including physical security and disaster management. Since the interdependency extends beyond cyberspace, it is important to consider physical security when identifying systemic risk. Japan has a long history of experiencing several national-scale disasters, including typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis. As a result, the country has developed a wealth of experience and expertise in dealing with such events, ensuring cyber and physical resilience. In particular, Japan’s major companies, which provide essential infrastructure services that support the functioning of the nation, are well-versed in integrated resilience measures specific to their industry. This is the source of Japan’s ability to provide infrastructure services with a high degree of stability and accuracy, and its practices can be highly beneficial for improving resilience and ensuring business continuity in sectors with similar characteristics in the United States.</p> -<p>These areas are not comprehensive, but in this paper they capture areas of potential proliferating interaction between market actors. For each area, the research examines whether states play roles as customers, investors, detectors or regulators, for both authorised and unauthorised markets. The research highlights examples of NPFs and SPBs. Again, these are not comprehensive, as they are used as examples of proliferating conditions or activity (see Table 2). The objective is to demonstrate the link between an NPF and an SPB, rather than to list all possible NPFs and SPBs. Additionally, the paper identifies pre-existing global “indicators” (for example, indexes) that may be applied in future research to provide substantive granular comparisons between state and market practices across a range of states.</p> +<p>Specific forms of cooperation could include operational collaboration between ISACs. While cooperation between government agencies is essential, it is also crucial to involve private companies, which own and operate the majority of critical infrastructure. It is, therefore, beneficial to facilitate direct collaboration between major companies representing sectors in both countries. One potential approach to advance this is to exchange a few selected cybersecurity staff from major companies in each sector in both countries for a certain period. Such an initiative would not only facilitate the exchange of valuable insights between the two sectors; it would also lay the foundation for the trust needed to facilitate operational collaboration.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/02S8f2S.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ Table 2: Types of NPFs and SPBs</em></p> +<p><em>Enhance coordinated operations to disrupt threat actors</em></p> -<h4 id="area-1-regulation-of-corporate-structure-and-governance">Area 1: Regulation of Corporate Structure and Governance</h4> +<p>As the number of borderless cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure continues to grow, it is becoming increasingly clear that international law enforcement agencies must take a more coordinated approach to countermeasures, including the takedown of botnets, shutdown of cryptocurrency infrastructures, recovery of ransom, and assistance to victims. The United States and Japan have a collaborative relationship in this area, with a particularly strong partnership in recent years, including in the coordinated response to the LockBit ransomware group. However, the number of such operations is smaller than that of the United States and European countries, and there is still room to expand cooperation in this area. As NPA demonstrated its high technical capabilities with the LockBit operation, Japan can make a further contribution with these capabilities. Furthermore, with the growing geopolitical tensions, Japan’s strategic location at the center of the Indo-Pacific region presents an opportunity for Japan to contribute to criminal investigations with the unique information it gathers in the region. Japan can also serve as a hub state for cooperation with other countries in the region, working with the United States.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF1: Offensive-cyber firms may be operating with limited internal checks or balances on sales.</code></strong></p> +<p>The FBI and NPA are responsible for the enforcement of countermeasures. However, since the cloud, networks, and cryptocurrency infrastructure utilized by attackers are tied to private providers internationally, it is necessary for companies in both countries to cooperate with law enforcement agencies within the legal framework. Further collaboration between law enforcement agencies and increased opportunities for coordinated operations involving private organizations in both countries would reinforce deterrence and demonstrate Japan-U.S. solidarity against foreign adversaries.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB1: Inadequate regulation or enforcement of corporate ethics and corporate social responsibility procedures.</code></strong></p> +<h4 id="additional-areas-of-collaboration">Additional Areas of Collaboration</h4> -<p>Notwithstanding limited and relatively recent export controls, the desire for continued opacity (from some buyers) has enabled an environment in which there is a continued lack of supply chain transparency among offensive-cyber developers, vendors and markets. In a context of generally poor transparency across the market, firms are disincentivised to increase oversight, as this could reduce sales and/or disrupt supply chains.</p> +<p><em>Harmonize rules, standards, and framework</em></p> -<p>Of an indicative sample of eight offensive-cyber firms (of those with a public presence), there is a wide degree of variation in transparency regarding oversight of sales and use of services or tools that may be used for unauthorised intrusion. Some firms have no ethics statements, while others have ethics statements that concern issues such as the environment and/or modern slavery in their supply chain, but do not have public-facing policies on their products or services. Some firms may claim that they have oversight of clients in some instances, but claim they have no oversight in other cases.</p> +<p>One key objective of Japan-U.S. collaboration is to harmonize the various cybersecurity processes in both countries. While there is a wide range of approaches to cybersecurity, from mandatory requirements to voluntary standards and frameworks, it is important to harmonize these internationally to streamline processes and ensure consistency. This is of particular importance for allied countries to ensure the interoperability of rules and frameworks, reduce the burden on multinational companies located in both countries, and ensure the same levels of cybersecurity.</p> -<p>More transparently, firms may place example end-user licence agreements on their webpages, which can include outcomes such as cessation of service or refusal to renew a contract. Other firms produce transparency and human rights reporting or statements, including indicative data on refused sales, the composition of their external ethics committee, or mention of internal review processes on the use of their products. However, such reports contrast with allegations of use of offensive-cyber products in human rights abuses. Experts have argued that such documentation does not constitute “a transparency report in any meaningful way”.</p> +<p>There is currently a growing discussion in Japan on the potential requirement for critical infrastructure owners and operators across sectors to report significant cyber incidents. As this discussion continues, it will be necessary for Japan to investigate and analyze similar regulations in other countries, including the U.S. CIRCIA, to achieve greater effectiveness and alignment. Furthermore, as a voluntary guideline for critical infrastructure, it would be beneficial to crosswalk and map between a series of Japan’s guidelines and the U.S. CSF and CPGs. It would also be beneficial for both countries to develop and standardize basic principles with international partners, such as minimum baseline requirements that may be developed in the United States in the near future, as baseline requirements should not differ significantly across nations. It is also recommended that government procurement and certification requirements be standardized to reduce the administrative burden on companies in both countries. For example, although FedRAMP and ISMAP, certification programs for cloud services, are said to be equivalent to some extent, providers need to obtain certification separately from each. There is an opportunity to explore the possibility of mutual recognition.</p> -<p>It is not possible to conclude that there is an inevitable ethical race to the bottom. Firms – particularly those operating relatively openly – will operate degrees of self-regulating oversight either because they believe it is the right thing to do, or as a means of avoiding negative consequences. These could include bad press, loss of investor or customer confidence, and impacted staff morale. However, beyond overt export control embargo lists and sanctions regimes, firms do not have clarity on how they should sell, and who they legally can, but should not, sell to or purchase from. Grey areas exist beyond the usual suspects – such as Iran, North Korea and Russia – from whom purchase requests are from law enforcement agencies in strategic-ally states where there may be recorded human rights breaches. In these instances, exporting states may be reluctant to provide clarity in writing and there may be a perceived risk of destabilising higher-priority diplomatic engagements. This links to a behaviour discussed later, SPB5.</p> +<p>It would also be beneficial for both countries to further promote the adoption of the NIST CSF as a risk-based, standards-based, flexible, technology-neutral, and global consensus-based framework. Japan has a long history of international partners engaging in CSF development and implementation. The release of CSF 2.0 is an opportunity for the private sector to take the lead in the transition to the new version, the development of supplementary resources, the sharing of use cases and lessons learned, and the expansion of application to a wide range of organizations, including SMBs. These should continue to be promoted through cooperation with NIST and the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) community. The use of a common framework for cybersecurity risk management enables organizations in both countries to visualize risks and their management plans and communicate in a common language, facilitating discussions on operational collaboration. Furthermore, in recent years, the CSF has been frequently brought up in regulatory discussions, with a growing consensus that it should serve as a common foundation for all involved. Thus, the adoption of the CSF has become a crucial step in facilitating international regulatory harmonization as well.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF2: Complex corporate structure crossing multiple jurisdictions.</code></strong></p> +<p><em>Cooperate on specific technologies and services</em></p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB2: Lack of transparency on corporate ownership and transnational subsidiaries.</code></strong></p> +<p>The United States and Japan have world-leading technological capabilities and much to gain from cooperating in specific technological areas. This paper does not address all of them, as its focus is on critical infrastructure protection, but briefly outlines some of the potential areas of cooperation.</p> -<p>Like many industries, the offensive-cyber industry has benefited from multi-jurisdictional spread, for instance drawing on tax and oversight regime divergence to increase potential for corporate secrecy. However, there is also scope for additional complexity in corporate structure for the purpose of obfuscating activities, ownership or clients, or sidestepping legal boundaries. For example, firms may operate a range of different company names in different jurisdictions. Additionally, personnel, senior leadership or investors may be involved in more than one commercial offensive-cyber firm, and may operate in fluid locations. As one regime tightens oversight or restrictions on a particular individual, that individual may move to a less rigorous jurisdiction. Feasibly, this fluidity could engender a transfer of intellectual property between firms, and firms themselves may be distinctly transitory. This may include sensitive and strategically significant intellectual property relating to advanced unauthorised intrusion capabilities. Senior leadership in firms that are blacklisted may create new – ostensibly different – firms to continue product or service development and gain new sales. There is, arguably, significant scope for increased alignment in sanction regimes with respect to commercial offensive cyber, as well as more robust enforcement of existing multilateral regimes, such as EU regulations. Beneficial ownership requirements could be enforced to counter shell corporation structures.</p> +<ul> + <li>Internet routing security</li> +</ul> -<p>Two suggested global indicators may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 1:</p> +<p>The internet is an inherently open and internationally interconnected infrastructure. In particular, routing security, which is currently a key area of focus, requires a collaborative approach involving multiple stakeholders internationally. The United States and Japan have a number of global leading providers of telecommunications, data centers, and cloud services. Many of these entities may have already implemented RPKI and other routing security measures in their infrastructure, but they could further influence the entire internet ecosystem, including SMBs and customer networks, by advocating their practices through the international community of internet operations. As the United States shifts its focus to a domestic regulatory approach, it would be highly beneficial for U.S. and Japanese operators to spearhead industry-led initiatives as a model for the community and to promote international stakeholder approaches.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>The level of compliance with the UN’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Scores on the World Bank Governance Index – Regulatory Quality.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<ul> + <li>5G/O-RAN security</li> +</ul> -<p>These could be used by stakeholders to benchmark and assess the degree to which states and offensive-cyber firms design and implement successful human rights oversight mechanisms.</p> +<p>The United States and Japan are in relatively similar positions with regard to the development and deployment of 5G networks using O-RAN, as there are no traditional wireless communications equipment vendors with a significant global market share, such as Nokia and Ericsson in Europe. In the international deployment of secure and reliable 5G networks, O-RAN security is a key area of focus and an opportunity for mutually beneficial collaboration between the United States and Japan. The O-RAN security report published by Quad states that networks using O-RAN do not fundamentally alter the security environment of wireless communication networks compared to conventional networks. Moving forward, it would be beneficial for the two countries to showcase their achievements in building secure networks by conducting joint tests focusing on cybersecurity in a phase closer to commercial implementation. This can be achieved through NTIA grant programs in which both Japanese and U.S. carriers participate, as well as test beds provided by carriers.</p> -<h4 id="area-2-legal-frameworks-for-product-development-sale-and-transfer">Area 2: Legal Frameworks for Product Development, Sale and Transfer</h4> +<ul> + <li>Vulnerability scanning</li> +</ul> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF3: Offensive-cyber firms may sell to high-risk countries or inappropriate domestic actors.</code></strong></p> +<p>The NOTICE project, which has been in operation in Japan for over five years, extensively scans vulnerabilities in internet-facing IoT devices in Japan and encourages users to take corrective action. Meanwhile, CISA has been providing a Cyber Hygiene Vulnerability Scanning service since 2022 that scans vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices owned by registered companies and issues reports and alerts. There are similarities between the two programs. Through cooperation, both programs could provide insights on how to enhance their programs from various perspectives, including technical implementations and user outreach methods. Moreover, there could be an opportunity for collaboration in sharing services, tools, and resources of the programs.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB3: Inadequate export controls, internal and/or insufficient training or guidance.</code></strong></p> +<ul> + <li>Space system security</li> +</ul> -<p>As noted in NPF/SPB1, there is a lack of meaningful clarity internationally regarding the “responsible” sale of offensive hacking tools and services. Meanwhile, there is a wide-ranging catalogue of allegations regarding the sale of offensive-cyber tools to state entities for uses that may be in breach of international human rights obligations. It is possible that there is nuance regarding legal but irresponsible cyber proliferation. For instance, a state may design a legal oversight regime for the export of offensive-cyber tools – unauthorised surveillance software – for the purposes of counterterrorism. However, the impracticality of an international definition of “terrorism” has become a cliché in international politics. In some jurisdictions, “terrorism” or “national-security risk” may be interpreted sufficiently broadly to include non-violent political opposition and civil society groups.</p> +<p>While space systems have not been designated as critical infrastructure in either country, it is clear that space has already become a strategic domain for both commercial and military use. While there is a growing concern about the cybersecurity of space systems, including from a national security perspective, both countries are still in the early stages of addressing the specific risk. In the United States, CISA, the NSC, and the National Space Council are taking the lead in studying minimum cybersecurity requirements for space systems. CISA, in cooperation with the private sector, recently released a paper outlining recommendations for space system operators. In Japan, METI has published cybersecurity guidelines for commercial space systems. As this is a new and evolving area, there may be an opportunity for the two countries to cooperate in assessing space-specific threats and risks and developing a risk management plan. In January 2023, the United States and Japan signed a framework agreement on comprehensive space cooperation. It would be worthwhile for both countries to prioritize cybersecurity as a key area of cooperation in anticipation of the potential designation of space systems as critical infrastructure in the future.</p> -<p>Additionally, in the absence of guardrails, and the failure of existing mechanisms such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, there is a risk of intentional or unintentional seepage proliferation from both private and state actors. For example, there are instances where hacker-for-hire firms, including those offering services to private investigators working on behalf of individual clients, have reportedly gained access to the NSO Group’s Pegasus software, and have claimed that they can spin up their own control centre to covertly snoop on a target’s digital presence.</p> +<ul> + <li>Post-quantum cryptography</li> +</ul> -<p>It is also possible that state entities may gain legitimate access to offensive-cyber tools but leak these tools to other agents for illegitimate or illegal use. It is of course also of note that the use of a zero-day exploit against a target can also expose the exploit – for instance, through forensic investigation – to the target entity and/or others. Use, therefore, can pose a proliferation risk.</p> +<p>Cryptography is a foundational technology for ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of data. It is a critical element of cybersecurity. The release of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards by NIST this year further accelerates global efforts around PQC migration. In the United States, the goal is to complete the migration in federal agencies by 2035, as outlined in NSM-10 and a subsequent OMB directive. During the long-term transition, it is essential to ensure connectivity and interoperability between organizations and systems, as there will be a mixed environment of systems with both existing and PQC algorithms. This is also true for the Japan-U.S. alliance. There is an opportunity for both governments to collaborate on coordinating migration road maps for government agencies and critical infrastructure and aligning their efforts on deployment to ensure cybersecurity and interoperability of the digital infrastructure and operational environment on which both countries depend. Moreover, Japanese companies could further contribute to the advancement of international PQC migration initiatives by actively engaging with relevant communities, such as the NCCoE’s project, where they can share best practices and develop guidance on PQC migration.</p> -<p>Combined, these issues highlight two distinct but linked regulatory or oversight gaps: there are arguably inadequate access control and oversight measures across the market; and there is a lack of cohesion in tools or processes that could be used to restrict irresponsible proliferation.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF4: Vulnerability researchers may choose to sell to black or grey markets.</code></strong></p> +<p>The Japan-U.S. alliance is more important than ever in light of the growing geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region. Much of today’s alliance activities are based on cyberspace, with critical infrastructure for which both countries rely on each other being a central element. Given the shared significant threat to critical infrastructure posed by state-sponsored actors, it is imperative for the two countries to cooperate in critical infrastructure protection to ensure the cybersecurity and resilience of the alliance as a whole and demonstrate their robust solidarity against foreign adversaries.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB4: Lack of effective vulnerabilities equities process, notification or disclosure processes, and/or insufficient legal protection for researchers.</code></strong></p> +<p>While there are a number of policy cooperation agendas between the two countries at various levels and entities, including critical infrastructure protection, there is still room for improvement in implementing concrete and tangible operational collaboration. It is crucial for both countries to further expand and operationalize these efforts with speed and scale while ensuring further involvement of critical infrastructure owners and operators. There are several potential avenues for collaboration, including engaging in national and alliance-level risk analysis, conducting cross-sector public-private joint cyber exercises, expanding the public-private operational collaboration environment, deepening sector-to-sector collaboration, enhancing coordinated operations to disrupt threat actors, harmonizing cybersecurity processes, and cooperating in specific technologies and services. To facilitate these specific operational collaborations efficiently, it is also important for all parties involved in Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation to have a comprehensive understanding of both countries’ highly decentralized and complicated cybersecurity structures and their roles, responsibilities, and authorities.</p> -<p>The activities undertaken by vulnerability researchers are often indistinguishable from those undertaken for malicious purposes. Both sets of actors look for vulnerabilities or configuration issues in third-party computing systems that can provide opportunities for access. Outside bug bounty programs, independent researchers will typically conduct their investigations without the knowledge or authorisation of the system owners or end-users. As a result, many researcher activities may be unauthorised and possibly illegal under a jurisdiction’s anti-hacking laws.</p> +<p>Japan and the United States are currently at a pivotal point in their national cybersecurity policies, with key national security and cybersecurity strategies and legislation being implemented. Taking these evolutions as an opportunity, it is the right time to reassess the current state of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation and explore ways forward for further collaboration.</p> -<p>Few states have legal carve-outs or exemptions that protect or support security research activities. In some jurisdictions, anti-hacking laws not only expose researchers to risk of criminal prosecution, but also contain civil causes of action that enable technology manufacturers to bring lawsuits against researchers. This legal environment imperils researchers, and, in some cases, incentivises them to go underground, selling their findings to brokers who will not ask questions, or governments that will not prosecute them, rather than disclosing them to the relevant technology manufacturer or operator.</p> +<hr /> -<p>In addition, the dynamics regarding exploit sale and/or notification may be inadvertently incentivising unmoderated proliferation of offensive-cyber tools. Vulnerability researchers who discover new vulnerabilities and develop new exploits may choose to sell their knowledge to private firms, vulnerability brokers or government entities. Researchers may be motivated to provide their knowledge to particular actors on the basis of a range of diverse factors, including reputation, alignment and pricing.</p> +<p><strong>Taro Hashimoto</strong> is a visiting fellow with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has been with Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) Group for over 15 years, where he has held various roles in cybersecurity and telecommunication businesses, including service planning, development and operation, research and development, corporate risk management, and human resource development from both technology and management perspectives.</p>Taro HashimotoCybersecurity is the foundation for a robust U.S.-Japan alliance. This report analyzes the cybersecurity policies of both countries and the prospects for future collaboration on critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience.Trusted Chips2024-10-24T12:00:00+08:002024-10-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trusted-chips<p><em>A quest for “trusted chips” risks sidetracking crucial semiconductor policy solutions. Aligned policy goals are needed to truly secure and de-risk supply chains, balancing national security, economic viability, and technological feasibility.</em></p> -<p>Buyers and platforms may have ranging payment values and structures. Receivers of exploits may not perform any form of vetting of the sources of exploits, beyond determining that the exploit itself is valid. This lack of oversight could be in response to market pressures – the preference of sellers to remain anonymous – or due to the receiver’s own preference or resource constraints. Additionally, as an emerging trend, exploit developers may gain greater income by maintaining their monopoly on their novel exploit and selling their access “as a service”, reducing scope for the exploit to be traded, identified and rectified.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Exploits may be framed simultaneously as both high-value private and public good commodities. Similarly, national security agencies may be incentivised to hold and deploy novel exploits for offensive operations, rather than share their knowledge with the owner(s) of impacted systems. Some commentators have advocated for an international vulnerabilities equities process (VEP) that holds states accountable to specific standards, or sets boundaries for keeping or disclosing vulnerabilities. Even at a national level, existing VEPs are few, and hindered by contention between the interests of offensive-cyber stakeholders and defensive or privacy cyber stakeholders. Nonetheless, the absence of binding reporting, disclosure or bug-purchase mechanisms leaves the market in a relative free-for-all, enabling opportunities for proliferation to occur unchecked.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Four suggested global indicators that may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 2 are:</p> +<p>The United States and its allies have taken significant actions to promote the de-risking of semiconductor supply chains. Protecting and controlling these supply chains also remain critical components of national and economic security discussions. To achieve this holistically, several sometimes-conflicting goals need to be met:</p> -<ul> +<ol> <li> - <p>Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.</p> + <p>Critical technologies and products need to be controlled.</p> </li> <li> - <p>World Justice Project.</p> + <p>Export control sanctions must be enforced.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Freedom House Index (Rule of Law).</p> + <p>Sensitive information must be safeguarded against attacks through compromised chips.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Bertelsmann Transformation Index.</p> + <p>Overreliance on nonmarket actors must be avoided.</p> </li> -</ul> - -<p>Although these global indicators are an imperfect solution, stakeholders could draw on them to contextualise proliferation across a range of jurisdictions. They are notably less direct and/or cohesive than those proposed for Area 1 and some other Areas. An overarching finding from this research is that existing proxy indexes have severe limitations. Put simply, it is not possible to use existing indexes or other open sources to meaningfully quantify the degree to which permissive behaviours have causal or correlative links to commercial cyber proliferation. This is an important dilemma. Stakeholders should consider how the Pall Mall Process and other initiatives can not only urge action against irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation, but also form new processes through which activity can be monitored and assessed.</p> - -<h4 id="area-3-diplomatic-support-and-engagement">Area 3: Diplomatic Support and Engagement</h4> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF3: Offensive-cyber firms may sell to high-risk countries or inappropriate domestic actors.</code></strong></p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB5: State actors may deploy offensive-cyber firms as a means of establishing or strengthening diplomatic relationships.</code></strong></p> - -<p>States with an economically and strategically significant presence of offensive-cyber firms may feel an incentive to promote proliferation in certain circumstances, where this feeds into broader diplomatic goals: for instance, maintaining strategic alignment or improving bilateral trade. It is notable that following the blacklisting by the US of offensive-cyber firms NSO Group and Candiru, both the Israeli government and the firms themselves lobbied Washington to reverse the decision.</p> - -<p>Furthermore, given the strategic exclusivity of some offensive-cyber tools, including advanced spyware, firms can possibly be used as bargaining chips in a broader diplomatic context. There have been alleged instances where offensive-cyber firms have halted trading with some states, for example following negative press, but have later resumed trading after intervention from their own government. In this way, cyber proliferation may be used as a tool of soft-power projection.</p> - -<p>It is also worth noting that, in some contexts, states may use diplomatic or economic levers to entice existing offensive-cyber firms to establish a presence in their territory. For instance, some states have incentivised companies through tax incentives and/or fast-tracked citizenship applications. As demonstrated by the case of Israeli QuaDream and its Cypriot partner InReach, such practices could be a tacit encouragement of SPB2 and could feed or stimulate NPF2.</p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF5: Hackers-for-hire may undertake unauthorised intrusion against third parties, on behalf of public relations firms, law firms or private investigative ecosystems.</code></strong></p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB6: State entities may cover up, downplay or inadvertently encourage the use of hackers-for-hire.</code></strong></p> - -<p>Clients from the private and public sectors may commission the support of public relations and law firms, which in turn contract a hacking-for-hire entity for an offensive-cyber operation for which the victim has not provided consent.</p> - -<p>Hacker-for-hire organisations may use an array of techniques, ranging from basic social engineering combined with open source hacking tools, to hacking with illicit copies of Pegasus. Targets of such unauthorised activity have reportedly included judges, investors, NGO figures and politicians. It is important to emphasise, however, that victims do not need to be public or high-profile figures. There are indications of hackers-for-hire conducting commissioned non-consensual hacking against romantic partners, landlords and competitor firms. Reporting indicates that this is a global issue, with mixed success for international prosecutions.</p> + <li> + <p>A competitive, commercially viable semiconductor supply must be ensured.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>Although the commissioning of hacking is illegal in many jurisdictions, there may be some instances where a client or private investigator may wish to commission hacking because they perceive a window of opportunity for hacked material to be used in court, for example in a divorce case. This contradiction may encourage pseudo-legal or illegal proliferation of hacking activity. Despite previous UK government interest in regulating this sector, and the role of private investigators in facilitating historical hacking scandals on behalf of tabloids, UK private investigator activity remains relatively self-regulating.</p> +<p>Many of these policy goals have been recently subsumed under a general call for “trusted” or “trustworthy” chips. In reality, the goals are varied and complex, and trade-offs are unavoidable. For example, adding security features will increase costs and might not be technically feasible for most semiconductors.</p> -<p>Additionally, investigations have identified hacker-for-hire operators who offer intrusive and unobtrusive services to disrupt rival political campaigns; these include a firm promoted on an Israeli Ministry of Defense website. Amid potential controversy and embarrassment associated with such linking, government entities may refuse to comment. Entities in the offensive-cyber industry that are subject to negative reporting may use anti-libel law firms and courts to prohibit the production and dissemination of such reporting. Combined, these behaviours indicate possible ways in which state apparatuses can be used overtly or tacitly as vehicles to obfuscate proliferating practices.</p> +<p>Without specific, clearly defined, and aligned policy goals – along with an appreciation of the technological boundary conditions and an understanding of the economic impacts along the supply chain – the discussions among the United States and its allies are unlikely to yield meaningful results. “Trusted chips” will continue to mean different things to different stakeholders, detracting from solving the underlying issues.</p> -<p>Three suggested global indicators may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 3:</p> +<p>This white paper offers three recommendations for policymakers to address pertinent questions about the semiconductor supply chain:</p> -<ul> +<ol> <li> - <p>National Cyber Security Index (diplomatic engagements).</p> + <p>Align on specific policy objectives rather than definitions.</p> </li> <li> - <p>UN open-ended working group positions on sharing of technologies and tools as part of capacity-building programmes.</p> + <p>Use, refine, and align existing policy tools devised for specific objectives.</p> </li> <li> - <p>UN Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrime positions on criminalisation carve-outs for security researchers.</p> + <p>Enable and seek industry involvement to ensure commercial viability and promote fast adoption.</p> </li> -</ul> +</ol> -<p>These indicators may be used by stakeholders to analyse the degree to which different states are overtly or tacitly facilitating commercial cyber proliferation through promotion and/or enticement of market actors through diplomatic and/or economic channels.</p> +<h3 id="mapping-wide-ranging-policy-objectives-onto-a-trusted-chip-concept-will-fail">Mapping Wide-Ranging Policy Objectives onto a “Trusted Chip” Concept Will Fail</h3> -<h4 id="area-4-development-of-cyber-security-ecosystem-and-workforce">Area 4: Development of Cyber-Security Ecosystem and Workforce</h4> +<p>Security typically deals with technical controls and processes, whereas trust is a social concept that goes a step further: It is fundamentally about relationship dynamics and the expectations that come with them.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF6: Unrewarding legal avenues for individuals to use hacking skills.</code></strong></p> +<p>The term “trusted chip” thus sets a high bar. It might imply, for example, the confidence that the semiconductor will perform according to its specifications under all conditions and be free of unintended defects or malicious manipulation. It could also signal awareness or control over the product’s provenance – transparency about the chip’s exact supply chain, or at least certainty that critical steps in the supply chain took place outside the control of adversaries.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB7: Lack of engagement or regulation to promote adoption of bug bounty programs, hackathons, “capture the flag” contests, or other forms of paid vulnerability research.</code></strong></p> +<p>Among semiconductor industry experts, the term “trust” historically means one of two narrowly defined concepts:</p> -<p>Vulnerability researchers have a range of ethical avenues for disseminating the vulnerabilities or exploits that can enable – although do not constitute – offensive capabilities. These avenues may include actively or retrospectively permissioned vulnerability disclosure programs, some of which may be fee-based bug bounty programs or commissions from software or service providers. However, there is a lack of government guidance on or regulation of how buyers should operate these types of programs, particularly to create greater security and awareness for technology users. This is an unresolved regulatory gap that feeds ambiguity and creates space for crossover between defensive and offensive research.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="trusted-microcontrollers">Trusted Microcontrollers</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Payment agreements may include non-disclosure agreement (NDA) clauses; in essence, the security researcher takes a payment in exchange for their silence after they share their knowledge of an identified vulnerability. Acceptance of the NDA can be a prerequisite for both payment and “safe harbour”: in other words, an agreement by the organisation not to seek prosecution for the hacking. This may be in addition to other vetting procedures, such as ID and banking checks. The rationale for an NDA is understandable; the “buying” organisation is placing a monetary value on exclusive knowledge and will not want the vulnerability to be broadcast to other actors until it is rectified. In some cases, vendors may decide not to disclose the vulnerability at all, for example to avoid reputational impact. It is also possible that the vulnerability may not be fixed altogether – “buying” the details could be viewed as a partial solution to the vulnerability itself. This lack of transparency may frustrate vulnerability researchers and provides an opportunity for them to break the NDA – unbeknownst to the technology manufacturer – to further monetise their findings by secretly selling the information to a vulnerability broker.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>A dedicated microcontroller (MCU), or parts of an MCU designed to secure hardware through integrated cryptographic features, is called a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). TPMs have proliferated from sensitive defense or government applications to high-volume consumer devices such as personal computers and mobile phones. An ISO/IEC 11889 standard was published in 2009. Trusted MCUs are instrumental in achieving high system-level cybersecurity standards, such as those called for by the U.S. Cybersecurity Label for consumer and Internet of Things devices or the European Union’s Cyber Resilience Act.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>At present, where formal and legal buyers develop a reputation for “sitting on” disclosures or making incomplete payments to researchers, the researchers may be motivated to sell to grey-market entities or otherwise publicly broadcast the vulnerability. As such, regulation that encourages public disclosure may be useful as a form of expectation management for both parties. Public disclosure also encourages mitigation or patching of vulnerabilities, reduces risk for users of the technology, and negates the value of the vulnerabilities in the grey or black markets.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="trusted-supply-chains">Trusted Supply Chains</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>On the other hand, government intervention in disclosure processes should be carefully calibrated to avoid unintended consequences. There are suggestions, for example, that disclosure laws in some jurisdictions, including recent developments in China, may reduce public disclosure. This may create possible security dilemmas where government entities hold vulnerabilities that remain unpatched.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>In 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense initiated a Trusted Foundry Program, now part of the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA)’s Trusted Supplier Program. As of early 2024, 16 out of 82 accredited trusted suppliers were also accredited for semiconductor foundry services, to provide services for advanced and foundational chips. The program is tailored to critical but less cost-sensitive defense and national security applications.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF7: Computer science students may not receive sufficient training in ethics or law.</code></strong></p> +<p>The two concepts can be applied simultaneously. However, while the latter can be applied to all semiconductors, the former is limited to a specific product category.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB8: Possible gaps in cyber-security and STEM education policy.</code></strong></p> +<p>There are more recent attempts to broaden the concept of trusted semiconductors. Examples can be found in the 2023 European Chips Act, which advocates for “trusted, secure and green chips.” However, a clear definition remains elusive.</p> -<p>An increase in the number of computer science graduates across major economies has been widely reported as necessary for both economic prosperity and cyber security. However, the increased number of skilled computer science graduates has implications for offensive-cyber proliferation. Notwithstanding the emergence of cyber-security degrees, which may include content on ethics, commentators have emphasised that there may be opportunities to improve ethics training in computer and data science training programmes. Additionally, the offensive skills that a student may learn on an “ethical hacking” course for defensive purposes are transferable to offensive markets, including unauthorised activity.</p> +<p>In the context of controlling access to the most advanced artificial intelligence (AI) hardware, secure and governable AI chips have been proposed, expanding on the concept of trusted MCUs.</p> -<p>Given a potential pay disparity between defensive and offensive markets, graduates may be incentivised to offer their skills to offensive operations, even in cases where these may be illegal or pseudo-illegal. This may be exacerbated in regions with high unemployment, or where technical roles may be more limited in pay or scope. In these cases, technical employees may work a primary job and supplement their incomes with hacking or exploit research on the side.</p> +<p>Some policymakers even proposed the concept of trusted semiconductors as a trade remedy – that is, restricting access to U.S. and allied markets to trade with trusted chips. Lastly, it has been suggested that trusted chips could aid in verifying export control compliance.</p> -<p>Ethical hackers may acquire validation through Certified Ethical Hacker, Offsec Certified Professional or other certifications, and clients may use these to filter providers. However, without guidance and guardrails, the voluntary nature of certification gives hackers space to use the adjective “ethical” even if they offer services or use methods that may be in breach of computer misuse laws. Given the international nature of the market, it is also important to note that “legal” and “ethical” are distinct, and can also vary significantly across jurisdictions. Practices that are legal in one country may be illegal and/or unethical in another.</p> +<p>This short overview illustrates how the concept of trust, broadly applied to semiconductor markets, glosses over crucial details: Should it apply to all chips or only some? Should it benefit broad consumer markets or defense contractors? Do the costs of implementing a technical solution matter or not? Mapping wide-ranging policy objectives – such as export control, supply risk mitigation, trade policy, cybersecurity, and integrity of critical microelectronic systems – onto the “trust” concept is bound to fail. Worse, it will distract from meaningful discussions.</p> -<p>Four suggested global indicators may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 4:</p> +<h3 id="answering-four-questions-can-structure-and-focus-the-discussion">Answering Four Questions Can Structure and Focus the Discussion</h3> + +<p>Policy solutions to guide semiconductor export control, supply risk mitigation, trade policy, and cybersecurity are nevertheless pertinent. They need to be coupled with an appreciation for technological feasibility and private sector commercial incentives.</p> + +<p>Answering four questions will help to structure and focus the discussion (Figure 1).</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AcVHFqr.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Figure 1: Option Space for Key Semiconductor Policy Questions</em></p> <ol> <li> - <p>International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Global Cybersecurity Index.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>ISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study 2023.</p> + <p><strong>Which semiconductors should be covered?</strong> MCUs and microprocessors (MPUs) allow, in principle, the implementation of on-chip security features to establish trust, traceability, and, potentially, governance features. However, MCUs and MPUs combined cover less than 15 percent of the semiconductor market. On-chip security features are not technically feasible for much of the remaining 85 percent (e.g., sensors, power semiconductors, other discrete semiconductors). These devices lack the compute and memory capabilities to execute trust functionality.</p> + + <p>A unique, tamper-proof, chip-level identification for all semiconductors would be commercially prohibitive in most cases. Printing a unique marker on every semiconductor’s packaging would be cheaper, but it would still need to be backed by an industry-wide global database to detect misuse reliably.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre, University of Oxford, Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model (Section 3).</p> + <p><strong>Which systems should be covered?</strong> Critical applications – such as military command, control, communications, and computing equipment – require the highest technical level of device security and supply chain provenance. Additionally, the export of these application-specific or dual-use chips to adversaries often needs to be controlled. At the same time, the universe of parties that are affected by stringent requirements is relatively small: government agencies or prime contractors as buyers and a small number of accredited suppliers. Their willingness to shoulder the additional compliance and risk mitigation costs is high.</p> + + <p>Another example involves high-volume consumer devices, which can indeed provide a high level of trust. For instance, a laptop or mobile phone must protect personal information and securely execute payment transactions. While this can be achieved with on-chip hardware security (available to retail consumers as aftermarket products for less than $30), full end-to-end control of a mobile phone or laptop supply chain is not commercially viable. For instance, one major U.S. consumer electronics company’s supplier list includes 200 suppliers with 600 sites at locations across the globe.</p> + + <p>Basic connected consumer devices often fall short of any digital security standards, something the EU Cyber Resilience Act and the S. Cybersecurity Label seek to address.</p> </li> <li> - <p>HackerOne top participant countries.</p> - </li> -</ol> + <p><strong>What are the policy requirements?</strong> After deciding which parts of the semiconductor market and which systems should be covered, policymakers need to agree on who or what they are trying to protect and what degree of certainty constitutes success in achieving their goals.</p> -<p>These indicators may be used by stakeholders to appraise the status of and possible issues within the cyber-security workforce, and education and training systems in a range of jurisdictional contexts.</p> + <p>At the level of a single chip or microelectronic system, policy goals might include the control of exports and protecting the system (or data) from unauthorized access or manipulation. Alternatively, labeling trusted semiconductors could serve as a trade action in disguise to restrict imports from suppliers or countries engaging in nonmarket state practices and policies.</p> -<h4 id="area-5-integration-with-defence-and-security-industrial-base">Area 5: Integration with Defence and Security Industrial Base</h4> + <p>At the level of the entire supply chain, policy goals may include the reliable supply of commercial semiconductor goods and supply chain transparency. In the case of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Trusted Supplier Program, the goal is very tight control over every step of the semiconductor supply chain.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF8: Competitive pressures on existing defence companies to develop offensive-cyber tools.</code></strong></p> + <p>Along with these requirements come different definitions of what constitutes success. Trade remedies might be considered successful at the 80 percent level, an export control agency might be satisfied with 95 percent compliance, and defense-critical applications could demand an even higher level of confidence in the integrity of the respective semiconductor supply.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Is the solution commercially viable?</strong> If governments procure trusted chips for critical applications, they can set the economic incentives directly and compensate suppliers for the costs of manufacturing and controlled supply chains. Suppliers can price in the opportunity cost of export controls, that is, the fact that application-specific products cannot be sold in certain markets.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB9: Application of unwieldy or inappropriate export and security policies to new technologies.</code></strong></p> + <p>The economics will play out very differently in the case of high-volume consumer applications, where end customers may or may not be willing to pay a premium for security or availability. In those scenarios, governments must work closely with industry and gradually influence economic incentives to steer commercial actors toward policy goals.</p> -<p>As noted regarding NPF3/SPB3, export licence regimes can be sufficiently malleable to enable relatively unchecked offensive-cyber proliferation. Additionally, it must be acknowledged that, due to their nature, offensive-cyber tools themselves hold a complicated regulatory position. A single cyber tool may include multiple components for propagation, exploit and payload, each composed of computer code that can be readily disseminated globally and reclassified. Where components are open source code, these may be protected under the First Amendment of the US Constitution. Complicating matters, there are suggestions that states may circumvent export restrictions by encouraging cross-hiring between international and domestic cyber-security vendors.</p> + <p>Answering these questions theoretically results in a large number of different scenarios. However, these scenarios can be distilled into a limited number of practical policy challenges – and the tools to address those challenges are often already available. Policymakers should focus on refining these tools and achieving better alignment among allies regarding their use.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>In this light, commentators have suggested that given the unique nature of cyber tools and the highly diffuse nature of the offensive-cyber ecosystem, “know your supplier” due diligence may be a pragmatic means by which suppliers and contractors can be regulated with the aim of reducing unchecked proliferation of unauthorised capabilities. Such oversight must account for the multilayered nature of supply chains, as it may be relatively common for arms suppliers to subcontract production of offensive-cyber tools. This increases the opportunity for parts of the supply chain to draw on grey-space exploit markets</p> +<h3 id="solve-practical-policy-challenges-instead-of-an-overarching-definition">Solve Practical Policy Challenges Instead of an Overarching Definition</h3> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF9: Revolving door between private companies and military/security positions.</code></strong></p> +<p>In reality, solving practical policy challenges is less complex. Semiconductor devices date back to 1947, as do the challenges to safeguard the technology, protect critical electronic systems and sensitive information from unreliable or malicious chips, and ensure a commercially viable supply of semiconductors. Even the risks of overreliance and state-subsidized industrial production are not new – although the scale of this risk might well be.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB10: Uncompetitive remuneration and lack of controls on career trajectories, post-deployment travel or intellectual property restrictions.</code></strong></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Critical Electronic Systems:</strong> For national security reasons, the United States and its allies have long controlled the semiconductor supply chain for critical electronic systems, such as those used in defense applications. This may involve both hardware and supply chain solutions. Given the sensitive nature of the applications, tools like DMEA’s Trusted Supplier Program are typically deployed on a national level. In addition to whitelisting trustworthy suppliers, blacklisting certain entities is an effective option with a strong forward-signaling impact. Examples include the EU toolbox for 5G security (though deployed with varying urgency among member states) and the more targeted Section 5949 of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act of 2023.</p> -<p>Observers have noted that there is a revolving door between defence and the private offensive-cyber industry, although it should be recognised that the door operates across the whole of the defence sector.</p> + <p>Commercial viability can typically be achieved due to the limited scope of applications, semiconductor volumes, and involved parties.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Cybersecurity of Electronic (Sub-)Systems:</strong> This is another area where technical and commercially viable solutions either already exist (e.g., ISO/IEC 11889 for secure crypto-processors, ISO/SAE 21434 for automotive cybersecurity) or are being implemented (e.g., the S. Cybersecurity Label and the EU Cyber Resilience Act). More recently, the U.S. government proposed a rule to secure information and communications technology for connected vehicles. The rule would regulate hardware “designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by a person owned by, controlled by . . . the PRC or Russia.” Effectively, a concept of “non-trusted” semiconductors is being established, though without explicitly calling it that.</p> -<p>Experienced personnel can draw on their advanced training, tactical skillsets, security clearances and networks to gain more lucrative employment in the private sector. It has been noted that in some national contexts, former defence personnel constitute a majority of founders of cyber-security startups, and research teams may be formed almost exclusively of former military or intelligence personnel. The porosity between private and defence activity should also be set against the backdrop of the challenge of pay gaps between the public and private sectors, with public entities often unable to match the higher salaries offered by the private sector. It is in this context that some states are seeking to loosen controls on career trajectories, giving space for personnel to move more seamlessly between defence and private sector positions.</p> + <p>Therefore, policy and commercial solutions are available or have been proposed for these use cases.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Export Controls:</strong> Limiting the export of certain types of semiconductors, their underlying technology, and manufacturing equipment is an established practice for the United States and its allies. New frameworks might be needed to address shortcomings of existing multilateral export control regimes. Still, in the meantime, multilateral, case-by-case agreements have been successfully achieved (e.g., the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands reaching a deal to curb chipmaking exports to China). Enforcing export controls for advanced AI MPUs is challenging, and stopping the illicit flow of legacy semiconductors to Russia is even harder. Solutions have been proposed to improve export control compliance, but introducing the concept of trusted MCUs or trusted supply chains is not among them. Export control is not an inbound issue – ensuring the United States and its allies get trusted products – but an outbound issue – ensuring adversaries do not obtain them.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Supply Chain Provenance Law:</strong> Various supply chain provenance requirements have been introduced in recent years. Examples include the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. In response to these requirements, companies – including semiconductor manufacturers – are implementing rigorous supply chain monitoring and verification systems, which, by definition, will apply to all their products. Introducing a “trusted chip” certification based on a geography- or entity-specific listing would be possible and might – considering the forward-signaling effect of various U.S. rulemaking proposals – already be expected by industry participants. Policymakers, however, need to carefully weigh the additional reporting burden on the industry against national and economic security goals.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Trade Remedies:</strong> There is mounting concern that Chinese industrial policy, including in the semiconductor market, supports domestic firms that do not operate according to market principles. The United States and its allies can use tools – principally tariffs – to counter nonmarket policies and practices. However, these remedies often amount to too little, too late, especially if lengthy negotiations among allies precede them. Moreover, tariffs are applied to the end product entering a market – such as a computer, mobile phone, or industrial machinery control system. Relatively few chips enter the U.S. and allied markets as components; instead, they are part of a microelectronic system (which is predominantly assembled in Asia). In those cases, the amount of the subsidy on the chip is a very small percentage of the total value of the end product and thus not much of a deterrent. Other, more targeted, entity-based policies might be more effective in countering the threat of overreliance, but such discussions are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that introducing a “trusted chip buyers alliance” to exclude countries of concern from allied markets broadly would face significant legal and practical hurdles, in addition to the abovementioned technical and commercial challenges of providing supply chain provenance.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The revolving door also has ramifications for cyber proliferation. Private firms, motivated to grow and generate revenues, will be incentivised to offer their services and products to a diverse array of clients across intrusion markets. This creates potential space for advanced techniques or products to filter to lower market tiers (for example private hacker-for-hire firms) and less restrained state actors. Concerted thought should be applied to how the benefits and risks of inter-sector movement can be managed through guardrails, restrictions and observation.</p> +<h3 id="policy-recommendations">Policy Recommendations</h3> -<p>Three suggested global indicators may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 5:</p> +<p>Each of the above challenges must be addressed with specific policy solutions. Some, like secure MCUs, are specific to the semiconductor industry. Others, such as export controls or transparency and certification of supply chains, extend beyond semiconductors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to make recommendations for each of them. As it pertains to the discussion about “trusted” or “trustworthy” chips, this paper offers the following recommendations to policymakers:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute military spending databases (expenditure, company value and export value).</p> + <p><strong>Align on specific policy objectives rather than definitions.</strong> Acknowledging that challenges, tools, and policy prerogatives may differ, aligning on clear, specific policy goals is important. A shared understanding is key to enabling problem-specific solutions. Often, the implementation will have to be country-specific, but integrated and aligned measures are needed to avoid negative spillover effects or loopholes. This is easier to achieve for discrete policy challenges than for a broad concept like “trusted chips.”</p> </li> <li> - <p>Global Organised Crime Index (law enforcement score).</p> + <p><strong>Use, refine, and align existing policy tools devised for specific objectives.</strong> Rules and tools already exist to address many of the current technical and geopolitical challenges facing the semiconductor industry. Policymakers should focus on jointly deploying these tools toward a common goal and augmenting national tool kits where there are gaps.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Enable and seek industry involvement to ensure commercial viability and promote fast adoption.</strong> An innovative and competitive semiconductor ecosystem is essential for the United States and its allies. Implementing both “promote” and “protect” policies through regular exchanges with industry representatives is key. Moreover, industry compliance with those policies is crucial for their effectiveness.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>Stakeholders may use these indicators to benchmark and contextualise the size and scope of national security and law enforcement markets in different jurisdictions. Although an imperfect and partial solution, these indicators can be used to provide insight into commercial offensive cyber against the backdrop of military–commercial cultures.</p> +<hr /> -<h3 id="conclusions-and-implications-for-interventions">Conclusions and Implications for Interventions</h3> +<p><strong>Andreas Schumacher</strong> is a visiting technology fellow in the Economic Security and Technology Department and the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.</p>Andreas SchumacherA quest for “trusted chips” risks sidetracking crucial semiconductor policy solutions. Aligned policy goals are needed to truly secure and de-risk supply chains, balancing national security, economic viability, and technological feasibility.NATO’s Airborne EW2024-10-24T12:00:00+08:002024-10-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/natos-airborne-electromagnetic-warfare<p><em>Long overlooked in mainstream defence circles as a “niche” capability reserved for deep specialists, airborne electronic warfare capabilities are an increasingly essential component in NATO’s ability to deter and defeat Russian aggression in Europe.</em></p> -<p>This paper has identified that offensive-cyber proliferation is facilitated by a range of SPBs and NPFs. While those identified in this research are non-exhaustive, it is of significant note that there is clear inter-relationship and reinforcement between some of them. National and international endeavours to promote responsible use of offensive-cyber tools and services will need to be multifaceted and nuanced. Commercial offensive-cyber tools and services perform a vital role in authorised activities, for example, by enhancing cyber-security standards through penetration testing. Similarly, commercial offensive-cyber tools and services are intrinsically necessary to empower responsible state activity, particularly with respect to national security and law enforcement operations.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>As states collectively seek to navigate their endeavour(s) to mitigate irresponsible cyber proliferation and maximise responsible behaviours, it is important to acknowledge and accommodate the multi-faceted activities within the offensive-cyber ecosystem. In instances of concerted irresponsible behaviour, sanctions and blacklisting may be useful tools. However, as identified in this paper, firms, investors and personnel may be motivated to evade such regimes, enabled by the fluid nature of cyber products and services, and incentivised by possible complicity of some state actors. The building of international consensus is thus important to increase the costs of business for the lowest-common-denominator actors.</p> +<p>As the UK and other European NATO members attempt to adapt their air forces to better meet the threat of wider Russian military aggression in the coming years, airborne electromagnetic warfare (EW) is a key area where non-US capabilities are in worryingly short supply across the Alliance. Investment in European airborne electromagnetic attack (EA) can, if done correctly, offer rapid increases in the survivability and lethality of existing air force aircraft and weapon systems. By the same token, however, significant expansion of capacity in Europe to rapidly update EW mission data is also essential in order to maintain current air capabilities in the face of an increasingly rapid pace of Russian radar and EW system adaptation – in part driven by the pressures Russia faces in its war against Ukraine.</p> -<p>More broadly, the building of international consensus is also vital to feed into softer intervention approaches that can draw on the goodwill and societally beneficial intentions of responsible commercial actors. The lowest-common-denominator actors are impactful and significant, but they are not representative of the industry at large. Industry actors, from researchers and brokers through to sellers and consumers, engage in this arena because they want to improve cyber security and shut down illegal activity (among many other positive motivations). In these contexts, such actors may welcome rationally designed and carefully calibrated guidance from the community of state jurisdictions in which they are based, to which they sell, and from whom they source.</p> +<p>Airborne EW capabilities play several key roles in high-intensity air operations, and are especially important for the vital suppression and destruction of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD) mission set. The first role is defensive electronic countermeasures (ECM), where aircraft employ directed jamming effects to try to degrade and break the lock of either the radar of a hostile aircraft or surface-to-air missile system that is targeting them. The second role is offensive stand-off escort jamming, where specialised aircraft with high-powered jamming arrays either mounted in the airframe or in underwing pods degrade hostile airborne and ground-based radar threats from much further back. This enables them to significantly increase the survivability of other attack aircraft or weapons in a strike package that is closer to the threat. The third role is offensive stand-in jamming, where stealth aircraft or advanced decoys, missiles or UAVs conduct suppressive jamming on specific high-priority threat systems from comparatively close range. This is done to provide a temporary window of access for other aircraft or weapons to get through to targets in the area.</p> -<p>Additionally, the research for this paper reinforces the need to view (ir)responsible cyber proliferation through a “whole-of society” lens. Although the inclusion of publicly accessible hacker-for-hire services and advanced state-oriented offensive capabilities into one research paper necessitates potentially problematic broad-brush strokes, this has fed into an important finding: offensive-cyber proliferation is porous. A cyber capability developed for state actor use may, in time, find its way into private hacking commissioned by everyday citizens. There is a clear and tangible risk that this democratises irresponsible and criminal activity. This reality raises both the stakes and the necessity for action by states that are willing to encourage, enforce and demonstrate responsible behaviours.</p> +<h3 id="dependency-on-the-us">Dependency on the US</h3> -<p>Opportunities for impactful policy interventions at national and international levels may be seen as a two-stage process.</p> +<p>Currently, NATO’s air forces are heavily dependent on US Air Force (USAF) and US Navy (USN) aircraft to provide both stand-off and stand-in jamming against a high-end threat like Russia, although several other countries’ fighter fleets have impressive ECM capabilities already for close-range self-defence. NATO’s primary stand-off jamming capability is provided by USN EA-18G Growler aircraft and the USAF EC-130H Compass Call, which is now being replaced by the new EA-37B. SEAD support is also provided by the Tornado electronic combat/reconnaissance (ECR) aircraft of the Italian Air Force and German Air Force, as well as the F-16CM “Wild Weasels” of the USAF’s 480th Fighter Squadron in Germany. However, in terms of EA systems, these Cold War-era aircraft only carry self-protection jamming equipment that is increasingly obsolescent against the more modern Russian threats if used without cover from the more powerful US stand-off systems like the EA-18G and EA-37B. The Tornado ECRs are also only available in small numbers, and the majority of the USAF F-16CM fleet is based in South Korea and Japan. It is notable that in almost any high-end NATO SEAD/DEAD exercise, USN EA-18Gs perform the majority of the EA support, since they offer by far the greatest capability in their class.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Contributions such as this paper help to develop the breadth and depth of understanding of the scale of offensive-cyber proliferation.</strong> In the absence of clear toolkits for further understanding, the paper has proposed a range of possible open source indicators across the five areas of NPFs and SPBs. In principle, these could be adapted or combined with other data points for use in future monitoring. Stakeholders could produce heatmaps of proliferation risk across differing jurisdictions and markets. As previously noted, however, these open sources are imperfect. As like-minded states continue to identify and consolidate positive practices while mitigating irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation, it will also be necessary to consider how multi-stakeholders can implement trusted measures of assessment and monitoring.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Building on these monitoring efforts could lead to assessment of the feasibility and efficacy of national and international interventions.</strong> Some key examples could include:</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Significant expansion of capacity in Europe to rapidly update electronic warfare mission data is essential in order to maintain current air capabilities in the face of an increasingly rapid pace of Russian adaptation</code></em></strong></p> - <p>2.1. <strong>International government coordination and collaboration on norms and regulation.</strong> Elements of the offensive-cyber ecosystem have shown that they are geographically and structurally flexible. Existing controls, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, are insufficient to keep offensive-cyber proliferation in check. Additionally, future internationally-agreed control mechanisms are likely to be achieved on a long-term, rather than short-term, basis. Combined, these factors mean that states should collectively continue to explore immediate unilateral mechanisms. International stakeholders from government, industry and the third sector should monitor and observe existing unilateral controls, such as the US sanctions against NSO Group and Candiru. Looking ahead, broader mechanisms could include export restrictions, limitations on lobbying and oversight of contracting. The recently started Pall Mall Process is an ideal forum through which national governments and regional bodies can push for greater inter-governmental alignment and collaboration on responsible behaviour regarding offensive-cyber proliferation. While it is promising that like-minded stakeholders are convening to discuss issues relating directly to offensive-cyber proliferation, it is notable that many states and actors have not necessarily (yet) been represented. There may be a challenge in the endeavour to widen participation while maintaining meaningful principles. Nonetheless, where consensus is achieved, a limited coalition of influential states may still be able to influence the wider market where universalism is unobtainable.</p> +<p>However, the USN attempted to withdraw its land-based EA-18G units from the European theatre in mid-2022 to bolster its presence in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East. The Growler is a critical part of the Carrier Air Wing force structure, and demand for its capabilities greatly outstrips the number of squadrons available to deploy at any given time. That attempt did not immediately lead to withdrawal, but relying on US EA support as a lynchpin of European NATO SEAD/DEAD capabilities remains a high-risk posture. One of the most likely scenarios in which Russia might risk direct conflict with a NATO member is if the US is drawn into either a serious military standoff or an actual conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific. In any clash over Taiwan or in the South China Sea, airborne EA assets would be some of the most in-demand in the entire US arsenal, meaning few if any EA-18G Growlers or USAF EA-37B Compass Call aircraft would be made available to respond to a Russian threat in Europe during a concurrent crisis. This means a much greater burden of the high-end EW effort would fall on European capabilities than in any previous post-Cold War conflict.</p> - <p>2.2. <strong>Requirements for greater vendor transparency, governance and accountability.</strong> The opacity of many offensive-cyber firms and marketplaces, which encompasses obfuscated or confusing corporate structures, legal liability and public presences, may be helpful in certain environments, such as with core national security-oriented activity and criminal enterprise. This nebulous composition is highly problematic from the standpoint of countering or restricting unchecked offensive-cyber proliferation. Given the diffuse and inter-related nature of the ecosystem, it is unlikely to be possible to counter proliferation meaningfully without responsibly increasing transparency and oversight across commercial intrusion markets.</p> +<h3 id="european-and-uk-airborne-ew-hardware">European and UK Airborne EW Hardware</h3> - <p>2.3. <strong>Adoption of robust vulnerabilities equities and counter-proliferation processes.</strong> The potential for seepage of advanced offensive-cyber capabilities should be a serious concern, in addition to indications that lower-tier hackers-for-hire may have been able to gain access to illicit copies of Pegasus. These cases should be seen as tangible, real-world examples of what happens when cyber proliferation goes wrong. Policymakers and stakeholders must assume that exploits developed for legitimate national security purposes can, and occasionally will, leak into the wrong hands. This is a rallying call for counter-proliferation efforts.</p> +<p>The French Rafale and Swedish Gripen both offer impressive ECM self-protection capabilities, but neither are currently equipped for dedicated stand-off or stand-in jamming. This follows a pattern across NATO air forces where EW in the air domain was primarily thought of as an aircraft self-defence capability outside of specialist units during decades of counterinsurgency operations. However, faced with the challenge of the extensive Russian integrated air defence system, European air forces now face a requirement for much greater offensive stand-off and stand-in jamming capabilities to support SEAD/DEAD operations at scale. Germany has ordered the development of 15 “Eurofighter EK” aircraft from existing airframes, designed to replace its ageing Tornado ECRs in the SEAD role. The EK will use an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar developed by Hensoldt; the Aeraxis EW sensor suit from Saab; and AI-enabled software and mission data by Helsing. However, it will not be certified as combat ready until 2030, and that timeline assumes that the programme faces no delays.</p> - <p>2.4. <strong>Increased support and protections for vulnerability research.</strong> The vulnerability market ecosystem is vital. Currently, a range of implicit incentives may be feeding proliferation to the grey market – where exploits may be acquired by a range of actors for offensive purposes – rather than prompting cyber-security improvements. Serious concerted thought should be given to how the balance can be meaningfully tipped in favour of defensive-first cyber-security research. This could include greater legal recognition of the necessity for vulnerability researcher disclosures, engagement and support for the development of responsible market behaviours, which may include adherence and transparency for VEPs.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>The F-35 is also a potent airborne EW asset, and one that has been purchased by a large number of NATO members including the UK, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Poland, Germany and Czechia. Despite being primarily designed for low-observable strike and SEAD/DEAD operations, its APG-81 radar and advanced mission systems enable highly effective ECM for self-defence and also provide potent stand-in jamming and potentially limited stand-off jamming capabilities against both airborne and surface threats. Even a few F-35s can greatly enhance the survivability of not only their own formation but also allied assets operating alongside them as part of composite air operations. However, the F-35 still faces tactical limitations that make it difficult to generate sustained EW effects for more than short bursts, and pilots potentially risk compromising their position to hostile sensors when emitting in this way. More advanced EA capabilities that formed part of the intended Block 4 upgrade have in many cases been delayed until at least 2029 by issues with the electrical power generation capacity of the existing F-135 engine and hardware manufacturing bottlenecks. Most countries that have bought F-35s also lack the capacity or rights to modify or create their own mission data sets, and instead rely on the US for their mission data and threat library updates.</p> -<p>These suggested interventions are merely a starting point. As is often the case in discussions relating to cyber security, there are no simple solutions, or solve-all mitigations. While there are unlikely to be easy wins to mitigate unchecked offensive-cyber proliferation, it is vital for national, societal and economic security that serious efforts continue. As the research for this paper shows, some governments are now leading on international initiatives. Their success depends on the involvement of various groups from wider society in the design and implementation of interventions to tackle this complex market.</p> +<p>However, this does not fully apply to the UK since it is part of the Australian, Canadian and United Kingdom Reprogramming Laboratory (ACURL), which enables it to generate UK-specific mission data. Beyond the ACURL for its F-35B fleet, the UK has several national airborne EW development and procurement programmes. For stand-in jamming effects, the RAF is exploring options for stand-in jamming payloads for its Autonomous Collaborative Platform (ACP) programme, and continues to fund development work on a stand-in jamming variant of the MBDA SPEAR 3 miniature cruise missile called SPEAR EW. Potent ECM capabilities are also a core feature of the new ECRS Mk2 AESA radar, which is being procured to eventually be retrofitted onto the 40 Tranche 3 aircraft in the RAF Typhoon fleet. However, SPEAR EW has not actually been ordered so far, and the ECRS Mk2 has been developed very slowly compared to AESA radar development programmes for comparable fighters. On current timeframes, RAF Typhoons with the new radar are unlikely to be in service on the frontlines before the late 2020s. The threat outlook in Europe, therefore, would seem to suggest that allocating increased funding and priority to whichever of these existing programmes can offer the most rapid path to procurement and introduction to service is something that should be seriously considered. Given the lack of funding so far for ECRS Mk2 radar sets for the remaining 77 RAF Tranche 2 Typhoons, urgent updates to the capability of their existing ESM and Defensive Aid Sub-System (DASS) suites should also be examined – especially if novel software techniques could improve capability faster than hardware upgrades planned but not yet funded within the Typhoon LTE construct.</p> -<hr /> +<h3 id="the-crucial-role-of-mission-data-and-software">The Crucial Role of Mission Data and Software</h3> -<p><strong>Gareth Mott</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Cyber research team at RUSI. His research interests include governance and cyberspace, the challenges (and promises) of peer-to-peer technologies, developments in the cyber risk landscape, and the evolution of cyber-security strategies at micro and macro levels.</p> +<p>Investment in platforms, sensors and effectors – however important – is also insufficient by itself. EW effectiveness requires electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection capabilities to record hostile radar emissions and covert intelligence collection in order to help understand enemy systems in depth. Many of these ELINT gathering capabilities can be and are mounted on a variety of assets besides fighter aircraft, with the RC-135W Rivet Joint and P-8 Poseidon being notable but by no means exclusive examples. One key objective must be to make better use of the huge amount of such data that is naturally collected by the increasingly capable digital sensors on most airborne and some land and maritime platforms during everyday training and on operations, since the vast majority of this data is not currently captured and fed into the EW analysis and mission data cycle. Beyond improving collection, however, making use of ELINT also requires the ability to rapidly convert collected data on hostile systems into frequent mission data updates in order to enable aircraft and EW systems to remain effective once a conflict starts. Outside the US, where once again the vast majority of NATO capacity and capability resides, the three most capable countries in terms of collection, ELINT analysis and mission data update generation are France, Sweden and the UK. Other countries such as Germany, Italy and Czechia also have centres of expertise and capability, but at a significantly smaller scale.</p> -<p><strong>James Shires</strong> is the Co-Director of both the European Cyber Conflict Research Incubator (ECCRI CIC) and the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative (ECCRI).</p> +<p>The UK has long maintained greater mission data generation capacity than most other NATO allies, largely through the Joint Electronic Warfare Operational Support Centre (JEWOSC) – a Strategic Command asset that is located within the RAF Air and Space Warfare Centre at RAF Waddington. However, dependency on data collected by the US for the JEWOSC’s work is still high, and budgetary and personnel limitations prevent major expansion of capacity without leveraging new techniques such as those offered by machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) toolsets. The task is more complex and simultaneously more essential than ever before, as Russian forces already make widespread use of sophisticated digital radar and EW systems with advanced processing capabilities that can very rapidly alter their signal patterns, energy levels and even frequency bands. This means that not only are they more difficult to detect within the background “noise” of any battlespace, but they are also difficult to identify from their emission signature and can rapidly adapt their signal to reduce the ability of EW to degrade their effectiveness. Consequently, mission data for aircraft, defensive aid suites, weapon seekers and EW systems must be updated far more rapidly than ever before to remain effective in any conflict involving a major power like Russia.</p> -<p><strong>Jen Ellis</strong> works to reduce cyber risk for society. Partnering with security experts, technology providers and operators, civil society and governments, she creates greater understanding of cyber-security realities and promotes collaboration to advance adoption of security strategies and practices. Jen serves on the UK Cabinet Office’s Government Cyber Advisory Board and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology’s Cyber Resilience Expert Advisory Group.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Faced with the challenge of Russia’s extensive integrated air defence system, European air forces now face a requirement for much greater offensive stand-off and stand-in jamming capabilities to support SEAD/DEAD operations at scale</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>James Sullivan</strong> is the Director of the Cyber research team at RUSI. He founded and has grown a research group at RUSI that explores topics such as the role of national cyber strategies, the cyber threat landscape, cyber security and risk management, commercial cyber proliferation, offensive cyber, cyber statecraft and diplomacy, and ransomware.</p> +<p>ML and AI technologies are likely to further increase the speed at which adversary systems adapt and change their behaviour in the coming years. However, these technologies also offer a path for the UK (and other NATO members) to greatly increase the speed and power of collection and mission data update cycles – especially by multiplying the capacity of relatively small teams of specialists. Therefore, the question of how to most efficiently and rapidly integrate advanced ML and AI capabilities into the JEWOSC in order to enhance its capacity and the speed at which it can generate new mission data should be a priority for the Ministry of Defence, even in a budgetary and strategic context where there are a huge variety of competing ones.</p> -<p><strong>Jamie MacColl</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Cyber research team at RUSI. His current research interests include ransomware, the UK’s approach to offensive cyber operations, cyber insurance and the role of private companies in global cyber governance. He has led a range of public and private projects for RUSI, with a particular focus on UK cyber policy.</p>Gareth Mott, et al.This paper seeks to identify how state “permissive” behaviours can contribute to the proliferation of offensive-cyber tools and services.European Economic Security2024-10-18T12:00:00+08:002024-10-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/european-economic-security<p><em>Amid heightened geopolitical tensions, the concept of “economic security” has rapidly come to dominate domestic and international policy agendas. Recent global shocks have exposed the fragility of international financial systems and revealed significant security vulnerabilities in economic dependencies.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>While a general understanding of economic security is gradually emerging, the definitions, objectives and strategies associated with the concept continue to vary greatly. This ambiguity severely hinders the ability of like-minded countries to work together towards coordinated and constructive economic security outcomes. Such efforts are further hampered by the fact that the finance and security communities are often siloed. To bridge this divide and bring clarity to the current policy debate, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI has launched a European Economic Security Taskforce (the Taskforce).</em></p> +<p>In February 2022, USAF F-35s found that even with the aircraft’s unmatched ELINT gathering sensor and analysis capabilities as a SEAD asset, some Russian radars were able to evade accurate identification by using previously unseen “war reserve modes”. The pace of Russian EW and radar signal adaptation has increased many times since then thanks to the pressure of the conflict against Ukraine. Without the capacity to update airborne mission data at a comparable pace, the UK will not only miss the opportunity to develop effective airborne EW capabilities that can help improve NATO’s SEAD/DEAD capabilities and thus its deterrence posture, but it will also risk seeing its existing combat air fleets lose survivability and lethality against Russia and other state threats over time.</p> -<p>CFS is uniquely positioned to deliver this timely initiative, given its reputation as a leading research programme based in Brussels and London that specialises in the intersection of finance and global security. As part of RUSI, the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank, CFS has used its cross-disciplinary expertise and multi-jurisdictional network to convene this Taskforce. The Taskforce brings together international policymakers, geoeconomic academics, and experts from security, industry and the private sector. Taskforce members contribute their expertise in a personal capacity and do not represent their organisations, which include numerous EU member state governments, the European Commission and associated institutions, NATO, and the key allies of Australia, Japan and the UK.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The first meeting of the Taskforce took place on 9 September 2024, and this report provides an overview of the main findings. To best reflect the breadth and fluidity of the discussion, the report does not provide a linear summary of the matters raised. Instead, it first outlines the economic security definition proposed by CFS to establish a conceptual foundation for the work of the Taskforce. Second, the report groups the observations, insights and consensus points that emerged during the meeting under two broad themes: the impact of ambiguity; and the importance of public–private partnerships (PPPs). These themes did not emerge in isolation from one another, but as interconnected considerations. Finally, the report concludes by summarising three key findings identified by Taskforce members when considering the case study of supply chains. As the meeting was conducted on a non-attributable basis, the names and affiliations of participants are not disclosed.</p> +<p><strong>Justin Bronk</strong> is the Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology in the Military Sciences team at RUSI, and the Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal. His particular areas of expertise include the modern combat air environment, Russian and Chinese ground-based air defences and fast jet capabilities, the air war during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and novel weapons technology.</p>Justin BronkLong overlooked in mainstream defence circles as a “niche” capability reserved for deep specialists, airborne electronic warfare capabilities are an increasingly essential component in NATO’s ability to deter and defeat Russian aggression in Europe.Democracy And Human Rights2024-10-24T12:00:00+08:002024-10-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/democracy-and-human-rights<p><em>Authoritarian states are targeting weaknesses in democratic governance to undermine U.S. interests across the globe. It is time for a bipartisan strategy that rallies alliances, business, and civil society actors in defense of democratic governance and human rights.</em></p> -<h3 id="economic-security-as-a-concept">Economic Security as a Concept</h3> +<excerpt /> -<p>The meeting began with a presentation by CFS on the history and meaning of economic security. The use of economic tools to advance security interests has been a feature of international relations for millennia. Indeed, the imposition of trade sanctions by the Athenian Empire is widely considered a causal factor of the Peloponnesian War. In the 21st century, the idea of identifying economic security as a national security priority has emerged primarily as a reaction to a series of global shocks. Over a period of 15 years, Europe has been confronted with an economic collapse after the 2008 financial crisis, the geopolitical ramifications of the 2016 Brexit vote, the cross-sectoral upheaval caused by the Covid-19 global pandemic, and an unprecedented energy crisis following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. At the same time, China has increasingly deployed coercive economic practices with growing scale, sophistication and intensity. These events have compelled international policymakers to reexamine the security risks that arise as a result of global financial integration.</p> +<p>Throughout its history, the United States has emphasized human rights and democracy as core tenets of global engagement but struggled to balance those priorities against the exigencies of immediate geopolitical threats. At home, the definition of democracy itself is increasingly contested in a hyper-partisan political environment that foreign adversaries seek to exploit for their own strategic gain. Both at home and abroad, key foreign policy strategists are questioning whether the United States and its allies have the consensus or capacity necessary to put values at the core of their resistance to coercion and cooption by aggrieved and autocratic adversaries.</p> -<p>The European Commission responded to these shocks by unveiling an Economic Security Strategy in June 2023, which identifies four risk areas: the resilience of supply chains; threats to critical infrastructure; technology security and leakage; and the weaponisation of economic dependencies or economic coercion. The strategy proposes mitigating these risks via a three-pillar approach that involves: promoting competitiveness; protecting against economic security risks; and partnering with the broadest possible range of like-minded partners. In January 2024, the Commission adopted a package of five initiatives aimed at strengthening the EU’s economic security across trade, investment and research. This was followed in July 2024 by European President Ursula von der Leyen designating economic security as a central plank of the 2024–29 European Commission’s economic foreign policy, and by the creation in September 2024 of a new portfolio of Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security.</p> +<p>This report argues that the United States can – and must – do more to promote democracy and democratic norms internationally if it is to secure a favorable international order that preserves common prosperity and security as well as a dignified way of life for people everywhere in the twenty-first century. It further argues that it is precisely because of, not in spite of, the aggressive ambitions and methods of the autocratic powers that the United States must integrate defense of democracy and human rights into its national security strategy. It notes that despite divisions at home, a broad bipartisan commitment exists to defend and advance democratic values that can be harnessed to sustain such a strategy. The report further illustrates that in key regions of the world, U.S. allies and partners are themselves recognizing that both their security and their economic interests depend on the democratic resilience of vulnerable states in their near abroad. Many are articulating strategies and preparing tools that align with or complement U.S. approaches.</p> -<p>Despite this flurry of activity, the concept of economic security remains relatively undefined, with no definition provided in the European Commission’s Economic Security Strategy. This is understandable, given the complexity of the topic, breadth of policy implications, and difficulty gaining multilateral consensus. However, it was crucial to establish a common understanding of economic security among Taskforce members to avoid miscommunication. To facilitate an open and wide-ranging discussion, CFS crafted a three-layered definition of economic security, as visualised in Figure 1. The first layer addresses the security risks and opportunities that arise due to a financially interconnected and increasingly unstable world. Opportunities are considered alongside risks because it is important to acknowledge that, while international integration can create vulnerabilities, effective responses often require collaborative actions. The second layer overlays the first, and covers the tools, systems and capabilities employed by countries and alliances to manage these risks and opportunities. Inherent in this layer is how these levers and structures can be weaponised by hostile and non-aligned actors. Finally, the third layer, which overlays and impacts the first two layers, encompasses how the geopolitical context influences the relative weight policymakers place on security, sovereignty and prosperity priorities.</p> +<p>The United States therefore has a requirement and opportunities to develop an integrated democracy strategy. The point is not that military, economic, or diplomatic objectives should be subordinated to human rights or democracy priorities, but rather that these strategies should be integrated in national security planning alongside diplomatic, military, and economic objectives. Key elements would include the following efforts:</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UxbTmrF.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: Economic Security Definition Created for the Taskforce</em></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Harness democratic allies and partners:</strong> It is important that any democratic agenda not be seen as a special interest of the United States but as one shared by a diverse array of nations globally. This is not a matter of recruiting allies and partners to a singular strategy but rather empowering them to shape debates and reinforce democratic norms internationally and in their own regions. The best framing for this effort in Asia, Africa, or Latin America is around sovereignty, prosperity, resilience, and national self-strengthening rather than justice or strategic competition with China and Russia. Empirical demonstrations, for example, that accountability, transparency, rule of law mechanisms, and women’s empowerment enhance national wealth and strength will be powerful. One successful example of such a regional approach is the National Endowment for Democracy’s Sunnylands Initiative on Enhancing Democratic Partnership in the Indo-Pacific.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Harness the business community:</strong> The U.S. business community should understand the competitive advantage of promoting a normative agenda that enhances openness and rules given their need for a level playing field in overseas markets and to counter the corruption and kleptocracy that have become business models for the modern-day authoritarian. Private sector engagement and trade policy levers can have significant impact on transparency and good governance that in turn reinforce accountability to the governed.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Harness civil society and support democrats at risk:</strong> The United States should continue to underwrite the development of democratic institutions worldwide, including an independent civil society. U.S. leaders should be consistent in meeting with and speaking out on behalf of dissidents and champions of freedom to encourage those struggling on the front lines of the normative democratic challenge. State Department reporting on democracy and human rights, and the work of U.S. Agency for Global Media components such as Radio Free Asia and Voice of America, also promote norms of openness and free expression and protect democrats at risk.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Enhance resilience of international institutions:</strong> China’s growing diplomatic influence in bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council has proven frustrating for U.S. interests. Efforts by autocracies to neuter or reshape international institutions should be a reason to increase U.S. diplomatic efforts rather than allow UN and regional bodies to become advocates for an authoritarian vision of regional and global order inconsistent with their origins.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Enhance U.S. strategic communications:</strong> Authoritarian regimes can often prove more agile than democracies at disseminating information and maintaining message discipline, but democratic allies enjoy the advantage of representing norms desired by billions of people worldwide. The United States and its allies should develop a global information strategy that supports local independent media, facilitates access to balanced news and analysis, and actively counters false and self-interested narratives advanced by authoritarians.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Harness digital technology:</strong> Digital technologies, particularly social media and artificial intelligence (AI), are playing an increasingly important role in enhancing the threat of algorithmically proliferated attacks on democracies and on the idea of democracy itself. Digital literacy, social media regulation, and support for those seeking to develop digital tools that are explicitly designed to enhance conversation and compromise (i.e., democratic norms), should be enhanced. The United States and its allies should also lead on establishing international principles on AI, oppose the unauthorized and unlabeled use of deep fakes, and establish digital norms, particularly around elections.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Sustain bipartisan consensus:</strong> As with most foreign policy issues, bipartisan unity and executive-congressional consensus will ensure strategic continuity and enhance prospects for success in advancing U.S. interests. A deliberate bipartisan coalition would help advance a values-based foreign policy that reflects the best traditions of the United States and defend U.S. security, while demonstrating to allies, partners, democratic activists, and autocratic adversaries alike that American unity, solidarity, and sustained commitment to the issue is strategic and unshakable.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h3 id="theme-1-the-impact-of-ambiguity">Theme 1: The Impact of Ambiguity</h3> +<p>Democracy is said to be in decline. But it is better understood to be under attack. Citizens today who are unhappy with their leaders, in democracies and autocracies alike, seek not less of a voice in political affairs, but more. Not fewer rights and protections, but more. Not less democracy, but better democracy. And they’re looking for allies.</p> -<p>The presentation of the CFS economic security definition prompted Taskforce members to consider the implications of the lack of definitional clarity at the EU level. Some participants expressed frustration that there had not been a formal discussion among member states to determine what economic security is and, importantly, what it is not. Without a definition, several Taskforce members raised the concern that “everything gets securitised”. A few policymaker participants expanded on this point, commenting that it was important to define and maintain boundaries between trade policy and national security. These participants argued that using trade instruments for national security purposes would undermine international trade regulations and jeopardise the “level playing field”. There was pushback against this assertion from a security specialist, who remarked that the playing field is already uneven precisely because of deliberate acts by hostile, non-aligned and even allied actors. Therefore, pursuing a level playing field inherently requires a strategy that involves both prosperity and security considerations.</p> +<p>The good news is supporting democratic development is not financially costly and plays to America’s strengths. But some creativity and urgency in developing a coherent democracy support strategy is needed. Failing to do so while watching our adversaries shape global norms that conform to their illiberal model will have profound effects on U.S. and allied security.</p> -<p>The debate on this point exemplified the main impact of definitional ambiguity identified by Taskforce members – that a lack of clarity can encourage and exacerbate siloed thinking on economic security. Many policymaker participants pointed to the fact that economic security concerns are currently being managed within member states by a multitude of ministries, including defence, national security, foreign affairs, home affairs, finance, economics, environment, industry and trade. Despite several participants highlighting the recent creation of economic security portfolios by their governments, there was general consensus that policymaking on this topic remains disjointed. This conclusion was reinforced by the experiences of some non-policymaker Taskforce members. Academic and industry participants commented that it was almost impossible for an outsider to understand which ministry, if any, had central oversight on economic security issues. These Taskforce members each shared personal anecdotes of consulting with numerous different agencies on economic security matters, only to become increasingly frustrated when it appeared that the agencies were not communicating with one another.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>There was agreement that this domestic fragmentation is compounded by the absence of EU governance structures capable of addressing economic security issues in a cohesive manner. This is largely due to a clash of competences – whereas most economic affairs fall under the authority of the EU, national security remains largely under the jurisdiction of member states. As a result, EU-level thinking on economic security is rooted in trade policy, and member states generally retain control over the enactment, implementation and enforcement of economic security measures. While Taskforce members emphasised the importance of preserving member state sovereignty, many acknowledged that institutional barriers prevent the EU from strategically addressing matters at the intersection of economics and national security. To illustrate the impact of this in practice, one policymaker participant noted that discussions on economic security issues (though often not explicitly framed as such) are occurring across multiple European Council working parties and different sectors of the EU system, yet no mechanism exists to unify these conversations. Another Taskforce member took this argument even further, to claim that the lack of an effective economic security governance framework prevents the EU from leveraging its economic power to strengthen the national security of member states, and global security more broadly.</p> +<p>The essence of grand strategy is the ability to reconcile two seemingly contradictory objectives in the pursuit of national interest. No objective has been more fundamental to the founding of the American republic and the United States’ role in the world than the advancement of democracy and individual rights. And no objective has proven more vexing to those who have sought to secure the republic through balance of power strategies that pursue alignments and projection of power unencumbered by debates about the political nature of other states in the system. This tension is as old as the United States itself, but it has resurfaced in the context of renewed great power geopolitical competition.</p> -<h3 id="theme-2-the-importance-of-ppps">Theme 2: The Importance of PPPs</h3> +<p>Can the United States formulate a grand strategy that incorporates liberal democratic values, avoids charges of hypocrisy, and withstands intensifying geopolitical fragmentation? This essay argues that we can – and must – do so if we are to secure a favorable international order that preserves common prosperity and security as well as the American way of life in the twenty-first century. Far from ignoring the complex realities of our times, such a strategy accounts for them. And while U.S. democracy itself is under unprecedented stress, and its return to health essential to any strategy’s success, addressing that urgent challenge should not distract us from the strategic importance of promoting international norms that support human dignity and have proved in both logic and empirical study to foster international peace, security, and development. Doing so can also help knit together common threads that have traditionally united Americans across the political divide and been a source of national strength.</p> -<p>A consensus point that emerged from the discussion was that the lack of conceptual clarity on economic security, combined with fragmented domestic and international policymaking, had led to a largely ineffective relationship between policymakers and the private sector. There was general agreement that a productive partnership with industry is vital to any economic security strategy, but it was felt by many participants that public–private engagement in Europe was less constructive than in other regions, such as North America or the Asia-Pacific. Some participants attributed this disparity to the fact that countries in those regions had faced increased incidents of direct economic coercion, which provided opportunities for policymakers to work intensively with the private sector and “learn under pressure”. One example discussed by Taskforce members was Australia’s ability to withstand the most comprehensive punitive trade measures enacted by China in recent history.</p> +<p>The premise of this report is that the United States and its allies and partners are engaged in a systems-level contest in which they must prevail. It begins with a review of the U.S. historical context and an assessment of the emerging conceptual obstacles and opportunities at home and abroad that confront any values-based foreign policy strategy. The report concludes by introducing a framework for integrating “democracy” and democratic values across all instruments of U.S. national power, not to the exclusion of realpolitik, hard power considerations but in thoughtful, creative, and effective combination with them.</p> -<p>While a sovereign country can exercise greater policy decisiveness and operational agility than a multilateral organisation like the EU, some Taskforce members felt there were specific structural and cultural barriers within the EU that prevented an optimal partnership between the European public and private sectors. Several participants criticised the European Commission for constructing its Economic Security Strategy under the “promote”, “protect” and “partner” pillars without providing a framework to work across these pillars or guidance on how they interact. Other Taskforce members expressed concern that the European Commission had failed to effectively communicate to the private sector the objectives and progress of its economic security risk assessment process, resulting in confusion. These critiques were echoed by one participant, who gave the example of being told by a prominent European company that it was more concerned about economic security measures being enacted erratically by the EU and member states than about economic risks coming from China.</p> +<h3 id="values-and-the-american-way-of-statecraft">Values and the American Way of Statecraft</h3> -<p>This anecdote led many participants to comment that there needs to be significant improvement in the communication of economic security priorities to the private sector. One lesson from Australia that was shared with the Taskforce was the fundamental importance of a “feedback loop” between policymakers and companies to enable the effective identification of vulnerabilities. This requires coordinated action across administrative silos to provide a combined assessment of sector-specific economic, security and geopolitical risks. Companies can then be supported to make informed risk assessments, implement diversification strategies, and combat the impact of trade weaponisation. By contrast, one industry participant commented that the current disjointed communication from the EU and member states often results in company executives relegating economic security issues to their legal teams, who enact a tick-box approach. The participant concluded by arguing that if agencies “joined the dots” between themselves, a clearer, more coordinated message could be communicated to industry about its role in economic security policies.</p> +<p>Americans have long struggled to find the proper balance between our transformational democratic values and our more risk-averse pursuit of commercial and diplomatic advantage. When the Empress of China set sail from New York in 1784 to open commerce with the Qing Empire for the newly independent United States, Major Samuel Shaw was sent along as the country’s first diplomatic representative to what was then called the East Indies. Shaw was instructed not to emphasize U.S. democracy, which might offend the Celestial Emperor, but instead to emphasize the new republic’s support for anticolonialism as a contrast to the United States’ major geopolitical rival, Great Britain. Similar geopolitical concerns prompted top U.S. diplomats to downplay democratic norms well into the twentieth century, including the approach to China by Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, and Brent Scowcroft in the 1970s through the 1990s, as well as the stance of multiple administrations toward Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations.</p> -<p>Several Taskforce members also commented that ineffective information sharing on economic security risks is preventing private actors from accurately assessing the trade-offs they are making between efficiency and security. A key example raised by participants of an economic security vulnerability that is commonly underestimated by the private sector is the risk posed by convertible loans. While these lending structures may seem lucrative, particularly to startup companies, they can result in the loss of company equity and intellectual property to hostile states. The 2023 European Investment Bank Investment Survey appears to support the view that the private sector remains focused on optimising cost-effectiveness over risk mitigation, as it reports that less than half of firms surveyed had changed, or were planning to change, their sourcing strategy. The fact that 96% of those firms had experienced disruptions to trade reflects the view of some Taskforce members that simply increasing private sector awareness is not sufficient – companies need to be incentivised to prioritise economic security risks. Participants suggested that this incentivisation could come through incorporating economic resilience into how valuations are arrived at by the financial markets, as well as more effective enforcement of economic security-related regulations, to encourage greater compliance.</p> +<p>Other U.S. leaders have moved sharply in the opposite direction, prioritizing democracy, self-rule, and human rights over security and business interests. President Woodrow Wilson stunned the U.S. business and foreign policy establishments in 1913 by moving quickly to recognize the new Republic of China and simultaneously pushing out the Mexican junta of General Victoriano Huerta. In a similar vein, President Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s rejected two decades of support for anticommunist allies and chose to condition security cooperation in Asia – namely with South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan – on improvements in human rights.</p> -<h3 id="case-study-supply-chains">Case Study: Supply Chains</h3> +<p>Neither of these contrasting approaches – the hard power realpolitik of Shaw, Kissinger, and Scowcroft nor the undisciplined idealism of Wilson and Carter – proved durable. Kissinger’s realism invited the pendulum swing of the Carter administration, while President George H.W. Bush’s approach to the Tiananmen Square massacre invited a debilitating congressional backlash on trade relations with China that took a year to resolve. On the other side, Wilson retreated from his early idealism and rejected self-determination for non-European peoples at Versailles at the end of World War I, in the process turning a generation of idealistic nationalists into anti-American revolutionaries (including Ho Chi Minh). Carter’s clashes with the leaders of South Korea, the Philippines, and Central American republics in the late 1970s proved untenable in the face of Soviet expansionism in the less-developed world, and he was forced to drop human rights pressure on allies. Idealism divorced from realism proved no more enduring than realism divorced from idealism.</p> -<p>Taskforce members raised several economic security examples to illustrate their thinking on the themes of definitional ambiguity and the importance of PPPs, including technology leakage, direct foreign investment and electronic vehicles. However, the discussion predominately centred around the case study of supply chains, and this enabled Taskforce members to explore the impact of the two themes in practice. From this dialogue emerged three key findings which, although framed in the context of supply chains, have broad application.</p> +<p>Some leaders in U.S. history have been notably more successful at integrating values and power politics and avoiding these pendulum swings. Thomas Jefferson and later Commodore Matthew Perry, who opened Japan in 1853, both argued that the United States had a strategic interest in supporting independent, well-governed republics in the Pacific because they would be more resistant to the hegemonic aspirations of America’s expanding European rivals (this was based on the assumption, of course, that these independent republics would give the vote to white men only). The most influential strategic thinker in American history, Alfred Thayer Mahan, wrote in the 1890s that the United States needed both commercial and “moral” influence in Asia and the Caribbean. However, his idealism was limited by a recognition of the limits to the scope of this influence, and thus he discouraged extending this policy to further reaches of South America or the continent of Asia, where U.S. power and interests began to fade. Some would see this self-restraint as cynical, but Mahan saw it as a pragmatic form of a moral foreign policy.</p> -<h4 id="finding-1-common-objectives">Finding 1: Common Objectives</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Idealism divorced from realism proved no more enduring than realism divorced from idealism.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>There was general agreement that, without clearly defined economic security goals, it is almost impossible to differentiate between supply chain risks, prioritise sectors according to their vulnerabilities, reach agreement on standards, and implement instruments coherently across the EU. One policymaker commented that this ambiguity prevents the incremental national security responses of member states from coalescing into a strategic convergence on European supply chain priorities. Another policymaker expressed the opinion that greater clarity would enable member states to understand how much weight to place on each of the three pillars of the European Commission’s Economic Security Strategy, particularly given that the “promote” and “protect” pillars often conflict in the context of supply chains.</p> +<p>After witnessing the counterproductive swings between idealism and realpolitik of the Wilson administration, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt sought a better balance during World War II. He championed the Atlantic Charter and the “Four Freedoms” (freedom of speech and worship, and freedom from fear and want) and set the stage for inclusion of those norms in postwar international institutions. But he was also willing to accept close relations with dictatorships in Latin America and with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in order to keep them on side against Hitler – allegedly stating that “they may be SOBs, but they’re my SOBs.”</p> -<p>A group of Taskforce members expanded on this point by proposing the idea that, once common goals had been established, member states would be able to construct a decision tree to navigate the three pillars. These participants suggested that such a framework could require member states to prioritise protecting the supply chain at first instance, before promoting economic resilience through innovation, diversification and other risk mitigation strategies. The final stage of the framework would involve developing an industrial policy, which would include building strategic partnerships. The discussion on this decision tree concluded with Taskforce members commenting that each stage would involve a different degree of public and private sector responsibility</p> +<p>These cycles of American enthusiasm for and against a values-based foreign policy have consistently been shaped – and often distorted by – geopolitical setbacks. The American entry into World War I, escalation in Vietnam, and the invasion of Iraq were all ostensibly driven primarily by hard-power considerations (restoring balance in the Euro-Atlantic, preventing the expansion of international communism, and reshaping Middle East security, respectively). However, presidents at the time framed the war efforts in moralistic terms that they believed the U.S. public would support. When the public turned against those wars in the 1920s, 1970s, and 2000s, the democratic imperative in U.S. foreign policy also became a casualty. The horrific battlefield experiences of the Great War fueled the isolationist America First movement and a distasteful tolerance on the right for Hitlerism that split the Republican Party before Pearl Harbor. The moral confusion of the Vietnam War prompted a backlash against democratic allies and a softer line toward the Soviet Union that split the Democratic Party in the 1970s (and gave birth to the neoconservative movement). The sagging enthusiasm for democracy promotion after the Iraq War had a similar effect. CSIS surveys of foreign policy specialists in the United States and Asia in 2014 found that the U.S. respondents’ prioritization of democracy, rule of law, women’s empowerment, and human rights briefly aligned more closely with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Singapore than democratic Japan, India, or South Korea. This same hangover from Iraq helps to explain why President Barack Obama expressed explicit appreciation of the realpolitik approach of Scowcroft and the George H.W. Bush administration during the 2008 campaign despite discomfort among prodemocracy advocates in his own party.</p> -<p>On a more granular level, many Taskforce members supported the adoption of a sector-specific approach in relation to the development of economic security objectives. This would begin by identifying the main priorities for a certain sector or, where appropriate, for a strategically significant supply chain within that sector. From that analysis, the tools, systems and capabilities required to manage the relevant economic security risks would emerge, which would enable the alignment of national and European strategies. These strategic objectives could then be shared with key allies, either bilaterally or through forums such as the G7, as well as with private sector partners, and be pursued in a coordinated manner. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act and the European Chips Act were raised by many Taskforce members as two examples of how the identification of sector-specific objectives can bring clarity and cohesion to economic security policies. While the limitations of these instruments were acknowledged (such as the validity of the targets and effectiveness of the tools chosen to implement them), several participants felt they were still a useful model for achieving coordinated, strategic action on economic security.</p> +<p>After each of these instances, the American people’s support for values-based foreign policy reverted to the norm with the rise of new authoritarian threats. Roosevelt’s January 1941 Four Freedoms speech and August 1941 Atlantic Charter took hold because the pact between Axis powers had metastasized the spreading cancers of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The Truman Doctrine emerged from the early post–World War II clashes with Soviet ambitions in Greece and Eastern Europe. Ronald Reagan’s June 1982 Westminster Speech championing international democracy promotion was embraced at home and abroad because of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev’s invasion of Afghanistan three years earlier. And Joe Biden’s framing of a world clash between authoritarian and democratic states resonated in ways it would not have when he was vice president because of the menacing turns and growing strategic alignment of China and Russia.</p> -<h4 id="finding-2-quality-data">Finding 2: Quality Data</h4> +<p>Ultimately, for all its inconsistency, hypocrisy, and vacillation over the years, no power in the history of the world has done more to advance human freedom and dignity than the United States of America. However, the United States cannot afford to continue framing its approach to democracy and human rights as a reaction to world events in a series of undisciplined pendulum swings – not if the goal is to shape global norms and the balance of power, build alliances, and deter authoritarian aggression, kinetic and otherwise – over the course of a multigenerational contest. History teaches that there is risk in overplaying values as the defining characteristic of strategic competition and even greater risk in failing to understand how fundamental democratic values are to the longer-term security of the United States.</p> -<p>To develop economic security objectives, it is necessary to have access to relevant, accurate and timely data. However, there was consensus among Taskforce members that the current level of information on supply chains is insufficient to enable EU policymakers to identify and prioritise economic dependencies. One participant commented that it was an immense challenge, if not impossible, for EU institutions to receive trade data of consistent quality and granularity across the different member states. This is supported by a report on economic security practices requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade, which found that: “Data that would allow for a comprehensive understanding of exposures is often lacking (e.g. intra-EU firm level trade data) or incomplete (e.g. Eurostat production data or data on multinational corporations’ geographic distributions of revenue, assets and profits)”. Another Taskforce member expressed concern that China has much greater access to this type of data, which gives it a sophisticated understanding of economic dependencies. This participant cited China’s export controls on critical minerals as an example of how China effectively uses trade data to exploit European economic vulnerabilities, without creating unintended consequences for its own manufacturing sector.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States cannot afford to continue framing its approach to democracy and human rights as a reaction to world events.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Many participants noted that any attempt to gain information on supply chain patterns and detect potential pinch points that are vulnerable to weaponisation would be pointless without private sector cooperation. Despite some policymakers arguing that there was an entrenched corporate aversion to sharing commercial data, other participants commented that companies are much more aware of the impacts of economic security risks than they were even 10 years ago, and that there was an increased appetite for information exchange. Indeed, one Taskforce member referenced a recent BusinessEurope report on economic security, which calls for greater intelligence sharing between the public and private sectors because it would “empower companies to better identify and address security risks through effective mitigation measures, while it will also help authorities to better calibrate policies”. There was general agreement that to enable empirical, data-driven risk identification, more efficient PPPs on economic security information sharing need to be developed.</p> +<p>Realist scholars have long associated democracy with “idealism” and contrasted that with “realism.” But a “realist” foreign policy must recognize that competition over what – and whose – governance norms, rules, and standards will prevail in the twenty-first century is no less important than the more traditional competition for predominance in outer space, cyberspace, or undersea warfare. And as with those other domains, the United States will require a strategy that is premised on an understanding of the nature of the challenges of our time, including the ideational fight we face both abroad and at home.</p> -<h4 id="finding-3-analytical-capacity">Finding 3: Analytical Capacity</h4> +<h3 id="difficult-terrain">Difficult Terrain</h3> -<p>Once policymakers and companies are in possession of quality data, they need the capacity to analyse and assess it effectively. However, most participants agreed that there was insufficient investment in economic security analytical competencies, both within and between the public and private sectors. Some Taskforce members commented that addressing this deficiency requires the integration of security expertise with economic analysis, citing the whole-of-government approach adopted during contingency planning in the defence sector as an example. A security expert elaborated that applying national security logic could enhance economic security policymaking, specifically the “acquisition, analysis, assessment, decision” framework used to make security decisions in pursuit of a strategic concept. This framework involves gathering intelligence, analysing the information, and producing an agreed statement of the situation, which is presented to the decision-maker. The expert acknowledged that tasking a multilateral agency to produce an agreed statement on an economic security situation would be significantly more challenging and politically contentious than a traditional national security assessment. However, the meeting was characterised by a shared desire among participants for greater precision and practicality on economic security issues, which some Taskforce members suggested could be achieved by drawing lessons from the defence and security communities.</p> +<p><strong><em>Democracy’s Strategic Logic, Challenges, and Opportunities Abroad</em></strong></p> -<p>The Australian experience with Chinese economic coercion illustrates why the analytical capacity needed to manage modern economic security threats requires the convergence of economic, trade and national security competencies. Traditionally, assessments of supply chain weaknesses have focused on economic and trade dimensions. However, an Australian representative shared with the Taskforce that China frequently weaponises supply chains not only because they are economically significant, but also to send a political message. For instance, while the scale of Australian beef, barley and wine exports to China does not match that of the iron ore industry, these products are symbols of Australia’s agricultural prowess and represent its success in establishing a profile within the Chinese consumer market as a producer of premium goods. Beyond the symbolic, China’s targeting of these industries has significant electoral implications, because many Australian politicians, particularly those from rural constituencies, rely heavily on support from the agricultural sector. As tensions between Europe and China are expected to escalate over the coming decade, it will be crucial for policymakers and companies to develop the analytical capacity needed to accurately map their risk exposure to politically motivated economic coercion.</p> +<h4 id="why-democracy-matters">Why Democracy Matters</h4> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>The logic of democracy – transparent, accountable, inclusive, and representative governance under law – is instinctive to most Americans. Without transparency and rule of law, corruption festers. When national leaders are accountable to their citizens, they have an incentive to deliver public goods and practical solutions to national problems and less motivation to engage in foreign adventures. This is the logic behind democratic peace theory: that democracies do not go to war with one another. When citizens are treated with dignity, when they have a voice in how they are governed and who governs them, and when they have reasonable confidence in equal protection under law, they are less prone to resort to extralegal means of redress, including violence. And when they have agency at home, they have less reason to flee across borders in desperation to escape political and economic injustice, affecting the security and stability of neighbors.</p> -<p>The inaugural meeting of the RUSI European Economic Security Taskforce highlighted the conceptual and concrete impacts of the lack of clarity, common priorities, and cohesive strategy on economic security within both member states and the EU. At the close of the meeting, one participant commented that the discussion “only emphasised the importance of initiating this Taskforce”, as it was a reminder that Europe is at the very beginning of designing and implementing the data-sharing mechanisms, analytical capacity, and PPPs necessary to achieve a more resilient and secure economy.</p> +<p>Overall, while some nondemocratic states may deliver positive outcomes in the short run, often by mortgaging the future for the present, the track record of autocrats is grim (see, for example, Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Myanmar, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, Venezuela, or Zimbabwe), while the benefits of democracy are increasingly borne out in the data. Recent studies by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, Sweden’s V-Dem Institute, and others, for instance, have shown that democratic governance leads to better health, security, peace, and development outcomes.</p> -<p>A second meeting of the Taskforce will build on these findings by examining how unstable geopolitical conditions and escalating geoeconomic threats influence the security, sovereignty and prosperity trade-offs that policymakers must navigate when developing domestic and multilateral responses to economic security risks.</p> +<p>Equally important, there is also ample empirical evidence that how nations organize themselves internally will go a long way in determining how they seek to shape the environment outside their borders. If a nation’s leaders are afraid of the free flow of information at home, they will feel the same way internationally. If they rule by kleptocracy, they will welcome opaque systems of elite corruption elsewhere. If they prefer rule by law rather than rule of law domestically, odds are they will support the shaping of a similar system abroad. Allied with other powerful nations with similar illiberal values, these states can leverage their collective power to try to reshape the international system consistent with those values and their narrow self-interest rather than for the global good.</p> -<hr /> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">How nations organize themselves internally will go a long way in determining how they seek to shape the environment outside their borders.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>Eliza Lockhart</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. Her research examines matters at the intersection of law, finance and global security. Eliza is a lawyer and legal policy expert with experience advising on economic security, hybrid/state threats, electoral integrity, risk and compliance, and disruptive technologies.</p>Eliza LockhartAmid heightened geopolitical tensions, the concept of “economic security” has rapidly come to dominate domestic and international policy agendas. Recent global shocks have exposed the fragility of international financial systems and revealed significant security vulnerabilities in economic dependencies.Shock And Awe2024-10-17T12:00:00+08:002024-10-17T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/shock-and-awe<p><em>Far from being a thing of the past, “shock and awe” must be an integral part of our approach to multi-domain warfare in the future.</em></p> +<p>But the reverse is equally true: the alliance of common values and interests between the United States and democratic-minded citizens globally can have powerful strategic potential in the twenty-first century, particularly in the Global South with its rapidly growing, restless, and relatively youthful demographic demanding a greater voice in their future.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="the-challenges-internationally">The Challenges Internationally</h4> -<p>In March 2003, more than a thousand precision-guided strikes from strategic air assets and stand-off weapons hit Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the first 24 hours of the US-led invasion. Although the concept of “shock and awe” had entered the military lexicon in the 1990s, it wasn’t truly popularised until the hostilities in 2003 introduced it in a visceral display of kinetic action. The war really did start with a bang. Overwhelming force discombobulated Iraqi decision-makers, fractured their command and control, subdued their armed forces, astonished their populous and, for the first time in history, was watched in real time by the rest of the world.</p> +<p>While some criticize Biden and members of Congress for framing strategic competition with China in ideational terms, the reality is that Beijing and Moscow have long viewed the spread of democracy as an existential threat, and seen strategic advantage in sowing doubts about, if not actively undermining, democratic practices. While China or Russia might have taken a more defensive stance in response to the color revolutions of the early 2000s, both have gone on the offensive in recent years. Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections is well documented even if the effects are debated. Around the same time, Beijing was caught pouring money into Australia’s parliament, which led to strict foreign interference laws by Canberra (Canada and New Zealand have since had the same experience). China’s foreign interference and elite capture strategies have had more success in Australia’s neighborhood, most notably with the 2022 security pact that China convinced the strategically situated Solomon Islands to sign after well-funded “study tours” for its leaders to Beijing. Leaders in China and Russia have also aligned in championing a counter-democracy coalition through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meetings and the expansion of the BRICS grouping to include Iran.</p> -<p>In simple terms, shock and awe is a colloquialism for a military approach which sets out to overwhelm an adversary through the use of rapid and massive force. It aims to achieve immediate tactical dominance through strikes which cause both a physical and a psychological blow. The adversary is left reeling and unable to respond effectively, while onlookers are surprised and, dare we say it, impressed – even if in a dark, macabre way. The Nazi blitzkrieg was as much a form of shock and awe as the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom.</p> +<p>In a kind of backhanded compliment, the PRC and Russia in recent years have even referred to themselves as democracies, albeit on their own illiberal terms. While seemingly absurd on its face, this is the latest of their attempts to redefine and thus frontally challenge accepted international norms, as witnessed in Chinese activity within UN agencies and other international institutions. The United States and its allies snicker at these subversive efforts at their own peril – even if in seeking to wrap themselves in democratic cloth, China and Russia inadvertently show their hand: their recognition of the power of the democratic idea, their fear of a world that conforms to true democratic norms, and their deep insecurity over the reality of their own systems.</p> -<p>When taking the long view, it becomes clear that shock and awe has always been part of military strategy and can be found, between the lines, in the principles of war – it is there in Surprise, Offensive Action and in the Concentration of Force. But it is also more than unexpected strike. It happens at the theatre and the political levels, and its impact interrupts decision-making. It is somewhat surprising, then, that in their August 2024 Foreign Affairs article, former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley and former Google CEO Eric Schmidt argued that “US military planners are right to have concluded that the era of ‘shock and awe’ campaigns – in which Washington could decimate its adversaries with overwhelming firepower – is finished”.</p> +<p>Under its new Global Civilization Initiative, Beijing asserts that ancient civilizations like China’s provide a superior cultural legitimacy over the democratic norms advocated by the United States and its allies and partners, and reflected in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Their message is that thinkers like John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Jefferson have no place in non-Western culture and emphasize wherever possible shortcomings in Western democratic practice. And even where Beijing and Moscow are not actively intervening, they offer diplomatic support to those resisting international pressure on democracy and human rights – most egregiously in the cases of North Korea, Myanmar, Iran, and Syria.</p> -<p>The thrust of Milley and Schmidt’s article was not specifically about shock and awe, but that the US is not fully prepared for future warfare, which they see as being driven by advanced technologies such as AI and autonomous systems. They emphasise that recent conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, demonstrate how warfare is evolving rapidly. They assert that the battlefield is becoming more transparent, and they predict that future wars will be dominated by new technologies rather than traditional, industrial age forces. We must “change or perish”, they opine.</p> +<p>This combination of cultural narratives, disparagement (or malign appropriation) of democracy, support for brutal dictatorships, and elite capture in weakly governed states is backed by an increasingly well-resourced and effective strategy of disinformation by Beijing and Moscow. In its first public report on Chinese interference and disinformation, the State Department found that:</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Shock and awe tactics involving massive bombardment may have an initial psychological impact, but the resultant unrest can lead to domestic and international backlash, instability and insurgency</code></em></strong></p> +<blockquote> + <p>The PRC’s information manipulation efforts feature five primary elements: leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing co-optation and pressure, and exercising control over Chinese-language media.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>They may be correct, but does this directly render shock and awe dead? Are they thinking too much from a US vantage point and projecting their opinions through the prism of their “pacing threat”, China?</p> +<p>It is becoming evident that the next phase of the PRC’s strategy is to harness the emerging information technology ecosystem to capture entire communities within a data environment that Beijing can control and manipulate. As the State Department report notes, Beijing is now offering to help developing countries to establish their own “smart cities” complete with Chinese technology for surveillance and one-way flows of data to Beijing. The technology competition of the twenty-first century is also fundamentally a competition about democratic norms of openness, transparency, and accountability. Beijing and Moscow’s aims are being abetted by the use of bots, deepfakes, and other tools of disinformation being made available in the digital space by artificial intelligence (AI).</p> -<p>We might instead choose to propose that since the character of war continually evolves, then so too does shock and awe. The psychological and operational impact of Israel’s recent “Trojan” attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon, for example, by rigging communications pagers with explosives and covertly delivering them into the hands and pockets of Hezbollah’s leaders, is just the latest iteration of this age-old strategy. The spread of fear, paranoia and distrust of equipment almost certainly did as much damage to Hezbollah’s fighting effectiveness as Israel’s targeted assassinations through more traditional means. And it hit the world news, too. There was shock at the tactic, and there was awe at its audacity.</p> +<p>While Beijing and Moscow did not create all the conditions for deteriorating democratic norms globally, these powers have accelerated negative trend lines by actively exploiting and exacerbating areas of societal divisions and weak governance. According to Freedom House, 2023 was the 18th straight year of decline in global freedom. Freedom House noted that the key drivers globally were denial of press freedoms and increased risk of harm for expressing personal beliefs, coupled with increasing extremism and intolerance online. Put another way, it is the ability of the governed to hold their leaders accountable that is under assault while intolerance is being manipulated to divide, demonize, and marginalize legitimate debate – and these factors in turn create even more favorable conditions for strategies of foreign interference and elite capture by malign revisionist powers like China.</p> -<p>So, before consigning shock and awe to the graveyard of military ideas, it is perhaps worth unpacking what it actually is, and considering how it might adapt, evolve and be used in the future.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While Beijing and Moscow did not create all the conditions for deteriorating democratic norms globally, these powers have accelerated negative trend lines.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The declared purpose of shock and awe is to inflict rapid, decisive blows, leaving the enemy unable to react effectively or to mount a counteroffensive. The concept was first outlined by former US Navy officer Harlan Ullman and military author James Wade, who argued that the basis for rapid dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception and understanding of the adversary through imposing sufficient “shock” and “awe” to achieve the necessary political, strategic and operational goals. The authors believed that by using overwhelming firepower, superior technology and speed, an attacking force could destroy not only the enemy’s physical capabilities but also their will to resist.</p> +<h4 id="the-opportunities-abroad">The Opportunities Abroad</h4> -<p>The effectiveness of shock and awe depends on several factors, including the nature of the conflict, the opponent, and the broader political and social context. Although the strategy can be effective in achieving initial military objectives where the goal is to quickly degrade a state’s infrastructure or neutralise key military targets, as it was in Iraq in 2003, its long-term success and its effectiveness against non-state actors are less certain. For instance, the use of shock and awe tactics involving massive bombardment may certainly have an initial psychologically demoralising and disorienting impact, but the resultant social and political unrest can lead to domestic and international backlash, instability and insurgency. Non-state groups tend to be decentralised and have less infrastructure to target. Even in Iraq, while the initial invasion against the state was successful, non-state insurgencies continued for years. The potential strategic consequences of a tactical action must always be factored into planning.</p> +<p>Freedom House’s 2024 report notes that 2023 marked the 18th consecutive year of democratic decline, yet the world has more freedom today than it had 50 years ago, and in 2024 more people will have voted around the world than ever before in history – over half of all adults on the planet. And in Asia – the major arena for great power competition – Freedom House found that freedom began growing again in 2022. This finding is consistent with surveys of regional elites in the Indo-Pacific conducted by CSIS since 2009, which consistently found that thought leaders from India to Japan associated themselves more with democracy, rule of law, good governance, and human rights than contrasting themes offered by China such as “noninterference” or any sort of “Beijing consensus” around authoritarian development. This aspirational map does not mean that elites within less developed countries will automatically forego bribes on offer from Beijing (so-called elite capture) or that leaders of postcolonial states will instinctively look to the former imperial powers for lessons on democracy. But it does reinforce the point that citizens in China’s own region – and perhaps in China itself – expect greater empowerment and accountability of their governments and associate their own national success with democracy, good governance, and protection of human rights.</p> -<p>Modern military operations, including peer and hybrid conflict, increasingly rely on more targeted and precise kinetic and non-kinetic strikes to minimise collateral damage, shifting away from the broad use of overwhelming force. Where mass has been used as the principal advantage, as in Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, it can become bogged down by spirited and innovative resistance. This perhaps reflects an evolution from the “traditional” shock and awe which Milley and Schmidt dismiss as passé, toward strategies that are more focused and adaptable, especially in urban or politically sensitive environments.</p> +<p>There are indications that democratic governments are increasingly reflecting those norms in foreign policy strategies, while younger civil society activists are also taking action. In 2020, youth across East Asia formed the Milk Tea Alliance to support students marching for democracy in Hong Kong. In 2022, Japanese civil society groups reached out to form the Indo-Pacific Platform for Universal Values and established the first regional network to host political dissidents at risk. Through the Sunnylands Initiative started by CSIS and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 2019, thought leaders from across the Indo-Pacific have gathered each year to push for greater alignment of efforts in support of democratic norms.</p> -<p>However, in conflicts where cyber, economic and information effects are brought to bear alongside traditional military operations, shock and awe may still be relevant, or perhaps even more so. Cyber shock and awe could apply the principles of the traditional version to the digital domain. The goal here could be to achieve overwhelming dominance over an adversary’s digital infrastructure and capabilities, paralysing their ability to respond by launching rapid, large-scale cyber attacks.</p> +<p>Once-reticent governments have also become more forward-leaning about the importance of democracy to their security. Japan incorporated support for universal values in its 2022 National Security Strategy and 2023 Development Cooperation Charter. South Korea has committed to reflecting universal values in its overall foreign policy, emphasized human rights and the rule of law in its 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, and hosted the third global Summit for Democracy in 2024. Australia launched a new International Development Policy that focused on supporting accountability, while its Home Affairs Ministry launched a Democracy Task Force to guard against foreign interference at home and in the region. While Australian diplomats sometimes caution their American counterparts against over-emphasizing democracy and human rights in the Pacific Islands, a 2024 public opinion survey by the University of Sydney’s U.S. Studies Centre found that average Australian and Japanese citizens were actually more likely than Americans to want their government to push for improvements in democracy abroad (72 percent of Australians, 69 percent of Japanese, and 61 percent of Americans).</p> -<p>A cyber shock and awe campaign targeting critical systems could disable power grids, water supplies and transport networks. It could shut down internet access and disrupt communications. Banks, stock markets and even retail payment systems could be hit, leading to financial and economic chaos. Like the traditional version, cyber shock and awe would create psychological panic. Consider the individual and societal impact if an attacker successfully cut off all communications, power and access to money or means of exchange. Rather than watch events unfolding in real time, digital darkness could be catastrophic as people struggle to make sense of what is happening around them. And, of course, without proper defences, military command and control systems could be crippled. Events such as the recent CrowdStrike outage show us a microcosm of the societal-level mayhem that could be inflicted. Combine this with more traditional effects, and serious damage could be inflicted on to the will of an opponent.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Once-reticent governments have also become more forward-leaning about the importance of democracy to their security.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In conflicts where cyber, economic and information effects are brought to bear alongside traditional military operations, shock and awe may still be relevant, or perhaps even more so</code></em></strong></p> +<p>To be clear, even close U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea, or Australia will take a lighter approach on human rights or democracy issues with other states than the U.S. government or Congress. Part of this difference is size – few nations can withstand retaliation by China like the United States can. Part of the difference is cultural, since few went through anything like the American Revolution or the Civil War to define and safeguard the future of democracy. And part of the explanation is free-riding, since it has often been useful for the Americans to be the bad cop on human rights at times when Japan or South Korea were seeking relative economic gains in the region and around the world.</p> -<p>We argue that far from being a thing of the past, shock and awe must be an integral part of our approach to multi-domain warfare. We must retain the concept of rapid dominance in our thinking, from contingency planning through to force development. Our offensive thinking must be able to seamlessly synchronise kinetic and non-kinetic kill chains. We must look for mass of effect, not just mass of capability, and we must always aim for the element of surprise.</p> +<p>Yet China’s coercive revisionism, foreign interference, and successful elite capture in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific have alerted the maritime democracies to an ideational threat to their strategic interests and national sovereignty. There is a pronounced alignment of government declaratory policy and civil society efforts across the region that could be harnessed as part of a grand strategy on democracy, if that strategy is iterative and not imposed from Washington.</p> -<p>Similarly, our defensive thinking must evolve and focus more on resilience, redundancy and reversionary modes, and less on “efficiency”. We must retain the ability to both survive and thrive in the face of a brutal and unexpected onslaught. Our infrastructure, civilian and military, must be hardened but adaptive. It should be as decentralised and multi-pathed as possible. Our military systems must be “network-optional” by design. Critically, we must consider the physical and psychological impacts of what we do – on the adversary, on ourselves and on onlookers. In the cognitive domain, societal resilience may be every bit as important as military resilience. Day-zero shock and awe thinking can add value to both our offensive and defensive calculus. This is especially true in an age of multiple nuclear-armed opponents when proactive escalation management is required to avoid Armageddon – which may be difficult if the lights go out and communications are down.</p> +<p>Since the Atlantic Charter, Europe has always been the natural partner for the United States in advancing democratic norms globally, but this transatlantic alignment has grown barnacles since Brexit and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Europeans are now less likely than publics in America’s Asian alliances to say that they share common democratic norms with the United States. The European Union has also been beset by internal democratic challenges and extremism from Hungary’s suppression of press and civil liberties to the electoral successes of the far right in Germany, as the round of European and then French elections demonstrated in the summer of 2024. Some member states like Denmark have long been active in advancing democracy abroad, but a lack of internal consensus on priorities has meant that most EU democracy support comes in the form of technical assistance when requested from host governments. And even with effective transatlantic alignment on democracy and human rights, Beijing or Moscow will be quick to paint those efforts as the return of the imperial masters (as China’s Global Times did in 2022 with a doctored photo of the G7 foreign ministers clad in the khaki uniforms and pith helmets of their armies during the Boxer Rebellion).</p> -<p>It is clear that the right mix of perfectly timed and targeted effects could, more than ever, paralyse an adversary. Conversely, we must appreciate, harden and defend our own potential critical weaknesses, right through to the societal level. We must have a bounce-back strategy because some element of the digital bomber will always get through. We must prepare to deliver shock and be resilient to awe. In both its offensive and defensive contexts, the death of shock and awe has surely been greatly exaggerated.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, the combination of Russian and Chinese political interference and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has raised the focus of European governments and thought leaders on the democratic challenge facing the free world. The participation of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand (known as the IP4) in NATO summits indicates the possibility for greater unity of effort globally by the net exporters of security in the international system. Europeans may have soured on American democracy, but polls indicate they have soured on China more and are looking to expand strategic partnerships with Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia in ways they would not have five years ago. The coalition-building opportunity is to strengthen the Euro-Pacific link as much as it is to reenergize the transatlantic one. The American approach to sub-Saharan Africa also requires European partnership to be effective, and there is growing recognition in Brussels that democratic backsliding requires new efforts to keep open civil society space, broaden political participation to women and other groups, and beat China in the digital game to ensure a clean and open information environment.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Latin America continues to hold democratic elections, but monitoring by Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Bertlesmann Stiftung Transformation Index in 2023 all found overall negative trends, including rising authoritarianism and political strife. China and Russia have enabled authoritarian sustainability in countries like Cuba and Venezuela and have largely been given a pass by democracies like Mexico or Brazil. Yet Latin America’s democracies continue to hold elections and maintain the key institutions of democratic governance and accountability, including functioning legislatures and courts and high levels of public education. The opportunity lies in international support for strengthening those institutions.</p> -<p><strong>Joe Dransfield</strong> is a Royal Navy aviator, a former military professor at the US Naval War College, and an Associate Fellow of the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre.</p> +<p>In summary, despite a disturbing global landscape of democratic backsliding and closing civic space, there are multiple opportunities emerging for coalitions to form in support of democratic norms. When the Biden administration hosted the first Summit for Democracy in 2021, the aim was to harness just such a coalition. However, the terms of participation were largely dictated from the White House, and key partners ranging from Japan to India attended with trepidation at the signal being sent by excluding strategic swing states like Thailand and Singapore.</p> -<p><strong>Kevin Rowlands</strong> is the Head of the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre and Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Plymouth.</p>Joe Dransfield and Kevin RowlandsFar from being a thing of the past, “shock and awe” must be an integral part of our approach to multi-domain warfare in the future.Canada-U.S. Defence Relations2024-10-17T12:00:00+08:002024-10-17T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/canada-us-defence-relations<p><em>This report assesses the challenges facing the U.S.-Canada relationship as it pertains to military spending and argues that Washington will expect Canada to follow through on the spending commitments.</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite a disturbing global landscape of democratic backsliding and closing civic space, there are multiple opportunities emerging for coalitions to form in support of democratic norms.</code></em></strong></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The second Summit for Democracy in 2023 was cohosted with South Korea, the Netherlands, Costa Rica, and Zambia, giving a stronger sense of empowerment to regional – and, importantly, non-Western – democracies. The second summit faced some criticism because the host countries narrowed the focus of democratic challenges to fit their respective regional vantage points ratherthan addressing universal concerns. However, its efforts to provide a more inclusive space for discussions on addressing global democratic challenges were received as a much-welcomed approach by the participants, including those from Africa – where at least 24 countries, including many summit participants, held elections that year. The opportunity abroad is not to form what Robert Kaplan once called a “League of Democracies” under U.S. leadership, but rather to develop a strategy that recognizes the variable geometry of regional relations and looks for leadership within regions and civil society.</p> -<h3 id="1-an-historic-low-canadas-defence-reputation-with-the-united-states">1. An Historic Low? Canada’s Defence Reputation with the United States</h3> +<p>By the time of the third summit, hosted by South Korea in March 2024, however, it was clear that an opportunity was missed to play to democracy’s strengths – its vibrancy, creativity, and direct connection to protecting human dignity. What could have been an opportunity to celebrate the fruits of free, democratic expression, such as music, art, literature, and debate, became a dreary long march of scripted panel discussions, leader statements, and commitments to “be better.” Nowhere was democracy precisely defined, an oversight when its definition is unclear to many and under attack by others.</p> -<p>Canada and the United States have arguably the closest and most comprehensive defence relationship of any two countries in the world. They share in the defence of the North American continent, particularly through NORAD, and work together to support international peace and security through myriad alliances and partnerships, including NATO and the Five Eyes. The relationship is underpinned by a vast network of bilateral bodies and agreements covering everything from materiel cooperation and defence planning to information sharing and emergency response. Defence ties have grown over the decades since the Second World War, reaching their zenith during the Afghanistan conflict, when the two militaries fought side by side and suffered significant casualties against a determined Taliban insurgency.</p> +<p>This requires a level of sophistication, nuance, and volume control that does not come naturally to American political discourse. But of course, domestic political support is essential.</p> -<p>While the direct relationship between the two militaries remains close, political strains have emerged lately between Ottawa and Washington over a perceived lack of political commitment on the Canadian side to sustain and improve defence capability in the face of seismic shifts in the geostrategic landscape. At the heart of this tension has been defence spending. While Canada has increased its defence budget significantly since the publication of Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) in 2017 (SSE committed to boosting spending by 70% from 2017 to 2026, though efforts to reach this goal have been undermined by persistent DND budget lapses in recent years), Canada remains one of only a handful of NATO countries that have failed to meet the Alliance benchmark of 2% defence spending as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Canada’s current defence budget of approximately $34 billion represents 1.34% of GDP.</p> +<h3 id="the-challenges-and-opportunities-at-home">The Challenges and Opportunities at Home</h3> -<p>Former U.S. President Donald Trump called out Prime Minister Trudeau in 2019 over defence spending, and leaks from the Washington Post in 2023 revealed a growing frustration among current U.S. officials over Canada’s failure to follow up on defence commitments — from the 2% target to NORAD modernization to Arctic security. Other NATO countries, including Germany and Turkey, may have expressed similar reservations privately, while some have gone public. France’s ambassador to Canada stated publicly, “You are riding a first-class carriage with a third-class ticket. If you want to remain in the first-class seat, you need to train and expand (the military) and to go somewhere.” The NATO Secretary-General has repeatedly stated that Canada needs to fulfill its 2% commitment.</p> +<p>Formulating a strategy to counter these trends would be challenging enough if the threats were exogenous, but American democracy itself is also being corroded in the current environment by forces both international and domestic. In 2023, the Pew Research Center found that public trust in the federal government was ticking downward again after a brief uptick in 2020 and 2021, with fewer than 20 percent of Americans saying they trusted the government in Washington to do what is right.</p> -<p>The April publication of Our North, Strong and Free, combined with recent capital announcements such as the F-35 fighter, drones, surveillance aircraft and NORAD modernization, was expected to blunt some of this criticism. While the Defence Policy Update (DPU) deserves praise for its focus on Arctic security and its stated intention to purchase new equipment such as tactical helicopters and airborne early warning aircraft, it was vague on other equipment acquisitions (e.g., a promise to “explore options” for new submarines). It also did little to assuage concerns over serious personnel shortfalls and procurement problems. Most importantly, Canada’s defence spending under the DPU will only reach 1.76% of GDP by 2029-30 — not 2%. The Parliamentary Budget Officer has since pronounced this goal as unachievable given the actual funding the government has provided (much of the funding under the DPU, it might be added, is back-end loaded), as well as ongoing procurement issues and a Canadian economy that could grow faster than anticipated.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">American democracy itself is also being corroded in the current environment by forces both international and domestic.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The U.S. reaction was predictable. A large group of U.S. Senators from both political parties wrote to the Prime Minister, stating they were “profoundly disappointed” with recent Canadian defence spending projections. At the same time, senior Republicans such as Mike Johnson and Mitch McConnell took the opportunity at the July NATO summit in Washington to criticize Canada for riding U.S. “coattails”.</p> +<p>Declining trust in democratic governance is a problem across many of the societies that should be part of an international coalition to defend and advance democratic norms. Cambridge University’s Bennet Institute found in surveys that across the Western democracies, majorities of young respondents expressed lack of confidence in their own democracies. However, the United States suffers from particular structural factors at present, including gerrymandered districts, the rise of “angertainment” programs, the demise of local journalism, and the lack of compulsory voting – all of which tend to skew election results away from the ideological center and exacerbate partisanship. Partisanship has also infected the ability of Congress and the American people to rally around a common national vision for protecting and advancing democracy internationally. In 2023, a narrow majority of Republicans for the first time said that they favor less U.S. involvement in global affairs, reflecting a “make America great again” repudiation of Reagan’s vision in the 1982 Westminster speech. Yet Republicans are also far more likely than Democrats to believe that the United States is the greatest country in the world, given the left’s own growing penchant for casting the West and capitalism as illegitimate, a 2021 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found. This polarization between the increasingly vocal left and right wings of politics makes the very definition of a democracy agenda more complicated. Older Republican supporters of former president Donald Trump are far less likely to support democratic Ukraine, for example, while younger Democratic voters are equally less likely to support democratic Israel.</p> -<p>Surprisingly, Canada went into the NATO Summit with no plan to address these concerns. But two days into the meeting, it hit the panic button. In his closing press conference, the PM stated that Canada expected to reach 2% defence spending by 2032, nearly a decade away, but provided no detailed plan of how it would get there. Moreover, the PM undercut his announcement by referring to 2% as a “crass mathematical calculation.” It may well be, but this argument has long ceased to be relevant. Canada has signed up for the commitment on multiple occasions, and as a responsible NATO member, it must honour it like all other allies. Moreover, at the Summit, Defence Minister Bill Blair announced the government’s intention to purchase up to 12 submarines. However, he gave no deadline. Moreover, no funding is provided in either DND’s existing capital plan or the fiscal framework for what could be the most expensive defence procurement in Canadian history, likely outstripping the cost of the Canadian Surface Combatant project and the F-35 acquisition.</p> +<p>Yet division at home is no reason to retreat from a robust strategy of supporting freedom abroad. The Founding Fathers did not promise the world a perfect government, just a system of government that would provide the opportunity to work toward a “more perfect union.” There are opportunities to forge a common national purpose around democracy at home because majorities of the American people also recognize what is at stake – and because the United States’ most important allies and partners do as well.</p> -<p>In his Washington press conference, the PM also argued that Canada should not be judged exclusively on its defence spending, as “we continually step up and punch above our weight” on the world stage. This worn-out cliché may have been true in the immediate post-Cold War period or the Afghanistan conflict, but it is demonstrably false now. For example, Canada has provided Ukraine with considerable assistance since Russia’s invasion, but it barely ranks in the top 20 donors as a percentage of GDP. In terms of major military equipment, including tanks and artillery, Canadian support to Kyiv has been, at best, modest. Canada has assisted in the recent strengthening of NATO’s eastern flank through its Enhanced Forward Presence commitment to Latvia. Still, concerns remain about whether the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) can find the personnel to increase the battle group to full brigade size. Canada’s increased military presence in the Indo-Pacific region as part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy is marginal (from two to three frigates). Defence spending under the Strategy is pegged at a minuscule $500 million over five years, and Canada is still not a member of the AUKUS military partnership comprising the U.S., U.K. and Australia (namely pillar 2 focused on advanced military capabilities) despite public pronouncements of interest. Canada’s defence presence in the Middle East is virtually invisible. The same can be said in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). While the government’s refusal to deploy troops to Haiti to quell gang violence may well have been the correct decision, it did the U.S. no favours. And in Africa, Canada is best remembered recently for a mission to Mali in 2017 that took forever to execute and was seen by many as little more than a box-ticking exercise.</p> +<h4 id="the-opportunities-for-consensus-at-home">The Opportunities for Consensus at Home</h4> -<h3 id="2-the-next-us-administration">2. The Next U.S. Administration</h3> +<p>Despite polarization overall, Americans agree on some key elements of what would constitute a strategy to advance democratic values globally. In the Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey cited above, Americans listed “strengthening democracy at home” as second only to “strengthening education” as a necessary tool to remain a leading power. In the same survey, 86 percent of Americans listed strengthening democracy abroad as either “important” or “very important,” with only 4 percent replying that it was “not important at all.” Congressional funding for the major tools of democracy promotion has increased over the past few years, with budgets for the NED and its affiliate institutes, the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), and internal State Department programs to counter Chinese and Russian disinformation all expanding at double-digit rates.</p> -<p>While it is difficult to predict whether recent steps by the Government to increase defence spending and enhance military capabilities will impress the U.S. and other allies, there is little doubt that Washington will expect Canada to follow through on these commitments and likely do even more. The focus in Canada is currently on the possible implications of a Trump administration, especially given recent comments by the former president that he would refuse to protect NATO allies which do not meet the 2% defence spending target. Vice-Presidential candidate J.D. Vance echoed these sentiments at the Republican convention in July, declaring that there would be “no more free rides for nations betraying the generosity of the American taxpayer.”</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite polarization overall, Americans agree on some key elements of what would constitute a strategy to advance democratic values globally.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Whether Republican or Democrat, the next U.S. government will seek strong Allied support in a dangerous and unpredictable world, including from Canada. While Trump may pull back from NATO and pursue a negotiated settlement in Ukraine, there is consensus in Washington that China is a major global threat that must be confronted. The U.S. needs Allied support to do this. Beyond any direct threats from Russia or China, the U.S. will seek allies to protect its back in other regions, such as Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Africa.</p> +<p>Congressional support for the tools of democracy promotion reflects the growing recognition that democracy is at risk abroad, but perhaps the greatest driver is the national consensus that the United States must rally to defend its interests against an increasingly coercive and revisionist China. Indeed, China policy is one of the few areas of real bipartisan consensus in Washington today, as indicated by the comity of the cochairs and the activism of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Even the Heritage Foundation, which has attracted criticism from Democrats and many independent media for proposals in its Project 2025 to supercharge presidential authority in a second Trump administration, issued a report on China calling for an emphasis on democracy and human rights. This political consensus will prove a double-edged sword, though. On one side, the clarity of purpose around strategic competition with China is yielding resources, focus, and presidential-level attention. On the other side, casting this fight for democracy as a contest with China can alienate key allies and partners that will be critical to forming a coalition in support of democratic norms, and perhaps distract governments from problems with democratic governance that are important on their own merit and not just derivative of competition with China.</p> -<p>For the U.S., then, Allied defence spending and capability, as well as a willingness to deploy troops to trouble spots in support of Western interests, will be a major litmus test. And for those that fail to respond, there will be a price to pay, including in other policy areas such as trade. Canada knows this all too well. It was understood in 2017 that the publication of SSE and an associated increase in defence spending would be a useful chip in the CUSMA poker game. Then Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin raised the 2% issue with Canadian Finance Minister Bill Morneau on every occasion they met.</p> +<p>It is also important to emphasize that despite the fascination with culture wars and authoritarianism on the right wing of the Republican Party, the mainstream Republican leadership includes some of the most vocal and active leaders on democracy and human rights in Congress, such as Senators Dan Sullivan and Marco Rubio. Similarly, while the progressive wing of the Democratic Party may criticize democratic nations such as Israel or India for perceived democratic regression (among other issues), the party overall sees no contradiction between speaking frankly with friends and allies about concerns – and accepting the same in return – and pursuing a strategic foreign policy. In short, there are leaders in Congress who could play a central role in forging a bipartisan consensus around championing democracy and human rights in U.S. foreign policy despite the polarization that besets the country and both parties. The key is for leaders in both parties to frame the strategy in ways that are inclusive of common values shared across the aisle and that reflect the interests of the American people regardless of party.</p> -<p>Canada’s defence record will be a target of any new administration, especially given our shared continental geography with the U.S. The recent statement by an unnamed senior Canadian official that the U.S. never raises concerns privately with Canada about defence spending reflects either naïveté or wishful thinking. Even if true, it may be more a sign that U.S. officials have grown tired of lecturing the Canadians and have effectively given up hope that Ottawa will respond. However, this is unlikely to be the case with a new administration, especially if the international security environment continues to deteriorate and/or pressure grows within NATO to revise the defence spending target upwards to 2.5% or even 3%.</p> +<h3 id="toward-an-integrated-democracy-strategy">Toward an Integrated Democracy Strategy</h3> -<h3 id="3-how-to-restore-canadas-military-credibility-with-the-us-a-ten-point-plan">3. How to Restore Canada’s Military Credibility with the U.S.: A Ten-Point Plan</h3> +<p>A successful U.S. values-based foreign policy must move away from the historic pendulum swings between idealism and realism if it is to sustain domestic and international support and have strategic effects. Just as “integrated deterrence” has emerged as an essential component of defense strategy, so too the United States and its allies will need a new “integrated democracy strategy” to prevail in the battle of norms. The point is not that military, economic, or diplomatic objectives should be subordinated to human rights or democracy priorities, but rather that these strategies should be integrated in national security planning alongside diplomatic, military, and economic objectives.</p> -<p>What can Canada do to restore its defence reputation with the U.S., keeping in mind that whatever it does should ultimately be in the national interest? (We should also recognize, of course. that having a healthy relationship with the U.S. is just as much in Canada’s interest).</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A successful U.S. values-based foreign policy must move away from the historic pendulum swings between idealism and realism.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Here is a 10-point plan to help put Canada back in the good graces of its most important defence partner.</p> +<p>One useful point of reference is the U.S. military’s traditional “DIME” construct for assessing threats and instruments of power. The diplomatic, military, and economic pillars have been fairly consistent over time, but the “I” has evolved from “intelligence” to “information.” One more evolution is needed, and that is to consider the ideational – that is not just the competition of information and narratives but the much more foundational competition of norms and ideas. This would reflect the reality that ideational contests, whether in the United States, Asia, Europe, or the Global South more broadly, are closely related to Chinese and Russian efforts to undermine U.S. power: its alliances, forward presence, economic interests, and political principles alike. If realism is about accurately assessing power dynamics, then it should be clear – as Joseph Nye noted in conceiving the concept of “soft power” – that the ideational dimension of competition is becoming as important as the diplomatic, military, or economic. Asserting the importance of information in the Information Age should not be a stunning insight. In the end, this is a matter of power and realism and not just à la carte idealism.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Live up to our commitments:</strong> If Canada says it will do something on defence, it should do so expeditiously. The current government has earned a well-deserved reputation for making defence announcements and quickly moving on. Implementation is often an afterthought — a variation on the military expression “fire and forget.” Whether hitting the 2% target, pursuing NORAD modernization, deploying troops internationally or procuring equipment (including submarines), the focus must be quick and efficient implementation and results. As the Washington Post leaks demonstrated, Canada currently lacks credibility in the U.S. because it does not follow through, or at least takes its time to do so. The Arctic was cited as a specific example. Canada needs to demonstrate a sense of urgency and strategic vision on the defence file — ad hoc or piecemeal announcements in response to the latest crisis or NATO pressure will not suffice.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Develop a detailed plan to reach 2% defence spending:</strong> The PM’s announcement that Canada expects to reach the 2% target by 2032 was the easy part. The government now needs to show how it will get there while at the same time addressing Parliamentary Budget Office concerns that the deadline may not be achievable. The U.S. government and Congress will be watching closely. It would be even better to reach the target in less than eight years.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Meet other NATO targets:</strong> NATO states have agreed to spend 20% of their defence budgets on research and capital equipment. Canada is one of only two member states that have failed to meet this objective. The DPU states that Canada is “on target” to achieve the goal but does not specify a timeframe. The government should set one. Two years would be appropriate.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Address P&amp;P (Procurement and Personnel):</strong> Implementation of the DPU will be challenging unless the CAF addresses its procurement and personnel issues. If the CAF cannot purchase equipment faster and more efficiently while at the same time increasing its personnel levels (there is a current shortfall of approximately 16,000 men and women in uniform, plus a shortage of civilians to support the procurement process), the policy will be an empty shell. Showing Washington that we are taking concrete steps to fix these fundamental and long-standing problems will enhance trust.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Maintain the focus on the Arctic:</strong> Prioritizing the Arctic was a wise policy choice in the DPU — it supports both our national interest and that of the U.S. in a major strategic theatre where Russia and China pose an emerging threat. The U.S. is relying on Canada to do its part in this region. Maintaining the North as both a policy and operational priority is critical. Moving quickly on specific capabilities will show good faith (unlike the projects for the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship and the Nanisivik refueling station, which were announced nearly 20 years ago and have still not been completed). In addition, now that Canada has committed $40 billion over 20 years to modernize NORAD, it needs to make this upgrade happen. This is a primordial U.S. priority. If the U.S. seeks our support, Canada should remain open to further bilateral cooperation in related areas, including ballistic missile defence.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Continue to support Ukraine and European security:</strong> While the U.S. commitment to Ukraine may change with a Trump administration, Washington will still appreciate every bit of military assistance Canada can provide to Europe. In addition to direct support to Ukraine, meeting the Latvia brigade group commitment will be key.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Do more in the Indo-Pacific:</strong> Defending Ukraine is critical to Western interests, but China is the most significant long-term threat to the U.S. Canada’s military presence in the Indo-Pacific remains small. Some have described the region’s recent strategy and associated funding as a down payment on greater engagement in the future. If so, increased priority should be placed on defence and security, especially if Canada hopes to be considered a serious regional player by the U.S. and other Five Eyes allies. Naval and air capabilities must top the list.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Do the U.S. a favour elsewhere in the world:</strong> Of course, any international deployment must be in Canada’s national interest. However, Ottawa must take the request seriously if the U.S. calls for help in LAC, Africa, or the Middle East. As the French ambassador stated, a nation needs a strong military and must be prepared to use it. A possible peace settlement in the Middle East with a subsequent U.N. mission may be an opportunity. However, LAC is also in our backyard, and we have significant experience in Africa (one caveat: do not repeat the mistakes of Mali). Of course, the ability to deploy troops overseas will depend very much on fixing the CAF’s personnel problems.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Be proactive:</strong> Canada should not always wait for the U.S. to ask for help. The government should try to anticipate, i.e., seek opportunities to assist Washington before it picks up the phone. Again, the Middle East may be a region where the U.S. will need a helping hand once a settlement is reached between Israel and Hamas. The government should be contemplating a role for Canada now.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Put defence in a larger National Security context:</strong> The U.S. rarely talks about defence in isolation. It fits defence into a broader national security paradigm that includes, among other things, intelligence and foreign policy tools. Canada needs to do the same. At home, Canada has recently lurched from crisis to crisis while dealing with threats such as foreign interference and espionage, responding with stop-gap measures. When will we see the recently promised National Security Strategy to address both domestic and international threats and strengthen cooperation with the U.S. against hostile state activities, including in such areas as critical minerals? And when will we see a foreign policy statement that identifies Canada’s international security priorities and shows the U.S. and others where it can add value? What will Canada do more broadly in the world (for example, through arms control efforts or sanctions) to help the U.S. counter the likes of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea?</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>An integrated democracy strategy would harness all tools of national power in an all-of-government but also all-of-society framework. Coalition building with democratic allies and partners along with businesses and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) would reinforce the traditional approach of outreach to civil society groups. The incentives and risk tolerance for business, allies, civil society, and different government agencies will vary, so this is not a matter of a single operational plan to be implemented by all actors so much as a variable geometry of coalitions to attack key problems, such as corruption, free speech, electoral integrity, government oversight and accountability, information integrity, and rule of law. The strategy would have to be authorized by the president, drafted by the National Security Council, coordinated with Congress, overseen from within the White House, and ultimately operationalized by individual agencies in support and coordination with one another. The following are key elements of this strategy that would need to be implemented by the United States.</p> -<h3 id="4-conclusion">4. Conclusion</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">An integrated democracy strategy would harness all tools of national power in an all-of-government but also all-of-society framework.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>While trade and commerce are often placed at the epicentre of the Canada-US relationship, defence can play a no less important role. The U.S. ultimately defines almost every major bilateral relationship in terms of National Security. And with the world at an “inflection point” (one of President Biden’s favourite catchphrases), Washington will look to allies more than ever for support. It will also increasingly examine other major bilateral policy issues, including trade, through a defence/security lens.</p> +<h4 id="harness-democratic-allies-and-partners">Harness Democratic Allies and Partners</h4> -<p>If Canada hopes to maintain a healthy relationship with the next U.S. administration, it must devote greater attention to defence. With the current state of the world, Canada should strengthen its military capabilities first and foremost for reasons of national interest (namely the protection of our citizens, the promotion of our prosperity and the defence of our democratic values), as well as out of self-respect and Alliance responsibility. But there is no shame in acknowledging that addressing our southern neighbour’s concerns over our commitment to defence is also a priority. It bears repeating — being a strong and reliable ally to the U.S. is in our national interest.</p> +<p>This is not a matter of recruiting allies and partners to a singular strategy but rather empowering them to shape debates and reinforce democratic norms internationally and in their own regions. The best framing for this effort in Asia, Africa, or Latin America is around sovereignty, prosperity, resilience, and national self-strengthening rather than justice or strategic competition with China and Russia. Empirical demonstrations that accountability, transparency, rule of law mechanisms, and women’s empowerment enhance national wealth and strength will be powerful.</p> -<p>Bolstering Canada’s defence capabilities in these desperate times will be no easy task. Public support remains soft, and the government faces many other domestic challenges. The government has recently taken some encouraging steps in the defence realm. However, they can only be viewed as preliminary given the current threat environment — further initiatives and resources will be required. Some additional steps are suggested in this paper, but they are unlikely to be carried out in their entirety and certainly not overnight. But further Allied pressure will be applied to the government, whether Liberal or Conservative, to take serious, systematic and concrete steps to build a strong Canadian Armed Forces capable of operating in a complex and dangerous world. Such a military will serve Canadian interests and help solidify the relationship with our most important ally and partner.</p> +<p>The NED’s Sunnylands Initiative on democracy in the Indo-Pacific is a useful example of how thought leaders in a region can help to validate and align a democracy strategy to their unique context while reinforcing that universal norms are indeed universal. First started in Sunnylands, California, by the NED and CSIS in 2020 and continued in Odawara, Japan, in 2022 and other locations in the Indo-Pacific, each Sunnylands meeting culminates in diverse regional thought leaders drafting and signing a joint statement with a vision and action plan for broad regional cooperation on advancing democratic norms and governance, including expanding support for democracy advocates at risk, grants to regional civil society organizations, and early warning of regional democratic setbacks.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Similar initiatives in other regions would yield results. It is critical that democratic values be owned and advanced not just by Euro-Atlantic peoples but by a broad range of cultures and contexts to prevent self-interested autocrats from speciously claiming cultural alienation from those values.</p> -<p><strong>Vincent Rigby</strong> was National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister from 2020 to 2021 and served in Canada’s Public Service for 30 years in a variety of departments and agencies across government, including the Privy Council Office, Global Affairs Canada, Public Safety Canada, the Department of National Defence and the former Canadian International Development Agency. His career focused on security and intelligence, foreign policy, defence, and development issues. He is currently the Slater Family Professor of Practice at McGill University’s Max Bell School of Public Policy. He is also a senior fellow with the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, as well as a senior advisor with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC. He holds an MA in history from Carleton University.</p>Vincent RigbyThis report assesses the challenges facing the U.S.-Canada relationship as it pertains to military spending and argues that Washington will expect Canada to follow through on the spending commitments.Accountability In Cyberspace2024-10-16T12:00:00+08:002024-10-16T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/accountability-in-cyberspace<p><em>Outlining the regional approaches, challenges, and solutions to the cyber accountability question in Latin America.</em></p> +<p>Critics of a democracy agenda often assume such a policy must entail dividing the world into strict blocs – democratic vs. authoritarian – and jettisoning relationships with those that are deemed nondemocratic. Admittedly, some talk in those terms, and there is little question that relationships among fellow democracies are fundamentally stronger and more sustainable than those with poor or deteriorating human rights records. But ultimately there is no reason one cannot promote democratic norms and still work closely and constructively with nondemocratic nations in areas of common purpose and strategic interest, including in the normative sphere.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is no reason one cannot promote democratic norms and still work closely and constructively with nondemocratic nations in areas of common purpose and strategic interest.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The pursuit of accountability as an absolute goal can limit policymakers from important considerations such as domestic and regional ambitions, economic priorities, and cultural context. In Latin America, governments and other stakeholders face internal challenges to the cybersecurity agenda that sideline accountability. This includes a growing reliance on the United States and China for digital infrastructure, the increasing militarization of cyber capabilities, and the often more pressing issue of economic growth and development. For any efforts in the region to take root, interpreting accountability and state responsibility in the context of regional politics and historical context is critical.</p> +<h4 id="harness-the-business-community">Harness the Business Community</h4> -<h3 id="contextualizing-accountability-in-latin-america">Contextualizing Accountability in Latin America</h3> +<p>The business community should be particularly inclined to see the merit of this approach and positioned to shape outcomes based on the need for a level playing field in overseas markets. As a 2021 task force report by CSIS, the McCain Institute, and Freedom House put it:</p> -<p>The UN framework for responsible state behavior and an evolving interpretation of how international law applies to cyberspace has set a normative benchmark for state conduct in cyberspace. However, the ways through which states interpret those international commitments and translate them domestically is an ongoing exercise – an important one nonetheless, as accountability relies on the domestic and international levers that countries devise to hold other state and non-state actors accountable for their actions, as well as the domestic mechanisms that also introduce checks and balances for their own actions in cyberspace.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Any serious effort to promote democracy and counter authoritarianism must include measures to combat corruption and kleptocracy, which have become business models for modern-day authoritarians. Corruption and its weaponization by authoritarians harms effective governance, undermines economic growth, and weakens the rule of law. It corrodes public trust and is interwoven with security issues like organized and transnational crime, terrorism, human rights abuses, and conflict.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>While it is beyond the scope of this paper to conceptualize accountability, there are at least two dimensions of accountability that are relevant for the purposes of this piece. The first refers to negative accountability, that is, the actions taken by one party to ensure that the other party is made responsible for their acts or neglect. This could include, for example, sanctions or public attribution for malicious activities that violate the norms for responsible state behavior. The second refers to positive accountability, that is, the proactive measures by states and other stakeholders that support either a domestic or international regime that is more open, transparent, and/or inclusive. Examples of positive accountability range from international and domestic due diligence measures, development of cyber capacities, promotion and protection of human rights in cyberspace, and inclusive and democratic policy development, among others. This piece focuses largely on positive accountability, domestic and regional enablers and constraints, and cultural nuances for thinking about cyber accountability and responsibility from a practice-oriented perspective.</p> +<p>U.S. trade policy, though anemic compared with years past, can still provide an important tool to reinforce good governance and accountability. The Trans-Pacific Partnership agreements provided market access that incentivized Vietnam to improve labor rights and transparency. The current Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) offers no such market access opportunities but could still be utilized to strengthen rules on digital trade, labor rights, and the environment where those priorities align with other key partners like Japan, Australia, or South Korea. Global standards on anti-corruption can also be compelling for governments because of the clear link to improved investment and growth, as the Financial Action Task Force has demonstrated. The business community will be less well positioned to use its leverage to protect democrats at risk or impose punishments for human rights abuses, except when legislation, national policy, or reputational risk compel them to do so – as occurred with the Uyghur Forced Labor Protection Act signed into law in 2022. Nevertheless, private sector and trade policy levers can have significant impacts on anti-corruption, transparency, and good governance that in turn reinforce accountability to the governed.</p> -<p>Latin America has its own pathways, experiences, and challenges in interpreting the links between accountability and cybersecurity. In fact, neither Portuguese nor Spanish possesses an exact word for “accountability”. The translation of the term relates to the responsibility of an organization or state for its decisions (and the consequences deriving from them), which is called “prestação de contas” or “redicion de cuentas” – the act of reporting or accounting for certain actions. The objective of this paper is thus to provide a contextualized, non-exhaustive view of enablers and blockers for accountability in cyberspace as it relates to the countries in the region.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The business community should be particularly inclined to see the merit of this approach and positioned to shape outcomes based on the need for a level playing field in overseas markets.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Analyses of cybersecurity maturity and development in the region (and elsewhere) have often concentrated on “technical” or “cyber-specific” markers, such as the development of a national Computer Emergency Response Team (nCERT) or a National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS). These and other maturity assessments have served, at times, as indicators of the responsibility of states in cyberspace within the region, as they directly relate to the measurement of the capacities of these countries to operationalize and implement the framework for responsible state behavior. While important, the discussion about accountability (or lack thereof) within Latin America (and arguably in other regions) needs to be understood as intimately connected to deeper historical, regulatory, and economic roots – all of which intersect in complex ways with the trajectory of cybersecurity agendas nationally and regionally.</p> +<h4 id="harness-civil-society-and-support-democrats-at-risk">Harness Civil Society and Support Democrats at Risk</h4> -<p>The first of those complex intersections refers to the securitization and militarization of cybersecurity – both institutionally and in terms of technological development. Despite the history of military dictatorships, the relative peace amongst countries in the region has led to the repurposing of military personnel as a backup for civilian capacities to protect, defend, and respond to domestic security issues, including organized crime. For some countries, the armed forces have also become one of the national epicenters for the development of cyber capabilities. Militarised approaches to cyber policies and institutions, and strong emphases on combatting online crime, relate to different trajectories of securitization of cybersecurity in Latin America that have, time and again, posed a challenge for greater accountability. Even so, competing security and economic incentives have created disjointed narratives with a securitized and militarized vision of cyberspace, on the one hand, and the commitment to market innovation, digital economy, and digital security, on the other.</p> +<p>An effective integrated democracy strategy would be an “all of the above” strategy. Companies or smaller allies might not be able to accept the risk associated with condemning human rights abuses or protecting democrats at risk. Size does matter, and the U.S. government can absorb retaliation in a ways no other state or firm can. Consequently, the president and the secretary of state should meet with and speak out for dissidents or champions of freedom like the Dalai Lama even when that carries diplomatic risk. Legislation passed in Congress by a wide margin in 2024 to counter disinformation against the Dalai Lama is another example of the bipartisanship that is possible on such issues.</p> -<p>Secondly, questions around economic stability have impacted the pace, consistency, and political visibility of cybersecurity developments in the region. Economic stifling in Latin America following the 2008 global economic crisis, compounded by COVID-19, has led to a “second lost decade” of development in the region. This was marked by an average 0.9% annual growth between 2014-2023. Unsurprisingly, the difficult road for sustained economic development in Latin America has had a direct impact on cybersecurity. Even though it has reinforced the region’s commitment to capacity building, it has equally affected the degree through which political elites view cybersecurity as a priority – given other more pressing areas underpinning economic development.</p> +<p>Consistency in this regard is critical: it encourages those on the front lines of freedom, it sets an example for other world leaders, it keeps authoritarian states on notice, and it prevents a backlash at home that could force overcompensation that proves more destabilizing for diplomacy. It is worth noting that Reagan developed a strong dialogue with Mikhail Gorbachev despite years of support for dissidents and George W. Bush did the same with former Chinese president Hu Jintao despite regular meetings with the Dalai Lama. The key was that these presidents did so out of conviction and not political calculation. That conviction must remain consistently in evidence to avoid the appearance that support for dissidents is gratuitous, episodic, or politically motivated.</p> -<p>Thirdly, growing dependency on the US and China for infrastructure provision poses significant geostrategic challenges and pressures for Latin American countries as they seek to combine both relationships in their favor. According to the World Bank, the United States remains the main export and import partner for Latin America and Caribbean countries, with China only slightly below the US in export markets. However, tensions have been constant around the provision of digital services and infrastructure. As of 2022, Huawei, ZTE, China Unicom, China Telecom, and China Mobile have at least 36 facilities distributed across Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina.</p> +<p>U.S. support for accurate reporting of democracy and human rights conditions is equally important. The organizations under the USAGM (such as Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Radio Marti) should remain robustly resourced and free to spotlight conditions as they find them. In the same vein, U.S. ambassadors need to understand the strategic value of democratic norms and be both authorized and equipped to speak confidently and assertively about them in their assigned countries. Likewise, officers in U.S. embassies must be authorized to report fully and accurately on issues such as trafficking, human rights, or women’s rights as they find them.</p> -<p>It is within this context of complex intersections between the region’s historical and recent past that cyber accountability should be interpreted. To do so, the paper is divided into two main parts.</p> +<p>Finally, U.S. funding of global democracy support work should continue to increase and U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funding should continue going toward building capacity of democratic institutions, including domestic civil society groups. The funding should not – as most Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) donors choose – be based on host government preferences. In fact, Japan and South Korea have begun debating how to delink some grants so that they can go directly to civil society groups. The U.S. government should encourage this trend and allies’ broader support of democratic institutions internationally. Support for marginalized groups may not always be popular with host governments, but it builds more resilient and accountable societies. For example, empowering women has proven an effective tool for achieving accountability in ceasefires and trade agreements, sustaining the peace once achieved, and increasing economic productivity.</p> -<h3 id="enabling-positive-accountability-through-policy-responses">Enabling Positive Accountability Through Policy Responses</h3> +<h4 id="do-not-cede-international-institutions">Do Not Cede International Institutions</h4> -<p>There are different ways in which countries can engage in positive accountability. That is the case of National Cybersecurity Strategies (NCS), which have become a key component to cyber accountability – and an equally relevant part of the development of responsible cyber behavior within the Latin American context in particular. These documents often represent the outcome of cross-government discussions, a public signal of the country’s interest in cybersecurity, and a confidence and transparency measure insofar as it translates the government’s ambitions to the broader population.</p> +<p>China’s growing diplomatic influence in bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council has proven frustrating for U.S. diplomacy. However, it is worth remembering these and other major international institutions are fundamentally American in origin. Eleanor Roosevelt herself lobbied to integrate her husband’s Four Freedoms into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, international institutions have proven useful in ways not originally envisioned. The Helsinki Accords were signed in 1975 with one basket (of four) focused on emigration, press freedom, and social issues. Most negotiators at the time had low expectations that these areas would be implemented, but they ultimately proved crucial to holding the Soviet Union to account for the free emigration of Jews and other human rights issues over the next 15 years.</p> -<p>Throughout the past decade, many countries in Latin America have developed their own NCSs, with some having merely published their first version, others being in the process of developing or publishing a second version, and some already having laws on the topic. Most of these documents follow a similar structure, covering strategic pillars such as cybersecurity governance, development of a legal/policy framework, research and development, and cooperation.</p> +<p>The United States cannot cede the field in these international institutions; rather, it should engage and seek to shape them in normative directions for which they were originally conceived. The position of the democracies is stronger than the results reveal. Beijing’s influence is a result of effort and not just size. When the Human Rights Council debated whether to put the UN Human Rights Commissioner’s report on crimes against humanity in Xinjiang on its agenda in 2022, President Xi Jinping personally called members of the council to persuade them to vote against the move. The United States relied on its ambassador in Geneva to rustle support and even then, China won by only two votes.</p> -<p>While important, NCSs do not always mean that there is high political commitment to a cybersecurity agenda – and despite being a positive accountability measure domestically, its impact in ensuring greater political traction of cybersecurity or government-wide accountability should be taken with a grain of salt. Visibility of the topic by the presidency or political elites in the region remains minimal considering the competing and more pressing national agendas facing countries in Latin America such as climate resilience, public security, and economic stability (i.e. handling rising inflation). However, lack of political visibility does not mean that some countries have not been consistent with their cyber policy development. At times, it means that bureaucratic or sector-specific leads can push forward, albeit slowly. That is the case of Colombia, which now has three versions of their NCS, each of which has a different emphasis on cyber defense (2011) and digital security (2016, and 2020).</p> +<p>Stepping up the effort on these battles is important, as retreat would</p> -<p>While lack of political visibility can be associated with limited accountability and transparency beyond a small group of bureaucratic or sector-specific leads, this is not always the case. High political visibility has, at times, resulted in the politicization and polarisation of cybersecurity discussions. That was the case of Colombia’s legislative proposals for the establishment of a National Cybersecurity Agency. Despite an agreement on the importance of having an agency, when the time came for the proposal to be presented, senators from the opposition associated the agency with a “spy agency” against citizens and other political parties – something that not even key privacy advocates and civil society organizations in Colombia had perceived as such.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>allow China, Russia, or Iran to increasingly turn these institutions into mouthpieces for their values and norms and against the United States and its allies with the Global South, while advancing resolutions endorsing China’s Global Civilization Initiative, defending Russia’s war in Ukraine, and reflexively condemning Israel</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>make it much more difficult to use these institutions to address true human rights violations</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>deny the United States a key forum for aligning positions on crucial human rights and democracy issues with allies and partners and to coordinate international approaches</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Other contextual factors, such as large-scale cybersecurity incidents have, on the other hand, helped propel further policy developments as well as promote visibility of cybersecurity challenges facing countries in the region both domestically and internationally. The Conti Russia-based ransomware group’s 5-day intrusion on Costa Rica’s government ministries in 2022 led to an unprecedented declaration of a state of emergency. Part of the incident also took place during a presidential transition, raising pressures for the incoming government of Rodrigo Chaves to regroup and respond accordingly. Domestically, it has led to a series of policy developments. One of the immediate outcomes include heightened international cooperation between Costa Rica and the United States, Spain, and Israel – all of which already possessed Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with the country. This was followed by a series of legislative proposals for a National Cybersecurity Agency and a national cybersecurity policy. Ultimately, it resulted on the publication of the country’s first NCS 2023-2027. In 2023, Costa Rica also joined the International Counter Ransomware Initiative and published its views on how international law applies to cyberspace, becoming the second country in the region to do so.</p> +<p>It will also be important to look beyond the UN institutions to consider regional organizations. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) established an Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights in 2009, which has underperformed in the face of coups in Thailand and Myanmar and shows a general division over values. Yet capacity building and engagement with the commission could yield future dividends in the ways the Helsinki Accords surprised many. The African Union established the Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1987 (when the grouping was still the Organization of African Unity). That commission is more active than ASEAN’s and regularly calls out member states for human rights violations. The United States has been relatively unengaged with the Pacific Islands Forum, which also has a secretariat with a charter to advance good governance and democracy. These regional organizations can be far more effective venues for advancing human rights and democracy for the obvious reason that they reflect regional values and priorities. Beijing is stepping up its own diplomatic engagement and offering significant funding to these regional organizations, for example, building the African Union’s new headquarters building in Addis Ababa. The United States and its allies should not be constructing buildings, but they can do more to invest in work on democracy, good governance, and human rights.</p> -<p>Despite the disruptiveness of large-scale incidents and their capacity to stress test a country’s capacity to react and respond, they also trigger policy processes. As Costa Rica’s case illustrates, the country has started to effectively invest and receive substantive support only after the incident. Such a combination has led to an increased interest and commitment of the country to enhance its own stance both on domestic and international cyber accountability.</p> +<h4 id="enhance-us-strategic-communications">Enhance U.S. Strategic Communications</h4> -<p>Going from reactive (i.e. developing policies and responses after a disruptive incident) to proactive approaches (i.e. investing in prevention) to cyber accountability can often be a non-linear process and an even greater challenge when there is limited capacity or political appetite. Even so, some of the countries that have developed their NCS have been seeking to transform strategic thinking into institutional development through the establishment of National Cybersecurity Agencies. That is the case of Chile, Brazil, Colombia, and others, although each of these countries has its particularities. In Colombia, there have been four legislative proposals for the establishment of an NCSA since 2023. Despite political controversies, two have not gone forward and two proposals remain, one proposed by the Ministry of Science and Technology and another by Senator David Luna. In Brazil, the Institutional Security Office of the Presidency – the body responsible for cyber policy development – has previously indicated its interest in presenting a bill to establish the Brazilian NCSA (Agência Nacional de Cibersegurança, or ANCiber). The draft bill was first circulated in mid-2023 and it included the establishment of ANCiber, which has yet to be presented to Congress at the time of writing.</p> +<p>Authoritarian regimes can often prove more agile than democracies at disseminating information and maintaining message discipline, but they also have a far weaker brand to sell. Democratic allies enjoy the advantage of representing norms – including open access to quality information – that are desired by billions of people worldwide, along with an honest interest in the sovereignty and well-being of others. The United States and its allies ought to play to these strengths by developing an information strategy that supports local independent media, facilitates access to balanced news and analysis, and actively counters false and self-interested narratives advanced by authoritarians. In addition to ensuring adequate resourcing of existing USAGM global media entities, a new entity ought to be established to provide free-of-charge, fact-based information to Global South countries whose media are littered with PRC and other authoritarian-influenced propaganda.</p> -<p>The convergence of policy debates around the establishment of NCSAs in Latin America shows that there is institutional appetite to transform strategy into action. It also highlights that many of these countries share the view that the first step to do so entails designating a focal point for cybersecurity that has the competency to provide action and oversight over national cybersecurity. While most of the countries in the region are still discussing the NCSA, there are already other existing models of governance in place that reflect the specificity of how accountability is bounded to the country’s institutional culture. Uruguay is an emblematic case. Instead of having an NCSA, it established in 2005 a National Agency for E-Government and Information and Knowledge Society (Agesic). One year later, the country’s Accountability Law was amended to add information security as part of its core competencies: The agency was then tasked with “planning and coordinating projects related to Electronic Government as a basis for the transformation and greater transparency of the state and conceiving and developing a national policy on information security issues that allow prevention, detection, and response to incidents that may affect the country’s critical assets”.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Democratic allies enjoy the advantage of representing norms – including open access to quality information – that are desired by billions of people worldwide.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>However, the discussion on accountability in cyberspace is not restricted to government agencies, bureaucratic elites, and a small pool of decision-makers. In addition to policy and institutional levers of accountability, some countries in the region have been historically and proactively engaged in technical cooperation. At the regional level, the Latin America and Caribbean Internet Address Registry (LACNIC) – responsible for assigning critical Internet resources and providing a forum for regional cooperation on Internet governance – has been one of the focal points for the technical security community to collaborate and exchange information. The LACNIC community established a Warning, Advice, and Reporting Point (WARP) in 2014 that later became the LACNIC CSIRT network. The network is composed by LACNIC members (i.e. national CERTs and private actors) and seeks to coordinate and strengthen incident response capacity as it relates to the Internet Protocol and Autonomous Systems through training, information sharing, and incident management. The Organisation of American States’ Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) has also established the CSIRTAmericas Network with national CERTs from over 20 countries in the region and has equally focused on supporting and developing incident response capacity across the Americas.</p> +<p>The U.S. government has long suffered from an inability to develop, let alone coordinate, a disciplined strategic communications strategy, with the Pentagon focused on “cognitive warfare” and the State Department on “public diplomacy.” While strategic oversight from Washington is required, there is a risk of overcentralizing implementation. U.S. ambassadors in the field, in partnership with local embassy staff and civic partners, are likely to have a far more nuanced and effective understanding of local media and narrative environments.</p> -<p>These and other initiatives illustrate that governmental cyber accountability can and has benefited from non-governmental initiatives, especially when the focus has been to create a space for sustained technical collaboration with cybersecurity experts, companies, and other parts of the private sector and law enforcement. More importantly, it illustrates that a regime of positive domestic accountability can grow and expand if and when it leverages other stakeholders and initiatives. However, this section also highlights that accountability is not a one-sided coin or an absolute value that is achieved; there are complexities and nuances that need to be further unpacked and navigated. When considering broader government incentives to engage in cybersecurity at the domestic level, political visibility does not always translate into desirable political traction or accountability – even though legislative processes obey broader policymaking accountability measures already in place.</p> +<p>While in recent years the United States has become adept at using instruments such as the State Department’s Global Engagement Center to better understand how and where PRC and Russian disinformation have made inroads in third countries, the United States needs more tools to address the challenge, including those outside of government. One successful example is the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, which demonstrated how independent research institutions can sometimes move more nimbly, with more credibility, and have broader impact than the U.S. government can. In the democratic space, think tanks and independent NGOs have the reach to not only assess the challenge and be effective messengers on disinformation but also to build capacity, jointly develop solutions, and create networks among countries facing similar challenges. At the same time, it will be important that these institutions retain their independence and not be used as mouthpieces for U.S. or other governments’ national narratives.</p> -<h3 id="challenges-for-cyber-accountability">Challenges for Cyber Accountability</h3> +<p>In short, while an “all of government” approach to countering disinformation has proven challenging, an “all of society” approach will bring certain advantages that closed, authoritarian states will not enjoy.</p> -<p>Despite the gradual progress of countries in both policy and technical cooperation, the region still faces fundamental challenges when it comes to cyber accountability. The thirst for capacity development can often translate to countries seeking to “buy off” cybersecurity and not be guided by strong concerns around privacy and human rights.</p> +<h4 id="harness-digital-technology">Harness Digital Technology</h4> -<p>While it might be reasonable to assume that countries will seek to outsource their cybersecurity – a posture reflective of both developed and developing countries given the perennial ownership of services by the private sector – lack of commitment from ministries or certain parts of the public administration may feed a one-off, solutions-driven approach. There are different reasons why the debate about the outsourcing of cybersecurity tooling within a developing country context – especially Latin America – can present some challenges to cyber accountability.</p> +<p>The State Department’s recent report on PRC disinformation activities highlighted the important role of digital technologies, particularly social media, in enhancing the growing threat of AI-enhanced deepfakes and algorithmically proliferated attacks on democracies and the idea of democracy itself. Those organizations working for democratic governance, particularly international NGOs, need support to develop and share the digital tools necessary to fight back. The conflict in Gaza has offered an alarming picture of what losing the digital information battle looks like, with one poll showing that the majority of young people who claim to support the slogan “from the river to the sea” do not know which river or which sea to which it refers.</p> -<p>First, many of the technologies and solutions are not based in the region. This means that there is increased dependency of national governments on cybersecurity services based elsewhere (either with a national or regional office), especially the US. This external reliance has not always been dealt in the smoothest of ways and has previously raised significant tensions with US-based companies. In 2015 and 2016, WhatsApp was temporarily suspended because the company did not comply with law enforcement investigations in Brazil. A few years later, in 2022, Telegram was also “blocked” in Brazil after a Supreme Court ruling ordered the platform to comply with law enforcement. Albeit not strictly cybersecurity focused, the case illustrates an extreme measure taken in a context in which a government sought to reclaim its capacity to act in a highly privatized space. The challenges for countries in the region involve how to balance Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME), local, and international cybersecurity service providers. Neglecting other contractual avenues such as consortium models can balance dependencies in a small pool of companies and leverage local and global expertise, though this is beyond the scope of this paper and would require a piece all on its own.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States and its allies must support digital literacy</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Second, dependency in private and public support in areas such as threat intelligence and incident response also raise important challenges concerning the sustainability of investments and capabilities for countries in the region. In Costa Rica’s post-Conti recovery, the US committed $9.8 million to support the country in developing its own Cybersecurity Operations Center by 2026 through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grant. While important, it also raises the question of how countries such as Costa Rica will work to maintain existing licenses after the 2026 cycle of investment – and how they can transform immediate reliance on foreign support into a sustainable approach that diminishes external dependencies. Thus, even though cyber capacity building projects and international assistance might seek to address gaps, upskill, or provide technology and infrastructure support for countries in the region and elsewhere, it creates a double accountability risk: On the one hand, there is a risk of projects not effectively helping recipient countries transition from reliance on foreign aid to sustainable development of capacities; on the other hand, the risk is that donors invest in Cyber Capacity Building (CCB) and cyber crisis response but fall short of being accountable themselves for the impact and sustainability of investments made in a third country.</p> +<p>The United States and its allies must support digital literacy not only at home but also in third countries. The U.S. government should partner with, and as needed regulate, social media giants to ensure that they take responsibility for the disinformation on their platforms. Governments should actively support those seeking to develop digital tools that are explicitly (and algorithmically) designed to enhance conversation and compromise – in other words, democratic norms – and not hate and division. The Open Technology Fund and similar democracy-affirming organizations should receive increased funding to this end. This is crucial in societies with relatively higher levels of political polarization and citizen mistrust toward traditional news media, which are more vulnerable to disinformation activities by domestic and foreign actors alike. In more open economies with a larger and more diverse set of competing advertising and social media markets, exposure and susceptibility to disinformation content is especially concerning. David Lauer’s study of social media platforms like Facebook, for example, underscores that their algorithms can exacerbate societal divisions and polarization by often promoting eye-catching and inflammatory content such as disinformation, extreme political views, and conspiracy theories to garner greater public engagement over their commercial rivals.</p> -<p>However, the most concerning outcome of such a highly private dependent incentive’s structure is the acquisition of intrusive cyber capabilities (i.e. spyware or other tooling – such as Malware-as-a-Service or Access-as-a-Service made commercially available). For nearly a decade, countries in Latin America have reportedly used third-party spyware and often tooled against their own citizens. The infamous Italian group Hacking Team held Latin America as one of its biggest regional markets. Countries such as Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, and others were part of the extensive list of buyers – most of which were driven by governments’ intent on spying on political opponents.</p> +<p>The United States and its allies should also lead on establishing international principles on AI, oppose the unauthorized and unlabeled use of deep fakes, and establish norms that may be adopted in nations most vulnerable to Chinese or Russian disinformation, particularly around elections. The United States has already made significant strides in this area. In February 2024, the Biden administration launched the Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute Consortium (AISIC), fulfilling its commitment from the first global AI Safety Summit in the United Kingdom in November 2023. Collaborating with over 200 technology companies and organizations, including Apple, the consortium is housed within the U.S. AI Safety Institute and ensures that the U.S. government plays a pivotal role in setting national AI standards and developing tools to mitigate potential risks from the emerging technology. The U.S. AI Safety Institute will also collaborate with its international counterparts, already including the United Kingdom’s AI Safety Institute, on developing methods of evaluating the safety of AI tools and the systems that underpin them.</p> -<p>Even though the Hacking Team may now look like a historical reference, the market supply for intrusive software remains compelling and attractive for countries in the region, arguably for the same reasons it did so 10 years ago. If in 2014 Ecuador was sending emails to Hacking Team asking them to provide the tool that would support the intelligence agency SENAIN in spying on a political dissident, in 2024 the Brazilian government fired the head of the intelligence agency after discovering that during Bolsonaro’s government the intelligence agency had been using Israeli tool FirstMile to eavesdrop on Supreme Court justices. Mexico, an already avid client of some of these tools, was the first country to close the deal with the Israeli company NSO Group and deploy the Pegasus tool against criminals and political opponents – and along with other Latin American countries such as El Salvador, which has also deployed the tool against civil society groups and journalists.</p> +<p>Additionally, in July 2024 members of Congress proposed the Content Origin Protection and Integrity from Edited and Deepfaked Media Act (COPIED Act) to protect original content from unauthorized use in AI training. These moves reflect the increasing recognition among U.S. political and private industry leaders of the need for a robust approach to AI safety, both domestically and internationally.</p> -<p>Even though many countries in the region do have data protection laws, the fact that some of them do not cover the protection of use of data for intelligence, national security, or public security cases, raises additional challenges for cyber accountability in the region. The Brazilian Data Protection Law (LGPD), though seen as an adaptation of the GDPR, notes in Art. 4 that the law is not applicable to the treatment of personal data used exclusively for public security, national defence, national security, or investigation or repression of infringements to the criminal code. The Argentinian Data Protection Law notes in Art. 23 that the processing of personal data for the purposes of national defence or public security without the consent of the affected parties is limited to cases and categories of data in strict compliance with missions legally assigned to national defence, public security, or repression of crime (criminal investigation).</p> +<h4 id="sustain-bipartisan-consensus">Sustain Bipartisan Consensus</h4> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>As with most foreign policy issues, bipartisan unity and executive-congressional consensus will ensure strategic continuity and enhance prospects for success in advancing U.S. interests. As noted, leading members of both parties in the Senate and the House have expressed strong commitment to defending and promoting democratic values globally to counteract the malign influence of China, Russia, and others. While differences remain between and within political parties on specific policies, their unity of principle offers a critical strategic opportunity that must be cultivated. In partnership with a compliant White House going forward, a bipartisan coalition could help frame, fund, and overcome political logjams to advance a values-based foreign policy that reflects the best traditions of the United States and defends U.S. security against the authoritarian onslaught, while demonstrating to allies, partners, democratic activists, and autocratic adversaries alike that American unity, solidarity, and sustained commitment to the issue are as strong as ever.</p> -<p>In an increasingly privatized cybersecurity market in which governments heavily rely on third-party solutions, cyber accountability should be seen increasingly as co-responsibility. However, when observing the actions of governments in Latin America, the first section of the paper showed how one should more carefully position the discussion about state responsibility and accountability within the historical and cultural background of a particular region. The second section explored how different countries have sought to enact and showcase positive accountability. It also highlighted that the term accountability should not be taken as an absolute goal, but rather in domestic policymaking, there are internal challenges that might emerge when accountability comes with greater political visibility of the cybersecurity agenda. The third part of the paper outlined some of the challenges and blockers to the operationalisation of accountability in the region – both from intragovernmental incentives to the delegation of cybersecurity to the perpetration of human rights abuses through intrusive commercial cyber tools in Latin America.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Leading members of both parties in the Senate and the House have expressed strong commitment to defending and promoting democratic values globally to counteract the malign influence of China, Russia, and others.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The panorama of cyber accountability in Latin America is a complex mix between national ambitions to develop cyber capacities, the thirst for innovation and economic growth, and the increasing commitments to policy and institutional developments. While this paper is far from exhaustive, it does illustrate that there are historical underpinnings that inform cyber accountability in Latin America as well as nuances when it comes to the economic structure of incentives for countries heavily outsourcing in the region.</p> +<p><em>FINAL NOTE: DEMOCRACY AT HOME</em></p> -<hr /> +<p>Some will charge that the United States has little credibility to promote democratic values globally when its own democracy is in such disrepair. This is a false dichotomy. There is no doubt that the American example matters. The United States does the authoritarians’ work for them when democratic practices are undermined at home or its politicians mirror the rhetoric, actions, and attitudes of authoritarians in their conduct. The U.S. democratic model is often considered the ultimate standard – despite endemic flaws throughout its history – so when egregiously dysfunctional, it can degrade the democratic brand overall.</p> -<p><strong>Louise Marie Hurel</strong> is a Research Fellow at RUSI’s Cyber Team. Throughout the past years, her research has focused on multiple areas of cyber policy, including but not restricted to incident response, cyber capacity building, cyber operations, cyber diplomacy, and non-governmental actors’ engagement in cyber security.</p>Louise Marie HurelOutlining the regional approaches, challenges, and solutions to the cyber accountability question in Latin America.Force Protection From UAS2024-10-15T12:00:00+08:002024-10-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/force-protection-from-uncrewed-aerial-systems<p><em>This paper outlines the core tasks and capabilities required by NATO members to provide coherent, layered protection from uncrewed aerial systems.</em></p> +<p>But the logic behind the intrinsic value of democracy and democratic norms in international affairs stands on its own, independent of the health of U.S. political society at any given time. America’s domestic challenges, if anything, only make it more urgent that other democratic nations step forward to fill gaps or complement U.S. democracy promotion work. Struggling populations around the world are not waiting for the United States to get its house in order before seeking dignity and rights for themselves. To the contrary, they are seeking international solidarity and support more than ever. Regardless of what is happening at home, the institutionalization of democratic norms globally will remain critical to U.S. strategic interests and those of other like-minded peoples around the world.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>The impact of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) on land operations has been a subject of extensive discussion, from the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine beginning in 2022. The corollary to the importance of armies fielding UAS is that effective, layered and efficient counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities are neither a luxury nor a concept to be explored as part of an abstract “future force”. They are a basic requirement for a land force to be suitable for operations on the modern battlefield. Without C-UAS capabilities, a force will be seen first, engaged more accurately, and ultimately defeated by an opposing force that successfully fields UAS and C-UAS capabilities at scale. For NATO members, the aiming mark set by the Alliance’s senior leadership is to be ready to deter Russia by 2028. Fielding C-UAS capabilities, which are absent in any structured sense from the British Army and from most other NATO land force elements, is therefore an urgent operational requirement.</p> +<p>If a strategist were told that a single factor would advance global peace, development, health, and security outcomes while making one the natural ally of billions of people worldwide, one would think that issue would be considered a strategic priority. But dismissal of – if not hostility toward – considering a twenty-first-century democracy agenda remains far too prevalent. Saddled with mental baggage fortified by excesses from the recent past, too many policymakers and strategists resolutely avoid considering a careful and creative approach to integrating democracy promotion into the U.S. foreign policy tool box.</p> -<p>There is a risk that in attempting to fill this critical gap, NATO members purchase a range of C-UAS capabilities that are overly specialised in dealing with specific threat systems, are not integrated effectively across the force, and cannot keep pace with the threat as UAS continue to rapidly evolve. This paper outlines the core tasks and capabilities required to provide coherent, layered C-UAS protection. The paper then explores how to integrate layered C-UAS protection across land forces without overburdening units and thus preventing them from performing their primary tasks.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">If a strategist were told that a single factor would advance global peace, development, health, and security outcomes while making one the natural ally of billions of people worldwide, one would think that issue would be considered a strategic priority.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The paper concludes that:</p> +<p>In many ways this is odd. For decades the United States and its allies have celebrated the advantages of a forward-leaning U.S. global posture to help shape the international security environment. It should not be a substantial conceptual leap, then, to pursuing a more active, forward-leaning, and thoughtful “shaping” policy in the political realm given the ever-increasing empirical data connecting a more democratic world to global security and development.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Software solutions are as important as hardware to enable accurate detection, classification and identification of UAS, and the allocation of appropriate effects to efficiently defeat UAS. Software can also reduce the bandwidth requirements for the networking of sensors. In most cases, the necessary data to field robust machine-based filtering is already available in Ukraine, so there should be little difficulty in obtaining libraries of signature data.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>There are multiple active and passive sensor techniques, and a wide range of soft- and hard-kill techniques exist for engaging and either providing a mission kill or physically destroying UAS, but none are a universally applicable solution, and they must be employed together across the force to provide effective and efficient coverage.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>All platoons must have the ability to detect the presence of UAS and have electronic countermeasures to protect themselves from them.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Across the force, remote weapon stations and other existing platforms should be updated to be able to engage UAS with direct fire.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>At the company level, it is necessary to have dedicated passive sensor arrays capable of detecting, classifying and identifying UAS.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Battalions should have a dedicated counter-reconnaissance capability with hard-kill C-UAS systems, fielding both self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery and UAS interceptors. An electronic warfare section is also necessary, to update and orchestrate the electronic protection suites at subordinate echelons that provide a soft-kill layer that attacks UAS command links and navigational systems.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The brigade should have independent C-UAS platoons that can be pushed to support the efforts of company groups, or to close key axes to hostile UAS.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The brigade should field directed energy systems to efficiently defeat medium-level ISTAR UAS overflying its area of responsibility.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The brigade should have the responsibility for electromagnetic spectrum command and control (C2) and deconfliction.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The division should fuse lower-echelon C-UAS capabilities with the common air defence picture and orchestrate a distributed defence in depth of the airspace to avoid local saturation of C-UAS systems at critical sites.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The point defence role for critical sites such as airbases should see C-UAS capabilities integrated into the wider integrated air and missile defence system at the national, theatre and Alliance levels.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>It is vital that the permissions on training areas allow these capabilities – both soft and hard kill – to be used in combination, alongside the rest of the force’s communications and C2 systems. This is to familiarise commanders with the use of C-UAS capabilities and the deconfliction procedures necessary, and to ensure that systems do not commit fratricide. Where it is not possible to train with these capabilities in live exercises, they should be made available in a synthetic training environment.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Ultimately, a smartly implemented democracy agenda would play to one of the most valuable strategic assets in the U.S. arsenal: the power to inspire and attract billions of people worldwide who seek the same rights and dignity reflected in the American ideal. To that end, the concept of “democracy promotion” must never again be connected to the offensive application of U.S. military power, but instead conducted peacefully and confidently in support of the aspirations of billions around the world for more transparent, accountable, inclusive, representative governance under law. In so doing, democratically empowered citizens globally – in defense of their own interests, protecting their own sovereignty – may become force multipliers in the defining normative competition of the coming century. They can help counter China and Russia as those countries seek to unapologetically shape norms within their own countries and internationally – where might makes right, elite corruption is tolerated if not encouraged, individual freedom is suppressed, information is controlled or manipulated, and strongman rule replaces rule of law.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Democracy is said to be in decline. But it is better understood to be under attack. From Myanmar to Belarus, Nicaragua to Hong Kong, Venezuela to Zimbabwe to Ukraine and beyond, millions of citizens in every corner of the globe continue to fight for their political rights and liberties even in the face of unspeakable violence. Those frustrated with the quality of their politics – including in troubled democracies – are seeking not less of a voice in political affairs but more. Not fewer rights and protections, but more. Not less democracy, but better democracy. And they’re looking for allies.</p> -<p>The pervasive threat from uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) on the modern battlefield, as demonstrated in Ukraine since 2022, Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and Syria since 2015, means that land forces and installations must be protected from the threat from persistent observation and strikes. The counter-UAS (C-UAS) mission, however, poses challenges to systems designed for traditional air and missile defence. One example of this mismatch in capability has been the relatively frequent shooting down of small UAS with multi-million-dollar air defence interceptors, such as when Israel was forced to down a UAS with a Patriot missile in 2017, or the use of Sea Viper/Aster 15 missiles to shoot down Houthi drones in the Red Sea in late 2023.</p> +<p>The good news is supporting democratic development is not financially costly and plays to America’s strengths. But some creativity and urgency in developing a coherent democracy support strategy is needed. Failing to do so while watching American adversaries shape global norms that conform to their illiberal model will have profound effects on U.S. and allied security.</p> -<p>The number of intermingled friendly and hostile UAS in any given area of operations, and the diversity of their forms and mission sets, means that acquiring C-UAS systems that can engage the full range of threat types and deploying them at all tactical echelons risks being cost prohibitive. However, each echelon of land forces must be protected. As Ukrainian air defence interceptors have become depleted to the point that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) could no longer afford to routinely use them to engage Russian reconnaissance UAS, the costs of not protecting each echelon have been illustrated by a great increase in Russian reconnaissance-strike activity throughout Ukraine’s operational depth. This has enabled extensive Russian targeting with ballistic missile and artillery strikes against critical Ukrainian assets, from aviation to artillery and (ironically) air defence systems, resulting in unsustainable attrition of those assets and materially worsening Ukraine’s operational position. The question for Western land forces, which this paper aims to address, is how to extend C-UAS coverage across the relevant tactical echelons within a manageable cost and personnel burden, and in a short period of time. C-UAS defence is a minimum requirement to operate sustainably on the battlefield today; it is a problem that cannot be left to be dealt with as part of an abstract “future force” concept.</p> +<p>In short, focusing only on the “three D’s” of U.S. foreign policy – defense, diplomacy and (economic) development – will be insufficient to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. A fourth “D” – democracy – must be added as the essential foundation for the rest.</p> -<p>This paper aims to set out an approach for providing a C-UAS capability across a deployed ground force. The need for a force-wide approach is not because destroying any particular UAS is difficult, but because optimising against this task comes at a significant cost in efficiency against other tasks within tactical formations. If a platoon, for example, must field both hard- and soft-kill C-UAS capabilities, it must expand in size, or its core vehicles will become significantly more expensive and complex to operate. This paper outlines the various detection, classification and engagement tools available, and an approach that allows C-UAS tasks to be federated at appropriate echelons so that any capabilities added to the force can be integrated efficiently in the context of operations against a peer adversary.</p> +<hr /> -<p>In developing the C-UAS approach hereafter outlined, this paper draws on the authors’ direct observations of the operation of all classes of UAS under exercise conditions, and a considerable proportion of UAS types under operational conditions in Ukraine and elsewhere. The authors have also spent time physically examining UAS and their resilience to electronic warfare (EW) and other C-UAS techniques. It was also necessary to observe the functioning and operation of a range of air defence systems, and to interview air defenders with experience of engaging UAS in a range of conflict zones, from Ukraine to Israel and Iraq. The authors also spoke to teams which had employed novel weapons technologies, such as directed energy weapons, on exercise and operations, to discuss the limitations and challenges of using these tools, and also the opportunities they offer.</p> +<p><strong>Michael J. Green</strong> is a non-resident senior adviser and Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and professor and CEO of the United States Studies Centre Sydney.</p> -<p>This is the second in a series of three papers examining the impact of UAS on modern operations. The first considered how land forces can best employ mass precision strike complexes using UAS. This paper focuses on countering the threat posed by these capabilities. The third will look at the impact of UAS on joint air-ground interactions.</p> +<p><strong>Derek Mitchell</strong> is a non-resident senior advisor with the Presidential Office and Asia Program at CSIS. Between 2018 and 2023, Ambassador Mitchell was president of the National Democratic Institute, a U.S.-based nonprofit, nongovernment organization dedicated to supporting democratic development worldwide.</p>Michael J. Green and Derek MitchellAuthoritarian states are targeting weaknesses in democratic governance to undermine U.S. interests across the globe. It is time for a bipartisan strategy that rallies alliances, business, and civil society actors in defense of democratic governance and human rights.China In Multilateral System2024-10-23T12:00:00+08:002024-10-23T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-multilateral-system<p><em>China is gaining influence within the international institutions that the United States has created, funded, and legitimized. China’s strategic positioning in multilateral bodies has allowed it to exert considerable influence, particularly within the UN system.</em></p> -<p>This paper has three chapters. Chapter I examines the challenges of detecting and classifying UAS and sharing this information as required among various elements. Chapter II explores the strengths and weaknesses of the various available categories of engagement and defeat mechanisms for UAS, to provide an overview of potential approaches. Chapter III examines what is likely to be needed to deploy a C-UAS complex across military echelons, to map at what echelon capabilities might be best integrated. The paper concludes with recommendations for the UK, as a typical NATO armed force, based on the analysis presented.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>It is necessary to briefly discuss definitions. UAS are also often referred to as drones, UAVs, remotely piloted air systems (RPAS), first person views ( FPVs), one way attacks (OWAs) and various other acronyms and designations that are used to refer to the same or sub-categories of capability. FPV relates to a navigational technique: specifically, one that requires active human control. OWA refers to a mission profile. UAV refers to the aircraft. RPAS and UAS both refer to systems: aircraft and their associated command-and-control (C2) systems and other enabling functions. Of these terms, UAS is the most widely recognised, and so this paper uses this term.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Although this paper concludes that the established categories of UAS “groups” are operationally unhelpful, the paper is largely concerned with UAS that fall between Group 1 and Group 3, that is from FPVs and small quad-/multi-copters up to lightweight fixed-wing uncrewed aircraft such as the Russian Orlan-10 (see Table 1), or heavier delta-wing Shahed-136 drones. The paper does not deal with larger medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) Group 4–5 UAS such as the MQ-9 Reaper or the RQ-4 Global Hawk. This is because, by dint of their speed, missions and operating altitude, these are targets for traditional air defence systems, rather than dedicated C-UAS assets. The cost of MALE UAS makes engagement by traditional air defence cost competitive in any case, such that they present a fundamentally different problem from the one explored in this paper.</p> +<p>The landscape of great power competition within multilateral institutions has significantly evolved over the past few decades, reflecting broader shifts in global power dynamics. The United States, historically dominant in these forums, now faces increasing competition from China and other emerging powers. Absent of a challenger, China is gaining influence within the international institutions that the United States has created, funded, and legitimized. China’s strategic positioning and substantial investments in multilateral bodies have allowed it to exert considerable influence, particularly within the United Nations system.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SPHDYyr.png" alt="image01" /> -<em><strong>Table 1: UAS Groups.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf?ver=2019-09-04-142255-657">US Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-30: Joint Air Operations”, 25 July 2021, validated 17 September 2021</a>, Figure III-14, p. III-31.</em></p> +<p>China’s approach includes placing its citizens in key leadership positions, increasing staffing, and boosting unearmarked financial contributions to multilateral institutions. This strategy not only enhances China’s influence over global policies but also promotes its development model and geopolitical interests in the Global South. Despite being the largest financial contributor to many international organizations, the United States has seen a relative decline in its influence, partly due to financial constraints, strategic missteps, and underrepresentation in staffing. Building on the 2021 CSIS report The Future of U.S. Leadership in Multilateral Development Institutions: A Playbook for the Next 10 Years, this policy brief presents recent trends regarding the Global South’s growing alignment with China and suggests ways for the United States to reclaim its influence within the multilateral system.</p> -<p>This paper focuses on land forces and to some extent also on the defence of installations of concern to air forces. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles and other such capabilities designed specifically for air combat are not covered, while uncrewed systems in the context of maritime operations present a substantively different problem, and so are also not covered by this paper.</p> +<h3 id="chinas-rising-influence-in-the-multilateral-system">China’s Rising Influence in the Multilateral System</h3> -<p>Finally, the AFU has found that it is useful to draw a clear doctrinal distinction between the defence of forces and the defence of territory, when it comes to C-UAS. Partly as a consequence, the AFU tends to consider countering enemy reconnaissance UAS as an entirely different function from countering long-range one-way-attack UAS. These distinctions make sense in relation to the problems confronting Ukraine. However, for a country like the UK, which must assume that it is operating in an expeditionary capacity, the force must be able to address all of these threats. Furthermore, there are critical pieces of territory to enable an expeditionary force that blur the Ukrainian distinction between protection of forces and territory. Finally, the distinctions between the UAS employed for these missions may converge over time, as is already occurring in the Middle East. For these reasons, this paper considers these issues as one problem set, even though this does not reflect current practice.</p> +<p>Multilateral institutions play a crucial role in collaborative governance and consensus building, reflecting broader shifts in global power structures. Since their inception nearly eight decades ago, the United States has maintained a preeminent norm-setting role in these institutions, leveraging its economic and political influence to shape international agendas and advocate for Western values. However, this influence has been steadily declining, coinciding with the rise of China as a formidable player on the global stage. At the same time, developing countries have demanded a greater voice in shaping these institutions in ways that are distinct from the priorities of both the United States and China.</p> -<h3 id="i-detect-and-identify">I. Detect and Identify</h3> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="box-1-exerting-influence-in-multilateral-organizations"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1. Exerting Influence in Multilateral Organizations</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The primary challenge that UAS present to traditional surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems is that as targets they are small, often slow, numerous, relatively cheap, and often operate at low altitude. Moreover, for a traditional target acquisition or fire control radar, opening the doppler gates to be able to see slow-moving UAS with small radar cross sections leads to a very cluttered display with a large number of false positive returns, greatly increasing the workload of the air defence crew. Furthermore, due to the short acquisition ranges possible against many small, low-flying UAS, the number of traditional radar systems needed to provide C-UAS coverage over any significant frontage makes relying on traditional active radar systems cost prohibitive, while proximity to the enemy would likely see these emitters destroyed in unsustainable numbers. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the first set of challenges in defeating UAS: how to affordably identify and classify them, how to discriminate friendly UAS from hostile ones, and how to distribute this information.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China has a track record of using multilateral institutions to promote its interests under the guise of the UN flag and in contravention of UN rules requiring agency heads to act as neutral international civil servants rather than agents of their home country.</code></em></p> -<h4 id="detection">Detection</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Under Chinese leadership, the International Civil Aviation Organization, which decides global flight paths and which airspace belongs to what countries, has excluded Taiwan from the organization.</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A UN whistleblower, a former employee of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), has alleged China’s use of intimidation of human rights defenders, bribery, and edited documents to remove mention of unflattering realities, such as facts about the origins of the Covid-19 virus and human rights abuses in China.</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In October 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted on whether to hold a debate on human rights violations against Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang after the OHCHR released an assessment that found evidence of serious abuses, including possible crimes against humanity. China managed to garner enough support to kill the resolution, with 19 votes against it, 17 in favor, and 11 abstentions. China successfully avoided further discussions and accountability for its human rights violations, including “mass arbitrary detention, widespread torture, sexual violence, coercive birth suppression, family separation, forced labor, and repression of religious and cultural practices in Xinjiang.”</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">By placing Chinese nationals in senior positions, China aims to boost the presence of Chinese tech companies, garner support for Chinese state-backed initiatives, and push the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s authoritarian norms. After being reelected unopposed as the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) secretary general, Houlin Zhao, whose previous experience includes developing telecommunications standards for the Chinese government, insisted that allegations of Huawei’s 5G equipment being used for espionage were baseless and politically motivated. Under the pretense of digital inclusion, the ITU touted its role in Huawei’s rollout of digital infrastructure in nearly 80 countries, impacting 90 million people in remote areas. Huawei is the same Chinese corporation responsible for developing and implementing surveillance technology, including facial recognition and a “Uighur alert” system, to enable China’s techno-authoritarian model of governance. The CCP leverages the United Nations’ specialized agency for digital technologies to push for authoritarian norms and sell its mobile network equipment and surveillance systems to train its own artificial intelligence. The ITU has adopted dozens of standards proposals from Chinese companies such as Huawei. The ITU’s standards are then adopted by developing countries that lack regulatory agencies of their own. that lack regulatory agencies of their own.</code></em></p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The first requirement for C-UAS capability is to ensure that multiple echelons within land forces, and force protection elements at fixed bases, have the capability to detect and track UAS. There are four primary methods for doing this:</p> +<p>China was largely uninvolved in the affairs of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations until the 1990s. Apart from issues relating to Taiwan, China rarely exercised interest or made voluntary contributions to the United Nations. China’s engagement increased rapidly once it started on the path toward globalizing its economy (see Box 1). China’s increasing influence in the United Nations has become evident through several trends:</p> <ol> <li> - <p>Active and passive radar systems that are specifically tailored for C-UAS detection and tracking.</p> + <p><strong>Competing for Leadership Positions:</strong> Through its leadership roles in multilateral forums, China promotes efforts that support its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), influencing global standards and practices in ways that favor its economic and political values and interests. Beijing has cultivated UN leaders, such as Secretary-General António Guterres, to champion the BRI and align it with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Under Chinese leadership, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has emphasized projects that dovetail with BRI objectives, raising concerns among Western leaders about China’s potential to undermine the integrity of multilateral institutions.</p> + + <p>In 2021, Chinese nationals led 4 of the 15 major UN specialized agencies: the FAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Additionally, China sought leadership of a fifth agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization, but that effort was successfully thwarted. Nevertheless, the leadership positions held by Chinese nationals in key agencies underscore China’s strategic positioning within the UN system and its intent to influence global policies and priorities in critical areas such as international development and technological advancement.</p> + + <p>African nations, as the largest regional bloc in the United Nations, with a 28 percent voting share, have played a crucial role in supporting China’s rise within multilateral institutions. A robust focus on Africa continues to pay dividends for China in multilateral fora, as evidenced by African support in electing Chinese nationals to the lead positions in four UN principal agencies, as well as securing deputy slots in nine others. African votes have also been pivotal in the passage of U.S.-opposed Chinese resolutions and increasing China’s representation within the UN Secretariat and various UN funds and programs, further solidifying Beijing’s influence.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Passive acoustic systems that are optimised for detecting the sound signatures of UAS propulsion systems and their flight.</p> + <p><strong>Increasing Its Personnel Footprint:</strong> China has strategically increased its presence within multilateral institutions by boosting staff numbers. The number of Chinese nationals employed by the United nations nearly doubled from 2009 to 2022, reaching 1,564 personnel in 2022. In tandem, China sponsored 32 UN junior professional officers (JPOs) and 590 other professional staff between 2015 and 2021, achieving rapid growth in just five years. To counterbalance China’s growing personnel footprint and increase the number of U.S. nationals in international organizations, the U.S. Department of State has made efforts over the past three years to publicize JPO vacancies in international institutions.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Passive radio frequency (RF) analysers that search for radio control signals and analyse them once isolated to provide an identification and location of the UAS and potentially the antennae of the UAS control station.</p> + <p><strong>Flexing Its Financial Muscle:</strong> Over the past decade, China has more than quadrupled its discretionary contributions to multilateral development institutions, including significant voluntary funding directed to multilateral development bank (MDB) concessional financing windows and specialized UN entities.China’s role in the World Bank has also expanded significantly since it joined in 1980. By 2013, it had become the third-largest shareholder in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank’s lending arm, with 5.03 percent of the voting power. This not only reflects China’s economic growth but also deliberate policy choices aimed at enhancing its global influence. China’s level of funding is still a fraction of that provided by the United States, but China has been able to mobilize this funding to advance national priorities in ways that the United States has not.</p> + + <p>China’s financial influence also includes substantial contributions to the World Bank’s International Development Association and specialized UN entities such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the World Food Programme, and UNICEF. In addition, within the UN system, China created the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund in 2016 with a $200 million contribution over 10 years, supporting peacekeeping, rapid response, and conflict prevention and mediation. It remains the only donor to this fund and has explicitly stated that the fund is intended to align the United Nations’ Agenda 2030 with the BRI. Additionally, in 2018, due in part to African lobbying, China placed an 8,000-strong standby force at the United Nations’ disposal for crisis deployment, and China is now the largest troop contributor among the UN Security Council’s permanent members.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Passive electro-optical (EO)/infra-red (IR) search-and-track systems that scan the sky for the visible shape and contrast signature of UAS.</p> + <p><strong>Leveraging New Institutions to Pursue Commercial Interests:</strong> To challenge the current global order, or to respond to what it sees as unfair treatment, China has established new multilateral organizations and partnerships, particularly with the Global South, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank, where it is the largest or co-largest shareholder and which exclude the United States. These institutions not only enhance China’s financial and strategic reach but also provide a platform for promoting its development model and policy preferences.</p> + + <p>The strategic engagement of Chinese firms in multilateral institutions further underscores China’s expanding influence. China’s ability to integrate its commercial interests with its strategic objectives has led to the prominence of Chinese firms in MDB contracts. In 2019 alone, Chinese firms won contracts worth $7.4 billion from major MDBs, representing 14 percent of total contracts by value. In recent years, Chinese firms have continued to rise to be the top or near-top recipients of contracts from MDBs. Between fiscal years 2013 and 2022, Chinese businesses were awarded around 20 percent of all contracts from the World Bank, positioning them as its top contract recipients. This dominance in procurement reflects institutional rules favoring the lowest bids and the substantial presence of Chinese firms in infrastructure sectors. China’s commercial benefits from these contracts align with its broader strategy of leveraging economic tools to gain political and strategic advantages within multilateral frameworks.</p> </li> </ol> -<p>Each of these detection and tracking approaches has its own advantages and drawbacks, such that forces will need a combination of them to reliably detect UAS. For any of them to be effective it is also necessary to have software able to process the relevant sensor returns.</p> - -<p>Active radar systems designed for C-UAS detection and tracking often operate in relatively high-frequency parts of the radar spectrum such as the X, Ku or even Ka-bands to ensure high resolution and rapid acquisition of small targets, but in some cases may operate in the somewhat lower frequency S-band to improve range performance for a given power output level. The flipside of detection range performance is the range at which enemy forces will be able to detect and conduct triangulation against the position of a C-UAS radar, with most active-radar systems being detectable by hostile sensors at 50% greater distances than their own functional detection range. A system designed for very short-range coverage that operates in the high-frequency bands will be difficult to detect for enemy systems that are not themselves close to the C-UAS radar in question. However, for longer-range systems, a core limitation of active radar as a primary sensor for C-UAS detection and tracking capability is the inherent requirement to transmit to perform their function. Crucially, this will often be at odds with the requirement to maintain emissions control (EMCON) to avoid giving away a unit’s position and inviting strikes cued in by hostile EW direction-finding and -ranging systems. For defending fixed sites such as airbases far from the frontlines, EMCON concerns will be more focused on electromagnetic deconfliction with other systems, rather than avoiding hostile detection and triangulation. Nevertheless, the operational lesson is that for C-UAS operations, active radar are better for fire control than for target acquisition, as the former requires short periods of illumination.</p> +<h3 id="chinas-strategic-engagement-with-the-global-south">China’s Strategic Engagement with the Global South</h3> -<p>Passive radar systems rely on detecting the energy reflected off targets from background sources of electromagnetic emissions such as television, WiFi or third-party active radar. To be effective they rely on accurate electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) surveys of the operating environment, although space-based EMS surveying renders this less of a challenge than has historically been the case. Modern techniques such as passive coherent location allow relatively high-resolution ranging and track information to be gathered, while remaining entirely passive and thus covert. Indeed, in an electromagnetically contested environment, passive systems have often been found to provide more reliable returns than active systems. These systems are likely to have limited capability in environments where there is comparatively little background “noise” in terms of emissions, such as in the Arctic, where population density is very low. However, in most scenarios, as demonstrated on exercise and operations, there is more than enough background emissions activity to ensure that passive radar systems can form a valuable part of C-UAS detection and tracking suites.</p> +<p>China’s strategy extends beyond merely filling top positions and personnel in the multilateral system; it actively shapes the norms and policies of these institutions to align with its broader geopolitical goals. More importantly, China presents itself as a developing country and leading advocate for the Global South.</p> -<p>Passive acoustic sensors rely on identifying the distinctive sound signature created by a UAS’s propulsion system and the interaction between its surfaces and the air. Although useable data can be obtained using cheap microphones, using this data requires the capacity to filter out false-positive detections and other background noise. Modern sound software makes the processing straightforward, but having a library of acoustic signatures and an algorithm that can distinguish between them is valuable intellectual property that is harder to generate and obtain. Major improvements in machine learning-enabled post-processing capabilities in recent years have driven a corresponding improvement in passive acoustic detection and limited tracking capabilities. The main limitations of acoustic sensors are the lack of ranging capability, since a single microphone can only provide bearing to a target; and that they have comparatively short range compared with radar and RF detection, or against targets with significant signature reduction features. As with RF capabilities, ranging can be achieved through multi-static triangulation. Acoustic sensors generally provide 2D tracking with too great a latency to guide fire control, but are incredibly cost efficient and reliable for target acquisition. The primary advantages of acoustic sensors are that they are completely passive and thus covert, requiring comparatively little electrical power and cooling capacity to operate, and that they can also provide additional capabilities such as shot detection and bearing for ground units.</p> +<p>Beijing has articulated a doctrine that places development and multilateralism at the forefront of Chinese foreign policy: “Big powers are the key, China’s periphery the priority, developing countries the foundation, and multilateral platforms the stage.” Through platforms such as the AIIB and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), Global South nations gain access to substantial economic aid, infrastructure development, and investment – critical for their development goals. China has had a long-standing relationship with the IsDB and, in recent years, established a partnership to assist bank members in constructing anti-pandemic infrastructure. China’s involvement provides these countries alternatives to Western-led financial institutions, often with more favorable terms and less-stringent conditions regarding governance and human rights standards.</p> -<p>Passive RF analysers are highly effective at detecting the presence of most reconnaissance and tactical UAS, because most classes of UAS receive or transmit data in one direction to perform their functions. For example, automatic navigation and target-recognition algorithms might enable a UAS to conduct ISTAR flights without the need for a real-time command-and-control signal from operators, but the UAS must still transmit to pass its ISTAR data back to ground stations, otherwise it cannot provide a real-time or close to real-time ISTAR function. With modern machine learning-enabled signal processing and analysis techniques, there are many RF analysis sensor solutions that can provide forces with a reliable means of at least detecting the presence of, and possibly also identifying or even locating, UAS within a tactical area.</p> +<p>Additionally, China’s diplomatic strategy includes steering nations toward its commercial sector. In recent years, China has significantly increased its presence in countries such as Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Djibouti, Venezuela, Laos, and others through strategic and significant foreign direct investment and foreign aid. Many of these countries now align themselves more closely with China’s geopolitical interests, resulting in diminished reliance on traditional Western partners, including the United States. Nations that engage in deals with China do not face consequences from the United States, even when the United States is a major donor or trading partner.</p> -<p>EO/IR scan and track systems rely on cameras searching the sky for points of contrast created by small UAS. Like acoustic sensors, they generally rely on powerful post-processing techniques to filter out false positives, both from lighting artefacts and from other flying objects, such as birds. They also rely on direct line of sight, although the same can be said of most of the other techniques here. The primary drawback of optical scan and track sensors is their comparatively short range and their vulnerability to rapid degradation in adverse weather conditions, such as fog, rain or dust, although UAS also perform poorly under these conditions. The benefits are that they are passive, consume limited power and cooling capacity, and can also incorporate ranging capabilities with an inbuilt laser that can be slewed on once a target has been detected. They can also support a weapons system to be slewed to engage a target and offer passive fire control.</p> +<p>China is actively using personal engagement to strengthen ties and leverage its position, often filling the vacuum left by U.S. neglect in various regions. In Africa, for example, where U.S. influence has been waning in recent years, China has maintained leading engagement among the continent’s central, eastern, and southern countries. In these regions, China fosters visits and interactions with senior security leaders across various sectors, including the army, air force, navy, and police, supporting Beijing’s strategic goals and agenda on the continent. China has also established 53 embassies in Africa – three more than the United States.</p> -<h4 id="classification">Classification</h4> +<p>Moreover, high-level visits have not been a regular feature of U.S.-Africa relations. However, the Biden administration has recently increased its focus on China, leading to more high-level engagements with African nations. In 2023, 17 cabinet members and leaders of U.S. government departments and agencies visited 26 African countries. Despite this uptick, these efforts pale in comparison to China’s sustained attention to Africa. For 33 years, Chinese foreign ministers have consistently made Africa their first stop in annual overseas travel, a standard practice so routine it garners no special media attention. Xi Jinping personally made 10 visits to Africa between 2014 and 2020.</p> -<p>Detecting that a UAV is present is a prerequisite for taking countermeasures, but it is insufficient for ensuring that the countermeasures adopted are appropriate. The appropriate response to the detection of a quadcopter that is conducting observation is different from the response required when a short-range loitering munition-type UAV, such as a Lancet-3M, is detected. Nor is the appropriate response to detecting the overflight of a long-range reconnaissance UAV, such as an Orlan-10, the same as detecting the overflight of a long-range OWA UAV, such as a Shahed-136. Classifying the activity being conducted and thus the threat posed is a vital step in any C-UAS capability.</p> +<p>As a result of these trends, China’s influence within multilateral institutions has profoundly shaped the positions and voting behaviors of Global South countries on key global issues. This influence became particularly evident through their voting patterns on critical matters such as the war in Ukraine, human rights violations, and the status of Taiwan.</p> -<p>For hostile aircraft, the traditional primary air defence approach involves first determining the type of aircraft, to infer the threat posed. An Su-35 Flanker, an Su-34 Fullback or an Il-22 Coot can be relatively safely assumed to be conducting certain mission sets based on their inherent capabilities, limitations and role within enemy doctrinal structures. Second, analysis of the aircraft’s detected heading, altitude and routing are also likely to provide a good indication of its current task. An Su-35 Flanker-M pair flying a racetrack pattern at high altitude inside their own airspace, for example, are likely to be conducting a defensive counter air patrol.</p> +<h4 id="russias-full-scale-invasion-of-ukraine">Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine</h4> -<p>By contrast, this type- and flight pattern-based approach is not nearly as reliable when seeking to classify the threat posed by UAS, and is likely to become less reliable as their employment proliferates. This is because the task performed by many types of UAS is variable, depending on the modules they carry, while their external form factors often are both relatively generic and also change frequently. Current approaches to classification within militaries tend to focus on the size, speed and altitude of the UAS, but this is problematic because these variables alone do not necessarily distinguish their mission or, therefore, the threat they pose. It is, in some cases, easy to associate airframe with task, but for many classes of UAS it is not a safe assumption. Classification needs, therefore, to be determined by comparing a wider range of characteristics, including a UAS’s electronic emissions, flight profile and silhouette. One of the most important classification criteria is to identify a UAS’s method for determining its location, or “self-localisation”. This is a particularly useful characteristic to assess because it provides not only insight into the likely mission of the UAS, but also data on how that mission can be disrupted.</p> +<p>Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many African, Asian, and Latin American countries have abstained from voting on resolutions condemning Russia’s actions. During the March 2022 emergency voting session on the “Aggression against Ukraine” resolution in the UN General Assembly, 17 African countries abstained from voting and an additional eight declined participation. This abstention reflects a diplomatic balancing act, influenced by economic and political ties with the West, China, and Russia. It demonstrates the nuanced positions these countries adopt to maintain favorable relations and avoid jeopardizing economic partnerships.</p> -<p>Emissions include the receipt of signals from a ground control station, the sending of signals to a ground control station or offboarding of data to a command post, or the emissions of sensors including radar, laser, light detection and ranging (LIDAR), and other sensor types. In most cases emissions can be monitored with a spectrum analyser. In combination with a flight profile, such emissions can confirm what a particular UAS is doing. For example, a UAS that is emitting consistently and is flying either at medium altitude or hovering in place for a sustained period is probably conducting ISR. A UAS that is emitting constantly but is flying on a determined course at low altitude is probably an FPV flying towards an identified target. A UAS that is not consistently emitting and is flying quickly at low or medium altitude with a consistent course is probably a OWA UAS flying to a pre-designated position. Some categories, such as autonomously guided OWA munitions, may not emit in this way, but in these cases they will generally fly in straight lines, turning at programmed waypoints – thus distinguishing them from a short-range reconnaissance UAV – and they may emit from the sensors necessary for their autonomous functioning. Flight profile can be determined by optical observation or acoustic or radar tracking to build up a picture of altitude, bearing and speed over time. Machine-learning algorithms can be used to build a library of recognised profiles and accelerate precise classification.</p> +<p>The abstentions and opposition to the resolutions against Russian aggression may reveal a growing assertiveness among countries of the Global South in shaping their foreign policies independently of traditional power blocs. Alternatively, the abstentions could be a reaction against what is seen as “the West” prioritizing a war in Europe over deadly conflicts in the Global South. The abstentions may also reflect countries’ unwillingness to involve themselves in a conflict that does not concern them. Regardless, this trend is indicative of a broader shift toward a multipolar world where Global South countries seek to assert their independence and protect their interests on the global stage.</p> -<p>Silhouette is best determined with EO/IR observation. In many cases the exact silhouette of a UAS can be compared against a database of previously observed UAS to determine its type. Where the exact type of UAS cannot be determined, the shape of the body and wing can often reveal its task. Designs such as the Russian Lancet 3 or the Iranian Missile 358, for example, have cylindrical fuselages like a missile, with multiple control surfaces that also provide lift in place of standard wings. This means that they can (and indeed, must) cruise at relatively high speeds and are very agile, but the configuration produces considerable drag, which limits their range and endurance for a given size.</p> +<h4 id="human-rights-violations">Human Rights Violations</h4> -<p>These designs are, therefore, typically associated with short-range strike tasks with some loiter time, rather than missions that require endurance, such as ISR. By contrast, long, high aspect ratio wings are much more appropriate for ISR, due to high cruising efficiency at slower speeds. A delta wing format is in some ways a middle ground that produces enough lift to enable more fuel and heavier warheads to be carried for a given airframe size, but at the cost of higher drag during cruise. This makes it the configuration of choice for many OWA UAVs, such as the Shahed 136. Quad- and multicopter designs are slightly more ambiguous in terms of the mission they are likely performing, although the silhouette of their payload is usually clear as it is carried externally, and so the threat they pose may be deducible by observation.</p> +<p>In addition, China’s influence extends to human rights issues, where many Global South countries align with China’s positions on sensitive topics such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong. During the 2022 vote on holding a Human Rights Council debate on human rights violations in Xinjiang, most African countries abstained or voted against the resolution in a show of support for China. This alignment stems from China’s extensive economic engagements and development assistance, which create an implicit expectation of political backing in international forums. China’s strategic investment and aid allow it to build a network of allies that support its positions in multilateral organizations.</p> -<p>Sound signatures are also a means of classifying specific UAS. The combination of the power unit, the propulsion system and the interaction of a UAS’s airframe with the air it displaces, all produce distinct sounds that when combined can produce a sufficiently unique pattern to allow accurate classification of a UAS. While automation of classification requires an extensive library and effective algorithm, human operators can often distinguish specific UAS types with limited training. Classification by sound has proven highly reliable. Where a new class or variation in build of UAS is detected, these features can also provide clear signals as to its task and thus the threat presented.</p> +<h4 id="status-of-taiwan">Status of Taiwan</h4> -<p>The methods UAS use for self-localising include Radio Frequency Line of Sight, paired Global Positioning and Inertial (GNSS/Inertial), and Beyond Visual Line of Sight radio and optical navigation, including simultaneous localisation and mapping, optical flow or visual odometry. Each of these navigational methods is optimised for different ranges and functions and is compatible with different tasks, aiding classification, but is also a critical dependency for the UAS in executing the task, meaning that if the navigational logic can be confirmed, an effective defeat mechanism can be paired with the target.</p> +<p>China’s influence also plays a critical role in issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly concerning Taiwan. Most Global South countries, influenced by their economic and diplomatic ties with China, not only profess adherence to the One China policy but go further by adopting Beijing’s preferred language of the “One China principle.” For example, Eswatini is the only African nation to recognize Taiwan. This diplomatic stance is crucial for China as it seeks to isolate Taiwan internationally. Support from these countries in international forums ensures that resolutions or statements potentially supportive of Taiwan rarely pass, consolidating China’s position and preventing any diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.</p> -<p>The sensors necessary to determine these considerations are generally the same as those required to detect the presence of a UAS. However, unlike detection, classification often requires the comparison of the returns from two or three sensors and the application of either judgement by the operator or, if automated, a logic engine attuned to prioritise threats to the force from objects according to their task once classified. This information is necessary to enable an appropriate defeat mechanism to be applied to each threat, and for threats to be engaged at both the appropriate echelon and in the right order. Where insufficient defeat mechanisms may be available, classification also provides the information to assess which threats from enemy UAS can be mitigated by passive measures, and which enemy UAS must be defeated, given that the threat they pose cannot be mitigated.</p> +<p>The alignment of Global South countries with China often results in the dilution of Western-led efforts to address issues such as human rights abuses, democratic governance, and territorial disputes. This shift complicates the balance of power within multilateral institutions, making it more challenging for Western nations to garner support for their initiatives. Consequently, this dynamic can lead to a fragmented international order where achieving consensus on critical global issues becomes increasingly difficult, impacting the effectiveness of global governance.</p> -<h4 id="discrimination">Discrimination</h4> +<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> -<p>One of the most prevalent challenges in C-UAS operations is the risk of fratricide. This can be fratricide of friendly communications and other capabilities. For example, during one exercise observed by the authors, a C-UAS system classified all personal radios worn by friendly troops in its area of regard as UAS and promptly collapsed all squadron communications. C-UAS capabilities are also very liable to destroy friendly UAS. During an operation observed by the authors, electronic protection from UAS similarly collapsed blue-force tracking across a divisional frontage, driving troops to have to revert to map-based navigation for a protracted period. In Israel, one of the authors observed how Israel Defense Forces had taken to shooting down both friendly and enemy UAS that flew over their units. Ukrainian and Russian air defences, meanwhile, have each accounted for a large proportion of their own larger UAS losses. Conversely, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps used the flight path of American UAS returning to a base in Jordan to fly a strike UAS to attack the base, with US air defenders presuming it to be friendly. The same method – following a known international flight path – enabled a UAS strike by the Houthis on Tel Aviv. The underlying problem is discrimination. The problems with discrimination of UAS arise from three causes:</p> +<p>The change in landscape discussed above may have initially caused some challenges, but it is time to reflect inward, assessing U.S. shortcomings in strategy and execution more than focusing on what others have done. An urgent mission objective for the United States and its allies should be to restore primacy in the multilateral system. Many of the actionable steps the United States can take toward reclaiming power ceded to China are connected and more complicated than they may appear, but they are critical to achieving foreign policy objectives through the multilateral system.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>There are too many UAS launched by too many separate units to enable precise blue-force tracking of them. This makes centralised deconfliction impracticable.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>UAS are sufficiently varied in shape and function, and simultaneously similar enough in silhouette and flight profile, to be difficult to differentiate in terms of who launched them.</p> - </li> +<ul> <li> - <p>The threat UAS may pose to those beneath them, either via direct strikes or observation leading to precision artillery strikes, leaves little time to discriminate.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<p>The solution to this problem should be federated by altitude, and by the type of UAS under discussion. For fixed-wing ISR UAS intended to operate at medium altitude, the fact that they fly above the range of most lower-echelon organic C-UAS effectors means that they do not need to be discriminated by those echelons. At the same time, these UAS are large enough and have enough power to be able to carry an encrypted transponder, which emits a pre-programmed signal when it receives a pre-programmed interrogative message. In this way, a system optimised for defeating these targets should be able to carry a capability to interrogate the target and, on receiving the appropriate electronic handshake, desist from targeting the system. Once a UAS has been shot down over enemy territory, there is a significant risk that the transponder will be captured. For this reason, the IFF (identification, friend or foe) signature would need to be updated to prevent hostile UAS from replicating it to avoid being intercepted, probably on a 24-hour basis. This approach is consistent with what is typically done with crewed aircraft.</p> - -<p>Such a solution is not viable for quadcopters and tactical UAS because most lack the payload and/or power storage to be fitted with an IFF transponder, and most of the capabilities that would passively detect and target them would not have an ability to interrogate a transponder. Here tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) must be used to avoid fratricide. For the company group, organically attached UAS can likely be protected by being controlled through the company mobile ad hoc network (MANET) that bears its tactical communications. Thus, UAS generated from within the company group would appear on blue-force tracking. Since these UAS would fly from and return to the company’s area of responsibility, this would present little problem. The challenge emerges when a battalion or UAS attached at battalion, or to support arms, flies UAS over company battlespace, since these capabilities will not be part of the company MANET and would saturate the capacity of the network if their integration was attempted.</p> + <p><strong>Establish priorities, align resources, and coordinate across U.S. missions.</strong></p> -<p>For OWA capabilities, the indication to friendly forces on their route of advance as to their time and course should allow for C-UAS teams to accurately discriminate. For ISR UAS, the problem with such an approach is that they must also overfly friendly positions en route back from a mission, and if subjected to jamming, may endeavour to autonomously return to the base station on an unplanned route. For these capabilities, it may make sense for the flight plan to include a point at which it traverses the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT)/Forward Line of Enemy Troops. On the outbound portion, deconfliction can be by warning to the unit occupying the battlespace. For the return portion, it may make sense for the UAS to emit a signal once it has crossed the FLOT – with the appropriate signal being determined by the sensors available to C-UAS systems – to indicate that it is friendly. As these emissions would likely be detectable by the enemy, they would need to be updated regularly, likely with a predistributed schedule of emissions given once per day, with a new signal per hour. Since the UAS would not have the schedule but would have the signal relevant to when they are flying, if the enemy captured one or monitored the signal, they could not then use it on their own UAS within the period of that signal being relevant. This would not be an entirely reliable system, but it would reduce friendly shoot-downs.</p> + <p>To regain leadership in international organizations and counter China’s growing influence, the United States should establish regular communication channels between U.S. representatives at international organizations, relevant home bureaus at the State Department, and U.S. country missions worldwide. This will help the United States better understand the domestic environments and specific needs of Global South countries, enabling it to build support in capitals for its preferences, address reasons for their alignment with China, and strengthen bilateral and multilateral relationships.</p> -<h4 id="distribution-and-cueing">Distribution and Cueing</h4> + <p>Improving interagency cooperation within the U.S. government is another crucial step for achieving foreign policy goals and enhancing overall diplomatic effectiveness. Utilizing integrated digital platforms for communication and management of policy implementation, which allow for real-time sharing of data and insights, can significantly improve interagency workflow and efficiency.</p> -<p>Once a UAS has been detected and identified as hostile, the next stages required for any C-UAS effect are to communicate that information to other assets within and potentially beyond the unit in the affected area of operations. This is primarily important for cueing C-UAS effectors and/or additional sensors onto the detected threat if that is required to obtain a weapons-grade track. It is also important to pass the information to the rest of the unit(s) in the vicinity to allow them to adjust activity according to the category of UAS threat detected. This is a critical requirement to minimise risk to the force and buy time for C-UAS effectors to be brought to bear.</p> + <p>However, enhanced communication and coordination are meaningless without established priorities. The United States should develop a priority list of top multilateral issues for missions to focus on. This prioritization will help guide missions in addressing the most pressing global challenges and ensure that U.S. efforts are concentrated where they will have the greatest impact. This approach will enable the United States to effectively mobilize resources, advocate for key initiatives, and foster partnerships that align with its values and interests, countering the influence of other major players such as China in the Global South. Matching resources and communication channels to prioritizations will prevent wasted political capital and maximize the weight of influence wielded in multilateral organizations.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Invest in the diplomatic corps.</strong></p> -<p>The communication of information to effectors for cueing can be simple or complex depending on the way that the C-UAS capability has been integrated into the force. If the sensors and effectors are concentrated on dedicated vehicles, hand-off between initial detection, track and discrimination sensors and systems to effectors can potentially take place on the same vehicle or at least within a small subset of those within a given unit. On the other hand, if detection relies on a distributed array of sensors such as multi-static passive radar arrays or acoustic sensor arrays mounted on multiple vehicles throughout a unit, then the communications links between them and any effector will need to be complex, resilient and low latency.</p> + <p>The United States should prioritize developing personal relationships with political leaders and decisionmakers to enhance its soft power in international diplomacy. This means prioritizing a personal, on-the-ground presence to build relationships and understand the interests and needs of other nations. These relationships are crucial, as they often influence decisions and ensure diplomats remain well informed through regular information sharing. The United States is already moving in this direction by opening new embassies in Pacific Island nations such as Tonga and Kiribati, demonstrating a commitment to foster closer ties. However, more needs to be done on this front.</p> -<p>For passive sensors that cannot produce high-resolution track data, which includes acoustic, some passive radar and most RF analysers, producing a track suitable for weapon guidance will require cueing on a secondary sensor that can generate the required track resolution. For most relatively short-range C-UAS tasks, the simplest solution is to use the azimuth data provided by passive sensors to cue on a sensor ball with a high-resolution EO/IR camera and integral laser rangefinder. Non-dedicated C-UAS optics, such as those found in sensor balls on remote weapon stations (RWS) or turret-mounted optical suites, should be able to relatively easily acquire UAS within several kilometres once provided with an accurate bearing to search, and ideally a rough range and speed of travel.</p> + <p>The United States should also prioritize improving training and providing incentives for diplomats to gain experience in multilateral institutions, with a focus on refining diplomacy skills. Training programs should be enhanced to include comprehensive modules on modern diplomacy, incorporating digital literacy, strategic communications, and crisis management.</p> -<p>Alternatively, active fire control radar systems such as those that provide ranging, speed and bearing data for self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (SPAAGs) or for missile cueing and guidance for SAM systems can be cued onto targets detected by wide area systems. The information that needs to be passed for cueing such systems does not need to be track-quality high-resolution data, but merely enough to enable those SPAAG and SAM systems to engage with minimal radar illumination times by only having to search a limited scan volume to acquire the target.</p> + <p>The United States is currently undergoing a major overhaul in its approach to training diplomats, making more training a career requirement and developing additional courses for diplomats at all career stages. The U.S. Congress has also mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2024 that training related to multilateral diplomacy be included and strengthened. This action recognizes that incentives, such as career advancement opportunities, financial rewards, and recognition, should be provided to encourage diplomats to take on challenging assignments within multilateral institutions.</p> -<h3 id="ii-engagement-and-defeat">II. Engagement and Defeat</h3> + <p>Establishing a multilateral “cone” for diplomats should be a part of the training overhaul. By having an entire portion of officers specializing in this niche of foreign affairs, diplomats will become knowledgeable of processes unique to these systems and will have already formed valuable personal relationships with diplomats from other countries in the same field. Formalizing a multilateral track within the Foreign Service would produce stronger personnel in vital roles within the multilateral system.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Leverage technology and data.</strong></p> -<p>Once a UAS has been detected, classified and identified, the force must apply the appropriate countermeasure to defeat it. Understanding the options and their various advantages and dependencies allows a force to field an appropriate array of options for protecting itself from UAS. This chapter therefore explores how UAS can be defeated in their mission through the targeting of their sensors, communications and navigation, and their enablers, or by physically destroying them.</p> + <p>The United States should leverage advanced technology and data management systems to improve coordination and strategic decisionmaking in multilateral forums. As diplomacy increasingly demands data-driven insights, integrating technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and big data analytics will enable the United States to process and analyze vast amounts of information swiftly and accurately, identify patterns, predict trends, and respond to emerging issues more effectively.</p> -<h4 id="sensor-defeat">Sensor Defeat</h4> + <p>Incorporating these technologies can significantly enhance various diplomatic functions. For instance, AI can sift through social media data to conduct sentiment analysis, allowing diplomats to gauge public opinion and measure the impact of their diplomatic efforts. Big data analytics can also aid in negotiations by removing bias and developing possible scenarios, providing diplomats with a strategic edge. By ensuring continuity and efficiency, information can easily be passed from outgoing to incoming representatives, preventing years of work from being wasted.</p> -<p>With the exception of GNSS-guided OWA systems, almost all UAS require functional sensors to pose a threat to forces or installations. Thus, one of the core approaches that can be taken as part of C-UAS defence is to temporarily or permanently degrade the sensors used by UAS that are operating in the vicinity of friendly assets.</p> + <p>In 2021, the State Department released its first-ever enterprise data strategy, Enterprise Data Strategy – Empowering Data Informed Diplomacy, marking a significant step in the department’s shift toward a data-centric approach. This strategy aims to equip the department’s workforce with timely, data-driven insights crucial for making important mission and management decisions. Since 2021, U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken has pressed to hire hundreds of data specialists and to build collaboration with the “policy” bureaus in what the State Department calls “Data Informed Diplomacy.” The State Department is now in the midst of deploying AI and considering the range of tasks where it can be of use, as Blinken discussed publicly in late June 2024.</p> -<p>Success is heavily contingent on being able to accurately determine the activity that a given UAS is conducting, and thus on what sensors it is likely to rely. As discussed in Chapter I, there are multiple potential methods that can be used, but the critical thing for the success of any sensor defeat effector is that the effector in question receives the data as quickly as possible.</p> + <p>By investing in data analysis initiatives, equipping diplomats with the necessary skills, and fostering a data-centric culture, the United States can enhance its strategic capabilities. This approach will not only improve coordination and information sharing among U.S. diplomatic missions and international organizations but also offer a compelling alternative to the authoritarian models promoted by China.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Prioritize strategic engagement with influential UN members.</strong></p> -<p>Since a substantial proportion of hostile UAS activity will be either ISTAR-type missions or FPV attack missions, the capability to blind optical sensor suites is critical for C-UAS approaches that rely on sensor defeat. Retroreflector technology using lasers to detect the reflected returns from lenses has seen extensive use in recent conflicts, including in Ukraine, and offers the potential to rapidly pinpoint and then dazzle or even permanently damage hostile optics. While this has until recently primarily been used to counter snipers and anti-tank guided missile teams and to degrade vehicle optics on the ground, if cued by an appropriate detection system, such technology can be used in the C-UAS role. Furthermore, the power requirements for a laser capable of dazzling sensitive optics are far lower than for more ambitious laser C-UAS systems, which aim to shoot down UAVs. This means that systems with retroreflector and laser dazzle capacity can be much smaller and relatively cheap, and have a much greater magazine depth for a given space, weight and power installation. This in turn means that optical sensor defeat capabilities are more feasible than many other C-UAS effector solutions for use by forward forces at low echelons close to the frontlines. This approach has a proven track record on defensive counter-aid suites for crewed platforms. However, if a system does not have sufficient power to permanently damage the optics of a hostile UAS, its sensor-defeat capacity will only last for as long as the operator can maintain direct line of sight to the target. Thus, for lower-powered systems, it would be necessary to have numerous effectors across the frontage held by a unit to ensure effective coverage, whereas for more powerful systems, a smaller number might be sufficiently effective. Another issue with relying on this capability in isolation is that cameras can be protected from retroreflective detection.</p> + <p>Prioritizing engagement with influential countries in the United Nations can help the United States build strategic alliances and regain leadership in international organizations. By understanding and addressing the unique interests and needs of these countries, the United States can foster stronger bilateral and multilateral relationships, thereby enhancing its diplomatic influence.</p> -<p>Passive defeat approaches are also important to consider. For example, against FPV-type direct attack UAS or loitering munitions, such as Lancet-3M, which use either EO or IR sensors for terminal guidance, using smoke as an obscurant can be highly effective if the unit being targeted can be warned promptly about the presence and likely category of incoming threat. Even for future systems that are likely to use AI and/or machine learning, and enabled automatic target selection and terminal guidance to avoid the need for a vulnerable connection to a human operator, the use of obscurants should remain highly effective if triggered in time. “Hot smoke” compounds that give a sufficient thermal signature and can effectively blind IR sensors as well as EO ones are an obvious choice given the versatility they offer against multiple types of hostile UAS/munitions. Smoke launchers are already a core component of the defensive systems on most main battle tanks, and given the increasing prevalence of UAS and loitering munition threats, could and probably should be mounted on a wider range of vehicles throughout most formations. The critical determinant of whether such systems can form a reliable part of sensor-defeat C-UAS approaches will be the communications architecture to enable the detect, track and classify functions of the sensor and processing layers to pass real-time and accurate warnings to the forward elements under attack with a sufficiently low false-positive rate. Finally, UAS can have their effectiveness reduced using multispectral camouflage and overhead protection on fighting positions, such that it requires much longer times on target to locate units and distinguish targets.</p> + <p>Understanding the objectives of others helps the United States to be a better partner. For instance, Brazil seeks to lead initiatives focused on revitalizing multilateral organizations such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and the India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum. Brazil has also been advocating for UN Security Council reform to gain a permanent seat. By supporting these efforts, the United States can align with Brazil’s strategic goals, promoting cooperation on regional stability, economic development, and social progress. Additionally, Brazil is a key player in environmental issues and sustainable development, particularly given its stewardship of the Amazon rainforest. Collaborating on environmental issues could strengthen U.S.-Brazil relations while contributing to global climate goals.</p> -<h4 id="soft-kill">Soft Kill</h4> + <p>Similarly, involving Pakistan in dialogues about security, counterterrorism, and economic development can also open new avenues for cooperation and reinforce the United States’ commitment to stability in South Asia. The International Monetary Fund recently approved a $7 billion loan to Pakistan. Pakistan plays a key role in regional security, especially concerning the situation in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Pakistan is a significant participant in China’s BRI, with projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. By addressing Pakistan’s economic development needs and offering alternative partnerships, the United States can counterbalance China’s influence and strengthen bilateral ties.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Increase U.S. leadership and staffing in multilateral organizations.</strong></p> -<p>For ISR UAS there is a requirement to offboard sensor data for them to achieve their mission, whether they are remotely piloted or autonomous systems. There is also usually a requirement for them to receive intermittent commands to fly to or orientate their sensors towards and orbit points of interest. There can be significant levels of automation in flight, but periodic receipt of data is generally necessary. The prevention of an ISR UAS from receiving such instructions can in many cases drastically limit its utility. If the data it is gathering cannot be offboarded, this is even more problematic, as the latency introduced if the data can only be recovered upon landing means that its value is greatly diminished. The easiest method for preventing an ISR UAS from achieving its mission therefore is simply to apply jamming against the receiver to sever its ability to receive instructions. In many cases this will cause the UAS to return to its base station and therefore end its mission. A similar approach can be effective against short-range FPVs. Jammers, however, are vulnerable to direction finding and strike, such that jammers cannot be used continuously unless the effect is passed between several that have been distributed.</p> + <p>As recommended in the 2021 CSIS report, actively advocating for U.S. candidates in leadership positions within multilateral organizations is essential for advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives and fostering cooperation on shared challenges. The United States must identify and develop qualified U.S. candidates with extensive experience and a deep understanding of international affairs.</p> -<p>Autonomously navigating UAS, either because they have lost contact with a control station or because they are strike systems following a pre-programmed route, must still have a method for accurately tracking their own position during flight. The same is true for future UAS systems with much greater levels of autonomy leveraging AI. This can be done through GNSS, sensors such as LIDAR or optical terrain contour-matching, inertial navigation, simultaneous localisation and mapping, optical flow or visual odometry. Usually, it will be a combination. Localised jamming or spoofing of GNSS signals can often achieve a soft kill against simpler systems, as can damage or interference with the onboard sensors of UAS through electronic attack. For example, if the navigation system of a UAS can be spoofed to indicate that it is flying above its actual altitude, it can be induced to execute a controlled flight into terrain. If a UAS is forced by the denial of GNSS to rely on inertial navigation for a sustained period, it can be brought significantly off target over time through drift. Even a relatively limited positional error induced in hostile ISTAR UAS, in particular, can lead to them passing inaccurate target coordinates to long-range strike systems, protecting the observed formation and wasting enemy precision munitions.</p> + <p>Public endorsements from high-ranking officials, such as the secretary of state, can significantly enhance the visibility and credibility of these candidates. For example, the early endorsement of Doreen Bogdan-Martin for the ITU secretary-general position by the State Department and USAID administrator Samantha Power highlighted a forward-looking strategy that should be emulated. Furthermore, the groundwork for Bogan-Martin was laid years prior under the Trump administration with a successful deputy secretary-general campaign, followed by strong efforts to clear the campaign field so that it was only the U.S. candidate running against Russia’s Rashid Ismailov.</p> -<p>There are more specialised forms of soft kill. If encryption keys for a UAS have been identified, either from captured UAS or from poor drills for key distribution by the enemy, or if a UAS receives data via certain channels, it becomes possible to conduct either a protocol-based electronic attack or cyber attack against the system. This can, for example, alter what is shown on a video feed to push false information back to the base station. Alternatively, it could hijack the UAS and force it to land somewhere harmless, enabling recovery and exploitation. These capabilities are more specialised than routine jamming and require dedicated operators with access to intelligence. These techniques are also opportunistically available, rather than persistently dependable.</p> + <p>Such diplomatic efforts are vital in garnering support for U.S. candidates. Utilizing diplomatic channels, including embassies and international forums, to lobby for U.S. candidates is critical. Focusing on organizations where leadership positions are becoming vacant and where U.S. strategic interests are most significant – such as the ITU, International Maritime Organization, FAO, and World Bank – is essential. Collaborating with like-minded countries to counterbalance undemocratic competitors’ influence and maintaining engagement with organizations, even if U.S. candidates are not elected, will further secure U.S. interests.</p> -<p>None of the forms of soft kill outlined above are guaranteed methods for defeating a UAS. One way to make jamming data transfer difficult, for example, is for a UAS to communicate on two non-adjacent frequencies, which hop, and to compare the message received on each. If one differs from the other, a third frequency is used and compared to the existing frequences to determine which is genuine, and then the false one is closed off. If the frequencies can be hopped quickly, it requires a very capable jammer to reliably track and defeat the signal. Similarly, a UAS that has an eight-element antenna for GNSS can receive signals on multiple navigational frequencies and compare them, and can compare the alignment of received signals, such that effectively denying GNSS requires specialised equipment and operators. While such specialised capabilities can be fielded, they cannot be available across all echelons and so where such bespoke jamming is held must be carefully prioritised.</p> + <p>In addition, seconding staff to key UN agencies allows for the development of relationships with counterparts from other countries, fostering networks that can be leveraged to support U.S. initiatives and candidates for leadership positions. Such positions provide an opportunity to build a cadre of U.S. experts experienced in multilateral settings, improving the United States’ ability to navigate and influence these organizations in the long term. These seconded positions should be targeted toward strategic UN roles that align with U.S. foreign policy objectives and areas of interest.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Invest in economic development to complement diplomatic efforts.</strong></p> -<p>That soft kill can be overcome across much of the front does not mean that it lacks utility. What the proliferation of soft kill capabilities achieves is that it significantly raises the sophistication and quality requirements for hostile UAS to enable them to successfully prosecute missions. This reduces the frequency and volume of the threat and requires the enemy to be more careful to avoid losing their UAS. UAS that have been designed with more costly and capable features to make them resistant to soft kill techniques are not necessarily any more survivable against hard kill approaches. By reducing the number that must be intercepted, soft kill capabilities make it more economical to conduct hard kill defence and reduce the risk of hard kill systems being saturated. Soft kill defences can also be more easily made persistent and can have a wide-area effect. Historically, the need for dedicated EW systems to deliver soft kill made it difficult to have such capabilities available across all echelons. However, today, the emergence of software-defined systems means that with the right programming and the right antenna, most tactical communications systems can be repurposed to deliver EW effects. Thus, it can be characterised as an opportunity, rather than an opportunity cost, to equip the force with useful soft kill C-UAS capabilities.</p> + <p>Investing in economic development abroad is crucial for the United States to maintain its leadership role in the international arena and address global challenges effectively. By strengthening development efforts, the United States enhances its ability to shape international norms and standards. In this context, Africa emerges as a critical region where increased U.S. engagement can yield significant geopolitical and economic benefits. One critical aspect is increasing the frequency of visits by senior U.S. government officials and commercial officers to African countries, which can address mutual interests and foster stronger bilateral relationships.</p> -<h4 id="hard-kill">Hard Kill</h4> + <p>Enhancing trade and investment is another critical aspect. Reauthorizing initiatives such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act promotes stronger trade ties between the United States and African nations by offering African countries better access to the U.S. market and encouraging economic growth.</p> -<p>Physical destruction of UAS can be achieved via various means, each of which has implications in terms of efficiency, cost and enablement. The three broad means of destruction are gunfire, manoeuvring interceptors and directed energy.</p> + <p>Maintaining strategic dialogue with key African regional organizations, such as the African Union, is also crucial for fostering collaborative relationships and understanding regional priorities and challenges. This dialogue can lead to more effective cooperation on issues such as security, development, and governance, aligning U.S. and African interests.</p> -<p><em>Gunfire</em></p> + <p>By committing to a more robust and consistent diplomatic presence, the United States can build long-term partnerships and counter China’s influence. This approach will not only support U.S. foreign policy objectives but also contribute to the stability and prosperity of developing regions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Promote modernization in the UN System.</strong></p> -<p>For most military forces, adapted existing small- and medium-calibre cannon mounted on vehicles represent the most obvious potentially available distributed C-UAS effectors. While it is a near-universal response of troops who observe UAS to shoot at them with whatever weapons are available, the fact is that UAS represent a difficult target set. Most are small and can move erratically in three dimensions, and accurately estimating their range from a shooter is difficult to do visually. Effectiveness even with standard rifles can be improved by providing some soldiers with specialist C-UAS sights that help calculate distance and speed and provide an aiming cue for the shooter. Shotguns have also had limited success as a last-ditch defence against Lancet series loitering munitions and FPV attacks in Ukraine. However, relying on soldiers as a significant layer in C-UAS defence is a terrible strategy because of the inherently low probability of kill, and the fact that soldiers have other important tasks to carry out.</p> + <p>The United States should prioritize modernization and reform efforts within multilateral forums to ensure these institutions remain relevant and effective in addressing global challenges. As a major contributor to the UN budget, the United States has a vested interest in ensuring that funds are used appropriately. The United States should advocate for various reforms:</p> -<p>As a rule, the base requirement for more reliable gunfire-based C-UAS effects is a system with either optics containing a laser rangefinder or a fire control radar system that can provide an accurate slant range and speed estimate for a precise firing solution. RWS can and should be used for this task. Dedicated anti-aircraft systems, such as the highly effective German-made Gepard SPAAG, also feature the capability to programme each shell to detonate as it reaches the target vicinity. This enables specialist anti-aircraft cannon ammunition to provide a blast-fragmentation effect to greatly increase the likelihood of critical damage to UAS and even cruise missiles with only short bursts of fire. The effectiveness of .50 BMG and 12.7-mm or 14.5-mm systems could also be improved with specialist ammunition, though even with standard ball, appropriately modified RWS can achieve kills against UAS with single shots. The major downside of dedicated SPAAGs as C-UAS effectors is that they are relatively expensive and specialised vehicles that represent a significant opportunity cost to acquire, and an additional logistical burden on units to which they are assigned.</p> + <ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Investing in the Latest Digital Tools and AI:</strong> Modernizing with the latest digital tools and AI is crucial for streamlining data sharing, analyzing global trends, and predicting crises. Such technological advancements can enhance the ability of multilateral organizations to respond swiftly and effectively to emerging issues under U.S. leadership.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Enhancing Transparency and Accountability:</strong> This can be achieved through regular independent audits, public reporting of financial statements, and encouraging whistleblower protections within the United Nations.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Supporting Security Council Reform:</strong> Advocating for the inclusion of new permanent seats for African and Latin American countries will help better reflect global power shifts. Reform to the UN Security Council regarding the permanent members is unlikely to be significant due to ongoing regional competition. Conflicts such as Brazil versus Mexico, Japan versus China, and the challenge of selecting a single African country for a permanent seat make substantial changes improbable. Instead, any changes that occur will remain at the margins, reflecting incremental adjustments rather than comprehensive reform. Additional proposals, such as expanding the G7 to include Australia, South Korea, and the European Union, have been put forward to form a “formal Democracies 10,” or D10, that would promote coordinated actions among democracies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Reforming the Human Rights Council:</strong> The current incentive structure allows bad actors to seek Human Rights Council membership to pursue their own immunity and protect fellow violators. There are no negative consequences for countries with low human rights standards sitting on the council. This is unacceptable. There must be increased accountability for those with poor marks on the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Reviewing UN Procurement Policies:</strong> This ensures fair contract distribution, preventing a disproportionate allocation to countries such as China. Although China may not win the majority of UN contracts, its success rate appears higher compared to others, similar to its performance with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. This trend highlights the need for more transparent and equitable procurement practices within the United Nations to maintain a balanced and fair competitive environment for all participating countries.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Introducing Clear Performance Metrics:</strong> Regular evaluations of UN agencies are essential to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations. The United States can support these efforts by advocating for the definition of key performance indicators, conducting regular impact assessments, and implementing feedback mechanisms involving beneficiaries and stakeholders.</p> + </li> + </ul> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Pay late dues and leverage funding in the future.</strong></p> -<p>However, the upside is that not only can they be equipped with heavier calibre cannon with a greater rate of fire than other medium-armoured vehicles, but they also generally come equipped with their own dedicated detect/classify/discrimination sensor suite to cue on their weapons. They can also provide devastating firepower against dismounted enemy infantry and lightly armoured vehicles in a ground-support role, and are much more capable against hostile aircraft, missiles and attack aviation than many other dedicated C-UAS effectors.</p> + <p>The United States should address the recurring issue of late payments to the United Nations. This may require paying double in one year to rectify the situation when Congress approves the following year. The Chinese Communist Party does not have the same appropriations process as the U.S. Congress. In pursuit of enabling the secretary of state, a designee of the secretary, or the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations to do their job from a position of strength, rather than constantly playing catch-up, an effort to reconcile the currently incongruent fiscal cycles of the U.S. government and the United Nations would be a worthy endeavor.</p> -<p>Most modern general purpose armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) designs also include the option for a gyrostabilised 25–40 mm rapid firing cannon armament, mounted either in a turret or in an RWS, with EO/IR optics, laser range finding and programmable ammunition. Thus, if provided with suitable air burst ammunition, and specified with the requisite elevation for the gun, there is clear potential to adapt regular AFVs relatively easily to provide a significant degree of C-UAS effector capacity for land formations in a package that otherwise retains its full utility as a regular AFV. Without specialised sensor suites for detecting and classifying UAS themselves, regular AFVs with suitably specified turret/RWS armament would still need to have their optics cued onto a rough target bearing by offboard detection systems.</p> + <p>Resolving late payments in Congress should be paired with empowering the secretary of state with clearer, more subjective control over the funds to establish greater diplomatic leverage at their disposal. To be clear, leveraging finances is a separate issue from paying dues on time, but the goal should be to have nothing potentially tainting the authority or credibility of the United States. As it now stands, U.S. diplomats have little to no flexibility in both authority and resource allocation to effectively administer repercussions for bad actors.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Two significant drawbacks of cannon-based C-UAS effectors are ammunition consumption and limited range. Both are linked to the calibre of the system chosen. Higher calibre guns will be able to engage UAS out to longer ranges and at higher altitudes, but will also be able to carry fewer ready rounds within each vehicle, and rounds will be more expensive and bulky to transport from a sustainment point of view. Even relatively large calibre rapid-fire cannon such as the British Army’s 40-mm Cased Telescope Armament System would still be unable to reliably engage ISR UAVs, such as the Russian Orlan-10, at maximum cruising altitudes of 16,000 ft. In other words, while cannon-based effectors can provide a significant volume of effective close-range C-UAS capability if provided with the correct cueing, specialist ammunition and sensors, the requirement to also have a missile, directed-energy or interceptor-UAS system to cover the medium-altitude ISTAR part of the UAV threat spectrum would not be removed.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p><em>Interceptors</em></p> +<p>The United States cannot abandon its leadership role in the United Nations and other multilateral institutions despite legitimate criticisms of their performance, transparency, and oversight. The United States must “ride herd” on the multilateral system. To counterbalance China’s growing influence, the United States must enhance communication and coordination across its diplomatic missions, invest in training and incentives for its diplomats, leverage advanced technology and data, and prioritize personal diplomacy. Strengthening partnerships with influential UN members and increasing U.S. leadership in multilateral organizations are also critical. Additionally, promoting modernization and accountability within multilateral forums can ensure these institutions remain effective and aligned with democratic values.</p> -<p>The most common currently fielded form of manoeuvrable interceptors for C-UAS tasks are shoulder-fired man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) such as the FIM-92 Stinger, which employ an IR/UV (heat-seeking) passive head to acquire and guide the weapon in on the hotter engine components of larger UAS. There are three core drawbacks to such systems for C-UAS defence. First, they have limited effective range, which prevents them from engaging medium-altitude ISTAR UAVs, such as Orlan-10. Second, they are much more expensive than small UAS or even than many medium-sized UAS, and so are not necessarily a sustainable answer to massed threats. Third, they are not suitable for engaging small UAS and FPV attack drones, as these electrically powered systems are too small and do not produce a viable heat signature to gain a lock.</p> +<p>Implementing these recommendations is crucial for the United States to regain and sustain its influence, especially in the Global South. This region is becoming an increasingly significant arena in the great power competition between the United States and China, with its large voting blocs and strategic partnerships. For the next U.S. administration, prioritizing these actions will be essential to countering China’s growing dominance and ensuring that U.S. values and interests are upheld in the international arena.</p> -<p>Traditional SAM systems designed for anti-aircraft or missile defence tasks are also not well suited for C-UAS work, primarily because they are generally too large, expensive and overstretched relative to air and missile defence requirements to be sustainably used to engage even medium-sized UAVs. Second, radar-guided SAM systems use Doppler gates to filter out returns from static or slow-moving objects to reduce clutter, which also means that many systems struggle to reliably detect and track UAS that are hovering or moving at slow speeds. However, the upside of SAM systems compared with cannon or EW-based effectors is range, and therefore defensive coverage potential. If cued in by connected sensors, a launcher can also potentially engage UAVs that are beyond line of sight, further increasing the area that can be protected by a given number of launch systems.</p> +<p>In this era of great power competition, it is imperative for the United States to adapt and reinforce its leadership within multilateral institutions. By doing so, the United States can better address global challenges, promote sustainable development, and maintain a balanced international order. Taking a proactive stance will enable the United States to effectively navigate the complexities of global diplomacy and secure a leading role in shaping the future of international relations.</p> -<p>Due to the far lower travel speed of UAVs compared with the aircraft and missiles that SAM systems are typically designed to engage, the ideal size of a C-UAS SAM is significantly smaller and can thus be cheaper and carried in larger numbers for a given volume. One promising option for SAM systems that are better suited to engaging ISTAR UAVs is the adaptation for ground launch of existing missiles designed for within-visual-range combat for air forces. One example is the British AIM-132 Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM), designed for use on RAF Typhoon fighters, which has successfully been adapted for cueing and launch by ground vehicles in the C-UAS role in Ukraine. While the range achievable will be significantly shorter than when launched from a fighter aircraft, when intercepting slow flying UAVs at medium altitudes, it is still significant. Existing short-range air-to-air missiles also offer the prospect of reduced cost per munition due to commonality across services, and the potential to use weapons in a ground role that have run out of airframe carriage hours but are otherwise still fully functional.</p> +<hr /> -<p>One emerging subtype of interceptor for C-UAS work are systems such as the Iranian–Houthi 358 Saqr [Missile] or the growing range of interceptor UAS fielded by Ukrainian and Russian forces. The 358 Saqr is a two-stage SAM which uses an initial rocket booster to launch the main turbojet-powered section to high altitude and high subsonic speed, where it can then loiter for some time and intercept even high-end UAVs such as MQ-9 Reapers. Anduril has proposed the Roadrunner: a single-stage canister-launched system powered by dual micro turbojets that can launch and, if unsuccessful, land itself vertically, and is designed to intercept hostile UAS by direct impact and destroy them with an integral warhead. Roadrunner is not yet an effective capability, but Ukrainian units have achieved significant results with experimental versions of the concept, albeit using propeller-driven solutions. The critical element in making this capability cost effective is to have an offboard sensor provide guidance, preferably electro-optical or a laser which can be seen by a sensor in the nose of the UAS. Alternatively an interceptor can be guided by a radar. Such systems offer significant potential area coverage against ISTAR UAVs if cued in by an appropriate sensor layer. With utility against helicopters and potentially against ground targets, this class of system is likely to proliferate.</p> +<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p><em>Directed Energy</em></p> +<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p>Daniel F. Runde and Austin HardmanChina is gaining influence within the international institutions that the United States has created, funded, and legitimized. China’s strategic positioning in multilateral bodies has allowed it to exert considerable influence, particularly within the UN system.The Military Use Of AI2024-10-22T12:00:00+08:002024-10-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-military-use-of-ai<p><em>Increasing cross-strait tensions between China and Taiwan suggest the need for the latter to look into the advantages offered by new defence approaches. With a defence budget vastly outpaced by China, Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept recognises a need to look to cutting-edge technologies to offset scale imbalances.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>This paper examines the challenges and opportunities Taiwan will need to consider for the military application of one such emerging technology: AI.</em></p> -<p>There are two primary classes of directed-energy effectors for C-UAS: high-powered microwave (HPM) systems and high-energy laser (HEL) systems. HPM systems emit energy in a narrow cone-shaped beam, and so can potentially provide effects against multiple UAS at once if they are operating close to one another. On the other hand, it is much harder to control for potential electronic fratricide and collateral damage due to the wider area of effect of the weapon compared to HEL systems. HELs are precise due to the inherent nature of a focused laser beam, but as a result can only engage a single UAS at once and may require a significant dwell time on each target to achieve destructive effect. The energy also potentially goes a long way beyond the target and may also refract unpredictably in certain atmospheric conditions, making clearing arcs of fire potentially more complex than for cannon or missile-based systems. The higher the power output of a HEL system, the lower the dwell time required on a given target, and the greater effective range it can have, especially in inclement weather conditions. However, higher power outputs also require more power generation capacity, larger banks of capacitors to store charge for “shots”, and greater cooling capacity, so mobile installations become less practical, and costs increase significantly.</p> +<p>Key challenges in the use of AI include: data-security concerns; ethical implications of autonomous weapons; unpredictability and unreliability of systems; high costs of implementation and maintenance; potential for increased use of armed force; issues of accountability and responsibility; risks associated with deepfake technology; and the danger of over-reliance on AI systems leading to a loss of traditional human military skills.</p> -<p>One of the issues that has hampered the development and fielding of practical HEL systems for wider short-ranged air defence (SHORAD) tasks is that most systems have been required to potentially deal with a wide variety of threats, including incoming mortar rounds and missiles, to enable them to replace traditional cannon systems such as Phalanx. Successfully engaging incoming munitions, many of which travel at high subsonic or supersonic speeds and so present a short engagement window, demands high power levels. However, if HEL systems were to be procured specifically for C-UAS functions, they could be functional with far more modest power outputs, as UAS tend to be relatively slow and relatively lightly built.</p> +<p>In terms of opportunities, the paper discusses the potential benefits of AI in enhancing situational awareness, improving command-and-control capabilities, and enabling advanced simulations for military training and strategy development. AI-powered systems can process vast amounts of data quickly, providing comprehensive battlefield intelligence and enabling faster, more accurate decision-making.</p> -<p>HPM and HEL systems also tend to be rather more expensive to procure than comparable missile or cannon systems, but far cheaper per engagement and with a greater potential magazine depth. The effectiveness of HEL systems also tends to drop substantially in heavy rain, fog or very dusty environmental conditions due to increased atmospheric refractive disruption and attenuation. However, many UAS are also not particularly effective in such conditions due to airframe or sensor limitations.</p> +<p>The paper emphasises the importance of carefully considering ethical, security and operational factors when integrating AI into Taiwan’s defence strategy. It suggests that effective use of AI could serve as a force multiplier for Taiwan’s military, potentially helping to offset China’s numerical and resource advantages.</p> -<h4 id="offensive-c-uas">Offensive C-UAS</h4> +<p>The research underscores the potential of AI to significantly enhance Taiwan’s defence capabilities, while also cautioning about the risks and challenges associated with its implementation. The paper advocates for a balanced approach that maximises the benefits of AI in military applications while mitigating potential drawbacks and ethical concerns.</p> -<p>The measures discussed above involve hard- or soft-kill effectors that aim to defeat enemy UAS in flight. However, C-UAS effects can also be achieved by targeting ground control stations and other enabling assets embedded within hostile ground forces. Even future strike UAS that may operate with a significant degree of autonomy will still need to be launched and monitored by a unit on the ground, while ISTAR UAS must transmit data back to ground control stations, and in many cases receive instructions or mission updates while in flight from teams of ground-based operators. These ground teams and control stations are an important potential attack surface against which C-UAS detection and effector capabilities can and should be optimised. In Chapter I, widespread distribution of RF analysers was discussed as one of the key approaches for detection of hostile UAS. These analysers will not only detect UAS, but as they would be spread out across a unit’s frontage, could also be used to triangulate emissions from hostile UAS ground control stations.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">INTRODUCTION</h3> -<p>Exploiting this information can be done in several ways. If the triangulation or raw data is shared to the battalion or brigade headquarters, various methods could be used to decrease the effectiveness of ongoing hostile UAS operations. In the first instance, a brigade might allocate electronic attack capabilities to jam frequencies over the control station, thus achieving a similar effect to a soft kill directly against each UAS. Against a system with a dual-frequency communications link, as described in previous sections, simultaneous jamming of the base station and the UAS can be particularly effective. While the range necessary to jam a ground control station behind the enemy frontlines will require significant power and thus a dedicated EW system, limiting the duration such an effect can be applied, targeted use of such capabilities could be sufficient to disrupt, for example, a large-scale loitering munition strike wave.</p> +<p>Scholars may differ on the probability of a Taiwan contingency, but cross-strait tensions between Taiwan and China are rising, and Beijing refuses to exclude the use of military force. The “One China” policy that many countries have adopted limits Taiwan’s ability to rely on collective defence or alliances. Taiwan can expect US support, but as the experience of Ukraine suggests, it needs to be resolute and prepared to defend itself. US allies in the region that are friendly to Taiwan (Japan, South Korea, Australia) may become involved, but there are no legally binding agreements or authoritative policy statements that would make that a reliable planning assumption. Given limitations in resources and difficulties in resupply to the island, to deter China and defend itself, Taiwan must seek advantage from emerging technologies and strategies, such as the military use of AI, while preserving interoperability with its sole security guarantor, the US, through alignment on concepts and systems.</p> -<p>The ground control station can be subjected to physical fires. Optimally, this results in the death or wounding of the UAS operators, and thus not only the defeat of the UAS they are controlling at the time, but also a diminution of specialist adversary expertise. However, even if strikes fail to hit the operators, they may damage the antennae being used to send signals and thus sever the ability to regain control of the UAS. The value is that, unlike soft-kill methods, kinetic damage against either operators or control equipment not only achieves defeat of the UAS in its mission, but also creates persistent, rather than time-bound, degradation.</p> +<p>China’s economic growth over recent decades has given the country a defence budget more than 20 times that of Taiwan, changing the balance of military power across the Taiwan Strait. How can Taiwan respond? The answer lies in the asymmetric strategy of Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept (ODC), which uses the small to control the big, leveraging Taiwan’s lead in cutting-edge technologies to gain advantage through the military use of AI. The transformation of modern warfare relies on the collection, organisation and manipulation of data: the ODC attempts to maximise Taiwan’s defence advantages by matching the characteristics of the battlefield environment in the Taiwan Strait to the development and application of low-cost, high-efficiency, high-quantity and high-survival weapons. The ODC envisions a large number of miniature missile assault boats, land-launched missiles, mines, attack drones and anti-armour rockets. Its effectiveness requires the use of AI to synchronise situational awareness with kinetic and electromagnetic effects. AI can enhance Taiwan’s defence and operational capabilities, serving as a multidomain force multiplier for other combat platforms and formations. This paper explores the opportunities and challenges associated with the effective use and implementation of AI in Taiwan’s military.</p> -<p>Alongside direction-finding location of hostile ground control sites, the other function of spectrum analysers being distributed across the front is an ability to collect large volumes of signals traffic. Decryption of such signals and/or sustained collection for pattern-of-life analysis may allow the identification of launch points, indicators of when the enemy is moving to them, and mapping of the support structure for enemy UAS complexes. These can then be pre-emptively targeted, to try to strike UAS and their crews on the ground while they are preparing to launch.</p> +<h4 id="methodology-and-structure">METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE</h4> -<h3 id="iii-deploying-a-c-uas-complex">III. Deploying a C-UAS Complex</h3> +<p>The paper’s methodology primarily relied on a review of English-language literature from 2019 to 2024. This is due in part to the scarcity of Chinese-language publications on the subject. However, the main reason for a focus on English-language and in particular US literature is that the US is the only country legally obliged to support Taiwan in securing the means for its defence and committed by leadership statements to come to its assistance. Given Taiwan’s unusual diplomatic status, alignment with US concepts and initiatives is thus of particular importance.</p> -<p>Having explored the means available for detecting, classifying, identifying and tracking a UAS, and how it can be defeated, this chapter considers how the force can integrate these capabilities to provide the relevant density of protection to enable it to operate. The chapter is in three parts. The first considers how C-UAS capabilities should be distributed across a force for its own protection. The second examines the protection of critical targets. The third discusses the C2 required to coordinate these capabilities.</p> +<p>The paper has three main sections. The first offers a general outline of the advantages and disadvantages of military adoption of AI. The second explores starting points for the use of AI by Taiwan’s military and addresses the imperative to advance further. The third section evaluates AI prospects for Taiwan’s military and proposes solutions to overcome obstacles. The paper concludes with some key considerations for Taiwan’s government.</p> -<h4 id="defining-requirements-at-echelon">Defining Requirements at Echelon</h4> +<h3 id="challenges-and-opportunities-for-the-military-use-of-ai">CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE MILITARY USE OF AI</h3> -<p>As described in Chapter I, the foundational C-UAS capability is situational awareness through the ability to detect UAS. This capability is required at all echelons because without it, no countermeasures can be initiated. The simplest means for detecting UAS at the FLOT is a spectrum analyser. The addition of acoustic sensors, which today can be vehicle mounted or man-packable, is also exceedingly useful for passive sensing of UAS and other threats. Acoustic sensors on vehicles also allow UAS to be tracked over time as they overfly units.</p> +<p>Coined by US computer scientist John McCarthy in 1956, the term “AI” referred to “the potential for creating machines that could simulate human intelligence”. AI denotes a machine’s capability to perform cognitive functions typically associated with the human mind. While there are risks associated with its use in a range of industries, from healthcare to finance, its application in the military domain carries unique challenges.</p> -<p>In terms of self-defence against UAS organic to platoon, it is possible for a software-defined radio with an appropriate antenna to be mounted on a vehicle and programmed for electronic attack. Having such a jammer within a platoon of vehicles would not allow complex jamming to be carried out by the vehicle crew, who would likely lack the expertise to programme bespoke attacks. However, as EW specialists build bespoke attacks for specific classes of UAS, it could become possible for this library to be pushed to these radios, so that if an emissions pattern has been classified it can be effectively engaged. This platoon EW could also be used to deny GNSS over its position to protect it from precision strike, although this would require the antenna, a generator and the software-defined radio to be offset from the vehicles when static, and so dismountable, to avoid drawing fire. The use of directional jamming could also be used to reduce the signature of the platoon emissions. While not able to craft attacks, the platoon would need to be conversant with when and how to employ the capability, analogous to how platoons manage electronic countermeasures to protect themselves from IEDs. Furthermore, with the advent of non-cooperative swarming in Ukraine, and cooperative swarming around the corner, increasing investment in the “detect/identify/track” phases of the C-UAS cycle is critical. Increasing capability and distributing sensors ensures expensive and bespoke C-UAS capabilities are not overwhelmed and attrited.</p> +<h4 id="risks-and-challenges">RISKS AND CHALLENGES</h4> -<p>The ability of platoons to self-defend will be constrained by the fact that they lack enough platforms to be able to dedicate any to C-UAS functions. However, it may be possible to modify some capabilities to have a C-UAS capability. Laser rangefinders on vehicles, for example, if they can pivot upwards, could be programmed to dazzle UAS, as discussed in Chapter II. RWS can also be programmed to track UAS electro-optically and to engage them to defeat OWA UAS and low-level reconnaissance UAS with significant efficiency.</p> +<p>Miliary use of AI presents concerns particular to the risks that accompany the use of lethal force. These disadvantages highlight challenges and risks associated with military use of AI, and the importance of carefully considering the ethical, security, financial and human factors involved in leveraging AI technologies in defence strategies.</p> -<p>A company group would lack the capacity to support significantly increased numbers of vehicles dedicated to C-UAS tasks within its organic order of battle. Nevertheless, it would make sense for a pair of vehicles to have dedicated search and classification capabilities. This could be achieved with a light vehicle carrying a mast with passive sensors cueing an electro-optical sensor. In combination with the ability to distribute the sensors at platoon level, this would allow a company commander to have a detailed detection and classification ability over their assigned battlespace. As most tactical actions are ultimately actions by company groups, it follows that it would be necessary for a more dedicated C-UAS capability to support a company operation. Holding these organically within the company would likely overburden it, but having them attached to the company group from higher echelon would be viable.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Data security:</strong> AI – like any other digital technology – can be hacked or manipulated. When systems are breached, sensitive information can be stolen and exploited, to the advantage of the adversary. In 2015, the US Office of Personnel Management suffered large-scale breaches of government data in the form of theft of confidential data affecting millions of federal employees and contractors. Sensitive personal information of approximately 21.5 million individuals who had undergone background checks, including 5.6 million fingerprint records, was stolen. The vulnerability of systems used to store and process sensitive information raises serious concerns about the ability to safeguard the systems on which AI would depend.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Ethics:</strong> While using robots in combat can reduce the number of human casualties and enhance operational efficiency, ethical questions arise when considering fully autonomous robotic soldiers. The concern is whether it is morally acceptable to allow machines to make life-and-death decisions without human oversight. The South Korean military considered deploying AI-powered sentry robots along the border with North Korea. These robots were equipped with automatic targeting and firing capabilities, raising significant ethical concerns about excluding human judgement. The prospect that they could engage and kill human targets without direct human oversight sparked widespread debate. Critics argued that delegating life-and-death decisions to autonomous machines inherently undermines human dignity and the principles of just war. The use of such AI-powered “killer robots” could lead to wars being fought entirely between autonomous systems, rather than between human soldiers, posing profound ethical questions about the role of human agency in warfare. Further challenges arose regarding accountability and responsibility if a malfunction in these robots were to cause civilian casualties. The “black box” non-transparent nature of the AI algorithms controlling the systems complicated the determination of accountability.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Unpredictability/unreliability:</strong> In 2021, an AI-powered drone strike carried out by the US military in Kabul, Afghanistan resulted in the deaths of 10 civilians, of whom seven were children, instead of the intended Islamic State in Khorasan target. The AI algorithms powering the drone’s target identification and engagement systems had failed to adequately discriminate between military and civilian targets, leading to the terrible loss of innocent and young life. The unpredictability of AI arises from the complexity and adaptability of these algorithms, which can learn, evolve and make decisions in ways that are not fully transparent in or constrained by their initial programming. As they encounter new situations and environments, their actions become increasingly difficult to anticipate with certainty, even when their ultimate goals are known.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Costs and maintenance:</strong> Building and maintaining AI systems in the military sector can incur significant costs, due to the systems’ complexity. Repair, maintenance and frequent upgrades add to the financial burden. In 2019, the US Department of Defense (DoD) awarded Microsoft a $10-billion cloud computing contract as part of its Cloud Strategy; known as the Joint Enterprise Defence Infrastructure (JEDI) project, it used AI to make it more effective. However, significant delays and cost overruns arose due to the complex engineering of the required AI systems. The “opaque nature” of the AI algorithms used in the JEDI project also “raised worries about unintended consequences” and the ability to properly test, validate and maintain these advanced technologies, which resulted in the Pentagon cancelling the contract. The need to ensure the security, reliability and transparency of these AI systems adds further to the complexity and cost of military modernisation, which can hamper the military’s efforts to integrate cutting-edge AI technologies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Increased use of armed force:</strong> AI-driven information-processing systems could enable a proliferation of target information, broadening the use of force and potentially leading to more civilian casualties. According to a 2023 media report, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) used an AI system known as Habsora (“the Gospel”) to rapidly identify and recommend targets for airstrikes in Gaza. According to the IDF, by extracting information quickly and automatically, Habsora provides targeted recommendations that match exactly to the identifications made by humans. Habsora and Israel’s Target Division have helped to build a database of between 30,000 and 40,000 people suspected of being Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants. To put it another way, AI-driven systems have accelerated the compilation of a vast potential kill list. Before Habsora, it would take Israel up to a year to identify 50 potential targets in Gaza. During the May 2021 conflict, the AI system identified around 100 targets per day.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Accountability and responsibility:</strong> AI in the military raises both C2 and legal questions about accountability. Current research suggests AI systems need more rigorous testing to be validated and considered safe in risky military situations. Such systems often involve a complex network of stakeholders, including developers, data providers, users and regulators. Attributing responsibility can be challenging, as each stakeholder is likely to contribute to the operation of the system in different ways. Aside from humanitarian issues, the unpredictability of AI can, as the above example on unpredictability demonstrates, obscure who should be held accountable when things go wrong. The more AI systems become autonomous and capable of independent decisions, the more difficult it becomes to determine who should be held accountable for their actions. Should it be the AI system itself, its developers or its users? Developing and adapting C2 and legal structures to govern the use of AI is essential to maintain the military chain of command and establish lines of accountability.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Deepfake technology risks:</strong> In March 2023, The Intercept uncovered a US Special Operations Command procurement document that suggests the US military is seeking to develop deepfake or other AI-based technologies to deceive its adversaries. The document showed that the military wishes to use deepfakes to mislead enemies on the battlefield. However, there is a risk that use of deepfakes in combat could percolate up to the field of foreign relations. Militaries serving societies that believe in the principle of democratic control of armed forces should be wary of capabilities such as deepfakes that can undermine trust and the principle of truth, without which their democracies cannot function.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Path dependency:</strong> As militaries adopt AI-powered systems, there is a risk over time that they will lose the institutional memory of performing tasks the “old-fashioned” way (without AI support). Ultimately, the more reliant on AI systems a military becomes, the greater the cost when that system is penetrated.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>The battalion is likely the lowest echelon with a sufficient logistics and sustainment capability to support dedicated C-UAS platforms, which would need to be assigned to support subordinate companies. Critically, at this echelon, C-UAS should not simply be thought of as a defensive activity, but rather as a counter-reconnaissance mission: to offensively degrade the enemy’s sensor picture by hunting and destroying their UAS. Counter-reconnaissance has a defensive benefit, but in assigning missions to the battalion assets, the mindset of these troops should be offensive.</p> +<h4 id="opportunities">OPPORTUNITIES</h4> -<p>There are two obvious requirements at battalion: an EW section and a C-UAS platoon. The EW section could run its own baselines, but as software-defined radios become pervasive, the expertise of these personnel might better be employed to first gather, monitor and interpret data recovered from the distributed antennae across the battalion’s companies. Second, this section can use software updates, pushed to the dedicated software-defined radios across the battalion, to deliver more specialised EW effects, and to update effects so that they keep pace with adversary adaptation. Third, these personnel provide the picture of the EMS within the battalion’s area of responsibility necessary to inform electromagnetic battlespace management and thus reduce fratricide.</p> +<p>AI offers potentially significant advantages to military capability in terms of increased speed and accuracy, enhanced battlefield awareness and enhanced decision-making capabilities. Some of the examples examined below reflect bold claims, and it must be noted that technologies under development frequently fail to live up to early ambitions. However, given the immaturity and fast-moving nature of the AI field, it is appropriate to evaluate opportunities with an open mind about the potential range of utility.</p> -<p>The C-UAS platoon would be an augmentation to the battalion support company. The most immediately relevant capability for this platoon is a SPAAG system, cued by the subordinate sensors, but with its own ability to interrogate targets. This capability could be distributed to support company lines of effort so that there is interlocking coverage across the battalion’s frontage while on the defensive. Additional SPAAG platoons could then be added to support the battalion if committed to offensive operations, held at brigade. It is also eminently feasible for the turrets of SPAAGs to hold launch canisters. In the first instance, these can hold MANPADS, allowing engagement of helicopters, cruise missiles and some classes of UAS. However, canisters could also hold interceptor UAS, guided by the electro-optical sensor of the SPAAG. These capabilities can engage aviation but are optimised for economically striking UAS at medium altitude. If a SPAAG has four canisters on its turret, there is no technical reason why it cannot have both MANPADS and interceptor UAS ready to fire. For light forces, interceptor UAS can be mounted in canisters on a light vehicle and guided either electro-optically or with a radar mounted on the vehicle.</p> +<p>AI is changing not just how the military fights, but how it works from head to tail. It potentially offers better situational understanding, faster decisions, improved targeting, less risk to military personnel, and more efficient recruitment, training and logistics, gifting militaries cost savings and advantages in planning, executing and sustaining missions. Some of these benefits are unproven, others may never materialise in the form projected, and many are accompanied by vulnerabilities and risks of over-dependence. While there is a cost–benefit balance to be struck, no matter how much AI is adopted for a force, understanding how these systems may work and shape the way an adversary thinks and acts has become indispensable.</p> -<p>The brigade is the echelon at which there is the ability to have standalone C-UAS capabilities. As the echelon at which EW deconfliction and management is likely best placed, the brigade should have the ability to conduct bespoke and dedicated electronic attack, using an EW company with large and specialised antennae. With regard to hard kill, the brigade can hold independent SPAAG units of action to protect key sites and distribute to reinforce battalion lines of effort. But the brigade is also the echelon with the requirement to be able to provide area defence for a sustained period against medium-altitude ISR UAS, and it has the opportunity for sufficient access to the common air picture to control such capabilities. The most efficient systems in this role are likely truck-mounted directed-energy weapons, but given the limitations of these systems in various weather conditions, it also makes sense for the brigade to have access to a missile or interceptor UAS able to engage targets at medium altitude. This should be employed as a secondary capability.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Situational awareness:</strong> With AI-powered sensors and technologies, military intelligence organisations can better understand battlefield conditions and provide a more comprehensive picture of adversary capabilities and intent. US Army researchers have developed machine learning algorithms that can operate in bandwidth-constrained environments to rapidly update situational awareness. These algorithms can compress data while maintaining near-optimal performance, allowing models to be frequently retrained on decentralised data sources, helping soldiers gain real-time analysis in a rapidly changing battlefield. The US Army is planning to integrate AI into tactical command posts by integrating disparate data sources into a common operational picture. AI systems can predict enemy actions, identify weaknesses, assess the environment, plan missions and suggest ways to avoid problems. By rapidly analysing disparate data sources, AI can provide precise intelligence forecasts, mission planning recommendations and situational assessments far quicker than human analysts alone.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Enhanced C2:</strong> AI systems allow the military to swiftly and precisely process large volumes of data and acquire nuanced insights, bringing unprecedented efficiency and accuracy to their decision-making process. The US DoD is creating an AI-powered system to combine data from different sensors into a single picture to help the joint force make better decisions. The US military has developed the CJADC2 (Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control) concept, which aims to increase interoperability and AI integration across all domains. By leveraging AI to rapidly collect, analyse and disseminate information on the battlefield, CJADC2 can identify and engage targets faster to create a well-informed force capable of defeating adversaries through accelerated decision-making cycles. By employing AI algorithms for predictive analytics and scenario modelling, the military can anticipate evolving threats and make immediate strategic adjustments to ensure agile, responsive C2. This capability is viewed by military strategists in both the US and China as a critical determinant that could prove decisive in shaping the outcomes of future armed conflicts and warfare scenarios.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Simulations and modelling:</strong> AI enables highly realistic simulations and modelling of complex military scenarios, systems and environments. This lets militaries test new ideas, strategies and equipment in a virtual environment before trying them in the real world. For example, the US Air Force is using AI-powered digital twins and simulations to model performance and maintenance requirements of aircraft such as the F-35 fighter. This helps accelerate innovation in areas such as predictive maintenance and mission planning. By personalising training regimens, AI enables more effective preparation of forces for dynamic real-world scenarios without compromising the safety of personnel. In the long term, AI-driven simulation training could be more cost effective than other kinds of realistic training simulations.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Lethal autonomous weapon systems:</strong> The integration of weaponry equipped with advanced sensors and algorithms offers a significant advance in military capability. These systems autonomously identify targets while ensuring human oversight for specific engagements, thereby enhancing precision, speed and efficiency. AI-supported autonomous systems have the processing power to draw on all the data-rich systems mentioned above to form an integrated, rapidly functional “kill chain” that can predict enemy actions, identify vulnerabilities, assess environmental conditions, evaluate mission strategies and recommend mitigation plans. By anticipating threats, optimising tactics and streamlining decision-making through AI-powered analytics, military forces can stay one step ahead of their targets, increasing operational effectiveness and mission success rates.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Training and recruitment:</strong> The US Air Force and the US Army have used AI-powered training tools that can reduce the time needed to complete training materials by up to 40%. AI-based chatbots have been used to assist with military recruitment, for example the US Army’s chatbot, Sergeant Star, which officially came into operation in 2006. The US Navy is deploying a conversational AI system called “Amelia” to handle and resolve the most common technical support questions from naval and civilian personnel, reducing the need for human support agents. The rollout of Amelia is part of the Navy’s $136-million Navy Enterprise Service Desk initiative to update and merge more than 90 IT support centres into a unified assistance platform.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Logistics:</strong> AI-driven solutions hold immense potential for streamlining logistics processes within the military domain. AI algorithms can analyse historical data on equipment use, maintenance schedules and operational rhythms to predict future demand for spare parts, ammunition, fuel and so on, enabling more proactive inventory management with the aim of avoiding stock-outs or surpluses of critical supplies. The US Army is using AI for predictive logistics, leveraging the technology to help forecast and manage the supply of parts and equipment more efficiently.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>Just as the brigade should hold independent SPAAG platoons to allocate to its subordinate battalions, so too should the division have independent C-UAS batteries that it can use to defend critical sites, or else field in support of brigades. The considerations for these divisional units of action, however, intended to protect sites from loitering munitions and OWA munitions, should be optimised against a slightly different target set than those intended to knock down ISR UAVs. Ultimately, divisional C-UAS units must be able to defeat salvos, and this is therefore considered next.</p> +<h3 id="taiwans-military-use-of-ai">TAIWAN’S MILITARY USE OF AI</h3> -<h4 id="c-uas-defence-of-critical-targets">C-UAS Defence of Critical Targets</h4> +<p>Taiwan is in a strategically central and commanding position in the Western Pacific. Its location across sea lanes connecting large economies and its proximity to the Chinese mainland make Taiwan vital in terms of defence and power projection for the major powers. Taiwan is also an important international trade hub and a partner in global supply chains.</p> -<p>The requirements for C-UAS defences around fixed points such as logistics hubs, airbases and ports differ in several important ways from the requirements to defend land forces on the battlefield. First, unless they are near the frontlines, the primary threat to such bases and installations is likely to come from cruise and ballistic missile attacks, but augmented by salvos of OWA UAS. This means that the C-UAS task is to protect not only the installations in question, but also the SAM systems, such as Sky Sabre or Patriot, which provide the primary means of defence against attack from above. Any attempt to provide C-UAS defences at every location that might be attacked throughout a given country, let alone across NATO, would be cost and personnel prohibitive. However, given the limited range and slow transit speeds of most classes of UAS, C-UAS coverage for point defence tasks can be prioritised around installations closer to likely conflict zones, such as RAF Akrotiri in the Eastern Mediterranean or Tallinn Airport as an airhead location in Estonia.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mSF50vm.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Taiwan’s Location in the First Island Chain.</strong> Source: AndreaNicolini/Adobe Stock.</em></p> -<p>Here, adversary OWA systems such as Shahed-136 could cause major problems at relatively short notice, especially if equipped with anti-radiation seeker heads to threaten traditional air-defence radars that are emitting to defend against simultaneous cruise and/or ballistic missile strikes. Even though systems such as Sky Sabre, NASAMS (National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System) or Patriot can engage the size of UAS that can travel hundreds of kilometres, this would risk rapidly and unsustainably depleting their ammunition. In other words, C-UAS defence capabilities are likely to become increasingly critical to ensuring that higher-end integrated air and missile defence systems can sustainably operate at locations within range of hostile UAS attacks.</p> +<p>Figures from 2023 show Taiwan as the 17th-largest trading economy globally, with a trade volume of more than $900 billion in that year. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced ones. One Taiwanese company, TSMC, dominates the global semiconductor market, with 57% of the market share of semiconductor foundries in 2021. If Taiwan were to be attacked and production disrupted, no country could fill the void, and a halt in the manufacture and distribution of semiconductors would cause a shortage of technology products such as smartphones, computers and cars, along with company closures.</p> -<p>The best way to avoid saturation of point defences at a site is to defeat a salvo over a significant distance, using dispersed capabilities. The efficacy of this approach may be seen in Israel’s defeat of a large complex strike from Iran, in which most of the UAS and cruise missiles were defeated by aircraft before they reached Israel. This is also the approach adopted by Ukraine’s mobile defence groups. A point defence system cannot have command over a dispersed set of effectors, but it should be emphasised that if the land force has the range and depth of effectors described in the previous section of this chapter, a major salvo should be significantly attrited before it reaches key targets, as reserves and land force elements in the rear can manoeuvre their C-UAS capabilities to provide a distributed defence in depth. In Ukraine, this defence in depth approach relies on around 50,000 personnel, operating in mobile groups with SHORAD weaponry to achieve a high rate of intercept. At the same time, this dispersed defence, while reducing the risk of saturation of a point defence, does not obviate the need for point defences or for protection of critical SAM systems responsible for protecting sites from ballistic missiles that cannot be defeated in depth.</p> +<p>China expresses a preference for peaceful unification but has spent the past 20 years developing its military to conquer Taiwan. China’s leaders consistently communicate that Taiwan should be under Beijing’s control, and that they are willing to use force to achieve this. As Taiwan becomes more independent and less interested in unifying with China, Beijing may decide that force is the only way to achieve its political goals regarding Taiwan.</p> -<p>Compared to the C-UAS detection, classification and engagement systems that might be suitable for integrating into mobile land forces for defensive or offensive tasks at various echelons, systems explicitly designed for point defence can be significantly larger and heavier and consume more power. C-UAS operators will need to be able to be part of the recognised air picture being used to coordinate IAMD activities, and this could help with cueing fire control systems and effectors onto incoming threats in addition to dedicated organic C-UAS sensor layers. In some ways, the point defence task could be considered ideal for HEL- or HPM-type directed-energy-based effectors, since higher power outputs and sufficient capacitors and cooling for a deep magazine are easier than in mobile installations. However, depending on the location of the base or installation in question and the equipment being used on and around it, guarding against collateral damage may still be a complex task, especially for HPM effectors. For cannon- or missile-based defence systems, there is likely to be a greater emphasis on effectiveness against salvo attacks than on the ability to deal with sustained attack by many small systems, the significant distance from the frontlines meaning that most very small and cheap hostile systems will lack the range to reach them unless inserted covertly for single salvos.</p> +<h4 id="taiwans-starting-points">TAIWAN’S STARTING POINTS</h4> -<p>That said, the use of any kind of kinetic or EW effector around an airbase, for example, is likely to require careful coordination and deconfliction with both military and civilian traffic. For that reason, any missile-, cannon- or EW-based effector designed for point defence at installations and bases will require robust communications links and coordination TTPs between them, military and civil air traffic control and any IAMD recognised air picture. However, given the relatively specialised nature of many of the C-UAS detection and threat classification sensors discussed in the first section of this chapter, it may be worth deploying and operating such sensors alongside those designed to feed into larger IAMD systems, rather than attempting to rely on the latter to cue in the C-UAS effectors deployed. In terms of the force planning assumptions, although the actual requirement for any given piece of terrain will be bespoke, providing a minimum viable point defence would likely need somewhere between a platoon (three to four platforms) and a company (9–12 platforms).</p> +<p>Currently, the Taiwanese military is actively exploring and utilising AI technology to enhance military efficiency and strengthen defence capabilities. For example, the Tri-Service General Hospital, one of the largest teaching hospitals in Taiwan, receives more than 2 million visits per year. By combining a Microsoft large-scale language model with AI and the technical support of Microsoft’s Taiwan R&amp;D centre, the hospital has brought together medical big data and Azure OpenAI to improve the accuracy of medical audio-visual recognition, to be automatically generated by AI to enable doctors and caregivers to improve the quality of diagnosis and care. The hospital’s medical information team will extend its technology development to record reports of doctors’ check-ups, outpatient clinics and surgeries, and the research results from medical image recognition, while reports of disease signs and symptoms and diagnoses will be generated and shared with the 13 military hospitals in the area of electrocardiography, to improve the speed of first aid through AI technology.</p> -<h4 id="c2-for-the-c-uas-fight">C2 for the C-UAS Fight</h4> +<p>China is rapidly increasing its intelligence-gathering capabilities against Taiwan, including through cyber attacks, surveillance aircraft (drones) and electronic warfare. A significant challenge for Taiwan is to monitor and analyse these multidomain threats. Taiwan is seeking to learn from countries such as Israel to improve its own use of these technologies to counter the growing Chinese threat. By leveraging AI algorithms for data fusion and pattern recognition, Taiwan can gain actionable insights into adversary intentions and activities. This includes using signal intelligence from communications and radar transmissions to understand China’s capabilities and intentions. Social media monitoring to detect disinformation campaigns or indications of impending military activity enables proactive decision-making and threat-mitigation strategies.</p> -<p>For a distributed array of comparatively short-ranged systems to be effective, it is necessary for them to be efficiently coordinated. Furthermore, since a range of the C-UAS techniques described can disrupt other C2 systems, it is important that the architecture for battlespace management is correct. Based on the functions at echelon described earlier in this chapter, a rational series of C2 relationships can be sketched out.</p> +<p>As cyber threats become increasingly complex and pervasive, Taiwan must strengthen its cyber-defence capabilities to protect critical infrastructure and sensitive information. Taiwan has elevated cyber security as a national security priority and is taking proactive measures through initiatives such as the National Institute of Cyber Security and the Administration for Cyber Security of the Ministry of Digital Affairs, which is developing cutting-edge AI tools to detect fraudulent online activities, analyse suspicious messages and combat misinformation or false information campaigns. By further leveraging AI for threat hunting, anomaly detection and incident response, Taiwan can enhance its ability to defend against cyber attacks and minimise the impact of cyber incidents on military operations.</p> -<p>First, within the company, the ability to have a warning indicator for the presence of UAS as a flag raised and distributed via the company MANET would allow for all personnel to make informed judgements about their diligence in managing their signature and profile, or to determine that a threat justified being engaged by them. This simply requires the presence of the acoustic signature of rotors, silhouette or radio-control frequencies of a recognised UAS to be detected on a company platform associated with the company net, and for the fact of this detection to be shared. This could be done autonomously, with a human on the loop, to accelerate the process and free up cognitive capacity within the platoon from monitoring systems.</p> +<p>In the ongoing Ukraine–Russia war, UAVs, especially smaller, low-cost drones adapted for combat roles, have demonstrated astonishing operational effectiveness in missions such as surveillance, targeting and precision-strike operations, enabling the outgunned Ukrainian army to deliver precise strikes and inflict significant damage against the quantitively superior Russian army.</p> -<p>Second, the sensor that detected the UAS should collect the assessed characteristics, bearing and azimuth of the detection and hold this data available to be pulled by anyone requesting it. The most likely pull for this data would come from the platoon and company commanders, needing to make a decision about whether to apply or withhold electronic countermeasures, and from the dedicated C-UAS reconnaissance capability – which should pull the data automatically upon a flag being raised on the company MANET – intending to compare returns from multiple sensors, or to interrogate with their own, to classify the UAS. Another interested party would be the battalion EW team, who would want to gather directional data from multiple points to achieve triangulation and potentially to begin using their own baselines, or other sensors, to look for the enemy control station. Again, much of this could be automated, with the EW specialists on the loop to intervene if required.</p> +<p>The ability to use missiles, drones and mines is critical for the defence of Taiwan, which needs to signal the ability to destroy invading ships and aircraft before they reach the main island. Taiwan could use drones with large payloads to attack China’s amphibious fleet, strike strategic targets and supplement crewed aircraft. They could also be used to serve as missile decoys and enable dispersed operations from roads if airbases are attacked. The use of multi-layered deterrence to maintain a solid defence posture is particularly suitable for Taiwan’s national defence strategy, which assumes lean military strength and tight procurement budget allocation. Taiwan’s drone capabilities are currently inferior to those of China. To catch up, Taiwan has set up the Drone National Team programme, which by mid-2024 had brought together companies and the military to produce more than 3,200 drones.</p> -<p>From this point, several additional C2 links become relevant. First, if the decision by the platoon or company commander is to apply countermeasures, those in the vehicles with this capability will need to be directed to activate their electronic protection capability. Second, the fact that this has been done will need to be communicated to the battalion EW team and thence to the brigade headquarters for the purposes of electromagnetic battlespace management. This could be automated by sending an alert as a function of turning on the electronic protection suite.</p> +<p>The National Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) in Taoyuan City has indicated its plans to integrate AI and deep learning to develop an intelligent training environment that integrates live, virtual and constructive simulation into the more than 240 sets of simulation systems it has established for Taiwan’s army, including a drone-operated training simulator and the Brave Eagle training system, which has the potential to improve the comprehensive effectiveness of the army’s combat power. This year, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense established a National Defense Innovation Group. The ministry has demonstrated its determination to strengthen its asymmetric warfare capabilities, and has begun in-depth cooperation with the US Department of Commerce to promote projects such as drone systems, anti-drone systems, and AI use.</p> -<p>Another line of communications will need to pass the telemetry data, alongside the classification data, from the C-UAS reconnaissance teams to the battalion C-UAS and brigade command post. This is because the UAS could be interested in targets outside the company area of responsibility, and therefore capabilities need to be cued at higher echelon to be orientated and positioned to intercept. In this way, the subordinate companies become a distributed sensor net that allows limited C-UAS assets to be positioned to achieve hard kill against threats as they cross into the rear of the fighting echelon. As each echelon will have companies in reserve, which will also have their laydown of passive sensors, this creates a dense belt of sensors that can not only report the initial contact with a UAS but also, in fact, provide a track of its passage over time, without the need for dedicated communications architectures comparable to the air defence C2 infrastructure, which is too expensive and onerous to be kept at platoon level. Such a C2 structure would, however, require the dedicated hard kill C-UAS capabilities to be able to take the general plot of a UAS’s progress and to then achieve a track-quality solution using organic sensors, as well as the ability to interrogate the target. The SPAAG and dedicated C-UAS systems at brigade would need to fall under the air defence command or at least have access to the common air picture to avoid fratricide, as they have the capability, but should not be primarily tasked, to engage a wider range of threats.</p> +<h4 id="current-use-of-ai-in-chinas-military">CURRENT USE OF AI IN CHINA’S MILITARY</h4> -<p>If such a system is to function on the standard tactical communications channels, it is important that raw data is not routinely moved from the sensors to a centralised point, but is instead interrogated on the platform so that the facts can be distributed in small data packets of text. The use of a structured language to conduct this reporting would make these reports usable by other C2 systems. This requires some analytical capacity to sit on the software-defined radios supporting the sensors. In principle, this is fairly straightforward. For classification, the onboard processing at the base of the sensor mast of the dedicated C-UAS ISR vehicles would be critical, as these would hold multiple sensors and thus the ability to achieve high-confidence classification of targets, which could then be distributed as text. If the raw data were needed, it could be routed through an offset satellite communications link or other method, and thereby uploaded to a common portal from which higher echelon systems could pull it for analysis. One function of this pooling would be to create a library of signatures over time, which could then be used to refine both the software providing the classifications and the EW effects programmed into the distributed electronic attack antennae. This would therefore allow EW specialists at brigade to also upload software updates onto the same portal to be downloaded when the tactical situation allowed and thereby be distributed to the company’s sensors.</p> +<p>China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been actively developing and deploying AI since the mid-2010s. These efforts are in line with China’s broader strategic initiatives, such as the Made in China 2025 plan from 2015 and the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, released in 2017.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>In July 2017, China’s State Council released a policy document, the “Developmental Regulations on a New Artificial Intelligence Generation”, which outlines the country’s AI development plan. The document demonstrates China’s ambition to become a world leader in AI by 2030. It stipulates that AI will be used for defence purposes, including command decision-making, military simulation and defence equipment. Since the release of the document, China has started to use AI more extensively in its military, particularly in the following areas:</p> -<p>Effective, layered and efficient C-UAS capabilities are not a luxury or a concept to be explored as part of an abstract “future force”. They are basic elements of a land force that is suitable for operations today. Without C-UAS capabilities, a force will be seen first, engaged more accurately, and ultimately defeated by an opposing force that fields UAS and has the ability to counter them. For NATO members, the aiming mark set by the Alliance’s senior leadership is to be ready to deter Russia by 2028. This does not leave time to design and develop new capabilities from scratch. Fielding C-UAS capabilities – which are absent in any structured sense from most NATO land force elements – is therefore an urgent operational requirement.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Unmanned combat systems:</strong> The PLA has been developing and using unmanned AI systems since 2015. These include drones for air, ground, sea and subsea operations. China has world-class capabilities in AI-dependent drone swarms with military potential. In April 2023, the PLA tested an AI system to help with artillery targeting, showing how AI is used in weapons.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Battlefield awareness and decision-making:</strong> The PLA is using AI to improve awareness on the battlefield and in decision-making. This means combining data from different sources to get a complete up-to-date picture. Chinese military experts have discussed the idea of a “command brain”, to use AI for making plans at the tactical and operational levels.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Multidomain operations:</strong> AI has been employed by China to conduct and coordinate actions across the domains of land, sea, air, space and cyber since at least 2020. AI helps to combine and analyse data from different domains to improve effectiveness.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Predictive maintenance and logistics:</strong> China is using AI to maintain equipment and improve logistics. AI can predict when equipment might fail and help with decisions about where to put resources. China has been using AI in this area since at least 2020. This is part of a broader strategy to leverage AI for military advantage and modernisation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Information and electronic warfare:</strong> AI is being used in information and electronic warfare to help the PLA in modern conflict. For example, the PLA Navy Submarine Academy has awarded contracts related to AI-based adaptive beamforming techniques.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Simulation and training:</strong> The PLA is using AI in training its military personnel through realistic and effective simulations of warfare. The PLA has been integrating AI technologies into various aspects of military training and operations as part of a shift towards “intelligentized warfare”. This shift began gaining significant momentum around 2015, when China emphasised the importance of AI Informatisation in its defence strategy.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Command, control and communication:</strong> AI is being added to the PLA’s command, control and communication systems to improve military operations. This includes applications at all levels of warfare.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>At the same time, simply procuring expensive and standalone C-UAS systems will not lead to an efficient or coordinated system for protecting the force. At best it will provide limited protection against specific classes of UAS, which will rapidly become obsolete as the threat evolves. This paper has sought to outline the balance of capabilities needed at echelon to provide effective and enduring protection. The following recommendations endeavour to translate this into specific capabilities needed by the British Army. The capability mix articulated may be said to be generalisable to all NATO militaries, but its articulation in terms of specific systems and programmes requires reference to a particular force, and so the British Army is used here as a reference force.</p> +<p>China has ambitious plans to employ AI in the military, but limited transparency means that it is not always clear how advanced these systems are. The PLA is still working on overcoming challenges in testing, training and developing concepts for these AI-enabled systems. The development of military AI in the PLA is certainly changing. In the near future, changes will probably be small, but in the long term, they could be substantial.</p> -<h4 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h4> +<h4 id="taiwans-necessary-tilt-towards-ai">TAIWAN’S NECESSARY TILT TOWARDS AI</h4> -<p>First, the British Army needs to mount EW antennae and software-defined electronic protection suites, passive radar and acoustic sensing across its vehicle fleets. The electronic protection suites should be capable of both directional RF and GNSS jamming. Where systems already exist – as with the acoustic sensors on Ajax – software updates must allow them to be used to accurately detect UAS, drawing on available libraries of data from Ukraine. The software solution should be common across the force, rather than separate for each platform or sensor type.</p> +<p>Four areas that shape Taiwan’s defence are connected to the kinds of capability advantages presented by the military application of AI.</p> -<p>Second, the British Army should develop a passive multi-sensor mast with a software solution that allows its sensor returns to be cross examined to classify objects. These should be mounted as a modular unit on existing fleets of vehicles, optimised for Jackal and Cayote, and procured in sufficient density to have two per company group. Dismounted light infantry should receive the mast as a deployable kit, since the sensors themselves are largely man-packable and can be connected to a buried generator or a light tactical vehicle to be powered. If this is to be done by 2028, the Army will need to risk existing trials processes for its integration on vehicles. The current process of assurance will drive delays and cost up to the point of mission failure.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>AI’s centrality to China–US rivalry and the PLA’s modernisation make it a major consideration in Taiwan’s defence strategy. In 2021, veteran US diplomat Henry Kissinger warned that, among other things, a mutual failure to understand each other’s AI capability could lead to conflict. China’s President Xi Jinping talked about “emerging domain strategic capabilities” at the National People’s Congress on 11 March 2024, calling on the military to deepen reforms, promote innovation and enhance emerging strategic capabilities. AI is a source as well as an instrument of conflict between Taiwan’s principal ally and its principal adversary, so even if a resource imbalance makes it difficult for Taiwan to acquire capabilities at the same level as China, there is no escaping the need for it to understand the AI capabilities of both ally and adversary, and how those are shaping the future of warfare.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>US forces that might be available to defend Taiwan are based some distance away in Japan, Guam and elsewhere, making early warning of preparations for invasion essential to a successful defence strategy. It is equally important that decision-makers in Taiwan and the US base their judgements on sources of information that both can trust. The more AI and machine learning are adopted by the US to monitor and assess China’s intentions towards Taiwan, including any indications of a possible military build-up or preparations for invasion, the more important it becomes for Taiwan to keep pace and not allow a gap to open in terms of a common standard for indications and warnings.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A successful invasion of Taiwan would require large amounts of materiel to cross the Taiwan Strait, making the underwater battlefield of particular importance. It is therefore natural that Taiwan is strongly incentivised to develop autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) powered by AI technology. The National Sun Yat-sen University successfully built Taiwan’s first marine-specific AUV with AI capabilities in 2020. It leverages AI and deep learning for object recognition, tracking, obstacle avoidance and self-correction during underwater operations. By integrating AI into autonomous systems, Taiwan can extend its operational reach and capabilities, enabling unmanned platforms to operate in contested environments and execute missions with minimal human oversight.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The air domain has a twofold importance for Taiwan’s defence – as a means by which an invasion force could arrive, and as a means by which Taiwan’s own forces could be degraded or destroyed in advance of an invasion. According to the 2022 National Defense Technology Trend Assessment Report published in late 2022 by Taiwan’s defense think tank, the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense believes that drones should be the focus of Taiwan’s asymmetric warfare weaponry development. NCSIST, the main R&amp;D organisation of the Armament Bureau of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, is developing AI-enabled weapon systems related to the use of drones.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>Third, the British Army must field hard-kill C-UAS capabilities. Software updates to existing RWS on British vehicles should be used to enable them to engage UAS. More importantly, the effective C-UAS interceptors developed and fielded in Ukraine should have their production scaled through the international drone coalition, which the UK leads. This is beneficial to Ukraine now. But the scale of production should also be used to equip British forces at the same unit price as Ukrainian forces are equipped. These interceptors should be given to British support weapons companies.</p> +<p>In conclusion, the integration of AI into Taiwan’s military is already offering many opportunities to enhance operational effectiveness and strengthen deterrence. As AI continues to advance, Taiwan must invest in R&amp;D, talent acquisition and international collaboration to harness the full potential of AI technologies and secure its position as a resilient and capable force for peace and stability in the region.</p> -<p>The acquisition of a SPAAG system for the UK to provide dedicated hard-kill C-UAS coverage at battalion level does require a more deliberate acquisition programme. However, the new Labour government has previously suggested that strengthening Anglo-German defence and industrial collaboration is a priority. The acquisition of a SPAAG turret module for the Anglo-German Boxer would be a possible area for such cooperation, given proven German expertise in SPAAG design. An important consideration for the UK is that using the wheeled Boxer for ground manoeuvre alongside armour will require troops to dismount off the objective and advance on foot, rather than fighting, like a tracked infantry fighting vehicle, onto the objective. In this context, however, a suitable cannon with high elevation angles could allow Boxers to hold back and provide both direct suppressive fire against ground targets with the vehicle hull down, and C-UAS protection over troops moving forward. This is probably the fastest and most plausible route to regenerating a sufficient density of C-UAS/SHORAD systems in the relevant timeframe, and would fit well within Boxer’s inherent capabilities and limitations.</p> +<h3 id="challenges-and-recommendations-for-taiwans-future-military-use-of-ai">CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TAIWAN’S FUTURE MILITARY USE OF AI</h3> -<p>For brigade and point defence C-UAS capability, the fielding of directed-energy weapons appears to be an increasingly practical proposition. The translation of a capability such as Dragonfire onto a land platform should be a priority. Integration of such a system is, however, likely to take time. In the meantime, a more immediate solution would be the acquisition of Supacat HMT vehicles carrying AIM-132 ASRAAM for UK forces. Tried and tested in Ukraine, this is a cheap option, not so much because of the cost of the ASRAAM missiles, but because increasing the stockpile of these missiles is of direct benefit to the RAF, which uses the ASRAAM as its primary within-visual-range air-to-air missile for Typhoon and F-35B. Therefore, investment in additional missile procurement tranches as a C-UAS stopgap will not be wasted if/when the British Army ultimately pivots away from the platform towards a more mature future SHORAD and medium-range air defence (MRAD) capability. The Supacat HMT is also a vehicle that can have a range of useful roles within the army beyond the utilisation of that particular weapons system. The deliberate development of a low-cost interceptor to augment higher-performance anti-aircraft missiles on a future deployable MRAD system should be a longer-term priority.</p> +<p>This section lays out seven principal challenges faced by Taiwan in advancing the implementation of AI for military functions, and makes recommendations for how to address them to continue its necessary tilt towards AI.</p> -<p>For higher-echelon EW, the highest payoff area of priority is likely to be localisation defeat, or the ability to determine a UAS’s self-localisation process and disrupt it. The equipment and effects involved in this are not the primary bottleneck. The most significant bottleneck will be personnel with appropriate training and expertise. The priority, therefore, should be to expand the number of personnel in this field.</p> +<h4 id="challenge-1-data-security-and-privacy-concerns">CHALLENGE 1: DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONCERNS</h4> -<p>Finally, fielding any significant C-UAS capability – and in particular the EW effects necessary to protect the force – depends on realistic training. The inability to use EW effects on exercise areas is a major impediment to the readiness of the army. The MoD should aim to establish areas where EW capabilities can be experimented with during live exercises, and if this cannot be done in physical training, it should be replicated in a synthetic environment. It is especially important that formations practise and understand how to use and deconflict their sensors, communications and EW without saturating their own frequencies. Although the need to confront commanders with EMS deconfliction and balance-of-risk judgements between connectivity and electronic protection is something that can be trained in simulators to some extent, the practical testing of all relevant systems at echelon requires live exercises.</p> +<p>Information has always been vital in war, but in modern warfare, information – data – is the foundation for leveraging the power of AI to deliver military advantage. Implementing AI in military operations requires vast amounts of data, including information about tactics, personnel and equipment. Military drones with the latest sensors capture live intelligence on enemy movements and send the data to command centres for analysis.</p> -<p>An effective C-UAS capability across the force is a non-discretionary requirement to be able to sustainably operate on the modern battlefield. A force that has not prepared for this challenge risks finding itself in the position of the Armenians in 2020 – unable to resupply, rotate units, concentrate forces for manoeuvre or achieve operational surprise without taking unsustainable casualties. Defeating current and likely future classes of battlefield UAS, including those with high levels of autonomy, is not intrinsically complex, nor is it difficult compared with developing ballistic missile defences or space capabilities; the requisite sensors, effectors and TTPs all exist and are mostly available off the shelf. There is no justification for complacency, or delay.</p> +<p>More data can only be beneficial if the problems of information overload can be managed and the data can be reliably fused into a single picture. Algorithms and machine learning find patterns, trends and problems in big data, helping to turn raw data into useful information, and helping leaders to make decisions and plan ahead. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense is implementing standardised protocols and secure cloud infrastructure to overcome information silos. This network lets data flow between different organisations, helping them work together and understand the operational landscape better.</p> -<hr /> +<p>However, ensuring the security and privacy of this data presents a significant challenge. Concerns include unauthorised access, data breaches and exploitation by adversaries. Military personnel are encouraged to share information through user-friendly tools and platforms that let people in different places work together. But it is vital to ensure sharing technology is used properly.</p> -<p><strong>Jack Watling</strong> is the Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. He works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation and assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts. Jack’s PhD examined the evolution of Britain’s policy responses to civil war in the early 20th century. Jack has worked extensively on Ukraine, Iraq, Yemen, Mali, Rwanda and further afield. He is a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC.</p> +<h4 id="recommendations">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> -<p><strong>Justin Bronk</strong> is the Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology in the Military Sciences research group at RUSI, and Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal. Justin holds a Professor II position at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy and is a member of the Editorial Board of the scientific and technical journal Weapons and Equipment at the Central Scientific Research Institute of Arms and Military Equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.</p>Jack Watling and Justin BronkThis paper outlines the core tasks and capabilities required by NATO members to provide coherent, layered protection from uncrewed aerial systems.China’s Legal War Over Taiwan2024-10-15T12:00:00+08:002024-10-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/chinas-legal-war-over-taiwan<p><em>This report unpacks China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law (ASL) and analyzes how China uses it as an evolving tool of legal warfare.</em></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Use encryption to protect data stored on computers and sent over the internet.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Implement secure communication protocols to ensure that data transmitted between systems remains protected from interception or tampering.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Restrict access to data to authorised personnel.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Verify user identities for accessing sensitive information.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Prioritise anonymisation and pseudonymisation techniques to de-identify sensitive data, reducing the risk of exposure in the event of a breach while still allowing for meaningful analysis and use.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Engage advanced encryption to protect sensitive data during transmission and storage.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Use secure cloud infrastructure for scalable processing with robust access controls and data isolation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Use strict data-handling protocols, such as applying anonymisation and secure deletion procedures.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Ensure continuous improvement based on feedback from military units, enhancing both performance and security.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US DoD’s Project Maven, which uses AI for object recognition in military imagery and video data, makes use of advanced encryption and secure cloud infrastructure to protect the sensitive data used in its AI-powered object recognition systems for military intelligence.</code></em></p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<h4 id="challenge-2-transparency-and-explainability">CHALLENGE 2: TRANSPARENCY AND EXPLAINABILITY</h4> -<p>In 2005, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) passed the Anti-Secession Law (ASL), a critical piece of domestic legislation that outlines Beijing’s approach to Taiwan and establishes a legal basis for it to force Taiwan’s unification through coercive and military means. Although the legislation was initially viewed as symbolic and mostly intended to constrain more hawkish tendencies within the PRC toward Taiwan, this has changed in the past two decades. In recent years, China has increasingly leveraged the ASL to legitimize its approach toward Taiwan and to dissuade foreign countries, organizations, and individuals from supporting and deepening ties with the island.</p> +<p>Many AI techniques, such as deep learning, are “black boxes”, in which the decision-making process is not transparent or easily explainable to human operators and decision-makers. Interpretable AI can help to identify potential biases or errors in the decision-making process, which is crucial for high-stakes military applications.</p> -<p>On June 21, 2024, the Chinese government cited the ASL in announcing a new and important interpretation of China’s Criminal Law that it had adopted in late May. It laid out the “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (hereafter referred to as the “22 Articles”), which impose criminal punishment on leaders and advocates of Taiwan independence. Punishment in circumstances deemed severe includes the death penalty. This was a marked shift from the relatively vague ASL: China has now laid out precise crimes of secession that it will punish.</p> +<h4 id="recommendations-1">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> -<p>To assess these critical developments, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) cohosted a conference with Taiwan’s Prospect Foundation in Taipei on August 6, 2024. The conference brought together leading international experts to analyze China’s legal warfare and the ASL, focusing on three main topics: (1) how China might use the ASL and the 22 Articles; (2) the legal basis and relevance of China’s ASL and the 22 Articles; and (3) how the international community should respond. This report compiles the expert analysis presented and shared at the international conference.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Develop more transparent and interpretable AI models that allow military personnel to understand the “reasoning” behind the system’s decisions, enabling better oversight and trust in the technology.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Utilise research on AI explainability and visualisation techniques to improve the understandability of military AI systems. Visualisation techniques such as saliency maps and feature importance plots can help human operators quickly comprehend the factors influencing an AI system’s outputs.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h4 id="main-themes-and-lessons-learned">Main Themes and Lessons Learned</h4> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Explainable AI (XAI) programme, which ended in 2021, aimed to produce more transparent machine learning models while maintaining high performance, applicable to military decision-support systems.</code></em></p> -<p>One important question that conference participants debated was whether the ASL should be viewed as more of a legal document or a policy document. Consisting of 10 articles, the law is relatively short and vague compared to other Chinese legislation. Yu-Jie Chen and Donald Clarke point out that the ASL does not constrain or expand China’s options because it does not authorize the Chinese government to do anything it could not do before; it also does not contain implementation guidelines, sanctions, enforcement mechanisms, or independent judicial oversight.</p> +<h4 id="challenge-3-robustness-and-reliability">CHALLENGE 3: ROBUSTNESS AND RELIABILITY</h4> -<p>I-Chung Lai explains that the law stipulates a process for China to employ non-peaceful means against Taiwan in which the PRC Central Military Commission and State Council must agree on a course of action and then report the decision to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee. This process may have slowed down the desire of hardline PRC actors to use force against Taiwan during the Hu Jintao era, but it is unlikely to constrain Xi Jinping given the concentration of power within his hands. Jacques deLisle is also skeptical that the ASL could durably or reliably constrain PRC activities toward Taiwan now or if both sides were to engage in unification negotiations and Taiwan were to unify with China.</p> +<p>AI systems have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks that can drastically reduce their performance, posing risks in high-stakes military applications. Robust security measures, such as adversarial training and model hardening, can help harden AI systems against intentional attacks designed to deceive or disable them.</p> -<p>However, if the ASL is viewed as a legal document, there are five main themes and findings experts highlighted:</p> +<h4 id="recommendations-2">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>China violates its own ASL and does not uphold some of the articles within the legislation that promote peaceful unification.</strong> Article 5 specifically states that China should do its utmost to ensure peaceful unification, and Article 6 details the activities China should engage in to induce this. Furthermore, Article 7 mentions that consultations and negotiations on unification should be conducted on “an equal footing” between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I-Chung Lai, Bonny Lin, and Wen-Hsuan Tsai observe that China has been far from abiding by these articles in recent years and has opted for a more coercive implementation of the ASL. Chi-Ting Tsai adds that China’s recurring threats and military actions around Taiwan undermine the principles outlined in these ASL articles.</p> + <p>Implement robust security measures to protect AI models from external manipulation.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>The legal language used in the ASL and the 22 Articles is vague and inconsistent.</strong> The ASL rests on China’s claims over Taiwan and not the de facto reality that Taiwan is not governed by China. Jacques deLisle argues that China deliberately framed the ASL in terms of “anti-secession” as opposed to “reunification” to create ambiguity in timelines and future actions while still being able to insist on the PRC’s broad claim over Taiwan’s sovereignty. Yeh-chung Lu observes that the ASL sets a vaguer set of conditions for the use of non-peaceful measures than what China had set forward before 2000, leaving room for unilateral interpretation. Margaret Lewis explains that the 22 Articles impose more severe punishment on those who are ringleaders and “die-hard” Taiwan “separatists” but does not provide any clear criteria for how to judge who falls into either category. Eric Poon furthers that the ambiguity of the ASL and the 22 Articles violated multiple fundamental parameters of the rule of law.</p> + <p>Continuously monitor for new vulnerabilities and develop countermeasures.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>The ASL has been used in PRC domestic litigation and provides a legal foundation upon which Beijing has passed additional legislation and interpretations.</strong> Donald Clarke points out that although the ASL’s impact on domestic litigation to date has been very slight, there was one case in which Chinese domestic courts cited the ASL to fine a PRC company, which could set a precedent for broader application of the ASL. The law also provided a basis for the 22 Articles released in May 2024 that impose punishment for not only what Beijing views as major acts leading to Taiwan’s independence but also any minor efforts Beijing perceives as Taiwan “salami slicing” its way toward independence.</p> + <p>Use continuous monitoring and rapid response to emerging vulnerabilities. This is crucial to maintaining the reliability of military AI systems in the face of evolving threats.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Compared with how other countries deal with questions about secession, China’s ASL and the 22 Articles are repressive and do not consider the obligations states have under international human rights law.</strong> Conference participants viewed the 22 Articles as representing a major escalation of PRC intimidation against Taiwan. Julian Ku highlights that the ASL and 22 Articles’ criminalization of secession activities is far more punitive and expansive in scope compared with most countries in that it bans even nonviolent support for Taiwan’s independence. Margaret Lewis suggests that the political nature of the new guidelines proposed in the 22 Articles would mean that the court is unlikely to rule “not guilty” for any secession-related acts. Furthermore, Raymond Sung and Donald Clarke argue that the 22 Articles’ linkage of the ASL and the PRC Criminal Law allows Beijing to persecute secession-related acts not just by Taiwan citizens in Taiwan, but by anyone of any nationality anywhere in the world. Sung flags that even scholars who provide a historical narrative that contradicts the PRC position on the island could be punished by Beijing.</p> + <p>Limit external access to critical AI models and defence techniques, which can help prevent adversaries from reverse-engineering or exploiting these systems.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>Many conference participants argued that China is far from a country governed by the rule of law and that existing legislation can be interpreted and applied differently over time. Instead, China passes legislation to rule by law and attempt to legitimize its policy. As a policy document, Beijing uses the ASL in several ways:</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US Army Research Laboratory is developing AI systems that can detect and resist adversarial attacks, particularly for image recognition systems used in military applications.</code></em></p> + +<h4 id="challenge-4-technological-limitations-and-integration-complexity">CHALLENGE 4: TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS AND INTEGRATION COMPLEXITY</h4> + +<p>Deploying AI systems in military environments often involves integrating complex technologies across diverse platforms and systems. Compatibility issues, interoperability challenges and limitations in AI capabilities may hinder seamless integration and adoption.</p> + +<h4 id="recommendations-3">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>The ASL legitimizes China’s overarching stance on — and relationship with — Taiwan.</strong> Jacques deLisle and Vincent Chao explain that the ASL and and the 22 Articles provide Beijing’s legal basis for its position that Taiwan is part of PRC territory and reflects China’s master narrative on Taiwan. As Chao notes, the ASL stipulates that unification with Taiwan is the only acceptable outcome and that Beijing precludes the possibility of indefinite continuation of the status quo. Margaret Lewis highlights that although “Taiwan authorities” are mentioned in the ASL, they are portrayed as passive objects of the Chinese state.</p> + <p>Design AI systems with modular and scalable architectures to facilitate integration with existing military infrastructure.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>It creates a (false) narrative that Taiwan bears the responsibility and blame for any PRC use of non-peaceful means against the island.</strong> Jacques deLisle explains that the ASL establishes the legal status quo that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. This then casts any potential Chinese use of coercion or force against Taiwan as defensive and preserving the status quo. Yu-Jie Chen further notes that the 22 Articles stigmatize Taiwan political figures, labeling them as “criminals” to discredit them and their causes.</p> + <p>Prioritise interoperability standards and protocols to ensure compatibility across different platforms and systems.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>The ASL makes clear that in any armed conflict with Taiwan, China does not consider itself bound by the international law of armed conflict.</strong> Donald Clarke explains that the ASL justifies any and all PRC means to maintain its territorial integrity and claims over Taiwan — contradicting international law and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. In other words, even if countries view the PRC as the sole and legitimate government of China, its ASL is problematic from the perspective of international law.</p> + <p>Conduct rigorous testing and evaluation of AI systems in realistic operational environments to identify and address technological limitations and performance gaps.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>It unilaterally justifies a wide range of actions and legislative actions.</strong> Conference experts point out the evolution of how the PRC interpreted and used the ASL over time. Donald Clarke and Yu-Jie Chen note that the law’s vague language is compatible with both friendly and coercive approaches to unification. Specifically, Yu-Jie Chen argues that the ambiguity of Article 8 of the ASL, which outlines conditions for deploying non-peaceful means for unification, grants China broad discretion in its timeline and methods for forcefully unifying with Taiwan.</p> + <p>Implement iterative development processes to refine AI algorithms and improve system capabilities over time.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>It seeks to deter countries, organizations, and individuals from supporting Taiwan.</strong> Bonny Lin and Donald Clarke highlight Beijing’s intent to use the ASL to deter international support for Taiwan, with Clarke noting that the lawfare strategy behind the ASL aims to have a chilling effect on other nations’ diplomatic and military engagements with Taiwan. Ken Jimbo and Mark Harrison, however, point out that China’s ASL and threats to use force against Taiwan have caused Japan and Australia to invest more in their respective defense capabilities to prevent regional instability.</p> + <p>Pool resources and share knowledge, which can accelerate technological advances and facilitate smoother integration of AI into military operations.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Foster collaboration and partnerships with industry, academia and allies to leverage expertise and resources in AI research and development.</p> </li> </ul> -<h4 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h4> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System uses a modular, open-systems approach to integrate AI capabilities across multiple platforms and domains. This approach enables rapid adaptation to new technologies and threats while maintaining cross-branch and allied forces interoperability.</code></em></p> -<p>In light of the multifaceted implications of the ASL and the 22 Articles, the conference panelists offer three key recommendations for the United States, its allies, and the international community:</p> +<h4 id="challenge-5-insufficient-training-data">CHALLENGE 5: INSUFFICIENT TRAINING DATA</h4> + +<p>Many military applications lack the large, high-quality datasets typically required to train effective AI models using machine learning.</p> + +<h4 id="recommendations-4">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>The United States and close allies and partners should engage in more proactive information campaigns to protest the ASL and the 22 Articles diplomatically and publicly and counter China’s cognitive warfare.</strong> This includes educating the public about the ASL and the 22 Articles, particularly how China is falling short of embracing peaceful means to seek unification and how its redlines for using force against Taiwan, as well as its definition and criminalization of “secessionist” activities, are repressive and not in line with international norms. Governments should also inform their citizens of the risks of traveling to China if individuals have expressed views on Taiwan that do not align with Beijing’s.</p> + <p>When dealing with limited training data, techniques such as data augmentation can be employed to artificially expand the dataset. This includes methods such as cropping, flipping, rotating or adding noise to existing data samples. While not a complete solution, data augmentation can help increase the diversity and size of training datasets.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Instead of training models from scratch on limited data, transfer learning allows leveraging of models pre-trained on large, general datasets and then fine-tuning them on the smaller, domain-specific military datasets. This can significantly reduce data requirements while still achieving good performance.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>For certain military use cases such as simulations or scenario modelling, it may be possible to generate synthetic training data using rule-based systems, physics engines or generative adversarial networks. While ensuring realism is crucial, synthetic data can supplement real-world data to increase the overall training dataset size.</p> + </li> +</ul> - <p>To date, there has been a relatively muted official U.S. or allied government response to the ASL. The United States should reassess the public and private positions it takes on both PRC measures and directly express concern to Beijing. The United States and allies and partners should also refute false claims by China that its 22 Articles are “normal” and in line with how other countries criminally punish “separatists.”</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US Air Force’s Dataworks initiative aims to create high-quality diverse datasets for AI training in military applications, addressing the challenge of limited data in sensitive contexts. This initiative is crucial for overcoming data-scarcity challenges in developing AI for sensitive military applications.</code></em></p> - <p>Taking a clear position will be of growing importance moving forward. Vincent Chao points out that 2025 is the twentieth anniversary of the ASL, and there is a possibility that Beijing could use this milestone to announce new interpretations or additions to the legislation. Wen-Hsuan Tsai believes that if China seeks to make significant progress on Taiwan by 2027 or beyond, it will need to either amend or revise the ASL. This could involve issuing more implementation details, clarifying how it will determine whether the possibilities of peaceful unification have been exhausted, or passing a unification law.</p> +<h4 id="challenge-6-keeping-pace-with-rapid-ai-advances">CHALLENGE 6: KEEPING PACE WITH RAPID AI ADVANCES</h4> + +<p>AI is changing fast, so it is challenging for the military’s testing and use to keep pace with developments in the technology.</p> + +<h4 id="recommendations-5">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>Agile development allows the military to be more responsive to the fast-paced changes in AI, rather than relying on traditional, lengthy procurement processes.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>The international community should bolster legal and institutional frameworks to counter China’s use of the ASL as a tool of legal warfare and diplomatic coercion.</strong> Conference participants recommend that countries should not physically remove or extradite people to China who face criminal prosecutions for their views on Taiwan. Yu-Jie Chen and Chi-Ting Tsai highlight that strengthening international laws and norms, particularly within organizations such as Interpol, can be critical to reducing malign PRC actions. Meia Nouwens points to the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in 2022 to not extradite a Taiwan national in Poland to China as an example of a measure that will shield individuals from the 22 Articles.</p> + <p>Continuous integration and testing help ensure new AI systems are thoroughly vetted before being deployed in operational environments.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Given China’s evolving views of secession and greater use of coercive tools against Taiwan, the United States and partners in the Indo-Pacific should take seriously China’s willingness to use non-peaceful means against Taiwan and should enhance defense and security cooperation.</strong> Ken Jimbo advocates for deeper U.S.-Japan collaboration on Taiwan-related issues. Similarly, Mark Harrison notes that Australia, which has vital economic stakes in the region, should develop hard-power capabilities to deter regional instability. Meanwhile, Ian Chong expresses concern over Southeast Asian states’ relative lack of attention to cross-Strait issues. I-Chung Lai suggests that one possible early indication and warning that China may seek to use significant force is if Beijing activates the process described in the ASL that requires the PRC State Council, Central Military Commission, and People’s Congress to be on the same page.</p> + <p>Investing in internal AI R&amp;D helps the military stay ahead of the curve and develop custom solutions tailored to its specific needs.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Attracting and retaining skilled AI researchers and engineers ensures the military has the necessary expertise to effectively leverage the latest advances.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Collaborating with academic and industry partners can help the military access the latest AI innovations and knowledge.</p> </li> </ul> -<h4 id="roadmap">Roadmap</h4> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US DoD’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) uses an agile development approach, allowing for rapid prototyping and iteration of AI systems. This approach allows JAIC to keep pace with rapid advancements in AI technology while ensuring that developed systems meet the specific needs of the military.</code></em></p> -<p>This report is divided into three sections: (1) an overview and background of the ASL and the 22 Articles; (2) legal analysis of the ASL and the 22 Articles; and (3) perspectives on the implications for specific countries, regions, and the international community.</p> +<h4 id="challenge-7-ethical-and-legal-implications">CHALLENGE 7: ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS</h4> -<p>There are four commentaries from U.S. and Taiwan experts who examine the origin and evolution of the ASL:</p> +<p>AI raises complex ethical and legal issues around autonomy, compliance with international law and accountability for AI-driven decisions and actions.</p> + +<h4 id="recommendations-6">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> <ul> <li> - <p>I-Chung Lai presents a close analysis of the political context surrounding the passing of the ASL by the PRC National People’s Congress in 2005.</p> + <p>Develop comprehensive ethical guidelines and frameworks specific to the use of AI in military contexts. Ensure that these guidelines address issues such as human oversight, accountability and the responsible use of autonomous systems.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Bonny Lin evaluates China’s political calculus for passing the ASL.</p> + <p>Engage with and draw on the work of international processes set up to explore and develop regulation on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) in the context of international humanitarian law, such as the Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS at the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Wen-Hsuan Tsai cautions about the increased willingness of the Chinese leadership to intensify cross-Strait tensions through revising the ASL as a part of Xi’s legal authoritarianism.</p> + <p>Ensure military AI applications comply with national and international regulations, including regulations governing the use of force, data protection and human rights.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Vincent Chao considers three ways Beijing can leverage the ASL in its Taiwan strategy.</p> + <p>Conduct legal reviews and assessments to identify and mitigate potential legal risks.</p> </li> -</ul> - -<p>There are six legal analyses on the legality and legal implications of the ASL and the 22 Articles:</p> - -<ul> <li> - <p>Jacques deLisle provides an in-depth analysis on the legal implications of the ASL for China’s Taiwan strategy.</p> + <p>Foster transparency in AI systems by providing clear documentation of their capabilities, limitations and decision-making processes.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Yu-Jie Chen presents a careful analysis of China’s use of the ASL for lawfare and the international legal implications of China’s lawfare strategies.</p> + <p>Establish mechanisms for accountability, including processes for reviewing and auditing AI-related decisions and actions.</p> </li> +</ul> + +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The UK Ministry of Defence has established an AI Ethics Advisory Panel to provide external advice and scrutiny of its AI development and deployment, ensuring alignment with ethical principles and legal requirements.</code></em></p> + +<h3 id="conclusion">CONCLUSION</h3> + +<p>AI appears to offer significant military advantages in terms of strategy (especially information processing and C2), operational capabilities, logistics and support. However, navigating the complexities of implementing AI in the military field requires careful consideration of not only technological capabilities but also ethical and organisational challenges.</p> + +<p>In Taiwan’s case, where material imbalances and political dependencies dominate the risks of conflict, those responsible for the island’s defence cannot afford to neglect any aspect of AI’s potential to gain time and level the playing field. Embracing AI in the military fosters a culture of innovation and adaptability to stay ahead of emerging threats and technological advances. By investing in R&amp;D and fostering collaboration with international partners, Taiwan can design military AI systems with modular and scalable architectures that can accommodate updates and upgrades as the technology evolves, as well as remaining interoperable with its key ally, the US.</p> + +<p>By identifying and mitigating risks proactively, Taiwan’s military can make gains beyond enhancing its own defensive capabilities. Keeping up with the rapid pace of AI development through the recommendations in this paper will enable the military to more effectively integrate and leverage the latest AI innovations to maintain a world-class technological edge, making Taiwan a globally more attractive defence industry partner. The combination of Taiwan’s industrial and technological and skills base, experience in AI research and experimentation, and the pressures of its defence challenges position it to take a lead on the military application of AI.</p> + +<p>Ultimately, Taiwan must embrace military AI because its adversary uses it, and so does its ally, and Taiwan must align with them on critical defence judgements and for interoperability. Taiwan needs AI to offset its scale disadvantages in demographics and material capability. AI-powered automation can multiply the number of platforms without the need for large personnel outlays. Gains in administrative and logistic efficiency permit scarce military personnel to focus their efforts on more critical missions and tasks, thereby maximising operational effectiveness.</p> + +<p>Given the complex geopolitical situation and rapid advances in military AI, Taiwan faces a critical decision regarding the immediate development of AI for military use.</p> + +<h4 id="key-considerations">KEY CONSIDERATIONS</h4> + +<p>Key considerations for the Taiwanese government include:</p> + +<ol> <li> - <p>Donald Clarke lays out an extensive discussion on how the ASL and the 22 Articles were developed and their legal effects.</p> + <p>Strategic necessity: AI development is likely to be crucial for Taiwan’s asymmetric defence strategy against potential threats from China. As China continues to advance its military AI capabilities, Taiwan needs to develop countermeasures to maintain a credible deterrent. AI could significantly enhance Taiwan’s surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning systems, providing a vital edge in situational awareness and response time.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Julian Ku compares the 22 Articles with the criminalization of secessionist acts in the United States and other countries.</p> + <p>Technological readiness: Taiwan has a strong technological foundation, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing, which could support AI development. However, it may face challenges in terms of data availability, computational power and specialised expertise for military AI applications. Careful assessment of these capabilities is necessary to ensure effective development and deployment.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Margaret Lewis analyzes the language of the ASL and the 22 Articles and discusses their legal implications, specifically what could constitute punishable secessionist acts by China’s Criminal Law.</p> + <p>Economic considerations: Given Taiwan’s limited defence budget compared to China’s, investing in AI could be a cost-effective way to enhance military capabilities. AI systems could potentially provide force multiplication effects, allowing Taiwan to do more with less. However, the initial investment and ongoing maintenance costs must be carefully weighed against other defence priorities.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Raymond Sung gives a detailed review of the 22 Articles and the political agenda behind the document’s weaponization of criminal jurisdiction.</p> + <p>Operational impact: Integrating AI into military operations will require significant changes in training, doctrine and organisational structure. Taiwan’s military will need to develop new skills and competencies to effectively utilise AI systems. Additionally, robust cyber-security measures must be implemented to protect AI systems from potential attacks or manipulation.</p> </li> -</ul> +</ol> -<p>On the implications of the ASL for the broader international community, there are five analyses and regional perspectives on how Japan, Southeast Asia, Australia, and Europe view the ASL and cross-Strait affairs:</p> +<p>To mitigate risks and accelerate the development and integration of AI capabilities in the military, Taiwan should consider:</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Chi-Ting Tsai explores the implications of the ASL for the broader international community and highlights the need to strengthen international institutions so that they can counter both this legislation and China’s exploitation of international laws to assert territorial claims.</p> - </li> +<ol> <li> - <p>Ken Jimbo discusses Japanese perspectives on navigating cross-Strait relations in the context of the ASL.</p> + <p>Focusing on specific AI applications that address critical defence needs.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Ian Chong assesses most Southeast Asian states’ general avoidance of Taiwan issues and their respective One China policies.</p> + <p>Leveraging international partnerships, particularly with the US, for technology sharing and expertise.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Mark Harrison analyzes the shifts in Australia’s strategy toward cross-Strait tensions.</p> + <p>Investing in education and training programmes to build a skilled workforce for AI development and implementation.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Meia Nouwens explains the muted EU response to the ASL and the varying approaches different EU states have taken on Taiwan.</p> + <p>Prioritising cyber security and resilience in AI system design and deployment.</p> </li> -</ul> +</ol> -<blockquote> - <h2 id="section-i">Section I</h2> - <h2 id="origin-and-evolution-of-the-anti-secession-law">Origin and Evolution of the Anti-Secession Law</h2> -</blockquote> +<p>In conclusion, while there are challenges and risks associated with rapidly developing military AI, the strategic necessity for Taiwan appears to outweigh these concerns. In addition, China’s growing military capabilities, its future ambitions and the potential for AI to serve as a force multiplier make it crucial for Taiwan to consider prioritising the development of military AI applications. However, this should be done thoughtfully, with careful consideration of ethical implications, international norms and the need for robust security measures.</p> -<h3 id="the-political-context-and-origins-of-chinas-anti-secession-law">The Political Context and Origins of China’s Anti-Secession Law</h3> +<hr /> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="i-chung-lai">I-Chung Lai</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>Cheng-Hung Hsu</strong> is the Chief of Operations Control at Taiwan’s Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command. His research interests include cyber security, defence strategy and Indo-Pacific policy. He holds a BA in Electronic Engineering and is a graduate of the Republic of China Air Force Air Command and Staff College.</p>Cheng-Hung HsuIncreasing cross-strait tensions between China and Taiwan suggest the need for the latter to look into the advantages offered by new defence approaches. With a defence budget vastly outpaced by China, Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept recognises a need to look to cutting-edge technologies to offset scale imbalances.Russia’s Sarmat Test Failure2024-10-22T12:00:00+08:002024-10-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/russias-sarmat-test-failure<p><em>The failure of Russia’s recent RS-28 Sarmat ICBM test points to potential propulsion issues, complicating Moscow’s strategic deterrent and future nuclear balance calculations.</em></p> -<h4 id="introduction-1">Introduction</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>The 2005 Anti-Secession Law (ASL) marked China’s effort to codify state responses in relation to what it perceived as “Taiwan independence action,” stating that such activities would induce Beijing to use non-peaceful means to prevent Taiwan from separating from China. The passage of this law raised strong opposition from the Taiwan government to the extent that it conducted a state-sponsored, island-wide rally against it. The law may have also caused the United States and Japan to publicly state in 2005 that they have the shared strategic objective of encouraging “the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.” Prior to that, the last time the Taiwan issue was included in the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee was in 1969, thus demonstrating the seriousness of their joint collective response to the passage of the ASL.</p> +<p>On 24 September 2024, Russia conducted a test of the RS-28 Sarmat heavy liquid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which was likely a catastrophic failure. Satellite imagery showed heavy damage to the Plesetsk Cosmodrome as well as fires in the woods surrounding the test site. This commentary will assess the potential causes of the test failure as well as its ramifications.</p> -<p>At the time, it was assumed that China had designed the ASL to counter Taiwan’s Referendum Law and its related activities. After Taiwan passed the referendum law in 2003, former president Chen Shui-bian held two referenda concurrently with the 2004 presidential election. Although both referenda failed due to insufficient participation, China was still concerned about the possibility that new ones could be passed to bring formal Taiwan independence into reality.</p> +<h3 id="causes-of-the-test-failure">Causes of the Test Failure</h3> -<p>However, this reasoning cannot explain why China did not resort to similar actions during Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election when both major parties proposed referenda related to Taiwan’s participation in the United Nations. The Kuomintang (KMT) proposed a referendum on whether the “Republic of China” should “return to the United Nations,” while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) proposed a referendum on “Taiwan” joining the United Nations as a new member. However, the KMT asked its supporters not to participate in the DPP referendum vote, leading both referenda to fail to obtain enough votes again. Although both referenda would seemingly have been perceived as violating the PRC’s redline defined in the ASL, Beijing did not do anything to prevent them from happening.</p> +<p>At this point, it cannot be known with any degree of certainty precisely why the test launch failed, though some early analysis suggests that the first stage booster of the missile suffered a catastrophic mechanical failure. However, it is possible to extrapolate from what is known about the missile and its design to generate hypotheses for further discussion.</p> -<p>In retrospect, it seems the ASL was Hu Jintao’s effort to both pacify and constrain the hardliners within his party on the issue of Taiwan. Hu preferred to focus on economic development and saw actions on Taiwan as a distraction. What the ASL did was transform the issue of Taiwan independence from a political question into a legal one. Although this law is still vague about what does not constitute “Taiwan independence” action, it did attach a procedure for enacting “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan — implementation of which could signal possible Chinese military action.</p> +<p>At first blush, it would seem odd that a failure of the propulsion system should have occurred. The PDU-99 rocket engine of the RS-28 is understood by many to be a derivative of the RD-274 employed on the R-36M2, Russia’s current silo-based ICBM. The RD-274 is a mature design, variants of which have been employed since the mid-1980s. The fuel mix of UDMH (unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine) and N202 is not especially volatile by the standards of liquid fuel, and has been employed on the R-36 series for several decades. On first inspection, then, the poor performance of the three-stage Sarmat vis the two-stage R-36 is a puzzle.</p> -<h4 id="the-cross-strait-relationship-before-the-passage-of-the-anti-secession-law">The Cross-Strait Relationship Before the Passage of the Anti-Secession Law</h4> +<p>Part of the answer for the difficulties that the Russians are facing may be available in the statements made by Vladimir Putin when the project was announced. Putin claimed that the missile has a shorter boost stage than previous generations of liquid-fuelled ICBMs, ostensibly a means of making interception by missile defences more difficult. While no missile could entirely avoid detection by the US’s Space-Based Infrared System in its boost phase, a shorter boost phase could compress the time available for detection, classification and cueing sensors associated with midcourse intercept. This might represent a hedge against a future development such as the fielding of a US space-based sensor layer capable of tracking Russian ICBMs, the deployment of space-based interceptors (which would theoretically be capable of boost phase intercept) or the placement of longer-range ballistic missile interceptors such as those used by the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system (which was once considered) in Europe.</p> -<p>It is commonly held that the ASL was passed during a time of tense cross-Strait relations. First, the DPP won Taiwan’s 2004 presidential election through a simple majority, not the plurality it achieved in 2000. This result demonstrated that grassroots support for the DPP had increased significantly since 2000. Second, the oppsition party, KMT, was in disarray, dealing with a power struggle among its leadership after its defeat in the presidential election. Third, it was also believed that the DPP could win significantly more seats in the legislative elections later that year, allowing the party to control both the executive and legislative branches. There were rumors that the CCP would introduce a Unification Law (統一法) in 2005 to stop the DPP’s momentum and prevent Taiwan’s formal independence.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The difficulties faced by the Russian nuclear enterprise with respect to Sarmat may be a reflection of the inherent complexity of the new system’s propulsion and its lighter structure</code></em></strong></p> -<p>However, several events at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005 painted a very different picture in Taiwan.</p> +<p>From an engineering standpoint, what is noteworthy is that the viable approaches to shortening a missile’s boost phase could explain the complications faced by the RS-28. One approach to optimising the efficiency which some commentators have suggested has been used for the RS-28 is the use of a stepped liquid engine which utilises multiple combustion chambers with different pressure levels and mixes of fuel and oxidiser to optimise the acceleration of the missile for different stages in its flight. This would pose several challenges, including the fact that staged combustion creates the risk of combustion instabilities because of the variable rate of combustion which can lead to varying vibrational loads (and thus a risk of mechanical failure) as well as pogo oscillations. The latter are self-sustaining oscillations driven by resonance between pressure pulsation in the propulsion system and mechanical vibration, leading to a positive feedback loop which can result in structural damage. If a fuel-rich mix (with a high fuel to oxidiser ratio) is used in early stages, this also raises the possibility of higher levels of mechanical stress early in a missile’s launch. Similarly, higher chamber pressures in the early stages would also pose some risk of structural damage. This can interact with the decision to employ a lighter orthogrid structure for the missile’s booster casing. This structure has the advantage of cutting the booster’s weight and can add to a missile’s resilience. However, orthogrid structures can be sensitive to localised changes in the axial load, which can impact different parts of the grid asymmetrically, creating stress concentrations near weld lands. This phenomenon would be associated with a stepped engine with a high rate of combustion at earlier stages.</p> -<p>First, the Pan-Blue Coalition — the opposition alliance consisting of the KMT, the People First Party (PFP), and several smaller parties — maintained a majority (113 seats out of 225) in the legislative elections in December 2004. This meant that Chinese fears of a DPP-dominated government were not realized. Even though it remained the largest party in the legislature, the DPP’s planned constitutional revisions would surely not take place.</p> +<p>A second (albeit less likely) possibility which has been proposed by some analysts is that the RS-28 employs a pulse detonation engine which relies on distinct rapid combustion cycles (as opposed to the continuous combustion of traditional engines) to generate thermal efficiency. While Rostec has conducted tests of pulse detonation engines in the last decade, their employment on the Sarmat is uncertain. If this was attempted, however, this would provide another explanation for the missile’s failure. The challenge of employing a pulse detonation engine is that components are subjected to even more extreme stress by repeated intense detonations, which also produce a great deal more mechanical vibration than is seen in a continuous combustion engine. Although the Russian fuel mix of UDMH and N202 is relatively stable for a liquid fuel mix, any liquid-fuelled engine will be to an extent sensitive to mechanical vibrations, which can impact the stability of fuel flow to a chamber (with unpredictable effects) and can also damage the turbopumps which pressurise and deliver fuel, among other things.</p> -<p>Second, a cross-Strait charter flight began operating in 2005 for the Lunar New Year festival between January 29 and February 20. Although there had been some sporadic flights between Taiwan and mainland China before, they had to make a midway stop at Hong Kong or Macau. The 2005 direct flights thus represented another important milestone in improving the cross-Strait relationship.</p> +<p>On first examination, then, some of the plausible reasons for the Sarmat’s repeated test failures would suggest that Russia’s efforts to shorten the missile’s boost phase created complications which would not otherwise have existed, particularly if the missile uses a variant of the tried and tested RD-274 engine. If this is the case, it would be illustrative of the degree to which Russian planners regard future developments in air and missile defence as credible threats, as they will have paid a considerable price in system complexity in order to overcome these challenges. Combined with somewhat puzzling Russian investments such as the Posideon nuclear torpedo, this would suggest that Russia’s stated fears regarding missile defences were more than just a source of diplomatic leverage in engagement with the West. It would also follow that these concerns can be instrumentalised as part of a competitive strategies approach to compel less than astute choices on the part of the Russians.</p> -<p>Third, as the result of Taiwan’s 2004 legislative election, President Chen of the DPP held a meeting with PFP chairman James Soong on February 24, 2005, and came up with the “ten points consensus (扁宋十點共識).” In this statement, Chen promised not to declare Taiwan’s independence, not to change its official name from the “Republic of China,” not to change the guidelines for national unification, and not to conduct constitutional reforms that might involve Taiwan’s sovereignty.</p> +<h3 id="the-significance-of-the-latest-issues-in-a-troubled-program">The Significance of the Latest Issues in a Troubled Program</h3> -<p>President Chen may have been hoping for the DPP to team up with the PFP to create a functional majority of 123 seats in the legislature, separating from the smaller parties in the Pan-Blue Coalition. Chen reportedly also asked James Soong to bring a message to Hu Jintao on his behalf during Hu and Soong’s 2005 meeting in Beijing. It is possible that this rapprochement between the DPP, PFP, and CCP triggered the KMT’s China-friendly movement and the subsequent KMT-CCP summit due to the party’s fear of being marginalized in the cross-Strait relationship.</p> +<p>The RS-28 has had a relatively troubled history in programmatic terms. This has included repeated delays to its ejection tests (which demonstrate the ability to “cold launch” a missile from its silo with pressurised gas). The flight testing of the missile was also repeatedly delayed, and the first test launch of the Sarmat, which was meant to occur in 2020, was carried out two years later. Since this point, Sarmat has had at least one other failed flight test (as well as two tests cancelled) before September’s catastrophic failure.</p> -<p>Even Hu Jintao himself indicated during the all-important “two sessions” meeting in March 2005 that cross-Strait ties were somewhat stabilized. He mentioned that there were some “positive factors” conducive to constraining Taiwan’s independence and that there were signs of reduced tensions in the Taiwan Strait (“當前，兩岸關係中出現了一些有利於遏制“台獨”分裂活動的新的積極因素，臺海緊張局勢出現了某些緩和的跡象”).</p> +<p>The difficulties faced by the Russian nuclear enterprise with respect to Sarmat may be a reflection of the inherent complexity of the new system’s propulsion and its lighter structure. However, structural fragilities within the Russian missile design and manufacturing ecosystem have also been cited as possible causes, something exemplified by personnel shortages at Proton-PM, which manufactures the Sarmat’s propulsion system.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5XBG2gt.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Table 1: Signs China Viewed as Indicative of Reduced Cross-Strait Tensions</em></p> +<p>Irrespective of its causes, the troubled history of the RS-28 programme is significant. While Russia has a large and diversified nuclear arsenal, its silo-based ICBMs are of particular significance. Because of their size and fuel efficiency, liquid-fuelled ICBMs can carry considerably larger payloads than solid-fuelled missiles. This comes at a cost both in terms of system complexity and the time taken to prepare a missile for launch, but it also means considerable increases in the payload a missile can carry. Both the RS-28 and its predecessor, the R-36M2, can carry 10 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVS). For reference, this is three times as many as the solid-fuelled RS-24 Yars. Moreover, while silo-based missiles are static targets, they also benefit from hardening (reportedly up to 4,000 psi for R-36 silos) as well as reliable communications. Finally, unlike most other means of delivery, silo-based systems do not require as many visible preparatory steps to launch.</p> -<p>Thus, in contrast to the conventional perception that cross-Strait relations were deteriorating before the introduction of the ASL, there were various signs indicating that developments in Taiwan were actually moving in China’s preferred direction, as Hu himself acknowledged. However, those developments did not dissuade Beijing from introducing and passing the ASL.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The balance of first strike-capable systems has a psychological effect, and can shape perceptions of the strategic balance of forces as well as crisis behaviour</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="the-cross-strait-relationship-after-the-passage-of-the-asl">The Cross-Strait Relationship after the Passage of the ASL</h4> +<p>For Russia, this is important for several reasons. Firstly, the throw weight of the RS-28 is a hedge against a rapid future improvement in US strike capabilities and missile defences. According to some authors, improvements in accurate low-fallout targeting of nuclear weapons as well as the speed and penetrative capacity of conventional prompt strike weapons can allow many Russian delivery systems to be destroyed prior to launch. The challenge for missile defences would then be simplified to mopping up the remnants of Russia’s strategic forces – a task potentially made easier by space-based sensors which can enable birth-to-death tracking. The technical viability and affordability of such a counterforce strategy is highly debatable, but it seems clear that Russian leaders believe it – something evidenced by their considerable investments in novel delivery systems meant to evade missile defences. In this context, silo-based missiles are a major hedge against a first strike, since they ensure that even a small number of surviving missiles can carry considerable throw weight. This function, delivering a “deep second strike”, was a driver for MIRVing ICBMs in the Soviet era. Relatedly, the RS-28 was meant to be a delivery system for the YU-71 Avangaard hypersonic glide vehicle, itself a major part of Russia’s efforts to hedge against future US missile defences (although other missiles such as the RS-18 can also carry Avangaard).</p> -<p>Looking back, cross-Strait tensions did not significantly rise after the passage of the ASL. Not only did the KMT and CCP launch an annual forum starting in 2005, but the PFP was also invited by the CCP for a bilateral party summit and has since conducted an annual visit to China. As seen by Taiwan’s local elections in late 2005, the more independence-minded DPP was losing its grip on power and was on its way to being defeated in the 2008 presidential election.</p> +<p>Secondly, MIRVed silo-based missiles represent an important factor in the balance of first strike capabilities between Russia and the US, given that these missiles can be launched with comparatively little visible preparation. Though the question of whether the Russians have ever viewed MIRVed ICBMs in these terms is the subject of considerable debate, they nonetheless play a role in US decision-makers’ perceptions of what Albert Wohlstetter memorably called the “delicate balance of terror”. We might consider, for example, how the development of the R-36 during the Cold War influenced US perceptions of the strategic vulnerability of Minuteman silos. Even assuming that a nuclear first strike of any kind is an act of suicidal folly in all circumstances, particularly given that the US maintains a large fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, the risk of one has always been factored into US planning. The US’s most recent Nuclear Posture Review rejects the notion of forces being on a “hair trigger alert”, but reaffirms the need to minimise the risk of either a first strike or nuclear blackmail, suggesting that these are viewed as plausible outcomes. At a minimum, the balance of first strike-capable systems has a psychological effect, and can shape perceptions of the strategic balance of forces as well as crisis behaviour.</p> -<p>U.S.-China ties also improved in September 2005, when Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick described China as a “responsible stakeholder” during a speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China relations. The U.S. midterm elections in 2006 then paved the way for the nomination of Hank Paulson as secretary of treasury, a role in which he introduced the annual “U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue,” later renamed the “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue” under the Obama administration. (However, these political developments had more to do with the internal politics in Taiwan and the United States’ preoccupation with the War on Terror than with the events caused by or related to the passage of the ASL.)</p> +<p>Despite Russia’s robust nuclear deterrent, the difficulties that it is facing with respect to fielding a successor to the ageing R-36 are thus not insignificant. For this reason, it is likely that the RS-28 was accepted into service despite its patchy test record – a relatively unusual occurrence. For illustration, the R-36M2 underwent 20 successful flight tests before acceptance into service.</p> -<p>Given the improved relations between Beijing and Taipei, as well as Beijing and Washington, it seems unlikely that the ASL was intended to force reunification. Instead, as DPP legislator Lin Chou-Shui argued in his 2006 book Community: Taiwan in the World Image (共同體：世界圖像下的台灣), Hu Jintao initiated this law to make it more difficult for the CCP to decide to attack Taiwan. Lin alleged that Hu wanted to focus on economic development when the momentum for that was particularly strong but faced considerable pressure on Taiwan from hawkish elements in the leadership circle — particularly Jiang Zemin, chairman of the Central Military Commission before Hu took over the position on March 13, 2005. Theoretically, there was a period during which the army could therefore have made a military move against Taiwan without President Hu’s prior knowledge. By institutionalizing the State Council and Central Military Commission in the decisionmaking process regarding military actions against Taiwan, Lin argued, Hu was able to rein in opposition from the military. As Lin believed, Hu’s public statement that cross-Strait relations were not too dire was part of an effort to de-escalate and convince his CCP colleagues not to overreact.</p> +<p>This impacts the strategic balance in several ways. First, should challenges with the RS-28 persist to a degree that calls its reliability into question, Russian leaders’ behaviour in an escalating crisis may be impacted. For example, it may be deemed necessary to take steps such as dispersing mobile missiles earlier in a crisis than would normally be the case. Parsing and contextualising this behaviour will be important. On a more positive note, given the US’s own issues with the ageing Minuteman arsenal (due to be replaced in 2030 by Sentinel), the challenges faced by the RS-28 further limit the risk that Russia perceives itself as enjoying a relative advantage with respect to first strike capabilities. Though unlikely to lead to any form of use, such an imbalance could incentivise brinkmanship, particularly if Russian planners perceive the imbalance as a factor in US calculations of the balance of power. These assessments of how the other side views the strategic balance will become all the more complex in a context where the US will also be compelled to balance China’s growing nuclear arsenal later in the decade and beyond. The additional time bought by delays to the RS-28 can be employed to modernise the US’s silo-based ICBMs, as well as to field conventional prompt strike options and carry out future improvements in strategic missile defences. These could, collectively, be used to ensure that systems such as the RS-28 remain a Russian backstop against a Western counterforce strategy and do not come to be viewed as a means of underwriting conventional aggression backed by nuclear blackmail.</p> -<h4 id="the-asl-and-the-use-of-force-against-taiwan">The ASL and the Use of Force Against Taiwan</h4> +<hr /> -<p>Much of the focus regarding the ASL has been on Article 8, which states:</p> +<p><strong>Sidharth Kaushal</strong> is the Research Fellow for Sea Power at RUSI. His research at RUSI covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century, and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.</p>Sidharth KaushalThe failure of Russia’s recent RS-28 Sarmat ICBM test points to potential propulsion issues, complicating Moscow’s strategic deterrent and future nuclear balance calculations.Salmon Swimming Upstream2024-10-21T12:00:00+08:002024-10-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/salmon-swimming-upstream<p><em>More and more nations and companies will send mission towards the Moon over the next several years. What challenges do these space operators face and how can they be addressed?</em></p> -<blockquote> - <p>In the event that the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.</p> -</blockquote> +<excerpt /> <blockquote> - <p>The State Council and the Central Military Commission shall decide on and execute the non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as provided for in the preceding paragraph and shall promptly report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.</p> + <p><em>“I think we’re going to the moon because it’s in the nature of the human being to face challenges. It’s by the nature of his deep inner soul . . . we’re required to do these things just as salmon swim upstream.”</em></p> + <h4 id="-neil-armstrong-1969">— Neil Armstrong, 1969</h4> </blockquote> -<p>The details of the three conditions for employing non-peaceful means are extremely vague and would seem to cover not just Taiwan’s secession but any events that could be perceived as “leading to” independence. In addition, the use of non-peaceful means is to be based on the Chinese assessment of the situation, not any specific actions by Taiwan. Thus, the Taiwan government believes that the ASL was created so that China would have maximum flexibility to easily legitimize its potential use of force against the island.</p> +<p>Humankind has had an on-again, off-again relationship with the Moon. During the 1960s, over 63 spacecraft, including several crewed Apollo missions, launched to the Moon. In contrast, during the 1980s, no nation launched a lunar mission. Over the course of the following decades, however, the world gradually fell back in love with our closest celestial neighbor. During the last four years alone, 11 nations and the European Space Agency have all sent payloads and spacecraft to the Moon.</p> -<p>On the other hand, Article 8 stresses that the process of employing non-peaceful means should be a joint decision agreed to by both the Central Military Commission and the State Council, which then need to report to the National People’s Congress. At the time the ASL was drafted, the Central Military Commission was led by Jiang Zemin (who was succeeded by Hu Jintao soon after the law passed), while the State Council was headed by Wen Jiabao and the National People’s Congress by Wu Bangguo — not all of whom were seen as favoring a more aggressive stance on the Taiwan issue. This context suggests that Hu probably wanted to dilute the hardliner’s influence and temper Chinese actions toward Taiwan.</p> +<p>Most of these missions were operated by government agencies and focused on scientific research and exploration. However, a few were carried out by companies such as Intuitive Machines and Astrobotic. A number of countries plan to send humans to the lunar surface within the next 10 years, and some have plans to establish a long-term human presence either in lunar orbit or on the Moon’s surface. At the time of writing, there was probably just one active mission on the lunar surface, a Chinese lander and associated rover, and several active spacecraft in lunar orbits.</p> -<p>The ASL outlines the actions China needs to take if it wants to gradually induce unification. Per Article 6, the PRC would need:</p> +<p>While the majority of future space endeavors will undoubtedly take place near Earth, more and more activities will likely happen in cislunar space, or the area between geosynchronous Earth orbit and the Moon. From the perspective of the United States, reasons to focus attention on cislunar space include lunar science and exploration, future crewed missions, and concerns about China’s space ambitions.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>to encourage and facilitate personnel exchanges across the Straits for greater mutual understanding and mutual trust;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>to encourage and facilitate economic exchanges and cooperation, realize direct links of trade, mail and air and shipping services, and bring about closer economic ties between the two sides of the Straits to their mutual benefit;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits exchanges in education, science, technology, culture, health, and sports, and work together to carry forward the proud Chinese cultural traditions;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>to encourage and facilitate cross-Strait cooperation in combating crimes; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>to encourage and facilitate other activities that are conducive to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and stronger cross-Strait relations</p> - </li> -</ol> +<h4 id="cislunar-challenges">CISLUNAR CHALLENGES</h4> -<p>This approach is reinforced in Article 7, which specifically mentions that peaceful unification can only be achieved through “consultations and negotiations on an equal footing between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.”</p> +<p>Operating in cislunar space presents new technical and policy challenges that the United States will want to consider. While exponential growth in cislunar activities is unlikely over the next 10 years, there will be modest expansion. To maximize the chances of success for U.S. cislunar missions and ensure the long-term sustainability and safety of cislunar space, the United States should assume a global leadership role and take actions, sooner rather than later, to address the anticipated cislunar challenges discussed in this report.</p> -<p>As Lin Chuo-Shui argued, these articles of the ASL successfully helped Hu cap internal pressure to be tough on Taiwan by circumscribing the mechanisms and actions needed to facilitate potential unification. There are reasons to believe that he was prepared to proceed with this proposed process of reconciliation when China-friendly Ma Ying-jeou was elected president of Taiwan in 2008. Indeed, Hu publicly called for cross-Strait negotiations during a speech later that year.</p> +<p>The list of related operational challenges is long. There is little space situational awareness (SSA) in cislunar space. The Global Positioning System (GPS) was not designed for this region, so without enhancements it cannot reliably provide cislunar navigation and timing services. In classical orbital mechanics, the motion of a near-Earth satellite can be predicted as part of a two-body problem (i.e., Earth and the spacecraft). In cislunar space, this two-body problem poorly predicts motion. Other issues, such as the impacts of cosmic radiation and lunar dust on equipment and humans, also pose hazards to cislunar missions.</p> -<h4 id="looking-forward-the-asl-under-xi-jinping-and-its-possible-function-as-a-political-signal">Looking Forward: The ASL under Xi Jinping and Its Possible Function as a Political Signal</h4> +<p>The space governance and operator coordination issues concerning cislunar activities are equally complex. Internationally, there are no agreed-upon rules of the road for operating in cislunar space or best practices for cislunar debris mitigation. Though cislunar space is covered by the treaties that underpin international space law, these treaties have sizable gaps and are subject to conflicting interpretations. Fortunately, while not focused on space, there are other non-space international treaties and frameworks that could offer lessons for space governance.</p> -<p>Xi has said more than once that he wants to see progress on unification rather than have the two sides’ political differences last for generations. In a speech on January 2, 2019, Xi invoked the 1992 Consensus between the CCP and KMT and indicated he would push for a solution to the Taiwan issue under the “one country, two system” doctrine.</p> +<h4 id="report-objectives-and-approach">REPORT OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH</h4> -<p>More recently, the “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (“22 Articles”) indicated that the PRC would begin to criminalize Taiwan citizens if they conduct actions or voice dissent against the unification of Taiwan under the PRC. This is definitely a sign that Xi is moving forward with his efforts to unify China and eradicate resistance in Taiwan. The 22 Articles applies to both individuals and civilian organizations, in contrast to the ASL, which focuses on collective entities such as the state and governments. This development raises an interesting question: Does the 22 Articles document supplement the ASL or replace it?</p> +<p>The goal of this report is to examine and assess oft-heard claims of a new Moon race, growing lunar economy, and need to extend military power into cislunar space. To write this report, the authors researched government and private sector activities planned for cislunar space by over 10 nations, covering the next decade. They interviewed cislunar stakeholders from government agencies, private companies, and academia. Additionally, the authors assessed cislunar reports prepared by other researchers.</p> -<p>Unlike Hu Jintao, who needed to share power with other members of the CCP Central Standing Committee, Xi has all the power concentrated in his own hands, as seen by his recent decree to downgrade the State Council’s executive powers and cut it out of the decisionmaking process. Xi has also stressed multiple times that the military has to listen to the party; in contrast, Hu never had firm control of the military and did not even know about the anti-satellite missiles China launched in 2007 until U.S. secretary of defense Robert Gates confronted him about it. Today, the National People’s Congress essentially rubber stamps the policies of the Chinese Communist Party, meaning procedures outlined in the ASL cannot slow down, let alone restrain, any potential decisions by Xi regarding Taiwan.</p> +<p>Though there is certainly a lot of buzz about cislunar growth, the authors of this report found evidence of only a modest increase in cislunar activities over the next decade compared to the past 10 years. Additionally, the authors found little sign of a business case for cislunar activities that is not closely tied to government funding and support. Almost all cislunar activities, no matter the mission’s nation of origin, have a civilian focus. The authors also could not identify any compelling strategic military value from cislunar space and did not foresee one developing in the next decade that could make a decisive difference in any conflict between the United States and China, Russia, or another nation-state. However, national security organizations may want access to cislunar SSA data for surveillance purposes.</p> -<p>However, the ASL remains the only legal framework for conducting non-peaceful actions against Taiwan. And non-peaceful means include more than military actions. This suggests that Beijing would still have to go through the procedures described in the ASL if it wants to resort to such tactics. Thus, evidence that the PRC is following these procedures might provide a signal that the Xi administration is contemplating actions against Taiwan.</p> +<p>But even under these conditions — modest growth in overall cislunar activities, no clear cislunar use cases without governments as a customer, and no clear strategic military value of cislunar space — there are reasons to focus on cislunar space and identify and address challenges facing cislunar operators. Through the Artemis program, the United States is establishing significant cislunar equities, building the foundation for sustainable human activity in cislunar space, investing in lunar infrastructure, and creating an ecosystem of commercial cislunar services. Addressing cislunar challenges discussed in this report is critical to the success of these endeavors. This report specifically seeks to analyze and recommend ways U.S. decisionmakers can address cislunar governance, coordination, and infrastructure challenges.</p> -<h3 id="the-political-calculus-behind-the-anti-secession-law-and-its-evolution">The Political Calculus Behind the Anti-Secession Law and Its Evolution</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In conclusion, this report’s authors could find no evidence of a lunar gold rush and no indication of a real commer cial lunar economy. Cislunar activity is supported almost exclusively by government spending.</code></em></strong></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="bonny-lin">Bonny Lin</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>On governance challenges, the report first provides background on international treaties and national U.S. space policies, laws, and regulations. Later, the report discusses specific policy and governance gaps that should be addressed to promote a safe and sustainable cislunar environment. The report also introduces and provides background on several non-space international frameworks that govern other areas with similar characteristics as cislunar space, such as Antarctica, the Arctic, and international air and maritime domains. The authors frequently cite these existing frameworks when describing models and approaches that could apply to cislunar space.</p> -<h4 id="introduction-2">Introduction</h4> +<p>The report also outlines operational and infrastructure challenges confronting operators of cislunar missions, explaining why these cislunar challenges are both different and similar to those confronting operators with missions in orbits closer to Earth. The authors note that infrastructure challenges, such as generating power and ensuring communications, are primarily solved by hardware and equipment — whereas operational challenges, such as traffic coordination and collision avoidance, require both technical solutions and operator-to-operator coordination.</p> -<p>On the margins of the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in Bali in November 2022, Xi Jinping, leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), raised the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) with U.S. president Joe Biden during their first in-person meeting as heads of state. Expressing his opposition to closer U.S.-Taiwan ties, Xi warned that “China will invoke the law and act resolutely if serious violations occur.” This is one of many cases in which PRC leaders have used the legislation to seek to deter foreign countries from supporting Taiwan and to demonstrate China’s determination and willingness to use force to unify with the island. Beijing has also increasingly cited the ASL to attempt to legitimize and justify its option to use coercive means or military force against the island if Beijing assesses that Taiwan has embraced “pro-independence” activities.</p> +<h4 id="report-recommendations">REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> -<p>In May 2024, for example, China’s Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Justice jointly released “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (the “22 Articles”). Citing the ASL as providing the legal basis for prosecuting those who promote Taiwan’s secession, the 22 Articles specified a range of criminal punishments up to and including the death penalty and the possibility for Beijing to try “separatists” in absentia.</p> +<p>Finally, the report offers several key recommendations for consideration by U.S. policymakers. First, the United States should work to find understanding with China on addressing international space governance and operational coordination challenges related to cislunar space, because the vast majority of cislunar activity over the next decade will be tied to these two nations. Second, the United States should consider whether it furthers U.S. interests to keep cislunar space nonmilitarized, taking an approach from the U.S. playbook toward Antarctica in the 1950s. Third, the United States should consider international approaches to building and operating cislunar infrastructure, combining resources, preventing duplication, and maximizing the gain for the cost to U.S. taxpayers.</p> -<p>Given the importance the ASL has played in China’s approach toward Taiwan, this paper examines the origin, contents, and evolution of the Anti-Secession Law.</p> +<p>In conclusion, this report’s authors could find no evidence of a lunar gold rush and no indication of a real commercial lunar economy. Cislunar activity is supported almost exclusively by government spending. Certainly, Britain’s famed eighteenth-century economist Adam Smith would not characterize the cislunar environment as a market-based economy. There are currently no clear strategic military benefits derived from cislunar space derived from cislunar space, with little chance a cislunar space system could influence the outcome of a conflict on Earth.</p> -<h4 id="origins-of-the-anti-secession-law">Origins of the Anti-Secession Law</h4> +<h4 id="evolving-future-considerations">EVOLVING FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS</h4> -<p>China adopted the ASL in March 2005 under significantly different domestic and international circumstances than today. When it was drafted, Beijing was most worried that Taipei could engage in major or significant actions to push for Taiwan independence, but China faced a more favorable international environment and better relations with the United States. Since then, particularly under Xi Jinping, China has become more worried about Taiwan’s incremental “salami slicing” tactics to promote independence and increase U.S. support, and Beijing’s relations with the United States have significantly deteriorated.</p> +<p>Maybe someday, in the distant future, there will be a market-based lunar economy and a reason to have a military presence in cislunar space. This may happen if a cislunar activity could unexpectedly produce significant commercial value, such as mining of rare earth elements that could cost-effectively be returned and sold on Earth. This may also happen if the United States and China, ignoring the precedent of Antarctica, cannot agree to forestall the equivalent of a cislunar colonial land grab and resulting rush of military assets to the cislunar region. Additionally, dramatically lowering transportation costs to the Moon may also generate new lunar business cases.</p> -<p>The ASL was passed as one of the first legislative acts by Chinese leader Hu Jintao. Hu was a relatively weak leader and a moderate who took nearly two years to become chair of China’s Central Military Commission (or hold control over China’s military) in 2004 despite becoming general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2002 and the president of China in 2003. Compared to his successor Xi Jinping, Hu was more reserved, less ideological, and sought to drive PRC policy through leadership consensus. It is possible the ASL was relatively short because it was hard to build consensus regarding adding more specifics or details to the legislation.</p> +<p>Ultimately, the calculus fundamentally changes if — probably when — large numbers of humans start living on the Moon and in other parts of the solar system. Many of us, these authors included, foresee that future. But that is not on the 10-year plan, probably not even on the 25-year one. There are, however, strong reasons to go to the Moon today and in the foreseeable future: to explore the unknown, learn, and advance science for the sake of all humankind. That is reason enough to address the challenges described in this report.</p> -<p>Hu’s priority was China’s economic development, which he believed was the most important driver of the country’s rise. Economic growth also served “as a foundation of social stability” as domestic incidents of mass unrest were growing at an alarming rate. His focus on economic development and creating the necessary international conditions to facilitate China’s growth were evident in the use of the term “peaceful rise” — and later “peaceful development” — to characterize China’s foreign policy.</p> +<h3 id="introduction-and-background">INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND</h3> -<p>Indeed, in December 2004, during an expanded session of China’s Central Military Commission, Hu Jintao noted that “the first 20 years of this century is the important Strategic Opportunity Period” for China to modernize and become a moderately well-off society. Washington’s preoccupation with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had created space for China to grow, and Beijing’s efforts to support the U.S. Global War on Terror helped improve U.S.-China relations. The United States also had a more favorable view of China and its trajectory, and the two countries were not yet engaged in intense strategic competition.</p> +<h4 id="defining-cislunar-space">DEFINING “CISLUNAR SPACE”</h4> -<p>China’s military in the early 2000s was also significantly weaker than today. When Beijing observed U.S. military operations in the 1990–1991 Gulf War, as well as in Afghanistan and Iraq a decade later, the Chinese government expressed greater concern over what it viewed as a major gap in terms of technology and capabilities between Chinese and Western militaries. There was a recognition in Beijing that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was far behind that of the United States and that the United States was capable of intervening to defend Taiwan. By 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense assessed that “the cross-Strait military balance appears to be shifting toward Beijing.” However, China’s capabilities were only beginning to surpass that of Taiwan’s. In 2005, even without U.S. intervention, it would have been difficult for China to launch any successful major military campaign against Taiwan.</p> +<p>In this report, “cislunar space” refers to the area between geosynchronous orbit around Earth (about 36,000 kilometers from Earth’s surface) and the Moon (approximately 384,000 kilometers from Earth’s surface, on average). Orbits around the Moon, trajectories to and from the Moon, the five Earth–Moon Lagrange points (L1, L2, L3, L4, and L5), and the Moon itself are also included in this report’s definition. Effectively, three different environments in which space operations can occur are included in this definition: the Moon’s surface, lunar orbits, and Earth orbits and trajectories to and from the Moon.</p> -<p>To Hu Jintao, Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian was a pro-independence troublemaker. He was first elected as Taiwan’s leader in 2000. Chen’s securing of a second term in 2004 — despite China’s attempts to prevent him from winning the presidency again — only made things worse from Beijing’s perspective. During his May 2004 inauguration speech, President Chen declared his intent to hold a referendum in 2006 to adopt a new constitution in 2008. Beijing was very worried that such major moves were intended to set Taiwan down a path toward independence.</p> +<p>Like the Moon itself, most objects in cislunar space are orbiting Earth, though some objects are also orbiting the Moon. However, due to Earth’s gravitational pull, orbits higher than 700 kilometers above the lunar surface are not stable. To further complicate matters, the mass of the Moon is irregularly distributed, which renders its gravitational field uneven. This means that at altitudes lower than 100 kilometers from the Moon’s surface, only four lunar orbital inclinations support stable orbits. Objects attempting to orbit the Moon below 100 kilometers at other inclinations must perform frequent station-keeping maneuvers and expend fuel to remain in orbit.</p> -<p>Like other PRC leaders, Hu could not afford to “lose” Taiwan and could not afford to look “weak” or incapable of defending China’s core interests. At the same time, Hu was likely aware that a conflict over Taiwan at that time would be catastrophic for his economic development priorities and foreign policy designs.</p> +<p>Objects in cislunar space are affected not only by Earth’s gravitational effects but also by the Moon’s gravity. As with any two large celestial bodies, there are five Lagrange points around the Earth and Moon at which the gravitational pull of the Earth and Moon is exactly equal to the amount of centripetal force needed for a small object, such as a satellite or spacecraft, to move with them. Due to these gravitational dynamics, the Lagrange points are nearly stationary relative to the Earth-Moon rotating frame.</p> -<p>Hu was under significant pressure to do something. One widely discussed and debated proposal came from Chinese scholar Yu Yuanzhou, who proposed in late 2002 that China pass a National Unification Promotion Law. His draft of the law had 32 articles divided into eight chapters. It began with Article 1, which stated that the law was drafted to accelerate unification with Taiwan. Article 5 listed three conditions for use of non-peaceful means against Taiwan:</p> +<h4 id="history-of-cislunar-space">HISTORY OF CISLUNAR SPACE</h4> -<ol> - <li> - <p>if Taiwan declares independence or takes concrete steps toward independence</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>if foreign militaries intervene or invade Taiwan</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>if Taiwan authorities indefinitely delay or prevent the realization of peaceful unification</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>Since Russia’s Luna 1 became the first spacecraft to reach the vicinity of the Moon in January 1959, approximately 140 missions have been launched to the Moon, either landing on the lunar surface, entering lunar orbit, or conducting a lunar flyby. Thirteen countries and the the European Space Agency (ESA) have launched spacecraft toward the Moon. The first U.S. spacecraft to reach the vicinity of the Moon was Pioneer 4, which conducted a lunar flyby in March 1959. In 1990, Japan became the third nation to launch a lunar probe, called Hiten, and the third nation to reach the lunar surface when Hiten’s small orbiter, Hagoromo, was intentionally crashed into the Moon in 1993 after completing several lunar orbits.</p> -<p>Articles 23–25 specified awards and benefits for those who promote unification, and Articles 26–29 stipulated criminal punishment and legal action against those who oppose it.</p> +<p>The majority of lunar missions have been launched and managed by government entities, with only four spacecraft ever sent to the Moon operated by private sector organizations. Cislunar space saw the most activity at the height of the space race between the 1950s and 1970s. Interest in the Moon quickly declined by the 1980s; as already noted, there were zero missions to the Moon from 1980 to 1989. Although there has been a steady increase in cislunar activity since 1990, the total number of lunar missions since then is only about two-thirds that of missions in just the 1960s. Almost all cislunar traffic to date has resulted from spacecraft traveling to the Moon, though spacecraft bound for other locations in the solar system have passed through cislunar space.</p> -<p>It is unclear if Yu’s proposal was a way for the Chinese government to test international and public opinion, but Chinese premier Wen Jiabao noted in a press conference in May 2004 that China would “seriously consider” drafting and adopting a national unification law.</p> +<p>Over the past decade, between 2014 and 2024, about 20 missions sent from Earth have transited cislunar space on their way to the Moon. To place this number into context, over 12,000 objects — including satellites, scientific probes, landers, crewed spacecraft, and components of space stations — have been launched into space during this same period. While the number of missions through cislunar space has increased over the past four decades, the increase is small compared to the exponential growth in the number of satellites launched into orbits closer to Earth. Overall, missions through cislunar space are just a small fraction of the total number of spacecraft launched from Earth.</p> -<h4 id="contents-of-the-anti-secession-law">Contents of the Anti-Secession Law</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mDgOqKV.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Cislunar Region wih Cone Denoting the Area of Greatest Cislunar Activity.</strong> Source: CSIS Aerospace Security Project.</em></p> -<p>The eventual Anti-Secession Law that passed in 2005 had some similarities with the draft National Unification Promotion Law, but it was significantly shorter and less specific. It also raised and changed the criteria for use of non-peaceful means against Taiwan, perhaps reflecting Hu’s prioritization of economic development.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K8hSQJq.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Launches to the Moon by Decade.</strong> Source: <a href="https://science.nasa.gov/moon/missions/">“Moon Missions,” NASA, accessed August 17, 2024</a>.</em></p> -<p>The ASL is broken down into 10 encompassing articles. Article 1 states that the law seeks to prevent Taiwan’s independence, promote unification, and safeguard China’s national interests. It does not mention any desire to accelerate the promotion of unification, nor is there any mention of a timeline for unification.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LqesqYZ.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: New Space Objects by Year.</strong> Note: Data is current as of September 26, 2024. Source: <a href="https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/index.jspx">“Outer Space Objects Index,” UN Office for Outer Space Affairs</a>.</em></p> -<p>Article 2 reiterates the PRC’s “one China” principle, but the specific formulation and language is softer than Beijing uses today. In contrast to China’s current language — “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China” — the ASL suggests flexibility. It simply states that “the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China.” The ASL also does not assert that the PRC is the only and sole legal government of China. In fact, it mentions the PRC only once to discuss the law’s adoption, preferring to use “the state” to refer to the government in Beijing. Articles 3 and 4 note that Taiwan remains a legacy and unresolved issue from the Chinese Civil War and declare that it is the duty of all Chinese citizens to unify with Taiwan.</p> +<h3 id="national-cislunar-policies-and-activities">NATIONAL CISLUNAR POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES</h3> -<p>These early articles establish what Beijing believes is the status quo in the Taiwan Strait (i.e., that Taiwan belongs to China). Any actions to change or challenge this status quo are unacceptable to Beijing and violate the ASL.</p> +<p>Today, cislunar activity remains limited because there are few commercial cislunar use cases and requirements that are independent of a government operator or customer. Most lunar activities are funded and operated by governments, primarily for scientific research and exploration to better understand the Moon and its environs. Most commercial lunar missions are also closely tied to government science and research requirements and funding. For example, Japanese company ispace and U.S. companies Astrobotic and Intuitive Machines have already launched and are planning more commercial missions to carry government-sponsored scientific payloads to the Moon, as well as nongovernment payloads.</p> -<p>Articles 5–7 specify Beijing’s desire for peaceful unification, list measures China will take to encourage peace and stability, and describe how negotiations for peaceful unification can be “flexible and with varied modalities.” It stipulates that unifying with Taiwan through peaceful means “best serves the fundamental interests of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.” When explaining the ASL during a press conference, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao noted that the legislation was meant to promote peaceful unification, not target the people of Taiwan or promote war.</p> +<p>In addition to conducting scientific research, many Moon missions aim to demonstrate technologies such as lunar rovers that could be used on future missions. Two upcoming lunar missions, part of the Chang’e program operated by China’s national space agency, will test technologies intended to support a future long-term uncrewed lunar base. In addition to supporting NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program, future missions from Astrobotic, Firefly Aerospace, and Intuitive Machines, among others, will carry a variety of payloads, including rovers, hoppers, sensors, scien tific experiments, and small satellites for private sector organizations and space agencies from around the world looking to test their technologies on and in orbit around the Moon.</p> -<p>These articles are often overlooked, but they detail activities that China should encourage or engage in to maintain peace and stability. Article 7 even states that consultations or negotiations between the two sides for peaceful unification can occur on “an equal footing.” It is far from clear whether China has upheld what it has laid out in these articles and whether it has tried its best to seek peaceful unification.</p> +<p>Other organizations are looking at using the Moon to preserve Earth’s cultural heritage and biodiversity. For example, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) intends to send a memory disk containing the UNESCO preamble in 275 human languages to the lunar surface on ispace’s upcoming Hakuto-R 2. Additionally, a group of scientists wants to use the Moon to create a biorepository of cryopreserved seeds and living cells as a safeguard against possible threats to life on Earth. In a similar vein, Interstellar Lab’s Mission Little Prince aims to grow flowers on the Moon in an environment-controlled plant pod.</p> -<p>Article 8 highlights the broad (and vague) circumstances that will justify China’s “use of non-peaceful and other means” against Taiwan. These conditions include the following:</p> +<p>For the near future, use cases such as scientific research, technology demonstrations, and, on a smaller scale, disaster planning are the drivers for cislunar traffic. Notably, the United States and China are pursuing ambitious agendas to create human habitats in lunar orbit and land people on the Moon. Over the next several years, the authors of this report anticipate around 40 significant missions launching toward cislunar space, not including missions that merely transit cislunar space bound for deep space destinations.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>If Taiwan independence forces “act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China”</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>If “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China” occur</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>If “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted”</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/hbDibDj.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Significant Future Cislunar Missions.</strong> Source: Authors’ research and analysis.</em></p> + +<p>At this point, the report authors should acknowledge the challenges in counting cislunar missions. Rather than attempting to count all missions, the authors identified significant future missions that represented the most considerable and impactful cislunar undertakings.</p> + +<p>Many future cislunar missions look like matryoshka, or Russian nesting, dolls; they are complex systems of systems, with some providing lunar ridesharing. Most Artemis missions have many moving parts, including the Orion spacecraft, modules of the Lunar Gateway, and space vehicles associated with the Starship Human Landing System (HLS). Additionally, China’s Chang’e 6 mission included a lander, ascender, return vehicle, mini rover, and an orbiter built by Pakistan. The future Chang’e 8 mission is also expected to include international payloads. Each Chang’e and Artemis mission is included in the significant mission list.</p> -<p>Compared to the draft National Unification Promotion Law, the ASL focuses on “the fact of Taiwan’s secession” and “major incidents” leading to secession. This sets a higher, but still unclear, bar for invoking non-peaceful means. The third condition of “possibilities of peaceful unification being completely exhausted” is also harder to achieve than the draft unification law, which suggested that “indefinitely delaying or preventing” unification could be a criterion.</p> +<p>The CLPS program epitomizes the concept of lunar ridesharing, transporting NASA payloads and creating opportunities for smaller companies, international partners, and other organizations to send missions, including scientific instruments, rovers, and orbiters, to the Moon. This approach is diversifying the types of entities launching to cislunar space and increasing the number of individual organizations with payloads in lunar orbit and on the Moon’s surface.</p> -<p>Article 9 limits how non-peaceful means and other means can be exercised. It states that China should do its “utmost to protect the lives, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilians and foreign nationals in Taiwan, and to minimize losses.” This again is another case in which it is not clear whether Beijing is respecting its own legislation.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Many future cislunar missions look like matryoshka, or Russian nesting, dolls; they are complex systems of systems, with some providing lunar ridesharing.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Articles 8 and 9 attempt to shift the responsibility onto Taiwan for any non-peaceful means that the PRC uses against it. By stipulating these conditions, Beijing can argue that Taipei’s actions leave Beijing with no choice but to use coercion or force against the island.</p> +<p>This report considers each CLPS mission a significant mission but not individual payloads, though many of these payloads are described in the report. In general, this report does not count instruments or experiments that remain associated with or near another spacecraft, lander, or rover as a significant mission. For example, a memory disk sponsored by UNESCO that will be carried on Hakuto-R 2 is not included in the significant mission tally.</p> -<p>In addition to the above, and compared to the detailed draft National Unification Promotion Law, there are other components not in the ASL:</p> +<p>If the report authors could not find clear indications of funding or recent progress for a future concept or mission — meaning the mission’s existence is based only on a press release — the authors did not include the mission in Figure 1. For missions beyond 2030, it was often difficult to differentiate real plans from aspirations, as many decisions on government funding for activities so far into the future have yet to be made. The authors also questioned whether Russia has the financial resources to execute its upcoming cislunar plans, which include at least three lunar missions, but still includes those on the significant mission list.</p> + +<p>Additionally, the fully assembled Lunar Gateway is not specifically listed in the table, though completion of the station will be a significant achievement. Finally, one mission in the table — DESTINY+ — has a lengthly transit time through cislunar space on its way to the parent body of the Geminids meteor shower.</p> + +<p><em>United States</em></p> + +<p><strong>Policies</strong></p> + +<p>In December 2021, the White House released the United States Space Priorities Framework, which outlined various goals related to national and economic security and scientific advancement for U.S. activities in space. Those goals include:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>The ASL does not specify how Taiwan would be unified with China. It does not take any position on whether Taiwan would become a special administrative region or if a federation could be formed between the two sides. It also does not specify the benefits and rights that Taiwan could enjoy post-unification. Instead, Article 7 of the ASL lists six aspects of Taiwan’s unification that can be negotiated between the two sides.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The ASL does not include language on rewarding those who promote unification.</p> + <p>maintaining “leadership in space exploration and space science”;</p> </li> <li> - <p>The ASL does not criminalize those who promote independence.</p> + <p>advancing “the development and use of space-based Earth observation capabilities that support action on climate change”;</p> </li> <li> - <p>The ASL does not specify any type of non-peaceful or other means that China could take if the circumstances for their use were met. In contrast, the draft National Unification Promotion Law discussed artillery shelling, the blockading of Taiwan, and other military operations.</p> + <p>fostering “a policy and regulatory environment that enables a competitive and burgeoning U.S. commercial space sector”;</p> </li> -</ul> - -<h4 id="evolution-and-use-of-the-anti-secession-law">Evolution and Use of the Anti-Secession Law</h4> - -<p>Although in recent years the ASL is most frequently mentioned in reference to PRC coercive measures against Taiwan, Chinese official media and experts have argued that the law is effective and conducive to maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait and has also brought about cross-Strait opportunities. They credit it for deterring Chen Shui-bian from engaging in more pro-independence activities and for decreasing Taiwan and international support for such efforts. They also credit the ASL for creating the momentum and opening for then Kuomintang chairman Lien Chan to visit Beijing in April 2005 and for People’s First Party chairman James Soong to do the same a month later, the first time Taiwan’s political leaders set foot in China since 1949. After Lien and Soong’s visits, China announced carrots for Taiwan, including easing restrictions on the island’s agricultural products and promoting Chinese tourism. Chinese experts argue that Article 6 of the ASL provided the basis to increase China’s trade and other linkages with Taiwan from 2008 onward during the Ma Ying-jeou administration.</p> - -<p>In the past decade, however, there has been growing dissatisfaction within China about how the ASL can be used and applied. Much of this occurred after Tsai Ing-wen won the Taiwan presidency in 2016. Beijing was increasingly suspicious and wary that Tsai either sought to push the island incrementally toward independence or keep it permanently separated from the PRC. At the same time, Beijing became more concerned about growing U.S. support for Taiwan. In 2016, former PLA lieutenant-general Wang Hongguang called for invoking the ASL, arguing that possibilities for peaceful reunification had been exhausted. In 2017, there were press reports that Chinese leader Xi Jinping was considering revising the ASL or passing a National Unification Act.</p> - -<p>In 2020, after Tsai was elected to a second term as Taiwan’s president, the discussion in Beijing intensified on how to respond. In March of that year, former PLA general Luo Yuan released an op-ed on how to revise the ASL. He criticized the three criteria for invoking “non-peaceful and other means” as too vague and unclear and noted that the ASL also did not specify what non-peaceful means might look like. He recommended that Beijing take the following actions:</p> - -<ul> <li> - <p>List “die-hard pro-independence” leaders as war criminals who seek to incite cross-Strait military tensions.</p> + <p>protecting “space-related critical infrastructure” and strengthening “the security of the U.S. space industrial base”;</p> </li> <li> - <p>Create a database of pro-independence individuals and record their acts of secession.</p> + <p>defending “national security interests from the growing scope and scale of space and counterspace threats”;</p> </li> <li> - <p>Impose sanctions on individuals or companies who support Taiwan’s independence.</p> + <p>investing in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education;</p> </li> <li> - <p>Compress Taiwan’s “survival space” if pro-independence Taiwan leaders engage in provocative activities, punishing them by conducting military exercises that move closer and closer to the island.</p> + <p>playing a lead role in “strengthening global governance of space activities”;</p> </li> <li> - <p>Engage in cognitive warfare to raise awareness of the costs that Taiwan would bear if China used force to unify with the island.</p> + <p>bolstering “space situational awareness sharing and space traffic coordination”; and</p> </li> <li> - <p>Publicize a timeline for unification.</p> + <p>prioritizing “space sustainability and planetary protection.”</p> </li> </ul> -<p>On May 29, 2020, as a part of a public event commemorating the 15th anniversary of the ASL, Chinese media quoted Li Zhanshu, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, as stating that the ASL is an important part of China’s “One Country, Two Systems” policy framework, which aims to promote the peaceful unification of China. The same article noted that the ASL was also vital because “it can crackdown [sic] on separatist movements in Taiwan by means of legal authorization.” Chinese media and scholars argued that President Tsai had begun creating the legal basis for Taiwan’s independence — such as by passing Taiwan’s Anti-Infiltration Act, trying to change wording in the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and proposing constitutional reforms — and that her actions thus provided legal ground to activate Article 8 of the ASL.</p> +<p>The framework emphasizes retaining U.S. leadership in space and broadening and deepening international space collaboration. Though this document does not focus on cislunar space specifically, its priorities apply to all U.S. activities and initiatives in space.</p> -<p>At this same late-May event, Chinese leaders and analysts signaled that Beijing was preparing non-peaceful measures against Taiwan. Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office Liu Jieyi warned that Beijing would not leave any space for “Taiwan independence” or renounce the use of force against the island and would reserve the option to take all necessary measures. These threats were similarly echoed by the chief of the Joint Staff Department, General Li Zuocheng.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7VjOCg7.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Example Commercial Lunar Mission Supporting CLPS - Intuitive Machines IM-2.</strong> Source: Intuitive Machines (reprinted with permission).</em></p> -<p>This 15th-anniversary commemoration of the ASL occurred two months late (taking place in May 2020 even though the actual anniversary was in March 2020). Instead, China celebrated the ASL a day after the National People’s Congress passed the controversial Hong Kong National Security Law on May 28, 2020. Against this backdrop, Chinese experts participating in the symposium argued that Beijing should be taking a range of measures on various separatist movements, including “completing the law systems on national security,” “making reciprocal measures to sanction overseas separatists and anti-China individuals,” and “mak[ing] more detailed laws by extending the experience of the Anti-Secession Law.”</p> +<p>In addition to these national space priorities, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), together with the National Science and Technology Council, developed and published the National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy in 2022. The strategy seeks to foster interagency cooperation and advance U.S. cislunar science and technology leadership. It defines four objectives: “support research and development to enable long-term growth in Cislunar space”; “expand international S&amp;T [science and technology] cooperation in Cislunar space”; “extend U.S. space situational awareness capabilities into Cislunar space”; and “implement Cislunar communications and PNT [positioning, navigation, and timing] capabilities.” Though OSTP does not itself direct funding or administer space programs, its cislunar strategy will likely influence spending and priorities across the U.S. federal government.</p> -<p>Chinese efforts to complement and extend the ASL began bearing fruit the next year. In June 2021, China adopted its Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. Although this document does not mention the ASL or Taiwan, Article 3 lays out China’s right to employ corresponding countermeasures when foreign nations interfere with its internal affairs.</p> +<p>Although China is not specifically mentioned in the United States Space Policy Framework or National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy, Beijing’s central role as a motivator for U.S. cislunar activities is undeniable. Some U.S. experts have argued that China could obtain a first-mover advantage and become the dominant power in cislunar space, to the detriment of U.S. interests. Additionally, the current NASA administrator, Bill Nelson, has expressed concern that China could try to restrict U.S. access to lunar resources if it establishes a long-term presence on the Moon before the United States does. Other U.S. experts worry about the impacts of China’s cislunar activities on U.S. prestige and influence, framing cislunar plans within the context of broader geopolitical competition between the two powers.</p> -<p>Since then, China has cited the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law to censure U.S. political leaders who support or visit Taiwan, as well as U.S. defense companies that sell arms to Taiwan. In August 2022, after U.S. speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei, China cited the ASL, as well as the National Security Law and Criminal Law, to take criminal punitive measures against Taiwan individuals and organizations whom Beijing called “die-hard pro-independence elements.” At the same time, China used the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law to justify imposing sanctions on Speaker Pelosi. China’s Ministry of National Defense further shared that the PLA’s unnamed large-scale exercises around Taiwan after Pelosi left were meant to deter secessionists and foreign interference. Although the ministry did not specifically cite the ASL, it noted that the Chinese exercises were “consistent with domestic law and international law and practice.”</p> +<p>Finally, many government actors — including the United States, China, Russia, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — have stated that space could be used for warfighting. Though cislunar space is not the primary focus of U.S. military attention on the space domain, the Department of Defense (DoD) is leading several initiatives, described later in this report, focused on cislunar space. However, it is not clear how cislunar space fits into the overall national security strategy, because the DoD has neither articulated broad cislunar goals nor put forward a cislunar strategy.</p> -<p>This usage of the ASL since at least 2022 has expanded the law beyond its original scope. China is now citing it to engage in gray-zone coercion and sanctions against Taiwan and to target specific individuals and organizations. The ASL does not provide the basis for such activities. Taiwan has not seceded from China, nor does Pelosi’s visit of Taiwan count as a “major incident” leading to Taiwan’s secession, and China has not exhausted the possibility of peaceful unification. As discussed earlier, and despite recommendations from some PRC scholars to include such provisions, the ASL did not include any articles on criminal punishment of Taiwan’s “pro-independence” forces.</p> +<p><strong>Enacted Law</strong></p> -<p>In 2024, China further outlined a series of military exercises that the PLA could conduct to punish Taiwan for engaging in “separatist activities” and suggested that the ASL authorizes such activities. In January, after William Lai won Taiwan’s presidential election, China’s Ministry of State Security published an article on WeChat entitled, “The Anti-Secession Law Is a Sharp Sword Hanging High.” The article explained that the blade of the sword points at Taiwan independence efforts, the sword clarifies what China’s red lines are, the hilt indicates that the duty and future is in the hands of the Chinese and Taiwan people, and the scabbard hides the edge of the sword to preserve the option of peace.</p> +<p>Over the past 90 years, the United States has enacted numerous laws related to military, civilian, and commercial space activities, which would apply not only to near-Earth orbits but also to cislunar space. Title 51 of U.S. Code contains laws related to national and commercial space programs. Applicable laws related to defense and military space programs are mostly found in Title 10.</p> -<p>In late May and perhaps building on this analogy, the PLA engaged in another round of large-scale exercises around Taiwan to “serve as a strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces and a stern warning against the interference and provocation by external forces.” Beijing sought to use these drills to express its condemnation of President Lai’s inauguration speech, which Beijing viewed as a departure from past inauguration speeches of Taiwan leaders. These joint drills were named Joint Sword-2024A, suggesting there could be several of these exercises per year and there might be more iterations in subsequent years.</p> +<p>The <strong>Communications Act</strong> of 1934 provided the basis for federal regulation of telephone, telegraph, and radio communications and was later amended to include requirements for commercial satellite licensing and use of radio spectrum. The act established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate use of these technologies in the United States. This law also applies to U.S. entities wanting to use spectrum to communicate from, to, and in cislunar space.</p> -<p>In late May 2024 and shortly after China wrapped up its military exercises, Beijing issued the 22 Articles, which China’s Taiwan Affairs Office noted was meant to strengthen the ASL by providing details. The timing of the 22 Articles reinforced China’s military demonstration and opposition to any attempts within Taiwan to move toward what Beijing views as incremental independence.</p> +<p>The <strong>National Aeronautics and Space Act</strong> of 1958 separated military and civilian space government functions and emphasized the peaceful character of U.S. pursuits in space. The act also established NASA, the first U.S. government organization dedicated to the civilian use of space.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h4> +<p>The <strong>Commercial Space Launch Act</strong> of 1984 provided the Department of Transportation authority to regulate commercial spaceflight, including commercial launch services; required the government to assume responsibility for large third-party damages that could arise from U.S. commercial space activities; and laid the foundation for future regulation of commercial human spaceflight.</p> -<p>China’s Anti-Secession Law remains an important piece of legislation that Beijing invokes as justification for its policies and actions toward Taiwan. The short law covers the broad components of China’s approach toward Taiwan, but its lack of specificity has afforded Chinese leaders and experts flexibility in how they interpret it. In recent years, China has increasingly cited Article 8 of the ASL to support its coercive and military activities against the island as it lowers its threshold for use of non-peaceful means against Taiwan. There has been less focus on the other articles, which require China to “do its utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful reunification.” China has also built out more legislation to support and complement the ASL, giving Beijing a large set of coercive tools to use against Taiwan and its supporters.</p> +<p>The <strong>U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act</strong> of 2015 extended the moratorium until 2023 on regulation of commercial human spaceflight activities, which has since been extended to early 2025. The law also explicitly allowed U.S. citizens and companies to own and sell any resources extracted from bodies in space, such as asteroids and the Moon, permitting them to “facilitate commercial exploration for and commercial recovery of space resources.” The text also states that the United States, in accordance with the Outer Space Treaty, cannot use this law to “assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.” Notably, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Luxembourg, and Japan have all enacted similar laws that allow the ownership and transfer of ownership of space resources.</p> -<h3 id="the-significance-and-application-of-chinas-anti-secession-law">The Significance and Application of China’s Anti-Secession Law</h3> +<p><strong>Regulations</strong></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="wen-hsuan-tsai">Wen-Hsuan Tsai</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Today, the U.S. government regulates elements of every private U.S. space activity. The Department of Transportation oversees private spaceports and licenses launch and reentry of spacecraft, requiring information about the space payload as part of the licensing process. The FCC licenses spectrum use and imposes associated requirements regarding space sustainability on licensees. Any satellite or spacecraft wishing to broadcast radio frequencies to or from any territory of the United States must receive a license from the FCC, including foreign satellites seeking to serve the U.S. market. The Department of Commerce licenses remote-sensing satellites, including ones conducting non-Earth imaging, such as imaging of other satellites in space.</p> -<h4 id="introduction-3">Introduction</h4> +<p>Beyond these regulations, the United States is considering proposals to regulate novel private sector space activities, a process often referred to as “mission authorization.” These novel activities include commercial habitats, in-space manufacturing, and on-orbit refueling, none of which are clearly addressed by existing licensing schemes.</p> -<p>The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Anti-Secession Law (ASL) notably asserts that Taiwan and mainland China are both part of “one China.” According to this law, there is no particular distinction between using “China” to refer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or the Republic of China. The legislation resembles the Treaty of Warsaw signed between East and West Germany in 1972, which declared that the two states should pursue reunification. However, the key difference between the ASL and the Treaty of Warsaw is that West Germany recognized East Germany as a country at the time. In contrast, the ASL only vaguely states that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the nation of China and that the question of Taiwan is a legacy of the Chinese Civil War. Thus, Beijing officially opposes the proposition of Taiwan’s independence and its actions in this regard.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dVNOUtq.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: NASA Crewed Lunar Missions Milestone Timeline.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/fy-2025-budget-request/">“Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request,” NASA, last updated August 29, 2024</a>.</em></p> -<p>Enacted during the Hu Jintao period, the ASL does not clearly define the name or nature of the country after reunification. However, actions taken under Xi Jinping have led to a clear understanding that this “China” is the PRC, making the terms of the law less flexible and potentially harming future cross-Strait interaction and negotiations.</p> +<p><strong>Activities</strong></p> -<h4 id="changing-the-prc-application-of-the-anti-secession-law">Changing the PRC Application of the Anti-Secession Law</h4> +<p>To date and for the foreseeable future, the majority of U.S. missions that transit cislunar space, reach lunar orbit, or land on the Moon are directly or indirectly funded by NASA and focus on space exploration. Today, most NASA funding for cislunar missions supports the Artemis program, an initiative to reestablish a human presence and build a long-term base on the Moon, as well as lay the foundations for a future crewed mission to Mars. According to NASA, the goals of the Artemis program are to make new scientific discoveries, realize economic benefits from returning to the Moon, and inspire a new generation of explorers.</p> -<p>This shift in the presumed nature of the ASL is related to the overall perspectives of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Foreign relations and cross-Strait policies under Hu Jintao primarily focused on economic development. Therefore, the law was implemented to encourage the future development, including economic integration and political unification, of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. However, it does not discuss the use of the name “China” following unification. Since the ASL was passed in 2005, the main policy focus has shifted from economic development to national security. The law has come to be seen as emphasizing that Taiwan is part of the PRC, with the intention of preventing foreign forces from exploiting the Taiwan issue to negatively affect China’s national security.</p> +<p>Achieving those goals will come at a high cost. According to the NASA Office of Inspector General, the agency will have spent approximately $93 billion on the Artemis program (including work on the Space Launch System) between 2012 and 2025. In 2022, NASA launched the uncrewed Artemis I mission, which placed the Orion capsule into lunar orbit and returned the craft to Earth. The first crewed Artemis mission, Artemis II, will take four astronauts into Earth orbit and a free-return trajectory around the Moon no earlier than 2025. The subsequent Artemis III mission, planned for no earlier than 2026, will take astronauts to the lunar surface and target a landing site near the Moon’s south pole.</p> -<p>Under Xi Jinping, the meaning and application of the ASL seem to have changed in several ways. First, the ASL has been used together with other PRC laws to punish so-called “Taiwan independence” elements. The document “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law,” promulgated by the CCP in June 2024 (the “22 Articles”), mentions in its preface that the PRC can use its Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, as well as other legal provisions. These recent activities align with what scholars call “legal authoritarianism” under Xi — the strengthening and legitimization of PRC policy through the enactment of numerous laws.</p> +<p>In addition to facilitating the Artemis program’s second human landing on the Moon, the third crewed Artemis mission, Artemis IV, will dock with the Lunar Gateway, a planned space station that will provide habitation space for astronauts and serve as a communications hub and science laboratory. NASA plans for the station to use a near-rectilinear halo orbit (NRHO) associated with the Earth–Moon L2 Lagrange point. In-space assembly of the Lunar Gateway is planned to start in 2028. NASA is collaborating with ESA, the Canadian Space Agency, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), the UAE, and commercial partners on the project. Planned for no earlier than 2030 and 2031, respectively, Artemis V and VI will also complete lunar landings and continue efforts to construct the Lunar Gateway.</p> -<p>Second, the ASL is no longer merely an initiative to promote the cross-Strait pursuit of reunification but an expression that Taiwan is an integral part of the territory of the PRC. Beijing uses this law to claim jurisdiction and control over the people of Taiwan. Under Hu Jintao, the CCP’s definition of “China” had room for ambiguity, and both sides of the strait could have their own interpretations of the China to which they belonged. However, under Xi Jinping, the concept is no longer vague. The “one China” referred to by the CCP now means the PRC.</p> +<p>To enhance its Deep Space Network to support upcoming lunar missions, NASA is building and expanding a network of Lunar Exploration Ground Sites (LEGS) so the agency can remain in continuous communications with the Moon during its orbit around Earth. NASA is also developing the LunaNet framework and Lunar Communications Relay and Navigation Systems (LCRNS) project to enable cislunar networking and connectivity services.</p> -<p>Third, the ASL is somewhat abstract, leaving ample room for interpretation and follow-on measures. The CCP could issue details on how to implement the law, making it more practically functional. It could also amend the ASL by adding text relating it to Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Xi has placed greater emphasis on the concepts of top-level design and national security, and the Taiwan issue is no longer expressed as scope limited to United Front work but forms part of the PRC’s overall security strategy. Therefore, it is possible the CCP will incorporate Xi Jinping Thought in the preface of the ASL, which would have two effects: to make anti-secession and cross-Strait reunification key to China’s concept of national security and to inject additional Xi Jinping symbolism into the law, further cementing his historical status and contribution to cross-Strait policies.</p> +<p>In addition to the Artemis program, NASA is currently funding missions to the Moon as part of the CLPS program, an initiative through which the agency contracts with companies to deliver freight to the lunar surface. Two CLPS awardees, Astrobotic and Intuitive Machines, have already sent commercial spacecraft to the Moon carrying NASA payloads. While the Astrobotic spacecraft suffered a malfunction en route and was not able to complete its mission, the Intuitive Machines spacecraft touched down on the Moon in February 2024, completing the world’s first successful commercial lunar landing. Currently, NASA has several CLPS contracts (i.e., trips to the Moon) on the books to deliver payloads to the lunar surface. Many NASA payloads planned for CLPS missions were built through the Lunar Surface Instrument and Technology Payloads (LSITP) program.</p> -<p>Fourth, the CCP may use the ASL to formulate a new law to accelerate unification. The ASL only passively opposes Taiwan’s independence, but a unification law would actively promote reunification. Xi might ask Wang Huning, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, to formulate more detailed regulations on the topic. Xi might also formulate or amend regulations on Taiwan affairs, in particular regarding supplementing and revising the ASL.</p> +<p>Focused on planetary exploration, NASA’s Small Innovative Missions for Planetary Exploration (SIMPLEx) program is also funding missions to the Moon. The aim of SIMPLEx is to build small, low-cost spacecraft for launches as secondary payloads on other missions. For example, a SIMPLEx mission called LunaH-Map was launched on Artemis I in 2022. Though the LunaH-Map mission experienced propulsion problems after deployment, it did conduct a lunar flyby and returned some data to Earth. The only other SIMPLEx mission to the Moon, a lunar orbiter called Lunar Trailblazer, is currently scheduled to launch in 2025.</p> -<p>Finally, the CCP might seek to clarify Article 8, the most important part of the ASL. This article grants the State Council and the Central Military Commission power to take non-peaceful measures if independence forces attempt to separate Taiwan from China or have already done so, or if the “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted” — a phrase that is currently very vague. It may be that Xi Jinping will seek to define this parameter more clearly. However, it remains to be seen whether the CCP will formulate a law to institute a timetable and deadline for unification. Doing so would greatly limit the flexibility of the CCP’s Taiwan policy.</p> +<p>The DoD is also funding work related to cislunar space. Specifically, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is leading a project that aims to move large payloads in cislunar space using a nuclear thermal rocket (NTR). The Demonstration Rocket for Agile Cislunar Operations (DRACO) program will produce a baseline design for the NTR reactor, build the reactor, and launch it into space to conduct experiments on the technologies in orbit. The DRACO flight experiment could take place as soon as 2027. DARPA is also funding the 10-Year Lunar Architecture (LunA-10) Capability Study, through which 14 companies are proposing architectures for future lunar infrastructure. Initial study results were presented in June 2024.</p> -<p>If China amends or revises the ASL, Beijing may face international concern and pushback against its unilateral changes to the political relationship between mainland China and Taiwan — particularly from the United States and Japan. Maintaining the status quo in Taiwan is most conducive to the interests of the United States and its allies and partners. If Donald Trump is elected president in November 2024, his anti-China stance may present even more challenges to the CCP’s tough Taiwan policy. But even if Kamala Harris is elected, given the current global anti-China situation and China’s strong diplomacy, the relationship between the United States and China may not improve.</p> +<p>Additionally, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is developing two satellites, Oracle-Mobility and Oracle-Prime, designed to provide SSA information on objects in cislunar space. The Oracle-Mobility satellite will test new navigational techniques needed for cislunar operations and object tracking and is expected to launch no earlier than 2025. Applying lessons learned from the Oracle-Mobility mission, the Oracle-Prime satellite will operate in a halo orbit associated with the Earth–Moon L1 Lagrange point and test techniques to monitor space objects that transit cislunar space.</p> -<h4 id="looking-forward">Looking Forward</h4> +<p>There are also several U.S. companies attempting to build and launch missions to the Moon for commercial purposes. For example, Astrolab is developing the Flexible Logistics and Exploration (FLEX) lunar rover, which will be launched on SpaceX’s Starship rocket. Astrolab has agreements from eight customers to carry commercial payloads on the rover to the Moon’s surface in 2026.</p> -<p>At the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP in July 2024, the party noted that the reform task of Chinese-style modernization needs to be completed by 2029, the 80th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. This suggests that Xi Jinping will likely secure a fourth term as general secretary in 2027. He may wish to resolve the “Taiwan problem” during this term, and it is possible that he will try his best to bring the cross-Strait political agenda to a stage of substantive negotiations on reunification. In pursuit of this goal, the CCP will need to formulate more relevant laws to provide the legal basis for unification, which will involve either building on or revising the ASL. However, the government and people of Taiwan may not be willing to obey Xi Jinping’s will, meaning cross-Strait tensions could intensify after 2027.</p> +<p><strong>Australia</strong></p> -<h3 id="the-dangers-of-the-anti-secession-law-under-xi-jinping">The Dangers of the Anti-Secession Law under Xi Jinping</h3> +<p>In partnership with NASA, Australia plans to build and send a rover to the surface of the Moon on an upcoming Artemis mission, perhaps as early as 2026. Support for the development of the rover comes in part from Australia’s Moon to Mars initiative, which awards grants to Australian space companies, aiming to grow the country’s space economy and give it a greater role in future missions to the Moon. Moon to Mars additionally funded the development of scientific instruments to be used for other U.S.-led lunar missions. However, Australia does not currently have an agreement with the United States to send an Australian astronaut to the Moon as part of the Artemis program.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="vincent-yi-hsiang-chao">Vincent Yi-Hsiang Chao</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ikfWg36.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Commercial Lunar Payload Services Landing Sites.</strong> Source: <a href="https://science.nasa.gov/lunar-science/clps-deliveries/">“Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) Deliveries,” NASA</a>.</em></p> -<h4 id="introduction-4">Introduction</h4> +<p><strong>Canada</strong></p> -<p>The Anti-Secession Law (ASL) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has recently been brought back into the spotlight after it was used as a basis for new guidelines that would, among other things, potentially impose a death penalty on “Taiwan independence” advocates. This is a significant escalation related to what was seen as a long-dormant piece of legislation.</p> +<p>The Canadian Space Agency has two programs focused on the Moon: the Lunar Exploration Accelerator Program (LEAP), which manages the science, technology, and commercial lunar payloads opportunities for Canadian industry and academic partners, and Canadarm3, a robotic arm built by Canadian company MDA Space that will be installed on the Lunar Gateway to manipulate and maneuver objects on the exterior of the station. Canadarm3 will perform a similar role to the first Canadarm, used on the Space Shuttle orbiter, and Canadarm2, currently installed on the International Space Station (ISS). In return for supplying Canadarm3, NASA offered Canada the opportunity to send science, technology, and commercial lunar payloads and fly two Canadian astronauts to the Moon on Artemis missions.</p> -<p>First introduced by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 2005, the ASL is widely viewed as a response to Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian’s pro-independence tendencies. Prior to its passage, PRC premier Wen Jiabao said Beijing was seriously considering a “law of unification” in response to questions of how to deter Taiwan independence. Li Zhanshu, chairman of the NPC’s Standing Committee, also stated that the ASL would serve as a “guiding compass in fighting against separatist forces and promoting reunification.”</p> +<p><strong>China</strong></p> -<p>Despite strenuous protests from Taipei, international reactions were fairly muted following the ASL’s passage. A White House spokesperson called it “unhelpful.” The European Union urged both sides to “avoid any unilateral action that could stoke tensions.” Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concern that the law might “exert a negative influence over peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits.” It was apparent that despite its bellicose content, the legislation itself was largely seen as symbolic rather than as a substantive effort to compel unification.</p> +<p>In 2004, China announced the Chinese Lunar Exploration Program (CLEP) — also known as the Chang’e Project — which would consist of a series of robotic lunar missions built and operated by the China National Space Administration. As originally envisioned, China planned for eight Chang’e missions, six of which have been completed. The series of Chang’e missions has operated lunar landers, rovers, orbiters, and sample-return activities. In 2024, China’s most recent CLEP mission, Chang’e 6, successfully landed on the Moon’s south pole and returned a sample of the lunar regolith (a layer of loose, dust-like material that covers the Moon’s surface). The last two missions, Chang’e 7 and Chang’e 8, are expected to launch in 2026 and 2028, respectively. Chang’e 8 will test technologies required to build a permanent base and could be powered by nuclear technology. Both missions would land in the lunar south pole.</p> -<p>This may very well change under President Xi Jinping’s leadership. Xi has adopted a much harder stance on cross-Strait issues, vowing that China will “never promise to renounce” the right to use force against Taiwan. U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken said that in doing so, Xi made a “fundamental decision that the status quo was no longer acceptable.” In this context, the PRC’s Anti-Secession Law can be seen as an ideal framework for Xi, not only as it would preclude the status quo continuing indefinitely, but also because it would help him rationalize the use of force against Taiwan to audiences both at home and abroad.</p> +<p>In July 2023, China declared that crewed missions would be added to CLEP, with a crewed landing on the lunar surface planned for 2030. Separately, China also announced plans in 2019 for a future scientific research station to be constructed within the next 10 years at the Moon’s south pole. This vision has likely evolved into the planned International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), a joint venture between China and Russia announced in 2021. At least 10 additional countries have signed up to support the ILRS, including Venezuela, Belarus, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, South Africa, Egypt, Nicaragua, Thailand, Serbia, and Kazakhstan. China is also planning a GPS-like constellation for lunar orbit that will provide satellite navigation for the Moon. To recruit international partners for its crewed research station, China announced the creation of the International Lunar Research Station Cooperation Organization (ILRSCO) in 2023.</p> -<h4 id="chinas-more-assertive-unification-campaign-under-xi-jinping">China’s More Assertive Unification Campaign under Xi Jinping</h4> +<p>China is currently operating the Queqiao 1 relay satellite in a halo orbit associated with the Earth–Moon L2 Lagrange point, providing communications for China’s missions to the side of the Moon not facing Earth. Operating in a frozen elliptical orbit around the Moon, the Queqiao 2 satellite also serves as a communications relay for lunar missions.</p> -<p>Over the past decade, the situation around the Taiwan Strait has changed dramatically, aided by China’s newfound economic and military might. Repeated overflights by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have eroded the role of the median line of the Taiwan Strait as a crucial barrier that prevents accidents and misunderstandings. Diplomatic pressure from the PRC on other countries to break off formal ties with Taipei has dampened Taiwan’s international space. Beijing has also sought to use disinformation and other gray zone tactics to undermine trust in democratic institutions. Through military, economic, and social means, Beijing has increasingly signaled that the status quo is no longer tenable and that concrete actions toward unification must be made.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1ovzmz1.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Chang’e Timeline.</strong> Source: <a href="https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/lunar/cnsa_moon_future.html">David R. Williams, “Future Chinese Lunar Missions,” NASA</a>.</em></p> -<p>There are growing signs that these efforts will be further aided by a lawfare campaign centering on the Anti-Secession Law. For example, Xi’s seminal piece on Taiwan policy, “The Taiwan Question and China’s ‘Reunification’ in the New Era,” refers to the ASL twice and quotes from Article 2 that “there is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division.” In November 2022, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also released a statement that Xi had raised the ASL during a meeting with U.S. president Joe Biden. More recently, it was used as a basis for the new legal interpretations that would impose jail terms on “pro-independence” activists, with the death penalty reserved for more serious cases.</p> +<p>In June 2024, China released a road map for a series of projects aimed at building lunar infrastructure, including elements related to communications and SSA, as well as GPS-equivalent services for lunar and deep-space users.</p> -<p>Within China, discussions over the ASL will likely intensify in the run-up to its 20th anniversary next year. During its 15th anniversary in 2020, China’s state media published an article calling the law “a powerful weapon to deter Taiwan separatists,” adding that it should be revisited in the context of fraying U.S.-China ties and Xi’s cross-Strait policies. It seems possible that Xi may use its 20th anniversary as another milestone to announce new interpretations and applications of the ASL. Such action would be wholly consistent with the way Xi used the 40th anniversary of the 1979 “Message to Taiwan Compatriots” to announce new policies on Taiwan.</p> +<p><strong>Europe</strong></p> -<h4 id="three-ways-china-further-interprets-the-anti-secession-law">Three Ways China Further Interprets the Anti-Secession Law</h4> +<p>Through ESA, Europe is closely involved in NASA’s Artemis missions. Most notably, ESA produces the European Service Module (ESM) for the Orion crewed capsule. Already tested on Artemis I, the ESM will be used on all Artemis missions. In addition, ESA will be providing several components for the Lunar Gateway, specifically a habitation module, a refueling and storage module, and a module that will contain communications equipment for linking with the lunar surface and satellites in lunar orbit. In return for these contributions, ESA will be able to send two European astronauts to the Moon as part of the Artemis program.</p> -<p>Moving forward, it is likely that the PRC will shape interpretations of the Anti-Secession Law in three critical areas to: (1) clarify that Taiwan is a part of the PRC; (2) rule out an indefinite continuation of the status quo; and (3) rationalize the use of military force against Taiwan.</p> +<p>ESA is also designing Argonaut, a lunar lander that can perform a variety of different missions. Argonaut will be able to carry cargo such as scientific payloads, power-generation and -storage equipment, and lunar rovers to the Moon’s surface. Currently, ESA is planning to use the Ariane 6 rocket to launch Argonaut missions.</p> -<p>First, although the ASL maintains ambiguity in declaring Taiwan as part of “China” rather than the PRC, a closer reading of its text could easily suggest otherwise. Its opening article makes clear that “promoting peaceful national unification” and “preserving China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” are among its central objectives. Article 2 states: “There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division.” Article 5 adds that “upholding the principle of one China is the basis of peaceful reunification of the country.”</p> +<p>To support Artemis, Argonaut, and other lunar missions, ESA established a program called Moonlight to provide PNT services for the Moon, as well as communication and data relay services between the Earth and Moon. Currently scheduled to launch in 2026, the Lunar Pathfinder is the first spacecraft developed as part of this initiative. The satellite will orbit the Moon, communicating with Earth using an X-band link and with missions on the Moon using S-band and ultra-high frequency links. It will be launched with the CLPS Blue Ghost M2.</p> -<p>This should be read in the context of the Taiwan Affairs Office, which has long declared that the “one China” principle means that Taiwan is part of the PRC, stating that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and, after replacing the government of the Republic of China in 1949, the government of the PRC has become the sole legal government of China, enjoying and exercising sovereignty over the whole of China, including Taiwan.” In addition, the preamble of the PRC’s 1982 constitution states: “Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China.” A case can thus be made that there is no flexibility in the ASL’s interpretation of the “one China” principle.</p> +<p><strong>India</strong></p> -<p>Second, the ASL suggests that unification cannot be delayed indefinitely. Article 7 lays out the steps and phases of how the two sides can negotiate the cessation of hostilities, the political status of Taiwan, and arrangements for peaceful unification. However, Article 8 also states that if “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Taken together, these passages can be interpreted to mean that unification must be inevitable and action toward it must be ongoing for there to be peace across the Taiwan Strait, rationalizing the exclusion of any other outcome as a matter of law.</p> +<p>In August 2023, India became the fourth nation to successfully land on the Moon, landing the Chandrayaan-3 probe in the lunar south pole region. India is working with Japan on the Lunar Polar Exploration (LUPEX) mission, expected to be launched no earlier than 2025. Japan agreed to provide the rover and launcher for LUPEX, while India agreed to provide the mission’s lander. Additionally, India is in the early stages of planning its Chandrayaan-4 mission with the aim of returning a sample of lunar regolith to Earth.</p> -<p>Third, the ASL can easily be seen as a basis for Xi engaging in military action in the Taiwan Strait. Article 8 details the conditions in which “non-peaceful means” may be employed, including “the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China” or an exhaustion of possibilities for peaceful unification. It also authorizes the State Council and the Central Military Commission to decide what constitutes “non-peaceful means.” The ambiguously worded legal framework has granted Xi flexibility in using force against Taiwan. While this could have been seen as a symbolic gesture in 2005, a time when the PLA had few military options regarding the Taiwan Strait, it should be interpreted far differently today given China’s growing capacity to quarantine, blockade, or invade Taiwan.</p> +<p><strong>Israel</strong></p> -<h4 id="conclusion-1">Conclusion</h4> +<p>In 2019, two private entities from Israel — SpaceIL and Israel Aerospace Industries — launched the Beresheet lunar lander, the first privately funded attempt to reach the Moon. The lander ultimately crashed into the Moon after its gyroscopes failed on approach to the landing site. SpaceIL announced plans in 2020 to build a second Beresheet lander for launch in 2024, but there is no public indication of subsequent progress on this mission. Israel Aerospace Industries is also partnering with OHB SE, a German aerospace technologies group, on the Lunar Surface Access Service (LSAS) program, which supports commercial lunar payload delivery. The first LSAS mission is planned for 2025.</p> -<p>The potential that Xi will leverage the Anti-Secession Law to justify more assertive actions against Taiwan should alarm both Taiwan society and the international community. At its core, the ASL is a misnomer. Far from simply targeting efforts to promote Taiwan’s independence, it is designed to affect another outcome: the annexation of Taiwan by any means necessary. It seeks to do so by precluding the indefinite continuation of the status quo while rationalizing the use of military force against Taiwan. It is fundamentally the most dangerous piece of legislation affecting cross-Strait peace and stability.</p> +<p><strong>Japan</strong></p> -<p>The stakes are high following the inauguration of Taiwan’s President William Lai, whom Beijing has vowed to oppose. While there may be a genuine desire within Taipei for cross-Strait relations to return to the status quo ante, Beijing’s growing use of the ASL suggests that this is extremely unlikely. Instead, both Taiwan and like-minded democracies around the world should be clear-eyed that defense deterrence and international support remain the best response to the dangers of the Anti-Secession Law as wielded by Xi Jinping.</p> +<p>Japan has maintained an active lunar exploration program for over 30 years. In 1990, it sent the Hiten spacecraft to the Moon, making it the third country after the Soviet Union and United States to launch a lunar mission. Japan did not send another spacecraft to the Moon until 2007, when it launched the SELENE mission, also called Kaguya, composed of three separate spacecraft: a main orbiter, a relay satellite, and another satellite designed to map the Moon’s gravity field.</p> -<blockquote> - <h2 id="section-ii">Section II</h2> - <h2 id="legality-and-legal-warfare-of-the-anti-secession-law-and-the-22-articles">Legality and Legal Warfare of the Anti-Secession Law and the 22 Articles</h2> -</blockquote> +<p>Japan’s most recent lunar mission was the Smart Lander for Investigating Moon (SLIM), designed to demonstrate precision lunar landings. As it descended to the lunar surface in January 2024, SLIM successfully deployed two lunar landers. Unfortunately, the lander touched down with its solar arrays misoriented away from the Sun, which meant that it could not generate the amount of power required for normal operations. Even in this state, SLIM survived several lunar nights — but has not communicated with ground controllers on Earth since April 2024.</p> -<h3 id="the-anti-secession-law-in-chinas-taiwan-strategy-then-and-now">The Anti-Secession Law in China’s Taiwan Strategy, Then and Now</h3> +<p>Japan has several missions planned over the next few years. This includes the Hakuto-R 2 mission, planned by Japanese company ispace scheduled for late 2024, which will carry a lunar lander and micro rover. Toyota and JAXA are currently developing a crewed, pressurized lunar rover that will be flown to the Moon on a future Artemis mission. As part of the NASA CLPS initiative, the Japanese company Dymon is also planning to launch a lunar rover called Yaoki on an upcoming Intuitive Machines mission to demonstrate its ability to support future NASA missions. Additionally, Japan will cooperate with India on the aforementioned joint LUPEX mission.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="jacques-delisle">Jacques deLisle</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>As part of the Artemis program, Washington and Tokyo signed an agreement in April 2024 for a Japanese astronaut to be the first non-U.S. national to crew an Artemis mission to the lunar surface.</p> -<h4 id="introduction-5">Introduction</h4> +<p><strong>Russia</strong></p> -<p>China’s Anti-Secession Law (ASL) is a curious, but distinctive and significant, component of Beijing’s repertoire for addressing the issue of Taiwan. In its most obvious features, the ASL appears to add little to long-standing positions. Its key substantive provisions — including the law’s most threatening elements — were far from novel when the ASL was adopted in 2005. With the ASL, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) declared that China will resort to “non-peaceful means” if “‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces . . . cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession” or if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession occur” or if “the possibilities for peaceful unification are completely exhausted.” According to the ASL, Taiwan is currently part of China and its possible secession is to be prevented. China’s policy preference is for peaceful unification, and Beijing is prepared to offer terms that include some version of a “one country, two systems” arrangement.</p> +<p>Russia’s most recent mission to the Moon, the uncrewed Luna 25 lunar lander, failed when the probe crashed into the Moon’s surface in 2023. Several more Luna missions are in various stages of planning and development, with some scheduled for launch in the next five years. These upcoming uncrewed missions are part of the Luna-Glob program, which aims to create a fully robotic lunar base based on plans from 1997. This program would set the stage for later crewed missions to the Moon.</p> -<p>Indeed, in some respects the ASL was seemingly more restrained than some of Beijing’s previously stated positions. For example, it omitted the specific language of the 2000 White Paper’s threat that China could use force if Taiwan were occupied or invaded, or if it refused indefinitely to engage in unification negotiations. And the ASL forewent the phrase “one country, two systems” — already of ill odor in Taiwan in 2005, and much more so after the 2019 crackdown on protests in Hong Kong and the subsequent passage of a National Security Law for Hong Kong in 2020 — instead using the substantively similar but less provocative phrases “systems different from those on the mainland” and “a high degree of autonomy.”</p> +<p>Planned for launch in 2027, the lunar orbiter Luna 26 is the next Russian mission to the Moon. It will carry a scientific payload, as well as serve as a communications relay between the Moon and Earth. In 2019, Beijing and Moscow agreed to cooperate on both Russia’s Luna 26 mission and China’s Chang’e 7 mission. Originally, ESA had also intended to collaborate with Russia on Luna 26; however, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the agency canceled these plans and withdrew from work with Russia on the Luna 27 mission, a lander planned for the lunar south pole. Russia has claimed it will complete Luna 26 and Luna 27 independently, with the latter consisting of a primary mission (Luna 27a) and a backup (Luna 27b) in the event Luna 27a fails.</p> -<p>Putting familiar propositions in the form of legislation by the National People’s Congress (NPC) would not seem to do much. As a matter of principles of Chinese law and governance — and perceptions in Taiwan, the United States, or elsewhere — the ASL could not meaningfully enhance the authority of the Chinese state and its military to use force or take other coercive measures against Taiwan. Conversely, and even if they had been less vague, the ASL’s statements concerning the preconditions or procedures for using force could not credibly indicate to audiences at home or abroad the existence of binding and not-easily-alterable limitations on China’s use of force in response to acts that authorities in Beijing deem unacceptably “secessionist.” The ASL’s designation of the PRC institutions that would authorize the use of non-peaceful means portended no meaningful constraint on a decision that, as a practical matter, would be made at the top levels of the party-state.</p> +<p>As early as 2009, Russia had been planning a new, reusable, crewed space capsule for use in low Earth orbit (LEO) and for transportation to the Moon. This new Orel spacecraft would be designed to transport up to four humans. In 2020, Russian officials announced plans for an uncrewed test launch of Orel in 2023 that never happened. Russia also said it was planning an uncrewed mission to the Moon in 2028, but there are no signs that it remains on track tomeet this goal. And although it announced in 2007 that it aimed to field its own Lunar Orbital Station, there has been no subsequent indication of work on its development.</p> -<p>What, then, does the ASL do, and why has it reemerged as a prominent focus and concern since the mid-2010s, and especially during the 2020s? There are (at least) three, somewhat overlapping, answers to these questions, and they shed some light on China’s current and likely near-future policies and behavior.</p> +<p>Given budget constraints — and the failure of Luna 25 in 2023 — it is unlikely that Russia will be able to launch any of these proposed missions. Sanctions imposed on Russia since its invasion of Ukraine have severely limited its access to Western technologies and microelectronics, further stalling Russian efforts to start or continue work on future Moon missions.</p> -<h4 id="a-specifically-legal-element-in-chinas-response-to-pro-independence-moves">A Specifically Legal Element in China’s Response to “Pro-Independence” Moves</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Given budget constraints — and the failure of Luna 25 in 2023 — it is unlikely that Russia will be able to launch any of these proposed missions.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The ASL is an unambiguously legal element in China’s repertoire for responding to what it perceives or depicts as excessively pro-Taiwan independence moves, especially (but not only) when such moves themselves have a legal component. The ASL was adopted in 2005, and shaped during the months preceding its passage, when Beijing saw troubling moves toward independence by Taiwan under the leadership of the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Chen Shui-bian, who had won reelection, to the PRC’s chagrin, at the beginning of 2004.</p> +<p><strong>South Korea</strong></p> -<p>Of course, China has had available — and has employed — other, less law-centered methods. But legislation — and law more generally — is, at a minimum, another tool in Beijing’s toolkit, and one with several distinctive values that have drawn reinvigorated appreciation during the Xi era. The Reform-Era Chinese regime has used law — particularly legislation — as a way of signaling that a policy position is especially seriously meant and durable. Putting the already-familiar policies set forth in the ASL into legislative form holds out the prospect — and almost surely reflects an intent — to tap into the legitimating power of law, domestically (which the regime has appreciated and sought to cultivate) and, no less importantly, internationally (including in Taiwan and the United States, where law’s legitimacy has been robust).</p> +<p>Launched in 2022, the Korea Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter (KPLO), also known as Danuri, is South Korea’s first spacecraft to operate beyond geostationary Earth orbit (GEO). The KPLO was designed to survey the lunar surface and help identify possible landing sites for future missions. It is currently orbiting the Moon. The South Korean space agency is planning an uncrewed mission to the lunar surface in 2032 and actively participates in UN discussions on lunar norms and sustainability.</p> -<p>As this last point suggests, there is also something of a mirroring effect. The ASL reads, in part, as a grudging homage to the United States’ principal relevant law: the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA has been an enduring anchor of U.S. policy and a useful and flexible tool, invoked by U.S. leaders in rebuffing Chinese calls for — or rebutting Chinese charges of — change in U.S. policy, yet not purporting to compel specific actions by U.S. presidential administrations (despite provisions that are more concrete and conventionally “law-like” than the ASL). Tellingly, Chinese sources have long denounced the TRA and, at times, compared the ASL to it.</p> +<p><strong>Other Countries</strong></p> -<p>The ASL was adopted in the face of a turn in Taiwan to legal means to address issues that resonated with independence and that alarmed Beijing. These included: the so-called “defensive referenda” put before Taiwan’s voters in 2004; the broader embrace of referenda, including through the adoption of a Referendum Law in 2003; and the pursuit of a project to “reform” the Republic of China (ROC)’s constitution, pursued as an alternative to a more radical project that Chen had at times flirted with of “replacing” the ROC’s constitution. Each of these law-centered means could be read as heightened assertions of Taiwan’s separate, state-like status. The (failed) referenda implicitly invoked Taiwan’s right to self-defense akin to that enjoyed by sovereign states under international law and asserted Taiwan’s equality with the PRC. The creation and subsequent use of a legal framework for referenda resonated with earlier DPP calls for a popular vote on Taiwan independence and with international legal norms that saw referenda as an appropriate means for deciding issues of self-determination (with outcomes that can include independence). The constitutional reform proposals were explicitly framed as efforts to “indigenize” the ROC’s constitution to Taiwan (including by eliminating the mainland-born and One-China-linked National Assembly). More pointedly if less narrowly legally, Chen had made the international law-adjacent assertions that Taiwan was “already an independent sovereign state” and that there was “one country on each side of the Strait.”</p> +<p>Additional countries have flown payloads on another nation’s lunar missions in the past several years or have plans to do so in the next decade. For example, the UAE is sponsoring an experiment created by students at AGH University of Science and Technology in Poland for inclusion as a rideshare payload on an upcoming Astrobotic CLPS mission. The UAE also developed a lunar rover that flew aboard ispace’s Hakuto-R 1 mission but was lost in the lander’s crash. Following the crash, Prime Minister and Vice President Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum signaled that the country will make another attempt at a lunar landing. Additionally, the UAE has other lunar plans, providing an airlock for the Lunar Gateway and making the UAE the only non-ISS partner nation providing hardware for the new station.</p> -<p>An analogous dynamic appears to have occurred and shaped the recent career of the ASL. A renewed emphasis on the ASL in PRC discourse, particularly in the 2020s, and the promulgation in May 2024 of a set of “22 Articles” jointly issued by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuracy, and the Ministries of Public Security, State Security, and Justice — in part interpreting the ASL — have been specifically legal features of Beijing’s response to what it sees as escalating efforts to assert or support Taiwan’s lasting separation. One principal concern is what Beijing characterizes as the “pro-independence” agenda of President Tsai Ing-wen and her successor, Lai Ching-te, whom PRC authorities regard as more provocative than his immediate predecessor (despite Lai’s repeated pledges of policy continuity). Another impetus is what China sees as dangerously increased support for Taiwan independence (or, at least, deterrence of pressure for unification) from the United States.</p> +<p>Similarly, in May 2024, Pakistan sent the iCube Qamar, a CubeSat designed to orbit the Moon and take photos of the lunar surface, as a payload on board China’s Chang’e 6 mission. In 2022, Mexico initiated its Colmena project, an effort to promote Mexican participation in lunar exploration through the development of microrobots, five of which were launched aboard Astrobotic’s Peregrine 1 mission. While the mission’s failure destroyed the payload, a second Colmena mission is slated for 2027. Turkey is planning on launching its lunar orbiter AYAP 1 in 2026, followed by AYAP 2, which aims to land a rover on the Moon in 2028. Finally, New Zealand plans to conduct SSA research and create a cislunar SSA capability in partnership with NASA.</p> -<p>During Tsai’s first year in office, for example, an ex-People’s Liberation Army (PLA) general called for triggering the ASL’s non-peaceful means provision because the prospects of peaceful unification had been exhausted, and PRC media reported that the ASL might undergo toughening amendments or supplementation by a National Unification Law. As Tsai moved into her second term, Beijing turned up the volume. At a formal fifteenth anniversary ceremony for the ASL, for example, a top PLA general warned that China’s military would “take all necessary steps” if “the possibility for peaceful unification is lost.” The Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee declared the ASL to be an important part of the “one country, two systems” framework, which Xi Jinping had already declared to be the inevitable template for Taiwan’s unification. A commentary from a prominent researcher at the closely state-linked Taiwan Studies Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) declared the ASL to be a “powerful weapon” meant to deter Taiwan separatists and a “legal ground” that the government might “activate” in response to Tsai’s provocations. There were also reprises of earlier Tsai-era calls to toughen the ASL.</p> +<h3 id="international-space-governance-frameworks">INTERNATIONAL SPACE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS</h3> -<p>Toward the middle of Tsai’s second term authoritative Chinese sources returned to emphasizing the ASL. A spokesperson from China’s Taiwan Affairs Office praised the law for its vital role in deterring Taiwan independence and separatism. Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned that Beijing would take “resolute actions to safeguard” China’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity” if the ASL were violated. Xi Jinping referred to the ASL in a G20 sidelines conversation with President Biden concerning Taiwan and U.S. policy. The PRC’s 2022 White Paper on Taiwan invoked the ASL (twice), alongside the PRC’s constitution and the National Security Law, in pushing back against what it characterized as the “DPP authorities’ separatist stance.” Official statements also pointed to the ASL as a basis for possible criminal sanctions for “die-hard” pro-independence elements in Taiwan.</p> +<p>There are several space-specific international treaties and other international agreements that address space issues, as well as the U.S.-led Artemis Accords. While no treaty deals solely with cislunar space, the provisions of the space-specific agreements cover cislunar space no differently than any other domain.</p> -<p>Lai’s inauguration was followed by a Ministry of State Security article on WeChat, which recited the ASL’s three triggers for using non-peaceful means and characterized the ASL as “a sword hanging over the head of Taiwan separatists.” Issued shortly after Lai took office, the 22 Articles explicitly interpreted the ASL, as well as other PRC legislation, criminalizing a wide range of still ill-defined pro-separatist actions and setting forth means for prosecuting violators. Spokespersons for the Taiwan Affairs Office characterized the 22 Articles as reflecting “a solid legal basis and sufficient legal grounds” for punishing efforts to promote Taiwan independence, and (here, apparently pursuing legitimation through comparative law) as consistent with the “common practices of all countries around the world” in punishing crimes of secession or incitement to secession — a legal argument that echoes longer-standing Chinese claims about the permissibility of preventing Taiwan’s secession.</p> +<h4 id="the-outer-space-treaty-and-related-agreements">THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND RELATED AGREEMENTS</h4> -<p>China has taken these measures against a backdrop that includes law-invoking or law-related moves from both Taipei and Washington. Law-reliant or law-resonant statements from Tsai and Lai that have been highly offensive to Beijing include: the now-familiar assertions that Taiwan is an independent, sovereign state (though, especially for Tsai, a state called the ROC, and, in one of Lai’s recent formulations, with the specifically legal hook of “according to international law”); declarations that the entities on the two sides of the Strait must deal as equals (another not-novel proposition, but one that figured prominently in Lai’s inaugural address); Tsai’s second-inaugural reference to “constitutional reform” (arguably echoing Chen); and Lai’s suggestion that, given its one-China presumption, relying on the ROC constitution could bring “disaster” for Taiwan (in a comment made late in the presidential campaign, evoking the specter of the Chen-era constitutional replacement gambit).</p> +<p>Evolving from several arms control resolutions debated in the United Nations during 1966, the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 was the first international treaty concerning space. It serves as the foundation for international space law and addresses all government and private sector space activities carried out by parties to the treaty. Although the treaty does not reference cislunar space, it does specifically reference the Moon — and thus, due to its broad applicability to all space activities, does apply to cislunar space.</p> -<p>PRC sources connected such Taiwanese moves to the ASL. China’s 2022 White Paper specifically pointed to “lobby[ing] for amendments to their ‘constitution’ and ‘laws’” as indicia of DPP authorities’ “separatist stance.” CASS Taiwan Studies Institute commentaries branded Tsai’s law-related moves as an effort to “establish a legal basis for Taiwan’s independence” and characterized Tsai’s mulling of constitutional reform as transgressing the ASL. The 22 Articles formally declared that any referendum or law-making that tried to change Taiwan’s legal status or its constitution would be criminal.</p> +<p>There are currently 114 parties to the OST, including all major spacefaring nations. Key provisions of the treaty state that</p> -<p>On the U.S. side, Beijing-offending statements — especially President Biden’s repeated commitments to defend Taiwan with military force, which China regards as hollowing out strategic ambiguity — have at times been tethered to an avowed legal obligation under the TRA. Such declarations by administration officials have come in the context of something that has not been seen since the passage of the TRA in 1979: congressional lawmaking (rather than mere proposed legislation) — including the TAIPEI Act, the Asian Reassurance Initiative Act, the Taiwan Travel Act, the parts of the proposed Taiwan Policy Act that made it into a National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and several other provisions in recent NDAAs — that has pointedly and repeatedly reaffirmed the TRA and called for U.S. policies of stronger quasi-diplomatic ties, greater defense support and security cooperation, and backing for Taiwan’s international status and participation.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>“the exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries . . . and shall be the province of all mankind”;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>outer space shall be “free for exploration and use by all States”;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>outer space is “not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>states shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies, or “station such weapons in outer space;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>“the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used . . . exclusively for peaceful purposes,” with no weapons testing of any kind, military maneuvers, or the establishment of military bases;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>astronauts shall be regarded “as envoys of mankind”;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>states shall be responsible for national space activities, whether carried out by “governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities”;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>states shall be liable for damage caused by their space objects; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>states shall avoid “harmful contamination” of space and celestial bodies.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h4 id="reflecting-and-supporting-beijings-master-narrative-on-taiwans-legal-status">Reflecting and Supporting Beijing’s Master Narrative on Taiwan’s Legal Status</h4> +<p>The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which played a key role in creating the OST, was originally established by the UN General Assembly in 1958 as an ad hoc committee that became a permanent body in 1959 tasked with addressing the exploration and use of space for the benefit of all humanity. The UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) acts as the secretariat for COPUOS, helping to implement space treaties and General Assembly resolutions that form the basis of international space law.</p> -<p>The ASL reflects — and supports — China’s master narrative on Taiwan’s international legal status, which is a core component of Beijing’s strategy toward Taiwan. A key attribute of the ASL is its assertion, set forth in particularly formal and legal terms, that Taiwan is currently part of China, that the PRC already holds sovereignty over Taiwan, and that the people in Taiwan therefore are Chinese nationals. The ASL, thus, is conceptually highly assertive, in pointed contrast to a contemporaneously discussed (and sometimes still-discussed) possible unification law, which implicitly would have conceded that Taiwan was not (or at least might not be) a part of China or under Chinese sovereignty. Since before the adoption of the ASL and continuing through the two decades since, a unification law has been floated periodically — often when PRC sources have contemplated or advocated a harder approach to Taiwan — as an alternative or a supplement to the ASL. But the appeal has been in a possible unification law’s tougher operational — not conceptual — implications: although implicitly accepting that Taiwan had slipped away (or at least was on the verge of doing so), it would declare a situation in which there would be an imperative to act, with force, if need be, to change a status quo of a separate Taiwan.</p> +<p>Other than the OST, there are four other legally binding international agreements that govern space. Each applies to spacecraft, people, and activities in cislunar space.</p> -<p>If the ASL-embodied position that Taiwan is currently part of China is accepted, much that serves China’s Taiwan strategy follows. For example, foreign “interference” to provide for the defense of Taiwan against force by the PRC would be broadly impermissible and presumptively unlawful intervention in China’s internal affairs and, in some versions, against China’s territorial integrity and sovereign autonomy. China’s use of force or coercion against “separatist” moves by Taiwan would be a generally permissible and presumptively lawful action by a government within its own sovereign territory and against a domestic rebellion or attempted secession, as the ASL assumes and China’s Taiwan White Papers assert.</p> +<p>The <strong>Rescue Agreement</strong> of 1968 requires that parties to the agreement provide assistance, when possible, to spacecraft personnel in distress or in the event of an accident or emergency landing. Additionally, should a party to the agreement become aware of spacecraft personnel in distress, they are required to notify the launching nation and the UN secretary general. The agreement also permits nations to request assistance recovering their space objects that land in territories outside of their jurisdiction. The launching nation is required to cover any costs incurred during recovery efforts.</p> -<p>Moreover, and reprising the Hong Kong “one country, two systems” template, the ASL framework assumes that governing a post-reversion Taiwan is ultimately a matter within the PRC government’s discretion. The Chinese government would not be durably or reliably constrained by the terms set forth in the ASL, nor would it be bound by any terms worked out through the unification negotiations that the ASL contemplates. In this respect, the ASL, and any PRC law implementing the outcome of ASL-authorized unification negotiations, would be analogous to the Basic Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Any such law for Taiwan would be a mere PRC domestic law and thus subject to the NPC’s, or its Standing Committee’s, unilateral interpretation, amendment, or supplementation by a region-specific National Security Law, but without the treaty-like underpinnings of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, which Beijing now regards as fully executed and thus moot.</p> +<p>The <strong>Liability Convention</strong> of 1972 states that countries are liable for any damages incurred from all space objects launched from their territories. The crash of a nuclear-powered Soviet satellite onto Canadian territory in 1978 resulted in the only claim to date made under this convention.</p> + +<p>The <strong>Registration Convention</strong> of 1976 requires that states submit details to the United Nations about their spacecraft and satellites launched into space. The associated UN registry of space objects contains information such as the name of the launching nation, an appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number, date and location of launch, basic orbital parameters, and general function of the space object.</p> + +<p>Though most of the <strong>Moon Agreement</strong> of 1984 merely reemphasizes provisions of the OST, it also includes new language specifying that the Moon is “the common heritage of mankind” and providing clarity on the use of lunar resources. The treaty specifies that all references to the Moon also apply to all other celestial bodies in the Solar System, including orbits and trajectories to, from, and around them. Regarding the lawful use of lunar resources, the treaty planned to establish an international regime to administer the exploitation of resources on the Moon, other planets, asteroids, and any of the Solar System’s other celestial bodies. The regime was never implemented because there are only 17 parties to the treaty as of October 2024. The Moon Agreement has had little impact on international space law, as most spacefaring nations, including the United States, Russia, and China, decided not to sign it.</p> + +<p>In addition to these five legally binding international space agreements, UNOOSA often highlights five non-binding resolutions approved by the General Assembly that articulate key principles of international space law. The earliest of these resolutions is the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which predates the OST and was passed in 1963. The other resolutions, passed in the 1980s and 1990s, present principles for international television broadcasting from satellites, remote sensing of Earth from space, and nuclear power sources in space, as well as a declaration on the importance of international cooperation in space for the benefit of all people, with a particular focus on developing nations.</p> + +<p>In 2010, COPUOS established the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities to identify issues impacting space sustainability — such as space debris, SSA, space weather, and national regulatory regimes for space — and develop ideas and voluntary guidelines to improve them. In 2019, COPUOS adopted a set of 21 voluntary best-practice guidelines for long-term sustainability that had been negotiated and approved by the working group.</p> + +<p>To address the use of space resources, including those on the Moon, the legal subcommittee of COPUOS also created the Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities in 2022, giving it a five-year mandate to examine the benefits of establishing a framework for use of space resources and whether such a framework might require new international agreements. Establishment of this working group represents a consensus view of COPUOS members that the OST does not adequately address the issue of space resource use and denotes members’ willingness to consider new international instruments to tackle it.</p> + +<p>Finally, during their official annual meetings in June 2024, COPUOS members agreed to establish the Action Team on Lunar Activities Consultation (ATLAC), which aims to provide recommendations for international consultative mechanisms on sharing information and best practices, ensuring safety, facilitating interoperability for lunar activities, protecting the lunar environment, and mitigating the creation of debris in lunar orbit. ATLAC membership is open to any COPUOS member, though key participants will include the United States and China. One expert involved in the establishment of the action team noted to this report’s authors that it was designed to facilitate such discussions between the United States, China, and Russia on lunar governance and coordination. The group will share its final recommendations during COPUOS meetings in 2027.</p> + +<p>While not directly related to cislunar space or the Moon, it is worth noting that UNOOSA supports the work of the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG). The ICG serves as a coordinating body for operators of such systems, working to facilitate compatibility, interoperability, communications, and transparency to benefit all global users of PNT services.</p> + +<h4 id="the-international-telecommunication-union">THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION</h4> + +<p>Originally established by the International Telegraph Convention of 1865, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is now a UN agency responsible for issues pertaining to information and communications technologies. Most of its mission is focused on Earth, but a key part of its responsibilities relates to the space environment. The ITU is responsible for international coordination of radio spectrum use, including spectrum used by satellites. It facilitates international coordination of spectrum use for spacecraft orbiting Earth — meaning the ITU has effectively had a regulatory role for most spacecraft, since every crewed and uncrewed spacecraft in orbit since Sputnik 1 in 1957 has relied on radio communications.</p> + +<p>The ITU groups satellites orbiting Earth into two categories: GEO, also called GSO, or non-geostationary orbit (non-GSO). Due to the finite space for satellites in GEO — sometimes compared to beachfront property on Earth — the ITU has developed rules that balance the access of all nations to these valuable slots and approval of new systems on a first-come, first-served basis.</p> + +<p>To date, there are very few ITU rules or decisions that relate specifically to cislunar space or the Moon. The union’s first foray into regulating spectrum use in cislunar space happened in 1971, when it added a provision to the Radio Regulations, the ITU’s legally binding spectrum rules, limiting the potential for interference to radio astronomy in the shielded zone of the Moon (SZM). The SZM is defined as the lunar surface area and adjacent part of space that are shielded from emissions originating from within 100,000 kilometers of Earth’s center (i.e., the far side of the Moon). The rule was designed to keep this naturally quiet zone free from human-made radio-signal interference so that the SZM could be used for radio astronomy in the future.</p> + +<p>Since then, the ITU has not promulgated additional formal rules focused on cislunar space or the Moon. In 1997, it urged members to carefully assess the impacts of communications relay systems between the Earth and Moon. More recently, attendees at the 2023 World Radio Conference, a gathering organized by the ITU every three to four years to update the Radio Regulations, approved studies to look at frequency bands for lunar and cislunar communications. The results of the studies will be presented and debated at the 2027 conference.</p> + +<h4 id="the-artemis-accords">THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS</h4> + +<p>The Artemis Accords are non-binding multilateral agreements between the United States and 43 other countries that contain various provisions related to norms of behavior in space. The United States has stated that these accords are intended to help facilitate operational implementation of obligations derived from the OST and other international space agreements.</p> -<p>Perhaps most fundamentally, the ASL-embedded PRC legal narrative frames assertions that Taiwan (or the ROC) is an independent sovereign state — and efforts by the United States or others that support or suborn such status or Taiwan’s claims to it — as challenges to the legal status quo of Taiwan as a province-like part of China, and casts China’s measures to prevent such moves as status quo-preserving. Any claims by Taiwan to independent sovereign state status under international law, therefore, would have to meet the much higher threshold for achieving legitimate statehood through secession, rather than the more capacious general criteria for statehood, which Taiwan arguably meets (territory, population, autonomous and effective government, and capacity to engage in relations — albeit mostly informal ones — with other states).</p> +<p>The Artemis Accords established new norms among signatories aimed at improving the transparency, peacefulness, and interoperability of space activities. Among other commitments, signatories agree to release scientific information gathered through civil space exploration to the public and other Artemis signatories; make reasonable efforts to adhere to existing interoperability standards for space infrastructure; protect space sites considered significant to human heritage; and prevent the accumulation of orbital debris around the Moon.</p> -<p>This aspect of the ASL, too, has returned to the fore in recent years. In the 2022 White Paper, for example, the quotations from PRC legal sources — the ASL, as well as the PRC constitution and the 2015 National Security Law — almost exclusively refer to Taiwan’s status as currently a part of China. In other official and quasi-official statements from the 2020s concerning the ASL, the posture is much the same, speaking of the ASL either as a deterrent to (as-yet-unaccomplished) separatist efforts or as a basis for the use of force to prevent such efforts from succeeding. In a similar vein, the 22 Articles restate the standard position that “Taiwan is an integral part of China’s territory” and criminalize acts of “wantonly distort[ing] or misrepresent[ing] the reality that Taiwan is part of China,” or “seeking to change the legal status of Taiwan as part of China.”</p> +<p>Though legal experts continue to disagree on the meaning of OST language related to using space resources, the Artemis Accords assert that the extraction and utilization of space resources can be done without violating the OST. Specifically, they state that the use of space “does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II” of the OST. Furthermore, they call for the development of international practices and rules governing the extraction and use of space resources.</p> -<p>Such statements dovetail with a more narrowly international law-focused strategy that Beijing has recently pressed much harder. The PRC claims that UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 settled, as a matter of international law, Taiwan’s status as a province or integral part of China. From this premise, according to Beijing’s account, it follows that the United States and others who support what China deems to be Taiwan independence, suggest that sovereignty over Taiwan is unsettled, or seek robust international participation for Taiwan are violating international law as well as “basic norms” of international relations. Notably, the 22 Articles define as crimes the promotion of Taiwan’s entry into states-member-only international organizations, the undertaking of official foreign and military connections, and collaboration with foreigners to do so.</p> +<p>The Artemis Accords are the first international agreement to implement a concept referred to as “safety zones,” which are designed to prevent the activities of one nation from causing harmful interference to the activities of other countries — for example, to or by lunar launch and landing sites. Both launches and landings on the Moon’s surface create plumes of regolith and debris, which may damage or blind nearby spacecraft. Artemis signatories are expected to notify and coordinate with the creators of safety zones before conducting space activities within these areas. However, some experts have suggested safety zones may constitute “national appropriation” in violation of Article II of the OST. But it can be noted that international maritime law does provide precedent for safety zones, albeit in a different domain.</p> -<p>To be sure, law (including international law) does not determine China’s — or the United States’ or Taiwan’s — choices on such fraught and high-stakes issues. But, as China’s framings in the ASL and various ASL-invoking contexts reflect, legal arguments and instruments seek, and can yield, international political gains.</p> +<p>Russia has criticized various elements of the Artemis Accords for being U.S.-centric. China has said the accords reinforce competition rather than cooperation in space. Neither nation has signed the Artemis Accords nor signaled an interest in supporting the Artemis program. Conversely, there is no indication that the United States would collaborate with China or Russia on the ILRS. China suggested during a presentation at the International Astronautical Congress in 2023 that the ILRS framework would eventually include space sustainability principles akin to the Artemis Accords.</p> -<h4 id="a-vague-and-flexible-framework">A Vague and Flexible Framework</h4> +<h3 id="non-space-international-frameworks-with-analogues-to-space-governance">NON-SPACE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS WITH ANALOGUES TO SPACE GOVERNANCE</h3> -<p>The ASL framework is so vague and flexible that Beijing can invoke it in the service of a wide range of policies, from very hard to soft, toward Taiwan. The ASL’s conditions for lawful use of force are general and indeterminate. In terms of substantive criteria, the ASL notably does not articulate any specific moves by Taiwan that would warrant China’s use of force, and there is no plain or definitively stated meaning of acts “under any name or by any means” that would “cause the fact of secession,” or “major incidents entailing . . . secession,” much less what would “completely exhaust” “possibilities for peaceful unification.” In this respect, the ASL is less specific than the policy positions set forth in the 2000 White Paper. In terms of process, the ASL states only that the State Council and the Central Military Commission will decide on and execute the “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures,” reporting to the NPC Standing Committee. Moreover, the ASL’s provisions are subject to unilateral, unreviewable interpretation — and, thus, de facto revision — by Chinese authorities.</p> +<p>There are several domains on Earth that have similar jurisdictional characteristics as space, including Antarctica, the Arctic, the high seas, and international airspace. Each of these areas possesses its own established international governance mechanisms, which can provide lessons for future space governance frameworks and evolutions of current international space law. This section provides an overview of these non-space agreements and frameworks, and the subsequent section draws parallels to space governance and identifies lessons that could be used to help address associated gaps.</p> -<p>During much of the decade or more following its adoption, the ASL stood comfortably alongside a policy of patience and pursuit of “peaceful development” of cross-Strait relations toward an outcome of eventual unification, which would bring practice into line with the ASL’s claimed principle of already-existing PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. But the ASL framework is equally compatible with a much more aggressive and threatening policy, as became evident during the final years of Chen’s presidency and remained so through the Tsai and early Lai administrations. Beijing can, in effect, substantially lower the thresholds and relax the procedures for using force and can credibly claim to do so lawfully without changing the text of the ASL. The 22 Articles may reflect a recognition of this point. To the extent that they adopt a tougher and more threatening line, the 22 Articles purport to do so through the mere interpretation of the unamended ASL — and other existing laws — rather than via a change in law or legislative addition to the ASL.</p> +<h4 id="the-law-of-the-sea-treaty">THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY</h4> -<p>To forge a legal framework for a much harder-line, even force-using, policy against Taiwan, Beijing thus need not risk the costs that could accompany amending or superseding the ASL. Such changes could undercut the ASL’s evident aspiration to “TRA lite” or “TRA-mirroring” status as a fixed, relatively venerable, formal framework for PRC strategy and behavior. Like the enactment of the ASL in 2005, any ASL-toughening amendment or repeal would draw criticism abroad as unhelpful and threatening. Moreover, any reaction would likely be sharper in the context of today’s resurgent concerns about Beijing’s intentions toward Taiwan and more fraught relations across the Strait and between China and the United States and other powers.</p> +<p>Signed in 1982, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the “Law of the Sea Treaty,” established the international legal framework for maritime activities and uses of ocean resources. Key provisions of the treaty include granting nations the right to assert sovereignty up to 12 nautical miles from shore, giving all states freedom of navigation and overflight of the high seas, and setting up rules for exploring and exploiting sea-floor resources. Currently, 167 parties and the European Union have ratified the treaty — with the notable exception of the United States, which has cited concerns that treaty provisions on the use of seabed resources were not free-market friendly.</p> -<h4 id="beyond-the-asl-beijings-legal-tactics-in-changing-circumstances">Beyond the ASL: Beijing’s Legal Tactics in Changing Circumstances</h4> +<p>Established in 1994 in accordance with UNCLOS provisions, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) authorizes and controls seabed mineral extraction and works to protect the seafloor environment. To justify such regulation, UNCLOS asserts that ocean resources, outside of those under national jurisdiction, are the “common heritage of mankind.” The work and policies of the ISA are governed by an assembly made up by representatives of all parties to UNCLOS, a 36-person council elected by the assembly, and a secretary-general elected by the assembly for a four-year term. To date, it has authorized over 30 seabed mining-exploration contracts. As the ISA has not yet finalized regulations for commercial mining, held up by calls for a global moratorium due to alleged environmental impacts, it has yet to issue any approvals for commercial deep-sea mining projects.</p> -<p>Notwithstanding the recently reinvigorated discussion of the ASL, the legal elements of Beijing’s current and probable near-term policy toward Taiwan appear to lie — and are better pursued — in areas that relate only obliquely to the ASL (although they remain consistent with the ASL and the broader PRC narrative concerning Taiwan’s status that is reflected in the ASL). A few changes, particularly in Beijing’s perspectives and assessments, help to explain this pattern.</p> +<p>At the same time as the original UNCLOS negotiations in the 1980s, the United States enacted the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act to provide a licensing framework for U.S. companies wanting to mine the seafloor. Though the United States has issued licenses for seafloor mining, some experts argue that U.S. companies could face international legal risks should they begin commercial mining without ISA approval.</p> -<p>First, Beijing’s bad-case scenarios for Taiwan’s trajectory have evolved since the ASL’s adoption nearly two decades ago. The focus has shifted toward concern about “gradual” or “incremental” independence, rather than a more dramatic and formal break by Taiwan’s leadership. PRC authorities could construe relevant phenomena in Taiwan as transgressing the ill-defined and malleable limits set forth in the ASL. But, for Beijing, the more promising legal path for addressing the problems it discerns and for setting forth the means to do so is the type of approach evident in the 22 Articles, which are framed as interpretations of the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law, as well as the ASL “and other relevant laws,” and which provide the first relatively full-fledged and formal legal gloss on the ASL’s sparse text.</p> +<h4 id="the-antarctic-treaty-and-antarctic-treaty-system">THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AND ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM</h4> -<p>The 22 Articles retain familiar targets, such as efforts to change Taiwan’s international legal status through domestic legal means, or attempts “to create Taiwan independence.” But the 22 Articles shift the emphasis away from the ASL’s principal scenario of possible actions by and against Taiwan as a political entity or aspiring state (with pledges to protect, as much as possible, the persons, rights and property of individual Taiwanese, as well as foreigners, in the event of China’s resort to non-peaceful means.) The 22 Articles focus on other entities and individuals — specifically “‘Taiwan independence’ die-hards” and, implicitly, primarily DPP leaders and office-holders (who are characterized as die-hards in the 2022 White Paper and other PRC sources) and secondarily others who might commit acts that fall within the expansively framed crime of separatism. The broadly enumerated offenses include actions — often but not necessarily only by those wielding government power — that would advance what Beijing sees as gradual or incremental independence and the preclusion of prospects for peaceful unification: depicting Taiwan as not a part of China in education, culture, history, or news media; suppressing political parties, organizations, or individuals supporting unification; establishing a separatist organization; and “other conduct seeking to separate Taiwan from China.” The 22 Articles’ agenda to chill or deter such moves is underscored by its call for relevant PRC state organs to “give full play” to their roles to “severely punish” offenders, by its reach to mere “drafting . . . principles, plans, or programs,” actions abroad, and potentially long-past behavior (given its capacious notion that prior actions can be part of ongoing separatist plots), and by its provisions for trials in absentia.</p> +<p>Antarctica is the only continent without an indigenous human population. No human is believed to have seen Antarctica or its ice shelf until 1820. Since that first sighting, seven countries have made territorial claims on the continent, with some national claims overlapping with others. The Cold War added another dimension to the geopolitics of Antarctica: though neither the United States nor the Soviet Union made territorial claims, both operated research stations there. Additionally, neither saw Antarctica as having strategic military value, with both nations seeking to prevent the militarization of the continent.</p> -<p>Second, Beijing has become more concerned about the “internationalization” of the Taiwan issue — that is, the PRC wants to avoid it becoming a less narrowly bilateral cross-Strait or trilateral PRC-Taiwan-U.S. issue. Internationalization was a relatively marginal issue in the ASL, wherein there is little more than a rote reference to brooking no “interference by outside forces” in China’s quest for unification. But it is a prominent focus in the 22 Articles, which define the crime of separatism as including: promoting Taiwan’s membership in international organizations (specifically those limited to sovereign states); engaging in official exchanges or military contacts with foreign states; and the more traditionally ASL-resonant offense of working to create two Chinas, or one China, one Taiwan, or an independent Taiwan in the international community. The 22 Articles also provide that any of the secessionist crimes carried out “in collusion with foreign or non-mainland institutions, organizations, or individuals” will incur enhanced punishments. In addition, the actions criminalized under the 22 Articles (as an interpretation of China’s Criminal Law) potentially include those undertaken outside Taiwan or the mainland, including by foreign nationals. In this respect (and some others as well), the 22 Articles echo the Hong Kong National Security Law, which the NPC adopted in the aftermath of the 2019–2020 unrest and which responded (in part) to what PRC authorities saw as foreign efforts to internationalize Hong Kong issues.</p> +<p>Though some claimant nations to territory on Antarctica initially objected, the United States pursued the development of and eventually succeeded in establishing an international treaty that preserved the freedom of scientific research and peaceful use of the continent without adjudicating or deciding on any territorial claims. Convened by the United States in 1958, the Antarctic Conference, which produced the Antarctic Treaty, only included the 12 nations with contemporary scientific equities in Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957 to 1958. Signed in 1959, the Antarctic Treaty serves as the foundation for a system of treaties and agreements that today provide the international governance framework for the continent.</p> -<p>Finally, as the foregoing account suggests, China’s preferred means for addressing the challenges it sees on the Taiwan issue have shifted away from the ASL’s emphasis on the full, war-like use of force. Instead, the 22 Articles set forth criteria and (in their interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Law) mechanisms for imposing criminal sanctions — often severe ones — on individuals and entities, which are not the initial or main targets of threats to use non-peaceful means. This legal approach aligns with China’s master narrative by framing Chinese state actions as matters of enforcing domestic criminal laws (albeit ones with extraterritorial reach). In a similar vein, the PRC has created and invoked a framework for maritime regulatory law as a purported legal basis for enforcement actions by non-PLA-Navy vessels against fishing boats or other vessels in waters near Taiwan-controlled territory. This framing casts Beijing’s responses to what it sees as problematically independence-promoting measures from Taiwan as domestic PRC legal measures, distinguished from the actions by the PRC military that are contemplated by the ASL. So, too, the escalating gray zone activities around Taiwan by the PRC military are presented as not entailing an ASL-authorized use of force to prevent Taiwan’s secession (even though such prevention is among their evident purposes). Instead, the principal relevant legal concepts appear to be the international law-rooted ones associated with Beijing’s claims that its military operations are short-of-force exercises in areas over which the PRC has lawful jurisdiction, such that China’s actions do not entail the use or threat of force internationally while other states’ military involvement or intervention would do so.</p> +<p>As part of the treaty framework, signatories began meeting regularly to discuss issues related to Antarctica, such as environmental protection and cooperation on research. Officially called the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) process, these meetings now occur each year, and participants make decisions by consensus. These annual meetings have provided opportunities for treaty Consultative Parties to develop specific, legally binding agreements, with greater precision than the original treaty on rules covering specific activities in Antarctica. The ATCM process has also been a mechanism for treaty parties to update and address contemporary issues that were not foreseen at the time the treaty was drafted.</p> -<h3 id="chinas-anti-secession-law">China’s Anti-Secession Law</h3> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="legal-warfare-and-illegality">Legal Warfare and Illegality</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>Currently, key legally binding documents of the Antarctic Treaty System include the original 1959 treaty, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, and the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. These documents and resolutions, decisions, recommendations, and other measures adopted by past ATCMs cover many topics, such as peaceful use and scientific collaboration, environmental protections, preservation of historic sites, management of tourism, designation and management of protected areas, mapping, safety, information sharing, logistical cooperation, and weather and meteorological cooperation.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="yu-jie-chen">Yu-Jie Chen</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Since 1998, commercial mining in Antarctica has been prohibited. Prior to this ban, several treaty parties had been working on a treaty addendum that would have regulated future resource extraction. Growing concerns about impacts of human activities to Earth, not just in Antarctica but around the world, and the rise of the environmental movement in the 1980s led to the abandonment of the addendum. At that time, Australia and France initiated efforts to oppose plans to allow future mining. Even today, there is limited interest in Antarctic mining, as experts question its business viability.</p> -<h4 id="introduction-6">Introduction</h4> +<h4 id="the-international-regulations-for-preventing-collisions-at-sea">THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR PREVENTING COLLISIONS AT SEA</h4> -<p>The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long employed “legal warfare” or “law-based warfare” (法律戰) as a coercive instrument to compel Taiwan into submission. This approach primarily aims to legitimize China’s claim over the island. As scholars observe, China’s strategy for absorbing Taiwan through legal warfare rests on three pillars: reframing the Beijing-Taipei relationship as an internal matter, constricting Taiwan’s international space, and undermining the right to self-determination.</p> +<p>Until the 1860s, most maritime nations developed and used their own navigation rules and practices. In 1863, the United Kingdom and France agreed on a set of maritime rules that were eventually adopted by 30 countries, including the United States. A well-known guide to these regulations, published in 1867 by British official Thomas Gray, was called The Rule of the Road, the progenitor of all future references to such guidelines as “rules of the road.” To expand on these regulations, the United States convened the first International Maritime Conference in 1889 to discuss additional measures needed to prevent maritime collisions. Throughout the next 70 years, a regular cadence of major international maritime conferences updated and revised these rules.</p> -<p>At the international level, China actively seeks to conflate its own “One China” principle with established international norms, thereby isolating Taiwan within the global community. Domestically, its 2005 Anti-Secession Law (ASL) purports to legitimize the use of force against Taiwan. Furthermore, as cross-Strait relations have deteriorated in recent years, China has initiated sanctions against Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) politicians and affiliated organizations, labeling them “Taiwan-independence diehards” (台獨頑固分子). On June 21, 2024, China escalated its deterrence efforts by publishing the “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (the “22 Articles”).</p> +<p>Then in 1972, all contemporary international navigation and maritime rules were replaced entirely by the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, also known as Collision Regulations (COLREGs), which specify the rules of the road for ships at sea with the aim of preventing accidents. The COLREGs are published and maintained by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a UN agency established in 1948 that focuses on ensuring safety at sea. Nations become a member of the IMO by ratifying the Convention on the International Maritime Organization, whereupon they are required to enact the COLREGs as national law within their own jurisdictions.</p> -<p>All these legislative and judicial maneuvers constitute an integral component of China’s legal warfare against Taiwan. These tactics aim to destabilize the status quo of Taiwan’s de facto independence, legitimize China’s use of force in a potential conflict, and coerce Taiwan into “unification.” Furthermore, they seek to frame any potential intervention by other countries as “foreign interference” in China’s domestic affairs. Within Taiwan, China’s legal warfare tactics aim to manipulate public opinion against supporting autonomy, suppress pro-independence sentiment, and create a pervasive chilling effect on political discourse.</p> +<h4 id="the-arctic-council">THE ARCTIC COUNCIL</h4> -<p>The conceptual framework of legal warfare highlights the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) predominant approach to law wherein legal discourse and mechanisms are means to an end. The objective is not to resolve disputes through law but to manipulate the broader strategic environment to the adversary’s disadvantage and to coerce submission from its target. In Taiwan’s case, this entails isolating it internationally, brandishing the threat of force to constrain Taipei’s political choices, and penalizing advocates for the island’s independence more generally.</p> +<p>The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum established in 1996 to promote cooperation, coordination, and engagement between countries with territory in the Arctic. Only nations with Arctic territory — Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States — are members of the council, though representatives of Indigenous peoples can join as permanent participants. Additionally, non-Arctic nations can be admitted as observers. Senior officials representing each member nation convene every six months to discuss past accomplishments and future work of the council, as well as issue a nonbinding declaration. Every two years, the council holds ministerial-level meetings.</p> -<p>Finally, when discussing China’s legal warfare, it is crucial to distinguish it from the lawfare that operates in democratic, rule-of-law settings. While using law as a weapon has a long history, the term “lawfare” gained traction in academic and policy circles around 2001, referring to employing legal means to achieve military objectives. Importantly, most definitions of the word are value-neutral, encompassing both positive and negative uses of the law. However, in the Chinese context — which lacks checks and balances, an independent judiciary, or public oversight — legal warfare differs significantly. Lawfare in a democratic society may involve legal arguments before neutral courts, whereas the CCP’s legal warfare lacks independent judicial review and seeks no impartial adjudication. As argued below, China’s legal warfare tactics threatening to annex Taiwan violate the international legal principle prohibiting the use of force, and its persecution of Taiwan individuals for their political views violates international human rights law. Therefore, China’s legal warfare should instead be labeled “illicit lawfare.”</p> +<p>The council itself was not established by a formal international treaty but rather by the Ottawa Declaration, signed by representatives of the future council’s membership. Its mandate covers a wide range of topics, including sustainable development of the Arctic region and environmental protection, but specifically excludes one topic: military security.</p> -<h4 id="chinas-illicit-lawfare">China’s Illicit Lawfare</h4> +<p>There is no budget or secretariat for the Arctic Council. The council is only a forum and lacks the ability to implement or enforce any of the guidelines or recommendations approved during council meetings. However, council members negotiated and concluded the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement in 2011, which addresses responsibilities and coordination for international search and rescue activities in the region.</p> -<p>In the official Chinese narrative, legal warfare is one of the “three warfares” (三戰), a concept that emerged formally in 2003 when China reissued the Regulations on the Political Work of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As described in Article 18 of the regulations, which covers “wartime political work,” these include “public opinion warfare” (輿論戰), “psychological warfare” (心理戰), and “legal warfare” (法律戰).</p> +<h4 id="the-convention-on-international-civil-aviation">THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION</h4> -<p>The three warfares are fundamentally influence operations. While the PLA regulations do not explicitly define them, they do have typical interpretations within Chinese academic discourse. “Public opinion warfare” encompasses the use of media to disseminate social information, intentionally shape and control public opinion, and actively influence public beliefs, perspectives, emotions, and attitudes toward political warfare actions. “Psychological warfare” involves the use of information to manipulate the target’s psyche during wartime. While public opinion warfare targets the general public, psychological warfare specifically aims to undermine the morale of an enemy’s armed forces and the political elite. Lastly, “legal warfare” refers to the state’s use of legal means to categorize the target’s behavior as unlawful, thereby employing legal coercion and sanctions to enforce submission and achieve diplomatic, political, or economic objectives.</p> +<p>The Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in 1944, established rules for airspace, aircraft registration, safety and security, personnel licensing, aircraft communications, customs and duties, and environmental protections and addressed national jurisdictional questions related to air travel. It recognizes states’ sovereignty over the airspace directly above their territory, which includes land areas and territorial waters. Parties to the convention must enact national laws that enforce convention rules and regulations and provide aircraft navigation services in their sovereign territories. Convention rules apply in the airspace above international waters, known as “high-seas airspace.”</p> -<p>Compared with other types of warfare, legal warfare displays distinct differences in medium, effects, and influences. It primarily employs legal norms, means, and narratives to achieve its effects or the potential threat thereof. In terms of influence, legal warfare often leans on the coercive force of the state apparatus to enforce punishments and to have a deterring and chilling effect.</p> +<p>The convention also set up the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the UN agency charged with coordinating standards and best practices for international air travel regarding topics such as air navigation, navigational infrastructure, flight procedures, cross-border aviation, and air-accident investigations. The ICAO is governed by a council — consisting of 36 members elected from the 193-member nations of the organization — that is responsible for adopting new standards and rules.</p> -<p>Legal warfare interacts with other types of warfare. Some Chinese commentators, for example, have observed that “public opinion warfare provides a platform for legal warfare, and legal warfare provides a legal basis for public opinion warfare, with both elements mutually reinforcing.” It is also argued that the synergy of the three warfares can “expand the political influence and psychological impact of military operations.” The integrated nature of these strategies necessitates that observers’ understanding of legal warfare extends beyond the legal domain to consider its broader context within the full spectrum of influence operations.</p> +<h3 id="cislunar-governance-and-policy-challenges">CISLUNAR GOVERNANCE AND POLICY CHALLENGES</h3> -<h4 id="asl-authorizing-the-use-of-force">ASL: Authorizing the Use of Force</h4> +<p>There are policy, legal, and regulatory questions that impact current activities, as well as the future evolution of human activities, in cislunar space. These cislunar questions are generally the same ones that exist today for all other areas of space, whether in near-Earth orbits or beyond the Moon. Governance questions applicable to cislunar space, therefore, should be addressed as much as possible so that resulting frameworks apply broadly to all regions of space.</p> -<p>One of China’s most notable instances of legal warfare against Taiwan is the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. In response to what Beijing perceived as the promotion of “Taiwan independence” by Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian, the ASL was passed to provide a legal foundation to counter propositions such as “two Chinas,” “one China and one Taiwan,” former Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui’s earlier formulation of “special state-to-state relations” (特殊國與國關係), and Chen Shui-bian’s “one country on each side” (一邊一國) theory. While the law expresses a preference for achieving Taiwan’s unification through peaceful negotiations, its vaguely defined provisions notably legitimize the use of force, a prospect of considerable importance to Beijing.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">These cislunar questions are generally the same ones that exist today for all other areas of space, whether in near-Earth orbits or beyond the Moon.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Article 8 of the ASL outlines three broad conditions under which China may employ “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”:</p> +<p>To tackle cislunar governance questions, this report examines broader space governance matters, identifying key unresolved issues that resulted from either gaps in national and international frameworks or technological advancements that were not foreseen when space treaties were negotiated. Today, there are three main deficits in international space governance, which the report authors assert should be addressed to facilitate the safe, sustainable, and secure development of cislunar space. Governments should</p> -<ol> +<ul> <li> - <p>If “‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China”</p> + <p>modify and elaborate upon rules regarding permissible activities in space,</p> </li> <li> - <p>If “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur”</p> + <p>further define property rights in space and use of space resources, and</p> </li> <li> - <p>If “possibilities for a peaceful unification should be completely exhausted”</p> + <p>establish rules of the road for human-made objects in space.</p> </li> -</ol> +</ul> -<p>Questions inevitably arise. Given that Taiwan has never been under the PRC’s control, how does one define “Taiwan’s secession from China?” What constitutes the complete exhaustion of “peaceful unification” possibilities, particularly if Taiwan prefers maintaining its independence? What if Taiwan continues to reject the so-called 1992 Consensus, which Beijing interprets as affirming the island’s status as part of China? In any case, what can be certain is that the vagueness of the ASL’s language grants China considerable discretion in determining when to act, as noted by many commentators.</p> +<p>As the Moon is likely the first celestial body other than Earth on which humans might live and work, new space governance rules applying to cislunar space will not only involve spacecraft in space but also probably people and equipment interacting on the lunar surface.</p> -<p>The phrase “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures” in Article 8 also warrants scrutiny. Chinese scholars argue that “non-peaceful means” should include more than just armed force or war under international law and that “other necessary measures” should be interpreted as actions closely linked to, yet distinct from, “non-peaceful means.” In this view, “non-peaceful means” may include suspending cross-Strait exchanges, initiating economic warfare, issuing or announcing sanctions (such as prosecutions or wanted lists) against prominent “Taiwan independence” figures and groups, launching public opinion campaigns, and blockading Taiwan internationally.</p> +<p>The OST and three related space agreements — the Rescue and Liability Conventions and Rescue Agreement (not including the Moon Agreement due to its low number of signatories) — that established the foundations for international space law somewhat address these issues. However, there are no consensus definitions or meanings of certain key treaty phrases.</p> -<p>Upon the ASL’s promulgation in 2005, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao sought to downplay concerns, emphasizing the law’s focus on peaceful unification rather than on targeting Taiwan or triggering war. China’s general low-profile approach at the time effectively deflected Western criticism. Some commentators predicted that the ASL would not drastically alter cross-Strait relations, characterizing China as “talking tough” but “acting prudently.</p> +<p>Though there are few similarities between life on Earth and the harsh vacuum of space or surface of the Moon, elements of governance frameworks used to regulate areas on Earth beyond national borders, such as Antarctica and the high seas, should be assessed when considering how to update international space governance frameworks. The non-space governance frameworks described earlier in this report, some of which date to before the founding of the United Nations, have proven durable.</p> -<p>However, the geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically over the past two decades, with China adopting a more assertive stance toward Taiwan. This is evident in the rise of hawkish proposals advocating for “legal preparations to resolve the Taiwan question through non-peaceful means.” These proposals include refining Article 8 of the ASL through interpretations by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee and exploring strategies to deter foreign intervention through legal warfare.</p> +<p>This section attempts to understand the reasons for that durability and discern lessons that can be applied to future space governance. For example, unlike the Antarctic Treaty System or UNCLOS, the OST did not establish a consultative mechanism or process for treaty parties to update space governance rules or address new issues that have arisen due to technological change, increasing commercial activities, and increased military interests in space. The report authors discuss international space governance gaps and describe how non-space international agreements and frameworks have addressed similar concerns and considerations in their respective domains. Though the Moon Agreement is effectively not relevant to international space law, it is discussed as a reference that could help serve as a guide for a new agreement.</p> -<p>As a tool of perception influence, the ASL notably does more than merely authorize the use of force. China uses it to shift blame onto the DPP, portraying its own actions as a necessary response to the party’s alleged “provocations.” Through the ASL, China can legitimize its coercive measures by framing them as a justified response to Taiwan’s perceived transgressions and casting Taiwan as the actor responsible for the deteriorating cross-Strait relationship.</p> +<h4 id="permissible-activities-in-space">PERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES IN SPACE</h4> -<h4 id="22-articles-punishing-taiwans-people-for-political-beliefs">22 Articles: Punishing Taiwan’s People for Political Beliefs</h4> +<p>Broadly speaking, activities in cislunar space could include government activities of either a civilian or military character and commercial, private sector activities. The OST and Moon Agreement provide some, albeit broad, direction on permissible uses of space, including cislunar space. The OST calls for the exploration and use of space for the benefit of all nations but does not provide a comprehensive list of permissible activities. However, it does enumerate various non-permissible space activities, such as national appropriation of space and the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in space. Without referencing outer space writ large, the OST says that the Moon and other celestial bodies should only be used for peaceful purposes.</p> -<p>However, the ASL appears to have fallen short of achieving the CCP’s objective of deterring Taiwan independence. DPP candidates have repeatedly been elected president in recent decades, with William Lai in 2024 becoming the third DPP president. This perceived failure by the CCP has fueled ongoing discussions within China about potentially passing more stringent legal measures against Taiwan.</p> +<p>The OST and Moon Agreement language relating to permissible activities drew upon the Antarctic Treaty, which placed similar, but not identical, constraints on what nations could do in Antarctica. Like outer space, Antarctica was reserved for peaceful purposes, with an emphasis on scientific exploration and research. Any activities of a military nature are prohibited. Similarly, the OST prohibits military activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies, but not in outer space.</p> -<p>Indeed, since 2021, China has initiated a policy of specifically targeting Taiwan officials and organizations, labeling them as purported “Taiwan independence diehards.” The current sanction lists include 10 DPP politicians, several of whom hold prominent positions in the Lai administration such as Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim, Secretary-General of the National Security Council Joseph Wu, and Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo. Sanctioned Taiwan organizations include the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, the International Cooperation and Development Fund, the Prospect Foundation, and the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats. The individuals and associated organizations on this list are prohibited from visiting mainland China, Hong Kong, or Macau. Cooperation between the sanctioned parties and any organizations or individuals in mainland China is forbidden, and companies and investors with ties to the sanctioned entities are precluded from generating profits within China. Importantly, these sanctions may also lead to the imposition of criminal penalties, potentially resulting in the death penalty under the PRC Criminal Code and National Security Law.</p> +<p>Since signing the Antarctic Treaty, signatories have refrained from militarizing the continent, though experts disagree on what constitutes militarization. In contrast, there are military interests in space today. However, it is not clear what military advantages could be obtained specifically in or from cislunar space. Advocates for extending military operations into cislunar space acknowledge that the Moon’s distance precludes it from having any direct and meaningful impact on terrestrial operations but suggest actions from cislunar space could affect space systems nearer to Earth. In particular, these arguments assert that cislunar space is a high ground that can be used for deploying weapons against satellites in lower orbits and conducting space observation and surveillance.</p> -<p>Furthermore, on June 21, 2024, the Supreme People’s Court, along with other government agencies, published the 22 Articles, which aims at using law enforcement to punish those deemed “Taiwan independence diehards.” In August, the website of the Chinese State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) published a list of 10 such individuals; the list aligns with those whom the TAO had sanctioned in previous years.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">However, it is not clear what military advantages could be obtained specifically in or from cislunar space.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The potential consequences of the 22 Articles are significant, and the possibility of Taiwan individuals being detained and tried within China cannot be dismissed. The large Taiwan population living in or visiting China is particularly vulnerable, as demonstrated by several high-profile cases, such as that of Taiwan NGO worker Lee Ming-che, who was detained in 2017 and subsequently sentenced to five years imprisonment for subverting state power. Lee’s detention appears to have been triggered by his advocacy within China, which included discussions on Chinese social media about human rights, democracy, and Taiwan’s experiences. In this case and in a series of subsequent detentions, Beijing violated the 2009 Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement, which mandates prompt notification and facilitation of family visits for those detained. Beijing’s denial of notification and family visits may be intended to create the impression that even the ruling DPP cannot help Taiwan citizens detained in China.</p> +<p>For example, one report expressed concerns that China might use the Moon’s gravity to slingshot hostile spacecraft around the Moon and into position to attack satellites in GEO or other orbits. While technically possible, such technology — if developed and deployed — offers no strategic advantage over the myriad of counterspace weapons that could be launched today. It would also be a much more time-consuming way to deliver a weapon targeting a satellite in GEO than other possible methods. Slingshotting around the Moon to reach GEO takes a lot of time and is designed to save spacecraft fuel — not the kind of maneuvering that would underpin a successful military attack.</p> -<p>Recent examples include the cases of pro-Taiwan independence activist Yang Chih-yuan and Gūsa Publishing founder Li Yan-he (also known as Fu Cha). Yang was detained in August 2022 on the charge of “separatism.” He was found guilty and sentenced to nine years in prison on August 26, 2024, with his case becoming the first tried under the 22 Articles. Li, a mainland Chinese national operating a publishing house in Taiwan that releases books on topics deemed sensitive by Beijing, is reportedly being held and investigated for alleged activities endangering national security.</p> +<p>One could argue that launching a counterspace weapon from cislunar space toward a satellite in GEO or lower orbits could offer a way to stage a surprise attack from an unexpected direction. While true, this advantage dissipates once it becomes known that such weapons are being deployed and possibly used. Improved cislunar SSA could certainly help provide advance warning of such activities, but since the vast majority of expected future cislunar missions are civilian, these SSA improvements should be the responsibility of civilian and commercial operators. However, military users could acquire cislunar SSA data from these sources, like they acquire other commercial space services like satellite communications.</p> -<p>Most Taiwan individuals targeted by the CCP reside in Taiwan and are unlikely to enter mainland China, Hong Kong, or Macau. Recognizing the challenges in prosecuting them, the 22 Articles establishes a clear process for pursuing and trying these individuals, even if they remain outside China’s jurisdiction.</p> +<p>Another reason given by proponents of conducting military activities in cislunar space is that it affords an ideal vantage to conduct space observation and surveillance and to assess counterspace operations at lower orbits. In reality, a system placed on the Moon or in halo orbits associated with the Earth–Moon L1 and L2 points could not provide continuous, persistent surveillance of any point on Earth or in lower Earth orbits. Earth itself would block cislunar observation platforms from having a persistent view of activities in near-Earth orbits.</p> -<p>Regarding the statute of limitations for prosecution, the 22 Articles emphasizes two key points. First, for “continuous or ongoing” acts of separatism or inciting separatism, the statute of limitations does not begin until the offense ends. Second, once a case is filed or accepted by the court, suspects evading investigation or trial will not be protected by any statute of limitations. This means individuals can be “held accountable for life” regardless of whether they appear in China during the investigation or trial.</p> +<p>Additionally, the Moon rotates around Earth about every 28 days, so it is not a static observation point relative to Earth. A system in cislunar space would lose track of areas for long periods of time. Plus, a spacecraft near the Moon is 10 times further from Earth (nearly 400,000 kilometers) than a spacecraft in GEO (about 36,000 kilometers). A network of sensors located on Earth, however, can provide persistent monitoring of activities in GEO, as is done today.</p> -<p>In terms of judicial procedures where the suspect is overseas, the public security or state security organs can issue a warrant for their arrest (Article 13). Even if the suspect does not appear, these organs can still transfer the case to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate for prosecution; the court can then conduct a trial in absentia (Article 17). In other words, even if the suspect remains outside of China throughout the entire judicial process, they can still be convicted.</p> +<p>Scientists in China have proposed another cislunar use for space monitoring, publishing a paper on using a lunar gravity assist for placement into retrograde GEO, along the same plane on the same plane as Earth’s equator. Such an orbit, which would run in the opposite direction of standard drift, would allow a spacecraft to get a view of the entire GEO belt every 12 hours but pose significant collision risks to other satellites in GEO, with one expert noting it would be akin to driving a car the wrong way on a highway. Additionally, a retrograde GEO system would not be able to examine any one spacecraft in detail due to the high relative velocities between such a monitoring system and other satellites in GEO drift orbits. There is also no clear benefit to using such a monitoring satellite rather than existing SSA sensors placed on Earth.</p> -<p>Chinese law enforcement cannot operate in Taiwan, but the potential for China to pursue these individuals through extradition or illegal measures should not be completely discounted. However, the primary significance of the 22 Articles may not be the physical apprehending of pro-independence individuals but rather its function as a legal warfare tool intended to deter, silence, and divide those perceived as adversaries. Coupled with “public opinion warfare” and “psychological warfare,” this strategy aims to criminalize specific behaviors and label them as “illegal.” By doing so, the 22 Articles appears oriented toward the following objectives, which align with the ASL and the CCP’s recent international efforts to promote the “One China” principle:</p> +<p>The larger question is: Under what circumstances should utilizing cislunar space for observation or collecting SSA data be characterized as a military use? Certainly, a military-owned and -operated satellite presumes a military use. But, as noted earlier in this section, improvements to cislunar SSA systems should be the focus of civilian and commercial operators. Civil-government or commercial cislunar capabilities that observe and characterize space activities, including a retrograde GEO system, could collect the same information and data as military-operated systems but would not carry the same militarization concerns. However, there is no reason military users should not have access to SSA data available from civilian and commercial sources.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Stigmatization:</strong> Labeling specific Taiwan political figures or activists as “criminals” to discredit them and their cause</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Deterrence:</strong> Creating a chilling effect within Taiwan society by threatening legal consequences for advocating independence</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Legitimization:</strong> Bolstering the legitimacy of the “One China” principle internationally by framing opposition to it as criminal activity</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Scapegoating:</strong> Shifting blame for instability in the Taiwan Strait onto pro-independence individuals, deflecting criticism from Beijing’s policies</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Ultimately, the raison d’être for extending military forces into cislunar space seems tied more to national honor and fear that China might do something there first than to a real strategic military goal. If this is true, the situation looks no different than Antarctica in the 1950s. To save time and military resources that could best be used elsewhere, the two superpowers of that day wisely made the decision to keep military interests and the Cold War out of Antarctica.</p> -<p>The CCP’s discourse and strategy toward Taiwan can also draw lessons from its treatment of Hong Kong, most notably its narrative of targeting “an extremely small number of people.” When the National People’s Congress issued the National Security Law in 2020, it claimed to be “punishing a small group of ‘Hong Kong independence’ elements and violent elements who seriously endanger national security.” When the Hong Kong government introduced the National Security Ordinance in 2024, it also claimed that “the legislation targets a very small group of people with extreme behavior.” Likewise, when the 22 Articles was issued, the CCP repeatedly emphasized that the document targets “an extremely small number” of diehard Taiwan independence elements and their secessionist activities, “not involving the vast majority of Taiwan compatriots.” This narrative serves to both appease the general public and create social division by distinguishing between those who are targeted by Beijing and those who are not.</p> +<p>In addition to questions about military uses of cislunar space, this report examines commercial, private sector uses. Like the Antarctic Treaty, the OST is silent on commercial, for-profit activities in cislunar or any part of space. But the OST does create room for broadly nongovernmental space activities by including a clause requiring nations to authorize and continuously supervise all national space activities by governmental and nongovernmental entities. This language satisfied both the Soviet Union, which sought to limit space to government-only missions, and the United States, which sought to permit commercial space developments.</p> -<p>However, the enactment of the National Security Law in Hong Kong has led to a rapid deterioration of the local society and governance system. According to the Hong Kong government, as of March 8, 2024, a total of 291 individuals have been arrested for suspected offenses endangering national security since the law came into effect. Among all cases, over 170 individuals and five companies were charged, with 112 people already convicted or awaiting sentencing. Many pro-democracy activists and ordinary citizens have been prosecuted and convicted, notably including the “Hong Kong 47,” media tycoon and democracy advocate Jimmy Lai, and members of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China and the 612 Humanitarian Relief Fund. These cases serve as a warning to ordinary protesters, pro-democracy activists, news media, and nongovernmental organizations alike. Since July 2020, a chilling effect has permeated Hong Kong’s civil society, with independent groups disbanding, residents leaving in a mass exodus, and street protests disappearing. While Taiwan is not Hong Kong, it is crucial to remain vigilant for any signs of a similar trend, particularly among Taiwan individuals residing in mainland China, who are likely to be the most vulnerable.</p> +<p>In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was arguably little commercial appetite for space beyond nascent plans for commercial communications satellites — and certainly no business plans built around the extraction of space resources from the Moon, asteroids, or other space objects.</p> -<h4 id="anticipating-chinas-future-moves-more-legislation">Anticipating China’s Future Moves: More Legislation?</h4> +<p>Space activity is now dominated by the private sector, though a significant percentage of commercial space activities are financed by governments. However, few of these current private sector space activities are related to the extraction or use of space resources.</p> -<p>As noted, China may see the ASL as insufficient in deterring perceived threats. The CCP has explicitly stated that it will not rule out various other legislative proposals such as introducing a “Motherland Unification Law” or “National Unification Law,” adding implementation rules for the ASL, issuing a legislative interpretation of Article 8 of the ASL, or enacting a “Basic Law of the Taiwan Special Administrative Region” modeled on that of Hong Kong. For instance, in March 2022, Zhang Lianqi, a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), remarked that because the ASL focuses on “anti-independence,” the party should instead pass a Motherland Unification Law, which would stipulate the legal obligation of all Chinese citizens, including Taiwan residents, to promote national reunification and would clearly define the legal responsibility — presumably to include punishment — for violating the “obligation of national reunification.”</p> +<p>Once it is possible to realize economic gains from resource extraction (or some other activity) on the Moon or other celestial bodies, nations will want a way to claim and protect their shares, as well as their national entities involved in those activities. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) established by the UNCLOS is an attempt to internationally regulate seabed mining, partly to avoid a rush to grab seafloor territory and bypass any motivations for a country to use armed force to assert national rights to ocean resources. The question, discussed in the next section, is whether a similar arrangement could work for space.</p> -<p>Such a law, however, could be a double-edged sword for the CCP. On the one hand, it might underscore Beijing’s determination to control Taiwan, but it could also limit the CCP’s flexibility on the issue, particularly given the difficulty of managing the nationalist sentiments of the domestic Chinese audience toward Taiwan. If a Motherland Unification Law were to be enacted but not successfully implemented, the CCP’s domestic credibility, and possibly legitimacy, could be undermined. Consequently, the potential enactment of such a law has sparked internal debate within China. Given the controversy and historical context surrounding the ASL — originally named the “National Unification Law” — it is unlikely the CCP will enact a Motherland Unification Law that includes any deadline for unification.</p> +<h4 id="property-rights-in-space-and-use-of-space-resources">PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SPACE AND USE OF SPACE RESOURCES</h4> -<p>China might still move forward on bolstering the ASL through a legislative interpretation or implementing regulation, explicitly defining the conditions for using military force under Article 8. This approach would be less politically contentious than enacting a Motherland Unification Law.</p> +<p>Property rights stipulate how a resource can be owned and used and have existed in some form since ancient times. Today, property rights are closely tied to national sovereignty, determined by national law, and provided by the nation-state to entities under its jurisdiction. The one notable instance in which property rights originate from an authority other than the nation-state is the bottom of the ocean, which is defined by UNCLOS as the “common heritage of mankind.” In this case, property rights to the seabed and ocean floor, including to resources within those areas, are shared by all nations and people. According to this principle, no nation or entity can unilaterally claim or distribute those resources. Only the ISA, as established by UNCLOS, has that right.</p> -<p>China will undoubtedly intensify its pursuit and punishment of individuals deemed “Taiwan independence diehards,” as outlined in the 22 Articles. This document, jointly issued by China’s top judicial and security organs, was disseminated to all levels of public security, state security, judicial, procuratorial, and justice departments nationwide, signaling a clear intent to encourage investigation, prosecution, and trial of such cases. Cases can be further categorized based on whether the defendant is located within mainland China or overseas, with different procedures for each type.</p> +<p>The use of resources in any domain is closely tied to property rights, namely that the decision to use a resource is predicated on the ability of that entity to first assert ownership of it. In space, property rights and national sovereignty are somewhat constrained by the OST. Specifically, Article II of the OST states that space, “including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” As already noted, legal scholars disagree on the meaning of “national appropriation,” with some arguing it prohibits any property claims while others assert it allows for private appropriations of space resources.</p> -<h4 id="cases-with-defendants-within-mainland-china">Cases with Defendants within Mainland China</h4> +<p>The OST does not provide clear direction on how national laws and regulations apply to space, but it does tacitly permit nations to exercise a degree of sovereignty in authorizing and continuously supervising their national space activities. Since the OST did not establish consultative bodies that regularly meet to discuss treaty implementation issues, like UNCLOS did with the ISA and the Antarctic Treaty System with its consultative meetings, there has not been an easy way to clarify this ambiguity.</p> -<p>In recent years, China has demonstrated a pattern of human rights abuses in politically sensitive cases, and Taiwan defendants have not been immune to this treatment. Individuals accused of “separatism” or “inciting separatism” are demonstrably prone to numerous abuses:</p> +<p>Experts generally agree that the OST prohibits national claims to territory in space, including territory on a celestial body, such as the Moon or an asteroid. But nations may still want to use these locations for their own national purposes. And the issue is that although outer space is large, there are certain locations, trajectories, or orbits that will have more value than others. There are probably only so many space objects that can safely occupy a given location, trajectory, or orbit at the same time. For orbits, this is sometimes called “orbital carrying capacity.” The Artemis Accords somewhat address this issue by creating safety zones, though the original intention of safety zones was to prevent harmful interference from one nation’s space activity on another nation’s space mission.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Imposition of six months of “residential surveillance at a designated location” (RSDL, also known as “enforced disappearance”)</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Isolation from the outside world for extended periods</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Lack of access to legal counsel</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Denial of the right to choose their own lawyers, instead appointing “government-assigned lawyers” to handle their cases</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Repeated interrogation to coerce them into “confessing” publicly</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Prohibition against family members or outsiders attending hearings, instead conducting trials in secret</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Prevention of families obtaining case information, including relevant legal documents, from “government-assigned lawyers”</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>In cislunar space, many users will probably want to operate around the Earth–Moon Lagrange points, particularly L1 and L2. Though only points in empty space, the Lagrange points are special due to the gravitational balance between the Moon and Earth at these locations. Spacecraft can orbit these points using a Lissajous orbit or halo orbit. Halo orbits associated with the L2 point are particularly useful because they provide a spacecraft a continuous line of sight to Earth and the far side of the Moon. Orbits associated with the L1 point are useful because they provide a spacecraft a continuous line of sight to both Earth and the near side of the Moon.</p> -<h4 id="cases-with-defendants-outside-of-china">Cases with Defendants Outside of China</h4> +<p>In addition to orbits associated with Earth–Moon Lagrange points, space in low lunar orbit (LLO) around the Moon will also be valuable. Only certain inclinations in LLO are stable. Finally, the “peaks of eternal light” — the locations near the lunar poles exposed to the most sunlight each day — will also be valuable because they will be the best locations to build solar power infrastructure.</p> -<p>For cases where the defendant is in Taiwan or a foreign country, the likely scenario is that Chinese police will first issue an arrest warrant, followed by prosecution and a trial in absentia. Throughout these proceedings, pressure will be exerted on defendants, urging them to “proactively abandon their ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist position [and] no longer carry out ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities,” as stipulated in Article 15 of the 22 Articles, in exchange for withdrawing the case or deciding not to prosecute.</p> +<p>Due to this legal uncertainty, there is currently no framework for adjudicating competing national claims to valuable locations in cislunar space, such as halo orbits associated with the Earth–Moon L2 Lagrange point or high-value crater-ridge real estate (i.e., peaks of eternal light) on the Moon. There is also no universally agreed-to framework among all spacefaring nations on the legality of exploiting lunar resources such as ice and minerals. To date, nations have extracted small amounts of material from the lunar surface for analysis, sometimes bringing those samples back to Earth. But the salient question is how to address space resource use at scale, potentially for commercial gain. There is no space equivalent to the ISA for internationally licensing and regulating resource extraction (though the Moon Agreement would have established such a mechanism). This ambiguity creates significant uncertainty for legal protections for space activities and may hinder private sector space investments.</p> -<p>Furthermore, during both the investigation and post-conviction phases, China may also replicate its practice of pursuing “fugitives” by applying to the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) for a Red Notice against targeted Taiwan individuals or requesting countries that have extradition treaties with China to hand these individuals over. Even when unsuccessful, these actions can inflict significant disruption and reputational harm on the targets.</p> +<p>Most nations, including the United States, did not support the approach taken by the Moon Agreement on space resources. The United States criticized UNCLOS and the Moon Agreement for designating a region as the “common heritage of all mankind” as counter to free market principles. This language was a main reason the United States decided not to ratify UNCLOS. Opponents of the Moon Treaty also expressed concerns that one of the goals of the agreement’s proposed regulatory regime would be equitable sharing of benefits from lunar resources, as they worried this approach could disadvantage private sector initiatives. This precedent suggests that a workable international framework for distributing space resources should not mirror such an approach.</p> -<h4 id="chinas-illicit-legal-warfare">China’s Illicit Legal Warfare</h4> +<p>To address the ambiguity of the OST language, the United States asserts through the Artemis Accords that the extraction and utilization of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation and can be accomplished in compliance with the OST. By signing the Artemis Accords, many other nations have supported this interpretation. But there is no international consensus on the term “space resource,” which does not appear in the OST text. As noted earlier, COPUOS has established a special working group to discuss the legal uncertainties around the term.</p> -<p>China’s legal warfare described above violates essential principles of international law. While China uses the ASL to legitimize the use of force against Taiwan, any such use of force would constitute a violation of international law. As Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” This prohibition against the threat or use of force is widely recognized as a fundamental principle of customary international law that binds all states, regardless of their membership in the United Nations.</p> +<p>As another reference, the Antarctic Treaty System currently bans commercial resource extraction from Antarctica, though there was a failed attempt in the 1980s to add a new agreement establishing a mineral extraction regime. But the Antarctic Treaty never claimed that Antarctica was the common heritage of humankind. Spectrum is another finite resource, albeit somewhat different from seabed minerals or Antarctic oil deposits. To optimize the use of spectrum, the ITU facilitates international coordination — but does not license spectrum, a role performed by national regulators.</p> -<p>China’s claim that Taiwan is part of China is unfounded — a point that has generated extensive scholarship. Even if one assumes, for the sake of argument, that Taiwan’s statehood cannot be established, international law still prohibits China from using force to annex Taiwan. For scholars who believe Taiwan’s statehood is contested, Taiwan is nevertheless a de facto state or entity with an international personality distinct from the PRC’s. Many argue that such contested states are bound by international law, including the prohibition on the use of force, and should also be protected by this principle for the purpose of international peace and security. Even scholars who do not view Taiwan as a state under international law, such as the late judge of the International Court of Justice James Crawford, argue that any use of force by China against Taiwan would endanger international peace and security and therefore first require that the parties attempt to seek a peaceful resolution per Article 33 of the UN Charter. In other words, irrespective of Taiwan’s status as an independent state, the evolution of international law establishes that the cross-Strait dispute falls under the purview of international law, particularly given the significant international concern. An attack by China would justify Taiwan’s exercise of self-defense, including seeking external assistance through collective self-defense measures.</p> +<p>Ultimately, though the United States has made clear it has no intention of claiming territory in space, whether on the Moon or anywhere else, its position on the use of space resources and concepts like safety zones could be disingenuously used by China and Russia to grab territory, claiming they were only following U.S. precedent. Opening this door has the potential to create a rush to claim resources, which effectively means claims on associated lunar real estate by designating safety zones. This is exactly what the OST aimed to prevent, as well as what the Antarctic Treaty, the UNCLOS through the ISA, and the ITU sought to avoid in their own domains.</p> -<p>Furthermore, China’s persecution of Taiwan individuals for their political beliefs violates international human rights law, including the right to freedom of speech. The arbitrary detention of Taiwan citizens for their views, compounded by the systematic abuses of the Chinese judicial system, violates their rights to personal security and a fair trial. Any attempt by China to exploit Interpol or extradition treaties to apprehend these targeted individuals would constitute an abuse of international judicial-cooperation mechanisms, and the international community should unequivocally condemn such legal warfare against Taiwan individuals as a blatant violation of fundamental human rights.</p> +<h4 id="space-rules-of-the-road">SPACE RULES OF THE ROAD</h4> -<h3 id="chinas-anti-secession-law-1">China’s Anti-Secession Law</h3> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="background-legal-significance-and-recent-developments">Background, Legal Significance, and Recent Developments</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>The main reason to develop rules of the road for space, including cislunar space, is to prevent collisions between space objects. In the sea domain, this was the same goal that drove the development and introduction of the COLREGs designed to prevent collisions of ships. There is no internationally agreed-to set of rules or regulations on spacecraft behaviors or collision avoidance, though some nongovernmental organizations — such as the Space Safety Coalition, which has international participation — have put forward guidelines for space behaviors.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="donald-c-clarke">Donald C. Clarke</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The only reference to space behaviors is contained in Article IX of the OST. This section stipulates that treaty parties must conduct their space activities “with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the treaty” and should consult with each other in cases where one nation’s activities could “cause potentially harmful interference” to another’s. As with other terms used in the OST, there is no definition of “due regard” or “harmful interference” in the text and no treaty-specific mechanism or venue to provide the needed clarifications.</p> -<h4 id="introduction-7">Introduction</h4> +<p>Outside the United Nations, the United States has tried to make progress on space safety through the Artemis Accords. Helpfully, the Artemis Accords establish a “safety zone” concept — originally envisioned by the Hague Space Resources Working Group Building Blocks — intended to prevent harmful interference between national space activities. However, the Artemis Accords do not create new obligations for parties to the OST, which already requires signatories to coordinate when they expect “harmful interference” — a term that remains undefined in either treaty.</p> -<p>While China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law (ASL) has received much attention for its role in justifying potential PRC actions against Taiwan, its significance specifically as a legal document — how it differs in practical terms from a policy announcement — is less explored.171 It turns out that while the ASL itself is of minor legal significance in the strict sense, it has provided the basis for an interpretive document jointly issued in May 2024 by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and several other state bodies. This new document represents a major escalation in China’s campaign of intimidation against Taiwan.</p> +<p>The long-term sustainability guidelines developed by COPUOS could help shape future efforts to develop COLREG-like rules for space, but the guidelines themselves lack the required specificity to serve as rules of the road for space operations. The ATLAC recently established by COPUOS also could develop the foundation for future rules of the road for lunar space activities.</p> -<h4 id="features-of-the-anti-secession-law">Features of the Anti-Secession Law</h4> +<h3 id="cislunar-operational-and-infrastructure-challenges">CISLUNAR OPERATIONAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGES</h3> -<p>The ASL consists of a mere nine substantive articles, as well as a tenth specifying the effective date. Article 1 makes it clear that it is specifically aimed at Taiwan, not at secession generally.</p> +<p>There are several cislunar operational and infrastructure challenges that, if unaddressed, will cause increasingly significant impediments to the safety, sustainability, and efficiency of cislunar operations. Though some of these challenges result from a lack of physical infrastructure and equipment needed to support a sustained crewed and uncrewed lunar presence, others stem from gaps in coordination mechanisms and agreed-to processes for operating in cislunar space. This section outlines several of these challenges, attempting to describe specifically whether the problem stems primarily from inadequate infrastructure or a lack of operator coordination processes.</p> -<p>Article 5 promises Taiwan a “high degree of autonomy” after peaceful unification. Unlike the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the ASL does not go into any detail about what will be within Taiwan’s scope of autonomy and how long it will last. In any case, given that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) also promised a “high degree of autonomy” to Hong Kong, the latter’s fate suggests that the Taiwan would be ill-advised to put much store in a verbal formula.</p> +<h4 id="space-situational-awareness">SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS</h4> -<p>Article 7 calls for talks on peaceful unification on the basis of equality. It does not specify any preconditions and in fact says that conditions can be flexible. In particular, it does not require that Taiwan accept Beijing’s “One China” principle or the alleged 1992 Consensus — conditions that the PRC government later imposed as a matter of policy.</p> +<p>Fundamentally, SSA is knowledge of the current and predicted future locations of objects in space. Objects in space can be detected and tracked using a variety of sensors, such as radar, optical, laser-ranging, and radio-frequency (RF) technologies. Terrestrial radar systems are typically used for detecting and tracking objects in LEO, including operational and non-operational spacecraft and debris fragments. For GEO, terrestrial optical telescopes are usually used for detecting and tracking objects, as radar signals are usually not powerful enough to track objects at such distances. Satellites equipped with optical sensors and cameras can also provide SSA data. Since virtually all operational spacecraft emit RF signals, RF receivers on Earth or other spacecraft can be used to detect and track active spacecraft in all orbits.</p> -<p>Article 8 calls for the use of non-peaceful means if: (1) “Taiwan independence forces” create the fact of Taiwan’s separation from China, (2) a serious incident occurs that will lead to Taiwan’s separation from China, or (3) the possibility of peaceful unification is “completely extinguished.”</p> +<p>In addition to data derived from these sensor systems, many satellites are equipped with GPS receivers, allowing operators to know the precise location of their satellites at any time. Some operators choose to share location information for their satellites with other operators, government entities, or third parties such as the Space Data Association, an international nongovernmenal organization that facilitates operator-to-operator information sharing.</p> -<p>Many commentators, not just outside of China but within the country as well, have noted that the ASL is not very law-like in the usual sense. Well-known party-aligned scholars such as Zhou Yezhong and Tian Feilong have each made this point.</p> +<p>All these SSA technologies were designed to track objects in lower Earth orbits, though most could be used for tracking objects in cislunar space. For example, terrestrial optical telescopes and RF sensors could track operational spacecraft. Spacecraft with optical sensors and cameras in cislunar space could likely also be used for cislunar SSA purposes. However, just as it is not feasible to use radar for tracking objects in GEO, power requirements make it difficult to use terrestrial radar systems to track cislunar objects. Laser-ranging systems might be feasible for tracking objects in cislunar space.</p> -<p>In its vagueness and brevity — just around 1,000 characters — it is not only unlike laws in the United States but also unlike most laws in China. The document generally reads like a government communiqué, not a piece of legislation. It states many principles and makes many assertions but contains no actual rules saying anyone must do this or must not do that. It neither specifies sanctions nor has an enforcement mechanism within the legal system. The only enforcement, so to speak, is via military action — the “non-peaceful means” referred to in Article 8.</p> +<p>An object in GEO can be tracked by an optical telescope or RF receiver at a fixed location on Earth’s surface. Objects in LEO are tracked by ground-based radars that do not maintain positive custody of each tracked object as it orbits Earth. Rather, an object’s position is confirmed when it passes over a radar site. At all other times, its position is predicted based on Keplerian orbital dynamics.</p> -<p>The Chinese legal system is not without vague and brief laws, but a custom has developed in which they are usually followed up by detailed implementing regulations and judicial interpretations. Both when the ASL was passed and many years later, Chinese commentators were noting the need for such implementing regulations. However, at the time it was passed, a spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office quite unusually made a specific announcement that no such implementing regulations or interpretations would be forthcoming. Indeed, none have been up until now, 19 years later. The ASL was evidently intended from the start to be an unelaborated statement of vague principles that would never be modified through the legal process. This does not, of course, mean that China’s Taiwan policy could not change and has not changed over time; clearly, it has. And Chinese interpretations of the ASL have changed accordingly. However, this has been accomplished not via legal institutions but through the party, government statements, media, and academic commentary.</p> +<p>Irrespective of the sensor phenomenology, detecting and tracking objects in cislunar space requires, at a minimum, a network of terrestrial sensors located around the globe. Unlike objects in GEO, whose orbital period is the same as Earth’s rotation, objects in cislunar space, as well as in LEO and medium Earth orbit (MEO), orbit Earth at a rate different from the speed at which Earth revolves on its axis.</p> -<p>What the ASL is not is what presents the biggest problem for legal analysis, by suggesting that it is all irrelevant. Unlike the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act, to which PRC scholars like to compare it, it does not allow or require the Chinese government to do anything it could not already do without the law. As Richard Bush accurately commented in 2005, “The ASL does not create any authority where it did not exist, and the actions of China’s leaders will not change because it is on the books.” China’s Leninist political system does not accept any legal limitations on government. Particularly in the realm of foreign and military affairs, the state can do whatever it chooses to do and does not need to pass a law to enable itself.</p> +<p>Objects in LEO and MEO orbit Earth at a speed faster than the rotation of Earth on its axis, while objects in cislunar orbit at a slower rate than Earth’s rotation. Terrestrial sensors tracking objects in cislunar space need to hand off and receive custody of tracked objects as cislunar space rotates from and into the sensors’ fields of view. Detecting and tracking objects in cislunar space will require a new approach that differs from the ones used for LEO, MEO, and GEO objects. Additionally, the power requirements for ground-based radar to reach cislunar space would likely rule out its use for detecting and tracking cislunar objects.</p> -<h4 id="history-and-policy">History and Policy</h4> +<p>Finally, any Earth-based sensor would lose custody of objects in lunar orbit as they transit around the side of the Moon that is always facing away from Earth. Given that the rotational period of an object in stable lunar orbit is as little as two hours, it would be possible to quickly reacquire the position of space objects once they reappear on the Earth-facing side. Keplerian orbital dynamics would apply to stable lunar orbits, so it would be possible to predict the position of objects during transit around the Moon’s far side.</p> -<p>The ASL was drafted and passed quite quickly — apparently in a kind of panic over political developments in Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian narrowly won reelection as Taiwan’s president in March 2004 after having promised during his campaign to hold a referendum on a new constitution in 2006, and China feared his Pan-Green coalition would win a majority in the subsequent legislative elections in December. China saw the referendum and constitutional change as a kind of lawfare on Taiwan’s part: the attempt to use legal measures to give legitimacy to what they saw as the Greens’ objective of formal independence. The ASL was China’s effort to fight law with law.</p> +<h4 id="space-object-tracking-and-traffic-coordination">SPACE OBJECT TRACKING AND TRAFFIC COORDINATION</h4> -<p>In the legislative elections, however, the Pan-Blue coalition retained its majority. This should have comforted China considerably, but it seems the process for formulating and passing the ASL was too far advanced to call off.</p> +<p>The DoD began tracking and cataloging satellites with the launch of Sputnik in 1957. In the 1960s, it started developing mathematical equations and source code used to predict the positions of satellites in Earth orbit. By the 1970s, the DoD and NASA adopted a standardized model and the two-line element (TLE) set format for space object tracking and position predictions. After the public release of the models, the TLE format became the industry standard for predicting satellite position.</p> -<p>One aspect of the ASL’s history worth highlighting is that it was not universally perceived as particularly aggressive at the time. To be sure, some saw it that way. The U.S. government made strong representations at several levels to the Chinese government, urging it not to go through with what it saw as a provocative law, but to no avail. And Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council viewed it as expanding the conditions under which China could use force against Taiwan.</p> +<p>Today, TLE datasets are used for various purposes. In conjunction with operator-to-operator information and maneuver plan sharing, government and private sector satellite operators use TLE data for planning and managing daily satellite operations. Militaries use TLE data to track the satellites and spacecraft of other nations as part of SSA operations. Astronomers and amateur space object trackers on Earth use TLE datasets to plan space observations. Launch operators and government and commercial operators planning on-orbit activities also use TLE data for planning purposes.</p> -<p>But other commentators — by no means all China sympathizers — saw it as conciliatory, pointing out that it could be read as a signal that China did not intend to move militarily so long as Taiwan respected the status quo and that the goal of the law was not active unification but the passive prevention of formal separation. Indeed, its name was changed at the last moment from “Law on Unification” to “Anti-Secession Law,” although other commentators argue that this was for a completely different reason: the premise of “unification” is that China is separated, whereas the premise of “anti-secession” is that it is already one body, which of course is the PRC’s official position.</p> +<p>Keplerian orbital mechanics, used to model objects in GEO or lower orbits, assume any two objects with mass — for example, Earth and a spacecraft — will impact each other’s orbital position. This is called a “two-body problem.” Unlike objects in these lower orbits, objects in cislunar space are also affected by the mass and gravity of the Moon. This is called a “three-body problem.” This means that cislunar trajectories cannot be effectively approximated or predicted using equations designed for Keplerian orbital mechanics. Object predictions from models used today for objects in GEO or lower orbits would remain accurate for only a very short period because the TLE format and its underlying equations are not suitable for non-Keplerian, three-body-problem conditions.</p> -<p>The law never uses the term “People’s Republic of China”; indeed, it appears to be the only statute ever passed by the National People’s Congress (NPC) or its Standing Committee that is not prefaced with the words “People’s Republic of China.” It does not require adherence to the “One China” principle or the alleged 1992 Consensus as a precondition for talks, while it does say the two governments should engage in dialogue as equals — quite a change from PRC policy today.</p> +<p>Since 2011, NASA has relied on the Multimission Automated Deepspace Conjunction Assessment Process (MADCAP), managed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, to assess the risks of collision for spacecraft orbiting the Moon and Mars. Given the lack of SSA infrastructure beyond GEO, the positions of spacecraft orbiting the Moon and Mars are provided by operators using radiometric tracking involving ground-based antennas. Some scientists are also trying to use very long baseline interferometry (VLBI) to track objects in cislunar space. Both of these techniques require that the object being tracked emit a radio signal, so this method could not be used to track non-operational satellites or inert space debris or fragments.</p> -<p>The vagueness of the law’s provisions means that as a policy statement, it can be plausibly interpreted in many ways, and the absence of any implementing regulations or explanatory interpretations over the years shows that the Chinese government likes it this way. Interestingly, the more aggressive recent interpretations of the law have come not just from foreign observers but from Chinese sources as well. Tian Feilong, a law professor at Beihang University, is a leading hardline nationalist intellectual. In an article elaborating on a 2020 speech by Li Zhanshu, then chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and the number-three man on the Politburo Standing Committee, he argued that the goal of the ASL is nothing less than “complete unification” (完全统一). In case there was any doubt, he stressed that this meant there was no room for “appeasement” (绥靖主义) or “opportunism” (机会主义), such terms presumably meaning compromise of any kind over the PRC’s absolute authority over Taiwan affairs after unification.</p> +<h4 id="positioning-navigation-and-timing">POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING</h4> -<p>Unlike other PRC commentators — who are apparently oblivious to everything that has happened in Hong Kong and so point to it enthusiastically as an outstanding example of the resounding success of the “one country, two systems” arrangement — Tian is very much aware of developments in Hong Kong, which he views as providing important lessons for the central government in its management of a post-unification Taiwan. He tells his readers they must not romanticize the notion of “one country, two systems” or local autonomy; that the PRC central government must have control over education to make sure children are inculcated into the right kind of thinking; and that the PRC must also control the legal system in the realm of national security, which of course can be (and has been) stretched to cover almost anything.</p> +<p>Currently, global PNT data from satellites is provided by four different navigation satellite systems: the United States’ GPS, Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, and the European Union’s Galileo. The systems are all located in MEO at altitudes between 19,000 kilometers and 24,000 kilometers. There are also two regional PNT systems: the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (NavIC) and Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS).</p> -<p>Evidently, it would be a mistake to read much determinate policy content into the ASL. While it clearly means, “We don’t want Taiwan to declare formal independence,” current policy can be more reliably gleaned from various official statements and actions than from the text of the ASL.</p> +<p>Since these satellite networks are designed to provide PNT data to terrestrial users, their signals are directed toward Earth and not deep space. Unless PNT signals are received on Earth and redirected into cislunar space or PNT satellite systems are redesigned to transmit into space as well as toward Earth, spacecraft in cislunar space would need some other way to reliably determine their position and establish timing. As described in earlier chapters, the United States, China, and Europe have plans to create lunar PNT infrastructure.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, the very existence of the law is a clear statement of one very important policy: that in any confrontation with Taiwan, China does not consider itself bound by the international laws of armed conflict. The PRC — or, at the very least, one prolific and apparently approved academic commentator, You Zhiqiang — takes the extreme position that all states have an inherent unconditional right to preserve their territorial integrity. Ignoring examples to the contrary, such as the voluntary breakup of Czechoslovakia, it insists that the commitment to maintaining territorial integrity is an inherent feature of a state’s sovereignty. Moreover, it argues that any measures a state undertakes to maintain its territorial integrity, at least within its claimed boundaries, are not governed by international law. This is simply false; Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, for example, specifically applies to conflicts not of an international character.</p> +<p>It is worth recalling that the Apollo missions were able to use two different navigation methods on their journeys to the Moon and back. Their main source of navigation data came from radio signals exchanged between the Apollo spacecraft and ground stations on Earth. The position of the Apollo Command Module could be calculated by measuring the Doppler shift of signals from the spacecraft, transmitting and analyzing ranging signals sent to the spacecraft, and using two receivers on Earth to conduct VLBI analysis on Apollo signals. Additionally, the Apollo spacecraft were equipped with inertial guidance systems, which do not require external signals to operate. For Artemis missions, NASA’s Orion capsule uses an inertial guidance system, GPS receivers, star-tracking technology, and an optical camera-based navigation system. Like Apollo, Orion — or any cislunar spacecraft emitting radio signals — can be tracked from Earth using VLBI techniques.</p> -<p>But of course, the fact that China does not consider a conflict with Taiwan to be of an international character does not mean it is not. “Conflicts of an international character” are those between states, and Taiwan meets all the conditions for statehood under the Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the Rights and Duties of States — as Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council correctly noted in its 2005 commentary on the ASL. It is important to note that under the convention, recognition by other states is explicitly not a condition for statehood. While China is not a signatory, the Montevideo Convention is generally considered declaratory of customary international law and is thus a mandatory norm. In short, customary international law says that Taiwan is a state; a conflict between states invokes duties under the international laws of war; and China has declared that it will ignore these duties.</p> +<p>In addition to the provision of real-time data on position, a spatial reference and associated coordinate system is needed for both cislunar space and the surface of the Moon to precisely measure locations within the given reference framework. A three-dimensional reference system would be needed for cislunar space, while a two-dimensional system would suffice for the lunar surface.</p> -<h4 id="legal-effects">Legal Effects</h4> +<p>Commonly used for objects in Earth orbit, an Earth-fixed coordinate system using x, y, and z measurements from Earth’s center could be used for objects in cislunar space. Alternatively, a Moon-fixed coordinate system could be created using x, y, and z measurements from the center of the Moon. Either a spherical coordinate system using latitude and longitude or a standardized Cartesian coordinate system that models the Moon as a flat plane would work for the Moon’s surface. An example of a Cartesian coordinate system used for Earth is the Universal Transverse Mercator. Currently, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, NASA, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the U.S. Space Force are collaborating on an effort to design a reference system for the Moon.</p> -<p>Although the ASL does not give China’s government any power or authority to use military force that it did not already have, it does still have some specifically legal uses.</p> +<p>In addition to the difficulties receiving timing data from GPS or other existing PNT systems in cislunar space, time itself behaves differently on the Moon due to the theory of relativity. The motion of the Moon relative to Earth, as well as its lower gravity, means that time actually moves 56 microseconds faster on the Moon than on Earth each day. While this difference may seem unimportant on the surface, precision time measured to nanoseconds is typically needed for navigation. Even if the moon had its own PNT constellation, potentially like what ESA envisioned as part of its Moonlight initiative, there would still be a 56-microsecond discrepancy per day between lunar time and Earth time. In April 2024, as part of the National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy, the White House directed NASA to lead and coordinate with other federal agencies on efforts to establish a lunar time standard.</p> -<p><em>LAWFARE</em></p> +<h4 id="debris-and-detritus">DEBRIS AND DETRITUS</h4> -<p>China’s concept of lawfare is somewhat different from the term as first popularized in the early 2000s by Major-General Charles Dunlap, who defined it as “the strategy of using — or misusing — law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.” In contrast, China considers “lawfare” to be the use of law as an accompaniment to traditional military action. Thus, it is the province not of diplomats but of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Its purpose is to expand the scope for military action by obtaining understanding and support internationally, sapping the enemy’s will, and boosting morale at home. That the ASL is very much the PLA’s lawfare tool and not a regular piece of legislation can be seen in the secrecy, suddenness, and irregular procedures surrounding its drafting and passage. Thus, concerned observers are not wrong to see a greater military threat behind it than might otherwise appear from its text and institutional source.</p> +<p>Only 12 humans have been to the Moon, but humankind has already left a significant amount of trash on the lunar surface. The current tally includes boosters from over 50 crashed landings, almost 100 bags of human waste, and miscellaneous items such as golf balls, boots, and a feather. In total, it is about 200 tons of trash.</p> -<p>China’s lawfare objectives of the ASL are primarily those of legitimation. As cynical Leninists, China’s leaders do not believe that separation of powers is actually real. Thus, when looking at U.S. legislation, they view the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act of 2001 not as instructions or as Congress granting authority to the president but as lawfare: nothing more than would-be legitimating exercises for what the United States wants to do anyway. The ASL is their answer.</p> +<p>To date, according to experts, there are only a few dozen pieces of human-made space debris in cislunar space. But it may prove difficult to keep debris levels low, as there are no internationally agreed-to, end-of-life disposal guidelines for spacecraft operating in cislunar space and no standard debris-mitigation procedures. Additionally cislunar operators are already facing increased collision risks between the few spacecraft in lunar orbit, heightening the risk that collisions produce debris fragments. A lack of agreed-to, cislunar, operator-to-operator, space-safety, coordination, and data-sharing mechanisms — particularly ones that include China — probably leads to increasing collision risk and debris-fragment creation.</p> -<p>Beyond simply responding to U.S. legislation, China believes that putting its Taiwan policy in legal form will enhance the international legitimacy of this policy by giving it a certain heft and permanence. In particular, China wants to use the ASL to press its view that what it does in Taiwan is purely its domestic affair. It also expects that putting policy in legislative form enhances the legitimacy of that policy domestically. Moreover, game theory teaches that you can enhance the credibility of your threat by limiting your options if challenged. Here, putting the policy in legal form arguably makes it more difficult — not legally but politically — for the PRC to back down and establish a line beyond which salami-slicing tactics by Taiwan cannot proceed.</p> +<p>Any debris fragments near the Earth–Moon L 4 and L5 Lagrange points might produce particularly acute risks to cislunar operators in these areas. At these stable equilibria, balanced gravitational forces trap both natural and artificial debris into clouds, posing physical risks to satellites stationed at or around these points. This same problem does not exist at L1, L2, or L3, all of which are unstable equilibria and thus allow debris to dissipate more easily.</p> -<p><em>CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION</em></p> +<h4 id="radiation">RADIATION</h4> -<p>Neither is the ASL completely insignificant when it comes to domestic Chinese law. In other words, Chinese law with the ASL is not the same as Chinese law without it.</p> +<p>Objects in cislunar space are exposed to higher levels of solar radiation (also called “solar energetic particles”) and cosmic radiation (also called “galactic cosmic rays”) than those experienced nearer to Earth, posing a risk to microelectronics and human safety. Unprotected by either an appreciable atmosphere or magnetic field, the lunar surface is battered by intense solar radiation when facing the Sun.</p> -<p>First, it has been used in domestic litigation, but only rarely and without much effect. One senior Chinese legal scholar, Zhou Yezhong, expressed the hope in 2018 that Chinese courts could add substance and prestige to the ASL by producing well-reasoned opinions involving its application, in the same way that norms can be strengthened in common-law countries through court opinions. For better or for worse, the court cases so far have been quite minor and do not show this happening. The one case in which it mattered, however, shows the ASL does have the potential for a wide-ranging and largely standardless application in domestic law whenever the authorities make the policy decision to do so, justifying fines and punishment for any words or actions deemed inconsistent with China’s Taiwan policy.</p> +<p>Due to the orbit of the Lunar Gateway around the Moon, it will be positioned in interplanetary space 80 percent of the time. This is a very different environment than near-Earth orbit — the location of every other long-term habitable space station to date, where the main source of radiation is the inner Van Allen belt, produced when cosmic radiation interacts with Earth’s magnetic field. When compared to past stations, the Lunar Gateway will experience notably higher levels and greater intensities of cosmic radiation, which has a higher relative biological effectiveness (i.e., to what extent a dose of radiation affects human tissue) than Van Allen–belt radiation.</p> -<p>On Pkulaw.cn, a major legal database, there were only five cases as of June 2024 in which courts were asked to address arguments made by a party based on the ASL. In four of the five cases, courts ignored the ASL-based arguments, which were uniformly weak — in one instance, the defendant pointed (irrelevantly as far as the issue before the court was concerned) to the plaintiff foreign firm’s inclusion of Taiwan as a “country” on its website. The court declined the invitation to punish the plaintiff for this offense.</p> +<p>Microelectronics can unexpectedly fail if they are not appropriately designed to withstand the expected levels of radiation in cislunar space. In July 2024, NASA revealed that microelectronics in the Europa Clipper spacecraft probably do not have sufficient radiation hardening to survive the radiation environment around Jupiter; however, NASA later cleared the spacecraft for launch, determining it could withstand the expected radiation. Meanwhile, Firefly’s first CLPS mission, slated for launch in 2024, will carry the RadPC-Lunar payload, a radiation-tolerant computing system built under the LSITP program, to test the architecture’s ability to operate in high-radiation environments.</p> + +<p>Existing technologies can be used to shield equipment and spacecraft from radiation levels expected on and near the Moon; however, since shielding adds costs and weight, engineers designing lunar systems will need to carefully balance requirements for radiation protection with other considerations impacting overall system requirements.</p> + +<h4 id="lunar-regolith">LUNAR REGOLITH</h4> -<p>There was only one case in which the ASL seemed to carry legal weight. A local Administration of Industry and Commerce issued an administrative fine to an advertising design firm for producing a map of China that showed the mainland in red but not Taiwan, Hainan, and various disputed islands in the Pacific. The fine was specifically based on Article 2 of the ASL, which declares that Taiwan is part of China. The firm objected, arguing that the ASL contained no provision for sanctions and that imposing a fine on such grounds violated the principle of administration according to law. The court found against the firm, specifically citing the ASL as a proper basis for the fine. Although this case remains an outlier for now, it shows the far-reaching potential application of this law.</p> +<p>The solid rock of the Moon’s surface is covered in regolith, a layer of loose, dust-like material composed of small, electrostatically charged particles made by meteor impacts. The average particle size of this lunar dust is about 72 micrometers. For comparison, the width of a human hair is on average about 100 micrometers and the size of a particle of grass pollen is about 25 micrometers. Medium-grain sand is about 500 micrometers in size.</p> -<p><em>THE CRIMINAL LAW AND THE 22 ARTICLES</em></p> +<p>As there is virtually no air on the moon, wind does not disturb the regolith. Rather, the regolith can be disturbed by electrical force (since it is composed of charged particles), micrometeoroid impacts, and engine landing and launch plumes. Due to the low gravity of the Moon and lack of air to slow down the particles by drag, engine plumes can eject regolith at very high speeds (measured in several kilometers per second) over very large distances. Additionally, these plume–surface interactions are presently poorly understood, making the effects that lunar landings may have on surrounding spacecraft unpredictable. A payload built by NASA flying aboard Firefly’s first CLPS mission, known as Stereo Cameras for Lunar Plume Surface Studies (SCALPSS) 1.1, will image the behavior of the regolith as the lander touches down on the Moon to better understand the surface effects of lunar landings. The collection of in situ data will complement NASA’s existing efforts to model and predict these interactions.</p> -<p>Second, and importantly, the ASL has been cited as the partial basis for an important new legal interpretation of China’s Criminal Law issued jointly by the SPC, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of State Security on May 26, 2024. This document, the “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (the “22 Articles”), instructs security authorities, including courts, police, and prosecutors, on how to handle cases of separatism — but also, for this reason, functions as a law prescribing offenses and punishments, which is why it was made public. The interpretation can stand on its own without the ASL, but the Chinese authorities thought it worth invoking, indicating a connection.</p> +<p>Previous operations on the Moon have demonstrated that regolith can harm electrical and mechanical systems. Lunar regolith and dust also pose a risk to humans, causing issues with respiration. Since the early days of the space race, operators of missions to the Moon have had to contend with the impacts of lunar regolith on their missions. In fact, as Apollo 17 commander Gene Cernan observed, “Dust is probably one of our greatest inhibitors to a nominal operation on the Moon.” Lunar activities that disturb and generate plumes of regolith have the potential to cause problems, especially in areas such as the lunar south pole, where there is expected to be a relatively high density of missions from a variety of nations.</p> -<p>The 22 Articles purports to be based on the ASL and the Criminal Law; it functions as an interpretive document, spelling out in more detail the actions and sanctions in Article 103 of the Criminal Law. In principle, there is no problem with this type of document in China’s legal system. Statutes are necessarily general, and it is common for bodies such as the SPC to issue documents under various names — interpretations, replies, and, in this case, opinions — to put meat on the bones of vague statutory terms.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EGvAHGC.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Regolith Size.</strong> Source: <a href="https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20220008062/downloads/The%20Challenge%20of%20Lunar%20Dust%20-%20v4.pdf">Kristen John, “The Challenge of Lunar Dust,” NASA, June 8, 2022</a>.</em></p> -<p>The following discussion examines what the 22 Articles criminalizes and the associated punishments, as well as its jurisdiction (i.e., who is liable). In brief, the response of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Office — to issue a travel alert discouraging all non-essential travel to the PRC — is not an overreaction and is quite justified.</p> +<p>To address concerns about lunar dust, many experts cite the need for greater coordination between lunar operators to prevent harmful interference between space systems, particularly around spacecraft launch and landing sites. The concept of a safety zone enshrined in the Artemis Accords is one such effort to establish a coordination approach to mitigate impacts of lunar dust on lunar operations.</p> -<p><em>WHAT THE 22 ARTICLES CRIMINALIZES</em></p> +<p>In addition to policy solutions, experts have raised technical solutions to the hazards posed by dust. To this end, NASA has developed an electrodynamic dust shield, which prevents dust accumulation using electric fields, and plans to send this payload to the Moon in 2024 aboard the Blue Ghost M1 mission. NASA is also exploring the use of different materials to prevent dust accumulation on sensitive surfaces such as solar panels, sensors, and optical systems. To test the “stickiness” of lunar regolith to different objects, NASA is launching its Regolith Adherence Characterization payload aboard Blue Ghost M1 to measure regolith accumulation rates across different test materials.</p> -<p>Article 103 of the Criminal Law criminalizes actions of “organizing, plotting, or carrying out the splitting of the country and the sabotaging of the country’s unity” as well as “instigating splitting of the country and the sabotaging of the country’s unity.” Article 2 of the 22 Articles adds detail, laying out all the activities associated with what it calls “Taiwan independence” that constitute crimes under Article 103. The coverage is very broad, including efforts to change Taiwan’s legal status through changes to Taiwan’s domestic law, efforts to get Taiwan admitted into international organizations whose membership is limited to states, using one’s authority of office to “wantonly distort or misrepresent the reality that Taiwan is part of China,” and finally, “any other actions that seek to separate Taiwan from China.” The overall thrust of Article 2 seems to be aimed at government officials, but private citizens could of course commit many of the offenses listed, so are by no means safe.</p> +<h4 id="heat-and-power">HEAT AND POWER</h4> -<p>As if these provisions were not broad enough, Article 7 adds detail to Article 103 of the Criminal Law on “instigation” of separatism. It spells out that it is a crime to “stubbornly spread advocacy” of Taiwan independence and related programs or plans of action. Like Article 2, Article 7 adds a catch-all clause covering “other actions inciting Taiwan to separate from China.”</p> +<p>Temperatures on the lunar surface range from 250 degrees Fahrenheit (121°C) during the lunar daytime to −208 degrees Fahrenheit (−133°C) at night. There are some places on the Moon where temperatures can drop to −410 degrees Fahrenheit (−246°C) or lower. Microelectronics cannot typically survive these extreme temperature swings, which can make materials brittle and damage connections. To survive the intense cold and heat, electronic equipment on the lunar surface needs to have power to regulate temperature.</p> -<p>Somewhat absurdly, Article 11 stipulates a heavier punishment for those who violate these provisions “in collusion with” foreign or overseas (境外) entities or individuals. “Overseas” here is a term of art designed to cover places in which PRC jurisdiction is limited (Hong Kong and Macau) or absent (Taiwan) but that cannot, for political reasons, be called “foreign.” Thus, any violation by one person not carried out in complete, hermit-like isolation from all others will be considered collusive and therefore subject to a heavier punishment.</p> +<p>The lunar night itself also creates power-generation and power-storage challenges that will need to be addressed for sustained operations. For example, spacecraft orbiting the Moon and on the lunar surface using solar power must have sufficient battery capacity (or another form of power storage) to operate throughout the lunar night.</p> -<p>Punishments for the various offenses are already spelled out in the Criminal Law. They range in most circumstances from minor penalties — deprivation of political rights, for example — to life imprisonment. Article 113 of the Criminal Law states that in the very worst cases of violation of Article 103, “where the harm to the state and the people is especially serious and the circumstances especially odious,” the death penalty may be imposed. The 22 Articles repeats this to make sure everyone gets the message.</p> +<p>There are several locations on the Moon that, while not always receiving light, are exposed to longer periods of sunlight than most locations on the lunar surface. Referenced earlier in the report, these are called peaks of eternal light, a term whose original meaning referred to theoretical points on any celestial body that are always lit by the Sun. On the Moon, these points are located on the ridges of craters in both the north and south poles.</p> -<p><em>WHO CAN BE LIABLE</em></p> +<p>Placement of solar power generation equipment at these locations would have the advantage of being able to produce electricity more consistently. These locations will undoubtedly become valuable lunar real estate, and infrastructure built by one nation on these ridges could influence the value of nearby positions. Specifically, construction of equipment at one location may impact the ability of other nearby locations to see the Sun, possibly creating shadowing over what had previously been a peak of eternal light. Currently, there is no lunar power grid to transmit electricity from these locations near the poles to other parts of the Moon. Additionally, the accumulation of lunar dust and regolith on the surface of solar panels risks dampening electricity generation. This risk will be particularly pronounced in areas of potentially high landing activity, such as the lunar south pole, due to plume–surface interactions.</p> -<p>The Criminal Law covers all actions committed in Chinese territory. As China deems Taiwan to be its territory, it covers actions committed in Taiwan, too. Ironically, given Taiwan’s de facto independence, China’s claim of criminal jurisdiction is even broader than in Hong Kong, where the Criminal Law, like all PRC laws, does not apply unless explicitly included in Annex III to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.</p> +<p>Looking beyond solar power, nuclear power systems offer attractive solutions for the Moon because they are not dependent on the Sun and can provide consistent generation throughout the lunar day and night. In 2022, NASA and the U.S. Department of Energy announced contracts with three companies to begin work designing concepts for nuclear power systems to be placed on the Moon. Additionally, Roscosmos announced in May 2024 that it is considering building a nuclear power plant on the Moon in partnership with China.</p> -<p>The Criminal Law also covers all actions committed by Chinese citizens anywhere in the world (though authorities may elect not to prosecute smaller infractions). From the PRC perspective, this includes Taiwan citizens. Thus, the Criminal Law covers actions by Taiwan individuals not just in Taiwan but abroad as well. This has some legal precedent in China: in March 2023, a Hong Kong student living in Japan was arrested upon her return to Hong Kong on a charge that a Facebook post she had made while in Japan “incited secession.”</p> +<h4 id="communications">COMMUNICATIONS</h4> -<p>Finally, if either the action or its effect takes place in Chinese territory, it is covered by the Criminal Law. Chinese authorities would certainly argue that advocacy of Taiwan independence has an effect in Chinese territory, so even where the above bases for liability do not exist — for example, with non-Taiwan, non-PRC citizens outside of Taiwan and the PRC — the Criminal Law can still be made to apply.</p> +<p>A spacecraft in orbit around Earth can only communicate when it has line of sight to ground stations, also called “gateways,” that are configured to support communications for that particular spacecraft. Often, a spacecraft is not in continuous communications with Earth, as there are times during its orbit when there are no suitable ground stations within line of sight. In some cases, satellites in orbit share ground station infrastructure, so satellite operators have to preschedule transmission times on specific ground-based antennas.</p> -<p>Thus, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that anything the PRC authorities deem to be advocacy of Taiwan independence, undertaken by anyone anywhere on the planet, constitutes a criminal offense. The actor is liable to prosecution if they come within reach of the PRC authorities. This is not idle speculation. British citizen Benedict Rogers, founder of Hong Kong Watch, was informed that he would be arrested if he went to Hong Kong, apparently on the basis of his criticisms of the local authorities made while in the United Kingdom. Samuel Chu, a U.S. citizen who has not resided in Hong Kong since 1990, is the subject of a 2020 arrest warrant issued by the Hong Kong authorities on charges under the National Security Law of “inciting secession” and “colluding with foreign powers” — the foreign power in question apparently being his country of citizenship. It is unlikely that this extensive scope is an accident of drafting. The threat is clear and intentional.</p> +<p>However, satellites in GEO can maintain continuous communications with one ground station, rather than having to hand off communications between ground stations, because the orbits of those satellites mean they are always stationary relative to a point on Earth’s surface. For this reason, NASA operates a constellation of satellites in GEO that can maintain communications with specific ground stations while serving as a data relay for spacecraft in lower Earth orbits.</p> -<p>Overall, the 22 Articles represents a major escalation in China’s war of intimidation against the people of Taiwan. The ASL was directed at Taiwan purely as a political entity; the only sanction mentioned in it is military action in response to what China deems unacceptable moves toward formal independence. The 22 Articles, by contrast, is specifically aimed at individuals.</p> +<p>Due to the large distances, communications between Earth and spacecraft beyond GEO require larger ground-based antennas with higher gain than those used for communications with spacecraft in near-Earth orbits. This means that NASA equipment and other similar infrastructure designed for communications with spacecraft beyond GEO, such as NASA’s Deep Space Network (DSN), is limited and usually in high demand. Communications are scheduled for short windows dependent not only on the availability of bandwidth, but also on when the ground infrastructure has line of sight to the spacecraft. Like the DSN, China operates a deep-space communications network that could support lunar communications. The European Union also operates a deep-space communications system called European Space Tracking (ESTRACK).</p> -<h3 id="the-anti-secession-law-in-comparative-context">The Anti-Secession Law in Comparative Context</h3> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="a-sign-of-weakness-and-insecurity">A Sign of Weakness and Insecurity</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>Any increase in cislunar activities will place additional strain on already taxed communications capacity able to support lunar missions. In addition, given that one side of the Moon always faces away from Earth, connectivity for all parts of the Moon will also require a way to relay data from the far side of the Moon. This will necessitate a relay satellite or infrastructure on the lunar surface to transmit data around the Moon. As noted earlier, China is currently operating two lunar relay satellites and has plans to build additional lunar communications infrastructure. Described in earlier sections, the U.S. LunaNet framework and the European Moonlight initiative are also focused on fielding new lunar communications capabilities.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="julian-ku">Julian Ku</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Several private companies are currently attempting to establish private communications networks in hopes of supplying lunar communication capabilities as a service to lunar and cislunar operators. Intuitive Machines is planning on launching its Khon-series relay satellites aboard its CLPS missions. These satellites will form the core of Intuitive Machines’ Khonstellation, its cislunar data-relay service. In 2024, NASA awarded Intuitive Machines a contract for providing lunar communications and navigation services, in addition to awarding Intuitive Machines a study contract for a lunar communications and navigation user terminal and Aalyria Technologies a study contract on lunar networking. Also slated to launch aboard an Intuitive Machines mission is a Nokia cellular network funded through NASA’s Tipping Point initiative that will enable communication between the Nova-C lander, the Micro-Nova hopper, and Lunar Outpost’s rover, establishing the first cellular network on the Moon in order to demonstrate the feasibility of such a network for future missions. Additionally, ispace is planning on deploying two relay satellites during its APEX 1.0 mission, slated for 2026, as part of a future data-relay service.</p> -<h4 id="introduction-8">Introduction</h4> +<h3 id="key-considerations-for-next-steps">KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEXT STEPS</h3> -<p>When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) enacted the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) in 2005, it drew a sharp negative reaction in Taiwan and a flurry of scholarly analysis. Yet for the following two decades, the controversial law has barely played a role in shaping cross-Strait relations.</p> +<p>Looking forward, it is worth restating the anticipated amount of U.S. and foreign cislunar activity expected in the decade ahead. In total, there are about 40 significant missions, though often several payloads are associated with each mission, from all nations headed to the Moon over the next several years, with many of those missions associated with NASA’s Artemis program and CLPS initiative.</p> -<p>All of that changed in June 2024, when the PRC prosecutorial and judicial authorities released official guidance on how the ASL is implemented in the PRC Criminal Code. These “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (the “22 Articles”) represented the first official statement that the ASL would be invoked to criminalize a wide range of conduct deemed supportive of or even related to Taiwan’s “secession” from China. The document both broadened the range of pro-Taiwan independence activities that might fall within the scope of the PRC’s Criminal Code and clarified that some of these activities could even warrant the death penalty.</p> +<p>There is no indication of a lunar gold rush because there are no strong revenue-generating businesses centered around cislunar activities anchored by commercial customers. The Moon’s surge in commercial activity is tied mostly to NASA’s CLPS program, where many payloads ferried to the lunar surface are for NASA and commercial rideshare payloads are effectively subsidized by NASA. Truly commercial uses of the Moon remain a chimera, with no obvious sign this could change in the next several years. The cislunar domain is dominated by government activities, with the missions planned for the next decade operated by governments, strongly tied to government funding and use, or taking advantage of government-subsidized rideshare missions.</p> -<p>In response to questions about the severity of the punishments contemplated by the 22 Articles, the spokesman for the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office defended the guidance as normal and internationally accepted. He stated:</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is no indication of a lunar gold rush because there are no strong revenue-generating businesses centered around cislunar activities anchored by commercial customers.</code></em></strong></p> -<blockquote> - <p>It is a common practice in all countries in the world to use criminal justice to punish criminals who seek to conduct secession and safeguard the core interests of the country. . . . It is reasonable and legal to punish the “Taiwan independence” diehards according to law for splitting the country and inciting the crime of secession.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Though the United States has released a cislunar technology strategy, it has not articulated a comprehensive national cislunar strategy or goals, nor a cislunar national security strategy. However, the U.S. Space Priorities Framework provides sufficient guidance to help shape U.S. cislunar efforts. Given the lack of clear commercial business cases for cislunar space, with no indication this absence is due to government action or inaction, efforts aimed at addressing the cislunar challenges identified in this report should primarily focus on furthering U.S. government requirements and not premature — or potentially imaginary — commercial ones.</p> -<p>Taiwan’s government rejects the application of the concept of secession to its situation, as it claims to be a separate and independent sovereign state. But even if, for the sake of argument, Taiwan’s formal independence does constitute “secession,” the PRC’s stance is far from “normal.” On the contrary, its approach to implementing the ASL is significantly out of step with how other countries — including the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada — treat potential secessionist movements. The PRC’s repressive tactics reveal a fundamental insecurity about its ability to persuade Taiwan residents to choose unification, an insecurity that is glaring when compared to the practice of other states.</p> +<h4 id="addressing-cislunar-governance-gaps">ADDRESSING CISLUNAR GOVERNANCE GAPS</h4> -<h4 id="global-trends-in-the-punishment-of-secession">Global Trends in the Punishment of Secession</h4> +<p>This report asserts that international space governance frameworks lack needed clarity and definition in three main areas: space rules of the road, property rights and resource use, and permissible activities. These governance gaps are not unique to cislunar space. The same lack of clarity and definition for these areas in current space treaties equally applies to activities in other parts of space.</p> -<p>As an initial matter, it is worth pointing out that international law offers little direct guidance on the question of secession. The UN Charter elevates territorial integrity to one of a state’s fundamental rights, but it also recognizes a people’s right to self-determination. As one scholar observed, “International law on its own is not the main legal space in which secessionist pressures find accommodation.”</p> +<p>As international space activities increase, particularly by the United States and China, space will become less safe and secure if these deficits are not addressed. A lack of agreed-to and followed space rules of the road will increase spacecraft collision risks. A lack of consensus by spacefaring nations on property rights, space resources, and permissible activities will lead to a greater chance of misunderstandings and miscalculations by space powers, potentially increasing geopolitical tensions and sparking conflict on Earth. Ultimately, a lack of consensus increases many dimensions of risk: risk of misunderstandings, risk of collisions, risk to businesses and investment decisions, risk to life and property, and risk of conflict.</p> -<p>Nonetheless, states have incurred obligations under international human rights law that limit how and in what circumstances they can punish even avowed secessionist activities. In a recent comment made to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Moldova’s laws on secession, a human rights watchdog surveyed a wide range of state practices regarding punishments of internal secessionist movements. It concluded that the vast majority of OSCE states limit anti-secession criminal punishment to activities involving the threat or use of force. This restrained approach to punishing only violence related to secession (and not the mere support of secession that the 22 Articles punishes) acknowledges the freedom of expression and due-process rights found in many international human rights instruments.</p> +<p>These hazards are particularly acute for cislunar space. Fortunately, there are various international efforts trying to fill these gaps, some by the United Nations and another, potentially complementary initiative in the United States’ Artemis Accords. No matter the forum or agreement, the solution should involve both the United States and China. In 2023, the United States and China together accounted for around 80 percent of the world’s space launches. Most of the planned missions to cislunar space over the next decade are sponsored or supported by these two countries.</p> -<p>Thus, Azerbaijan — which has been locked in a decades-long battle with what it deems Armenian secessionists — nonetheless limits criminal punishment to those organizing “armed rebellion or active participation in it with a view of violent change of constitutional power.” Its traditional rival, Armenia, imposes punishment for “actions targeted at violation of territorial integrity . . . through violence or under the threat of violence.” Other countries facing serious secessionist or territorial disputes, such as Croatia, Estonia, and the Czech Republic, take a similarly restrained approach.</p> +<p>Agreement between the United States and China on an approach to address the cislunar space governance gaps discussed in this report would de facto establish the international standard. But neither the United States nor China can unilaterally fill those gaps, as each nation will throw sand in the gears of any attempt by the other to impose its will on the world. This is no different than U.S. and Soviet behavior during the Cold War. Other entities such as Russia, India, and ESA are still important, but they are not kingmakers.</p> -<p>In contrast, Article 102 of the PRC Criminal Law prohibits colluding “with a foreign State to endanger the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the People’s Republic of China” whether or not this entails the use of force or violence. The 22 Articles makes clear that merely “participating” or “assisting” in Taiwan independence activities violates this part of the Criminal Law.</p> +<p>While there is no need to disregard or contradict the OST and other international space agreements, addressing the identified space governance gaps need not happen as part of UN processes. There are over 100 nations in COPUOS, only a small fraction of which operate spacecraft. An even smaller fraction has a space launch capability, and fewer still have cislunar plans. The COPUOS ATLAC could provide a forum for U.S. and Chinese dialogue on cislunar governance questions, though it is too early to predict its chances of success — especially as COPUOS members continue to disagree on whom to name as vice chairs of the body.</p> -<p>The only countries that have joined the PRC in this repressive approach to secessionist movements are authoritarian countries aligned with it through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), consisting of China, Belarus, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. For instance, Article 180 of the Kazakhstan Criminal Code punishes “propaganda or public calls for violation of the unitarity and integrity of the Republic of Kazakhstan, inviolability and inalienability of its territory or disintegration of the state,” without reference to the use of force or violence. Similarly, broad prohibitions on “separatist” or secessionist activities can be found in the criminal codes of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.</p> +<p>Looking for ways to address thorny international issues outside of UN processes is not a new idea. Consider the Antarctic Treaty, whose groundwork was laid not at the United Nations but by the IGY and a subsequent conference organized by the United States that included only 12 nations. Interestingly, the United States has endorsed a concept for an International Lunar Year, taking inspiration from the IGY and International Polar Year of 2007 to 2008, possibly opening the door for an approach to cislunar space modeled after Antarctica. Additionally, the Arctic Council was formed using a similar mindset; only nations with Arctic territory have a vote. These models could be applied to new cislunar space governance negotiations. This might mean setting criteria for participation in a new international convention on space issues that relates to a nation’s stake and existing presence in space. Only nations that meet the criteria get a seat at the table.</p> -<p>In sum, while international law does not strictly prohibit criminal punishments for secession, many countries facing secessionist movements have nonetheless chosen to limit criminal punishments to activities involving the use of force or violence. The PRC, along with a few aligned countries in Central Asia, is a clear outlier in this trend.</p> +<p>At a minimum, the United States and China need a seat, particularly on measures and frameworks designed to ensure the safe and sustainable use of the space environment. Approaches that produce multiple governance frameworks overlapping with the same operational environments and geographical regions of space increase risks for space operators. International air travel and maritime shipping only work as well as they do because national leaders negotiated and agreed to one set of rules governing global air travel and one for maritime traffic.</p> -<h4 id="the-united-states-and-secession">The United States and Secession</h4> +<p>It would not be a good outcome to have more than one set of rules of the road for space — for example, one agreed upon by the United States and its traditional allies and one agreed upon by China and perhaps Russia. That would be like having cars on the same highway following different sets of traffic rules. There is no reason to think China could unilaterally impose its own rules on the United States or that the United States could impose its own rules on China. This is arguably the limit of the Artemis Accords, as China is unlikely to sign onto it. But the principles outlined in the accords could be used during any future discussions and negotiations with China on new cislunar space governance rules.</p> -<p>The United States has wrestled with secessionist movements for much of its history, including a devastating civil war over secession by southern states. At times, the PRC has used this history to analogize its own right to use force against Taiwan. For instance, in 2022, Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi told the Asia Society, “Just as the US would not allow Hawaii to break away,” Beijing “reserves the right” to seek unification with Taiwan.</p> +<h4 id="learning-from-existing-governance-frameworks">LEARNING FROM EXISTING GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS</h4> -<p>This talking point, however, ignores how U.S. law differs from PRC law in its treatment of secession. First, like many other nations, the United States does not criminalize mere advocacy of secession. Rather, Section 2283 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code punishes incitement or assistance of a “rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States.” First enacted in 1862 during the U.S. Civil War, this passage has rarely been used. In the most detailed case, it was applied to convict individuals accused of warlike conduct such as outfitting ships to attack U.S. commerce during the Civil War. It has not, and almost certainly could not, be interpreted to apply to mere advocacy of secession.</p> +<p>To frame and inform initiatives aimed at filling cislunar space governance gaps, this report introduced and discussed existing treaties and arrangements covering non-space domains that could offer lessons for space. Since no existing non-space framework has every element needed to cover all space governance gaps, the report’s authors have described which parts of each system could apply to space and cislunar activities.</p> -<p>U.S. law also punishes “seditious conspiracy,” which is defined as two or more persons who “conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States.” Although broadly worded, Section 2384 of Title 18 requires that individuals charged with seditious conspiracy have or had an intention to use force in a way that the PRC’s sedition law does not. Moreover, while this provision has recently been used — with a D.C. court convicting individuals of planning to physically breach the U.S. Capitol grounds on January 6, 2021, to block the certification of the presidential election — U.S. courts have rejected broader applications of the law to prosecute strikes, kidnapping, and even the planned assassination of local law enforcement officers.</p> +<p>One lesson from the non-space examples is that national leaders did not let unbridgeable differences on issues tangential to core topics undermine efforts to negotiate consensus positions. For example, the Antarctic Treaty avoids any position on territorial claims, as the treaty drafters realized that no consensus on that issue was possible. Insistence on addressing claims would have torpedoed the agreement. In a similar vein, the Arctic Council excludes military matters from its agenda, recognizing that all nations with Arctic territory already use the region for military purposes and have no desire to coordinate on that topic with potential adversaries. The council’s founders instead focused on areas where member interests overlapped, such as sustainable development and environmental protection of the region.</p> -<p>Given this approach to punishing rebellion and sedition, it is not surprising that Hawaiian independence activists can advocate for and seek independence without fearing U.S. prosecution. The United States has also allowed Puerto Rico to hold numerous referendums on the question of independence without threat of criminal liability. To be sure, the U.S. government has in the past taken draconian measures to oppose San Juan’s independence, such as banning the Puerto Rican flag, but it has generally only prosecuted independence advocates who resorted to violence. Such violent activities have ranged from an attempt to assassinate President Harry S. Truman in 1950 to over 130 bombings on the U.S. mainland in the 1970s and 1980s.</p> +<p>Another lesson from the non-space frameworks is that there is no one-size-fits-all approach for structuring negotiations or the final form of an agreement. Except for the Arctic Council, all of the non-space frameworks discussed originate from official treaties. Though it is merely an inter-governmental forum, deliberations in the Arctic Council have produced three official treaties and been effective at maintaining dialogue and coordination between Arctic nations. Of the non-space frameworks, only UNCLOS originated directly from a UN-facilitated process. For example, the negotiations that produced the Convention on International Civil Aviation pre-dated the creation of the United Nations. The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated specifically outside of the United Nations so that the agreement would not be influenced by the UN General Assembly and members with no contemporary presence on the continent.</p> -<p>Despite this violent history, Washington has accommodated efforts by Puerto Ricans to hold six plebiscites on the island’s relationship with the United States since 1967. These votes have generally favored Puerto Rico’s status quo as a commonwealth that is neither independent nor a state. While independence activists had drawn some support in earlier votes, a slim majority of voters (52 percent) in November 2020 instead supported immediate statehood. Meanwhile, support for independence sits in the single digits. President Joe Biden has supported Puerto Rican statehood, and some members of the U.S. Congress have proposed a law that, if passed, would require admission of the island as the fifty-first state. While far from perfect, the U.S. process of managing aspirations for Puerto Rican independence has, at least since the 1930s, allowed peaceful and open activism in favor of independence as well as free and fair votes on the question. This confident accommodation of Puerto Rico’s secessionist movement contrasts dramatically with the PRC’s insecure and repressive approach to Taiwan.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Another lesson from the non-space frameworks is that there is no one-size-fits-all approach for structuring negotiations or the final form of an agreement.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The United States is not alone in its refusal to use criminal law to suppress secessionist speech and its willingness to allow secessionist movements to hold democratic votes. Most recently, the United Kingdom allowed Scotland to hold a free and open vote in 2014 on whether to separate from the rest of the country and pledged to honor the results of that vote. Similarly, in 1995, Canada did not take action to punish Quebec’s government for holding a vote on independence even though its supreme court later found that a unilateral secession would violate Canadian law. In all three jurisdictions, residents were given the ability to vote in free and fair elections on the question of secession, free from the threat of criminal punishment.</p> +<p>A final lesson — perhaps the most important of the three — is that the non-space frameworks described in this report are durable because they can evolve over time. Each of the frameworks has consultative mechanisms baked into its structure so there is no need to negotiate a new treaty or agreement and involve the entire UN General Assembly or the 102-member COPUOS to make decisions. These mechanisms have allowed framework parties to update and clarify aspects of their governance structures to keep up with changes in technologies, societal preferences, business use cases, environmental considerations, and other factors that have changed over time. Some of these agreement-specific mechanisms take the form of annual or regular meetings at which binding and non-binding decisions can be made. Of the space-specific treaties and frameworks noted in this report, only the ITU has such a mechanism, which has probably contributed to the union’s longevity.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion-2">Conclusion</h4> +<h4 id="building-lunar-infrastructure">BUILDING LUNAR INFRASTRUCTURE</h4> -<p>As a matter of principle, Taiwan’s government may object to considering the concept of secession given its existing claims to already be a sovereign country. However, even if the PRC is right that Taiwan’s formal separation would constitute secession, Beijing’s use of criminal threats and disregard for democratic processes departs from international trends. Many countries, including the United States, allow peaceful consideration and democratic deliberation on questions of secession. This confirms that the PRC’s hard-edged ASL approach is far from normal. Instead, its harsh threats to punish peaceful, nonviolent advocacy of democratic deliberation on Taiwan’s status reflect the PRC’s larger failure to offer the people of Taiwan a real choice in their future. It is worth noting that in a free vote conducted without the threat of criminal punishment or military invasion, the people of Quebec, Scotland, and Puerto Rico all decided against secession. It is a sad commentary on the failure of the PRC’s Taiwan policy that there is little chance of a similar result if such an election were held on the island.</p> +<p>Improving cislunar infrastructure can optimize U.S. cislunar efforts, particularly activities aiming for a long-term, sustained presence on the lunar surface. Specifically, NASA’s vision for the Moon will require processes and systems that can provide power and communications, protect electronics and humans from radiation, provide positioning and navigation services, collect cislunar SSA information, manage cislunar space traffic to minimize spacecraft collision risks, and mitigate the risks to lunar operations from regolith dust.</p> -<h3 id="chinas-anti-secession-law-2">China’s Anti-Secession Law</h3> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="bluster-to-bite">Bluster to Bite?</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>Many planned lunar activities will happen in the same areas, specifically in the south pole, so there will be a need for one nation’s systems to coexist near other nations’ missions. Effective solutions for this issue are not primarily technical ones but depend on the development of coordination mechanisms and baseline agreement regarding how to behave on the Moon and in lunar orbit. Improved coordination mechanisms between spacecraft operators, both transiting space between GEO and the Moon and in lunar orbit, would likely go a long way toward mitigating the threat of cislunar spacecraft collisions and minimizing risks of new debris creation.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="margaret-k-lewis">Margaret K. Lewis</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>As noted, efficiently supporting upcoming U.S. lunar activities will require certain technological solutions, including communications, power, and navigation and positioning information. Though the United States, ESA, China, and other spacefaring entities can continue to pursue their own cislunar goals, there is an opportunity to address infrastructure challenges using an international model. The United States is already thinking internationally by developing the LunaNet communications framework, an open-architecture approach intended to facilitate allied collaboration around lunar connectivity.</p> -<h4 id="introduction-9">Introduction</h4> +<p>There are several helpful examples for structuring international cooperation in space. One is the ISS model, which assigned responsibilities for the provisions of certain space-station components to individual countries. A nearly identical model is the Artemis program, which trades opportunities to fly payloads and astronauts on Artemis missions for equipment, systems, and components provided by other countries for use in the Artemis architecture and Lunar Gateway. Notably, other than the UAE, all other nations contributing to the Lunar Gateway are also ISS partners. A third model is ESA’s Ariane project, which led to the development of the Ariane 1 rocket and creation of Arianespace, a company that operates this family of launch vehicles.</p> -<p>The classic cartoon version of the Three Little Pigs features two carefree pigs overconfidently singing “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Wolf?” As the fable goes, they ultimately retreat to safety in the home of the third pig, who had prepared for the threat by building a brick house. Nearly 20 years after its enactment, who should be afraid of China’s “big, bad” Anti-Secession Law (ASL)? Does it carry serious bite, or is it mere bluster?</p> +<p>It is worth taking a closer look at the approach used for the Ariane project, which is the same way that ESA funds and manages all its projects. For the original Ariane project, about 10 partner nations pooled funds and assigned one organization to act as project manager. Each partner nation signed up for the project knowing it would receive a certain rate of return on national funding provided to the project. Specifically, domestic firms in each partner country received contracts totaling 80 percent of the amount invested by their governments. This approach allows partners to invest in their own domestic industries and pool resources for greater impact.</p> -<p>As discussed in the analysis by Donald Clarke, the ASL is in many ways an unusual law that is heavy on broad assertions and light on clear rules. While the ASL has lurked in the background for nearly 20 years, China’s 2024 “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (the “22 Articles”) sharpens its teeth by foregrounding its linkage to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It even provides that punishments can, in severe circumstances, warrant the death penalty. That advocating Taiwan independence anywhere could have an effect in Chinese territory — as authorities in China could argue, at least — means potential global liability. Put starkly, the ASL now applies to advocacy emanating from any “brick house” if deemed as having effects in China, though it is a different question as to whether the Chinese authorities could extract people from their safe havens to inflict punishment.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K1mObCW.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: Selected Planned Activities in the Lunar South Pole Area.</strong> Source: Authors’ research based on multiple sources.</em></p> -<p>The 22 Articles interprets the subjects (i.e., the “doers”) and objects (i.e., the “receivers,” who are having something done to them) of the ASL. When the law came on the scene nearly 20 years ago, it had a clear message about Beijing’s desired future for Taiwan but few details about who was allegedly doing what to impede the stated goal of unification across the Taiwan Strait. The focus was on when the PRC might use force against Taiwan (couched in the term “non-peaceful means”), not when the PRC might use force against individuals deemed as impeding unification with Taiwan (such as by restricting their rights during criminal prosecution and sentencing). The 22 Articles hones the ASL from a murky document to one that has enhanced bite, or at least sharpened teeth. The United States is thus at a moment where it is prudent to ask what protective measures should be taken to guard against the ASL’s reach — in other words, how best to build the brick house and how cautious people should be about stepping outside it.</p> +<p>There are several benefits to modeling an effort on the Ariane project for building and operating lunar infrastructure. The first is that it allows for cost sharing across many nations interested in developing and using lunar infrastructure for their own national efforts. If there were commercial use cases for developing such infrastructure on the Moon, there would be no need for an international, government-sponsored activity, as market forces would be driving the development of lunar infrastructure. But government missions and missions primarily supported or subsidized by government funding are the only real customers for lunar infrastructure services. An international, government-funded and -driven approach would thus ensure the final product matches space agencies’ science and exploration needs.</p> -<h4 id="the-who-and-whom-of-the-asl">The Who and Whom of the ASL</h4> +<p>Another benefit to an internationalized initiative is that it could attenuate national pressure to compete for certain lunar real estate, such as peaks of eternal light (ideal for solar power infrastructure) or Earth–Moon Lagrange points (ideal for communications nodes). Internationalized cislunar architecture could also be an anchor for peaceful coexistence in space, just as the ISS maintains a peaceful link between the United States and Russia today. Finally, an international approach can be structured to provide benefits to national industries. The Ariane 1 and ESA models guarantee national governments’ return on investment that gets funneled directly back to their domestic industrial bases. The ISS and Artemis programs, while structured differently, do the same thing. These models effectively offer protectionist returns to domestic industries while pursuing international collaboration.</p> -<p>Article 2 of the ASL speaks in terms of countering “‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces” (‘台独’分裂势力), a phrase that is repeated in Article 8. Article 3 further warns against interference by “outside [foreign] forces” (外国势力). In Articles 1 and 4, the ASL also calls for safeguarding the “Chinese nation” (中华民族, which also carries the meaning of the “Chinese people”) and speaks of the duties of the “Chinese people” (中国人民) — of which “Taiwan compatriots” (台湾同胞) are declared to be a part (Articles 2, 4, 6, 9) — to safeguard territorial integrity and achieve unification. It does not, however, specify what actions would transform someone from a “Taiwan compatriot” into a “secessionist force.”</p> +<h4 id="improving-operator-coordination-and-data-sharing">IMPROVING OPERATOR COORDINATION AND DATA SHARING</h4> -<p>The Chinese “state” (国家) shall never allow secession (Article 2) and shall further do its utmost to achieve unification (Article 5), as well as take measures to promote cross-Strait relations (Article 6), with Article 8 specifying the roles of several specific bodies within this state. In the event that “non-peaceful means” (非和平方式) are used, the state shall protect “Taiwan civilians” (台湾平民), “foreign nationals in Taiwan” (在台湾的外国人), and “Taiwan compatriots in other parts of China” (台湾同胞在中国其他地区) (Article 9). There is one reference to “Taiwan authorities” (台湾当局) in Article 7, but as passive objects without agency whose status requires clarification.</p> +<p>Ideally, new cislunar monitoring infrastructure, possibly comprising systems on Earth and the Moon as well as spacecraft in cislunar space, will provide comprehensive SSA services for operators of cislunar spacecraft. Infrastructure could also provide positioning and tracking data about spacecraft and human-made systems operating on the Moon’s surface. There are plans in the next 10 years to build and launch space systems to collect SSA data in cislunar space. One or two SSA data-collecting satellites, however, would only be able to provide coverage on a very small portion of cislunar space — just a drop in the ocean.</p> -<p>Overall, the ASL depicts the Chinese state as justified in acting toward the goal of unification; it is the doer, and the object of its actions is Taiwan. It is unclear, however, who the separatist forces it seeks to quell are and what activities would gain someone the label of being part of these forces.</p> +<p>Building robust and comprehensive SSA infrastructure will be costly and take time. As noted in the previous section, one idea to address this need would be to create an international partnership to build cislunar infrastructure, such as an SSA network. The authors of this report think this approach has merit but recognize that it would take time to negotiate and establish the foundations for an internationalized cislunar infrastructure operator, effectively equivalent to a lunar public utility company.</p> -<h4 id="the-who-and-whom-of-the-22-articles">The Who and Whom of the 22 Articles</h4> +<p>In the meantime, something should be done to reduce the risk of collisions for spacecraft operating in cislunar space, including in lunar orbit. There is also a need to coordinate activities on the lunar surface, particularly in the Moon’s south pole due to the amount of expected activity there (see Figure 8). Even with the paltry number of active spacecraft orbiting the Moon — only about a handful today — there are increasing collision risks. Fortunately, unlike orbits closer to Earth, there are very few known human-made debris objects or fragments in cislunar space and only one recent example of human-made debris unintentionally hitting the Moon’s surface. International agreed-to rules and norms on mitigating the creation of cislunar debris — accepted by both the United States and China, as well as other lunar operators — could go a long way in protecting the cislunar environment from new human-made debris.</p> -<p>Like the ASL, the 22 Articles uses the familiar language of the “Chinese nation” (中华民族) and “compatriots” (同胞). Yet it goes a step further from using “‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces” (‘台独’分裂势力) to warn about “a very small number of ‘Taiwan independence’ die-hards who wantonly carry out ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities” (极少数‘台独’顽固分子大肆进行‘台独’分裂活动) (Article 1). The phrase “forces” (势力) is nowhere to be found. The focus is squarely on “elements” (分子), and the 22 Articles goes on to advise how judicial authorities should identify these elements’ crimes under Article 103 of the Criminal Law, which covers “separatism and inciting separatism.”</p> +<p>One way to address both cislunar space traffic coordination and deconfliction and prevent the creation of new cislunar debris is to incorporate these elements into international space governance frameworks. Though the authors of this report believe that negotiators and diplomats, especially U.S. and Chinese ones, can ultimately find common ground on these and other space governance issues, the authors recognize this may take time. Until then, cislunar governmental and private sector spacecraft operators from all nations can do a lot on their own, taking matters somewhat into their own hands.</p> -<p>Unlike the vague ASL, the 22 Articles provides guidance on various activities that would violate Article 103 in the context of Taiwan, as well as how to determine if a person’s actions qualify them as a “ringleader” (首要分子) and when conduct is sufficiently robust to reach a level of “active participation” (积极参加). As in the ASL, the object of alleged harm is expressed in terms of general conceptions of the “state and people” (国家和人民). In this context, supporting Taiwan independence is a way of inflicting harm on Beijing’s conception of China. What the 22 Articles adds is an articulation of what kinds of activities are harmful enough to be criminal.</p> +<p>Spacecraft operators can vastly reduce the risk of collisions and events that could cause new cislunar debris by increasing coordination and data sharing. No operator wants its satellite to collide with another or to hit a piece of space debris, so arguably all operators share a common goal, one of self-interest.</p> -<p>The 22 Articles echoes the ASL’s warning of “outside [foreign] forces” (外国势力), but Article 11 includes broader phrasing of collusion with institutions, organizations, and individuals that are outside the borders (境外机构、组织、个人) as an aggravating factor in determining punishment, thus unequivocally covering Taiwan and not just “foreign” countries. The document does not address these outside actors as being “doers” subject to criminal punishment. Reading the Criminal Law, however, they could themselves be prosecuted directly under Article 103 and other provisions because the Criminal Law is not limited to subjects labeled “‘Taiwan independence’ diehards.” So long as someone satisfies the general requirements for criminal liability (e.g., meeting the age of criminal responsibility in Article 17), they can be charged with crimes of separatism if the Chinese authorities determine that all elements of Article 103 are met.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Spacecraft operators can vastly reduce the risk of collisions and events that could cause new cislunar debris by increasing operator-to-operator coordination and data sharing.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Notably, Article 103 of the Criminal Law includes not only “carrying out” separatist acts but also “organizing” and “plotting” them (组织、策划、实施分裂国家). This language also appears in the 22 Articles. Guidance is lacking, however, on what level of conduct beyond mere thoughts is needed to reach the threshold of organizing or plotting separatism. In other words, what is the scope of inchoate criminal liability (i.e., when can a person still face criminal punishment even if their actions fall short of committing a crime)? For instance, would an academic roundtable discussing a possible role for Taiwan in the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), or other international organizations limited to sovereign states amount to “plotting” the promotion of Taiwan’s independence, as proscribed in Article 2(3) of the 22 Articles?</p> +<p>Outside of diplomatic channels or government-to-government negotiations, operators and other space stakeholders from the United States, China, and other nations are working together in forums such as the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems and International Organization for Standards to establish mechanisms and best practices for improved information sharing. These efforts are not tied specifically to cislunar space, but to space operations more broadly and touch on issues such as data standards, sharing spacecraft position information, and operator notification procedures to forestall collisions. Such discussions could eventually include elements important to cislunar operators, particularly considerations for landing and launch from the Moon’s surface and measures to prevent the creation of new cislunar debris. These discussions can also help build trust between U.S. and Chinese space stakeholders.</p> -<p>That Article 103 encompasses not only the crime of separatism but also the “crime of inciting separatism” (煽动分裂国家罪) provides further elasticity in terms of criminal liability. This is underscored by the 22 Articles’ broad definition of this crime as “stubbornly promoting ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist ideas and their separatist principles, plans, and programs” (顽固宣扬“台独”分裂主张及其分裂行动纲领、计划、方案的) and, even more expansively, as “other actions inciting Taiwan to separate from China” (其他煽动将台湾从中国分裂出去的行为) (Article 7).</p> +<h4 id="military-use-and-national-security">MILITARY USE AND NATIONAL SECURITY</h4> -<p>Clarke’s piece in this compendium addresses the global reach of liability under Article 103 via its interaction with other articles of the Criminal Law. Similarly, other parts of the Criminal Law expand the conduct covered by Article 103, not just the territory. Specifically, Article 23 provides for punishment of attempted crimes, albeit with the possibility that said punishment will be mitigated. What acts might not rise to the level of “inciting separatism” but still qualify as attempting to incite Taiwan to separate from China? Will this gray zone prompt people to take protective measures to assert that they are not advocating independence? What if a person does not engage in separatist crimes or incite separatist crimes by their own hands but assists those who do? Does accomplice liability under Article 27 of the Criminal Law kick in because someone played an ancillary role in the crimes of another?</p> +<p>Outer space up to GEO is widely used for military purposes, with significant national security equities in those regions of space. The U.S. military relies on space to fight and win wars, with satellites between LEO and GEO performing all or parts of critical missions, such as navigation, missile warning, and communications. Additionally, the U.S. economy depends on space, with power utilities, communications networks, and financial institutions using precision timing derived from GPS satellites. Commercial air travel is increasingly dependent on GPS. Many American households, businesses, and first responders use satellites for broadband connectivity. In these regions of space, the United States has many reasons to protect and defend its equities — which do face counterspace threats.</p> -<p>In sum, while the 22 Articles opens by mentioning “a very small number” (极少数) of Taiwan separatists as the subjects, its emphasis on the linkage between the ASL and Criminal Law provides no comfort that the targets of potential criminal prosecution are “very small,” especially when Article 1 calls on the security and judicial organs to give “full play to their functions and roles” (发挥职能作用). The Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC State Council has only expressly listed 10 individuals as “‘Taiwan independence’ diehards,” but there is no analysis of why these people were included or guidance about when or why others might be added to the list. Moreover, although there is coordination across government bodies, there is no assurance that the prosecutors and courts are limited to the listed individuals when pursuing criminal charges related to separatism and Taiwan.</p> +<p>But beyond GEO, things start to look very different. There are no current cislunar assets that enable joint operations. The United States would gain no clear strategic military advantage over China or any potential adversary from military activities in cislunar space. No technology that could be conceivably deployed within the next few decades could influence military outcomes on Earth. There is also no appreciable economic activity or national presence to defend and protect other than initiatives focused on science and exploration. Though future human habitation or significant economic activities on other planets could change these dynamics, there is no sign this will happen anytime soon. If the military needed SSA data on cislunar space, it could obtain that from systems operated by civilian or commercial entities.</p> -<p>There are many unanswered questions. What acts are nefarious enough for the PRC authorities to label someone a “‘Taiwan independence’ diehard”? What nonpublic lists exist in addition to the public one? To what extent is the Taiwan Affairs Office list a constraint on decisions by prosecutors and the courts? This is not known. What is known is that if the PRC authorities decide to charge someone under Article 103 for their activities related to Taiwan, it is politically inconceivable that a court would rule that the person is not guilty. If that convicted person is physically within China (as compared with having been tried in absentia), it is likewise hard to imagine a scenario where they would not be punished by at least some period of incarceration. The 22 Articles, with its express invocation of the Criminal Law, makes these questions of conviction and punishment more immediate and real.</p> +<p>Every dollar the U.S. military spends on a cislunar-focused project is a dollar taken away from another effort that likely has more effect on U.S. national security. In particular, if U.S. defense and military officials are concerned about fielding capabilities to deter and address threats from China by 2027, any resources spent today on cislunar national security capabilities could be better spent elsewhere. Nothing the U.S. military deploys to cislunar space can help win a war on Earth, whether with China or anybody else. Technological developments and other circumstances could cause a reevaluation of this calculus, but that does not rule out the consideration that a nonmilitarized cislunar space is the right answer now. And “right answer now” means “for the foreseeable future” — a span measured in many decades. In the far distant future, realistic plans for human colonies on the Moon and other planets, lunar economic equities threatened by space piracy, cislunar deployment of weapons of mass destruction targeting Earth or non-Earth locations would mean reevaluating the wisdom of keeping military activities out of cislunar space.</p> -<h4 id="protecting-from-the-bite-of-the-asl-22-articles-and-criminal-law-trio">Protecting from the Bite of the ASL, 22 Articles, and Criminal Law Trio</h4> +<p>The United States faced similar considerations regarding Antarctica in the 1950s. At that time, Washington was concerned that the Cold War could extend to Antarctica, sparking both a territorial land grab and race to establish military dominance there. Smartly, the United States saw no benefit from that development and worked diplomatically to preserve the status quo, which meant keeping military activities out and preserving the region for scientific research. Fortunately, the Soviet Union agreed to insulate Antarctica from military activities as long as it could be a party to the negotiation and subsequent agreement. It is critical to highlight that this arrangement only worked because the United States gave the Soviet Union a seat at the negotiating table.</p> -<p>In a recent conversation about the enhanced law enforcement tools provided by Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law — which was passed in the name of national security but brings enhanced erosion of individual liberties — I raised concerns with Chinese interlocutors regarding the legislation’s further empowering of the Hong Kong government to impose criminal punishments for actions that are viewed as exercises of protected freedoms of expression and assembly under international human rights law (to which Hong Kong should abide under China’s accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). The response indicated that there should not be too much concern because implementation could well show that the legislation will be invoked cautiously. In short, “Wait and see.” I, in turn, explained that not only was the chilling effect already palpable, but also that the only way to see where the line for triggering enforcement is drawn would be for people to put their individual liberty at risk. In other words, lines can only be clarified at tremendous personal cost.</p> +<p>Both the United States and China talk publicly about national security considerations for cislunar space. But the core considerations on both sides are national prestige and fears about getting shut out of cislunar opportunities, rather than strategic military advantage. As with Antarctica, it may be better for the United States and China to keep military uses and activities away from cislunar space for as long as possible.</p> -<p>Similarly, the 22 Articles has sharpened the teeth of the ASL by emphasizing its interrelation with the Criminal Law. It remains to be seen who will do something, whether intentionally or inadvertently, that tests the line and prompts PRC authorities to invoke Article 103. Audiences outside of China who are concerned about this issue can express concern to Chinese interlocutors about the message that the 22 Articles sends, caution people outside of China who do not support the party line on Taiwan about the potential for law enforcement intervention should they visit the PRC (as the Taiwan government has prudently done), and encourage countries not to extradite people to China who could face criminal prosecutions for their views on Taiwan. The number of people who could be deemed to have run afoul of Article 103 is vast. The international community should take seriously what China has said, and the United States should expand and fortify its brick houses to protect against the threat it has declared.</p> +<p>What happens if the United States seeks to preserve the nonmilitarized cislunar status quo through an agreement with China and other nations, with compliance monitored via new civil and commercial cislunar SSA capabilities? Achieving this outcome would free up U.S. defense funding and resources for better use elsewhere, possibly on other military space capabilities closer to Earth. China, like the Soviet Union regarding Antarctica, might be receptive to preserving a nonmilitarized cislunar environment. But if China does not agree on that goal, the United States should let China waste resources. Every renminbi spent on a Chinese military cislunar development — to win a race that would grant it no strategic advantage — is a renminbi not spent on some other system that could truly harm U.S. national security. For the foreseeable future, nothing China could do in cislunar space would alter the military calculus on Earth should it ever find itself in a direct conflict with the United States.</p> -<h3 id="the-weaponization-of-criminal-jurisdiction">The Weaponization of Criminal Jurisdiction</h3> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="the-prcs-22-articles-criminalizing-advocacy-for-taiwan-independence">The PRC’s 22 Articles Criminalizing Advocacy for “Taiwan Independence”</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>In the interest of optimizing the use of military resources, the United States may want to consider whether DoD cislunar programs, such as those at DARPA and AFRL, should be funded from the defense or non-defense budgets. Programs like AFRL’s Oracle-Mobility and Oracle-Prime are designed to test cislunar SSA and tracking technologies, which could support civilian and commercial cislunar activities and align with NASA’s cislunar infrastructure needs. There is no reason such programs could not be managed and funded by NASA or another civilian agency. Additionally, the U.S. government could contract with companies, who could build and operate commercial systems, to provide cislunar SSA data and services. Alternatively or concurrently, the United States could undertake an international approach to building such cislunar infrastructure. In either case, DoD and other national security users who want SSA data for cislunar space domain awareness, such as for monitoring China’s cislunar activities, could obtain such data from civilian or commercial systems.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="raymond-c-e-sung">Raymond C-E Sung</h4> -</blockquote> +<h3 id="recommendations">RECOMMENDATIONS</h3> -<h4 id="introduction-10">Introduction</h4> +<p>Based on the preceding observations on potential paths forward, the authors offer the following recommendations for consideration by U.S. policymakers:</p> -<p>On May 26, 2024, various organs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) — including the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Justice — adopted the “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (the “22 Articles”). The gist of the 22-point document is provided in Article 2, which deems advocacy for “Taiwan independence” as a criminal act of “separatism,” detailing the acts that shall constitute such behavior.</p> +<p><strong>Address governance gaps and coordination with China:</strong> To create a safe and sustainable cislunar environment so that the United States can achieve its national objectives, the United States should address cislunar space governance and coordination gaps in a manner that includes input from China. These governance gaps include agreement on permissible activities, property rights and space resources, and space rules of the road. Additionally, the United States should work with China to increase operator-to-operator data and information sharing related to space safety. Other nations should be included, but coordination protocols and governance agreements and principles negotiated without China are not worth the time. Ideally, solutions to address these issues for cislunar space can address these issues across all of space too.</p> -<h4 id="extension-of-the-application-of-prc-criminal-law-to-taiwan">Extension of the Application of PRC Criminal Law to Taiwan</h4> +<p>There are several possible approaches that could be used by the United States to address cislunar governance gaps. An approach modeled on the Arctic Council — not a treaty but an intergovernmental agreement — could provide a body through which the United States and China, as well as other spacefaring nations meeting certain membership criteria, could discuss cislunar space governance and coordination. As with the Arctic Council, this approach would exclude direct involvement with the United Nations and its full membership. In taking the first steps in establishing such a cislunar space council, the United States could look to the Ottawa Declaration, which established the Arctic Council, for guidance. An International Lunar Year conference — already being discussed by the United States — could also aim to facilitate discussions on cislunar governance among nations with lunar equities. Should it pursue any of these paths, the United States could base its negotiating positions on the Artemis principles. But as the report’s authors have already noted, it is not realistic to expect that China would sign the Artemis Accords, since it was not consulted during their formulation.</p> -<p>The PRC has long maintained its claim over Taiwan, including this claim in its constitution. However, it had not been clear whether the crime of secession provided in Article 103 of its Criminal Law applies to Taiwan. In this sense, the 22 Articles removes room for possible doubt and, in explicit terms, extends the substantive scope of Article 103 to apply to advocacy of “Taiwan independence.”</p> +<p>Additionally, the United States could try to find consensus with China on cislunar coordination issues through UN arrangements such as the ATLAC. As noted in an earlier section, this action team was established to provide a forum for U.S.-Chinese discussions on cislunar space coordination. Ultimately, a modest goal for the ATLAC may be to build trust between the two powers. Trust is needed for both sides to grow more comfortable directly engaging with each other on cislunar space safety, coordination, and governance issues — and later in drafting more comprehensive agreements on broader space governance, coordination, and safety issues.</p> -<p>Under international law, however, the Chinese claim over Taiwan is legally in contention, and the PRC does not in fact control the island. The aforementioned application of Criminal Law to the case of Taiwan rests on a claim, not a settled territorial status — making it fundamentally different from similar provisions found in the criminal codes of many other countries. The state organs of the PRC have often cited the criminalization of secession in other states to justify the legality of its move without mentioning the fundamental difference in terms of territorial status. As such, this move advances a contentious claim wrapped under the cloak of law.</p> +<p><strong>Ensure nonmilitarized status:</strong> The United States should assess whether there are compelling strategic cislunar military uses or goals. The authors of this report assert that this report do not see any now or in the foreseeable future and assert that cislunar space looks like Antarctica did in the 1950s. If it does not foresee any strategic national security objectives, the United States should advocate for the same approach taken in Antarctica, meaning no military uses of cislunar space, reinforcing the OST provisions already prohibiting military activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies. This would require an agreement between the United States and China, ideally including other spacefaring nations, to keep military interests out of cislunar space. Such an agreement could be negotiated outside of the United Nations, mirroring the approach taken for the Antarctic Treaty. Arguably, this process could proceed hand in hand with the first recommendation in this section, meaning that part of the effort to create a cislunar space council might involve efforts to ensure the nonmilitarized status of cislunar space. This approach does not rule out U.S. national security interest in monitoring cislunar space and assumes DoD and other national security users could acquire cislunar SSA data from civilian or commercial sources for such purposes.</p> -<p>As a matter of PRC domestic law, the 22 Articles provides a supplemental interpretation of the offence of secession. The document itself is not a legislative act or an ordinance but seems to be an interpretative instrument in the PRC legal system. It contains a set of elaborate provisions that operationalize the prosecution, arrest, trial (including trial in absentia), and sentencing (with a maximum sentence of death for a “ringleader” or serious offender) of the crime in question, and in many places bears the hallmarks of legal tactics found in Hong Kong’s National Security Law. In promulgating the 22 Articles, the PRC seems to be building on the experience gained from cracking down on all forms of dissent in Hong Kong using legislative and judicial means. In this sense, the document is a tool to wage lawfare and infringe on fundamental human rights. It bears careful legal analysis in conjunction with provisions of the PRC Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law.</p> +<p><strong>Pursue international collaboration on infrastructure:</strong> Solutions to address cislunar infrastructure requirements can best be addressed internationally by pooling resources and creating shared capabilities that potentially lessen the motivations for friction over desirable lunar real estate such as the peaks of eternal light. An international approach that allows partner nations to earn returns on their investments and support domestic industries provides an incentive to participate. The Ariane project offers one model for consideration. Such internationalized infrastructure could help preserve the peaceful, scientific use of the Moon and cislunar space, creating a strong foundation for the United States and other nations to pursue their scientific research and exploration goals. Shared international ownership of cislunar architecture could also form the sinews of peace between nations with cislunar activities, even in times of tension. Arguably, the ISS has served that purpose, remaining one of the last places of peaceful collaboration between the West and Russia over the past two years. Future internationalized cislunar infrastructure could serve the same purpose and advance not only U.S. national interests, but the interests of all humankind.</p> -<p>Overall, the 22 Articles furthers the agenda of the PRC’s Anti-Secession Law (ASL) in suppressing “Taiwan independence” forces. It constitutes an unlawful claim of criminal jurisdiction under international law, and the international community should push back.</p> +<p>The report’s authors also want to reiterate a few things that the United States does not need to do. There is presently no need for a specific U.S. cislunar strategy or national security cislunar strategy. Existing U.S. space goals and strategy documents are sufficient, though U.S. government implementation plans will prove useful. While investments in new cislunar SSA technologies and systems are important, improved coordination mechanisms and operator data sharing can vastly improve cislunar space safety and sustainability. Incremental steps today to improve cislunar SSA data collection are sufficient to meet the anticipated traffic, giving the United States time to develop a holistic and thoughtful architecture for a future cislunar SSA network. Taking steps to create agreed-to rules to prevent the creation of new cislunar space debris further lessens any urgency to build cislunar SSA infrastructure. Additionally, there is no need for U.S. military projects focused on cislunar space.</p> -<h4 id="pursuing-the-asls-agenda-with-newly-learned-lawfare-tactics">Pursuing the ASL’s Agenda with Newly Learned Lawfare Tactics</h4> +<p>Ultimately, the authors acknowledge that these recommendations — collaborating with China, limiting military activities beyond GEO, and internationalizing lunar infrastructure — challenge aspects of conventional U.S. thinking on space. This means that implementing one or all of these recommendations will require significant political will. But the United States should not be afraid to make a course correction resulting in an outcome that better aligns with U.S. interests, even if that path seems hard.</p> -<p>The term “‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces” (“台獨”分裂勢力) was already found in the PRC’s 2005 ASL. Article 8 of the ASL authorizes the use of “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures” in three cases: (1) where the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces cause a fait accompli of Taiwan’s secession from China; (2) where a major incident happens that will lead to Taiwan’s secession from China; or (3) where possibilities for peaceful unification are “completely exhausted.”</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">CONCLUSION</h3> -<p>The ASL does not provide a definition of “‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces.” From the political context at the time of its adoption, Beijing was primarily worried about the “pro-independence” slant of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), together with the intervention, aid, or encouragement from “external forces” — hence the ambiguous term “forces,” which covers an undefined range of actors, potentially including Taiwan authorities, a foreign government, or a political movement.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><em>“We choose to go to the Moon. . . . We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard.”</em></p> + <h4 id="-president-john-f-kennedy-1962">— President John F. Kennedy, 1962</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>In addition, the elements in Article 8 of the ASL were put in terms of a “situation:” a state in which the secession of Taiwan is either complete or seen by China as on the brink of happening. It seems that the function of Article 8 was not to define these situations but to indicate in broad terms what circumstances would “authorize” China to act with force.</p> +<p>There is a lot of promise — and hype — around the future of humankind in cislunar space. But there are also hard realities. Only the United States and China are positioned to develop and launch crewed spacecraft to the Moon. Russia has ambitious plans for crewed lunar missions but insufficient resources to make them happen. Without the United States and China, there would be very few missions to cislunar space over the next decade. Several other nations are planning uncrewed missions to the Moon, but most of these missions are hitching a ride on a U.S. spacecraft. While some of these future missions will be operated by companies, they are still inextricably tied to government funding and objectives — particularly to NASA funding. Today, there are few, if any, realized business cases separate from the government for cislunar activities.</p> -<p>The 22 Articles differs from the ASL in the above two aspects and builds on its agenda. A notable heightened degree of specificity can be found in the definition of the “criminal” acts, in effect transforming the ASL’s descriptions of potential situations into elements of crime that can be prosecuted.</p> +<p>Almost all activities in cislunar space, including in orbit and on the surface of the Moon, focus on science and research. As with Antarctica, there is no clear or obvious strategic military benefit derived from cislunar space. Militarily “winning” in cislunar space, no matter how one defines it, would do nothing to alter the outcome of a conflict between the United States and China — or any other possible adversary. Military funding and resources can be better spent elsewhere. It is in the interests of the United States to keep military uses out of cislunar space as long as possible and to retain the focus on science, leaving open the door to future business use cases such as mining.</p> -<h4 id="urisdiction-ratione-materiae">urisdiction Ratione Materiae</h4> +<p>There is no indication of a lunar gold rush, though cislunar traffic has steadily increased since the 1980s. If there is one area of increased activity deserving of attention, it is the lunar south pole. There will likely be more overlapping activities from various nations at the lunar south pole than anywhere else on the Moon. Governments’ investments in technologies and infrastructure and their efforts to address space governance gaps should be aimed at making sure that activity in this region and in lunar orbits can be done safely, sustainably, and efficiently. Given that the current focus is science and exploration, the United States should continue to collaborate with partners worldwide, potentially taking an international approach to building and operating cislunar infrastructure to meet these goals. Furthermore, the United States should try to collaborate with China, particularly on cislunar space governance and operational space safety coordination.</p> -<p>The criminal acts described in Article 2 of the new instrument include the following:</p> +<p>The current geopolitical environment makes it harder to work collaboratively with China. The Cold War provided a similarly tense environment — yet it was against this backdrop that the United States, Soviet Union, and dozens of nations produced the OST and several subsequent space agreements. This context produced the Apollo-Soyuz mission, laying the groundwork for the ISS decades later. Cislunar space and beyond is probably the best environment — maybe the only environment today — where the United States and China, as well as many other nations, can find common ground on shared interests. The United States should seize this opportunity, both for U.S. national interests and for humankind more broadly.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Initiating or establishing a “Taiwan independence” secessionist organization; planning and drafting “Taiwan independence” separatist action principles, plans, or programs; and directing members of the “Taiwan Independence” separatist organization or other persons to carry out activities to divide the country and undermine national unity</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Seeking to change the legal status of Taiwan as part of China through means such as drafting, amending, interpreting, or abolishing the regulations related to the Taiwan region or through “referendums”</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Attempting to create “two Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” or “Taiwan independence” in the international community by means such as promoting Taiwan’s entrance into international organizations that are limited to sovereign states or by conducting official foreign exchanges and military contacts</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Using their authority to wantonly distort or misrepresent the reality that Taiwan is part of China in fields such as education, culture, history, or news media, or to suppress political parties, groups, or persons that support the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and national reunification</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Other conduct seeking to separate Taiwan from China</p> - </li> -</ol> +<hr /> -<p>This detailed description of acts constituting advocacy of “Taiwan independence” marks a huge difference from the ASL. China has shifted its focus from “situations” to “acts” and has laid out precise crimes of secession that it will now punish.</p> +<p><strong>Clayton Swope</strong> is the deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> -<h4 id="jurisdiction-ratione-personae">Jurisdiction Ratione Personae</h4> +<p><strong>Louis Gleason</strong> is a former research intern for the CSIS Aerospace Security Project.</p>Clayton Swope and Louis GleasonMore and more nations and companies will send mission towards the Moon over the next several years. What challenges do these space operators face and how can they be addressed?Philippine Energy Security2024-10-21T12:00:00+08:002024-10-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/philippine-energy-security<ul> + <li><em>The Philippines’ fragile energy outlook threatens to undermine efforts to secure its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis an assertive China.</em></li> +</ul> -<p>The range of actors the 22 Articles targets is even more interesting. Given the “criminal” acts defined above, Article 2 might cover the following:</p> +<excerpt /> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Organizers, leaders, activists, and participants of a “Taiwan independence” secessionist organization</p> - </li> +<ul> <li> - <p>Individuals and entities, including political parties, involved in a relevant legislative acts or referendums in Taiwan</p> + <p><em>A tabletop exercise held at CSIS this spring with U.S. and Philippine participants explored the strategic implications of different energy investments and their vulnerability to disruption.</em></p> </li> <li> - <p>Individuals and entities that promote Taiwan’s membership in international organizations and international partnerships, irrespective of their nationality</p> + <p><em>Bringing online renewable and clean energy sources is an imperative to providing for Philippine energy security in the long term, but fossil fuels will have a critical stabilizing role in the near term.</em></p> </li> <li> - <p>Individuals and entities that research, teach, or promote a historical view of Taiwan’s status that deviates from PRC official doctrine, as well as individuals and entities that “suppress” a pro-PRC political party, organization, or person.</p> + <p><em>The United States can support its ally through enhanced alliance programing, technical assistance, and new approaches to interagency cooperation.</em></p> </li> -</ol> - -<p>The above range of actors might well cover persons who have associations with a “Taiwan independence” organization, political leaders or government officials of Taiwan, political leaders or government officials of a state that has friendly relations with Taiwan, and companies that are involved in arms sales to Taiwan, among others.</p> - -<p>A good reference point is the PRC’s sanctions list, which prohibits Chinese interactions with various political leaders, government officials, parliamentarians, governmental agencies, human rights and democracy promotion organizations, and researchers. A large portion of this has to do with their stances on Taiwan. Many of the targets are high-level figures who have visited Taiwan or met with Taiwan’s leaders (e.g., Nancy Pelosi, Mike Pompeo, and Michael McCaul) or represent major companies in the arms industry (e.g., Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing).</p> - -<p>Beijing’s targeting of individuals and entities does not happen out of the blue. The PRC has practiced such a tactic through targeted sanctions for years. Nevertheless, it is a sobering thought that persons and entities whose statements or actions have made them the target of PRC sanctions are now susceptible to criminal prosecution per the 22 Articles.</p> - -<p>Apart from building on the existing sanctions regime, two new aspects of the 22 Articles are worth further discussion. The first is the singling out of studies of Taiwan history: Article 2(4) specifically targets persons who present a historical narrative about the island that contradicts the official position of the PRC. Given that Beijing has already sanctioned scholars and researchers — German anthropologist Adrian Zenz, who writes on human rights in Xinjiang, being the most prominent case in point — the 22 Articles might be used to prosecute researchers in the field of Taiwan history, including individuals involved in editing Taiwan’s textbooks. This calls to mind Putin’s crafting of a narrative that Ukraine was always Russian, then launching a full-scale invasion. But China has gone even further by criminalizing academic research on Taiwan’s history.</p> - -<p>The other new aspect is also found in Article 2(4), which seeks to punish actors who suppress “political parties, groups, or persons that support the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and national reunification.” This likewise has roots in how China has leveraged sanctions against the island, including the recent censure of five Taiwan TV network commentators on May 15, 2024. But Article 2(4) makes the behind-the-scenes distinction clear: The PRC will lend a hand to those who work with it and threaten to criminally prosecute those who work against it in the public sphere in democratic Taiwan. As such, this is an audacious intervention in Taiwan’s democracy, clearly aiming at influencing local public debates and opinions. Its real effect is yet to be seen, but it will not be surprising if some parties or groups publicly come out or implicitly accept a designation as one supporting “the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and national reunification.”</p> - -<h4 id="the-political-agenda-maintaining-the-status-quo-to-change-the-status-quo">The Political Agenda: Maintaining the Status Quo to Change the Status Quo</h4> +</ul> -<p>Notwithstanding the above distinction, which aims to foster divisions within Taiwan, the 22 Articles represents an even bigger departure in the PRC’s official approach to the legal order that currently exists in Taiwan. This stance is shaped by China’s “anti-secession” agenda and its relations in the Taiwan Strait.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Article 2(2) punishes any attempt to change the status of Taiwan through constitutional or legislative means or by referendum. The legal order in question, of course, refers primarily to the 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China, as well as legislation such as the 1992 Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. Any attempt to change Taiwan’s constitution or the Cross-Strait Act will be considered by the PRC as completely exhausting the possibilities for peaceful reunification (ASL Article 8), which is now punishable by criminal law. On its face, this seems to “protect” the existing legal order of Taiwan and maintain the status quo.</p> +<h4 id="an-alliance-reborn">An Alliance Reborn</h4> -<p>The flip side is that, if so, what explains the hostile posture toward the governing DPP administration of Taiwan? Consecutive DPP administrations have publicly pronounced time and again that their political agenda will not push for Taiwan’s de jure independence and will conduct affairs with China in accordance with the Taiwan constitution or the constitutional order. From the perspective of the ASL and the 22 Articles, these systems pose no threat of “secession” — and may even work toward the aims apparently enshrined in the two documents.</p> +<p>The U.S.-Philippine alliance is experiencing a renaissance. Driven by unrelenting pressure from Beijing on Philippine activities in the South China Sea, Manila has pushed forward with Washington on a range of measures to modernize the alliance and give substance to the commitments outlined in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. The once-stalled Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) — which provides for U.S. construction of joint facilities, pre-positioning of equipment, and rotational deployment of troops at designated Philippine military sites — has been given new life amid a flurry of military-to-military cooperation, and was expanded from five to nine sites in 2023. This July, the United States quintupled foreign military financing to the Philippines, announcing that $500 million would be made available in the 2024 fiscal year by the Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act. And in April 2024, recognizing that economic independence plays an equal part in securing the Philippines’ strategic autonomy, leaders of the United States, the Philippines, and Japan announced the Luzon Economic Corridor, an initiative under the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) to accelerate coordinated investments in high-impact infrastructure connecting four locations: Subic Bay, Clark Freeport and Special Economic Zone, Manila, and Batangas.</p> -<p>The answer to the above inconsistency lies in the PRC’s political agenda, as was neatly expressed by Chinese minister of foreign affairs Wang Yi at the Munich Security Conference in 2024. In the question-and-answer session following his speech, Wang stated:</p> +<p>But despite substantial progress, the alliance still faces tremendous challenges in securing the Philippines’ freedom from coercion. The country is on the wrong end of a significant capacity gap with China in the South China Sea. Outmatched by tens of China Coast Guard ships and hundreds of Chinese maritime militia vessels, the Philippines struggles to maintain access to outposts in disputed areas, even within its own exclusive economic zone. Regular confrontations with Chinese ships — and, more recently, aircraft — have injured Philippine troops, damaged vessels and equipment, and come dangerously close to resulting in the death of a service member, a contingency that could force Manila to invoke U.S. alliance commitments.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Stability in the Taiwan Strait serves the interests of all parties, but it is the “Taiwan independence” forces on the island that undermine peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. “Taiwan independence” and peace in the Taiwan Strait are incompatible. To adhere to the one-China principle, we should support China’s peaceful reunification; to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, we must resolutely oppose “Taiwan independence.”</p> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ndUB05w.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>This statement reflects the PRC’s changed perception of the status quo regarding Taiwan. While paying lip service to peace and stability in the Strait, Wang laid blame on the “Taiwan independence” forces, pointing to the PRC’s One China principle as a solution, and asked government leaders attending the conference to actively support China’s plan for “peaceful reunification.” This rhetoric completely reversed the normative narrative. According to this view, the status quo is not a state to be maintained but a state to be changed by way of China “reunifying Taiwan.” This sophistry would turn the breaker of peace into a maker of peace.</p> +<p>There are also challenges to the alliance from within the Philippines. While the current administration, political-military establishment, and a majority of public opinion support strong U.S. ties, there remains a vocal anti-U.S. coalition of politicians and elites with ties to the Duterte administration or China. Pro-China and anti-U.S. narratives are widespread in a fractured information environment susceptible to disinformation campaigns by China-linked media outlets. Cynics argue that Washington is only using the Philippines as a tool to contain China and defend Taiwan. Even among those who support stronger U.S.-Philippine ties, the shadow of past failures — particularly China’s 2012 seizure of Scarborough Shoal — looms large. Commitments to defense spending, military cooperation, and economic support do not necessarily answer the lingering concern that in a critical moment, the United States may not be willing or able to protect the Philippines.</p> -<p>The PRC’s political agenda helps observers understand PRC instruments. China’s Anti-Secession Law, for instance, has never been an end in itself but is instead a halfway house to the ultimate goal of annexing Taiwan. And the 22 Articles carry the torch of the ASL by weaponizing criminal jurisdiction.</p> +<h4 id="a-critical-vulnerability-energy">A Critical Vulnerability: Energy</h4> -<blockquote> - <h2 id="section-iii">Section III</h2> - <h2 id="international-and-regional-perspectives-on-the-anti-secession-law">International and Regional Perspectives on the Anti-Secession Law</h2> -</blockquote> +<p>Even as Washington and Manila work to modernize their alliance and solidify its foundations, an emerging vulnerability threatens to undermine its potential: the Philippines’ fragile energy outlook.</p> -<h3 id="the-anti-secession-law-and-chinas-evolving-legal-warfare-against-taiwan">The Anti-Secession Law and China’s Evolving Legal Warfare Against Taiwan</h3> +<p>The Philippine energy mix is heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels, with coal accounting for 60 percent of power generation in 2022, up from 34 percent in 2010. This reliance on fossil fuels increases vulnerability to supply disruptions, a risk amplified by the nation’s archipelagic geography. The country suffers from some of the highest electricity prices in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). These vulnerabilities are compounded by operational challenges, including frequent blackouts, with most Filipinos experiencing power outages at least once a month.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="chi-ting-tsai">Chi-Ting Tsai</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9jVDUze.png" alt="image02" /></p> -<h4 id="introduction-11">Introduction</h4> +<p>The inadequacies of the power grid, including issues of transmission, storage, and inter-island connectivity, are concerns that the Philippines’ Department of Energy (PDOE) is keenly focused on. The grid also harbors a strategic vulnerability: its operator, the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP), is 40 percent owned by the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC). Fears in both Manila and Washington that Beijing could disable the grid in a time of crisis have lent urgency to efforts to reform its ownership and operational structure.</p> -<p>This article will explore China’s Anti-Secession Law (ASL) and its broader implications for international law and regional stability, particularly in relation to Taiwan. The ASL, passed in 2005, serves as a cornerstone of China’s strategy to prevent Taiwan’s independence by combining military deterrence with legal frameworks. However, the law has broader applications, as China increasingly invokes domestic legislation to justify international actions in other territorial disputes.</p> +<p>Parallel to addressing immediate challenges, the Philippines is setting ambitious long-term goals under its Philippine Energy Plan 2023-2050 (PEP), which envisions a significant transition to renewable energy. The PEP aims to increase the share of renewables in the energy mix to over 50 percent by 2050, a substantial shift. Key legislative changes, such as a recent bill allowing 100 percent foreign ownership of renewable energy projects, are steps toward reaching this goal.</p> -<p>The main arguments examined here include how the international community perceives the ASL as part of China’s legal warfare, the potential precedents set by its invocation for other territorial claims, and the growing concerns over China’s hybrid influencing strategies. Additionally, this essay will discuss how China’s evolving legal tactics pose significant challenges to international law, particularly regarding self-determination, the use of force, and human rights.</p> +<p>However, the country’s heavy reliance on energy imports continues to be a pressing issue, with over 50 percent of its energy supply sourced through net imports. The impending depletion of the Malampaya gas fields in the South China Sea, which currently supply about 30 percent of Luzon’s electricity, further exacerbates this problem. China’s willingness to use its coast guard to contest any new exploration or development in disputed areas has created reluctance within the private sector to invest in such a high-risk environment.</p> -<p>Finally, the essay will propose potential responses to counter China’s legal warfare, emphasizing the role of international institutions and laws in preventing the normalization of these tactics. By understanding the broader ramifications of the ASL, it is possible to better address the threats it poses to Taiwan’s autonomy and regional stability.</p> +<p>Without smart mitigation, the Philippines’ current energy challenges threaten to leave it economically stunted and vulnerable to global supply shocks, economic coercion, physical and cyberattacks on infrastructure, and information operations that seek to undermine its strategic autonomy. How Manila calibrates its energy policy in the next several years will have critical ramifications for Philippine national security, the U.S.-Philippine alliance, and the Indo-Pacific at large.</p> -<h4 id="international-community-views-on-asl">International Community Views on ASL</h4> +<h3 id="tabletop-exercise-design">Tabletop Exercise Design</h3> -<p>China’s ASL aims to prevent Taiwan’s independence through a two-pronged approach of military deterrence and economic integration. While some view the ASL as a war authorization law, others see it as part of China’s conflict prevention strategy. Over time, the international community has come to see China’s legal warfare against Taiwan as a multifaceted strategy aimed at undermining Taiwan’s international status and at justifying China’s actions. This approach includes reframing the cross-Strait relationship as an internal dispute, thereby limiting Taiwan’s international space while making threats to Taiwan’s people and constraining self-determination claims by Taiwan.</p> +<p>To better understand the challenges, opportunities, and trade-offs facing Manila and Washington as they try to provide for Philippine energy security, CSIS conducted a tabletop exercise (TTX) with participants from U.S. government agencies, think tanks, and private sector energy companies, plus Philippine academics, national security experts, and former government officials. The TTX was conducted in person in April 2024 over two days, facilitating candid discussions under the Chatham House Rule.</p> -<p>The international community in the past decade has also gradually come to believe that China has often employed domestic legislation on national security and foreign affairs to shape legal narratives and to pressure adversaries into accepting its territorial sovereignty and maritime claims, not only regarding Taiwan but also in the East and South China Seas and disputed borders with India and Russia. Within such a legal warfare strategy, China incorporates cognitive warfare, manipulating information to influence public opinion in Taiwan. China’s legal warfare is part of a broader influencing strategy that includes military threats and covert infiltration. The ASL and its subsequent relevant practices — such as the Hong Kong National Security Law, Coast Guard Law, Maritime Traffic Safety Law, and the 22 “Taiwan Independence Die-hard” Articles (the 22 Articles) — exemplify China’s approach of combining hard and soft tactics within legal frameworks.</p> +<p>The TTX took players through three interconnected modules focusing on energy, competition, and conflict, with the goal of determining optimal investments for different stakeholders within the context of strategic competition. Teams of participants representing the United States, the Philippines, China, and the private sector worked together to develop investment strategies and ranked seven areas of energy investment by priority: transmission and distribution, storage, renewables, nuclear, domestic oil and gas, imported oil and gas, and coal. The energy module was run three times over the course of the exercise, creating three sets of investment preferences: one after initial strategy discussions within players’ own teams, a second after each team’s preferences were shared with all other teams in a group discussion, and a third after teams had participated in competition and conflict modules.</p> -<p>Therefore, the international community views China’s ASL with concern, particularly regarding its implications for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the broader Indo-Pacific region. The United States is wary of the ASL’s provisions that authorize the use of non-peaceful means to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence. It sees this as a potential threat to regional stability, as such actions could lead to military conflict between China and Taiwan, with significant ramifications for the region and beyond.</p> +<p>Additionally, in advance of the TTX, a survey of Philippine public opinion was conducted by CSIS in cooperation with Philippine public opinion research firm WR Numero Research. This March 2024 in-person survey of 1,765 Filipinos informed the scenarios and design of the modules within the TTX, and results were used to inform participants of baseline attitudes among the Philippine public on key issues.</p> -<h4 id="effects-of-asl-invocation-on-other-territorial-claims">Effects of ASL Invocation on other Territorial Claims</h4> +<h4 id="exercise-results-and-key-findings">Exercise Results and Key Findings</h4> -<p>China’s invocation of the ASL to justify actions against Taiwan could set a precedent for using domestic laws to justify international actions in China’s other territorial dispute cases. China’s public and legal declarations, such as domestic laws or official statements regarding territorial claims, often serve as the basis for its legal and international enforcement of such claims. By codifying certain positions into law, China makes it costly to backtrack without facing domestic or international repercussions. For example, domestic Chinese legislation that regulates activities in disputed territories, including the establishment of administrative units and fishing ban areas in the South China Sea, signal a commitment to maintaining control over these areas through unilateral domestic law.</p> +<p>The energy investment preferences of each team are summarized in the table below, which lists the top three priorities for each team by round.</p> -<p>Moreover, if China invokes the ASL as a basis for the use of force against Taiwan, that could create substantial and comprehensive challenges to international law. For example, when China faces territorial disputes under international law, Beijing often invokes a “historical rights claim,” which forms an underlying legal rationale to justify territorial claims, including to Taiwan. Typically, such historical rights discourse involves arguments that certain territories have been part of Chinese cultural or political spheres in its history. For example, in one white paper — “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era” (台灣問題與新時代中國統一事業) issued by Taiwan Affairs Council of the State Council — China’s sovereignty claim on Taiwan is based, at least partly, on such a historical rights discourse.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RqpXhde.png" alt="image03" /></p> -<blockquote> - <p>The historical context that Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times is clear, and the legal facts are well-established. Continuous new archaeological discoveries and research demonstrate the profound historical and cultural connections across the Taiwan Strait. Numerous historical books and documents have recorded the early endeavors of the Chinese people in developing Taiwan.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Over the course of the TTX, several key themes emerged.</p> -<p>However, such discourse — whether “since ancient times” or based on “cultural connections” — is not a valid legal rationale for sovereignty claims in contemporary international law. Therefore, an invocation of the ASL as a basis for using force against Taiwan may create another precedent, with dangerous implications for China’s other territorial sovereignty claims.</p> +<p><em>The Battle for the Grid</em></p> -<p>China’s invocation of the 22 Articles will create another precedent by violating international human rights conventions in order to suppress pro-Taiwan independence. If this precedent can be successfully set by China, especially if China were able to extradite such “political criminals” from other countries, China could very well (and probably would) employ similar measures against “die-hard individuals” in other contexts. In Taiwan’s case, the international community should be very concerned about China potentially utilizing extradition treaties with Shanghai Cooperation Organization member countries for domestic political reasons by labeling pro-independence “die-hards” as separatist criminals. As such, China’s ASL practices may alter the scope of political crime in extradition law.</p> +<p>Transmission and distribution (T+D), and to a lesser extent storage, were key focuses of the U.S., Philippine, and Chinese teams from the beginning to the end of the game. The focus on transmission and distribution — with transmission referring to large-scale movement of high-voltage power from plants to substations, and distribution referring to smaller-scale movement of lower-voltage power from substations to consumers — was particularly acute given the contested status of the NGCP’s Chinese ownership stake. The Chinese team viewed its involvement in the Philippine electrical grid as a lever of power that it could employ in a crisis to cause paralysis among Philippine decisionmakers and, potentially, military forces. The United States and the Philippines both recognized that threat, which contributed to their own prioritization of T+D. Both additionally expressed an interest to enhance the grid and expand it to more remote areas, seeing its current state as a key bottleneck in delivering reliable power across the Philippines.</p> -<p>China’s invocation of the ASL would also be a violation of the prohibition against the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. China has not renounced the use of force to achieve reunification with Taiwan and, in fact, included this potential action in the ASL. This stance raises concerns under international law because the threat, or use, of force to coerce a political outcome can be considered a violation of the prohibition against the use of force as defined in the UN Charter. The ongoing Chinese military pressure and exercises near Taiwan, coupled with diplomatic and economic measures meant to isolate Taiwan internationally, can be viewed as coercive actions that undermine the principle of peaceful dispute resolution.</p> +<p>Philippine participants emphasized that while the future of SGCC’s ownership stake in the grid is a political question, there are also practical concerns about the operation of the grid. Although the NGCP concession agreement mandates that Philippine nationals remain in charge of all operational functions of the grid, SGCC has been accused of instead hiring Chinese personnel and even having systems and operator instructions exclusively in Chinese, raising questions about whether the Philippines can easily replace Chinese functions inside the NGCP.</p> -<p>Through invocation of the ASL, China has the potential to establish precedent concerning two related issues: the non-intervention principle and the right of self-determination. While China asserts sovereignty over Taiwan, many in Taiwan view themselves as having the right to determine their own political status. By threatening force to prevent any move toward independence, invocation of the ASL can be seen as infringing upon the right to self-determination of Taiwan’s people, thus violating international norms that protect such rights.</p> +<p>In contrast to the national teams, the private sector team remained hesitant about investing in the grid. The concession agreement with SGCC was seen as a fundamental obstacle, as all cooperative projects would need to involve the Chinese company, which would preclude involvement from most other private partners, particularly U.S. companies. The Philippines’ archipelagic geography was also seen as making transmission or distribution development in Mindanao and the Visayas economically unattractive — a problem compounded by fears that any investment would be subject to the approval of local political leaders who sometimes have personal interests in utility markets, introducing a high level of political risk for the life of the project.</p> -<h4 id="countering-chinas-asl">Countering China’s ASL</h4> +<p><em>Competing Priorities: Imported Oil and Gas vs. Renewables</em></p> -<p>Structurally speaking, China’s legal warfare has been elevated to “legal enforcement warfare” in recent years and includes not only the unilateral promulgation of new laws or regulations by China but also the projection of actual “legal enforcement” capabilities in “extraterritorial” and “disputed areas.” China hopes that these laws, and the appearance of their implementation and acceptance, will serve as a psychological deterrent to other countries. For instance, in the South China Sea, China has enacted unilateral fishing bans and Provisions on Administrative Law Enforcement Procedures of Coast Guard Agencies. For cross-Strait relations, China has put forward the aforementioned 22 Articles — coupled with possible red notice and extradition treaties — as well as other measures.</p> +<p>Strong interest in renewable energy solutions for the Philippines was evident, consistently ranking among the top four priority areas for all teams. But notable shifts in priorities occurred over the course of the game, with more groups placing a higher priority on imported oil and gas (IO&amp;G) than renewable energy (RE) by the end of the TTX.</p> -<p>Given the current situation, the international community must prevent China from making such practices acceptable through the use of international institutions and international law. For example, the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence in Liu v. Poland needs to be elaborated outside of the court. In Liu v. Poland Liu v. Poland (Application No. 37610/18), the European Court of Human Rights ruled that, if Poland were to extradite Liu — a Taiwan national — to China, it would violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhumane treatment. The court’s reasoning in the Liu case should be noted by European countries and should spur them to reconsider judicial cooperation with China and other nations characterized by a “general situation of violence” and a lack of transparency. In the context of the ASL and the 22 Articles, we may need to further elaborate on the relationship between them and torture in particular, while also recognizing the court’s interpretation as obligations erga omnes.</p> +<p>In round one, renewables enjoyed high interest from all teams, but did not make the top three of the Philippines team, which placed IO&amp;G as their number one priority. The Philippine team explained that its preference was driven by the necessities of timing: only IO&amp;G was perceived to be able to meet rising energy demand over the next 10–15 years. Following this discussion, other teams responded: IO&amp;G rose above renewable energy for the United States in round two, and the private sector also mildly elevated priority on IO&amp;G. After the teams played through competition and conflict scenarios, the shift became even more pronounced, with the United States elevating IO&amp;G to its top priority. Renewables remained in the top three only for China, which continued to think that their adoption would present opportunities for increased influence in the Philippines through the provision of renewable equipment and technology. Renewables remained a close fourth, however, for both the Philippines and the United States, who both saw a transition to renewable energy as inevitable for the Philippines, current strategic exigencies notwithstanding.</p> -<p>Moreover, request of a red notice in Interpol, as a matter of law, must align with the international policing organization’s regulations as well as international law in order to ensure that the notice is not used for political, military, racial, or religious reasons. The definition and scope of “politically motivated reasons” can be ephemeral and thus may not serve as a safeguard for political dissidents. Hence, in the reviewing process of red notice issuances, the international community needs to examine more closely whether countries criminalize separatism for politically motivated reasons and place more burden of proof on countries that request red notices.</p> +<p><em>Mirrored Image Problems: Nuclear Energy and Domestic Oil and Gas</em></p> -<p>Furthermore, in jus ad bellum issues, to assert that China’s ASL violates international law on the prohibition of the use, or threatened use, of force, one key issues must be considered: the positioning of cross-Strait relations. If cross-Strait relations are considered to be interstate relations, then the narrowest interpretation of Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter and the customary international law principle prohibiting the use of force can serve as a rationale. However, if the special nature of cross-Strait relations is adopted, or if it is claimed that Taiwan is a special entity under international law, it is necessary to consider which interpretation (or interpretations) of the injunction should be adopted, including: the use of force against de facto regimes, the use of force to infringe upon de facto borders, or the use of force to deprive a people of their right to self-determination. Although these scenarios are not explicitly stipulated in the aforementioned United Nations Charter provisions, the spirit of the prohibition, state practice, and scholarly views suggest that the principle should apply to cases beyond traditional interstate relations.</p> +<p>Despite official efforts to accelerate cooperation between the United States and the Philippines on civil nuclear technology, nuclear energy was deprioritized by the national teams. Philippine participants placed a low priority on nuclear energy, citing popular fears of a nuclear disaster given the frequency of extreme weather events in the Philippines. The Fukushima accident in Japan, brought on by an extreme weather event itself, has remained in the public eye in the Philippines as maritime communities have voiced concerns over the potential impact of treated nuclear wastewater released into the Pacific Ocean.</p> -<h4 id="implications">Implications</h4> +<p>The reverse disparity was observed for domestic oil and gas: though it is unclear whether untapped gas reserves in the South China Sea would make a critical difference in meeting Philippine energy needs over the coming decades, it remained a major topic of discussion almost entirely for its symbolic importance. The national teams ultimately deprioritized it, with Philippine and U.S. teams citing the risk of interference by China as a critical barrier to development. However, due in part to extensive media coverage over the last decade, oil and gas in the South China Sea are widely seen in the Philippines as valuable resources that have been unjustly denied by China.</p> -<p>China’s ASL is a critical element of its broader strategy to assert control over Taiwan and other contested territories, and understanding it is essential. By legally codifying the potential use of force to prevent Taiwan’s independence, China aims to create a framework that justifies aggressive actions under the cover of domestic law. This approach not only threatens Taiwan’s autonomy but also serves as a tool for China to extend its influence and assert its sovereignty over other disputed regions, such as the South China Sea and borders with India and Russia. The international community, particularly the United States, rightfully views these developments with concern, recognizing the potential for the ASL to escalate tensions and destabilize the region.</p> +<p>These sensibilities were also observed in the public opinion survey conducted prior to the TTX.</p> -<p>The implications of China’s ASL extend beyond Taiwan, as its invocation sets a worrying precedent for using domestic legislation to justify international actions. By invoking the ASL, China seeks to legitimize its territorial claims and suppress any movements toward self-determination, not just in Taiwan but also potentially in other regions. This is exemplified by China’s historical rights claims, which are often used to assert long-standing ties to contested territories. Additionally, measures such as the 22 Articles illustrate China’s willingness to use legal tools to silence dissent and to control narratives. Such actions raise significant concerns under international law, particularly regarding the prohibition of the use of force and the right to self-determination.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QfJwdlo.png" alt="image04" /></p> -<p>As China’s legal warfare evolves into what can be described as “legal enforcement warfare,” the international community faces new challenges, including responding not only legally and diplomatically but also with practical measures to counteract China’s gray zone strategies. The international community must also scrutinize China’s use of international organizations, such as Interpol, to pursue political objectives under the guise of criminal charges. In response, countries must reinforce international legal norms, support Taiwan’s democratic self-determination, and work collectively to prevent the erosion of international law standards.</p> +<p>While survey participants favored energy transmission and grid development as the top targets for U.S. energy investment in the Philippines, over 40 percent also supported oil and gas exploration, while less than 25 percent expressed support for nuclear power.</p> -<h3 id="a-view-from-japan">A View from Japan</h3> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="navigating-cross-strait-tensions">Navigating Cross-Strait Tensions</h3> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="planning-for-a-secure-transition">Planning for a Secure Transition</h4> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="ken-jimbo">Ken Jimbo</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The U.S. and Philippine teams were aligned in their goal of enabling the Philippines to resist coercion. To do this, their final energy investment strategies sought to balance competing priorities in several dimensions:</p> -<h4 id="introduction-12">Introduction</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Near-term stability vs. long-term sustainability</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Economic efficiency vs. strategic preparedness</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Energy sourcing vs. power infrastructure</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Grid resilience vs. grid expansion</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The introduction of the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2005 was a significant event in East Asian geopolitics, reflecting Beijing’s determination to prevent Taiwan’s formal independence. For Japan, the law represents China’s uncompromised official declaration to use force in the case of unacceptable political consequences in cross-Strait relations, which later became Tokyo’s basic logic to prepare for a Taiwan Strait contingency. The law has also strictly limited Taiwan’s international representation, thus testing Japan’s diplomatic balancing act between China and Taiwan. Japan’s approach to the ASL, and more broadly to the “One China” framework, underscores its strategic interests in maintaining regional peace and stability while fostering unofficial relations with Taiwan.</p> +<p>IO&amp;G, especially liquidified natural gas (LNG), was seen to be a critical component of the Philippines’ energy mix over the coming decades and one of the only energy sources that could meet growing demand in the near term. Both teams sought to make investments in LNG terminals and plants to connect this resource to the transmission grid and to distribute these terminals geographically such that, in the event of a conflict, cargoes could still be delivered.</p> -<h4 id="historical-context-of-japan-taiwan-relations">Historical Context of Japan-Taiwan Relations</h4> +<p>The power grid was also a top priority. The Philippine team aimed to implement an urgent review and elimination of Chinese involvement in grid systems and operations such that, even if the SGCC concession agreement itself was not altered or canceled, grid operations would remain firmly under Philippine control. Teams also identified a need to develop grid infrastructure to integrate renewable energy resources. In doing so, participants saw an opportunity to enhance the resilience of the power system by developing microgrids that would not be integrated directly into the NGCP-run central grid. This was seen as a better fit for the Philippines’ archipelagic geography as well as an opportunity for U.S. and other companies to contribute to developing the Philippine power system in a way that would avoid the difficulties of partnering with the Chinese-invested NGCP.</p> -<p>Following the normalization of relations with the PRC in 1972, Japan adhered to a policy of recognizing the PRC as the sole legal government of China (a “One China” policy) while maintaining unofficial relations with Taiwan, primarily in economic and cultural spheres. This stance was rooted in Japan’s strategic interest in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait, an area critical to regional security and economic interests.</p> +<p>Storage was a key piece of each team’s final strategy, and was linked with plans to both import hydrocarbons in the near term and bring online renewable energy in the long term. The Philippine team aimed to fast-track the creation of a strategic petroleum reserve that would provide for 90 days of the country’s energy consumption, a measure that the Philippine government started in 2019 but put on hold in 2022. Teams also sought to invest in power storage for the energy grid as a prerequisite for the connection of renewable energy sources — without it, the variable output of renewables could contribute to grid instability.</p> -<p>Taiwan’s democratization in the 1990s added a new dimension to its relationship with Japan. The political liberalization allowed for greater public appreciation of Japan in Taiwan, fostering closer economic and cultural ties. However, the shadow of the PRC’s claims over Taiwan has consistently necessitated a cautious approach from Japan, ensuring that its interactions with Taiwan do not provoke Beijing’s ire.</p> +<p>Renewables themselves were seen as the final essential component of a Philippine energy security strategy. Transition to renewables was seen as the best way to reduce the Philippines’ external dependencies and vulnerabilities to price shocks, blockades, and resource depletion. Solar, offshore wind, and hydropower were all raised as important sources to explore, with all likely to play some role in a renewables mix. While the Philippines is already a significant producer of geothermal energy, little opportunity was seen to expand this production, which is heavily dependent on localized areas of geothermal activity. Biomass was also dismissed as having little potential to play a major role in a future renewable energy mix, though smaller-scale efforts to incorporate biofuels for vehicles were seen as having some potential utility.</p> -<h4 id="the-anti-secession-law-and-regional-implications">The Anti-Secession Law and Regional Implications</h4> +<h4 id="potential-for-disruption">Potential for Disruption</h4> -<p>The enactment of the ASL by China was perceived in Japan as a unilateral move that could destabilize the Taiwan Strait, an area Japan views as vital for its security. The law’s explicit provision for “non-peaceful means” to prevent Taiwan’s independence heightened concerns about the potential for military conflict, which could directly impact Japan given its geographical proximity and security ties with the United States.</p> +<p>The China team’s strategy revolved around different end goals: maintaining influence over Philippine energy sectors, displacing the United States as a provider and partner in these areas, and ultimately disrupting the U.S.-Philippine alliance. To this end, its prioritization of different energy investments was not based on any desired end state for the Philippines’ energy outlook, but instead largely sought to follow whichever area the Philippines was interested in and outcompete the United States in order to establish or maintain influence. The ability of China’s government to directly control the investment or operations of both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and nominally private Chinese companies was seen as an advantage that would allow China to outbid U.S. or other companies on renewable projects. Facing a Philippine team that declared a clear interest in working with the United States, the China team also turned to investing in renewables and microgrids in the provinces, hoping to foster the narrative that China was in fact doing more for Philippine public good than the United States. And in response to Philippine efforts to limit Chinese involvement in the power grid, the China team aimed to leverage connections with provincial governments and local authorities to impede those efforts and prevent Philippine leadership from uniting to execute its planned strategy.</p> -<p>Japan’s official response to the ASL was measured. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concern over the potential threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, reiterating Japan’s opposition to any non-peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. This response reflects Japan’s broader strategic calculus: maintaining a stable regional environment conducive to economic growth while balancing its relations with China and Taiwan.</p> +<h3 id="ongoing-efforts-and-potential-tools">Ongoing Efforts and Potential Tools</h3> -<p>Nevertheless, Japan’s commitment to adherence to the basic position of the One China policy remained after the PRC’s adoption of the ASL. At the Japan-China Summit Meeting in May 2008, “Regarding the Taiwan issue, the Japanese side again expressed its adherence to the position enunciated in the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China.”</p> +<p>Public and private actors in the Philippines and the United States are actively pursuing many of the secure transition strategies identified during the TTX. This section will outline ongoing, high-value U.S. initiatives that are aimed at improving Philippine energy security or that have strong potential to serve as vehicles for future efforts.</p> -<h4 id="japans-strategic-interests-and-policy-adjustments">Japan’s Strategic Interests and Policy Adjustments</h4> +<p><em>Energy Policy Dialogue</em></p> -<p>Japan’s strategic interests in the post-ASL Taiwan Strait are multifaceted. Economically, Taiwan is a significant partner with robust trade and investment ties. Japan’s economic interests in Taiwan are driven by its advanced technology sector and its role in global supply chains. Culturally, the shared values of democracy and the rule of law have fostered a unique bond between the Japanese and Taiwan peoples. The U.S.-Japan security alliance underscores the importance of maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait, with both countries sharing concerns about China’s growing military capabilities and assertiveness. These factors have driven Japan to seek a balance in its approach, leveraging unofficial channels to deepen ties with Taiwan while adhering to its official recognition of the PRC.</p> +<p>In August 2023, the United States and the Philippines launched the first U.S.-Philippines Energy Policy Dialogue. A product of agreements made during Vice President Kamala Harris’s visit to the Philippines in November 2022, the dialogue brought together representatives from the Department of State’s Bureau of Energy Resources, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the PDOE to discuss the acceleration of renewable energy, transmission modernization and expansion, and reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels. The dialogue also established priorities for future technical support and discussed nuclear energy cooperation opportunities, likely aiding in the signing of a 123 Agreement the following year.</p> -<p>The changing geopolitical landscape, particularly China’s rise as a more assertive regional power, has prompted Japan to reconsider its security posture. In December 2022, the Japanese government approved three security-related strategic documents, namely the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program. The premise of these strategic documents is that the international community is facing its “greatest postwar challenge” and that the security environment surrounding Japan is “the most severe and complex” in the postwar era. The documents defined China as the “greatest strategic challenge.”</p> +<p>During the fourth 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue between foreign and defense secretaries of the United States and the Philippines on July 30, 2024, the two sides committed to convening a second energy policy dialogue in Manila later this year, noting that the dialogue will provide “a platform to accelerate efforts to diversify critical minerals supply chains, promote renewable energy deployment, foster reliable and resilient power grids, and elevate energy security.”</p> -<p>The approach that the three strategy documents seek to take is to operationalize deterrence by denial and new ways of fighting. Given a status of structural inferiority vis-à-vis China, Japan’s goal is not to quantitively balance the amount of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) equipment against the scale of China’s conventional forces. The strategy documents aim to develop JSDF capability enough to “make [the] opponent realize that the goal of invasion of Japan is not achievable” and that the “damage the opponent will incur makes the invasion not worth the cost.” In other words, denying adversaries’ prospects of operational success is the essence of the denial strategy.</p> +<p><em>Civil Nuclear Cooperation</em></p> -<p>The sequence of operationalizing denial strategy is (1) disrupting and defeating invasion over long distances through stand-off defense capabilities; (2) if deterrence fails, ensuring asymmetric superiority through cross-domain operations that integrate the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains; and (3) conducting swift and persistent operations to dissuade conflict escalation. Until 2027, Japan will strengthen its existing defense equipment to prevent or eliminate an invasion of Japan. By roughly 2032, it will fundamentally strengthen its defense capability to “disrupt and defeat invasion at earlier timing at a location further afield.”</p> +<p>In November 2023, the United States and the Philippines signed a 123 Agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. Entered into force on July 2, 2024, the agreement provides the legal framework for exports to the Philippines of nuclear material, equipment, components, and information for nuclear research and civil nuclear energy production. Even before the signing of the agreement, the PEP had targeted 1,200 MW of nuclear power generation by 2032, increasing to 2,400 MW by 2035, and up to a total of 4,800 MW by 2050. The initial 1,200 MW is envisioned to come from eight 150 MW small modular reactors (SMRs). Several Philippine companies are already exploring cooperation with U.S. SMR firms, including Ultra Safe Nuclear and NuScale Power. The United States is facilitating further connections through a civil nuclear industry working group based in Manila, which held its first virtual meeting between U.S. companies and the Philippine government on July 31.</p> -<p>The high-end military contingency scenarios over the Taiwan Strait are unspoken assumptions for which the Japanese government aims to be ready. The logic of denial for China’s integrated military operations in Taiwan can be found in various dimensions.</p> +<p>In addition to SMRs, the Philippines is also considering the possibility of conventional nuclear reactors, including the potential restoration of the existing Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. The plant was completed in 1986 but shuttered before it was ever fired, amid public protests and concerns that it was built near a major fault line in an earthquake-prone region. Nevertheless, the PDOE is in discussions with Korea Hydro &amp; Nuclear Power about a feasibility study on reviving the plant, which was originally engineered to provide an output of 621 MW.</p> -<p>Enhancing the U.S.-Japan alliance, particularly in defense cooperation, implicitly acknowledges the possibility of a Taiwan contingency. The essence of integrated deterrence in the Japan-U.S. alliance lies in the joint promotion of the denial strategy. Fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capability will lead to Japan’s defense and the effective projection of U.S. forces. The JSDF’s standoff defense capability will also provide wide-area force projection support to U.S. forces. Integrated air and missile defense capabilities, sustained and robust operations, and the strengthening of domestic and international facility areas will be key elements for U.S. forces to conduct operations in the war zone.</p> +<p><em>Energy Secure Philippines</em></p> -<h4 id="opportunities-and-challenges-in-japan-taiwan-relations">Opportunities and Challenges in Japan-Taiwan Relations</h4> +<p>The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) primary workstream on Philippine energy is Energy Secure Philippines, a five-year, $34 million project that aims to improve the reliability and resilience of the Philippine power system. Running from 2020 to 2025, the program focuses on digitization of distribution and utilities, development of financing platforms for utility resiliency investments, development of a resiliency assessment system, and implementation of cybersecurity standards and best practices across the power sector.</p> -<p>In recent years, Japan has explored new avenues to strengthen its relationship with Taiwan, capitalizing on areas less likely to provoke a strong reaction from China. This includes cooperation in nontraditional security domains such as cybersecurity and public health, where both sides have shared interests and face common threats. The Global Cooperation and Training Framework, which includes the United States, Japan, and Taiwan, exemplifies a pragmatic approach to trilateral cooperation that circumvents diplomatic constraints. Japan also began stationing an active-duty Ministry of Defense official in the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association in 2022.</p> +<p><em>Competitive Renewable Energy Zones</em></p> -<p>However, challenges remain. The lack of official diplomatic recognition limits the scope of Japan-Taiwan relations, necessitating creative diplomatic strategies to advance mutual interests. Additionally, domestic politics in both Japan and Taiwan can complicate bilateral ties. In Taiwan, political agendas related to Japan often become contentious issues, reflecting the island’s divided political landscape. In Japan, while public sentiment toward Taiwan is generally positive, political caution prevails in the Diet, where strengthening ties with Taiwan could draw China’s strong opposition.</p> +<p>In September of 2018, the PDOE authorized the study and designation of Competitive Renewable Energy Zones (CREZ) in the Philippines. Conducted by the PDOE and the NGCP with support from USAID and the DOE’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), CREZ is a transmission planning tool that seeks to identify high concentrations of renewable resources and plan for corresponding transmission infrastructure that would maximize efficiencies and provide the groundwork for investment in renewables generation. The process is chaired by the PDOE but also involves the NGCP as well as numerous organizations and departments associated with energy, the electricity market, and the grid. USAID and NREL have provided training and assistance to the PDOE and the NGCP in identifying CREZ and conducting load modeling, forecasting, and power system planning. The model is based on Texas’s implementation of CREZ from 2005 to 2014 to bring wind power into the state’s grid but currently incorporates only the analysis and planning phases, with no commitment to construct the planned transmission infrastructure. The project does, however, provide assistance to the PDOE in preparing and submitting new renewable transmission projects to the Energy Regulatory Commission, as well as training for the commission on how to assess those submissions. CREZ is currently in phase three, which spans from 2023 to 2025 and focuses on implementing plans from phases one and two as well as mapping offshore wind resources for future implementation.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion-navigating-the-future">Conclusion: Navigating the Future</h4> +<p><em>Luzon Economic Corridor</em></p> -<p>As Japan navigates the complexities of the ASL and its implications for regional stability, it must continue to balance its strategic interests with the realities of cross-Strait relations. This involves carefully calibrating its policy toward Taiwan, leveraging unofficial channels to foster cooperation while adhering to the framework established by the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué.</p> +<p>In April 2024, U.S., Philippine, and Japanese leaders together launched the Luzon Economic Corridor (LEC) as an initiative of the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI). To be coordinated by the State Department, the LEC is aimed at supporting connectivity between Subic Bay, Clark Freeport and Special Economic Zone, Manila, and Batangas, with $14.75 million to support project preparation and technical assistance for infrastructure and other strategic investments.</p> -<p>Japan’s path forward involves maintaining its current policy stance and exploring new opportunities for collaboration with Taiwan in areas aligning with its strategic interests. This includes enhancing economic partnerships, strengthening people-to-people exchanges, and supporting Taiwan’s participation in the international community in ways that do not contravene Japan’s official diplomatic stance.</p> +<p>The original announcement of the LEC mentioned energy only in the context of “clean energy and semiconductor supply chains and deployments,” one of four target investment areas that also include rail, ports modernization, and agribusiness. But a PGI fact sheet released by the White House on June 13 during the G7 summit in Fasano, Italy, touted more specific developments, including a U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) grant for a private energy developer in the Philippines to evaluate the use of a U.S. geothermal firm’s technology to increase power production. The fact sheet also lists a grant for a feasibility study and pilot for a Philippine telecom operator to develop a 5G mobile and fixed wireless network in the Philippines — a project that does not clearly fall within the specified focuses of the original LEC launch announcement. Given the broad scope of investments covered by the LEC’s stated goals and the apparent flexibility in incorporating new ones, it is likely that the LEC could function as a vehicle for further activities related to energy security.</p> -<h3 id="a-view-from-southeast-asia">A View from Southeast Asia</h3> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="inattention-and-avoidance">Inattention and Avoidance</h3> -</blockquote> +<p><em>Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="ja-ian-chong">Ja Ian Chong</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Signed in 2014, EDCA provides for the U.S. construction of joint facilities, pre-positioning of equipment, and rotational deployment of troops at designated Philippine military sites. EDCA projects to date have been focused on improving Philippine military facilities, but there have also been mentions of potential expansion of programming to include efforts aimed at benefiting surrounding communities. A May 2023 White House fact sheet on the U.S.-Philippine alliance noted that the United States was working with communities near EDCA sites to drive sustainable development and investment. A joint statement from the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in July mentions plans for USAID to pre-position humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) commodities for use by Philippine civilian disaster response authorities at one EDCA site. Given the interest in providing public goods to local communities, EDCA programming that could provide local energy solutions has the potential to both contribute to energy resiliency and counter anti-EDCA and anti-U.S. narratives.</p> -<h4 id="introduction-13">Introduction</h4> +<p><em>Millennium Challenge Corporation</em></p> -<p>Relations across the Taiwan Strait are typically out of sight, out of mind in Southeast Asia, where states are eager to profit from economic ties with both Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Governments generally view the political sensitivities associated with cross-Strait relations as quagmires to avoid, especially if there is the potential for friction with Beijing’s goals of controlling Taiwan and reducing Taiwan’s distinctiveness. They believe that cross-Strait issues are separable from developments in Southeast Asia and try to pay little attention — except when there is a real risk of instability spilling over. Consequently, these governments have put little thought into the PRC’s Anti-Secession Law (ASL) since it was introduced in 2005. To the region, it is a piece of domestic legislation on which they have little, if anything, to comment.</p> +<p>In December 2023, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) selected the Philippines for a threshold program, a grant “designed to support policy and institutional reforms that address economic growth constraints.” As of February 2024, no focus area for the grant had been decided. The July joint statement from the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue directly referenced the threshold program agreement, urging both sides to work toward its completion as soon as possible. Given the variety of possible focus areas, it is difficult to speculate whether energy is under consideration. But the Philippines’ high electricity costs and unreliable power likely qualify as economic growth constraints that would at least lead the MCC to consider a focus on energy policy reforms.</p> -<h4 id="varied-views-of-taiwan-across-southeast-asia">Varied Views of Taiwan Across Southeast Asia</h4> +<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> -<p>Taiwan’s relationship with the PRC is something most regional governments believe has little to do with them, even though Taiwan borders the South China Sea and Taipei lays claim to much of those waters. A popular perspective across Southeast Asian governments is that they are unable to affect decisions in Taipei and Beijing — and, at any rate, can depend on the United States and perhaps Japan to discourage escalation and manage crises. Many in Southeast Asia also appear to think that the importance of economic ties across the Taiwan Strait will ease tensions. Legacies of colonialism, independence, and separatist movements, along with a norm of noninterference in domestic affairs, further prompt Southeast Asian states to disregard cross-Strait relations as someone else’s problem.</p> +<h4 id="secure-near-term-stability">Secure Near-Term Stability</h4> -<p>The Philippines is an exception. The PRC’s demarcation of military exercise areas just outside Philippine territorial waters following U.S. speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan emphatically reminded Filipinos of the fallout that a major crisis around Taiwan could bring. The islands’ geographic proximity makes avoiding reverberations highly unlikely. Complicating the calculus for Manila are, of course, its ongoing territorial dispute with the PRC and its alliance with the United States. Resources, trainings, diplomatic support, and potentially military support from the United States can better enable the Philippines to maintain its claims in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea in the face of mounting PRC pressure until a solution emerges. However, a contingency involving Taiwan might see the United States demand access to territorial waters, airspace, and bases and emplace equipment and supplies, which could in turn invite backlash or even force from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian governments, such as Singapore, are purportedly privately concerned about rising tensions surrounding the South China Sea and Taiwan but have refrained from taking public positions, possibly out of fear of PRC punishment.</p> +<p>Facing rapidly rising energy demand, continuous threats of maritime coercion, and the very real risk of near-term conflict, the Philippines needs help to stabilize its energy outlook and prepare for crisis scenarios. Hydrocarbons, though they may be destined to be replaced by cleaner, renewable alternatives, will remain an important component of the Philippines’ energy mix for the next several decades. They will be especially vital over the next 10–15 years, before nuclear and renewable sources can begin to contribute at sufficient scale. LNG, as a cleaner alternative to other fossil fuels, will play an important role in this context.</p> -<p>On the status of Taiwan, Southeast Asian governments have generally adhered to the definitions used by the PRC and Kuomintang (KMT) that Taiwan is part of China — regardless of which regime represents it. These governments have adopted “One China” policies (“一中”政策) to some degree, sometimes in exchange for economic benefits such as market access or assistance. However, there are clear divergences among the Southeast Asian states’ One China policies, as evident following the PRC’s military exercises in response to the 2022 Pelosi visit, when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) called for calm and reiterated “Member States’ support for their respective One-China Policy [sic].” Southeast Asian states have, until recently, generally managed to escape debates surrounding PRC efforts to recast these positions in terms of its own, narrower One China principle, but whether this can continue is an open question.</p> +<p>Washington should reconsider recent efforts to curb U.S. LNG exports, such as the pause implemented on LNG export project approvals in January 2024. While a federal court issued a stay in July that ended the pause, such efforts create uncertainty about the future of U.S. LNG that undermines investing and contracting processes. For European allies, U.S. LNG exports have been a critical backstop for sanctioned Russian gas since the invasion of Ukraine. Japan, the world’s second-largest importer of LNG, has also been a foundational buyer for several U.S. export projects. While the Philippines’ current LNG imports are not coming from the United States, future supplies almost certainly will. Given the importance of Philippine energy security to the United States’ own national security, Washington should aim to facilitate, not jeopardize, future purchases of U.S. LNG by the Philippines.</p> -<p>The table below summarizes the current One China policies of Southeast Asian governments, noting that positions sometimes subtly adjust over time. It draws on official statements from the government in question and is cross-referenced against PRC versions, although in some cases only one version is publicly available. The Laotian, Indonesian, Singaporean, and Vietnamese positions recognize that Taiwan is part of China but do not explicitly equate China with the PRC. Cambodia is not explicit about whether Taiwan is a part of China or the PRC, while the Philippines “fully understands and respects” the PRC’s position on Taiwan without openly recognizing or agreeing to it. Indonesia, Laos, the Myanmar junta, Timor Leste, and Vietnam publicly support peaceful (re)unification but are silent about their stances on Beijing using force. Other parts of Southeast Asian states’ One China policies draw variously from that of the PRC. ASEAN itself has no position on the issue given the wide range of member-state policies.</p> +<p>Within the Philippines, the United States should support the country’s efforts to develop LNG terminal infrastructure and connect LNG plants to the grid. It can also support efforts to improve port infrastructure and to diversify delivery points, which would ensure shipments of LNG or other hydrocarbons could continue to reach the Philippines in the event of conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WHSnyCS.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Table 2: Chinese and Southeast Asian Policies toward Taiwan</em></p> +<p>While LNG is a priority, other hydrocarbons may have a role to play in preparing for crisis scenarios. The United States should support the revival of a strategic petroleum reserve for the Philippines. The two countries should also conduct a cost-benefit analysis on the construction of an additional oil refinery. Following the closure of the Tabangao Refinery in Batangas in August 2020, the Philippines only has one refinery in operation, which could prove to be a vulnerability.</p> -<p>Different Southeast Asian governments’ One China policies are not necessarily consistent with Beijing’s One China principle. These differences are especially evident in terms of equating “China” with the PRC, insistence on peaceful (re)unification, and non-support for Taiwan independence. The lack of a clear, sustained position reflects the fact that Southeast Asian states mostly do not care whether Taiwan is a formal part of China, defined as the PRC or otherwise — instead preferring stability, being able to benefit from economic ties with China and Taiwan, and avoiding trouble. Statements about “one China” serve as a way to improve ties with Beijing and seize any accompanying opportunities, since they see the cost of crossing Taiwan as minimal. In the case of Myanmar, the competing regimes each appear to be using public alignment with the PRC’s One China principle to garner support from Beijing for their rule, or at least to avoid having the PRC side with their rival. Southeast Asian states have little reason to commit one way or another on issues of Taiwan and China and seem willing to trade commitments to One China for whatever benefits them most at a given time.</p> +<p>Investments in hydrocarbons, including LNG, will be difficult to coordinate through agencies like USAID, the Development Finance Corporation, or MCC, given strong funding preferences for clean and renewable energy. And high-profile initiatives such as the LEC may be better received by an environmentally conscious Philippine public if they avoid association with hydrocarbons. But given the strategic value of such investments, there may be opportunity for funds earmarked for regional deterrence to be channeled into energy security, or for projects to be funded through alliance programming like EDCA.</p> -<p>Southeast Asian states care most about safeguarding their sovereignty, maintaining their regimes, driving economic development, and maintaining the regional stability that undergirds their ability to pursue prosperity. The ASEAN statement in the wake of the 2022 Pelosi visit to Taiwan — one of the very few times the grouping and its members spoke publicly on cross-Strait relations — was more an expression of concern for stability and supply chains than anything else. Southeast Asian states are happy to leave Taipei and Beijing to their own devices so long as they bear no negative consequences.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, in many of these areas, even Department of Defense (DOD) budgets may be insufficient to make direct contributions to infrastructure. For reference, three Philippine energy companies announced an investment in March of $3.3 billion to develop an LNG terminal in Batangas. In these cases, the United States may be able to aid by instead providing technical assistance and planning in a process that could draw from the CREZ model, focusing not on renewable energy but on determining the most efficient investments to fulfill basic crisis preparations through construction of hydrocarbon infrastructure.</p> -<h4 id="southeast-asian-views-of-chinas-anti-secession-law">Southeast Asian Views of China’s Anti-Secession Law</h4> +<h4 id="prepare-for-a-sustainable-future">Prepare for a Sustainable Future</h4> -<p>Given such reasoning, it is not surprising that Southeast Asian states and ASEAN barely made any mention of either the PRC’s Anti-Secession Law upon its promulgation in 2005 (or any of its subsequent anniversaries) or the “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” released in 2024. They view these documents as domestic PRC law like any other legislative or policy framework promulgated for internal purposes, only taking public positions when it affects the Southeast Asian countries’ interests.</p> +<p>Renewable energy is envisioned to form the backbone of the Philippines energy mix, with the PEP calling for renewables to provide 35 percent of electricity generation by 2030 and over 50 percent by 2050. While renewables have the obvious benefit of reducing carbon emissions, they also have many advantages over fossil fuels in terms of energy security, especially in reducing exposure to external supply shocks.</p> -<p>Instrumental approaches toward One China among Southeast Asian capitals, however, cede initiative on an issue that could have broad and serious ramifications for the stability and security of the region. For the most part, Southeast Asian governments either negotiate over One China for immediate gains or accept what Beijing tells them in the hope of winning goodwill. They may rhetorically call for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences, but they have not commit anything to promoting resolutions or stability. Such attitudes are evident from the public silence about Beijing’s unilateral gray-zone pressure tactics and political interference targeting Taiwan. There tends to be reflexive blaming of the United States and Taiwan for provocation despite overwhelming support for the status quo among Taiwan’s public over time, as seen across various opinion polls. Southeast Asian states see such statements as costless in the immediate term, since they do not expect punishment from Taipei or Washington.</p> +<p>The United States should continue to support renewable energy investments in the Philippines. USAID and DOE cooperation with the PDOE and other Philippine stakeholders on the CREZ model is a prime example of how technical assistance programs can help attract and direct private capital to maximize public gains and achieve the Philippines’ goal of creating a secure and resilient renewable power grid. Though technical in nature and perhaps less eye-catching than traditional infrastructure in rail or ports, the CREZ program is setting the foundation for the Philippines’ renewable energy future and demonstrates a high level of trust between U.S. and Philippine energy policy counterparts. U.S. and Philippine leaders should consider providing additional visibility for the CREZ program in joint statements and press releases on U.S.-Philippine economic and strategic achievements. Demonstrating high-level support for CREZ would amplify the program’s ability to attract investment and highlight a critical area of U.S.-Philippine cooperation.</p> -<p>Another consideration for Southeast Asian states and ASEAN regarding the ASL is to avoid the awkwardness that comes with public positions on PRC domestic legislation. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have territorial disputes with the PRC over the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea/East Sea. In addition, Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), extending northward from the Natuna Islands, overlaps with the southern section of Beijing’s unilaterally drawn “nine-dash line” in those waters, even if Jakarta asserts that there is no dispute. Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam contend with the ecological consequences of the PRC’s upstream damming of tributaries to major rivers such as the Mekong and Irrawaddy. Taking public positions or making public comments on the ASL may invite complicated questions about PRC domestic laws that pertain to contested maritime and riparian issues where Southeast Asian states would prefer silence for the sake of limiting friction. At any rate, publicly commenting on China’s domestic legislation runs counter to the Southeast Asian and ASEAN norms of noninterference in the internal affairs of others.</p> +<p>At the same time, renewables should not be overly securitized. Unlike in the case of fossil fuels, there is significant opportunity for investments in renewable energy to receive funding from development finance institutions. Multilateral development banks (Asian Development Bank, World Bank) and U.S. development agencies have energy transition and climate finance as priority lending areas. These same lenders, however, can have difficulty funding projects if they are overtly associated with security. Development of renewable transmission and generation, even when facilitated by smart planning efforts like CREZ, will require tens of billions of dollars in capital investment over the next several decades; efforts to champion U.S.-Philippine cooperation in these areas should be careful not to lose any funding opportunities through an over-association with military or strategic goals.</p> -<p>Some among Southeast Asia’s large ethnic Chinese communities demonstrate sympathy toward Beijing’s position on Taiwan, including the ASL, regardless of official positions. Such sentiments are often rooted in a twentieth-century Chinese nationalism that was keen to recover from the “century of humiliation” and recreate the Qing Empire’s more expansive borders, which encompassed Taiwan and Mongolia. Recent PRC advancement of the “China Dream” has given life to attempts by some ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia to advance Beijing’s One China principle, ASL, and the unification of Taiwan on Beijing’s terms. The most obvious aspects of such mobilization take the form of local “peaceful unification promotion associations” (和平统一促进会); another is renewed United Front Work Department (统一战线工作部) activities that seek to shape host-country policies and police local opinions about the PRC. Such manipulation of ethnic-based nationalism in Southeast Asian societies risks sparking resurgent communal tensions during a crisis.</p> +<p>Nuclear energy is another important potential source of clean power. U.S.-Philippine cooperation on nuclear is further along than other areas and, in some ways, has a clearer trajectory. Targets for the number of SMRs and the resulting level of power generation have been set by the PEP; high-level support from leadership in both countries has been made clear in numerous announcements over the past two years; and public discussions are already occurring between Philippine firms and potential U.S. SMR providers.</p> -<p>Inattentiveness toward Taiwan-China ties also means that Southeast Asian states and ASEAN are not in positions to help manage and reduce cross-Strait tensions. They depend on Beijing and Taipei to avoid escalation and crises while relying on Washington and possibly Tokyo to address any serious problems that may arise. Such conditions mean that Southeast Asian states and ASEAN possess little initiative on cross-Strait issues and end up simply reacting to developments. A major crisis in the Taiwan Strait may see Beijing pressure Southeast Asian states to deny the United States and allied forces access to territorial waters, airspace, and facilities, including by mobilizing members of local ethnic Chinese communities. Washington could well demand the opposite. Without more active approaches to cross-Strait developments — which include Beijing’s efforts to use its ASL to justify coercion, force, and violence toward Taiwan — most Southeast Asian states would be caught flat-footed in a cross-Strait crisis.</p> +<p>Though progress has been rapid, the installation of SMRs in the Philippines is certain to be a long process that, given the relative nascency of the technologies involved, comes with a risk of delays and cost overruns. In late 2023, one of the leading SMR firms in talks to work with the Philippines, NuScale Power, saw its planned SMR project in the state of Utah canceled after costs had grown from an initial $3 billion in 2015 to $9.3 billion by 2023. In facilitating talks between the Philippines and U.S. nuclear firms, the State Department’s Bureau of Energy Resources and the DOE should help the Philippines critically evaluate proposals and compare options to ensure that any eventual agreement is based on realistic estimates. The unpopularity of nuclear power among the Philippine public means that if U.S.-provided SMRs in the country get saddled with significant delays, cost overruns, or other issues, the resulting negative impact on U.S.-Philippine relations would be substantial. Even if projects proceed as planned, U.S. energy officials should prepare to help Philippine counterparts demonstrate the benefits of clean nuclear power and prove its safety to the public.</p> -<p>Taiwan, the United States, and others who wish to maintain stability and the cross-Strait status quo may want to emphasize to Southeast Asian states what they have at stake. A Taiwan that remains functionally and effectively autonomous is important for supply chains, access to technology, and prosperity in Southeast Asia, as is these states’ unfettered physical access to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and the PRC. The South China Sea is not insulated from conflict, blockades, and other forms of instability around Taiwan. Any escalation in tensions could quickly and easily spread southward as contestation over water, airspace, and submarine cables intensifies. Except for the Philippines, Southeast Asian governments do not appear ready to acknowledge the gravity of increasing PRC pressure on Taiwan and its implications for broader regional security and order. Yet they have good reasons to take a more active interest and role in supporting stability and the status quo surrounding Taiwan, not out of enthusiasm for any position but to safeguard their own interests.</p> +<h4 id="prevent-disruption">Prevent Disruption</h4> -<h3 id="a-view-from-australia">A View from Australia</h3> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="the-risk-of-non-peaceful-means-is-already-priced-in">The Risk of Non-Peaceful Means is Already Priced In</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>The addition of new power sources is crucial to ensuring Philippine energy security, but the reliability and resilience of transmission and distribution infrastructure is just as important.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="mark-harrison">Mark Harrison</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>One paramount concern is China’s involvement in the transmission grid through its ownership stake and operational involvement in the NGCP. Its 25-year concession agreement means that the NGCP will, in theory, continue to operate the grid through at least 2034. But concerns over the NGCP’s performance and Chinese ownership have led media and Philippine legislators to push for a review of the company’s activities and the nature of Chinese involvement in its operations. President Marcos himself said in May 2023 that the government would “take back control” of the NGCP if necessary.</p> -<h4 id="introduction-14">Introduction</h4> +<p>From a strategic perspective, having 40 percent of the Philippines’ grid operator owned by a Chinese SOE is far from ideal. While it may not significantly affect day-to-day operations, it likely means that Beijing has access to intimate details about the Philippine power system that could be exploited in a time of conflict to disable key functions via kinetic or cyberattack. But at this point, ousting SGCC’s minority stake would not necessarily reduce these risks, as the vulnerabilities would likely persist unless key infrastructure and grid management systems were entirely replaced. At the same time, nationalization of SGCC’s stake would almost certainly provoke a response from China in the form of economic retaliation or, potentially, escalation over maritime disputes. The operational effectiveness of the NGCP is another question: the corporation has been the subject of pointed criticism from Marcos and others over failures to adequately manage the grid.</p> -<p>Taiwan’s interstitial place in the international system and Australia’s own history of post-colonial federation and statehood have created an indeterminate basis for the bilateral Australia-Taiwan relationship. For Australia, relations with Taiwan are mediated by the absence of formal diplomatic recognition and a strong trade relationship, while being triangulated by Australia’s relationships with the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).</p> +<p>USAID programs to enhance Philippine grid management capacity, assess resilience, and improve utility markets are valuable tools that allow the United States to contribute to positive outcomes without getting too deeply involved in highly politicized discussions about the performance and role of the NGCP. It would be wise for Washington to allow Manila to take the lead on managing the NGCP and determining what, if anything, to do about China’s stake in it while continuing technical assistance for grid management and cybersecurity.</p> -<p>Australia’s fundamental policy response to this indeterminacy is a One China policy that, like most such policies, maintains an ambiguity toward Beijing’s territorial claim over Taiwan. Australia recognizes the PRC as a state in the international system but only goes so far as to acknowledge Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. This distinction has enabled Australia to remain committed to the U.S. alliance, including taking into account U.S. obligations to Taiwan, while building relations with China in accordance with a broad trade maximization principle, to the level that it accounts for one-third of Australia’s exports.</p> +<p>Where Washington can play a larger role is in showing the value that U.S.-Philippine cooperation is bringing to the Filipino people. Military cooperation, and especially the presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines via EDCA, remains a focal point of counternarratives promoted by anti-U.S. media and politicians. While the provision of HADR resources for communities near EDCA sites is an excellent project that should be expanded, efforts on local energy resilience (such as small-scale solar generation or other shared facilities that contribute to the local grid) can also be a cost-effective way to reach out to local communities and associate U.S. presence with improvements not just to peace and security, but to day-to-day life.</p> -<p>On this basis, the relationship with Taiwan is simultaneously central and peripheral for Australia. Taiwan makes visible the structural challenges of reconciling the alliance with the United States and promoting trade with China while tending to displace the bilateral Australia-Taiwan relationship itself. This is expressed in both a cautious and highly constrained policy rhetoric from Canberra about Taiwan and an intense and divisive domestic public discourse about Taiwan’s place in Australia’s international relations.</p> +<h4 id="align-efforts">Align Efforts</h4> -<p>Therefore, the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) has been seen as an additional complication in Australian policy toward China and the United States rather than a central issue in Australia-Taiwan relations. As Donald Clarke observes in this collection, the law itself is as much a policy statement as a piece of legislation given its brevity and lack of specifics. The ASL sits within the development of legal institutions in China overall and asserts the role of legal instruments in cross-Strait relations, which had been dominated by party-to-party relations since the National People’s Congress in 1979. Its most notable feature is the assertion of a legal justification for military action against Taiwan in the name of securing China’s territorial integrity.</p> +<p>U.S. tools and efforts involved in improving the Philippines’ energy security are spread across numerous agencies and departments. To date, there exists no cohesive platform for coordinating efforts, such that many U.S. government employees who attended the TTX were unaware of projects being pursued by other agencies that had the potential to synergize with their own work. Among the currently existing mechanisms, the Energy Security Dialogue comes closest in that it theoretically covers the full range of U.S.-Philippine energy cooperation. But its inaugural iteration lacked participation from several important implementers, including USAID, USTDA, and DOD. As a merely annual meeting between U.S. and Philippine counterparts, it fails to stimulate year-round coordination within Washington on disparate efforts that impact Philippine energy security.</p> -<h4 id="australias-initial-response-to-chinas-anti-secession-law">Australia’s Initial Response to China’s Anti-Secession Law</h4> +<p>There is room for a more flexible, cross-cutting mechanism to organize efforts targeted at energy security. In analyzing this problem, the Energy for Growth Hub has proposed the implementation of Energy Security Compacts, a five-year agreement on joint investments between the United States and a partner nation. Based on the structure of MCC compact agreements, an Energy Security Compact would be rooted in an initial constraints analysis and report to both Congress and the National Security Council (NSC), which would play a significant role in facilitating cooperation across agencies. The program would require legislation to establish it within either MCC or USAID; it could be made even more effective by the introduction of a mandate for global energy security at the MCC and the extension, per the Energy for Growth Hub, of certain “DOD loan and loan guarantee authorities under the Defense Production Act to specific investments in allied nations.” This last provision would be particularly useful in the Philippine case to mobilize funding for measures such as a petroleum stockpile, refinery redundancy, and other strategic energy projects that don’t meet the requirements of development lenders focused primarily on energy transition initiatives.</p> -<p>The promulgation of the ASL in 2005 coincided with a period of difficult relations between Australia and Taiwan. In 2004, Australian minister of foreign affairs Alexander Downer made a statement that the Australia, New Zealand, and United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty would not necessarily be in effect in the event a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait brought the United States and China into a wider conflict. This was the culmination of a series of challenges in the Pacific and a general reorientation of Australian policy toward Beijing in response to China’s economic growth.</p> +<p>While an Energy Security Compact authority enacted through legislation would be ideal, the executive branch can also try to approximate some of these functions through existing authorities and workstreams. While the DOE and Department of State should continue to play a leading role, agency representation at the forthcoming second annual Energy Policy Dialogue should be increased. The two countries should also consider creating a working group subordinate to the Energy Policy Dialogue that would meet quarterly to discuss progress toward shared goals and provide a motivational mechanism for energy stakeholders across U.S. agencies to regularly harmonize efforts related to the Philippines. The NSC can also play an important coordinating role. Some projects to shore up strategic energy vulnerabilities in the Philippines may be able to be addressed through additional EDCA programming. But without additional authorizations, there will likely remain a disconnect between the deterrence value of energy security in the Philippines and the ability of DOD resources to contribute to it.</p> -<p>Tension between Canberra and Taipei in the 1990s and 2000s developed from Australian efforts to promote Pacific development and stable governance while Taiwan sought to maintain or even grow the number of its diplomatic allies. As Pacific governments switched recognition from the PRC to Taiwan or vice versa and both Beijing and Taipei used development aid and investment as diplomatic tools in the Pacific in their competition, Canberra tended to view Taipei’s activities as destabilizing. The absence of a regional security architecture or formal diplomatic relations between Australia and Taiwan constrained the capacity of both sides to manage these issues.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Therefore, the Australian government at the time assessed that the ASL was more of a complication in relations with China than a significant development in cross-Strait relations or the bilateral Australia-Taiwan relationship.</p> +<p><strong>Harrison Prétat</strong> is a fellow and deputy director for the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p>At a summit in Beijing in April 2005, Australian prime minister John Howard stated that he had not raised the ASL in his discussions with his Chinese counterparts. He did, however, comment on the initiation of negotiations for an Australia-China free trade agreement. Earlier in March, Australian Greens leader Bob Brown, a federal Senate member for Tasmania, tabled a motion that the Senate “opposes China’s ‘anti-secession’ laws which would mandate the use of military force if the Taiwan people opt for independence,” but the motion was defeated 7 to 44.</p> +<p><strong>Yasir Atalan</strong> is an associate data fellow for the Futures Lab in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> -<p>Later that year, the Australian government noted that it was “very disappointed” by the law’s references to military action but that the provisions for cross-Strait consultations were positive. The assessment also stated that Australia urged “both sides to refrain from any unilateral action that would change the status quo, pending a dialogue towards an eventual peaceful settlement.”</p> +<p><strong>Gregory B. Poling</strong> is a senior fellow and director for the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS.</p> -<p>The ASL is also noted in the final report of an inquiry by the Australian Senate’s Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade References Committee into Australia-China relations in 2005. The report did not draw conclusions about the law’s significance, but the PRC’s embassy in Canberra did submit public comments stating that the ASL “is the legislation that promotes the development of cross-Straits relations and peaceful reunification, aimed to maintain China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, oppose and curb any secessionist activities as well as maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits.”</p> +<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow for the Futures Lab in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>Harrison Prétat, et al.The Philippines’ fragile energy outlook threatens to undermine efforts to secure its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis an assertive China.State Behav. &amp; Cyber Security2024-10-18T12:00:00+08:002024-10-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/state-behaviours-and-cyber-security<p><em>This paper seeks to identify how state “permissive” behaviours can contribute to the proliferation of offensive-cyber tools and services.</em></p> -<p>In the decade after the ASL was issued, Australia’s relations with China developed significantly. In 2014, the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement was signed, and both sides agreed to elevate the relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Australia was also considering a free trade agreement with Taiwan. But in 2017, in the context of the PRC’s approach to Taiwan’s new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government led by Tsai Ing-wen, Beijing communicated directly to Canberra that it would look unfavorably on an Australia-Taiwan free trade agreement, and Canberra dropped the proposal.</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="deteriorating-relations-with-china-and-pricing-in-the-anti-secession-law">Deteriorating Relations with China and “Pricing in” the Anti-Secession Law</h4> +<p>Commercial cyber tools and services have many legitimate applications, from corporate penetration testing (an authorised simulated cyber attack on an IT system) to law enforcement and national security operations. But they are also subject to misuse and abuse, when they are used in ways that are contrary to national or international law, violate the human rights of their targets, or pose risks to international security. Some states are currently grappling with this policy challenge. Meanwhile, collective international initiatives for action are underway.</p> -<p>In the past decade, however, relations between Australia and China have deteriorated sharply as Canberra took action against PRC interference in Australian domestic politics and public institutions, responded to the growing capacity of the Chinese military, and addressed the Covid-19 pandemic. Beijing’s displeasure at this sometimes-clumsy recalibration from the Australian side was to implement a ministerial-level communications freeze and targeted trade sanctions in 2020 that triggered a vociferous and divisive debate in Australian policy and public life.</p> +<p>For example, there is the US’s 2023 Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware and the UK- and France-led Pall Mall Process of 2024. Ultimately, one aim of these initiatives is to enable states to harmonise their policy interventions where possible.</p> -<p>The deterioration of relations with China coincided with a disciplined and open government in Taipei, and Taiwan-Australia relations have become the warmest they have been since 1967, the only time an Australian prime minister has ever visited Taiwan. However, in managing the difficult relations with Beijing, Canberra remains cautious with Taipei, and steps are small. In 2024, the two governments signed a new memorandum of understanding on transportation safety. This was followed by a science and technology arrangement that promotes cooperation on information and communications technology, biotechnology, and zero-carbon energy. These agreements are meaningful in the context of Canberra’s reluctance to enter into new agreements over the previous decade.</p> +<p>To inform principles and policies for intervention at national and international levels, it is necessary to understand the dynamics that encourage or facilitate offensive-cyber proliferation. This paper identifies a range of “non-state proliferating factors” (NPFs) and “state permissive behaviours” (SPBs), and its findings draw on desk-based research on the international commercial offensive-cyber market. These findings were supplemented by a data validation and consultative workshop with industry stakeholders held in person at Chatham House in March 2024. This half-day validation workshop drew on the expertise and insights of 44 participants predominantly based in the UK, the US and Western Europe. To facilitate candid discussion, remarks made at the workshop are not attributable, and the identities of participants are not referenced here.</p> -<p>The most important policy initiative to emerge from this period concerning Taiwan is the AUKUS partnership, under which Australia will acquire U.S. nuclear-powered, but not armed, submarines before developing a new AUKUS-class submarine in collaboration with the United Kingdom. This capability-development framework has been normalized into Australia’s policy establishment across both sides of politics but remains the subject of intense public debate and criticism. AUKUS reflects a change in Australia’s overall strategic outlook, as expressed in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, which lists regional conflict involving China and the United States as one of the key concerns. This outlook captures Australia’s difficulty in placing the bilateral relationship itself at the center of Taiwan policy.</p> +<p>In this paper, NPFs and SPBs are categorised into five areas:</p> -<p>AUKUS circulates around the concept of deterrence, wherein Australia develops the military capability to project power in the region and deter action by Beijing. As Minister of Defense Richard Marles summarized:</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Regulation of corporate structure and governance.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Legal frameworks for product development, sale and transfer.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Diplomatic support and engagement.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Development of cyber-security ecosystem and workforce.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Integration with defence and security industrial base.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<blockquote> - <p>Our national security and our national prosperity are based on a stable peaceful region where the global rules-based order is preeminent and respected. Indeed, the rules of the road at sea are everything for us. When the rules-based order is under pressure, Australia is under pressure.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Using these categories, this research analyses the roles of both state and non-state actors. It identifies critical inter-relationships between different SPBs and NPFs that serve to facilitate or enable potentially irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Crucially, this narrative paints the picture of the geography of our national security. And it does not lie on the coast line of our continent. It lies further afield. An invasion of Australia is an unlikely prospect in any scenario, precisely because so much damage can be done to our country by an adversary without ever having to step foot on Australian soil.</p> -</blockquote> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<blockquote> - <p>Our national security actually lies in the heart of our region. Because the defence of Australia does not mean much without the collective security of the region in which we live.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Commercial cyber tools enable a variety of capabilities, including gaining access to technical systems, moving through technical ecosystems, providing visibility of user activity, and exfiltrating data. The goals of users of these tools vary greatly. In the mass market, cyber-security professionals use them to determine where an organisation or individual may be susceptible to attack so that necessary steps can be taken to mitigate this risk. In the more limited law enforcement market, governments may use these kinds of tools to monitor criminal activity and capture evidence for prosecution, or to gain access to technical assets to investigate or prevent crime. There is also a variety of commercial services that offer offensive capabilities along similar lines, for example penetration testers, which intentionally emulate the behaviour of attackers in order to report to clients the opportunities for and impact of an intrusion into their systems.</p> -<p>The vitriolic public debate about AUKUS reflects anxieties about Australia’s identity as a postcolonial nation, in which relations with China are symbolic of an Australian postcolonial modernity that contrasts with the “imperial” powers of the United States and United Kingdom. Nonetheless, while these themes drive the domestic debate, the agreement itself reflects how the ASL has been priced into Australian policymaking and defense preparations for a Taiwan Strait crisis.</p> +<p>The demand for commercially accessible offensive-cyber tools and services has expanded markedly in recent years, with at least 80 states having purchased offensive tools. Unfortunately, these commercial cyber products and services are also subject to misuse and abuse. There are broad reports of these tools and services being used in ways that are contrary to national or international law, violating the human rights of their targets, and posing risks to international security. The proliferation of these products and services presents an expanding set of risks to states and, in some cases, challenges commitments to protecting openness, security and stability in cyberspace. From selling products to conducting operations, paid attackers and companies are routinely hired on behalf of governments or other customers.</p> -<p>Australia’s policy architecture is not sensitive to the complexity of Taiwan’s sovereignty or the role of the ASL in institutionalizing Beijing’s territorial claim over Taiwan. Canberra is also not fully attuned to the possibility that Beijing would use the ASL to justify military action against Taiwan. Australian policy is being made within a deteriorating regional security outlook: with more than 60 percent of Australian exports going to Northeast Asia, a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would have a devastating impact on Australia’s economy and security regardless of how it is justified by Beijing. Australia has recognized that regional power projection is required to secure its interests through hard power.</p> +<p>“Offensive-cyber proliferation” refers to the increasing access that a wider range of actors has to increasingly advanced cyber capabilities. Proliferation may occur purposely and legally as a market process: for example, a law enforcement agency may purchase a licence for a phone-cracking tool, subject to local laws and import/export controls. Other proliferation may be legal but unethical or abusive: for example a law enforcement agency using licensed offensive-cyber tools in a way that either directly breaches human rights or facilitates later human rights violations. Proliferation may also occur unintentionally and/or illegally, including instances of software piracy.</p> -<p>The ASL offers one lens for viewing Australia’s overall shift in regional security policy. Canberra’s relatively sanguine interpretation of the law in 2005 has given way to a much more sober reading of the security outlook, in which China’s “rise” in the past decade has become less of an unalloyed market opportunity than a complex security challenge. While Australia has far to go to implement the goals of AUKUS, this agreement is a sign that the purpose of the ASL — and recognition that it runs counter to Australia’s national interests — has been internalized in Australian policymaking.</p> +<p>Like-minded states have engaged in international discourse on offensive-cyber proliferation in a range of forums. In March 2023, a group of 11 states made a joint statement on the proliferation and misuse of spyware, with a further six signing in 2024. In February 2024, the UK- and France-led Pall Mall Process kicked off with a declaration on commercial cyber-intrusion capabilities, signed by a larger collection of states and regional bodies. As part of an ongoing and evolutionary process, further discussions on offensive-cyber proliferation are anticipated at future events, including in Paris in 2025.</p> -<h3 id="europe-and-the-anti-secession-law">Europe and the Anti-Secession Law</h3> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="challenges-in-unity">Challenges in Unity</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>This paper seeks to inform these ongoing deliberations by identifying how state “permissive” behaviours can contribute to the proliferation of offensive-cyber tools and services. “State permissive behaviours” refers to state action (or inaction) that directly or indirectly shapes offensive-cyber market conditions. For example, in this context, “behaviour” may include active diplomacy on behalf of firms (active), but it could also include insufficient guidance or regulation (inactive). The identification of these permissive behaviours is intended to facilitate constructive analysis and discussion about the scope for targeted interventions and recalibration of the market.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="meia-nouwens">Meia Nouwens</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>This is one of two papers on this topic. The other paper, authored by the researchers and published by Chatham House in October 2024, draws on the findings in this paper and identifies a range of “principles” that could be used to build a code of conduct that governments could use to counter irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation.</p> -<p>Understanding Europe-Taiwan relations requires differentiating between the European Union overall and its member states and, further, among EU member states and non-EU European countries. Similarly, it requires an examination of EU institutions and of branches of national governments, particularly regarding the role of parliaments.</p> +<h4 id="methodology">Methodology</h4> -<p>The European Union’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) drives European relations with Taiwan, and all such relations (including for the European Union itself) are stated in adherence with a “One China” policy. The official policy positions on the One China policy among capitals and the European Union are relatively consistent: European governments remain committed to the idea that the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China.</p> +<p>The findings of this paper draw on desk-based research on the international commercial offensive-cyber market. This research included non-academic sources (for example, news reports) and interdisciplinary academic literature. Given the dynamic nature of the commercial offensive-cyber market, relatively contemporary literature (sources published within the past five years) has been favoured. However, historical sources have been included where useful: for example, where contemporary equivalents are unavailable or need contextualisation. The desk-based research phase ran from November 2023 to early March 2024 and mainly covered literature from 2019 to March 2024. The findings for this research were validated by a half-day data-validation and consultative workshop with commercial offensive-cyber industry stakeholders held in person at Chatham House in March 2024. The workshop drew on the expertise and insights of 44 participants, predominantly based in the UK, the US and Western Europe. Attendees represented a broad spectrum of the commercial offensive-cyber industry, including developers, brokers, contractors and government entities. To facilitate candid discussion, remarks made at the workshop are not attributable, and the identities of participants are not referenced here.</p> + +<h4 id="limitations">Limitations</h4> -<p>Europe’s initial response to the 2005 Anti-Secession Law (ASL) was limited. However, geopolitical shifts have since changed European views on China and Taiwan. In the event that the ASL is invoked, Europe will likely find it difficult to offer a unified response. Europe’s limited defense resources may complicate military responses. A more likely reaction from Europe would be economic, particularly since Europe has already developed an economic toolbox in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet the extent of any response is unclear, and disagreement over the level of ambition to “de-risk” from China remains. Political and diplomatic responses may be even more likely, but significant effort will be needed to speak with one European voice on the issue of Taiwan moving forward. Forming a unified European response in the event of a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait will be challenging. Doing so in the event that the ASL is applied short of war will be even more challenging.</p> +<p>Some limitations of this research should be noted. First, the diffuse and dynamic nature of the commercial offensive-cyber market means that the endeavour to succinctly map and analyse a wide range of indicative behaviours may lack depth and nuance. A single paper could focus on any one of the behaviours detailed here. Second, although the research team significantly revised the paper and its framing(s) following the validation phase, the dynamic nature of the market – as well as ongoing national and international efforts to calibrate market behaviours – means that some findings may become outdated. Third, the paper focuses on analysing the state of play in market behaviours that influence proliferation. The paper does not identify possible interventions. “Principles” of possible interventions are proposed at length in the companion paper published by Chatham House. However, further interdisciplinary research from academics, researchers, policy stakeholders and industry could assess and substantiate this paper’s findings, and identify opportunities for calibration or intervention in the market.</p> -<h4 id="response-to-the-prcs-asl">Response to the PRC’s ASL</h4> +<p>The paper has two chapters. Chapter I offers an overview of the offensive-cyber industry. Chapter II draws on examples of state permissive behaviours that interact with proliferating market practices. The paper concludes with reflections on the challenges and opportunities that these permissive behaviours present for policy interventions.</p> -<p>Initial reactions to the PRC’s ASL were muted. The European Union published a declaration concerning the passing of the law, which stated that the bloc had “taken note” of the law’s adoption. It further avowed that the “peaceful resolution of disputes . . . is the only means of maintaining stability in the Taiwan Straits” and that the bloc was opposed to any use of force. The declaration did reveal some element of concern. The European Union “would be concerned if this adoption of legislation referring to the use of non-peaceful means were to invalidate the recent signs of reconciliation between the two shores” and urged Taiwan and the PRC to “develop initiatives which contribute to dialogue and to mutual understanding.”</p> +<h3 id="i-overview-of-the-offensive-cyber-industry">I. Overview of the Offensive-Cyber Industry</h3> -<h4 id="context-of-european-response-to-asl-in-2005">Context of European Response to ASL in 2005</h4> +<p>The commercial offensive-cyber industry is an overlapping supply chain and can be divided into different operational elements. For example, research from 2021 distinguished between “vulnerability research and exploit development”, “malware payload generation”, “technical command and control”, “operational management” and “training and support”. These capabilities are common across both legitimate (security testing and law enforcement) and illegitimate or malicious activity, and it is not possible to draw a distinction between these activities at a purely technical level. In addition, these elements are linked, rather than existing in a vacuum, with resources and knowledge shared or exchanged within and between market actors. A single “zero-day” chain may draw components from multiple sources and may itself operate as a component of a product comprising a broader set of capabilities. The supply chain is highly complex and interdependent. Figure 1 presents a simplified representation of the commercial hacking market. Table 1 complements this figure, highlighting contextual characteristics of different tools and services. It is also a simplified representation of a complex market. For example, although the target market for surveillance capabilities is likely to be government entities, there are secondary markets, such as the mass and criminal markets.</p> -<p>The European Union’s early response was perhaps not entirely surprising. The law was passed at a time when the European Union’s policy toward the PRC was, as some observers described, “comprehensive engagement and co-operation.” Individual member states and business interests in trade and economic issues dominated the region’s China policies, and European and U.S. observers could not agree on whether a stronger China could be compatible with Western norms and interests.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/g0ggd5E.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Figure 1: Complexity and Interdependence of Commercial Hacking Markets</em></p> -<p>Structural issues also played an important role. The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy sought to coordinate EU foreign policy, an activity that required unanimity between member states in the Council of Ministers. It was not until 2009 that, with the Treaty of Lisbon, there was a singular high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy and a common Foreign Office through the European External Action Service. In September 2005, when the European Union and China held their eighth China-EU summit in Beijing, there was only one mention of Taiwan: a reaffirmation of the European Union’s continued adherence to the One China policy and its hope for a peaceful resolution of the “Taiwan question.” Aside from the bloc’s continued arms embargo on the PRC, the rest of the joint statement following the summit highlighted overwhelming cooperation and engagement.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jqWrZJL.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ Table 1: Contextual Characteristics of Goods and Services of the Commercial Hacking Market</em></p> -<h4 id="enter-geopolitical-commission">Enter Geopolitical Commission</h4> +<p>Additionally, it should be recognised that there is significant scope for supply chain and/or operational overlap between market actors (government agencies, commercial firms and criminal entities). Ultimately, this interdependency, combined with the inherently international nature of the market and the intangible nature of software products, arguably provides fertile ground for proliferation.</p> -<p>More recently, and in response to geopolitical shifts involving the PRC, some European governments have been more willing to explore to what extent Europe-Taiwan cooperation can be developed further. The European Parliament has been leading the call for greater criticism of the PRC and its assertive and illiberal rise; it has also worked to deepen EU-Taiwan relations.</p> +<p>The purpose of this paper is to identify state permissive behaviours (SPBs) and non-state proliferation factors (NPFs). To do this, it is necessary to outline a clear and accessible understanding of which market phenomena are in scope. This is achieved by: defining cyber intrusion capabilities; narrowing the focus to “commercial” practices; and drawing a dichotomy between “authorised” and “unauthorised” cyber intrusion.</p> -<p>In 2021, the European Parliament adopted its first stand-alone report addressing the European Union’s relationship with Taiwan (under the guidance of the bloc’s One China policy). The European Commission and other EU institutions have taken note.</p> +<p>This research project was an evolutionary process. The description of the markets that appears in this paper is the final version that was decided on by the research team following both the data-validation workshop in March 2024 and follow-up consultative discussions with industry stakeholders. The research team recognises that providing an overview of such a highly diverse, dynamic and inter-/intra-layered industry in the broad-brush strokes necessary for a research paper is, in part, a process of simplification that may not capture fine-grained nuance. Nonetheless, doing so offers a common framing that is intended to be accessible to a wide audience and serves as an important foundation for subsequent analysis. This framing is also applied in the companion research paper, published by Chatham House, which outlines principles for international intervention.</p> -<p>In an address to the EU Parliament in February 2022, EU high representative and vice president (HRVP) Josep Borrell declared that “to preserve, peace, stability, and the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is key, not just for the security and prosperity of the region, but also for ours.”</p> +<p>The three stages of framing are:</p> -<p>The following year, Borrell clarified his position, stating that “Europe must in fact be very present on this issue [of Taiwan], which concerns us economically, commercially and technologically. That is why I call on European navies to patrol the Taiwan Strait to signify Europe’s commitment to freedom of navigation in this absolutely crucial area.”</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Scoping cyber-intrusion capabilities to varied components, which contribute to the ability of an actor to gain remote access to a target host or network. The components include: vulnerability discovery and exploitation; development of a functional exploit for a vulnerability; the technical infrastructure for command and control of that malware; and broader training and support.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Focusing on commercial activity where at least one of the components is obtained through a financial transaction. This could include, for example, the sale of a product or the provision of licensed services. Commercial cyber-intrusion capabilities may be traded either on the open market or to exclusive clientele. A range of actors are involved in the commercial offensive-cyber ecosystem, including developers, vendors, service providers, brokers, resellers and system integrators. All of these actors are in scope in this paper. Their activities take place in an interlinked nexus, which may be mapped from the point of “initial research”, where raw novel exploits are identified, to implementation, and finally, in some cases, to a product that a client can acquire and use. This nexus is both nuanced and complex.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Distinguishing between authorised and unauthorised cyber intrusion. In cyber security, tools developed and sold primarily for defensive testing purposes can often be abused for offensive purposes. Likewise, activities undertaken for security research or good-faith hacking services are often the same as those undertaken for more malicious purposes. As such, a distinction drawn on how tools or services operate will be moot, and will not help understanding of SPBs and NPFs. Rather, use cases must be examined to better understand behaviours in the market, which leads to a distinction between authorised and unauthorised cyber intrusion.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>In her 2024 bid for a second term, EU Commission president Ursula Von der Leyen declared that she would seek to “deter China from unilaterally changing the status quo by military means, particularly over Taiwan” by cooperating with partners and allies who face common challenges.</p> +<p>Authorised intrusion takes place with the permission of the owner/lessee, operator or manufacturer of a device, system or network. An example could be corporate penetration testing, participation in a bug bounty program, or employee workstation surveillance tools. If the use of a cyber-intrusion capability is not approved by the owner/lessee, operator or manufacturer, it is categorised as unauthorised. There are exceptions, particularly with regard to national security and law enforcement operations. For example, in the UK, a minister and a judge may authorise offensive-cyber operations.</p> -<p>Von der Leyen’s remarks were unprecedentedly direct on the question of Taiwan and were a result of the geopolitical context in which the European Union found itself. The Trump administration debated with Europe about the nature of China’s rise and the challenges it posed to the rule-based international order. As a result, the European Union launched its revamped China Strategy in 2019, which more keenly saw EU-China relations through a triptych of lenses: China is simultaneously a competitor, rival, and partner. Brussels was particularly concerned about China’s reach into critical European national infrastructure, the hostile takeover of European strategic industries, China’s human rights violations in Xinjiang, the crackdown on protests in Hong Kong, and the People’s Liberation Army’s intense modernization efforts. Covid-19 highlighted just how dependent Europe had become on China for key resources and products and how vital the role of Taiwan is in global supply chains. Von der Leyen’s focus on “de-risking” rather than decoupling reflected the European Union’s recognition of the challenges it faced. If Europe needed a further push toward a more clear-eyed approach to its China policy, the PRC’s deepening relationship with Russia following Putin’s second invasion of Ukraine provided the impetus.</p> +<p>Although this paper categorises the landscape into authorised and unauthorised markets, in truth there is a vast array of products and services included in the ecosystem, and a range of attitudes, approaches and priorities among vendors. Tools and services offered specifically for unauthorised intrusion are most often the ones that are discussed in research disclosures, news stories or lawsuits relating to malicious campaigns against journalists, activists or governments. Tools and services in this market are typically designed to avoid detection. For this reason, and due to the go-to-market dynamics discussed in Chapter II, vendors in this market tend to operate in relative secrecy. As a result of all these factors, many public sources on proliferation and abuses of commercial cyber tools focus on just a few vendors and tools. This is reflected in the references quoted in this paper, and while the researchers believe the points highlighted are also true beyond the limited examples cited, the hidden nature of this market makes it challenging to present broader public examples.</p> -<h4 id="varying-approaches-to-taiwan-by-eu-member-states">Varying Approaches to Taiwan by EU Member States</h4> +<p>Understanding the diversity of the two markets is critical to examining the dynamics at play, and potentially developing mitigation strategies or policy proposals. While the examples and public analysis in this paper often focus on the more extreme and secretive vendors and offerings, it is important to recognise that they are only one part of the picture. These markets also include well-established defence contractors, and cyber-security vendors offering broad market offerings. These organisations are themselves highly varied, generally operate in legitimate markets and are answerable to investors, customers and employees. These organisations are more likely to adopt new, or adapt existing, behaviours in response to calls for more responsible approaches to the sale and development of commercial cyber tools.</p> -<p>Some European capitals have become more forward-leaning in their approaches to Taiwan. Germany, for example, has published its first Strategy on China and the Netherlands has also published its own China “notitie.” However, neither the German nor the Dutch plans directly mention the ASL. Furthermore, many capitals have yet to make any China strategy publicly available. Some of those countries, such as the United Kingdom, however, have deepened Taiwan relations in practice, albeit quietly, while others have become more openly aligned with Taiwan, though not diplomatically. This is particularly true of Lithuania and various other Central and Eastern European states, which have developed closer technology and industrial ties with Taiwan.</p> +<h3 id="ii-the-role-of-permissive-behaviours-in-commercial-offensive-cyber-proliferation">II. The Role of Permissive Behaviours in Commercial Offensive-Cyber Proliferation</h3> -<p>There remain disagreements among the capitals with regard to China. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, numerous European leaders have traveled to Beijing on state visits, but these visits have lacked unity in messaging. In contrast to the aforementioned shifts toward Taiwan, for example, French president Emmanuel Macron has struck a more conciliatory tone toward Beijing and avoided critical statements on the issue of Taiwan, even stating that Europe should not become embroiled in conflicts not of its own making. Though President Macron has since clarified his comments, it does appear that the French president is more convinced of the merits of cooperation and partnership with Beijing than some of his European counterparts, including on issues such as Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.</p> +<p>The proliferation of offensive-cyber tools is fed by supply and demand. Given the relative novelty of offensive-cyber activities and their relationship with states, the proliferation is also dependent on a range of “permissive behaviours”. These are behaviours that encourage or stimulate other actors to enter or expand the market. The research for this paper scopes these permissivebehaviours to states, focusing on the interaction of a range of SPBs in relation to NPFs. The paper also addresses behaviours of other stakeholders, for example vendors, but only inasmuch as they reflect the permissive behaviours of states.</p> -<p>Europeans more generally have become more concerned about China. A Pew Research Center study showed that, while only 34 percent of participants surveyed in Poland viewed China unfavorably in 2005, that number had risen to 67 percent by 2023. Similar changes in opinion were seen in France, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.</p> +<p>Some caveats and clarifications are needed. First, both supply and demand factors are in scope. Second, the term “permissive behaviour” is not used as a synonym for “negative behaviour”, nor is there an implication that behaviours will always lead to harmful or unwarranted proliferation. Third, permissive behaviours can refer to both action and inaction. Fourth, it should be noted that while the behaviours described have been observed and documented, this does not imply that they are widespread across all stakeholders in each category. In some cases, behaviours will likely be associated with only specific types of stakeholder; nevertheless, their impact is significant enough to be worth noting. Last, it should be acknowledged that a degree of permissive behaviour is required for the offensive-cyber market to be viable. As states seek to identify ways to scrutinise and/or regulate the proliferation of offensive-cyber tools, it may be assumed that “fully permissive” or “fully restrictive” regimes would not be desirable.</p> -<p>Despite these unfavorable rates, a 2023 European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) poll found that, in most EU countries surveyed, China is still overwhelmingly a “necessary partner” rather than a ”rival — with which we need to compete” or “an adversary.” Furthermore, though over 70 percent of those surveyed recognized that Russia and China are close partners, only 22 percent believed that Europe’s economic relationship with China poses more risks than benefits. In short, in the eyes of those surveyed, Russia and China are not alike and Europe’s response to the two countries should recognize that difference.</p> +<p>Context is important. It is necessary to understand the crossover and functional overlap between behaviours and market actors. Additionally, while behaviours may be individually influential, it is likely that the cumulative effect of multiple permissive behaviours can markedly increase scope for unchecked proliferation and irresponsible behaviour. NPFs and permissive behaviours are categorised into five distinct areas:</p> -<p>When it comes to public views on Taiwan, a 2023 Pew Research Center survey showed that in 8 out of 10 European countries polled, participants viewed Taiwan more favorably than unfavorably. Notable exceptions were Greece and Hungary.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Regulation of corporate structure and governance.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Legal frameworks for product development, sale and transfer.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Diplomatic support and engagement.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Development of cyber-security ecosystem and workforce.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Integration with defence and security industrial base.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>The question remains as to what these developments mean for Europe’s response to any situations in which the PRC may seek to invoke the ASL.</p> +<p>These areas are not comprehensive, but in this paper they capture areas of potential proliferating interaction between market actors. For each area, the research examines whether states play roles as customers, investors, detectors or regulators, for both authorised and unauthorised markets. The research highlights examples of NPFs and SPBs. Again, these are not comprehensive, as they are used as examples of proliferating conditions or activity (see Table 2). The objective is to demonstrate the link between an NPF and an SPB, rather than to list all possible NPFs and SPBs. Additionally, the paper identifies pre-existing global “indicators” (for example, indexes) that may be applied in future research to provide substantive granular comparisons between state and market practices across a range of states.</p> -<h4 id="will-europe-respond-in-support-of-taiwan-if-the-asl-is-invoked">Will Europe Respond in Support of Taiwan If the ASL Is Invoked?</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/02S8f2S.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ Table 2: Types of NPFs and SPBs</em></p> -<p>In contrast to the Biden administration, European capitals and the European Union have, to date, refrained from stating whether they will intervene to support Taiwan in the event of the ASL being invoked. Nevertheless, the heightened awareness in European capitals of geopolitical challenges and increasing concerns over the potential impact of PRC foreign and domestic policies on European security could create the conditions in which Europe sees stability in the Taiwan Strait as central to regional and European security and prosperity. China’s ongoing support for Russia despite the latter’s war of aggression in Ukraine further clarifies the links between European security and the Indo-Pacific region.</p> +<h4 id="area-1-regulation-of-corporate-structure-and-governance">Area 1: Regulation of Corporate Structure and Governance</h4> -<p>Though Europe is unlikely to be able to contribute to a Taiwan crisis or a conflict militarily, its response to Russia’s war of aggression and the economic and legal toolbox that it has developed since then does provide European countries and the European Union with potential nonmilitary means to respond. Depending on China’s actions toward Taiwan, Europe’s economic response could include the further sanctioning of Chinese state-owned or private sector entities or individuals. However, while the United States and the United Kingdom have discussed coordinating policies, it is unclear to what extent European states have made equal progress in preparation. Political and diplomatic actions are more likely — such as sanctioning party leaders or formally denouncing China’s actions — but even here the type of activity China undertakes against Taiwan will be an important factor in determining the European Union’s response. In the event that there is any doubt about Taiwan’s role in instigating a crisis or conflict, a collective EU response in support of Taiwan would be more complicated. Ultimately, Taiwan would stand the best chance of European support if it were unequivocally understood to be the victim in the event of crisis or conflict.</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF1: Offensive-cyber firms may be operating with limited internal checks or balances on sales.</code></strong></p> -<p>A key obstacle to any response will be the ability of European countries to unite in the same way against China were the ASL to be invoked. When it comes to China, Europe has shown difficulty speaking with one voice; acting together will be even more difficult. European unity will require greater alignment on China strategies as well as greater public discussion around Taiwan and the impact of instability in the Taiwan Strait on European interests. Economic responses will largely depend on the severity of Chinese actions and the willingness of the private sector to cooperate. While European businesses took swift and unilateral action after Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it is not yet clear whether businesses will be similarly proactive in the event of any Taiwan scenario short of a full-scale invasion.</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB1: Inadequate regulation or enforcement of corporate ethics and corporate social responsibility procedures.</code></strong></p> -<p>Similarly, unified diplomatic action will be complicated. As an example, the European Union failed to issue a council statement supporting the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in favor of the Philippines’ case against China’s excessive territorial claims in the South China Sea. Despite the ruling being unequivocally in favor of the Philippines, the European Union took two weeks to issue a response, and ultimately merely issued a statement by the high representative and vice president of the European Commission — usually a sign that consensus was unable to be reached. Furthermore, the statement issued avoided direct reference to Beijing.</p> +<p>Notwithstanding limited and relatively recent export controls, the desire for continued opacity (from some buyers) has enabled an environment in which there is a continued lack of supply chain transparency among offensive-cyber developers, vendors and markets. In a context of generally poor transparency across the market, firms are disincentivised to increase oversight, as this could reduce sales and/or disrupt supply chains.</p> -<p>Europe’s response will also be dependent on the timing and context of Europe’s own neighborhood. In 2023, some European militaries increased their exercises in the Indo-Pacific and with Asian partners. The Netherlands, United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Italy have deployed navy ships and aircraft to the region in recent years. However, as long as the war in Ukraine continues, Europe will likely prioritize its resources for the European theater instead of the Indo-Pacific. This, however, could still be helpful for a Taiwan scenario if it allows the United States, in turn, to focus its resources on the Indo-Pacific.</p> +<p>Of an indicative sample of eight offensive-cyber firms (of those with a public presence), there is a wide degree of variation in transparency regarding oversight of sales and use of services or tools that may be used for unauthorised intrusion. Some firms have no ethics statements, while others have ethics statements that concern issues such as the environment and/or modern slavery in their supply chain, but do not have public-facing policies on their products or services. Some firms may claim that they have oversight of clients in some instances, but claim they have no oversight in other cases.</p> -<p>The last consideration with regard to the ASL relates to its invocation just short of justifying unification by force. Indeed, the extraterritoriality of clauses within the “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan independence’ Die-hards in Accordance with the Law,” published by the PRC on May 26, 2024, creates the potential for Chinese requests for extradition of those considered guilty under PRC law. Several European countries have signed extradition treaties with China, including Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, and Spain; a number of these countries have already extradited Taiwan nationals to China. For example, in 2019, Spain extradited 94 Taiwan criminal suspects for alleged involvement in telecommunications fraud.</p> +<p>More transparently, firms may place example end-user licence agreements on their webpages, which can include outcomes such as cessation of service or refusal to renew a contract. Other firms produce transparency and human rights reporting or statements, including indicative data on refused sales, the composition of their external ethics committee, or mention of internal review processes on the use of their products. However, such reports contrast with allegations of use of offensive-cyber products in human rights abuses. Experts have argued that such documentation does not constitute “a transparency report in any meaningful way”.</p> -<p>Despite these treaties, in 2022, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) blocked a Taiwan national in Poland from being extradited to China on fraud charges. The ruling stated that “torture and other forms of ill-treatment were credibly and consistently reported to be used in Chinese detention facilities and penitentiaries”; the ECHR ruling prohibits the extradition of individuals to countries where they may face torture or general violence. The ruling applies to any person in Europe, regardless of nationality, who is at risk of extradition to China, and it applies to all 46 member states of the Council of Europe. The ruling therefore makes it unlikely for Chinese nationals found guilty of separatism under the 22 Articles to be extradited to China.</p> +<p>It is not possible to conclude that there is an inevitable ethical race to the bottom. Firms – particularly those operating relatively openly – will operate degrees of self-regulating oversight either because they believe it is the right thing to do, or as a means of avoiding negative consequences. These could include bad press, loss of investor or customer confidence, and impacted staff morale. However, beyond overt export control embargo lists and sanctions regimes, firms do not have clarity on how they should sell, and who they legally can, but should not, sell to or purchase from. Grey areas exist beyond the usual suspects – such as Iran, North Korea and Russia – from whom purchase requests are from law enforcement agencies in strategic-ally states where there may be recorded human rights breaches. In these instances, exporting states may be reluctant to provide clarity in writing and there may be a perceived risk of destabilising higher-priority diplomatic engagements. This links to a behaviour discussed later, SPB5.</p> -<hr /> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF2: Complex corporate structure crossing multiple jurisdictions.</code></strong></p> -<p><strong>Bonny Lin</strong> is a senior fellow for Asian security and director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB2: Lack of transparency on corporate ownership and transnational subsidiaries.</code></strong></p> -<p><strong>I-Chung Lai</strong> is the president of the Prospect Foundation and the board member of Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.</p> +<p>Like many industries, the offensive-cyber industry has benefited from multi-jurisdictional spread, for instance drawing on tax and oversight regime divergence to increase potential for corporate secrecy. However, there is also scope for additional complexity in corporate structure for the purpose of obfuscating activities, ownership or clients, or sidestepping legal boundaries. For example, firms may operate a range of different company names in different jurisdictions. Additionally, personnel, senior leadership or investors may be involved in more than one commercial offensive-cyber firm, and may operate in fluid locations. As one regime tightens oversight or restrictions on a particular individual, that individual may move to a less rigorous jurisdiction. Feasibly, this fluidity could engender a transfer of intellectual property between firms, and firms themselves may be distinctly transitory. This may include sensitive and strategically significant intellectual property relating to advanced unauthorised intrusion capabilities. Senior leadership in firms that are blacklisted may create new – ostensibly different – firms to continue product or service development and gain new sales. There is, arguably, significant scope for increased alignment in sanction regimes with respect to commercial offensive cyber, as well as more robust enforcement of existing multilateral regimes, such as EU regulations. Beneficial ownership requirements could be enforced to counter shell corporation structures.</p> -<p><strong>Vincent Yi-Hsiang Chao</strong> is an elected member of the Taipei City Council. Formerly, he was Taiwan president Lai Ching-te’s campaign spokesperson and foreign policy adviser.</p> +<p>Two suggested global indicators may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 1:</p> -<p><strong>Yu-Jie Chen</strong> is an assistant research professor at Institutum Iurisprudentiae of Academia Sinica and a non-resident affiliated scholar at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute of NYU School of Law.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>The level of compliance with the UN’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Scores on the World Bank Governance Index – Regulatory Quality.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p><strong>Ja Ian Chong</strong> is an associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore. He is also a nonresident scholar at Carnegie China, Carnegie’s East Asia-based research center on contemporary China.</p> +<p>These could be used by stakeholders to benchmark and assess the degree to which states and offensive-cyber firms design and implement successful human rights oversight mechanisms.</p> -<p><strong>Donald C. Clarke</strong> is the David Weaver research professor emeritus of law at the George Washington University.</p> +<h4 id="area-2-legal-frameworks-for-product-development-sale-and-transfer">Area 2: Legal Frameworks for Product Development, Sale and Transfer</h4> -<p><strong>Jacques deLisle</strong> is the Stephen A. Cozen professor of law, a professor of political science, and director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China at the University of Pennsylvania.</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF3: Offensive-cyber firms may sell to high-risk countries or inappropriate domestic actors.</code></strong></p> -<p><strong>Mark Harrison</strong> is a senior lecturer in Chinese studies in the Politics and International Relations program at the University of Tasmania. He is also a founding fellow of the Australian Centre on China in the World at the Australian National University.</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB3: Inadequate export controls, internal and/or insufficient training or guidance.</code></strong></p> -<p><strong>Ken Jimbo</strong> is an associate professor at the Department of Policy Management, Keio University. He is also a senior research fellow at the Canon Institute for Global Studies.</p> +<p>As noted in NPF/SPB1, there is a lack of meaningful clarity internationally regarding the “responsible” sale of offensive hacking tools and services. Meanwhile, there is a wide-ranging catalogue of allegations regarding the sale of offensive-cyber tools to state entities for uses that may be in breach of international human rights obligations. It is possible that there is nuance regarding legal but irresponsible cyber proliferation. For instance, a state may design a legal oversight regime for the export of offensive-cyber tools – unauthorised surveillance software – for the purposes of counterterrorism. However, the impracticality of an international definition of “terrorism” has become a cliché in international politics. In some jurisdictions, “terrorism” or “national-security risk” may be interpreted sufficiently broadly to include non-violent political opposition and civil society groups.</p> -<p><strong>Julian Ku</strong> is the Maurice A. Deane distinguished professor of constitutional law at Hofstra University’s Maurice A. Deane School of Law.</p> +<p>Additionally, in the absence of guardrails, and the failure of existing mechanisms such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, there is a risk of intentional or unintentional seepage proliferation from both private and state actors. For example, there are instances where hacker-for-hire firms, including those offering services to private investigators working on behalf of individual clients, have reportedly gained access to the NSO Group’s Pegasus software, and have claimed that they can spin up their own control centre to covertly snoop on a target’s digital presence.</p> -<p><strong>Margaret K. Lewis</strong> is a professor of law and an associate dean at Seton Hall University. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a non-resident affiliated scholar of NYU School of Law’s U.S.-Asia Law Institute.</p> +<p>It is also possible that state entities may gain legitimate access to offensive-cyber tools but leak these tools to other agents for illegitimate or illegal use. It is of course also of note that the use of a zero-day exploit against a target can also expose the exploit – for instance, through forensic investigation – to the target entity and/or others. Use, therefore, can pose a proliferation risk.</p> -<p><strong>Yeh-Chung Lu</strong> is an assistant professor of the Department of Diplomacy in National Cheng-chi University (NCCU), Taipei, Taiwan, ROC.</p> +<p>Combined, these issues highlight two distinct but linked regulatory or oversight gaps: there are arguably inadequate access control and oversight measures across the market; and there is a lack of cohesion in tools or processes that could be used to restrict irresponsible proliferation.</p> -<p><strong>Meia Nouwens</strong> is a senior fellow for Chinese Security and Defence Policy and head of the China Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF4: Vulnerability researchers may choose to sell to black or grey markets.</code></strong></p> -<p><strong>Eric Tin-wai Poon</strong> (Sang Pu) is the director-general of Taiwan Hong Kong Association and a commentator on Taiwan affairs. He is a solicitor in Hong Kong, a qualified attorney in Taiwan and New York State, and has taught a number of Chinese law courses in the Open University of Hong Kong.</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB4: Lack of effective vulnerabilities equities process, notification or disclosure processes, and/or insufficient legal protection for researchers.</code></strong></p> -<p><strong>Raymond C-E Sung</strong> is the vice president of the Prospect Foundation and a DPhil candidate at Oxford University.</p> +<p>The activities undertaken by vulnerability researchers are often indistinguishable from those undertaken for malicious purposes. Both sets of actors look for vulnerabilities or configuration issues in third-party computing systems that can provide opportunities for access. Outside bug bounty programs, independent researchers will typically conduct their investigations without the knowledge or authorisation of the system owners or end-users. As a result, many researcher activities may be unauthorised and possibly illegal under a jurisdiction’s anti-hacking laws.</p> -<p><strong>Chi-Ting Tsai</strong> is an assistant professor of international law in the Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan. He is also an author for CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.</p> +<p>Few states have legal carve-outs or exemptions that protect or support security research activities. In some jurisdictions, anti-hacking laws not only expose researchers to risk of criminal prosecution, but also contain civil causes of action that enable technology manufacturers to bring lawsuits against researchers. This legal environment imperils researchers, and, in some cases, incentivises them to go underground, selling their findings to brokers who will not ask questions, or governments that will not prosecute them, rather than disclosing them to the relevant technology manufacturer or operator.</p> -<p><strong>Wen-Hsuan Tsai</strong> is a research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica and a jointly appointed professor at the National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan.</p>Bonny Lin and I-Chung LaiThis report unpacks China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law (ASL) and analyzes how China uses it as an evolving tool of legal warfare.Bridging Blocs2024-10-15T12:00:00+08:002024-10-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/bridging-blocs<p><em>The EU–GCC summit on 16 October is a critical opportunity to strengthen strategic ties, addressing trade, energy and climate, and geopolitical tensions amid growing regional instability.</em></p> +<p>In addition, the dynamics regarding exploit sale and/or notification may be inadvertently incentivising unmoderated proliferation of offensive-cyber tools. Vulnerability researchers who discover new vulnerabilities and develop new exploits may choose to sell their knowledge to private firms, vulnerability brokers or government entities. Researchers may be motivated to provide their knowledge to particular actors on the basis of a range of diverse factors, including reputation, alignment and pricing.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Buyers and platforms may have ranging payment values and structures. Receivers of exploits may not perform any form of vetting of the sources of exploits, beyond determining that the exploit itself is valid. This lack of oversight could be in response to market pressures – the preference of sellers to remain anonymous – or due to the receiver’s own preference or resource constraints. Additionally, as an emerging trend, exploit developers may gain greater income by maintaining their monopoly on their novel exploit and selling their access “as a service”, reducing scope for the exploit to be traded, identified and rectified.</p> -<p>More than two years have passed since the EU unveiled its strategy to elevate relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In that time, both sides have taken steps to implement the framework, though with mixed results. Meanwhile, ongoing geopolitical shifts have demonstrated that instability in the Middle East has far-reaching consequences, particularly for Europe. These changes have underscored the growing significance of the GCC countries within the MENA region and beyond. Recognising this, the EU and Qatar – the current holder of the GCC Presidency – are set to host the first-ever EU–GCC high-level summit in Brussels on 16 October, aiming to further solidify strategic ties.</p> +<p>Exploits may be framed simultaneously as both high-value private and public good commodities. Similarly, national security agencies may be incentivised to hold and deploy novel exploits for offensive operations, rather than share their knowledge with the owner(s) of impacted systems. Some commentators have advocated for an international vulnerabilities equities process (VEP) that holds states accountable to specific standards, or sets boundaries for keeping or disclosing vulnerabilities. Even at a national level, existing VEPs are few, and hindered by contention between the interests of offensive-cyber stakeholders and defensive or privacy cyber stakeholders. Nonetheless, the absence of binding reporting, disclosure or bug-purchase mechanisms leaves the market in a relative free-for-all, enabling opportunities for proliferation to occur unchecked.</p> -<p>From a European perspective, the summit is an opportunity to strengthen cooperation with Gulf countries, to find a common language for international conflicts and to offset the energy imbalance caused by the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the mood in the Gulf toward the summit could be described as “sceptically optimistic”. While GCC capitals share the European enthusiasm for strengthening relations, the shadow of double-standard measures toward the Middle East in comparison to Ukraine remains, and Gulf decision-makers are concerned about whether pragmatic results can be achieved from the summit.</p> +<p>Four suggested global indicators that may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 2 are:</p> -<p>Despite the scepticism, progress was made in EU–GCC relations from the revealing of a new strategy in the lead-up to this summit, notably in engagement and institutional relations. Several high-level engagements have taken place since 2022 to address common concerns and elevate relations, such as the Joint Council and Ministerial meetings in Brussels in 2022, which resulted in the adoption of the Joint Cooperation Programme for the period of 2022–2027 and agreement on a wide range of areas to elevate relations in. Another notable point was the appointment of Luigi Di Maio as the new EU special representative for the Gulf region, and the intensification of high-level visits conducted by officials between both regions. Therefore, this high-level summit has the potential to serve as a powerful catalyst to elevate relations to new heights and clear the fog of scepticism between the two regions. However, for the summit to yield positive outcomes, both sides need to go beyond symbolic pledges and diplomatic engagement and weigh the potential outcomes through the prism of the Middle East’s current turbulence and an equal consideration of each other’s interests.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>World Justice Project.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Freedom House Index (Rule of Law).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Bertelsmann Transformation Index.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While Ukraine is undoubtedly a pressing geopolitical issue for European countries, the GCC countries face regional challenges that pose more immediate threats to their interests</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Although these global indicators are an imperfect solution, stakeholders could draw on them to contextualise proliferation across a range of jurisdictions. They are notably less direct and/or cohesive than those proposed for Area 1 and some other Areas. An overarching finding from this research is that existing proxy indexes have severe limitations. Put simply, it is not possible to use existing indexes or other open sources to meaningfully quantify the degree to which permissive behaviours have causal or correlative links to commercial cyber proliferation. This is an important dilemma. Stakeholders should consider how the Pall Mall Process and other initiatives can not only urge action against irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation, but also form new processes through which activity can be monitored and assessed.</p> -<p>The summit will cover various areas of cooperation, with a primary focus on crucial issues such as trade, energy and climate, peace and security, the Ukraine conflict, and the broader geopolitical landscape in the MENA region, including Gaza, the Red Sea, Lebanon, Iran, Sudan and other critical hotspots.</p> +<h4 id="area-3-diplomatic-support-and-engagement">Area 3: Diplomatic Support and Engagement</h4> -<h3 id="trade-and-investment">Trade and Investment</h3> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF3: Offensive-cyber firms may sell to high-risk countries or inappropriate domestic actors.</code></strong></p> -<p>One of the summit’s most pressing topics is the trade and investment relationship between the EU and the GCC. Although trade liberalisation is the ultimate goal, tangible progress has been elusive. In 2023, the EU attempted to restart discussions on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which had been stalled since 2008, only to achieve minimal advancements. However, this should not hinder efforts to enhance trade relations, especially given that trade between the two regions reached €174 billion in 2022. This made the GCC the EU’s ninth-largest trading partner, while the EU ranked as the GCC’s second largest. Further strengthening trade relations will provide a solid foundation for deepening collaboration across the other strategic pillars entailed in the strategy, such as maritime security, people-to-people connections, energy and climate initiatives, and advancements in technology including AI. Therefore, among the main outcomes both sides should pursue in this summit – and which the GCC countries will be particularly looking forward to – is forging bilateral strategic partnerships between the EU and GCC members. The recent positive results from the EU–UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements technical talks should incentivise the EU to work toward the conclusion of such bilateral formats, which will not be an alternative to the FTA, but will complement and create momentum toward the FTA’s conclusion.</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB5: State actors may deploy offensive-cyber firms as a means of establishing or strengthening diplomatic relationships.</code></strong></p> -<h3 id="energy-and-climate">Energy and Climate</h3> +<p>States with an economically and strategically significant presence of offensive-cyber firms may feel an incentive to promote proliferation in certain circumstances, where this feeds into broader diplomatic goals: for instance, maintaining strategic alignment or improving bilateral trade. It is notable that following the blacklisting by the US of offensive-cyber firms NSO Group and Candiru, both the Israeli government and the firms themselves lobbied Washington to reverse the decision.</p> -<p>Another important pillar is energy and climate, since both regions have ambitious visions in this area. The UAE’s hosting of COP28 in Dubai intensified discussions on energy and climate between the two regions, culminating in the adoption of a pledge endorsed by over 60 countries and spearheaded by the US, UAE and EU to triple global renewable energy capacity by 2030 and enhance energy efficiency by 4% annually. Cooperation between the EU and GCC in this domain is not new, but has been ongoing since the strategy was revealed. For instance, Qatar has secured gas supply agreements with Germany, the Netherlands and France, while the UAE has sent hydrogen shipments to Germany and established a green hydrogen supply chain between Amsterdam and Abu Dhabi. Both regions understand that the COP28 pledges cannot be translated into reality without the Europeans. Meanwhile, the EU’s decoupling from Russia and efforts to forge new sustainable energy ties to offset the imbalance mean it needs the GCC countries’ cooperation.</p> +<p>Furthermore, given the strategic exclusivity of some offensive-cyber tools, including advanced spyware, firms can possibly be used as bargaining chips in a broader diplomatic context. There have been alleged instances where offensive-cyber firms have halted trading with some states, for example following negative press, but have later resumed trading after intervention from their own government. In this way, cyber proliferation may be used as a tool of soft-power projection.</p> -<p>Therefore, building on previous efforts and intensifying cooperation on energy and climate is not only a shared ambition but a critical necessity. However, the EU should understand that although GCC countries are ambitious regarding the green transition, fossil fuels remain an important pillar of their economies. Moving away from conventional fuels effectively, and forging sustainable cooperation, can only happen through the inclusion of fuel firms in the discussion.</p> +<p>It is also worth noting that, in some contexts, states may use diplomatic or economic levers to entice existing offensive-cyber firms to establish a presence in their territory. For instance, some states have incentivised companies through tax incentives and/or fast-tracked citizenship applications. As demonstrated by the case of Israeli QuaDream and its Cypriot partner InReach, such practices could be a tacit encouragement of SPB2 and could feed or stimulate NPF2.</p> -<h3 id="ukraine">Ukraine</h3> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF5: Hackers-for-hire may undertake unauthorised intrusion against third parties, on behalf of public relations firms, law firms or private investigative ecosystems.</code></strong></p> -<p>While Ukraine is undoubtedly a pressing geopolitical issue for European countries, the GCC countries face regional challenges that pose more immediate threats to their interests. Although all GCC members supported the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of territory and the illegal referendums in four Ukrainian regions, they maintain a strategic ambiguity regarding the conflict in order to protect their own interests.</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB6: State entities may cover up, downplay or inadvertently encourage the use of hackers-for-hire.</code></strong></p> -<p>Nevertheless, GCC countries have demonstrated a strong commitment to humanitarian aid and mediation efforts, particularly in facilitating prisoner exchanges. Since the onset of the war, Saudi Arabia has provided over $410 million in support for Ukraine, encompassing humanitarian assistance and oil derivatives. Meanwhile, the UAE has allocated $105 million in humanitarian aid and has contributed to initiatives to build homes for children affected by the war led by Ukraine’s First Lady, Olena Zelenska. The UAE has also facilitated eight prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine, resulting in the release of over 1,990 captives.</p> +<p>Clients from the private and public sectors may commission the support of public relations and law firms, which in turn contract a hacking-for-hire entity for an offensive-cyber operation for which the victim has not provided consent.</p> -<p>Therefore, for any efforts to find a common language on Ukraine, the EU should not only focus on garnering agreement on anti-Russian measures but also take into consideration the interests of the GCC countries and prioritise what can be quickly achieved, such as cooperation on humanitarian aid and mediation.</p> +<p>Hacker-for-hire organisations may use an array of techniques, ranging from basic social engineering combined with open source hacking tools, to hacking with illicit copies of Pegasus. Targets of such unauthorised activity have reportedly included judges, investors, NGO figures and politicians. It is important to emphasise, however, that victims do not need to be public or high-profile figures. There are indications of hackers-for-hire conducting commissioned non-consensual hacking against romantic partners, landlords and competitor firms. Reporting indicates that this is a global issue, with mixed success for international prosecutions.</p> -<h3 id="middle-east-geopolitics">Middle East Geopolitics</h3> +<p>Although the commissioning of hacking is illegal in many jurisdictions, there may be some instances where a client or private investigator may wish to commission hacking because they perceive a window of opportunity for hacked material to be used in court, for example in a divorce case. This contradiction may encourage pseudo-legal or illegal proliferation of hacking activity. Despite previous UK government interest in regulating this sector, and the role of private investigators in facilitating historical hacking scandals on behalf of tabloids, UK private investigator activity remains relatively self-regulating.</p> -<p>No meaningful progress will be made at the summit unless the dynamics of the Middle East are fully considered, as this region is as critical to the GCC countries as Ukraine is to EU member states. The geopolitical and economic realities of the Middle East will continue to significantly influence the relationship between these two blocs.</p> +<p>Additionally, investigations have identified hacker-for-hire operators who offer intrusive and unobtrusive services to disrupt rival political campaigns; these include a firm promoted on an Israeli Ministry of Defense website. Amid potential controversy and embarrassment associated with such linking, government entities may refuse to comment. Entities in the offensive-cyber industry that are subject to negative reporting may use anti-libel law firms and courts to prohibit the production and dissemination of such reporting. Combined, these behaviours indicate possible ways in which state apparatuses can be used overtly or tacitly as vehicles to obfuscate proliferating practices.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The growing influence of GCC countries and the repercussions of Middle Eastern events in Europe underscore the need for strengthened interdependence</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Three suggested global indicators may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 3:</p> -<p>For instance, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, plans for which were signed in September 2023, exemplified potential cooperation toward shared objectives. However, the outbreak of conflict in Gaza has stalled the initiative, which was designed to mitigate instability caused by Houthi activities in the Red Sea. Now, with renewed turmoil in Gaza and Lebanon, the future of the initiative is even more uncertain. The instability on the GCC’s doorstep poses a more pressing concern to GCC countries than the situation in Europe. Therefore, the EU should lecture less and listen more to GCC countries on matters related to Middle East conflicts, and forge cooperation based on a shared understanding of the turbulence in the region.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>National Cyber Security Index (diplomatic engagements).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>UN open-ended working group positions on sharing of technologies and tools as part of capacity-building programmes.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>UN Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrime positions on criminalisation carve-outs for security researchers.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>While both regions have been broadly aligned in condemning Hamas for the 7 October attack, Israeli aggression against civilians in Gaza and the violation of humanitarian law, the EU should more effectively encourage and support the Gulf countries’ diplomatic efforts to contain the conflict in both Gaza and Lebanon. Crucially, the EU must recognise that the absence of a Palestinian state lies at the heart of the ongoing conflict; only by advocating for its establishment can a lasting resolution and cessation of hostilities be achieved, starting with a ceasefire in both Gaza and Lebanon.</p> +<p>These indicators may be used by stakeholders to analyse the degree to which different states are overtly or tacitly facilitating commercial cyber proliferation through promotion and/or enticement of market actors through diplomatic and/or economic channels.</p> -<p>The summit presents a critical opportunity to elevate relations between the EU and GCC to unprecedented levels. Given the geopolitical dynamics at play, both regions have incentives to deepen their cooperation. The growing influence of GCC countries and the repercussions of Middle Eastern events in Europe underscore the need for strengthened interdependence. More importantly, the EU must understand that the value-imposing tone it has used previously rarely yields any results, and although it constitutes a significant economic power, it is not irreplaceable. Thus, embracing the GCC states as they are rather than how it wishes them to be is the preliminary step for cultivating sustainable partnerships. This summit could serve as a pivotal moment in redefining and enhancing transregional ties, provided both sides engage with openness and a genuine commitment to addressing shared challenges based on equal consideration of each other’s interests.</p> +<h4 id="area-4-development-of-cyber-security-ecosystem-and-workforce">Area 4: Development of Cyber-Security Ecosystem and Workforce</h4> -<hr /> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF6: Unrewarding legal avenues for individuals to use hacking skills.</code></strong></p> -<p><strong>Saeed Alblooshi</strong> is a commentator and an independent geopolitical analyst based in Dubai, specialising in European politics. He has focused extensively on regional geopolitics in Europe and their effect on Middle Eastern states. He also specialises in international economic and investment policies, and the effect of geopolitical events on business environments.</p>Saeed AlblooshiThe EU–GCC summit on 16 October is a critical opportunity to strengthen strategic ties, addressing trade, energy and climate, and geopolitical tensions amid growing regional instability.Moldova’s Energy Future2024-10-11T12:00:00+08:002024-10-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/moldovas-energy-future<p><em>Russia has attempted to exert influence over Moldova through manipulating or threatening to manipulate energy prices and flows, and until recently, Moldova’s long-standing efforts to develop and reform its energy sector have produced minimal results.</em></p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB7: Lack of engagement or regulation to promote adoption of bug bounty programs, hackathons, “capture the flag” contests, or other forms of paid vulnerability research.</code></strong></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Vulnerability researchers have a range of ethical avenues for disseminating the vulnerabilities or exploits that can enable – although do not constitute – offensive capabilities. These avenues may include actively or retrospectively permissioned vulnerability disclosure programs, some of which may be fee-based bug bounty programs or commissions from software or service providers. However, there is a lack of government guidance on or regulation of how buyers should operate these types of programs, particularly to create greater security and awareness for technology users. This is an unresolved regulatory gap that feeds ambiguity and creates space for crossover between defensive and offensive research.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Payment agreements may include non-disclosure agreement (NDA) clauses; in essence, the security researcher takes a payment in exchange for their silence after they share their knowledge of an identified vulnerability. Acceptance of the NDA can be a prerequisite for both payment and “safe harbour”: in other words, an agreement by the organisation not to seek prosecution for the hacking. This may be in addition to other vetting procedures, such as ID and banking checks. The rationale for an NDA is understandable; the “buying” organisation is placing a monetary value on exclusive knowledge and will not want the vulnerability to be broadcast to other actors until it is rectified. In some cases, vendors may decide not to disclose the vulnerability at all, for example to avoid reputational impact. It is also possible that the vulnerability may not be fixed altogether – “buying” the details could be viewed as a partial solution to the vulnerability itself. This lack of transparency may frustrate vulnerability researchers and provides an opportunity for them to break the NDA – unbeknownst to the technology manufacturer – to further monetise their findings by secretly selling the information to a vulnerability broker.</p> -<p>Russian gas flowed into Moldova via Ukraine from the fall of the Soviet Union (formally 1991) until the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Historically, this arrangement gave Russia an annual opportunity to seek Moldovan concessions or have the country suffer the consequences in both gas prices and the volume of gas supplied. This ongoing struggle provides a window into Moldova’s complex and layered relationship with Russia and with the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria, as well as Moldova’s internal challenges with institutional effectiveness.</p> +<p>At present, where formal and legal buyers develop a reputation for “sitting on” disclosures or making incomplete payments to researchers, the researchers may be motivated to sell to grey-market entities or otherwise publicly broadcast the vulnerability. As such, regulation that encourages public disclosure may be useful as a form of expectation management for both parties. Public disclosure also encourages mitigation or patching of vulnerabilities, reduces risk for users of the technology, and negates the value of the vulnerabilities in the grey or black markets.</p> -<p>Examining Moldova’s energy sector also reveals the country’s significant growth and reform over the past several years. As of 2023, Chisinau (the capital of Moldova) no longer purchases gas from Russia’s Gazprom. However, this does not mean that Chisinau has freed itself from Russia’s malign hand on the thermostat. Russian gas still flows into Transnistria and the majority of Moldova’s electricity is still supplied via the electrical plant in Transnistria, which is run on Russian gas.</p> +<p>On the other hand, government intervention in disclosure processes should be carefully calibrated to avoid unintended consequences. There are suggestions, for example, that disclosure laws in some jurisdictions, including recent developments in China, may reduce public disclosure. This may create possible security dilemmas where government entities hold vulnerabilities that remain unpatched.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">This ongoing struggle provides a window into Moldova’s complex and layered relationship with Russia and with the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria, as well as Moldova’s internal challenges with institutional effectiveness.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF7: Computer science students may not receive sufficient training in ethics or law.</code></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6dxwVTm.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Gas Pipelines in Moldova.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.stopfake.org/en/moldova-political-pressure-in-the-gas-pipeline/">“Moldova: Political Pressure In The Gas Pipeline,” Media Reforms Center, November 22, 2021</a>.</em></p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB8: Possible gaps in cyber-security and STEM education policy.</code></strong></p> -<p>To fully understand the current energy situation in Moldova, it is essential to explore the history of the country’s post–Soviet Union energy supply system. Moreover, in order to explore the long history of discounted gas from Russia, as well as Transnistria’s current supplying of most Moldovan electricity, one must inevitably look at Tiraspol, the capital city of Transnistria. But more than a look backward is needed to understand the future of gas, electric, and alternative energy sectors; accordingly, this piece goes beyond that, offering an overview of the current international aid efforts underway, as well as how EU accession is likely to affect this industry. Most importantly, this piece includes potential and crucial solutions to continue progressing toward Moldova’s energy independence.</p> +<p>An increase in the number of computer science graduates across major economies has been widely reported as necessary for both economic prosperity and cyber security. However, the increased number of skilled computer science graduates has implications for offensive-cyber proliferation. Notwithstanding the emergence of cyber-security degrees, which may include content on ethics, commentators have emphasised that there may be opportunities to improve ethics training in computer and data science training programmes. Additionally, the offensive skills that a student may learn on an “ethical hacking” course for defensive purposes are transferable to offensive markets, including unauthorised activity.</p> -<h3 id="background-on-post-soviet-moldovan-energy">Background on Post-Soviet Moldovan Energy</h3> +<p>Given a potential pay disparity between defensive and offensive markets, graduates may be incentivised to offer their skills to offensive operations, even in cases where these may be illegal or pseudo-illegal. This may be exacerbated in regions with high unemployment, or where technical roles may be more limited in pay or scope. In these cases, technical employees may work a primary job and supplement their incomes with hacking or exploit research on the side.</p> -<p>Since Moldova’s independence in 1992 and until 2022, the majority of Moldovan gas has come from Russia. As of 2018, Chisinau was only meeting 20 percent of its energy demand domestically, instead relying almost entirely on imports. Until 2014, most of this imported energy consisted of natural gas coming from Russia via Ukraine. The Moldovan populace felt the Russian hand reach in and turn down their thermostats in the winters of 2006 and 2009, when the energy giant Gazprom shut off gas to Moldova. While such measures are not unheard of in Moldova, the country has largely been shielded from Russian shut-off threats at least partially because the Balkan gas supply ran through Moldova.</p> +<p>Ethical hackers may acquire validation through Certified Ethical Hacker, Offsec Certified Professional or other certifications, and clients may use these to filter providers. However, without guidance and guardrails, the voluntary nature of certification gives hackers space to use the adjective “ethical” even if they offer services or use methods that may be in breach of computer misuse laws. Given the international nature of the market, it is also important to note that “legal” and “ethical” are distinct, and can also vary significantly across jurisdictions. Practices that are legal in one country may be illegal and/or unethical in another.</p> -<p>Russia has long used energy as a coercive tool, especially against post-Soviet states, in particular targeting Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova. While Russian efforts to leverage energy flows as a coercive tool across the post-Soviet world often yield acquiescence in the short term, in the longer term such effort pushes clients to diversify their supply, as has been the case in both Ukraine and Lithuania. Moldova’s tempestuous history with Russia — as played out in the latter’s unreliable supply and pricing of energy, among other avenues — eventually pushed Moldova to diversify its energy supply in earnest in 2022.</p> +<p>Four suggested global indicators may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 4:</p> -<p>Until recently, Moldova’s long-standing efforts to develop and reform its energy sector have produced minimal results. In 1997, the Moldovan government established the National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE), a body tasked with, among other duties, regulating and monitoring the energy sector. But like much of the Moldovan bureaucracy, the agency was not provided with sufficient independent authority to effect this oversight. Without such power, the energy industry has remained a political and profitable tool for internal and external forces. ANRE has also been accused of placing unnecessary challenges on private sector engagement in the marketplace, including delays in permitting, licensing, and anticompetitive tariff setting.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Global Cybersecurity Index.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>ISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study 2023.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre, University of Oxford, Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model (Section 3).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>HackerOne top participant countries.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Until recently, Moldova’s long-standing efforts to develop and reform its energy sector have produced minimal results.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>These indicators may be used by stakeholders to appraise the status of and possible issues within the cyber-security workforce, and education and training systems in a range of jurisdictional contexts.</p> -<p>Moldova’s efforts toward energy diversification, if not full energy independence, have gone the way of so many Moldovan reform efforts — progressing in fits and starts and plagued by corruption and bureaucratic missteps. In August 2014, the Iasi-Ungheni gas interconnector between Romania and Moldova was commissioned, becoming notionally operational in 2015. However, the entire pipeline was not finished, including connecting Ungheni to Chisinau, until 2021. Moreover, gas did not even begin to flow through this pipeline until 2022. There was a 2017 attempt to move Moldova’s electrical supply to a Ukrainian firm, but that ultimately failed, with some alleging corruption as the culprit. Even in the fraud cases investigated by ANRE, prosecutions and fund recovery have been slow.</p> +<h4 id="area-5-integration-with-defence-and-security-industrial-base">Area 5: Integration with Defence and Security Industrial Base</h4> -<p>Perhaps the largest corrupt bureaucratic maneuvers occurred between 1995 and 1998, when the gas networks in Moldova were privatized. Throughout the privatization process a number of dubious, and likely corrupt, schemes were evident, including the undervaluation of assets and the overvaluation of Moldovan government debt. These debt and asset valuations led to the Russian state-owned Gazprom obtaining a 50 percent ownership stake in Moldovagaz as repayment for the debts. The remaining ownership of Moldovagaz rests with the Moldovan government in Chisinau (35 percent) and the government in Tiraspol, the capital of the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria (15 percent).</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF8: Competitive pressures on existing defence companies to develop offensive-cyber tools.</code></strong></p> -<p>Russian Gazprom was created in 1989 when the Soviet Gas Ministry was privatized. In 2005, the Russian state became the majority owner of Gazprom. Until 2022, the company was one of the top producers and exporters of natural gas in the world. (Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Gazprom’s revenue has decreased sharply; it reported its first net loss in 20 years.) By law the sole exporter of Russian gas, Gazprom has leveraged this supply to obtain diplomatic concessions from not only post-Soviet states but western Europe as well.</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB9: Application of unwieldy or inappropriate export and security policies to new technologies.</code></strong></p> -<p>Gazprom’s ownership stake in Moldovagaz provides another avenue for the Russian government to manipulate the Moldovan energy sector, which it has already done. For example, in 2021, it was only after a contentious negotiation period that the contract between Moldovagaz and Gazprom was renewed for five years. Two days before the deal was set to be signed, Gazprom tripled the pricing model for Chisinau, leading to a hold in negotiations during which the Moldovan government proved successful in diversifying its energy sources, if only for a short period. The European Union played a role in this process, not only through financial assistance to aid Moldova in keeping the lights on, but also by publicly calling out Russia’s use of energy as a geopolitical tool.</p> +<p>As noted regarding NPF3/SPB3, export licence regimes can be sufficiently malleable to enable relatively unchecked offensive-cyber proliferation. Additionally, it must be acknowledged that, due to their nature, offensive-cyber tools themselves hold a complicated regulatory position. A single cyber tool may include multiple components for propagation, exploit and payload, each composed of computer code that can be readily disseminated globally and reclassified. Where components are open source code, these may be protected under the First Amendment of the US Constitution. Complicating matters, there are suggestions that states may circumvent export restrictions by encouraging cross-hiring between international and domestic cyber-security vendors.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RcVM985.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Moldova Gas Sector before Unbundling.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/moldova-energy-profile/market-design">“Moldova Energy Profile: Market Design,” International Energy Agency</a>; and <a href="https://www.eu-advisers.md/mission-2019-2022/">“European Union High Level Advisers’ Mission 2019–2021,” European Union</a>.</em></p> +<p>In this light, commentators have suggested that given the unique nature of cyber tools and the highly diffuse nature of the offensive-cyber ecosystem, “know your supplier” due diligence may be a pragmatic means by which suppliers and contractors can be regulated with the aim of reducing unchecked proliferation of unauthorised capabilities. Such oversight must account for the multilayered nature of supply chains, as it may be relatively common for arms suppliers to subcontract production of offensive-cyber tools. This increases the opportunity for parts of the supply chain to draw on grey-space exploit markets</p> -<p>The 2021 negotiations centered around three main challenges that have long plagued Moldova’s energy industry. The first involves the debt that Chisinau supposedly owes and the repayment schedule, both of which are contested. The second is the pricing model and its flexibility, as well as Russia’s commitment to supply. The third challenge involves the restructuring of the energy sector, including the unbundling that Moldova has committed to as a part of the European Union’s Third Energy Package. While progress has been made on each of these challenges since 2021, none are yet resolved. All three of these challenges are discussed in greater depth later in this paper.</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF9: Revolving door between private companies and military/security positions.</code></strong></p> -<p>The 2021 deal and the overall lack of progress in the energy sector since independence left Moldova still largely dependent on Russia for energy when Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022. Russia’s invasion and continued attacks on infrastructure meant that Ukraine was no longer able to supply Moldova with electricity, a gap which Romania stepped in to fill. Most likely in response, Russia announced it was reducing gas supplies to Moldova — including to Transnistria — by 30 percent. Tiraspol then announced cuts of over 50 percent in the amount of electricity it could supply to Chisinau. Combined, this left Moldova with the worst energy crisis since its independence.</p> +<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB10: Uncompetitive remuneration and lack of controls on career trajectories, post-deployment travel or intellectual property restrictions.</code></strong></p> -<p>The crisis led to the government in Chisinau asking citizens to reduce their energy usage; protests against the pro-western government followed. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the United States, and the European Union provided aid in the form of grants, loans, and funds aimed at subsidizing bills for the poorest Moldovans. While efforts to diversify energy suppliers had been made prior to 2022, the crisis pushed them into high gear. By 2023, none of the gas supply flowing to Moldova (aside from Transnistria) was imported from Russia.</p> +<p>Observers have noted that there is a revolving door between defence and the private offensive-cyber industry, although it should be recognised that the door operates across the whole of the defence sector.</p> -<p>However, despite this apparent independence from Russian gas (and therefore influence), since Moldovagaz controls gas flow, and Gazprom owns 50 percent of Moldovagaz, the Russian government is still involved in and profiting from Moldova’s gas sector. Furthermore, while none of the right bank of Moldova’s gas is imported from Russia, the entirety of Transnistria’s gas is still being provided by Russia, and it has been provided free of charge for the last fifteen years. The cost of this “free” gas — worth approximately $9 billion — is billed by Gazprom to Moldovagaz. In 2023, an independent review found that Moldova’s current debts were significantly lower than Russia had alleged. And so, disagreements over debts that Moldova, or more specifically Moldovagaz, owes to Russia for gas continue.</p> +<p>Experienced personnel can draw on their advanced training, tactical skillsets, security clearances and networks to gain more lucrative employment in the private sector. It has been noted that in some national contexts, former defence personnel constitute a majority of founders of cyber-security startups, and research teams may be formed almost exclusively of former military or intelligence personnel. The porosity between private and defence activity should also be set against the backdrop of the challenge of pay gaps between the public and private sectors, with public entities often unable to match the higher salaries offered by the private sector. It is in this context that some states are seeking to loosen controls on career trajectories, giving space for personnel to move more seamlessly between defence and private sector positions.</p> -<p>Regardless of the debts owed and who might owe or pay them eventually, the Transnistrian economy has long been reliant on discounted (“free”) gas from Russia, including to run one of the largest electrical plants in the region, the Cuciurgan Power Station (MGRES), which itself is owned by a Russian company. This plant currently provides approximately 80 percent of Moldova’s electricity, revealing yet another way in which Moldova remains under Russia’s thumb for its energy.</p> +<p>The revolving door also has ramifications for cyber proliferation. Private firms, motivated to grow and generate revenues, will be incentivised to offer their services and products to a diverse array of clients across intrusion markets. This creates potential space for advanced techniques or products to filter to lower market tiers (for example private hacker-for-hire firms) and less restrained state actors. Concerted thought should be applied to how the benefits and risks of inter-sector movement can be managed through guardrails, restrictions and observation.</p> -<p>Currently, Russian gas flows to Transnistria via Ukraine, but Ukraine has indicated that it will not extend that contract with Russia when it expires in December 2024. The Moldovan government has indicated that there are alternative ways for Russian gas to flow to Transnistria following the ending of the Russian-Ukrainian contract. But questions remain: Will Russia continue to provide this free gas? Who will pay transit fees? And, will this affect the price of electricity provided to Chisinau?</p> +<p>Three suggested global indicators may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 5:</p> -<p>Moldova’s pathway to energy independence has continued to develop in leaps and bounds. In 2024, Moldova joined with other European partners in supporting the security of the energy supply for Ukraine, including efforts to integrate Romanian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian electrical systems. These efforts, among others, not only support Ukraine’s energy supply, but also further diversify Moldova’s energy flows.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute military spending databases (expenditure, company value and export value).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Global Organised Crime Index (law enforcement score).</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>In May 2024, the United States committed additional resources to Moldova to support energy development, among other cross-sector collaborations including but not limited to cyber security. This follows significant U.S. government investments in Moldova’s energy sector. Furthermore, the continuing support from the European Union, the World Bank, and other foreign partners is essential for Moldova’s energy future.</p> +<p>Stakeholders may use these indicators to benchmark and contextualise the size and scope of national security and law enforcement markets in different jurisdictions. Although an imperfect and partial solution, these indicators can be used to provide insight into commercial offensive cyber against the backdrop of military–commercial cultures.</p> -<p>Despite this progress toward energy diversification, the higher energy prices have negatively impacted the Moldovan economy. This means that energy remains not only a physical resourcing issue but also a political one, as pro-Russian candidates can (and do) use the promise of a return to lower prices as a part of their platforms. While Moldova is solidly on the path to energy diversification, its road to long-term energy independence and having an efficient energy sector free from corruption and Russian influence is going to take time, support, and smart, collaborative policy solutions.</p> +<h3 id="conclusions-and-implications-for-interventions">Conclusions and Implications for Interventions</h3> -<h3 id="the-transnistrian-equation">The Transnistrian Equation</h3> +<p>This paper has identified that offensive-cyber proliferation is facilitated by a range of SPBs and NPFs. While those identified in this research are non-exhaustive, it is of significant note that there is clear inter-relationship and reinforcement between some of them. National and international endeavours to promote responsible use of offensive-cyber tools and services will need to be multifaceted and nuanced. Commercial offensive-cyber tools and services perform a vital role in authorised activities, for example, by enhancing cyber-security standards through penetration testing. Similarly, commercial offensive-cyber tools and services are intrinsically necessary to empower responsible state activity, particularly with respect to national security and law enforcement operations.</p> -<p>Transnistria, a territory wedged between Moldova and Ukraine, has existed as a breakaway region with Russian troops stationed there since 1992. The Russian “peacekeepers” arrived at the end of kinetic conflict and are tasked with patrolling the territory as a part of the agreement that ended the fighting. While Moldova agreed to the “peacekeepers,” it never agreed to the additional Russian forces tasked with protecting a large Soviet-era weapons depot. The presence of these troops and the weapons depot serve as reminders of Moscow’s power to exert influence on Chisinau one way or another.</p> +<p>As states collectively seek to navigate their endeavour(s) to mitigate irresponsible cyber proliferation and maximise responsible behaviours, it is important to acknowledge and accommodate the multi-faceted activities within the offensive-cyber ecosystem. In instances of concerted irresponsible behaviour, sanctions and blacklisting may be useful tools. However, as identified in this paper, firms, investors and personnel may be motivated to evade such regimes, enabled by the fluid nature of cyber products and services, and incentivised by possible complicity of some state actors. The building of international consensus is thus important to increase the costs of business for the lowest-common-denominator actors.</p> -<p>Prior to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine — in fact, since 2005 — both governments (Chisinau and Tiraspol) engaged in negotiations via the 5+2 format. This group originally included Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, and the United States; since the 2022 Russian invasion, Ukraine has refused to continue negotiations in this format, but Russia and Transnistria have asked for their continuation. While a reinstatement of the 5+2 format is unlikely, Chisinau has expressed a commitment to working closely with Tiraspol, as it is in the former’s interest for the situation in Transnistria to remain stable.</p> +<p>More broadly, the building of international consensus is also vital to feed into softer intervention approaches that can draw on the goodwill and societally beneficial intentions of responsible commercial actors. The lowest-common-denominator actors are impactful and significant, but they are not representative of the industry at large. Industry actors, from researchers and brokers through to sellers and consumers, engage in this arena because they want to improve cyber security and shut down illegal activity (among many other positive motivations). In these contexts, such actors may welcome rationally designed and carefully calibrated guidance from the community of state jurisdictions in which they are based, to which they sell, and from whom they source.</p> -<p>Russia has attempted to exert influence over Moldova through manipulating energy prices and flows or by threatening to do so. An argument frequently raised in these aggressive negotiations is Moldova’s gas debt. This debt — the total of which is still being contested — includes the amount that Moldova owes Russia both for the “free” gas being provided to Transnistria and the gas provided to the rest of the country.</p> +<p>Additionally, the research for this paper reinforces the need to view (ir)responsible cyber proliferation through a “whole-of society” lens. Although the inclusion of publicly accessible hacker-for-hire services and advanced state-oriented offensive capabilities into one research paper necessitates potentially problematic broad-brush strokes, this has fed into an important finding: offensive-cyber proliferation is porous. A cyber capability developed for state actor use may, in time, find its way into private hacking commissioned by everyday citizens. There is a clear and tangible risk that this democratises irresponsible and criminal activity. This reality raises both the stakes and the necessity for action by states that are willing to encourage, enforce and demonstrate responsible behaviours.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russia has attempted to exert influence over Moldova through manipulating energy prices and flows or by threatening to do so.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Opportunities for impactful policy interventions at national and international levels may be seen as a two-stage process.</p> -<p>As a part of the 2021 Gazprom, Moldovagaz, and Moldovan government negotiations, an independent review of the debts was conducted. The review found that the Moldovan government owes Russia approximately $8 million, not the more than $700 million that Russia claims. The difference is partially due to noncompliant expenses including salaries, office renovations, and interest accumulation on the debts owed. Furthermore, this review found that the distribution of gas transit costs over the last twenty years had been overpaid by Chisinau and underpaid by Tiraspol to the tune of $250 million. Some portion of discrepancy may be due to Gazprom not providing financial documentation in support of this review. Of note, this review was only conducted in relation to the debts for Moldovan territory and did not include those relating to Transnistria.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Contributions such as this paper help to develop the breadth and depth of understanding of the scale of offensive-cyber proliferation.</strong> In the absence of clear toolkits for further understanding, the paper has proposed a range of possible open source indicators across the five areas of NPFs and SPBs. In principle, these could be adapted or combined with other data points for use in future monitoring. Stakeholders could produce heatmaps of proliferation risk across differing jurisdictions and markets. As previously noted, however, these open sources are imperfect. As like-minded states continue to identify and consolidate positive practices while mitigating irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation, it will also be necessary to consider how multi-stakeholders can implement trusted measures of assessment and monitoring.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Building on these monitoring efforts could lead to assessment of the feasibility and efficacy of national and international interventions.</strong> Some key examples could include:</p> -<p>The import contract between Gazprom and Moldovagaz stipulates that gas is to be provided to Transnistria, with Moldovagaz holding the debts. In a further complication of the structure between these entities, Transnistria’s gas is provided via a Moldovagaz subsidiary named Tiraspoltransgaz. This company owns the gas-related infrastructure in Transnistria. Historic ANRE inspections and their subsequent reports have noted irregularities in the accounting for Tiraspoltransgaz.</p> + <p>2.1. <strong>International government coordination and collaboration on norms and regulation.</strong> Elements of the offensive-cyber ecosystem have shown that they are geographically and structurally flexible. Existing controls, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, are insufficient to keep offensive-cyber proliferation in check. Additionally, future internationally-agreed control mechanisms are likely to be achieved on a long-term, rather than short-term, basis. Combined, these factors mean that states should collectively continue to explore immediate unilateral mechanisms. International stakeholders from government, industry and the third sector should monitor and observe existing unilateral controls, such as the US sanctions against NSO Group and Candiru. Looking ahead, broader mechanisms could include export restrictions, limitations on lobbying and oversight of contracting. The recently started Pall Mall Process is an ideal forum through which national governments and regional bodies can push for greater inter-governmental alignment and collaboration on responsible behaviour regarding offensive-cyber proliferation. While it is promising that like-minded stakeholders are convening to discuss issues relating directly to offensive-cyber proliferation, it is notable that many states and actors have not necessarily (yet) been represented. There may be a challenge in the endeavour to widen participation while maintaining meaningful principles. Nonetheless, where consensus is achieved, a limited coalition of influential states may still be able to influence the wider market where universalism is unobtainable.</p> -<p>The gas that Moldovagaz provides to the Transnistrian-based subsidiary is then sold via an agreement with the government in Tiraspol and subsequently sold at below-market rates to Transnistrian businesses. The revenue thus generated is put into an account and recorded as loans from Tiraspoltransgaz to support the region’s budget. This revenue makes up approximately 50 percent of the region’s budget, but more importantly, the value of the gas consumed free of charge was approximately 50 percent of the entire region’s GDP over a ten-year period.</p> + <p>2.2. <strong>Requirements for greater vendor transparency, governance and accountability.</strong> The opacity of many offensive-cyber firms and marketplaces, which encompasses obfuscated or confusing corporate structures, legal liability and public presences, may be helpful in certain environments, such as with core national security-oriented activity and criminal enterprise. This nebulous composition is highly problematic from the standpoint of countering or restricting unchecked offensive-cyber proliferation. Given the diffuse and inter-related nature of the ecosystem, it is unlikely to be possible to counter proliferation meaningfully without responsibly increasing transparency and oversight across commercial intrusion markets.</p> -<p>This means that the entire Transnistrian economy, and government service provisioning, is based on a model of receiving free Russian gas. If Transnistria were to no longer receive free or significantly subsidized Russian gas, there would likely be massive and swift bankruptcies of Transnistrian businesses. This is not in the interest of the Transnistrian oligarchs, who hold significant political power in the region. Perhaps surprisingly given Moscow’s significant influence and presence, the Transnistrian government has remained neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. This neutrality is demonstrative of just how much sway the oligarchs in Transnistria have over Tiraspol.</p> + <p>2.3. <strong>Adoption of robust vulnerabilities equities and counter-proliferation processes.</strong> The potential for seepage of advanced offensive-cyber capabilities should be a serious concern, in addition to indications that lower-tier hackers-for-hire may have been able to gain access to illicit copies of Pegasus. These cases should be seen as tangible, real-world examples of what happens when cyber proliferation goes wrong. Policymakers and stakeholders must assume that exploits developed for legitimate national security purposes can, and occasionally will, leak into the wrong hands. This is a rallying call for counter-proliferation efforts.</p> -<p>Despite the December 2024 expiration of the Russian-Ukrainian gas contract, the Moldovan government is confident that alternatives exist to continue the flows of Russian gas to Transnistria. The cheapest option would be to continue using Ukrainian pipelines via a third party, but, given Ukrainian laws on signing contracts with Russian entities, any such third party would need to own the gas itself, not just be providing it on behalf of Gazprom. An alternative is to utilize the Turkstream and Trans-Balkan pipelines, but this would be significantly more expensive, and the pipelines still pass through Ukrainian territory. Both of these alternatives are only possible if the infrastructure in Ukrainian territory remains undamaged from a Russian attack and if the pipelines in question have the capacity to carry the additional flow. It remains to be seen if Russia will take these alternatives or request for Transnistria to pay transit fees or other costs associated with the gas delivery.</p> + <p>2.4. <strong>Increased support and protections for vulnerability research.</strong> The vulnerability market ecosystem is vital. Currently, a range of implicit incentives may be feeding proliferation to the grey market – where exploits may be acquired by a range of actors for offensive purposes – rather than prompting cyber-security improvements. Serious concerted thought should be given to how the balance can be meaningfully tipped in favour of defensive-first cyber-security research. This could include greater legal recognition of the necessity for vulnerability researcher disclosures, engagement and support for the development of responsible market behaviours, which may include adherence and transparency for VEPs.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>Of note in this discussion is the fact that Moldova’s largest power plant, the Cuciurgan Power Station (MGRES), sits within Transnistria. Moldova has historically been reliant on this plant’s production and the pricing models provided to Chisinau, which are predicated on the free gas the plant receives. Moreover, historically all Moldovan gas and electrical lines ran through Transnistria; prior to independence, Moldova was essentially reliant on its east for energy. However, even if Moldova could supply all the electricity needed for all its citizens through lines from the west to Chisinau, in all likelihood, not purchasing Transnistrian electricity would lead to a collapse of the Transnistrian economy, government, or both.</p> +<p>These suggested interventions are merely a starting point. As is often the case in discussions relating to cyber security, there are no simple solutions, or solve-all mitigations. While there are unlikely to be easy wins to mitigate unchecked offensive-cyber proliferation, it is vital for national, societal and economic security that serious efforts continue. As the research for this paper shows, some governments are now leading on international initiatives. Their success depends on the involvement of various groups from wider society in the design and implementation of interventions to tackle this complex market.</p> -<p>If subsidized gas ceases to flow, unemployed Transnistrian citizens will likely seek support from Chisinau, creating an additional flow of refugees. Chisinau, which has taken in the largest number of Ukrainian refugees per capita worldwide since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, is not equipped to handle the numbers this would entail. Moreover, as mentioned above, Transnistria is home to a contingent of Russian troops and a Soviet-era weapons depot, both of which would be affected by the instability in the region if a collapse were to occur.</p> +<hr /> -<p>This instability could force Chisinau to face the challenges a reunification process presents. Alternatively, if Russia ceases to provide its “free” gas, Chisinau could stave off volitivity by subsidizing the purchase of gas and electricity for both itself and the breakaway region. If this were to occur, the Moldovan government would likely need to turn to international partners for support given the costs associated with these subsidies.</p> +<p><strong>Gareth Mott</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Cyber research team at RUSI. His research interests include governance and cyberspace, the challenges (and promises) of peer-to-peer technologies, developments in the cyber risk landscape, and the evolution of cyber-security strategies at micro and macro levels.</p> -<p>It is in neither Chisinau’s nor Tiraspol’s interest to get into a back and forth tit-for-tat on energy, nor to let the Transnistrian energy market — and subsequently its entire economy — collapse. Ukraine also has a vested interest in Transnistrian stability, not only for humanitarian reasons, but also because a portion of Ukraine’s electrical grid is linked to Moldova’s via the hub in Transnistria. There is also the question of whether even Moscow would want a true crisis in Transnistria, especially one focused on energy, as it might break the implicit contract between Moscow, the government in Tiraspol, and the population residing in Transnistria.</p> +<p><strong>James Shires</strong> is the Co-Director of both the European Cyber Conflict Research Incubator (ECCRI CIC) and the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative (ECCRI).</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is in neither Chisinau’s nor Tiraspol’s interest to get into a back and forth tit-for-tat on energy, nor to let the Transnistrian energy market — and subsequently its entire economy — collapse.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Jen Ellis</strong> works to reduce cyber risk for society. Partnering with security experts, technology providers and operators, civil society and governments, she creates greater understanding of cyber-security realities and promotes collaboration to advance adoption of security strategies and practices. Jen serves on the UK Cabinet Office’s Government Cyber Advisory Board and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology’s Cyber Resilience Expert Advisory Group.</p> -<p>It is also in both Chisinau’s and Tiraspol’s interests to keep energy prices as low as possible, especially at a time when the Moldovan populace has been economically depressed since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic. This pricing is of concern not just for Chisinau seeking alternative sources of energy, but also for Transnistria. If Transnistria were cut off from heavily subsidized gas, but alternative sources were available to Transnistria at market rates, the pricing adjustments would create a shock to the economy that would likely lead to a refugee crisis, which would not only be a humanitarian problem but also a political one as it would occur approximately six months before the 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections. Furthermore, the current electricity that Transnistria sells to Moldova is below market rate, so this arrangement also benefits Chisinau. This leaves Chisinau in the position of funding its own breakaway region for the time being.</p> +<p><strong>James Sullivan</strong> is the Director of the Cyber research team at RUSI. He founded and has grown a research group at RUSI that explores topics such as the role of national cyber strategies, the cyber threat landscape, cyber security and risk management, commercial cyber proliferation, offensive cyber, cyber statecraft and diplomacy, and ransomware.</p> -<h3 id="gas-sector-overview">Gas Sector Overview</h3> +<p><strong>Jamie MacColl</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Cyber research team at RUSI. His current research interests include ransomware, the UK’s approach to offensive cyber operations, cyber insurance and the role of private companies in global cyber governance. He has led a range of public and private projects for RUSI, with a particular focus on UK cyber policy.</p>Gareth Mott, et al.This paper seeks to identify how state “permissive” behaviours can contribute to the proliferation of offensive-cyber tools and services.European Economic Security2024-10-18T12:00:00+08:002024-10-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/european-economic-security<p><em>Amid heightened geopolitical tensions, the concept of “economic security” has rapidly come to dominate domestic and international policy agendas. Recent global shocks have exposed the fragility of international financial systems and revealed significant security vulnerabilities in economic dependencies.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>While a general understanding of economic security is gradually emerging, the definitions, objectives and strategies associated with the concept continue to vary greatly. This ambiguity severely hinders the ability of like-minded countries to work together towards coordinated and constructive economic security outcomes. Such efforts are further hampered by the fact that the finance and security communities are often siloed. To bridge this divide and bring clarity to the current policy debate, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI has launched a European Economic Security Taskforce (the Taskforce).</em></p> -<p>Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Moldova has been heavily reliant on supply from Russia, specifically Gazprom, for nearly all its natural gas needs. Moldova’s gas company, Moldovagaz — with Russian Gazprom holding a 50 percent stake, the Moldovan government 35 percent, and Tiraspol 15 percent — monopolizes the gas sector. This has left the country vulnerable to Russian market manipulations and influence. The power of this ownership is particularly significant as more than half of Moldova’s energy supply is derived from natural gas.</p> +<p>CFS is uniquely positioned to deliver this timely initiative, given its reputation as a leading research programme based in Brussels and London that specialises in the intersection of finance and global security. As part of RUSI, the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank, CFS has used its cross-disciplinary expertise and multi-jurisdictional network to convene this Taskforce. The Taskforce brings together international policymakers, geoeconomic academics, and experts from security, industry and the private sector. Taskforce members contribute their expertise in a personal capacity and do not represent their organisations, which include numerous EU member state governments, the European Commission and associated institutions, NATO, and the key allies of Australia, Japan and the UK.</p> -<p>Since it halted the direct import of Russian gas and began diversifying its gas supply in 2022, Moldova has also sought sources outside of Moldovagaz. Chisinau now uses Energocom, another state-owned Moldovan company. Of note, Energocom also participates in the auctions on the BRM (Romanian Commodities Exchange) gas exchange in Moldova to deliver gas to Moldovagaz. While this removed Gazprom from having ownership control, it has not created an environment that incentivizes private sector participation in the energy market. For example, the recent contracting negotiations with suppliers have been opaque at best, releasing neither volume nor pricing publicly. A state-owned entity conducting business in this manner is not a recipe for accountability to the Moldovan taxpayer, nor for private sector engagement in the sector in the short or long term.</p> +<p>The first meeting of the Taskforce took place on 9 September 2024, and this report provides an overview of the main findings. To best reflect the breadth and fluidity of the discussion, the report does not provide a linear summary of the matters raised. Instead, it first outlines the economic security definition proposed by CFS to establish a conceptual foundation for the work of the Taskforce. Second, the report groups the observations, insights and consensus points that emerged during the meeting under two broad themes: the impact of ambiguity; and the importance of public–private partnerships (PPPs). These themes did not emerge in isolation from one another, but as interconnected considerations. Finally, the report concludes by summarising three key findings identified by Taskforce members when considering the case study of supply chains. As the meeting was conducted on a non-attributable basis, the names and affiliations of participants are not disclosed.</p> -<p>In the coming years, Moldova is expected to continue diversifying its gas sector by exploring a range of alternatives for expanding supply, including developing networks through Romania to import gas from EU markets; using Bulgarian networks to transport natural gas; and implementing the Vertical Corridor Initiative to import natural gas from the Caspian Sea and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from terminals in Greece. In fact, Moldova was instrumental in the first delivery of gas from Greece to Ukraine via the Vertical Corridor in 2023, which stored it in its underground storage space, the largest in the European Union. However, while Moldova has the Iasi-Ungheni gas interconnector operational and available as an alternative gas supply if the current main route — the Trans-Balkan pipeline — is unavailable, that option is significantly more expensive.</p> +<h3 id="economic-security-as-a-concept">Economic Security as a Concept</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Recent contracting negotiations with suppliers have been opaque at best, releasing neither volume nor pricing publicly. A state-owned entity conducting business in this manner is not a recipe for accountability to the Moldovan taxpayer, nor for private sector engagement in the sector.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The meeting began with a presentation by CFS on the history and meaning of economic security. The use of economic tools to advance security interests has been a feature of international relations for millennia. Indeed, the imposition of trade sanctions by the Athenian Empire is widely considered a causal factor of the Peloponnesian War. In the 21st century, the idea of identifying economic security as a national security priority has emerged primarily as a reaction to a series of global shocks. Over a period of 15 years, Europe has been confronted with an economic collapse after the 2008 financial crisis, the geopolitical ramifications of the 2016 Brexit vote, the cross-sectoral upheaval caused by the Covid-19 global pandemic, and an unprecedented energy crisis following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. At the same time, China has increasingly deployed coercive economic practices with growing scale, sophistication and intensity. These events have compelled international policymakers to reexamine the security risks that arise as a result of global financial integration.</p> -<p>Another possibility is that Moldova could enter the global LNG market and access resources from the United States and Qatar. Additionally, Moldova could import gas from Azerbaijan or Turkey by building extensions to the Trans-Anatolian pipeline. While these options are costly and time consuming, Moldova will want to avoid a return to reliance on a single source of gas. The country will likely continue pursuing energy market reforms aimed at liberalizing the market, increasing competition, and reducing the power of Moldovagaz, all of which necessitate private sector participation.</p> +<p>The European Commission responded to these shocks by unveiling an Economic Security Strategy in June 2023, which identifies four risk areas: the resilience of supply chains; threats to critical infrastructure; technology security and leakage; and the weaponisation of economic dependencies or economic coercion. The strategy proposes mitigating these risks via a three-pillar approach that involves: promoting competitiveness; protecting against economic security risks; and partnering with the broadest possible range of like-minded partners. In January 2024, the Commission adopted a package of five initiatives aimed at strengthening the EU’s economic security across trade, investment and research. This was followed in July 2024 by European President Ursula von der Leyen designating economic security as a central plank of the 2024–29 European Commission’s economic foreign policy, and by the creation in September 2024 of a new portfolio of Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security.</p> -<p>Moldova will also likely continue working to improve its energy efficiency, thereby lessening the demand for energy, to a degree. Currently, many buildings use older technology for district heating, and consumers use two or three times more energy than would otherwise be required because they do not have horizontal distribution of heat with individual temperature controls. With the help of other countries and international financial institutions such as the World Bank Group, Moldova aims to modernize its gas and energy capabilities. As part of that strategy, in 2024, the Moldovan government launched a program focusing on increasing energy efficiency in residential buildings. Additionally, Moldova is working toward building and utilizing the alternative energy industry, thereby further reducing its reliance on natural gas and aligning with the European Union Clean Energy package and standards for a green economy as part of its EU accession aspirations.</p> +<p>Despite this flurry of activity, the concept of economic security remains relatively undefined, with no definition provided in the European Commission’s Economic Security Strategy. This is understandable, given the complexity of the topic, breadth of policy implications, and difficulty gaining multilateral consensus. However, it was crucial to establish a common understanding of economic security among Taskforce members to avoid miscommunication. To facilitate an open and wide-ranging discussion, CFS crafted a three-layered definition of economic security, as visualised in Figure 1. The first layer addresses the security risks and opportunities that arise due to a financially interconnected and increasingly unstable world. Opportunities are considered alongside risks because it is important to acknowledge that, while international integration can create vulnerabilities, effective responses often require collaborative actions. The second layer overlays the first, and covers the tools, systems and capabilities employed by countries and alliances to manage these risks and opportunities. Inherent in this layer is how these levers and structures can be weaponised by hostile and non-aligned actors. Finally, the third layer, which overlays and impacts the first two layers, encompasses how the geopolitical context influences the relative weight policymakers place on security, sovereignty and prosperity priorities.</p> -<p>It is important to note that the situation of Moldova’s gas sector overall is contingent on the outcomes of Moldova’s next presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as the trajectory of Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine. If pro-Russian government officials are elected in Moldova, the gas sector may revert to its historic dependency on Russian gas supply. But even if a pro-European government is elected and able to hold power, this will not be enough. It is essential that Moldova continue the challenging process of unbundling its energy sector, not only to comply with EU requirements but also to ensure that Moldova has an energy sector that is sufficiently diversified to withstand market and geopolitical fluctuations. This includes ensuring an environment that is sufficiently private sector friendly to not be so reliant on Western aid.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UxbTmrF.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Figure 1: Economic Security Definition Created for the Taskforce</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qXEc0tz.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Gas Prices for Households in Moldova.</strong> Source: <a href="https://statbank.statistica.md/PxWeb/pxweb/en/40%20Statistica%20economica/40%20Statistica%20economica__15%20ENE__serii%20lunare/ENE010400.px/?rxid=9a62a0d7-86c4-45da-b7e4-fecc26003802">“Stocks, inputs and natural gas consumption, monthly, 2015–2024,” Statistica Moldovei</a>.</em></p> +<h3 id="theme-1-the-impact-of-ambiguity">Theme 1: The Impact of Ambiguity</h3> -<h3 id="electricity-sector-overview">Electricity Sector Overview</h3> +<p>The presentation of the CFS economic security definition prompted Taskforce members to consider the implications of the lack of definitional clarity at the EU level. Some participants expressed frustration that there had not been a formal discussion among member states to determine what economic security is and, importantly, what it is not. Without a definition, several Taskforce members raised the concern that “everything gets securitised”. A few policymaker participants expanded on this point, commenting that it was important to define and maintain boundaries between trade policy and national security. These participants argued that using trade instruments for national security purposes would undermine international trade regulations and jeopardise the “level playing field”. There was pushback against this assertion from a security specialist, who remarked that the playing field is already uneven precisely because of deliberate acts by hostile, non-aligned and even allied actors. Therefore, pursuing a level playing field inherently requires a strategy that involves both prosperity and security considerations.</p> -<p>The electrical systems of the Eastern European region were designed under the assumption of a unified region, specifically under the control of the Soviet Union. Now, Moldova and Ukraine must manage fragmented pieces of a larger energy puzzle. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Moldova and Ukraine stayed connected to the Eastern European electrical system known as the Interconnected Power Systems, while Romania connected with the Western European system.</p> +<p>The debate on this point exemplified the main impact of definitional ambiguity identified by Taskforce members – that a lack of clarity can encourage and exacerbate siloed thinking on economic security. Many policymaker participants pointed to the fact that economic security concerns are currently being managed within member states by a multitude of ministries, including defence, national security, foreign affairs, home affairs, finance, economics, environment, industry and trade. Despite several participants highlighting the recent creation of economic security portfolios by their governments, there was general consensus that policymaking on this topic remains disjointed. This conclusion was reinforced by the experiences of some non-policymaker Taskforce members. Academic and industry participants commented that it was almost impossible for an outsider to understand which ministry, if any, had central oversight on economic security issues. These Taskforce members each shared personal anecdotes of consulting with numerous different agencies on economic security matters, only to become increasingly frustrated when it appeared that the agencies were not communicating with one another.</p> -<p>Built in 1964, the Cuciurgani power plant (MGRES) in Transnistria was the only power plant capable of meeting Moldova’s electricity consumption demands. Consequently, all electricity transmission infrastructure in Moldova was built around this plant. For many years, Gazprom has supplied the gas needed for electricity generation in Transnistria for “free” while billing Moldovagaz (and thus the Moldovan government in Chisinau) for the costs. This enabled the breakaway region to sell the electricity to Chisinau and to Transnistrian businesses at below market rates. This process continues today and is critical for Transnistria’s economy. Currently, approximately 80 percent of Moldova’s electricity is generated by the Cuciurgani power plant (MGRES), with the remaining portion either imported from Ukraine or produced domestically. Despite efforts by pro-European Moldovan politicians to reduce dependency on Russian energy, initiatives are often reversed by pro-Russian Moldovan officials. Implementing reforms also has been difficult due to a lack of investment in infrastructure.</p> +<p>There was agreement that this domestic fragmentation is compounded by the absence of EU governance structures capable of addressing economic security issues in a cohesive manner. This is largely due to a clash of competences – whereas most economic affairs fall under the authority of the EU, national security remains largely under the jurisdiction of member states. As a result, EU-level thinking on economic security is rooted in trade policy, and member states generally retain control over the enactment, implementation and enforcement of economic security measures. While Taskforce members emphasised the importance of preserving member state sovereignty, many acknowledged that institutional barriers prevent the EU from strategically addressing matters at the intersection of economics and national security. To illustrate the impact of this in practice, one policymaker participant noted that discussions on economic security issues (though often not explicitly framed as such) are occurring across multiple European Council working parties and different sectors of the EU system, yet no mechanism exists to unify these conversations. Another Taskforce member took this argument even further, to claim that the lack of an effective economic security governance framework prevents the EU from leveraging its economic power to strengthen the national security of member states, and global security more broadly.</p> -<p>In March 2022, in part due to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, Moldova and Ukraine conducted an energy synchronization with the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity. This gave both Moldova and Ukraine the ability to import electricity from EU markets. When Ukraine was forced to halt electricity exports due to Russian bombardments of its energy infrastructure, Moldova initially turned to Romania, at a more expensive rate. As a result of the increased costs, the Moldovan government chose to continue purchasing electricity from Transnistria on a short-term basis. To ensure long-term energy security, Moldova is currently working to increase grid stability and to build additional power lines — that do not pass through Transnistrian territory — in order to connect the country to the EU market. With the support of the European Investment Bank, lines between Vulcanesti-Chisinau and Balti-Suceava are expected to be operational in 2025 and 2028, respectively.</p> +<h3 id="theme-2-the-importance-of-ppps">Theme 2: The Importance of PPPs</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xrBczUO.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Sources of Electricity for Moldova.</strong> Source: <a href="https://moldelectrica.md/ru/network/annual_report">“Technical and Economic Indicators,” Moldelectrica SE</a>.</em></p> +<p>A consensus point that emerged from the discussion was that the lack of conceptual clarity on economic security, combined with fragmented domestic and international policymaking, had led to a largely ineffective relationship between policymakers and the private sector. There was general agreement that a productive partnership with industry is vital to any economic security strategy, but it was felt by many participants that public–private engagement in Europe was less constructive than in other regions, such as North America or the Asia-Pacific. Some participants attributed this disparity to the fact that countries in those regions had faced increased incidents of direct economic coercion, which provided opportunities for policymakers to work intensively with the private sector and “learn under pressure”. One example discussed by Taskforce members was Australia’s ability to withstand the most comprehensive punitive trade measures enacted by China in recent history.</p> -<p>While Moldova may have secured alternative sources of electricity starting in 2025, the questions surrounding Transnistrian electrical production and the gas supply to support it remain. If Russian gas ceases to flow into Transnistria or if Chisinau no longer purchases Transnistrian electricity, the effects to Transnistria will be devastating. The region’s electricity sector will have to look to Chisinau for help, and the breakaway region may have to purchase gas at market rates, which would be shocking and devastating to its economy. Tiraspol would also likely be pressured to integrate its energy infrastructure with Moldova. To adapt to these potential changes, Moldova will need to continue looking for new sources of electricity, increasing storage capacities, and exploring alternative energy possibilities. Additionally, as it currently stands, electricity even from Romania must transit through either Ukraine or Tiraspol before reaching Chisinau, further complicating the situation.</p> +<p>While a sovereign country can exercise greater policy decisiveness and operational agility than a multilateral organisation like the EU, some Taskforce members felt there were specific structural and cultural barriers within the EU that prevented an optimal partnership between the European public and private sectors. Several participants criticised the European Commission for constructing its Economic Security Strategy under the “promote”, “protect” and “partner” pillars without providing a framework to work across these pillars or guidance on how they interact. Other Taskforce members expressed concern that the European Commission had failed to effectively communicate to the private sector the objectives and progress of its economic security risk assessment process, resulting in confusion. These critiques were echoed by one participant, who gave the example of being told by a prominent European company that it was more concerned about economic security measures being enacted erratically by the EU and member states than about economic risks coming from China.</p> -<p>In the coming years, Moldova’s electricity sector is expected to make significant progress in diversification and integration with the EU energy market. Upon the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau and Balti-Suceava power lines, Chisinau will be able to supply electricity without relying on Transnistria; a power line between Straseni-Iasi is under consideration as well. But further development of the electrical sector requires the government to implement reforms that align with EU standards in the electricity sector and modernize its grid. To incentivize private sector participation, Moldova must also improve its rule of law and ensure a stable environment for energy-market competitiveness and investments.</p> +<p>This anecdote led many participants to comment that there needs to be significant improvement in the communication of economic security priorities to the private sector. One lesson from Australia that was shared with the Taskforce was the fundamental importance of a “feedback loop” between policymakers and companies to enable the effective identification of vulnerabilities. This requires coordinated action across administrative silos to provide a combined assessment of sector-specific economic, security and geopolitical risks. Companies can then be supported to make informed risk assessments, implement diversification strategies, and combat the impact of trade weaponisation. By contrast, one industry participant commented that the current disjointed communication from the EU and member states often results in company executives relegating economic security issues to their legal teams, who enact a tick-box approach. The participant concluded by arguing that if agencies “joined the dots” between themselves, a clearer, more coordinated message could be communicated to industry about its role in economic security policies.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/F6sEpLG.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Electrical Map of Moldova.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.pism.pl/publications/the-moldovan-gas-crisis-causes-and-consequences">“The Moldovan Gas Crisis: Causes and Consequences,” The Polish Institute of International Affairs, November 26, 2021</a>.</em></p> +<p>Several Taskforce members also commented that ineffective information sharing on economic security risks is preventing private actors from accurately assessing the trade-offs they are making between efficiency and security. A key example raised by participants of an economic security vulnerability that is commonly underestimated by the private sector is the risk posed by convertible loans. While these lending structures may seem lucrative, particularly to startup companies, they can result in the loss of company equity and intellectual property to hostile states. The 2023 European Investment Bank Investment Survey appears to support the view that the private sector remains focused on optimising cost-effectiveness over risk mitigation, as it reports that less than half of firms surveyed had changed, or were planning to change, their sourcing strategy. The fact that 96% of those firms had experienced disruptions to trade reflects the view of some Taskforce members that simply increasing private sector awareness is not sufficient – companies need to be incentivised to prioritise economic security risks. Participants suggested that this incentivisation could come through incorporating economic resilience into how valuations are arrived at by the financial markets, as well as more effective enforcement of economic security-related regulations, to encourage greater compliance.</p> -<h3 id="alternative-energy-sector-overview">Alternative Energy Sector Overview</h3> +<h3 id="case-study-supply-chains">Case Study: Supply Chains</h3> -<p>In 2020, renewable energy represented 25 percent of gross energy consumption in Moldova, with biomass serving as the primary resource. Moldova’s biomass sector has been long under development, and the resource is utilized for heating purposes as well. Although Moldova’s alternative energy market is not as developed as that of some of its neighbors, the country has significant potential for alternative energy to play a major role in its energy production. While the country is attempting to expand its solar energy and wind energy sectors, it faces limitations in integrating generated energy into its grid due to the consumption patterns of its population and the lack of flexibility in the existing grid. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)’s BESS (battery energy storage system) and ICE (internal combustion engines) investment will increase Moldova’s grid stability and flexibility.</p> +<p>Taskforce members raised several economic security examples to illustrate their thinking on the themes of definitional ambiguity and the importance of PPPs, including technology leakage, direct foreign investment and electronic vehicles. However, the discussion predominately centred around the case study of supply chains, and this enabled Taskforce members to explore the impact of the two themes in practice. From this dialogue emerged three key findings which, although framed in the context of supply chains, have broad application.</p> -<p>The Renewable Energy Promotion Law, which became active in 2018, created support mechanism schemes aimed at promoting the alternative energy market, including net metering, feed-in tariffs, and tendering. Net metering allows consumers who generate their own electricity from renewable sources to receive credit for the surplus electricity they feed back into the grid. Feed-in tariffs entail guaranteed payments, access to the grid, long-term contracts, and other incentives for entities developing renewable energy projects in the country. In January 2024, this was replaced by net billing, which allows individuals or companies who are generating electricity to feed surplus energy produced back into the grid. Although feed-in tariffs and net billing have already been implemented, the Moldovan government recently initiated its first renewables auction. The government allocated 165 megawatts of total capacity for wind and solar energy, reflecting the structure of consumption, generation, and grid availability. Moldova expects to see 190 million euros in associated investments.</p> +<h4 id="finding-1-common-objectives">Finding 1: Common Objectives</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rB5cKsN.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Existing Capacities of Renewable Electricity Production.</strong> Source: <a href="https://energie.gov.md/en/content/renewable-energy">“Renewable Energy,” Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Moldova</a>; and <a href="https://www.undp.org/moldova/news/how-much-renewable-energy-there-moldova-and-how-much-could-it-be">“How much renewable energy is there in Moldova and how much could it be?,” UNDP, December 20, 2023</a>.</em></p> +<p>There was general agreement that, without clearly defined economic security goals, it is almost impossible to differentiate between supply chain risks, prioritise sectors according to their vulnerabilities, reach agreement on standards, and implement instruments coherently across the EU. One policymaker commented that this ambiguity prevents the incremental national security responses of member states from coalescing into a strategic convergence on European supply chain priorities. Another policymaker expressed the opinion that greater clarity would enable member states to understand how much weight to place on each of the three pillars of the European Commission’s Economic Security Strategy, particularly given that the “promote” and “protect” pillars often conflict in the context of supply chains.</p> -<p>Despite these advancements, barriers to total renewable energy success persist. Sufficient wind and solar generation, grid stability, and functioning power plants are necessary to meet energy consumption demands. Unfortunately, Moldova’s largest power plant is in Transnistria, and this makes Moldova’s electricity supply dependent on both the Transnistrian government and the flow of “free” Russian gas. In 2022, in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Moldovan government introduced energy balancing to the market through relatively expensive and unplanned energy exchanges with nearby countries. Moldova’s current infrastructure is not yet capable of supporting large amounts of renewable energy generation. Many potential investors are deterred by these factors, as well as unstable rule of law.</p> +<p>A group of Taskforce members expanded on this point by proposing the idea that, once common goals had been established, member states would be able to construct a decision tree to navigate the three pillars. These participants suggested that such a framework could require member states to prioritise protecting the supply chain at first instance, before promoting economic resilience through innovation, diversification and other risk mitigation strategies. The final stage of the framework would involve developing an industrial policy, which would include building strategic partnerships. The discussion on this decision tree concluded with Taskforce members commenting that each stage would involve a different degree of public and private sector responsibility</p> -<p>By 2030, Moldova plans to increase the role of renewable energy in its electricity production by 30 percent. Not only is the transition to alternative energy better for the environment, but it also reduces dependence on Russian gas and electricity from MGRES, the Transnistrian electricity plant. To achieve this, Moldova will need to explore all available options, including developing new infrastructure for solar and wind energy. Since Moldova’s overall energy consumption is low, and its existing energy system is relatively small (the country mostly relies on imports), it does not have to dismantle any large-scale systems and can build from a relatively fresh slate.</p> +<p>On a more granular level, many Taskforce members supported the adoption of a sector-specific approach in relation to the development of economic security objectives. This would begin by identifying the main priorities for a certain sector or, where appropriate, for a strategically significant supply chain within that sector. From that analysis, the tools, systems and capabilities required to manage the relevant economic security risks would emerge, which would enable the alignment of national and European strategies. These strategic objectives could then be shared with key allies, either bilaterally or through forums such as the G7, as well as with private sector partners, and be pursued in a coordinated manner. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act and the European Chips Act were raised by many Taskforce members as two examples of how the identification of sector-specific objectives can bring clarity and cohesion to economic security policies. While the limitations of these instruments were acknowledged (such as the validity of the targets and effectiveness of the tools chosen to implement them), several participants felt they were still a useful model for achieving coordinated, strategic action on economic security.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/pGJnEuS.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Installed Capacity of Renewable Sources.</strong> Source: <a href="https://pxweb.irena.org/pxweb/en/IRENASTAT/IRENASTAT__Power%20Capacity%20and%20Generation/">“Power Capacity and Generation,” IRENASTAT Online Data Query Tool, International Renewable Energy Agency</a>.</em></p> +<h4 id="finding-2-quality-data">Finding 2: Quality Data</h4> -<p>In the next five to ten years, Moldova is likely to increase its power system capacity and flexibility. This includes managing demand and investing in battery storage. Additionally, the country will need to attract investors in order to become less dependent on international aid. This will require Moldova to expand its renewable energy market and to ensure all market standards are aligned with the European Union regulations. Moldova will need to implement reforms streamlining bureaucratic processes, improving the transparency of technical guidelines, and ensuring fiscal stability; without such reform, private sector investors will shy away from the market. For example, Moldova recently opened an auction of renewable energy that was met with a tepid response from the investor community.</p> +<p>To develop economic security objectives, it is necessary to have access to relevant, accurate and timely data. However, there was consensus among Taskforce members that the current level of information on supply chains is insufficient to enable EU policymakers to identify and prioritise economic dependencies. One participant commented that it was an immense challenge, if not impossible, for EU institutions to receive trade data of consistent quality and granularity across the different member states. This is supported by a report on economic security practices requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade, which found that: “Data that would allow for a comprehensive understanding of exposures is often lacking (e.g. intra-EU firm level trade data) or incomplete (e.g. Eurostat production data or data on multinational corporations’ geographic distributions of revenue, assets and profits)”. Another Taskforce member expressed concern that China has much greater access to this type of data, which gives it a sophisticated understanding of economic dependencies. This participant cited China’s export controls on critical minerals as an example of how China effectively uses trade data to exploit European economic vulnerabilities, without creating unintended consequences for its own manufacturing sector.</p> -<p>It is in the country’s best interest that the government ensure all resources are being developed and are used efficiently, including hydropower, biofuel, and geothermal energy. Currently, Moldova has only one operational hydro installation, the Costesti-Stinca hydropower plant. The government will likely attempt to expand this sector to meet investors’ interests. Moldova could also develop a biofuel sector and utilize both liquid and solid biofuels to leverage its existing agricultural industry. To manage all of these renewable energy sources, Moldova will have to stabilize its current energy grid and supply. Ultimately, Moldova’s focus will likely extend beyond merely expanding renewable energy infrastructure to maximizing the development of all potential renewable resources.</p> +<p>Many participants noted that any attempt to gain information on supply chain patterns and detect potential pinch points that are vulnerable to weaponisation would be pointless without private sector cooperation. Despite some policymakers arguing that there was an entrenched corporate aversion to sharing commercial data, other participants commented that companies are much more aware of the impacts of economic security risks than they were even 10 years ago, and that there was an increased appetite for information exchange. Indeed, one Taskforce member referenced a recent BusinessEurope report on economic security, which calls for greater intelligence sharing between the public and private sectors because it would “empower companies to better identify and address security risks through effective mitigation measures, while it will also help authorities to better calibrate policies”. There was general agreement that to enable empirical, data-driven risk identification, more efficient PPPs on economic security information sharing need to be developed.</p> -<h3 id="european-union-accession-and-foreign-aid">European Union Accession and Foreign Aid</h3> +<h4 id="finding-3-analytical-capacity">Finding 3: Analytical Capacity</h4> -<p>In December of 2023, following their 2022 candidate status, the European Union opened formal accession talks for both Moldova and Ukraine. This was a recognition of the progress that both countries individually had made on the reform recommendations provided. Moldovan president Maia Sandu has indicated a goal of 2030 for EU membership, but there are structural challenges within the European Union to Moldova becoming a member. These challenges are unrelated to the many reforms Moldova must complete, including but not limited to reforms in the energy sector, before it is eligible for full membership.</p> +<p>Once policymakers and companies are in possession of quality data, they need the capacity to analyse and assess it effectively. However, most participants agreed that there was insufficient investment in economic security analytical competencies, both within and between the public and private sectors. Some Taskforce members commented that addressing this deficiency requires the integration of security expertise with economic analysis, citing the whole-of-government approach adopted during contingency planning in the defence sector as an example. A security expert elaborated that applying national security logic could enhance economic security policymaking, specifically the “acquisition, analysis, assessment, decision” framework used to make security decisions in pursuit of a strategic concept. This framework involves gathering intelligence, analysing the information, and producing an agreed statement of the situation, which is presented to the decision-maker. The expert acknowledged that tasking a multilateral agency to produce an agreed statement on an economic security situation would be significantly more challenging and politically contentious than a traditional national security assessment. However, the meeting was characterised by a shared desire among participants for greater precision and practicality on economic security issues, which some Taskforce members suggested could be achieved by drawing lessons from the defence and security communities.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In December of 2023, following their 2022 candidate status, the European Union opened formal accession talks for both Moldova and Ukraine.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The Australian experience with Chinese economic coercion illustrates why the analytical capacity needed to manage modern economic security threats requires the convergence of economic, trade and national security competencies. Traditionally, assessments of supply chain weaknesses have focused on economic and trade dimensions. However, an Australian representative shared with the Taskforce that China frequently weaponises supply chains not only because they are economically significant, but also to send a political message. For instance, while the scale of Australian beef, barley and wine exports to China does not match that of the iron ore industry, these products are symbols of Australia’s agricultural prowess and represent its success in establishing a profile within the Chinese consumer market as a producer of premium goods. Beyond the symbolic, China’s targeting of these industries has significant electoral implications, because many Australian politicians, particularly those from rural constituencies, rely heavily on support from the agricultural sector. As tensions between Europe and China are expected to escalate over the coming decade, it will be crucial for policymakers and companies to develop the analytical capacity needed to accurately map their risk exposure to politically motivated economic coercion.</p> -<p>Regardless of the timeline for Moldova’s notional EU membership, progress is being made across sectors. Even before EU candidate status was granted, Moldova was already engaged with the European Union on several fronts, including but not limited to energy. In 2010, Moldova became a member of the Energy Community, a group of EU and non-EU members in southeastern Europe who have committed to adopting parts of EU energy-related legislation. As a part of this membership, Moldova agreed to reform its energy sector to comply with EU directives and antitrust laws; while several pieces of legislation have been adopted as of 2024, the process is ongoing.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>In 2014, Moldova signed an Association Agreement with the European Union in which it committed to implementing the legislation by which all EU member states are bound, including legal and regulatory provisions related to the energy sector.</p> +<p>The inaugural meeting of the RUSI European Economic Security Taskforce highlighted the conceptual and concrete impacts of the lack of clarity, common priorities, and cohesive strategy on economic security within both member states and the EU. At the close of the meeting, one participant commented that the discussion “only emphasised the importance of initiating this Taskforce”, as it was a reminder that Europe is at the very beginning of designing and implementing the data-sharing mechanisms, analytical capacity, and PPPs necessary to achieve a more resilient and secure economy.</p> -<p>At the fifth EU-Moldova High-Level Energy Dialogue in 2024, both sides endorsed a roadmap that included a timeline for EU accession. The reform agenda and associated timeline are aggressive and Moldova is continuing to struggle to reach its commitments on the timeline; commitments include, among other things, increasing the energy efficiency of infrastructure and the use of renewable sources. Additionally, Moldova has committed to having 27 percent renewables by 2030.</p> +<p>A second meeting of the Taskforce will build on these findings by examining how unstable geopolitical conditions and escalating geoeconomic threats influence the security, sovereignty and prosperity trade-offs that policymakers must navigate when developing domestic and multilateral responses to economic security risks.</p> -<p>One of the key reforms in the EU package is the unbundling of the electrical and gas sectors. Unbundling refers to the separation in ownership of supply, generation, and transmission across a sector, in this instance specifically gas. During the 2021 negotiations between Moldovagaz and Gazprom, Moldova agreed not to proceed with unbundling the gas sector until the debt issue was resolved. As discussed previously, an independent review was conducted on Moldova’s debt, the results of which Russia is contesting.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The EU-required unbundling includes the separation of supply and generation from transmission operators for natural gas, thus bolstering incentives for private sector competition, particularly around gas infrastructure. As currently structured, Moldovagaz controls almost the entirety of the Moldovan gas business, including infrastructure. As discussed above, Moldovagaz is 50 percent owned by Russia’s Gazprom, 35 percent by Chisinau, and the remaining 15 percent by the government in Tiraspol. Moldovagaz’s ownership structure is further complicated by a Moldovagaz subsidiary, Tiraspoltransgaz, which provides gas to and owns the gas-related infrastructure in Transnistria. After the European Union opened infringement proceedings against Moldova for their continued failure to unbundle in 2021, Moldova has begun to make progress in this arena.</p> +<p><strong>Eliza Lockhart</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. Her research examines matters at the intersection of law, finance and global security. Eliza is a lawyer and legal policy expert with experience advising on economic security, hybrid/state threats, electoral integrity, risk and compliance, and disruptive technologies.</p>Eliza LockhartAmid heightened geopolitical tensions, the concept of “economic security” has rapidly come to dominate domestic and international policy agendas. Recent global shocks have exposed the fragility of international financial systems and revealed significant security vulnerabilities in economic dependencies.Shock And Awe2024-10-17T12:00:00+08:002024-10-17T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/shock-and-awe<p><em>Far from being a thing of the past, “shock and awe” must be an integral part of our approach to multi-domain warfare in the future.</em></p> -<p>Moldova’s other improvements in gas sector reforms include adopting regulation around network codes and market rules. There has also been significant progress in both the gas and electrical sectors with regard to regional integration. For example, on the electrical side, both Moldova and Ukraine became connected to the European grid following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In October of 2023, Moldova was granted observer status in the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity; to become a full member, Moldova must implement the Catalogue of Measures, work which is supported by USAID. And when the Chisinau-Vulcanesti line is completed (which is projected to be in 2025), electricity will flow into Moldova without passing through Transnistria. These are not the only reforms needed on the pathway to a free and fair energy sector in Moldova; more on this is discussed in the recommendations section of this paper.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>EU support for Moldovan energy development has included grant funding to individuals making improvements in their homes to increase energy efficiency, as well as ongoing energy subsidies for economically disadvantaged populations within the country. While the European Union has provided significant development assistance to Moldova’s energy sector, it is far from the only donor in this space. The United States has supported Moldova’s energy development across the interagency portfolio; for example, the Development Finance Corporation has provided millions of dollars to support political risk insurance for energy projects. The U.S. State Department and USAID have been working on projects funded through a $394 million investment in support of energy sector development. This includes a focus on developing the country’s power grid, as well as supporting foreign investments in the energy sector, especially in renewable energy sources. The U.S. government is one of the main donors providing capacity building to key energy sector entities and supporting legal-regulatory reforms required as a part of the European Union’s energy directives, regulations, and provisions in Moldova.</p> +<p>In March 2003, more than a thousand precision-guided strikes from strategic air assets and stand-off weapons hit Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the first 24 hours of the US-led invasion. Although the concept of “shock and awe” had entered the military lexicon in the 1990s, it wasn’t truly popularised until the hostilities in 2003 introduced it in a visceral display of kinetic action. The war really did start with a bang. Overwhelming force discombobulated Iraqi decision-makers, fractured their command and control, subdued their armed forces, astonished their populous and, for the first time in history, was watched in real time by the rest of the world.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The U.S. government is one of the main donors providing capacity building to key energy sector entities and supporting legal-regulatory reforms required as a part of the European Union’s energy directives, regulations, and provisions in Moldova.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>In simple terms, shock and awe is a colloquialism for a military approach which sets out to overwhelm an adversary through the use of rapid and massive force. It aims to achieve immediate tactical dominance through strikes which cause both a physical and a psychological blow. The adversary is left reeling and unable to respond effectively, while onlookers are surprised and, dare we say it, impressed – even if in a dark, macabre way. The Nazi blitzkrieg was as much a form of shock and awe as the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom.</p> -<p>Support has also come in from a variety of multilateral institutions. The United Nations Development Programme and the government of Japan have funded development of the biomass sector, as well as additional energy development in partnership with Switzerland. NATO and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have also supported the continued growth of Moldova’s energy security. The EBRD has been a key source of support for Moldova’s energy development. The World Bank recently launched an initiative that includes support for renovating public buildings and heating. Support has come bilaterally across Europe from countries including but not limited to Bulgaria, Germany, France, Lithuania, and Romania.</p> +<p>When taking the long view, it becomes clear that shock and awe has always been part of military strategy and can be found, between the lines, in the principles of war – it is there in Surprise, Offensive Action and in the Concentration of Force. But it is also more than unexpected strike. It happens at the theatre and the political levels, and its impact interrupts decision-making. It is somewhat surprising, then, that in their August 2024 Foreign Affairs article, former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley and former Google CEO Eric Schmidt argued that “US military planners are right to have concluded that the era of ‘shock and awe’ campaigns – in which Washington could decimate its adversaries with overwhelming firepower – is finished”.</p> -<p>This outpouring of aid must not disincentivize the development of a robust energy private sector in Moldova. This requires donating countries to not only bear this potential for market disruption in mind when providing aid but also to hold the Moldovan government accountable for the commitments and progress it has made as a part of energy sector development. It is essential that future support for Moldova be contingent on continued development and reform of the energy sector, including but not limited to the solutions outlined in the following section.</p> +<p>The thrust of Milley and Schmidt’s article was not specifically about shock and awe, but that the US is not fully prepared for future warfare, which they see as being driven by advanced technologies such as AI and autonomous systems. They emphasise that recent conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, demonstrate how warfare is evolving rapidly. They assert that the battlefield is becoming more transparent, and they predict that future wars will be dominated by new technologies rather than traditional, industrial age forces. We must “change or perish”, they opine.</p> -<h3 id="ensuring-a-bright-future">Ensuring a Bright Future</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Shock and awe tactics involving massive bombardment may have an initial psychological impact, but the resultant unrest can lead to domestic and international backlash, instability and insurgency</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Moldova’s energy picture is complex and largely rooted in the country’s history — not only regarding reliance on Russian gas, but also the very structure and ownership of its state-owned gas company, Moldovagaz, which still leaves Russia with a controlling interest. There is also, of course, the reliance on Transnistria — with its close ties to Russia — for electricity, not only in terms of the current production but also as all power lines presently run through this breakaway region. Over the past few years, significant progress has been made toward a more independent and secure future for Moldovan energy, but more work is needed.</p> +<p>They may be correct, but does this directly render shock and awe dead? Are they thinking too much from a US vantage point and projecting their opinions through the prism of their “pacing threat”, China?</p> -<p>This growth has been aided by partners and allies across the globe. And efforts driven by the need to meet EU requirements have the potential, if done correctly, to continue this trajectory. There is still much to be done in order to achieve not only Moldovan energy independence, but also a Moldovan energy sector that is based on free-market competition and rule-of-law principles. Outlined below are six key recommendations for ensuring a bright energy future for Moldova.</p> +<p>We might instead choose to propose that since the character of war continually evolves, then so too does shock and awe. The psychological and operational impact of Israel’s recent “Trojan” attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon, for example, by rigging communications pagers with explosives and covertly delivering them into the hands and pockets of Hezbollah’s leaders, is just the latest iteration of this age-old strategy. The spread of fear, paranoia and distrust of equipment almost certainly did as much damage to Hezbollah’s fighting effectiveness as Israel’s targeted assassinations through more traditional means. And it hit the world news, too. There was shock at the tactic, and there was awe at its audacity.</p> -<p><strong>1. Domestic Electrical Connectivity and Production</strong></p> +<p>So, before consigning shock and awe to the graveyard of military ideas, it is perhaps worth unpacking what it actually is, and considering how it might adapt, evolve and be used in the future.</p> -<p>While sources of natural gas have been diversified for Moldova, the same is not yet true for electricity. Most of the electricity generated for Moldova is via the plant in Transnistria; all the physical lines supplying Moldovan electricity run through Transnistria. This will change when the Chisinau-Vulcanesti line is operational, as this line will not run through Transnistria. However, this line is unlikely to be able to provide all electricity needed to supply both Moldova and Transnistria at peak usage.</p> +<p>The declared purpose of shock and awe is to inflict rapid, decisive blows, leaving the enemy unable to react effectively or to mount a counteroffensive. The concept was first outlined by former US Navy officer Harlan Ullman and military author James Wade, who argued that the basis for rapid dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception and understanding of the adversary through imposing sufficient “shock” and “awe” to achieve the necessary political, strategic and operational goals. The authors believed that by using overwhelming firepower, superior technology and speed, an attacking force could destroy not only the enemy’s physical capabilities but also their will to resist.</p> -<p>This means that capacity needs to be further increased. The essential capacity needs to not only be supplied by lines that do not pass through the Transnistria hub, but also should be used as an opportunity for Moldova, outside of Transnistria, to generate its own electricity, and not simply import from either Romania or other allies and partners. Among other collaborations in process between Ukraine and Moldova is the exploration of a gas-to-electricity exchange in which Moldova would build the capacity to produce electricity (outside of Transnistria) and Ukraine would supply gas, which it continues to produce. Moldova, Ukraine, and Romania must work to get their lines out of Transnistria and to integrate their systems.</p> +<p>The effectiveness of shock and awe depends on several factors, including the nature of the conflict, the opponent, and the broader political and social context. Although the strategy can be effective in achieving initial military objectives where the goal is to quickly degrade a state’s infrastructure or neutralise key military targets, as it was in Iraq in 2003, its long-term success and its effectiveness against non-state actors are less certain. For instance, the use of shock and awe tactics involving massive bombardment may certainly have an initial psychologically demoralising and disorienting impact, but the resultant social and political unrest can lead to domestic and international backlash, instability and insurgency. Non-state groups tend to be decentralised and have less infrastructure to target. Even in Iraq, while the initial invasion against the state was successful, non-state insurgencies continued for years. The potential strategic consequences of a tactical action must always be factored into planning.</p> -<p><strong>2. Impartial Oversight and Support for Unbundling and Deregulation of Gas Sector</strong></p> +<p>Modern military operations, including peer and hybrid conflict, increasingly rely on more targeted and precise kinetic and non-kinetic strikes to minimise collateral damage, shifting away from the broad use of overwhelming force. Where mass has been used as the principal advantage, as in Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, it can become bogged down by spirited and innovative resistance. This perhaps reflects an evolution from the “traditional” shock and awe which Milley and Schmidt dismiss as passé, toward strategies that are more focused and adaptable, especially in urban or politically sensitive environments.</p> -<p>The process of unbundling the gas sector is still in its early stages and faces many hurdles, including the ongoing contestation of the debts owed and Gazprom’s majority ownership stake in Moldovagaz. In practice, this means that Gazprom can vote against many of the changes needed to move forward. It is essential that Russia’s proxy Gazprom be removed from this industry entirely.</p> +<p>However, in conflicts where cyber, economic and information effects are brought to bear alongside traditional military operations, shock and awe may still be relevant, or perhaps even more so. Cyber shock and awe could apply the principles of the traditional version to the digital domain. The goal here could be to achieve overwhelming dominance over an adversary’s digital infrastructure and capabilities, paralysing their ability to respond by launching rapid, large-scale cyber attacks.</p> -<p>There must be oversight, transparency, and technical support throughout all elements of the unbundling process. This will not only ensure free-market best practices are leveraged, but also that the process is free from both actual and apparent corruption. Transparency and oversight will also provide the ability to shine a public light on any tactics Gazprom may employ to delay or divert the process.</p> +<p>A cyber shock and awe campaign targeting critical systems could disable power grids, water supplies and transport networks. It could shut down internet access and disrupt communications. Banks, stock markets and even retail payment systems could be hit, leading to financial and economic chaos. Like the traditional version, cyber shock and awe would create psychological panic. Consider the individual and societal impact if an attacker successfully cut off all communications, power and access to money or means of exchange. Rather than watch events unfolding in real time, digital darkness could be catastrophic as people struggle to make sense of what is happening around them. And, of course, without proper defences, military command and control systems could be crippled. Events such as the recent CrowdStrike outage show us a microcosm of the societal-level mayhem that could be inflicted. Combine this with more traditional effects, and serious damage could be inflicted on to the will of an opponent.</p> -<p>The United States, its partners, and its allies should extend on-the-ground, technical, expert-staff augmentation to support the development of regulations both for the gas sector and for the entirety of the restructuring process. This staff augmentation is especially important given Moldova’s challenges with personnel capacity across all sectors.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In conflicts where cyber, economic and information effects are brought to bear alongside traditional military operations, shock and awe may still be relevant, or perhaps even more so</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>3. Create a Secure and Enabling Environment for Investments</strong></p> +<p>We argue that far from being a thing of the past, shock and awe must be an integral part of our approach to multi-domain warfare. We must retain the concept of rapid dominance in our thinking, from contingency planning through to force development. Our offensive thinking must be able to seamlessly synchronise kinetic and non-kinetic kill chains. We must look for mass of effect, not just mass of capability, and we must always aim for the element of surprise.</p> -<p>The process for investment in the energy sector must be clear, transparent, and provide ease of access for potential investors. This is important to increase the volume and types of investments that come not only from within Moldova, but also from the diaspora and other investors across the globe. There must also be foreign investment limitations, including effective and as-transparent-as-possible investment screening to ensure that malign actors, including but not limited to Russian state-owned or affiliated enterprises, cannot bid. These clarity and screening processes need to be in effect prior to unbundling, thereby continuing to ensure that the overall process is done freely, fairly, and securely.</p> +<p>Similarly, our defensive thinking must evolve and focus more on resilience, redundancy and reversionary modes, and less on “efficiency”. We must retain the ability to both survive and thrive in the face of a brutal and unexpected onslaught. Our infrastructure, civilian and military, must be hardened but adaptive. It should be as decentralised and multi-pathed as possible. Our military systems must be “network-optional” by design. Critically, we must consider the physical and psychological impacts of what we do – on the adversary, on ourselves and on onlookers. In the cognitive domain, societal resilience may be every bit as important as military resilience. Day-zero shock and awe thinking can add value to both our offensive and defensive calculus. This is especially true in an age of multiple nuclear-armed opponents when proactive escalation management is required to avoid Armageddon – which may be difficult if the lights go out and communications are down.</p> -<p>While Moldova’s geographic location — less than four hours from the frontlines of Ukraine — and investors’ concerns over stability are impediments to capital investment, they are not the only ones. There is also the history of corruption across all Moldovan sectors, as well as bureaucratic ineffectiveness and challenges with consistent rule of law. The combination of these factors means that there is a need for structural changes within the law — and therefore, to some degree, election proof — to align incentives for investors to put money in Moldova.</p> +<p>It is clear that the right mix of perfectly timed and targeted effects could, more than ever, paralyse an adversary. Conversely, we must appreciate, harden and defend our own potential critical weaknesses, right through to the societal level. We must have a bounce-back strategy because some element of the digital bomber will always get through. We must prepare to deliver shock and be resilient to awe. In both its offensive and defensive contexts, the death of shock and awe has surely been greatly exaggerated.</p> -<p>One such change is the creation of formal, government-sanctioned advisory boards for Moldovan gas, electricity, and alternative energy sectors, at least. These boards must include representation from the European Union, the U.S. government across the government agencies with stakes in these efforts, and private industry from across the globe. It is essential to include a varied group in order to ensure that these recommendations are not designed with a singular interest in mind but instead are long term.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Both the selection process for members of these advisory boards and their work should be made public on an ongoing basis. This is of critical importance as state-owned enterprises have long been a magnet for corrupt interests in Moldova. With Moldova’s commitments to the IMF, the country has agreed to the creation of corporate governance structures and the review of appointees.</p> +<p><strong>Joe Dransfield</strong> is a Royal Navy aviator, a former military professor at the US Naval War College, and an Associate Fellow of the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre.</p> -<p>These boards should work with the energy ministry and make recommendations for policies and practices that are needed to stimulate investment in the energy sector in the short and medium term. These groups should provide specific solutions, timelines, and resources associated with decisions to implement. Foreign donors seeking to help the Moldovan energy sector must work with these boards to provide a long-term, sustainable pathway for the development of a robust energy private sector.</p> +<p><strong>Kevin Rowlands</strong> is the Head of the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre and Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Plymouth.</p>Joe Dransfield and Kevin RowlandsFar from being a thing of the past, “shock and awe” must be an integral part of our approach to multi-domain warfare in the future.Canada-U.S. Defence Relations2024-10-17T12:00:00+08:002024-10-17T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/canada-us-defence-relations<p><em>This report assesses the challenges facing the U.S.-Canada relationship as it pertains to military spending and argues that Washington will expect Canada to follow through on the spending commitments.</em></p> -<p><strong>4. Reforming Corporate Governance Structures and ANRE</strong></p> +<excerpt /> -<p>There is a need to revisit myriad corporate governance structures, starting with Moldovagaz and moving across the entire energy sector. The development of updated structures and new processes for appointments or reappointments need to be done publicly and with monitoring from development partners to ensure scrutiny and to limit kickbacks or even the appearance of impropriety. There also needs to be a careful vetting of all current holders of these roles, as well as senior leadership at ANRE. This would align with the ongoing and proposed vetting happening elsewhere across Moldovan government. In order for any system or industry to function, there should be a natural tension between stakeholders, including but not limited to regulators, private sector entities, oversight bodies, and agencies; this is healthy in any free-market sector. To help ensure there is tension, rather than collusion, between these groups, there must be ethics regulations, including gift limitations, in place prior to the appointments or reappointments of individuals to the advisory boards and ANRE. These ethics regulations should be developed with the help of EU partners and must include methods to report violations and enforce compliance. If done thoughtfully, these ethics rules could be applied across the government and all sectors in Moldova.</p> +<h3 id="1-an-historic-low-canadas-defence-reputation-with-the-united-states">1. An Historic Low? Canada’s Defence Reputation with the United States</h3> -<p><strong>5. Cybersecurity for the Energy Sector</strong></p> +<p>Canada and the United States have arguably the closest and most comprehensive defence relationship of any two countries in the world. They share in the defence of the North American continent, particularly through NORAD, and work together to support international peace and security through myriad alliances and partnerships, including NATO and the Five Eyes. The relationship is underpinned by a vast network of bilateral bodies and agreements covering everything from materiel cooperation and defence planning to information sharing and emergency response. Defence ties have grown over the decades since the Second World War, reaching their zenith during the Afghanistan conflict, when the two militaries fought side by side and suffered significant casualties against a determined Taliban insurgency.</p> -<p>Cyberattacks have increased in frequency and scale within Moldova and include significant cyber incursions targeting infrastructure. It is likely that cyberattacks targeting the energy sector will increase as the negotiations with Gazprom around unbundling and with Transnistria on issues related to energy continue. Regardless of a short-term increase, it is of utmost long-term importance that, as new physical energy infrastructure is brought online and new private sector energy players enter, there be an integrated strategy for cybersecurity across the Moldovan energy sector. Improving cybersecurity for the energy sector is essential not only to protect publicly owned infrastructure and government agencies, but also to integrate protections across private entities within the energy sector.</p> +<p>While the direct relationship between the two militaries remains close, political strains have emerged lately between Ottawa and Washington over a perceived lack of political commitment on the Canadian side to sustain and improve defence capability in the face of seismic shifts in the geostrategic landscape. At the heart of this tension has been defence spending. While Canada has increased its defence budget significantly since the publication of Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) in 2017 (SSE committed to boosting spending by 70% from 2017 to 2026, though efforts to reach this goal have been undermined by persistent DND budget lapses in recent years), Canada remains one of only a handful of NATO countries that have failed to meet the Alliance benchmark of 2% defence spending as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Canada’s current defence budget of approximately $34 billion represents 1.34% of GDP.</p> -<p>While the Moldovan government has taken steps to implement best practices in cybersecurity, including their 2023 cybersecurity law (set to go into effect in 2025), there are still gaps. This law, which will require incident reporting as well as safeguards, cooperation, and network standards, is just a first step. The Moldovan government should work with the private sector, as well as international partners and allies, to develop an energy sector–specific plan at the national level.</p> +<p>Former U.S. President Donald Trump called out Prime Minister Trudeau in 2019 over defence spending, and leaks from the Washington Post in 2023 revealed a growing frustration among current U.S. officials over Canada’s failure to follow up on defence commitments — from the 2% target to NORAD modernization to Arctic security. Other NATO countries, including Germany and Turkey, may have expressed similar reservations privately, while some have gone public. France’s ambassador to Canada stated publicly, “You are riding a first-class carriage with a third-class ticket. If you want to remain in the first-class seat, you need to train and expand (the military) and to go somewhere.” The NATO Secretary-General has repeatedly stated that Canada needs to fulfill its 2% commitment.</p> -<p>This sector-specific strategy must include details for energy subsectors, a focus on increasing public-private partnership, and diplomatic engagement, including shared intelligence. The strategy must be created with timelines aligned to resourcing and include not only incident response plans but also strategies to train and prepare for these potential occurrences across the sector. Cyber and physical security must be fully integrated within the strategy and include access controls, as well as the screening and vetting of associated personnel.</p> +<p>The April publication of Our North, Strong and Free, combined with recent capital announcements such as the F-35 fighter, drones, surveillance aircraft and NORAD modernization, was expected to blunt some of this criticism. While the Defence Policy Update (DPU) deserves praise for its focus on Arctic security and its stated intention to purchase new equipment such as tactical helicopters and airborne early warning aircraft, it was vague on other equipment acquisitions (e.g., a promise to “explore options” for new submarines). It also did little to assuage concerns over serious personnel shortfalls and procurement problems. Most importantly, Canada’s defence spending under the DPU will only reach 1.76% of GDP by 2029-30 — not 2%. The Parliamentary Budget Officer has since pronounced this goal as unachievable given the actual funding the government has provided (much of the funding under the DPU, it might be added, is back-end loaded), as well as ongoing procurement issues and a Canadian economy that could grow faster than anticipated.</p> -<p><strong>6. Transnistrian Reintegration in Energy</strong></p> +<p>The U.S. reaction was predictable. A large group of U.S. Senators from both political parties wrote to the Prime Minister, stating they were “profoundly disappointed” with recent Canadian defence spending projections. At the same time, senior Republicans such as Mike Johnson and Mitch McConnell took the opportunity at the July NATO summit in Washington to criticize Canada for riding U.S. “coattails”.</p> -<p>As Russia continues its hybrid warfare against Moldova, it could focus on energy as part of its continued cyber-assault. Moreover, it is near certain that pro-Russian candidates will continue to leverage energy-focused narratives — including what the pricing would look like were they to be elected — against pro-Western candidates and parties. These narratives are especially important in Transnistria, where the majority of the population are Russian speakers, because, whether causal or not, consuming Russian media is correlated with higher trust in the Russian government.</p> +<p>Surprisingly, Canada went into the NATO Summit with no plan to address these concerns. But two days into the meeting, it hit the panic button. In his closing press conference, the PM stated that Canada expected to reach 2% defence spending by 2032, nearly a decade away, but provided no detailed plan of how it would get there. Moreover, the PM undercut his announcement by referring to 2% as a “crass mathematical calculation.” It may well be, but this argument has long ceased to be relevant. Canada has signed up for the commitment on multiple occasions, and as a responsible NATO member, it must honour it like all other allies. Moreover, at the Summit, Defence Minister Bill Blair announced the government’s intention to purchase up to 12 submarines. However, he gave no deadline. Moreover, no funding is provided in either DND’s existing capital plan or the fiscal framework for what could be the most expensive defence procurement in Canadian history, likely outstripping the cost of the Canadian Surface Combatant project and the F-35 acquisition.</p> -<p>The anticipated end of the Russian-Ukrainian gas contract in December 2024 has brought to the forefront the challenges that the Transnistrian economy, government, and people would face if Russian gas were to no longer flow there for free. Even if this gas were provided at cost, the difference in price would be so significant that it would crash the Transnistrian economy and lead to a refugee crisis. This means that it is in both Chisinau’s and Tiraspol’s interest to find a long-term solution to Transnistria’s energy instability.</p> +<p>In his Washington press conference, the PM also argued that Canada should not be judged exclusively on its defence spending, as “we continually step up and punch above our weight” on the world stage. This worn-out cliché may have been true in the immediate post-Cold War period or the Afghanistan conflict, but it is demonstrably false now. For example, Canada has provided Ukraine with considerable assistance since Russia’s invasion, but it barely ranks in the top 20 donors as a percentage of GDP. In terms of major military equipment, including tanks and artillery, Canadian support to Kyiv has been, at best, modest. Canada has assisted in the recent strengthening of NATO’s eastern flank through its Enhanced Forward Presence commitment to Latvia. Still, concerns remain about whether the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) can find the personnel to increase the battle group to full brigade size. Canada’s increased military presence in the Indo-Pacific region as part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy is marginal (from two to three frigates). Defence spending under the Strategy is pegged at a minuscule $500 million over five years, and Canada is still not a member of the AUKUS military partnership comprising the U.S., U.K. and Australia (namely pillar 2 focused on advanced military capabilities) despite public pronouncements of interest. Canada’s defence presence in the Middle East is virtually invisible. The same can be said in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). While the government’s refusal to deploy troops to Haiti to quell gang violence may well have been the correct decision, it did the U.S. no favours. And in Africa, Canada is best remembered recently for a mission to Mali in 2017 that took forever to execute and was seen by many as little more than a box-ticking exercise.</p> -<p>The negotiations along this pathway toward long-term energy sustainability for Transnistria, as an integrated part of Moldova, must be conducted between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Chisinau will have more leverage in 2025 than ever before; the Chisinau-Vulcanesti power line will give Chisinau the first electrical power line that does not run through Transnistria. As discussed earlier, by 2025, at a minimum, the transit method for providing Russian gas to Transnistria will have changed. These are key leverage points for Chisinau to use to bring Tiraspol leadership to the table in developing a collaborative, realistic, and time-bound plan to further reintegrate Transnistria with Moldova.</p> +<h3 id="2-the-next-us-administration">2. The Next U.S. Administration</h3> -<hr /> +<p>While it is difficult to predict whether recent steps by the Government to increase defence spending and enhance military capabilities will impress the U.S. and other allies, there is little doubt that Washington will expect Canada to follow through on these commitments and likely do even more. The focus in Canada is currently on the possible implications of a Trump administration, especially given recent comments by the former president that he would refuse to protect NATO allies which do not meet the 2% defence spending target. Vice-Presidential candidate J.D. Vance echoed these sentiments at the Republican convention in July, declaring that there would be “no more free rides for nations betraying the generosity of the American taxpayer.”</p> -<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development (PPD) and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a leading global think tank.</p> +<p>Whether Republican or Democrat, the next U.S. government will seek strong Allied support in a dangerous and unpredictable world, including from Canada. While Trump may pull back from NATO and pursue a negotiated settlement in Ukraine, there is consensus in Washington that China is a major global threat that must be confronted. The U.S. needs Allied support to do this. Beyond any direct threats from Russia or China, the U.S. will seek allies to protect its back in other regions, such as Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Africa.</p> -<p><strong>Leah Kieff</strong> is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS. She has spent almost a decade tackling complex policy and operational challenges in senior roles across executive branch agencies, including but not limited to the Department of Homeland Security, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, and the White House.</p> +<p>For the U.S., then, Allied defence spending and capability, as well as a willingness to deploy troops to trouble spots in support of Western interests, will be a major litmus test. And for those that fail to respond, there will be a price to pay, including in other policy areas such as trade. Canada knows this all too well. It was understood in 2017 that the publication of SSE and an associated increase in defence spending would be a useful chip in the CUSMA poker game. Then Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin raised the 2% issue with Canadian Finance Minister Bill Morneau on every occasion they met.</p> -<p><strong>Thomas Bryja</strong> is a program coordinator and research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS. In this role, he supports the program’s research agenda, business development, and administrative management. His analytical focus is on leveraging nonmilitary power to advance the interests of the United States abroad and, in particular, to confront China’s growing global influence.</p>Daniel F. Runde, et al.Russia has attempted to exert influence over Moldova through manipulating or threatening to manipulate energy prices and flows, and until recently, Moldova’s long-standing efforts to develop and reform its energy sector have produced minimal results.Ore To Ordnance2024-10-10T12:00:00+08:002024-10-10T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ore-to-ordnance<p><em>This report focuses on Russia’s artillery supply chain, as artillery is central to the invasion of Ukraine and has inflicted more than 70% of Ukraine’s casualties. Disrupting Russia’s access to ammunition and new artillery barrels should therefore be a central focus for Ukraine’s supporters.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>The findings within this paper will empower Ukraine’s Western partners to coordinate sanctions, diplomatic pressure and civil society efforts to exploit the vulnerabilities of Russia’s artillery supply chain and reduce its access to ammunition and barrels.</em></p> +<p>Canada’s defence record will be a target of any new administration, especially given our shared continental geography with the U.S. The recent statement by an unnamed senior Canadian official that the U.S. never raises concerns privately with Canada about defence spending reflects either naïveté or wishful thinking. Even if true, it may be more a sign that U.S. officials have grown tired of lecturing the Canadians and have effectively given up hope that Ottawa will respond. However, this is unlikely to be the case with a new administration, especially if the international security environment continues to deteriorate and/or pressure grows within NATO to revise the defence spending target upwards to 2.5% or even 3%.</p> -<p>So far, attempts to disrupt Russia’s military supply chains have achieved some successes, with thousands of Russian entities and individuals sanctioned, and evidence of raw materials being diverted from the Russian supply chain. By and large, however, they have targeted components or high-priority items that are difficult to disrupt, such as microchips, and have not taken a view as to which supply chains should be disrupted. Instead, the current approach has been to try and restrict the access of the entire Russian defence industry to key materials and equipment like machine tools. While this approach is admirable in its ambition and has produced many sanctions and even some effects, it has struggled to measurably restrict the growth of Russia’s defence industry and its ability to fuel the war. This paper’s findings indicate that a more effective approach is to focus on a single supply chain and identify the raw materials, products and machinery that sit outside Russia and must be imported. These elements of the supply chain may be open to Western interventions from a variety of angles, and their limited nature, combined with the overall importance of artillery, could empower governments to focus disruption efforts on these elements, to meaningfully degrade and disrupt Russia’s artillery supply chain.</p> +<h3 id="3-how-to-restore-canadas-military-credibility-with-the-us-a-ten-point-plan">3. How to Restore Canada’s Military Credibility with the U.S.: A Ten-Point Plan</h3> -<p>To evidence this, this paper provides a comprehensive analysis of Russia’s artillery supply chain – from raw iron ore, cotton and sulphuric acid to the 2S19 Msta-S howitzers – to identify vulnerabilities that could be disrupted by Ukraine’s Western partners. It also provides an indication of the expansion of Russia’s defence industry that is currently underway. The objective of this research is to show the ways in which Russia’s supply chains are truly vulnerable, and to inform future policy decisions that are taken towards supply chain disruption.</p> +<p>What can Canada do to restore its defence reputation with the U.S., keeping in mind that whatever it does should ultimately be in the national interest? (We should also recognize, of course. that having a healthy relationship with the U.S. is just as much in Canada’s interest).</p> -<p>This has led to three key conclusions:</p> +<p>Here is a 10-point plan to help put Canada back in the good graces of its most important defence partner.</p> <ol> <li> - <p>Russia’s artillery supply chain is complex, but exposed in procurement of key raw materials and components from abroad. More than 70% of Russia’s computer numerical control machines come from China, 55% of its chromium is imported, and its imports of nitrocellulose have increased by 70% since 2022, for example.</p> + <p><strong>Live up to our commitments:</strong> If Canada says it will do something on defence, it should do so expeditiously. The current government has earned a well-deserved reputation for making defence announcements and quickly moving on. Implementation is often an afterthought — a variation on the military expression “fire and forget.” Whether hitting the 2% target, pursuing NORAD modernization, deploying troops internationally or procuring equipment (including submarines), the focus must be quick and efficient implementation and results. As the Washington Post leaks demonstrated, Canada currently lacks credibility in the U.S. because it does not follow through, or at least takes its time to do so. The Arctic was cited as a specific example. Canada needs to demonstrate a sense of urgency and strategic vision on the defence file — ad hoc or piecemeal announcements in response to the latest crisis or NATO pressure will not suffice.</p> </li> <li> - <p>There is redundancy within the supply chain, and even a complete disruption of the Plastmass ammunition plant – a major producer – would not lead to a collapse in Russia’s ammunition supply. It could remove 300,000 rounds from Russia’s artillery ammunition production capacity, but there are alternative sources. This necessitates a comprehensive and focused approach to disruption, with intra- and inter-governmental coordination.</p> + <p><strong>Develop a detailed plan to reach 2% defence spending:</strong> The PM’s announcement that Canada expects to reach the 2% target by 2032 was the easy part. The government now needs to show how it will get there while at the same time addressing Parliamentary Budget Office concerns that the deadline may not be achievable. The U.S. government and Congress will be watching closely. It would be even better to reach the target in less than eight years.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Russia’s defence industry is expanding, with major works identified at the Perm and Kazan Gunpowder plants, Izhevsk Unmanned Systems Research and Production Association, several armoured-machine repair plants and Kurganpribor. However, the industry faces challenges such as a lack of personnel and a crumbling rail infrastructure that is struggling to meet the demands of the war, as well as the need for imported machinery to meet its aggressive expansion goals. There is a window of opportunity for Western governments to slow this expansion; otherwise, they risk facing a rejuvenated and more capable Russian defence industry when the invasion of Ukraine is over.</p> + <p><strong>Meet other NATO targets:</strong> NATO states have agreed to spend 20% of their defence budgets on research and capital equipment. Canada is one of only two member states that have failed to meet this objective. The DPU states that Canada is “on target” to achieve the goal but does not specify a timeframe. The government should set one. Two years would be appropriate.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Address P&amp;P (Procurement and Personnel):</strong> Implementation of the DPU will be challenging unless the CAF addresses its procurement and personnel issues. If the CAF cannot purchase equipment faster and more efficiently while at the same time increasing its personnel levels (there is a current shortfall of approximately 16,000 men and women in uniform, plus a shortage of civilians to support the procurement process), the policy will be an empty shell. Showing Washington that we are taking concrete steps to fix these fundamental and long-standing problems will enhance trust.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Maintain the focus on the Arctic:</strong> Prioritizing the Arctic was a wise policy choice in the DPU — it supports both our national interest and that of the U.S. in a major strategic theatre where Russia and China pose an emerging threat. The U.S. is relying on Canada to do its part in this region. Maintaining the North as both a policy and operational priority is critical. Moving quickly on specific capabilities will show good faith (unlike the projects for the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship and the Nanisivik refueling station, which were announced nearly 20 years ago and have still not been completed). In addition, now that Canada has committed $40 billion over 20 years to modernize NORAD, it needs to make this upgrade happen. This is a primordial U.S. priority. If the U.S. seeks our support, Canada should remain open to further bilateral cooperation in related areas, including ballistic missile defence.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Continue to support Ukraine and European security:</strong> While the U.S. commitment to Ukraine may change with a Trump administration, Washington will still appreciate every bit of military assistance Canada can provide to Europe. In addition to direct support to Ukraine, meeting the Latvia brigade group commitment will be key.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Do more in the Indo-Pacific:</strong> Defending Ukraine is critical to Western interests, but China is the most significant long-term threat to the U.S. Canada’s military presence in the Indo-Pacific remains small. Some have described the region’s recent strategy and associated funding as a down payment on greater engagement in the future. If so, increased priority should be placed on defence and security, especially if Canada hopes to be considered a serious regional player by the U.S. and other Five Eyes allies. Naval and air capabilities must top the list.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Do the U.S. a favour elsewhere in the world:</strong> Of course, any international deployment must be in Canada’s national interest. However, Ottawa must take the request seriously if the U.S. calls for help in LAC, Africa, or the Middle East. As the French ambassador stated, a nation needs a strong military and must be prepared to use it. A possible peace settlement in the Middle East with a subsequent U.N. mission may be an opportunity. However, LAC is also in our backyard, and we have significant experience in Africa (one caveat: do not repeat the mistakes of Mali). Of course, the ability to deploy troops overseas will depend very much on fixing the CAF’s personnel problems.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Be proactive:</strong> Canada should not always wait for the U.S. to ask for help. The government should try to anticipate, i.e., seek opportunities to assist Washington before it picks up the phone. Again, the Middle East may be a region where the U.S. will need a helping hand once a settlement is reached between Israel and Hamas. The government should be contemplating a role for Canada now.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Put defence in a larger National Security context:</strong> The U.S. rarely talks about defence in isolation. It fits defence into a broader national security paradigm that includes, among other things, intelligence and foreign policy tools. Canada needs to do the same. At home, Canada has recently lurched from crisis to crisis while dealing with threats such as foreign interference and espionage, responding with stop-gap measures. When will we see the recently promised National Security Strategy to address both domestic and international threats and strengthen cooperation with the U.S. against hostile state activities, including in such areas as critical minerals? And when will we see a foreign policy statement that identifies Canada’s international security priorities and shows the U.S. and others where it can add value? What will Canada do more broadly in the world (for example, through arms control efforts or sanctions) to help the U.S. counter the likes of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea?</p> </li> </ol> -<p>At the same time, elements of Russia’s artillery supply chain are relatively robust and contained within its borders. This led to the conclusion and key recommendation from the paper, which is that Ukraine’s Western partners can achieve the greatest impact by focusing on Russia’s import of key materials before they reach the country. These parts of the supply chain are the most vulnerable to external influence, whereas the elements that sit inside Russia, or can be smuggled with relative ease, are difficult to regulate without coordinated corporate compliance, and often have established networks for sanctions evasion. Disruption should, of course, focus on vulnerabilities rather than taking a broad-spectrum approach, and within the gamut of vulnerabilities, Western governments are most likely to have success against those outside Russia’s borders. For example, it is apparent that Russia is facing recruitment challenges in its expansion: this is a vulnerability, but it may prove difficult to disrupt recruitment from Washington or London. Another vulnerability is that many companies in the artillery supply chain rely on Western machinery and/or Western businesses, or still have European subsidiaries that keep them supplied with key materials and components. This report shows the role that these companies play in the supply of howitzers and ammunition to the frontlines and indicates that targeted efforts to disrupt these elements of the supply chain are more likely to lead to success than a broad spectrum approach, and may create the disruption that policy makers are hoping for.</p> +<h3 id="4-conclusion">4. Conclusion</h3> -<p>Ukraine has demonstrated determination and bravery from day one of the invasion and has upset Russia’s military plans time and again. However, Russia’s greater economic and industrial capacity is likely to be a determining factor in the ultimate outcome of the war. This need not be the case: Russia’s industrial might can and should be disrupted with a focused effort on the artillery supply chain. Doing so will save Ukrainian lives, degrade Russia’s offensive and defensive capabilities, and weaken its overall ability to fight the war in the way that its units have grown accustomed to. The Russian threat will not disappear, regardless of what happens in Ukraine – the expansion of its defence industry and armed forces makes this clear. However, there is a window of opportunity for Western powers to disrupt this expansion and slow production to prevent further Russian successes in 2025. That window is small, but Ukraine and its Western partners have the tools and knowledge to make the most of it and reduce the threat posed by Russia.</p> +<p>While trade and commerce are often placed at the epicentre of the Canada-US relationship, defence can play a no less important role. The U.S. ultimately defines almost every major bilateral relationship in terms of National Security. And with the world at an “inflection point” (one of President Biden’s favourite catchphrases), Washington will look to allies more than ever for support. It will also increasingly examine other major bilateral policy issues, including trade, through a defence/security lens.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>If Canada hopes to maintain a healthy relationship with the next U.S. administration, it must devote greater attention to defence. With the current state of the world, Canada should strengthen its military capabilities first and foremost for reasons of national interest (namely the protection of our citizens, the promotion of our prosperity and the defence of our democratic values), as well as out of self-respect and Alliance responsibility. But there is no shame in acknowledging that addressing our southern neighbour’s concerns over our commitment to defence is also a priority. It bears repeating — being a strong and reliable ally to the U.S. is in our national interest.</p> -<p>This paper provides a comprehensive overview of Russia’s artillery supply chain. It set out with the ambitious goal of mapping the supply chain, from the extraction and processing of raw materials needed for producing howitzers and ammunition, to their delivery to the frontline in Ukraine. The goal of the paper is to inform a cross-government, and ideally inter-governmental, approach to disrupting this specific supply chain.</p> +<p>Bolstering Canada’s defence capabilities in these desperate times will be no easy task. Public support remains soft, and the government faces many other domestic challenges. The government has recently taken some encouraging steps in the defence realm. However, they can only be viewed as preliminary given the current threat environment — further initiatives and resources will be required. Some additional steps are suggested in this paper, but they are unlikely to be carried out in their entirety and certainly not overnight. But further Allied pressure will be applied to the government, whether Liberal or Conservative, to take serious, systematic and concrete steps to build a strong Canadian Armed Forces capable of operating in a complex and dangerous world. Such a military will serve Canadian interests and help solidify the relationship with our most important ally and partner.</p> -<p>The research has been conducted through the layering of different datasets and the expertise of a research team built specifically for this type of task. The data used includes: records from commercial providers of trade data; trade data from the UN; and publicly available information released either by the companies and enterprises involved, or through leaked financial records seen by the report authors that reveal the nature of contracts between Russian manufacturers. Extensive analysis has been conducted of Russia’s internal railway data, which was obtained via a commercial trade platform, to provide additional granularity on the nature of supply between manufacturers. Many online sources are no longer available, as Russian websites relating to defence are frequently changed or removed, and company websites may have been altered to obscure their involvement in Russia’s defence industry. The Wayback Machine (https://web.archive.org/) and other internet archives have been used to locate and interrogate past iterations of websites.</p> +<hr /> -<p>That data has been collated and organised to detail the process required to get from iron ore to a finished howitzer, or from cotton to a propellant charge for an artillery projectile. The research is focused on Russia’s manufacturers of 122 mm, 152 mm and 203 mm howitzer ammunition, and 82 mm and 120 mm mortar ammunition. However, many of the companies involved in this supply chain also produce components for rocket ammunition and anti-tank guided missiles. The paper sets out to establish which elements of the supply chain might prove vulnerable to the policy levers available to a Western government, such as the application of sanctions, diplomatic pressure, preclusive purchases, or the disruption of financial transactions.</p> +<p><strong>Vincent Rigby</strong> was National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister from 2020 to 2021 and served in Canada’s Public Service for 30 years in a variety of departments and agencies across government, including the Privy Council Office, Global Affairs Canada, Public Safety Canada, the Department of National Defence and the former Canadian International Development Agency. His career focused on security and intelligence, foreign policy, defence, and development issues. He is currently the Slater Family Professor of Practice at McGill University’s Max Bell School of Public Policy. He is also a senior fellow with the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, as well as a senior advisor with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC. He holds an MA in history from Carleton University.</p>Vincent RigbyThis report assesses the challenges facing the U.S.-Canada relationship as it pertains to military spending and argues that Washington will expect Canada to follow through on the spending commitments.Accountability In Cyberspace2024-10-16T12:00:00+08:002024-10-16T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/accountability-in-cyberspace<p><em>Outlining the regional approaches, challenges, and solutions to the cyber accountability question in Latin America.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>The pursuit of accountability as an absolute goal can limit policymakers from important considerations such as domestic and regional ambitions, economic priorities, and cultural context. In Latin America, governments and other stakeholders face internal challenges to the cybersecurity agenda that sideline accountability. This includes a growing reliance on the United States and China for digital infrastructure, the increasing militarization of cyber capabilities, and the often more pressing issue of economic growth and development. For any efforts in the region to take root, interpreting accountability and state responsibility in the context of regional politics and historical context is critical.</p> + +<h3 id="contextualizing-accountability-in-latin-america">Contextualizing Accountability in Latin America</h3> + +<p>The UN framework for responsible state behavior and an evolving interpretation of how international law applies to cyberspace has set a normative benchmark for state conduct in cyberspace. However, the ways through which states interpret those international commitments and translate them domestically is an ongoing exercise – an important one nonetheless, as accountability relies on the domestic and international levers that countries devise to hold other state and non-state actors accountable for their actions, as well as the domestic mechanisms that also introduce checks and balances for their own actions in cyberspace.</p> + +<p>While it is beyond the scope of this paper to conceptualize accountability, there are at least two dimensions of accountability that are relevant for the purposes of this piece. The first refers to negative accountability, that is, the actions taken by one party to ensure that the other party is made responsible for their acts or neglect. This could include, for example, sanctions or public attribution for malicious activities that violate the norms for responsible state behavior. The second refers to positive accountability, that is, the proactive measures by states and other stakeholders that support either a domestic or international regime that is more open, transparent, and/or inclusive. Examples of positive accountability range from international and domestic due diligence measures, development of cyber capacities, promotion and protection of human rights in cyberspace, and inclusive and democratic policy development, among others. This piece focuses largely on positive accountability, domestic and regional enablers and constraints, and cultural nuances for thinking about cyber accountability and responsibility from a practice-oriented perspective.</p> + +<p>Latin America has its own pathways, experiences, and challenges in interpreting the links between accountability and cybersecurity. In fact, neither Portuguese nor Spanish possesses an exact word for “accountability”. The translation of the term relates to the responsibility of an organization or state for its decisions (and the consequences deriving from them), which is called “prestação de contas” or “redicion de cuentas” – the act of reporting or accounting for certain actions. The objective of this paper is thus to provide a contextualized, non-exhaustive view of enablers and blockers for accountability in cyberspace as it relates to the countries in the region.</p> -<p>The paper gives a brief explanation of the role that artillery plays in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and why it is important to focus disruption efforts on that supply chain. It sets out the component parts of a typical howitzer before exploring the supply chain for Russian howitzers in detail. The same process is repeated for artillery ammunition, taking raw materials as the starting point. The key companies involved in each step of the process are profiled, and where possible, the volume of their transactions with the Russian Ministry of Defence (Russian MoD) are indicated. The final element of the artillery supply chain – the delivery of howitzers and ammunition to the frontlines – is briefly covered to provide an overall picture of the Russian artillery lifecycle.</p> +<p>Analyses of cybersecurity maturity and development in the region (and elsewhere) have often concentrated on “technical” or “cyber-specific” markers, such as the development of a national Computer Emergency Response Team (nCERT) or a National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS). These and other maturity assessments have served, at times, as indicators of the responsibility of states in cyberspace within the region, as they directly relate to the measurement of the capacities of these countries to operationalize and implement the framework for responsible state behavior. While important, the discussion about accountability (or lack thereof) within Latin America (and arguably in other regions) needs to be understood as intimately connected to deeper historical, regulatory, and economic roots – all of which intersect in complex ways with the trajectory of cybersecurity agendas nationally and regionally.</p> -<p>Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Western countries have brought hundreds of sanctions into force against Russian companies and individuals. They have applied tools such as diplomatic pressure and public shaming of companies in a bid to limit Russia’s access to key Western technology. This approach has enjoyed some success, but has failed to prevent the growth of Russia’s domestic defence industry, or to alter the balance of power in the invasion. If Ukraine is to win, Russia’s artillery supply chain must be disrupted; no theory of victory for Ukraine will be viable as long as Russia’s supply of artillery systems and ammunition remains intact. This paper aims to help address this challenge by providing an assessment of where this supply chain is vulnerable to external action by Western governments, and showing that Russia’s defence industry is far from the Soviet behemoth of the 1980s.</p> +<p>The first of those complex intersections refers to the securitization and militarization of cybersecurity – both institutionally and in terms of technological development. Despite the history of military dictatorships, the relative peace amongst countries in the region has led to the repurposing of military personnel as a backup for civilian capacities to protect, defend, and respond to domestic security issues, including organized crime. For some countries, the armed forces have also become one of the national epicenters for the development of cyber capabilities. Militarised approaches to cyber policies and institutions, and strong emphases on combatting online crime, relate to different trajectories of securitization of cybersecurity in Latin America that have, time and again, posed a challenge for greater accountability. Even so, competing security and economic incentives have created disjointed narratives with a securitized and militarized vision of cyberspace, on the one hand, and the commitment to market innovation, digital economy, and digital security, on the other.</p> -<h3 id="chapter-1-why-artillery">Chapter 1: Why Artillery?</h3> +<p>Secondly, questions around economic stability have impacted the pace, consistency, and political visibility of cybersecurity developments in the region. Economic stifling in Latin America following the 2008 global economic crisis, compounded by COVID-19, has led to a “second lost decade” of development in the region. This was marked by an average 0.9% annual growth between 2014-2023. Unsurprisingly, the difficult road for sustained economic development in Latin America has had a direct impact on cybersecurity. Even though it has reinforced the region’s commitment to capacity building, it has equally affected the degree through which political elites view cybersecurity as a priority – given other more pressing areas underpinning economic development.</p> -<p>The balance of artillery between Russia and Ukraine is the single greatest determinant of the distribution of casualties and equipment loss, the balance of military initiative, the calculus of what is operationally possible, and thus the political perception of the trajectory of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.</p> +<p>Thirdly, growing dependency on the US and China for infrastructure provision poses significant geostrategic challenges and pressures for Latin American countries as they seek to combine both relationships in their favor. According to the World Bank, the United States remains the main export and import partner for Latin America and Caribbean countries, with China only slightly below the US in export markets. However, tensions have been constant around the provision of digital services and infrastructure. As of 2022, Huawei, ZTE, China Unicom, China Telecom, and China Mobile have at least 36 facilities distributed across Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina.</p> -<p>The initial Russian invasion force that entered Ukraine on 24 February 2022 fielded 2,214 artillery systems, of which 1,635 were howitzers and 579 were multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). Russia originally viewed the invasion as a “Special Military Operation” in which the military component was to conduct a coup de main to capitalise on the destabilisation of the Ukrainian state by Russia’s special services. When this failed, the Russian military found itself fighting the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which fielded 1,176 tube artillery systems and 1,680 MRLs, in a conventional war. Alongside Ukraine’s resolve, and Russian disorganisation, this imbalance in artillery in Ukraine’s favour was a key factor in the defeat of Russian forces north of Kyiv and near Kharkiv, Sumy and Chernihiv, and Ukraine’s successful retention of Donbas.</p> +<p>It is within this context of complex intersections between the region’s historical and recent past that cyber accountability should be interpreted. To do so, the paper is divided into two main parts.</p> -<p>Ukraine, however, only had ammunition to support its artillery park until mid-May 2022. The result was that when Russia regrouped and launched an offensive on Donbas, it was able to achieve an indirect fires superiority of up to 20:1 in some areas, as Ukraine’s artillery was starved of munitions. It is also important to note that this disparity in artillery gave the Kremlin the confidence that they could defeat the AFU without mobilising additional troops, despite being outnumbered by Ukraine at this time. Artillery is the centre of gravity for Russia’s ground forces. It is seen as the most efficient means to defeat an opponent’s forces, either through destruction or by weakening them to such an extent that an offensive is certain to succeed. Recognising the central and foundational role of artillery in Russia’s armed forces is key to understanding the priorities for disrupting Russia’s war machine. Whereas NATO forces broadly see artillery as a supporting element that is designed to set the conditions for manoeuvre forces to engage an enemy, the Russians see manoeuvre forces as responsible for both getting the enemy into a position where artillery can defeat them, and then exploit the destruction achieved by artillery. This was what Russia was doing to the AFU in Donbas in May to June 2022. It is also why, when the AFU received the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) from its international partners and began to unpick Russian artillery logistics, this brought Russian forces to a standstill, ceding the initiative to Ukraine, until Russia began the process of military mobilisation over the winter of 2022 to 2023.</p> +<h3 id="enabling-positive-accountability-through-policy-responses">Enabling Positive Accountability Through Policy Responses</h3> -<p>Since Russian mobilisation, the artillery advantage has consistently sat with Russia. Russia reached a high point in its rate of fire at around 38,000 rounds per day in June 2022. For the remainder of the war, the rate of Russian fire has been fairly consistent, at between 7,000 and 16,000 rounds per day, averaging at around 10,000 rounds per day. Ukrainian artillery fire, meanwhile, peaked at around 9,000 rounds per day, and has rarely exceeded 6,000 rounds per day, while in early 2024, Ukraine was firing fewer than 1,800 rounds per day. This disparity is largely a product of Russia’s deep stockpiles and industrial mobilisation.</p> +<p>There are different ways in which countries can engage in positive accountability. That is the case of National Cybersecurity Strategies (NCS), which have become a key component to cyber accountability – and an equally relevant part of the development of responsible cyber behavior within the Latin American context in particular. These documents often represent the outcome of cross-government discussions, a public signal of the country’s interest in cybersecurity, and a confidence and transparency measure insofar as it translates the government’s ambitions to the broader population.</p> -<p>In addition to its fielded artillery park, Russia entered the war with approximately 13,985 artillery systems and 2,700 MRLs in storage, though not all of them were suitable for restoration. Ukraine has succeeded in inflicting sustained losses on Russia’s artillery park, but Russia’s defence industry has mobilised for war and is working to replace those losses. Many of the enterprises involved in Russia’s artillery supply chain are working triple shifts. As a consequence, the Ukrainian General Staff assessed in February 2024 that the Russian Operational Group of Forces inside Ukraine was fielding 4,780 tube artillery systems, as well as 1,130 MRLs. Despite the losses inflicted by Ukraine, Russia has managed to increase the number of artillery systems available to its forces over the opening invasion force.</p> +<p>Throughout the past decade, many countries in Latin America have developed their own NCSs, with some having merely published their first version, others being in the process of developing or publishing a second version, and some already having laws on the topic. Most of these documents follow a similar structure, covering strategic pillars such as cybersecurity governance, development of a legal/policy framework, research and development, and cooperation.</p> -<p>Russia has also succeeded in stabilising the supply of ammunition to support its rate of fire. Russian ammunition production for 152 mm howitzers quadrupled in the first year of the war to one million rounds. By the end of 2023, Russia had increased the totality of its ammunition production and is expected to produce 1.325 million new 152 mm rounds in 2024, as well as 800,000 122 mm rounds, and to refurbish an even larger number of rounds from remaining stockpiles. It is procuring millions more from North Korea, Iran, Syria and Belarus. By comparison, the AFU has received more than 600 155 mm howitzers from Ukraine’s international partners, but a significant proportion of these have been destroyed, and ammunition supplies have been limited.</p> +<p>While important, NCSs do not always mean that there is high political commitment to a cybersecurity agenda – and despite being a positive accountability measure domestically, its impact in ensuring greater political traction of cybersecurity or government-wide accountability should be taken with a grain of salt. Visibility of the topic by the presidency or political elites in the region remains minimal considering the competing and more pressing national agendas facing countries in Latin America such as climate resilience, public security, and economic stability (i.e. handling rising inflation). However, lack of political visibility does not mean that some countries have not been consistent with their cyber policy development. At times, it means that bureaucratic or sector-specific leads can push forward, albeit slowly. That is the case of Colombia, which now has three versions of their NCS, each of which has a different emphasis on cyber defense (2011) and digital security (2016, and 2020).</p> -<p>This disparity has had a range of tangible effects on the course of the fighting. The considerable attention paid to first-person view (FPV) drones conceals the reality that artillery continues to be the biggest cause of death and injury among Ukrainian troops. The actual percentage varies along the length of the frontline and is not uniform, but a paper written by the Global Medical and Surgical Support Group in 2023 observed that 70% of all Ukrainian combat casualties had been caused by Russian artillery. The casualties often suffered severe wounds, including polytrauma to multiple organ systems, which, if not fatal, would likely prevent them from returning to service. Russian artillery has also inflicted widespread concussion among Ukrainian troops subjected to barrage, with multiple concussions over time leading to personnel having to be withdrawn from the front.</p> +<p>While lack of political visibility can be associated with limited accountability and transparency beyond a small group of bureaucratic or sector-specific leads, this is not always the case. High political visibility has, at times, resulted in the politicization and polarisation of cybersecurity discussions. That was the case of Colombia’s legislative proposals for the establishment of a National Cybersecurity Agency. Despite an agreement on the importance of having an agency, when the time came for the proposal to be presented, senators from the opposition associated the agency with a “spy agency” against citizens and other political parties – something that not even key privacy advocates and civil society organizations in Colombia had perceived as such.</p> -<p>The continued disparity in fire is one reason why the Kremlin believes it can still win the war. With approximately 1,200 km of active frontline, Ukraine must maintain enough combat-capable personnel to both hold defensive positions across this area and have enough reserves to rotate its units. The rate of rotation is increased in those sectors where units are under pressure. The accumulation of killed and wounded, with artillery injuries often causing wounds that prevent troops from returning to service even if they survive, is a strategic threat to Ukraine’s ability to sustain the war effort. As of August 2024, the Russian theory of victory does not centre on major breakthroughs, but rather on the destruction of the AFU as a force capable of defending the breadth of front through attrition, and it is artillery that is primarily inflicting the constant attrition of Ukrainian troops. The Russian leadership likely believes it can kill its way out of the war, and artillery will be key to doing that.</p> +<p>Other contextual factors, such as large-scale cybersecurity incidents have, on the other hand, helped propel further policy developments as well as promote visibility of cybersecurity challenges facing countries in the region both domestically and internationally. The Conti Russia-based ransomware group’s 5-day intrusion on Costa Rica’s government ministries in 2022 led to an unprecedented declaration of a state of emergency. Part of the incident also took place during a presidential transition, raising pressures for the incoming government of Rodrigo Chaves to regroup and respond accordingly. Domestically, it has led to a series of policy developments. One of the immediate outcomes include heightened international cooperation between Costa Rica and the United States, Spain, and Israel – all of which already possessed Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with the country. This was followed by a series of legislative proposals for a National Cybersecurity Agency and a national cybersecurity policy. Ultimately, it resulted on the publication of the country’s first NCS 2023-2027. In 2023, Costa Rica also joined the International Counter Ransomware Initiative and published its views on how international law applies to cyberspace, becoming the second country in the region to do so.</p> -<p>Furthermore, so long as Russia maintains a substantial advantage in artillery systems, it can use tactics that will, over time, deplete the AFU of reserves – a critical vulnerability for Ukraine. For example, fixing the AFU into defending terrain can allow Russian artillery to inflict significant casualties on Ukrainian forces as they rotate and are resupplied. In other cases, Russia has used its artillery to destroy Ukrainian towns that come into range. This has fixed the AFU politically into defending unfavourable terrain to delay the widespread depopulation of nearby population centres.</p> +<p>Despite the disruptiveness of large-scale incidents and their capacity to stress test a country’s capacity to react and respond, they also trigger policy processes. As Costa Rica’s case illustrates, the country has started to effectively invest and receive substantive support only after the incident. Such a combination has led to an increased interest and commitment of the country to enhance its own stance both on domestic and international cyber accountability.</p> -<p>Russia’s artillery advantage also constrains Ukraine’s tactical options, thereby limiting the risk to Russian forces. For example, during the Ukrainian offensive of 2023, Ukraine managed to concentrate 55 155 mm howitzers on its main axis of advance, as well as a variety of Soviet calibre guns along the front. The total number of Ukrainian guns in action is sensitive and therefore remains undisclosed, but suffice to say that it was unable to properly resource the artillery fight in support of its offensive. Russia fielded 720 guns and 230 MRLs across the southern front, and was able to concentrate a significant proportion of those around priority areas. This meant that the Ukrainian artillery concentration struggled to be brought forward because of strikes from Lancet-3M loitering munitions and counter-battery fire on what was a limited frontage. Thus, Ukrainian forces advanced into a fire pocket where they could not suppress Russian artillery, and so accepted disproportionate risk if they rose from their trenches. Given Ukraine’s need to husband limited artillery and ammunition stockpiles, this situation meant that any advance had to be carefully planned and executed, both reducing the number of points at which Ukraine could dynamically threaten Russian units and slowing the tempo of Ukrainian operations. If the conditions for successful offensive action were not obtained with sufficient quantities of howitzers and munitions, this would also increase the cost to the AFU as they were unable to counter the Russian fires superiority.</p> +<p>Going from reactive (i.e. developing policies and responses after a disruptive incident) to proactive approaches (i.e. investing in prevention) to cyber accountability can often be a non-linear process and an even greater challenge when there is limited capacity or political appetite. Even so, some of the countries that have developed their NCS have been seeking to transform strategic thinking into institutional development through the establishment of National Cybersecurity Agencies. That is the case of Chile, Brazil, Colombia, and others, although each of these countries has its particularities. In Colombia, there have been four legislative proposals for the establishment of an NCSA since 2023. Despite political controversies, two have not gone forward and two proposals remain, one proposed by the Ministry of Science and Technology and another by Senator David Luna. In Brazil, the Institutional Security Office of the Presidency – the body responsible for cyber policy development – has previously indicated its interest in presenting a bill to establish the Brazilian NCSA (Agência Nacional de Cibersegurança, or ANCiber). The draft bill was first circulated in mid-2023 and it included the establishment of ANCiber, which has yet to be presented to Congress at the time of writing.</p> -<p>Effectively constraining Russian artillery – even to achieve parity with the AFU as regards the availability at any given point in the front – would therefore have a transformative effect on the character of the war. It would achieve three things. First, it would reduce the rate of Ukraine’s casualties, alleviating the pressure of rotation, and thereby allowing the AFU to preserve the fighting power of its units in defence. Second, it would reduce Russia’s ability to punish Ukrainian attempts to conduct localised attacks, thereby increasing the proportion of Russian forces that must be held across the front to defend each sector, and so reducing the felt effect of Russia’s advantage in personnel along the front. Third, a consequence of the preceding effects would be to stabilise the front. Between the reduced attrition of the AFU and the reduced offensive combat power of Russian forces, limiting Russia’s access to artillery would likely undermine Russia’s theory of victory and make the conflict sustainable for Ukraine in the long term. This would protract the war, increasing the risk to the Russian economy. It would therefore reverse the current trajectory of the conflict, where Russian leverage in potential negotiations is gaining as the AFU becomes weaker, and would instead leave Russia with the prospect of accumulating damage to its critical national infrastructure, the depletion of its stockpiles, and the growing vulnerability of its domestic economy, without any confidence that it would achieve its objectives militarily. Even if negotiations end the intensity of the fighting, limiting Russia’s ability to regenerate its artillery stockpiles is critical to reducing the threat of renewed hostilities against Ukraine or a conventional threat emerging against Georgia, Moldova or European NATO.</p> +<p>The convergence of policy debates around the establishment of NCSAs in Latin America shows that there is institutional appetite to transform strategy into action. It also highlights that many of these countries share the view that the first step to do so entails designating a focal point for cybersecurity that has the competency to provide action and oversight over national cybersecurity. While most of the countries in the region are still discussing the NCSA, there are already other existing models of governance in place that reflect the specificity of how accountability is bounded to the country’s institutional culture. Uruguay is an emblematic case. Instead of having an NCSA, it established in 2005 a National Agency for E-Government and Information and Knowledge Society (Agesic). One year later, the country’s Accountability Law was amended to add information security as part of its core competencies: The agency was then tasked with “planning and coordinating projects related to Electronic Government as a basis for the transformation and greater transparency of the state and conceiving and developing a national policy on information security issues that allow prevention, detection, and response to incidents that may affect the country’s critical assets”.</p> -<p>The reduction in casualty rates and equipment loss for the AFU, were the volume of Russian artillery fire to be curtailed, could also allow new recruits to be kept in training for longer and formed into new units, rather than pushed to units on the front as battlefield replacements. Given that the West has a limited supply of artillery systems and armoured vehicles and is not yet producing equipment in sufficient quantities to replace losses, the reduction in the rate of equipment destruction at the front is also important if the AFU is to build new units for future operations. The reduction of Russia’s artillery park is therefore a prerequisite for Ukraine rebuilding its capacity to achieve the liberation of its occupied territories. The prospect of Ukraine regaining such a capability must necessarily increase the risk of Russia continuing the conflict, building Ukrainian leverage to terminate the conflict on favourable terms. The disruption of Russia’s artillery supply chains should consequently be of the highest priority for Ukraine’s international partners.</p> +<p>However, the discussion on accountability in cyberspace is not restricted to government agencies, bureaucratic elites, and a small pool of decision-makers. In addition to policy and institutional levers of accountability, some countries in the region have been historically and proactively engaged in technical cooperation. At the regional level, the Latin America and Caribbean Internet Address Registry (LACNIC) – responsible for assigning critical Internet resources and providing a forum for regional cooperation on Internet governance – has been one of the focal points for the technical security community to collaborate and exchange information. The LACNIC community established a Warning, Advice, and Reporting Point (WARP) in 2014 that later became the LACNIC CSIRT network. The network is composed by LACNIC members (i.e. national CERTs and private actors) and seeks to coordinate and strengthen incident response capacity as it relates to the Internet Protocol and Autonomous Systems through training, information sharing, and incident management. The Organisation of American States’ Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) has also established the CSIRTAmericas Network with national CERTs from over 20 countries in the region and has equally focused on supporting and developing incident response capacity across the Americas.</p> -<h3 id="chapter-2-what-makes-a-russian-howitzer">Chapter 2: What Makes a Russian Howitzer?</h3> +<p>These and other initiatives illustrate that governmental cyber accountability can and has benefited from non-governmental initiatives, especially when the focus has been to create a space for sustained technical collaboration with cybersecurity experts, companies, and other parts of the private sector and law enforcement. More importantly, it illustrates that a regime of positive domestic accountability can grow and expand if and when it leverages other stakeholders and initiatives. However, this section also highlights that accountability is not a one-sided coin or an absolute value that is achieved; there are complexities and nuances that need to be further unpacked and navigated. When considering broader government incentives to engage in cybersecurity at the domestic level, political visibility does not always translate into desirable political traction or accountability – even though legislative processes obey broader policymaking accountability measures already in place.</p> -<p>A howitzer is a large-calibre gun, over 100 mm in diameter, designed to fire large shells filled with high explosives. It can be self-propelled or towed. In Russian service, most self-propelled howitzers are based on tracked armoured vehicles designed during the Cold War.</p> +<h3 id="challenges-for-cyber-accountability">Challenges for Cyber Accountability</h3> -<p>The vehicle protects the crew from small arms fire and other howitzers, and carries the system’s ammunition. Towed howitzers are moved around by the crew, which operates out in the open, exposed to enemy fire. Ammunition is typically carried in the truck that tows the howitzer, or pre-positioned so that the gun can be moved between different areas.</p> +<p>Despite the gradual progress of countries in both policy and technical cooperation, the region still faces fundamental challenges when it comes to cyber accountability. The thirst for capacity development can often translate to countries seeking to “buy off” cybersecurity and not be guided by strong concerns around privacy and human rights.</p> -<p>The core component of a howitzer is its gun assembly, which includes the barrel, breech, a bore evacuator (on a self-propelled howitzer), and a muzzle brake. The gun assembly is installed into an armoured hull with electric servos that elevate the barrel, and recuperators that absorb the recoil generated by firing the gun. The vehicle that carries the barrel in a self-propelled howitzer is built from armoured steel that is rolled to the correct thickness, often while heated, and welded into shape. This becomes the hull, which is then fitted with an engine and transmission. A drive sprocket is attached to the transmission through final drives to provide the vehicle’s motion. The weight of the vehicle is supported through road wheels attached to torsion bar suspension, which all rest upon the track. The track is built using segments connected with pins, and helps disperse the vehicle’s weight over a wider area, which in turn improves its ability to cross weak terrain.</p> +<p>While it might be reasonable to assume that countries will seek to outsource their cybersecurity – a posture reflective of both developed and developing countries given the perennial ownership of services by the private sector – lack of commitment from ministries or certain parts of the public administration may feed a one-off, solutions-driven approach. There are different reasons why the debate about the outsourcing of cybersecurity tooling within a developing country context – especially Latin America – can present some challenges to cyber accountability.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/B3t1toS.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: D-30 2A18 Russian towed artillery.</strong> Source: Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<p>First, many of the technologies and solutions are not based in the region. This means that there is increased dependency of national governments on cybersecurity services based elsewhere (either with a national or regional office), especially the US. This external reliance has not always been dealt in the smoothest of ways and has previously raised significant tensions with US-based companies. In 2015 and 2016, WhatsApp was temporarily suspended because the company did not comply with law enforcement investigations in Brazil. A few years later, in 2022, Telegram was also “blocked” in Brazil after a Supreme Court ruling ordered the platform to comply with law enforcement. Albeit not strictly cybersecurity focused, the case illustrates an extreme measure taken in a context in which a government sought to reclaim its capacity to act in a highly privatized space. The challenges for countries in the region involve how to balance Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME), local, and international cybersecurity service providers. Neglecting other contractual avenues such as consortium models can balance dependencies in a small pool of companies and leverage local and global expertise, though this is beyond the scope of this paper and would require a piece all on its own.</p> -<p>Once the gun assembly, drive train and running gear have been added to the hull, the howitzer is fitted with a fire control system. The fire control system is a computer that is used to enter coordinates and meteorological data to support the firing of the howitzer. It generates ballistic calculations that, in an ideal setting, will account for air pressure, wind and the temperature of the ammunition. The ballistic calculation generates the elevation for the gun that will give the greatest chance of successfully delivering rounds against a target. A howitzer will typically carry a radio that allows the crew to communicate with other howitzers, its battery commander or the force that it is supporting.</p> +<p>Second, dependency in private and public support in areas such as threat intelligence and incident response also raise important challenges concerning the sustainability of investments and capabilities for countries in the region. In Costa Rica’s post-Conti recovery, the US committed $9.8 million to support the country in developing its own Cybersecurity Operations Center by 2026 through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grant. While important, it also raises the question of how countries such as Costa Rica will work to maintain existing licenses after the 2026 cycle of investment – and how they can transform immediate reliance on foreign support into a sustainable approach that diminishes external dependencies. Thus, even though cyber capacity building projects and international assistance might seek to address gaps, upskill, or provide technology and infrastructure support for countries in the region and elsewhere, it creates a double accountability risk: On the one hand, there is a risk of projects not effectively helping recipient countries transition from reliance on foreign aid to sustainable development of capacities; on the other hand, the risk is that donors invest in Cyber Capacity Building (CCB) and cyber crisis response but fall short of being accountable themselves for the impact and sustainability of investments made in a third country.</p> -<p>The final element that makes a howitzer is the ammunition. There are three components to an artillery round: the charge, the projectile and the fuse. The charge is built from nitrocellulose and propels the projectile out of the barrel at very high speeds in a ballistic arc towards the target. The projectile is made of steel with thick walls that may be pre-fragmented. The shell is filled with an explosive material that is detonated by the fuse. The fuse is a cone-shaped object that is screwed into the nose of the projectile before it is loaded into the gun; it detonates the explosive filling inside the projectile either when it hits the ground, or just above it.</p> +<p>However, the most concerning outcome of such a highly private dependent incentive’s structure is the acquisition of intrusive cyber capabilities (i.e. spyware or other tooling – such as Malware-as-a-Service or Access-as-a-Service made commercially available). For nearly a decade, countries in Latin America have reportedly used third-party spyware and often tooled against their own citizens. The infamous Italian group Hacking Team held Latin America as one of its biggest regional markets. Countries such as Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, and others were part of the extensive list of buyers – most of which were driven by governments’ intent on spying on political opponents.</p> -<p>Russia employs different calibre artillery systems to the West, including howitzers that are towed and self-propelled with 122 mm, 152 mm and 203 mm barrels. They are accompanied by mortars, which can also be towed or self-propelled and are used with 82 mm, 120 mm and 240 mm barrels.</p> +<p>Even though the Hacking Team may now look like a historical reference, the market supply for intrusive software remains compelling and attractive for countries in the region, arguably for the same reasons it did so 10 years ago. If in 2014 Ecuador was sending emails to Hacking Team asking them to provide the tool that would support the intelligence agency SENAIN in spying on a political dissident, in 2024 the Brazilian government fired the head of the intelligence agency after discovering that during Bolsonaro’s government the intelligence agency had been using Israeli tool FirstMile to eavesdrop on Supreme Court justices. Mexico, an already avid client of some of these tools, was the first country to close the deal with the Israeli company NSO Group and deploy the Pegasus tool against criminals and political opponents – and along with other Latin American countries such as El Salvador, which has also deployed the tool against civil society groups and journalists.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bWebmte.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Russian 122mm artillery shell.</strong> Source: Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<p>Even though many countries in the region do have data protection laws, the fact that some of them do not cover the protection of use of data for intelligence, national security, or public security cases, raises additional challenges for cyber accountability in the region. The Brazilian Data Protection Law (LGPD), though seen as an adaptation of the GDPR, notes in Art. 4 that the law is not applicable to the treatment of personal data used exclusively for public security, national defence, national security, or investigation or repression of infringements to the criminal code. The Argentinian Data Protection Law notes in Art. 23 that the processing of personal data for the purposes of national defence or public security without the consent of the affected parties is limited to cases and categories of data in strict compliance with missions legally assigned to national defence, public security, or repression of crime (criminal investigation).</p> -<p>The range of the smallest howitzers is greater than the range of the biggest mortars. A mortar uses less propellant to fire its projectiles at a high angle. As a result, mortars have a shorter range and may take longer to reach their target. A howitzer has a longer and stronger barrel, which enables more propellent and heavier projectiles to be used.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>Howitzer projectiles typically deliver more explosive energy; however, the lower weight and size of mortars and their ammunition means that they can be carried and used by infantry, with howitzers typically held further back.</p> +<p>In an increasingly privatized cybersecurity market in which governments heavily rely on third-party solutions, cyber accountability should be seen increasingly as co-responsibility. However, when observing the actions of governments in Latin America, the first section of the paper showed how one should more carefully position the discussion about state responsibility and accountability within the historical and cultural background of a particular region. The second section explored how different countries have sought to enact and showcase positive accountability. It also highlighted that the term accountability should not be taken as an absolute goal, but rather in domestic policymaking, there are internal challenges that might emerge when accountability comes with greater political visibility of the cybersecurity agenda. The third part of the paper outlined some of the challenges and blockers to the operationalisation of accountability in the region – both from intragovernmental incentives to the delegation of cybersecurity to the perpetration of human rights abuses through intrusive commercial cyber tools in Latin America.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5Oy3edH.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: 252 Krasnopol Artillery Fired Guided Munition.</strong> Source: Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<p>The panorama of cyber accountability in Latin America is a complex mix between national ambitions to develop cyber capacities, the thirst for innovation and economic growth, and the increasing commitments to policy and institutional developments. While this paper is far from exhaustive, it does illustrate that there are historical underpinnings that inform cyber accountability in Latin America as well as nuances when it comes to the economic structure of incentives for countries heavily outsourcing in the region.</p> -<h3 id="chapter-3-howitzer-supply-chains">Chapter 3: Howitzer Supply Chains</h3> +<hr /> -<p>Modern military supply chains are deeply complex, often requiring inputs from a variety of entities and culminating with a systems integrator, where the component parts are assembled into a finished vehicle or weapon. This can make it difficult to understand supply chains – and where they are vulnerable. This chapter attempts to set out the primary elements in Russia’s howitzer supply chain through an in-depth look at the production of howitzer barrels. Barrels are a consumable product that must be replaced regularly or their accuracy and efficacy declines – unlike items such as armoured plates or engines, which are rarely required unless new systems are being built. At present, Russia is modernising or refurbishing many of its armoured vehicles and maintaining a large arsenal of howitzers in Ukraine. This indicates that barrel production may be a bottleneck in Russia’s ability to sustain its artillery forces in Ukraine.</p> +<p><strong>Louise Marie Hurel</strong> is a Research Fellow at RUSI’s Cyber Team. Throughout the past years, her research has focused on multiple areas of cyber policy, including but not restricted to incident response, cyber capacity building, cyber operations, cyber diplomacy, and non-governmental actors’ engagement in cyber security.</p>Louise Marie HurelOutlining the regional approaches, challenges, and solutions to the cyber accountability question in Latin America.Force Protection From UAS2024-10-15T12:00:00+08:002024-10-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/force-protection-from-uncrewed-aerial-systems<p><em>This paper outlines the core tasks and capabilities required by NATO members to provide coherent, layered protection from uncrewed aerial systems.</em></p> -<h4 id="manufacturers">Manufacturers</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BWTDAiw.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Cannon units for Msta-S, made by Volgograd-based Titan-Barrikady Plant, ready for assembly at Uraltransmash in Yekaterinburg, April 2023.</strong> Source: Russian military correspondent.</em></p> +<p>The impact of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) on land operations has been a subject of extensive discussion, from the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine beginning in 2022. The corollary to the importance of armies fielding UAS is that effective, layered and efficient counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities are neither a luxury nor a concept to be explored as part of an abstract “future force”. They are a basic requirement for a land force to be suitable for operations on the modern battlefield. Without C-UAS capabilities, a force will be seen first, engaged more accurately, and ultimately defeated by an opposing force that successfully fields UAS and C-UAS capabilities at scale. For NATO members, the aiming mark set by the Alliance’s senior leadership is to be ready to deter Russia by 2028. Fielding C-UAS capabilities, which are absent in any structured sense from the British Army and from most other NATO land force elements, is therefore an urgent operational requirement.</p> -<p>Artillery system production in Russia is a centralised network of interconnected manufacturers, contractors, subcontractors, suppliers and research and development (R&amp;D) partners, managed mainly by Rostec, the state-governed defence holding, in direct cooperation with the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Army. In 2023, Rostec announced an internal reorganisation on the “gun-to-shot” principle, which aimed to streamline production of tanks and artillery by separating them and allowing each group to specialise. It transferred companies in the artillery supply chain from UralVagonZavod, Russia’s main tank manufacturer, to Tekhmash, which had previously focused on ammunition production.</p> +<p>There is a risk that in attempting to fill this critical gap, NATO members purchase a range of C-UAS capabilities that are overly specialised in dealing with specific threat systems, are not integrated effectively across the force, and cannot keep pace with the threat as UAS continue to rapidly evolve. This paper outlines the core tasks and capabilities required to provide coherent, layered C-UAS protection. The paper then explores how to integrate layered C-UAS protection across land forces without overburdening units and thus preventing them from performing their primary tasks.</p> -<p>Key artillery production facilities are as follows:</p> +<p>The paper concludes that:</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Uraltransmash:</strong> The main assembly facility for Russian artillery systems is a 143-hectare plant in Yekaterinburg which also produces trams and oil pumps for the civilian market. The plant has its own engineering and design centre for artillery, SKB Transmash-Spetstekhnika, and tests howitzers on a 15,000-hectare artillery range 17 km north of the plant. Uraltransmash developed and manufactured the main artillery systems used by the Russian army, such as the 2S3 Akatsiya, which entered service in the 1970s, and the 2S19 Msta-S, which was produced from 1989. According to Russian brand registers, the plant now owns the Msta-S, Koalitsiya-SV, Akatsiya, Tyulpan and Giatsint howitzer brands, which make up the majority of self-propelled howitzers (SPH) in Russian service.</p> + <p>Software solutions are as important as hardware to enable accurate detection, classification and identification of UAS, and the allocation of appropriate effects to efficiently defeat UAS. Software can also reduce the bandwidth requirements for the networking of sensors. In most cases, the necessary data to field robust machine-based filtering is already available in Ukraine, so there should be little difficulty in obtaining libraries of signature data.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Motovilikha Plant:</strong> Earlier towed versions of the Msta-S howitzers and other self-propelled machines – such as the 2S23 Nona, a 120 mm mortar based on the wheeled chassis of a BTR-80 armoured fighting vehicle – have been assembled at the SKB Motovilikha Plant. The plant went into bankruptcy in 2018 and stopped delivery to the Russian army in 2022. To preserve its manufacturing processes in 2023 it was transferred to Remdizel, a Rostec-affiliated company, before being fully acquired by Rostec subsidiary Tekhnodinamika in 2024.</p> + <p>There are multiple active and passive sensor techniques, and a wide range of soft- and hard-kill techniques exist for engaging and either providing a mission kill or physically destroying UAS, but none are a universally applicable solution, and they must be employed together across the force to provide effective and efficient coverage.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Zavod No. 9:</strong> This is a former production unit of Uralmashzavod and specialises in barrel manufacturing, being one of the four main artillery suppliers. It produces D-30 towed howitzers and various tank guns, including the 2A20 U-5TS Molot for the modernised T-62 and 2А46 for the T-72, T-64A and T-90. The plant is also the manufacturer of the Soviet-era 125-mm 2A45 Sprut-A and 2A45M Sprut-B anti-tank guns.</p> + <p>All platoons must have the ability to detect the presence of UAS and have electronic countermeasures to protect themselves from them.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Titan-Barrikady:</strong> The Volgograd-based plant has specialised in a diverse range of artillery and missile systems and its portfolio includes Msta-B and Msta-S howitzers (the latter’s assembly has been recently moved to Uraltransmash).</p> + <p>Across the force, remote weapon stations and other existing platforms should be updated to be able to engage UAS with direct fire.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Krasny Oktyabr:</strong> Titan-Barrikady has been vertically integrated with the nearby Krasny Oktyabr metallurgy plant, which specialises in the production of special steel, and the two plants share energy and forging infrastructure. Krasny Oktyabr does not list military uses for its products, but Russian archives have records of the plant casting 152 mm barrels.</p> + <p>At the company level, it is necessary to have dedicated passive sensor arrays capable of detecting, classifying and identifying UAS.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Battalions should have a dedicated counter-reconnaissance capability with hard-kill C-UAS systems, fielding both self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery and UAS interceptors. An electronic warfare section is also necessary, to update and orchestrate the electronic protection suites at subordinate echelons that provide a soft-kill layer that attacks UAS command links and navigational systems.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The brigade should have independent C-UAS platoons that can be pushed to support the efforts of company groups, or to close key axes to hostile UAS.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The brigade should field directed energy systems to efficiently defeat medium-level ISTAR UAS overflying its area of responsibility.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The brigade should have the responsibility for electromagnetic spectrum command and control (C2) and deconfliction.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The division should fuse lower-echelon C-UAS capabilities with the common air defence picture and orchestrate a distributed defence in depth of the airspace to avoid local saturation of C-UAS systems at critical sites.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The point defence role for critical sites such as airbases should see C-UAS capabilities integrated into the wider integrated air and missile defence system at the national, theatre and Alliance levels.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>It is vital that the permissions on training areas allow these capabilities – both soft and hard kill – to be used in combination, alongside the rest of the force’s communications and C2 systems. This is to familiarise commanders with the use of C-UAS capabilities and the deconfliction procedures necessary, and to ensure that systems do not commit fratricide. Where it is not possible to train with these capabilities in live exercises, they should be made available in a synthetic training environment.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>The hull of a howitzer is built from high-hardness steel that is hot- or cold-rolled until it forms a material called rolled homogeneous armour (RHA). After the collapse of the USSR, Russia developed its own production of RHA, having previously relied on plants in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia and Mariupol in Ukraine. According to the armour steel Institute Stali, the three main steel suppliers for tanks and artillery are Krasny Oktyabr iron &amp; steel plant, Magnitogorsk Iron &amp; Steel Works (MMK) and OMZ-Spetstal. Establishing these production capabilities required a serious re-adjustment and investment in specialised production facilities with little to no civilian application, which suggests they are reliant upon the Russian defence industry.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eOLAPWz.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: The MSTA System.</strong> Source: Open Source Centre.</em></p> - -<p>The primary supplier of diesel engines for Russian tanks and self-propelled howitzers is the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (Uraltrak) , while some newer models - such as the wheeled 2S34 Malva - use engines from the Yaroslavl Motor Plant. Engine production requires heat-resistant high-alloy steel for elements such as valves and fasteners, and high-precision computer numerical control (CNC) machines. Tracks for tanks and self-propelled artillery have similar requirements, and are forged by Rostec-owned Omsktransmash and Kalashnikov Concern’s Lipetsk Mechanical Plant.</p> - -<p>In addition to its physical structure and gun, a howitzer carries a fire control system. The traditional supplier of automated fire guidance and navigation systems for Russian howitzers is the Signal Research Institute, based in Kovrov. Like most other strategic enterprises, it is part of Rostec, and is held within the group’s missile-manufacturing arm. It supplies the newest version of Russia’s automated fire control system ASUNO, which has been in development since 2019 and was first shown at the Ukrainian frontline in June 2024.</p> - -<p>Each of these companies will have their own supply chains, from raw materials through to finished products that are delivered to Uraltransmash for assembly into a howitzer.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/oms9w4G.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: The Uraltransmash Plant.</strong> Source: Maxar Technologies, RUSI, Open Source Centre.</em></p> - -<h4 id="barrel-production">Barrel Production</h4> - -<p>Unlike armour or engine production, barrel production is a constant requirement for any military. This is because barrels are a consumable component of a howitzer or tank. Even when steels that are resistant to high heat and pressure are used, and a chrome lining is added to the bore interior, the use of a barrel will degrade its structural integrity to the point where it must be replaced. This means that a country’s ability to meet its needs for barrel replacement in a high-intensity war is critical to its ability to continue the fight.</p> - -<p>The impact of failing to replace barrels is demonstrated by a report from an operator of a 203 mm 2S7 howitzer in Ukraine: “The gun was fired a lot in one day and overheated. It was performing poorly, and we weren’t sure where the shells landed. There are no replacement barrels, so we might be transferred to the 2S1 [a Soviet-era howitzer]”. This indicates not only that the gun was less accurate and effective because of barrel wear, but that the crew could be transferred to a shorter-range and less lethal system if a replacement could not be found. This is why disrupting barrel production is likely to have a greater impact on the battlefield than disrupting the production of armour or refurbishment of engines.</p> - -<p>Russian artillery barrel manufacturers are under state control because of their strategic importance. Historically there were many barrel manufacturers in Russia, but there are now just four: Zavod No. 9 in Yekaterinburg; Titan-Barrikady in Volgograd; MZ/SKB in Perm; and the Burevestnik Research Institute in Nizhny Novgorod. The latter is the country’s main artillery research and development facility; its research and production facilities are responsible for developing artillery systems and their production processes, so these facilities are equipped with trial production capacity. There is also the main assembly plant, Uraltransmash, which has its own casting and forging facility, but this is primarily the systems integrator in Russia’s artillery supply chain, and reports deliveries from Zavod No. 9 and Titan-Barrikady, indicating that it is not currently a significant source of barrel production.</p> - -<p><em>RAW MATERIALS</em></p> - -<p>Metallurgy plants manufacture the steel for artillery barrels in dedicated production runs, allocating resources specifically for producing barrel moulds. The output ranges from 20 to 10 tonnes per mould, depending on the order size and forge capacity. The process begins with casting a steel bar – known as ingots – that will eventually become a barrel. The base materials needed to make the alloy – iron ore, scrap metal and small amounts of molybdenum, chromium or nickel – are melted in a blast furnace for up to 12 hours. An alternate process uses an electric arc furnace, which primarily relies on electricity and scrap metal, as well as ferroalloys, which are created by reducing metal elements in a submerged electric arc furnace.</p> - -<p>The molten steel is treated to remove excess carbon before it is poured into moulds. The ingots may be subject to further treatments such as annealing, which removes impurities, and acid baths to remove forge scale from the surface. The steel will be rolled into its final shape before being cut to size and transported to the customer by rail.</p> - -<p>Several metallurgy plants have been identified as suppliers to the UralVagonZavod group of companies. Most of the sources are pre-2022 registers of public procurement and contracts, as this information is no longer disclosed.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SAtwlRM.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Suppliers of Raw Materials Into the Barrel Production Supply Chain in Russia.</strong> Source: Russian internal railway data, Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, Russian legal databases, Krasny Oktyabr Volgograd Steel Work, 74.ru, Kursiv.</em></p> - -<p><strong>Raw Materials In-Depth: Chromium</strong></p> - -<p>Our research indicates that Russia’s artillery supply chain is exposed and vulnerable in its need for foreign sources of high-quality chrome ore to sustain its barrel production. Much of this material is sourced from outside Russia, and so it should be feasible to disrupt its delivery through the focused use of sanctions and by adjusting existing sanctions legislation and export control regulations.</p> - -<p>Russia is self-sufficient to a significant degree in the raw materials required for barrel production. There is, however, evidence to suggest that Russia requires substantial imports of chromium ore to produce pure chromium, which is used for chrome-plating barrels. This is a process whereby the interior of the barrel bore is coated with a layer of chrome between 50 and 180 microns thick. This thin layer of chrome protects the bore from the corrosive effects of firing. Shooting can damage the barrel. Regular maintenance, such as cleaning and lubrication, helps manage this wear. The chrome coating makes maintenance easier and reduces the harmful effects of shooting. Chromium is also used to alloy the steel used to produce artillery barrels, which makes it an important raw material for the overall barrel supply chain.</p> - -<p>Chromium is valued for its high corrosion resistance and hardness. It can be processed into different types of compounds, such as oxides and ferrochromium, which are used to harden steel, manufacture stainless steel or make anti-corrosion coatings. Chrome ore (chromite) tends to be quite accessible and is primarily extracted using open-pit mining. The extracted ore is mainly used to produce an alloy of iron and chromium called ferrochromium, or to process the ore into pure chromium.</p> - -<p>Russia produces between 1.5 and 2 million tonnes of chrome ore per year from the Saranovo Rudnaya mine and in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District. Russia’s demand for chromium is around 1.47 million tonnes per year, with a growth trend to 1.6 million tonnes by 2025 and 1.73 million tonnes by 2030. About 55.2% of this consumption is covered by imports, despite Russia technically producing enough by weight to meet its needs, because Russian ore has a lower chromium content. For example, deposits in the Polar Urals or the Perm region are characterised by a chromium content of 38% and 37% respectively. Typically, ore with a chromium content in excess of 45%, along with a low ratio of impurities like aluminium and silicon, is required for metallurgic uses. Russia is also understood to have a state reserve system that may include chromium as a strategic raw material, which means that a disruption to chromium supply could lead it to rely on this reserve.</p> - -<p>In addition to Russia’s ore being generally of insufficient quality for gun barrels and pure chromium, the country’s reserves are underdeveloped. Russia technically sits on 52.4 million tonnes of chrome ore, around 2% of the world’s global reserves, however it has only initiated development of 13% of those reserves. As a result, it is forced to import large quantities of raw materials to meet its chromium needs – for pure chromium in particular. Krasny Oktyabr’s relationship with the Aktobe Ferroalloy Plant in Kazakhstan, which manufactures artillery barrels, reinforces this conclusion. The two entities have no public relationship, but commercial trade data reveals that the Aktobe Ferroalloy Plant delivered more than 4,000 tonnes of high carbon ferrochrome, worth approximately $9 million, to Krasny Oktyabr between March and May 2024. As transactions between Russia and Kazakhstan are not normally recorded, it is possible that this relationship has existed for much longer.</p> - -<p>Chromite has the harmonised system (HS) code of 2610, which is used to monitor trade between countries. Data for 2023 indicates that Russia imported around $36.7 million worth of products under this HS code. Russia’s imports for 2023 and January to May 2024 show that most chromium-containing goods – $29.9 million – originated from South Africa, but that the majority of South African ore was exported to Russia via European countries, including $17.9 million from the Netherlands. Export data for Kazakhstan is not included in this analysis, as Kazakhstan and Russia are both members of the Eurasian Customs Union, which lacks detailed records on their mutual trade. In 2021, Kazakhstan was the primary supplier of chromium to Russia, accounting for 86.8% of imports. Although supplies from Kazakhstan have significantly decreased since 2022, it is likely that Kazakhstan remains a major supplier of chromium-containing goods to Russia. Information on other countries of interest, along with the dollar value of those supplies, are provided in Table 2 below. The available data for 2024 paints a markedly different picture, with less than $1 million in chromium-containing imports between January and May. This may indicate that Russia’s imports have reduced because of sanctions, or that Russia has limited the data made available on its imports.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/goX7Kgp.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Countries of Interest (the US and EU Members) Involved in Supply of Chromium-Containing Goods to Russia in 2023.</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider.</em></p> - -<p>The companies involved in extracting and processing chromite and exporting it to Russia, along with the dollar value of those exports in 2023, are provided in Table 3. The top three are mining companies which both extracted and exported chromium ore to Russia. The others are mainly involved either in processing chromium ore into various chromium compounds or reselling raw material. Of course, not all these imports are destined for Russia’s artillery supply chain; its oil and gas industry are significant consumers of chromite, too. However, there are five chromite importers in Russia with historical ties to the defence industry: Polema; Vladmettsentr; Industrial Systems; CTK Euro; and EK Resources. These companies imported $6,758,000 worth of chrome products across five different HS codes in 2023. EK Resources was responsible for importing $3,485,000 worth of products under HS code 2610 (through EK-Company AG “EKC.AG” as a supplier), indicating that it is potentially a key link in the supply of chromite imported to be processed into pure chromium for the lining of barrels.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K5RK4dd.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 3: The 10 Largest Suppliers Involved in the Chromite Supply Chain.</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider.</em></p> +<p>The pervasive threat from uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) on the modern battlefield, as demonstrated in Ukraine since 2022, Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and Syria since 2015, means that land forces and installations must be protected from the threat from persistent observation and strikes. The counter-UAS (C-UAS) mission, however, poses challenges to systems designed for traditional air and missile defence. One example of this mismatch in capability has been the relatively frequent shooting down of small UAS with multi-million-dollar air defence interceptors, such as when Israel was forced to down a UAS with a Patriot missile in 2017, or the use of Sea Viper/Aster 15 missiles to shoot down Houthi drones in the Red Sea in late 2023.</p> -<p>There are many methods of processing chromite to produce pure chromium. The most common is the aluminothermic method, which produces metals and alloys by reducing their oxides through a chemical reaction with aluminium. The largest producer of pure chromium in Russia is the powder chemicals plant Polema. Between 2015 and 2018, Polema made 100 deliveries of pure chromium compounds and other components to Russian military plants worth $6.4 million. In the first half of 2023, Polema had $928,000 in transactions with the Imperial Tula Arms Plant alone, which makes components for the 152 mm 2K25 Krasnopol guided munitions, as well as many other defence-related components. Polema also registered $134,000 in transactions with the Perm Machine Building Plant, as well as small orders with other Russian defence manufacturers.</p> +<p>The number of intermingled friendly and hostile UAS in any given area of operations, and the diversity of their forms and mission sets, means that acquiring C-UAS systems that can engage the full range of threat types and deploying them at all tactical echelons risks being cost prohibitive. However, each echelon of land forces must be protected. As Ukrainian air defence interceptors have become depleted to the point that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) could no longer afford to routinely use them to engage Russian reconnaissance UAS, the costs of not protecting each echelon have been illustrated by a great increase in Russian reconnaissance-strike activity throughout Ukraine’s operational depth. This has enabled extensive Russian targeting with ballistic missile and artillery strikes against critical Ukrainian assets, from aviation to artillery and (ironically) air defence systems, resulting in unsustainable attrition of those assets and materially worsening Ukraine’s operational position. The question for Western land forces, which this paper aims to address, is how to extend C-UAS coverage across the relevant tactical echelons within a manageable cost and personnel burden, and in a short period of time. C-UAS defence is a minimum requirement to operate sustainably on the battlefield today; it is a problem that cannot be left to be dealt with as part of an abstract “future force” concept.</p> -<p>Overall, while disruptions to imports of chromite may be difficult, they are not impossible, especially given the increasing scrutiny on supply chains and continued sanctions pressure by the US, particularly via banks. Though Russia’s access to alternative suppliers like Turkey and India is a potential safeguard, the logistical complexities and the potential for sanctions to extend to those channels should not be underestimated. Thus, while chromium supply may not pose an immediate crisis, it remains a point of strategic vulnerability, especially in prolonged conflict scenarios where access to diverse and stable sources of critical materials becomes increasingly important. As with the majority of sanctions, the initial impact is likely to be indirect, and manifest itself in logistics and time costs, which does not defeat the purpose.</p> +<p>This paper aims to set out an approach for providing a C-UAS capability across a deployed ground force. The need for a force-wide approach is not because destroying any particular UAS is difficult, but because optimising against this task comes at a significant cost in efficiency against other tasks within tactical formations. If a platoon, for example, must field both hard- and soft-kill C-UAS capabilities, it must expand in size, or its core vehicles will become significantly more expensive and complex to operate. This paper outlines the various detection, classification and engagement tools available, and an approach that allows C-UAS tasks to be federated at appropriate echelons so that any capabilities added to the force can be integrated efficiently in the context of operations against a peer adversary.</p> -<h4 id="manufacturing-process">Manufacturing Process</h4> +<p>In developing the C-UAS approach hereafter outlined, this paper draws on the authors’ direct observations of the operation of all classes of UAS under exercise conditions, and a considerable proportion of UAS types under operational conditions in Ukraine and elsewhere. The authors have also spent time physically examining UAS and their resilience to electronic warfare (EW) and other C-UAS techniques. It was also necessary to observe the functioning and operation of a range of air defence systems, and to interview air defenders with experience of engaging UAS in a range of conflict zones, from Ukraine to Israel and Iraq. The authors also spoke to teams which had employed novel weapons technologies, such as directed energy weapons, on exercise and operations, to discuss the limitations and challenges of using these tools, and also the opportunities they offer.</p> -<p>The raw materials for an artillery barrel are cast, rolled, and forged in several steel plants traditionally specialising in artillery-grade alloys. Further processing involves cutting, drilling the bore, polishing, and assembly with other elements (such as the breech and recuperator) into a barrel module ready for the assembly plant. The first stage is done by plants with special steel processing capacity, such as Krasny Oktyabr and MMK. The barrel module manufacturers buy steel blanks from these suppliers and process them into finished barrels and fully assembled artillery parts ready to be installed onto the appropriate system. There are two primary methodologies for producing large-calibre artillery barrels.</p> +<p>This is the second in a series of three papers examining the impact of UAS on modern operations. The first considered how land forces can best employ mass precision strike complexes using UAS. This paper focuses on countering the threat posed by these capabilities. The third will look at the impact of UAS on joint air-ground interactions.</p> -<p>The first primary methodology is radial or rotary forging. In this method, a steel blank that is shorter than the total length required is drilled and heated, before being inserted into a radial forging machine. The machine inserts a mandrel inside the blank, which can carry the rifling in the case of howitzer barrels, and the blank is passed through four hammers that operate at a very high speed and pressure to shape the steel around the mandrel. This process hardens and stretches the steel and forms it into shape in a matter of minutes.</p> +<p>This paper has three chapters. Chapter I examines the challenges of detecting and classifying UAS and sharing this information as required among various elements. Chapter II explores the strengths and weaknesses of the various available categories of engagement and defeat mechanisms for UAS, to provide an overview of potential approaches. Chapter III examines what is likely to be needed to deploy a C-UAS complex across military echelons, to map at what echelon capabilities might be best integrated. The paper concludes with recommendations for the UK, as a typical NATO armed force, based on the analysis presented.</p> -<p>The result will be precise, and close to the profile of the finished part. Machine tools can either be manually operated – that is, without a CNC – or automated with a CNC. Automated radial forging machines are much more precise, as they allow for the selection of the forging angle, forging diameter, and pressure. It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union also imported its barrel-forging equipment from the West: a CIA report from 1982 covers the procurement of 26 automated rotary forges from Austrian company Gesellschaft fuer Fertigungstechnik und Maschinenbau (GFM). One machine, an SXP 55, was installed at a Perm factory in 1975 and provided the capacity to produce artillery barrels up to 203 mm in calibre. The CIA estimated that a large-calibre barrel could be forged using this technology in two to 10 minutes, and that the USSR had procured sufficient spares for 15 years of operations. The same report estimated that the Soviets could produce 14,000 barrels per year, although this only relates to the production of unfinished barrels. Rotary forging machines have a number of civil applications as well as military outputs, and it is possible that many of these GFM machines were imported for civil production, although Russia’s mobilisation laws do allow for the transfer of capacity and machinery from civil to military production.</p> +<p>It is necessary to briefly discuss definitions. UAS are also often referred to as drones, UAVs, remotely piloted air systems (RPAS), first person views ( FPVs), one way attacks (OWAs) and various other acronyms and designations that are used to refer to the same or sub-categories of capability. FPV relates to a navigational technique: specifically, one that requires active human control. OWA refers to a mission profile. UAV refers to the aircraft. RPAS and UAS both refer to systems: aircraft and their associated command-and-control (C2) systems and other enabling functions. Of these terms, UAS is the most widely recognised, and so this paper uses this term.</p> -<p>The second primary methodology of barrel production is for the blank to be shaped externally before the bore is drilled using a type of machine tool that holds the blank in place as a channel is drilled through the blank from one end to the other. The drill is fed a constant supply of a lubricant that is designed to remove debris and cool the metal and drill. This process may take place in two stages, with course drilling followed by fine drilling. It can take 24 hours. Once the barrel is shaped and complete, it is heat treated in a shaft furnace with as many as three barrels that are brought up to temperatures of around 500°C before being cooled in oil. This regularises the grain structure within the barrel and is designed to ensure it is suitably hardened against the stresses of firing. To increase the service life of barrels, the interior of the barrel bore is then coated with chrome between 50 and 180 microns thick, which increases the service life by 2.5–3 times. There are separate processes for the breech and block, which are forged from similar steel to the barrel. Additional components such as a muzzle brake and recuperators are also produced, all using high-quality alloy steels. These components are combined to create a complete barrel that is then painted, tested and inspected before being shipped to one of the manufacturers, which adds the barrel to a howitzer.</p> +<p>Although this paper concludes that the established categories of UAS “groups” are operationally unhelpful, the paper is largely concerned with UAS that fall between Group 1 and Group 3, that is from FPVs and small quad-/multi-copters up to lightweight fixed-wing uncrewed aircraft such as the Russian Orlan-10 (see Table 1), or heavier delta-wing Shahed-136 drones. The paper does not deal with larger medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) Group 4–5 UAS such as the MQ-9 Reaper or the RQ-4 Global Hawk. This is because, by dint of their speed, missions and operating altitude, these are targets for traditional air defence systems, rather than dedicated C-UAS assets. The cost of MALE UAS makes engagement by traditional air defence cost competitive in any case, such that they present a fundamentally different problem from the one explored in this paper.</p> -<p>Altogether, the production process for a batch of artillery barrels using this methodology can take up to four months, according to the CEO of SKB, which sits within the Motovilikha Plant in Perm. The full process can also include the production of steel blanks, which may take up to five months. This equates to a potential nine-month delivery schedule for batch orders made by the Russian MoD. This provides a fuller indication of barrel production capacity at many of Russia’s plants. Furthermore, barrel-forging machines are shared between calibres, so a rotary forging machine that is used to make a 152 mm howitzer barrel may also be used in the production of 125 mm tank barrels. Only one manufacturer, Zavod No. 9, is understood to have distinct production lines for different calibres. In addition, Russian manufacturers report recycling worn and damaged barrels from the frontline, as well as old Soviet-era barrels. A rotary forge can also be used for this process by reducing a larger calibre barrel to a smaller one. Furthermore, some models, like the 2S5 Giatsint 152 mm howitzers, do not need new barrel production, as a large stock of barrels has been retained from the Soviet era, according to Vyacheslav Tsybulin, the production director at SKB.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SPHDYyr.png" alt="image01" /> +<em><strong>Table 1: UAS Groups.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf?ver=2019-09-04-142255-657">US Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-30: Joint Air Operations”, 25 July 2021, validated 17 September 2021</a>, Figure III-14, p. III-31.</em></p> -<p>As barrel production is key to maintaining an effective fighting force, it is useful to assess Russia’s capacity to produce barrels. This is naturally challenging, but there are some data points that provide an indication of Russia’s ability to meet these needs. UralVagonZavod reported the capacity to manufacture 328 armoured vehicles of all types in its 2019 annual report. This was stated to be 64% of the company’s total production capacity, indicating a theoretical maximum of 512 armoured vehicles per year, which in turn suggests the ability to produce 500 barrels of all calibres per year. This would not be sufficient to meet the needs of the war in Ukraine, either those generated by losses of howitzers, or those arising from wear and tear. However, by April 2024, production of self-propelled and towed howitzers had increased by 10 and 14 times respectively, compared with 2022, Bekhan Ozdoev, an industrial director at Rostec, claimed. Given the above, this figure is likely reached through a combination of refurbishing old barrels, matching existing stocks to new howitzers, and new production. If 30% of UralVagonZavod’s production in 2019 was focused on artillery systems, these figures indicate an approximate theoretical production maximum of 1,000 howitzers of all types per year. Within this, it is reasonable to conclude that the focus of forging may have shifted away from tank barrels and towards artillery barrels, which may mean that Russia is able to produce hundreds of new barrels per year.</p> +<p>This paper focuses on land forces and to some extent also on the defence of installations of concern to air forces. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles and other such capabilities designed specifically for air combat are not covered, while uncrewed systems in the context of maritime operations present a substantively different problem, and so are also not covered by this paper.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UIoHcsE.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 4: Russia’s Barrel Manufacturers and the Entities They Supply.</strong> Source: Financial data seen by authors.</em></p> +<p>Finally, the AFU has found that it is useful to draw a clear doctrinal distinction between the defence of forces and the defence of territory, when it comes to C-UAS. Partly as a consequence, the AFU tends to consider countering enemy reconnaissance UAS as an entirely different function from countering long-range one-way-attack UAS. These distinctions make sense in relation to the problems confronting Ukraine. However, for a country like the UK, which must assume that it is operating in an expeditionary capacity, the force must be able to address all of these threats. Furthermore, there are critical pieces of territory to enable an expeditionary force that blur the Ukrainian distinction between protection of forces and territory. Finally, the distinctions between the UAS employed for these missions may converge over time, as is already occurring in the Middle East. For these reasons, this paper considers these issues as one problem set, even though this does not reflect current practice.</p> -<p><em>PRODUCTION IN-DEPTH: MACHINE TOOLS</em></p> +<h3 id="i-detect-and-identify">I. Detect and Identify</h3> -<p>Artillery barrels are complex metal structures that require large, precise machinery throughout the production process. In this respect, the question of existing production capabilities looms large. Russia is thought to have access to legacy Soviet barrel-manufacturing machines. Also, Russia relies on metalworking machine tools, including CNC machines, offering higher degree of automation and precision that support many parts of the artillery supply chain; they are used in the production of engines, in shaping the shell casings of artillery ammunition, in barrel production and in the production of many other weapons. Russian internal demand for machine tools is partially met by local producers, particularly manufacturers within the military-industrial complex like Kalashnikov and Rostec, which specialize in machinery for military production. Efforts to expand domestic production capabilities are also underway. Still, as of 2024, Russia has limited production capacities for machine tools manufacturing and imported many of its systems from Europe prior to 2022. For example, the Motovilikha Plant announced a contract in 2011 to procure a new radial forging machine from GFM in Austria. The machine was expected to replace the legacy equipment operating at the plant, which indicates that it may have been designed to replace the SPX 55 referenced in the CIA report from the previous section. China became Russia’s main supplier of machine tools after 2022, and was the primary source of CNC radial forging machines that were imported in 2023. It is unclear how all of these machines will be used; however, Russia’s defence industry uses around 70% of all machine tools in Russia. And there is evidence that a portion of them have been used to expand artillery production capacity. At the same time, import was the primary source for meeting the machine tools consumption demands, with 70% of machine tools and 80–90% of spare parts and components coming from abroad.</p> +<p>The primary challenge that UAS present to traditional surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems is that as targets they are small, often slow, numerous, relatively cheap, and often operate at low altitude. Moreover, for a traditional target acquisition or fire control radar, opening the doppler gates to be able to see slow-moving UAS with small radar cross sections leads to a very cluttered display with a large number of false positive returns, greatly increasing the workload of the air defence crew. Furthermore, due to the short acquisition ranges possible against many small, low-flying UAS, the number of traditional radar systems needed to provide C-UAS coverage over any significant frontage makes relying on traditional active radar systems cost prohibitive, while proximity to the enemy would likely see these emitters destroyed in unsustainable numbers. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the first set of challenges in defeating UAS: how to affordably identify and classify them, how to discriminate friendly UAS from hostile ones, and how to distribute this information.</p> -<p>Russian companies have historically preferred Western machine tools over Chinese equivalents, as they are more precise and higher quality. Russia’s longstanding preference for Western machines and components provided Ukraine’s Western partners with a critical lever of influence on the Russian war machine that was overlooked until late 2023, when a raft of sanctions came into force. Russia had accelerated its imports of machine tools and their control systems from $29.46 million in January 2022, a month before the full-scale invasion, to $120.86 million in July 2023, with most coming from China. As the sanctions came into effect, supplies from nation-states in the Sanctions Coalition Against Russia (the Sanctions Coalition) decreased dramatically.</p> +<h4 id="detection">Detection</h4> -<p>At the same time, Russia’s demand for machine tools, including with CNC, is increasing. This is due to many different factors. Part of the increase is driven by Russia’s struggle to recruit enough personnel to meet its production needs. The Russian media outlet Izvestia estimated that Russia was short of 4.8 million workers in 2023, and recruitment adverts on the websites of many Russian defence companies point to challenges in expanding production. Machine tools, especially those with CNC, allow fewer personnel to perform a given role – albeit personnel with a higher level of training. Moreover, as of 2023, 63–65% of capital equipment in the defence and related industries was worn out or approaching the end of its service life. Finally, Russia is expanding its ammunition and artillery production capacity, as well as its production of drones and all the materials of war, which drives the need for additional machine tools. Russia’s domestic machine tool-building industry cannot meet this demand; it produced 9,269 machine tools in 2023, up from 7,221 in 2022. At the same time, imports of processing machine tools for various materials, including metal, for the same period are understood to have exceeded 60,000 units, indicating the extent of Russia’s import dependency. To meet this need, Russia has turned to China, which is becoming a key supplier of goods and technologies critical to Russia’s military-industrial complex using the following three mechanisms, explored in more detail below:</p> +<p>The first requirement for C-UAS capability is to ensure that multiple echelons within land forces, and force protection elements at fixed bases, have the capability to detect and track UAS. There are four primary methods for doing this:</p> -<ul> +<ol> <li> - <p>Re-export of machine tools manufactured by countries from the Sanctions Coalition.</p> + <p>Active and passive radar systems that are specifically tailored for C-UAS detection and tracking.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Supply of machine tools manufactured at Western subsidiary factories located in China.</p> + <p>Passive acoustic systems that are optimised for detecting the sound signatures of UAS propulsion systems and their flight.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Supply of Chinese machine tools that rely upon Western components, technologies, and expertise.</p> + <p>Passive radio frequency (RF) analysers that search for radio control signals and analyse them once isolated to provide an identification and location of the UAS and potentially the antennae of the UAS control station.</p> </li> -</ul> - -<p>According to an analysis of Chinese customs data by the Carnegie Endowment, Beijing exports over $300 million worth of dual-use items to Russia every month. In 2023, China was responsible for approximately 90% of Russia’s imports of goods on the G7’s high-priority export control list. Machine tools exports from China to Russia grew 10-fold from $6.5 million in February 2022 to $68 million in July 2023, representing 57% of Russia’s imports of machine tools, up from 12% before the invasion. Pavel Luzin, an expert on the Russian defence industry, has assessed that China’s share of Russian imports of machine tool parts grew to 32% in 2022, compared to pre-invasion period, and to at least 80–90% in 2023.</p> + <li> + <p>Passive electro-optical (EO)/infra-red (IR) search-and-track systems that scan the sky for the visible shape and contrast signature of UAS.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>This analysis indicates that there are avenues for disrupting Russia’s artillery supply chain through targeted sanctions and diplomatic pressure to restrict the supply of quality machine tools. As of August 2024, a minority of the Chinese machine tool manufacturers that are among Russia’s critical suppliers were sanctioned by any member of the Sanctions Coalition. This gap in the international sanctions regime allows Chinese companies to export and re-export machine tools, including with CNC, to Russia without consequences, to manufacture Western machine tools under licence and to build critical Western technology into machines that would be far less capable without them. Many of these machines are then used to build weapons to fight Ukraine and threaten the West with nuclear war.</p> +<p>Each of these detection and tracking approaches has its own advantages and drawbacks, such that forces will need a combination of them to reliably detect UAS. For any of them to be effective it is also necessary to have software able to process the relevant sensor returns.</p> -<p><strong>China as a Re-Export Hub</strong></p> +<p>Active radar systems designed for C-UAS detection and tracking often operate in relatively high-frequency parts of the radar spectrum such as the X, Ku or even Ka-bands to ensure high resolution and rapid acquisition of small targets, but in some cases may operate in the somewhat lower frequency S-band to improve range performance for a given power output level. The flipside of detection range performance is the range at which enemy forces will be able to detect and conduct triangulation against the position of a C-UAS radar, with most active-radar systems being detectable by hostile sensors at 50% greater distances than their own functional detection range. A system designed for very short-range coverage that operates in the high-frequency bands will be difficult to detect for enemy systems that are not themselves close to the C-UAS radar in question. However, for longer-range systems, a core limitation of active radar as a primary sensor for C-UAS detection and tracking capability is the inherent requirement to transmit to perform their function. Crucially, this will often be at odds with the requirement to maintain emissions control (EMCON) to avoid giving away a unit’s position and inviting strikes cued in by hostile EW direction-finding and -ranging systems. For defending fixed sites such as airbases far from the frontlines, EMCON concerns will be more focused on electromagnetic deconfliction with other systems, rather than avoiding hostile detection and triangulation. Nevertheless, the operational lesson is that for C-UAS operations, active radar are better for fire control than for target acquisition, as the former requires short periods of illumination.</p> -<p>China serves as a re-export hub for machine tools (including with CNC) manufactured in Western countries and Sanctions Coalition states. The following supply chain assessment is based on Russia’s imports under 18 HS codes corresponding to machine tool products, and originating from 10 Western countries with active machine tools production.</p> +<p>Passive radar systems rely on detecting the energy reflected off targets from background sources of electromagnetic emissions such as television, WiFi or third-party active radar. To be effective they rely on accurate electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) surveys of the operating environment, although space-based EMS surveying renders this less of a challenge than has historically been the case. Modern techniques such as passive coherent location allow relatively high-resolution ranging and track information to be gathered, while remaining entirely passive and thus covert. Indeed, in an electromagnetically contested environment, passive systems have often been found to provide more reliable returns than active systems. These systems are likely to have limited capability in environments where there is comparatively little background “noise” in terms of emissions, such as in the Arctic, where population density is very low. However, in most scenarios, as demonstrated on exercise and operations, there is more than enough background emissions activity to ensure that passive radar systems can form a valuable part of C-UAS detection and tracking suites.</p> -<p>The data indicates that at least 2,113 companies supplied machine tools manufactured in Western countries to Russia during 2023 and the first quarter of 2024. Among these suppliers, Chinese entities rank second (340 companies, or 17.5%), behind only Turkey (508 companies, or 26.16%). The rest of the suppliers originate from Germany (8.50%), South Korea (6.75%), Taiwan (6.08%), Italy (5.92%), the UAE (4.63%), Lithuania (2.47%) and Serbia (2.21%). The total value of Russia’s machine imports over the same time period was $4.5 billion. Chinese companies accounted for $568.6 million or 12.6% of the total during 2023 and the first quarter of 2024. Chinese entities are increasingly facilitating the re-export of machine tools and equipment to Russia from neighbouring countries. For instance, Chinese entities account for 41% of entities re-exporting Japanese machine tools products to Russia, 26% of those re-exporting Taiwanese machine tools, and 19% of those re-exporting South Korean machine tools. There are 36 Chinese companies among the top suppliers of Western machines to Russia for 2023 and the first quarter of 2024. Only five of those companies have been sanctioned by members of the Sanctions Coalition – one by the US, the EU and Switzerland (Shenzhen Biguang Trading Co. LTD), three just by the US (Silver Technology LTD, Most Development LTD, Agu Information Technology Co. LTD), and one just by the EU (Afox Corporation LTD).</p> +<p>Passive acoustic sensors rely on identifying the distinctive sound signature created by a UAS’s propulsion system and the interaction between its surfaces and the air. Although useable data can be obtained using cheap microphones, using this data requires the capacity to filter out false-positive detections and other background noise. Modern sound software makes the processing straightforward, but having a library of acoustic signatures and an algorithm that can distinguish between them is valuable intellectual property that is harder to generate and obtain. Major improvements in machine learning-enabled post-processing capabilities in recent years have driven a corresponding improvement in passive acoustic detection and limited tracking capabilities. The main limitations of acoustic sensors are the lack of ranging capability, since a single microphone can only provide bearing to a target; and that they have comparatively short range compared with radar and RF detection, or against targets with significant signature reduction features. As with RF capabilities, ranging can be achieved through multi-static triangulation. Acoustic sensors generally provide 2D tracking with too great a latency to guide fire control, but are incredibly cost efficient and reliable for target acquisition. The primary advantages of acoustic sensors are that they are completely passive and thus covert, requiring comparatively little electrical power and cooling capacity to operate, and that they can also provide additional capabilities such as shot detection and bearing for ground units.</p> -<p>For example, the Chinese companies Agu Information Technology (AIT) and Yinuo Supply Chain Management (YSCM) were established in April and August 2022, respectively, shortly after the full-scale invasion. From the start of 2023 to the end of the first quarter of 2024, they exported $75 million worth of US and Taiwanese machines, including with CNC, to Russia, and both supplied machines to importers close to the Russian defence industry. AIT’s largest client was the Russian company Vneshekostil, which has been under US blocking sanctions since September 2023. YSCM became a supplier to the Russian company known as LLC Energy Industries. According to public procurement registers and financial data available to the authors, the latter has cooperated with Russian defence enterprises including Admiralty Shipyards, the largest Russian manufacturer of diesel-electric submarines, and Elektrokhimpribor Combine, a nuclear weapons company, among many others.</p> +<p>Passive RF analysers are highly effective at detecting the presence of most reconnaissance and tactical UAS, because most classes of UAS receive or transmit data in one direction to perform their functions. For example, automatic navigation and target-recognition algorithms might enable a UAS to conduct ISTAR flights without the need for a real-time command-and-control signal from operators, but the UAS must still transmit to pass its ISTAR data back to ground stations, otherwise it cannot provide a real-time or close to real-time ISTAR function. With modern machine learning-enabled signal processing and analysis techniques, there are many RF analysis sensor solutions that can provide forces with a reliable means of at least detecting the presence of, and possibly also identifying or even locating, UAS within a tactical area.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yemjYYe.png" alt="image11" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 5: Chinese Subsidiaries of Western Companies with Sales to Russia Exceeding $800,000 for 2023 – Q1 2024.</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider.</em></p> +<p>EO/IR scan and track systems rely on cameras searching the sky for points of contrast created by small UAS. Like acoustic sensors, they generally rely on powerful post-processing techniques to filter out false positives, both from lighting artefacts and from other flying objects, such as birds. They also rely on direct line of sight, although the same can be said of most of the other techniques here. The primary drawback of optical scan and track sensors is their comparatively short range and their vulnerability to rapid degradation in adverse weather conditions, such as fog, rain or dust, although UAS also perform poorly under these conditions. The benefits are that they are passive, consume limited power and cooling capacity, and can also incorporate ranging capabilities with an inbuilt laser that can be slewed on once a target has been detected. They can also support a weapons system to be slewed to engage a target and offer passive fire control.</p> -<p><strong>Western Subsidiaries</strong></p> +<h4 id="classification">Classification</h4> -<p>Another dimension of Chinese support for Russia’s need for critical equipment is the supply of products manufactured at Western companies’ subsidiaries in China. An analysis of 30 Western brands that make up the main machine tools manufacturers indicates that 22 of them have direct subsidiaries registered in China (see Table 5). This study only examined subsidiaries that have their production facilities in China; it excludes those that only provide technical support, training or sales functions.</p> +<p>Detecting that a UAV is present is a prerequisite for taking countermeasures, but it is insufficient for ensuring that the countermeasures adopted are appropriate. The appropriate response to the detection of a quadcopter that is conducting observation is different from the response required when a short-range loitering munition-type UAV, such as a Lancet-3M, is detected. Nor is the appropriate response to detecting the overflight of a long-range reconnaissance UAV, such as an Orlan-10, the same as detecting the overflight of a long-range OWA UAV, such as a Shahed-136. Classifying the activity being conducted and thus the threat posed is a vital step in any C-UAS capability.</p> -<p>Most of these machines are not exported to Russia directly by the Chinese subsidiaries, but via Chinese intermediaries. The case of the US company Hardinge illustrates a typical supply chain. In 1996, the company established a wholly owned subsidiary in Shanghai, Hardinge Machine Tool (Shanghai), which also serves as its demonstration, training and maintenance centre in China. The company’s largest production site in China is the Hardinge Jiaxing factory, established in 2010. This factory manufactured three vertical CNC machines worth $701,000 in 2023 that were delivered to Russia via Chinese distributor Beijing Zhuangguan International Import &amp; Export Trade Co.</p> +<p>For hostile aircraft, the traditional primary air defence approach involves first determining the type of aircraft, to infer the threat posed. An Su-35 Flanker, an Su-34 Fullback or an Il-22 Coot can be relatively safely assumed to be conducting certain mission sets based on their inherent capabilities, limitations and role within enemy doctrinal structures. Second, analysis of the aircraft’s detected heading, altitude and routing are also likely to provide a good indication of its current task. An Su-35 Flanker-M pair flying a racetrack pattern at high altitude inside their own airspace, for example, are likely to be conducting a defensive counter air patrol.</p> -<p>The Russian importer of Hardinge’s equipment was Technoproekt, a research and production company specialising in development and production of pipeline valves for the gas, oil, and nuclear industries. Technoproekt is not subject to international sanctions despite having open state contracts to supply machine tools and fittings to Russian military-industrial enterprises such as the Electrokhimpribor Combine, which manufactures components for nuclear warheads. While Technoproekt could be using Hardinge’s machinery to produce valves for the gas industry, it could also be shipping those machines onwards to a key entity in Russia’s nuclear deterrent. There are at least 12 other Chinese entities that supplied CNC machine tools produced by Western subsidiaries to Russia in 2023.</p> +<p>By contrast, this type- and flight pattern-based approach is not nearly as reliable when seeking to classify the threat posed by UAS, and is likely to become less reliable as their employment proliferates. This is because the task performed by many types of UAS is variable, depending on the modules they carry, while their external form factors often are both relatively generic and also change frequently. Current approaches to classification within militaries tend to focus on the size, speed and altitude of the UAS, but this is problematic because these variables alone do not necessarily distinguish their mission or, therefore, the threat they pose. It is, in some cases, easy to associate airframe with task, but for many classes of UAS it is not a safe assumption. Classification needs, therefore, to be determined by comparing a wider range of characteristics, including a UAS’s electronic emissions, flight profile and silhouette. One of the most important classification criteria is to identify a UAS’s method for determining its location, or “self-localisation”. This is a particularly useful characteristic to assess because it provides not only insight into the likely mission of the UAS, but also data on how that mission can be disrupted.</p> -<p><strong>Chinese Machine Tools</strong></p> +<p>Emissions include the receipt of signals from a ground control station, the sending of signals to a ground control station or offboarding of data to a command post, or the emissions of sensors including radar, laser, light detection and ranging (LIDAR), and other sensor types. In most cases emissions can be monitored with a spectrum analyser. In combination with a flight profile, such emissions can confirm what a particular UAS is doing. For example, a UAS that is emitting consistently and is flying either at medium altitude or hovering in place for a sustained period is probably conducting ISR. A UAS that is emitting constantly but is flying on a determined course at low altitude is probably an FPV flying towards an identified target. A UAS that is not consistently emitting and is flying quickly at low or medium altitude with a consistent course is probably a OWA UAS flying to a pre-designated position. Some categories, such as autonomously guided OWA munitions, may not emit in this way, but in these cases they will generally fly in straight lines, turning at programmed waypoints – thus distinguishing them from a short-range reconnaissance UAV – and they may emit from the sensors necessary for their autonomous functioning. Flight profile can be determined by optical observation or acoustic or radar tracking to build up a picture of altitude, bearing and speed over time. Machine-learning algorithms can be used to build a library of recognised profiles and accelerate precise classification.</p> -<p>There is also evidence to suggest that the expansion of Russia’s defence industry is enabled by Chinese machine tools, including with CNC. For example, the Russian Izhevsk Unmanned Systems Research and Production Association, which manufactures Granat and Takhion reconnaissance drones that are used in Ukraine, recently announced that it had increased its production output. Russian media reported that the company had commissioned a new 5,800 m2 production shop complete with newly installed CNC machines and an increased number of machining centres. Then, in March 2024, a CNC machine produced by Chinese Dalian Machine Tool Group was observed at the new facility. Another Russian defence plant, NPO Kurganpribor – which manufactures components for land and naval artillery, as well as fuzes for tank rounds and rocket launchers, among many other products – opened a new 1,500 m2 production site with dozens of new CNC machines in August 2024. The manufacturers that can be identified include Zhe Jiang Headman Machinery and Shandong Weida Heavy Industries.</p> +<p>Silhouette is best determined with EO/IR observation. In many cases the exact silhouette of a UAS can be compared against a database of previously observed UAS to determine its type. Where the exact type of UAS cannot be determined, the shape of the body and wing can often reveal its task. Designs such as the Russian Lancet 3 or the Iranian Missile 358, for example, have cylindrical fuselages like a missile, with multiple control surfaces that also provide lift in place of standard wings. This means that they can (and indeed, must) cruise at relatively high speeds and are very agile, but the configuration produces considerable drag, which limits their range and endurance for a given size.</p> -<p>The supply of Chinese machine tools with CNC to Russian defence plants is not straightforward, because Western states are critical suppliers of hardware that is essential for their production and use. For example, vital control instruments such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and distributed control systems (DCSs) usually come from non-Chinese companies, which hold nearly 100% of the small and medium/large PLC markets and 65% of the DCS market. This means that Russia is dependent on Western technology for its machine tools, and China is too. China’s reliance upon Western companies is further evidenced by the fact that of 10–16 Chinese manufacturers supplying the Russian market, at least 13 have confirmed connections with Western markets.</p> +<p>These designs are, therefore, typically associated with short-range strike tasks with some loiter time, rather than missions that require endurance, such as ISR. By contrast, long, high aspect ratio wings are much more appropriate for ISR, due to high cruising efficiency at slower speeds. A delta wing format is in some ways a middle ground that produces enough lift to enable more fuel and heavier warheads to be carried for a given airframe size, but at the cost of higher drag during cruise. This makes it the configuration of choice for many OWA UAVs, such as the Shahed 136. Quad- and multicopter designs are slightly more ambiguous in terms of the mission they are likely performing, although the silhouette of their payload is usually clear as it is carried externally, and so the threat they pose may be deducible by observation.</p> -<h4 id="refurbishment">Refurbishment</h4> +<p>Sound signatures are also a means of classifying specific UAS. The combination of the power unit, the propulsion system and the interaction of a UAS’s airframe with the air it displaces, all produce distinct sounds that when combined can produce a sufficiently unique pattern to allow accurate classification of a UAS. While automation of classification requires an extensive library and effective algorithm, human operators can often distinguish specific UAS types with limited training. Classification by sound has proven highly reliable. Where a new class or variation in build of UAS is detected, these features can also provide clear signals as to its task and thus the threat presented.</p> -<p>Russia launched an extensive modernisation of its armed forces leading up to the invasion of Ukraine, concentrating much of its newest equipment in its better-trained and professionalised units. However, the losses incurred during the invasion, as well as the need to stand up additional units to fight the war, has exhausted Russia’s stocks of new systems. There was a huge effort to refurbish old howitzers that had been kept in storage from the Soviet era, with the result that up to 80% of Russia’s armoured fighting vehicles are now refurbished. The degree of refurbishment required depends upon the conditions that the vehicles have been stored in, and for how long.</p> +<p>The methods UAS use for self-localising include Radio Frequency Line of Sight, paired Global Positioning and Inertial (GNSS/Inertial), and Beyond Visual Line of Sight radio and optical navigation, including simultaneous localisation and mapping, optical flow or visual odometry. Each of these navigational methods is optimised for different ranges and functions and is compatible with different tasks, aiding classification, but is also a critical dependency for the UAS in executing the task, meaning that if the navigational logic can be confirmed, an effective defeat mechanism can be paired with the target.</p> -<p>It is understood that as of 2024, all new model production and repair is concentrated in Uraltransmash, while most repair and refurbishment of legacy models is conducted at Russia’s armoured vehicle repair plants and the Motovilikha Plant. The number of these facilities is unknown: they received their numbered names during the Second World War and some, if not most, were transferred to Rostec in the 2000s, which closed many that were not solvent. Below, six of the main armoured-vehicle plants are examined in more detail.</p> +<p>The sensors necessary to determine these considerations are generally the same as those required to detect the presence of a UAS. However, unlike detection, classification often requires the comparison of the returns from two or three sensors and the application of either judgement by the operator or, if automated, a logic engine attuned to prioritise threats to the force from objects according to their task once classified. This information is necessary to enable an appropriate defeat mechanism to be applied to each threat, and for threats to be engaged at both the appropriate echelon and in the right order. Where insufficient defeat mechanisms may be available, classification also provides the information to assess which threats from enemy UAS can be mitigated by passive measures, and which enemy UAS must be defeated, given that the threat they pose cannot be mitigated.</p> -<p>No. 103: One of the main armoured-vehicle repair plants is No. 103 in Atamanovka (Transbaikal region). This plant is the key military facility in the easternmost regions of Russia and is directly on the Trans-Siberian railway linking the European part of Russia and the Pacific coast, with a rail connection allowing the plant to load vehicles directly onto freight carriages. Satellite images reveal the plant has parking space for more than 1,000 vehicles.</p> +<h4 id="discrimination">Discrimination</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/y7SvMFA.png" alt="image12" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Armoured-vehicle Repair Plant No. 103 in Atamanovka (Left) and its Main Parking for More Than 400 Heavy Machines (Right).</strong> Source: Airbus Defence and Space, RUSI, Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<p>One of the most prevalent challenges in C-UAS operations is the risk of fratricide. This can be fratricide of friendly communications and other capabilities. For example, during one exercise observed by the authors, a C-UAS system classified all personal radios worn by friendly troops in its area of regard as UAS and promptly collapsed all squadron communications. C-UAS capabilities are also very liable to destroy friendly UAS. During an operation observed by the authors, electronic protection from UAS similarly collapsed blue-force tracking across a divisional frontage, driving troops to have to revert to map-based navigation for a protracted period. In Israel, one of the authors observed how Israel Defense Forces had taken to shooting down both friendly and enemy UAS that flew over their units. Ukrainian and Russian air defences, meanwhile, have each accounted for a large proportion of their own larger UAS losses. Conversely, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps used the flight path of American UAS returning to a base in Jordan to fly a strike UAS to attack the base, with US air defenders presuming it to be friendly. The same method – following a known international flight path – enabled a UAS strike by the Houthis on Tel Aviv. The underlying problem is discrimination. The problems with discrimination of UAS arise from three causes:</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>No. 560: There is at least one more armoured-machine repair plant operating in Siberia – the Vozhaevka-based armoured-vehicle repair plant No. 560, which is visibly smaller than No. 103.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>No. 81: Much closer to the frontline is Armoured Vehicle Repair Plant No. 81 in Armavir, some 200 km from the official Russian-Ukrainian border, in the Donbas area.</p> - </li> +<ol> <li> - <p>No. 61: Armoured Vehicle Repair Plant No. 61 is owned by UralVagonZavod in the St Petersburg region.</p> + <p>There are too many UAS launched by too many separate units to enable precise blue-force tracking of them. This makes centralised deconfliction impracticable.</p> </li> <li> - <p>No. 163: Armoured Vehicle Repair Plant No. 163 is located in the Krasnodar region.</p> + <p>UAS are sufficiently varied in shape and function, and simultaneously similar enough in silhouette and flight profile, to be difficult to differentiate in terms of who launched them.</p> </li> <li> - <p>No. 144: Armoured Vehicle Repair Plant No. 144 in Yekaterinburg (close to Zavod No. 9 and Uraltransmash) has been contracted by the Russian MoD for upgrades of BMDs and 2S9 self-propelled mortars to 2S9-1.</p> + <p>The threat UAS may pose to those beneath them, either via direct strikes or observation leading to precision artillery strikes, leaves little time to discriminate.</p> </li> -</ul> +</ol> -<p>All these plants were advertising for additional staff at the time of writing, with an emphasis on CNC operators and technical engineers, indicating the rapid expansion of these facilities. The majority of identified armoured-machine repair plants are involved in repair and overhaul of direct fire armoured fighting vehicles like tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. The 39th Arsenal in Perm is believed to be one of the only armoured-machine repair plants specialised in refurbishing artillery in the country. The property, including the land and buildings, had been acquired by a private entrepreneur following asset liquidation in 2021, but the liquidation was halted in the Russian courts in 2023. The case for doing so was based on the strategic importance of the plant. The current status of the plant and its equipment is unknown, but it is possible that it and its infrastructure – like the tracks that carry vehicles to and from the plant – have fallen into disrepair. It is understood that ad hoc facilities have been established closer to Ukraine for the repair of artillery systems, including regular maintenance like the replacement of barrels. However, this type of facility is unlikely to be capable of returning stored howitzers to a combat-fit state.</p> +<p>The solution to this problem should be federated by altitude, and by the type of UAS under discussion. For fixed-wing ISR UAS intended to operate at medium altitude, the fact that they fly above the range of most lower-echelon organic C-UAS effectors means that they do not need to be discriminated by those echelons. At the same time, these UAS are large enough and have enough power to be able to carry an encrypted transponder, which emits a pre-programmed signal when it receives a pre-programmed interrogative message. In this way, a system optimised for defeating these targets should be able to carry a capability to interrogate the target and, on receiving the appropriate electronic handshake, desist from targeting the system. Once a UAS has been shot down over enemy territory, there is a significant risk that the transponder will be captured. For this reason, the IFF (identification, friend or foe) signature would need to be updated to prevent hostile UAS from replicating it to avoid being intercepted, probably on a 24-hour basis. This approach is consistent with what is typically done with crewed aircraft.</p> -<p>Russia has a lot of equipment waiting for refurbishment; one assessment indicates that Russia had at least 10 storage bases, 12 artillery storage bases and 37 mixed equipment storage bases. For reference, one storage base – the 591st artillery warehouse in the Novgorod Region – was home to at least 400 howitzers in 2018. This indicates that Russia may have thousands of howitzers sitting in storage. The refurbishment of equipment has been accompanied by what appears to be a significant effort to stand up or restore armoured-machine and artillery repair plants closer to Ukraine. The majority of those that were functional in 2022 were in the Urals.</p> +<p>Such a solution is not viable for quadcopters and tactical UAS because most lack the payload and/or power storage to be fitted with an IFF transponder, and most of the capabilities that would passively detect and target them would not have an ability to interrogate a transponder. Here tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) must be used to avoid fratricide. For the company group, organically attached UAS can likely be protected by being controlled through the company mobile ad hoc network (MANET) that bears its tactical communications. Thus, UAS generated from within the company group would appear on blue-force tracking. Since these UAS would fly from and return to the company’s area of responsibility, this would present little problem. The challenge emerges when a battalion or UAS attached at battalion, or to support arms, flies UAS over company battlespace, since these capabilities will not be part of the company MANET and would saturate the capacity of the network if their integration was attempted.</p> -<p>However, Russian news outlets indicate that orders were given to establish facilities closer to Ukraine in late 2022. This suggests that Russia has established or will establish facilities designed to repair vehicles and artillery damaged in Ukraine and return it to the front line as quickly as possible. However, if the facilities to refurbish howitzers are specific to those vehicles, and have been allowed to atrophy, it is logical that artillery manufacturers like Uraltransmash and Motovilikha Plant would currently be responsible for refurbishing artillery stockpiles as well as manufacturing or overhauling new, more capable systems like the Msta-SM2 and 2S35 Koalitsiya.</p> +<p>For OWA capabilities, the indication to friendly forces on their route of advance as to their time and course should allow for C-UAS teams to accurately discriminate. For ISR UAS, the problem with such an approach is that they must also overfly friendly positions en route back from a mission, and if subjected to jamming, may endeavour to autonomously return to the base station on an unplanned route. For these capabilities, it may make sense for the flight plan to include a point at which it traverses the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT)/Forward Line of Enemy Troops. On the outbound portion, deconfliction can be by warning to the unit occupying the battlespace. For the return portion, it may make sense for the UAS to emit a signal once it has crossed the FLOT – with the appropriate signal being determined by the sensors available to C-UAS systems – to indicate that it is friendly. As these emissions would likely be detectable by the enemy, they would need to be updated regularly, likely with a predistributed schedule of emissions given once per day, with a new signal per hour. Since the UAS would not have the schedule but would have the signal relevant to when they are flying, if the enemy captured one or monitored the signal, they could not then use it on their own UAS within the period of that signal being relevant. This would not be an entirely reliable system, but it would reduce friendly shoot-downs.</p> -<h3 id="chapter-4-ammunition-supply-chains">Chapter 4: Ammunition Supply Chains</h3> +<h4 id="distribution-and-cueing">Distribution and Cueing</h4> -<p>Russia has an anticipated need for four million 152 mm artillery rounds and 1.6 million 122 mm rounds for offensive operations in 2025. The Russian defence industry can manufacture around 1.3 million 152 mm rounds and 800,000 122 mm rounds per year, so many of the required rounds will have to be procured from abroad or refurbished from legacy stockpiles. Russia has been refurbishing artillery ammunition and missiles at least since 2018, when Putin indicated that 550,000 rounds of ammunition and missiles had been refurbished and returned to service.</p> +<p>Once a UAS has been detected and identified as hostile, the next stages required for any C-UAS effect are to communicate that information to other assets within and potentially beyond the unit in the affected area of operations. This is primarily important for cueing C-UAS effectors and/or additional sensors onto the detected threat if that is required to obtain a weapons-grade track. It is also important to pass the information to the rest of the unit(s) in the vicinity to allow them to adjust activity according to the category of UAS threat detected. This is a critical requirement to minimise risk to the force and buy time for C-UAS effectors to be brought to bear.</p> -<h4 id="manufacturers-1">Manufacturers</h4> +<p>The communication of information to effectors for cueing can be simple or complex depending on the way that the C-UAS capability has been integrated into the force. If the sensors and effectors are concentrated on dedicated vehicles, hand-off between initial detection, track and discrimination sensors and systems to effectors can potentially take place on the same vehicle or at least within a small subset of those within a given unit. On the other hand, if detection relies on a distributed array of sensors such as multi-static passive radar arrays or acoustic sensor arrays mounted on multiple vehicles throughout a unit, then the communications links between them and any effector will need to be complex, resilient and low latency.</p> -<p>Russia’s artillery ammunition manufacturers sit on top of a supply chain that is largely domestic, but some key resources are procured from abroad. There are three primary manufacturers of artillery ammunition in Russia: NIMI Bakhirev, the Plastmass Plant and KBP Shipunov. NIMI Bakhirev appears to perform as a contractor for the Russian MoD and control deliveries from companies like Plastmass and the Kazan Gunpowder Plant.</p> +<p>For passive sensors that cannot produce high-resolution track data, which includes acoustic, some passive radar and most RF analysers, producing a track suitable for weapon guidance will require cueing on a secondary sensor that can generate the required track resolution. For most relatively short-range C-UAS tasks, the simplest solution is to use the azimuth data provided by passive sensors to cue on a sensor ball with a high-resolution EO/IR camera and integral laser rangefinder. Non-dedicated C-UAS optics, such as those found in sensor balls on remote weapon stations (RWS) or turret-mounted optical suites, should be able to relatively easily acquire UAS within several kilometres once provided with an accurate bearing to search, and ideally a rough range and speed of travel.</p> -<p><em>NIMI BAKHIREV</em></p> +<p>Alternatively, active fire control radar systems such as those that provide ranging, speed and bearing data for self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (SPAAGs) or for missile cueing and guidance for SAM systems can be cued onto targets detected by wide area systems. The information that needs to be passed for cueing such systems does not need to be track-quality high-resolution data, but merely enough to enable those SPAAG and SAM systems to engage with minimal radar illumination times by only having to search a limited scan volume to acquire the target.</p> -<p>State Scientific Research Institute of Machine Building Bakhirev (NIMI Bakhirev) is Russia’s oldest and most prominent developer of artillery and tank ammunition. Like most of Russia’s artillery supply chain, it sits within the Tekhmash holding, part of Rostec. The available tax data indicates that it delivered goods worth around $1.7 billion to the Russian MoD in the first half of 2023. NIMI Bakhirev is Moscow-based and doesn’t have any known production facilities, which leads to the conclusion that it acts as an R&amp;D, procurement and supervising entity on behalf of the Russian MoD.</p> +<h3 id="ii-engagement-and-defeat">II. Engagement and Defeat</h3> -<p>NIMI Bakhirev is understood to produce a range of 125 mm ammunition that is used by tanks, as well as 152 mm rounds for artillery. Since the invasion of Ukraine, the plant has made efforts to restart production of 122 mm ammunition and to upgrade and modernise the 100 mm ammunition used by the BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle.</p> +<p>Once a UAS has been detected, classified and identified, the force must apply the appropriate countermeasure to defeat it. Understanding the options and their various advantages and dependencies allows a force to field an appropriate array of options for protecting itself from UAS. This chapter therefore explores how UAS can be defeated in their mission through the targeting of their sensors, communications and navigation, and their enablers, or by physically destroying them.</p> -<p><em>PLASTMASS PLANT</em></p> +<h4 id="sensor-defeat">Sensor Defeat</h4> -<p>Plastmass Plant is also a subsidiary of Tekhmash and a producer of 76–152 mm artillery ammunition. Its product portfolio includes the 3VOF58 152 mm round, which is the designation given to the 3OF45 high explosive projectile, and a variable charge, designed to be fired by the 2A65 Msta-B towed howitzer and the 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzer. It also manufactures 3VOF39 152 mm rounds with 3OF29 high explosive shells and charges for the towed 2A36 Giatsint-B and 2S5 Giatsint SPH. Collectively, these four howitzers represent the longest-range systems chambered to fire 152 mm shells that are available to Russian forces in Ukraine. Plastmass produces a range of other warheads that are used in missiles and rockets.</p> +<p>With the exception of GNSS-guided OWA systems, almost all UAS require functional sensors to pose a threat to forces or installations. Thus, one of the core approaches that can be taken as part of C-UAS defence is to temporarily or permanently degrade the sensors used by UAS that are operating in the vicinity of friendly assets.</p> -<p><em>INSTRUMENT DESIGN BUREAU</em></p> +<p>Success is heavily contingent on being able to accurately determine the activity that a given UAS is conducting, and thus on what sensors it is likely to rely. As discussed in Chapter I, there are multiple potential methods that can be used, but the critical thing for the success of any sensor defeat effector is that the effector in question receives the data as quickly as possible.</p> -<p>Instrument Design Bureau (KBP) is the second-largest supplier to the Russian MoD by value, with more than $895 million in sales for the first quarter of 2023. Its parent company is the High Precision Systems Holding, which sits within Rostec. KBP develops precision-guided weapons and air defence systems as well as automatic cannons. This includes the Kornet ATGM and Pantsir-S short-range air defence system, with deliveries of the former reported in June 2023. Additionally, KBP manufactures and develops the 2K25 Krasnopol laser-guided artillery round. In August 2023, KBP started supplying the Russian army with upgraded Krasnopol rounds that can be guided onto a target by a laser designation from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The enterprise has also been working on increasing the efficiency of its laser-guided KM-8 Gran bomb for 120 mm mortars and Kitolov-2M artillery shells for D-30 and 2S1 artillery systems. Laser-guided rounds are important to Russia’s artillery war, as the extreme dispersion adopted by Ukrainian forces reduces the efficacy of massed artillery barrages. More precise fires are therefore used against singular targets and individual howitzers when possible.</p> +<p>Since a substantial proportion of hostile UAS activity will be either ISTAR-type missions or FPV attack missions, the capability to blind optical sensor suites is critical for C-UAS approaches that rely on sensor defeat. Retroreflector technology using lasers to detect the reflected returns from lenses has seen extensive use in recent conflicts, including in Ukraine, and offers the potential to rapidly pinpoint and then dazzle or even permanently damage hostile optics. While this has until recently primarily been used to counter snipers and anti-tank guided missile teams and to degrade vehicle optics on the ground, if cued by an appropriate detection system, such technology can be used in the C-UAS role. Furthermore, the power requirements for a laser capable of dazzling sensitive optics are far lower than for more ambitious laser C-UAS systems, which aim to shoot down UAVs. This means that systems with retroreflector and laser dazzle capacity can be much smaller and relatively cheap, and have a much greater magazine depth for a given space, weight and power installation. This in turn means that optical sensor defeat capabilities are more feasible than many other C-UAS effector solutions for use by forward forces at low echelons close to the frontlines. This approach has a proven track record on defensive counter-aid suites for crewed platforms. However, if a system does not have sufficient power to permanently damage the optics of a hostile UAS, its sensor-defeat capacity will only last for as long as the operator can maintain direct line of sight to the target. Thus, for lower-powered systems, it would be necessary to have numerous effectors across the frontage held by a unit to ensure effective coverage, whereas for more powerful systems, a smaller number might be sufficiently effective. Another issue with relying on this capability in isolation is that cameras can be protected from retroreflective detection.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/La7xiWT.png" alt="image13" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 6: Companies Supplying the Russian MoD and Defence Industry with Ammunition.</strong> Source: Financial data seen by authors.</em></p> +<p>Passive defeat approaches are also important to consider. For example, against FPV-type direct attack UAS or loitering munitions, such as Lancet-3M, which use either EO or IR sensors for terminal guidance, using smoke as an obscurant can be highly effective if the unit being targeted can be warned promptly about the presence and likely category of incoming threat. Even for future systems that are likely to use AI and/or machine learning, and enabled automatic target selection and terminal guidance to avoid the need for a vulnerable connection to a human operator, the use of obscurants should remain highly effective if triggered in time. “Hot smoke” compounds that give a sufficient thermal signature and can effectively blind IR sensors as well as EO ones are an obvious choice given the versatility they offer against multiple types of hostile UAS/munitions. Smoke launchers are already a core component of the defensive systems on most main battle tanks, and given the increasing prevalence of UAS and loitering munition threats, could and probably should be mounted on a wider range of vehicles throughout most formations. The critical determinant of whether such systems can form a reliable part of sensor-defeat C-UAS approaches will be the communications architecture to enable the detect, track and classify functions of the sensor and processing layers to pass real-time and accurate warnings to the forward elements under attack with a sufficiently low false-positive rate. Finally, UAS can have their effectiveness reduced using multispectral camouflage and overhead protection on fighting positions, such that it requires much longer times on target to locate units and distinguish targets.</p> -<p><em>PRODUCTION IN-DEPTH: PLASTMASS PLANT</em></p> +<h4 id="soft-kill">Soft Kill</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OjRnrxd.png" alt="image14" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: The Plastmass Plant.</strong> Source: Airbus Defence and Space, RUSI, Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<p>For ISR UAS there is a requirement to offboard sensor data for them to achieve their mission, whether they are remotely piloted or autonomous systems. There is also usually a requirement for them to receive intermittent commands to fly to or orientate their sensors towards and orbit points of interest. There can be significant levels of automation in flight, but periodic receipt of data is generally necessary. The prevention of an ISR UAS from receiving such instructions can in many cases drastically limit its utility. If the data it is gathering cannot be offboarded, this is even more problematic, as the latency introduced if the data can only be recovered upon landing means that its value is greatly diminished. The easiest method for preventing an ISR UAS from achieving its mission therefore is simply to apply jamming against the receiver to sever its ability to receive instructions. In many cases this will cause the UAS to return to its base station and therefore end its mission. A similar approach can be effective against short-range FPVs. Jammers, however, are vulnerable to direction finding and strike, such that jammers cannot be used continuously unless the effect is passed between several that have been distributed.</p> -<p>Plastmass is an important element of the Russian artillery supply chain, located in Kopeysk in Chelyabinsk region. The following analysis indicates that the plant is responsible for at least 15% of Russia’s projected 152 mm round production in 2024. The plant is owned by Rostec and has focused on ammunition for artillery, tanks and aviation. It specialises in the assembly and refurbishment of shells and rounds for 120 mm and 152 mm howitzers, and has supplied the Russian army with ammunition for all of its primary indirect fire systems. It produces the S-8 series of 80 mm unguided rockets that are fired from Russian helicopters in a ground attack role, as well as 125 mm explosive ammunition natures for tanks. This product suite is indicative of the plant’s role in supporting Russia’s war effort, and, while it is by no means the only plant producing ammunition for the armed forces, it is one of the few that only produces ammunition, and for which there is sales data to indicate volume.</p> +<p>Autonomously navigating UAS, either because they have lost contact with a control station or because they are strike systems following a pre-programmed route, must still have a method for accurately tracking their own position during flight. The same is true for future UAS systems with much greater levels of autonomy leveraging AI. This can be done through GNSS, sensors such as LIDAR or optical terrain contour-matching, inertial navigation, simultaneous localisation and mapping, optical flow or visual odometry. Usually, it will be a combination. Localised jamming or spoofing of GNSS signals can often achieve a soft kill against simpler systems, as can damage or interference with the onboard sensors of UAS through electronic attack. For example, if the navigation system of a UAS can be spoofed to indicate that it is flying above its actual altitude, it can be induced to execute a controlled flight into terrain. If a UAS is forced by the denial of GNSS to rely on inertial navigation for a sustained period, it can be brought significantly off target over time through drift. Even a relatively limited positional error induced in hostile ISTAR UAS, in particular, can lead to them passing inaccurate target coordinates to long-range strike systems, protecting the observed formation and wasting enemy precision munitions.</p> -<p>A significant part of the plant’s production is commissioned by ammunition developer NIMI Bakhirev, which in turn is subcontracted by the Russian MoD. The Plastmass Plant reportedly made $143 million in payments to NIMI Bakhirev and $232 million to the Russian MoD in 2023. In addition, publicly available arbitration records confirm that prior to 2022, the entity was subcontracted by NIMI Bakhirev to fill artillery shells with explosive materials under contracts issued by the MoD or Rosoboronexport, Russia’s defence export agency. The total value of these orders is $375 million – far less than the Instrument Design Bureau, which has close to $1 billion. However, as Plastmass is primarily involved in ammunition production, while KBP has a range of business lines, the volume of production at Plastmass and the possible impact of disrupting its operations can be more accurately discerned. A 152 mm artillery round is thought to cost around $700, suggesting that Plastmass could be contracted to produce 535,000 rounds of 152 mm ammunition for the $375 million that it has received from the Russian MoD. While this figure is unlikely to be precise, given Plastmass’ range of products, it indicates the potential impact of disrupting this manufacturer.</p> +<p>There are more specialised forms of soft kill. If encryption keys for a UAS have been identified, either from captured UAS or from poor drills for key distribution by the enemy, or if a UAS receives data via certain channels, it becomes possible to conduct either a protocol-based electronic attack or cyber attack against the system. This can, for example, alter what is shown on a video feed to push false information back to the base station. Alternatively, it could hijack the UAS and force it to land somewhere harmless, enabling recovery and exploitation. These capabilities are more specialised than routine jamming and require dedicated operators with access to intelligence. These techniques are also opportunistically available, rather than persistently dependable.</p> -<p>As of early 2022, the Plastmass Plant operated 38 production facilities, repair shops and workshops with a total area of 33,005 m2, as well as 78 warehouse facilities with a total area of 37,200 m2. In 2013, it had seven main structural subdivisions, including Workshop No. 4, which focused on ammunition production, with a stated output of 50,000 units per year with a “military” purpose – Plastmass has other business arms, including the production of explosives for industrial use. In September 2021, Rostec announced plans to launch a new assembly facility for 100–152 mm ammunition, with an area of approximately 4,000 m2 by 2023. The facility was to employ automated technologies worth RUB 250 million (~ $3.4 million) and increase the plant’s output by 150%. The most recent publicly available video showing the plant’s premises is from March 2022; it includes footage of a new industrial boiler room and older-looking ammunition assembly facilities. Nevertheless, Rostec announced in June 2024 that Plastmass had increased its military-use production five-fold since the start of the invasion, and planned to increase production volumes by another 20% in 2024.</p> +<p>None of the forms of soft kill outlined above are guaranteed methods for defeating a UAS. One way to make jamming data transfer difficult, for example, is for a UAS to communicate on two non-adjacent frequencies, which hop, and to compare the message received on each. If one differs from the other, a third frequency is used and compared to the existing frequences to determine which is genuine, and then the false one is closed off. If the frequencies can be hopped quickly, it requires a very capable jammer to reliably track and defeat the signal. Similarly, a UAS that has an eight-element antenna for GNSS can receive signals on multiple navigational frequencies and compare them, and can compare the alignment of received signals, such that effectively denying GNSS requires specialised equipment and operators. While such specialised capabilities can be fielded, they cannot be available across all echelons and so where such bespoke jamming is held must be carefully prioritised.</p> -<p>This growth in capacity is confirmed by the plant’s recruitment of new personnel, particularly assemblers of munitions for three shifts per day. The plant started posting monthly job adverts on the VK social media platform in June 2022 seeking ammunition assemblers, electricians and other technical roles. The salary offered for ammunition assemblers grew from a minimum of RUB 19,000 (~ $351) per month in June 2022 to a minimum of RUB 85,000 (~ $964) by July 2024. As of 24 July 2024, the plant had 134 vacancies for ammunition assembler positions on the Federal Service for Labour and Employment vacancies website, accounting for more than 20% of the plant’s active vacancies. The sharp increase in salaries and large number of vacancies for this unskilled position may indicate that the plant is struggling to find enough workers to meet the demands of its expanded capacity.</p> +<p>That soft kill can be overcome across much of the front does not mean that it lacks utility. What the proliferation of soft kill capabilities achieves is that it significantly raises the sophistication and quality requirements for hostile UAS to enable them to successfully prosecute missions. This reduces the frequency and volume of the threat and requires the enemy to be more careful to avoid losing their UAS. UAS that have been designed with more costly and capable features to make them resistant to soft kill techniques are not necessarily any more survivable against hard kill approaches. By reducing the number that must be intercepted, soft kill capabilities make it more economical to conduct hard kill defence and reduce the risk of hard kill systems being saturated. Soft kill defences can also be more easily made persistent and can have a wide-area effect. Historically, the need for dedicated EW systems to deliver soft kill made it difficult to have such capabilities available across all echelons. However, today, the emergence of software-defined systems means that with the right programming and the right antenna, most tactical communications systems can be repurposed to deliver EW effects. Thus, it can be characterised as an opportunity, rather than an opportunity cost, to equip the force with useful soft kill C-UAS capabilities.</p> -<p>It is rare for any ammunition manufacturer to reveal production figures, but it is possible to form an assessment of Plastmass’ output using the available data. If, for example, the production figure for 2013 of 50,000 units is accurate and remained constant until the invasion, the increases announced by Rostec indicate that Plastmass will be able to produce 300,000 units by the end of 2024. Taken together with data seen for this report, it can be reasonably concluded that the annual production output of Plastmass is at least 300,000 units of all ammunition types per year, and may be as high as 535,000 if it focuses on 152 mm natures alone. However, the plant’s activities include refurbishing old ammunition, which is likely cheaper and faster than producing new ammunition, as well as the production of munitions that are more advanced and therefore likely more expensive than a traditional 152 mm round. This could lower or increase the total output of the plant. In addition, Russia is understood to have sacrificed production capacity for many of its non-artillery ammunition natures in 2022 and 2023 to meet its need for 152 mm and 122 mm rounds.</p> +<h4 id="hard-kill">Hard Kill</h4> -<p>Assessing the plant’s artillery ammunition output is therefore challenging, but it appears likely that the plant could produce at least 200,000 rounds of artillery ammunition per year through production and refurbishment, alongside production of tank and rocket ammunition. This figure could be increased by tens or hundreds of thousands of rounds if all other production was sacrificed to focus on artillery natures. As Russia is projected to produce 1.3 million rounds of 152 mm ammunition in 2024, Plastmass may be responsible for more than 15% of the country’s output.</p> +<p>Physical destruction of UAS can be achieved via various means, each of which has implications in terms of efficiency, cost and enablement. The three broad means of destruction are gunfire, manoeuvring interceptors and directed energy.</p> -<p>This of course depends upon the ability of the plant’s supply chain to meet its needs for raw materials and products. The available data indicates that the supply chain is heavily concentrated; the plant was reliant on six suppliers for more than 95% of its purchases in terms of value, which were in excess of $179 million in 2023. More than 60% of its transactions by value were with the Selmash Plant, which manufactures shell bodies for 152 mm ammunition as well as S-8 rockets. This plant has been expanding production capacity by refurbishing old buildings and modernising its existing machinery, and is working “24/7 in support of the SVO [special military operation]”, according to the director general. Plastmass’ suppliers are set out in Table 7.</p> +<p><em>Gunfire</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iPOdh2e.png" alt="image15" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 7: Companies Identified in the Plastmass Plant Supply Chain in 2023.</strong> Source: Financial data seen by authors, Unified Information System in the Field of Procurement, Financial data seen by authors, Unified Information System in the Field of Procurement, JSC Selmash Plant, JSC NPO Kurganpribor, JSC Solikamsk Plant, ASK, Missile-Technical and Artillery-Technical Support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.</em></p> +<p>For most military forces, adapted existing small- and medium-calibre cannon mounted on vehicles represent the most obvious potentially available distributed C-UAS effectors. While it is a near-universal response of troops who observe UAS to shoot at them with whatever weapons are available, the fact is that UAS represent a difficult target set. Most are small and can move erratically in three dimensions, and accurately estimating their range from a shooter is difficult to do visually. Effectiveness even with standard rifles can be improved by providing some soldiers with specialist C-UAS sights that help calculate distance and speed and provide an aiming cue for the shooter. Shotguns have also had limited success as a last-ditch defence against Lancet series loitering munitions and FPV attacks in Ukraine. However, relying on soldiers as a significant layer in C-UAS defence is a terrible strategy because of the inherently low probability of kill, and the fact that soldiers have other important tasks to carry out.</p> -<p>These supply chain dependencies can become vulnerabilities. The largest dependency is Plastmass’ relationship with Selmash; there are other manufacturers of shell bodies within the ammunition supply chain, but they are supplying other producers. It is not clear that an alternative to Selmash could be found if it were unable to supply Plastmass.</p> +<p>As a rule, the base requirement for more reliable gunfire-based C-UAS effects is a system with either optics containing a laser rangefinder or a fire control radar system that can provide an accurate slant range and speed estimate for a precise firing solution. RWS can and should be used for this task. Dedicated anti-aircraft systems, such as the highly effective German-made Gepard SPAAG, also feature the capability to programme each shell to detonate as it reaches the target vicinity. This enables specialist anti-aircraft cannon ammunition to provide a blast-fragmentation effect to greatly increase the likelihood of critical damage to UAS and even cruise missiles with only short bursts of fire. The effectiveness of .50 BMG and 12.7-mm or 14.5-mm systems could also be improved with specialist ammunition, though even with standard ball, appropriately modified RWS can achieve kills against UAS with single shots. The major downside of dedicated SPAAGs as C-UAS effectors is that they are relatively expensive and specialised vehicles that represent a significant opportunity cost to acquire, and an additional logistical burden on units to which they are assigned.</p> -<p>Additionally, the expansion of the plant and recruitment of staff may be limiting production capacity. These supply chain dependencies can become vulnerabilities. The largest dependency is Plastmass’ relationship with Selmash; there are other manufacturers of shell bodies within the ammunition supply chain, but they are supplying other producers. It is not clear that an alternative to Selmash could be found if it were unable to supply Plastmass. Additionally, the expansion of the plant and recruitment of staff may be limiting production capacity.</p> +<p>However, the upside is that not only can they be equipped with heavier calibre cannon with a greater rate of fire than other medium-armoured vehicles, but they also generally come equipped with their own dedicated detect/classify/discrimination sensor suite to cue on their weapons. They can also provide devastating firepower against dismounted enemy infantry and lightly armoured vehicles in a ground-support role, and are much more capable against hostile aircraft, missiles and attack aviation than many other dedicated C-UAS effectors.</p> -<h4 id="raw-materials">Raw Materials</h4> +<p>Most modern general purpose armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) designs also include the option for a gyrostabilised 25–40 mm rapid firing cannon armament, mounted either in a turret or in an RWS, with EO/IR optics, laser range finding and programmable ammunition. Thus, if provided with suitable air burst ammunition, and specified with the requisite elevation for the gun, there is clear potential to adapt regular AFVs relatively easily to provide a significant degree of C-UAS effector capacity for land formations in a package that otherwise retains its full utility as a regular AFV. Without specialised sensor suites for detecting and classifying UAS themselves, regular AFVs with suitably specified turret/RWS armament would still need to have their optics cued onto a rough target bearing by offboard detection systems.</p> -<p>The raw materials involved in producing artillery ammunition begin with the iron ore that is used to make the shell casing. A shell casing is typically made from steel, and it is designed to be strong enough to withstand the forces of firing from a howitzer, but brittle enough to shatter into small fragments when the explosive inside detonates. In the Russian supply chain, propellent is stored and transported in brass cases that are loaded into the howitzer behind the shell and detonated to fire the round. This adds zinc and copper to the supply chain. The propellent itself is produced from cotton cellulose or cotton pulp and nitric acid, as well as some alcohols. Cotton pulp is produced by harvesting cotton linter and treating it with chemicals like sodium hydroxide that break down the other fibres, leaving only the cellulose, which is then purified and refined to the appropriate length. The resultant material is dried and formed into bales for transport. The final element to consider is the explosive inside the shell, which is typically a variant of Royal Demolition Explosive (RDX), which may also be known as hexogen or cyclonite. RDX is made from the nitrolysis of hexamine, which is produced by combining formaldehyde and ammonia.</p> +<p>Two significant drawbacks of cannon-based C-UAS effectors are ammunition consumption and limited range. Both are linked to the calibre of the system chosen. Higher calibre guns will be able to engage UAS out to longer ranges and at higher altitudes, but will also be able to carry fewer ready rounds within each vehicle, and rounds will be more expensive and bulky to transport from a sustainment point of view. Even relatively large calibre rapid-fire cannon such as the British Army’s 40-mm Cased Telescope Armament System would still be unable to reliably engage ISR UAVs, such as the Russian Orlan-10, at maximum cruising altitudes of 16,000 ft. In other words, while cannon-based effectors can provide a significant volume of effective close-range C-UAS capability if provided with the correct cueing, specialist ammunition and sensors, the requirement to also have a missile, directed-energy or interceptor-UAS system to cover the medium-altitude ISTAR part of the UAV threat spectrum would not be removed.</p> -<p>The raw materials needed for Russia’s artillery ammunition are:</p> +<p><em>Interceptors</em></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Ammonia.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Formaldehyde.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Aluminium.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Nitric acid.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Cotton pulp.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Sodium hydroxide.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Iron ore.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Alloy components.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Copper.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Zinc.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The most common currently fielded form of manoeuvrable interceptors for C-UAS tasks are shoulder-fired man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) such as the FIM-92 Stinger, which employ an IR/UV (heat-seeking) passive head to acquire and guide the weapon in on the hotter engine components of larger UAS. There are three core drawbacks to such systems for C-UAS defence. First, they have limited effective range, which prevents them from engaging medium-altitude ISTAR UAVs, such as Orlan-10. Second, they are much more expensive than small UAS or even than many medium-sized UAS, and so are not necessarily a sustainable answer to massed threats. Third, they are not suitable for engaging small UAS and FPV attack drones, as these electrically powered systems are too small and do not produce a viable heat signature to gain a lock.</p> -<p>The companies active in the supply of raw materials into Russia’s artillery ammunition supply chain are shown in Table 8.</p> +<p>Traditional SAM systems designed for anti-aircraft or missile defence tasks are also not well suited for C-UAS work, primarily because they are generally too large, expensive and overstretched relative to air and missile defence requirements to be sustainably used to engage even medium-sized UAVs. Second, radar-guided SAM systems use Doppler gates to filter out returns from static or slow-moving objects to reduce clutter, which also means that many systems struggle to reliably detect and track UAS that are hovering or moving at slow speeds. However, the upside of SAM systems compared with cannon or EW-based effectors is range, and therefore defensive coverage potential. If cued in by connected sensors, a launcher can also potentially engage UAVs that are beyond line of sight, further increasing the area that can be protected by a given number of launch systems.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/204RcO2.png" alt="image16" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 8: Primary Suppliers of Raw Materials into Russia’s Artillery Ammunition Supply Chain.</strong> Source: Financial data seen by authors, Unified Information System in the Field of Procurement, Fargona Kimyo Zavodi, Jizzakh Chemical Plant, Uralchem JSC.</em></p> +<p>Due to the far lower travel speed of UAVs compared with the aircraft and missiles that SAM systems are typically designed to engage, the ideal size of a C-UAS SAM is significantly smaller and can thus be cheaper and carried in larger numbers for a given volume. One promising option for SAM systems that are better suited to engaging ISTAR UAVs is the adaptation for ground launch of existing missiles designed for within-visual-range combat for air forces. One example is the British AIM-132 Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM), designed for use on RAF Typhoon fighters, which has successfully been adapted for cueing and launch by ground vehicles in the C-UAS role in Ukraine. While the range achievable will be significantly shorter than when launched from a fighter aircraft, when intercepting slow flying UAVs at medium altitudes, it is still significant. Existing short-range air-to-air missiles also offer the prospect of reduced cost per munition due to commonality across services, and the potential to use weapons in a ground role that have run out of airframe carriage hours but are otherwise still fully functional.</p> -<p><em>RAW MATERIALS IN-DEPTH: NITROCELLULOSE</em></p> +<p>One emerging subtype of interceptor for C-UAS work are systems such as the Iranian–Houthi 358 Saqr [Missile] or the growing range of interceptor UAS fielded by Ukrainian and Russian forces. The 358 Saqr is a two-stage SAM which uses an initial rocket booster to launch the main turbojet-powered section to high altitude and high subsonic speed, where it can then loiter for some time and intercept even high-end UAVs such as MQ-9 Reapers. Anduril has proposed the Roadrunner: a single-stage canister-launched system powered by dual micro turbojets that can launch and, if unsuccessful, land itself vertically, and is designed to intercept hostile UAS by direct impact and destroy them with an integral warhead. Roadrunner is not yet an effective capability, but Ukrainian units have achieved significant results with experimental versions of the concept, albeit using propeller-driven solutions. The critical element in making this capability cost effective is to have an offboard sensor provide guidance, preferably electro-optical or a laser which can be seen by a sensor in the nose of the UAS. Alternatively an interceptor can be guided by a radar. Such systems offer significant potential area coverage against ISTAR UAVs if cued in by an appropriate sensor layer. With utility against helicopters and potentially against ground targets, this class of system is likely to proliferate.</p> -<p>The charge in an artillery round charge is made of nitrocellulose, making this a key material for artillery production. Russian propellant plants are critically dependent on imports of cotton cellulose, the base material of nitrocellulose, as Russia currently has no domestic capacity for its production. Attempts to grow cotton domestically or develop alternatives to cotton cellulose from wood or flax have so far been futile. The raw materials are often imported, leaving them open to Western interventions to disrupt Russia’s access.</p> +<p><em>Directed Energy</em></p> -<p>Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been the main exporters of the base material for cotton cellulose. Russia and Uzbekistan have remained particularly close following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as indicated by a joint statement released during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s three-day state visit in Tashkent in the end of May 2024 announcing that the two countries would continue “paying attention to cooperation in the defence sphere”. Under an agreement between Uzbekistan’s State Defence Industry and the Kazan Gunpowder Plant in 2020, Russia even agreed to set up licensed powder production in Uzbekistan in exchange for supplies of propellant powders in 2021. Official statistics indicate that Russia’s largest supplier of cotton pulp is currently Uzbekistan, whose exports of the material to Russia doubled in 2022, to $9.4 million. One report indicates that Uzbekistan sold more than 4.8 million kilograms of cotton pulp to Russia in the first nine months of 2023. The majority of shipments were received by Russian entities, which appear as suppliers of all major propellant plants, including Perm, Kazan and Solikamsk. Most of these intermediaries were designated by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in May 2024.</p> +<p>There are two primary classes of directed-energy effectors for C-UAS: high-powered microwave (HPM) systems and high-energy laser (HEL) systems. HPM systems emit energy in a narrow cone-shaped beam, and so can potentially provide effects against multiple UAS at once if they are operating close to one another. On the other hand, it is much harder to control for potential electronic fratricide and collateral damage due to the wider area of effect of the weapon compared to HEL systems. HELs are precise due to the inherent nature of a focused laser beam, but as a result can only engage a single UAS at once and may require a significant dwell time on each target to achieve destructive effect. The energy also potentially goes a long way beyond the target and may also refract unpredictably in certain atmospheric conditions, making clearing arcs of fire potentially more complex than for cannon or missile-based systems. The higher the power output of a HEL system, the lower the dwell time required on a given target, and the greater effective range it can have, especially in inclement weather conditions. However, higher power outputs also require more power generation capacity, larger banks of capacitors to store charge for “shots”, and greater cooling capacity, so mobile installations become less practical, and costs increase significantly.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZzFBrtg.png" alt="image17" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Russian Imports of Cotton Cellulose and Recipient Entities.</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<p>One of the issues that has hampered the development and fielding of practical HEL systems for wider short-ranged air defence (SHORAD) tasks is that most systems have been required to potentially deal with a wide variety of threats, including incoming mortar rounds and missiles, to enable them to replace traditional cannon systems such as Phalanx. Successfully engaging incoming munitions, many of which travel at high subsonic or supersonic speeds and so present a short engagement window, demands high power levels. However, if HEL systems were to be procured specifically for C-UAS functions, they could be functional with far more modest power outputs, as UAS tend to be relatively slow and relatively lightly built.</p> -<p>According to commercial trade databases, 85% of Uzbek cotton cellulose exports to Russia in 2023 came from just two manufacturers Fargona Kimyo Zavodi and Raw Materials Cellulose. The two entities are interlinked through their beneficial owners and appear to be ultimately controlled by Rustam Muminov, who has owned several companies in Russia, including LLC TD Khimsnabsbyt, which used to be a direct supplier to the Kazan Gunpowder Plant and was the largest Russian importer of cotton cellulose prior to the invasion of Ukraine. Muminov is currently building a factory in Russia for hydroxypropyl methylcellulose (HPMC), a cotton cellulose derivative with civilian uses. It will also have the capacity to produce cotton cellulose, and so could contribute to the defence industry.</p> +<p>HPM and HEL systems also tend to be rather more expensive to procure than comparable missile or cannon systems, but far cheaper per engagement and with a greater potential magazine depth. The effectiveness of HEL systems also tends to drop substantially in heavy rain, fog or very dusty environmental conditions due to increased atmospheric refractive disruption and attenuation. However, many UAS are also not particularly effective in such conditions due to airframe or sensor limitations.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BGpkDJL.png" alt="image18" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: Cotton Pulp Trade with Kazan and Perm Gunpowder Plants.</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, financial data seen by authors, ClearSpending, Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<h4 id="offensive-c-uas">Offensive C-UAS</h4> -<p>Customs records show that the Kazan Gunpowder Plant – which manufactures propellant and explosives for artillery ammunition – imported over $2.2 million of cotton pulp from Fargona Kimyo Zavodi between March 2022 and January 2023. The plant also appears to have transacted with at least three other Russian companies – Lenakhim, the Bina Group, and Khimtreid – which imported significant amounts of Uzbek cotton pulp. In total, the four companies imported over $3.5 million in 2022 and almost $7 million in 2023. Meanwhile, the Perm Gunpowder Plant has not reported any imports, and has relied on Lenakhim and the Bina Group (with which it had contracts) to supply Uzbek cotton pulp. These transactions are shown in Figure 5.</p> +<p>The measures discussed above involve hard- or soft-kill effectors that aim to defeat enemy UAS in flight. However, C-UAS effects can also be achieved by targeting ground control stations and other enabling assets embedded within hostile ground forces. Even future strike UAS that may operate with a significant degree of autonomy will still need to be launched and monitored by a unit on the ground, while ISTAR UAS must transmit data back to ground control stations, and in many cases receive instructions or mission updates while in flight from teams of ground-based operators. These ground teams and control stations are an important potential attack surface against which C-UAS detection and effector capabilities can and should be optimised. In Chapter I, widespread distribution of RF analysers was discussed as one of the key approaches for detection of hostile UAS. These analysers will not only detect UAS, but as they would be spread out across a unit’s frontage, could also be used to triangulate emissions from hostile UAS ground control stations.</p> -<p>US-sanctioned Lenakhim is the largest Russian importer of cotton pulp, procuring over $8 million-worth from 2019 to 2023. The company received payments from the Kazan and Perm plants in early 2023 and has been fulfilling contracts for both since at least 2016 and 2013, respectively. Its annual imports of cotton pulp sat below $700,000 between 2019 and 2021, but in 2022 and 2023, the company imported over $7 million in cotton pulp from Fargona Kimyo Zavodi and Raw Materials Cellulose LLC, which supplied over $4.4 million. Uzbek customs data shows that Fargona Kimyo Zavodi supplied a further $600,000 of cotton pulp to Lenakhim in January 2024.</p> +<p>Exploiting this information can be done in several ways. If the triangulation or raw data is shared to the battalion or brigade headquarters, various methods could be used to decrease the effectiveness of ongoing hostile UAS operations. In the first instance, a brigade might allocate electronic attack capabilities to jam frequencies over the control station, thus achieving a similar effect to a soft kill directly against each UAS. Against a system with a dual-frequency communications link, as described in previous sections, simultaneous jamming of the base station and the UAS can be particularly effective. While the range necessary to jam a ground control station behind the enemy frontlines will require significant power and thus a dedicated EW system, limiting the duration such an effect can be applied, targeted use of such capabilities could be sufficient to disrupt, for example, a large-scale loitering munition strike wave.</p> -<p>Other importers of cotton pulp include Kazan-based Khimtreid, a chemical products wholesaler that imported just under $200,000 of cotton pulp from Fargona Kimyo Zavodi in September 2023, Bina Group, a large Russian chemicals company which received payments from Kazan and fulfilled contracts with Perm and other Russian defence companies. Both Khimtreid and Bina Group were sanctioned by the US in May 2024. The latter company has been importing large volumes of chemicals and precursors since 2020, and in 2023, it imported $1 million of cotton pulp from Fargona Kimyo Zavodi.</p> +<p>The ground control station can be subjected to physical fires. Optimally, this results in the death or wounding of the UAS operators, and thus not only the defeat of the UAS they are controlling at the time, but also a diminution of specialist adversary expertise. However, even if strikes fail to hit the operators, they may damage the antennae being used to send signals and thus sever the ability to regain control of the UAS. The value is that, unlike soft-kill methods, kinetic damage against either operators or control equipment not only achieves defeat of the UAS in its mission, but also creates persistent, rather than time-bound, degradation.</p> -<p>There is some evidence that sanctions and diplomatic pressure have successfully disrupted the nitrocellulose supply chain. The Kazakhstan-based Khlopkoprom-Tsellyuloza used to be one of the largest cotton cellulose suppliers of Russian propellant plants, but as of July 2023, when the Kazan and Aleksin propellant plants were designated by OFAC, Kazakhstan has drastically decreased its total exports of cotton cellulose, sending a total of 115 tonnes, worth $232,959 to Russia, between July and October 2023, and then ostensibly ceasing its shipments altogether. Instead, commercial trade data reveals that since March 2024, the entity has delivered 8,585 metric tonnes of cotton cellulose, worth nearly $17 million, to one single customer: US Department of State contractor, Bizzell Corporation. Bizzell is reportedly engaged in the production of large-calibre artillery ammunition in Europe for NATO partners. This is indicative of the positive effect that focused sanctions and political effort can have in denying critical materials to an opponent, while also benefiting a country’s own defence industry.</p> +<p>Alongside direction-finding location of hostile ground control sites, the other function of spectrum analysers being distributed across the front is an ability to collect large volumes of signals traffic. Decryption of such signals and/or sustained collection for pattern-of-life analysis may allow the identification of launch points, indicators of when the enemy is moving to them, and mapping of the support structure for enemy UAS complexes. These can then be pre-emptively targeted, to try to strike UAS and their crews on the ground while they are preparing to launch.</p> -<h4 id="processing">Processing</h4> +<h3 id="iii-deploying-a-c-uas-complex">III. Deploying a C-UAS Complex</h3> -<p>The raw materials are processed into core products that are then turned into projectiles and propellant. The product that becomes the outer shell of each projectile is a steel rod that is forged and stamped into a cylinder with a cavity in the middle. The outside of the shell is shaped with a machine tool, and a thread for the fuse is cut into the cone-shaped nose of the projectile. The projectile is heat-treated and cooled. A copper band is added to the outside of the shell, which is known as a driving band; it is designed to be softer than the steel of the shell so that the metal grooves of the rifling inside the howitzer barrel bite into it. This creates a more effective seal to ensure most of the gases produced by the propellant are directed into the shell and serves to impart spin to the projectile once it leaves the barrel, which stabilises it and improves accuracy. The shell is designed to be thick and strong enough through heat treatment to withstand the pressures of being fired from a howitzer, but not so thick that it will not fragment upon detonation. Further work is carried out to remove excess metal and prepare the round to receive a fuse, and the outer surface of the shell is polished and painted before it is transferred to a filling plant.</p> +<p>Having explored the means available for detecting, classifying, identifying and tracking a UAS, and how it can be defeated, this chapter considers how the force can integrate these capabilities to provide the relevant density of protection to enable it to operate. The chapter is in three parts. The first considers how C-UAS capabilities should be distributed across a force for its own protection. The second examines the protection of critical targets. The third discusses the C2 required to coordinate these capabilities.</p> -<p>At another plant, the explosive fill is produced, which, for Russian ammunition, is a compound called A-IX-2, an explosive made from 73% RDX, 23% aluminium and 4% wax, which is called a phlegmatizer. This is added to stabilise the explosive material. RDX is produced through the nitrolysis of hexamine with nitric acid. Hexamine is produced through a chemical reaction that results from formaldehyde and ammonia being mixed in gaseous states. The explosive fill is added through casting or pressing through the opening left for the fuse. This takes place at the filling plant before the shells are made ready for transit. Often this is done by plugging the open nose of the shell, which is used to insert the fuse before firing.</p> +<h4 id="defining-requirements-at-echelon">Defining Requirements at Echelon</h4> -<p>Separately, the propellant for the shells is produced from nitrocellulose, which is produced by nitrating cotton cellulose with nitric and sulfuric acid under temperature-controlled conditions. This creates an unstable and energetic material by binding nitrate groups to the cellulose fibres found in cotton. The degree of nitration can also be controlled, leading to different nitrocellulose products. In the next stage, the nitrated cellulose is separated from the acid mixture and boiled in water to help remove unstable nitro groups. The finished mixture is then dried and cut or extruded into rods or granules. In the case of Russian ammunition, these are packed into a brass casing. The casings are filled either completely or partially, depending on the range they are designed to provide. They are they made ready for use as a propellent that is inserted behind the artillery round in the breech of the gun prior to firing.</p> +<p>As described in Chapter I, the foundational C-UAS capability is situational awareness through the ability to detect UAS. This capability is required at all echelons because without it, no countermeasures can be initiated. The simplest means for detecting UAS at the FLOT is a spectrum analyser. The addition of acoustic sensors, which today can be vehicle mounted or man-packable, is also exceedingly useful for passive sensing of UAS and other threats. Acoustic sensors on vehicles also allow UAS to be tracked over time as they overfly units.</p> -<p>Russian ammunition manufacturing is not strictly specialised, and in an emergency, it is possible for companies to cover more than one stage or process. For example, one company may assemble projectiles for one calibre but deliver elements of others to a separate company working on a different calibre. There are several companies involved in this process in Russia (see Table 9); the Serov Mechanical Plant is one example. It is part of Tekhmash and is responsible for producing shells for artillery ammunition up to 152 mm. The plant was extensively refurbished in 2020 with state-of-the-art CNC machines, and has become an important element within the artillery supply chain. Other companies such as Mechanical Plant in Orsk produce brass casings for propellant. Charges and propellant are produced by many companies, including the Perm and Kazan Gunpowder Plants, as well as the Samara Plant, which is focused on charges for mortars. The Solikamsk Plant is also responsible for manufacturing propellant for mortar and rocket ammunition. The Sverdlov Plant, which has a branch in Altai region, states that it produces Hexogen for the defence industry, and fuses are believed to be manufactured by a company called the Kazan Precision Machinery Plant and Kurganpribor.</p> +<p>In terms of self-defence against UAS organic to platoon, it is possible for a software-defined radio with an appropriate antenna to be mounted on a vehicle and programmed for electronic attack. Having such a jammer within a platoon of vehicles would not allow complex jamming to be carried out by the vehicle crew, who would likely lack the expertise to programme bespoke attacks. However, as EW specialists build bespoke attacks for specific classes of UAS, it could become possible for this library to be pushed to these radios, so that if an emissions pattern has been classified it can be effectively engaged. This platoon EW could also be used to deny GNSS over its position to protect it from precision strike, although this would require the antenna, a generator and the software-defined radio to be offset from the vehicles when static, and so dismountable, to avoid drawing fire. The use of directional jamming could also be used to reduce the signature of the platoon emissions. While not able to craft attacks, the platoon would need to be conversant with when and how to employ the capability, analogous to how platoons manage electronic countermeasures to protect themselves from IEDs. Furthermore, with the advent of non-cooperative swarming in Ukraine, and cooperative swarming around the corner, increasing investment in the “detect/identify/track” phases of the C-UAS cycle is critical. Increasing capability and distributing sensors ensures expensive and bespoke C-UAS capabilities are not overwhelmed and attrited.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AkvmU4y.png" alt="image19" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 9: Raw Material Processing Companies that Produce the Critical Goods for Ammunition Production.</strong> Source: Perm Gunpowder Plant, FKP Kazan Gunpowder Plant, FKP Samara Plant Communar, Kommersant, Sverdlov Plant, Centre for Pre-University Training of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University, Interfax-Russia, FKP Tambov Gunpowder Plant, Rostec, JSC Mechanical Plant, RIA Novosti, JSC Selmash Plant.</em></p> +<p>The ability of platoons to self-defend will be constrained by the fact that they lack enough platforms to be able to dedicate any to C-UAS functions. However, it may be possible to modify some capabilities to have a C-UAS capability. Laser rangefinders on vehicles, for example, if they can pivot upwards, could be programmed to dazzle UAS, as discussed in Chapter II. RWS can also be programmed to track UAS electro-optically and to engage them to defeat OWA UAS and low-level reconnaissance UAS with significant efficiency.</p> -<p><em>PROCESSING IN-DEPTH: THE PERM AND KAZAN GUNPOWDER PLANTS</em></p> +<p>A company group would lack the capacity to support significantly increased numbers of vehicles dedicated to C-UAS tasks within its organic order of battle. Nevertheless, it would make sense for a pair of vehicles to have dedicated search and classification capabilities. This could be achieved with a light vehicle carrying a mast with passive sensors cueing an electro-optical sensor. In combination with the ability to distribute the sensors at platoon level, this would allow a company commander to have a detailed detection and classification ability over their assigned battlespace. As most tactical actions are ultimately actions by company groups, it follows that it would be necessary for a more dedicated C-UAS capability to support a company operation. Holding these organically within the company would likely overburden it, but having them attached to the company group from higher echelon would be viable.</p> -<p>Two of Russia’s most important propellant and energetics plants are the Perm Gunpowder Plant, which accounts for over 40% of Russia’s propellant production based on sales, and the Kazan Gunpowder Plant, which is the country’s most advanced propellant plant and has its own research and development centre as well as a dedicated nitrocellulose production facility. The Perm Gunpowder Plant is a sprawling facility that houses a TNT production plant, a ballistic missile R&amp;D institute and an area dedicated to the testing of ballistic missile engines. It also reportedly produces charges and igniters for rocket engines used in a variety of Russian weapons systems. Perm is equipped with its own thermal power plant, and manufactures a range of explosives for submarine-launched, air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles and artillery systems.</p> +<p>The battalion is likely the lowest echelon with a sufficient logistics and sustainment capability to support dedicated C-UAS platforms, which would need to be assigned to support subordinate companies. Critically, at this echelon, C-UAS should not simply be thought of as a defensive activity, but rather as a counter-reconnaissance mission: to offensively degrade the enemy’s sensor picture by hunting and destroying their UAS. Counter-reconnaissance has a defensive benefit, but in assigning missions to the battalion assets, the mindset of these troops should be offensive.</p> -<p>Following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, both plants appear to have ramped up production. In December 2022, Perm’s governor announced that the plant would receive over RUB one billion in investment for modernisation and construction of new facilities. Meanwhile, the plant announced plans to add 350 workers and increase shifts for current employees after an influx of new defence orders. Similarly, the workforce at the Kazan Plant increased shifts, while the plant launched plans to upgrade production of nitrocellulose and propellant powders.</p> +<p>There are two obvious requirements at battalion: an EW section and a C-UAS platoon. The EW section could run its own baselines, but as software-defined radios become pervasive, the expertise of these personnel might better be employed to first gather, monitor and interpret data recovered from the distributed antennae across the battalion’s companies. Second, this section can use software updates, pushed to the dedicated software-defined radios across the battalion, to deliver more specialised EW effects, and to update effects so that they keep pace with adversary adaptation. Third, these personnel provide the picture of the EMS within the battalion’s area of responsibility necessary to inform electromagnetic battlespace management and thus reduce fratricide.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Fcg4lkl.png" alt="image20" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: Geographic Locations of Perm and Kazan Gunpowder Plants.</strong> Source: Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<p>The C-UAS platoon would be an augmentation to the battalion support company. The most immediately relevant capability for this platoon is a SPAAG system, cued by the subordinate sensors, but with its own ability to interrogate targets. This capability could be distributed to support company lines of effort so that there is interlocking coverage across the battalion’s frontage while on the defensive. Additional SPAAG platoons could then be added to support the battalion if committed to offensive operations, held at brigade. It is also eminently feasible for the turrets of SPAAGs to hold launch canisters. In the first instance, these can hold MANPADS, allowing engagement of helicopters, cruise missiles and some classes of UAS. However, canisters could also hold interceptor UAS, guided by the electro-optical sensor of the SPAAG. These capabilities can engage aviation but are optimised for economically striking UAS at medium altitude. If a SPAAG has four canisters on its turret, there is no technical reason why it cannot have both MANPADS and interceptor UAS ready to fire. For light forces, interceptor UAS can be mounted in canisters on a light vehicle and guided either electro-optically or with a radar mounted on the vehicle.</p> -<p>High-resolution satellite imagery confirms that, in mid-2023, both the Kazan and Perm Plants began significant expansion and renovation.</p> +<p>The brigade is the echelon at which there is the ability to have standalone C-UAS capabilities. As the echelon at which EW deconfliction and management is likely best placed, the brigade should have the ability to conduct bespoke and dedicated electronic attack, using an EW company with large and specialised antennae. With regard to hard kill, the brigade can hold independent SPAAG units of action to protect key sites and distribute to reinforce battalion lines of effort. But the brigade is also the echelon with the requirement to be able to provide area defence for a sustained period against medium-altitude ISR UAS, and it has the opportunity for sufficient access to the common air picture to control such capabilities. The most efficient systems in this role are likely truck-mounted directed-energy weapons, but given the limitations of these systems in various weather conditions, it also makes sense for the brigade to have access to a missile or interceptor UAS able to engage targets at medium altitude. This should be employed as a secondary capability.</p> -<p>Ground has been broken on a large footprint of land directly next to the Kazan Plant’s nitrocellulose production facility, indicating that areas of the facility used for the production of ammunition are being expanded. At least five other locations at the plant have been cleared, likely indicating plans to expand production. This is shown in Figures 12 and 14.</p> +<p>Just as the brigade should hold independent SPAAG platoons to allocate to its subordinate battalions, so too should the division have independent C-UAS batteries that it can use to defend critical sites, or else field in support of brigades. The considerations for these divisional units of action, however, intended to protect sites from loitering munitions and OWA munitions, should be optimised against a slightly different target set than those intended to knock down ISR UAVs. Ultimately, divisional C-UAS units must be able to defeat salvos, and this is therefore considered next.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2xNutN3.png" alt="image21" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 12: Kazan Gunpowder Plant Overview.</strong> Source: Airbus Defence and Space, RUSI, Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<h4 id="c-uas-defence-of-critical-targets">C-UAS Defence of Critical Targets</h4> -<p>A similar expansion was observed at several locations in the Perm Gunpowder Plant, most notably alongside the TNT production facility, where large swathes of land have been deforested. Similar deforestation can also be seen alongside the solid fuel production area. This is shown in Figures 13 and 14.</p> +<p>The requirements for C-UAS defences around fixed points such as logistics hubs, airbases and ports differ in several important ways from the requirements to defend land forces on the battlefield. First, unless they are near the frontlines, the primary threat to such bases and installations is likely to come from cruise and ballistic missile attacks, but augmented by salvos of OWA UAS. This means that the C-UAS task is to protect not only the installations in question, but also the SAM systems, such as Sky Sabre or Patriot, which provide the primary means of defence against attack from above. Any attempt to provide C-UAS defences at every location that might be attacked throughout a given country, let alone across NATO, would be cost and personnel prohibitive. However, given the limited range and slow transit speeds of most classes of UAS, C-UAS coverage for point defence tasks can be prioritised around installations closer to likely conflict zones, such as RAF Akrotiri in the Eastern Mediterranean or Tallinn Airport as an airhead location in Estonia.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/czqrhKA.png" alt="image22" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 13: Perm Gunpowder Plant Overview.</strong> Source: Airbus Defence and Space, RUSI, Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<p>Here, adversary OWA systems such as Shahed-136 could cause major problems at relatively short notice, especially if equipped with anti-radiation seeker heads to threaten traditional air-defence radars that are emitting to defend against simultaneous cruise and/or ballistic missile strikes. Even though systems such as Sky Sabre, NASAMS (National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System) or Patriot can engage the size of UAS that can travel hundreds of kilometres, this would risk rapidly and unsustainably depleting their ammunition. In other words, C-UAS defence capabilities are likely to become increasingly critical to ensuring that higher-end integrated air and missile defence systems can sustainably operate at locations within range of hostile UAS attacks.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iAsgHKa.png" alt="image23" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 14: New Construction Projects Underway at the Kazan and Perm Gunpowder Plant.</strong> Source: Airbus Defence and Space, RUSI, Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<p>The best way to avoid saturation of point defences at a site is to defeat a salvo over a significant distance, using dispersed capabilities. The efficacy of this approach may be seen in Israel’s defeat of a large complex strike from Iran, in which most of the UAS and cruise missiles were defeated by aircraft before they reached Israel. This is also the approach adopted by Ukraine’s mobile defence groups. A point defence system cannot have command over a dispersed set of effectors, but it should be emphasised that if the land force has the range and depth of effectors described in the previous section of this chapter, a major salvo should be significantly attrited before it reaches key targets, as reserves and land force elements in the rear can manoeuvre their C-UAS capabilities to provide a distributed defence in depth. In Ukraine, this defence in depth approach relies on around 50,000 personnel, operating in mobile groups with SHORAD weaponry to achieve a high rate of intercept. At the same time, this dispersed defence, while reducing the risk of saturation of a point defence, does not obviate the need for point defences or for protection of critical SAM systems responsible for protecting sites from ballistic missiles that cannot be defeated in depth.</p> -<p>This analysis of the Perm and Kazan Gunpowder Plants further demonstrates that the vulnerabilities of Russia’s artillery supply chain – specifically those that can be affected by Ukraine’s Western partners – are outside Russia. There is a large and significant trade in chemicals between Russia’s petrochemical industry and its defence industry, which would be difficult to disrupt. However, that same petrochemical industry has multiple intersections and relations with Western countries and companies. This means that key chemicals are linked to Western economies, providing points of exposure.</p> +<p>Compared to the C-UAS detection, classification and engagement systems that might be suitable for integrating into mobile land forces for defensive or offensive tasks at various echelons, systems explicitly designed for point defence can be significantly larger and heavier and consume more power. C-UAS operators will need to be able to be part of the recognised air picture being used to coordinate IAMD activities, and this could help with cueing fire control systems and effectors onto incoming threats in addition to dedicated organic C-UAS sensor layers. In some ways, the point defence task could be considered ideal for HEL- or HPM-type directed-energy-based effectors, since higher power outputs and sufficient capacitors and cooling for a deep magazine are easier than in mobile installations. However, depending on the location of the base or installation in question and the equipment being used on and around it, guarding against collateral damage may still be a complex task, especially for HPM effectors. For cannon- or missile-based defence systems, there is likely to be a greater emphasis on effectiveness against salvo attacks than on the ability to deal with sustained attack by many small systems, the significant distance from the frontlines meaning that most very small and cheap hostile systems will lack the range to reach them unless inserted covertly for single salvos.</p> -<p><strong>Domestic Supply Chains</strong></p> +<p>That said, the use of any kind of kinetic or EW effector around an airbase, for example, is likely to require careful coordination and deconfliction with both military and civilian traffic. For that reason, any missile-, cannon- or EW-based effector designed for point defence at installations and bases will require robust communications links and coordination TTPs between them, military and civil air traffic control and any IAMD recognised air picture. However, given the relatively specialised nature of many of the C-UAS detection and threat classification sensors discussed in the first section of this chapter, it may be worth deploying and operating such sensors alongside those designed to feed into larger IAMD systems, rather than attempting to rely on the latter to cue in the C-UAS effectors deployed. In terms of the force planning assumptions, although the actual requirement for any given piece of terrain will be bespoke, providing a minimum viable point defence would likely need somewhere between a platoon (three to four platforms) and a company (9–12 platforms).</p> -<p>Russia’s sprawling petro-chemicals and mining industries are responsible for meeting much of the defence industry’s needs for chemicals and precursors. The majority are moved by rail, and analysis of Russian railway data indicates that both the Perm and the Kazan Gunpowder Plants receive large volumes of precursor materials and chemicals by rail. These include monthly shipments of benthol, methylbenzene, nitric and sulphuric acid, oleum and a range of other chemicals and materials used to manufacture propellant powders, explosives and high- energetics. The delivery of these materials has increased significantly since 2021.</p> +<h4 id="c2-for-the-c-uas-fight">C2 for the C-UAS Fight</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WOQRhZp.png" alt="image24" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 15: Railway imports to Perm and Kazan.</strong> Source: Russian internal railway data, Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<p>For a distributed array of comparatively short-ranged systems to be effective, it is necessary for them to be efficiently coordinated. Furthermore, since a range of the C-UAS techniques described can disrupt other C2 systems, it is important that the architecture for battlespace management is correct. Based on the functions at echelon described earlier in this chapter, a rational series of C2 relationships can be sketched out.</p> -<p>In many cases, the chemicals are sold and shipped to the Perm and Kazan Plants by well-established Russian companies involved in the manufacture of chemicals, petrochemicals and fertilisers, underscoring the intimate links between the country’s defence and civilian economies. Despite acting as critical supply nodes for Russia’s war effort, many of these companies continue to trade with the global economy. For example, one of the most important suppliers of precursors to both plants is Russia’s Sredneuralsky Copper Smelting Plant (SUMZ). Between April 2023 and April 2024, the latter shipped over 4,000 tonnes of oleum to the Kazan Gunpowder Plant and over 770 tonnes of oleum to the Perm Gunpowder Plant. Oleum, otherwise known as fuming sulphuric acid, is used in the manufacture of explosives such as TNT.</p> +<p>First, within the company, the ability to have a warning indicator for the presence of UAS as a flag raised and distributed via the company MANET would allow for all personnel to make informed judgements about their diligence in managing their signature and profile, or to determine that a threat justified being engaged by them. This simply requires the presence of the acoustic signature of rotors, silhouette or radio-control frequencies of a recognised UAS to be detected on a company platform associated with the company net, and for the fact of this detection to be shared. This could be done autonomously, with a human on the loop, to accelerate the process and free up cognitive capacity within the platoon from monitoring systems.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/luZwGaH.png" alt="image25" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 16: Annual Import Totals for Sredneuralsky Copper Smelting Plant, 2019-2023 (USD).</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<p>Second, the sensor that detected the UAS should collect the assessed characteristics, bearing and azimuth of the detection and hold this data available to be pulled by anyone requesting it. The most likely pull for this data would come from the platoon and company commanders, needing to make a decision about whether to apply or withhold electronic countermeasures, and from the dedicated C-UAS reconnaissance capability – which should pull the data automatically upon a flag being raised on the company MANET – intending to compare returns from multiple sensors, or to interrogate with their own, to classify the UAS. Another interested party would be the battalion EW team, who would want to gather directional data from multiple points to achieve triangulation and potentially to begin using their own baselines, or other sensors, to look for the enemy control station. Again, much of this could be automated, with the EW specialists on the loop to intervene if required.</p> -<p>Available Russian customs records show that SUMZ has been procuring machinery from overseas since 2019. While its total imports have decreased since 2019, the company still imported $11.5 million of equipment and related materials in 2023. Over $1 million of these shipments were spare parts for sulphuric acid blowers supplied by Herzog Hydraulik GmbH, a German company which has a history of shipping goods to SUMZ and other Russian companies. An acid blower is used to move gases during the production of sulfuric acid. The majority of these acid blower spare parts, produced by Howden Turbo, were shipped via Lithuania, with the last shipment occurring in October 2023.</p> +<p>From this point, several additional C2 links become relevant. First, if the decision by the platoon or company commander is to apply countermeasures, those in the vehicles with this capability will need to be directed to activate their electronic protection capability. Second, the fact that this has been done will need to be communicated to the battalion EW team and thence to the brigade headquarters for the purposes of electromagnetic battlespace management. This could be automated by sending an alert as a function of turning on the electronic protection suite.</p> -<p>Russia’s petrochemical and refinery industry is also a critical supplier to both gunpowder plants. For example, Lukoil’s refinery in Perm has been making regular deliveries of toluene by rail, a critical precursor for the manufacture of TNT, to the Perm Plant.</p> +<p>Another line of communications will need to pass the telemetry data, alongside the classification data, from the C-UAS reconnaissance teams to the battalion C-UAS and brigade command post. This is because the UAS could be interested in targets outside the company area of responsibility, and therefore capabilities need to be cued at higher echelon to be orientated and positioned to intercept. In this way, the subordinate companies become a distributed sensor net that allows limited C-UAS assets to be positioned to achieve hard kill against threats as they cross into the rear of the fighting echelon. As each echelon will have companies in reserve, which will also have their laydown of passive sensors, this creates a dense belt of sensors that can not only report the initial contact with a UAS but also, in fact, provide a track of its passage over time, without the need for dedicated communications architectures comparable to the air defence C2 infrastructure, which is too expensive and onerous to be kept at platoon level. Such a C2 structure would, however, require the dedicated hard kill C-UAS capabilities to be able to take the general plot of a UAS’s progress and to then achieve a track-quality solution using organic sensors, as well as the ability to interrogate the target. The SPAAG and dedicated C-UAS systems at brigade would need to fall under the air defence command or at least have access to the common air picture to avoid fratricide, as they have the capability, but should not be primarily tasked, to engage a wider range of threats.</p> -<p><strong>International supply chains</strong></p> +<p>If such a system is to function on the standard tactical communications channels, it is important that raw data is not routinely moved from the sensors to a centralised point, but is instead interrogated on the platform so that the facts can be distributed in small data packets of text. The use of a structured language to conduct this reporting would make these reports usable by other C2 systems. This requires some analytical capacity to sit on the software-defined radios supporting the sensors. In principle, this is fairly straightforward. For classification, the onboard processing at the base of the sensor mast of the dedicated C-UAS ISR vehicles would be critical, as these would hold multiple sensors and thus the ability to achieve high-confidence classification of targets, which could then be distributed as text. If the raw data were needed, it could be routed through an offset satellite communications link or other method, and thereby uploaded to a common portal from which higher echelon systems could pull it for analysis. One function of this pooling would be to create a library of signatures over time, which could then be used to refine both the software providing the classifications and the EW effects programmed into the distributed electronic attack antennae. This would therefore allow EW specialists at brigade to also upload software updates onto the same portal to be downloaded when the tactical situation allowed and thereby be distributed to the company’s sensors.</p> -<p>Internal transaction data for the first half of 2023 shows that both plants made payments to hundreds of companies in Russia, including some that have imported goods. Customs data reveals that dozens of these importers procured items critical to the production of propellants, explosives and shells, which can be broken down into three categories: cotton pulp; chemicals and precursors; and machinery. The issue of cotton pulp supply for nitrocellulose is covered in the Raw Materials section of chapter 4 of this paper. It is sufficient to state here that the trade in cotton pulp and nitrocellulose mentioned in that section is important to the function of the Kazan and Perm Plants.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p><strong>Chemicals and Precursors</strong></p> +<p>Effective, layered and efficient C-UAS capabilities are not a luxury or a concept to be explored as part of an abstract “future force”. They are basic elements of a land force that is suitable for operations today. Without C-UAS capabilities, a force will be seen first, engaged more accurately, and ultimately defeated by an opposing force that fields UAS and has the ability to counter them. For NATO members, the aiming mark set by the Alliance’s senior leadership is to be ready to deter Russia by 2028. This does not leave time to design and develop new capabilities from scratch. Fielding C-UAS capabilities – which are absent in any structured sense from most NATO land force elements – is therefore an urgent operational requirement.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HiyZ0Mi.png" alt="image26" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 17: Chemical Products and Precursor Supply Chain for the Kazan and Perm Gunpowder Plants.</strong> Source: Financial data seen by authors, trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, Clearspending, Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<p>At the same time, simply procuring expensive and standalone C-UAS systems will not lead to an efficient or coordinated system for protecting the force. At best it will provide limited protection against specific classes of UAS, which will rapidly become obsolete as the threat evolves. This paper has sought to outline the balance of capabilities needed at echelon to provide effective and enduring protection. The following recommendations endeavour to translate this into specific capabilities needed by the British Army. The capability mix articulated may be said to be generalisable to all NATO militaries, but its articulation in terms of specific systems and programmes requires reference to a particular force, and so the British Army is used here as a reference force.</p> -<p>The Kazan and Perm Gunpowder Plants have also engaged with a network of large and small wholesale traders of critical chemical compounds within Russia. This is shown in Figures 12 and 13. Several of these enterprises have been sanctioned by the US, UK and Ukrainian governments since February 2022. Nevertheless, some continue trading internationally and are open about their relationship with the military-industrial complex.</p> +<h4 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cxs9XhS.png" alt="image27" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 18: Annual Imports of Russian Chemical Companies That Transact With the Kazan and Perm Gunpowder Plants, 2019-2023.</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial providers, Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<p>First, the British Army needs to mount EW antennae and software-defined electronic protection suites, passive radar and acoustic sensing across its vehicle fleets. The electronic protection suites should be capable of both directional RF and GNSS jamming. Where systems already exist – as with the acoustic sensors on Ajax – software updates must allow them to be used to accurately detect UAS, drawing on available libraries of data from Ukraine. The software solution should be common across the force, rather than separate for each platform or sensor type.</p> -<p>One supplier to both plants is Neo Chemical LLC, a large distributor of chemical products that states that it operates in Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Europe. It has fulfilled contracts with Russia’s defence industry, including with the Srednenevsky Shipbuilding Plant, the Solikamsk Plant, and the Sverdlov Plant.</p> +<p>Second, the British Army should develop a passive multi-sensor mast with a software solution that allows its sensor returns to be cross examined to classify objects. These should be mounted as a modular unit on existing fleets of vehicles, optimised for Jackal and Cayote, and procured in sufficient density to have two per company group. Dismounted light infantry should receive the mast as a deployable kit, since the sensors themselves are largely man-packable and can be connected to a buried generator or a light tactical vehicle to be powered. If this is to be done by 2028, the Army will need to risk existing trials processes for its integration on vehicles. The current process of assurance will drive delays and cost up to the point of mission failure.</p> -<p>The company has been consistent in procuring chemicals and precursors, including epoxy resins, stearic acids, acrylic polymers and polyisobutylene - primarily from Chinese companies. The last of these is a compound used for the production of explosive charges. Russian government patents demonstrate the application of polyisobutylene in the production of plastic and emulsion explosive charges, including for military use.</p> +<p>Third, the British Army must field hard-kill C-UAS capabilities. Software updates to existing RWS on British vehicles should be used to enable them to engage UAS. More importantly, the effective C-UAS interceptors developed and fielded in Ukraine should have their production scaled through the international drone coalition, which the UK leads. This is beneficial to Ukraine now. But the scale of production should also be used to equip British forces at the same unit price as Ukrainian forces are equipped. These interceptors should be given to British support weapons companies.</p> -<p>Neo Chemical is one of the largest importers of polyisobutylene into Russia, receiving over $3.4 million-worth over 2022 and 2023. The largest supplier during this period was a South Korean petrochemical company named DL Chemical, which shipped over $1.6 million of polyisobutylene in that period.</p> +<p>The acquisition of a SPAAG system for the UK to provide dedicated hard-kill C-UAS coverage at battalion level does require a more deliberate acquisition programme. However, the new Labour government has previously suggested that strengthening Anglo-German defence and industrial collaboration is a priority. The acquisition of a SPAAG turret module for the Anglo-German Boxer would be a possible area for such cooperation, given proven German expertise in SPAAG design. An important consideration for the UK is that using the wheeled Boxer for ground manoeuvre alongside armour will require troops to dismount off the objective and advance on foot, rather than fighting, like a tracked infantry fighting vehicle, onto the objective. In this context, however, a suitable cannon with high elevation angles could allow Boxers to hold back and provide both direct suppressive fire against ground targets with the vehicle hull down, and C-UAS protection over troops moving forward. This is probably the fastest and most plausible route to regenerating a sufficient density of C-UAS/SHORAD systems in the relevant timeframe, and would fit well within Boxer’s inherent capabilities and limitations.</p> -<p>However, one of the company’s largest foreign suppliers is Neo Chemical Deutschland, which shipped over $25 million of products – such as surfactants, epoxy resins and polyethylene produced in the EU – between March 2022 and November 2023. Neo Chemical Deutschland was founded in 2004 by Russian national Andrey Lipovetsky, who was the founder of a third company named Neo Chemical in Russia a year later. While this iteration of Neo Chemical was dissolved in 2007, a co-founder of that company, Vladimir Fedyushkin, founded and currently operates the Neo Chemical that has been receiving shipments from Neo Chemical Deutschland. Meanwhile, an individual named Andrey Lipovetsky registered the domain for a UAE-based company named Proximo FZCO, which also shipped nearly $1.4 million in chemicals and acids to Neo Chemical from October 2022 to December 2023.</p> +<p>For brigade and point defence C-UAS capability, the fielding of directed-energy weapons appears to be an increasingly practical proposition. The translation of a capability such as Dragonfire onto a land platform should be a priority. Integration of such a system is, however, likely to take time. In the meantime, a more immediate solution would be the acquisition of Supacat HMT vehicles carrying AIM-132 ASRAAM for UK forces. Tried and tested in Ukraine, this is a cheap option, not so much because of the cost of the ASRAAM missiles, but because increasing the stockpile of these missiles is of direct benefit to the RAF, which uses the ASRAAM as its primary within-visual-range air-to-air missile for Typhoon and F-35B. Therefore, investment in additional missile procurement tranches as a C-UAS stopgap will not be wasted if/when the British Army ultimately pivots away from the platform towards a more mature future SHORAD and medium-range air defence (MRAD) capability. The Supacat HMT is also a vehicle that can have a range of useful roles within the army beyond the utilisation of that particular weapons system. The deliberate development of a low-cost interceptor to augment higher-performance anti-aircraft missiles on a future deployable MRAD system should be a longer-term priority.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4jda5ZQ.png" alt="image28" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 19: The supply chain for Neo Chemical from its German and Dubai affiliates to the Russian defence industry.</strong> Source: Financial data seen by authors, trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, North Data, Clearspending, Open Souce Centre.</em></p> +<p>For higher-echelon EW, the highest payoff area of priority is likely to be localisation defeat, or the ability to determine a UAS’s self-localisation process and disrupt it. The equipment and effects involved in this are not the primary bottleneck. The most significant bottleneck will be personnel with appropriate training and expertise. The priority, therefore, should be to expand the number of personnel in this field.</p> -<p>Another supplier to Kazan and Perm, UCC UralChem, has continued to import large volumes of chemicals and related materials from abroad, including lubricants, mineral fertilisers, stearic acids, catalysts, calcium nitrates and potassium nitrates, the latter of which is used in production of gunpowder mixes. While its imports fell from $17.5 million in 2022 to $3.3 million in 2023 the company received shipments from companies in countries such as China, Germany, Turkey, Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia.</p> +<p>Finally, fielding any significant C-UAS capability – and in particular the EW effects necessary to protect the force – depends on realistic training. The inability to use EW effects on exercise areas is a major impediment to the readiness of the army. The MoD should aim to establish areas where EW capabilities can be experimented with during live exercises, and if this cannot be done in physical training, it should be replicated in a synthetic environment. It is especially important that formations practise and understand how to use and deconflict their sensors, communications and EW without saturating their own frequencies. Although the need to confront commanders with EMS deconfliction and balance-of-risk judgements between connectivity and electronic protection is something that can be trained in simulators to some extent, the practical testing of all relevant systems at echelon requires live exercises.</p> -<p>Of the Russia-based companies supplying both gunpowder plants, the largest importer is Sibur Holding, an oil and petroleum processor closely associated with Gazprom. In addition to oil and petroleum products, the company is involved in the supply of rubber and polymer products and owns a large processing plant in Perm that produces polystyrene, propylene and butyl alcohol. In 2022 and 2023, the company imported over $439.7 million in chemicals and precursors. While many of these products were shipped by Chinese companies – including subsidiaries of Chinese state-owned enterprise SinoPec – the company also received shipments of chrome-aluminium composite catalysts and aromatic polycarboxylic acids from South Korean companies Annamoon Co Ltd and Lotte Chemical.</p> +<p>An effective C-UAS capability across the force is a non-discretionary requirement to be able to sustainably operate on the modern battlefield. A force that has not prepared for this challenge risks finding itself in the position of the Armenians in 2020 – unable to resupply, rotate units, concentrate forces for manoeuvre or achieve operational surprise without taking unsustainable casualties. Defeating current and likely future classes of battlefield UAS, including those with high levels of autonomy, is not intrinsically complex, nor is it difficult compared with developing ballistic missile defences or space capabilities; the requisite sensors, effectors and TTPs all exist and are mostly available off the shelf. There is no justification for complacency, or delay.</p> -<p>VitaReactiv, a chemicals supplier to both Perm and Kazan, imported over $5.5 million of chemicals from Chinese, Turkish and Indonesian suppliers in 2022 and 2023. Contract data shows that the company has a history of supplying industrial chemicals to other Russian defence companies, including Admiralty Shipyards, Salut LLC and the Smolensk Aviation Plant.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Virage International, a Kazan-based producer of chemical products, has imported a curious variety of items over the years, from esters of methacrylic acids to kitchenware, primarily from Chinese companies. One Chinese company that has supplied it with tert-butyl peroxybenzoate, Shanghai East Best International Business Development, is ultimately a subsidiary of a Chinese state-owned enterprise.</p> +<p><strong>Jack Watling</strong> is the Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. He works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation and assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts. Jack’s PhD examined the evolution of Britain’s policy responses to civil war in the early 20th century. Jack has worked extensively on Ukraine, Iraq, Yemen, Mali, Rwanda and further afield. He is a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC.</p> -<p><strong>Machinery</strong></p> +<p><strong>Justin Bronk</strong> is the Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology in the Military Sciences research group at RUSI, and Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal. Justin holds a Professor II position at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy and is a member of the Editorial Board of the scientific and technical journal Weapons and Equipment at the Central Scientific Research Institute of Arms and Military Equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.</p>Jack Watling and Justin BronkThis paper outlines the core tasks and capabilities required by NATO members to provide coherent, layered protection from uncrewed aerial systems.China’s Legal War Over Taiwan2024-10-15T12:00:00+08:002024-10-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/chinas-legal-war-over-taiwan<p><em>This report unpacks China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law (ASL) and analyzes how China uses it as an evolving tool of legal warfare.</em></p> -<p>Both the Perm and Kazan plants have also transacted with companies that have procured machine tools and industrial tooling from abroad. While it is possible that the importers are procuring such machinery to sell to Kazan or Perm, it is likely that some procure machinery for their own use while providing other related goods or services to Perm and Kazan.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/W0p6UpF.png" alt="image29" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 20: Machinery Supply Chain for Kazan and Perm Gunpowder Plants.</strong> Source: Financial data seen by authors, trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, Clearspending, Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>One of the most notable companies that has received large payments from Kazan is the Tambov-based Metall Service LLC, a wholesale trader of pipes, wires and rolled metals. The company’s website confirms that its metal production capacity has significantly expanded since 2019 with the purchase of numerous CNC machines and construction of additional manufacturing halls. The website shows images of Italian, German and South Korean machine tools installed in its manufacturing halls.</p> +<p>In 2005, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) passed the Anti-Secession Law (ASL), a critical piece of domestic legislation that outlines Beijing’s approach to Taiwan and establishes a legal basis for it to force Taiwan’s unification through coercive and military means. Although the legislation was initially viewed as symbolic and mostly intended to constrain more hawkish tendencies within the PRC toward Taiwan, this has changed in the past two decades. In recent years, China has increasingly leveraged the ASL to legitimize its approach toward Taiwan and to dissuade foreign countries, organizations, and individuals from supporting and deepening ties with the island.</p> -<p>Import data shows that Metall Service has procured large volumes of machine tools and related components, with the total value of imports in 2023 exceeding $13.2 million, compared to $123,000 the previous year. Since February 2022, the company has imported almost all of these items from Chinese suppliers, with the exception of several shipments of cutting tools acquired from Italy-based Rolm Srl in July and August 2022.</p> +<p>On June 21, 2024, the Chinese government cited the ASL in announcing a new and important interpretation of China’s Criminal Law that it had adopted in late May. It laid out the “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (hereafter referred to as the “22 Articles”), which impose criminal punishment on leaders and advocates of Taiwan independence. Punishment in circumstances deemed severe includes the death penalty. This was a marked shift from the relatively vague ASL: China has now laid out precise crimes of secession that it will punish.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/k8udQOM.png" alt="image30" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 21: Annual Imports for Vidis Group, Syaskky Pulp &amp; Paper Mill, Metall Service and Pozis, 2019-23.</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, Open Source Centre.</em></p> +<p>To assess these critical developments, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) cohosted a conference with Taiwan’s Prospect Foundation in Taipei on August 6, 2024. The conference brought together leading international experts to analyze China’s legal warfare and the ASL, focusing on three main topics: (1) how China might use the ASL and the 22 Articles; (2) the legal basis and relevance of China’s ASL and the 22 Articles; and (3) how the international community should respond. This report compiles the expert analysis presented and shared at the international conference.</p> -<p>POZiS, which is part of Rostec, is involved in production of small-calibre munitions for artillery systems and over 20 different types of pyrotechnic ignition devices. The company has imported a variety of goods, including steel alloy products and injection-moulding inserts, from Chinese, Italian, South Korean and Turkish companies.</p> +<h4 id="main-themes-and-lessons-learned">Main Themes and Lessons Learned</h4> -<p>Another example, Vidis Group, is a US-sanctioned metal-cutting-tool supplier and was once the Russian distributor of German Widia-branded drilling and milling equipment. In 2022 and 2023, the company imported a total of $3 million in metal-cutting tools and related items from Chinese companies. As well as transacting with the Perm Gunpowder Plant, the company has fulfilled contracts with other defence companies, including Ulan Ude Aviation Plant, UAZ and Titan-Barrikady. The latter is involved in the assembly of artillery pieces and mobile launchers for ballistic missiles.</p> +<p>One important question that conference participants debated was whether the ASL should be viewed as more of a legal document or a policy document. Consisting of 10 articles, the law is relatively short and vague compared to other Chinese legislation. Yu-Jie Chen and Donald Clarke point out that the ASL does not constrain or expand China’s options because it does not authorize the Chinese government to do anything it could not do before; it also does not contain implementation guidelines, sanctions, enforcement mechanisms, or independent judicial oversight.</p> -<p>Meanwhile, Syassky Pulp &amp; Paper Mill (Syassky PPM), a producer of wood pulp, has received payments from the Kazan Gunpowder Plant. While the mill itself has not been sanctioned, it has supplied a since-sanctioned military explosives plant (Federal State Enterprise Kamensk Plant) with cellulose. Customs records show that the company imported a range of industrial machinery totalling almost $5 million over 2022 and 2023 from Chinese, Turkish, German and Italian companies. It is likely that Syassky PPM is procuring this machinery for its own use to produce cellulose which can then be sold to the Kazan Plant to mitigate Russia’s reliance on foreign importers of cotton cellulose. If this is the case, Syassky PPM’s imports may represent an opportunity for external disruption that could slow the expansion and recapitalisation of Russia’s defence industry.</p> +<p>I-Chung Lai explains that the law stipulates a process for China to employ non-peaceful means against Taiwan in which the PRC Central Military Commission and State Council must agree on a course of action and then report the decision to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee. This process may have slowed down the desire of hardline PRC actors to use force against Taiwan during the Hu Jintao era, but it is unlikely to constrain Xi Jinping given the concentration of power within his hands. Jacques deLisle is also skeptical that the ASL could durably or reliably constrain PRC activities toward Taiwan now or if both sides were to engage in unification negotiations and Taiwan were to unify with China.</p> -<p>The supply chains of Perm and Kazan overall indicate the disruption challenges. A lot of the materials needed by both plants are produced inside Russia and transported via rail. Sanctions against the companies involved may damage their finances on the international market, but they are likely obliged to serve the Russian defence industry, and will receive government backing to continue. It stands to reason that seeking disruption of elements that could be physically stopped because they originate or transit through jurisdictions where Western powers can exercise legal or political effects is more likely to impact the supply chains of Perm and Kazan. For example, by denying access to raw materials like cotton pulp, products like polyisobutylene and key components like German and Italian industrial machinery, Western governments could be reasonably certain that both plants would have to affect a major adaptation and face disruption to their production output.</p> +<p>However, if the ASL is viewed as a legal document, there are five main themes and findings experts highlighted:</p> -<h4 id="delivery">Delivery</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>China violates its own ASL and does not uphold some of the articles within the legislation that promote peaceful unification.</strong> Article 5 specifically states that China should do its utmost to ensure peaceful unification, and Article 6 details the activities China should engage in to induce this. Furthermore, Article 7 mentions that consultations and negotiations on unification should be conducted on “an equal footing” between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I-Chung Lai, Bonny Lin, and Wen-Hsuan Tsai observe that China has been far from abiding by these articles in recent years and has opted for a more coercive implementation of the ASL. Chi-Ting Tsai adds that China’s recurring threats and military actions around Taiwan undermine the principles outlined in these ASL articles.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>The legal language used in the ASL and the 22 Articles is vague and inconsistent.</strong> The ASL rests on China’s claims over Taiwan and not the de facto reality that Taiwan is not governed by China. Jacques deLisle argues that China deliberately framed the ASL in terms of “anti-secession” as opposed to “reunification” to create ambiguity in timelines and future actions while still being able to insist on the PRC’s broad claim over Taiwan’s sovereignty. Yeh-chung Lu observes that the ASL sets a vaguer set of conditions for the use of non-peaceful measures than what China had set forward before 2000, leaving room for unilateral interpretation. Margaret Lewis explains that the 22 Articles impose more severe punishment on those who are ringleaders and “die-hard” Taiwan “separatists” but does not provide any clear criteria for how to judge who falls into either category. Eric Poon furthers that the ambiguity of the ASL and the 22 Articles violated multiple fundamental parameters of the rule of law.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>The ASL has been used in PRC domestic litigation and provides a legal foundation upon which Beijing has passed additional legislation and interpretations.</strong> Donald Clarke points out that although the ASL’s impact on domestic litigation to date has been very slight, there was one case in which Chinese domestic courts cited the ASL to fine a PRC company, which could set a precedent for broader application of the ASL. The law also provided a basis for the 22 Articles released in May 2024 that impose punishment for not only what Beijing views as major acts leading to Taiwan’s independence but also any minor efforts Beijing perceives as Taiwan “salami slicing” its way toward independence.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Compared with how other countries deal with questions about secession, China’s ASL and the 22 Articles are repressive and do not consider the obligations states have under international human rights law.</strong> Conference participants viewed the 22 Articles as representing a major escalation of PRC intimidation against Taiwan. Julian Ku highlights that the ASL and 22 Articles’ criminalization of secession activities is far more punitive and expansive in scope compared with most countries in that it bans even nonviolent support for Taiwan’s independence. Margaret Lewis suggests that the political nature of the new guidelines proposed in the 22 Articles would mean that the court is unlikely to rule “not guilty” for any secession-related acts. Furthermore, Raymond Sung and Donald Clarke argue that the 22 Articles’ linkage of the ASL and the PRC Criminal Law allows Beijing to persecute secession-related acts not just by Taiwan citizens in Taiwan, but by anyone of any nationality anywhere in the world. Sung flags that even scholars who provide a historical narrative that contradicts the PRC position on the island could be punished by Beijing.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>After it has been filled, the ammunition is transported via rail from the factories to Russian military depots. From there, it eventually makes its way to one of three primary depots near the Ukrainian border:</p> +<p>Many conference participants argued that China is far from a country governed by the rule of law and that existing legislation can be interpreted and applied differently over time. Instead, China passes legislation to rule by law and attempt to legitimize its policy. As a policy document, Beijing uses the ASL in several ways:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Kotluban depot, close to Volgograd. It has an area of 2.17 km2 and appears to include 67 sheds and 28 open air sites for storage of ammunition.</p> + <p><strong>The ASL legitimizes China’s overarching stance on — and relationship with — Taiwan.</strong> Jacques deLisle and Vincent Chao explain that the ASL and and the 22 Articles provide Beijing’s legal basis for its position that Taiwan is part of PRC territory and reflects China’s master narrative on Taiwan. As Chao notes, the ASL stipulates that unification with Taiwan is the only acceptable outcome and that Beijing precludes the possibility of indefinite continuation of the status quo. Margaret Lewis highlights that although “Taiwan authorities” are mentioned in the ASL, they are portrayed as passive objects of the Chinese state.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>It creates a (false) narrative that Taiwan bears the responsibility and blame for any PRC use of non-peaceful means against the island.</strong> Jacques deLisle explains that the ASL establishes the legal status quo that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. This then casts any potential Chinese use of coercion or force against Taiwan as defensive and preserving the status quo. Yu-Jie Chen further notes that the 22 Articles stigmatize Taiwan political figures, labeling them as “criminals” to discredit them and their causes.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>The ASL makes clear that in any armed conflict with Taiwan, China does not consider itself bound by the international law of armed conflict.</strong> Donald Clarke explains that the ASL justifies any and all PRC means to maintain its territorial integrity and claims over Taiwan — contradicting international law and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. In other words, even if countries view the PRC as the sole and legitimate government of China, its ASL is problematic from the perspective of international law.</p> </li> <li> - <p>68th Arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Army, near Mozdok in North Ossetia. It has an area of 2.12 km2 and appears to house 61 sheds and 35 bunker facilities dug into the ground.</p> + <p><strong>It unilaterally justifies a wide range of actions and legislative actions.</strong> Conference experts point out the evolution of how the PRC interpreted and used the ASL over time. Donald Clarke and Yu-Jie Chen note that the law’s vague language is compatible with both friendly and coercive approaches to unification. Specifically, Yu-Jie Chen argues that the ambiguity of Article 8 of the ASL, which outlines conditions for deploying non-peaceful means for unification, grants China broad discretion in its timeline and methods for forcefully unifying with Taiwan.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The 719th Artillery Ammunition Storage Base, near Krasnodar region. It has an area of around 1 km2 and includes 13 sheds, four bunker facilities dug into the ground, and 12 open-air storage sites.</p> + <p><strong>It seeks to deter countries, organizations, and individuals from supporting Taiwan.</strong> Bonny Lin and Donald Clarke highlight Beijing’s intent to use the ASL to deter international support for Taiwan, with Clarke noting that the lawfare strategy behind the ASL aims to have a chilling effect on other nations’ diplomatic and military engagements with Taiwan. Ken Jimbo and Mark Harrison, however, point out that China’s ASL and threats to use force against Taiwan have caused Japan and Australia to invest more in their respective defense capabilities to prevent regional instability.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>It is understood that ammunition is driven from these sites to temporary storage locations inside occupied Ukraine. The routes avoid the Kerch Bridge, with less than a quarter of Russia’s cargo traversing the bridge, and the majority instead driven over long distances through occupied Ukraine – even that which is destined for Kherson. Once in Ukraine, the ammunition is stored in warehouse facilities that are rarely protected, but are located some distance from the frontline. It may be driven forward to the front by logistics units such as the 293rd Separate Automobile Battalion – a road-based unit located in Rostov-on-Don – or, as some accounts indicate, collected by drivers dispatched by Russian units.</p> - -<p>Russia has recently completed a new rail route between Rostov-on-Don, Mariupol, Donetsk City and Dzhankoi in Crimea. This route has a single track and has been built in a year, indicating that its primary initial purpose will be support for logistics inside occupied Ukraine. It has been reported that four engines with associated freight cars in the Russian Railways colours were observed in the Mariupol region on 5 August 2024, indicating that the rail route had been launched at that time. It is possible that this rail route will become a source of supply to Russian units fighting in Ukraine, reducing reliance upon road transport.</p> +<h4 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h4> -<p>The Russian Aerospace Forces are normally reliant on rail infrastructure and railheads for their logistic requirements. However, it appears that a lack of secure access to these facilities inside Ukraine has led to greater reliance on road transport of ammunition and supplies. At certain points in the conflict, Russia has employed the rail infrastructure in occupied Ukraine to deliver directly to the front, but Ukraine has effectively severed these routes on several occasions. The largest national railway carrier, owner and builder of public railway infrastructure is Russian Railways. The company is 100% owned by the government, and it is responsible for 16 railways covering the entire country. Although other companies participate in the freight sector, they operate under Russian Railways’ network, leasing access from the state-backed monopoly. For example, the Federal Freight Company JSC, delivers raw materials to the fuel and energy sector and to metallurgical industries. It is owned by Russian Railways and participates in the Russian public procurement system. Among its most prominent clients is UralVagonZavod, the largest supplier of military equipment in Russia and the sole manufacturer of tanks in Russia. There are also rail companies that specifically handle military cargo, like T-Trans, which delivered military cargo to the frontline in 2022 by order of the Russian MoD.</p> +<p>In light of the multifaceted implications of the ASL and the 22 Articles, the conference panelists offer three key recommendations for the United States, its allies, and the international community:</p> -<p>There are some signs that the rail network is struggling to cope with the pressures of sanctions and to meet the demands of the war. The Ukrainian advance into Kursk in August 2024 prompted the large-scale movement of Russian troops to the area, primarily using rail. This caused overcrowding at stations in the region and led Russian Railways to cancel freight trains coming from Belarus. The Belarusian Railway Workers Association reported that a significant portion of the Moscow region locomotive fleet was used to complete the transfer. This led to a shortage of locomotives to return train carriages, which were abandoned in Smolensk. Russian Railways reportedly faces a labour shortage – much like Russia’s defence industry – as well as challenges in finding spares to maintain its rail fleet. According to Russian Railways, the high volume of locomotive repairs needed and the longer timeframes needed to repair them because of a lack of parts mean that Russia’s ability to export cargo is decreasing. The number of trains put on hold due to a lack of maintenance more than doubled in 2023. As of 2024, about 40,000 trains were out of service because the locomotives re undergoing repairs. Russian Railways’s own figures for 2024 indicate a year-on-year decline in freight loading of 3.5%, as well as a 6.8% reduction in freight turnover. It is reasonable to conclude that the Russian railways are both a vital element in the artillery supply chain and a potential vulnerability. However, further study – of a similar nature to this paper – would be required to assess the exposure of the Russian railways to external disruption and anticipate actions that Russia might take to secure alternatives to Western components.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>The United States and close allies and partners should engage in more proactive information campaigns to protest the ASL and the 22 Articles diplomatically and publicly and counter China’s cognitive warfare.</strong> This includes educating the public about the ASL and the 22 Articles, particularly how China is falling short of embracing peaceful means to seek unification and how its redlines for using force against Taiwan, as well as its definition and criminalization of “secessionist” activities, are repressive and not in line with international norms. Governments should also inform their citizens of the risks of traveling to China if individuals have expressed views on Taiwan that do not align with Beijing’s.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + <p>To date, there has been a relatively muted official U.S. or allied government response to the ASL. The United States should reassess the public and private positions it takes on both PRC measures and directly express concern to Beijing. The United States and allies and partners should also refute false claims by China that its 22 Articles are “normal” and in line with how other countries criminally punish “separatists.”</p> -<p>This paper set out to investigate Russia’s artillery supply chain and identify vulnerabilities that could inform thinking around disrupting the defence industrial base. It has explored the critical role played by artillery in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and how Russia’s supply chains are set up to support the war effort. The available information indicates that Russia’s defence industry is expanding, through new facilities in Kazan and Perm, supplies of CNCs from China, and mass recruitment programmes. This suggests that, if it is not interrupted, Russia will be in a better position to conduct a prolonged war in a material sense by 2030 at the latest.</p> + <p>Taking a clear position will be of growing importance moving forward. Vincent Chao points out that 2025 is the twentieth anniversary of the ASL, and there is a possibility that Beijing could use this milestone to announce new interpretations or additions to the legislation. Wen-Hsuan Tsai believes that if China seeks to make significant progress on Taiwan by 2027 or beyond, it will need to either amend or revise the ASL. This could involve issuing more implementation details, clarifying how it will determine whether the possibilities of peaceful unification have been exhausted, or passing a unification law.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>The international community should bolster legal and institutional frameworks to counter China’s use of the ASL as a tool of legal warfare and diplomatic coercion.</strong> Conference participants recommend that countries should not physically remove or extradite people to China who face criminal prosecutions for their views on Taiwan. Yu-Jie Chen and Chi-Ting Tsai highlight that strengthening international laws and norms, particularly within organizations such as Interpol, can be critical to reducing malign PRC actions. Meia Nouwens points to the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in 2022 to not extradite a Taiwan national in Poland to China as an example of a measure that will shield individuals from the 22 Articles.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Given China’s evolving views of secession and greater use of coercive tools against Taiwan, the United States and partners in the Indo-Pacific should take seriously China’s willingness to use non-peaceful means against Taiwan and should enhance defense and security cooperation.</strong> Ken Jimbo advocates for deeper U.S.-Japan collaboration on Taiwan-related issues. Similarly, Mark Harrison notes that Australia, which has vital economic stakes in the region, should develop hard-power capabilities to deter regional instability. Meanwhile, Ian Chong expresses concern over Southeast Asian states’ relative lack of attention to cross-Strait issues. I-Chung Lai suggests that one possible early indication and warning that China may seek to use significant force is if Beijing activates the process described in the ASL that requires the PRC State Council, Central Military Commission, and People’s Congress to be on the same page.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>From analysing Russia’s artillery supply chain from end to end, it is clear that some elements are more robust than others. From the mining pits that feed the furnaces at Krasny Oktyabr to the cotton fields that are harvested throughout summer to make nitrocellulose, to the storage sheds at the Kotluban ammunition depot, Russia’s artillery supply chain is a complex ecosystem of raw material suppliers, foreign machinery, trains and overworked specialists. The foundations of the artillery supply chain – namely the factories themselves – and the depots used to store ammunition close to Ukraine are hard to disrupt. These facilities sit inside Russia, in some cases thousands of kilometres from Europe, in others built to withstand a NATO aerospace assault.</p> +<h4 id="roadmap">Roadmap</h4> -<p>Russia is self-sufficient in many of its needs, especially in raw materials like iron ore, and may have enough machine tools and stored howitzers from the Soviet era to support its war in Ukraine. However, the longer the war continues, the more Russia’s dependencies on foreign suppliers will become a weakness. The examples identified here – such as chromite, cotton cellulose and CNC machines – are examples of raw materials and components that must be sourced from abroad to maintain the artillery supply chain. There have been efforts at disruption of supplies of some of these, but the expansion of Russia’s artillery manufacturing capability, and its ability to continue using artillery ammunition at a high rate of expenditure, indicate that these efforts have failed to successfully limit or affect the artillery supply chain.</p> +<p>This report is divided into three sections: (1) an overview and background of the ASL and the 22 Articles; (2) legal analysis of the ASL and the 22 Articles; and (3) perspectives on the implications for specific countries, regions, and the international community.</p> -<p>However, Russia’s artillery supply chain is not infallible. It can be disrupted with the help of Ukraine’s international partners, through careful targeting of vulnerabilities. The evidence gathered for this paper indicates that Ukraine’s Western partners would be better able to disrupt Russia’s artillery supply chain by focusing efforts in a coordinated manner on raw materials and components that are procured outside Russia. This would involve sanctions and diplomatic pressure: levers that have so far been pulled only in an ad hoc and opportunistic manner. A concerted approach, with additional resources dedicated to enforcement and disruption, will have a greater chance of success. Disrupting the artillery supply chain should be a priority, and if the vulnerabilities identified in this report can be successfully disrupted for prolonged periods, Russia will struggle to meet its needs for artillery ammunition and barrels – this will be vital if Ukraine is to survive.</p> +<p>There are four commentaries from U.S. and Taiwan experts who examine the origin and evolution of the ASL:</p> -<p>For example, strict sanctions against the supply of chrome ore to Russia would impact the barrel production process and likely other military outputs, as well as the oil and gas industry, which is a significant source of funding for the Russian state. Most resources are imported from countries or companies in jurisdictions that are Western partners or receptive to their concerns. It is more difficult to secretly transfer thousands of tonnes of chromium ore into a country than to smuggle in a few thousand microchips. It therefore appears likely that enforced sanctions in this field would have a better chance of successfully disrupting the chromium supply to Russia than sanctions on microchips have had of disrupting that supply chain. Russia would eventually find an alternate source of chromium, but that would take time and could present further disruption opportunities.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>I-Chung Lai presents a close analysis of the political context surrounding the passing of the ASL by the PRC National People’s Congress in 2005.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Bonny Lin evaluates China’s political calculus for passing the ASL.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Wen-Hsuan Tsai cautions about the increased willingness of the Chinese leadership to intensify cross-Strait tensions through revising the ASL as a part of Xi’s legal authoritarianism.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Vincent Chao considers three ways Beijing can leverage the ASL in its Taiwan strategy.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Other tools may include: diplomatic pressure, such as encouraging Taiwan to examine companies exporting CNC machines to Russia and China; or preclusive buying of raw materials on the open market to prevent the hostile nation from accessing them, or to drive up the price and limit access.</p> +<p>There are six legal analyses on the legality and legal implications of the ASL and the 22 Articles:</p> -<p>There is a growing alliance of authoritarian powers aligned against the West and the rules-based international order. Russia, China and Iran frequently work together to evade sanctions, degrade the authority of Western governments and counter the progress made by democracies since the end of the Second World War. The current focus is Russia, but the need to disrupt supply chains will emerge again as these autocratic regimes continue to attack the West. Western governments must develop the ability to understand and disrupt an opponent’s most critical supply chains sooner rather than later. As Russia expands its defence industry, there is an opportunity to limit its ability to support the war. But there is also a necessity to do so, to help Ukraine win the war. Left on its current trajectory, Russian fire superiority will increase year-on-year and become less vulnerable to external disruption through pressure on the supply chain. It is therefore paramount that Ukraine’s partners work together to find routes that will lead to the disruption of the artillery supply chain. This report provides a starting point; there are dozens of vulnerabilities that could be identified. And if each one could be acted on in concert, it would prove very challenging for Russia to adjust before the trajectory of the war had changed.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Jacques deLisle provides an in-depth analysis on the legal implications of the ASL for China’s Taiwan strategy.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Yu-Jie Chen presents a careful analysis of China’s use of the ASL for lawfare and the international legal implications of China’s lawfare strategies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Donald Clarke lays out an extensive discussion on how the ASL and the 22 Articles were developed and their legal effects.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Julian Ku compares the 22 Articles with the criminalization of secessionist acts in the United States and other countries.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Margaret Lewis analyzes the language of the ASL and the 22 Articles and discusses their legal implications, specifically what could constitute punishable secessionist acts by China’s Criminal Law.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Raymond Sung gives a detailed review of the 22 Articles and the political agenda behind the document’s weaponization of criminal jurisdiction.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<hr /> +<p>On the implications of the ASL for the broader international community, there are five analyses and regional perspectives on how Japan, Southeast Asia, Australia, and Europe view the ASL and cross-Strait affairs:</p> -<p><strong>Oleksii Borovikov</strong> is an Analytical Expert, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Chi-Ting Tsai explores the implications of the ASL for the broader international community and highlights the need to strengthen international institutions so that they can counter both this legislation and China’s exploitation of international laws to assert territorial claims.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Ken Jimbo discusses Japanese perspectives on navigating cross-Strait relations in the context of the ASL.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Ian Chong assesses most Southeast Asian states’ general avoidance of Taiwan issues and their respective One China policies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Mark Harrison analyzes the shifts in Australia’s strategy toward cross-Strait tensions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Meia Nouwens explains the muted EU response to the ASL and the varying approaches different EU states have taken on Taiwan.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong>Denys Hutyk</strong> is an Executive Director, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.</p> +<blockquote> + <h2 id="section-i">Section I</h2> + <h2 id="origin-and-evolution-of-the-anti-secession-law">Origin and Evolution of the Anti-Secession Law</h2> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Bohdan Kovalenko</strong> is an Analytical Expert, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.</p> +<h3 id="the-political-context-and-origins-of-chinas-anti-secession-law">The Political Context and Origins of China’s Anti-Secession Law</h3> -<p><strong>Anastasiia Opria</strong> is an Analytical Expert, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="i-chung-lai">I-Chung Lai</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Bohdan Veselovskyi</strong> is a Legal Analyst, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.</p> +<h4 id="introduction-1">Introduction</h4> -<p><strong>Olena Yurchenko</strong> is an Analytics, Research &amp; Investigations Director, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.</p> +<p>The 2005 Anti-Secession Law (ASL) marked China’s effort to codify state responses in relation to what it perceived as “Taiwan independence action,” stating that such activities would induce Beijing to use non-peaceful means to prevent Taiwan from separating from China. The passage of this law raised strong opposition from the Taiwan government to the extent that it conducted a state-sponsored, island-wide rally against it. The law may have also caused the United States and Japan to publicly state in 2005 that they have the shared strategic objective of encouraging “the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.” Prior to that, the last time the Taiwan issue was included in the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee was in 1969, thus demonstrating the seriousness of their joint collective response to the passage of the ASL.</p> -<p><strong>Olena Zhul</strong> is an Analytical Expert, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.</p> +<p>At the time, it was assumed that China had designed the ASL to counter Taiwan’s Referendum Law and its related activities. After Taiwan passed the referendum law in 2003, former president Chen Shui-bian held two referenda concurrently with the 2004 presidential election. Although both referenda failed due to insufficient participation, China was still concerned about the possibility that new ones could be passed to bring formal Taiwan independence into reality.</p> -<p><strong>Denys Karlovskyi</strong> is a Research Analyst at the Open Source Centre.</p> +<p>However, this reasoning cannot explain why China did not resort to similar actions during Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election when both major parties proposed referenda related to Taiwan’s participation in the United Nations. The Kuomintang (KMT) proposed a referendum on whether the “Republic of China” should “return to the United Nations,” while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) proposed a referendum on “Taiwan” joining the United Nations as a new member. However, the KMT asked its supporters not to participate in the DPP referendum vote, leading both referenda to fail to obtain enough votes again. Although both referenda would seemingly have been perceived as violating the PRC’s redline defined in the ASL, Beijing did not do anything to prevent them from happening.</p> -<p><strong>Gary Somerville</strong> is a Senior Analyst at the Open Source Centre.</p> +<p>In retrospect, it seems the ASL was Hu Jintao’s effort to both pacify and constrain the hardliners within his party on the issue of Taiwan. Hu preferred to focus on economic development and saw actions on Taiwan as a distraction. What the ASL did was transform the issue of Taiwan independence from a political question into a legal one. Although this law is still vague about what does not constitute “Taiwan independence” action, it did attach a procedure for enacting “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan — implementation of which could signal possible Chinese military action.</p> -<p><strong>Maya Kalcheva</strong> is a Research Analyst for Panoptikon.</p> +<h4 id="the-cross-strait-relationship-before-the-passage-of-the-anti-secession-law">The Cross-Strait Relationship Before the Passage of the Anti-Secession Law</h4> -<p><strong>Mariya Plachkova</strong> is an Investigative Journalist for Panoptikon.</p> +<p>It is commonly held that the ASL was passed during a time of tense cross-Strait relations. First, the DPP won Taiwan’s 2004 presidential election through a simple majority, not the plurality it achieved in 2000. This result demonstrated that grassroots support for the DPP had increased significantly since 2000. Second, the oppsition party, KMT, was in disarray, dealing with a power struggle among its leadership after its defeat in the presidential election. Third, it was also believed that the DPP could win significantly more seats in the legislative elections later that year, allowing the party to control both the executive and legislative branches. There were rumors that the CCP would introduce a Unification Law (統一法) in 2005 to stop the DPP’s momentum and prevent Taiwan’s formal independence.</p> -<p><strong>Nikolay Staykov</strong> is a Lead Investigator for Panoptikon.</p> +<p>However, several events at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005 painted a very different picture in Taiwan.</p> -<p><strong>Mila Vasileva</strong> is an AML Expert and Research Analyst for Panoptikon.</p> +<p>First, the Pan-Blue Coalition — the opposition alliance consisting of the KMT, the People First Party (PFP), and several smaller parties — maintained a majority (113 seats out of 225) in the legislative elections in December 2004. This meant that Chinese fears of a DPP-dominated government were not realized. Even though it remained the largest party in the legislature, the DPP’s planned constitutional revisions would surely not take place.</p> -<p><strong>Sam Cranny-Evans</strong> is an Associate Fellow at RUSI and the Open Source Centre.</p> +<p>Second, a cross-Strait charter flight began operating in 2005 for the Lunar New Year festival between January 29 and February 20. Although there had been some sporadic flights between Taiwan and mainland China before, they had to make a midway stop at Hong Kong or Macau. The 2005 direct flights thus represented another important milestone in improving the cross-Strait relationship.</p> -<p><strong>Jack Watling</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI.</p>Oleksii Borovikov, et al.This report focuses on Russia’s artillery supply chain, as artillery is central to the invasion of Ukraine and has inflicted more than 70% of Ukraine’s casualties. Disrupting Russia’s access to ammunition and new artillery barrels should therefore be a central focus for Ukraine’s supporters.Crossroads Of Commerce2024-10-10T12:00:00+08:002024-10-10T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/crossroads-of-commerce<p><em>This report provides an unprecedented look at the Taiwan Strait’s role in global trade, revealing that over one-fifth of all maritime commerce passes through this vital waterway. China possesses a range of non-kinetic options it may employ to coerce Taiwan, which could significantly disrupt this trade.</em></p> +<p>Third, as the result of Taiwan’s 2004 legislative election, President Chen of the DPP held a meeting with PFP chairman James Soong on February 24, 2005, and came up with the “ten points consensus (扁宋十點共識).” In this statement, Chen promised not to declare Taiwan’s independence, not to change its official name from the “Republic of China,” not to change the guidelines for national unification, and not to conduct constitutional reforms that might involve Taiwan’s sovereignty.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>President Chen may have been hoping for the DPP to team up with the PFP to create a functional majority of 123 seats in the legislature, separating from the smaller parties in the Pan-Blue Coalition. Chen reportedly also asked James Soong to bring a message to Hu Jintao on his behalf during Hu and Soong’s 2005 meeting in Beijing. It is possible that this rapprochement between the DPP, PFP, and CCP triggered the KMT’s China-friendly movement and the subsequent KMT-CCP summit due to the party’s fear of being marginalized in the cross-Strait relationship.</p> -<p>Maritime trade is the lifeblood of the global economy.</p> +<p>Even Hu Jintao himself indicated during the all-important “two sessions” meeting in March 2005 that cross-Strait ties were somewhat stabilized. He mentioned that there were some “positive factors” conducive to constraining Taiwan’s independence and that there were signs of reduced tensions in the Taiwan Strait (“當前，兩岸關係中出現了一些有利於遏制“台獨”分裂活動的新的積極因素，臺海緊張局勢出現了某些緩和的跡象”).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/StdkURK.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5XBG2gt.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Table 1: Signs China Viewed as Indicative of Reduced Cross-Strait Tensions</em></p> -<p>Each year, thousands of massive containerships and tankers ferry more than $11.5 trillion in goods and energy across the world’s oceans.</p> +<p>Thus, in contrast to the conventional perception that cross-Strait relations were deteriorating before the introduction of the ASL, there were various signs indicating that developments in Taiwan were actually moving in China’s preferred direction, as Hu himself acknowledged. However, those developments did not dissuade Beijing from introducing and passing the ASL.</p> -<p>These vessels follow well-established routes that converge at strategic chokepoints where maritime traffic is especially vulnerable to disruption.</p> +<h4 id="the-cross-strait-relationship-after-the-passage-of-the-asl">The Cross-Strait Relationship after the Passage of the ASL</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mXlsru0.png" alt="image02" /></p> +<p>Looking back, cross-Strait tensions did not significantly rise after the passage of the ASL. Not only did the KMT and CCP launch an annual forum starting in 2005, but the PFP was also invited by the CCP for a bilateral party summit and has since conducted an annual visit to China. As seen by Taiwan’s local elections in late 2005, the more independence-minded DPP was losing its grip on power and was on its way to being defeated in the 2008 presidential election.</p> -<p>Asia’s geography, and its centrality to global commerce, have heightened the importance of chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca and, increasingly, the Taiwan Strait.</p> +<p>U.S.-China ties also improved in September 2005, when Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick described China as a “responsible stakeholder” during a speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China relations. The U.S. midterm elections in 2006 then paved the way for the nomination of Hank Paulson as secretary of treasury, a role in which he introduced the annual “U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue,” later renamed the “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue” under the Obama administration. (However, these political developments had more to do with the internal politics in Taiwan and the United States’ preoccupation with the War on Terror than with the events caused by or related to the passage of the ASL.)</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4LqpdA5.png" alt="image03" /></p> +<p>Given the improved relations between Beijing and Taipei, as well as Beijing and Washington, it seems unlikely that the ASL was intended to force reunification. Instead, as DPP legislator Lin Chou-Shui argued in his 2006 book Community: Taiwan in the World Image (共同體：世界圖像下的台灣), Hu Jintao initiated this law to make it more difficult for the CCP to decide to attack Taiwan. Lin alleged that Hu wanted to focus on economic development when the momentum for that was particularly strong but faced considerable pressure on Taiwan from hawkish elements in the leadership circle — particularly Jiang Zemin, chairman of the Central Military Commission before Hu took over the position on March 13, 2005. Theoretically, there was a period during which the army could therefore have made a military move against Taiwan without President Hu’s prior knowledge. By institutionalizing the State Council and Central Military Commission in the decisionmaking process regarding military actions against Taiwan, Lin argued, Hu was able to rein in opposition from the military. As Lin believed, Hu’s public statement that cross-Strait relations were not too dire was part of an effort to de-escalate and convince his CCP colleagues not to overreact.</p> -<p>China’s rising assertiveness has sparked fears that it may soon use force to bring Taiwan under its control.</p> +<h4 id="the-asl-and-the-use-of-force-against-taiwan">The ASL and the Use of Force Against Taiwan</h4> -<p>While a major conflict over Taiwan would have catastrophic consequences for the global economy, less severe actions taken by Beijing would also destabilize trade through the Taiwan Strait.</p> +<p>Much of the focus regarding the ASL has been on Article 8, which states:</p> -<p>New research from CSIS estimates that approximately $2.45 trillion worth of goods — over one-fifth of global maritime trade — transited the Taiwan Strait in 2022.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>In the event that the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Disruptions to this trade would send shockwaves well beyond Taiwan and China, impacting key U.S. allies and broad swaths of the Global South.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>The State Council and the Central Military Commission shall decide on and execute the non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as provided for in the preceding paragraph and shall promptly report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/z9NnwKA.png" alt="image04" /></p> +<p>The details of the three conditions for employing non-peaceful means are extremely vague and would seem to cover not just Taiwan’s secession but any events that could be perceived as “leading to” independence. In addition, the use of non-peaceful means is to be based on the Chinese assessment of the situation, not any specific actions by Taiwan. Thus, the Taiwan government believes that the ASL was created so that China would have maximum flexibility to easily legitimize its potential use of force against the island.</p> -<p>Chinese leader Xi Jinping has made it unequivocally clear that the use of force remains an option for resolving Taiwan’s ambiguous political status, stoking fears about a possible invasion of the island.</p> +<p>On the other hand, Article 8 stresses that the process of employing non-peaceful means should be a joint decision agreed to by both the Central Military Commission and the State Council, which then need to report to the National People’s Congress. At the time the ASL was drafted, the Central Military Commission was led by Jiang Zemin (who was succeeded by Hu Jintao soon after the law passed), while the State Council was headed by Wen Jiabao and the National People’s Congress by Wu Bangguo — not all of whom were seen as favoring a more aggressive stance on the Taiwan issue. This context suggests that Hu probably wanted to dilute the hardliner’s influence and temper Chinese actions toward Taiwan.</p> -<p>But Beijing has a range of options short of invasion at its disposal. CSIS research suggests that less kinetic actions, such as a coast guard–led quarantine of Taiwan, are more likely in the short term than an amphibious assault on the island.</p> +<p>The ASL outlines the actions China needs to take if it wants to gradually induce unification. Per Article 6, the PRC would need:</p> -<p>While lower in intensity, such contingencies could still threaten the trillions of dollars’ worth of trade that moves through the Taiwan Strait each year.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>to encourage and facilitate personnel exchanges across the Straits for greater mutual understanding and mutual trust;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>to encourage and facilitate economic exchanges and cooperation, realize direct links of trade, mail and air and shipping services, and bring about closer economic ties between the two sides of the Straits to their mutual benefit;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits exchanges in education, science, technology, culture, health, and sports, and work together to carry forward the proud Chinese cultural traditions;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>to encourage and facilitate cross-Strait cooperation in combating crimes; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>to encourage and facilitate other activities that are conducive to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and stronger cross-Strait relations</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7nsuvOe.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ Reliance on the Taiwan Strait for Trade</em></p> +<p>This approach is reinforced in Article 7, which specifically mentions that peaceful unification can only be achieved through “consultations and negotiations on an equal footing between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.”</p> -<p>Taiwan produces over 90 percent of the most cutting-edge chips used in smartphones, data centers, and advanced military equipment. Disruptions to the supply of these technologies could wipe trillions of dollars from global GDP.</p> +<p>As Lin Chuo-Shui argued, these articles of the ASL successfully helped Hu cap internal pressure to be tough on Taiwan by circumscribing the mechanisms and actions needed to facilitate potential unification. There are reasons to believe that he was prepared to proceed with this proposed process of reconciliation when China-friendly Ma Ying-jeou was elected president of Taiwan in 2008. Indeed, Hu publicly called for cross-Strait negotiations during a speech later that year.</p> -<p>It is a critical hub for other goods as well. CSIS estimates that Taiwan’s ports handled approximately $586 billion worth of trade in 2022, including transshipments between other economies. Yet nearly all of this activity flowed through a handful of ports located as little as 100 miles from the Chinese mainland — leaving them uniquely vulnerable to Chinese provocations.</p> +<h4 id="looking-forward-the-asl-under-xi-jinping-and-its-possible-function-as-a-political-signal">Looking Forward: The ASL under Xi Jinping and Its Possible Function as a Political Signal</h4> -<p>Any possible disruption of merchant traffic through the Taiwan Strait may prompt shipping companies to avoid the area to limit risks and avoid the increased costs from spikes in insurance premiums. Many shippers have done just that throughout 2024 to avoid Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.</p> +<p>Xi has said more than once that he wants to see progress on unification rather than have the two sides’ political differences last for generations. In a speech on January 2, 2019, Xi invoked the 1992 Consensus between the CCP and KMT and indicated he would push for a solution to the Taiwan issue under the “one country, two system” doctrine.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ej2RUIV.png" alt="image06" /></p> +<p>More recently, the “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (“22 Articles”) indicated that the PRC would begin to criminalize Taiwan citizens if they conduct actions or voice dissent against the unification of Taiwan under the PRC. This is definitely a sign that Xi is moving forward with his efforts to unify China and eradicate resistance in Taiwan. The 22 Articles applies to both individuals and civilian organizations, in contrast to the ASL, which focuses on collective entities such as the state and governments. This development raises an interesting question: Does the 22 Articles document supplement the ASL or replace it?</p> -<p>Merchant vessels typically travel well-worn routes that make the most economical sense, so forced deviations come at a cost.</p> +<p>Unlike Hu Jintao, who needed to share power with other members of the CCP Central Standing Committee, Xi has all the power concentrated in his own hands, as seen by his recent decree to downgrade the State Council’s executive powers and cut it out of the decisionmaking process. Xi has also stressed multiple times that the military has to listen to the party; in contrast, Hu never had firm control of the military and did not even know about the anti-satellite missiles China launched in 2007 until U.S. secretary of defense Robert Gates confronted him about it. Today, the National People’s Congress essentially rubber stamps the policies of the Chinese Communist Party, meaning procedures outlined in the ASL cannot slow down, let alone restrain, any potential decisions by Xi regarding Taiwan.</p> -<p>For example, a container ship carrying goods from Singapore — the second-busiest port in the world — to South Korea’s top port, Busan, would typically route through the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, with stops in Taiwan or China.</p> +<p>However, the ASL remains the only legal framework for conducting non-peaceful actions against Taiwan. And non-peaceful means include more than military actions. This suggests that Beijing would still have to go through the procedures described in the ASL if it wants to resort to such tactics. Thus, evidence that the PRC is following these procedures might provide a signal that the Xi administration is contemplating actions against Taiwan.</p> -<p>If traffic through the Taiwan Strait is disrupted, the same container ship could reroute through the Luzon Strait and sail east of Taiwan. This would not add much distance to the overall route, but it would likely necessitate skipping port calls in China.</p> +<h3 id="the-political-calculus-behind-the-anti-secession-law-and-its-evolution">The Political Calculus Behind the Anti-Secession Law and Its Evolution</h3> -<p>If cross-strait tensions become especially dire, cautious shipping companies may avoid routes near Taiwan altogether.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="bonny-lin">Bonny Lin</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>That same vessel departing from Singapore may choose to sail south of the Philippines before heading north through the Miyako Strait to reach South Korea. This would extend the journey by roughly 1,000 miles, adding significant costs and delays.</p> +<h4 id="introduction-2">Introduction</h4> -<p>It would also likely make it infeasible to stop at Chinese ports while en route to Busan, which could have significant ripple effects on supply chains given China’s central role in maritime shipping.</p> +<p>On the margins of the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in Bali in November 2022, Xi Jinping, leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), raised the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) with U.S. president Joe Biden during their first in-person meeting as heads of state. Expressing his opposition to closer U.S.-Taiwan ties, Xi warned that “China will invoke the law and act resolutely if serious violations occur.” This is one of many cases in which PRC leaders have used the legislation to seek to deter foreign countries from supporting Taiwan and to demonstrate China’s determination and willingness to use force to unify with the island. Beijing has also increasingly cited the ASL to attempt to legitimize and justify its option to use coercive means or military force against the island if Beijing assesses that Taiwan has embraced “pro-independence” activities.</p> -<p>While charting new routes is possible, shipping companies will face significant logistical challenges in implementing these changes, leading to cost increases and delays that will ultimately affect consumers.</p> +<p>In May 2024, for example, China’s Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Justice jointly released “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (the “22 Articles”). Citing the ASL as providing the legal basis for prosecuting those who promote Taiwan’s secession, the 22 Articles specified a range of criminal punishments up to and including the death penalty and the possibility for Beijing to try “separatists” in absentia.</p> -<h3 id="powering-japan-and-south-korea">Powering Japan and South Korea</h3> +<p>Given the importance the ASL has played in China’s approach toward Taiwan, this paper examines the origin, contents, and evolution of the Anti-Secession Law.</p> -<p>Many countries would feel the effects of these disruptions, but two key U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea, would be among those most impacted. CSIS estimates that 32 percent of Japan’s imports and 25 percent of its exports — totaling nearly $444 billion — transited the strait in 2022.</p> +<h4 id="origins-of-the-anti-secession-law">Origins of the Anti-Secession Law</h4> -<p>South Korea depended on the Taiwan Strait for 30 percent of its imports and 23 percent of its exports, amounting to about $357 billion in goods.</p> +<p>China adopted the ASL in March 2005 under significantly different domestic and international circumstances than today. When it was drafted, Beijing was most worried that Taipei could engage in major or significant actions to push for Taiwan independence, but China faced a more favorable international environment and better relations with the United States. Since then, particularly under Xi Jinping, China has become more worried about Taiwan’s incremental “salami slicing” tactics to promote independence and increase U.S. support, and Beijing’s relations with the United States have significantly deteriorated.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Ng1LqQk.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ Reliance on the Taiwan Strait: Japan and South Korea</em></p> +<p>The ASL was passed as one of the first legislative acts by Chinese leader Hu Jintao. Hu was a relatively weak leader and a moderate who took nearly two years to become chair of China’s Central Military Commission (or hold control over China’s military) in 2004 despite becoming general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2002 and the president of China in 2003. Compared to his successor Xi Jinping, Hu was more reserved, less ideological, and sought to drive PRC policy through leadership consensus. It is possible the ASL was relatively short because it was hard to build consensus regarding adding more specifics or details to the legislation.</p> -<p>For both allies, their reliance on the Taiwan Strait is crucial for importing raw materials. Each year, tankers and other ships carry vast amounts of oil, gas, and coal through the strait to Japan and South Korea to meet their immense energy needs.</p> +<p>Hu’s priority was China’s economic development, which he believed was the most important driver of the country’s rise. Economic growth also served “as a foundation of social stability” as domestic incidents of mass unrest were growing at an alarming rate. His focus on economic development and creating the necessary international conditions to facilitate China’s growth were evident in the use of the term “peaceful rise” — and later “peaceful development” — to characterize China’s foreign policy.</p> -<p>Over 95 percent of Japan’s crude oil and 65 percent of South Korea’s is sourced from a select group of Middle Eastern countries. Since ships typically follow the shortest paths available, much of this trade passes through the Taiwan Strait.</p> +<p>Indeed, in December 2004, during an expanded session of China’s Central Military Commission, Hu Jintao noted that “the first 20 years of this century is the important Strategic Opportunity Period” for China to modernize and become a moderately well-off society. Washington’s preoccupation with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had created space for China to grow, and Beijing’s efforts to support the U.S. Global War on Terror helped improve U.S.-China relations. The United States also had a more favorable view of China and its trajectory, and the two countries were not yet engaged in intense strategic competition.</p> -<p>For Japan, CSIS estimates that roughly $13 billion of its imports also pass through the Luzon Strait — a trip that makes sense for some ships bound for the country’s eastern ports. Yet this is just a fraction of its imports through the Taiwan Strait.</p> +<p>China’s military in the early 2000s was also significantly weaker than today. When Beijing observed U.S. military operations in the 1990–1991 Gulf War, as well as in Afghanistan and Iraq a decade later, the Chinese government expressed greater concern over what it viewed as a major gap in terms of technology and capabilities between Chinese and Western militaries. There was a recognition in Beijing that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was far behind that of the United States and that the United States was capable of intervening to defend Taiwan. By 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense assessed that “the cross-Strait military balance appears to be shifting toward Beijing.” However, China’s capabilities were only beginning to surpass that of Taiwan’s. In 2005, even without U.S. intervention, it would have been difficult for China to launch any successful major military campaign against Taiwan.</p> -<blockquote> - <p><em>We reaffirm that maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is indispensable to international security and prosperity.</em></p> - <h4 id="-g7-leaders-communique-june-2024">— G7 Leaders’ Communique, June 2024</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>To Hu Jintao, Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian was a pro-independence troublemaker. He was first elected as Taiwan’s leader in 2000. Chen’s securing of a second term in 2004 — despite China’s attempts to prevent him from winning the presidency again — only made things worse from Beijing’s perspective. During his May 2004 inauguration speech, President Chen declared his intent to hold a referendum in 2006 to adopt a new constitution in 2008. Beijing was very worried that such major moves were intended to set Taiwan down a path toward independence.</p> -<p>Japan and South Korea are also major players in high-tech supply chains and are heavily reliant on the Taiwan Strait for shipments of electronics and machinery.</p> +<p>Like other PRC leaders, Hu could not afford to “lose” Taiwan and could not afford to look “weak” or incapable of defending China’s core interests. At the same time, Hu was likely aware that a conflict over Taiwan at that time would be catastrophic for his economic development priorities and foreign policy designs.</p> -<p>Chips and electronics rank as South Korea’s second-largest import and Japan’s fourth-largest by value. The lion’s share of these chips are imported from Taiwan and China, including fabrication plants located along the Taiwan Strait in western Taiwan and southeast China.</p> +<p>Hu was under significant pressure to do something. One widely discussed and debated proposal came from Chinese scholar Yu Yuanzhou, who proposed in late 2002 that China pass a National Unification Promotion Law. His draft of the law had 32 articles divided into eight chapters. It began with Article 1, which stated that the law was drafted to accelerate unification with Taiwan. Article 5 listed three conditions for use of non-peaceful means against Taiwan:</p> -<h3 id="elsewhere-in-the-indo-pacific">Elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific</h3> +<ol> + <li> + <p>if Taiwan declares independence or takes concrete steps toward independence</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>if foreign militaries intervene or invade Taiwan</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>if Taiwan authorities indefinitely delay or prevent the realization of peaceful unification</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>For another key U.S. ally, Australia, these dynamics are almost completely flipped. The continent is endowed with immense natural resources, which Canberra has leveraged to position Australia as a pivotal player in the global economy.</p> +<p>Articles 23–25 specified awards and benefits for those who promote unification, and Articles 26–29 stipulated criminal punishment and legal action against those who oppose it.</p> -<p>Nearly 27 percent of Australia’s exports passed through the Taiwan Strait in 2022, totaling almost $109 billion. Commodities such as iron ore, coal, and liquefied natural gas comprised approximately 83 percent of this trade.</p> +<p>It is unclear if Yu’s proposal was a way for the Chinese government to test international and public opinion, but Chinese premier Wen Jiabao noted in a press conference in May 2004 that China would “seriously consider” drafting and adopting a national unification law.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/T76yRjO.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ Global Reliance on the Taiwan Strait: Australia</em></p> +<h4 id="contents-of-the-anti-secession-law">Contents of the Anti-Secession Law</h4> -<p>China has an especially voracious appetite for Australian iron ore. One in every six dollars Australia earns from its global exports comes from selling iron ore to China. Much of this must pass through the Taiwan Strait to reach China’s heavily industrialized northern provinces, where roughly three-quarters of China’s steel production occurs.</p> +<p>The eventual Anti-Secession Law that passed in 2005 had some similarities with the draft National Unification Promotion Law, but it was significantly shorter and less specific. It also raised and changed the criteria for use of non-peaceful means against Taiwan, perhaps reflecting Hu’s prioritization of economic development.</p> -<p>These exports are heavily geographically concentrated in northern Australia. Roughly 85 percent of ore carriers sailing from Australia through the Taiwan Strait to China depart from just one location, Port Hedland, which is one of the world’s largest iron ore export hubs.</p> +<p>The ASL is broken down into 10 encompassing articles. Article 1 states that the law seeks to prevent Taiwan’s independence, promote unification, and safeguard China’s national interests. It does not mention any desire to accelerate the promotion of unification, nor is there any mention of a timeline for unification.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EEz1s49.png" alt="image09" /></p> +<p>Article 2 reiterates the PRC’s “one China” principle, but the specific formulation and language is softer than Beijing uses today. In contrast to China’s current language — “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China” — the ASL suggests flexibility. It simply states that “the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China.” The ASL also does not assert that the PRC is the only and sole legal government of China. In fact, it mentions the PRC only once to discuss the law’s adoption, preferring to use “the state” to refer to the government in Beijing. Articles 3 and 4 note that Taiwan remains a legacy and unresolved issue from the Chinese Civil War and declare that it is the duty of all Chinese citizens to unify with Taiwan.</p> -<p>Crucially, though, the extent of the pain for Australia would likely depend on the extent of Chinese aggression. During a quarantine or blockade, Australia may continue selling iron ore and other goods to China while absorbing some of the costs from rerouting away from the waters around Taiwan. In a wide-scale war over Taiwan, the issue may be moot as Canberra could withhold exports of iron ore and other goods to China in response.</p> +<p>These early articles establish what Beijing believes is the status quo in the Taiwan Strait (i.e., that Taiwan belongs to China). Any actions to change or challenge this status quo are unacceptable to Beijing and violate the ASL.</p> -<p>Other key actors in the region are less reliant on the Taiwan Strait. The Philippines depends on the strait to transport about one-fifth of its global imports and one-seventh of its exports, but its geography allows it to send much of its trade through the Luzon Strait and Western Pacific Ocean.</p> +<p>Articles 5–7 specify Beijing’s desire for peaceful unification, list measures China will take to encourage peace and stability, and describe how negotiations for peaceful unification can be “flexible and with varied modalities.” It stipulates that unifying with Taiwan through peaceful means “best serves the fundamental interests of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.” When explaining the ASL during a press conference, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao noted that the legislation was meant to promote peaceful unification, not target the people of Taiwan or promote war.</p> -<p>Similarly, mainland Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar are less dependent on the Taiwan Strait — in part because they can send a sizeable portion of their trade overland.</p> +<p>These articles are often overlooked, but they detail activities that China should encourage or engage in to maintain peace and stability. Article 7 even states that consultations or negotiations between the two sides for peaceful unification can occur on “an equal footing.” It is far from clear whether China has upheld what it has laid out in these articles and whether it has tried its best to seek peaceful unification.</p> -<h3 id="a-critical-route-for-the-global-south">A Critical Route for the Global South</h3> +<p>Article 8 highlights the broad (and vague) circumstances that will justify China’s “use of non-peaceful and other means” against Taiwan. These conditions include the following:</p> -<p>The Taiwan Strait’s importance is not limited to Indo-Pacific countries. The four countries most reliant on the strait are in Africa.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>If Taiwan independence forces “act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China”</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>If “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China” occur</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>If “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted”</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>These countries all have one thing in common: their economies depend heavily on exporting raw materials to Asia, especially China.</p> +<p>Compared to the draft National Unification Promotion Law, the ASL focuses on “the fact of Taiwan’s secession” and “major incidents” leading to secession. This sets a higher, but still unclear, bar for invoking non-peaceful means. The third condition of “possibilities of peaceful unification being completely exhausted” is also harder to achieve than the draft unification law, which suggested that “indefinitely delaying or preventing” unification could be a criterion.</p> -<p>The Democratic Republic of the Congo shipped nearly $13 billion worth of copper, cobalt, and other metals through the strait — about 62 percent of its total global exports. Nearly all of it was bound for China.</p> +<p>Article 9 limits how non-peaceful means and other means can be exercised. It states that China should do its “utmost to protect the lives, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilians and foreign nationals in Taiwan, and to minimize losses.” This again is another case in which it is not clear whether Beijing is respecting its own legislation.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zdW0xjp.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ Global Reliance on the Taiwan Strait: Africa and the Middle East</em></p> +<p>Articles 8 and 9 attempt to shift the responsibility onto Taiwan for any non-peaceful means that the PRC uses against it. By stipulating these conditions, Beijing can argue that Taipei’s actions leave Beijing with no choice but to use coercion or force against the island.</p> -<p>Eritrea likewise exports more than 70 percent of its zinc ore and almost 100 percent of its copper ore to China. Gabon and Angola are endowed with oil, about 40 percent of which is bound for China. Much of this trade makes its way through the Taiwan Strait to ports in northern China.</p> +<p>In addition to the above, and compared to the detailed draft National Unification Promotion Law, there are other components not in the ASL:</p> -<p>Countries in the Middle East are similarly reliant on the strait for transporting oil to markets in Asia. Oman, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Yemen all send over 30 percent of their exports through the strait.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>The ASL does not specify how Taiwan would be unified with China. It does not take any position on whether Taiwan would become a special administrative region or if a federation could be formed between the two sides. It also does not specify the benefits and rights that Taiwan could enjoy post-unification. Instead, Article 7 of the ASL lists six aspects of Taiwan’s unification that can be negotiated between the two sides.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The ASL does not include language on rewarding those who promote unification.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The ASL does not criminalize those who promote independence.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The ASL does not specify any type of non-peaceful or other means that China could take if the circumstances for their use were met. In contrast, the draft National Unification Promotion Law discussed artillery shelling, the blockading of Taiwan, and other military operations.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>These dynamics also extend to some of China’s largest and most important economic and geopolitical partners. On average, the nine BRICS economies rely on the Taiwan Strait for about 14 percent of their imports and 15 percent of their exports. That is more than twice the level of dependence of the G7 economies.</p> +<h4 id="evolution-and-use-of-the-anti-secession-law">Evolution and Use of the Anti-Secession Law</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/f994PTk.png" alt="image11" /> -<em>▲ Reliance on the Taiwan Strait: BRICS vs. G7</em></p> +<p>Although in recent years the ASL is most frequently mentioned in reference to PRC coercive measures against Taiwan, Chinese official media and experts have argued that the law is effective and conducive to maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait and has also brought about cross-Strait opportunities. They credit it for deterring Chen Shui-bian from engaging in more pro-independence activities and for decreasing Taiwan and international support for such efforts. They also credit the ASL for creating the momentum and opening for then Kuomintang chairman Lien Chan to visit Beijing in April 2005 and for People’s First Party chairman James Soong to do the same a month later, the first time Taiwan’s political leaders set foot in China since 1949. After Lien and Soong’s visits, China announced carrots for Taiwan, including easing restrictions on the island’s agricultural products and promoting Chinese tourism. Chinese experts argue that Article 6 of the ASL provided the basis to increase China’s trade and other linkages with Taiwan from 2008 onward during the Ma Ying-jeou administration.</p> -<p>China has sought to position itself as a leader and voice of developing countries, in part to build support for its alternative vision of international order beyond the “Western approach.” This is especially the case for its engagement with BRICS nations.</p> +<p>In the past decade, however, there has been growing dissatisfaction within China about how the ASL can be used and applied. Much of this occurred after Tsai Ing-wen won the Taiwan presidency in 2016. Beijing was increasingly suspicious and wary that Tsai either sought to push the island incrementally toward independence or keep it permanently separated from the PRC. At the same time, Beijing became more concerned about growing U.S. support for Taiwan. In 2016, former PLA lieutenant-general Wang Hongguang called for invoking the ASL, arguing that possibilities for peaceful reunification had been exhausted. In 2017, there were press reports that Chinese leader Xi Jinping was considering revising the ASL or passing a National Unification Act.</p> -<p>The need to maintain broad-based diplomatic support to advance this vision may make Beijing more sensitive to the concerns of these nations. In a crisis or conflict over Taiwan, developing countries will likely seek to continue trading with China — as many have continued to do business with Russia following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Faced with severe disruptions to their trade, they could collectively exert significant pressure on Beijing to resolve a conflict to avoid long-term economic pain.</p> +<p>In 2020, after Tsai was elected to a second term as Taiwan’s president, the discussion in Beijing intensified on how to respond. In March of that year, former PLA general Luo Yuan released an op-ed on how to revise the ASL. He criticized the three criteria for invoking “non-peaceful and other means” as too vague and unclear and noted that the ASL also did not specify what non-peaceful means might look like. He recommended that Beijing take the following actions:</p> -<h3 id="chinas-reliance-on-the-taiwan-strait">China’s Reliance on the Taiwan Strait</h3> +<ul> + <li> + <p>List “die-hard pro-independence” leaders as war criminals who seek to incite cross-Strait military tensions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Create a database of pro-independence individuals and record their acts of secession.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Impose sanctions on individuals or companies who support Taiwan’s independence.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Compress Taiwan’s “survival space” if pro-independence Taiwan leaders engage in provocative activities, punishing them by conducting military exercises that move closer and closer to the island.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Engage in cognitive warfare to raise awareness of the costs that Taiwan would bear if China used force to unify with the island.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Publicize a timeline for unification.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>China’s own economy stands to be severely impacted by any disruptions to trade through the Taiwan Strait.</p> +<p>On May 29, 2020, as a part of a public event commemorating the 15th anniversary of the ASL, Chinese media quoted Li Zhanshu, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, as stating that the ASL is an important part of China’s “One Country, Two Systems” policy framework, which aims to promote the peaceful unification of China. The same article noted that the ASL was also vital because “it can crackdown [sic] on separatist movements in Taiwan by means of legal authorization.” Chinese media and scholars argued that President Tsai had begun creating the legal basis for Taiwan’s independence — such as by passing Taiwan’s Anti-Infiltration Act, trying to change wording in the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and proposing constitutional reforms — and that her actions thus provided legal ground to activate Article 8 of the ASL.</p> -<p>In a large-scale conflict over Taiwan — such as a blockade or invasion — China would likely face severe economic consequences from financial market shocks, U.S. and allied sanctions, and other ripple effects. In addition to those imposed costs, the consequences of interrupted trade flows would be significant.</p> +<p>At this same late-May event, Chinese leaders and analysts signaled that Beijing was preparing non-peaceful measures against Taiwan. Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office Liu Jieyi warned that Beijing would not leave any space for “Taiwan independence” or renounce the use of force against the island and would reserve the option to take all necessary measures. These threats were similarly echoed by the chief of the Joint Staff Department, General Li Zuocheng.</p> -<p>A staggering $1.3 trillion of Chinese imports and exports passed through the Taiwan Strait — far more than any other country. Hong Kong adds another $95 billion in trade, bringing the total to nearly $1.4 trillion.</p> +<p>This 15th-anniversary commemoration of the ASL occurred two months late (taking place in May 2020 even though the actual anniversary was in March 2020). Instead, China celebrated the ASL a day after the National People’s Congress passed the controversial Hong Kong National Security Law on May 28, 2020. Against this backdrop, Chinese experts participating in the symposium argued that Beijing should be taking a range of measures on various separatist movements, including “completing the law systems on national security,” “making reciprocal measures to sanction overseas separatists and anti-China individuals,” and “mak[ing] more detailed laws by extending the experience of the Anti-Secession Law.”</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/U3SZyzE.png" alt="image12" /> -<em>▲ Value of Trade through the Taiwan Strait</em></p> +<p>Chinese efforts to complement and extend the ASL began bearing fruit the next year. In June 2021, China adopted its Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. Although this document does not mention the ASL or Taiwan, Article 3 lays out China’s right to employ corresponding countermeasures when foreign nations interfere with its internal affairs.</p> -<p>The waterway is especially crucial in supplying China with raw materials. China’s rapid economic development has transformed the country into the largest importer of oil, coal, and natural gas, as well as key manufacturing imports like ores and metals.</p> +<p>Since then, China has cited the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law to censure U.S. political leaders who support or visit Taiwan, as well as U.S. defense companies that sell arms to Taiwan. In August 2022, after U.S. speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei, China cited the ASL, as well as the National Security Law and Criminal Law, to take criminal punitive measures against Taiwan individuals and organizations whom Beijing called “die-hard pro-independence elements.” At the same time, China used the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law to justify imposing sanctions on Speaker Pelosi. China’s Ministry of National Defense further shared that the PLA’s unnamed large-scale exercises around Taiwan after Pelosi left were meant to deter secessionists and foreign interference. Although the ministry did not specifically cite the ASL, it noted that the Chinese exercises were “consistent with domestic law and international law and practice.”</p> -<p>These goods collectively make up two-thirds of the value of goods headed to China through the strait.</p> +<p>This usage of the ASL since at least 2022 has expanded the law beyond its original scope. China is now citing it to engage in gray-zone coercion and sanctions against Taiwan and to target specific individuals and organizations. The ASL does not provide the basis for such activities. Taiwan has not seceded from China, nor does Pelosi’s visit of Taiwan count as a “major incident” leading to Taiwan’s secession, and China has not exhausted the possibility of peaceful unification. As discussed earlier, and despite recommendations from some PRC scholars to include such provisions, the ASL did not include any articles on criminal punishment of Taiwan’s “pro-independence” forces.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/h9BhO94.png" alt="image13" /> -<img src="https://i.imgur.com/CZC2hme.png" alt="image14" /> -<em>▲ Chinese Trade through the Taiwan Strait by Industry</em></p> +<p>In 2024, China further outlined a series of military exercises that the PLA could conduct to punish Taiwan for engaging in “separatist activities” and suggested that the ASL authorizes such activities. In January, after William Lai won Taiwan’s presidential election, China’s Ministry of State Security published an article on WeChat entitled, “The Anti-Secession Law Is a Sharp Sword Hanging High.” The article explained that the blade of the sword points at Taiwan independence efforts, the sword clarifies what China’s red lines are, the hilt indicates that the duty and future is in the hands of the Chinese and Taiwan people, and the scabbard hides the edge of the sword to preserve the option of peace.</p> -<p>China’s reliance on the strait for exports is lower by comparison, with only 15 percent of its exports passing through the waterway. This is largely because many exports do not have to transit the strait to reach China’s key export markets, such as the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Despite this lower dependency, the total value of exports transiting the strait still exceeds $551 billion — an enormous sum to put at risk.</p> +<p>In late May and perhaps building on this analogy, the PLA engaged in another round of large-scale exercises around Taiwan to “serve as a strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces and a stern warning against the interference and provocation by external forces.” Beijing sought to use these drills to express its condemnation of President Lai’s inauguration speech, which Beijing viewed as a departure from past inauguration speeches of Taiwan leaders. These joint drills were named Joint Sword-2024A, suggesting there could be several of these exercises per year and there might be more iterations in subsequent years.</p> -<p>Crucially, the strait is not simply vital for China’s international trade. It also facilitates the flow of goods within China. Over half of all voyages through the Taiwan Strait are between the sprawling ports dotting China’s eastern seaboard. China could move some goods internally by land or air, but doing so is typically far more expensive than transporting them by sea. Policymakers in Beijing are undoubtedly aware of this reality, which likely plays a role in their decisionmaking regarding the use of force against Taiwan.</p> +<p>In late May 2024 and shortly after China wrapped up its military exercises, Beijing issued the 22 Articles, which China’s Taiwan Affairs Office noted was meant to strengthen the ASL by providing details. The timing of the 22 Articles reinforced China’s military demonstration and opposition to any attempts within Taiwan to move toward what Beijing views as incremental independence.</p> -<p>In a crisis or conflict that disrupts maritime traffic through the Taiwan Strait, China would face major obstacles to conducting trade. Yet Beijing does have options to mitigate the challenges.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MhZCgWS.png" alt="image15" /> -<em>▲ China’s Top Container Ports</em></p> +<p>China’s Anti-Secession Law remains an important piece of legislation that Beijing invokes as justification for its policies and actions toward Taiwan. The short law covers the broad components of China’s approach toward Taiwan, but its lack of specificity has afforded Chinese leaders and experts flexibility in how they interpret it. In recent years, China has increasingly cited Article 8 of the ASL to support its coercive and military activities against the island as it lowers its threshold for use of non-peaceful means against Taiwan. There has been less focus on the other articles, which require China to “do its utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful reunification.” China has also built out more legislation to support and complement the ASL, giving Beijing a large set of coercive tools to use against Taiwan and its supporters.</p> -<p>If the Taiwan Strait is completely impassable to merchant ships, vessels bound for China could reroute, but if they are forced to go through the Miyako Strait, this could leave China susceptible to a distant blockade by U.S., Japanese, and other forces seeking to deprive China of trade.</p> +<h3 id="the-significance-and-application-of-chinas-anti-secession-law">The Significance and Application of China’s Anti-Secession Law</h3> -<p>In less kinetic scenarios, China could also attempt to only close the Taiwan Strait to non-Chinese vessels while allowing or demanding that its ships continue sailing through the Strait. Nearly half of all cargo and tanker vessels transiting through the Taiwan Strait each year are Chinese-flagged. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that Chinese-owned ships would be secure from interdiction by forces opposing China.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="wen-hsuan-tsai">Wen-Hsuan Tsai</h4> +</blockquote> -<h3 id="looking-ahead">Looking Ahead</h3> +<h4 id="introduction-3">Introduction</h4> -<p>Beijing forcefully asserts that the issue of Taiwan is “purely an internal affair,” and its officials bristle when other countries sail naval vessels through the Taiwan Strait — despite their rights to freedom of navigation under international law.</p> +<p>The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Anti-Secession Law (ASL) notably asserts that Taiwan and mainland China are both part of “one China.” According to this law, there is no particular distinction between using “China” to refer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or the Republic of China. The legislation resembles the Treaty of Warsaw signed between East and West Germany in 1972, which declared that the two states should pursue reunification. However, the key difference between the ASL and the Treaty of Warsaw is that West Germany recognized East Germany as a country at the time. In contrast, the ASL only vaguely states that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the nation of China and that the question of Taiwan is a legacy of the Chinese Civil War. Thus, Beijing officially opposes the proposition of Taiwan’s independence and its actions in this regard.</p> -<p>Yet this report shows the immense importance of the Taiwan Strait to international commerce and demonstrates the scale of the economic consequences should Beijing upset the fragile stability in the strait by using force against Taiwan.</p> +<p>Enacted during the Hu Jintao period, the ASL does not clearly define the name or nature of the country after reunification. However, actions taken under Xi Jinping have led to a clear understanding that this “China” is the PRC, making the terms of the law less flexible and potentially harming future cross-Strait interaction and negotiations.</p> -<p>Ensuring free and open maritime trade through the Taiwan Strait is critical not just for nearby nations like China, South Korea, and Japan, but for the entire global economy. For Washington, working closely with allies and partners to maintain cross-strait stability is essential to safeguarding international trade.</p> +<h4 id="changing-the-prc-application-of-the-anti-secession-law">Changing the PRC Application of the Anti-Secession Law</h4> -<hr /> +<p>This shift in the presumed nature of the ASL is related to the overall perspectives of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Foreign relations and cross-Strait policies under Hu Jintao primarily focused on economic development. Therefore, the law was implemented to encourage the future development, including economic integration and political unification, of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. However, it does not discuss the use of the name “China” following unification. Since the ASL was passed in 2005, the main policy focus has shifted from economic development to national security. The law has come to be seen as emphasizing that Taiwan is part of the PRC, with the intention of preventing foreign forces from exploiting the Taiwan issue to negatively affect China’s national security.</p> -<p><strong>Matthew P. Funaiole</strong> is vice president of the iDeas Lab, Andreas C. Dracopoulos Chair in Innovation, and senior fellow of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>Under Xi Jinping, the meaning and application of the ASL seem to have changed in several ways. First, the ASL has been used together with other PRC laws to punish so-called “Taiwan independence” elements. The document “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law,” promulgated by the CCP in June 2024 (the “22 Articles”), mentions in its preface that the PRC can use its Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, as well as other legal provisions. These recent activities align with what scholars call “legal authoritarianism” under Xi — the strengthening and legitimization of PRC policy through the enactment of numerous laws.</p> -<p><strong>Brian Hart</strong> is a fellow with the China Power Project at CSIS.</p> +<p>Second, the ASL is no longer merely an initiative to promote the cross-Strait pursuit of reunification but an expression that Taiwan is an integral part of the territory of the PRC. Beijing uses this law to claim jurisdiction and control over the people of Taiwan. Under Hu Jintao, the CCP’s definition of “China” had room for ambiguity, and both sides of the strait could have their own interpretations of the China to which they belonged. However, under Xi Jinping, the concept is no longer vague. The “one China” referred to by the CCP now means the PRC.</p> -<p><strong>David Peng</strong> is a senior fellow for data science with the iDeas Lab at CSIS. He has over 15 years of experience in quantitative research.</p> +<p>Third, the ASL is somewhat abstract, leaving ample room for interpretation and follow-on measures. The CCP could issue details on how to implement the law, making it more practically functional. It could also amend the ASL by adding text relating it to Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Xi has placed greater emphasis on the concepts of top-level design and national security, and the Taiwan issue is no longer expressed as scope limited to United Front work but forms part of the PRC’s overall security strategy. Therefore, it is possible the CCP will incorporate Xi Jinping Thought in the preface of the ASL, which would have two effects: to make anti-secession and cross-Strait reunification key to China’s concept of national security and to inject additional Xi Jinping symbolism into the law, further cementing his historical status and contribution to cross-Strait policies.</p> -<p><strong>Bonny Lin</strong> is a senior fellow for Asian security and director of the China Power Project at CSIS.</p> +<p>Fourth, the CCP may use the ASL to formulate a new law to accelerate unification. The ASL only passively opposes Taiwan’s independence, but a unification law would actively promote reunification. Xi might ask Wang Huning, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, to formulate more detailed regulations on the topic. Xi might also formulate or amend regulations on Taiwan affairs, in particular regarding supplementing and revising the ASL.</p> -<p><strong>Jasper Verschuur</strong>.</p>Matthew P. Funaiole, et al.This report provides an unprecedented look at the Taiwan Strait’s role in global trade, revealing that over one-fifth of all maritime commerce passes through this vital waterway. China possesses a range of non-kinetic options it may employ to coerce Taiwan, which could significantly disrupt this trade.Uncertainty For Russian Army2024-10-09T12:00:00+08:002024-10-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uncertainty-for-russian-army<p><em>The Russian Army in Ukraine performed poorly as a result of degraded unit quality due to attrition and operational failures, but has adapted by improving electronic warfare, air defense, and drone integration, making it more lethal and survivable.</em></p> +<p>Finally, the CCP might seek to clarify Article 8, the most important part of the ASL. This article grants the State Council and the Central Military Commission power to take non-peaceful measures if independence forces attempt to separate Taiwan from China or have already done so, or if the “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted” — a phrase that is currently very vague. It may be that Xi Jinping will seek to define this parameter more clearly. However, it remains to be seen whether the CCP will formulate a law to institute a timetable and deadline for unification. Doing so would greatly limit the flexibility of the CCP’s Taiwan policy.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>If China amends or revises the ASL, Beijing may face international concern and pushback against its unilateral changes to the political relationship between mainland China and Taiwan — particularly from the United States and Japan. Maintaining the status quo in Taiwan is most conducive to the interests of the United States and its allies and partners. If Donald Trump is elected president in November 2024, his anti-China stance may present even more challenges to the CCP’s tough Taiwan policy. But even if Kamala Harris is elected, given the current global anti-China situation and China’s strong diplomacy, the relationship between the United States and China may not improve.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/f3J44OO.jpeg" alt="image01" /></p> +<h4 id="looking-forward">Looking Forward</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Despite setbacks with Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), Russia could reconstitute its military capabilities post-war, potentially focusing on more effective combined arms formations. Institutional corruption and neglect of personnel remain significant barriers to modernization, but some military leaders are pushing for reforms.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Russia’s military future depends on addressing these deep-rooted issues while adjusting its doctrine and force structure.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>At the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP in July 2024, the party noted that the reform task of Chinese-style modernization needs to be completed by 2029, the 80th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. This suggests that Xi Jinping will likely secure a fourth term as general secretary in 2027. He may wish to resolve the “Taiwan problem” during this term, and it is possible that he will try his best to bring the cross-Strait political agenda to a stage of substantive negotiations on reunification. In pursuit of this goal, the CCP will need to formulate more relevant laws to provide the legal basis for unification, which will involve either building on or revising the ASL. However, the government and people of Taiwan may not be willing to obey Xi Jinping’s will, meaning cross-Strait tensions could intensify after 2027.</p> -<h3 id="how-russias-army-may-rebuild-and-evolve-after-the-war-in-ukraine">How Russia’s Army May Rebuild and Evolve After the War in Ukraine</h3> +<h3 id="the-dangers-of-the-anti-secession-law-under-xi-jinping">The Dangers of the Anti-Secession Law under Xi Jinping</h3> -<p>The full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been a bruising debacle for Russia’s ground forces. Despite staving off outright defeat in 2022 and 2023, the quality of its units degraded due to attrition.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="vincent-yi-hsiang-chao">Vincent Yi-Hsiang Chao</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Nevertheless, the institution has adapted by varying degrees, and how it reconstitutes itself and modernizes after the current high-intensity period of the war ends is worth considering, for this will shape the threat that Russia poses in the future.</p> +<h4 id="introduction-4">Introduction</h4> -<p>The Russian Army bogged down in the Donbas and the Kursk Oblast, is currently absorbed with recruiting, training, arming, and equipping personnel to replace those it is hemorrhaging through battlefield losses. Operationally, it is for the most part holding ground while exerting pressure along Ukraine’s extended front line. This appears to be taking up the majority of the planning capacity of its senior leadership, and bureaucratic and logistical apparatus.</p> +<p>The Anti-Secession Law (ASL) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has recently been brought back into the spotlight after it was used as a basis for new guidelines that would, among other things, potentially impose a death penalty on “Taiwan independence” advocates. This is a significant escalation related to what was seen as a long-dormant piece of legislation.</p> -<p>Despite periodic discussions of the possibility of the Russian state collapsing, the resilience of the war economy and Putin regime has been notable. More likely is that Russia is eventually forced to scale back or cease current high-intensity operations, and must return to other methods of undermining Ukraine. Bar the unlikely possibility that internal problems topple the government, Russia’s conventional forces will restructure and rebuild their capabilities.</p> +<p>First introduced by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 2005, the ASL is widely viewed as a response to Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian’s pro-independence tendencies. Prior to its passage, PRC premier Wen Jiabao said Beijing was seriously considering a “law of unification” in response to questions of how to deter Taiwan independence. Li Zhanshu, chairman of the NPC’s Standing Committee, also stated that the ASL would serve as a “guiding compass in fighting against separatist forces and promoting reunification.”</p> -<p>It is impossible to predict with any certainty what direction the Russian Army might take. Nevertheless, a necessary question that might shed light on this is what the Russian Army perceives its most important lessons learned to be.</p> +<p>Despite strenuous protests from Taipei, international reactions were fairly muted following the ASL’s passage. A White House spokesperson called it “unhelpful.” The European Union urged both sides to “avoid any unilateral action that could stoke tensions.” Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concern that the law might “exert a negative influence over peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits.” It was apparent that despite its bellicose content, the legislation itself was largely seen as symbolic rather than as a substantive effort to compel unification.</p> -<p>What changes have already taken place are likely to be here to stay. Russia has the benefit of optimizing for a single, clearly understood task, trench warfare, which has shaped its operational force structure and decisions of what new capabilities to invest in, but many of these are either transferable or have obvious and broad utility.</p> +<p>This may very well change under President Xi Jinping’s leadership. Xi has adopted a much harder stance on cross-Strait issues, vowing that China will “never promise to renounce” the right to use force against Taiwan. U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken said that in doing so, Xi made a “fundamental decision that the status quo was no longer acceptable.” In this context, the PRC’s Anti-Secession Law can be seen as an ideal framework for Xi, not only as it would preclude the status quo continuing indefinitely, but also because it would help him rationalize the use of force against Taiwan to audiences both at home and abroad.</p> -<p>Advances in electronic warfare for force protection, their robust air defense network, the integration of new sensors into a more-developed targeting cycle, and the way that uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) such as Lancet, Orlan, and Shahid are employed have made Russian ground forces more survivable and lethal and have created a deeper and more dangerous battlespace for any enemy facing them.</p> +<h4 id="chinas-more-assertive-unification-campaign-under-xi-jinping">China’s More Assertive Unification Campaign under Xi Jinping</h4> -<p>At a higher level, structural changes such as the split of the Western Military District into the Moscow and Leningrad military districts indicate re-posturing towards a potential war in the Baltic region, a longer-term change in posture indicative of a more confrontational approach to NATO.</p> +<p>Over the past decade, the situation around the Taiwan Strait has changed dramatically, aided by China’s newfound economic and military might. Repeated overflights by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have eroded the role of the median line of the Taiwan Strait as a crucial barrier that prevents accidents and misunderstandings. Diplomatic pressure from the PRC on other countries to break off formal ties with Taipei has dampened Taiwan’s international space. Beijing has also sought to use disinformation and other gray zone tactics to undermine trust in democratic institutions. Through military, economic, and social means, Beijing has increasingly signaled that the status quo is no longer tenable and that concrete actions toward unification must be made.</p> -<p>More questionable is the shape of future Russian formations. Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) were essentially abandoned due to ineffectiveness and replaced by a more traditional, hierarchical military structure. Aside from suffering from a shortage of infantry, an essential component for any combined arms formation, Russia’s logistics system had not been adjusted in line with the BTG concept and was not able to support the large number of small and complicated formations that were initially deployed.</p> +<p>There are growing signs that these efforts will be further aided by a lawfare campaign centering on the Anti-Secession Law. For example, Xi’s seminal piece on Taiwan policy, “The Taiwan Question and China’s ‘Reunification’ in the New Era,” refers to the ASL twice and quotes from Article 2 that “there is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division.” In November 2022, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also released a statement that Xi had raised the ASL during a meeting with U.S. president Joe Biden. More recently, it was used as a basis for the new legal interpretations that would impose jail terms on “pro-independence” activists, with the death penalty reserved for more serious cases.</p> -<p>The increasing use of assault detachments fit within a long-standing practice of concentrating better-trained and equipped personnel into sub-units dedicated to maneuver and assault while setting low standards and expectations for most of the infantry. Yet the way they are currently used does not scale well, while useful for local tactical actions, they do not help ground forces conduct larger-scale offensive maneuvers.</p> +<p>Within China, discussions over the ASL will likely intensify in the run-up to its 20th anniversary next year. During its 15th anniversary in 2020, China’s state media published an article calling the law “a powerful weapon to deter Taiwan separatists,” adding that it should be revisited in the context of fraying U.S.-China ties and Xi’s cross-Strait policies. It seems possible that Xi may use its 20th anniversary as another milestone to announce new interpretations and applications of the ASL. Such action would be wholly consistent with the way Xi used the 40th anniversary of the 1979 “Message to Taiwan Compatriots” to announce new policies on Taiwan.</p> -<p>Likewise, armored forces are not currently competitive against the mix of precise lethal systems that are fielded by both sides in Ukraine, tanks can be held in reserve for fire support and to blunt enemy breakthroughs, but suffer when brought closer to the front line.</p> +<h4 id="three-ways-china-further-interprets-the-anti-secession-law">Three Ways China Further Interprets the Anti-Secession Law</h4> -<p>Therefore, a future development to watch for is what kind of combined arms formation the Russians design and build once they have sufficient breathing space. This may be a return to a better implementation of the BTG concept, with logistics issues resolved and the balance of capabilities adjusted, or may focus on rebuilding Russia’s brigades.</p> +<p>Moving forward, it is likely that the PRC will shape interpretations of the Anti-Secession Law in three critical areas to: (1) clarify that Taiwan is a part of the PRC; (2) rule out an indefinite continuation of the status quo; and (3) rationalize the use of military force against Taiwan.</p> -<p>Russian doctrine is conceptually viable as a way of war. However, due to Russia’s military culture and comprehensive neglect of its personnel, operations are at best unwieldy and more often simply unimplementable with the force available. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Russia’s military leadership recognizes the need for cultural change in this area.</p> +<p>First, although the ASL maintains ambiguity in declaring Taiwan as part of “China” rather than the PRC, a closer reading of its text could easily suggest otherwise. Its opening article makes clear that “promoting peaceful national unification” and “preserving China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” are among its central objectives. Article 2 states: “There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division.” Article 5 adds that “upholding the principle of one China is the basis of peaceful reunification of the country.”</p> -<p>Where there have been changes are in making corruption and systemic dishonesty less acceptable. These are deep-rooted issues and are also a necessity of a system that forces officers to obfuscate their unit’s readiness assessments. Some within Russia’s military leadership are attempting and this could pave the way for a more effective force in the future, though it faces a great deal of institutional inertia and may be worsened by repression.</p> +<p>This should be read in the context of the Taiwan Affairs Office, which has long declared that the “one China” principle means that Taiwan is part of the PRC, stating that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and, after replacing the government of the Republic of China in 1949, the government of the PRC has become the sole legal government of China, enjoying and exercising sovereignty over the whole of China, including Taiwan.” In addition, the preamble of the PRC’s 1982 constitution states: “Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China.” A case can thus be made that there is no flexibility in the ASL’s interpretation of the “one China” principle.</p> -<p>These are perhaps the greatest barriers to change and will be the key dynamics to watch when assessing future modernization efforts regardless of what Russia’s senior leaders unveil on paper or in military displays in Moscow.</p> +<p>Second, the ASL suggests that unification cannot be delayed indefinitely. Article 7 lays out the steps and phases of how the two sides can negotiate the cessation of hostilities, the political status of Taiwan, and arrangements for peaceful unification. However, Article 8 also states that if “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Taken together, these passages can be interpreted to mean that unification must be inevitable and action toward it must be ongoing for there to be peace across the Taiwan Strait, rationalizing the exclusion of any other outcome as a matter of law.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Third, the ASL can easily be seen as a basis for Xi engaging in military action in the Taiwan Strait. Article 8 details the conditions in which “non-peaceful means” may be employed, including “the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China” or an exhaustion of possibilities for peaceful unification. It also authorizes the State Council and the Central Military Commission to decide what constitutes “non-peaceful means.” The ambiguously worded legal framework has granted Xi flexibility in using force against Taiwan. While this could have been seen as a symbolic gesture in 2005, a time when the PLA had few military options regarding the Taiwan Strait, it should be interpreted far differently today given China’s growing capacity to quarantine, blockade, or invade Taiwan.</p> -<p><strong>Nick Reynolds</strong> is the Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).</p>Nick ReynoldsThe Russian Army in Ukraine performed poorly as a result of degraded unit quality due to attrition and operational failures, but has adapted by improving electronic warfare, air defense, and drone integration, making it more lethal and survivable.Tests For Success2024-10-09T12:00:00+08:002024-10-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/tests-for-success<p><em>The Strategic Defence Review underway has been described as a “root and branch review” of the whole UK defence enterprise, pointing the way to “a new era for defence”. Can the different approach being taken this time around produce significantly better results than other recent reviews?</em></p> +<h4 id="conclusion-1">Conclusion</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>The potential that Xi will leverage the Anti-Secession Law to justify more assertive actions against Taiwan should alarm both Taiwan society and the international community. At its core, the ASL is a misnomer. Far from simply targeting efforts to promote Taiwan’s independence, it is designed to affect another outcome: the annexation of Taiwan by any means necessary. It seeks to do so by precluding the indefinite continuation of the status quo while rationalizing the use of military force against Taiwan. It is fundamentally the most dangerous piece of legislation affecting cross-Strait peace and stability.</p> -<p>The announcement shortly after the general election that the government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) would be conducted by three independent figures came as a surprise to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and wider UK national security community. Traditionally, UK defence and security reviews have been led by officials. Apparently taking their cue from the way Australia’s Defence Strategic Review of 2023 was conducted, the prime minister and the new defence secretary, John Healey, appointed Lord Robertson, a former defence secretary and NATO Secretary General, to lead the review. He is being supported by retired General Sir Richard Barrons and Fiona Hill, a British-born Russia expert who worked for many years inside the US national security system. Six additional senior-level experts were recently added to the review team. They are being supported by an internal MoD secretariat team.</p> +<p>The stakes are high following the inauguration of Taiwan’s President William Lai, whom Beijing has vowed to oppose. While there may be a genuine desire within Taipei for cross-Strait relations to return to the status quo ante, Beijing’s growing use of the ASL suggests that this is extremely unlikely. Instead, both Taiwan and like-minded democracies around the world should be clear-eyed that defense deterrence and international support remain the best response to the dangers of the Anti-Secession Law as wielded by Xi Jinping.</p> -<p>The terms of reference say that the SDR will “determine the roles, capabilities and reforms required by UK Defence to meet the challenges, threats and opportunities of the twenty-first century, deliverable and affordable within the resources available to Defence within the trajectory [to spending] 2.5% [of GDP on Defence]”. The scope is customarily expansive.</p> +<blockquote> + <h2 id="section-ii">Section II</h2> + <h2 id="legality-and-legal-warfare-of-the-anti-secession-law-and-the-22-articles">Legality and Legal Warfare of the Anti-Secession Law and the 22 Articles</h2> +</blockquote> -<p>The terms of reference also set out some clear parameters: commitment to the independent UK nuclear deterrent; a “NATO first” approach; reinforcing homeland security; continuing support for Ukraine; maintaining defence ties with the Indo-Pacific region, the Gulf and the Middle East; and delivering AUKUS.</p> +<h3 id="the-anti-secession-law-in-chinas-taiwan-strategy-then-and-now">The Anti-Secession Law in China’s Taiwan Strategy, Then and Now</h3> -<p>Inputs to the review have been sought from within Defence, other government departments, industry, allies and partners, academia and members of the public. These will feed into a process intended to deliver a final report to the defence secretary in early 2025. It is yet to be announced how this will be translated into government policy, including its treatment in the second phase of the Spending Review, which is due to completed by the Spring Budget – although at the outset the government said the review would be complete by next summer.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="jacques-delisle">Jacques deLisle</h4> +</blockquote> -<h3 id="five-tests-for-the-sdr-threats-risks-and-policy-responses">Five Tests for the SDR: Threats, Risks and Policy Responses</h3> +<h4 id="introduction-5">Introduction</h4> -<p>In 2020, we developed five tests against which the claim that the Integrated Review would be the deepest and most radical review of UK foreign, defence and security policy since the end of the Cold War could be assessed. They can equally be applied to this SDR. The first of these tests relates to the accuracy of assessments about changing risks to the UK and international security and stability, and the quality of the headline policy responses.</p> +<p>China’s Anti-Secession Law (ASL) is a curious, but distinctive and significant, component of Beijing’s repertoire for addressing the issue of Taiwan. In its most obvious features, the ASL appears to add little to long-standing positions. Its key substantive provisions — including the law’s most threatening elements — were far from novel when the ASL was adopted in 2005. With the ASL, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) declared that China will resort to “non-peaceful means” if “‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces . . . cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession” or if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession occur” or if “the possibilities for peaceful unification are completely exhausted.” According to the ASL, Taiwan is currently part of China and its possible secession is to be prevented. China’s policy preference is for peaceful unification, and Beijing is prepared to offer terms that include some version of a “one country, two systems” arrangement.</p> -<p>The scale and immediacy of both threats and risks to UK national security continues to grow. The SDR will need to consider both the pressing threats to European security and longer-term challenges, particularly from China. It will also need to factor in conflict and instability in the Middle East and the potential for escalation into a major war, and contingencies with respect to Taiwan and the Korean peninsula. The growing risk of hybrid attacks, challenges in the new domains of space and cyberspace, and the potential recurrence of international terrorism will also have to be on the menu.</p> +<p>Indeed, in some respects the ASL was seemingly more restrained than some of Beijing’s previously stated positions. For example, it omitted the specific language of the 2000 White Paper’s threat that China could use force if Taiwan were occupied or invaded, or if it refused indefinitely to engage in unification negotiations. And the ASL forewent the phrase “one country, two systems” — already of ill odor in Taiwan in 2005, and much more so after the 2019 crackdown on protests in Hong Kong and the subsequent passage of a National Security Law for Hong Kong in 2020 — instead using the substantively similar but less provocative phrases “systems different from those on the mainland” and “a high degree of autonomy.”</p> -<p>All the post-Cold War reviews have tended to focus on the threats and risks that were more immediately present and occupying the time and energy of the government of the day, devising headline policy responses that seemed appropriate at the time. Events sometimes then required these responses to be re-thought quite quickly. The need to “refresh” the Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper within two years of their publication, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, is the most recent case in point. Briefings associated with the SDR suggest that it will focus on China as the “pacing threat” to plan against (borrowing US language). Planning against an apparently longer-term threat rather than more immediate ones would mark a significant departure in approach, so it will be interesting to see how the review gives substance to this notion. The UK and other Western governments have so far struggled to strike the right balance between cooperation, competition and confrontation with China – and the policy and resource implications of potentially correcting this go way beyond Defence. A clear and convincing case will need to be made to the public to explain the rationale for doing so and the impact on steps needed to counter more immediate threats from Russia.</p> +<p>Putting familiar propositions in the form of legislation by the National People’s Congress (NPC) would not seem to do much. As a matter of principles of Chinese law and governance — and perceptions in Taiwan, the United States, or elsewhere — the ASL could not meaningfully enhance the authority of the Chinese state and its military to use force or take other coercive measures against Taiwan. Conversely, and even if they had been less vague, the ASL’s statements concerning the preconditions or procedures for using force could not credibly indicate to audiences at home or abroad the existence of binding and not-easily-alterable limitations on China’s use of force in response to acts that authorities in Beijing deem unacceptably “secessionist.” The ASL’s designation of the PRC institutions that would authorize the use of non-peaceful means portended no meaningful constraint on a decision that, as a practical matter, would be made at the top levels of the party-state.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Strategic Defence Review will need to consider both the pressing threats to European security and longer-term challenges, particularly from China</code></em></strong></p> +<p>What, then, does the ASL do, and why has it reemerged as a prominent focus and concern since the mid-2010s, and especially during the 2020s? There are (at least) three, somewhat overlapping, answers to these questions, and they shed some light on China’s current and likely near-future policies and behavior.</p> -<p>Two major policy choices will flow from decisions about which threats to focus planning against. The first is the balance between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. With its “NATO first” mantra, the government may appear to have settled the matter. But a China focus would imply that the UK will expect to share some of the burden in the Indo-Pacific, particularly if it wants the US to continue to invest in the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The SDR will need to find a way of squaring this circle. We expand on the second major policy choice – striking the right balance between meeting short-term and longer-term risks – in the section below on force structure and capabilities.</p> +<h4 id="a-specifically-legal-element-in-chinas-response-to-pro-independence-moves">A Specifically Legal Element in China’s Response to “Pro-Independence” Moves</h4> -<h3 id="defence-planning-responses">Defence Planning Responses</h3> +<p>The ASL is an unambiguously legal element in China’s repertoire for responding to what it perceives or depicts as excessively pro-Taiwan independence moves, especially (but not only) when such moves themselves have a legal component. The ASL was adopted in 2005, and shaped during the months preceding its passage, when Beijing saw troubling moves toward independence by Taiwan under the leadership of the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Chen Shui-bian, who had won reelection, to the PRC’s chagrin, at the beginning of 2004.</p> -<p>Our second test relates to the success of the defence planning responses that lie below these headline policy choices, and their impact on activities, posture and capability/force structure planning. In 2020 we picked out “jointery”, international coordination and a “comprehensive approach” as the three most important themes in post-Cold War defence planning.</p> +<p>Of course, China has had available — and has employed — other, less law-centered methods. But legislation — and law more generally — is, at a minimum, another tool in Beijing’s toolkit, and one with several distinctive values that have drawn reinvigorated appreciation during the Xi era. The Reform-Era Chinese regime has used law — particularly legislation — as a way of signaling that a policy position is especially seriously meant and durable. Putting the already-familiar policies set forth in the ASL into legislative form holds out the prospect — and almost surely reflects an intent — to tap into the legitimating power of law, domestically (which the regime has appreciated and sought to cultivate) and, no less importantly, internationally (including in Taiwan and the United States, where law’s legitimacy has been robust).</p> -<p>The Review Team posits a transition to an “Integrated Force”. As a concept, this is a natural development of “multi-domain integration” as outlined in the 2021 Defence Command Paper. But it is not clear what it means – and how, in practical terms, it will differ from what exists now. Presumably this will emerge from the Review itself. Otherwise, we should expect an acceleration of the technology-led modernisation that has been a goal of all the UK’s recent reviews. This approach will presumably be based on an updated operational concept for how the UK Armed Forces will expect to fight in the future. General Barrons has spoken and written extensively on this topic. It remains to be seen whether the Integrated Force design that results from the SDR can be implemented more successfully than the model (in reality, little more than a one-page diagram) proposed in the 2021 document.</p> +<p>As this last point suggests, there is also something of a mirroring effect. The ASL reads, in part, as a grudging homage to the United States’ principal relevant law: the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA has been an enduring anchor of U.S. policy and a useful and flexible tool, invoked by U.S. leaders in rebuffing Chinese calls for — or rebutting Chinese charges of — change in U.S. policy, yet not purporting to compel specific actions by U.S. presidential administrations (despite provisions that are more concrete and conventionally “law-like” than the ASL). Tellingly, Chinese sources have long denounced the TRA and, at times, compared the ASL to it.</p> -<p>The Reviewers have invited views on how UK defence can build relationships with allies, partners and international groupings as a strategic strength for the UK. The SDR will need to make practical proposals for how a “NATO first” approach will be enacted. The change of government also represents an opportunity to reset the UK’s defence relationship with the EU. AUKUS Pillar 1 is well defined, but Pillar 2 is not; the SDR represents a good opportunity to ameliorate this.</p> +<p>The ASL was adopted in the face of a turn in Taiwan to legal means to address issues that resonated with independence and that alarmed Beijing. These included: the so-called “defensive referenda” put before Taiwan’s voters in 2004; the broader embrace of referenda, including through the adoption of a Referendum Law in 2003; and the pursuit of a project to “reform” the Republic of China (ROC)’s constitution, pursued as an alternative to a more radical project that Chen had at times flirted with of “replacing” the ROC’s constitution. Each of these law-centered means could be read as heightened assertions of Taiwan’s separate, state-like status. The (failed) referenda implicitly invoked Taiwan’s right to self-defense akin to that enjoyed by sovereign states under international law and asserted Taiwan’s equality with the PRC. The creation and subsequent use of a legal framework for referenda resonated with earlier DPP calls for a popular vote on Taiwan independence and with international legal norms that saw referenda as an appropriate means for deciding issues of self-determination (with outcomes that can include independence). The constitutional reform proposals were explicitly framed as efforts to “indigenize” the ROC’s constitution to Taiwan (including by eliminating the mainland-born and One-China-linked National Assembly). More pointedly if less narrowly legally, Chen had made the international law-adjacent assertions that Taiwan was “already an independent sovereign state” and that there was “one country on each side of the Strait.”</p> -<p>Successive reviews have provided exhaustive lists of bilateral defence relationships. The outcome of the US presidential election will influence how the UK–US defence relationship develops – and, potentially, even the future of NATO. It is already clear that the UK will wish to further strengthen defence relations with France and Germany. The SDR could choose a relatively small number of other bilateral relationships and invest in them heavily in ways that would really move the dial, while still maintaining others.</p> +<p>An analogous dynamic appears to have occurred and shaped the recent career of the ASL. A renewed emphasis on the ASL in PRC discourse, particularly in the 2020s, and the promulgation in May 2024 of a set of “22 Articles” jointly issued by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuracy, and the Ministries of Public Security, State Security, and Justice — in part interpreting the ASL — have been specifically legal features of Beijing’s response to what it sees as escalating efforts to assert or support Taiwan’s lasting separation. One principal concern is what Beijing characterizes as the “pro-independence” agenda of President Tsai Ing-wen and her successor, Lai Ching-te, whom PRC authorities regard as more provocative than his immediate predecessor (despite Lai’s repeated pledges of policy continuity). Another impetus is what China sees as dangerously increased support for Taiwan independence (or, at least, deterrence of pressure for unification) from the United States.</p> -<p>We understand that the government chose to conduct a defence-focused review because of the scale of the steps it believes will be required to transform the MoD and the Armed Forces. The outcome of the SDR will need to be integrated with the range of other reviews already underway, including those on national resilience and the global impact of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.</p> +<p>During Tsai’s first year in office, for example, an ex-People’s Liberation Army (PLA) general called for triggering the ASL’s non-peaceful means provision because the prospects of peaceful unification had been exhausted, and PRC media reported that the ASL might undergo toughening amendments or supplementation by a National Unification Law. As Tsai moved into her second term, Beijing turned up the volume. At a formal fifteenth anniversary ceremony for the ASL, for example, a top PLA general warned that China’s military would “take all necessary steps” if “the possibility for peaceful unification is lost.” The Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee declared the ASL to be an important part of the “one country, two systems” framework, which Xi Jinping had already declared to be the inevitable template for Taiwan’s unification. A commentary from a prominent researcher at the closely state-linked Taiwan Studies Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) declared the ASL to be a “powerful weapon” meant to deter Taiwan separatists and a “legal ground” that the government might “activate” in response to Tsai’s provocations. There were also reprises of earlier Tsai-era calls to toughen the ASL.</p> -<h3 id="capabilities-and-force-structure">Capabilities and Force Structure</h3> +<p>Toward the middle of Tsai’s second term authoritative Chinese sources returned to emphasizing the ASL. A spokesperson from China’s Taiwan Affairs Office praised the law for its vital role in deterring Taiwan independence and separatism. Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned that Beijing would take “resolute actions to safeguard” China’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity” if the ASL were violated. Xi Jinping referred to the ASL in a G20 sidelines conversation with President Biden concerning Taiwan and U.S. policy. The PRC’s 2022 White Paper on Taiwan invoked the ASL (twice), alongside the PRC’s constitution and the National Security Law, in pushing back against what it characterized as the “DPP authorities’ separatist stance.” Official statements also pointed to the ASL as a basis for possible criminal sanctions for “die-hard” pro-independence elements in Taiwan.</p> -<p>Our third test relates to choices on capabilities and force structure. The rhetoric about transformation that accompanied the launch of the review implies some significant shaking up of defence capabilities and force structure. That begs the question of how much scope there is to make substantial changes in a meaningful timeframe. The long-term nature of defence procurement means that most of the capabilities that will be on the front line a decade from now are either already in service or on contract. The previous government emphasised the need to innovate and invest in the latest military capabilities, including “AI, robotics and cyber … laser weapons and autonomous drones”. It is hard to fault this general approach to making the most of the platforms that already exist, drawing on lessons from the war in Ukraine. But there are two big, related questions that the SDR will need to address: timeframe and spectrum of capability versus role specialisation.</p> +<p>Lai’s inauguration was followed by a Ministry of State Security article on WeChat, which recited the ASL’s three triggers for using non-peaceful means and characterized the ASL as “a sword hanging over the head of Taiwan separatists.” Issued shortly after Lai took office, the 22 Articles explicitly interpreted the ASL, as well as other PRC legislation, criminalizing a wide range of still ill-defined pro-separatist actions and setting forth means for prosecuting violators. Spokespersons for the Taiwan Affairs Office characterized the 22 Articles as reflecting “a solid legal basis and sufficient legal grounds” for punishing efforts to promote Taiwan independence, and (here, apparently pursuing legitimation through comparative law) as consistent with the “common practices of all countries around the world” in punishing crimes of secession or incitement to secession — a legal argument that echoes longer-standing Chinese claims about the permissibility of preventing Taiwan’s secession.</p> -<p>By timeframe we mean the period over which improvements to force structure and capabilities would be put in place. Most post-Cold War defence reviews have had the luxury of being able to look ahead over several decades and plan for a future force that would take 10 years to create. Today’s dangerous world calls for greater urgency. This does not mean abandoning all lengthy procurement programmes. Some capabilities, such as nuclear-powered submarines, are critically important but take a long time to build.</p> +<p>China has taken these measures against a backdrop that includes law-invoking or law-related moves from both Taipei and Washington. Law-reliant or law-resonant statements from Tsai and Lai that have been highly offensive to Beijing include: the now-familiar assertions that Taiwan is an independent, sovereign state (though, especially for Tsai, a state called the ROC, and, in one of Lai’s recent formulations, with the specifically legal hook of “according to international law”); declarations that the entities on the two sides of the Strait must deal as equals (another not-novel proposition, but one that figured prominently in Lai’s inaugural address); Tsai’s second-inaugural reference to “constitutional reform” (arguably echoing Chen); and Lai’s suggestion that, given its one-China presumption, relying on the ROC constitution could bring “disaster” for Taiwan (in a comment made late in the presidential campaign, evoking the specter of the Chen-era constitutional replacement gambit).</p> -<p>But, in our view, it does involve giving greater priority to preparing for (and hopefully thereby deterring) nearer-term threats by replenishing stockpiles and enhancing readiness, including through the rapid addition of affordable combat capabilities to regenerate the “mass” that is missing from the UK’s force structure and to plug some key gaps, including in air and missile defence. Finding cost-effective solutions, given the widespread availability of inexpensive drones, presents a stiff challenge. And all of this needs to be done without discarding the seed-corn for capabilities that might be needed for the likely continuing confrontation with Russia and prospective longer-term challenges from China. Space seems a strong candidate for modest additional expenditure in the SDR. All of this will have major implications for the overhaul of the defence industrial base.</p> +<p>PRC sources connected such Taiwanese moves to the ASL. China’s 2022 White Paper specifically pointed to “lobby[ing] for amendments to their ‘constitution’ and ‘laws’” as indicia of DPP authorities’ “separatist stance.” CASS Taiwan Studies Institute commentaries branded Tsai’s law-related moves as an effort to “establish a legal basis for Taiwan’s independence” and characterized Tsai’s mulling of constitutional reform as transgressing the ASL. The 22 Articles formally declared that any referendum or law-making that tried to change Taiwan’s legal status or its constitution would be criminal.</p> -<p>Spectrum of capability is related to the timeframe question. In past reviews, it was possible to retain a broad (but thin) spectrum of capability and force structure over the long term by taking calculated risks with so-called “capability holidays”. That was on the basis that, with sufficient warning time, it would be possible to regenerate and reconstitute the forces needed. Governments do not enjoy this luxury today. This may mean the MoD will have to be more selective in its choice of new capabilities to develop and existing ones to retain. For example, an unsentimental examination of the role and vulnerability of aircraft carriers will be required. There will also presumably be some consideration of the timelines and scope of the Global Combat Air Programme, given that Typhoon should serve well for another 20 years (provided it is fitted with the latest weapons and sensors). Lessons from the Ukraine and Middle East conflicts will inform judgements on future land platforms and wider capabilities.</p> +<p>On the U.S. side, Beijing-offending statements — especially President Biden’s repeated commitments to defend Taiwan with military force, which China regards as hollowing out strategic ambiguity — have at times been tethered to an avowed legal obligation under the TRA. Such declarations by administration officials have come in the context of something that has not been seen since the passage of the TRA in 1979: congressional lawmaking (rather than mere proposed legislation) — including the TAIPEI Act, the Asian Reassurance Initiative Act, the Taiwan Travel Act, the parts of the proposed Taiwan Policy Act that made it into a National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and several other provisions in recent NDAAs — that has pointedly and repeatedly reaffirmed the TRA and called for U.S. policies of stronger quasi-diplomatic ties, greater defense support and security cooperation, and backing for Taiwan’s international status and participation.</p> -<p>A narrower spectrum of capability would not necessarily lead to role specialisation. It would still be possible to field a “whole force” constituted of a smaller number of different capabilities. But it at least raises the question of whether the loss of sovereignty involved in greater reliance on shared NATO capabilities and greater role specialisation by the UK and its European allies would be worth accepting if it led to less duplication of industrial effort and a bigger bang for buck overall.</p> +<h4 id="reflecting-and-supporting-beijings-master-narrative-on-taiwans-legal-status">Reflecting and Supporting Beijing’s Master Narrative on Taiwan’s Legal Status</h4> -<h3 id="balancing-policy-plans-commitments-and-the-defence-budget">Balancing Policy, Plans, Commitments and the Defence Budget</h3> +<p>The ASL reflects — and supports — China’s master narrative on Taiwan’s international legal status, which is a core component of Beijing’s strategy toward Taiwan. A key attribute of the ASL is its assertion, set forth in particularly formal and legal terms, that Taiwan is currently part of China, that the PRC already holds sovereignty over Taiwan, and that the people in Taiwan therefore are Chinese nationals. The ASL, thus, is conceptually highly assertive, in pointed contrast to a contemporaneously discussed (and sometimes still-discussed) possible unification law, which implicitly would have conceded that Taiwan was not (or at least might not be) a part of China or under Chinese sovereignty. Since before the adoption of the ASL and continuing through the two decades since, a unification law has been floated periodically — often when PRC sources have contemplated or advocated a harder approach to Taiwan — as an alternative or a supplement to the ASL. But the appeal has been in a possible unification law’s tougher operational — not conceptual — implications: although implicitly accepting that Taiwan had slipped away (or at least was on the verge of doing so), it would declare a situation in which there would be an imperative to act, with force, if need be, to change a status quo of a separate Taiwan.</p> -<p>It is a cliché to say that defence reviews should be policy-led, not financially driven. But all governments have to strike a balance between policy requirements and fiscal responsibility. Before 2015, the conclusion to defence reviews was marked by an argument with the Treasury about how much money would be made available to fund policy commitments. Since 2015, governments have announced the size of the budgetary envelope ahead of defence and security reviews. Neither approach has resulted in a sustained balance between programme and budget. Our fourth test is whether the SDR will be able to achieve such an outcome.</p> +<p>If the ASL-embodied position that Taiwan is currently part of China is accepted, much that serves China’s Taiwan strategy follows. For example, foreign “interference” to provide for the defense of Taiwan against force by the PRC would be broadly impermissible and presumptively unlawful intervention in China’s internal affairs and, in some versions, against China’s territorial integrity and sovereign autonomy. China’s use of force or coercion against “separatist” moves by Taiwan would be a generally permissible and presumptively lawful action by a government within its own sovereign territory and against a domestic rebellion or attempted secession, as the ASL assumes and China’s Taiwan White Papers assert.</p> -<p>One approach would be to provide the MoD with a long-term commitment to a given level of expenditure growth, against which the Department could plan more effectively. Shortly before calling the general election, the previous government committed to raising the defence budget to 2.5% of GDP by 2030. The current government has committed to 2.5% but has yet to set out publicly a timeline or any profile for the increase.</p> +<p>Moreover, and reprising the Hong Kong “one country, two systems” template, the ASL framework assumes that governing a post-reversion Taiwan is ultimately a matter within the PRC government’s discretion. The Chinese government would not be durably or reliably constrained by the terms set forth in the ASL, nor would it be bound by any terms worked out through the unification negotiations that the ASL contemplates. In this respect, the ASL, and any PRC law implementing the outcome of ASL-authorized unification negotiations, would be analogous to the Basic Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Any such law for Taiwan would be a mere PRC domestic law and thus subject to the NPC’s, or its Standing Committee’s, unilateral interpretation, amendment, or supplementation by a region-specific National Security Law, but without the treaty-like underpinnings of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, which Beijing now regards as fully executed and thus moot.</p> -<p>Whether an increase to 2.5% would be enough to meet the growing threats to UK security and the ambitions that have been stated for the SDR seems doubtful. To illustrate the point, an increase from the current level of 2.32% by 2030 would generate some £6 billion a year in today’s money. That would represent an increase of circa 10% in the size of the defence budget. But not all of this will be available for the technology-led modernisation described above: nuclear and submarine spending, which now accounts for almost 40% of planned equipment spending, is expected to rise further in the years ahead, limiting the resource available for other areas.</p> +<p>Perhaps most fundamentally, the ASL-embedded PRC legal narrative frames assertions that Taiwan (or the ROC) is an independent sovereign state — and efforts by the United States or others that support or suborn such status or Taiwan’s claims to it — as challenges to the legal status quo of Taiwan as a province-like part of China, and casts China’s measures to prevent such moves as status quo-preserving. Any claims by Taiwan to independent sovereign state status under international law, therefore, would have to meet the much higher threshold for achieving legitimate statehood through secession, rather than the more capacious general criteria for statehood, which Taiwan arguably meets (territory, population, autonomous and effective government, and capacity to engage in relations — albeit mostly informal ones — with other states).</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The rhetoric about transformation that accompanied the launch of the review implies some significant shaking up of defence capabilities and force structure</code></em></strong></p> +<p>This aspect of the ASL, too, has returned to the fore in recent years. In the 2022 White Paper, for example, the quotations from PRC legal sources — the ASL, as well as the PRC constitution and the 2015 National Security Law — almost exclusively refer to Taiwan’s status as currently a part of China. In other official and quasi-official statements from the 2020s concerning the ASL, the posture is much the same, speaking of the ASL either as a deterrent to (as-yet-unaccomplished) separatist efforts or as a basis for the use of force to prevent such efforts from succeeding. In a similar vein, the 22 Articles restate the standard position that “Taiwan is an integral part of China’s territory” and criminalize acts of “wantonly distort[ing] or misrepresent[ing] the reality that Taiwan is part of China,” or “seeking to change the legal status of Taiwan as part of China.”</p> -<p>Malcolm Chalmers set out the short-term pressures on the defence budget in his recent commentary (including pay increases and the nuclear enterprise), and noted that further cuts might be required imminently. Removing further capabilities from service now would be very hard to square with the ambitious goals of the SDR. Looking ahead, the reviewers will need to resist optimism that significant financial “efficiencies” can be created and that new capabilities can be developed and fielded at bargain basement prices to square this circle at the end of the review. Like all defence reviews, the SDR will need to offer clear recommendations on priorities. Decisions on these recommendations will be for the government to make in the first part of 2025.</p> +<p>Such statements dovetail with a more narrowly international law-focused strategy that Beijing has recently pressed much harder. The PRC claims that UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 settled, as a matter of international law, Taiwan’s status as a province or integral part of China. From this premise, according to Beijing’s account, it follows that the United States and others who support what China deems to be Taiwan independence, suggest that sovereignty over Taiwan is unsettled, or seek robust international participation for Taiwan are violating international law as well as “basic norms” of international relations. Notably, the 22 Articles define as crimes the promotion of Taiwan’s entry into states-member-only international organizations, the undertaking of official foreign and military connections, and collaboration with foreigners to do so.</p> -<h3 id="organisation">Organisation</h3> +<p>To be sure, law (including international law) does not determine China’s — or the United States’ or Taiwan’s — choices on such fraught and high-stakes issues. But, as China’s framings in the ASL and various ASL-invoking contexts reflect, legal arguments and instruments seek, and can yield, international political gains.</p> -<p>The 1998 SDR was unusual among the canon of post-Cold War reviews in paying considerable attention to organisation, the fifth and final of our tests. A series of major and generally positive organisational changes resulted. In the authors’ view, these reforms were subsequently partially undermined by the “Levene” model introduced in 2012, which disaggregated capability-planning and associated budgeting decisions to the single Services. There has been a steady erosion of the joint approach, and the strategic prioritisation necessary in this new era has been largely absent.</p> +<h4 id="a-vague-and-flexible-framework">A Vague and Flexible Framework</h4> -<p>As shadow defence secretary, John Healey set out his views on this issue in a Policy Exchange speech in late February, advocating the need for clearer strategic authority over the capability the Armed Forces have and how it is procured.</p> +<p>The ASL framework is so vague and flexible that Beijing can invoke it in the service of a wide range of policies, from very hard to soft, toward Taiwan. The ASL’s conditions for lawful use of force are general and indeterminate. In terms of substantive criteria, the ASL notably does not articulate any specific moves by Taiwan that would warrant China’s use of force, and there is no plain or definitively stated meaning of acts “under any name or by any means” that would “cause the fact of secession,” or “major incidents entailing . . . secession,” much less what would “completely exhaust” “possibilities for peaceful unification.” In this respect, the ASL is less specific than the policy positions set forth in the 2000 White Paper. In terms of process, the ASL states only that the State Council and the Central Military Commission will decide on and execute the “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures,” reporting to the NPC Standing Committee. Moreover, the ASL’s provisions are subject to unilateral, unreviewable interpretation — and, thus, de facto revision — by Chinese authorities.</p> -<p>His answer was a “stronger defence centre” including: a “full-functioning Military-Strategic Headquarters within the MoD”; greater authority for the Chief of Defence Staff over the single Service Chiefs of Staff; “more policy muscle” for the MoD civil service; and the appointment of a “fully-fledged National Armaments Director”.</p> +<p>During much of the decade or more following its adoption, the ASL stood comfortably alongside a policy of patience and pursuit of “peaceful development” of cross-Strait relations toward an outcome of eventual unification, which would bring practice into line with the ASL’s claimed principle of already-existing PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. But the ASL framework is equally compatible with a much more aggressive and threatening policy, as became evident during the final years of Chen’s presidency and remained so through the Tsai and early Lai administrations. Beijing can, in effect, substantially lower the thresholds and relax the procedures for using force and can credibly claim to do so lawfully without changing the text of the ASL. The 22 Articles may reflect a recognition of this point. To the extent that they adopt a tougher and more threatening line, the 22 Articles purport to do so through the mere interpretation of the unamended ASL — and other existing laws — rather than via a change in law or legislative addition to the ASL.</p> -<p>While the speech promised to implement these changes immediately rather than wait for the outcome of the SDR, in practice they are taking time to plan and enact. We have previously counselled against rushing major organisational redesign. In this case, the SDR will need to view the question of organisation in the context of the other issues it is addressing – including the “Integrated Force” concept, the digital enablement of that Force, and the right balance of regular, reserve, civil servant and industry personnel across defence. But some adjustments to the new defence operating model – such as to the arrangements for capability planning – will need to be in place by the time the SDR concludes in order to enact the transformative changes that it promises.</p> +<p>To forge a legal framework for a much harder-line, even force-using, policy against Taiwan, Beijing thus need not risk the costs that could accompany amending or superseding the ASL. Such changes could undercut the ASL’s evident aspiration to “TRA lite” or “TRA-mirroring” status as a fixed, relatively venerable, formal framework for PRC strategy and behavior. Like the enactment of the ASL in 2005, any ASL-toughening amendment or repeal would draw criticism abroad as unhelpful and threatening. Moreover, any reaction would likely be sharper in the context of today’s resurgent concerns about Beijing’s intentions toward Taiwan and more fraught relations across the Strait and between China and the United States and other powers.</p> -<h3 id="prospects">Prospects</h3> +<h4 id="beyond-the-asl-beijings-legal-tactics-in-changing-circumstances">Beyond the ASL: Beijing’s Legal Tactics in Changing Circumstances</h4> -<p>This survey of just some of the major issues the SDR will need to tackle highlights the challenge involved in conducting a genuinely transformative review, securing the financial resources to pay for it and then quickly implementing its key conclusions and recommendations. As the Australian government has found, appointing independent reviewers to conduct defence reviews is not a silver bullet. Aligning defence policy, plans, commitments and resources at the conclusion of reviews is hard enough. Keeping them in balance is harder still.</p> +<p>Notwithstanding the recently reinvigorated discussion of the ASL, the legal elements of Beijing’s current and probable near-term policy toward Taiwan appear to lie — and are better pursued — in areas that relate only obliquely to the ASL (although they remain consistent with the ASL and the broader PRC narrative concerning Taiwan’s status that is reflected in the ASL). A few changes, particularly in Beijing’s perspectives and assessments, help to explain this pattern.</p> -<p>We hope that this framework helps to provide benchmarks against which the review can be assessed as it progresses and once it is published.</p> +<p>First, Beijing’s bad-case scenarios for Taiwan’s trajectory have evolved since the ASL’s adoption nearly two decades ago. The focus has shifted toward concern about “gradual” or “incremental” independence, rather than a more dramatic and formal break by Taiwan’s leadership. PRC authorities could construe relevant phenomena in Taiwan as transgressing the ill-defined and malleable limits set forth in the ASL. But, for Beijing, the more promising legal path for addressing the problems it discerns and for setting forth the means to do so is the type of approach evident in the 22 Articles, which are framed as interpretations of the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law, as well as the ASL “and other relevant laws,” and which provide the first relatively full-fledged and formal legal gloss on the ASL’s sparse text.</p> -<hr /> +<p>The 22 Articles retain familiar targets, such as efforts to change Taiwan’s international legal status through domestic legal means, or attempts “to create Taiwan independence.” But the 22 Articles shift the emphasis away from the ASL’s principal scenario of possible actions by and against Taiwan as a political entity or aspiring state (with pledges to protect, as much as possible, the persons, rights and property of individual Taiwanese, as well as foreigners, in the event of China’s resort to non-peaceful means.) The 22 Articles focus on other entities and individuals — specifically “‘Taiwan independence’ die-hards” and, implicitly, primarily DPP leaders and office-holders (who are characterized as die-hards in the 2022 White Paper and other PRC sources) and secondarily others who might commit acts that fall within the expansively framed crime of separatism. The broadly enumerated offenses include actions — often but not necessarily only by those wielding government power — that would advance what Beijing sees as gradual or incremental independence and the preclusion of prospects for peaceful unification: depicting Taiwan as not a part of China in education, culture, history, or news media; suppressing political parties, organizations, or individuals supporting unification; establishing a separatist organization; and “other conduct seeking to separate Taiwan from China.” The 22 Articles’ agenda to chill or deter such moves is underscored by its call for relevant PRC state organs to “give full play” to their roles to “severely punish” offenders, by its reach to mere “drafting . . . principles, plans, or programs,” actions abroad, and potentially long-past behavior (given its capacious notion that prior actions can be part of ongoing separatist plots), and by its provisions for trials in absentia.</p> -<p><strong>Will Jessett</strong> CBE is a Senior Associate at SC Strategy Ltd. He recently (early 2019) retired from the UK Ministry of Defence after 33 years in a wide range of policy, operational, crisis and change management roles. He has specialised in strategic defence planning, particularly in the last decade, shaping and leading MOD’s work on the major strategic defence and security reviews in 2010 and 2015, the 2017 National Security Capability Review and overseeing the Modernising Defence Programme which concluded at the end of 2018.</p> +<p>Second, Beijing has become more concerned about the “internationalization” of the Taiwan issue — that is, the PRC wants to avoid it becoming a less narrowly bilateral cross-Strait or trilateral PRC-Taiwan-U.S. issue. Internationalization was a relatively marginal issue in the ASL, wherein there is little more than a rote reference to brooking no “interference by outside forces” in China’s quest for unification. But it is a prominent focus in the 22 Articles, which define the crime of separatism as including: promoting Taiwan’s membership in international organizations (specifically those limited to sovereign states); engaging in official exchanges or military contacts with foreign states; and the more traditionally ASL-resonant offense of working to create two Chinas, or one China, one Taiwan, or an independent Taiwan in the international community. The 22 Articles also provide that any of the secessionist crimes carried out “in collusion with foreign or non-mainland institutions, organizations, or individuals” will incur enhanced punishments. In addition, the actions criminalized under the 22 Articles (as an interpretation of China’s Criminal Law) potentially include those undertaken outside Taiwan or the mainland, including by foreign nationals. In this respect (and some others as well), the 22 Articles echo the Hong Kong National Security Law, which the NPC adopted in the aftermath of the 2019–2020 unrest and which responded (in part) to what PRC authorities saw as foreign efforts to internationalize Hong Kong issues.</p> -<p><strong>Tom McKane</strong> is a Distinguished Fellow of RUSI and a Visiting Senior Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He is also a senior member of the European Leadership Network. Since retiring from the UK Ministry of Defence, Tom has divided his time between think tank work and consulting on defence issues, particularly on policy and strategy and how to trans-late policy into practical action.</p> +<p>Finally, as the foregoing account suggests, China’s preferred means for addressing the challenges it sees on the Taiwan issue have shifted away from the ASL’s emphasis on the full, war-like use of force. Instead, the 22 Articles set forth criteria and (in their interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Law) mechanisms for imposing criminal sanctions — often severe ones — on individuals and entities, which are not the initial or main targets of threats to use non-peaceful means. This legal approach aligns with China’s master narrative by framing Chinese state actions as matters of enforcing domestic criminal laws (albeit ones with extraterritorial reach). In a similar vein, the PRC has created and invoked a framework for maritime regulatory law as a purported legal basis for enforcement actions by non-PLA-Navy vessels against fishing boats or other vessels in waters near Taiwan-controlled territory. This framing casts Beijing’s responses to what it sees as problematically independence-promoting measures from Taiwan as domestic PRC legal measures, distinguished from the actions by the PRC military that are contemplated by the ASL. So, too, the escalating gray zone activities around Taiwan by the PRC military are presented as not entailing an ASL-authorized use of force to prevent Taiwan’s secession (even though such prevention is among their evident purposes). Instead, the principal relevant legal concepts appear to be the international law-rooted ones associated with Beijing’s claims that its military operations are short-of-force exercises in areas over which the PRC has lawful jurisdiction, such that China’s actions do not entail the use or threat of force internationally while other states’ military involvement or intervention would do so.</p> -<p><strong>Peter Watkins</strong> left the MoD in 2018. Between 2014–18 he was, successively, Director General Security Policy and Director General Strategy &amp; International in the MoD. During a career spanning 38 years, Peter worked in a variety of roles in the MoD and overseas, including many years in defence acquisition.</p>Will Jessett, et al.The Strategic Defence Review underway has been described as a “root and branch review” of the whole UK defence enterprise, pointing the way to “a new era for defence”. Can the different approach being taken this time around produce significantly better results than other recent reviews?Imec2024-10-08T12:00:00+08:002024-10-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/imec<p><em>Imec attracts and retains leading companies to cooperatively develop cutting-edge semiconductor technologies in a fiercely competitive and unforgiving industry. It is an opportunity for the United States National Semiconductor Technology Center and its nonprofit purpose-built operator, Natcast to learn from and collaborate with imec to accelerate the U.S. research and industry.</em></p> +<h3 id="chinas-anti-secession-law">China’s Anti-Secession Law</h3> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="legal-warfare-and-illegality">Legal Warfare and Illegality</h3> +</blockquote> -<excerpt /> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="yu-jie-chen">Yu-Jie Chen</h4> +</blockquote> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<h4 id="introduction-6">Introduction</h4> -<p>International competition for the most advanced semiconductors has highlighted the importance of cooperative research institutes. These centers, while diverse in their memberships and specialties, serve a critical role as aggregators of research and development (R&amp;D) resources across firms — as well as shared infrastructure for de-risking emerging technologies throughout the semiconductor value chain and for driving the chip industry’s uniquely rapid pace of innovation.</p> +<p>The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long employed “legal warfare” or “law-based warfare” (法律戰) as a coercive instrument to compel Taiwan into submission. This approach primarily aims to legitimize China’s claim over the island. As scholars observe, China’s strategy for absorbing Taiwan through legal warfare rests on three pillars: reframing the Beijing-Taipei relationship as an internal matter, constricting Taiwan’s international space, and undermining the right to self-determination.</p> -<p>Located in the Flanders region of Belgium, imec is perhaps the foremost cooperative research organization for semiconductors, a status bolstered by the participation and support of the world’s top semiconductor firms in its programs, with the exception of major Chinese entities.</p> +<p>At the international level, China actively seeks to conflate its own “One China” principle with established international norms, thereby isolating Taiwan within the global community. Domestically, its 2005 Anti-Secession Law (ASL) purports to legitimize the use of force against Taiwan. Furthermore, as cross-Strait relations have deteriorated in recent years, China has initiated sanctions against Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) politicians and affiliated organizations, labeling them “Taiwan-independence diehards” (台獨頑固分子). On June 21, 2024, China escalated its deterrence efforts by publishing the “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (the “22 Articles”).</p> -<p>Imec has pushed the concept of multinational, diverse research collaboration to achieve ambitious objectives. To this end, it works closely with other leading semiconductor research centers such as the Albany NanoTech Complex, the Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA)’s Leti lab in France, and now Japan’s Leading-Edge Semiconductor Technology Center.</p> +<p>All these legislative and judicial maneuvers constitute an integral component of China’s legal warfare against Taiwan. These tactics aim to destabilize the status quo of Taiwan’s de facto independence, legitimize China’s use of force in a potential conflict, and coerce Taiwan into “unification.” Furthermore, they seek to frame any potential intervention by other countries as “foreign interference” in China’s domestic affairs. Within Taiwan, China’s legal warfare tactics aim to manipulate public opinion against supporting autonomy, suppress pro-independence sentiment, and create a pervasive chilling effect on political discourse.</p> -<p>This research institute’s substantial physical assets, talented staff, reputation for neutrality, strong track record, and proven protocols make it ideally situated to advance leadership in semiconductor technology among like-minded countries. In fact, to a considerable degree, it is already performing this role. As such, the United States should collaborate closely with this research center in its efforts to regain technological leadership in chip manufacturing.</p> +<p>The conceptual framework of legal warfare highlights the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) predominant approach to law wherein legal discourse and mechanisms are means to an end. The objective is not to resolve disputes through law but to manipulate the broader strategic environment to the adversary’s disadvantage and to coerce submission from its target. In Taiwan’s case, this entails isolating it internationally, brandishing the threat of force to constrain Taipei’s political choices, and penalizing advocates for the island’s independence more generally.</p> -<p>Imec holds major lessons for the development of the U.S. National Semiconductor Technology Center and its nonprofit purpose-built operator, Natcast. Imec’ s ability to attract and retain leading companies to cooperatively develop cutting-edge semiconductor technologies in a fiercely competitive and unforgiving industry represents an outstanding model for international cooperative research. The following analysis highlights the unique strengths and approach of this research institute in Leuven, Belgium.</p> +<p>Finally, when discussing China’s legal warfare, it is crucial to distinguish it from the lawfare that operates in democratic, rule-of-law settings. While using law as a weapon has a long history, the term “lawfare” gained traction in academic and policy circles around 2001, referring to employing legal means to achieve military objectives. Importantly, most definitions of the word are value-neutral, encompassing both positive and negative uses of the law. However, in the Chinese context — which lacks checks and balances, an independent judiciary, or public oversight — legal warfare differs significantly. Lawfare in a democratic society may involve legal arguments before neutral courts, whereas the CCP’s legal warfare lacks independent judicial review and seeks no impartial adjudication. As argued below, China’s legal warfare tactics threatening to annex Taiwan violate the international legal principle prohibiting the use of force, and its persecution of Taiwan individuals for their political views violates international human rights law. Therefore, China’s legal warfare should instead be labeled “illicit lawfare.”</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Imec’s ability to attract and retain leading companies to cooperatively develop cutting-edge semiconductor technologies in a fiercely competitive and unforgiving industry represents an outstanding model for international cooperative research.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="chinas-illicit-lawfare">China’s Illicit Lawfare</h4> -<h3 id="imecs-origins">Imec’s Origins</h3> +<p>In the official Chinese narrative, legal warfare is one of the “three warfares” (三戰), a concept that emerged formally in 2003 when China reissued the Regulations on the Political Work of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As described in Article 18 of the regulations, which covers “wartime political work,” these include “public opinion warfare” (輿論戰), “psychological warfare” (心理戰), and “legal warfare” (法律戰).</p> -<p>In 1982, the regional government of Flanders launched an “intense mobilisation of industrial and scientific actors for a ‘Third Industrial Revolution’” in the area. The most important expression of this effort was the government’s establishment of the Interuniversity Micro-Electronics Center (imec) in Leuven in January 1984. Its mission was to promote microelectronics in Flanders through R&amp;D projects with companies and universities that anticipated industry needs by 3–10 years. Research themes eventually came to include microelectronics, nanotechnology, information and communications technology, semiconductor packaging, photovoltaics, and chip-design methods.</p> +<p>The three warfares are fundamentally influence operations. While the PLA regulations do not explicitly define them, they do have typical interpretations within Chinese academic discourse. “Public opinion warfare” encompasses the use of media to disseminate social information, intentionally shape and control public opinion, and actively influence public beliefs, perspectives, emotions, and attitudes toward political warfare actions. “Psychological warfare” involves the use of information to manipulate the target’s psyche during wartime. While public opinion warfare targets the general public, psychological warfare specifically aims to undermine the morale of an enemy’s armed forces and the political elite. Lastly, “legal warfare” refers to the state’s use of legal means to categorize the target’s behavior as unlawful, thereby employing legal coercion and sanctions to enforce submission and achieve diplomatic, political, or economic objectives.</p> -<p>Imec was founded by Roger Van Overstraeten, a Flanders-born Stanford PhD graduate who returned to Belgium to pursue future-generation semiconductor technology with a group of colleagues at Catholic University Leuven (KU Leuven). His vision was to establish “an unparalleled research facility dedicated to microchip technology,” which he pursued despite considerable skepticism at the time. There was widespread recognition in government circles that while Flanders often excelled in research, its ability to support its practical applications was often lacking. Focusing on this challenge, Van Overstraeten sought to “drag European microelectronics excellence out of the laboratories and into the factories.”</p> +<p>Compared with other types of warfare, legal warfare displays distinct differences in medium, effects, and influences. It primarily employs legal norms, means, and narratives to achieve its effects or the potential threat thereof. In terms of influence, legal warfare often leans on the coercive force of the state apparatus to enforce punishments and to have a deterring and chilling effect.</p> -<p>When imec was established, policymakers intended for it to focus entirely on support for the Flanders region in collaboration with regional universities and companies. Given the lack of critical mass in the microelectronics space within the region, this initial concept was not feasible. Fortunately, imec’s leadership pivoted to a more international approach, establishing the organization as a neutral research center supporting companies and universities worldwide.</p> +<p>Legal warfare interacts with other types of warfare. Some Chinese commentators, for example, have observed that “public opinion warfare provides a platform for legal warfare, and legal warfare provides a legal basis for public opinion warfare, with both elements mutually reinforcing.” It is also argued that the synergy of the three warfares can “expand the political influence and psychological impact of military operations.” The integrated nature of these strategies necessitates that observers’ understanding of legal warfare extends beyond the legal domain to consider its broader context within the full spectrum of influence operations.</p> -<h3 id="business-model">Business Model</h3> +<h4 id="asl-authorizing-the-use-of-force">ASL: Authorizing the Use of Force</h4> -<p>Most major microelectronics R&amp;D centers around the world are located in jurisdictions that have one or more large semiconductor companies and where, for political and economic reasons, the centers tend to support those local producers, whether directly or indirectly. Belgium has no large chip firms — but in building a global network of industry partners, this has worked to imec’s unique advantage. The center’s current CEO, Luc Van den hove, explained in 2024 that because no one semiconductor company dominates imec’s strategy, the organization has been able to build a “Switzerland of semiconductors” reputation.</p> +<p>One of China’s most notable instances of legal warfare against Taiwan is the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. In response to what Beijing perceived as the promotion of “Taiwan independence” by Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian, the ASL was passed to provide a legal foundation to counter propositions such as “two Chinas,” “one China and one Taiwan,” former Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui’s earlier formulation of “special state-to-state relations” (特殊國與國關係), and Chen Shui-bian’s “one country on each side” (一邊一國) theory. While the law expresses a preference for achieving Taiwan’s unification through peaceful negotiations, its vaguely defined provisions notably legitimize the use of force, a prospect of considerable importance to Beijing.</p> -<p>The center’s broad membership includes companies that often compete with each other but are confident that their intellectual property (IP) will be respected. They recognize the value added from cooperation on common problems and the advantages of sharing the costs of cutting-edge facilities and equipment.</p> +<p>Article 8 of the ASL outlines three broad conditions under which China may employ “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”:</p> -<p>The goal of neutrality has been reflected in practice. For example, in 2008, imec declared that it would not take part in any R&amp;D projects organized under the auspices of the European Union’s Eureka initiative, claiming such programs often serve as “a form of support for national champions” and are thus inconsistent with imec’s practice of strictly neutral international collaboration. In subsequent years, imec did participate in Eureka programs but to a limited degree.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>If “‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China”</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>If “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur”</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>If “possibilities for a peaceful unification should be completely exhausted”</p> + </li> +</ol> -<h4 id="partnerships-with-industry-the-central-focus">Partnerships with Industry: The Central Focus</h4> +<p>Questions inevitably arise. Given that Taiwan has never been under the PRC’s control, how does one define “Taiwan’s secession from China?” What constitutes the complete exhaustion of “peaceful unification” possibilities, particularly if Taiwan prefers maintaining its independence? What if Taiwan continues to reject the so-called 1992 Consensus, which Beijing interprets as affirming the island’s status as part of China? In any case, what can be certain is that the vagueness of the ASL’s language grants China considerable discretion in determining when to act, as noted by many commentators.</p> -<p>The principal focus of imec’s operations is joint R&amp;D projects with industry partners to develop precompetitive technologies for applications in future generations of semiconductor products and processes. According to a science and technology counselor for the Flemish government, “This joint collaboration model accelerates innovation, by pooling resources and alleviating the ever-increasing development costs of new technologies.”</p> +<p>The phrase “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures” in Article 8 also warrants scrutiny. Chinese scholars argue that “non-peaceful means” should include more than just armed force or war under international law and that “other necessary measures” should be interpreted as actions closely linked to, yet distinct from, “non-peaceful means.” In this view, “non-peaceful means” may include suspending cross-Strait exchanges, initiating economic warfare, issuing or announcing sanctions (such as prosecutions or wanted lists) against prominent “Taiwan independence” figures and groups, launching public opinion campaigns, and blockading Taiwan internationally.</p> -<p>Reflecting its central position in advanced semiconductor manufacturing research, as of 2021 imec has over 600 industry partners who contribute their own resources to joint projects, including their knowledge base, experts, funding, and materials. They may share precompetitive intellectual property or use imec’s fabrication services for their own proprietary research, including prototyping and low-volume manufacturing. Industry partners can sign up for individual imec projects and programs without committing to others — in contrast to the former U.S. chip research consortium Sematech, which required an all-or-nothing commitment from member companies. Companies can also collaborate with imec bilaterally for private research, development, or services while securing their IP. For example, imec helped ASML fabricate high-quality sensor chips for their EUV lithography systems.</p> +<p>Upon the ASL’s promulgation in 2005, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao sought to downplay concerns, emphasizing the law’s focus on peaceful unification rather than on targeting Taiwan or triggering war. China’s general low-profile approach at the time effectively deflected Western criticism. Some commentators predicted that the ASL would not drastically alter cross-Strait relations, characterizing China as “talking tough” but “acting prudently.</p> -<p>Industry partners can also collaborate with imec to develop new research units and facilities within the consortium. In 2000, for example, imec and Philips Research (the R&amp;D arm of Dutch chip and electronics firm Royal Philips Electronics) jointly created a permanent department within imec, with Philips signing onto all of imec’s process-oriented industrial programs and gaining the ability to use the center’s chip fabrication line for its own research on process technologies. In 2003, Samsung, Intel, Infineon, Philips, and STMicroelectronics enabled imec to set up an R&amp;D fab for 300-millimeter (mm) chips by joining imec as core partners in its sub-45-nanometer (nm) complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) program. And in 2010, imec and Intel entered into an agreement to establish a new lab dedicated to exascale-class supercomputers, including the development of tools and applications.</p> +<p>However, the geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically over the past two decades, with China adopting a more assertive stance toward Taiwan. This is evident in the rise of hawkish proposals advocating for “legal preparations to resolve the Taiwan question through non-peaceful means.” These proposals include refining Article 8 of the ASL through interpretations by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee and exploring strategies to deter foreign intervention through legal warfare.</p> -<p>Imec’s chip research strategy has two elements. The first, “More Moore,” seeks to sustain the developmental path of established silicon-based technologies through incremental improvements, usually through scaling, to maintain Moore’s Law into ever-deeper extremes of miniaturization. On this front, imec has created the world’s largest ecosystem for CMOS technology, bringing together most of the world’s major chip foundries, fabless firms, tool and materials suppliers, electronic design automation firms, and application developers. CMOS is the chip technology currently used to produce most of the world’s integrated circuits, offering advantages such as low power consumption, simple structure, high noise tolerance, and strong temperature stability. In addition, imec’s longstanding commitment to developing extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography with Dutch chip toolmaker ASML has been instrumental in the industry’s ability to scale beyond the 14 nm node level (as discussed further below).</p> +<p>As a tool of perception influence, the ASL notably does more than merely authorize the use of force. China uses it to shift blame onto the DPP, portraying its own actions as a necessary response to the party’s alleged “provocations.” Through the ASL, China can legitimize its coercive measures by framing them as a justified response to Taiwan’s perceived transgressions and casting Taiwan as the actor responsible for the deteriorating cross-Strait relationship.</p> -<p>Meanwhile, “More Than Moore” pursues innovation that could lead to the emergence of new micro- and nanoelectronics technologies and markets. Imec’s long-term assumption is that this branch of its research effort will eventually eclipse More Moore. Pursuant to More Than Moore, the center has explored specialties such as organic electronics, hybrid semiconductors, organic photovoltaics, and biomedical electronics. These projects often involve collaboration with imec’s Dutch affiliate, the Holst Center, which it cofounded in 2006.</p> +<h4 id="22-articles-punishing-taiwans-people-for-political-beliefs">22 Articles: Punishing Taiwan’s People for Political Beliefs</h4> -<p>Within the constellation of imec industry partners, a handful of companies are “core partners.” The center’s management may identify research programs of interest, then reach out to interested firms from their pool of core partners and provide them the shared facilities to conduct collaborative research. In 2003, imec recruited several major chipmakers to pursue process technology for 45 nm and smaller semiconductors — then the next generation of semiconductor technology. Core partner status meant that the firms involved could participate in all seven of the 45 nm programs that comprised imec’s platform at the time and would receive “certain advantages over companies that remain outside the core,” according to then-CEO Gilbert Declerck.</p> +<p>However, the ASL appears to have fallen short of achieving the CCP’s objective of deterring Taiwan independence. DPP candidates have repeatedly been elected president in recent decades, with William Lai in 2024 becoming the third DPP president. This perceived failure by the CCP has fueled ongoing discussions within China about potentially passing more stringent legal measures against Taiwan.</p> -<h4 id="substantial-and-sustained-public-support">Substantial and Sustained Public Support</h4> +<p>Indeed, since 2021, China has initiated a policy of specifically targeting Taiwan officials and organizations, labeling them as purported “Taiwan independence diehards.” The current sanction lists include 10 DPP politicians, several of whom hold prominent positions in the Lai administration such as Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim, Secretary-General of the National Security Council Joseph Wu, and Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo. Sanctioned Taiwan organizations include the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, the International Cooperation and Development Fund, the Prospect Foundation, and the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats. The individuals and associated organizations on this list are prohibited from visiting mainland China, Hong Kong, or Macau. Cooperation between the sanctioned parties and any organizations or individuals in mainland China is forbidden, and companies and investors with ties to the sanctioned entities are precluded from generating profits within China. Importantly, these sanctions may also lead to the imposition of criminal penalties, potentially resulting in the death penalty under the PRC Criminal Code and National Security Law.</p> -<p>The imec research center was founded in 1984 with an initial investment of around $72 million by the government of Flanders. Although the regional government continued to make the annual contributions crucial for a sustainable research program, it set a target from the outset for imec to eventually receive 50 percent of its revenues from nongovernment sources, which it achieved in the mid-1990s and has exceeded in every subsequent year. In 2023, imec’s annual revenue totaled 941 million euros: 75 percent came from industry partners, 16 percent from the regional government of Flanders, 6 percent from the European Union, and 3 percent from other government programs. This long-term commitment by the regional government to support and grow the institution is one of the keys to imec’s success.</p> +<p>Furthermore, on June 21, 2024, the Supreme People’s Court, along with other government agencies, published the 22 Articles, which aims at using law enforcement to punish those deemed “Taiwan independence diehards.” In August, the website of the Chinese State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) published a list of 10 such individuals; the list aligns with those whom the TAO had sanctioned in previous years.</p> -<p>Although Flanders is a relatively small political jurisdiction with a population of about 6.8 million, its government wields substantial power to drive internal economic development and plays a strong role in supporting imec. A 2012 Japanese study observed that the “strength of the Flemish government’s authority in industrial development is equivalent to that of the Japanese federal government.” This regional thrust comes as Belgium has shifted from a unitary state to a federal state in phases since the 1960s, with central government powers devolving progressively onto the regional governments of Dutch-speaking Flanders, French-speaking Wallonia, and the Brussels Capital Region, each with its own executive and parliament. Although the central government retains authority in areas such as foreign relations and national defense, regional authorities lead industrial development. Devolution gave the government of Flanders the autonomy to significantly increase its investments in innovation, enabling it to more than double outlays on R&amp;D from what had been below-average levels relative to the European Union prior to devolution to far above the EU average by 1995.</p> +<p>The potential consequences of the 22 Articles are significant, and the possibility of Taiwan individuals being detained and tried within China cannot be dismissed. The large Taiwan population living in or visiting China is particularly vulnerable, as demonstrated by several high-profile cases, such as that of Taiwan NGO worker Lee Ming-che, who was detained in 2017 and subsequently sentenced to five years imprisonment for subverting state power. Lee’s detention appears to have been triggered by his advocacy within China, which included discussions on Chinese social media about human rights, democracy, and Taiwan’s experiences. In this case and in a series of subsequent detentions, Beijing violated the 2009 Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement, which mandates prompt notification and facilitation of family visits for those detained. Beijing’s denial of notification and family visits may be intended to create the impression that even the ruling DPP cannot help Taiwan citizens detained in China.</p> -<p>In a 2024 interview at CSIS, imec CEO Van den hove emphasized the importance of continued public funding despite its diminished percentage of total revenue:</p> +<p>Recent examples include the cases of pro-Taiwan independence activist Yang Chih-yuan and Gūsa Publishing founder Li Yan-he (also known as Fu Cha). Yang was detained in August 2022 on the charge of “separatism.” He was found guilty and sentenced to nine years in prison on August 26, 2024, with his case becoming the first tried under the 22 Articles. Li, a mainland Chinese national operating a publishing house in Taiwan that releases books on topics deemed sensitive by Beijing, is reportedly being held and investigated for alleged activities endangering national security.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>We believe that we’ve been able to realize a phenomenal growth over those 40 years. And this has been realized through a growing commitment from industry. But at the same time, this commitment from industry was leveraged on top of very strong and stable support from the local government. And this, we believe, is important because it allows us to invest in new programs which today are probably too early for industry to finance but allow us to make sure that we can develop a long-term strategy. . . . Our role is to kind of set the roadmap for the next 10–20 years. So we have to pre-invest a lot in some of these [emerging technology areas].</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Most Taiwan individuals targeted by the CCP reside in Taiwan and are unlikely to enter mainland China, Hong Kong, or Macau. Recognizing the challenges in prosecuting them, the 22 Articles establishes a clear process for pursuing and trying these individuals, even if they remain outside China’s jurisdiction.</p> -<p>In addition, Flanders and the European Union have also made significant one-time contributions to imec for special projects. For instance, Flanders provided imec 35.7 million euros for a new research facility that allowed it, among other things, to build a machine to clean silicon plates of minute dust particles in 2004. In 2009, Flanders gave imec 35 million euros to help finance 75 million euros that it used to construct a new 2,800-square-meter (0.7-acre) cleanroom to support research on 22 nm and smaller CMOS chips and on organic solar cells and biomedical electronics. In 2012, Flanders indicated it would invest in the cost of building cleanroom facilities at imec to enable the pursuit of 450 mm wafer technology, estimated at 100 million euros. The project was shifted to expand the existing 300 mm facility, as the industry did not coalesce around 450 mm technology.</p> +<p>Regarding the statute of limitations for prosecution, the 22 Articles emphasizes two key points. First, for “continuous or ongoing” acts of separatism or inciting separatism, the statute of limitations does not begin until the offense ends. Second, once a case is filed or accepted by the court, suspects evading investigation or trial will not be protected by any statute of limitations. This means individuals can be “held accountable for life” regardless of whether they appear in China during the investigation or trial.</p> -<p>In 2016, imec added a second 4,000 square meter 300 mm cleanroom. This new cleanroom expansion (including building and equipment) entailed a total investment of more than 1 billion euros, one-tenth of which was supplied by the Flemish government. Importantly, more than 900 million euros in investment were derived from joint R&amp;D with more than 90 industrial partners from across the entire semiconductor industry. Imec’s semiconductor research cleanrooms now total more than 13,000 square meters (nearly 140,000 square feet).</p> +<p>In terms of judicial procedures where the suspect is overseas, the public security or state security organs can issue a warrant for their arrest (Article 13). Even if the suspect does not appear, these organs can still transfer the case to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate for prosecution; the court can then conduct a trial in absentia (Article 17). In other words, even if the suspect remains outside of China throughout the entire judicial process, they can still be convicted.</p> -<p>Most recently, it was announced in May 2024 that imec will receive 1.4 billion euros in combined funding from the European Chips Act and the Flanders government — complemented by 1.1 billion euros from industry partners — to extend its NanoIC pilot line, a leading technology platform for companies to explore new technologies before they are introduced into large-scale production. Aiming to accelerate commercialization of sub-2 nm semiconductor technologies, the NanoIC pilot line will support a broad range of industries — including automotive, telecommunications, and health — to develop products that leverage the latest chip innovations. This will include a new 4,000 square meter 300 mm Fab 4, bringing total cleanroom space to 17,000 square meters (182,000 square feet). These ambitious projects feed into what European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has described as an “essential” role for imec in the context of the European Chips Act:</p> +<p>Chinese law enforcement cannot operate in Taiwan, but the potential for China to pursue these individuals through extradition or illegal measures should not be completely discounted. However, the primary significance of the 22 Articles may not be the physical apprehending of pro-independence individuals but rather its function as a legal warfare tool intended to deter, silence, and divide those perceived as adversaries. Coupled with “public opinion warfare” and “psychological warfare,” this strategy aims to criminalize specific behaviors and label them as “illegal.” By doing so, the 22 Articles appears oriented toward the following objectives, which align with the ASL and the CCP’s recent international efforts to promote the “One China” principle:</p> -<blockquote> - <p>The role imec plays in the European Union’s ambitions will be particularly significant. . . To be less dependent on East Asia, we need to scale up our production here in Europe: imec is essential for our economic security. For investors who need to research and test their innovations before moving to mass production, it is an important place.</p> -</blockquote> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Stigmatization:</strong> Labeling specific Taiwan political figures or activists as “criminals” to discredit them and their cause</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Deterrence:</strong> Creating a chilling effect within Taiwan society by threatening legal consequences for advocating independence</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Legitimization:</strong> Bolstering the legitimacy of the “One China” principle internationally by framing opposition to it as criminal activity</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Scapegoating:</strong> Shifting blame for instability in the Taiwan Strait onto pro-independence individuals, deflecting criticism from Beijing’s policies</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>While imec is strongly supported by Flanders, it enjoys operational autonomy. It is run by an executive board and a senior leadership team that plan and execute strategy. The center’s R&amp;D targets are set forth in 5-year business plans that are reviewed by both the government of Flanders and technical advisory boards comprised of global experts in the various thematic areas in which imec is active. imec is further overseen by a board of directors, which has four members drawn from the faculty of Flemish universities, two from Flemish industry, two designated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and one picked by the Ministry of Education. In addition, university professors and industry researchers drawn from among core partners conduct a critical review twice a year of each research project and suggest actions the center could take. The relative autonomy of the imec leadership enables it to follow the technology — and indeed lead it — without undue political constraints.</p> +<p>The CCP’s discourse and strategy toward Taiwan can also draw lessons from its treatment of Hong Kong, most notably its narrative of targeting “an extremely small number of people.” When the National People’s Congress issued the National Security Law in 2020, it claimed to be “punishing a small group of ‘Hong Kong independence’ elements and violent elements who seriously endanger national security.” When the Hong Kong government introduced the National Security Ordinance in 2024, it also claimed that “the legislation targets a very small group of people with extreme behavior.” Likewise, when the 22 Articles was issued, the CCP repeatedly emphasized that the document targets “an extremely small number” of diehard Taiwan independence elements and their secessionist activities, “not involving the vast majority of Taiwan compatriots.” This narrative serves to both appease the general public and create social division by distinguishing between those who are targeted by Beijing and those who are not.</p> -<h4 id="the-leuven-technology-cluster">The Leuven Technology Cluster</h4> +<p>However, the enactment of the National Security Law in Hong Kong has led to a rapid deterioration of the local society and governance system. According to the Hong Kong government, as of March 8, 2024, a total of 291 individuals have been arrested for suspected offenses endangering national security since the law came into effect. Among all cases, over 170 individuals and five companies were charged, with 112 people already convicted or awaiting sentencing. Many pro-democracy activists and ordinary citizens have been prosecuted and convicted, notably including the “Hong Kong 47,” media tycoon and democracy advocate Jimmy Lai, and members of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China and the 612 Humanitarian Relief Fund. These cases serve as a warning to ordinary protesters, pro-democracy activists, news media, and nongovernmental organizations alike. Since July 2020, a chilling effect has permeated Hong Kong’s civil society, with independent groups disbanding, residents leaving in a mass exodus, and street protests disappearing. While Taiwan is not Hong Kong, it is crucial to remain vigilant for any signs of a similar trend, particularly among Taiwan individuals residing in mainland China, who are likely to be the most vulnerable.</p> -<p>Imec is the main hub of a local technology cluster, which reflects decades of investment by Flanders, local governments, the private sector, and imec itself. In addition to five excellent nearby research universities, Leuven hosts numerous other world-leading research entities.</p> +<h4 id="anticipating-chinas-future-moves-more-legislation">Anticipating China’s Future Moves: More Legislation?</h4> -<p>Applying the imec model to similar national efforts around the world has led critics to claim that subsidizing the research activities of multinational firms without a local footprint will not help the local economy. However, imec’s benefits to the Flemish region have been significant and measurable over the past four decades. Young company representatives doing research at imec are likely to move up in their own companies, then consider Flanders when later making decisions about where to locate research centers or other activities. Hundreds of PhD candidates pursuing their research at imec provide a growing talent pool with ties to the region. In addition, imec subcontracts many tasks to local companies, helping to strengthen the industrial ecosystem; some of these firms have gone on to become “very fast growers.” An independent analysis of imec’s economic benefits to the region concluded in 2020 that for each euro of Flemish government investment, imec creates 7 euros of value added to the Belgian economy and 3.7 euros of return on the subsidy through taxes. Each million euros invested in imec creates 23 jobs at imec and 67 elsewhere in the Belgian economy.</p> +<p>As noted, China may see the ASL as insufficient in deterring perceived threats. The CCP has explicitly stated that it will not rule out various other legislative proposals such as introducing a “Motherland Unification Law” or “National Unification Law,” adding implementation rules for the ASL, issuing a legislative interpretation of Article 8 of the ASL, or enacting a “Basic Law of the Taiwan Special Administrative Region” modeled on that of Hong Kong. For instance, in March 2022, Zhang Lianqi, a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), remarked that because the ASL focuses on “anti-independence,” the party should instead pass a Motherland Unification Law, which would stipulate the legal obligation of all Chinese citizens, including Taiwan residents, to promote national reunification and would clearly define the legal responsibility — presumably to include punishment — for violating the “obligation of national reunification.”</p> -<h4 id="intellectual-property">Intellectual Property</h4> +<p>Such a law, however, could be a double-edged sword for the CCP. On the one hand, it might underscore Beijing’s determination to control Taiwan, but it could also limit the CCP’s flexibility on the issue, particularly given the difficulty of managing the nationalist sentiments of the domestic Chinese audience toward Taiwan. If a Motherland Unification Law were to be enacted but not successfully implemented, the CCP’s domestic credibility, and possibly legitimacy, could be undermined. Consequently, the potential enactment of such a law has sparked internal debate within China. Given the controversy and historical context surrounding the ASL — originally named the “National Unification Law” — it is unlikely the CCP will enact a Motherland Unification Law that includes any deadline for unification.</p> -<p>Given its large pool of researchers and expertise, imec brings very substantial knowledge — some of it patented — to any research collaboration, known as “relevant background IP.” Industry partners can pay a fee to join one or more of imec’s Industrial Affiliation Programs, and imec will share its background IP applicable to their particular research area. Imec holds the “foreground IP” that is developed during the collaboration and licenses it out to all industry partners who participated; this becomes part of its background IP for use in future collaborations.</p> +<p>China might still move forward on bolstering the ASL through a legislative interpretation or implementing regulation, explicitly defining the conditions for using military force under Article 8. This approach would be less politically contentious than enacting a Motherland Unification Law.</p> -<p>Industrial partners can take away as little or as much of the IP generated by the joint effort as they would like, with the terms being negotiated on a case-by-case basis, usually involving costs to the industrial partner, particularly for an exclusive license. These bilateral negotiations are overseen by imec lawyers and valuation experts. Imec may seek terms such as payment of the royalties on subsequent sales if the industry partner takes the technology to market.</p> +<p>China will undoubtedly intensify its pursuit and punishment of individuals deemed “Taiwan independence diehards,” as outlined in the 22 Articles. This document, jointly issued by China’s top judicial and security organs, was disseminated to all levels of public security, state security, judicial, procuratorial, and justice departments nationwide, signaling a clear intent to encourage investigation, prosecution, and trial of such cases. Cases can be further categorized based on whether the defendant is located within mainland China or overseas, with different procedures for each type.</p> -<h4 id="infrastructure">Infrastructure</h4> +<h4 id="cases-with-defendants-within-mainland-china">Cases with Defendants within Mainland China</h4> -<p>From imec’s inception, companies and academic researchers have been attracted to its research partnerships because of its ability to make available the advanced equipment needed to pursue cutting-edge research. Imec benefits in this respect since partners “can provide tools, equipment and materials for free and that can be provided and tested by other partners when conducting R&amp;D at the facility.” The center also offers other forms of support, including design, prototyping, testing, and consulting services, which are particularly important for start-ups and small- to medium-sized enterprises.</p> +<p>In recent years, China has demonstrated a pattern of human rights abuses in politically sensitive cases, and Taiwan defendants have not been immune to this treatment. Individuals accused of “separatism” or “inciting separatism” are demonstrably prone to numerous abuses:</p> -<p>In an event at CSIS, imec CEO Van den hove observed that the center’s success is attributable to the fact that it has invested in the infrastructure needed to achieve its objectives: “Over those 40 years, we probably built out what is. . . the world’s most advanced, independent R&amp;D pilot line. We’ve invested more than $5 billion in that facility. And it’s really run as one integrated facility, with a very strong focus on operational excellence so that we can deliver value in a very effective way to our partners.”</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Imposition of six months of “residential surveillance at a designated location” (RSDL, also known as “enforced disappearance”)</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Isolation from the outside world for extended periods</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Lack of access to legal counsel</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Denial of the right to choose their own lawyers, instead appointing “government-assigned lawyers” to handle their cases</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Repeated interrogation to coerce them into “confessing” publicly</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Prohibition against family members or outsiders attending hearings, instead conducting trials in secret</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Prevention of families obtaining case information, including relevant legal documents, from “government-assigned lawyers”</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Imec currently has 8,000 square meters (1.98 acres) of 300 mm cleanroom space and 5,200 square meters (1.28 acres) of 200 mm cleanroom space. Its class 1,000 300 mm cleanroom has all the equipment needed to pursue sub-2 nm CMOS R&amp;D, including advanced lithography based on ASML’s newest EUV equipment. It has a vast array of specialized labs pursuing silicon and organic photovoltaics, packaging and testing equipment, photonics, gallium-nitride processing, design methodology, biosensors, DNA research, imaging, and many other topics.</p> +<h4 id="cases-with-defendants-outside-of-china">Cases with Defendants Outside of China</h4> -<h4 id="workforce-a-melting-pot">Workforce: A Melting Pot</h4> +<p>For cases where the defendant is in Taiwan or a foreign country, the likely scenario is that Chinese police will first issue an arrest warrant, followed by prosecution and a trial in absentia. Throughout these proceedings, pressure will be exerted on defendants, urging them to “proactively abandon their ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist position [and] no longer carry out ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities,” as stipulated in Article 15 of the 22 Articles, in exchange for withdrawing the case or deciding not to prosecute.</p> -<p>From about 70 employees at its inception, imec’s workforce has grown to over 5,500, with roughly 10 percent holding PhDs. In November 2023, imec forecast that its workforce would add nearly 2,000 new hires by 2035. Research staff are drawn from university partners in Belgium and many other countries, and staff are allowed to hold dual appointments at their institutions. An important strength of the model is that it allows industry partners to assign their own employees to work on site, which brings in cutting-edge, commercially relevant perspectives and the tacit knowledge garnered through familiarity with actual production.</p> +<p>Furthermore, during both the investigation and post-conviction phases, China may also replicate its practice of pursuing “fugitives” by applying to the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) for a Red Notice against targeted Taiwan individuals or requesting countries that have extradition treaties with China to hand these individuals over. Even when unsuccessful, these actions can inflict significant disruption and reputational harm on the targets.</p> -<p>This inclusive approach results in imec having one of the most diverse workforces of any major microelectronics center in the world. As CEO Van den hove observed, “We’ve been attracting people from all over the world, close to 100 nationalities, and 5,500 of the most advanced, top-notch researchers. Many of them have experience of more than twenty years either in imec or the industry.” One Indian-Finnish employee at imec remarked that the staff is so multinational in character that “the Flemish culture does not prevail. . . . You can never see the difference between people’s national backgrounds.”</p> +<h4 id="chinas-illicit-legal-warfare">China’s Illicit Legal Warfare</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">An important strength of the model is that it allows industry partners to assign their own employees to work on site, which brings in cutting-edge, commercially relevant perspectives and the tacit knowledge garnered through familiarity with actual production.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>China’s legal warfare described above violates essential principles of international law. While China uses the ASL to legitimize the use of force against Taiwan, any such use of force would constitute a violation of international law. As Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” This prohibition against the threat or use of force is widely recognized as a fundamental principle of customary international law that binds all states, regardless of their membership in the United Nations.</p> -<p>Imec’s facilities are colocated with KU Leuven, and its CEOs have all been professors there. For instance, Luc Van den hove is a member of KU Leuven’s Faculty of Engineering Sciences and received his PhD in electrical engineering from the institution while conducting research at imec. When the center was starting up, faculty from various Flemish universities — particularly a group of KU Leuven professors who wanted to pursue microprocessor research — served as experts to help build its knowledge base. This partnership has contributed to Thompson-Reuters rating KU Leuven as Europe’s most innovative university in recent years, while the university-based leadership has enabled imec to develop a global network of formal and informal relationships with other institutions of higher learning. At present, it has collaborations with over 200 universities and myriad “non-formal collaborations through a network of scientists, engineers and PhD students.”</p> +<p>China’s claim that Taiwan is part of China is unfounded — a point that has generated extensive scholarship. Even if one assumes, for the sake of argument, that Taiwan’s statehood cannot be established, international law still prohibits China from using force to annex Taiwan. For scholars who believe Taiwan’s statehood is contested, Taiwan is nevertheless a de facto state or entity with an international personality distinct from the PRC’s. Many argue that such contested states are bound by international law, including the prohibition on the use of force, and should also be protected by this principle for the purpose of international peace and security. Even scholars who do not view Taiwan as a state under international law, such as the late judge of the International Court of Justice James Crawford, argue that any use of force by China against Taiwan would endanger international peace and security and therefore first require that the parties attempt to seek a peaceful resolution per Article 33 of the UN Charter. In other words, irrespective of Taiwan’s status as an independent state, the evolution of international law establishes that the cross-Strait dispute falls under the purview of international law, particularly given the significant international concern. An attack by China would justify Taiwan’s exercise of self-defense, including seeking external assistance through collective self-defense measures.</p> -<h3 id="critical-bilateral-partnerships">Critical Bilateral Partnerships</h3> +<p>Furthermore, China’s persecution of Taiwan individuals for their political beliefs violates international human rights law, including the right to freedom of speech. The arbitrary detention of Taiwan citizens for their views, compounded by the systematic abuses of the Chinese judicial system, violates their rights to personal security and a fair trial. Any attempt by China to exploit Interpol or extradition treaties to apprehend these targeted individuals would constitute an abuse of international judicial-cooperation mechanisms, and the international community should unequivocally condemn such legal warfare against Taiwan individuals as a blatant violation of fundamental human rights.</p> -<h4 id="asml">ASML</h4> +<h3 id="chinas-anti-secession-law-1">China’s Anti-Secession Law</h3> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="background-legal-significance-and-recent-developments">Background, Legal Significance, and Recent Developments</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>Imec’s costly, risky, but successful three-decade research partnership with the Dutch chip toolmaker ASML is an important illustration of its capabilities. This collaboration has created an ecosystem for proving, testing, and debugging newly developed ASML tools and integrating them into manufacturing lines. With imec’s support, ASML has produced technological breakthroughs such as the development of EUV lithography tools used to produce the chips needed to support cutting-edge applications, including artificial intelligence (AI).</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="donald-c-clarke">Donald C. Clarke</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Prior versions of photolithography for chips utilized deep ultraviolet (DUV) light, but shorter wavelengths were needed to continue to make circuit patterns smaller and advance Moore’s Law. EUV uses light with a wavelength of 13.5 nm, which does not occur in nature but can be created by zapping drops of molten tin with a carbon dioxide laser until they become plasma. The light emitted by this process is collected and passed through a mask with the pattern of the circuitry on it, then the pattern is shrunk down to the size of a semiconductor die with a system of ultra-flat mirrors and projected onto a silicon wafer. This must all be done in a vacuum.</p> +<h4 id="introduction-7">Introduction</h4> -<p>Developing and refining this technology into workable lithography tools was a challenge so daunting that during the several-decade-long developmental effort, various observers declared that the process was a failure, would never work, or could not become reality in the reasonably foreseeable future. Nevertheless, ASML and imec persevered in a protracted, multi-billion-euro effort, a demonstration of how big R&amp;D risks and a long-term focus sometimes pay off in spectacular fashion.</p> +<p>While China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law (ASL) has received much attention for its role in justifying potential PRC actions against Taiwan, its significance specifically as a legal document — how it differs in practical terms from a policy announcement — is less explored.171 It turns out that while the ASL itself is of minor legal significance in the strict sense, it has provided the basis for an interpretive document jointly issued in May 2024 by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and several other state bodies. This new document represents a major escalation in China’s campaign of intimidation against Taiwan.</p> -<p>ASML enjoys a monopoly on the manufacture of the world’s most advanced lithography equipment, EUV — representing a major strategic asset for Western powers in their technological competition with China. EUV lithography enables the high-volume production of chips with advanced AI applications, underpinning advances in a vast array of other critical technology areas that have the potential to shape the outcome of future conflicts. Many in the West have underestimated Chinese capabilities in adapting and improving complex technologies such as high-speed rail, aircraft, and telecommunications. Nonetheless, given the enormous complexity of EUV lithography, China is unlikely to possess a comparable capability for many years, especially given U.S. semiconductor export controls.</p> +<h4 id="features-of-the-anti-secession-law">Features of the Anti-Secession Law</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">ASML and imec persevered in a protracted, multi-billion-euro effort, a demonstration of how big R&amp;D risks and a long-term focus sometimes pay off in spectacular fashion.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The ASL consists of a mere nine substantive articles, as well as a tenth specifying the effective date. Article 1 makes it clear that it is specifically aimed at Taiwan, not at secession generally.</p> -<p>While other players made major contributions to the EUV effort — including Intel, IBM, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), and ASML’s German optics partner, Carl Zeiss — imec’s role was crucial. Before the first EUV-based lithography tool was available, imec conducted EUV tests at Switzerland’s Paul Scherrer Institute and collaborated with six makers of photoresist. In 2006, imec received one of the first full-field EUV lithography tools, the Alpha Demo Tool — jointly created by engineers at ASML and the College of Nanotechnology, Science, and Engineering (CNSE) at the University of Albany, SUNY — so it could assess its commercial viability and identify operational challenges on pilot lines in a real factory environment. Since then, imec has worked with ASML to prove and test every subsequent generation of EUV tools.</p> +<p>Article 5 promises Taiwan a “high degree of autonomy” after peaceful unification. Unlike the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the ASL does not go into any detail about what will be within Taiwan’s scope of autonomy and how long it will last. In any case, given that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) also promised a “high degree of autonomy” to Hong Kong, the latter’s fate suggests that the Taiwan would be ill-advised to put much store in a verbal formula.</p> -<p>Summarizing imec’s “very close partnership” with ASML, CEO Luc Van den hove has said “ASML focuses on the machine. We develop the process. We develop the ecosystem around the machine.” This dynamic continues today. In June 2023, imec signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with ASML to install and service its “full suite of advanced lithography and metrology equipment in the imec pilot line in Leuven,” such as the new 0.55 and 0.33 numerical-aperture (NA) EUV machines. The high-NA lithography EXE-series machines enable much faster wafer throughput than the previous-generation NXE systems introduced in 2010, and can be used to produce 2 nm and below semiconductors. Imec has secured commitments of 750 million euros each from the European Union and the Flanders government to support this project.</p> +<p>Article 7 calls for talks on peaceful unification on the basis of equality. It does not specify any preconditions and in fact says that conditions can be flexible. In particular, it does not require that Taiwan accept Beijing’s “One China” principle or the alleged 1992 Consensus — conditions that the PRC government later imposed as a matter of policy.</p> -<h4 id="taiwan-semiconductor-manufacturing-company">Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company</h4> +<p>Article 8 calls for the use of non-peaceful means if: (1) “Taiwan independence forces” create the fact of Taiwan’s separation from China, (2) a serious incident occurs that will lead to Taiwan’s separation from China, or (3) the possibility of peaceful unification is “completely extinguished.”</p> -<p>Over time, imec has come to engage deeply with TSMC. A core partner of imec since 2005, TSMC dispatched a researcher to Leuven in 2006 to work with the prototype Alpha Demo Tool and prepare the technology for high-volume manufacturing; after its work at imec, it eventually ordered a development EUV tool from ASML for delivery in 2013, concluding that the technology could be refined and used successfully. TSMC subsequently deployed its EUV machines in high-volume manufacturing in 2019 for use in its N7+ process.</p> +<p>Many commentators, not just outside of China but within the country as well, have noted that the ASL is not very law-like in the usual sense. Well-known party-aligned scholars such as Zhou Yezhong and Tian Feilong have each made this point.</p> -<p>In the meantime, the imec-TSMC relationship became more symbiotic. One 2010 partnership between them was designed to resolve a chicken-and-egg conundrum facing the Taiwanese foundry. TSMC could not safely develop manufacturing processes for certain application-specific technologies until it was sure that volume demand would exist, but volume demand would not emerge until the process existed. To break the impasse, imec promised to pass on certain new technologies to TSMC, which would ramp up their production once imec had demonstrated their viability.</p> +<p>In its vagueness and brevity — just around 1,000 characters — it is not only unlike laws in the United States but also unlike most laws in China. The document generally reads like a government communiqué, not a piece of legislation. It states many principles and makes many assertions but contains no actual rules saying anyone must do this or must not do that. It neither specifies sanctions nor has an enforcement mechanism within the legal system. The only enforcement, so to speak, is via military action — the “non-peaceful means” referred to in Article 8.</p> -<h4 id="rapidus">Rapidus</h4> +<p>The Chinese legal system is not without vague and brief laws, but a custom has developed in which they are usually followed up by detailed implementing regulations and judicial interpretations. Both when the ASL was passed and many years later, Chinese commentators were noting the need for such implementing regulations. However, at the time it was passed, a spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office quite unusually made a specific announcement that no such implementing regulations or interpretations would be forthcoming. Indeed, none have been up until now, 19 years later. The ASL was evidently intended from the start to be an unelaborated statement of vague principles that would never be modified through the legal process. This does not, of course, mean that China’s Taiwan policy could not change and has not changed over time; clearly, it has. And Chinese interpretations of the ASL have changed accordingly. However, this has been accomplished not via legal institutions but through the party, government statements, media, and academic commentary.</p> -<p>Reflecting its international approach, in late 2022 imec entered into a collaboration with Rapidus, a collective of eight Japanese companies that aims to restore an internationally competitive chip industry in Japan.71 In 2023, the conglomerate became one of imec’s core partners, gaining access to its “advanced technologies, system solutions, state-of-the-art 300 mm pilot line, and extensive partner network.” This cooperation complements the partnership at SUNY-Albany’s CNSE between IBM and Rapidus, which hopes to gain the ability to manufacture 2 nm chips. The Japanese government is committed to this ambitious effort, as reflected in its announcement in April 2024 that it would contribute $3.9 billion to Rapidus.</p> +<p>What the ASL is not is what presents the biggest problem for legal analysis, by suggesting that it is all irrelevant. Unlike the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act, to which PRC scholars like to compare it, it does not allow or require the Chinese government to do anything it could not already do without the law. As Richard Bush accurately commented in 2005, “The ASL does not create any authority where it did not exist, and the actions of China’s leaders will not change because it is on the books.” China’s Leninist political system does not accept any legal limitations on government. Particularly in the realm of foreign and military affairs, the state can do whatever it chooses to do and does not need to pass a law to enable itself.</p> -<h3 id="start-up-support-and-investment-arms">Start-up Support and Investment Arms</h3> +<h4 id="history-and-policy">History and Policy</h4> -<p>Today, over 300 high-tech companies are now located in Leuven, many of which are spinoffs from KU Leuven and imec. This situation underscores imec’s dynamic effects on the region (in the view of Chairman Antoon de Proft) and highlights how imec not only serves established high-tech companies but also creates new firms in significant numbers.</p> +<p>The ASL was drafted and passed quite quickly — apparently in a kind of panic over political developments in Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian narrowly won reelection as Taiwan’s president in March 2004 after having promised during his campaign to hold a referendum on a new constitution in 2006, and China feared his Pan-Green coalition would win a majority in the subsequent legislative elections in December. China saw the referendum and constitutional change as a kind of lawfare on Taiwan’s part: the attempt to use legal measures to give legitimacy to what they saw as the Greens’ objective of formal independence. The ASL was China’s effort to fight law with law.</p> -<p>Notably, imec conducts venturing activities that focus on “deep tech” — fundamental technologies that require an extended phase of R&amp;D to commercialize but promise major payoffs, transforming “disruptive technologies into disruptive companies.” Imec encourages this dynamic in several ways: through spinoffs led by its own researchers; through its technology accelerator, imec.istart; and through venture capital investments in its independently managed imec.xpand fund.</p> +<p>In the legislative elections, however, the Pan-Blue coalition retained its majority. This should have comforted China considerably, but it seems the process for formulating and passing the ASL was too far advanced to call off.</p> -<h4 id="spinoffs">Spinoffs</h4> +<p>One aspect of the ASL’s history worth highlighting is that it was not universally perceived as particularly aggressive at the time. To be sure, some saw it that way. The U.S. government made strong representations at several levels to the Chinese government, urging it not to go through with what it saw as a provocative law, but to no avail. And Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council viewed it as expanding the conditions under which China could use force against Taiwan.</p> -<p>In the view of imec’s director of venture development, Olivier Rousseaux, spinoffs in particular represent a way for imec to help commercialize IP it has developed and capture “a share of the upside potential of our innovation.” He suggests this activity could be expanded further, noting, “Today, imec gets paid typical research project fees for innovation that goes into the market and generates billions of Euros. We make good money, but peanuts compared to what we could make.”</p> +<p>But other commentators — by no means all China sympathizers — saw it as conciliatory, pointing out that it could be read as a signal that China did not intend to move militarily so long as Taiwan respected the status quo and that the goal of the law was not active unification but the passive prevention of formal separation. Indeed, its name was changed at the last moment from “Law on Unification” to “Anti-Secession Law,” although other commentators argue that this was for a completely different reason: the premise of “unification” is that China is separated, whereas the premise of “anti-secession” is that it is already one body, which of course is the PRC’s official position.</p> -<p>These spinoff ventures continue to grow. Imec’s website lists 72 companies spun off by the consortium between 1986 and 2023, most of which are still operating or have been acquired by other firms. Another 68 companies were spun off from iMinds before that organization merged with imec in 2016. As one would expect with high-tech start-ups, a few of these new companies have been liquidated, but the majority have survived and thrived. This is in no small part because imec contributes the deep-tech expertise of over 5,000 “highly skilled and dedicated researchers”; access to exceptional facilities, particularly cleanroom space and 3.5 billion euros worth of equipment; and support through a vibrant regional ecosystem of established partners, “which creates opportunities for young spinoffs to collaborate.”</p> +<p>The law never uses the term “People’s Republic of China”; indeed, it appears to be the only statute ever passed by the National People’s Congress (NPC) or its Standing Committee that is not prefaced with the words “People’s Republic of China.” It does not require adherence to the “One China” principle or the alleged 1992 Consensus as a precondition for talks, while it does say the two governments should engage in dialogue as equals — quite a change from PRC policy today.</p> -<h4 id="the-imecistart-accelerator">The Imec.istart Accelerator</h4> +<p>The vagueness of the law’s provisions means that as a policy statement, it can be plausibly interpreted in many ways, and the absence of any implementing regulations or explanatory interpretations over the years shows that the Chinese government likes it this way. Interestingly, the more aggressive recent interpretations of the law have come not just from foreign observers but from Chinese sources as well. Tian Feilong, a law professor at Beihang University, is a leading hardline nationalist intellectual. In an article elaborating on a 2020 speech by Li Zhanshu, then chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and the number-three man on the Politburo Standing Committee, he argued that the goal of the ASL is nothing less than “complete unification” (完全统一). In case there was any doubt, he stressed that this meant there was no room for “appeasement” (绥靖主义) or “opportunism” (机会主义), such terms presumably meaning compromise of any kind over the PRC’s absolute authority over Taiwan affairs after unification.</p> -<p>The 12 to 18-month imec.istart program complements imec’s venture activity. Launched in 2011, imec.istart is a digital technology business accelerator for supporting start-ups that present a working proof of concept, providing access to imec facilities, early-stage financing, mentoring, free office space, and introductions to tech communities, among other benefits. Participation in imec.istart is limited to companies that are less than two years old, based in Belgium, and focus on digital products or nanotechnologies.</p> +<p>Unlike other PRC commentators — who are apparently oblivious to everything that has happened in Hong Kong and so point to it enthusiastically as an outstanding example of the resounding success of the “one country, two systems” arrangement — Tian is very much aware of developments in Hong Kong, which he views as providing important lessons for the central government in its management of a post-unification Taiwan. He tells his readers they must not romanticize the notion of “one country, two systems” or local autonomy; that the PRC central government must have control over education to make sure children are inculcated into the right kind of thinking; and that the PRC must also control the legal system in the realm of national security, which of course can be (and has been) stretched to cover almost anything.</p> -<p>Imec.istart invests a minimum of 100,000 euros in pre-seed funding for each selected start-up, split 50-50 between equity and a convertible loan, and may choose to award an additional 150,000 euros at its discretion once the start-up is “up-and-running.” The initial 100,000 euros can be used for any business costs, but only up to 30,000 of it can be spent on product development, and none of it on salaries.</p> +<p>Evidently, it would be a mistake to read much determinate policy content into the ASL. While it clearly means, “We don’t want Taiwan to declare formal independence,” current policy can be more reliably gleaned from various official statements and actions than from the text of the ASL.</p> -<p>In January 2024, imec.istart announced the launch of a new, independently managed future fund to enable longer-term and larger-scale investments in promising imec.istart start-ups beyond the initial 100,000 euros of seed funding. The investments are expected to average 1 million euros per qualifying start-up, totaling an estimated 25 million euros over the first five years. Investors include imec, PMV (the Flanders government’s wholly owned investment fund), ING Belgium, and private parties such as angel investors and the founders of imec.istart alumni companies.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, the very existence of the law is a clear statement of one very important policy: that in any confrontation with Taiwan, China does not consider itself bound by the international laws of armed conflict. The PRC — or, at the very least, one prolific and apparently approved academic commentator, You Zhiqiang — takes the extreme position that all states have an inherent unconditional right to preserve their territorial integrity. Ignoring examples to the contrary, such as the voluntary breakup of Czechoslovakia, it insists that the commitment to maintaining territorial integrity is an inherent feature of a state’s sovereignty. Moreover, it argues that any measures a state undertakes to maintain its territorial integrity, at least within its claimed boundaries, are not governed by international law. This is simply false; Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, for example, specifically applies to conflicts not of an international character.</p> -<p>About two-thirds of imec.istart’s portfolio consists of software firms, which have the advantage of lower capital costs than hardware developers and can go to market more quickly, making them much more attractive to investors. Some of the accelerator’s notable successes include the Ghent-based food-delivery company Deliverect, data companies Datacamp and PieSync, and medical-software developer Ugentec. Imec.istart now has a portfolio of over 300 start-ups, and in 2023 UBI Global named it the world’s top business incubator linked to a university.</p> +<p>But of course, the fact that China does not consider a conflict with Taiwan to be of an international character does not mean it is not. “Conflicts of an international character” are those between states, and Taiwan meets all the conditions for statehood under the Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the Rights and Duties of States — as Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council correctly noted in its 2005 commentary on the ASL. It is important to note that under the convention, recognition by other states is explicitly not a condition for statehood. While China is not a signatory, the Montevideo Convention is generally considered declaratory of customary international law and is thus a mandatory norm. In short, customary international law says that Taiwan is a state; a conflict between states invokes duties under the international laws of war; and China has declared that it will ignore these duties.</p> -<h4 id="venture-investment-imecxpand">Venture Investment: Imec.xpand</h4> +<h4 id="legal-effects">Legal Effects</h4> -<p>Established in 2017, imec.xpand operates as a venture capital fund, investing in nanotechnology hardware start-ups and spinoffs in which “imec knowledge, expertise and infrastructure will be the differentiating factor for success.” The fund is independently managed and cofinanced by imec, government entities, and private firms (some of which are imec members), who together contributed 120 million euros in its first round of investment. In May 2024, imec.xpand announced the launch of a second, 300-million-euro fund for “accelerating the growth of transformative semiconductor and nanotechnology innovations.” According to imec, imec.xpand has invested in 23 companies to date — including two unicorns — which have collectively raised close to 1.5 billion euros in funding.</p> +<p>Although the ASL does not give China’s government any power or authority to use military force that it did not already have, it does still have some specifically legal uses.</p> -<h3 id="international-partnerships-and-footprint">International Partnerships and Footprint</h3> +<p><em>LAWFARE</em></p> -<h4 id="imec-in-the-united-states">Imec in the United States</h4> +<p>China’s concept of lawfare is somewhat different from the term as first popularized in the early 2000s by Major-General Charles Dunlap, who defined it as “the strategy of using — or misusing — law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.” In contrast, China considers “lawfare” to be the use of law as an accompaniment to traditional military action. Thus, it is the province not of diplomats but of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Its purpose is to expand the scope for military action by obtaining understanding and support internationally, sapping the enemy’s will, and boosting morale at home. That the ASL is very much the PLA’s lawfare tool and not a regular piece of legislation can be seen in the secrecy, suddenness, and irregular procedures surrounding its drafting and passage. Thus, concerned observers are not wrong to see a greater military threat behind it than might otherwise appear from its text and institutional source.</p> -<p>In addition to its research partnerships with many U.S. firms, imec operates three centers of excellence in the United States at sites where it can collaborate easily with local research universities. Notable centers and partnerships include:</p> +<p>China’s lawfare objectives of the ASL are primarily those of legitimation. As cynical Leninists, China’s leaders do not believe that separation of powers is actually real. Thus, when looking at U.S. legislation, they view the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act of 2001 not as instructions or as Congress granting authority to the president but as lawfare: nothing more than would-be legitimating exercises for what the United States wants to do anyway. The ASL is their answer.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>imec USA–Florida, located near Orlando, which focuses on cryogenic and superconducting computing, as well as advanced semiconductor packaging;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>imec USA–Berkeley, which focuses on innovative AI architectures and the co-optimization (redesigning) of system technology;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>imec USA–San José, which provides design services, multi-project wafer runs, and application-specific integrated circuit development;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>joint research by imec and Purdue University to develop and demonstrate novel semiconductor materials, laying the foundation for “the next wave of high-performance compute and packaging materials” and aiming to make them more sustainable; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>an MoU signed by imec, the University of Michigan, Washtenaw Community College, General Motors, the semiconductor firm KLA, and the Michigan Economic Development Corporation to pursue semiconductor technologies for the automotive industry.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Beyond simply responding to U.S. legislation, China believes that putting its Taiwan policy in legal form will enhance the international legitimacy of this policy by giving it a certain heft and permanence. In particular, China wants to use the ASL to press its view that what it does in Taiwan is purely its domestic affair. It also expects that putting policy in legislative form enhances the legitimacy of that policy domestically. Moreover, game theory teaches that you can enhance the credibility of your threat by limiting your options if challenged. Here, putting the policy in legal form arguably makes it more difficult — not legally but politically — for the PRC to back down and establish a line beyond which salami-slicing tactics by Taiwan cannot proceed.</p> -<p>Imec has proposed further partnerships with U.S. research organizations and companies to advance the competitiveness and self-sufficiency of semiconductor production in the two regions. Along with partners, imec has expressed its willingness to help CHIPS Act entities ramp up U.S. semiconductor programs. As CEO Van den hove has pointed out, the center is well-positioned to expand upon its ties with major U.S. chipmaking firms by providing access to its expertise, IP, and other complementary operational capabilities. Imec also hopes to work with the newly established U.S. National Semiconductor Technology Center on earlier-stage technology research that may take seven to ten years before going to market and has proposed assigning imec engineers to the Albany NanoTech Complex.</p> +<p><em>CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION</em></p> -<h4 id="europes-prevail-consortium">Europe’s PREVAIL Consortium</h4> +<p>Neither is the ASL completely insignificant when it comes to domestic Chinese law. In other words, Chinese law with the ASL is not the same as Chinese law without it.</p> -<p>In late 2022, Europe’s four leading public research organizations — imec, France’s CEA-Leti, Germany’s Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, and Finland’s Technical Research Center (VTT) — established a consortium to coordinate their respective 300 mm research facilities to design, evaluate, test, and fabricate the advanced chips needed to enable artificial intelligence.</p> +<p>First, it has been used in domestic litigation, but only rarely and without much effect. One senior Chinese legal scholar, Zhou Yezhong, expressed the hope in 2018 that Chinese courts could add substance and prestige to the ASL by producing well-reasoned opinions involving its application, in the same way that norms can be strengthened in common-law countries through court opinions. For better or for worse, the court cases so far have been quite minor and do not show this happening. The one case in which it mattered, however, shows the ASL does have the potential for a wide-ranging and largely standardless application in domestic law whenever the authorities make the policy decision to do so, justifying fines and punishment for any words or actions deemed inconsistent with China’s Taiwan policy.</p> -<p>The consortium, the Partnership for Realization and Validation of AI-hardware Leadership (PREVAIL), will initially operate for 42 months and has a budget of 156 million euros — half of which is coming from the European Union and half from the host governments of the four organizations involved. Most of this budget (86 percent) is allocated to capital outlays, and only 6 percent funds the manufacture of demonstration circuits. By February 2024, the consortium announced it was finishing up installing cleanroom tools and was almost ready to design and test prototypes from across Europe. The aim is for the consortium to open up their new, shared pilot lines to smaller chipmakers, start-ups, and research institutions by May 2026, allowing them to manufacture, assemble, and test AI-embedded devices.</p> +<p>On Pkulaw.cn, a major legal database, there were only five cases as of June 2024 in which courts were asked to address arguments made by a party based on the ASL. In four of the five cases, courts ignored the ASL-based arguments, which were uniformly weak — in one instance, the defendant pointed (irrelevantly as far as the issue before the court was concerned) to the plaintiff foreign firm’s inclusion of Taiwan as a “country” on its website. The court declined the invitation to punish the plaintiff for this offense.</p> -<h4 id="imec-research-center-in-spain">Imec Research Center in Spain</h4> +<p>There was only one case in which the ASL seemed to carry legal weight. A local Administration of Industry and Commerce issued an administrative fine to an advertising design firm for producing a map of China that showed the mainland in red but not Taiwan, Hainan, and various disputed islands in the Pacific. The fine was specifically based on Article 2 of the ASL, which declares that Taiwan is part of China. The firm objected, arguing that the ASL contained no provision for sanctions and that imposing a fine on such grounds violated the principle of administration according to law. The court found against the firm, specifically citing the ASL as a proper basis for the fine. Although this case remains an outlier for now, it shows the far-reaching potential application of this law.</p> -<p>In March 2024, imec, the Spanish government, and the regional government of Andalusia signed an MoU to establish a public-private partnership to establish a 300 mm R&amp;D facility in Málaga called Fab 5. Imec will manage operations, provide the necessary technology and operations, and grant access to its global partner network. The two government parties have agreed to finance the construction of Fab 5, including equipment for a pilot line, and will provide additional long-term support for its operation. However, as the parties are reportedly still negotiating on the level of public support, there is no timetable or budget available yet. Complementing the existing imec fab in Leuven, which is focusing on CMOS and sub-1 nm fabrication, the Málaga fab will concentrate on “process developments and the introduction of materials that are difficult to combine with standard CMOS processes,” as well as R&amp;D of devices with applications to healthcare, photonics, sensing, and augmented and virtual reality.</p> +<p><em>THE CRIMINAL LAW AND THE 22 ARTICLES</em></p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>Second, and importantly, the ASL has been cited as the partial basis for an important new legal interpretation of China’s Criminal Law issued jointly by the SPC, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of State Security on May 26, 2024. This document, the “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (the “22 Articles”), instructs security authorities, including courts, police, and prosecutors, on how to handle cases of separatism — but also, for this reason, functions as a law prescribing offenses and punishments, which is why it was made public. The interpretation can stand on its own without the ASL, but the Chinese authorities thought it worth invoking, indicating a connection.</p> -<p>As one of the world’s premier cooperative research institutions, imec has made remarkable contributions to today’s semiconductor ecosystem. These contributions are reflected most clearly in the continued active participation of major chip manufacturers, system companies, and equipment, materials, and design software suppliers in imec programs, as well as the sustained support of the Flanders regional authorities. In addition to its outstanding research facilities and staff, the flexibility of the imec structure — allowing for different degrees of cooperation — and the independence of its leadership have made it a central node in the global semiconductor supply chain. Critically, the center is a major source of the next-generation manufacturing technologies needed to keep the Western chip industry continuing along its rapid trajectory, with all the economic and social benefits that entails.</p> +<p>The 22 Articles purports to be based on the ASL and the Criminal Law; it functions as an interpretive document, spelling out in more detail the actions and sanctions in Article 103 of the Criminal Law. In principle, there is no problem with this type of document in China’s legal system. Statutes are necessarily general, and it is common for bodies such as the SPC to issue documents under various names — interpretations, replies, and, in this case, opinions — to put meat on the bones of vague statutory terms.</p> -<p>For the United States, expanded collaboration with imec is an opportunity to accelerate the progress of U.S. semiconductor research programs, strengthen the transatlantic alliance, and minimize needlessly duplicative, costly investments in semiconductor research programs and infrastructure.</p> +<p>The following discussion examines what the 22 Articles criminalizes and the associated punishments, as well as its jurisdiction (i.e., who is liable). In brief, the response of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Office — to issue a travel alert discouraging all non-essential travel to the PRC — is not an overreaction and is quite justified.</p> -<hr /> +<p><em>WHAT THE 22 ARTICLES CRIMINALIZES</em></p> -<p><strong>Sujai Shivakumar</strong> directs the Renewing American Innovation (RAI) program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he also serves as a senior fellow. Dr. Shivakumar brings over two decades of experience in policy studies related to U.S. competitiveness and innovation.</p> +<p>Article 103 of the Criminal Law criminalizes actions of “organizing, plotting, or carrying out the splitting of the country and the sabotaging of the country’s unity” as well as “instigating splitting of the country and the sabotaging of the country’s unity.” Article 2 of the 22 Articles adds detail, laying out all the activities associated with what it calls “Taiwan independence” that constitute crimes under Article 103. The coverage is very broad, including efforts to change Taiwan’s legal status through changes to Taiwan’s domestic law, efforts to get Taiwan admitted into international organizations whose membership is limited to states, using one’s authority of office to “wantonly distort or misrepresent the reality that Taiwan is part of China,” and finally, “any other actions that seek to separate Taiwan from China.” The overall thrust of Article 2 seems to be aimed at government officials, but private citizens could of course commit many of the offenses listed, so are by no means safe.</p> -<p><strong>Charles Wessner</strong> is currently an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, where he teaches global innovation policy. He is active as a speaker, researcher, and writer with a global lens on innovation policy and frequently advises technology agencies, universities, and governments on effective innovation policies.</p> +<p>As if these provisions were not broad enough, Article 7 adds detail to Article 103 of the Criminal Law on “instigation” of separatism. It spells out that it is a crime to “stubbornly spread advocacy” of Taiwan independence and related programs or plans of action. Like Article 2, Article 7 adds a catch-all clause covering “other actions inciting Taiwan to separate from China.”</p> -<p><strong>Thomas Howell</strong> is an international trade attorney (currently in solo practice) serving as a consultant to CSIS Renewing American Innovation. During the course of his 40-plus year legal career, he has represented U.S.-based semiconductor companies and organizations in matters such as the U.S.-Japan trade disputes and litigation of the 1980s, the formation of Sematech in 1986–87, trade disputes with China (including the first WTO dispute settlement challenge to that country in 2003), and numerous other public policy initiatives.</p>Sujai Shivakumar, et al.Imec attracts and retains leading companies to cooperatively develop cutting-edge semiconductor technologies in a fiercely competitive and unforgiving industry. It is an opportunity for the United States National Semiconductor Technology Center and its nonprofit purpose-built operator, Natcast to learn from and collaborate with imec to accelerate the U.S. research and industry.China’s Nuke Worrying Europe2024-10-08T12:00:00+08:002024-10-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/chinas-nuke-shadow-to-europe<p><em>China’s nuclear expansion challenges European security by complicating NATO’s deterrence posture, raising concerns about extended deterrence and necessitating a strategic recalibration by NATO nuclear powers.</em></p> +<p>Somewhat absurdly, Article 11 stipulates a heavier punishment for those who violate these provisions “in collusion with” foreign or overseas (境外) entities or individuals. “Overseas” here is a term of art designed to cover places in which PRC jurisdiction is limited (Hong Kong and Macau) or absent (Taiwan) but that cannot, for political reasons, be called “foreign.” Thus, any violation by one person not carried out in complete, hermit-like isolation from all others will be considered collusive and therefore subject to a heavier punishment.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Punishments for the various offenses are already spelled out in the Criminal Law. They range in most circumstances from minor penalties — deprivation of political rights, for example — to life imprisonment. Article 113 of the Criminal Law states that in the very worst cases of violation of Article 103, “where the harm to the state and the people is especially serious and the circumstances especially odious,” the death penalty may be imposed. The 22 Articles repeats this to make sure everyone gets the message.</p> -<p>Many observers of European security still assume that China’s nuclear arsenal build-up does not threaten European interests. Yet as China moves away from a minimalist nuclear force posture, the US must necessarily recalibrate its own strategy and posture. This has a grave bearing on NATO’s deterrence construct, in which nearly all European allies depend on US nuclear weapons to provide for their fundamental security needs. China’s nuclear expansion thus adds urgency to the need to adapt NATO’s nuclear posture to the post-2022 environment.</p> +<p><em>WHO CAN BE LIABLE</em></p> -<p>China’s emergence as the second nuclear peer competitor of the US cannot help but impact European security in three ways. Firstly, it raises new questions for all three NATO nuclear powers as far as their nuclear strategy and posture are concerned. Washington, London and Paris face the question of whether their legacy posture remains fit for purpose in the future. If not, they will probably recalibrate their posture accordingly. Secondly, the emergence of nuclear multipolarity complicates deterrence decision-making and signalling. This may well translate into an erosion of the confidence allies have in extended deterrence. Thirdly, China’s growing arsenal puts renewed emphasis on theatre-level (as opposed to strategic-level) nuclear deterrence. As such, developments in the Indo-Pacific region amplify the need to reinvigorate NATO’s theatre-level deterrence.</p> +<p>The Criminal Law covers all actions committed in Chinese territory. As China deems Taiwan to be its territory, it covers actions committed in Taiwan, too. Ironically, given Taiwan’s de facto independence, China’s claim of criminal jurisdiction is even broader than in Hong Kong, where the Criminal Law, like all PRC laws, does not apply unless explicitly included in Annex III to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.</p> -<p>Instead of thinking about China’s nuclear arsenal as something that hardly affects European security, nuclear deterrence dynamics in Europe and the Indo-Pacific must be analysed together. With concerns about potential US abandonment already high in Europe due to the looming spectre of a second Trump presidency, China’s nuclear shadow can no longer be ignored by European capitals.</p> +<p>The Criminal Law also covers all actions committed by Chinese citizens anywhere in the world (though authorities may elect not to prosecute smaller infractions). From the PRC perspective, this includes Taiwan citizens. Thus, the Criminal Law covers actions by Taiwan individuals not just in Taiwan but abroad as well. This has some legal precedent in China: in March 2023, a Hong Kong student living in Japan was arrested upon her return to Hong Kong on a charge that a Facebook post she had made while in Japan “incited secession.”</p> -<h3 id="the-challenges-to-natos-strategic-deterrence">The Challenges to NATO’s Strategic Deterrence</h3> +<p>Finally, if either the action or its effect takes place in Chinese territory, it is covered by the Criminal Law. Chinese authorities would certainly argue that advocacy of Taiwan independence has an effect in Chinese territory, so even where the above bases for liability do not exist — for example, with non-Taiwan, non-PRC citizens outside of Taiwan and the PRC — the Criminal Law can still be made to apply.</p> -<p>China’s emergence as a nuclear superpower poses a challenge to the strategic nuclear forces that are the supreme guarantee of the security of all NATO allies. The construction of hundreds of new Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile silos, the ongoing switch to solid propellants, and the exercises of the People’s Liberation Army suggest that China is moving to a launch-on-warning posture akin to those maintained by Russia and the US. By the end of this decade, the Chinese arsenal is expected to grow beyond 1,000 operational nuclear warheads.</p> +<p>Thus, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that anything the PRC authorities deem to be advocacy of Taiwan independence, undertaken by anyone anywhere on the planet, constitutes a criminal offense. The actor is liable to prosecution if they come within reach of the PRC authorities. This is not idle speculation. British citizen Benedict Rogers, founder of Hong Kong Watch, was informed that he would be arrested if he went to Hong Kong, apparently on the basis of his criticisms of the local authorities made while in the United Kingdom. Samuel Chu, a U.S. citizen who has not resided in Hong Kong since 1990, is the subject of a 2020 arrest warrant issued by the Hong Kong authorities on charges under the National Security Law of “inciting secession” and “colluding with foreign powers” — the foreign power in question apparently being his country of citizenship. It is unlikely that this extensive scope is an accident of drafting. The threat is clear and intentional.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China’s posturing in its neighbourhood cannot help but impact extended deterrence in the NATO context because the US arsenal forms the backbone of the US-led alliance system worldwide</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Overall, the 22 Articles represents a major escalation in China’s war of intimidation against the people of Taiwan. The ASL was directed at Taiwan purely as a political entity; the only sanction mentioned in it is military action in response to what China deems unacceptable moves toward formal independence. The 22 Articles, by contrast, is specifically aimed at individuals.</p> -<p>This raises different questions for NATO’s nuclear powers. Washington is already embroiled in an intense debate over the need to augment its nuclear modernisation plans. In turn, London and Paris face the question of whether their arsenals, which historically have been designed with the ability to strike Moscow as the benchmark, retain sufficient deterrence value under nuclear multipolarity. Even if the French and British targeting strategies do not depend on numerical parity, major changes to the balance in strategic nuclear weapons mean that London and Paris must re-evaluate the technical adequacy of their existing posture.</p> +<h3 id="the-anti-secession-law-in-comparative-context">The Anti-Secession Law in Comparative Context</h3> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="a-sign-of-weakness-and-insecurity">A Sign of Weakness and Insecurity</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>Washington has become quite familiar with the two nuclear peer problem. Early in 2023, a study group convened by the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory analysed the implications of China’s emergence as a second nuclear peer in great detail. The final report of the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission recommended significant changes to US nuclear deterrence in order to be capable of simultaneously deterring Moscow and Beijing. If the US government stays committed to its existing nuclear strategy of holding the adversary arsenal at risk, China’s nuclear breakout will necessitate growing the size and adapting the composition of the US arsenal.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="julian-ku">Julian Ku</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Yet China’s growing nuclear arsenal also begs the question of whether France and the UK as separate centres of nuclear decision-making will respond with posture changes of their own. Against the background of the Ukraine war, both Paris and London have embraced wholescale nuclear modernisation, as explained by the French 2022 National Strategic Review and the UK’s Integrated Review Refresh of 2023. Will Paris and London remain satisfied with the deterrence value of their existing ability to exact vengeance in the event of an all-out conflict involving two opposing nuclear superpowers? Under such a scenario, a larger part of the US arsenal will be reserved for targets in the Indo-Pacific theatre instead of the European theatre. Whether London and Paris will step into the deterrence gap that would result from fewer US nuclear weapons being available for striking Russian targets remains to be seen. Yet growing doubts over what London and Paris consider “strict sufficiency” may prompt changes to French and British stockpiles, plans and capabilities. Even if Paris and London would struggle to fully replace US-provided extended deterrence, they could mitigate their relative vulnerability to nuclear coercion by expanding their range of retaliatory options.</p> +<h4 id="introduction-8">Introduction</h4> -<p>The UK Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper released in March 2024 highlights China’s expanding numbers of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. Not only does it emphatically declare the nuclear deterrent to the defence of NATO, but it also speaks repeatedly about potential adversaries in the plural. One way in which the UK could step up is by reintroducing a second nuclear delivery system. Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron has emphasised that nuclear deterrence is at the heart of French defence strategy and an element to be reckoned with in the defence of the European continent. After having declared US–China competition to be “an established strategic fact which … from now on will structure, all international relations”, Macron’s nuclear overtures presumably speak to the doubts some may have about US extended deterrence commitments.</p> +<p>When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) enacted the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) in 2005, it drew a sharp negative reaction in Taiwan and a flurry of scholarly analysis. Yet for the following two decades, the controversial law has barely played a role in shaping cross-Strait relations.</p> -<h3 id="complicating-deterrence-decision-making-and-signalling">Complicating Deterrence Decision-Making and Signalling</h3> +<p>All of that changed in June 2024, when the PRC prosecutorial and judicial authorities released official guidance on how the ASL is implemented in the PRC Criminal Code. These “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (the “22 Articles”) represented the first official statement that the ASL would be invoked to criminalize a wide range of conduct deemed supportive of or even related to Taiwan’s “secession” from China. The document both broadened the range of pro-Taiwan independence activities that might fall within the scope of the PRC’s Criminal Code and clarified that some of these activities could even warrant the death penalty.</p> -<p>Discussions about nuclear posture adaptation reverberate strongly in the Nuclear Planning Group, the senior NATO body on nuclear matters. During the Cold War, such discussions had one single adversary as their referent. The logic of deterrence had a quasi-dyadic character. Yet today, China’s nuclear rise is vastly complicating deterrence signalling and decision-making. The larger number of actors cannot help but rob deterrence of its earlier simplicity. This has major consequences for NATO because the emerging strategic tripolarity threatens to erode the confidence allies have in the US ability to deter different threats simultaneously.</p> +<p>In response to questions about the severity of the punishments contemplated by the 22 Articles, the spokesman for the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office defended the guidance as normal and internationally accepted. He stated:</p> -<p>As all three NATO nuclear powers grapple with deterrence challenges emanating far away from the Euro-Atlantic area, the choices they make will be interpreted as deterrence signals by the leaderships of multiple adversaries. In turn, these may give rise to further choices in Moscow, Beijing and other capitals such as Pyongyang and Tehran. US posture changes meant to address the consequences of China’s growing arsenal may prompt Russia to take countermeasures of its own. China’s posturing in its neighbourhood cannot help but impact extended deterrence in the NATO context because the US arsenal forms the backbone of the US-led alliance system worldwide. Nuclear multipolarity could thus set unpredictable chain reactions into motion. This generates novel challenges for the Nuclear Planning Group, as NATO’s nuclear strategy can no longer be tailored to the Russian threat alone.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>It is a common practice in all countries in the world to use criminal justice to punish criminals who seek to conduct secession and safeguard the core interests of the country. . . . It is reasonable and legal to punish the “Taiwan independence” diehards according to law for splitting the country and inciting the crime of secession.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>This emerging nuclear multipolarity has grave consequences for strategic stability. First, the interconnectedness between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres is set to increase. Every posture change or deterrence signal in response to China’s nuclear rise will prompt multiple assessments and responses by adversaries and allies alike. This is bound to fuel uncertainty rather than predictable nuclear equilibria. Second, such uncertainty may well prompt greater caution in the heads of key leaders, resulting in a desire to differentiate between strategic deterrence (in which the homeland offers a degree of sanctuary) and theatre-level deterrence (in which risk tolerance must be higher for the sake of extended deterrence). As nuclear deterrence is robbed of its earlier simplicity, strategic-level nuclear forces lose part of their value as instruments for providing extended deterrence.</p> +<p>Taiwan’s government rejects the application of the concept of secession to its situation, as it claims to be a separate and independent sovereign state. But even if, for the sake of argument, Taiwan’s formal independence does constitute “secession,” the PRC’s stance is far from “normal.” On the contrary, its approach to implementing the ASL is significantly out of step with how other countries — including the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada — treat potential secessionist movements. The PRC’s repressive tactics reveal a fundamental insecurity about its ability to persuade Taiwan residents to choose unification, an insecurity that is glaring when compared to the practice of other states.</p> -<h3 id="a-renewed-focus-on-theatre-level-nuclear-deterrence">A Renewed Focus on Theatre-level Nuclear Deterrence</h3> +<h4 id="global-trends-in-the-punishment-of-secession">Global Trends in the Punishment of Secession</h4> -<p>China’s nuclear expansion features the development of a theatre-level nuclear arsenal. This concerns foremost the Dong Feng-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile with a reported range of 4,000 km and a high degree of precision, characterised by the US Department of Defense as “the most likely weapon system to field low-yield warheads”. Another example is the introduction of the H-6N bomber, capable of delivering air-launched nuclear cruise missiles. These developments indicate that China has grasped the coercive value that theatre-level nuclear weapons can provide in a regional conflict.</p> +<p>As an initial matter, it is worth pointing out that international law offers little direct guidance on the question of secession. The UN Charter elevates territorial integrity to one of a state’s fundamental rights, but it also recognizes a people’s right to self-determination. As one scholar observed, “International law on its own is not the main legal space in which secessionist pressures find accommodation.”</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In response to the combined nuclear threats from Russia and China, NATO’s nuclear posture will need to become more robust, more survivable and more diversified than it is today</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Nonetheless, states have incurred obligations under international human rights law that limit how and in what circumstances they can punish even avowed secessionist activities. In a recent comment made to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Moldova’s laws on secession, a human rights watchdog surveyed a wide range of state practices regarding punishments of internal secessionist movements. It concluded that the vast majority of OSCE states limit anti-secession criminal punishment to activities involving the threat or use of force. This restrained approach to punishing only violence related to secession (and not the mere support of secession that the 22 Articles punishes) acknowledges the freedom of expression and due-process rights found in many international human rights instruments.</p> -<p>Theatre-level nuclear weapons generate strike options that differentiate between a geographically limited regional war and a full-blown strategic nuclear exchange. By trying to create and exploit a gap between the US and its allies in terms of their relative vulnerability in a conflict, such systems allow China to leverage any theatre-level conventional superiority as well as to threaten nuclear escalation to stave off conventional defeat. In the NATO community, such a vocabulary is well-known in the context of Russian nuclear sabre-rattling. This now risks being repeated by a second adversary that is much stronger in conventional terms. With China acquiring a large, diversified and fully survivable nuclear arsenal, extended deterrence relationships in the Indo-Pacific region will require theatre-level nuclear weapons just as much as NATO needed them in the Cold War.</p> +<p>Thus, Azerbaijan — which has been locked in a decades-long battle with what it deems Armenian secessionists — nonetheless limits criminal punishment to those organizing “armed rebellion or active participation in it with a view of violent change of constitutional power.” Its traditional rival, Armenia, imposes punishment for “actions targeted at violation of territorial integrity . . . through violence or under the threat of violence.” Other countries facing serious secessionist or territorial disputes, such as Croatia, Estonia, and the Czech Republic, take a similarly restrained approach.</p> -<p>While this is particularly troubling for Indo-Pacific allies, the implications for NATO allies are equally hard to overstate. Firstly, these developments reverse the post-Cold War trend of deprioritising theatre-level nuclear weapons that many policymakers in European capitals still take for granted. Secondly, as nuclear multipolarity increases the risk of miscalculation, the extended deterrence value of strategic arsenals is set to diminish unless this devaluation is offset by an increase of theatre-level systems. Extended deterrence guarantees embodied by non-strategic weapons deployed in theatre are much stronger than the promise of strategic nuclear weapon employment that allies have no say over. Thirdly, as both Russia and China field larger numbers of theatre-level nuclear systems, severe stress is being put on the US arsenal of theatre-level weapons due to competing demands. Given the limited number of available B-61 bombs, the emerging requirements in the Indo-Pacific may call the cross-theatre distribution of theatre-level weapons into question. Moreover, the risk of overstretch associated with simultaneous regional crises pertains to all sorts of deterrence capabilities, not just nuclear ones. US Air Force bombers, for instance, constitute critical assets for suppressing enemy air defences and enabling nuclear operations in both the European and Indo-Pacific theatres.</p> +<p>In contrast, Article 102 of the PRC Criminal Law prohibits colluding “with a foreign State to endanger the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the People’s Republic of China” whether or not this entails the use of force or violence. The 22 Articles makes clear that merely “participating” or “assisting” in Taiwan independence activities violates this part of the Criminal Law.</p> -<h3 id="take-aways-for-nato-nuclear-posture-adaptation">Take-aways for NATO Nuclear Posture Adaptation</h3> +<p>The only countries that have joined the PRC in this repressive approach to secessionist movements are authoritarian countries aligned with it through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), consisting of China, Belarus, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. For instance, Article 180 of the Kazakhstan Criminal Code punishes “propaganda or public calls for violation of the unitarity and integrity of the Republic of Kazakhstan, inviolability and inalienability of its territory or disintegration of the state,” without reference to the use of force or violence. Similarly, broad prohibitions on “separatist” or secessionist activities can be found in the criminal codes of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.</p> -<p>After the Nuclear Planning Group consultations in June 2023, then NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg explained that “we continue to adapt our nuclear deterrence to the changing security environment”. While this comment related to the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, it is not hard to see that nuclear developments in the Indo-Pacific will intensify the debate on NATO nuclear posture adaptation. NATO’s legacy posture – relying on small numbers of dual-capable aircraft delivering gravity bombs – is already no longer fit for purpose when taking Russia’s nuclear intimidation into account. While the introduction of the F-35A will offer a boost to NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements, NATO remains at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the wide array of non-strategic nuclear options fielded by Russia.</p> +<p>In sum, while international law does not strictly prohibit criminal punishments for secession, many countries facing secessionist movements have nonetheless chosen to limit criminal punishments to activities involving the use of force or violence. The PRC, along with a few aligned countries in Central Asia, is a clear outlier in this trend.</p> -<p>As China’s growing arsenal results in a greater emphasis on theatre-level nuclear capabilities, developments in the Indo-Pacific will exacerbate existing shortfalls. In response to the combined nuclear threats from Russia and China, NATO’s nuclear posture will need to become more robust, more survivable and more diversified than it is today. At the Vilnius Summit, NATO leaders called for “updating planning to increase flexibility and adaptability of the Alliance’s nuclear forces”. This relates to the numbers of dual-capable aircraft, the associated network of air bases, and the European air forces flying nuclear deterrence as well as conventional support missions. The need for a second theatre-level weapon system – offering greater stand-off capability and survivability – is already apparent in the light of the Russian threat alone. Yet China’s nuclear expansion does contribute to the growing urgency thereof, precisely because so many of the key capabilities needed for shoring up extended deterrence in the European and Indo-Pacific theatres are in such short supply.</p> +<h4 id="the-united-states-and-secession">The United States and Secession</h4> -<hr /> +<p>The United States has wrestled with secessionist movements for much of its history, including a devastating civil war over secession by southern states. At times, the PRC has used this history to analogize its own right to use force against Taiwan. For instance, in 2022, Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi told the Asia Society, “Just as the US would not allow Hawaii to break away,” Beijing “reserves the right” to seek unification with Taiwan.</p> -<p><strong>Alexander Mattelaer</strong> is an Associate Professor in International Security at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Brussels School of Governance and a Senior Research Fellow at Egmont – the Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations.</p>Alexander MattelaerChina’s nuclear expansion challenges European security by complicating NATO’s deterrence posture, raising concerns about extended deterrence and necessitating a strategic recalibration by NATO nuclear powers.From Mine To Microchip2024-10-07T12:00:00+08:002024-10-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/from-mine-to-microchip<p><em>The United States relies on China and Russia for minerals used in semiconductors, posing a clear national security risk. While the CHIPS Act has built downstream U.S. capacity, upstream incentives are needed to secure materials for the next generation of advanced chips.</em></p> +<p>This talking point, however, ignores how U.S. law differs from PRC law in its treatment of secession. First, like many other nations, the United States does not criminalize mere advocacy of secession. Rather, Section 2283 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code punishes incitement or assistance of a “rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States.” First enacted in 1862 during the U.S. Civil War, this passage has rarely been used. In the most detailed case, it was applied to convict individuals accused of warlike conduct such as outfitting ships to attack U.S. commerce during the Civil War. It has not, and almost certainly could not, be interpreted to apply to mere advocacy of secession.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>U.S. law also punishes “seditious conspiracy,” which is defined as two or more persons who “conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States.” Although broadly worded, Section 2384 of Title 18 requires that individuals charged with seditious conspiracy have or had an intention to use force in a way that the PRC’s sedition law does not. Moreover, while this provision has recently been used — with a D.C. court convicting individuals of planning to physically breach the U.S. Capitol grounds on January 6, 2021, to block the certification of the presidential election — U.S. courts have rejected broader applications of the law to prosecute strikes, kidnapping, and even the planned assassination of local law enforcement officers.</p> -<p>Semiconductors are a vital and mineral-intensive component in the electronic devices that power the modern economy. Four minerals central to semiconductor production — gallium, germanium, palladium, and silicon — face heightened supply chain risks due to dependence on China and Russia. Building resilient supply chains for these minerals is essential for the next generation of chipmaking. To date, enacted legislation has focused on downstream manufacturing, leaving American technologies highly vulnerable to minerals supply chain disruptions. A new policy playbook for semiconductor minerals is necessary to incentivize private sector investment and foster cooperation with allies and strategic partners.</p> +<p>Given this approach to punishing rebellion and sedition, it is not surprising that Hawaiian independence activists can advocate for and seek independence without fearing U.S. prosecution. The United States has also allowed Puerto Rico to hold numerous referendums on the question of independence without threat of criminal liability. To be sure, the U.S. government has in the past taken draconian measures to oppose San Juan’s independence, such as banning the Puerto Rican flag, but it has generally only prosecuted independence advocates who resorted to violence. Such violent activities have ranged from an attempt to assassinate President Harry S. Truman in 1950 to over 130 bombings on the U.S. mainland in the 1970s and 1980s.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Despite this violent history, Washington has accommodated efforts by Puerto Ricans to hold six plebiscites on the island’s relationship with the United States since 1967. These votes have generally favored Puerto Rico’s status quo as a commonwealth that is neither independent nor a state. While independence activists had drawn some support in earlier votes, a slim majority of voters (52 percent) in November 2020 instead supported immediate statehood. Meanwhile, support for independence sits in the single digits. President Joe Biden has supported Puerto Rican statehood, and some members of the U.S. Congress have proposed a law that, if passed, would require admission of the island as the fifty-first state. While far from perfect, the U.S. process of managing aspirations for Puerto Rican independence has, at least since the 1930s, allowed peaceful and open activism in favor of independence as well as free and fair votes on the question. This confident accommodation of Puerto Rico’s secessionist movement contrasts dramatically with the PRC’s insecure and repressive approach to Taiwan.</p> -<p>Semiconductors are a critical technology for economic security, and they are also incredibly mineral intensive. Semiconductors are present in all types of electronics, including smartphones, computers, automotives, energy storage, medical devices, lighting, and military and aerospace applications. Four indispensable minerals — gallium, germanium, palladium, and silicon — face significant supply chain risks. While current government funding and tax incentives, such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), focus on addressing supply chain vulnerabilities and stimulating private investment, they are limited to metals used to manufacture electric vehicle (EV) batteries. Moreover, though the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 was designed to boost semiconductor manufacturing, it does not include any support for the related mineral inputs.</p> +<p>The United States is not alone in its refusal to use criminal law to suppress secessionist speech and its willingness to allow secessionist movements to hold democratic votes. Most recently, the United Kingdom allowed Scotland to hold a free and open vote in 2014 on whether to separate from the rest of the country and pledged to honor the results of that vote. Similarly, in 1995, Canada did not take action to punish Quebec’s government for holding a vote on independence even though its supreme court later found that a unilateral secession would violate Canadian law. In all three jurisdictions, residents were given the ability to vote in free and fair elections on the question of secession, free from the threat of criminal punishment.</p> -<p>The CHIPS Act provided over $280 billion for advanced chip manufacturing, packaging, and workforce development. The bill focused almost entirely on onshoring downstream capabilities, and as a result significant funding has gone to companies such as Intel and Micron to enable them to build and expand fabrication facilities for chipmaking. Yet the CHIPS Act did not include any provisions to incentivize the diversification of critical mineral supply chains for semiconductors. This is a major national security oversight. Without alternative sourcing, the semiconductor supply chain remains highly dependent on China and other U.S. adversaries. This has already backfired. In August 2023, China imposed export restrictions on gallium and germanium, alarming the U.S. semiconductor industry. China accounts for 98 percent of the world’s refined gallium and 68 percent of the world’s germanium production. The United States, meanwhile, produces no gallium and less than 2 percent of the world’s refined germanium. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that just a 30 percent supply disruption of gallium could cause a $602 billion decline in U.S. economic output, equivalent to 2.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), posing a significant economic threat.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-2">Conclusion</h4> -<p>The United States needs policies that incentivize investment in mineral supply chains that are independent of Chinese control. Just as the IRA has spurred private sector investment in lithium, copper, nickel, and graphite for EVs, the right set of tax incentives and grant programs could bolster the mineral supply chains on which semiconductor technologies rely.</p> +<p>As a matter of principle, Taiwan’s government may object to considering the concept of secession given its existing claims to already be a sovereign country. However, even if the PRC is right that Taiwan’s formal separation would constitute secession, Beijing’s use of criminal threats and disregard for democratic processes departs from international trends. Many countries, including the United States, allow peaceful consideration and democratic deliberation on questions of secession. This confirms that the PRC’s hard-edged ASL approach is far from normal. Instead, its harsh threats to punish peaceful, nonviolent advocacy of democratic deliberation on Taiwan’s status reflect the PRC’s larger failure to offer the people of Taiwan a real choice in their future. It is worth noting that in a free vote conducted without the threat of criminal punishment or military invasion, the people of Quebec, Scotland, and Puerto Rico all decided against secession. It is a sad commentary on the failure of the PRC’s Taiwan policy that there is little chance of a similar result if such an election were held on the island.</p> -<h3 id="mineral-inputs-for-semiconductors">Mineral Inputs for Semiconductors</h3> +<h3 id="chinas-anti-secession-law-2">China’s Anti-Secession Law</h3> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="bluster-to-bite">Bluster to Bite?</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>Semiconductors control the flow of electric currents within electronic devices. In order to perform this function, semiconductors use a variety of minerals for their different conductive and insulative properties. The manufacturing process is extensive and complex, requiring industry-specific equipment (e.g., lithography machines) and precise processes (e.g., etching, packaging, and cleaning for impurities). The type of semiconductor and the stage of manufacturing determine the minerals needed. For example, fluorine is used in etching and purifying, while titanium comes into play during advanced packaging.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="margaret-k-lewis">Margaret K. Lewis</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Because it can be conductive, semiconductive, or even insulative, silicon is the most common material for chip wafers. After initial manufacturing, silicon wafers undergo a process called doping, where additional metals such as gallium, arsenic, iridium, and phosphorous are introduced to slightly alter the wafers’ conductivity. Copper and cobalt make up the wires connecting these billions of transistors together into one integrated circuit. By the end of the manufacturing process, a dozen different minerals may have been used in the creation of a single chip.</p> +<h4 id="introduction-9">Introduction</h4> -<p>This paper focuses on gallium, germanium, palladium, and silicon for several reasons. First, the primary application for gallium, germanium, and silicon is the semiconductor industry, with U.S. demand for these minerals consequently being driven by the industry. In contrast, demand for copper, titanium, and cobalt is driven by the energy, construction, automotive, and aerospace industries. Second, these same three minerals — gallium, germanium, and silicon — are the most used semiconductor materials and lack good substitutes; other materials such as arsenic are only needed in trace amounts for gallium arsenide (GaAs) chips, which are increasingly being substituted with higher-performance gallium nitride (GaN) compounds. Finally, the United States is reliant on foreign adversaries for the import of these four essential minerals, whereas it was a top exporter of iridium, fluorine, and phosphorous in 2022 and already has a plethora of allied sourcing options in India, Israel, Japan, and South Korea.</p> +<p>The classic cartoon version of the Three Little Pigs features two carefree pigs overconfidently singing “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Wolf?” As the fable goes, they ultimately retreat to safety in the home of the third pig, who had prepared for the threat by building a brick house. Nearly 20 years after its enactment, who should be afraid of China’s “big, bad” Anti-Secession Law (ASL)? Does it carry serious bite, or is it mere bluster?</p> -<p>Considering the industry specificity of these four minerals, U.S. reliance on imports from foreign adversaries, and the export restrictions and supply disruptions that gallium, germanium, palladium, and silicon already face, or are likely to face, prioritizing new sourcing is key for U.S. economic security.</p> +<p>As discussed in the analysis by Donald Clarke, the ASL is in many ways an unusual law that is heavy on broad assertions and light on clear rules. While the ASL has lurked in the background for nearly 20 years, China’s 2024 “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (the “22 Articles”) sharpens its teeth by foregrounding its linkage to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It even provides that punishments can, in severe circumstances, warrant the death penalty. That advocating Taiwan independence anywhere could have an effect in Chinese territory — as authorities in China could argue, at least — means potential global liability. Put starkly, the ASL now applies to advocacy emanating from any “brick house” if deemed as having effects in China, though it is a different question as to whether the Chinese authorities could extract people from their safe havens to inflict punishment.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DRJQVwY.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Semiconductor Minerals Risk Comparison.</strong> Source: Author’s research.</em></p> +<p>The 22 Articles interprets the subjects (i.e., the “doers”) and objects (i.e., the “receivers,” who are having something done to them) of the ASL. When the law came on the scene nearly 20 years ago, it had a clear message about Beijing’s desired future for Taiwan but few details about who was allegedly doing what to impede the stated goal of unification across the Taiwan Strait. The focus was on when the PRC might use force against Taiwan (couched in the term “non-peaceful means”), not when the PRC might use force against individuals deemed as impeding unification with Taiwan (such as by restricting their rights during criminal prosecution and sentencing). The 22 Articles hones the ASL from a murky document to one that has enhanced bite, or at least sharpened teeth. The United States is thus at a moment where it is prudent to ask what protective measures should be taken to guard against the ASL’s reach — in other words, how best to build the brick house and how cautious people should be about stepping outside it.</p> -<h3 id="critical-minerals-for-semiconductors-which-minerals-pose-the-greatest-risks">Critical Minerals for Semiconductors: Which Minerals Pose the Greatest Risks?</h3> +<h4 id="the-who-and-whom-of-the-asl">The Who and Whom of the ASL</h4> -<h4 id="gallium">Gallium</h4> +<p>Article 2 of the ASL speaks in terms of countering “‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces” (‘台独’分裂势力), a phrase that is repeated in Article 8. Article 3 further warns against interference by “outside [foreign] forces” (外国势力). In Articles 1 and 4, the ASL also calls for safeguarding the “Chinese nation” (中华民族, which also carries the meaning of the “Chinese people”) and speaks of the duties of the “Chinese people” (中国人民) — of which “Taiwan compatriots” (台湾同胞) are declared to be a part (Articles 2, 4, 6, 9) — to safeguard territorial integrity and achieve unification. It does not, however, specify what actions would transform someone from a “Taiwan compatriot” into a “secessionist force.”</p> -<p>Gallium is key to unlocking higher-power and higher-frequency electronics. Yet, the mineral is also the semiconductor mineral with the highest supply chain vulnerability due to the concentration of its global production in China and the high dependence of U.S. semiconductor manu¿facturing on Chinese imports. Used to produce GaN and GaAs high-performance chips, gallium offers higher speed, lower resistance, and lower production costs when compared to alternatives. Gallium is an indispensable, non-substitutable material for the United States’ defense industry’s next generation of electronic devices. These kinds of chips can be found in mobile phones, automotives, satellites, and LiDAR sensors. Today, China produces 98 percent of the world’s gallium, meaning that even as the United States reshores semiconductor fabrication facilities with CHIPS Act money, the semiconductor industry remains reliant on materials sourced from China.</p> +<p>The Chinese “state” (国家) shall never allow secession (Article 2) and shall further do its utmost to achieve unification (Article 5), as well as take measures to promote cross-Strait relations (Article 6), with Article 8 specifying the roles of several specific bodies within this state. In the event that “non-peaceful means” (非和平方式) are used, the state shall protect “Taiwan civilians” (台湾平民), “foreign nationals in Taiwan” (在台湾的外国人), and “Taiwan compatriots in other parts of China” (台湾同胞在中国其他地区) (Article 9). There is one reference to “Taiwan authorities” (台湾当局) in Article 7, but as passive objects without agency whose status requires clarification.</p> -<p>The difficulty in diversifying gallium sources centers on the mineral’s availability. It is exceedingly rare in the Earth’s crust — less than 19 parts per million (ppm) — and is sourced only as a byproduct of bauxite mining. The United States has small bauxite reserves (just 20 million metric tons) and minimal mining activity. Guinea, however, has the world’s largest bauxite reserves, at 7.4 billion metric tons, followed by Australia (5.1 billion) and Brazil (2.7 billion). In 2022, 64.3 percent of global bauxite exports came from Guinea, 12.0 percent from Australia, 9.3 percent from Indonesia, and 2.4 percent from Brazil. Most of these exports went to China for refining. For example, 81.5 percent of Guinea’s bauxite exports went to China, as did 97 percent of Australia’s and 100 percent of Indonesia’s.</p> +<p>Overall, the ASL depicts the Chinese state as justified in acting toward the goal of unification; it is the doer, and the object of its actions is Taiwan. It is unclear, however, who the separatist forces it seeks to quell are and what activities would gain someone the label of being part of these forces.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XgFQnSr.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Top Bauxite Exporters in 2022.</strong> Source: <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/hs/aluminium-ore">“Aluminum ore,” Observatory of Economic Complexity</a>.</em></p> +<h4 id="the-who-and-whom-of-the-22-articles">The Who and Whom of the 22 Articles</h4> -<p>If the United States seeks to increase its bauxite imports from non-Chinese sources, the private sector will need to invest in mineral-refining infrastructure in bauxite-rich allied nations and secure offtake agreements with Western mining companies. As an established ally, Australia would be an excellent partner for the United States to develop a bauxite-to-gallium refining pipeline. Guinea and Brazil are also potential partners for sourcing bauxite, and investing in the development of refineries can boost economic development in these states while decreasing dependence on China and minimizing the related supply chain vulnerabilities.</p> +<p>Like the ASL, the 22 Articles uses the familiar language of the “Chinese nation” (中华民族) and “compatriots” (同胞). Yet it goes a step further from using “‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces” (‘台独’分裂势力) to warn about “a very small number of ‘Taiwan independence’ die-hards who wantonly carry out ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities” (极少数‘台独’顽固分子大肆进行‘台独’分裂活动) (Article 1). The phrase “forces” (势力) is nowhere to be found. The focus is squarely on “elements” (分子), and the 22 Articles goes on to advise how judicial authorities should identify these elements’ crimes under Article 103 of the Criminal Law, which covers “separatism and inciting separatism.”</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1S5L9jc.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Share of Bauxite Exports Headed to China.</strong> Source: <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/hs/aluminium-ore">“Aluminum ore,” Observatory of Economic Complexity</a>.</em></p> +<p>Unlike the vague ASL, the 22 Articles provides guidance on various activities that would violate Article 103 in the context of Taiwan, as well as how to determine if a person’s actions qualify them as a “ringleader” (首要分子) and when conduct is sufficiently robust to reach a level of “active participation” (积极参加). As in the ASL, the object of alleged harm is expressed in terms of general conceptions of the “state and people” (国家和人民). In this context, supporting Taiwan independence is a way of inflicting harm on Beijing’s conception of China. What the 22 Articles adds is an articulation of what kinds of activities are harmful enough to be criminal.</p> -<h4 id="germanium">Germanium</h4> +<p>The 22 Articles echoes the ASL’s warning of “outside [foreign] forces” (外国势力), but Article 11 includes broader phrasing of collusion with institutions, organizations, and individuals that are outside the borders (境外机构、组织、个人) as an aggravating factor in determining punishment, thus unequivocally covering Taiwan and not just “foreign” countries. The document does not address these outside actors as being “doers” subject to criminal punishment. Reading the Criminal Law, however, they could themselves be prosecuted directly under Article 103 and other provisions because the Criminal Law is not limited to subjects labeled “‘Taiwan independence’ diehards.” So long as someone satisfies the general requirements for criminal liability (e.g., meeting the age of criminal responsibility in Article 17), they can be charged with crimes of separatism if the Chinese authorities determine that all elements of Article 103 are met.</p> -<p>Due to its high electron mobility, germanium is a key material for high-speed transistors. Fiber-optic cable manufacturing accounts for one-third of germanium demand. Germanium wafers are high performing and can be found in computer processors, infrared detectors, communication systems, and radar systems. No alternatives to germanium exist without significant performance losses.</p> +<p>Notably, Article 103 of the Criminal Law includes not only “carrying out” separatist acts but also “organizing” and “plotting” them (组织、策划、实施分裂国家). This language also appears in the 22 Articles. Guidance is lacking, however, on what level of conduct beyond mere thoughts is needed to reach the threshold of organizing or plotting separatism. In other words, what is the scope of inchoate criminal liability (i.e., when can a person still face criminal punishment even if their actions fall short of committing a crime)? For instance, would an academic roundtable discussing a possible role for Taiwan in the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), or other international organizations limited to sovereign states amount to “plotting” the promotion of Taiwan’s independence, as proscribed in Article 2(3) of the 22 Articles?</p> -<p>Germanium is sourced as a byproduct of the processing of zinc ores; it does not occur as a natural metal. The Earth’s crust is only 1.5 ppm germanium, making the mineral one of the rarest metals on the periodic table. Countries with the greatest zinc reserves, aside from China, include Australia, Peru, and Mexico.</p> +<p>That Article 103 encompasses not only the crime of separatism but also the “crime of inciting separatism” (煽动分裂国家罪) provides further elasticity in terms of criminal liability. This is underscored by the 22 Articles’ broad definition of this crime as “stubbornly promoting ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist ideas and their separatist principles, plans, and programs” (顽固宣扬“台独”分裂主张及其分裂行动纲领、计划、方案的) and, even more expansively, as “other actions inciting Taiwan to separate from China” (其他煽动将台湾从中国分裂出去的行为) (Article 7).</p> -<p>As the world’s leading producer of refined germanium, China accounts for about 60 percent of global supply. Since imposing export restrictions last year, germanium prices have climbed over 70 percent, to $2,280 per kilogram. The United States produces some germanium from zinc mines in Tennessee and Alaska, but over half of its domestic consumption is imported, largely from China (53 percent), Belgium (22 percent), Germany (11 percent), and Russia (9 percent).</p> +<p>Clarke’s piece in this compendium addresses the global reach of liability under Article 103 via its interaction with other articles of the Criminal Law. Similarly, other parts of the Criminal Law expand the conduct covered by Article 103, not just the territory. Specifically, Article 23 provides for punishment of attempted crimes, albeit with the possibility that said punishment will be mitigated. What acts might not rise to the level of “inciting separatism” but still qualify as attempting to incite Taiwan to separate from China? Will this gray zone prompt people to take protective measures to assert that they are not advocating independence? What if a person does not engage in separatist crimes or incite separatist crimes by their own hands but assists those who do? Does accomplice liability under Article 27 of the Criminal Law kick in because someone played an ancillary role in the crimes of another?</p> -<p>Germanium needs significant refining to become suitable material for semiconductors, and germanium refining infrastructure is currently dominated by China. Companies in the United States face significant hurdles in justifying investment in new refining capacity for germanium. Germanium refining is particularly expensive, as the metal needs to reach purity levels of over 99.999 percent. The process is not only costly, but technically challenging and energy intensive. While China manages to keep production costs low through reduced environmental and social safeguards, manufacturers outside of China have not been able to compete. Without the kind of government subsidies Chinese competitors have, U.S. companies will not be competitive in the face of higher labor and power costs, necessitating financial incentives to reduce the cost of doing business.</p> +<p>In sum, while the 22 Articles opens by mentioning “a very small number” (极少数) of Taiwan separatists as the subjects, its emphasis on the linkage between the ASL and Criminal Law provides no comfort that the targets of potential criminal prosecution are “very small,” especially when Article 1 calls on the security and judicial organs to give “full play to their functions and roles” (发挥职能作用). The Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC State Council has only expressly listed 10 individuals as “‘Taiwan independence’ diehards,” but there is no analysis of why these people were included or guidance about when or why others might be added to the list. Moreover, although there is coordination across government bodies, there is no assurance that the prosecutors and courts are limited to the listed individuals when pursuing criminal charges related to separatism and Taiwan.</p> -<h4 id="palladium">Palladium</h4> +<p>There are many unanswered questions. What acts are nefarious enough for the PRC authorities to label someone a “‘Taiwan independence’ diehard”? What nonpublic lists exist in addition to the public one? To what extent is the Taiwan Affairs Office list a constraint on decisions by prosecutors and the courts? This is not known. What is known is that if the PRC authorities decide to charge someone under Article 103 for their activities related to Taiwan, it is politically inconceivable that a court would rule that the person is not guilty. If that convicted person is physically within China (as compared with having been tried in absentia), it is likewise hard to imagine a scenario where they would not be punished by at least some period of incarceration. The 22 Articles, with its express invocation of the Criminal Law, makes these questions of conviction and punishment more immediate and real.</p> -<p>Palladium is one of six platinum group metals (PGMs). Metals in this group are characterized by high melting points, heat and corrosion resistance, and catalytic properties. Palladium is used in the metal connections attaching chips to circuit boards, and palladium plating is used on semiconductors to ensure longevity and reliability. As semiconductors advance and chips become increasingly compact, the risk of oxidation and deterioration rises. Palladium’s durability and corrosion and oxidation resistance make it a crucial protective shield on chips to ensure their sustained performance.</p> +<h4 id="protecting-from-the-bite-of-the-asl-22-articles-and-criminal-law-trio">Protecting from the Bite of the ASL, 22 Articles, and Criminal Law Trio</h4> -<p>The United States produces just 5 percent of the world’s palladium from its two operations in Montana, both owned by Sibanye Stillwater, a South African company. Domestic production represents just 16 percent of the nation’s consumption, leaving domestic industry reliant on imports from other palladium-rich nations.</p> +<p>In a recent conversation about the enhanced law enforcement tools provided by Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law — which was passed in the name of national security but brings enhanced erosion of individual liberties — I raised concerns with Chinese interlocutors regarding the legislation’s further empowering of the Hong Kong government to impose criminal punishments for actions that are viewed as exercises of protected freedoms of expression and assembly under international human rights law (to which Hong Kong should abide under China’s accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). The response indicated that there should not be too much concern because implementation could well show that the legislation will be invoked cautiously. In short, “Wait and see.” I, in turn, explained that not only was the chilling effect already palpable, but also that the only way to see where the line for triggering enforcement is drawn would be for people to put their individual liberty at risk. In other words, lines can only be clarified at tremendous personal cost.</p> -<p>Russia holds the world’s largest palladium reserves and produces over 40 percent of the world’s palladium from just two top-performing projects. In 2021, the United States imported 35 percent of its palladium from Russia. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration warned the semiconductor industry to diversify its palladium supply chains. Compounding matters, the World Platinum Investment Council predicts a 1.28 million ounce palladium deficit in 2024, equivalent to over one-third of Russia’s total production in 2022. These deficits are largely the result of supply issues as mine producers restructure in response to a period of suppressed prices.</p> +<p>Similarly, the 22 Articles has sharpened the teeth of the ASL by emphasizing its interrelation with the Criminal Law. It remains to be seen who will do something, whether intentionally or inadvertently, that tests the line and prompts PRC authorities to invoke Article 103. Audiences outside of China who are concerned about this issue can express concern to Chinese interlocutors about the message that the 22 Articles sends, caution people outside of China who do not support the party line on Taiwan about the potential for law enforcement intervention should they visit the PRC (as the Taiwan government has prudently done), and encourage countries not to extradite people to China who could face criminal prosecutions for their views on Taiwan. The number of people who could be deemed to have run afoul of Article 103 is vast. The international community should take seriously what China has said, and the United States should expand and fortify its brick houses to protect against the threat it has declared.</p> -<p>South Africa holds the world’s second-largest reserves of palladium, contributing 34 percent of the world’s production. The country’s largest venture, Mogalakwena, produces 6 percent of the world’s palladium and is owned by Anglo American, a UK company. The industry faces several challenges in South Africa, including rising production costs, energy and transport infrastructure failures, lack of permitting, labor disputes, and declining ore grades. South Africa ranked 62nd out of 84 jurisdictions in the 2021 Fraser Investment Attractiveness Index, one place below the Democratic Republic of the Congo and just above Ecuador. The index indicates that South Africa is not an attractive option for Western private sector investment because of the aforementioned risks without government-led incentives.</p> +<h3 id="the-weaponization-of-criminal-jurisdiction">The Weaponization of Criminal Jurisdiction</h3> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="the-prcs-22-articles-criminalizing-advocacy-for-taiwan-independence">The PRC’s 22 Articles Criminalizing Advocacy for “Taiwan Independence”</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>The total cash cost for mining one ounce of palladium in Mogalakwena is $590, compared to just $402 at Norilsk in Russia. With palladium prices down to just $923 per ounce, Russian palladium mining operations have a 56 percent greater profit margin than Anglo American’s project in South Africa. However, the South Africa mining operations are more economical than those in the United States. The Sibanye Stillwater palladium mine in Montana faces 2024 operating costs of $1,032 per ounce, greater than the current selling price of palladium. As current palladium prices make domestic mining operations untenable, the United States needs to be incentivizing investment in countries such as South Africa where operation costs will be more competitive with Russia and, therefore, projects will be more likely to succeed.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="raymond-c-e-sung">Raymond C-E Sung</h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="silicon">Silicon</h4> +<h4 id="introduction-10">Introduction</h4> -<p>Silicon is the most important mineral for semiconductor manufacturing and is used to make silicon wafers, the largest portion of the semiconductor materials market. Integrated circuits with billions of transistors are squeezed onto less than a square inch of silicon. Although Japan and South Korea perform the majority of global silicon wafer manufacturing, China accounts for 79 percent of global raw silicon production and 75 percent of the ultra-high-purity polysilicon needed for semiconductors, demonstrating the need for polysilicon manufacturing in allied countries in order to diversify silicon sourcing and reduce potential supply disruptions.</p> +<p>On May 26, 2024, various organs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) — including the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Justice — adopted the “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” (the “22 Articles”). The gist of the 22-point document is provided in Article 2, which deems advocacy for “Taiwan independence” as a criminal act of “separatism,” detailing the acts that shall constitute such behavior.</p> -<p>Silicon is the second-most common element in the Earth’s crust and is mined in open pits as silica sand. However, silicon is bound to oxygen, alumina, and magnesium, so it has to undergo extensive refining to extract silicon metal and produce high-purity polysilicon. In the early 2000s, an oligopoly of seven companies, known as the Seven Sisters and all located in the United States, Japan, and Germany, dominated the polysilicon market. Today, six companies dominate the global polysilicon supply — five out of those six companies are Chinese owned.</p> +<h4 id="extension-of-the-application-of-prc-criminal-law-to-taiwan">Extension of the Application of PRC Criminal Law to Taiwan</h4> -<p>Analyses of gallium, germanium, palladium, and silicon supply chains highlight both the dominance of foreign adversaries in the production of these critical raw materials and the importance of commercially viable, Western mineral-refining projects. Building a resilient domestic semiconductor industry will require not only incentives and subsidies in downstream manufacturing, but also support to develop mining and refining capabilities in allied countries.</p> +<p>The PRC has long maintained its claim over Taiwan, including this claim in its constitution. However, it had not been clear whether the crime of secession provided in Article 103 of its Criminal Law applies to Taiwan. In this sense, the 22 Articles removes room for possible doubt and, in explicit terms, extends the substantive scope of Article 103 to apply to advocacy of “Taiwan independence.”</p> -<h3 id="lessons-from-the-ira-what-worked-to-incentivize-investments-in-ev-mineral-supply-chains">Lessons from the IRA: What Worked to Incentivize Investments in EV Mineral Supply Chains</h3> +<p>Under international law, however, the Chinese claim over Taiwan is legally in contention, and the PRC does not in fact control the island. The aforementioned application of Criminal Law to the case of Taiwan rests on a claim, not a settled territorial status — making it fundamentally different from similar provisions found in the criminal codes of many other countries. The state organs of the PRC have often cited the criminalization of secession in other states to justify the legality of its move without mentioning the fundamental difference in terms of territorial status. As such, this move advances a contentious claim wrapped under the cloak of law.</p> -<p>The IRA was the Biden administration’s flagship legislation meant to incentivize the transition to clean energy and EVs. Several provisions created financial mechanisms to expand and strengthen critical mineral projects, including the Section 30D Clean Vehicle Tax Credit, the 48C Investment Tax Credit, the 45X Production Tax Credit, additional grant funding for the Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III program, and Department of Energy loan programs.</p> +<p>As a matter of PRC domestic law, the 22 Articles provides a supplemental interpretation of the offence of secession. The document itself is not a legislative act or an ordinance but seems to be an interpretative instrument in the PRC legal system. It contains a set of elaborate provisions that operationalize the prosecution, arrest, trial (including trial in absentia), and sentencing (with a maximum sentence of death for a “ringleader” or serious offender) of the crime in question, and in many places bears the hallmarks of legal tactics found in Hong Kong’s National Security Law. In promulgating the 22 Articles, the PRC seems to be building on the experience gained from cracking down on all forms of dissent in Hong Kong using legislative and judicial means. In this sense, the document is a tool to wage lawfare and infringe on fundamental human rights. It bears careful legal analysis in conjunction with provisions of the PRC Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law.</p> -<p>The Section 30D New Clean Vehicle Tax Credit provides up to $7,500 in tax credits for qualifying EV purchases. To be eligible, vehicle manufacturers must meet several criteria, including sourcing requirements for critical minerals and components. As part of 30D, vehicles eligible for a $3,750 tax credit at purchase must: (1) ensure that 50 percent of critical minerals contained in EV batteries produced in 2024 (increasing to 80 percent by 2027) are extracted and processed in the United States, or a country with which the United States has a free trade agreement (FTA) or critical minerals agreement (CMA); and (2) do not contain any critical minerals extracted or processed by a Foreign Entity of Concern, such as China or Russia. To take advantage of the 30D program, EV manufacturers are looking to quickly diversify critical mineral supply chains away from China, but there is little evidence that Section 30D is actually driving mining companies to expand operations in FTA countries. Although lithium- and nickel-mining explorations in countries such as Australia and Canada have moderately increased in 2023, exploration in lithium-rich FTA countries, such as Chile, has stalled. At the same time, exploration in non-FTA countries, such as Argentina, has increased because it has a more favorable domestic investment policy climate. Without extending IRA benefits to Argentina, there is little incentive to export minerals to the United States instead of China.</p> +<p>Overall, the 22 Articles furthers the agenda of the PRC’s Anti-Secession Law (ASL) in suppressing “Taiwan independence” forces. It constitutes an unlawful claim of criminal jurisdiction under international law, and the international community should push back.</p> -<p>Some critical mineral projects may qualify for the IRA’s Qualifying Advanced Energy Project Investment Tax Credit (48C) or its Advanced Manufacturing Production Tax Credit (45X). The 48C credit was renewed and expanded under the IRA with an additional $10 billion in funding. So far, the Department of Energy has announced $6 billion for projects investing in clean energy manufacturing as well as the refining, processing, and recycling of critical materials. Albemarle, Novonix, and MP Materials have all received the 48C Investment Tax Credit for their critical minerals projects. The 45X credit aims to spur domestic production capacity by offering a 10 percent tax credit to companies producing critical materials for EV battery manufacturing in the United States. These two credits are especially desired by the private sector, as they can be sold in exchange for cash. However, the credits are restricted to projects within the United States, limiting their reach; companies investing abroad — even in allied nations — largely do not qualify.</p> +<h4 id="pursuing-the-asls-agenda-with-newly-learned-lawfare-tactics">Pursuing the ASL’s Agenda with Newly Learned Lawfare Tactics</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HVA7KIp.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Exploration Budget for Lithium by Country, 2014–2022 (USD, millions).</strong> Source: S&amp;P Capital IQ Pro.</em></p> +<p>The term “‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces” (“台獨”分裂勢力) was already found in the PRC’s 2005 ASL. Article 8 of the ASL authorizes the use of “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures” in three cases: (1) where the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces cause a fait accompli of Taiwan’s secession from China; (2) where a major incident happens that will lead to Taiwan’s secession from China; or (3) where possibilities for peaceful unification are “completely exhausted.”</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rbbPZAs.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Exploration Budget for Nickel by Country, 2014–2022 (USD, millions).</strong> Source: S&amp;P Capital IQ Pro.</em></p> +<p>The ASL does not provide a definition of “‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces.” From the political context at the time of its adoption, Beijing was primarily worried about the “pro-independence” slant of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), together with the intervention, aid, or encouragement from “external forces” — hence the ambiguous term “forces,” which covers an undefined range of actors, potentially including Taiwan authorities, a foreign government, or a political movement.</p> -<p>Finally, the IRA included grant funding in the form of an additional $500 million toward DPA Title III grants, which provide financial support to critical mineral projects that protect, expand, or restore industrial base capabilities critical to national security. DPA Title III grants have so far been awarded for nickel production, lithium mining, graphite processing, rare earth element separating, and cobalt extraction feasibility studies in the United States and Canada.</p> +<p>In addition, the elements in Article 8 of the ASL were put in terms of a “situation:” a state in which the secession of Taiwan is either complete or seen by China as on the brink of happening. It seems that the function of Article 8 was not to define these situations but to indicate in broad terms what circumstances would “authorize” China to act with force.</p> -<p>While the rollout of these programs has not been without criticism, the IRA has catalyzed investment in EV mineral supply chains. For example, Syrah Resources began production earlier this year of its natural graphite anode material facility in Vidalia, Louisiana, funded by the Department of Energy. The Vidalia processing facility will source graphite from Syrah Balama’s mining operations in Mozambique, originally funded through a loan from the U.S. Development Finance Corporation, creating the first fully vertically integrated supply chain for natural graphite anode materials outside of China.</p> +<p>The 22 Articles differs from the ASL in the above two aspects and builds on its agenda. A notable heightened degree of specificity can be found in the definition of the “criminal” acts, in effect transforming the ASL’s descriptions of potential situations into elements of crime that can be prosecuted.</p> -<h3 id="chips-20-policy-recommendations-to-incentivize-investment-in-semiconductor-minerals-supply-chains">CHIPS 2.0: Policy Recommendations to Incentivize Investment in Semiconductor Minerals Supply Chains</h3> +<h4 id="urisdiction-ratione-materiae">urisdiction Ratione Materiae</h4> -<p>The United States needs a comprehensive legislative package that incentivizes private investments in projects at home and abroad aimed at securing, and ensuring, supplies of critical minerals for the semiconductor industry. As discussed, current supply chains for gallium, germanium, palladium, and silicon are highly dependent on foreign adversaries, leaving vital semiconductor supply chains vulnerable to supply disruptions that can bring significant economic consequences. Recommendations to create more resilient semiconductor supply chains include the following:</p> +<p>The criminal acts described in Article 2 of the new instrument include the following:</p> <ol> <li> - <p><strong>Initiate an Investment Tax Credit (ITC) for mineral processing and refining projects at sites with Western-allied mining operations.</strong> Australia has significant bauxite and zinc reserves mined by Western mining companies such as Rio Tinto and Glencore. In 2022, Western companies mined 98 million metric tons of bauxite ore in Australia, accounting for nearly all of the country’s bauxite production and 24.5 percent of global production. However, a midstream vulnerability in this supply chain remains — this ore is being sent to China to be refined into gallium and germanium. Since Western companies are already controlling upstream bauxite mining, the United States needs to focus on securing the midstream processing and refining of bauxite into gallium. Therefore, the United States should offer incentives (including tax credits) to the private sector to encourage onsite, Western-controlled refining capabilities to close supply chains.</p> - - <p>The IRA’s 48C Investment Tax Credit could be a good guidepost for this type of new tax credit, but the current program needs to be expanded to allow projects abroad to qualify. Western mining companies already own some of the largest mining projects in Peru, Guinea, South Africa, and Australia: Glencore controls the largest zinc mine in Peru, Rio Tinto owns bauxite mines in Guinea, and Anglo American possesses the largest palladium mine in South Africa. To ensure that bauxite and zinc are refined into gallium and germanium by a Western partner onsite — and not sent to China for refining — the United States should offer an investment tax credit for companies setting up refining projects that will work jointly with already established Western mining operations. These refining investments are critical to securing the entire mineral supply chain upstream and downstream.</p> + <p>Initiating or establishing a “Taiwan independence” secessionist organization; planning and drafting “Taiwan independence” separatist action principles, plans, or programs; and directing members of the “Taiwan Independence” separatist organization or other persons to carry out activities to divide the country and undermine national unity</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Fund a research and development laboratory to build the technological know-how for semiconductor-specific critical mineral refining.</strong> Refining gallium, germanium, and silicon to needed purity levels of over 99 percent for the semiconductor industry requires specific technology, infrastructure, and know-how, all of which are currently lacking. The United States has only one company that refines high-purity gallium, one operation for refining germanium, and three companies producing high-purity polysilicon. In order to be competitive globally, the United States needs to innovate and ramp up production quickly to generate minerals in a more cost-effective way.</p> - - <p>The Department of Energy already funds laboratories focused on critical minerals for EVs and clean energy. For example, the Critical Minerals Innovation Hub at the Ames Laboratory and the Minerals and Materials Supply Chain Facility (METALLIC) bring together the expertise of several leading national laboratories to find solutions to critical minerals supply challenges for the EV industry. The Department of Commerce should fund similar initiatives focused on minerals for the semiconductor industry. If the United States wishes to build and expand critical mineral refining operations at home and abroad, it needs to invest in national laboratories that will develop the capabilities, technologies, and skills needed to produce refined semiconductor minerals at scale.</p> + <p>Seeking to change the legal status of Taiwan as part of China through means such as drafting, amending, interpreting, or abolishing the regulations related to the Taiwan region or through “referendums”</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Subsidize price premiums to ensure Western companies can compete for offtake agreements.</strong> Western-owned mining and refining operations face higher production costs than their Chinese and Russian competitors due to higher labor, energy, and environmental standards. For example, Anglo American’s cash costs to produce palladium in South Africa are 41 percent higher than Russia’s costs to do so domestically. Furthermore, China is investing in bauxite smelting facilities in Indonesia which run on coal, making them energy intensive and environmentally dirty, but inexpensive. Western companies looking to invest in bauxite refining in an environmentally responsible way do not have this option. As a result, these companies need to place a premium on their prices, making it difficult to compete for offtake agreements.</p> - - <p>The U.S. government should offer a direct subsidy to U.S. semiconductor manufacturers to offset the price premium for Western-produced semiconductor minerals. This will incentivize chip producers to diversify from China and enter offtake agreements with Western mining and refining operations. Just as the $7,500 30D tax credit was designed to incentivize EV manufacturers to source critical minerals outside of China, chip manufacturers need to be incentivized through a subsidy to source gallium, germanium, palladium, and silicon from Western-allied sources despite the higher price.</p> + <p>Attempting to create “two Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” or “Taiwan independence” in the international community by means such as promoting Taiwan’s entrance into international organizations that are limited to sovereign states or by conducting official foreign exchanges and military contacts</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Dedicate more DPA Title III funding toward projects focused on securing semiconductor mineral supply chains.</strong> DPA Title III provides an upfront source of capital needed for the private sector to make investments in projects crucial to national security that they may be unable to finance otherwise. The Department of Defense has awarded funding to projects for EV minerals and for downstream semiconductor manufacturing, but no funding has been put toward the production of upstream gallium, germanium, palladium, or silicon. In 2023, a DPA Title III grant was awarded to Raytheon for military-grade GaN produced at its semiconductor foundry in Andover, Massachusetts. The project is a worthwhile investment, but in order to fully secure the supply chain, DPA funds need to be targeting projects that produce the refined and purified gallium needed for GaN, as this refining is currently dominated by China.</p> - - <p>The DPA Title III program should also be expanded to include project development in more allied countries such as Australia, Japan, and member states of the European Union aimed at expanding potential reserves and refining capacity. Tables 2 and 3 illustrate how grant funding of projects in Australia, Canada, and Norway would be invaluable to securing critical supplies of gallium, germanium, palladium, and silicon. Considering how central semiconductors are to defense technologies, the use of DPA funds for critical minerals projects related to semiconductors should be prioritized.</p> + <p>Using their authority to wantonly distort or misrepresent the reality that Taiwan is part of China in fields such as education, culture, history, or news media, or to suppress political parties, groups, or persons that support the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and national reunification</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Other conduct seeking to separate Taiwan from China</p> </li> </ol> -<h3 id="target-countries-for-critical-minerals-investments-to-secure-semiconductor-supply-chains">Target Countries for Critical Minerals Investments to Secure Semiconductor Supply Chains</h3> +<p>This detailed description of acts constituting advocacy of “Taiwan independence” marks a huge difference from the ASL. China has shifted its focus from “situations” to “acts” and has laid out precise crimes of secession that it will now punish.</p> -<p>As the United States builds alternative supply chains for gallium, germanium, palladium, and silicon outside of China, it also needs to target countries for investment that are mineral rich and allied with U.S. interests and that offer economically viable and cost-effective opportunities. Because China and Russia hold significant reserves of vital commodities and are top producers of bauxite, zinc, palladium, and silicon, it is vital for the United States to partner with mineral-rich allies that can compete with foreign adversaries.</p> +<h4 id="jurisdiction-ratione-personae">Jurisdiction Ratione Personae</h4> -<p>To secure the bauxite needed for gallium production, the United States should be encouraging Western investment in Australia and Guinea. Australia is currently the top global producer of bauxite, but China is close behind, despite having just 14 percent of Australia’s bauxite reserves. This indicates that there is significant opportunity to increase Australia’s total production. Furthermore, Australia is currently sending 97 percent of its bauxite to China, allowing the latter to dominate the refining of bauxite into high-purity gallium. Similarly, although Guinea holds the world’s largest bauxite reserves and is responsible for nearly 65 percent of the globe’s exports, the country sends over 80 percent of its bauxite to China. DPA Title III funds should be leveraged for Australian refining projects, and projects in both Australia and Guinea should be eligible for the investment tax credit. This will give the private sector an influx of cash to boost gallium production from Australian and Guinean bauxite ores under Western control.</p> +<p>The range of actors the 22 Articles targets is even more interesting. Given the “criminal” acts defined above, Article 2 might cover the following:</p> -<p>Australia and Peru will be key allies for securing zinc deposits for germanium production. Australia holds the world’s largest zinc reserves, estimated to be double the size of China’s, but currently has less than one-third of China’s output. Peru has more modest reserves — about one-quarter the size of Australia’s — but currently produces more zinc than Australia. DPA Title III and the ITC can free up capital for investments in Australian and Peruvian zinc and germanium projects while national laboratories build the expertise and innovative technologies needed to drive successful germanium refineries outside of China.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Organizers, leaders, activists, and participants of a “Taiwan independence” secessionist organization</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Individuals and entities, including political parties, involved in a relevant legislative acts or referendums in Taiwan</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Individuals and entities that promote Taiwan’s membership in international organizations and international partnerships, irrespective of their nationality</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Individuals and entities that research, teach, or promote a historical view of Taiwan’s status that deviates from PRC official doctrine, as well as individuals and entities that “suppress” a pro-PRC political party, organization, or person.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>South Africa’s palladium reserves will be key to countering Russia’s lead in the commodity, with Canada as a strong secondary resource. South Africa and Russia both produce about 40 percent of world’s palladium (see Table 3), despite South Africa holding less than half the reserves of Russia. South Africa also has the distinct advantage of an open trade regime and a strong U.S. business presence; as the largest U.S. trade partner in Africa, approximately 600 U.S. businesses operate there. The U.S.-South African trade relationship is united under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), and a bilateral tax treaty. Still, the mining sector in South Africa faces a number of challenges in attracting needed investment. High production costs and the risks of doing business in South Africa discourage potential Western investors. Implementing the ITC and direct price subsidies could offset some of these risks and encourage more Western palladium mining projects in the country.</p> +<p>The above range of actors might well cover persons who have associations with a “Taiwan independence” organization, political leaders or government officials of Taiwan, political leaders or government officials of a state that has friendly relations with Taiwan, and companies that are involved in arms sales to Taiwan, among others.</p> -<p>Finally, silicon production should be further supported in Brazil and Norway, which currently account for 5 percent and 4 percent of global silicon production, respectively (see Table 3). China has a formidable lead in silicon production, necessitating further investment in Brazilian and Norwegian silicon projects. To establish alternative silicon supply chains for the semiconductor industry, policymakers should leverage: (1) DPA Title III funds for silicon refining in Norway; (2) the ITC for production in Brazil; (3) direct subsidies to put prices on a more competitive footing with less-expensive Chinese materials; and (4) a national laboratory to further research and development in purified polysilicon.</p> +<p>A good reference point is the PRC’s sanctions list, which prohibits Chinese interactions with various political leaders, government officials, parliamentarians, governmental agencies, human rights and democracy promotion organizations, and researchers. A large portion of this has to do with their stances on Taiwan. Many of the targets are high-level figures who have visited Taiwan or met with Taiwan’s leaders (e.g., Nancy Pelosi, Mike Pompeo, and Michael McCaul) or represent major companies in the arms industry (e.g., Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PEHZ6CK.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Global Reserve Landscape for Semiconductor Mineral Ores.</strong> Source: Author’s elaborations based on USGS and S&amp;P.</em></p> +<p>Beijing’s targeting of individuals and entities does not happen out of the blue. The PRC has practiced such a tactic through targeted sanctions for years. Nevertheless, it is a sobering thought that persons and entities whose statements or actions have made them the target of PRC sanctions are now susceptible to criminal prosecution per the 22 Articles.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Eemy5aM.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 3: Global Production Landscape for Semiconductor Mineral Mining.</strong> Source: USGS data.</em></p> +<p>Apart from building on the existing sanctions regime, two new aspects of the 22 Articles are worth further discussion. The first is the singling out of studies of Taiwan history: Article 2(4) specifically targets persons who present a historical narrative about the island that contradicts the official position of the PRC. Given that Beijing has already sanctioned scholars and researchers — German anthropologist Adrian Zenz, who writes on human rights in Xinjiang, being the most prominent case in point — the 22 Articles might be used to prosecute researchers in the field of Taiwan history, including individuals involved in editing Taiwan’s textbooks. This calls to mind Putin’s crafting of a narrative that Ukraine was always Russian, then launching a full-scale invasion. But China has gone even further by criminalizing academic research on Taiwan’s history.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>The other new aspect is also found in Article 2(4), which seeks to punish actors who suppress “political parties, groups, or persons that support the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and national reunification.” This likewise has roots in how China has leveraged sanctions against the island, including the recent censure of five Taiwan TV network commentators on May 15, 2024. But Article 2(4) makes the behind-the-scenes distinction clear: The PRC will lend a hand to those who work with it and threaten to criminally prosecute those who work against it in the public sphere in democratic Taiwan. As such, this is an audacious intervention in Taiwan’s democracy, clearly aiming at influencing local public debates and opinions. Its real effect is yet to be seen, but it will not be surprising if some parties or groups publicly come out or implicitly accept a designation as one supporting “the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and national reunification.”</p> -<p>Supply chains for semiconductor critical minerals are fraught with vulnerabilities, as China and other U.S. adversaries continue to dominate the mining and refining of gallium, germanium, palladium, and silicon. Meanwhile, U.S. policymakers have so far done little to incentivize diversification of these supply chains by the private sector. The semiconductor industry needs a set of tax incentives and funding programs to spur the private sector, just as the IRA spurred investments in EV mineral supply chains. To address supply chain vulnerabilities, policymakers should prioritize: (1) creating an investment tax credit for processing and refining projects; (2) opening national laboratories focused on semiconductor mineral research and development; (3) expanding eligibility for DPA Title III grants; and (4) offering direct subsidies to encourage offtake agreements with Western companies.</p> +<h4 id="the-political-agenda-maintaining-the-status-quo-to-change-the-status-quo">The Political Agenda: Maintaining the Status Quo to Change the Status Quo</h4> -<hr /> +<p>Notwithstanding the above distinction, which aims to foster divisions within Taiwan, the 22 Articles represents an even bigger departure in the PRC’s official approach to the legal order that currently exists in Taiwan. This stance is shaped by China’s “anti-secession” agenda and its relations in the Taiwan Strait.</p> -<p><strong>Gracelin Baskaran</strong> is director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>Article 2(2) punishes any attempt to change the status of Taiwan through constitutional or legislative means or by referendum. The legal order in question, of course, refers primarily to the 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China, as well as legislation such as the 1992 Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. Any attempt to change Taiwan’s constitution or the Cross-Strait Act will be considered by the PRC as completely exhausting the possibilities for peaceful reunification (ASL Article 8), which is now punishable by criminal law. On its face, this seems to “protect” the existing legal order of Taiwan and maintain the status quo.</p> -<p><strong>Meredith Schwartz</strong> is a research associate with the Critical Minerals Security Program at CSIS.</p>Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith SchwartzThe United States relies on China and Russia for minerals used in semiconductors, posing a clear national security risk. While the CHIPS Act has built downstream U.S. capacity, upstream incentives are needed to secure materials for the next generation of advanced chips.Defining Success2024-10-07T12:00:00+08:002024-10-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/defining-success<p><em>This new report explores whether the United States should more clearly define the end goals for its China policy.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>While some argue that the United States should aim to “win” in the strategic competition against China, others advocate for a managed competition, avoiding conflict while strengthening the global rules-based order. This report advances the debate with contributions from over 20 leading experts on China and grand strategy, aiming to deepen discussion on how the United States should navigate an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.</em></p> +<p>The flip side is that, if so, what explains the hostile posture toward the governing DPP administration of Taiwan? Consecutive DPP administrations have publicly pronounced time and again that their political agenda will not push for Taiwan’s de jure independence and will conduct affairs with China in accordance with the Taiwan constitution or the constitutional order. From the perspective of the ASL and the 22 Articles, these systems pose no threat of “secession” — and may even work toward the aims apparently enshrined in the two documents.</p> -<h3 id="introduction-the-united-states-china-policy-in-historical-context">Introduction: The United States’ China Policy in Historical Context</h3> +<p>The answer to the above inconsistency lies in the PRC’s political agenda, as was neatly expressed by Chinese minister of foreign affairs Wang Yi at the Munich Security Conference in 2024. In the question-and-answer session following his speech, Wang stated:</p> <blockquote> - <h4 id="jude-blanchette">Jude Blanchette</h4> - <h4 id="freeman-chair-in-china-studies-csis">Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS</h4> + <p>Stability in the Taiwan Strait serves the interests of all parties, but it is the “Taiwan independence” forces on the island that undermine peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. “Taiwan independence” and peace in the Taiwan Strait are incompatible. To adhere to the one-China principle, we should support China’s peaceful reunification; to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, we must resolutely oppose “Taiwan independence.”</p> </blockquote> -<p>The ongoing debate within the United States over whether to pursue a clear “end state” in its China policy or focus on managing the competition reflects a crucial divide in American strategic thinking. As tensions with China deepen, U.S. policymakers and experts are wrestling with the question of how best to navigate this evolving rivalry. One camp argues that the United States must articulate definitive long-term goals to safeguard U.S. interests and shape the future global order. The opposing view contends that given the inherent uncertainties of China’s political trajectory and the volatility of global events, it may be wiser for the United States to adopt a more flexible approach, one that emphasizes managing the competition rather than locking in a fixed endpoint. This debate strikes at the heart of how the United States should engage its most formidable challenger in the twenty-first century.</p> - -<p>This report brings together more than 20 leading scholars from the United States and its allies and partners to examine this debate, analyzing both the strategic necessity and the historical context of the U.S.-China rivalry. Understanding today’s debate requires a longer view — one that places contemporary issues within the broader sweep of history. The United States and China have been grappling with each other for over 150 years, navigating a relationship that has been characterized by both cooperation and intense competition. It is against this historical backdrop that the current tensions must be understood, and it is in this context that the necessity of a clear “end state” or the prudence of ongoing management must be evaluated.</p> - -<p>The history of U.S.-China relations stretches back to the mid-nineteenth century, beginning with the Treaty of Wanghia in 1844. This treaty, signed following the Opium Wars, marked the first formal diplomatic agreement between the United States and China. While it opened trade and established American rights in Chinese ports, it also reflected the unequal power dynamics of the time, as China was forced into concessions by Western powers. The treaty laid the foundation for a relationship rooted in commercial interests but shaped by geopolitical rivalry and strategic distrust.</p> +<p>This statement reflects the PRC’s changed perception of the status quo regarding Taiwan. While paying lip service to peace and stability in the Strait, Wang laid blame on the “Taiwan independence” forces, pointing to the PRC’s One China principle as a solution, and asked government leaders attending the conference to actively support China’s plan for “peaceful reunification.” This rhetoric completely reversed the normative narrative. According to this view, the status quo is not a state to be maintained but a state to be changed by way of China “reunifying Taiwan.” This sophistry would turn the breaker of peace into a maker of peace.</p> -<p>The late nineteenth century saw the United States play a unique role in China through initiatives such as the Open Door Policy, which sought to guarantee U.S. access to the Chinese market and to prevent European powers from carving up China into spheres of influence. American leaders argued that all nations should have equal access to Chinese markets, not only as a matter of economic interest but as a principle of fairness. Yet, despite this seemingly benign policy, the United States was still driven by its own strategic goals, attempting to secure influence in China without resorting to colonialism.</p> +<p>The PRC’s political agenda helps observers understand PRC instruments. China’s Anti-Secession Law, for instance, has never been an end in itself but is instead a halfway house to the ultimate goal of annexing Taiwan. And the 22 Articles carry the torch of the ASL by weaponizing criminal jurisdiction.</p> -<p>This early period of interaction demonstrates a key feature of U.S.-China relations that persists today: a tension between cooperation and competition, between engagement and self-interest. Even as the United States worked to protect China from European colonialism, it was also seeking to assert its own influence. This duality has been a recurring theme in U.S.-China relations, from the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which reflected rising racial and economic anxieties, to the 1940s, when China became a crucial ally in the fight against Imperial Japan during World War II. As both nations evolved, so too did the stakes of their engagement.</p> +<blockquote> + <h2 id="section-iii">Section III</h2> + <h2 id="international-and-regional-perspectives-on-the-anti-secession-law">International and Regional Perspectives on the Anti-Secession Law</h2> +</blockquote> -<p>Fast-forward to the Cold War, and the competition between the United States and China took on new dimensions. Following the communist revolution in 1949, China became a central player in the global ideological struggle between capitalism and communism. America’s containment strategy, largely focused on the Soviet Union, extended to China, particularly after the Korean War. But despite decades of isolation and hostility, both countries eventually found common ground when President Richard Nixon opened the door to U.S.-China engagement in 1972, seeing China as a counterbalance to Soviet power.</p> +<h3 id="the-anti-secession-law-and-chinas-evolving-legal-warfare-against-taiwan">The Anti-Secession Law and China’s Evolving Legal Warfare Against Taiwan</h3> -<p>This period of rapprochement, however, did not resolve the underlying strategic tensions. Rather, it temporarily aligned the two powers’ interests in the face of a common adversary. Once the Cold War ended, the United States embraced a strategy of engagement, hoping that China’s integration into the global economy would lead to a “mellowing” of Chinese behavior and its evolution into a stakeholder in the international order. For a time, this strategy appeared to be working, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) released its grasp on the economy, providing space for millions of Chinese citizens to work their way out of poverty. At the same time, China’s political institutions began to evolve out of their Soviet-Maoist straightjacket. Yet, by the early twenty-first century, it became clear that China’s leadership was growing wary of Western economic and political models. Instead, they pursued a strategy of authoritarian resilience, pairing economic growth with military power and political control under the CCP, particularly under the leadership of Xi Jinping.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="chi-ting-tsai">Chi-Ting Tsai</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Today, the United States faces a China that is more powerful, more confident, and more assertive on the world stage. Whether through economic statecraft, military modernization, or technological innovation, China seeks to reshape the global order in ways that challenge U.S. dominance. The strategic competition is no longer confined to military or economic realms; it extends into cyberspace, technological innovation, and even the narratives that shape global governance. As U.S. policymakers debate whether to define a clear “end state” or simply manage this competition, they must do so with a keen understanding of this historical trajectory.</p> +<h4 id="introduction-11">Introduction</h4> -<p>Nearly all of this report’s contributors see economic, technological, and military friction as a likely enduring feature of the U.S.-China relationship, at least until change in China’s political trajectory opens up space for a different type of relationship. This near-consensus among the contributors, one that I share, is a tragedy for the respective populations of the United States, China, and, indeed, the entire world. Instead of these two great nations pooling their considerable economic resources and human talent to jointly address the world’s many growing challenges, they lock horns in a multifaceted strategic competition. The blunt reality is that because of these deep divisions, there will be diseases that will not be cured, there will be children who will unnecessarily suffer, and our climate will continue to degrade as opportunities for global cooperation slip through humanity’s fingers. The mutual mistrust and strategic rivalry between the United States and China create barriers to innovation, collaboration, and the bold, unified action needed to tackle existential threats. In this fractured global landscape, the pursuit of dominance and security overshadows the shared responsibility to steward a livable future for all, leaving the world worse off.</p> +<p>This article will explore China’s Anti-Secession Law (ASL) and its broader implications for international law and regional stability, particularly in relation to Taiwan. The ASL, passed in 2005, serves as a cornerstone of China’s strategy to prevent Taiwan’s independence by combining military deterrence with legal frameworks. However, the law has broader applications, as China increasingly invokes domestic legislation to justify international actions in other territorial disputes.</p> -<h3 id="how-does-this-end-the-future-of-the-us-china-competition">How Does This End? The Future of the U.S.-China Competition</h3> +<p>The main arguments examined here include how the international community perceives the ASL as part of China’s legal warfare, the potential precedents set by its invocation for other territorial claims, and the growing concerns over China’s hybrid influencing strategies. Additionally, this essay will discuss how China’s evolving legal tactics pose significant challenges to international law, particularly regarding self-determination, the use of force, and human rights.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="hal-brands">Hal Brands</h4> - <h4 id="henry-a-kissinger-distinguished-professor-johns-hopkins-school-of-advanced-international-studies-senior-fellow-american-enterprise-institute">Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Finally, the essay will propose potential responses to counter China’s legal warfare, emphasizing the role of international institutions and laws in preventing the normalization of these tactics. By understanding the broader ramifications of the ASL, it is possible to better address the threats it poses to Taiwan’s autonomy and regional stability.</p> -<p>The U.S.-China competition has begun, but how will it end? There is a bipartisan consensus that Sino-American relations will be defined primarily by rivalry across multiple regions and dimensions of statecraft for years to come. Yet there is little clarity on what will happen after that. Washington has accepted, under both Donald Trump and Joe Biden, the reality of competition without identifying a theory of victory — which means that U.S. leaders have yet to articulate how rivalry will lead to something other than unremitting tension and danger.</p> +<h4 id="international-community-views-on-asl">International Community Views on ASL</h4> -<p>This marks a contrast to the United States’ Cold War experience. By 1947, U.S. officials — principally George Kennan — argued that if Washington held the line against Soviet expansion, while selectively exerting counterpressure, the Soviet system would either eventually collapse from its own internal weaknesses or evolve into something less threatening. It took time for this thesis to gain widespread acceptance; in the early 1950s, the Eisenhower administration considered preventive war and aggressive rollback as alternative solutions to the Soviet challenge. But over time, Kennan’s theory of victory directed the United States’ approach.</p> +<p>China’s ASL aims to prevent Taiwan’s independence through a two-pronged approach of military deterrence and economic integration. While some view the ASL as a war authorization law, others see it as part of China’s conflict prevention strategy. Over time, the international community has come to see China’s legal warfare against Taiwan as a multifaceted strategy aimed at undermining Taiwan’s international status and at justifying China’s actions. This approach includes reframing the cross-Strait relationship as an internal dispute, thereby limiting Taiwan’s international space while making threats to Taiwan’s people and constraining self-determination claims by Taiwan.</p> -<p>There are many conceivable outcomes to the present Sino-American competition, ranging from the United States ceding a sphere of influence to China, to mutual accommodation, to Chinese collapse, and even to a devastating global conflict. Yet if the goal of competition is to secure a better peace by means short of war, then the pivotal question becomes whether the United States can achieve this outcome by changing the minds of present or future Chinese leaders — convincing them that expansion and aggrandizement is futile — or whether it will require the decline of Chinese power or the downfall of the Communist Party. In short, can Sino-American tensions turn into competitive coexistence, as some Biden administration officials have suggested? Or must this clash culminate in regime failure, via the weakening or political evolution of the United States’ challenger? U.S. officials should certainly hope for the first outcome. They should probably prepare for the second.</p> +<p>The international community in the past decade has also gradually come to believe that China has often employed domestic legislation on national security and foreign affairs to shape legal narratives and to pressure adversaries into accepting its territorial sovereignty and maritime claims, not only regarding Taiwan but also in the East and South China Seas and disputed borders with India and Russia. Within such a legal warfare strategy, China incorporates cognitive warfare, manipulating information to influence public opinion in Taiwan. China’s legal warfare is part of a broader influencing strategy that includes military threats and covert infiltration. The ASL and its subsequent relevant practices — such as the Hong Kong National Security Law, Coast Guard Law, Maritime Traffic Safety Law, and the 22 “Taiwan Independence Die-hard” Articles (the 22 Articles) — exemplify China’s approach of combining hard and soft tactics within legal frameworks.</p> -<h4 id="the-new-consensus">The New Consensus</h4> +<p>Therefore, the international community views China’s ASL with concern, particularly regarding its implications for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the broader Indo-Pacific region. The United States is wary of the ASL’s provisions that authorize the use of non-peaceful means to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence. It sees this as a potential threat to regional stability, as such actions could lead to military conflict between China and Taiwan, with significant ramifications for the region and beyond.</p> -<p>Over the past decade, a consensus has emerged in Washington: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is seeking to regain China’s historic place as the dominant power in Asia (and perhaps globally) and is pursuing a comprehensive strategy — economic, technological, diplomatic, and military — to attain this end. Beijing is seeking to upend, perhaps forcibly, the favorable balance of power that the United States has long enjoyed in the Western Pacific while challenging U.S. technological, economic, and diplomatic leadership globally. As a result, the Trump and Biden administrations have largely abandoned the idea of using engagement and inducement to integrate China into — and make it a stakeholder in — the liberal international order and have focused on penalizing Beijing’s revisionist behavior instead.</p> +<h4 id="effects-of-asl-invocation-on-other-territorial-claims">Effects of ASL Invocation on other Territorial Claims</h4> -<p>Yet this consensus is more superficial than it initially seems. There remain major debates about the degree to which China is an ideological rival, whether China is a peaking power whose economic strength will soon begin (in relative terms) to decline, when and under what circumstances Xi Jinping might be willing to use military force, and how thorough an economic decoupling or de-risking the United States should seek. Furthermore, the U.S. government has yet to clearly and consistently articulate its view of how competition will produce a better and more stable status quo.</p> +<p>China’s invocation of the ASL to justify actions against Taiwan could set a precedent for using domestic laws to justify international actions in China’s other territorial dispute cases. China’s public and legal declarations, such as domestic laws or official statements regarding territorial claims, often serve as the basis for its legal and international enforcement of such claims. By codifying certain positions into law, China makes it costly to backtrack without facing domestic or international repercussions. For example, domestic Chinese legislation that regulates activities in disputed territories, including the establishment of administrative units and fishing ban areas in the South China Sea, signal a commitment to maintaining control over these areas through unilateral domestic law.</p> -<p>At several points — namely in a speech by then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in July 2020 and in documents issued by the National Security Council and the Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff that same year — the Trump administration argued that competition with China was caused by the nature of the Communist Party. This assertion implied that the rivalry would last as long as the regime itself. Yet the administration also insisted, on various occasions, that its approach was “not premised on determining a particular end state for China” or “on an attempt to change the PRC’s domestic governance model.”</p> +<p>Moreover, if China invokes the ASL as a basis for the use of force against Taiwan, that could create substantial and comprehensive challenges to international law. For example, when China faces territorial disputes under international law, Beijing often invokes a “historical rights claim,” which forms an underlying legal rationale to justify territorial claims, including to Taiwan. Typically, such historical rights discourse involves arguments that certain territories have been part of Chinese cultural or political spheres in its history. For example, in one white paper — “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era” (台灣問題與新時代中國統一事業) issued by Taiwan Affairs Council of the State Council — China’s sovereignty claim on Taiwan is based, at least partly, on such a historical rights discourse.</p> -<p>In its early months, the Biden administration adopted the overall framework of strategic competition with China — “extreme competition,” as the president initially phrased it, before tempering that description by terming the relationship as one of “healthy competition” instead — without fully clarifying its view of how that competition might ultimately be resolved. There are two basic possibilities: competitive coexistence or regime failure.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>The historical context that Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times is clear, and the legal facts are well-established. Continuous new archaeological discoveries and research demonstrate the profound historical and cultural connections across the Taiwan Strait. Numerous historical books and documents have recorded the early endeavors of the Chinese people in developing Taiwan.</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="competitive-coexistence">Competitive Coexistence</h4> +<p>However, such discourse — whether “since ancient times” or based on “cultural connections” — is not a valid legal rationale for sovereignty claims in contemporary international law. Therefore, an invocation of the ASL as a basis for using force against Taiwan may create another precedent, with dangerous implications for China’s other territorial sovereignty claims.</p> -<p>Advocates of competitive coexistence believe the United States can eventually change the minds of Chinese leaders — if not Xi then perhaps those who come after him — convincing them not to forcibly contest the balance of power in Asia and upset the liberal international order in that region and beyond. The idea is that if Washington shows, over some sustained period, that it can preserve a favorable military balance in the Western Pacific, preserve its economic and technological advantages, and rally overlapping coalitions of states to push back against Chinese coercion, then Beijing might conclude that its current course is self-defeating and adopt a less bellicose stance.</p> +<p>China’s invocation of the 22 Articles will create another precedent by violating international human rights conventions in order to suppress pro-Taiwan independence. If this precedent can be successfully set by China, especially if China were able to extradite such “political criminals” from other countries, China could very well (and probably would) employ similar measures against “die-hard individuals” in other contexts. In Taiwan’s case, the international community should be very concerned about China potentially utilizing extradition treaties with Shanghai Cooperation Organization member countries for domestic political reasons by labeling pro-independence “die-hards” as separatist criminals. As such, China’s ASL practices may alter the scope of political crime in extradition law.</p> -<p>This would not lead to perfect harmony. U.S.-China relations would still have strong elements of military, geopolitical, economic, technological, and diplomatic competition. But Beijing would presumably pull back a bit on issues — such as Taiwan and the U.S. alliance structure in East Asia — where U.S. vital interests are at stake. The end state, whether enshrined in a formal diplomatic settlement or simply arrived at through tacit geopolitical bargaining, would be a more stable relationship in which the danger of war recedes, the United States’ key strategic interests are preserved, and areas of potential cooperation can gradually expand.</p> +<p>China’s invocation of the ASL would also be a violation of the prohibition against the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. China has not renounced the use of force to achieve reunification with Taiwan and, in fact, included this potential action in the ASL. This stance raises concerns under international law because the threat, or use, of force to coerce a political outcome can be considered a violation of the prohibition against the use of force as defined in the UN Charter. The ongoing Chinese military pressure and exercises near Taiwan, coupled with diplomatic and economic measures meant to isolate Taiwan internationally, can be viewed as coercive actions that undermine the principle of peaceful dispute resolution.</p> -<p>Competitive coexistence updates, but does not discard, the logic of U.S. policy toward China in the post-Cold War era. It holds that Washington can still shape Chinese behavior through the proper mix of incentives, although the United States will rely significantly more on pressure and dissuasion, meant to inhibit China from doing disruptive things, and far less on positive inducements aimed at making it a responsible stakeholder. Competitive coexistence rests on the idea that the CCP may mellow over time; even if Xi Jinping has chosen confrontation, perhaps his successors will take a more moderate tack. Indeed, the more effectively the United States pushes back against disruptive Chinese behavior during Xi’s rule — that is, the more it shows that Chinese coercion and aggression will lead to counterpressure and isolation — the more likely it is that a future generation of Chinese leaders will conclude it is in their interest to de-escalate the rivalry with the United States.</p> +<p>Through invocation of the ASL, China has the potential to establish precedent concerning two related issues: the non-intervention principle and the right of self-determination. While China asserts sovereignty over Taiwan, many in Taiwan view themselves as having the right to determine their own political status. By threatening force to prevent any move toward independence, invocation of the ASL can be seen as infringing upon the right to self-determination of Taiwan’s people, thus violating international norms that protect such rights.</p> -<p>This approach is appealing because it offers strategic success without requiring the downfall of one of the competitors. Yet it also invites a series of questions that proponents of competitive coexistence have yet to persuasively answer.</p> +<h4 id="countering-chinas-asl">Countering China’s ASL</h4> -<p>For example: Does the fact that Beijing has become so assertive, not just regionally but globally, over the past 15 years indicate that any significant softening of China’s policies may be many years in the future? Indeed, if Xi retains power as long as Mao did — until the age of 82 — then a post-Xi leadership would not emerge until 2036. (If he lives as long as Deng Xiaoping did — until the age of 92 — a leadership transition would not occur for another generation.) In addition, how could U.S. officials be sure whether the CCP made a strategic decision for moderation or as a tactical decision meant to temporarily reduce tensions in hopes of splitting its opponents or inducing the United States to lower its guard? After all, this is often what Soviet leaders had in mind when they spoke of “peaceful coexistence” in the 1950s. When U.S. officials declined to accept a détente on Soviet terms, a terrifying period of high tensions followed.</p> +<p>Structurally speaking, China’s legal warfare has been elevated to “legal enforcement warfare” in recent years and includes not only the unilateral promulgation of new laws or regulations by China but also the projection of actual “legal enforcement” capabilities in “extraterritorial” and “disputed areas.” China hopes that these laws, and the appearance of their implementation and acceptance, will serve as a psychological deterrent to other countries. For instance, in the South China Sea, China has enacted unilateral fishing bans and Provisions on Administrative Law Enforcement Procedures of Coast Guard Agencies. For cross-Strait relations, China has put forward the aforementioned 22 Articles — coupled with possible red notice and extradition treaties — as well as other measures.</p> -<p>The biggest problem with competitive coexistence is that it does not seem to reflect the reality of U.S.-China relations. This approach holds that the rivalry between the United States and China is severe but not immutable. In other words, a powerful CCP-led China can eventually be reconciled to a world order in which the United States, its allies and partners, and its democratic values remain predominant. Yet what if that belief is illusory because the rivalry is more deeply rooted, more fundamental? What if the CCP desires a more thorough revision of the international order because it views a liberal system led by a democratic superpower as an existential threat to its own survival?</p> +<p>Given the current situation, the international community must prevent China from making such practices acceptable through the use of international institutions and international law. For example, the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence in Liu v. Poland needs to be elaborated outside of the court. In Liu v. Poland Liu v. Poland (Application No. 37610/18), the European Court of Human Rights ruled that, if Poland were to extradite Liu — a Taiwan national — to China, it would violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhumane treatment. The court’s reasoning in the Liu case should be noted by European countries and should spur them to reconsider judicial cooperation with China and other nations characterized by a “general situation of violence” and a lack of transparency. In the context of the ASL and the 22 Articles, we may need to further elaborate on the relationship between them and torture in particular, while also recognizing the court’s interpretation as obligations erga omnes.</p> -<p>There is substantial evidence to suggest that this is the case. Sino-American tensions may have risen under Xi Jinping, but Rush Doshi has shown that those tensions reflect something far more profound than the soaring ambitions of a single statesman. Leading Chinese officials have publicly affirmed the party’s view that the United States has always been committed to undermining, even overthrowing, the Communist regime. “From the Chinese perspective,” former diplomat Fu Ying wrote in 2020, “the U.S. has never given up its intent to overthrow the socialist system led by the Communist Party of China.” Even at the height of Sino-American cooperation during the 1980s, Deng alleged that Washington was prosecuting a “smokeless World War III” against the CCP. Sinologist Nadège Rolland argues that the party cannot reconcile itself to an international order whose liberal principles conflict directly with the government’s illiberal rule. Even in the early 1990s, when the United States was betting big on engagement with China, some Chinese military officials argued that it was “impossible to fundamentally improve Sino-U.S. relations.” Xi himself has more recently suggested that the United States is bent on the “containment” and “suppression” of his country.</p> +<p>Moreover, request of a red notice in Interpol, as a matter of law, must align with the international policing organization’s regulations as well as international law in order to ensure that the notice is not used for political, military, racial, or religious reasons. The definition and scope of “politically motivated reasons” can be ephemeral and thus may not serve as a safeguard for political dissidents. Hence, in the reviewing process of red notice issuances, the international community needs to examine more closely whether countries criminalize separatism for politically motivated reasons and place more burden of proof on countries that request red notices.</p> -<p>“Win-win” rhetoric aside, the CCP is governed by a fundamentally zero-sum mindset which bodes ill for long-term strategic accommodation. Moreover, the party’s increasingly coercive behavior vis-à-vis Taiwan and other Asian democracies, its horrifying crimes against its Uyghur population, and its utterly cynical and irresponsible conduct at the outset of the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrate how fundamentally the regime’s concept of self-interest diverges from anything acceptable to the United States and other liberal democracies. Today, far from preparing for détente, Xi’s government is hoarding food and fuel, churning out weapons, and making moves that suggest it may be preparing for war. In view of all this, the United States needs to reckon with the possibility that acute Sino-American antagonism will persist so long as a powerful China is governed by the CCP.</p> +<p>Furthermore, in jus ad bellum issues, to assert that China’s ASL violates international law on the prohibition of the use, or threatened use, of force, one key issues must be considered: the positioning of cross-Strait relations. If cross-Strait relations are considered to be interstate relations, then the narrowest interpretation of Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter and the customary international law principle prohibiting the use of force can serve as a rationale. However, if the special nature of cross-Strait relations is adopted, or if it is claimed that Taiwan is a special entity under international law, it is necessary to consider which interpretation (or interpretations) of the injunction should be adopted, including: the use of force against de facto regimes, the use of force to infringe upon de facto borders, or the use of force to deprive a people of their right to self-determination. Although these scenarios are not explicitly stipulated in the aforementioned United Nations Charter provisions, the spirit of the prohibition, state practice, and scholarly views suggest that the principle should apply to cases beyond traditional interstate relations.</p> -<h4 id="regime-failure">Regime Failure</h4> +<h4 id="implications">Implications</h4> -<p>If this is the case, then even a long period of vigorous competition by the United States would not bring about a mellowing of the CCP. Instead, the rivalry could persist in a fairly intense form until the party loses its ability to prosecute that rivalry. This could happen due to either a decline in Chinese power or a fundamental change in the nature of the ruling regime. In this scenario, competition would not be a relatively short bridge to a more stable relationship, but rather a longer bridge to the collapse of China’s power or the transformation of its government.</p> +<p>China’s ASL is a critical element of its broader strategy to assert control over Taiwan and other contested territories, and understanding it is essential. By legally codifying the potential use of force to prevent Taiwan’s independence, China aims to create a framework that justifies aggressive actions under the cover of domestic law. This approach not only threatens Taiwan’s autonomy but also serves as a tool for China to extend its influence and assert its sovereignty over other disputed regions, such as the South China Sea and borders with India and Russia. The international community, particularly the United States, rightfully views these developments with concern, recognizing the potential for the ASL to escalate tensions and destabilize the region.</p> -<p>According to this theory, what will end the Sino-American competition is the accumulated effects of the profound internal problems China confronts, combined with consistent external resistance. If the United States and its friends can check China’s aggrandizement, then the combination of slowing growth, a slow-motion demographic catastrophe, an increasingly stifling and unresponsive political system, and other internal flaws could eventually produce a marked decline in China’s ability to challenge the international order. Beijing’s hostility to the United States could become less strategically problematic, even if hostility persists.</p> +<p>The implications of China’s ASL extend beyond Taiwan, as its invocation sets a worrying precedent for using domestic legislation to justify international actions. By invoking the ASL, China seeks to legitimize its territorial claims and suppress any movements toward self-determination, not just in Taiwan but also potentially in other regions. This is exemplified by China’s historical rights claims, which are often used to assert long-standing ties to contested territories. Additionally, measures such as the 22 Articles illustrate China’s willingness to use legal tools to silence dissent and to control narratives. Such actions raise significant concerns under international law, particularly regarding the prohibition of the use of force and the right to self-determination.</p> -<p>Alternatively, the same pressures could eventually cause an evolution in Chinese governance, either toward democracy or simply toward a less toxic form of tyranny. In either case, the United States’ task would be to hold the line geopolitically — while perhaps marginally increasing the stresses on Chinese power and governance — until these internal processes play out.</p> +<p>As China’s legal warfare evolves into what can be described as “legal enforcement warfare,” the international community faces new challenges, including responding not only legally and diplomatically but also with practical measures to counteract China’s gray zone strategies. The international community must also scrutinize China’s use of international organizations, such as Interpol, to pursue political objectives under the guise of criminal charges. In response, countries must reinforce international legal norms, support Taiwan’s democratic self-determination, and work collectively to prevent the erosion of international law standards.</p> -<p>These are grim scenarios because the regime-failure scenario echoes an experience — the Cold War — that no sober analyst wishes to relive. The regime-failure theory also raises serious questions. A CCP that fears its power or control is slipping could become more aggressive, in hopes of locking in gains while it still can. If the United States uses offensive measures to increase the strains on Chinese power or on the Chinese regime — such as technological denial policies meant to keep Beijing well behind in the economic and military race — it could ratchet up tensions and dangers in the relationship. And critically, the United States simply does not know, at this point, whether the combination of external resistance and pressure would accelerate the decay of the CCP — or help it hang on by stoking Chinese nationalism.</p> +<h3 id="a-view-from-japan">A View from Japan</h3> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="navigating-cross-strait-tensions">Navigating Cross-Strait Tensions</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>That said, this approach is not as radical as it might initially sound. It need not involve actively seeking regime change any more than the United States’ containment strategy actively sought to overthrow the rulers of the Kremlin. Back then, “regime failure” or “regime mellowing” was more of a long-term aspiration than a near-term operational objective. This approach also does not require abandoning diplomacy any more than containment precluded cooperation on arms control, nuclear non-proliferation, or global public health during the Cold War. What it requires, simply, is accepting that the nature of the CCP imposes severe limitations on how much the relationship can improve, so long as the party retains power.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="ken-jimbo">Ken Jimbo</h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="who-cares">Who Cares?</h4> +<h4 id="introduction-12">Introduction</h4> -<p>There is, of course, another question: Why should U.S. officials spend their time speculating about long-term theories of victory in a competition that is just getting underway? Indeed, given how dangerous that competition can be on a day-to-day basis, there is a certain argument for simply focusing on handling China in the here and now, while deferring intellectual debates about the distant future. This is, in fact, the approach that some key U.S. officials seem to favor.</p> +<p>The introduction of the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2005 was a significant event in East Asian geopolitics, reflecting Beijing’s determination to prevent Taiwan’s formal independence. For Japan, the law represents China’s uncompromised official declaration to use force in the case of unacceptable political consequences in cross-Strait relations, which later became Tokyo’s basic logic to prepare for a Taiwan Strait contingency. The law has also strictly limited Taiwan’s international representation, thus testing Japan’s diplomatic balancing act between China and Taiwan. Japan’s approach to the ASL, and more broadly to the “One China” framework, underscores its strategic interests in maintaining regional peace and stability while fostering unofficial relations with Taiwan.</p> -<p>But this would be a mistake. Strategy involves determining how actions taken today will lead to the achievement of distant objectives. Different theories of victory might produce different conceptions of what roles bilateral diplomacy and offensive pressure should play in U.S. statecraft. Moreover, if the United States does not know where it is going, how can Americans tell if it is getting anywhere? And if rivalry with China is indeed the fundamental challenge for U.S. strategy, does the U.S. government not owe the American people an answer to the question of where this all may lead?</p> +<h4 id="historical-context-of-japan-taiwan-relations">Historical Context of Japan-Taiwan Relations</h4> -<p>Admittedly, it is hard to conclusively say which theory of victory is analytically dominant, because both theories hinge on judgments that are necessarily prospective and somewhat tentative. But in my view, the balance of evidence supports the more pessimistic theory — that competition will ultimately be resolved through changes in Chinese power or in the way China is governed. That is a dark view of where Sino-American competition is headed. Yet if the rivalry is as fundamental as CCP leaders seem to think, and as Xi himself sometimes says, then that view may also be the most realistic.</p> +<p>Following the normalization of relations with the PRC in 1972, Japan adhered to a policy of recognizing the PRC as the sole legal government of China (a “One China” policy) while maintaining unofficial relations with Taiwan, primarily in economic and cultural spheres. This stance was rooted in Japan’s strategic interest in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait, an area critical to regional security and economic interests.</p> -<p>Yet this conclusion leads to a final problem. Right now, the theory of victory that holds together analytically may not be the theory of victory that best holds the counter-China coalition together. A multilateral strategy is necessary to check Chinese power. As the United States has seen in recent years, this requires assembling multiple, overlapping coalitions to balance Beijing militarily, economically, technologically, and ideologically.</p> +<p>Taiwan’s democratization in the 1990s added a new dimension to its relationship with Japan. The political liberalization allowed for greater public appreciation of Japan in Taiwan, fostering closer economic and cultural ties. However, the shadow of the PRC’s claims over Taiwan has consistently necessitated a cautious approach from Japan, ensuring that its interactions with Taiwan do not provoke Beijing’s ire.</p> -<p>The Biden team, in my view, has done fairly well in this task. But there is no denying that the rallying of these coalitions is often complicated by the fact that many U.S. allies and partners, in Asia, Europe, and elsewhere, have little appetite for a zero-sum slugfest between Washington and Beijing. Few of these countries — even the United States’ closest allies — would welcome a U.S. strategy that explicitly seeks regime failure. Indeed, just talking about such a strategy in public makes many U.S. allies nervous. So, it is understandable that there has remained so much ambiguity in Washington’s assessments of where the rivalry is going, because the truth may be something that no one particularly wants to hear.</p> +<h4 id="the-anti-secession-law-and-regional-implications">The Anti-Secession Law and Regional Implications</h4> -<p>There is no easy escape from this dilemma. Eventually, the U.S. government must be candid about its China strategy. There is no way to rally the domestic commitment and resources necessary to succeed if U.S. officials are not honest about the underlying problem. Democracies cannot have one strategic agenda in private and a second one for public and international consumption. In the near term, there may be good reasons to highlight the practical aspects of building the coalitions needed to counter China while downplaying the more sensitive question of how this might all end. But over the longer term, it is hard to see how the United States can win the defining rivalry of this century without being clear about what it is trying to achieve.</p> +<p>The enactment of the ASL by China was perceived in Japan as a unilateral move that could destabilize the Taiwan Strait, an area Japan views as vital for its security. The law’s explicit provision for “non-peaceful means” to prevent Taiwan’s independence heightened concerns about the potential for military conflict, which could directly impact Japan given its geographical proximity and security ties with the United States.</p> -<h3 id="the-necessity-of-a-phased-china-strategy">The Necessity of a Phased China Strategy</h3> +<p>Japan’s official response to the ASL was measured. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concern over the potential threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, reiterating Japan’s opposition to any non-peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. This response reflects Japan’s broader strategic calculus: maintaining a stable regional environment conducive to economic growth while balancing its relations with China and Taiwan.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="zack-cooper">Zack Cooper</h4> - <h4 id="senior-fellow-american-enterprise-institute">Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Nevertheless, Japan’s commitment to adherence to the basic position of the One China policy remained after the PRC’s adoption of the ASL. At the Japan-China Summit Meeting in May 2008, “Regarding the Taiwan issue, the Japanese side again expressed its adherence to the position enunciated in the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China.”</p> -<p>The United States needs a China strategy that maintains security in the short term and presents a vision of success in the long term. Recent U.S. approaches have focused on either the former or the latter, without a clear strategy for integrating them together. This essay suggests a different framework — a phased strategy that overlays objectives with distinct timeframes. A phased approach of this sort is the only option around which policymakers can build a lasting and bipartisan consensus.</p> +<h4 id="japans-strategic-interests-and-policy-adjustments">Japan’s Strategic Interests and Policy Adjustments</h4> -<h4 id="extreme-end-states">Extreme End States</h4> +<p>Japan’s strategic interests in the post-ASL Taiwan Strait are multifaceted. Economically, Taiwan is a significant partner with robust trade and investment ties. Japan’s economic interests in Taiwan are driven by its advanced technology sector and its role in global supply chains. Culturally, the shared values of democracy and the rule of law have fostered a unique bond between the Japanese and Taiwan peoples. The U.S.-Japan security alliance underscores the importance of maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait, with both countries sharing concerns about China’s growing military capabilities and assertiveness. These factors have driven Japan to seek a balance in its approach, leveraging unofficial channels to deepen ties with Taiwan while adhering to its official recognition of the PRC.</p> -<p>The wide range of views on China within the United States makes characterizing the overall debate difficult. Yet the extreme positions on the United States’ China strategy are relatively clear: coevolution or regime change. Neither is likely to attract sufficient support, for reasons explained below.</p> +<p>The changing geopolitical landscape, particularly China’s rise as a more assertive regional power, has prompted Japan to reconsider its security posture. In December 2022, the Japanese government approved three security-related strategic documents, namely the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program. The premise of these strategic documents is that the international community is facing its “greatest postwar challenge” and that the security environment surrounding Japan is “the most severe and complex” in the postwar era. The documents defined China as the “greatest strategic challenge.”</p> -<p>For many years, a cadre of U.S. experts promoted a strategy aimed at making China more like the United States and bringing it more fully into the international order. The end state envisioned by advocates of this approach was to make China a “responsible stakeholder” in the existing order rather than a threat to that system. Henry Kissinger labeled this “co-evolution” and explained it as an effort in which “both countries pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict. Neither side endorses all the aims of the other or presumes a total identity of interests, but both sides seek to identify and develop complementary interests.” This approach enjoyed broad bipartisan support for several decades.</p> +<p>The approach that the three strategy documents seek to take is to operationalize deterrence by denial and new ways of fighting. Given a status of structural inferiority vis-à-vis China, Japan’s goal is not to quantitively balance the amount of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) equipment against the scale of China’s conventional forces. The strategy documents aim to develop JSDF capability enough to “make [the] opponent realize that the goal of invasion of Japan is not achievable” and that the “damage the opponent will incur makes the invasion not worth the cost.” In other words, denying adversaries’ prospects of operational success is the essence of the denial strategy.</p> -<p>Yet, over the last 15 years — and especially since Xi Jinping took over as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012 — it became clear that China was not converging with the United States. As a result, Beijing is unlikely to become a responsible stakeholder in the existing system anytime soon, if at all. Xi has sketched out a vision of China as a challenger to the United States, rather than a partner. Although Beijing’s vision of an alternative order has not come into focus — at least not yet — Chinese leaders proposed elements of an alternative system in the 20th Party Congress in 2022, as well as through the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative.</p> +<p>The sequence of operationalizing denial strategy is (1) disrupting and defeating invasion over long distances through stand-off defense capabilities; (2) if deterrence fails, ensuring asymmetric superiority through cross-domain operations that integrate the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains; and (3) conducting swift and persistent operations to dissuade conflict escalation. Until 2027, Japan will strengthen its existing defense equipment to prevent or eliminate an invasion of Japan. By roughly 2032, it will fundamentally strengthen its defense capability to “disrupt and defeat invasion at earlier timing at a location further afield.”</p> -<p>As it has become increasingly clear that China will not follow the path that some in the United States have hoped, experts from both parties have suggested that Washington should take a different approach to Beijing. Some have called for the “end of engagement,” while others have called for an era of “strategic competition.” Few observers, however, have laid out a clear alternative end state to U.S-China coevolution.</p> +<p>The high-end military contingency scenarios over the Taiwan Strait are unspoken assumptions for which the Japanese government aims to be ready. The logic of denial for China’s integrated military operations in Taiwan can be found in various dimensions.</p> -<p>A small group of academics and China experts favor a turn toward a policy of accommodation in order to ensure that China’s rise does not lead to conflict. Charlie Glaser, for example, has suggested that an alteration of U.S. policy on Taiwan might be sufficient to satisfy Beijing. Others have urged the United States and its allies and partners to give China more breathing room in the Western Pacific, which could help “meet China halfway.” This, however, appears unlikely to succeed given that Obama-era engagement efforts largely came to naught. Perhaps more importantly, there is little political support for these efforts in Washington today.</p> +<p>Enhancing the U.S.-Japan alliance, particularly in defense cooperation, implicitly acknowledges the possibility of a Taiwan contingency. The essence of integrated deterrence in the Japan-U.S. alliance lies in the joint promotion of the denial strategy. Fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capability will lead to Japan’s defense and the effective projection of U.S. forces. The JSDF’s standoff defense capability will also provide wide-area force projection support to U.S. forces. Integrated air and missile defense capabilities, sustained and robust operations, and the strengthening of domestic and international facility areas will be key elements for U.S. forces to conduct operations in the war zone.</p> -<p>The alternative end state favored in some more hawkish circles is to actively undermine the CCP and accelerate processes that could bring down the regime. But it remains unclear whether the United States has enough influence within China to genuinely threaten the CCP’s hold on power. More importantly, even if this was possible, doing so might not be in the United States’ interest, given the possibility that U.S.-instigated regime change could backfire and lead to even more confrontation. Moreover, it remains unclear whether a post-CCP government in China would be more cooperative with the United States.</p> +<h4 id="opportunities-and-challenges-in-japan-taiwan-relations">Opportunities and Challenges in Japan-Taiwan Relations</h4> -<p>So, although there are some who would advocate for end states of either coevolution or regime change, the bulk of observers in Washington find these alternatives unappealing and desire a third way. This is precisely what the Biden administration has attempted to offer.</p> +<p>In recent years, Japan has explored new avenues to strengthen its relationship with Taiwan, capitalizing on areas less likely to provoke a strong reaction from China. This includes cooperation in nontraditional security domains such as cybersecurity and public health, where both sides have shared interests and face common threats. The Global Cooperation and Training Framework, which includes the United States, Japan, and Taiwan, exemplifies a pragmatic approach to trilateral cooperation that circumvents diplomatic constraints. Japan also began stationing an active-duty Ministry of Defense official in the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association in 2022.</p> -<h4 id="unsatisfying-steady-states">Unsatisfying Steady States</h4> +<p>However, challenges remain. The lack of official diplomatic recognition limits the scope of Japan-Taiwan relations, necessitating creative diplomatic strategies to advance mutual interests. Additionally, domestic politics in both Japan and Taiwan can complicate bilateral ties. In Taiwan, political agendas related to Japan often become contentious issues, reflecting the island’s divided political landscape. In Japan, while public sentiment toward Taiwan is generally positive, political caution prevails in the Diet, where strengthening ties with Taiwan could draw China’s strong opposition.</p> -<p>Recognizing that neither of these end states has robust political support in the United States, the Biden administration and many Democrats have jettisoned discussion of end states altogether. Instead, they have embraced an approach focused on establishing a stable “steady state” with China. Shortly before returning to government, current deputy secretary of state Kurt Campbell advocated turning “from end states to steady states across military, economic, political, and global governance domains to find a form of evolving and complex co-existence.”</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-navigating-the-future">Conclusion: Navigating the Future</h4> -<p>The Biden team has asserted that the best way to shape regional dynamics is by deepening Asian alliances and partnerships — its strategy therefore has revolved less around China’s future than around that of the United States and its friends. The thinking is that Washington has less ability to influence Beijing’s actions than commonly perceived, so U.S. policymakers should focus on things they can control. With this in mind, the Biden team put forward a three-part China strategy, which it calls “invest, align, compete.” The core idea is that investing in the United States and aligning with allies and partners will put the United States in a better position to compete with China.</p> +<p>As Japan navigates the complexities of the ASL and its implications for regional stability, it must continue to balance its strategic interests with the realities of cross-Strait relations. This involves carefully calibrating its policy toward Taiwan, leveraging unofficial channels to foster cooperation while adhering to the framework established by the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué.</p> -<p>But the lack of a clear objective with regard to the preferred end state of their China policy has been a recurring problem for advocates of the Biden administration’s approach. Although it is tempting to do away with end states altogether, it is hard to convince the U.S. public to make great sacrifices for a competition with no end. Though Republicans have started making this critique more directly in recent months, political leaders from both sides of the aisle talk explicitly about winning, not just competing.</p> +<p>Japan’s path forward involves maintaining its current policy stance and exploring new opportunities for collaboration with Taiwan in areas aligning with its strategic interests. This includes enhancing economic partnerships, strengthening people-to-people exchanges, and supporting Taiwan’s participation in the international community in ways that do not contravene Japan’s official diplomatic stance.</p> -<p>This is true even of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris. In the foreword to his administration’s National Security Strategy, Biden pledged to “win the competition for the 21st century.” In his last State of the Union speech, Biden was more explicit, promising to “win the competition for the 21st century against China.” Vice President Kamala Harris has made similar remarks, committing in her Democratic National Convention speech that “America, not China, wins the competition.” These remarks suggest that political leaders in the United States believe that the U.S. public wants to “win” rather than simply “compete,” regardless of what their advisers put in policymaking documents.</p> +<h3 id="a-view-from-southeast-asia">A View from Southeast Asia</h3> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="inattention-and-avoidance">Inattention and Avoidance</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>The question that remains is whether the United States can identify an end state with regard to China that can win broad political support. Many Republicans are more willing to tolerate short-term instability if it puts the United States on a better long-term pathway vis-à-vis China. This case was made by then secretary of state Mike Pompeo when he referenced Richard Nixon in arguing, “we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside of the family of nations. . . . The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus, our aim — to the extent we can, we must influence events. Our goal should be to induce change.”</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="ja-ian-chong">Ja Ian Chong</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>This view has generally been an outlier among Republican policymakers. Although politicians may talk openly about accelerating the downfall of the CCP, few leaders embrace those statements when put into positions of power. Donald Trump’s White House guidance on China strategy was explicit that “United States policies are not premised on an attempt to change the PRC’s domestic governance model.” Other Trump administration officials have continued to insist that the United States should signal to China that U.S. policy is to maintain the status quo when it comes to the CCP.</p> +<h4 id="introduction-13">Introduction</h4> -<p>Observers are thus left with three basic options — coevolution, regime change, or sustained competition — none of which alone can win sufficient support across the political spectrum to be sustainable from one administration to the next. The end states of coevolution and regime change are too extreme to attract bipartisan support. Steady-state competition is more palatable, but Republicans find it unsatisfying and even Democratic political leaders say their aim is to win, not just compete. The U.S. strategic community must do better than these three options — and it can.</p> +<p>Relations across the Taiwan Strait are typically out of sight, out of mind in Southeast Asia, where states are eager to profit from economic ties with both Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Governments generally view the political sensitivities associated with cross-Strait relations as quagmires to avoid, especially if there is the potential for friction with Beijing’s goals of controlling Taiwan and reducing Taiwan’s distinctiveness. They believe that cross-Strait issues are separable from developments in Southeast Asia and try to pay little attention — except when there is a real risk of instability spilling over. Consequently, these governments have put little thought into the PRC’s Anti-Secession Law (ASL) since it was introduced in 2005. To the region, it is a piece of domestic legislation on which they have little, if anything, to comment.</p> -<h4 id="a-phased-approach">A Phased Approach</h4> +<h4 id="varied-views-of-taiwan-across-southeast-asia">Varied Views of Taiwan Across Southeast Asia</h4> -<p>Thankfully, there is a way to combine elements of all three concepts into a coherent strategy — it just requires a phased approach. Phasing would differentiate between short- and long-term objectives, acknowledging that the situation which exists today will not last forever and, therefore, could make more appealing end states possible at a later time.</p> +<p>Taiwan’s relationship with the PRC is something most regional governments believe has little to do with them, even though Taiwan borders the South China Sea and Taipei lays claim to much of those waters. A popular perspective across Southeast Asian governments is that they are unable to affect decisions in Taipei and Beijing — and, at any rate, can depend on the United States and perhaps Japan to discourage escalation and manage crises. Many in Southeast Asia also appear to think that the importance of economic ties across the Taiwan Strait will ease tensions. Legacies of colonialism, independence, and separatist movements, along with a norm of noninterference in domestic affairs, further prompt Southeast Asian states to disregard cross-Strait relations as someone else’s problem.</p> -<p>In the short term, the United States is unlikely to fundamentally alter China’s basic path. U.S. policies can certainly influence China’s decisions on the margins. But at the moment, the best Washington can do is to build strength at home and partnerships abroad in order to demonstrate to Xi that he cannot overturn the existing order through the use or threat of force. In other words, U.S. policies designed to put the United States on a stronger competitive footing should win broad partisan support for the moment. This short-term period is likely to last at least as long as Xi remains in power — possibly the next 10–20 years. Both patience and firmness will be required during this period to avoid a conflict while demonstrating to China that aggression will not pay.</p> +<p>The Philippines is an exception. The PRC’s demarcation of military exercise areas just outside Philippine territorial waters following U.S. speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan emphatically reminded Filipinos of the fallout that a major crisis around Taiwan could bring. The islands’ geographic proximity makes avoiding reverberations highly unlikely. Complicating the calculus for Manila are, of course, its ongoing territorial dispute with the PRC and its alliance with the United States. Resources, trainings, diplomatic support, and potentially military support from the United States can better enable the Philippines to maintain its claims in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea in the face of mounting PRC pressure until a solution emerges. However, a contingency involving Taiwan might see the United States demand access to territorial waters, airspace, and bases and emplace equipment and supplies, which could in turn invite backlash or even force from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian governments, such as Singapore, are purportedly privately concerned about rising tensions surrounding the South China Sea and Taiwan but have refrained from taking public positions, possibly out of fear of PRC punishment.</p> -<p>Yet, in the long term, it is only natural for the U.S. public to expect that a strategy requiring substantial resource expenditures will bring about a more lasting resolution. Xi Jinping’s eventual departure as general secretary could create an opportunity to reset the U.S.-China relationship. Optimists will no doubt hold out hope for a new set of leaders in China more open to genuine cooperation with the United States. Pessimists will think this unlikely and instead envision the people of China demanding political reforms from within once Xi is gone. This could even bring about more fundamental changes in China’s domestic governance system.</p> +<p>On the status of Taiwan, Southeast Asian governments have generally adhered to the definitions used by the PRC and Kuomintang (KMT) that Taiwan is part of China — regardless of which regime represents it. These governments have adopted “One China” policies (“一中”政策) to some degree, sometimes in exchange for economic benefits such as market access or assistance. However, there are clear divergences among the Southeast Asian states’ One China policies, as evident following the PRC’s military exercises in response to the 2022 Pelosi visit, when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) called for calm and reiterated “Member States’ support for their respective One-China Policy [sic].” Southeast Asian states have, until recently, generally managed to escape debates surrounding PRC efforts to recast these positions in terms of its own, narrower One China principle, but whether this can continue is an open question.</p> -<p>U.S. policymakers need not make this choice for the Chinese people. It is critical that U.S. experts differentiate between forceful regime change, which is commonly viewed as brought about from outside, and regime failure, which emerges from a government’s own internal breakdowns. U.S. leaders can talk openly about the latter without suggesting that they endorse the former. Indeed, the United States did exactly this in the Cold War and it did not bring about a third world war in the twenty-first century. Acknowledging the CCP’s flaws need not be inflammatory, particularly since many Chinese citizens are growing increasingly frustrated with aspects of their own government’s decisionmaking.</p> +<p>The table below summarizes the current One China policies of Southeast Asian governments, noting that positions sometimes subtly adjust over time. It draws on official statements from the government in question and is cross-referenced against PRC versions, although in some cases only one version is publicly available. The Laotian, Indonesian, Singaporean, and Vietnamese positions recognize that Taiwan is part of China but do not explicitly equate China with the PRC. Cambodia is not explicit about whether Taiwan is a part of China or the PRC, while the Philippines “fully understands and respects” the PRC’s position on Taiwan without openly recognizing or agreeing to it. Indonesia, Laos, the Myanmar junta, Timor Leste, and Vietnam publicly support peaceful (re)unification but are silent about their stances on Beijing using force. Other parts of Southeast Asian states’ One China policies draw variously from that of the PRC. ASEAN itself has no position on the issue given the wide range of member-state policies.</p> -<p>It should be acknowledged that a phased approach is not an entirely new strategy. The long-term options presented here might be termed “mellowing or breakup” — indeed, that is what George Kennan labeled them when discussing just this sort of strategy with respect to the Soviet Union. Kennan did not insist that mellowing or breaking up should — or could — happen at the outset of the Cold War. Rather, he acknowledged that the United States would only prevail over the Soviet Union when the Communist Party’s own flaws manifested. The same is true of the CCP today.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WHSnyCS.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ Table 2: Chinese and Southeast Asian Policies toward Taiwan</em></p> -<h3 id="no-exit-from-rivalry-how-steady-states-can-guide-strategy">No Exit from Rivalry: How Steady States Can Guide Strategy</h3> +<p>Different Southeast Asian governments’ One China policies are not necessarily consistent with Beijing’s One China principle. These differences are especially evident in terms of equating “China” with the PRC, insistence on peaceful (re)unification, and non-support for Taiwan independence. The lack of a clear, sustained position reflects the fact that Southeast Asian states mostly do not care whether Taiwan is a formal part of China, defined as the PRC or otherwise — instead preferring stability, being able to benefit from economic ties with China and Taiwan, and avoiding trouble. Statements about “one China” serve as a way to improve ties with Beijing and seize any accompanying opportunities, since they see the cost of crossing Taiwan as minimal. In the case of Myanmar, the competing regimes each appear to be using public alignment with the PRC’s One China principle to garner support from Beijing for their rule, or at least to avoid having the PRC side with their rival. Southeast Asian states have little reason to commit one way or another on issues of Taiwan and China and seem willing to trade commitments to One China for whatever benefits them most at a given time.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="rush-doshi">Rush Doshi</h4> - <h4 id="cv-starr-senior-fellow-for-asia-studies-and-director-of-the-china-strategy-initiative-council-on-foreign-relations">C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia Studies and Director of the China Strategy Initiative, Council on Foreign Relations</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Southeast Asian states care most about safeguarding their sovereignty, maintaining their regimes, driving economic development, and maintaining the regional stability that undergirds their ability to pursue prosperity. The ASEAN statement in the wake of the 2022 Pelosi visit to Taiwan — one of the very few times the grouping and its members spoke publicly on cross-Strait relations — was more an expression of concern for stability and supply chains than anything else. Southeast Asian states are happy to leave Taipei and Beijing to their own devices so long as they bear no negative consequences.</p> -<p>The debate around the long-term objectives for U.S. China strategy is intensifying. Does the United States need a definitive “end state” for its competition with China, or is a “steady state” of competition on terms favorable to Washington more realistic? Would either even be enough, or is the focus on the long-term academic when the short-term challenge is so urgent?</p> +<h4 id="southeast-asian-views-of-chinas-anti-secession-law">Southeast Asian Views of China’s Anti-Secession Law</h4> -<p>Too often what should be a strategic debate breaks down, becoming merely conceptual and semantic. So, for the sake of clarity, “end states” in this context should be understood as a specific vision for how a rivalry ends, be it by war, grand bargains, regime change, or mutual agreement. A “steady state,” in contrast, assumes rivalry is more likely to persist than it is to end.</p> +<p>Given such reasoning, it is not surprising that Southeast Asian states and ASEAN barely made any mention of either the PRC’s Anti-Secession Law upon its promulgation in 2005 (or any of its subsequent anniversaries) or the “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards in Accordance with Law” released in 2024. They view these documents as domestic PRC law like any other legislative or policy framework promulgated for internal purposes, only taking public positions when it affects the Southeast Asian countries’ interests.</p> -<p>Achieving a steady state is not about what kind of bilateral relationship Washington wants from Beijing, nor is it about the kind of government Americans want for China. The assumption behind a steady state is that there is no exit from this rivalry that is realistic, achievable, or acceptable and around which U.S. policymakers could prudently strategize. A steady state instead revolves around an affirmative vision of which interests the United States should secure and what order it should build in a world where competition with China is a condition to be managed rather than a problem to be solved.</p> +<p>Instrumental approaches toward One China among Southeast Asian capitals, however, cede initiative on an issue that could have broad and serious ramifications for the stability and security of the region. For the most part, Southeast Asian governments either negotiate over One China for immediate gains or accept what Beijing tells them in the hope of winning goodwill. They may rhetorically call for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences, but they have not commit anything to promoting resolutions or stability. Such attitudes are evident from the public silence about Beijing’s unilateral gray-zone pressure tactics and political interference targeting Taiwan. There tends to be reflexive blaming of the United States and Taiwan for provocation despite overwhelming support for the status quo among Taiwan’s public over time, as seen across various opinion polls. Southeast Asian states see such statements as costless in the immediate term, since they do not expect punishment from Taipei or Washington.</p> -<p>Many proponents of an end state tout its benefits for mobilizing the U.S. public or for reassuring Beijing. But they then fail to put forward an end state that anyone could support. Moreover, they overlook the fact that steady states — when defined with adequate detail — can also work like end states to mobilize or to reassure. When compared with the obvious end states for rivalry, steady states are the only realistic anchor for U.S. strategy. Accordingly, the debate should focus less on how rivalry ends, which the United States cannot control, and more on defining and framing steady states in a world where rivalry continues — all with an eye toward mobilizing Americans, reducing misperceptions, and properly guiding strategy in a future U.S. administration.</p> +<p>Another consideration for Southeast Asian states and ASEAN regarding the ASL is to avoid the awkwardness that comes with public positions on PRC domestic legislation. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have territorial disputes with the PRC over the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea/East Sea. In addition, Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), extending northward from the Natuna Islands, overlaps with the southern section of Beijing’s unilaterally drawn “nine-dash line” in those waters, even if Jakarta asserts that there is no dispute. Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam contend with the ecological consequences of the PRC’s upstream damming of tributaries to major rivers such as the Mekong and Irrawaddy. Taking public positions or making public comments on the ASL may invite complicated questions about PRC domestic laws that pertain to contested maritime and riparian issues where Southeast Asian states would prefer silence for the sake of limiting friction. At any rate, publicly commenting on China’s domestic legislation runs counter to the Southeast Asian and ASEAN norms of noninterference in the internal affairs of others.</p> -<h4 id="new-assessments-new-debates">New Assessments, New Debates</h4> +<p>Some among Southeast Asia’s large ethnic Chinese communities demonstrate sympathy toward Beijing’s position on Taiwan, including the ASL, regardless of official positions. Such sentiments are often rooted in a twentieth-century Chinese nationalism that was keen to recover from the “century of humiliation” and recreate the Qing Empire’s more expansive borders, which encompassed Taiwan and Mongolia. Recent PRC advancement of the “China Dream” has given life to attempts by some ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia to advance Beijing’s One China principle, ASL, and the unification of Taiwan on Beijing’s terms. The most obvious aspects of such mobilization take the form of local “peaceful unification promotion associations” (和平统一促进会); another is renewed United Front Work Department (统一战线工作部) activities that seek to shape host-country policies and police local opinions about the PRC. Such manipulation of ethnic-based nationalism in Southeast Asian societies risks sparking resurgent communal tensions during a crisis.</p> -<p>It is not coincidental that this debate on strategy has intensified as the national consensus on China has shifted. Many in the analytic and policy community believe — as I’ve argued previously — that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) seeks to displace the current order led by the United States and its allies and partners, first at the regional level and now at the global level. They see the PRC preparing to defeat the United States in a protracted military conflict over Taiwan while also pursuing global military bases; working to dominate technologies critical to the “fourth industrial revolution”; increasing the world’s dependence on China while decreasing China’s dependence on the world; and aligning with Russia, Iran, and North Korea to challenge U.S.-led order. On all sides of the political spectrum, growing numbers of analysts frame this competition as a new Cold War, albeit one fundamentally different from the last.</p> +<p>Inattentiveness toward Taiwan-China ties also means that Southeast Asian states and ASEAN are not in positions to help manage and reduce cross-Strait tensions. They depend on Beijing and Taipei to avoid escalation and crises while relying on Washington and possibly Tokyo to address any serious problems that may arise. Such conditions mean that Southeast Asian states and ASEAN possess little initiative on cross-Strait issues and end up simply reacting to developments. A major crisis in the Taiwan Strait may see Beijing pressure Southeast Asian states to deny the United States and allied forces access to territorial waters, airspace, and facilities, including by mobilizing members of local ethnic Chinese communities. Washington could well demand the opposite. Without more active approaches to cross-Strait developments — which include Beijing’s efforts to use its ASL to justify coercion, force, and violence toward Taiwan — most Southeast Asian states would be caught flat-footed in a cross-Strait crisis.</p> -<p>Although some disagree with these assessments, for now, the center of gravity has shifted. The Biden administration, for example, declared China as the only state with the intent to reshape the international order and as having the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so.</p> +<p>Taiwan, the United States, and others who wish to maintain stability and the cross-Strait status quo may want to emphasize to Southeast Asian states what they have at stake. A Taiwan that remains functionally and effectively autonomous is important for supply chains, access to technology, and prosperity in Southeast Asia, as is these states’ unfettered physical access to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and the PRC. The South China Sea is not insulated from conflict, blockades, and other forms of instability around Taiwan. Any escalation in tensions could quickly and easily spread southward as contestation over water, airspace, and submarine cables intensifies. Except for the Philippines, Southeast Asian governments do not appear ready to acknowledge the gravity of increasing PRC pressure on Taiwan and its implications for broader regional security and order. Yet they have good reasons to take a more active interest and role in supporting stability and the status quo surrounding Taiwan, not out of enthusiasm for any position but to safeguard their own interests.</p> -<p>The darkening national assessment about the scale of China’s challenge has led to greater discomfort — even alarm — over the idea that this competition might have no foreseeable end point. This has intensified the question of what the end state for U.S. strategy should be and whether a focus on a “steady state” is sufficient as many analysts look for an exit to rivalry.</p> +<h3 id="a-view-from-australia">A View from Australia</h3> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="the-risk-of-non-peaceful-means-is-already-priced-in">The Risk of Non-Peaceful Means is Already Priced In</h3> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="no-exit">No Exit</h4> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="mark-harrison">Mark Harrison</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Throughout history, great power rivalries end in only a few ways, and none offer a realistic escape from the current U.S.-China competition.</p> +<h4 id="introduction-14">Introduction</h4> -<p>First, rivalries can end in war. Yet no serious analyst would propose that the United States could or should seek to militarily subjugate or occupy a nuclear-armed great power to end a strategic rivalry.</p> +<p>Taiwan’s interstitial place in the international system and Australia’s own history of post-colonial federation and statehood have created an indeterminate basis for the bilateral Australia-Taiwan relationship. For Australia, relations with Taiwan are mediated by the absence of formal diplomatic recognition and a strong trade relationship, while being triangulated by Australia’s relationships with the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).</p> -<p>Second, they can end with a formal grand bargain. This might mean conceding a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific to China in exchange for the PRC perhaps committing not to use force in the region, including against Taiwan, and accepting the U.S. regional presence. But trading such stark and irreversible U.S. concessions for speculative benefits is foolish, especially if it closes off the world’s most dynamic region to PRC hegemony. And in any case, the competition is global, too, spanning most regions of the world and most functional policy domains.</p> +<p>Australia’s fundamental policy response to this indeterminacy is a One China policy that, like most such policies, maintains an ambiguity toward Beijing’s territorial claim over Taiwan. Australia recognizes the PRC as a state in the international system but only goes so far as to acknowledge Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. This distinction has enabled Australia to remain committed to the U.S. alliance, including taking into account U.S. obligations to Taiwan, while building relations with China in accordance with a broad trade maximization principle, to the level that it accounts for one-third of Australia’s exports.</p> -<p>Third, rivalries can end with the collapse of one party. Some writers have hinted that this is the end state that the United States should pursue with regard to the PRC. But doing so makes the competition dangerously more existential than it is now. Moreover, it is unlikely to succeed in any case, and it may just as easily leave the United States with a more aggressive — and still potent — rival.</p> +<p>On this basis, the relationship with Taiwan is simultaneously central and peripheral for Australia. Taiwan makes visible the structural challenges of reconciling the alliance with the United States and promoting trade with China while tending to displace the bilateral Australia-Taiwan relationship itself. This is expressed in both a cautious and highly constrained policy rhetoric from Canberra about Taiwan and an intense and divisive domestic public discourse about Taiwan’s place in Australia’s international relations.</p> -<p>Fourth, some strategists, such as the RAND Corporation’s Michael J. Mazarr, have made the innovative point that rivalries can end by mutual agreement. For example, Britain and France set aside their hostility to deal with a rising Germany. This threat of a rising third power, however, has no analogy in the current U.S.-China rivalry, and transnational challenges, such as climate change, are unlikely to fill that gap. More broadly, given the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s nationalist objectives, Leninist ideology, and deeply rooted paranoia, Beijing is unlikely to exit rivalry due to overt U.S. pressure. Any such exit “will have to emerge organically from Beijing’s own thinking,” which is precisely why this end state cannot serve as a basis for strategy.</p> +<p>Therefore, the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) has been seen as an additional complication in Australian policy toward China and the United States rather than a central issue in Australia-Taiwan relations. As Donald Clarke observes in this collection, the law itself is as much a policy statement as a piece of legislation given its brevity and lack of specifics. The ASL sits within the development of legal institutions in China overall and asserts the role of legal instruments in cross-Strait relations, which had been dominated by party-to-party relations since the National People’s Congress in 1979. Its most notable feature is the assertion of a legal justification for military action against Taiwan in the name of securing China’s territorial integrity.</p> -<p>Finally, some analysts reject the preceding four end states and propose an intriguing phased approach. Zack Cooper from the American Enterprise Institute, for example, acknowledges the need for steady states in the short term but believes it necessary to articulate that the United States is “waiting for regime failure” even as it does not pursue “forcible regime change.” This idea of explicitly phasing objectives is interesting and similar to George Kennan’s recommendations in the Cold War, and it could be workable. But any strategy that posits Beijing’s collapse as the United States’ end goal would lead Beijing to see all U.S. actions as part of a cohesive strategy to bring down the CCP. The distinctions between short-term steady states and long-term visions of victory would merely exist in the minds of American strategists. And an approach that declares an interest in regime failure, but then opts to wait for it, would incur the costs of a seemingly provocative end state without necessarily having implications for U.S. policy or for mobilizing Americans. Nonetheless, a phased approach with different ends might provide a plausible path for structuring U.S. strategy.</p> +<h4 id="australias-initial-response-to-chinas-anti-secession-law">Australia’s Initial Response to China’s Anti-Secession Law</h4> -<p>If the four end states above are unrealistic, and phased approaches cannot necessarily avoid the downsides of the end states they are associated with, then what path remains for a rivalry to end that proponents of end states could support?</p> +<p>The promulgation of the ASL in 2005 coincided with a period of difficult relations between Australia and Taiwan. In 2004, Australian minister of foreign affairs Alexander Downer made a statement that the Australia, New Zealand, and United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty would not necessarily be in effect in the event a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait brought the United States and China into a wider conflict. This was the culmination of a series of challenges in the Pacific and a general reorientation of Australian policy toward Beijing in response to China’s economic growth.</p> -<h4 id="the-critiques-of-steady-states">The Critiques of Steady States</h4> +<p>Tension between Canberra and Taipei in the 1990s and 2000s developed from Australian efforts to promote Pacific development and stable governance while Taiwan sought to maintain or even grow the number of its diplomatic allies. As Pacific governments switched recognition from the PRC to Taiwan or vice versa and both Beijing and Taipei used development aid and investment as diplomatic tools in the Pacific in their competition, Canberra tended to view Taipei’s activities as destabilizing. The absence of a regional security architecture or formal diplomatic relations between Australia and Taiwan constrained the capacity of both sides to manage these issues.</p> -<p>Rather than answer this question with a clearly defined and realistic end state, many proponents of end states elide it. They instead conflate this debate with other questions: how should U.S. strategy be framed so that it can motivate the U.S. people? How tough should it be practically? Their arguments demonstrate that they see end states not as a strategic device but rather as a political or rhetorical one.</p> +<p>Therefore, the Australian government at the time assessed that the ASL was more of a complication in relations with China than a significant development in cross-Strait relations or the bilateral Australia-Taiwan relationship.</p> -<p>There are two broad camps on opposite sides of the policy spectrum thinking in these terms. Neither puts forward a clear and distinct end state, but each instead offers critiques of steady states that are in reality merely criticisms of other things.</p> +<p>At a summit in Beijing in April 2005, Australian prime minister John Howard stated that he had not raised the ASL in his discussions with his Chinese counterparts. He did, however, comment on the initiation of negotiations for an Australia-China free trade agreement. Earlier in March, Australian Greens leader Bob Brown, a federal Senate member for Tasmania, tabled a motion that the Senate “opposes China’s ‘anti-secession’ laws which would mandate the use of military force if the Taiwan people opt for independence,” but the motion was defeated 7 to 44.</p> -<p>The first camp is uncomfortable with the idea that rivalry is more likely to endure than to end and seeks an end state that can mobilize the U.S. public for what increasingly resembles a cold war. But this is a political argument rather than a strategic one. Mike Gallagher, the clearest proponent of this view, writes that “strategic competition with China will be difficult and expensive” and “American leaders must convince their constituents to sacrifice.” He goes on to indicate the need for an end state because “nobody wants to sacrifice much in pursuit of “managed competition.”</p> +<p>Later that year, the Australian government noted that it was “very disappointed” by the law’s references to military action but that the provisions for cross-Strait consultations were positive. The assessment also stated that Australia urged “both sides to refrain from any unilateral action that would change the status quo, pending a dialogue towards an eventual peaceful settlement.”</p> -<p>First, it is unclear which end state would mobilize Americans. It is hard to imagine invocations to pursue war, grand bargains, regime collapse, or mutual exit that would mobilize Americans in peacetime competition. Left unstated in these kinds of critique is what the end state should be. Gallagher admirably puts forward an answer, citing Kennan’s “Long Telegram” as providing an end state in the “break-up” or “mellowing” of Soviet power. But only the former is an end state, while the latter is in fact a steady state assuming competition continues. Similarly, when Gallagher approvingly cites the Biden administration’s objective of “building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to United States [and] our allies and partners” as “something approximating a long-term objective,” he is once again supporting a steady state. This objective — which continues to animate U.S. policy from export controls to shifts in posture to coordination on tariffs — assumes that rivalry persists and that the United States should try to shape the terms of coexistence in its favor with its allies and partners. The aim is not, as other critics charge, simply to “avoid war” or to “change China’s thinking.” It is to advance U.S. interests responsibly amid rivalry.</p> +<p>The ASL is also noted in the final report of an inquiry by the Australian Senate’s Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade References Committee into Australia-China relations in 2005. The report did not draw conclusions about the law’s significance, but the PRC’s embassy in Canberra did submit public comments stating that the ASL “is the legislation that promotes the development of cross-Straits relations and peaceful reunification, aimed to maintain China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, oppose and curb any secessionist activities as well as maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits.”</p> -<p>Second, what proponents of end states often seek is a rhetorical frame that can mobilize Americans, discipline bureaucracies, and restrain vested interests. But it is not clear that an end state would do that. In fact, the best way to mobilize Americans is likely through focusing on how PRC behavior directly harms them and the United States’ future. Such a rhetorical frame — even a cold war frame, should a future administration adopt it — would be consistent with a steady state acknowledging that rivalry is unlikely to decisively end. Discussion of PRC efforts to defeat the U.S. military, surpass the United States technologically, exploit U.S. dependencies in critical minerals and pharmaceuticals, compromise critical infrastructure, export Fentanyl precursors to drug cartels, and silence dissent even beyond China’s borders are more likely to be compelling than abstract visions of victory because these actions directly harm U.S. citizens. This kind of rhetorical mobilization has helped generate bipartisan support for domestic investments that strengthen the United States’ competitiveness, including in infrastructure, semiconductors, scientific research, and manufacturing. But more is needed.</p> +<p>In the decade after the ASL was issued, Australia’s relations with China developed significantly. In 2014, the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement was signed, and both sides agreed to elevate the relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Australia was also considering a free trade agreement with Taiwan. But in 2017, in the context of the PRC’s approach to Taiwan’s new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government led by Tsai Ing-wen, Beijing communicated directly to Canberra that it would look unfavorably on an Australia-Taiwan free trade agreement, and Canberra dropped the proposal.</p> -<p>Smaller than the first, the second camp includes those who are uncomfortable with the idea that rivalry is more likely to continue than to end because they fear misperception and escalation. Their criticisms include that, “a strategy of an open-ended competition” is dangerous and that “broadcasting an endless horizon of confrontation will appear to China and others as a sweeping and permanent campaign to undermine its power.” But this analysis is also in error. Acknowledging that rivalry is unlikely to end is not the same as advocating open-ended competition. Put differently, the United States does not have a strategy seeking competition with China but instead a structural reality that forces competition on the United States. For those worried about misperception and escalation, what should be more important than articulating the end of competition is articulating the possible limits of competition in a world where it continues so that there might be a chance of managing it. This entails making clear that U.S. ambitions are not unlimited but instead tied to U.S. interests. It also means stressing the kind of steady state the United States seeks.</p> +<h4 id="deteriorating-relations-with-china-and-pricing-in-the-anti-secession-law">Deteriorating Relations with China and “Pricing in” the Anti-Secession Law</h4> -<h4 id="steady-states-and-a-new-administration">Steady States and a New Administration</h4> +<p>In the past decade, however, relations between Australia and China have deteriorated sharply as Canberra took action against PRC interference in Australian domestic politics and public institutions, responded to the growing capacity of the Chinese military, and addressed the Covid-19 pandemic. Beijing’s displeasure at this sometimes-clumsy recalibration from the Australian side was to implement a ministerial-level communications freeze and targeted trade sanctions in 2020 that triggered a vociferous and divisive debate in Australian policy and public life.</p> -<p>Critics have rightly made clear that the current steady state requires further definition. It is important to get the strategic logic for a steady state right. And if that can be accompanied by a public frame that can mobilize Americans, keep allies and partners aligned, and perhaps help manage PRC perceptions, all the better.</p> +<p>The deterioration of relations with China coincided with a disciplined and open government in Taipei, and Taiwan-Australia relations have become the warmest they have been since 1967, the only time an Australian prime minister has ever visited Taiwan. However, in managing the difficult relations with Beijing, Canberra remains cautious with Taipei, and steps are small. In 2024, the two governments signed a new memorandum of understanding on transportation safety. This was followed by a science and technology arrangement that promotes cooperation on information and communications technology, biotechnology, and zero-carbon energy. These agreements are meaningful in the context of Canberra’s reluctance to enter into new agreements over the previous decade.</p> -<p>Anchoring U.S. strategy on an end state for how rivalry ends is neither realistic nor practical. Nor should U.S. strategy be based entirely on what the United States hopes to avoid, such as conflict. Instead, U.S. strategy should be anchored on a steady state that envisions terms of coexistence — however uneasy and fraught that may be — with the PRC that are maximally favorable to the United States. This might have several components.</p> +<p>The most important policy initiative to emerge from this period concerning Taiwan is the AUKUS partnership, under which Australia will acquire U.S. nuclear-powered, but not armed, submarines before developing a new AUKUS-class submarine in collaboration with the United Kingdom. This capability-development framework has been normalized into Australia’s policy establishment across both sides of politics but remains the subject of intense public debate and criticism. AUKUS reflects a change in Australia’s overall strategic outlook, as expressed in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, which lists regional conflict involving China and the United States as one of the key concerns. This outlook captures Australia’s difficulty in placing the bilateral relationship itself at the center of Taiwan policy.</p> -<p>First, the ideal steady state should begin with affirmatively outlining the interests that the United States seeks to secure and the kinds of order it hopes to preserve and strengthen. In broad terms, these interests include keeping the Indo-Pacific and wider world free from PRC hegemony, including by maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait; sustaining U.S. technological leadership; ensuring broad-based prosperity for Americans while avoiding dependence on adversaries; and ensuring that the international system allows states to make sovereign decisions and is generally conducive to democracy and liberalism, among other elements.</p> +<p>AUKUS circulates around the concept of deterrence, wherein Australia develops the military capability to project power in the region and deter action by Beijing. As Minister of Defense Richard Marles summarized:</p> -<p>Second, it should involve some theory of how to get there. There is bipartisan consensus that the United States needs to invest in the sources of its own strength — such as its defense industrial base, technological edge, manufacturing capability — and to align with allies and partners to achieve the scale needed to take on the China challenge. On that foundation, the United States will need to powerfully compete across every regional and functional domain to blunt China’s provocative actions, including its order-building efforts, and to build the foundations for U.S. order. None of this is inconsistent with diplomacy with China that seeks to manage competition, avoid escalation, and enhance transnational cooperation — all of which contribute to a more competitive and sustainable U.S. approach.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Our national security and our national prosperity are based on a stable peaceful region where the global rules-based order is preeminent and respected. Indeed, the rules of the road at sea are everything for us. When the rules-based order is under pressure, Australia is under pressure.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Third, a steady state should involve some articulation of what the United States wants from Beijing. It is better to avoid framing the answer in terms of changing China’s regime, but instead put it in terms of changing China’s actions. There is value in stating that rivalry would lessen dramatically if Beijing would cease threatening its neighbors militarily; increase consumption and reduce excess capacity economically; refrain from interfering in free societies politically; and work in good faith on issues such as climate transnationally, among other elements. To be clear, China is unlikely to make sweeping changes, U.S. and Chinese interests are at odds in many cases, and both sides will continue taking steps that harm the other’s interests.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Crucially, this narrative paints the picture of the geography of our national security. And it does not lie on the coast line of our continent. It lies further afield. An invasion of Australia is an unlikely prospect in any scenario, precisely because so much damage can be done to our country by an adversary without ever having to step foot on Australian soil.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Nonetheless, there is competitive advantage in signaling to Beijing, and to the allies Washington needs to keep on board, that U.S. aims are not unlimited but instead tied to specific interests that are quite reasonable and widely shared by the rest of the world. In some cases, this kind of precision can create bilateral understandings that lead to fragile but real de-escalation and progress in some areas.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Our national security actually lies in the heart of our region. Because the defence of Australia does not mean much without the collective security of the region in which we live.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Fourth, and finally, the United States needs a public frame for its strategy. For foreign audiences, anchoring strategy on an affirmative vision for the world that speaks to their interests will be more appealing than anchoring it on how a bilateral rivalry ends. Meanwhile, at home, China competition needs a frame that rallies the U.S. people. The next administration should stress that outcompeting China is the United States’ main foreign policy priority and necessity, and that the current decade is the critical window to adjust the trend lines in the competition. It should link the China challenge to the interests of everyday Americans, which are real and concrete, rather than rely on abstractions for mobilization. And it should make clear that, while the United States will run hard in the competition, it need not run scared.</p> +<p>The vitriolic public debate about AUKUS reflects anxieties about Australia’s identity as a postcolonial nation, in which relations with China are symbolic of an Australian postcolonial modernity that contrasts with the “imperial” powers of the United States and United Kingdom. Nonetheless, while these themes drive the domestic debate, the agreement itself reflects how the ASL has been priced into Australian policymaking and defense preparations for a Taiwan Strait crisis.</p> -<p>All of these propositions for a steady state are debatable. Indeed, this is the debate that is needed. The question of how rivalry ends is somewhat hubristic and premature, particularly when some of the trend lines in the competition need urgent reversal. The questions around how the United States succeeds in rivalry — what objectives it prioritizes, how it strengthens itself after decades of neglect, how it keeps allies and partners on board, how it mobilizes audiences at home and abroad, and how it competes hard while managing escalation — will shape the United States’ future. U.S. strategy may or may not need an answer to the question of how rivalry ends, but it certainly needs answers on how best to compete.</p> +<p>Australia’s policy architecture is not sensitive to the complexity of Taiwan’s sovereignty or the role of the ASL in institutionalizing Beijing’s territorial claim over Taiwan. Canberra is also not fully attuned to the possibility that Beijing would use the ASL to justify military action against Taiwan. Australian policy is being made within a deteriorating regional security outlook: with more than 60 percent of Australian exports going to Northeast Asia, a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would have a devastating impact on Australia’s economy and security regardless of how it is justified by Beijing. Australia has recognized that regional power projection is required to secure its interests through hard power.</p> -<h3 id="china-and-the-united-states-action-versus-reaction">China and the United States: Action Versus Reaction</h3> +<p>The ASL offers one lens for viewing Australia’s overall shift in regional security policy. Canberra’s relatively sanguine interpretation of the law in 2005 has given way to a much more sober reading of the security outlook, in which China’s “rise” in the past decade has become less of an unalloyed market opportunity than a complex security challenge. While Australia has far to go to implement the goals of AUKUS, this agreement is a sign that the purpose of the ASL — and recognition that it runs counter to Australia’s national interests — has been internalized in Australian policymaking.</p> +<h3 id="europe-and-the-anti-secession-law">Europe and the Anti-Secession Law</h3> <blockquote> - <h4 id="elizabeth-economy">Elizabeth Economy</h4> - <h4 id="hargrove-senior-fellow-hoover-institution-stanford-university">Hargrove Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University</h4> + <h3 id="challenges-in-unity">Challenges in Unity</h3> </blockquote> -<p>A strategy requires an end goal or a “vision of victory,” and policymakers need a clear objective against which to establish priorities, align resources and capabilities, and make appropriate trade-offs among policy choices. Yet a vision of victory is not enough to ensure a successful strategy. The vision held must be in keeping with the scale and scope of the challenge. While the current U.S. strategy toward China of “managed competition” has a vision of victory, that vision is not adequate to address the grand-scale, multi-dimensional challenge that China poses to U.S. interests. China has articulated a transformative vision for itself, its position in the international system, and the international system itself. Beijing’s policy toward the United States — namely maintaining stability while working to erode U.S. global leadership and the values, norms, and institutions that underpin it — is a function of its grander vision of change for itself and the international system. The United States needs an equally comprehensive vision of victory that includes a vision for itself and for the nature of U.S. leadership in a transformed twenty-first-century international system. Constraining China is only one strand of what must be a much larger strategy.</p> - -<h4 id="grand-vision">Grand Vision</h4> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="meia-nouwens">Meia Nouwens</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s vision of victory is clear. He seeks to create a system predicated on Chinese values, interests, and institutional preferences which redefines both the international system and China’s position in it. Much, if not all, of this vision is antithetical to U.S. values and interests.</p> +<p>Understanding Europe-Taiwan relations requires differentiating between the European Union overall and its member states and, further, among EU member states and non-EU European countries. Similarly, it requires an examination of EU institutions and of branches of national governments, particularly regarding the role of parliaments.</p> -<p>Xi’s objectives include a dramatically expanded Chinese physical territory and maritime domain that reflect the realization of Chinese sovereignty claims over contested territories, such as Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, territory on the Sino-Indian border, and land within Nepal and Bhutan, among others. Xi’s vision also includes dominion over 80 percent of the South China Sea.</p> +<p>The European Union’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) drives European relations with Taiwan, and all such relations (including for the European Union itself) are stated in adherence with a “One China” policy. The official policy positions on the One China policy among capitals and the European Union are relatively consistent: European governments remain committed to the idea that the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China.</p> -<p>In addition, Xi seeks to position China as the dominant economic, political, and military power within the broader Asia Pacific, supplanting the United States. According to Xi, “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.” The United States is thus not a legitimate voice in regional affairs. He has established new trade and investment institutions, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the Silk Road Fund, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, that bind the region’s economies more closely to China. Chinese investment in the region rose by 37 percent between 2022 and 2023, making China the largest single investor in the region (although Chinese investment has still not attained pre-Covid levels). Moreover, under Xi’s leadership, China is rapidly developing the capabilities to challenge the United States’ military preeminence in the Asia Pacific, including an apparent new basing opportunity for the People’s Liberation Army Navy in Cambodia.</p> +<p>Europe’s initial response to the 2005 Anti-Secession Law (ASL) was limited. However, geopolitical shifts have since changed European views on China and Taiwan. In the event that the ASL is invoked, Europe will likely find it difficult to offer a unified response. Europe’s limited defense resources may complicate military responses. A more likely reaction from Europe would be economic, particularly since Europe has already developed an economic toolbox in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet the extent of any response is unclear, and disagreement over the level of ambition to “de-risk” from China remains. Political and diplomatic responses may be even more likely, but significant effort will be needed to speak with one European voice on the issue of Taiwan moving forward. Forming a unified European response in the event of a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait will be challenging. Doing so in the event that the ASL is applied short of war will be even more challenging.</p> -<p>Beyond seeking China’s primacy in the Asia Pacific, Xi is transforming China’s role on the global stage through four initiatives — the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). Combined, these projects are designed to transform the geopolitical, economic, and strategic landscapes in ways that reflect Chinese interests, supporting a set of norms and institutions aimed at eroding those of the current international system. The BRI, for example, has provided as much as $1 trillion in financing and investment for global infrastructure projects in emerging and middle-income economies. At the same time, it serves as a vehicle for the export of China’s own development model (and control) through rapid, debt-inducing infrastructure investment with poor transparency and weak labor, environmental, and social safeguards. China also uses the BRI to gain support for political elements of its governing model. Alongside the export of technology, for example, China has provided cybersecurity training to over three dozen countries, including how to monitor and control dissenting opinions. The GSI also advances a set of norms and values that undermine the current order. The GSI calls for the end of formal alliance structures (e.g., NATO) and supports the notion that one state’s security cannot come at the expense of another’s. Russia used this principle of “indivisible security” to justify its invasion of Ukraine, and China could follow suit in any military action against Taiwan. Further, both the GDI and GCI undermine the notion of inalienable and universal political and civil rights by claiming that all states have the power to determine the rights of their citizens depending on their history, culture, system, and development. Finally, China is working hard to advance the de-dollarization of the global economy.</p> +<h4 id="response-to-the-prcs-asl">Response to the PRC’s ASL</h4> -<p>Xi’s vision is engendering a new reality in the U.S.-China relationship. Competition between the two countries is not merely economic, nor is it simply between rising and status quo powers. Instead, the U.S.-China relationship much further reaching. It is a competition for the values and structure of the international system itself and leadership of that system. The United States sees China as a revisionist power trying to undermine U.S. global leadership, while China believes that the United States is trying to contain its growing influence and power and is working to prevent China from realizing its legitimate right to define the rules of international engagement. The two countries stand on opposite sides of the current major military conflicts — between Israel and the Palestinians, and between Russia and Ukraine. There is also the potential for the United States and China to end up in direct military conflict in the Indo-Pacific over Taiwan or over territorial disputes that involve U.S. treaty allies, such as Japan or the Philippines. Each major power also backs a different set of multilateral organizations. For example, China supports the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, while the United States supports the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), the G7, and NATO. Xi does not shy away from acknowledging the system-level competition underway, claiming that the “rising east and declining west” is the “most prominent” feature of today’s world, suggesting the inevitable triumph of socialism over capitalism.</p> +<p>Initial reactions to the PRC’s ASL were muted. The European Union published a declaration concerning the passing of the law, which stated that the bloc had “taken note” of the law’s adoption. It further avowed that the “peaceful resolution of disputes . . . is the only means of maintaining stability in the Taiwan Straits” and that the bloc was opposed to any use of force. The declaration did reveal some element of concern. The European Union “would be concerned if this adoption of legislation referring to the use of non-peaceful means were to invalidate the recent signs of reconciliation between the two shores” and urged Taiwan and the PRC to “develop initiatives which contribute to dialogue and to mutual understanding.”</p> -<h4 id="limited-line-of-sight">Limited Line of Sight</h4> +<h4 id="context-of-european-response-to-asl-in-2005">Context of European Response to ASL in 2005</h4> -<p>As Xi has moved to execute his strategy, successive U.S. administrations have struggled to keep pace. What has emerged over the course of the Obama, Trump, and now Biden administrations has been a series of China strategies that are too reactive and piecemeal.</p> +<p>The European Union’s early response was perhaps not entirely surprising. The law was passed at a time when the European Union’s policy toward the PRC was, as some observers described, “comprehensive engagement and co-operation.” Individual member states and business interests in trade and economic issues dominated the region’s China policies, and European and U.S. observers could not agree on whether a stronger China could be compatible with Western norms and interests.</p> -<p>The current U.S. strategy toward China — “managed competition” — reflects a highly discrete set of objectives, not a comprehensive plan. The United States seeks to maintain a comparative advantage over China in core technologies and military capabilities, push back against Chinese political and military incursions globally, rally support from U.S. allies and partners, and prevent the U.S.-China relationship from devolving into kinetic conflict.</p> +<p>Structural issues also played an important role. The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy sought to coordinate EU foreign policy, an activity that required unanimity between member states in the Council of Ministers. It was not until 2009 that, with the Treaty of Lisbon, there was a singular high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy and a common Foreign Office through the European External Action Service. In September 2005, when the European Union and China held their eighth China-EU summit in Beijing, there was only one mention of Taiwan: a reaffirmation of the European Union’s continued adherence to the One China policy and its hope for a peaceful resolution of the “Taiwan question.” Aside from the bloc’s continued arms embargo on the PRC, the rest of the joint statement following the summit highlighted overwhelming cooperation and engagement.</p> -<p>In practical terms, this has translated into a policy built on three and a half pillars. First, the United States is investing in the technology, education, innovation, and manufacturing ecosystems necessary to enable it to compete effectively with China in the twenty-first century through the CHIPS and Science Act, Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA).</p> +<h4 id="enter-geopolitical-commission">Enter Geopolitical Commission</h4> -<p>Second, it is working to align its policies with those of its allies and partners. In recognition that the United States cannot effectively compete or counter China by itself, the Biden administration has aggressively courted other countries and created new institutions (e.g., IPEF, AUKUS, and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council) as well as informal groupings (e.g., the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral). These partnerships are designed to coordinate policies across an array of U.S. priority areas, such as the green transition, supply chain resiliency, military technology, and AI governance. Many of these policies either explicitly or implicitly are directed at China.</p> +<p>More recently, and in response to geopolitical shifts involving the PRC, some European governments have been more willing to explore to what extent Europe-Taiwan cooperation can be developed further. The European Parliament has been leading the call for greater criticism of the PRC and its assertive and illiberal rise; it has also worked to deepen EU-Taiwan relations.</p> -<p>And third, the United States is directly competing with China. This competition includes ensuring that the United States has the appropriate economic, military, and political tools to secure a number of U.S. objectives, including a peaceful and stable environment in the Indo-Pacific, a global investment environment that respects the rule of law, and the wherewithal to push back against Beijing’s efforts to advance authoritarianism globally. These tools include, for example, export controls on military-related technologies, new U.S.-supported investment initiatives (e.g., IPEF and Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment), and U.S. leadership in international organizations, such as the International Telecommunications Union.</p> +<p>In 2021, the European Parliament adopted its first stand-alone report addressing the European Union’s relationship with Taiwan (under the guidance of the bloc’s One China policy). The European Commission and other EU institutions have taken note.</p> -<p>For the current administration, managing competition also requires developing channels of communication with China to identify and, where possible, address U.S. concerns. The channels focus on issues affecting both countries, including ensuring operational safety between the U.S. and Chinese militaries; addressing the U.S. fentanyl crisis, third-world debt, and AI governance; creating a level economic playing field; countering climate change; and expanding civil society engagement. Progress has been constrained, however, by a limited willingness to compromise on both sides.</p> +<p>In an address to the EU Parliament in February 2022, EU high representative and vice president (HRVP) Josep Borrell declared that “to preserve, peace, stability, and the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is key, not just for the security and prosperity of the region, but also for ours.”</p> -<h4 id="broadening-the-horizon">Broadening the Horizon</h4> +<p>The following year, Borrell clarified his position, stating that “Europe must in fact be very present on this issue [of Taiwan], which concerns us economically, commercially and technologically. That is why I call on European navies to patrol the Taiwan Strait to signify Europe’s commitment to freedom of navigation in this absolutely crucial area.”</p> -<p>Managed competition is a strategy with two primary goals: (1) preventing the U.S.-China relationship from deteriorating further; and (2) providing the time and space needed to rebuild the foundations of U.S. political, economic, and military competitiveness. However, while ensuring that the foundations of U.S. strength are robust is necessary for “winning” in the competition with China, it is not sufficient. The United States needs a strategy that takes aim at China’s claim that it (along with Russia) is driving the transformative changes in the world. The United States needs an understanding of victory that includes a vision of itself and its global leadership in the twenty-first century. The strategy for China should anchored within this larger vision of victory.</p> +<p>In her 2024 bid for a second term, EU Commission president Ursula Von der Leyen declared that she would seek to “deter China from unilaterally changing the status quo by military means, particularly over Taiwan” by cooperating with partners and allies who face common challenges.</p> -<p>Winning in this context means that the values, norms, and broad policy preferences of the United States continue to underpin the future of the international system. As articulated by Samantha A. Taylor of the U.S. Army War College, these values include: “open and free trade, liberal democratic governance, universal human rights, collective security, international institutions, and the rule of law.” The overarching U.S. strategy will require a return to a U.S. consensus around what international relations scholar Kori Schake has termed conservative internationalism, in which the United States commits to “promote American security and economic power while supporting the expansion of democracy around the world.” Schake’s prescription for how to get there includes a list of traditional pre-Trump and pre-Biden U.S. values and commitments: advancing free trade, providing a level playing field for U.S. companies, opposing authoritarianism, promoting the rule of law in immigration policy, ensuring a strong military, cooperating with allies to advance shared interests, and enhancing U.S. power in international institutions. These elements are essential to a winning strategy, and many are already represented in the U.S. National Security Strategy.</p> +<p>Von der Leyen’s remarks were unprecedentedly direct on the question of Taiwan and were a result of the geopolitical context in which the European Union found itself. The Trump administration debated with Europe about the nature of China’s rise and the challenges it posed to the rule-based international order. As a result, the European Union launched its revamped China Strategy in 2019, which more keenly saw EU-China relations through a triptych of lenses: China is simultaneously a competitor, rival, and partner. Brussels was particularly concerned about China’s reach into critical European national infrastructure, the hostile takeover of European strategic industries, China’s human rights violations in Xinjiang, the crackdown on protests in Hong Kong, and the People’s Liberation Army’s intense modernization efforts. Covid-19 highlighted just how dependent Europe had become on China for key resources and products and how vital the role of Taiwan is in global supply chains. Von der Leyen’s focus on “de-risking” rather than decoupling reflected the European Union’s recognition of the challenges it faced. If Europe needed a further push toward a more clear-eyed approach to its China policy, the PRC’s deepening relationship with Russia following Putin’s second invasion of Ukraine provided the impetus.</p> -<p>But the United States cannot go back to the future. The world has changed and U.S. strategy must account for that change. The relative economic weight of China and India in global GDP terms is now roughly equal to that of the European Union and Japan, respectively; and of the world’s fastest-growing economies in 2024, nine are in Africa. Spurred by China, many emerging and middle-income economies are working to de-dollarize the global economy by trading and investing in their own currencies. In addition, new military alignments, such as the one between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea in support of Russia’s war against Ukraine, are emerging and pose significant new challenges to U.S. security interests. While the United States remains the world’s most powerful military, of the next four, only South Korea is a treaty ally.</p> +<h4 id="varying-approaches-to-taiwan-by-eu-member-states">Varying Approaches to Taiwan by EU Member States</h4> -<p>The changed relative and absolute limitations of U.S. military and economic power mean that the United States needs to make explicit a different conception of global leadership — one that reflects a greater role for its closest allies and partners, for example, in the G7, in shaping and driving the future international system. Some of this is already occurring. Japan, for example, has stepped up to lead in advancing multilateral trade agreements. In addition, the evolution of the hub-and-spoke alliance system into a “lattice” framework in the Indo-Pacific recognizes the importance of other regional powers playing larger roles in guaranteeing regional stability through a set of informal and formal minilateral arrangements across multiple economic and security domains. In spite of these positive developments, the United States needs to stay ahead of this shifting power dynamic and consider what new security structures may be needed and whether and how to defend the dollar’s position as the world’s reserve currency.</p> +<p>Some European capitals have become more forward-leaning in their approaches to Taiwan. Germany, for example, has published its first Strategy on China and the Netherlands has also published its own China “notitie.” However, neither the German nor the Dutch plans directly mention the ASL. Furthermore, many capitals have yet to make any China strategy publicly available. Some of those countries, such as the United Kingdom, however, have deepened Taiwan relations in practice, albeit quietly, while others have become more openly aligned with Taiwan, though not diplomatically. This is particularly true of Lithuania and various other Central and Eastern European states, which have developed closer technology and industrial ties with Taiwan.</p> -<p>The United States will also need to address its failure over the past eight years to develop a compelling vision for global trade. Within the Biden administration’s mantra of “a foreign policy for the middle class” is a deep suspicion of international trade, and this has left the United States without a seat at the table as the future international trading system is being designed. The administration dropped out of the World Trade Organization e-commerce negotiations being led by three of its closest partners — Australia, Singapore, and Japan — and pulled out of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a trade arrangement which not only includes its closest Asian allies but also accounts for over 40 percent of the global goods trade. Without U.S. leadership in structuring these deals, the country’s role in shaping the international system is diminished, and U.S. consumers and businesses lose out as others reap the benefits of lower tariffs and efficiencies in integrated supply chains.</p> +<p>There remain disagreements among the capitals with regard to China. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, numerous European leaders have traveled to Beijing on state visits, but these visits have lacked unity in messaging. In contrast to the aforementioned shifts toward Taiwan, for example, French president Emmanuel Macron has struck a more conciliatory tone toward Beijing and avoided critical statements on the issue of Taiwan, even stating that Europe should not become embroiled in conflicts not of its own making. Though President Macron has since clarified his comments, it does appear that the French president is more convinced of the merits of cooperation and partnership with Beijing than some of his European counterparts, including on issues such as Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.</p> -<p>Moreover, the United States should consider how it can most effectively engage with emerging and middle-income economies. The Biden administration has worked hard to rebuild relations with its closest allies and partners in Asia and Europe. But without an equally committed effort to build stronger ties with countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, the United States cannot “win” a global contest to shape the international system of the twenty-first century. These countries are essential to U.S. efforts aimed at shaping Chinese behavior on issues such as human rights; internet governance; illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; freedom of navigation; and climate change. Without their support in international regimes and institutions, China will continue to make gains in reshaping the international system to advance its own values and interests.</p> +<p>Europeans more generally have become more concerned about China. A Pew Research Center study showed that, while only 34 percent of participants surveyed in Poland viewed China unfavorably in 2005, that number had risen to 67 percent by 2023. Similar changes in opinion were seen in France, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.</p> -<p>The United States should start by bringing emerging and middle-income economies to the table to be part of the decisionmaking processes. This is particularly the case for some of the newest and most pressing issues, including AI governance and workforce retraining. Making decisions with only advanced economies participating will alienate these countries, who rightly believe that their voices should also be heard and respected. Furthermore, the United States should meet these countries where they are at; in other words, the United States must take account of their needs and interests and work with them to achieve those objectives as well. The CHIPS and Science Act and the IRA both have the potential to offer these countries opportunities to participate in major U.S. economic and innovation initiatives, for example. Weaving countries in Africa and Latin America into the educational, innovation, and manufacturing ecosystem of the CHIPs and Science Act and the IRA would send a powerful signal of support from the United States and begin to build a sense of investment in partnering with the United States. The United States should also consider expanding security cooperation with countries in these regions; currently, of the 20 countries the United States has designated as major non-NATO allies, only 6 are in Latin America or Africa.</p> +<p>Despite these unfavorable rates, a 2023 European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) poll found that, in most EU countries surveyed, China is still overwhelmingly a “necessary partner” rather than a ”rival — with which we need to compete” or “an adversary.” Furthermore, though over 70 percent of those surveyed recognized that Russia and China are close partners, only 22 percent believed that Europe’s economic relationship with China poses more risks than benefits. In short, in the eyes of those surveyed, Russia and China are not alike and Europe’s response to the two countries should recognize that difference.</p> -<p>Finally, the United States needs a clear set of metrics to evaluate how it is faring in this “all-of-system” competition with China over time in order to determine the need for strategy adjustments. Such metrics should include votes in the United Nations, the number of technical standards in core technologies, immigration statistics, and resolution of major military conflicts, among others.</p> +<p>When it comes to public views on Taiwan, a 2023 Pew Research Center survey showed that in 8 out of 10 European countries polled, participants viewed Taiwan more favorably than unfavorably. Notable exceptions were Greece and Hungary.</p> -<p>A winning U.S.-China strategy will require leadership that prioritizes investing in the foundations of U.S. economic, political, and military strength. The United States will need to develop new forms of global leadership that elevate the role of allies and partners. Most important, however, the overall vision of victory enacted will need to embrace and help shape the dynamics of change in the international system in ways that acknowledge and invite in the needs and interests of the rest of the world.</p> +<p>The question remains as to what these developments mean for Europe’s response to any situations in which the PRC may seek to invoke the ASL.</p> -<h3 id="preserve-order-and-prevent-upheaval">Preserve Order and Prevent Upheaval</h3> +<h4 id="will-europe-respond-in-support-of-taiwan-if-the-asl-is-invoked">Will Europe Respond in Support of Taiwan If the ASL Is Invoked?</h4> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="richard-fontaine">Richard Fontaine</h4> - <h4 id="ceo-center-for-a-new-american-security">CEO, Center for a New American Security</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>In contrast to the Biden administration, European capitals and the European Union have, to date, refrained from stating whether they will intervene to support Taiwan in the event of the ASL being invoked. Nevertheless, the heightened awareness in European capitals of geopolitical challenges and increasing concerns over the potential impact of PRC foreign and domestic policies on European security could create the conditions in which Europe sees stability in the Taiwan Strait as central to regional and European security and prosperity. China’s ongoing support for Russia despite the latter’s war of aggression in Ukraine further clarifies the links between European security and the Indo-Pacific region.</p> -<p>To invoke the U.S.-Chinese rivalry as a defining feature of today’s world is now commonplace, and analysts and policymakers across the political spectrum support the United States’ shift away from engagement and toward competition. Jettisoning Washington’s previous strategy of cooperation and integration, premised as it was on the eventual transformation of Chinese behavior, has become a rare point of agreement between the Trump and Biden administrations. The next U.S. administration, irrespective of its makeup, is likely to retain this fundamental orientation in its approach to China.</p> +<p>Though Europe is unlikely to be able to contribute to a Taiwan crisis or a conflict militarily, its response to Russia’s war of aggression and the economic and legal toolbox that it has developed since then does provide European countries and the European Union with potential nonmilitary means to respond. Depending on China’s actions toward Taiwan, Europe’s economic response could include the further sanctioning of Chinese state-owned or private sector entities or individuals. However, while the United States and the United Kingdom have discussed coordinating policies, it is unclear to what extent European states have made equal progress in preparation. Political and diplomatic actions are more likely — such as sanctioning party leaders or formally denouncing China’s actions — but even here the type of activity China undertakes against Taiwan will be an important factor in determining the European Union’s response. In the event that there is any doubt about Taiwan’s role in instigating a crisis or conflict, a collective EU response in support of Taiwan would be more complicated. Ultimately, Taiwan would stand the best chance of European support if it were unequivocally understood to be the victim in the event of crisis or conflict.</p> -<p>That is a welcome shift, given the paucity of positive results yielded by the previous approach. China and the United States are in a largely competitive relationship, and U.S. policy aims to respond to Chinese actions more than to shape them. A strategy grounded in this reality — one that combines a U.S.-led coalition with targeted, issue-specific efforts to contest Chinese assertiveness — is now emerging to protect U.S. interests and values.</p> +<p>A key obstacle to any response will be the ability of European countries to unite in the same way against China were the ASL to be invoked. When it comes to China, Europe has shown difficulty speaking with one voice; acting together will be even more difficult. European unity will require greater alignment on China strategies as well as greater public discussion around Taiwan and the impact of instability in the Taiwan Strait on European interests. Economic responses will largely depend on the severity of Chinese actions and the willingness of the private sector to cooperate. While European businesses took swift and unilateral action after Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it is not yet clear whether businesses will be similarly proactive in the event of any Taiwan scenario short of a full-scale invasion.</p> -<p>There remains, however, a significant omission in U.S. policy: an objective. Competition is merely a description of U.S.-Chinese relations, not an end in and of itself. Conspicuously absent from the flurry of speeches, strategy documents, and policy pronouncements is the endgame that Washington ultimately seeks with China. Without a clearly defined goal, any overarching strategy is likely to waste resources, frustrate attempts to track progress, and elude the broad-based domestic support necessary to sustain it. U.S. allies and partners wish — and deserve — to know the objective of the coalitions in which Washington increasingly seeks to enlist them. The absence of a clear goal for its self-proclaimed top priority is a liability for Washington — and one that it should urgently work to address.</p> +<p>Similarly, unified diplomatic action will be complicated. As an example, the European Union failed to issue a council statement supporting the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in favor of the Philippines’ case against China’s excessive territorial claims in the South China Sea. Despite the ruling being unequivocally in favor of the Philippines, the European Union took two weeks to issue a response, and ultimately merely issued a statement by the high representative and vice president of the European Commission — usually a sign that consensus was unable to be reached. Furthermore, the statement issued avoided direct reference to Beijing.</p> -<h4 id="eyes-on-the-prize">Eyes on the Prize</h4> +<p>Europe’s response will also be dependent on the timing and context of Europe’s own neighborhood. In 2023, some European militaries increased their exercises in the Indo-Pacific and with Asian partners. The Netherlands, United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Italy have deployed navy ships and aircraft to the region in recent years. However, as long as the war in Ukraine continues, Europe will likely prioritize its resources for the European theater instead of the Indo-Pacific. This, however, could still be helpful for a Taiwan scenario if it allows the United States, in turn, to focus its resources on the Indo-Pacific.</p> -<p>Good strategies articulate a desired end state and outline how to attain it. In his famous 1947 Foreign Affairs article, for instance, diplomat and historian George Kennan argued for “either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power,” to be pursued through a combined policy of containment and an effort to increase the strains under which the Soviets operated. Establishing such an objective, as the United States did early in the Cold War, explicitly ruled out other possible goals, such as a partnership and political intimacy between Washington and Moscow on the one hand or the active rollback of communism on the other. Having identified the collapse — or at least moderation — of Moscow’s regime as their aim, U.S. officials pursued containment as the strategy most likely to yield the desired positive results.</p> +<p>The last consideration with regard to the ASL relates to its invocation just short of justifying unification by force. Indeed, the extraterritoriality of clauses within the “Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism by ‘Taiwan independence’ Die-hards in Accordance with the Law,” published by the PRC on May 26, 2024, creates the potential for Chinese requests for extradition of those considered guilty under PRC law. Several European countries have signed extradition treaties with China, including Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, and Spain; a number of these countries have already extradited Taiwan nationals to China. For example, in 2019, Spain extradited 94 Taiwan criminal suspects for alleged involvement in telecommunications fraud.</p> -<p>After the end of the Cold War, the United States established a set of objectives for China and theorized about how to achieve them. In 1997, U.S. president Bill Clinton said that Washington’s goal vis-à-vis Beijing “is not containment and conflict; it is cooperation,” noting that “a pragmatic policy of engagement” was most likely to bring about that end. By engaging Beijing, primarily but not exclusively through trade, the Clinton administration aimed to cultivate a “stable, open, and non-aggressive” China. U.S. policymakers postulated that such openness might even foster liberalization and political pluralism within China itself.</p> +<p>Despite these treaties, in 2022, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) blocked a Taiwan national in Poland from being extradited to China on fraud charges. The ruling stated that “torture and other forms of ill-treatment were credibly and consistently reported to be used in Chinese detention facilities and penitentiaries”; the ECHR ruling prohibits the extradition of individuals to countries where they may face torture or general violence. The ruling applies to any person in Europe, regardless of nationality, who is at risk of extradition to China, and it applies to all 46 member states of the Council of Europe. The ruling therefore makes it unlikely for Chinese nationals found guilty of separatism under the 22 Articles to be extradited to China.</p> -<p>The George W. Bush administration largely retained the goal of a cooperative and liberalizing China, adding to it a wish that the country would become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system. Washington would seek areas of active cooperation with Beijing across the spectrum of global challenges, from terrorism to energy conservation, in hopes that Chinese leaders would become invested and active in addressing them. Perhaps less certain than its predecessor in the prospects for cooperation, the Bush administration hedged its bets by boosting U.S. military capabilities and bolstering alliances and partnerships throughout Asia.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The Obama administration shared many of the Bush administration’s objectives, but it hedged even more heavily as doubts about Beijing’s direction and goals grew. Still, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton rejected the notion of an adversarial Beijing, saying that it was “essential” for the United States and China to have “a positive, cooperative relationship.” The administration announced a “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia aimed at forging such a relationship by embedding it in a “regional framework of security alliances, economic networks, and social connections” that would strengthen the United States’ position.</p> +<p><strong>Bonny Lin</strong> is a senior fellow for Asian security and director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> -<p>The Trump administration ushered in a new era of U.S.-Chinese relations. Under Trump, the United States neither sought a cooperative relationship with Beijing nor pursued engagement as the central means for securing U.S. interests. Rejecting the notion that integration into the global order would spur either Chinese liberalization or responsible international behavior, the Trump administration labeled Beijing a “revisionist power” with which the United States would have a fundamentally competitive relationship. Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy, declassified in the waning days of his presidency, takes malign Chinese activity as a given to be resisted, often in concert with partners. The Trump administration was no model of message discipline, however, and key policymakers differed on the desired end state. Whereas Trump predicted in 2020 that his bilateral trade deal would “bring both the U.S. and China closer together in so many other ways,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that same year that the United States “must induce China to change” and suggested that efforts to replace the regime in Beijing might be on the table.</p> +<p><strong>I-Chung Lai</strong> is the president of the Prospect Foundation and the board member of Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.</p> -<p>The Biden administration largely retained Trump’s diagnosis of a fundamentally competitive U.S.-China relationship and dismissed previous hopes of transforming China through U.S. policy. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin referred to China as the Pentagon’s top priority. Secretary of State Antony Blinken described China as “the biggest geopolitical test” of the twenty-first century. And President Joe Biden himself stated that he envisions “extreme competition” between Washington and Beijing. A long period of managed competition, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said, “is simply not going to resolve in a neat and decisive end state.” Instead, in Blinken’s words, the United States seeks to “coexist peacefully” with China, and to “share in and contribute to human progress together.”</p> +<p><strong>Vincent Yi-Hsiang Chao</strong> is an elected member of the Taipei City Council. Formerly, he was Taiwan president Lai Ching-te’s campaign spokesperson and foreign policy adviser.</p> -<p>To be sure, any brief review of the past several administrations’ China policies risks attributing a coherence and continuity to their strategies that did not always exist. Governments are not unitary actors, objectives and approaches change with shifting circumstances and players, and public pronouncements can conflict with private aims. Yet for much of the time since the end of the Cold War and, particularly, during the years of U.S. engagement with China, Washington’s objectives with regard to Beijing were generally explicit. That is no longer the case.</p> +<p><strong>Yu-Jie Chen</strong> is an assistant research professor at Institutum Iurisprudentiae of Academia Sinica and a non-resident affiliated scholar at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute of NYU School of Law.</p> -<h4 id="from-the-bottom-up">From the Bottom Up</h4> +<p><strong>Ja Ian Chong</strong> is an associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore. He is also a nonresident scholar at Carnegie China, Carnegie’s East Asia-based research center on contemporary China.</p> -<p>The fate of the U.S.-Chinese relationship has profound global implications, and so the objective of U.S. policy should flow from the kind of order Washington wishes to obtain — and the kind of threat China poses to that order. The United States generally seeks to maintain a global order governed by rules rather than by brute power, one in which countries enjoy sovereignty, disputes are resolved peacefully, markets are open to trade, human rights are considered universal, and democracy can flourish. Although the United States’ own track record in upholding such principles is hardly perfect, the country has nevertheless championed them as ideals that should govern international behavior. Since the 1940s, Washington has opposed hostile spheres of influence emerging in Eurasia precisely because they threaten the United States’ desired rules-based order. The overarching goal of U.S. policy today should be to preserve the core pillars of the international order, even as specific rules and institutions change and adapt.</p> +<p><strong>Donald C. Clarke</strong> is the David Weaver research professor emeritus of law at the George Washington University.</p> -<p>From that overarching goal should flow the objective of U.S. policy toward China. Given China’s growing military and technological power, its assertive behavior, its economic interdependence with the United States and its allies, and the incompatibility of many Chinese actions with the existing order, Washington should articulate an objective that is both realistic and protective of its people. The aim of U.S. policy toward China should be to ensure that Beijing is either unwilling or unable to overturn the regional and global order.</p> +<p><strong>Jacques deLisle</strong> is the Stephen A. Cozen professor of law, a professor of political science, and director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China at the University of Pennsylvania.</p> -<p>China might cease trying to upend elements of the liberal order if its leaders come to see the strength of the countries that are committed to them and the vigor with which they oppose China’s disruptive efforts. Beijing might someday even see its own future in the preservation of the liberal order. Even if it does not, it could grow incapable of undermining the order for any number of reasons: Beijing’s own weaknesses, the unpalatability of its authoritarian vision in other countries, or a relative strengthening of the powers committed to the liberal status quo, to name a few.</p> +<p><strong>Mark Harrison</strong> is a senior lecturer in Chinese studies in the Politics and International Relations program at the University of Tasmania. He is also a founding fellow of the Australian Centre on China in the World at the Australian National University.</p> -<p>A China that is unwilling or unable to undermine the regional and global order is a fairly abstract goal for U.S. policy, but it would nonetheless rule out several other potential objectives. With such an end in mind, Washington would not aim to transform China into a liberal power or a responsible stakeholder in the international system. Washington would not work toward Cold War-style containment or regime change in Beijing. And it would not aim to stop China’s rise but rather oppose Beijing’s efforts to disrupt existing international arrangements in ways that damage the United States and its partners.</p> +<p><strong>Ken Jimbo</strong> is an associate professor at the Department of Policy Management, Keio University. He is also a senior research fellow at the Canon Institute for Global Studies.</p> -<p>Progress toward this objective would almost certainly be a matter of degree, but it could be measured (unlike progress toward the broad notions of competition or coexistence). China’s approach to global rules and norms is varied, however. Beijing does not seek to simply repeal and replace what currently exists but rather to reject some principles, accept others, and rewrite the remainder. Such subtlety should help define U.S. priorities, as Washington should focus on preserving those elements of the liberal order that are simultaneously of greatest importance to U.S. interests and under the most threat from Chinese behavior.</p> +<p><strong>Julian Ku</strong> is the Maurice A. Deane distinguished professor of constitutional law at Hofstra University’s Maurice A. Deane School of Law.</p> -<p>A medium-term policy agenda would naturally flow from such a goal. The United States would seek to improve its military position in the Indo-Pacific relative to China; it would contest China’s use of economic coercion, including through an ambitious regional trade policy that aims to reduce countries’ reliance on the Chinese market. The United States would promote building new technology partnerships to ensure the free flow of information and focus existing alliances on protecting democracies from external interference. Washington would, in other words, continue many of the efforts that currently fall under the broad umbrella of competition, but it would channel them toward resisting Chinese attempts to upend key elements of the liberal order.</p> +<p><strong>Margaret K. Lewis</strong> is a professor of law and an associate dean at Seton Hall University. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a non-resident affiliated scholar of NYU School of Law’s U.S.-Asia Law Institute.</p> -<p>All of this would entail a shift in how Washington communicates — and thinks about — its China policy. The United States would not strictly be competing against China but rather be working toward the preservation and extension of core international values that serve many nations, including the United States. Its partners would not be required to break their ties with China in order to join a unified bloc, but they would be encouraged to join coalitions aimed at resisting Beijing on specific issues, such as economic coercion, military aggression, the spread of illiberal technologies, and human rights abuses, among others. The accompanying message, despite Beijing’s claims to the contrary, would be that Washington does not seek to suppress China’s rise but rather to establish a U.S.-Chinese equilibrium in the long term.</p> +<p><strong>Yeh-Chung Lu</strong> is an assistant professor of the Department of Diplomacy in National Cheng-chi University (NCCU), Taipei, Taiwan, ROC.</p> -<h4 id="reckoning-day">Reckoning Day</h4> +<p><strong>Meia Nouwens</strong> is a senior fellow for Chinese Security and Defence Policy and head of the China Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).</p> -<p>The United States and the world can live with a powerful China that does not attempt to overturn key principles of the liberal order. At the moment, however, that possibility seems remote. The military balance in the Indo-Pacific is shifting away from the United States and its allies and toward Beijing. China is becoming increasingly economically dominant in Asia, with Washington noticeably absent from any real leadership on trade. Chinese diplomacy is growing more coercive and more focused on the internal affairs of other countries, undermining the latter’s sovereignty and independence. Although cooperation with Beijing is desirable and theoretically possible, it is in very short supply, even in areas in which U.S. and Chinese interests seem to overlap, such as climate change and pandemic disease.</p> +<p><strong>Eric Tin-wai Poon</strong> (Sang Pu) is the director-general of Taiwan Hong Kong Association and a commentator on Taiwan affairs. He is a solicitor in Hong Kong, a qualified attorney in Taiwan and New York State, and has taught a number of Chinese law courses in the Open University of Hong Kong.</p> -<p>Reversing these trends is no easy task. It will take years and involve risks. Diplomacy can help mitigate the risks, but only to a limited degree. The United States will need to accept increased tension in the medium term in order to achieve a more stable equilibrium with China in the long term.</p> +<p><strong>Raymond C-E Sung</strong> is the vice president of the Prospect Foundation and a DPhil candidate at Oxford University.</p> -<p>Every month, it seems, U.S. policymakers sound the alarm about the U.S.-Chinese relationship with greater volume. Across party lines and branches of government, increasing numbers of policymakers now endorse a major response to the China challenge. The watchwords are more resources, more speed, more vigor. And all of this is appropriate. But Washington would do well to clarify what, precisely, this national effort aims to achieve.</p> +<p><strong>Chi-Ting Tsai</strong> is an assistant professor of international law in the Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan. He is also an author for CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.</p> -<h3 id="renewing-american-leadership-requires-more-than-countering-china">Renewing American Leadership Requires More than Countering China</h3> +<p><strong>Wen-Hsuan Tsai</strong> is a research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica and a jointly appointed professor at the National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan.</p>Bonny Lin and I-Chung LaiThis report unpacks China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law (ASL) and analyzes how China uses it as an evolving tool of legal warfare.Bridging Blocs2024-10-15T12:00:00+08:002024-10-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/bridging-blocs<p><em>The EU–GCC summit on 16 October is a critical opportunity to strengthen strategic ties, addressing trade, energy and climate, and geopolitical tensions amid growing regional instability.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="ryan-hass">Ryan Hass</h4> - <h4 id="director-john-l-thornton-china-center-and-senior-fellow-brookings-institution">Director, John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution</h4> -</blockquote> +<excerpt /> -<p>It has been heartening to see the recent invigoration of discussion around the need for clarity on the goals of U.S. strategy toward China. Effective strategy requires clear goals. Over the past three years, the U.S.-China relationship has become more functional and stable, even as it remains intensively competitive. As laudable as this progress has been, the Biden administration has fallen short in articulating goals for its relationship with China.</p> +<p>More than two years have passed since the EU unveiled its strategy to elevate relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In that time, both sides have taken steps to implement the framework, though with mixed results. Meanwhile, ongoing geopolitical shifts have demonstrated that instability in the Middle East has far-reaching consequences, particularly for Europe. These changes have underscored the growing significance of the GCC countries within the MENA region and beyond. Recognising this, the EU and Qatar – the current holder of the GCC Presidency – are set to host the first-ever EU–GCC high-level summit in Brussels on 16 October, aiming to further solidify strategic ties.</p> -<p>The Biden administration’s foreign policy record has been strongest on its progress in deepening America’s relationships with key allies and partners. With creativity, tenacity, and good diplomacy, the Biden team has launched an alphabet soup of minilateral groupings which collectively have improved the United States’ posture in Asia. The sum of these efforts equals greater U.S. influence and stronger deterrence against any attempts to redraw borders through threat or use of force.</p> +<p>From a European perspective, the summit is an opportunity to strengthen cooperation with Gulf countries, to find a common language for international conflicts and to offset the energy imbalance caused by the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the mood in the Gulf toward the summit could be described as “sceptically optimistic”. While GCC capitals share the European enthusiasm for strengthening relations, the shadow of double-standard measures toward the Middle East in comparison to Ukraine remains, and Gulf decision-makers are concerned about whether pragmatic results can be achieved from the summit.</p> -<p>The Biden administration also has unlocked a massive wave of investment aimed at upscaling the United States. With over $2 trillion allocated through the Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the Biden team has made generational investments in clean energy, semiconductors, and advanced manufacturing. These efforts have attracted many global firms to crowd-in their support for these industries, contributing to America becoming the world’s top recipient of inbound investment in 2023.</p> +<p>Despite the scepticism, progress was made in EU–GCC relations from the revealing of a new strategy in the lead-up to this summit, notably in engagement and institutional relations. Several high-level engagements have taken place since 2022 to address common concerns and elevate relations, such as the Joint Council and Ministerial meetings in Brussels in 2022, which resulted in the adoption of the Joint Cooperation Programme for the period of 2022–2027 and agreement on a wide range of areas to elevate relations in. Another notable point was the appointment of Luigi Di Maio as the new EU special representative for the Gulf region, and the intensification of high-level visits conducted by officials between both regions. Therefore, this high-level summit has the potential to serve as a powerful catalyst to elevate relations to new heights and clear the fog of scepticism between the two regions. However, for the summit to yield positive outcomes, both sides need to go beyond symbolic pledges and diplomatic engagement and weigh the potential outcomes through the prism of the Middle East’s current turbulence and an equal consideration of each other’s interests.</p> -<p>On the critical question of America’s goals for its relationship with China, however, the Biden administration has not been clear. To the extent leaders have addressed the question, they have tended to explain what the United States seeks to avoid — a new Cold War, confrontation or conflict, containment of China, or full economic decoupling from China — not what it seeks.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While Ukraine is undoubtedly a pressing geopolitical issue for European countries, the GCC countries face regional challenges that pose more immediate threats to their interests</code></em></strong></p> -<p>In attempting to clarify, at least partially, the boundaries of the U.S. approach toward China, the Biden administration aims to attract greater alignment with partners regarding China while still maintaining a firm handle on competition with China. In leaving U.S. objectives open to interpretation, and not black and white, the administration provides — perhaps intentionally, perhaps not — allies and partners with greater political space to work alongside the United States. In other words, the Biden team seeks to demonstrate competence and steadiness in building coalitions and in navigating competition with a nuclear-armed rival, while giving its partners flexibility.</p> +<p>The summit will cover various areas of cooperation, with a primary focus on crucial issues such as trade, energy and climate, peace and security, the Ukraine conflict, and the broader geopolitical landscape in the MENA region, including Gaza, the Red Sea, Lebanon, Iran, Sudan and other critical hotspots.</p> -<p>Even so, calculated ambiguity in explaining the goals of U.S. strategy on China carries risks. First, it feeds a perception of President Biden as lacking the vision and boldness needed to confront what his administration has identified as America’s most serious foreign policy challenge. Second, if Americans do not know the purpose of a particular strategy, they are less likely to support sacrifices in service of it. Third, with this approach, the United States risks squandering one of its asymmetric advantages — its global network of allies and partners for dealing with challenges posed by China. If America’s partners do not know the desired destination of U.S. strategy, there is greater risk that they will hedge.</p> +<h3 id="trade-and-investment">Trade and Investment</h3> -<p>Unsurprisingly, experts have begun filling the vacuum left by the Biden administration’s decision not to articulate clear affirmative goals vis-à-vis China. Unfortunately, however, the expert debate has run into an intellectual cul-de-sac. On one side, there are advocates of regime change, on the other, proponents of managed coexistence. This binary framing turns on a judgment about whether a strong China poses an intolerable threat to the United States and its way of life. To some, the answer is yes. To others, it is closer to maybe not; for the latter, it remains possible for the United States to coexist with China, even amid intense competition.</p> +<p>One of the summit’s most pressing topics is the trade and investment relationship between the EU and the GCC. Although trade liberalisation is the ultimate goal, tangible progress has been elusive. In 2023, the EU attempted to restart discussions on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which had been stalled since 2008, only to achieve minimal advancements. However, this should not hinder efforts to enhance trade relations, especially given that trade between the two regions reached €174 billion in 2022. This made the GCC the EU’s ninth-largest trading partner, while the EU ranked as the GCC’s second largest. Further strengthening trade relations will provide a solid foundation for deepening collaboration across the other strategic pillars entailed in the strategy, such as maritime security, people-to-people connections, energy and climate initiatives, and advancements in technology including AI. Therefore, among the main outcomes both sides should pursue in this summit – and which the GCC countries will be particularly looking forward to – is forging bilateral strategic partnerships between the EU and GCC members. The recent positive results from the EU–UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements technical talks should incentivise the EU to work toward the conclusion of such bilateral formats, which will not be an alternative to the FTA, but will complement and create momentum toward the FTA’s conclusion.</p> -<p>While an interesting intellectual debate, this is not a sound basis for developing strategy. First, as history has shown, the United States is not capable of determining China’s governance system. If the United States could not alter Cuba’s governance structure — a small island 90 miles off the coast of Florida — it should not expect to affect the CCP’s grip on power; the same logic could be applied to Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Venezuela.</p> +<h3 id="energy-and-climate">Energy and Climate</h3> -<p>Second, the United States and China are not captains of two rival blocs with fixed geographic boundaries, as was the case during the Cold War. Instead, both countries exist within the same international system, are entangled within the same global web, and are both vying for greater relative influence over its future direction. Washington and Beijing are competing to establish a favorable balance of power. They both want to maximize their freedom of maneuver and limit dependence on the other. They are striving to outpace and outperform the other rather than to defeat them. Indeed, as both realize, if ever one side did vanquish the other, they would harm themselves in the process, given the depth of interdependence that exists between the United States and China.</p> +<p>Another important pillar is energy and climate, since both regions have ambitious visions in this area. The UAE’s hosting of COP28 in Dubai intensified discussions on energy and climate between the two regions, culminating in the adoption of a pledge endorsed by over 60 countries and spearheaded by the US, UAE and EU to triple global renewable energy capacity by 2030 and enhance energy efficiency by 4% annually. Cooperation between the EU and GCC in this domain is not new, but has been ongoing since the strategy was revealed. For instance, Qatar has secured gas supply agreements with Germany, the Netherlands and France, while the UAE has sent hydrogen shipments to Germany and established a green hydrogen supply chain between Amsterdam and Abu Dhabi. Both regions understand that the COP28 pledges cannot be translated into reality without the Europeans. Meanwhile, the EU’s decoupling from Russia and efforts to forge new sustainable energy ties to offset the imbalance mean it needs the GCC countries’ cooperation.</p> -<p>Critics will counter that the United States won the Cold War by toppling the Soviet Union. In this telling, the United States should employ a similar playbook for confronting China, including by working to contain China’s global expansion of influence and limiting China’s capacity to grow its economy. These critics celebrate President Reagan’s unflinching determination to stare down the Soviet Union and clamor for a strong U.S. leader to do the same against China. They overlook the fact that virtually no other country in the world would join the United States in seeking to contain China today. Moreover, America is incapable of containing China alone. These critics also elide the fact that out of the Soviet Union’s collapse grew Putin’s Russia, not an outcome worth celebrating or seeking to emulate. The brave people of Ukraine are a living testament to this sad reality.</p> +<p>Therefore, building on previous efforts and intensifying cooperation on energy and climate is not only a shared ambition but a critical necessity. However, the EU should understand that although GCC countries are ambitious regarding the green transition, fossil fuels remain an important pillar of their economies. Moving away from conventional fuels effectively, and forging sustainable cooperation, can only happen through the inclusion of fuel firms in the discussion.</p> -<p>Rather than drawing imprecise historical analogies to justify ideological pursuits against China, the more central questions policymakers should ask are: (1) What kind of world do Americans want to live in during the twenty-first century, and (2) what type of relationship with China would best support such a scenario?</p> +<h3 id="ukraine">Ukraine</h3> -<p>For decades, U.S. policymakers had the luxury of not having to grapple with these questions. America enjoyed primacy in international affairs. Now, however, the era of Pax Americana is over. U.S. power is contested around the globe, as are U.S. invocations of a “rules-based international order.” The United States and China are both capable of harming the other; and neither rival can secure absolute security against the other. America’s ability to control the outcomes of events worldwide has diminished and continues to do so. This is the present-day reality.</p> +<p>While Ukraine is undoubtedly a pressing geopolitical issue for European countries, the GCC countries face regional challenges that pose more immediate threats to their interests. Although all GCC members supported the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of territory and the illegal referendums in four Ukrainian regions, they maintain a strategic ambiguity regarding the conflict in order to protect their own interests.</p> -<p>The world is entering a unique era of fluidity. Comparable precedents include the ends of the Napoleonic era, of World War II, and of the Cold War. Geopolitical tectonic plates are shifting as power changes and disperses. The impact of these shifts is being exacerbated by concurrent industrial revolutions — in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, clean energy, and elsewhere.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, GCC countries have demonstrated a strong commitment to humanitarian aid and mediation efforts, particularly in facilitating prisoner exchanges. Since the onset of the war, Saudi Arabia has provided over $410 million in support for Ukraine, encompassing humanitarian assistance and oil derivatives. Meanwhile, the UAE has allocated $105 million in humanitarian aid and has contributed to initiatives to build homes for children affected by the war led by Ukraine’s First Lady, Olena Zelenska. The UAE has also facilitated eight prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine, resulting in the release of over 1,990 captives.</p> -<p>In this moment of transition, the goal of U.S. strategy should be to maximally advance the security, prosperity, and wellbeing of the American people. Doing so will require holding firm on — and securing as broad of a buy-in as possible from other countries for — several key principles and conditions. Preserving the post–World War II norm that national boundaries should not be redrawn through threat or use of force must remain, a norm that has been honored in the breech recently with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United States also should rally global support for upholding open access to the global commons, including international waters and airspace. Washington must coordinate with allies and partners to prevent any single power from dominating Asia and establishing a closed sphere of influence. The United States should work to become more of a model for upholding the human rights it advocates protecting around the world. Washington also should strive to preserve an open, rules-based international trading system, which would support diversification of value and supply chains and limit the ability of any power to corner the market on key products and inputs.</p> +<p>Therefore, for any efforts to find a common language on Ukraine, the EU should not only focus on garnering agreement on anti-Russian measures but also take into consideration the interests of the GCC countries and prioritise what can be quickly achieved, such as cooperation on humanitarian aid and mediation.</p> -<p>The American people’s security, prosperity, and wellbeing depends upon collective efforts to confront global challenges. One of the largest casualties of the breakdown in U.S.-China relations over the past seven years has been the abandonment of efforts to coordinate global responses to immediate challenges. The debilitating spectacle of Beijing and Washington engaging in nationalist blamesmanship instead of leading international efforts to tackle Covid-19 was a glaring example of the baleful consequences of the U.S.-China relationship becoming singularly defined by mutual enmity.</p> +<h3 id="middle-east-geopolitics">Middle East Geopolitics</h3> -<p>While it is more comfortable and self-satisfying to coordinate responses to crises within a cocoon of like-minded partners, such an approach will only hasten the United States’ abdication of global leadership. To best protect its interests, Washington needs to truly lead on the world stage, not merely settle to serve as leader of the G7. Global leadership means being capable of pulling in and pooling resources from the world’s most capable countries, including those with whom the United States disagrees, such as China.</p> +<p>No meaningful progress will be made at the summit unless the dynamics of the Middle East are fully considered, as this region is as critical to the GCC countries as Ukraine is to EU member states. The geopolitical and economic realities of the Middle East will continue to significantly influence the relationship between these two blocs.</p> -<p>America has experience pulling China into responses to global challenges, including in response to the 2014 outbreak of Ebola, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, calls for greater UN peacekeeping capacity, and climate change, to cite a few examples. To do so again, Washington will need to return to first principles. Among these, Washington will need to demonstrate in word and deed that it is willing to share leadership with China when Beijing materially contributes to solutions for global challenges. China’s leaders crave recognition as global leaders, and this desire should be better leveraged to extract concrete Chinese contributions, such as in Gaza’s reconstruction, the development of a global emerging disease surveillance network, and investments in the green energy transition.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The growing influence of GCC countries and the repercussions of Middle Eastern events in Europe underscore the need for strengthened interdependence</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Achieving this will require the United States to rethink its global position and to pursue global leadership in lieu of centering its foreign policy on competition with China, regardless of whether Beijing remains fixed in its dark view of hostile U.S. intentions. This will necessitate U.S. policymakers adopting a broader framework for evaluating the impact of Chinese actions beyond a narrow threat-based prism, currently in vogue in Washington. Viewing every Chinese action as threatening produces pressure on U.S. policymakers to react to every Chinese move, without regard as to whether the Chinese action implicates vital U.S. interests or even whether the United States’ response helps or hinders its own long-term interests. Viewing Chinese actions as primarily threatening has forced U.S. foreign policy to become increasingly reactive and defensive, when the present global moment calls for the United States to be bold, ambitious, and optimistic about leveraging its strengths to lead globally.</p> +<p>For instance, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, plans for which were signed in September 2023, exemplified potential cooperation toward shared objectives. However, the outbreak of conflict in Gaza has stalled the initiative, which was designed to mitigate instability caused by Houthi activities in the Red Sea. Now, with renewed turmoil in Gaza and Lebanon, the future of the initiative is even more uncertain. The instability on the GCC’s doorstep poses a more pressing concern to GCC countries than the situation in Europe. Therefore, the EU should lecture less and listen more to GCC countries on matters related to Middle East conflicts, and forge cooperation based on a shared understanding of the turbulence in the region.</p> -<p>Now, with the acceleration of climate change, the growing wave of climate-induced migration, armed conflicts, the likelihood of another pandemic, and the societal disruptions that artificial intelligence will engender, there is a crying need for global leadership. In this post-unipolar moment, the United States will need to draw on as much support as it can muster to address these and other challenges in line with its interests, including from China.</p> +<p>While both regions have been broadly aligned in condemning Hamas for the 7 October attack, Israeli aggression against civilians in Gaza and the violation of humanitarian law, the EU should more effectively encourage and support the Gulf countries’ diplomatic efforts to contain the conflict in both Gaza and Lebanon. Crucially, the EU must recognise that the absence of a Palestinian state lies at the heart of the ongoing conflict; only by advocating for its establishment can a lasting resolution and cessation of hostilities be achieved, starting with a ceasefire in both Gaza and Lebanon.</p> -<p>Enlisting greater Chinese buy-in for tackling global challenges will not be easy, nor will it be satisfying. Beijing will insist on doing things its own way. Chinese leaders will continue to support and sympathize with countries that oppose U.S. leadership, including Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Even so, Beijing’s goal is not to become captain of a team of aggrieved and isolated powers. Rather, it desires to become a respected global power. China lacks the power to achieve this outcome through conquest or use of force. Yet President Xi and those around him still covet recognition as global statesmen, peacemakers, and leaders for the coming century.</p> +<p>The summit presents a critical opportunity to elevate relations between the EU and GCC to unprecedented levels. Given the geopolitical dynamics at play, both regions have incentives to deepen their cooperation. The growing influence of GCC countries and the repercussions of Middle Eastern events in Europe underscore the need for strengthened interdependence. More importantly, the EU must understand that the value-imposing tone it has used previously rarely yields any results, and although it constitutes a significant economic power, it is not irreplaceable. Thus, embracing the GCC states as they are rather than how it wishes them to be is the preliminary step for cultivating sustainable partnerships. This summit could serve as a pivotal moment in redefining and enhancing transregional ties, provided both sides engage with openness and a genuine commitment to addressing shared challenges based on equal consideration of each other’s interests.</p> -<p>To be clear, shared pursuits will not dull the intensely competitive nature of U.S.-China relations. Nor will they reduce the imperative for the United States to bolster its military posture in Asia. After all, China will still claim Taiwan and will continue to develop advanced military capabilities in order to assert greater control over its periphery. As China’s military capabilities rise, so too will the bar for the United States and its partners to maintain credible deterrence against Chinese aggression.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Deterring Chinese assertions of control over contested territories is necessary, but it is an insufficient response to the challenge at hand. A core pillar of America’s strategy must be, as Ben Rhodes suggested, to “revitalize U.S. innovation and advanced manufacturing, disentangle critical supply chains from China, and maintain a lead for U.S. companies in developing new and potentially transformative technologies.”</p> +<p><strong>Saeed Alblooshi</strong> is a commentator and an independent geopolitical analyst based in Dubai, specialising in European politics. He has focused extensively on regional geopolitics in Europe and their effect on Middle Eastern states. He also specialises in international economic and investment policies, and the effect of geopolitical events on business environments.</p>Saeed AlblooshiThe EU–GCC summit on 16 October is a critical opportunity to strengthen strategic ties, addressing trade, energy and climate, and geopolitical tensions amid growing regional instability.Moldova’s Energy Future2024-10-11T12:00:00+08:002024-10-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/moldovas-energy-future<p><em>Russia has attempted to exert influence over Moldova through manipulating or threatening to manipulate energy prices and flows, and until recently, Moldova’s long-standing efforts to develop and reform its energy sector have produced minimal results.</em></p> -<p>Thus, to lead effectively, U.S. leaders will need to create conditions which enable the United States to continue serving as a magnet for global talent, technology, and capital, including from China. These are key ingredients for the United States to maintain an overall edge in innovation. It is increasingly clear that whichever country leads in technological innovation in the coming century will enjoy preponderant influence in the international system.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>In sum, U.S. policymakers need to realize that their obsession with countering China is blinding them to larger dynamics in the international system and thus limiting the United States’ chance to renew its global leadership. Neither attempts to vanquish China nor aspirations to coexist with it are credible end goals for the purpose-built strategy for which the current moment calls.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Embedding its approach to China within a broader framework for renewing global leadership will allow the United States to regain initiative. It will help rebuild U.S. capacity to galvanize solutions to global challenges by bringing U.S. priorities in closer alignment with those of its partners. It will strengthen the United States’ hand to push back firmly when China attempts to challenge core principles. At the same time, such an approach holds the potential to open space for China to contribute more to global challenges.</p> +<p>Russian gas flowed into Moldova via Ukraine from the fall of the Soviet Union (formally 1991) until the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Historically, this arrangement gave Russia an annual opportunity to seek Moldovan concessions or have the country suffer the consequences in both gas prices and the volume of gas supplied. This ongoing struggle provides a window into Moldova’s complex and layered relationship with Russia and with the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria, as well as Moldova’s internal challenges with institutional effectiveness.</p> -<p>The United States’ foremost priority is to lead in a twenty-first-century multipolar world, rather than to downsize itself into a regional power or a mere captain of a collection of democracies. To move in this direction, U.S. policymakers will need clarity and firmness on what principles it must uphold, as well as flexibility and creativity in creating (and leading) broad coalitions of capable countries, including China, to tackle pressing challenges and to develop rules and norms for future ones. Policymakers also will need to prioritize strategies for accelerating innovation within the United States.</p> +<p>Examining Moldova’s energy sector also reveals the country’s significant growth and reform over the past several years. As of 2023, Chisinau (the capital of Moldova) no longer purchases gas from Russia’s Gazprom. However, this does not mean that Chisinau has freed itself from Russia’s malign hand on the thermostat. Russian gas still flows into Transnistria and the majority of Moldova’s electricity is still supplied via the electrical plant in Transnistria, which is run on Russian gas.</p> -<p>These steps are well within America’s reach. For all its challenges, the United States remains uniquely positioned to lead in this coming century, if it plays its cards right. The more it does so, the better positioned it will be to address challenges posed by China in the twenty-first century.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">This ongoing struggle provides a window into Moldova’s complex and layered relationship with Russia and with the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria, as well as Moldova’s internal challenges with institutional effectiveness.</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="the-end-goal-should-be-avoiding-conflicts">The End Goal Should Be Avoiding Conflicts</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6dxwVTm.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Gas Pipelines in Moldova.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.stopfake.org/en/moldova-political-pressure-in-the-gas-pipeline/">“Moldova: Political Pressure In The Gas Pipeline,” Media Reforms Center, November 22, 2021</a>.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="yasheng-huang">Yasheng Huang</h4> - <h4 id="epoch-foundation-professor-of-global-economics-and-management-sloan-school-of-management-massachusetts-institute-of-technology">Epoch Foundation Professor of Global Economics and Management, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>To fully understand the current energy situation in Moldova, it is essential to explore the history of the country’s post–Soviet Union energy supply system. Moreover, in order to explore the long history of discounted gas from Russia, as well as Transnistria’s current supplying of most Moldovan electricity, one must inevitably look at Tiraspol, the capital city of Transnistria. But more than a look backward is needed to understand the future of gas, electric, and alternative energy sectors; accordingly, this piece goes beyond that, offering an overview of the current international aid efforts underway, as well as how EU accession is likely to affect this industry. Most importantly, this piece includes potential and crucial solutions to continue progressing toward Moldova’s energy independence.</p> -<p>In 1848, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote, “A specter is haunting Europe — the specter of Communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this specter.” Today, America is haunted by the specter of a Cold War. Many key stakeholders — members of Congress, voters, social media commentators, and geopolitical strategists — have entered into an alliance to exorcise this specter.</p> +<h3 id="background-on-post-soviet-moldovan-energy">Background on Post-Soviet Moldovan Energy</h3> -<p>The Cold War ended in a collapse of the Soviet Union, and some in the policy community advocate for a collapse of the Chinese Communist Party’s regime in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as an end goal of U.S. policy toward China. Regime collapse is such a complex phenomenon rooted in a myriad of conditions, dynamics, and factors, many of which are simply beyond any realistic conception of what the United States can achieve in its foreign policy. That purported goal does not provide a meaningful direction and reliable guide for how to think about international relations, and it does not account for the deep complexities of the relationship between China and the United States.</p> +<p>Since Moldova’s independence in 1992 and until 2022, the majority of Moldovan gas has come from Russia. As of 2018, Chisinau was only meeting 20 percent of its energy demand domestically, instead relying almost entirely on imports. Until 2014, most of this imported energy consisted of natural gas coming from Russia via Ukraine. The Moldovan populace felt the Russian hand reach in and turn down their thermostats in the winters of 2006 and 2009, when the energy giant Gazprom shut off gas to Moldova. While such measures are not unheard of in Moldova, the country has largely been shielded from Russian shut-off threats at least partially because the Balkan gas supply ran through Moldova.</p> -<p>There is a saying in management education, “Operation is strategy.” While some critics deride “managed competition” as a mere process, getting process right is precisely what the United States needs to confront the geopolitical challenges of a China that has abandoned its previous pragmatic working relationships with the West, but also a China with which the United States has built up some deep and productive connections and ties.</p> +<p>Russia has long used energy as a coercive tool, especially against post-Soviet states, in particular targeting Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova. While Russian efforts to leverage energy flows as a coercive tool across the post-Soviet world often yield acquiescence in the short term, in the longer term such effort pushes clients to diversify their supply, as has been the case in both Ukraine and Lithuania. Moldova’s tempestuous history with Russia — as played out in the latter’s unreliable supply and pricing of energy, among other avenues — eventually pushed Moldova to diversify its energy supply in earnest in 2022.</p> -<p>The policy of the Biden administration is known as “managed competition.” As a concept, managed competition permits a degree of flexibility in U.S. policy toward China — tough in areas where necessary and collaborative in areas where desired. It is also a concept that does not set out assuming a China that is completely set in stone; rather, it is a China that, however reluctantly, slowly, and often imperceptibly, may still respond to a combination of incentives, punitive acts, and confrontational postures.</p> +<p>Until recently, Moldova’s long-standing efforts to develop and reform its energy sector have produced minimal results. In 1997, the Moldovan government established the National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE), a body tasked with, among other duties, regulating and monitoring the energy sector. But like much of the Moldovan bureaucracy, the agency was not provided with sufficient independent authority to effect this oversight. Without such power, the energy industry has remained a political and profitable tool for internal and external forces. ANRE has also been accused of placing unnecessary challenges on private sector engagement in the marketplace, including delays in permitting, licensing, and anticompetitive tariff setting.</p> -<h4 id="china-is-not-a-new-soviet-union">China Is Not a New Soviet Union</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Until recently, Moldova’s long-standing efforts to develop and reform its energy sector have produced minimal results.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>A U.S. policy toward China designed to achieve a complete victory is based on a loose reading of history, and prescriptively it is a highly risky idea. First, it is worth clarifying some fundamental distinctions between the Soviet Union of the Cold War era and China today.</p> +<p>Moldova’s efforts toward energy diversification, if not full energy independence, have gone the way of so many Moldovan reform efforts — progressing in fits and starts and plagued by corruption and bureaucratic missteps. In August 2014, the Iasi-Ungheni gas interconnector between Romania and Moldova was commissioned, becoming notionally operational in 2015. However, the entire pipeline was not finished, including connecting Ungheni to Chisinau, until 2021. Moreover, gas did not even begin to flow through this pipeline until 2022. There was a 2017 attempt to move Moldova’s electrical supply to a Ukrainian firm, but that ultimately failed, with some alleging corruption as the culprit. Even in the fraud cases investigated by ANRE, prosecutions and fund recovery have been slow.</p> -<p>In 1956, the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, and in 1961, the Berlin Wall was built with tacit or explicit encouragement from the Soviet Union. In 1962, the Soviet Union’s placement of missiles in Cuba prompted the Kennedy administration to impose a naval blockade, bringing the world to the brink of nuclear Armageddon for 13 days. In 1968, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, and in 1979, it invaded Afghanistan. Today, Russia, the successor state to the Soviet Union, is waging an active war of aggression against Ukraine.</p> +<p>Perhaps the largest corrupt bureaucratic maneuvers occurred between 1995 and 1998, when the gas networks in Moldova were privatized. Throughout the privatization process a number of dubious, and likely corrupt, schemes were evident, including the undervaluation of assets and the overvaluation of Moldovan government debt. These debt and asset valuations led to the Russian state-owned Gazprom obtaining a 50 percent ownership stake in Moldovagaz as repayment for the debts. The remaining ownership of Moldovagaz rests with the Moldovan government in Chisinau (35 percent) and the government in Tiraspol, the capital of the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria (15 percent).</p> -<p>China has adopted an aggressive and destabilizing geopolitical stance toward Taiwan and in the South China Sea, matched with strident and virulent anti-Western, anti-American rhetoric that is deeply unsettling. Historically, it has engaged in border clashes with Vietnam and India. That said, China has not engaged in reckless behavior that has brought the world to the brink of World War III or nuclear Armageddon in the same way the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. The United States needs to be vigilant, clear-eyed, and attentive to the geopolitical intentions and actions of the PRC, but a factually loose and selective analogy between China and the Soviet Union is misleading.</p> +<p>Russian Gazprom was created in 1989 when the Soviet Gas Ministry was privatized. In 2005, the Russian state became the majority owner of Gazprom. Until 2022, the company was one of the top producers and exporters of natural gas in the world. (Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Gazprom’s revenue has decreased sharply; it reported its first net loss in 20 years.) By law the sole exporter of Russian gas, Gazprom has leveraged this supply to obtain diplomatic concessions from not only post-Soviet states but western Europe as well.</p> -<p>Although some analysts assert with certainty that the Soviet Union collapsed because of the confrontational policy of the Reagan administration, that view is an oversimplification of history. The arms race with the United States and significant military expenditures did strain the Soviet economy, and President Ronald Reagan’s policies — including increased defense spending and the Strategic Defense Initiative — put additional pressure on Moscow. But the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted from a host of other complex developments, such as the reform programs launched by Mikhail Gorbachev and long-term economic stagnation. Also, unlike China, the Soviet Union’s composition — with distinct ethnic and nationalistic groups that overlapped with the entity’s political boundaries — also contributed to its unitary frailties.</p> +<p>Gazprom’s ownership stake in Moldovagaz provides another avenue for the Russian government to manipulate the Moldovan energy sector, which it has already done. For example, in 2021, it was only after a contentious negotiation period that the contract between Moldovagaz and Gazprom was renewed for five years. Two days before the deal was set to be signed, Gazprom tripled the pricing model for Chisinau, leading to a hold in negotiations during which the Moldovan government proved successful in diversifying its energy sources, if only for a short period. The European Union played a role in this process, not only through financial assistance to aid Moldova in keeping the lights on, but also by publicly calling out Russia’s use of energy as a geopolitical tool.</p> -<p>There are many counterexamples in the world. North Korea and Cuba did not collapse despite years of sanctions imposed by the West and isolation. History does not repeat, and in this case it may not even rhyme. Adopting a “vision of victory” designed to destabilize China or otherwise provoke internal change has a very small likelihood of achieving its professed goal, while its provocative rationale risks getting the United States involved in an escalation of conflicts with China. Designing a policy around the idea of causing regime collapse is not only lacking in realism — it is prone to many problematic, unintended consequences.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RcVM985.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Moldova Gas Sector before Unbundling.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/moldova-energy-profile/market-design">“Moldova Energy Profile: Market Design,” International Energy Agency</a>; and <a href="https://www.eu-advisers.md/mission-2019-2022/">“European Union High Level Advisers’ Mission 2019–2021,” European Union</a>.</em></p> -<p>The Biden administration has, by and large, struck the right balance between cooperation and confrontation in its articulation of policy toward China. One can quibble exactly where the administration should come down in that difficult and delicate balancing act, but the general approach is one that the United States should continue to embrace in the future. The overarching goal of the United States’ policy toward China should be avoiding conflicts, and that goal sometimes requires a confrontational stance and sometimes requires active diplomacy and acts of cooperation.</p> +<p>The 2021 negotiations centered around three main challenges that have long plagued Moldova’s energy industry. The first involves the debt that Chisinau supposedly owes and the repayment schedule, both of which are contested. The second is the pricing model and its flexibility, as well as Russia’s commitment to supply. The third challenge involves the restructuring of the energy sector, including the unbundling that Moldova has committed to as a part of the European Union’s Third Energy Package. While progress has been made on each of these challenges since 2021, none are yet resolved. All three of these challenges are discussed in greater depth later in this paper.</p> -<p>The concept of “managed competition” is not only a prudent approach, it is rooted in the complexity that defines the very nature of the relationship between China and the United States, a level of complexity that was entirely absent during the Cold War. For instance, collaboration with China is essential to addressing climate change. And even amid trade wars and derisking, China remains an important economic and trading partner with the United States. Scientists of the two countries have collaborated with each other on important and meaningful basic research projects that benefit not only the two countries but all of humankind. One area of fruitful research is in agriculture, as noted by a report of the Carter Center.</p> +<p>The 2021 deal and the overall lack of progress in the energy sector since independence left Moldova still largely dependent on Russia for energy when Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022. Russia’s invasion and continued attacks on infrastructure meant that Ukraine was no longer able to supply Moldova with electricity, a gap which Romania stepped in to fill. Most likely in response, Russia announced it was reducing gas supplies to Moldova — including to Transnistria — by 30 percent. Tiraspol then announced cuts of over 50 percent in the amount of electricity it could supply to Chisinau. Combined, this left Moldova with the worst energy crisis since its independence.</p> -<p>A policy that is single-handedly punitive can backfire on the United States. The trade war with China is one example; it damaged the Chinese economy but also produced a negative effect on the United States. The bout of inflation that the United States experienced resulted from supply chain disruptions during the Covid-19 pandemic, but the trade war with China further constrained the supply capacity and exacerbated the transitory inflationary pressures. A widespread view is that China hoarded pandemic-related medical supplies during the Covid-19 outbreak. China did hoard supplies, but it was not the only cause of the lack of preparation among U.S. healthcare institutions. For example, the tariffs enacted by the Trump administration reduced U.S. stockpiling of essential medical supplies before the onset of Covid-19.</p> +<p>The crisis led to the government in Chisinau asking citizens to reduce their energy usage; protests against the pro-western government followed. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the United States, and the European Union provided aid in the form of grants, loans, and funds aimed at subsidizing bills for the poorest Moldovans. While efforts to diversify energy suppliers had been made prior to 2022, the crisis pushed them into high gear. By 2023, none of the gas supply flowing to Moldova (aside from Transnistria) was imported from Russia.</p> -<p>This is not an argument to go back to the geopolitically naive era of unfettered globalization, but an argument that economic interdependence creates special challenges that U.S. administrations during the Cold War did not have to consider. A “win” against China is not guaranteed to be an unambiguous win for the United States, and the costs of trying to achieve that win can be far costlier than those associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union.</p> +<p>However, despite this apparent independence from Russian gas (and therefore influence), since Moldovagaz controls gas flow, and Gazprom owns 50 percent of Moldovagaz, the Russian government is still involved in and profiting from Moldova’s gas sector. Furthermore, while none of the right bank of Moldova’s gas is imported from Russia, the entirety of Transnistria’s gas is still being provided by Russia, and it has been provided free of charge for the last fifteen years. The cost of this “free” gas — worth approximately $9 billion — is billed by Gazprom to Moldovagaz. In 2023, an independent review found that Moldova’s current debts were significantly lower than Russia had alleged. And so, disagreements over debts that Moldova, or more specifically Moldovagaz, owes to Russia for gas continue.</p> -<h4 id="even-the-cold-war-was-not-all-about-confrontation">Even the Cold War Was Not All About Confrontation</h4> +<p>Regardless of the debts owed and who might owe or pay them eventually, the Transnistrian economy has long been reliant on discounted (“free”) gas from Russia, including to run one of the largest electrical plants in the region, the Cuciurgan Power Station (MGRES), which itself is owned by a Russian company. This plant currently provides approximately 80 percent of Moldova’s electricity, revealing yet another way in which Moldova remains under Russia’s thumb for its energy.</p> -<p>It is also important to note that the actual Cold War was far more nuanced than many of the current Cold Warriors remember. Indeed, the United States pursued a version of “managed competition” with the Soviet Union for much of the Cold War. Its policy toward Moscow was a mixture of détente and confrontation, and the United States and the Soviet Union actively collaborated with each other in areas that were deemed as benefiting both countries. While many China hawks no doubt oppose continuing academic collaborations with China, it is important to point out that even in the immediate aftermath of Sputnik, the Soviet Union and the United States maintained collaborative efforts. The 1958 Lacy–Zarubin Agreement, a cultural exchange accord, facilitated the movement and collaboration of students and scholars between the two nations. Additionally, during the 1960s and 1970s, the two countries cooperated on the smallpox eradication project under the auspices of the World Health Organization, a project that provided enduring benefits to humanity.</p> +<p>Currently, Russian gas flows to Transnistria via Ukraine, but Ukraine has indicated that it will not extend that contract with Russia when it expires in December 2024. The Moldovan government has indicated that there are alternative ways for Russian gas to flow to Transnistria following the ending of the Russian-Ukrainian contract. But questions remain: Will Russia continue to provide this free gas? Who will pay transit fees? And, will this affect the price of electricity provided to Chisinau?</p> -<p>The two ends of the policy spectrum — unfettered collaboration and globalization on the one hand and the decoupling of all the ties with the PRC on the other — are easy options, but a responsible policy course that recognizes the complex reality of interdependence between the two countries is one that mitigates risks while striving to retain the upside of that interdependence. It is hard and does not make for good bumper stickers, but it is the only responsible policy course.</p> +<p>Moldova’s pathway to energy independence has continued to develop in leaps and bounds. In 2024, Moldova joined with other European partners in supporting the security of the energy supply for Ukraine, including efforts to integrate Romanian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian electrical systems. These efforts, among others, not only support Ukraine’s energy supply, but also further diversify Moldova’s energy flows.</p> -<p>Here, it is possible to look to the Cold War and how the United States and Soviet Union managed collaboration in science and technology. One suggestion is to adopt a more structured and organized approach, akin to the joint smallpox project during the Cold War, where both governments mutually agreed on and supervised topics and research areas. In this geopolitical climate, collaboration must ensure the safety of both nations and participating researchers. This curated method will inevitably result in some loss of autonomy and research scale, and while it may not be the preferred approach, it is a necessary and viable alternative in these times of geopolitical tension and distrust.</p> +<p>In May 2024, the United States committed additional resources to Moldova to support energy development, among other cross-sector collaborations including but not limited to cyber security. This follows significant U.S. government investments in Moldova’s energy sector. Furthermore, the continuing support from the European Union, the World Bank, and other foreign partners is essential for Moldova’s energy future.</p> -<p>In the area of capital investments, the United States can take a page from how China has managed its own globalization process. The United States utilizes tariffs to restrict goods from China, a strategy that, if executed correctly, can benefit American interests. The current approach to Chinese capital inflows tends to recognize the complexity of the issue but then simplifies it to a single solution — restriction. The United States should leverage the benefits of Chinese capital inflows while mitigating the drawbacks. The United States can establish special procedures and processes dedicated to vetting and regulating Chinese investments. For instance, Congress could pass a law mandating that Chinese investments in the United States have to have American joint venture partners, or that subjects Chinese operations in the United States to a higher level and broader range of scrutiny than investments from other countries. The rise of China and the numerous challenges it poses to the United States necessitate a dedicated policy and regulatory framework, rather than adhering to the United States’ usual non-discriminatory most favored nation (MFN) approach.</p> +<p>Despite this progress toward energy diversification, the higher energy prices have negatively impacted the Moldovan economy. This means that energy remains not only a physical resourcing issue but also a political one, as pro-Russian candidates can (and do) use the promise of a return to lower prices as a part of their platforms. While Moldova is solidly on the path to energy diversification, its road to long-term energy independence and having an efficient energy sector free from corruption and Russian influence is going to take time, support, and smart, collaborative policy solutions.</p> -<h4 id="a-balanced-lesson-from-the-cold-war">A Balanced Lesson from the Cold War</h4> +<h3 id="the-transnistrian-equation">The Transnistrian Equation</h3> -<p>China’s shift toward autocracy, reversal of globalization, market reforms, and belligerent geopolitical posture have all been deeply troubling developments, and the United States should harbor no illusions about Xi Jinping and his policy agenda. That said, it is important to recognize that the China of today is not the Soviet Union of the Cold War era. China is a globally connected economy in a way the Soviet Union never was, and it remains a vital economy that is important to the United States and the rest of the world. The flows of financial resources, human capital exchanges, and research collaborations have been beneficial to both countries.</p> +<p>Transnistria, a territory wedged between Moldova and Ukraine, has existed as a breakaway region with Russian troops stationed there since 1992. The Russian “peacekeepers” arrived at the end of kinetic conflict and are tasked with patrolling the territory as a part of the agreement that ended the fighting. While Moldova agreed to the “peacekeepers,” it never agreed to the additional Russian forces tasked with protecting a large Soviet-era weapons depot. The presence of these troops and the weapons depot serve as reminders of Moscow’s power to exert influence on Chisinau one way or another.</p> -<p>The United States must confront China where the geopolitical and economic interests of the two countries collide, but it must categorically reject a strategy based solely on confrontation. Instead, the United States should seek creative and proactive ways to compete and collaborate with China, balancing the relationship to produce benefits while managing risks. The world is a complex place, requiring a nuanced approach. To espouse a policy based on toppling the Chinese regime runs the risk of turning China, an economic competitor and geopolitical rival, into an outright enemy.</p> +<p>Prior to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine — in fact, since 2005 — both governments (Chisinau and Tiraspol) engaged in negotiations via the 5+2 format. This group originally included Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, and the United States; since the 2022 Russian invasion, Ukraine has refused to continue negotiations in this format, but Russia and Transnistria have asked for their continuation. While a reinstatement of the 5+2 format is unlikely, Chisinau has expressed a commitment to working closely with Tiraspol, as it is in the former’s interest for the situation in Transnistria to remain stable.</p> -<p>It was the deft management of the Cold War — a combination of the willingness of President John F. Kennedy to reach a compromise with the Soviet Union to resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis, the détente policy of President Richard Nixon, and President Reagan’s challenge to the Soviet autocracy — that cumulatively contributed to an outcome in which the Cold War ended in peace rather than in nuclear Armageddon. In drawing a lesson from the Cold War, the United States should make sure to draw the right one.</p> +<p>Russia has attempted to exert influence over Moldova through manipulating energy prices and flows or by threatening to do so. An argument frequently raised in these aggressive negotiations is Moldova’s gas debt. This debt — the total of which is still being contested — includes the amount that Moldova owes Russia both for the “free” gas being provided to Transnistria and the gas provided to the rest of the country.</p> -<h3 id="a-vision-of-victory-is-unnecessary-and-undesirable">A “Vision of Victory” Is Unnecessary and Undesirable</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russia has attempted to exert influence over Moldova through manipulating energy prices and flows or by threatening to do so.</code></em></strong></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="bilahari-kausikan">Bilahari Kausikan</h4> - <h4 id="chairman-middle-east-institute-national-university-of-singapore-former-permanent-secretary-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-singapore">Chairman, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore; Former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>As a part of the 2021 Gazprom, Moldovagaz, and Moldovan government negotiations, an independent review of the debts was conducted. The review found that the Moldovan government owes Russia approximately $8 million, not the more than $700 million that Russia claims. The difference is partially due to noncompliant expenses including salaries, office renovations, and interest accumulation on the debts owed. Furthermore, this review found that the distribution of gas transit costs over the last twenty years had been overpaid by Chisinau and underpaid by Tiraspol to the tune of $250 million. Some portion of discrepancy may be due to Gazprom not providing financial documentation in support of this review. Of note, this review was only conducted in relation to the debts for Moldovan territory and did not include those relating to Transnistria.</p> -<p>The United States’ relationship with China cannot be separated from broader historical processes. Professor Michael J. Green has pointed out that, since the eighteenth century, the central theme of the United States’ strategy toward the Asia-Pacific has been that it “will not tolerate any other power establishing exclusive hegemonic control over Asia or the Pacific.” To this end, the United States has “overcome bids for regional hegemony in Asia from the European powers, Imperial Japan, and Soviet communism.” The current competition with China is only the latest iteration. After more than two centuries of application, the United States’ current focus on avoiding exclusive control by China remains both necessary and desirable; no alternative “vision of victory” presented rivals current policy.</p> +<p>The import contract between Gazprom and Moldovagaz stipulates that gas is to be provided to Transnistria, with Moldovagaz holding the debts. In a further complication of the structure between these entities, Transnistria’s gas is provided via a Moldovagaz subsidiary named Tiraspoltransgaz. This company owns the gas-related infrastructure in Transnistria. Historic ANRE inspections and their subsequent reports have noted irregularities in the accounting for Tiraspoltransgaz.</p> -<p>Though critics may disagree, they also provide valuable reminders of what is too often overlooked or downplayed: China is a Leninist state ruled by a vanguard party that demands a monopoly of power. Moreover, the flaw in many of these Cold War 2.0 arguments lies in their underlying assumption: that the current U.S.-China relationship mirrors the twentieth-century U.S.-Soviet Cold War. While there are superficial similarities between the current U.S.-China and former U.S.-Soviet competitions, this is to be expected in a relationship between two great powers. The real problem with the Cold War analogy is that it confuses the epiphenomenal with the essential and is, therefore, fundamentally misleading.</p> +<p>The gas that Moldovagaz provides to the Transnistrian-based subsidiary is then sold via an agreement with the government in Tiraspol and subsequently sold at below-market rates to Transnistrian businesses. The revenue thus generated is put into an account and recorded as loans from Tiraspoltransgaz to support the region’s budget. This revenue makes up approximately 50 percent of the region’s budget, but more importantly, the value of the gas consumed free of charge was approximately 50 percent of the entire region’s GDP over a ten-year period.</p> -<p>The United States and the Soviet Union’s connections were tangential as each led a discrete system, with only superficial economic connections. The Cold War was a war of ideas, an existential struggle between systems, between differing views on the fundamental ordering of society. At its core, the U.S.-Soviet relationship was a competition to determine the best way of organizing modern industrial society. Once the Soviet Union collapsed, the issue was settled.</p> +<p>This means that the entire Transnistrian economy, and government service provisioning, is based on a model of receiving free Russian gas. If Transnistria were to no longer receive free or significantly subsidized Russian gas, there would likely be massive and swift bankruptcies of Transnistrian businesses. This is not in the interest of the Transnistrian oligarchs, who hold significant political power in the region. Perhaps surprisingly given Moscow’s significant influence and presence, the Transnistrian government has remained neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. This neutrality is demonstrative of just how much sway the oligarchs in Transnistria have over Tiraspol.</p> -<p>The U.S.-China relationship is fundamentally different because their connections are very real and deep. The relationship rests on mutual interdependence and, consequently, mutual vulnerability. Unlike during the Cold War, almost all twenty-first-century economies are now mixed and differ only in the balance between the planned (which the United States and others in the West prefer to call “regulated”) and market elements. By contrast to the twentieth century, with its clear divides and limited interdependence, the twenty-first century is a global century, its economies and societies deeply interconnected.</p> +<p>Despite the December 2024 expiration of the Russian-Ukrainian gas contract, the Moldovan government is confident that alternatives exist to continue the flows of Russian gas to Transnistria. The cheapest option would be to continue using Ukrainian pipelines via a third party, but, given Ukrainian laws on signing contracts with Russian entities, any such third party would need to own the gas itself, not just be providing it on behalf of Gazprom. An alternative is to utilize the Turkstream and Trans-Balkan pipelines, but this would be significantly more expensive, and the pipelines still pass through Ukrainian territory. Both of these alternatives are only possible if the infrastructure in Ukrainian territory remains undamaged from a Russian attack and if the pipelines in question have the capacity to carry the additional flow. It remains to be seen if Russia will take these alternatives or request for Transnistria to pay transit fees or other costs associated with the gas delivery.</p> -<p>The United States and China are the two most important nodes in this global system woven together by a global web of supply chains whose scope, density, and complexity have never before been seen.</p> +<p>Of note in this discussion is the fact that Moldova’s largest power plant, the Cuciurgan Power Station (MGRES), sits within Transnistria. Moldova has historically been reliant on this plant’s production and the pricing models provided to Chisinau, which are predicated on the free gas the plant receives. Moreover, historically all Moldovan gas and electrical lines ran through Transnistria; prior to independence, Moldova was essentially reliant on its east for energy. However, even if Moldova could supply all the electricity needed for all its citizens through lines from the west to Chisinau, in all likelihood, not purchasing Transnistrian electricity would lead to a collapse of the Transnistrian economy, government, or both.</p> -<p>The United States and China are both uncomfortable because their interdependence exposes their mutual vulnerabilities. Each is trying to mitigate its risks — Washington by denying China critical technologies and forcing supply-chain diversification and Beijing by promoting technological self-reliance and domestic-consumption-driven growth. Neither approach is likely to succeed, at least not to the extent their advocates may hope.</p> +<p>If subsidized gas ceases to flow, unemployed Transnistrian citizens will likely seek support from Chisinau, creating an additional flow of refugees. Chisinau, which has taken in the largest number of Ukrainian refugees per capita worldwide since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, is not equipped to handle the numbers this would entail. Moreover, as mentioned above, Transnistria is home to a contingent of Russian troops and a Soviet-era weapons depot, both of which would be affected by the instability in the region if a collapse were to occur.</p> -<p>The global system is under pressure. But barring a catastrophic U.S.-China war, it is highly improbable that the incredibly dense and complex web of supply chains binding the United States and China (and others) will — or can be made to — bifurcate into two separate systems. Even within particular high-technology domains — the only area where such a divide is conceivable — it would be, at most, only partial.</p> +<p>This instability could force Chisinau to face the challenges a reunification process presents. Alternatively, if Russia ceases to provide its “free” gas, Chisinau could stave off volitivity by subsidizing the purchase of gas and electricity for both itself and the breakaway region. If this were to occur, the Moldovan government would likely need to turn to international partners for support given the costs associated with these subsidies.</p> -<p>The Asia-Pacific is the epicenter of U.S.-China competition. It is also the location of some of the most important nodes of the global web. It is also the region where the interconnections are most difficult to disentangle. Like it or not, the United States and China must continue to compete within the single system in which they and the rest of the world are inextricably entangled.</p> +<p>It is in neither Chisinau’s nor Tiraspol’s interest to get into a back and forth tit-for-tat on energy, nor to let the Transnistrian energy market — and subsequently its entire economy — collapse. Ukraine also has a vested interest in Transnistrian stability, not only for humanitarian reasons, but also because a portion of Ukraine’s electrical grid is linked to Moldova’s via the hub in Transnistria. There is also the question of whether even Moscow would want a true crisis in Transnistria, especially one focused on energy, as it might break the implicit contract between Moscow, the government in Tiraspol, and the population residing in Transnistria.</p> -<p>Cold War 2.0 advocates often see the end point of U.S.-China competition as regime change — “a China that is able to chart its own course free from communist dictatorship,” as one advocate put it. Such an understanding echoes George Kennan’s prediction that patient containment would eventually lead to “either the break-up or a gradual mellowing of Soviet power,” although most contemporary advocates of regime change in China seem less patient.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is in neither Chisinau’s nor Tiraspol’s interest to get into a back and forth tit-for-tat on energy, nor to let the Transnistrian energy market — and subsequently its entire economy — collapse.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>But the Soviet Union was containable because it pursued self-containment through autarchy; the regime in essence contained itself. The same cannot be said for China, which is so vital a node in the global system and its economy so intertwined with the world that the United States might as well try to contain itself. Even with the demographic and other structural weaknesses now evident, the Chinese system is more economically viable and more resilient than the Soviet economy ever was, even at its peak. Chinese growth will slow, but China will not collapse.</p> +<p>It is also in both Chisinau’s and Tiraspol’s interests to keep energy prices as low as possible, especially at a time when the Moldovan populace has been economically depressed since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic. This pricing is of concern not just for Chisinau seeking alternative sources of energy, but also for Transnistria. If Transnistria were cut off from heavily subsidized gas, but alternative sources were available to Transnistria at market rates, the pricing adjustments would create a shock to the economy that would likely lead to a refugee crisis, which would not only be a humanitarian problem but also a political one as it would occur approximately six months before the 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections. Furthermore, the current electricity that Transnistria sells to Moldova is below market rate, so this arrangement also benefits Chisinau. This leaves Chisinau in the position of funding its own breakaway region for the time being.</p> -<p>The dynamics of competition within a system are fundamentally different from the dynamics of the Cold War U.S.-Soviet competition between systems. Though dangerous The U.S.-China competition is not an existential struggle between two systems, each seeking to replace the other, but rather a struggle between two powers seeking to control the one system. Today, no one can seriously hope (or fear) that communism or the planned economy could replace capitalism or the market. Nor is it likely that U.S.-China competition will end in any clear-cut dénouement as did U.S.-Soviet competition.</p> +<h3 id="gas-sector-overview">Gas Sector Overview</h3> -<p>The United States and China compete by trying to use the complex interdependencies of their relationship to gain an advantage within a system from which they and the rest of the world have benefitted. And, in a crucial difference from the Cold War, both the United States and China seek to do this without irrevocably damaging the system itself. This is very different from one system trying to replace the other; it is also not clear that either can gain a decisive advantage without risking serious damage to themselves, something the United States largely accomplished in the Cold War.</p> +<p>Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Moldova has been heavily reliant on supply from Russia, specifically Gazprom, for nearly all its natural gas needs. Moldova’s gas company, Moldovagaz — with Russian Gazprom holding a 50 percent stake, the Moldovan government 35 percent, and Tiraspol 15 percent — monopolizes the gas sector. This has left the country vulnerable to Russian market manipulations and influence. The power of this ownership is particularly significant as more than half of Moldova’s energy supply is derived from natural gas.</p> -<p>This underscores a fundamental reality: competition and the possibility of conflict are intrinsic characteristics of international relations among sovereign states. It is thus a mistake to conceive of any international order as necessarily based on consensus. More often than not in world history, it was the competition between major powers, and the efforts to minimize the risks of competition, that constituted the only “order” that existed.</p> +<p>Since it halted the direct import of Russian gas and began diversifying its gas supply in 2022, Moldova has also sought sources outside of Moldovagaz. Chisinau now uses Energocom, another state-owned Moldovan company. Of note, Energocom also participates in the auctions on the BRM (Romanian Commodities Exchange) gas exchange in Moldova to deliver gas to Moldovagaz. While this removed Gazprom from having ownership control, it has not created an environment that incentivizes private sector participation in the energy market. For example, the recent contracting negotiations with suppliers have been opaque at best, releasing neither volume nor pricing publicly. A state-owned entity conducting business in this manner is not a recipe for accountability to the Moldovan taxpayer, nor for private sector engagement in the sector in the short or long term.</p> -<p>This was certainly the case for the 40 years after the end of World War II. Only within the short and historically exceptional period after the Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet Union imploded was this central reality masked by the overwhelming dominance of the United States, which had created the illusion that there was only one vision of order.</p> +<p>In the coming years, Moldova is expected to continue diversifying its gas sector by exploring a range of alternatives for expanding supply, including developing networks through Romania to import gas from EU markets; using Bulgarian networks to transport natural gas; and implementing the Vertical Corridor Initiative to import natural gas from the Caspian Sea and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from terminals in Greece. In fact, Moldova was instrumental in the first delivery of gas from Greece to Ukraine via the Vertical Corridor in 2023, which stored it in its underground storage space, the largest in the European Union. However, while Moldova has the Iasi-Ungheni gas interconnector operational and available as an alternative gas supply if the current main route — the Trans-Balkan pipeline — is unavailable, that option is significantly more expensive.</p> -<p>That brief period was beneficial to most countries, including China, but that does not make it any less exceptional. Though the United States is not in the absolute decline that China likes to portray, the relativities of power have irrevocably changed. The United States will never again be as dominant as it was in the immediate post–Cold War period. The world have returned to normalcy, where competition and the possibility of conflict drive international relations.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Recent contracting negotiations with suppliers have been opaque at best, releasing neither volume nor pricing publicly. A state-owned entity conducting business in this manner is not a recipe for accountability to the Moldovan taxpayer, nor for private sector engagement in the sector.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Viewed within the longue durée of world history, the end of the Cold War was just another geopolitical event, albeit a momentous one. It is foolish to invest a single geopolitical event with universal significance. Although the most extreme versions of investing an event with such widespread significance as the “end of history” are no longer fashionable, their lingering shadow underlies the idea that some “vision of victory” is needed for competition with China.</p> +<p>Another possibility is that Moldova could enter the global LNG market and access resources from the United States and Qatar. Additionally, Moldova could import gas from Azerbaijan or Turkey by building extensions to the Trans-Anatolian pipeline. While these options are costly and time consuming, Moldova will want to avoid a return to reliance on a single source of gas. The country will likely continue pursuing energy market reforms aimed at liberalizing the market, increasing competition, and reducing the power of Moldovagaz, all of which necessitate private sector participation.</p> -<p>The realization that China’s views of the post–Cold War international order were not identical to those of the West — despite being one of its main beneficiaries — seemed shockingly unnatural to some analysts. Responses by some Cold War 2.0 advocates seem overblown, with aggressiveness concealing a loss of confidence that is close to panic. But it is not just China whose views differ from the West. Many U.S. partners and friends in the Asia-Pacific also have their own interpretations of the current rules-based order — across the region, the same words do not necessarily hold the same meaning. Singapore, for example, is a staunch supporter of what it too calls a rules-based order but is much more committed to the economic rules than to the belief that certain political ideas claimed to be “universal rights,” give other countries the right to interfere in another’s internal affairs. It is a Western conceit that U.S. — or Western — definitions and interpretations of rules are or should be the norm.</p> +<p>Moldova will also likely continue working to improve its energy efficiency, thereby lessening the demand for energy, to a degree. Currently, many buildings use older technology for district heating, and consumers use two or three times more energy than would otherwise be required because they do not have horizontal distribution of heat with individual temperature controls. With the help of other countries and international financial institutions such as the World Bank Group, Moldova aims to modernize its gas and energy capabilities. As part of that strategy, in 2024, the Moldovan government launched a program focusing on increasing energy efficiency in residential buildings. Additionally, Moldova is working toward building and utilizing the alternative energy industry, thereby further reducing its reliance on natural gas and aligning with the European Union Clean Energy package and standards for a green economy as part of its EU accession aspirations.</p> -<p>Heightened U.S.-China competition was in some measure due to the disenchantment after the hope that economic reform in China would lead to at least some political reform, and that this would then modify China’s behavior, proved illusionary. When political reform did not follow economic reform, some of China’s strategic choices — entirely logical from the Leninist state’s viewpoint — aroused something almost akin to a sense of betrayal among some observers. Self-delusion contaminated the Western idea of China after Deng Xiaoping’s reforms; this was based on a misunderstanding of why such states reform. The purpose of reform — any reform — in a Leninist system is always to strengthen the vanguard party and to perpetuate its rule, a fact that Xi Jinping has now made impossible to ignore. The United States must dispel its illusions to compete.</p> +<p>It is important to note that the situation of Moldova’s gas sector overall is contingent on the outcomes of Moldova’s next presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as the trajectory of Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine. If pro-Russian government officials are elected in Moldova, the gas sector may revert to its historic dependency on Russian gas supply. But even if a pro-European government is elected and able to hold power, this will not be enough. It is essential that Moldova continue the challenging process of unbundling its energy sector, not only to comply with EU requirements but also to ensure that Moldova has an energy sector that is sufficiently diversified to withstand market and geopolitical fluctuations. This includes ensuring an environment that is sufficiently private sector friendly to not be so reliant on Western aid.</p> -<p>With the orthodox justification of class struggle no longer credible, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to legitimate its monopoly of power, now relies on a highly nationalist — and revanchist — narrative of Chinese humiliation, rejuvenation, and anticipated achievement of the “China Dream” under its leadership. This narrative drives assertive Chinese behavior in the Himalayas, the East and South China Seas, and Taiwan. It infuses Chinese foreign policy with a strong sense of entitlement and makes compromise difficult, except as a tactical expedient. With this understanding, Chinese actions become more intelligible. After all, if they are only reclaiming what is rightfully theirs and that was stolen when the country was weak — as their revanchist narrative lays out — why should China compromise? Moreover, from the CCP’s perspective, how can they do so without looking weak to their own people?</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qXEc0tz.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Gas Prices for Households in Moldova.</strong> Source: <a href="https://statbank.statistica.md/PxWeb/pxweb/en/40%20Statistica%20economica/40%20Statistica%20economica__15%20ENE__serii%20lunare/ENE010400.px/?rxid=9a62a0d7-86c4-45da-b7e4-fecc26003802">“Stocks, inputs and natural gas consumption, monthly, 2015–2024,” Statistica Moldovei</a>.</em></p> -<p>Lacking a credible alternative, the CCP cannot abandon its current legitimating narrative. The regime knows that it cannot rule by coercion alone, and preservation of its rule and its monopoly on power are the most vital of the CCP’s core interests. There is no real threat to CCP rule, and it is not unreasonable to assume that the general Chinese population whose lives have undoubtedly improved under its leadership are not dissatisfied with its rule. However, the CCP’s demand for absolute control makes it continually insecure. As China faces a future of uninspiring growth, to bolster its authority the CCP may be tempted to act out its legitimating narrative even more aggressively, possibly in the East and South China Seas or against Taiwan, particularly it if concludes that the United States is in no mood to resist.</p> +<h3 id="electricity-sector-overview">Electricity Sector Overview</h3> -<p>The United States must be prepared to manage Chinese behavior over the long term through the time-tested tools of resolute deterrence and patient diplomacy. There are no quick fixes. The United States should not assume that a China without the CCP would be easier to deal with than the current China with it. Whatever various other countries may think of China’s Leninist system, the United States cannot assume that all countries in the Asia-Pacific, including U.S. allies, would regard a regime change, even if achievable, as desirable.</p> +<p>The electrical systems of the Eastern European region were designed under the assumption of a unified region, specifically under the control of the Soviet Union. Now, Moldova and Ukraine must manage fragmented pieces of a larger energy puzzle. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Moldova and Ukraine stayed connected to the Eastern European electrical system known as the Interconnected Power Systems, while Romania connected with the Western European system.</p> -<p>Moreover, it is naïve to think that without the CCP, nationalism would fade away. Professor Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University has warned of the dangers of the sense of superiority and over-confidence of young Chinese. The CCP fears — and uses — nationalism. And its monopoly on power gives the CCP the means to control nationalism. That is not to be assumed in any other type of regime. Political dynamics in a multiparty China have the potential to stoke rather than dampen nationalism, with dangerously unpredictable consequences</p> +<p>Built in 1964, the Cuciurgani power plant (MGRES) in Transnistria was the only power plant capable of meeting Moldova’s electricity consumption demands. Consequently, all electricity transmission infrastructure in Moldova was built around this plant. For many years, Gazprom has supplied the gas needed for electricity generation in Transnistria for “free” while billing Moldovagaz (and thus the Moldovan government in Chisinau) for the costs. This enabled the breakaway region to sell the electricity to Chisinau and to Transnistrian businesses at below market rates. This process continues today and is critical for Transnistria’s economy. Currently, approximately 80 percent of Moldova’s electricity is generated by the Cuciurgani power plant (MGRES), with the remaining portion either imported from Ukraine or produced domestically. Despite efforts by pro-European Moldovan politicians to reduce dependency on Russian energy, initiatives are often reversed by pro-Russian Moldovan officials. Implementing reforms also has been difficult due to a lack of investment in infrastructure.</p> -<p>Trying to shoehorn U.S.-China relations into simplistic frameworks such as “democracy versus authoritarianism” only complicates the management of competition and evokes as much resistance as support. Most countries in the Asia-Pacific, including U.S. allies, do not regard every aspect of U.S. democracy with unqualified admiration, nor do they recoil with horror from all aspects of Chinese authoritarianism. With so many disparate views, it would be well-nigh impossible to achieve regional consensus on any definition of victory.</p> +<p>In March 2022, in part due to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, Moldova and Ukraine conducted an energy synchronization with the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity. This gave both Moldova and Ukraine the ability to import electricity from EU markets. When Ukraine was forced to halt electricity exports due to Russian bombardments of its energy infrastructure, Moldova initially turned to Romania, at a more expensive rate. As a result of the increased costs, the Moldovan government chose to continue purchasing electricity from Transnistria on a short-term basis. To ensure long-term energy security, Moldova is currently working to increase grid stability and to build additional power lines — that do not pass through Transnistrian territory — in order to connect the country to the EU market. With the support of the European Investment Bank, lines between Vulcanesti-Chisinau and Balti-Suceava are expected to be operational in 2025 and 2028, respectively.</p> -<p>China’s leaders are rational actors, not gamblers. They will certainly not roll the dice with CCP rule, which is what a war with the United States would amount to. Nuclear deterrence kept the “long peace” between the United States and the Soviet Union. The risk of conflict is never entirely absent from international relations. Still, nuclear deterrence makes a war by design — where China or the United States use war as an instrument of policy against the other — highly improbable. Instead, the real risk is conflict by miscalculation or an accident getting out of hand. Although such risks cannot be entirely eliminated, they can be managed and minimized through deterrence and diplomacy.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xrBczUO.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Sources of Electricity for Moldova.</strong> Source: <a href="https://moldelectrica.md/ru/network/annual_report">“Technical and Economic Indicators,” Moldelectrica SE</a>.</em></p> -<p>Composing oneself for the long-term management of an issue with little prospect of any clear resolution is not an attitude that sits naturally with most Americans. However, accepting a different goal — the prevention of exclusive hegemonic control of the Asia-Pacific, as identified by Michael Green — has the potential to make the situation more acceptable across and within the U.S. and its allies. Moreover, this goal — the aim of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific for the last two centuries — has largely already been achieved. Insofar as the CCP’s “China Dream” implies the restoration of a real or imagined regional hierarchy with China at its apex, Beijing cannot succeed.</p> +<p>While Moldova may have secured alternative sources of electricity starting in 2025, the questions surrounding Transnistrian electrical production and the gas supply to support it remain. If Russian gas ceases to flow into Transnistria or if Chisinau no longer purchases Transnistrian electricity, the effects to Transnistria will be devastating. The region’s electricity sector will have to look to Chisinau for help, and the breakaway region may have to purchase gas at market rates, which would be shocking and devastating to its economy. Tiraspol would also likely be pressured to integrate its energy infrastructure with Moldova. To adapt to these potential changes, Moldova will need to continue looking for new sources of electricity, increasing storage capacities, and exploring alternative energy possibilities. Additionally, as it currently stands, electricity even from Romania must transit through either Ukraine or Tiraspol before reaching Chisinau, further complicating the situation.</p> -<p>China’s size, proximity, and strategic weight will always give Beijing significant influence in the region. But these very same factors have also aroused resistance in all but a handful of countries. Within today’s Asia-Pacific region, there is a better — if not always publicly acknowledged — appreciation of the irreplaceable U.S. role in maintaining equilibrium. To be sure, no country, including U.S. allies, will ever foreswear dealing with Beijing. The U.S. will have to share the Asia-Pacific space as countries seek to maximize strategic flexibility by pursuing omnidirectional foreign policies.</p> +<p>In the coming years, Moldova’s electricity sector is expected to make significant progress in diversification and integration with the EU energy market. Upon the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau and Balti-Suceava power lines, Chisinau will be able to supply electricity without relying on Transnistria; a power line between Straseni-Iasi is under consideration as well. But further development of the electrical sector requires the government to implement reforms that align with EU standards in the electricity sector and modernize its grid. To incentivize private sector participation, Moldova must also improve its rule of law and ensure a stable environment for energy-market competitiveness and investments.</p> -<p>Concerns about Chinese behavior have revitalized bilateral U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines, with only Thailand still somewhat ambivalent. It has led to the formation of the Quad, AUKUS, and security cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan, between Manila and Tokyo, between Australia and Indonesia, and between Japan and India, among others. Japan has finally and decisively abandoned its postwar Yoshida Doctrine and adopted a proactive security role. Vietnam is putting aside old enmities to improve defense ties with the United States, as are traditionally non-aligned India and Indonesia. No member country of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is going to accept an exclusive relationship with China. Laos and Cambodia are partial exceptions but strategically, they are of little consequence. Overall, China is not in a favorable geopolitical position.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/F6sEpLG.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Electrical Map of Moldova.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.pism.pl/publications/the-moldovan-gas-crisis-causes-and-consequences">“The Moldovan Gas Crisis: Causes and Consequences,” The Polish Institute of International Affairs, November 26, 2021</a>.</em></p> -<p>As China modernizes its nuclear forces and improves its second-strike capabilities, the strength of U.S. extended deterrence in the Asia-Pacific will inevitably be questioned. Will San Francisco or Los Angeles be sacrificed to save Tokyo or Seoul? Japanese or South Koreans are unlikely to assume that the answer will be positive. It is a matter of when not whether Japan and South Korea will acquire nuclear deterrents within the U.S. alliance system, just as Britain and France did in Europe decades ago. For Tokyo and Seoul, this will be politically very difficult. But however reluctantly, the logic of their situation will inexorably lead them in that direction. The alternative is the loosening of their alliances with the United States and their eventual subordination to China.</p> +<h3 id="alternative-energy-sector-overview">Alternative Energy Sector Overview</h3> -<p>Subordination would force such a fundamental redefinition of Japanese and South Korean national identities that the nuclear option will be the less traumatic one. Independent nuclear deterrents will keep Tokyo and Seoul within America’s orbit. With India, Pakistan, Russia, and North Korea also in the equation, an octagonal balance of mutually assured destruction will freeze the Asia-Pacific into a multipolar configuration, preventing hegemonic domination by China and thereby forcing the CCP to moderate its dreams of hierarchy.</p> +<p>In 2020, renewable energy represented 25 percent of gross energy consumption in Moldova, with biomass serving as the primary resource. Moldova’s biomass sector has been long under development, and the resource is utilized for heating purposes as well. Although Moldova’s alternative energy market is not as developed as that of some of its neighbors, the country has significant potential for alternative energy to play a major role in its energy production. While the country is attempting to expand its solar energy and wind energy sectors, it faces limitations in integrating generated energy into its grid due to the consumption patterns of its population and the lack of flexibility in the existing grid. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)’s BESS (battery energy storage system) and ICE (internal combustion engines) investment will increase Moldova’s grid stability and flexibility.</p> -<p>Such an outcome is not against U.S. interests. Even if the journey there may be fraught, the end result — which will be to the benefit, not only of the United States, but also to the global economy — will be a stable Asia-Pacific. The essential U.S. role is to manage the transition to such an Asia-Pacific. There is no reason for hasty or panicked responses.</p> +<p>The Renewable Energy Promotion Law, which became active in 2018, created support mechanism schemes aimed at promoting the alternative energy market, including net metering, feed-in tariffs, and tendering. Net metering allows consumers who generate their own electricity from renewable sources to receive credit for the surplus electricity they feed back into the grid. Feed-in tariffs entail guaranteed payments, access to the grid, long-term contracts, and other incentives for entities developing renewable energy projects in the country. In January 2024, this was replaced by net billing, which allows individuals or companies who are generating electricity to feed surplus energy produced back into the grid. Although feed-in tariffs and net billing have already been implemented, the Moldovan government recently initiated its first renewables auction. The government allocated 165 megawatts of total capacity for wind and solar energy, reflecting the structure of consumption, generation, and grid availability. Moldova expects to see 190 million euros in associated investments.</p> -<h3 id="beyond-de-risking-focus-on-systemic-success">Beyond De-Risking: Focus on Systemic Success</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rB5cKsN.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Existing Capacities of Renewable Electricity Production.</strong> Source: <a href="https://energie.gov.md/en/content/renewable-energy">“Renewable Energy,” Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Moldova</a>; and <a href="https://www.undp.org/moldova/news/how-much-renewable-energy-there-moldova-and-how-much-could-it-be">“How much renewable energy is there in Moldova and how much could it be?,” UNDP, December 20, 2023</a>.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="scott-kennedy">Scott Kennedy</h4> - <h4 id="senior-adviser-and-trustee-chair-in-chinese-business-and-economics-csis">Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Despite these advancements, barriers to total renewable energy success persist. Sufficient wind and solar generation, grid stability, and functioning power plants are necessary to meet energy consumption demands. Unfortunately, Moldova’s largest power plant is in Transnistria, and this makes Moldova’s electricity supply dependent on both the Transnistrian government and the flow of “free” Russian gas. In 2022, in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Moldovan government introduced energy balancing to the market through relatively expensive and unplanned energy exchanges with nearby countries. Moldova’s current infrastructure is not yet capable of supporting large amounts of renewable energy generation. Many potential investors are deterred by these factors, as well as unstable rule of law.</p> -<h4 id="a-superficial-consensus">A Superficial Consensus</h4> +<p>By 2030, Moldova plans to increase the role of renewable energy in its electricity production by 30 percent. Not only is the transition to alternative energy better for the environment, but it also reduces dependence on Russian gas and electricity from MGRES, the Transnistrian electricity plant. To achieve this, Moldova will need to explore all available options, including developing new infrastructure for solar and wind energy. Since Moldova’s overall energy consumption is low, and its existing energy system is relatively small (the country mostly relies on imports), it does not have to dismantle any large-scale systems and can build from a relatively fresh slate.</p> -<p>One of the most common refrains in Washington today is the claim of a deep consensus on China policy. Republicans and Democrats may disagree on almost everything else, but they are united in their assessment that China is increasingly authoritarian at home and in violation of its international commitments abroad. As a result, the argument goes, the United States must emphatically push back on security and economic issues, with both becoming increasingly intertwined. The clearest evidence of this consensus, so the story goes, is that the Biden administration has continued, and even extended, many of the trade and technology restrictions first imposed by the Trump administration.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/pGJnEuS.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Installed Capacity of Renewable Sources.</strong> Source: <a href="https://pxweb.irena.org/pxweb/en/IRENASTAT/IRENASTAT__Power%20Capacity%20and%20Generation/">“Power Capacity and Generation,” IRENASTAT Online Data Query Tool, International Renewable Energy Agency</a>.</em></p> -<p>But this alignment is not as deep as it first appears. It is held together artificially, as with a horse’s blinker hood, by a focus on day-to-day developments, the consideration and adoption of tactical moves, an effort to avoid steps that would invite domestic political attacks, and a preference for policies that score political points. While proponents of this consensus focus on the short term, however, China policy has lacked clear and measurable long-term goals, and little effort has gone into evaluating the extent to which recent policies have actually been effective in achieving their stated aims.</p> +<p>In the next five to ten years, Moldova is likely to increase its power system capacity and flexibility. This includes managing demand and investing in battery storage. Additionally, the country will need to attract investors in order to become less dependent on international aid. This will require Moldova to expand its renewable energy market and to ensure all market standards are aligned with the European Union regulations. Moldova will need to implement reforms streamlining bureaucratic processes, improving the transparency of technical guidelines, and ensuring fiscal stability; without such reform, private sector investors will shy away from the market. For example, Moldova recently opened an auction of renewable energy that was met with a tepid response from the investor community.</p> -<p>There has been a quiet countertrend, with analysts constructively pressing for a turn toward addressing unresolved issues. A central question, around which this volume revolves, concerns identifying the ultimate goals that the United States should set in order to define the success of its China policy; possibilities include the orientation of China’s political system, the tenor of the U.S.-China relationship, and China’s international behavior. The United States should not make having China be a multiparty democracy a policy goal. Instead, attention should go to the two other kinds of end states — the U.S.-China relationship and China’s actions abroad. Some effort should be made to achieve a relatively stable bilateral relationship, though such a goal is highly conditional and not paramount. Instead, the most important goal of the United States’ China policy should be directed at shaping Chinese behavior — specifically, limiting its destructive actions and facilitating constructive behavior — with an eye intentionally toward both the short and long term.</p> +<p>It is in the country’s best interest that the government ensure all resources are being developed and are used efficiently, including hydropower, biofuel, and geothermal energy. Currently, Moldova has only one operational hydro installation, the Costesti-Stinca hydropower plant. The government will likely attempt to expand this sector to meet investors’ interests. Moldova could also develop a biofuel sector and utilize both liquid and solid biofuels to leverage its existing agricultural industry. To manage all of these renewable energy sources, Moldova will have to stabilize its current energy grid and supply. Ultimately, Moldova’s focus will likely extend beyond merely expanding renewable energy infrastructure to maximizing the development of all potential renewable resources.</p> -<p>To explain the reasoning behind this position, this essay first provides a brief overview of the alternative approaches the United States has taken toward China over the past five decades and the key assumptions and goals of each strategy. It then provides succinct answers to key questions about China’s trajectory, the dynamics of the U.S.-China relationship, and the United States’ broader foreign policy goals, all of which are relevant for setting the primary goal for China policy. The essay concludes by suggesting how U.S. policy should be adjusted with the arrival of a new administration.</p> +<h3 id="european-union-accession-and-foreign-aid">European Union Accession and Foreign Aid</h3> -<h4 id="alternative-strategies-to-date">Alternative Strategies to Date</h4> +<p>In December of 2023, following their 2022 candidate status, the European Union opened formal accession talks for both Moldova and Ukraine. This was a recognition of the progress that both countries individually had made on the reform recommendations provided. Moldovan president Maia Sandu has indicated a goal of 2030 for EU membership, but there are structural challenges within the European Union to Moldova becoming a member. These challenges are unrelated to the many reforms Moldova must complete, including but not limited to reforms in the energy sector, before it is eligible for full membership.</p> -<p>Since the path toward normalization commenced in the early 1970s, the United States has adopted four distinct strategies toward China (see Figure 1). The approaches have differed on whether they have seen the U.S.-China relationship as essentially cooperative or competitive and over what kind of tactics they have thought would be most effective in achieving their goals. However, surprisingly, all four have shared one characteristic in common: none has been aimed at turning China into a multiparty democracy.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In December of 2023, following their 2022 candidate status, the European Union opened formal accession talks for both Moldova and Ukraine.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/pkdHshy.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: U.S. Strategies toward China since 1972</em></p> +<p>Regardless of the timeline for Moldova’s notional EU membership, progress is being made across sectors. Even before EU candidate status was granted, Moldova was already engaged with the European Union on several fronts, including but not limited to energy. In 2010, Moldova became a member of the Energy Community, a group of EU and non-EU members in southeastern Europe who have committed to adopting parts of EU energy-related legislation. As a part of this membership, Moldova agreed to reform its energy sector to comply with EU directives and antitrust laws; while several pieces of legislation have been adopted as of 2024, the process is ongoing.</p> -<p>It is widely recognized that regime type was a nonissue for the original opening to China. Instead, in the 1970s, during the latter part of the Cold War, Presidents Nixon and Carter were primarily focused on drawing China nearer to the United States and, consequently, away from the Soviet Union. A decade later, the administration of George H. W. Bush clearly discounted the relevance of China’s authoritarian system. Instead, motivated to keep relations stable as part of a broader realist view of maintaining a balance of power in international politics, they argued against heavily sanctioning China following the June 4 massacre in Tiananmen Square.</p> +<p>In 2014, Moldova signed an Association Agreement with the European Union in which it committed to implementing the legislation by which all EU member states are bound, including legal and regulatory provisions related to the energy sector.</p> -<p>Less well-known is that those administrations that pursued a strategy of engagement were also not motivated to make turning China into a democracy a policy goal. Some analysts have argued that advocates of engagement believed that China’s democratization would naturally emerge from greater economic connectivity between the United States and China, what James Mann called “the soothing scenario.” Given the wave of democratization that occurred among former Soviet republics and in Central Europe, the existence of senior Chinese elites who favored at least some sort of political pluralism, and the emergence of the private sector in China, it would not have been outlandish at the time to make this connection. Nevertheless, promoting China’s political change was never a central motivation of any administration pursuing engagement. In fact, although Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s first national security adviser, put forward the idea of using trade to expand the number of market democracies, this idea was never translated into policy. And although President Clinton said on at least one occasion that China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) could generate pressures for political pluralization, analysts who have carefully reviewed the record convincingly argue that democratization was not a priority of the Clinton or George W. Bush administrations, or of congressional advocates for China’s WTO entry; the issue was mentioned for domestic political purposes. China experts were, and have remained, skeptical that greater trade would result in China’s democratization. Instead, the key arguments for WTO entry (or more accurately, for providing China permanent normal trade relations) have revolved around promoting the marketization of China’s economy and the consequent commercial benefits for the United States and others.</p> +<p>At the fifth EU-Moldova High-Level Energy Dialogue in 2024, both sides endorsed a roadmap that included a timeline for EU accession. The reform agenda and associated timeline are aggressive and Moldova is continuing to struggle to reach its commitments on the timeline; commitments include, among other things, increasing the energy efficiency of infrastructure and the use of renewable sources. Additionally, Moldova has committed to having 27 percent renewables by 2030.</p> -<p>Subsequently, the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations also did not focus on China’s political regime as a target of policy. All assumed that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was ensconced in power and that it would be impossible for the United States, alone or in concert with others, to remove it, and that even an attempt to do so would be highly counterproductive to the United States’ national interests. And so, if Washington were to now make the replacement of the CCP regime by a multiparty democracy a preferred end state of its China policy, it would be breaking entirely with the precedent of every other previous administration.</p> +<p>One of the key reforms in the EU package is the unbundling of the electrical and gas sectors. Unbundling refers to the separation in ownership of supply, generation, and transmission across a sector, in this instance specifically gas. During the 2021 negotiations between Moldovagaz and Gazprom, Moldova agreed not to proceed with unbundling the gas sector until the debt issue was resolved. As discussed previously, an independent review was conducted on Moldova’s debt, the results of which Russia is contesting.</p> -<p>Previous administrations have enacted their China policies — and thereby revealed their desired end states — by pursuing a certain kind of relationship with China and by trying to encourage and discourage certain kinds of Chinese behavior. Those that pursued engagement were not aiming to induce regime change, but instead to integrate China into the liberal international rules-based order as a way to induce marketization of its economy at home and less threatening behavior on both the economic and security fronts abroad. This patient approach was always combined with deterrence on security issues, especially with regard to Taiwan, and some restrictions around sharing the most advanced technologies. This was aptly described by some in the 1980s and 1990s as a strategy of “entanglement” or “constrainment.” By the mid-2000s, as China became more powerful and more active in global governance, the George W. Bush administration went one step further and tried to induce China to become a “responsible stakeholder” who would act in accordance with international norms across economic, security, and human rights spheres. The final attempt to use integration to induce Chinese behavior more aligned with international norms was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Although China was not an original negotiating party, in the back of many minds was the desire to create a new agreement with higher standards that China would have to meet in order to maintain extensive commercial ties with its neighbors and advanced economies. But this effort was stillborn when the Trump administration withdrew on the first day of its administration, having an effect similar to that of the United States’ decision against joining the League of Nations almost a century earlier.</p> +<p>The EU-required unbundling includes the separation of supply and generation from transmission operators for natural gas, thus bolstering incentives for private sector competition, particularly around gas infrastructure. As currently structured, Moldovagaz controls almost the entirety of the Moldovan gas business, including infrastructure. As discussed above, Moldovagaz is 50 percent owned by Russia’s Gazprom, 35 percent by Chisinau, and the remaining 15 percent by the government in Tiraspol. Moldovagaz’s ownership structure is further complicated by a Moldovagaz subsidiary, Tiraspoltransgaz, which provides gas to and owns the gas-related infrastructure in Transnistria. After the European Union opened infringement proceedings against Moldova for their continued failure to unbundle in 2021, Moldova has begun to make progress in this arena.</p> -<p>The Trump and Biden administrations both abandoned pursuing a relationship defined by cooperation with China and neither was optimistic that the United States could induce Chinese behavior consonant with U.S. interests. As will be discussed below, this is mainly the result of their assessment of China’s more problematic policy direction under CCP general secretary Xi Jinping. Neither administration sought regime change, but rather both have used alternative approaches against what they have determined is a strategic competitor. Like the Nixon, Carter, and George H. W. Bush administrations, the Trump administration saw the relationship entirely in terms of relative power and was not motivated by a desire to defend a broader liberal international order. By contrast, the Biden administration, akin to advocates of engagement in previous years, has made defending such an order the cornerstone of its broader foreign policy and its specific approach toward China.</p> +<p>Moldova’s other improvements in gas sector reforms include adopting regulation around network codes and market rules. There has also been significant progress in both the gas and electrical sectors with regard to regional integration. For example, on the electrical side, both Moldova and Ukraine became connected to the European grid following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In October of 2023, Moldova was granted observer status in the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity; to become a full member, Moldova must implement the Catalogue of Measures, work which is supported by USAID. And when the Chisinau-Vulcanesti line is completed (which is projected to be in 2025), electricity will flow into Moldova without passing through Transnistria. These are not the only reforms needed on the pathway to a free and fair energy sector in Moldova; more on this is discussed in the recommendations section of this paper.</p> -<h4 id="answering-the-big-questions">Answering the Big Questions</h4> +<p>EU support for Moldovan energy development has included grant funding to individuals making improvements in their homes to increase energy efficiency, as well as ongoing energy subsidies for economically disadvantaged populations within the country. While the European Union has provided significant development assistance to Moldova’s energy sector, it is far from the only donor in this space. The United States has supported Moldova’s energy development across the interagency portfolio; for example, the Development Finance Corporation has provided millions of dollars to support political risk insurance for energy projects. The U.S. State Department and USAID have been working on projects funded through a $394 million investment in support of energy sector development. This includes a focus on developing the country’s power grid, as well as supporting foreign investments in the energy sector, especially in renewable energy sources. The U.S. government is one of the main donors providing capacity building to key energy sector entities and supporting legal-regulatory reforms required as a part of the European Union’s energy directives, regulations, and provisions in Moldova.</p> -<p>Regardless of previous administrations’ strategies, determining what should be the ultimate measure of success for the United States’ China policy going forward requires addressing key questions about the United States’ broader foreign policy goals, China’s current direction, and the factors shaping the U.S.-China relationship. In the interests of space — fully addressing each issue could be an article on its own — here is a list of the key questions and brief answers.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The U.S. government is one of the main donors providing capacity building to key energy sector entities and supporting legal-regulatory reforms required as a part of the European Union’s energy directives, regulations, and provisions in Moldova.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><em>BROADER U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS</em></p> +<p>Support has also come in from a variety of multilateral institutions. The United Nations Development Programme and the government of Japan have funded development of the biomass sector, as well as additional energy development in partnership with Switzerland. NATO and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have also supported the continued growth of Moldova’s energy security. The EBRD has been a key source of support for Moldova’s energy development. The World Bank recently launched an initiative that includes support for renovating public buildings and heating. Support has come bilaterally across Europe from countries including but not limited to Bulgaria, Germany, France, Lithuania, and Romania.</p> -<p><strong>1. Should the United States support the rules-based liberal international order?</strong></p> +<p>This outpouring of aid must not disincentivize the development of a robust energy private sector in Moldova. This requires donating countries to not only bear this potential for market disruption in mind when providing aid but also to hold the Moldovan government accountable for the commitments and progress it has made as a part of energy sector development. It is essential that future support for Moldova be contingent on continued development and reform of the energy sector, including but not limited to the solutions outlined in the following section.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Yes. This order has been hugely beneficial to U.S. national interests and has helped facilitate peace and prosperity around the world, including in East Asia, since the end of World War II. Its successful operation should be of paramount importance to the United States. That said, to be durable and have greater legitimacy, it clearly needs to be reformed to more effectively address the challenges of inequality, the changing nature of work, rising debt, climate change, public health threats, the role of the state in the market, and the blurring lines between the economy and national security.</p> -</blockquote> +<h3 id="ensuring-a-bright-future">Ensuring a Bright Future</h3> -<p><strong>2. Is it important for the United States to act in ways consistent with the principles of this order?</strong></p> +<p>Moldova’s energy picture is complex and largely rooted in the country’s history — not only regarding reliance on Russian gas, but also the very structure and ownership of its state-owned gas company, Moldovagaz, which still leaves Russia with a controlling interest. There is also, of course, the reliance on Transnistria — with its close ties to Russia — for electricity, not only in terms of the current production but also as all power lines presently run through this breakaway region. Over the past few years, significant progress has been made toward a more independent and secure future for Moldovan energy, but more work is needed.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Yes. The order is both normatively attractive and materially beneficial to the United States. Regularly acting against its principles undermines the system’s legitimacy, effectiveness, and value.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>This growth has been aided by partners and allies across the globe. And efforts driven by the need to meet EU requirements have the potential, if done correctly, to continue this trajectory. There is still much to be done in order to achieve not only Moldovan energy independence, but also a Moldovan energy sector that is based on free-market competition and rule-of-law principles. Outlined below are six key recommendations for ensuring a bright energy future for Moldova.</p> -<p><strong>3. Is the United States powerful enough to defend this order on its own?</strong></p> +<p><strong>1. Domestic Electrical Connectivity and Production</strong></p> -<blockquote> - <p>No. The United States needs others to proactively and enthusiastically participate in and contribute to the governance of this system as well as to defend it against violators, including China. Without widespread buy-in, involvement, and collective defense, the system will break down and its value will dissipate. Collaborating with others under the framework of a broader order expands the United States’ influence and raises its ability to deter and reassure.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>While sources of natural gas have been diversified for Moldova, the same is not yet true for electricity. Most of the electricity generated for Moldova is via the plant in Transnistria; all the physical lines supplying Moldovan electricity run through Transnistria. This will change when the Chisinau-Vulcanesti line is operational, as this line will not run through Transnistria. However, this line is unlikely to be able to provide all electricity needed to supply both Moldova and Transnistria at peak usage.</p> -<p><em>CHINA’S DYNAMICS</em></p> +<p>This means that capacity needs to be further increased. The essential capacity needs to not only be supplied by lines that do not pass through the Transnistria hub, but also should be used as an opportunity for Moldova, outside of Transnistria, to generate its own electricity, and not simply import from either Romania or other allies and partners. Among other collaborations in process between Ukraine and Moldova is the exploration of a gas-to-electricity exchange in which Moldova would build the capacity to produce electricity (outside of Transnistria) and Ukraine would supply gas, which it continues to produce. Moldova, Ukraine, and Romania must work to get their lines out of Transnistria and to integrate their systems.</p> -<p><strong>1. Has China’s domestic and foreign policy become significantly more problematic under the leadership of Xi Jinping?</strong></p> +<p><strong>2. Impartial Oversight and Support for Unbundling and Deregulation of Gas Sector</strong></p> -<blockquote> - <p>Yes. Although the difference is not night and day and some of the changes preceded his ascendance to power, on Xi’s watch the CCP has substantially tightened up the political system, expanded party-state intervention in the economy, and pursued with more vigor economic and security policies inconsistent with the rules-based liberal international order. An important implication of this conclusion is that the United States’ overriding concern is not with the CCP regime per se, but rather with the policies of its current leadership. This means that if China’s overall policy direction were to change, the dangers to the United States and the international order would be less severe. Significantly, there are important segments of the broader Chinese population and elites who are dissatisfied with the country’s current overall direction.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>The process of unbundling the gas sector is still in its early stages and faces many hurdles, including the ongoing contestation of the debts owed and Gazprom’s majority ownership stake in Moldovagaz. In practice, this means that Gazprom can vote against many of the changes needed to move forward. It is essential that Russia’s proxy Gazprom be removed from this industry entirely.</p> -<p><strong>2. Are China’s current overall foreign policy intentions to displace the United States as the world’s dominant superpower and establish a more illiberal international order?</strong></p> +<p>There must be oversight, transparency, and technical support throughout all elements of the unbundling process. This will not only ensure free-market best practices are leveraged, but also that the process is free from both actual and apparent corruption. Transparency and oversight will also provide the ability to shine a public light on any tactics Gazprom may employ to delay or divert the process.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>This is unclear. The language of Chinese leaders often criticizes the rules-based liberal international order and advocates for substantial reforms in line with CCP values and norms (such as the absolute sovereignty of states), but China also often praises elements of the current order (such as the United Nations and WTO), and it appears some of the more critical elements of their rhetoric are directed at a domestic audience.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>The United States, its partners, and its allies should extend on-the-ground, technical, expert-staff augmentation to support the development of regulations both for the gas sector and for the entirety of the restructuring process. This staff augmentation is especially important given Moldova’s challenges with personnel capacity across all sectors.</p> -<p><strong>3. Is China destined to be an economic superpower?</strong></p> +<p><strong>3. Create a Secure and Enabling Environment for Investments</strong></p> -<blockquote> - <p>No. China has made huge, genuine strides in the past four decades, becoming dominant in manufacturing, prominent in many supply chains, and a leader in several high-tech sectors. However, China’s economy has major structural challenges that will constrain growth, and its current economic strategy, which is rooted in pursuing technology leadership, is depressing growth due to industrial-policy waste and growing tensions with trading partners. Going forward, China could encounter a crisis, muddle through with low growth, or revive growth with a more market-oriented strategy.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>The process for investment in the energy sector must be clear, transparent, and provide ease of access for potential investors. This is important to increase the volume and types of investments that come not only from within Moldova, but also from the diaspora and other investors across the globe. There must also be foreign investment limitations, including effective and as-transparent-as-possible investment screening to ensure that malign actors, including but not limited to Russian state-owned or affiliated enterprises, cannot bid. These clarity and screening processes need to be in effect prior to unbundling, thereby continuing to ensure that the overall process is done freely, fairly, and securely.</p> -<p><em>U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS</em></p> +<p>While Moldova’s geographic location — less than four hours from the frontlines of Ukraine — and investors’ concerns over stability are impediments to capital investment, they are not the only ones. There is also the history of corruption across all Moldovan sectors, as well as bureaucratic ineffectiveness and challenges with consistent rule of law. The combination of these factors means that there is a need for structural changes within the law — and therefore, to some degree, election proof — to align incentives for investors to put money in Moldova.</p> -<p><strong>1. Is the U.S.-China rivalry simply about relative power?</strong></p> +<p>One such change is the creation of formal, government-sanctioned advisory boards for Moldovan gas, electricity, and alternative energy sectors, at least. These boards must include representation from the European Union, the U.S. government across the government agencies with stakes in these efforts, and private industry from across the globe. It is essential to include a varied group in order to ensure that these recommendations are not designed with a singular interest in mind but instead are long term.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>No. It is about both relative power and different visions — liberal and illiberal — of the international order.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Both the selection process for members of these advisory boards and their work should be made public on an ongoing basis. This is of critical importance as state-owned enterprises have long been a magnet for corrupt interests in Moldova. With Moldova’s commitments to the IMF, the country has agreed to the creation of corporate governance structures and the review of appointees.</p> -<p><strong>2. Can the United States shape China’s environment to limit negative behavior or its consequences and incentivize more constructive behavior?</strong></p> +<p>These boards should work with the energy ministry and make recommendations for policies and practices that are needed to stimulate investment in the energy sector in the short and medium term. These groups should provide specific solutions, timelines, and resources associated with decisions to implement. Foreign donors seeking to help the Moldovan energy sector must work with these boards to provide a long-term, sustainable pathway for the development of a robust energy private sector.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Yes. This is possible if the United States pursues this in concert with other countries and in line with broader principles. Collective action creates higher material and reputational costs for China to act uncooperatively.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>4. Reforming Corporate Governance Structures and ANRE</strong></p> -<p><strong>3. Does interdependence with China only carry risks to the United States’ economy and national security?</strong></p> +<p>There is a need to revisit myriad corporate governance structures, starting with Moldovagaz and moving across the entire energy sector. The development of updated structures and new processes for appointments or reappointments need to be done publicly and with monitoring from development partners to ensure scrutiny and to limit kickbacks or even the appearance of impropriety. There also needs to be a careful vetting of all current holders of these roles, as well as senior leadership at ANRE. This would align with the ongoing and proposed vetting happening elsewhere across Moldovan government. In order for any system or industry to function, there should be a natural tension between stakeholders, including but not limited to regulators, private sector entities, oversight bodies, and agencies; this is healthy in any free-market sector. To help ensure there is tension, rather than collusion, between these groups, there must be ethics regulations, including gift limitations, in place prior to the appointments or reappointments of individuals to the advisory boards and ANRE. These ethics regulations should be developed with the help of EU partners and must include methods to report violations and enforce compliance. If done thoughtfully, these ethics rules could be applied across the government and all sectors in Moldova.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>No. There are substantial risks, including being vulnerable to China’s non-market economy, practices, and threats to economic security (e.g., technology leakage, supply-chain dependence, and economic coercion). However, there also are substantial benefits: opportunities for greater business, more rapid innovation, and accelerated commercial competitiveness; the ability to maintain global technological leadership and Chinese dependence on Western technology; possibilities to increase China’s economic costs of engaging in military aggression; continued access to Chinese talent; greater ease of benchmarking Chinese capabilities; and the maintenance of lines of communication to reduce the chances of misunderstanding or a crisis.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>5. Cybersecurity for the Energy Sector</strong></p> -<p>The above answers can be boiled down to the following: China’s current domestic and international trajectories are highly problematic, but they are also subject to substantial change even if the CCP remains in power. The United States’ aims toward China should be viewed through the prism of a broader contest over the international order. The United States can most effectively manage relations and shape China’s behavior by operating according to the norms of this rules-based order and in concert with others.</p> +<p>Cyberattacks have increased in frequency and scale within Moldova and include significant cyber incursions targeting infrastructure. It is likely that cyberattacks targeting the energy sector will increase as the negotiations with Gazprom around unbundling and with Transnistria on issues related to energy continue. Regardless of a short-term increase, it is of utmost long-term importance that, as new physical energy infrastructure is brought online and new private sector energy players enter, there be an integrated strategy for cybersecurity across the Moldovan energy sector. Improving cybersecurity for the energy sector is essential not only to protect publicly owned infrastructure and government agencies, but also to integrate protections across private entities within the energy sector.</p> -<h4 id="beyond-de-risking">Beyond De-Risking</h4> +<p>While the Moldovan government has taken steps to implement best practices in cybersecurity, including their 2023 cybersecurity law (set to go into effect in 2025), there are still gaps. This law, which will require incident reporting as well as safeguards, cooperation, and network standards, is just a first step. The Moldovan government should work with the private sector, as well as international partners and allies, to develop an energy sector–specific plan at the national level.</p> -<p>These insights should shape the overall goals of the United States’ China policy as well as the ways Washington pursues these aims in both the short and long term.</p> +<p>This sector-specific strategy must include details for energy subsectors, a focus on increasing public-private partnership, and diplomatic engagement, including shared intelligence. The strategy must be created with timelines aligned to resourcing and include not only incident response plans but also strategies to train and prepare for these potential occurrences across the sector. Cyber and physical security must be fully integrated within the strategy and include access controls, as well as the screening and vetting of associated personnel.</p> -<p>The most important “end state” for the United States’ China policy is not the nature of China’s political system or simply a more powerful United States, but rather the extent to which its China policy helps strengthen a reformed rules-based liberal international order. This outcome is unlikely to be furthered by an aggressive effort to undermine the CCP’s monopoly on power, which very well could lead to war or, at a minimum, an expensive waste of resources and energy that could be more effectively employed elsewhere. Conversely, the rules-based order would also not be promoted by eternal patience and the accommodation of China’s preferences about human rights, economic governance, sovereignty claims, and other issues in the name of maintaining friendly relations.</p> +<p><strong>6. Transnistrian Reintegration in Energy</strong></p> -<p>Instead of either extreme, the United States should pursue a middle path of actively managing relations with China through a combination of deterrence and reassurance across issue areas, both on its own and in concert with others. In the short term, the goal would be to limit destructive Chinese behavior, or at least its consequences, and promote its constructive behavior where possible.</p> +<p>As Russia continues its hybrid warfare against Moldova, it could focus on energy as part of its continued cyber-assault. Moreover, it is near certain that pro-Russian candidates will continue to leverage energy-focused narratives — including what the pricing would look like were they to be elected — against pro-Western candidates and parties. These narratives are especially important in Transnistria, where the majority of the population are Russian speakers, because, whether causal or not, consuming Russian media is correlated with higher trust in the Russian government.</p> -<p>The approach outlined here is likely closer in spirit and overall approach to the Biden administration’s strategy of the past three years than that of the Trump administration’s strategy before it. There is no doubt that adopting de-risking measures to address economic security risks has been and will continue to be necessary. Yet such steps — such as export controls, investment screening, and onshoring — need to be judicious, coordinated with other economies, and done in a manner consistent with the rules-based order. And where there are no rules or the rules are outdated, the United States must pursue revising the international system with a sense of urgency in order to avoid a race to the bottom. If the United States overly emphasizes defensive restrictions, it is likely to find itself with insufficient support to achieve its goals. Similarly, unconstrained industrial policy would likely result in massive waste, slower growth, less innovation, and weaker global competitiveness. Finally, the United States needs to avoid targeted de-risking measures escalating into a broader decoupling that would result in a bifurcated or fragmented global economy. Such an outcome would be economically costly to U.S. companies, workers, and consumers, while also denying the United States the benefits of maintaining commercial ties with China, as outlined above.</p> +<p>The anticipated end of the Russian-Ukrainian gas contract in December 2024 has brought to the forefront the challenges that the Transnistrian economy, government, and people would face if Russian gas were to no longer flow there for free. Even if this gas were provided at cost, the difference in price would be so significant that it would crash the Transnistrian economy and lead to a refugee crisis. This means that it is in both Chisinau’s and Tiraspol’s interest to find a long-term solution to Transnistria’s energy instability.</p> -<p>Pursuing specific policies aligned with the principles of the broader order on a day-to-day basis is meant to provide long-term benefits in two ways. The first is simply through the gradual advancement of building and strengthening a successful rules-based order. The second is by maintaining an opportunity for China to eventually choose a path more consistent with this order. From today’s vantage point and with the current geometry of power in China, this second goal seems highly unlikely. However, given the prevalence of internal disquietude because of the trajectory of the country’s current political, economic, and foreign policies, an eventual tack back in the other direction is not out of the question. Hence, even if ties are highly constrained and defined largely by rivalry, maintaining civil ties and avoiding conflict would help “keep the pilot light on” for future generations of potential reformers. Similarly, the United States can only keep an open seat at the table for a future China if the United States continues to defend and nurture this system.</p> +<p>The negotiations along this pathway toward long-term energy sustainability for Transnistria, as an integrated part of Moldova, must be conducted between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Chisinau will have more leverage in 2025 than ever before; the Chisinau-Vulcanesti power line will give Chisinau the first electrical power line that does not run through Transnistria. As discussed earlier, by 2025, at a minimum, the transit method for providing Russian gas to Transnistria will have changed. These are key leverage points for Chisinau to use to bring Tiraspol leadership to the table in developing a collaborative, realistic, and time-bound plan to further reintegrate Transnistria with Moldova.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h4> +<hr /> -<p>There is no consensus on the goals and approach of the China policy outlined here. That is reflected in disagreements about China’s trajectory, analyses of U.S.-China relations, and conflicting views about the international system. The final leg of this triangle may be the weakest given the chorus of criticisms from the left and right, alternatively, about globalization, multilateralism, and immigration. Yet this is a debate that needs to occur, with an evaluation of the costs and benefits of U.S. policies to date and a weighing of the strengths and weaknesses of various options going forward.</p> +<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development (PPD) and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a leading global think tank.</p> -<p>At the same time, if one takes a historical view, the various policy approaches adopted over the past half-century, even if different, need not be seen as necessarily in inexorable conflict. Instead, one could argue that different times call for different strategies. There was a powerful logic in normalizing relations in order to counter the Soviet Union, but such a rationale had a finite life once the Soviet Union waned and then disappeared. Using engagement to facilitate integration did yield substantial value for a decade or more, on net benefiting the U.S. economy and restraining some of China’s most aggressive impulses. But as China became more powerful, the U.S. economy faltered, and faith in the underlying order waned, China shifted in a different, more contentious direction, pulling the United States to adjust accordingly. As Susan Shirk aptly describes, China “overreached,” and the United States then “overreacted.” It is now time for Washington to course correct again, from “de-risking” to “re-building,” not just the bilateral relationship, but the broader international order.</p> +<p><strong>Leah Kieff</strong> is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS. She has spent almost a decade tackling complex policy and operational challenges in senior roles across executive branch agencies, including but not limited to the Department of Homeland Security, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, and the White House.</p> -<h3 id="an-indian-view-on-us-china-strategic-competition">An Indian View on U.S.-China Strategic Competition</h3> +<p><strong>Thomas Bryja</strong> is a program coordinator and research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS. In this role, he supports the program’s research agenda, business development, and administrative management. His analytical focus is on leveraging nonmilitary power to advance the interests of the United States abroad and, in particular, to confront China’s growing global influence.</p>Daniel F. Runde, et al.Russia has attempted to exert influence over Moldova through manipulating or threatening to manipulate energy prices and flows, and until recently, Moldova’s long-standing efforts to develop and reform its energy sector have produced minimal results.Ore To Ordnance2024-10-10T12:00:00+08:002024-10-10T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ore-to-ordnance<p><em>This report focuses on Russia’s artillery supply chain, as artillery is central to the invasion of Ukraine and has inflicted more than 70% of Ukraine’s casualties. Disrupting Russia’s access to ammunition and new artillery barrels should therefore be a central focus for Ukraine’s supporters.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>The findings within this paper will empower Ukraine’s Western partners to coordinate sanctions, diplomatic pressure and civil society efforts to exploit the vulnerabilities of Russia’s artillery supply chain and reduce its access to ammunition and barrels.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="manoj-kewalramani">Manoj Kewalramani</h4> - <h4 id="china-studies-fellow-and-chairperson-indo-pacific-research-program-takshashila-institution-senior-associate-non-resident-freeman-chair-in-china-studies-csis">China Studies Fellow and Chairperson, Indo-Pacific Research Program, Takshashila Institution; Senior Associate (non-resident), Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>So far, attempts to disrupt Russia’s military supply chains have achieved some successes, with thousands of Russian entities and individuals sanctioned, and evidence of raw materials being diverted from the Russian supply chain. By and large, however, they have targeted components or high-priority items that are difficult to disrupt, such as microchips, and have not taken a view as to which supply chains should be disrupted. Instead, the current approach has been to try and restrict the access of the entire Russian defence industry to key materials and equipment like machine tools. While this approach is admirable in its ambition and has produced many sanctions and even some effects, it has struggled to measurably restrict the growth of Russia’s defence industry and its ability to fuel the war. This paper’s findings indicate that a more effective approach is to focus on a single supply chain and identify the raw materials, products and machinery that sit outside Russia and must be imported. These elements of the supply chain may be open to Western interventions from a variety of angles, and their limited nature, combined with the overall importance of artillery, could empower governments to focus disruption efforts on these elements, to meaningfully degrade and disrupt Russia’s artillery supply chain.</p> -<p>Over the last few years, Indian policymakers, scholars, and strategic affairs analysts have been grappling to contextualize the changes in international affairs and to understand what they mean for India’s interests. Some have contended that the world has entered a new state of disorder; unfortunately, the prescriptive utility of this analysis is extremely limited. Others argue that there is a definite, if gradual, shift toward a new Cold War–style architecture. Such an outcome is indeed a possibility and, moreover, is rather seductive, for it embodies the comfort of familiarity. Yet it underplays the peculiarities of present times. Finally, there are those who maintain that the world is between orders — that it is adrift, somewhere between bipolarity and classical multipolarity. Though this third framework accounts for the prevailing uncertainties and advises caution, it does not capture the opportunities that may be emerging.</p> +<p>To evidence this, this paper provides a comprehensive analysis of Russia’s artillery supply chain – from raw iron ore, cotton and sulphuric acid to the 2S19 Msta-S howitzers – to identify vulnerabilities that could be disrupted by Ukraine’s Western partners. It also provides an indication of the expansion of Russia’s defence industry that is currently underway. The objective of this research is to show the ways in which Russia’s supply chains are truly vulnerable, and to inform future policy decisions that are taken towards supply chain disruption.</p> -<h4 id="constituents-of-the-new-order">Constituents of the New Order</h4> +<p>This has led to three key conclusions:</p> -<p>The last decade has witnessed the gradual reemergence of great power competition — between the United States and China. Assessed on broad metrics of power, and though there are significant differences between them, these two countries are the dominant global actors. Together, the United States and China account for over 42 percent of global GDP and over half of global defense spending. Moreover, increasingly, the prism of competition appears to be baked into their respective strategic worldviews.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Russia’s artillery supply chain is complex, but exposed in procurement of key raw materials and components from abroad. More than 70% of Russia’s computer numerical control machines come from China, 55% of its chromium is imported, and its imports of nitrocellulose have increased by 70% since 2022, for example.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>There is redundancy within the supply chain, and even a complete disruption of the Plastmass ammunition plant – a major producer – would not lead to a collapse in Russia’s ammunition supply. It could remove 300,000 rounds from Russia’s artillery ammunition production capacity, but there are alternative sources. This necessitates a comprehensive and focused approach to disruption, with intra- and inter-governmental coordination.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russia’s defence industry is expanding, with major works identified at the Perm and Kazan Gunpowder plants, Izhevsk Unmanned Systems Research and Production Association, several armoured-machine repair plants and Kurganpribor. However, the industry faces challenges such as a lack of personnel and a crumbling rail infrastructure that is struggling to meet the demands of the war, as well as the need for imported machinery to meet its aggressive expansion goals. There is a window of opportunity for Western governments to slow this expansion; otherwise, they risk facing a rejuvenated and more capable Russian defence industry when the invasion of Ukraine is over.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>That said, nearly three decades of economic globalization have built deep linkages between Chinese and U.S. economic and science and technology ecosystems. An unprecedented web of interconnected supply chains now powers the global economy. The Chinese economy is central to these networks and the health of the world economy. Shattering these bonds, therefore, would come at significant costs. The recent shift in discourse — away from decoupling to de-risking in the United States and from self-reliance to high-standard opening up in China — acknowledges that reality. In addition, while the current U.S.-China competition does exhibit an ideological hue, both sides have significant stakes in the existing international institutional architecture. Undoubtedly, both China and the United States have their own set of grievances with this architecture and are engaging in a certain degree of revisionism. However, neither appears to be driven by a revolutionary zeal to upend the UN-centered system. More importantly, even if revolution were an ambition for either, both are evidently inhibited by the constraints of their resources, capacities, domestic politics, and global appeal.</p> +<p>At the same time, elements of Russia’s artillery supply chain are relatively robust and contained within its borders. This led to the conclusion and key recommendation from the paper, which is that Ukraine’s Western partners can achieve the greatest impact by focusing on Russia’s import of key materials before they reach the country. These parts of the supply chain are the most vulnerable to external influence, whereas the elements that sit inside Russia, or can be smuggled with relative ease, are difficult to regulate without coordinated corporate compliance, and often have established networks for sanctions evasion. Disruption should, of course, focus on vulnerabilities rather than taking a broad-spectrum approach, and within the gamut of vulnerabilities, Western governments are most likely to have success against those outside Russia’s borders. For example, it is apparent that Russia is facing recruitment challenges in its expansion: this is a vulnerability, but it may prove difficult to disrupt recruitment from Washington or London. Another vulnerability is that many companies in the artillery supply chain rely on Western machinery and/or Western businesses, or still have European subsidiaries that keep them supplied with key materials and components. This report shows the role that these companies play in the supply of howitzers and ammunition to the frontlines and indicates that targeted efforts to disrupt these elements of the supply chain are more likely to lead to success than a broad spectrum approach, and may create the disruption that policy makers are hoping for.</p> -<p>The complex interdependencies between and limitations of the United States and China have generated space for and shaped the decisionmaking of countries like India. In essence, the world appears to be in a state wherein great powers are seeking to compete by investing in domestic capacity, constraining and delegitimizing each other’s actions, and expanding their respective influences. Middle powers such as India, meanwhile, are pursuing capability enhancement, autonomy of action, and enhanced bargaining power.</p> +<p>Ukraine has demonstrated determination and bravery from day one of the invasion and has upset Russia’s military plans time and again. However, Russia’s greater economic and industrial capacity is likely to be a determining factor in the ultimate outcome of the war. This need not be the case: Russia’s industrial might can and should be disrupted with a focused effort on the artillery supply chain. Doing so will save Ukrainian lives, degrade Russia’s offensive and defensive capabilities, and weaken its overall ability to fight the war in the way that its units have grown accustomed to. The Russian threat will not disappear, regardless of what happens in Ukraine – the expansion of its defence industry and armed forces makes this clear. However, there is a window of opportunity for Western powers to disrupt this expansion and slow production to prevent further Russian successes in 2025. That window is small, but Ukraine and its Western partners have the tools and knowledge to make the most of it and reduce the threat posed by Russia.</p> -<h4 id="the-view-from-delhi">The View from Delhi</h4> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>In his book, published on the eve of India’s 2024 parliamentary elections, S. Jaishankar, India’s external affairs minister, described the current international order as fragile and undergoing a “transition,” with sharpening great power competition enhancing stress factors across multiple domains. This, he argued, is likely to result in selective disengagement in certain areas of contention. Nevertheless, given the impacts of decades of economic globalization and the transnational nature of many challenges (e.g., climate change), interdependence and interconnectedness were likely to remain key features of the world order. Consequently, the challenge for countries like India was to identify opportunities and boost national capabilities, particularly in core and sensitive areas. This, Jaishankar wrote, was the key to ensuring strategic autonomy.</p> +<p>This paper provides a comprehensive overview of Russia’s artillery supply chain. It set out with the ambitious goal of mapping the supply chain, from the extraction and processing of raw materials needed for producing howitzers and ammunition, to their delivery to the frontline in Ukraine. The goal of the paper is to inform a cross-government, and ideally inter-governmental, approach to disrupting this specific supply chain.</p> -<p>Implicit in this analysis is an acknowledgment that distant developments increasingly have a direct bearing on Indian interests. The strategic impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the global balance of power, along with the war’s second-order effects on global finance and food and energy supply chains is a case in point. At the same time, Jaishankar’s analysis evidences India’s desire to engage more actively in mitigating these challenges and shaping a favorable external environment. This shift is a product of not only India’s expanding interests but also the country’s greater capacity and willingness to pursue them. In other words, if India’s earlier non-alignment was the product of a desire to not choose between competing blocs, multi-alignment, as the current strategy has been termed, is premised on a desire to expand options and choices. The objective of this strategy is to eventually fashion a multipolar world order, with India being a key pole. Indian strategic thought has long engendered a sense of manifest destiny regarding the country’s global role, and multipolarity in Asia, of course, is a prerequisite to achieve that.</p> +<p>The research has been conducted through the layering of different datasets and the expertise of a research team built specifically for this type of task. The data used includes: records from commercial providers of trade data; trade data from the UN; and publicly available information released either by the companies and enterprises involved, or through leaked financial records seen by the report authors that reveal the nature of contracts between Russian manufacturers. Extensive analysis has been conducted of Russia’s internal railway data, which was obtained via a commercial trade platform, to provide additional granularity on the nature of supply between manufacturers. Many online sources are no longer available, as Russian websites relating to defence are frequently changed or removed, and company websites may have been altered to obscure their involvement in Russia’s defence industry. The Wayback Machine (https://web.archive.org/) and other internet archives have been used to locate and interrogate past iterations of websites.</p> -<p>The logical corollary to this line of thought is that neither extreme — a Cold War–style rivalry between China and the United States nor a coexistence that results in U.S. acquiescence of Chinese primacy in Asia — serves India’s interests. The former scenario narrows India’s options and potentially places it on a volatile frontline. The latter fundamentally alters Asia’s balance of power adversely for India. That said, Indian policymakers and analysts do not tend to view the U.S.-China relationship as a zero-sum game. Rather, they believe that the relationship exhibits strands of cooperation — albeit deeply strained — and of contention. India’s engagement with both great powers, therefore, is primarily rooted in pragmatism, prioritizing the country’s strategic interests, while being mindful of factors like geography, values, and legacy. Issue-based tents rather than ideological camps is what India would prefer.</p> +<p>That data has been collated and organised to detail the process required to get from iron ore to a finished howitzer, or from cotton to a propellant charge for an artillery projectile. The research is focused on Russia’s manufacturers of 122 mm, 152 mm and 203 mm howitzer ammunition, and 82 mm and 120 mm mortar ammunition. However, many of the companies involved in this supply chain also produce components for rocket ammunition and anti-tank guided missiles. The paper sets out to establish which elements of the supply chain might prove vulnerable to the policy levers available to a Western government, such as the application of sanctions, diplomatic pressure, preclusive purchases, or the disruption of financial transactions.</p> -<p>With that in mind, a certain amount of friction between the United States and China on issues of security, values, trade, and technology is essential to opening up new formulations and dimensions of cooperation. Given the current state of affairs, fluidity is where India believes it can thrive. Of course, fluidity is not necessarily a sustainable state, nor is it desirable for the long term; it comes with significant challenges. By its very nature, fluidity engenders uncertainty. The occurrence of a black swan event, such as hostilities in the South China Sea or over Taiwan, can quickly erode the window of opportunity for middle powers and inhibit maneuverability. Such an event would also result in higher costs for accessing capital, markets, commodities, and technologies. Consequently, the transition from fluidity to multipolarity necessitates prompt deal-making to enhance developmental outcomes, build interdependencies based on shared interests and values, and rapidly expand national capabilities and power.</p> +<p>The paper gives a brief explanation of the role that artillery plays in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and why it is important to focus disruption efforts on that supply chain. It sets out the component parts of a typical howitzer before exploring the supply chain for Russian howitzers in detail. The same process is repeated for artillery ammunition, taking raw materials as the starting point. The key companies involved in each step of the process are profiled, and where possible, the volume of their transactions with the Russian Ministry of Defence (Russian MoD) are indicated. The final element of the artillery supply chain – the delivery of howitzers and ammunition to the frontlines – is briefly covered to provide an overall picture of the Russian artillery lifecycle.</p> -<h4 id="interests-and-strategic-empathy">Interests and Strategic Empathy</h4> +<p>Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Western countries have brought hundreds of sanctions into force against Russian companies and individuals. They have applied tools such as diplomatic pressure and public shaming of companies in a bid to limit Russia’s access to key Western technology. This approach has enjoyed some success, but has failed to prevent the growth of Russia’s domestic defence industry, or to alter the balance of power in the invasion. If Ukraine is to win, Russia’s artillery supply chain must be disrupted; no theory of victory for Ukraine will be viable as long as Russia’s supply of artillery systems and ammunition remains intact. This paper aims to help address this challenge by providing an assessment of where this supply chain is vulnerable to external action by Western governments, and showing that Russia’s defence industry is far from the Soviet behemoth of the 1980s.</p> -<p>The India-U.S. relationship has grown by leaps and bounds over the past 25 years. This is a product of a convergence of strategic interests and sustained diplomatic engagement. Despite raucous public debates, there is an evident appreciation of the significance of a close partnership with the United States among the political elite in India. Economic ties with the United States are deeply consequential for India, particularly regarding access to technology, skills, capital, and markets. More significantly, the persistence of U.S. power in Asia is a necessary condition for India to ensure that the external environment remains conducive to its security and developmental goals.</p> +<h3 id="chapter-1-why-artillery">Chapter 1: Why Artillery?</h3> -<p>To this end, over the past 25 years, successive governments in New Delhi have pursued a deeper strategic partnership with Washington. Economically, the United States is among India’s largest trading partners. Security ties have also deepened, picking up pace after the signing of foundational defense agreements and the 2016 designation of India as a “Major Defense Partner.” The United States’ defense trade with India has expanded from near zero in 2008 to over $20 billion in 2020. Additionally, the two countries are also more deeply cooperating in the exchange and development of critical and emerging technologies. Finally, there has been greater diplomatic and intelligence engagement across a range of issues. In particular, the United States has played a key role in augmenting India’s capabilities to counter domestic threats, particularly through intelligence and defense cooperation.</p> +<p>The balance of artillery between Russia and Ukraine is the single greatest determinant of the distribution of casualties and equipment loss, the balance of military initiative, the calculus of what is operationally possible, and thus the political perception of the trajectory of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.</p> -<p>Importantly, both sides appear to view the relationship as strategically symbiotic, rather than as a transactional arrangement. From a U.S. perspective, India’s growing market, skilled talent pool, democratic system, and shared normative vision for the world order make it an attractive partner. This has acquired greater salience recently, particularly given the rise of China and the United States’ domestic debates over recalibrating its own interests and commitments abroad. Washington’s desire to pursue more cost-effective means of influence, primarily by seeking an offshore balancing role and greater burden-sharing from allies and partners to achieve global objectives, also makes India an appealing partner. Consequently, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy acknowledges that a strong India is critical to further the United States’ vision of “freedom and openness” by expanding “autonomy and options” for regional actors. In other words, the United States views India’s growing power in Asia as critical to blunting the coercive edge of Chinese power. This is a goal that New Delhi shares, as evident by its engagement in the Quad, its support for AUKUS, and its public criticism of Chinese policy in the South China Sea.</p> +<p>The initial Russian invasion force that entered Ukraine on 24 February 2022 fielded 2,214 artillery systems, of which 1,635 were howitzers and 579 were multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). Russia originally viewed the invasion as a “Special Military Operation” in which the military component was to conduct a coup de main to capitalise on the destabilisation of the Ukrainian state by Russia’s special services. When this failed, the Russian military found itself fighting the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which fielded 1,176 tube artillery systems and 1,680 MRLs, in a conventional war. Alongside Ukraine’s resolve, and Russian disorganisation, this imbalance in artillery in Ukraine’s favour was a key factor in the defeat of Russian forces north of Kyiv and near Kharkiv, Sumy and Chernihiv, and Ukraine’s successful retention of Donbas.</p> -<p>Both the United States and India, thus far, have demonstrated foresight and not let specific divergences in interests or narrow differences over values undermine their strategic congruence. The management of friction over India’s ties with Russia and its importation of Russian energy supplies, along with differences with the United States over human rights and democracy in India, are noteworthy examples. However, given the challenges inherent to fluidity, as discussed earlier, lines of communication absolutely must remain open and be utilized frequently. This is likely to remain a challenging endeavor. Maintaining strategic empathy requires constant engagement, clarification of expectations and limitations, and respect for each other’s political concerns. It also requires appreciating that the daily manifestations of shared values — such as respect for freedom and individual liberty, the sanctity of constitutionalism and rule of law, transparency in governance, inclusion, pluralism, and human rights — derive from social and national contexts. That, however, does not mean that their manifestations must be constrained by those contexts.</p> +<p>Ukraine, however, only had ammunition to support its artillery park until mid-May 2022. The result was that when Russia regrouped and launched an offensive on Donbas, it was able to achieve an indirect fires superiority of up to 20:1 in some areas, as Ukraine’s artillery was starved of munitions. It is also important to note that this disparity in artillery gave the Kremlin the confidence that they could defeat the AFU without mobilising additional troops, despite being outnumbered by Ukraine at this time. Artillery is the centre of gravity for Russia’s ground forces. It is seen as the most efficient means to defeat an opponent’s forces, either through destruction or by weakening them to such an extent that an offensive is certain to succeed. Recognising the central and foundational role of artillery in Russia’s armed forces is key to understanding the priorities for disrupting Russia’s war machine. Whereas NATO forces broadly see artillery as a supporting element that is designed to set the conditions for manoeuvre forces to engage an enemy, the Russians see manoeuvre forces as responsible for both getting the enemy into a position where artillery can defeat them, and then exploit the destruction achieved by artillery. This was what Russia was doing to the AFU in Donbas in May to June 2022. It is also why, when the AFU received the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) from its international partners and began to unpick Russian artillery logistics, this brought Russian forces to a standstill, ceding the initiative to Ukraine, until Russia began the process of military mobilisation over the winter of 2022 to 2023.</p> -<h4 id="quest-for-a-modus-vivendi">Quest for a Modus Vivendi</h4> +<p>Since Russian mobilisation, the artillery advantage has consistently sat with Russia. Russia reached a high point in its rate of fire at around 38,000 rounds per day in June 2022. For the remainder of the war, the rate of Russian fire has been fairly consistent, at between 7,000 and 16,000 rounds per day, averaging at around 10,000 rounds per day. Ukrainian artillery fire, meanwhile, peaked at around 9,000 rounds per day, and has rarely exceeded 6,000 rounds per day, while in early 2024, Ukraine was firing fewer than 1,800 rounds per day. This disparity is largely a product of Russia’s deep stockpiles and industrial mobilisation.</p> -<p>Beijing has long believed that a shared antipathy toward its rise is the fundamental driver of U.S.-India proximity. Chinese diplomats’ repeated calls for New Delhi to view bilateral relations in the context of the evolving global situation underscore this. China has predominantly relied on tools of coercion to shape and constrain India’s options. In doing so, China has also demonstrated increased risk tolerance and willingness to use force, likely emboldened by perceptions of its own superiority in terms of the bilateral balance of power.</p> +<p>In addition to its fielded artillery park, Russia entered the war with approximately 13,985 artillery systems and 2,700 MRLs in storage, though not all of them were suitable for restoration. Ukraine has succeeded in inflicting sustained losses on Russia’s artillery park, but Russia’s defence industry has mobilised for war and is working to replace those losses. Many of the enterprises involved in Russia’s artillery supply chain are working triple shifts. As a consequence, the Ukrainian General Staff assessed in February 2024 that the Russian Operational Group of Forces inside Ukraine was fielding 4,780 tube artillery systems, as well as 1,130 MRLs. Despite the losses inflicted by Ukraine, Russia has managed to increase the number of artillery systems available to its forces over the opening invasion force.</p> -<p>In fact, over the past decade, Chinese policies have shifted from being merely unaccommodating of India’s interests to being clearly hostile and adversarial. This has been particularly evident in the escalation of tensions along the countries’ disputed land border, China’s repeated blocking of the listing of Pakistan-based terrorists on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council, and its refusal to acquiesce to India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. China has remained steadfast on these issues, despite repeated high-level diplomatic attempts at a thaw, particularly in 2018 and 2019. It is little surprise then that the India-China relationship is at its worst since their 1962 war. Key to this relationship are structural factors, such as the expanded interests and capacities of the two countries, the asymmetry of power between them, and the shifts in the world order as characterized by U.S.-China competition. In addition, the persistence of the boundary dispute and escalation along the Line of Actual Control have deepened political mistrust.</p> +<p>Russia has also succeeded in stabilising the supply of ammunition to support its rate of fire. Russian ammunition production for 152 mm howitzers quadrupled in the first year of the war to one million rounds. By the end of 2023, Russia had increased the totality of its ammunition production and is expected to produce 1.325 million new 152 mm rounds in 2024, as well as 800,000 122 mm rounds, and to refurbish an even larger number of rounds from remaining stockpiles. It is procuring millions more from North Korea, Iran, Syria and Belarus. By comparison, the AFU has received more than 600 155 mm howitzers from Ukraine’s international partners, but a significant proportion of these have been destroyed, and ammunition supplies have been limited.</p> -<p>The ongoing standoff between Indian and Chinese forces in Eastern Ladakh is now in its fifth year, with both sides having 60,000 forward-deployed troops. Politically, dialogue has largely stalled. There has been no formal bilateral meeting between the Indian prime minister Narendra Modi and the Chinese president Xi Jinping since October 2019. Years of discord have dealt a severe blow to people-to-people relations, with people on both sides increasingly viewing the relationship through a threat prism rather than an opportunity one. This is also the dominant view of the strategic affairs communities in both countries.</p> +<p>This disparity has had a range of tangible effects on the course of the fighting. The considerable attention paid to first-person view (FPV) drones conceals the reality that artillery continues to be the biggest cause of death and injury among Ukrainian troops. The actual percentage varies along the length of the frontline and is not uniform, but a paper written by the Global Medical and Surgical Support Group in 2023 observed that 70% of all Ukrainian combat casualties had been caused by Russian artillery. The casualties often suffered severe wounds, including polytrauma to multiple organ systems, which, if not fatal, would likely prevent them from returning to service. Russian artillery has also inflicted widespread concussion among Ukrainian troops subjected to barrage, with multiple concussions over time leading to personnel having to be withdrawn from the front.</p> -<p>Yet, geography as well as economic and security concerns necessitate dialogue. It is simply not possible to wish away a neighbor or perennially eschew engagement, particularly when that neighbor is one of your largest trading partners, and trade with them is critical to your own manufacturing and export ambitions. Moreover, the absolute and opportunity costs of the sustained deployment of sizable forces along a frigid and harsh boundary terrain will sooner or later begin to take their toll. New Delhi’s quest, therefore, has been to arrive at a new modus vivendi with Beijing, one in which China accommodates India’s core interests and aspirations. This is encapsulated in India’s framework of the “three mutuals” — mutual respect, mutual sensitivity, and mutual interest. Ensuring adherence to these, however, requires a significant advancement of Indian power in order to narrow the differential with China. This is akin to the proposition put forward by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken of dealing with China from a position of strength. In this endeavor for India, the United States is an indispensable partner.</p> +<p>The continued disparity in fire is one reason why the Kremlin believes it can still win the war. With approximately 1,200 km of active frontline, Ukraine must maintain enough combat-capable personnel to both hold defensive positions across this area and have enough reserves to rotate its units. The rate of rotation is increased in those sectors where units are under pressure. The accumulation of killed and wounded, with artillery injuries often causing wounds that prevent troops from returning to service even if they survive, is a strategic threat to Ukraine’s ability to sustain the war effort. As of August 2024, the Russian theory of victory does not centre on major breakthroughs, but rather on the destruction of the AFU as a force capable of defending the breadth of front through attrition, and it is artillery that is primarily inflicting the constant attrition of Ukrainian troops. The Russian leadership likely believes it can kill its way out of the war, and artillery will be key to doing that.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion-1">Conclusion</h4> +<p>Furthermore, so long as Russia maintains a substantial advantage in artillery systems, it can use tactics that will, over time, deplete the AFU of reserves – a critical vulnerability for Ukraine. For example, fixing the AFU into defending terrain can allow Russian artillery to inflict significant casualties on Ukrainian forces as they rotate and are resupplied. In other cases, Russia has used its artillery to destroy Ukrainian towns that come into range. This has fixed the AFU politically into defending unfavourable terrain to delay the widespread depopulation of nearby population centres.</p> -<p>In conclusion, from India’s perspective, sustained yet contained competition between the United States and China is desirable. It is in India’s interests for the United States to remain the preeminent power in a multipolar Asia. China, of course, would be part of such an order, although the balance of power would ideally have significantly constrained that country’s ability to coerce regional actors or to violate rules and norms. Ensuring this outcome requires the following.</p> +<p>Russia’s artillery advantage also constrains Ukraine’s tactical options, thereby limiting the risk to Russian forces. For example, during the Ukrainian offensive of 2023, Ukraine managed to concentrate 55 155 mm howitzers on its main axis of advance, as well as a variety of Soviet calibre guns along the front. The total number of Ukrainian guns in action is sensitive and therefore remains undisclosed, but suffice to say that it was unable to properly resource the artillery fight in support of its offensive. Russia fielded 720 guns and 230 MRLs across the southern front, and was able to concentrate a significant proportion of those around priority areas. This meant that the Ukrainian artillery concentration struggled to be brought forward because of strikes from Lancet-3M loitering munitions and counter-battery fire on what was a limited frontage. Thus, Ukrainian forces advanced into a fire pocket where they could not suppress Russian artillery, and so accepted disproportionate risk if they rose from their trenches. Given Ukraine’s need to husband limited artillery and ammunition stockpiles, this situation meant that any advance had to be carefully planned and executed, both reducing the number of points at which Ukraine could dynamically threaten Russian units and slowing the tempo of Ukrainian operations. If the conditions for successful offensive action were not obtained with sufficient quantities of howitzers and munitions, this would also increase the cost to the AFU as they were unable to counter the Russian fires superiority.</p> -<p>First, Washington must maintain policy continuity, regardless of domestic political changes, and ensure sustained high-level engagement with the region, despite stress in other theaters. Second, the United States must work with allies and partners to build joint capabilities with the aim of blunting Beijing’s ability to coerce through threats of force. This requires action across domains including defense, economic development, resiliency in key supply chains, innovations in emerging technologies, and development of governance rules and norms based on shared values. Finally, it is inevitable that this process will generate friction; there is, in fact, a high probability of confrontation. It is, thus, imperative for Washington to engage Beijing with the aim of establishing escalation management mechanisms. Given the current circumstances, progress is likely to resemble two steps forward, one step back.</p> +<p>Effectively constraining Russian artillery – even to achieve parity with the AFU as regards the availability at any given point in the front – would therefore have a transformative effect on the character of the war. It would achieve three things. First, it would reduce the rate of Ukraine’s casualties, alleviating the pressure of rotation, and thereby allowing the AFU to preserve the fighting power of its units in defence. Second, it would reduce Russia’s ability to punish Ukrainian attempts to conduct localised attacks, thereby increasing the proportion of Russian forces that must be held across the front to defend each sector, and so reducing the felt effect of Russia’s advantage in personnel along the front. Third, a consequence of the preceding effects would be to stabilise the front. Between the reduced attrition of the AFU and the reduced offensive combat power of Russian forces, limiting Russia’s access to artillery would likely undermine Russia’s theory of victory and make the conflict sustainable for Ukraine in the long term. This would protract the war, increasing the risk to the Russian economy. It would therefore reverse the current trajectory of the conflict, where Russian leverage in potential negotiations is gaining as the AFU becomes weaker, and would instead leave Russia with the prospect of accumulating damage to its critical national infrastructure, the depletion of its stockpiles, and the growing vulnerability of its domestic economy, without any confidence that it would achieve its objectives militarily. Even if negotiations end the intensity of the fighting, limiting Russia’s ability to regenerate its artillery stockpiles is critical to reducing the threat of renewed hostilities against Ukraine or a conventional threat emerging against Georgia, Moldova or European NATO.</p> -<h3 id="a-vision-is-not-a-strategy">A Vision Is Not a Strategy</h3> +<p>The reduction in casualty rates and equipment loss for the AFU, were the volume of Russian artillery fire to be curtailed, could also allow new recruits to be kept in training for longer and formed into new units, rather than pushed to units on the front as battlefield replacements. Given that the West has a limited supply of artillery systems and armoured vehicles and is not yet producing equipment in sufficient quantities to replace losses, the reduction in the rate of equipment destruction at the front is also important if the AFU is to build new units for future operations. The reduction of Russia’s artillery park is therefore a prerequisite for Ukraine rebuilding its capacity to achieve the liberation of its occupied territories. The prospect of Ukraine regaining such a capability must necessarily increase the risk of Russia continuing the conflict, building Ukrainian leverage to terminate the conflict on favourable terms. The disruption of Russia’s artillery supply chains should consequently be of the highest priority for Ukraine’s international partners.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="james-lee">James Lee</h4> - <h4 id="assistant-research-professor-institute-of-european-and-american-studies-academia-sincia">Assistant Research Professor, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sincia</h4> -</blockquote> +<h3 id="chapter-2-what-makes-a-russian-howitzer">Chapter 2: What Makes a Russian Howitzer?</h3> -<p>There has long been abundant evidence that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) poses a formidable challenge to U.S. interests, whether in matters directly relating to the national security of the United States or in matters relating to the security of U.S. allies and partners. But the United States would not be better served by attempting to bring about a particular outcome in its China policy: any “vision of victory” would either be too specific to be attainable or too abstract to be actionable. If such a vision were elaborated in all of its details, the United States would face the problem of lacking the policy instruments for engineering political and economic developments on the other side of the world; it is difficult enough for the United States to implement a vision for how its own polity and economy will develop, let alone in China. If, on the other hand, a vision of victory should be defined in terms of abstractions, it would necessarily be subject to a wide range of interpretations and lack clear benchmarks for measuring its progress and eventual success. Moreover, in attempting to pursue those abstractions, the United States would introduce substantial risks in its relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and with its own allies and partners.</p> +<p>A howitzer is a large-calibre gun, over 100 mm in diameter, designed to fire large shells filled with high explosives. It can be self-propelled or towed. In Russian service, most self-propelled howitzers are based on tracked armoured vehicles designed during the Cold War.</p> -<p>To elaborate on this critique more fully, it is helpful to first provide a working definition of a “vision of victory” with regard to China. Judging by recent proposals along these lines, this concept can be defined as follows: to make it inconceivable that China would seek to contest U.S. primacy in international relations, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Pursuant to this end, the United States would seek some combination of degrading PRC capabilities (both military and economic) and encouraging liberal reforms within the PRC that would weaken the CCP’s hold on power. In this view, the United States would be able to claim victory once it became clear that China could no longer achieve its strategic and operational objectives under any contingency scenario that involved the introduction of U.S. forces and assets. This would be deterrence by denial, but on a systematic and comprehensive scale. The United States would also be able to claim victory once China was transformed into a liberal state that (it is assumed) would observe more moderation and restraint in its foreign policy. The scale of these ambitions is vast — so vast, in fact, that this vision seems very much like a pipe dream.</p> +<p>The vehicle protects the crew from small arms fire and other howitzers, and carries the system’s ammunition. Towed howitzers are moved around by the crew, which operates out in the open, exposed to enemy fire. Ammunition is typically carried in the truck that tows the howitzer, or pre-positioned so that the gun can be moved between different areas.</p> -<p>Such a vision of victory would go beyond the strategic requirements of the challenge that the United States faces. Safeguarding U.S. national security does not require the United States to “defeat” China, but rather to deter China from taking actions that would jeopardize U.S. interests. This is a tall order, to be sure, but it considers contingencies, capabilities, operations, and tactics that are finite and concrete. Many of them, such as the range of scenarios that involve Beijing trying to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, have already been elaborated in public documents. While some of these analyses necessarily involve a degree of speculation, any speculation is subject to the discipline of the facts on the ground: Does Beijing have the capability to launch a fait accompli that would enable it to seize control of Taiwan before the United States (and U.S. allies and partners) could intervene? Does the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have the requisite capabilities for launching a major amphibious operation across the strait? Does Taiwan have the resiliency needed to prevent the PLA from securing a beachhead within a matter of days? The answers to these questions may not be straightforward, but their operational and tactical dimensions are fairly well defined.</p> +<p>The core component of a howitzer is its gun assembly, which includes the barrel, breech, a bore evacuator (on a self-propelled howitzer), and a muzzle brake. The gun assembly is installed into an armoured hull with electric servos that elevate the barrel, and recuperators that absorb the recoil generated by firing the gun. The vehicle that carries the barrel in a self-propelled howitzer is built from armoured steel that is rolled to the correct thickness, often while heated, and welded into shape. This becomes the hull, which is then fitted with an engine and transmission. A drive sprocket is attached to the transmission through final drives to provide the vehicle’s motion. The weight of the vehicle is supported through road wheels attached to torsion bar suspension, which all rest upon the track. The track is built using segments connected with pins, and helps disperse the vehicle’s weight over a wider area, which in turn improves its ability to cross weak terrain.</p> -<p>The aperture of speculation widens to unmanageable proportions once U.S. strategy is conceived of as a vision of victory. If the United States is to plan for a future “V-Day” in the Indo-Pacific, then it must take into account — and even try to influence — what happens the day before V-Day, and what happens the day before the day before V-Day, and so on. The longer the time horizon over which this vision is to unfold, the more difficult it will be to put it into practice because the variables and constraints will multiply with every passing day. The difficulty is magnified by the fact that, in contrast to victory in war, victory in peace is neither easy to see nor to define: nobody will be waving a white flag, nobody will be signing instruments of surrender, and nobody will pay reparations to the victor. Consider, for instance, the earlier definition in which China “could no longer achieve its strategic and operational objectives under any contingency scenario that involved the introduction of U.S. forces and assets.” In the abstract, that is clear enough, but what does it mean in practice? How could the United States ever be certain that China would be incapable of achieving its objectives if the United States intervened? Not only would such a vision require a complete description of all potential contingencies, but it would also require the United States to have absolute confidence in the outcome of a range of hypothetical scenarios. Such confidence would be either elusive or fundamentally misguided. It is impossible to predict the outcome of a war before it starts, even if all of the available information suggests that one side has a decisive advantage.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/B3t1toS.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: D-30 2A18 Russian towed artillery.</strong> Source: Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>Having a vision of victory would not help the United States secure appreciable gains, and it would introduce significant risk. If the issue at stake is taking more decisive action in the United States’ China policy — by bolstering U.S. capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, for example — then it is entirely possible to rationalize and implement those policies without a vision of victory. The United States can compete more vigorously with China without defining its objective as the defeat of China. The concept of a vision of victory is neither necessary nor sufficient for prescribing policy changes that would more effectively safeguard U.S. interests. The difference is largely one of branding, and that branding could be detrimental to the United States even if the policies themselves are sound. There is a risk that if the United States declares its vision of victory, the PRC will be locked into a posture of hostility, especially if Beijing comes to believe that the United States seeks regime change. Under that scenario, Beijing would likely lose all interest in engaging on issues of importance to the United States, including continuing dialogue between their military forces, halting fentanyl production and trafficking, mitigating the effects of climate change, and regulating AI. As much as U.S.-China relations may have deteriorated in recent years, they could deteriorate even further, and the United States still needs some degree of cooperation from China.</p> +<p>Once the gun assembly, drive train and running gear have been added to the hull, the howitzer is fitted with a fire control system. The fire control system is a computer that is used to enter coordinates and meteorological data to support the firing of the howitzer. It generates ballistic calculations that, in an ideal setting, will account for air pressure, wind and the temperature of the ammunition. The ballistic calculation generates the elevation for the gun that will give the greatest chance of successfully delivering rounds against a target. A howitzer will typically carry a radio that allows the crew to communicate with other howitzers, its battery commander or the force that it is supporting.</p> -<p>It is also important to consider how U.S. allies and partners will respond. Concerns about their reactions have been raised before, though they are not always fully elaborated. The Biden-Harris administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy relies extensively on the United States’ alliances and partnerships, and that context provides enough reason to ask whether a U.S. vision of victory would find support outside of the United States. But supposing that a more unilateral strategy could be formulated, how important would it be to consider the views of allies and partners? The Cold War concept of “neutralism” offers an answer: the posture of not aligning with either of the great powers. U.S. strategy throughout the Cold War was often concerned with preventing the spread of neutralism among U.S. allies and partners. At the start of the Korean War, for example, an intelligence estimate concluded that failure by the United States to intervene in Korea would “strengthen existing widespread desire for neutrality” in Japan because it would “add force to the argument that alignment of Japan with the United States would, while inviting Soviet aggression, in no way ensure American protection of Japan against such aggression.” According to the estimate, neutralism would also spread in West Germany. While the United States does not currently face the prospect of a wholesale disengagement from the U.S. alliance system, it must ask itself whether its allies and partners see the United States as a strategic asset or as a strategic liability over the long term. If the United States pursues a more confrontational approach in its relations with China — even if that confrontation is circumscribed to the branding of U.S. strategy — will U.S. allies and partners see that approach as shielding them from PRC aggression, or triggering the PRC to retaliate? Bonnie Glaser has raised a similar point in the debate on strategic ambiguity and strategic clarity in the Taiwan Strait. The risks for U.S. allies and partners become even more acute under a vision of victory.</p> +<p>The final element that makes a howitzer is the ammunition. There are three components to an artillery round: the charge, the projectile and the fuse. The charge is built from nitrocellulose and propels the projectile out of the barrel at very high speeds in a ballistic arc towards the target. The projectile is made of steel with thick walls that may be pre-fragmented. The shell is filled with an explosive material that is detonated by the fuse. The fuse is a cone-shaped object that is screwed into the nose of the projectile before it is loaded into the gun; it detonates the explosive filling inside the projectile either when it hits the ground, or just above it.</p> -<p>One might argue that the United States could offset these risks for its allies and partners in how it implements its vision of victory. In this view, any increased risk of PRC retaliation could be compensated for by an increased U.S. defense commitment. But that kind of assurance would not be very comforting to U.S. allies and partners, who would become even more dependent on the United States for their security because of actions that the United States had taken. This development would be particularly alarming for U.S. partners, who, lacking a formal alliance treaty, would harbor doubts about the United States’ willingness to intervene in their defense. Public opinion research from Taiwan, for example, has shown that there is considerable fluctuation year to year in terms of how the Taiwanese public views the credibility of the United States (defined as being “consistent in its words and actions 講信用”). Doubts about U.S. credibility cannot be completely addressed by declaring a policy of strategic clarity, since adopting a policy of clarity would only be a change of words. Allies and partners might choose instead to distance themselves from the United States, leading to the spread of neutralism that the United States feared during the Cold War.</p> +<p>Russia employs different calibre artillery systems to the West, including howitzers that are towed and self-propelled with 122 mm, 152 mm and 203 mm barrels. They are accompanied by mortars, which can also be towed or self-propelled and are used with 82 mm, 120 mm and 240 mm barrels.</p> -<p>A vision of victory has a certain appeal in terms of its simplicity and clarity. Yet this appeal, which often invokes the Cold War, can be misleading in how it interprets history, and thus lead to a poorly conceived strategy. When the United States decided to intervene in the Korean War, its objective was not only to impose costs on North Korea. It was also to reassure U.S. allies that an alliance with the United States was worth more than what it cost: aligning with Washington might raise tensions with U.S. adversaries, but the promise of U.S. support was credible enough to convince those allies to choose Washington’s side. A vision of victory, on the other hand, has the potential to remind U.S. allies of the risks, rather than the benefits, of an alliance with the United States.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bWebmte.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Russian 122mm artillery shell.</strong> Source: Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>Critics might claim that there’s a logical inconsistency: if the United States’ intervention in the Korean War enhanced U.S. credibility and galvanized support for alliances with the United States, why would a vision of victory with regard to China not have the same effect? The difference has to do with which side would be perceived as changing the status quo and what the nature of that status quo would be. The North Korean attack on June 25, 1950, was a brazen act of aggression in flagrant violation of the UN Charter; in President Truman’s words, “The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.” The international communist movement had tried to create a new status quo in which U.S. allies and partners were potentially subject to armed attack; U.S. intervention restored the status quo ante, by defeating North Korea in war and deterring North Korea in peace. A vision of victory against China, on the other hand, would involve the United States trying to create a new status quo in how it defines its strategic objectives; and if China reacts with hostility, then the United States would be creating a condition of insecurity for its allies and partners. Adopting a vision of victory would not be a case of the United States saving the free world from communism, but rather of the United States setting itself, its allies, and its partners on a collision course with China.</p> +<p>The range of the smallest howitzers is greater than the range of the biggest mortars. A mortar uses less propellant to fire its projectiles at a high angle. As a result, mortars have a shorter range and may take longer to reach their target. A howitzer has a longer and stronger barrel, which enables more propellent and heavier projectiles to be used.</p> -<h3 id="a-vision-of-success-in-the-us-china-rivalry-the-technological-competition">A Vision of Success in the U.S.-China Rivalry: The Technological Competition</h3> +<p>Howitzer projectiles typically deliver more explosive energy; however, the lower weight and size of mortars and their ammunition means that they can be carried and used by infantry, with howitzers typically held further back.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="michael-j-mazarr">Michael J. Mazarr</h4> - <h4 id="senior-political-scientist-rand-corporation">Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5Oy3edH.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: 252 Krasnopol Artillery Fired Guided Munition.</strong> Source: Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>U.S. strategy toward China is currently focused on the requirements of persistent competition rather than on a clear vision of success or end state. Arguably, nowhere is that more evident than in the most important single measure of competitive advantage: the competition in basic science and frontier technologies. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has identified this domain as a critical leverage point for national power, and its strategies — ranging from massive state subsidies to intellectual property theft and forced technology transfers — to achieve leadership, or even dominance, in key technologies have caused severe strains in its relationship with the United States and others. The United States has responded with a series of actions designed to sustain or recapture scientific and technological leadership — limits on high-technology exports and outbound investment, massive investments in the U.S. semiconductor and renewable energy industries, increased research and development (R&amp;D) spending, and much more.</p> +<h3 id="chapter-3-howitzer-supply-chains">Chapter 3: Howitzer Supply Chains</h3> -<p>Few treatments of the U.S.-China technology competition, however, have addressed the question of objectives: What would count as a successful endgame for this specific contest? Developing a concept of success for such a wide-ranging and ongoing competition, while extremely difficult, is essential. Absent such a construct, the current U.S. approach risks embracing competition for its own sake and rushing down blind alleys without a clear sense of where policy will lead. The recent spate of semiconductor-oriented export controls is a perfect example. While they are based on a clear sense of the importance of cutting-edge chips, even the architects of such policies admit that their true long-term results — such as how much of a delay they will impose upon China, how Beijing’s responses will reshape the future technology competition, and how the loss of markets will affect the semiconductor industry — cannot be known. The only vision of success that appears to animate these actions is a very broad idea of staying ahead of China in semiconductors.</p> +<p>Modern military supply chains are deeply complex, often requiring inputs from a variety of entities and culminating with a systems integrator, where the component parts are assembled into a finished vehicle or weapon. This can make it difficult to understand supply chains – and where they are vulnerable. This chapter attempts to set out the primary elements in Russia’s howitzer supply chain through an in-depth look at the production of howitzer barrels. Barrels are a consumable product that must be replaced regularly or their accuracy and efficacy declines – unlike items such as armoured plates or engines, which are rarely required unless new systems are being built. At present, Russia is modernising or refurbishing many of its armoured vehicles and maintaining a large arsenal of howitzers in Ukraine. This indicates that barrel production may be a bottleneck in Russia’s ability to sustain its artillery forces in Ukraine.</p> -<p>Several studies have suggested lists of basic outcomes for the U.S.-China science and technology competition, and such lists are useful as far as they go. But U.S. strategists need something more — a broader idea of what success looks like that describes how those outcomes can be produced on an enduring basis and that nests them within a larger vision of how the overall rivalry can reach a more stable and lasting equilibrium that itself can serve as an endgame.</p> +<h4 id="manufacturers">Manufacturers</h4> -<p>This essay offers such a vision, based primarily on lessons from the history of prior scientific and technological revolutions. The goal is neither to assess who is winning nor to lay out a comprehensive strategy, but rather to sketch out a lasting recipe for security and competitive advantage within a larger concept of a trajectory toward an endgame for the rivalry, one that can provide a target for U.S. strategy. In the process, the essay focuses in some depth on one especially critical field of technology — artificial intelligence (AI) — and offers one especially important overarching theme: a stable outcome of the current competition has much less to do with metrics of relative standing with major rivals and instead relies much more on the fundamental national qualities which underwrite dynamism and competitive advantage. The most compelling concept of success must be built around a dynamic, effective, and innovative U.S. competitive engine in science and technology, an approach that is consistent with a program to encourage the long-term mellowing of the rivalry.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BWTDAiw.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Cannon units for Msta-S, made by Volgograd-based Titan-Barrikady Plant, ready for assembly at Uraltransmash in Yekaterinburg, April 2023.</strong> Source: Russian military correspondent.</em></p> -<p>The vision of success proposed here marries this core ideal of domestic scientific and technological dynamism with two other elements. First, any successful outcome will be one in which the United States remains at the hub of the global science and technology networks of the twenty-first century. Second, success requires that the United States achieves enough national resilience to mitigate key vulnerabilities and dependencies related to science and technology, a concept that implies, at a minimum, preventing Chinese monopolies or effective dominance of essential scientific and technological fields. Current U.S. policy embraces all of these themes, to some degree. But the important insight for U.S. strategy is that these three concepts — a world-leading engine of scientific and technological progress, network power, and resilience — can provide the essential ingredients for a vision of success in scientific and technological competition.</p> +<p>Artillery system production in Russia is a centralised network of interconnected manufacturers, contractors, subcontractors, suppliers and research and development (R&amp;D) partners, managed mainly by Rostec, the state-governed defence holding, in direct cooperation with the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Army. In 2023, Rostec announced an internal reorganisation on the “gun-to-shot” principle, which aimed to streamline production of tanks and artillery by separating them and allowing each group to specialise. It transferred companies in the artillery supply chain from UralVagonZavod, Russia’s main tank manufacturer, to Tekhmash, which had previously focused on ammunition production.</p> -<h4 id="a-rivalry-for-global-economic-and-technological-supremacy">A Rivalry for Global Economic and Technological Supremacy</h4> +<p>Key artillery production facilities are as follows:</p> -<p>The U.S.-China rivalry takes place in many domains — such as military capabilities, cultural influence, the ability to shape the international system, and battles of narratives. But both sides appear to believe that the contest for leadership in a set of frontier technologies may be the most decisive struggle of all. Many analysts of scientific and technological trends agree that the nations of the world are confronting a transformational moment, with one economic-technological era giving way to another. A set of emerging technologies, including biotechnology, quantum science, advanced manufacturing, and most of AI — discussed at some length below — may be fashioning a new Industrial Revolution with even more profound implications than the last two. The great powers which master this new revolution will gain tremendous competitive advantage.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Uraltransmash:</strong> The main assembly facility for Russian artillery systems is a 143-hectare plant in Yekaterinburg which also produces trams and oil pumps for the civilian market. The plant has its own engineering and design centre for artillery, SKB Transmash-Spetstekhnika, and tests howitzers on a 15,000-hectare artillery range 17 km north of the plant. Uraltransmash developed and manufactured the main artillery systems used by the Russian army, such as the 2S3 Akatsiya, which entered service in the 1970s, and the 2S19 Msta-S, which was produced from 1989. According to Russian brand registers, the plant now owns the Msta-S, Koalitsiya-SV, Akatsiya, Tyulpan and Giatsint howitzer brands, which make up the majority of self-propelled howitzers (SPH) in Russian service.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Motovilikha Plant:</strong> Earlier towed versions of the Msta-S howitzers and other self-propelled machines – such as the 2S23 Nona, a 120 mm mortar based on the wheeled chassis of a BTR-80 armoured fighting vehicle – have been assembled at the SKB Motovilikha Plant. The plant went into bankruptcy in 2018 and stopped delivery to the Russian army in 2022. To preserve its manufacturing processes in 2023 it was transferred to Remdizel, a Rostec-affiliated company, before being fully acquired by Rostec subsidiary Tekhnodinamika in 2024.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Zavod No. 9:</strong> This is a former production unit of Uralmashzavod and specialises in barrel manufacturing, being one of the four main artillery suppliers. It produces D-30 towed howitzers and various tank guns, including the 2A20 U-5TS Molot for the modernised T-62 and 2А46 for the T-72, T-64A and T-90. The plant is also the manufacturer of the Soviet-era 125-mm 2A45 Sprut-A and 2A45M Sprut-B anti-tank guns.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Titan-Barrikady:</strong> The Volgograd-based plant has specialised in a diverse range of artillery and missile systems and its portfolio includes Msta-B and Msta-S howitzers (the latter’s assembly has been recently moved to Uraltransmash).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Krasny Oktyabr:</strong> Titan-Barrikady has been vertically integrated with the nearby Krasny Oktyabr metallurgy plant, which specialises in the production of special steel, and the two plants share energy and forging infrastructure. Krasny Oktyabr does not list military uses for its products, but Russian archives have records of the plant casting 152 mm barrels.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><em>CHINA’S VIEWS OF TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION</em></p> +<p>The hull of a howitzer is built from high-hardness steel that is hot- or cold-rolled until it forms a material called rolled homogeneous armour (RHA). After the collapse of the USSR, Russia developed its own production of RHA, having previously relied on plants in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia and Mariupol in Ukraine. According to the armour steel Institute Stali, the three main steel suppliers for tanks and artillery are Krasny Oktyabr iron &amp; steel plant, Magnitogorsk Iron &amp; Steel Works (MMK) and OMZ-Spetstal. Establishing these production capabilities required a serious re-adjustment and investment in specialised production facilities with little to no civilian application, which suggests they are reliant upon the Russian defence industry.</p> -<p>The current Chinese leadership has come to see science and technology as the essential requirement for national competitive success. China-watcher Tanner Greer recently catalogued the numerous ways in which the senior leadership of the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) has declared, in word and deed, the priority they place on technological progress and advantage. The 2024 National Peoples’ Congress Work Report, for example, calls out developing China “through science and technology” as the basic avenue to economic competitiveness. As Greer and Nancy Yu put it, “The central task of the Chinese state is to build an industrial and scientific system capable of pushing humanity to new technological frontiers.” They cite a 2016 PRC planning document which lays out the goal of China becoming the “leading scientific power in the world.” Recent statements such as these build on earlier programs for scientific and technological advantage, such as the “National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006–2020),” which explicitly stated its goal: “In the 21st century, China, being a large developing nation, is to accelerate its [science and technology] development and narrow down the gaps with the developed nations. To this end, the nation must make unremitting efforts for a long period of time.”</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eOLAPWz.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: The MSTA System.</strong> Source: Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>The recent emphasis on technology in the Chinese system has deep roots in pre-communist-era analyses of how China fell behind in the industrial age, Marxist historical materialism, and various other sources. As Greer and Yu write, many Chinese sources refer to a “hinge point in history,” a transition point in economic life, and they believe that the set of emerging technologies is creating that today. A recent study entitled National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers by a Chinese think tank also emphasizes science and technology as the leading “general law” that determines national fates.</p> +<p>The primary supplier of diesel engines for Russian tanks and self-propelled howitzers is the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (Uraltrak) , while some newer models - such as the wheeled 2S34 Malva - use engines from the Yaroslavl Motor Plant. Engine production requires heat-resistant high-alloy steel for elements such as valves and fasteners, and high-precision computer numerical control (CNC) machines. Tracks for tanks and self-propelled artillery have similar requirements, and are forged by Rostec-owned Omsktransmash and Kalashnikov Concern’s Lipetsk Mechanical Plant.</p> -<p>The most recent form this thinking has taken is the Chinese discussion of “new quality productive forces.” This is another way of referring to a set of science and technology advances that empower national strength. As economist Arthur Kroeber writes:</p> +<p>In addition to its physical structure and gun, a howitzer carries a fire control system. The traditional supplier of automated fire guidance and navigation systems for Russian howitzers is the Signal Research Institute, based in Kovrov. Like most other strategic enterprises, it is part of Rostec, and is held within the group’s missile-manufacturing arm. It supplies the newest version of Russia’s automated fire control system ASUNO, which has been in development since 2019 and was first shown at the Ukrainian frontline in June 2024.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>These slogans culminate a major shift in China’s overall economic policy direction that has been building for two decades, and that has accelerated noticeably in the last five or so years of Xi’s administration. China has now decisively moved away from the growth-maximizing orientation that prevailed from 1979 until the early 2010s, which prioritized systemic reforms to achieve as high a GDP growth rate as possible. The new economic vision prioritizes the acquisition and development of technology — especially “hard” technologies that require a large industrial and manufacturing base.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Each of these companies will have their own supply chains, from raw materials through to finished products that are delivered to Uraltransmash for assembly into a howitzer.</p> -<p>In service of these general concepts, Beijing’s Made in China 2025 program is designed to channel state investment into a set of 10 critical technologies with the goal of achieving relative leadership, if not global predominance. With ideas of innovation chains and productive networks clearly in mind, China is investing in technology components throughout these chains. In the process — and especially after recent U.S. technology export controls — Beijing has placed an increasing focus on self-reliance and indigenous production of key technologies. This year’s Third Plenum of the 20th Party Congress reemphasized these factors, doubling down on China’s development strategy, which focuses on dominating key frontier industries to achieve “high-quality” development.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/oms9w4G.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: The Uraltransmash Plant.</strong> Source: Maxar Technologies, RUSI, Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>China’s endgame in the technology competition, then, is in one sense clear enough. There can be little doubt that Beijing aims to be the unquestioned global leader in a whole series of science- and technology-based industries, from 5G and renewable energy to electric vehicles and biotechnology. (In parallel, it is seeking dominance in less technologically cutting-edge industries such as shipbuilding.) How precisely China defines success in these terms is not clear, although in some cases, such as solar panels, it has achieved something close to a global monopoly position in manufacturing, and in 5G China was apparently seeking to position Huawei similarly as the overwhelmingly dominant global actor. This position of technological overmatch would consequently provide Beijing with tremendous leverage in its broader effort to achieve global leadership. China’s favored end state in the technology competition therefore envisions overall supremacy in many critical fields, all of which can be employed for broader geostrategic effect.</p> +<h4 id="barrel-production">Barrel Production</h4> -<p><em>THE UNITED STATES’ APPROACH TO THE COMPETITION</em></p> +<p>Unlike armour or engine production, barrel production is a constant requirement for any military. This is because barrels are a consumable component of a howitzer or tank. Even when steels that are resistant to high heat and pressure are used, and a chrome lining is added to the bore interior, the use of a barrel will degrade its structural integrity to the point where it must be replaced. This means that a country’s ability to meet its needs for barrel replacement in a high-intensity war is critical to its ability to continue the fight.</p> -<p>Until recently, the United States’ approach to the technology competition has been far less comprehensive, strategic, and nationally directed, instead relying on a more laissez-faire attitude that largely counted on the private sector to produce the necessary national scientific and technological strengths. In fact, despite earlier emphases on technology competition with Japan, until the late 2000s the United States did not even fully recognize that it was engaged in a national technology competition with China at all. This began to change in the Trump administration and was fully overturned in the Biden administration, which brought a new focus to the issue.</p> +<p>The impact of failing to replace barrels is demonstrated by a report from an operator of a 203 mm 2S7 howitzer in Ukraine: “The gun was fired a lot in one day and overheated. It was performing poorly, and we weren’t sure where the shells landed. There are no replacement barrels, so we might be transferred to the 2S1 [a Soviet-era howitzer]”. This indicates not only that the gun was less accurate and effective because of barrel wear, but that the crew could be transferred to a shorter-range and less lethal system if a replacement could not be found. This is why disrupting barrel production is likely to have a greater impact on the battlefield than disrupting the production of armour or refurbishment of engines.</p> -<p>National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan made perhaps the most elaborate statement about the contest in a 2022 speech. “Advancements in science and technology are poised to define the geopolitical landscape of the 21st century,” he argued. “They will generate game-changers in health and medicine, food security, and clean energy. We’ll see leap-ahead breakthroughs and new industries that drive our prosperity. And, of course, new military and intelligence capabilities that will shape our national security.” Sullivan laid out an ambitious goal for the U.S. strategy:</p> +<p>Russian artillery barrel manufacturers are under state control because of their strategic importance. Historically there were many barrel manufacturers in Russia, but there are now just four: Zavod No. 9 in Yekaterinburg; Titan-Barrikady in Volgograd; MZ/SKB in Perm; and the Burevestnik Research Institute in Nizhny Novgorod. The latter is the country’s main artillery research and development facility; its research and production facilities are responsible for developing artillery systems and their production processes, so these facilities are equipped with trial production capacity. There is also the main assembly plant, Uraltransmash, which has its own casting and forging facility, but this is primarily the systems integrator in Russia’s artillery supply chain, and reports deliveries from Zavod No. 9 and Titan-Barrikady, indicating that it is not currently a significant source of barrel production.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>On export controls, we have to revisit the longstanding premise of maintaining “relative” advantages over competitors in certain key technologies. We previously maintained a “sliding scale” approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead. That is not the strategic environment we are in today. Given the foundational nature of certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as large of a lead as possible.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><em>RAW MATERIALS</em></p> -<p>A later speech by Secretary of State Antony Blinken expanded on the significance of the technology competition. He identified six technologies as core to the U.S. competitive strategy: “microelectronics, advanced computing and quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and biomanufacturing, advanced telecommunications, and clean energy technologies.” Blinken introduced a key principle of U.S. strategy — not an isolating “digital sovereignty” as China has proposed, but rather engaging in “digital solidarity” with friends and allies.</p> +<p>Metallurgy plants manufacture the steel for artillery barrels in dedicated production runs, allocating resources specifically for producing barrel moulds. The output ranges from 20 to 10 tonnes per mould, depending on the order size and forge capacity. The process begins with casting a steel bar – known as ingots – that will eventually become a barrel. The base materials needed to make the alloy – iron ore, scrap metal and small amounts of molybdenum, chromium or nickel – are melted in a blast furnace for up to 12 hours. An alternate process uses an electric arc furnace, which primarily relies on electricity and scrap metal, as well as ferroalloys, which are created by reducing metal elements in a submerged electric arc furnace.</p> -<p>The U.S. response to China’s goals has taken shape gradually and incrementally. At least three major tools have so far been in evidence. First, the Biden administration has invested large sums in catalyzing certain domestic U.S. technology industries — most notably semiconductors and renewable energy — in a bid to match selected elements of China’s industrial policy. Second, the United States has sought to set back efforts of specific Chinese firms to achieve dominance (or at least parity) in critical domains. Major examples of this strategy include sanctions against the Chinese firms ZTE and Huawei, targeted outbound investment restrictions, efforts to convince other countries to spurn Chinese firms and investment, and semiconductor export limits. (In the process, the United States has sought to identify chokepoints or “chokeholds,” specific firms or dependencies that U.S. policy can use to constrain China’s technology development.)</p> +<p>The molten steel is treated to remove excess carbon before it is poured into moulds. The ingots may be subject to further treatments such as annealing, which removes impurities, and acid baths to remove forge scale from the surface. The steel will be rolled into its final shape before being cut to size and transported to the customer by rail.</p> -<p>It is not yet evident, however, if the Biden administration or other U.S. analysts and commentators have a clear idea of what this must or could all add up to. The U.S. strategy so far seems to lack a clear theory of success, and its embrace of apparently never-ending competition has the potential to lead to substantial mission creep. As one account suggests, the intensity of the U.S. competitive vision contains elements that “seek to eradicate, root and branch, China’s entire ecosystem of advanced technology,” which more than one observer has described as acts of economic warfare. The United States has embraced an approach that at least implies a campaign to constrain China’s general technological and economic advances, something that is viewed in Beijing as a generalized threat to the regime’s survival.</p> +<p>Several metallurgy plants have been identified as suppliers to the UralVagonZavod group of companies. Most of the sources are pre-2022 registers of public procurement and contracts, as this information is no longer disclosed.</p> -<p>It is also not clear, however, whether the current U.S. approaches will even work in the long run. While U.S. policy might have restrained the spread of Huawei to a few key countries, for example, the firm has managed to thrive despite U.S. sanctions. Whether U.S. semiconductor sanctions can provide a lasting advantage — or if they will merely prompt China to develop indigenous production years before it might otherwise have done — remains an open question. Both situations starkly illustrate the problem of sustaining a truly targeted approach to technology competition. Sanctions against individual firms or technologies do not address the larger ecosystems that support China’s development. Yet going after the wider ecosystem, as a growing list of U.S. technology sanctions has sought to do, implies a completely unrestrained technology conflict. China, meanwhile, is gearing up to build tools to retaliate against U.S. technology constraints. These challenges and risks are increasingly evident in what may become the centerpiece of the scientific and technological contest in years ahead — the development and, perhaps even more importantly, the practical application of the wide range of tools collectively known as AI.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SAtwlRM.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Suppliers of Raw Materials Into the Barrel Production Supply Chain in Russia.</strong> Source: Russian internal railway data, Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, Russian legal databases, Krasny Oktyabr Volgograd Steel Work, 74.ru, Kursiv.</em></p> -<p><em>THE SPECTER OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE</em></p> +<p><strong>Raw Materials In-Depth: Chromium</strong></p> -<p>The benefits of AI to the great powers remain a mystery. Some economic forecasts envision a massive boost to productivity and growth, while others are less optimistic. If even part of the hype surrounding AI’s economic and military applications proves true, this area of the technological competition may decide the U.S.-China rivalry all by itself. Some analysts expect further developments in AI — including, perhaps, the achievement of artificial general intelligence, the moment when an AI model can solve a broad range of problems and operate autonomously through many stages of self-determined action in ways that vastly outpace human consciousness — to augment national power in almost magical ways.</p> +<p>Our research indicates that Russia’s artillery supply chain is exposed and vulnerable in its need for foreign sources of high-quality chrome ore to sustain its barrel production. Much of this material is sourced from outside Russia, and so it should be feasible to disrupt its delivery through the focused use of sanctions and by adjusting existing sanctions legislation and export control regulations.</p> -<p>If AI has such effects, whoever gets to critical thresholds first, or whoever develops a massive lead in a more gradual and emergent process, will enjoy a competitive advantage far beyond even that granted to earlier great powers by the Industrial Revolution. Many commentators agree with the recent statement of the U.S. Special Competitive Studies Project that, “The geopolitical and technological imperatives of the emerging international landscape demand a grand strategy, one that harnesses the transformative potential of AI and other emerging technologies.”</p> +<p>Russia is self-sufficient to a significant degree in the raw materials required for barrel production. There is, however, evidence to suggest that Russia requires substantial imports of chromium ore to produce pure chromium, which is used for chrome-plating barrels. This is a process whereby the interior of the barrel bore is coated with a layer of chrome between 50 and 180 microns thick. This thin layer of chrome protects the bore from the corrosive effects of firing. Shooting can damage the barrel. Regular maintenance, such as cleaning and lubrication, helps manage this wear. The chrome coating makes maintenance easier and reduces the harmful effects of shooting. Chromium is also used to alloy the steel used to produce artillery barrels, which makes it an important raw material for the overall barrel supply chain.</p> -<p>How all of this will play out remains unknown. Export controls on semiconductors and other AI-supporting technologies may provide the United States with a significant and growing lead that it never relinquishes, or AI progress may stall across the board. New forms of AI may begin to deliver astonishing levels of national advantage, or not. The only thing clear today is that the potential of AI to be the single point of success or failure in the technology competition is very real.</p> +<p>Chromium is valued for its high corrosion resistance and hardness. It can be processed into different types of compounds, such as oxides and ferrochromium, which are used to harden steel, manufacture stainless steel or make anti-corrosion coatings. Chrome ore (chromite) tends to be quite accessible and is primarily extracted using open-pit mining. The extracted ore is mainly used to produce an alloy of iron and chromium called ferrochromium, or to process the ore into pure chromium.</p> -<h4 id="conceptualizing-endgames-in-scientific-and-technological-contests">Conceptualizing Endgames in Scientific and Technological Contests</h4> +<p>Russia produces between 1.5 and 2 million tonnes of chrome ore per year from the Saranovo Rudnaya mine and in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District. Russia’s demand for chromium is around 1.47 million tonnes per year, with a growth trend to 1.6 million tonnes by 2025 and 1.73 million tonnes by 2030. About 55.2% of this consumption is covered by imports, despite Russia technically producing enough by weight to meet its needs, because Russian ore has a lower chromium content. For example, deposits in the Polar Urals or the Perm region are characterised by a chromium content of 38% and 37% respectively. Typically, ore with a chromium content in excess of 45%, along with a low ratio of impurities like aluminium and silicon, is required for metallurgic uses. Russia is also understood to have a state reserve system that may include chromium as a strategic raw material, which means that a disruption to chromium supply could lead it to rely on this reserve.</p> -<p>The contest for the high ground of science and technology in the twenty-first century, and in particular for predominance in AI, represents one of the very few essential components of the larger U.S.-China rivalry. Both countries have embraced strategies for scientific and technological advantage that are increasingly creating a zero-sum mindset in the other, both, evidently, without a clear sense of what success looks like. One leading observer has noted that the United States “stumbled into” the generalized application of export controls and other technology restrictions: “We started using these weapons before we really knew how to use them.” As the intensity of the overall rivalry worsens, moreover, the significance of the technology competition will grow as well. The more each side comes to fear war as an inevitable outcome of the rivalry, the more each will view victory in the technology competition — and its implications for military and societal capabilities in conflict — as an existential priority.</p> +<p>In addition to Russia’s ore being generally of insufficient quality for gun barrels and pure chromium, the country’s reserves are underdeveloped. Russia technically sits on 52.4 million tonnes of chrome ore, around 2% of the world’s global reserves, however it has only initiated development of 13% of those reserves. As a result, it is forced to import large quantities of raw materials to meet its chromium needs – for pure chromium in particular. Krasny Oktyabr’s relationship with the Aktobe Ferroalloy Plant in Kazakhstan, which manufactures artillery barrels, reinforces this conclusion. The two entities have no public relationship, but commercial trade data reveals that the Aktobe Ferroalloy Plant delivered more than 4,000 tonnes of high carbon ferrochrome, worth approximately $9 million, to Krasny Oktyabr between March and May 2024. As transactions between Russia and Kazakhstan are not normally recorded, it is possible that this relationship has existed for much longer.</p> -<p>The current U.S. approach to this contest includes many important and necessary steps — investing in U.S. science and technology, nurturing talent in key fields, protecting U.S. technology from slipping into the hands of rivals, and developing partnerships with allies and friends. But the present approach promises only endless competition without a horizon; it does not spell out a true long-term theory of success. The ways in which the United States can protect its most critical national interests and sustain truly necessary degrees of power and influence remain unclear.</p> +<p>Chromite has the harmonised system (HS) code of 2610, which is used to monitor trade between countries. Data for 2023 indicates that Russia imported around $36.7 million worth of products under this HS code. Russia’s imports for 2023 and January to May 2024 show that most chromium-containing goods – $29.9 million – originated from South Africa, but that the majority of South African ore was exported to Russia via European countries, including $17.9 million from the Netherlands. Export data for Kazakhstan is not included in this analysis, as Kazakhstan and Russia are both members of the Eurasian Customs Union, which lacks detailed records on their mutual trade. In 2021, Kazakhstan was the primary supplier of chromium to Russia, accounting for 86.8% of imports. Although supplies from Kazakhstan have significantly decreased since 2022, it is likely that Kazakhstan remains a major supplier of chromium-containing goods to Russia. Information on other countries of interest, along with the dollar value of those supplies, are provided in Table 2 below. The available data for 2024 paints a markedly different picture, with less than $1 million in chromium-containing imports between January and May. This may indicate that Russia’s imports have reduced because of sanctions, or that Russia has limited the data made available on its imports.</p> -<p>Conceptualizing an endgame or vision of enduring success for a broad-based scientific and technological competition is extremely challenging, for several reasons. Treatments of the issue often use buzzwords like “control,” “hegemony,” or “domination” to describe potential great power influence over technology domains, but no such clean outcomes are likely. Competition encompasses myriad frontier technologies and dozens of subcomponents within each domain. Perhaps most of all, because science and technology advance without end, establishing a clear threshold for success or anything like a singular endgame remains elusive. This makes the contest in science and technology different from the larger rivalry, which, as a geopolitical phenomenon, can (and, if history is any guide, will) end.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/goX7Kgp.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Countries of Interest (the US and EU Members) Involved in Supply of Chromium-Containing Goods to Russia in 2023.</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider.</em></p> -<p>Another challenge relates specifically to AI and biotechnology. In these areas, the United States and China face not only competition from one another, but also threats from the technologies themselves. Unconstrained development of these domains has the potential to pose existential risks to either or both sides. Any vision of success must seek to mitigate those threats as well as guarantee national competitive position. What vision of enduring and stable success would serve all these goals?</p> +<p>The companies involved in extracting and processing chromite and exporting it to Russia, along with the dollar value of those exports in 2023, are provided in Table 3. The top three are mining companies which both extracted and exported chromium ore to Russia. The others are mainly involved either in processing chromium ore into various chromium compounds or reselling raw material. Of course, not all these imports are destined for Russia’s artillery supply chain; its oil and gas industry are significant consumers of chromite, too. However, there are five chromite importers in Russia with historical ties to the defence industry: Polema; Vladmettsentr; Industrial Systems; CTK Euro; and EK Resources. These companies imported $6,758,000 worth of chrome products across five different HS codes in 2023. EK Resources was responsible for importing $3,485,000 worth of products under HS code 2610 (through EK-Company AG “EKC.AG” as a supplier), indicating that it is potentially a key link in the supply of chromite imported to be processed into pure chromium for the lining of barrels.</p> -<h4 id="visions-of-success-in-scientific-and-technological-revolutions-the-lessons-of-history">Visions of Success in Scientific and Technological Revolutions: The Lessons of History</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K5RK4dd.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 3: The 10 Largest Suppliers Involved in the Chromite Supply Chain.</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider.</em></p> -<p>Looking to history, specifically, to the last transformational scientific and technological advances, is essential to developing an answer. What lessons might the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Industrial Revolution spanning the eighteenth to twentieth centuries, and the twentieth-century computing revolution offer for conceptualizing success in the current scientific and technological competition?</p> +<p>There are many methods of processing chromite to produce pure chromium. The most common is the aluminothermic method, which produces metals and alloys by reducing their oxides through a chemical reaction with aluminium. The largest producer of pure chromium in Russia is the powder chemicals plant Polema. Between 2015 and 2018, Polema made 100 deliveries of pure chromium compounds and other components to Russian military plants worth $6.4 million. In the first half of 2023, Polema had $928,000 in transactions with the Imperial Tula Arms Plant alone, which makes components for the 152 mm 2K25 Krasnopol guided munitions, as well as many other defence-related components. Polema also registered $134,000 in transactions with the Perm Machine Building Plant, as well as small orders with other Russian defence manufacturers.</p> -<p>This section relies on an extensive literature review, much of which was consulted for the RAND project on the social foundations of national competitiveness. That literature reviewed the sources and character of the Industrial Revolution, the factors energizing national dynamism and development in general, explanations for the West’s stunning surge of economic and technological development after 1500, and more focused assessments of scientific and technological revolutions. That broad set of sources offers several lessons that are applicable to the current scientific and technological competition. Taken together, they point in the direction of the three essential components mentioned above: domestic dynamism, network power, and resilience.</p> +<p>Overall, while disruptions to imports of chromite may be difficult, they are not impossible, especially given the increasing scrutiny on supply chains and continued sanctions pressure by the US, particularly via banks. Though Russia’s access to alternative suppliers like Turkey and India is a potential safeguard, the logistical complexities and the potential for sanctions to extend to those channels should not be underestimated. Thus, while chromium supply may not pose an immediate crisis, it remains a point of strategic vulnerability, especially in prolonged conflict scenarios where access to diverse and stable sources of critical materials becomes increasingly important. As with the majority of sanctions, the initial impact is likely to be indirect, and manifest itself in logistics and time costs, which does not defeat the purpose.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Technology revolutions encompass many interrelated technologies and techniques.</strong> Different countries might lead in distinct areas, but overall success comes from remaining competitive in a wide set of areas and in ways that provide critical synergies. It is the holistic interaction of these technologies that produces major advantage. During the Industrial Revolution, for example, the technologies of steam, railroads, mass production, and advanced agriculture, among others, comprised a much broader scientific and technological advance. Investing in a handful of leading technologies individually will not be enough for more comprehensive forms of success.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>The essential basis for scientific and technological advance is a supportive package of social qualities, with values, habits, and institutions that promote innovation and its widespread adoption throughout society.</strong> Many studies have demonstrated the importance of social values, structures, and institutions to innovation. The scientific and industrial revolutions were deeply grounded in such qualities, without which individual inventions and scientific breakthroughs would not have had their transformative effects. This understanding also comes in part from RAND’s analysis on the sources of long-term competitive advantage, which highlights seven major societal characteristics — including a forward-looking ambition, shared opportunity among the people, a learning and adapting mindset, and effective institutions, among others — that create the context for more material forms of national advantage, be it economic growth, military power, or technological innovation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>The supporting ecosystem for scientific and technological advance — including resources, infrastructure, energy, human capital, social values, and more — is the essential basis for long-term competitive advantage.</strong> Beyond the general societal characteristics that underwrite advantage in these areas, the most competitive nations have strong scientific and technology ecosystems — a broader context of material capabilities and networks, with elements ranging from capital to skilled workforces, and from transportation and energy infrastructure to intellectual networks among scientists and entrepreneurs — that provide the necessary support structure.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Science and technology are by nature shared and now global enterprises, and their advance cannot be limited to one country except in very specific industries and usually for limited periods of time.</strong> Any vision of success must think primarily in terms of generating greater national dynamism rather than denying advances to others. There are exceptions to this rule, such as industries or specific technologies where one firm or country manages to acquire unique capabilities, tacit knowledge, and sometimes specific technologies to dominate an industry. Examples include the German optics industry in the twentieth century and the present-day Dutch semiconductor lithography producer ASML. As a rule, however, history suggests that countries exist within a broad flow of scientific and technological progress, which is often propelled by shared breakthroughs and ideas and even investment across borders. The degree to which nations keep up is a function of their own domestic qualities, not others’ constraints. During the Industrial Revolution, for example, efforts to quash others’ progress played a relatively small role in determining relative standing, which was largely a function of key internal variables that determined each country’s scientific and technological prowess. A vision of success predicated upon denying progress to a rival, except for in a very small number of highly targeted and usually temporary controls, will not work in the long run.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Scientific and technological innovation is often initially fueled by the insights and efforts of a relatively small number of critically important scientists, entrepreneurs, engineers, and tinkerers.</strong> This was very much the story of the Industrial Revolution, in which a few hundred critical innovators, and a larger but still modest number of innovator-implementers in Britain, made a disproportionate difference. (The lesson here is not that the actual breakthroughs from a handful of geniuses make all the difference — quite the opposite, wider diffusion of those inventions, spurred by a broader community of application-focused engineers and tinkerers, is key. But those technically expert individuals who led the diffusion still represent only a tiny proportion of a nation’s overall population.) Creating an environment that empowers such actors, both the original inventors and those making practical applications — with capital, the rule of law, regulatory clearance, and other supports — is therefore an important component of the wider domestic environment needed for progress. In its most successful guises, this is usually a process of “mass flourishing” — bottom-up aggregations of dynamism rather than centralized direction.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>First-mover advantage is not permanent, but catching up requires the right national support system.</strong> So far there has not been a general technological revolution monopolized by a single country. Second movers can catch up and sometimes have certain advantages from doing so, but only if they manage to cultivate the essential supportive ecosystem. In the industrial era, only one country — Japan — managed this feat from a position of significant inferiority. Some analysts believe that there may be a profound first-mover advantage in AI, because the first countries past certain thresholds will begin to experience explosive growth and innovation; but this is a contested idea, based more on speculation than hard analysis at this point.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Government support is almost always critical for at least some steps in the process.</strong> There is a strong relationship between scientific and technological advantage and open, market-based systems, at least in the modern era. But comprehensive national programs of development, or efforts to align themselves to the demands of a new technological era, do not happen on their own. They require some level of what the RAND project termed an “active state” — efforts to promote and shape the necessary advances, and to mitigate their socioeconomic risks. Japan again provides a leading example of the competitive value of targeted and effective government action, both in the Meiji and postwar periods — through support for research and economic intelligence, direct backing for national champions, investments in infrastructure, and other means.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Diffusion is at least as important as technological breakthroughs to long-term sustained advantage.</strong> There is a significant literature on the role of diffusion in generating technological advantage, much of it arguing that many entrepreneurs in different states might generate similar ideas and even test products, but if those ideas and products do not spread throughout a society and become applied in numerous ways, the country will not gain the full degree of competitive advantage. The institutions, skills, and capabilities required for diffusion are somewhat different from those of initial innovation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>The accumulation of tacit knowledge is one of the most essential foundations for long-term success in scientific and technological innovation.</strong> Tacit knowledge is understanding or expertise built up through long experience — things like insight, intuition, skills in operating equipment, and other forms of knowledge that are not formalized or objective and therefore are difficult to express or transfer. Significant evidence suggests that countries or firms which accumulate tacit knowledge in key fields gain the potential for long-term advantage. This again points to the essential role of a broad-based socioeconomic foundation for technological progress, one which embeds tacit knowledge throughout multiple firms and industries.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Scientific and technological advances reshape the societies in which they occur, in ways that either promote long-term solidarity, resilience, and dynamism, or that cause disruptions and instabilities that undermine competitive standing.</strong> History suggests that long-term success in scientific and technological competitions is not mainly, or even mostly, about simple measures of relative standing. Instead, such success concerns how technological advances echo through society and create or disrupt patterns of social, economic, and political life in ways that either enhance or undermine national competitive dynamics and resilience. Especially in their early phases, these effects can be deeply disempowering for workers and average people. The initial decades of the Industrial Revolution, for example, were devastating for wages and opportunities for many elements of the working and middle classes in Britain.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Countries that lead frontier technologies tend to become the hubs of international networks of research and production around those technologies, and to dominate norm and standard setting for these domains.</strong> The fundamental international scaffolding for any science and technology revolution involves a combination of networks of exchange, norms, rules, and standards that end up providing advantages to some countries over others. Like so many other forms of advantage, these tend to reflect synergistic dynamics, with some elements building on others. During the Industrial Revolution, to cite one example, Britain’s position in world trade networks, standard setting for emerging technologies, and influence in international institutions that began to set the context for science and technology reinforced the country’s advantage conveyed by its domestic dynamism.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h4 id="manufacturing-process">Manufacturing Process</h4> -<h4 id="a-vision-of-success">A Vision of Success</h4> +<p>The raw materials for an artillery barrel are cast, rolled, and forged in several steel plants traditionally specialising in artillery-grade alloys. Further processing involves cutting, drilling the bore, polishing, and assembly with other elements (such as the breech and recuperator) into a barrel module ready for the assembly plant. The first stage is done by plants with special steel processing capacity, such as Krasny Oktyabr and MMK. The barrel module manufacturers buy steel blanks from these suppliers and process them into finished barrels and fully assembled artillery parts ready to be installed onto the appropriate system. There are two primary methodologies for producing large-calibre artillery barrels.</p> -<p>Developing a vision of success requires the United States to define its goals: What is it trying to achieve? What are the ends against which success should be measured?</p> +<p>The first primary methodology is radial or rotary forging. In this method, a steel blank that is shorter than the total length required is drilled and heated, before being inserted into a radial forging machine. The machine inserts a mandrel inside the blank, which can carry the rifling in the case of howitzer barrels, and the blank is passed through four hammers that operate at a very high speed and pressure to shape the steel around the mandrel. This process hardens and stretches the steel and forms it into shape in a matter of minutes.</p> -<p>The lessons of history and the challenges posed by China to U.S. interests suggest at least four necessary components, or objectives, of any concept of success in the scientific and technological rivalry:</p> +<p>The result will be precise, and close to the profile of the finished part. Machine tools can either be manually operated – that is, without a CNC – or automated with a CNC. Automated radial forging machines are much more precise, as they allow for the selection of the forging angle, forging diameter, and pressure. It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union also imported its barrel-forging equipment from the West: a CIA report from 1982 covers the procurement of 26 automated rotary forges from Austrian company Gesellschaft fuer Fertigungstechnik und Maschinenbau (GFM). One machine, an SXP 55, was installed at a Perm factory in 1975 and provided the capacity to produce artillery barrels up to 203 mm in calibre. The CIA estimated that a large-calibre barrel could be forged using this technology in two to 10 minutes, and that the USSR had procured sufficient spares for 15 years of operations. The same report estimated that the Soviets could produce 14,000 barrels per year, although this only relates to the production of unfinished barrels. Rotary forging machines have a number of civil applications as well as military outputs, and it is possible that many of these GFM machines were imported for civil production, although Russia’s mobilisation laws do allow for the transfer of capacity and machinery from civil to military production.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>The domestic U.S. foundations of scientific and technological innovation, including the supporting science and technology ecosystem, must remain at a world-class level.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The domestic capability for the diffusion and application of those technologies — the financial and infrastructural foundations of the technology ecosystem, the domestic standard-setting processes, the supply of educated specialists to develop new breakthroughs, and much more — must be vibrant and effective at enabling the practical employment of advances.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>No major rival should obtain a monopoly position or a lasting, dominant advantage in any critical field of science and technology.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The United States should remain free from catastrophic risk to its science and technology sector, military capabilities, or broader society due to foreign dependencies on supplies of the most essential components or materials or vulnerability to active disruption.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>The second primary methodology of barrel production is for the blank to be shaped externally before the bore is drilled using a type of machine tool that holds the blank in place as a channel is drilled through the blank from one end to the other. The drill is fed a constant supply of a lubricant that is designed to remove debris and cool the metal and drill. This process may take place in two stages, with course drilling followed by fine drilling. It can take 24 hours. Once the barrel is shaped and complete, it is heat treated in a shaft furnace with as many as three barrels that are brought up to temperatures of around 500°C before being cooled in oil. This regularises the grain structure within the barrel and is designed to ensure it is suitably hardened against the stresses of firing. To increase the service life of barrels, the interior of the barrel bore is then coated with chrome between 50 and 180 microns thick, which increases the service life by 2.5–3 times. There are separate processes for the breech and block, which are forged from similar steel to the barrel. Additional components such as a muzzle brake and recuperators are also produced, all using high-quality alloy steels. These components are combined to create a complete barrel that is then painted, tested and inspected before being shipped to one of the manufacturers, which adds the barrel to a howitzer.</p> -<p>It is important to note that these objectives do not require the United States to achieve monopoly or a lasting dominant position in any arena. The lessons of history seem to be clear on this point: among the most advanced science and technology powers, the goal cannot be to achieve monopoly or controlling position in any technology area for a sustained period. Such outcomes are possible for a limited time and only in very specific fields. Long-term national security and power comes from seeking the four broader and more self-directed goals above.</p> +<p>Altogether, the production process for a batch of artillery barrels using this methodology can take up to four months, according to the CEO of SKB, which sits within the Motovilikha Plant in Perm. The full process can also include the production of steel blanks, which may take up to five months. This equates to a potential nine-month delivery schedule for batch orders made by the Russian MoD. This provides a fuller indication of barrel production capacity at many of Russia’s plants. Furthermore, barrel-forging machines are shared between calibres, so a rotary forging machine that is used to make a 152 mm howitzer barrel may also be used in the production of 125 mm tank barrels. Only one manufacturer, Zavod No. 9, is understood to have distinct production lines for different calibres. In addition, Russian manufacturers report recycling worn and damaged barrels from the frontline, as well as old Soviet-era barrels. A rotary forge can also be used for this process by reducing a larger calibre barrel to a smaller one. Furthermore, some models, like the 2S5 Giatsint 152 mm howitzers, do not need new barrel production, as a large stock of barrels has been retained from the Soviet era, according to Vyacheslav Tsybulin, the production director at SKB.</p> -<p>Those objectives, combined with the lessons surveyed above, point to one essential finding about scientific and technological advantage: success starts not with performance relative to a rival, but with the qualities of a nation and its society that offer the basis for enduring innovation, development, diffusion, and societal mitigation efforts. That is the primary lesson of earlier scientific and technological revolutions. Britain did not actively seek to ruin French or Prussian/German modernization (or did so only at the margins). Instead, the country generated an engine of scientific and technological application that could not be matched. That was the only effective route to long-term advantage; and it was, in large part, when Britain lost the societal and economic prerequisites for dynamism that their advantage flagged, and they could not bring about an endgame of true success. Their earlier recipe for success is the model the United States should seek to follow. The Western technology controls applied to the Soviet Union made some difference, but the real determinant of success was the relative energy and dynamism of the two societies and their institutions.</p> +<p>As barrel production is key to maintaining an effective fighting force, it is useful to assess Russia’s capacity to produce barrels. This is naturally challenging, but there are some data points that provide an indication of Russia’s ability to meet these needs. UralVagonZavod reported the capacity to manufacture 328 armoured vehicles of all types in its 2019 annual report. This was stated to be 64% of the company’s total production capacity, indicating a theoretical maximum of 512 armoured vehicles per year, which in turn suggests the ability to produce 500 barrels of all calibres per year. This would not be sufficient to meet the needs of the war in Ukraine, either those generated by losses of howitzers, or those arising from wear and tear. However, by April 2024, production of self-propelled and towed howitzers had increased by 10 and 14 times respectively, compared with 2022, Bekhan Ozdoev, an industrial director at Rostec, claimed. Given the above, this figure is likely reached through a combination of refurbishing old barrels, matching existing stocks to new howitzers, and new production. If 30% of UralVagonZavod’s production in 2019 was focused on artillery systems, these figures indicate an approximate theoretical production maximum of 1,000 howitzers of all types per year. Within this, it is reasonable to conclude that the focus of forging may have shifted away from tank barrels and towards artillery barrels, which may mean that Russia is able to produce hundreds of new barrels per year.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/80xqLXP.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Figure 2: Conceptualizing a Vision of Success in the U.S.-China Science and Technology Competition</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UIoHcsE.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 4: Russia’s Barrel Manufacturers and the Entities They Supply.</strong> Source: Financial data seen by authors.</em></p> -<p>The figure above outlines the three-part vision of success in graphical terms. As it suggests, the centerpiece for any enduring positive end state in such a competition is a domestic engine of dynamism and technological integration. Everything flows from that — national competitive advantage, resilience, and standing relative to others. The domestic foundation for success in turn has three major components: nurturing a supportive ecosystem for science and technology, promoting diffusion, and managing the wider social effects of technology for competitive advantage. As suggested above, those in turn rely on even more essential national qualities — ambition and willpower, solidarity, widely shared social opportunity, an innovative and learning mindset, effective institutions, and other factors essential to a healthy engine of dynamism.</p> +<p><em>PRODUCTION IN-DEPTH: MACHINE TOOLS</em></p> -<p>The wider recipe for success includes two other elements which support that core domestic emphasis. One is a supportive international context in the form of rules and norms, and also friendly networks and coalitions that underwrite U.S. scientific and technological strength, so that the United States continues to sit at the hub of critical network power in science and technology. A second element involves a future in which critical vulnerabilities and dependencies have been mitigated to some degree, especially in that very small number of technologies or areas of scientific knowledge where ensuring some sort of lead or advantage may have disproportionate leverage over the wider competition.</p> +<p>Artillery barrels are complex metal structures that require large, precise machinery throughout the production process. In this respect, the question of existing production capabilities looms large. Russia is thought to have access to legacy Soviet barrel-manufacturing machines. Also, Russia relies on metalworking machine tools, including CNC machines, offering higher degree of automation and precision that support many parts of the artillery supply chain; they are used in the production of engines, in shaping the shell casings of artillery ammunition, in barrel production and in the production of many other weapons. Russian internal demand for machine tools is partially met by local producers, particularly manufacturers within the military-industrial complex like Kalashnikov and Rostec, which specialize in machinery for military production. Efforts to expand domestic production capabilities are also underway. Still, as of 2024, Russia has limited production capacities for machine tools manufacturing and imported many of its systems from Europe prior to 2022. For example, the Motovilikha Plant announced a contract in 2011 to procure a new radial forging machine from GFM in Austria. The machine was expected to replace the legacy equipment operating at the plant, which indicates that it may have been designed to replace the SPX 55 referenced in the CIA report from the previous section. China became Russia’s main supplier of machine tools after 2022, and was the primary source of CNC radial forging machines that were imported in 2023. It is unclear how all of these machines will be used; however, Russia’s defence industry uses around 70% of all machine tools in Russia. And there is evidence that a portion of them have been used to expand artillery production capacity. At the same time, import was the primary source for meeting the machine tools consumption demands, with 70% of machine tools and 80–90% of spare parts and components coming from abroad.</p> -<p>This approach does not emphasize holding China back as a necessary component of any vision for success. A good end state emerges from domestic vibrancy paired with strong positions in global networks. The challenge emerges in avoiding Chinese dominance in key industries where the United States and its friends and allies do not have competitive industries. There will be a great temptation to punish Chinese firms in order to attempt to level the playing field rather than push to develop indigenous capabilities, but in the long run that is likely to be a losing gambit. If Western 5G providers cannot offer competitive technology and prices to Huawei, sanctions will get the United States only so far in obstructing Chinese leadership in the sector.</p> +<p>Russian companies have historically preferred Western machine tools over Chinese equivalents, as they are more precise and higher quality. Russia’s longstanding preference for Western machines and components provided Ukraine’s Western partners with a critical lever of influence on the Russian war machine that was overlooked until late 2023, when a raft of sanctions came into force. Russia had accelerated its imports of machine tools and their control systems from $29.46 million in January 2022, a month before the full-scale invasion, to $120.86 million in July 2023, with most coming from China. As the sanctions came into effect, supplies from nation-states in the Sanctions Coalition Against Russia (the Sanctions Coalition) decreased dramatically.</p> -<p>While this simple formula leaves many questions to be answered, it also suggests a specific research agenda to flesh out this concept of success. Dozens of research reports have already been published on important questions bearing on these issues, including: the most essential technology areas in which the United States must ensure global competitiveness; technologies in which China has the closest thing to an emerging predominant position, the risk posed by each, and the essential elements of a sufficient U.S. position in them; sectors more subject to natural monopolies or “moats” preventing others from gaining equivalent positions; and specific supply chain or material dependencies that threaten continued U.S. science and technology progress. Questions that remain without definitive answers include the following:</p> +<p>At the same time, Russia’s demand for machine tools, including with CNC, is increasing. This is due to many different factors. Part of the increase is driven by Russia’s struggle to recruit enough personnel to meet its production needs. The Russian media outlet Izvestia estimated that Russia was short of 4.8 million workers in 2023, and recruitment adverts on the websites of many Russian defence companies point to challenges in expanding production. Machine tools, especially those with CNC, allow fewer personnel to perform a given role – albeit personnel with a higher level of training. Moreover, as of 2023, 63–65% of capital equipment in the defence and related industries was worn out or approaching the end of its service life. Finally, Russia is expanding its ammunition and artillery production capacity, as well as its production of drones and all the materials of war, which drives the need for additional machine tools. Russia’s domestic machine tool-building industry cannot meet this demand; it produced 9,269 machine tools in 2023, up from 7,221 in 2022. At the same time, imports of processing machine tools for various materials, including metal, for the same period are understood to have exceeded 60,000 units, indicating the extent of Russia’s import dependency. To meet this need, Russia has turned to China, which is becoming a key supplier of goods and technologies critical to Russia’s military-industrial complex using the following three mechanisms, explored in more detail below:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>The most cost-effective investments and policies to promote the U.S. position in critical fields and thus sustain domestic dynamism (including a critical assessment of recent U.S. industrial policy support for key industries)</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The most important parts of the supportive ecosystem for leading areas of scientific research and technological innovation</p> + <p>Re-export of machine tools manufactured by countries from the Sanctions Coalition.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The most important mechanisms for the diffusion and application of innovations, including their weaknesses and areas where public or private action could strengthen them</p> + <p>Supply of machine tools manufactured at Western subsidiary factories located in China.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Strategies for overturning Chinese leadership in key areas (such as solar power and 5G) where they have achieved temporary dominance, in part by developing leapfrog approaches that position the United States for leadership in successor technologies</p> + <p>Supply of Chinese machine tools that rely upon Western components, technologies, and expertise.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>If the vision suggested here is indeed the route to success in the scientific and technological contest with China, then the United States may enjoy important advantages. Despite the large role of the private sector in China’s development and technology sector, the United States continues to have a far more open system, one more intrinsically oriented to generating grassroots experimentation and energy. Recent trends suggest real problems for China, with the growing emphasis on the sort of orthodoxy and control that are devastating to innovation. China is not and will never be the Soviet Union, but the U.S. system starts the race with intrinsic advantages.</p> - -<p>There remains work to be done. The RAND analysis on the societal foundations of national competitiveness has suggested that the essence of the twenty-first-century competitive paradigm for great powers is effective governance of all kinds. And it has highlighted an urgent requirement for the United States: to transcend the social and institutional ossification, so characteristic of late-stage great powers, that has set in with many industrial-era institutions today. The modern analogy to the constraining orthodoxy, conservatism, and tradition that held back the laggards of the Industrial Revolution is red tape, bureaucratic inertia, path dependence, excessive hierarchy, and confining management techniques. Finding ways to free as much progress as possible from these straightjackets — even while protecting humanity from the risks of some key technologies — may well be the best route to competitive advantage.</p> - -<p>This concept of a route to success in science and technology — one focused on spurring the United States’ domestic dynamism — can fit nicely into a larger vision of a successful endgame for the rivalry as a whole. Rivalries do eventually end. From the roster of historical possibilities, a peaceful endgame for the U.S.-China competition will have to involve mutual decisions — particularly one from China, as the dissatisfied power of the two — that both countries can better promote their long-term power and interests by transcending the zero-sum competition to some new form of relationship. Such an endgame is most likely to emerge through a combination of political shifts, changing perceptions of interests, and growing concerns about threats other than the rival.</p> - -<p>It may take decades to reach that point. In the meantime, the United States, while competing and opposing Chinese goals and ambitions where necessary, can preserve the possibility for such a peaceful endgame by adopting strategies that deny Chinese hegemony, but do so in a way that is focused on U.S. strength rather than on trying to undermine China. A vision of success for science and technology built around U.S. domestic dynamism would achieve both of those goals.</p> - -<h3 id="the-united-states-needs-a-broader-vision">The United States Needs a Broader Vision</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="lily-mcelwee">Lily McElwee</h4> - <h4 id="deputy-director-and-fellow-freeman-chair-in-china-studies-csis">Deputy Director and Fellow, Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p>Over the past decade, Beijing has firmly adopted a statist, security-driven approach to economic governance, become more coercive in its region, and begun proactively undermining liberal norms abroad. These developments required Washington to revisit long-held expectations for China’s rise and move into a more competitive mindset. The United States is now transitioning from diagnosing to addressing risks posed by China. The Biden administration expanded the Trump administration’s tariffs, multiplied export controls on high-end technology, and sought to unwind supply chains out of China. China-related bills increased over sixfold from the 113th Congress (2013–15) to the 116th Congress (2019–21).</p> - -<p>Many experts argue that Washington will need a concrete set of goals for its China policy, as intense bilateral frictions will endure for decades to come. Instead, the Biden administration has sought to compete with China where needed to sustain and advance the United States’ preferred vision for the global order. This is a more durable and flexible approach, one more conducive to vital coalition building with U.S. partners in the years ahead — but it could use a stronger foundation. What is needed now is not a “vision of victory” for China policy but a bold and well-specified U.S. “vision of victory” for the global order.</p> - -<h4 id="why-visions-of-victory-for-china-policy-dont-cut-it">Why Visions of Victory for China Policy Don’t Cut It</h4> - -<p>Escalating U.S.-China tensions have led practitioners and analysts from the United States and elsewhere to suggest that Washington needs a vision of victory for its China policy. Proposed visions range from outright regime change in Beijing at an extreme to sustained U.S. global dominance to policy-based goals seeking to blunt problematic Chinese behaviors until they change for reasons the United States cannot predict or foresee. Advocates of any one of these visions of victory suggest that clear objectives for China policy will improve the focus and effectiveness of U.S. actions by guiding tough questions around prioritization and trade-off management, improving bureaucratic alignment, and providing more sustained signaling to allies and partners about the direction of U.S. policy.</p> - -<p>Upon closer examination, these arguments run into several problems.</p> - -<p>First, clarity on goals for U.S. policy toward China does not necessarily translate into more efficient and directed policymaking. Take the case of U.S. investment screening reform, for example. In 2016–17, a bipartisan set of lawmakers and both the Obama and Trump administrations expressed interest in more scrutiny of inbound Chinese investment. Despite consensus around U.S. goals (in this case, curbing openness to Chinese capital), various parts of the Trump administration, business community, and Congress came up with their own ideas of how to achieve them. Debates ranged from the jurisdictional (e.g., the locus of certain regulatory authorities) to the philosophical (e.g., the proper role of the state in commerce) to the practical (e.g., how to balance trade-offs, such as scalability versus nuance).</p> - -<p>Clear goals for what the United States would like to see from China do not tell U.S. policymakers how to reconcile these tricky choices over priorities and trade-offs. This is clear from debates over outbound investment screening today. Proponents and opponents have a similar goal — to slow China’s military modernization — yet reach very different conclusions on whether such a mechanism will help us get there. Advocates argue that U.S. investments in China need to be screened and, in some cases, prohibited to prevent Americans from funding China’s technological and military ambitions. Opponents argue that such a mechanism is counterproductive: U.S. investments in China enable U.S. firms to keep tabs on innovations coming from the Chinese economy, an advantage the United States should not forfeit. Concrete goals toward China will not be a cure-all for tough decisions around prioritization and trade-off management in the policymaking process, as advocates suggest.</p> +<p>According to an analysis of Chinese customs data by the Carnegie Endowment, Beijing exports over $300 million worth of dual-use items to Russia every month. In 2023, China was responsible for approximately 90% of Russia’s imports of goods on the G7’s high-priority export control list. Machine tools exports from China to Russia grew 10-fold from $6.5 million in February 2022 to $68 million in July 2023, representing 57% of Russia’s imports of machine tools, up from 12% before the invasion. Pavel Luzin, an expert on the Russian defence industry, has assessed that China’s share of Russian imports of machine tool parts grew to 32% in 2022, compared to pre-invasion period, and to at least 80–90% in 2023.</p> -<p>A second problem is that over-specified visions of victory for China policy lack flexibility, whether focused on China’s political system, power, or policies. There is no guarantee, for example, that regime change in China would result in a country neatly conforming to U.S. interests. Some analysts have pointed to the example of Communist Russia giving way to Vladimir Putin’s Russia to make this case. Likewise, a weaker Beijing could still threaten U.S. interests. Russia offers another example: its gross domestic product (GDP) is 10 percent of China’s and yet its actions have proven even more destabilizing and disruptive to international peace and prosperity in the past two years. Declaring “victory” after China democratized, or grew substantially weaker economically or militarily, would be short-sighted.</p> +<p>This analysis indicates that there are avenues for disrupting Russia’s artillery supply chain through targeted sanctions and diplomatic pressure to restrict the supply of quality machine tools. As of August 2024, a minority of the Chinese machine tool manufacturers that are among Russia’s critical suppliers were sanctioned by any member of the Sanctions Coalition. This gap in the international sanctions regime allows Chinese companies to export and re-export machine tools, including with CNC, to Russia without consequences, to manufacture Western machine tools under licence and to build critical Western technology into machines that would be far less capable without them. Many of these machines are then used to build weapons to fight Ukraine and threaten the West with nuclear war.</p> -<p>The same is true for visions of victory for China policy that seek to blunt a set of Beijing’s practices, defined a priori. Say “victory” were a China that approaches military modernization more transparently, calls off its territorial pursuits, promotes domestic consumption, and curtails problematic practices such as intellectual property theft, cyber hacking, and an increasingly statist approach to economic governance. For one, it would be challenging to know whether these practices had stopped for good or might be resumed under a new leader or the same leader down the road. Putin’s Russia, for example, was causing far less trouble in 2012 than in 2022, and optimistic U.S. and European assumptions about its future trajectory 10 years ago led to problematic dependencies today. Moreover, new threats from Beijing could arise at any time, which might prove a better use of limited U.S. diplomatic attention and resources.</p> +<p><strong>China as a Re-Export Hub</strong></p> -<p>Third, visions of victory for the United States’ China policy risk jeopardizing much-needed coordination with market democracies. U.S. power on the world stage is declining in relative terms. Still, the United States and its closest allies — including the G7 and key Indo-Pacific partners such as Australia and South Korea — boast nearly half of global GDP, over half of the world’s largest companies by market capitalization, and among the world’s most sophisticated militaries. Beyond this, unilateral U.S. measures only go so far in a world of long, globally diversified supply chains. Controls on advanced chips and chip equipment exports to China in late 2022, for example, only have a chance to slow China’s military technology trajectory because Japan and the Netherlands followed suit. Allied coordination will, therefore, be essential to push back against China’s coercive tendencies, deter its regional aggression, improve the effectiveness of U.S. technology and economic controls, and minimize the chances of loopholes and backfilling in technology protection.</p> +<p>China serves as a re-export hub for machine tools (including with CNC) manufactured in Western countries and Sanctions Coalition states. The following supply chain assessment is based on Russia’s imports under 18 HS codes corresponding to machine tool products, and originating from 10 Western countries with active machine tools production.</p> -<p>This coordination is not guaranteed. Visions of victory for China policy will make it harder. The close allies mentioned above would distance themselves from a bid for political transformation in China, given their exposure to the Chinese economy and the amount of resistance such a goal would provoke in Beijing. Visions of victory directed at China’s policies would be less off-putting to allies, but even G7 economies remain uneasy about naming China explicitly in policies clearly designed to address China-related concerns. This suggests that unilaterally articulating a set of China-specific objectives will not necessarily make enlisting allied cooperation on everything from export controls to deterrence measures in the Indo-Pacific any easier.</p> +<p>The data indicates that at least 2,113 companies supplied machine tools manufactured in Western countries to Russia during 2023 and the first quarter of 2024. Among these suppliers, Chinese entities rank second (340 companies, or 17.5%), behind only Turkey (508 companies, or 26.16%). The rest of the suppliers originate from Germany (8.50%), South Korea (6.75%), Taiwan (6.08%), Italy (5.92%), the UAE (4.63%), Lithuania (2.47%) and Serbia (2.21%). The total value of Russia’s machine imports over the same time period was $4.5 billion. Chinese companies accounted for $568.6 million or 12.6% of the total during 2023 and the first quarter of 2024. Chinese entities are increasingly facilitating the re-export of machine tools and equipment to Russia from neighbouring countries. For instance, Chinese entities account for 41% of entities re-exporting Japanese machine tools products to Russia, 26% of those re-exporting Taiwanese machine tools, and 19% of those re-exporting South Korean machine tools. There are 36 Chinese companies among the top suppliers of Western machines to Russia for 2023 and the first quarter of 2024. Only five of those companies have been sanctioned by members of the Sanctions Coalition – one by the US, the EU and Switzerland (Shenzhen Biguang Trading Co. LTD), three just by the US (Silver Technology LTD, Most Development LTD, Agu Information Technology Co. LTD), and one just by the EU (Afox Corporation LTD).</p> -<h4 id="thinking-bigger">Thinking Bigger</h4> +<p>For example, the Chinese companies Agu Information Technology (AIT) and Yinuo Supply Chain Management (YSCM) were established in April and August 2022, respectively, shortly after the full-scale invasion. From the start of 2023 to the end of the first quarter of 2024, they exported $75 million worth of US and Taiwanese machines, including with CNC, to Russia, and both supplied machines to importers close to the Russian defence industry. AIT’s largest client was the Russian company Vneshekostil, which has been under US blocking sanctions since September 2023. YSCM became a supplier to the Russian company known as LLC Energy Industries. According to public procurement registers and financial data available to the authors, the latter has cooperated with Russian defence enterprises including Admiralty Shipyards, the largest Russian manufacturer of diesel-electric submarines, and Elektrokhimpribor Combine, a nuclear weapons company, among many others.</p> -<p>The Biden administration recognized these challenges in its 2022 National Security Strategy, committing to compete with China where needed — while aligning with partners and investing in domestic strength — to protect a “free, open, prosperous, and secure international order.” Many call this approach “managed competition,” defined as competing across a variety of domains to reinforce and defend the international order that the United States prefers while avoiding conflict.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yemjYYe.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 5: Chinese Subsidiaries of Western Companies with Sales to Russia Exceeding $800,000 for 2023 – Q1 2024.</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider.</em></p> -<p>This approach has come under attack by Republicans and Democrats alike — the former publicly, the latter less so — for various reasons. Some argue that “managed competition” without an end goal for China makes U.S. competitive efforts unfocused. Others worry about room for interpretation of U.S. intentions among allies and partners in a way that undermines coalition building.</p> +<p><strong>Western Subsidiaries</strong></p> -<p>These critiques have merit, as elaborated below. However, none are insurmountable under the current approach. Where “managed competition” has suffered is not in design, but execution. Strategic competition over the global order becomes difficult without a clear vision of victory for this order. In recent years, however, domestic consensus over the United States’ preferred global order, and its role in sustaining this order, has come under strain.</p> +<p>Another dimension of Chinese support for Russia’s need for critical equipment is the supply of products manufactured at Western companies’ subsidiaries in China. An analysis of 30 Western brands that make up the main machine tools manufacturers indicates that 22 of them have direct subsidiaries registered in China (see Table 5). This study only examined subsidiaries that have their production facilities in China; it excludes those that only provide technical support, training or sales functions.</p> -<p>Within the Republican Party, various “tribes” compete for influence. These include “restrainers” that would prefer a more isolationist foreign policy in favor of a greater focus on domestic issues — which would mark a major departure for a globally engaged United States over the past decades; “prioritizers” that emphasize limitations on U.S. resources and support a full-scale reorientation of strategic resources to the Indo-Pacific; and “primacists” that assert the United States can and must remain globally engaged. Democrats under the Biden administration have declared ambitions to sustain the liberal political and economic order through broad international engagement, but even here, longstanding U.S. preferences for existing international rules and norms are clearly evolving.</p> +<p>Most of these machines are not exported to Russia directly by the Chinese subsidiaries, but via Chinese intermediaries. The case of the US company Hardinge illustrates a typical supply chain. In 1996, the company established a wholly owned subsidiary in Shanghai, Hardinge Machine Tool (Shanghai), which also serves as its demonstration, training and maintenance centre in China. The company’s largest production site in China is the Hardinge Jiaxing factory, established in 2010. This factory manufactured three vertical CNC machines worth $701,000 in 2023 that were delivered to Russia via Chinese distributor Beijing Zhuangguan International Import &amp; Export Trade Co.</p> -<p>Trade policy is one example where U.S. practice is departing from the principles of free and open markets that Washington used to espouse (across party lines) as a global priority. The Biden administration eschewed traditional trade deals. The Trump administration levied tariffs on China and U.S. allies alike and promises to do so again in a potential second term. Both major political parties now embrace industrial policy. Economic efficiency, once the gold standard for Washington and internationalizing U.S. firms alike, now comes second to other imperatives (national security, manufacturing jobs at home) in a “new Washington consensus,” to cite a term referenced by U.S. national security advisor Jake Sullivan.</p> +<p>The Russian importer of Hardinge’s equipment was Technoproekt, a research and production company specialising in development and production of pipeline valves for the gas, oil, and nuclear industries. Technoproekt is not subject to international sanctions despite having open state contracts to supply machine tools and fittings to Russian military-industrial enterprises such as the Electrokhimpribor Combine, which manufactures components for nuclear warheads. While Technoproekt could be using Hardinge’s machinery to produce valves for the gas industry, it could also be shipping those machines onwards to a key entity in Russia’s nuclear deterrent. There are at least 12 other Chinese entities that supplied CNC machine tools produced by Western subsidiaries to Russia in 2023.</p> -<p>This development reflects a broader reckoning over longstanding U.S. preferences for the rules and norms of interstate behavior. Understandably, perhaps, the world in 2024 looks different than it did during the United States’ “unipolar moment” of uncontested military, economic, and technology leadership in the 1990s. Global power is far more diffuse. China got rich in part by leveraging open markets in the West yet is now strengthening state-led economic governance at home. A revanchist Russia, regionally assertive China, and growing transnational challenges such as climate change and global pandemics have complicated the security landscape. A two-decade U.S. fight against transnational terrorism and “forever wars” in the Middle East have made Americans wary of sustained military commitments overseas and the sacrifices that come with global leadership.</p> +<p><strong>Chinese Machine Tools</strong></p> -<p>Yet, an underspecified vision for the global order leaves “managed competition” with China underperforming. For one, combating Chinese behavior without consensus on broader U.S. goals risks wasting national resources on fights the United States does not need to have. China’s cooperation in certain domains may help achieve a world that benefits the United States. Should Washington care if China deepens cooperation with Africa in agriculture and public health?</p> +<p>There is also evidence to suggest that the expansion of Russia’s defence industry is enabled by Chinese machine tools, including with CNC. For example, the Russian Izhevsk Unmanned Systems Research and Production Association, which manufactures Granat and Takhion reconnaissance drones that are used in Ukraine, recently announced that it had increased its production output. Russian media reported that the company had commissioned a new 5,800 m2 production shop complete with newly installed CNC machines and an increased number of machining centres. Then, in March 2024, a CNC machine produced by Chinese Dalian Machine Tool Group was observed at the new facility. Another Russian defence plant, NPO Kurganpribor – which manufactures components for land and naval artillery, as well as fuzes for tank rounds and rocket launchers, among many other products – opened a new 1,500 m2 production site with dozens of new CNC machines in August 2024. The manufacturers that can be identified include Zhe Jiang Headman Machinery and Shandong Weida Heavy Industries.</p> -<p>Reduced global hunger and disease promises benefits for the United States, including fewer demands on U.S. resources to address these issues, less global political instability and risk of conflict, richer societies that buy U.S. goods, and less migration pressuring U.S. borders.</p> +<p>The supply of Chinese machine tools with CNC to Russian defence plants is not straightforward, because Western states are critical suppliers of hardware that is essential for their production and use. For example, vital control instruments such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and distributed control systems (DCSs) usually come from non-Chinese companies, which hold nearly 100% of the small and medium/large PLC markets and 65% of the DCS market. This means that Russia is dependent on Western technology for its machine tools, and China is too. China’s reliance upon Western companies is further evidenced by the fact that of 10–16 Chinese manufacturers supplying the Russian market, at least 13 have confirmed connections with Western markets.</p> -<p>Further, absent an articulation of U.S. goals for the international system, allies and partners will indeed draw their own conclusions about the motivations behind competitive U.S. measures toward China. To boost European support for reducing reliance on China for critical goods, for example, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen adopted the term “de-risking” to distinguish a European approach from what was familiarly seen in Brussels and key EU capitals as a broader “decoupling” by the United States. This deliberate distancing was a powerful reminder of the wariness in many EU capitals to fully align with a U.S. approach many see as overly aggressive and confrontational. Confusion around broader U.S. global objectives among key allies and partners leaves space for such wariness to thrive.</p> +<h4 id="refurbishment">Refurbishment</h4> -<p>What is needed now is not a China-specific vision of victory but a well-articulated, bipartisan vision of victory for the global order. It is time for policymakers on both sides of the aisle to have hard conversations about the set of principles the United States would like to govern the international system going forward. This may seem an insurmountable task given the political debates over foreign policy and U.S. international engagement described above. On the other hand, most U.S. policymakers could agree that a vision for the global order is actually needed, which is more than can be said for a vision of victory for China policy itself. And this broader vision should be centered on a set of principles for state behavior rather than the resourcing and specific policies that will be required to support such principles — which is where the controversy generally lies.</p> +<p>Russia launched an extensive modernisation of its armed forces leading up to the invasion of Ukraine, concentrating much of its newest equipment in its better-trained and professionalised units. However, the losses incurred during the invasion, as well as the need to stand up additional units to fight the war, has exhausted Russia’s stocks of new systems. There was a huge effort to refurbish old howitzers that had been kept in storage from the Soviet era, with the result that up to 80% of Russia’s armoured fighting vehicles are now refurbished. The degree of refurbishment required depends upon the conditions that the vehicles have been stored in, and for how long.</p> -<p>This vision for the global order need not be revolutionary. “Winning” should mean the international system is characterized by policy preferences that both the United States and its closest allies have spent billions of dollars to sustain and advance as a basis for post–Cold War global peace and prosperity. These preferences must be adapted to geopolitical and domestic realities, but should include peaceful resolution of disputes, territorial integrity, the primacy of individual rights in international law and standards, unimpeded freedom of navigation and commerce, and space for democracy to flourish. U.S. strategy toward China and every nation should flow from this broader set of goals: the United States should welcome China’s international contributions but commit to blunt China’s behavior (or ability to carry out such behavior) where it threatens such principles.</p> +<p>It is understood that as of 2024, all new model production and repair is concentrated in Uraltransmash, while most repair and refurbishment of legacy models is conducted at Russia’s armoured vehicle repair plants and the Motovilikha Plant. The number of these facilities is unknown: they received their numbered names during the Second World War and some, if not most, were transferred to Rostec in the 2000s, which closed many that were not solvent. Below, six of the main armoured-vehicle plants are examined in more detail.</p> -<h4 id="a-stronger-foundation">A Stronger Foundation</h4> +<p>No. 103: One of the main armoured-vehicle repair plants is No. 103 in Atamanovka (Transbaikal region). This plant is the key military facility in the easternmost regions of Russia and is directly on the Trans-Siberian railway linking the European part of Russia and the Pacific coast, with a rail connection allowing the plant to load vehicles directly onto freight carriages. Satellite images reveal the plant has parking space for more than 1,000 vehicles.</p> -<p>The substance of United States’ China policy today would not necessarily change much under a more disciplined definition of global priorities. Preventing a Chinese attack on Taiwan that threatens an Asian democracy and risks destabilizing global confrontation, deterring China’s threats to freedom of navigation and trade in the Indo-Pacific, developing defensive mechanisms against Beijing’s coercive economic behavior, and fighting back against Beijing’s efforts to shape global rules and standards in illiberal ways would all be on the agenda. However, an approach of “managed competition” to shape the future international order is more flexible than a China-specific vision of victory. U.S. priorities toward China could evolve dynamically — based on a regular determination of where Beijing’s behavior runs counter to the United States’ preferred principles of the global order and, therefore, must be deterred or blunted.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/y7SvMFA.png" alt="image12" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Armoured-vehicle Repair Plant No. 103 in Atamanovka (Left) and its Main Parking for More Than 400 Heavy Machines (Right).</strong> Source: Airbus Defence and Space, RUSI, Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>Beyond its flexibility, this approach is conducive to coalition building. Support for a rules-based order — and a focus on threats that Beijing’s behavior poses in this light — have been central themes of the China strategies issued by the G7, many NATO countries, and key Indo-Pacific partners in recent years. This includes Berlin’s China strategy released in July 2023, the China policy paper of the Netherlands, the EU-China Strategic Outlook, and Tokyo’s National Security Strategy in 2022, among others. A principles-based approach to China strategy speaks to this common language, making it politically easier for these capitals to support U.S. competitive measures.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>No. 560: There is at least one more armoured-machine repair plant operating in Siberia – the Vozhaevka-based armoured-vehicle repair plant No. 560, which is visibly smaller than No. 103.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>No. 81: Much closer to the frontline is Armoured Vehicle Repair Plant No. 81 in Armavir, some 200 km from the official Russian-Ukrainian border, in the Donbas area.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>No. 61: Armoured Vehicle Repair Plant No. 61 is owned by UralVagonZavod in the St Petersburg region.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>No. 163: Armoured Vehicle Repair Plant No. 163 is located in the Krasnodar region.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>No. 144: Armoured Vehicle Repair Plant No. 144 in Yekaterinburg (close to Zavod No. 9 and Uraltransmash) has been contracted by the Russian MoD for upgrades of BMDs and 2S9 self-propelled mortars to 2S9-1.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Finally, this approach is better suited to counter Beijing’s bid for influence in the so-called Global South, a set of low-income and emerging economies that will increasingly shape the future global order. China builds influence in many of these countries by pushing a narrative that the United States is seeking to preserve its global hegemony at all costs and is unilaterally responsible for geopolitical tensions squeezing the development space of these economies. These narratives may seem far-fetched in Western capitals, but they get more airtime and traction in the Global South than is in U.S. interests. As one example, Beijing’s packaging of efforts such as AUKUS, the Quad, and the U.S.-Japan alliance as a destabilizing “NATOization” of the Indo-Pacific has gone some way to deter Southeast Asian states from engaging with the United States on security issues. Anchoring China policy in a clear, affirmative set of principles for the global order — and then following these principles — will help combat such narratives, more so than an approach more explicitly focused on forcing policy or political changes from Beijing.</p> +<p>All these plants were advertising for additional staff at the time of writing, with an emphasis on CNC operators and technical engineers, indicating the rapid expansion of these facilities. The majority of identified armoured-machine repair plants are involved in repair and overhaul of direct fire armoured fighting vehicles like tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. The 39th Arsenal in Perm is believed to be one of the only armoured-machine repair plants specialised in refurbishing artillery in the country. The property, including the land and buildings, had been acquired by a private entrepreneur following asset liquidation in 2021, but the liquidation was halted in the Russian courts in 2023. The case for doing so was based on the strategic importance of the plant. The current status of the plant and its equipment is unknown, but it is possible that it and its infrastructure – like the tracks that carry vehicles to and from the plant – have fallen into disrepair. It is understood that ad hoc facilities have been established closer to Ukraine for the repair of artillery systems, including regular maintenance like the replacement of barrels. However, this type of facility is unlikely to be capable of returning stored howitzers to a combat-fit state.</p> -<h4 id="looking-ahead">Looking Ahead</h4> +<p>Russia has a lot of equipment waiting for refurbishment; one assessment indicates that Russia had at least 10 storage bases, 12 artillery storage bases and 37 mixed equipment storage bases. For reference, one storage base – the 591st artillery warehouse in the Novgorod Region – was home to at least 400 howitzers in 2018. This indicates that Russia may have thousands of howitzers sitting in storage. The refurbishment of equipment has been accompanied by what appears to be a significant effort to stand up or restore armoured-machine and artillery repair plants closer to Ukraine. The majority of those that were functional in 2022 were in the Urals.</p> -<p>Greater consensus around U.S. goals for the international system going forward, across party lines, would help U.S. policymakers tackle both the “policy” and “political” dimensions of strategic competition with China in the decade ahead. This would provide a concrete and sustainable foundation for dynamic U.S. foreign policy prioritization as Beijing’s behavior evolves — and prove more useful in lubricating the joint action with allies and partners that will be necessary to resource U.S. goals in a more multipolar era.</p> +<p>However, Russian news outlets indicate that orders were given to establish facilities closer to Ukraine in late 2022. This suggests that Russia has established or will establish facilities designed to repair vehicles and artillery damaged in Ukraine and return it to the front line as quickly as possible. However, if the facilities to refurbish howitzers are specific to those vehicles, and have been allowed to atrophy, it is logical that artillery manufacturers like Uraltransmash and Motovilikha Plant would currently be responsible for refurbishing artillery stockpiles as well as manufacturing or overhauling new, more capable systems like the Msta-SM2 and 2S35 Koalitsiya.</p> -<h3 id="a-false-choice">A False Choice</h3> +<h3 id="chapter-4-ammunition-supply-chains">Chapter 4: Ammunition Supply Chains</h3> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="evan-s-medeiros">Evan S. Medeiros</h4> - <h4 id="penner-family-chair-in-asian-studies-and-cling-family-distinguished-fellow-in-us-china-relations-school-of-foreign-service-georgetown-university-senior-fellow-for-foreign-policy-center-for-china-analysis-asia-society-policy-institute">Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies and Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Relations, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University; Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy, Center for China Analysis, Asia Society Policy Institute</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Russia has an anticipated need for four million 152 mm artillery rounds and 1.6 million 122 mm rounds for offensive operations in 2025. The Russian defence industry can manufacture around 1.3 million 152 mm rounds and 800,000 122 mm rounds per year, so many of the required rounds will have to be procured from abroad or refurbished from legacy stockpiles. Russia has been refurbishing artillery ammunition and missiles at least since 2018, when Putin indicated that 550,000 rounds of ammunition and missiles had been refurbished and returned to service.</p> -<h4 id="contextualizing-us-debates-on-china">Contextualizing U.S. Debates on China</h4> +<h4 id="manufacturers-1">Manufacturers</h4> -<p>Since the end of World War II, U.S. debates about China policy have been both legendary and legion. They date back to the earliest days after the war, when scholars and policymakers asked big questions such as “who lost China?” As the Cold War raged, policymakers argued about how best to contain Mao Zedong’s China when it was acting as the “OG” of rogue states with its extensive support for Vietnam and “third world” revolutionary movements. By the 1970s and 1980s, rapprochement and normalization sparked a different conversation about the optimum means of building U.S.-China ties. Engagement had become all the rage.</p> +<p>Russia’s artillery ammunition manufacturers sit on top of a supply chain that is largely domestic, but some key resources are procured from abroad. There are three primary manufacturers of artillery ammunition in Russia: NIMI Bakhirev, the Plastmass Plant and KBP Shipunov. NIMI Bakhirev appears to perform as a contractor for the Russian MoD and control deliveries from companies like Plastmass and the Kazan Gunpowder Plant.</p> -<p>In the 1990s, U.S. debates about China changed, expanded, and intensified. Policymakers struggled to manage America’s competing interests when it came to China (e.g., economics versus human rights) as well as diverging assessments of China’s growing power. Conflict over Taiwan became a real possibility and a new axis of debate. China policy became even more politicized in Congress. In retrospect, the debates about China policy in this decade of great change became a Rorschach test of elites’ beliefs about global affairs, embodying the pacifying influence of international integration and economic interdependence, the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons, and the ability to shape authoritarian regimes, among other issues. This may remain so today.</p> +<p><em>NIMI BAKHIREV</em></p> -<p>Over the last decade, policy debates about China have come to focus, essentially, on two issues: (1) diagnosing the nature of the China challenge, and (2) prescribing strategies and policies to respond. The relative focus on diagnosis versus prescription has shifted as policymakers have responded to Chinese actions while navigating politics at home.</p> +<p>State Scientific Research Institute of Machine Building Bakhirev (NIMI Bakhirev) is Russia’s oldest and most prominent developer of artillery and tank ammunition. Like most of Russia’s artillery supply chain, it sits within the Tekhmash holding, part of Rostec. The available tax data indicates that it delivered goods worth around $1.7 billion to the Russian MoD in the first half of 2023. NIMI Bakhirev is Moscow-based and doesn’t have any known production facilities, which leads to the conclusion that it acts as an R&amp;D, procurement and supervising entity on behalf of the Russian MoD.</p> -<p>Debates about these two issues have taken a very different course in recent years, however. As China’s capabilities have grown and as Chinese leader Xi Jinping began to act assertively, discussions about the nature of the China challenge have converged, in broad terms. While some differences persist, most policymakers and analysts now perceive Chinese goals, capabilities, and behaviors as being directed at undermining both U.S. interests and values.</p> +<p>NIMI Bakhirev is understood to produce a range of 125 mm ammunition that is used by tanks, as well as 152 mm rounds for artillery. Since the invasion of Ukraine, the plant has made efforts to restart production of 122 mm ammunition and to upgrade and modernise the 100 mm ammunition used by the BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle.</p> -<p>By contrast, debates about the most appropriate response to the China challenge remain robust, with experts and officials constantly discussing the right mix of competitive and cooperative strategies. Competitive approaches have received far more attention and support in recent years, with discussions now focusing on a range of policies aimed at constraining, containing, and degrading Chinese capabilities. Indeed, strategies of both external and internal balancing are back in vogue. Such balancing strategies are even becoming linked in novel ways, as policies to expand alliances and to modernize U.S. industrial capabilities are now reinforcing one another. Nonetheless, the perennial grand strategy question of how to best mix policies of engaging, binding, and balancing Chinese power persists.</p> +<p><em>PLASTMASS PLANT</em></p> -<h4 id="understanding-the-new-era">Understanding the New Era</h4> +<p>Plastmass Plant is also a subsidiary of Tekhmash and a producer of 76–152 mm artillery ammunition. Its product portfolio includes the 3VOF58 152 mm round, which is the designation given to the 3OF45 high explosive projectile, and a variable charge, designed to be fired by the 2A65 Msta-B towed howitzer and the 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzer. It also manufactures 3VOF39 152 mm rounds with 3OF29 high explosive shells and charges for the towed 2A36 Giatsint-B and 2S5 Giatsint SPH. Collectively, these four howitzers represent the longest-range systems chambered to fire 152 mm shells that are available to Russian forces in Ukraine. Plastmass produces a range of other warheads that are used in missiles and rockets.</p> -<p>All of this brings us to the latest iteration of the United States’ China debates: end states versus steady states. In essence, the question is, does the United States need a specific end goal for its China policy, or can it be content with pursuing a steady state of persistent, albeit evolving, competition? This is a new and important evolution in the pantheon of China policy discussions. This question looks beyond the preoccupation with competition and cooperation by asking an even more fundamental question — an a priori question — about U.S. strategy. This question asserts that the United States needs to know the direction of strategy before discussing the right mix of tools to get there.</p> +<p><em>INSTRUMENT DESIGN BUREAU</em></p> -<p>Answering this question is a particularly complex matter because most answers come embedded within a series of assumptions about China policy and U.S.-China relations, both past and present. Thus, answering it must begin with a precise understanding both of the current state of bilateral relations and of the United States’ China policy. In that regard, the U.S.-China relationship is in a historically unique moment. While many policymakers and scholars tend to focus on the 40-year evolution of bilateral ties, doing so obscures the uniqueness of the current period. The U.S.-China relationship may be middle-aged, but it is experiencing a new youth — or perhaps a midlife crisis — and not a positive one.</p> +<p>Instrument Design Bureau (KBP) is the second-largest supplier to the Russian MoD by value, with more than $895 million in sales for the first quarter of 2023. Its parent company is the High Precision Systems Holding, which sits within Rostec. KBP develops precision-guided weapons and air defence systems as well as automatic cannons. This includes the Kornet ATGM and Pantsir-S short-range air defence system, with deliveries of the former reported in June 2023. Additionally, KBP manufactures and develops the 2K25 Krasnopol laser-guided artillery round. In August 2023, KBP started supplying the Russian army with upgraded Krasnopol rounds that can be guided onto a target by a laser designation from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The enterprise has also been working on increasing the efficiency of its laser-guided KM-8 Gran bomb for 120 mm mortars and Kitolov-2M artillery shells for D-30 and 2S1 artillery systems. Laser-guided rounds are important to Russia’s artillery war, as the extreme dispersion adopted by Ukrainian forces reduces the efficacy of massed artillery barrages. More precise fires are therefore used against singular targets and individual howitzers when possible.</p> -<p>The United States and China are in the early stages of the complex process of determining the scope and intensity of the competition. Washington and Beijing are still figuring out — both implicitly and explicitly — where and how they are going to compete: on what issues, in what regions, and using which mix of policy tools. (Notably, will nuclear weapons move to the forefront?) In this sense, the United States and China have only just begun to explore the arenas and boundaries of their competition. This moment bears some resemblance to the U.S.-Soviet competition in the late 1940s and 1950s. As in those decades, both sides are probing and testing one another in regions, in venues, and on various issues. Perceptions and policies are hardening on both sides, while the precise contours of the competition are still evolving and thus remain unclear.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/La7xiWT.png" alt="image13" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 6: Companies Supplying the Russian MoD and Defence Industry with Ammunition.</strong> Source: Financial data seen by authors.</em></p> -<p>As part of this process, both Washington and Beijing are trying to determine the precise national interests and, perhaps more importantly, the stakes for each other in this long-term competition. In practical terms this means that both sides are still exploring what risks they are willing to run and what costs they are willing to bear. The Cold War was both an intense ideological competition and a military confrontation, with Europe as the main theater and nuclear weapons at the center of it all. Economic and technological competition between the powers was secondary at most. The order and intensity of the drivers of U.S.-China competition will clearly be different.</p> +<p><em>PRODUCTION IN-DEPTH: PLASTMASS PLANT</em></p> -<p>For Washington and Beijing, this process will take time and will be intensely political in both capitals. During the Cold War, actions and behaviors in key regions shaped this phase of the U.S.-Soviet competition; the same will be true for U.S.-China dynamics. Just as the first Berlin crisis in 1948 set the stage for the then-emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry, U.S.-China jockeying over disputes in the South China Sea and Taiwan may have a similar consequence. As with the early days of the Cold War, there are few rules or norms to guide or even bound today’s competition.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OjRnrxd.png" alt="image14" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: The Plastmass Plant.</strong> Source: Airbus Defence and Space, RUSI, Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<h4 id="not-either----or">Not Either . . . Or</h4> +<p>Plastmass is an important element of the Russian artillery supply chain, located in Kopeysk in Chelyabinsk region. The following analysis indicates that the plant is responsible for at least 15% of Russia’s projected 152 mm round production in 2024. The plant is owned by Rostec and has focused on ammunition for artillery, tanks and aviation. It specialises in the assembly and refurbishment of shells and rounds for 120 mm and 152 mm howitzers, and has supplied the Russian army with ammunition for all of its primary indirect fire systems. It produces the S-8 series of 80 mm unguided rockets that are fired from Russian helicopters in a ground attack role, as well as 125 mm explosive ammunition natures for tanks. This product suite is indicative of the plant’s role in supporting Russia’s war effort, and, while it is by no means the only plant producing ammunition for the armed forces, it is one of the few that only produces ammunition, and for which there is sales data to indicate volume.</p> -<p>This framing of current U.S.-China ties is critical to understanding the argument put forward here on the issue of end states versus steady states. In this bilateral context, the issue assumes a false distinction; there is, in fact, no need to make a binary choice. Both are needed, albeit in the right configuration.</p> +<p>A significant part of the plant’s production is commissioned by ammunition developer NIMI Bakhirev, which in turn is subcontracted by the Russian MoD. The Plastmass Plant reportedly made $143 million in payments to NIMI Bakhirev and $232 million to the Russian MoD in 2023. In addition, publicly available arbitration records confirm that prior to 2022, the entity was subcontracted by NIMI Bakhirev to fill artillery shells with explosive materials under contracts issued by the MoD or Rosoboronexport, Russia’s defence export agency. The total value of these orders is $375 million – far less than the Instrument Design Bureau, which has close to $1 billion. However, as Plastmass is primarily involved in ammunition production, while KBP has a range of business lines, the volume of production at Plastmass and the possible impact of disrupting its operations can be more accurately discerned. A 152 mm artillery round is thought to cost around $700, suggesting that Plastmass could be contracted to produce 535,000 rounds of 152 mm ammunition for the $375 million that it has received from the Russian MoD. While this figure is unlikely to be precise, given Plastmass’ range of products, it indicates the potential impact of disrupting this manufacturer.</p> -<p>An effective strategy toward China requires an end state, but it should be a general or broad one meant to guide policy choices. The end state should not be too specific or rigid because policymakers and strategists do not yet know the precise arenas, boundaries, or even rules of the competition. The end state needs to be able to evolve as the competition does. An end state with a general directionality and some elasticity provides this while also giving content and credibility to U.S. efforts at competition, including recruiting and retaining allies and partners. At the same time, a strategy that lacks any future orientation point risks meandering from crisis to crisis, misallocating resources, and being driven by domestic politics.</p> +<p>As of early 2022, the Plastmass Plant operated 38 production facilities, repair shops and workshops with a total area of 33,005 m2, as well as 78 warehouse facilities with a total area of 37,200 m2. In 2013, it had seven main structural subdivisions, including Workshop No. 4, which focused on ammunition production, with a stated output of 50,000 units per year with a “military” purpose – Plastmass has other business arms, including the production of explosives for industrial use. In September 2021, Rostec announced plans to launch a new assembly facility for 100–152 mm ammunition, with an area of approximately 4,000 m2 by 2023. The facility was to employ automated technologies worth RUB 250 million (~ $3.4 million) and increase the plant’s output by 150%. The most recent publicly available video showing the plant’s premises is from March 2022; it includes footage of a new industrial boiler room and older-looking ammunition assembly facilities. Nevertheless, Rostec announced in June 2024 that Plastmass had increased its military-use production five-fold since the start of the invasion, and planned to increase production volumes by another 20% in 2024.</p> -<p>This varietal of end state should be an affirmative proposal focused on protecting and promoting U.S. interests (rather than opposing others). These interests should include the following: preventing the rise of a hegemon in Asia that could restrict U.S. freedom of action; preserving unfettered U.S. access to Asia (especially its markets); reinforcing the credibility of global rules and norms (on both economic and security issues); generating cooperation for transnational challenges such as climate change; and encouraging support for extra-regional security challenges, such as the war in Ukraine.</p> +<p>This growth in capacity is confirmed by the plant’s recruitment of new personnel, particularly assemblers of munitions for three shifts per day. The plant started posting monthly job adverts on the VK social media platform in June 2022 seeking ammunition assemblers, electricians and other technical roles. The salary offered for ammunition assemblers grew from a minimum of RUB 19,000 (~ $351) per month in June 2022 to a minimum of RUB 85,000 (~ $964) by July 2024. As of 24 July 2024, the plant had 134 vacancies for ammunition assembler positions on the Federal Service for Labour and Employment vacancies website, accounting for more than 20% of the plant’s active vacancies. The sharp increase in salaries and large number of vacancies for this unskilled position may indicate that the plant is struggling to find enough workers to meet the demands of its expanded capacity.</p> -<p>This approach offers several benefits. It is a positive vision focused on upholding interests and values which benefit multiple stakeholders beyond (and including) the United States. It offers broad international appeal because it puts the protection of nations’ sovereignty, strategic autonomy, and respect for national conditions at its center. It leverages U.S. strengths and experiences over the past 70 years in defending a rules-based order. It is flexible enough to adapt as U.S.-China competition evolves and does not preclude additional competitive options. It creates plenty of room for China to choose to be more constructive, without requiring it to change its domestic political regime. Finally, it provides allies and partners with much to support, even as tactical policy differences emerge about where and how to compete with China.</p> +<p>It is rare for any ammunition manufacturer to reveal production figures, but it is possible to form an assessment of Plastmass’ output using the available data. If, for example, the production figure for 2013 of 50,000 units is accurate and remained constant until the invasion, the increases announced by Rostec indicate that Plastmass will be able to produce 300,000 units by the end of 2024. Taken together with data seen for this report, it can be reasonably concluded that the annual production output of Plastmass is at least 300,000 units of all ammunition types per year, and may be as high as 535,000 if it focuses on 152 mm natures alone. However, the plant’s activities include refurbishing old ammunition, which is likely cheaper and faster than producing new ammunition, as well as the production of munitions that are more advanced and therefore likely more expensive than a traditional 152 mm round. This could lower or increase the total output of the plant. In addition, Russia is understood to have sacrificed production capacity for many of its non-artillery ammunition natures in 2022 and 2023 to meet its need for 152 mm and 122 mm rounds.</p> -<p>In the context of current U.S. debates about end states, the approach offered here gains the advantages of the advocates and avoids the disadvantages of the detractors. It provides direction to policymaking as well metrics to measure success and failure. It offers the flexibility policymakers need to adapt to shifting Chinese behaviors, both positive and negative. The goals outlined above provide sufficient guidance on policy trade-offs, which would be hard even with a more specific end state. In sum, this approach — with its affirmative vision — not only guides competition management but also generates support for it, even amid its inherent vagaries.</p> +<p>Assessing the plant’s artillery ammunition output is therefore challenging, but it appears likely that the plant could produce at least 200,000 rounds of artillery ammunition per year through production and refurbishment, alongside production of tank and rocket ammunition. This figure could be increased by tens or hundreds of thousands of rounds if all other production was sacrificed to focus on artillery natures. As Russia is projected to produce 1.3 million rounds of 152 mm ammunition in 2024, Plastmass may be responsible for more than 15% of the country’s output.</p> -<p>This approach avoids trying to solve the China challenge in absolute terms, such as by advocating regime change (or another end state). It focuses on Chinese behavior rather than regime type, the latter of which could be problematic even under a change in Chinese leadership or a new governance model. Washington is more likely to be able to generate a domestic political consensus around these objectives than around more specific end states. None of the ideas outlined here will alienate partners and allies and, in fact, most will reassure them. Indeed, Washington might even gain a few fence-sitters with active and creative diplomacy.</p> +<p>This of course depends upon the ability of the plant’s supply chain to meet its needs for raw materials and products. The available data indicates that the supply chain is heavily concentrated; the plant was reliant on six suppliers for more than 95% of its purchases in terms of value, which were in excess of $179 million in 2023. More than 60% of its transactions by value were with the Selmash Plant, which manufactures shell bodies for 152 mm ammunition as well as S-8 rockets. This plant has been expanding production capacity by refurbishing old buildings and modernising its existing machinery, and is working “24/7 in support of the SVO [special military operation]”, according to the director general. Plastmass’ suppliers are set out in Table 7.</p> -<h4 id="broadening-the-steady-state">Broadening the “Steady State”</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iPOdh2e.png" alt="image15" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 7: Companies Identified in the Plastmass Plant Supply Chain in 2023.</strong> Source: Financial data seen by authors, Unified Information System in the Field of Procurement, Financial data seen by authors, Unified Information System in the Field of Procurement, JSC Selmash Plant, JSC NPO Kurganpribor, JSC Solikamsk Plant, ASK, Missile-Technical and Artillery-Technical Support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.</em></p> -<p>The second half of the equation is how best to approach the “steady state” of managed competition. Current U.S. debates about the steady state often use the Biden strategy of “invest, align, and compete” as the baseline. This approach has both strengths and weaknesses. After the volatility of the Trump years, Biden rightly refocused U.S. strategy on domestic investments and alliance building to put the United States in a stronger position vis-à-vis China. However, Biden’s approach to a steady state remains somewhat under-conceptualized. It has some important components but is not comprehensive enough to meet the demands of long-term competition.</p> +<p>These supply chain dependencies can become vulnerabilities. The largest dependency is Plastmass’ relationship with Selmash; there are other manufacturers of shell bodies within the ammunition supply chain, but they are supplying other producers. It is not clear that an alternative to Selmash could be found if it were unable to supply Plastmass.</p> -<p>At its core, the Biden approach mixes up apples and oranges and in doing so takes its eye off the bullseye of a long-term competition. “Investing” and “aligning” are both important means to balance Chinese power, and the Biden team excelled at expanding both in novel and creative ways. But both are competitive strategies — both are varieties of apples. The third part of the Biden trifecta (“compete”) is also an apple, and it is treated as a grab-bag category of policies meant to constrain and contain Chinese capabilities. Moreover, it begs many questions and would benefit from greater clarity.</p> +<p>Additionally, the expansion of the plant and recruitment of staff may be limiting production capacity. These supply chain dependencies can become vulnerabilities. The largest dependency is Plastmass’ relationship with Selmash; there are other manufacturers of shell bodies within the ammunition supply chain, but they are supplying other producers. It is not clear that an alternative to Selmash could be found if it were unable to supply Plastmass. Additionally, the expansion of the plant and recruitment of staff may be limiting production capacity.</p> -<p>The essential strategy question at the heart of a steady-state approach is broader than that implied by Biden’s policymaking. Namely, what is the optimum mix of engaging, binding, and balancing policies that can achieve a steady state of competitive coexistence that advances U.S. interests and values. To continue the analogy, a strategy for long-term competition needs several types of fruit, not just apples. All three types of policies — engaging, binding, and balancing — are needed to compete effectively, especially on complex issues such as Taiwan. The mix can be adjusted as the challenges posed by China evolve and as U.S.-China dynamics evolve with it.</p> +<h4 id="raw-materials">Raw Materials</h4> -<p>Dialogue and engagement get a bad rap, often dismissed as ineffective at best, and as appeasement at worst. U.S. policy has not been purely engagement with China since the 1980s. In fact, engagement is a broad category that encompasses multiple types of dialogue and negotiation. A recent positive example is National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s channel with Politburo member Wang Yi, which has been key to stabilizing relations in 2023 and 2024. Military communications, crisis management, and confidence-building measures are also types of engagement. These tools are critical to managing the scope and intensity of competition. In this sense, engagement policies enhance competition rather than undermine it. They improve deterrence and prevent competition from drifting into confrontation. In addition, such policies reassure U.S. allies and partners that Washington is not drawing them into an inevitable conflict, thereby making U.S. coalitions more sustainable.</p> +<p>The raw materials involved in producing artillery ammunition begin with the iron ore that is used to make the shell casing. A shell casing is typically made from steel, and it is designed to be strong enough to withstand the forces of firing from a howitzer, but brittle enough to shatter into small fragments when the explosive inside detonates. In the Russian supply chain, propellent is stored and transported in brass cases that are loaded into the howitzer behind the shell and detonated to fire the round. This adds zinc and copper to the supply chain. The propellent itself is produced from cotton cellulose or cotton pulp and nitric acid, as well as some alcohols. Cotton pulp is produced by harvesting cotton linter and treating it with chemicals like sodium hydroxide that break down the other fibres, leaving only the cellulose, which is then purified and refined to the appropriate length. The resultant material is dried and formed into bales for transport. The final element to consider is the explosive inside the shell, which is typically a variant of Royal Demolition Explosive (RDX), which may also be known as hexogen or cyclonite. RDX is made from the nitrolysis of hexamine, which is produced by combining formaldehyde and ammonia.</p> -<p>Given the scope of China’s global footprint and its substantial technological and military capabilities, a steady state of competition will require a broader support base in the world, especially among emerging powers and in the Global South. Such support can help bind China, including through means such as regional and multilateral commitments. In this sense, binding can function as a non-confrontational competitive strategy that focuses on creating a strategic environment in which China’s choices are delimited. The Biden team made headway with traditional Asian and European allies in expanding support for its China strategy, both binding and deterring Chinese actions. But the current era will require the United States to cast a wider net and use different tools, especially with the Global South.</p> +<p>The raw materials needed for Russia’s artillery ammunition are:</p> -<p>In order to effectively compete with China without resorting to confrontation at every turn, Washington needs to expand its competition tool kit to offer more and different things to countries. The most obvious candidates are initiatives aimed at helping countries improve their own infrastructures: digital, health, transport, and energy. An effective steady state of competition requires the United States to offer a better value proposition to others, such as high-quality and resilient infrastructure. The United States’ ability to compete effectively rests on its ability to bring something to prospective partners and not just treat them as proxies in a great power contest. Ideally, these initiatives dovetail with U.S. domestic policies seeking to renew and expand U.S. industrial capabilities, including by creating new markets for exports. Finding and maximizing synergies between internal and external balancing creates both the political and the material foundations for long-term competition against a country as capable as China. Such synergies are perhaps the holy grail of steady state competition given their ability to broadly distribute the benefits of competitive policymaking, especially at home.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Ammonia.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Formaldehyde.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Aluminium.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Nitric acid.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Cotton pulp.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Sodium hydroxide.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Iron ore.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Alloy components.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Copper.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Zinc.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>This essay offers one final point about crafting and maintaining a steady state of competition. For it to be politically sustainable in the United States (not just in Congress but within the business community) and to ensure access to the right kinds of resources, U.S. policymakers, over time, need to better articulate the boundaries of their competitive policies. On technology competition, U.S. officials often talk about pursuing a strategy of “small yard and high fences,” but they do not explain the principles that will inform these limitations. In recent years, both the yard and the fence have grown, and they will likely continue to do so. Enforcement has been uneven as well, undercutting effectiveness. Policymakers, business leaders, and foreign partners will be more willing to support costly policies needed for long-term competition — such as reduced exports to China — if they have greater understanding about the boundaries of U.S. policy actions and greater faith in their enforcement.</p> +<p>The companies active in the supply of raw materials into Russia’s artillery ammunition supply chain are shown in Table 8.</p> -<p>This recommendation and the ones above are all designed to maximize the synergies generated by a China strategy that possesses both a well-articulated end state and a steady state. Such an approach provides sufficient clarity and direction for both policymakers and business leaders. It provides flexibility and an expanded tool kit to deal with the evolving challenge. Collectively, this approach unlocks domestic support, international assistance, and a broad base of resources (monetary, technological, and otherwise). All of this substantially improves the United States’ ability to compete with China, but in a way that can be sustained over time and that can adjust as the challenges posed by China morph and change, as they inevitably will.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/204RcO2.png" alt="image16" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 8: Primary Suppliers of Raw Materials into Russia’s Artillery Ammunition Supply Chain.</strong> Source: Financial data seen by authors, Unified Information System in the Field of Procurement, Fargona Kimyo Zavodi, Jizzakh Chemical Plant, Uralchem JSC.</em></p> -<h3 id="what-does-the-united-kingdom-want-from-a-china-policy">What Does the United Kingdom Want from a China Policy?</h3> +<p><em>RAW MATERIALS IN-DEPTH: NITROCELLULOSE</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="rana-mitter">Rana Mitter</h4> - <h4 id="st-lee-chair-in-us-asia-relations-harvard-kennedy-school">S.T. Lee Chair in U.S.-Asia Relations, Harvard Kennedy School</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The charge in an artillery round charge is made of nitrocellulose, making this a key material for artillery production. Russian propellant plants are critically dependent on imports of cotton cellulose, the base material of nitrocellulose, as Russia currently has no domestic capacity for its production. Attempts to grow cotton domestically or develop alternatives to cotton cellulose from wood or flax have so far been futile. The raw materials are often imported, leaving them open to Western interventions to disrupt Russia’s access.</p> -<p>On July 4, 2024, the United Kingdom elected a new Labour government with an immense parliamentary majority. A wealth of foreign policy issues faces that government, notably the Russia-Ukraine war, as well as the wider issue of the United Kingdom’s post-Brexit relationship with Europe. China does not loom large in public discussion, certainly compared to the moment four years ago when several issues put Beijing’s actions at the heart of British decisionmaking: among them, the role of Huawei in UK critical infrastructure, the imposition of the National Security Law on Hong Kong, and the question of blame over the origins of Covid-19.</p> +<p>Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been the main exporters of the base material for cotton cellulose. Russia and Uzbekistan have remained particularly close following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as indicated by a joint statement released during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s three-day state visit in Tashkent in the end of May 2024 announcing that the two countries would continue “paying attention to cooperation in the defence sphere”. Under an agreement between Uzbekistan’s State Defence Industry and the Kazan Gunpowder Plant in 2020, Russia even agreed to set up licensed powder production in Uzbekistan in exchange for supplies of propellant powders in 2021. Official statistics indicate that Russia’s largest supplier of cotton pulp is currently Uzbekistan, whose exports of the material to Russia doubled in 2022, to $9.4 million. One report indicates that Uzbekistan sold more than 4.8 million kilograms of cotton pulp to Russia in the first nine months of 2023. The majority of shipments were received by Russian entities, which appear as suppliers of all major propellant plants, including Perm, Kazan and Solikamsk. Most of these intermediaries were designated by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in May 2024.</p> -<p>Yet there are plenty of signs that the United Kingdom will want to think about China in the medium term. One of the government’s first actions has been to mobilize a “China audit” examining the relevance and role of China in all aspects of UK foreign policy engagement, from defense to trade. There will likely be continuity with defense initiatives in Asia, such as AUKUS, and confirmation of trade-related plays, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZzFBrtg.png" alt="image17" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Russian Imports of Cotton Cellulose and Recipient Entities.</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>It is a useful exercise to substitute the words “United Kingdom” for “United States” in answering the question: “Does the United Kingdom need a specific ‘vision of victory’ for its China policy?” In Washington, there have been lively debates around whether victory is possible or can even be defined for the United States. For the United Kingdom, the question makes much less sense.</p> +<p>According to commercial trade databases, 85% of Uzbek cotton cellulose exports to Russia in 2023 came from just two manufacturers Fargona Kimyo Zavodi and Raw Materials Cellulose. The two entities are interlinked through their beneficial owners and appear to be ultimately controlled by Rustam Muminov, who has owned several companies in Russia, including LLC TD Khimsnabsbyt, which used to be a direct supplier to the Kazan Gunpowder Plant and was the largest Russian importer of cotton cellulose prior to the invasion of Ukraine. Muminov is currently building a factory in Russia for hydroxypropyl methylcellulose (HPMC), a cotton cellulose derivative with civilian uses. It will also have the capacity to produce cotton cellulose, and so could contribute to the defence industry.</p> -<p>Working through an answer is worthwhile. The United Kingdom is still a country with global economic interests, particularly in services, considerable soft power, and a military and security role that makes it one of the most significant members of NATO. It may not be correct to think of the United Kingdom looking for “victory” over China (as it may similarly be incorrect for the United States). But knowing whether there is an endpoint, or at least a steady state, when it comes to the United Kingdom’s relationship with China says a great deal about how other powers involved in the U.S.-China binary, but with roles of their own, may see the 2020s and 2030s.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BGpkDJL.png" alt="image18" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: Cotton Pulp Trade with Kazan and Perm Gunpowder Plants.</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, financial data seen by authors, ClearSpending, Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<h4 id="brexit-britain-navigating-the-us-china-relationship">Brexit Britain Navigating the U.S.-China Relationship</h4> +<p>Customs records show that the Kazan Gunpowder Plant – which manufactures propellant and explosives for artillery ammunition – imported over $2.2 million of cotton pulp from Fargona Kimyo Zavodi between March 2022 and January 2023. The plant also appears to have transacted with at least three other Russian companies – Lenakhim, the Bina Group, and Khimtreid – which imported significant amounts of Uzbek cotton pulp. In total, the four companies imported over $3.5 million in 2022 and almost $7 million in 2023. Meanwhile, the Perm Gunpowder Plant has not reported any imports, and has relied on Lenakhim and the Bina Group (with which it had contracts) to supply Uzbek cotton pulp. These transactions are shown in Figure 5.</p> -<p>Ideas from government, business, and society in the United Kingdom regarding the country wants to end up with China is a function of the United Kingdom’s current need to redefine itself in a world where previous certainties (e.g., Atlanticism, Europeanism, free trade) are more fragile. The United Kingdom is a close ally of Washington, yet finds the relationship harder to navigate and make relevant than a decade ago; it is a European power with a security narrative in formation and a trade and cooperation narrative that has narrowed since Brexit; and it is a seeker of opportunities in a Global South, which it has yet to fully understand or engage with. Its interests relating to China have to be seen through that prism.</p> +<p>US-sanctioned Lenakhim is the largest Russian importer of cotton pulp, procuring over $8 million-worth from 2019 to 2023. The company received payments from the Kazan and Perm plants in early 2023 and has been fulfilling contracts for both since at least 2016 and 2013, respectively. Its annual imports of cotton pulp sat below $700,000 between 2019 and 2021, but in 2022 and 2023, the company imported over $7 million in cotton pulp from Fargona Kimyo Zavodi and Raw Materials Cellulose LLC, which supplied over $4.4 million. Uzbek customs data shows that Fargona Kimyo Zavodi supplied a further $600,000 of cotton pulp to Lenakhim in January 2024.</p> -<p>In that context, does the United Kingdom of 2024 have a vision of what the China endpoint looks like?</p> +<p>Other importers of cotton pulp include Kazan-based Khimtreid, a chemical products wholesaler that imported just under $200,000 of cotton pulp from Fargona Kimyo Zavodi in September 2023, Bina Group, a large Russian chemicals company which received payments from Kazan and fulfilled contracts with Perm and other Russian defence companies. Both Khimtreid and Bina Group were sanctioned by the US in May 2024. The latter company has been importing large volumes of chemicals and precursors since 2020, and in 2023, it imported $1 million of cotton pulp from Fargona Kimyo Zavodi.</p> -<p>The short answer is not yet. The majority of UK policymaking over the past two decades has been to find maximal trade opportunities with China while remaining vocal on certain values issues (for instance, the National Security Law in Hong Kong) and steadily increasing concern about UK security interests. But these have mostly been reactions, not proactive choices: domestic politics in the United Kingdom has been too turbulent in recent years to allow for a firm assessment of China policy, and the additional unpredictability of both Chinese and U.S. politics has made it hard to navigate toward a steady outcome. The major reviews of UK policy, the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (2021) and the Integrated Review Refresh (2023), both gave a broad definition of policy toward China, defining it as an “evolving and epoch-defining challenge . . . to the international order.” However, there is a strong sense that the direction of travel in the 2020s has been toward treating China primarily in security terms rather than as a major opportunity for growth, particularly as investment in China becomes less attractive because of domestic regulation and a faltering economy.</p> +<p>There is some evidence that sanctions and diplomatic pressure have successfully disrupted the nitrocellulose supply chain. The Kazakhstan-based Khlopkoprom-Tsellyuloza used to be one of the largest cotton cellulose suppliers of Russian propellant plants, but as of July 2023, when the Kazan and Aleksin propellant plants were designated by OFAC, Kazakhstan has drastically decreased its total exports of cotton cellulose, sending a total of 115 tonnes, worth $232,959 to Russia, between July and October 2023, and then ostensibly ceasing its shipments altogether. Instead, commercial trade data reveals that since March 2024, the entity has delivered 8,585 metric tonnes of cotton cellulose, worth nearly $17 million, to one single customer: US Department of State contractor, Bizzell Corporation. Bizzell is reportedly engaged in the production of large-calibre artillery ammunition in Europe for NATO partners. This is indicative of the positive effect that focused sanctions and political effort can have in denying critical materials to an opponent, while also benefiting a country’s own defence industry.</p> -<p>As a result, one trend that will likely accelerate under the Keir Starmer government is coordination with the United States. It is extremely unlikely that the United Kingdom would support any version of China’s global role that sits at odds with the policy of the United States, regardless of whether the president is Kamala Harris or Donald Trump. In an earlier era, there were occasional small exceptions. In 2013, former UK chancellor of the exchequer (finance minister) George Osborne could bring the United Kingdom into the Asian International Infrastructure Bank against U.S. advice, but that was at a time of relatively calm geopolitics, with a friendly U.S. administration and the United Kingdom firmly embedded in the European Union. A United Kingdom that is much less certain of its geopolitical links will not take a risk on links with China, particularly if those links risk the relationship with the United States on security. This does not mean matching on every element in the Indo-Pacific: while AUKUS involves deepening formal links with the United States, membership of CPTPP involves a relationship with an organization that the Trump administration left and the Biden administration has shown no signs of wishing to rejoin.</p> +<h4 id="processing">Processing</h4> -<p>In the event that the United States sought “victory” over China in some form definable to a wider global audience, why would the United States be concerned about UK support? The United States would not be concerned for reasons of material support. The United Kingdom’s assets in the region are simply too limited to make a decisive contribution; Japan and South Korea are clearly the key allies. However, the symbolic importance of the United Kingdom is not negligible when it comes to a “vision of victory.” After all, this was the reason that Lyndon Johnson pressed Harold Wilson to support the United States in Vietnam (unsuccessfully), and George W. Bush looked for Tony Blair’s support (successfully) over Iraq. London would almost certainly provide support of some sort for U.S. policy on China and might be a surer bet for that support than other major European capitals, but the form of that support might remain undefined until a moment of crisis — for instance, a call for sanctions that might be more damaging to the United Kingdom’s smaller and highly open economy than to the United States. Any such UK action, of course, would have consequences and likely result in China categorizing the United Kingdom as a clear adversary by definition.</p> +<p>The raw materials are processed into core products that are then turned into projectiles and propellant. The product that becomes the outer shell of each projectile is a steel rod that is forged and stamped into a cylinder with a cavity in the middle. The outside of the shell is shaped with a machine tool, and a thread for the fuse is cut into the cone-shaped nose of the projectile. The projectile is heat-treated and cooled. A copper band is added to the outside of the shell, which is known as a driving band; it is designed to be softer than the steel of the shell so that the metal grooves of the rifling inside the howitzer barrel bite into it. This creates a more effective seal to ensure most of the gases produced by the propellant are directed into the shell and serves to impart spin to the projectile once it leaves the barrel, which stabilises it and improves accuracy. The shell is designed to be thick and strong enough through heat treatment to withstand the pressures of being fired from a howitzer, but not so thick that it will not fragment upon detonation. Further work is carried out to remove excess metal and prepare the round to receive a fuse, and the outer surface of the shell is polished and painted before it is transferred to a filling plant.</p> -<h4 id="britain-as-a-european-actor-on-china">Britain as a European Actor on China?</h4> +<p>At another plant, the explosive fill is produced, which, for Russian ammunition, is a compound called A-IX-2, an explosive made from 73% RDX, 23% aluminium and 4% wax, which is called a phlegmatizer. This is added to stabilise the explosive material. RDX is produced through the nitrolysis of hexamine with nitric acid. Hexamine is produced through a chemical reaction that results from formaldehyde and ammonia being mixed in gaseous states. The explosive fill is added through casting or pressing through the opening left for the fuse. This takes place at the filling plant before the shells are made ready for transit. Often this is done by plugging the open nose of the shell, which is used to insert the fuse before firing.</p> -<p>One factor that will shape the United Kingdom’s trajectory on China policy is the country’s rapidly changing role in the European defense environment. This was already underway under the Sunak government, where bilateral relations with Paris and Berlin had greatly improved, and there was warm talk about greater security cooperation with Europe. However, a government that was a continuation of the one that had engineered Brexit would still have had trouble creating a warm atmosphere with a collective Europe, even defined in terms that went beyond the European Union. A Labour government without an anti-EU political strand will find it easier to engage with European actors.</p> +<p>Separately, the propellant for the shells is produced from nitrocellulose, which is produced by nitrating cotton cellulose with nitric and sulfuric acid under temperature-controlled conditions. This creates an unstable and energetic material by binding nitrate groups to the cellulose fibres found in cotton. The degree of nitration can also be controlled, leading to different nitrocellulose products. In the next stage, the nitrated cellulose is separated from the acid mixture and boiled in water to help remove unstable nitro groups. The finished mixture is then dried and cut or extruded into rods or granules. In the case of Russian ammunition, these are packed into a brass casing. The casings are filled either completely or partially, depending on the range they are designed to provide. They are they made ready for use as a propellent that is inserted behind the artillery round in the breech of the gun prior to firing.</p> -<p>Compared even to five years ago, there are thin but growing structures that allow the UK-Europe partnership on security to develop, in particular the European Political Community (EPC), formulated by French president Emmanuel Macron in 2022 as a means to include actors who were not EU members, and which has developed a strong orientation toward security issues. The institution will also morph over time depending on what foreign policy agenda is promoted by the U.S. administration in power from 2025, but the Starmer government will have a strong interest in making sure it has as central a role as possible in the EPC.</p> +<p>Russian ammunition manufacturing is not strictly specialised, and in an emergency, it is possible for companies to cover more than one stage or process. For example, one company may assemble projectiles for one calibre but deliver elements of others to a separate company working on a different calibre. There are several companies involved in this process in Russia (see Table 9); the Serov Mechanical Plant is one example. It is part of Tekhmash and is responsible for producing shells for artillery ammunition up to 152 mm. The plant was extensively refurbished in 2020 with state-of-the-art CNC machines, and has become an important element within the artillery supply chain. Other companies such as Mechanical Plant in Orsk produce brass casings for propellant. Charges and propellant are produced by many companies, including the Perm and Kazan Gunpowder Plants, as well as the Samara Plant, which is focused on charges for mortars. The Solikamsk Plant is also responsible for manufacturing propellant for mortar and rocket ammunition. The Sverdlov Plant, which has a branch in Altai region, states that it produces Hexogen for the defence industry, and fuses are believed to be manufactured by a company called the Kazan Precision Machinery Plant and Kurganpribor.</p> -<p>China will not be the first or most urgent issue on a security agenda with Europe: Russia sits at the top of the list, where the question of “victory” is more clearly defined by Europeans, even if it is increasingly harder to obtain. However, there are signs that, in a range of ways, the United Kingdom is already indicating interest in China as a wider security issue and will share that agenda with Europe as a whole. The United Kingdom may choose to press harder on China’s support for Russia on dual-use technologies that have the effect of helping Russia’s war effort and is likely to follow the United States’ lead (or demands) on the restriction of Chinese access to sensitive technology and training.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AkvmU4y.png" alt="image19" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 9: Raw Material Processing Companies that Produce the Critical Goods for Ammunition Production.</strong> Source: Perm Gunpowder Plant, FKP Kazan Gunpowder Plant, FKP Samara Plant Communar, Kommersant, Sverdlov Plant, Centre for Pre-University Training of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University, Interfax-Russia, FKP Tambov Gunpowder Plant, Rostec, JSC Mechanical Plant, RIA Novosti, JSC Selmash Plant.</em></p> -<p>The United Kingdom will continue to support the status quo around Taiwan and the South China Sea in terms of freedom of navigation. The term “status quo” might seem odd in the context of the United Kingdom’s involvement in AUKUS, which extends the United Kingdom’s presence in the region over time, but in light of Chinese pressure on regional maritime claims, the argument would be that the United Kingdom is contributing to maintaining the balance that is being altered by Chinese claims. Yet a harder question would be: Would the United Kingdom consider a change in Taiwan’s status, brought about by coercion, to be an issue of fundamental concern? And would either NATO or the EPC, in both of which the United Kingdom would be a key voice, be the right forum to debate that viewpoint if European actors took a different view?</p> +<p><em>PROCESSING IN-DEPTH: THE PERM AND KAZAN GUNPOWDER PLANTS</em></p> -<h4 id="endpoint-rather-than-victory">Endpoint Rather than Victory?</h4> +<p>Two of Russia’s most important propellant and energetics plants are the Perm Gunpowder Plant, which accounts for over 40% of Russia’s propellant production based on sales, and the Kazan Gunpowder Plant, which is the country’s most advanced propellant plant and has its own research and development centre as well as a dedicated nitrocellulose production facility. The Perm Gunpowder Plant is a sprawling facility that houses a TNT production plant, a ballistic missile R&amp;D institute and an area dedicated to the testing of ballistic missile engines. It also reportedly produces charges and igniters for rocket engines used in a variety of Russian weapons systems. Perm is equipped with its own thermal power plant, and manufactures a range of explosives for submarine-launched, air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles and artillery systems.</p> -<p>The ideal endpoint from the United Kingdom’s point of view will be a settlement in which versions of the current status quo remain the case. There is no great desire to expend political capital to obtain an ideological outcome in China that is different from the current one — in other words, there is no current British equivalent with the standing of Margaret Thatcher as an advocate of a Cold War–style victory (on the left or right). If a U.S. administration were to adopt a “vision of victory” that demanded an ideological outcome, there might be some symbolic sense of adhering to that vision of the world, but it would be something the United Kingdom would choose to do on a minimal basis for the most part. Europe will simply loom larger, and even an expanded European defense ecology with a strong UK presence would necessarily be focused on Russia and not China. A desirable UK outcome would also need to consider the practical need to keep the country’s core interests secure and viable. Therefore, any economic and infrastructural settlement would need to provide significant protection from cyberwar, as the prospect of direct UK involvement in regional Asian kinetic conflict is low, but the likelihood of the UK economy, which is heavily tied to international services, being vulnerable to cyberattacks is high.</p> +<p>Following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, both plants appear to have ramped up production. In December 2022, Perm’s governor announced that the plant would receive over RUB one billion in investment for modernisation and construction of new facilities. Meanwhile, the plant announced plans to add 350 workers and increase shifts for current employees after an influx of new defence orders. Similarly, the workforce at the Kazan Plant increased shifts, while the plant launched plans to upgrade production of nitrocellulose and propellant powders.</p> -<p>At the same time, the United Kingdom also has other key aims where China is deeply relevant that do not sit simply in the security and defense space. The current Labour government, not wholly at odds with its Conservative predecessor, wants to see a global endpoint that involves a net-zero energy transition. For that to happen, there needs to be a realistic assessment of how far that will be possible without dealing with Chinese technology. More broadly, the United Kingdom’s net-zero aims as a global influencer will need to take into account whether to support Global South countries in using one of the few global public goods that China produces: solar panels.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Fcg4lkl.png" alt="image20" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: Geographic Locations of Perm and Kazan Gunpowder Plants.</strong> Source: Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>This is aside from the areas where the United Kingdom has trade interests and can no longer rely on the European Union as a powerful trade shield. If both France and Germany end up with policies that seek to accommodate China (and Russia), particularly if there is a more transactional administration in the United States, then the three Ls — luxury automobiles and goods, legal and financial services, and life sciences — in the United Kingdom’s heavily service-dependent economy will need space to flourish, too, and cutting Chinese markets out of any growth model will be hard. The United Kingdom has various core interests, but one is being part of a global trading network at a time when free trade is not in fashion.</p> +<p>High-resolution satellite imagery confirms that, in mid-2023, both the Kazan and Perm Plants began significant expansion and renovation.</p> -<p>The question, of course, is whether such a UK-friendly status quo is attainable. If there were to be a fundamental shift in geopolitics — a conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea — then the United Kingdom would certainly become tied to the United States’ vision of the outcome. But without that shift, that gray steady state on China is probably the closest “vision of victory” that the United Kingdom is likely to be able to manage or afford in the world as it is now.</p> +<p>Ground has been broken on a large footprint of land directly next to the Kazan Plant’s nitrocellulose production facility, indicating that areas of the facility used for the production of ammunition are being expanded. At least five other locations at the plant have been cleared, likely indicating plans to expand production. This is shown in Figures 12 and 14.</p> -<h3 id="the-comfort-of-ambiguity-europe-and-the-future-of-the-us-approach-to-china">The Comfort of Ambiguity: Europe and the Future of the U.S. Approach to China</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2xNutN3.png" alt="image21" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 12: Kazan Gunpowder Plant Overview.</strong> Source: Airbus Defence and Space, RUSI, Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="janka-oertel">Janka Oertel</h4> - <h4 id="director-asia-programme-and-senior-policy-fellow-european-council-on-foreign-relations">Director, Asia Programme and Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>A similar expansion was observed at several locations in the Perm Gunpowder Plant, most notably alongside the TNT production facility, where large swathes of land have been deforested. Similar deforestation can also be seen alongside the solid fuel production area. This is shown in Figures 13 and 14.</p> -<p>Europeans should be careful offering strategic advice on China policy to others generally, and maybe Germans in particular. Europe is desperately trying to support Ukraine after Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion. Failure to spend adequately on defense has left the continent ill-prepared for a contingency that was not only likely but certainly foreseeable. What the war has since made abundantly clear is that Europe does not only have a Russia problem, it also has a China problem. By providing strategic, diplomatic, economic, and military support to Moscow, Beijing has become part of the European security equation and now poses a more palpable risk than Chinese economic coercion, cyberattacks, or market distorting practices — even if all simultaneously present — ever could.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/czqrhKA.png" alt="image22" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 13: Perm Gunpowder Plant Overview.</strong> Source: Airbus Defence and Space, RUSI, Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>A strategic China-Russia axis is even worse for European security and economic interests than it is for the United States. Europe is economically, strategically, and geographically more exposed. China’s increasing dominance in sectors crucial to Europe’s industrial and economic future are challenging Europe’s future prosperity and political stability. Europe, particularly Germany, has benefitted for decades from the close integration and complementarity of its own economy with that of China. However, a “China shock,” possibly worse than what the United States went through — that is, a massive wave of deindustrialization and loss of competitiveness in crucial sectors — is now on the horizon. The outlook is grim. While a lot has changed in the rhetoric in Paris, Berlin, and Warsaw since the Trump administration first increased the pressure on Europeans to face up to their China-sized Achilles heel, real action has still mostly been emanating from Brussels. In member states, illusions about a “third way,” a magic “middle ground,” or even the delusional idea of Europe playing a “mediating role” between the United States and China continue to make up a surprisingly potent part of the policy conversation.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iAsgHKa.png" alt="image23" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 14: New Construction Projects Underway at the Kazan and Perm Gunpowder Plant.</strong> Source: Airbus Defence and Space, RUSI, Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>Given this, does it make the life of the European policymaker easier if the United States were to spell out its “vision of victory” for its China policy more clearly? Absolutely not. Ambiguity gives Europeans the ability to wiggle their way around the tough policy choices that a clearly defined vision of victory would entail, all while pretending to be either “on the way to being more closely aligned” or “basically almost fully autonomous” in their decisionmaking, depending on the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November. Ambiguity leaves room for interpretation and appropriation.</p> +<p>This analysis of the Perm and Kazan Gunpowder Plants further demonstrates that the vulnerabilities of Russia’s artillery supply chain – specifically those that can be affected by Ukraine’s Western partners – are outside Russia. There is a large and significant trade in chemicals between Russia’s petrochemical industry and its defence industry, which would be difficult to disrupt. However, that same petrochemical industry has multiple intersections and relations with Western countries and companies. This means that key chemicals are linked to Western economies, providing points of exposure.</p> -<p>The European Union and its member states have a self-interest in responding to Beijing’s support of Moscow, China’s assertive posture in the Indo-Pacific region, and China’s market-distorting practices with overcapacities in key industries that are threatening to destroy the very sectors that have thus far provided for European prosperity. Without the stabilizing effect of economic prosperity, Europe lacks not only the financial but also the political basis for its ability to invest in military defense. This has been particularly evident in light of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, Europe’s transition to a decarbonized economy in order to continue to lead on climate action, and the research, development, and education needed to form the basis of future wealth and progress. While the United States, under the last two administrations, has made significant efforts to counter or shield itself from the economic practices promoted by China’s leadership under Xi Jinping and has heavily invested in preparing the U.S. armed forces for a potential conflict with China, Europe has been slower to act, as the political costs of taking similar measures appear overwhelming.</p> +<p><strong>Domestic Supply Chains</strong></p> -<p>European policymakers like to point out that while U.S. and European interests vis-à-vis China overlap to a large extent, they are not identical, and they are thus keen on carving out a path that is at least domestically seen as genuinely European and actively distinct from the United States’ path. This is particularly the case in Germany and France, where transatlantic skepticism is a relevant factor. For domestic political reasons, actions taken should thus by no means be seen as either a response to U.S. pressure (because who wants to be seen as being a poodle) or as a form of “ganging up” against China (because who wants to be seen as being a bully).</p> +<p>Russia’s sprawling petro-chemicals and mining industries are responsible for meeting much of the defence industry’s needs for chemicals and precursors. The majority are moved by rail, and analysis of Russian railway data indicates that both the Perm and the Kazan Gunpowder Plants receive large volumes of precursor materials and chemicals by rail. These include monthly shipments of benthol, methylbenzene, nitric and sulphuric acid, oleum and a range of other chemicals and materials used to manufacture propellant powders, explosives and high- energetics. The delivery of these materials has increased significantly since 2021.</p> -<p>Being seen as aligned with the Trump administration’s alleged endgame of “full decoupling” has been used as a strawman for inaction by European policymakers in the past. By using the phrase “de-risk, not decouple,” policymakers suggest that Europeans have a more balanced and less aggressive approach to China, without having to explicitly state it. This framing implies that certain segments of the U.S. policy elite are more focused on achieving outright victory — favoring defeat over coexistence and dominance over balance — which could ultimately be futile or even exacerbate global conflicts, from kinetic wars to intensified disputes over climate action. When the Biden administration started to use the “de-risking” framing as well, it made it harder to keep this line of argument alive. Close transatlantic alignment on responding to Beijing remains highly contested. Europe wants its distinct strategy. And while it is clear that this would entail a serious new approach to economic policy, new investment, and a radical repositioning vis-à-vis Beijing, so far the political will needed to pursue this approach is missing. “Not like the United States” then becomes a comfortable fallback option, but that is much easier stated if the U.S. approach remains ambiguous in its end goal.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WOQRhZp.png" alt="image24" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 15: Railway imports to Perm and Kazan.</strong> Source: Russian internal railway data, Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>So, what could happen if the next U.S. administration were to specify its vision of victory?</p> +<p>In many cases, the chemicals are sold and shipped to the Perm and Kazan Plants by well-established Russian companies involved in the manufacture of chemicals, petrochemicals and fertilisers, underscoring the intimate links between the country’s defence and civilian economies. Despite acting as critical supply nodes for Russia’s war effort, many of these companies continue to trade with the global economy. For example, one of the most important suppliers of precursors to both plants is Russia’s Sredneuralsky Copper Smelting Plant (SUMZ). Between April 2023 and April 2024, the latter shipped over 4,000 tonnes of oleum to the Kazan Gunpowder Plant and over 770 tonnes of oleum to the Perm Gunpowder Plant. Oleum, otherwise known as fuming sulphuric acid, is used in the manufacture of explosives such as TNT.</p> -<p>Let’s assume the next U.S. administration was to say: “The United States has to continue to be the dominant military, technological, economic, and security player in the Indo-Pacific region. It has to maintain the ability to push back against Chinese pressure wherever it challenges this core interest or the interests of U.S. allies, and the United States will use all available means — from economic and trade tools to the use of military force — to defend its role of global superiority, which would include: the defense of Taiwan out of pure U.S. self-interest; the destruction of Chinese high-tech ambitions through export controls, where possible, and sabotage or coercion, where needed; and the use of all possible means to force allies to follow suit.” This would mean a United States seeking to win systemic competition, striving to maintain and restore superiority through demonstrating the failure of the Chinese system, and embracing the possibility of at least massive weakening of China, but even a political collapse or regime change — or in a nutshell, a different China.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/luZwGaH.png" alt="image25" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 16: Annual Import Totals for Sredneuralsky Copper Smelting Plant, 2019-2023 (USD).</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>The knee-jerk reaction of European policymakers would be to seek distance. Rather than winning systemic rivalry with all possible means, they would argue, the twenty-first century should be about proving the capacity of democracies to deliver a green and digital transformation and to guarantee security and stability. They would underscore that Europe certainly does not seek regime change and does not have a problem with losing superiority in global politics and trade because it does not have it in the first place. This would, however, imply that: (a) the Chinese leadership has no ambition to win systemic rivalry and does not see the current situation as such (which unfortunately it has clearly said it does), and (b) that it would not matter to European policymaking whether the United States or China leads in military, technological, or economic terms, that Europeans could basically accommodate either in this role. This is a crucial but often only implied point. For some Europeans, the prospect of a Trump-led United States makes the difference between global leadership of the United States or China a more optional question. And for some, the focus on renewed fossil fuel extraction becomes scarier than the idea of an authoritarian, surveillance-prone, aggressive, green-tech superpower that dominates the industrial supply chains of the future.</p> +<p>Available Russian customs records show that SUMZ has been procuring machinery from overseas since 2019. While its total imports have decreased since 2019, the company still imported $11.5 million of equipment and related materials in 2023. Over $1 million of these shipments were spare parts for sulphuric acid blowers supplied by Herzog Hydraulik GmbH, a German company which has a history of shipping goods to SUMZ and other Russian companies. An acid blower is used to move gases during the production of sulfuric acid. The majority of these acid blower spare parts, produced by Howden Turbo, were shipped via Lithuania, with the last shipment occurring in October 2023.</p> -<p>For those interested in European territorial integrity and the survival of democracy, market economy, freedom, or privacy, this is a questionable proposition. But the clarity in approach on the U.S. side would necessitate policymakers in Europe to make the case for why they believe that it would be in Europe’s broader strategic interests to push back hard against U.S. policies that are trying to undermine Chinese dominance in key industries, strategic theatres, and emerging technologies. And they would have to do so under conditions of extreme economic pressure, as many leading companies in Europe have used the incentives of the Inflation Reduction Act and other Biden administration policies to invest more deeply into a U.S. footprint in production, supply chains, and shifting market shares. The economic cost of pushing back against the United States would have to be factored into, and would ultimately challenge, the political equation.</p> +<p>Russia’s petrochemical and refinery industry is also a critical supplier to both gunpowder plants. For example, Lukoil’s refinery in Perm has been making regular deliveries of toluene by rail, a critical precursor for the manufacture of TNT, to the Perm Plant.</p> -<p>Let’s assume on the other hand that the next U.S. administration decides that it has a much more limited endgame for its China policy — one that really ignores Europe for the most part. It could say: “Only the direct contest matters. The United States would happily concede global leadership to China as long as Beijing never has the ability to coerce or attack the United States. The United States will become more self-sufficient; it will continue to be an attractive market and a place for international investment and talent, but it will focus on domestic consumption and production, relative military strength, and a highly flexible interpretation of where intervention is deemed necessary.” This would represent a more inward-focused and self-centered approach, where allies and partners play only a marginal role, if any at all. In this scenario, Europe is left to manage its own security, and every nation is expected to fend for itself, with Washington operating under the assumption that the United States would maintain a relatively stronger position for the foreseeable future.</p> +<p><strong>International supply chains</strong></p> -<p>European policymakers would likely find this option equally problematic. As soon as a U.S. administration clearly spelled out a game plan for an isolationist, self-centered rivalry that is national rather than systemic, Europeans would have to relate to it without the comforting ambiguity of the current approach, where they can alternate between condemning the United States for overly confrontational policies and benefitting from actions taken that are in the European interest in the first place, all without having to pay a political price. Such a U.S.-centered endgame would force Europeans to make tough policy choices, accrue greater debt, and invest more in industrial capacity and consumption at home. It could also lead to some allies making different choices, exerting enormous pressure on EU structures, and making it even harder to come to collective action. Smaller countries, less dependent on the United States, might seek the opportunity in a changing global order to be on the “right side” of the new global leader and see a benefit in closer alignment with China.</p> +<p>Internal transaction data for the first half of 2023 shows that both plants made payments to hundreds of companies in Russia, including some that have imported goods. Customs data reveals that dozens of these importers procured items critical to the production of propellants, explosives and shells, which can be broken down into three categories: cotton pulp; chemicals and precursors; and machinery. The issue of cotton pulp supply for nitrocellulose is covered in the Raw Materials section of chapter 4 of this paper. It is sufficient to state here that the trade in cotton pulp and nitrocellulose mentioned in that section is important to the function of the Kazan and Perm Plants.</p> -<p>Ideally, the United States could define its “vision for victory” with regard to China — or choose not to — and it would have no effect on Europeans doing whatever they possibly can to improve their own position under the current geopolitical circumstances: more scrutiny for Chinese production and investment in Europe; greater focus on strengthening competitiveness in areas exposed to de-industrialization so that it is adequate to the scale of the problem and the speed with which it is coming at Europe; creating improved structures to deal with economic coercion and critical dependencies; and galvanizing the political will to dare greater European integration, make the tough political choices to strengthen European defense, and invest collectively in the green and digital transformations to ensure technological leadership and future prosperity.</p> +<p><strong>Chemicals and Precursors</strong></p> -<p>This would be a European reality where the lack of unity around these goals would no longer be optional, but imperative — and in which Europe could make actual choices. As this dynamic was not unleashed by the existential threat of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and Beijing’s strategically enabling role, it seems hard to fathom what kind of shock would be needed to get to this point. On China policy, even a second Trump administration might not be enough — precisely because, even among his supporters, there is no clear agreement about the actual vision for victory. Neither is an alignment within the Democratic Party around one precise vision for victory very likely. Ironically, it could be this ambiguity on the strategic aim that will throw European governments a lifeline so that they may maintain incessant complacency and as a form of collateral damage make it even harder for both sides of the Atlantic to actually deal with the challenges posed by Xi Jinping’s China, collectively and individually.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HiyZ0Mi.png" alt="image26" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 17: Chemical Products and Precursor Supply Chain for the Kazan and Perm Gunpowder Plants.</strong> Source: Financial data seen by authors, trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, Clearspending, Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<h3 id="concrete-goals-and-strategic-bargaining-with-china">Concrete Goals and Strategic Bargaining with China</h3> +<p>The Kazan and Perm Gunpowder Plants have also engaged with a network of large and small wholesale traders of critical chemical compounds within Russia. This is shown in Figures 12 and 13. Several of these enterprises have been sanctioned by the US, UK and Ukrainian governments since February 2022. Nevertheless, some continue trading internationally and are open about their relationship with the military-industrial complex.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="susan-shirk">Susan Shirk</h4> - <h4 id="research-professor-director-emeritus-21st-century-china-center-uc-san-diego-school-of-global-policy-and-strategy">Research Professor; Director Emeritus, 21st Century China Center, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cxs9XhS.png" alt="image27" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 18: Annual Imports of Russian Chemical Companies That Transact With the Kazan and Perm Gunpowder Plants, 2019-2023.</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial providers, Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>The U.S. government needs to specify concrete goals for its China policy to incentivize Beijing to act more responsibly as it pursues its ambitions. Americans have no choice but to coexist with China under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership for the foreseeable future. Therefore, the United States needs a strategy to influence China’s decision calculus so that it acts constructively, or at least in ways that are less harmful to other countries.</p> +<p>One supplier to both plants is Neo Chemical LLC, a large distributor of chemical products that states that it operates in Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Europe. It has fulfilled contracts with Russia’s defence industry, including with the Srednenevsky Shipbuilding Plant, the Solikamsk Plant, and the Sverdlov Plant.</p> -<p>An effective strategy requires that the United States identify the Chinese behaviors that it wants to change and that the CCP leadership might be amenable to change under the right circumstances; communicate these specific demands to the Chinese leadership; and use a mixture of negotiations, pressure, and reassurance to motivate the leadership to adjust its behavior. Underlying this practical approach, the United States should make clear that the way it treats China depends entirely on China’s own conduct, not on U.S. ideological preconceptions or domestic politics. The overall objective of the United States’ strategy should be to motivate China to moderate its policies and improve its conduct.</p> +<p>The company has been consistent in procuring chemicals and precursors, including epoxy resins, stearic acids, acrylic polymers and polyisobutylene - primarily from Chinese companies. The last of these is a compound used for the production of explosive charges. Russian government patents demonstrate the application of polyisobutylene in the production of plastic and emulsion explosive charges, including for military use.</p> -<h4 id="primacy-and-strategic-competition">Primacy and Strategic Competition</h4> +<p>Neo Chemical is one of the largest importers of polyisobutylene into Russia, receiving over $3.4 million-worth over 2022 and 2023. The largest supplier during this period was a South Korean petrochemical company named DL Chemical, which shipped over $1.6 million of polyisobutylene in that period.</p> -<p>The alternative conceptions that have dominated U.S. China policy over the past decade — U.S. primacy and strategic competition — have not been at all effective at persuading Beijing to act like a responsible power. From China’s perspective, these are simply synonyms for Cold War–style containment.</p> +<p>However, one of the company’s largest foreign suppliers is Neo Chemical Deutschland, which shipped over $25 million of products – such as surfactants, epoxy resins and polyethylene produced in the EU – between March 2022 and November 2023. Neo Chemical Deutschland was founded in 2004 by Russian national Andrey Lipovetsky, who was the founder of a third company named Neo Chemical in Russia a year later. While this iteration of Neo Chemical was dissolved in 2007, a co-founder of that company, Vladimir Fedyushkin, founded and currently operates the Neo Chemical that has been receiving shipments from Neo Chemical Deutschland. Meanwhile, an individual named Andrey Lipovetsky registered the domain for a UAE-based company named Proximo FZCO, which also shipped nearly $1.4 million in chemicals and acids to Neo Chemical from October 2022 to December 2023.</p> -<p>The widespread notion that the United States should claim global primacy in every domain — holding on to the top slot in the global pecking order — may sound appealing to American ears, but it has not gotten the United States anywhere with China. The idea of complete primacy is an outdated holdover from the exceptional period of U.S. unipolarity in the immediate wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, at a time when China was still an extremely poor country. Primacy now smacks of a playground fight, not a principled aspiration for peace and order. No country, however capable, can expect to be the best at everything. For example, nothing can stop the rest of the world from buying Chinese solar panels and electric vehicles that offer superior value, even if the Chinese government subsidized the takeoff of the green tech sectors. Defining the bilateral relationship as a universal zero-sum contest also alienates the United States’ partners, who do not want to have to choose between China and the United States. This framework also discourages Beijing from making the compromises necessary to preserve a constructive relationship with the United States and its neighbors. Why should Beijing calm relations with other claimants in the South China Sea or resume dialogue with the Democratic Progressive Party government in Taiwan if it cannot expect to gain any appreciation from the United States or its neighbors?</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4jda5ZQ.png" alt="image28" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 19: The supply chain for Neo Chemical from its German and Dubai affiliates to the Russian defence industry.</strong> Source: Financial data seen by authors, trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, North Data, Clearspending, Open Souce Centre.</em></p> -<p>At the next level of goal setting, the U.S. framework of “strategic competition” or “managed competition” is overly vague. Without a clearer conception of success, there is no way for the American public, Beijing, or allies and partners to assess how well the United States is doing. Moreover, the competition framing creates global uncertainty by setting no limits on how extreme U.S. actions such as tariffs or other sanctions might become and offers no reason for Beijing to cooperate with the United States by restraining itself.</p> +<p>Another supplier to Kazan and Perm, UCC UralChem, has continued to import large volumes of chemicals and related materials from abroad, including lubricants, mineral fertilisers, stearic acids, catalysts, calcium nitrates and potassium nitrates, the latter of which is used in production of gunpowder mixes. While its imports fell from $17.5 million in 2022 to $3.3 million in 2023 the company received shipments from companies in countries such as China, Germany, Turkey, Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia.</p> -<p>Most important, neither “primacy” nor “competition” has effectively motivated Beijing to moderate its behavior. These approaches simply have not worked. China’s behavior today is just as harmful, or even more harmful, to the United States, its neighbors, other countries, and China’s own citizens as it was a decade ago.</p> +<p>Of the Russia-based companies supplying both gunpowder plants, the largest importer is Sibur Holding, an oil and petroleum processor closely associated with Gazprom. In addition to oil and petroleum products, the company is involved in the supply of rubber and polymer products and owns a large processing plant in Perm that produces polystyrene, propylene and butyl alcohol. In 2022 and 2023, the company imported over $439.7 million in chemicals and precursors. While many of these products were shipped by Chinese companies – including subsidiaries of Chinese state-owned enterprise SinoPec – the company also received shipments of chrome-aluminium composite catalysts and aromatic polycarboxylic acids from South Korean companies Annamoon Co Ltd and Lotte Chemical.</p> -<p>China’s intimidation of Xinjiang, Hong Kong, India, Australia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Lithuania, among others and its support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine have hardened U.S. perceptions of the Chinese threat. Although China has not invaded another country as Russia has, the Trump and Biden administrations have treated China as the greatest threat to the United States’ security, economy, and values. Washington’s accusations of genocide against Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, nervous talk about an imminent war on Taiwan, and economic and financial sanctions, some of which are unprecedented except in wartime, have mobilized Americans to ready their defenses against the China threat, but they have failed to provide any incentives for Beijing to ameliorate its policies. Instead, Beijing is currently expanding its nuclear deterrent and pursuing technological and economic self-reliance in its own preparations for a possible war with the United States.</p> +<p>VitaReactiv, a chemicals supplier to both Perm and Kazan, imported over $5.5 million of chemicals from Chinese, Turkish and Indonesian suppliers in 2022 and 2023. Contract data shows that the company has a history of supplying industrial chemicals to other Russian defence companies, including Admiralty Shipyards, Salut LLC and the Smolensk Aviation Plant.</p> -<p>Given the dangers of this downward spiral toward military confrontation, shouldn’t the United States revise its approach to China by testing the potential for intensified diplomacy that uses carrots and sticks in a targeted strategic manner?</p> +<p>Virage International, a Kazan-based producer of chemical products, has imported a curious variety of items over the years, from esters of methacrylic acids to kitchenware, primarily from Chinese companies. One Chinese company that has supplied it with tert-butyl peroxybenzoate, Shanghai East Best International Business Development, is ultimately a subsidiary of a Chinese state-owned enterprise.</p> -<h4 id="possibilities-for-negotiated-agreements-today-or-tomorrow">Possibilities for Negotiated Agreements, Today or Tomorrow</h4> +<p><strong>Machinery</strong></p> -<p>Although Beijing is unlikely to make fundamental changes in its system or modify its approach to Xinjiang or Hong Kong, there are other important areas where compromise may be possible if Washington presents realistic demands and offers. Chinese leader Xi Jinping still appears motivated by a desire for international respect. There are also issues where pragmatic adjustments might help Xi shore up his lagging domestic support during this period of economic and fiscal distress. China is dealing with an economic slowdown, an aging population, high youth unemployment, and a middle class whose real estate assets are losing value.</p> +<p>Both the Perm and Kazan plants have also transacted with companies that have procured machine tools and industrial tooling from abroad. While it is possible that the importers are procuring such machinery to sell to Kazan or Perm, it is likely that some procure machinery for their own use while providing other related goods or services to Perm and Kazan.</p> -<p>Based on my own interviews, I believe that many among the Chinese elite are disenchanted with Xi’s overconcentration of power and his policy missteps. Some might dare to encourage Xi to respond positively to the United States’ diplomatic offers if they seem beneficial to their country. Moreover, China’s domestic dynamics are unpredictable, and Xi will not be in charge forever. Making reasonable offers now will increase domestic pressure on Xi to reach agreements with the United States and encourage his successors to negotiate if Xi does not.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/W0p6UpF.png" alt="image29" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 20: Machinery Supply Chain for Kazan and Perm Gunpowder Plants.</strong> Source: Financial data seen by authors, trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, Clearspending, Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>My own experience in government as the deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for China (1997–2000) was more than 20 years ago, during what might, in retrospect, be considered a golden age of U.S.-China engagement. During that period, arms control negotiations by professionals such as Bob Einhorn, backed up by the threat of sanctions, helped convince China to stop proliferating nuclear and missile technology. And trade negotiations by professionals such as Charlene Barshefsky, combined with the inducement of Permanent Normal Trade Relations and increased foreign direct investment, convinced China to open its markets to meet the requirements for membership in the World Trade Organization. China’s legal system and access to information through commercial media and the internet improved largely due to domestic initiatives reinforced by a welcoming attitude from the West.</p> +<p>One of the most notable companies that has received large payments from Kazan is the Tambov-based Metall Service LLC, a wholesale trader of pipes, wires and rolled metals. The company’s website confirms that its metal production capacity has significantly expanded since 2019 with the purchase of numerous CNC machines and construction of additional manufacturing halls. The website shows images of Italian, German and South Korean machine tools installed in its manufacturing halls.</p> -<p>Admittedly, China has changed significantly since that time, as I discuss in my book, Overreach: How China Derailed its Peaceful Rise. Nowadays, a cloud of pessimism lies over Washington’s policymaking toward China. The American policy elite has concluded that the United States and China are destined to be hostile adversaries and that nothing the U.S. can do will change that. Xi’s overweening nationalist ambitions and his dictatorial rule reinforce gloomy expectations of China’s behavior in the future. Many politicians and experts have abandoned hope for leveraging Xi’s choices through negotiations even now that the United States has restored its position of strength and dispelled misperceptions that it is a declining power.</p> +<p>Import data shows that Metall Service has procured large volumes of machine tools and related components, with the total value of imports in 2023 exceeding $13.2 million, compared to $123,000 the previous year. Since February 2022, the company has imported almost all of these items from Chinese suppliers, with the exception of several shipments of cutting tools acquired from Italy-based Rolm Srl in July and August 2022.</p> -<p>It is too soon to give up on diplomacy, however. China’s post-Mao political history contains surprising twists and turns driven by domestic and international factors, which should lead observers to reject deterministic predictions about future Chinese behavior. In fact, such factors — including human agency, especially the decisions of individual leaders; the swing from collective leadership to centralized dictatorship; shocks such as the 2007–08 global financial crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic; and incidents such as NATO’s 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade — have produced unexpected shifts in Chinese behavior. China’s future is likely to be equally unpredictable and could open avenues for well-crafted diplomatic efforts as well as create new dangers.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/k8udQOM.png" alt="image30" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 21: Annual Imports for Vidis Group, Syaskky Pulp &amp; Paper Mill, Metall Service and Pozis, 2019-23.</strong> Source: Trade data supplied by third-party commercial provider, Open Source Centre.</em></p> -<p>Adding to the uncertainty about China’s future is the fact that, as of 2024, Xi’s power looks to be past its peak. Since 2019–20, the strongman leader has confronted daunting economic and political realities at home, many of them related to his mishandling of the Covid-19 pandemic and his fetish for social control over economic development.</p> +<p>POZiS, which is part of Rostec, is involved in production of small-calibre munitions for artillery systems and over 20 different types of pyrotechnic ignition devices. The company has imported a variety of goods, including steel alloy products and injection-moulding inserts, from Chinese, Italian, South Korean and Turkish companies.</p> -<p>Xi’s lockdown of Shanghai and other cities and then the sudden reversal of his zero-Covid policy in reaction to widespread protests left the population collectively traumatized. In the absence of government assistance to households struggling with layoffs during the pandemic, consumption has plummeted, and deflation and unemployment have taken hold.</p> +<p>Another example, Vidis Group, is a US-sanctioned metal-cutting-tool supplier and was once the Russian distributor of German Widia-branded drilling and milling equipment. In 2022 and 2023, the company imported a total of $3 million in metal-cutting tools and related items from Chinese companies. As well as transacting with the Perm Gunpowder Plant, the company has fulfilled contracts with other defence companies, including Ulan Ude Aviation Plant, UAZ and Titan-Barrikady. The latter is involved in the assembly of artillery pieces and mobile launchers for ballistic missiles.</p> -<p>Foreign investment has also cratered, as even the most bullish investors have grown skittish about the risks of betting on Xi’s China, which nowadays looks more like a police state than a developmental state. When, in 2024, foreign investors withdrew more money than they put into Chinese equities markets for the first time in a decade, Beijing’s first response was to stop publishing net investment flow data, a suppression of economic information that is bound to further erode confidence. Data secrecy, erratic interventions in financial markets, and crackdowns on the private sector have so alarmed Chinese entrepreneurs that many of them have exited China to seek opportunities elsewhere. This would be a logical time for the U.S. government to press Xi to expand market access and legal protections for foreign businesspeople instead of restricting financial flows to China in the name of national security; anything to restore investors’ confidence should be a high priority for Xi. Reviving proposals for a bilateral investment treaty or an agreement that combines China’s “voluntary” export controls with a U.S. policy to allow Chinese foreign direct investment in certain sectors in the United States with appropriate security protections, as the United States did with Japan in the 1980s, might also be beneficial to both economies.</p> +<p>Meanwhile, Syassky Pulp &amp; Paper Mill (Syassky PPM), a producer of wood pulp, has received payments from the Kazan Gunpowder Plant. While the mill itself has not been sanctioned, it has supplied a since-sanctioned military explosives plant (Federal State Enterprise Kamensk Plant) with cellulose. Customs records show that the company imported a range of industrial machinery totalling almost $5 million over 2022 and 2023 from Chinese, Turkish, German and Italian companies. It is likely that Syassky PPM is procuring this machinery for its own use to produce cellulose which can then be sold to the Kazan Plant to mitigate Russia’s reliance on foreign importers of cotton cellulose. If this is the case, Syassky PPM’s imports may represent an opportunity for external disruption that could slow the expansion and recapitalisation of Russia’s defence industry.</p> -<p>Many Chinese believe that Xi’s mishandling of foreign policy has left China in a weakened position. Xi’s support of Russian president Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine is controversial within China and has estranged Europe and the United States. This self-defeating policy has reinforced the backlash from advanced democracies, including Japan, South Korea, and Australia, against China’s provocative military pressure on its neighbors and Taiwan. Moreover, Xi has no way of knowing how capable his military is because he has jailed the key generals he selected to lead the modernization of the strategic missile program, who turned out to be corrupt and deceiving him about the performance of the new equipment.</p> +<p>The supply chains of Perm and Kazan overall indicate the disruption challenges. A lot of the materials needed by both plants are produced inside Russia and transported via rail. Sanctions against the companies involved may damage their finances on the international market, but they are likely obliged to serve the Russian defence industry, and will receive government backing to continue. It stands to reason that seeking disruption of elements that could be physically stopped because they originate or transit through jurisdictions where Western powers can exercise legal or political effects is more likely to impact the supply chains of Perm and Kazan. For example, by denying access to raw materials like cotton pulp, products like polyisobutylene and key components like German and Italian industrial machinery, Western governments could be reasonably certain that both plants would have to affect a major adaptation and face disruption to their production output.</p> -<p>Chinese elites and the public alike have lost confidence in the competence of Xi’s leadership. As an aging strongman heading toward a fourth term with no successor in place, Xi must also be anxious about possible challenges from other CCP leaders. The United States’ own strategy should be more cognizant of Xi’s domestic dilemmas without explicitly pursuing regime change. The United States’ audience is mainly Xi, but it should extend to other elites who might persuade him to shift gears or eventually to transfer power to a successor. Showing a reasonable face to the elites who will govern China in the future makes good sense. This is the context in which the next U.S. administration should pursue a practical strategy to motivate changes in Chinese behavior.</p> +<h4 id="delivery">Delivery</h4> -<h4 id="strategic-bargaining-with-beijing">Strategic Bargaining with Beijing</h4> +<p>After it has been filled, the ammunition is transported via rail from the factories to Russian military depots. From there, it eventually makes its way to one of three primary depots near the Ukrainian border:</p> -<p>It is unclear whether Xi’s regime is influenceable. However, the United States needs to test the possibility of mutually beneficial compromises by clearly communicating to Beijing the specific actions it wants it to take and then negotiating with China through the strategic use of pressure and inducements linked to these actions. More intensive communication with Beijing will enable Washington to reinforce the message that good relations with the United States are contingent on China’s own actions. The United States will retaliate in various ways when China pushes other countries around, but on the other hand, if China can restrain itself and get along well with others, the United States should be willing to retract sanctions and extend a friendly hand.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Kotluban depot, close to Volgograd. It has an area of 2.17 km2 and appears to include 67 sheds and 28 open air sites for storage of ammunition.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>68th Arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Army, near Mozdok in North Ossetia. It has an area of 2.12 km2 and appears to house 61 sheds and 35 bunker facilities dug into the ground.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The 719th Artillery Ammunition Storage Base, near Krasnodar region. It has an area of around 1 km2 and includes 13 sheds, four bunker facilities dug into the ground, and 12 open-air storage sites.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>An effective strategy is not only linked to specific goals but also melds reassurance with threats. The more explicit the United States can be about the actions Chinese decisionmakers could take to improve relations, the more likely it is to motivate them to act on them. And if this strategic approach fails to moderate Chinese actions, the United States will have learned something important about what it will take to be more effective in the future. Some might argue that the United States already ran this experiment in the 1990s and failed. Others might argue that it succeeded but only because China was still weak. But in my view, the United States abandoned it too soon and needs to test it again, especially now that Xi has damaged China’s national interests and his own standing by overreaching.</p> +<p>It is understood that ammunition is driven from these sites to temporary storage locations inside occupied Ukraine. The routes avoid the Kerch Bridge, with less than a quarter of Russia’s cargo traversing the bridge, and the majority instead driven over long distances through occupied Ukraine – even that which is destined for Kherson. Once in Ukraine, the ammunition is stored in warehouse facilities that are rarely protected, but are located some distance from the frontline. It may be driven forward to the front by logistics units such as the 293rd Separate Automobile Battalion – a road-based unit located in Rostov-on-Don – or, as some accounts indicate, collected by drivers dispatched by Russian units.</p> -<p>A negative example is the Biden administration’s recent campaign against Chinese “overcapacity,” which is flooding the world with cheap exports that exceed domestic demand and harm producers in the United States and other countries. When U.S. officials complain about this unfair phenomenon, they frame it as a feature of the heavy hand of the state in the Chinese economic system instead of targeting a specific set of government subsidies such as the export tax rebates that could be eliminated to mitigate the problem. How is Beijing supposed to get back into Washington’s good graces without specific asks to guide its responses?</p> +<p>Russia has recently completed a new rail route between Rostov-on-Don, Mariupol, Donetsk City and Dzhankoi in Crimea. This route has a single track and has been built in a year, indicating that its primary initial purpose will be support for logistics inside occupied Ukraine. It has been reported that four engines with associated freight cars in the Russian Railways colours were observed in the Mariupol region on 5 August 2024, indicating that the rail route had been launched at that time. It is possible that this rail route will become a source of supply to Russian units fighting in Ukraine, reducing reliance upon road transport.</p> -<p>Nor has the Biden administration’s approach to managing technological competition with China been linked to specific Chinese actions that are objectionable to the United States. Instead, Washington erects barriers to Chinese technological advances because some of them leak from civilian into military capabilities, broadly speaking. Because putting successful Chinese companies such as Huawei on the entity list and banning U.S. outbound investment to China are costly to the United States as well as China, these sanctions are viewed by China as credible signals of a hostile containment policy. The U.S. mode of technological decoupling appears to have no limits. It keeps bleeding into new sectors and has not been connected to specific Chinese malfeasance; rather than motivating Beijing to act more considerately, it has only served to heighten its determination to achieve technological self-reliance.</p> +<p>The Russian Aerospace Forces are normally reliant on rail infrastructure and railheads for their logistic requirements. However, it appears that a lack of secure access to these facilities inside Ukraine has led to greater reliance on road transport of ammunition and supplies. At certain points in the conflict, Russia has employed the rail infrastructure in occupied Ukraine to deliver directly to the front, but Ukraine has effectively severed these routes on several occasions. The largest national railway carrier, owner and builder of public railway infrastructure is Russian Railways. The company is 100% owned by the government, and it is responsible for 16 railways covering the entire country. Although other companies participate in the freight sector, they operate under Russian Railways’ network, leasing access from the state-backed monopoly. For example, the Federal Freight Company JSC, delivers raw materials to the fuel and energy sector and to metallurgical industries. It is owned by Russian Railways and participates in the Russian public procurement system. Among its most prominent clients is UralVagonZavod, the largest supplier of military equipment in Russia and the sole manufacturer of tanks in Russia. There are also rail companies that specifically handle military cargo, like T-Trans, which delivered military cargo to the frontline in 2022 by order of the Russian MoD.</p> -<p>National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s public statement that the goal of U.S. technology policies is to keep “as large a lead as possible” to ensure that “technology that could tilt the military balance . . . is not used against us” sent the wrong message. Instead, he should have identified the specific ways that these advanced military technologies have been used to coerce Japan, Taiwan, or other neighbors and linked them to U.S. restrictions on semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and other advanced technologies. The message should be that openness with trade and investment partners depends on their eschewing the use of force against other countries. Sullivan could have argued that were China to ease off its military intimidation of Asian neighbors, the United States would be prepared to reduce its technology restrictions against Beijing.</p> +<p>There are some signs that the rail network is struggling to cope with the pressures of sanctions and to meet the demands of the war. The Ukrainian advance into Kursk in August 2024 prompted the large-scale movement of Russian troops to the area, primarily using rail. This caused overcrowding at stations in the region and led Russian Railways to cancel freight trains coming from Belarus. The Belarusian Railway Workers Association reported that a significant portion of the Moscow region locomotive fleet was used to complete the transfer. This led to a shortage of locomotives to return train carriages, which were abandoned in Smolensk. Russian Railways reportedly faces a labour shortage – much like Russia’s defence industry – as well as challenges in finding spares to maintain its rail fleet. According to Russian Railways, the high volume of locomotive repairs needed and the longer timeframes needed to repair them because of a lack of parts mean that Russia’s ability to export cargo is decreasing. The number of trains put on hold due to a lack of maintenance more than doubled in 2023. As of 2024, about 40,000 trains were out of service because the locomotives re undergoing repairs. Russian Railways’s own figures for 2024 indicate a year-on-year decline in freight loading of 3.5%, as well as a 6.8% reduction in freight turnover. It is reasonable to conclude that the Russian railways are both a vital element in the artillery supply chain and a potential vulnerability. However, further study – of a similar nature to this paper – would be required to assess the exposure of the Russian railways to external disruption and anticipate actions that Russia might take to secure alternatives to Western components.</p> -<p>Similarly, if China were to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross or another respected organization to inspect Xinjiang and certify that the reeducation camps have been closed and that recruitment of workers is entirely voluntary instead of “forced labor,” the United States should also be prepared to end its economic sanctions against Xinjiang and permit imports of cotton, silicone, and other products from the region.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>In contrast, the Biden administration has been much more targeted in its efforts to prevent Xi from assisting Putin’s unprovoked war in Ukraine. Before Putin invaded, President Joe Biden directly warned Xi that if he provided military aid to the Russian invasion, the United States would impose severe sanctions on China. From the standpoint of Europe and the United States, preserving the sovereignty of Ukraine and other countries that border Russia is what the Chinese would call a “core interest.” This leader-to-leader communication was effective in dissuading China from giving lethal military support to abet Russia’s aggression, which would have been unpopular inside China as well as financially costly. Subsequently, when Xi started helping Russia revive its military-industrial complex to meet its wartime needs, including by producing military equipment (a form of gray zone military assistance), the Biden administration’s clear and forceful diplomacy failed to persuade Xi not to support Putin. This discouraging outcome indicates that to overcome Xi’s affinity for Putin, the United States and Europe will have to ramp up both threats and promises to the Chinese leader.</p> +<p>This paper set out to investigate Russia’s artillery supply chain and identify vulnerabilities that could inform thinking around disrupting the defence industrial base. It has explored the critical role played by artillery in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and how Russia’s supply chains are set up to support the war effort. The available information indicates that Russia’s defence industry is expanding, through new facilities in Kazan and Perm, supplies of CNCs from China, and mass recruitment programmes. This suggests that, if it is not interrupted, Russia will be in a better position to conduct a prolonged war in a material sense by 2030 at the latest.</p> -<p>Negotiating with China based on clear and targeted goals in a respectful manner that connotes goodwill toward the Chinese people may not always succeed. However, it will provide a foundation for a more stable relationship in the future and tell the United States whether it needs to move into an even harder defensive crouch. Only if a series of strategically designed diplomatic interactions attempted over an extended period of time fail to moderate Chinese conduct should Americans conclude that the only option is to pull the grim trigger to deny and degrade China.</p> +<p>From analysing Russia’s artillery supply chain from end to end, it is clear that some elements are more robust than others. From the mining pits that feed the furnaces at Krasny Oktyabr to the cotton fields that are harvested throughout summer to make nitrocellulose, to the storage sheds at the Kotluban ammunition depot, Russia’s artillery supply chain is a complex ecosystem of raw material suppliers, foreign machinery, trains and overworked specialists. The foundations of the artillery supply chain – namely the factories themselves – and the depots used to store ammunition close to Ukraine are hard to disrupt. These facilities sit inside Russia, in some cases thousands of kilometres from Europe, in others built to withstand a NATO aerospace assault.</p> -<h3 id="victory-is-not-an-option">Victory Is Not an Option</h3> +<p>Russia is self-sufficient in many of its needs, especially in raw materials like iron ore, and may have enough machine tools and stored howitzers from the Soviet era to support its war in Ukraine. However, the longer the war continues, the more Russia’s dependencies on foreign suppliers will become a weakness. The examples identified here – such as chromite, cotton cellulose and CNC machines – are examples of raw materials and components that must be sourced from abroad to maintain the artillery supply chain. There have been efforts at disruption of supplies of some of these, but the expansion of Russia’s artillery manufacturing capability, and its ability to continue using artillery ammunition at a high rate of expenditure, indicate that these efforts have failed to successfully limit or affect the artillery supply chain.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="melanie-sisson">Melanie Sisson</h4> - <h4 id="fellow-foreign-policy-strobe-talbott-center-for-security-strategy-and-technology-brookings">Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Brookings</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>However, Russia’s artillery supply chain is not infallible. It can be disrupted with the help of Ukraine’s international partners, through careful targeting of vulnerabilities. The evidence gathered for this paper indicates that Ukraine’s Western partners would be better able to disrupt Russia’s artillery supply chain by focusing efforts in a coordinated manner on raw materials and components that are procured outside Russia. This would involve sanctions and diplomatic pressure: levers that have so far been pulled only in an ad hoc and opportunistic manner. A concerted approach, with additional resources dedicated to enforcement and disruption, will have a greater chance of success. Disrupting the artillery supply chain should be a priority, and if the vulnerabilities identified in this report can be successfully disrupted for prolonged periods, Russia will struggle to meet its needs for artillery ammunition and barrels – this will be vital if Ukraine is to survive.</p> -<p>People like to win. And why shouldn’t they? It satisfies the id, the ego, and the superego all at the same time.</p> +<p>For example, strict sanctions against the supply of chrome ore to Russia would impact the barrel production process and likely other military outputs, as well as the oil and gas industry, which is a significant source of funding for the Russian state. Most resources are imported from countries or companies in jurisdictions that are Western partners or receptive to their concerns. It is more difficult to secretly transfer thousands of tonnes of chromium ore into a country than to smuggle in a few thousand microchips. It therefore appears likely that enforced sanctions in this field would have a better chance of successfully disrupting the chromium supply to Russia than sanctions on microchips have had of disrupting that supply chain. Russia would eventually find an alternate source of chromium, but that would take time and could present further disruption opportunities.</p> -<p>Those most in thrall of winning tend also to be those most certain that victory is within reach. They are confident pitfalls can be anticipated, traps avoided, and obstacles overcome. They urge on the hesitant with motivational affirmations and quiet the questioners with oblique insults to their valor. They emphasize the righteousness of their cause, the perfidy of the competitor, and use both to rouse and to galvanize.</p> +<p>Other tools may include: diplomatic pressure, such as encouraging Taiwan to examine companies exporting CNC machines to Russia and China; or preclusive buying of raw materials on the open market to prevent the hostile nation from accessing them, or to drive up the price and limit access.</p> -<p>In times of war, the call to victory is indispensable because it works on the mind the way a fictional leader of men described the recommending attributes of rum: it incites violence and liberates from self-doubt. At most other times in international politics the call to victory is dangerous, for the same reason.</p> +<p>There is a growing alliance of authoritarian powers aligned against the West and the rules-based international order. Russia, China and Iran frequently work together to evade sanctions, degrade the authority of Western governments and counter the progress made by democracies since the end of the Second World War. The current focus is Russia, but the need to disrupt supply chains will emerge again as these autocratic regimes continue to attack the West. Western governments must develop the ability to understand and disrupt an opponent’s most critical supply chains sooner rather than later. As Russia expands its defence industry, there is an opportunity to limit its ability to support the war. But there is also a necessity to do so, to help Ukraine win the war. Left on its current trajectory, Russian fire superiority will increase year-on-year and become less vulnerable to external disruption through pressure on the supply chain. It is therefore paramount that Ukraine’s partners work together to find routes that will lead to the disruption of the artillery supply chain. This report provides a starting point; there are dozens of vulnerabilities that could be identified. And if each one could be acted on in concert, it would prove very challenging for Russia to adjust before the trajectory of the war had changed.</p> -<p>The United States is not at war with China. China is not at war with the United States. Neither state’s survival or prosperity is furthered by the other’s destruction, physically or ideologically. To the extent that there is symmetry with the Cold War — the memory of which has softened since its death and become remarkably forgiving of its menacing character and many excesses — it lies in both sides’ conviction about the superiority of its own model of domestic politics.</p> +<hr /> -<p>There are, nonetheless, those who wish for the United States to pursue victory over China — who seek not to manage competition indefinitely but rather to produce an end state in which the United States has “won.” It is not wrong to agitate for a clear articulation of what the United States seeks to achieve in the world and an explanation of how it plans to do so. There is, indeed, a pressing need for a U.S. strategic vision that is more than getting through today to get to tomorrow.</p> +<p><strong>Oleksii Borovikov</strong> is an Analytical Expert, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.</p> -<p>Victory over China is not that vision. The purpose of U.S. foreign policy is not to vanquish the United States’ competitors. It is to create conditions that allow Americans to live, in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s enduring phrase, in freedom from want and in freedom from fear. Seeking to defeat China would do neither — it would only make Americans economically worse off and the world less safe.</p> +<p><strong>Denys Hutyk</strong> is an Executive Director, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.</p> -<h4 id="a-victory-that-would-utterly-undo-us">A Victory that Would Utterly Undo Us</h4> +<p><strong>Bohdan Kovalenko</strong> is an Analytical Expert, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.</p> -<p>A U.S. defeat of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can come about in one of two ways: as the outcome of a kinetic war that produces surrender, or through internal dissolution that either cascades from the leadership down or surges from the citizenry up. For the moment, no one openly advocates for victory by violence, though there are some whose views on the U.S. role in the cross-strait dispute over Taiwan’s international political status reveal that war is not their least-preferred option.</p> +<p><strong>Anastasiia Opria</strong> is an Analytical Expert, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.</p> -<p>War — begun over Taiwan or as the result of another dispute — would do more harm than good to U.S. interests. This is true even if the war were to remain conventional — and there is no reason supported either by history or by theory to presume that the likelihood that it would not escalate to nuclear exchange is any greater than the likelihood that it would.</p> +<p><strong>Bohdan Veselovskyi</strong> is a Legal Analyst, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.</p> -<p>Even if the United States were to win a conventional war with China — an outcome that is far from certain — the net effect would still be profoundly negative. Such a confrontation would very likely include cyberattacks on domestic U.S. digital assets and critical infrastructure. It would destroy U.S. military platforms, take the lives of U.S. servicemembers, kill civilians, and cause an enormous amount of damage in Taiwan, throughout East Asia, and possibly within the broader Indo-Pacific. It would have unknown effects on U.S. regional alliances, drop the bottom out of the global economy for an imponderable period of time, and turn China’s domestic political situation into a giant, seething question mark.</p> +<p><strong>Olena Yurchenko</strong> is an Analytics, Research &amp; Investigations Director, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.</p> -<p>The outlook for victory by internal political dissolution is not much better. Those drawn to this idea seem to believe that government collapse is more likely to occur without immediate or sizable intra-or interstate violence than with it, though there is no analytical method through which to arrive at a defensible conclusion about which of these outcomes is more probable. China’s history of such transitions, however, might offer some instructive insights.</p> +<p><strong>Olena Zhul</strong> is an Analytical Expert, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.</p> -<p>It is similarly difficult to take solace in the optimists’ view that China’s domestic politics ultimately would resolve into “the end state desired by a growing number of Chinese: a China that is able to chart its own course free from communist dictatorship.” This is a possibility. It also is a possibility that this prediction is based on an overly rosy view of the aspirations and commitments of the average Chinese citizen — of which there are almost 1.4 billion — and that the result would be something far less desirable. There is, again, no social-scientific method to assess the relative probabilities of the many possible outcomes such a political undoing might produce. Russia’s history, as well as that of other post-Soviet states, however, might offer some instructive insights.</p> +<p><strong>Denys Karlovskyi</strong> is a Research Analyst at the Open Source Centre.</p> -<p>The economic effects of an unraveling of CCP control, whether violent or not, would doubtless constitute an enormous shock to China’s economy. There is no way to predict the contours and duration of this disruption, but it is implausible to think that the derailing of normal economic activity inside China would not ripple outward to shock economic activity elsewhere. And there is no objective measure to suggest that a dramatic reduction in the extent or quality of China’s participation in global commerce and finance would do anything except harm economic growth in the United States, or in any other country. In a private exchange about what might happen in such a situation, the chief economist of a large global investment management and research firm offered, “Nobody can say, really. But it seems like it would be bad.”</p> +<p><strong>Gary Somerville</strong> is a Senior Analyst at the Open Source Centre.</p> -<h4 id="off-target">Off Target</h4> +<p><strong>Maya Kalcheva</strong> is a Research Analyst for Panoptikon.</p> -<p>Prior to reaching any end state — good or bad — aiming for victory points U.S. policy toward costly non-liberal economic practices and risky military confrontation. Today’s economic prescriptions for beating China include imposing high tariffs on imported Chinese goods, enacting export controls and supply chain requirements that restrict access to China’s commercial market, and favoring bilateral trade deals over multilateral free trade agreements. Such parochialist and protectionist policies harm the U.S. economy and strain its otherwise productive, long-term relationships with allies, partners, and friends worldwide.</p> +<p><strong>Mariya Plachkova</strong> is an Investigative Journalist for Panoptikon.</p> -<p>Military prescriptions for beating China invariably include increases in U.S. defense spending and plans to bulk up U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific. This is despite the fact that although Americans are increasingly uncomfortable with China’s growing presence in international affairs, they are not more concerned about China’s military power than they are about its human rights record. It also is despite the math: expert analysis estimates that in 2024 China’s defense spending totaled $471 billion — “around 36 percent of comparable U.S. defense spending of about $1.3 trillion.”</p> +<p><strong>Nikolay Staykov</strong> is a Lead Investigator for Panoptikon.</p> -<p>The work of trying to beat China, it would seem, will come at a steep price to the American — and global — economy, while also requiring the United States to outspend China on defense by more than the current ratio of nearly 3 to 1. It is insufficient to justify this differential on the basis that the United States is a global power with global interests while China’s concerns are regional. It is, after all, China’s global threat to U.S. interests that proponents cite as the impetus for the drive to victory in the first place.</p> +<p><strong>Mila Vasileva</strong> is an AML Expert and Research Analyst for Panoptikon.</p> -<p>Infusing the Indo-Pacific with U.S. warfighting capability would further provoke China’s anxieties about U.S. intentions toward Taiwan and exacerbate Beijing’s fears about the security of its nuclear arsenal. What it would not do, therefore, is decrease the likelihood of war. It also would not restore U.S. dominance; as remarked by noted defense experts, much of the military superiority the United States enjoyed after the Cold War “is gone . . . and it is not coming back.”</p> +<p><strong>Sam Cranny-Evans</strong> is an Associate Fellow at RUSI and the Open Source Centre.</p> -<h4 id="its-not-them-its-us">It’s Not Them, It’s Us</h4> +<p><strong>Jack Watling</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI.</p>Oleksii Borovikov, et al.This report focuses on Russia’s artillery supply chain, as artillery is central to the invasion of Ukraine and has inflicted more than 70% of Ukraine’s casualties. Disrupting Russia’s access to ammunition and new artillery barrels should therefore be a central focus for Ukraine’s supporters.Crossroads Of Commerce2024-10-10T12:00:00+08:002024-10-10T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/crossroads-of-commerce<p><em>This report provides an unprecedented look at the Taiwan Strait’s role in global trade, revealing that over one-fifth of all maritime commerce passes through this vital waterway. China possesses a range of non-kinetic options it may employ to coerce Taiwan, which could significantly disrupt this trade.</em></p> -<p>The United States does not need to defeat, contain, convert, or befriend China. What it needs is a strategy for which the measure of success is what the United States does or does not achieve, not what China does or does not do. Such a strategy will continue to focus on creating the conditions that keep Americans in freedom from want by generating domestic economic productivity and in freedom from fear by minimizing the likelihood of war.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>An affirmative U.S. strategy designed to generate domestic economic productivity will seek to stimulate innovation by growing and attracting human talent, by investing in the research centers and supporting the companies that are developing and applying the next generation of modern technologies, and by promoting access to resource and commercial markets worldwide. It also will attend much more purposefully to the quality of U.S. participation in the institutions that have guided the post–World War II global economy. This is not a bromide about the ability of institutions to constrain powerful states or about the power of diplomatic engagement to settle scores and mend ties. It is a response to the reality that China has made significant investments of capital and talent in expanding and enhancing its ability to shape the operations and outputs of these post-war institutions for the purposes of advancing the interests and values of the CCP. If the United States prefers that the rules that these institutions produce hew toward the interests and values of the United States and other liberal democracies, then it only stands to reason that the United States will need to work more actively and effectively within them to make it so.</p> +<p>Maritime trade is the lifeblood of the global economy.</p> -<p>An affirmative strategy designed to minimize the likelihood of war does not require increasing U.S. forward presence in the Western Pacific. It entails emphasizing the region’s military balance less and acting on its non-military priorities more — transnational crime, illicit resource extraction, climate change, climate-caused security threats, and economic development, for example. Seeking to restore U.S. military superiority would give the appearance of assuming, perhaps mistakenly, that local governments are more fearful of China than they are interested in solving these problems.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/StdkURK.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>U.S. military capability and presence, developed and deployed wisely and with discipline, can enable action on these issues while simultaneously promoting the long-standing and unchanged U.S. interest in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and in peaceful resolution of disputes throughout the waters of East Asia. Ongoing support for Taiwan’s investment in creative and modern applications of military technology, and for its efforts to increase all-of-society preparedness, will usefully increase the difficulty and cost of any military attack on the people of Taiwan. The United States can similarly encourage regional allies to communicate to China the unprofitability of aggression by being demonstrably prepared to defend their territorial and access interests by investing in their own coastal defense capabilities. And the U.S. Department of Defense can develop the concepts and acquire the tools and platforms that power a dispersed presence, equipped with modern sensing and information technologies and hardened command and control networks. This combined U.S. and allied force profile will provide domain awareness, operational agility with which to respond rapidly to indications and warnings, and mission and asset flexibility without fueling an arms race or being dangerously provocative.</p> +<p>Each year, thousands of massive containerships and tankers ferry more than $11.5 trillion in goods and energy across the world’s oceans.</p> -<h4 id="seeing-things-as-they-are">Seeing Things as They Are</h4> +<p>These vessels follow well-established routes that converge at strategic chokepoints where maritime traffic is especially vulnerable to disruption.</p> -<p>Images of competition with China that end with U.S. global dominance restored are illusions. Defeating China will not make the United States a unipolar power again, and that outcome is neither necessary nor sufficient to make Americans prosperous and secure. To the contrary, even if seeking a win ultimately produced one, the United States and the world would be the poorer for it.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mXlsru0.png" alt="image02" /></p> -<p>The aspiration for an end state in international politics in which most if not all states have representative forms of government has a long intellectual lineage and might, someday, come to pass. In the meantime, the work of U.S. foreign policy is not to rid the world of unrepresentative, illiberal governments. It is to create an international environment in which Americans have opportunity to exercise their talents, to innovate, to grow their national economy, to make progress on solving the world’s pressing problems, and to live with the minimum of worry that their country will be attacked. Unipolarity is not the only structural condition under which U.S. citizens can enjoy these freedoms from want and from fear. A strategy that tries to recapture the primacy of the past century, rather than to position the United States to succeed as a great power in the next one, will most likely fail to do either.</p> +<p>Asia’s geography, and its centrality to global commerce, have heightened the importance of chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca and, increasingly, the Taiwan Strait.</p> -<h3 id="us-policy-toward-china-in-search-of-a-vision-of-victory">U.S. Policy toward China: In Search of a Vision of Victory</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4LqpdA5.png" alt="image03" /></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="yun-sun">Yun Sun</h4> - <h4 id="senior-fellow-and-co-director-east-asia-program-and-director-china-program-stimson-center">Senior Fellow and Co-Director, East Asia Program and Director, China Program, Stimson Center</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>China’s rising assertiveness has sparked fears that it may soon use force to bring Taiwan under its control.</p> -<p>Since the beginning of the era of great power competition between the United States and China in 2017, a vision of victory in U.S. policy toward China has been the subject of persistent debate. Most U.S. analysts agree that the United States is in a strategic competition with China, but disagreement runs deep on what a victory looks like. Most agree that competition itself is a process rather than a goal or a means to an end. The question is: What is the end?</p> +<p>While a major conflict over Taiwan would have catastrophic consequences for the global economy, less severe actions taken by Beijing would also destabilize trade through the Taiwan Strait.</p> -<p>Strategists have developed very different visions for the answer. Nicknamed “competition managers” by some Chinese analysts, the Biden administration has been criticized for aiming to “responsibly manage the competition.” Some prominent Republicans have singled out China’s regime type as the essential problem. They have called for “winning the competition” and for a China “free from communist dictatorship.” Yet challenges to that proposition exist even within the Republican Party. In Project 2025, the proposed presidential transition plan drafted by the conservative Heritage Foundation, the China challenge is defined as “rooted in China’s strategic culture and not just the Marxism-Leninism of the [Chinese Communist Party], meaning that internal culture and civil society will never deliver a more normative nation.” The clear implication is that even if the regime changes, or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) collapses or is overthrown, it will not solve the challenge that China poses to the United States.</p> +<p>New research from CSIS estimates that approximately $2.45 trillion worth of goods — over one-fifth of global maritime trade — transited the Taiwan Strait in 2022.</p> -<p>Although China has always presented the United States with challenges and problems since the diplomatic normalization in 1979 (even during the engagement era), strategic competition with China is a relatively new development. The Trump administration is generally seen to have initiated this great power competition, even though the origin and momentum of this contest are deeply rooted in past decades of “engagement” policy. The recency tends to lead to bias and a limited field of vision. As put by historian John Lewis Gaddis, “the direct experience of events isn’t necessarily the best path toward understanding them, because your field of vision extends no further than your own immediate senses.” He concludes that “the historian of the past is much better off than the participant in the present, from the simple fact of having an expanded horizon.”</p> +<p>Disruptions to this trade would send shockwaves well beyond Taiwan and China, impacting key U.S. allies and broad swaths of the Global South.</p> -<p>Gaddis’s observation highlights an inconvenient truth: a vision of victory or a theory of success in dealing with a major geopolitical power such as China may ultimately be a matter of ex post facto assessment, rather than an a priori declaration.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/z9NnwKA.png" alt="image04" /></p> -<h4 id="if-the-cold-war-were-comparable">If the Cold War Were Comparable</h4> +<p>Chinese leader Xi Jinping has made it unequivocally clear that the use of force remains an option for resolving Taiwan’s ambiguous political status, stoking fears about a possible invasion of the island.</p> -<p>As many strategists have described today’s U.S.-China relations as a “new cold war,” perhaps the original Cold War could be a historical reference point. A key debate is whether and when the United States decided that the total collapse of the Soviet Union was its goal for victory in the Cold War. George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” diagnosed the nature of the Soviet regime, its destructiveness, and its profound sense of insecurity. One could conclude from the “Long Telegram” that regime change, or the “internal change” of the Soviet Union, was Kennan’s view of an endgame for U.S. strategy.</p> +<p>But Beijing has a range of options short of invasion at its disposal. CSIS research suggests that less kinetic actions, such as a coast guard–led quarantine of Taiwan, are more likely in the short term than an amphibious assault on the island.</p> -<p>But at least two key factors stand out in the assessment of Kennan’s view. The first is that Kennan did not prescribe an actively confrontational policy solely aimed at regime change. He did not believe that the United States alone “could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia.” In fact, he advocated for the United States to “increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection.” And the eventual end state would be “either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” From this perspective, the policy toward the Soviet Union was solidly focused on the process of straining the Soviet Union, pushing Moscow back regionally and globally, and actively competing in all domains.</p> +<p>While lower in intensity, such contingencies could still threaten the trillions of dollars’ worth of trade that moves through the Taiwan Strait each year.</p> -<p>Second, despite Kennan’s conclusion, it took two decades of negotiations and testing each other’s limits before the United States and the Soviet Union established rules to avoid mutual destruction. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis itself was not sufficient. It took at least another decade for the United States and the Soviet Union to agree to the rules of their coexistence. It was in the early 1970s that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to several arrangements, including the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty and the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7nsuvOe.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ Reliance on the Taiwan Strait for Trade</em></p> -<p>What happened during those two decades and since then is what Kennan called a “test of national quality.” This was true for the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and is equally true for the United States and China today.</p> +<p>Taiwan produces over 90 percent of the most cutting-edge chips used in smartphones, data centers, and advanced military equipment. Disruptions to the supply of these technologies could wipe trillions of dollars from global GDP.</p> -<h4 id="a-vision-of-victory">A Vision of Victory</h4> +<p>It is a critical hub for other goods as well. CSIS estimates that Taiwan’s ports handled approximately $586 billion worth of trade in 2022, including transshipments between other economies. Yet nearly all of this activity flowed through a handful of ports located as little as 100 miles from the Chinese mainland — leaving them uniquely vulnerable to Chinese provocations.</p> -<p>Even for those who see the current U.S.-China competition as analogous to the Cold War, it should not be forgotten that the disintegration of the Soviet Union did not eliminate the threat from Russia. It might only have reduced its intensity and scale. Russia may no longer be an existential threat to the United States, but it remains a critical geopolitical challenge, and an acute threat, as demonstrated by the war in Ukraine.</p> +<p>Any possible disruption of merchant traffic through the Taiwan Strait may prompt shipping companies to avoid the area to limit risks and avoid the increased costs from spikes in insurance premiums. Many shippers have done just that throughout 2024 to avoid Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.</p> -<p>The same is true for China. Given its history, culture, and physical capacity, China will always remain a geopolitical challenge for the United States, regardless of its regime type. Historically, China had been the hegemon in Asia, and the tributary system — China’s own version of hegemonic stability — is the only international relations system that China knew and that worked in its favor. Beijing’s desire to reclaim its historical primacy in the region is a fundamental cause for its clash with the United States in the western Pacific. China as a nation-state will not, of course, go away; therefore, some type of coexistence with China is almost a given.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ej2RUIV.png" alt="image06" /></p> -<p>China’s defeat might be the next-best outcome. The best and most gratifying historical example of this is the defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II. However, that victory was only the beginning of a long process of reforming Germany and Japan and reintegrating them into a global system based on shared values and interests. The defeat was not the endgame — reform and integration were.</p> +<p>Merchant vessels typically travel well-worn routes that make the most economical sense, so forced deviations come at a cost.</p> -<p>However, if the reform and integration of China into the liberal international order is the goal, the theory of victory will look very different. Four decades of engagement since 1979 did not mold China according to the United States’ desired economic and political liberalization model. If the diagnosis is that the CCP is the core of the challenge, the vision of victory will have to include an alternative path that will lead to the desired change without jeopardizing China’s economic and political stability. If a divided and unstable China is indeed the endgame, this might potentially recreate the situation that the United States faced after the breakup of the Soviet Union.</p> +<p>For example, a container ship carrying goods from Singapore — the second-busiest port in the world — to South Korea’s top port, Busan, would typically route through the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, with stops in Taiwan or China.</p> -<h4 id="pros-and-cons">Pros and Cons</h4> +<p>If traffic through the Taiwan Strait is disrupted, the same container ship could reroute through the Luzon Strait and sail east of Taiwan. This would not add much distance to the overall route, but it would likely necessitate skipping port calls in China.</p> -<p>A clearly defined vision of victory offers some advantages. Presumably, it will diminish the space for unending debate on China policy and help to direct the United States’ attention and resources in one single strategic direction. From a domestic point of view, it could help forge a national consensus and, to a certain degree — as some would hope — reunite a deeply divided nation through a higher calling to counter a challenge, threat, and adversary that poses a menace to the United States’ society and way of being.</p> +<p>If cross-strait tensions become especially dire, cautious shipping companies may avoid routes near Taiwan altogether.</p> -<p>Furthermore, once implemented, any clearly defined vision of victory will become self-reinforcing. China will react and, most likely, respond in kind. A hostile strategy, therefore, will lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy and a self-reinforcing security dilemma between the United States and China. This will further strengthen China’s nature as a threat, reinforce the national consensus, and lock both countries in a fixed trajectory.</p> +<p>That same vessel departing from Singapore may choose to sail south of the Philippines before heading north through the Miyako Strait to reach South Korea. This would extend the journey by roughly 1,000 miles, adding significant costs and delays.</p> -<p>However, a single-dimensional, irreversible, and rigid definition of U.S. strategy toward China could be potentially very costly, especially before Kennan’s “test of national quality” renders a concrete, definitive answer about China’s strength and resilience. It could run the risk of underestimating China’s strength and elasticity, posing a potential overstretch of the United States’ resources and capacity. Alternatively, it could overstate the China threat, missing more important priorities and global challenges that could require great power cooperation. Just like it took the United States decades during the Cold War to identify the equilibrium of coexistence with the Soviet Union, it would potentially be premature to declare an endgame in the strategic competition with China.</p> +<p>It would also likely make it infeasible to stop at Chinese ports while en route to Busan, which could have significant ripple effects on supply chains given China’s central role in maritime shipping.</p> -<h4 id="the-china-question">The China Question</h4> +<p>While charting new routes is possible, shipping companies will face significant logistical challenges in implementing these changes, leading to cost increases and delays that will ultimately affect consumers.</p> -<p>Since 2018, relatively early in the great power competition, Chinese strategists have been complaining about the lack of a clearly defined vision of victory — an endgame — by the United States. In the Chinese narrative, “competition” fundamentally lacks explanatory power in defining the endgame and the cost that the United States is willing to carry for the competition. One prevalent question among Chinese analysts is whether the United States sees strategic competition with China as one of superiority or survival. In these analysts’ view, the former offers space and the possibility for coexistence, while the latter equates to an existential rivalry.</p> +<h3 id="powering-japan-and-south-korea">Powering Japan and South Korea</h3> -<p>China prefers strategic clarity regarding the United States’ endgame. This would help China develop, define, and refine its counterstrategy and, at the same time, forge consensus within China’s bureaucracy and society. It would help the hardliners eliminate dissenting views in China about the U.S. strategic agenda. If the United States were to adopt a Cold War–like strategy, it would push China to tighten domestic control to counter the U.S. threat for the foreseeable future, as some hardliners have called for.</p> +<p>Many countries would feel the effects of these disruptions, but two key U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea, would be among those most impacted. CSIS estimates that 32 percent of Japan’s imports and 25 percent of its exports — totaling nearly $444 billion — transited the strait in 2022.</p> -<p>China’s demand for clarity certainly does not require the United States to provide it. Ambiguity might work in the United States’ favor. But how Beijing interprets the U.S. debate on China policy should nonetheless be a consideration, as it impacts an important set of dynamics shaping the competition.</p> +<p>South Korea depended on the Taiwan Strait for 30 percent of its imports and 23 percent of its exports, amounting to about $357 billion in goods.</p> -<h4 id="competition-as-an-imperfect-vision-of-victory">Competition as an Imperfect Vision of Victory</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Ng1LqQk.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ Reliance on the Taiwan Strait: Japan and South Korea</em></p> -<p>The current state of U.S.-China relations is often summarized as “competition.” The two countries are engaged in a whole-of-government, extensive, and comprehensive competition in almost every domain. It is a true test of national quality. Victory depends not on the result of one contest, but the sum of the results of all the contests. The endgame is unlikely to transpire in the short or medium term. Furthermore, given the nature of the China challenge, which goes beyond the CCP, an eventual victory is unlikely to be as unambivalent and clear-cut as the disintegration of the Soviet Union. If the United States remains vigilant and seeks to actively compete with China in all relevant domains — diplomatic, informational, military, and economic — while vigorously building up its own capacity and competitiveness, the competition strategy will be both a means to an end as well as the end in itself.</p> +<p>For both allies, their reliance on the Taiwan Strait is crucial for importing raw materials. Each year, tankers and other ships carry vast amounts of oil, gas, and coal through the strait to Japan and South Korea to meet their immense energy needs.</p> -<p>People like to ask what the U.S. endgame with China is. The question underestimates the duration and complexity of the competition between two great powers such as China and the United States. Today is not the endgame — far from it. If history serves as precedent, the United States and China are only at the beginning of the game and likely not even the beginning of the end. Given the nature of the China challenge, which does not only originate from its regime type, it is better strategy to compete vigorously at every corner and in every domain rather than declare a goal that may be premature or self-reinforcing and deny other options and possibilities.</p> +<p>Over 95 percent of Japan’s crude oil and 65 percent of South Korea’s is sourced from a select group of Middle Eastern countries. Since ships typically follow the shortest paths available, much of this trade passes through the Taiwan Strait.</p> -<h3 id="at-the-end-of-strategic-patience">At the End of Strategic Patience</h3> +<p>For Japan, CSIS estimates that roughly $13 billion of its imports also pass through the Luzon Strait — a trip that makes sense for some ships bound for the country’s eastern ports. Yet this is just a fraction of its imports through the Taiwan Strait.</p> <blockquote> - <h4 id="akio-takahara">Akio Takahara</h4> - <h4 id="distinguished-visiting-professor-tokyo-womans-christian-university-senior-fellow-merics">Distinguished Visiting Professor, Tokyo Woman’s Christian University; Senior Fellow, MERICS</h4> + <p><em>We reaffirm that maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is indispensable to international security and prosperity.</em></p> + <h4 id="-g7-leaders-communique-june-2024">— G7 Leaders’ Communique, June 2024</h4> </blockquote> -<p>Should the United States have a specific “vision of victory” for its China policy? This question assumes that the United States is in competition with China. Few would deny that the two countries are in an intensifying strategic competition. The initial question provokes another — does China have a “vision of victory” for its relations with the United States? It does, and the United States should have one, too. The United States and its allies must share a vision of the future in order to win the strategic competition they have been compelled to enter. That is, they must prevent China from changing the status quo by physical or economic force. If China wants to change the rules that support the international order, it should do so according to the rules.</p> +<p>Japan and South Korea are also major players in high-tech supply chains and are heavily reliant on the Taiwan Strait for shipments of electronics and machinery.</p> -<p>At the same time, when discussing the end goal of the United States’ relations with China, a “vision of victory” may not be enough. The reason is simple. The United States is not only competing with China. It is also cooperating with China, its people, and its companies. There are numerous aspects of the bilateral relationship beyond competition. Discussing only the strategic side will not be enough to understand and envisage the relationship in total. Japan’s relations with China provide an example of how the United States might proceed.</p> +<p>Chips and electronics rank as South Korea’s second-largest import and Japan’s fourth-largest by value. The lion’s share of these chips are imported from Taiwan and China, including fabrication plants located along the Taiwan Strait in western Taiwan and southeast China.</p> -<h4 id="should-the-united-states-have-a-vision-of-victory-china-does">Should the United States Have a “Vision of Victory?” China Does.</h4> +<h3 id="elsewhere-in-the-indo-pacific">Elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific</h3> -<p>In explaining China’s vision, Japan serves as a productive example. When comparing China’s policies toward Japan and toward the United States, it is evident that while China’s Japan policy is rather murky, its U.S. policy is quite clear. Beijing has been sending mixed signals to Tokyo for decades. At the November 2023 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, Chinese leader Xi Jinping agreed with Japanese prime minister Kishida Fumio that Japan and China should comprehensively promote mutually beneficial relations with common strategic interests and strive to construct a constructive and stable relationship. A few months later, at the May 2024 trilateral summit with Prime Minister Kishida and President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea, Chinese premier Li Qiang offered a proposal for cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, science and technology, and sustainable development, among others. At the same time, however, China pilloried Japan for releasing treated water from the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant into the Pacific Ocean. To this day, Beijing calls it “contaminated water” and bans the import of seafood products, including freshwater koi. In addition, some Chinese scholars continue to question the international status of Okinawa, over 50 years after the United States returned its administrative authority to Japan. These scholars claim that China never agreed on Okinawa’s status since it did not take part in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference, which acknowledged Japan’s residual sovereignty. Moreover, the Chinese government has not stopped regularly sending its coast guard vessels into the Senakaku Islands’ territorial waters and their contiguous zone. All are grave challenges to the international order in Northeast Asia. What, then, is China’s Japan policy? Chinese international affairs experts themselves often wonder if China even has one.</p> +<p>For another key U.S. ally, Australia, these dynamics are almost completely flipped. The continent is endowed with immense natural resources, which Canberra has leveraged to position Australia as a pivotal player in the global economy.</p> -<p>This contrasts sharply with China’s view of what it wants to do with the United States, the sole superpower. Although the text of China’s National Security Strategy for 2021–2025 has not been publicly released, based on the words of Xi Jinping, the strategy is likely designed as part of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s larger goal of becoming a leading world power. It is well known that Xi encourages his people with phrases such as “the East is rising and the West is declining” and “we are advancing towards the center of the world stage.” Internally, he has declared, “History indicates a true world power is one that is both a sea power and a land power. . . . It is our important strategic decision to proceed from a land power to a nation that is both a land power and a sea power.” Does Xi mean to replace the United States as the hegemonic power and initiate a Pax Sinica? At the least, this is probably not the target for 2025. China knows its national power will not reach that level soon. However, China’s intentions grow as its power increases. In 1973, for example, former premier Zhou Enlai did not deny the possibility that China would become hegemonistic in the future. China has actually become more ambitious along with the rise in its national power. Xi Jinping himself told President Barack Obama that the Pacific Ocean was big enough to accommodate both the United States and China. Ten years later, he told President Joe Biden that the globe is big enough to accommodate the two. In fact, Xi has a personal liking for standing center stage. In 2018, he told the late prime minister Abe Shinzo that he would have become either a Democrat or a Republican and not a member of the U.S. Communist Party had he been born in the United States, since a politician should aim to stand center stage. Xi knows it’s impossible for China to leapfrog the United States in the near future, but his end goal is to eventually win the competition, do away with the global dominance of U.S. forces and the supremacy of the U.S. dollar, and gain power and prestige as the Middle Kingdom. From his remarks and the policies Xi promotes, this would appear to be his “China Dream.”</p> +<p>Nearly 27 percent of Australia’s exports passed through the Taiwan Strait in 2022, totaling almost $109 billion. Commodities such as iron ore, coal, and liquefied natural gas comprised approximately 83 percent of this trade.</p> -<p>Despite pursuing dominance, China argues for a multicentered world. For example, the recent Resolution of the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP stated that China calls for an equal and orderly multipolar world. This is especially appealing to many countries in the so-called Global South, where anti-Western sentiments are running high. But what do the Chinese really mean by multipolarity? Judging from the way China exerts pressure on smaller nations via paramilitary vessels and measures of economic coercion, it would appear that, for China, equality exists only among the poles themselves, and not between the poles and other, smaller nations. Despite the modest, friendly language written in leaders’ speeches and other policy documents, any potential Pax Sinica seems actually to be a global extension of the Pax Communista, that is, their domestic order as supported by the potent power of the CCP and not by rule of law. Such multipolarity is unacceptable to the great majority of the countries in the world. In order to counter this Chinese vision, and to prevent China from changing the status quo through physical and economic force, the United States must share its “vision for victory” with allied nations, working with them in the pursuit of a common goal.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/T76yRjO.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ Global Reliance on the Taiwan Strait: Australia</em></p> -<p>The maintenance of peace and the preservation of the rule of law may not appear to be a decisive “victory.” However, the United States and its partners need to face a reality: what is best for the United States, its allies, and the world is to coexist and cooperate with China where possible, while competing with it fiercely where necessary.</p> +<p>China has an especially voracious appetite for Australian iron ore. One in every six dollars Australia earns from its global exports comes from selling iron ore to China. Much of this must pass through the Taiwan Strait to reach China’s heavily industrialized northern provinces, where roughly three-quarters of China’s steel production occurs.</p> -<h4 id="winning-the-strategic-competition-is-not-enough">Winning the Strategic Competition Is Not Enough</h4> +<p>These exports are heavily geographically concentrated in northern Australia. Roughly 85 percent of ore carriers sailing from Australia through the Taiwan Strait to China depart from just one location, Port Hedland, which is one of the world’s largest iron ore export hubs.</p> -<p>Preventing China from changing the status quo through physical and economic force does not mean that the United States should wage a new cold war or sever the cooperative ties between the two nations. Rather, the vision of the future should include the possibility of prosperous collaboration in the areas of economics, non-traditional security, and other global issues (e.g., climate change, environmental protection, and global pandemics). But can the United States compete and cooperate at the same time? Japan’s experience over the past 15 years offers one potential path to do exactly that.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EEz1s49.png" alt="image09" /></p> -<p>Komiyama Hiroshi, former president of the University of Tokyo, dubbed Japan an “advanced country in meeting new challenges.” Earlier than many other countries, Japan has had to face the challenges of a financial crisis, an aging society, and the fallout from a nuclear power plant accident caused by a tsunami. It has also faced the challenge of China’s rise. Needless to say, Japan directly aided China’s economic rise and has benefited from it. Although Japan stopped embarking on new official development assistance (ODA) projects to China in 2018, it remains the largest historic donor nation toward China’s economic and social development. However, along with the rapid rise in its economic power, China increased its military might. Chinese leaders used to say that they had no intention of building aircraft carriers or of militarizing the South China Sea, but their actions tell a different story. The focus of tension between Japan and China has been the Senkaku Islands. China claimed sovereignty over them for the first time in December 1971 and started printing the Chinese name Diaoyudao (钓鱼岛) on their maps, replacing the islands’ Japanese name — Senkaku Islands (尖閣列島) and Uo-tsuri-jima (魚釣島). Although there was a tacit understanding between the two governments that neither side should touch the issue or change the status quo, China began to abrogate its agreement by sending fishing boats (1978), research vessels (1990s), and eventually the Chinese Coast Guard (2008) into the Senkaku Islands’ territorial waters. The initial patrol boat intrusion in December 2008 was likely the result of the recently introduced (2006) policy to regularly patrol Chinese maritime interests in the East China Sea. In 2012, when the Japanese government purchased three of the five major islands in the Senkakus from a private landlord with the aim of stabilizing the situation, China seized the opportunity and started consistently sending their patrol boats into the islands’ territorial waters and contiguous zone. Japan originally did not think that China would increase its national power such that it would be able to start physically challenging Japan’s interests and sovereignty so quickly (if at all). But China’s military rise and its maritime advancement eventually posed a serious potential threat, and Japan had no choice but to stand up to this strategic challenge.</p> +<p>Crucially, though, the extent of the pain for Australia would likely depend on the extent of Chinese aggression. During a quarantine or blockade, Australia may continue selling iron ore and other goods to China while absorbing some of the costs from rerouting away from the waters around Taiwan. In a wide-scale war over Taiwan, the issue may be moot as Canberra could withhold exports of iron ore and other goods to China in response.</p> -<p>Complicating matters, and further increasing strategic tension, Japanese firms were attracted by the growing Chinese market and its appeal as a profitable production site in the increasingly globalized world economy. China overtook the United States as Japan’s largest trading partner in 2004 and has remained in that position. As of May 2024, there were over 31,000 Japanese companies registered in China. According to a survey conducted by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in China in the spring of 2024, 26 percent of Japanese companies in China consider the country their most important market in 2024 and beyond; another 26 percent declared that the Chinese market was one of their three most important markets.</p> +<p>Other key actors in the region are less reliant on the Taiwan Strait. The Philippines depends on the strait to transport about one-fifth of its global imports and one-seventh of its exports, but its geography allows it to send much of its trade through the Luzon Strait and Western Pacific Ocean.</p> -<p>In response, Japan has adopted a two-pronged approach toward China — compete and cooperate concurrently. This is, in many ways, a seemingly contradictory approach. If one is concerned about security, then Japan should not cooperate with China, since cooperation makes China stronger. But then economic and business experts would counter that if Japan stopped cooperating with China, it would lose the economic vibrancy that constitutes the foundation for the competition itself. Which side is right? Both. And this is Japan’s dilemma.</p> +<p>Similarly, mainland Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar are less dependent on the Taiwan Strait — in part because they can send a sizeable portion of their trade overland.</p> -<p>Although the United States is less dependent on the Chinese economy, the situation is roughly analogous; this applies to Europe as well, especially since China began supporting Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. China, for its part, is facing the same dilemma in reverse. It is true that striking the right balance between competition and cooperation is increasingly difficult, particularly as it is likely that strategic competition will intensify, while economic, environmental, and cultural cooperation widens and deepens. However, the reality is that people often live with contradictions and dilemmas. Japan has had to live with them in dealing with China for the past 15-plus years. Of course, this is not an easy situation. The world needs to strive, persevere, and maintain peace by mobilizing every means and method possible. Balancing, hedging, communicating for strategic reassurance, and exchanging at all levels in order to promote mutual understanding all require maintaining strategic patience.</p> +<h3 id="a-critical-route-for-the-global-south">A Critical Route for the Global South</h3> -<h4 id="upholding-strategic-patience-until-when">Upholding Strategic Patience until When?</h4> +<p>The Taiwan Strait’s importance is not limited to Indo-Pacific countries. The four countries most reliant on the strait are in Africa.</p> -<p>But for how long must the United States and the world uphold strategic patience? The answer is until China changes. Much mainstream thinking in the United States today holds that China has not and will not change. However, China and Chinese society have changed enormously in the past 40 years. True, the CCP clings on to (and has even increased) its power and is prone to wield that power forcefully. Likewise, Xi Jinping is reversing the trend of political and administrative reform set by Deng Xiaoping and his friends started in the 1980s. But the path of history is always a zigzag. Xi is desperate to indoctrinate the Chinese people because he knows that the Chinese people have changed, both the elite and ordinary, everyday people. Nobody can shape China from the outside; only the Chinese people can change China. One day the transformation will start, triggered perhaps by a financial crisis or another pandemic. No one knows when the transformation will start, if that process will be peaceful, or what the final end state will be. The United States and other countries could help the Chinese people, perhaps through inviting more students and tourists. Though this path involves myriad risks and challenges, if the internal order of China is eventually transformed into one that is supported by the rule of law, the returns would be high, and there will be a significant, positive change in the nature of the relations between China and the world.</p> +<p>These countries all have one thing in common: their economies depend heavily on exporting raw materials to Asia, especially China.</p> -<h3 id="achieving-victory">Achieving Victory</h3> +<p>The Democratic Republic of the Congo shipped nearly $13 billion worth of copper, cobalt, and other metals through the strait — about 62 percent of its total global exports. Nearly all of it was bound for China.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="matt-turpin">Matt Turpin</h4> - <h4 id="senior-advisor-palantir-technologies-visiting-fellow-hoover-institution-stanford-university">Senior Advisor, Palantir Technologies; Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zdW0xjp.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ Global Reliance on the Taiwan Strait: Africa and the Middle East</em></p> -<p>Over the past decade, U.S. policy toward China has shifted from being a somewhat niche topic, covered almost exclusively by a small group of China watchers, to the center stage of debates over national security and foreign policy. Those debates spawn questions such as, does the United States need a specific “vision of victory” for its China policy? And, if it does, what is it? Or, if not, why not? It is tempting to desire a clear and concise end state when crafting policy but doing so would be shortsighted. U.S. policy toward China has been and remains nested within broader national strategies and policies, making it difficult to adopt one specific vision of victory or strategic end state for policy toward China. Such U.S. policy only makes sense within the broader outline of what Americans want the world to look like and what they are willing to sacrifice to achieve it.</p> +<p>Eritrea likewise exports more than 70 percent of its zinc ore and almost 100 percent of its copper ore to China. Gabon and Angola are endowed with oil, about 40 percent of which is bound for China. Much of this trade makes its way through the Taiwan Strait to ports in northern China.</p> -<p>This might seem like an unsatisfying answer, but the United States already has a well-developed vision of victory, and that vision has been remarkably consistent for nearly a century. Leaders from across the last fifteen presidential administrations (which implies a considerable degree of support by the American people) believed that U.S. security and prosperity depend on building, expanding, and maintaining an international system that privileges democracies over authoritarian regimes. Whether one calls it a “liberal international order” or a “rules-based international order,” the concept is the same. Allowing for a situation to emerge in which the United States is isolated, cut off from foreign markets, and surrounded by more powerful and hostile powers is a disastrous scenario that U.S. strategists and political leaders have been wise to avoid. U.S. policymakers from across the political spectrum largely share the vision that security and prosperity rest on an international environment that is “maximally favorable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share.”</p> +<p>Countries in the Middle East are similarly reliant on the strait for transporting oil to markets in Asia. Oman, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Yemen all send over 30 percent of their exports through the strait.</p> -<p>In countless speeches and documents over nearly a century, U.S. policymakers have described the attributes of the desired international order. For example, the Biden administration described the challenge facing the United States and their version of the vision of victory in their October 2022 National Security Strategy:</p> +<p>These dynamics also extend to some of China’s largest and most important economic and geopolitical partners. On average, the nine BRICS economies rely on the Taiwan Strait for about 14 percent of their imports and 15 percent of their exports. That is more than twice the level of dependence of the G7 economies.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>The post-Cold War era is definitively over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next. No nation is better positioned to succeed in this competition than the United States, as long as we work in common cause with those who share our vision of a world that is free, open, secure, and prosperous. This means that the foundational principles of self-determination, territorial integrity, and political independence must be respected, international institutions must be strengthened, countries must be free to determine their own foreign policy choices, information must be allowed to flow freely, universal human rights must be upheld, and the global economy must operate on a level playing field and provide opportunity for all.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/f994PTk.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ Reliance on the Taiwan Strait: BRICS vs. G7</em></p> -<p>The quotation above describes a vision for how the world works, and how Americans want it to work. It observes that the nature of the international order is contested, and it ties U.S. prosperity and security to an international order with particular characteristics. Not every U.S. administration has or will define this international order in precisely the same language, but their descriptions are close enough to view the underlying consensus that Americans have about the world they desire, as well as how that vision differs from the alternative international order that Beijing and Moscow are trying to build.</p> +<p>China has sought to position itself as a leader and voice of developing countries, in part to build support for its alternative vision of international order beyond the “Western approach.” This is especially the case for its engagement with BRICS nations.</p> -<p>The embrace of this concept of a “maximally favorable” international order is so ingrained in U.S. strategic culture that it is very difficult to imagine an alternative end state that Americans would be willing to accept (whether Americans are willing to bear the costs to maintain it is a different question). This is the vision of victory or end state that strategists demand an articulation of and from which all subordinate policies and strategies (including U.S. policy toward China) flow.</p> +<p>The need to maintain broad-based diplomatic support to advance this vision may make Beijing more sensitive to the concerns of these nations. In a crisis or conflict over Taiwan, developing countries will likely seek to continue trading with China — as many have continued to do business with Russia following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Faced with severe disruptions to their trade, they could collectively exert significant pressure on Beijing to resolve a conflict to avoid long-term economic pain.</p> -<p>U.S. strategic culture views alternative international orders based on anti-liberal characteristics (whether built by Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, or the People’s Republic of China) as threats to be countered, contained, and vanquished.</p> +<h3 id="chinas-reliance-on-the-taiwan-strait">China’s Reliance on the Taiwan Strait</h3> -<p>This begs another question: if the U.S. end state has been so consistent in how Americans define their vision of victory, what accounts for the changes in U.S. policy toward China?</p> +<p>China’s own economy stands to be severely impacted by any disruptions to trade through the Taiwan Strait.</p> -<p>Between the 1970s and the early 2010s, U.S. policymakers largely viewed China as a partner (or potential partner) in achieving broader U.S. objectives, first in helping the United States weaken and isolate the Soviet Union, and later in becoming a “responsible stakeholder” in the international order. As long as U.S. policymakers assumed that China’s leaders shared mutual objectives with the United States and that Chinese interests were converging with U.S. interests (or at least as long as Americans thought they could persuade Beijing of these things), U.S. policy sought to accelerate China’s economic growth and strengthen the Sino-American partnership.</p> +<p>In a large-scale conflict over Taiwan — such as a blockade or invasion — China would likely face severe economic consequences from financial market shocks, U.S. and allied sanctions, and other ripple effects. In addition to those imposed costs, the consequences of interrupted trade flows would be significant.</p> -<p>In the two decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the goal of U.S. policy toward China was to ensure that a potential rival became a strategic partner instead. This was in line with a wider set of bilateral and multilateral policies that sought to turn the world’s major powers into partners to be swayed and persuaded, as opposed to rivals to be countered and contained. U.S. policymakers wanted Chinese leaders to succeed with a form of “reform and opening” that fit U.S. interests (whether this was the same “reform and opening” Chinese leaders were pursuing is another matter). As Orville Schell has observed, U.S. policymakers wanted China to become “a little bit more soluble” in the world the United States had built.</p> +<p>A staggering $1.3 trillion of Chinese imports and exports passed through the Taiwan Strait — far more than any other country. Hong Kong adds another $95 billion in trade, bringing the total to nearly $1.4 trillion.</p> -<p>Under these conditions, it made little sense for U.S. policymakers to imagine a vision of victory with regard to China policy (aside from the ultimate political liberalization that would come with Beijing’s mellowing as its citizens became wealthier and more connected to the rest of the world). This was a relationship that needed to be managed, not a rivalry to be won. If one were to press U.S. policymakers during that time, many would have likely claimed that their objective was to prevent the start of a second cold war.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/U3SZyzE.png" alt="image12" /> +<em>▲ Value of Trade through the Taiwan Strait</em></p> -<p>By the early 2010s, U.S. policymakers could see that Chinese and U.S. interests were diverging, and their objectives were in greater conflict. In response to these developments, U.S. policy became more competitive. The debate today centers around how competitive that policy should be and whether the U.S. should treat the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a rival, or even an adversary, bent on undermining the United States’ broader end state of a liberal international order.</p> +<p>The waterway is especially crucial in supplying China with raw materials. China’s rapid economic development has transformed the country into the largest importer of oil, coal, and natural gas, as well as key manufacturing imports like ores and metals.</p> -<p>By 2022, this change in thinking and policy revealed itself with statements like this from Secretary of State Antony Blinken:</p> +<p>These goods collectively make up two-thirds of the value of goods headed to China through the strait.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing’s vision would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the world’s progress over the past 75 years.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/h9BhO94.png" alt="image13" /> +<img src="https://i.imgur.com/CZC2hme.png" alt="image14" /> +<em>▲ Chinese Trade through the Taiwan Strait by Industry</em></p> -<p>To put it simply, Chinese actions over the past 15 years changed the minds of U.S. policymakers about Chinese intentions.</p> +<p>China’s reliance on the strait for exports is lower by comparison, with only 15 percent of its exports passing through the waterway. This is largely because many exports do not have to transit the strait to reach China’s key export markets, such as the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Despite this lower dependency, the total value of exports transiting the strait still exceeds $551 billion — an enormous sum to put at risk.</p> -<p>Where there had once been optimism about “reform and opening,” there came to be hardened conclusions that Beijing’s vision of victory — the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation — could only be achieved at the expense of the U.S. rules-based order. As the implications of these conclusions sunk in, U.S. administrations shifted U.S. policy away from engagement and partnership with Beijing, and toward rivalry and hostility (an approach that Chinese leaders had already adopted).</p> +<p>Crucially, the strait is not simply vital for China’s international trade. It also facilitates the flow of goods within China. Over half of all voyages through the Taiwan Strait are between the sprawling ports dotting China’s eastern seaboard. China could move some goods internally by land or air, but doing so is typically far more expensive than transporting them by sea. Policymakers in Beijing are undoubtedly aware of this reality, which likely plays a role in their decisionmaking regarding the use of force against Taiwan.</p> -<h4 id="from-partner-to-rival">From “Partner” to “Rival”</h4> +<p>In a crisis or conflict that disrupts maritime traffic through the Taiwan Strait, China would face major obstacles to conducting trade. Yet Beijing does have options to mitigate the challenges.</p> -<p>This U.S. vision is not a secret, and for many living in Europe, North America, and parts of Asia, it has become banal. The effort by the United States and its partners to build, expand, and maintain an international order that favors liberal values while disadvantaging authoritarian regimes has been on display for decades. The citizens living within this order take it for granted, with many assuming that its existence is natural, the way things ought to be. But even as some dismiss talk of an international order as empty rhetoric, it is important to consider how this decades-long effort is interpreted in places like Beijing and Moscow, as well as in Pyongyang and Tehran.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MhZCgWS.png" alt="image15" /> +<em>▲ China’s Top Container Ports</em></p> -<p>The leaders of these regimes have come to view this international order as an existential threat, one that compels them to set aside their differences and cooperate. As far back as Mao Zedong in the 1950s and continuing through to the present, Chinese leaders have interpreted efforts by the United States to bring about democratic reforms as a deceptive tactic meant to weaken and topple the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Known as “peaceful evolution” (a term Mao borrowed from speeches given by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles), the concept is employed by Chinese leaders to explain a long-term U.S. effort to drive the CCP from power.</p> +<p>If the Taiwan Strait is completely impassable to merchant ships, vessels bound for China could reroute, but if they are forced to go through the Miyako Strait, this could leave China susceptible to a distant blockade by U.S., Japanese, and other forces seeking to deprive China of trade.</p> -<p>The fall of the Berlin Wall, revolutions across Eastern Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union turned a vague sense of vulnerability into an acute fear. As South Korea and Taiwan transitioned from authoritarian rule to democracy a pattern started to emerge. The United States and NATO’s war against Serbia fit the pattern. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan fit the pattern. As a series of color revolutions took place in the 2000s and 2010s, leaders in Beijing and Moscow became convinced that all these events were connected: the United States was intentionally causing revolutions (some peaceful, others violent), and it was only a matter of time before the leaders in Beijing and Moscow faced the same fates as Ceauşescu and Gaddafi.</p> +<p>In less kinetic scenarios, China could also attempt to only close the Taiwan Strait to non-Chinese vessels while allowing or demanding that its ships continue sailing through the Strait. Nearly half of all cargo and tanker vessels transiting through the Taiwan Strait each year are Chinese-flagged. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that Chinese-owned ships would be secure from interdiction by forces opposing China.</p> -<p>For individuals like Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, the grand strategy of the United States and its vision to build and extend a liberal international order poses an existential threat to their personalized rule. History provides them with stark examples from their predecessors who failed to take seriously the threat posed by the United States. One of the key lessons that their predecessors left is the danger that arises when the United States can take advantage of divisions between China and Russia. From Xi and Putin’s perspectives, the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s sowed the seeds for the Soviet Union’s collapse two decades later. The two leaders understand how critical it is for their two countries to remain aligned. Preventing their own isolation and accentuating divisions between the United States and its allies is vital to their own survival.</p> +<h3 id="looking-ahead">Looking Ahead</h3> -<p>It is unlikely that Xi and Putin have set their sights as low as simply survival. Actions and assumptions by leaders in Beijing and Moscow brought about the end of the post-Cold War era, and the United States has entered an era of the second cold war. Both leaders want their nations to flourish and see them resume, what many of their countrymen believe to be, their rightful places at the center of the world stage. The United States stands in the way of those more ambitious visions. Thus, the only way to achieve them, under the leadership of Xi and Putin, is to dismantle what the United States has built over the past century. Fracturing the U.S.-sponsored international order and replacing it with one that privileges Beijing and Moscow is the only long-term end state that serves the interests and desires of both men. It is clear that if they are successful in creating what they intend, the new international order will be anti-liberal.</p> +<p>Beijing forcefully asserts that the issue of Taiwan is “purely an internal affair,” and its officials bristle when other countries sail naval vessels through the Taiwan Strait — despite their rights to freedom of navigation under international law.</p> -<p>Different Chinese and Russian leaders might make different assumptions, different calculations, and different decisions, but for the foreseeable future, the United States will be dealing with Xi and Putin and the regimes they have built. The United States should prevent Xi and Putin from achieving their vision, and it must put considerable pressure on their regimes. That will require a significant increase in U.S. defense spending (and the defense spending of U.S. partners), as well as a realignment of our economies away from both the PRC and Russia (call it de-risking or decoupling, the concept is the same). The United States will need to contain them militarily and isolate them economically. This will require serious upfront sacrifice, as well as prioritizing these efforts over a rapid energy transition that is overly reliant on the PRC. But the United States should be confident that it can build a much more prosperous international system than its rivals can. The United States therefore needs to play for time and wait for leaders to emerge in Beijing and Moscow who will be open to compromise on its terms.</p> +<p>Yet this report shows the immense importance of the Taiwan Strait to international commerce and demonstrates the scale of the economic consequences should Beijing upset the fragile stability in the strait by using force against Taiwan.</p> -<h3 id="is-the-steady-state-reaching-its-expiration-date">Is the “Steady State” Reaching Its Expiration Date?</h3> +<p>Ensuring free and open maritime trade through the Taiwan Strait is critical not just for nearby nations like China, South Korea, and Japan, but for the entire global economy. For Washington, working closely with allies and partners to maintain cross-strait stability is essential to safeguarding international trade.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="rick-waters">Rick Waters</h4> - <h4 id="managing-director-china-eurasia-group-senior-fellow-center-for-china-analysis-asia-society-policy-institute">Managing Director, China, Eurasia Group; Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis, Asia Society Policy Institute</h4> -</blockquote> +<hr /> -<p>George Kennan often lamented that ambiguities in his “Long Telegram” allowed it to be used as the intellectual basis for a global military containment effort he never intended. Kennan thought the Soviets could be defeated by a more calibrated (and less costly) approach. Decades later, he said “My thoughts . . . were distorted by the people who understood it and pursued it exclusively as a military concept, and I think that, as much as any other cause, led to [the] 40 years of unnecessary, fearfully expensive and disoriented process of the Cold War.”</p> +<p><strong>Matthew P. Funaiole</strong> is vice president of the iDeas Lab, Andreas C. Dracopoulos Chair in Innovation, and senior fellow of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p>The current ambiguity over the end-state goal of U.S. policy toward China is an impediment to strategy development. Without defined ends, strategy — the application of means to an end — is incomplete and ineffective. Today, wide gaps exist within both Republican and Democratic foreign policy debates over what the desired end state with regard to China should be. To be sure, the lack of a clear answer under the past two administrations did not prevent the U.S. policy pivot to strategic competition under the Trump administration or, under the Biden administration, the reboot of U.S. industrial policy and the profound reshaping of the Indo-Pacific security architecture. But, as with Kennan’s formulation, ambiguity over the theory of victory for U.S. policy toward China can contribute over time to an environment fertile for strategic incoherence and overreach. This is the case for several reasons.</p> +<p><strong>Brian Hart</strong> is a fellow with the China Power Project at CSIS.</p> -<p>First, domestic U.S. consensus around a theory of victory is essential to a durable China strategy. What exists in Washington today is more a diagnostic convergence over key aspects of the China challenge than a true bipartisan union around strategy, as the latter requires an alignment of means against clearly defined end goals. Phrases such as “bipartisan consensus” and “malign Chinese behavior” elide over the central question: Does the United States seek to blunt or change China’s policies and actions by affecting the leadership’s cost calculus or, alternatively, is it the nature of the regime itself that must change before the country’s policies will shift? This question matters because the subset of appropriate responses along the policy spectrum will vary between different end-state formulations.</p> +<p><strong>David Peng</strong> is a senior fellow for data science with the iDeas Lab at CSIS. He has over 15 years of experience in quantitative research.</p> -<p>The current administration’s answer evolved from Jake Sullivan and Kurt Campbell’s 2019 Foreign Affairs essay outlining why a steady state was preferable to an end state in the U.S.-China context. This notion implicitly underpinned the 2022 National Security Strategy, Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s 2022 speech outlining the Biden administration’s China policy, and subsequent speeches from cabinet officials. Yet much of the current administration’s answer to what that means revolves around articulating what its China policy is not. For example, in early 2024, Jake Sullivan stated “We expect that the PRC will be a major player on the world stage for the foreseeable future. That means that even as we compete, we have to find ways to live alongside one another. Competition with the PRC does not have to lead to conflict, confrontation, or a new Cold War.” This approach made sense as a placeholder while the United States worked to rebuild its domestic strength and fortify key partnerships, but in dodging the end-state question, the policy increasingly catalyzes debate over it.</p> +<p><strong>Bonny Lin</strong> is a senior fellow for Asian security and director of the China Power Project at CSIS.</p> -<p>Some scholars have proposed a regime-based theory of victory as an alternative to a U.S.-defined end state for U.S. policy. This approach has several shortcomings. First, the United States lacks the ability to achieve its goals in most domains without third-country support, and the coalition that would align around a regime-based framing is a solitary one. Second, a successor regime would not necessarily jettison Beijing’s broad ambitions unless they lacked the resources and power to do so. The historical record suggests that nearly 80 percent of authoritarian regimes conclude with a depressing end — another regime that pursues similar interests. Third, it is unclear whether ordinary Chinese citizens dislike the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as much as some scholars believe they do, or at least should. In fact, many Chinese people who are dissatisfied with current policies indicate privately that they pin their hopes on the transition to the next generation of CCP leaders who came of age after the Cultural Revolution and in many cases studied abroad — some of whom are quite candid in private about their frustration with the current direction of domestic and external policies.</p> +<p><strong>Jasper Verschuur</strong>.</p>Matthew P. Funaiole, et al.This report provides an unprecedented look at the Taiwan Strait’s role in global trade, revealing that over one-fifth of all maritime commerce passes through this vital waterway. China possesses a range of non-kinetic options it may employ to coerce Taiwan, which could significantly disrupt this trade.Uncertainty For Russian Army2024-10-09T12:00:00+08:002024-10-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uncertainty-for-russian-army<p><em>The Russian Army in Ukraine performed poorly as a result of degraded unit quality due to attrition and operational failures, but has adapted by improving electronic warfare, air defense, and drone integration, making it more lethal and survivable.</em></p> -<p>While a theory of victory could arguably be considered better than no theory, the challenge for the next administration is to articulate a clearer alternative to a steady state, or many will read into the ambiguity of the current formulation that regime change is the ultimate U.S. hope. Raja Krishnamurthi (D-IL) has spoken of an end state in which China’s policies moderate, returning Beijing to a greater pragmatism akin to that of Deng Xiaoping. Krishnamurthi admitted that the odds of this happening are not high, meaning the United States must be prepared for a long competition. While the Republican and Democrat co-chairs of the House Select Committee on the CCP found some common ground, the risk in eliding over gaps — especially the lack of a coherent end state — is that prioritization comes to be defined more by which constituencies are loudest than by a clear strategic North Star. Even the House Select Committee name implies that the problem is the CCP, not its policies, creating a perhaps unintended messaging around the motivation behind the 150 bipartisan recommendations it put forward last year.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Second, ambiguity over U.S. end-state goals undercuts coalition-building efforts by allowing third-country suspicions (and the Russia/China “color revolution” narrative) to fill in the blanks. Many abroad suspect that regime change (or its passive cousin, peaceful evolution) remains the secret U.S. intention, or at least that it could become the goal of some future administration. These suspicions shape the context within which third countries consider the choices Washington is asking of them. Although ambiguity over the end state did not prevent the Biden administration from engineering alignment around advanced computing restrictions with the Dutch, Japanese, and South Koreans, new trilateral mechanisms, AUKUS, or the strengthened Quad, it does evoke suspicion, even hesitation. For example, third-country diplomatic colleagues often confide that suspicion of the United States envisioning a regime-change end state sometimes acts as a partially engaged emergency brake, limiting the speed of alignment on coordinated policy responses or providing excuses to hedge in these areas. When it comes to convergence over the “core interests” of the CCP — such as human rights, Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Xinjiang — the impact of this ambiguity is more pronounced, as even like-minded nations balk at tactics (e.g., visa sanctions on Chinese leaders and their families) as going beyond human rights advocacy and into regime delegitimization efforts. Ambiguous formulations complicate U.S. messaging by allowing others — including China itself — to paint U.S. intentions as seeking a “color revolution” — a narrative that appeals to the instincts of autocrats, countries where past U.S. regime change strategies went awry, and to the vast majority of Global South countries who see their interest as staying on the sidelines of a new cold war.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/f3J44OO.jpeg" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>Third, the absence of a clear end state impedes the development of detailed implementation guidance within the executive branch. A sharper end state is a precondition to articulating more robust internal executive branch implementation guidance and prioritization frameworks akin to those that served as the bureaucratic operating system during the Cold War. Key internal National Security Council strategy documents offered robust assessments of the strategic choices facing the United States during the Cold War, the rationale for adopting a specific course of action, and the implications for policies across various domains (including even taxation). No similar strategy documents have emerged regarding the policy toward China.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Despite setbacks with Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), Russia could reconstitute its military capabilities post-war, potentially focusing on more effective combined arms formations. Institutional corruption and neglect of personnel remain significant barriers to modernization, but some military leaders are pushing for reforms.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russia’s military future depends on addressing these deep-rooted issues while adjusting its doctrine and force structure.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The national security and defense strategies of two successive administrations as well as key speeches from administration officials offer partial answers to the question of overall strategy (including desired end states) in some domains (particularly Indo-Pacific security), but in other areas discrete tactical decisions (e.g., visa restrictions targeting CCP leaders and their families) often accumulate to give the impression of a strategic regime-change end state, complicating alignment with allies and strategic communications efforts.</p> +<h3 id="how-russias-army-may-rebuild-and-evolve-after-the-war-in-ukraine">How Russia’s Army May Rebuild and Evolve After the War in Ukraine</h3> -<p>Today, the steady state formula is too ambiguous to shape frameworks for evaluating the costs and benefits of policy options or to determine when incentives should be considered versus a mix of solely defensive or punitive measures. An “everything, everywhere, all at once” dynamic sometimes results among the roughly 1,400 parts of the U.S. government which hold some legal or regulatory authority over aspects of China policy. Executive branch structures originally constituted to tackle more straightforward national security challenges — such as bilateral relationships or specific functional issues like counterterrorism or arms control — are often not configured to manage global, multidimensional challenges such as technology competition or to reconcile U.S. objectives across geographic and bureaucratic boundaries. Too often, the tendency is for these individual bureaucratic actors to articulate niche China “strategies” which often become the justification for resource requests or starting points for debates that should more accurately be framed as cost-benefit equations against a cohesive administration policy that could include trade-offs or requests the United States’ makes of partner nations. No single Executive Office of the President (EOP) structure can coordinate these debates; the National Security Council, National Economic Council, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Office of Management and Budget, and Office of Legislative Affairs are all peer-equals, reporting (loosely) to the White House chief of staff with little statutory authority over cabinet agencies. Moreover, within the executive branch, there is a dearth of expertise in critical areas (including both Sinologists and technologists), and much of the proprietary external analysis is not shared between agencies. Finally, rotational bureaucracies and political appointee staffing create incentives to prioritize what can be achieved (or avoided) within timeframes of two to three years and disincentivize specialization.</p> +<p>The full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been a bruising debacle for Russia’s ground forces. Despite staving off outright defeat in 2022 and 2023, the quality of its units degraded due to attrition.</p> -<p>Fourth, China’s perception of the debate should also be considered. Regardless of future trendlines, China currently accounts for a quarter of the world’s population and a third of global growth, and for over a decade, it has been the world’s largest trading nation and the largest bilateral trading partner with most of the world. Many in the senior leadership — including Xi himself — have long believed that the U.S. endgame is regime change, and, as such, there is no middle ground between the two governments. This limits the utility of assurances to the contrary, despite the Biden administration’s efforts. Yet former National Security Council deputy senior director for China Rush Doshi and others have spoken eloquently about the role leader-level diplomacy has played in keeping the Chinese leadership from interpreting specific competitive actions (e.g., tech restrictions or new funding for Taiwan’s defense) as tactics of regime change rather than as reflections of specific policy concerns. This diplomatic approach has kept the U.S.-China relationship from unravelling as it did in 2020, when channels froze after Covid-19 and parts of the Chinese system convinced themselves that the U.S. military was planning some form of imminent attack.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, the institution has adapted by varying degrees, and how it reconstitutes itself and modernizes after the current high-intensity period of the war ends is worth considering, for this will shape the threat that Russia poses in the future.</p> -<p>But the problem of an unarticulated end state goes beyond Xi. Yes, he is the dominant figure now, but China still has politics below his level and he will not live forever. Chinese scholars often say that even perceptions of a U.S. regime-change goal feed hardline views within the system and make it more difficult to advocate for moderate perspectives on issues that are subject to debate even under Xi, such as parts of economic and social policy or tactical aspects of China’s external policies. These same academics often interpret the phrase “outcompete” in the 2022 National Security Strategy and the word “prevail” in the 2021 Interim National Security Strategy as code for a comprehensive containment strategy aimed at unseating the CCP. Many Chinese contacts saw the shift in U.S. export-control strategy from maintaining a few generations’ lead to “maintain[ing] as large of a lead as possible” in foundational technologies as akin to a technology containment strategy meant to deny China’s move up the value-added chain. Subsequent assurances that U.S. restrictions would entail merely a “small yard, high fence” achieved little traction as advances in technology frequently force recalibrations of U.S. protection measures.</p> +<p>The Russian Army bogged down in the Donbas and the Kursk Oblast, is currently absorbed with recruiting, training, arming, and equipping personnel to replace those it is hemorrhaging through battlefield losses. Operationally, it is for the most part holding ground while exerting pressure along Ukraine’s extended front line. This appears to be taking up the majority of the planning capacity of its senior leadership, and bureaucratic and logistical apparatus.</p> -<p>In the end, nearly every advanced technology is inherently dual-use, and China’s current development strategy increasingly centers around dominating advanced technologies, particularly those with offensive or defensive importance and the supply chains that support them. In a sense, China’s leaders are right that the United States seeks to block China’s ability to achieve its economic and technology ambitions, as both present a threat to U.S. national and economic security objectives. The question is what condition — leadership or policy change — could alter U.S. strategy. If framed around the former, some Chinese scholars claim it becomes more difficult to argue internally for desired U.S. changes, though it is difficult to judge in an increasingly opaque decisionmaking system. Even amid uncertainty, it seems advantageous to reduce the chances that ambiguity around the desired U.S. end state sends strategic signals the United States’ does not intend, particularly into a system it does not adequately understand.</p> +<p>Despite periodic discussions of the possibility of the Russian state collapsing, the resilience of the war economy and Putin regime has been notable. More likely is that Russia is eventually forced to scale back or cease current high-intensity operations, and must return to other methods of undermining Ukraine. Bar the unlikely possibility that internal problems topple the government, Russia’s conventional forces will restructure and rebuild their capabilities.</p> -<p>As Michael J. Mazarr has written, great power rivalries only truly end in one of three ways: one side collapses or is conquered, one side decides to give up and grants predominance to the other, or both sides agree to transcend the competition and develop a different relationship. Surrender is not a logical national strategy, nor should the United States bet on China’s submission or the collapse of the CCP. The remaining approach would be to leave open the theoretical possibility of transcending current dynamics over time, if China makes key policy choices.</p> +<p>It is impossible to predict with any certainty what direction the Russian Army might take. Nevertheless, a necessary question that might shed light on this is what the Russian Army perceives its most important lessons learned to be.</p> -<p>A strategic end state requires setting conditions that are achievable at a reasonable cost with the sustained support from the American people and U.S. allies. A China that chooses to regulate its modernization efforts of the People’s Liberation Army via transparency and strategic stability discussions, to live within its current borders, to incentivize demand over supply, to rein in industrial policies, to curtail cyber hacking and intellectual property theft, and to keep its law enforcement and influence tactics within the scope of normal state-to-state behavior would offer the United States different policy choices. Whether these shifts are possible under CCP rule or under Xi is unclear — no one really knows what China will look like in a year, much less a decade. Returning the end state focus to policy differences, rather than the nature of the regime, will lend discipline to U.S. tactics and strategy, remove hedging excuses from allies, and perhaps leave oxygen within China for debates over failing strategies that could, over time, moderate as a result of economic constraints or unforeseeable internal political dynamics. This would also avoid the Kennan trap of allowing others to define the end state for the United States.</p> +<p>What changes have already taken place are likely to be here to stay. Russia has the benefit of optimizing for a single, clearly understood task, trench warfare, which has shaped its operational force structure and decisions of what new capabilities to invest in, but many of these are either transferable or have obvious and broad utility.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Advances in electronic warfare for force protection, their robust air defense network, the integration of new sensors into a more-developed targeting cycle, and the way that uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) such as Lancet, Orlan, and Shahid are employed have made Russian ground forces more survivable and lethal and have created a deeper and more dangerous battlespace for any enemy facing them.</p> -<p><strong>Jude Blanchette</strong> holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> +<p>At a higher level, structural changes such as the split of the Western Military District into the Moscow and Leningrad military districts indicate re-posturing towards a potential war in the Baltic region, a longer-term change in posture indicative of a more confrontational approach to NATO.</p> -<p><strong>Lily McElwee</strong> serves as deputy director and fellow in the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, where she researches China’s foreign policy and international engagement. She has particular interests in U.S.-China relations, EU-China relations, and China’s evolving relations with the Global South.</p> +<p>More questionable is the shape of future Russian formations. Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) were essentially abandoned due to ineffectiveness and replaced by a more traditional, hierarchical military structure. Aside from suffering from a shortage of infantry, an essential component for any combined arms formation, Russia’s logistics system had not been adjusted in line with the BTG concept and was not able to support the large number of small and complicated formations that were initially deployed.</p> -<p><strong>Hal Brands</strong> is the Henry Kissinger distinguished professor at JHU-SAIS, a senior fellow at American Enterprise Institute, and a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion.</p> +<p>The increasing use of assault detachments fit within a long-standing practice of concentrating better-trained and equipped personnel into sub-units dedicated to maneuver and assault while setting low standards and expectations for most of the infantry. Yet the way they are currently used does not scale well, while useful for local tactical actions, they do not help ground forces conduct larger-scale offensive maneuvers.</p> -<p><strong>Zack Cooper</strong> is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies U.S. alliances and strategy in Asia. Dr. Cooper also teaches at Princeton University, is a partner with Armitage International, chairs the board of the Open Technology Fund, and cohosts the Net Assessment podcast for War on the Rocks.</p> +<p>Likewise, armored forces are not currently competitive against the mix of precise lethal systems that are fielded by both sides in Ukraine, tanks can be held in reserve for fire support and to blunt enemy breakthroughs, but suffer when brought closer to the front line.</p> -<p><strong>Rush Doshi</strong> is the C.V. Starr senior fellow for Asia studies and director of the China Strategy Initiative at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He is also an assistant professor in the Security Studies Program in Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.</p> +<p>Therefore, a future development to watch for is what kind of combined arms formation the Russians design and build once they have sufficient breathing space. This may be a return to a better implementation of the BTG concept, with logistics issues resolved and the balance of capabilities adjusted, or may focus on rebuilding Russia’s brigades.</p> -<p><strong>Elizabeth Economy</strong> is the Hargrove senior fellow and codirector of the Program on the US, China, and the World at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. She serves on the boards of Swarthmore College, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.</p> +<p>Russian doctrine is conceptually viable as a way of war. However, due to Russia’s military culture and comprehensive neglect of its personnel, operations are at best unwieldy and more often simply unimplementable with the force available. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Russia’s military leadership recognizes the need for cultural change in this area.</p> -<p><strong>Richard Fontaine</strong> is the chief executive officer of CNAS. He served as president of CNAS from 2012 to 2019 and as senior fellow from 2009 to 2012.</p> +<p>Where there have been changes are in making corruption and systemic dishonesty less acceptable. These are deep-rooted issues and are also a necessity of a system that forces officers to obfuscate their unit’s readiness assessments. Some within Russia’s military leadership are attempting and this could pave the way for a more effective force in the future, though it faces a great deal of institutional inertia and may be worsened by repression.</p> -<p><strong>Ryan Hass</strong> is director of the John L. Thornton China Center and the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies at Brookings. He is also a senior fellow in the Center for Asia Policy Studies.</p> +<p>These are perhaps the greatest barriers to change and will be the key dynamics to watch when assessing future modernization efforts regardless of what Russia’s senior leaders unveil on paper or in military displays in Moscow.</p> -<p><strong>Yasheng Huang</strong> is a professor and holds the Epoch Foundation professorship of global economics and management at MIT Sloan School of Management.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong>Bilahari Kausikan</strong> spent his entire career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore (MFA). Over 37 years in MFA, he served in a variety of appointments at home and abroad.</p> +<p><strong>Nick Reynolds</strong> is the Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).</p>Nick ReynoldsThe Russian Army in Ukraine performed poorly as a result of degraded unit quality due to attrition and operational failures, but has adapted by improving electronic warfare, air defense, and drone integration, making it more lethal and survivable.Tests For Success2024-10-09T12:00:00+08:002024-10-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/tests-for-success<p><em>The Strategic Defence Review underway has been described as a “root and branch review” of the whole UK defence enterprise, pointing the way to “a new era for defence”. Can the different approach being taken this time around produce significantly better results than other recent reviews?</em></p> -<p><strong>Scott Kennedy</strong> is senior adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at CSIS. Ongoing focuses include China’s innovation drive, Chinese industrial policy, U.S.-China relations, and global economic governance.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><strong>Manoj Kewalramani</strong> is a fellow in China studies and the chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution, a leading public policy education center in India. He is also a senior associate (non-resident) wit the Freeman Chair in China Studies with CSIS.</p> +<p>The announcement shortly after the general election that the government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) would be conducted by three independent figures came as a surprise to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and wider UK national security community. Traditionally, UK defence and security reviews have been led by officials. Apparently taking their cue from the way Australia’s Defence Strategic Review of 2023 was conducted, the prime minister and the new defence secretary, John Healey, appointed Lord Robertson, a former defence secretary and NATO Secretary General, to lead the review. He is being supported by retired General Sir Richard Barrons and Fiona Hill, a British-born Russia expert who worked for many years inside the US national security system. Six additional senior-level experts were recently added to the review team. They are being supported by an internal MoD secretariat team.</p> -<p><strong>James Lee</strong> is an assistant research professor at Academia Sinica in Taiwan, as well as an associate fellow of the NATO Defense College and an affiliated researcher of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. His research interests are in U.S. strategy in Europe and East Asia.</p> +<p>The terms of reference say that the SDR will “determine the roles, capabilities and reforms required by UK Defence to meet the challenges, threats and opportunities of the twenty-first century, deliverable and affordable within the resources available to Defence within the trajectory [to spending] 2.5% [of GDP on Defence]”. The scope is customarily expansive.</p> -<p><strong>Michael J. Mazarr</strong> is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He has served as special assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, president and CEO of the Henry L. Stimson Center, senior vice president for strategic planning at the Electronic Industries Alliance, legislative assistant in the U.S. House of Representatives, and senior fellow and editor of the Washington Quarterly at CSIS.</p> +<p>The terms of reference also set out some clear parameters: commitment to the independent UK nuclear deterrent; a “NATO first” approach; reinforcing homeland security; continuing support for Ukraine; maintaining defence ties with the Indo-Pacific region, the Gulf and the Middle East; and delivering AUKUS.</p> -<p><strong>Evan S. Medeiros</strong> is a professor and Penner family chair in Asia studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He has published several books and articles on East Asian security affairs, U.S.-China relations, and China’s foreign and national security policies.</p> +<p>Inputs to the review have been sought from within Defence, other government departments, industry, allies and partners, academia and members of the public. These will feed into a process intended to deliver a final report to the defence secretary in early 2025. It is yet to be announced how this will be translated into government policy, including its treatment in the second phase of the Spending Review, which is due to completed by the Spring Budget – although at the outset the government said the review would be complete by next summer.</p> -<p><strong>Rana Mitter</strong> is ST Lee Chair in US-Asia Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School.</p> +<h3 id="five-tests-for-the-sdr-threats-risks-and-policy-responses">Five Tests for the SDR: Threats, Risks and Policy Responses</h3> -<p><strong>Janka Oertel</strong> is director of the Asia programme and a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.</p> +<p>In 2020, we developed five tests against which the claim that the Integrated Review would be the deepest and most radical review of UK foreign, defence and security policy since the end of the Cold War could be assessed. They can equally be applied to this SDR. The first of these tests relates to the accuracy of assessments about changing risks to the UK and international security and stability, and the quality of the headline policy responses.</p> -<p><strong>Susan Shirk</strong> is research professor and the director emeritus of the 21st Century China Center, an academic research center and university-based policy think tank at the School of Global Policy and Strategy, UC San Diego.</p> +<p>The scale and immediacy of both threats and risks to UK national security continues to grow. The SDR will need to consider both the pressing threats to European security and longer-term challenges, particularly from China. It will also need to factor in conflict and instability in the Middle East and the potential for escalation into a major war, and contingencies with respect to Taiwan and the Korean peninsula. The growing risk of hybrid attacks, challenges in the new domains of space and cyberspace, and the potential recurrence of international terrorism will also have to be on the menu.</p> -<p><strong>Melanie W. Sisson</strong> is a fellow in the Brookings Institution Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology where she researches the use of the armed forces in international politics, U.S. national security strategy, and defense policy.</p> +<p>All the post-Cold War reviews have tended to focus on the threats and risks that were more immediately present and occupying the time and energy of the government of the day, devising headline policy responses that seemed appropriate at the time. Events sometimes then required these responses to be re-thought quite quickly. The need to “refresh” the Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper within two years of their publication, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, is the most recent case in point. Briefings associated with the SDR suggest that it will focus on China as the “pacing threat” to plan against (borrowing US language). Planning against an apparently longer-term threat rather than more immediate ones would mark a significant departure in approach, so it will be interesting to see how the review gives substance to this notion. The UK and other Western governments have so far struggled to strike the right balance between cooperation, competition and confrontation with China – and the policy and resource implications of potentially correcting this go way beyond Defence. A clear and convincing case will need to be made to the public to explain the rationale for doing so and the impact on steps needed to counter more immediate threats from Russia.</p> -<p><strong>Yun Sun</strong> is a senior fellow and codirector of the East Asia Program and director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. Her expertise is in Chinese foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and China’s relations with neighboring countries and authoritarian regimes.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Strategic Defence Review will need to consider both the pressing threats to European security and longer-term challenges, particularly from China</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>Akio Takahara</strong> is distinguished visiting professor at the Tokyo Woman’s Christian University and emeritus professor of the University of Tokyo.</p> +<p>Two major policy choices will flow from decisions about which threats to focus planning against. The first is the balance between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. With its “NATO first” mantra, the government may appear to have settled the matter. But a China focus would imply that the UK will expect to share some of the burden in the Indo-Pacific, particularly if it wants the US to continue to invest in the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The SDR will need to find a way of squaring this circle. We expand on the second major policy choice – striking the right balance between meeting short-term and longer-term risks – in the section below on force structure and capabilities.</p> -<p><strong>Matt Turpin</strong> is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution specializing in U.S. policy toward the People’s Republic of China, economic statecraft, and technology innovation. He is also a senior adviser at Palantir Technologies.</p> +<h3 id="defence-planning-responses">Defence Planning Responses</h3> -<p><strong>Rick Waters</strong> is the managing director of Eurasia Group’s China practice. Rick joined Eurasia Group after a 27-year career as the U.S. State Department’s top China policy official, overseeing the creation of the Office of China Coordination, informally known as the China House, and concurrently serving as deputy assistant secretary of state for China and Taiwan.</p>Jude Blanchette and Lily McElweeThis new report explores whether the United States should more clearly define the end goals for its China policy.Semiconductor Export Controls2024-10-04T12:00:00+08:002024-10-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/semiconductor-export-controls<p><em>U.S. policymakers are increasingly leveraging export controls on advanced semiconductors and related technologies to constrain China’s development of military and dual-use capabilities.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>But notably, expanding U.S. trade restrictions have heightened political and commercial pressure on Chinese semiconductor companies to wean off U.S. technology wherever possible, with potential negative impacts for U.S. technological leadership. This report, the first in a series of four, explains how export controls have accelerated and scaled Chinese efforts to design out (i.e., adopt alternative sources for U.S. technologies) and design around (i.e., innovate new technologies that bypass U.S. technologies altogether), ultimately facilitating a shift of global semiconductor supply chains away from the United States. This report describes how the design-out and design-around strategies jeopardize U.S. economic and national security due to the diversion of sales and innovation to China and other nations’ technology champions. The report then describes Chinese efforts to develop advanced packaging capabilities to “leapfrog” U.S. and allies’ leadership in leading-edge chip design and manufacturing. It is argued that advanced packaging provides a key example of the design-around trend and threatens to shift the balance of U.S.-China competition in critical technologies. The report concludes with emphasizing the importance and challenges of greater multilateralization as well as potential avenues to mitigate the negative impacts of controls on U.S. companies.</em></p> +<p>Our second test relates to the success of the defence planning responses that lie below these headline policy choices, and their impact on activities, posture and capability/force structure planning. In 2020 we picked out “jointery”, international coordination and a “comprehensive approach” as the three most important themes in post-Cold War defence planning.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>The Review Team posits a transition to an “Integrated Force”. As a concept, this is a natural development of “multi-domain integration” as outlined in the 2021 Defence Command Paper. But it is not clear what it means – and how, in practical terms, it will differ from what exists now. Presumably this will emerge from the Review itself. Otherwise, we should expect an acceleration of the technology-led modernisation that has been a goal of all the UK’s recent reviews. This approach will presumably be based on an updated operational concept for how the UK Armed Forces will expect to fight in the future. General Barrons has spoken and written extensively on this topic. It remains to be seen whether the Integrated Force design that results from the SDR can be implemented more successfully than the model (in reality, little more than a one-page diagram) proposed in the 2021 document.</p> -<p>The United States has undertaken a significant shift in its economic security strategy in recent years. As geopolitical competition with China has accelerated, U.S. policymakers have increasingly leveraged restrictions on critical and emerging technologies (CETs) to safeguard U.S. leadership in military and dual-use applications such as artificial intelligence (AI). Export controls have reemerged as a widely utilized economic security tool in the U.S. arsenal, with the aim of slowing Chinese technological progression by limiting access to U.S. and allied nations’ products. Advanced semiconductors have been a key focus of these efforts due to their national security implications, chief among them the enablement of advanced AI systems.</p> +<p>The Reviewers have invited views on how UK defence can build relationships with allies, partners and international groupings as a strategic strength for the UK. The SDR will need to make practical proposals for how a “NATO first” approach will be enacted. The change of government also represents an opportunity to reset the UK’s defence relationship with the EU. AUKUS Pillar 1 is well defined, but Pillar 2 is not; the SDR represents a good opportunity to ameliorate this.</p> -<p>The Trump administration’s actions toward Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE marked an early, pivotal moment in the United States’ expanded use of export controls. In April 2018, President Donald Trump imposed tough restrictions on ZTE’s access to a range of U.S. technologies, including semiconductors, putting the company on the verge of bankruptcy. Despite Trump’s later reversal, the episode showcased a renewed embrace of export controls by Washington as a tool of economic coercion. Another key moment came in a 2022 speech by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, in which he announced that the United States must “maintain as large of a lead as possible” over China in the fields of advanced logic and memory chips. This was a departure from the longstanding “sliding scale” approach, in which the United States sought to stay “a couple generations ahead” of strategic competitors like China but did not impose broad measures to restrict technological progression.</p> +<p>Successive reviews have provided exhaustive lists of bilateral defence relationships. The outcome of the US presidential election will influence how the UK–US defence relationship develops – and, potentially, even the future of NATO. It is already clear that the UK will wish to further strengthen defence relations with France and Germany. The SDR could choose a relatively small number of other bilateral relationships and invest in them heavily in ways that would really move the dial, while still maintaining others.</p> -<p>Under the Biden administration, the U.S. government has implemented two major rounds of semiconductor export controls targeting advanced semiconductor supply chains in countries of concern, most notably China. As of this report’s release, Washington remains engaged in discussions around enacting further measures. The U.S. goal is to ensure that Chinese semiconductor capabilities remain well behind the global technological frontier in the interest of protecting U.S. national security.</p> +<p>We understand that the government chose to conduct a defence-focused review because of the scale of the steps it believes will be required to transform the MoD and the Armed Forces. The outcome of the SDR will need to be integrated with the range of other reviews already underway, including those on national resilience and the global impact of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.</p> -<p>However, as the U.S. government has expanded efforts to control global semiconductor markets, Chinese officials and businesses have responded — often in ways not entirely anticipated by U.S. policymakers. For one, Chinese policymakers and businesses have employed various methods to circumvent U.S. export controls. These include importing controlled U.S. technologies from third countries via overseas shell companies, redirecting semiconductor technologies to prohibited entities via domestic technology trading networks, misleading foreign suppliers about the end uses of imported technologies, and stockpiling equipment before regulations take effect.</p> +<h3 id="capabilities-and-force-structure">Capabilities and Force Structure</h3> -<p>While circumvention efforts have been a key topic of discussion for the U.S. export controls, less attention has been paid to the other key impact of the controls: catalyzing a government-and industry-wide effort within the Chinese semiconductor industry to do away with U.S. companies and technology entirely. While Beijing has for decades been interested in building domestic semiconductor production, the Biden administration’s controls transformed the timeline and scale of these efforts. China’s government and commercial sector have begun undertaking a supply chain transformation aimed at reducing reliance on U.S. semiconductor technologies wherever possible. These efforts aim to mitigate the impact of current export controls and reduce the long-term vulnerability of China’s semiconductor ecosystem to future U.S. trade actions.</p> +<p>Our third test relates to choices on capabilities and force structure. The rhetoric about transformation that accompanied the launch of the review implies some significant shaking up of defence capabilities and force structure. That begs the question of how much scope there is to make substantial changes in a meaningful timeframe. The long-term nature of defence procurement means that most of the capabilities that will be on the front line a decade from now are either already in service or on contract. The previous government emphasised the need to innovate and invest in the latest military capabilities, including “AI, robotics and cyber … laser weapons and autonomous drones”. It is hard to fault this general approach to making the most of the platforms that already exist, drawing on lessons from the war in Ukraine. But there are two big, related questions that the SDR will need to address: timeframe and spectrum of capability versus role specialisation.</p> -<p>China’s semiconductor ecosystem is following two main pathways to achieve this goal: design-out and design-around. Together, these strategies threaten to render U.S. export control policies — even when comprehensively enforced — less effective as a longer-term barrier to Chinese technological progression in advanced semiconductors. More importantly, they also threaten to weaken U.S. semiconductor industry leadership overall by hindering U.S. companies’ market access and revenue — and consequently, their long-term leadership in research and development (R&amp;D):</p> +<p>By timeframe we mean the period over which improvements to force structure and capabilities would be put in place. Most post-Cold War defence reviews have had the luxury of being able to look ahead over several decades and plan for a future force that would take 10 years to create. Today’s dangerous world calls for greater urgency. This does not mean abandoning all lengthy procurement programmes. Some capabilities, such as nuclear-powered submarines, are critically important but take a long time to build.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Design out: supplanting existing U.S. and allied semiconductor technologies with comparable technologies, from either</p> +<p>But, in our view, it does involve giving greater priority to preparing for (and hopefully thereby deterring) nearer-term threats by replenishing stockpiles and enhancing readiness, including through the rapid addition of affordable combat capabilities to regenerate the “mass” that is missing from the UK’s force structure and to plug some key gaps, including in air and missile defence. Finding cost-effective solutions, given the widespread availability of inexpensive drones, presents a stiff challenge. And all of this needs to be done without discarding the seed-corn for capabilities that might be needed for the likely continuing confrontation with Russia and prospective longer-term challenges from China. Space seems a strong candidate for modest additional expenditure in the SDR. All of this will have major implications for the overhaul of the defence industrial base.</p> - <p>a. Chinese firms; or</p> +<p>Spectrum of capability is related to the timeframe question. In past reviews, it was possible to retain a broad (but thin) spectrum of capability and force structure over the long term by taking calculated risks with so-called “capability holidays”. That was on the basis that, with sufficient warning time, it would be possible to regenerate and reconstitute the forces needed. Governments do not enjoy this luxury today. This may mean the MoD will have to be more selective in its choice of new capabilities to develop and existing ones to retain. For example, an unsentimental examination of the role and vulnerability of aircraft carriers will be required. There will also presumably be some consideration of the timelines and scope of the Global Combat Air Programme, given that Typhoon should serve well for another 20 years (provided it is fitted with the latest weapons and sensors). Lessons from the Ukraine and Middle East conflicts will inform judgements on future land platforms and wider capabilities.</p> - <p>b. third-country (non-U.S. and non-Chinese firms)</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Design around: developing new technologies that do away with an entire category of controlled technology in the semiconductor supply chain</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>A narrower spectrum of capability would not necessarily lead to role specialisation. It would still be possible to field a “whole force” constituted of a smaller number of different capabilities. But it at least raises the question of whether the loss of sovereignty involved in greater reliance on shared NATO capabilities and greater role specialisation by the UK and its European allies would be worth accepting if it led to less duplication of industrial effort and a bigger bang for buck overall.</p> -<p>China’s design-out and design-around efforts are threats to U.S. policymakers and domestic business leaders working to develop a strong domestic technological industrial base and compete with powerful dual-use technologies. Therefore, they are threats to U.S. national and economic security.</p> +<h3 id="balancing-policy-plans-commitments-and-the-defence-budget">Balancing Policy, Plans, Commitments and the Defence Budget</h3> -<p>This report argues that if they are not responded to properly, design-out and design-around efforts mean that U.S. export control policy could unintentionally undermine the United States’ long-term positioning in its geopolitical and economic competition against China to “win the 21st century.”</p> +<p>It is a cliché to say that defence reviews should be policy-led, not financially driven. But all governments have to strike a balance between policy requirements and fiscal responsibility. Before 2015, the conclusion to defence reviews was marked by an argument with the Treasury about how much money would be made available to fund policy commitments. Since 2015, governments have announced the size of the budgetary envelope ahead of defence and security reviews. Neither approach has resulted in a sustained balance between programme and budget. Our fourth test is whether the SDR will be able to achieve such an outcome.</p> -<h4 id="the-design-out-strategy">The Design-Out Strategy</h4> +<p>One approach would be to provide the MoD with a long-term commitment to a given level of expenditure growth, against which the Department could plan more effectively. Shortly before calling the general election, the previous government committed to raising the defence budget to 2.5% of GDP by 2030. The current government has committed to 2.5% but has yet to set out publicly a timeline or any profile for the increase.</p> -<p>Chinese policymakers are increasingly concerned about dependence on U.S. technology within China’s semiconductor supply chain. Private sector interests, namely Chinese semiconductor companies, have also come to realize the business risks of overreliance on U.S. technology. To minimize the impact of current restrictions and hedge against a future tightening of controls, Chinese policymakers and semiconductor companies are working to “design out” U.S. technology from China’s semiconductor ecosystem — in other words, to replace U.S. suppliers with alternatives wherever possible.</p> +<p>Whether an increase to 2.5% would be enough to meet the growing threats to UK security and the ambitions that have been stated for the SDR seems doubtful. To illustrate the point, an increase from the current level of 2.32% by 2030 would generate some £6 billion a year in today’s money. That would represent an increase of circa 10% in the size of the defence budget. But not all of this will be available for the technology-led modernisation described above: nuclear and submarine spending, which now accounts for almost 40% of planned equipment spending, is expected to rise further in the years ahead, limiting the resource available for other areas.</p> -<p>Today, non-U.S. production lines are being built out in two ways. First, China’s central and local governments are investing billions to help domestic firms produce the designs, components, and tools necessary for manufacturing semiconductors. At the same time, there is new government pressure on Chinese semiconductor companies to procure key technologies domestically. These manufacturers, themselves wary of the commercial risks of reliance on foreign technology, are also increasingly eager to buy from Chinese suppliers.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The rhetoric about transformation that accompanied the launch of the review implies some significant shaking up of defence capabilities and force structure</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Second, companies from third countries (i.e., countries other than the United States and China) — whose governments are resistant to expanding export controls on China due to concerns about lost revenue and access to Chinese markets — are filling in the gaps left behind by U.S. companies. As Chinese semiconductor manufacturing facilities, known as fabs, buy less and less technology from U.S. suppliers, market opportunities are opening up for firms from third countries, which are not fully aligned with the United States on control policy or enforcement.</p> +<p>Malcolm Chalmers set out the short-term pressures on the defence budget in his recent commentary (including pay increases and the nuclear enterprise), and noted that further cuts might be required imminently. Removing further capabilities from service now would be very hard to square with the ambitious goals of the SDR. Looking ahead, the reviewers will need to resist optimism that significant financial “efficiencies” can be created and that new capabilities can be developed and fielded at bargain basement prices to square this circle at the end of the review. Like all defence reviews, the SDR will need to offer clear recommendations on priorities. Decisions on these recommendations will be for the government to make in the first part of 2025.</p> -<p>The U.S. controls are designed to apply extraterritorially, which ostensibly complicates import substitution. However, this has not necessarily been the case in practice. Despite the U.S. foreign direct product rules (FDPRs) and de minimis restrictions associated with the controls, which limit foreign companies’ use of some U.S. technology content, there is strong evidence to suggest that import substitution by foreign countries is occurring. Although the Netherlands and Japan imposed new controls in 2023 that replicated aspects of U.S. restrictions, key differences remain in scope and enforcement capabilities — for instance, the ability of foreign companies to offer on-site servicing to Chinese customers. Notable supply countries — such as Germany, South Korea, and Israel — have also not imposed comparable controls. The United States, for its part, continues to pressure allies to expand export regimes to achieve harmonization, but success has proven challenging.</p> +<h3 id="organisation">Organisation</h3> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="foreign-direct-product-rules"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Foreign Direct Product Rules</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The 1998 SDR was unusual among the canon of post-Cold War reviews in paying considerable attention to organisation, the fifth and final of our tests. A series of major and generally positive organisational changes resulted. In the authors’ view, these reforms were subsequently partially undermined by the “Levene” model introduced in 2012, which disaggregated capability-planning and associated budgeting decisions to the single Services. There has been a steady erosion of the joint approach, and the strategic prioritisation necessary in this new era has been largely absent.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">FDPRs apply the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to foreign-made items if they are the “direct product” of certain types of U.S.-origin equipment, software, or other technology, and are destined for designated countries. Specifically, FDPRs empower the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to require licenses for exports of certain foreign-made products if listed U.S. technology was directly used to produce them or produce key parts of the plants that were used to manufacture the products, such as a tool or a piece of software — even if a controlled U.S. component or system does not appear in the product.</code></em></p> +<p>As shadow defence secretary, John Healey set out his views on this issue in a Policy Exchange speech in late February, advocating the need for clearer strategic authority over the capability the Armed Forces have and how it is procured.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Three FDPRs limit Chinese access to semiconductor technologies: the Entity List (EL), Advanced Computing, and Supercomputer FDPRs. These FDPRs differ in terms of the products, companies, and countries that they cover. The EL FDPR, introduced in May 2020 by the Trump administration, applies U.S. export controls to products destined for hundreds of Chinese (and other foreign) companies and their subsidiaries. These restrictions vary based on the products involved as well as the type of EL classification applicable to the purchaser company. Their reach has continued to grow as the U.S. Department of Commerce has added Chinese firms to the EL. The Advanced Computing FDPR applies the EAR to a narrower range of products meeting certain performance parameters and based on the destination country rather than the destination company. Originally aimed at China, the Advanced Computing FDPR has expanded the list of destination countries to include the countries China likely uses to avoid controls, such as Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Finally, the Supercomputer FDPR applies a country and end-use scope to encompass any items subject to the EAR that are used to produce supercomputers, which are defined based on compute capacity and system dimensions.</code></em></p> +<p>His answer was a “stronger defence centre” including: a “full-functioning Military-Strategic Headquarters within the MoD”; greater authority for the Chief of Defence Staff over the single Service Chiefs of Staff; “more policy muscle” for the MoD civil service; and the appointment of a “fully-fledged National Armaments Director”.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="de-minimis-rules"><code class="highlighter-rouge">De Minimis Rules</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>While the speech promised to implement these changes immediately rather than wait for the outcome of the SDR, in practice they are taking time to plan and enact. We have previously counselled against rushing major organisational redesign. In this case, the SDR will need to view the question of organisation in the context of the other issues it is addressing – including the “Integrated Force” concept, the digital enablement of that Force, and the right balance of regular, reserve, civil servant and industry personnel across defence. But some adjustments to the new defence operating model – such as to the arrangements for capability planning – will need to be in place by the time the SDR concludes in order to enact the transformative changes that it promises.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">De minimis rules apply the EAR based on the inclusion of U.S.-origin controlled inputs in foreign-exported goods destined for specific countries. Notably, unlike the FDPRs, use of de minimis rules requires that the exported goods directly contain products produced in the United States that fall under the EAR. This differs from the FDPR’s broader threshold of goods being the “direct product” of certain U.S.-origin technologies or inputs (that do not need to be included in the actual goods being shipped). In cases where the shipment of the U.S. inputs to the final country destination by themselves (i.e., when not incorporated into a final product) would require a license, a de minimis calculation is necessary for the foreign export of the product that contains the inputs. Depending on the type of product and country destination, different de minimis thresholds — or the minimum percentage of U.S.-origin controlled items as a share of “fair market value” at which the EAR applies (typically 10 or 25 percent) — are relevant to the specific good. If the good exceeds the relevant de minimis threshold, an export waiver is required, pursuant to the EAR. For some products (e.g., certain lithography tools), a zero percent de minimis threshold applies, meaning that inclusion of any U.S.-origin controlled input automatically applies the EAR.</code></em></p> +<h3 id="prospects">Prospects</h3> -<h4 id="the-design-around-strategy">The Design-Around Strategy</h4> +<p>This survey of just some of the major issues the SDR will need to tackle highlights the challenge involved in conducting a genuinely transformative review, securing the financial resources to pay for it and then quickly implementing its key conclusions and recommendations. As the Australian government has found, appointing independent reviewers to conduct defence reviews is not a silver bullet. Aligning defence policy, plans, commitments and resources at the conclusion of reviews is hard enough. Keeping them in balance is harder still.</p> -<p>Beyond its efforts to replace U.S. technologies one-for-one using domestic and third-country suppliers, China also seeks to develop novel capabilities that offer alternative methods to achieve the same performance capabilities provided by leading-edge chips in microelectronics systems. These innovations would enable China’s semiconductor ecosystem to achieve the capabilities required for applications such as advanced AI, and to do so using technologies that originate in Chinese — rather than U.S. or partner nations’ — intellectual property (IP) and manufacturingcapabilities. This report refers to such efforts as “design-around.”</p> +<p>We hope that this framework helps to provide benchmarks against which the review can be assessed as it progresses and once it is published.</p> -<p>The growing incentive to innovate ways around U.S. export controls has bolstered domestic R&amp;D efforts and potentially placed China on a quicker path toward semiconductor technological superiority in industry segments where it already held strong market share, such as packaging. For instance, advanced packaging innovations offer one potential path for Chinese companies to achieve cutting-edge chip capabilities without needing to replicate Western semiconductor manufacturing equipment technologies.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The growing incentive to innovate ways around U.S. export controls has bolstered domestic R&amp;D efforts and potentially placed China on a quicker path toward semiconductor technological superiority.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Will Jessett</strong> CBE is a Senior Associate at SC Strategy Ltd. He recently (early 2019) retired from the UK Ministry of Defence after 33 years in a wide range of policy, operational, crisis and change management roles. He has specialised in strategic defence planning, particularly in the last decade, shaping and leading MOD’s work on the major strategic defence and security reviews in 2010 and 2015, the 2017 National Security Capability Review and overseeing the Modernising Defence Programme which concluded at the end of 2018.</p> -<p>Alongside design-out efforts, design-around provides another tool for the Chinese semiconductor ecosystem to reduce reliance on U.S. technologies in supply chains. It also creates potential opportunities for Chinese companies to ultimately surpass U.S. technological capabilities in semiconductor supply chains. While testifying to a Senate panel in April 2024, a senior U.S. official dealing with export enforcement called attention to this longer-term danger of the design-around issue. “I’m . . . concerned [about] the day that . . . [the Chinese] don’t want our technology, that day that we aren’t the world leader, because that means that they’ve surpassed us and they’ve become superior.”</p> +<p><strong>Tom McKane</strong> is a Distinguished Fellow of RUSI and a Visiting Senior Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He is also a senior member of the European Leadership Network. Since retiring from the UK Ministry of Defence, Tom has divided his time between think tank work and consulting on defence issues, particularly on policy and strategy and how to trans-late policy into practical action.</p> -<h4 id="impacts-on-us-economic-and-national-security">Impacts on U.S. Economic and National Security</h4> +<p><strong>Peter Watkins</strong> left the MoD in 2018. Between 2014–18 he was, successively, Director General Security Policy and Director General Strategy &amp; International in the MoD. During a career spanning 38 years, Peter worked in a variety of roles in the MoD and overseas, including many years in defence acquisition.</p>Will Jessett, et al.The Strategic Defence Review underway has been described as a “root and branch review” of the whole UK defence enterprise, pointing the way to “a new era for defence”. Can the different approach being taken this time around produce significantly better results than other recent reviews?Imec2024-10-08T12:00:00+08:002024-10-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/imec<p><em>Imec attracts and retains leading companies to cooperatively develop cutting-edge semiconductor technologies in a fiercely competitive and unforgiving industry. It is an opportunity for the United States National Semiconductor Technology Center and its nonprofit purpose-built operator, Natcast to learn from and collaborate with imec to accelerate the U.S. research and industry.</em></p> -<p>At an elementary level, well-functioning export controls on advanced, dual-use technologies seek to regulate the export of goods when there is no other method of supply. Otherwise, buyers can simply shift procurement of controlled goods to either domestic suppliers or countries with looser controls. If the controlled technology can be easily sourced from a domestic firm or a foreign country outside of the export control regime (i.e., design-out), then the restriction will only be successful until the replacement technology can fill the resulting demand gap. Additionally, as new substitute technologies emerge (i.e., design-around), export control policies must adjust accordingly, or they risk solely being a hindrance to the home country’s export revenue and its influence within the global economy.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>During the age of the “sliding scale” approach to export controls, the United States’ adversaries consistently lagged behind the technological frontier, in large part due to the global R&amp;D leadership of U.S. companies in key technology areas. In switching to the current approach — “maintaining as large a lead as possible” — the United States hopes to leverage its industry leadership to contain China’s technological progression in military and dual-use technologies. However, the design-out phenomenon threatens to unintentionally undermine this goal and ultimately presents a threat, rather than a boost, to U.S. technology leadership over China.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>The primary concern with design-out efforts is that they would allow China to divert global semiconductor industry revenue away from U.S. companies, shrinking U.S. market share and creating new opportunities for Chinese and third-country firms. This risk is by no means trivial since the Chinese semiconductor market is — and is expected to remain — the largest in the world. The potential impacts are also not confined to the Chinese semiconductor market itself, as export controls could create new incentives for foreign-based multinationals to limit their use of U.S. technologies to avoid facing export controls that would affect access to the Chinese market.</p> +<p>International competition for the most advanced semiconductors has highlighted the importance of cooperative research institutes. These centers, while diverse in their memberships and specialties, serve a critical role as aggregators of research and development (R&amp;D) resources across firms — as well as shared infrastructure for de-risking emerging technologies throughout the semiconductor value chain and for driving the chip industry’s uniquely rapid pace of innovation.</p> -<p>In this way, current U.S. export controls risk inadvertently allowing foreign companies to supplant U.S. semiconductor champions throughout key parts of the global market. If this happens, U.S. technological companies stand to lose out on the revenue, as well as share price growth, that serves as the feedstock for R&amp;D investment. R&amp;D is critical for companies in the semiconductor industry given the rapid rate of technology change and the importance of maintaining the leading edge, so any reduction in investment can be devastating to a firm’s positioning. This means that losses in R&amp;D could entail U.S. companies losing the technology leadership they currently have in key parts of the semiconductor supply chain — the very opposite goal of the export controls.</p> +<p>Located in the Flanders region of Belgium, imec is perhaps the foremost cooperative research organization for semiconductors, a status bolstered by the participation and support of the world’s top semiconductor firms in its programs, with the exception of major Chinese entities.</p> -<p>If China’s semiconductor industry can successfully remove U.S. technology from its supply chain, then the U.S. government would also lose access to data on Chinese equipment purchases, which sales from U.S. companies currently provide. This data offers insight into the military and dual-use capabilities available to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which confers advantages from a national security perspective. U.S. policymakers would also lose a key point of leverage over China. If China no longer utilizes the U.S. technology to make chips, continued implementation and enforcement of U.S. export controls — as well as the threat of introducing new controls — would do little to advance U.S. economic and national security interests.</p> +<p>Imec has pushed the concept of multinational, diverse research collaboration to achieve ambitious objectives. To this end, it works closely with other leading semiconductor research centers such as the Albany NanoTech Complex, the Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA)’s Leti lab in France, and now Japan’s Leading-Edge Semiconductor Technology Center.</p> -<p>Finally, the United States would also give up some of its ability to influence how CETs are developed and utilized, a key advantage within global technology markets. The following table provides an overview of why CET standard setting is important to U.S. strategic competition with China and other adversaries.</p> +<p>This research institute’s substantial physical assets, talented staff, reputation for neutrality, strong track record, and proven protocols make it ideally situated to advance leadership in semiconductor technology among like-minded countries. In fact, to a considerable degree, it is already performing this role. As such, the United States should collaborate closely with this research center in its efforts to regain technological leadership in chip manufacturing.</p> -<p>Through this series of reports, the CSIS Scholl Chair will seek to detail and evaluate the design-out and design-around threats as they relate to the Chinese and global semiconductor supply chain. Analysis will focus on four key stages of the semiconductor supply chain. For each stage, findings will highlight (1) the risk of design-out by firms in China and third countries, (2) the potential for design-around solutions, and (3) the effects of these strategies on U.S. economic and national security.</p> +<p>Imec holds major lessons for the development of the U.S. National Semiconductor Technology Center and its nonprofit purpose-built operator, Natcast. Imec’ s ability to attract and retain leading companies to cooperatively develop cutting-edge semiconductor technologies in a fiercely competitive and unforgiving industry represents an outstanding model for international cooperative research. The following analysis highlights the unique strengths and approach of this research institute in Leuven, Belgium.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/92WO2mW.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: U.S. CET Standard Setting.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/US-Gov-National-Standards-Strategy-2023.pdf">The White House, United States Government National Standards Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2023)</a>.</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Imec’s ability to attract and retain leading companies to cooperatively develop cutting-edge semiconductor technologies in a fiercely competitive and unforgiving industry represents an outstanding model for international cooperative research.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>This first report provides a brief introduction to the design-out and design-around phenomena and how they have taken shape within China’s government and private sector. It then turns to the packaging segment within semiconductor supply chains, a primary example of the design-around threat. Advanced packaging represents an area of intensive innovation that China has identified as a strategic priority in efforts to undermine the effectiveness of U.S. export controls.</p> +<h3 id="imecs-origins">Imec’s Origins</h3> -<p>In subsequent reports, the Scholl Chair will cover the fields of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and tool subsystems and components, as well as electronic design automation (EDA), chip design, and core design IP. Each report will provide evidence for the design-out and design-around phenomena and evaluate the potential impacts of these Chinese counterstrategies. Ultimately, it is argued that the resulting loss of leverage over the global semiconductor industry is detrimental to U.S. economic and national security.</p> +<p>In 1982, the regional government of Flanders launched an “intense mobilisation of industrial and scientific actors for a ‘Third Industrial Revolution’” in the area. The most important expression of this effort was the government’s establishment of the Interuniversity Micro-Electronics Center (imec) in Leuven in January 1984. Its mission was to promote microelectronics in Flanders through R&amp;D projects with companies and universities that anticipated industry needs by 3–10 years. Research themes eventually came to include microelectronics, nanotechnology, information and communications technology, semiconductor packaging, photovoltaics, and chip-design methods.</p> -<h3 id="chinas-evolving-strategy-2018present">China’s Evolving Strategy, 2018–Present</h3> +<p>Imec was founded by Roger Van Overstraeten, a Flanders-born Stanford PhD graduate who returned to Belgium to pursue future-generation semiconductor technology with a group of colleagues at Catholic University Leuven (KU Leuven). His vision was to establish “an unparalleled research facility dedicated to microchip technology,” which he pursued despite considerable skepticism at the time. There was widespread recognition in government circles that while Flanders often excelled in research, its ability to support its practical applications was often lacking. Focusing on this challenge, Van Overstraeten sought to “drag European microelectronics excellence out of the laboratories and into the factories.”</p> -<p>The basic motivation behind both design-out and design-around strategies is a recognition by Chinese policymakers and businesses that U.S. (and allies’) export controls jeopardize China’s critical technology supply chains — and that strategic trade controls are only becoming more common. Such concerns are not new within the highest levels of the Chinese government. Beijing has long been anxious about its reliance on foreign manufacturing for “core technologies,” including semiconductors. Xi Jinping’s election as general secretary in 2013 led to a strengthening of this focus, reflected in the ambitious semiconductor self-sufficiency goals associated with the landmark industrial policy document “Made in China 2025.” Despite these top-down goals, however, Chinese semiconductor companies continued to source key technologies heavily from U.S. and other foreign suppliers.</p> +<p>When imec was established, policymakers intended for it to focus entirely on support for the Flanders region in collaboration with regional universities and companies. Given the lack of critical mass in the microelectronics space within the region, this initial concept was not feasible. Fortunately, imec’s leadership pivoted to a more international approach, establishing the organization as a neutral research center supporting companies and universities worldwide.</p> -<p>The Trump administration’s 2018 restrictions on ZTE — and their implication that U.S. export controls could put a Chinese national technology champion out of business — created newfound urgency behind efforts to wean off U.S. technology. An additional wake-up call was Huawei’s near collapse following its addition to the entity list, which crippled its smartphone business for multiple years. Huawei, alongside Chinese policymakers, made attempts at reshaping domestic technology supply chains to reduce foreign (particularly U.S.) dependencies, investing in new vertical integration efforts and partnerships with local suppliers.</p> +<h3 id="business-model">Business Model</h3> -<p>The most important shift, however, came on October 7, 2022. The Biden administration’s new rules under the EAR, which were broader than expected by both Chinese and third-country commercial and government stakeholders, fundamentally changed decisionmaking about U.S. technology within China’s semiconductor industry. Almost overnight, Chinese self-sufficiency targets transformed from top-down, broad objectives to an industry-wide supply chain effort to ensure that the future of China’s semiconductor industry was safe from current and future U.S. restrictions. As an employee of one top U.S. semiconductor company described it, “the October 2022 unilateral regulations poured ‘jet fuel’ on the Chinese innovation economy.”</p> +<p>Most major microelectronics R&amp;D centers around the world are located in jurisdictions that have one or more large semiconductor companies and where, for political and economic reasons, the centers tend to support those local producers, whether directly or indirectly. Belgium has no large chip firms — but in building a global network of industry partners, this has worked to imec’s unique advantage. The center’s current CEO, Luc Van den hove, explained in 2024 that because no one semiconductor company dominates imec’s strategy, the organization has been able to build a “Switzerland of semiconductors” reputation.</p> -<p>This series of reports focuses on the key pathways that the Chinese government and businesses have used to pursue this goal of “de-Americanizing” semiconductor supply chains, as well as their consequences for U.S. and global semiconductor markets. In conducting background research, several baseline facts about Chinese semiconductor manufacturing and procurement behavior became apparent:</p> +<p>The center’s broad membership includes companies that often compete with each other but are confident that their intellectual property (IP) will be respected. They recognize the value added from cooperation on common problems and the advantages of sharing the costs of cutting-edge facilities and equipment.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Politics aside, Chinese companies largely prefer to utilize the most advanced semiconductor tools and technologies, most of which are produced in the United States and allied nations. Under normal circumstances (i.e., in the absence of recent export control trends), Chinese firms would likely continue to purchase and utilize U.S. technology in areas where it is industry leading.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>China is aiming in the long term for a semiconductor manufacturing supply chain free of U.S. equipment. Policymakers and business leaders are directing domestic semiconductor firms to find alternatives to U.S. technology. Government entities are also investing heavily in the domestic semiconductor supply chain through subsidies and R&amp;D programs to create substitutes for foreign technology.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>There is an ongoing, relatively successful, government-backed campaign across the Chinese semiconductor industry that urges Chinese companies to buy domestic equipment rather than equipment from foreign suppliers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Chinese fabs and other semiconductor industry participants will often purchase Chinese technologies that are less technologically advanced than foreign counterparts in order to reduce foreign dependencies and nurture domestic industry.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>When there is not a domestically produced substitute to U.S. technology, Chinese firms will look to procure equipment from companies headquartered in countries with less hawkish economic security policies toward China. Buying new equipment from U.S. companies is often seen as a last resort.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In response to U.S. export controls, companies from third countries (i.e., not the United States or China) have actively sought to replace U.S. companies in the Chinese semiconductor supply chain. Some have even used the lack of U.S. regulatory impediments as a sales pitch to Chinese customers.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>The goal of neutrality has been reflected in practice. For example, in 2008, imec declared that it would not take part in any R&amp;D projects organized under the auspices of the European Union’s Eureka initiative, claiming such programs often serve as “a form of support for national champions” and are thus inconsistent with imec’s practice of strictly neutral international collaboration. In subsequent years, imec did participate in Eureka programs but to a limited degree.</p> -<p>These assertions largely reflect the conclusions of publicly available reporting on China’s semiconductor industry. The clearest available evidence in Chinese policy for these trends is “Document 79” — also known as “Delete A,” for “Delete America” — a highly sensitive strategic plan to rid Chinese digital supply chains of Western technology that has been partially leaked to Western sources. In the weeks before the landmark October 7, 2022, U.S. export controls package, the Chinese leadership privately circulated Document 79. The plan, according to reporting from the Wall Street Journal, incentivizes firms to procure technology from domestic firms even in cases where foreign alternatives are more advanced.</p> +<h4 id="partnerships-with-industry-the-central-focus">Partnerships with Industry: The Central Focus</h4> -<p>The trends described in the reports on Document 79 are supported by a wide range of sources. They are also taking place across the semiconductor supply chain, from design to manufacturing equipment to packaging. For instance, in semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME), Chinese companies such as Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment (AMEC) and Naura Technology Group have increasingly won key tenders over U.S. leaders. Within subsystems and components, China is attempting to develop its own extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV) light sources and replace foreign suppliers for chemicals, gases, and other materials. In design and electronic design automation (EDA), Chinese startups like Moore Threads and Empyrean Technology are beginning to take some share from U.S. companies. These cases are merely illustrative examples out of a broader set of evidence, as these trends will be explored in detail during each supply chain stage’s report.</p> +<p>The principal focus of imec’s operations is joint R&amp;D projects with industry partners to develop precompetitive technologies for applications in future generations of semiconductor products and processes. According to a science and technology counselor for the Flemish government, “This joint collaboration model accelerates innovation, by pooling resources and alleviating the ever-increasing development costs of new technologies.”</p> -<p>The threat that U.S. companies will be designed-out of key parts of the semiconductor supply chain is multifaceted and growing. Design-out efforts are boosting Chinese companies, as policymakers and businesses are attempting to nurture new domestic alternatives. The efforts are also visible in third-country semiconductor industries, where opportunistic non-U.S. firms are seeking to fill the demand gap in China left by newly shunned U.S. firms.</p> +<p>Reflecting its central position in advanced semiconductor manufacturing research, as of 2021 imec has over 600 industry partners who contribute their own resources to joint projects, including their knowledge base, experts, funding, and materials. They may share precompetitive intellectual property or use imec’s fabrication services for their own proprietary research, including prototyping and low-volume manufacturing. Industry partners can sign up for individual imec projects and programs without committing to others — in contrast to the former U.S. chip research consortium Sematech, which required an all-or-nothing commitment from member companies. Companies can also collaborate with imec bilaterally for private research, development, or services while securing their IP. For example, imec helped ASML fabricate high-quality sensor chips for their EUV lithography systems.</p> -<p>Design-around threats are also continuing to emerge. Chinese innovation leadership can be seen in several portions of the semiconductor supply chain, some of which are outside the reach of export control regulations. Advanced packaging serves as a key example of this trend, but there are other examples of it in semiconductor manufacturing equipment, such as novel attempts to produce leading-edge chips using older lithography and etching tools.</p> +<p>Industry partners can also collaborate with imec to develop new research units and facilities within the consortium. In 2000, for example, imec and Philips Research (the R&amp;D arm of Dutch chip and electronics firm Royal Philips Electronics) jointly created a permanent department within imec, with Philips signing onto all of imec’s process-oriented industrial programs and gaining the ability to use the center’s chip fabrication line for its own research on process technologies. In 2003, Samsung, Intel, Infineon, Philips, and STMicroelectronics enabled imec to set up an R&amp;D fab for 300-millimeter (mm) chips by joining imec as core partners in its sub-45-nanometer (nm) complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) program. And in 2010, imec and Intel entered into an agreement to establish a new lab dedicated to exascale-class supercomputers, including the development of tools and applications.</p> -<p>Current U.S. economic security policy may, therefore, inadvertently cause the very thing it was attempting to prevent: the acceleration of leading-edge semiconductor innovation and manufacturing beyond the boundaries of the United States and its allies.</p> +<p>Imec’s chip research strategy has two elements. The first, “More Moore,” seeks to sustain the developmental path of established silicon-based technologies through incremental improvements, usually through scaling, to maintain Moore’s Law into ever-deeper extremes of miniaturization. On this front, imec has created the world’s largest ecosystem for CMOS technology, bringing together most of the world’s major chip foundries, fabless firms, tool and materials suppliers, electronic design automation firms, and application developers. CMOS is the chip technology currently used to produce most of the world’s integrated circuits, offering advantages such as low power consumption, simple structure, high noise tolerance, and strong temperature stability. In addition, imec’s longstanding commitment to developing extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography with Dutch chip toolmaker ASML has been instrumental in the industry’s ability to scale beyond the 14 nm node level (as discussed further below).</p> -<p>While this series of reports will cover the Chinese counterstrategies to U.S. export controls in much of the supply chain, this report focuses on advanced packaging. These technologies are a key growth area in chip production today, and they offer a prime case of China’s design-around efforts in practice. Importantly, advanced packaging and its associated capital equipment are (1) less technologically challenging to develop — and less exclusively dominated by the United States and its allies — compared to fabrication technologies like EUV lithography and (2) potential enablers of cutting-edge applications such as AI large language models (LLMs) without the need for advanced chips. While design-out efforts are occurring in some parts of advanced packaging, such as a shift away from U.S. packaging tools and inputs like advanced substrates, this paper will focus on design-around because of its greater impact on the industry.</p> +<p>Meanwhile, “More Than Moore” pursues innovation that could lead to the emergence of new micro- and nanoelectronics technologies and markets. Imec’s long-term assumption is that this branch of its research effort will eventually eclipse More Moore. Pursuant to More Than Moore, the center has explored specialties such as organic electronics, hybrid semiconductors, organic photovoltaics, and biomedical electronics. These projects often involve collaboration with imec’s Dutch affiliate, the Holst Center, which it cofounded in 2006.</p> -<p>Unsurprisingly, U.S. economic security policymakers seeking to keep China from developing cutting-edge technology feel compelled to counter the enabling power of advanced packaging technologies. However, attempts to broadly control these technologies would likely only serve to damage U.S. companies, which lack dominance in the supply chain and operate in the context of a highly competitive global market. Packaging is a clear example of how design-around threatens U.S. technological superiority and must be addressed appropriately.</p> +<p>Within the constellation of imec industry partners, a handful of companies are “core partners.” The center’s management may identify research programs of interest, then reach out to interested firms from their pool of core partners and provide them the shared facilities to conduct collaborative research. In 2003, imec recruited several major chipmakers to pursue process technology for 45 nm and smaller semiconductors — then the next generation of semiconductor technology. Core partner status meant that the firms involved could participate in all seven of the 45 nm programs that comprised imec’s platform at the time and would receive “certain advantages over companies that remain outside the core,” according to then-CEO Gilbert Declerck.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Current U.S. economic security policy may, therefore, inadvertently cause the very thing it was attempting to prevent: the acceleration of leading-edge semiconductor innovation and manufacturing beyond the boundaries of the United States and its allies.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="substantial-and-sustained-public-support">Substantial and Sustained Public Support</h4> -<p>This paper focuses only on packaging services and tools. It does not cover packaging design tools and overall chip design services and IP, nor does it cover physical testing tools used during the packaging process. Packaging design and testing will be covered in the briefs on (1) EDA and chip design and (2) semiconductor manufacturing equipment, respectively. Designing advanced packaging relies on many of the same software tools used in chip design, such as Synopsys and Cadence, and often occurs in concert with, or as part of, chip and manufacturing process design by “fabless,” or design-only, semiconductor firms and foundries. Testing tools, while used in the packaging process, are also important to semiconductor manufacturing and have more similar design-out and design-around dynamics to semiconductor tools used in areas like etching and process control. For these reasons, these technologies and companies are not covered here.</p> +<p>The imec research center was founded in 1984 with an initial investment of around $72 million by the government of Flanders. Although the regional government continued to make the annual contributions crucial for a sustainable research program, it set a target from the outset for imec to eventually receive 50 percent of its revenues from nongovernment sources, which it achieved in the mid-1990s and has exceeded in every subsequent year. In 2023, imec’s annual revenue totaled 941 million euros: 75 percent came from industry partners, 16 percent from the regional government of Flanders, 6 percent from the European Union, and 3 percent from other government programs. This long-term commitment by the regional government to support and grow the institution is one of the keys to imec’s success.</p> -<h3 id="the-rise-of-advanced-packaging-technologies">The Rise of Advanced Packaging Technologies</h3> +<p>Although Flanders is a relatively small political jurisdiction with a population of about 6.8 million, its government wields substantial power to drive internal economic development and plays a strong role in supporting imec. A 2012 Japanese study observed that the “strength of the Flemish government’s authority in industrial development is equivalent to that of the Japanese federal government.” This regional thrust comes as Belgium has shifted from a unitary state to a federal state in phases since the 1960s, with central government powers devolving progressively onto the regional governments of Dutch-speaking Flanders, French-speaking Wallonia, and the Brussels Capital Region, each with its own executive and parliament. Although the central government retains authority in areas such as foreign relations and national defense, regional authorities lead industrial development. Devolution gave the government of Flanders the autonomy to significantly increase its investments in innovation, enabling it to more than double outlays on R&amp;D from what had been below-average levels relative to the European Union prior to devolution to far above the EU average by 1995.</p> -<h4 id="background-chasing-moores-law">Background: Chasing Moore’s Law</h4> +<p>In a 2024 interview at CSIS, imec CEO Van den hove emphasized the importance of continued public funding despite its diminished percentage of total revenue:</p> -<p>Since the infancy of semiconductor technology, chip manufacturers have pursued the twin goals of greater computing power and efficiency. These goals have, for decades, been achieved by increasing the number of transistors on a chip, primarily via component miniaturization. Moore’s Law — an observation made by Intel cofounder Gordon Moore in 1965 — predicted that the number of transistors that manufacturers could fit onto an integrated circuit would double every two years. Researchers and engineers sought to continually invent ways to put more and more transistors on a chip while optimizing the key tradeoffs between power (P) vs. performance (P) as well as a chip’s area (A) vs. its cost (C), a paradigm collectively known as PPAC. For most of the semiconductor industry’s history, the winning strategy was continually shrinking transistor sizes. For each successive generation of chip, node names (e.g., “50 nanometers”) referred to the actual size of a chip’s smallest feature — typically its gate length — which was decreasing rapidly.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>We believe that we’ve been able to realize a phenomenal growth over those 40 years. And this has been realized through a growing commitment from industry. But at the same time, this commitment from industry was leveraged on top of very strong and stable support from the local government. And this, we believe, is important because it allows us to invest in new programs which today are probably too early for industry to finance but allow us to make sure that we can develop a long-term strategy. . . . Our role is to kind of set the roadmap for the next 10–20 years. So we have to pre-invest a lot in some of these [emerging technology areas].</p> +</blockquote> -<p>However, in recent years, transistor size has been shrinking at a slower rate than in the past, calling into question the durability of Moore’s Law and increasing the need for alternative strategies to boost computing power and efficiency. Around the late 2000s, leading-edge node names stopped signifying a chip’s exact minimum feature size. Instead, node names began symbolizing total increases in transistor density, which were being enabled less by shrinking transistor sizes than by new methods such as feature depopulation and reductions in space between transistors. However, even these new methods have at times struggled to sustain the pace predicted by Moore’s Law in the last decade, and ballooning capital costs to boost transistor density have challenged the economic corollary often associated with Moore’s Law, which says that cost per transistor is inversely proportional to the number of transistors.</p> +<p>In addition, Flanders and the European Union have also made significant one-time contributions to imec for special projects. For instance, Flanders provided imec 35.7 million euros for a new research facility that allowed it, among other things, to build a machine to clean silicon plates of minute dust particles in 2004. In 2009, Flanders gave imec 35 million euros to help finance 75 million euros that it used to construct a new 2,800-square-meter (0.7-acre) cleanroom to support research on 22 nm and smaller CMOS chips and on organic solar cells and biomedical electronics. In 2012, Flanders indicated it would invest in the cost of building cleanroom facilities at imec to enable the pursuit of 450 mm wafer technology, estimated at 100 million euros. The project was shifted to expand the existing 300 mm facility, as the industry did not coalesce around 450 mm technology.</p> -<h4 id="the-rise-of-advanced-packaging">The Rise of Advanced Packaging</h4> +<p>In 2016, imec added a second 4,000 square meter 300 mm cleanroom. This new cleanroom expansion (including building and equipment) entailed a total investment of more than 1 billion euros, one-tenth of which was supplied by the Flemish government. Importantly, more than 900 million euros in investment were derived from joint R&amp;D with more than 90 industrial partners from across the entire semiconductor industry. Imec’s semiconductor research cleanrooms now total more than 13,000 square meters (nearly 140,000 square feet).</p> -<p>Advanced packaging has emerged as a promising alternative to both boost transistor density and scale processing power and efficiency in other ways — particularly as a more capital-efficient alternative compared to investing in changes at the transistor level. The architectures and materials used to connect different chips to each other and the printed circuit board (PCB) can be as important in optimizing PPAC as transistor architecture itself, representing a key opportunity. For instance, the density of interconnects between memory and logic units within a chip package has historically been a communication bottleneck that has lagged the growth of transistor density.</p> +<p>Most recently, it was announced in May 2024 that imec will receive 1.4 billion euros in combined funding from the European Chips Act and the Flanders government — complemented by 1.1 billion euros from industry partners — to extend its NanoIC pilot line, a leading technology platform for companies to explore new technologies before they are introduced into large-scale production. Aiming to accelerate commercialization of sub-2 nm semiconductor technologies, the NanoIC pilot line will support a broad range of industries — including automotive, telecommunications, and health — to develop products that leverage the latest chip innovations. This will include a new 4,000 square meter 300 mm Fab 4, bringing total cleanroom space to 17,000 square meters (182,000 square feet). These ambitious projects feed into what European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has described as an “essential” role for imec in the context of the European Chips Act:</p> -<p>In previous decades, semiconductor packaging was often regarded as a somewhat commoditized last step in an otherwise highly advanced chip fabrication process. The function of packaging has traditionally been to isolate the chip from other components and keep it connected to the PCB. The PCB, in traditional applications, is responsible for transferring power and information between chips and other circuit components. Conventional packaging is a low-value step in the manufacturing process, and it has historically been outsourced to third-party firms — often located in countries with lower labor costs — that specialize in packaging and testing.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>The role imec plays in the European Union’s ambitions will be particularly significant. . . To be less dependent on East Asia, we need to scale up our production here in Europe: imec is essential for our economic security. For investors who need to research and test their innovations before moving to mass production, it is an important place.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Advanced packaging design, on the other hand, is a newer field seeking to arrange the components of a chip and its interconnecting parts in ways that improve input/output (I/O), reduce latency (the delay period between when a computing instruction is given and when data begins transferring), and increase power efficiency. As such, it incorporates wholly different processes and technologies than traditional packaging.</p> +<p>While imec is strongly supported by Flanders, it enjoys operational autonomy. It is run by an executive board and a senior leadership team that plan and execute strategy. The center’s R&amp;D targets are set forth in 5-year business plans that are reviewed by both the government of Flanders and technical advisory boards comprised of global experts in the various thematic areas in which imec is active. imec is further overseen by a board of directors, which has four members drawn from the faculty of Flemish universities, two from Flemish industry, two designated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and one picked by the Ministry of Education. In addition, university professors and industry researchers drawn from among core partners conduct a critical review twice a year of each research project and suggest actions the center could take. The relative autonomy of the imec leadership enables it to follow the technology — and indeed lead it — without undue political constraints.</p> -<p>Notably, advanced packaging occurs during both upstream and downstream manufacturing processes. Traditional packaging is an entirely back-end process, occurring downstream, typically executed by an outsourced semiconductor assembly and test (OSAT) vendor. This outsourcing existed because packaging was lower margin relative to front-end manufacturing due to its commoditized nature, with OSATs competing primarily on cost.</p> +<h4 id="the-leuven-technology-cluster">The Leuven Technology Cluster</h4> -<p>Advanced packaging, on the other hand, is moving much of the packaging process farther upstream. New, innovative methods are changing the way in which foundries prepare chips during fabrication, such as logic and memory fabs collaborating to make their chips integrate seamlessly in the final package. To build advanced packaging architectures, certain technologies and methods need to be integrated throughout the front-end wafer fabrication process, creating opportunities for chip manufacturers to increase their share of industry value-added.</p> +<p>Imec is the main hub of a local technology cluster, which reflects decades of investment by Flanders, local governments, the private sector, and imec itself. In addition to five excellent nearby research universities, Leuven hosts numerous other world-leading research entities.</p> -<h4 id="chiplets-and-heterogeneous-integration">“Chiplets” and Heterogeneous Integration</h4> +<p>Applying the imec model to similar national efforts around the world has led critics to claim that subsidizing the research activities of multinational firms without a local footprint will not help the local economy. However, imec’s benefits to the Flemish region have been significant and measurable over the past four decades. Young company representatives doing research at imec are likely to move up in their own companies, then consider Flanders when later making decisions about where to locate research centers or other activities. Hundreds of PhD candidates pursuing their research at imec provide a growing talent pool with ties to the region. In addition, imec subcontracts many tasks to local companies, helping to strengthen the industrial ecosystem; some of these firms have gone on to become “very fast growers.” An independent analysis of imec’s economic benefits to the region concluded in 2020 that for each euro of Flemish government investment, imec creates 7 euros of value added to the Belgian economy and 3.7 euros of return on the subsidy through taxes. Each million euros invested in imec creates 23 jobs at imec and 67 elsewhere in the Belgian economy.</p> -<p>One particularly important advanced packaging innovation is “chiplet” design, which brings multiple chips with discrete functions into a singular packaged unit. The packaging methods used to bring chiplet designs to life — referred to as heterogeneous integration — have the potential to enable greater power efficiency, faster data transfer rates, and lower signal degradation relative to conventional packaging methods. One major advantage of chiplet design is flexibility in terms of serving different applications. Semiconductor components that interact often in a system can be placed in greater proximity, reducing latency and power demands. For AI computations, for instance, which rely heavily on memory functions, bringing a memory chiplet closer to the processing core has proven to be a powerful design solution.</p> +<h4 id="intellectual-property">Intellectual Property</h4> -<p>Importantly, chiplet technology can be used to create microelectronic systems that perform like those containing leading-edge semiconductors — without any access to the advanced manufacturing technology required to make such chips. Chiplets have therefore become a serious concern for U.S. policymakers seeking to curb the advancement of Chinese technology, as cutting-edge chipmaking tools, such as EUV lithography, represent the key “chokepoints” used to deny China access to advanced semiconductor capabilities.</p> +<p>Given its large pool of researchers and expertise, imec brings very substantial knowledge — some of it patented — to any research collaboration, known as “relevant background IP.” Industry partners can pay a fee to join one or more of imec’s Industrial Affiliation Programs, and imec will share its background IP applicable to their particular research area. Imec holds the “foreground IP” that is developed during the collaboration and licenses it out to all industry partners who participated; this becomes part of its background IP for use in future collaborations.</p> -<h4 id="imposing-export-controls-on-advanced-packaging">Imposing Export Controls on Advanced Packaging</h4> +<p>Industrial partners can take away as little or as much of the IP generated by the joint effort as they would like, with the terms being negotiated on a case-by-case basis, usually involving costs to the industrial partner, particularly for an exclusive license. These bilateral negotiations are overseen by imec lawyers and valuation experts. Imec may seek terms such as payment of the royalties on subsequent sales if the industry partner takes the technology to market.</p> -<p>To make matters more challenging for U.S. regulators, advanced packaging is, for the most part, enabled by widely available equipment and materials. Unlike semiconductor fabrication, which occurs on the nanometer level (one billionth of a meter) and requires highly sophisticated equipment at every step, advanced packaging processes are typically measured on the micron level (one thousand times larger). While some specialized machinery is required to build advanced-packaged semiconductors, most tools are less technologically niche and challenging to develop in comparison to fabrication. Furthermore, the supply chain for equipment and materials used in advanced packaging involves Chinese companies and has greater supplier diversification compared to SME or chip design, making potential unilateral, bilateral, or trilateral agreements less effective.</p> +<h4 id="infrastructure">Infrastructure</h4> -<p>There are, however, a couple of hard-to-acquire inputs and technologies that enable advanced packaging and are worth covering specifically: hybrid bonding and advanced substrates. Each of these technologies enables firms to create advanced chip packages that perform well above their traditionally packaged counterparts, even for similar process nodes at the underlying chip level.</p> +<p>From imec’s inception, companies and academic researchers have been attracted to its research partnerships because of its ability to make available the advanced equipment needed to pursue cutting-edge research. Imec benefits in this respect since partners “can provide tools, equipment and materials for free and that can be provided and tested by other partners when conducting R&amp;D at the facility.” The center also offers other forms of support, including design, prototyping, testing, and consulting services, which are particularly important for start-ups and small- to medium-sized enterprises.</p> -<p><em>HYBRID BONDING</em></p> +<p>In an event at CSIS, imec CEO Van den hove observed that the center’s success is attributable to the fact that it has invested in the infrastructure needed to achieve its objectives: “Over those 40 years, we probably built out what is. . . the world’s most advanced, independent R&amp;D pilot line. We’ve invested more than $5 billion in that facility. And it’s really run as one integrated facility, with a very strong focus on operational excellence so that we can deliver value in a very effective way to our partners.”</p> -<p>Perhaps the most impactful technology propelling advanced packaging innovation is hybrid bonding. Hybrid bonding, in short, is a method used to vertically connect fabricated semiconductor wafers (commonly referred to as “dies,” “die,” or “dice” once they are cut into individual chips) using closely spaced copper pads, creating an exceptionally short interconnect distance between discrete chips. Importantly, hybrid bonding enables advanced “3D” stacking of wafers, which is expected to play a key role in future Moore’s Law advancements in power and performance. The utilization of hybrid bonding can dramatically increase the performance of a given chip package. Without advancing the process nodes of the underlying semiconductors, computing efficiency can be greatly increased, enabling various leading-edge applications.</p> +<p>Imec currently has 8,000 square meters (1.98 acres) of 300 mm cleanroom space and 5,200 square meters (1.28 acres) of 200 mm cleanroom space. Its class 1,000 300 mm cleanroom has all the equipment needed to pursue sub-2 nm CMOS R&amp;D, including advanced lithography based on ASML’s newest EUV equipment. It has a vast array of specialized labs pursuing silicon and organic photovoltaics, packaging and testing equipment, photonics, gallium-nitride processing, design methodology, biosensors, DNA research, imaging, and many other topics.</p> -<p>Hybrid bonding can be done in one of two ways: wafer-on-wafer (W2W) or die-on-wafer (D2W). In W2W bonding, wafers are stacked on top of one another, and the stack is diced upon finishing. In D2W bonding, wafers are diced into individual chiplets before stacked. Both methods require specialized manufacturing equipment such as die attach and laser dicing tools.</p> +<h4 id="workforce-a-melting-pot">Workforce: A Melting Pot</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OEo99Df.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Mapping Key Global Players in the Advanced Packaging Supply Chain.</strong> Source: <a href="https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/the-semiconductor-supply-chain/">Saif M. Khan, “The Semiconductor Supply Chain,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, January 2021</a>.</em></p> +<p>From about 70 employees at its inception, imec’s workforce has grown to over 5,500, with roughly 10 percent holding PhDs. In November 2023, imec forecast that its workforce would add nearly 2,000 new hires by 2035. Research staff are drawn from university partners in Belgium and many other countries, and staff are allowed to hold dual appointments at their institutions. An important strength of the model is that it allows industry partners to assign their own employees to work on site, which brings in cutting-edge, commercially relevant perspectives and the tacit knowledge garnered through familiarity with actual production.</p> -<p>Besi, a Dutch company specializing in tools for advanced packaging, is a major player in hybrid bonding. According to company data, Besi holds 40 percent of the total global market for “die attach” and 74 percent of the total global market for “advanced die placement.” Both technologies are critical components of D2W hybrid bonding operations. Besi’s major competitors include two Singapore-based companies, ASMPT and Kulicke &amp; Soffa.</p> +<p>This inclusive approach results in imec having one of the most diverse workforces of any major microelectronics center in the world. As CEO Van den hove observed, “We’ve been attracting people from all over the world, close to 100 nationalities, and 5,500 of the most advanced, top-notch researchers. Many of them have experience of more than twenty years either in imec or the industry.” One Indian-Finnish employee at imec remarked that the staff is so multinational in character that “the Flemish culture does not prevail. . . . You can never see the difference between people’s national backgrounds.”</p> -<p>Hybrid bonding processes are for the most part executed in fabs rather than OSATs. Key companies developing hybrid bonding capabilities include leading chip manufacturers such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), Samsung, Intel, and SK hynix — as well as Chinese companies such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) and Yangtze Memory Technologies Corporation (YMTC). But in terms of existing scaled production, hybrid bonding is limited to a handful of AMD chiplets produced by TSMC, and certain 3D memory chips. Key breakthroughs are expected in the next five years, such as TSMC’s 3D-stacked system-on-integrated chip (SOIC) packaging, which is expected to reach the market in 2027. This design builds on TSMC’s leading chip-on-wafer-on-substrate (CoWoS) process — a “2.5-D” package one step below hybrid bonding in terms of advancement — which has already proven critical for AI data center applications.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">An important strength of the model is that it allows industry partners to assign their own employees to work on site, which brings in cutting-edge, commercially relevant perspectives and the tacit knowledge garnered through familiarity with actual production.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><em>ADVANCED SUBSTRATES</em></p> +<p>Imec’s facilities are colocated with KU Leuven, and its CEOs have all been professors there. For instance, Luc Van den hove is a member of KU Leuven’s Faculty of Engineering Sciences and received his PhD in electrical engineering from the institution while conducting research at imec. When the center was starting up, faculty from various Flemish universities — particularly a group of KU Leuven professors who wanted to pursue microprocessor research — served as experts to help build its knowledge base. This partnership has contributed to Thompson-Reuters rating KU Leuven as Europe’s most innovative university in recent years, while the university-based leadership has enabled imec to develop a global network of formal and informal relationships with other institutions of higher learning. At present, it has collaborations with over 200 universities and myriad “non-formal collaborations through a network of scientists, engineers and PhD students.”</p> -<p>A substrate serves two main purposes in the manufacturing and packaging of a chip. First, a substrate is the basic surface on which microfabrication takes place. Second, and more important for the purposes of advanced packaging, a substrate serves as the connecting point between the “brains” and the “electrical highways” of a chip.</p> +<h3 id="critical-bilateral-partnerships">Critical Bilateral Partnerships</h3> -<p>The computing operations of a chip occur on the die, in essence the “brains” of the chip. When in operation, information comes in from the printed circuit board (the “electrical highway”), through the substrate, and onto the die, where a computing operation is performed. Then, the processed information leaves the die by passing back through the substrate and returning to the printed circuit board for further transmission.</p> +<h4 id="asml">ASML</h4> -<p>The expansion of chip capabilities and growth of specialized applications such as 5G infrastructure, aerospace and defense, high-performance computing, and electric vehicles (EVs) increases demand for semiconductors that can withstand high signal frequency, heat, and data throughput requirements. Advanced substrates are often uniquely able to achieve desired high-performance capabilities under these types of conditions. Therefore, chip packages based on advanced substrates such as gallium arsenide (GaAs), gallium nitride (GaN), and silicon carbide (SiC) are growing in importance. The latter two on this list are considered “wide-bandgap” semiconductors, which can operate at higher voltages, temperatures, and frequencies relative to traditional semiconductors and play a key role in the production of various renewable energy technologies.</p> +<p>Imec’s costly, risky, but successful three-decade research partnership with the Dutch chip toolmaker ASML is an important illustration of its capabilities. This collaboration has created an ecosystem for proving, testing, and debugging newly developed ASML tools and integrating them into manufacturing lines. With imec’s support, ASML has produced technological breakthroughs such as the development of EUV lithography tools used to produce the chips needed to support cutting-edge applications, including artificial intelligence (AI).</p> -<p>The current advanced substrate supply chain runs primarily through three geographies: Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. Combined, companies in these three countries are responsible for 88 percent of global advanced substrate revenues. Taiwan in particular holds a strong share in advanced substrate production, led by companies such as Unimicron, NanYa PCB, and Kinsus. China, however, has ambitions to expand with newer players such as Shennan Circuits and Access. China’s growing investment in the advanced substrate market has the potential to shift market share away from the current leaders. The United States, building off government subsidies under the CHIPS and Science Act, also hopes to gain a foothold in the market, although its share remains small.</p> +<p>Prior versions of photolithography for chips utilized deep ultraviolet (DUV) light, but shorter wavelengths were needed to continue to make circuit patterns smaller and advance Moore’s Law. EUV uses light with a wavelength of 13.5 nm, which does not occur in nature but can be created by zapping drops of molten tin with a carbon dioxide laser until they become plasma. The light emitted by this process is collected and passed through a mask with the pattern of the circuitry on it, then the pattern is shrunk down to the size of a semiconductor die with a system of ultra-flat mirrors and projected onto a silicon wafer. This must all be done in a vacuum.</p> -<h3 id="designing-around-us-export-controls-via-advanced-packaging">Designing Around U.S. Export Controls via Advanced Packaging</h3> +<p>Developing and refining this technology into workable lithography tools was a challenge so daunting that during the several-decade-long developmental effort, various observers declared that the process was a failure, would never work, or could not become reality in the reasonably foreseeable future. Nevertheless, ASML and imec persevered in a protracted, multi-billion-euro effort, a demonstration of how big R&amp;D risks and a long-term focus sometimes pay off in spectacular fashion.</p> -<p>Advanced packaging technologies provide a key opportunity for Chinese government officials and companies to design around U.S. export controls on advanced chips and pursue performance gains via noncontrolled technologies. In these efforts, Chinese companies have a moderate incumbency advantage due to their strong market positioning in conventional semiconductor packaging. While the global packaging market is more geographically distributed than semiconductor industry segments like chip design and fabrication, China is the global leader, controlling 38 percent of total assembly, testing, and packaging (ATP) value-added activity. Key Chinese outsourced semiconductor assembly and test (OSAT) companies include Jiangsu Changjiang Electronics Tech ( JCET) and Tongfu Microelectronics, both of which have historically provided low-cost partnerships to key foreign foundries for ATP.</p> +<p>ASML enjoys a monopoly on the manufacture of the world’s most advanced lithography equipment, EUV — representing a major strategic asset for Western powers in their technological competition with China. EUV lithography enables the high-volume production of chips with advanced AI applications, underpinning advances in a vast array of other critical technology areas that have the potential to shape the outcome of future conflicts. Many in the West have underestimated Chinese capabilities in adapting and improving complex technologies such as high-speed rail, aircraft, and telecommunications. Nonetheless, given the enormous complexity of EUV lithography, China is unlikely to possess a comparable capability for many years, especially given U.S. semiconductor export controls.</p> -<p>High-volume packaging facilities for U.S. semiconductor manufacturers such as Intel, GlobalFoundries, and Onsemi are located inside China, indicating that packaging technology and expertise are likely widely available in the country. As of 2021, for instance, China was home to 111 ATP facilities for OSATs and 23 facilities for integrated device manufacturers (IDMs), 28 percent of all global facilities (regardless of firm headquarters). Additionally, China holds stronger shares in manufacturing packaging equipment relative to other types of semiconductor tools, giving it some experience with producing required tools such as die attach and bonding.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">ASML and imec persevered in a protracted, multi-billion-euro effort, a demonstration of how big R&amp;D risks and a long-term focus sometimes pay off in spectacular fashion.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Leveraging its conventional packaging capacity to build out an advanced packaging ecosystem offers a key opportunity to get around U.S. export controls, and this is indeed what China has begun doing. Chinese OSATs have increasingly pivoted toward advanced back-end processes such as chiplets over the past few years. In conjunction with its private sector, the Chinese government is also subsidizing advanced packaging research. In August 2023, for example, the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology announced it would fund up to 30 chiplet-based projects, making over $6.4 million available for research. This is also happening at the local level: in 2023, the city of Wuxi — home to JCET and other Chinese packaging firms — made a pledge to invest $14 million to create a Chinese “Chiplet Valley,” a nod to Silicon Valley.</p> +<p>While other players made major contributions to the EUV effort — including Intel, IBM, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), and ASML’s German optics partner, Carl Zeiss — imec’s role was crucial. Before the first EUV-based lithography tool was available, imec conducted EUV tests at Switzerland’s Paul Scherrer Institute and collaborated with six makers of photoresist. In 2006, imec received one of the first full-field EUV lithography tools, the Alpha Demo Tool — jointly created by engineers at ASML and the College of Nanotechnology, Science, and Engineering (CNSE) at the University of Albany, SUNY — so it could assess its commercial viability and identify operational challenges on pilot lines in a real factory environment. Since then, imec has worked with ASML to prove and test every subsequent generation of EUV tools.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CKs78mk.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: 2022 Industry Value-Added by Country for Assembly, Testing, and Packaging (ATP).</strong> Source: <a href="https://web-assets.bcg.com/25/6e/7a123efd40199020ed1b4114be84/emerging-resilience-in-the-semiconductor-supply-chain-r.pdf">Raj Varadajan et al., Emerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply Chain (Boston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association, May 2024)</a>.</em></p> +<p>Summarizing imec’s “very close partnership” with ASML, CEO Luc Van den hove has said “ASML focuses on the machine. We develop the process. We develop the ecosystem around the machine.” This dynamic continues today. In June 2023, imec signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with ASML to install and service its “full suite of advanced lithography and metrology equipment in the imec pilot line in Leuven,” such as the new 0.55 and 0.33 numerical-aperture (NA) EUV machines. The high-NA lithography EXE-series machines enable much faster wafer throughput than the previous-generation NXE systems introduced in 2010, and can be used to produce 2 nm and below semiconductors. Imec has secured commitments of 750 million euros each from the European Union and the Flanders government to support this project.</p> -<p>Chinese foundries and chip designers are working to incorporate advanced packaging methods into their semiconductor manufacturing operations. To this end, Huawei, through its subsidiary HiSilicon, has already launched partnerships with packaging equipment vendor JT Automation and wafer probe card startup MaxOne Semiconductor, in addition to securing hundreds of patents. In 2022, Huawei and HiSilicon began innovating with 3D chip stacking designs, an advanced process involving vertical integration of multiple wafer dies into a single package, in an attempt to design around U.S. sanctions. A 2019 patent filing reveals a sophisticated design that makes use of two chips, stacked on top of one another, but only partially overlapping.</p> +<h4 id="taiwan-semiconductor-manufacturing-company">Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company</h4> -<p>SMIC, the most advanced of China’s foundries, has called for other Chinese companies to embrace advanced packaging since 2021. SMIC often partners with Huawei to develop chips (including packaging), recently doing so to develop the 7 nanometer (nm) Kirin 9000s for the Huawei Mate 60 Pro smartphone. JCET also recently confirmed its ability to offer packaging capabilities for 5nm manufacturing processes, linking the OSAT with SMIC’s reported efforts to achieve 5nm process production at scale.</p> +<p>Over time, imec has come to engage deeply with TSMC. A core partner of imec since 2005, TSMC dispatched a researcher to Leuven in 2006 to work with the prototype Alpha Demo Tool and prepare the technology for high-volume manufacturing; after its work at imec, it eventually ordered a development EUV tool from ASML for delivery in 2013, concluding that the technology could be refined and used successfully. TSMC subsequently deployed its EUV machines in high-volume manufacturing in 2019 for use in its N7+ process.</p> -<p>YMTC is yet another Chinese entity trying to design around U.S. regulations using advanced packaging. In 2022, YMTC, which is the top Chinese chipmaker for NAND flash memory — a type of semiconductor that stores data without using power, commonly used in memory cards and solid-state drives — employed advanced packaging processes to develop a world-leading memory chip. With different architectures from logic chips, memory chips are measured in the number of layers produced in their manufacturing processes. U.S. export controls prevent the export to China of NAND chips with 128 layers or higher. YMTC’s 2022 NAND process produced memory chips with 232 layers, making the firm the first to break the 200-layer milestone. Additionally, the package architecture — called Xtacking — uses hybrid bonding, an advanced packaging process hallmark, demonstrating China’s commitment to utilizing packaging as a means of innovation.</p> +<p>In the meantime, the imec-TSMC relationship became more symbiotic. One 2010 partnership between them was designed to resolve a chicken-and-egg conundrum facing the Taiwanese foundry. TSMC could not safely develop manufacturing processes for certain application-specific technologies until it was sure that volume demand would exist, but volume demand would not emerge until the process existed. To break the impasse, imec promised to pass on certain new technologies to TSMC, which would ramp up their production once imec had demonstrated their viability.</p> -<p>Notably, the YMTC 232-layer memory chip attracted the attention of customers beyond the domestic market. In fact, the U.S.-based technology giant Apple planned to use YMTC memory chips in its sold-in-China iPhones in 2022. While the company canceled this plan shortly after the October 2022 U.S. export controls took effect, the episode nonetheless provides an example of the potential global appeal of Chinese advanced packaging technologies. Some analysts have gone as far as to argue that cheaply produced, advanced-packed chips originating from China have serious export potential.</p> +<h4 id="rapidus">Rapidus</h4> -<p>Perhaps the most alarming example of Chinese companies leveraging advanced packaging to design around U.S. controls is the Jasminer X4, a cryptocurrency mining chip that successfully made use of DRAM-to-logic hybrid bonding, a package that involves stacking advanced logic chips on memory chips to boost performance and lower energy demand. While most non-monolithic designs (i.e., packages combining different types of chips) from Chinese companies have been theoretical, the Jasminer X4 is a case of heterogeneous integration in practice. In fact, this is the first demonstrated commercial use of DRAM-to-logic hybrid bonding — a niche heterogeneous integration application that illustrates the ability of Chinese engineers to work around U.S. regulations to manufacture high-performance chips.</p> +<p>Reflecting its international approach, in late 2022 imec entered into a collaboration with Rapidus, a collective of eight Japanese companies that aims to restore an internationally competitive chip industry in Japan.71 In 2023, the conglomerate became one of imec’s core partners, gaining access to its “advanced technologies, system solutions, state-of-the-art 300 mm pilot line, and extensive partner network.” This cooperation complements the partnership at SUNY-Albany’s CNSE between IBM and Rapidus, which hopes to gain the ability to manufacture 2 nm chips. The Japanese government is committed to this ambitious effort, as reflected in its announcement in April 2024 that it would contribute $3.9 billion to Rapidus.</p> -<p>The YMTC and Jasminer examples should be a warning sign for regulators in Washington. U.S. export controls, which incentivized the design-around counterstrategy, may well have created a generation of Chinese innovators that seek to push the boundaries of semiconductor technology via advanced packaging. Chinese companies, rather than copying the cutting edge as was seen during the “sliding scale” era of U.S. export control policy, are forced to invent new technologies to design around U.S. regulations. This implicit cultural shift in Chinese commercial goals, from copying to innovation, is a potential sea change in U.S.-China technological competition.</p> +<h3 id="start-up-support-and-investment-arms">Start-up Support and Investment Arms</h3> -<p>While China has invested heavily into the chiplet ecosystem, it is worth noting that few chiplet designs have been made into physical products, and scaled production remains an obstacle. A key challenge, as with any new semiconductor manufacturing process, will be achieving high yields in production. However, some industry analysts believe that Chinese firms are perhaps just one to three years away from achieving the wide adoption of heterogeneous integration processes. Chinese companies, including scaled firms and startups, as well as public officials have widely highlighted the promise of advanced packaging — particularly chiplets — as a way around U.S. export controls. One key factor is that the United States does not have significant incumbent advantages in the packaging space, so China is in a strong position to match (or even overtake) U.S. capabilities more quickly.</p> +<p>Today, over 300 high-tech companies are now located in Leuven, many of which are spinoffs from KU Leuven and imec. This situation underscores imec’s dynamic effects on the region (in the view of Chairman Antoon de Proft) and highlights how imec not only serves established high-tech companies but also creates new firms in significant numbers.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">This implicit cultural shift in Chinese commercial goals, from copying to innovation, is a potential sea change in U.S.-China technological competition.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Notably, imec conducts venturing activities that focus on “deep tech” — fundamental technologies that require an extended phase of R&amp;D to commercialize but promise major payoffs, transforming “disruptive technologies into disruptive companies.” Imec encourages this dynamic in several ways: through spinoffs led by its own researchers; through its technology accelerator, imec.istart; and through venture capital investments in its independently managed imec.xpand fund.</p> -<p>On a macro level, aggressive U.S. economic security measures — through their impacts on the expansion of Chinese semiconductor innovation — have the potential to harm the very industry leadership they are designed to protect. Chinese advancements in the packaging space present medium- and long-term challenges for U.S. semiconductor companies. Unintentionally, U.S. export restrictions have galvanized Chinese companies to invent novel technologies that threaten the balance of global competition in semiconductor markets.</p> +<h4 id="spinoffs">Spinoffs</h4> -<h3 id="designing-out-us-firms-in-advanced-packaging">Designing Out U.S. Firms in Advanced Packaging</h3> +<p>In the view of imec’s director of venture development, Olivier Rousseaux, spinoffs in particular represent a way for imec to help commercialize IP it has developed and capture “a share of the upside potential of our innovation.” He suggests this activity could be expanded further, noting, “Today, imec gets paid typical research project fees for innovation that goes into the market and generates billions of Euros. We make good money, but peanuts compared to what we could make.”</p> -<p>Evidence of U.S. firms being designed-out of the Chinese advanced packaging market is more limited compared to design-around innovations. It requires U.S. companies to occupy leading market share positions in the advanced packaging supply chain, which is less common relative to segments of the semiconductor industry (e.g., tools, design). The strongest example of this taking place is in the advanced substrate market — in particular, silicon carbide (SiC) wafer substrates, which are the foundation of wide-bandgap power electronics semiconductors used in EVs. Despite not being directly affected by the export controls, SiC substrates provide an example of how Chinese decoupling from U.S. semiconductor inputs is affecting technology areas outside of leading-edge chips.</p> +<p>These spinoff ventures continue to grow. Imec’s website lists 72 companies spun off by the consortium between 1986 and 2023, most of which are still operating or have been acquired by other firms. Another 68 companies were spun off from iMinds before that organization merged with imec in 2016. As one would expect with high-tech start-ups, a few of these new companies have been liquidated, but the majority have survived and thrived. This is in no small part because imec contributes the deep-tech expertise of over 5,000 “highly skilled and dedicated researchers”; access to exceptional facilities, particularly cleanroom space and 3.5 billion euros worth of equipment; and support through a vibrant regional ecosystem of established partners, “which creates opportunities for young spinoffs to collaborate.”</p> -<p>U.S. companies — particularly Wolfspeed and Coherent — along with Japan’s SiCrystal, together hold a dominant share of the global SiC wafer market today. North Carolina-based Wolfspeed alone controlled more than 60 percent of the market as of 2021 and pioneered the industry’s transition to eight-inch wafers, a key technological breakthrough. SiC-based chips have taken on increased importance within the automotive industry due to their performance benefits compared to silicon wafers in inverters for EVs. China’s rapidly growing EV manufacturing capacity represents a key market for SiC wafers for U.S. and third-country firms.</p> +<h4 id="the-imecistart-accelerator">The Imec.istart Accelerator</h4> -<p>China has targeted expansion in the SiC market for many years (SiC was mentioned in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan, indicating plans for government support), but its efforts have recently accelerated. A key focus has been on developing public-private research partnerships with key universities such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which has helped China become a leader in SiC patent filing. At the same time, large private capital investments by EV giants such as BYD and Nio have propelled the growth of emerging Chinese players such as TanKeBlue, SICC, and Sanan. Projections by the semiconductor research firm Yole Group indicate that SiC production within China could see substantial increases in the coming years: 2021 production levels of SiC wafers stood at 0.18 million wafers, whereas 2026 forecasts predict an increase to 3.9 million.</p> +<p>The 12 to 18-month imec.istart program complements imec’s venture activity. Launched in 2011, imec.istart is a digital technology business accelerator for supporting start-ups that present a working proof of concept, providing access to imec facilities, early-stage financing, mentoring, free office space, and introductions to tech communities, among other benefits. Participation in imec.istart is limited to companies that are less than two years old, based in Belgium, and focus on digital products or nanotechnologies.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9PAtbDc.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Historical and Planned Chinese SiC Wafer Manufacturing, 2018–2026.</strong> Source: <a href="https://macropolo.org/analysis/sic-china-ev-chip/">AJ Cortese, “That’s So SiC: China Aims to Master an EV Chip You Haven’t Heard Of,” MacroPolo, January 2, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<p>Imec.istart invests a minimum of 100,000 euros in pre-seed funding for each selected start-up, split 50-50 between equity and a convertible loan, and may choose to award an additional 150,000 euros at its discretion once the start-up is “up-and-running.” The initial 100,000 euros can be used for any business costs, but only up to 30,000 of it can be spent on product development, and none of it on salaries.</p> -<p>While U.S. firms have retained their large leadership so far in terms of SiC market share, the rise of Chinese competitors, facilitated by government support, is expected to create increased challenges going forward. China also has advantages from its leadership in EV manufacturing and integrating SiC-based packages into power electronics systems, providing a strong source of demand and technological knowledge that enables innovative partnerships with domestic SiC substrate suppliers. Overall, this design-out example showcases how China is taking a “whole-of-supply-chain” approach to replacing semiconductor technologies from the United States and its allies, one that has only accelerated following the October 2022 export controls.</p> +<p>In January 2024, imec.istart announced the launch of a new, independently managed future fund to enable longer-term and larger-scale investments in promising imec.istart start-ups beyond the initial 100,000 euros of seed funding. The investments are expected to average 1 million euros per qualifying start-up, totaling an estimated 25 million euros over the first five years. Investors include imec, PMV (the Flanders government’s wholly owned investment fund), ING Belgium, and private parties such as angel investors and the founders of imec.istart alumni companies.</p> -<h3 id="summary">Summary</h3> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="the-state-of-advanced-packaging-today">The State of Advanced Packaging Today</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>About two-thirds of imec.istart’s portfolio consists of software firms, which have the advantage of lower capital costs than hardware developers and can go to market more quickly, making them much more attractive to investors. Some of the accelerator’s notable successes include the Ghent-based food-delivery company Deliverect, data companies Datacamp and PieSync, and medical-software developer Ugentec. Imec.istart now has a portfolio of over 300 start-ups, and in 2023 UBI Global named it the world’s top business incubator linked to a university.</p> -<p>The semiconductor advanced packaging market is at a critical juncture. While Chinese policymakers and companies are prioritizing packaging innovation and have made key strides, similar efforts are playing out in the United States and around the world. They include increased private sector R&amp;D focused on areas like chiplets and advanced substrates as well as industrial policy investments, such as the CHIPS Act in the United States. As discussed, China has some existing advantages — namely, large domestic conventional packaging capacity and leadership in downstream applications manufacturing for wide-bandgap semiconductors such as EVs and solar panels. That said, China does not hold all the cards in terms of developing advanced packaging, and its long-term leadership in the sector is by no means guaranteed.</p> +<h4 id="venture-investment-imecxpand">Venture Investment: Imec.xpand</h4> -<p>Taiwan is currently considered the global leader in advanced packaging, primarily due to TSMC’s leading CoWoS product as well as Taiwan’s important domestic ecosystem of equipment and packaging materials suppliers. TSMC’s capabilities depend on close collaboration in system design with U.S. fabless firms such as Nvidia and AMD (which will be discussed in greater detail in a future paper on design), whose Hopper H200 and Ryzen-16 core packages, respectively, are key market leaders. In terms of OSAT competition, the United States’ Amkor and Taiwan’s ASE retain the technological edge over China’s JCET and Tongfu in terms of advanced packaging. Key OSATs are also increasingly shifting production away from China to geographies like Southeast Asia amid rising U.S.-China tensions.</p> +<p>Established in 2017, imec.xpand operates as a venture capital fund, investing in nanotechnology hardware start-ups and spinoffs in which “imec knowledge, expertise and infrastructure will be the differentiating factor for success.” The fund is independently managed and cofinanced by imec, government entities, and private firms (some of which are imec members), who together contributed 120 million euros in its first round of investment. In May 2024, imec.xpand announced the launch of a second, 300-million-euro fund for “accelerating the growth of transformative semiconductor and nanotechnology innovations.” According to imec, imec.xpand has invested in 23 companies to date — including two unicorns — which have collectively raised close to 1.5 billion euros in funding.</p> -<p>That said, China’s recent progress in advanced packaging should not be taken lightly. There is broad consensus among Chinese and foreign observers that U.S. export restrictions have accelerated the timeline of innovation in China’s advanced packaging ecosystem. Chinese investments into advanced packaging are significant and reflect the high level of government prioritization for the area, which was identified as a Chinese opportunity to surpass the United States even prior to October 2022. Most importantly, the United States and China are working from a similar “starting line” with respect to packaging, unlike most of the rest of the semiconductor ecosystem. The extent to which either country can achieve packaging industry leadership longer term will likely depend closely on effective coordination between a wide range of players, including OSATs, IDMs, designers and EDA firms, foundries, and original equipment manufacturers. In this respect, the increasingly close collaboration across China’s entire semiconductor (and electronics manufacturing) ecosystem in response to U.S. controls may present another possible Chinese advantage.</p> +<h3 id="international-partnerships-and-footprint">International Partnerships and Footprint</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is broad consensus among Chinese and foreign observers that U.S. export restrictions have accelerated the timeline of innovation in China’s advanced packaging ecosystem.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="imec-in-the-united-states">Imec in the United States</h4> -<p>It remains to be seen whether future advancements in the semiconductor industry will be driven primarily by transistor density or changes in systemic complexity such as advanced packaging innovations. Areas such as EUV lithography — access to which is controlled by the United States and its allies — are likely to remain important to PPAC improvements, meaning that the ability of U.S. companies to use these technologies still confers advantages in the overall chip race against China, which is still struggling to develop domestic alternatives. However, the combination of advanced packaging capabilities and advanced fabrication tools represents the most promising way for the United States and its allies to maintain semiconductor leadership. For this reason, the United States cannot afford to let China run away with leadership in advanced packaging, even if it continues to lead in other areas.</p> +<p>In addition to its research partnerships with many U.S. firms, imec operates three centers of excellence in the United States at sites where it can collaborate easily with local research universities. Notable centers and partnerships include:</p> -<h3 id="conclusion-and-policy-recommendations">Conclusion and Policy Recommendations</h3> +<ul> + <li> + <p>imec USA–Florida, located near Orlando, which focuses on cryogenic and superconducting computing, as well as advanced semiconductor packaging;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>imec USA–Berkeley, which focuses on innovative AI architectures and the co-optimization (redesigning) of system technology;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>imec USA–San José, which provides design services, multi-project wafer runs, and application-specific integrated circuit development;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>joint research by imec and Purdue University to develop and demonstrate novel semiconductor materials, laying the foundation for “the next wave of high-performance compute and packaging materials” and aiming to make them more sustainable; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>an MoU signed by imec, the University of Michigan, Washtenaw Community College, General Motors, the semiconductor firm KLA, and the Michigan Economic Development Corporation to pursue semiconductor technologies for the automotive industry.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The United States’ new approach to semiconductor export controls attempts to grow its technological lead to the greatest extent possible, rather than simply remaining one step ahead of adversaries. This strategy has produced a range of countermoves from Beijing, including design-out and design-around efforts. Both have the potential to severely impact the U.S. chip ecosystem in the long term. This paper has focused on advanced packaging, which offers China’s semiconductor industry a rare opportunity to leverage preexisting advantages in a supply chain segment to avoid using U.S. and allies’ chipmaking technologies and leapfrog ahead in innovation.</p> +<p>Imec has proposed further partnerships with U.S. research organizations and companies to advance the competitiveness and self-sufficiency of semiconductor production in the two regions. Along with partners, imec has expressed its willingness to help CHIPS Act entities ramp up U.S. semiconductor programs. As CEO Van den hove has pointed out, the center is well-positioned to expand upon its ties with major U.S. chipmaking firms by providing access to its expertise, IP, and other complementary operational capabilities. Imec also hopes to work with the newly established U.S. National Semiconductor Technology Center on earlier-stage technology research that may take seven to ten years before going to market and has proposed assigning imec engineers to the Albany NanoTech Complex.</p> -<p>New export controls focused on advanced packaging technologies, which have reportedly been under consideration, would likely do little to solve this issue due to the previously mentioned challenges of lower industry barriers to entry than chipmaking equipment, a widely distributed global supply chain, and the extent of existing Chinese facilities and know-how. In fact, controls would potentially hurt U.S. industry players seeking to grow in advanced packaging more than they would hobble Chinese competitors. The most effective direct U.S. responses to Chinese packaging advancements therefore likely lie in the “promote” side of economic security rather than “protect.”</p> +<h4 id="europes-prevail-consortium">Europe’s PREVAIL Consortium</h4> -<p>While the low margins and labor intensity of packaging traditionally made U.S. investment unattractive, these factors are evolving as the value added by advanced packaging increases and plant automation expands. A promising government effort to drive U.S. packaging growth is the National Advanced Packaging Manufacturing Program (NAPMP), a National Institute of Standards and Technology initiative under the CHIPS Act that will invest $1.6 billion in funding innovation across five packaging R&amp;D areas, including chiplets. Another CSIS paper outlines potential strategies to further boost these efforts, including permitting process changes to develop manufacturing sites, workforce development initiatives, and further public-private partnerships. While increased onshoring of packaging technologies will likely not lead to the United States controlling key chokepoints in the packaging space, it can mitigate the risk of domestic and allied firms being supplanted by superior Chinese packaging technologies. This would also prevent Chinese firms locking in future packaging leadership by leading the global setting of protocol and technology standards in advanced packaging, which will likely shape advanced packaging technology adoption.</p> +<p>In late 2022, Europe’s four leading public research organizations — imec, France’s CEA-Leti, Germany’s Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, and Finland’s Technical Research Center (VTT) — established a consortium to coordinate their respective 300 mm research facilities to design, evaluate, test, and fabricate the advanced chips needed to enable artificial intelligence.</p> -<p>China’s primary goals — and its already-realized achievements — in advanced packaging are designing around U.S. controls on advanced chips and associated manufacturing equipment. Investments in areas like chiplets may soon enable a range of Chinese electronics systems with processing, power, and cost capabilities that were once only possible using leading-edge lithography tools and inputs — technologies developed and largely controlled by the United States and its allies. The United States, itself not a key leader in packaging, has been unable to meaningfully slow China’s rise in the sector.</p> +<p>The consortium, the Partnership for Realization and Validation of AI-hardware Leadership (PREVAIL), will initially operate for 42 months and has a budget of 156 million euros — half of which is coming from the European Union and half from the host governments of the four organizations involved. Most of this budget (86 percent) is allocated to capital outlays, and only 6 percent funds the manufacture of demonstration circuits. By February 2024, the consortium announced it was finishing up installing cleanroom tools and was almost ready to design and test prototypes from across Europe. The aim is for the consortium to open up their new, shared pilot lines to smaller chipmakers, start-ups, and research institutions by May 2026, allowing them to manufacture, assemble, and test AI-embedded devices.</p> -<p>A potential policy shift on a broader level would be to return to the sliding scale approach to semiconductor export controls. This approach disincentivized countries of concern to invest tremendous amounts of time and money into their own capabilities in attempts to surpass the United States and its allies. Sliding scale strategies kept adversaries behind by letting them consistently access new capabilities — albeit capabilities one or two generations behind the United States. The new U.S. “hard ceiling” approach to export controls incentivizes affected countries and companies to innovate away from their dependencies on U.S. and allied inputs. To be fair, the shift is not quite so clear cut for China. The country has long sought to become more technologically independent — even before the U.S. and its allies tightened their economic security rules. The hard ceiling imposed by export controls over the last two years, however, undeniably brought Chinese efforts to a new scale.</p> +<h4 id="imec-research-center-in-spain">Imec Research Center in Spain</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The new U.S. “hard ceiling” approach to export controls incentivizes affected countries and companies to innovate away from their dependencies on U.S. and allied inputs.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>In March 2024, imec, the Spanish government, and the regional government of Andalusia signed an MoU to establish a public-private partnership to establish a 300 mm R&amp;D facility in Málaga called Fab 5. Imec will manage operations, provide the necessary technology and operations, and grant access to its global partner network. The two government parties have agreed to finance the construction of Fab 5, including equipment for a pilot line, and will provide additional long-term support for its operation. However, as the parties are reportedly still negotiating on the level of public support, there is no timetable or budget available yet. Complementing the existing imec fab in Leuven, which is focusing on CMOS and sub-1 nm fabrication, the Málaga fab will concentrate on “process developments and the introduction of materials that are difficult to combine with standard CMOS processes,” as well as R&amp;D of devices with applications to healthcare, photonics, sensing, and augmented and virtual reality.</p> -<p>A move back to the old sliding scale approach may not be politically feasible, however — and more importantly, it likely would not reverse the damage done to U.S. industry interests. The most notable impact of the current export controls is not China’s newfound homegrown capabilities in advanced packaging. Rather, it is the shift in the Chinese industry and government mindset that foreign inputs — particularly U.S. inputs — are no longer reliable because their supply is not secure. The growing U.S. conflation of economic and national security means that leading-edge critical goods are always liable to be controlled, making them less attractive to Chinese buyers. De-controlling items related to CETs to adjust policy gaps may, therefore, be too little, too late in terms of reversing Chinese design-out and design-around efforts.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>This idea that “the ship has sailed” should not be used either as a reason to surrender to Chinese ambitions or as an excuse to expand controls on mature and foundational technologies, such as legacy chips, packaging, or any semiconductor technology with substantial foreign capacity. Such controls would strangle domestic industry, overwhelm BIS capabilities, and exacerbate the Chinese mindset shift related to CETs. Alternative strategies to reduce impacts on U.S. businesses will be discussed in greater detail in a report on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and include greater multilateralization of semiconductor export controls, which may require a narrower focus on certain “chokepoint” technologies and the exclusion of areas such as memory chips.</p> +<p>As one of the world’s premier cooperative research institutions, imec has made remarkable contributions to today’s semiconductor ecosystem. These contributions are reflected most clearly in the continued active participation of major chip manufacturers, system companies, and equipment, materials, and design software suppliers in imec programs, as well as the sustained support of the Flanders regional authorities. In addition to its outstanding research facilities and staff, the flexibility of the imec structure — allowing for different degrees of cooperation — and the independence of its leadership have made it a central node in the global semiconductor supply chain. Critically, the center is a major source of the next-generation manufacturing technologies needed to keep the Western chip industry continuing along its rapid trajectory, with all the economic and social benefits that entails.</p> -<p>At the same time, policymakers can redouble efforts to make up for the inevitable losses the U.S. industry will be facing due to design-out and design-around, such as how China’s development of advanced packaging may lead to reduced purchases of U.S. capital equipment and chips. These efforts should include, for instance, greater cooperation between the United States and its partners and allies to coordinate state-led investments as well as efforts such as manufacturing expansions and joint R&amp;D projects. These efforts could also include a more ambitious trade policy to ensure that U.S. firms have access to more customers globally, which could help offset lost commercial opportunities within China.</p> +<p>For the United States, expanded collaboration with imec is an opportunity to accelerate the progress of U.S. semiconductor research programs, strengthen the transatlantic alliance, and minimize needlessly duplicative, costly investments in semiconductor research programs and infrastructure.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Jack Whitney</strong> is a former research intern with the CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business and a strategy consultant in EY-Parthenon’s Government &amp; Public Sector. At EY-Parthenon, his work focuses on helping federal government clients understand U.S.-China technology competition, identify vulnerabilities in U.S. critical industry supply chains, and design public-private financing partnerships.</p> +<p><strong>Sujai Shivakumar</strong> directs the Renewing American Innovation (RAI) program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he also serves as a senior fellow. Dr. Shivakumar brings over two decades of experience in policy studies related to U.S. competitiveness and innovation.</p> -<p><strong>Matthew Schleich</strong> is a former research assistant with the CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business. He currently works as a foreign affairs officer in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation.</p> +<p><strong>Charles Wessner</strong> is currently an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, where he teaches global innovation policy. He is active as a speaker, researcher, and writer with a global lens on innovation policy and frequently advises technology agencies, universities, and governments on effective innovation policies.</p> -<p><strong>William Alan Reinsch</strong> holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS. He is also an adjunct assistant professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, teaching a course in trade policy and politics.</p>Jack Whitney, et al.U.S. policymakers are increasingly leveraging export controls on advanced semiconductors and related technologies to constrain China’s development of military and dual-use capabilities.Japan’s New Security2024-10-04T12:00:00+08:002024-10-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/japans-new-security<p><em>Taking over as Japan’s new prime minister after narrowly winning the Liberal Democratic Party leadership, Shigeru Ishiba’s approach to foreign and security policy is likely to include several strategic adjustments.</em></p> +<p><strong>Thomas Howell</strong> is an international trade attorney (currently in solo practice) serving as a consultant to CSIS Renewing American Innovation. During the course of his 40-plus year legal career, he has represented U.S.-based semiconductor companies and organizations in matters such as the U.S.-Japan trade disputes and litigation of the 1980s, the formation of Sematech in 1986–87, trade disputes with China (including the first WTO dispute settlement challenge to that country in 2003), and numerous other public policy initiatives.</p>Sujai Shivakumar, et al.Imec attracts and retains leading companies to cooperatively develop cutting-edge semiconductor technologies in a fiercely competitive and unforgiving industry. It is an opportunity for the United States National Semiconductor Technology Center and its nonprofit purpose-built operator, Natcast to learn from and collaborate with imec to accelerate the U.S. research and industry.China’s Nuke Worrying Europe2024-10-08T12:00:00+08:002024-10-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/chinas-nuke-shadow-to-europe<p><em>China’s nuclear expansion challenges European security by complicating NATO’s deterrence posture, raising concerns about extended deterrence and necessitating a strategic recalibration by NATO nuclear powers.</em></p> <excerpt /> -<p>Shigeru Ishiba has succeeded in his long-standing ambition of leading Japan, becoming the new prime minister after winning the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership following five attempts. The 67-year-old narrowly beat conservative rival Sanae Takaichi in a tightly contested race of nine candidates. Winning by just 21 votes, Ishiba’s victory signals a shift in Japanese politics, ushering in a new era.</p> - -<h3 id="the-road-to-victory-a-narrow-margin">The Road to Victory: A Narrow Margin</h3> - -<p>The LDP leadership election was a fierce contest between Ishiba, Takaichi and Shinjiro Koizumi. In the first round, Takaichi led the vote, with Ishiba close behind. It was the runoff, however, combining 367 parliamentary and 47 prefectural votes (totalling 414), that tipped the scales in Ishiba’s favour. Ishiba secured 215 votes to Takaichi’s 194, thanks largely to support from the faction of former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. While Takaichi appealed to the conservative base, her hardline stance worried many who thought it could hurt the LDP in the general election and strain relations with neighbouring countries. These concerns led to the perception that her leadership might complicate diplomacy, which played in Ishiba’s favour.</p> - -<p>Ishiba has spent decades at the centre of Japanese politics, holding key positions including Minister of Defence; Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; and Minister for Regional Revitalisation. Known for his deep understanding of security and agricultural issues and his pragmatic leadership, Ishiba is regarded as a steady hand in times of uncertainty. One notable proposal is to establish a Ministry of Disaster Prevention and introduce nuclear shelters nationwide, reflecting his focus on enhancing national resilience against natural disasters and geopolitical threats.</p> +<p>Many observers of European security still assume that China’s nuclear arsenal build-up does not threaten European interests. Yet as China moves away from a minimalist nuclear force posture, the US must necessarily recalibrate its own strategy and posture. This has a grave bearing on NATO’s deterrence construct, in which nearly all European allies depend on US nuclear weapons to provide for their fundamental security needs. China’s nuclear expansion thus adds urgency to the need to adapt NATO’s nuclear posture to the post-2022 environment.</p> -<p>Despite his experience, Ishiba faces major challenges within the LDP. Unlike some of his predecessors, he does not command a strong faction in the party. Hence, his success will largely depend on uniting the various LDP factions.</p> +<p>China’s emergence as the second nuclear peer competitor of the US cannot help but impact European security in three ways. Firstly, it raises new questions for all three NATO nuclear powers as far as their nuclear strategy and posture are concerned. Washington, London and Paris face the question of whether their legacy posture remains fit for purpose in the future. If not, they will probably recalibrate their posture accordingly. Secondly, the emergence of nuclear multipolarity complicates deterrence decision-making and signalling. This may well translate into an erosion of the confidence allies have in extended deterrence. Thirdly, China’s growing arsenal puts renewed emphasis on theatre-level (as opposed to strategic-level) nuclear deterrence. As such, developments in the Indo-Pacific region amplify the need to reinvigorate NATO’s theatre-level deterrence.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Ishiba’s track record suggests a willingness to take a more assertive stance on key issues while fostering greater multilateral cooperation</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Instead of thinking about China’s nuclear arsenal as something that hardly affects European security, nuclear deterrence dynamics in Europe and the Indo-Pacific must be analysed together. With concerns about potential US abandonment already high in Europe due to the looming spectre of a second Trump presidency, China’s nuclear shadow can no longer be ignored by European capitals.</p> -<p>He appears to have skilfully managed his relationship with the influential Aso faction, once seen as an obstacle. To strengthen party cohesion, Ishiba appointed former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga as the LDP’s vice president and Taro Aso as the party’s supreme advisor. By including several Aso faction members in key Cabinet positions, he has smoothed over potential friction. These strategic appointments have reassured international policymakers about the stability and continuity of Japan’s leadership.</p> +<h3 id="the-challenges-to-natos-strategic-deterrence">The Challenges to NATO’s Strategic Deterrence</h3> -<h3 id="foreign-policy-outlook-continuity-and-pragmatism">Foreign Policy Outlook: Continuity and Pragmatism</h3> +<p>China’s emergence as a nuclear superpower poses a challenge to the strategic nuclear forces that are the supreme guarantee of the security of all NATO allies. The construction of hundreds of new Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile silos, the ongoing switch to solid propellants, and the exercises of the People’s Liberation Army suggest that China is moving to a launch-on-warning posture akin to those maintained by Russia and the US. By the end of this decade, the Chinese arsenal is expected to grow beyond 1,000 operational nuclear warheads.</p> -<p>Despite the change in leadership, the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” initiative will continue to serve as the guiding framework. Yet Ishiba’s approach to foreign policy is likely to include several strategic adjustments. His track record suggests a willingness to take a more assertive stance on key issues while fostering greater multilateral cooperation. A key test will be managing Japan’s delicate relationships with China, South Korea and the US.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China’s posturing in its neighbourhood cannot help but impact extended deterrence in the NATO context because the US arsenal forms the backbone of the US-led alliance system worldwide</code></em></strong></p> -<p>China: Ishiba’s firm stance on China is evident in his calls to remove Chinese buoys around the disputed Senkaku Islands, signalling a tough approach to territorial disputes. His August visit to Taiwan, where he met President Lai Ching-te and other senior ministers, underlined his concern over regional security amid rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait. While his support for Taiwan has drawn criticism from Beijing, Ishiba recognises the need to balance deterrence with diplomacy, as economic ties with China remain vital.</p> +<p>This raises different questions for NATO’s nuclear powers. Washington is already embroiled in an intense debate over the need to augment its nuclear modernisation plans. In turn, London and Paris face the question of whether their arsenals, which historically have been designed with the ability to strike Moscow as the benchmark, retain sufficient deterrence value under nuclear multipolarity. Even if the French and British targeting strategies do not depend on numerical parity, major changes to the balance in strategic nuclear weapons mean that London and Paris must re-evaluate the technical adequacy of their existing posture.</p> -<p>South Korea: Perhaps the country most relieved by Ishiba’s victory is South Korea. Had Takaichi become prime minister, relations might have worsened due to her hawkish stance, whereas Ishiba holds moderate views on historical issues, reducing the likelihood of friction over past disputes. His approach offers an opportunity to improve bilateral relations and strengthen cooperation on shared security concerns, such as North Korea.</p> +<p>Washington has become quite familiar with the two nuclear peer problem. Early in 2023, a study group convened by the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory analysed the implications of China’s emergence as a second nuclear peer in great detail. The final report of the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission recommended significant changes to US nuclear deterrence in order to be capable of simultaneously deterring Moscow and Beijing. If the US government stays committed to its existing nuclear strategy of holding the adversary arsenal at risk, China’s nuclear breakout will necessitate growing the size and adapting the composition of the US arsenal.</p> -<p>The US: Strengthening the Japan–US alliance while advocating for a more equal partnership is a priority for Ishiba. He has called for a review of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to pursue joint management of US military bases in Japan, enhancing sovereignty over these facilities. Additionally, he proposes establishing training bases for the Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces (SDF) on US soil. Japan lacks sufficient space for full-scale training; utilising the US’s vastness would enhance the SDF’s proficiency. Ishiba suggests this arrangement would elevate mutual trust and grant Japan greater operational control. These measures aim to put the alliance on a more equal footing.</p> +<p>Yet China’s growing nuclear arsenal also begs the question of whether France and the UK as separate centres of nuclear decision-making will respond with posture changes of their own. Against the background of the Ukraine war, both Paris and London have embraced wholescale nuclear modernisation, as explained by the French 2022 National Strategic Review and the UK’s Integrated Review Refresh of 2023. Will Paris and London remain satisfied with the deterrence value of their existing ability to exact vengeance in the event of an all-out conflict involving two opposing nuclear superpowers? Under such a scenario, a larger part of the US arsenal will be reserved for targets in the Indo-Pacific theatre instead of the European theatre. Whether London and Paris will step into the deterrence gap that would result from fewer US nuclear weapons being available for striking Russian targets remains to be seen. Yet growing doubts over what London and Paris consider “strict sufficiency” may prompt changes to French and British stockpiles, plans and capabilities. Even if Paris and London would struggle to fully replace US-provided extended deterrence, they could mitigate their relative vulnerability to nuclear coercion by expanding their range of retaliatory options.</p> -<p>However, revising SOFA would affect other US allies and require US Congress approval, making it complex regardless of the next US administration. Historically, SOFA issues have been addressed through operational changes or supplementary provisions rather than formal revisions. Ishiba’s proposals may require delicate negotiations to align with US policies and address domestic sensitivities. However, his initiatives could reshape the alliance’s dynamics, promoting shared responsibilities and deeper military integration.</p> +<p>The UK Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper released in March 2024 highlights China’s expanding numbers of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. Not only does it emphatically declare the nuclear deterrent to the defence of NATO, but it also speaks repeatedly about potential adversaries in the plural. One way in which the UK could step up is by reintroducing a second nuclear delivery system. Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron has emphasised that nuclear deterrence is at the heart of French defence strategy and an element to be reckoned with in the defence of the European continent. After having declared US–China competition to be “an established strategic fact which … from now on will structure, all international relations”, Macron’s nuclear overtures presumably speak to the doubts some may have about US extended deterrence commitments.</p> -<h3 id="rethinking-regional-security-beyond-asian-nato">Rethinking Regional Security: Beyond “Asian NATO”</h3> +<h3 id="complicating-deterrence-decision-making-and-signalling">Complicating Deterrence Decision-Making and Signalling</h3> -<p>One of Ishiba’s more ambitious policies is creating an “Asian NATO”. He believes frameworks like the Japan–US alliance, the US–South Korea alliance and the ANZUS Treaty can be organically combined. While this concept seeks to integrate existing alliances, it faces significant challenges because Asia’s geopolitical landscape differs vastly from Europe’s, where NATO has been successful. The diversity of strategic interests and conflicting security priorities among Asian countries makes establishing a NATO-like collective defence system difficult. This will be compounded if Ishiba conflates “collective defence” – mutual defence against aggression – with “collective security”, a broader framework not targeting specific adversaries. Such distinctions, together with historical barriers, make the realisation of his vision unlikely.</p> +<p>Discussions about nuclear posture adaptation reverberate strongly in the Nuclear Planning Group, the senior NATO body on nuclear matters. During the Cold War, such discussions had one single adversary as their referent. The logic of deterrence had a quasi-dyadic character. Yet today, China’s nuclear rise is vastly complicating deterrence signalling and decision-making. The larger number of actors cannot help but rob deterrence of its earlier simplicity. This has major consequences for NATO because the emerging strategic tripolarity threatens to erode the confidence allies have in the US ability to deter different threats simultaneously.</p> -<p>Furthermore, Ishiba has suggested that revisiting Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles – particularly the principle of “not allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons” – may be necessary to strengthen Japan’s deterrence posture and participate more fully in regional security arrangements. He proposes exploring nuclear sharing with the US modelled after NATO’s nuclear policy. However, questions remain about the practicality of such an idea. The air-launched cruise missiles carried by US B-52 bombers with ranges of around 3,000 km can be effectively launched from US bases, making their deployment to Japan unnecessary. Additionally, the B-61 tactical nuclear bombs used in NATO’s sharing arrangements are designed for aerial delivery, but do not align well with Japan’s strategic environment or geography. Without specific details on the types of nuclear weapons to be introduced, Ishiba’s proposal remains speculative and raises more questions than it answers. Moreover, such a move would be highly controversial domestically and could exacerbate regional tensions, making its implementation challenging.</p> +<p>As all three NATO nuclear powers grapple with deterrence challenges emanating far away from the Euro-Atlantic area, the choices they make will be interpreted as deterrence signals by the leaderships of multiple adversaries. In turn, these may give rise to further choices in Moscow, Beijing and other capitals such as Pyongyang and Tehran. US posture changes meant to address the consequences of China’s growing arsenal may prompt Russia to take countermeasures of its own. China’s posturing in its neighbourhood cannot help but impact extended deterrence in the NATO context because the US arsenal forms the backbone of the US-led alliance system worldwide. Nuclear multipolarity could thus set unpredictable chain reactions into motion. This generates novel challenges for the Nuclear Planning Group, as NATO’s nuclear strategy can no longer be tailored to the Russian threat alone.</p> -<p>A more viable alternative may lie in enhancing the latticework of alliances and partnerships gradually emerging in the Indo-Pacific. This framework builds on existing minilateral arrangements – such as the Quad, AUKUS and the Camp David Principles – to create flexible, issue-specific partnerships. The latticework model allows for cooperation on specific security concerns, like maritime security or cyber defence, without the rigid structure of a formal military bloc.</p> +<p>This emerging nuclear multipolarity has grave consequences for strategic stability. First, the interconnectedness between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres is set to increase. Every posture change or deterrence signal in response to China’s nuclear rise will prompt multiple assessments and responses by adversaries and allies alike. This is bound to fuel uncertainty rather than predictable nuclear equilibria. Second, such uncertainty may well prompt greater caution in the heads of key leaders, resulting in a desire to differentiate between strategic deterrence (in which the homeland offers a degree of sanctuary) and theatre-level deterrence (in which risk tolerance must be higher for the sake of extended deterrence). As nuclear deterrence is robbed of its earlier simplicity, strategic-level nuclear forces lose part of their value as instruments for providing extended deterrence.</p> -<p>Despite these challenges, there are reasons to believe that Japan’s security policy will move in a stable direction. Ishiba has appointed key figures with substantial expertise in defence and security, including the new foreign minister, defence minister and Special Advisor for National Security, all of whom possess a strong understanding of defence issues. This knowledgeable leadership at the helm of Japan’s defence policy provides reassurance that the country will pursue a pragmatic and stable approach as it navigates complex geopolitical dynamics.</p> +<h3 id="a-renewed-focus-on-theatre-level-nuclear-deterrence">A Renewed Focus on Theatre-level Nuclear Deterrence</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As global dynamics evolve, Ishiba’s leadership presents an opportunity for Japan to redefine its international role, embracing traditional values while strategically adapting to new realities</code></em></strong></p> +<p>China’s nuclear expansion features the development of a theatre-level nuclear arsenal. This concerns foremost the Dong Feng-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile with a reported range of 4,000 km and a high degree of precision, characterised by the US Department of Defense as “the most likely weapon system to field low-yield warheads”. Another example is the introduction of the H-6N bomber, capable of delivering air-launched nuclear cruise missiles. These developments indicate that China has grasped the coercive value that theatre-level nuclear weapons can provide in a regional conflict.</p> -<p>Both Ishiba’s nuclear sharing proposal and his idea for an “Asian NATO” appear to be aimed largely at a domestic audience. While these bold proposals resonate with national security concerns in Japan, they are unlikely to be pushed aggressively on the international stage. In a recent interview, Ishiba acknowledged the need for careful pre-coordination with allies like the US before raising such issues at high-level meetings, signalling a pragmatic understanding of the complexities involved.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In response to the combined nuclear threats from Russia and China, NATO’s nuclear posture will need to become more robust, more survivable and more diversified than it is today</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="conclusion-navigating-japans-future-amid-global-uncertainties">Conclusion: Navigating Japan’s Future Amid Global Uncertainties</h3> +<p>Theatre-level nuclear weapons generate strike options that differentiate between a geographically limited regional war and a full-blown strategic nuclear exchange. By trying to create and exploit a gap between the US and its allies in terms of their relative vulnerability in a conflict, such systems allow China to leverage any theatre-level conventional superiority as well as to threaten nuclear escalation to stave off conventional defeat. In the NATO community, such a vocabulary is well-known in the context of Russian nuclear sabre-rattling. This now risks being repeated by a second adversary that is much stronger in conventional terms. With China acquiring a large, diversified and fully survivable nuclear arsenal, extended deterrence relationships in the Indo-Pacific region will require theatre-level nuclear weapons just as much as NATO needed them in the Cold War.</p> -<p>Ishiba’s ascent to prime minister marks a pivotal moment for Japan, potentially reshaping domestic governance and security policy. With 38 years of political experience and deep expertise in the defence arena, he is well-prepared to address the country’s complex challenges amid an uncertain global landscape.</p> +<p>While this is particularly troubling for Indo-Pacific allies, the implications for NATO allies are equally hard to overstate. Firstly, these developments reverse the post-Cold War trend of deprioritising theatre-level nuclear weapons that many policymakers in European capitals still take for granted. Secondly, as nuclear multipolarity increases the risk of miscalculation, the extended deterrence value of strategic arsenals is set to diminish unless this devaluation is offset by an increase of theatre-level systems. Extended deterrence guarantees embodied by non-strategic weapons deployed in theatre are much stronger than the promise of strategic nuclear weapon employment that allies have no say over. Thirdly, as both Russia and China field larger numbers of theatre-level nuclear systems, severe stress is being put on the US arsenal of theatre-level weapons due to competing demands. Given the limited number of available B-61 bombs, the emerging requirements in the Indo-Pacific may call the cross-theatre distribution of theatre-level weapons into question. Moreover, the risk of overstretch associated with simultaneous regional crises pertains to all sorts of deterrence capabilities, not just nuclear ones. US Air Force bombers, for instance, constitute critical assets for suppressing enemy air defences and enabling nuclear operations in both the European and Indo-Pacific theatres.</p> -<p>Ishiba’s success hinges on balancing continuity with innovation. While ambitious proposals like an “Asian NATO” and nuclear sharing attract attention, their practicality is limited by Indo-Pacific geopolitical realities. Focusing on enhancing existing alliances and cultivating flexible partnerships may offer a more sustainable path, strengthening Japan’s security posture without the complications of rigid alliances.</p> +<h3 id="take-aways-for-nato-nuclear-posture-adaptation">Take-aways for NATO Nuclear Posture Adaptation</h3> -<p>Domestically, unifying the LDP is crucial. By incorporating diverse viewpoints and fostering collaboration between factions, Ishiba can build a cohesive government capable of effective policy implementation.</p> +<p>After the Nuclear Planning Group consultations in June 2023, then NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg explained that “we continue to adapt our nuclear deterrence to the changing security environment”. While this comment related to the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, it is not hard to see that nuclear developments in the Indo-Pacific will intensify the debate on NATO nuclear posture adaptation. NATO’s legacy posture – relying on small numbers of dual-capable aircraft delivering gravity bombs – is already no longer fit for purpose when taking Russia’s nuclear intimidation into account. While the introduction of the F-35A will offer a boost to NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements, NATO remains at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the wide array of non-strategic nuclear options fielded by Russia.</p> -<p>Ultimately, his tenure will be defined internationally by his ability to balance assertiveness with diplomacy. Steering Japan through internal challenges and external pressures will determine the country’s role in promoting stability and security in the Indo-Pacific. As global dynamics evolve, Ishiba’s leadership presents an opportunity for Japan to redefine its international role, embracing traditional values while strategically adapting to new realities.</p> +<p>As China’s growing arsenal results in a greater emphasis on theatre-level nuclear capabilities, developments in the Indo-Pacific will exacerbate existing shortfalls. In response to the combined nuclear threats from Russia and China, NATO’s nuclear posture will need to become more robust, more survivable and more diversified than it is today. At the Vilnius Summit, NATO leaders called for “updating planning to increase flexibility and adaptability of the Alliance’s nuclear forces”. This relates to the numbers of dual-capable aircraft, the associated network of air bases, and the European air forces flying nuclear deterrence as well as conventional support missions. The need for a second theatre-level weapon system – offering greater stand-off capability and survivability – is already apparent in the light of the Russian threat alone. Yet China’s nuclear expansion does contribute to the growing urgency thereof, precisely because so many of the key capabilities needed for shoring up extended deterrence in the European and Indo-Pacific theatres are in such short supply.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Daisuke Kawai</strong> is a Project Assistant Professor and the Deputy Director of the Economic Security Programme at RCAST, The University of Tokyo. He also serves as an Asia Fellow at the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), and Senior Advisor for Quad Strategic Planning to the Quad Investors Network (QUIN).</p>Daisuke KawaiTaking over as Japan’s new prime minister after narrowly winning the Liberal Democratic Party leadership, Shigeru Ishiba’s approach to foreign and security policy is likely to include several strategic adjustments. \ No newline at end of file +<p><strong>Alexander Mattelaer</strong> is an Associate Professor in International Security at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Brussels School of Governance and a Senior Research Fellow at Egmont – the Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations.</p>Alexander MattelaerChina’s nuclear expansion challenges European security by complicating NATO’s deterrence posture, raising concerns about extended deterrence and necessitating a strategic recalibration by NATO nuclear powers. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/hkers/2024-11-18-project-atom-2024.html b/hkers/2024-11-18-project-atom-2024.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d9b65846 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-11-18-project-atom-2024.html @@ -0,0 +1,1098 @@ + + + + + + + + + + Project Atom 2024 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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Project Atom 2024

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Intra-War Deterrence in a Two-Peer Environment

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Heather Williams, et al. | 2024.11.18

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There is a growing risk that U.S. adversaries might resort to nuclear use in a regional conflict. To help address for this threat, the Project on Nuclear Issues invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for responding to strategic deterrence failure.

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Introduction

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Heather Williams, Reja Younis, and Lachlan MacKenzie

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There is a growing risk that the United States and its allies could face scenarios in which one or more adversaries might resort to nuclear weapons use in a regional conflict. This risk is especially evident in Russian strategic theory and doctrine, which envisions regional deterrence as complementing global deterrence. Some Russian military experts see the potential use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons for “de-escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions favorable to the Russian Federation,” or “a demonstration to the enemy of resolve to defend [Russia’s] interests by escalating the use of nuclear weapons (tactical) and forcing him to forego further aggression by the threat of use of strategic nuclear weapons.” Statements by North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un indicate that the country’s nuclear arsenal is also intended for deterrence in a regional conflict, such as a potential decapitation strike. Moreover, China has been rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal for both military reasons and to gain geopolitical leverage, as argued by Tong Zhao, such as upholding its “core interests” in Taiwan.

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Due to these growing risks of regional crisis escalation with potential for nuclear use, U.S. decisionmakers are revisiting the concept of intra-war deterrence, which is about influencing enemy actions during an ongoing conflict. The risks of deterrence failure have been a focal point in the testimony of recent U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commanders, including Admiral Charles Richard, who noted in 2020 that STRATCOM conducted analysis into the risks of strategic deterrence failure, and General Anthony Cotton, who said, “We must be ready if deterrence fails” in testimony in February 2024. Intra-war deterrence operates on the premise that in an active conflict, threats can be leveraged to shape an adversary’s actions and set boundaries on the intensity and nature of military engagement. This concept underpinned much Cold War strategic thinking. One fundamental challenge of intra-war deterrence is how to balance deterrence objectives with war-fighting objectives. As W. Andrew Terrill writes regarding the mismatch of these objectives, “a state pursuing such [an intra-war] policy is waging war against another nation while seeking to prevent its opponent from responding with all of the weapons that it possesses. Such a task is . . . challenging since both sides usually seek to use as much of their capabilities as possible to optimize their chances of victory.”

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To assist in this thinking and to develop actionable insights for the U.S. policy and strategy communities, the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for responding to strategic deterrence failure. This study revives a concept and approach that the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) developed a decade ago to review U.S. nuclear strategy and posture for 2025–2050. The project’s current contributors were each asked to respond to a scenario involving near-simultaneous battlefield nuclear use by Russia and China. The strategies focused on four specific themes: strategic objectives, assurance to allies, military responses, and non-kinetic responses. The strategies demonstrate agreement on key issues, such as the importance of deterring conventional aggression and the relevance of non-kinetic responses to adversary nuclear use. But the strategies also highlight important areas of disagreement about the relative importance and feasibility of assuring allies, at least relative to other strategic objectives; the advisability of a nuclear versus conventional response to deterrence failure; and what “winning” in a strategic deterrence failure scenario would look like. While many people may disagree with these positions, PONI welcomes a diverse range of views, which can help foster a robust debate. CSIS does not take an institutional view, and the views presented here are those of the individual contributors.

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After providing an overview of the authors’ competing strategies, this chapter presents the project’s guiding assumptions and analytic framework. This introductory analysis then distills three principles for intra-war deterrence: establishing (or maintaining) regional deterrence, restoring assurance, and planning precrisis for intra-war deterrence. These principles capture areas of consensus among the strategies while also engaging with areas of disagreement in order to identify which policy options are best suited for the current strategic environment.

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Competing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence

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As a foundation for Project Atom’s analysis, PONI provided the authors a scenario that features concurrent nuclear aggression from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. The scenario, set in 2027, is predicated on the following assumptions:

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    Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin remain the leaders of the PRC and Russia, respectively.

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    The PRC and Russia have not relinquished their territorial claims — that is, the PRC continues to pursue “reunification” with Taiwan, and Russia maintains its claims on annexed Ukrainian territory.

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    The war in Ukraine continues as a stalemate. Western aid for Ukraine continues.

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    Western sanctions damage the Russian economy and drive continued economic cooperation between Russia and the PRC.

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    Russia manages to partially rebuild its conventional military despite low GDP growth, related financial challenges, and ongoing fighting.

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    PRC GDP growth stabilizes between 3 and 4 percent, compared to the United States’ approximately 2 percent. The two economies remain deeply intertwined.

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    The United States and its allies proceed with their planned defense modernization and preparedness efforts. The United States forward deploys additional forces to Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

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By March 2027 in this scenario, Taiwan’s domestic political landscape has shifted decisively against reunification. In response to pro-independence statements from Taiwanese presidential candidates, PRC officials begin to publicly discuss using military force to achieve reunification. In the ensuing weeks, the U.S. intelligence community observes the beginnings of a PRC military buildup in Fujian Province.

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Around the same time as this buildup, Xi and Putin host a summit at which Putin voices support for the PRC’s position on Taiwan. The two leaders announce joint naval drills in the Pacific to coincide with Russian conventional and nuclear exercises near Russia’s Western borders in mid-May.

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In preparation for what they consider an imminent threat, the United States and its allies signal that “wars of conquest will be punished” and bolster their defensive postures through expanded forward deployments and elevated readiness levels in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. In the weeks preceding the joint PRC-Russian exercise, a Ukrainian offensive makes significant gains and threatens Russian control of Crimea.

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On May 14, the joint PRC-Russian naval exercise begins in the Western Pacific. The following day, the PRC begins missile strikes on Taiwan in preparation for a full-scale invasion. On May 16, Russia conducts conventional missile strikes against Polish transportation infrastructure. Xi and Putin release statements justifying their own actions and supporting the other’s.

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NATO promptly invokes Article 5, and the United States and its allies begin highly successful conventional campaigns against the PRC and Russia. In the Indo-Pacific, U.S. and allied forces interdict PRC landing craft before they reach Taiwan. Heavy People’s Liberation Army (PLA) casualties prompt limited anti-mobilization protests across China. In Europe, Polish and Lithuanian forces push into Kaliningrad Oblast and threaten to seize Kaliningrad City. NATO states begin to deploy forces to Ukraine, while Ukrainian forces advance with NATO assistance and prepare for an invasion of Crimea.

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On June 2, Russia strikes Polish transportation infrastructure and NATO forces threatening Kaliningrad with low-yield (< 10 kt) nuclear weapons, inflicting approximately 1,000 casualties (including some Americans). Putin warns NATO of “total annihilation” if it does not cease its “aggression.” On June 3, the PRC conducts a 50 kt nuclear strike on a U.S. naval base in the Philippines, resulting in 15,000 casualties. Xi Jinping warns that “Anyone aiding the splitists in Taiwan . . . will face the wrath of a people determined to rejuvenate their nation at any cost.”

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Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence

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The PONI team provided experts with four framing assumptions and respective guiding questions as an analytical framework, which are discussed later in this introduction. This report contains five chapters, each of which constitutes a distinct strategy for intra-war deterrence. A comparison of the strategies across the analytical framework is provided in Tables 1–4; discussion of the framing assumptions then follows.

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image01 +▲ Table 1: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — U.S. Strategic Objectives

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image02 +▲ Table 2: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — Assuring Allies

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image03 +▲ Table 3: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — Military Response Options

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image04 +▲ Table 4: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — Non-Kinetic Response Options

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Framing Assumptions

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U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

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Assumption #1: In the event that strategic deterrence fails and an adversary has used a single or multiple nuclear weapons, the United States will be forced to confront competing priorities to uphold security commitments to allies, manage further escalation, and resolve the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. The adversaries may assume they have more at stake in a regional crisis than the United States and thereby question U.S. resolve. This raises the following questions with regard to U.S. strategic objectives in the event of strategic deterrence failure:

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    In what ways, if any, did the United States fail to demonstrate resolve and commitment to its strategic objectives in the lead-up to nuclear use? Why did deterrence fail? Could anything have been done to prevent strategic deterrence failure?

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    What are the United States’ core objectives in this scenario, and how should the United States prioritize its strategic objectives? Is one area of operations more important than another in this scenario?

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    What does “winning” look like? How would the United States know if deterrence has been “restored”?

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Identifying and prioritizing strategic objectives will be critical following adversary nuclear use, and this will require understanding why deterrence failed. Authors reached different conclusions on this point. Ford, on one hand, concludes that deterrence failed because of adversary perceptions about U.S. credibility that had built up over years. He argues that there may have been nothing that U.S. policymakers could have done to deter adversary aggression in the immediate run-up to the crisis. Panda, on the other hand, points to the swift defeat of adversary conventional forces as a primary driver of escalation, adding that the adversary may believe that limited nuclear use can deter the United States from further involvement. Weaver suggests that the United States may have failed to credibly signal its resolve to defend its allies and partners but acknowledges that deterrence failure may have alternatively stemmed from adversary miscalculations about their abilities to fight and win conventional conflicts against the United States and its partners.

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While the authors agree about the importance of avoiding full-scale nuclear war following deterrence failure, they disagree about the relevance and prioritization of other strategic objectives. Sisson, for example, identifies only two U.S. strategic objectives: preventing general nuclear war and preventing further nuclear detonations of any type in any location. Similarly, Panda writes that “no objective should be greater for the president of the United States than ensuring that the survival of the country is not threatened by the prospect of uncontrollable escalation into a general nuclear war.” Ford and Gibbons also both list avoiding nuclear war as the primary U.S. objective but identify a range of secondary strategic objectives, including denying the adversary battlefield victory, denying the adversary any advantage specifically from having used nuclear weaponry, and maintaining alliance relationships. Conversely, Weaver lists four strategic objectives: (1) restoring the territorial status quo ante; (2) restoring nuclear deterrence; (3) avoiding general nuclear war; and (4) denying the adversary any benefit from nuclear use.

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ASSURING ALLIES

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Assumption #2: The United States will remain committed to allies’ security and their vital national interests in the event of strategic deterrence failure. For example, if NATO Article 5 is invoked, the United States will respond. Therefore, at least one U.S. objective (from above) will be continuing to assure and demonstrate credibility and resolve to allies. Partners, however, remain in a somewhat ambiguous position in the event of direct military attacks or nuclear strikes. This raises the following questions with regard to allies and partners in the event of strategic deterrence failure:

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    What are the risks — and their likelihoods and potential consequences — of allies questioning U.S. credibility in the event of strategic deterrence failure?

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    What will be allies’ security concerns in the event of strategic deterrence failure? What role might certain allies and partners play in a response?

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    How can the United States signal resolve to allies in the event of strategic deterrence failure? How does this differ from signaling resolve to non-treaty partners?

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Based on their differing assessments about the most pressing U.S. strategic objectives, the authors disagree about the importance and feasibility of assuring allies following adversary nuclear use. Panda argues that, given that any U.S. president is likely to prioritize protecting the U.S. homeland above all, severe damage to U.S. credibility is a forgone conclusion in the event of strategic deterrence failure. He writes that the United States would face “insurmountable” assurance and credibility challenges following nuclear use and that “it is highly likely that following strategic deterrence failure, allied perceptions of the credibility of the United States would suffer drastically.” Sisson suggests that the defense of Ukraine and Taiwan should be a primary U.S. war aim but maintains that avoiding further nuclear use of any type should be the United States’ first objective.

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Ford, Gibbons, and Weaver, on the other hand, argue that assuring allies should be one of the United States’ primary strategic objectives. Ford and Gibbons both suggest that a nuclear response to deterrence failure is not necessary to reassure allies. Ford writes that the United States is not obligated to use any specific weapons in defense of its allies, as long as it does effectively defend them against aggression. He also argues that that, on the facts of the scenario, “continuing to prosecute a successful conventional campaign” and deny the adversary any benefits from nuclear weapons use “should represent an optimal answer from U.S. allies’ perspectives.” Weaver offers that the U.S. response that deters further aggression while avoiding uncontrollable escalation will be the optimal response from an allied perspective.

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MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS

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Assumption #3: The president will consider a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic response options in the event of strategic deterrence failure. Options might include the use — or explicit threatened use — of nuclear weapons, naval deployments, or boots on the ground. This raises the following questions with regard to military response options in the event of deterrence failure:

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    What would be the president’s military options in the event of strategic deterrence failure? Which of these options would you recommend to the president?

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    What are the risks associated with a military response?

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    What are the signaling objectives of military response options? How will these options contribute to conflict termination on terms favorable to the United States?

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    In the event of strategic deterrence failure, how strictly should the United States observe the law of armed conflict (i.e., principles of proportionality and discrimination)? How much should it influence the strategy?

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While the authors agree on the need for some form of military response to adversary nuclear use, their proposed responses differ significantly. Panda, Ford, and Gibbons each recommend conventional responses to adversary nuclear use. Gibbons and Panda endorse conventional strikes against the adversaries’ forces that were directly responsible for nuclear strikes against U.S. partners and allies. Though he argues that the United States needs to be prepared to use nuclear weapons if the adversaries were to use them again, Ford suggests that U.S. and allied forces should “fight through” adversary nuclear use here and continue their already successful conventional campaigns with slight changes in posture to better prepare for the possibility of further adversary nuclear use.

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Weaver is the only author to propose a nuclear response. He concludes that a conventional response would be problematic for several reasons, including that it may simply encourage adversaries to escalate further.

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Sisson proposes the most restrained response to adversary nuclear use. She suggests that, to avoid further escalation, U.S. and allied forces should cease offensive military operations and look instead to hold the line against further adversary aggression and rely on non-kinetic options.

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NON-KINETIC RESPONSE OPTIONS

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Assumption #4: The U.S. political and military leadership would consider non-kinetic response options across the diplomacy-information-military-economics (DIME) spectrum. Many of these capabilities might overlap across domains, and the authors were given discretion to decide what are military versus diplomatic, information, economic, or other non-kinetic response options. Possibilities such as economic sanctions, building international pressure, or information operations would likely be part of the U.S. response to a strategic deterrence failure. This raises the following questions with regard to non-kinetic response options in the event of deterrence failure:

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    What would be the president’s non-kinetic options in the event of strategic deterrence failure? Which of these options would you recommend to the president?

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    What are the risks associated with a non-kinetic response?

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    What are signaling objectives of non-kinetic response options? How will these options contribute to conflict termination on terms favorable to the United States?

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The authors generally agreed about the importance of non-kinetic measures in responding to adversary nuclear use. One area of commonality was the importance of non-kinetic deterrence efforts prior to nuclear use during the crisis. Most suggested some form of information warfare or targeted messaging to accompany their proposed military responses, as well as non-kinetic military measures and economic retaliation. Weaver, for example, proposes information operations to maximize international backlash to adversary nuclear use and convince the Russian and Chinese people that their governments’ actions risk large-scale nuclear war, as well as measures to impose economic costs on Russia and China. Ford, Gibbons, Sisson, and Panda each suggest cyberattacks against adversary forces, as well as economic retaliation. Moreover, Gibbons, Sisson, and Panda advocate for diplomatic messaging to the international community to build a coalition condemning Russian and Chinese nuclear use. Panda proposes intelligence declassification as a tool to counter adversaries’ information operations.

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Three Principles for Intra-War Deterrence in a Two-Peer Environment

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Based on the expert papers, the PONI team identified three broad principles for thinking about and planning for intra-war deterrence in a two-peer environment. At the outset, however, it is worth observing that intra-war deterrence is highly context dependent, and many of the recommendations of these papers might not be applicable to other intra-war deterrence scenarios, to include whether to respond with nuclear or conventional weapons and how to assure allies. The stakes will depend on the context. In the scenario provided here, what is at stake is allies’ sovereignty and security and U.S. global leadership, but these must be balanced with the stakes of escalation, which could include further humanitarian consequences depending on whether conventional or nuclear weapons are used.

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INTRA-WAR DETERRENCE REQUIRES REGIONAL DETERRENCE

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In these scenarios, America’s adversaries are acting on the belief that they have more at stake in the region than the United States. Ford describes the strategic challenge: “Both of these failures [are] likely derived from assumptions in Moscow and Beijing, not that Western leaders lacked the capacity to respond effectively, but that they lacked the will . . . . It is the primary task of intra-war deterrence here to convince them that this, too, was a misapprehension.” As demonstrated by all of the papers in this volume, the United States will need a diverse and flexible tool kit, to include regional nuclear capabilities and conceal/reveal capabilities.

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While only one of the papers calls for the United States to respond with nuclear weapons, nearly all of the authors acknowledge the importance of the United States having a breadth of nuclear response options. For Panda, this is largely tied to assuring allies because “it is highly likely that following strategic deterrence failure, allied perceptions of the credibility of the United States would suffer drastically unless Washington opted for nuclear use in kind,” although he expresses concerns with risks of escalation. For Ford, amid a conventional response, “U.S. nuclear weapon storage vaults at relevant European airfields should also be readied for potential operations, and any existing plans for weapon dispersal to additional airfields that do not involve actual DCA attack assets should be implemented.”

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These and other points make a case for the United States to improve its regional deterrence posture through increased regional capabilities and flexible options in order to prepare for a proportionate nuclear response in a limited-use scenario. U.S. policymakers should strive to diversify U.S. nuclear forces through investments in new regional capabilities so that the president will have a broader range of credible options, particularly if an adversary threatens limited nuclear attacks. The capabilities should be survivable, lower yield, and responsive and effective across a spectrum of targets. Strategic deterrence is, and should remain, the primary mission of the U.S. nuclear force, and the triad is essential to the success of that mission. These capabilities will play a deterrence function not only during a crisis but also beforehand, as argued by Weaver:

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If the effect of selecting a nonnuclear response to adversary nuclear escalation is to convince the adversary that the United States is so concerned about uncontrolled escalation that it fears responding in kind, then a U.S. nonnuclear response could actually increase the risk of eventual uncontrolled escalation. This may seem counterintuitive, but if a U.S. nonnuclear response to adversary limited nuclear use results in encouraging further adversary nuclear escalation, then the U.S. nuclear responses that may eventually be required to achieve U.S. objectives are likely to be larger in scale and more provocative in their effects. This could well make uncontrolled escalation more likely.

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Another option for re-establishing deterrence would be relying on conceal/reveal capabilities, such as demonstrating a previously unknown capability amid a crisis to inspire the adversary to exert caution. As described by Weaver, “There is a potential role here for the calculated revelation of capabilities the adversary was previously unaware of that have potentially decisive military effects (‘You didn’t tell me they could do that. What else don’t I know?’).” Conceal/reveal capabilities could also offer U.S. decisionmakers more flexibility in a crisis, as well as having a powerful deterrence impact when needed most to de-escalate a crisis.

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RESTORING DETERRENCE REQUIRES RESTORING ASSURANCE

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As multiple authors identify, a strategic deterrence failure could inspire a crisis of confidence among U.S. allies and partners. While some of the papers in this volume call for reconsidering U.S. security commitments to allies in a crisis, this would be a mistake for both short- and long-term reasons. Amid the ongoing conflict, the United States would need allies to fight through a scenario such as the one outlined in one or both theaters. While Ford argues that the Indo-Pacific theater is the more important of the two, he notes that “a Western loss in the European theater” would still be “a disaster.” For him, “[j]ust as the United States prioritized defending Europe from the Nazis in World War II without backing off against Japan in the Pacific, even if the United States must now prioritize East Asia in certain ways, it should not abandon Europe.” Ford, for example, points to the importance of European allies in leading on conventional fighting and re-establishing deterrence in one theater while the United States focuses on the Indo-Pacific. For Weaver, “If U.S. responses to initial Russian or Chinese escalation make clear that the United States is willing to engage in a competition in dire risk-taking, and that Russia and China must also fear potential uncontrolled escalation, allies are likely to be reassured in the near term.” Over the long term, alliance structures would be an essential component for any eventual peace settlement and post-conflict international order, assuming a U.S. objective is to maintain global leadership, as argued in nearly all of these papers.

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Gibbons points to an additional value of maintaining and assuring allies: they can play a crucial role in generating international condemnation aimed at deterring further nuclear use by the adversaries:

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Allies and partners have a significant role to play in the messaging following nuclear use. They must unite in loudly and publicly condemning the nuclear attacks and should do so repeatedly. They should communicate that using nuclear weapons in these scenarios was unacceptable and neither nation will gain from using these weapons. These messages are key to reestablishing the nuclear taboo following nuclear use.

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Gibbons goes on to make the case for U.S. policymakers to immediately engage the U.S. public on the importance of allies, for example. The United States could also develop an engagement plan for deepening planning and consultations with allies on potential battlefield nuclear use and opportunistic aggression scenarios. A series of mini tabletop exercises could begin familiarizing allied and U.S. government officials across the interagency, including at the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense (including combatant commands) with how deterrence works and how battlefield nuclear use might impact both conventional campaigns and deterrence dynamics.

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INTRA-WAR DETERRENCE WILL DEPEND ON PRECRISIS PLANNING AND DECISIONS

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Finally, intra-war deterrence will largely depend on precrisis decisions and planning. These comprise decisions and actions taken with adversaries, allies, domestic audiences, and wider international ones. Examples include dialogue with allies about crisis communication and decisionmaking, conceal/reveal capabilities, and establishing thresholds and threats (i.e., do not bluff). There are at least two main areas where the United States can focus on intra-war deterrence planning before a crisis begins: strategic communications, particularly with international audiences, and wargaming.

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Shaping narratives and messaging before and during crises will be essential. Such messages will need to be tailored to multiple audiences: allies (focusing on assurance), domestic audiences (focused on the importance of U.S. alliances, and in support of achieving U.S. military responses to adversarial limited nuclear use), international audiences (aimed to “make the adversary a pariah,” as Weaver argues), and adversarial domestic audiences (meant to foment a facts-based public consensus). When facing a crisis involving potential limited nuclear use, strategic communication must be multifaceted. Messages must be tailored to diverse audiences (allies, the U.S. public, the international community, adversary leadership, and their citizens) and adapted for each stage of the crisis, including preemptive communication. For example, before a crisis, messages aimed at the U.S. population should focus on the importance of alliances. As Gibbons argues, “Before any potential conflict — and frankly, right now — the U.S. government, especially the president, should aim to better educate the public about the history of U.S. alliance relationships and their benefits.” Precrisis messaging to Americans could also focus, for example, on reassuring the U.S. public about U.S. commitment to deterrence and the limited nature of any potential nuclear response.

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Precrisis engagement with international audiences (particularly the Global South and “non-aligned” states) was raised in several analyses. Gibbons writes:

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It is worth emphasizing here that improving U.S. and allied relations with states within the Global South before this notional conflict in 2027 is paramount. Though the international community broadly supported the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s attack on Ukraine, there have been fewer governments that have unilaterally condemned the attack or Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling, even among members of the Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons, a treaty that explicitly bans nuclear threats.

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A second priority for precrisis intra-war deterrence will be more wargaming. One way to address this challenge is with more wargames through all stages of escalation, as highlighted in Weaver’s paper in particular. But Sisson also writes, “Each phase of a scenario exercises the thought processes involved in aligning military operations with war aims, and war aims with strategic objectives, under conditions in which some variables that might affect the likelihood of success are foreseeable and controllable and some are not.” Variations of these aims, objectives, and conditions can be explored through wargaming or other exercising. One particular scenario that would be worth exploring is coordination among allies, which is somewhat ambiguous in the scenario used for this study. Even with additional gaming and empirical data, however, there will be limits on knowledge about what happens after nuclear use and how to re-establish strategic deterrence.

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As Weaver argues, “Detailed wargaming and simulation is needed to analyze the ways in which limited nuclear use by both sides affect the course of twenty-first-century conflict and escalation dynamics across a range of scenarios and strategic circumstances. Without such analysis, U.S. efforts to identify the range of nuclear options needed to address limited nuclear escalation will risk missing key insights.” More comprehensive wargaming of the central problem could require asking these same questions across a set of plausible scenarios that span the range of key strategic circumstances the United States might face. Examples of other scenarios that should be examined using the Project Atom 2024 methodology include

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    Conflict with Russia while deterring Chinese opportunistic aggression

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    Conflict with China while deterring Russian opportunistic aggression

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    Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is winning conventionally in one theater and losing in the other when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails

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    Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is losing conventionally in both theaters when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails

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    The full range of scenarios farther into the future when China is a nuclear peer

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It is worth acknowledging that even with additional gaming and empirical data, there will be limits on knowledge about what happens after nuclear use and how to re-establish strategic deterrence. However, analysis of additional scenarios and circumstances would likely produce new and important insights regarding the four key issues addressed in this project, to include opportunities for de-escalation and identifying off-ramps.

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There are a host of other opportunities for strengthening intra-war deterrence before a crisis begins. The United States and its allies may have to be prepared to fight and operate in a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) environment, which will require troop protection, equipment, and training. These preparations could also serve a deterrent function by demonstrating U.S. commitment to prevailing in defense of its allies, even in a CBRN environment.

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Conclusion

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To state the obvious, contemplating how to respond to nuclear weapons use and strategic deterrence failure is deeply uncomfortable. Such a scenario could involve hundreds of thousands (perhaps millions) of casualties, environmental disasters, and the potential for further damage. Indeed, Sisson’s paper starts with the assumption that any nuclear detonation could quickly escalate to civilization-threatening general nuclear war. Ideally, the international community would condemn such attacks and impose heavy costs. But the United States also needs to be prepared to restore deterrence and end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. In many of these scenarios, allies’ sovereignty is at stake.

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This report’s recommendations point to an urgent need for renewed engagement among policymakers and publics on nuclear issues. The stakes could not be higher, as it is the risk of repeated nuclear exchanges as well as the United States’ global leadership and credibility that are on the line. More regional nuclear capabilities will give U.S. planners more rungs on the escalation ladder for restoring deterrence without resorting to large-scale exchanges. They will also give the U.S. president more options in the event of a horrific scenario such as the one outlined here. A future U.S. president must be willing and able to employ nuclear weapons in response to a strategic deterrence failure scenario — and will therefore require flexible, limited options to navigate a scenario of limited nuclear use effectively. Whether a conventional or nuclear response to adversary nuclear use will be more effective in re-establishing deterrence and achieving U.S. objectives will depend on adversary motivations and the specific context of deterrence failure; while a nuclear response may be appropriate in certain scenarios, the same response could be unnecessary and escalatory in others. It is critical, however, that a U.S. president be able to employ whatever military response they determine to be most effective. The United States may therefore benefit from a more diverse nuclear force with a wider range of theater nuclear capabilities. Strategic investments in modernizing, diversifying, and enhancing the resilience of existing deterrent forces will strengthen deterrence and help avoid intra-war deterrence scenarios in the first place. By anticipating scenarios in which adversaries escalate regionally, potentially concurrently, the United States and its allies can strengthen deterrence and reduce the likelihood of adversaries exploiting perceived weaknesses. Preparing for multiple scenarios is not about seeking war but about enhancing deterrence to prevent it altogether.

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In addition to these capability considerations, U.S. decisionmakers can start laying the groundwork now for intra-war deterrence, to include increased and improved wargaming and tabletop exercises, including with allies. And U.S. military and strategic planners, along with policymakers, must immediately consider the question of how to restore assurance alongside deterrence.

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Challenges of Deterrence and Security upon Nuclear Use

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Christopher A. Ford

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The following pages respond to questions posed by the organizers of Project Atom 2024.

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U.S. Strategic Objectives

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ASSESSING DETERRENCE’S “FAILURE”

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The locus of deterrence “failure” here may lie not so much in the specific run-up to the crisis outlined in Project Atom 2024, but potentially years earlier. In this scenario, U.S. and allied leaders were stepping up their military preparedness before war broke out, and were very clear publicly that “wars of conquest will be punished.” Western posture and policy statements, in their own terms, left little basis for U.S. adversaries’ apparent conclusion either that: (a) the United States would not contest aggression in the first place; or (b) the United States could be frightened into intra-war concessions by adversaries’ use of nuclear weapons.

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Rather, irrespective of what the United States declared in the run-up to war, U.S. adversaries seem to have assumed that the United States and its allies were: averse to war in general; incapable of waging war effectively or on a sustained basis; and sufficiently afraid of nuclear escalation that Beijing and Moscow could enjoy the benefits of aggression without facing prohibitive risk. This assumption would appear to be rooted not in assessments of specific Western actions undertaken in this scenario, but rather in antecedent beliefs, accumulated over time, about fundamental weaknesses and risk-aversion in Western leadership and societies, coupled — presumably — with the conclusion that the aggressors could draw upon greater resources of martial seriousness and societal stamina in waging war, and that the stakes involved in each theater favored the nearer, “hungrier” power over the distant and more diffident United States and its weak and degenerate local friends.

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Deterrence of this aggression, in other words, arguably failed in Project Atom 2024 much the same way that deterrence of Russia’s 2022 attack on Ukraine failed not in 2021–22 but in 2014 — when Vladimir Putin, observing Western reactions to his annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbas, seems to have concluded that they would not react forcefully “next time” either. In the scenario presented here, the failure was twofold: the United States and its allies failed to deter Russia and China from undertaking wars of conventional military aggression, and then further failed in deterring them from using nuclear weapons when things on the battlefield began to go bad. Both of these failures likely derived from assumptions in Moscow and Beijing not that Western leaders lacked the capacity to respond effectively, but that they lacked the will — and hence were more tied to general and longer-term adversary assessments than to specific U.S. or allied posture and signaling failures in the run-up to the crisis.

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If so, this suggests that the efficacy of deterrence lies not only in clear military postures and public messaging, but also in an adversary’s underlying, longer-term assumptions about the character, motivation, and sociopolitical support enjoyed by those adopting such postures and sending such signals. If the adversary power has concluded that one is fundamentally timid and conflict averse — or simply unable to wage a war with resolution and commitment anyway — that adversary is less likely to be deterred by short-term precrisis signals even if they do, on their face, convey admirable resolution.

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Nevertheless, the more immediate problem for Western leaders in this situation lies not in addressing such deeper challenges but in managing escalation risks and restoring deterrence now that bullets have started flying.

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If U.S. adversaries assumed that the West’s sociopolitical weakness and fears of nuclear escalation would preclude its responding effectively to conventional aggression by a nuclear-armed great power in this scenario, of course, they were wrong. Since they also seem to have assumed that even their very limited tactical use of nuclear weaponry would scare the United States into abandoning its response to their aggression, it is the primary task of intra-war deterrence here to convince them that this, too, was a misapprehension. To the degree that the United States can do this, it has a chance not merely to manage this scenario, but also to help shape U.S. adversaries’ more general perceptions of the United States in ways that will enable maintaining deterrence once peace is restored. (After all, it is much less plausible to argue that a country will not fight you next time when it has just surprised you, this time, by demonstrating that it actually will.)

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CORE U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THIS SCENARIO

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Given the potentially existential implications, the first U.S. objective here is to avoid escalation to a full-scale nuclear exchange with either Russia or China. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from this that the best way to achieve this requires backing down, or that this is the United States’ only important objective. On the contrary, making no response to the Russian and Chinese use of nuclear weapons in this scenario — or acting in a way that would reward such use with terrified Western de-escalation and hence cede theater-level advantage (or even victory) to the aggressor or convince that aggressor that the United States was abandoning its commitments to its allies — may actually increase the risk of broader war and even a full-scale exchange sooner or later, more than would a response of judicious firmness that denies them such benefits and makes clear that the United States stands with its friends and is not entirely unwilling to turn up the heat further.

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The United States has at least two second-order, but nonetheless extremely important, objectives in this scenario. First, it has an incentive to deny Russia and China victory in these regional conflicts (even in conventional terms) and to make good on U.S. commitments to its allies, because were the United States to lose or weaken those alliances, this would open the door to untold future revisionist aggression and upend the international order upon which U.S. prosperity and that of the United States’ most important international trading and security partners depends.

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Second, the United States has an incentive to deny Russia and China not just victory in general, but also victory through the use of nuclear weapons in particular. Rewarding their attempt at nuclear coercion would presumably lead to more aggressive employment of such approaches by Russia and China in the future, hence leading to more wars and greater risks of a full-scale nuclear exchange. Rewarding such coercion and aggression, moreover — and demonstrating the inability of U.S. alliance structures to deter them — would also encourage defensive nuclear proliferation to (and perhaps future offensive nuclear-facilitated coercion by) others as well.

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PRIORITIZING THEATERS

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A more difficult question is whether, in this scenario, the United States should prioritize one theater over the other. They present different military-operational situations, with the conflict against Russia being primarily a land war and that against China emphasizing naval power projection, although both would require significant air power. For this reason, each region is likely to draw most heavily upon somewhat different mixes of U.S. military capabilities and assets. It is conceivable, therefore, that the United States might not face unmanageably stark prioritization choices.

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Nevertheless, if the United States were forced to choose between concentrating upon Europe and concentrating upon the Indo-Pacific, Washington should prioritize the latter. Even if Russia succeeds in carving out for itself some kind of neo-tsarist imperium in Eastern Europe, Moscow lacks the economic, demographic, and material resources to hold it over the medium-to-long term, especially if confronted by strong and sophisticated adversaries. An allied loss in the Polish-Lithuanian theater in this scenario would be devastating, but even then, a sufficiently alarmed, angry, and resolute Europe could likely still — even alone — present Russia with just such a set of adversaries if it really wished to. Accordingly, the odds of the entire continent falling under the Kremlin’s sway — as well as the odds of Russia maintaining a new empire over the long term — seem low.

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By contrast, the implications of a Chinese victory in the Indo-Pacific seem more systemically problematic. Such a victory would very likely lead not merely to the bankruptcy of existing U.S. alliance guarantees, resulting in the Americans’ expulsion from the region — de facto, if not necessarily de jure (or at least not at first) — but also the creation of a Sinocentric imperium in East Asia. Nor would this new authoritarian Chinese regional order likely be particularly short lived. In contrast to the declining state of Russia, and despite some recent economic headwinds and the longer-term specter of demographic decline, China would not lack the manpower, military capabilities, or economic resources necessary to dominate its new network of tributary vassals. Between the two “theater-defeat” scenarios, therefore, from the perspective of the international order and the United States’ future role therein, an Indo-Pacific loss is probably the more traumatic and irreversible.

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Nevertheless, in saying that the United States should, in extremis, prioritize the Indo-Pacific theater, this paper is not suggesting that the United States should abandon efforts to protect its European allies in the Russia scenario. Prioritizing one thing need not mean euthanizing the other. Indeed, any failure to stand by NATO would likely have significant adverse consequences in the Indo-Pacific, whose leaders would be watching the war in Europe carefully as a window into their own ability to rely upon the United States when things become difficult. Just as the United States prioritized defending Europe from the Nazis in World War II without backing off in the war against Japan in the Pacific, even if the United States must now prioritize East Asia in certain ways, it should not abandon Europe.

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WHAT COUNTS AS “WINNING”?

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As the great power committed to maintaining the existing system of international order against revisionist challengers, and as the leading state in the two alliance systems challenged by opportunistic authoritarian aggression, the United States has a “theory of victory” requirement here of denying Russia and China the achievement of their own theories of victory. In Europe, for example, this means preserving Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine as sovereign independent states, and as countries enjoying close security ties to the United States. In Asia, this means similarly preserving Taiwan’s autonomy and keeping the United States’ free democratic allies in Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines from having to become vassal states of the Middle Kingdom. As a status quo power facing revisionist aggression, the fundamental victory requirement for the United States here is thus simply that its adversaries do not “win.”

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To be sure, a broader and more satisfying sort of U.S. victory would see the threat of revisionist aggression from Moscow and Beijing recede (or end?) more broadly, rather than having those powers simply “put back in their place,” thereafter remaining as wounded and aggrieved states looking for future vengeance. Indeed, given the nature of the two authoritarian regimes in question, it is possible that the clear military defeat of either one could shatter its brittle internal legitimacy narrative and lead to regime collapse.

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That said, the United States should not assume that such regime collapse would end revisionist threats. After all, both polities have strong and vicious hyper-nationalist elements strongly committed to dark and semi-paranoid anti-Western discourse. Moreover, there is no guarantee that either Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping would be replaced by rulers any less committed to violent international self-aggrandizement. Nevertheless, even if further revisionism could not be precluded by the replacement of the current government, the very fact of a decisive defeat could help reinforce future deterrence messages, especially to the degree that this defeat “felt” more like a consequence of the regime having overreached by striking out abroad than like the fruits of a nefarious Western conspiracy to conquer or subvert the state.

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To be sure, after a Western victory in either theater, it might be difficult to tell whether deterrence had truly been “restored,” for each regime might react to such a setback with a policy of tactical retrenchment — that is, effectively accepting only a temporary armistice in order to buy time in which to reprovision, reequip, and prepare to resume hostilities on better terms. Yet deterrence is always provisional and conditional, as it is contingent upon the deterring party’s success in maintaining concrete capabilities (and a perceived willingness to use them) sufficient to persuade a would-be aggressor, each and every day, that “today is not the day.” In this sense, the belligerent powers are not the only ones with agency here. Even a mere armistice would also give the United States and its allies a chance to be better prepared for a potential resumption of hostilities, and hence better able to deter the aggressors. In the face of revisionist moves against the geopolitical status quo, an approach that defeats the aggressor’s initial thrust, returns all players to the territorial status quo ante, and buys time in which the United States can further shore up its alliances and prepare to counter any further attacks looks more like victory than loss.

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As suggested above, moreover, the aggressor’s prior defeat at U.S. hands might itself help to redress the longer-term deterrence problem rooted in adversary assumptions about Western sociopolitical weakness. Rather than being presumed to be a soft and fundamentally weak-willed adversary, the United States would thereafter be “the folks who thrashed you last time, even though you used nuclear weapons.” With a track record of martial success against twenty-first-century near-peer adversaries — and with no less capacity than before to actually use nuclear weapons against future aggression if this is needed — the United States would thus be better positioned to ensure future deterrence than it is now.

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Assuring Allies

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QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. CREDIBILITY

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In general, there are two levels of U.S. credibility about which U.S. allies have reason to be concerned in this scenario, with the second being of more significance than the first. The first level is whether the United States would be willing to risk a direct clash with a great power adversary, in any form, were it to move against its allies. Here the allies ought to have little doubt about U.S. credibility, for in this scenario the United States not only did respond to aggression against its allies by throwing its conventional forces into the fray against the aggressors, but also responded effectively enough that it led to dramatic setbacks for the aggressors.

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The second level of allied concern is whether U.S. nuclear extended deterrence will remain available in the event that an adversary uses nuclear weapons against it — that is, whether the United States would be willing to use nuclear weapons in such a conflict if needed. This is a game-theoretical challenge dating back to the early years of the Cold War, which materialized once the Soviets acquired a strategic nuclear arsenal to counterpose against the U.S. one, and it raises a question to which no truly definitive answer has ever been given. In a context in which adversary nuclear weapons hold major U.S. cities at risk, to what degree would a U.S. president really be willing to “lose New York to save Hamburg”? On this level, the present scenario confronts the United States with a clear challenge: how much risk of nuclear escalation against the U.S. homeland should the United States be willing to accept in responding to an aggressor’s use of nuclear weapons against its forces and allies in theaters thousands of miles away?

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This is a challenging question to which no a priori answer is likely possible, as much would depend upon the specific battlefield circumstances, the geopolitical and political contexts, and the personalities of the leaders in question. To judge from U.S. deterrence policy over many decades, however, the answer to the question is “definitely some.” Nonetheless, U.S. intestinal fortitude in this regard is presumably not infinite. The United States was clearly willing to accept considerable risk of escalation to a full-scale nuclear exchange in order to deter Soviet aggression against its allies in Europe during the Cold War. Yet the United States also seems to have recognized that there was an inherent degree of non-credibility in a promise, in effect, to destroy the world in order to “save” (for instance) Hamburg from the Red Army.

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In response to this problem, the United States and its allies developed three answers that went beyond relying exclusively upon potentially homeland-imperiling U.S. strategic brinkmanship: (a) the British and French invested in their own nuclear weapons programs; (b) the United States adopted a “nuclear-sharing” policy under which it would provide nuclear gravity bombs for delivery by key NATO allies in time of war (while preserving U.S. control of such devices in peacetime); and (c) the United States deployed a variety of theater- and shorter-range nuclear delivery systems that would give it more options to respond to aggression without the stark choice between surrender and jumping all the way up the escalation ladder to a strategic exchange. Together, these choices added considerable operational flexibility to the collective NATO nuclear tool kit, enhancing deterrence without making nuclear use so casually thinkable that the United States would be tempted to engage in it absent the gravest of provocations.

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Today, by contrast, only the first of the United States’ three Cold War–era responses (British and French weapons) really remains viable, though even then in a form considerably attenuated since Cold War days and not optimized for theater-type engagements of this sort in any event. The second response (NATO’s nuclear-sharing policy) has been allowed to atrophy into a fairly noncredible operational capability that would be difficult to employ in a full-scale conflict, is vulnerable to both nuclear and conventional preemption, and which (at least until sizeable numbers of dual-capable F-35 aircraft come online) would have difficulty surviving and ensuring mission-completion against serious air defenses.

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As for the third response, the United States no longer has any effective U.S. nuclear assets designed for, devoted to, and deployed for theater-level nuclear missions. It does have a low-yield option in the form of the W76-2 warhead, but that device rides on a strategic delivery system, the Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The United States has no flexible, theater-range nuclear systems to array against the considerable Russian and Chinese arsenals of diverse and flexible theater-range systems. This makes it harder to reassure our allies that we really would be there (in a nuclear sense) for their “Hamburg” — as well as harder to convince (and hence deter) the would-be aggressor.

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This is the basic challenge of the second-level question of nuclear use. It is surely possible for nuclear weapons to be too “usable,” and overquick resort to such tools could be catastrophic. Yet it is also possible for nuclear weapons use to be too hard to contemplate, for to find it truly “unthinkable” would be to invite aggression that cannot be deterred or combatted by purely conventional means. Deterrence policy is thus about finding the “Goldilocks point” — or, more elegantly, the Aristotelean Mean — between these bad answers. In the present scenario, however, the United States would surely be more able both to deter and to respond to aggression if it had more theater-range options.

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Now that nuclear weapons have been used in this scenario, this second-level question of nuclear use moves to the forefront. Fortunately, the facts of the scenario so far do not quite precipitate the most challenging dilemma, so it matters less that the United States lacks the more flexible theater-range nuclear options it needs.

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Presumably, U.S. allies have no special interest in the United States using nuclear weapons per se: their interest lies in being defended against aggression by whatever means are necessary — not excluding nuclear weaponry, but not necessarily employing it either. Indeed, at various points over the years, some allies have expressed concern that the United States might perhaps be too quick to use such weapons, particularly where such employment in theater would occur on their soil. (Over NATO’s history, U.S. defense planners have struggled incessantly with simultaneous European demands that the United States (a) be entirely ready to wage a nuclear war on their behalf and (b) not be too eager to do so, especially not in Europe. The equilibrium point between these demands is not always easily found.) Most likely, however, U.S. allies’ primary concern here is quite singular. Their fear is only that the United States might fail to use nuclear weapons in circumstances in which there is no way to protect the allies’ own existential security interests other than by using nuclear weapons.

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Through this lens, a critical question is whether this scenario is “one of those cases.” And in this regard, the scenario could be said not yet to present such a need. So far, the conventional situation does not seem to be one in which vital U.S. or allied interests are threatened in ways that would require U.S. nuclear use. On the contrary, the United States and its allies seem to be prevailing without it. The primary, existential question from the perspective of allied second-level (nuclear) assurance, therefore, has arguably thus not yet been raised. After all, it would presumably do little harm to the United States’ reputation among its allies as an extended deterrence protector — and might even enhance its reputation for responsible nuclear statesmanship — if Washington were to decline to use nuclear weapons where it did not need to use them.

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Instead, the remaining question here is whether a U.S. or allied nuclear response might be needed to the Russian or Chinese nuclear attacks simply because they were nuclear attacks. To this question, under these facts, reasonable people may disagree. Some might argue in the affirmative — claiming, in effect, that we “need” to use nuclear weapons to protect the credibility, to ally and aggressor alike, of the “nuclear” aspect of extended deterrence even when the United States does not need to use nuclear weapons for any actual operational military purpose in a war it is already winning.

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This paper, however, contends that on the current facts of this scenario, the United States does not yet need to use nuclear weaponry. The extended deterrence the United States provides to its allies has never been an exclusively nuclear insurance policy against aggression. Instead, it has been an inclusively nuclear one. It combines all elements of available military power that are required to deter aggression and to defeat it should deterrence fail. That is, the United States has promised to defend its allies by whatever means are necessary, but it has not promised to use any specific form of military power unless that form is necessary. This is not some U.S. analogue to the mindless automaticity of the old Soviet (and now Russian) “Dead Hand” nuclear launch system. Rather, it is an ironclad promise to the United States’ best friends of effective defense — not of U.S. nuclear use per se and no matter what.

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In this author’s view, a fundamental allied loss of trust in the credibility of the U.S. alliance guarantee would therefore probably not arise unless and until either (a) battlefield circumstances changed in ways that presented an ally with the prospect of catastrophic defeat absent U.S. nuclear use, and the United States did not then use nuclear weapons, or (b) the United States reacted to Sino-Russian nuclear use by retreat or some other measure of capitulation. Otherwise, remaining unintimidated and continuing to prosecute a successful conventional campaign — “fighting through” the adversary’s nuclear use in theater, as it were — should represent an optimal answer from the perspective of U.S. allies.

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In this scenario, at least, it is possible that some allies would wish the United States to use nuclear weapons against Russia and/or China, while others surely would prefer that we did not. On the whole, however, it would likely be less costly to alliance solidarity for the United States to continue to win the conventional conflict fighting alongside its allies without using nuclear weapons than it would for the United States to use such weapons (especially on European soil) when it was not absolutely clear it needed to do so.

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ALLIED SECURITY CONCERNS

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The security concerns of U.S. allies in this scenario are fourfold, deriving from their situations as relatively militarily weak states close to a powerful revisionist great-power predator that is eager to carve out a more expansive sphere of influence or empire for itself in the world. First and most fundamentally, U.S. allies’ security concern is an existential one: they must avoid the loss of their autonomy and independence as sovereign peoples. Beyond this, and deriving from this core concern, U.S. allies have a second security interest in avoiding the loss of their ties to other countries able and willing to assist them in meeting such primary security needs. Most of all, this means preserving military ties to the United States, but it also entails preserving their more general ability to leverage bilateral relationships or collective security institutions to meet security needs.

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A third allied security concern is more prosaic, but still significant. Each ally has a security interest in keeping the military forces of its local great-power predator as far from its own borders as possible. Moreover, irrespective of immediate border threats, allies have a security interest in limiting that predator’s deployment of long-range fires, aviation assets, naval power-projection capabilities, and other military tools capable of threatening that ally’s forces, facilities, or critical infrastructure from afar.

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More indirectly, U.S. allies have a fourth security interest in avoiding deep entanglement in economic, natural resource–centered, technological, supply chain, financial, or other relationships of dependency with either of the two great-power predators involved in this scenario. Such relationships may, or may not, provide immediate benefits (e.g., inexpensive goods, cheap energy, or corporate profits), but such ties are strategically debilitating and inimical to maintaining the sovereign independence that is each ally’s first-order existential concern. Such relationships give leverage over that ally by allowing the other power to administer rewards and punishments in ways that reduce the ally’s autonomy, undermine its ability to maintain a credible deterrent against aggression, and weaken relationships with third parties that are important to preserving its core security interests. (The existence of such relationships also likely contributes to adversary assumptions underlying the deep sociopolitical failure of deterrence discussed earlier: a country mired in structural dependency upon an aggressor will probably be assumed less likely to fight it.)

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SIGNALING RESOLVE

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Once deterrence has failed — or more challengingly, failed doubly, as in this scenario where both aggression and nuclear weapons use have occurred — the United States will likely have passed the point at which policy pronouncements and deterrence-related consultations with its allies can, alone, signal sufficient resolve. At this point, what counts most are U.S. actions and how adversaries understand them.

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In this respect, perhaps the most important signal the United States could send is to not slow or alter its activities against aggressor forces in the two theaters, except when such steps may be needed to preserve ongoing operations in a potentially nuclear environment. To this end, all relevant U.S. (and NATO) conventional assets should be readied to operate in a radiological-nuclear combat environment as quickly as possible, with ground assets dispersing to widely scattered field dispositions and air assets moving to dispersal airfields. This could also include the issuance of detection and protective gear, medical countermeasures, and relevant decontamination equipment, as well as surging radiation-hazard first responder units and medical personnel forward.

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Dispersing conventional capabilities — not merely land and naval units near the zone of operations but also aircraft from vulnerable bases to a wider variety of auxiliary dispersed locations, including those dual-capable aircraft (DCA) that would be needed for nuclear attack missions (i.e., unilateral U.S. assets in East Asia and NATO nuclear-sharing aircraft in Europe) — would also demonstrate resolve, unity, and collective preparedness. U.S. nuclear weapon storage vaults at relevant European airfields should also be readied for potential operations, and any existing plans for weapon dispersal to additional airfields that do not involve actual DCA attack assets should be implemented. (Care should be taken, however, not to fly NATO DCAs en masse to weapon storage airfields or to fly DCA from such airfields, lest Russia mistake this for an attack in progress.) Every effort should be made to keep these precautions from slowing the pace of combat operations against the Russian forces, which should not stop, though some impact might be unavoidable. (The scenario gives us notably little detail about the operational implications of the Russian and Chinese nuclear strikes.)

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The signals sent by these efforts are intended, together, to demonstrate in concrete form that (i) NATO will not give up in the face of nuclear provocations and (ii) NATO is quite prepared for the possibility of escalation. Beyond the theaters in question, moreover, U.S. and allied leaders in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific should make clear their intention to isolate the aggressors’ economies as completely as possible from the global economy (e.g., impeding Chinese oil shipments through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca, and ending all Russian resource exports) for the duration of their wars of aggression. This may help create additional incentives for moderation.

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The alert level of U.S. strategic nuclear forces would also need to be elevated, with vulnerable bomber assets dispersing to auxiliary airfields, and with portions of the force perhaps even beginning rotating in-air readiness patrols (though not flying on headings that could be mistaken for attack trajectories either toward Russia or toward China). U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would remain on ready-to-launch alert, with logistics support crews immediately providing extra supplies of diesel fuel to ICBM bases and individual silos to prepare them to sustain alert operations during a potentially prolonged crisis in which reliance upon local peacetime power grids might be precluded by sabotage or cyberattack.

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Meanwhile, serviceable in-port nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) — not only in the United States but also in Britain and France — should muster their crews and put to sea as quickly as possible. Emergency notice should also be given to operators of critical infrastructure facilities in the United States, Europe, and East Asia, encouraging or directing them to implement whatever protective protocols they might have to defend against Russian and/or Chinese cyberattacks, and to move to insulate their systems as much as possible from the internet (even at financial cost or loss in operational efficiency) and prepare themselves to implement emergency service restoration or reconstitution plans.

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THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF MESSAGE

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While these preparatory steps are important in their own right, they are also critical to the U.S. messaging strategy. To understand the importance of getting U.S. strategic signaling right, it should be remembered that the Russian and Chinese nuclear attacks in this scenario were notably limited. They hit only things in theater that were of tactical operational relevance, for instance, striking only a very small number of targets despite both adversaries possessing a huge numerical advantage in theater delivery systems. Moreover, they refrained from hitting anything in the U.S. homeland or that was of arguable strategic importance to the United States. This suggests that U.S. adversaries are themselves carefully considering escalation risks, and that they do fear provoking a large-scale nuclear response. If they understand that their nuclear use has not intimidated the United States and that the United States is indeed comfortable with escalation despite their previous assumptions to the contrary — but that, at the same time, U.S. war aims are limited, being confined only to restoring the status quo ante — the United States may have a chance to restore deterrence.

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Accordingly, these concrete military moves would be accompanied by full-spectrum public messaging — including by the president directly — making three key points:

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    First, the United States would make clear that these nuclear-preparatory steps are indeed underway and that Washington is demonstrating in concrete ways the United States’ ironclad commitment to protecting the sovereignty and independence of its military allies by whatever means necessary.

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    Second, the United States would make equally clear that under the current circumstances, U.S. nuclear weapons use is not yet necessary. U.S. messaging would stress that, while Russia and China’s nuclear use was the result of tactical desperation as their wars of aggression began to falter, the United States itself faces no such desperate circumstances. On the contrary, despite the United States’ strong preference to avoid using nuclear weapons and its willingness to use them if its adversaries force it to, the United States is currently prevailing in the conventional fight and intends to continue with that winning approach for so long as its adversaries’ fixation upon aggression makes it necessary to resist them in order to protect the security and independence of free sovereign peoples. Washington would also make clear that it remains entirely prepared and ready to use nuclear weapons itself if Russia or China leave it no choice, and the United States would warn them not to test its resolve by using nuclear weapons a second time.

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    Third, the United States would make explicit that its war aims in this conventional fight are quite limited. The United States do not seek to inflict a “strategic loss” or regime change upon either Russia or China, but rather merely stop their wars of aggression. If they stop that aggression, the United States would have no more need to fight them.

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TREATY VERSUS NON-TREATY PARTNERS

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Much of this above-mentioned activity would be aimed primarily at protecting and reassuring U.S. military allies, as they would undoubtedly be the United States’ highest priority. Moves that would reassure those treaty allies would likely have some impact in reassuring non-treaty partners as well, but this would be merely a secondary, rather than primary, benefit.

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Military Response Options

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U.S. MILITARY OPTIONS

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The foregoing pages have already made clear the optimal immediate U.S. military responses to the current scenario: the United States should continue winning the conventional fight without employing nuclear weapons itself, while posturing itself to be ready for nuclear use if adversary nuclear threats or other military circumstances require. The United States would retain the option to do more, of course, and — depending how things develop — might well indeed still need to do so in the face of further Russian or Chinese provocations (e.g., massive U.S. battlefield reverses or a second instance of adversary nuclear use). Absent such further need, however, discretion should remain the better part of valor.

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WHAT IF THEY USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAIN?

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In the event that U.S. adversaries chose to use nuclear weapons a second time, the United States — as it will have signaled that it was ready to do — should be prepared to cross the nuclear threshold itself. At least initially, the key would be to find a type and level of U.S. nuclear response appropriate to the delicate task of (a) signaling undiminished resolve and of (b) not jumping so much further up the proverbial escalation ladder that things spiral out of control.

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In this regard, one possibility would be to have a deployed SSBN in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific launch Trident missiles with reduced-yield W76-2 nuclear warheads toward two targets. (If the United States had the capability to do this, and reasonable confidence that its adversaries could see and understand that this is what the United States was doing, these weapons should also be launched on depressed ballistic trajectories clearly incapable of hitting strategic targets deep in the adversaries’ homelands.) These four targets, two in Russia and two in China, would be chosen on the basis of being military locations consistent with legitimate targeting under the law of armed conflict (LOAC), and the destruction of which would have a real impact upon adversary military operations in each theater, but without inflicting massive civilian casualties and without directly posing what could be seen as an existential threat to either ruling regime. Choosing these targets would need to be done relatively quickly, and carefully, but there would be at least some time for careful selection, informed not only by military analysis but also careful assessment of adversary leadership psychology and domestic political dynamics.

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The point in these attacks would be affirmatively to cross the “nuclear threshold,” including by hitting targets in the adversaries’ homelands — not merely to raise the ante somewhat for purposes of coercive bargaining, but also because, as Willie Sutton might have put it, that is where the targets are, as well as because the United States would prefer not to set off nuclear weapons on its allies’ territory if it can avoid it — while yet doing so in ways that adversary observers would be less likely to mistake for any sort of strategic attack and that signaled U.S. continuing commitment to a great degree of restraint. The U.S. president should also announce these launches publicly, making clear that this is a carefully limited theater action responding directly to these adversaries’ nuclear use and demonstrating that the United States will neither yield to their intimidation nor be provoked into overreaction, and that U.S. commitment to protecting its military allies remains undimmed. (Afterward, moreover, U.S. officials would publicly present the rationale for choosing those targets and that means of attack, also making clear how this decision was consistent with longstanding LOAC principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity.)

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THE RISKS

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This has already been covered, or at least implied, in the paragraphs above. The primary risk lies in the danger that the United States fails to find the optimal Goldilocks point between the extremes as it tries to simultaneously (a) persuade allies and adversaries alike of U.S. seriousness and martial resolution and (b) not signal so much readiness or eagerness for escalation that the adversary feels provoked into catastrophic preemptive moves. Secondary risks also exist, among them the possibility either that some ally “opts out” of the conflict for fear of escalatory consequences, or that it “opts in” with too much enthusiasm by unilaterally taking steps that end up provokingadversary escalation rather than deterring it.

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THE LOAC

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The United States has long made clear its belief that the LOAC does apply to the use of all forms of weaponry in wartime, including nuclear weapons. Washington has also made clear in recent years its intention to abide by those rules in the event of conflict, even nuclear conflict. Despite U.S. commitment to such legal constraints, however, LOAC principles — if properly understood as U.S. officials have indeed carefully outlined them, and as generations of operational lawyers in the U.S. armed services have been trained on them — should not be a significant impediment to sound U.S. or allied strategy in this scenario.

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There is no question that the use of nuclear weapons is not illegal under the LOAC when the very existence of a state is threatened — this being a formulation that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accepted in its 1996 advisory opinion on the topic — and the present scenario of aggressor use of nuclear weapons against Poland and the Philippines would certainly seem to raise such concerns. Nor would the LOAC rule out U.S. or other allied nuclear use in defending an ally from such attack as a matter of course, as the right of self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter does not preclude collective self-defense. The law would not permit simply any nuclear response, of course. Nevertheless, under such quasi-existential circumstances the logic of compelling “military necessity” should permit judicious nuclear counter-strikes — both to prevent allied defeat in a growing conventional conflict and to dissuade further (and potentially full-scale) nuclear escalation by the aggressor — even if such strikes entailed considerable civilian casualties.

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LOAC principles are thus unlikely to be an obstacle to a careful and prudent response to the current scenario, even if that response turned out to involve U.S. or allied use of nuclear weaponry. The LOAC would preclude using a U.S. nuclear weapon directly to target Russian or Chinese civilians, of course, and U.S. and allied commanders would need to take feasible precautions to limit civilian damage (e.g., being as precise in their targeting as is feasible under the circumstances and using weapons of yield no greater than needed to accomplish the military objective). Yet it is hard to imagine military circumstances in this scenario giving rise to any need to do more than what a clear-eyed analysis of necessity and proportionality would permit.

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Non-Kinetic Response Options

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To the degree that non-kinetic options might exist that could affect the ability of Russian or Chinese forces to operate effectively in the specific theater wars described in this scenario, such activity might well contribute usefully to prosecution of the conflict below the level of U.S. or allied nuclear escalation. This might include, for instance: pursuing cyber or electronic warfare (EW) degradation of air defense activity or battlefield command, control, and communications (C3) networks; jamming or spoofing of adversary positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) communications for engaged combatants; launching cyberattacks on infrastructure or transportation capabilities that directly contribute to the fight in theater; or jamming or otherwise engaging space assets in connection specifically with their support to theater operations. If means were available to degrade adversary nuclear C3, but only in the context of theater operations such as the two nuclear attacks that already occurred, this would likely also be a useful contribution to the fight, helping make further regional strikes more difficult.

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At least initially, however, care should be taken to avoid non-kinetic measures that might be interpreted as having existential implications. This could include, for instance, attacks upon Russian or Chinese space assets that support strategically critical functions such as national nuclear C3, cyberattacks upon critical infrastructure not associated with the specific military theater of operations, or perhaps even — given the paranoid and potentially fragile nature of the regimes in question — the dramatic stepping up of Information Operations (IO) or public diplomacy messaging that could be interpreted as encouraging regime change in Moscow and Beijing.

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Conclusion

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This scenario certainly presents challenging questions. For this author, however, the particular fact pattern of Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons use outlined in Project Atom 2024 does not have to drive the United States to nuclear use itself, at least not yet. The United States must continue to stand by its allies and ensure that they are defended against aggression, while denying the aggressors any advantage from their choice to cross the nuclear threshold. Nevertheless, since (and for so long as) the United States is winning both wars without using nuclear weaponry, it should continue to do so, while yet making it very clear that it is prepared to escalate to nuclear use — and indeed actually ensuring that it is thus prepared — if the aggressors leave the United States no choice. With the moderate war aims appropriate to a status quo power seeking to defeat aggression but not to remake the world in its image, the United States has the chance here to confound Sino-Russian aggression, rebuild a strong deterrent posture, prove to its allies that it indeed does stand with them when bullets start to fly, and demonstrate reassuringly temperate nuclear statesmanship, all at the same time.

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Washington’s Response to Nuclear Use against U.S. Allies

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Rebecca Davis Gibbons

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Introduction

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The circumstances of nuclear use described in the proposed 2027 scenario are unprecedented. The notional attacks would not only break an 82-year taboo concerning nuclear use in warfare, but nuclear weapons have never been used in conflict against other nuclear-armed states. These novel circumstances combined with the high stakes for all parties involved present U.S. policymakers with significant challenges in determining how to respond. Ideally, Washington would lead a course of action that would illustrate U.S. resolve and credibility to its allies and partners, avoid nuclear escalation, and demonstrate that nuclear use does not result in attackers achieving their strategic goals.

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The analysis below argues that the primary U.S. objective, if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF) use nuclear weapons in the context of conflicts over Ukraine and Taiwan, is to manage and prevent escalation up to a major nuclear exchange. Secondary — though still vitally important — objectives include maintaining alliance relationships, ending the conflicts on favorable terms, and ensuring that the international community does not perceive nuclear use as benefitting the attackers. The United States and its allies should take several actions, militarily and diplomatically, to prevent these conflicts in the first place, and failing this, be ready to address the first instance of nuclear use since World War II in a manner that does not lead to a broader nuclear war.

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U.S. Strategic Objectives

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The following section explores why deterrence failed and what the United States can do to prevent these deterrence failures, before presenting the U.S. strategic objectives in the scenario.

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WHY DID DETERRENCE FAIL?

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In the notional 2027 scenario, the initial failure of conventional deterrence is the most consequential failure. Both adversaries used nuclear weapons because they instigated imprudent conventional conflicts against U.S. allies and partners.

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The purpose of nuclear use in both theaters appears to be twofold: (1) demonstrating the high stakes with which the adversaries view the conflicts and (2) terminating the war by deterring the United States and its allies from continuing to fight due to Western fears of additional nuclear attacks.

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The best way to prevent these competitors from resorting to nuclear attacks is to ensure that a strong and credible U.S. deterrent posture — integrating nuclear and conventional capabilities — prevents both from initiating aggression against allies and partners in the first place. The United States and its allies could have taken several political and military steps to improve this posture prior to 2027 when the proposed nuclear attacks occur. A deterrence failure would likely result from an adversary questioning the U.S. political commitment to its allies and partners. It is thus helpful to review signals the United States has sent in recent years that were intended to strengthen credibility, but which may have been misinterpreted.

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The U.S. government, in June of 2024, began to publicly signal its military plan to aid Taiwan’s defense. Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, described the “Hellscape” strategy for defending Taiwan to a Washington Post columnist. Paparo explained that the “U.S. military would deploy thousands of unmanned submarines, unmanned surface ships and aerial drones to flood the area and give Taiwanese, U.S. and partner forces time to mount a full response.” He continued, “I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities.” International media sources reported on Paparo’s remarks widely, serving a deterrent function for the United States.

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Admiral Paparo, however, also warned that the U.S. industrial base would need to increase its production of drones and other capabilities to implement this plan. Along the same lines, in 2023, a retired U.S. general questioned whether the U.S. military would be ready to defend Taiwan. This skeptical public rhetoric and an inability to attain necessary levels of readiness — something the Chinese government would surely learn from intelligence gathering — could contribute to deterrence failure by creating doubt about both U.S. resolve and U.S. military readiness for such an operation.

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Politically, there are reasons for the PRC to doubt the United States’ commitment to defending Taiwan due to the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity. The United States terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan (the Republic of China or ROC) in 1979 when it formally recognized the PRC. Since then, U.S. relations with Taiwan have been based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The act obligates the United States to provide Taiwan “with defense articles and defense services” to allow the island “to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” The act created a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding U.S. defense of Taiwan. Despite this policy, President Biden has spoken strongly of U.S. support for Taiwan’s defense on four separate occasions. Following these statements, White House officials emphasized that U.S. policy regarding Taiwan remained the same, presumably to avoid raising tensions with China. Making a “mistake” about U.S. support for Taiwan four different times likely has sent a strong signal of U.S. intentions to the PRC. It will be important to see how the next president speaks about Taiwan, as their words will send important messages to Chinese leadership about the U.S. defense of Taiwan. It is worth noting, however, regardless of presidential rhetoric, that as long as the policy of strategic ambiguity is in place, there is room for Chinese leaders to question the U.S. commitment to assisting Taiwan’s defense.

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Beyond uncertainty regarding Washington’s military and political pledges to Taiwan, any Chinese attacks on Taiwan could stem from an assumption by President Xi that the stakes are higher for the PRC than for the United States. With Taiwan just over eighty miles from mainland China and the PRC increasingly asserting its dominance in the East and South China Seas, it is unsurprising that Chinese leaders would assume that the island of Taiwan matters more to Beijing than to Washington. The assumption that the United States and its Pacific allies have lower stakes in the region could lead Xi to calculate, first, that he could get away with annexing Taiwan by force, and second, that nuclear use could stop the United States from continuing to defend Taiwan in a crisis if the annexation does not go as planned.

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Turning to the European theater, the deterrence failure dates to at least 2014, when the RF annexed Crimea. Based on the West’s limited response to that action, Putin determined that it was worth attempting to take the rest of Ukraine by force in 2022. He did not anticipate Ukraine’s ability to resist the invasion or the support Kyiv would receive from the West. As Ukraine was not a member of the alliance, NATO’s Article 5 commitment did not apply, but members of NATO responded to the attack with intelligence, supplies, and funding. The level of NATO unity surrounding Ukraine and the increases in defense spending among alliance members are intended to send a strong deterrent message to Putin regarding further aggression, but if Moscow were in a desperate gamble to split the alliance and to reduce the West’s support for Ukraine in a conventional conflict, then additional attacks could not be ruled out.

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Finally, while preventing the conventional attacks in the first place is key to preventing the subsequent instances of nuclear use, this scenario does involve nuclear deterrence failures. The adversaries likely hoped that crossing the nuclear threshold would compel the United States and its allies to stop fighting. They may have doubts about whether the United States would employ nuclear weapons in regional conflicts.

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WHAT CAN BE DONE TO AVOID THESE DETERRENCE FAILURES?

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The U.S. military must prioritize the acquisitions required for the Hellscape plan and for follow-on military action in the region. In addition, the United States needs to find a way to sell Taiwan the military hardware required to defend itself from a PRC attack. If the United States does not provide what Taiwan needs in a timely fashion, it signals a lack of political resolve on the part of the United States and undermines Taiwanese military readiness. As (or if) the United States takes these steps to increase U.S. and Taiwanese readiness between 2024 and 2027, U.S. military leaders should project greater public confidence than they have to date about their ability to aid Taiwan’s defense.

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Short of altering the U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding Taiwan’s status, there are several ways the United States could message its resolve to maintain the status quo. First, more statements like those made by President Biden about his intention to defend Taiwan — even if they must be clarified after the fact — are better than saying nothing or being dismissive of the issue.

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Second, top U.S. leaders should make clear to all audiences that the United States has long been a Pacific power and will continue to be one into the future. U.S. stakes in the region are significant: the United States has several allies and partners in the Pacific, maintains key military bases in the region, and benefits from the substantial percentage of global trade transported through the region’s waters. The United States has demonstrated its commitment to the Pacific in recent years with AUKUS, the trilateral security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Australia, India, and Japan. U.S. leaders should not concede that the PRC has more of a stake in the region, and particularly in Taiwan, than the United States.

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Third, U.S. leaders should reiterate several talking points regarding Taiwan, both domestically and to the broader international community, to highlight why the United States seeks to maintain the status quo. One set of messages should emphasize what could occur if Taiwan loses its autonomy and becomes part of the PRC. Taiwan is a liberal democracy and a fundamental economic partner to the West. In particular, Taiwan is the world’s foremost supplier of semiconductors and advanced semiconductors, which are necessary for cell phones, computers, cars, and military hardware. If Taiwan were to be swallowed up by its large communist neighbor, this vitally important industry would be under Chinese control. The United States could lose access to the advanced semiconductors necessary for its defense.

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Another set of messages should address the PRC’s unlawful claim to Taiwan. There is no history of the PRC controlling the island. The Taiwanese are a mix of indigenous and ethnic Chinese people, some of whom have lived on the island for centuries, well before the PRC existed as a nation-state. The PRC claiming that it has a right to this island is akin to modern colonialism. In sum, the United States and its allies must make clear that taking Taiwan by force is an illegal and illegitimate action.

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There are also several steps the United States could take to strengthen its relationship with the Philippines and deter a potential attack on the island nation. The United States could do more to emphasize the importance of its partnership with the Philippines by assisting President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. with his domestic and international priorities, countering the Chinese disinformation campaigns in the country, providing additional military assistance, and engaging in more joint military exercises in the region.

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Moving to the European theater, the RF’s initial attack on Ukraine in February 2022 appears to have been a strategic blunder as it created an enemy on its border, united NATO members against Russia, and caused many European nations to increase defense spending. If at some point in the future, the RF attacks Poland or another NATO member, then there must have been some change of circumstances that made Putin question NATO unity in the face of nuclear use on NATO soil. Alternately, a nuclear attack could be a desperate attempt to stop NATO from supporting Ukraine’s defense.

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Finally, Washington must signal its ability and willingness to employ nuclear weapons in these theaters, if necessary, to defend its allies. Signaling comes in a variety of forms, from guidance documents, presidential rhetoric, weapons movement, and exercises that employ these weapons. While the United States under the Biden administration has been wise to avoid the type of belligerent nuclear rhetoric coming from its Russian counterparts, future administrations can privately message their willingness to defend allies using all available options.

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WHAT DOES WINNING LOOK LIKE?

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The United States has several immediate and long-term strategic objectives in the proposed scenario. Before outlining those goals, it is worth emphasizing exactly what is at stake in this conflict. The PRC and RF crossing the nuclear threshold means that the world has come significantly closer to nuclear war, and with it, a nuclear exchange ending millions of lives, the loss of societies, and even the risk of human civilization on the planet. Any U.S. leader considering how to address this scenario must have that grave reality — however remote — in mind.

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The primary objective in this scenario is to prevent nuclear escalation, whereby the United States and either the PRC, the RF, or both engage in escalating tit-for-tat nuclear attacks that result in a large-scale exchange of nuclear weapons. This is the primary goal because such nuclear exchanges would destroy societies, lead to millions of deaths, and cause widespread environmental devastation. Even if that outcome appears unlikely from the limited notional scenario, the circumstances are so unprecedented and the possibility of large-scale nuclear exchange so dire that avoiding large-scale nuclear escalation must be considered the goal that supersedes all others.

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Secondary objectives include the following:

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    Reestablishing the pre-conflict status quo with the PRC and Taiwan and returning Ukraine to its pre-2022 borders.

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    Demonstrating U.S. credibility to its allies and partners. This is especially important in terms of nuclear nonproliferation goals. If allies no longer perceive Washington as a trusted security partner, they may consider developing their own indigenous nuclear weapons programs. For example, some leaders in the Republic of Korea (ROK) have called for the country to develop nuclear weapons, and a small number have done so in Japan as well. Polls of the ROK public have found that a majority supports an indigenous nuclear program. Polling of Eastern European publics also indicated support for indigenous nuclear programs in the weeks following the RF’s 2022 attack on Ukraine.

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    Maintaining the Philippines as an ally in the Pacific, to include the use of its military bases.

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    Maintaining freedom of movement for all states within the Pacific Ocean.

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    Reestablishing the taboo against first nuclear use.

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The inability to achieve any of these important secondary goals means the loss of U.S. global leadership. U.S. allies and partners are key enablers in promoting favorable rules, norms, and institutions within the international system. The PRC and the RF, along with Belarus, Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), are increasingly forming a bloc determined to undermine U.S. global influence. If the U.S. response to this conflict were to cause the perception that the United States is not a dependable ally or partner, it would be a strategic win for the so-called Axis of Upheaval.

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Assuring Allies

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After the nuclear attacks on the territories of allies, other allies and partners will closely watch to see how Washington responds. U.S. leaders will need to address the immediate challenge of the attacks and the ongoing conflicts, while also considering how their actions affect alliance relationships in the immediate and longer term.

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WHAT ARE THE RISKS — INCLUDING THEIR LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES — OF ALLIES QUESTIONING U.S. CREDIBILITY IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE?

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It is fair to assume that the publics and elites within allied nations will perceive the nuclear attacks by the PRC and RF as deterrence failures, but it is also important to note that both states used nuclear weapons in this notional scenario when they were losing conventional conflicts against the United States and its allies. Nuclear use stemmed from a place of adversary weakness and was meant to undermine U.S. resolve to keep fighting and to illustrate the high stakes of the conflict for the PRC and RF.

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Given Putin’s behavior over the past decade, it is possible, and perhaps even likely, that U.S. allies and partners will emphasize the RF’s taboo-breaking decision to conduct a nuclear attack more than they will blame the United States for the deterrence failure. For example, Putin already has defied several international rules and norms when it comes to respecting national sovereignty, upholding sanctions against proliferating nations, and using chemical weapons against perceived enemies of the state. Moreover, his strategic mistake in invading Ukraine in 2022 and his administration’s persistent nuclear saber-rattling since may result in NATO leaders questioning Putin’s rationality. The theory of nuclear deterrence relies on leaders behaving rationally, so can the United States be blamed for not deterring an actor who may not be rational?

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The PRC’s nuclear use presents a different and perhaps more complex challenge. The Philippines is not under the protection of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence per the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, and yet in a Pacific conflict, the nation would become a target as the United States operates out of its military bases. A potential nuclear attack on a Philippine military base would likely provoke public backlash toward the United States, especially among Filipinos aligned with the political faction of former president Rodrigo Duterte. Some Philippine leaders have already expressed concerns that U.S. military forces on their islands make them a potential target of a nuclear attack. Maintaining this partnership after an attack may be difficult without extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

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HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES SIGNAL RESOLVE TO ALLIES IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE? WHAT WILL BE ALLIES’ SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE? WHAT ROLE MIGHT CERTAIN ALLIES AND PARTNERS PLAY IN A RESPONSE?

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The most important means of signaling resolve is for the United States to continue prosecuting the respective conflicts and to respond to the nuclear attacks. Continuing the fight means that military forces may have to operate in spite of, and even in, radiation-contaminated environments.

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In the hours after nuclear use, the focus in the White House will be learning as much as possible about the attacks and assessing its response. This will be a tense, high-stress period, but Washington will want to make allies aware of its plans. Ideally, NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group would have discussed responses to RF or PRC nuclear use well before the beginning of this hypothetical conflict in 2027. The public response to the Russian attack should be presented as a NATO response.

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A key aspect of demonstrating credible resolve is maintaining public support for U.S. responses to the attacks; reminding the U.S. public of the strategic importance of its alliances will be vital to this support. News of nuclear use on allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe will shock the U.S. public; many could fear nuclear detonations would occur on U.S. territory. As a result, securing public support in the United States for military action in defense of allies and partners following the attacks may be challenging. NATO expanded in a period when most Americans no longer worried about European security or nuclear war; the public salience of the alliance and of U.S. alliance commitments is likely much lower than it was during the Cold War.

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Before any potential conflict — and frankly, right now — the U.S. government, especially the president, should aim to better educate the public about the history of U.S. alliance relationships and their benefits. When it comes to most public discussions of U.S. allies today, there is too much talk about free-riding and too little about how U.S. economic, security, and political interests benefit from maintaining strong relations with its 30-plus treaty allies. Existing research from political science suggests that the U.S. public is more likely to support military action on behalf of formal allies than nonformal allies (such as Taiwan), so public education about Taiwan is also important. Current scholarship also indicates that support for allies among the U.S. public is based on “elite cues,” so leaders need to be providing positive talking points about U.S. allies if they want to build public support for military action.

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Following the use of nuclear weapons in this scenario, allies will have several concerns. Any countries targeted or immediately impacted by the nuclear use will need immediate assistance addressing the medical emergencies caused by the nuclear detonation. Allies could also be fearful of follow-on attacks; they will expect the United States to respond strongly to protect them.

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Allies and partners have a significant role to play in the messaging following nuclear use. They must unite in loudly and publicly condemning the nuclear attacks and should do so repeatedly. They should communicate that using nuclear weapons in these scenarios was unacceptable and neither nation will gain from using these weapons. These messages are key to reestablishing the nuclear taboo following nuclear use.

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Military Response Options

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The most challenging question facing the U.S. president after nuclear use by the PRC and the RF is how to respond to the nuclear attacks. The following section offers options for a military response that aligns with the strategic goals discussed in the section on U.S. strategic priorities.

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WHAT WOULD BE THE PRESIDENT’S MILITARY OPTIONS IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE? WHICH OF THESE OPTIONS WOULD YOU RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT?

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Following the Chinese and Russian nuclear attacks, the president will hear many arguments that they must respond with nuclear weapons to signal strength and resolve. Some advisors will argue that responding without nuclear weapons will lead the adversaries to counter with another round of nuclear use. Others will warn that adversaries will perceive a nuclear response as escalatory and set the world on a dangerous path of nuclear exchange.

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Recommendations for the U.S. response to this notional scenario are based on the following assumptions:

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Assumption 1: Leaders may be unable to control nuclear escalation. Responding to the initial nuclear attacks with a U.S. or NATO nuclear attack makes it more likely that the United States will find itself engaging in tit-for-tat nuclear exchanges than if it does not initially respond with nuclear weapons. Once this contest of nerves begins, it could be exceedingly difficult to stop. Even if both sides do not want to escalate, in the fog of war, circumstances may add escalation pressures. For example, misinterpretations about the goals of adversary nuclear attacks (such as regime change or undermining command and control centers) could lead to escalation.

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Alternatively, nuclear-armed states could face other types of accidents, mistakes, or misinterpretations that could lead to nuclear use. There are several historical examples of such mistakes. For instance, during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, an errant U2 pilot, an accidentally inserted nuclear attack training tape, and even a black bear in Duluth, Minnesota, could have led to a nuclear war that neither side wanted. Additionally, leaders below the commander in chief could conduct unauthorized attacks that could lead to further escalation.

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Some may argue that the theater nuclear use is far from a strategic nuclear exchange and does not present a risk of all-out nuclear war. In this argument, there is a clear and meaningful line between theater (or tactical) nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. It assumes that leaders could use tactical weapons but remain “below” the strategic threshold. There is little evidence to know whether this is true, and it could be a very costly and dangerous assumption to make. This argument of a clear demarcation between tactical and strategic weapons also has the unintended consequences of reifying three categories of weapons: conventional weapons, theater nuclear weapons, and strategic nuclear weapons. Whether intentional or not, this argument leads to the appearance that theater nuclear weapons are acceptable and thus more usable. And while smaller nuclear weapons do less damage, the damage is still significant and indicates a violation of a long-standing taboo. Furthermore, it is not clear if other leaders share the same assumption that there is a clear divide between employing theater and strategic weapons.

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In sum, significant destruction could occur if both sides begin employing nuclear weapons. This is unprecedented territory, and no one can predict with certainty what will happen. The potential destruction caused by nuclear escalation poses too great of a risk to make the ex ante assumption that leaders can fully manage this risk.

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Assumption 2: Military responses that lead to public humiliation of Putin and Xi are not likely to lead to preferred U.S. objectives. Considering the few checks on their decisionmaking, their regional and global ambitions, and their obsessions with legacy, it worth considering how to minimize actions that serve to humiliate Xi and Putin. For this reason, the West should explore finding the right balance between responses that are conducted in the open and those that can be conducted with plausible deniability.

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Assumption 3: To be deterred from further escalation, Xi and Putin must be fearful of follow-on actions. If the United States does not respond strongly to the nuclear attack, it will confirm that Xi and Putin were correct that the United States has lower stakes in both regions relative to the PRC and RF. The responses to the attack must be costly in terms of destruction of adversary capabilities — though not necessarily with nuclear weapons — and indicate that more attacks could follow.

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Policy recommendation: Given the extreme danger of beginning a process of nuclear exchange with U.S. adversaries and the fact that the adversaries may use nuclear weapons again regardless of U.S. and allied action, it is prudent to retaliate with punishing nonnuclear responses that are both public and clandestine. The United States should conduct timely and precise conventional attacks on adversary military bases or installations to degrade their military capabilities. Targeting should not include command and control capabilities, which could be perceived as escalatory. Moreover, these attacks should be reported to the public. This strong conventional response signals both that nuclear use will be punished and that the United States does not need to resort to nuclear use to do considerable damage to the adversary’s military capabilities. At the same time, the U.S. should signal its readiness to conduct limited nuclear operations, if necessary, by moving dual-capable aircraft and submarines to the regions.

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The United States should accompany these conventional attacks with clear assurances both in public and private that the United States does not seek regime change in the PRC or the RF. While in general the United States would prefer fewer authoritarian governments, in this conflict scenario, making adversaries believe their lives and governments are at risk could lead to further nuclear escalation. As prospect theory informs us, those in the domain of losses — as China and Russia would be in this scenario — are willing to take great risks. The United States simply seeks a reversion to the pre-conflict status quo. If either foreign leader assesses that regime change is a goal of the West, the conflict could quickly escalate.

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In addition to these conventional attacks, the United States should consider clandestine operations employing special forces teams that would degrade adversary military capabilities. These attacks do not need to be as immediate as the conventional attacks, but they should surprise the adversaries in terms of the damage done. If there are novel capabilities not employed by the West previously, this would be a suitable time to use them. The goal of these nonpublic attacks is to degrade enemy capabilities and demonstrate U.S. capabilities to adversary leadership with the plausible deniability of secret operations. PRC and RF leaders will not be forced to discuss these attacks in public and thus the potential humiliation or backlash that could come from these attacks is less likely. In other words, these operations should do serious damage while allowing Putin and Xi to save face. Once these actions have taken place, the United States should offer off-ramps to the RF and the PRC, while also making clear that the United States will continue fighting and may have to resort to nuclear use.

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WHAT ARE THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH A MILITARY RESPONSE?

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The most significant immediate risk is nuclear escalation. Other risks include the PRC and RF retaliating against the U.S. homeland and allies by other means, including conventional, cyber, or space attacks. The risks of not responding, however, include a loss of U.S. credibility, a breakdown in the U.S. alliance system, and a further weakening of the rules-based global order. Moreover, perceptions of “successful” use of nuclear weapons could increase proliferation pressures around the world.

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Non-Kinetic Response Options

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In addition to military responses to nuclear use, there are several other means by which the United States and its allies can pursue the primary and secondary strategic goals discussed previously. The president, with allies, should take non-kinetic actions against the RF and PRC to punish the use of nuclear weapons and demonstrate the costly repercussions of nuclear use. These actions should be taken along with the military responses described above. Potential non-kinetic responses include the following:

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Financial punishments: The United States could utilize the tools of the global financial system to hurt the PRC and RF economies. These tools may have limited utility in 2027, however, as both countries have worked to limit, to the extent possible, their economic vulnerabilities. Additional use of these tools may be necessary, but they will further the decoupling of adversaries from the global economic system led by the United States.

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Cyberattacks: The United States should consider conducting cyberattacks on the adversaries that are initially limited and measured, but which signal the possibility of pursuing attacks with greater effect if the conflict continues. This action does risk a dangerous escalation of cyber conflict — also unprecedented to date — so these actions must be calibrated very carefully. Attacks should avoid military command and control capabilities or otherwise blinding the adversary in such a way that they misinterpret the attacks as being the prelude to a larger attack.

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Diplomatic statements: In the days and weeks following the nuclear attacks, U.S. and allied leaders should make strong statements to all audiences — foreign and domestic — about how the PRC and RF have broken a long-standing taboo in international relations. In addition, Washington should work with allies and all other like-minded states to write and publicize a unified statement of condemnation from leaders around the world (with as diverse a geographic grouping as possible). In addition, a UN General Assembly resolution, such as the one following Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2022, would help send the message that the international community disapproves of the nuclear use. These condemnations may not affect RF and PRC actions in the immediate term, but the lack of global condemnation following the first nuclear use since World War II would undermine the nuclear taboo moving forward.

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In making public statements about the nuclear attacks, the United States and its allies must consider how other members of the international community will perceive nuclear use — namely, was it successful for the attackers? The most important message to convey will be that nuclear attacks do not allow states to succeed in territorial aggrandizement. The existing global nuclear order has dealt with many challenges to date, and this nuclear use would be a grave one, but there are indications that the order would be able to survive this challenge.

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It is worth emphasizing here that improving U.S. and allied relations with states within the Global South before this notional conflict in 2027 is paramount. Though the international community broadly supported the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s attack on Ukraine, there have been fewer governments that have unilaterally condemned the attack or Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling, even among members of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a treaty that explicitly bans nuclear threats.

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Conclusion

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The notional 2027 scenario discussed in this paper would pose significant challenges to U.S. leadership in the immediate and longer term. At best, the 82-year-old nuclear taboo is broken but further nuclear escalation is prevented. The United States is able to end both conflicts on favorable terms that punish the adversary’s militaries for nuclear use. Taiwan remains an autonomous democracy with a strong economy. Allies and partners remain committed to their security arrangements with the United States. Competition between the United States and both powers continues, but the PRC and RF are chastened. The message is clear that the use of nuclear weapons is not a means of achieving geopolitical goals, and the norm against their use is maintained.

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The worst outcome is almost too horrible to imagine but must be contemplated: large nuclear exchanges that devastate massive swaths of nations on all sides of the conflict.

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Somewhere in the middle of these extremes, a large nuclear conflict is averted, but the use of nuclear weapons and the resulting fear of being targeted make allies and partners reconsider whether they want to be in a defensive alliance. In a world with fewer allies and partners, Washington would lose a great deal of influence to shape the norms and institutions that make up the global order. This outcome likely would hasten the end of any remaining notion of a U.S.-led global order.

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Because so much is at stake, the most significant takeaway from this analysis is the importance of trying to deter such conflict in the first place. As described above, there are several ways in which the United States can improve readiness and signal its resolve. Once nuclear weapons are used in war, one cannot predict how conflict will escalate. Because nuclear weapons present an existential threat to humanity, there is nothing more important than avoiding nuclear war.

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Presidential Prudence and Responding to Strategic Deterrence Failure

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Ankit Panda

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U.S. presidents, their advisers, and military planners must take seriously the possibility of limited nuclear use by adversaries in a range of plausible future contingencies. Resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons may appear attractive to U.S. adversaries as a means of seeking undeniable military and political advantage while simultaneously communicating exceptional resolve, risk acceptance, and stakes. In this way, the detonation of one — or multiple — nuclear weapons with deliberately lower yields on strictly military targets in the course of a conventional war or an intense crisis could compel the president of the United States, in their capacity as commander-in-chief, to weigh several risky response options, none of which may be particularly optimal across the full set of U.S. national objectives as articulated in peacetime.

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As Thomas Schelling observed in 1961, reflecting contemporaneously on the Berlin crisis (1958–1961), intense crises between nuclear-armed adversaries are usefully conceived of as games of competitive risk-taking, where the military effects of nuclear use may be a secondary consideration to the resolve conveyed. “We should plan for a war of nerve, of demonstration, and of bargaining, not of tactical target destruction,” Schelling observed. He added that should the United States resort to the use of nuclear weapons against Soviet military targets over Berlin, “destroying the target is incidental to the message the detonation conveys to the Soviet leadership.” For Schelling, prevailing in the crisis over Berlin would require “impress[ing] the Soviet leadership with the risk of general war — a war that may occur whether we or they intend it or not.” Limited nuclear use — or limited nuclear war — thus was an option meant specifically to communicate to the Soviet Union that the United States would be willing to tolerate exceptionally high risks to achieve the political ends it sought at the time. Today, military planners contemplating limited nuclear use may believe that target choice is more than an incidental matter; however, impressing on the adversary the prospect of an uncontrollable lurch toward Armageddon will remain central to such a choice. Adversaries need not be irrational or deliberately seeking nuclear escalation to contemplate such actions; all it may take for limited nuclear use to be attractive is that adversary leaders see that step as being less bad than the alternatives, which may include conventional defeat.

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Schelling’s prescriptions, written in 1961, may appear somewhat uncontroversial to U.S. audiences familiar with the history of the Cold War and U.S. interests in central Europe in the 1960s. Yet it is not inconceivable that should Russia, China, or North Korea choose in the twenty-first century to rationally resort to limited, nuclear first-use, their calculations will rest on a similar logic. Just as a U.S. president might have resorted to a nuclear detonation to convey a greater stake in the fate of Berlin to the Soviet leadership in 1961, so too might Russian president Vladimir Putin, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, or North Korean leader Kim Jong Un seek to “impress” on a U.S. president that running a risk of a general — possibly spasmodic — nuclear war over nuclear strikes on military targets is simply a risk not worth running. This logic underscoring the potential appeal of limited nuclear use is essentially deductive. To be sure, any nuclear use by U.S. adversaries would represent a world-altering event and the unambiguous manifestation of what U.S. deterrence planners consider “strategic deterrence failure,” but there remains a meaningful difference between successful war termination between nuclear-armed adversaries following limited nuclear use and war termination after a large-scale nuclear exchange. This difference may, quite literally, be measured in the millions-of-human-lives lost.

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The Project Atom study asks its authors to consider a particularly sobering scenario of limited nuclear use. U.S. adversaries — specifically, Russia and China — escalate to limited nuclear use in order to compel the United States to back away from continuing military action. In the scenario assigned to the authors, both Russia and China resort to nuclear first-use, paired with signals designed to convey their willingness to run greater risks than the United States. In the scenario, both Beijing and Moscow reference each other’s military actions, including the other’s nuclear strikes, and a strong collusive logic appears to drive each adversary’s willingness to run risks. While such a scenario may not cohere to how subject matter experts versed in the decisionmaking and bureaucratic idiosyncrasies of the Russian and Chinese political systems might conceive of pathways to limited nuclear use by those states, it represents something close to a worst-case scenario for strategic deterrence failure manifesting in near-simultaneous nuclear use by two near-peer U.S. adversaries in different theaters. Notably, the scenario also features a resort to nuclear use by both adversaries following exceptional U.S. and allied conventional successes: in Europe, the United States’ NATO allies successfully seize a substantial portion of Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast and, in the Indo-Pacific, the United States successfully interdicts an amphibious invasion force destined for Taiwan.

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Given the problem described above and the prescribed scenario, this paper answers the query posed by the Project Atom study — namely, how the United States should respond to limited nuclear use — by centering the role of the U.S. president in nuclear decisionmaking. U.S. presidents, despite their limited briefings on U.S. nuclear capabilities and policies in peacetime, are unlikely to reason about matters of intra-war deterrence, escalation control, and war termination in a real crisis in the same manner that nuclear strategists writing about these matters in peacetime from their comfortable perches at research institutes might. Put simply, presidents are likely to be inordinately fearful of general nuclear war in the aftermath of limited nuclear use and averse to the possibility of even a single nuclear warhead detonating on U.S. territory. This may be the case even if presidential advisers and intelligence assessments do not necessarily ascribe a high probability to further nuclear escalation in the prescribed scenario. Given that the president is solely imbued with the authority to issue valid and legal orders to release nuclear weapons, any analysis of likely and plausible U.S. response options must center how current and future presidents may weigh response options. Despite however many options are in place or requirements provided in peacetime, a U.S. president cannot be compelled by their military advisers to seek any particular course of action in a given crisis. Given this, this paper largely argues that should Russia and China resort to partially collusive, deliberate, limited nuclear use in simultaneous crises, as specified in the Project Atom scenario, most plausible U.S. presidents — individuals who are overwhelmingly likely to be politicians, unversed in the finer points of nuclear strategy — will likely be compelled to stand down instead of engaging in competitive nuclear risk-taking. These men and women, whoever they may be, are overwhelmingly likely to find themselves worrying about the prospect of general nuclear war — or the “final failure” — as John F. Kennedy once did at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

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If this is true, there is little doubt that several self-professed U.S. national objectives as articulated in peacetime would come under substantial stress, with potentially far-reaching consequences for U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy. This is ultimately the cost of strategic deterrence failure and why the United States must take the prospect of averting any nuclear use anywhere seriously. Other scenarios, including those featuring opportunistic limited nuclear use by one peer, may lead a president to accept greater risks, but this is outside of the scope of this study. As this essay will discuss, prudent planning for such failure can ensure that a U.S. president that may choose to avoid running the risk of nuclear escalation remains able to seek a world after strategic deterrence failure that is somewhat favorable for the United States. This can also be a world where the consequences of having resorted to limited nuclear use do not entail strategic victory for Russia and China, but rather a narrow, costly, pyrrhic victory.

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Fundamental Questions for the United States

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In reasoning about possible responses to strategic deterrence failure manifesting in limited nuclear use, U.S. leaders, advisers, and planners must be clear about the key national objectives and their relative levels of priority. In the event of strategic deterrence failure, the chief U.S. objective should be to ensure the avoidance of a general, unlimited nuclear war that could lead to fundamentally unacceptable levels of damage against the U.S. homeland as a result of adversary counterforce or countervalue strikes. Democratically elected U.S. presidents, charged by voters with defending the homeland, are likely to consider any nuclear attacks on U.S. territory as tantamount to unacceptable damage. Despite the somewhat methodical Cold War origins of this terminology, in the context of the given scenario, presidents are unlikely to be persuaded by their military advisers that the United States can ride out limited nuclear strikes and continue to exist as it did precrisis. This consideration presents an obvious and uncomfortable source of friction with U.S. assurances to allies as delivered in peacetime, a matter to which we will return later in this essay.

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Avoiding general kinetic damage against the homeland in the course of an ongoing war should thus be a key consideration for the president and should be prioritized above all other considerations, including, in the context of the scenario, supporting Taiwanese and Ukrainian objectives, supporting NATO and East Asian allies, and generally preserving the international order. These goals will remain operative but are fundamentally secondary to the survival and protection of the U.S. homeland. Because strategic deterrence failure of any magnitude is likely to be a world-altering event, it is quite likely that the precise circumstances of initial adversary nuclear use should cause a reassessment of key U.S. objectives. While the prescriptions that follow will make for unsettling reading in allied capitals, they should not be taken as a recommendation for the United States to exit the business of extended deterrence altogether. There are several plausible limited nuclear use scenarios that do not feature collusion as outlined in the Project Atom scenario where U.S. presidents may be substantially more willing to run risks in the defense of allies, but the scenario at hand here presents a particularly devilish predicament: the possibility of follow-on collusion by Moscow and Beijing in a general nuclear war against the United States.

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That said, strategic deterrence failure should not paralyze the United States in its ability to respond entirely. While restoring the territorial status quo ex ante in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific in the given scenario may not be possible at acceptable levels of cost to the United States, Washington should nevertheless seek to dissuade and deter further adversary nuclear use and terminate conflict on terms that would be deemed acceptable, if not entirely favorable. Critically, following strategic deterrence failure, U.S. adversaries will be correct in their assessment that their stakes — over Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively — are greater than those of the United States given the objectives articulated above. This is especially likely to be the case if Putin and Xi resorted to nuclear use out of desperation to preserve their political control and out of a belief that maintaining their territorial integrity requires running the risk of a nuclear exchange over these territories. Even if U.S. grand strategy and decades of investment in a global order that seeks to proscribe aggressive territorial revisionism may be at risk, many presidents may nevertheless opt for prudence in averting escalation.

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While the president’s advisers might point out that Russia and China, like the United States, would also be fearful of a general nuclear war — undoubtedly correctly — and that the U.S. nuclear force is survivable to the point of assuring their destruction should escalation prove uncontrollable, prudent presidential leadership would still have to consider the stepwise process of escalation after a U.S. nuclear response. As a result, the prioritization of the survival of the United States as a key national objective is likely to prompt such a prudent president to abstain from responses that could heighten the probability of a general nuclear war.

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Nevertheless, the president should be ready to employ the full array of tools from across the diplomacy-information-military-economics (DIME) spectrum to achieve the above-stated U.S. objectives as well as possible. Many of these steps can be planned for and conceived of well outside the immediate confines of a crisis, including the crises specified in the Project Atom scenario.

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Preventing adversary nuclear use and strategic deterrence failure will rest on manifesting in the mind of adversarial leaders the prospect of intolerable costs should they proceed, while simultaneously conveying that nuclear use is unlikely to confer tactical or strategic benefit. For both Putin and Xi, the most substantial cost likely relates to their personal political control over their respective states. While the United States should not unambiguously indicate that any nuclear use would lead to an end of their regimes, its declaratory signaling should maintain calculated ambiguity while conveying that catastrophic costs would ensue. While deterrence should prioritize a willingness to hold at risk what adversaries value most, threatening the personal political control or broader regime security of nuclear-armed great power adversaries is unlikely to advance U.S. interests — either in the scenario at hand or in general terms. Issuing such signals, by contrast, is likely to powerfully disabuse adversaries of any deliberate restraint that may still seem valuable after their limited nuclear use, rendering the prospect of follow-on uncontrollable escalation far more likely. In essence, such signaling by the United States would have the effect of further heightening the stakes for adversarial leaders to essentially existential levels concerning their personal political control. Successful war termination for the United States following limited nuclear use will require forbearance on such messaging. A practical problem for the United States, however, will be its noisy domestic political environment, where prominent political figures, including lawmakers from the president’s own party and the opposition, will likely issue calls for regime change or at least the removal of these leaders. U.S. adversaries will likely be unable to disentangle this “noise” from the “signal” of deliberate presidential messaging and assurances.

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At higher levels of escalation — particularly, follow-on strikes initiated by Russia and China — U.S. messaging could adopt the position that general nuclear war is a real possibility and would mean the effective end of Putin’s and Xi’s political control. The United States should simultaneously seek to maintain a robust set of flexible and responsive conventional capabilities, including capabilities forward-deployed to both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. It should also seek to enable its allies and partners in the regions to proffer similar capabilities while ensuring integrated military planning and operations with these allies. Critically, U.S. messaging in the course of a crisis prior to strategic deterrence failure should be contingent: emphasizing that consequences will befall adversaries should they choose to transgress the nuclear threshold, but that, by contrast, those same consequences will not befall adversaries should they choose to abstain from nuclear employment.

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U.S. Strategic Objectives

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It is useful to reflect on the factors inherent in the scenario that appear to precipitate a resort by both Russia and China to limited nuclear use. In the scenario, the most critical cause of strategic deterrence failure appears to be the result of two factors. First, leaders in both Russia and China, fearing conventional defeat and having experienced substantial conventional setbacks, are likely primed to reach into their nuclear holsters. Successful conventional denial, in other words, prompts these leaders to view nuclear weapons as a useful offset — for tactical, strategic, and psychological reasons. Second, both Putin and Xi appear to believe — probably correctly — that nuclear use will powerfully convey both their resolve and the substantial asymmetry in stakes that exists for them versus the United States.

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They may further believe that despite professed U.S. diplomatic and other assurances to allies in peacetime, a U.S. president in wartime may be deterred from employing disproportionate force, including through the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, due to the prospect of uncontrollable escalation. Within the confines of the scenario, deterrence failure may have been averted through protracted conventional warfighting, even if this would entail substantial costs to the armed forces of the United States and its allies. Swift conventional success by the United States and its allies appears to have been a powerful motivator for both Russia and China to reach for their nuclear holsters. Deterrence failure in the scenario in no small part appears to be intertwined with both Putin and Xi fundamentally miscalculating the odds of conventional victory.

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In both the Indo-Pacific and Europe, the United States’ core objectives prior to strategic deterrence failure are to deter significant escalation, to preserve the territorial status quo, to reassure its allies, and to preserve the international norm against territorial conquest. Following strategic deterrence failure, no objective should be greater for the U.S. president than ensuring that the survival of the country is not threatened by the prospect of uncontrollable escalation into a general nuclear war.

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Victory for the United States within the presented scenario is far from straightforward despite the formidable conventional successes of allied forces in Europe and U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific. A president and their expert advisers may disagree on the precise contours of victory in a crisis like the one envisaged in the scenario — just as President Kennedy and many of the key ExComm members (with the exception of George Ball) disagreed about the advisability of the Jupiter deal in the final days of the Cuban Missile Crisis. After strategic deterrence failure, a president may be rendered exceptionally sober by the prospect of general nuclear war — what Kennedy called the “final failure” — and be willing to take exceptional steps to seek prompt war termination, even on terms that would have been nominally unacceptable to that same president prior to adversary nuclear use.

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On the contrary, should a president choose to accept the risk of further nuclear escalation and retaliate in kind — either with nuclear weapons or a massive conventional attack — victory could amount to a decision by the adversary to seek termination of the conflict to avoid further damage to their nations or their political control. Because this latter option is far more contingent and depends on variables that may be fundamentally unknowable in the midst of a crisis (such as Putin’s and Xi’s proximal risk acceptance), it bears substantially greater risks. Should the U.S. president seek to sue for war termination following adversary nuclear use, there likely would be severe, unprecedented, and — from the vantage point of peacetime — intolerable consequences to how the United States’ capability to project power globally, to reassure allies at a distance, and to hold global leadership would be perceived. In such an event, the casualty would largely be the United States’ extended deterrence guarantees; a U.S. president would have palpably demonstrated that they are unwilling to run the risk of a nuclear war that could cause damage to the homeland to back its allies. But, in general, the United States would be able to maintain robust deterrence of adversaries for other scenarios, such as attacks on U.S. territory itself. The potentially fatal blow to the U.S. system of extended deterrence thus further underscores the severity of any strategic deterrence failure scenario involving limited nuclear use, but especially the collusive scenario articulated in Project Atom. As mentioned earlier, this analysis should not be taken as a repudiation of extended deterrence, but instead as an appraisal of the challenges to sustaining U.S. allied commitments in the aftermath of the precise limited nuclear use scenario at hand. Even if the course of action recommended here may heighten the probability of allied nuclear proliferation, this outcome — with its many uncertainties — may be preferable to inviting greater escalation by resorting to reciprocal nuclear attacks.

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Assuring Allies

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The risks of allies questioning U.S. credibility in the event of strategic deterrence failure are substantial and likely insurmountable in the context of the scenario provided if Washington pursues a course of action that prioritizes its own national survival and immunity from nuclear attack. Allied leaders and a U.S. president will likely have a divergent sense of risk acceptance following strategic deterrence failure. For the presidents of the Philippines and Poland, in particular, nuclear use on their territories will be seen as a cataclysmic deterrence failure verging on an existential threat. For the United States, that same assessment would not hold, but the possibility of further damage in a general nuclear war would likely cause any prudent U.S. president to weigh the trade-off in supporting allies and averting damage to the homeland.

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There are likely conventional options that the president could adopt to inflict military costs on adversaries for nuclear use that would maintain an acceptable level of risk of follow-on nuclear escalation, but these may be insufficient for allied leaders and publics that could be motivated to see a U.S. nuclear response out of a desire for retributive damage against Russia and China. As a result, it is highly likely that following strategic deterrence failure, allied perceptions of the credibility of the United States would suffer drastically unless Washington opted for nuclear use in kind, which would present substantial risks and is unlikely to be preferable to the alternatives presented to most plausible presidents. As much as expert advisers to any president might profess support for U.S. alliances in peacetime, they might find that in the heart of a bona fide nuclear crisis, concerns about credibility are simply unpersuasive to a president concerned first and foremost with averting a pathway to nuclear war. This was precisely the predicament that arose in the final days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when several ExComm members were opposed to Kennedy’s willingness to contemplate an off-ramp by way of withdrawing U.S. intermediate-range missiles deployed to Turkey, a NATO ally. Notably, adversary limited nuclear use against allies may be unlikely to prompt the same kind of national outrage and fervor that drove the United States to run risks in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor (1941) and September 11 (2001) attacks on the homeland. The sole exception may be the Chinese strike specified in the scenario, which hits a U.S. naval base and presumably results in the deaths of thousands of U.S. servicemembers. This could encourage a president to accept greater risks in responding to China, though likely still well under the nuclear threshold.

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A president may further inquire how best to signal resolve to U.S. allies throughout the crisis. They may then be told that the most effective means of signaling resolve to allies would be to meet adversary nuclear use with some form of proportionate nuclear use. There are substantial risks to this, however. First, a proportionate response in the eyes of U.S. military planners may be interpreted as escalatory by the adversary and, therefore, potentially could prompt further escalation. Second, by employing nuclear weapons, the United States would concede substantial normative credibility that could be valuable in shaping global diplomatic narratives in a post-conflict environment (including with nonaligned states). The United States could aim to signal resolve to allies by inflicting calibrated, proportionate damage against adversary forces implicated in the nuclear strikes described in the scenario with its conventional forces. This is unlikely to sufficiently convey resolve as allies may not find a conventional response to nuclear use on their territory as satisfactory. While allies may not be uniform in this assessment of a conventional response, U.S. experts and officials, in consultations with allies, from East Asia to Europe, repeatedly contend with demands that nuclear use be met with nuclear retaliation.

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Military Response Options

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There are four basic categories of military response that could be considered in the course of the Project Atom scenario. First, a U.S. president could choose to forgo all military options and focus solely on war termination by diplomatic means. Second, a U.S. president could opt for a conventional response — either one designed to inflict tailored, proportionate damage, or one designed to disproportionately retaliate for nuclear use without employing nuclear weapons. Third, a U.S. president could opt for a nuclear response designed to inflict tailored, proportionate damage. Finally, a U.S. president could opt to seek escalation dominance and up the ante with significant nuclear use while communicating to the adversary U.S. resolve to escalate further should it be necessary to accomplish U.S. and allied objectives.

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Of these options, the first and second will hold the greatest practical appeal for any prudent U.S. president, who is unlikely to be versed in the strategic rationales for an in-kind or escalatory nuclear response and more concerned with preserving the safety, integrity, and survival of the United States itself. The first option may be unappealing, however, due to it appearing tantamount to complete strategic defeat. (Presidents may consider their own political legacies in weighing responses too.) Following strategic deterrence failure, there is likely an extremely low probability that the United States can, at acceptable levels of risk to the homeland, optimize for all its core strategic objectives, including reassuring its allies. As a result, a prescription for the president could be two-fold. First, they should opt for a limited conventional strike against the nonstrategic and regional nuclear force units involved in the strikes against Poland and the Philippines. At the same time, the president should employ a diplomatic strategy that seeks to persuade these allies as to the inadvisability of a nuclear response, which could beget further nuclear use against their territories (including against nonmilitary targets or military targets more proximal to population centers).

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While allies may be unpersuaded and motivated by a retributive logic demanding nuclear use, it is equally possible that internal fissures within allied governments and domestic political forces may support U.S. goals in persuading allies of the sufficiency of a conventional response. To deter further nuclear use by adversaries, the president should be willing to allude to intolerable and extreme consequences while underscoring to the broader world that the United States differentiates itself from Russia and China in viewing nuclear weapons as tools of last resort for truly extreme circumstances — not as a mere offset to the possibility of conventional defeat, as Moscow and Beijing have demonstrated in the scenario.

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Critics may counter that Russia and China resorted to nuclear use precisely because of U.S. and allied conventional military successes — and so why should a conventional response deter further nuclear use? The answer to this question rests on the logic of nuclear use by both countries in the first place. If both leaders crossed the nuclear Rubicon out of a belief that a single instance of limited nuclear use would paralyze the United States into inaction, the willingness to continue conventional military operations would disabuse them of this notion. By “fighting through” nuclear use and continuing to inflict costs without relying on nuclear weapons, the United States would deny Moscow and Beijing the political benefits of their limited nuclear use. Should Russia and China seek to deprive the United States of this option, they may be forced to opt for additional nuclear strikes against U.S. and allied forces, significantly raising the prospects of a total war across two hemispheres alongside the prospect of general nuclear war with the United States. If Putin and Xi remain rational, they may see no benefit in upping the ante in this game of competitive risk-taking, and instead may seek to minimize their further losses while retaining political control.

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The reason for not recommending that the president seek a tailored nuclear response or adopt an escalation dominance mindset and seek to escalate with nuclear weapons is because both options present substantial drawbacks and an unacceptable level of risk of a general nuclear war that would be most ruinous to the United States. Even assuming a small probability of escalation by the adversary should be sobering for a president given the consequences that could ensue. In the case of a tailored nuclear response option, U.S. adversaries may fail to be deterred if they continue to believe that their stakes in resolving their short-term territorial conquests are greater than those of the United States. Putin and Xi would, in their own minds, likely be willing to believe this — especially if they see the stakes in the crises as having now grown to encompass their own political survivals and legacies. If this is the case, a tailored, proportionate U.S. nuclear response, even if correctly interpreted as proportionate by U.S. adversaries, may beget further adversary nuclear use. Neither Putin nor Xi may choose to escalate in the types of targets they choose to hold at risk — keeping retaliation confined to military targets — but could continue strikes on NATO and Philippine territory by focusing on military targets. The collusive logic that is at play in the scenario could also influence this decisionmaking as both Moscow and Beijing may understand that their continued choice to participate in a game of competitive nuclear risk-taking will force the United States to contend with the challenge of waging a general nuclear war simultaneously against both powers. Hewing to the damage-limiting principles that have guided U.S. nuclear strategy for decades simultaneously against Russia and China would be largely unfeasible, even if survivable U.S. systems could inflict massive damage in punishment against both aggressors. A collusive all-out nuclear attack by Russia and China against the United States with their surviving forces would still result in the practical end of U.S. civilization and society.

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An escalation dominance approach, meanwhile, would succeed in conveying U.S. resolve and likely persuade Xi and Putin that their assumptions about U.S. stakes in these conflicts may be incorrect. However, a substantial use of nuclear weapons by the United States against military targets in Russia and China runs a serious risk of generating concerns in both states about the possibility of their forces remaining intact and about the viability of their regimes themselves. Without robust means of communication with the national or senior military leadership of both countries, which cannot be taken for granted, the United States may be unable to assure Russia and China that its choice to opt for nuclear escalation was not the precursor to a massive, damage-limiting counterforce campaign or a broader war of regime change. Fear of either outcome will encourage both Putin and Xi to contemplate larger-scale nuclear use. Because U.S. and allied combined military posture in the Indo-Pacific and Europe will also consist in the scenario timeframe of precise, conventional munitions, adversaries will have to also account for the possibility of massive, supplemental, conventional counterforce strikes. This option, while appealing for what it might convey about U.S. credibility to adversaries and allies alike, generates the greatest possibility of massive adversary nuclear use, which would result in unacceptable damage to the U.S. homeland. It would not be advisable for a president to run these risks immediately; instead, they should seek to maximize U.S. goals through the nonnuclear means articulated above, at least initially.

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There is a meaningful difference between the preceding two options in terms of how they might prompt reactions from Russia and China. Russia, which is known to incorporate a degree of counterforce targeting itself, may be more willing than China to run greater risks by attempting to destroy U.S. nuclear forces preemptively. In the 2028 timeframe specified in the Project Atom scenario, China’s nuclear forces will remain quantitatively inferior to those of the United States, and Chinese leaders would likely be deterred by the prospect of assured U.S. retaliation. As a result, it is substantially more likely that, even if opting for escalation dominance, U.S.-China nuclear exchanges could take place across several steps before either side considers massive nuclear strikes against the other. Despite this, Chinese leaders may remain pathologically vulnerable to fears of a disarming U.S. counterforce strike; these fears could be compounded by 2028 with the deployment of additional missile defense and conventional long-range strike assets in the Indo-Pacific.

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Regardless of U.S. objectives, it will be in the interest of the United States to have adversaries remain less concerned about the possibility of a massive, damage-limiting first strike than about limited retaliation (either nuclear or conventional). Additionally, the United States should endeavor to avoid feeding adversary expectations that it seeks to end their political control or regimes. The key to successful war termination will differ with regard to both Russia and China. For China and Xi, inflicting substantial enough damage to the People’s Liberation Army’s conventional and amphibious landing forces to render seizing and controlling Taiwan unfeasible will confer bargaining leverage. With Russia, the United States and NATO may try to use seized territory in Kaliningrad to sue for war termination with Putin. If either Putin or Xi begin to exhibit particular psychological pathologies indicating irrational risk acceptance (which cannot be ruled out), these assumptions may not hold, and the United States may be forced to contemplate greater escalation than might otherwise be prudent. Given the impossibility of predicting irrational decisionmaking pathologies in a serious nuclear crisis, further elaboration on this point will not be provided, though it does bear consideration.

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U.S. planners must also consider the law of armed conflict. Adversaries will expect a U.S. nuclear or conventional response to adhere to publicly stated prewar principles, which include an emphasis on counterforce targeting and compliance with the law of armed conflict. This should rule out adversary expectations of countervalue strikes (deliberate attacks against major urban population centers and other nonmilitary targets). However, this will likely also heighten adversary fears about a possible damage-limiting strike against their nuclear forces, command and control, and other enabling capabilities. While the United States will be unable to disabuse adversaries of its long-stated interests in damage limitation, to the extent possible, any U.S. nuclear or substantial kinetic response should be accompanied by assurances that it does not seek to destroy adversary nuclear forces or sever adversary national leadership from key military functions. To this end, a response should be accompanied by public and private messaging (if feasible) designed to indicate tailored punishment against military units implicated in the execution of nuclear strikes. There is no reason the United States should deliberately seek to eschew the law of armed conflict in navigating responses to the scenario at hand.

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Non-Kinetic Response Options

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The president would have a wide array of non-kinetic options available in the event of strategic deterrence failure. Choices would include broad diplomatic messaging to allies, partners, and the nonaligned world aimed at obtaining unconditional condemnation of Russia and China for resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons in war in more than 80 years. The president could simultaneously marshal U.S. diplomatic resources to seek a broad, international coalition condemning both countries. It is likely that certain nonaligned states or states more aligned with Russia and China would opt to blame the United States for Russian and Chinese nuclear use, citing well-trodden narratives built up over years by Moscow and Beijing about U.S. alliances, military posture, and other factors. The United States should be ready to actively counter this, including by declassifying intelligence as much as possible to demonstrate that nuclear use was a result of desperation for both Putin and Xi. Given the severity of the scenario and the implications for U.S. interests, the president should be willing to authorize broad declassification that would serve these ends, even at the cost of possibly compromising sensitive sources and methods.

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Practically, the United States would likely also seek to enhance international economic sanctions, but the efficacy of these sanctions is likely to be limited; in anticipation of a decision to employ nuclear weapons, Putin and Xi would likely have expected such a response and have been undeterred by the prospect, as their limited nuclear use exhibits. Other non-kinetic options could include cyber operations against both Russia and China. These could be carried out for a range of objectives, including sowing a narrative within both countries that seeks to convey to the Russian and Chinese people the erratic character of their national leadership; seeking intelligence on likely follow-on military action following deterrence failure; and, finally, undermining Russian and Chinese military operations. Out of caution, the president should ensure that U.S. offensive cyber operations, to the extent feasible, do not affect Russian or Chinese assertive political control over their own nuclear — or broader military — forces. In general, cyber operations, if detected, could prove escalatory. The president should be particularly cautious about authorizing operations aimed at penetrating sensitive systems related to strategic situational awareness or command and control, which could raise the fears in both states about non-kinetic interference in their nuclear forces either as an end in itself or as a precursor to broader counterforce strikes.

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A chief purpose of U.S. non-kinetic efforts should be to maintain the normative higher ground, which will be valuable in a post-conflict environment with allies, partners, and nonaligned states alike. Even if allied governments view U.S. credibility as having taken a fatal hit following a decision to resort to a nonnuclear response, allied publics may be more readily persuaded by a U.S. choice to respond in a more limited fashion, particularly if Washington is able to make the case that opting for more escalatory responses would likely have resulted in nuclear strikes on their territories (and further nuclear strikes, in the case of Poland and the Philippines). For Russia and China, however, U.S. non-kinetic measures will largely be peripheral in shaping their cost-benefit calculations on further escalation.

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Conclusion

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It should be acknowledged that from the vantage point of peacetime in 2024, the above-stated analysis does not make for particularly encouraging reading. One does not need to have read this assessment of the scenario and U.S. response options to conclude that the strategic deterrence scenario presented likely portends “defeat” for the United States. However, this defeat should be construed narrowly: the United States likely fails to compel Russia and China away from seeking their territorial revisionist goals at substantial cost, but ultimately survives as a nation and polity to restore and seek influence in a post-conflict world. Writing about potential nuclear crises demands an abundance of imagination, and U.S. policymakers and planners should be clear-eyed about the possibilities that would remain for the country in a post-strategic deterrence failure world.

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The centrality of presidential decisionmaking about nuclear crises represents both a strength and a weakness in the analysis above. It is a strength because it contends with the often-heard dictum that military plans “never survive first contact with the enemy” — partly because reality is complex and inherently unpredictable, but also because the ineffable idiosyncrasies of presidential decisionmaking can only become known under the psychological and emotional stress of a real crisis. However, the choice to center the president and presidential guidance also represents an analytical limitation in reasoning about U.S. responses to limited nuclear use because it is inherently impossible to account for the various personalities that may one day be asked to reason about matters of nuclear war.

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Finally, for U.S. allies, this scenario presents the crystallization of long-held anxieties about extended deterrence. Indeed, as much as U.S. policymakers may see peacetime assurance demands from allies as a leaky sieve, they are born of well-placed anxieties about extended deterrence failing under extreme circumstances. Allied fears in this regard are not entirely misplaced and there are indeed scenarios, at the worst-case end of the spectrum, involving collusion by the United States’ two great power, near-peer, nuclear-armed adversaries that will bend and possibly break assurances made in peacetime. The Project Atom scenario could be one such example. Analytically, however, this should not condemn extended deterrence to the status of a bluff. Instead, the United States and its allies should be ready to consult, plan, and game out various strategic deterrence failure scenarios to ensure that they can be averted in the first place. For instance, in the provided scenario, it appears that escalation to nuclear use by Russia in the European theater was driven by Polish and Lithuanian conventional operations into Kaliningrad without a central decision by NATO or broader consultations with the United States. Ensuring coordination and strategic synchronicity between the United States and its allies will be key to avoiding the worst in high-intensity conventional crises. Finally, beyond the working- and expert-level tracks, U.S. assurances must be supplemented by high-level political engagement with allies, underscoring in particular the special role of the president in U.S. nuclear decisionmaking.

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Above all, this analysis should also underscore the essential importance of averting strategic deterrence failure in the first place. The hard choices U.S. nuclear-armed adversaries could force upon the United States by resorting to limited nuclear use are ones no president should be asked to consider.

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Basis and Elements of a Strategy for Multiparty, Intra-War Nuclear Deterrence

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Melanie W. Sisson

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Though much is known about nuclear explosions — their physics, their mechanics, their effects — very little is known about their use as weapons of war. History provides analysts a single war in which nuclear weapons were detonated, and a small number of occasions in which decisionmakers are known to have seriously contemplated their use. This record is thin gruel upon which to make compelling inferences, or from which to draw solid conclusions.

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A paucity of empirical data, however, is not evidence that nuclear weapons cannot — or will never — be used again. Nor does it exempt civilian policymakers and military practitioners from the responsibility of preparing to make choices about nuclear employment.

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Policymakers confronting a situation in which they find it necessary to consider whether, when, which, and how many nuclear weapons to use will have to answer questions that are at once philosophical and practical, moral and material, urgent and permanent. If they are of stable temperament and rational inclination, then policymakers will seek methodical ways with which to weigh the value of nuclear restraint against that of nuclear action. Such approaches will produce clarity in defining strategic objectives and war aims, intellectual empathy for the adversary’s decision calculus, and creativity in the operational art of designing alternative military courses of action.

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Scenario analysis is one method for comparing the advantages and disadvantages of alternative courses of action and, for strategists and planners, serves the same purpose as practice does for teams in any discipline: it doesn’t make perfect, but it does make progress. Each phase of a scenario exercises the thought processes involved in aligning military operations with war aims, and war aims with strategic objectives, under conditions in which some variables that might affect the likelihood of success are foreseeable and controllable, and some are not. In this way, scenarios pull assumptions to the surface, inspect their implications, and then test courses of action for consistency of logic, fidelity to principle, and resiliency to changes in condition.

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Scenario analyses, however, are abstractions of reality accompanied by storytelling — theory, reasoning, and argumentation. This is especially true for nuclear scenarios. There is, therefore, special risk in attending too much to a scenario’s mechanics and not enough to the concepts and commitments it calls into question. If nuclear war does move from being a possibility to being a reality, whatever the specifics, there is no evading the fact that what policymakers will be deciding is which and how many humans will not survive, or if any will survive at all.

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Analytic Assumptions

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The strategy developed here is premised on analysis of a two-theater, two-adversary, two intra-war nuclear launch scenario (referred to throughout as “the scenario”). Where information is not available — either because it does not exist or because it is not specified in the scenario — the strategy relies on a set of reasonable assumptions. Some assumptions are about the dynamics of nuclear war, because there hasn’t been one from which to draw historical evidence. Some are about decisionmaking in the United States, about which relatively much is known in general, but nothing at all in the context of a two-theater war that involves nuclear use. Other assumptions are made about the scenario’s adversaries, because little information about their respective decisionmaking processes is available in the scenario itself.

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There is no standard definition of what elevates nuclear use from being limited nuclear war to being general — “all-out” — nuclear war. In the 1960s, the U.S. government planned for its nuclear forces to be of a size and quality to be able to execute a retaliatory strike that would destroy “between 20 and 25 per cent of the enemy’s civilian population and between 50 and 75 per cent of his industrial capacity.” Applying this measure to the scenario means that general nuclear war would produce the immediate deaths of approximately 376–469 million people. A recent study by climate scientists calculates that if the belligerents in the scenario detonated sufficient warheads to achieve this mutual 25 percent casualty rate, then follow-on deaths from post-nuclear famine would reach approximately 2.5 billion people within two years.

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In the absence of any less arbitrary threshold, this strategy defines the lower bound of general nuclear war as the detonation by any one state of the number of nuclear weapons needed to produce a total yield sufficient to kill 25 percent of a belligerent’s population. Detonations that occur below that threshold constitute limited, not general, nuclear war. The strategy similarly assumes, based on the above, that general nuclear war in the scenario would destroy modern civilization and might even constitute a species-extinction event for much of biological life on earth, including humans. It assumes that governments would cease to function, and that there would be no meaning attached to the idea of nationhood, as individuals and collectives would instead be left to struggle to survive. In other words, the strategy assumes that the costs of general nuclear war are so extremely negative that they far exceed any benefits derived from the defeat and unconditional surrender of the adversary.

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The strategy also is built upon the recognition that there is no empirical basis upon which to make predictions about the dynamics of nuclear war. Specifically, once nuclear exchange has begun, there is no fact-based reason to presume that the likelihood of de-escalation, or of controlled escalation, is greater than the likelihood of unrestrained escalation. The strategy therefore assumes that all nuclear detonations have an unknown probability of creating an escalatory spiral, regardless of variation in their specific features — for example their type, location, yield, casualty rate, and so forth. Even relaxing this assumption and allowing the likelihood of escalation to general nuclear war to be low instead of unknown does not change the basic inequality. The magnitude of the costs of general nuclear war are so great that even very small probability estimates produce very large negative results — ones so destructive that they dwarf any possible positive results of victory.

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U.S. Strategic Objectives

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The strategy presented here assumes that U.S. policymakers are rational actors. This means they are sensitive to the costs, benefits, and probabilities of various courses of action and base their choice of action on estimates of expected value: the net positive or negative effect on U.S. interests produced by the outcome of each course of action, multiplied by that outcome’s probability of occurring. The strategy also assumes that U.S. decisionmakers assess that the extreme costs of general nuclear war exceed any potential benefits derived from the adversary’s total destruction, and that they are aware that the detonation of any nuclear weapon has the potential to result in an escalatory cycle that ultimately produces general nuclear war.

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Within the set of nonnuclear outcomes, the strategy assumes that policymakers consider the benefits of conventional victory to be greater than those of a negotiated settlement, and that both are greater than the benefits of total defeat. It also assumes policymakers judge the value of maximalist victory — the unconditional surrender of the adversary — and of a negotiated settlement to be greater than the costs of conventional war because, in the absence of this assumption, the incentive would be for the United States to withdraw.

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The expected values produced by these combinations of probabilities, costs, and benefits mean that U.S. policymakers will prefer all nonnuclear outcomes to all nuclear outcomes (Table 1).

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In the absence of information to the contrary, this strategy assumes that the scenario’s adversarial decisionmakers also are rational actors whose choices reflect their estimates of expected value. This assumption, however, does not require the adversaries to arrive at the same rank ordering of preferences over outcomes as the United States.

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image05 +▲ Table 1: Assumed U.S. Preferences over Outcomes

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In general, preference hierarchies can be classified as one of two types. Type-1 actors estimate that the costs of general nuclear war exceed any benefits derived from the adversary’s total destruction, whether by nuclear or conventional means. A Type-1 actor will therefore prefer all nonuse outcomes to all nuclear-use outcomes.

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Type-2 actors do not consider the costs of general nuclear war to exceed any benefits derived from the adversary’s total destruction, whether by nuclear or conventional means. A Type-2 actor can therefore prefer one or more nuclear-use outcomes to one or more nonuse outcomes. One possibility in the scenario, for example, is that one or both of the adversaries assesses that the expected value of general nuclear war is equal to or greater than the expected value of a defeat that requires conceding their political objectives and surrendering (Table 2).

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image06 +▲ Table 2: Example Rank Ordering of Rational Type-2 Adversary Preferences over Conflict Outcomes

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If either adversary is a Type-2 actor, and it concludes that the United States has maximalist war aims and estimates the probability of conventional loss to be high, then this preference ordering makes the Type-2 adversary more likely than a Type-1 adversary to initiate nuclear war, and very unlikely to exercise restraint in waging it. Other preference orderings are possible, though for all rank order profiles the key differentiator between adversary type is the relative value placed on nuclear-nonuse outcomes compared to nuclear-use outcomes.

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This strategy makes assumptions about the United States, as outlined above, that define it as a Type-1 actor. This classification might be incorrect. Even if it is correct at conflict initiation, policymaker views might change once war is underway; so long as decisionmaking is driven by humans, the decisions they make will be vulnerable to variations caused by the full range of human biases, frailties, emotions, and impulses. Nonetheless, the United States is assumed here to be a firmly Type-1 actor because this assumption is consistent with the scenario’s emphasis on seeking to deter, rather than to fight, nuclear war. The strategy does not make the same assumption about the adversaries and instead accepts the possibility that each might be either Type-1 or Type-2 — not for lack of hope that they are the former and not the latter, but rather to account for the uncertainty that they are.

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The assumed expected value calculations and resultant rank order establish preventing general nuclear war as the primary U.S. strategic objective. The secondary U.S. strategic objective is for there to be no additional nuclear detonation, of any type or yield, anywhere. This secondary objective is responsive to the horrific effects that all nuclear detonations have on humans, other animal species, and their habitats, and to the risk that additional nuclear launches might escalate to general nuclear war.

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In the scenario, the United States has joined wars in two theaters after adversarial attacks on allies and partners. U.S. political objectives and war aims in both regions are twofold: to demonstrate intolerance for wars of choice and to retain the sovereignty and autonomy of U.S. allies and partners. Because policymakers cannot eliminate the possibility that the adversaries are Type-2 actors, and because the primary U.S. strategic objective is to achieve a nonuse outcome, U.S. warfighting strategy must start from the premise that for all belligerents there is a set of possible, acceptable political outcomes short of maximalism that they can accept. Seeking such an outcome requires implementing a U.S. warfighting strategy that uses diplomatic, economic, and military measures to communicate that the United States does not seek regime change or societal collapse. The strategy must also demonstrate nuclear restraint by not engaging in tit-for-tat nuclear actions, including posture, alert, or deployment changes.

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Assuring Allies

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U.S. political objectives need to be supported, and its warfighting operations aided, by local allies in both regions in the scenario. Alliance discipline in communicating limited war aims is essential; inconsistent and mixed messages will undermine the ability of the United States to credibly signal both nuclear restraint and its desire to reach a mutually acceptable, negotiated settlement.

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As adversary confusion and the likelihood of misperception of U.S. intent increase, so does the likelihood of adversary nuclear use regionally and, ultimately, the likelihood of escalation to general nuclear war. The United States cannot impose signaling consistency upon its allies and partners, but they should regularly be reminded that mixed messages increase the risks of adversary nuclear use and escalation.

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In the scenario, U.S. allies across and within the two theaters differ in their reasons for entering into conflict, in the type and extent of the material contributions they make, and in their respective war’s immediate effects on their interests. Some allies might be dissatisfied with non-maximalist U.S. political objectives and wish to press for the adversaries to surrender on allied terms. The United States should attempt to address this objection by reinforcing that the purpose of limiting possible actions (e.g., nuclear use or nonuse) is to protect the alliances’ shared interest in averting the least favorable conflict outcomes: concession to the adversaries’ maximalist demands, or an uncontrolled escalatory spiral that begins with nuclear detonations, perhaps on allied territories, and that ultimately leads to general nuclear war.

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Allies might also take the view that the unwillingness of the United States to make nuclear threats or to use nuclear weapons on their behalf undermines long-standing U.S. policies of extended deterrence, and therefore increases their risk of being a victim of a nuclear strike. This misperceives key features of the post-detonation environment. In the first instance, the United States’ nonuse strategic objectives render as equivalent the security interests of U.S. allies and of the United States itself — nonuse is definitionally an “extended” objective. In the second, an environment in which an adversary has used conventional and nuclear weapons to attack a U.S. ally is one in which U.S. extended nuclear deterrence — adversary inaction produced by the threat of nuclear consequence — has failed.

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The possible reasons for detonating a U.S. nuclear weapon thereafter are three: to punish the adversary; as an element of a strategy to try to reassure allies by demonstrating that the United States will use nuclear weapons on their behalf; or as one element of a strategy aimed at deterring adversaries from additional nuclear use. Policymakers cannot be confident that the likelihood of producing these effects is greater than the likelihood of producing an escalatory spiral ending in general nuclear war. Because the primary U.S. objective of this strategy is to prevent general nuclear war, this risk of escalation means that the United States cannot use a nuclear weapon to punish the adversary, to try to assure allies, or to try to establish U.S. credibility and, on that basis, implement a new strategy of deterrence. This does not mean that the United States is not committed to its allies and their vital national security interests during the war. It does mean, however, that the United States’ obligation to defend them is addressed by the ongoing conventional fight and the strategic U.S. objectives of preventing additional nuclear detonation and general nuclear war.

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Military Response Options

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Achieving a nuclear nonuse outcome is commonly discussed under the rubric of intra-war deterrence. In this scenario, deterrence is applicable because military defeat of the adversaries is not possible. No matter how powerful and effective U.S. diplomatic, political, economic, and military measures are, they cannot render the adversary (or adversaries) incapable of continuing to fight: their nuclear arsenals will remain available for use even under conditions of international isolation, economic collapse, and conventional military defeat.

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Strategies of deterrence seek to alter adversary perceptions of the likelihood and magnitude of the benefits of an action in relation to the likelihood and magnitude of its costs. This assumes the actor is sensitive to costs, and that it has principles, people, objects, or assets that it values and prefers not to lose.

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The logic of deterrence, however, does not capture the full set of possible motivations for an adversary’s nonuse of nuclear weapons. An actor might choose to exercise nuclear restraint for one or some combination of at least seven reasons (Table 3).

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image07 +▲ Table 3: Possible Reasons for Adversary Nuclear Nonuse and its Applicability in the Near-Term, Two-Theater, Intra-War Nuclear Use Scenario

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Moral or ethical compunction and fear of technical failure can be considered if not impossible then at least highly unlikely to inhibit an actor from nuclear use in any conflict scenario in which that actor has already successfully detonated at least one nuclear weapon. In the scenario, it also is reasonable to assume that none of the belligerents is likely to assess that any one of them has the capability to mount a meaningfully protective defense against a concerted nuclear campaign. The United States therefore can seek to deter additional nuclear use through the threat of cost imposition — a strategy of conventional or nuclear deterrence — or it can seek to convince the adversaries to pursue a mutually acceptable, negotiated, political settlement.

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In the scenario, U.S. adversaries first used conventional war to achieve political aims despite the threat of substantial resistance, continued to fight despite a decreasing likelihood of prevailing, then escalated horizontally by attacking a U.S. defense treaty ally, and finally escalated again vertically through the detonation of a nuclear weapon. The scenario does not contain sufficient information to make any analytically sound inferences about how or why the initial U.S. warfighting strategy failed to deter the adversaries from nuclear use. This strategy therefore interprets these behaviors as indicating that the scenario adversaries are highly cost tolerant, a characteristic that decreases the likelihood that strategies of deterrence through threats of cost-imposition will be effective.

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The strategy assumes that in both theaters the initial U.S. conventional warfighting strategy was to impose conventional costs meaningful enough and substantial enough either to eliminate the adversary’s ability to continue to fight conventionally or to convince it to sue for peace — that is, to deter it from carrying on fighting. The scenario describes the war as ongoing, meaning that the United States has been unable to destroy the adversary’s conventional capabilities or to threaten the type and severity of costs that would convince it to abandon its war aims. Given that both adversaries detonated a nuclear weapon during the war, moreover, the conventional costs the United States imposed, and those it threatened, also were demonstrably not effective at deterring intra-war nuclear use.

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It is possible that the United States would eventually identify and be able to threaten conventional costs that could hurt the adversary sufficiently in a way it didn’t anticipate and thereby deter further nuclear use or persuade it to concede. Pursuing such a strategy of deterrence, however, is high in uncertainty and, therefore, also in risk. It is not possible to know prior to making the threat or imposing the consequence that it will have the desired effect. Each such attempt has some probability of resulting in escalation to further adversary nuclear use, and there is no way to know if that probability is high or low. Even if the quality of intelligence assessments and other information about the disposition and preference of the adversaries is quite high, such information cannot eliminate uncertainty about the adversary’s likely course of action.

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The effects produced by the threat of nuclear cost imposition in a strategy of intra-war deterrence are similarly uncertain. This approach risks cultivating the adversaries’ belief that they might be able to achieve their strategic or political objectives by engaging in nuclear brinkmanship and escalation.

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The risk of encouraging rather than deterring adversary nuclear use applies equally to threats to and attacks on the adversaries’ nuclear infrastructure, via conventional kinetic or cyber weapons, including on units or sites from which a tactical nuclear strike has been launched. Such an action would not only run the risk of initiating an escalatory spiral, but the possible colocation of tactical with strategic nuclear weapons also means that strikes meant as limited retaliations might be misconstrued as strategic first strikes intended to deplete the adversary’s second-strike capability. In this scenario such a perception would therefore be expected to increase the likelihood that an adversary would launch a nuclear weapon, and perhaps execute a massive attack, possibly against nuclear assets or civilian targets in the U.S. homeland.

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U.S. warfighting aims in each region therefore will be limited and focal. In both regions, U.S. warfighting strategy should use conventional forces to try to prevent either adversary from advancing the current lines of contact as described in the scenario, but not to advance the line of contact itself. All kinetic and cyber actions should target only adversary military units and assets. Attacks on the adversaries’ homelands should include only those military units and assets that have been directly engaged in conventional kinetic or confirmed cyber-warfighting activity, and all U.S. military actions should adhere to international humanitarian law. To the extent possible, the United States and allied forces should execute operational concepts that minimize the military utility of adversary tactical nuclear weapons.

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If an adversary does detonate another nuclear weapon anywhere, then the U.S. intra-war deterrence strategy has failed, and the president will have to assess current conditions and decide whether to continue to fight conventionally or to concede. The United States should not respond with its own use of a nuclear weapon in theater or elsewhere, given the possibility of escalation to general nuclear war. This is true even if the adversary launches one or more nuclear weapons against nuclear assets, industrial facilities, or civilian centers in the U.S. homeland. If the homeland strike is limited, the adversary still cannot be certain that the United States will not use its nuclear weapons in the future and therefore might still be deterred. The president would therefore, again, have to assess current conditions and decide whether to continue to fight conventionally or to concede. If the homeland strike exceeds the lower bound of general nuclear war (an explosive yield that kills 25 percent of the U.S. population), then the United States, insofar as it exists, destroys much but gains nothing by sending a salvo in return.

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Non-Kinetic Response Options

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This strategy assumes that diplomatic and economic instruments — e.g., severe reprimands, changes in standing and status in international institutions, the imposition of economic sanctions, and other restrictions on adversaries’ abilities to participate in the global economy and to access the international financial system — were imposed as part of the initial U.S. warfighting effort. Given that both adversaries detonated a nuclear weapon during the war, the non-kinetic costs the United States imposed and those it threatened were not effective at deterring intra-war nuclear use. Even if the United States did not immediately implement the full retinue of available measures, the adversaries’ initial nuclear detonations suggest that threatening to impose more such costs is likely to have little persuasive effect.

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Non-kinetic responses should, nonetheless, continue to be elements of the ongoing U.S. warfighting strategy. They are useful insofar as they hinder the adversaries’ kinetic warfighting capacity, and the United States can use the possibility of relaxing these consequences in efforts to convince the adversaries that a mutually acceptable, negotiated, political settlement is possible.

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War Termination on Favorable Terms

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This strategy is based upon the rational calculation that, in this scenario, the overriding U.S. strategic objective must be to preserve a future in which humans can live in some form of society that permits more than the base struggle for near-term survival. It therefore confines the definition of war termination on favorable terms to those that govern the present moment, not those that might protect U.S. interests beyond it. There is no way to anticipate what U.S. interests after these wars will be, or what geopolitical structures might further them.

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The temptation when formulating alternative strategies based on nuclear war scenarios like the one considered here is to recommend courses of action that include U.S. nuclear use on the basis that there is some chance that it will succeed in convincing the adversary to do what the United States wishes — to argue, that is, that it just might work. This is precisely the temptation that policymakers must resist. No attachment to any political ideology, nor any idea of nationhood, can justify knowingly endangering humankind. This must certainly be true for any political ideology or nation that purports to hold sacred the inalienable rights of all human beings. What could be more contrary to this commitment than risking nuclear holocaust for entire societies of people who had no direct authorship in the policies of their governments?

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The urge to destroy adversary governments in such a situation would no doubt be powerful, but it is intolerable under any circumstance to risk the extinction of the human species in order to do so. Nuclear decisionmaking cannot be driven by pride or vengeance, or by the fear that, if the worst comes and the United States perishes, then so too do the values and principles that produced it. Nuclear decisionmaking must instead be guided by the conviction that liberal thought will reemerge, and by the imperative of preserving a world in which that is possible.

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If Deterrence Fails

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Analyzing U.S. Options for Responding to Adversary Limited Nuclear Use

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Gregory Weaver

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The decision to focus Project Atom 2024 on the issue of how the United States should respond to limited nuclear deterrence failure in a conflict with a peer nuclear adversary was both wise and timely. Wise because doing so helps address key gaps in U.S. strategy development. Timely because the rise of China as a second peer nuclear adversary, and the increasing strategic alignment of Russia and China, create a heightened risk of collaborative or opportunistic aggression in two theaters that requires the development of a strategy and associated enabling capabilities to address this problem.

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Most nongovernmental analyses of the problem of war with a nuclear-armed adversary focus, understandably, on how to deter the initiation of such a conflict or on deterring nuclear escalation in such a conflict. Successful deterrence avoids the much uglier problem of what to do if deterrence fails.

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Focusing on deterrence alone, however, fails to address the very difficult problem of how the United States and its allies and partners can protect their vital interests while avoiding uncontrolled escalation to large-scale nuclear war when the adversary has already escalated to the limited use of nuclear weapons. Focusing on deterrence alone fails to address the complex task of thinking through the military and non-kinetic response options the United States and its allies and partners might require to achieve their objectives while avoiding uncontrolled escalation. Moreover, by failing to identify the range of response options required, perhaps through multiple instances of limited nuclear weapons employment by both sides, such deterrence-focused analysis also risks failing to identify the capabilities required to provide such options credibly and effectively. Finally, the process of thinking through how to address limited nuclear deterrence failure somewhat counterintuitively provides important insights into how to enhance deterrence of both war and limited nuclear escalation in war that an analytic focus on deterrence alone is unlikely to provide.

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Analysis of how to respond to limited nuclear deterrence failure is inherently scenario dependent for a number of reasons. The stakes of the two sides in a conflict have a significant impact on the war aims of the combatants and on their willingness to escalate and counter-escalate in pursuit of those aims. The political circumstances, particularly regarding issues of alliance cohesion and the internal politics of the combatants, also shape the options of both sides. The military circumstances are of course a critical factor in shaping the two sides’ strategic and operational objectives and the military means available to pursue them. Analyses must address a range of questions, including: Who is winning or losing, and why and how? Is one side asymmetrically vulnerable to limited nuclear escalation? Could horizontal escalation alter the military situation to one side’s advantage? Does one side have an endurance advantage in an extended conflict?

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Of course, were the United States to find itself engaged either in a conflict with one nuclear peer while seeking to deter opportunistic aggression by the other, or in simultaneous conflicts with both Russia and China, the interaction of these scenario-specific factors would be far more complex to assess and far more challenging to address.

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Project Atom 2024 asked its participants to conduct their analyses in the context of a single 2027 scenario involving two regional conflicts with Russia and China simultaneously. Thus, this paper addresses only that scenario, providing analysis of the four key issue areas identified by the project’s designers:

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    U.S. Strategic Objectives If Strategic Deterrence Fails

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    Assuring Allies after Strategic Deterrence Failure

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    Military Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure

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    Non-Kinetic Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure

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As the reader will see, this two-conflict scenario presents U.S. strategists with a complex set of issues. However, a more comprehensive analysis of the overarching two nuclear-armed adversary problem would require asking these same questions across a set of plausible scenarios that span the range of key strategic circumstances the United States might face. Examples of other scenarios that should be examined using the Project Atom 2024 methodology include:

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    Conflict with Russia while deterring Chinese opportunistic aggression

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    Conflict with China while deterring Russian opportunistic aggression

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    Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is winning conventionally in one theater and losing in the other when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails

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    Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is losing conventionally in both theaters when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails

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    The full range of scenarios farther into the future when China is a nuclear peer

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There are bound to be additional important insights from analysis of these alternative scenarios that are needed to formulate a comprehensive U.S. strategy for this problem set.

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The Scenario in Question

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Project Atom 2024 posits a 2027 scenario in which the United States and its allies and partners face collaborative aggression by Russia and China in two theaters simultaneously. The scenario postulates that, despite collaborative Russian-Chinese aggression, U.S. and allied conventional forces far outperform Russian and Chinese conventional forces, almost immediately putting Russia and China in very difficult strategic circumstances 8–10 days after conflict initiation in both theaters. The scenario results in a dire strategic situation in which both Russia and China have initiated limited nuclear escalation, seemingly in response to losing the conventional conflicts they initiated.

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As noted earlier, U.S. objectives and potential response options in such a situation would be highly dependent on the specific political-military circumstances of a conflict. In the case of this scenario, however, several key facts regarding the strategic situation are unclear:

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    Has the defeat of the Chinese landing force negated China’s ability to invade Taiwan, and for how long?

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    How long will it take Polish forces to seize the city of Kaliningrad and the rest of Kaliningrad oblast?

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    How much have Russian nuclear strikes damaged NATO’s ability to reinforce Poland and the Baltic states, and to seize Kaliningrad?

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    How many Russian ground forces are where? Along the Baltic states’ borders? In Kaliningrad? In Belarus?

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Pointing out these uncertainties is not intended as a criticism of the scenario. But the fact that such details regarding the range of strategic circumstances the United States might face have such a significant effect on the analysis of the central problem does raise an issue for future analysis: How much understanding of the potential impacts of limited nuclear use on the course of a theater conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries is required to formulate an effective strategy for the potential range of such contingencies? It is likely that experts are reaching the end of what they can learn about this central question without detailed wargaming and simulation of twenty-first-century theater warfare that includes the limited use of nuclear weapons by one or both sides in the conflict.

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Project Atom 2024 is a first step in this direction, as it effectively examines the issues regarding what to do in the wake of limited nuclear deterrence failure by asking the right first-order questions at the unclassified level. But that is not enough. The Department of Defense needs to take up the challenge of a campaign of wargaming and simulation that will provide the necessary analytic basis for informed strategy development and military capability requirements identification.

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What follows is an analysis of the four key issue areas in the scenario provided.

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U.S. Strategic Objectives If Strategic Deterrence Fails

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For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the U.S. stake in both theater conflicts is sufficient for the United States to risk large-scale nuclear war. Whether either adversary perceives this to be true, however, is unclear. Stakes sufficient to take this risk clearly involve vital national security interests. The United States has historically perceived the sovereignty and security of its NATO allies as meeting this test. The purposeful ambiguity regarding whether the United States would intervene to defend Taiwan against Chinese military aggression makes it less certain that Taiwanese security meets this threshold, though the impact of the forcible incorporation of Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China on U.S. economic interests and U.S. alliances in Asia could well rise to a vital national interest.

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Before identifying potential U.S. strategic objectives in this scenario, it is useful to consider for a moment why deterrence of limited nuclear use failed in both theaters and whether there was something that the United States could have done to enhance deterrence of such nuclear use. While the scenario does not provide sufficient information to determine the answers to these questions with much confidence, it does at least hint at Russian and Chinese motivations for crossing the nuclear threshold.

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In both theaters, the adversaries’ unexpectedly poor conventional military performance puts them in fairly dire strategic circumstances very early in the conflict. In Europe, the combined effect of Russia’s failure to make any significant inroads into the Baltic states while simultaneously failing to stop the NATO offensive into Kaliningrad and eliciting direct NATO military intervention in Ukraine could hardly be worse. In Asia, the destruction of China’s invasion fleet before it can reach Taiwan denies the Chinese leadership their primary objective and is followed by internal unrest in opposition to the war. Limited nuclear escalation in both theaters offers some prospect of terminating the conflicts on terms Russia and China can accept, but the scenario does not describe Russian or Chinese intent. Neither adversary pairs their limited nuclear escalation with clear coercive political-military demands, making the purpose of their escalation unclear.

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It is tempting to say that the United States failed to clearly and credibly communicate its stake in defending its allies and partners in both theaters. However, it is also possible that the Russian and Chinese leaderships miscalculated not about U.S. will to intervene but rather regarding the ability of Russian and Chinese conventional forces to achieve their objectives even in the face of U.S. intervention if they both attacked at roughly the same time.

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There are four U.S. strategic objectives that should be pursued in both theater conflicts.

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The first is to restore or maintain the territorial status quo ante. This means that no NATO or Taiwanese territory remains under Russian or Chinese control (respectively) at the end of the conflict. This constitutes a fundamental denial of Russia and Chinese strategic objectives.

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The second U.S. strategic objective should be to restore deterrence of further nuclear use by Russia or China. Doing so would enable the United States and its allies and partners to continue to pursue the first strategic objective at lower risk and with a lower level of violence.

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The third U.S. strategic objective in both conflicts should be to avoid uncontrolled nuclear escalation. This means deterring large-scale nuclear escalation by Russia and China even if restoring deterrence of further limited nuclear use is unachievable.

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The fourth U.S. strategic objective should be to demonstrate that the adversaries’ limited nuclear escalation did not result in any meaningful political-military gains. Achieving this objective in one theater could enhance the achievement of the U.S. objectives mentioned above in the second theater. It would also arguably enhance deterrence of future aggression and escalation.

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The scenario’s description of the Ukraine conflict complicates the establishment of further clear U.S. strategic objectives consistent with the four above objectives. The scenario posits that some eastern NATO allies have begun deploying forces into Ukraine, and NATO airpower is now flying support missions for Ukrainian forces on the offensive in preparation for the liberation of Crimea “within weeks.”

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It is not clear, however, what U.S. territorial objectives should be in the Ukraine conflict post Russian nuclear use. Combined NATO-Ukraine forces pressing to drive Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory might make restoring deterrence of Russian nuclear use significantly more difficult and could increase the risk of uncontrolled escalation. A less risky, but still ambitious, option would be to demand Russian withdrawal from all Ukrainian territory that Russia has seized since the February 2022 invasion in exchange for NATO withdrawal from the portions of Kaliningrad it now occupies. However, this would leave Russia in control of Crimea.

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Regardless of which U.S. objective is chosen regarding Ukraine, U.S. objectives should clearly include termination of all fighting between NATO/Ukraine and Russia, consistent with the achievement of the other U.S. strategic objectives identified above.

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What is the relative priority of this set of potential U.S. strategic objectives in this strategic context?

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Restoring the territorial status quo ante (with a possible modification regarding Ukraine) while avoiding uncontrolled escalation are undoubtedly the two most important objectives. Achieving these two objectives in both theaters would amount to “victory.” Immediately restoring deterrence of nuclear use is not necessary to “win” the conflicts, but doing so would reduce both the cost and the risk of doing so. Achieving the two most important objectives would also arguably result in achieving the fourth objective of denying U.S. adversaries any significant political-military gain through their nuclear escalation, thereby enhancing future deterrence of war and escalation in war.

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In the scenario, there is no clear indication of whether success in one theater is more important to the United States than in the other theater. However, one thing is clear: U.S. and allied successes in achieving their objectives in one theater would be likely to affect the decision calculus of the adversary in the other theater regarding further nuclear escalation.

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Assuring Allies after Strategic Deterrence Failure

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The second key issue noted by the Project Atom 2024 designers involves how the United States can assure its allies and partners in the wake of a failure to deter limited nuclear escalation by an adversary. This is indeed an important question, as one potential adversary motivation to escalate is to shatter U.S.-led alliance cohesion. Maintaining such cohesion is critically important to the achievement of the highest priority U.S. strategic objectives in both theaters. Thus, effectively assuring U.S. allies after strategic deterrence failure is in effect an enabler of the primary war aims of the United States should a nuclear-armed adversary choose to escalate.

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Assuring allies in the immediate aftermath of adversary nuclear use, particularly if they have been the target of such use, is more complex than assurance while deterring first use. Allies might be concerned the United States will not respond forcefully enough to either restore deterrence and/or continue to defend their vital interests for fear that the conflict might escalate out of control and put the U.S. homeland at risk. Conversely, allies might fear that the U.S. response to adversary nuclear escalation will elicit further adversary nuclear escalation in the theater, putting the allies at increased risk.

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Despite these legitimate concerns, allies and partners in both theaters have no credible alternatives to U.S. nuclear extended deterrence commitments. In NATO, the only non-U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities are French and British. Other NATO allies are unlikely to see those forces as credible alternatives to U.S. nuclear forces in the wake of limited nuclear deterrence failure given the vast superiority of Russian nuclear forces over those of the United Kingdom and France combined. In Asia, there are no existing alternatives to U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities whatsoever.

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If U.S. responses to initial Russian or Chinese escalation make clear that the United States is willing to engage in a competition in dire risk-taking, and that Russia and China must also fear potential uncontrolled escalation, allies are likely to be reassured in the near term. The greatest fear of allies who rely on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is that in extremis the United States will be unwilling to risk strikes on the United States homeland to defend them. A decisive early demonstration that this fear is unfounded would bolster allies’ confidence and potentially convince U.S. adversaries that they had miscalculated about the U.S. stake in the conflict, as well as about U.S. political will to defend that stake resolutely.

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However, if the U.S. responses result in further Russian or Chinese nuclear use against U.S. allies and partners, allied confidence will likely go down. Once deterrence has failed — as evidenced by limited adversary nuclear use against U.S. allies or partners — allies will want to be reassured about our ability to defend them against such attacks, not just deter them.

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Decisions about how to respond to limited nuclear deterrence failure will be about how best to achieve U.S. (and allied) political-military objectives while avoiding uncontrolled escalation. If the United States succeeds in achieving its objectives while avoiding uncontrolled escalation, allies are likely to be assured. And those U.S. response decisions may need to be made too quickly to allow for extensive consultation if they are to be effective. For example, if an adversary escalates to limited nuclear use in an effort to coerce war termination on terms it can accept because it is decisively losing the conventional war, how long can we expect them to wait to see if their coercive use has had the desired effect before they decide to escalate further?

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Military Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure

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The third key issue raised by the Project Atom 2024 designers involves the range of potential U.S. military responses to adversary limited nuclear escalation. The relevant range of such military options will be a direct function of the political-military objectives they are designed to achieve or support.

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A recap of the U.S. strategic objectives identified above allows one to identify sub-objectives and military options to achieve them:

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RESTORE OR MAINTAIN THE TERRITORIAL STATUS QUO ANTE

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Potential Sub-Objective: Restore U.S. or allied conventional superiority following limited adversary nuclear strikes on key U.S. or allied conventional forces.

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Potential Military Options: Depends on the exact nature of the military impact of adversary nuclear use and the adversary’s own vulnerability to U.S. response options. Analysis is required to understand the range of potential targets this objective and sub-objective might dictate and to determine whether currently planned military capabilities enable effective strikes on such targets on operationally relevant timelines.

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RESTORE DETERRENCE OF FURTHER NUCLEAR USE BY RUSSIA AND CHINA

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Potential Sub-Objective: Convince adversary that their nuclear escalation was a dire miscalculation regarding how the United States would respond and that further adversary escalation will fail to achieve their objectives while increasing the risk of uncontrolled escalation.

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Potential Military Options: Must exceed either the level of violence or the strategic impact that the adversary anticipated — likely difficult to know with confidence — in order to shake their confidence in their ability to gauge how the United States might respond to further escalation. There is a potential role here for the calculated revelation of capabilities of which the adversary was previously unaware that have potentially decisive military effects (“You didn’t tell me they could do that. What else don’t I know?”).

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AVOID UNCONTROLLED NUCLEAR ESCALATION

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Potential Sub-Objective: Convince adversary that U.S. nuclear responses and conventional operations are being conducted in pursuit of limited war aims that do not constitute an immediate threat to state survival and do not constitute the initiation of a large-scale counterforce attack designed to negate their strategic nuclear deterrent.

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Potential Military Options: Avoid strikes that threaten the adversary’s ability to detect nuclear attacks, command and control their nuclear forces, etc. Pair messaging about the purpose of the U.S. response with promises of U.S. restraint if Russia or China were to cease nuclear use.

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DEMONSTRATE ADVERSARY LIMITED NUCLEAR ESCALATION DID NOT RESULT IN MEANINGFUL POLITICAL-MILITARY GAINS

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Potential Sub-Objectives: Send a message to the adversary in the second theater of conflict that limited nuclear escalation is unlikely to have the coercive effects they seek. Send a message to future potential adversaries that there is no nuclear coercive offramp from failed conventional aggression against the United States and its allies.

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Potential Military Options: Almost all the options noted above could serve this purpose if effective in denying the adversary their objectives and in making clear that further nuclear escalation increases the risk of uncontrolled escalation. The nature and extent of U.S. and allied resolve must be messaged appropriately.

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TERMINATION OF FIGHTING BETWEEN NATO/UKRAINE AND RUSSIA, CONSISTENT WITH ACHIEVEMENT OF OTHER U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

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Potential Sub-Objective: Create facts on the ground that provide negotiating leverage that enables termination of the Ukraine conflict.

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Potential Military Options: Seize more or all of Kaliningrad to use as a bargaining chip. Escalate level of NATO military intervention in Ukraine conflict.

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There are several key issues associated with the military response options outlined above that need to be taken into account.

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NUCLEAR OR NONNUCLEAR RESPONSE?

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The first of these is whether the U.S. military responses to Russian or Chinese nuclear use should be nuclear or nonnuclear. If the objective of the U.S. military response is to restore deterrence of nuclear use, then there are several problems with a nonnuclear response. First, if the purpose of the adversary’s escalation was to coerce war termination on terms they can accept because they are decisively losing the conventional war, then a nonnuclear response may convince them that they simply need to hit the United States harder in pursuit of their objective. Further, they may conclude that it safe to escalate because the United States is reluctant to respond in kind for fear of uncontrolled escalation. Second, if restoring deterrence requires that the United States respond in a more severe way than anticipated by the adversary in order to convince them that they cannot be confident in predicting future U.S. responses to further escalation, then a nonnuclear response is less likely to meet this criterion.

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If the U.S. objective is to restore U.S. or allied conventional superiority following limited adversary nuclear strikes, then the decision to respond with nuclear or nonnuclear weapons should hinge in part on which response is most likely to be more militarily effective. Increasing the range of relevant targets susceptible to a U.S. nuclear or nonnuclear response option would increase the range of options available to the president.

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Finally, for the U.S. objective of avoiding uncontrolled nuclear escalation, at first glance it might seem that nonnuclear military response options may be preferred. And in some circumstances this would be true. However, if the effect of selecting a nonnuclear response to adversary nuclear escalation is to convince the adversary that the United States is so concerned about uncontrolled escalation that it fears responding in kind, then a U.S. nonnuclear response could actually increase the risk of eventual uncontrolled escalation. This may seem counterintuitive, but if a U.S. nonnuclear response to adversary limited nuclear use results in encouraging further adversary nuclear escalation, then the U.S. nuclear responses that may eventually be required to achieve U.S. objectives are likely to be larger in scale and more provocative in their effects. This could well make uncontrolled escalation more likely.

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STRIKE RUSSIAN OR CHINESE TERRITORY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

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The second key issue regarding U.S. military responses to adversary limited nuclear use involves whether to strike targets on Russian or Chinese territory with nuclear weapons given the potentially escalatory nature of such action. On the one hand, strikes on the adversary’s homeland would cross a potential firebreak against uncontrolled escalation. On the other hand, making the adversary’s territory a sanctuary from U.S. limited nuclear responses could create a potentially decisive asymmetry in the ability of the two sides to achieve relevant military effects with nuclear weapons. A limited U.S. nuclear response (or a credibly communicated threat) that makes clear that Russian or Chinese territory will not be a sanctuary if the adversary continues to escalate could be effective in restoring deterrence following adversary first use. This decision in particular will be highly scenario dependent.

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RANGE OF AVAILABLE NUCLEAR OPTIONS

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The effectiveness of U.S. military response options in the wake of adversary limited nuclear escalation will in part be a function of the range of available nuclear options available to the U.S. president. Identifying future nuclear force and capability requirements first requires development of a future strategy for addressing the two-peer nuclear threat environment, a strategy that is likely to create new operational requirements for nuclear and conventional forces. But strategy development alone is not enough. Detailed wargaming and simulation is needed to analyze the ways in which limited nuclear use by both sides potentially affects the course of twenty-first-century conflict and escalation dynamics across a range of scenarios and strategic circumstances. Without such analysis, U.S. efforts to identify the range of nuclear options needed to address limited nuclear escalation will risk missing key insights.

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HOW TO MESSAGE U.S. INTENT AND WAR AIMS PAIRED WITH A GIVEN MILITARY RESPONSE

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As Thomas Schelling first made clear in his book Strategy of Conflict, there are certain strategic circumstances in which deterrence or the avoidance of further escalation can only be achieved if one pairs a credible threat of military response with a credible promise of restraint that provides the adversary with an acceptable, if not desirable, offramp. Given the clear role of coercive limited nuclear use in Russian strategy and doctrine, and the potential for China to adopt a similar strategy and practice when it soon acquires the necessary nuclear capabilities, the United States must determine how it will formulate and implement this pairing of threat with promise to deter such limited nuclear use. This includes not only ensuring that U.S. nuclear forces have the requisite range of capabilities to make the threat element credible and effective, but also determining what forms of restraint the United States is willing to promise and how to make such promises credible and effective in the context of a high-intensity theater conflict in which nuclear weapons have already been employed.

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RECOMMENDED MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS

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The final step in a scenario-based analysis of this central problem is making recommendations regarding U.S. military responses to Russian and Chinese nuclear escalation in this scenario.

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Regarding Russian escalation, the United States should simultaneously pursue its objectives of restoring the territorial status quo ante, reestablishing deterrence of further nuclear use, and restoring U.S. and allied conventional superiority following limited Russian nuclear strikes. This could be done by executing low-yield nuclear strikes on key military targets in Kaliningrad paired with clear messaging that Russia must halt further nuclear use and that U.S. war aims are limited to restoring the territorial status quo ante vis-à-vis NATO (and possibly a return to the pre-February 2022 borders in Ukraine). However, should Russia escalate with further nuclear use, U.S. war aims might change, and U.S. military responses will become more severe.

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Regarding China, assuming Chinese forces are no longer capable of conducting a Taiwan invasion due to U.S. and allied conventional actions, simultaneously pursuing the U.S. objectives of restoring deterrence and restoring U.S. and allied conventional superiority following limited Chinese nuclear strikes (as the territorial status quo ante already is intact) could be an appropriate course of action. This could take the form of a U.S. response in kind on three of the militarized islands in the South China Sea: Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross. Such strikes would not affect the Chinese mainland and, given the U.S. position on territorial disputes in the South China Sea, would not constitute attacks on Chinese territory. This response would make clear that the United States will neither tolerate, nor be disadvantaged by, Chinese limited nuclear use. These strikes should be paired with clear messaging that U.S. war aims are limited to defending Taiwan and our regional allies and to achieving an immediate ceasefire. However, it should be kept in mind that should China escalate with further nuclear use, U.S. war aims might change and the Chinese mainland may not be a sanctuary.

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Non-Kinetic Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure

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There is a wide array of potential non-kinetic response options to adversary limited nuclear use in this scenario that could further the achievement of the U.S. strategic objectives identified above. The most important of these are the following (in descending order):

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    Messaging in support of achieving the purposes of U.S. military responses to adversary limited nuclear use. How this might be done has been discussed above. Formulating this kind of messaging should become part of both the political-military planning process and the presidential decision-support process.

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    Information actions designed to make the adversary a pariah for having been the first to violate the nuclear taboo since 1945. The purpose of this is to make it difficult, if not impossible, for third parties to side with Russia or China in the wake of their nuclear escalation, and to affect the Russian and Chinese leaderships’ decision calculus regarding further escalation.

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    Information actions designed to convince both elements of Russian and Chinese political and military leadership, and the Russian and Chinese populations, that their leaders’ actions are risking large-scale nuclear war and the destruction of their nations in a failing pursuit of nonessential objectives. The purpose of this is to put pressure on the leadership to terminate the conflict.

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    Economic actions designed to make clear that the longer the adversaries continue the war, the more long term the economic damage they will incur. This also serves the purpose of pressuring their leaderships to terminate the conflict, though it is not clear that such economic effects can be imposed on a timeline sufficient to affect relatively near-term adversary decisionmaking.

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Impact of the Law of Armed Conflict on U.S. Military Responses

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Finally, Project Atom 2024 asked how U.S. policy, when U.S. nuclear planning and operations comply with the law of armed conflict, might affect U.S. military responses in this scenario. Compliance with the law of armed conflict poses no insurmountable barriers to the United States developing effective military response options in support of the array of potential strategic objectives identified in this paper.

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Conclusion

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The insights derived from this analysis make clear that there is a need to move beyond thinking only about how to deter aggression and subsequent escalation in wars with multiple nuclear-armed adversaries in the twenty-first century. The failure of deterrence of limited nuclear use would create extremely dangerous circumstances, but there are plausible ways to achieve U.S. and allied strategic objectives without automatically triggering large-scale nuclear war.

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Having said that, there is a need to expand the scope of the initial Project Atom 2024 analysis to address the full range of plausible scenarios and strategic circumstances in which the United States and its allies and partners might face the challenge of responding to a failure to deter limited nuclear use in a theater conflict with Russia or China. In the scenario addressed here, the United States and its allies find themselves rapidly and decisively winning the conventional war in both theaters simultaneously. As a result, Russian and Chinese nuclear escalation seems to be motivated by a desire to terminate the conflicts on terms they can accept before U.S. and allied conventional success further worsens the outcome. This is a very different strategic circumstance than a scenario in which an adversary is winning the conventional conflict and seeks to secure rapid victory through limited nuclear escalation, or one in which the United States is forced to consider limited nuclear first use to prevent a decisive conventional military defeat. Analysis of those and other scenarios and circumstances would likely produce new and important insights regarding the four key issues addressed in this project.

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Heather Williams is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

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Reja Younis is the associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS, where she leads research on nuclear deterrence issues, nuclear strategy, and emerging technologies.

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Lachlan MacKenzie is a research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS.

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Christopher Ford is professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University’s Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

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Rebecca Davis Gibbons is senior associate (non-resident) with the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS and an assistant professor of political science at the University of Southern Maine.

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Ankit Panda is the Stanton senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research interests include nuclear strategy, escalation, missiles and missile defense, space security, and U.S. alliances.

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Melanie W. Sisson is a fellow in the Foreign Policy program’s Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology where she researches the use of the armed forces in international politics, strategies of deterrence, U.S. national security strategy, defense policy, and defense applications of emerging technologies.

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Gregory Weaver is the principal of Strategy to Plans LLC. Prior to this, he was deputy director for strategic stability on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5).

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Retying The Caucasian Knot

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Russia’s Evolving Approach to the South Caucasus

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Neil Melvin | 2024.11.18

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This paper explores the challenge to Russia’s established position in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes significant change.

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Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community now find that their reach exceeds their grasp in terms of their ability to shape the regional order in the South Caucasus. Both remain regionally influential, but their leverage to drive developments is eroding as the South Caucasus is affected by multipolar international politics. The rise of multipolarity is being promoted by the increasing role of a broad set of external actors – most of all Turkey, Iran and China – engaging in the South Caucasus, and by strengthening links between the region and Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia, links that are supplementing the region’s established ties to the US, Europe and Russia. In this context, there is increased local agency in relation to external partnerships (reinforced by a turn to illiberal domestic politics), and waning attraction both to Russian and Euro-Atlantic integration projects.

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As a result of these changes, Russia has lost its position of pre-eminence, which rested primarily on tying together its security interests with the region’s protracted conflicts. Over the past 30 years, Moscow has leveraged these conflicts to give it a central geopolitical role, which it has used to promote a regional status quo to its advantage and to create a Gordian knot of interwoven obstacles and interests to hinder efforts at Euro-Atlantic integration. The war in Ukraine has played a part in undercutting Moscow’s position in the South Caucasus, but Russia’s long-term relative decline as new actors have entered the region, power shifts within the South Caucasus itself (notably the rise of Azerbaijan), and changing Russian regional interests are the main factors challenging Moscow’s established role.

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Russia is now seeking to adapt to the new regional situation. It is attempting to establish its role as the leading, but no longer exclusive, external actor in the South Caucasus by reconfiguring its position. This involves a rebalancing of bilateral relations, broadening its range of policy tools (notably in the areas of transport and communications) from a previous reliance on security, and being ready to countenance an expanded presence for other external actors, notably regional powers – principally Iran, Turkey and, increasingly, China – while remaining opposed to the US and the EU.

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In the absence of a Euro-Atlantic security commitment capable of challenging Russia in the South Caucasus, the policies of enlargement (eventual NATO and EU membership) have lost traction. The Euro-Atlantic community now risks being marginalised in an increasingly competitive regional environment. If it is to undercut Russia’s effort to build a new position – to retie the Caucasian knot – and retain a significant regional role, it will need to develop approaches capable of responding to and shaping the new South Caucasus geopolitics and geo-economics.

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Introduction

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Russia is facing a key moment in its post-Soviet position in the South Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia). Since the mid-2000s, geopolitical competition between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community has emerged as a defining issue shaping the regional order. Using security policy – including direct military action – as its primary tool, Russia was able to establish itself both as the main arbiter in conflict resolution and central to the balance of power in the South Caucasus. On this basis, Russia was able to limit NATO and EU enlargement policies, while at the same time seeking to advance its own integration project.

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image01 +▲ Figure 1: Political and Military Map of the South Caucasus. Source: Labrang/Wikimedia. Edited by RUSI.

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As a result, the South Caucasus became an internally and externally fragmented region (see Figure 1). Countries were divided domestically and regionally by protracted conflicts – Nagorno-Karabakh was contested between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and conflicts emerged over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia also developed differing foreign and security policy trajectories and built diverse allegiances. Azerbaijan adopted policies of balancing and neutrality, Georgia aspired to join the EU and NATO, and Armenia became Russia’s ally within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Russia has sought to manipulate and deepen these divisions to give itself a central regional role. In recent years, as President Vladimir Putin has developed a more assertive policy of rebuilding Russia as a “great power”, the South Caucasus has become integral to the Kremlin’s wider ambitions of dominating the Black Sea, and projecting power into the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

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The pre-eminence that Russia has established in the South Caucasus over the past three decades is now being eroded by far-reaching shifts in the international regional and domestic environments. These changes have the potential to create a new regional order. A variety of international actors – China, Iran, Israel, the Gulf states and India, among others – has entered the region, offering new diplomatic and political, trade and investment, and security relations, and providing alternatives to both Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. The governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have sought to widen their space for political action by developing foreign policies to engage with new international actors and to escape from the geopolitical competition between Russia and the West. Together, these developments have diminished the significance of Russia’s security leverage, notably in respect to the contest over Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijan and Armenia seek to finalise a peace agreement, and shifted the South Caucasus towards alternative agendas for trade, connectivity and strengthening multipolarity.

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This paper explores the challenge to Russia’s established position in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes significant change, and analyses Moscow’s effort to craft a new regional approach. The findings of the paper are drawn from three principal sources. A review of secondary literature on regional developments in the South Caucasus was supplemented by a workshop conducted in Tbilisi, Georgia, in April 2024 that brought together leading experts on regional issues. In addition, interviews were conducted, in confidence, with officials from the US, the EU and the UK in Washington, DC, Brussels, London, Tbilisi and Yerevan between February and May 2024.

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The paper has three chapters. Chapter I examines how in the post-Soviet decades Russia established itself as the leading external actor in the South Caucasus. Chapter II analyses how Russia’s regional position is being challenged, notably by the wars over Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh, the appearance of new international actors in the South Caucasus, and by the shift of regional governments to pursuing foreign policies of multi-alignment, made possible by multipolarity, and often in conjunction with increasingly illiberal domestic politics. Chapter III considers the implications of these changes for Russia’s regional position and sets out how Moscow has sought to respond to these shifts to retain a leading role. The paper concludes with the implications of the changes in Russia’s position and the wider shifts in the South Caucasus for the policies of the Euro-Atlantic community.

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I. Russia’s South Caucasus Strategy

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The South Caucasus has historically played a key role in Moscow’s broader strategic thinking. The conquest of the North and South Caucasus was central to Russian imperial ambitions and involved a prolonged and ultimately triumphant struggle for control over the region with the Ottoman and Persian empires between the 18th and 20th centuries. The defeat of the Ottomans was at the heart of the wider Russian plan to establish dominance in the Black Sea region, including extending state boundaries through the territories of contemporary Ukraine, and expanding influence into the Balkans, as well as through the Caucasus.

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This strategic goal of expanding control over the Caucasus was a stepping-stone for Russia to extend its reach into the Middle East and the Mediterranean, notably as it sought naval access to the world’s oceans beyond the limits of its northern ports. During the Soviet era (1922–91), Moscow applied a similar strategic logic to the region, while also seeing the South Caucasus as a buffer zone to the conflicts of the Middle East and, during the Cold War, the threat posed by NATO to the south.

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Post-Soviet South Caucasus Engagement

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With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of the independent states of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Russia initially shifted away from viewing the South Caucasus as integral to its security policy. The new Russian leadership under President Boris Yeltsin focused instead on a Euro-Atlantic vector in its external ties, while its neighbours were a much lower priority. A series of civil wars in the South Caucasus – over Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan – involved elements of Russia’s security forces and led Moscow to develop a new security engagement in the region around the deployment of Russian-led “peacekeeping operations”. These missions served to freeze the violence, rather than resolve the conflicts, and opened the way for Moscow to manage, as well as manipulate, the conflicts in subsequent years, including the opportunity to influence regional issues.

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From the mid-1990s, growing violent instability in the North Caucasus, notably in Chechnya, drew Russia into a more southern-oriented security and military posture, and promoted a refocus of its foreign and security policy onto the immediate neighbourhood. Notwithstanding the withdrawal of some Russian military facilities from the South Caucasus in the 1990s and early 2000s, notably from Georgia and Azerbaijan, Moscow retained a border guard and military presence in Armenia. This positioning reflected the long-term view in Moscow of the South Caucasus as a buffer to instability from the south and a means to balance Turkey’s regional aspirations.

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The growing threat of Islamist terrorism in Russia’s North Caucasus and the launch of the second Chechen war by Putin in 1999 led Russia to strengthen further its military and security focus on both the North and South Caucasus. It was, however, the emergence of growing Euro-Atlantic engagement in the region that led Russia increasingly to instrumentalise protracted conflicts as leverage in an emerging geopolitical struggle with the West.

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During Putin’s initial period as Russia’s president (2000–08), and in particular during his second term (2004–08), Russia moved away from cooperative security approaches to regional conflict management, notably through the OSCE, to giving primacy to its own bilateral engagements. Moscow sought to balance betweenArmenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including through the supply of weapons to both sides. Russian repositioning around Georgia’s protracted conflicts accelerated following the November 2003 Rose Revolution that brought to power in Tbilisi a government seeking closer ties to NATO and the EU. Increasingly, Moscow backed the separatist leaderships of the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in opposition to Georgia.

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Russia and Euro-Atlantic Regional Competition

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The August 2008 Russia–Georgia war, following the April NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration that Georgia (and Ukraine) would join the Alliance in the future, marked the onset of full-scale geopolitical confrontation in the South Caucasus. Russia’s use of military force was designed to demonstrate that it was unwilling to countenance Euro-Atlantic integration in territories it considered its backyard.

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The return of Putin as president in 2012 marked a new phase of Russian policy towards the South Caucasus. The region became fully integrated into Putin’s growing great power ambitions for Russia, and the confrontation with the Euro-Atlantic community. Russia’s military action against Georgia in 2008 directly challenged the Euro-Atlantic community by suggesting that it would need to be ready for war with Russia if it sought to advance membership in European organisations for countries in the South Caucasus. Through this positioning, Putin aimed to maintain a regional status quo favourable to Russia.

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While Russia’s security position has been its trump card in the South Caucasus, Moscow has developed other interlinked policy approaches, both to coerce and attract the region. As geopolitical competition with the Euro-Atlantic community strengthened after 2008, Russia increasingly sought to integrate the South Caucasus more closely as part of its efforts to create a “sphere of privileged interests” across the territory of the former Soviet Union. Russia aimed to counter Euro-Atlantic integration efforts through its own integration agenda, focused on the EAEU and the CSTO. Ultimately, only Armenia agreed to join the EAEU – it was already a member of the CSTO – when Russia leveraged Armenia’s security dependence to pressure it to reject an EU association agreement in 2013.

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Moscow’s policy mix has been tailored to the countries of the region. With Georgia, the Kremlin has used a stick-and-carrot approach. Initially, Moscow relied on economic coercion and disinformation, while leveraging the protracted conflicts (including periodically raising the prospect of annexing South Ossetia), and the threat of further coercive and even military action against Tbilisi following the 2008 war. With the adoption by the Georgian government of a policy to normalise relations with Russia from 2012, and in particular as the ruling Georgian Dream Party has grown increasingly authoritarian in its domestic policies, leading to a deterioration of ties with the Euro-Atlantic community, Moscow has offered visa liberalisation, the resumption of direct flights between the two countries, increased tourism and the importance of a trade relationship.

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With Armenia, Moscow has employed a different approach. It has provided security guarantees through Armenia’s CSTO membership and the presence of Russian military and border guard facilities. Moscow has also offered Armenia favourable economic terms. It has sought to advance Russian investment in the energy and other sectors, while membership of the EAEU has provided Armenia with access to a large market.

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In the case of Azerbaijan, Russia has been ready to accommodate flexibility as long as Baku has eschewed seeking NATO or EU membership, while at the same time pledging good neighbourly relations. This has been achieved through the conclusion of a series of partnership agreements over the past two decades (notably the partnership agreement in February 2022), and building cooperation in key economic areas, critically energy.

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Over the past two decades, Russia has sought to use its pre-eminent security position, supported by other policies, to limit the three South Caucasian republics’ options for external economic and security ties. The aim of these approaches has been to isolate the South Caucasus strategically while tying it ever closer to Russia. Entangling the conflicts of the South Caucasus with Russian security interests has created a Gordian knot for the Euro-Atlantic community in the region which, in the absence of a readiness to challenge Russia directly for fear of escalation to military confrontation and even war, has been unable to advance substantially its integration efforts.

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Russia as a Great Power and the South Caucasus

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As competition with the Euro-Atlantic community intensified, the South Caucasus became part of Russia’s broader ambition to project its power around and across the Black Sea. In a return to Russia’s grand strategy towards the South Caucasus, Moscow’s regional engagement was linked to the wider goal of projecting power into the Black Sea region and beyond, into the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, as Russia became involved in the conflicts in Syria and Libya. After the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its intervention in eastern Ukraine, the military and security dimensions of the South Caucasus were strengthened through enhancing the network of Russian military bases in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Armenia (see Figure 1), and promoting the integration of these facilities with the regional network of Russian military facilities.

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Russia’s Growing Dominance of the South Caucasus

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By the 2020s, Russia appeared to have largely achieved dominance in the South Caucasus. Moscow’s approach to the region had effectively halted Euro-Atlantic integration while gradually strengthening its own position. In 2020, when Azerbaijan launched the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Russia aimed to advance its regional role with the introduction of “peacekeepers” into the conflict, something it had sought for over 20 years. These developments led to interpretations that Russia was consolidating its regional pre-eminence. In fact, the South Caucasus was already experiencing a set of interrelated shifts that have together undermined the regional position that Russia built up in the post-Soviet period.

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II. Russia Challenged in the South Caucasus

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In recent years, the foundations of Moscow’s dominant regional position, built in the context of geopolitical and geo-economic competition with the Euro-Atlantic community, have been challenged by three interlinked developments.

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First, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020 and 2023) created a new regional balance of force and the emergence of economic and connectivity opportunities that have undercut security agendas. Second, a set of external actors has entered the region, providing alternatives to Moscow, Brussels and Washington, and tying the South Caucasus more closely to the Middle East, central Eurasia and Asia. Third, Russia’s war in Ukraine initially led to a questioning of Moscow’s ability to project security and military force in the region, while the prolonged nature of the war has reinforced hedging strategies by countries in the region unsure of who will ultimately be victorious. Together, these developments are promoting foreign and security policies of multi-alignment in the South Caucasus, as regional governments seek to develop multiple external partners to balance and hedge against the dominance of Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.

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The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War

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The most significant development within the South Caucasus region has been Azerbaijan’s military actions in 2020 and 2023 to take back territory occupied by Armenia following the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–94), and ultimately to reclaim control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region itself. As a result, Azerbaijan has emerged as the regional agenda setter and has attracted Russia’s interest.

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For Armenia, there has been a deterioration in the Armenia–Russia alliance as a result of Russia’s failure to restrain Azerbaijan in 2020 and the inability – and possibly unwillingness – of Russian “peacekeepers” to prevent the seizure of the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. This led to the flight of the ethnic Armenian population amid claims of ethnic cleansing – along with a perception that Moscow is more interested in developing a close relationship with Baku.

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Armenia has signalled publicly that it is ready to shift away from its reliance on Russian security guarantees and seek closer relations with others, notably the US and the EU (especially France). Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has indicated that Armenia has suspended its participation in the CSTO – having previously indicated that it would leave the organisation – although he has not closed the door to a future relationship, and Russian border guards have been removed from Yerevan airport. With the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolved by military force, Russia is no longer able to leverage its role as a mediator, while the prospect of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, potentially also leading to Armenia–Turkey normalisation, will further reduce Moscow’s ability to leverage its security role. With the war in Ukraine also redefining Russian regional interests, Moscow has begun to reshape its approach to the South Caucasus.

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Emerging International Actors in the South Caucasus

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While the period since 2008 has been marked by geopolitical competition between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community in the South Caucasus, states within the region are increasingly reaching out to a wider network of partners to help them to manage geopolitical competition and expand economic opportunities.

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Turkey

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The growing influence of Turkey has relied to a significant degree on its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan and the coordinated approach that the two countries have taken to Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as energy projects. Since 1992, they have forged close military, diplomatic and economic ties. Turkey has notably provided Azerbaijan with important military capacities and training. This relationship was central to the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, in which Turkish military technologies played an important role, but even more significant was the ability of Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to balance diplomatic efforts by Putin to shape the outcomes of the conflict to Russia’s advantage. Since then, Turkey and Azerbaijan have coordinated efforts to position the South Caucasus as the gateway to the Middle Corridor, which links Europe through the Caspian region to Central Asia and western parts of China, and to accelerate work on this initiative.

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Although Azerbaijan is Turkey’s key regional ally, Turkey has been exploring deeper ties with Georgia, reflecting the country’s key transit role for energy, transport and trade. Turkey identifies relations with Georgia as a “strategic partnership”, supports its territorial integrity and does not recognise claims by Abkhazia and South Ossetia for independence. Turkey is Georgia’s leading trade partner, ahead of Russia and China, and Ankara views Georgia as a critical partner in its plans for the development and expansion of the Middle Corridor. Turkey has also sought to develop its security ties to Georgia, including as part of a trilateral format with Azerbaijan, and has been a supporter of closer ties between NATO and Georgia. Turkey’s role has also been important as part of a broader strengthening in relations between the South Caucasus and Middle Eastern countries that has included rising trade and deepening diplomatic ties, notably with Saudi Arabia, but also with Iraq and Jordan (as well as Iran and Israel).

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Iran

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Iran does not have the levels of regional influence achieved by Russia and Turkey, in part reflecting its strategic view of the South Caucasus as a buffer region. Tehran’s approach has been focused on preventing overspill from the region into Iran. It hopes to balance the influence of regional rivals (Turkey and Russia) and ensure that the South Caucasus does not become a base of operations for states seen as hostile to Tehran (principally the US and Israel). As the third regional neighbouring state it has, nonetheless, built ties with Armenia, while managing a complex and occasionally confrontational relationship with Azerbaijan.

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As the South Caucasus has begun to open to greater connectivity, gaining access to Iran’s trade and transport routes has risen in importance. Tehran has developed a more forward-leaning foreign policy towards the South Caucasus and has sought to improve its relationship with Azerbaijan and adopt a more balanced approach to the countries in the region. This has led to an emergent closer relationship with Georgia.

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Along with Russia and Turkey, Iran shares an interest in limiting the role of the Euro-Atlantic community in the South Caucasus, and Tehran has supported efforts to advance the “3 + 3” South Caucasus Regional Cooperation Platform format, aimed at bringing together Iran, Turkey, Russia and the South Caucasus countries. Iran has also recognised the strategic importance of efforts to shape a new regional transportation network as part of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Crucially, Tehran has opposed efforts to open the so-called Zangezur Corridor, the proposed transport link between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhchivan across the southern Armenian region of Syunik, fearing it would impede its trade links northwards and strengthen Turkey’s regional position, even when this has led to friction with Russia.

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Despite strains in the Iran–Russia relationship, there has been a strategic convergence between Tehran and Moscow as a result of the Ukraine war, which is being formalised through a proposed partnership treaty that will include regional security issues, alongside a free-trade agreement to link the EAEU to Iran. Iran’s evolving engagement in the South Caucasus, and notably its cooperation with Russia in the area of transport, form an important element of the growing alignment between the two countries.

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Israel and the Gulf States

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After Turkey, Israel has been Azerbaijan’s most important external partner in military, investment and diplomatic support. Azerbaijan has looked to Israel to provide it with key military capabilities, as well as technologies to advance its ambitions to move its economy away from reliance on hydrocarbon production. Azerbaijan has become a significant energy supplier to Israel. Israel has, on the other hand, had modest relations with Georgia and Armenia, and its engagement in the South Caucasus has served primarily to reinforce Baku’s international options and capabilities, rather than to play a regional role. At the same time, Iran’s concern about a potential Israeli security presence in Azerbaijan has fed into Tehran’s broader foreign and military approach to the South Caucasus, notably into an effort to weaken Baku through support for Armenia.

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Building on their established links to Azerbaijan, Gulf states are increasingly looking to the South Caucasus for investment and trade opportunities, particularly in the energy and transportation sectors.

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China and Central Asia

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China’s presence in the South Caucasus has been growing through trade and tourism, as well as infrastructure projects. The new international interest in transport corridors through the South Caucasus, in part created by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, has increased China’s engagement in the region as it seeks to develop “the Great Silk Road” as part of its global Belt and Road Initiative. The award to a Chinese-led consortium of a contract to build the Anaklia deepwater port in Georgia is a particular focus for Beijing as part of its effort to build transport infrastructure connecting China’s economy to European markets.

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The pull of China in relation to economic and trade issues is also drawing the countries of the South Caucasus to the east in their external relations, as efforts to develop the Middle Corridor accelerate. While the central approach of China in the South Caucasus appears to be geo-economic, its growing interest in Georgia has been linked to the erosion of democratic practices through rising elite corruption, while also being seen to reinforce the broader regional shift of foreign policy – away from the Euro-Atlantic community.

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To cement its developing regional role, China has sought to conclude “strategic agreements” with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Baku has made the most significant shift to the east, even raising the prospect of joining regional formats, and President Ilham Aliyev has attended the Central Asia head of state consultative meetings, as well as forging bilateral and minilateral ties with countries across that region. The transport connectivity agenda is, however, exerting a pull on all the South Caucasus countries, pushing them to develop ties linking the Black and Caspian Sea regions.

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India and Pakistan

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India and Pakistan are relatively minor international actors in the region, but India has been increasing its arms sales, notably becoming a primary supplier to Armenia, while Pakistan has concluded defence agreements with Azerbaijan. Pakistan has sought to track India’s growing regional ties as an extension of their bilateral rivalry. Relations with the South Caucasus also reflect India’s long-term plans to build new trade and transport routes from South Asia across Eurasia to Europe, linking the region to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. These new ties are becoming the basis for competing groupings, with India seeking to cooperate with Iran and Armenia, and Pakistan looking to partner with Turkey and Azerbaijan.

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The South Caucasus as a Multipolar Region

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The emergence of a multitude of international actors in the South Caucasus is changing the region’s international environment. While Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community remain key reference points, reflecting their continuing regional strategic weight, new actors are offering additional security, economic and transport relationships. Minilateral formats are emerging to reflect new partnerships and blending of interests, and some South Caucasus states are looking to participate in larger multilateral formats, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the BRICS (Azerbaijan announced its application to join in August 2024), and the Organization of Turkic States.

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For countries in the region, this approach to external ties is driven by two main interests. First, governments are pursuing balancing approaches to serve as counterweights to external integration projects that seek to curtail the position and interests of domestic elites, whether it is via Russia’s efforts to shape pro-Moscow regimes or the Euro-Atlantic community’s democracy, human rights and rule of law agenda challenging illiberal and kleptocratic regimes. Second, the broadening of external contacts has enabled countries in the South Caucasus to increase their leverage, and notably to hedge their dominant bilateral ties to Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community, in order to improve their bargaining position.

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The development of this dimension of regional politics is, however, also a source for new instability in the region, with countries now linked to various disputes and competition beyond the South Caucasus, for example the tensions between Turkey and Israel over Gaza and Lebanon have unsettled their ties to Azerbaijan. It is also difficult for external actors to develop a stable approach to the region, as the regional governments are able to switch external partners and play them against each other to secure better offers.

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Russia’s War in Ukraine

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 created shock waves across the South Caucasus. Initially, Russia pulled forces from the region to reinforce its struggling troops in Ukraine. As Moscow faced difficulties in overcoming Ukrainian forces, questions were raised in the region about the effectiveness of Russia as a military and security actor. The war also increased external pressure on the governments in the South Caucasus to take sides in the conflict, including through observing Western sanctions on Russia.

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Georgia, concerned about the Russian threat to its own territories, distanced itself from Kyiv and refused to apply sanctions. Azerbaijan sought to maintain its policy of balancing, providing limited support to Ukraine, agreeing to supply extra gas volumes to Europe as it sought to diversify its energy markets, and emphasised its crucial geographic position at the heart of the Middle Corridor as an alternative to Russian transit routes. At the same time, Baku sought to maintain its strategic relationship with Moscow. Armenia, given its reliance on Moscow and questions about the effectiveness of Russian forces and the ability of Russia’s defence industry to supply weapons, began to recalibrate its security partnership with Russia.

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As the Ukraine war has continued, the impact of the conflict on the South Caucasus has shifted. With considerable uncertainty about the outcome of the war, all three South Caucasus states have sought to avoid being too overtly tied to one side and have pursued different balancing options. There is also concern that if Russia is victorious in Ukraine, it may then look to strengthen its control over the South Caucasus as the next step in efforts to expand Russia’s regional power, and so the prudent approach is to avoid taking sides.

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At the same time, the Ukraine war has reshaped Russia’s own interests in the South Caucasus. As a result of the war and Western sanctions, the South Caucasus has become critical to Russia’s efforts to reorient trade and communications away from Europe. This has led Moscow to rebalance its regional relations, with Baku becoming central to Russia’s regional transportation plans.

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III. Russia’s Repositioning in the South Caucasus

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Faced with the current shifts across the region, Russia has sought to craft a new balance of policies so that it can reposition itself and remain at the heart of the South Caucasus regional order.

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Security Policy

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Despite the emergence of new policy tools, Moscow continues to use security issues to shape the region towards its interests. The ongoing occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their steady integration into Russia remains a defining point in Moscow’s regional position. As the relationship between Georgia and the Euro-Atlantic community has frayed, as Tbilisi has adopted increasingly anti-democratic domestic policies and continued to develop ties with Russia, Moscow has rebalanced its approach from threat to inducement around the protracted Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflict. Before the Georgian elections on 26 October 2024 Moscow hinted that it would be ready to help Tbilisi “normalise” relations with the two breakaway regions.

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At the same time, the fact that the Euro-Atlantic community has not been prepared to challenge Russian military occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia directly signals to the wider region the limit of EU/NATO regional commitment. While Russia’s policy towards Georgia remains a clear indication that Moscow will not countenance Euro-Atlantic integration in the region, its ability to bind the wider region through security ties has, however, corroded, notably with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the subsequent shift by Armenia towards a broader range of security partners.

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Since its defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia has signalled strong dissatisfaction with the Russian security guarantee, and there has been an escalation of negative rhetoric regarding Moscow’s role. Yerevan has taken steps on the margins of its security relationship with Moscow to underline its discontent, opened to a wider range of external relationships, including with the Euro-Atlantic community, and begun to rebuild its military through partnerships with Europe, India and the US. While Armenia may be able to “navigate a path away from Russia” through diversifying its security partnerships, there are real limits on how far Armenia can push, at least in the medium term. It has become clear since 2020 that Russian security protection does not extend to actions by Azerbaijan. However, ultimately, only Moscow is willing to give security guarantees to Armenia when it believes it remains vulnerable to other external threats, notably from Turkey, and there continues to be security interdependence between Russia and Armenia. Moscow may also be ready to threaten more direct responses to Armenia if it veers far from Russian interests.

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Azerbaijan has sought to diminish Russia’s security leverage, notably through a commitment over several decades to building ties to other military partners (Turkey and Israel). But an equally important element of managing the Russian security threat has been Baku’s decision to eschew EU and NATO integration – a decision taken to a significant degree in light of the lesson of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War that the Euro-Atlantic community is not ready to challenge Russia militarily in the region. To underline that it does not seek to break away completely from Russia, Azerbaijan has sought to identify a positive agenda of alternative policy areas for cooperation with Russia where it can shape a partnership in its interests.

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image02 +▲ Figure 2: Key South Caucasus Transport Routes. Source: Tanvir Anjum Adib/Wikimedia. Edited by RUSI.

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Transport and Communications

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Moscow’s most important policy shift regarding the changing political and economic dynamics of the South Caucasus is the new emphasis given to the region as a zone for trade and communications (see Figure 2). The breakdown of ties with the Euro-Atlantic community, the imposition of sanctions and the closing of some markets has effectively forced Russia to reorient its economic policy on a north–south axis, away from the previous east–west axis. Moscow’s efforts to reorient its external economic relations, as part of the wider shift in its foreign and security relations brought about by the Ukraine war, are already having significant results, as trade along a north–south axis, notably with Iran and India, has increased substantially in recent years.

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In this context, the key project for Russia is the International North–South Transit Corridor (INSTC), a series of rail, ship and road routes connecting Russia to Iran and its Gulf ports and beyond, to South and East Asia. The most promising route goes through Azerbaijan, the only country that borders both Russia and Iran, and which already has a railway connecting Russia and Iran. While the INSTC has been on the drawing board since 2005, it has gained new impetus since the war in Ukraine and Western efforts to isolate Russia economically. In May 2023, Russia and Iran agreed to complete, by 2027, the construction of a railway from the Iran–Azerbaijan border, at Astara, to Rasht in northern Iran, which represents the last missing rail link to connect St Petersburg to the Gulf. Realisation of the INSTC is a strategic goal for Moscow, supported by Iran and India, but Russia is likely to be the main funder of any new infrastructure, in view of its pressing need to bypass Western sanctions.

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The focus on connectivity in the South Caucasus is giving Russia a new direction for its security policy. Russia is aiming to assert a security role in the South Caucasus transport network to unblock the regional transport network on its terms and, thereby, provide Moscow with important regional leverage. For this reason, the Zangezur Corridor has become a particular focus for Russian diplomacy and a key interest in the wider Armenia–Azerbaijan peace negotiations.

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Citing provisions on Russian security personnel managing the land corridor in the 2020 Armenia–Azerbaijan ceasefire agreement brokered by Moscow, the Kremlin insists on its presence along the corridor. If it were able to exert influence on the region’s transport networks, Moscow would gain new leverage over the countries of the South Caucasus, including Georgia, which currently is the main axis for north–south trade. Russia has sought to channel negotiations on transport links into the 2021 tripartite commission on this issue that it convenes with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and into key bilateral formats.

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Pivot to Azerbaijan, Monitoring Georgia

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A third key component of Moscow’s evolving policy towards the South Caucasus is a deepened partnership with Baku. Azerbaijan has emerged as the leading regional state as a result of its military successes against Armenia, its ability to build a latticework of external partners, and its balancing policy towards Russia. Indeed, Azerbaijan is now essential for Russia in terms of energy exports and its transport links to Iran. The Kremlin has stressed that Azerbaijan is a “stable” partner in the region, and has spoken of the bilateral relationship in warm terms as having an “alliance” character.

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Azerbaijan has been able to use its newfound regional leverage to bypass Russia’s efforts to manipulate regional conflicts – ignoring Russia’s demands over Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, and sidelining Moscow’s role in mediating the Armenia–Azerbaijan relationship – all while maintaining a degree of support for Ukraine. But Baku has lined up behind Russia on Moscow’s interests where they largely align with those of Azerbaijan. Together with Russia, Azerbaijan has been critical of Armenia’s efforts to reach out to the Euro-Atlantic community, and it has opposed the deployment of an EU border-monitoring mission to the region. Azerbaijan is also publicly supporting Russia’s position on transport corridors across Armenia, even if there are suspicions that Baku would also be keen to leave Russia out of the route.

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While Azerbaijan is now Russia’s main regional partner, Moscow is paying close attention to contemporary developments within Georgia. Since the Rose Revolution, Georgia has been the anchor of the Euro-Atlantic community’s regional engagement, and in 2023, the EU granted Tbilisi candidate status. However, despite movement on some bureaucratic processes, the integration of Georgia into the Euro-Atlantic community has been effectively frozen following the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, reflecting the reluctance of the US and its European allies to challenge directly Moscow’s security commitment to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

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Since the Georgian Dream political party – established and led by the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili – entered government in Tbilisi in 2012, Georgia has followed a twin-track policy of seeking to advance NATO and EU memberships while also pursuing a policy of gradual normalisation with Moscow. With Euro-Atlantic integration unable to make real progress and with the turn to increasingly authoritarian domestic politics in Georgia in recent years, the relationship between Tbilisi, Washington and Brussels has deteriorated significantly.

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At the same time, the normalisation process with Russia has continued, even in the difficult context of the war in Ukraine. While there is little evidence that Russia has driven the breakdown in ties between Georgia and the Euro-Atlantic community, Moscow has opportunistically sought to benefit. The Georgian government has also given the impression that it is ready to move closer to Moscow if the US and Europe continue to set democracy and human rights conditions that are unacceptable to Georgian Dream.

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Against this background, the October 2024 parliamentary elections were seen as a critical test of Georgia’s future. With Georgian Dream claiming victory in the disputed elections, relations with the Euro-Atlantic community appear set to deteriorate further. Following the election, the US and European countries called for an investigation into how it was conducted and, in particular, the steps taken ahead of the vote by the ruling party to ensure its victory. US President Joe Biden publicly raised concerns about the decline of democracy in Georgia.

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At the same time, having offered ahead of the election to facilitate Georgia’s territorial disputes as a means to promote support for Georgian Dream, Moscow will need to demonstrate that it can deliver progress on a new relationship between Georgia and the two breakaway regions that will satisfy Tbilisi. Given Moscow’s strategic investment in the nominal independence of these regions, the prospects of significant shifts over the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are, however, slim, likely placing an important check on how far Russia–Georgia rapprochement can advance. The Georgian government may well move closer to Russia to test Moscow’s offer, but is likely to continue to pursue multi-alignment in its foreign and security policies rather than joining Russia’s regional organisations such as the CSTO or the EAEU.

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Economic and Trade Relations

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As an economic actor, Russia remains vital for the countries of the South Caucasus. Indeed, sanctions on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine have strengthened interdependence between Russia (and, via the EAEU, Belarus and Central Asia) and the countries of the region. The Ukraine war is having far-reaching impacts on the geo-economics of the South Caucasus, with the region’s role as an energy and trade corridor becoming even more significant, notably for Russia.

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Georgia serves as an example for Moscow of how – despite the political tensions between the two governments over the occupied territories – economic cooperation has a positive impact on relations. Indeed, trade with Russia has continued to be strong in recent years. Since 2021, Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia has increased, with some sectors reliant on the Russian market. For example, in 2023, wine exports to Russia increased 5% on the previous year, with the Russian market taking 65% of Georgian wine exports, the highest level since 2013. Although there is widespread Georgian public distrust and even hostility to Russia, views on closer economic relations are mixed.

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For Armenia, despite the political rhetoric about souring ties, economic relations continue to flourish, with a notable rise in exports following the onset of the Ukraine war – widely seen as a result of Armenia (alongside Georgia) becoming a route to Russia for goods that avoided sanctions. Russia is Armenia’s largest trading partner, with an overall foreign trade volume in 2023 of more than 35% and notably 49.6% of Armenia’s imports coming from Russia. In 2022, the volume of trade between Armenia and Russia nearly doubled, a trend that continued through 2023 and the first months of 2024. In 2023, Russia’s over 35% share of the country’s foreign trade contrasted with the EU’s 13%. Russian companies also have considerable investments in Armenia, notably owning key parts of the energy sector and the railways, and make a substantial contribution through taxes to the national budget.

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For Azerbaijan, which has sought to diversity its economic as well as security policy, economic ties with Russia are following a similar trajectory to its neighbours. In 2023, trade between Azerbaijan and Moscow was reported to have risen by 17.5%. Bilateral energy trade has also developed in recent years.

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Cooperation with Regional Powers

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It would appear that Russia has implicitly accepted that it can no longer maintain primacy in the South Caucasus and that other, notably regional, powers will have roles. The Russian regionalisation policy aims at intensifying dialogue, coordination and interaction with the main regional powers engaged in the South Caucasus. Moscow has, however, tried to maintain a regional leadership position through seeking to manage informal cooperation – and competition – with Turkey and Iran. Iran has become a key ally for Russia on the international stage and both countries share an interest in developing closer ties and north–south trade links. On 25 December 2023, the EAEU signed a free-trade agreement with Iran that will eliminate customs duties on almost 90% of goods, thereby linking Russia’s regional economic integration initiative to its efforts to build a wider bloc of friendly countries beyond the post-Soviet space. While Turkey and Russia cooperate and compete in various theatres (often articulated through tactical alliances), including in the South Caucasus, they share an interest in establishing a new regional strategic equilibrium around a potential peace settlement of the Armenia–Azerbaijan confrontation.

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Institutionally, Russia supports the 3 + 3 South Caucasus Regional Cooperation Platform format, which sets the stage for the direct participation of Iran and Turkey in determining the future of the region – although Georgia has, to date, boycotted the grouping. Speaking at the October 2024 meeting of the 3 + 3 format, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov indicated that Armenia and Azerbaijan should use the platform to negotiate their peace agreement.

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The Armenia–Azerbaijan Peace Settlement

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A resolution of the bitter Armenia–Azerbaijan relationship through a peace agreement and subsequent process of normalisation stands at the centre of the potential transformation of the South Caucasus. Agreement between Baku and Yerevan would open the region for investment in transport, trade, energy and communications projects, unlock closed borders, and create some of the conditions for Armenia–Turkey normalisation. The nature of an agreement would also have a profound impact on the balance of power within the South Caucasus. For these reasons, the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have become a focus of external actors, with Russia, the EU (notably France and Germany) and the US jockeying for influence and a role in the negotiations.

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With Azerbaijan’s victory in its two military campaigns in 2020 and 2023 to reclaim the occupied territories and the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Russia’s previous leverage around the protracted conflict collapsed as the OSCE Minsk Group process (the diplomatic mechanism established in 1992 to facilitate negotiations to end the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh under the co-chairmanship of the US, Russia and France) was marginalised, Moscow’s leverage as the leading arms supplier to both sides evaporated, and Baku sought to move negotiations between different formats and ultimately to push successfully for direct bilateral Armenia–Azerbaijan contacts as the way forward to exclude third parties (principally Russia, the US and the EU).

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With the departure of Russian “peacekeepers” from Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2024, as well as pressure on the Russian relationship with Armenia, Moscow’s ability to use security to shape developments on the ground has been undermined. Instead, it has sought to reposition itself diplomatically to shape developments so that an eventual peace agreement would also serve Russian interests.

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Moscow’s goals have been to ensure that Russia has a central role in any agreements about the future shape and management of land transport and communications infrastructure in the South Caucasus, that the Euro-Atlantic community is marginalised, and that the region’s immediate neighbours (Russia, Turkey and Iran) emerge as the key regional arbiters – with Moscow in the lead role. Russia has sought to insert itself into the key issue of a transport corridor across Armenia and to ensure that the INSTC, which is vital to its ability to build economic and trade links to the south, goes ahead. Moscow views a role in these areas as critical to ensuring its regional influence, notably in the Armenia–Azerbaijan relationship.

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The partnership with Azerbaijan has become central to Russia’s efforts to advance this agenda – notably as the transatlantic community has increasingly aligned to support Armenia, leading to growing tensions with Baku. In August 2024, the visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu to Baku underlined how the variety of Russian regional interests are now being channelled through the bilateral relationship. In a meeting with President Aliyev, Shoigu highlighted the intersection of the peace negotiations, the development of the INSTC and the future agenda of the 3 + 3 format to manage the stabilisation of the South Caucasus, with efforts to prevent Western “meddling” in the region.

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Conclusion: Russia Retying the Caucasian Knot?

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For most of the past two hundred years, Russia has pursued relatively stable strategic goals in relation to the South Caucasus region. At the core, Russia has focused on binding the region to itself, as a buffer zone against external encroachment. In more expansionist foreign policy phases, such as since the turn of the 21st century under Putin, the region has been seen as integral to ambitions to extend Russia’s influence and control in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, as well as the Middle East. At such times, the territories and peoples of the South Caucasus have also often been viewed by Moscow as part of a wider Russian world.

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With the South Caucasus undergoing a transformation, notably as result of geopolitical and geo-economic trends towards multipolarity, Russia’s regional role is displaying elements of continuity, but is increasingly characterised by change. Much of the analysis of the region sees Russia as experiencing a “managed decline” or loss of hegemony because of this process of change. The analysis in this paper, however, points to a different conclusion. Moscow is attempting to refashion its position through a renewed regional approach – seeking to retie the Caucasian knot to ensure a continuing central role for Russia in the South Caucasus, retain close links to countries in the region, and marginalise the Euro-Atlantic community.

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Over the past two decades, geopolitical competition with the Euro-Atlantic community in the region has been the key challenge to Russia’s ability to achieve its longstanding strategic goals. In this struggle, the Kremlin has deployed security policy as Russia’s trump card. Up until 2020, it was customary to assume that Russia’s goal in the South Caucasus was to use its security advantage to preserve a favourable status quo. Moscow’s current policy towards the region reflects a shift in some respects from this approach and indicates a changed significance of the South Caucasus in Russia’s strategic calculus.

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Moscow has recognised that the changes in the international politics of the South Caucasus towards multipolarity have provided opportunities for the countries in the region to pursue policies of multi-alignment. This has meant that Russia can no longer approach the region as though it remains part of the post-Soviet space where it has an exclusive role, and some of its past policy levers have lost traction – notably in respect to the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. At the same time, the breakdown of ties with Europe and the US has forced Moscow to seek to reorient its foreign and economic ties south and east.

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Russia now looks on the South Caucasus not just as a buffer against the Euro-Atlantic community and a means to strengthen its power projection ambitions in the Black Sea and the Middle East, but also as a vital link to Iran, as well as the location of potential southern routes to access markets and build political and security ties across Eurasia. Russia is therefore rebalancing and realigning its policies to continue to be a central regional player in the South Caucasus, even if this requires a shift from its previous reliance on security policy and the ambition to exclude other external powers from the region.

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Moscow is today willing to accommodate and even cooperate with other international actors, notably Iran, China and even Turkey, in the South Caucasus, and it has also adapted by developing new and varied bilateral ties with the three South Caucasian states to shape the regional agenda, particularly on economic and transport issues. However, the Kremlin remains focused on blocking Euro-Atlantic integration efforts in the region, and is willing to work with other regional powers to advance this goal. Indeed, Moscow is now looking to develop its new approach in the South Caucasus as part of a larger Eurasian security initiative, driven, together with China, Iran and other partners, as a counter-West bloc.

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Moscow is also experiencing real challenges in forging a new approach to the South Caucasus. It is having to contend with an increasingly complex region in which not only is there a diversity of other, often competitive, external actors, but also the governments of the region have a new degree of agency in developing their foreign relationships. As a result, Moscow is facing resistance to its efforts to insert itself within the central issues that could reshape the regional order, notably the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and the associated initiatives to open the region’s transport network.

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Faced with the prospect of being marginalised from the peace process, Putin made a rare state visit to Baku in August 2024 to promote Moscow’s regional role. The visit was marked by positive words, photo opportunities and commitments to cooperation (notably on the INSTC). Putin appeared, however, unable to reverse the steps that have seen Russia pushed out from its former regional role. Critically, since the early 1990s, Russia – together with the US and Europe – has been at the centre of diplomatic efforts to resolve the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. Since 2020 and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Baku has, however, managed to exclude major third parties from discussions, even turning to Kazakhstan to host peace negotiations.

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During his visit to Baku, Putin indicated, with a degree of desperation, that he would “be happy” to serve as a regional peacemaker, but neither Baku nor Yerevan has responded positively. At the same time, the decision of Armenia and Azerbaijan to exclude the issue of the Zangezur Corridor from discussions on a peace agreement struck a direct blow to Moscow’s efforts to reinsert itself between the two countries, leading to further, unsuccessful Russian diplomatic efforts.

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Russia’s South Caucasus policies are thus at a key moment. Moscow has recognised the importance of the shifts taking place in the region and is taking action to try to ensure that it remains a key regional player. Despite the advantages that Russia has as a consequence of history and geography and the country’s strong security policies, it is nevertheless facing a struggle to reposition itself in the South Caucasus. There is a real prospect that the Kremlin’s efforts to forge a renewed regional role may prove unsuccessful, and Moscow may emerge from the process of realignment a significantly reduced regional force. The high-level political engagement in the region, notably signalled by Putin’s visit to Baku, suggests, however, that the Kremlin is prepared to commit significant political capital to ensure that Russia remains a leading regional actor, and to show that Moscow is not ready to accept a diminished role.

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Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Community

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The changing geopolitics of the South Caucasus and Russia’s shifting regional approach pose a challenge for the Euro-Atlantic community. Over the past two decades, the prospect of eventual EU and NATO integration has been the main policy framework to build support and attract regional states. The approach marries values – in support of human rights, rule of law and democratisation – with a geopolitical approach to counter Russia and its integration offer, notably through access to European markets and financial assistance.

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Since 2008, Moscow has, however, been able to thwart Euro-Atlantic integration through its dominance of regional security politics. Unwilling to challenge Russia’s security trump card, the Euro-Atlantic community has officially followed an open-door policy for NATO and EU membership for Georgia, and maintained a readiness to advance ties to Azerbaijan and Armenia if there is an opportunity. In reality, the EU and NATO tracks have effectively been stalled, even in the case of Georgia, which has been at the forefront of building ties.

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With shifts in the international politics of the South Caucasus, a policy built on “strategic patience” is well past its expiry date. The changes that have affected the South Caucasus have shifted the region from being an exclusively European security region, as it was in the decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to one increasingly linked to the Middle East, South Asia and China. The countries of the South Caucasus now have alternative partners to the Euro-Atlantic community (and Russia), notably for trade, infrastructure investment and business, but also for the supply of weapons and for diplomatic ties. While these ties may lack the potential of Euro-Atlantic integration, they offer immediate and tangible gains, especially in comparison to the promise of a bright future of EU and NATO membership that never seems to quite arrive.

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The links to other external actors generally also come without the formal conditionality attached by the Euro-Atlantic community. The development of multipolarity has, in this way, reinforced the ability of local elites to advance illiberalism. As a result, Russian-style authoritarian politics has taken hold in Georgia and is consolidated in Azerbaijan, while democratisation remains fragile and vulnerable in Armenia. With this shift, the idea that the region will become part of the Euro-Atlantic community through eventual EU and NATO membership looks unrealistic.

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This presents a dilemma for the Euro-Atlantic community: either continue to criticise non-democratic governments and risk them shifting orientation to Russia and others, or try to retain engagement but then face working with regimes that do not reflect Western values. In either option, Euro-Atlantic integration will struggle to advance. In recent years, Georgia has represented this challenge most starkly. The adoption of increasingly antidemocratic practices by Georgian Dream, the ruling party, and the cultivation of a diversity of external ties have seen a withdrawal of Euro-Atlantic security and economic support. After decades of effort to advance Tbilisi as the key Euro-Atlantic partner in the South Caucasus, Georgia was largely absent from the Washington NATO Summit Communique in 2024. An EU report on Georgia’s progress towards membership that appeared immediately after the October 2024 election appeared to indicate that the membership process was effectively frozen.

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As the Euro-Atlantic position has weakened in Georgia, there has been an effort to pivot to Armenia, including supplying security assistance and even military equipment. This will add little to Armenia’s overall defence and deterrence, but the shift risks being seen as taking sides within the region, further accelerating the militarisation of the South Caucasus and contributing to the emergence of a new round of internal divisions just as the prospects of a new regional settlement are emerging. In any case, Armenia’s prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration will be constrained by the same developments that have affected the other countries of the region – Russia’s readiness to use its range of policies, and centrally its willingness to use security and military tools, to prevent Euro-Atlantic enlargement, and the appearance of attractive alternative international partners.

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The risks for the Euro-Atlantic community of failing to find an effective means of engagement in the region are highlighted by Azerbaijan. Having turned away from Euro-Atlantic integration, Baku has been able to consolidate its authoritarian political order and reclaim the occupied territories and Nagorno-Karabakh, employing approaches that have led to ethnic cleansing. Euro-Atlantic actors appear largely powerless regarding either development. Indeed, Europe has been keen to develop closer energy and transport links to Azerbaijan, even as Baku has followed this domestic and foreign policy course.

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The Euro-Atlantic community must now look at the emerging regional realities and craft a regional policy capable of influencing contemporary developments. Given the broader confrontation with Russia, weakening Moscow’s presence in the South Caucasus and disrupting its efforts to rebuild a new regional position for itself should be at the heart of a regional strategy for the Euro-Atlantic community. A key emphasis should be on countering Moscow’s efforts to position itself in the regional trade and communications infrastructure to support its war effort and reinforce its strategic partnership with Iran.

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The focus of Western policy should be on strengthening the sovereignty and independence of regional states and their ability to balance Russia through multi-alignment (in which context the Euro-Atlantic community can remain a leading partner), and to undermine Russia’s efforts to control them or to shepherd them into regional and international formats (such as the 3 + 3 and the BRICS) that exclude Europe and the US. This approach should also include supporting and investing in projects such as the Middle Corridor that will help economic diversification and promote external investment, while seeking to constrain projects that strengthen the Russia–Iran north–south axis and enable Moscow to reshape regional trade and transport around its own agenda.

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Supporting the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, including measures to build trust and confidence to overcome the legacy of conflict, will be critical, as this agreement is central to opening the region. To play such a role, the Euro-Atlantic community will need to be more effective in balancing its approaches with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Rebuilding a political relationship with Baku, which is increasingly the regional agenda-setter, to go beyond energy cooperation will be a necessary step to balance Moscow–Baku ties. If peace can be achieved, there will also be opportunities to advance regional cooperation among the South Caucasus countries, which Russia has effectively undercut to date, and which can help to balance Moscow’s policies by strengthening regional balancing.

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While domestic political forces more favourable to the West may re-emerge in the countries of the South Caucasus, the geopolitical and geo-economic context in the region militates against the Euro-Atlantic integration model regaining traction, with its interdependent security, normative and economic elements. Russia has begun to adapt its approach to the South Caucasus as the region undergoes change, and so must the West. Support for democracy and human rights should be pursued, where realistic, but its prioritisation will need to be balanced with the geopolitical imperative of building relationships to counter Russia and its major allies.

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Enhancing coordination with Turkey on regional issues should be a priority. Ankara is continuing to strengthen its South Caucasus interests and engagement as part of a broader strategy reaching to Central Asia and across the Black Sea. An opening of the South Caucasus would inevitably see an even greater Turkish presence. As a NATO member, Turkey is uniquely placed to strengthen regional security that aligns with the wider interests of the Euro-Atlantic community, if common cause can be promoted.

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Without a readiness to adapt, the Euro-Atlantic community is likely to face a growing regional marginalisation and the prospect that Russia will be able to reposition itself, while the countries of the South Caucasus are likely to be drawn increasingly into regional and international groupings that exclude the US and Europe. To challenge Russia effectively and to rebuild regional influence, the Euro-Atlantic community will need to recalibrate its policies and move beyond approaches that have lost the ability to shape regional developments effectively.

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This will involve difficult trade-offs, including working with non-democratic regimes. It will also mean being ready to acknowledge that the South Caucasus is unlikely to be part of a wider Europe, and so should be approached through the sort of foreign and security policy frameworks that are applied to other such parts of the world, rather than through integration. While such a shift will be challenging, Russia is at a uniquely vulnerable moment in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes far-reaching change. Although Russia is already active in repairing its position, the Euro-Atlantic community nevertheless has an opportunity to help facilitate a regional realignment that could substantially constrain Moscow.

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Neil Melvin is Director of the International Security research group at RUSI. Prior to joining RUSI, he was Director of the Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme and then Director of Research at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). He has held senior adviser positions in the OSCE and the Energy Charter. He has published widely on the international and security politics of the South Caucasus.

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Semiconductor Mfg. Equipment

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The Double-Edged Sword of Semiconductor Export Controls: Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment

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William Alan Reinsch, et al. | 2024.11.19

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This report argues that existing controls incentivize China to minimize reliance on U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment by indigenizing development of tools and increasing purchases from third-country suppliers, which ultimately hinders U.S. technology leadership.

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Export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) represent a key focus of ongoing U.S. government efforts to “choke off” China’s access to leading-edge semiconductors. The United States, along with allies such as the Netherlands and Japan, is a global leader in production and R&D for chipmaking tools. By imposing uniquely broad and unilateral controls on U.S. toolmakers’ access to the Chinese market, however, the U.S. government has turbocharged Chinese efforts to wean off all U.S. SME due to growing concerns about the reliability and trustworthiness of U.S. companies. In this way, expanding U.S. trade restrictions are facilitating the “design-out” of U.S. toolmakers in Chinese semiconductor supply chains in favor of domestic and third-country (i.e., non-U.S. and non-Chinese) companies. This growing trend in China’s market, the world’s largest for semiconductor manufacturing, threatens the long-term leadership of the United States in SME by diverting revenue (and R&D investment) away from U.S. industry. As a result, current U.S. export controls risk jeopardizing the economic and national security of the United States by hindering U.S. companies’ market share and accelerating China’s relative technological gains. This report, the second in a series on U.S. semiconductor export controls, outlines the importance of SME to chip markets, key types of tools being designed-out, and the rapid growth of Chinese toolmakers. It also evaluates how toolmakers based in third countries have leveraged U.S. unilateral controls to win new business with Chinese customers. The report argues that the United States should limit further unilateral controls on SME sales and consider new incentives for allies to create multilateral export regimes, which could mitigate some of the negative impacts of current controls on U.S. companies.

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Introduction

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With geopolitical competition intensifying, U.S. economic security policy has undergone significant changes. Primarily, the United States has expanded economic security measures to take new defensive actions around critical and emerging technologies (CETs). Such efforts center on denying China access to key foundational technologies — particularly advanced semiconductors that support dual-use applications such as artificial intelligence (AI).

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The administrations of Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden have expanded economic security measures regarding China’s access to CETs. Export controls are an increasingly common tool in U.S. economic security efforts, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has called them a “new strategic asset in the U.S. and allied toolkit.” Under the Biden administration, the federal government has implemented two major rounds of semiconductor export controls, one in October 2022 and a second in October 2023. Additional controls may be forthcoming as the United States aims to use trade restrictions to deny China access to leading-edge semiconductors, thus limiting China’s ability to develop military and dual-use technologies such as advanced AI systems.

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The potential benefits of such a strategy to economic and national security are obvious. They include maintaining technological superiority for modern military capabilities and intelligence gathering. Washington sees clear, legitimate risks associated with the proliferation of highly advanced semiconductors among its adversaries. A sensible U.S. export control policy focused on preserving technological superiority is a measured response.

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Export controls, however, are a double-edged sword. When a nation decides to implement controls, it effectively restricts its companies’ market share. If controls negatively affect a nation’s technological champions, policymakers may inadvertently compromise their country’s status as a long-term technology leader. The loss in sales decreases these tech champions’ revenue and, in some cases, redirects it to foreign competitors, potentially reducing future investments in innovation for key U.S. firms.

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Washington sees clear, legitimate risks associated with the proliferation of highly advanced semiconductors among its adversaries. A sensible U.S. export control policy focused on preserving technological superiority is a measured response.

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If the relative costs imposed on China’s technological progression and the corresponding benefits to U.S. national security outweigh the costs to U.S. industry and innovation, then Washington may well view these impacts as a necessary price. However, China’s semiconductor ecosystem — through its own strategies and through government support — has managed to undermine the effectiveness of many of the controls meant to keep Chinese firms behind their Western counterparts. For one, Chinese companies have found ways to access U.S. technology by circumventing controls. These efforts have been widely written about and include using overseas shell companies to purchase controlled products, as well as leveraging domestic technology trading networks to redirect technology via firms that are exempt from controls.

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Beyond circumvention efforts, U.S. export controls have helped facilitate a farther-reaching unintended consequence: China has set its domestic semiconductor ecosystem on a path toward removing U.S. technology altogether. Chinese government and commercial actors have deployed two key long-term strategies to create ex-U.S. supply chains for semiconductor technologies across the value chain. These strategies, which represent the focus of this series of papers by the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business, include the following:

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    Design-out: supplanting existing U.S. and allied semiconductor technologies with comparable technologies, from either

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    a. Chinese firms; or

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    b. third-country (non-U.S. and non-Chinese) firms

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    Design-around: developing new technologies that do away with an entire category of controlled technology in the semiconductor supply chain

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Design-Out and Design-Around

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As discussed in the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business’s introductory report in this series, which covers advanced packaging, China is rapidly accelerating the design-out of U.S. technologies from semiconductor supply chains in response to existing — and in anticipation of future — U.S. export controls. It has pursued this goal, in part, by increasingly adopting domestic firms’ technologies. China’s semiconductor industry has rapidly pivoted toward made-in-China technology over the last few years, facilitated by expanded government investment and other incentives, as well as preferential procurement practices by Chinese semiconductor companies.

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There is also evidence of increased Chinese adoption of third-country suppliers within semiconductor supply chains. For instance, competitors from Japan, the Netherlands, Taiwan, Israel, and South Korea have increasingly leveraged China’s chip market as a growth engine, winning new Chinese customers and increasing existing customers’ wallet share as the impacts of U.S. export controls constrain the competitiveness of U.S. companies. This third-country design-out threat potentially shifts semiconductor industry leadership toward foreign competitors, some of whom offer China the very technologies U.S. companies are barred from selling.

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In addition, China is looking to design around U.S. export controls — in other words, innovate to achieve advanced semiconductor capabilities using approaches not modeled on U.S. technologies. Importantly, this trend means China is beginning to innovate rather than copy foreign technology in the chip industry. As discussed in the packaging report, a shift away from a “fast-follower” approach toward a more innovative approach would represent a key change in U.S.-China technological competition — one that potentially threatens long-term U.S. innovation leadership.

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It would be one thing if China’s design-out and design-around strategies affected only leading-edge semiconductor technologies, which are the primary targets of U.S. export controls. However, China’s pivot away from U.S. technology has affected not only the leading edge but also foundational, or “trailing-edge,” semiconductor technologies. Chinese and third-country firms want to avoid dealing with the high regulatory and financial burdens of U.S. export controls, which are complex, stricter than other nations’ in coverage and enforcement, and fast evolving. As a result, Chinese and foreign companies selling to the Chinese market are newly incentivized to avoid using U.S. technology where possible. Additionally, the ambiguity of the controls means that firms may opt to overcomply with export regulations and avoid selling or purchasing U.S. technologies — even if the products technically fall outside of the controls — for fear of dealing with costly litigation.

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The United States, for its part, looks to press forward with stricter controls. This threat of stricter controls, in turn, encourages China to design out and design around other U.S. technologies to hedge against future regulations. In this way, tightening unilateral U.S. export controls is having a ripple effect across the Chinese — and global — semiconductor ecosystem, threatening to undermine U.S. leadership and leverage in the sector.

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Overview

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Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment

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This paper focuses on China’s design-out and design-around strategies related to semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) — the machines critical to making chips. China’s access to such equipment has become increasingly important to its national semiconductor ambitions as expanding U.S. and allied export controls limit Chinese access to leading global chip manufacturers such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), Samsung, and Intel.

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SME is a strong example of the design-out issue. Chinese companies are increasingly replacing U.S. producers one-to-one in Chinese semiconductor manufacturing facilities, or fabs. As procurement practices in Chinese fabs shift toward an anywhere-but-the-United-States approach, SME sales are also shifting toward third-country toolmakers.

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SME is a strong example of the design-out issue. Chinese companies are increasingly replacing U.S. producers one-to-one in Chinese semiconductor manufacturing facilities, or fabs.

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The United States would benefit economically and strategically from continuing to sell some SME technology to China. These benefits do not apply to technologies that are highly specific to advanced dual-use technology and cannot be acquired elsewhere or rapidly developed domestically. For example, ASML’s sales of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography provide a choke point for Chinese technological advancement into fabrication processes like 3 nanometers (nm) and is a prime example of the power of export controls. But for less niche and non-sole-sourced tools, unilateral and broad export controls risk U.S. technology champions losing out on revenue while China maintains its access to the same technology, either via industry indigenization efforts or shifting purchases to third countries.

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This paper explores why SME is important to semiconductor technological innovation, what types of U.S. SME are facing design-out and design-around risks, and what implications those risks carry for U.S. economic and national security.

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Why Is Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Important?

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Making semiconductors is impossible without a wide array of specialized, highly advanced machinery. Each manufacturing plant, or fab, contains an average of 1,200 multi-million-dollar tools — all of which are critical to chip production. This group of tools transforms a thin piece of crystalline silicon or other semiconducting material into a fabricated wafer containing billions — if not trillions — of nanometric transistors precisely etched onto a tiny surface area (often just 300 millimeters). Capital expenditures (CapEx) on SME constitute an estimated 75 percent of total CapEx on fab construction, and some tools reach the size of a double-decker bus, costing upward of $150 million.

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Semiconductor fabrication, both for leading-edge process nodes and mature chip technologies, is one of the most complex manufacturing processes on the planet — in large part due to the machinery required. For instance, ASML’s EUV lithography devices have been called “the most complicated machine humans have built.” As a result, advancements in SME technology have historically represented a key driver of semiconductor industry innovation. High-quality SME is also critical to the economics of scaled production, as any imprecision in a finished chip’s structure or composition can affect performance and reduce a fab’s production yield. All this means that a fab’s access to tools is a leading determinant of how competitive its technology is on a global scale.

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SME is often divided into front-end equipment used in wafer fabrication and processing, such as lithography, etch, deposition, and cleaning, and back-end equipment used for assembly, packaging, dicing, bonding, and testing. Because the advanced packaging brief covers assembly and packaging equipment, this brief focuses on fabrication and test equipment in evaluating design-out and design-around risks.

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Four types of SME across front-end and back-end equipment are under significant threat of design-out: (1) deposition, (2) etching, (3) process control, and (4) testing. While discussions of the semiconductor supply chain often group testing with assembly and packaging, the authors include testing within SME here for two reasons: First, testing plays a key role in front-end wafer fabrication (as well as in back-end processes like assembly and packaging), as it takes place continually throughout the production life cycle. Second, the design-out and design-around dynamics of testing equipment are more like those of chipmaking tools rather than those of assembly or packaging technologies. As in the areas of etching, deposition, and process control, the United States is home to leading competitors in testing equipment, which are facing design-out risks from foreign manufacturers. For these reasons, testing is included as part of SME in this report.

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The following section introduces each category of SME as well as the key U.S. and global players associated with it. The primary takeaway is that U.S. manufacturers, alongside competitors primarily from U.S.-allied countries such as Japan and the Netherlands, have historically held leading shares of global equipment markets — particularly for chipmaking technologies at the leading edge. This leadership underscores the high stakes of any shift in global market share because of U.S. export controls. U.S. companies have much revenue and technological leadership to lose to new Chinese companies — as well as Dutch, Japanese, Israeli, German, and other foreign firms, many of which are well positioned in equipment markets to grab a share of the U.S. market.

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Deposition

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The deposition process involves specialized tools depositing thin films of conducting, isolating, or semiconducting materials on the wafer. Deposition takes place throughout the fabrication stage and often occurs in multiple sequential iterations along with processes such as photolithography and etching. It plays a key role in enabling miniaturization in semiconductors, as it can create protective barriers to prevent atomic-level interference. Deposition can also help strengthen or weaken an electric field and connect transistors with other devices and power sources.

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There are various types of deposition used in wafer fabrication. U.S. companies such as Lam, Applied Materials, Plasma-Therm, and Veeco are key players across most types of deposition tools. The two areas discussed in depth here are epitaxy and atomic layer deposition, given their potential for design-out by Chinese supply chains.

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Epitaxy — also known as “epi” — involves depositing a near-perfect crystalline layer directly on top of the wafer substrate. Epitaxy growth typically occurs during the beginning of the wafer fabrication process, following wafer polishing and preceding the sequences of lithography, etching, and other deposition processes. Adding an epitaxial layer helps fabs better control doping wafers with impurities and can introduce a different material than that used in wafer “bulk” materials. As a result, epitaxy facilitates more effective electron transmission, a key goal in advanced chipmaking.

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Epitaxy innovation plays an important role in the ongoing evolution of both chip fabrication and advanced packaging. Epitaxy is important to nonclassical wafer substrates (i.e., nonsilicon) such as gallium arsenide (GaAs), gallium nitride (GaN), and silicon carbide (SiC), which play a key role in critical technologies such as aerospace and defense applications and electric vehicles. An emerging technology within the field of epitaxy is remote epitaxy. Remote epitaxy is the growth of a thin epitaxial layer that is aligned — but not in contact — with the substrate. This technique has a plethora of applications in advanced packaging, particularly three-dimensional (3D) packaging designs, in which multiple chips are stacked to enhance bandwidth while reducing power consumption and footprint.

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The epitaxy equipment market includes tools used for metal-organic chemical vapor deposition, high-temperature chemical vapor deposition, and molecular beam epitaxy. Leading suppliers are based in Germany, the United States, and Japan — as well as China. Key companies in terms of 2020 market share include Germany’s Aixtron, the United States’ Veeco, China’s Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment Inc., China (AMEC), and Japan’s Tokyo Electron (TEL).

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Atomic layer deposition (ALD) is an advanced type of chemical vapor deposition (CVD) that adds layers consisting of a single atom of thickness onto a wafer. It is key to leading-edge chip designs due to the importance of controlling layer thickness and composition in fabricating advanced chips, whose features are small enough that the industry is running up against the physical limits of miniaturization. There are two key types of ALD: thermal ALD and plasma-enhanced ALD (PEALD). Whereas the former relies solely on chemical precursors to deposit the atomic layer, PEALD uses plasma to provide reaction energy for the process, enabling greater control over film characteristics.

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Netherlands-based ASM is the leader in ALD, particularly PEALD, holding above 50 percent of the market, according to investor materials. Additional key suppliers include Japan’s Kokusai, TEL, and Optorun, as well as the United States’ Lam Research. As of 2020, China’s Naura had a “negligible” share.

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Etching

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The etching process involves carving a precise pattern onto the wafer by selectively removing layers of material using either liquid or gas chemicals. Etching takes the pattern created during photolithography — during which a light selectively removes parts of a photoresist coating based on a photomask design — and applies this pattern permanently to the material layer below. Etching occurs multiple times in fabrication and creates a complex pattern of cavities where the thin film layer has been removed.

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There are two main types of etching tools: dry and wet. Dry etching tools use gases to engrave the wafer and are necessary to create the circuitry on leading-edge chips. Atomic layer etching tools are particularly important for advanced process node production due to their greater control and precision. Wet etching, which uses liquid chemicals to engrave the wafer, is less common than dry etching for advanced process nodes due to the challenges of creating complex structures. However, it is cheaper and less risky, making it commonly used to clean wafers. Because etching also plays a key role in mature chip technologies, both dry and wet etching tools are critical to semiconductor manufacturing.

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The United States and Japan are the world’s leading suppliers of etching equipment, followed by China and South Korea. Lam Research, Applied Materials, and KLA all have strong shares in global dry and wet etching markets. Japan’s TEL, Hitachi, and Screen are other notable players. South Korea-based SEMES represents a growing wet etching player. Finally, in China, AMEC, Naura, and Kingsemi are notable small providers of etching tools.

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Process Control

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Process control refers to using monitoring tools in semiconductor manufacturing to ensure quality control. It takes place concurrently with other stages of fabrication and involves metrics like the purity of wafer materials, transistor dimensions, and chip conductivity. As chip dimensions get smaller, variations at the molecular level represent a larger share of an integrated circuit’s dimensions, making process control increasingly important in fabrication. Ongoing industry shifts, like the switch from single patterning to multiple patterning and from planar to 3D transistors, mean that variations increasingly come from the material quality or the deposition process, calling for more advanced control tools.

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Process control is important to both advanced and mature node production, as it has a key impact on yield. Wafer production yield, or the percentage of individual chips (dies) per wafer that make it through the final probe testing stage, is a critical metric for fabs due to their high per-unit operating costs. Process control technology helps enable a higher yield, thus improving profitability by minimizing wasted output.

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Key types of semiconductor process control technologies include photomask inspection and repair tools, process monitoring equipment, wafer inspection equipment, and wafer-level inspection packaging tools. U.S. companies hold strong market share across all key types of tools. Notable U.S. players include Applied Materials, KLA, Keithley Instruments, Keysight Technologies, Onto Innovation, Nanotronics, and Thermo Fisher. Japan and Germany are home to most leading competitors, such as Lasertec, Rigaku, and Screen in Japan and Zeiss and Bruker in Germany. Chinese players are smaller and include Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE), Jingce, and Raintree.

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While various players compete across the entire process control ecosystem, individual markets are often highly concentrated among a few players. For instance, the market for wafer-level packaging inspection tools is dominated by one U.S. and one Israeli firm. As a result, the impact of export controls on a single company’s positioning can have a significant effect on global market shares.

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Testing

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Semiconductor testing occurs at multiple stages during fabrication and packaging, helping ensure defective chips do not make it into final packages. Chips go through up to six stages of testing: (1) wafer acceptance, (2) wafer sort, (3) wafer-level burn-in, (4) package test, (5) burn-in test, and (6) testing at the system level. Testing equipment has taken on increased importance and industry value as the cost of testing devices and the potential losses associated with manufacturing defective dice have risen in response to advances in chip design and applications such as advanced graphics processing units, which are commonly used to train AI models.

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Key types of semiconductor testing tools include burn-in test equipment, handlers and probes, linear and discrete testing tools, and system-on-a-chip testing equipment. Japanese and U.S. firms hold leading market shares in different parts of the industry. Notable Japanese companies include Advantest, Tesec, and Accretech. U.S. players include Teradyne, National Instruments, and Cohu. South Korean firms such as UniTest and DI Corporation are also key participants. Chinese capabilities have historically been more limited.

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How the EAR Impacts U.S. and Foreign Toolmakers

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The Commerce Department’s October 7, 2022, rules, implemented under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), require licensing of U.S. equipment and persons involved in certain types of chip manufacturing. Affected technologies include equipment used in the production of “logic chips with non-planar transistor architectures . . . of 16nm or 14nm, or below; DRAM memory chips of 18nm half-pitch or less; [and] NAND flash memory chips with 128 layers or more.” The regulation’s October 2023 updates tighten controls to include some older technologies, such as immersion deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography.

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Products newly subject to the EAR include both items in the United States and “all U.S. origin items wherever located.” This inclusion means that U.S.-based multinational companies producing SME (not to mention other semiconductor technologies) cannot avoid the controls when selling to China, even when relying on factories abroad.

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For companies based outside the United States, determining whether the EAR applies is more complex. Foreign-made items may be subject to the EAR in two ways: (1) falling under a U.S. foreign direct product rule (FDPR) or (2) exceeding the de minimis threshold of “controlled” U.S.-origin content. Ostensibly, both rules apply the U.S. controls extraterritorially, leveraging the frequent presence of U.S. technology in third-country products.

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Foreign Direct Product Rules

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FDPRs apply the EAR to foreign-made items if they are the “direct product” of certain types of U.S.-origin equipment, software, or other technology, and are destined for designated countries. Specifically, FDPRs empower the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to require licenses for exports of certain foreign-made products if listed U.S. technology was directly used to produce them or produce key parts of the plants that were used to manufacture the products, such as a tool or a piece of software — even if a controlled U.S. component or system does not appear in the product.

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Three FDPRs limit Chinese access to semiconductor technologies: the Entity List (EL), Advanced Computing, and Supercomputer FDPRs. These FDPRs differ in terms of the products, companies, and countries that they cover. The EL FDPR, introduced in May 2020 by the Trump administration, applies U.S. export controls to products destined for hundreds of Chinese (and other foreign) companies and their subsidiaries. These restrictions vary based on the products involved as well as the type of EL classification applicable to the purchaser company. Their reach has continued to grow as the U.S. Department of Commerce has added Chinese firms to the EL. The Advanced Computing FDPR applies the EAR to a narrower range of products meeting certain performance parameters and based on the destination country rather than the destination company. Originally aimed at China, the Advanced Computing FDPR has expanded the list of destination countries to include the countries China likely uses to avoid controls, such as Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Finally, the Supercomputer FDPR applies a country and end-use scope to encompass any items subject to the EAR that are used to produce supercomputers, which are defined based on compute capacity and system dimensions.

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The FDPRs and de minimis rules aim to limit the ability of third-country suppliers (who face less strict export controls from their governments) to replace U.S. suppliers in Chinese markets. However, their current efficacy in this regard is questionable. Multiple U.S. SME companies told CSIS that these restrictions are not stopping foreign toolmakers from replacing them in Chinese fabs, a complaint that has also been raised to U.S. officials. While public evidence supporting this trend remains limited, a New York Federal Reserve study from April 2024 on the impacts of U.S. semiconductor export controls showed that non-U.S. firms that sell to Chinese semiconductor companies experienced “higher revenues and profitability . . . following the inclusion of the Chinese targets in the U.S. export control lists.”

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De Minimis Rules

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De minimis rules apply the EAR based on the inclusion of U.S.-origin controlled inputs in foreign-exported goods destined for specific countries. Notably, unlike the FDPRs, use of de minimis rules requires that the exported goods directly contain products produced in the United States that fall under the EAR. This differs from the FDPR’s broader threshold of goods being the “direct product” of certain U.S.-origin technologies or inputs (that do not need to be included in the actual goods being shipped). In cases where the shipment of the U.S. inputs to the final country destination by themselves (i.e., when not incorporated into a final product) would require a license, a de minimis calculation is necessary for the foreign export of the product that contains the inputs. Depending on the type of product and country destination, different de minimis thresholds — or the minimum percentage of U.S.-origin controlled items as a share of “fair market value” at which the EAR applies (typically 10 or 25 percent) — are relevant to the specific good. If the good exceeds the relevant de minimis threshold, an export waiver is required, pursuant to the EAR. For some products (e.g., certain lithography tools), a zero percent de minimis threshold applies, meaning that inclusion of any U.S.-origin controlled input automatically applies the EAR.

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Notably, the United States has been relatively hesitant to apply the FDPR to foreign exports of semiconductor technology due to the rule’s negative perception among U.S. allies. Allied governments and companies have sharply criticized the FDPR as an overreach of U.S. export control authority. During recent discussions in which the United States threatened to expand application of the FDPR, foreign governments reportedly said they would not cooperate with enforcement of this application, potentially threatening FDPR expansion. Although the U.S. government is reportedly preparing an expansion to the FDPR and EL that would increase restrictions on foreign exports, a Reuters report indicated that category A:5 countries — which include Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea — would be exempt from the expanded FDPR. The exclusion of countries home to leading toolmakers like ASML and Tokyo Electron belies the U.S. government’s continued hesitation to use the FDPR on key allies in the semiconductor supply chain.

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Enforcement of extraterritorial applications of the EAR is also a challenge. For semiconductor controls, enforcement challenges are exacerbated by needing to know the node process for which the technology is used, in order to determine whether the extraterritorial rules apply. As an example, SME used in the production of “advanced-node integrated circuits” does not have a de minimis level in terms of U.S. content, whereas SME for less mature chipmaking does. For shipments of finished chips, the node process is self-evident, based on the exported product itself. However, for SME and other inputs, the type of process node manufactured using the product may be less transparent to suppliers. For instance, the same types of etch equipment may be used in a wide range of process nodes, a practice known in the industry as “CapEx recycling.” Therefore, suppliers could unintentionally sell some tools used for advanced nodes to Chinese customers, as these customers can lie about the process node they are using the tools for. Additionally, the burden falls on the company to determine whether the foreign-made item is subject to the EAR, further challenging enforcement.

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Interestingly, the New York Federal Reserve study described an increase in revenues for third-country firms despite including firms ostensibly subject to the extraterritorial restrictions (via FDPR or de minimis) in its data set. The authors admitted that this had the potential to bias “estimates towards finding a decline in revenues by non-U.S. firms that sell to Chinese targets.”

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These findings suggest that the United States is applying the EAR less restrictively to third-country firms than U.S. firms, even where the FDPR or de minimis restrictions are meant to apply — another indication of potential challenges facing enforcement.

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Even when fully enforced, FDPR and de minimis requirements are potentially avoidable by removing U.S. technologies from supply chains. Industry participants reported to CSIS that the EAR is incentivizing foreign toolmakers to minimize the use of U.S. technologies, services, and personnel in supply chains to avoid restricted trade with China. For example, one individual noted that a Japanese toolmaker was removing U.S. components from its supply chains and publicizing its products as outside U.S. EAR authority — a practice the individual suggested was widespread across SME markets globally. Reports of these supply chain shifts suggest that, at least for some third-country toolmakers, reliance on U.S. technology is low enough to make avoiding the existing FDPR and de minimis thresholds possible.

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In 2023, the Netherlands and Japan adopted their own export controls following U.S. diplomatic efforts. However, these restrictions remain less stringent than U.S. controls in terms of end use and servicing personnel, giving Japanese and Dutch companies greater ability to sell to Chinese customers and provide on-the-ground support. Additionally, other key supplier countries such as South Korea, Israel, and Germany have not adopted similar export controls. Under the existing set of international export controls, foreign toolmakers continue to face significantly weaker restrictions on access to the Chinese market than U.S. companies.

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A final risk of the current EAR in terms of creating unequal market access for U.S. and foreign companies is overcompliance. As one public commentator argued to BIS,

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The October 7 IFR is so complex that only a small group of people with significant experience in the EAR and semiconductors can fully understand the rulemaking . . . Many small and medium enterprises, or even large foreign multinationals, not highly versed in these details will either not know if they are following the rule, or out of an abundance of caution, “over-comply” by restricting legitimate exports and trade not otherwise subject to these rules.

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While the October 2023 update simplifies calculations and identifies flags to help companies determine compliance, challenges remain in terms of understanding the breadth of the restrictions, which are highly technical and continually evolving.

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In other words, the EAR’s complexity and ambiguity risk encouraging U.S. toolmakers to pull back from Chinese markets — even in places where they are not legally required to do so. For instance, the previously mentioned New York Federal Reserve study also showed that U.S. firms were more likely to terminate relations with Chinese customers following the export controls, even with those not directly targeted by the controls, and less likely to form new Chinese customer relationships — potentially due to concerns about unintentionally violating restrictions. This risk of overcompliance also makes it more likely that third-country companies will design out U.S. companies, facilities, and personnel, even in areas not covered by export controls, to ensure they avoid the regulations.

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Chinese Firms Designing Out U.S. Firms in SME

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As U.S. economic and national security policy has become more stringent, Chinese businesses and policymakers have accelerated the semiconductor industry’s shift away from U.S. inputs. China’s SME industry historically has failed to achieve technological parity with foreign toolmakers due to factors such as the smaller size of its companies and, as a result, its reduced capacity to invest in research and development (R&D). Instead of buying domestic, leading Chinese chipmakers such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), Hua Hong Semiconductor, and Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC) have sought out the most advanced chipmaking technology available — which is often of U.S. origin. For instance, Applied Materials, KLA, and Lam Research all held large market shares in Chinese chip markets as of 2022. That same year, China’s SME localization rate (the share of tools produced domestically) was 21 percent. A 2021 report by Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology estimated a localization rate of just 8 percent.

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However, strong evidence suggests that China’s procurement approach has shifted since late 2022, with the removal of U.S. technology emerging as a primary industry objective. In 2023, China’s SME localization rate nearly doubled year over year to reach 40 percent. A South China Morning Post article recently reported that the “unwritten rule” for Chinese fabs was 70 percent self-sufficiency (made in China) in SME and that firms were achieving “significant progress” for key types of chipmaking equipment, with the exceptions of lithography, ion implantation, and inspection and metrology (parts of process control).

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This design-out trend results from increasing top-down pressure from government officials and growing bottom-up commercial incentives for Chinese companies to minimize exposure to present — and future — U.S. regulatory actions. In the SME space, China’s semiconductor industry is pursuing design-out through two main approaches: (1) increased procurement from and investment in Chinese toolmakers and (2) replacement of U.S. SME technology with products from third-country firms.

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An April 2024 quote in the Financial Times by a YMTC investor neatly summarizes China’s general design-out strategy for SME:

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If Chinese companies have equipment that can be used, [YMTC] will use it. If not, it will see if countries other than the US can sell to it. . . . If that doesn’t work, YMTC will develop it together with the supplier.

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Design-Out via Chinese Toolmakers

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In China, the export controls from October 7, 2022, accelerated a joint government-industry effort to build a domestic semiconductor supply chain for chipmaking equipment. De-Americanizing Chinese semiconductor supply chains has been a Chinese objective for decades. However, Chinese firms frequently ignored this top-down policy goal and sourced large shares of chipmaking equipment from abroad, including from U.S.-based companies.

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The Trump administration’s April 2018 imposition of sanctions and export controls on ZTE represented a major turning point in pushing China to take steps toward reducing U.S. reliance, particularly for semiconductors. These efforts went into overdrive following the October 7 export controls, which created immediate existential challenges for the Chinese semiconductor industry’s access to key technologies. As a result, the controls catalyzed a coordinated response by both government and private sector entities. Central, provincial, and local government entities — as well as chipmaking firms such as Huawei, SMIC, YMTC, Hua Hong, and others — have rapidly expanded efforts to replace U.S. chipmaking technology with technology from Chinese suppliers. Nowhere in the industry has this shift been clearer than in SME.

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Top-down government efforts focus on putting pressure on domestic chipmakers to procure Chinese SME. For instance, some companies told CSIS that Chinese customers are facing mandates from government officials to buy most chipmaking equipment from an approved “white list” of domestic companies. These sourcing goals can overrule traditional business performance metrics such as yield, benefitting Chinese toolmakers even in cases where quality is lower relative to U.S. firms. China is also investing heavily in SME production and innovation, including via the $47.5 billion third phase of its so-called Big Fund and by increasing industry involvement in state-backed research.

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At a bottom-up commercial level, Chinese fabs increasingly see advantages to using Chinese chipmaking tools wherever possible. Chinese firms have diversified supply chains away from U.S. and other foreign suppliers to mitigate risks associated with current export controls — as well as the threat of future controls. For instance, leading foundries such as YMTC are increasingly collaborating with leading Chinese toolmakers to access replacement parts and help Chinese companies quickly develop SME technology. Chinese private investors are also increasingly investing in semiconductor companies, including toolmakers, attracted by public investment and the growing preference for Chinese suppliers.

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Based on publicly available data and interviews with industry participants, the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business identified evidence of the design-out phenomenon taking place in at least four types of SME: (1) deposition, (2) etching, (3) process control, and (4) testing. These areas receive less attention than EUV lithography but nonetheless represent key technologies in the semiconductor manufacturing process. Notably, it is tougher to establish “choke points” using U.S. export controls for these areas than, for example, lithography tools and advanced metrology tools, meaning there are fewer obstacles to Chinese and third-country companies replacing U.S. technologies in Chinese fabs.

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Two chipmaking equipment companies in particular — Naura Technology Group and AMEC — have been the largest beneficiaries of increased investment and innovation in Chinese SME supply chains. These companies represent the best evidence of the design-out of U.S. companies via Chinese suppliers. Other key players include lithography developer SMEE, etching and glue developer Kingsemi, and test equipment provider Jingce. Chinese SME firms increasingly include smaller start-ups taking advantage of new openings in the domestic market, such as Shanghai-based Crystal Growth and Energy Equipment, which went public in early 2023.

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Table 1 summarizes key players in the Chinese SME space, their product focus areas, and historical global leaders based in the United States and its allies.

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image01 +▲ Table 1: Product Portfolio of Chinese Original Equipment Manufacturer. Source: Kyriakos Petrakakos, “U.S. Semiconductor Export Controls Might Actually Give China the Edge,” The China Project, June 15, 2023.

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The growing revenues of Chinese toolmakers offer key evidence of the design-out phenomenon. The Chinese consultancy CINNO Research released a 2023 analysis showing that the revenues of China’s 10 largest SME companies increased by 39 percent in the first half of the year compared to the previous period in 2022. AMEC, for its part, saw a 32 percent rise in sales in 2023. Company executives identified strong demand from domestic firms as a key driver of growth. In August 2023, AMEC’s chairman and CEO announced his firm had developed a road map to replace foreign-produced tools with domestic alternatives. Naura saw its 2023 revenues increase by around 50 percent year over year. As with AMEC, reports attribute Naura’s rapid growth to China’s desire to remove U.S. inputs from the domestic semiconductor fabrication market. AMEC and Naura are no exception — a wide variety of Chinese toolmakers have seen explosive domestic sales growth in the two years since the U.S. export controls.

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There is also evidence of Chinese toolmakers winning market share away from U.S. companies, indicating that growing Chinese revenues are not just the result of top-line Chinese market growth. Historically, Chinese toolmakers could secure only a small share of key equipment markets, even within China. From January to August 2023, however, local manufacturers won 47 percent of all machinery equipment tenders from Chinese foundries, according to an analysis by Huatai Securities. An August 2023 article by the South China Morning Post reported that AMEC’s share of one type of etching equipment is expected to hit 60 percent “in the near future,” increasing from 24 percent in October 2022 — attributed to the fact that “once-dominant US chip equipment maker Lam Research saw its mainland sales drop sharply.” Notably, many U.S. toolmakers are still seeing increasing sales to China due to surging industry growth. However, companies told CSIS that this growth is significantly below what it would otherwise be in the absence of design-out practices.

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Beyond the observable increases in revenue and market share, reporting suggests that the Chinese semiconductor industry is publicly showing great enthusiasm for locally produced semiconductor tools and components. In March 2024, SEMICON China, a major semiconductor industry conference held in Shanghai, saw increased participation of domestic tool manufacturers and the notable absence of rival U.S. firms. Reuters also reported that several domestic Chinese semiconductor equipment companies leaned into marketing strategies encouraging Chinese fabs to buy local at SEMICON: “More [Chinese] manufacturing facilities are willing to use materials prescribed by Chinese firms, a trend that has certainly been accelerated by U.S. sanctions.” The report mentions that while Chinese domestic firms may produce semiconductor manufacturing tools and components of slightly lesser quality, China is quickly catching up to its foreign counterparts. Furthermore, Chinese semiconductor products are sold at significantly cheaper prices than those of rival firms in other countries.

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Design-Out via Third-Country Toolmakers

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There has been significant reporting on Chinese tools replacing U.S. tools in the Chinese market. However, less attention has been paid thus far to the other strategy enabling China’s design-out: the increased substitution of tools from third countries — or countries other than the United States and China — in place of U.S. technology.

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While Chinese buyers are increasingly apt to buy from domestic toolmakers, China is still a large buyer of foreign-made tools. Foreign SME helps fulfill technological capabilities not yet developed in China’s market and provides a helpful blueprint for Chinese firms developing new tools. Since early 2023, Chinese fabs have gone on a shopping spree, amassing tools from both domestic and foreign suppliers. The most recent data, as of the first quarter of 2024, suggest that Chinese buying represents an unprecedented 45 percent of revenue for major Western toolmakers, nearly double the share of revenue recorded a year prior (see Figures 1 and 2). Some of this revenue is going to U.S. toolmakers. According to fiscal year 2023 financials, China still represents the largest geographic share of sales for Applied Materials, KLA, and Lam Research. In fact, the dramatic investment boom in China’s semiconductor industry and practices like equipment stocking in case of future restrictions have helped some U.S. toolmakers grow in the near term.

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image02 +▲ Figure 1: Global Semiconductor Equipment Market Revenues by Region, 2019–Present. Source: SEMI, “Semiconductor Manufacturing Monitor,” October 11, 2024.

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image03 +▲ Figure 2: Sales to China for Select U.S. and Foreign Toolmakers, 2015–23. Source: Mackenzie Hawkins, Ian King, and Takashi Mochikuzi, “US Floats Tougher Trade Rules to Rein in China Chip Industry,” Bloomberg.com, July 17, 2024.

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However, there is evidence that China is increasingly redirecting business away from U.S. firms to non-U.S. foreign companies as part of its design-out strategy. CSIS Scholl Chair conversations with SME industry participants revealed reports that Chinese customers are increasingly selecting third-country toolmakers — such as firms based in Japan, Israel, South Korea, Germany, the Netherlands, and Taiwan — over U.S. companies in procurement decisions. Specifically, several U.S. toolmakers told CSIS they rapidly lost share to third-country suppliers in Chinese foundries subsequent to the export regulations, which is unsurprising in the context of explicit rhetoric by Chinese companies indicating a growing preference for third-country purchases. As the previously mentioned YMTC investor noted, the second option after sourcing from China is “countries other than the U.S.”

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China is increasingly redirecting business away from U.S. firms to non-U.S. foreign companies as part of its design-out strategy.

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This trend, in part, reflects the unique limits the EAR places on U.S. firms compared to foreign companies. As previously discussed, companies can sell chipmaking equipment that U.S. companies — whose products are by definition “U.S. origin items” — cannot. Although the United States worked trilaterally in early 2023 to convince the Netherlands and Japan to adopt new controls on advanced chipmaking technologies, these rules do not equate to U.S. controls. Dutch and Japanese restrictions are less stringent than the EL (a regulatory concept they lack a close equivalent to) and do not list China as a country of concern, creating substantial coverage gaps. Additionally, Dutch and Japanese companies can keep personnel on site in China. This servicing ability provides a source of revenue and is a comparative advantage in SME, as toolmakers typically deploy teams of servicers within customers’ fabs.

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Even for technologies the EAR does not encompass, there are reports that Chinese fabs are selecting third-country suppliers over their U.S. competitors. This trend may owe, in part, to U.S. companies overcomplying for fear of unintentionally violating export controls. In the United States, companies such as Applied Materials have faced criminal investigations for alleged violations of export controls, so it is unsurprising that other firms (particularly smaller businesses) would want to avoid these risks, even at risk of overcompliance.

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More importantly, Chinese firms have started seeing U.S. suppliers as higher-risk options compared to third-country suppliers. Tightening U.S. export controls has created a perception in Chinese markets that U.S. suppliers are not a reliable long-term procurement solution. Chinese fabs are concerned both about the repercussions of violating existing controls — either knowingly or unknowingly — and mitigating exposure to stricter U.S. export controls in the future. This view encourages Chinese fabs to turn to third-country toolmakers — at least until domestic supply develops sufficiently to avoid buying foreign technology altogether.

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This shift has both contributed to and been accelerated by growing efforts by third-country suppliers to win business away from U.S. competitors in Chinese markets — sometimes leveraging the U.S. export restrictions as a competitive advantage. In certain cases, industry participants described instances of foreign suppliers explicitly advertising their non-U.S. inputs (an indication they were not subject to the EAR) to attract new Chinese buyers or highlighting regulatory risks as reasons to select them over their U.S. competitors. For instance, some third-country firms raised concerns about future U.S. restrictions as reasons for Chinese businesses to choose them over U.S. firms.

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Industry events like SEMICON China 2024 also demonstrate the new competitiveness of third-country firms. Whereas U.S. firms were absent, other foreign sellers were not. Japanese tool firms, according to a report, kept a strong presence at SEMICON. Per the same report, Chinese demand for certain Japanese products is still strong, as Japanese companies have been rewarded with increased orders from Chinese firms, especially for noncontrolled products enabling leading-edge production. This sales increase is apparent in Japanese trade data. Japanese exports of SME and related tools to China reached $3.32 billion in the first quarter of 2024, an 82 percent year-over-year increase. There have even been reports that Japanese industry groups are arranging trips for Chinese chipmakers to explore “core opportunities in Japan’s semiconductor equipment and materials industry,” with a focus on getting around U.S. export controls.

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While CSIS has identified some preliminary evidence of third-country design-out taking place, there remains a shortage of publicly available data to estimate the extent of the phenomenon — specifically, detailed data from U.S. and third-country toolmakers on market share losses and gains in China. Some industry participants noted that U.S. and foreign companies hesitate to describe design-out trends due to concerns about investor perceptions. Even so, the trend represents the important and largely overlooked impact of increasingly broad and unilateral U.S. export controls that target China.

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Chinese Firms Designing Around U.S. Firms in SME

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SME has fewer examples of the design-around strategy — or innovating Chinese technologies to circumvent the need for U.S. technologies — compared to advanced packaging. This is, in large part, because the United States and allied countries have a strong lead over China in manufacturing chipmaking tools, making it harder for Chinese companies to develop innovations that sidestep or “leapfrog” U.S. capabilities in the space.

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That said, one Chinese SME innovation bears mentioning in the context of design-around strategies. Increasingly, China is adopting new strategies to use older lithography equipment to achieve the same capabilities as EUV lithography, which represents a key chokepoint for Chinese lead-edge chip manufacturing. EUV machines — exclusively produced by the Dutch company ASML — are considered essential to the production of advanced chips, and exports to China have been highly limited since the Dutch government imposed restrictions on EUV shipments in 2019. However, in March 2024, Huawei and its chipmaking partner SiCarrier patented a technology known as self-aligned quadruple patterning (SAQP), which may allow them to produce the same chips as ASML’s EUV machines in a novel way. By using older DUV lithography equipment and additional etching to increase transistor density, China reportedly has the necessary capabilities for 5nm fabrication, an advancement beyond the 7nm process that SMIC provided for the Mate 60 Pro smartphone.

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Industry analysts believe China still needs EUV machines in the long run to reach 3nm capabilities — the leading edge in commercial production, as of this report, as pairing DUV with technologies like SAQP may represent a technological cul-de-sac in terms of achieving transistor density beyond 5nm. As a result, China is also investing heavily in attempts to develop EUV lithography domestically via efforts by companies such as Naura and Huawei. These attempts to develop EUV represent an additional example of Chinese toolmakers designing out U.S. and allies’ technology.

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Security Impacts of SME Controls

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The effects of U.S. export controls on the SME industry will shape the future of U.S.-China strategic competition in semiconductors. Chipmaking tools are not only a key driver of advanced semiconductor capabilities but also an industry area where the United States currently leads in market share and innovation. According to 2022 estimates by the Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group, U.S. value-added activity made up 47 percent of the global SME market, along with 26 percent for Japan, 18 percent for the European Union, 3 percent for South Korea, and only 3 percent for China. China is the largest importer of U.S. chipmaking tools in the world and is far from self-reliant. It is reasonable that the United States would seek to use its leverage in SME to ensure leadership over its leading strategic competitor in a key dual-use technology.

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However, current export controls could undermine the innovation leadership of the U.S. SME companies that created this leverage in the first place. The Trump and Biden administrations’ efforts to control advanced chip capabilities have catalyzed a transformative shift away from U.S. technology in China but have failed to stop access to many controlled technologies due to widely documented smuggling efforts such as transshipments via third countries and domestic technology trading networks. Moreover, policymakers have not reckoned with the fact that China’s domestic semiconductor ecosystem is already making large strides toward replicating technologies previously supplied by U.S. toolmakers — aside from a few technological chokepoints, most notably EUV lithography.

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Chinese — and to a lesser but still important extent third-country — toolmakers are poised to be the primary beneficiaries of China’s ongoing shift away from U.S. chipmaking equipment. The primary losers of this transition therefore are U.S. toolmakers, who increasingly find themselves excluded from parts of the world’s leading SME market. Importantly, the extent of this exclusion from Chinese markets is broader than that imposed by the export controls themselves due to multifaceted, interrelated trends such as Chinese companies hedging against future U.S. regulatory actions and overall declining trust in U.S. suppliers in Chinese markets.

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In some cases, the financial impacts of export controls on U.S. toolmakers are already visible. The best available evidence of this trend is the previously mentioned April 2024 New York Federal Reserve study, which stated that export control announcements were associated with negative impacts on market capitalization and revenues for affected U.S. companies. Specifically, export controls preceded a 2.5 percent abnormal decline in stock price and an 8.6 percent decline in revenue. Negative impacts on market capitalization have also taken place following the launch of criminal investigations related to export control violations. Shares of Applied Materials fell by as much as 8.3 percent following a November 2023 report that the company faces a criminal investigation regarding tools sold to SMIC. Shares of KLA and Lam Research also fell during the probe.

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The top-line growth of the Chinese market should not obscure the potential impacts of design-out on long-term U.S. SME revenues. Some U.S. toolmakers have seen growing sales to China because overall Chinese fab spending has soared in the last two years. This short-term sales growth belies the underlying dynamic: market share is increasingly shifting toward Chinese and third-country competitors even as the market as a whole grows. This trend will likely expand as Chinese firms like Naura and AMEC broaden their toolmaking capabilities. While the Chinese SME market “pie” is getting larger, the U.S. share is shrinking.

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This decline in market share means the ultimate losers in the current export regime are U.S. economic and national security. SME markets are capital intensive and have fast-paced product development cycles, much like their foundry and integrated device manufacturer customers in the chip fabrication world. These features mean that market leadership historically has been concentrated among a small group of multinationals who are able to invest large sums in research and development and globalized manufacturing footprints. Lost revenues and market share can therefore have significant long-term effects on the ability of toolmakers to remain competitive in the future. When U.S. SME companies are increasingly sidelined in Chinese acquisition of chipmaking technology, these same companies lose access to R&D dollars to support future innovation leadership.

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Diminishing share in the Chinese market for U.S. toolmakers also means the U.S. government loses data on Chinese fab investment and technological capabilities. Historically, U.S. companies selling to China have offered a source of insight into China’s semiconductor industry, particularly in terms of understanding the microelectronics capabilities available to Chinese defense and dual-use technologies. However, diverted market share to Chinese and third-country firms risks undermining this source of intelligence. The surprise release of Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro in 2023 provides just one example of how Chinese semiconductor advancements increasingly take place under the radar of U.S. intelligence. The risk of design-around innovation represents a particularly pressing concern, as increased Chinese innovation could result in novel technology advancements occurring without advanced U.S. awareness.

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Imposing these export controls has clear costs for U.S. economic and national security. It is therefore worth considering ways the United States can achieve the benefits of export controls while minimizing costs.

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Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

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China’s ongoing effort to reduce dependency on U.S. SME marks a significant change to previous Chinese industrial policy targets. Although China is still far from self-sufficient in chipmaking tools, its new trajectory represents an important step toward long-term semiconductor industry decoupling goals. Increasingly broad and unilateral export controls are creating strong political and economic incentives for Chinese fabs to design out and around U.S. firms’ technology, with important long-term implications for U.S.-China technology competition.

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This trend is unlikely to reverse entirely, even if the United States relaxes export controls. China has demonstrated progress in developing SME capabilities and is likely to continue down this path. While Chinese indigenization achievements to date have focused on mature processes, future progress at the leading edge is increasingly likely for Chinese toolmakers.

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Despite these changes, the United States can refine its export control regime to better balance national security and economic interests. A crucial step is to better understand how and where existing controls hurt U.S. companies. Conducting a survey of U.S. toolmakers through the Department of Commerce could provide valuable insights into market share shifts and competitive dynamics in global chip markets related to U.S. export controls. The survey could gather metrics like the share of Chinese tenders won by U.S. toolmakers relative to Chinese and third-country suppliers. It could also address the extent to which U.S. mature tools are being designed out, beyond the leading-edge tools that the controls target.

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Past semiconductor industry feedback on Department of Commerce surveys has been mixed, with concerns about confidentiality and business sensitivity. Therefore, the Department of Commerce must carefully communicate any new data collection efforts to ensure transparency and highlight the benefits for U.S. companies in shaping future export policies. If the survey provides evidence that current U.S. export controls have significant adverse impacts on U.S. toolmakers, the next step would be to consider how to mitigate these impacts. The current approach, which results in U.S. companies losing market share to Chinese and third-country competitors, is unsustainable — particularly considering how Chinese circumvention efforts arguably undercut the controls’ national security objectives.

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A key limitation of the existing controls is the failure of the United States to implement them multilaterally. Talks of a full trilateral agreement with the Netherlands and Japan reportedly broke down over inclusion of technologies such as memory and mature logic chips in controls on chipmaking equipment. Any unilateral U.S. export control decision would fuel a growing view in Chinese markets that U.S. semiconductor companies are uniquely risky partners for Chinese companies — even relative to firms based in U.S. allies such as Japan and the Netherlands. The more the United States moves without allied support to control Chinese technology, the more it risks making its firms uncompetitive with allies’ firms.

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The United States must determine how to position its national security partners — not just Japan and the Netherlands but also South Korea, Germany, Israel, Taiwan, and potentially others — on more equal footing in terms of limiting trade of semiconductor manufacturing technologies with China. This strategy could involve a combination of the following three approaches:

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    Expand the application of FDPR and de minimis requirements within the U.S. controls to more effectively stop import substitution by third countries.

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    Apply increased economic or geopolitical pressure on allied countries to expand their own export controls.

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    Reduce the bounds of U.S. export controls to bring them back in line with multilateral agreements (e.g., the Wassenaar Arrangement).

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The third option, by itself, seems highly unlikely. Any loosening of U.S. trade restrictions appears prohibitively challenging given bipartisan anxieties about China, particularly during an election year. The approach also could fail to stem Chinese companies’ redirection of market share to third countries, as rolling back U.S. controls may not be enough to undo the loss of trust in U.S. firms within Chinese chip markets.

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The U.S. government is focused on the first two options: (1) expanding the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. EAR and (2) convincing U.S. allies to implement more closely aligned controls. Expanding the FDPR and de minimis restrictions could limit sales of third-country technologies, but doing so risks further upsetting allies and accelerating efforts to remove U.S. technology and labor from third-country supply chains. This trade-off limits the effectiveness of U.S. plans to add to FDPRs. The Biden administration is reportedly planning to expand the FDPR’s product scope and add 120 new Chinese companies to the EL, effectively widening the EL FDPR’s destination coverage. But, as previously mentioned, the rule is not expected to apply to category A:5 countries, which include the Netherlands, Japan, and South Korea, undercutting its effectiveness in limiting third-country exports of key chipmaking tools. While an expanded FDPR would affect other countries and territories involved in chip supply chains, such as Israel, Singapore, and Taiwan, the impact on SME markets would likely be limited to specific niches or stages of fabrication.

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The second option — greater multilateralization — is more promising. However, U.S. allies still have strong incentives not to impose restrictions that are comparable with the U.S. controls, as toolmakers are significant and influential economic actors in countries like the Netherlands, Japan, and South Korea. To get around these obstacles, U.S. regulators should consider an expanded menu of carrots and sticks. The current strategy of appealing to shared national security concerns has clearly been unsuccessful. Allied governments have reportedly been unconvinced by justifications for the controls in terms of China’s People’s Liberation Army capabilities, in part because of very different perceptions among key partners (e.g., the European Union) of the extent to which China poses (or does not pose) a national security threat. Some form of mutual benefit, such as via shared intelligence or economic opportunities, might therefore be necessary to convince allies to cooperate.

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Regardless of what incentives are on offer, the United States likely must loosen some restrictions to achieve multilateralization. These reductions could focus on contentious areas such as memory chip production and nodes like 14nm and 16nm, which the semiconductor industry rarely considers “advanced.” A narrower approach could better ground national security arguments for multilateralization, which resonate with allies for some technologies (e.g., tools for fabricating 7nm logic chips) more than others (e.g., tools for fabricating 128-layer NAND flash memory chips).

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Loosening restrictions to enable greater multilateralization could be paired with efforts to improve enforcement of existing controls and stem circumvention efforts, which continue to blunt the controls’ effectiveness at slowing China’s technology development. Combining these efforts provides one way to apply continued pressure on China’s chip industry (and reduce domestic political pushback) while mitigating some of the controls’ negative economic repercussions via greater cooperation with allies.

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Finally, the United States, even if it does not pursue a loosening of the existing controls, could return to a strategic mindset of the “sliding scale” approach in designing future export control policy. This shift could help signal to the Chinese market that the United States is not pursuing full-scale decoupling of its technology ecosystem from China’s and that it remains interested in doing business in technologies outside of the leading edge. This shift may be even more useful in convincing U.S. allies that U.S. companies will not be further restricted unilaterally and unpredictably from access to China’s markets, helping secure their role as trusted and reliable participants in globalized technology supply chains.

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Although U.S. toolmakers are key players in today’s semiconductor markets, U.S. leadership did not develop in a vacuum and is not guaranteed indefinitely. China remains a critical and growing market for semiconductor fabrication, so export restrictions may have far-reaching adverse impacts on U.S. SME companies. If there is one recurring theme in writing policy related to semiconductors, it is that details matter. The U.S. government must take care to design future semiconductor export controls in ways deeply attuned to the nuances of semiconductor competitive dynamics, where one small change often has powerful ripple effects across global supply chains. Export controls must not jeopardize the complex web of factors underlying U.S. market leadership in semiconductors. Otherwise, the controls risk undermining the advantages the United States has in its important technology competition with China.

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William Alan Reinsch is senior adviser with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

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Jack Whitney is a former research intern with the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business and a strategy consultant in EY-Parthenon’s Government & Public Sector.

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Matthew Schleich is a former research assistant with the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business. He currently works as a foreign affairs officer in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation.

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Defence Procurement Success

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Five Innovations that Make Defence Procurement Faster and Cut Cost and Risk

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Trevor Taylor and Linus Terhorst | 2024.11.20

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GCAP’s management involves five innovations that should drive success in its technology development and timeline. They also have the potential to transform the UK approach to major development, production and support programmes – if government is willing to change how it approaches project financing.

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On 8 November, the UK government announced its continued commitment to the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). The announcement was likely a relief to Japan and Italy, the UK’s treaty partners in the programme. GCAP – and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme of which it is a part – promises to take UK combat air and industrial capability into the sixth generation of combat jet platforms.

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Government, Military and Industry as One Team

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GCAP from its inception involved a government-industry team rather than the traditional adversarial model. The GCAP announcement at the Farnborough air show in 2018 presented a team of the MoD and the RAF alongside four core companies. BAE Systems, Rolls Royce, Leonardo and MBDA – to generate a new aircraft and its weapons. This was a broader and earlier grouping than had been used in the 1980s with Eurofighter Typhoon, and a strong contrast even with recent naval practice in which the Navy first works out its requirement and only then goes to industry to find the best supplier. As Vice Admiral Paul Marshall told the House of Commons Defence Committee in 2023:

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“When we have a programme or project in the concept phase, that is done by the Navy Command Headquarters development team. They take the concept and work out the requirements that the Navy needs to meet the threats of the future. Once those requirements are set, what normally happens is that it is passed to a delivery team to get on with the business of full design and implementation.”

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Two lines of logic underpin the MoD’s new approach in Team Tempest. The first logic was that one purpose of the strategy was sustaining and developing UK industrial capability in the combat air domain. This capability primarily lay in four companies that had survived decades of industrial consolidation. The second logic was that the approach offered the prospect of better integrating and exploiting the expertise of government and industry: the MoD with its understanding of future threats and their nature, and industry with its knowledge of technology, engineering and manufacturing.

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We acknowledge that government-industry partnering in defence is not entirely new. But even the Carrier Alliance had been preceded by a formal competition between BAE Systems and Thales. The nearest thing to the partnering approach to what was first called Tempest may be the relationship between the government, Rolls Royce and other firms in the Submarine Delivery Agency on submarine nuclear reactors. Thus, the expansion of this approach beyond the immediate industrial concerns around the nuclear deterrent is new.

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Securing Industry Funding for Early-Stage Work

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Selecting key partners could be seen as encouraging corporate complacency, but this risk was mitigated by the readiness of the firms to invest significant sums of their own money in the early work without formal assurance of development, let alone production. The companies have not formally revealed their individual spending, but in total it has been around £800 million, compared to the government’s contribution of around £2 billion. The need to recover this funding, along with recognition that production will be shared across the three partners and that exports will be essential to sustain industrial capability long-term, is a major incentive for companies to avoid slacking.

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The dedication of corporate funding was feasible given more than 13 years of firm government signalling of an intention to maintain the national combat air industrial capability. This had been part of the Labour government’s Defence Industrial Strategy of 2005, which led to the Taranis uncrewed stealthy vehicle and the exploration of collaboration on an aircraft with France. The Conservatives’ 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review stated:

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“We will invest in the next generation of combat aircraft technology, in partnership with our defence aerospace industry and our closest allies. We are working with the US to build and support the F35 Lightning. We will work with France to develop our Unmanned Combat Air System programme, and collaborate on complex weapons.”

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These words emerged publicly as the Future Combat Air Systems Technology Initiative and launched the commitment to joint MoD and private sector investment.

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GCAP is conceived both as an initially defined project in its own right (a crewed aircraft) and as a platform that will be designed to evolve and spirally develop over time

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Thus, the Team Tempest model in the Combat Air Strategy emerged after years of discussions on how best to sustain UK industrial capabilities in the broad field of combat air. It was far from being a spur of the moment choice, and reflected an MoD recognition that:

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“The UK’s ability to choose how we deliver our future requirements (including maintenance and upgrade of current systems) is dependent on maintaining access to a dynamic and innovative industrial base.”

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Novel Collaborative Decision-Making Structures

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The UK has participated in many collaborative aircraft projects, but a negative feature of even Typhoon was the limited authority of the government and corporate structures that were supposed to manage and deliver the project. Subsequently decision-making was often slow.

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With GCAP, the emphasis is on empowered structures and streamlined decision-making processes. The three governments were able to agree quickly on a treaty-based GCAP International Government Organisation with the legal and political powers needed to be able to manage the project from the customer side. Its commercial delivery structure – bringing together the top-level industrial players – is understood to be largely settled, with a formal announcement expected by the end of this year.

+ +

The capacity of these bodies to make choices quickly without having to send everything back to national capitals and company headquarters will be exposed only during the operation of the project, but certainly the intention in 2024 is that the joint executive bodies should be able to proceed at pace in order to keep the project on track.

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Japan is a new collaborative partner for the UK, but GCAP is a key element in a strengthening of UK–Japan security relations that dates back to at least 2013. UK Typhoons exercised with Japanese counterparts in 2016, and Theresa May visited Japan as prime minister in 2017. All this was accompanied by company-to-company discussions among the key players. Thus, when the formal announcement of an Italy–Japan–UK aircraft programme was made in 2022, many political, military and industrial preparations had already been made.

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Development for the Unknown: Spiral Development in Action

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A further feature of GCAP is its conception as an initially defined project in its own right (a crewed aircraft), and also a platform that will be designed to evolve and spirally develop over time. There will thus be no single declaration of Full Operational Capability because the final “full” stage of the platform is unknown. Moreover, that platform is to be part of a wider and only partially defined evolving system of equipment and capabilities under the FCAS umbrella. Thus, the aim for 2035 is for a minimum viable product that can deal effectively with threats in the 2035–2040 timeframe, but which will be capable of regular, perhaps even continuous improvements.

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In terms of industrial motivation, spiral development offers an appealing base for the export potential of GCAP. All the companies are aware that the long-term sustainment of their combat air capabilities will not be satisfied by demand from the three core countries alone: exports will be necessary, and the UK government is clear that exporting needs to be a key element of its defence industrial strategy.

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There is nothing innovative about thinking of an aircraft as part of a wider system: the Spitfires and Hurricanes that were so effective in the Battle of Britain owed much of their effectiveness to the radar, communication and ground-based fighter control direction that made up the air defence system of the time. Moreover, the idea of “spiral development” is pretty much the same as the concept of “incremental acquisition” that was prominent in defence procurement earlier in the millennium. However, that idea was little implemented, in part because of customer reluctance to compromise on requirements when access to funding for future improvements was uncertain.

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A key consideration for how effectively spiral development can operate will be the availability of early funding to build in the key enablers of advances, not least strength, space and electric power in the platform as well the ease of upgrading software.

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Significantly Enhancing the Use of Digital Engineering

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Finally, a key enabler of affordability and speed of delivery will be digital engineering (DE). While largely a technology matter, DE also has organisational implications, not least in the form of company and governmental relationships with the Military Aviation Authority (MAA).

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The practice of designing aircraft in a computerised, digital environment is not new. All modern civil and military equipment is designed first on a computer using engineers’ expertise to inform how different elements will interact. Digital simulations enable a digital-twin aircraft to be operated by humans in a simulated “cockpit” and environment. Tests with a real system then evaluate how this simulation data corresponds with reality. However, as the documentary film about the competition for the F-35 contract between Lockheed Martin and Boeing illustrates, while these tests often confirmed the simulation data, some unexpected faults emerged. This was over 25 years ago. As time has passed, the computing capacity of simulations has dramatically improved, and so has the data base for generating high fidelity environments in benign and contested scenarios.

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This development in data quality and quantity and processing speed is especially important in the combat air sector because of the time and costs taken up by real-world testing and flying. The US’s transparency on many defence matters enables a sense of the scale of what “testing” has involved to date. This is apparent in a 2018 statement by Vice Admiral Mat Winter, F-35 Program Executive Officer:

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“Since the first flight of AA-1 in 2006, the developmental flight test program has operated for more than 11 years mishap-free, conducting more than 9,200 sorties, accumulating over 17,000 flight hours, and executing more than 65,000 test points to verify the design, durability, software, sensors, weapons capability and performance for all three F-35 variants.”

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The average sortie lasted less than two hours. Over the 11 years, more than 16 sorties were flown a week. These numbers give some sense of both the time and money that could be saved if development could be done largely online rather than in the air.

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The vision associated with DE is that a large amount of testing will be done online at great speed and low cost. Computers can operate “flights” on a 24-hours a day basis if need be. Sub-system testing, which is usually less expensive, can be done both online and on the ground. But the role of flight testing should be massively reduced, generating significant savings.

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All defence systems must have an approved Safety Case. In the case of aircraft, arrangements need the approval of the MoD’s safety authorities including the MAA. This suggests that safety and certification people should be involved throughout development, as opposed to being asked for cooperation late in the day (as was the case, for example, with the Ajax armoured vehicle programme).

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Another major impact of advanced DE is that it will enable numerous engineers to work on different aspects of the system simultaneously as simulation data on the mutually dependent components is shared, analysed and acted upon at much greater speed. As one key programme manager confirmed to us, this process – from simulation data to design alternations that result from it and from implementation to a model to re-run a simulation – would have taken months in the last significant UK combat air programme. Today, it can be done overnight, as the simulation alternates designs automatically to improve. In the case of GCAP, there is the prospect of a long working day for the humans involved, as those ending their day in Japan can be succeeded by staff in Italy and the UK.

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Development is far from the only area where DE could be a key enabler. The potential reach of DE is extraordinary. BAE Systems is already invested in digital manufacturing, robotic assembly, and training support for those doing skilled manual work. Additive manufacturing is a sub-element in DE, as are computer-controlled machine tools. It could thus cut manufacturing time and increase product reliability. In-service modification and spiral development would be quicker and easier with DE. Building data-collecting sensors into systems would support longer usage rates for platforms and enable condition-based maintenance rather than time- or usage-based maintenance. Many modern civil aircraft engines are already fitted with such sensors (linked to computers analysing their results). These mean that engine companies can take on profitable availability contracts.

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Advanced digital engineering will enable numerous engineers to work on different aspects of a system simultaneously as data on the mutually dependent components is shared, analysed and acted upon at much greater speed

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DE is the clear direction of travel for much of manufacturing. For GCAP, expanding the boundaries of DE is key to holding costs down and delivering an aircraft for 2035: it could and should be rewarding but also inevitably risky. Significantly, it is a field which US defence companies, not least Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman are actively exploring. Because of the hundreds of sub-contractors that will need to be captured within the GCAP DE tent, the expertise they acquire can be applied on other manufacturing projects, both military and civil. Subject to respect for companies’ intellectual property, the government could work to diffuse GCAP-origin DE experiences to other industrial sectors beyond aerospace. This could enable progress, especially in productivity growth, under the government’s industrial ambitions as laid out in its Green Paper of October 2024.

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However, this will require resources and skill. For instance, a highly secure information infrastructure that enables DE is pivotal. Clearly, information on GCAP’s digital twin and its performance in a countless number of combat scenarios will be highly prized, with state and perhaps corporate bodies focused on accessing it. A key to its GCAP capability is keeping that information safe. This has significant implications for the organisations that handle this data, including security clearances, establishing processes, and having the necessary IT infrastructure to handle data securely and at great speed. Skill is also an important factor. Government and industry alike will need to muster the necessary talent to maintain and develop DE capabilities. GCAP is conceptualised as an open-platform system that seeks to enable seamless integration of mission-specific FCAS capabilities from a multitude of suppliers. These suppliers must also be able to recruit the people required for the new digital working environment that they cannot grow themselves. Thus, government and industrial primes will need to produce a skill spill-over to make the FCAS system work.

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All this has consequences for the financial approach to GCAP. Historically, major defence development programmes start cheap and then build up. The DE element of GCAP means that significant initial costs of computing, staff recruitment and training and model development have to be incurred. Investment in a highly secure information storage, processing and communication system is needed early. What this means in UK terms is that Treasury approval for higher than usual early costs is needed. It is a matter of approving a “spend to save” strategy, which clearly involves risk. But DE could then play a pivotal role in materialising the cost reduction and increases in speed.

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Conclusions

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The five areas of innovation in GCAP should be seen holistically as a transformational approach to defence acquisition:

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    Government-industry partnering from the outset.

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    Securing access to significant industrial cost contributions for the early stages.

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    Bringing in a novel collaborative partner and setting up customer and industry delivery structures to facilitate timely decision-making.

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    Starting from a minimum viable capability while envisaging spiral development.

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    Pushing the boundaries of digital engineering to reduce the time and cost of development and production.

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This will require persistent teamworking across government departments, among multiple businesses and between government and the private sector. But each offers the prospect of lowering costs and flattening the tendency towards increased inter-generational aircraft costs first pointed out by Norman Augustine more than 40 years ago.

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The case for this approach rests on the simple observation that different things should be bought in different ways. There is no doubt that GCAP will require a mindset change from those in Defence Equipment & Support whose instinct is that the only way to secure value is through competitive tendering, passing as much risk as possible to the private supplier, and relying primarily on contracted commitments to assure delivery. Also, for teaming to be effective, there will be a need for government technical expertise to be available, not least on the design and meaning of digital and real-world tests. To be specific, the GCAP approach is particularly relevant for projects in which national operational independence is valued and there is little or no scope for sustained competition within the country.

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The elements of this approach give real hope for effective cost control: incentivising industry by securing early significant company investments, focusing government and industrial delivery structures on pace regarding decisions, defining a realistic but militarily adequate requirement from the outset and, perhaps above all, investing in DE to speed development, reduce risks and lower costs.

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Successive UK governments have shown that they can talk the talk on defence industrial matters, and their defence industrial partners have expressed confidence in their potential. Maintaining the momentum of GCAP will require all concerned to show that they can also walk the walk.

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Trevor Taylor is Director of the Defence, Industries & Society Programme and Professorial Fellow in Defence management at RUSI where he has worked since 2009. He also works regularly on a consultancy basis for the Institute of Security Governance which is based at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.

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Linus Terhorst is a Research Analyst at the Defence, Industries & Society Programme where he works on defence procurement and industrial strategy questions and innovation management in defence.

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UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
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Defence Procurement Success

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Trevor Taylor and Linus Terhorst | 2024.11.20
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GCAP’s management involves five innovations that should drive success in its technology development and timeline. They also have the potential to transform the UK approach to major development, production and support programmes – if government is willing to change how it approaches project financing.

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Semiconductor Mfg. Equipment

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William Alan Reinsch, et al. | 2024.11.19
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This report argues that existing controls incentivize China to minimize reliance on U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment by indigenizing development of tools and increasing purchases from third-country suppliers, which ultimately hinders U.S. technology leadership.

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UK Sanctions On Russia

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Retying The Caucasian Knot

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Gonzalo Saiz and Maria Nizzero | 2024.11.15
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This report presents findings from the second meeting of the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce, held in October 2024.

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Neil Melvin | 2024.11.18
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This paper explores the challenge to Russia’s established position in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes significant change.

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U.S. Public Diplomacy Now

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Project Atom 2024

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Daniel F. Runde and Phillip Arceneaux | 2024.11.14
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The United States needs to rethink public diplomacy in an era dominated by great-power competition. U.S. public diplomacy must work harder than ever to showcase the superior attractiveness and value of the United States and its policies over competing alternatives.

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Heather Williams, et al. | 2024.11.18
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There is a growing risk that U.S. adversaries might resort to nuclear use in a regional conflict. To help address for this threat, the Project on Nuclear Issues invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for responding to strategic deterrence failure.

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Countering China And Russia

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UK Sanctions On Russia

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Kathleen McInnis, et al. | 2024.11.14
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This brief lays an ana­lytic foundation for considering gender analyses, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) programs, as strategic enablers for accomplishing key Department of Defense (DoD) priorities.

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Gonzalo Saiz and Maria Nizzero | 2024.11.15
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This report presents findings from the second meeting of the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce, held in October 2024.

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Build A Future Force For UA

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U.S. Public Diplomacy Now

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Andriy Zagorodnyuk | 2024.11.14
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Ending the war and establishing lasting peace in Ukraine is impossible without implementing practical measures to deter potential future waves of Russian aggression. Crafting an effective deterrence strategy, however, presents its own unique challenges.

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Daniel F. Runde and Phillip Arceneaux | 2024.11.14
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The United States needs to rethink public diplomacy in an era dominated by great-power competition. U.S. public diplomacy must work harder than ever to showcase the superior attractiveness and value of the United States and its policies over competing alternatives.

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Power And Planet

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Countering China And Russia

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Joseph Majkut, et al. | 2024.11.13
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In July 2024, CSIS’s Energy Security and Climate Change Program, in collaboration with the Scholl Chair in International Business, hosted a one-day trade and climate simulation game titled Power and Planet. The focus was on how players representing key nations make decisions at the intersection of climate and trade policy to reduce emissions, boost economic opportunity, and ensure security.

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Kathleen McInnis, et al. | 2024.11.14
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This brief lays an ana­lytic foundation for considering gender analyses, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) programs, as strategic enablers for accomplishing key Department of Defense (DoD) priorities.

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Collaborative AI Governance

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Build A Future Force For UA

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Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, et al. | 2024.11.13
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The UK and Canada, leveraging their strengths as trusted middle powers, are well-positioned to lead in setting global AI standards, fostering ethical, responsible and innovative AI governance.

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Andriy Zagorodnyuk | 2024.11.14
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Ending the war and establishing lasting peace in Ukraine is impossible without implementing practical measures to deter potential future waves of Russian aggression. Crafting an effective deterrence strategy, however, presents its own unique challenges.

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Build Civic Tech

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Suzanne Spaulding and Paula Reynal | 2024.11.13
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As technology continues to shape society, it’s essential for tech leaders to recognize their role in strengthening democracy. This report highlights the urgent need to integrate civic knowledge and responsibility into STEM education and careers.

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Ukraine’s Military AI Ecosystem

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Kateryna Bondar | 2024.11.12
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This report examines the Ukrainian government initiatives and key institutions driving the development of military AI capabilities. It also explores the preconditions that have shaped their adoption in the Ukraine war.

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