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+---
+layout: post
+title : A Decade On
+author: Mico A Galang
+date : 2024-04-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/xWQrACF.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "EDCA and the Philippines–US Alliance"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Since its signing in 2014, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement has faced some delays in its implementation. However, with Beijing showing no signs of curtailing its aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea, recent years have seen an uptick in security cooperation between Manila and Washington._
+
+
+
+April 2024 has thus far been marked by two major developments in the Philippines’ security relations with the US and other countries. First, the Maritime Cooperative Activity was conducted in the South China Sea (SCS) on 7 April between Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the US to promote “freedom of navigation and overflight”. Second, the first Japan–Philippines–US trilateral summit was held on 11 April to advance their shared vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”.
+
+Apart from the conduct of the annual Balikatan military exercises, this month is important for Manila and Washington because of another milestone in their alliance: the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Signed on 28 April 2014 during the administration of the late Philippine President Benigno Aquino III, EDCA was designed to boost security cooperation between the two countries by providing for the increased rotational presence of US troops in “agreed locations” in the Philippines.
+
+Formal negotiations for EDCA commenced in 2013, the same year Manila filed an arbitration case against China over the SCS maritime dispute. While the Philippines won the case, security challenges in the SCS have intensified. Guided by its strategic intent to alter the balance of power in its favour, China has been much more aggressive in advancing its expansive maritime and territorial claims in the SCS. Short of an armed attack, Beijing has been relentless in harassing Philippine maritime vessels through the use of water cannons, lasers and maritime militia, among other tools. Beyond the SCS, China is likewise much more assertive in its position in its relations with Taiwan.
+
+In the 10 years since the agreement’s signing, EDCA has been presented with both challenges and opportunities. Indeed, just days after EDCA was signed, the agreement’s legality was challenged before the Philippines’ supreme court. Prominent Philippine legislators, including the late Miriam Defensor Santiago, then-chair of the Senate foreign relations committee, also expressed opposition to EDCA. In January 2016, after nearly two years, the supreme court ruled that EDCA was constitutional. Two months later, Manila and Washington announced the five initial “agreed locations” under EDCA: Antonio Bautista Air Base in Puerto Princesa, Palawan; Lumbia Air Base in Cagayan de Oro, Mindanao; Basa Air Base in Floridablanca, Pampanga; Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija; and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base in Cebu.
+
+However, the biggest challenge to EDCA did not come from congress or the judiciary but from the Philippine presidential palace. In June 2016, Rodrigo Duterte, a populist firebrand, succeeded Aquino. Determined to upend the country’s foreign relations, Duterte announced his intent to “separate” Manila from Washington, and declared his desire to scrap EDCA. The largest threat to EDCA’s future came in 2020 when the Duterte administration initiated the termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Indeed, EDCA is an executive agreement designed to implement the VFA. Subsequently, the Duterte administration suspended, and later scrapped, its decision to terminate the VFA. While EDCA itself was not terminated, its implementation languished under Duterte.
+
+___`Beijing’s increasingly aggressive posture in advancing its claims in the South China Sea has served as a powerful impetus in revitalising the Philippines–US alliance in the past couple of years`___
+
+The election of incumbent Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr in 2022 presented an opportunity to strengthen the alliance after the uncertainty of the Duterte years. In February 2023, just months into the Marcos Jr administration, Manila and Washington announced “their plans to accelerate the full implementation” of EDCA. The allies later identified four new EDCA sites: Naval Base Camilo Osias in Santa Ana, Cagayan; Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in Gamu, Isabela; Balabac Island in Palawan; and Lal-lo Airport in Cagayan. In the same year, Washington unveiled additional funding on top of the $82 million previously announced. The allies also approved 63 additional projects to be constructed at EDCA sites, and they are eyeing more potential locations for the future.
+
+During the visit of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Manila in March 2024, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo described the alliance to be in “hyperdrive”. This is certainly the case in terms of security cooperation, including initiatives related to EDCA. The policy and strategy documents of both countries clearly articulate a shared concern over China’s aggressive behaviour and a desire to advance a rules-based international order.
+
+EDCA’s provisions state that the deal shall have “an initial term of ten years, and thereafter, it shall continue in force automatically”. While the language of the agreement is clear that it will continue unless terminated by either party, the current developments in Philippines–US relations must not be taken to mean that it will continue on a similar trajectory in the coming years. Indeed, the past decade suggests that the future of EDCA is by no means a foregone conclusion. Three major factors could help shape the prospects of EDCA and the overall Philippines–US alliance.
+
+The first consideration is China’s coercive behaviour in the SCS and its influence operations within the Philippines. Beijing’s increasingly aggressive posture in advancing its expansive nine-dash line claim in the SCS has served as a powerful impetus in revitalising the Philippines–US alliance in the past couple of years. Confrontations in the SCS provide opportunities for Washington to reassure Manila of its commitments under the Mutual Defense Treaty, as demonstrated in the 23 March 2024 water canon incident which led to the injury of multiple Philippine servicemembers.
+
+Beyond maritime coercive actions, China also appears to be trying to shape Manila’s foreign relations within the Philippines through political influence operations. When it was announced that Cagayan would host an EDCA site, the province’s governor opposed the move while seeking closer ties with Beijing. It should be noted that Cagayan benefited from Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects such as the Chico River Pump Irrigation project, as well as a proposed “smart city” project on the province’s Fuga Island, which is near Taiwan. These BRI projects were initiated during the Duterte administration. There have been concerns about Chinese espionage and the military dual-use and control of critical infrastructure – similar to projects under the BRI. Moreover, it has been reported that China has been purchasing real estate in strategic areas near the SCS, such as in Zambales and Palawan. China also appears to be conducting influence operations in areas such as offshore gaming, the national power grid and telecommunications, as well as by conducting disinformation campaigns.
+
+___`In recent years, public opinion polls in the Philippines have consistently indicated high levels of trust in the US`___
+
+The second factor concerns domestic political developments within the Philippines and the US. The last decade has seen how domestic political transitions can swing Manila’s foreign policy pendulum. As noted earlier, the Marcos Jr administration has moved to expand EDCA, which was not fully implemented under Duterte. However, even as the Marcos Jr government forges a closer military alliance with Washington, there is significant opposition even from within the president’s coalition. Imee Marcos, the president’s sister and current chair of the Senate foreign relations committee, has been critical of EDCA’s expansion, and at one point even called for the agreement’s termination. Since leaving office, former President Duterte – who is the father of Marcos Jr’s own vice president, has also publicly criticised EDCA and the overall foreign policy of his successor. Admitting that he regularly meets with the Chinese ambassador to the Philippines, the former president also made a surprise visit to China in 2023 and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
+
+At the time of writing, the US is about to undergo another political transition. The 2024 presidential election is poised to be an electoral rematch between US President Joe Biden and his predecessor Donald Trump. While a bipartisan consensus in favour of a stronger stance against China has been forged since the Trump administration, a degree of uncertainty over US foreign policy can be expected should Trump win another term. Indeed, a number of former key officials and moderate elements of the Republican party who served in the Trump administration have distanced themselves from the former president, and would likely not serve should he win again in November 2024.
+
+Third, there are the sentiments of the foreign and security policy community and the general public in the Philippines. Historically, there has been an anti-US element to Filipino nationalism. However, in recent years, public opinion polls in the Philippines have consistently indicated high levels of trust in the US. With its aggressive actions against the Philippine military, law enforcement personnel and civilians in the SCS, China has a low trust rating among Filipinos. Similar results were apparent in a survey conducted among members of the Philippine government and security policy community by ISEAS-Yusok Ishak Institute, a Singapore-based think tank. These sentiments were very much at play when the Philippine diplomatic and defence establishments successfully convinced then-President Duterte to suspend and later rescind his decision to abrogate the VFA.
+
+After signing EDCA on behalf of the Philippines, then-Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin said that “alliances evolve”. In the context of EDCA, the Philippines–US alliance has indeed evolved – but not in a linear way. As the past decade suggests, the future of the agreement will depend on domestic and international factors which are increasingly volatile and unpredictable.
+
+---
+
+__Mico A Galang__ is a member of the Young Leaders Program, Pacific Forum (Hawaii, US).
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-19-euro-sifmanet-hague-report.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-19-euro-sifmanet-hague-report.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Euro SIFMANet Hague Report
+author: Olivia Allison
+date : 2024-04-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/GTlxQH5.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network: Hague Report"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_A roundtable on sanctions implementation sheds light on the challenges that the public and private sectors are facing in the Netherlands._
+
+
+
+In late March 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI, with the support of the Clingendael Institute, hosted a roundtable in The Hague. Held under the Chatham House Rule, the roundtable, along with a series of one-on-one meetings, discussed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in the Netherlands. The gatherings included representatives from national authorities with sanctions-related competences, as well as sanctions and compliance experts from financial institutions, the Dutch Banking Association and other advisers. These included, among others, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, Ministry of Finance, Financial Intelligence Unit–the Netherlands, the Ministry of Justice and Security, Customs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant agencies. This event was part of the in-country engagements conducted by the CFS-led European Sanctions and the Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.
+
+The roundtable discussion was rooted in a consideration of the current process of modernising the current Dutch Sanctions Act (Sanctiewet 1977). Under this Act, the minister of foreign affairs is responsible for the sanctions orders that bring Dutch regulations in line with UN and EU sanctions.
+
+Although the law has been amended numerous times since it was initially enacted, the scale and challenge of the sanctions imposed on Russia prompted the minister of foreign affairs to establish a temporary national coordinator for sanctions compliance and enforcement. Further, the minister of foreign affairs has launched a wider effort to modernise the Sanctions Act, collecting pre-consultation comments in 2023.
+
+Participants said that, although modernisation of the Dutch Sanctions Act is a long process, the consultation around the Sanctions Act has been a useful platform to discuss wider issues with sanctions compliance in the Netherlands, to which this SIFMANet roundtable hopefully also contributed.
+
+Russia was a top-10 trading partner of the Netherlands before February 2022. Much of the discussion therefore focused on practical issues arising from the private and public sector challenges of enforcing sanctions while supporting the private sector in continuing to trade – this challenge featured particularly notably in the discussion. Other issues highlighted included international and local cooperation, as set out further below.
+
+
+### Criminalising Sanctions Evasion and Enforcement Tactics
+
+The Netherlands has been among the most active EU member states in investigating and prosecuting sanctions evasion and circumvention since 2022. For example, in October 2023, a Dutch man was fined and sentenced to 18 months in prison for exporting microchips and other dual-use electronics to Russia, in violation of EU sanctions. Other arrests have occurred, and, as of early 2024, the government confirmed 192 ongoing investigations.
+
+Participants said this reflected the Dutch Sanctions Act’s provision to criminalise sanctions infractions (something that is not the case in many EU member states) and allows for simple harmonisation with the upcoming EU directive’s criminalisation requirements. Dutch legislation also allows for administrative enforcement on certain sanctions breaches, but only in the financial sector. However, public bodies are considering how this can be harmonised given the perceived benefit of applying administrative penalties across industry as a way in which learning can be communicated to the private sector. No civil enforcement of material sanctions violations are known to this date.
+
+A government official said that although the Netherlands has been one of the most active EU member states in enforcing sanctions, “most cases are settlements between prosecutor and company and in most cases not published”. Participants advocated for publishing such settlements, even on an anonymised basis, to provide greater visibility on sanctions evasions methodologies and current circumvention trends.
+
+
+### The Gatekeeper Role of the Private Sector
+
+As in other countries, issues relating to ownership and control continue to plague the work of private sector actors to comply with sanctions. In the Netherlands, significant focus in 2022 fell on the yacht sector, but officials said investigating a single yacht took a significant amount of time due to complex ownership structures. The same is true for banking relationships and other private sector links with Russian-owned companies or others affected by sanctions. The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs has responded by setting up a “collaborative platform” to study the ownership and control of companies based in the Netherlands, working alongside the Ministry of Finance, minister of foreign affairs, Customs and other government bodies. This work feeds into Dutch investment screening, but information gathered is also shared with other government bodies. If a sanctioned person was identified as an owner or controller of a company, a government representative said they would share this information with the body maintaining Dutch corporate records. However, there is no audit process identified to ensure that these designations ultimately are added to company records.
+
+In the financial sector, participants believed that large Dutch and foreign-owned banks operating in the Netherlands have high compliance standards, but smaller financial institutions require greater expert support. Further, participants referred to uneven compliance by other “gatekeepers”, such as accountants, notaries and private companies. Greater collaboration between industries would be beneficial, financial industry representatives said, particularly if it could be accompanied by further support by the public sector – such as a public–private partnership format.
+
+Private sector representatives believed that a number of obstacles restrict information sharing. Participants perceived strict privacy rules as restricting the amount of information sharing that would be required to tackle sanctions circumvention and evasion more robustly. For example, in line with the 2022 decision by the European Court of Justice, the full Dutch register of ultimate beneficial owners (UBO register) cannot be searched publicly, which participants said substantially restricted their ability to conduct sufficient due diligence and other compliance procedures.
+
+Added to this is the fact that many global companies are headquartered in the Netherlands, but the majority of their financial and trading activity occurs outside the country. Participants said both public regulators and private sector actors struggle to have sufficient visibility of the business outside the Netherlands. Informing companies headquartered in the Netherlands about their responsibilities under sanctions was also viewed as a challenge.
+
+
+### Implementing Trade Sanctions and Export Controls
+
+The discussion then considered capabilities of Customs and the private sector to respond to trade sanctions, particularly in light of the December 2023 amendments to US Executive Order 14024. This Executive Order strengthened the US ability to sanction financial institutions facilitating and funding supplies to the Russian military–industrial complex.
+
+Participants said the Netherlands’ high pre-2022 trading volume with Russia means that there is still a desire to continue to trade “legitimately” with Russia. Customs services check export declarations at the border for all exports to Russia directly, but their representative said that it is impossible to audit all exporters to see if they comply – particularly for goods declared as exports to third countries such as Kazakhstan. Further, those companies that had significant trade with Russia before 2022 had suffered commercially. In order to survive, many have explored new markets, which participants acknowledged has raised the risk that Dutch companies may be deliberately or unwittingly trading with Russia through new intermediaries.
+
+A government official said they have addressed this by conducting onsite audits of companies to examine prior export records, seeking to identify potential signs of non-compliance. This is a robust measure, and the same official said they had uncovered a “spectrum” of issues, ranging from deliberate circumvention and evasion to lack of knowledge. These reviews also provide valuable insight on types of potential circumvention that cannot be detected in standard controls. One type of circumvention that can be identified in audits but not through border monitoring is brokering and strategic services supporting the movement of sanctioned goods.
+
+Private sector participants also noted differing risk appetites between banks and corporates. Banks, they said, have a lower risk appetite because of regulatory enforcement risk, whereas corporates are more willing to pursue trade. One government representative noted that large corporates have compliance teams, but that smaller companies are sometimes unaware of the risk of exporting dual-use goods to Central Asia: “They just see the money”. There was a perception that this is further augmented by regulators’ focus on banks, which “makes corporates feel it’s the banks’ problem and if they do something illegal, the bank will tell them”.
+
+This opens a gap, participants said, because banks lack both data and specialist export control expertise to monitor dual-use goods. Between trade finance, correspondent banking and other transactions, most banks lack sufficient information on the underlying trade. (One participant with a banking background said that banks have “only an invoice number” for many transactions.) At the same time, Dutch courts have ruled against banks when they enforce rules more strictly than legislation requires. A bank’s representative noted a case when they had exited a client due to suspicious transactions, only to be forced by a court ruling to take the client back.
+
+Considering banking personnel expertise, one representative from the Dutch Banking Association said that there is further work to do to support financial institutions on trade sanctions and dual-use goods. A representative from Customs said the department had met with banks to explain dual-use and export controls.
+
+Corporates also perceived the licensing application process to be a form of administrative enforcement, insofar as licences can be (and have been) refused. But the fact that manufacturers and corporates face only potential criminal charges (not administrative) may be a potential enforcement gap: criminal prosecutions often require a level of evidence and intent that can be difficult to obtain in a sanctions circumvention matter.
+
+Despite these challenges, participants believed that the Executive Order 14024 did not have a significant impact on the industry because the compliance culture was already high.
+
+
+### Coordination and Measuring Impact
+
+The roundtable’s assessment of coordination within the Netherlands was generally positive. Private sector participants did not raise concerns over a lack of coordination, despite numerous bodies involved in sanctions implementation and enforcement. Government participants acknowledged that there are many points of contact but referred to effective information sharing and relationship-building between departments. Some participants noted the need for a single point of contact, or for more centralisation. Nonetheless, several others noted that most sanctions enforcement contact is governed by industry regulators, who would continue to have oversight of other related issues. For example, a single national point of contact for sanctions would not replace financial sector regulators with overlapping requirements, including anti-money laundering.
+
+Practical coordination with other member states was also seen generally positively. Law enforcement, coordination and information sharing that was carried out with other member states through existing mechanisms – such as Europol – were viewed positively. This is, however, one way in which the lack of a single point of contact could increase complication: each member state organises its sanctions mechanisms differently. Government participants said that the EU could provide more guidance and initiative, but that they have built their own networks.
+
+Similarly, the Dutch Banking Association said it worked well with counterparts through the European Banking Federation. Private sector participants sought more information from the government, whose powers to share information on ongoing cases are constrained by law.
+
+The differences among EU member states and lack of harmonisation frustrated participants, however. Member states interpreted the same facts differently, which caused challenges for implementation when Dutch company presence may be limited to a holding company, with assets in other EU and non-EU jurisdictions. Participants worried that different approaches to sanctions would become more of an issue with the advent of the instant credit transfer requirement within the Single Euro Payments Area, which would require financial institutions to rely on counterparties’ sanctions standards and screening.
+
+There was frustration from both the public and private sector about the resources required to comply with sanctions, compared with the apparent impact. Customs authorities said they conduct risk assessments in considering which areas to prioritise when enforcing export controls. However, requests from other member states and other bodies take significant resources, even if they do not relate to high-priority goods. Some suggested impact assessments, to consider the cost of the regulation and whether it has been effective in stopping Russia’s military–industrial complex.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Dutch authorities have clearly demonstrated commitment to the effective implementation of sanctions in the public and private sectors, and the existing sanctions legislation has allowed law enforcement to undertake robust investigation and enforcement.
+
+There was, however, some ambivalence in how to weigh sanctions against potential loss in trading and business partners. This was particularly true in the corporate sector, which is – in general – incentivised to maximise trade. Banks, then, have become the frontline in enforcing trade sanctions, but participants felt they lacked both the data and expertise to address the risk of trade sanction circumvention sufficiently.
+
+The government has adapted with two steps to address practical issues. First, government participants highlighted that their collaboration to trace beneficial ownership for key Netherlands-registered companies is important, although private sector representatives raised concerns about how data protection restricts their ability to review ownership and control. Second, Customs described how their onsite audits of manufacturers and exporters are an important step to addressing the gaps in border detection alone.
+
+There was support for greater harmonisation within the Dutch government and across the EU, but also practical questions from both private and public sectors about how this could be implemented given competing legislative priorities (particularly data protection).
+
+---
+
+__Olivia Allison__ has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex, international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies and international financial institutions. She has a wide range of financial crime and asset-tracing experience from leadership roles held in London, Moscow, Kyiv and Kazakhstan.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-29-breaking-bad.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-29-breaking-bad.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Breaking Bad
+author: Victor Cha
+date : 2024-04-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ux5e0SZ.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "South Korea’s Nuclear Option"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Is South Korea on the verge of a nuclear breakout? A handful of recent public opinion polls indicated the speculation about South Korea’s nuclear ambitions. But a CSIS strategic elite survey shows that a nuclear South Korea is not in the offing._
+
+
+
+In the face of an uncertain security environment — precipitated by wars in Europe and the Middle East, China’s assertive behavior, and North Korea’s campaign to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — South Korea has witnessed increasingly open discussion about the previously taboo topic of national nuclear weapons capability. Recent public opinion polling suggests that over 76 percent of South Koreans favor a nuclear path. Concerns heightened in January 2023, when the president of South Korea raised the possibility that the country could deploy nuclear weapons rapidly given its scientific and technological prowess.
+
+CSIS distributed an opinion poll to over 1,000 strategic elites in South Korea between January 15 and March 17, 2024, on this question. This demographic was selected because the views of strategic elites — defined as academics, think tank experts, business elites, legislators, and officials (current and former) — is understood to better reflect both the state of national discussion and the views influential in decisionmaking on issues of national security. Key findings of this study run contrary to the public discussion of this issue:
+
+- Two-thirds of South Korea’s strategic elites do not favor nuclearization of South Korea (66 percent opposed or uncertain), while only one-third support it (34 percent).
+
+- The 34 percent of strategic elites who support nuclearization is a significantly lower number than the oft-cited 76 percent support of the general public and is a better indicator of the current attitudes of South Korea toward the nuclear option.
+
+- The main reason South Korea’s strategic elites do not favor nuclearization is the consequences in terms of international condemnation, reputational costs, and sanctions, highlighting the value that elites place on South Korea’s global status in the rules-based international order.
+
+- Strategic elite opposition to a nuclear South Korea, however, is not unconditional. Should abandonment fears regarding the U.S. security commitment come to fruition (such as the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops by a future U.S. administration), 51 percent of those opposed to nuclearization would become supportive of this path.
+
+- Thirteen percent of elites remain uncertain about nuclearization, representing a substantial group whose opinions can be shaped by factors such as alliance assurances, adversary threats, and similar means.
+
+- Strategic elites who support nuclearization favor the acquisition of autonomous nuclear capabilities by a two-to-one margin over a nuclear sharing option; those who do not support nuclearization, if pressed, most prefer nuclear sharing over indigenous capabilities by an almost five-to-one margin.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+South Korea faces an increasingly uncertain security environment. The way conflicts have erupted in Europe and the Middle East demonstrates that devastating war is more than a remote possibility in Asia. China’s growing military assertiveness against Taiwan raises concerns about the possibility of simultaneous conflicts on the peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait that could stretch the defense capabilities of Seoul’s primary security benefactor. On the peninsula, the security situation is far from tranquil. Since 2005, North Korea has conducted 180 ballistic missile tests and six nuclear tests. It enshrined nuclear weapons status permanently into the constitution over a decade ago and stipulated its right to preemptive use of nuclear weapons in September 2022. It is seeking the second leg of the nuclear triad in a sea-based capability and tactical nuclear weapons to use in war. Kim Jong-un’s legacy-seeking ambition is to become a nuclear weapons state on par with France or the United Kingdom by the end of the decade. All diplomatic efforts at negotiating away North Korea’s nuclear weapons have failed, with the last actual dismantlement efforts and international inspections taking place during the Six Party talks almost two decades ago. International sanctions pressure on North Korea has significantly decreased with Chinese and Russian non-compliance, and the UN Security Council, once unanimous in its 10 previous resolutions on North Korea, has been stymied from action by Moscow and Beijing.
+
+This dim picture has led to heightened speculation that South Korea will inevitably head down the nuclear path. Scholars and opinion leaders have forcefully argued the logic of why South Korea should pursue nuclearization. Twice before, this critical U.S. ally has tried to develop nuclear weapons clandestinely, starting nearly a half-century ago. Moreover, recent South Korean opinion polling points to most of the public asserting that their country should acquire nuclear weapons — or, at a minimum, call for the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula. South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol broke taboo when he stated his belief that South Korea could easily and quickly develop nuclear weapons given its high levels of science and technology expertise.
+
+Is South Korea the next nuclear weapons state? The stakes of this question are exceedingly high. A nuclear South Korea could severely damage its alliance with the United States, as it would be tantamount to a statement of no-confidence in the U.S. security guarantee. A nuclear South Korea could also set off a “nuclear domino chain” among other states in the region, including Japan and Taiwan. It could create crisis instability on the peninsula, tempting North Korea to act preemptively. It could create insecurity spirals with Russia, China, and Japan, which would see new strategic threats from the peninsula.
+
+Concerns about a nuclear South Korea are so high that they have been a driver of alliance politics. The subtext of the highly successful April 2023 state visit by President Yoon to the White House was a set of agreements designed to manage any nuclear aspirations by South Korea. The creation of the Washington Declaration and the Nuclear Consultative Group in 2023 had two purposes. One was to shore up allied deterrence against the burgeoning WMD threat from North Korea, but the other was to assure South Korea of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella such that it did not contemplate its own nuclear path. Washington even sought in writing a commitment from Seoul to remain a non-nuclear state in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as part of the Washington Declaration. These developments reinforce the impression that South Korea is on the verge of a nuclear breakout.
+
+Based on new and original data, however, this report concludes that concerns about a nuclear South Korea are exaggerated. A minority of South Korean foreign policy thinkers — only 34 percent — believe that their government should consider the nuclear option, while upwards of 66 percent disagree or remain uncertain about such a proposition. Confidence in the United States as a security provider remains strong. But this policy judgment is far from unconditional and permanent. If security deficits emerge on the peninsula, and U.S. security commitments lose credibility, then South Korean support for going nuclear would increase dramatically. More specifically, if Donald Trump returns to the presidency with an “America First” policy that denigrates alliances and seeks the retrenchment of U.S. security commitments, then support for a nuclear capability by South Korea among non-nuclear advocates would grow exponentially.
+
+___`A minority of South Korean foreign policy thinkers — only 34 percent — believe that their government should consider the nuclear option, while upwards of 66 percent disagree or remain uncertain about such a proposition.`___
+
+This report’s conclusions differ from those of the oft-cited opinion polls in South Korea because they are gleaned from the views of strategic elites, not the general public. Strategic elites are defined here as academic scholars, think tank experts, legislators, business decisionmakers, and officials (both current and former). As scholars have argued, major decisions about a government’s national security reflect the views of elites rather than the public — even in a period of increasing populism and resentment of elites — because elites enjoy control of resources, have access to or are themselves top decisionmakers, often have domain-specific knowledge, and can define narratives on national security.
+
+Much of the speculation in Washington and Seoul about South Korea’s nuclear ambitions has been informed by a handful of recent public opinion polls. This has created an echo chamber effect where many pundits have accepted South Korean nuclear ambitions as a reality. Moreover, of the 55 public polls collected on this question, none have bothered to analyze the views of policy experts and elites. This is the first U.S. study, reaching out to over 1,000 South Korean elites, that highlights how the vast majority of respondents in this group are far more cautious about, and resistant to, South Korea going nuclear.
+
+___`Is South Korea the next nuclear weapons state? The stakes of this question are exceedingly high . . . [polls have] created an echo chamber effect where many pundits have accepted South Korean nuclear ambitions as a reality.`___
+
+In addition to the lack of enthusiasm for nuclear weapons among South Korean experts, this study offers several other novel findings. For one, there is approximately two times more support for remaining non-nuclear than going nuclear among policy elites. Two, reputational costs and international condemnation is a more important motivating factor in preserving South Korea’s non-nuclear status than damage to the U.S. alliance. Three, those who are positive on nuclearization mostly prefer doing so through indigenous development of a South Korean capability, rather than other possible options (e.g., returning U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula or a nuclear sharing arrangement). Those who oppose nuclearization, if pressed, tend to prefer nuclear sharing arrangements with the United States over going it alone. Finally, more than half of those opposed to South Korean nuclearization would change their minds if the United States proved to be an unreliable security partner.
+
+
+### Public Opinion Polls on South Korean Nuclearization
+
+There has been a plethora of opinion polls on South Korean nuclearization. A handful of recent polls have captured global attention because they report strong public support for a nuclear option in the face of North Korea’s unrelenting WMD ambitions. This has led some to speculate and even advocate for Seoul to take this path. The rationale is that if North Korea acquires a survivable nuclear capability, there are few in the United States who would be willing to trade San Francisco for Seoul despite reassurances to the contrary. This has led some to conclude that “Koreans are concerned that their country would meet the same fate as Ukraine — another non-nuclear state attacked by its nuclear-armed neighbor.” Such arguments operate from the logic that South Korean national security decisionmakers cannot count on U.S. intentions and commitment, and therefore the country would do well to develop its own deterrent.
+
+As part of this project, researchers created a dataset of nuclear polls to understand better their overall significance, collecting 55 polls from 2010 to 2023. These were divided between polls taken of the public prior to and after September 2017, which was when North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test. The first observation is that the polls were uniformly brief in their questioning. The majority consisted of a question asking simply whether the respondent was in favor or against (or undecided) on the question of South Korea going nuclear. An oft-asked question was, “Should South Korea have its own nuclear weapons?” Another popular question was, “Do you think South Korea should develop nuclear weapons to counter North Korea’s nuclear weapon developments?” But outside of this one query, there were usually no further questions for the respondent on the motivations or reasoning behind the expressed opinion.
+
+Second, while a snapshot of the polls gives the impression of hearty South Korean support for nuclearization, a longitudinal look across the entire set of polls suggests otherwise. As Table 1 shows, the average positive response to a question about South Korea’s nuclearization from January 2010 to August 2017 was 59 percent. This increased by only two points on average across polls after September 2017, the year of North Korea’s sixth and latest nuclear test. While this is a net increase (and is not an insubstantial number in itself ), it is not nearly as dramatic as a cross-sectional view that shows some 76 percent supporting nuclearization. None of the existing opinion polls noted this qualification in their findings, but it is an important one because it shows there has not been a dramatic spike in South Korean public enthusiasm for the nuclear option. Instead, there has been an incremental increase — which is understandable given the changing security environment and alliance uncertainties.
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: South Korean Views of Nuclearization (2010–2023).__ Source: CSIS Korea Chair._
+
+
+### Strategic Elite Polling Results
+
+This is the first U.S. multi-question polling of strategic elites in South Korea on the nuclear question. Strategic elites identified for this online survey numbered 1,094; there was a 16 percent response rate, for a final sample size of 175 respondents. The sample included academics, think tank experts, business elites, legislators, and officials (current and former). The survey was conducted online as a Google Forms and sent to South Korean nationals who are strategic elites residing in South Korea, the United States, Japan, and Europe. The survey sample ranged from junior to senior professionals. Each respondent was asked an initial question about their supportiveness for South Korea going nuclear. Based on the initial answer, respondents were directed to a separate set of questions to gain greater fidelity on their reasoning and their preferences. The survey was in the field for two months ( January to March 2024). The survey answers were anonymized.
+
+One would expect elites to have a different view of South Korea’s security environment than the public. In general, they have a better understanding of the threat matrix, conventional South Korean military capabilities, and North Korean nuclear capabilities. This group is also more likely to understand the costs and benefits of South Korea crossing the nuclear weapons threshold. Finally, they should have a more nuanced understanding of the U.S. alliance and its extended deterrence guarantees to South Korea. These factors combine into the expectation that opinions among the strategic elite on nuclearization would be less enthusiastic than those of the public.
+
+#### Finding 1: The vast majority of South Korean strategic elites do not favor nuclearization.
+
+In response to the statement “South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons,” 34 percent of strategic elites answered positively, 53 percent answered negatively, and 13 percent answered, “I am not sure.”
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1A.__ Source: CSIS Nuclear Survey of South Korean Strategic Elites 2024._
+
+Thirty-four percent support represents a much lower level of elite support than that of the general public, which averages at 61 percent based on 36 public opinion polls since September 2017 — and a substantially lower level of support than a recent public poll that puts support as high as 76.6 percent. Strategic elites, whose views matter most in national security decisionmaking, by a wide margin do not favor a nuclear South Korea.
+
+Moreover, those who do not support nuclearization represent a broad bipartisan base, with 36 percent each self-identifying as either politically conservative/moderate conservative or progressive/moderate progressive and 28 percent identifying as politically moderate. By contrast, those who do support nuclearization predominantly self-identify as conservative (68 percent versus 10 percent identifying as progressive).
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1B.__ Source: CSIS Nuclear Survey of South Korean Strategic Elites 2024._
+
+___`Moreover, those who do not support nuclearization represent a broad bipartisan base, with 36 percent each self-identifying as either politically conservative/moderate conservative or progressive/moderate progressive and 28 percent identifying as politically moderate.`___
+
+#### Finding 2: South Korean strategic elites see high reputational and material costs to going nuclear.
+
+When those who replied “no” to the previous question were asked why they do not support a nuclear South Korea, a plurality of respondents (43 percent) ranked the most important reason to be the international sanctions and reputational loss of status that would come with breaking away from the NPT regime. They ranked this reason higher than the potential damage done to the U.S.-South Korea alliance. They also ranked the costs associated with reputational loss and economic sanctions higher than inducing an arms race on the Korean Peninsula and higher than being targeted as strategic threats by other nuclear powers such as China and Russia.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2.__ Source: CSIS Nuclear Survey of South Korean Strategic Elites 2024._
+
+Perhaps unsurprisingly, those strategic elites who do not support nuclearization believe that nuclear weapons will not provide South Korea with greater security. Nearly 71 percent of strategic elites disagreed with the statement that nuclear weaponization of South Korea would make it “secure and safe from outside threats.” This stands in contrast to ubiquitous North Korean rhetoric that justifies nuclear weapons as the ultimate security provider for the state.
+
+#### Finding 3: The opposition to nuclear weaponization in South Korea changes dramatically if an “America First” policy returns to the White House.
+
+The negative attitude held by South Korean strategic elites in regard to nuclearization is not unconditional. The CSIS poll asked a hypothetical question as to whether a wavering of the U.S. security commitment to South Korea would change the respondents’ views on the nuclear question.
+
+Specifically, respondents were asked if abandonment fears regarding the United States, attendant with policies that denigrate allies and call for troop withdrawals, would affect their perspective toward acquiring nuclear weapons.
+
+Fifty-one percent of those who previously did not support a nuclear South Korea said that they would change their minds in such a scenario. In addition, of those respondents who initially supported a nuclear South Korea, 90 percent said their support for nuclearization would increase even further. While the poll did not fully test alternative scenarios, this finding suggests that strategic elites’ views on nuclearization are tied more to confidence in the alliance than to extant security threats. Moreover, it suggests that the return of Donald Trump to the White House and a renewal of decoupling rhetoric or actual policies to withdraw U.S. ground troops from the peninsula could significantly impact the nuclear debate in South Korea.
+
+While it is notable that a substantial body of elite opinion among the “non-nuclear believers” (46 percent) would still assert non-nuclear principles in such a scenario, only 10 percent of those “nuclear believers” said their support for a nuclear South Korea would remain the same or decrease. This suggests strong support for nuclearization among the original “nuclear believer” minority would be supplemented by significantly new supportive voices from the previously “non-nuclear” community.
+
+___`Moreover, it [the finding] suggests that the return of Donald Trump to the White House and a renewal of decoupling rhetoric or actual policies to withdraw U.S. ground troops from the peninsula could significantly impact the nuclear debate in South Korea.`___
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3.__ Source: CSIS Nuclear Survey of South Korean Strategic Elites 2024._
+
+#### Finding 4: South Koreans who support nuclearization focus on the threat posed by North Korea, and most prefer an independent nuclear capability over other alternatives.
+
+Of those strategic elites who agree that South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons, the majority of these (54 percent) prefer an autonomous and independent capability over any nuclear sharing arrangements or the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula. Ninety-five percent of these nuclear advocates see the weapons as enhancing South Korea’s external security, and 65 percent of advocates believe the primary purpose of such weapons is to counter North Korea as opposed to China or Russia. A small fraction of respondents (no more than 2 percent) see nuclear weapons acquisition as important for status or prestige.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4A.__ Source: CSIS Nuclear Survey of South Korean Strategic Elites 2024._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4B.__ Source: CSIS Nuclear Survey of South Korean Strategic Elites 2024._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4C.__ Source: CSIS Nuclear Survey of South Korean Strategic Elites 2024._
+
+#### Finding 5: South Korea’s pro- and anti-nuclear weapons advocates disagree on how South Korea should/would go nuclear.
+
+While supporters of a nuclear South Korea most prefer achieving this goal through an independent capability, most non-supporters, if pressed to choose, prefer a nuclear sharing arrangement within the U.S.-ROK alliance. When asked about the hypothetical question of South Korean nuclearization, the vast majority (71 percent) of non-nuclear strategic elites ranked an independent capability as the least preferred option, while only 1 percent ranked a nuclear sharing arrangement as their least preferred option. A simple majority (61 percent) ranked nuclear sharing as their most preferable choice. In addition, most elites (57 percent) in the noncommittal category of nuclearization (“I am not sure”) also ranked nuclear sharing as preferable to other modes of South Korean nuclearization. This suggests that the majority of South Korean strategic elites, even if forced to rescind their non-nuclear beliefs because of U.S. decoupling, would still seek nuclearization within the context of the alliance and would still potentially see the alliance as a resilient institution from which they could derive security benefits.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5A.__ Source: CSIS Nuclear Survey of South Korean Strategic Elites 2024._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5B.__ Source: CSIS Nuclear Survey of South Korean Strategic Elites 2024._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5C.__ Source: CSIS Nuclear Survey of South Korean Strategic Elites 2024._
+
+
+### Analysis
+
+There are several possible explanations for why strategic elites hold such different views on nuclearization compared with the general public. First, elites value their country’s global status as a supporter of the rules-based international system, particularly Seoul’s championing of the nonproliferation regime. South Korea is an upstanding member of the NPT and has wholly condemned North Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty. Its 123 Civil Nuclear Agreement with the United States maintains gold-standard nonproliferation safeguards. The 2023 Washington Declaration on the occasion of President Yoon’s state visit reaffirmed South Korea’s commitment to nonproliferation. Elites understand better than the public the consequences that going nuclear would have in terms of tarnishing the nation’s reputation, labeling it a rule breaker, and costing them years of reputational risk and economic sanctions — not unlike North Korea.
+
+Second, elites have a better understanding than the public of the deterrence value of the U.S. alliance for South Korean national security. This applies to both strategic capabilities and will. Elites understand the full range of U.S. strategic capabilities that support the defense of the peninsula as a treaty ally. They also give greater weight to the physical manifestations of those capabilities in the nuclear submarine port calls and strategic bomber visits to the peninsula. Strategic elites also certainly have better insights than the public into nuclear planning by the United States, be this in the context of the alliance or in NATO. In terms of intentions, elites recognize the importance of words as policy, particularly at the summit level, and better appreciate recent U.S. efforts to bolster deterrence by reiterating U.S. nuclear guarantees in Biden’s speeches and in official documents such as the Washington Declaration.
+
+But South Korean elite confidence in the alliance’s security guarantees is not gifted to Washington, it is earned. If decoupling actions are undertaken by future U.S. administrations, these elites have the capacity to adjust their views and take alternative actions as needed, even if these actions might impinge on core values and beliefs. It is noteworthy that the non-nuclear believers who responded that their approval of nuclearization would increase in response to U.S. retrenchment represent the full political spectrum in Korea. Thirty-six percent of this group self-identified as conservative/moderate conservative, 28 percent as moderate, and 36 percent as progressive/moderate progressive. The upshot is that the groundswell of support for nuclearization would not be a polarizing political issue in South Korea.
+
+The public discussion of nuclear options for South Korea has revolved around whether to consider autonomous nuclear capabilities, or if the country should instead encourage the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula. The option of nuclear sharing has usually been at the margins of discussion. But the present survey shows that when the majority of elites choose nuclearization, the debate will be between whether to pursue an autonomous capability (the preferred choice of “nuclear believers”) or nuclear sharing arrangements (the preferred choice of “non-nuclear believers”). The survey shows that the least preferred option for a nuclear path is the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons.
+
+___`In terms of intentions, elites recognize the importance of words as policy, . . . better appreciate recent U.S. efforts to bolster deterrence by reiterating U.S. nuclear guarantees in Biden’s speeches and in official documents such as the Washington Declaration.`___
+
+There will still be a demand signal from a nuclear South Korea for the alliance with the United States. The fact that a majority of respondents (both nuclear believers and non-nuclear believers) prefer nuclear sharing as South Korea’s nuclear option suggests that South Koreans, even if forced to go nuclear in response to fears of U.S. abandonment, would want to do this through the alliance with a sharing arrangement (rather than acquiring autonomous capabilities).
+
+The survey results show that the primary rationale for a nuclear option is security, not status, and that the security threat is defined exclusively as North Korea. This suggests two positive implications. First, South Korean strategic elites do not see nuclear weapons as necessary to counter China, Russia, or Japan. Second, absent a North Korean nuclear threat, South Korean need for nuclear weapons would be minimized, at least in the minds of strategic elites (all else held equal).
+
+Finally, the survey results show a degree of partisanship on the nuclear issue. The vast majority of those respondents who support nuclearization self-identified as conservative or moderately conservative (68 percent), while only a small minority self-identified as progressive or moderately progressive (10 percent). However, it is notable that the 66 percent who do not agree with South Korea’s nuclearization tend to be bipartisan.
+
+
+### Recommendations for Policy
+
+__Don’t press the panic button yet.__
+
+Policymakers and alliance managers do not have to be concerned that South Korea is on the verge of a nuclear breakout. The bottom line is that South Korean elites do not want to go nuclear and still have confidence in the alliance.
+
+__Continue to reassure.__
+
+At least for the time being, the continued development of extended deterrence mechanisms such as the Nuclear Consultative Group, integrated early-warning systems, strategic asset visits to the Korean Peninsula, streamlined intelligence sharing, and other measures serve the alliance well. Trilateralizing extended deterrence discussions with Tokyo offers another venue for reassurance. Reassurance can sometimes be a bottomless pit, but this is a small price to pay to avoid nuclearization.
+
+__Avoid retrenchment and decoupling rhetoric.__
+
+Confidence in the alliance is the key determinant of South Korean nuclear attitudes, even more so than external threats posed by North Korea, China, or Russia. If preventing further proliferation on the peninsula is a U.S. policy goal, this would be well served by avoiding rhetoric and action that suggest U.S. decoupling from its ally, even as trade disputes or cost-sharing disputes might negatively impact relations.
+
+__Be mindful of the undecided views.__
+
+Messaging about the alliance should consider not only the nuclear believers and non-nuclear believers but also the undecided population. This is a not-insignificant group, according to the present survey (13 percent), that could tip the balance in any national debate on going nuclear. Moreover, there remains almost 50 percent of non-nuclear believers who responded that they would still not seek nuclearization if the United States disengaged from the Korean Peninsula. This core non-nuclear respondent group also represents a broad political base, with about one-third each self-identifying as conservative, moderate, or progressive. For nonproliferation purposes, this group’s voice should be amplified.
+
+__Public opinion still matters.__
+
+Elites, while influential, do not always get what they want in foreign policy, especially in today’s environment of hyper-politicization of issues and misinformed narratives. Careful alliance messaging should avoid decoupling talk and bolster the persuasiveness of the “non-nuclear” camp. Otherwise, once these elites are forced to opt for nuclearization, the public will support them.
+
+__Invest in South Korea’s nonproliferation bona fides.__
+
+The United States should help facilitate a larger global role for South Korea in nuclear security and safety, including a role in a second generation of nuclear security summits; a Korean director-general for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); bilateral cooperation in civil nuclear energy and gold-standard safety and security; and a South Korean convening role in a Seoul-based Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) secretariat.
+
+
+### Appendix
+
+___CSIS Nuclear Survey of South Korean Strategic Elites 2024___
+
+__Polling sample:__ 1,094
+
+__Poll results:__ 16% (175)
+
+__Date of poll:__ January 15–March 17, 2024
+
+__Definition of strategic elites:__ Academic scholars, think tank experts, legislators, business decisionmakers, and officials (current and former).
+
+__LEGEND__
+
+__Pro-nuclear:__ Group of respondents who answered “yes” and agree with nuclearization
+
+__Anti-nuclear:__ Group of respondents who answered “no” and disagree with nuclearization
+
+__Not certain:__ Group of respondents who answered “I am not sure” and are not certain about nuclearization
+
+__WA:__ Weighted average
+
+▼ __1. Do you agree with the following statement?__ _“South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons.”_
+
+
+#### Questions to “Pro-Nuclear” Respondents
+
+▼ __2. Since you answered “Yes,” which of the following statements best explains your answer choice?__ _(Choose one)_
+
+
+▼ __3. Rank your preference based on the previous question.__ _What are your reasons for supporting South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons? From 1 to 4, please rank your reasons (1 – most important, 4 – least important)_
+
+
+▼ __4. How should South Korea “go nuclear”?__ _From 1 to 3, please rate your preference for how South Korea should “go nuclear.” (1 - most preferred, 3 - least preferred)_
+
+
+▼ __5. From a range of 1 to 5, to what degree do you agree with the following statement?__ _“Acquiring nuclear weapons will make South Korea more secure and safe from outside threats.” (1 – strongly agree, 5 – strongly disagree)_
+
+
+▼ __6. If an “America First” policy returns to the White House in November 2024 that denigrates allies and seeks retrenchment, your support for a nuclear South Korea would:__
+
+
+#### Questions to “Anti-nuclear” Respondents
+
+▼ __7. From a range of 1 to 5, to what degree do you agree with the following statement?__ _“Acquiring nuclear weapons will make South Korea more secure and safe from outside threats.” (1 – strongly agree, 5 – strongly disagree)_
+
+
+▼ __8. Since you answered “No,” which of the following statements best explains your answer choice?__ _(Choose one)_
+
+
+▼ __9. Rank your preference based on the previous question.__ _What are your reasons for NOT supporting South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons? From 1 to 4, please rank your reasons. (1 – most important, 4 – least important)_
+
+
+▼ __10. Although you disagree with the following statement, “South Korea should develop nuclear weapons,” what would be your preferred way for South Korea to “go nuclear,” if necessary?__ _(1 – most preferred, 3 – least preferred)_
+
+
+▼ __11. If an “America First” policy returns to the White House in November 2024 that denigrates allies and seeks retrenchment, your support for a nuclear South Korea would:__
+
+
+#### Questions to “Not Certain” Group of Respondents
+
+▼ __12. Although you are not certain about the following statement, “South Korea should develop nuclear weapons,” what would be your preferred way for South Korea to “go nuclear,” if necessary?__ _(1 – most preferred, 3 – least preferred)_
+
+
+▼ __If an “America First” policy returns to the White House in November 2024 that denigrates allies and seeks retrenchment, your support for a nuclear South Korea would:__
+
+
+---
+
+__Victor Cha__ is senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at CSIS. He is also the distinguished university professor and professor of government at Georgetown University.