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【香港保衛戰當年今日・四】

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diff --git a/columns.xml b/columns.xml index 0cff7302..06e457c5 100644 --- a/columns.xml +++ b/columns.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-07-08T14:32:47+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIV蜘蛛網的結2024-04-24T12:00:00+08:002024-04-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/spider-web-knots<p>在灰色夜幕的小城中,孤獨和失落是{子進}唯一的朋友,他靜靜地走在空蕩蕩的街上,直到一隻黑色蜘蛛進入了他的視線,它正在吐著柔軟的絲線,編織一張飄渺而神秘的網。</p> +Jekyll2024-07-10T11:11:53+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIV蜘蛛網的結2024-04-24T12:00:00+08:002024-04-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/spider-web-knots<p>在灰色夜幕的小城中,孤獨和失落是{子進}唯一的朋友,他靜靜地走在空蕩蕩的街上,直到一隻黑色蜘蛛進入了他的視線,它正在吐著柔軟的絲線,編織一張飄渺而神秘的網。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/feed.xml b/feed.xml index 33d3e502..0e17dc0a 100644 --- a/feed.xml +++ b/feed.xml @@ -1 +1 @@ -Jekyll2024-07-08T14:32:47+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file +Jekyll2024-07-10T11:11:53+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/heros.xml b/heros.xml index 2ecd79aa..ba4f289d 100644 --- a/heros.xml +++ b/heros.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-07-08T14:32:47+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIVSuperconducting Supercomputer2024-05-15T12:00:00+08:002024-05-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/AnnaHerr_QuentinHerr-a1_c-superconducting-supercomputer<p>Before the explosion of generative AI, scientists had predicted that by 2040, almost 50 percent of the world’s electric power will be used in computing. The amount of computing resources used to train the AI models has been doubling every 6 months for the past decade. <!--more--> At this rate, by 2030 training a single artificial-intelligence model would take one hundred times as much computing resources as the combined annual resources of the current top ten supercomputers. Simply put, computing will require colossal amounts of power, soon exceeding what our planet can provide.</p> +Jekyll2024-07-10T11:11:53+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIVSuperconducting Supercomputer2024-05-15T12:00:00+08:002024-05-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/AnnaHerr_QuentinHerr-a1_c-superconducting-supercomputer<p>Before the explosion of generative AI, scientists had predicted that by 2040, almost 50 percent of the world’s electric power will be used in computing. The amount of computing resources used to train the AI models has been doubling every 6 months for the past decade. <!--more--> At this rate, by 2030 training a single artificial-intelligence model would take one hundred times as much computing resources as the combined annual resources of the current top ten supercomputers. Simply put, computing will require colossal amounts of power, soon exceeding what our planet can provide.</p> <p>One way to manage the unsustainable energy requirements of the computing sector is to fundamentally change the way we compute. Superconductors could let us do just that.</p> diff --git a/hkers.xml b/hkers.xml index b471a81e..1f1df0f0 100644 --- a/hkers.xml +++ b/hkers.xml @@ -1,4 +1,159 @@ -Jekyll2024-07-08T14:32:47+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIVAlgorithmic Stability2024-06-10T12:00:00+08:002024-06-10T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/algorithmic-stability<p><em>This report delves into the future of deterrence and the role of human judgment in an AI-focused crisis simulation.</em></p> +Jekyll2024-07-10T11:11:53+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIV【黎智英案・審訊第 90 日】2024-06-11T12:00:00+08:002024-06-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-90<ul> + <li>控方完成案情 黎智英要求法庭裁表證不成立 案件押後至7.24續審</li> +</ul> + +<excerpt /> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KBf0rKU.png" alt="image01" /></p> + +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(11日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第90日審訊。控方正式表示完成控方案情;黎智英一方將有中段陳詞,要求法庭裁定3項控罪表證不成立。控辯雙方將於6月提交書面陳詞,早前定於7月9日作口頭陳詞,惟法官另有工作要處理,故改於7月24及25日續審。</p> + +<p>甫開庭,法官杜麗冰表示於6月7日收到黎智英代表律師事務所羅拔臣的信件,要求法庭批准黎智英缺席今天聆訊,又指黎乃自願缺席,而在他有法律代表的情況下,他的權利不會受到影響。杜官表示,考慮到今天聆訊的性質,只是處理翻譯文本的問題,並沒有重要事項,而且黎有法律代表保障其權利,因此批准黎毋須出席今天聆訊。</p> + +<p>控方向法庭提交經修訂的翻譯文本和證物列表,其後正式表示完成控方案情。</p> + +<p>黎智英一方將有中段陳詞,要求法庭裁定3項控罪表證不成立。早前經控辯雙方商討,黎一方須於6月18日向法庭提交書面中段陳詞,控方則須於6月25日提交陳詞,之後黎一方須於7月2日提交回應控方的書面陳詞。</p> + +<p>法庭早前定於7月9日庭上聽取口頭陳詞,惟法官李運騰今表示有其他案件需要處理,故改期至7月24及25日續審。</p> + +<p>代表「蘋果日報有限公司」、「蘋果日報印刷有限公司」及「蘋果互聯網有限公司」的大律師王國豪則早前表示不會有中段陳詞。</p> + +<hr /> + +<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導控方完成案情 黎智英要求法庭裁表證不成立 案件押後至7.24續審F-16s Unleashed2024-06-11T12:00:00+08:002024-06-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/f16s-unleashed<p><em>The paper explores the implications of supplying F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>It examines the strategic- and tactical-level effects, outlines limitations and obstacles in their utilization by the Ukrainian Air Force and presents recommendations to leverage the platform’s capabilities to support Ukraine objectives. This document provides invaluable insights for policymakers, military strategists, and academics grappling with the intricate dynamics of European security.</em></p> + +<h3 id="background">Background</h3> + +<p>Ukrainian F-16s will be challenged to independently create conditions for a much-desired breakthrough in the war with Russia. But with the right strategy, doctrinal approach, logistical support, and training, F-16s could provide a critical advance in enhancing Ukraine’s border defense and establishing localized air superiority, significantly bolstering Ukraine’s position on the ground. The underwhelming 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, combined with finite Western materiel support, prompts the question: what role can Ukrainian F-16s play in 2024?</p> + +<p>Rather than a year marked by significant military maneuvers, 2024 may become a rebuilding period for both Ukraine and Russia. As in a rebuilding phase in sports, recently trained Ukrainian F-16 pilots will likely showcase periods of excellence while gaining vital experience that could lay the groundwork for lasting advantages over Russian forces. Consequently, the authors expect the impact of giving Ukraine F-16s in 2024 to be primarily strategic, offering long-term benefits rather than immediate tactical gains.</p> + +<p>The first section of this brief describes the strategic implications of giving F-16s to Ukraine. The next section describes the challenges expected during F-16 integration and their potential tactical influence on the battlefield in 2024. Finally, the authors offer a set of short- and long-term recommendations that policymakers can incorporate to complement the political aims of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s strategy to support Ukraine’s war effort.</p> + +<h3 id="part-i-strategic-impacts">Part I: Strategic Impacts</h3> + +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Opponents of the free world fear the airpower of the United States and its allies.</strong> These air forces have been purposely built to strike strategic targets, counter the power of great armies and navies, and defend sovereign territory. They have been highly successful over the past 80 years. A significant portion of the power of these air forces comes from the technological superiority they possess over their adversaries, in addition to the might of their combined size across the alliance. The F-16 is the most prolific Western fourth-generation fighter jet produced, with thousands still in active service and highly upgraded versions still in production. Furthermore, as the mainstay of NATO air forces for decades, and with its impressive combat record, giving Ukraine such an iconic jet sends a strong message of U.S. and NATO commitment to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>The capabilities of the F-16 enable Ukraine to hold more Russian targets at risk and, in turn, gain more leverage in the war and at the negotiation table.</strong> To create a strategic “fleet in being” that Russia must respect, the size of the F-16 fleet matters. NATO countries have committed 65 F-16s to Ukraine. However, more are needed to give the Ukrainian Air Force more power to affect the ground war. As a simple starting point, NATO should be willing to replace all of Ukraine’s Soviet-era fighters with F-16s or equivalent NATO-standard aircraft and dramatically expand the size of Ukraine’s fighter fleet beyond pre-2022 strengths. Some estimates suggest that the size of Ukraine’s fighter fleet was only 69 aircraft in March 2023. By NATO standards, that number of aircraft may make up no more than three fighter squadrons (with 18 aircraft per squadron). Ukraine needs close to 12 fighter squadrons to achieve the air support needed for the war on the ground, with four squadrons primarily responsible for each core mission set: (1) suppression of enemy air defenses, (2) air interdiction, and (3) defensive counter air. This aim would require 216 F-16s, with 18 aircraft in each squadron. Additionally, NATO should have a reserve of F-16s available for resupply on demand, proportional to historical combat loss rates.</p> + + <p>The well-known conventional strengths of the F-16 fit neatly within the core mission sets Ukraine needs to execute. Ukraine can leverage these advantages while placing the Russian forces in its territory at a disadvantage. Additionally, F-16s can carry a significant variety of weapons in the U.S. Air Force (USAF) inventory that are supported by an active and expanding industry. Alternatively, F-16s could increase the potency of Ukraine’s interdiction campaign in the Black Sea, further degrading the effectiveness of Russia’s Black Sea fleet or threatening the flow of sanctioned trade to and from Russian ports in the Black Sea.</p> + + <p>The quantity of targets Ukraine can hold at risk with F-16s is a function of (1) the overall quantity of F-16s Ukraine receives, (2) the type and quantity of weapons it receives, (3) U.S. and NATO employment restrictions placed on Ukraine (i.e., restricting employment beyond Ukraine’s borders), (4) the fusion of intelligence between NATO and Ukrainian sources, (5) the proficiency of the pilots and support personnel that can optimize F-16 effectiveness, and (6) the air strategy Ukraine chooses to use for its F-16s (primarily for air defense or offensive missions such as strategic attack or interdiction of fielded forces and Russian logistics).</p> + + <p>Additionally, giving Ukraine F-16s presents NATO and the United States with a unique opportunity to gather intelligence on the potency of allied aircraft and weapons against Russian and Iranian equipment and tactics. This could be leveraged as an opportunity to gather strategic intelligence as Russia reacts to the introduction of the F-16 and follow-on security packages of logistical support for use with the aircraft. With collaboration between Ukraine and NATO, these insights can inform NATO’s leaders of the viability of the alliance’s strategy and tactics in certain domains.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Giving F-16s to Ukraine is a significant step forward to further integrate the country into the U.S. and European economic and defense ecosystem, which will increase Ukraine’s strength in the long term.</strong> Assuming the belligerent countries have equal will to fight, attritional wars are typically won by the side with the greatest economic and industrial strength and the greatest ability to manifest those strengths on the battlefield through more equipment, people, and ammunition. In The Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze asserts that the economic and material strengths of the Allies in World War II overwhelmed Germany’s capacity to field enough equipment and people to resist the persistent assault over the long term. In 2020, the Ukrainian economy was about 9.5 times smaller than Russia’s ($155.5 billion compared to $1.5 trillion), and the Ukrainian population was 3.5 times smaller than Russia’s. For economies with equivalent levels of industrialization, industrial capacity roughly follows the measurements of gross domestic product and population.</p> + + <p>Sustainment and reconstitution of warfighting formations, including aviation, is a challenge for Ukraine. Before the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s military used equipment mostly from the former Soviet Union, and many of the supply chains to repair or replace the equipment and its ammunition needs no longer exist or are controlled by Russia. Over time, these Soviet relics have lost their effectiveness as damage and shortages in parts and ammunition render them unfit for combat. The situation cannot support a positive outcome for Ukraine in a long attritional war. Therefore, supplying Ukraine with NATO or U.S. standard equipment is critical to sustain Ukrainian efforts because those weapon systems and Ukrainian operational needs can be integrated into U.S. and NATO supply chains. Over time, Ukraine would become more systemically integrated with NATO.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>The U.S. resupply of Israel during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 shows how commonality of equipment becomes a strategic asset in sustaining forces during attritional wars.</strong> The lessons from the Yom Kippur War should inform NATO decisionmakers of the value of supplying the Ukrainian Air Force with F-16s. During the war, a coalition of Arab countries led by Egypt strategically surprised Israel, leaving it little time to prepare for the invasion. Israel’s military doctrine called for preemptive air strikes similar to those it had used during the 1967 war to offset its quantitative disadvantages in personnel and equipment vis-à-vis its adversaries. However, U.S. national security advisor Henry Kissinger made clear that U.S. support was contingent on Israel receiving the first blow. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) plan and strategy depended upon preemptive strikes. When the option for a preemptive strike disappeared, Israel lost a significant advantage. The IAF paid dearly: it lost 15 percent of its total combat aircraft (60 aircraft) in less than 24 hours and about 35 percent of its total combat aircraft by the war’s end — catastrophic losses for any air force in such a short period. By the end of the first week of the war, Israel was in bad shape and gravely needed a resupply of ammunition, tanks, and aircraft.</p> + + <p>Luckily, the IAF had modernized most of its fleet prior to the war with U.S.-made A-4 Skyhawks and F-4 Phantoms, also flown by the USAF and U.S. Navy (USN). Israeli prime minister Golda Meir asked the United States for assistance, which kicked off a large resupply effort, including Operation Nickel Grass, in which the United States provided Israel with large numbers of 155 mm howitzers, M-60 and M-48 main battle tanks, and 100 USAF F-4s and 36 USN A-4s to reconstitute the IAF inventory. Consequently, the resupply efforts by the United States to Israel outpaced those of the Soviet Union to the Arab coalition, allowing Israel to change the balance of the war enough to secure a negotiated settlement about 10 days after the first U.S. resupply.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Finally, while F-16s alone will not provide air superiority, they are a vital component of this goal.</strong> For more than 100 years, militaries have known air superiority is essential to the success of any conventional ground campaign, but World War II was the first time the technology and capacity of mass production existed at the degree necessary to demonstrate the merits of air superiority. Examples include the Germans during the Blitz of 1939–40, the UK Royal Air Force and U.S. Army Air Forces’ air campaign in Europe in 1944–45, Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War of 1967, and the swift U.S. defeat of Iraq in Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In each case, casualties for the ground forces operating under air superiority were relatively low compared to those of their counterparts fighting without air superiority. Additionally, the tempo of ground campaigns improved significantly compared to the ground campaigns of World War I, in which each ground force maintained relative parity with others in terms of technology and the size of its army.</p> + + <p>Per the USAF Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-01, control of the air is among the top priorities of the joint force and is classified into three categories: (1) air parity, (2) air superiority, and (3) air supremacy. The air war in Ukraine over the past two years is best classified as one of air parity, where no force controls the air for its own ends or faces significant interference. According to U.S. Air Force doctrine, air superiority is the “degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats. Air superiority may be localized in space (horizontally and vertically) and in time, or it may be broad and enduring.”</p> + + <p>Air supremacy results when one side is incapable of effective air interference in the operating area, which the United States has generally enjoyed in conflicts over the past few decades.</p> + + <p>Today, each side of the war in Ukraine has a relatively robust air defense capability such that each can deny air superiority to the other. The missing component of air superiority for Ukraine is an offensive air capability, which the F-16s will begin to provide. Therefore, ground forces find themselves locked in relatively static battles of attrition, unable to create the conditions for a decisive maneuver campaign that could change the trajectory of the war. The robust Russian Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) makes establishing air superiority over the entire occupied territory a difficult feat. However, the Ukrainian Air Force can focus on establishing localized air superiority over limited areas for limited times. Such localized air superiority would be coordinated with Ukrainian land offensives to support a breakthrough operation and would be most effective with combined arms operations. Giving F-16s to Ukraine is an essential move toward establishing air superiority.</p> + + <p>Gaining air superiority enables the land component to bypass or maneuver through enemy forces and obstacle belts. Trench warfare exists on both sides because neither side has air superiority. However, trenches cannot stand up to the constant bombardment and might of 500–2,000-pound bombs, as demonstrated by the U.S. coalition in Operation Desert Storm, in which an air war lasting more than 40 days pulverized the Iraqi military to such a degree that it surrendered less than 100 hours after the start of the ground invasion. Likewise, tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles will succumb to cluster bombs, Maverick missiles, and 500–2,000-pound bombs. With air superiority, Ukraine’s F-16s can bring these effects to the battlefield.</p> + </li> +</ol> + +<h3 id="part-ii-f-16-integration-challenges-and-tactical-influence-in-2024">Part II: F-16 Integration Challenges and Tactical Influence in 2024</h3> + +<p>The Ukrainian Ground Forces has showcased its adeptness in assimilating cutting-edge Western weaponry into its arsenal with remarkable efficacy. Within its artillery corps, the Ukrainian Ground Forces phased out antiquated Soviet systems, replacing them with the technologically advanced M142 High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and accompanying munitions supplied by the United States. Following a three-week training regimen for M142 operators and maintainers, Ukrainian forces learned effective tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), enabling them to proficiently target Russian ammunition and fuel depots, bases, command and control nodes, and critical resupply infrastructure. While Ukrainian troops were familiar with various rocket launchers, HIMARS represents a substantial leap forward compared to Ukraine’s previous reliance on organic BM-30 Smerch and BM-27 Uragan systems, boasting superior capabilities including extended range, improved precision, enhanced mobility, and a faster rate of fire. While Ukraine’s successful integration of HIMARS presents tactical and operational challenges for Russia, mastering the integration of F-16s into the war strategy to produce impacts of a similar magnitude will be a formidable endeavor.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It will be years before the Ukrainian Air Force has enough experience to execute combat missions effectively. However, if supplied with the proper air-to-ground munitions, they will quickly be able to execute long-range strikes (air interdiction).</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>It will be years before the Ukrainian Air Force has enough experience to execute combat missions effectively. However, if supplied with the proper air-to-ground munitions, they will quickly be able to execute long-range strikes (air interdiction). Training a proficient F-16 pilot takes a long time. For instance, the training timeline for USAF fighter pilots, from initial flight training to certification as a combat-qualified wingman, spans three to four years. Furthermore, the total training duration extends to four to five years when factoring in leadership training essential for executing formations of fighter tactics in combat. While Ukrainian fighter pilots already possess basic airmanship skills, adapting to an aircraft with a fundamentally different cockpit interface and instrument layout, designed around a different concept of human factors engineering, requires an alternative way of thinking. This reality means experienced fighter pilots will also need time to transition effectively. Furthermore, their flying experience with Soviet-era fighter aircraft will not necessarily translate to the fly-by-wire controls and design of the F-16.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kd9Tsgh.jpeg" alt="image01" /></p> + +<p>To fully leverage the capabilities of the F-16, Ukrainian fighter pilots must become familiar with battle-proven TTPs honed over the past four decades. To make a significant combat impact, Ukrainian F-16 pilots must excel in three mission sets: offensive counter air/air interdiction (OCA/AI), offensive counter air/air operations–suppression of enemy air defenses (OCA/AO-SEAD), and defensive counter air (DCA). These mission sets will allow the Ukrainian Air Force to maximize the combat capabilities of the F-16 while not exposing them to higher combat losses executing more complex combat missions.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Ukraine must start flying combat sorties and build experience immediately.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>Learning and applying Western TTPs proficiently will likely take Ukrainian fighter pilots over a year. As a historical reference, the United States delivered the first F-16s to Israel in 1980. Eleven months later, the IAF flew the new platform on a daring and successful air strike against an Iraqi nuclear weapons production plant. The IAF, despite the advantages of combat and Western tactics experience, chose to wait almost a year before employing the F-16. It takes time and experience to build the proficiency needed to employ a complex fighter effectively. Ukraine must start flying combat sorties and build experience immediately. Therefore, it will be difficult to measure the significant battlefield impacts of the F-16s until 2025, and expectations should be managed accordingly.</p> + +<p>Ukraine must be able to organically maintain and repair the F-16s. One crucial lesson learned throughout U.S. military operations in Afghanistan was the vital role host-nation service members, rather than contractors, play in aircraft maintenance and repair. In Afghanistan, contractors predominantly handled maintenance support. Following the order to withdraw, their departure led to a significant decrease in mission-capable combat-ready aircraft. Similarly, the time, training, and experience required to cultivate proficient F-16 pilots are equally essential for developing competent F-16 maintainers. On average, it takes approximately five to eight years of on-the-job experience and rigorous certification (known in the USAF as “7-level” certification) to ensure the resident knowledge necessary for maintaining these aircraft. While not all maintainers are certified with “7-level” proficiency, the mid and upper levels of leadership, and their expertise, are essential to effective maintenance operations.</p> + +<p>Ukrainians must embrace a military culture in which all recommendations or voices are heard, specifically from the junior ranks. Ukraine’s impressive performance early in the war, and during the Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives, demonstrated its will and fighting ability. To capitalize on this fighting spirit, Ukraine must adopt NATO’s method to improve pilot performance and proficiency — specifically, a somewhat scientific and rigorous debrief of each flight. Reviewing the data recorded from each flight (“watching the tapes”) is crucial to this learning process. All aircrew are debriefed regardless of rank. Pride and ego must be sidelined to improve combat effectiveness and save lives. Furthermore, accurate battle damage assessment (BDA) should be reported back through the planning channels to maximize the efficiency of airpower by assigning strikes only to essential targets. Finally, this method of debriefing and the BDA feedback loop improve pilots’ rate of learning and the effectiveness of all air operations.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Ukrainians must embrace a military culture in which all recommendations or voices are heard, specifically from the junior ranks.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>Poor doctrine presents a potential obstacle to maximizing the effectiveness of the F-16. Doctrine is a collection of best practices used to accomplish military objectives or effects. Ukraine should establish desired effects or objectives and then combine combat experience with Western TTPs to develop best practices. Rather than simply apply NATO or U.S. airpower doctrine, which is built around a robust command and control and resupply network, Ukrainians should own their doctrine while continuously improving it to confront the challenges from Russia on the battlefield.</p> + +<p>Once introduced on the battlefield, F-16s will increase the Ukrainian Air Force’s air-to-air capabilities. Leveraging its combat-proven radar, coupled with variants of the AIM-120 AMRAAM missile, Ukraine will extend its maximum air-to-air engagement range up to 180 km. This is an appreciable engagement range improvement compared to Ukraine’s Soviet-era MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter aircraft. Additionally, Ukrainian F-16s can more effectively disrupt Russian close air support missions across contested battlefields. During the summer of 2023, Russian helicopters impeded and delayed the Ukrainian counteroffensive. With the introduction of the F-16, these helicopters will become vulnerable and less effective in supporting Russian defensive or offensive operations. Lastly, expect Ukrainian F-16s to suppress the long-range glide bombs tactics Russian fighters have adeptly used around Kharkiv.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The F-16 can improve Ukraine’s layered air defense, contributing to detection and elimination of incoming drones and missiles.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>Furthermore, the F-16 can improve Ukraine’s layered air defense, contributing to detection and elimination of incoming drones and missiles. The recent successful defense of Israel against the Iranian assault of over 300 drones and missiles highlights the significance of this capability, as USAF F-15Es shot down over 70 drones. However, the effectiveness of this approach hinges significantly on the interoperability of Ukrainian doctrine and technological systems. In the short term, while Russian IADSs remain intact, the battlefield conditions will make close air support too risky for Ukrainian F-16s. Instead, the Ukrainian Air Force should incorporate the F-16 as another platform capable of long-range strikes with the British Storm Shadow or French SCALP. Ukraine has already received ground-launched small-diameter bomb (SBD) launchers and should likewise be given the air-launched versions for its F-16s. Dropping SDBs from F-16s would complicate the Russian air defense, provide more opportunities for successful long-range fires, and enable targeting time-sensitive targets similar to the HIMARS — and at a far more economical rate.</p> + +<h3 id="part-iii-short--and-long-term-recommendations-to-capitalize-on-the-f-16s-advantages">Part III: Short- and Long-Term Recommendations to Capitalize on the F-16’s Advantages</h3> + +<h4 id="short-term-recommendations-in-2024">Short-Term Recommendations (in 2024)</h4> + +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>To assist in the quality of learning, NATO should embed fighter pilots with Ukrainian Air Force units to aid with debriefing, learning, and mission planning, or set up virtual options for video footage review.</strong> In February 2024, French president Emmanuel Macron opened the door to Western nations sending their troops to Ukraine, stating, “Nothing should be excluded.” Should future policy allow, NATO fighter pilots should aid Ukrainian aircrew and train them to review the tapes on every training or combat sortie to find lessons learned and improve tactics, techniques, and procedures. This tape review must be incorporated into the battle rhythm of Ukrainian fighter pilots. This will reinforce a culture of learning and ensure pilots provide and receive constructive feedback from every rank. Tape reviews increase tactical effectiveness and minimize losses. During review, learning is best achieved when individuals with the most expertise or proficiency lead the debrief, even if they do not hold the highest rank. Examples of this culture of debriefing may be found in the fighter and bomber units of the USAF and USN as well as within NATO air forces.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>The United States and NATO should authorize the use of cluster bomb munitions, GBU-39B SDBs, and Storm Shadow or SCALP missiles with the F-16s.</strong> Specifically, the Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU)–87/89 and smart bomb equivalents (CBU-103/105) are most relevant for military targets in this context. A specific set of guidelines or restrictions on how the munitions may be used could be attached to the authorization of the weapons to minimize the risk of collateral damage. These weapons would aid in defending Ukrainian territory if Russia gains momentum toward a breakout on the battlefield. Cluster bomb munitions degrade and destroy large concentrations of personnel or equipment with fewer aircraft or strikes, while the SDB, Storm Shadow, and SCALP munitions can strike targets at great distances, improving the survivability of the employing aircraft. In 2023, Russia used attack helicopters with success to blunt the Ukrainian counteroffensive. If Russia can muster a breakout situation, it will require a concentration of personnel and equipment that cluster munitions are well suited to counter. Additionally, it is essential to include longer-range variants of the AIM-120 AMRAAM in the ammunition package. Enhanced air-to-air capabilities will bolster Ukraine’s capacity to deter Russia’s deployment of glide bombs.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>The United States and NATO should set up a permanent training rotation program for Ukrainian F-16 aircrew and maintainers.</strong> After six months of combat, aircrew and maintainers should rotate to Ramstein Air Base for debriefing and the opportunity to rest and recuperate (R&amp;R). After R&amp;R, they should be allowed to refine their skill sets on a high-quality training range such as the Nevada Test and Training Range before returning to Ukraine for combat. The USAF and USN put their aircrew and maintainers through predeployment flying exercises to improve combat effectiveness, and these programs could be leveraged to provide Ukrainian units with a similar experience. For example, the USN saw dramatic improvements in combat effectiveness following the stand-up of the Navy Top Gun program during the Vietnam War, as evidenced by a 600 percent improvement to its aerial kill-to-loss ratio from Rolling Thunder (1968) to Linebacker (1972). The USAF had equivalent improvements to its combat effectiveness after the creation of Red Flag in 1975, in which the Air Force kill ratio hovered around 2:1 throughout the Vietnam War. In contrast, the USAF achieved 31 kills without a single loss in direct air-to-air combat in Desert Storm. Vastly improved training and doctrine account for a significant portion of the dramatic improvement to each service’s combat effectiveness. Following this logic, dedicating a unit at Nellis Air Force Base or another NATO base to orchestrate housing and training for Ukrainian aircrew and maintainers would make this initiative more effective.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>NATO should commit more F-16s in the next couple of months to bring its total commitment to at least 90.</strong> This would allow Ukraine to convert five squadrons to F-16s (18 jets per squadron) using similar operations, maintenance, and sustainment practices as NATO units. For planning purposes, each additional set of 18 like-model F-16s would equate to another unit’s worth of aircraft. Since operational planning assigns missions and tasks to tactical units, the United States could help the Ukrainian Air Force by sending appropriately sized packages that can be seamlessly integrated into operations for improved efficiency. These numbers are the minimum needed and exclude aircraft needed for pipeline training and attrition.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Ukraine should prioritize converting its units to F-16s based on criteria that will maximize the combat capability the F-16 brings to the Ukrainian Air Force in as little time as possible.</strong> The authors recommend three actions to aid in this decision. First, prioritize the units that most need fighter aircraft and that are most capable of meeting the needs of Ukraine’s air strategy with the proper amount of aircraft and equipment. With these criteria, the equipment is the limiting factor — not the number of qualified people. Second, choose the unit currently assigned a mission that is the most similar to the anticipated role of the F-16 to capitalize on the culture, experience, and expertise ingrained in the people of the unit. Finally, access to higher-quality infrastructure and logistics will minimize the time aircraft sit grounded awaiting repairs or maintenance between missions. Therefore, picking a unit that already operates in a location with these features and remains beyond the range of most Russian air attacks will also aid Ukraine in reaping the dividends of the aircraft’s capabilities sooner rather than later.</p> + </li> +</ol> + +<h4 id="long-term-recommendations-beyond-2024">Long-Term Recommendations (Beyond 2024)</h4> + +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>To substantially increase Ukraine’s chances of victory, NATO should give Ukraine the equipment it needs to establish air superiority within its national borders.</strong> Providing F-16s is a step in the right direction toward this goal, but more equipment is needed. The authors estimate Ukraine needs 12 fighter squadrons of F-16s to significantly improve its position in the war. With 18 jets per squadron, this requires 216 F-16s on the front lines, and more should be placed in a reserve that can replace losses. Much has been written about the necessity of air superiority to support successful land campaigns. The remaining recommendations address helping Ukraine establish localized air superiority first, with broad and enduring air superiority as the eventual aim, to enable airpower’s subsequent use to support the land war.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Should U.S. and NATO political commitments allow, establish a NATO-Ukraine undergraduate pilot training (UPT) exchange program similar to programs for NATO pilots through USAF UPT bases.</strong> Alternatively, the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program could be modified to include Ukrainian pilots for a similar purpose but could also invest in building strategic relationships, with a multitude of NATO pilots going through the same program. Capturing Ukrainian talent early in their flying careers and training them with NATO methods and doctrine offers the greatest return on investment in the long term. This will result in a generational change of air doctrine that will take several years to bear fruit and, hence, a long-term strategic impact on integrating Ukraine into NATO methods.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>For more impact on Ukraine’s strategy, the United States and NATO should consider minimal restrictions on how Ukraine uses its F-16s.</strong> The recent loosening of restrictions on munitions from the United States and other partners needs to continue with the inclusion of the F-16. Strikes should not be confined to Ukrainian territory. Ukraine may need to use its air force to interdict Russian logistics and forces or for strategic attack. Additionally, the Ukrainian Air Force may need other systems to strike IADSs positioned in Russian territory, beyond the operational range of Ukraine’s weaponry, to facilitate F-16 strikes. Such options may entail operations beyond Ukraine’s borders. Additionally, restricting the use of F-16s to attacks within Ukraine’s borders may result in a longer conflict such as the one the United States experienced throughout the Vietnam War until Operation Linebacker II, coupled with key diplomatic efforts led by the administration of U.S. president Richard Nixon, aggressively applied direct pressure to the leadership of North Vietnam. If Western support for Ukraine wavers, a longer conflict of attrition will favor Russia.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>The United States should flood the Ukrainian Air Force with F-16s and other aircraft by incorporating decommissioned U.S. aircraft from the boneyard or those divested from its force structure.</strong> This recommendation is not novel; it echoes CSIS senior fellow Ben Jensen’s proposal in a Wall Street Journal commentary dated August 9, 2023. His insights remain pertinent and could be even more impactful today. Coupled with the ongoing manpower shortages facing Ukrainian forces, bolstering the Ukrainian Air Force’s capabilities is imperative. Introducing EA-6Bs, A-10s, C-12 Hurons, AH-1s, UH-1s, and MQ-8 Fire Scout helicopters would substantially augment Ukraine’s airpower. Leveraging existing artificial intelligence technology could transform many of these platforms into unmanned vehicles capable of complementing manned aircraft operations. This capability was demonstrated recently with the Air Force secretary riding in the front seat of a pilotless F-16 flight.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Do not impose U.S. doctrine or methods of warfare onto the Ukrainian Air Force.</strong> The United States has a lot of experience, but the Western way of war may not fit Ukraine’s methods or needs at this time. The U.S. role must be to impart hard-learned lessons, tried-and-true TTPs, and the capabilities and limitations of the F-16. Adaptation and understanding of the local realities and motivations is crucial to the success of a military strategy.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Ensure Ukraine can maintain and repair the F-16s.</strong> Effective maintenance and robust supply support are indispensable for preserving the operational readiness of military equipment. To secure the sustained operational lifespan of fixed-wing platforms, a vigorous and ongoing training pipeline must run in parallel with pilot training, alongside the modernization of maintenance personnel. Furthermore, F-16 maintenance teams should establish direct connections to experts (utilizing telemaintenance), facilitating the swift access required to support combat-ready fighters in the field.</p> + </li> +</ol> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + +<p>In 2024, Ukraine faces a critical juncture as its manpower, supplies, and ammunition reserves dwindle, providing an opportunity for Russia to seize momentum and exploit the West’s waning support. Adding the F-16 to the Ukrainian Armed Forces will assist in stalling Russia’s potential counteroffensive and further integrating Ukraine into the U.S. and European economic and defense ecosystem. This move also provides better sustainment of Ukraine’s air power, improves the security of its airspace, and increases Ukraine’s ability to hold more Russian targets at risk. It will take time to observe how Ukrainian F-16s affect combat operations. However, localized air superiority, followed by broad and enduring air superiority, should be the long-term goal, which will require more aircraft. Now is the time to ensure short- and long-term adjustments are made to partnership capacity in order for F-16s to play a critical role in 2024 and beyond. At the policy level, when addressing Ukraine’s capabilities and capacity, the United States must decide what type of Ukrainian armed force it wants to support. Is it a Ukraine that can defend, deter, or defeat Russia? Regardless of wanted outcomes, Ukraine needs more aircraft, and it needs them now.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Christopher Koeltzow</strong> is a military fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> + +<p><strong>Brent Peterson</strong> is a national security fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.</p> + +<p><strong>Eric Williams</strong> is a military fellow with the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>Christopher Koeltzow, et al.The paper explores the implications of supplying F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine.Algorithmic Stability2024-06-10T12:00:00+08:002024-06-10T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/algorithmic-stability<p><em>This report delves into the future of deterrence and the role of human judgment in an AI-focused crisis simulation.</em></p> <excerpt /> @@ -181,7 +336,68 @@ <p><strong>Yasir Atalan</strong> is an associate data fellow in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a PhD candidate at American University.</p> -<p><strong>Jose M. Macias III</strong> is a research associate in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a Pearson fellow at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago.</p>Benjamin Jensen, et al.This report delves into the future of deterrence and the role of human judgment in an AI-focused crisis simulation.New Opportunistic Aggression2024-06-06T12:00:00+08:002024-06-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/new-opportunistic-aggression<p><em>The United States faces an increasingly contested strategic environment. As policymakers grapple with the “two-near-peer” challenge, a crucial question remains: How should the United States mitigate the risk of opportunistic aggression?</em></p> +<p><strong>Jose M. Macias III</strong> is a research associate in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a Pearson fellow at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago.</p>Benjamin Jensen, et al.This report delves into the future of deterrence and the role of human judgment in an AI-focused crisis simulation.Russia And China2024-06-07T12:00:00+08:002024-06-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/russia-and-china<p><em>Strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has visibly intensified in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, Russia is now firmly the weaker partner in the relationship, with China exploiting the Kremlin’s situation for its own ends.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>On 29 May, US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell spoke to NATO representatives in Brussels on the seriousness of Chinese-Russian relations. His words underscore the true nature of the “no-limits” arrangement between Beijing and Moscow. It is not a partnership of convenience, but a concerted effort to shift the geopolitical centre of gravity towards Asia. While the West often talks about “bleeding Russia dry” through the conflict in Ukraine, Campbell warns that it risks suffering a similar drawn-out death. China does not represent a voice of reason in Russia’s ear as has been suggested by some Western leaders, but has a vested interest in destabilising the West and distracting it from Beijing’s own objectives in the Indo-Pacific.</p> + +<p>Increasing political, economic, and social burdens stemming from the invasion of Ukraine have kneecapped Russian agency in the international arena. As the divide between Russia and the West grows, the Kremlin is increasingly focusing its attention on China, with ties between the two states growing ever stronger. In defiance of the West, Russia characterises its relationship with China as an alliance between two great civilisations. However, as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to China has highlighted, Moscow is increasingly finding itself a pawn of China’s geopolitical aspirations.</p> + +<p>Amid increasing geopolitical turbulence, the concept of multipolarity is becoming acknowledged as a global trend. Russia and China have been quick to label themselves as key players in this emerging world order, and have collectively strived towards the formation of a bloc that is set to rival Western hegemony. At a glance, the relationship appears natural: two rising authoritarian powers are joining forces to challenge the prevailing order. Yet upon delving deeper into the relationship’s dynamics, Russia’s commitment to its war on Ukraine, its stagnating economy, and its search for support extraneous to the West have led to its foreign policy objectives becoming slowly subsumed into China’s vision of the future international order.</p> + +<h3 id="the-new-world-order">The New World Order</h3> + +<p>Geopolitical constraints provide Russia and China with a plethora of reasons to band together. Their distrust of Western hegemony, authoritarian governments, and similar political ambitions have nurtured relations between Moscow and Beijing for the last political generation.</p> + +<p>In their recent press conference, both states agreed that civilisational differences shape spheres of influence; that international institutions are polarised against their interests, requiring shifts in structure to accommodate “new realities”; and that there is no place for military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. Noticeably, the conversation focused on the developing trade partnership between the two states, with comments on external affairs remaining limited in detail. In comparison to Putin’s usual damning rhetoric on the collective West, the restraint within this meeting is a sign of the true dynamics of the situation – namely, that they are shaped primarily by Chinese interests.</p> + +<h3 id="cooperation-over-competition">Cooperation over Competition?</h3> + +<p>Despite exorbitant bilateral proclamations of partnership, dynamics between the two states remain cautious, partly as a result of historical tensions. Putin’s reference to Russia and China remaining “brothers forever” seems to skip over the Treaty of Peking (1860), the Soviet invasion of Xinjiang (1934) and nuclear posturing during the Sino-Soviet split, to name a few “breaks” in their historical relationship. These memories are still fresh in the minds of much of the Chinese population, including scholars who note an incongruence between Russian and Chinese visions of a new world order. Despite the friendly veneer, distrust remains.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russia’s refocused economy means it has no ability to provide incentives for greater integration within its historical sphere of influence in the face of Chinese economic competition</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>With Russia’s economy concentrated on supporting the war effort in Ukraine, its exports have become focused on shipping fossil fuels and other raw materials to Eastern partners. Meanwhile, imports from China now cover a diverse field of industrial and consumer goods, providing essential resources to sustain both Russia’s economy and the conflict in Ukraine. This asymmetrical balance is forecasted to increase over the coming years as Russia struggles to survive on its war economy, and consequently, China will become an ever more important lifeline for the Russian state.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/B7FwpbK.png" alt="image01" /> +<img src="https://i.imgur.com/60uJ7y3.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Chinese-Russian Trade Complexity.</strong> Variance in export complexity suggests that Russia has become a Chinese petrol station, while China provides necessities for Russia’s struggling war economy. <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/rus?depthSelector=HS2Depth">Source</a>.</em></p> + +<p>This imbalance has precipitated unusual geopolitical concessions from Russia. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Russia’s customs union – initially conceived in part to limit Chinese influence in Russia’s historical sphere of influence – contains several states operating a multi-vector foreign policy, including investment from China’s global development project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Putin’s comments at the 2023 Eurasian Economic Forum supporting the pairing of the EAEU and BRI demonstrate both a concession in terms of Russia’s dominance over Eurasia and an acceptance of the nature of relations with China.</p> + +<p>Development and investment have become the dominant tools for building influence in Eurasia; in this context, Russia’s economic integration with former Soviet states offers only limited influence over its neighbours. Its refocused economy means it has no ability to provide incentives for greater integration within its historical sphere of influence in the face of Chinese economic competition.</p> + +<p>Therefore, Russia finds itself increasingly reliant on a partner with historical grievances as well as ambitions in its own backyard. If Russia continues to stagnate, it must either make further concessions regarding its geopolitical position within Eurasia, or risk severing its life support mechanism.</p> + +<h3 id="russias-excessive-optimism">Russia’s Excessive Optimism</h3> + +<p>Putin’s recent visit to China, the first since his fifth inauguration as president, highlighted Russia’s strategic dependence upon its neighbour. In the opening address by the two countries’ leaders, one could see an incongruence in the rhetoric surrounding the state of Sino-Russian relations. Putin’s reference to collaboration reaching unprecedented levels was met with lukewarm compliments from Chinese President Xi Jinping about the level of cooperation, indicating a desire for improvement.</p> + +<p>These comments exemplify Russia and China’s positions. Ultimately, Russia needs China far more than China needs Russia. The relationship hardly extends beyond the transactional, with strict limitations on bilateral cooperation on projects that do not favour Chinese interests. During Putin’s visit, aspirations for a second gas pipeline linking the two states were dashed by yet another unenthusiastic response from Beijing. While Russia still has use for China, there are clear limits to how far China will cooperate with the Kremlin’s interests.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9ttmIWg.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Average Russian Oil Exports by Country and Region, 2021-2023 (million barrels per day).</strong> Russia’s growing reliance on China and other Asian partners to mitigate Western sanctions on Russian exports. <a href="https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/average-russian-oil-exports-by-country-and-region-2021-2023">Source</a>.</em></p> + +<h3 id="the-ukrainian-question">The Ukrainian Question</h3> + +<p>Victory in Ukraine has become integral to the continuation of Putin’s reign, and consequently, the progress of the Russian invasion now dictates every facet of Russian domestic and foreign policy. This opens the door to external exploitation. China, along with other Asian states, have profited from cheap Russian oil; Central Asian states have transformed into crucial transport hubs for goods to and from Russia; and the supply of goods now underproduced within Russia’s war economy is driving increased exports from the East. The longer Russia’s attention is focused on Ukraine, the longer Russia’s neighbours will profit from its increased reliance on them.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China will happily tolerate a conflict in Ukraine, even going as far to prop up Russia’s military economy, but this does not denote an equal partnership or a friendship</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>Therefore, while China continues to seek a “political solution” to the conflict in Ukraine, it seems more than happy to put up with a protracted conflict. China has typically remained neutral on external matters, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has presented Beijing with a narrow path through which it can prioritise its interests without suffering secondary sanctions from the West. On the surface, Beijing is fostering a growing trade relationship with Russia in a very particular manner, through the export of components with both civilian and military applications such as machine tools, satellite equipment, and drone technology – enough to turn a nice profit and maintain the status quo in the conflict, without overtly support Russia.</p> + +<p>However, Campbell’s words suggest that China is providing much greater support in terms of materiel to help reconstitute Russian forces, kept out of sight to avoid Western retaliation. Ultimately, this situation seems likely, and Russia’s aggressive revanchism in Ukraine serves as an exemplary case study of the limits of Western resolve. Meanwhile, Xi’s Taiwanese ambitions loom large; with an ever narrowing window of opportunity for military action, China will likely be analysing its Russian guinea pig while propping it up just enough to continue to drain Western military and political resources.</p> + +<p>Ultimately, China will happily tolerate a conflict in Ukraine, even going as far to prop up Russia’s military economy, but this does not denote an equal partnership or a friendship. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine suits a very particular purpose for China, distracting and draining the West. As long as this status quo continues, we can expect China to keep exploiting Russia’s position.</p> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + +<p>Sino-Russian relations are strengthening in the political, economic, and military domains, posing a direct threat to Western security interests. The long-term dynamics of this relationship suggest a purely transactional approach, with China exploiting Russia’s economic weaknesses. However, the war in Ukraine also presents an opportunity for China to bleed Western resolve, drain NATO resources, and distract attention from Beijing’s interests in the Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, Putin, through his dreams of Russian revanchism, has transformed Russia into a tool for its ambitious and unreliable Eastern neighbour.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Callum Fraser</strong> is a Research Fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI, specialising in the confluence between Russian foreign policy and its periphery states. Callum is particularly interested in the evolution of geopolitics within Eurasia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. He also specialises in researching the underlying motivations, justifications, and dynamics of conflict within the Eurasian space along ethnic, identity, cultural, and political dimensions.</p>Callum FraserStrategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has visibly intensified in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, Russia is now firmly the weaker partner in the relationship, with China exploiting the Kremlin’s situation for its own ends.New Opportunistic Aggression2024-06-06T12:00:00+08:002024-06-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/new-opportunistic-aggression<p><em>The United States faces an increasingly contested strategic environment. As policymakers grapple with the “two-near-peer” challenge, a crucial question remains: How should the United States mitigate the risk of opportunistic aggression?</em></p> <excerpt /> @@ -538,7 +754,200 @@ <p><strong>Reja Younis</strong> is the associate fellow with PONI in ISP at CSIS, she leads research on nuclear deterrence issues, nuclear strategy, and emerging technologies.</p> -<p><strong>Lachlan MacKenzie</strong> is a program coordinator and research assistant with PONI in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>David M. Allison, et al.The United States faces an increasingly contested strategic environment. As policymakers grapple with the “two-near-peer” challenge, a crucial question remains: How should the United States mitigate the risk of opportunistic aggression?Euro SIFMANet CPH Report2024-06-06T12:00:00+08:002024-06-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/euro-sifmanet-copenhagen-report<p><em>Discussions held in Copenhagen in March 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Denmark.</em></p> +<p><strong>Lachlan MacKenzie</strong> is a program coordinator and research assistant with PONI in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>David M. Allison, et al.The United States faces an increasingly contested strategic environment. As policymakers grapple with the “two-near-peer” challenge, a crucial question remains: How should the United States mitigate the risk of opportunistic aggression?Friendshore Lithium-Ion2024-06-06T12:00:00+08:002024-06-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/friendshore-lithium-ion<p><em>This white paper outlines the technical details behind the production of the active battery materials stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain and how U.S. government policies are impacting friendshoring efforts in the sector.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<p>Nearshoring the lithium-ion battery supply chain requires substantial policy efforts at every stage. Upstream inputs, such as critical minerals sourcing and processing, are concentrated in a few nations. Although many more countries engage in midstream and downstream processing of critical resources, access to this end of the supply chain is becoming less secure for U.S. manufacturers because of uncertainty in the domestic and geopolitical spheres.</p> + +<p>Commensurate to the breadth of the challenges is the importance of overcoming them. An adequate, predictable supply of lithium-ion batteries, as well as the supply chain and raw materials, is essential to reaching green transition goals in the United States. These batteries power key products that enable a sustainable, large-scale switch away from fossil fuels essential to long-term environmental goals.</p> + +<p>Calls to accelerate the shift to renewables are accompanied by other goals and legislation that have a significant impact on the direction of U.S. economic and trade policy. Recognizing China’s dominance over the supply of several goods critical to U.S. prosperity and security, policymakers say they intend to spur de-risking of these supply chains by diversifying import sources away from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as creating redundancies to protect against potential unforeseen shocks such as pandemics. Policymakers’ de-risking agenda goes hand in hand with government measures designed to bring production of critical goods back to the United States. They perceive renewing U.S. domestic manufacturing capabilities as a geostrategic shield as well as the pathway to creating more profitable and equitable opportunities for workers.</p> + +<p>Congress and the administration under President Joe Biden have thus undertaken several policies to simultaneously tackle three objectives that will transform the landscape of U.S. lithium-ion battery production, among other sectors. These policies aim to drastically quicken the pace of the U.S. green transition, reshore production capabilities in critical sectors, and diversify away from the PRC’s dominance in these key areas. While these three goals may all be critical to U.S. economic security in the long term, actions that enable the latter two could hamper achievement of the first. Unfortunately, measures aimed at securing the lithium-ion battery supply chain through industrial policy packages that emphasize reshoring threaten to hinder U.S. consumers’ access to this technology.</p> + +<p>This brief, the second in a series of three, builds upon the first’s findings on refining and processing and examines the production of active materials — the next step of the lithium-ion battery supply chain. The paper first outlines the technical steps necessary for active materials production — namely, mixing, coating, calendaring, and slitting, as well as production of the separator and electrolytes. It then describes current U.S. capabilities at this stage of the supply chain relative to the global market, considering the country’s nearshoring and onshoring ambitions.</p> + +<p>In addition, the brief addresses the Biden administration’s incentives, such as tax credits included in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) and grants programs enabled by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA). It continues with an examination of different regulations and their potential impact on the ability of lithium-ion battery input manufacturers to scale up their capabilities in the face of growing demand. Lastly, the report unpacks recent policy recommendations from Congress relevant to lithium-ion battery nearshoring considerations.</p> + +<h3 id="manufacturing-a-battery-cell">Manufacturing a Battery Cell</h3> + +<h4 id="active-materials-production">Active Materials Production</h4> + +<p><strong>Technical steps.</strong> After mining or extracting the raw minerals and materials — typically, lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite — processors and refiners purify them. The materials are then used to create cathode and anode active battery materials, which are commonly referred to as the midstream portion of the lithium-ion battery supply chain. Noteworthily, the active material production stage requires complex processes and advanced technologies and chemistries, meaning there are few producers and significant technical barriers to entry.</p> + +<p>As mentioned in the first paper of this series, a lithium-ion battery usually includes multiple lithium-ion cells, which function as interconnected building blocks. A lithium-ion cell is chiefly made up of an anode, a cathode, a separator, and an electrolyte. The anode is the negative electrode in a cell, whereas the positive side is the cathode. During charging, the lithium ions move from the cathode, through the separator, to the anode.</p> + +<p>The cathode component of the lithium-ion battery may comprise various formulations, chemistries, and crystalline structures. Metal oxides like cobalt, nickel, manganese, aluminum, iron, and phosphate, among others, make up the formulations and chemistries known as the cathode active materials (CAMs). Binders and cognitive additives such as polyvinylidene fluoride (PVDF) are also critical to the battery’s performance, especially for safer and longer-range applications. As mentioned in the first paper of this series, graphite is paramount to anodes, though industry is searching for ways to use alternative materials such as silicon or lithium given that they present opportunities for higher energy density and power.</p> + +<p>The process of converting a set of refined and purified critical minerals into functional components of electrodes — namely, a positively charged cathode and a negatively charged anode — may be divided into five key steps. These are mixing, coating, calendaring, slitting, and electrode making.</p> + +<p><em>Mixing.</em> The active materials of the cathode, lithium, nickel, manganese, and cobalt, are dry blended in a planetary vacuum mixer. The active material of the anode is blended to ensure it approaches a viscous consistency. The anode and cathode materials are blended separately to ensure they do not react with one another. A solvent is added to both mixes to increase viscosity, which is critical as the viscosity, density, and solid content of the slurry affect battery longevity and performance. An additional key concern in the mixing process is air quality: controls on moisture level can limit air particles or impurities that contaminate the electrode slurry, but if moisture is not controlled, then the nickel is likely to corrode. Adding phosphoric acid or another solvent can also prevent corrosion.</p> + +<p><em>Coating.</em> Coating broadly describes the process of applying the separate aluminum-cathode and copper-anode slurries onto metal foils. Once poured, the slurries are dried via an internal heater that operates between 70°C and 150°C. While warmer temperatures lead to lower production costs, there is a negative effect on the performance and overall longevity of the battery. Coating and drying are achieved via a slot die coater, which disperses the slurry through gaps onto moving metal foil. Once the slurry is dispersed, air flotation drying is used to evaporate any added solvents and provoke the sedimentation of particles, which is critical to battery performance. The newfound metal coating successfully protects the slurry from corrosion and damage. Both drying temperature and the speed at which drying occurs affect the distribution of slurry in each electrode. Generally, drying at room temperature, while slower, creates a more uniform dried slurry, thereby increasing the quality and longevity of the electrode.</p> + +<p><em>Calendaring.</em> Calendaring occurs through compression of the coated electrodes onto collector metal foils. This improves the energy density of the battery and further controls for dust and humidity within the electrode. This compression to a point of even thickness and density of the dried slurry increases performance. A roller calendar is used during this stage. Generally, higher calendaring pressure increases the energy density of a given battery, thereby increasing battery life.</p> + +<p><em>Slitting and electrode making.</em> A roller slitting machine then cuts the coated electrode into several slices. An electrode-making machine welds and cuts the electrode, and the anode, cathode, and separator are either stacked or wound into a spiral, depending on the type of battery. The machine clearly marks each side as “+ve” or “–ve,” and the electrolyte fluid (a lithium salt solution) is injected into the battery cylinder or pouch. The battery cell is then sealed and thus ready for use.</p> + +<p><em>Separator production.</em> Separators may be manufactured via a dry or wet process. Regardless, they are made of either polypropylene or polyethylene (types of plastic). In the dry process, either plastic type is pushed through a machine to create a thin sheet. The sheet is then heated until the plastic melts. This step controls the size and alignment of the tiny crystal structures within the sheet that allow lithium ions to pass through once the battery is functional. The sheet is then stretched again to create a set of additional slit-like holes. The stretching occurs until the sheet has a porosity of roughly 40 percent. The wet process, in contrast, involves mixing softening agents that can turn polymers into plastics once heat is applied. The heated mixture is pushed out of a machine to form a sheet, which is stretched until a network of pores is present. The softening agent is then washed out, leaving a porous surface that allows lithium ions through.</p> + +<p><em>Electrolyte solution production.</em> Electrolytes enable the conductivity of lithium-ion batteries by allowing for the movement of ions from the cathode to the anode when the battery is charging and from the anode to the cathode when the battery is in use. Electrolyte solutions are made up of soluble salts, acids, and other bases in a liquid format. When these solutions are mixed with various carbonates, such as vinylene carbonate, conductivity can increase, leading to improved battery performance.</p> + +<h4 id="current-us-capabilities">Current U.S. Capabilities</h4> + +<p>As it stands, China dominates the active materials production portion of the lithium battery supply chain. In addition, South Korea and Japan have significant capacity. The United States finds itself a distant fourth, a position where it is likely to remain for 10 years despite significant investment. As of 2022, China produced roughly 90 percent of anodes and lithium electrolyte solutions.</p> + +<p>China also produces 70 percent of cathodes, 74 percent of separators, 82 percent of electrolytes, and 85 percent of anodes. Japan, a secondary player in the industry, produces 14 percent of cathodes, 11 percent of anodes, 31 percent of separators, and 19 percent of electrode solutions. South Korea manufactures 15 percent of the world’s cathodes and 3 percent of anodes. The United States occupies a far more modest role in the supply chain than its peers in East Asia, responsible for roughly 7 percent of battery production. It imports most components, such as cathodes and anodes, from abroad.</p> + +<p>One factor that hampers onshoring efforts in the United States is the high cost of production. Whereas the average lithium ferrophosphate cell factory in China costs $650 million to build, it costs roughly $865 million to build a similar facility in the United States or Europe due to differences in labor costs and supporting facilities. This difference in cost has created a global status quo that has favored, and will continue to favor, Chinese hegemony over the midstream. While the United States is predicted to see battery production increase to roughly 1.2 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2030, corresponding increases in Chinese production will ensure most global battery production continues to occur in China. By 2030 the United States is set to produce 0.8 million metric tons of cathodes per annum, though demand will stand at 1.3 million metric tons. Domestic anode supply will also stand at roughly 500,000 metric tons per annum, with demand hovering at 700,000 metric tons. These shortfalls will therefore drive the importation of cell components, such as cathodes and anodes, for locally produced batteries. Nonetheless, domestic demand for battery cells in the 2030s will likely outstrip the supply of battery active materials despite increases in domestic manufacturing.</p> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="the-prcs-influence-over-commodity-prices"><code class="highlighter-rouge">The PRC’s Influence over Commodity Prices</code></h4> +</blockquote> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China’s dominance over commodities critical to the lithium-ion battery supply chain — along with the PRC’s internal demand for lithium-ion battery products, chief among them electric vehicles (EVs) — has a marked effect on the global prices of these commodities. In recent years, an annual doubling of Chinese demand for EVs has caused prices of key minerals and battery components to remain elevated. While demand is still increasing as of 2023, the rate of increase has slowed to only 30 percent. Analysts predict this leveling off of demand will continue in the coming years and that the era of annual doubling has ended.</code></em></p> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">This reduction in demand has led to a 50 percent decrease in nickel futures since December 2022 and an 80 percent decrease in lithium carbonate prices. The oversupply of critical minerals resulting from the relative drop in Chinese demand is further exacerbated by the fact that nations that produce critical minerals used in EVs — such as those in the Lithium Triangle (Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia) and Indonesia, which produces nickel — have drastically increased their investment in mines in the hope that demand would continue to double annually for the coming few years. To that end, annual lithium production increased by 23 percent worldwide in 2023, while nickel output grew by 10 percent, according to U.S. Geological Survey estimates.</code></em></p> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In response to this decrease in prices, China’s government is planning to increase the size of its strategic stockpiles of cobalt by buying up 3,000 tons of privately owned cobalt from producers to add to the nation’s commodity stockpile. China added 5,000 tons of cobalt to its stockpile in July, representing another opportunity to take advantage of low cobalt prices, which have decreased by 60 percent since May 2022 due to rising supplies from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Indonesia. These stockpiles are being expanded to protect domestic producers and military manufacturers from supply and price shocks.</code></em></p> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While S&amp;P Global projects that commodity prices will stabilize in the coming years, existing price volatility poses a challenge for new firms entering the industry. Firms that are profitable while commodity prices are low, for example, may be forced to shut down prematurely if prices of lithium carbonate spike. Both nascent and long-standing firms therefore require some protection from the ebbs and flows of the market.</code></em></p> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To that end, China acts to protect its domestic battery industry from external shocks by enforcing export license requirements on graphite, which is regarded as the most critical mineral for battery anodes. Given the market for graphite is expected to triple in the next five years and that China produces more than 90 percent of spherical graphite — the type primarily used in batteries — export licensing efforts give China leverage over the price and global supply of both graphite and anodes. Adoption of the export license requirement comes on the heels of an August 2023 rule that requires export licenses for rare earth elements gallium and germanium, which are both primarily used in semiconductors, though they have applications in EVs as well. For instance, gallium nitride can handle a lot of power without generating heat, making it ideal for onboard chargers and inverters. The new export license requirement led to a sharp increase of 25 percent in gallium prices, which has remained constant since. More critically, these curbs highlight China’s willingness to use export license requirements as a means to control the supply and price of key minerals in the supply chains of electric appliance components.</code></em></p> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">This export licensing effort serves two PRC objectives. The first is a means of geopolitical leverage, especially against nations that have tense relations with China despite significant trade, such as the United States. The second is an attempt to boost the competitiveness of China’s domestic high-value industries. To that end, Beijing increased the number of restrictions on critical raw materials needed for electric cars and renewable energy, such as lithium, cobalt, and manganese, by a factor of nine between 2009 and 2020.</code></em></p> + +<h4 id="recycling">Recycling</h4> + +<p>As the demand for lithium-ion batteries continues to grow, efficient recycling methods become increasingly relevant. The minerals and raw materials involved in producing a lithium-ion battery can be scarce and costly to extract and refine. Recycling lithium-ion batteries is therefore less energy intensive than producing new batteries from raw minerals. A thriving recycling industry enables lithium-ion battery manufacturers to bypass the challenges of the upstream stages of the supply chain and closes the loop of the circular economy by enabling additional cell production.</p> + +<p>With their easily separable and durable components, traditional lead-acid batteries are relatively simple to recycle. Over 90 percent of lead-acid batteries are recycled as a result. The recycling process for lithium-ion batteries, however, is substantially more complex since lithium is highly reactive (flammable). Typically, devices that contain lithium-ion batteries are collected by the original retailers, an e-waste collector, or a business that specializes in collecting used electronics.</p> + +<p>Battery packs are sorted and shipped to collection and processing facilities. Some packs are designated for repair or reuse. Those that are not undergo a process called shredding, through which the battery is chopped into pieces, creating a “black mass” — granular material made up of the dismembered cathodes and anodes of batteries. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), there are currently no industry standards defining the exact components of black mass from which valuable metals like cobalt and nickel are extracted. The shredding and extraction processes require a relatively high amount of energy, decreasing the extracted components’ value and creating some disincentives for reprocessing. Additionally, the lack of common regulations or standards for EV battery recycling, particularly advanced chemical processes for recycling as well as restrictions on the trade of used batteries, serve as additional limiting incentives for reprocessing and recycling efforts.</p> + +<p>In response to these issues, the U.S. Department of Energy has devoted $62 million in funding set forth in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law toward efforts that entice consumers to engage in battery recycling and improve the overall economic viability of private recycling efforts. Examples of these investments include $14.4 million in student education and outreach programs that will strengthen collection efforts for end-of-life electronics and $40 million toward projects that generate “greater market demand for recycling consumer electronics batteries” through cost-savings approaches within the preprocessing and sorting sectors. Government and private sector efforts to establish battery drop-off programs also received $7.2 million in funding.</p> + +<h3 id="promoting-active-materials-production">Promoting Active Materials Production</h3> + +<p>Key to U.S. economic security is the assurance that critical goods — among which lithium-ion batteries are included given their importance to the green transition — have resilient and secure supply chains. The lithium-ion battery supply chain is currently dominated by countries of concern and a just-in-time model that can withstand neither geopolitical fragmentation nor black swan economic shocks. In particular, U.S. dependence on PRC inputs reflects a long-term risk to national security that should be addressed. U.S. economic partners and allies are currently in a better position to satisfy demand for active materials: nearshoring and friendshoring efforts therefore represent a necessary step toward countering such dependence. Another important piece of the puzzle is to promote domestic production. The Biden administration and Congress have leveraged several policy tools to spur the latter, such as tax incentives, grants, and loans.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The lithium-ion battery supply chain is currently dominated by countries of concern and a just-in-time model that can withstand neither geopolitical fragmentation nor black swan economic shocks.</code></em></strong></p> + +<h4 id="biden-administration-policies">Biden Administration Policies</h4> + +<p><strong>Tax incentives.</strong> Current tax incentives included in recent industrial policy packages — chief among them the IRA — aim to provide a launchpad for domestic manufacturers. They are meant to spur production of multiple goods necessary to the green transition, including the active materials production stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain.</p> + +<p>When it comes to producing electrode materials, such as anodes and cathodes, the IRA’s 45X advanced manufacturing production tax credit (PTC) is a boon for U.S. manufacturers. With eligible materials receiving a credit of 10 percent of the cost of production, the PTC is designed to support development of the active materials production stage of the supply chain. The tax credit applies to both equipment and minerals produced in the United States and sold between December 31, 2022, and December 31, 2032. Further, the produced equipment must be sold to an unrelated party as part of the taxpayer’s trade or business. There is a credit amount phaseout beginning in 2030 for only the manufactured components, but credits for critical minerals will expire without phasing out over time.</p> + +<p>However, the effectiveness of this tax credit is somewhat limited as it applies to specific production costs only. It does not cover direct or indirect material costs, nor does it include expenses related to the extraction, production, or acquisition of raw materials. These exclusions limit the overall utility of the credit in boosting domestic production of electrode active materials and instead ensure that it is only an impetus for production for firms at the margins.</p> + +<p>Another supply-side incentive the IRA provides is the 48C investment credit, awarded by the Department of Treasury in partnership with the Department of Energy. It awards credits of up to 30 percent of capital investment, provided the relevant project satisfies wage and apprenticeship requirements. This incentive has more regulatory barriers than the 45X credit, as project developers must apply to the Department of Energy and receive a decision from the Internal Revenue Service. In addition, total financing for the investment credit is capped at $10 billion.</p> + +<p>The 48C investment credit is geared toward bridging the gap between the required capital expenditures to develop factories in the United States and China. According to Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, the capital expenditure intensity in the United States averages around $90 million per gigawatt-hour (GWh), about a third higher than the $60 million per GWh capital expenditure required in the PRC. China clearly maintains the dominant position in access to raw materials, processing capabilities, and active materials production. Nevertheless, the investment credit helps enhance U.S. competitiveness. U.S. gigafactory capacity in the pipeline through 2030 has increased by roughly 70 percent, from around 700 GWh in July 2022 (before the IRA) to just over 1.2 TWh in July 2023.</p> + +<p><strong>Grants and loans.</strong> While the United States is currently not a major player in refining and active material assembly, significant amounts of onshore capacity are expected to come online in the coming years. Spurred by government-backed loans and private investments totaling $1.6 billion, firms such as Our Next Energy are set to begin producing 20 GWh of cathode materials and battery cells in a Michigan plant set to come online in late 2024. Plans for the gigafactory were announced in October 2022, giving it an ambitious timeline of roughly two years between the announcement of additional capacity and that capacity coming online.</p> + +<p>The two-to-three-year timeline also applies to gigafactory projects that Redwood Materials, Tesla, and Gotion are currently pursuing. These factories, which will focus on cathode production, anode manufacturing, and lithium refining, respectively, will collectively amount to 200 GWh in capacity once operational.</p> + +<p>However, the rollout of these gigafactories is already experiencing some setbacks. Ford announced it would pause development of a 35 GWh plant worth $3.5 billion in Michigan. Delays in battery cell factories coming online arise largely due to shortages in skilled labor, efficiency limitations, and unforeseen price increases for active materials. In recent years, pricing hurdles were driven by a surge in lithium carbonate prices from roughly $6 per kilogram in 2020 to $70 per kilogram in November of 2022. Since cathode active materials represent roughly 50 percent of total manufacturing costs for battery cells, such increases have placed barriers to entry on expanding battery cell manufacturing capacity. Yet in the last two years, these increases have largely reversed, and prices have plummeted back to $14.50 per kilogram. While this value is almost three times higher than in 2020, the effect of pricing concerns on gigafactory rollout is far more modest than it was in 2022.</p> + +<p>Additionally, U.S. workers may lack the necessary manufacturing experience, effectively ensuring that even when plants and gigafactories come online, they will not produce active materials with high efficiency. Gigafactory construction requires a set of competencies related to “equipment maintenance [and] troubleshooting production” not widely available within the U.S. workforce. Additionally, once factories have begun producing materials and finished cells, they also face assembly line staff shortages, as the U.S. workforce is largely trained in internal combustion engine manufacturing rather than in battery production. Ohio, for instance, has 58,000 open roles related to EV manufacturing. Aside from competencies, another cause of this labor shortage is the relatively low compensation levels compared to the broader automotive sector. The starting wage at a GM battery cell plant in Ohio is $16.50 an hour, while the average assembly line worker at a United Auto Workers plant makes roughly $28 an hour. While lower wages serve as a hedge against active material price increases, they also ensure labor shortages going forward.</p> + +<p>Initial production yields for battery cell lines among new entrants to the sector in the United States are often as low as 50 percent. As shown by the Center on Global Energy Policy, projections through 2032 clearly show North America will have the gigafactories to satisfy cell demand but will not have the local supply of cathodes and anodes to construct those cells.</p> + +<p>The Biden administration’s EPA sees lithium-ion battery recycling and repurposing as a means of domesticating this lithium-ion battery supply chain, particularly since U.S. lithium reserves make up just 4 percent of the world total. In the near term, the EPA seeks to take the following steps to encourage these processes:</p> + +<ol> + <li> + <p>Foster the design of battery packs for ease of second use and recycling.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Establish successful methods for collecting, sorting, transporting, and processing recycled lithium-ion battery materials, with a focus on reducing costs.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Increase recovery rates of key materials such as cobalt, lithium, nickel, and graphite.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Develop processing technologies to reintroduce these materials into the supply chain.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Develop methodologies for proper sorting, testing, and balancing for second-use applications.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Establish federal recycling policies to promote collection, reuse, and recycling of lithium-ion batteries.</p> + </li> +</ol> + +<p>The IIJA grant disbursement notes that the focus of the funding is primarily on lithium processing, with nickel and graphite processors also receiving some grant money. The IIJA guidebook provides a comprehensive overview of all IIJA programs and grants, including several focused on active materials production and battery recycling:</p> + +<ol> + <li> + <p>Battery Manufacturing and Recycling Grants ($3 billion total)</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Battery and Critical Mineral Recycling ($125 million total)</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Lithium-Ion Recycling Prize ($10 million total)</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Battery Recycling Best Practices ($10 million total)</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Electric Drive Vehicle Battery Recycling and Second Life Applications ($200 million total)</p> + </li> +</ol> + +<p>The U.S. Department of Energy also announced $192 million in funding in June 2023 to expand battery recycling research and development, calling the investments “essential” to the advancement of a domestic supply chain of critical materials for the energy transition.</p> + +<p>However, the Biden administration’s investments in recycling capabilities may face similar roadblocks as the active materials production hubs. In October 2023, Li-Cycle Holdings Corp., which was set to receive significant backing from the Biden administration, saw its share price cut by almost 50 percent after announcing it would pause construction on a lithium-ion battery recycling plant. Li-Cycle assessed that it was facing escalating costs in attempting to operationalize its fabrication plant.</p> + +<p>While battery recycling is a relatively new market in North America, more mature firms abroad are also encountering issues. In the PRC, for instance, there are too many recyclers and not enough materials to go around, making many businesses’ operations currently untenable. It may take several years for recycling to become a viable industry in the United States: there are still relatively few EVs on the road, and other electronics that contain lithium-ion batteries are challenging to collect and too few in number to meet the needs of budding lithium-ion battery demand. Thus, the sector may encounter losses before becoming sustainable.</p> + +<h4 id="congressional-considerations">Congressional Considerations</h4> + +<p>A report by the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, released in December 2023, offers some insight into the bipartisan ad hoc committee’s thinking on diversifying the lithium-ion battery supply chain. The report’s recommendations may be split into two categories: those that pertain to critical minerals and those that pertain to battery manufacturing.</p> + +<p>When it comes to critical minerals, the committee’s report recommends enacting legislation to “encourage sectoral agreements with key trading partners and allies with strong rules of origin and high standards on critical minerals,” in addition to sourcing critical minerals and materials domestically and from friendly nations. This demonstrated openness to ensuring U.S. partners and allies become a stronger part of the country’s critical minerals supply chain, instead of solely focusing on onshoring, could enable lithium-ion battery manufacturers to scale up their production capabilities.</p> + +<p>However, the report recommends incentives with domestic content requirement guardrails that partially defeat the friendshoring purpose of the overarching recommendations. Limiting the sourcing of necessary minerals and materials to U.S. production in part negates the diversification objectives in these tax credits. The enhanced recycling measures the report recommends — such as requiring the Defense Logistics Agency Strategic Material Recovery and Reuse Program to pilot a recovery program to extract strategic and critical materials from end-of-life government hard disk drives — would likely not make up, in time or amount, for the production capabilities of U.S. partners.</p> + +<p>The report’s recommendations about batteries pose a similar issue, as its proposals largely emphasize the need to “encourage a domestic battery recycling industry.” Ramping up recycling efforts could help the U.S. lithium-ion battery industry become self-sufficient as more batteries are retired, while limiting incentives to domestic efforts would curtail U.S. access to additional lithium-ion battery materials. In addition, recycling is a technically challenging, labor-intensive process. Given the difficulties, it would not wholly replace production of original active materials.</p> + +<p>Instead, coordinating the ramping up of recycling operations with economic partners and allies who are also aiming to enhance their capabilities in this sector would enable more effective diversification results. U.S. efforts are not occurring in isolation: the EU lithium-ion battery recycling market is set to increase to 130 GWh, or 700 kilotons, by 2030. In addition, the EU market is set to expand again, threefold, by 2040 to 2,100 kilotons. Japan and South Korea are also aiming to expand their battery recycling industries. For instance, key Japanese firms have collaborated with the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization, a state-owned energy research agency, to develop technology that increases their capacity to extract recyclable materials from used batteries. This initiative is set to enable a recycling ratio of 70 percent for lithium, 95 percent for nickel, and 95 percent for cobalt by 2030. South Korea is also investing some 40 trillion won ($30 billion) to facilitate recycling efforts and second-life applications for used battery components. A U.S. strategy that prioritizes working with partners who are also investing in their own capabilities would improve the likelihood of successful diversification away from China and an effective transition to renewables.</p> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + +<p>The second stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain examined in this paper — active materials production destined for cathodes and anodes — poses challenges to current onshoring policies. It demands physical capital and labor to accomplish technical work. Active materials production involves several steps — namely, mixing, coating, calendaring, slitting, and electrode making — in addition to producing the separator and electrolyte solution key to the functioning of a lithium-ion battery.</p> + +<p>As noted, China largely dominates this portion of the lithium battery supply chain, followed by South Korea and Japan. China’s dominance is strengthened by its sway over the production of inputs higher up the supply chain, as well as its strong influence over the global prices of key commodities. The United States is also limited by higher costs in penetrating the market, given its relative dearth of operational manufacturing capabilities and challenges in obtaining workers, which stem both from more robust labor standards and the lack of a sufficiently trained workforce.</p> + +<p>Policies that emphasize onshoring capabilities in the active materials production stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain are already confronted with the limitations of U.S. capacity. Projects launched by grants and loans under the IIJA and IRA are facing various hurdles, such as inadequacies in the domestic labor market as well as difficulties in making a nascent recycling industry profitable. These barriers are in part self-imposed by restrictions around domestic content requirements.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Policies that emphasize onshoring capabilities in the active materials production stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain are already confronted with the limitations of U.S. capacity.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>Likewise, current congressional considerations and recommendations on providing the sector with additional launchpads also turn largely inward, hindering the green transition and impeding the country’s ability to successfully diversify away from Chinese manufacturing dominance. Given that other large players at this stage — namely, Japan and South Korea — are valuable partners in achieving long-term U.S. geostrategic objectives, U.S. policymakers should revisit the limitations set on incentives designed to spur active materials production. In addition, the United States should recognize that foreign direct investment from partners and allies has played an essential role in stimulating the domestic battery sector. Further efforts should be made to deepen ties with these nations and encourage additional investment. Ideally, policymakers should turn to negotiating plurilateral agreements with major players to secure this stage of the battery manufacturing supply chain. More ambitious agreements would enable partners to coordinate industrial policy efforts, enhance information sharing for research and development efforts in the field to improve manufacturing efficiency, and eliminate trade barriers in critical goods.</p> + +<p>The business community is currently engaged in reassessing the risk of doing business with the PRC given potential supply chain resiliency risks. In light of current geopolitical tensions, private entities now are striving to create redundancies in supply sources to mitigate the consequences of large-scale shocks on current choke points. The United States, along with economic partners and allies, is also moving to de-risk supply chains, but the cornerstone of the Biden administration strategy is to spur domestic production anchored by industrial policy initiatives.</p> + +<p>These efforts overlap with the push to spur a green transition, for which the lithium-ion battery is a key technology. However, if diversifying supply chains away from China occurs too soon, achieving enough domestic capabilities to effectively spur the green transition in the United States will not be possible. Likewise, a diversification strategy that does not consider the benefits of nearshoring will prove lengthy and costly. In addition, the United States should develop an effective materials management policy that incentivizes development of additional supply chains and regulatory cooperation with like-minded countries. This policy should be pursued in a manner that does not hamper domestic manufacturers from investing or commercializing products.</p> + +<p>In short, the United States is pursuing three goals: accelerating the transition to renewables; reshoring production capabilities in key sectors, which include several items necessary to the green transition; and diversifying away from China in these critical areas. Policies that prioritize one of these goals get in the way of the other two.</p> + +<p>Finally, nearshoring and friendshoring considerations lead to questions of what it means to be “near” and a “friend.” In addition, lithium-ion batteries are the current bedrock of a transition to renewables, but there are numerous research projects underway aiming to find more efficient alternatives. The final paper of this series will discuss both of these issues, in addition to describing policy challenges surrounding the final stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain — the assembly of battery cells into modules, packed and sold to manufacturers of various end products.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>William Reinsch</strong> holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> + +<p><strong>Meredith Broadbent</strong> serves as a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p> + +<p><strong>Thibault Denamiel</strong> is an associate fellow with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p> + +<p><strong>Elias Shammas</strong> is a research intern with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p>William Alan Reinsch, et al.This white paper outlines the technical details behind the production of the active battery materials stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain and how U.S. government policies are impacting friendshoring efforts in the sector.Euro SIFMANet CPH Report2024-06-06T12:00:00+08:002024-06-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/euro-sifmanet-copenhagen-report<p><em>Discussions held in Copenhagen in March 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Denmark.</em></p> <excerpt /> @@ -663,45 +1072,223 @@ <hr /> -<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導料控方下周二完成案情 黎智英一方料7月作中段陳詞China To Quarantine Taiwan2024-06-05T12:00:00+08:002024-06-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-to-quarantine-taiwan<p><em>This report lays out China’s potential motivations for a quarantine and maps out two plausible scenarios of how it could conduct operations.</em></p> +<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導料控方下周二完成案情 黎智英一方料7月作中段陳詞Ever The Day After2024-06-05T12:00:00+08:002024-06-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ever-the-day-after<p><em>Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords in 1978, the first peace treaty between the Jewish state and any of its Arab neighbours. The accords are the bedrock of the region’s security architecture, but owing to Israel’s war on Gaza and its moves at the border between Gaza and Egypt, the relationship between Cairo and Tel Aviv has reached its lowest point in decades. What kind of state are Egyptian-Israeli relations in, and how might this impact the future?</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Jonathan Eyal (<strong>JE</strong>) asked RUSI Senior Associate Fellow H A Hellyer (<strong>HH</strong>) about the significance of these events.</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong>JE</strong>: Camp David was a historic peace treaty between Cairo and Tel Aviv, and laid down the groundwork for a new regional security arrangement for the region in general, and Egypt and Israel in particular. Are we seeing that security arrangement unravel?</p> -<p>China has significantly increased pressure on Taiwan in recent years, stoking fears that tensions could erupt into outright conflict. Much attention has been paid to the threat of an invasion, but Beijing has options besides invading to coerce, punish, or annex Taiwan. One major step China could take is a “gray zone” quarantine led not by its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) but by its coast guard and other law enforcement forces. Rather than sealing off the island, a quarantine would aim to demonstrate China’s ability to exert control over Taiwan. A quarantine is more feasible for China and more likely than an invasion or blockade in the near term; it also presents unique challenges in terms of how Taiwan and the international community can respond. This brief explores two hypothetical maritime quarantine scenarios that are informed by in-depth research, tabletop exercises, private consultations, and expert surveys conducted by the CSIS China Power Project.</p> +<p><strong>HH</strong>: The Camp David Accords had a number of annexes attached to them. One of these describes several different zones; Sinai is divided into three zones (A, B and C), and then there is “Zone D” which is along the border between Gaza and Egypt, on the Gazan side. Article 2/D of Annex 1 is very clear about what type of Israeli military forces are allowed to exist in that zone, which was later described as the “Philadelphi Corridor”. There’s no question that when the Israelis moved tanks into the Corridor on 7 May and took over the Rafah border crossing, they violated that article, and they’ve done much more since then. Last week, Tel Aviv declared that it had taken over the entire corridor, again violating the terms of the Camp David Accords.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>We should be clear-eyed about this: Israel’s moves are seriously endangering the region’s security architecture, and many analysts – myself included – have warned over the past eight months that reckless escalatory behaviour will put all under the “law of unintended consequences”. If we’re frank, Israel’s moves over the past eight months have been incredibly reckless and have raised the likelihood of conflict breaking out across the region – between Israel and Iran, Israel and Lebanon, and now Israel and Egypt. It’s a testament to the region that we haven’t seen all-out war break out, despite these kinds of moves; it shows how little appetite there is for widespread conflict. But I think Tel Aviv is pushing the envelope hard, and it’s difficult to imagine there won’t be consequences.</p> -<p>China has significantly increased pressure on Taiwan in recent years. China’s military frequently flies aircraft within the island’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and across the Taiwan Strait median line. In August 2022 and April 2023, China escalated in response to U.S.-Taiwan political engagements by staging unprecedented large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. China has also deployed its navy and coast guard in increasing numbers around Taiwan and its outlying islands.</p> +<p><strong>JE</strong>: Are you saying Egypt might pull out of Camp David?</p> -<p>Cross-Strait tensions further intensified in the wake of William Lai’s inauguration as Taiwan’s president on May 20, 2024. Three days after Lai delivered his inauguration address, China commenced two days of large-scale military exercises surrounding Taiwan, called “Joint Sword-2024A,” and accompanied them with “comprehensive law enforcement operations” (综合执法演练) involving China’s coast guard. Chinese officials stated that the drills were intended to “serve as a strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces and a stern warning against the interference and provocation by external forces.”</p> +<p><strong>HH</strong>: No, I think Cairo continues to place great value on the treaty, and will be looking for other ways to express its rejection of Tel Aviv’s moves. As recently as 2 June, when Israel, the US and Egypt convened to discuss the issue, Cairo reiterated its demand that the Israelis withdraw from the Rafah border crossing. This is why, for example, Egypt announced it would join South Africa’s case at the International Court of Justice against Israel, and Cairo refused to coordinate with the Israelis on usage of the Rafah border crossing, clearly seeing such coordination as recognising the legitimacy of the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) presence there. Cairo may be pointing to the fact there are seven other border crossings, also completely under Israel’s control; several of them have been permanently closed by the Israelis, such as Karni and Sufa, but could be opened in order to provide aid relief to Palestinians in Gaza. Moreover, Israel’s official spokesperson, David Mencer, said to journalists that Israel had asked Egypt to open up so that Palestinians who wanted to flee to Sinai could do so, but that the request had been declined. There’s widespread concern in Cairo that Israel will take any opportunity to ethnically cleanse Palestinians from Gaza and displace them to Sinai, if it can do so; such admissions by Israel’s officials do not help.</p> -<p>These Chinese escalations against Taiwan are raising concerns that Beijing could take even more significant steps to “punish” and coerce Taiwan going forward. One major action China could take against Taiwan is a gray zone quarantine of the island. Quarantine scenarios have received far less attention than other contingencies, such as an invasion, but a quarantine is likelier in the near term and therefore warrants increased scrutiny.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Israel’s moves over the past eight months have been incredibly reckless and have raised the likelihood of conflict breaking out across the region</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="what-is-a-quarantine">What Is a Quarantine?</h3> +<p>But there are other things to be concerned about, as Israel continues to engage in more reckless behaviour. A recent clash near the Rafah border crossing led to the death of an Egyptian soldier; Israeli media itself reported that the clash resulted from an Israeli provocation, designed to test Egypt’s reaction. Even without such moves, the risk assessment is serious; Israeli forces along the border in Rafah are seen by the Egyptians not only as violating the peace treaty, but also as part of an occupying power in occupied territory – which is also how London, the EU, the UN and most governments see Israel in Gaza. Egyptian soldiers on the border are no doubt impacted by that; they are seeing an occupying power in Gaza, right on their doorstep, where they know it’s not supposed to be, and they also know that nearby, that same army is engaged in massive hostilities against Palestinians in Rafah. Those soldiers see the same news reports that you and I see, and know that the UN and various agencies are reporting all manners of suffering as a result of the IDF operation. This time, the clash resulted in the death of one soldier; what happens next time, considering everything else that is going on?</p> -<p>The term quarantine is sometimes used interchangeably with “blockade.” However, this report differentiates between the two, defining a quarantine as a law enforcement–led operation to control maritime or air traffic within a specific area while a blockade is foremost military in nature. A quarantine would entail China’s coast guard and other forces conducting gray zone operations intended to stay below the threshold of an armed conflict. Thus, the military would play a supporting role — not a leading role — in such operations.</p> +<p><strong>JE</strong>: OK, so things are rocky. But we have a normalisation of political relations between Egypt and Israel going back more than four decades. We also have a more recent set of normalisations between Israel and Arab states in terms of the Abraham Accords, and a new deal being proposed that would normalise relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. How does that impact Egypt, as it was the first to normalise, which gave it a certain leverage in terms of relations with Western powers?</p> -<p>The political and operational goals of a quarantine are not to completely seal Taiwan off from the world but to impose a system of controls over the island’s maritime and/or air commerce. In a quarantine, key necessities like food and medicine could continue to flow into Taiwan, enabling China to assert that its law enforcement operation is imposing no hardship. A quarantine could target the delivery of specific goods, such as shipments of U.S. weapons to Taiwan, but such a move would risk provoking a more direct U.S. response.</p> +<p><strong>HH</strong>: There are a few things to mention here; the first is that the Biden administration has invested tremendous energy in expanding the Abraham Accords. Indeed, many analysts characterised Biden’s Middle East policy as prioritising extending those accords, and very little else. Incredibly, despite the massively destructive conflict of the past eight months, the administration has still directed a lot of its limited bandwidth towards efforts to normalise Israel’s political relationship with Saudi Arabia. There’s a lot to unpack there, but I’m not convinced it will succeed, because Tel Aviv has already said it won’t accede to the fairly minimalist demands that Saudi Arabia has, which are all about fulfilling certain UN Security Council resolutions.</p> -<p>A key goal of the quarantine approach is to obtain compliance from international companies and other countries to demonstrate China’s power over Taiwan. This is similar, in some respects, to China’s 2013 declaration of an ADIZ over much of the East China Sea. Many airlines, including U.S. companies, complied with Beijing’s demands then.</p> +<p>Be that as it may, there were also concerns expressed in 2020, when the Abraham Accords were signed, in terms of what they might do to Cairo’s geopolitical standing. The talk at the time was that they would decrease Cairo’s – and also Amman’s – importance in the region, because now there were other Arab states that had relations with Israel. But the truth is, whenever a crisis emerges involving Israel, the world still calls on Cairo and Amman, and moreso on Cairo. None of that has changed; they don’t call on Abu Dhabi, Manama or anywhere else in the same way. Cairo in particular has relationships not only with the Israelis, but with pretty much every major Palestinian faction.</p> -<p>A quarantine of Taiwan could involve a change of Chinese domestic policy to establish new rules or requirements for regulating trade or traffic into Taiwan, or it could simply involve Chinese law enforcement forces stepping up activities against Taiwan on the basis of existing laws. Thus, a quarantine would focus on forcing compliance with Chinese rules and strengthening China’s asserted sovereignty claims over Taiwan.</p> +<p>In any case, my assessment of the Saudi-Israeli normalisation deal remains the same – I’m not sure we’ll be seeing that anytime soon.</p> -<p>In contrast to law enforcement–led quarantines, this brief defines a blockade as a military-led operation. China’s PLA would be leading a blockade by encircling parts or all of Taiwan, while forces such as the coast guard and maritime militia play a supporting role. More intense versions of a blockade could involve missile strikes against Taiwan as well as mining of waters around Taiwan.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Whenever a crisis emerges involving Israel, the world still calls on Cairo and Amman, and moreso on Cairo. They don’t call on Abu Dhabi, Manama or anywhere else in the same way</code></em></strong></p> -<p>A blockade would, by nature, involve much more escalatory operations than a quarantine. A quarantine would not intentionally involve the use of kinetic force to attack targets, though it is possible that escalation could lead to an exchange of kinetic attacks.</p> +<p><strong>JE</strong>: Perhaps, but the normalisation deal is all about the “day after”, and Biden’s plan put a lot of focus on trying to see beyond the current hostilities. What’s Egypt’s role in that regard?</p> -<p>There are no publicly available doctrinal writings on how exactly China could execute a quarantine. However, China has conducted several maneuvers and exercises that are indicative of how it can use law enforcement operations to assert control over traffic to Taiwan and complicate Taiwan’s maritime environment.</p> +<p><strong>HH</strong>: There are a lot of scenarios being discussed for Gaza following the end of hostilities. The problem is, most of them have been vetoed by the Israelis, so it becomes rather academic and abstract to even discuss them without addressing the elephant in the room, which is Israel’s occupation of Gaza, along with its military presence therein. Even the Israelis have found themselves in rather awkward situations due to this; Netanyahu announced in early May that the Emiratis could be involved in governing Gaza following the war, only to be met with a very public denunciation of the idea by the Emirati foreign minister. The stumbling block, including for Abu Dhabi – irrespective of the Abraham Accords – was the Israeli occupation, and the absence of a Palestinian government with “integrity, competence and independence”, which would then have the capacity to invite the UAE to assist.</p> -<p>In August 2022, when then speaker of the house Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, China’s Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) deployed a large patrol vessel, the Haixun 06, to conduct operations off the coast of China’s Fujian Province and in the Taiwan Strait for the first time. In April 2023, after Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen transited through the United States, the Haixun 06 deployed again. This time, it sailed farther into the Taiwan Strait, and the Fujian Province MSA announced that the vessel would carry out “on-site inspections” of vessels, though there were no reports that inspections occurred.</p> +<p>It’s not only Arab states that reject “providing cover for the Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip”, as the Emiratis put it; I don’t think any country or multilateral organisation is interested in assisting in governing Gaza, without a clear commitment from the Israelis that they are leaving. Otherwise, such a presence would simply be interpreted as being Israel’s police force in the Gaza Strip – and thus quite likely targeted as part of the occupation. I’m not sure anyone would willingly take on that role; Cairo certainly won’t.</p> -<p>More recently, China increased coast guard patrols near Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen Islands after an incident there. In February 2024, a Taiwan coast guard vessel chased and collided with a Chinese vessel that Taiwan asserts was illegally fishing near Kinmen. The incident resulted in the death of two crew members. China responded by increasing coast guard patrols near what Taiwan calls “restricted” and “prohibited” waters around Kinmen. At one point, Chinese coast guard personnel boarded a Taiwan-owned tourist boat to check its licenses and paperwork.</p> +<p>I think if Biden is successful in getting a permanent ceasefire and an Israeli withdrawal of troops, as well as a commitment to allow a track towards a Palestinian state that includes Gaza, then yes, Egypt could probably be convinced to deploy troops as part of a broader and temporary international force, similar to KFOR in Kosovo, for example.</p> -<p>Amid this uptick in activity around Kinmen, China conducted a series of combat activities in which naval and air forces from the PLA Eastern Theater Command conducted drills jointly with the China Coast Guard (CCG). Chinese official outlets described the exercises as simulating “emergency scenarios” and focusing on enhancing forces’ “interoperability and joint strike capabilities.”</p> +<p>But that’s a lot of “ifs”. The irony of all of this is that it is actually quite clear what a workable plan in Gaza entails, and it has been for decades. The question has always been: is the international community in general, and the US in particular, going to use its leverage to push such a workable plan forward? So far, the answer has been a firm “no” – and the Israelis know it.</p> -<p>China again stepped up the involvement of the CCG in May 2024 during its latest round of large-scale exercises around Taiwan. Alongside the PLA exercises, the CCG conducted its own operations around two of Taiwan’s outlying islands. On the same day that the PLA exercises started, the Fujian Province Coast Guard launched a “comprehensive law enforcement exercise” in waters around Wuqiu and Dongyin “to test its joint patrol, rapid reaction and emergency response capabilities.” The CCG indicated that its patrol vessels came as close as 2.8 nautical miles from Wuqiu’s islands and as close as 3.1 nautical miles from Dongyin, marking the first time CCG vessels have entered waters there.</p> +<hr /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IW7hrxm.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p><strong>H A Hellyer</strong> is the Senior Associate Fellow of RUSI. Specialising in geopolitics, security studies, political economy, and belief, he has more than 20 years of experience in governmental, corporate advisory, and academic environments in Europe, USA, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.</p>H A HellyerEgypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords in 1978, the first peace treaty between the Jewish state and any of its Arab neighbours. The accords are the bedrock of the region’s security architecture, but owing to Israel’s war on Gaza and its moves at the border between Gaza and Egypt, the relationship between Cairo and Tel Aviv has reached its lowest point in decades. What kind of state are Egyptian-Israeli relations in, and how might this impact the future?Chinese Engagement In AR2024-06-05T12:00:00+08:002024-06-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/chinese-engagement-in-argentina<p><em>In August 2023, then-Argentine presidential candidate Javier Milei declared he would not make “pacts with Communists.”</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Months later, following his election, he declined an invitation to Argentina to join the China-dominated BRICS organization, signaling a deepening of the political distancing from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that began under his once pro-PRC predecessor Alberto Fernandez. However, the move did not necessarily signal an end to the substantial private trade and investment relationship between the two countries.</em></p> + +<p>As Argentina’s economic crisis deepened under President Fernandez, most of China’s high-profile infrastructure projects in Argentina became paralyzed over financing and other questions. Such projects included an $8 billion nuclear reactor at Argentina’s Atucha III complex, two dams on the Santa Cruz River, work on the Belgrano Cargas rail system, dredging of the Paraguay and Paraná Rivers to support the continued operation of the hidrovía (waterway), and problems in approving a Chinese port project near Antarctica.</p> + +<p>Even before the election of President Milei in November 2023, China had deepening difficulties in Argentina, including the cancellation of Argentina’s purchase of China’s JF17/FC-1 fighters in favor of U.S.-produced F-16 fighters. China also had replaced its dynamic Spanish-speaking ambassador and military attaché with a new ambassador, Wang Wei, who spoke mainly Italian, and a new attaché whose second language was Portuguese, not Spanish. Argentine China experts perceived that the PRC was informally downgrading the relationship.</p> + +<p>Despite Argentine foreign minister Diana Mondino’s cordial, professional approach toward the PRC and her assurances of Argentina’s continued interest in transparent commercial and diplomatic relations with China, relations continued to deteriorate. The PRC suspended a $6.5 billion bank credit that it had extended to the outgoing government, and its banks have reportedly put on hold credit for major investment projects in the country. In addition to the PRC’s reaction to President Milei’s remarks about China, the PRC was also reportedly offended by Taiwanese government representatives’ attendance at an academic event with Mondino involving Kung Guo Wei, a visiting professor from Taipei’s famous Tamkang University, before Mondino became foreign minister. Nevertheless, PRC-Argentina commercial relations are significant and, arguably, poised to deepen under President Milei’s government, driven by the likely turnaround of the Argentine economy and projects by private businesspersons and provincial and local-level politicians.</p> + +<h3 id="trade">Trade</h3> + +<p>Argentina-China bilateral trade has grown substantially since the PRC entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, though, as with many countries of the region, Argentine purchases of Chinese products and services have grown far greater than PRC purchases from Argentina. Argentine exports to the PRC grew approximately eightfold, from $1.09 billion in 2002 to $7.93 billion in 2022, while Argentine imports from China grew over 53-fold, from $330 million in 2002 to $17.5 billion in 2022. Argentina’s main exports to the PRC were agricultural goods, led by soybeans, beef, and barley, while Argentina imported an array of higher value-added manufactured goods and services from China, including telephones and computers.</p> + +<p>Argentine exports of agricultural goods, as well as lithium and other minerals, are poised to expand in the coming years as the Argentine economy recovers. Argentine consumption of Chinese electronics, cars, and other manufactured goods and services is also poised to grow, bolstered, ironically, by the relatively laissez-faire posture of President Milei toward commercial matters.</p> + +<p>Despite some reasons for optimism regarding overall trade growth, the realization of value added is likely to be lopsided in China’s favor, reflecting Argentina’s limited knowledge of the PRC as a market and the limited ability of the Argentine government to help its businesspeople consummate profitable deals there. In off-the-record interviews with an Argentine China expert, the author learned that although Argentina has diplomatic offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Canton, and Hong Kong, it has centers for commercial promotion only in Shanghai and Chengdu.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite some reasons for optimism regarding overall trade growth, the realization of value added is likely to be lopsided in China’s favor, reflecting Argentina’s limited knowledge of the PRC as a market and the limited ability of the Argentine government to help its businesspeople.</code></em></strong></p> + +<h3 id="political-relations">Political Relations</h3> + +<p>Prior to the Milei government, the PRC consistently put Argentina in the highest ranks of diplomatic partnerships it possesses. In 2004, the PRC recognized Argentina as one of three strategic partners in the region, and in 2014 it upgraded the relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Consistent with this high level of relationship, the PRC tried to get Argentina to set up a ministerial-level committee to facilitate coordination across sectors, such as the COSBAN in Brazil and the High-Level Mixed Commission in Venezuela. But, according to an Argentine China expert, the Argentine Peronist government could not facilitate the required coordination between the Foreign and Commerce Ministries and other required government agencies, and the effort to create such a committee was ultimately set aside.</p> + +<p>In February 2022, the Fernandez government joined the PRC Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during a state visit to Beijing tied to the Winter Olympics held there. Fernandez was one of two Latin American presidents to attend the BRI’s 10th-anniversary celebration in October 2023. The PRC reportedly is concerned that the Fernandez government could withdraw Argentina from the BRI, however, just as it turned down membership in BRICS.</p> + +<p>In 2017, Argentina also applied and was accepted to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, but the country reportedly never paid the $7.5 million membership quota and has not attended any board meetings or otherwise participated in the affairs of the bank. According to Argentine sinologists, the new Milei government appointed a respected career diplomat, Marcelo Suárez Salvia, to represent Argentina in the PRC, though he has not served in Asia and does not speak any Asian languages.</p> + +<h3 id="petroleum">Petroleum</h3> + +<p>China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is the controlling partner in Bridas and, with British Petroleum, the Pan American Energy–Axion consortium. Together, the ventures give CNOOC substantial petroleum operations in Argentina. Bridas — in which the Bulgheronis, one of Argentina’s wealthiest families, also have an important stake — is the key operator of the Vaca Muerta shale gas deposits.</p> + +<h3 id="mining-sector">Mining Sector</h3> + +<p>In the mining sector, PRC-based companies have long had a presence in traditional operations, albeit with difficulties involving relations with local communities and government licensing. The most significant Chinese conventional mining project in the country is the Veladero gold mine, in which PRC-based Shandong Gold purchased a $960 million (50 percent) stake in 2017. Other Chinese-owned mines include Campana Mahuida, owned by China Metallurgical Corporation and shut down in 2009 due to problems with the local community; Sierra Grande, shut down in 2016 over low minerals prices; and a gold mine in La Rioja owned by Chinese conglomerate Hanaq.</p> + +<p>In the lithium sector, PRC-based companies have made major advances in recent years, courting Argentine provincial governments, which make key decisions about licensing and regulation. Chinese lithium projects in Argentina include Pozuelos and Pastos Grandes, acquired by China’s Ganfeng through its $962 million purchase of Lithea Inc. in 2022. Ganfeng also owns and is developing the Mariana salt flats in Salta and Cauchari-Olaroz in Jujuy, a joint venture with Canada’s Lithium Americas.</p> + +<p>Chinese carmaker Chery and minor partner Gotion proposed a $400 million investment in an electric vehicle plant also in Jujuy, though with the country’s economic difficulties, plans have not yet moved forward. In nearby Catamarca Province, the Chinese mining giant Zijin operates the Tres Quebradas lithium field and has proposed the construction of a plant for refining lithium and manufacturing cathodes for lithium-ion batteries.</p> + +<h3 id="agriculture">Agriculture</h3> + +<p>Agrologistics companies Nidera and Noble, owned by China Oilseeds and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO), have a substantial presence in Argentina, with a substantial part of their business coming from supplying agricultural goods to their parent organization COFCO. COFCO purchases for the Chinese market, giving it an advantage in competing with non-Chinese agrologistics firms such as ADM, Bunge, Dreyfuss, and Cargill. Nidera has a plant in Rosario, which suffered a high-profile explosion in 2017. It also has storage facilities in Santa Fe and Cordoba for grains, which may have some processing capabilities. There are also Chinese-owned agricultural facilities in Chaco and Tucuman, among other locations. The PRC-based company Syngenta, owned by ChemChina since 2017, has a presence in Argentina and has sought a new law for transgenic seeds to use its genetically modified organism technology in the country.</p> + +<p>Finally, during the prior government, to meet growing Chinese demand for pork, PRC-based investors had proposed $3.7 billion in investments in slaughterhouses and other pork production facilities in the country. The project became the focus of protests by environmentalists and animal rights activists, who objected to the inhumane conditions the animals were allegedly raised in. To the consternation of the Chinese, President Fernandez became involved in the dispute on the side of the protesters, including allowing himself to be photographed at one of the protests near signs that were highly derogatory toward the Chinese. The position of Fernandez effectively stopped the project from going forward.</p> + +<h3 id="electricity-sector">Electricity Sector</h3> + +<p>In Jujuy Province, a consortium led by PowerChina is currently working on the fourth phase of the Cauchari photovoltaic array, the largest solar park in Argentina and the region. The plan, according to Argentine China experts, is to leverage the project not only to power mining and other operations in the region but also to support an ecosystem of green energy facilities. PowerChina and other PRC-based firms have also been involved in the Loma Blanca wind farm and other wind projects in Neuquén and Santa Cruz.</p> + +<p>Also in Santa Cruz, PowerChina leads a consortium for the construction of two hydroelectric facilities on the Santa Cruz River — the Jorge Cepernic and Nestor Kirchner facilities — though progress on the project has been delayed over regulatory and environmental, as well as financing, issues. As noted, the construction of a nuclear pressurized water reactor by the Chinese Gezhouba Group in the Atucha complex, initially agreed to during the presidency of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, also continues to be stuck over the insistence by the fiscally imperiled prior Argentine government that the Chinese finance 100 percent of the project.</p> + +<p>PowerChina was also involved in the long-delayed Chihuido hydroelectric project, which Russia originally pursued, though neither had success in taking the project forward. PowerChina further attempted, unsuccessfully, to sell steel tubing for the construction of a gas pipeline connecting the Vaca Muerta shale gas field to Buenos Aires, but the Alberto Fernandez government chose to award the contract to the favored but much more expensive Argentine supplier Techint. According to an Argentine China expert interviewed for this project, because of the poor outcome of several PowerChina projects, CEO Tu Shuiping reportedly resigned and left for the PRC, with many of the company’s projects in Argentina remaining stagnant.</p> + +<h3 id="transportation-infrastructure">Transportation Infrastructure</h3> + +<p>Over the past 15 years, PRC-based companies have pursued multiple train and highway infrastructure projects in Argentina, albeit with considerable delays and difficulties. The most significant of these projects are track modernization and the provision of new engines and rolling stock for the Belgrano Cargas railroad, key to moving freight within Argentina and connecting it to the ports of neighboring countries. Although work on various segments of Belgrano Cargas have been completed, work became stuck at the end of the Fernandez administration over a series of disputes, including the Chinese insisting they import their own railroad ties instead of using locally available quebracho, an Argentine hardwood. The Chinese also completed work on the Red Line (Line B) of the Buenos Aires metro (Subte), though the extension to the Buenos Aires (Ezeiza) International Airport and work on the Cordoba metro never went forward.</p> + +<p>Argentina and China explored work on tunnels through mountain passes connecting Argentina and Chile via highway, including the Agua Negra tunnel at the latitude of Buenos Aires and Santiago and a route further to the north through the Argentine province of Salta. Perhaps the most controversial Chinese infrastructure project has been the proposed construction of the $500 million multiuse Rio Grande commercial port at the tip of Antarctica in Tierra del Fuego. The area has been of interest to Chinese investors since the early 2000s when a PRC-based group explored building a petrochemical plant and maritime export terminal for urea fertilizer in the area.</p> + +<p>The potential ability of the Chinese military to surreptitiously use the port during times of war to observe and possibly inhibit transits through the Straits of Magellan or the Drake Passage has drawn attention to the project as a security concern, even obligating the governor of Ushuaia to contract a media consultant to help deal with the controversy. As of the time of this writing, the project was seen as unlikely to receive the federal approval required by the port and navigable rivers organization within the Ministry of Economy to move forward.</p> + +<h3 id="digital-infrastructure">Digital Infrastructure</h3> + +<p>Since 2001, PRC-based companies such as Huawei and ZTE — and today Xiaomi — have played a leading role in Argentina’s telecommunications infrastructure. By 2021, Huawei had over 500 employees in the country. Such Chinese firms are important suppliers to Argentina’s telecommunications providers, including Claro, Movistar, and Personal (which is part of Grupo Clarín). The latter relies heavily on Huawei equipment. Huawei is also a significant cloud services provider in the country.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Since 2001, PRC-based companies such as Huawei and ZTE — and today Xiaomi — have played a leading role in Argentina’s telecommunications infrastructure.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>The outgoing Fernandez government had planned an accelerated auction of the country’s 5G bandwidth in September 2023 to raise needed funds for the government (an estimated $1 billion in royalty payments, according to Argentine China experts interviewed for this project). Companies using Huawei 5G equipment were poised to win, but the government could not conduct the bid in time, and its status with the new government remains uncertain. In Argentina, as in other countries, Huawei has a scholarship program, Seeds of the Future, to strengthen its base of tech employees in the region by bringing technically talented youth to the PRC for three months to a year.</p> + +<p>In the surveillance systems domain, ZTE is the key supplier for a $30 million smart cities project in Jujuy, where the PRC depends on local government support to access the province’s lithium. In addition, the Chinese firm Hikvision is a key provider of surveillance cameras in the country, including for corporate and home security systems, as well as for traffic cameras in towns and neighborhoods like Vicente Lopez.</p> + +<p>As in other parts of Latin America, customs scanners in Ezeiza International Airport, first purchased in 2016, are supplied by the PRC-based company Nuctec. With respect to taxi services, as in other parts of Latin America such as Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil, the Chinese taxi company DiDi is present in the country, with a particular focus on mototaxi and delivery services. However, competitors Uber and Cabify are more dominant in local markets.</p> + +<h3 id="banking-and-finance">Banking and Finance</h3> + +<p>Three Chinese banks currently operate in Argentina. Hong Kong Shanghai Bank of China and International Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) are licensed to conduct branch banking operations in the country. ICBC entered the country following a 2012 approval by Argentine authorities of its controlling interest in the locally licensed Standard Bank.</p> + +<p>In addition, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), with offices in the Buenos Aires district of Puerto Madero, primarily conducts representational banking for Chinese companies tied to the currency swap and business in the PRC. According to an Argentine China expert interviewed for this project, the Agricultural Bank of China also has explored establishing a presence in the country.</p> + +<p>Through the PBOC, Argentina and China have an $18.5 billion currency swap arrangement. It was set up to facilitate the clearance of transactions for imports and exports between the two countries in order to avoid using U.S. dollars as the clearing mechanism. They also agreed to expand the agreement by $5 billion. The interest rate secured for the new portion of the swap, according to an Argentine China expert, was the 3.5 percent benchmark Hong Kong interest rate plus an additional 3.5 percent. The rate is considered high but still in the range of commercial norms. Under the Fernandez government, $5 billion of the swap was activated to support trade between the two countries. In addition, Argentina may have used its access to the renminbi to pay part of its installment payments to the International Monetary Fund.</p> + +<p>When President Milei took office, the Chinese reportedly asked the incoming government if it wished to activate part of the currency swap line to facilitate trade, but the Milei government reportedly declined, Argentine China experts say. Shortly after, the PRC also canceled the new $6.5 billion portion of its swap.</p> + +<h3 id="pharmaceutical-sector">Pharmaceutical Sector</h3> + +<p>During the early phases of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Chinese company Sinopharm conducted Phase 3 trials in Argentina, among other countries, and partnered with a local laboratory, Richmond Laboratories, for assembling and distributing its vaccine in Argentina. Because of the poor performance of the Chinese vaccine, however, the demand for the Sinopharm vaccine dried up once higher-efficacy Western messenger RNA vaccines came online. According to Argentine China experts, Sinopharm could not reach an agreement to produce its vaccine in Argentina or branch into other areas.</p> + +<p>By contrast, an Argentine laboratory, Bagó, had a production facility in the PRC for the production of aftosa vaccines for animals. In off-the-record interviews with Argentine China experts interviewed for this project, they expressed that although there was interest in leveraging the partnership to bring Chinese pharmaceutical capabilities to Argentina, as with Sinopharm, nothing came of the initiative.</p> + +<h3 id="media-influence">Media Influence</h3> + +<p>As in other parts of the region, the PRC has courted the Argentine media, including purchasing advertising supplements in important papers such as Clarín and La Nación. Grupo Clarín also has important business interests with the PRC, including its telecommunications firm Personal, which is the principal user of Chinese equipment in the country and the pioneer for Huawei’s entry into the Argentine market for 5G.</p> + +<h3 id="intellectual-infrastructure">Intellectual Infrastructure</h3> + +<p>Argentina, like most Latin American countries, has relatively limited China knowledge within its universities and think tanks. Nevertheless, its knowledge base and human connections have grown in recent years and are better than in many other parts of Latin America. Argentina’s most respected China studies centers include those at the Catholic University of Argentina (UCA), Universidad Nacional de la Plata (one of the country’s oldest China and Asia studies programs, with the China Center currently under Maria Francesca Staiano), Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero, and Universidad Nacional de Lanús, at which Argentina’s passionately Sinophile ambassador to the PRC, Sabino Vaca Narvaja, formerly taught. As in the United States, leading Argentine think tanks, such as the Argentine Council for International Relations, have China studies programs as well.</p> + +<p>Argentina currently has three Confucius Institutes in public universities, in keeping with Chinese tradition. The oldest, at Universidad Nacional de la Plata, was established in the 1980s, followed by Universidad de Buenos Aires and, most recently, Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, set up in 2020. Universidad Católica de Salta has also explored setting up a Confucius Institute.</p> + +<p>According to China-focused Argentines interviewed for this work, the number of PRC-paid trips for Argentines to study or attend forums in China has reportedly decreased from the golden age of the 2010s, with restrictions on interactions and travel for Argentines increased. Beyond PRC-sponsored education institutions and scholarships, the Sino-Argentine Chamber of Commerce is an important referent for Argentine businesses doing business in the PRC or with Chinese companies. The president of the chamber is Sergio Spadone, son of one of Argentina’s pioneers of doing business with China, and the executive director is Alejandra Conconi. In addition, former head of the chamber Ernesto Taboada now operates a small, separate organization, the Argentine-China Council, after a falling out with the chamber, which he formerly headed, according to an Argentine China expert.</p> + +<h3 id="provincial-and-local-engagement">Provincial and Local Engagement</h3> + +<p>As elsewhere in the region, the PRC is particularly engaged at the provincial and local levels in Argentina, including in investment projects, the gifting of trips for local officials to the PRC, and in arrangements with local universities. These engagements include a technology and resources agreement with the National University of Jujuy, an agreement with Alibaba, agreements with PowerChina, and a $30 million contract for ZTE to install cameras and a provincial response and control system in the province, among other technologies.</p> + +<p>Beyond PRC initiatives within the Argentine provinces and with their leaders, Chinese provinces have pursued national-level representation in Argentina. According to an Argentine China expert, Hunan, Canton, and Szechuan Provinces all have representative offices in Buenos Aires but not in the Argentine provinces with which they have sister-province relations. As in Brazil under President Jair Bolsonaro, PRC engagement with Argentine local and provincial-level governments is likely to expand as a complement to a less amenable atmosphere for pursuing agreements at the national level.</p> + +<h3 id="prc-space-sector-presence-in-argentina">PRC Space Sector Presence in Argentina</h3> + +<p>As has been widely publicized, in 2012, the PRC signed a $300 million agreement with the Fernandez de Kirchner government, serving as the basis for the construction and operation of a deep space radar facility in a remote part of Neuquén. The facility is operated by China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control, part of the Chinese Strategic Support Force of the People’s Liberation Army. The Argentine government has only an intermittent presence at the site.</p> + +<p>In addition, since the signing of a 1989 cooperation agreement, the Chinese have operated space telescopes at the Felix Aguilar Astronomical Observatory in San Juan, constructing a satellite laser ranging station at the site in 2006. The PRC is currently constructing a 40-meter space telescope, the China Argentina Radio Telescope, at the facility.</p> + +<p>In Rio Gallegos, in the south of the country, the Chinese firm Emposat has plans to build a space tracking facility with four to six antennae. The site, if approved, would complement the Chinese polar space capabilities provided by its Antarctic research facilities at Zhongshan and Inexpressible Island, Antarctica.</p> + +<h3 id="security">Security</h3> + +<p>The PRC has explored sales and gifts of arms and other equipment to Argentina’s police and military, though those appeared to have been decreasing at the end of the prior government and have not gone forward under the Milei administration. During the Fernandez de Kirchner administration, Argentina began exploring the purchase of Chinese 8x8 armored personnel carriers for the Cruz del Sur multinational peacekeeping brigade, which it formed with Chile, as well as P-18 offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) similar to those the PRC sold to Trinidad and Tobago and FC-1 interceptor aircraft. After purchasing four WMZ-551s for evaluation for $2.6 million, Argentina decided against the purchase of more of the vehicles.</p> + +<p>During the center-right administration of Mauricio Macri (2015–19), Argentina decided to buy French patrol boats, obviating the need for Chinese OPVs. Purchase of the Chinese FC-1 received serious consideration under the leftist Peronist government of Alberto Fernandez, including due to significant efforts by the Chinese, who saw an opportunity to introduce the fighter into the region more broadly through Argentina and who went so far as to cut the offer price by 40 percent in an attempt to win the contract, according to off-the-record interviews with Argentine security experts. The Chinese were reportedly even exploring assembly of the aircraft in Argentina in a facility of the national defense industry manufacturer FADEA for export to other parts of the region. The Chinese may have also had an additional source of leverage through Francisco Taiana, son of then minister of defense Jorge Taiana, who had received considerable access to China to write a book on the country, among other activities.</p> + +<p>In the end, however, there were serious questions about quality and maintainability, particularly because the Chinese did not use the fighter themselves. According to Argentine security experts, the Argentine evaluation team could not speak with the Pakistani pilots who had flown the FC-1s. Because the planes used a Russian-made engine, the availability of parts became uncertain in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine and associated Western sanctions. In the final months of the Fernandez government, Argentina chose to buy U.S. F-16s from Denmark rather than the Chinese fighter. Beyond these weapons purchases, Argentina also received a donation of four armored vehicles and security cameras from the PRC in conjunction with the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires, though there were no further gifts after that.</p> + +<p>In professional military interactions, the Argentine National War College (NWC) has regularly sent an officer to a six-month command and general staff course in the PRC, as well as sending officials to shorter courses. According to an Argentine security expert, the Argentine NWC, as recently as 2020, also hosted a student from the People’s Liberation Army.</p> + +<p>The Chinese National Police also maintains a presence in the PRC embassy in Argentina to support Argentine authorities in combatting Chinese-organized crime in the country. During the prior Fernandez de Kirchner government, the PRC brought in a larger presence to help the Argentine government combat the Chinese triad Pi Xue, which had grown significantly in the greater Buenos Aires area and was extorting Chinese shopkeepers. Argentine security experts note that while the reported level of extortion and other activity by Pi Xue is now much lower, the Chinese national presence in the PRC embassy in Buenos Aires continues.</p> + +<p>As in other parts of the region, the Chinese government appears to operate unofficial Chinese police stations in the country, ostensibly to assist but also to pressure Chinese nationals living in Argentina, leveraging relatives living in China. According to Argentine security experts, local authorities have identified at least two such facilities in the neighborhoods of San Martin and Tres de Febrero.</p> + +<p>In the domain of private security, China Overseas Security Group (COSG) has an office in Buenos Aires whose address, according to reports by security experts interviewed for this project, is that of the local law firm that registered it, Wilson Rae. COSG continues to advertise on its website a search for a country manager position dating to the 2019 G20 meeting in the city, though it does not have a visible presence in the city.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As in other parts of the region, the Chinese government appears to operate unofficial Chinese police stations in the country, ostensibly to assist but also to pressure Chinese nationals living in Argentina, leveraging relatives living in China.</code></em></strong></p> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + +<p>The Argentine-China commercial relationship is broad and substantial and will likely continue under the Milei administration, particularly in high-priority sectors such as lithium, renewable energy, and digital sectors. PRC purchases of Argentine agricultural products and other commodities and Chinese sales of a broad range of goods and services to the Argentine economy will probably continue at a significant level, though lack of political will on the Argentine side and lack of financing on the Chinese side may restrict agreements of a more political or military nature and large infrastructure projects whose business case is questionable.</p> + +<p>As in Brazil under the China-skeptical Bolsonaro regime, PRC engagements at the provincial level in Argentina may flourish compared to those at the national level, where political skepticism toward the PRC is greater. The success of the Milei government in turning around the Argentine economy will also impact its ability to engage commercially with the PRC and take new projects forward. Whatever the trajectory, the underlying economic logic between the two countries means the future of the Argentina-PRC relationship is likely to be better than some in the PRC fear and will present an opportunity for Washington to work with the Milei administration to define what a transparent, balanced relationship should look like between Argentina and a range of countries, including China, other Asian partners, the European Union, and the United States.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Evan Ellis</strong> is a research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, with a focus on the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors as well as transnational organized crime and populism in the region.</p>Evan EllisIn August 2023, then-Argentine presidential candidate Javier Milei declared he would not make “pacts with Communists.”China To Quarantine Taiwan2024-06-05T12:00:00+08:002024-06-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-to-quarantine-taiwan<p><em>This report lays out China’s potential motivations for a quarantine and maps out two plausible scenarios of how it could conduct operations.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>China has significantly increased pressure on Taiwan in recent years, stoking fears that tensions could erupt into outright conflict. Much attention has been paid to the threat of an invasion, but Beijing has options besides invading to coerce, punish, or annex Taiwan. One major step China could take is a “gray zone” quarantine led not by its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) but by its coast guard and other law enforcement forces. Rather than sealing off the island, a quarantine would aim to demonstrate China’s ability to exert control over Taiwan. A quarantine is more feasible for China and more likely than an invasion or blockade in the near term; it also presents unique challenges in terms of how Taiwan and the international community can respond. This brief explores two hypothetical maritime quarantine scenarios that are informed by in-depth research, tabletop exercises, private consultations, and expert surveys conducted by the CSIS China Power Project.</p> + +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<p>China has significantly increased pressure on Taiwan in recent years. China’s military frequently flies aircraft within the island’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and across the Taiwan Strait median line. In August 2022 and April 2023, China escalated in response to U.S.-Taiwan political engagements by staging unprecedented large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. China has also deployed its navy and coast guard in increasing numbers around Taiwan and its outlying islands.</p> + +<p>Cross-Strait tensions further intensified in the wake of William Lai’s inauguration as Taiwan’s president on May 20, 2024. Three days after Lai delivered his inauguration address, China commenced two days of large-scale military exercises surrounding Taiwan, called “Joint Sword-2024A,” and accompanied them with “comprehensive law enforcement operations” (综合执法演练) involving China’s coast guard. Chinese officials stated that the drills were intended to “serve as a strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces and a stern warning against the interference and provocation by external forces.”</p> + +<p>These Chinese escalations against Taiwan are raising concerns that Beijing could take even more significant steps to “punish” and coerce Taiwan going forward. One major action China could take against Taiwan is a gray zone quarantine of the island. Quarantine scenarios have received far less attention than other contingencies, such as an invasion, but a quarantine is likelier in the near term and therefore warrants increased scrutiny.</p> + +<h3 id="what-is-a-quarantine">What Is a Quarantine?</h3> + +<p>The term quarantine is sometimes used interchangeably with “blockade.” However, this report differentiates between the two, defining a quarantine as a law enforcement–led operation to control maritime or air traffic within a specific area while a blockade is foremost military in nature. A quarantine would entail China’s coast guard and other forces conducting gray zone operations intended to stay below the threshold of an armed conflict. Thus, the military would play a supporting role — not a leading role — in such operations.</p> + +<p>The political and operational goals of a quarantine are not to completely seal Taiwan off from the world but to impose a system of controls over the island’s maritime and/or air commerce. In a quarantine, key necessities like food and medicine could continue to flow into Taiwan, enabling China to assert that its law enforcement operation is imposing no hardship. A quarantine could target the delivery of specific goods, such as shipments of U.S. weapons to Taiwan, but such a move would risk provoking a more direct U.S. response.</p> + +<p>A key goal of the quarantine approach is to obtain compliance from international companies and other countries to demonstrate China’s power over Taiwan. This is similar, in some respects, to China’s 2013 declaration of an ADIZ over much of the East China Sea. Many airlines, including U.S. companies, complied with Beijing’s demands then.</p> + +<p>A quarantine of Taiwan could involve a change of Chinese domestic policy to establish new rules or requirements for regulating trade or traffic into Taiwan, or it could simply involve Chinese law enforcement forces stepping up activities against Taiwan on the basis of existing laws. Thus, a quarantine would focus on forcing compliance with Chinese rules and strengthening China’s asserted sovereignty claims over Taiwan.</p> + +<p>In contrast to law enforcement–led quarantines, this brief defines a blockade as a military-led operation. China’s PLA would be leading a blockade by encircling parts or all of Taiwan, while forces such as the coast guard and maritime militia play a supporting role. More intense versions of a blockade could involve missile strikes against Taiwan as well as mining of waters around Taiwan.</p> + +<p>A blockade would, by nature, involve much more escalatory operations than a quarantine. A quarantine would not intentionally involve the use of kinetic force to attack targets, though it is possible that escalation could lead to an exchange of kinetic attacks.</p> + +<p>There are no publicly available doctrinal writings on how exactly China could execute a quarantine. However, China has conducted several maneuvers and exercises that are indicative of how it can use law enforcement operations to assert control over traffic to Taiwan and complicate Taiwan’s maritime environment.</p> + +<p>In August 2022, when then speaker of the house Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, China’s Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) deployed a large patrol vessel, the Haixun 06, to conduct operations off the coast of China’s Fujian Province and in the Taiwan Strait for the first time. In April 2023, after Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen transited through the United States, the Haixun 06 deployed again. This time, it sailed farther into the Taiwan Strait, and the Fujian Province MSA announced that the vessel would carry out “on-site inspections” of vessels, though there were no reports that inspections occurred.</p> + +<p>More recently, China increased coast guard patrols near Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen Islands after an incident there. In February 2024, a Taiwan coast guard vessel chased and collided with a Chinese vessel that Taiwan asserts was illegally fishing near Kinmen. The incident resulted in the death of two crew members. China responded by increasing coast guard patrols near what Taiwan calls “restricted” and “prohibited” waters around Kinmen. At one point, Chinese coast guard personnel boarded a Taiwan-owned tourist boat to check its licenses and paperwork.</p> + +<p>Amid this uptick in activity around Kinmen, China conducted a series of combat activities in which naval and air forces from the PLA Eastern Theater Command conducted drills jointly with the China Coast Guard (CCG). Chinese official outlets described the exercises as simulating “emergency scenarios” and focusing on enhancing forces’ “interoperability and joint strike capabilities.”</p> + +<p>China again stepped up the involvement of the CCG in May 2024 during its latest round of large-scale exercises around Taiwan. Alongside the PLA exercises, the CCG conducted its own operations around two of Taiwan’s outlying islands. On the same day that the PLA exercises started, the Fujian Province Coast Guard launched a “comprehensive law enforcement exercise” in waters around Wuqiu and Dongyin “to test its joint patrol, rapid reaction and emergency response capabilities.” The CCG indicated that its patrol vessels came as close as 2.8 nautical miles from Wuqiu’s islands and as close as 3.1 nautical miles from Dongyin, marking the first time CCG vessels have entered waters there.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IW7hrxm.png" alt="image01" /></p> <p>In addition to patrolling around Taiwan’s outlying islands, four CCG vessels sailed east of Taiwan and another three sailed southwest of Taiwan near the southern entrance of the Taiwan Strait. As part of the exercises east of Taiwan, videos released by official Chinese outlets showed multiple CCG ships encircling a target vessel and spraying water cannons, though the vessel appeared to be Chinese-flagged, and the video did not show the water cannons actually hitting the vessel. This represents a marked increase in intensity compared to previous CCG activities around Taiwan, and it is the latest and clearest indication that China is preparing its law enforcement and military forces to operate together in the context of a Taiwan Strait crisis.</p> @@ -5186,845 +5773,4 @@ <hr /> -<p><strong>Pia Hüsch</strong> is a Research Fellow in cyber, technology and national security. Her research focusses on the impact, societal risks and lawfulness of cyber operations and the geopolitical and national security implications of disruptive technologies, such as AI.</p>Pia HüschA workshop discussion in February 2024 explores the role of AI and intelligence in a hypothetical invasion.【黎智英案・審訊第 72 日】2024-05-08T12:00:00+08:002024-05-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-72<ul> - <li>周達權確認有份處理黎私人戶口</li> -</ul> - -<excerpt /> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/klOkY0T.png" alt="image01" /></p> - -<p>壹傳媒創辦人黎智英與《蘋果日報》3間相關公司,被控「串謀勾結外國勢力」等罪,案件周三(8日)在西九龍裁判法院(暫代高等法院)展開第72日審訊。控方證人、壹傳媒集團營運總裁兼時任財務總裁周達權第二天作供,控方續問及黎智英名下公司的運作,而周亦確認,佢有份處理黎私人戶口帳目。</p> - -<p>周周二確認,自己與黎為離岸公司「LACOCK」董事。及至2020年初,陳梓華成為公司新股東及董事,但他不認識陳,而黎的助手 Mark Simon 曾向他解釋「因為呢個陳梓華,幫阿黎生手、做到嘢,所以黎生將呢間公司轉畀佢作為酬勞」。</p> - -<p>案件由高院《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李素蘭及李運騰審理。控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官陳穎琛代表;黎智英由資深大律師彭耀鴻、大律師關文渭及有香港執業資格的新西蘭御用大律師 Marc Corlett 代表。</p> - -<h4 id="1008-開庭">10:08 開庭</h4> - -<h4 id="1010-控方續問黎智英名下公司運作">10:10 控方續問黎智英名下公司運作</h4> - -<p>控方繼續就黎智英名下加拿大公司「Lais Hotel Properties Limited」提問,周達權指公司於2010年之前成立﹐主要管理加拿大酒店,例如 Prince of Wales Hotel、Queen’s Landing Hotel,以及 Pillar and Post Hotel,業務與壹傳媒無關,他本人、Mark Simon 和 Robert Jackson 為公司董事。</p> - -<p>控方問,誰是「Lais Hotel」股東?周稱「上高有一間公司 hold 住」,但不記得該公司名稱,「我記憶應該係黎智英先生擁有」。控方問,周在「Lais Hotel」有何工作?周稱,公司每三個月有一個董事會,每半年一次與核數師開會,每年一個股東大會,「咁我實際上、日常運作我係冇參與」。控方問,周需向誰人匯報?周回答是董事局,主席應該是 Mark Simon。</p> - -<p>控方再問,周供稱每半年一次與核數師開會,那麼他是否需要處理公司的財務事宜?周稱,不需要處理公司日常財務事宜,而是核數師開會後告知他相關情況,他再去處理。</p> - -<h4 id="1030-周確認有份處理黎智英私人戶口">10:30 周確認有份處理黎智英私人戶口</h4> - -<p>控方展示2019年4月25日、由力高顧問有限公司助理財務總監 Linda MENDOZA 傳送至周、Mark Simon 的電郵,副本傳送至員工 Evan Lau,「Kindly approve via return email the following Request For Payments from Lai Chee Ying’s SCSB USD account(請透過回覆電郵,批准黎智英 SCSB 美元帳戶付款請求)」</p> - -<p>周解釋,Evan Lau 是會計,他向 Linda MENDOZA 或 Mark Simon 匯報,電郵中的「SCSB美元帳戶」是指黎個人的上海商業儲蓄銀行美元帳戶。控方指,該付款請求與 Mark Simon 的計劃有關,涉及200萬美金,詢問周是否知道與甚麼有關?周稱,若 Mark Simon 的計劃獲批准,就會發出付款請求,「我相信黎生 approve 咗,呢個係會計部有嘅程序」。</p> - -<p>周續指,「咁如果 Linda 佢畀 email 我,就應該已經將呢啲程序行晒,所以我亦都會 approve」。法官李運騰詢問,這是黎的個人銀行帳戶,為何需要周的批准?周稱「我嘅批准,係批准個 payment request form」,讓黎私人公司的核數師查核紀錄,又指他接任工作時,「我係跟返我上手一路咁樣做落嚟」。</p> - -<p>李運騰再問,周不僅處理黎的私人公司,還處理他的私人銀行戶口?周稱「私人公司就會係 accountant(會計師)做」,又指 Mark Simon 的計劃已獲黎批准,他只是批准相關付款憑證(payment voucher)。周稱,Mark Simon 向 Linda 傳送電郵,「應該有埋黎生嘅 approval」。</p> - -<p>李運騰問,為何周稱「應該」?周稱「因為呢一個係公司要有嘅程序,我都認為 Linda 會做咗呢一啲工作,先出呢個 email」。他同意電郵沒有佐證文件紀錄,但重申「呢個係應該有嘅 procedure 嚟,相信 Linda 有做到」。</p> - -<p>李運騰聞言指,周沒看文件、僅相信 Linda,可算是「橡皮圖章(rubber stamping)」?周稱「如果係咁講,可以係咁講,但係最尾因為呢個戶口係黎先生私人戶口,如果張 cheque 或者 remittance,都係要黎生佢簽返嘅」。控方問,誰設立這程序?周稱「我唔知邊個 set up,但呢個程序係恆之已久」。</p> - -<p>針對電郵內的 Mark Simon 計劃,周稱不知道內容,「因為如果寫 Mark’s project,我係唔需要問⋯Mark Simon 同我講,黎生同意呢樣嘢」。李運騰問,周不論如何都會相信 Mark Simon 說法?周稱「咁以往都有其他關於Mark 嘅 project,都有畀過錢,黎生見到個 report 都冇任何嘅異議,咁我覺得係佢冇講到大話囉」。</p> - -<h4 id="1050-控方問及黎名下台灣公司">10:50 控方問及黎名下台灣公司</h4> - -<p>控方詢問,是否有一間離岸公司名為「Chartwell」?周同意,以他理解是黎名下的一間台灣公司,但並非由他處理,而是由台灣同事或 Mark Simon 處理,「我實際上係冇參與呢間公司」,亦不清楚 Mark Simon 在這間公司的工作。</p> - -<p>控方問,周如何得悉「Chartwell」是黎名下?周稱「因為我時常都去台灣,咁黎生喺台灣都有佢一班同事,處理佢嘅私人事務,咁有時佢啲私人公司嘅同事會嚟傾計,從而得知」。</p> - -<h4 id="1054-控方問及黎墊支李宇軒登報事宜">10:54 控方問及黎墊支李宇軒登報事宜</h4> - -<p>控方展示 Mark Simon 於2019年6月27日傳送給 Linda 的電郵,「Linda, Please see the attachment, we are making some payments to newspaper for various advertisements as the groups cannot get their money transferred in time. I will be sending one to you shortly for payment today. We need to pay in this person’s name. Pay in name of Mr Li= LI YU HIN」</p> - -<p>(中譯:請參閱附件,我們正在向報館支付廣告費,但未能及時匯款。今天我會盡快向你發送款項,我們需要以李宇軒名義付款)</p> - -<p>控方問,此交易關於甚麼?周稱,Mark Simon 通知 Linda,需要向李宇軒支付500萬元,電郵附件為 Mark Simon 與黎的 WhatsApp 對話,當中提到 Mark Simon 從 Martin 得悉,有人需要500萬元過渡性貸款(bridge loan),Mark Simon 可以在7月4日取回款項,黎遂表示「OK」。至於電郵內所指的廣告費,周稱「我理解係一啲文宣廣告」。</p> - -<p>控方問,為何 Mark Simon 要向 Linda 發送電郵?周稱,因需要 Linda 簽發支票或轉帳,「阿 Mark 都要(向 Linda)畀埋黎生 approval 先可以做到」,因此在電郵附上他與黎的 WhatsApp 紀錄。控方問,周是否牽涉在內?周稱「我諗我冇參與到」,指 Mark Simon 予他電郵密件副本,僅因他每個月要製作關於黎個人支出的報表,亦不知道該500萬元來源。</p> - -<p>控方展示2019年6月27日由 Mark Simon 傳送至周、壹傳媒行政總裁張劍虹等人的電郵,「Guys, can you inform them that they have credit for one week and so we will run the ad. And they can pay us within one week. Mr Lai has approved Assisting as they are having trouble moving their money.」</p> - -<p>(中譯:你能否告訴他們,登報人有一周寬限期,我們會投放廣告,而他們可在一周內向我們付款。因為他們在轉移資金方面遇到困難,黎先生已批准了協助。)</p> - -<p>周解釋,此有關李宇軒向台灣《蘋果日報》登報事宜,「收到呢個 email 睇到有黎生 approve,我哋就畀咗一個星期 credit 畀呢個客人啦」。</p> - -<h4 id="1116-小休">11:16 小休</h4> - -<h4 id="1159-周mark-simon-在壹傳媒大樓有固定辦公室">11:59 周:Mark Simon 在壹傳媒大樓有固定辦公室</h4> - -<p>控方圍繞《蘋果》「飯盒會」提問。周確認,2019年至2020年期間,自他任職營運總裁後,每周都會參與由黎主持的「飯盒會」,周本人、張劍虹、ICT 部門主管 Connie Chan 會出席。控方問,還有誰人出席?「因為飯盒會有唔同主題,所以要睇吓當時傾啲乜」,例如《蘋果》實體版編輯、壹週刊、《蘋果》網上版、廣告部及業務發展。</p> - -<p>法官杜麗冰問,Mark Simon 在壹傳媒的角色是甚麼?周稱他沒有正式職銜,「就係黎先生嘅私人助理」,周會聽從其指示。法官李素蘭問,Mark Simon 辦公室在壹傳媒大樓?周同意,他有固定辦公室在壹傳媒大樓,重申他會替黎執行壹傳媒、私人公司上的決定。</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qhv7gpH.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 張劍虹(左)、黎智英(中)、周達權(右)(資料圖片)</p> - -<h4 id="1212-周飯盒會談及反政府運動黑暴">12:12 周:「飯盒會」談及反政府運動、「黑暴」</h4> - -<p>控方進一步問及「飯盒會」的內容,周先解釋形式,出席者在開會前在 WhatsApp 提出問題,黎通常會回覆「到時再討論」。其後,「食飯大家有啲傾講啦,咁黎生亦都會講吓,佢對當時個睇法啦,例如當時嘅反政府示威」,亦會討論員工提出的問題。周再指,黎針對問題作出決定,由張劍虹撰寫會議紀錄,再傳送予各出席者。</p> - -<p>控方問,飯盒會涉及甚麼主題?周指,如果跟報紙相關,「好多時啲話題,都會連帶到當時嘅反政府運動、『黑暴』,咁黎生就會有佢指示,有啲咩會做啦,例如需要多啲人注意,或者可以令到外國有關注」,但不清楚之後編輯做法。</p> - -<p>針對周稱「令到外國有關注」,控方問如何達到目的?周舉例,推出《蘋果》英文版、、「一人一信計劃」、「自由之夏」特刊,「咁嗰本特刊有中文版同埋英文版,最主要都係啲相呀、畫冊,關於當時反政府示威呀。咁亦都有少量文字,我冇詳細閱讀,咁英文版係中文版嘅翻譯啦」。</p> - -<p>控方再問,是希望獲得甚麼關注?周稱,是關於香港反政府行動,「或者佢哋所謂嘅『警暴』咁囉,咁亦都希望得到外國嘅支持啦,咁或者係再厲害啲,就係制裁啦」。</p> - -<h4 id="1230-周蘋果英文版為吸引外國支持">12:30 周:《蘋果》英文版為吸引外國支持</h4> - -<p>控方問,《蘋果》網上版如何吸引更多人關注?周稱,在「飯盒會」曾討論,要多報道反政府示威、示威者,「令到多啲人同情佢哋,呢啲最主要都係啲 video 嚟」。周補充,他由2019年9月、10月任職營運總裁起,參加「飯盒會」,至2020年12月初。</p> - -<p>至於周有否參與《蘋果》英文版,周稱,他參與 ICT 部分,「make sure launch 到個英文版嘅《蘋果日報》囉」。周解釋,行政總裁著他幫忙管理 ICT,「咁喺呢個情形 make sure 可以準時 launch 到英文版《蘋果日報》,睇住個進度、有咩問題,同埋有咩難題可以幫佢解決到」。</p> - -<p>控方問,《蘋果》英文版目的是甚麼?周稱讓外國、尤是美國政要閱讀《蘋果》,「咁希望可以爭取到佢哋嘅支持」。他續指,因為當時情況,黎覺得外國支持很重要,令到反政府、反修例運動可以成功,重申「我相信係為咗吸引外國嘅讀者、外國嘅支持」。</p> - -<h4 id="1240-休庭午膳">12:40 休庭午膳</h4> - -<h4 id="1433-控方就自由之夏特刊提問">14:33 控方就「自由之夏」特刊提問</h4> - -<p>控方繼續圍繞「自由之夏」特刊提問,指中文版於2019年9月20日刊出,英文版於同年10月9日刊出;周確認。控方問,刊物是否派發出去?周稱「我嘅理解係賣㗎喎」,刊物同時是一個畫冊,「記錄返佢哋認為嘅警暴,吸引返啲讀者,同埋想增加多啲力量啩」。</p> - -<p>控方問,「自由之夏」有否在海外派發?周稱「我記得我冇直接 involve 喺海外發行,但係我記得 Mark Simon 有要求過我攞二千幾本」,包括中文版及英文版刊物,用作海外派發,「我嘅理解佢嘅外國係美國、英國嗰啲地方」,但 Mark Simon 沒詳細交代派發至哪些組織。</p> - -<p>法官杜麗冰問,在刊物英文版寫有「扣除成本捐 612 人道基金」,為何中文版沒有標明?周稱不清楚,但指「可以做呢個決定,我相信係黎生或者 CEO」,又指記得刊物中英文版的淨收益都捐予 612 人道基金。</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qT6aAj3.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 《蘋果》《2019 自由之夏》特刊(資料圖片)</p> - -<h4 id="1448-周mark-simon-年終奬金由黎私人給予">14:48 周:Mark Simon 年終奬金由黎私人給予</h4> - -<p>控方展示2019年12月10日、周與黎的 WhatsApp 紀錄,周稱「老闆,你好,以下是 Mark Simon 過往四年的年終獎金你參考:</p> - -<p>1 2015 US$200,000 -2 2016 US$250,000 -3 2017 US$300,000 -4 2018 US$200,000」</p> - -<p>黎回覆「跟去年 US$200,000 Thanks. Jimmy.」</p> - -<p>周庭上解釋,年終獎金並非由壹傳媒予 Mark Simon,而是黎私人予他,但不記得哪個戶口,「我理解獎金就係你辦事做到得嘅獎金」。周再指,「因為我收到佢指示係畀呢個 bonus,冇提過係咪因為喺壹傳媒定係同黎生私人做咗嘢而畀,我嘅理解 bonus 係你嗰一年工作做得好,所以佢畀呢個 bonus」。</p> - -<p>周續指,他收到黎的訊息後轉發給 Linda,由她處理付款,強調相關支票由黎簽發。</p> - -<h4 id="1455-周一人一信予特朗普會引好多注意力">14:55 周:「一人一信」予特朗普會引「好多注意力」</h4> - -<p>控方展示2020年5月13日黎向周傳送一條眾籌網站連結,名為「US Supporting Apple Daily」,「Anna contacted me, I gave them the rate after speaking with our ad department. Now they put an ad up that lets everybody our discount. (So I just tell everybody it’s subsidized).(Anna 聯絡了我,我與廣告部討論後,給了他們折扣,現在他們登廣告,讓每個人都可以享受折扣。(所以我只是告訴大家,這是有補助的)。)</p> - -<p>黎再稱「Does this crowdfunding campaign come from Simon lee and his friends? Great idea! We can go the same channel for our US subscription effort. Thanks.(這次眾籌活動來自 Simon Lee 和他的朋友嗎?好提議!我們可以透過相同渠道進行美國訂閱工作,謝謝。)</p> - -<p>周回覆「Copy that. I will look into it and come back to you. We also have 美蘋撐蘋果計劃和贈閱卷 and will start work immediately. thanks.(收到。我會調查一下後再回覆你,我們還有美蘋撐蘋果計劃和贈閱卷,即將開始工作。謝謝)、「Hi Boss, this one is not coming from Simon Lee. Thanks!(老闆,這不是 Simon Lee 發起的,謝謝)」</p> - -<p>控方問,訊息提到的眾籌是甚麼?周稱「我諗我其實當時都唔知,都要一段時間先覆返(黎)」,後來他回覆黎有關「美蘋撐蘋果計劃」,「我問咗其他同事,我之後回覆唔係由 Simon Lee(發起)」。周續指,這並非公司舉辦的計劃,他沒進入連結閱讀相關內容。</p> - -<p>法官李運騰問,誰是 Simon Lee?周稱是李兆富,之前曾替《蘋果》工作,「之後我理解佢都有幫黎生做嘢」,但不清楚其實際工作。</p> - -<p>控方再展示周與黎有關「一人一信行動」的訊息,黎稱「紙信有蘋果 logo 而且傳媒一定會印出來和報道,有助我們之後推廣美國人訂閱蘋果」,周則稱「會立刻跟進」。控方問,他所指的跟進是甚麼?周稱「咁我應該係搵咗劍虹、印刷廠去準備印呢封信」。</p> - -<p>控方問,為何「一人一信」有助推廣美國人訂閱《蘋果》?周稱「如果要一人一信寄去畀特朗普,咁個聲音會好大囉,咁亦都會有好多注意力囉,咁從而希望多啲人去subscribe、去訂閱《蘋果》」。</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JjCiPNy.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 《蘋果》於2020年推「一人一信救香港」行動,呼籲市民寫信給時任美國總統特朗普。(資料圖片)</p> - -<h4 id="1517-控方完成主問">15:17 控方完成主問</h4> - -<p>控方又顯示由2019年4月1日至10月31日的「合併現金流量表(Combined Cash Flow)」,周稱是 Linda 製作,「比黎生知道佢收入嗰啲洗費,同埋喺後面見到所有私人公司嘅銀行戶口狀況」。庭上顯示,當中一項紀錄為「Chan Tsz Wah – sponsorship for exhibition $14.4k」,控方詢問是甚麼?周按紀錄表示,「就係 sponsor 佢嘅 exhibition」,但不知道內容。</p> - -<p>控方完成主問。辯方資深大律師彭耀鴻提出,由於控方沒有提供《蘋果》的工作平台 Slack 紀錄,其後需由辯方自行擷取,故當前壹傳媒行政總裁張劍虹作供時,無法向張提問,希望重新傳召張劍虹出庭。法官杜麗冰表示周四(9日)會再考慮辯方申請。</p> - -<h4 id="1540-休庭">15:40 休庭</h4> - -<hr /> - -<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>《法庭線》周達權確認有份處理黎私人戶口Russia And China In Arctic2024-05-08T12:00:00+08:002024-05-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/russia-and-china-in-arctic<p><em>Despite some common interests, Russia and China have different goals in the Arctic.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>Closer engagement between Russia and China has fuelled assumptions of an emerging axis. The Arctic is often cited as evidence of Sino-Russian alignment due to their growing Arctic ties across the security, strategic and commercial spheres. Beijing frames its Arctic relationship with Russia often in terms of “win-win” agreements and strategies. This term, “win-win”, reflects Beijing’s Confucius thinking, and indicates that the two countries’ bilateral mutually beneficial interests in the region remain far short of the increasingly popular assumption of a brewing Arctic alliance.</p> - -<p>Resources and transportation (that is, the future history of global maritime trade) are the two primary strategic interests driving China’s Arctic gambit. All components of the Arctic resource “prize” are of interest to Beijing and feature across various policy statements and indeed within China’s 2018 Arctic Strategy. As a burgeoning global trade power, the ability to cut logistics costs and, indeed, transportation times, is of central interest to China. Here, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) – largely hugging the Russian Arctic coastline – links Asia to Europe. Through the Arctic Ocean, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are connected. Travel time between Asia and Europe via the NSR is about 23 days on average, compared with the Suez Canal’s 37-day average. In 2013, the first Chinese merchant ship transited the NSR and was the first container vessel ever to do so.</p> - -<p>China’s Arctic interest dates to 1925, when it acceded to the Spitsbergen (now Svalbard) Treaty. The treaty benefited the signatories economically by facilitating access to mining rights on the Svalbard archipelago, while agreeing to protect Svalbard from any military buildup. This Arctic archipelago’s scientific and research value was further tapped by China in 2004 when Beijing built the Yellow River Arctic research station – cementing Chinese presence in the region.</p> - -<p>In addition, the Xue Long (Snow Dragon), China’s first icebreaker, has conducted numerous Arctic research expeditions since 1999. Today, it is joined by Xue Long-2, China’s first indigenously built icebreaker. Murmurs of a nuclear-powered icebreaker about to roll off China’s production yard further point to Beijing’s growing polar capability. In securing observer status to the Arctic Council in 2013, China inserted itself into the Arctic governance ecosystem. But this does not place Beijing at the decision-making table – observers do not vote or lead multilateral discussion within the Arctic Council.</p> - -<p>Beyond transportation, Beijing seeks to diversify its energy imports across the globe. This makes the resource-rich Russian Arctic Zone (both inland and offshore) an attractive component of China’s diversification strategy. While the Sino-Russian Arctic relationship is predicated on economic foundations, for now, Russia has yet to fall into Beijing’s “debt-trap diplomacy”. Moscow maintains stringent domestic legislation on joint ventures and ownership of sovereign energy deposits. This is a delicate balance. Russia relies on sustained future Chinese demand for Arctic liquified natural gas (LNG), but Moscow has also worked to diversify its capital pools. India, Japan, Saudi Arabia and South Korea are all linked to Russian Arctic energy ventures in one way or another.</p> - -<p>China does not have a majority share in either of the two key LNG projects on the Russian Arctic’s Yamal Peninsula. Beijing’s share in the Yamal LNG venture is 29.9%, while Russia’s Novatek holds a controlling 50.1% and France’s Total holds 20%. In the Arctic-2 LNG project, China holds 20%, Novatek 60%, Total 10%, and the remaining 10% is held by a Japanese consortium. Russia’s upcoming Arctic energy projects, located in proximity to the existing Yamal Peninsula ventures Ob (LNG), Vostok (oil), Arctic-1 (LNG) and Arctic-3 (LNG), can be expected to attract diverse capital pools.</p> - -<p>Likewise, on the NSR or “polar silk road” front, Russia maintains the upper (controlling) hand. The NSR wraps along the Russian coastline for most of its route. This is important to Russia for two reasons. First, much of the NSR falls within Russia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and therefore Moscow has deemed it necessary to charge transit tariffs. The tariffs have been accompanied by Russia’s introduction of tight rules and domestic laws for foreign firms looking to use the route. Second, Russia insists vessels can only navigate the NSR when accompanied by Russian nuclear icebreakers. Tapping into NSR potential is thus subject to strict Russian directives.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The notion that there is a Sino-Russian Arctic alliance is a misinterpretation of the realities that drive China and Russia together in the Arctic</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>While mutually beneficial interests – and the overall sense of “win-win” agreements – facilitate close engagement between Beijing and Moscow in the Arctic, it is still problematic to assume an Arctic “axis” is forthcoming. China’s efforts to increase its engagement in the Arctic are occurring far beyond the Russian Arctic Zone. Iceland was the first European state to sign a free-trade agreement with Beijing, and China’s first intergovernmental framework in the Arctic was struck with Iceland in 2012. Various Chinese state energy interests have been floated in geothermal resources in Iceland – but to date the projects have been abandoned. In 2018, the China–Iceland Arctic Science Observatory opened and continues to operate. Iceland strategically presents as a logistics hub that would act as a key shipping port between Europe and Asia along the NSR. It seems clear that Chinese Arctic strategy is to “internationalise” the Arctic in a way that features and promotes China’s strategic benefit.</p> - -<p>China is also driven by great power ideology and the prestige afforded by having a global polar footprint. Russia is aware of this simmering rationale for Chinese Arctic strategy. Efforts by China to move beyond the agreed terms of its mutually beneficial arrangement with Moscow within the Russian Arctic Zone, and how closely China adheres to the existing legal and sovereign arrangements of the Arctic Ocean, will certainly be a litmus test for the Sino-Russian Arctic “alliance”.</p> - -<p>Indeed, Sino-Russian strategic tensions remain, well beyond the overhanging fear of centuries of mistrust and the issue of the Russian Far East. In June 2020, Moscow accused one of its leading Arctic scientists, Valery Mitko, of spying for Beijing. Mitko was charged with treason for handing over classified information on Arctic research and submarine sensor technology to China. But perhaps more telling is the way that both countries have hushed up the incident, with neither formally commenting on the arrest. For now, Beijing and Moscow appear to agree to disagree – so long as Arctic LNG business is booming.</p> - -<p>The narrative of Moscow and Beijing working together to carve up the Arctic riches and take control of new global transport corridors has started to make its way into the policy and defence planning documents of Arctic-rim states. Washington’s litany of Arctic strategic planning documents – Naval, Air Force and Coast Guard strategies – feature renewed great power competition in the Arctic as a central security threat. However, the notion that there is a Sino-Russian Arctic alliance is a misinterpretation of the realities that drive China and Russia together in the Arctic.</p> - -<p>The realities of the Sino-Russian relationship (dubbed by both as one of “mutual benefit”) in the Arctic is best grasped when the limits of the partnership are considered. There are, first and foremost, limits in terms of geographical boundaries. The Russian Arctic Zone is the lion’s share of the Arctic region, home to the NSR and a vast percentage of Arctic resources. The Russian Arctic Zone is also the geographical “limit” of Sino-Russian Arctic “cooperation” as well.</p> - -<p>Of the eight members of the Arctic Council, Russia took the most convincing to grant China its observer status in 2013. Moscow approved membership, and with it, legitimacy, on the basis that Beijing explicitly acknowledged the sovereignty of Arctic-rim states and reaffirmed its commitment to the legal architecture of the Arctic region – the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.</p> - -<p>Russia watches, with tempered suspicion, Beijing’s Arctic high sea missions and scientific research agenda in what China sees as a global commons. Yet within the Russian Arctic Zone, Russia welcomes Chinese engagement, but on Kremlin terms. Since 2014, with Western sanctions over Russia’s annexation of Crimea and sustained aggression in Ukraine, Moscow has had a cashflow problem.</p> - -<p>Despite key economic strategic partnerships in the Russian Arctic, China is busy diversifying itself throughout the region. China is actively engaging with other Arctic-rim powers and has commercial ventures, investment plans and entrenched soft-power strategies in Norway, Canada, Iceland and Denmark (through Greenland).</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite mutually beneficial interests in the Arctic, commercial realpolitik is at the heart of China and Russia’s engagement in the region</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Russia’s Arctic strategy is built on both economic security and frontier border security objectives. The Sino-Russian relationship lends itself to these economic security interests and ambitions, but it is less effective at navigating Russia’s Arctic “siege mentality”. This is largely because of the kind of increased interest and activity that China is undertaking in the Arctic – and against which Russia seeks to secure its vast open frontier. Any deterioration in Sino-Russian ties could threaten this delicate balance.</p> - -<p>Russian efforts to securitise its economic interests in the Arctic fall short of an expansionist agenda. Beyond the posturing, ultimately Moscow’s Arctic priority remains regional stability. Continued regional cooperation with its NATO-member and Western Arctic neighbours remains a central strategic objective. After all, keeping the arena free of conflict is crucial to ensuring the NSR (and Russia’s future economic resource base) remains open and commercially viable. Russia needs to be able to deliver secure, trusted and unimpeded energy supplies from its northern frontier to Asian and European energy clients.</p> - -<p>The same cannot be assumed of Chinese Arctic interests, with clear indicators of an emerging expansionist agenda. While much of Beijing’s recent Arctic Ocean missions have been primarily about “raising the flag” and promoting soft-power public relations campaigns for domestic consumption, it is evident that China is set to stay in the Arctic. While much of the Arctic Ocean is delineated by territorial seas and agreed maritime boundaries, the central Arctic Ocean does hold international waters, which facilitates Chinese engagement.</p> - -<p>Fragmentation of Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic context might yet emerge from the outcomes of the Arctic continental shelf debate. Via the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Russia, Canada and Denmark have all submitted formal, yet overlapping, claims to this continental shelf. Should a claim be upheld, the awarded state will then claim exclusive rights to the seabed and the resources beneath the area of the North Pole. This would block China’s access to seabed or resources in the international Arctic waters around the North Pole.</p> - -<p>Overall, continued efforts to put Moscow and Beijing in the same “basket” when it comes to great power competition in the Arctic “great game” is short-sighted and misses critical opportunities to futureproof the Arctic as a zone of international cooperation, collaboration and low tension. Sino-Russian Arctic ties will continue to be predictable to a large extent. Ties will remain mutually beneficial – until they are not. Predicting this point should be the priority for Arctic stakeholders. The problem appears to be, for now, that many stakeholders assume a fractured or fragmented Sino-Russian Arctic relationship does not exist.</p> - -<p>Russia and China’s Arctic relationship is not an alliance – it is driven by “win-win” thinking. Such framing is extremely subjective and prone to change. Despite mutually beneficial interests in the region, commercial realpolitik is at the heart of their engagement. For now, the partnership in the Arctic navigates existing fault lines elsewhere, such as Beijing’s failure to acknowledge Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Moscow’s nonalignment in the developing India–China conflict.</p> - -<p>Sino-Russian mutually beneficial cooperation and engagement within the Russian Arctic Zone is not a Sino-Russian alliance in the Arctic. In a somewhat Confucius-informed position, Beijing wants to “seek harmony and keep differences” when it comes to engagement with Russia in the Arctic. Both countries will remain engaged proactively and collaboratively across industrialisation projects, diplomatic relations and various commercial dealings in the Russian Arctic Zone. But when this “win-win” situation sours, Western Arctic states may indeed be faced with another Arctic security threat – a conflict between Russia and China in the Arctic.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Elizabeth Buchanan</strong> is a former Australian Department of Defence employee who is currently a senior fellow with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and an Associate Researcher with the French Ministry of Armed Forces’ strategic research institute (IRSEM).</p>Elizabeth BuchananDespite some common interests, Russia and China have different goals in the Arctic.Europe’s Fiscal Crossroads2024-05-08T12:00:00+08:002024-05-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/europes-fiscal-crossroads<p><em>Europe currently lacks the political and institutional mechanisms to fund crucial investments for a new geopolitical era. The question is, “where will the money come from?”</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>Europe finds itself at both a geopolitical and fiscal crossroads. On the one hand, the European Union is no longer in danger of collapse after a decade of crises. The bloc is beginning to play a stronger global role, with European Commission president Ursula Von Der Leyen endeavoring — and largely succeeding — to lead a “geopolitical commission.” But on the other hand, Europe is facing growing threats and acute challenges to both its security and its economic and governance model.</p> - -<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the threat posed by energy dependence and climate change have awakened Europeans to the need to invest in both defense and the energy transition. Europe also fears the possibility that the United States will be less engaged in ensuring European security, especially under a potential second Trump administration. Additionally, the need to support Ukraine and facilitate its European future has revived the potential of EU enlargement, which will require considerable resourcing. Lastly, the rise of China and its predatory business practices has prompted the European Union to take economic security seriously and advance efforts to “de-risk.” As Mario Draghi aptly summed up in the Financial Times, the era of relying on the United States for defense, China for exports, and Russia for energy is over. The former president of the European Central Bank and former Italian prime minister posited: “The geopolitical, economic model upon which Europe rested since the end of the second world war, is gone.”</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the threat posed by energy dependence and climate change have awakened Europeans to the need to invest in both defense and the energy transition.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Yet Europe is also finding that this new era of geopolitical competition is costly. Despite having created a monetary union with a common currency, the euro, and a powerful central bank, the European Union lacks a fiscal union and a common fiscal policy. The entire EU budget is less than $200 billion per year (about 1 percent of EU GDP), with 33 percent of that money going to agricultural subsidies. It also has tight fiscal rules (the so-called Stability and Growth Pact) that limit debt and deficit levels for EU member states. A recently agreed reform increases spending flexibility, but the new rules also put pressure on member states to reduce deficits.</p> - -<p>This is the quandary facing Europe. It must meet the demands of this new geopolitical era, support Ukraine and strengthen its own defense, provide European public goods, and tackle the climate crisis, but it lacks the appropriate political and institutional mechanisms to fund these investments. The question is, “where will the money come from?”</p> - -<p>This white paper outlines Europe’s fiscal terrain and presents potential paths forward for the European Union. Whether Europe develops its collective fiscal capacities is of tremendous geopolitical importance and of relevance to the United States. NATO’s defense spending goal of 2 percent of GDP is directly tied to Europe’s fiscal landscape and EU fiscal rules. Moreover, Europe’s capacity to accelerate the energy transition, reduce its energy insecurity, increase its competitiveness, and ensure its economic security crucially depends on the creation of a fiscal union to finance European public goods.</p> - -<p>Europe is thus at a crossroads. It will not fall apart, as feared in the previous decade, but it could easily stagnate economically and geopolitically without major advances in its fiscal integration. For the European Union — and therefore Europe as a whole — to become a relevant geopolitical actor, Brussels will need to develop its own fiscal capacity.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">For the European Union to become a relevant geopolitical actor, Brussels will need to develop its own fiscal capacity.</code></em></strong></p> - -<h3 id="europes-fiscal-terrain">Europe’s Fiscal Terrain</h3> - -<p>Unlike in the United States, where the federal budget is much larger than that of individual states, countries in the European Union have relatively high levels of public spending relative to GDP (the EU average is around 50 percent, with some countries, such as France, well above that level). But the bloc, in contrast to the U.S. federal government, spends very little. Also, while U.S. states have credible rules for limiting spending and debt (precisely because federal spending is high), in the European Union such rules are not credible, which generates problems of excess debt and deficits in some member states. This prompted the creation of the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997, which stipulates that deficits should be below 3 percent of GDP and debt levels below 60 percent of GDP. However, these rules were suspended during the Covid-19 pandemic and have recently been reformed because there is wide consensus that applying them without substantial changes would force the European Union into austerity precisely when it needs fiscal flexibility to address its huge challenges.</p> - -<p>The reasons for the differences between the EU and U.S. fiscal structures are historical. In the United States, political union came before monetary and fiscal union. In 1790, Alexander Hamilton, then secretary of the treasury, transferred the outstanding debts of the federated states to the federal government in exchange for a compromise where states promised to run balanced budgets. On the monetary side, it was only in 1913 that the Federal Reserve was created, inaugurating the contemporary structure of American monetary policy. Otherwise, federal spending in the United States grew as the need to finance public goods, such as defense and infrastructure, increased.</p> - -<p>In the European Union, on the other hand, economic integration began in the 1950s, as most countries had already created or were creating their welfare states, which entailed taxes and spending at the national level. In that context, the EU budget, known as the Multiannual Financial Framework, was created. But it was envisioned — and still is — as a small complement to national budgets for common policies (including agriculture and cohesion funds). In fact, EU rules stipulate that the European budget, which is negotiated for periods of seven years, has to be balanced (i.e., contributions from member states and EU taxes, which are negligible, have to finance all EU spending, and debt issuance is not allowed).</p> - -<p>As a result, efforts to invest in European public goods with strong positive externalities, such as decarbonization, digitalization, transport and energy infrastructure, or defense, are left to member states. This inevitably leads to shortfalls and discrepancies in investment due to the varying financial capacities of each country, conditioned by its debt and differing national priorities. It also makes pan-European, cross-border investments, whether in infrastructure or defense, more difficult. This creates a typical collective-action problem where joint European action that would benefit all is put on hold, leading to major gaps in European capacity. Not only can this tie the hands of the European Union, leaving it unable to take strong action, but it can also threaten the single market, creating significant disparities between European countries.</p> - -<p>In short, the European Union (and in particular the eurozone) does not have a coherent and common fiscal policy, but a poorly coordinated one that prevents the adequate financing of many of the urgent European public goods that the new global economic and geopolitical reality makes increasingly necessary.</p> - -<p>This is not news. It has long been recognized that the lack of a common fiscal capacity is a significant gap in the European project. However, in the last year, calls for Europe to take the next step in its integration and develop a fiscal union are coming from increasingly prominent voices and in unexpected places. Leading them is Mario Draghi, who recently wrote in the Economist that:</p> - -<p>“Europe must now confront a host of supranational challenges that will require vast investments in a short time frame, including defense as well as the green transition and digitisation. As it stands, however, Europe neither has a federal strategy to finance them, nor can national policies take up the mantle, as European fiscal and state-aid rules limit the ability of countries to act independently.”</p> - -<p>He further developed his ideas and called for a fiscal union in the 15th Annual Feldstein Lecture in 2023 (“The Next Flight of the Bumblebee: The Path to Common Fiscal Policy in the Eurozone”). But Draghi is not alone. International institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and a variety of thinktanks and academics have long argued that the European Monetary Union requires a fiscal (and also a political) union to be sustainable — an idea that is backed by significant historical evidence. More recently, Paolo Gentiloni, the European commissioner for economy, has suggested that the bloc establish a central treasury to finance common goods through issuing eurobonds in order to address massive spending demands.</p> - -<p>Momentum is moving toward fiscal union. Should the European Union decide to develop its fiscal capacities, it would be emulating the history of U.S. economic integration. As Jacob Kirkegaard and Adam Posen write, “US national economic institutions formed gradually during the 19th and 20th centuries not only within the confines of a changing federal constitution but also often in response to the specific political events and natural disasters of the time” (emphasis added).</p> - -<h3 id="why-europe-needs-to-spend">Why Europe Needs to Spend</h3> - -<p>The current geopolitical environment provides a clear rationale for collective European investment. There are three clear lines of effort for greater EU spending: defense and foreign policy (including military and economic support for Ukraine), the energy transition, and economic competitiveness. These goals have proved exceptionally difficult given the fiscal constraints explained above.</p> - -<p>On defense, Europe faces an urgent crisis that requires massive expenditures. The European Union needs to not only support Ukraine’s war effort militarily, but it also needs to urgently rebuild its own militaries. As for Ukraine, wars are incredibly expensive and require massive fiscal outlays and expenditure. The European Union collectively has provided significant economic and military aid to Ukraine. But EU member states have now given away most of their stockpiles of ready military equipment, meaning additional military support for Ukraine requires buying from industry, which is more costly. Moreover, European militaries also require major investment to acquire immediate capabilities — to make up for present shortfalls and to ensure Europeans have the basic capabilities to defend themselves. European states need to spend not just to replace equipment given to Ukraine but also to drastically increase their own stockpiles. Yet, Europe also needs to invest in major capabilities over the medium and long term that both reduce and mitigate Europe’s dependence on the United States. These include the capacity to procure major enabling capabilities, such as air-to-air refueling, as well as invest in the next generation of weaponry, from fighter jets to tanks to air defense systems. This both requires an immediate injection of funding as well as a sustained financial pipeline.</p> - -<p>While defense is a collective European problem, it is presently funded almost exclusively at the national level. This creates significant gaps in European collective military capabilities, leaving the European Union utterly dependent on the United States.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While defense is a collective European problem, it is presently funded almost exclusively at the national level. This creates significant gaps in European collective military capabilities, leaving the European Union utterly dependent on the United States.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>On energy, the needs are great not just for climate but for the competitiveness of European firms, especially in a context in which most great powers, including the United States through the Inflation Reduction Act, are heavily subsidizing energy and green investments. Europe needs to dramatically accelerate the green transition not just for climate purposes but to lower its energy costs, which now largely come from expensive hydrocarbon imports.</p> - -<p>Europe needs energy interconnections in order to increase the flexibility and resilience of its electricity system, as well as to be able to leverage the comparative advantages of the different member states in the production of different types of energy. For instance, Spain is becoming a major producer of solar energy, but this energy cannot currently be exported in large quantities to the rest of Europe due to inadequate transmission infrastructure.</p> - -<p>Additionally, a subsidy race has begun in the world economy for which the European Union is woefully unprepared. China has increased its support for all types of domestic manufacturing and technology industries, while the United States has revived its own industrial policy with generous support for green and digital industries. The situation is potentially pernicious for European industry because many of the U.S. subsidies consist of tax credits (which are much simpler to implement than European ones). Moreover, the American economy is not permeated with as much bureaucracy as the European Union, and, in addition, its trade and industrial policies contain a series of protectionist clauses that are incompatible with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules (“Buy American”), whereby only products almost entirely manufactured within the United States will be able to benefit from federal subsidies.</p> - -<p>The European response cannot come from each of its individual member states because this would lead those with more fiscal space to inject public funds into their companies, thus undermining fair competition within the internal European market. Therefore, Europe’s response would need to come from industrial policies at the European level.</p> - -<p>For all of these investments, the private sector has an important role to play. However, the fragmentation of European financial markets makes it difficult for private investment to adapt adequately to European needs and thus complement public investments. The European Union therefore will also need to promote the deepening of its banking and capital markets union and move toward the creation of a truly European, risk-free sovereign asset. But since financing public goods and risky investments requires that the public sector takes the lead, it is essential to increase the bloc’s public financial capacities.</p> - -<h3 id="how-europe-could-spend">How Europe Could Spend</h3> - -<p>To address Europe’s challenges and to take on a larger geopolitical role, the European Union will need a substantial increase to its budget. In 2022, which is the latest official available figure, the bloc’s GDP was almost €16 trillion ($17 trillion) and the EU budget was €168 billion ($182 billion), equivalent to 1.1 percent of its GDP.</p> - -<p>The European Union could increase its budget in three ways.</p> - -<p><strong>First, member states could increase contributions to the EU budget.</strong> Member countries pay the European Union every year based on their population and GDP, and those funds are then spent on common policies. To grow the EU budget, larger and richer countries would have to pay more. These countries are typically the ones that benefit most from the existence of the single market. In addition, since the European Union cares about economic convergence and social cohesion between its regions, it is logical that richer countries contribute more.</p> - -<p>However, the next EU budget negotiations will not take place until 2027. Member states could in the interim create off-budget vehicles to fund certain priorities. For instance, the European Peace Facility is an off-budget EU instrument, meaning it is not funded by the “EU budget” but by member states contributing at a national level to a separate pot of funds allocated toward a policy priority that benefits the whole bloc.</p> - -<p><strong>Second, the European Union could issue more joint debt.</strong> More debt issuance at the central level raises complex legal and distributional questions. However, it makes little economic sense that the bloc is unable to issue common debt on a regular basis to finance some specific investments. All other great powers do it. Moreover, the experience of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) — the program launched in 2020 to finance the economic recovery from Covid-19, by which the European Union is issuing up to €750 billion ($814 billion) worth of debt and transferring funds to member states as grants and loans — provides a useful blueprint. In fact, if the European Union were to issue large amounts of debt, it could take advantage of economies of scale which would structurally reduce long-term financing costs and therefore increase the sustainability of national public debts. It would also increase the international role of the euro. There are growing calls from countries such as Estonia for the European Union to issue eurobonds to invest in defense and to provide aid to Ukraine. The issuing of debt for the NGEU program is also leading to investments in the green transition and economic competitiveness.</p> - -<p>Debt-financing payments will come out of the EU budget, as they are intended for the NGEU. But increased debt-servicing payments will either require increases to the EU budget or difficult trade-offs.</p> - -<p><strong>Third, the European Union could introduce European taxes.</strong> These are called “own resources” in the EU jargon because they are collected directly by the European Union. These new European taxes could be “green” taxes, tariffs (such as the Common Border Adjustment Mechanism), levies on multinationals’ profits (as agreed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), and levies on financial transactions. Another option, capable of raising much more revenue, would be to transfer a percentage of what member states collect in value-added tax (VAT) to the EU budget. In any case, more EU taxes would be politically difficult, as they may or may not imply lower taxes at the national level (using VAT solves this problem). But they might increase the centrality of the European Union in European politics because citizens would see more clearly that their taxes directly finance European public goods. In this sense, the American saying “no taxation without representation” in the European Union works backwards. There is representation (directly at the European Parliament) and indirectly at the European Commission and European Council, but Brussels has virtually no taxation powers. Approving these new “own resources” requires unanimity by member states, which is not easy, but it does not require treaty change.</p> - -<h3 id="the-political-challenge">The Political Challenge</h3> - -<p>While there is momentum for more EU spending, there is also strong resistance inside the European Union to developing the bloc’s fiscal capacities. The major problem is resistance to the redistributive nature of fiscal integration and common debt issuances, particularly in wealthier Northern European countries. Opposition has become deeply entrenched politically, with claims that the NGEU was merely a “one-off.”</p> - -<p>The difficulties of increasing the EU budget were demonstrated in December, when, despite all the pressing challenges, the increases requested by the European Union were cut. The European Commission’s initial proposal to add €99 billion ($107 billion) between 2024 and 2027 (€66 billion of grants and €33 billion of loans) was reduced to €66 billion (€33 billion of loans and €33 billion of grants), of which only €21 billion is new financing (the rest comes from existing EU funds).</p> - -<p>During the euro crisis during the 2010s, a divide was created between creditor countries in the north and debtor countries in the south that still persists and impedes consensus. Germany, the Netherlands, and other northern countries are particularly reluctant to mutualize risks and to create financial instruments that increase their solidarity commitments with southern countries, which exhibit higher levels of debt and deficits. They argue that until the usefulness of the NGEU funds can be assessed in 2027, it is premature to consider new joint debt issues. They are also unwilling to increase their contributions to the Multiannual Financial Framework due to tight domestic fiscal environments related to low economic growth, as well as for fear that this will increase support for extreme right-wing parties. The discourse in northern countries is still anchored in the need for rules and spending restraint to avoid the rise of extreme right-wing political groups, which continue to accuse the southern countries of being profligate.</p> - -<p>Moreover, the fact that the European Union currently has a majority of center-right (and even some far-right) governments, whose liberal economic visions preach fiscal prudence and a reduced role for the state, also makes it difficult to reach ambitious agreements. Additionally, the ascendency of some far-right parties to positions of power in Europe may make reaching agreement on EU financing efforts extremely challenging. There are tremendous political hurdles to moving forward on fiscal integration.</p> - -<p>However, it has become cliché to say that Europe is forged through crises. A crisis prompts the need for tangible action, which prompts European states to act. This was evident in response to the Covid-19 pandemic when the European Union bought vaccines for the entire bloc and allocated €750 billion ($814 billion) for its economic recovery, funded extensively through issuing joint debt. The security and energy crises caused by the war in Ukraine may therefore spur further action. The European Union will likely create a fiscal union, perhaps not by setting out with that goal but instead by seeking to address tangible and urgent issues, such as the need to arm Ukraine or accelerate the energy transition.</p> - -<h3 id="the-road-toward-fiscal-union-a-permanent-fiscal-capacity">The Road toward Fiscal Union: A Permanent Fiscal Capacity</h3> - -<p>Given that increasing the EU budget will be politically difficult in the short run, an alternative option could be to create a permanent fiscal capacity, which would function as an embryo of a European treasury. A permanent fiscal capacity would be an independent extension of the European budget. It would issue triple-A-rating debt backed by revenues from the European Union’s own resources, thus guaranteeing that the debt would be repaid (if there is political agreement, the issued debt could be rolled over indefinitely, as is the case for most countries with sound fiscal policies).</p> - -<p>The fiscal capacity would enable the European Union to respond to crises and urgent issues. It could also play a countercyclical role during crises for the eurozone as a whole, complement national automatic stabilizers, support investment in highly indebted member states, and finance specific European public goods with positive externalities, such as those outlined above.</p> - -<p>The easiest way to create this permanent fiscal capacity would be the institutionalization of the NGEU as a common financing tool. The logic behind the instrument is simple. The European Union borrows and gives grants or “cheap” loans to member states to finance specific investments and reforms previously negotiated with the European Commission and approved by the European Council. The investments have to focus primarily on the green and digital transitions, as well as defense, and the reforms have to address recommendations that the European Commission makes every year to improve member states’ socioeconomic performance (the so-called “Country Specific Recommendations” of the European Semester).</p> - -<p>The disbursement of the funds is conditional. It only takes place once member states have passed the reforms or started the investments. Therefore, it provides a positive incentive for reform: there is a carrot, but there is no stick. If a country does not pass the milestones and targets established in their Recovery and Resilience Facility agreed to with Brussels, it does not receive access to the funds, but it is also not fined.</p> - -<p>Although the NGEU funds can be improved in terms of efficiency control or agility in their provision, it would be a mistake to give up the possibility of extending the use of an already implemented and relatively successful (although improvable) mechanism such as the NGEU debt. Some countries insist on canceling the instrument and confirming this experience as a one-off, but the truth is that the current geopolitical demands go far beyond the mere economic recovery needs of Covid-19, which were the original justification for the NGEU.</p> - -<p>This paper’s proposed permanent fiscal capacity would imply transfers to member states similar to the current NGEU, but they would be demand-based and without preassigned amounts by country. They should focus on the priorities established above: defense, the energy transition, and competitiveness. Access to the permanent fiscal capacity should be subject to a stricter conditionality, better in terms of milestones, reforms, and assessment than that of the current NGEU mechanism. Governance and ownership should be enhanced through a coordinated decisionmaking process between the European Commission and member states, later ratified by both the European Council and the European Parliament.</p> - -<p>Finally, part of the spending coming from the fiscal capacity could go directly to European companies that develop investment projects instead of going through member states. This is particularly relevant for defense spending, trans-European infrastructure, and projects of strategic interest entailing substantial research and development investment. Direct procurement by the European Commission could speed up the projects, reduce the administrative burden, and help develop a culture of collaboration between companies from different member states.</p> - -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> - -<p>The European Union will struggle to make progress in addressing the collective European challenges it is facing without massive investment. Yet it is trying to achieve vital goals — ensuring Ukraine’s survival, decarbonizing, rebuilding EU militaries, and enhancing competitiveness — without an adequate budget that supports these objectives, finances basic European public goods, and contributes to the macroeconomic stability of the eurozone. The current debate, however, is focused not on the financial tools needed to achieve preset objectives, but on reducing debt imbalances. While it is important for the European Union to ensure the long-term sustainability of national budgets, it is also important to gauge the financial capacity of the European Union as a whole to take on the current challenges.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While it is important for the European Union to ensure the long-term sustainability of national budgets, it is also important to gauge the financial capacity of the European Union as a whole to take on the current challenges.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Finally, if the European Commission were to issue large quantities of debt on a permanent basis, the international role of the euro would be strengthened. The euro is already the second-most internationally traded currency after the dollar, but it still lags in terms of some of the key functions of an international currency, such as serving as a reference for private and official use. Beyond economic factors, the euro has also lacked the political support to become a more entrenched reserve currency. But things have changed. The erosion of the so-called liberal economic order and the increasingly hostile external environment have alerted the bloc’s leaders to the urgent need to bolster their defense and strengthen economic security. The euro is one of the remaining reliable foundations upon which Brussels can strengthen its geo-economic might. The euro, an orphan currency at its inception, can thus find more backing now than could previously have been imagined. Thus, a permanent fiscal capacity or a fiscal union in the European Union would greatly contribute to the project of making the bloc a geopolitical actor.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Max Bergmann</strong> is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> - -<p><strong>Federico Steinberg</strong> is a visiting fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS and a senior fellow at the Royal Elcano Institute.</p>Max Bergmann and Federico SteinbergEurope currently lacks the political and institutional mechanisms to fund crucial investments for a new geopolitical era. The question is, “where will the money come from?”【黎智英案・審訊第 71 日】2024-05-07T12:00:00+08:002024-05-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-71<ul> - <li>前壹傳媒營運總裁周達權:黎智英將其名下離岸公司轉至陳梓華作為「酬勞」</li> -</ul> - -<excerpt /> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/aS5Vo8M.png" alt="image01" /></p> - -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(7日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第71日審訊。已認罪的陳梓華早上作供完畢,結束13天的作供。控方下午傳召前壹傳媒營運總裁兼財務總裁周達權出庭作供,他需就黎的控罪提供真實而全面的證供,來換取控方免於起訴。周提及黎智英名下有很多公司,包括力高顧問有限公司和 Lais Hotel Property Limited,其中力高是黎自資營運的私人公司,財務由黎和 Mark Simon 掌控。早前庭上證供顯示黎智英透過力高向陳梓華支付逾8萬元,以歸還陳去台北和英國的開支費用。就黎智英名下的離岸公司 LACOCK,自2020年1月起,陳梓華成為銀行戶口唯一簽署人,周轉述 Mark Simon 稱陳「幫阿黎生手做咗啲嘢」,所以黎「作為酬勞」把公司轉至陳梓華名下。</p> - -<p>陳梓華稱國安法後黎智英繼續呼籲制裁 惟辯方質疑陳沒細閱文章內容</p> - -<p>已認罪的被告陳梓華第13天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控辯雙方昨日均完成提問。其後在法官的提問下,陳稱在國安法生效之後,有在網上見到黎智英繼續呼籲制裁,包括推動「避風港法案」(Harbour Act),又邀請很多外國智庫和政經界名人來做訪問,以及在社交媒體上繼續發表意見。惟辯方代表之一、紐西蘭御用大律師 Marc Corlett 質疑,陳梓華只在 Telegram 上看過一篇或多於一篇的文章標題,便說黎有繼續呼籲制裁,可是他並沒有按進去連結來細閱文章內容。</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/U1RNJgN.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻(左)、大律師 Marc Corlett(右)</p> - -<p>辯方今繼續圍繞此話題盤問,陳承認很多黎智英的文章和訪談均沒有看過,但是他並不是只從文章或訪談去得知黎有繼續呼籲制裁。陳又指,在 Telegram 轉載一個連結的時候,該訊息不會只顯示標題,而是會顯示訪談或文章的摘要,所以他不只看過標題。</p> - -<p>陳稱該訊息是在一個 Telegram 群組收到的,但他不記得是誰人傳送出來,印象中該人傳送連結的同時,有說「喺國際線上嘅新消息或新情報」,而連結內容是關於「外國政府可以限制中國的經濟發展」。</p> - -<h4 id="陳梓華確認從朋友口中得知黎智英邀請外國人訪談-不知道黎有否節目中呼籲制裁">陳梓華確認從朋友口中得知黎智英邀請外國人訪談 不知道黎有否節目中呼籲制裁</h4> - -<p>至於陳稱黎在《國安法》生效後推動「避風港法案」(Harbour Act),以及邀請外國智庫和政經界名人進行訪談,辯方質疑以上均是陳從朋友口中得知。</p> - -<p>陳則指「避風港法案」並非從朋友口中得知,而是他在壹傳媒大樓會見黎智英期間,黎講過「佢會喺美國爭取」,惟他當時不知道黎爭取什麼,後來從黎的私人助手 Mark Simon 得悉黎爭取的是「避風港法案」。</p> - -<p>就黎智英邀請外國智庫和政經界名人進行訪談,陳確認是因為朋友告知他,所以知道,而他並沒有參與任何相關訪談、不知道訪談內容,也不知道黎有否在訪談節目中呼籲制裁。</p> - -<h4 id="3間涉案蘋果公司時任董事周達權出庭作供-獲控方豁免起訴">3間涉案蘋果公司時任董事周達權出庭作供 獲控方豁免起訴</h4> - -<p>控方下午傳召前壹傳媒營運總監兼財務總裁周達權出庭作供。周在本案中沒有被起訴,他循法庭特別通道進入庭內,之後以非宗教形式宣誓。</p> - -<p>周達權確認,他學歷至大學程度,自1993年加入壹傳媒集團,擔任財務主管;在2016年1月1日至2020年8月25日之間,他擔任壹傳媒集團的財務總裁;在2019年10月至2021年7月2日之間,他亦是壹傳媒的營運總裁。</p> - -<p>周達權亦確認,在2019年1月1日至2021年7月2日期間,他是本案被告3間公司的董事,即蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司,也是壹傳媒有限公司的行政董事。</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/606hSh8.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 左起:張劍虹、黎智英、周達權(資料圖片)</p> - -<p>2020年8月10日,周達權被警方以「欺詐」罪名拘捕,同日再以「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」罪拘捕,之後在8月11日獲警方批准擔保。至2020年12月2日,周與黎智英和黃偉強共同被控「欺詐」罪,涉及向科技園有限公司提供虛假陳述。</p> - -<p>2020年6月24日,《蘋果日報》停運。至2021年7月2日,周辭去公司秘書和營運總裁,及至同年9月,他辭去壹傳媒內所有職務。</p> - -<p>2022年2月16日,周獲控方發出「免予起訴令」,只要針對黎智英和黃偉強的欺詐、「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」和「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」罪,提供真實而全面的證供,便可以豁免被起訴。在欺詐案件中,周經已出庭作供,黎和黃被裁定罪成,而周的案件則押後。</p> - -<h4 id="周達權指作為壹傳媒財務總裁-需向董事局主席黎智英匯報">周達權指作為壹傳媒財務總裁 需向董事局主席黎智英匯報</h4> - -<p>就周的職責,周指他作為壹傳媒的營運總裁,負責確保整個集團能夠營運,亦負責廣告營銷。此外,他會協助時任行政總裁張劍虹管理資訊科技部門。</p> - -<p>而作為財務總裁,周負責管理公司財務部和其他後勤部門,例如行政部、發行部和法律部。他指在職線上,他需要向行政總裁張劍虹、壹傳媒集團董事局和董事局主席即黎智英匯報。周指,黎智英有時會就廣告方面提供意見,也會問及一些公司財務問題。</p> - -<p>周達權指,黎智英名下有很多公司,包括力高顧問有限公司(Dico Consultants Limited)、加拿大公司 Lais Hotel Property Limited 和公明織造廠有限公司(Comitex Holdings Limited)。</p> - -<h4 id="周達權指由力高顧問財政事宜由黎智英或mark-simon決定">周達權指由力高顧問財政事宜由黎智英或Mark Simon決定</h4> - -<p>就力高顧問有限公司,周確認他在案發期間以信託形式持有力高的股份,即是代表黎智英持有股份,而黎則是另一名股東和董事。</p> - -<p>至於力高的財務事宜,周稱乃由黎智英或 Mark Simon 其中一人有決定權,有時較細額的帳目則由時任壹傳媒行政總監黃偉強決定,例如公司名下的汽車續保、續牌以及日常行政事宜。除此之外,力高所有其他開支都需要黎或 Mark Simon 批准。</p> - -<p>控方展示力高的文件,顯示力高銀行帳戶的授權簽署人是黎智英、Mark Simon、周達權和洪志強。</p> - -<h4 id="力高透過支票向陳梓華支付約8萬元-周達權表示簽署時不知道詳情">力高透過支票向陳梓華支付約8萬元 周達權表示簽署時不知道詳情</h4> - -<p>控方又展示由力高簽發的支票,顯示抬頭是陳梓華,款項為80,273港元,支票簽署人為周達權和 Mark Simon。周憶述,當時有一個付款要求,而黎智英亦批准了相關付款,財政部同事開了一張支票,周遂簽署。惟周並不知道為何要透過力高來付款,黎也沒有談及相關支票。</p> - -<p>據陳梓華早前證供,在他的英國和台北之旅之後,黎智英把陳和林姓女示威者的旅程相關費用,以支票形式歸還給他,款項合共為80,273元。</p> - -<h4 id="黎智英於2019年6月向mark-simon支付300萬元-周達權稱用以籌辦項目惟不知詳情">黎智英於2019年6月向Mark Simon支付300萬元 周達權稱用以籌辦項目惟不知詳情</h4> - -<p>控方另展示2019年6月由周達權傳送給黎智英的電郵,顯示2019年5月黎的個人開支報表,其中一筆是給予 Mark Simon 的300萬款項,用來籌辦專案項目,另有一筆200萬美元款項由黎智英匯款至 Lais Hotel Property Limited。</p> - -<p>就300萬元款項,周稱他理解是給予 Mark Simon 籌辦一些專案項目:「我理解嗰時2019年6月,可能都係用嚟做吓一啲海外文宣。」惟法官李運騰指周現在是作供,只需要說出他所知道的事情,而不要猜測。周遂表示,Mark Simon 並沒有告知他該300萬元的用途,而且周也不知道該300萬元是從哪一個銀行戶口支取。</p> - -<p>控方另展示2019年7月的電郵,顯示黎智英在2019年6月的個人開支報表,其中有一筆85萬元美金匯款至加拿大。不過周則表示,因為事隔多年,他不記得自己有否經手這一筆匯款,也記不起誰人或哪個機構是加拿大那邊的收款人。此外,報表顯示黎向壹傳媒支付了一筆貸款。</p> - -<h4 id="周達權指力高沒有實際生意-是黎智英自資營運的私人公司">周達權指力高沒有實際生意 是黎智英自資營運的私人公司</h4> - -<p>法官李運騰問,周知不知道力高的性質是什麼,是一間商業上活躍的公司,還是一間空殻公司,或是一間持有物業的集團公司。周則稱,按他理解力商「冇乜實際 business」、「我記憶中係冇乜定期收入」,但是持有一些車和船,以及聘請了一些員工。</p> - -<p>李官問,那麼力高成立的目的是什麼。周僅表示:「呢間公司喺我接手之前,已經有好多年喇。」周又指,按他理解力高是黎智英的私人公司,由黎自資營運。</p> - -<h4 id="周達權指黎智英轉讓名下離岸公司lacock作為陳梓華的酬勞">周達權指黎智英轉讓名下離岸公司LACOCK作為陳梓華的「酬勞」</h4> - -<p>控方指黎智英名下有一個在英屬處女群島註冊的公司 LACOCK,在香港有一個匯豐銀行本地戶口。控方指,根據控辯雙方承認事實,在2018年4月26日至2020年1月13日之間,黎智英、Mark Simon 和周達權是 LACOCK 銀行戶口的授權簽署人。由2020年1月14日開始,該銀行戶口唯一授權簽署人轉為陳梓華。</p> - -<p>周達權指,LACOCK是一間離岸公司,「我記得呢間公司係唔活躍。」他記得,大約在2016年1月1日至2019年中左右,公司董事有黎智英及他本人;不過他不肯定自己有否持有公司股份,還是以信託形式持有公司股份,即「掛名股東」,但是他可以肯定的是黎智英百份百擁有這間公司。</p> - -<p>周供稱,在2019年9月處理 LACOCK 的轉讓手續期間,Mark Simon 曾告知他,「呢個陳梓華,幫阿黎生手做咗啲嘢」,所以黎把公司轉至陳梓華名下,「作為酬勞」,之後周便沒有追問下去。電郵紀錄顯示,轉名手續在2019年12月完成。</p> - -<p>周達權作供未完,案件明日續審。</p> - -<hr /> - -<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導前壹傳媒營運總裁周達權:黎智英將其名下離岸公司轉至陳梓華作為「酬勞」The Fall Of Hong Kong2024-05-07T12:00:00+08:002024-05-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-fall-of-hong-kong<p><em>Informed by an intensive research trip, this report assesses the extent of the erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy across a range of spheres, including governance, the economy, and civil society. On this basis, the authors evaluate the policy options for the United States.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<h3 id="why-hong-kong-matters-to-the-united-states">Why Hong Kong Matters to the United States</h3> - -<p>Hong Kong has been a valuable partner to the United States for decades, and consequently, the United States has an important stake in the city’s future. Hong Kong is the 15th-largest export market for the United States and a top destination for U.S. consumer products. As of 2023, approximately 1,300 U.S. companies were based in Hong Kong, with banks, law firms, accounting firms, and other financial services the most prominent among this group. What is more, roughly 84,000 Americans live in Hong Kong, while about 250,000 Hong Kong–born immigrants live in the United States.</p> - -<p>Hong Kong’s long-standing business climate — characterized by open markets, judicial independence, rule of law, and the free flow of information — has helped embed the city at the center of global trade and investment networks and positioned it as a critical interface between mainland China and the rest of the world. Hence, beyond the bilateral commercial and people-to-people ties, Hong Kong has served as an entrepôt between the United States and the rest of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), playing a critical role in trade, investment, finance, travel, and legal services. Until recently, the people of Hong Kong enjoyed considerable civil liberties relative to those in mainland cities. As a result, beyond the clear utilitarian value of how Hong Kong has benefited the United States and the world commercially, support for Hong Kong’s political pluralism and vitality — and the human rights of the city’s residents — had long been core to U.S. policy toward the city.</p> - -<p>Yet since 2019, Beijing has taken major steps to significantly erode the once-high degree of political, judicial, and economic autonomy Hong Kong has enjoyed since its handover from the United Kingdom in 1997. The most dramatic of these moves was the imposition of a sweeping national security law in 2020, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (NSL), which marked the key turning point of a years-long effort by Beijing to extend its de jure and de facto control over internal elements of the city’s governance and way of life. The move followed several years of increasing social activism and demands by Hong Kong residents on a range of issues, including for Chinese authorities to fulfill their pledge in the Basic Law to allow for universal suffrage by Hong Kong’s population for the members of the Legislative Council (LegCo) and the chief executive. With major protests emerging during the “Occupy Central” movement of 2014, Beijing began to tighten its grip, culminating in the harsh crackdown on pro-democracy protests and marches in 2019. Authorities followed the NSL with electoral reforms to ensure that Hong Kong is governed by “patriots,” thereby disqualifying many viable candidates for no other reason than the perception that they are not sufficiently “pro-Beijing.” With these concerted legal and political efforts, capped by the recently adopted Article 23–based Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, Beijing has gone a long way to undermining Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy” promised in the Joint Declaration, weakening the civil liberties of its residents, and degrading the independence of its legal and judiciary system. Taken in total, these developments have substantially eroded the “One Country, Two Systems” (一国两制) framework that has been in place since 1997 and was supposed to remain intact until 2047, casting a pall over the city’s future as a regional — and global — financial and economic hub.</p> - -<p>Beijing’s erosion of the “One Country, Two Systems” framework came at an inflection point in U.S.-China ties. When the NSL was adopted, Washington and Beijing were sparring over the origins of Covid-19, but tensions had grown in prior years. The Trump administration had jettisoned strategic engagement in favor of a more punitive approach, reflecting built-up frustration in Washington over China’s unfair trade practices, growing regional assertiveness, deteriorating domestic human rights conditions, and increased economic coercion. The events of 2019–2020 also took place amid growing concern in Washington about the centralization of decisionmaking authority in China’s political system under Xi Jinping and the entrenchment of a statist, security-driven approach to economic and political governance on the mainland. Since 2014, the Xi administration had been centralizing power in party organizations and overhauling the mainland’s national security architecture to address a host of perceived external and internal threats, while continuing to advance the country’s international power and influence. Anti-corruption campaigns targeting political rivals, a suite of new security policies, and crackdowns on civil society were part of this push.</p> - -<p>Against the backdrop of these developments, Washington and partner capitals tracked the growing activism and protests of 2019 and the subsequent 2020 NSL closely. Congress and the Trump administration quickly enacted punitive measures on individuals and entities involved in eroding Hong Kong’s autonomy, signaled support for the human rights and civil liberties of Hong Kong’s residents, and began to pare back privileges granted to the special administrative region (SAR) based on an expectation of its sustained autonomy — for example, by curbing differential treatment for Hong Kong relative to mainland China under U.S. export controls.</p> - -<p>Amid growing U.S.-China tensions on other issues ranging from technology to Taiwan, as well as the ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, Hong Kong features less prominently in today’s policy conversations. Its Covid-19 control policies arguably compounded this problem, as few international travelers could visit the city for three years. As a result, international perspectives on Hong Kong risk being out of step with the reality on the ground. With that in mind, this report aims to provide an objective analysis of Hong Kong’s status based on on-the-ground discussions with various stakeholders in the city, open-source research, and consultations with the business community, policymakers, and the Hong Kong diaspora.</p> - -<p>Two of the coauthors (Blanchette and Kennedy) visited Hong Kong in September 2023, and over nine days conducted 35 interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, including representatives from the Hong Kong government, former Hong Kong government officials, members of the LegCo, executives from local and multinational companies and financial institutions, university professors, local and international journalists, NGO leaders, and public interest legal experts. Interviews were also conducted with experts, members of the overseas Hong Kong community, and U.S. policymakers before and after this trip. These discussions were supplemented by wide reading of primary and secondary sources about Hong Kong, China, and U.S.-China relations.</p> - -<p>The goal of this project is to understand ongoing developments in Hong Kong’s political, legal, and economic environment; likely implications for the city’s future as a global business hub; and the options available for U.S. policymakers to preserve a productive relationship that advances U.S. commercial interests and is supportive of any remaining autonomy, consistent with Beijing’s international commitments.</p> - -<p>There are several key findings of this report:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>An authoritarian turn in China under Xi Jinping has significantly eroded Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy” that was supposed to be maintained until 2047. These challenges are compounded by divisions within the SAR about its appropriate roles within China (and globally) due to growing U.S.-China geostrategic tensions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>There remains some resilience of autonomy, and life in Hong Kong is qualitatively different than in other mainland Chinese jurisdictions. However, the overall trend is clearly in the direction of further erosion of autonomy across nearly all domains — the legal and political system and civil society, as well as the climate for companies and investors. Not all of this erosion can be captured quantitatively. Such change does not become obvious until one sees how on-the-ground actors are adjusting — often in subtle ways — to a new political-legal reality.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The U.S. government should reevaluate its current approach to Hong Kong and consider some adjustments. Its policy should be rooted in a pragmatic understanding of what strategies are likely to be most productive (or counterproductive) for U.S. interests and Hong Kong’s autonomy and resilience, rather than symbolic measures. The choice is between three broad policy alternatives:</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<ol> - <li> - <p>Penalization. This approach would enact punitive measures against the individuals and entities most closely involved in the erosions of Hong Kong’s autonomy, seeking to raise the costs to Beijing for its behavior.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Resignation. This would assume that Washington and partners are powerless to change clear trends toward erosion in Hong Kong’s autonomy, and it would seek to remove, incrementally, all policy exemptions giving the SAR special treatment under U.S. law.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Strategic Engagement. This more proactive approach would seek to extend the SAR’s distinctiveness — and its remaining autonomy — within the PRC for as long as possible, by solidifying practical interactions between state and non-state actors in the United States and Hong Kong but also, when necessary, using punitive measures in a more targeted manner.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<h3 id="the-pathway-to-the-current-dilemmas-over-hong-kong">The Pathway to the Current Dilemmas over Hong Kong</h3> - -<p>After over 150 years of British rule, Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. This followed the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration (“Joint Declaration”), which set the conditions for this transfer. Beijing committed to permit Hong Kong a “high degree of autonomy” from the mainland for five decades, except in foreign affairs and defense. Beijing frames this arrangement as “One Country, Two Systems,” a national unification policy Deng Xiaoping outlined for Taiwan and Hong Kong in the early 1980s. Pursuant to the Joint Declaration, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) enacted the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region of the People’s Republic of China (“Basic Law”) in 1990, a de facto “mini-constitution” for Hong Kong. The Basic Law enshrined this “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement for Hong Kong’s governance.</p> - -<p>For roughly two decades after returning to China’s control, the city enjoyed a relatively high degree of autonomy, facilitating its prosperity and success as a global business hub. Even as China, under Xi Jinping, took a more pronounced authoritarian turn beginning in 2013, Hong Kong’s courts, its civic freedoms, and its economic and regulatory environment all possessed relative autonomy. U.S. policy toward Hong Kong largely reflected this. Under the 1992 United States-Hong Kong Policy Act (USHKPA), Washington treated the Hong Kong SAR as distinct from the rest of China in trade, finance, immigration, and other fields based on the assumption that China was committed to maintaining the city’s autonomy through 2047. The USHKPA was designed to bolster the SAR’s autonomy through this distinct treatment.</p> - -<p>While Beijing had incrementally made tactical curtailments of Hong Kong’s freedoms in the initial decade after the handover in 1997, its efforts intensified from the mid-2010s. These efforts fueled sequential local protests in Hong Kong. In 2012, for example, more than 90,000 residents, by one estimate, took to the streets to oppose proposed amendments to the city’s school curriculum intended to foster Chinese national identity. In 2014, hundreds of thousands came out to support universal suffrage as part of the “Umbrella Movement” — named for the use of umbrellas to defend against police pepper spray. A new high in public protest was reached in 2019, in response to a Beijing-endorsed legislative proposal to enable extradition to mainland China of criminals accused in Hong Kong. Then chief executive Carrie Lam later withdrew the proposal, but the repression of protestors drew global attention. As a result, the pro-democracy movement received greater public support; in the November 2019 district council elections, voters delivered the pro-democracy camp a majority of seats.</p> - -<p>This marked a turning point in Beijing’s approach, with the Xi administration apparently feeling that there was a political crisis emerging that could no longer be managed through traditional means and that fulfilling Beijing’s original pledge to maintain Hong Kong’s autonomy and widen suffrage would undermine China’s sovereignty over the city and erode Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control. In June 2020, the NPC Standing Committee bypassed Hong Kong’s legislature to impose sweeping national security legislation on the city. The NSL sent shockwaves through Hong Kong and the international community owing to its expansive conception of national security. It adopted broad and vague definitions for crimes such as subversion, terrorism, secession, and collusion with foreign forces, and it effectively criminalized public dissent of any variety. In the years since, the law has been used to disqualify pro-democracy candidates from public office, decimate opposition parties, curb media freedoms, and quiet public complaints about central government erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy.</p> - -<p>The events of 2019–2020, particularly the adoption of the NSL, accentuated the polarization of views among Hong Kong residents about the city’s future in ways that have continued in the years since. A central theme of this debate is over what it means to preserve Hong Kong’s way of life. Pro-establishment stakeholders highlight that Hong Kong has never been fully autonomous or a multi-party democracy in which political leaders were chosen through open elections. Moreover, in their view, Hong Kong residents are apolitical, and they value stability most of all. The push for universal elections, for this camp, is a deviation from the past and tantamount to advocating for a Hong Kong that is entirely independent from the PRC. Those who identify more with the opposition or “pro-democracy” camp point to the fact that although Hong Kong was never a democracy due to British rule, the city has a long history of rule of law, a vigorous civil society, an independent media, an open economy, and direct elections for a portion of the city’s political leadership. In their view, the move toward universal suffrage and opposition to the NSL was important for consolidating and protecting these underlying features of the city’s life. This division about the essence of Hong Kong and its future was on full display during this project’s interviews.</p> - -<h3 id="signs-of-resilience-and-erosion-of-autonomy">Signs of Resilience and Erosion of Autonomy</h3> - -<h4 id="defining-autonomy">Defining Autonomy</h4> - -<p>The goal of the 2023 trip was to assess how Beijing’s tightened grip has affected the city’s autonomy and to evaluate confidence among key stakeholders, such as foreign and domestic businesses, university faculty and students, and the general public, about the city’s future.</p> - -<p>One challenge in assessing the degree of backsliding in Hong Kong is formulating a clear conception of “autonomy” and determining what would constitute a “high degree” of local discretion.</p> - -<p>For the purposes of this analysis, autonomy can be conceptualized in two ways:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>First, differences in the way of life between mainland China and Hong Kong, in terms of political liberties, the legal system, social norms, and economic openness — in other words, the extent to which a “One Country, Two Systems” framework is evident in practice. The narrower the gap between these “systems,” the less autonomy there is for Hong Kong.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Second, the authority Hong Kong officials and members of society have to make their own decisions about the city’s way of life and its system. The more authority for keeping (or changing) this system that lies in Beijing, the less autonomy the SAR has.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>These two ways of measuring autonomy were referenced when evaluating trends in the city’s status. Through interviews, review of primary documents, and further research, this report identifies signs of retained resilience but also clear erosion of autonomy across three key areas: governance, the economy, and civil society. While in every instance it is a mixed picture, in most domains, more signs of erosion than resilience were evident, and the general trajectory is toward continued erosion going forward.</p> - -<h4 id="legal-and-political-environment">Legal and Political Environment</h4> - -<p><strong>ELECTORAL SYSTEM</strong></p> - -<p>The most obvious loss of autonomy since 2020 is in Hong Kong’s political environment. Far from moving toward universal suffrage as promised under the Basic Law, Beijing now has almost total control of the selection of Hong Kong government authorities. Much of this relates to the adoption and implementation of the NSL and the use of older colonial-era laws to crack down on freedom of association and expression, as well as a set of electoral changes that were enacted in 2021. As one interlocutor shared, these reforms were designed to intentionally remove the “electoral” element from Hong Kong’s political system. Candidates must now be vetted for political loyalty to Beijing, with the aim of a city governed by “patriots.” In addition, the LegCo has been expanded (from 70 to 90 seats), while the number of seats elected directly by Hong Kong residents has been reduced (from 35 to 20). Further, the power of an election committee composed largely of Beijing-controlled organizations to vet and choose legislative candidates has been expanded. Later “reforms” to district council elections in 2023 likewise dramatically reduced the number of seats chosen directly by the populace (from around 90 percent, or 452 of 479, to around 20 percent, or 88 of 470), with most of the remainder chosen by the chief executive and government-appointed committees. Candidates up for election via direct vote must still be vetted for their political loyalty.</p> - -<p>Pro-democracy representation was largely snuffed out by the introduction of these rules, in effect disqualifying those with a history of criticizing Beijing or the Hong Kong government for departing from the political reforms promised in the Basic Law. Simultaneous to these electoral changes, pro-democracy lawmakers were detained for charges under the NSL. In 2021 (the latest LegCo election), only one non-establishment candidate was elected, representing a dramatic drop from 2016, when pro-democracy and centrist or localist candidates won a third of seats.</p> - -<p>Several interlocutors suggested that these changes move Hong Kong’s legislature and district council closer to the mainland’s NPC model, with representation controlled from the top down and no real resistance to proposals from Beijing. Elections for seats in the legislative council and district council continue to be contested, but voter interest has declined precipitously in line with pre-vetting of candidates. In the recent district elections of December 2023, for example, voter turnout stood at a mere 27.5 percent, a new record low, down from a high of 71 percent in 2019 amid the pro-democracy protests. Turnout at the 2021 LegCo elections was a record low of 30.2 percent, down from 58 percent in 2016.</p> - -<p><strong>RULE OF LAW AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE</strong></p> - -<p>Hong Kong’s strong rule of law tradition has long served as the backbone of its economic success, and in fact Hong Kong’s legal system remains qualitatively different from the one on the mainland in some important ways. Conservative voices interviewed for this report suggested that the then-forthcoming national security legislation, as stipulated under Article 23 of the Basic Law, would be necessary in part because Beijing has shown restraint in exercising its privileges to impose national laws on the SAR. For example, Beijing has not extended its Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law or Counter-Espionage Law to Hong Kong. Interlocutors in this Beijing-leaning group also cited Xi Jinping’s 2022 speech emphasizing that Hong Kong remains a Common Law system as evidence that Beijing is committed to preserving Hong Kong’s legal system and judicial independence.</p> - -<p>Furthermore, some suggested that Hong Kong’s national security law is not out of step with international practice; many Commonwealth of Nations countries have national security legislation of some variety. They highlighted specifics around the implementation and scope of the 2020 NSL — such as the fact that issuance of charges, warrants, and arrests under the law have been public and visible — to suggest that the legal system remains transparent. Of course, in these countries, national security legislation is embedded in an independent rule of law system that is accountable to voters and faces scrutiny from an independent media, so the comparison has only a superficial logic. Perhaps the most important distinction is that Hong Kong increasingly has less discretion to define its own local national security concerns in the face of Xi Jinping’s expansive framework of the “holistic view of national security” (国家安全观). While the final Article 23 national security law did not contain any references to Xi or his “outlook,” the “public consultation” document released in January by the Hong Kong government made explicit reference to both Xi and his “holistic view of national security.”</p> - -<p>One important measure of judicial independence is a record of court rulings that go against the Hong Kong government and the clear interests of Beijing. In a prominent case this past year, a judge blocked a government effort to ban the broadcast or distribution of “Glory to Hong Kong,” a song largely understood as an unofficial protest anthem, on online platforms such as YouTube. In recent years, Hong Kong’s courts have also fended off government challenges to the rights of same-sex couples. As another example, the Court of Final Appeal, the city’s highest court, overturned the conviction of a journalist accused of making false statements to access car registration records while investigating attacks on pro-democracy protestors in 2019. Despite high-profile departures in the years since the 2020 NSL, foreigners still serve as judges in Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal and foreign law firms remain among the most respected in the city, representing clients on a wide variety of issues.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="key-provisions-of-2020-national-security-law"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Key Provisions of 2020 National Security Law</code></h4> -</blockquote> - -<ul> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Establishes new committee responsible for managing national security affairs in Hong Kong (12), chaired by the SAR chief executive (13) but supervised by and accountable to the central government in Beijing (12) — including through direct oversight by Beijing-vetted secretary-general (13) and national security advisor (15). Committee’s work is not subject to judicial review (14).</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Sets up a powerful new central government office tasked with overseeing and supporting national security affairs in the SAR (48–53), with the power to take over national security cases in certain instances (55–56).</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Vests power of interpretation of the NSL in the NPC Standing Committee (65).</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Extends to a vast jurisdiction, including to alleged violations by non–Hong Kong residents overseas (38).</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Requires all candidates for public office to swear oath of allegiance to the SAR (6) — a more expansive provision than in the Basic Law — and disqualifies those convicted for national security–related charges from running in elections (35).</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Circumvents due process in trial procedures, including removing presumptive approval of bail (42), closed trials in certain instances (41), and appointment/removal of judges by the chief executive (44).</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Commits the SAR to promoting national security education among public, including in schools, universities, and civil society organizations, in the media, on the internet (10).</code></em></p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Note: The numbers in parentheses refer to the relevant articles of the NSL. Source: Information gathered from the 2020 National Security Law.</code></em></p> - -<p>Yet, while Hong Kong’s legal system may remain qualitatively different than that of mainland China, there are signs of substantial erosion. The 2020 NSL clearly pared back judicial independence as well as due process. One need only look at the administrative build-out of NSL governance and security architecture, which formalizes Beijing’s influence over judicial affairs in the city when national security, broadly and vaguely defined, is concerned. The NSL stood up a new committee equipped with broad authority for national security matters in the SAR, led by the Beijing-aligned chief executive, accountable to and supervised by Beijing, and not subject to judicial review. Local authorities may hand-select personnel in law enforcement and prosecution to manage national security cases and appoint and remove judges to hear national security cases. The Hong Kong government may conduct NSL-related trials without a jury. The central government in Beijing also stood up an office to monitor national security matters in the SAR, and it can take over NSL cases under certain circumstances, including where a “foreign country or external elements” are involved. The NSL rests power of interpretation with the NPC Standing Committee.</p> - -<p>Simultaneous with the build-out of the NSL architecture, older legislation has been repurposed to cover security-related crimes not covered by the NSL itself, including a colonial-era sedition law that remained dormant for 50 years. A large number of opposition activists and politicians have been pursued under the NSL and related ordinances in recent years. As of February 23, 2024, 291 people had been arrested for suspected activity endangering national security since the NSL was enacted. Of these, 174 individuals (and five companies) have been charged under either the NSL or other laws, and 111 have been convicted or await sentencing; 32 have been convicted or await sentencing under the NSL. Cash bounties have been issued for information leading to arrest of least 13 opposition figures and activists overseas, compounding an environment of fear even for activists who manage to escape Hong Kong.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1J0jxKX.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Individuals Arrested and Charged in Hong Kong under the NSL and Related Security Ordinances, July 2020–December 2023.</strong> Source: Authors’ calculations based on <a href="https://www.chinafile.com/tracking-impact-of-hong-kongs-national-security-law">Lydia Wong et al., “Tracking the Impact of Hong Kong’s National Security Law,” ChinaFile, April 9, 2024</a>.</em></p> - -<p>The first large-scale case under the NSL came in February 2021, when 47 pro-democracy activists were charged with “conspiracy to commit subversion” for efforts to improve pro-democrats’ electoral chances and force a positive government response to the ongoing protests. Of the 47 charged, 31 pleaded guilty. The trial for the 16 pleading not guilty began in February 2023, almost two years later. Their trial had no jury, and the three presiding judges were all appointed by the chief executive (with approval of a Beijing-controlled committee) under the NSL. Another prominent and ongoing case involves Jimmy Lai, a UK citizen and a long-standing critic of Beijing, charged under the NSL on counts of colluding with foreign forces and, under the sedition law, with publishing seditious material. Lai founded the Apple Daily, among the most popular newspapers in Hong Kong, which ran until June 2021, when it was forced to close after Hong Kong authorities raided and froze the assets of its publishing company under authority of the NSL.</p> - -<p>Local lawyers suggest there is insufficient due process for those accused of security-related crimes. Authorities have the power to detain defendants indefinitely without bail as long as the crime in question is a national security–related one. Trials and pretrial detention times for political charges have been lengthy. Some of the “Hong Kong 47” defendants, for example, were jailed for nearly two years before their trial began. Jimmy Lai spent over 1,000 days in pre-trial detention. His trial was slated to begin December 2022, but was delayed a year after Hong Kong authorities rejected his choice of legal representation.</p> - -<p>The actual adoption in March 2024 of the Article 23–based national security ordinance provides additional evidence of the erosion of the SAR’s political autonomy. Local advocates argue that an additional version was needed to fill in the gaps of the 2020 laws passed by the NPC, to account for additional kinds of violations, including colluding with external forces, insurrection, sedition, and espionage. Moreover, they emphasize that because of Hong Kong’s Common Law system, implementation of the law would align with Hong Kong’s historic respect of due process. That said, the law is far from reassuring. It was sprung on the public with little warning, rushed through its review, and adopted by a LegCo bereft of diverse voices in a vote of 89–0. There is sufficient vagueness in terms such as “state secrets” and “external forces” that could give the Hong Kong government substantial leeway in charging and prosecuting defendants.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="key-provisions-of-the-article-23based-safeguarding-national-security-ordinance"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Key Provisions of the Article 23–based Safeguarding National Security Ordinance</code></h4> -</blockquote> - -<ul> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Builds on 2020 NSL by targeting five offenses, broadly and vaguely defined — treason, insurrection, sabotage, “external interference,” and theft of state secrets and espionage (parts 2–6).</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Empowers the chief executive to make subsidiary legislation deemed necessary to protect national security (110).</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Gives police and courts power to extend pre-charge detention period, restrict access to lawyers in certain cases (76–78).</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Allows major offenses, such as “sabotage” and “external interference,” to apply to persons for activities committed outside of Hong Kong (9).</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Moves toward mainland’s broad definition of “state secrets,” to include “secrets” on the economic, technological, and social development of mainland China or the SAR (29).</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">References “external interference” frequently throughout, consistent with SAR officials’ emphasis on protecting the city from “foreign forces.”</code></em></p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Note: Unless specified otherwise, numbers in parentheses refer to the relevant articles in the ordinance. Source:</code> <a href="https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/capA305!en?INDEX_CS=N"><code class="highlighter-rouge">“Safeguarding National Security Ordinance,” Government of the HKSAR Gazette, March 23, 2024</code></a>; <code class="highlighter-rouge">and</code> <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12341"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Ricardo Barrios, Hong Kong Adopts New National Security Ordinance: Article 23 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 1, 2024)</code></a>.</em></p> - -<p><strong>DAY-TO-DAY GOVERNANCE</strong></p> - -<p>Interlocutors shared various perspectives on the degree to which Hong Kong operates autonomously from Beijing in terms of day-to-day governance. One former top official suggested that the fact that the People’s Liberation Army has never been called on to intervene is a sign of Hong Kong’s sustained autonomy. Another former official emphasized a need for realism about the extent of autonomy that Hong Kong as “a local city,” like any city within China, would be granted under the PRC system (which is not a federal system). On the other side of the equation, interlocutors noted that Hong Kong’s civil servants are largely trained to be apolitical, which means they are not able to defend their self-interest and authority when challenged. Two interview sources outside the government suggested that self-censorship among authorities in Hong Kong is on the rise, and although officials may not be receiving direct orders from Beijing, they see it within their professional interests to try to guess what Beijing’s preferences are and to adapt accordingly. Such a dynamic, which is also not uncommon in the mainland, leads to officials often taking more hardline stances than Beijing has requested or potentially desires. While some interlocutors indicated that this dynamic is part of an “adjustment period” as Hong Kong navigates the post-NSL period, it seems likely that this is a lasting, not transient, trend.</p> - -<h4 id="economy-and-business-environment">Economy and Business Environment</h4> - -<p><strong>FINANCE AND MONETARY POLICY</strong></p> - -<p>Hong Kong has long had among the world’s most vibrant financial sectors, which represents almost a quarter of the city’s GDP and employs over 7 percent of its population. Local authorities clearly want to preserve this reputation. Monetary policy, macro-prudential regulation, governance of the securities market, and maintaining the peg of the Hong Kong dollar to the U.S. dollar appear largely unchanged since the imposition of the NSL. Innovation in the financial sector remains a focus. Hong Kong is, for example, building out regulatory infrastructure for crypto assets. The city government has issued green bonds that align incentives in favor of decarbonization and instituted disclosure requirements to promote environmental, social, and governance (ESG) goals. Government interlocutors pointed to Hong Kong’s role in resolving a U.S.-China audit dispute in 2022 — inspectors from the U.S. audit watchdog Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) reviewed Chinese audit documents on the ground in Hong Kong — to suggest the city was poised to remain a bridge between the mainland and international markets in the years ahead.</p> - -<p>That said, financial sector resilience is not guaranteed. Political instability is a key concern for investors. Many clients of Hong Kong’s private wealth managers, for example, including clients from mainland China, have relocated assets away from the city to the benefit of other regional hubs such as Singapore. Looking ahead, foreign and local businesses and investors have expressed concern that Article 23 and uncertainties associated with broad definitions of key terms like “state secrets” may complicate the picture, jeopardizing research and acquisition of economic and financial data.</p> - -<p>Beyond this, greater financial integration of Hong Kong and mainland China and involvement from Beijing in this integration are clear trends. “Stock connect” programs, launched before the NSL, enable cross-border investments between Hong Kong and mainland markets. These require extensive consultations with the central government and creation of special systems to allow funds from mainland China to enter Hong Kong’s capital market and economy. In mid-2023, the Hong Kong stock exchange introduced RMB-denominated shares, potentially aiding Beijing’s efforts to drive up use of the Chinese yuan overseas. In January 2024, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority introduced further measures to deepen financial links with the mainland.</p> - -<p><strong>THE REAL ECONOMY</strong></p> - -<p>Trends in the real economy are a mixed picture. Hong Kong’s economy is still dominated by local private firms and remains deeply connected to global supply chains. The city’s formal approach to international commercial engagement has been stable since 2019, with few formal restrictions on flows of goods and capital. According to U.S. consul general Gregory May, foreign businesses have also been largely spared non-tariff barriers to trade (unlike the situation on the mainland). Businesses involved in pro-democracy activism have encountered trouble, but Hong Kong remains a substantially freer economy than the mainland (ranked second globally in a long-running index).</p> - -<p>Hong Kong authorities appear determined to retain this status, and they still clearly consider the city the connective tissue linking China and the rest of the world — not just through trade but also through arts, sciences, and technology. Hong Kong has signed 250 bilateral agreements with other countries in areas covering trade, taxation, and investment protection and promotion. The SAR is applying to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Chief Executive John Lee frequently refers to the city as a “super-connector” in China’s international relationships (aligning with terminology deployed by Beijing).</p> - -<p>Even so, research for this report revealed declining autonomy in many areas that will likely jeopardize Hong Kong’s economic resilience going forward. Local officials with whom the authors spoke were careful not to directly criticize Beijing’s economic policies. They blamed the pandemic and U.S.-China tensions for Hong Kong’s economic troubles over the past years, not policies from Beijing. Similarly, the authors witnessed limited willingness of officials and others in Hong Kong to offer alternative estimates of China’s economic growth rate or challenges that differ from official data and positions. Such differing assessments were common in the authors’ previous engagements with Hong Kong officials in the pre-NSL period.</p> - -<p>Hong Kong is aligning with the positions of mainland China in international economic bodies as well. In 2021, Hong Kong stepped in to block the election of an official representing “Chinese Taipei” (the name Taiwan uses when participating in international bodies) to serve as the chair of the World Trade Organization (WTO) government procurement committee, aligning with Beijing’s declared position. The election was uncontested and most other parties were in support. Pro-Beijing interlocutors claimed the Hong Kong position was made on its own, not directed by Beijing. But many capitals have warned that such trends amplify Beijing’s voice in international bodies. Further, interviews also revealed that Hong Kong authorities do not believe Chinese Taipei has a right to join the RCEP — another sign of alignment with Beijing’s positions.</p> - -<p>Simultaneously, the SAR government is driving forward greater economic integration with the mainland, a trend that aligns with the Xi administration’s articulated priorities for the national economy. Many interlocutors highlighted the “Greater Bay Area” (GBA), which connects Hong Kong, Macau, and nine cities in Guangdong, and they identified specific policies designed to promote regional integration and innovation. One was the Hetao Shenzhen-Hong Kong Science and Technology Innovation Cooperation Zone, announced in 2017, which follows a “one zone, two parks” model purportedly to reflect a “One Country, Two Systems” framework. Yet the clear intent is to reduce the relevance of the boundary between Hong Kong and the mainland. Beijing has been explicit about leveraging Hong Kong’s international reputation and positioning to advance national priorities, such as industrial and technology upgrading. Indeed, the GBA intends to incubate technology companies and research institutes in areas critical to Xi’s high-tech vision, such as semiconductors, AI, aerospace, and biomedical technology. Yet when various Hong Kong officials were asked how coordination within and among the GBA localities would work, there was little by way of concrete — or convincing — answers. It is arguably the case that Beijing would play a key role in facilitating GBA integration.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jI3mZ8V.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Share of Hong Kong’s Total Goods Trade by Selected Region, 2013–2023.</strong> Source: Authors’ calculations based on <a href="https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/web_table.html?id=133">“Table 325-43011A: Number of regional headquarters by selected location of parent company,” December 21, 2023, Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department</a>.</em></p> - -<p>Relatedly, interviews for this report demonstrated greater interest than ever before among Hong Kong authorities in the need for industrial policy to promote the city’s role in various industries, including ICT and pharma. Government interlocutors referred frequently to “blueprints” and “plans” for R&amp;D and innovation, including joint efforts with the mainland. Despite making integration with Shenzhen and other mainland cities in the GBA a priority, officials were hard pressed to marshal evidence that the initiative would actually strengthen Hong Kong’s economy.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jeIm8wd.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Multinational Firms with Hong Kong as a Regional Headquarters, 2000–2023.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/web_table.html?id=133">“Table 325-43011A,” Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, December 21, 2023</a>.</em></p> - -<p>As a sign of closer integration, for the first time in at least 30 years companies from the mainland with regional headquarters in Hong Kong outnumbered U.S. ones in 2022. U.S. firms operating in Hong Kong have fallen continuously in the past years, reflecting growing anxiety among the U.S. business community. Eighty percent of U.S. businesses surveyed by the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) HK in late 2021 said the NSL had impacted their operations. While many U.S. firms and investors plan to remain in the city, less than a third of U.S. companies surveyed by AmCham HK at the end of 2023 planned to expand investment in the next two years. Aside from U.S.-China ties and a slowing Chinese economy, challenges related to the political and legal environment ranked high among the list of complaints. Some business travelers now revert to “burner” devices when traveling to Hong Kong — mirroring a common practice for the mainland — due to concerns about government surveillance. Crackdowns on due-diligence and consulting firms on the mainland, including the Mintz Group and Capvision, and Beijing’s increasingly draconian approach to security have not helped investor confidence in Hong Kong.</p> - -<h4 id="civil-society">Civil Society</h4> - -<p>Space for Hong Kong’s once vibrant civil society has shrunk substantially in the past years. According to major indices tracking freedom of expression, assembly, and association, Hong Kong’s position has worsened substantially since 2020, although the situation remains qualitatively different from any mainland city. Criminal charges under the NSL and other security-related legislation, high-profile detainments, and the risk of legal difficulties have led to the closure of many independent news outlets and NGOs either by force or preemptively, while journalists, academics, and activists operate in an environment of self-censorship and fear. This trend has accelerated in the wake of the Article 23 national security law.</p> - -<p><strong>NGOs</strong></p> - -<p>According to NGO interlocutors, conditions have deteriorated considerably, and NGOs are reportedly dissuaded informally from engaging in policy advocacy. Many civil society organizations, particularly those with international connections, have been forced to disband or relocate. A 2023 report from Amnesty International estimated over 100 civil society organizations have left or been shut down since the enactment of the NSL in July 2020. The group itself famously closed its two offices in Hong Kong in October 2021, citing the NSL which “made it effectively impossible for human rights organizations in Hong Kong to work freely and without fear of serious reprisals from the government.”</p> - -<p>For civil society groups that continue to operate in Hong Kong, barriers to resourcing and operations have grown. Amended guidelines for charitable groups specify that any group that “takes part in acts or activities . . . contrary to the interests of national security” will not be qualified (or will be disqualified) as a charitable organization. The bounds of acceptable behavior have become more uncertain, given the vague and expanding definition of national security and sensitivity to it under both national security laws and related legislation. Civil society organizations report challenges in obtaining essential services, as providers increasingly worry about running afoul of security restrictions, according to those interviewed for this report. Those receiving international funds, hiring non-local staff, or having overseas connections worry about the potential application of the joint national security laws (which cover foreign collusion) to their work. In a high-profile case illustrative of government paranoia and associated risks for NGOs around foreign engagement, Hong Kong national security authorities in March 2022 pursued a UK-based NGO (Hong Kong Watch) for breach of the NSL.</p> - -<p><strong>MEDIA AND PUBLISHING</strong></p> - -<p>Media freedoms are also generally on a downward trend, although local and international journalists interviewed felt that the reporting environment in Hong Kong is still more open than in the rest of China. This is a relatively low bar, however, given that Beijing has kicked out a substantial portion of the U.S. press corps in the mainland. Hong Kong’s English and Chinese press still run stories about Chinese politics, economics, and society that would not be able to run in the mainland. Journalists remain able to conduct interviews and cover most events largely free of harassment, interlocutors shared.</p> - -<p>That said, the NSL and the revival of colonial era anti-sedition laws have left a clear mark. On an index of press freedom from Reporters Without Borders, Hong Kong dropped from 58th in 2013 to 140th in 2023, of the 180 countries and territories included. Prominent independent news outlets have been forced to close, with leadership staff arrested. Most notable was Apple Daily in June 2021, but Stand News (a free online news site that adopted a generally pro-democracy editorial position) was also forcefully shut down that year. At least five other independent media outlets chose to close, citing heightened risks for staff. Public broadcaster Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) overhauled its programming under new pro-government management.</p> - -<p>Foreign publications have gotten in trouble for routine coverage of political events. Hong Kong authorities, for example, reprimanded the Wall Street Journal and New York Times in December 2021 for publishing op-eds on Beijing’s bid to prevent low turnout during the city’s inaugural “patriots only” LegCo election that month and warned they may be guilty of “incitement.” Some journalists shared that the breadth of stories Hong Kong media can cover has narrowed significantly, particularly concerning sensitive topics such as the Hong Kong government, the question of autonomy, and the NSL. Corporate and government records once available to journalists have been shut down or made more difficult to access, interlocutors shared. Foreign journalists who covered the 2019 pro-democracy protests have had visa applications or renewals denied. The New York Times, prominently, moved a third of its Hong Kong–based staff to Seoul following imposition of the 2020 NSL.</p> - -<p>Changes have contributed to a climate of fear and self-censorship. The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Hong Kong, for example, suspended its annual Human Rights Press Awards in 2022 out of concern that its plans to recognize the pro-democracy outlet Stand News would put staff and members at risk under the NSL and anti-sedition law. A string of arrests under the laws have accentuated the climate, including most notably that of Jimmy Lai. Some journalists and editors simply choose to avoid stories that may be seen by the Hong Kong government or Beijing as too sensitive even in the absence of any codified prohibition. Better safe than sorry is a posture that many have adopted.</p> - -<p>While bookstores still have a range of books, particularly in English, the spectrum of views in Chinese-language books and periodicals in particular has narrowed considerably, as has the distance between the types of material that one would find in Hong Kong versus mainland Chinese bookstores. There are no longer books available that dig into the professional and personal lives of Chinese officials, for example, and there is a narrower range of books on China’s political history. Instead, more copies of the collected works of Xi Jinping and CCP documents fill the shelves of bookstores.</p> - -<p><strong>UNIVERSITIES</strong></p> - -<p>At universities, the formal tenure and promotion systems, open library access, and curriculum structure largely remain intact from the pre-NSL days. Some university leaders (presidents, provosts, and deans) have shown substantial courage to protect their universities, schools, programs, and students while faced with significant external pressure to limit research, push out heterodox views and faculty, and circumscribe debate and exploration among students. One source said that the worst time for university life was in 2020–2021, but that the situation has stabilized since then. A dependable source said that law schools have been largely able to preserve academic freedom, with their curriculum remaining the same as prior to 2019. Cooperation remains between Hong Kong law schools and those in the West, including the University of Pennsylvania, Harvard, and Columbia, among others, one source shared.</p> - -<p>Although formal systems protecting academic freedom remain intact, both external and internal pressures threaten the future of Hong Kong’s globally respected universities. There has been substantial pressure on universities to voluntarily introduce “patriotic” coursework to stay in the good graces of city authorities and Beijing. In August 2022, after Xi visited Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Education Bureau distributed thousands of copies of his speech to schools across the city. Interviews with relevant parties revealed that the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) “reorganized” its Universities Service Center for Chinese Studies to make its collection of Chinese documents unavailable to scholars in Hong Kong, and that online forums for students and teachers have been closed down or made unavailable in Hong Kong.</p> - -<p>Informal pressures on academics to self-censor have grown. Interlocutors said that on some campuses, “patriotic” faculty members have started social media and whisper campaigns to attack other faculty members and block promotions, some of whom have responded by leaving those universities and Hong Kong altogether. Prominent scholars have faced disciplinary action from Hong Kong authorities or from universities themselves. Soon after NSL enactment, the University of Hong Kong’s governing board moved to fire key 2019 protest organizer Benny Tai under pressure from pro-Beijing lawmakers. Academics now worry about being overlooked for tenure or having their contracts cut short for political expression. University community members interviewed for this report also expressed concerns about the how the Article 23 NSL, which had yet to be passed at that point, could further chill Hong Kong’s research environment by adding uncertainty about what topics and research methods may violate national security.</p> - -<p>These changes have catalyzed a brain drain and created a less robust and diverse academic ecosystem. Indeed, research showed that most new applicants for open positions in social sciences and humanities are PRC citizens with Western academic training, with a major drop in applications from scholars from Europe and North America. One of Hong Kong academia’s traditional strengths is that it attracted top-tier talent from around the world, so a diminishment of that advantage would be a great detriment to the city’s human capital. The 2022–2023 period saw the highest turnover in 20 years at Hong Kong’s eight government-funded universities, with 380 academics leaving, marking a 7.6 percent increase from the year before. Quality scholarship on a range of issues beyond domestic Chinese politics and society is at stake.</p> - -<p><strong>FREEDOM OF RELIGION</strong></p> - -<p>Both the 2020 NSL and the 2024 Article 23 national security ordinance raise worrying questions about the protection of religious freedom in Hong Kong. In October 2022, Pastor Garry Pang Moon-yuen was jailed for a total of 13 months after being found guilty of sedition and seditious speech. In May 2022, 90-year-old cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun was arrested under the NSL on the charge of “collusion with foreign forces.” Later that year, Zen and five others were found guilty of failing to register a fund that supported individuals arrested in connection with the 2019 protests. Given the focus from the twin national security laws on punishing individuals who support or aid ill-defined “external interference,” the space for Hong Kong’s vibrant Catholic community is certainly at risk, given that it communes directly with Rome (as opposed to the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association in the mainland). As Cardinal Stephen Chow Sau-yan stated in a 2023 interview, “If you come out with something that violates the national security law, then that’s a problem.” He added, “In the past, you could freely say whatever you want. Now you have to be careful how you say it.”</p> - -<h4 id="summary">Summary</h4> - -<p>Hong Kong is not yet like a regular city in mainland China, but the trajectory is clear and worrying. Areas of resilience remain, but in ways that look largely unsustainable, for example, coming down to the impressively brave behavior of discrete individuals, such as university administrators fighting off curriculum changes. As one analyst shared, Hong Kong is perhaps closer to how Chinese cities operated in 2004–2005 under Hu Jintao: when governance was less ideologically oppressive, there were more open consultations with government authorities, civil society organizations were constrained but growing, and village leaders were chosen through direct elections.</p> - -<p>The text of the Joint Declaration and elements of the Basic Law indicate that Hong Kong has certain political, social, and economic rules and practices that will remain different from the rest of China, and the decision of whether (and how) to change them rests in part with the officials and people of Hong Kong. However, the reality appears to be that when push comes to shove — both figuratively and literally — the extent of autonomy that Hong Kong authorities have is determined unilaterally by Beijing. Hong Kong can propose how the boundary is drawn and what powers its officials have, but it can only do so through requests. In an interview for CSIS’s China Field Notes podcast, LegCo member Regina Ip noted that Hong Kong could make proposals to and have consultations with Beijing, but that policy across a wide range of domains was ultimately at Beijing’s discretion.</p> - -<p>Within Hong Kong, there is debate about the city’s future and whether the developments of the past years have been positive or negative. There is a clear divide between conservatives, who believe Hong Kong is finally stable and better than it has ever been, and liberals, who believe the city’s vitality is in the process of being snuffed out. One person with a conservative perspective said, for example, that “the ‘one country’ part of ‘one country, two systems’ was ignored by everyone, but things are much better now.” By contrast, liberals are deeply disheartened. One shared that they feel Hong Kong now is a “semi-police state.” They sense a drumbeat toward the city’s “mainlandization.”</p> - -<p>The distribution of views on these issues is difficult to discern. For one, elections no longer address these questions. Campaigns at the district level, for example, largely focus on bread-and-butter issues with debates about Hong Kong’s degree of autonomy and critiques of Beijing’s oversight largely off limits. Low turnout at elections since the NSL may reflect silent protest, but it may also simply reflect disinterest in politics as elections become less consequential. Public opinion polls on these topics are also a thing of the past, for the same reasons.</p> - -<p>As a result of this trajectory, there has been an exodus of Western expatriates and their families from Hong Kong. In a keynote address at CSIS in January 2023, U.S. consul general May estimated that 15,000 U.S. citizens — representing 20 percent of the American population in the city — had left Hong Kong over the past two years, for reasons that included Covid-19 lockdowns but also Beijing’s ongoing crackdowns on democratic freedoms and those who advocate for them. Those who remain do so for distinctive personal and professional reasons that set them apart from many of their colleagues. Very few Westerners are moving to Hong Kong. For the population overall, at least a third of Hong Kong residents suggested interest in emigrating overseas in late 2023. At the same time, the number of mainland Chinese moving to Hong Kong has grown. One consequence is that Mandarin is now far more common than in years past, and Cantonese is far less commonly heard.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zMZGJUx.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Hong Kong Migration Trends (Net inflow/outflow, thousands).</strong> Source: Authors’ calculations based on <a href="https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/web_table.html?id=110-01003">“Table 110-01003: Population Growth by Component,” Census and Statistics Department, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, February 20, 2024</a>.</em></p> - -<h3 id="implications-for-us-policy-options">Implications for U.S. Policy Options</h3> - -<p>Washington adjusted its approach to Hong Kong in light of the events of 2019–2020. Congress passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (HKHRDA) before the NSL, in response to the proposed extradition bill and ensuing pro-democracy protests. The effort was intended to signal U.S. support for human rights and democracy and to pressure Hong Kong authorities to shelve the bill — requiring, among other measures, the secretary of state to certify annually whether Hong Kong remains sufficiently autonomous to justify special treatment under U.S. law (and authorizing the president to revoke privileges if not). Soon after the NSL was passed, Congress passed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (HKAA) to sanction officials and entities contributing to the erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy. Through executive action following the HKAA, the Trump administration sanctioned individuals involved with the NSL and decertified Hong Kong’s special status under U.S. law, pursuing several measures to remove policy exemptions for Hong Kong relative to the PRC.</p> - -<p>U.S. policy toward Hong Kong remains rooted in a determination to support the SAR’s autonomy, prosperity, and way of life; to protect American individuals and firms in Hong Kong; and to promote the human rights and democratic freedoms of Hong Kong residents. Even as international attention to Hong Kong has declined, the city’s status continues to evolve. The most prominent recent development is the passage of Hong Kong’s own national security legislation, under Article 23 of the Basic Law (the repeat of an effort stopped by public protest in 2003). In past years, Beijing has also continued to flesh out its security apparatus to reflect heightened vigilance around perceived domestic and external threats — broadening the definition of “state secrets” and espionage, for example.</p> - -<p>Given these dynamics, it is an appropriate time for Washington to revisit its approach to Hong Kong. This report identifies three alternative approaches for U.S. policymakers to consider.</p> - -<p><strong>Penalization.</strong> One option is a “penal” approach, rooted in punishing Beijing for its encroachments on Hong Kong’s autonomy. This strategy arguably most closely mirrors the U.S. approach over the past few years. Washington has sanctioned PRC officials and those Beijing has appointed to positions of authority in Hong Kong, including SAR chief executive John Lee. Such sanctions are aimed at raising the costs to Beijing for its behavior. Some argue Washington has further to go, for example shutting down or limiting privileges of Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices (HKETOs) in the United States or imposing new sanctions on individuals involved in Article 23 formulation. One risk of this penalization strategy is that it could further erode Hong Kong’s economy, by, for example, pushing sanctioned Hong Kong officials closer to Beijing.</p> - -<p><strong>Resignation.</strong> Another alternative, what might be called “resignation,” would be based on the fact, as detailed in this report, that Hong Kong’s autonomy is on a trajectory of erosion that is likely to continue as long as Xi Jinping leads the CCP. Observers will likely see greater explicit presence of the CCP in Hong Kong, less meaningful elections, narrower space for civil society, more restrictions on information and the media, intensified promotion of “patriotic” education, continued undermining of academic freedom at universities, and a greater use of industrial policy and state tools for economic policies.</p> - -<p>Given these trends, the United States could accept and adapt to this reality by removing, step by step, all the policy exemptions that give Hong Kong distinct treatment from China under U.S. law and instead interact with the SAR as just another city in the PRC. There is already evidence of this approach. In line with the Trump administration’s decertification of the SAR’s special status under U.S. law in 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection required all goods imported from Hong Kong to use the label “Made in China,” rather than “Made in Hong Kong,” for example (which the WTO later ruled a violation of international trade rules). This broader strategy would translate into wholesale changes in bilateral relations across trade, investment, travel, law enforcement, and other areas. Under this approach, the United States would also oppose Hong Kong’s participation in international organizations, including the WTO, International Monetary Fund, International Olympic Committee, and others.</p> - -<p>The upside of this strategy is that it conforms to the SAR’s most likely trajectory and accepts that Washington and partners are powerless to change that larger trend. Underlying historic U.S. Hong Kong policy was an assumption that China had committed to maintain the SAR’s autonomy until 2047 in ways that justified having a separate relationship with Hong Kong. A resignation strategy acknowledges that the transition period to full takeover by Beijing is over prematurely, and that the facets of political life, the economy, and civil society that made Hong Kong unique are disappearing and unlikely to return.</p> - -<p>The downside of this strategy is that it risks accelerating Hong Kong’s loss of autonomy in every dimension. Beijing will likely conclude it has no choice (or even see this as an opportunity) but to install the CCP more rapidly and make other changes to Hong Kong’s political economy (including eliminating the Hong Kong dollar, for example). While it is right to blame Beijing for Hong Kong’s eroded autonomy thus far, it is worth asking whether pushing the city closer into Beijing’s orbit is in Washington’s strategic interests. In the authors’ view, this is a “feel good” strategy that is unlikely to bring substantial benefits for the United States. Criticizing foreign judges for serving in Hong Kong, for example, may inadvertently reduce safeguards against erosion of judicial independence. Even if this strategy weakens Hong Kong, the SAR’s overall economic heft is small enough on a relative perspective that it will be unlikely to hurt Beijing much.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sGwrmAH.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Hong Kong’s GDP as a Share of China’s Nominal GDP, 1990–2022.</strong> Source: Authors’ calculations based on <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/HKG/CHN">“GDP, current prices,” International Monetary Fund, 2024</a>.</em></p> - -<p><strong>Strategic Engagement.</strong> The other alternative is to pursue strategic engagement with Hong Kong, across as many domains as possible and for as long as possible, in order to extend the SAR’s distinctiveness, if not pockets of autonomy, within the PRC for as long as possible. The existence of a Hong Kong that runs according to somewhat different rules than the rest of China is a model for other parts of China to see, a place within China with access to a variety of ideas and information and where there are greater legal protections for international business. The U.S. goal here would be to help Hong Kong remain a modest island of openness in relative terms within an authoritarian socialist country. This approach, even while creating immigration and asylum pathways for Hong Kong residents wishing to leave, recognizes that the vast majority will stay in the city — and it is important to support their freedoms. It also recognizes the value that people from all sides in Hong Kong place on a strong and unique relationship with the United States. Furthermore, the strategic engagement approach should not shy away from punitive measures where appropriate, as well as public criticism of further backsliding.</p> - -<p>From this perspective, while sanctions and other punitive measures must remain on the table, the most appropriate U.S. strategy would be to focus on strengthening practical interactions between the United States and Hong Kong. This could include government-to-government communication and dialogue, but it would most certainly involve expanding societal level connections. It would be important to bring a wide range of voices from Hong Kong to the table, both those with pro-government positions and those who are much more critical of the current trajectory — including those forced, for at least the moment, to reside outside the SAR. Track-1 and Track-2 dialogues between U.S. and Hong Kong officials, businesses, universities, think tanks, the media, civil society organizations, and others would go a long way toward reducing misunderstandings on policies and their motivations. Reinstating Fulbright exchanges to and from Hong Kong would be a valuable part of this approach. The overall goal is to slow, where possible, Hong Kong’s slide away from autonomy by reinforcing the connective tissue between the United States and all key actors in Hong Kong, government officials and pro-democracy activists alike.</p> - -<p>Deciding how to choose from among these three options is far from easy, as it requires a sense not only of Hong Kong’s trajectory but also of what would be most effective in the long run, not simply in reaction to any specific development or crisis.</p> - -<p>As with China policy more generally over the past five decades, Washington adopted an engagement policy toward Hong Kong for many years. However, whereas the approach toward China as a whole was geared toward trying to coax reform within China and integrate it into the international system, engagement with Hong Kong was driven not by a goal to change the city, but rather to use the United States’ limited leverage to preserve the city’s economic and social openness for as long as possible.</p> - -<p>The Hong Kong of 2024 looks substantially different than that of 2020, let alone 1997, when the city reverted to PRC sovereignty. The SAR’s autonomy has been substantially eroded by Beijing’s tightening grip. An increasingly closed-off, security-focused Xi administration looks unlikely to reverse course — for Hong Kong or for the country as a whole. This trajectory has resulted in a wave of U.S. sanctions aligned with the penal approach, geared to punishing Beijing and its local allies for reversing course on One Country, Two Systems. The “resignation” approach would extend this logic further.</p> - -<p>The view of this report’s authors is that a policy built entirely around punishments or giving up on Hong Kong would be counterproductive and result in the further undermining of whatever autonomy remains. As this report has shown, spots of resilience persist, and the best policy approach to managing the challenge of Hong Kong will be rooted in a strong understanding of how its citizens, government authorities, businesses, and civil society organizations envision their city’s future. There remains substantial debate within the city (and among its residents who have moved abroad) about whether developments of the past years have been positive or negative for Hong Kong and how the rest of the world, including the United States, should respond. Although there may be a need for sanctions in certain instances, symbolic opprobrium need not be the central tenet of U.S. policy. Washington would be wise to focus on sustaining what space remains for civic engagement, foreign interaction, and political debate. Such an approach will require patience and persistence, but it lies firmly within U.S. interests.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Scott Kennedy</strong> is senior adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). A leading authority on Chinese economic policy and U.S.-China commercial relations, Kennedy has been traveling to China for 36 years. His specific areas of expertise include industrial policy, technology innovation, business lobbying, U.S.-China commercial relations, and global governance.</p> - -<p><strong>Lily McElwee</strong> serves as deputy director and fellow in the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, where she researches Chinese foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and EU-China relations. She is currently writing a book on the history of U.S. investment gatekeeping amid the rise of China as a strategy and policy fellow with the Smith Richardson Foundation.</p> - -<p><strong>Jude Blanchette</strong> holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS. Previously, he was engagement director at the Conference Board’s China Center for Economics and Business in Beijing, where he researched China’s political environment with a focus on the workings of the Communist Party of China and its impact on foreign companies and investors.</p>Scott Kennedy, et al.Informed by an intensive research trip, this report assesses the extent of the erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy across a range of spheres, including governance, the economy, and civil society. On this basis, the authors evaluate the policy options for the United States.Disable The Enablers2024-05-07T12:00:00+08:002024-05-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/disable-the-enablers<p><em>This Policy Brief identifies common mechanisms by which professional service providers facilitate sanctions evasion and makes recommendations for how policymakers can work together to minimise the use of professional service providers to circumvent sanctions.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, an international coalition of Ukraine’s allies deployed a wide range of sanctions as a core pillar of its response. These sanctions regimes have focused on efforts to restrict the funding and resourcing of the Russian military. However, President Vladimir Putin’s kleptocratic government also relies on an inner circle, which has been rewarded for its loyalty with tremendous wealth. These individuals have also been targeted by sanctions, with bank accounts and trophy assets, such as yachts, being frozen. In anticipation of being sanctioned – or subsequent to designation – these individuals have sought out professional services to construct complex mechanisms for hiding their assets and avoiding the full impact of the sanctions.</p> - -<p>A critical element of the response to this evasion activity is the work of investigative journalists, including those of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), which has uncovered information – such as that revealed in the “Rotenberg Files” and “Cyprus Confidential” project – about how these entities and individuals respond, and about the circumvention services they employ.</p> - -<p>While policymakers have been focused on designing and issuing sanctions packages, historically less focus has been placed on tackling evasion activity, particularly in Europe. Analysing the reporting by OCCRP and others can provide insights into the tactics employed by those seeking to evade sanctions and thus can offer valuable guidance on how to respond in the Russia context and beyond. As this Policy Brief reveals, one critical response to the widespread problem of sanctions circumvention is to disable the professional “enablers” of such circumvention.</p> - -<p>This brief analyses a sample of over 100 relevant recent investigative reports, by OCCRP and other media outlets, on Russian and Belarusian individuals and entities who have been aided by professional service providers in their attempts to circumvent sanctions; as well as official US, UK and EU actions taken against professional enablers and their services since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Using this evidence base, and with an audience of policymakers in mind, this brief identifies common mechanisms by which professional service providers facilitate sanctions evasion and makes recommendations as to how policymakers can work together to minimise the use of professional service providers to circumvent sanctions.</p> - -<h3 id="the-enablers">The Enablers</h3> - -<p>With Russia’s war in Ukraine entering its third year, and with no military resolution appearing imminent, sanctions – and their effective implementation – will remain a key part of the response to this illegal and unprovoked aggression. At the same time, those targeted by sanctions will inevitably attempt to thwart their impact by exploiting loopholes. Targeting the enablers of this evasion activity will be a critical front in ensuring sanctions are as effective as possible.</p> - -<p>The “enablers” are professionals who often hide behind a veil of white-collar respectability while providing their clients with services to help them hide, move and invest illicit wealth. These services are frequently provided by lawyers, trust and company formation agents, investment advisers, money managers, real-estate professionals, art and antiquities dealers, and accountants. They can also, as described below, be “one-stop-shop” consultants. The involvement of these enablers falls across a spectrum: at one end sits wilful blindness (for example, choosing not to identify the ultimate beneficiary of opaque financial transactions); and at the other are those that offer active collusion (deliberately hiding and moving assets for Russian oligarchs) by exploiting jurisdictions with lax regulatory oversight and using networks of agents across offshore financial centres.</p> - -<p>However, it would be a mistake to focus too much on the type of profession because, as this Policy Brief demonstrates, in practice many enablers from different professional backgrounds perform the same types of services for their clients, such as shell company formation, to take one example.</p> - -<p>Enablers also vary in their level of sophistication. For instance, certain service providers in what is often called the “wealth defence industry” not only create the front-end financial vehicles and offer the asset and legal services necessary to obscure their client’s wealth, but also provide the critical back-end services to contest and attack regulators and the media.</p> - -<p>Although the primary focus of this brief is non-bank enablers, which have in the past escaped the kind of regulatory oversight and enforcement that traditional financial institutions have been subjected to, it is critical to acknowledge that banks and elite lenders continue to manage money for clients who are at risk of being sanctioned.</p> - -<h3 id="the-services">The Services</h3> - -<p>As a result of the wide range of services provided by the enablers identified through OCCRP and other investigative reporting, as well as the relevant literature, this Policy Brief interprets the term broadly and has identified the following typologies of activity.</p> - -<h4 id="hiding-wealth">Hiding Wealth</h4> - -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Playing the shell game:</strong> Oligarch ownership is obscured through convoluted corporate structuring that uses shell companies, trusts, nominee directors and the shifting of assets to offshore jurisdictions, including via cryptocurrencies, loan forgiveness schemes, convertible promissory notes and the use of opaque investment vehicles. One example of this behaviour was exposed by the recent Cyprus Confidential investigation, which revealed that Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich held an estimated $2 billion in assets and cash across Credit Suisse, UBS and Barclays. Abramovich’s ownership of blue-chip US stocks, which were used as collateral for bank loans, had been obscured via offshore companies, trusts and complex corporate structures arranged by the Cypriot corporate service provider, MeritServus. In another example from June 2022, the US Treasury Department blocked a Delaware trust holding over $1 billion in assets linked to oligarch Suleiman Kerimov. Although the trust was formed in 2017 and Kerimov was sanctioned in 2018, it took four years for the trust to be identified as blocked. According to the US Treasury’s press release, “Kerimov used a complex series of legal structures and front persons to obscure his interest in [the trust]”. The trust funds were in turn invested in large US companies and “managed by a series of U.S. investment firms and facilitators”.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Keeping it in the family:</strong> To avoid detection, enablers often register companies, assets and trusts in the names of relatives or trusted proxies of their clients, as well as using relatives or associates as directors. Investigative reporting has revealed this to be a common typology, with examples including: Russian oligarch Alisher Usmanov’s sister, a gynaecologist, listed as the beneficial owner of 27 Swiss bank accounts; Boris Rotenberg’s bodyguard and Arkady Rotenberg’s girlfriend holding valuable assets; and Alexander Mashenski restructuring ownership of his Belarusian fishing business to benefit his daughter, two months after the invasion of Ukraine. Another high-profile proxy that was exposed through investigative journalism is Eric Whyte, a Canadian and Cypriot citizen, who appears to have no business activities outside the network of offshore companies he allegedly controls – offshore companies connected to assets worth approximately $130 million. OCCRP reporting suggests that the beneficial owner of Whyte’s empire is actually Andrei Kostin, a sanctioned Russian banker with strong ties to Putin.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Leveraging networks:</strong> Enablers employ connections to other money-laundering networks or organised crime. Although they attempt to maintain a veneer of respectability, some enablers are not above working with professional money launderers and criminals. In a sweeping action against sanctions evasion, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Georgios Georgiou for his role in laundering money for “criminal organizations, corrupt businessmen and Russian oligarchs” by using a variety of creative schemes to obscure the beneficial ownership of funds. In its press release, the Treasury noted Georgiou’s provision of services to another sanctioned enabler and founder of a “private equity and corporate structuring entity heavily involved in moving Russian finance into the UAE and money laundering”.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<h4 id="maintaining-control">Maintaining Control</h4> - -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Pass the parcel of assets:</strong> Once the source of funds is obscured through shell companies, trusts and investment vehicles, they are invested by the professional enabler (either the same enabler who created the vehicle or a more specialised facilitator such as a real-estate professional). The funds are channelled into desirable assets including shares, real estate, artwork, yachts, jets and other luxury goods, such as precious metals and stones. OCCRP’s investigation into the Russian oligarch brothers Boris and Arkady Rotenberg, “The Rotenberg Files”, has revealed complex investment vehicles, corporate restructures, asset transfers and property schemes involving numerous proxies and permissive jurisdictions, such as the British Virgin Islands and Cyprus, all coordinated by a network of international professional service providers and designed to preserve the brothers’ financial empire and maintain their control over real estate, yachts and companies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Owning 49%:</strong> Diluting ownership stakes to avoid certain thresholds, such as those that trigger share reporting or financial sanctions, allows the effective control of assets by oligarchs to remain undetected or outside the requirement to freeze those assets. This tactic is often used by enablers in combination with other sanctions-evasion typologies, such as “keeping it in the family”, “pass the parcel of assets”, or “playing the shell game”, to maintain hidden ownership or control. For example, OCCRP investigative reporting in 2022 revealed how, at that time, Usmanov maintained a 49% stake in his main business conglomerate, while the remainder was held by a range of opaque offshore companies and business associates.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<h4 id="thinking-globally">Thinking Globally</h4> - -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Shopping around:</strong> Jurisdiction shopping to take advantage of a lack of sanctions, a delay in sanctions or lax regulatory oversight is one of the most common tactics used by enablers to avoid these measures. OCCRP’s “Russian Asset Tracker” reveals a profusion of oligarch mansions, yachts and planes located in offshore financial centres, such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Dubai, Luxembourg, Switzerland, the British Virgin Islands and the Isle of Man. Moreover, recent investigative reporting into large leaks of financial documents, such as the FinCEN files, Panama Papers and Suisse Secrets reports, all bear the classic hallmark of oligarchs using offshore entities to hide their international assets. The Rotenberg Files further reveal how mismatches between the US, EU and UK sanctions against the brothers and their family members allowed them to exploit those differences. While both brothers were sanctioned by the US in 2014, the UK and the EU did not sanction both until years later. For cunning and well-resourced oligarchs, that sort of time lag is a major window of opportunity.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Passport to financial freedom:</strong> Enablers often take advantage of the multiple passports of their clients and their clients’ family members to unlock access to favourable jurisdictions. Investigative reporting has identified the Finnish citizenship of Boris Rotenberg and the US citizenship of his wife. Abramovich is a citizen of Israel and Portugal, in addition to Russia. Members of the powerful Vorobyev family are citizens of Israel, Latvia, Singapore and Monaco. If their clients do not already possess useful passports, enablers also facilitate the purchase of citizenship in a preferred jurisdiction. As OCCRP reported in February 2023, five of the 10 people sanctioned by the US for operating a Russian arms sanctions-evasion network acquired EU citizenship through Cyprus’s notorious “golden passport” scheme.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<h4 id="deflecting-scrutiny">Deflecting Scrutiny</h4> - -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>On the front foot:</strong> Many enablers offer a one-stop shop, not only constructing the vehicles necessary to shield their clients’ assets from international scrutiny; but also negotiating or aggressively dealing with regulators, compliance officials and journalists who take an interest in their clients’ affairs. An OCCRP report into data leaked from the boutique Swiss investment firm Finaport Holding shows a client list that included dozens of politically exposed persons, among them Russian oligarchs. Correspondence published by OCCRP demonstrates how Finaport employees actively circumvented compliance procedures and forcefully pushed back against due diligence requests from banks, dismissing concerns and threatening to remove their clients’ accounts.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Spin and suits:</strong> In addition to playing defence, some enablers play offence by deploying global public relations strategies and international lawfare against governments, regulators and the media. For instance, in October 2022 The Intercept reported that Yevgeny Prigozhin, then-leader of the mercenary Wagner Group, had recruited UK and US legal firms to challenge international sanctions against him and to sue journalists who had investigated his business dealings. The detrimental impact of such strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) is immense, with OCCRP revealing in 2023 that journalists and media outlets in its global network were battling over 60 lawsuits filed by the subjects of their investigations.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<h4 id="being-prepared">Being Prepared</h4> - -<ol> - <li><strong>Staying one step ahead:</strong> With all risk-management strategies, the best outcome is to avoid exposure entirely. Thus, the most accomplished professional service providers engage in all typologies of sanctions-avoidance activity before their client is even sanctioned. For example, OCCRP and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists investigative reporting has revealed that, in the days after the invasion of Ukraine, PwC Cyprus facilitated the transfer of millions of dollars between anonymous shell companies on behalf of as yet non-sanctioned Russian oligarch clients. Similarly, shortly before sanctions were imposed on Roman Abramovich, leaked files demonstrate that trusts holding billions of dollars in assets were amended to transfer beneficial ownership to his seven children.</li> -</ol> - -<h3 id="conclusion-and-recommendations">Conclusion and Recommendations</h3> - -<p>As illustrated by the reporting and analysis presented in this brief, fundamental policy and practice gaps continue to allow enablers to help their clients improperly protect their assets and interests from sanctions. To address the range of activities highlighted above, policymakers should take the following steps, which will also strengthen sanctions implementation beyond the Russia context:</p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Establish deterrence:</strong> Enforcement actions against professional enabler networks that violate existing laws and designations against those that operate in lax jurisdictions must be increased. The EU and the UK lag the US when it comes to designations of, and criminal and civil enforcement against, professional enablers. The chilling effect of US and UK designations against Cypriot enablers in April 2023 should be replicated, while more criminal prosecutions should be brought against those who continue to break the law, following the example of the US Department of Justice’s Task Force KleptoCapture, and greater use should be made of the multinational REPO Taskforce. Currently, being a professional enabler in the UK and the EU is low cost and high reward, with few to no consequences. This is critical as professional enablers serve as nodes for sanctions evasion and can cater to multiple sanctioned clients.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhance coordination:</strong> Better coordination of sanctions designations across likeminded jurisdictions is required to improve compliance. Although significant strides have been made in multilateral coordination between the US, the UK and the EU, and other likeminded jurisdictions, significant differences in sanctions designations remain, as shown by the Atlantic Council’s Russia Sanctions Database. At the same time, this brief demonstrates that jurisdictional arbitrage is one of the most popular methods for avoiding the bite of sanctions, and that lags in the imposition of sanctions provide legal cover to enablers taking advantage of differences in timing to move and hide oligarch assets.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Take a “network” approach:</strong> Sanctions must be imposed on an oligarch’s entire network simultaneously to minimise opportunities to shift assets to family members and associates. Any delay facilitates evasion. The use of family members, such as children, romantic partners, and even low-level associates, like bodyguards or school friends, continues to be a top sanctions-evasion and -avoidance method. Abramovich’s transfers to his children are a case in point. While it is standard in US sanctions programmes to include spouses and adult children, the EU only expanded its sanctions programme to cover immediate family members in mid-2023. But loopholes – such as the use of minors who are unlikely to be sanctioned for legal and policy reasons – persist and should be addressed by, for example, blocking assets that have been transferred to them in an apparent effort to avoid sanctions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Publicise blocked property:</strong> A lack of information about ownership impedes effective private sector implementation. To enhance private sector enforcement, allies should consistently and publicly identify any property, such as real estate, yachts and artwork, or legal arrangements, such as trusts, in which the sanctioned person has an interest. As described above, particular attention should be paid to any assets that may have been transferred to family members and associates to shield them from sanctions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Harmonise ownership and control sanctions rules:</strong> Harmonisation of the sanctions rules on 50% ownership and control across the US, the UK and the EU is required to enhance multilateral sanctions enforcement. Additionally, the US should expand its “50% rule” to encompass a control standard as lowering ownership of entities to just below the 50% threshold while maintaining control through proxies continues to be a favoured tactic used by oligarchs and their enablers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Close regulatory loopholes:</strong> Loopholes in the regulation and supervision of professional enablers facilitate sanctions circumvention and evasion. The US, in particular, needs to pass legislation or in certain cases finalise proposed rules imposing anti-money-laundering obligations on those who provide certain financial or related services, including those who incorporate or register companies, form trusts, manage money or other assets, are involved in real-estate closings and settlements, advise on investments, or are engaged in the trade or sale of works of art or antiquities. Those who fail to comply should face more actively applied civil and/or criminal penalties and, as appropriate, the suspension or revocation of licences, along with other disciplinary actions. The UK and the EU should focus on making their existing supervisory regimes more effective and on following through with enforcement to act as a genuine deterrent.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Focus on services:</strong> As enablers do not adhere to neatly defined professional roles, neither should efforts to regulate them. To avoid inadvertently creating loopholes, legislation and regulations should follow the example of the proposed US ENABLERS Act by focusing on the services provided by enablers across various professions, such as setting up companies and trusts, serving as nominee directors and managing assets.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Pressure enabling jurisdictions:</strong> The ability of certain jurisdictions to continue to offer sanctions-evasion services must be addressed. Pressure on enabler jurisdictions, such as Cyprus, the British Virgin Islands, the UAE and Türkiye must be increased to restrict evasion opportunities by designing clearer consequences for their actions. If such efforts are unsuccessful, allies must issue advisories on specific “enabler jurisdictions”, laying out the risks of doing business with them and should consider creating a designation category of “jurisdiction of primary sanctions evasion concern”.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhance scrutiny of visa and citizenship schemes:</strong> Further progress must be made in addressing the abuse of “golden passports/visas” (or citizenship/residency) by investment schemes which are easily exploited by oligarchs and their enablers to shield themselves and their assets. Numerous oligarchs and enablers are reported to have benefited from these types of schemes. More broadly, visa bans should be used more frequently – and the listings publicised and coordinated between allies – to enhance travel restrictions on those who, whether or not in violation of local law, enable sanctions evasion and to highlight those enablers who represent a sanctions-evasion risk.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Develop more inclusive information sharing mechanisms:</strong> Investigative journalists and civil society have committed significant resources to revealing sanctions-evasion vulnerabilities and activities. Governments should systematically leverage this capacity by sharing unclassified information with accredited journalism organisations, civil society and the private sector to enhance investigations and compliance. They should also expand or create dedicated liaison and reporting channels for two-way information exchange that shield groups submitting information from legal or other threats.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Get serious about tackling SLAPP suits:</strong> The UK and the EU need to build on recent progress by ensuring that the UK’s anti-SLAPP bill is sufficiently broad and the EU’s anti-SLAPP directive is implemented properly by member states. Effective anti-SLAPP laws are essential to ensuring that the “wealth defence industry” is not able to suppress investigative reporting by journalists and civil society that exposes kleptocrats and their enablers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Continue to boost beneficial ownership and control transparency:</strong> Publicly accessible, central and verified beneficial ownership registries that encompass the full gamut of legal entities and arrangements are indispensable to combating sanctions evasion. Key global centres, such as the British Virgin Islands, must be provided with the analytical resources they need, and journalists and civil society actors must be granted access to such registries to allow them to leverage the information in their investigations, thus serving as a resource for overextended governments. Governments too must upskill law enforcement and other investigative authorities on how to make use of beneficial ownership information.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<p>As Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine grinds into its third year and the range of sanctions targets dwindles, curtailing evasion activities must be a heightened focus for Ukraine’s allies. As this Policy Brief has shown, central to this mission should be an active campaign to disable the enablers which have been revealed by investigative journalists to be, knowingly or unknowingly, facilitating evasion by exploiting loopholes and using a range of obfuscation tactics.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Justyna Gudzowska</strong> has spent her career at the intersection of financial crime and international security. She is an international expert on sanctions, corruption, terrorism financing, and money laundering, having worked on these issues across the public and private sectors. She teaches a class on illicit finance at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and is the founder of Firefly Advisory LLC, an anti-financial crime strategic advisory firm. Justyna is also a Senior Advisor to The Sentry, an investigative and policy organisation that seeks to disable multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy.</p> - -<p><strong>Eliza Lockhart</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. Her research examines matters at the intersection of law, finance, and global security; with a particular focus on how evidence-based policy can promote democratic resilience and protect the rule of law against foreign interference. Eliza’s current projects include whistleblowing, state threats and economic security.</p> - -<p><strong>Tom Keatinge</strong> is the founding Director of the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI, where his research focuses on matters at the intersection of finance and security. He is also currently a specialist adviser on illicit finance to the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee ongoing enquiry.</p>Justyna Gudzowska, et al.This Policy Brief identifies common mechanisms by which professional service providers facilitate sanctions evasion and makes recommendations for how policymakers can work together to minimise the use of professional service providers to circumvent sanctions. \ No newline at end of file +<p><strong>Pia Hüsch</strong> is a Research Fellow in cyber, technology and national security. Her research focusses on the impact, societal risks and lawfulness of cyber operations and the geopolitical and national security implications of disruptive technologies, such as AI.</p>Pia HüschA workshop discussion in February 2024 explores the role of AI and intelligence in a hypothetical invasion. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/hkers/2024-06-05-chinese-engagement-in-argentina.html b/hkers/2024-06-05-chinese-engagement-in-argentina.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e005d12d --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-06-05-chinese-engagement-in-argentina.html @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ + + + + + + + + + + Chinese Engagement In AR · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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Chinese Engagement In AR

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The Evolution of Chinese Engagement in Argentina under Javier Milei

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Evan Ellis | 2024.06.05

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In August 2023, then-Argentine presidential candidate Javier Milei declared he would not make “pacts with Communists.” Months later, following his election, he declined an invitation to Argentina to join the China-dominated BRICS organization, signaling a deepening of the political distancing from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that began under his once pro-PRC predecessor Alberto Fernandez. However, the move did not necessarily signal an end to the substantial private trade and investment relationship between the two countries.

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As Argentina’s economic crisis deepened under President Fernandez, most of China’s high-profile infrastructure projects in Argentina became paralyzed over financing and other questions. Such projects included an $8 billion nuclear reactor at Argentina’s Atucha III complex, two dams on the Santa Cruz River, work on the Belgrano Cargas rail system, dredging of the Paraguay and Paraná Rivers to support the continued operation of the hidrovía (waterway), and problems in approving a Chinese port project near Antarctica.

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Even before the election of President Milei in November 2023, China had deepening difficulties in Argentina, including the cancellation of Argentina’s purchase of China’s JF17/FC-1 fighters in favor of U.S.-produced F-16 fighters. China also had replaced its dynamic Spanish-speaking ambassador and military attaché with a new ambassador, Wang Wei, who spoke mainly Italian, and a new attaché whose second language was Portuguese, not Spanish. Argentine China experts perceived that the PRC was informally downgrading the relationship.

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Despite Argentine foreign minister Diana Mondino’s cordial, professional approach toward the PRC and her assurances of Argentina’s continued interest in transparent commercial and diplomatic relations with China, relations continued to deteriorate. The PRC suspended a $6.5 billion bank credit that it had extended to the outgoing government, and its banks have reportedly put on hold credit for major investment projects in the country. In addition to the PRC’s reaction to President Milei’s remarks about China, the PRC was also reportedly offended by Taiwanese government representatives’ attendance at an academic event with Mondino involving Kung Guo Wei, a visiting professor from Taipei’s famous Tamkang University, before Mondino became foreign minister. Nevertheless, PRC-Argentina commercial relations are significant and, arguably, poised to deepen under President Milei’s government, driven by the likely turnaround of the Argentine economy and projects by private businesspersons and provincial and local-level politicians.

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Trade

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Argentina-China bilateral trade has grown substantially since the PRC entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, though, as with many countries of the region, Argentine purchases of Chinese products and services have grown far greater than PRC purchases from Argentina. Argentine exports to the PRC grew approximately eightfold, from $1.09 billion in 2002 to $7.93 billion in 2022, while Argentine imports from China grew over 53-fold, from $330 million in 2002 to $17.5 billion in 2022. Argentina’s main exports to the PRC were agricultural goods, led by soybeans, beef, and barley, while Argentina imported an array of higher value-added manufactured goods and services from China, including telephones and computers.

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Argentine exports of agricultural goods, as well as lithium and other minerals, are poised to expand in the coming years as the Argentine economy recovers. Argentine consumption of Chinese electronics, cars, and other manufactured goods and services is also poised to grow, bolstered, ironically, by the relatively laissez-faire posture of President Milei toward commercial matters.

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Despite some reasons for optimism regarding overall trade growth, the realization of value added is likely to be lopsided in China’s favor, reflecting Argentina’s limited knowledge of the PRC as a market and the limited ability of the Argentine government to help its businesspeople consummate profitable deals there. In off-the-record interviews with an Argentine China expert, the author learned that although Argentina has diplomatic offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Canton, and Hong Kong, it has centers for commercial promotion only in Shanghai and Chengdu.

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Despite some reasons for optimism regarding overall trade growth, the realization of value added is likely to be lopsided in China’s favor, reflecting Argentina’s limited knowledge of the PRC as a market and the limited ability of the Argentine government to help its businesspeople.

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Political Relations

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Prior to the Milei government, the PRC consistently put Argentina in the highest ranks of diplomatic partnerships it possesses. In 2004, the PRC recognized Argentina as one of three strategic partners in the region, and in 2014 it upgraded the relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Consistent with this high level of relationship, the PRC tried to get Argentina to set up a ministerial-level committee to facilitate coordination across sectors, such as the COSBAN in Brazil and the High-Level Mixed Commission in Venezuela. But, according to an Argentine China expert, the Argentine Peronist government could not facilitate the required coordination between the Foreign and Commerce Ministries and other required government agencies, and the effort to create such a committee was ultimately set aside.

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In February 2022, the Fernandez government joined the PRC Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during a state visit to Beijing tied to the Winter Olympics held there. Fernandez was one of two Latin American presidents to attend the BRI’s 10th-anniversary celebration in October 2023. The PRC reportedly is concerned that the Fernandez government could withdraw Argentina from the BRI, however, just as it turned down membership in BRICS.

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In 2017, Argentina also applied and was accepted to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, but the country reportedly never paid the $7.5 million membership quota and has not attended any board meetings or otherwise participated in the affairs of the bank. According to Argentine sinologists, the new Milei government appointed a respected career diplomat, Marcelo Suárez Salvia, to represent Argentina in the PRC, though he has not served in Asia and does not speak any Asian languages.

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Petroleum

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China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is the controlling partner in Bridas and, with British Petroleum, the Pan American Energy–Axion consortium. Together, the ventures give CNOOC substantial petroleum operations in Argentina. Bridas — in which the Bulgheronis, one of Argentina’s wealthiest families, also have an important stake — is the key operator of the Vaca Muerta shale gas deposits.

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Mining Sector

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In the mining sector, PRC-based companies have long had a presence in traditional operations, albeit with difficulties involving relations with local communities and government licensing. The most significant Chinese conventional mining project in the country is the Veladero gold mine, in which PRC-based Shandong Gold purchased a $960 million (50 percent) stake in 2017. Other Chinese-owned mines include Campana Mahuida, owned by China Metallurgical Corporation and shut down in 2009 due to problems with the local community; Sierra Grande, shut down in 2016 over low minerals prices; and a gold mine in La Rioja owned by Chinese conglomerate Hanaq.

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In the lithium sector, PRC-based companies have made major advances in recent years, courting Argentine provincial governments, which make key decisions about licensing and regulation. Chinese lithium projects in Argentina include Pozuelos and Pastos Grandes, acquired by China’s Ganfeng through its $962 million purchase of Lithea Inc. in 2022. Ganfeng also owns and is developing the Mariana salt flats in Salta and Cauchari-Olaroz in Jujuy, a joint venture with Canada’s Lithium Americas.

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Chinese carmaker Chery and minor partner Gotion proposed a $400 million investment in an electric vehicle plant also in Jujuy, though with the country’s economic difficulties, plans have not yet moved forward. In nearby Catamarca Province, the Chinese mining giant Zijin operates the Tres Quebradas lithium field and has proposed the construction of a plant for refining lithium and manufacturing cathodes for lithium-ion batteries.

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Agriculture

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Agrologistics companies Nidera and Noble, owned by China Oilseeds and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO), have a substantial presence in Argentina, with a substantial part of their business coming from supplying agricultural goods to their parent organization COFCO. COFCO purchases for the Chinese market, giving it an advantage in competing with non-Chinese agrologistics firms such as ADM, Bunge, Dreyfuss, and Cargill. Nidera has a plant in Rosario, which suffered a high-profile explosion in 2017. It also has storage facilities in Santa Fe and Cordoba for grains, which may have some processing capabilities. There are also Chinese-owned agricultural facilities in Chaco and Tucuman, among other locations. The PRC-based company Syngenta, owned by ChemChina since 2017, has a presence in Argentina and has sought a new law for transgenic seeds to use its genetically modified organism technology in the country.

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Finally, during the prior government, to meet growing Chinese demand for pork, PRC-based investors had proposed $3.7 billion in investments in slaughterhouses and other pork production facilities in the country. The project became the focus of protests by environmentalists and animal rights activists, who objected to the inhumane conditions the animals were allegedly raised in. To the consternation of the Chinese, President Fernandez became involved in the dispute on the side of the protesters, including allowing himself to be photographed at one of the protests near signs that were highly derogatory toward the Chinese. The position of Fernandez effectively stopped the project from going forward.

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Electricity Sector

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In Jujuy Province, a consortium led by PowerChina is currently working on the fourth phase of the Cauchari photovoltaic array, the largest solar park in Argentina and the region. The plan, according to Argentine China experts, is to leverage the project not only to power mining and other operations in the region but also to support an ecosystem of green energy facilities. PowerChina and other PRC-based firms have also been involved in the Loma Blanca wind farm and other wind projects in Neuquén and Santa Cruz.

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Also in Santa Cruz, PowerChina leads a consortium for the construction of two hydroelectric facilities on the Santa Cruz River — the Jorge Cepernic and Nestor Kirchner facilities — though progress on the project has been delayed over regulatory and environmental, as well as financing, issues. As noted, the construction of a nuclear pressurized water reactor by the Chinese Gezhouba Group in the Atucha complex, initially agreed to during the presidency of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, also continues to be stuck over the insistence by the fiscally imperiled prior Argentine government that the Chinese finance 100 percent of the project.

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PowerChina was also involved in the long-delayed Chihuido hydroelectric project, which Russia originally pursued, though neither had success in taking the project forward. PowerChina further attempted, unsuccessfully, to sell steel tubing for the construction of a gas pipeline connecting the Vaca Muerta shale gas field to Buenos Aires, but the Alberto Fernandez government chose to award the contract to the favored but much more expensive Argentine supplier Techint. According to an Argentine China expert interviewed for this project, because of the poor outcome of several PowerChina projects, CEO Tu Shuiping reportedly resigned and left for the PRC, with many of the company’s projects in Argentina remaining stagnant.

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Transportation Infrastructure

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Over the past 15 years, PRC-based companies have pursued multiple train and highway infrastructure projects in Argentina, albeit with considerable delays and difficulties. The most significant of these projects are track modernization and the provision of new engines and rolling stock for the Belgrano Cargas railroad, key to moving freight within Argentina and connecting it to the ports of neighboring countries. Although work on various segments of Belgrano Cargas have been completed, work became stuck at the end of the Fernandez administration over a series of disputes, including the Chinese insisting they import their own railroad ties instead of using locally available quebracho, an Argentine hardwood. The Chinese also completed work on the Red Line (Line B) of the Buenos Aires metro (Subte), though the extension to the Buenos Aires (Ezeiza) International Airport and work on the Cordoba metro never went forward.

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Argentina and China explored work on tunnels through mountain passes connecting Argentina and Chile via highway, including the Agua Negra tunnel at the latitude of Buenos Aires and Santiago and a route further to the north through the Argentine province of Salta. Perhaps the most controversial Chinese infrastructure project has been the proposed construction of the $500 million multiuse Rio Grande commercial port at the tip of Antarctica in Tierra del Fuego. The area has been of interest to Chinese investors since the early 2000s when a PRC-based group explored building a petrochemical plant and maritime export terminal for urea fertilizer in the area.

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The potential ability of the Chinese military to surreptitiously use the port during times of war to observe and possibly inhibit transits through the Straits of Magellan or the Drake Passage has drawn attention to the project as a security concern, even obligating the governor of Ushuaia to contract a media consultant to help deal with the controversy. As of the time of this writing, the project was seen as unlikely to receive the federal approval required by the port and navigable rivers organization within the Ministry of Economy to move forward.

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Digital Infrastructure

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Since 2001, PRC-based companies such as Huawei and ZTE — and today Xiaomi — have played a leading role in Argentina’s telecommunications infrastructure. By 2021, Huawei had over 500 employees in the country. Such Chinese firms are important suppliers to Argentina’s telecommunications providers, including Claro, Movistar, and Personal (which is part of Grupo Clarín). The latter relies heavily on Huawei equipment. Huawei is also a significant cloud services provider in the country.

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Since 2001, PRC-based companies such as Huawei and ZTE — and today Xiaomi — have played a leading role in Argentina’s telecommunications infrastructure.

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The outgoing Fernandez government had planned an accelerated auction of the country’s 5G bandwidth in September 2023 to raise needed funds for the government (an estimated $1 billion in royalty payments, according to Argentine China experts interviewed for this project). Companies using Huawei 5G equipment were poised to win, but the government could not conduct the bid in time, and its status with the new government remains uncertain. In Argentina, as in other countries, Huawei has a scholarship program, Seeds of the Future, to strengthen its base of tech employees in the region by bringing technically talented youth to the PRC for three months to a year.

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In the surveillance systems domain, ZTE is the key supplier for a $30 million smart cities project in Jujuy, where the PRC depends on local government support to access the province’s lithium. In addition, the Chinese firm Hikvision is a key provider of surveillance cameras in the country, including for corporate and home security systems, as well as for traffic cameras in towns and neighborhoods like Vicente Lopez.

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As in other parts of Latin America, customs scanners in Ezeiza International Airport, first purchased in 2016, are supplied by the PRC-based company Nuctec. With respect to taxi services, as in other parts of Latin America such as Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil, the Chinese taxi company DiDi is present in the country, with a particular focus on mototaxi and delivery services. However, competitors Uber and Cabify are more dominant in local markets.

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Banking and Finance

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Three Chinese banks currently operate in Argentina. Hong Kong Shanghai Bank of China and International Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) are licensed to conduct branch banking operations in the country. ICBC entered the country following a 2012 approval by Argentine authorities of its controlling interest in the locally licensed Standard Bank.

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In addition, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), with offices in the Buenos Aires district of Puerto Madero, primarily conducts representational banking for Chinese companies tied to the currency swap and business in the PRC. According to an Argentine China expert interviewed for this project, the Agricultural Bank of China also has explored establishing a presence in the country.

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Through the PBOC, Argentina and China have an $18.5 billion currency swap arrangement. It was set up to facilitate the clearance of transactions for imports and exports between the two countries in order to avoid using U.S. dollars as the clearing mechanism. They also agreed to expand the agreement by $5 billion. The interest rate secured for the new portion of the swap, according to an Argentine China expert, was the 3.5 percent benchmark Hong Kong interest rate plus an additional 3.5 percent. The rate is considered high but still in the range of commercial norms. Under the Fernandez government, $5 billion of the swap was activated to support trade between the two countries. In addition, Argentina may have used its access to the renminbi to pay part of its installment payments to the International Monetary Fund.

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When President Milei took office, the Chinese reportedly asked the incoming government if it wished to activate part of the currency swap line to facilitate trade, but the Milei government reportedly declined, Argentine China experts say. Shortly after, the PRC also canceled the new $6.5 billion portion of its swap.

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Pharmaceutical Sector

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During the early phases of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Chinese company Sinopharm conducted Phase 3 trials in Argentina, among other countries, and partnered with a local laboratory, Richmond Laboratories, for assembling and distributing its vaccine in Argentina. Because of the poor performance of the Chinese vaccine, however, the demand for the Sinopharm vaccine dried up once higher-efficacy Western messenger RNA vaccines came online. According to Argentine China experts, Sinopharm could not reach an agreement to produce its vaccine in Argentina or branch into other areas.

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By contrast, an Argentine laboratory, Bagó, had a production facility in the PRC for the production of aftosa vaccines for animals. In off-the-record interviews with Argentine China experts interviewed for this project, they expressed that although there was interest in leveraging the partnership to bring Chinese pharmaceutical capabilities to Argentina, as with Sinopharm, nothing came of the initiative.

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Media Influence

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As in other parts of the region, the PRC has courted the Argentine media, including purchasing advertising supplements in important papers such as Clarín and La Nación. Grupo Clarín also has important business interests with the PRC, including its telecommunications firm Personal, which is the principal user of Chinese equipment in the country and the pioneer for Huawei’s entry into the Argentine market for 5G.

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Intellectual Infrastructure

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Argentina, like most Latin American countries, has relatively limited China knowledge within its universities and think tanks. Nevertheless, its knowledge base and human connections have grown in recent years and are better than in many other parts of Latin America. Argentina’s most respected China studies centers include those at the Catholic University of Argentina (UCA), Universidad Nacional de la Plata (one of the country’s oldest China and Asia studies programs, with the China Center currently under Maria Francesca Staiano), Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero, and Universidad Nacional de Lanús, at which Argentina’s passionately Sinophile ambassador to the PRC, Sabino Vaca Narvaja, formerly taught. As in the United States, leading Argentine think tanks, such as the Argentine Council for International Relations, have China studies programs as well.

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Argentina currently has three Confucius Institutes in public universities, in keeping with Chinese tradition. The oldest, at Universidad Nacional de la Plata, was established in the 1980s, followed by Universidad de Buenos Aires and, most recently, Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, set up in 2020. Universidad Católica de Salta has also explored setting up a Confucius Institute.

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According to China-focused Argentines interviewed for this work, the number of PRC-paid trips for Argentines to study or attend forums in China has reportedly decreased from the golden age of the 2010s, with restrictions on interactions and travel for Argentines increased. Beyond PRC-sponsored education institutions and scholarships, the Sino-Argentine Chamber of Commerce is an important referent for Argentine businesses doing business in the PRC or with Chinese companies. The president of the chamber is Sergio Spadone, son of one of Argentina’s pioneers of doing business with China, and the executive director is Alejandra Conconi. In addition, former head of the chamber Ernesto Taboada now operates a small, separate organization, the Argentine-China Council, after a falling out with the chamber, which he formerly headed, according to an Argentine China expert.

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Provincial and Local Engagement

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As elsewhere in the region, the PRC is particularly engaged at the provincial and local levels in Argentina, including in investment projects, the gifting of trips for local officials to the PRC, and in arrangements with local universities. These engagements include a technology and resources agreement with the National University of Jujuy, an agreement with Alibaba, agreements with PowerChina, and a $30 million contract for ZTE to install cameras and a provincial response and control system in the province, among other technologies.

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Beyond PRC initiatives within the Argentine provinces and with their leaders, Chinese provinces have pursued national-level representation in Argentina. According to an Argentine China expert, Hunan, Canton, and Szechuan Provinces all have representative offices in Buenos Aires but not in the Argentine provinces with which they have sister-province relations. As in Brazil under President Jair Bolsonaro, PRC engagement with Argentine local and provincial-level governments is likely to expand as a complement to a less amenable atmosphere for pursuing agreements at the national level.

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PRC Space Sector Presence in Argentina

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As has been widely publicized, in 2012, the PRC signed a $300 million agreement with the Fernandez de Kirchner government, serving as the basis for the construction and operation of a deep space radar facility in a remote part of Neuquén. The facility is operated by China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control, part of the Chinese Strategic Support Force of the People’s Liberation Army. The Argentine government has only an intermittent presence at the site.

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In addition, since the signing of a 1989 cooperation agreement, the Chinese have operated space telescopes at the Felix Aguilar Astronomical Observatory in San Juan, constructing a satellite laser ranging station at the site in 2006. The PRC is currently constructing a 40-meter space telescope, the China Argentina Radio Telescope, at the facility.

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In Rio Gallegos, in the south of the country, the Chinese firm Emposat has plans to build a space tracking facility with four to six antennae. The site, if approved, would complement the Chinese polar space capabilities provided by its Antarctic research facilities at Zhongshan and Inexpressible Island, Antarctica.

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Security

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The PRC has explored sales and gifts of arms and other equipment to Argentina’s police and military, though those appeared to have been decreasing at the end of the prior government and have not gone forward under the Milei administration. During the Fernandez de Kirchner administration, Argentina began exploring the purchase of Chinese 8x8 armored personnel carriers for the Cruz del Sur multinational peacekeeping brigade, which it formed with Chile, as well as P-18 offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) similar to those the PRC sold to Trinidad and Tobago and FC-1 interceptor aircraft. After purchasing four WMZ-551s for evaluation for $2.6 million, Argentina decided against the purchase of more of the vehicles.

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During the center-right administration of Mauricio Macri (2015–19), Argentina decided to buy French patrol boats, obviating the need for Chinese OPVs. Purchase of the Chinese FC-1 received serious consideration under the leftist Peronist government of Alberto Fernandez, including due to significant efforts by the Chinese, who saw an opportunity to introduce the fighter into the region more broadly through Argentina and who went so far as to cut the offer price by 40 percent in an attempt to win the contract, according to off-the-record interviews with Argentine security experts. The Chinese were reportedly even exploring assembly of the aircraft in Argentina in a facility of the national defense industry manufacturer FADEA for export to other parts of the region. The Chinese may have also had an additional source of leverage through Francisco Taiana, son of then minister of defense Jorge Taiana, who had received considerable access to China to write a book on the country, among other activities.

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In the end, however, there were serious questions about quality and maintainability, particularly because the Chinese did not use the fighter themselves. According to Argentine security experts, the Argentine evaluation team could not speak with the Pakistani pilots who had flown the FC-1s. Because the planes used a Russian-made engine, the availability of parts became uncertain in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine and associated Western sanctions. In the final months of the Fernandez government, Argentina chose to buy U.S. F-16s from Denmark rather than the Chinese fighter. Beyond these weapons purchases, Argentina also received a donation of four armored vehicles and security cameras from the PRC in conjunction with the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires, though there were no further gifts after that.

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In professional military interactions, the Argentine National War College (NWC) has regularly sent an officer to a six-month command and general staff course in the PRC, as well as sending officials to shorter courses. According to an Argentine security expert, the Argentine NWC, as recently as 2020, also hosted a student from the People’s Liberation Army.

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The Chinese National Police also maintains a presence in the PRC embassy in Argentina to support Argentine authorities in combatting Chinese-organized crime in the country. During the prior Fernandez de Kirchner government, the PRC brought in a larger presence to help the Argentine government combat the Chinese triad Pi Xue, which had grown significantly in the greater Buenos Aires area and was extorting Chinese shopkeepers. Argentine security experts note that while the reported level of extortion and other activity by Pi Xue is now much lower, the Chinese national presence in the PRC embassy in Buenos Aires continues.

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As in other parts of the region, the Chinese government appears to operate unofficial Chinese police stations in the country, ostensibly to assist but also to pressure Chinese nationals living in Argentina, leveraging relatives living in China. According to Argentine security experts, local authorities have identified at least two such facilities in the neighborhoods of San Martin and Tres de Febrero.

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In the domain of private security, China Overseas Security Group (COSG) has an office in Buenos Aires whose address, according to reports by security experts interviewed for this project, is that of the local law firm that registered it, Wilson Rae. COSG continues to advertise on its website a search for a country manager position dating to the 2019 G20 meeting in the city, though it does not have a visible presence in the city.

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As in other parts of the region, the Chinese government appears to operate unofficial Chinese police stations in the country, ostensibly to assist but also to pressure Chinese nationals living in Argentina, leveraging relatives living in China.

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Conclusion

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The Argentine-China commercial relationship is broad and substantial and will likely continue under the Milei administration, particularly in high-priority sectors such as lithium, renewable energy, and digital sectors. PRC purchases of Argentine agricultural products and other commodities and Chinese sales of a broad range of goods and services to the Argentine economy will probably continue at a significant level, though lack of political will on the Argentine side and lack of financing on the Chinese side may restrict agreements of a more political or military nature and large infrastructure projects whose business case is questionable.

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As in Brazil under the China-skeptical Bolsonaro regime, PRC engagements at the provincial level in Argentina may flourish compared to those at the national level, where political skepticism toward the PRC is greater. The success of the Milei government in turning around the Argentine economy will also impact its ability to engage commercially with the PRC and take new projects forward. Whatever the trajectory, the underlying economic logic between the two countries means the future of the Argentina-PRC relationship is likely to be better than some in the PRC fear and will present an opportunity for Washington to work with the Milei administration to define what a transparent, balanced relationship should look like between Argentina and a range of countries, including China, other Asian partners, the European Union, and the United States.

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Evan Ellis is a research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, with a focus on the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors as well as transnational organized crime and populism in the region.

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Ever The Day After

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Egypt, Israel and Gaza

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H A Hellyer | 2024.06.05

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Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords in 1978, the first peace treaty between the Jewish state and any of its Arab neighbours. The accords are the bedrock of the region’s security architecture, but owing to Israel’s war on Gaza and its moves at the border between Gaza and Egypt, the relationship between Cairo and Tel Aviv has reached its lowest point in decades. What kind of state are Egyptian-Israeli relations in, and how might this impact the future? Jonathan Eyal (JE) asked RUSI Senior Associate Fellow H A Hellyer (HH) about the significance of these events.

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JE: Camp David was a historic peace treaty between Cairo and Tel Aviv, and laid down the groundwork for a new regional security arrangement for the region in general, and Egypt and Israel in particular. Are we seeing that security arrangement unravel?

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HH: The Camp David Accords had a number of annexes attached to them. One of these describes several different zones; Sinai is divided into three zones (A, B and C), and then there is “Zone D” which is along the border between Gaza and Egypt, on the Gazan side. Article 2/D of Annex 1 is very clear about what type of Israeli military forces are allowed to exist in that zone, which was later described as the “Philadelphi Corridor”. There’s no question that when the Israelis moved tanks into the Corridor on 7 May and took over the Rafah border crossing, they violated that article, and they’ve done much more since then. Last week, Tel Aviv declared that it had taken over the entire corridor, again violating the terms of the Camp David Accords.

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We should be clear-eyed about this: Israel’s moves are seriously endangering the region’s security architecture, and many analysts – myself included – have warned over the past eight months that reckless escalatory behaviour will put all under the “law of unintended consequences”. If we’re frank, Israel’s moves over the past eight months have been incredibly reckless and have raised the likelihood of conflict breaking out across the region – between Israel and Iran, Israel and Lebanon, and now Israel and Egypt. It’s a testament to the region that we haven’t seen all-out war break out, despite these kinds of moves; it shows how little appetite there is for widespread conflict. But I think Tel Aviv is pushing the envelope hard, and it’s difficult to imagine there won’t be consequences.

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JE: Are you saying Egypt might pull out of Camp David?

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HH: No, I think Cairo continues to place great value on the treaty, and will be looking for other ways to express its rejection of Tel Aviv’s moves. As recently as 2 June, when Israel, the US and Egypt convened to discuss the issue, Cairo reiterated its demand that the Israelis withdraw from the Rafah border crossing. This is why, for example, Egypt announced it would join South Africa’s case at the International Court of Justice against Israel, and Cairo refused to coordinate with the Israelis on usage of the Rafah border crossing, clearly seeing such coordination as recognising the legitimacy of the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) presence there. Cairo may be pointing to the fact there are seven other border crossings, also completely under Israel’s control; several of them have been permanently closed by the Israelis, such as Karni and Sufa, but could be opened in order to provide aid relief to Palestinians in Gaza. Moreover, Israel’s official spokesperson, David Mencer, said to journalists that Israel had asked Egypt to open up so that Palestinians who wanted to flee to Sinai could do so, but that the request had been declined. There’s widespread concern in Cairo that Israel will take any opportunity to ethnically cleanse Palestinians from Gaza and displace them to Sinai, if it can do so; such admissions by Israel’s officials do not help.

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Israel’s moves over the past eight months have been incredibly reckless and have raised the likelihood of conflict breaking out across the region

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But there are other things to be concerned about, as Israel continues to engage in more reckless behaviour. A recent clash near the Rafah border crossing led to the death of an Egyptian soldier; Israeli media itself reported that the clash resulted from an Israeli provocation, designed to test Egypt’s reaction. Even without such moves, the risk assessment is serious; Israeli forces along the border in Rafah are seen by the Egyptians not only as violating the peace treaty, but also as part of an occupying power in occupied territory – which is also how London, the EU, the UN and most governments see Israel in Gaza. Egyptian soldiers on the border are no doubt impacted by that; they are seeing an occupying power in Gaza, right on their doorstep, where they know it’s not supposed to be, and they also know that nearby, that same army is engaged in massive hostilities against Palestinians in Rafah. Those soldiers see the same news reports that you and I see, and know that the UN and various agencies are reporting all manners of suffering as a result of the IDF operation. This time, the clash resulted in the death of one soldier; what happens next time, considering everything else that is going on?

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JE: OK, so things are rocky. But we have a normalisation of political relations between Egypt and Israel going back more than four decades. We also have a more recent set of normalisations between Israel and Arab states in terms of the Abraham Accords, and a new deal being proposed that would normalise relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. How does that impact Egypt, as it was the first to normalise, which gave it a certain leverage in terms of relations with Western powers?

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HH: There are a few things to mention here; the first is that the Biden administration has invested tremendous energy in expanding the Abraham Accords. Indeed, many analysts characterised Biden’s Middle East policy as prioritising extending those accords, and very little else. Incredibly, despite the massively destructive conflict of the past eight months, the administration has still directed a lot of its limited bandwidth towards efforts to normalise Israel’s political relationship with Saudi Arabia. There’s a lot to unpack there, but I’m not convinced it will succeed, because Tel Aviv has already said it won’t accede to the fairly minimalist demands that Saudi Arabia has, which are all about fulfilling certain UN Security Council resolutions.

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Be that as it may, there were also concerns expressed in 2020, when the Abraham Accords were signed, in terms of what they might do to Cairo’s geopolitical standing. The talk at the time was that they would decrease Cairo’s – and also Amman’s – importance in the region, because now there were other Arab states that had relations with Israel. But the truth is, whenever a crisis emerges involving Israel, the world still calls on Cairo and Amman, and moreso on Cairo. None of that has changed; they don’t call on Abu Dhabi, Manama or anywhere else in the same way. Cairo in particular has relationships not only with the Israelis, but with pretty much every major Palestinian faction.

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In any case, my assessment of the Saudi-Israeli normalisation deal remains the same – I’m not sure we’ll be seeing that anytime soon.

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Whenever a crisis emerges involving Israel, the world still calls on Cairo and Amman, and moreso on Cairo. They don’t call on Abu Dhabi, Manama or anywhere else in the same way

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JE: Perhaps, but the normalisation deal is all about the “day after”, and Biden’s plan put a lot of focus on trying to see beyond the current hostilities. What’s Egypt’s role in that regard?

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HH: There are a lot of scenarios being discussed for Gaza following the end of hostilities. The problem is, most of them have been vetoed by the Israelis, so it becomes rather academic and abstract to even discuss them without addressing the elephant in the room, which is Israel’s occupation of Gaza, along with its military presence therein. Even the Israelis have found themselves in rather awkward situations due to this; Netanyahu announced in early May that the Emiratis could be involved in governing Gaza following the war, only to be met with a very public denunciation of the idea by the Emirati foreign minister. The stumbling block, including for Abu Dhabi – irrespective of the Abraham Accords – was the Israeli occupation, and the absence of a Palestinian government with “integrity, competence and independence”, which would then have the capacity to invite the UAE to assist.

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It’s not only Arab states that reject “providing cover for the Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip”, as the Emiratis put it; I don’t think any country or multilateral organisation is interested in assisting in governing Gaza, without a clear commitment from the Israelis that they are leaving. Otherwise, such a presence would simply be interpreted as being Israel’s police force in the Gaza Strip – and thus quite likely targeted as part of the occupation. I’m not sure anyone would willingly take on that role; Cairo certainly won’t.

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I think if Biden is successful in getting a permanent ceasefire and an Israeli withdrawal of troops, as well as a commitment to allow a track towards a Palestinian state that includes Gaza, then yes, Egypt could probably be convinced to deploy troops as part of a broader and temporary international force, similar to KFOR in Kosovo, for example.

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But that’s a lot of “ifs”. The irony of all of this is that it is actually quite clear what a workable plan in Gaza entails, and it has been for decades. The question has always been: is the international community in general, and the US in particular, going to use its leverage to push such a workable plan forward? So far, the answer has been a firm “no” – and the Israelis know it.

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H A Hellyer is the Senior Associate Fellow of RUSI. Specialising in geopolitics, security studies, political economy, and belief, he has more than 20 years of experience in governmental, corporate advisory, and academic environments in Europe, USA, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

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Friendshore Lithium-Ion

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Friendshoring the Lithium-Ion Battery Supply Chain: Battery Cell Manufacturing

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William Alan Reinsch, et al. | 2024.06.06

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This white paper outlines the technical details behind the production of the active battery materials stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain and how U.S. government policies are impacting friendshoring efforts in the sector.

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Introduction

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Nearshoring the lithium-ion battery supply chain requires substantial policy efforts at every stage. Upstream inputs, such as critical minerals sourcing and processing, are concentrated in a few nations. Although many more countries engage in midstream and downstream processing of critical resources, access to this end of the supply chain is becoming less secure for U.S. manufacturers because of uncertainty in the domestic and geopolitical spheres.

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Commensurate to the breadth of the challenges is the importance of overcoming them. An adequate, predictable supply of lithium-ion batteries, as well as the supply chain and raw materials, is essential to reaching green transition goals in the United States. These batteries power key products that enable a sustainable, large-scale switch away from fossil fuels essential to long-term environmental goals.

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Calls to accelerate the shift to renewables are accompanied by other goals and legislation that have a significant impact on the direction of U.S. economic and trade policy. Recognizing China’s dominance over the supply of several goods critical to U.S. prosperity and security, policymakers say they intend to spur de-risking of these supply chains by diversifying import sources away from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as creating redundancies to protect against potential unforeseen shocks such as pandemics. Policymakers’ de-risking agenda goes hand in hand with government measures designed to bring production of critical goods back to the United States. They perceive renewing U.S. domestic manufacturing capabilities as a geostrategic shield as well as the pathway to creating more profitable and equitable opportunities for workers.

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Congress and the administration under President Joe Biden have thus undertaken several policies to simultaneously tackle three objectives that will transform the landscape of U.S. lithium-ion battery production, among other sectors. These policies aim to drastically quicken the pace of the U.S. green transition, reshore production capabilities in critical sectors, and diversify away from the PRC’s dominance in these key areas. While these three goals may all be critical to U.S. economic security in the long term, actions that enable the latter two could hamper achievement of the first. Unfortunately, measures aimed at securing the lithium-ion battery supply chain through industrial policy packages that emphasize reshoring threaten to hinder U.S. consumers’ access to this technology.

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This brief, the second in a series of three, builds upon the first’s findings on refining and processing and examines the production of active materials — the next step of the lithium-ion battery supply chain. The paper first outlines the technical steps necessary for active materials production — namely, mixing, coating, calendaring, and slitting, as well as production of the separator and electrolytes. It then describes current U.S. capabilities at this stage of the supply chain relative to the global market, considering the country’s nearshoring and onshoring ambitions.

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In addition, the brief addresses the Biden administration’s incentives, such as tax credits included in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) and grants programs enabled by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA). It continues with an examination of different regulations and their potential impact on the ability of lithium-ion battery input manufacturers to scale up their capabilities in the face of growing demand. Lastly, the report unpacks recent policy recommendations from Congress relevant to lithium-ion battery nearshoring considerations.

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Manufacturing a Battery Cell

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Active Materials Production

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Technical steps. After mining or extracting the raw minerals and materials — typically, lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite — processors and refiners purify them. The materials are then used to create cathode and anode active battery materials, which are commonly referred to as the midstream portion of the lithium-ion battery supply chain. Noteworthily, the active material production stage requires complex processes and advanced technologies and chemistries, meaning there are few producers and significant technical barriers to entry.

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As mentioned in the first paper of this series, a lithium-ion battery usually includes multiple lithium-ion cells, which function as interconnected building blocks. A lithium-ion cell is chiefly made up of an anode, a cathode, a separator, and an electrolyte. The anode is the negative electrode in a cell, whereas the positive side is the cathode. During charging, the lithium ions move from the cathode, through the separator, to the anode.

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The cathode component of the lithium-ion battery may comprise various formulations, chemistries, and crystalline structures. Metal oxides like cobalt, nickel, manganese, aluminum, iron, and phosphate, among others, make up the formulations and chemistries known as the cathode active materials (CAMs). Binders and cognitive additives such as polyvinylidene fluoride (PVDF) are also critical to the battery’s performance, especially for safer and longer-range applications. As mentioned in the first paper of this series, graphite is paramount to anodes, though industry is searching for ways to use alternative materials such as silicon or lithium given that they present opportunities for higher energy density and power.

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The process of converting a set of refined and purified critical minerals into functional components of electrodes — namely, a positively charged cathode and a negatively charged anode — may be divided into five key steps. These are mixing, coating, calendaring, slitting, and electrode making.

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Mixing. The active materials of the cathode, lithium, nickel, manganese, and cobalt, are dry blended in a planetary vacuum mixer. The active material of the anode is blended to ensure it approaches a viscous consistency. The anode and cathode materials are blended separately to ensure they do not react with one another. A solvent is added to both mixes to increase viscosity, which is critical as the viscosity, density, and solid content of the slurry affect battery longevity and performance. An additional key concern in the mixing process is air quality: controls on moisture level can limit air particles or impurities that contaminate the electrode slurry, but if moisture is not controlled, then the nickel is likely to corrode. Adding phosphoric acid or another solvent can also prevent corrosion.

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Coating. Coating broadly describes the process of applying the separate aluminum-cathode and copper-anode slurries onto metal foils. Once poured, the slurries are dried via an internal heater that operates between 70°C and 150°C. While warmer temperatures lead to lower production costs, there is a negative effect on the performance and overall longevity of the battery. Coating and drying are achieved via a slot die coater, which disperses the slurry through gaps onto moving metal foil. Once the slurry is dispersed, air flotation drying is used to evaporate any added solvents and provoke the sedimentation of particles, which is critical to battery performance. The newfound metal coating successfully protects the slurry from corrosion and damage. Both drying temperature and the speed at which drying occurs affect the distribution of slurry in each electrode. Generally, drying at room temperature, while slower, creates a more uniform dried slurry, thereby increasing the quality and longevity of the electrode.

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Calendaring. Calendaring occurs through compression of the coated electrodes onto collector metal foils. This improves the energy density of the battery and further controls for dust and humidity within the electrode. This compression to a point of even thickness and density of the dried slurry increases performance. A roller calendar is used during this stage. Generally, higher calendaring pressure increases the energy density of a given battery, thereby increasing battery life.

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Slitting and electrode making. A roller slitting machine then cuts the coated electrode into several slices. An electrode-making machine welds and cuts the electrode, and the anode, cathode, and separator are either stacked or wound into a spiral, depending on the type of battery. The machine clearly marks each side as “+ve” or “–ve,” and the electrolyte fluid (a lithium salt solution) is injected into the battery cylinder or pouch. The battery cell is then sealed and thus ready for use.

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Separator production. Separators may be manufactured via a dry or wet process. Regardless, they are made of either polypropylene or polyethylene (types of plastic). In the dry process, either plastic type is pushed through a machine to create a thin sheet. The sheet is then heated until the plastic melts. This step controls the size and alignment of the tiny crystal structures within the sheet that allow lithium ions to pass through once the battery is functional. The sheet is then stretched again to create a set of additional slit-like holes. The stretching occurs until the sheet has a porosity of roughly 40 percent. The wet process, in contrast, involves mixing softening agents that can turn polymers into plastics once heat is applied. The heated mixture is pushed out of a machine to form a sheet, which is stretched until a network of pores is present. The softening agent is then washed out, leaving a porous surface that allows lithium ions through.

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Electrolyte solution production. Electrolytes enable the conductivity of lithium-ion batteries by allowing for the movement of ions from the cathode to the anode when the battery is charging and from the anode to the cathode when the battery is in use. Electrolyte solutions are made up of soluble salts, acids, and other bases in a liquid format. When these solutions are mixed with various carbonates, such as vinylene carbonate, conductivity can increase, leading to improved battery performance.

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Current U.S. Capabilities

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As it stands, China dominates the active materials production portion of the lithium battery supply chain. In addition, South Korea and Japan have significant capacity. The United States finds itself a distant fourth, a position where it is likely to remain for 10 years despite significant investment. As of 2022, China produced roughly 90 percent of anodes and lithium electrolyte solutions.

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China also produces 70 percent of cathodes, 74 percent of separators, 82 percent of electrolytes, and 85 percent of anodes. Japan, a secondary player in the industry, produces 14 percent of cathodes, 11 percent of anodes, 31 percent of separators, and 19 percent of electrode solutions. South Korea manufactures 15 percent of the world’s cathodes and 3 percent of anodes. The United States occupies a far more modest role in the supply chain than its peers in East Asia, responsible for roughly 7 percent of battery production. It imports most components, such as cathodes and anodes, from abroad.

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One factor that hampers onshoring efforts in the United States is the high cost of production. Whereas the average lithium ferrophosphate cell factory in China costs $650 million to build, it costs roughly $865 million to build a similar facility in the United States or Europe due to differences in labor costs and supporting facilities. This difference in cost has created a global status quo that has favored, and will continue to favor, Chinese hegemony over the midstream. While the United States is predicted to see battery production increase to roughly 1.2 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2030, corresponding increases in Chinese production will ensure most global battery production continues to occur in China. By 2030 the United States is set to produce 0.8 million metric tons of cathodes per annum, though demand will stand at 1.3 million metric tons. Domestic anode supply will also stand at roughly 500,000 metric tons per annum, with demand hovering at 700,000 metric tons. These shortfalls will therefore drive the importation of cell components, such as cathodes and anodes, for locally produced batteries. Nonetheless, domestic demand for battery cells in the 2030s will likely outstrip the supply of battery active materials despite increases in domestic manufacturing.

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The PRC’s Influence over Commodity Prices

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China’s dominance over commodities critical to the lithium-ion battery supply chain — along with the PRC’s internal demand for lithium-ion battery products, chief among them electric vehicles (EVs) — has a marked effect on the global prices of these commodities. In recent years, an annual doubling of Chinese demand for EVs has caused prices of key minerals and battery components to remain elevated. While demand is still increasing as of 2023, the rate of increase has slowed to only 30 percent. Analysts predict this leveling off of demand will continue in the coming years and that the era of annual doubling has ended.

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This reduction in demand has led to a 50 percent decrease in nickel futures since December 2022 and an 80 percent decrease in lithium carbonate prices. The oversupply of critical minerals resulting from the relative drop in Chinese demand is further exacerbated by the fact that nations that produce critical minerals used in EVs — such as those in the Lithium Triangle (Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia) and Indonesia, which produces nickel — have drastically increased their investment in mines in the hope that demand would continue to double annually for the coming few years. To that end, annual lithium production increased by 23 percent worldwide in 2023, while nickel output grew by 10 percent, according to U.S. Geological Survey estimates.

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In response to this decrease in prices, China’s government is planning to increase the size of its strategic stockpiles of cobalt by buying up 3,000 tons of privately owned cobalt from producers to add to the nation’s commodity stockpile. China added 5,000 tons of cobalt to its stockpile in July, representing another opportunity to take advantage of low cobalt prices, which have decreased by 60 percent since May 2022 due to rising supplies from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Indonesia. These stockpiles are being expanded to protect domestic producers and military manufacturers from supply and price shocks.

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While S&P Global projects that commodity prices will stabilize in the coming years, existing price volatility poses a challenge for new firms entering the industry. Firms that are profitable while commodity prices are low, for example, may be forced to shut down prematurely if prices of lithium carbonate spike. Both nascent and long-standing firms therefore require some protection from the ebbs and flows of the market.

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To that end, China acts to protect its domestic battery industry from external shocks by enforcing export license requirements on graphite, which is regarded as the most critical mineral for battery anodes. Given the market for graphite is expected to triple in the next five years and that China produces more than 90 percent of spherical graphite — the type primarily used in batteries — export licensing efforts give China leverage over the price and global supply of both graphite and anodes. Adoption of the export license requirement comes on the heels of an August 2023 rule that requires export licenses for rare earth elements gallium and germanium, which are both primarily used in semiconductors, though they have applications in EVs as well. For instance, gallium nitride can handle a lot of power without generating heat, making it ideal for onboard chargers and inverters. The new export license requirement led to a sharp increase of 25 percent in gallium prices, which has remained constant since. More critically, these curbs highlight China’s willingness to use export license requirements as a means to control the supply and price of key minerals in the supply chains of electric appliance components.

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This export licensing effort serves two PRC objectives. The first is a means of geopolitical leverage, especially against nations that have tense relations with China despite significant trade, such as the United States. The second is an attempt to boost the competitiveness of China’s domestic high-value industries. To that end, Beijing increased the number of restrictions on critical raw materials needed for electric cars and renewable energy, such as lithium, cobalt, and manganese, by a factor of nine between 2009 and 2020.

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Recycling

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As the demand for lithium-ion batteries continues to grow, efficient recycling methods become increasingly relevant. The minerals and raw materials involved in producing a lithium-ion battery can be scarce and costly to extract and refine. Recycling lithium-ion batteries is therefore less energy intensive than producing new batteries from raw minerals. A thriving recycling industry enables lithium-ion battery manufacturers to bypass the challenges of the upstream stages of the supply chain and closes the loop of the circular economy by enabling additional cell production.

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With their easily separable and durable components, traditional lead-acid batteries are relatively simple to recycle. Over 90 percent of lead-acid batteries are recycled as a result. The recycling process for lithium-ion batteries, however, is substantially more complex since lithium is highly reactive (flammable). Typically, devices that contain lithium-ion batteries are collected by the original retailers, an e-waste collector, or a business that specializes in collecting used electronics.

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Battery packs are sorted and shipped to collection and processing facilities. Some packs are designated for repair or reuse. Those that are not undergo a process called shredding, through which the battery is chopped into pieces, creating a “black mass” — granular material made up of the dismembered cathodes and anodes of batteries. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), there are currently no industry standards defining the exact components of black mass from which valuable metals like cobalt and nickel are extracted. The shredding and extraction processes require a relatively high amount of energy, decreasing the extracted components’ value and creating some disincentives for reprocessing. Additionally, the lack of common regulations or standards for EV battery recycling, particularly advanced chemical processes for recycling as well as restrictions on the trade of used batteries, serve as additional limiting incentives for reprocessing and recycling efforts.

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In response to these issues, the U.S. Department of Energy has devoted $62 million in funding set forth in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law toward efforts that entice consumers to engage in battery recycling and improve the overall economic viability of private recycling efforts. Examples of these investments include $14.4 million in student education and outreach programs that will strengthen collection efforts for end-of-life electronics and $40 million toward projects that generate “greater market demand for recycling consumer electronics batteries” through cost-savings approaches within the preprocessing and sorting sectors. Government and private sector efforts to establish battery drop-off programs also received $7.2 million in funding.

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Promoting Active Materials Production

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Key to U.S. economic security is the assurance that critical goods — among which lithium-ion batteries are included given their importance to the green transition — have resilient and secure supply chains. The lithium-ion battery supply chain is currently dominated by countries of concern and a just-in-time model that can withstand neither geopolitical fragmentation nor black swan economic shocks. In particular, U.S. dependence on PRC inputs reflects a long-term risk to national security that should be addressed. U.S. economic partners and allies are currently in a better position to satisfy demand for active materials: nearshoring and friendshoring efforts therefore represent a necessary step toward countering such dependence. Another important piece of the puzzle is to promote domestic production. The Biden administration and Congress have leveraged several policy tools to spur the latter, such as tax incentives, grants, and loans.

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The lithium-ion battery supply chain is currently dominated by countries of concern and a just-in-time model that can withstand neither geopolitical fragmentation nor black swan economic shocks.

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Biden Administration Policies

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Tax incentives. Current tax incentives included in recent industrial policy packages — chief among them the IRA — aim to provide a launchpad for domestic manufacturers. They are meant to spur production of multiple goods necessary to the green transition, including the active materials production stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain.

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When it comes to producing electrode materials, such as anodes and cathodes, the IRA’s 45X advanced manufacturing production tax credit (PTC) is a boon for U.S. manufacturers. With eligible materials receiving a credit of 10 percent of the cost of production, the PTC is designed to support development of the active materials production stage of the supply chain. The tax credit applies to both equipment and minerals produced in the United States and sold between December 31, 2022, and December 31, 2032. Further, the produced equipment must be sold to an unrelated party as part of the taxpayer’s trade or business. There is a credit amount phaseout beginning in 2030 for only the manufactured components, but credits for critical minerals will expire without phasing out over time.

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However, the effectiveness of this tax credit is somewhat limited as it applies to specific production costs only. It does not cover direct or indirect material costs, nor does it include expenses related to the extraction, production, or acquisition of raw materials. These exclusions limit the overall utility of the credit in boosting domestic production of electrode active materials and instead ensure that it is only an impetus for production for firms at the margins.

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Another supply-side incentive the IRA provides is the 48C investment credit, awarded by the Department of Treasury in partnership with the Department of Energy. It awards credits of up to 30 percent of capital investment, provided the relevant project satisfies wage and apprenticeship requirements. This incentive has more regulatory barriers than the 45X credit, as project developers must apply to the Department of Energy and receive a decision from the Internal Revenue Service. In addition, total financing for the investment credit is capped at $10 billion.

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The 48C investment credit is geared toward bridging the gap between the required capital expenditures to develop factories in the United States and China. According to Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, the capital expenditure intensity in the United States averages around $90 million per gigawatt-hour (GWh), about a third higher than the $60 million per GWh capital expenditure required in the PRC. China clearly maintains the dominant position in access to raw materials, processing capabilities, and active materials production. Nevertheless, the investment credit helps enhance U.S. competitiveness. U.S. gigafactory capacity in the pipeline through 2030 has increased by roughly 70 percent, from around 700 GWh in July 2022 (before the IRA) to just over 1.2 TWh in July 2023.

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Grants and loans. While the United States is currently not a major player in refining and active material assembly, significant amounts of onshore capacity are expected to come online in the coming years. Spurred by government-backed loans and private investments totaling $1.6 billion, firms such as Our Next Energy are set to begin producing 20 GWh of cathode materials and battery cells in a Michigan plant set to come online in late 2024. Plans for the gigafactory were announced in October 2022, giving it an ambitious timeline of roughly two years between the announcement of additional capacity and that capacity coming online.

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The two-to-three-year timeline also applies to gigafactory projects that Redwood Materials, Tesla, and Gotion are currently pursuing. These factories, which will focus on cathode production, anode manufacturing, and lithium refining, respectively, will collectively amount to 200 GWh in capacity once operational.

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However, the rollout of these gigafactories is already experiencing some setbacks. Ford announced it would pause development of a 35 GWh plant worth $3.5 billion in Michigan. Delays in battery cell factories coming online arise largely due to shortages in skilled labor, efficiency limitations, and unforeseen price increases for active materials. In recent years, pricing hurdles were driven by a surge in lithium carbonate prices from roughly $6 per kilogram in 2020 to $70 per kilogram in November of 2022. Since cathode active materials represent roughly 50 percent of total manufacturing costs for battery cells, such increases have placed barriers to entry on expanding battery cell manufacturing capacity. Yet in the last two years, these increases have largely reversed, and prices have plummeted back to $14.50 per kilogram. While this value is almost three times higher than in 2020, the effect of pricing concerns on gigafactory rollout is far more modest than it was in 2022.

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Additionally, U.S. workers may lack the necessary manufacturing experience, effectively ensuring that even when plants and gigafactories come online, they will not produce active materials with high efficiency. Gigafactory construction requires a set of competencies related to “equipment maintenance [and] troubleshooting production” not widely available within the U.S. workforce. Additionally, once factories have begun producing materials and finished cells, they also face assembly line staff shortages, as the U.S. workforce is largely trained in internal combustion engine manufacturing rather than in battery production. Ohio, for instance, has 58,000 open roles related to EV manufacturing. Aside from competencies, another cause of this labor shortage is the relatively low compensation levels compared to the broader automotive sector. The starting wage at a GM battery cell plant in Ohio is $16.50 an hour, while the average assembly line worker at a United Auto Workers plant makes roughly $28 an hour. While lower wages serve as a hedge against active material price increases, they also ensure labor shortages going forward.

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Initial production yields for battery cell lines among new entrants to the sector in the United States are often as low as 50 percent. As shown by the Center on Global Energy Policy, projections through 2032 clearly show North America will have the gigafactories to satisfy cell demand but will not have the local supply of cathodes and anodes to construct those cells.

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The Biden administration’s EPA sees lithium-ion battery recycling and repurposing as a means of domesticating this lithium-ion battery supply chain, particularly since U.S. lithium reserves make up just 4 percent of the world total. In the near term, the EPA seeks to take the following steps to encourage these processes:

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    Foster the design of battery packs for ease of second use and recycling.

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    Establish successful methods for collecting, sorting, transporting, and processing recycled lithium-ion battery materials, with a focus on reducing costs.

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    Increase recovery rates of key materials such as cobalt, lithium, nickel, and graphite.

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    Develop processing technologies to reintroduce these materials into the supply chain.

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    Develop methodologies for proper sorting, testing, and balancing for second-use applications.

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    Establish federal recycling policies to promote collection, reuse, and recycling of lithium-ion batteries.

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The IIJA grant disbursement notes that the focus of the funding is primarily on lithium processing, with nickel and graphite processors also receiving some grant money. The IIJA guidebook provides a comprehensive overview of all IIJA programs and grants, including several focused on active materials production and battery recycling:

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    Battery Manufacturing and Recycling Grants ($3 billion total)

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    Battery and Critical Mineral Recycling ($125 million total)

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    Lithium-Ion Recycling Prize ($10 million total)

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    Battery Recycling Best Practices ($10 million total)

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    Electric Drive Vehicle Battery Recycling and Second Life Applications ($200 million total)

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The U.S. Department of Energy also announced $192 million in funding in June 2023 to expand battery recycling research and development, calling the investments “essential” to the advancement of a domestic supply chain of critical materials for the energy transition.

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However, the Biden administration’s investments in recycling capabilities may face similar roadblocks as the active materials production hubs. In October 2023, Li-Cycle Holdings Corp., which was set to receive significant backing from the Biden administration, saw its share price cut by almost 50 percent after announcing it would pause construction on a lithium-ion battery recycling plant. Li-Cycle assessed that it was facing escalating costs in attempting to operationalize its fabrication plant.

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While battery recycling is a relatively new market in North America, more mature firms abroad are also encountering issues. In the PRC, for instance, there are too many recyclers and not enough materials to go around, making many businesses’ operations currently untenable. It may take several years for recycling to become a viable industry in the United States: there are still relatively few EVs on the road, and other electronics that contain lithium-ion batteries are challenging to collect and too few in number to meet the needs of budding lithium-ion battery demand. Thus, the sector may encounter losses before becoming sustainable.

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Congressional Considerations

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A report by the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, released in December 2023, offers some insight into the bipartisan ad hoc committee’s thinking on diversifying the lithium-ion battery supply chain. The report’s recommendations may be split into two categories: those that pertain to critical minerals and those that pertain to battery manufacturing.

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When it comes to critical minerals, the committee’s report recommends enacting legislation to “encourage sectoral agreements with key trading partners and allies with strong rules of origin and high standards on critical minerals,” in addition to sourcing critical minerals and materials domestically and from friendly nations. This demonstrated openness to ensuring U.S. partners and allies become a stronger part of the country’s critical minerals supply chain, instead of solely focusing on onshoring, could enable lithium-ion battery manufacturers to scale up their production capabilities.

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However, the report recommends incentives with domestic content requirement guardrails that partially defeat the friendshoring purpose of the overarching recommendations. Limiting the sourcing of necessary minerals and materials to U.S. production in part negates the diversification objectives in these tax credits. The enhanced recycling measures the report recommends — such as requiring the Defense Logistics Agency Strategic Material Recovery and Reuse Program to pilot a recovery program to extract strategic and critical materials from end-of-life government hard disk drives — would likely not make up, in time or amount, for the production capabilities of U.S. partners.

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The report’s recommendations about batteries pose a similar issue, as its proposals largely emphasize the need to “encourage a domestic battery recycling industry.” Ramping up recycling efforts could help the U.S. lithium-ion battery industry become self-sufficient as more batteries are retired, while limiting incentives to domestic efforts would curtail U.S. access to additional lithium-ion battery materials. In addition, recycling is a technically challenging, labor-intensive process. Given the difficulties, it would not wholly replace production of original active materials.

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Instead, coordinating the ramping up of recycling operations with economic partners and allies who are also aiming to enhance their capabilities in this sector would enable more effective diversification results. U.S. efforts are not occurring in isolation: the EU lithium-ion battery recycling market is set to increase to 130 GWh, or 700 kilotons, by 2030. In addition, the EU market is set to expand again, threefold, by 2040 to 2,100 kilotons. Japan and South Korea are also aiming to expand their battery recycling industries. For instance, key Japanese firms have collaborated with the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization, a state-owned energy research agency, to develop technology that increases their capacity to extract recyclable materials from used batteries. This initiative is set to enable a recycling ratio of 70 percent for lithium, 95 percent for nickel, and 95 percent for cobalt by 2030. South Korea is also investing some 40 trillion won ($30 billion) to facilitate recycling efforts and second-life applications for used battery components. A U.S. strategy that prioritizes working with partners who are also investing in their own capabilities would improve the likelihood of successful diversification away from China and an effective transition to renewables.

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Conclusion

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The second stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain examined in this paper — active materials production destined for cathodes and anodes — poses challenges to current onshoring policies. It demands physical capital and labor to accomplish technical work. Active materials production involves several steps — namely, mixing, coating, calendaring, slitting, and electrode making — in addition to producing the separator and electrolyte solution key to the functioning of a lithium-ion battery.

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As noted, China largely dominates this portion of the lithium battery supply chain, followed by South Korea and Japan. China’s dominance is strengthened by its sway over the production of inputs higher up the supply chain, as well as its strong influence over the global prices of key commodities. The United States is also limited by higher costs in penetrating the market, given its relative dearth of operational manufacturing capabilities and challenges in obtaining workers, which stem both from more robust labor standards and the lack of a sufficiently trained workforce.

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Policies that emphasize onshoring capabilities in the active materials production stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain are already confronted with the limitations of U.S. capacity. Projects launched by grants and loans under the IIJA and IRA are facing various hurdles, such as inadequacies in the domestic labor market as well as difficulties in making a nascent recycling industry profitable. These barriers are in part self-imposed by restrictions around domestic content requirements.

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Policies that emphasize onshoring capabilities in the active materials production stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain are already confronted with the limitations of U.S. capacity.

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Likewise, current congressional considerations and recommendations on providing the sector with additional launchpads also turn largely inward, hindering the green transition and impeding the country’s ability to successfully diversify away from Chinese manufacturing dominance. Given that other large players at this stage — namely, Japan and South Korea — are valuable partners in achieving long-term U.S. geostrategic objectives, U.S. policymakers should revisit the limitations set on incentives designed to spur active materials production. In addition, the United States should recognize that foreign direct investment from partners and allies has played an essential role in stimulating the domestic battery sector. Further efforts should be made to deepen ties with these nations and encourage additional investment. Ideally, policymakers should turn to negotiating plurilateral agreements with major players to secure this stage of the battery manufacturing supply chain. More ambitious agreements would enable partners to coordinate industrial policy efforts, enhance information sharing for research and development efforts in the field to improve manufacturing efficiency, and eliminate trade barriers in critical goods.

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The business community is currently engaged in reassessing the risk of doing business with the PRC given potential supply chain resiliency risks. In light of current geopolitical tensions, private entities now are striving to create redundancies in supply sources to mitigate the consequences of large-scale shocks on current choke points. The United States, along with economic partners and allies, is also moving to de-risk supply chains, but the cornerstone of the Biden administration strategy is to spur domestic production anchored by industrial policy initiatives.

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These efforts overlap with the push to spur a green transition, for which the lithium-ion battery is a key technology. However, if diversifying supply chains away from China occurs too soon, achieving enough domestic capabilities to effectively spur the green transition in the United States will not be possible. Likewise, a diversification strategy that does not consider the benefits of nearshoring will prove lengthy and costly. In addition, the United States should develop an effective materials management policy that incentivizes development of additional supply chains and regulatory cooperation with like-minded countries. This policy should be pursued in a manner that does not hamper domestic manufacturers from investing or commercializing products.

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In short, the United States is pursuing three goals: accelerating the transition to renewables; reshoring production capabilities in key sectors, which include several items necessary to the green transition; and diversifying away from China in these critical areas. Policies that prioritize one of these goals get in the way of the other two.

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Finally, nearshoring and friendshoring considerations lead to questions of what it means to be “near” and a “friend.” In addition, lithium-ion batteries are the current bedrock of a transition to renewables, but there are numerous research projects underway aiming to find more efficient alternatives. The final paper of this series will discuss both of these issues, in addition to describing policy challenges surrounding the final stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain — the assembly of battery cells into modules, packed and sold to manufacturers of various end products.

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William Reinsch holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

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Meredith Broadbent serves as a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.

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Thibault Denamiel is an associate fellow with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.

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Elias Shammas is a research intern with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.

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Russia And China

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The True Nature of their Cooperation

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Callum Fraser | 2024.06.07

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Strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has visibly intensified in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, Russia is now firmly the weaker partner in the relationship, with China exploiting the Kremlin’s situation for its own ends.

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On 29 May, US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell spoke to NATO representatives in Brussels on the seriousness of Chinese-Russian relations. His words underscore the true nature of the “no-limits” arrangement between Beijing and Moscow. It is not a partnership of convenience, but a concerted effort to shift the geopolitical centre of gravity towards Asia. While the West often talks about “bleeding Russia dry” through the conflict in Ukraine, Campbell warns that it risks suffering a similar drawn-out death. China does not represent a voice of reason in Russia’s ear as has been suggested by some Western leaders, but has a vested interest in destabilising the West and distracting it from Beijing’s own objectives in the Indo-Pacific.

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Increasing political, economic, and social burdens stemming from the invasion of Ukraine have kneecapped Russian agency in the international arena. As the divide between Russia and the West grows, the Kremlin is increasingly focusing its attention on China, with ties between the two states growing ever stronger. In defiance of the West, Russia characterises its relationship with China as an alliance between two great civilisations. However, as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to China has highlighted, Moscow is increasingly finding itself a pawn of China’s geopolitical aspirations.

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Amid increasing geopolitical turbulence, the concept of multipolarity is becoming acknowledged as a global trend. Russia and China have been quick to label themselves as key players in this emerging world order, and have collectively strived towards the formation of a bloc that is set to rival Western hegemony. At a glance, the relationship appears natural: two rising authoritarian powers are joining forces to challenge the prevailing order. Yet upon delving deeper into the relationship’s dynamics, Russia’s commitment to its war on Ukraine, its stagnating economy, and its search for support extraneous to the West have led to its foreign policy objectives becoming slowly subsumed into China’s vision of the future international order.

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The New World Order

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Geopolitical constraints provide Russia and China with a plethora of reasons to band together. Their distrust of Western hegemony, authoritarian governments, and similar political ambitions have nurtured relations between Moscow and Beijing for the last political generation.

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In their recent press conference, both states agreed that civilisational differences shape spheres of influence; that international institutions are polarised against their interests, requiring shifts in structure to accommodate “new realities”; and that there is no place for military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. Noticeably, the conversation focused on the developing trade partnership between the two states, with comments on external affairs remaining limited in detail. In comparison to Putin’s usual damning rhetoric on the collective West, the restraint within this meeting is a sign of the true dynamics of the situation – namely, that they are shaped primarily by Chinese interests.

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Cooperation over Competition?

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Despite exorbitant bilateral proclamations of partnership, dynamics between the two states remain cautious, partly as a result of historical tensions. Putin’s reference to Russia and China remaining “brothers forever” seems to skip over the Treaty of Peking (1860), the Soviet invasion of Xinjiang (1934) and nuclear posturing during the Sino-Soviet split, to name a few “breaks” in their historical relationship. These memories are still fresh in the minds of much of the Chinese population, including scholars who note an incongruence between Russian and Chinese visions of a new world order. Despite the friendly veneer, distrust remains.

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Russia’s refocused economy means it has no ability to provide incentives for greater integration within its historical sphere of influence in the face of Chinese economic competition

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With Russia’s economy concentrated on supporting the war effort in Ukraine, its exports have become focused on shipping fossil fuels and other raw materials to Eastern partners. Meanwhile, imports from China now cover a diverse field of industrial and consumer goods, providing essential resources to sustain both Russia’s economy and the conflict in Ukraine. This asymmetrical balance is forecasted to increase over the coming years as Russia struggles to survive on its war economy, and consequently, China will become an ever more important lifeline for the Russian state.

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image01 +image02 +Chinese-Russian Trade Complexity. Variance in export complexity suggests that Russia has become a Chinese petrol station, while China provides necessities for Russia’s struggling war economy. Source.

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This imbalance has precipitated unusual geopolitical concessions from Russia. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Russia’s customs union – initially conceived in part to limit Chinese influence in Russia’s historical sphere of influence – contains several states operating a multi-vector foreign policy, including investment from China’s global development project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Putin’s comments at the 2023 Eurasian Economic Forum supporting the pairing of the EAEU and BRI demonstrate both a concession in terms of Russia’s dominance over Eurasia and an acceptance of the nature of relations with China.

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Development and investment have become the dominant tools for building influence in Eurasia; in this context, Russia’s economic integration with former Soviet states offers only limited influence over its neighbours. Its refocused economy means it has no ability to provide incentives for greater integration within its historical sphere of influence in the face of Chinese economic competition.

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Therefore, Russia finds itself increasingly reliant on a partner with historical grievances as well as ambitions in its own backyard. If Russia continues to stagnate, it must either make further concessions regarding its geopolitical position within Eurasia, or risk severing its life support mechanism.

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Russia’s Excessive Optimism

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Putin’s recent visit to China, the first since his fifth inauguration as president, highlighted Russia’s strategic dependence upon its neighbour. In the opening address by the two countries’ leaders, one could see an incongruence in the rhetoric surrounding the state of Sino-Russian relations. Putin’s reference to collaboration reaching unprecedented levels was met with lukewarm compliments from Chinese President Xi Jinping about the level of cooperation, indicating a desire for improvement.

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These comments exemplify Russia and China’s positions. Ultimately, Russia needs China far more than China needs Russia. The relationship hardly extends beyond the transactional, with strict limitations on bilateral cooperation on projects that do not favour Chinese interests. During Putin’s visit, aspirations for a second gas pipeline linking the two states were dashed by yet another unenthusiastic response from Beijing. While Russia still has use for China, there are clear limits to how far China will cooperate with the Kremlin’s interests.

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image03 +Average Russian Oil Exports by Country and Region, 2021-2023 (million barrels per day). Russia’s growing reliance on China and other Asian partners to mitigate Western sanctions on Russian exports. Source.

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The Ukrainian Question

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Victory in Ukraine has become integral to the continuation of Putin’s reign, and consequently, the progress of the Russian invasion now dictates every facet of Russian domestic and foreign policy. This opens the door to external exploitation. China, along with other Asian states, have profited from cheap Russian oil; Central Asian states have transformed into crucial transport hubs for goods to and from Russia; and the supply of goods now underproduced within Russia’s war economy is driving increased exports from the East. The longer Russia’s attention is focused on Ukraine, the longer Russia’s neighbours will profit from its increased reliance on them.

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China will happily tolerate a conflict in Ukraine, even going as far to prop up Russia’s military economy, but this does not denote an equal partnership or a friendship

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Therefore, while China continues to seek a “political solution” to the conflict in Ukraine, it seems more than happy to put up with a protracted conflict. China has typically remained neutral on external matters, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has presented Beijing with a narrow path through which it can prioritise its interests without suffering secondary sanctions from the West. On the surface, Beijing is fostering a growing trade relationship with Russia in a very particular manner, through the export of components with both civilian and military applications such as machine tools, satellite equipment, and drone technology – enough to turn a nice profit and maintain the status quo in the conflict, without overtly support Russia.

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However, Campbell’s words suggest that China is providing much greater support in terms of materiel to help reconstitute Russian forces, kept out of sight to avoid Western retaliation. Ultimately, this situation seems likely, and Russia’s aggressive revanchism in Ukraine serves as an exemplary case study of the limits of Western resolve. Meanwhile, Xi’s Taiwanese ambitions loom large; with an ever narrowing window of opportunity for military action, China will likely be analysing its Russian guinea pig while propping it up just enough to continue to drain Western military and political resources.

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Ultimately, China will happily tolerate a conflict in Ukraine, even going as far to prop up Russia’s military economy, but this does not denote an equal partnership or a friendship. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine suits a very particular purpose for China, distracting and draining the West. As long as this status quo continues, we can expect China to keep exploiting Russia’s position.

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Conclusion

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Sino-Russian relations are strengthening in the political, economic, and military domains, posing a direct threat to Western security interests. The long-term dynamics of this relationship suggest a purely transactional approach, with China exploiting Russia’s economic weaknesses. However, the war in Ukraine also presents an opportunity for China to bleed Western resolve, drain NATO resources, and distract attention from Beijing’s interests in the Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, Putin, through his dreams of Russian revanchism, has transformed Russia into a tool for its ambitious and unreliable Eastern neighbour.

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Callum Fraser is a Research Fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI, specialising in the confluence between Russian foreign policy and its periphery states. Callum is particularly interested in the evolution of geopolitics within Eurasia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. He also specialises in researching the underlying motivations, justifications, and dynamics of conflict within the Eurasian space along ethnic, identity, cultural, and political dimensions.

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F-16s Unleashed

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How They Will Impact Ukraine’s War

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Christopher Koeltzow, et al. | 2024.06.11

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The paper explores the implications of supplying F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. It examines the strategic- and tactical-level effects, outlines limitations and obstacles in their utilization by the Ukrainian Air Force and presents recommendations to leverage the platform’s capabilities to support Ukraine objectives. This document provides invaluable insights for policymakers, military strategists, and academics grappling with the intricate dynamics of European security.

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Background

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Ukrainian F-16s will be challenged to independently create conditions for a much-desired breakthrough in the war with Russia. But with the right strategy, doctrinal approach, logistical support, and training, F-16s could provide a critical advance in enhancing Ukraine’s border defense and establishing localized air superiority, significantly bolstering Ukraine’s position on the ground. The underwhelming 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, combined with finite Western materiel support, prompts the question: what role can Ukrainian F-16s play in 2024?

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Rather than a year marked by significant military maneuvers, 2024 may become a rebuilding period for both Ukraine and Russia. As in a rebuilding phase in sports, recently trained Ukrainian F-16 pilots will likely showcase periods of excellence while gaining vital experience that could lay the groundwork for lasting advantages over Russian forces. Consequently, the authors expect the impact of giving Ukraine F-16s in 2024 to be primarily strategic, offering long-term benefits rather than immediate tactical gains.

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The first section of this brief describes the strategic implications of giving F-16s to Ukraine. The next section describes the challenges expected during F-16 integration and their potential tactical influence on the battlefield in 2024. Finally, the authors offer a set of short- and long-term recommendations that policymakers can incorporate to complement the political aims of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s strategy to support Ukraine’s war effort.

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Part I: Strategic Impacts

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    Opponents of the free world fear the airpower of the United States and its allies. These air forces have been purposely built to strike strategic targets, counter the power of great armies and navies, and defend sovereign territory. They have been highly successful over the past 80 years. A significant portion of the power of these air forces comes from the technological superiority they possess over their adversaries, in addition to the might of their combined size across the alliance. The F-16 is the most prolific Western fourth-generation fighter jet produced, with thousands still in active service and highly upgraded versions still in production. Furthermore, as the mainstay of NATO air forces for decades, and with its impressive combat record, giving Ukraine such an iconic jet sends a strong message of U.S. and NATO commitment to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty.

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    The capabilities of the F-16 enable Ukraine to hold more Russian targets at risk and, in turn, gain more leverage in the war and at the negotiation table. To create a strategic “fleet in being” that Russia must respect, the size of the F-16 fleet matters. NATO countries have committed 65 F-16s to Ukraine. However, more are needed to give the Ukrainian Air Force more power to affect the ground war. As a simple starting point, NATO should be willing to replace all of Ukraine’s Soviet-era fighters with F-16s or equivalent NATO-standard aircraft and dramatically expand the size of Ukraine’s fighter fleet beyond pre-2022 strengths. Some estimates suggest that the size of Ukraine’s fighter fleet was only 69 aircraft in March 2023. By NATO standards, that number of aircraft may make up no more than three fighter squadrons (with 18 aircraft per squadron). Ukraine needs close to 12 fighter squadrons to achieve the air support needed for the war on the ground, with four squadrons primarily responsible for each core mission set: (1) suppression of enemy air defenses, (2) air interdiction, and (3) defensive counter air. This aim would require 216 F-16s, with 18 aircraft in each squadron. Additionally, NATO should have a reserve of F-16s available for resupply on demand, proportional to historical combat loss rates.

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    The well-known conventional strengths of the F-16 fit neatly within the core mission sets Ukraine needs to execute. Ukraine can leverage these advantages while placing the Russian forces in its territory at a disadvantage. Additionally, F-16s can carry a significant variety of weapons in the U.S. Air Force (USAF) inventory that are supported by an active and expanding industry. Alternatively, F-16s could increase the potency of Ukraine’s interdiction campaign in the Black Sea, further degrading the effectiveness of Russia’s Black Sea fleet or threatening the flow of sanctioned trade to and from Russian ports in the Black Sea.

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    The quantity of targets Ukraine can hold at risk with F-16s is a function of (1) the overall quantity of F-16s Ukraine receives, (2) the type and quantity of weapons it receives, (3) U.S. and NATO employment restrictions placed on Ukraine (i.e., restricting employment beyond Ukraine’s borders), (4) the fusion of intelligence between NATO and Ukrainian sources, (5) the proficiency of the pilots and support personnel that can optimize F-16 effectiveness, and (6) the air strategy Ukraine chooses to use for its F-16s (primarily for air defense or offensive missions such as strategic attack or interdiction of fielded forces and Russian logistics).

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    Additionally, giving Ukraine F-16s presents NATO and the United States with a unique opportunity to gather intelligence on the potency of allied aircraft and weapons against Russian and Iranian equipment and tactics. This could be leveraged as an opportunity to gather strategic intelligence as Russia reacts to the introduction of the F-16 and follow-on security packages of logistical support for use with the aircraft. With collaboration between Ukraine and NATO, these insights can inform NATO’s leaders of the viability of the alliance’s strategy and tactics in certain domains.

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    Giving F-16s to Ukraine is a significant step forward to further integrate the country into the U.S. and European economic and defense ecosystem, which will increase Ukraine’s strength in the long term. Assuming the belligerent countries have equal will to fight, attritional wars are typically won by the side with the greatest economic and industrial strength and the greatest ability to manifest those strengths on the battlefield through more equipment, people, and ammunition. In The Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze asserts that the economic and material strengths of the Allies in World War II overwhelmed Germany’s capacity to field enough equipment and people to resist the persistent assault over the long term. In 2020, the Ukrainian economy was about 9.5 times smaller than Russia’s ($155.5 billion compared to $1.5 trillion), and the Ukrainian population was 3.5 times smaller than Russia’s. For economies with equivalent levels of industrialization, industrial capacity roughly follows the measurements of gross domestic product and population.

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    Sustainment and reconstitution of warfighting formations, including aviation, is a challenge for Ukraine. Before the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s military used equipment mostly from the former Soviet Union, and many of the supply chains to repair or replace the equipment and its ammunition needs no longer exist or are controlled by Russia. Over time, these Soviet relics have lost their effectiveness as damage and shortages in parts and ammunition render them unfit for combat. The situation cannot support a positive outcome for Ukraine in a long attritional war. Therefore, supplying Ukraine with NATO or U.S. standard equipment is critical to sustain Ukrainian efforts because those weapon systems and Ukrainian operational needs can be integrated into U.S. and NATO supply chains. Over time, Ukraine would become more systemically integrated with NATO.

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    The U.S. resupply of Israel during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 shows how commonality of equipment becomes a strategic asset in sustaining forces during attritional wars. The lessons from the Yom Kippur War should inform NATO decisionmakers of the value of supplying the Ukrainian Air Force with F-16s. During the war, a coalition of Arab countries led by Egypt strategically surprised Israel, leaving it little time to prepare for the invasion. Israel’s military doctrine called for preemptive air strikes similar to those it had used during the 1967 war to offset its quantitative disadvantages in personnel and equipment vis-à-vis its adversaries. However, U.S. national security advisor Henry Kissinger made clear that U.S. support was contingent on Israel receiving the first blow. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) plan and strategy depended upon preemptive strikes. When the option for a preemptive strike disappeared, Israel lost a significant advantage. The IAF paid dearly: it lost 15 percent of its total combat aircraft (60 aircraft) in less than 24 hours and about 35 percent of its total combat aircraft by the war’s end — catastrophic losses for any air force in such a short period. By the end of the first week of the war, Israel was in bad shape and gravely needed a resupply of ammunition, tanks, and aircraft.

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    Luckily, the IAF had modernized most of its fleet prior to the war with U.S.-made A-4 Skyhawks and F-4 Phantoms, also flown by the USAF and U.S. Navy (USN). Israeli prime minister Golda Meir asked the United States for assistance, which kicked off a large resupply effort, including Operation Nickel Grass, in which the United States provided Israel with large numbers of 155 mm howitzers, M-60 and M-48 main battle tanks, and 100 USAF F-4s and 36 USN A-4s to reconstitute the IAF inventory. Consequently, the resupply efforts by the United States to Israel outpaced those of the Soviet Union to the Arab coalition, allowing Israel to change the balance of the war enough to secure a negotiated settlement about 10 days after the first U.S. resupply.

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    Finally, while F-16s alone will not provide air superiority, they are a vital component of this goal. For more than 100 years, militaries have known air superiority is essential to the success of any conventional ground campaign, but World War II was the first time the technology and capacity of mass production existed at the degree necessary to demonstrate the merits of air superiority. Examples include the Germans during the Blitz of 1939–40, the UK Royal Air Force and U.S. Army Air Forces’ air campaign in Europe in 1944–45, Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War of 1967, and the swift U.S. defeat of Iraq in Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In each case, casualties for the ground forces operating under air superiority were relatively low compared to those of their counterparts fighting without air superiority. Additionally, the tempo of ground campaigns improved significantly compared to the ground campaigns of World War I, in which each ground force maintained relative parity with others in terms of technology and the size of its army.

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    Per the USAF Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-01, control of the air is among the top priorities of the joint force and is classified into three categories: (1) air parity, (2) air superiority, and (3) air supremacy. The air war in Ukraine over the past two years is best classified as one of air parity, where no force controls the air for its own ends or faces significant interference. According to U.S. Air Force doctrine, air superiority is the “degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats. Air superiority may be localized in space (horizontally and vertically) and in time, or it may be broad and enduring.”

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    Air supremacy results when one side is incapable of effective air interference in the operating area, which the United States has generally enjoyed in conflicts over the past few decades.

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    Today, each side of the war in Ukraine has a relatively robust air defense capability such that each can deny air superiority to the other. The missing component of air superiority for Ukraine is an offensive air capability, which the F-16s will begin to provide. Therefore, ground forces find themselves locked in relatively static battles of attrition, unable to create the conditions for a decisive maneuver campaign that could change the trajectory of the war. The robust Russian Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) makes establishing air superiority over the entire occupied territory a difficult feat. However, the Ukrainian Air Force can focus on establishing localized air superiority over limited areas for limited times. Such localized air superiority would be coordinated with Ukrainian land offensives to support a breakthrough operation and would be most effective with combined arms operations. Giving F-16s to Ukraine is an essential move toward establishing air superiority.

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    Gaining air superiority enables the land component to bypass or maneuver through enemy forces and obstacle belts. Trench warfare exists on both sides because neither side has air superiority. However, trenches cannot stand up to the constant bombardment and might of 500–2,000-pound bombs, as demonstrated by the U.S. coalition in Operation Desert Storm, in which an air war lasting more than 40 days pulverized the Iraqi military to such a degree that it surrendered less than 100 hours after the start of the ground invasion. Likewise, tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles will succumb to cluster bombs, Maverick missiles, and 500–2,000-pound bombs. With air superiority, Ukraine’s F-16s can bring these effects to the battlefield.

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Part II: F-16 Integration Challenges and Tactical Influence in 2024

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The Ukrainian Ground Forces has showcased its adeptness in assimilating cutting-edge Western weaponry into its arsenal with remarkable efficacy. Within its artillery corps, the Ukrainian Ground Forces phased out antiquated Soviet systems, replacing them with the technologically advanced M142 High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and accompanying munitions supplied by the United States. Following a three-week training regimen for M142 operators and maintainers, Ukrainian forces learned effective tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), enabling them to proficiently target Russian ammunition and fuel depots, bases, command and control nodes, and critical resupply infrastructure. While Ukrainian troops were familiar with various rocket launchers, HIMARS represents a substantial leap forward compared to Ukraine’s previous reliance on organic BM-30 Smerch and BM-27 Uragan systems, boasting superior capabilities including extended range, improved precision, enhanced mobility, and a faster rate of fire. While Ukraine’s successful integration of HIMARS presents tactical and operational challenges for Russia, mastering the integration of F-16s into the war strategy to produce impacts of a similar magnitude will be a formidable endeavor.

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It will be years before the Ukrainian Air Force has enough experience to execute combat missions effectively. However, if supplied with the proper air-to-ground munitions, they will quickly be able to execute long-range strikes (air interdiction).

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It will be years before the Ukrainian Air Force has enough experience to execute combat missions effectively. However, if supplied with the proper air-to-ground munitions, they will quickly be able to execute long-range strikes (air interdiction). Training a proficient F-16 pilot takes a long time. For instance, the training timeline for USAF fighter pilots, from initial flight training to certification as a combat-qualified wingman, spans three to four years. Furthermore, the total training duration extends to four to five years when factoring in leadership training essential for executing formations of fighter tactics in combat. While Ukrainian fighter pilots already possess basic airmanship skills, adapting to an aircraft with a fundamentally different cockpit interface and instrument layout, designed around a different concept of human factors engineering, requires an alternative way of thinking. This reality means experienced fighter pilots will also need time to transition effectively. Furthermore, their flying experience with Soviet-era fighter aircraft will not necessarily translate to the fly-by-wire controls and design of the F-16.

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To fully leverage the capabilities of the F-16, Ukrainian fighter pilots must become familiar with battle-proven TTPs honed over the past four decades. To make a significant combat impact, Ukrainian F-16 pilots must excel in three mission sets: offensive counter air/air interdiction (OCA/AI), offensive counter air/air operations–suppression of enemy air defenses (OCA/AO-SEAD), and defensive counter air (DCA). These mission sets will allow the Ukrainian Air Force to maximize the combat capabilities of the F-16 while not exposing them to higher combat losses executing more complex combat missions.

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Ukraine must start flying combat sorties and build experience immediately.

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Learning and applying Western TTPs proficiently will likely take Ukrainian fighter pilots over a year. As a historical reference, the United States delivered the first F-16s to Israel in 1980. Eleven months later, the IAF flew the new platform on a daring and successful air strike against an Iraqi nuclear weapons production plant. The IAF, despite the advantages of combat and Western tactics experience, chose to wait almost a year before employing the F-16. It takes time and experience to build the proficiency needed to employ a complex fighter effectively. Ukraine must start flying combat sorties and build experience immediately. Therefore, it will be difficult to measure the significant battlefield impacts of the F-16s until 2025, and expectations should be managed accordingly.

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Ukraine must be able to organically maintain and repair the F-16s. One crucial lesson learned throughout U.S. military operations in Afghanistan was the vital role host-nation service members, rather than contractors, play in aircraft maintenance and repair. In Afghanistan, contractors predominantly handled maintenance support. Following the order to withdraw, their departure led to a significant decrease in mission-capable combat-ready aircraft. Similarly, the time, training, and experience required to cultivate proficient F-16 pilots are equally essential for developing competent F-16 maintainers. On average, it takes approximately five to eight years of on-the-job experience and rigorous certification (known in the USAF as “7-level” certification) to ensure the resident knowledge necessary for maintaining these aircraft. While not all maintainers are certified with “7-level” proficiency, the mid and upper levels of leadership, and their expertise, are essential to effective maintenance operations.

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Ukrainians must embrace a military culture in which all recommendations or voices are heard, specifically from the junior ranks. Ukraine’s impressive performance early in the war, and during the Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives, demonstrated its will and fighting ability. To capitalize on this fighting spirit, Ukraine must adopt NATO’s method to improve pilot performance and proficiency — specifically, a somewhat scientific and rigorous debrief of each flight. Reviewing the data recorded from each flight (“watching the tapes”) is crucial to this learning process. All aircrew are debriefed regardless of rank. Pride and ego must be sidelined to improve combat effectiveness and save lives. Furthermore, accurate battle damage assessment (BDA) should be reported back through the planning channels to maximize the efficiency of airpower by assigning strikes only to essential targets. Finally, this method of debriefing and the BDA feedback loop improve pilots’ rate of learning and the effectiveness of all air operations.

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Ukrainians must embrace a military culture in which all recommendations or voices are heard, specifically from the junior ranks.

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Poor doctrine presents a potential obstacle to maximizing the effectiveness of the F-16. Doctrine is a collection of best practices used to accomplish military objectives or effects. Ukraine should establish desired effects or objectives and then combine combat experience with Western TTPs to develop best practices. Rather than simply apply NATO or U.S. airpower doctrine, which is built around a robust command and control and resupply network, Ukrainians should own their doctrine while continuously improving it to confront the challenges from Russia on the battlefield.

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Once introduced on the battlefield, F-16s will increase the Ukrainian Air Force’s air-to-air capabilities. Leveraging its combat-proven radar, coupled with variants of the AIM-120 AMRAAM missile, Ukraine will extend its maximum air-to-air engagement range up to 180 km. This is an appreciable engagement range improvement compared to Ukraine’s Soviet-era MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter aircraft. Additionally, Ukrainian F-16s can more effectively disrupt Russian close air support missions across contested battlefields. During the summer of 2023, Russian helicopters impeded and delayed the Ukrainian counteroffensive. With the introduction of the F-16, these helicopters will become vulnerable and less effective in supporting Russian defensive or offensive operations. Lastly, expect Ukrainian F-16s to suppress the long-range glide bombs tactics Russian fighters have adeptly used around Kharkiv.

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The F-16 can improve Ukraine’s layered air defense, contributing to detection and elimination of incoming drones and missiles.

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Furthermore, the F-16 can improve Ukraine’s layered air defense, contributing to detection and elimination of incoming drones and missiles. The recent successful defense of Israel against the Iranian assault of over 300 drones and missiles highlights the significance of this capability, as USAF F-15Es shot down over 70 drones. However, the effectiveness of this approach hinges significantly on the interoperability of Ukrainian doctrine and technological systems. In the short term, while Russian IADSs remain intact, the battlefield conditions will make close air support too risky for Ukrainian F-16s. Instead, the Ukrainian Air Force should incorporate the F-16 as another platform capable of long-range strikes with the British Storm Shadow or French SCALP. Ukraine has already received ground-launched small-diameter bomb (SBD) launchers and should likewise be given the air-launched versions for its F-16s. Dropping SDBs from F-16s would complicate the Russian air defense, provide more opportunities for successful long-range fires, and enable targeting time-sensitive targets similar to the HIMARS — and at a far more economical rate.

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Part III: Short- and Long-Term Recommendations to Capitalize on the F-16’s Advantages

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Short-Term Recommendations (in 2024)

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    To assist in the quality of learning, NATO should embed fighter pilots with Ukrainian Air Force units to aid with debriefing, learning, and mission planning, or set up virtual options for video footage review. In February 2024, French president Emmanuel Macron opened the door to Western nations sending their troops to Ukraine, stating, “Nothing should be excluded.” Should future policy allow, NATO fighter pilots should aid Ukrainian aircrew and train them to review the tapes on every training or combat sortie to find lessons learned and improve tactics, techniques, and procedures. This tape review must be incorporated into the battle rhythm of Ukrainian fighter pilots. This will reinforce a culture of learning and ensure pilots provide and receive constructive feedback from every rank. Tape reviews increase tactical effectiveness and minimize losses. During review, learning is best achieved when individuals with the most expertise or proficiency lead the debrief, even if they do not hold the highest rank. Examples of this culture of debriefing may be found in the fighter and bomber units of the USAF and USN as well as within NATO air forces.

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    The United States and NATO should authorize the use of cluster bomb munitions, GBU-39B SDBs, and Storm Shadow or SCALP missiles with the F-16s. Specifically, the Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU)–87/89 and smart bomb equivalents (CBU-103/105) are most relevant for military targets in this context. A specific set of guidelines or restrictions on how the munitions may be used could be attached to the authorization of the weapons to minimize the risk of collateral damage. These weapons would aid in defending Ukrainian territory if Russia gains momentum toward a breakout on the battlefield. Cluster bomb munitions degrade and destroy large concentrations of personnel or equipment with fewer aircraft or strikes, while the SDB, Storm Shadow, and SCALP munitions can strike targets at great distances, improving the survivability of the employing aircraft. In 2023, Russia used attack helicopters with success to blunt the Ukrainian counteroffensive. If Russia can muster a breakout situation, it will require a concentration of personnel and equipment that cluster munitions are well suited to counter. Additionally, it is essential to include longer-range variants of the AIM-120 AMRAAM in the ammunition package. Enhanced air-to-air capabilities will bolster Ukraine’s capacity to deter Russia’s deployment of glide bombs.

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    The United States and NATO should set up a permanent training rotation program for Ukrainian F-16 aircrew and maintainers. After six months of combat, aircrew and maintainers should rotate to Ramstein Air Base for debriefing and the opportunity to rest and recuperate (R&R). After R&R, they should be allowed to refine their skill sets on a high-quality training range such as the Nevada Test and Training Range before returning to Ukraine for combat. The USAF and USN put their aircrew and maintainers through predeployment flying exercises to improve combat effectiveness, and these programs could be leveraged to provide Ukrainian units with a similar experience. For example, the USN saw dramatic improvements in combat effectiveness following the stand-up of the Navy Top Gun program during the Vietnam War, as evidenced by a 600 percent improvement to its aerial kill-to-loss ratio from Rolling Thunder (1968) to Linebacker (1972). The USAF had equivalent improvements to its combat effectiveness after the creation of Red Flag in 1975, in which the Air Force kill ratio hovered around 2:1 throughout the Vietnam War. In contrast, the USAF achieved 31 kills without a single loss in direct air-to-air combat in Desert Storm. Vastly improved training and doctrine account for a significant portion of the dramatic improvement to each service’s combat effectiveness. Following this logic, dedicating a unit at Nellis Air Force Base or another NATO base to orchestrate housing and training for Ukrainian aircrew and maintainers would make this initiative more effective.

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    NATO should commit more F-16s in the next couple of months to bring its total commitment to at least 90. This would allow Ukraine to convert five squadrons to F-16s (18 jets per squadron) using similar operations, maintenance, and sustainment practices as NATO units. For planning purposes, each additional set of 18 like-model F-16s would equate to another unit’s worth of aircraft. Since operational planning assigns missions and tasks to tactical units, the United States could help the Ukrainian Air Force by sending appropriately sized packages that can be seamlessly integrated into operations for improved efficiency. These numbers are the minimum needed and exclude aircraft needed for pipeline training and attrition.

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    Ukraine should prioritize converting its units to F-16s based on criteria that will maximize the combat capability the F-16 brings to the Ukrainian Air Force in as little time as possible. The authors recommend three actions to aid in this decision. First, prioritize the units that most need fighter aircraft and that are most capable of meeting the needs of Ukraine’s air strategy with the proper amount of aircraft and equipment. With these criteria, the equipment is the limiting factor — not the number of qualified people. Second, choose the unit currently assigned a mission that is the most similar to the anticipated role of the F-16 to capitalize on the culture, experience, and expertise ingrained in the people of the unit. Finally, access to higher-quality infrastructure and logistics will minimize the time aircraft sit grounded awaiting repairs or maintenance between missions. Therefore, picking a unit that already operates in a location with these features and remains beyond the range of most Russian air attacks will also aid Ukraine in reaping the dividends of the aircraft’s capabilities sooner rather than later.

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    To substantially increase Ukraine’s chances of victory, NATO should give Ukraine the equipment it needs to establish air superiority within its national borders. Providing F-16s is a step in the right direction toward this goal, but more equipment is needed. The authors estimate Ukraine needs 12 fighter squadrons of F-16s to significantly improve its position in the war. With 18 jets per squadron, this requires 216 F-16s on the front lines, and more should be placed in a reserve that can replace losses. Much has been written about the necessity of air superiority to support successful land campaigns. The remaining recommendations address helping Ukraine establish localized air superiority first, with broad and enduring air superiority as the eventual aim, to enable airpower’s subsequent use to support the land war.

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    Should U.S. and NATO political commitments allow, establish a NATO-Ukraine undergraduate pilot training (UPT) exchange program similar to programs for NATO pilots through USAF UPT bases. Alternatively, the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program could be modified to include Ukrainian pilots for a similar purpose but could also invest in building strategic relationships, with a multitude of NATO pilots going through the same program. Capturing Ukrainian talent early in their flying careers and training them with NATO methods and doctrine offers the greatest return on investment in the long term. This will result in a generational change of air doctrine that will take several years to bear fruit and, hence, a long-term strategic impact on integrating Ukraine into NATO methods.

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    For more impact on Ukraine’s strategy, the United States and NATO should consider minimal restrictions on how Ukraine uses its F-16s. The recent loosening of restrictions on munitions from the United States and other partners needs to continue with the inclusion of the F-16. Strikes should not be confined to Ukrainian territory. Ukraine may need to use its air force to interdict Russian logistics and forces or for strategic attack. Additionally, the Ukrainian Air Force may need other systems to strike IADSs positioned in Russian territory, beyond the operational range of Ukraine’s weaponry, to facilitate F-16 strikes. Such options may entail operations beyond Ukraine’s borders. Additionally, restricting the use of F-16s to attacks within Ukraine’s borders may result in a longer conflict such as the one the United States experienced throughout the Vietnam War until Operation Linebacker II, coupled with key diplomatic efforts led by the administration of U.S. president Richard Nixon, aggressively applied direct pressure to the leadership of North Vietnam. If Western support for Ukraine wavers, a longer conflict of attrition will favor Russia.

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    The United States should flood the Ukrainian Air Force with F-16s and other aircraft by incorporating decommissioned U.S. aircraft from the boneyard or those divested from its force structure. This recommendation is not novel; it echoes CSIS senior fellow Ben Jensen’s proposal in a Wall Street Journal commentary dated August 9, 2023. His insights remain pertinent and could be even more impactful today. Coupled with the ongoing manpower shortages facing Ukrainian forces, bolstering the Ukrainian Air Force’s capabilities is imperative. Introducing EA-6Bs, A-10s, C-12 Hurons, AH-1s, UH-1s, and MQ-8 Fire Scout helicopters would substantially augment Ukraine’s airpower. Leveraging existing artificial intelligence technology could transform many of these platforms into unmanned vehicles capable of complementing manned aircraft operations. This capability was demonstrated recently with the Air Force secretary riding in the front seat of a pilotless F-16 flight.

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    Do not impose U.S. doctrine or methods of warfare onto the Ukrainian Air Force. The United States has a lot of experience, but the Western way of war may not fit Ukraine’s methods or needs at this time. The U.S. role must be to impart hard-learned lessons, tried-and-true TTPs, and the capabilities and limitations of the F-16. Adaptation and understanding of the local realities and motivations is crucial to the success of a military strategy.

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    Ensure Ukraine can maintain and repair the F-16s. Effective maintenance and robust supply support are indispensable for preserving the operational readiness of military equipment. To secure the sustained operational lifespan of fixed-wing platforms, a vigorous and ongoing training pipeline must run in parallel with pilot training, alongside the modernization of maintenance personnel. Furthermore, F-16 maintenance teams should establish direct connections to experts (utilizing telemaintenance), facilitating the swift access required to support combat-ready fighters in the field.

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Conclusion

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In 2024, Ukraine faces a critical juncture as its manpower, supplies, and ammunition reserves dwindle, providing an opportunity for Russia to seize momentum and exploit the West’s waning support. Adding the F-16 to the Ukrainian Armed Forces will assist in stalling Russia’s potential counteroffensive and further integrating Ukraine into the U.S. and European economic and defense ecosystem. This move also provides better sustainment of Ukraine’s air power, improves the security of its airspace, and increases Ukraine’s ability to hold more Russian targets at risk. It will take time to observe how Ukrainian F-16s affect combat operations. However, localized air superiority, followed by broad and enduring air superiority, should be the long-term goal, which will require more aircraft. Now is the time to ensure short- and long-term adjustments are made to partnership capacity in order for F-16s to play a critical role in 2024 and beyond. At the policy level, when addressing Ukraine’s capabilities and capacity, the United States must decide what type of Ukrainian armed force it wants to support. Is it a Ukraine that can defend, deter, or defeat Russia? Regardless of wanted outcomes, Ukraine needs more aircraft, and it needs them now.

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Christopher Koeltzow is a military fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

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Brent Peterson is a national security fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

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Eric Williams is a military fellow with the International Security Program at CSIS.

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+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-06-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-90.html b/hkers/2024-06-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-90.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..946ea46f --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-06-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-90.html @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第 90 日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第 90 日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.06.11

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  • 控方完成案情 黎智英要求法庭裁表證不成立 案件押後至7.24續審
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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(11日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第90日審訊。控方正式表示完成控方案情;黎智英一方將有中段陳詞,要求法庭裁定3項控罪表證不成立。控辯雙方將於6月提交書面陳詞,早前定於7月9日作口頭陳詞,惟法官另有工作要處理,故改於7月24及25日續審。

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甫開庭,法官杜麗冰表示於6月7日收到黎智英代表律師事務所羅拔臣的信件,要求法庭批准黎智英缺席今天聆訊,又指黎乃自願缺席,而在他有法律代表的情況下,他的權利不會受到影響。杜官表示,考慮到今天聆訊的性質,只是處理翻譯文本的問題,並沒有重要事項,而且黎有法律代表保障其權利,因此批准黎毋須出席今天聆訊。

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控方向法庭提交經修訂的翻譯文本和證物列表,其後正式表示完成控方案情。

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黎智英一方將有中段陳詞,要求法庭裁定3項控罪表證不成立。早前經控辯雙方商討,黎一方須於6月18日向法庭提交書面中段陳詞,控方則須於6月25日提交陳詞,之後黎一方須於7月2日提交回應控方的書面陳詞。

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法庭早前定於7月9日庭上聽取口頭陳詞,惟法官李運騰今表示有其他案件需要處理,故改期至7月24及25日續審。

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代表「蘋果日報有限公司」、「蘋果日報印刷有限公司」及「蘋果互聯網有限公司」的大律師王國豪則早前表示不會有中段陳詞。

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案件編號:HCCC51/2022

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UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
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New Opportunistic Aggression

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F-16s Unleashed

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David M. Allison, et al. | 2024.06.06
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The United States faces an increasingly contested strategic environment. As policymakers grapple with the “two-near-peer” challenge, a crucial question remains: How should the United States mitigate the risk of opportunistic aggression?

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Christopher Koeltzow, et al. | 2024.06.11
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The paper explores the implications of supplying F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine.

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Euro SIFMANet CPH Report

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Algorithmic Stability

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Olivia Allison | 2024.06.06
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Discussions held in Copenhagen in March 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Denmark.

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Benjamin Jensen, et al. | 2024.06.10
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This report delves into the future of deterrence and the role of human judgment in an AI-focused crisis simulation.

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【黎智英案・審訊第 89 日】

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Russia And China

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獨媒報導 | 2024.06.05
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  • 料控方下周二完成案情 黎智英一方料7月作中段陳詞
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Callum Fraser | 2024.06.07
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Strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has visibly intensified in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, Russia is now firmly the weaker partner in the relationship, with China exploiting the Kremlin’s situation for its own ends.

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China To Quarantine Taiwan

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New Opportunistic Aggression

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Bonny Lin, et al. | 2024.06.05
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This report lays out China’s potential motivations for a quarantine and maps out two plausible scenarios of how it could conduct operations.

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David M. Allison, et al. | 2024.06.06
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The United States faces an increasingly contested strategic environment. As policymakers grapple with the “two-near-peer” challenge, a crucial question remains: How should the United States mitigate the risk of opportunistic aggression?

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【黎智英案・審訊第 88 日】

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Friendshore Lithium-Ion

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獨媒報導 | 2024.06.04
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  • 黎智英指新冠肺炎致人命經濟損失 料美國人民會支持對中國實施制裁懲罰
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William Alan Reinsch, et al. | 2024.06.06
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This white paper outlines the technical details behind the production of the active battery materials stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain and how U.S. government policies are impacting friendshoring efforts in the sector.

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Framing Sanctions

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Euro SIFMANet CPH Report

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Balázs Gyimesi | 2024.06.04
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This paper examines the question: How does the EU use strategic communications to persuade third countries to cooperate on sanctions? The paper analyses how the EU is using arguments linked to upholding values and appealing to the interests of third countries.

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Olivia Allison | 2024.06.06
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Discussions held in Copenhagen in March 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Denmark.

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No Silver Bullets

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Ever The Day After

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Matthew Savill | 2024.06.03
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Removing restrictions on the use of weapons supplied to Ukraine by international partners will help Ukraine’s defence against Russia, but it is not a war-winning move on its own.

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H A Hellyer | 2024.06.05
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Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords in 1978, the first peace treaty between the Jewish state and any of its Arab neighbours. The accords are the bedrock of the region’s security architecture, but owing to Israel’s war on Gaza and its moves at the border between Gaza and Egypt, the relationship between Cairo and Tel Aviv has reached its lowest point in decades. What kind of state are Egyptian-Israeli relations in, and how might this impact the future?

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【初選47人案・審訊判詞】

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Chinese Engagement In AR

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獨媒報導 | 2024.05.31
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  • 官指無差別否決財案迫政府回應五大訴求 屬違《基本法》及濫權
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  • 官:戴耀廷終極目標推翻現行制度 游說參與者 運用否決權成絕大部分人共識
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Evan Ellis | 2024.06.05
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In August 2023, then-Argentine presidential candidate Javier Milei declared he would not make “pacts with Communists.”

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