From ec862d29a5ea98fde902d730e0f3f7966204fc80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: hokoi Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2022 05:59:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] C2: Initial commit HKers articles, 0x14 Aug.28 --- .../2022-08-22-china-russia-weaknesses.md | 133 ++++++++++++++++++ .../2022-08-24-china-russia-military-ties.md | 126 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 259 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-08-22-china-russia-weaknesses.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-08-24-china-russia-military-ties.md diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-22-china-russia-weaknesses.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-22-china-russia-weaknesses.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1cf67796 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-22-china-russia-weaknesses.md @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : China-Russia Weaknesses +author: CSIS China Power Team +date : 2022-08-22 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/bu3saJH.jpg +#image_caption: +description: What Are the Weaknesses of the China-Russia Relationship? +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Russia’s war in Ukraine has cast a spotlight on the China-Russia relationship. On February 4, 2022, just weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin met and issued a historic joint statement which stated their bilateral relationship has “no limits” and that “there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation” between them._ + + + +The two countries have indeed significantly strengthened their relationship in recent years. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin enjoy close working relations, which drives high-level cooperation. The two sides also cooperate based on shared threat perceptions that the United States and its allies seek to encircle and undermine them. Close military ties and complementary economic dynamics help cement their relationship. + +Yet the China-Russia relationship is complex and comes with costs for both sides. Leaders in Beijing and Moscow appear to have assessed for now that the benefits outweigh the costs, but that calculus could change. In the sections that follow, this ChinaPower feature analyzes three key weaknesses of the relationship: + +- Historical and structural factors engender strategic mistrust between Beijing and Moscow; + +- Russian stagnation renders Moscow a less useful partner and contributes to a growing power asymmetry; and + +- Russian military aggression sparks blowback for China and exacerbates Russia’s stagnation. + + +### Historical and Structural Factors Create Strategic Mistrust + +Despite the strengthening of relations between Beijing and Moscow in recent years, considerable strategic mistrust exists between the two countries. Chinese strategic mistrust stems partly from the checkered history between the two countries, which saw the more powerful Russian Empire and the Soviet Union take advantage of a weaker China. For Russia’s part, enduring structural factors — especially geography — stoke fears that an increasingly powerful China may encroach on its interests and take advantage of Russian weaknesses. Moscow’s concerns are heightened by a strategic culture that harbors deep-seated great power ambitions and chafes at being the junior partner in a relationship with China. + +The present close relationship between China and Russia is a notable deviation from history, which often witnessed the more powerful neighbor taking advantage of the weaker country. In the 19th century, the Russian Empire was party to many of the “unequal treaties” that compelled China to hand over territory, money, and other spoils to European powers. The 1858 Treaty of Aigun and 1860 Treaty of Peking were particularly harsh, forcing China to forfeit approximately 1 million square kilometers (km) of territory to the Russian Empire. + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/2Vvikud.png) +_▲ Key Historical Sources of Chinese Mistrust of Russia_ + +In the mid-20th century, tensions between the newly founded People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union devolved into the Sino-Soviet Split, which lasted into the 1980s. The two countries’ longstanding border disputes were a central flashpoint of the period. In 1969, hostility along the border escalated to nuclear posturing and nearly resulted in large-scale conflict between the two communist powers. Moscow also pressed Beijing on other fronts, including criticizing Chinese repression in Tibet and indirectly calling for Tibet’s independence. + +Following the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989, China and Russia officially resolved their longstanding border disputes and Moscow began expressing support or neutrality on sensitive Chinese issues like Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Nevertheless, Moscow’s decades of antagonism have remained a source of suspicion within China. The unequal treaties that Russia was partner to were central to China’s “century of humiliation,” which the Chinese Communist Party still draws on as a source of nationalistic energy. It is impossible to de-link Russia from that legacy. Many Chinese thinkers still view these historic incidents as indicators of Russia’s willingness to use its power to pursue its own interests at China’s expense, and many in China continue to be wary of Russia’s reliability as a strategic partner. + +On top of historical factors, enduring structural factors generate friction in the relationship — chief among them, geography. China’s immediate proximity to Russia leads to competitive dynamics in areas along their shared periphery, most notably in the Russian Far East, Central Asia, and the Arctic. More fundamentally, China’s immense size and power make it a daunting neighbor in the event that relations between Beijing and Moscow sour. + +Following the opening of the China-Russia border in 1988, China’s presence in the Russian Far East emerged as an irritant in the relationship. As China’s economy grew, Chinese workers and businesses flowed into the region. Many went into the agricultural sector. One study found that in 2018 Chinese citizens owned or leased approximately 350,000 hectares (3,500 square km) of farming land in the Russian Far East — approximately 16 percent of the total land used for agriculture. The presence of Chinese workers in the region stirred up anger among some Russians, with many complaining about Chinese workers stealing Russian jobs and exploiting Russian natural resources. + +Concerns about China’s presence in the Russian Far East have waned somewhat in recent years, and China is broadly popular among the Russian public. According to the Pew Research Center, 71 percent of Russians said they viewed China positively in 2019 — the highest of all 35 countries surveyed. However, China’s presence in the Russia Far East continues to provoke negative views. A 2017 poll by the Russian Academy of Sciences found that more than one in three Russians view China’s increasing presence as “expansion.” Half of respondents said that China threatened Russia’s territorial integrity, and one-third of them believed that China’s policies endanger their country’s economic development. This negative local sentiment has at times stalled planned Chinese investment projects, such as a Chinese-funded water bottling plant in the Irkutsk region, which was suspended after local protests in 2019. + +China and Russia also face competitive dynamics in their shared backyard of Central Asia, which could become a source of tensions. Moscow remains influential in the five former Soviet states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and it considers the region to be within its “privileged sphere of influence.” Russia has thus far been willing to accept China’s activities there, for example, by cooperating with Beijing in the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization and by not opposing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ambitions. Russia currently even reaps some benefits out of China’s presence in the region: China’s considerable economic engagement there helps to facilitate regional stability and development allowing Russia to focus more on shaping military and security dynamics. + +However, China is stepping up its security and economic footprint in Central Asia in ways that may increasingly be perceived through a competitive lens by Moscow. In 2021, it was announced that China would construct an outpost for police special forces in Tajikistan. While it appears that Chinese forces will not be stationed there, China’s move was seen by some as an encroachment on Russia’s ties to Tajikistan, which is a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (a rough analogue to NATO comprising former Soviet states) and home to Russia’s largest overseas military base. + +On the economic front, China has rapidly replaced Russia as the larger trading partner of all five Central Asian states. In 2000, Chinese imports from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan totaled less than one-fourth of Russian imports, but by 2020 they were more than double Russia’s imports. China’s exports have ballooned as well, with $19.3 billion worth of Chinese goods destined for Central Asia in 2020. As this trend continues, it threatens to undercut Russia’s ability to wield its economic influence in the region. + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/0xmiTaB.png) +_▲ China Has Surpassed Russia as the Bigger Trade Partner in All Former Soviet States in Central Asia_ + +Finally, Russia is wary of Chinese ambitions in the Arctic, where Moscow has significant interests. Approximately one-fifth of Russia’s expansive territory is located within the Arctic Circle. This area encompasses more than 24,000 km of shoreline and is home to some 2.5 million people. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has made the Arctic a key region of focus, including reviving Russia’s military presence there. In recent years, Russia has refurbished 50 previously closed Soviet-era military posts, including 13 air bases, 10 radar stations, 20 border outposts, and 10 integrated emergency rescue stations. + +Despite lacking territory in the arctic, China has pushed to establish itself as a “near-Arctic state,” and in a 2018 white paper on the arctic, China put forward a vision for building a “Polar Silk Road” to complement the broader BRI. China and Russia have so far cooperated on energy and infrastructure projects in the region, but there have been considerable setbacks. Russia initially opposed allowing China onto the multilateral Arctic Council as an observer, and Moscow continues to be suspicious of Beijing’s strategic goals in the region. In 2012, Russia blocked Chinese research vessels from conducting surveys along the Northern Sea Route, and in 2020 Russian prosecutors charged a prominent Russian Arctic expert with treason for passing classified information to China. + +In the future, Russia may feel the need to push back against China’s growing influence in these areas. In the spirit of the Chinese idiom “一山不容二虎” (one mountain cannot tolerate two tigers), China may also assert its interests over Russia’s as it pushes to shore up its regional and global power. So far, China and Russia have managed to compartmentalize competition in these areas, and they have succeeded in strengthening relations despite their turbulent history. Yet the seeds of mistrust remain planted within the relationship and could someday grow into a major impediment in the relationship. + + +### Russian Stagnation Exacerbates Tensions + +China and Russia have long sought to cast themselves as equal partners, but this narrative is increasingly difficult to maintain given the growing power asymmetry between the two. As Russia stagnates or even declines, and as China continues to bolster its national power, Russia is poised to be a less useful partner to China in countering Western influence. China’s growing lead over Russia could also exacerbate existing tensions and mistrust between Beijing and Moscow if Russia feels it is being disrespected or treated as a junior partner. + +Across virtually all elements of national power — including economic, technological, and military power — China is surging ahead of Russia or rapidly catching up. Economically, China has already far surpassed Russia. On a nominal basis, the Chinese economy was nearly 10 times larger than Russia’s in 2021. For the first time, China even surpassed Russia in nominal per capita GDP in 2020 (though Russia remains ahead of China when adjusted for purchasing power parity). The gap is set to widen significantly in the coming years. Economic forecasts by the International Monetary Fund expect China’s GDP to climb toward nearly $30 trillion by 2027 while Russia’s GDP is forecasted to stall at well under $2 trillion. + +![image03](https://i.imgur.com/553C2Yv.png) +_▲ GDP of China and Russia_ + +Russia’s stagnating economic growth is rendering it less important as an economic partner. In 2020, Russia only accounted for about 2 percent of China’s total trade (imports and exports). By comparison, China was Russia’s largest trade partner, accounting for about 18 percent of Russia’s trade. + +Long-term trends will likely render Russia even less economically relevant for China. Russia’s current value to China is in supplying energy, with oil, gas, and coal collectively accounting for two-thirds of Russia’s exports to China. Barring a major paradigm shift, Russia will decline in importance in the coming decades as China weens itself off fossil fuels. This trend is already in the works. In 2010, oil and coal made up nearly 87 percent of China’s energy consumption. In 2020, that figure had dropped to less than 76 percent. Similarly, renewable energies made up approximately 16 percent of China’s energy consumption — up from about 9 percent in 2010. + +![image04](https://i.imgur.com/vbyi7Dz.png) +_▲ The China-Russia Trade Imbalance_ + +Russia would face enormous headwinds in transitioning toward a more balanced and competitive economy since Russia lags far behind China and other global leaders when it comes to technological power and sophistication. In 2020, China spent 14 times more on research and development (R&D) than Russia. This was not simply the result of differences in economic size: China also spent more than twice as much as Russia as a percent of GDP. + +Across the board, Russia lacks the science and technology ecosystem needed to produce the kinds of products that would make it a more valuable and dynamic economic and technological partner for China in the long-term. The Global Innovation Index, a leading index measuring innovative capabilities and performance, ranked China 12th globally in 2021, just behind France and ahead of Japan. Meanwhile, it ranked Russia 45th alongside Vietnam (44th) and India (46th). + +![image05](https://i.imgur.com/x7QSOel.png) +_▲ Performance in Key Metrics of Science and Technology Innovation_ + +Russian stagnation on the economic and technological fronts is weighing on its military power, which has traditionally been a key source of its strength and influence. In 2021, Russia spent virtually the same on its military as it did in 2014 (about $64 billion). China’s military budget grew over 47 percent during that period, from $183 billion to $270 billion.2 + +This has multiple implications for China. In recent decades, Beijing has looked to Russia as a major military partner in competing with the United States and its allies, but Russia’s faltering defense spending is weighing on China and Russia’s collective capacity to compete militarily. In 2021, the United States and its NATO and Indo-Pacific allies collectively spent 3.7 times more on defense than China and Russia. More concretely, Chinese experts have complained about the state of the Russian military, highlighting, for example, that the Russian naval fleet largely comprises outdated Soviet-era vessels and equipment. + +![image06](https://i.imgur.com/Mb7Un3c.png) +_▲ Defense Spending: China and Russia vs. the United States and Allies_ + +It is unclear whether, or at what point, the power disparity between the two countries would threaten their relationship. If Russian power wanes and Western isolation of Russia continues, Moscow may conclude that it has no choice but to bandwagon with China. However, given Russian perceptions of itself and its history as a great power, Russia may be unwilling to have a close partnership with China that is not built on equality. + +There are signs that some Russians are already wary of being treated poorly by China. In March 2022, former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev described China’s leaders as “ruthless businessmen” and said “China will never take [Putin] as an equal partner or even as ally.” If Russian leaders feel that they are being taken advantage of or treated like the junior partner, they may ultimately choose to cool relations with Beijing and limit cooperation. Russia may even assess at some point that the power imbalance has become so severe that China poses a direct challenge or threat to Russia, which could result in a full pivot away from China. + + +### Russian Aggression Runs Counter to Chinese Interests + +Compounding these issues is Russia’s persistent military aggression on the world stage. Russia’s numerous military interventions — especially its ongoing war in Ukraine — have created political and economic blowback for China. On top of that, Russia’s war in Ukraine has weakened Russia, diminishing its utility to China and further exacerbating the widening power gap between China and Russia.. + +Chinese strategists and analysts have contrasted Russia’s willingness to use force with China’s forbearance. Some have described Vladimir Putin as a “revolutionary” seeking to overturn the existing international order and noted that Moscow’s goals render it more willing to use violence to advance its interests. By comparison, Chinese scholars have characterized China as having the more modest goal of rendering the existing international system more conducive to China’s growth and development — and therefore less willing to resort to force. + +Russia’s willingness to use aggression has put China in politically awkward situations. Chinese officials have long described territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries as a cornerstone of China’s foreign policy. Chinese officials and propaganda outlets frequently try to cast China as having never invaded or bullied other countries. Russia’s repeated invasions of other countries run in direct opposition to those principles. + +![image07](https://i.imgur.com/6jewgfW.png) +_▲ Major Military Interventions by Russia under Vladimir Putin_ + +China has at times gone so far as to subtly criticize Russian military aggression. In 2008, then-spokesman of China’s foreign ministry Qin Gang stated that China “expressed concern” over the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia during Russia’s war in Georgia. Mostly, China has sought to neither criticize nor directly side with Russia. Beijing, for example, has not recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia; nor has it recognized the breakaway Ukrainian territories of Donetsk and Luhansk or Russian claims over Crimea. + +In the case of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Xi Jinping has gone farther by publicly legitimizing Russian security and sovereignty concern, but this has come at a political and diplomatic cost. In the United Nations, China was compelled to make unpopular votes that placed it among a small minority of countries. In March 2022, for example, 141 countries voted in the UN General Assembly in favor of a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while China joined a minority of 34 other countries in abstaining. + +![image08](https://i.imgur.com/rVnGSFO.png) +_▲ UN General Assembly Vote on Resolution to Condemn Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine_ + +Russia’s war in Ukraine has also propelled a rapid and significant improvement in relations between the United States and its European allies as they collectively counter Russia, and it has strengthened perceived fault lines between democracies and autocracies — unwelcome outcomes for China. In the United States, China’s tacit support for Russia has brought a spotlight to the China-Russia relationship, with 62 percent of people polled describing it as posing “a very serious problem.” In Europe, a key economic partner for China where Beijing has been pushing to gain influence, countries there have toughened their stance toward China. In April and May, China sent an envoy to meet with officials in eight central and eastern European countries with the hopes of improving ties, but China’s outreach was rebuffed. + +The war in Ukraine has also inflicted economic pain on China. The global rise in energy prices sparked by the war led oil prices to spike in China — much as they did in other countries. According to Chinese customs data, the price of China’s crude oil imports rose to RMB 5,070 per metric ton in April 2022 — up 37 percent from January 2022. + +![image09](https://i.imgur.com/a88s3G5.png) +_▲ Average Monthly Price of Chinese Crude Oil Imports_ + +China and its companies are also facing the added burden of navigating Western sanctions on Russia. While China has not joined U.S. and European sanctions on Russia, and despite Beijing’s calls for companies to continue conducting business in Russia, many Chinese firms have paused or cut operations there. This includes major Chinese tech companies like computer-maker Lenovo, smartphone-maker Xiaomi, and drone-maker DJI. + +As a result, China’s exports to Russia plummeted to RMB 24.1 billion in April 2022 — down 53 percent from the recent high of RMB 52 billion in December 2021. Technology exports have been particularly hard hit. In March, laptop sales to Russia were down more than 40 percent and smartphones down by nearly two-thirds. In late May, five Chinese firms were told to stop construction of a Chinese-Russian liquefied natural gas pipeline, a key node in China’s “Polar Silk Road,” to avoid EU sanctions. + +![image10](https://i.imgur.com/fgpF3mp.png) +_▲ Chinese Monthly Exports to Russia_ + +In addition to causing political and economic blowback, Russia’s wars threaten to further diminish Russia’s utility as a strategic partner for China. Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine created significant setbacks for the Russian military and its supporting defense industry. The war disrupted Russia’s ability to deliver weapons systems to Vietnam — one of Russia’s top arm export markets — which in turn contributed to a broader decline in Russia’s arms exports in recent years. During the 2016-2021 period, Russian arms sales around the world declined 24 percent over the previous six-year period, and its share of global arms sales fell from 25 percent to 19 percent. This undercut a notable benefit of the China-Russia relationship for Beijing, wherein Russia could wield its prominence as an arms exporter to influence countries — like Vietnam — with which China has tense relations. + +Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine has had far more drastic consequences for Russia. Western sanctions have had substantial impacts on the Russian economy. Russia’s GDP is expected to shrink by 8.5 percent in 2022 and unemployment is expected to rise substantially. Russia’s military losses in Ukraine are also staggering. In June 2022, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley stated that the Russian military had already lost roughly 20 to 30 percent of its armored force in Ukraine, which he described as a “huge” and “significant” loss. + +For now, Beijing has chosen to double down on its relationship with Russia despite these drawbacks. These developments nevertheless represent meaningful headaches for China. Russia is stagnating, and perhaps in outright decline, which could ultimately exacerbate existing mistrust between Beijing and Moscow and potentially render Russia of far less strategic value to China. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-24-china-russia-military-ties.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-24-china-russia-military-ties.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f5285d6e --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-24-china-russia-military-ties.md @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : China-Russia Military Ties +author: Brian Hart, et al. +date : 2022-08-24 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/cEYrdGj.jpg +#image_caption: +description: How Deep Are China-Russia Military Ties? +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_China’s decision to tacitly side with Russia despite its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine renewed fears of a China-Russia military alliance. The two countries have so far eschewed a formal alliance, but they share deep military ties centering on arms sales and joint military exercises._ _Russian arms sales to China have been invaluable to China’s efforts to rapidly modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Joint military exercises have likewise aided the PLA and offered Beijing a suite of other benefits._ + +Yet military ties between Beijing and Moscow are not without considerable hiccups. China’s repeated theft of Russian technology is a major sore spot, and arms sales are becoming a less important focal point of the broader bilateral relationship. With respect to joint exercises, shifting power dynamics between China and Russia are upsetting the status quo with mixed results for China. + + +### Military Aid and Arms Sales + +Through the decades, cooperation on military technology has at times been an important and symbolic element of China-Russia relations. Politically, Russian military aid and arms sales have helped undergird the broader diplomatic relationship. Militarily, arms sales have provided the PLA with equipment that it struggled to produce on its own, like advanced aircraft, engines, and air defense systems. However, China has repeatedly stolen Russian technology and know-how, creating friction between Beijing and Moscow. Going forward, arms sales could become a less important area of the relationship or even become a point of contention as China advances and competes with Russia in the global arms industry. + +#### The Ebb and Flow of Russian Military Aid and Arms Sales + +Military aid and arms sales played a major role in cementing ties between the newly founded People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. After entering the Korean War in October 1950, China suffered heavy losses and turned to the Soviets for aid. In October 1951, Moscow agreed to provide massive amounts of equipment and assistance from Soviet experts. Soviet aid included around 700 MiG-15 fighter jets and 150 Tu-2 light bombers and effectively tripled the size of China’s air force fleet. In total, Chinese historical data suggests the Soviets provided the equivalent of $1.5–2 billion worth of aid during the war. + +The Soviet Union also abetted China’s nuclear development, for both civilian and military purposes. Soviet aid included training Chinese scientists, supporting China’s weapons-grade uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, and assisting with warhead design and production and missile technologies. The Soviets, however, stopped short of directly providing China with nuclear weapons. + +This massive influx of Soviet aid catalyzed China’s indigenous weapons production. Moscow encouraged and assisted Chinese production through licensing and technical support, and by 1956 China was producing the J-4, its first indigenous combat aircraft modeled on the Soviet MiG-17. China likewise leveraged Russian aid to eventually develop its first successful atomic bomb by 1964. + +Yet this military cooperation did not last. By 1960, ideological and political differences resulted in the Sino-Soviet Split, which effectively lasted until the normalization of relations in 1989. During this period, the two countries ceased virtually all forms of military aid and arms sales. + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/hW6jzwT.png) +_▲ Chinese Arms Purchases from the Soviet Union/Russia (1950-2021)_ + +Following the resumption of normal relations between Beijing and Moscow in 1989, arms sales again played a major role in strengthening political ties between the two sides. The Soviet Union was one of the only major arms-producing countries willing to sell weapons to China after the deadly crackdown on protestors in Tiananmen Square in 1989, which left Beijing an international pariah. The benefits were not one-sided. Chinese arms purchases were a lifeline for Russia’s defense industry in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. + +Russian arms sales to China burgeoned in the 1990s and early 2000s. Some of the most big-ticket purchases were of Russian fighter aircraft. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 1990 and 2005 China placed several orders for some 270 Su-27 and Su-30 fighters at a cost of approximately $10-11 billion. In the years following the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis — during which China’s navy was outmatched by U.S. naval forces in the region — Beijing ordered eight Russian Kilo-class diesel-powered submarines and four Sovremenny-class destroyers. China also bought thousands of missiles and several S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, among other equipment. Altogether, between 1990 and 2005, China purchased more than 83 percent of its arms imports from Russia. + +As in the 1950s, this influx of major weapons systems in the 1990s and 2000s significantly aided the PLA by filling modernization gaps. Russia’s willingness to license production rights to China catalyzed the development of China’s own defense industry. By selling China kits of Russian aircraft parts, Chinese engineers gained manufacturing experience, which aided China in developing indigenous designs. + +![image2](https://i.imgur.com/ZcdYJJY.png) +_▲ Chinese Orders of Russian Military Equipment by Type_ + +#### Problems in the China-Russia Arms Trade Relationship + +After a flurry of orders, Chinese arms purchases from Russia slowed to a trickle in the late 2000s. China’s overall arms imports were down 30 percent during the 2007-2021 period compared to 1992-2006. Declining orders from Russia drove much of this fall. China has procured around 71 percent of its arms imports from Russia since 2007 — a notable drop from 84 percent during the previous 15-year period. + +This decline is partly the result of growing frustration with China’s repeated theft of Russian military technology and intellectual property through espionage and hacks. According to ChinaPower analysis, there have been at least 17 cases of Chinese espionage and hacking to steal Russian military technology during the last two decades. China has most heavily targeted Russian aerospace technologies. In 2004 alone, three court cases saw seven Russians convicted of providing China with information on Russian airplane and satellite technologies. + +Espionage and hacks are only part of the story. China has frequently breached agreements with Russian arms suppliers by reverse-engineering Russian equipment to produce its own. China copied Russian Su-27 fighters to develop its J-11 fighter and it reverse-engineered S-300 SAM systems to produce its HQ-9 SAM systems. This has not gone unnoticed in Moscow. In 2019, Russian state-owned defense firm Rostec claimed that there had been 500 cases of unauthorized copying of its equipment in the preceding 17 years. In a rare move, the company publicly criticized China, stating that “‘China alone has copied aircraft engines, Sukhoi planes, deck jets, air defense systems, portable air defense missiles, and analogs of the Pantsir medium-range surface-to-air systems.’” + +![image3](https://i.imgur.com/NOZAgRS.png) +_▲ Timeline of Chinese Espionage and Technology Theft against Russia_ + +The relative decline in Russian arms sales to China is also largely due to China’s shrinking reliance on foreign-made equipment. Decades of growing defense spending and intensive efforts to modernize its defense industry have rendered China increasingly capable of producing its own advanced fighter jets, naval vessels, and other equipment. + +China does notably still depend on Russian-made engines for many PLA aircraft. Over the last five years (2017-2021), aircraft engines accounted for more than 54 percent of China’s arms imports (by value), with the overwhelming majority coming from Russia. Some of China’s Chengdu J-20 stealth fighters are equipped with Russian Saturn AL-31 engines and versions of China’s developmental Shenyang J-35/FC-31 jet fighter have used Russian RD-93 engines. + +![image4](https://i.imgur.com/WefUeoW.png) +_▲ Recent Chinese Orders of Russian Aircraft Engines_ + +However, China appears to be making headway toward replacing Russian engines. A domestically built WS-10C engine is reportedly being used in variants of the J-20, and new variants of the J-35/FC-31 are likely to be outfitted with Chinese WS-13E engines. Over the next decade, both planes are expected to feature more advanced Chinese-made engines, including the WS-15 and WS-19. China also aims to phase out the Russian Soloviev D-30KP-2 currently powering China’s Y-20 large transport aircraft and H-6K bombers and replace them with Chinese WS-18 engines. + +#### The Future of Russian Arms Sales to China + +Going forward, several factors could render arms trade a source of contention and competition, rather than a platform for cooperation. The Chinese defense industry’s continued efforts toward self-reliance could result in the evaporation of Chinese arms purchases from Russia altogether. There has already been a marked slowdown in recent years. China last purchased military equipment (two orders of Mi-17 transport helicopters) from Russia in 2019 — a far cry from earlier years when China placed more than a dozen orders in a single year. + +Even if China does continue to purchase certain items, Russia may face challenges in supplying them. In 2020, Russia delayed delivery of its highly advanced S-400 SAM system to China, citing the Covid-19 pandemic as an excuse. However, the move was seen by some as a diplomatic move by Moscow to avoid angering India — Russia’s top arms buyer — amid heightened tensions and border skirmishes between China and India. + +Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine could further inhibit Russia from delivering orders to China. After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, international sanctions on Russia disrupted Russia’s ability to deliver certain equipment to Vietnam, one of Russia’s top arm export markets. The severe sanctions placed on Russia in response to its 2022 invasion of Ukraine could further disrupt the Russian defense industry and limit its ability to fulfill large orders to China or other customers. + +Finally, if China pushes to establish itself as a more dominant player in the global arms market, it could put significant pressure on the broader China-Russia relationship. Russia’s prominence in the global arms market has already declined steeply. In 2021, Russian arms exports plunged to 11 percent of the global total — the lowest point in decades and a steep fall from a high of 32 percent in 2002. So far, China has not made major gains in capturing global market share due to steep competition from more established actors, including the United States and Russia. Nevertheless, China may be able to use Russia’s war in Ukraine to make marginal gains in regions like the Middle East and North Africa. In the long-term, Beijing could become a more attractive arms supplier as developing countries look to diversify their suppliers away from just Russia. + +![image5](https://i.imgur.com/nBm9tcO.png) +_▲ Share of Global Arm Sales_ + +For now, arms sales will likely remain a slightly diminished but positive element of the relationship. As China’s capabilities and influence grow, however, this could change and may ultimately become a thorny issue in the bilateral relationship. + + +### Joint Military Exercises + +Unlike military aid and arms sales, which have waxed and waned over the years, joint exercises are a relatively new and thriving element of China-Russia military ties and a driver behind the strengthening of China-Russia relations in recent years. Joint military exercises provide China and the PLA with myriad benefits, such as operational experience and opportunities for deterrent signaling. These benefits could evolve or diminish, however, as China’s power grows and as Russia stagnates. + +#### The Evolving Nature of China-Russia Joint Exercises + +China and Russia first participated in a military exercise together in 2003. The multilateral exercise, dubbed Coalition 2003, featured a series of counter-terrorism drills and brought together 1,300 troops from China, Russia, and three other members of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Two years later, China and Russia held their first bilateral military exercise, known as Peace Mission 2005, which began in the Russian far eastern city of Vladivostok and moved to China’s Shandong Peninsula. The exercise was a major undertaking involving 8,000 Chinese troops and 2,000 Russian troops conducting both land and amphibious maneuvers. Exercises such as these, consisting of large ground or multi-domain operations, were the norm during the early years of China-Russia joint exercises. + +![image6](https://i.imgur.com/Faobkb2.png) +_▲ China-Russia Joint Military Exercises by Type_ + +However, as China and Russia strengthened ties, they dramatically scaled up the number and type of exercises. In 2007, they conducted their first joint paramilitary exercise Cooperation 2007, focused on anti-terrorism drills, and in 2009 they held their first joint naval drills in the Gulf of Aden. Starting in 2014, China and Russia began to participate in large-scale competitions such as the Aviadarts air force competition and Tank Biathlon, both of which are now annual exercises. Since then, the two have further widened the aperture of their cooperation by participating in computer-based simulations and by conducting joint aerial patrols. Altogether, China and Russia participated in at least 78 joint military exercises between 2003 and mid-2022, with more than half of these taking place since 2016. + +China-Russia joint exercises have also expanded in terms of geographic reach. Early exercises largely took place in the rugged terrains of western China and Central Asia, but more recent naval exercises saw the two operate in the distant waters of the South African coast, the Mediterranean Sea, and even as far as the Baltic Sea. Joint aerial patrols have likewise seen the two flying across broad swaths of the Western Pacific Ocean. + +![image7](https://i.imgur.com/BK3AdTW.png) +_▲ __[Mapping China-Russia Joint Military Exercises](https://chinapower.csis.org/data/china-russia-joint-military-exercises/).__ This interactive map visualizes China-Russia joint military exercises that took place between 2003 and mid-2022._ + +#### How China Benefits from Joint Exercises with Russia + +China reaps many benefits from joint exercises with Russia. First and foremost, joint exercises have allowed the PLA to gain valuable experience operating with the far more experienced Russian military and afforded the PLA opportunities to practice maneuvering in a variety of geographies and climates far from China’s borders. These experiences are invaluable to the PLA, which has not engaged in large-scale military conflict in several decades. + +Joint exercises provide additional benefits to China (and Russia) as a tool for sending political signals and deterring perceived adversaries. Chinese officials have long claimed that joint exercises do not target “third parties”; however, the 2020 edition of Science of Military Strategy — an authoritative textbook published by China’s National Defense University — states that an exercise “not only demonstrates the Chinese army’s combat capabilities to adversaries, but also causes doubts, making them uncertain about our intentions.” + +In recent years, China and Russia have increasingly exploited joint exercises to signal to the United States and its allies. In September 2016, just two months after the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that invalidated China’s claims over much of the South China Sea, China and Russia launched Joint Sea 2016, which featured island seizure operations in the South China Sea. It was their first and only naval exercise held there, sending a clear signal that it was a response to the tribunal’s ruling. More recently, in May 2022, China and Russia conducted a joint aerial patrol over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea that coincided with a summit of the leaders of the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue (also known as the Quad) in Tokyo. The move was widely seen as a direct response and intentional provocation in protest of the summit. + +Beijing also aims to use the exercises to positively signal to friends and neighbors. More than half of China-Russia exercises are multilateral. SCO members states and other neighbors participate in the lion’s share of these. These exercises help to both level up the military capabilities of these countries while also helping to assure them that China and Russia have the capability and will to aid them in addressing regional security threats. They also aim to ease worries in neighboring countries about Beijing’s own intentions, making the exercises an important element of China’s peripheral diplomacy. + +![image8](https://i.imgur.com/55FsAVU.png) +_▲ China-Russia Joint Military Exercise by Number of Participants_ + +Finally, joint military exercises help to strengthen the broader bilateral relationship by facilitating exchanges at multiple levels. The recent Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises were viewed by Chinese experts as being unique in that the two sides not only jointly conducted the exercise but also collaborated in planning and commanding the exercises. More broadly, exercises have provided opportunities for Chinese military leaders — including vice chairs of China’s Central Military Commission and defense ministers — to meet with their Russian counterparts. + +On top of this, exercises increase mutual trust and transparency by revealing to each other their respective capabilities. At Zapad/Interaction 2021, more than 80 percent of China’s equipment used in the exercise was new — including the PLA’s KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, J-20 and J-16 fighters, Y-20 transport planes, and surveillance and combat drones — giving Russia a look at some of China’s most advanced systems. + +#### The Shifting Dynamics of China-Russia Joint Exercises + +The benefits that China gains from joint exercises with Russia are changing as China-Russia power dynamics shifts. Chinese analysts increasingly emphasize China’s military capabilities are catching up with, or surpassing, Russia’s. One expert argues, for example, that Chinese battalion groups have surpassed their Russian counterparts in terms of weapons and equipment and that Russian battalion tactical groups “are only suitable for the kind of battlefield in East Ukraine… and are easily defeated on high-intensity battlefields by advanced adversaries like the U.S. military.” + +China has even started to flip the status quo by leading exercises while Russia participates from a junior position. Official Chinese media described the Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises as the first in which the PLA led, as well as the first joint exercises held entirely in China using mostly Chinese weaponry. Li Shuyin, a researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences, emphasized the uniqueness of Zapad/Interaction 2021, describing it as “a change of roles” and a chance to create a joint exercise “brand” centered on the PLA. + +This emerging dynamic is likely to be cemented as China’s power grows and Russia stagnates. Russia’s war in Ukraine may accelerate this trend. The Russian military has surprised many by how poorly it has performed in Ukraine, and the conflict has proven costly and deadly for Russia. If Russia becomes deeply weakened and overstretched by the war, it may be unable to carry out frequent large-scale exercises. This may lead China to pivot toward smaller-scale exercises that are focused less on operational benefits and more on political signaling. The two sides could also continue with frequent exercises but with China more consistently leading as the senior partner. Alternately, if Beijing concludes that Russia’s performance in Ukraine has been bad enough, it may ultimately rethink the value of participating in joint exercises with Russia and even reconsider the overall value of strategic ties with Russia. + +--- + +#### Authors + +__Brian Hart, Bonny Lin, Matthew P. Funaiole, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Nicholas Kaufman, and Gavril Torrijos.__