diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-01-19-european-security-realities.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-01-19-european-security-realities.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..137a5f62 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-01-19-european-security-realities.md @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : European Security Realities +author: Ed Arnold +date : 2023-01-19 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/s2hCuHP.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "New European Security Realities Following the War in Ukraine" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_On 30 November 2022, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), in partnership with the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, held a roundtable on the future of European security following Russia’s war against Ukraine._ _The purpose of the roundtable was to facilitate discussions between Estonian and UK officials and experts on preliminary lessons identified from the war for European security and specifically the areas on which Estonia and the UK can continue to cooperate to enhance the security of Europe._ + +_The speakers were senior UK and Estonian government officials with significant experience in foreign and defence policy, alongside experts on Russian foreign and military policy. The first session considered lessons identified at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare. The second session focused on options for better managing Russia in the future and what changes to the European security architecture might be required (see Annex for discussion points). This report contains a non-attributable summary of the discussions._ + + +### Summary of Roundtable Themes + +Participants agreed that much of the future of European security is dependent on how the war on the ground in Ukraine ends. There was a general sense that Russia was likely ultimately to lose the war and must incur significant costs for deterrence to be re-established. The best-case scenario was that a future Russia would wish to buy into a rebuilt collective security system. The worst-case scenario was that Russia turns inwards and continues an aggressive and isolated path, and a North Korea-type scenario develops. + +Russia has been significantly conventionally weakened by the war thus far and will need a further period of defence modernisation and doctrine development into the future. However, this does not mean that Russia will become a less dangerous defence and security actor. Therefore, Russia is likely to use unconventional and hybrid means more prominently in the short to medium term. + +The confrontation with Russia remains a long-term struggle. All NATO nations, individually and collectively, need to understand that there is no return even to the 23 February 2022 security relationship with Russia. + +Unity of purpose is the Western centre of gravity and must be maintained and protected at all costs. Moreover, the war has also highlighted NATO weaknesses and there must be a mutual recognition of these if the Alliance is to address them to be strong enough to guarantee the security of its member states. + + +## The Estonian–UK Defence and Security Relationship + +The Estonian–UK relationship and current levels of defence and security cooperation were described as ‘exemplary’ in terms of the bilateral relationship, multinationally through NATO and minilaterally through the Joint Expeditionary Force and other initiatives. The level of strategic integration is unprecedented. Each side could not wish for more from the relationship, with very few countries seeing eye to eye in the defence and security sphere to the same extent as Tallinn and London. However, there is still scope to build on this relationship – an example provided was the Estonian (as well as other Baltic and Nordic countries’) operation of a ‘total defence model’ that the UK could learn from in terms of building its own resilience. + + +### A Joint Strategic Assessment on the War in Ukraine + +The war in Ukraine has already changed the fundamentals of European security. Russia has not only attacked Ukraine, but the very principles of European security itself – national sovereignty, the inviolability of national borders and the use of aggression as a tool of statecraft, particularly directed at the civilian population. Moreover, the war has animated a common threat assessment for Europeans across all the defence and security dimensions – conventional, hybrid, nuclear, energy, protection of critical national infrastructure (CNI), emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and food. As the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) have been exposed as poor compared with perceptions of them prior to the conflict, participants unanimously agreed that it is likely that President Vladimir Putin will ‘double down’ on non-conventional threats, such as nuclear and hybrid, as Russia does not delineate between conventional and unconventional levers or war and peace as separate constructs, and will always prioritise its defence and security policy over domestic considerations. Conversely, NATO’s significant challenges have also been exposed to its potential adversaries and competitors. + +Russia has demonstrated a flagrant disregard for international norms for years. Conference speakers agreed that the current war, while ultimately Putin’s decision, should be considered as ‘Russia’s war’. Strategically, this is a war between Russia and the West, and it will not be won, or ended, kinetically on the battlefield in Ukraine. However, what happens on the battlefield will determine the foundations for the architecture which will follow. Despite multiple operational and tactical setbacks, Russia is not yet facing strategic defeat, although it is paying a heavier price than anticipated, both domestically and externally. Russia is still progressing its strategic intent. Its forces currently occupy approximately 20% of Ukraine and Moscow has established greater control over Belarus. Sanctions, while having an impact, are unlikely to bring Russia to its knees in the near future – Iran and North Korea were offered by one of the Estonian speakers as examples of states still functioning following decades of sanctions, capable still of developing advanced weaponry and military technology. + +Estonian and UK officials agreed that Russia will likely be strategically weakened in the short term if Ukraine comes out of this war without concessions on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Should Russia gain any territory as a result of the war, it is the West and rules-based order that will be strategically weakened, not Russia. The poor Russian military performance presents opportunities for the Euro-Atlantic community. Yet, there needs to be a conscious understanding and effort if NATO is to take full advantage of the AFRF’s current weakness and the valuable insights on Russian vulnerabilities that the war has produced. Merely taking the additional time afforded to NATO to rectify weaknesses is insufficient and will not produce genuine strategic advantage. Moreover, NATO has been strengthened through unity and the adoption of its New Strategic Concept, and the imminent accession of two new members – Finland and Sweden. However, NATO must also be wary of the global context. While Ukraine has gained significant support through its informational campaigns in the West, the picture is more mixed elsewhere, such as in the Global South (broadly, the regions of Latin America, Asia, Africa and Oceania). It is important that the West recognises this and that the Russian narrative and propaganda gains traction outside English-speaking and other Western nations, which are actively targeted through its global network. + +Europe must be resilient. Ukraine fatigue must not set in among the electorate or political leaderships. + +Putin is likely using the winter and the shift of the ‘Special Military Operation’ to a stalemate on the ground to buy time to recover and enable ‘Ukraine fatigue’, as Western governments grapple with other political imperatives such as inflation, recession, and energy and other cost of living pressures. + + +### Lessons Identified from the War in Ukraine + +The war in Ukraine has challenged the strength of the AFRF and exposed its rigid command structures and culture, in direct contrast to Ukraine’s adaptability, flexibility and innovation. Despite a poor tactical and operational performance by the AFRF, however, Russia will continue to be a direct military threat. Previous underperformance of the AFRF, such as in Georgia in 2008, did not sufficiently prompt the requirement for change, but the strategic shock of its performance in 2022 may finally provide the recognition, and acceptance, of the necessity for wider cultural changes throughout the Russian defence and security community. + +Participants highlighted that the Western assessment community had previously overestimated Russian capabilities and underestimated Ukraine and there is a risk that the reverse may now occur. It was also noted that this was also true in assessments of the relative strengths of the Taliban and Afghan National Security Forces and could reflect a strategic weakness in how NATO assesses its adversaries and partners. + +There was a debate on the timeframes for NATO transformation and when the AFRF will pose a legitimate and credible conventional threat to Europe again. There was a warning that future credibility, for example, between 2030 and 2035, relied on decisions being made now and therefore there was actually not much time for action. The earliest assessments were that Russia could recover conventionally by 2023, with the caveat that additional personnel and equipment would be ‘operationally useful by Russian standards’ as its industry had retained industrial capacity and was able to secure components through illicit procurement and Iranian networks. + +There is a serious risk that Ukraine runs out of ammunition, due to expenditure rates and limited stocks of NATO states, as well as a lack of spare industrial capacity to ramp up production in the short term. However, it was noted that ‘Ukrainians are good at sustaining momentum’ and were receiving more military aid before winter 2022 and continue to win the hearts and minds of Western media, people and thus governments to act on the relevant demand signals. + +On the same day as the conference, RUSI published a report, ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022’ which one of the authors discussed in detail. The main findings pertinent to NATO defence planners are: + +- There is no sanctuary in modern warfare. The enemy can strike throughout operational depth. + +- Warfighting demands large initial stockpiles and significant slack capacity. + +- Unmanned aerial systems and counter-UAS are essential across all branches and at all echelons. + +- The force must fight for the right to precision. Precision is not only vastly more efficient in the effects it delivers but also allows the force to reduce its logistics tail and thereby makes it more survivable. + +- For land forces, the pervasive ISTAR on the modern battlefield and the layering of multiple sensors at the tactical level make concealment exceedingly difficult to sustain. + + +### Implications of the War in Ukraine for NATO + +NATO, thus far, has responded well and in unity to a war which has been a real test for the Alliance. While not directly involved militarily, NATO is a critical actor and it was noted that the Russian pre-war proposals of December 2021 were primarily concerned with the US and NATO, not Ukraine. Words and non-military means did not deter Russia from launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and NATO, or its membership, must not self-deter and allow Russia the initiative to manage escalation. There was a recognition among the speakers that NATO did not do enough to deter Russia from its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, all NATO members need to understand, both individually and collectively, that there is no return to the relations with Russia that existed on 23 February 2022. + +NATO’s New Strategic Concept, unveiled at the June 2022 Madrid Summit, drastically altered the NATO defence and deterrence posture in Europe and rebalanced away from the other core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security. The priority is now implementation and the delivery of the Madrid commitments quickly and fully to ensure credibility. Defence and reinforcement plans need to be resourced, with fighting formations stocked, trained, equipped and ringfenced for their mission. + +All participants agreed that the unity demonstrated at Madrid is the Alliance’s centre of gravity and must prevail, as it would be naive to think Russia will not test Europe again. But Madrid is only the starting point and increased investments in defence and security should become the norm, not just in financial terms but also in manufacturing capabilities to obtain better outputs and therefore outcomes. The demand signal is there, and contracts need to be signed for long-term requirements to bring industry on board and ensure European strategic advantage. Increased defence spending and investment is predicated on political will and Allies have a duty to help. The transformation that NATO requires is not just process driven but one of mindset and culture. It needs to jettison the counterinsurgency mindset that has dominated the past 20 years of Alliance activity and get back to preparing for conventional warfighting as the requirements are very different. + +Participants agreed that the NATO Vilnius Summit in June 2023 would be critical and hoped its outcome would be increased resilience and full implementation of the Madrid vision for the future of the Alliance. NATO plans need to be approved, the defence investment pledge revised and Finland and Sweden need to be welcomed as full members. NATO cannot and should not be scared of success. + + +### The Future of Russia as a European Security Actor + +The 70 years of general peace that Europe has experienced since the end of the Second World War was built on the presence of the US and its security umbrella and transatlanticism – an assessment that participants from both Estonia and the UK shared. By 1945 appeasement and the use of aggression were discredited on the European continent, but now appear again. + +Russia’s war in Ukraine is pivotal, due to its scale, how it will change Ukraine as a nation, and how it will establish new norms of European security and reinforce the principle that larger states do not get a veto over smaller ones. Putin’s aggression cannot pay off, in any way, as other authoritarian states, especially China, are watching. + +It was reinforced that Russia has no intention of losing its war in Ukraine and has identified Western unity as a centre of gravity which must be attacked, through producing economic pain, scaring the West into paralysis through nuclear and hybrid escalation, and providing false-hope narratives as traps to damage unity. Russia’s national strategy has been to deter responses by NATO while taking slices out of its neighbourhood, and the war has now changed attitudes and beliefs in Russia’s neighbourhood. Participants agreed that the status of Crimea is fundamental to the security future of both Russia and Ukraine and cannot be treated separately. + +It was further noted that the West must also learn from its past mistakes to manage Russia better in the future – both the strategic failure to deter Russian designs on Ukraine from 2014 to 2022 and the grand strategic failure to deal with Russia adequately since the end of the Cold War and understanding the realistic military threat it poses. There must be a recognition that the West is stuck with Putin or ‘Putinism’ for some time. It would be a mistake to think that democratising Russia, such as the manner of Western engagement in the 1990s, will be possible. The imperialistic mindset is entrenched in Russian society that the West has only a very limited ability to influence. + + +### Managing What Comes Next? + +Participants were unanimous in agreeing that managing what comes next depends on how this phase of the war ends. However, regardless of the ultimate outcome, it was agreed that existing security frameworks need to be rethought and what can be salvaged and built upon needs to be identified. + +The conference participants disagreed as to how the war on the ground would play out in 2023 and beyond but were steadfast in their belief that Russia must be defeated. Regardless of how the war ends, the European security order has transformed as Russia has flagrantly violated European and international norms by brutally invading a neighbouring country entirely unprovoked. Also, the significant write down in Russian combat power due to poor AFRF performance, with only modest investment from NATO Allies (primarily the US), has provided time and space for Europe to undergo its own military transformation as demanded by NATO’s Strategic Concept. Yet this investment to date has already strained Allied military capability and readiness, exposing NATO weaknesses, which must be urgently rectified. The multitude of Russian weaknesses on the battlefield must be decoupled with assessing the change in relationship between Russia and its partners, including Belarus, Iran and China. + +A key aspect raised was that it is currently difficult to assess what has genuinely changed in Russia as a result of the war. The strategic intent – to occupy the whole of Ukraine and disrupt the European and international order – remains. Moreover, the values, world view and approach that Putin incarnates are likely to endure beyond Putin himself. Most of the criticism in Moscow is about not going hard and fast in the war, rather than the legitimacy of the war itself. The speakers agreed that while Russia might experience some destabilisation, there would be no ‘colour revolutions’ and that any challenge to Putin’s power would likely come from the right and not the liberal centre. + +Linked to this was a sense among participants of a growing disconnect between Russian capabilities and the country’s ambitions and self-identity as a great power, which is fundamental to national identity. The foundations are built on Russia’s permanent seat at the UN Security Council and its nuclear status, its military might and its ability to act as a regional hegemon. Following the war, the last two are now under threat, which could cause Russia to act more aggressively and in an unpredictable manner, especially to compel its neighbours to act in certain ways and influence behaviours. In this context, it is likely that Russia will continue to exploit differences among NATO, and EU, members. Frozen conflicts are Russia’s comfort zone and their manipulation is key to Moscow’s exercise of power; therefore anything that is pushed on Ukraine towards that status is counterproductive, will look like a win for Russia and will therefore be unacceptable to NATO. + + +### Assessing the European Structural Relationship with Russia + +The discussions highlighted that European security, and the architecture underpinning it, must now be rethought. In terms of arms control, the war in Ukraine feels like the closing of an era, akin to the end of the Cold War. Certain components, such as the OSCE, especially the Vienna Document, endure, and New START is robust and remains critical. However, participants agreed that the era of cooperative security agreements that have characterised the previous 30 years do not feel like tomorrow’s world. + +It was emphasised that Estonia and the UK are part of a community of democracies which take longer to make decisions, but make stronger decisions collectively, with legitimacy, transparency and accountability. Estonia and the UK want the war to end as soon as practically possible, but no concessions can be given to Putin. Therefore, these decisions must be made with a rational and coherent strategy which will benefit European security. There was doubt that this is moving quickly enough as Western countries are experiencing economic pain (inflation in Europe is currently highest in Estonia). A strategic breaking point of unity is approaching and some speakers believed it to be unsustainable, giving a particular warning about the pain of next winter for Europe, in addition to the current one. + +The speakers all agreed that security guarantees must be provided to the future Ukrainian state, including a capable and integrated Ukrainian military, linked to industry, that can match Russia. However, there was no consensus on the form those guarantees should take. It should not be the uncertain assurance of NATO’s 2008 Budapest Summit commitment to eventual Alliance membership for Ukraine but must include an honest and realistic assessment of what kind of assistance Allies can supply to Ukraine in the long term, including force modernisation and NATO standardisation, and resupply for a future crisis. Strengthening Ukrainian deterrence of future Russian threats is critical and can be done through intelligence support, sanctions, military technical assistance and training programmes, which are all measures that would support Ukraine on its journey to join NATO. + + +## Annex: Roundtable Discussion Points + +### Session 1: Defence Policy and Military Lessons from Russia’s War in Ukraine and Their Impact on European Security + +- What are the principal military lessons to date of the war in Ukraine? What do these lessons mean for the UK, Estonia and NATO defence policy and posture? + +- What is the UK strategic assessment of the war in Ukraine? How does this assessment change UK priorities in the Euro-Atlantic? What are the key takeaways and action items? + +- What is the Estonian strategic assessment of the war in Ukraine? How does this assessment change Estonian priorities in the Euro-Atlantic? What are the key takeaways and action items? + +- How best can NATO’s new Defence and Deterrence posture, as outlined within the Strategic Concept, be implemented? Where are the ongoing challenges? What are the realistic timeframes? Which additional adaptions seem necessary? What are the longterm consequences and challenges for NATO? + +- What military threat does Russia now pose to Europe? How does this vary by subregion (Arctic, High North, Baltic Sea, Baltic states, Central and Eastern Europe, Black Sea, Caucasus)? + + +### Session 2: Managing What Comes Next – The Future of Russia as a European Security Actor + +- How has the European security environment changed following the war in Ukraine (politically, diplomatically, militarily)? What kind of threat environment is the West facing in the longer term? How can the West safeguard Euro-Atlantic security? What are the key challenges? + +- Within this environment, how best can Russia be managed in the future? Which extant agreements can be salvaged? What are the requirements for new agreements? + + - Helsinki Final Act 1975. + + - Charter of Paris for a New Europe 1990. + + - NATO–Russia Founding Act 1997. + + - OSCE Istanbul Document 1999. + + - OSCE Vienna Document 2011. + + - Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1990. + + - Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 1987. + + - Treaty on Open Skies 1992. + + - Chemical Weapons Convention 1993. + + - New START 2011. + +- How might Russian security policy towards Europe change due to the war in Ukraine? What will be the key indicators and warnings to identify these shifts? + +- Which organisations, frameworks and initiatives within the European security architecture are most valuable for the UK and Estonia in managing Russia? Which initiatives are most productive for UK–Estonia cooperation? How can the UK and Estonia cooperate to meaningfully advance European security? + +--- + +__Ed Arnold__ is a Research Fellow for European Security within the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His experience covers defence, intelligence, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, within the public and private sector. His primary research focus is on British defence, security, and foreign policy, specifically relating to the European security architecture and transatlantic cooperation. Ed has a particular interest in UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Reviews. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-ipef-for-us-india.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-ipef-for-us-india.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9f6bea11 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-ipef-for-us-india.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : IPEF For U.S.-India +author: Jayant Krishna, et al. +date : 2023-02-13 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/IkmXc0a.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Experts React: Can IPEF Be a Watershed Moment for U.S.-India?" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) was launched in May 2022 and has the qualities to significantly strengthen U.S.-India economic partnership. IPEF holds the rare distinction of being a multilateral approach to regional economic integration that includes both the United States and India — two nations often at odds during multilateral trade talks._ _Divided into four pillars — Connected Economy, Resilient Economy, Clean Economy, and Fair Economy — IPEF is aimed at structural economic transformation. The 14-member country arrangement is driven by the political urgency of countering Chinese economic influence in the region. With the special negotiation meetings for IPEF in New Delhi held between February 8–11, CSIS experts provide their analyses._ + + +### Managing India’s Supply Chain Disruptions + +_Jayant Krishna_ + +IPEF aspires to rewrite the rules of engagement for the twenty-first century economies and enable them to grow faster and fairer. It is surely bigger than Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in size as well as clout and continues to expand. + +Like other nations with a significant industrial footprint, India also experienced serious supply chains disruptions in supply of electronic components, semiconductor devices, minerals, and other raw materials due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The worsening of trade relations among Asian countries, a logistics slowdown, and China’s economic coercion only added to its economic woes. + +Supply chain resilience is one of IPEF’s four key themes. Beyond the traditional risk management frameworks deployed by the industry, India could leverage IPEF to develop an adaptive capability of its supply chain to prepare for unprecedented events, become responsive to disruptions, and maintain business continuity at an optimum level of connectivity, coordination, and command. + +IPEF already accounts for 40 percent of global GDP and is likely to cross 50 percent soon. With pragmatic supply chain framework understanding expected to be operative among IPEF signatory nations, India would be far better positioned to safeguard its supply chains against the associated vulnerabilities. This would ensure that India’s industrial output does not remain compromised and the GDP continues to grow uninhibited. + + +### Building Consensus on Cross-Border Taxation Issues + +_Mukesh Butani_ + +The IPEF meeting presents a significant opportunity for India to push its key reform agenda on multilateral tax policy and trade, keeping in mind investment and inclusive economic growth. Specifically, it presents an opportunity to move forward with member states for comprehensive free trade agreements and reduction of trade barriers. + +The forum will play a critical role in building global consensus on contentious cross-border tax issues, such as taxation of digital services, virtual digital assets, and indirect transfer of capital assets. Most of these are being debated at wider multilateral institutions such as Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Monetary Fund, and World Bank — however, there is inertia. + +The member states should reaffirm their commitment to transparency by adopting global best practices on a common framework for the exchange of information for tax purposes and crypto trades. The forum is expected to supplement efforts to improve tax administration and mutual cooperation by supporting the ongoing work on the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project’s Two-Pillar Solution and tax inspectors without borders. + + +### Strengthening Leadership in Clean Energy and Improving Domestic Programs + +_Kartikeya Singh_ + +At the upcoming ministerial meeting of the IPEF, leaders will gather to deliberate the next steps on the guiding pillars. India is a participant to pillar three: Clean Economy. To activate meaningful cooperation between India and the other members of this pillar, India can contribute in the following ways: + +1. structuring reverse auctions for utility-scale clean energy projects to ensure lowest tariffs; + +2. designing bulk procurement programs to reduce cost of energy efficiency, and e-mobility ventures; + +3. promoting joint financial and technical partnerships for business transition toward clean energy verticals between state-owned enterprises, including National Thermal Power Corporation, Coal India, and Indian Oil with peer institutions in partner countries (i.e., to foster the growth of offshore wind industry); and + +4. consolidating the One Sun, One World, One Grid by designing effective electricity transmission, which would dovetail with the efforts to create an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) super-grid or the proposed undersea interconnection between Australia and Singapore. + +In exchange, given the recent line items in India’s 2023 budget where clean energy featured heavily, India should work with IPEF partner countries to add value to these efforts: + +1. work with partner countries to develop a green hydrogen ecosystem, including crowding demand for products like green steel to develop an edge in low carbon production; + +2. jointly create the supply chains for critical materials that are required for powering the clean energy economy, given countries like Australia, Indonesia, and others with large reserves of these materials are in the coalition, is beneficial; + +3. jointly develop and improve the technologies that can dovetail with India’s biogas (GOBARdhan Scheme) to ensure its success; and + +4. negotiate how countries in IPEF might create their own versions of the United States’ Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) to ensure healthy competition and joint benefit-sharing of localized job creation from enacting such incentive schemes. + + +### Improving Governance Efficacy and Attracting Foreign Direct Investment + +_Alok Gupta_ + +IPEF is aimed at incentivizing partner countries to contribute to stability, prosperity, development, and peace in the Indo-Pacific region. Inducing cooperation between the countries requires effective governance at the back end. This is to ensure that the commitments made by partner countries are timely and effectively implemented. Several countries in the region suffer from endemic institutional problems such as ineffective bureaucracies and corruption. Addressing these challenges will be crucial for ensuring that development efforts in the region are not in vain. + +To contextualize, the United States should look at where India stands in terms of governance. Per the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2021, published by the World Bank, India occupies 11th position out of the 14 IPEF countries on two measured metrics — government effectiveness and control of corruption. Out of a maximum score of 100, India received 62.5 on government effectiveness, as opposed to index leader Singapore, which has 100, and Philippines, which is at the bottom of the chart with 57.69. Similarly, on control of corruption, India scored 46.63. New Zealand leads the chart with a score of 99.04, and Philippines is at the bottom with 34.13. While India has improved since the previous rankings in 2016, there is a long road ahead. + +Better governance and less corruption can enable a more conducive environment for commercial cooperation and technical exchanges which can increase the FDI in the country and growth in economy, thus driving to prosperity and peace. India needs to accelerate its efforts of improving governance and employ technological advances to work towards creating an efficacious environment for collaboration and cooperation. Specifically, India needs to proactively engage the United States on technological exchanges and commercial engagements to enhance trade and mutually benefit both countries. + +--- + +__Jayant Krishna__ is currently the CEO of the Foundation for Advancing Science and Technology (FAST India), an organization dedicated to enabling transformation in India’s science and technology landscape. He was previously group CEO of the UK India Business Council (UKIBC) and led in strengthening bilateral economic ties between the United Kingdom and India. He is also a non-resident senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and between May 2019 and July 2020 served as executive director of public policy at the Wadhwani Foundation, a U.S. nonprofit. Mr. Krishna previously led key initiatives of the prime minister’s Skill India Mission as CEO and as executive director and chief operating officer of the National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC). He previously worked for the Tata Group, India’s largest conglomerate. + +__Mukesh Butani__ is a senior associate with the Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at CSIS and the managing partner of BMR Legal. With specialization in corporate international tax and transfer pricing, he has significant experience in advising Fortune 500 multinationals and large Indian business houses on a wide range of matters relating to foreign direct investment policy, business re-organizations, cross-border tax structuring, tax controversy, and regulatory policy across a range of sectors. Mukesh participated in the Kelkar Task Force (2002) on tax reforms and was a member of the Indian Ministry of Finance (MoF) committee on e-commerce taxation (2000). He is presently representing the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Paris on the MoF Standing Committee on Tax Deducted on Source and Foreign Tax Credit. + +__Kartikeya Singh__ is director of programmes at the SED Fund, where he manages the portfolio to support energy transition efforts around the world. To inform his strategies, he leverages his extensive experience being in or engaging with government, research institutions, intergovernmental organizations, civil society, and industries in the sustainable development sector. He has also traveled from the Arctic to the Antarctic exploring the challenges of energy geopolitics in a changing climate. Previously, Kartikeya was a senior fellow and deputy director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) where he was charged with leading the Engaging Indian States initiative. + +__Alok Gupta__ is presently the director of technology and policy at the Wadhwani Foundation in New Delhi, India. Based in Noida, Uttar Pradesh, Alok brings in over two decades of experience working in various leadership roles in the private sector, government, and policy. A computer graduate by training, Alok has implemented technology projects in the Indian government across departments and ministries. Alok specializes in strategy, opportunity analysis, solution conceptualization, developing policy frameworks, and conducting program and stakeholder management. His experience includes working in diverse sectors like IT, financial inclusion, identity, health, maternity and nutrition, education, skills, agriculture, transport, labor and employment, and food processing. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-russo-ukrainian-war-in-2023.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-russo-ukrainian-war-in-2023.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f252db8f --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-13-russo-ukrainian-war-in-2023.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Russo-Ukrainian War In 2023 +author: Emily Harding, et al. +date : 2023-02-13 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/38NUWOB.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Experts React: Factors Shaping the Russia-Ukraine Conflict in 2023" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_As Russia and Ukraine head into year two of a war that has defied expectations, a collection of CSIS experts examined driving factors for the future of the conflict. They borrow the approach from intelligence analysts, who seek to evaluate the possible trajectories of a conflict rather than make straight-line predictions, bounding reality for policymakers._ _Emily Harding discusses the life-or-death question of continued outside aid for Ukraine and the resilience of the Ukrainian people. Ben Jensen discusses cohesion in the Russian military and the potential for catastrophic collapse. Heather Williams evaluates the looming nuclear question. Finally, Eliot Cohen examines how a conflict might end._ + + +### Single Point of Failure: Will Outside Support for Ukraine Endure? + +_Emily Harding_ + +The success or failure of Kyiv’s war effort hinges on one unfortunate fact: Ukraine does not have the indigenous capacity to arm itself for this fight. Ukrainian president Zelensky knows it and has devoted considerable time and energy to shoring up relationships and corresponding supply lines — for example, leaving Ukraine to visit Washington and Europe. + +The West has responded: despite a slow, hesitant start, marked by hand-wringing over escalation, NATO members have stepped up to provide increasingly effective and potent weapons systems. HIMARS — the light, mobile, precision artillery platforms — are already a hero of the war, and Abrams and Leopard tanks are inbound. Debates over fourth-generation fighter jets and long-range fires are surely right around the corner. + +But Zelensky’s work is never done. Russia is working hard to widen any crack in support for Ukraine. Recent Quran-burning protests in Sweden seem to have been bought and paid for by Russian assets, designed to make it impossible for Turkey to support Sweden’s bid for NATO membership. A recent poll by the European Hybrid CoE suggests that segments of the public in key European nations are questioning why Europe is sending so much aid to Ukraine. Those segments are still minorities, but Ukraine is only a year into what most likely will be a very long fight. + +NATO allies also have a structural concern beyond the whims of opinion polls. As CSIS’s Seth Jones argued in his recent report, Empty Bins in a Wartime Environment, support to Ukraine has drawn down U.S. stocks of critical weapons systems faster than they can be replenished, in our current peacetime production tempo. The report says “DoD has only placed on contract a fraction of the weapons it has sent to Ukraine. Many U.S. allies and partners in Europe also have defense industrial bases that are unprepared for major war, heavily reliant on the United States, and chronically underfunded.” At some point, U.S. and European military planners will begin to feel the pinch and question what should go to Ukraine and what should be held in reserve for a potential future fight, should this conflict dramatically escalate or China see an opportunity to move in the Pacific. + +In this conflict more than most, Ukraine’s chances at victory will be decided by both the weapons themselves and the symbolic value of the commitment to send them. Moscow is betting that time is on its side and it can grind Ukraine into dust. The key assumption in that bet is that Russia can outlast NATO commitment. Instead, Russia needs to fear that, just as it underestimated NATO’s willingness to help Ukraine and Ukraine’s ability to fight, it has miscalculated the West’s resolve to stay with Ukraine all the way to Crimea. The Biden administration has signaled medium-term U.S. commitment with its military aid package and training programs, and in one of his few lines on foreign policy in the State of the Union, Biden pledged that the United States “will stand with you as long as it takes.” On the heels of Zelensky’s trip, European allies need to find ways to signal the same commitment to their people and to Kyiv. + +#### Can Ukrainian Resilience Hold? + +> On February 24, millions of us made a choice. Not a white flag, but a blue and yellow flag. Not escaping, but meeting. Meeting the enemy. Resisting and fighting. –Zelensky’s New Year address to the nation + +President Zelensky has been a symbol of his nation’s resolve and defiance in the face of a brutal enemy. He has been steadfast, but how long can Ukrainian resilience hold? As of January 15, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees recorded 18,358 civilian casualties in the country: 7,031 killed and 11,327 injured. More than eight million Ukrainians have become refugees, at least six million more are internally displaced, and nearly half the population needs humanitarian assistance. Russia has engaged in a ruthless campaign to knock out critical infrastructure, including power and water, in the middle of winter. Ukrainians have suffered greatly and will continue to suffer as a result of Moscow’s blatant disregard for human life. + +Meanwhile, reliable numbers of Ukrainian military casualties are difficult to calculate; the Ukrainian government has labeled them classified. In early December, Ukrainian government officials publicly estimated up to 13,000 killed and stridently denied a European estimate of 100,000 dead. Ukrainian soldiers have shown ingenuity and grit and have made clear they will fight to free their country for as long as is necessary with whatever is available. + +NATO and other friends of Ukraine should plan for a multiyear conflict and develop sustainable plans for keeping Ukraine’s forces and population resilient. For refugees, those plans look like work programs — in particular support for Ukraine’s women to work remotely in their Ukrainian jobs whenever possible — education for children, and mental health support. A soldier unburdened with worries about their spouse and kids is a soldier better able to focus on the fight. For those fighting, efforts to create sustainable rotations on and off the battlefield for training and rest are a basic start. Fostering the belief that the fight is winnable with public symbols of support — from flags waving over Washington, to the United Kingdom hosting Eurovision on behalf of Ukraine, to NAFO Fellas, to, yes, tanks and HIMARS — will keep determination high. + + +### Is There Cohesion in the Russian Military? + +_Benjamin Jensen_ + +In stark contrast to Ukrainian forces, Russian efforts in Ukraine have been plagued by faulty equipment, lack of winter gear, and reported fights and drunkenness in the trenches. What if the mutinies endemic in the Russian revolutions in 1905 and 1917 are a harbinger for the course of 2023? Military power requires cohesive fighting organizations as much as it does tanks and planes. Soldiers tend to reflect cleavages and power struggles in their societies. The combined stress of battlefield losses and growing crises on the home front can undermine military power through eroding cohesion. Look no further than the Kiel Mutiny in the German navy in 1918 and the cascading protests across that accelerated the end of World War I. Along similar lines, a recent study by Jason Lyall, director of the Political Violence Field Lab, found that military performance is linked to economic and social inequality in a society. The more unequal and stratified a society, the more likely the military is to underperform and even collapse. + +Applied to Russia, which has seen a dramatic rise in income inequality over the last generation, alongside a rise in nationalistic xenophobic attitudes and racism against non-ethnic Russians, this finding suggests the winter could be longer for Moscow than it is for Kyiv. The signs are already present given changing sentiments in minority regions like Buryatia and mass emigration by military age males. Sanctions combined with the Kremlin’s rhetoric about historic Russia may bolster the elite that didn’t jump from windows, but it only acerbates the tensions tearing the nation apart and undermining its military performance. Russia has more forced conscripts and prison units than it does volunteers. + +The conditions are already present for a large-scale Russian military mutiny. Low morale, cold weather, and high attrition rates alongside nationalist rhetoric and economic decline will continue over the course of the next three months. In this environment, a spark can start a wildfire. Riots, rampant refusal of orders, and even defections and surrenders could spread like a disease through the burnt-out cities and trenches along the battlefield in Ukraine. Though impossible to predict, the most likely catalyst on the horizon is the first offensive of the spring in which mobilized conscripts currently training in Russia and Belarus discover the hell of modern trench warfare. + + +### Will Putin Continue to Make Nuclear Threats? + +_Heather Williams_ + +Whether the war in Ukraine lasts months or years, nuclear weapons will continue to lurk in the background. Russian president Vladimir Putin has come to rely on nuclear weapons for coercion and bullying and will continue to make nuclear threats. Since the start of the invasion, Putin has made explicit and implicit reference to Russia’s nuclear arsenal. On December 21, he stated, “We will continue maintaining and improving the combat readiness of the nuclear triad” and listed Russia’s numerous nuclear delivery vehicles, including the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. + +Putin is relying on nuclear threats for two primary reasons. First, he wants to deter NATO from directly intervening in Ukraine. While the West has gradually increased its military support for Ukraine, Putin’s efforts have arguably had some success preventing direct Western military intervention for fear of escalation. Keeping NATO out of Ukraine will remain a top priority for Putin. But the second reason for Putin’s nuclear threats is even more dangerous and risky. By suggesting a willingness to use nuclear weapons, Putin is also signaling his commitment to winning the war in Ukraine at ever-increasing costs. In the event Russia is facing defeat on the battlefield, Putin may resort to tactical nuclear weapons use in a key strategic region, such as Kherson. + +Deterring Putin from using nuclear weapons will require concerted international efforts. The international community should make it clear that any nuclear use in Ukraine would turn Russia into an international pariah and while nuclear weapons might win a battle, they will lose Putin the war. This message would be particularly meaningful coming from Russia’s key strategic partners in Beijing and New Delhi. But U.S. and NATO leaders should also continue to rely on risk reduction measures and crisis communication channels, such as the October call between Secretary of Defense Austin and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu. The West may not be able to stop Putin from threatening to use nuclear weapons, but countries can work to prevent him from following through on those threats. + + +### How Might This End? + +_Eliot Cohen_ + +The conventional wisdom says “negotiations,” of course. That is the point that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, and numerous civilian officials in the U.S. government have often made. + +In some sense this is true: a bunch of tired men sitting around a table conclude most wars — but that can be a surrender negotiation (which is not much of a negotiation), or a ceasefire arrangement (which merely creates an interlude until the next round of fighting) or a grand peace-fest like Vienna 1815. “Negotiation,” in other words, covers a multitude of events. + +In this case, it is most likely that what will not happen is the kind of negotiation Milley and others have in mind — a genuine compromise that brings about peace. What is more likely is that one side or the other collapses in exhaustion, and that the result is a ceasefire for now, which is the predicate for another conflict. + +Conceivably, if the West continues to be dilatory in arming Ukraine, it could be Kyiv that crawls wearily to the table. But it is rather more likely the Russians will be the ones to do so, if (as laid out above) outside support is robust, the Ukrainians maintain their immense capacity to adapt and continue the fight, Russia sees collapses in its fighting force, and the West maintains a united front rejecting nuclear threats. After suffering another hundred thousand or more casualties and feeling the internal strains of an unjust and ill-conceived war, Russia could be driven by Ukrainian grit and Western firepower and battlefield intelligence to slump its way to a table at which it agrees to leave the lands it has pillaged, and the populations it has occupied, violated, and slaughtered. But it depends on us. + +--- + +__Emily Harding__ is deputy director and senior fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She joined CSIS from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), where she was deputy staff director. In her nearly 20 years of government service, she has served in a series of high-profile national security positions at critical moments. While working for SSCI, she led the Committee’s multiyear investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 elections. + +__Benjamin Jensen__ is a senior fellow for future war, gaming, and strategy in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is also a professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting. Dr. Jensen has spent the last decade researching the changing character of political violence, technology, and strategy. He has worked with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, NATO, the U.S. Army, and a range of government agencies and foundations to develop wargames and scenario-driven exercises exploring strategy, defense analysis, crisis response, military planning, and complex emergencies. + +__Heather Williams__ is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, she was a visiting fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School and a Stanton Nuclear Security fellow in the Security Studies Program at MIT. + +__Eliot A. Cohen__ is the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Robert E. Osgood Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where he has taught since 1990. He received his BA and PhD degrees from Harvard and taught there and at the U.S. Naval War College before going to SAIS, where he has also served as the school’s ninth dean. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-14-atoms-for-sale.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-14-atoms-for-sale.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8693eb6e --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-02-14-atoms-for-sale.md @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Atoms For Sale +author: Darya Dolzikova +date : 2023-02-14 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/H5dAZgw.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Atoms for Sale: Developments in Russian Nuclear Energy Exports" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western sanctions on the Russian economy have been expanding. Nonetheless, Russia’s nuclear energy exports have not come under economic restrictions._ _The Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation (Rosatom), which has a monopoly over the Russian nuclear industry, has continued exports of nuclear fuel and other goods relevant to the nuclear energy sector. According to Russian customs data, sourced through a third-party commercial trade data provider, Russia has exported just over $1 billion-worth of nuclear energy-related goods and materials since the start of the war in Ukraine._ + +_Some customers that have historically relied on Russian nuclear energy exports – like Ukraine, Czechia and Bulgaria – have sought to diversify away from Russian supplies. However, contractual obligations and technical challenges make diversification slow and complicated – although not impossible. Additionally, generous Russian financing arrangements make Russia an attractive supplier among its other competitors in the nuclear energy sector._ + +_The trade data reviewed by the author shows a drop-off in Russian nuclear exports to some countries in Eastern and Western Europe since the invasion of Ukraine, but also a significant rise in the overall value of Russian nuclear energy exports in 2022. Significant increases in value can be observed in Russian nuclear energy-related exports to China, which appear to be the result of Russian exports of fuel for the Chinese CFR-600 reactor at the Xiapu nuclear power plant (NPP). In a year-on-year comparison between 2021–22, the dataset also shows increases in overall Russian nuclear exports to Hungary, Turkey and India. And while the dataset studied by the author does not span a long enough time frame to draw definitive conclusions on longterm trends in Russian nuclear energy exports, or how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine might impact these trends, it does point to the importance for the Russian nuclear energy sector of markets outside North America and traditional European customers._ + +_The primacy among Russian nuclear energy customers of countries that have proven reluctant to support Western sanctions on Russia so far suggests that any EU and US sanctions on Rosatom and Russian nuclear trade need to be coupled with broader diplomatic efforts if they are to be effective in significantly curtailing Russian economic gains from its nuclear energy exports. Focusing efforts on bringing countries like Turkey and Hungary on board with increasing the political and economic pressure on Moscow – including through the provision of viable and sustainable alternatives to Russian nuclear energy-related supplies – will be key. Securing China’s cooperation will undoubtedly prove more difficult. As it has in other contexts, Russia will find ways to take advantage of these divisions to its own benefit._ + + +### Pass Go and Collect $1 Billion + +Since Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the UK, the US, the EU and others have introduced several rounds of Russia-focused sanctions packages. These measures have targeted both Russian individuals and certain economic sectors in an effort to curb the flow of funds that are enabling Moscow’s war effort and enriching those in Russia perpetrating and supporting it. Western sanctions have targeted Russian energy exports as a major contributor to the Russian economy. However, one component of the Russian energy market – the nuclear energy sector – has been left unsanctioned. This omission of Russian nuclear exports from Western sanctions appears to be – at least in part – the result of persistent dependencies in some countries on Russian nuclear energy fuel and reactor technology. + +Russian customs data, sourced though a third-party commercial trade data provider and reviewed by the author in collaboration with Bloomberg shows that, between March and December 2022, Russia exported just over $1 billion-worth of materials and technology of relevance to the nuclear energy sector. This trade included exports to members of NATO and the EU. In fact, not only has the value of Russian nuclear-related exports not shrunk since February 2022, the data reviewed by the author suggests that it may be expanding, with a handful of loyal customers still eager to do business with Russia’s nuclear sector. + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/v60SLfQ.png) +_▲ __Figure 1: Monthly Transaction Values of Russian Nuclear Energy Exports Over Time.__ Source: Russian customs data obtained through a third-party commercial provider, RUSI._ + +The Russian nuclear energy sector is monopolised by Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation (better known as Rosatom) and its many subsidiaries. The company also appears to have been directly involved in supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Rosatom staff are present at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya NPP, on the front line of Russia’s invasion. According to Ukrainian reports, Rosatom has taken over the management of the plant and have been pressuring the NPP’s Ukrainian staff to sign employment contracts with the Russian company. A recent report by the Washington Post also detailed apparent offers by Rosatom to provide components, technology and raw materials to the Russian military and Russian weapons manufacturers. However, Rosatom has not come under Western sanctions, despite calls from Ukrainian officials as well as Members of the European Parliament to impose restrictions on Russian nuclear exports. Hungary – which has insisted on maintaining its nuclear cooperation with Russia – has stated that it would veto any such attempt from the EU. + +This report presents data and analysis on continued Russian nuclear energy exports since the invasion of Ukraine and highlights some of the difficulties countries may face in diversifying away from Russian supplies. At the same time, it points to the importance of customers outside of Europe and North America for the Russian nuclear energy sector and concludes that Western sanctions on Russian nuclear exports must be coupled with broader diplomatic efforts to curtail dependencies on Russian nuclear energy technology. + + +### Notes on Methodology and Data + +The data presented and analysed in this report was sourced from a third-party commercial trade data provider and captures Russian exports between January 2019 and December 2022. The data includes goods that fall under five nuclear-relevant HS codes – numeric identifiers used to internationally standardise the classifications of traded goods. The HS codes, their associated goods and notes on their relevance to the civilian nuclear fuel cycle are included in Table 1. + +As with all customs information datasets, the dataset reviewed by the author in this report is incomplete and may include some inaccuracies – including missing transactions or duplicates of transactions. The dataset also clearly excludes certain export destinations – likely because they do not make their customs data publicly available. For instance, Russian nuclear exports to Iran were not captured in the dataset. The author tried her best to validate the available data by comparing it against another commercial trade dataset from a different third-party provider. Some discrepancies are inevitable when comparing any large datasets and were indeed identified when comparing this dataset against a second one. Furthermore, the availability of data over time was inconsistent across the datasets; data was not available in the second dataset past June 2022, meaning the original dataset could not be validated past that date. However, despite these discrepancies, the alternative dataset does not contradict the analysis presented in this report and, within the timeframe of the data available in the second dataset (January 2019–June 2022), confirms the general trends outlined in this piece. Nevertheless, the author has kept her analysis within the bounds of the available data in the original dataset. The reader should also engage with the data and associated analysis presented with an understanding of these limitations. + +It is worth noting that lack of data at certain points in the dataset may indicate either a lack of transactions in that instance or missing transaction data in this particular dataset. As detailed above, the author validated – to the best of her abilities – the overall reliability of the data available but is not in a position to make a final judgement on the origin of gaps in the dataset. + +The data for Russian nuclear exports to individual countries tends to be characterised by large peaks and troughs. This is unsurprising, as trade in the nuclear sector is often made up of periodic high-value transactions – such as the delivery of nuclear fuel batches or materials for the construction of nuclear plants – instead of a consistent flow of goods. Furthermore, timelines for nuclear energy projects are significantly longer than those in other energy sectors. Well-planned NPP construction projects take about 11 to 12 years to construct and commission. For instance, the agreement between Russia and Turkey for the construction of the Akkuyu NPP was signed in 2010; construction of the first of the four planned reactors did not begin until 2018. Negotiations in advance of the start of an NPP project can also take considerable time. Commissioned reactors will then operate for decades, requiring fuel, maintenance and servicing – all of which is often bespoke to the reactor. + +As such, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions from a nuclear trade dataset that only spans four years – as is the case in this instance, or to assess the long-term implication of changes observed in the data from the 10 months since the invasion of Ukraine (March-December 2022). The spikes and drops in trade value captured by the data may not necessarily point to persistent trends. Some of the transactions captured in the dataset for the post-invasion period may also represent an acceleration in the delivery of contracts for goods and materials – such as nuclear fuel – in advance of countries’ diversification from Russian supplies. As such, additional data over the coming months and years will be necessary to confirm whether the trade activity seen in the dataset represents persistent trends or one-off occurrences. + +As mentioned earlier, the Russian nuclear sector is monopolised by Russian state corporation Rosatom. Due to the volume of transactions, the author could not definitively confirm that all instances of nuclear-related exports from Russia were on behalf of Rosatom and its group of companies. However, nearly all of the transactions reviewed by the author within the database appear to have been conducted either by a subsidiary of Rosatom or on behalf of one. + +![image2](https://i.imgur.com/ZatW99R.png) +_▲ __Table 1: Nuclear Energy Trade HS Codes.__ Source: Russian customs data obtained through a third-party commercial provider, RUSI._ + + +### Global Dependencies + +As others have detailed elsewhere, Russia occupies a major share of the global nuclear energy market, with dependencies on Russian nuclear fuel supplies particularly high in Central and Eastern Europe, but also apparent in the US and Western Europe. In 2021, there were 44 Russian or Soviet-built VVERs (water-water energetic reactors – a type of pressurised water reactor) operating outside Russia. Seventeen of them were in Ukraine, with the rest spread across 10 other countries. Many of these were built decades ago. However, Russia is continuing to construct nuclear reactors abroad. According to Rosatom’s webpage as of January 2023, the company had 34 active NPP construction projects ‘at various implementation stages’ (although the accuracy of Rosatom’s reporting on its construction portfolio has been questioned in the past and others have counted 13 reactors actively under construction at the end of 2021). + +Russia’s role in the global nuclear market includes not only the construction of nuclear reactors, but also the mining of raw uranium, conversion of uranium ore into fuel-useable compounds, the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies, and the provision of other services across the nuclear fuel cycle – ‘from assessing and developing key nuclear infrastructure components in customer countries to NPP decommissioning’, as the company notes in its 2021 annual report. According to the 2021 report – the latest available – Russia occupied the greatest share of the global uranium enrichment market (38%) (other sources show that it had 46% of the world’s total operational and planned uranium enrichment capacity), was second in the world in terms of uranium production (15% of the market) and third in its share of the global nuclear fuel market (17%). + +As such, many countries with civilian nuclear energy sectors face significant dependencies on Russian provision of technology, services and fuel for their operation. A May 2022 report by Matt Bowen and Paul Dabbar for Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy assessed the degree of dependency of Western markets on Russian nuclear energy supplies. Bowen and Dabbar highlight in particular the key role Russia plays in uranium conversion and enrichment for global markets, including for American and Western European nuclear energy production. In 2021, subsidiaries of Rosatom provided 31% of enrichment services to EU nuclear utilities and 28% to US ones. They point out that replacing Russian uranium enrichment and conversion capacity possible, but that additional alternative capacity will need to be brought online, likely resulting in higher nuclear fuel prices. Alternative nuclear suppliers will also need to be convinced that the resources they invest in expanding their operations will not be in vain should any restrictions on Russian nuclear supplies be rescinded in a few years. + +Alternative suppliers would also have to be found for the fabrication of nuclear fuel. A consortium of Western companies has been conducting work on the diversification of VVER fuel supply for years, focusing mainly on the production and licensing of VVER-440 fuel supplies. According to recent industry media reporting, supplies of VVER-440 fuel produced by a collaboration between US energy company Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (Westinghouse) and Spanish company Enusa should be ready for deliveries in 2024. French company Framatome also produces fuel under licence from a Rosatom subsidiary, which is reportedly identical to Russian-produced VVER fuel. Diversification away from Russian nuclear fuel supplies is time consuming, costly and presents technical challenges. Western nuclear fuel production lines need to be adapted, expanded and licensed for the production of VVER fuel, while customer countries need to license new suppliers which – according to one former senior Westinghouse engineer – can take at least five years. However, despite all this – and as has been demonstrated – diversification is possible. + +Finally, Bowen and Dabbar note that reactors often rely on unique components produced by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM), which results in significant dependence on the OEM for replacement parts and servicing. The Russian customs data reviewed by the author shows Russian nuclear energy-related exports going to 21 different countries between January 2019 and December 2022. New reactors being constructed by Rosatom will also need servicing and spare parts over their lifetimes, which is likely to perpetuate future dependencies on imports from Russia. The Rosatom project for the construction of the El Dabaa NPP in Egypt, for instance, explicitly includes provisions for personnel training and reactor maintenance for the first 10 years of the plant’s operations, as well as fuel supply over the plant’s lifetime. Even more extensive long-term maintenance and operation provisions could be built into future NPP construction projects – for instance, the ‘build-own-operate’ model, which is being used for the first time in the construction of the Akkuyu NPP in Turkey and is discussed in more detail later. + + +### Fuelling Up + +While the importance of Russia as a supplier of nuclear technology has been well-established, the dataset reviewed by the author points to an increase in the dollar value of Russian nuclear energy-related exports in the last few months, driven by a handful of countries outside of North America, Western Europe and traditional Eastern European customers. According to the dataset, the value of Russian nuclear energy exports increased considerably in the second half of 2022. In a month-on-month comparison, the dataset examined by the author shows values of 2022 nuclear energy exports exceeding 2021 exports in five out of 10 months captured by the data since the invasion (March – December 2022). + +![image3](https://i.imgur.com/ldEHTGA.png) +_▲ __Figure 2: Month-on-Month Value of Russian Nuclear Energy Exports.__ Source: Russian customs data obtained through a third-party commercial provider, RUSI._ + +Both prior to the invasion and since March 2022, Russia’s primary nuclear-related exports – by a significant margin – came under HS code 840130 – ‘fuel elements, unirradiated’; in other words, fresh fuel for nuclear reactors. According to the trade data reviewed by the author, nuclear fuel exports accounted for about 77% of Russian nuclear exports prior to the invasion, rising to 86% between March and December 2022. Prior to March 2022, the top five destination countries for Russian nuclear fuel in the dataset – by dollar value – were Ukraine, Czechia, China, Bulgaria and Hungary. + +Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some of these customers have sought to diversify away from Russian nuclear fuel. Czechia and Bulgaria have reached agreements with French and US suppliers for the supply of nuclear fuel for some of their reactors. However, the deliveries of this fuel are not expected until 2024 in Czechia and 2025 in Bulgaria. The trade data reviewed by the author shows that Russia has continued exporting nuclear fuel into both countries after the invasion, although the value of those imports dropped from 2021 to 2022. + +Ukraine is of course the most obvious case of diversification away from Russian nuclear fuel supplies. Hosting 17 VVER reactors, Ukraine has relied heavily on Russian imports of nuclear fuel to keep the units powered. In the last year – and even before then – it became clear that this dependency was no longer feasible. After Moscow’s initial incursion into Ukraine in 2014, Westinghouse was granted contracts to supply nuclear fuel to a number of Ukraine’s VVER reactors. The company – which has the capability to produce fuel for VVER-1000 reactors – was reportedly supplying fuel for six of the country’s reactors as of April 2022. Ukraine went from being the top export destination for Russian nuclear reactor fuel prior to the invasion to not importing any at all after the end of February 2022. + +![image4](https://i.imgur.com/TsGbbP5.png) +_▲ __Figure 3: Year-on-Year Value of Russian Nuclear Fuel Exports (HS 840130) to Ukraine, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary and China.__ Source: Russian customs data obtained through a third-party commercial provider, RUSI._ + +In the cases of China and Hungary, the dataset reviewed by the author shows the two countries assuming a larger proportion of Russian nuclear fuel exports since March 2022. In fact, the value of Russian nuclear fuel exports to Hungary in the 10 months between March and December 2022 far exceeds that of any of the previous three years. According to the transaction details captured in the data, the deliveries were for Hungary’s Paks NPP. In August 2022, Hungary controversially decided to go ahead with issuing permits for Rosatom construction of two new nuclear reactors at the site. + +The data also shows a clear spike in Russian exports of nuclear fuel to China in the second half of 2022, which appears to be primarily driven by the export – for the first time – of Russian fuel for the CFR-600 fast neutron reactor currently under construction at China’s Xiapu NPP in Fujian Province. The supply of fuel for the CFR-600 reactor is part of a set of 2018 Russo-Chinese agreements on nuclear energy cooperation, which includes Russian commitments for the delivery of fuel, equipment and services for the Chinese-built CFR-600. The trade data shows three separate batches of nuclear fuel assemblies being exported to China in September, November and December 2022. This data corroborates public reporting of the fuel deliveries. Data for December 2022 also shows the export to China of control and protection system assemblies for the CFR-600 reactor. + +The CFR-600 is a sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor. According to assessments by the US Department of Defense, the reactor could be used as a breeder reactor; this means that the reactor may be capable of producing more fissile material than it consumes. This has raised concerns that the reactor could be used for the production of plutonium, which could in turn be used for fuel in nuclear weapons, among unconfirmed suspicions that China may be expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that China is diverting – or planning to divert – plutonium from the CFR-600 to nuclear weapons production and some experts have suggested that there are more efficient ways for Beijing to increase its weapons-usable plutonium stockpiles than relying on a breeder reactor designed for civilian energy production. + +All other Russian nuclear fuel shipments to China recorded in the dataset appear to be for the Russian-built Tainwan-3 VVER reactor. Rosatom is also due to construct four new reactor units at the Tainwan and Xudabao NPPs. One of these began construction on 25 February 2022 – the day after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – and the other in May 2022. + + +### The Nuclear Family + +An analysis of trends in overall Russian nuclear energy-related exports, across all HS categories, also point to the emergence of several loyal customers for the Russian nuclear energy market. As many countries look to diversify their sourcing of nuclear energy supplies, a handful of others appear to be increasing Russian imports of nuclear goods and technology. + +![image5](https://i.imgur.com/BX2fFAJ.png) +_▲ __Figure 4: Changes in the Value of Russia’s Nuclear Exports Between 2021 and 2022 by Destination Country.__ Source: Russian customs data obtained through a third-party commercial provider, RUSI._ + +Before March 2022, the dataset shows that the top five destination countries for Russian nuclear exports were Ukraine, China, Czechia, Bulgaria and Hungary, with India not far behind. Since March, exports to Ukraine have stopped entirely according to the data. Other destinations for Russian nuclear exports also disappear from the dataset from March 2022 onwards, including the US, Switzerland, Sweden, Canada and the Netherlands. However, even in the three years prior to March 2022, Russian nuclear energy exports to these countries made up a very small proportion of the entire dataset. As mentioned earlier, it is possible that more significant exports took place before 2019 and materials were stockpiled. However, the relatively small proportion of Russian nuclear energy exports to these countries suggests that Western customers – and retaining access to those export markets – will be relatively less important to Russia than customers in other parts of the world. + +Russia’s priority is likely to be focused on retaining and growing business in a handful of apparently loyal customers that remain less enthusiastic about imposing sanctions on the Russian economy. The data shows that both the relative share and net value of overall nuclear exports to China has skyrocketed, driven almost exclusively by the spike in the value of Russian nuclear fuel exports to China in the second half of 2022, which were discussed earlier. The relative and absolute value of Russian exports to Hungary has also grown, consisting – as before the invasion – almost entirely of nuclear fuel exports. The data also shows a significant amount of Russian nuclear exports going to India in the first half of 2022 – consisting of deliveries of nuclear fuel (HS 840130) and nuclear reactor components (HS 840140) – but dropping off after June of that year. + +![image6](https://i.imgur.com/fVPJv64.png) +_▲ __Figure 5: Value of Russian Nuclear Energy Export Transactions to China Over Time.__ Source: Russian customs data obtained through a third-party commercial provider, RUSI._ + +Another country which – according to the data – continues to import a significant amount of Russian nuclear-related goods and materials, and whose importance in Russia’s nuclear export market has grown since March 2022, is Turkey. The data shows that Russian nuclear exports to Turkey took a dip in the first few months of the invasion but have since rallied in both relative and absolute terms. While future trade data will help to determine whether the importance of Turkey as a market for Russian nuclear exports will continue to grow, such a trend would not be surprising. Rosatom is in the process of constructing Turkey’s first nuclear power plant – the Akkuyu NPP, on the country’s Mediterranean coast. The project is the result of a 2010 agreement signed between the Russian and Turkish governments and – according to Rosatom – is the ‘largest project in the history of Russian-Turkish cooperation’. + +The project is the first application of the ‘build-own-operate’ model for nuclear reactor construction; under this arrangement, Rosatom will maintain ownership of the NPP after its construction, selling the generated electricity to a Turkish utility company – thus expecting to make a guaranteed profit off the project. According to the project’s webpage, Rosatom companies own nearly 100% of the project. When completed, the Akkuyu NPP will host four VVER-1200 reactors and is expected to generate 35 billion kWh per year – an estimated 10% of Turkey’s electricity. Construction of the first reactor began in April 2018 and of the fourth in July 2022. Descriptions of Russian exports to Turkey within the dataset reviewed by the author clearly identify shipments of nuclear reactor parts and other technology for the construction of the Akkuyu NPP. + +As mentioned in the methodology section of this report, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions on long-term trends in Russian nuclear exports just from looking at four years of trade data and especially from any movement in the 10 months following the invasion of Ukraine. The trends observed in the post-invasion trade data align with expectations on shifts in Russian nuclear energy customers, as a result of efforts in some countries – and publicly reported resistance in others – to diversify away from Russian nuclear energy supplies. However, additional data over the coming months and years will help confirm – or disprove – these apparent trends. For now, the observed increases in Russian nuclear energy exports to certain destinations in the reviewed dataset are best viewed as general confirmation of these countries’ commitments to nuclear cooperation with Russia, rather than a rapid expansion of these relationships since the start of 2022. + + +### In For a Penny + +Besides the aforementioned dependencies and difficulties in diversifying suppliers, several factors continue to make Russia an attractive supplier for existing and new customers. One key consideration is Moscow’s willingness to extend attractive financing schemes for its NPP construction projects abroad. As Matthew Bowen and Alec Apostoaei highlight in a recent report on government financing of nuclear reactor exports, the debt and equity arrangements that Rosatom is able to provide are government-backed and their conditions are not limited by restrictions placed on US, French and South Korean competitors by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). As such, the authors note, Russian financing arrangements are consistently more generous and attractive than other suppliers are able to provide. + +Such financing arrangements likely serve as an important motivator for countries that may not be able to front the costs of an NPP construction project themselves. Equally, they create commitments that are financially difficult to disentangle from down the road. For instance, Rosatom’s construction of two new units at Hungary’s Paks NPP is expected to cost €12.4 billion, with Russia providing €10 billion as a loan under a repayment period of 16 years. Russia is also providing Egypt with a $25 billion loan for the construction by Rosatom of the El Dabaa NPP, out of a total estimated cost of $60 billion. The repayment term for that arrangement is reportedly 22 years. In Bangladesh, Russia extended a loan for $11.4 billion, with a repayment term of 20 years for the construction of the Rooppur NPP. The loan represents 90% of the total original cost of the project. + +Differences in the regulatory requirements for the export of US nuclear technology versus nuclear exports from Russia as well as other major suppliers may also allow Rosatom to be a more nimble and attractive supplier, at least in relation to US competitors. In instances where the US wishes to make significant transfers of nuclear material or technology, US law generally requires the conclusion of a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (commonly known as a ‘123 Agreement’). These agreements outline requirements around specific non-proliferation criteria that recipient countries must meet in order to receive US technology; 123 Agreements are reviewed – and may therefore be rejected or delayed – by the US Congress. Furthermore, these agreements require periodic renewal. The expiry of the US’ 123 Agreement with South Africa in December 2022 has meant that Westinghouse lost its US Nuclear Regulatory Commission licence to export nuclear fuel components to the country’s Koeberg NPP. As others have outlined elsewhere, while Russia also includes non-proliferation and export-control measures in its nuclear cooperation agreements, they are less extensive than those applied by the US. + + +### Conclusion + +As the trade data reviewed by the author demonstrates, Russia’s nuclear export sector has continued to thrive since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. This trade in nuclear technology will directly benefit state corporation Rosatom, which appears to be actively supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Some have called for the Russian nuclear industry to be sanctioned. Others have taken it into their own hands to find alternative suppliers for their nuclear energy sectors. On 5 February, Kyiv took the step of sanctioning 200 entities connected to the Russian nuclear sector. A few days earlier, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for sanctions on Rosatom and an embargo on imports of Russian uranium. Such actions are helpful and should be actively pursued as part of broader national and multilateral efforts to place economic pressure on Moscow and Russian entities supporting Russia’s invasion and atrocities in Ukraine. + +By sanctioning Rosatom and its subsidiaries, the US and EU can make it more difficult for the corporation to operate within the international financial system and to access certain services – like insurance – that it would need to move its wares to customers. + +Yet, as demonstrated by the trade data reviewed by the author, Russia’s most important customers for nuclear energy exports are located outside Western Europe and North America, and Russia appears to be increasingly reliant on business from countries that have shown less enthusiasm for sanctioning its economy. As such, for any US and EU sanctions on Rosatom and the Russian nuclear energy industry to be effective in significantly curtailing Russian economic gains from its nuclear energy exports, they will need to be coupled with broader diplomatic efforts to encourage and support diversification away from Russian supplies. + +Focusing efforts on bringing countries like Turkey and Hungary on side to increase the political and economic pressure on Moscow will be key. It remains unclear to what extent these countries will maintain – or expand – their nuclear cooperation with Russia moving forward although incentives and restrictions to diversification clearly exist, as detailed in this report. Finding ways to support a sustainable shift away from dependence on Russian nuclear fuel and technology and towards alternative suppliers will be key to ensuring that emerging trends suggested by the data assessed for this report do not become permanent ones. + +However, securing the cooperation of China – Russia’s most important customer in nuclear energy exports – when it comes to curtailing Russian access to its nuclear energy market is an undoubtedly tall order. As it has already demonstrated, Beijing is likely to remain the persistently weak link in Western efforts to effectively apply sanctions against the Russian economy. As long as international consensus on condemning and sanctioning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains divided, Russia will find ways to benefit from these divisions. + +--- + +__Darya Dolzikova__ is a Research Fellow in Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at RUSI. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including proliferation financing and other illicit trade by actors of proliferation concern. She also conducts research and publishes on the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy.