From f30116f6d481e48c3d680684694602d1b103b572 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: hokoi Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 02:21:51 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x24 Jan.24 --- .../_hkers/2024-01-10-surveying-the-seas.md | 159 ++++++ .../2024-01-12-western-pacific-security.md | 477 ++++++++++++++++++ .../2024-01-22-iran-pakistan-conflict.md | 66 +++ 3 files changed, 702 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-01-10-surveying-the-seas.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-01-12-western-pacific-security.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-01-22-iran-pakistan-conflict.md diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-10-surveying-the-seas.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-10-surveying-the-seas.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..10a840c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-10-surveying-the-seas.md @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Surveying The Seas +author: Matthew P. Funaiole, et al. +date : 2024-01-10 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/u6siJbP.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "China’s Dual-Use Research Operations in the Indian Ocean" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_China is deploying dozens of civilian vessels to survey the world’s oceans. While these ships support scientific and commercial objectives, they can also help China’s navy understand the maritime environment as it ventures into less familiar waters like the Indian Ocean._ + + + +China is undertaking sweeping efforts to transform its navy into a formidable “blue water” force capable of projecting power far beyond its shores. As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ventures into less familiar waters like the Indian Ocean, Beijing has sought to deepen its understanding of the maritime operating environment by studying water conditions, currents, and the seafloor. + +To survey the Earth’s oceans, China has developed the world’s largest fleet of civilian research vessels. While these ships support scientific and commercial objectives, they are also being used to advance Beijing’s strategic ambitions. + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/ZEGClV6.png) +_▲ Chinese oceanographic surveys span the globe._ + +> Maritime activity data collected using the Windward Intelligence Platform reveals Chinese survey vessels have carried out hundreds of thousands of hours of operations globally over the past four years. + +> Hidden Reach analyzed Chinese oceanographic missions since 2020 and identified 64 active research and survey vessels. + +> China’s dual-use approach to oceanographic research raises questions about the nature of these activities. Many vessels that undertake missions for peaceful purposes are also capable of providing the PLA with critical data about the world’s oceans. + +> Of the 64 active vessels, over 80 percent have demonstrated suspect behavior or possess organizational links suggesting their involvement in advancing Beijing’s geopolitical agenda. + +> China’s surveying operations have been heavily concentrated along its maritime periphery in the South China Sea and western Pacific Ocean. + +> But it has also set its sights on the Indian Ocean, an emerging arena of competition between Beijing and New Delhi. + +> The PLA can leverage the insights gained from these missions to enhance its knowledge of the dynamic undersea environment — a crucial precursor to confidently deploying naval forces abroad. + +Exploring and mapping the world’s oceans is not unique to China. Dozens of countries have active oceanographic research programs, which contribute to global efforts to study climate change, marine life, geology, and the distribution of natural resources. + +China is also not alone in applying oceanographic research to support military needs. Yet the scale of China’s activities is immense, and the line between its civilian and military research is heavily blurred. + +Beijing’s lack of transparency makes it challenging to discern the true nature of its survey operations, but three specific indicators shed light on which vessels may be supporting Beijing’s military and national security objectives. + + +### Vessel Ownership and Type + +Many of China’s research vessels are owned and operated by state-affiliated organizations with close ties to the Chinese military. For example, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Chinese Academy of Sciences both operate research vessels and have signed cooperation agreements with the PLA. + +Some survey ships were in service with the PLA before entering civilian service. Hulls in the Xiang Yang Hong (向阳红) class, for example, were originally built for the Chinese navy but were later transferred to civilian authorities with ties to the PLA. + +Other ships are operated directly by the Chinese Coast Guard, which ultimately reports to the country’s Central Military Commission. + +Chinese officials are not always quiet about the dual function of these ships. During the commissioning of the Shiyan 06 (实验-06), officials acknowledged the ship would “provide strong scientific and technological support for homeland security.” + + +### Military-Affiliated Port Visits + +Many Chinese survey ships have a record of calling at port in military-affiliated facilities in China. This includes Sanya, Guangzhou, Qingdao, and other ports known to host major contingents of PLA Navy warships and maritime militia vessels. Some have also visited China’s unlawfully constructed military outposts in the South China Sea. + +Notably, some vessels have gone dark for hours or days while near PLA installations, a potential sign of intentional efforts to obscure activities there. + + +### Activities + +Behavior at sea can also raise red flags. Repeated instances of “spoofing” (providing falsified identification information) or “going dark” (turning off automatic identification system signals for extended periods) are important warning signs. Data from Windward indicates these activities occur frequently — sometimes near foreign military facilities. + +In other instances, China has deployed research vessels to strengthen its presence in geopolitical hotspots. Commercial and scientific research ships, such as those operated by the state-owned China Oilfield Services Limited (COSL), have played a major role in helping Beijing assert its claims of “indisputable sovereignty” over vast swaths of the contested South China Sea. + +Some ships have conducted survey operations within the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of other countries without prior approval, which is prohibited under international law. These activities have sparked diplomatic spats, including a 2019 confrontation between an Indian warship and Chinese research vessel operating unauthorized in India’s EEZ. + +The blurred boundaries between China’s oceanographic research ecosystem and its expansive national security apparatus bear the hallmarks of Beijing’s military-civil fusion (军民融合) strategy, which seeks to break down barriers between the country’s civilian and military scientific, technological, and economic development. + +China’s national economic blueprint, the 14th Five Year Plan, names deep sea exploration as one of its seven focus areas for scientific and technological research and calls for the development of “submarine scientific observation networks.” In 2021, the Ministry of Natural Resources laid out specific guidance on furthering the Five Year Plan, including linking ocean surveying to military objectives. + +PLA personnel have written extensively on the need for a robust set of advanced deep-sea technologies to support undersea warfare, a domain where China considerably lags the U.S. military. The data collected by China’s civilian research fleet, which is outfitted with cutting-edge measuring and monitoring equipment, can help fill in major gaps in the PLA Navy’s undersea capabilities. + +The connections between the Chinese military and civilian oceanographic research are often in plain sight. The PLA Navy Submarine Academy openly touts its frequent collaborations with China’s major maritime research institutions. + +The Qingdao National Laboratory for Marine Science and Technology (QNLM) is the crown jewel in China’s oceanographic research technology ecosystem. It is located among a cluster of advanced research labs built near the submarine academy’s main campus. + +These partnerships have raised security concerns abroad. Texas A&M University terminated a research partnership with QNLM in 2022, citing “more than 200 instances of Foreign Talent Recruitment activity.” In the same year, the U.S. Department of Commerce added QNLM to its Entity List due to its involvement in supporting China’s military modernization efforts. + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/oX0OKOP.png) + +> #### XIANG YANG HONG 06 向阳红 06 + +> One of China’s most extensive expeditions took place in 2019 and 2020, when the research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 06 traveled more than 10,000 kilometers over 110 days to survey vast swaths of the Indian Ocean. Scientists from Sri Lanka and Myanmar joined for parts of the ship’s expedition. + +> Part of its mission involved releasing 12 advanced underwater gliders and deploying 15 profiling floats, which spent months collecting data on the area’s hydrological conditions. That data was then fed back to China via satellite transmission. + +> These floats are part of an effort to build up a real-time ocean observation network of hundreds of devices spanning the “Two Oceans and One Sea” (两洋一海) region, a conceptualization of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and South China Sea put forward by Beijing as a focus area for maritime surveillance. + +![image03](https://i.imgur.com/imS6gpY.png) + +> #### HAI YANG SHI YOU 760 海洋石油 760 + +> In another telling example, the seismic survey ship Hai Yang Shi You 760 completed a four-month ocean bed mapping mission in early 2023. + +> The vessel is owned and operated by COSL, a subsidiary of the state-owned oil giant China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). During its mission, it followed an extensive “lawnmower” path within Bangladesh’s EEZ, indicating the vessel was exploring the seabed for oil and gas deposits. + +> CNOOC ships and large-scale rigs have been routinely deployed to assert Beijing’s sovereignty claims in the highly contested South China Sea. In 2012, CNOOC’s chairman famously referred to the firm’s oil rigs as a “strategic weapon” supporting national interests. CNOOC’s ties to the PLA led the U.S. Treasury Department to add the firm to its Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List. + +> There is no indication that the Hai Yang Shi You 760 operated within Bangladesh’s EEZ without official consent. Its repeated port calls at Chittagong suggest it received permission. Nonetheless, the seismic and bathymetric data collected during the survey could be of significant value to the PLA. + +> Once the survey was complete, the Hai Yang Shi You 760 returned to its home port at Zhanjiang, just beside the headquarters of the PLA Navy’s South Sea Fleet. + +![image04](https://i.imgur.com/DOVgfjh.png) + +> #### SHIYAN 06 实验 06 + +> More recently, in October 2023, the research vessel Shiyan 06 entered the eastern Indian Ocean bound for the Port of Colombo in Sri Lanka. + +> The vessel is operated by the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology, a research institute that has provided technical and logistical support for China’s militarization of the South China Sea.  + +> Sri Lanka initially demurred on China’s requests to dock the vessel at Colombo due to objections raised by India. Local researchers also expressed concern about their lack of access to the data gathered by Chinese expeditions. Colombo eventually relented, however, allowing the Shiyan 06 to dock for five days before it left to execute research surveys along the island’s west coast. + +> Beijing’s interest in Sri Lanka goes well beyond scientific pursuits. China’s massive investments in ports and other infrastructure there have raised concerns — including from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) — that the PLA has likely considered setting up a military facility in the island nation. + +While Chinese surveys in the Indian Ocean contribute to scientific and commercial efforts, the data collected on research missions has clear military value — especially to submarine operations. + +The most recent Chinese defense white paper highlights the need for the PLA to support “far seas protection and strategic projection.” The Indian Ocean is a pivotal region for the PLA as it pushes to extend its “strategic perimeter” (战略外线) farther from China’s borders. + +The underwater domain is critical to China’s interests in the Indian Ocean. Chinese submarines could be called on to support a wide range of missions, ranging from intelligence collection to nuclear deterrence patrols. In a crisis, Chinese attack submarines operating there could complicate attempts by U.S. or allied forces to interdict China’s supply lines or traverse the region to reach the Pacific. + +![image05](https://i.imgur.com/gcv8Uaf.jpg) +_▲ This Hidden Reach Snapshot uses satellite imagery to reveal how China is quietly using submarine diplomacy to deepen its influence along the Bay of Bengal._ + +Expanding submarine operations, however, requires overcoming significant hurdles. China’s lack of a nearby military facility forces its submarines to navigate key chokepoints between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. + +Beijing may seek to address this vulnerability. The U.S. DOD assesses that China has likely considered 18 countries as potential hosts for an additional overseas military facility. Of these, 11 ring the massive Indian Ocean. + +Even with a regional military facility, submarine operations remain highly complex — a fact that has been brought home to the PLA Navy through its own experiences and those of foreign navies. In 2014, a Chinese submarine operating near Hainan Island was nearly lost when it encountered an unexpected change in water density, causing the submarine to sink rapidly into an underwater trench. The PLA Navy awarded the captain and crew high honors for successfully averting disaster. + +Safely navigating submarines requires thorough knowledge of complex undersea conditions. Changes in subsurface topography, currents, thermoclines, salinity, and other factors have major impacts on how submarines navigate their surroundings. + +Civilian oceanographic research helps to arm the PLA Navy with critical data, enhancing its capability to safely deploy in distant waters. + +![image06](https://i.imgur.com/Eotzay0.jpg) + +The PLA and its civilian surrogates are harvesting data from the world’s oceans. While scientific and commercial benefits may accrue from Chinese oceanographic research, these activities may also prove crucial for the PLA in expanding its operational reach and capabilities in the Indian Ocean. + +This expansion poses a significant challenge to key regional players like India, as well as to the United States and its allies. Beijing’s track record of defying international norms to serve its own interests further heightens the stakes. + +Some of China’s erstwhile partners in the region have started to pull back from research collaboration with China. At India’s encouragement, Sri Lanka announced in January 2024 that it would implement a one-year pause on Chinese research vessels docking at its ports. The country’s foreign minister suggested the ban would allow Sri Lanka to develop its capacity to “participate in such research activities as equal partners.” + +Such efforts are critical to holding Beijing to account. Engagement with Chinese researchers should not be unnecessarily curtailed, but these collaborations should be handled equitably and transparently. + +In the long term, countries can also work together to ensure that a heightened PLA presence in the Indian Ocean does not destabilize the region. + +India’s cooperation is crucial, and New Delhi has already demonstrated a degree of willingness to engage with partners. Amid simmering tensions with China, India has supported maritime security efforts with members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad). + +As China charts its course in the Indian Ocean, Washington and its partners should keep a close watch on Chinese actors and explore opportunities to cooperate as an effective ballast. + +--- + +__Matthew P. Funaiole__ is vice president of iDeas Lab, Andreas C. Dracopoulos Chair in Innovation and senior fellow of China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He specializes in using data-driven research to unpack complex policy issues, specifically those related to Chinese foreign and security policy, cross-Strait relations, and maritime trade. + +__Brian Hart__ is a fellow with the China Power Project at CSIS, where he researches the evolving nature of Chinese power. His particular research interests include Chinese foreign and security policy, Chinese military modernization, and U.S.-China technological competition. + +__Aidan Powers-Riggs__ is a research associate for China analysis with the iDeas Lab at CSIS, where he primarily supports the Hidden Reach special initiative. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-12-western-pacific-security.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-12-western-pacific-security.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a5086c69 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-12-western-pacific-security.md @@ -0,0 +1,477 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Western Pacific Security +author: Mark F. Cancian +date : 2024-01-12 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/5KCNkOJ.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Building Future Capabilities in the Time of AUKUS" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_AUKUS is a historic agreement signed to develop a nuclear submarine force in Australia, but it will be decades before more submarines are available. To cover this gap, the United States and its partners need to explore a variety of promising technologies._ + + + +This report aims to help the defense industry and governments identify future capabilities to deal with the rising challenge from China. The AUKUS agreement has been a major development in facing this challenge, but insights here apply to the full spectrum of U.S. allies and partners in the Pacific. Although strategists seek to expand the number of submarines, the U.S. submarine fleet will not grow beyond its current size until the 2040s. Thus, the project studies wargames and the war in Ukraine to identify ways for the United States and its partners to manage this submarine gap. + +#### The Challenge Ahead + +The need for action is clear. China’s military buildup is well documented and continuing. Its fleet now outnumbers the U.S. Navy, and its ground-based missile force is massive. The United States has many partners and allies in the region, but the lack of an integrating structure like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) means that any coalition responding to Chinese aggression must be developed bilaterally. This requires U.S. presence and leadership. + +The AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States represents a major development in the Western Pacific. Pillar 1 of the agreement will develop an Australian nuclear submarine capability and enhance U.S. submarine presence in Australia. Pillar 2 seeks to share emerging technologies across the three countries. The insights of this report relate particularly to Pillar 2. + +Strategists inside and outside of government see submarines as a key capability in a conflict with China because of the stealth and firepower of these platforms. They have proposed U.S. submarine fleets ranging in size from 66 to 78 vessels, compared to the current fleet of 53. However, the U.S. submarine fleet will decline through the 2020s due to a lack of submarine construction in the 1990s, reaching a low of 46 in 2030 before rebuilding and returning to the current level in the late 2030s. Fleet levels after that are highly speculative, but even under optimistic circumstances, the submarine fleet will not reach the size targeted by strategists until the 2040s or beyond. + +#### Filling the Gap + +What should the United States and its partners do to manage the impending gap in submarine numbers over the coming decades? + +Wargames of a Chinese invasion, blockade, or gray zone squeeze of Taiwan illuminate capabilities that would be helpful. Early assessments of the war in Ukraine give additional insights. + +The following provides a thematic menu of possibilities. Some are available in the near term, while others are possible in the longer term. Not all will work out, but many could evolve into programs of record that would balance China’s military buildup, enhance deterrence, and strengthen warfighting if deterrence fails. + +__Make existing submarines more effective:__ + +- Large uncrewed underwater vessels (UUVs) can operate autonomously inside the Chinese defensive zone. + +- Medium UUVs can extend the reach of individual submarines. + +- Enhanced submarine maintenance would increase the number of operational submarines. + +__Bring more forces to bear more effectively:__ + +- Deployable command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) packages would allow U.S. forces to link more effectively with allies and partners. + +- Contractors can expand coalition training without diverting military personnel. + +- Operational contracting can supplement limited military logistics units in providing the logistics needed to cover the vast expanses of the Pacific. + +__Plan to operate in a hostile environment:__ + +- Dispersed aircraft basing complicates Chinese targeting. + +- Building hardened aircraft shelters would protect aircraft remaining at large bases during conflict. + +- Stronger surface ship defenses would allow operations deeper inside the Chinese defensive zone. + +- Assisting Taiwan in developing a balanced force with both traditional and asymmetric capabilities would hedge against the spectrum of threats it faces, from gray zone harassment to invasion. + +- Sustaining efforts to build resilience against cyberattacks would help prevent such attacks from having an operational or strategic effect even if they cannot be fully thwarted. + +- Backup systems for communications and geolocation would provide a hedge against jamming and GPS spoofing. + +- Peacetime preparations can enhance wartime operations in an environment where logistics are contested. + +__Hedge against unconventional threats:__ + +- Stronger countermine capabilities, long neglected by the U.S. Navy, would protect against a common adversary tactic. + +- Counter-swarming capabilities would allow military and civilian ships to continue operations without resorting to lethal force against harassing elements. + +- Uncrewed aerial systems (UASs) could be used to harass Chinese harassers. + +__Defend against air threats in all their manifestations:__ + +- Upgraded defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles would protect forces against an expanding and constantly evolving threat. + +- Expanding and fielding systems to counter adversary UASs would protect friendly forces from adversary reconnaissance and attack amid the ubiquity of such systems on the battlefield, and defensive systems against aircraft are generally too expensive for this use. + +__Think offensively, even when on the defensive:__ + +- Enhanced jamming and counter-C3I would disrupt China’s ability to coordinate forces. + +- Uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) can extend the awareness and reach of crewed vessels. + +- UASs can perform missions that are too dangerous, extended, or monotonous for crewed platforms. + +- Hypersonic missiles, even if niche weapons, can contribute to campaigns by attacking high-value, well-defended targets. + +- Sea mines with standoff capabilities can emplace minefields with less risk to the launch platforms. + +This report does not make recommendations on which of these capabilities to pursue. That requires an in-depth analysis of each capability’s cost, technological maturity, operational effectiveness, and political acceptability. The report does recommend moving forward across many possibilities to illuminate the most promising approaches and to provide signals to industry about where it should focus its attention and resources. + + +### Why This Study? + +Pacific security has been at the top of the national security agenda since at least 2014, when the Obama administration announced an end to the United States’ focus on counterinsurgency and regional stability and laid out five challenges: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and global terrorism. China was challenge number two after Russia, which had just occupied Crimea. The Trump administration continued this framework, clearly articulated a new focus on great power conflict, and moved China to the top position ahead of Russia. The Biden administration has essentially continued this approach. + +The most dramatic recent event in this space has been the signing of the AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to develop a nuclear-powered Australian submarine fleet and share key technologies. The challenge from China and the AUKUS response has spawned a wide variety of analyses. This study adds to that body of research by focusing on one key question: What promising technologies are available in the near and mid-term to enhance capabilities while the United States and its partners wait for this expanded submarine force to arrive? The report aims to help industry work with governments to pursue these capabilities. + +The report does not claim to be a comprehensive analysis of what is needed to compete against China. That would include new operational concepts, force posture, force readiness, force size and structure, relations with partners and allies, and budget — all important topics but beyond the scope of this project. + +After this short introduction, the report is organized as follows: + +Chapter 2 examines today’s security environment in the Western Pacific, including a brief overview of the challenge from China, U.S. alliances and partnerships in the region, and finally the AUKUS agreement. + +Chapter 3 describes what wargames and campaign analyses say about potentially useful capabilities. The chapter concludes with insights from the war in Ukraine. + +Chapter 4 analyzes the U.S. submarine fleet and the submarine industrial base. It concludes that while additional submarines would provide critical capabilities, the U.S. submarine fleet will decline through the mid-2030s. Therefore, enhanced near and midterm capabilities will need to come from elsewhere to meet China’s rising military challenge. + +Finally, Chapter 5 pulls all these threads together. It identifies capabilities that should be expanded, technological areas for exploration, and some services that the defense industry might provide. + + +### Today’s Security Environment in the Western Pacific + +_China’s Challenge, U.S. Alliances, and AUKUS_ + +This chapter sets the stage by exploring three key elements of today’s security environment in the Western Pacific: the China challenge, U.S. alliances and partnerships, and the AUKUS agreement. These shape the military requirements the United States, Australia, and other partners must meet to compete in this environment. + +#### China’s Challenge + +It is commonplace to note how China has become increasingly assertive diplomatically and politically, backed by a massive military expansion. This assertiveness arises from China’s view of itself as an alternative to the U.S.-led international system based on free markets and democratic values. As a result, the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy identifies China as the primary global competitor to the United States: “The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power.” In response, Congress has taken several legislative actions, from bolstering U.S. semiconductor manufacturing via the CHIPS Act of 2022 to cutting off U.S. funding from Chinese entities that abuse human rights via the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of 2021. The House of Representatives has created a committee focused on China: the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. + +To implement its new strategic vision, China began a long-term military modernization program in the late 1990s, focusing particularly on air and maritime capabilities. This was a change from China’s previous military strategy, which was land-focused, relied on masses of poorly trained conscripts, and could not exert influence at a distance from its borders. Its poor performance in the 1979 border war with Vietnam underscored its weakness, as did the 1996 transit of the Taiwan Strait by U.S. naval forces. + +This has changed. As the Department of Defense (DOD)’s annual assessment of Chinese military power notes: + +> In 2022, the PRC turned to the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] as an increasingly capable instrument of statecraft. Throughout the year, the PLA adopted more coercive actions in the Indo-Pacific region while accelerating its development of capabilities and concepts to strengthen the PRC’s ability to “fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy,” counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s periphery, and to project power globally. + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/NeJQJ5O.png) +_▲ __Map 1: Taiwan and Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands.___ + +The DOD report also documents the continuing expansion of the Chinese military. The Chinese navy — the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) — grew from 216 ships in 2005 to 351 ships in 2022, making it nearly 60 ships larger than the U.S. Navy. China’s nuclear modernization has accelerated, growing from 300 to 500 nuclear warheads, “exceed[ing] some of our [DOD’s] previous expectations.” + +This military buildup and assertive diplomacy — characterized in China as a “wolf warrior” attitude — pose challenges to countries in the region. Three challenges — to Taiwan, Japan, and the South China Sea region — are particularly important: + +- __Taiwan:__ China has been emphatic that Taiwan is a part of greater China. It therefore regards Taiwan as a renegade province, not an independent or autonomous entity. China has also been clear about its intention to reunite Taiwan with the mainland and that it will not renounce the use of force to achieve reunification. + +- __Japan:__ Japan and China have a long history of conflict, from the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century to the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s and 1940s. Recently, those tensions have focused on the Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu Islands by China), which both nations claim. China has sailed warships near Japan and fired missiles into Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Japan also has concerns about China’s client, North Korea, which has launched missiles over Japan and regularly threatens nuclear holocaust. + +- __South China Sea region:__ Although recent attention has focused on Taiwan, the South China Sea is also a region of intense competition. The region is important because of the high level of seaborne traffic and large oil and gas deposits. China’s infamous “nine-dash line,” by which China seeks to claim most of the South China Sea, exacerbates regional tensions. These claims have put China in competition with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, which also have territorial claims. China has been aggressive in asserting its claims, including by building and fortifying artificial islands in the region, demanding that ships and aircraft recognize an expanded Chinese identification zone, and harassing the ships of other nations. Such tactics were seen recently as China endeavored to prevent the Philippines from resupplying a garrison in the Second Thomas Shoals. The United States does not take a position on territorial claims but regularly conducts freedom of navigation operations in the region, to which China strongly objects + +___`Admiral Philip S. Davidson, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) until April 2021, testified the same year that the Chinese threat to invade Taiwan “is manifest . . . in the next six years.” . . . The notion of a “Davidson window” has thus entered the national security vocabulary.`___ + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/3IMre4s.png) +_▲ __Map 2: Maritime Claims in South China Sea.__ Source: [“Maritime Claims of the Indo-Pacific,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS](https://amti.csis.org/maritime-claims-map/)._ + +#### Alliances and Partnerships + +The United States has a strong set of Pacific alliances with a variety of wealthy, powerful, and strategically located nations. In addition, the United States has less formal security links to many other countries. However, all these relationships are bilateral, not united through a common structure like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As a result, nations will react individually to any crisis. Such ally countries include: + +- __Australia:__ The Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty) binds the United States, Australia, and New Zealand to meet common dangers together, and the countries have a long security relationship, having fought side by side in six wars: World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and Iraq. The relationship has become closer with the AUKUS agreement (discussed later) and regular rotations of U.S. aircraft and Marines to bases in northern Australia. + + China has attempted to squeeze Australia economically to make Australia’s policies more China friendly. For example, in 2020, after Canberra questioned the origins of Covid-19, China imposed restrictions on the import of Australian beef, wine, and other commodities. This alerted Australia to the dangers that China posed. In a 2022 event held at CSIS, Australian deputy prime minister and defense minister Richard Marles noted, “For the first time in decades, we are thinking hard about the security of our own strategic geography; the viability of our trade and supply routes; and above all the preservation of an inclusive regional order founded on rules agreed by all, not the coercive capabilities of a few.” + + Australia is a strong democracy with high-quality armed forces. As Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review states, a close relationship with the United States has ensured that, since the 1960s, “While small in size, the ADF [Australian Defense Force] was [is] highly capable and could outmatch potential regional opponents in critical areas of technology, planning, and operations.” + + The downside is that Australia’s armed forces are relatively small, and Australia is far from some potential conflict zones. + +- __Japan:__ The United States and Japan are bound through the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960. This authorizes the United States to station troops in Japan and obligates the parties to defend each other if either is attacked on the territories administered by Japan. This alliance is particularly important because 53,600 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan, about half on Okinawa. The Japanese constitution allows the country to maintain only self-defense forces as a result of the country’s defeat in World War II; indeed, its military is called the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force. For decades, Japanese governments have defined self-defense as 1 percent of GDP and focused on defensive weapons. However, in response to China’s aggressiveness, Japan has made plans to acquire more offensive weapons, increase its defense budget above the traditional 1 percent, and conduct exercises aimed at China. + +- __South Korea:__ The United States and South Korea are bound through the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty. As a result of the Korean War of 1950 to 1953, the United States still has 24,300 troops stationed in the country and a joint military command with the South Korean armed forces. The Mutual Defense Treaty obligates the parties to defend each other if either is attacked in the Pacific on territories under their administrative control. South Korea has powerful armed forces, but they are designed for national defense. Although South Korea sent combat troops to Vietnam and peacekeepers to Afghanistan, the willingness of the South Koreans to participate in conflict outside of the Korean Peninsula is unclear. South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol has strengthened ties with the United States and other regional partners such as Japan and has been willing to criticize China. However, he has stated that in the event of a U.S. conflict with China, South Korea would keep its forces at home to deter any aggression by North Korea. + +- __The Philippines:__ The United States and the Philippines are linked through the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and a long history of mutual security arrangements dating back to when the Philippines was a U.S. colony. Although the United States has provided equipment and training over the years, the Philippine armed forces are relatively limited, being equipped with older equipment. A major recent development is a set of agreements by which the Philippines granted the United States access to nine bases. + +- __Thailand:__ The United States and Thailand are bound to defend each other’s territory in the Asia-Pacific by the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty of 1954. As a result, the countries conduct regular military exercises together. However, Thailand’s military forces are weak, as are its democratic institutions. This limits the strength of the relationship. + +In addition to formal alliances, the United States has security relationships with several countries in the region: + +- __Taiwan:__ Although the United States has no formal security agreement with Taiwan, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 states, “Any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes is considered a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” For decades, U.S. policy has been governed by “strategic ambiguity” regarding how the United States would react to any Chinese attack on Taiwan. However, Congress and President Biden have recently indicated that the United States would defend Taiwan. + +- __Singapore:__ The United States and Singapore have an agreement that allows U.S. access to port facilities in the city-state but are not formal allies. Singapore’s legendary founder, Lee Kuan Yew, established this relationship after the United Kingdom withdrew from Asia in the 1960s, and it has since been a central element of Singapore’s security architecture. However, that close relationship has faded somewhat since Lee’s death in 2015, and most Singaporeans now view China more positively than the United States. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has stated that Singapore does not want to choose sides in a U.S.-China war. + +- __India:__ India is a major military power with nuclear weapons and 1,460,000 personnel on active duty in its armed forces. It is also intensely independent, being one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement. It resists the establishment of formal alliances. However, increased tensions with China have compelled India to augment security ties with partners, including the United States, Australia, and Japan. India has been incrementally diversifying its defense imports away from Russia while attempting to jump-start a stronger indigenous defense manufacturing base. + +- __Vietnam:__ Once bitter enemies, Vietnam and the United States have been pushed together by mutual concerns about China. China is Vietnam’s traditional enemy, having occupied the country at various times in the past and most recently having fought a border war in 1979. Although Vietnam has large ground forces — its army numbers 412,000 personnel — its air and naval forces are limited, and it is overshadowed militarily by China. Therefore, Vietnam is unlikely to participate in a U.S.-China conflict unless attacked directly. + +The bottom line is that the United States will be able to draw on support from many other countries in the event of a crisis or a conflict. However, the amount and nature of the support will depend on the circumstances. Further, any action will require U.S. leadership since all these relationships are bilateral. There is no substitute for U.S. forces and presence. + +#### AUKUS + +AUKUS is a defense collaboration between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States that was initially announced in September 2021. A joint report followed from defense industry associations in the three countries. In March 2023, the three countries signed a trilateral agreement describing how AUKUS would be operationalized. The agreement aims to “boost defense capabilities, accelerate technological integration, and expand the industrial capacity of all three nations.” On December 2, 2023, the AUKUS defense ministers met, reaffirmed the three nations’ commitment to the program, and elaborated on implementation plans. + +___`Any action will require U.S. leadership since all these relationships are bilateral. There is no substitute for U.S. forces and presence.`___ + +AUKUS has two pillars. Pillar 1 will assist Australia in acquiring conventionally armed nuclear attack submarines (SSNs). Under the agreement, the United States will sell Australia three to five Virginia-class submarines in the early 2030s. The United States will also base a submarine rotational force in western Australia as early as 2027. Starting in 2032, the United Kingdom and Australia will co-develop a new nuclear-powered submarine class to enter service in the late 2030s, with initial production in the UK and later production in Australia. The three nations will cooperate to build a stronger trilateral submarine industrial base. The additional submarine capacity will increase Australia’s ability to defend its sea routes from Chinese interference. The United Kingdom has recently signed contracts for £4 billion ($5 billion) to develop the new submarine design. In addition to submarine construction, Pillar 1 calls for rotating U.S. submarines to Australia’s west coast and enhanced basing there. + +AUKUS Pillar 2 seeks to enhance cooperation in key technological and functional areas. Eight intragovernmental working groups coordinate Pillar 2 activities: undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and autonomy, advanced cyber, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, electronic warfare, innovation, and information sharing. The defense ministers identified six capability areas for cooperation (anti-submarine warfare, undersea vehicle launch and recovery, quantum positioning, navigation, and timing, and resilient and autonomous artificial intelligence. The defense ministers also specified a variety of processes and structures for coordinating capability development and conducting experiments. + +Pillar 2 activities are expected to help fill the partnership’s capability gaps in the decades before Pillar 1’s SSN procurement activities take effect. A recent technology readiness experiment (dubbed T-REX 23-2) moved Pillar 2 forward by evaluating 11 advanced technologies. + +The agreement has received tremendous fanfare and has the potential for unprecedented military and industrial cooperation among the participants. The deal is particularly important to Australia, as AUKUS is one of the largest military projects the country has ever undertaken. However, as one U.S. official described it, AUKUS will remain a promise rather than a reality for many years. It has great future potential but involves modest steps in the near term. + + +### What War and Wargames Say about Conflict in the Western Pacific + +Three potential conflicts in the Western Pacific are particularly important to examine because of their plausibility, potential severity, and relevance to AUKUS commitments. The first is a full-scale conventional war between China and a U.S.-led coalition. The second is a blockade of Taiwan. The third is Chinese gray zone activities, particularly in the South China Sea. Collectively, these describe the broad set of military demands that would be put on the United States and its partners and that AUKUS needs to hedge against. Wargames and associated analyses can illuminate the nature of such conflicts and the military requirements that flow from them. A real war — the Russian invasion of Ukraine — provides additional insights. Many other potential conflicts, such as North Korean aggression, constitute serious threats but are less relevant to the AUKUS agreement and competition with China because the conflict would be relatively low-tech (except for missiles and nuclear weapons) and mainly on the ground. + +#### Chinese Invasion of Taiwan + +As noted in the first chapter, China has been unrelenting in its goal of uniting Taiwan with the mainland. A Chinese military invasion of Taiwan may not be the most likely course of action to accomplish this goal. However, given China’s rhetoric and military buildup, an invasion is plausible and the most dangerous Chinese course of action. Several Taiwan-focused wargames warrant consideration: + +- __CSIS Wargame:__ For the reasons described above, CSIS conducted a project that examined Taiwan invasion scenarios. The project developed a wargame and ran 25 iterations in a dozen scenarios. Because the wargame was based entirely on unclassified information, the project could describe the assumptions, mechanics, and results in detail. Several findings bear on requirements for future capabilities: + + - Submarines were highly lethal. Whereas surface ships had to pull back in the face of the Chinese anti-ship missile threat, submarines could push into the Chinese defensive bubble, often called the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone or weapons engagement zone. Once inside the Taiwan Strait, they rapidly exhausted their inventories of missiles and torpedoes against the Chinese invasion fleet. Indeed, the project dubbed this the “happy time” for U.S. submarines. + + - Their ability to strike the Chinese center of gravity, the amphibious ships, made them particularly valuable. However, once submarines expended their munitions, they had to travel to either Sasebo or Guam to reload before returning to the fight. This conveyor belt — strike, return to base, reload, transit back to the war zone, strike again — was effective but slow. U.S. players always wanted more submarines. + + - Bombers were survivable and highly effective. They could be based outside of Chinese missile range, thus avoiding attack on the ground. Armed with long-range missiles, bombers could launch from outside of the Chinese air defense zone and strike ground and naval targets at relatively low risk. + + - However, long-range anti-ship munitions were too few. The United States ran out of these munitions after just a few days. Their long range was critical, allowing U.S. aircraft to launch from outside of the range of Chinese air defenses. + + - U.S. fighter/attack aircraft were most vulnerable on the ground. About 90 percent of U.S. and coalition aircraft losses occurred on the ground to Chinese missile strikes. The Chinese have enough long-range missiles to saturate U.S. bases several times over the course of a conflict. + + - Hypersonic missiles were valuable but niche weapons. They were extremely effective in striking high-value defended targets. However, their high cost limits inventories, so they lack the volume needed to counter the immense numbers of Chinese air and naval platforms. + + - Surface ships were highly vulnerable to Chinese missile attacks. As long as China retained substantial long-range missile inventories, U.S. and coalition surface ships had to back off to the east of Guam. It was too dangerous for them to remain within range of Chinese anti-ship missiles. Once China’s missile inventories declined as they repeatedly struck land targets such as air bases, the surface ships could move forward. + + - Taiwan’s surface ships and aircraft struggled to survive. These traditional capabilities are valuable in day-to-day operations to counter Chinese harassment and encroachment but are highly vulnerable to the massive and growing Chinese navy and air force in a major conflict. Most Taiwanese surface ships and aircraft were destroyed in the first few days. The balanced force structure that served Taiwan so well from 1949 needs re-examination, a discussion that is already taking place as Taiwanese national security literature considers a “porcupine strategy.” + +- __CNAS Wargames:__ The Center for New American Security (CNAS) has run several wargames on a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan. These wargames arrived at conclusions similar to those of the CSIS wargame, with several additional insights: + + - The United States has insufficient supporting forces. It also lacks enough access to partner or allied bases across the Indo-Pacific to sufficiently disperse its forces to survive initial attacks and blunt China’s initial strikes. + + - The United States needs a greater emphasis on conducting logistics in a contested environment so that it can sustain combat power beyond the first days or weeks of a war. + + - China is likely to engage in nuclear brinkmanship despite its stated “no first use” policy. + + - Taiwan requires improved training for its armed forces, especially its reserves. + + - Taiwan is highly dependent on imports of critical supplies and should stockpile these resources in advance of a conflict. + + - Several critical capabilities are needed, including long-range precision-guided weapons, undersea capabilities such as uncrewed underwater vessels (UUVs), and improved passive and active base defenses. + +- __RAND Wargames:__ RAND conducted a series of wargames focused especially on technologies that can be applied in the near term. Although the details have not been released and are apparently classified, some general insights are available. Some particularly useful capabilities were as follows: + + - Multi-domain decoys and smart sea mines, which can disrupt the adversary’s kill chain. + + - Real-time language translation, which can enhance situational awareness for allies while protecting friendly information. + + - Integrated warfighting networks, which can make better use of networked devices on the tactical edge. + +#### Chinese Blockade of Taiwan + +Many commentators consider a Chinese blockade of Taiwan more likely than an invasion because such an approach is less violent and confrontational. Blockades are different from invasion scenarios because political and diplomatic aspects are often paramount, though military capabilities still have a key role. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine analyses and wargames about blockades to see which military capabilities might be useful in countering a blockade. + +- __Chinese Military Exercises:__ In recent years, China has conducted regular exercises simulating a blockade of Taiwan. Exercise Joint Sword in April 2023 was revealing. Chinese military commentators cited the effort to attain “information agility” whereby China would speed up the kill chain through a “system-of-systems” approach. China also conducted major military exercises in the seas around Taiwan in September 2023, which included practicing sustained carrier-based air operations that would be useful in enforcing a blockade on Taiwan. + +- __CSIS Emerging Wargame Results:__ CSIS is beginning a series of wargames and analyses of a Chinese blockade of Taiwan as a follow-on to its First Battle of the Next War invasion analysis. Although this work is still in progress, several emerging insights are worth noting. + + - Sea mines are especially attractive in blockades because of their covertness and persistence. China has many mines and the platforms to employ them. Its doctrine explicitly includes such use. + + - Missile attacks are part of a blockade strategy. Chinese exercises conducted before House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit showed how China might use missiles to impose a blockade. + + - China will harass civilian shipping. Although cargo ships are large and imposing, they are risk averse and therefore susceptible to pressure unless provided with mechanisms for resistance. + + - China might attack civilian shipping. Cargo ships are highly survivable because of their large size but need protection and incentives to accept the risk of damage or loss. + + - Several capabilities are needed: sea mines and mine clearance, protection packages for merchant shipping, and missile defense. + +- __RAND Analysis:__ A 2002 RAND study examined the implications of a blockade of Taiwan. Although the study focused mostly on the political and economic aspects of such an operation, it did note the likelihood of China employing swarming tactics. In such situations, China often uses nonmilitary platforms such as the China Coast Guard, Maritime Militia, or fishing vessels to crowd an adversary ship and prevent it from accomplishing its mission. + +- __Other Studies:__ In a study published by the China Maritime Studies Institute, former U.S. intelligence officer and East Asia expert Lonnie Henley describes how a blockade might unfold. He notes Taiwan’s maritime vulnerability due to the concentration of its major ports on Taiwan’s west coast, closest to Chinese power. He argues for enhancing mine clearance, developing concepts and technologies for blockade running and convoy operations, and degrading the Chinese integrated air defense system through electronic and kinetic methods. + + A Carnegie-sponsored study by Sean Mirski examined the dynamics of a U.S. naval blockade of China. Nevertheless, the study identifies several capabilities that would be needed in the event of a Chinese blockade, particularly sea mines, mine clearance, and maritime domain awareness. + + A forthcoming CSIS study on Taiwan blockade scenarios raises the possibility of cyberattacks being part of a Chinese blockade operation. + +#### Gray Zone Competition in the South China Sea + +Gray zone competition refers to actions short of war that challenge U.S. interests, influence, or power in ways designed to avoid direct U.S. military responses. Although these activities could occur anywhere in the Pacific, the South China Sea is a region of particular attention because of Chinese ambitions, making it a flashpoint for conflict. + +In 2023, RAND conducted a wargame simulating Chinese gray zone coercion of Taiwan. Their findings highlight the conditions under which a conflict over Taiwan might begin and illuminate which capabilities would be useful to the United States and its allies and partners. Their conclusions include the following: + +- Gray zone coercion is relatively unlikely to escalate to full-blown war. + +- The United States will consider escalating to military force if Taiwan faces an existential threat, such as a blockade or an invasion. + +- Taiwan will not escalate without explicit U.S. support. + +- The United States is more likely to intervene to support Taiwan if the island takes steps to defend itself. + +- Several capabilities are needed: air defense, maritime surveillance, and anti-harassment tools. + +#### The Real War in Ukraine + +The war in Ukraine is occurring in a different geography than would a war in the Western Pacific. In Ukraine, the ground domain dominates, whereas the air and maritime domains would dominate conflict in the Western Pacific. Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine provides a current example of high-intensity conflict between large and well-equipped adversaries and, therefore, is relevant to all future conflicts. Although it will be many years before the lessons learned from this conflict are fully examined and understood, several important insights relevant to a conflict in the Western Pacific can be discerned now. + +- __The Importance of Inventories:__ In the post-Cold War period, the United States and its allies assumed that future wars would have a short, high-intensity phase. If there were an extended stabilization phase, it would not put heavy demands on firepower, so inventories of weapons and munitions would not need to be extensive. However, the war in Ukraine has had a fundamentally different character. The continuing demands for weapons and munitions have strained U.S. and coalition inventories, limiting what they can send, as deliveries deplete stockpiles to levels that threaten other global commitments. + +- __The Need for Industrial Surge:__ Maintaining full stockpiles of all systems for long wars is impossible because of the high cost. Industrial surge must be able to meet the demands of longer and more intensive wars. However, in the United States and elsewhere, most surge capabilities have been eliminated in the name of efficiency. Production levels were set to produce weapons and munitions efficiently at peacetime rates. + +- __The Major and Evolving Role of Uncrewed Systems:__ Ukrainian ground forces note the ubiquity of uncrewed aerial systems (UASs) that spot targets for artillery attacks. “Kamikaze” UASs fly into targets, whether personnel or vehicles, acting as a tactical cruise missile. Uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) have attacked Russian ships and driven them from Crimea. + +- __The Centrality of Connectivity:__ Ukrainian forces have connected their diverse and expanding forces by using Starlink, a civilian system. They have thus avoided what might have been a major limitation on Ukrainian operations — an inability to communicate rapidly and reliably across geography, organizations, and domains. + +- __The Power of Electronic Warfare:__ Communications are routinely jammed. GPS spoofers — widely anticipated for many years — are commonplace. + +- __The influence of narrative:__ Narrative shaping has been an essential tool for Ukraine to drive political support. It has dominated the information space by reaching out to experts and journalists, sending representatives — including the president — to other countries to make their argument, and ensuring that good news got out while bad news was restricted. + + +### Submarines + +_The Unobtainable Solution_ + +In light of Chinese threats, the AUKUS agreement, and wargame results, a clear solution would be for the United States to build more submarines. Indeed, a strong submarine force is a feature of nearly every proposed fleet architecture, whether developed by government organizations or outside experts, and is the foundation of AUKUS. However, expanding the submarine fleet in the near or midterm is not possible because of constraints on the submarine industrial base. Indeed, the size of the submarine fleet will drop below the current level through the mid-2030s. Therefore, enhanced near- and midterm capabilities to meet a rising Chinese military challenge will need to come from elsewhere. This chapter lays out the strategic desirability of submarines, the difficulties in building more, and the future size of the submarine fleet. + +__Strong Support from Strategists:__ Strategists like SSNs because the firepower and covertness of these platforms are useful in great power conflicts. Unlike surface ships, submarines can easily operate inside an adversary’s defensive bubble. + +Figure 1 shows how support for increasing the submarine fleet — including SSNs and guided missile submarines (SSGNs) — has been strong across many different fleet architectures developed by the Navy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and think tanks. The horizontal line shows the current level of the attack submarine fleet (FY 2024). The vertical bars show the proposed level in the different architectures, all of which are above the current inventory level. + +![image03](https://i.imgur.com/c3jRTk1.png) +_▲ __Figure 1: Target Inventory for Attack Submarines (SSNs and SSGNs) Compared with Current Fleet.__ Source: Fleet architectures as described by the DOD, Navy, and research organizations._ + +__The Implementation Challenge:__ The problem is getting to these higher goals. The obvious solution would be to build more submarines, but having two submarine construction programs operating simultaneously — for Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and Virginia-class SSNs — puts pressure on the shipbuilding budget and the submarine industrial base. + +In the president’s proposed FY 2024 defense budget, building two SSNs and one SSBN will cost $16.1 billion in a Navy shipbuilding account that totals $29.5 billion for new construction. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that: “The three alternatives in the Navy’s 2024 plan would require average annual shipbuilding appropriations that were 31 percent to 40 percent more than the average over the past five years.” + +SSBNs have the highest priority because of their strategic nuclear role. As Admiral Lisa Franchetti stated in her confirmation hearing, “CLB [the Columbia class] is the Navy’s number one acquisition priority, with no further margin for program delay. The Navy must fully fund CLB to meet U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) requirements for the first patrol no later than October 2030 to replace retiring Ohio-class SSBNs.” Because of this program’s high priority, it will be fully funded, including any cost growth. So far, the Columbia class has not shown large cost growth, but programs of that size and technical complexity often do, and the program has high schedule risk. In October 2022, the Navy estimated that there was a high probability that procurement costs would be greater than what the Navy previously forecast: 54 percent for the first Columbia-class boat (excluding costs for plans) and 49 percent for boats 2 through 12. Attack submarines will have to fight for the remaining shipbuilding funds. + +Further, only two shipyards build submarines, General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) in Groton, CT, and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), in Newport News, VA. The Navy is investing $2.4 billion over the next five years to strengthen the submarine industrial base to handle both programs. The president has proposed another $3.4 billion in his October 2023 Ukraine/Israel supplemental. Nevertheless, the challenge for the industrial base — both shipyards and suppliers — is to ramp up production from one “regular” Virginia-class boat per year (the volume of work before FY 2011) to the equivalent of about five “regular” Virginia-class boats per year (the approximate volume of work represented by two Virginia Payload Module-equipped Virginia-class boats and one Columbia-class boat). + +The AUKUS agreement, by providing nuclear submarines and nuclear facilities to the Royal Australian Navy, will put additional pressure on the U.S. submarine industrial base even as it strengthens security in the Western Pacific. + +__A Shrinking Fleet:__ Figure 2 shows the size of the submarine fleet over time. The dotted horizontal line shows the level of the current fleet (FY 2024). + +The solid line shows the current plan. In the near term, the size of the attack submarine fleet declines, bottoming out at 46 boats in FY 2030. This decline reflects the low production rates of the 1990s and 2000s, when the strategic focus was on regional conflicts, and the Navy often built only one submarine a year. The large inventory from the Cold War has kept the fleet size high for many years, but those Cold War submarines are now retiring in large numbers. + +To mitigate this trough, the Navy has extended the service life of some older Los Angeles-class submarines. There is unlikely much more that can be done using this approach. + +Figure 2 also shows two alternative futures. One line extends the Navy’s base plan, which builds two SSNs in most years (solid line). Fleet size eventually recovers as new ships join the fleet, reaching the level of today’s submarine fleet in the late 2030s but never rising to the recommended level of most fleet architectures. This plan could change, as it does not incorporate the effects of the 2022 National Defense Strategy; that analysis is still undergoing review. Neither does it include the effects of the AUKUS agreement, which was signed after the projection was developed. Nevertheless, whatever plan emerges next year, the previously described limits on the submarine industrial base will constrain it in the near- and mid-term. + +The alternative (dashed line) assumes that the Navy builds three SSNs per year once production of the Columbia class ends and pressure on the industrial base eases. Under these circumstances, the submarine fleet reaches the target level of many proposed architectures in the late 2040s and the level of the most ambitious plans in the early 2050s. The obstacle to achieving this alternative, higher level of production would be finding the budget space. + +![image04](https://i.imgur.com/odhjc6H.png) +_▲ __Figure 2: Projected Attack Submarine Fleet, FY 2023–FY 2053.__ Source: Data from Long-Range Naval Inventory tables in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, [Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2024 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2023)](https://www.govexec.com/media/navy_2024_shipbuilding_plan.pdf)._ + +The need to give priority to the Columbia-class program and AUKUS, the limits of the industrial base, and the aging of the existing fleet constrain what the Navy can do in the near and midterm to increase the size of the submarine fleet. + +In theory, regional allies might help fill the gap, but numbers and capabilities are limited. Taiwan has four old submarines (30+ years), though it has begun construction on a modern class. Australia has six Collins-class submarines, but these are aging and based far from potential conflict areas. Japan has 22 excellent submarines but may not be involved and, if involved, might be unwilling to use its forces offensively. Beyond these countries, the analysis in Chapter 2 indicates that it is unlikely that other allies or partners would be willing to provide military forces to a conflict. + +Thus, regardless of what strategists may want, the submarine fleet will remain below desired levels for many decades. The challenge is to find other mechanisms to compete in the Western Pacific for the two decades until a larger submarine inventory becomes available. + +___`Regardless of what strategists may want, the submarine fleet will remain below desired levels for many decades.`___ + + +### Filling the Gaps + +_What to Do until More Submarines Arrive_ + +AUKUS offers a powerful mechanism for enhancing U.S. and partner security interests in the Western Pacific. A coalition submarine fleet with increased numbers, wider basing, and more diversified capabilities will enhance deterrence and strengthen warfighting. + +However, since additional submarines will not be available for many years, the United States and its partners need to take other measures. Pillar 2 of AUKUS offers a mechanism with its focus on technological cooperation. Beyond AUKUS, the United States has many other relationships in the Western Pacific that would benefit from an expanded menu of capabilities. + +The threats described in Chapter 2 and the wargame results described in Chapter 3 suggest several potentially useful capabilities, which are described below. + +#### Making Existing Submarines More Effective + +Because the size of the submarine fleet will decline through the 2020s, there is a need to increase the effectiveness of the submarines that are available. Two items come up repeatedly in wargames and the warfighting literature: + +- __Uncrewed Underwater Vehicles:__ The Navy is investigating a range of UUVs, from the very small to the very large. The Navy envisions UUVs being a force multiplier for their motherships, which will not decrease in numbers. Two kinds have promise for enhancing the effectiveness of existing submarines. + + On the high end, there is the Orca, 50 tons and the size of a bus. The Orca, the only Extra-Large UUV (XLUUV) program, will initially provide a minelaying capability, with the platform deploying the planned Hammerhead mine. This mine would be tethered to the seabed and armed with an antisubmarine torpedo, similar to the Navy’s Cold War-era CAPTOR antisubmarine mine. Although six prototype Orcas are being built, they are still experimental and not a program of record. + + Medium UUVs (MUUVs) are systems with a diameter larger than 10 inches but less than 21 inches, allowing torpedo tube deployment. The two primary MUUV missions are intelligence gathering (“Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment”) and mine countermeasures. By deploying from a submarine, they can respond rapidly to a tactical situation. + + A recent trilateral exercise by the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia — Technology Readiness Experimentation, or T-REX 23-2 — tested some of these capabilities. + + CSIS’s working group of outside experts noted that UUVs were attractive because of their stealth, but also that command and control underwater was extremely difficult. It represented a technological challenge that industry needs to overcome. + +- __Improved Submarine Maintenance:__ What matters ultimately is not how many submarines a fleet has but how many submarines it can deploy. U.S. submarine availability has been low because of maintenance backlogs. In recent years, availability has run about 60 percent; that figure is up to 64–67 percent now, and the Navy hopes to get it up to 80 percent. Extended shipyard maintenance periods for submarines contribute to this low availability rate. From FY 2015 to FY 2019, only 5 of 33 submarine maintenance periods were completed on time, with a total of 6,296 days (about 17 years) lost to maintenance delay. Across the fleet, the difference between 60 percent and 80 percent availability is 10 boats that should be sailing the seas but are instead sitting in shipyards. The budget supplemental proposed in October 2023 contains $3.4 billion for the submarine industrial base. This would help substantially, though it will take years before the fleet feels the effects of those funds. + +- __Forward rearming:__ In wargames, submarines rapidly exhaust their munition inventories and must return to base to reload. Currently, those reload locations are limited to Guam and Yokosuka. The Navy is considering additional reload locations and could, for example, build more submarine tenders. Accelerating the reload cycle gets submarines get back into the fight more quickly. + +#### Bringing More Forces to Bear, More Effectively + +As noted in Chapter 2, the United States has many allies and partners in the Western Pacific. The challenge is bringing these forces to bear, especially since there is no overarching alliance like NATO to establish joint structures and set standards. Instead, these must be established bilaterally. Measures to enhance cooperation include: + +- __Coalition Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Packages:__ These systems are critical for creating a common operating picture across an entire coalition. However, every country has its own technologies and procedures. Therefore, systems that allow the U.S. C3I systems to link with those of an ally or partner would be enormously valuable. + + Such systems must be effective without multibillion-dollar acquisition programs, imposition of common standards, or years of training and exercises. Although all these approaches would be useful, they are likely unobtainable except with the closest allies because of the cost and need to exchange highly sensitive data. One example of an alternative approach would be a deployable package that could sit in an allied or partner command center. This would build on the fusion centers that already exist. However, many other approaches are possible. + + In considering solutions, the perfect is the enemy of the good. It would be better to have some simple systems in the hands of U.S. and allied forces now, given the immediacy of the threat, rather than wait for the perfect network solution in the distant future. + + The working group emphasized that these arrangements need to be made before war breaks out. Improvising joint C3I during a conflict takes time, misses warfighting opportunities, and weakens defenses. + +- __Air and Maritime Domain Awareness:__ All three potential conflict scenarios — invasion, blockade, and gray zone competition — require excellent air and maritime domain awareness. The United States and its allies and partners need to know the location of potential adversaries’ forces, their own forces, and coalition forces. The latter can be challenging because allied and coalition forces do not always connect to friendly information systems. Low-tech solutions may, therefore, be a better option to bridge gaps in air/maritime domain awareness with some allies and partners. This requirement does not diminish as the intensity of conflict diminishes; it is as important for gray zone competition and blockades as it is for full-scale conflict. + +- __Coalition Training:__ Some allies, such as Australia and Japan, have highly trained forces; others struggle to attain adequate levels of training proficiency. All allies and the United States need training on how to work together. Analyses and wargames often gloss over “soft” factors such as training. The United States has recognized the need for training and education for decades, instituting a wide variety of training programs with allies. The availability of troops and units to conduct this training is frequently a constraint. Expanded contractor support could increase coalition training opportunities and thereby link military forces more closely. + + Contractors can supplement military personnel in meeting these training demands and have done so in the past. Indeed, contractors have been described as the fourth element of military force structure, along with active-duty troops, National Guard and reserves, and government civilians. + +- __Contractor Logistics Support:__ Many allies and partners struggle with obsolescent equipment and readiness challenges. All militaries must compete with the civilian sector for technically skilled personnel to maintain the equipment. Further, maintainers are often junior enlisted personnel who are essentially apprentices as they gain experience. As with training, one solution is to have contractors augment military personnel. Contractors often have substantial technical skills that can supplement military maintenance efforts, not just in peacetime but also in wartime. The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan was that contractors would stay at their posts in conflicts as long as they understood the risks beforehand. + +#### Operating in a Hostile Environment + +China has been able to threaten adversary forces at increasing distances by building large missile forces, and it is not alone in this regard. Russia and Iran have similarly developed long-range capabilities. Although this environment is widely understood and appreciated in the United States, it will nevertheless be a shock for U.S. naval and air forces, which have operated in sanctuary for many decades. The following actions would enhance the ability to operate in this hostile environment: + +- __Aircraft Dispersion:__ Wargaming indicates that aircraft are most vulnerable on the ground. For many years, the U.S. solution to airbase defense was interceptors. That is still an essential part of any strategy but is insufficient because of the potentially massive strikes that China can conduct. Therefore, another element of the strategy needs to be dispersal. The Air Force has recognized this with its agile combat employment doctrine. The doctrine seeks to “shift operations from centralized physical infrastructures to a network of smaller, dispersed locations that can complicate adversary planning and provide more options for joint force commanders.” Part of implementing the doctrine involves training personnel and conducting exercises. However, part requires creating the units and equipment needed to operate successfully from many more sites, some of which may be austere and lack the required supporting capabilities. + +- __Aircraft Survivability:__ The Air Force has made some investments in explosive ordinance demolition and runway repair, recognizing that air bases will be attacked. These initiatives should be continued. One aspect of aircraft survivability that the Air Force has not embraced is hardened shelters. Although the United States built many during the Cold War, it has not built any since. Yet, dispersal alone is insufficient because of the large number of aircraft requiring forward basing and the need to continue using large U.S. bases despite missile strikes. Without hardened shelters, any aircraft at these bases would be highly vulnerable. + +- __Surface Ships’ Defensive Capabilities:__ Surface ships that want to operate west of Guam during a conflict with China need strong defensive capabilities. Indeed, any ship operating near a hostile shore needs strong and vigilant defenses, as the Russian cruiser Moskva learned to its sorrow. The Navy is aware of this and is constantly upgrading ship defensive systems. This project is never done, as adversaries continue to develop new attack capabilities that require new responses. + +- __Asymmetric Capabilities for Taiwan:__ Taiwan’s need for asymmetric defenses has been widely discussed and needs no expansion here. This does not mean that Taiwan should retire all of its conventional capabilities. However, it does mean that asymmetric capabilities — land-based antiship missiles, land-based air defenses, sea mines, and missile boats — need greater priority because of their ability to survive in this increasingly hostile environment. This is often called a “porcupine” strategy and has been hotly debated in Taiwan. A more balanced force structure would also enhance deterrence by reducing the possibility of a debilitating Chinese first strike. + +- __Resilience against Cyberattacks:__ Cyber defenses are now well established as integral to modern warfare. These defenses need to be tended continuously like those in any other domain. The war in Ukraine has shown that robust cyber defenses are possible, particularly when developed in connection with commercial firms. These defenses cannot deflect all attacks but can protect friendly assets sufficiently so that cyberattacks do not have a major operational impact. + +- __Resilience against Electronic Warfare:__ The working group emphasized that China has powerful electronic warfare capabilities, and many wargames have speculated about what these capabilities might be able to do. This represents a level of threat that other post-Cold War adversaries have not possessed. Decades of operating in “electronic sanctuary” have created vulnerabilities in U.S. and allied forces even as electronic systems have greatly enhanced military capabilities. One vulnerability is the loss of communications. Such a loss would not be absolute because some mechanisms for communication will always be available. However, a generation of military officers has become accustomed to reliable voice, internet, chat rooms, and video and will find it difficult to operate in a severely degraded communications environment. Finding ways to harden communications, for example, by using wire and cable instead of airwaves, would cushion the force against electronic warfare shock. + + Related to the loss of communications is the loss of the Global Positioning System (GPS). As with reliable communications, U.S. and partner forces have come to expect reliable GPS service for guiding munitions, ascertaining unit locations, and developing a common operating picture. Indeed, GPS is so ingrained into U.S. operations that loss of its capability would have second and third-order effects that are not fully understood. Alternatives to GPS, such as determining location through inertial navigation systems and even old-fashioned map reading, are available. However, the accuracy, precision, and low cost of GPS make adopting alternatives difficult despite the system’s widely recognized vulnerability. + +- __Contested Logistics:__ Since the German U-boats of World War II, no adversary has been able to interfere with U.S. logistics flow. That is changing. China can now disrupt flows within the second island chain and will soon be able to reach beyond that. Building logistics systems that can operate in a contested environment requires new technologies, platforms, and concepts. The Navy has begun such adaptation by closing the Red Hill depot and instead building a network of fuel distribution points, including on-call tankers. The military services are conducting wargames to understand what contested logistics mean operationally. However, programmatic efforts in this space have just begun. + +#### Hedging against Unconventional Threats + +When thinking about threats, it is natural to mirror image, imagining that threats to U.S. forces are the same as threats to adversary forces. For many aspects of great power conflict, this is true. However, some challenges from adversaries lack strong U.S. counterparts, and these need careful consideration lest the United States be surprised. Such challenges include: + +- __Countering Mines:__ Periodically, a major article appears in military journals noting how sea mines have constituted the greatest threat to U.S. Navy ships since World War II and bemoaning the lack of preparation to deal with this well-documented threat. The United States could encounter mines in any future conflict, whether due to an invasion of Taiwan, a blockade, or gray zone competition. Countering mine warfare requires locating minefields, clearing lanes, and then keeping the lanes open. This, in turn, requires a spectrum of capabilities from mine reconnaissance to mine neutralization. In the past, the United States has developed a variety of imaginative approaches, from using sea mammals to spot mines to sailing sacrificial ships through minefields. Yet, U.S. countermine capabilities today remain weak. + +- __Countering Maritime Swarming:__ Chinese maritime swarming comes up repeatedly in wargames and analyses. The tactic seeks to defeat adversaries without kinetic attack. This low-level threat is not something the United States has had to deal with because of its powerful naval forces, but it is a day-to-day reality for many allies and partners in the Western Pacific. Technologies that inhibit swarming tactics without resorting to deadly force would be helpful. + + Efforts to counter piracy developed some non-kinetic approaches such as fire hoses, restricted shipboard access, and barbed wire. In a blockade or gray zone confrontation, these same systems could be used to counter attempts to board transiting vessels. + + Portable defensive packages might be placed on merchant ships to provide some protection. Such packages would include capabilities that are too expensive to place on every ship but inexpensive enough to be produced in large numbers and deployed on those ships that need it. Some examples include sonic systems, foams, water cannons, and dazzlers to discourage boarding parties. The aim is to increase survivability to the point where operations are viable, not to prevent all losses, which is an unattainable goal. This space is open for imaginative solutions, as major navies have historically been less susceptible to these challenges, and therefore, not thought deeply about them. + + The DOD’s Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program has developed a wide variety of nonlethal systems “to arm the Joint Force with the fullest range of capabilities in support of National Security objectives.” Many of the technologies developed by the task force have been used in combat. Expanding them to partner nations and commercial shippers would be new but could potentially provide significant leverage in a blockade or gray zone situation. Partner nations might find these capabilities easier to employ during gray zone or blockade confrontations because they are the ones being directly threatened. Commercial organizations might use these capabilities under the concept of self-defense, expanding what they have done to protect themselves against pirates. + +- __UASs to Harass the Harassers:__ Building on the discussion above, small, shipborne UASs might help thwart harassment by Chinese ships, particularly nonmilitary vessels such as the China Coast Guard and Maritime Militia. By harassing the harassers, UASs could warn of impending danger and interfere with attacks by Chinese water cannons or “shouldering.” + +#### Defending against All Manifestations of Air Threats + +An area universally noted in discussions about future conflict is the need to counter a wide variety of air threats, from ballistic missiles, to cruise missiles, to UASs. Once the province of well-funded states, these capabilities are now obtainable by every nation. Indeed, even non-national groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas now field large rocket and cruise missile forces. + +This drives a demand for air defenses to protect populations, military forces, and the flow of goods. Missile defenses need not be 100 percent effective to have value. All defenses complicate an adversary’s planning. Such efforts could include: + +- __Missile Defenses:__ Regional U.S. ballistic missile defenses are relatively well developed since these threats have been around for a while, such as from North Korea, Iran, and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Cruise missile defenses have received considerable attention recently as more countries have obtained these missiles, and U.S. ground-based air defenses have atrophied. The CSIS Missile Defense Project has written extensively about these needs. Although many of these analyses have focused on U.S. homeland defense, many of the insights and systems described are applicable to overseas operations and other countries. Their 2023 report on the Russian missile offensive against Ukraine notes that U.S. missile defense systems have been largely successful in intercepting Russian missiles, that fixed air defense platforms are themselves highly vulnerable, and that passive defenses remain critical to mitigating missile threats. Their 2022 review of North American missile defense architecture argues that U.S. homeland cruise missile defenses have been neglected, leaving the United States vulnerable to non-nuclear attack and coercion. + + Even hypersonic missiles can be countered. A pair of CSIS Missile Defense Program reports argue that, although hypersonic missiles are formidable weapons, they are not unbeatable. The United States can develop defenses, and these can be deployed overseas. + +- __Counter Uncrewed Aerial Systems:__ The wars in Ukraine and between Israel and Hamas have highlighted the need to counter UASs with inexpensive systems. Systems designed for aircraft and cruise missile defense are too expensive. It makes little sense to shoot down a $20,000 kamikaze UAS with a million-dollar missile. Further, countering the swarms of cheap, often commercial reconnaissance UASs requires many systems to cover the entire length of the front lines. + + This need is not a surprise, as the United States has been developing a wide variety of such systems for some time, including small-scale interceptor rockets, electronic warfare and jammers, and nets that capture adversary UASs. While some of these countermeasures involve complex technologies, others are simple since many Chinese UASs rely on simple radio links that can easily be jammed or overpowered. Many of these countermeasures have been sent to Ukraine. On the horizon is the possibility of directed energy weapons, which could rapidly attack multiple targets at low cost per shot. + + Nevertheless, the field is underdeveloped, and with UAS technology constantly evolving, a measure/countermeasure competition will play out for many years. Innovation and new systems will be needed constantly. + + The working group emphasized that systems to counter small and medium-sized UASs need to be integrated with front-line units because UASs are so widely proliferated. Creating specialized units is not sufficiently responsive except for dealing with the largest UASs. + +#### Thinking Offensively, Even When on the Defense + +Much of the literature relating to the Western Pacific is about defense and coping with Chinese A2/AD capabilities. This is reasonable considering the threat environment. However, even in defensive situations, there are opportunities for the offense. Several technologies can facilitate these opportunities: + +- __Jamming and Counter-C3I:__ Chinese reliance on “information agility” and “system-of-systems” operational concepts opens vulnerabilities. Without fully functioning C3I systems to coordinate and integrate, the disconnected parts will be less than the integrated whole. Thus, jamming activities could pay huge dividends. + +- __Uncrewed Surface Vessels:__ USVs might provide a way to operate inside the Chinese defensive zone while minimizing risk to crewed surface ships. The Navy is investigating many such vessels, from the size of rowboats to the size of corvettes. All can extend the sensor range of crewed vessels. The additional standoff distance provides more warning of attack and longer-range targeting for offensive weapons. Larger USVs will likely incorporate weapons, thus increasing the magazine depth of the total fleet. The Navy is conducting many experiments in this area, not having settled on a particular architecture or set of programs. + + The working group saw great potential here and noted that USV command and control was much easier than with UUVs because air is a better medium for communications than water. However, they cautioned against making the platforms multi-mission. That increased cost and complexity, removing one of their advantages over crewed systems. Instead, missions for both USVs and UASs (below) should be focused. + +- __Uncrewed Aerial Systems:__ Like USVs, UASs offer the ability to extend sensor range and potentially be strike assets of their own, with the ability to penetrate A2/AD zones without risking crews. Unlike USVs and UUVs, the Navy has several programs of record, the MQ-25 Stingray and MQ-4 being the most relevant here. The MQ-25 program has particular potential. Its units are beginning production and will reach the fleet in 2026. Although currently configured as tankers, they have the potential to be strike assets on their own. + +- __Hypersonic Weapons:__ Hypersonic weapons have become the iconic weapon of the new era, with close attention being paid to the technology’s relative development among the United States, China, and Russia. As noted earlier, the problem with hypersonic missiles is their high cost. Nevertheless, even low-inventory weapons can be hugely valuable. The ability of hypersonic weapons to strike distant, high-value, and well-defended targets holds at risk adversary assets that might otherwise be invulnerable or nearly so. Losing these assets, such as headquarters or major platforms, such as aircraft carriers, would disproportionately affect adversary capabilities and morale. + +- __Standoff Sea Mines:__ As previously noted, sea mines are enormously powerful weapons because of their latency and covertness. However, emplacing them can be a challenge, particularly for the United States, which abides by international rules and has relatively distant bases. Mines that need to be dropped from aircraft risk the survivability of the delivery platform. Mines that can glide some distance reduce this vulnerability. Thus, standoff mines have great potential. The United States has begun developing such a capability with the QuickStrike Extended Range mine, but there is much more that could be done given the increasing strength of Chinese and Russian air defenses. Indeed, sea mines and similar technologies — such as new kinds of mines, decoys, and different emplacement methods — are areas where creative solutions can add friction to Chinese military plans. + + The working group recommended enhancing the sea mine capabilities of regional allies since they were already present at key locations and had the latitude to conduct mining in their territorial waters. + +#### Conclusion: Opportunities for Cooperation + +The foregoing lays out many areas of potential cooperation between nations and between the governments and their defense industry. All provide insight into the question of what might be done while waiting for the submarine fleet to expand. Some areas may prove more fruitful or easier to coordinate than others. Deciding which to pursue requires prototyping, experimentation, and field testing. That process needs to move forward. + +Only by beginning the forward movement can the assessment process illuminate challenges that inevitably occur. For example, export controls and restrictions on data sharing are emerging as key challenges to the technology coordination envisioned by AUKUS. + +Finally, government decisions on promising technologies signal industry where it should focus its attention and resources. The defense industry in every country wants to produce products that the defense establishment requires, but these industries need pointers to ensure they are being responsive to government strategies. + +--- + +__Mark Cancian__ (Colonel, USMCR, ret.) is a senior adviser with the CSIS International Security Program. He joined CSIS in April 2015 from the Office of Management and Budget, where he spent more than seven years as chief of the Force Structure and Investment Division, working on issues such as Department of Defense budget strategy, war funding, and procurement programs, as well as nuclear weapons development and nonproliferation activities in the Department of Energy. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-22-iran-pakistan-conflict.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-22-iran-pakistan-conflict.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..18bc0a5a --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-22-iran-pakistan-conflict.md @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Iran–Pakistan Conflict +author: Kamal Alam +date : 2024-01-22 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/A4KdCPK.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "An Undeclared Intelligence War Comes Out into the Open" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Recent strikes by Iran and Pakistan on each other’s territory in the region of Baluchistan have raised fears of a wider escalation. While the two countries enjoy a near-unbreakable bilateral relationship and close political ties, there has been an ongoing intelligence war between the two since the Islamic Revolution in Tehran._ + + + +The last few days have seen global headlines focused on the tit-for-tat airstrikes between Iran and Pakistan. There has been speculation about an Iranian escalation and a wider Middle Eastern conflict that might suck in the Pakistani military. To be clear, no such scenario is on the cards. Iran and Pakistan are already deescalating, with both sides stating a lack of interest in harming their “brotherly ties”. However, a clear violation has been committed by both countries, initiated by Iran, and there is historical bad blood when it comes to the Baluch border, with both sides backing each other’s respective proxies. Friction between the two countries has also been raised by competition for control and influence in Afghanistan, overt Pakistani support for Azerbaijan, and Iran’s recruitment of Shia fighters from Pakistan to fight in the Middle East. While the two have not engaged directly in open conflict in the Middle East, there have been numerous irregular small wars between Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). + + +### The Shah’s Steadying Hand to Support a Young Pakistani State + +Long before 1979, the Shah of Iran had been one of Pakistan’s foremost backers against a much larger India. Indeed, the Shah even threatened to attack India if it went beyond its remit when it came to attacking East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971. The Shah along with Jordan and Syria were the only countries in the Islamic world that helped Pakistan with military hardware, intelligence and logistics. All of this is described in some detail in a lucid account by the Shah’s chief courtier, Assadollah Alam. + +Furthermore, Baluchistan, which has seen numerous insurgencies sponsored by India and Afghanistan, was always a sore point for the Shah. Iranian jets and military helicopters used to be based in Pakistan while hunting Baluch and Afghan insurgents on both sides of the Iran–Pakistan border. The Shah also repeatedly batted for Pakistan, convincing Nixon and Kissinger to go all the way in supporting Pakistan against the Indians in the 1971 war. In fact, Kissinger’s first trip to Pakistan was to study the Baluch insurgency and its impact on US–Persian Gulf security relations. Both Roham Alvandi’s Nixon, Kissinger and the Shah and Alex Vatanka’s Iran and Pakistan go into some detail about the US influence on the Pakistan–Iran joint strategy for security partnerships to protect the Persian Gulf and South Asia from Soviet designs. Baluchistan was central to the security partnership that had endured since 1947, and the Shah was resolute in protecting a young and inexperienced Pakistani state from implosion, especially after the loss of East Pakistan. However, after the ousting of the Shah by Islamic hardliners in 1979, the ebb and flow between Iran and Pakistan began to change for the worse, with an increasing hostility between the two and the convergence over Baluchistan becoming a divergence. + + +### Tehran’s Export of Its Revolution and Changing Tides + +During the early years of the Iranian revolution, the two sides continued to maintain close relations and to cooperate on security issues. Pakistan was pivotal in ending the Iran–Iraq war, with former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani mentioning in his memoirs that along with Syria, Pakistan played a key role as an arbitrator between Tehran and the Saudi-backed coalition led by Saddam Hussein. + +However, ties began to worsen after the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, as various proxies in the country began to aim their guns at each other. Iran favoured the Shia-dominated warring parties, while the Saudis and Pakistan backed the Sunnis. Before the emergence of the Taliban, the Iranians had already begun to support Shia groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan to challenge a growing Saudi madrassa movement which had been spawned by the Afghan war. + +The 1990s and early 2000s also saw a peak in the power and strength of Saudi-funded groups in Pakistan, culminating in multiple bombings and the targeting of Shia mosques and prominent Shia figures. The Iranian consulate in Peshawar was attacked twice, and a senior diplomat was also kidnapped in the same city in 2009. + +___`A clear violation has been committed by both countries, initiated by Iran, and there is historical bad blood when it comes to the Baluch border, with both sides backing each other’s respective proxies`___ + +Of course, the use of proxies was a two-way street, and Tehran allegedly had a hand in attacking the Saudi consulate in Karachi. The Pakistanis had not been comfortable with the Iranian-Indian alliance in Afghanistan, which was seen as a direct attempt to undermine both Baluchistan and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan. Iran’s cooperation with India over the port of Chabahar (bypassing Pakistan) is also seen by Pakistan as a threat to its own port of Gwadar. + +The use of Pakistani Shia fighters in Syria and Iraq was another red line that crossed by Iran. This took the competition firmly into the sectarian realm, with the risk that thousands of battle-hardened Shia would return to cause havoc in Pakistan, and has upset the status quo in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2020, Javad Zarif, the then Iranian foreign minister, said that Shia fighters could be used to stabilise Afghanistan and Pakistan. This caused considerable anger in both countries, but showed the Iranian desire to dominate by using proxies to fight local civil wars and to provoke ethnic and sectarian strife. The Saudis have also shown an increasing mistrust of Iranian involvement and influence in domestic Pakistani politics that has bordered on purely sectarian lines. Further evidence of this emerged when one of the former president’s right-hand men confessed to spying on the Pakistani military on behalf of the Iranians, with political cover provided by a party the Saudis had always suspected of being pro-Iranian. + + +### The India Factor and Super Spies + +After the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the new Afghan Republic also pulled closer to India and Iran when it came to trying to isolate Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. In contrast to the Shah’s time when Iran ensured that India kept out of Baluchistan and Afghanistan, Tehran now welcomed India in both Afghanistan and Baluchistan owing to its desire to weaken the Pakistanis’ grip over Afghanistan. + +The case of the Indian spy Kulbhushan Jadhav, captured in Iran by the ISI, has led many in Pakistan to suspect that the Iranians have tolerated Indian spies in sensitive Baluch areas, thereby confirming an Iran–India partnership to trap Pakistan. However, the Indians firmly believed that the ISI had used its own Baluch agents to capture Jadhav deep inside Iranian territory. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made no secret of his desire to raise the temperature in Baluchistan to test Pakistani defences and nerves. + +The popular film Kandahar, released last year, portrays a four-way battle on the Iran–Afghanistan–Pakistan border between Pakistani, Indian, US and Iranian intelligence agencies to solidify gains in the Afghan endgame. The Great Game for control of Central Asia has now morphed into an all-out battle between regional players in Afghanistan, as opposed to the Russians and the British of the 19th century. India has even moved into Kabul and established friendly relations with the Taliban, in stark contrast to its entrenched enmity with the group in the 1990s. Iran and India have both cornered Pakistan by doing a U-turn on their ties with the Taliban, ensuring that the ISI can no longer use the group against them. + + +### Geopolitics Trumps Sectarianism + +Notwithstanding the use of significant sectarian elements by both sides in the pursuit of strategic and tactical intelligence wins, this fight is by and large about power and influence, from Baluchistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan all the way to the Caucasus. Pakistan has closely supported Shia-majority Azerbaijan in its fight against Iranian-backed Armenia. Moreover, Pakistan has had multiple Shia Chiefs of Army Staff and a significant number of Shia generals, and so it is clear that in their military calculus, there is no room for sectarian-influenced decisions. Wajahat S Khan of the Atlantic Council, Pakistan’s foremost defence journalist, also believes that Iran and Pakistan are engaged in extensive geopolitical competition in the region. + +___`Notwithstanding the use of significant sectarian elements by both sides, this fight is by and large about power and influence, from Baluchistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan all the way to the Caucasus`___ + +Similarly, in contrast to an almost war-like situation with the Taliban in the 1990s, Tehran is now heavily embedded in the Taliban’s return to power despite the group’s heavy Sunni tilt, with little or no room for Shia minorities in its leadership. The Iranians began recalibrating their previous animosity towards the Taliban by hosting senior Taliban and Al-Qa’ida leaders who were on the run. A lot of this was done out of necessity in order to balance against the Pakistanis and to widen mistrust between Pakistan and the US during their joint quest for an amicable balance of power in 2021. The killing of the Taliban leader Mullah Mansour in 2016 in a drone strike was viewed with suspicion by the Pakistani military, given that Mansour had just crossed the border from Iran into Pakistan. Pakistan alleged that Iran and the US had colluded in making Pakistan the fall guy once again, when in fact the Taliban were now also being supported fully by Tehran. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, another former Sunni strongman in Afghanistan who was previously a favourite of Pakistan’s, subsequently fled to Iran and became its ally against the US. Iran and Pakistan both used him against each other, with his presence in Kabul after his return during Ashraf Ghani’s government making him a major asset in the ongoing intelligence war. + +Major General Sahibzada Isfandiyar Pataudi (Retired), a former Director General of the ISI, told me: + +> “There has been an intelligence failure in Iran that has caused a disproportionate response and a violent lashing out in all directions – particularly so in Pakistan’s case – which has been immature and unnecessary. I would not put a sectarian twist on it, nor would I suggest a Cold War-type situation. I do believe, however, believe that Pakistan’s measured response shows our resolve to deal with any violation of our sovereignty.” + +Both countries have already restored their diplomatic channels, and their ambassadors will be returning to each other’s capitals very soon. There will not be a further escalation. However, from Karachi to Baluchistan and all the way to the Caucasus, both are waging a covert war for influence and leverage against each other in the modern-day Great Game. + +--- + +__Kamal Alam__ was a RUSI Fellow from 2015 to 2019. He was also part of the UK-Pak Army COIN engagement with Afghanistan. He works on Pakistan’s defence engagement with the Middle East. He is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.