From fcb0af60b7d76c83047dcc33c01526b7496c3607 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: theagora Date: Tue, 24 Dec 2024 11:55:37 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?0x2f=20Patch=20Build=20VOL.47=20=C2=A9=20MMXXIV?= =?UTF-8?q?=209e33a88?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit --- c2/index.html | 32 +- c2/page10/index.html | 32 +- c2/page11/index.html | 32 +- c2/page12/index.html | 32 +- c2/page13/index.html | 32 +- c2/page14/index.html | 32 +- c2/page15/index.html | 32 +- c2/page16/index.html | 32 +- c2/page17/index.html | 32 +- c2/page18/index.html | 32 +- c2/page19/index.html | 32 +- c2/page2/index.html | 32 +- c2/page20/index.html | 32 +- c2/page21/index.html | 32 +- c2/page22/index.html | 32 +- c2/page23/index.html | 32 +- c2/page24/index.html | 32 +- c2/page25/index.html | 32 +- c2/page26/index.html | 32 +- c2/page27/index.html | 32 +- c2/page28/index.html | 32 +- c2/page29/index.html | 32 +- c2/page3/index.html | 32 +- c2/page30/index.html | 32 +- c2/page31/index.html | 32 +- c2/page32/index.html | 32 +- c2/page33/index.html | 32 +- c2/page34/index.html | 32 +- c2/page35/index.html | 32 +- c2/page36/index.html | 32 +- c2/page37/index.html | 32 +- c2/page38/index.html | 16 + c2/page4/index.html | 32 +- c2/page5/index.html | 32 +- c2/page6/index.html | 32 +- c2/page7/index.html | 32 +- c2/page8/index.html | 32 +- c2/page9/index.html | 32 +- columns.xml | 2 +- feed.xml | 2 +- heros.xml | 2 +- hkers.xml | 763 ++++++++---------- ...2024-11-28-china-in-the-euro-atlantic.html | 293 +++++++ hkers/2024-12-04-europe-and-the-sahel.html | 223 +++++ hkers/index.html | 63 +- 45 files changed, 1492 insertions(+), 1056 deletions(-) create mode 100644 hkers/2024-11-28-china-in-the-euro-atlantic.html create mode 100644 hkers/2024-12-04-europe-and-the-sahel.html diff --git a/c2/index.html b/c2/index.html index 113e51f0..a9f9eaab 100644 --- a/c2/index.html +++ b/c2/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,14 @@
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【香港保衛戰當年今日・十三】

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diff --git a/columns.xml b/columns.xml index feed9a32..cbe858cc 100644 --- a/columns.xml +++ b/columns.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-12-22T13:24:34+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV澳門城的誕生2024-09-30T12:00:00+08:002024-09-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/the-birth-of-macau-city<p>澳門擁有另一個華麗且神秘的名稱——澳門天主之名之城(Cidade do Nome de Deus de Macau,一譯澳門天主聖名之城),在此之前,澳門被稱為「澳門港」(Porto de Macau)、「澳門居留地」(Povoação de Macau)。</p> +Jekyll2024-12-24T11:54:16+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV澳門城的誕生2024-09-30T12:00:00+08:002024-09-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/the-birth-of-macau-city<p>澳門擁有另一個華麗且神秘的名稱——澳門天主之名之城(Cidade do Nome de Deus de Macau,一譯澳門天主聖名之城),在此之前,澳門被稱為「澳門港」(Porto de Macau)、「澳門居留地」(Povoação de Macau)。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/feed.xml b/feed.xml index 084f7e3d..90b0341d 100644 --- a/feed.xml +++ b/feed.xml @@ -1 +1 @@ -Jekyll2024-12-22T13:24:34+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file +Jekyll2024-12-24T11:54:16+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/heros.xml b/heros.xml index a1d84b4a..b1cee1b3 100644 --- a/heros.xml +++ b/heros.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-12-22T13:24:34+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV暴力与父权:泰国男子从军经历调查2022-08-05T12:00:00+08:002022-08-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/2022-08-05-ElinBjarnegard/ElinBjarnegard...-a1_l-armed-violence-and-patriarchal-values<p>本研究超越男女二元性的论调,强调男性内部对于暴力的态度因意识形态影响而存在分化:志愿参军的人通常更亲近父权制意识形态,而不是军队塑造了士兵的父权思想;强制参军对不希望主动参军人士的父权思想并无明显影响。</p> +Jekyll2024-12-24T11:54:16+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV暴力与父权:泰国男子从军经历调查2022-08-05T12:00:00+08:002022-08-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/2022-08-05-ElinBjarnegard/ElinBjarnegard...-a1_l-armed-violence-and-patriarchal-values<p>本研究超越男女二元性的论调,强调男性内部对于暴力的态度因意识形态影响而存在分化:志愿参军的人通常更亲近父权制意识形态,而不是军队塑造了士兵的父权思想;强制参军对不希望主动参军人士的父权思想并无明显影响。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/hkers.xml b/hkers.xml index 554e176d..a7053575 100644 --- a/hkers.xml +++ b/hkers.xml @@ -1,4 +1,134 @@ -Jekyll2024-12-22T13:24:34+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV【黎智英案・審訊第 99 日】2024-11-29T12:00:00+08:002024-11-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-99<ul> +Jekyll2024-12-24T11:54:16+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIVEurope And The Sahel2024-12-04T12:00:00+08:002024-12-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/europe-and-the-sahel<p><em>Widespread instability and the growing influence of China and Russia has increased the strategic importance of the Sahel to European security. A reset in relations between Europe and the region is direly needed.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<p>The Sahel is acquiring a new importance due to recent events that have exponentially increased its capacity to influence the stability and security of the Mediterranean. It is an inhospitable area that is often discussed interchangeably with North Africa. But the Sahel and North Africa are quite distinct and are facing different realities, making it difficult to formulate a single strategy for both regions. North Africa will likely continue its current trajectory of closer integration with Europe, while the Sahel will continue to lag behind in terms of modernization, integration, security and stability, and economic development. The Sahel, therefore, currently requires the most attention from both the European Union and NATO, as well as from southern European nations.</p> + +<h3 id="the-sahel">The Sahel</h3> + +<p>The first difficulty in addressing the multiple challenges facing the region lies in defining its boundaries. Sahel means “edge” or “coast” in Arabic, and from this point of view, the Sahel would be a 5,000 kilometer strip stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. But these boundaries have no cultural, historical, or economic meaning and include 12 very different countries. For this reason, it is more usual to use the term to refer to a group of five countries with common historical, economic, cultural, and social characteristics: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Historically, these areas were part of the great Sahelian empires based on trans-Saharan trade. They were subsequently colonized by France, which left a common political and cultural legacy. This legacy currently coexists with the fundamental role of Islam as the majority religion throughout the region.</p> + +<p>In 2014, the five countries established the G5 Sahel, born as a result of the conviction of these governments (and of European pressure) about the need to jointly implement a comprehensive approach to ensure the conditions for peace, development, security, and governance. In 2017, a joint force was added to the organization to coordinate counterterrorism efforts, aiming to curb the expansion of armed groups that seriously threaten regional security. The efficacy of this organization is uncertain now, since three of its five founding members have left it, but officially the organization has not been dissolved.</p> + +<p>There are also other partially Sahelian states geographically — such as Algeria, Nigeria, and Senegal — which, despite their different historical experiences and current situations, influence the evolution of Sahelian developments.</p> + +<h4 id="the-challenges">The Challenges</h4> + +<p>The Sahel is one of the least habitable regions in the world. It has been characterized by a combination of great political instability, little economic development, and very unfavorable environmental conditions, the latter of which has exacerbated the unstable political context and driven migratory flows toward Europe. The lack of instruments to respond to these challenges has long been a source of structural weakness, resulting in a dependency on contributions from the United Nations, the European Union, or third countries. But perhaps the most worrying element is the Sahel’s position as the world epicenter of jihadist terrorism, an issue that has increased in severity since 2016. Not only is it fertile ground for recruiting rootless and disaffected youth into terrorism, but it also provides safe havens for terrorist organizations to plan and launch international attacks. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are expanding violently in the region and the Sahel suffered 47 percent of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2023.</p> + +<p>The crises already known to have been lurking in the Sahel for more than a decade are, however, entering a new stage due to two main reasons: the domestic political climate and the regional impact of the war in Ukraine.</p> + +<p>The political climate in the G5 Sahel has become more volatile in the last three years with the success of a series of military coups: in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, in Burkina Faso in September 2022, and in Niger in July 2023. The latter is perhaps the most significant because it happened following the military coup in Mali in 2021, where French troops on the ground as part of Operation Barkhane were forced to conduct an accelerated withdrawal. Paris then decided to move its operational center to Niger, becoming the focal point for a renewed security partnership in the Sahel based on lessons learned from previous failures. The Nigerien government was also keen to host other European forces to counter Islamist insurgent groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State — so much so that the European Union decided to organize a three-year mission to train the Nigerien army. Niger had thus become the focal point of security efforts in the region.</p> + +<p>After the 2023 coup, however, this delicate balance has shifted. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) — the main regional organization — has been unable to respond effectively, showing its weakness and causing Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali to leave its ranks. The G5 Sahel has also been abandoned by its own members. In December 2023, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their withdrawal from the G5 Sahel joint military force, echoing Mali’s departure in May 2022, while Mauritania and Chad have accepted these sovereign decisions. The military juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have also signed a new security agreement under the name of Alliance of the Sahel States (AES), whose priority will be the fight against terrorism. Outside the continent, France is consolidating a military withdrawal that began in Mali in 2022, continuing in Burkina Faso and more recently in Niger, although it maintains operations in Chad.</p> + +<p>The United States, for its part, has tried to maintain military collaboration with Niger, where it has built one of the largest drone bases on the continent in Agadez. And yet, despite U.S. wishes and after months of tensions, Niger’s ruling military council announced that it was ending the agreement that allowed U.S. forces to be based in the country. Among the disagreements between the two governments was the desire of Niger to supply Iran with uranium and work more closely with Russian military forces. The United States had completed its military withdrawal from the country by early August 2024, a blow to its counterterrorism effort — and to the broader security situation in the Sahel.</p> + +<p>Secondly, Russia’s military offensive against Ukraine is having a significant impact on the region. For one, it has decreased food security, exacerbating the harsh living conditions of Sahelians with rising wheat, fuel, and fertilizer prices. The energy crisis in Europe due to the war has also heightened Europe’s need to strengthen its partnership with African countries, whose natural resources attract them. Thus, in July 2022, Algeria, Niger, and Nigeria signed a memorandum of understanding for the formalization of the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline, which could have great potential for the transportation of gas supplies to Europe.</p> + +<p>But the war in Ukraine has also made the Sahel more permeable to international influence efforts. In fact, it has grown in prominence within the framework of strategic competition, with the growing influence of Russia and China potentially challenging the security of NATO and the European Union.</p> + +<p>Although relations between Russia and the Sahelian countries were established decades ago during the Cold War, today the presence of the Wagner Group in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger stands out. Its presence has been demonstrated in the last three years through participation in antiterrorist operations and support to the armed forces of some countries in the area. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Moscow has continued to expand its influence in the Sahel, as shown through the Africa-Russia summit held in July 2023. That said, the death of the head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has led Moscow to create a new military structure under the Ministry of Defense called Africa Corps, with which it intends to replace Wagner’s mercenaries.</p> + +<p>China’s presence, on the other hand, is more linked to the economic sphere and to the Sahel’s natural resources. China’s state-owned companies operate in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger. Mali potentially has one of the world’s largest lithium reserves, and the Chinese company Ganfeng Lithium has invested heavily in the country. China is the second-largest investor in Niger, with projects led by PetroChina (a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation) and China National Nuclear Corporation. Investments in the oil sector in Chad have also been significant and have made the Chadian army one of the best equipped forces in Africa. And some reports suggest that China would be willing to use the conflicts in the Sahel to test its weapons products, although it seems more plausible to think that it will prioritize the protection of its interests in the region.</p> + +<p>This growing influence and presence of Russia and China fuels the idea that the countries of the Sahel — along with those in North Africa — are aligning more closely with these two powers, or at least that they want to reinvigorate their foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis the West in line with that of other countries of the “Global South.” In both cases, this is connected to the relative decline of the influence of Western powers in the region.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">This growing influence and presence of Russia and China fuels the idea that the countries of the Sahel — along with those in North Africa — are aligning more closely with these two powers, or at least that they want to reinvigorate their foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis the West in line with that of other countries of the “Global South.”</code></em></strong></p> + +<h3 id="the-european-union">The European Union</h3> + +<p>After the coup d’état in Niger, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stated in her last State of the Union address to the European Parliament that the European Union should engage more with African countries. She stated that Europe had to show the same unity of purpose toward Africa as it has shown toward Ukraine, focusing on cooperation with legitimate governments and regional organizations. The president further accused Russia of sowing chaos in the Sahel and stated that military coups destabilize the region, making it prone to the risk of terrorism.</p> + +<p>The European Union’s concerns about developments beyond the Mediterranean directly impacting the continent’s security and prosperity are not new. But the results of its actions have been disappointing, perhaps because of tactical errors in its approach or inadequate attention paid to the issue.</p> + +<p>For years, the perceived risks emanating from the Sahel have generally remained low due to the intangible nature of many of them and the belief that they were somehow under the control of the intervening countries in North Africa. These are countries with which Brussels cooperates under the European Neighborhood Policy, with programs in a wide range of sectors, such as democratic and economic development, rule of law, and migration. The Sahel region was therefore perceived by European policymakers as largely a remote desert area prone to drought and in need of infrastructure and humanitarian aid.</p> + +<p>Since the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime in Libya in 2011 and the ensuing security crisis in Mali, however, Europe accelerated the process of expanding the borders of its immediate southern neighborhood into the Sahel. It committed more spending, launched more development and stabilization programs, and intensified its external military presence in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, which were beginning to be seen as part of the “gateway to Europe” — a source of dangerous population growth, unwanted migration, and violent extremism, not to mention the favored territory of Russian mercenaries.</p> + +<p>In 2011, the European Union became involved in the Sahel with the adoption of the EU Sahel Strategy (2011–2020), which was reinforced in 2015 with the Regional Action Plan for the Sahel. These two strategies had a strong militarized approach focused on security. But Brussels also opened new embassies in the region, and an EU high representative for the Sahel was appointed to demonstrate continued diplomatic engagement. The European Union additionally became a founding member of the Sahel Alliance in 2017, pledging to coordinate international development spending in the region.</p> + +<p>But the expected results were not adequately achieved and the European Union decided to move away from a preeminently security-oriented approach to a more integrated intervention, adopting the EU Integrated Sahel Strategy 2021. This was formulated at a time when most of the current crises had not yet emerged. Indeed, migration flows were fairly under control, political instability in the Sahel was not yet fueled by the ensuing succession of coups, the presence of the Wagner Group was not yet threatening the region, and the European Union was not facing a war on its eastern border. The strategy today must cope with a different and more hostile situation than initially planned.</p> + +<p>In general, EU policies toward the Sahel have sought to satisfy different interests: to solve the migration issue for the countries bordering the Mediterranean with long-term development programs in the region, to support the French military efforts over the last decade, and to introduce a European dimension to the security and development sector in the region. But the European Union has proven itself not yet ready to respond in all of these dimensions. This lack of European success must be coupled with the unilateral French stance in the Sahel, which has caused considerable frustration among European partners and seems to have had a fragmenting effect on European efforts in the region. More recently, successive military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and especially Niger have imposed a limit on the Europeans’ military response capacity. And the latest worrying decision made by EU member states was to not extend the fifth mandate of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) beyond May 18, 2024, although it was due to expire in January 2025. The reason given was the evolving political and security situation and consultations with the Malian authorities.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In general, EU policies toward the Sahel have sought to satisfy different interests: to solve the migration issue for the countries bordering the Mediterranean with long-term development programs in the region, to support the French military efforts over the last decade, and to introduce a European dimension to the security and development sector in the region.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>European governments are reluctant to support undemocratic governments because they undermine Europe’s own priorities, in particular that of advancing democracy. But at the same time, shutting down security support leaves the door open for other actors — such as the Wagner Group — to fill the void and offer support to governments in the aftermath of coups. For now, there seems to be no “good” for Europe in the Sahel. And yet, despite the current paralysis, the region remains of strategic importance to the European Union.</p> + +<h3 id="nato">NATO</h3> + +<p>NATO’s southern flank has always existed, although it has been considered strategically secondary to its eastern flank. NATO’s southern members have historically been most concerned about security issues in the Mediterranean and its adjacent regions; they have also been among the most vocal advocates for NATO to pay more attention to its southern neighborhood. However, there is room for improvement in terms of the cohesion of the alliance’s approach, to the extent that, at times, the Mediterranean has become an area of competition rather than coordination among NATO’s southern members. It should not be forgotten that NATO is an alliance of sovereign countries, some of which have permanent interests in the south. That is why NATO accepted the UN Security Council’s invitation to protect civilians in Libya in 2011: it was reflecting French and Italian interests in North Africa. Similarly, in 2012, regional interests were at play when it was decided at the Chicago Summit to erect a southward-oriented missile shield for the alliance. Ultimately, it is the member states that decide to project stability in the south — bilaterally, regionally, or through the European Union, the United Nations, or NATO.</p> + +<p>In general, NATO has not been very explicit in addressing risks emanating from the Sahel region. It was only in 2016 that the alliance formally launched the so-called 360° approach, which addresses threats from all fronts and ensures a focused and tailored response. Thanks to the political commitment of countries such as Spain and Italy, NATO began to adopt — at least theoretically — this global vision that valued all its borders with equal concern. Since then, NATO has tried to reformulate its policies toward the southern region according to the notion of “stability projection,” with the idea of contributing to a stable environment in NATO’s vicinity by increasing regional understanding and situational awareness and by supporting capacity building in partner countries.</p> + +<p>The most recent NATO Parliamentary Assembly regional outlook reports have identified the security environment in North Africa and the Sahel as among the key trends that will shape the future. They point to the importance of the region because of its geographical proximity to Europe, as well as its cultural, social, economic, postcolonial, and migratory links. In addition, the latest strategic concept adopted in Madrid in 2022 confirmed the alliance’s commitment to work with its partners in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sahel regions “to address shared security threats,” including war, terrorism, and the growing challenges related to climate change — a commitment that would be reaffirmed at the summit in Vilnius the year after. A few months later, the secretary-general appointed an independent group of experts whose findings of a “comprehensive and deep reflection process” on the southern flank were reflected in a report published in May. The report laid the ground for “an action plan for a stronger, more strategic and result-oriented approach toward our southern neighborhood,” including the Sahel area, an idea that managed to be incorporated into the Washington Summit Declaration of 2024. It should also be noted that the declaration refers to new efforts in the fight against terrorism and the identification of key areas for long-term effort, one of which is undoubtedly the Sahel. The Washington summit also produced the establishment of a special representative for the southern neighborhood, a position to which Spanish deputy assistant secretary general for political affairs and security policy Javier Colomina was appointed shortly thereafter.</p> + +<p>All this aside, the Eastern flank is still considered by the allies the immediate and primary challenge to NATO, while in the long term the Indo-Pacific is beginning to stand out. As a result, the alliance’s political and military leeway to the southern flank risks being limited. What does seem to be clear among the allies, however, is that the increasing instability in the Sahel makes it necessary to consider that a southward-oriented NATO strategy should not necessarily stop at the Mediterranean and its immediate areas of influence. Beyond the Maghreb, Africa is an integral part of the European and transatlantic security calculus.</p> + +<p>But an extension of the security space beyond the Mediterranean and North Africa would imply closer cooperation with regional institutions and partner countries. Countries like Senegal and Nigeria could be important in NATO’s effort to “project stability” to the south. But from an operational point of view, NATO’s global engagement has obvious limits. It is therefore important to distinguish between the idea of NATO’s role in the Global South and the alliance’s role as a forum for the discussion of broader strategic concerns and policy coordination. From a political point of view, NATO’s southern flank can extend as far as the allies agree to take it.</p> + +<p>When it comes to challenges such as terrorism, instability, and the migration crisis affecting Europe, NATO is not and should not be the first responder. National authorities, the European Union, and ad hoc coalitions should lead the way. Maritime, humanitarian, and low-intensity counterterrorism issues are indeed particularly promising scenarios for NATO-EU cooperation. Practical and effective collaborative strategies already exist, as demonstrated by the support provided by NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian to the European Union’s Operation Sophia, which aims to disrupt criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers operating in the Mediterranean. However, several other crises in the area have not been addressed through NATO-EU cooperation, exemplified by the current situation in Libya.</p> + +<p>Planning for the long term in a manner that builds on the alliance’s strengths and is sustainable over time is thus an urgent need — even if this amounts to a relatively modest effort.</p> + +<h3 id="national-interests">National Interests</h3> + +<p>In an increasingly unstable international environment in which a Global South is ascending regardless of Western diplomatic pressure, organizations such as the European Union and NATO are limited in their ability to influence countries beyond the West on security and defense issues. But in the Sahel, there is perhaps still room for them. In the Sahel in particular, governments have traditionally given more importance to relations and cooperation with states, such as France, Italy, and Spain, than relations with multilateral organizations.</p> + +<h4 id="france">France</h4> + +<p>The current wave of postcolonial African — and, specifically, Sahelian — unease with France may have originated in 2014, when France launched Operation Barkhane to fight jihadism in several countries in the region, starting with Mali. The operation lasted eight years, and although it achieved military successes on the ground, it prevented the collapse of Mali’s government and territorial integrity against a jihadist threat coming mainly from the north of the country. Its continued presence also created resentment and a focal point for growing public discontent with France. A wave of pan-Africanism, centered on anti-Westernism, has been on the rise, mobilizing sectors of the military and political elites in the Sahel countries and highlighting anti-French sentiment as a lever to seize power.</p> + +<p>More than any other country, France has been exposed in Africa because of its military footprint and its adoption of measures perceived as neocolonial. It is the only former colonial power with a wide range of bases from Senegal to Djibouti, via Gabon, the Ivory Coast, and Chad. Since the independence of these countries, Paris has carried out more than 50 military operations or interventions on the continent. However, given the size of the region, its objectives were too ambitious for such a small military force, and this military solution was only a “band-aid” that failed to address the structural weaknesses of regional states. Seen from this perspective, France is reaping the consequences of its interventionism in Africa and its failure to successfully curb terrorism.</p> + +<p>Hence, when powers like Russia, with no colonial history in the region, offered aid in fighting jihadism, they were welcomed, even if they were financed by appropriating part of the natural wealth of the Sahel countries. This is what French president Emmanuel Macron described as “the baroque alliance of the pseudo-Pan-Africanists and the new imperialists.” Reflecting on the above mistakes, Macron has expressed the desire to develop a relationship with Sahelian states “without paternalism or weaknesses,” warning that the recent string of coups in the region entails “a risk of weakening the West and especially Europe.” That is why Paris bet on Niger — but the partnership has not worked out.</p> + +<p>France, however, will likely continue to have a military and diplomatic presence in Africa because it has (primarily geostrategic) interests to preserve. Moreover, France signed the Quirinale Treaty with Italy in 2021, which reflects a will to bet on reinforced bilateral cooperation, the effects of which have begun to be visible in the Sahel. It should be noted that this cooperation does not apply to North Africa, a region in which Rome and Paris have each developed deep ties with local elites, even if this has involved engaging in a struggle for influence that has benefited certain oligarchies.</p> + +<h4 id="italy">Italy</h4> + +<p>Italy is another major European player in the Sahel, with a strategy reflecting a “return” to Africa. The focus on the Sahel fits into a more general reorientation of Italian foreign policy — in line with its European partners — manifested by an increase in diplomatic activities, including the opening of new embassies, and an involvement in bilateral military operations and European cooperation.</p> + +<p>Niger has so far been the clearest representation of Italy’s new activities in the area, mainly because of its position as a transit country for migratory flows from sub-Saharan Africa. In its bilateral engagement, for example, Italy reinforced the contingent of its project MISIN (Missione Italiana di Supporto in Niger), which has been present in the country since 2018. Italy has also increased its support of European initiatives in the region, for instance by holding key positions on the ground during European missions and by appointing Emanuela del Re as EU high representative for the Sahel.</p> + +<p>However, Italy’s engagement with the Sahel is not without attention to the political and security dynamics of North African countries. The links between the protracted conflict in Libya and the destabilization of the Sahel have long been a subject of debate in Italy, for example. This has manifested in the widespread adoption of the “wider Mediterranean” — an area of interest encompassing countries from West Africa to the Horn of Africa, including the Sahel — into Italian policy. At the European level, Italian engagement is also reflected in the recent creation of the “One Desert Initiative” committee, with Italy as the interlocutor between the European Union, Libya, and the Sahel. Thus, Italy’s new involvement in the Sahel, built through new bilateral proposals and greater leadership within European initiatives, also represents an important search for legitimacy, not only with African partners but also with European ones.</p> + +<p>The latest impulse has been the presentation of the “Piano Mattei per l’Africa” initiative as a new model for Italy’s cooperation with the continent and, in particular, with the Sahel. It consists of three pillars: immigration control, regional development with investment in various productive sectors, and cooperation in the field of energy. It was presented at the Italy-Africa Summit organized by the government in January 2024 as the inaugural event of its upcoming presidency of the G7. However, it was precisely the Sahel countries that decided not to participate in the summit.</p> + +<p>Given Italy’s ambitions and efforts in the Sahel, NATO’s decision to choose the Spanish Colomina as representative of the southern neighborhood was very badly received by the Meloni government, which sent a letter of protest to Secretary General Stoltenberg. But Italy has not given up the game and will resume efforts to push for an Italian candidacy for the post with the new NATO secretary general, Mark Rutte.</p> + +<h4 id="spain">Spain</h4> + +<p>Spain could become a leading force on behalf of Europe in the Sahel. In fact, some international actors have spurred Spain on to play a larger role and increase cooperation in the region. In October 2023, Spain and the United States inaugurated the first meeting of the U.S.-Spain Working Group on the Sahel, which highlights the urgency of addressing the critical situation in the region and the role that Spain could play.</p> + +<p>Madrid has consistently promoted and defended the need to devote more attention to the Mediterranean and surrounding areas, promoting cooperation frameworks and building trust between partners. But Spain’s main priority and concern is the Maghreb and, in particular, the spiral of tension between Morocco and Algeria, both fundamental countries with which Spain works bilaterally.</p> + +<p>Spain is the only EU member state that has been in every civilian and military mission deployed in Africa since 2003. In some missions, such as EUTM-Mali, Spanish soldiers have accounted for nearly 60 percent of the total number of troops deployed. Spain has also played an important role in two international coalitions for the region: the Coalition for the Sahel, which has addressed security, governance, and development issues, and the Alliance for the Sahel, whose assembly it chaired for three years until July 2023.</p> + +<p>However, unlike other major countries such as France, Germany, Italy, or Poland, Spain does not have a summit at the political level that reinforces its role with the African continent — beyond bilateral meetings or other bodies such as the G5 Sahel — despite the fact that Spain is the only European country that maintains a land border with Africa.</p> + +<p>Therefore, despite having shown initiative and sometimes leadership capacity in this part of the planet and despite having supported the French and international military presence there, Spain has not managed to establish itself as a leading military actor in the Sahel. It was reluctant to extend the support provided by its armed forces to the Barkhane operation beyond logistical support, and it was absent from the Takuba special force entirely. And yet, the image of Spain’s presence in this region is generally positive — mainly because it has not played a colonial role in it.</p> + +<p>For the last 15 years, Spain has done invaluable work for the improvement of West Africa and the Sahel, strengthening the capabilities of some countries in the region and strengthening international cooperation. It has done so in multiple areas and initiatives, establishing its own format in its relations with countries such as Mauritania. However, in recent years it has been unable to expand its role in parallel with the new needs that have arisen. This has meant that other European countries, such as Germany or Denmark — with fewer direct interests and less influence in the region — have filled the void left by Spain.</p> + +<p>The good news is that Spain does not want to leave the Sahel behind. In addition to the aforementioned bilateral cooperation with the United States, Spain launched a series of new projects in Mauritania in 2024 with the support of the European Union. These include the development of green hydrogen and a broader strengthening of the partnership between Mauritania and the European Union, which will also serve as an engine for the stability of the Sahel.</p> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + +<p>The challenges emanating from the Sahel are growing more complex, and international attention devoted to the region has risen exponentially. European states must reflect on their existing policies, which are often inadequately adapted to local challenges, and move beyond an agenda focused primarily on containing threats instead of on addressing structural problems. Given the complexity of the current situation — the entire security architecture built over the last decade that was contingent on external support having collapsed in the last year — a reset in relations between Europe and the Sahel is direly needed.</p> + +<p>A new geopolitical framework is emerging in the region where Europe and the West increasingly seem out of place. This situation seems to be leading southern European countries, mainly France, Italy, and Spain, to review their policies toward the region while prioritizing bilateral efforts ahead of multilateral ones.</p> + +<p>This approach is a mistake, given the complexity of the challenges emanating from the Sahel. A better solution would be for these countries to set aside rivalry among themselves and coordinate to address the challenges emanating from the Sahel. France, Italy, and Spain are well known in the region and can work together to coordinate agendas, particularly as all have the tacit support of the European Union and NATO. At the same time, both the European Union and NATO could take advantage of the potential coordinated effort of these three countries to harmonize their strategies toward the region, thus reducing intra-European power struggles and increasing efficiency.</p> + +<p>France, Italy, and Spain should also coordinate with the United States, which remains concerned about instability in the Sahel. Given the mediocre results of EU and NATO efforts in the region, the United States has recently been trying to approach southern European countries individually to find effective solutions to specific countries and challenges. With the assistance of NATO’s new southern neighborhood representative, it is time for Paris, Rome, and Madrid to engage in coordinated talks with Washington to try to find new solutions for the Sahel, again leaving aside the perceived competition between them.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Carlota G. Encina</strong> is a non-resident senior associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.; a senior analyst for the United States and transatlantic relations at the Elcano Royal Institute, a Spanish think tank; and a lecturer in international relations.</p>Carlota G. EncinaWidespread instability and the growing influence of China and Russia has increased the strategic importance of the Sahel to European security. A reset in relations between Europe and the region is direly needed.【黎智英案・審訊第 99 日】2024-11-29T12:00:00+08:002024-11-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-99<ul> <li>黎智英明言希望美國推制裁 以阻止國安法 惟稱僅願望未必發生</li> </ul> @@ -390,7 +520,207 @@ <hr /> -<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英否認曾說「推爆個政府」、「國際力量」 稱不知道陳梓華與國際線有關連 黎智英:冀透過制裁推翻中共想法「比荒謬更荒謬」 反指和平示威才是「最強大的游說」【黎智英案・審訊第 97 日】2024-11-27T12:00:00+08:002024-11-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-97<ul> +<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英否認曾說「推爆個政府」、「國際力量」 稱不知道陳梓華與國際線有關連 黎智英:冀透過制裁推翻中共想法「比荒謬更荒謬」 反指和平示威才是「最強大的游說」China In The Euro-Atlantic2024-11-28T12:00:00+08:002024-11-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-the-euro-atlantic<p><em>This paper outlines the likely scope of a putative presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in and around the Euro-Atlantic in the next 15 years and the nature of the foreign policy it will support.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>China is becoming an ever-more prominent actor in the global maritime commons, emerging as a key player in sectors such as global shipping. China is also gradually expanding its military footprint outside its region and developing the capacity for power projection at reach. For policymakers in the Euro-Atlantic, this raises the prospect of a Chinese military presence in the region and its environs (such as the South Atlantic and the Arctic). This paper seeks to outline the likely scope of a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) putative presence in and around the Euro-Atlantic in the next 15 years and the nature of the foreign policy it will support.</p> + +<h3 id="key-findings">Key Findings</h3> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>While there is some rationale for a PLAN presence in the Euro-Atlantic and its environs, the challenges of maintaining an extra-regional military presence at any scale will limit its scope. China’s blue-water capabilities are still nascent and even after likely growth, resourcing either a rotational or permanent deployment of PLAN capabilities will impose challenging force structure trade-offs on a navy that already faces the daunting task of competing in both the Pacific and Indian oceans.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Despite this, the bottlenecks in key Chinese supply chains that begin in the Atlantic may provide incentives for a future Chinese leader to decide that a military presence at scale is warranted – such a choice will probably not be made in the medium term (10–15 years). Much of China’s military activity, including defence engagement, is likely to be Phase 0 shaping to set the conditions if such a shift is chosen.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>While China will represent a very limited military challenge in the region, it is likely to seek coercive options towards Europe. Beijing’s most likely foreign policy towards Europe would combine elements of coercion and engagement, since China needs the European market, but seeks a degree of leverage.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>China has several coercive options that leverage maritime power. Its central role in port infrastructure and support to Russia’s economy and military are two options that it might leverage. While many of these options either do not involve the PLAN, or involve it primarily as a supporting element, they can have second-order ramifications for European navies.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p>Although a future PLAN presence should not be a basis for strategic distraction from the core tasks of Europe’s navies in terms of deterring Russia, its shaping activities in the region should be monitored and where possible constrained.</p> + +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<p>In 2019, NATO’s then Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg voiced concerns that although “there’s no way that NATO will move into the South China Sea … we have to address the fact that China is coming closer to us, investing heavily in infrastructure”. The prospect of China moving into the Euro-Atlantic area poses new questions for the UK and its partners in the region. Given that China has not yet emerged as a major defence and security actor in the Atlantic (although it wields considerable economic influence), policymakers and ministries of defence will benefit from an understanding of the potential scope of China’s regional ambitions, and their ramifications.</p> + +<p>To explore China’s likely approach to the Euro-Atlantic, this paper’s analysis is based on some assumptions about the principles driving China’s foreign policy. These are derived from public statements and published scholarship.</p> + +<p>The nature of China’s engagement in the Euro-Atlantic is apparent more from its conflicting economic imperatives than its modest military presence. The capacity of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) for sustained power projection remains limited. However, China has strong incentives to maintain stable relations with states whose markets partly sustain its investment-led, export-dependent economy. There are also reasons for China to pursue coercive leverage over European states that have, to some extent, cooperated with US efforts to economically contain China (most notably through exercising control over key technologies, such as semiconductors). An assessment of how Beijing might balance these conflicting imperatives and the emerging military implications of its approach will help European leaders avoid either complacency or overreaction. The Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre and the Centre for Strategic Studies of the French Navy (CESM) have supported this project, conducted by RUSI and the Council on Geostrategy. The project examines how China may evolve as a power in the Euro-Atlantic. The research for this paper, conducted in July 2024, involved a review of existing literature on China’s capabilities and wider geostrategic imperatives.</p> + +<p>There are several trajectories that China’s foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic may take, each of which corresponds to a different set of naval priorities. It might opt for an increasingly coercive approach, aimed at fixing US and European assets in the region and thus giving it more of a free hand in the Indo-Pacific. This approach has been advocated by members of China’s military and analytical communities. It might entail the deployment of forces in the Atlantic at a scale sufficient to occupy the attention of a meaningful number of US forces and to give European states pause on their commitments to the Indo-Pacific. More explicit support to Russia than has been offered by China thus far might also constitute a coercive approach.</p> + +<p>At the other end of the spectrum is the view, espoused by others in China, that Europe’s consumer economies represent “the endpoints” for many of the infrastructure projects that form part of the Belt and Road Initiative – a large number of which would serve the primary role of linking Chinese producers with European markets (since few other markets in Eurasia are of a comparable scale). While strategic engagement in the Euro-Atlantic is part of this view of China’s priorities, the main focus is not to alienate European states. To do so would drive them to coordinate with the US more closely, which incentivises non-military forms of regional engagement.</p> + +<p>These are not mutually exclusive options, as coercion and engagement can form complementary strands of a state’s foreign policy. However, a nakedly coercive foreign policy makes engagement more difficult.</p> + +<p>This paper contends that dissuasion is the foreign policy that Beijing is most likely to embark on in the Atlantic. China needs the markets of Europe, given its own structural export surpluses, which will prove difficult to export elsewhere. However, China’s latent capacity for coercion can serve as a useful means of dissuading policies that directly impact China’s interests in its immediate periphery. It is thus likely that China’s foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic will attempt to maintain a constructive relationship with Europe (eschewing some aggressive foreign policy tools) while attempting to ensure that the principles on which the relationship rest are amenable to Beijing’s interests, particularly with respect to European policies in the Indo-Pacific.</p> + +<p>The direct military ramifications of a strategy of dissuasion are likely to be limited in the short to medium term. While there are some reasons for China to seek a military presence in the vicinity of the Euro-Atlantic area (for example, in the Arctic and South Atlantic), there are considerable practical limitations, which are likely to prove enduring. China is likely to engage in what Western military parlance would term “Phase 0 shaping activities” in the South Atlantic and potentially also the Arctic. Phase 0 activities would be designed to cultivate regional influence, habituate the PLAN to longer deployments, and set the conditions for a more substantial presence in the longer term. Naval presence and activities, such as joint exercises with Russia, might also be used as a means of signalling to Europe China’s capacity to indirectly play a more significant security role in the Euro-Atlantic. For example, China might provide more explicit military and economic support to Russia as one way of seeking to reinforce a strategy of dissuasion.</p> + +<p>The main conclusion of the paper is that for Europe’s navies, the presence of the PLAN in the Atlantic is a relatively distant and low-probability concern, but that growing Chinese interests in the region will lead to an increase in activity, which should at this stage be monitored and matched as an economy-of-force effort. In the long term, China may become increasingly dependent on sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the South Atlantic and may have the capacity to commit significant resources to their protection. Similarly, its footprint in the Arctic might grow, for reasons that are discussed in the paper. While it is not likely that China’s presence will materialise until well beyond the next decade, it is a contingency to plan for, and the shaping activity that might enable this eventual development should be monitored. In the period most relevant to national defence reviews, the most significant consideration from a security standpoint is the Sino-Russian relationship in the High North and beyond, which might have more direct military ramifications in Europe.</p> + +<p>The paper has three chapters. Chapter I describes the underlying assumptions about China’s foreign policy drivers on which the assessment of its military engagement with the Euro-Atlantic is based. Chapter II provides further detail on Beijing’s strategic imperatives in the Euro-Atlantic that have a plausible maritime dimension. Chapter III describes the employment and potential limitations of China’s naval power in the Euro-Atlantic. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of a Chinese presence in the Euro-Atlantic for European navies.</p> + +<h3 id="i-assumptions-about-drivers-for-chinas-foreign-policy">I. Assumptions About Drivers for China’s Foreign Policy</h3> + +<p>The assessments in this paper are based on a number of underlying assumptions for the next decade. The first is that the US will increasingly prioritise strategic competition with China. This will involve a rebalancing of US military capabilities towards the Indo-Pacific, potentially leaving gaps in the European security architecture. The 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy released by President Joe Biden’s administration, for example, explicitly states an intention to “renew our focus on innovation to ensure the U.S. military can operate in rapidly evolving threat environments” in the Indo-Pacific region. It is likely that the US Indo-Pacific Command, which already absorbs 60% of critical capabilities, such as nuclear attack submarines, will see its allocation of naval assets grow. One outcome of this refocusing is that, much like the British and German fleets before the First World War, the US Navy and the PLAN might fix much of the other’s naval power in static opposition within a single region, ironically limiting the extra-regional footprints of both global aspirants. Both navies may seek to maintain an extra-regional presence to secure lines of communication and, in the case of China, to potentially fix US resources elsewhere. However, the very fragility of the regional balance of power will limit each navy’s slack capacity for deployment elsewhere.</p> + +<p>The second assumption is that, to the greatest extent possible, China will remain committed to securing its supply chains and maintaining market access. Beijing’s economic plan hinges on a delicate balancing act: constructing a trade framework that supports regime security and self-sufficiency while fostering in other countries greater economic dependence on it. China’s trajectory of economic growth is heavily reliant on expanding its share of global manufacturing, a strategy which necessitates sustained increases in both production capacity and global market penetration. Beijing recognises the vulnerability of its economic model to external disruptions and will continue to pursue strategies to mitigate these risks.</p> + +<p>The third assumption is that China’s efforts to reduce its dependence on external markets and technology through initiatives such as the “dual circulation” economy and “Made in China 2025” are unlikely to fully materialise by 2032. However, if this changes, it will affect the likelihood of a coercive foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic by setting the economic incentive structures of China and European states at odds. Although these initiatives are aimed at mitigating reliance on foreign technologies and markets, China remains deeply integrated in the international systems from which it seeks to partially detach, and its growing role in some sectors (such as electric vehicles and solar panels) will also create new dependencies on suppliers in regions such as West Africa.</p> + +<p>The fourth assumption is that Beijing will be heavily influenced by status concerns as well as security interests. The two may significantly overlap since global acceptance of China as a rule-setter in key regions will aid its economic and security interests. As China continues to rise on the global stage, Beijing will be increasingly motivated by the desire to be recognised as a great power and to shape international norms and institutions in the image of the values and interests of the Communist Party of China (CCP). Evidence for this desire to be a rule-setter rather than a rule-follower is apparent in initiatives such as the Global Development Initiative (2021), the Global Security Initiative (2022) and the Global Civilisation Initiative (2023).</p> + +<p>Many of the instruments that China will apply to deliver this engagement are non-military, although a limited military presence can serve several aims for China. These include enabling certain forms of engagement (such as coordination on non-traditional security threats) and supporting China’s scientific establishment, as well as the efforts of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to generate maritime domain awareness and setting the conditions for a more ambitious military posture, should political and military circumstances require it.</p> + +<h3 id="ii-chinas-strategic-interests-in-the-euro-atlantic">II. China’s Strategic Interests in the Euro-Atlantic</h3> + +<p>China has several major areas of strategic interest in the Euro-Atlantic and adjoining regions to which its position in the maritime domain may be relevant. These are:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>Securing SLOCs and access to critical resources.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Maintaining market access to Europe.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Protecting Chinese overseas interests.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Maintaining the capacity to put pressure on the US and other Western states on “exterior lines”.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<h4 id="securing-sea-lines-of-communication">Securing Sea Lines of Communication</h4> + +<p>While energy supplies that traverse the Indian Ocean have historically been an area of focus for Chinese strategists, a number of critical Chinese supply chains have bottlenecks in the Atlantic. For example, 98% of China’s cobalt is imported, with the majority from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Cobalt plays a vital role in several industrial processes, including oil refining. Similarly, much of China’s manganese, used in the production of steel and anodes for lithium-ion batteries, is procured from South Africa, Gabon and Ghana. This can have long-term military ramifications. Despite the fears of Chinese strategists, the prospect of a US blockade of the Strait of Malacca has always been remote: it would also have an impact on countries within the cordon (and the PLAN would inflict considerable attrition on any enforcing vessels). Many of China’s avenues to securing other key inputs, such as cobalt, are far more fragile.</p> + +<p>The efforts of the US and its allies to control flows of key industrial and military inputs that must cross the South Atlantic in a conflict are, in theory, more militarily achievable. The US Navy could constrain flows of these inputs with a close blockade in more militarily permissive waters. Whether the US has an appetite to enforce such a cordon on distant neutral states is debatable, especially as this would also rob the US Navy of resources it would need in the Pacific. However, it would seem logical that a country that has spent decades treating the “Malacca dilemma” as a real concern should be equally worried about the prospects of such a blockade. It should perhaps not be surprising, therefore, that the PLAN is reportedly seeking bases capable of hosting its aircraft carriers in West African states such as Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, and that it has conducted visible naval exercises with Russia and South Africa. Chinese military authors have posited that aircraft carriers have an important role in protecting SLOCs and a carrier strike group acting as a fleet in being need not be preponderant to significantly complicate SLOC interdiction.</p> + +<p>Nonetheless, there are a number of alternative and arguably less risky methods of supply-chain derisking available to China, including diversification and stockpiling – the same approach China applies to oil. Moreover, in a conflict, the precedence taken by military production over civilian consumption and the ability of a sophisticated economy to engage in import substitution is typically a limiting factor on the immediate impact of a blockade. Short of imposing something analogous to the Navicert system on vessels leaving African ports, it is unclear how the US Navy could impose a blockade, since most shipping to China occurs on vessels that are not Chinese-flagged. It is entirely plausible that the assertions of the Chinese military community regarding the need for “far seas protection” reflect institutional beliefs and interests of the PLAN rather than China’s strategy. If this is the case, it might well be that these interests will not translate into a military presence adjacent to the Euro-Atlantic, with some questioning the evidence that China has indeed sought a base in West Africa.</p> + +<p>At a minimum, however, a plausible rationale for a military presence does exist and China has reportedly already set up military infrastructure, such as telemetry stations in Kenya. If the naval protection of SLOCs becomes a core mission for China, this would place sizeable Chinese forces within the Atlantic. On balance, this paper argues that this is unlikely to occur until well beyond the next decade, but efforts to set the conditions for a Chinese naval presence in the Atlantic, should a future leader opt to create one, may be visible during the next 15 years.</p> + +<h4 id="maintaining-market-access-to-europe">Maintaining Market Access to Europe</h4> + +<p>Market access to the consumption-led economies of Europe represents a second area of focus for China. The country has invested substantially in efforts to increase its connectivity across Eurasia through the Belt and Road Initiative, and the ability to move finished goods to European markets is likely to remain a significant driver of Chinese foreign policy, especially as its investment-led economic model will make it difficult to shift to a consumption-led economy.</p> + +<p>Strategic investments in port infrastructure in Europe, including Piraeus in Greece and Hamburg in Germany, as well as ports in countries such as Egypt, give Chinese companies a controlling share in a number of critical maritime nodes, with Chinese firms owning or having a stake in all 15 of the world’s busiest ports. Chinese firms are deploying sophisticated logistics management platforms such as LOGINK, which already has agreements with at least 24 ports, and security inspection equipment manufactured by Nuctech. These technologies provide unprecedented opportunity for covert gathering of intelligence about maritime traffic, trade flows, cargo data and even biometric information of individuals working at ports. In principle, there are sound commercial reasons for China’s port investments and they do not necessarily provide Beijing with control over operations. However, a central position in global transport networks can be employed as a coercive instrument. Port operators are bound by national laws and cannot easily refuse services on political grounds, but countries can exercise other forms of control over their companies and capital. Consider, for example, recent US restrictions on the ability of US nationals to work with Chinese companies in key sectors. Moreover, coercive activity can be presented as administrative procedure, as was the case during China’s 2010 rare earths embargo on Japan (under the aegis of production issues) and its embargo on Norwegian salmon after the latter hosted the dissident Liu Xiabo (under the aegis of health inspections, conducted repeatedly until the produce rotted).</p> + +<p>Economic entanglement, even if not designed explicitly for coercion, can create latent coercive tools – consider how networks such as SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications – the leading provider of secure financial messaging services) have been weaponised against Russia and Iran. The dominance of Chinese companies, such as engineering giant ZPMC, in providing critical port equipment such as ship-to-shore cranes, enhances Beijing’s potential influence over port operations. For navies, a major consideration is likely to be that, for many deployments, routine resupply of non-sensitive goods depends on suppliers operating through civilian ports.</p> + +<h4 id="protecting-chinese-overseas-interests">Protecting Chinese Overseas Interests</h4> + +<p>The protection of China’s overseas interests, including the considerable number of Chinese nationals who work abroad, is also an increasingly important goal, the salience of which was illustrated by events such as the 2011 non-combatant evacuation operation for Chinese nationals in Libya carried out by the PLAN.</p> + +<p>Other overseas interests include exploration for resources in international waters, which falls under the purview of the State Oceanic Administration. In the past decade, Chinese authors have highlighted the fact that there was scope for China to increase the number of applications it made to the International Seabed Authority for mining rights in the Atlantic, with a specific focus on metallic sulphides in the South Atlantic. China has recently concluded its first deep-sea expedition in the Atlantic, in which the State Oceanic Administration’s research ship Shenyai Yihao (which can operate a range of submersibles) played a leading role. China has also conducted a number of scientific expeditions in the Atlantic in the past decade, with a particular focus on the South Atlantic. A number of Chinese scholars and analysts have also expressed interest in resource extraction in areas such as the Arctic, which, although not part of the Euro-Atlantic, have a symbiotic relationship with it, particularly since several NATO members are Arctic states. Activity in the Arctic can serve a range of aims, including setting the conditions for access to seabed resources in international waters and generating usable data to support navigation that Chinese entities, including the PLA, can leverage.</p> + +<p>China has committed significant resources to scientific activity in the Arctic, coordinated through the State Oceanic Administration, but which the PLA supports with personnel. The PLA is also represented on China’s Polar advisory committee. To date, China has completed 13 scientific expeditions to the region, employing platforms such as the polar icebreaker Xuelong-2, and its share of research outputs related to the region is growing rapidly. In addition, China has sought to increase its regional access through investments in infrastructure, including an abortive bid by China Communications Construction Company to construct airports in Greenland.</p> + +<p>Thus far, however, China has worked primarily (but not exclusively) through Russia, an approach that dovetails with Russia’s own aspirations to become a primary goods provider in the Indo-Pacific. For example, in 2021 Russia articulated plans to fill gaps in the Chinese coal sector left by China’s decision to embargo Australian coal. Much of Russia’s coal mining occurs in the Arctic and the country maintains coal mines in geopolitically sensitive Svalbard, Norway. Similarly, since 2014, Russia has relied on China for financial support to underpin its efforts to tap its liquefied natural gas (LNG) reserves in the Arctic and, in February 2021, Novatek (Russia’s second-largest gas producer) and China’s investment company Shenergy Group signed a deal to ship several million tonnes of LNG from Russia’s now-sanctioned Arctic LNG-2 project to the Yamal peninsula in northwest Siberia for onward transit to China. Despite this, China’s embrace of Russian hydrocarbons remains lukewarm. Although coal exports from Russia have risen, nearby Indonesia has been the primary beneficiary of China’s frictions with Australia, while Arctic LNG-2 has had to suspend operations due to a paucity of tankers following Western sanctions. Moreover, China’s foreign policy aspirations to be regarded as a “near Arctic” state have roused suspicions in Moscow.</p> + +<h4 id="maintaining-pressure-on-western-states-exterior-lines">Maintaining Pressure on Western States’ Exterior Lines</h4> + +<p>The idea of expanding strategic space on exterior lines is a common feature of Chinese analytical discourse. China is, as mentioned, likely to seek latent coercive levers to apply to Europe, if only to shape European behaviour regarding its own interests in Asia. China’s foreign policy, however, beyond its immediate environs, has thus far largely (but not exclusively) eschewed military coercion. While not averse to flexing the state’s economic muscle (for example when then Premier Wen Jiabao cancelled trade talks with France in 2007 after the latter hosted the Dalai Lama, or cutting off imports from Lithuania in 2021 over the latter’s decision to open a Taiwan Representative Office), China has by and large limited its coercive statecraft to economics and has been judicious in its use of non-military coercive tools.</p> + +<p>Several Chinese analysts suggest that maritime presence in the Atlantic should be part of a strategy of operating on exterior lines and a means of relieving pressure in East Asia, although there is a lack of consensus to some degree on whether such a strategy should be militarised. Some advocate a cautious approach, emphasising geo-economics and investments in port infrastructure in which the PLAN should focus on multilateral engagement and cooperation with European states on non-traditional security threats such as piracy – partly as a means of countering the narrative that it represents a threat. Other Chinese analysts, such as Hu Bo of Beijing University, have called for a force of two to three carrier strike groups to be deployed beyond East Asia to “pin down” US assets that might be deployed to the region. Similarly, China’s premier doctrinal publication, The Science of Military Strategy, calls for aircraft carriers to be deployed to protect Chinese SLOCs. By and large, discussions of operating on exterior lines tend to focus on the Indian Ocean and Central Pacific. However, and as discussed in subsequent sections of this paper, the practicalities of operating in the Atlantic will limit possibilities for the PLAN over the next decade. Advocates of a larger presence in the Atlantic do consider the prospect of a more prominent role for Chinese “escort forces” in the region in the future but appear to recognise that the PLAN’s presence will be limited for the foreseeable future.</p> + +<p>The idea of operating on exterior lines may also be relevant to China’s nuclear deterrent. While China’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would struggle to break out of the First Island Chain in a crisis, the Arctic in theory offers a safe bastion and an energy efficient route for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) such as the JL-3 (successor to China’s current SLBM) to reach the US, leading the Pentagon to raise the prospect of Chinese submarines operating in the Arctic. However, the practicalities of operating in the Arctic make this a highly questionable means of increasing the survivability of China’s second-strike capabilities, for reasons which are explored in greater depth in the next chapter.</p> + +<p>In practice, the PLAN’s presence in both the Euro-Atlantic and its immediate peripheries (the Arctic and South Atlantic) is for the next decade likely to be relatively modest, but the deployment of such a limited presence to set the conditions for a more significant presence beyond the next decade should not be overlooked. Moreover, while China may not have a direct regional security presence, it can have an indirect impact on the security environment in the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) Area of Responsibility in ways that bear considering, primarily through its relationship with Russia.</p> + +<h3 id="iii-chinas-blue-water-navy-as-a-foreign-policy-instrument">III. China’s Blue-Water Navy as a Foreign Policy Instrument</h3> + +<p>The past three decades have seen China grow as a maritime power, moving from a regional power, built for contingencies related to Taiwan and the South China Sea, into a more expeditionary force. A continued build-up of maritime capability meant that, by 2022, the PLAN had more hulls than the US Navy. Nonetheless, the US Navy remains the largest in terms of gross tonnage, while the PLAN is still in the process of moving from a regional force with a large number of smaller vessels towards a blue-water navy.</p> + +<p>This ambition has been manifested in projects such as the Type 055 cruiser (equipped with a higher vertical launch system capacity than the US Navy’s Ticonderoga-class, since its individual cells are larger), and the Type 076 landing helicopter assault (LHA) carrier, which may be equipped with CATOBAR (catapult launchers). Similarly, the People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC) has grown five-fold in the past decade, with an explicitly stated focus on expeditionary missions. Notably, contingencies involving Taiwan remain the preserve of the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF), which controls the six heavy amphibious brigades in the Eastern Theatre Command and retained this despite the growth of the PLANMC. Moreover, since 2015 the PLA has added “far seas protection” to the list of the PLAN’s missions. It seems clear, then, that China desires the capacity to project power beyond its environs, but the answers to the questions of where, to what end and to what extent are less clear.</p> + +<p>It should be noted that despite its substantial growth, the PLAN still has relatively limited (although rapidly growing) blue-water capabilities. For example, the force fields fewer major surface combatants (vessels of destroyer size or larger) than the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) – the PLAN operates 31 destroyers and cruisers to the JMSDF’s 36 destroyers. The PLAN also fields four Type 075 landing helicopter docks (LHDs) in support of its marine corps. It is likely that the PLAN will also grow rapidly, but it will have significant regional commitments even within the First Island Chain, given the scale of the area the chain encompasses. For example, the Spratly Islands are 1,200 kilometres from China’s nearest land-based airfields on Hainan Island off China’s south coast. Moreover, most contemporary Chinese discussions of PLAN activity beyond the First Island Chain tend to focus on the Pacific and Indian Oceans, where establishing a militarily significant naval presence will prove highly resource intensive.</p> + +<h4 id="practical-limitations-of-chinas-naval-power">Practical Limitations of China’s Naval Power</h4> + +<p>In principle, the fact that most of the several critical materials on which China relies, including cobalt and magnesium, come from a limited number of West and South African providers, including the DRC, Gabon and South Africa, provides a cogent rationale for a Chinese presence in the Atlantic, which would be entirely consistent with the logic of far-seas protection. That Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are states that China has reportedly approached to secure a facility large enough to house an aircraft carrier would also be consistent with the logic of SLOC protection.</p> + +<p>However, there would be several impediments to the emergence of a standing PLAN presence in the Atlantic. The most obvious is the fact that in the Atlantic the PLAN would be operating at considerable distances from the wellsprings of Chinese power and in an area where the US and its allies militarily dominate – a fact acknowledged by most Chinese strategists.</p> + +<p>It could be argued (as have analysts such as Bo) that China can secure its major aims at reach by creating a distant fleet in being large enough to make the US enforcement of a blockade unfeasibly costly (especially if the US were also confronting China in East Asia). Indeed, it is precisely the difficulty of managing both a distant blockade and events in the First Island Chain (which, as several studies have noted, is not viable) that would, in theory, incentivise the US to focus on bottlenecks. Such bottlenecks include China’s access to materials that come from a small number of states where a close blockade could be more readily enforced given the absence of a Chinese naval or anti-access threat beyond the Indo-Pacific.</p> + +<p>The issue with this reasoning, as discussed, is that the immediate demands of balancing commitments within China’s region and outside it are considerations for China as well. Despite its rapid recent growth, the PLAN has a limited blue-water fleet (it fields just eight Type 055 cruisers, for example). This will change in due course, but even a much larger PLAN fielding the six aircraft carriers that China aspires to have by 2035 will be bound by the logic of force structuring. Factors such as vessel maintenance cycles and workup periods impact all navies, and experience suggests that perhaps half of the PLAN’s notional future carrier fleet will be at sea at any given time. The forward deployment of a carrier battlegroup, particularly one that includes the nine escort cruisers, frigates and destroyers discussed by Chinese analysts, would imply that China would have to make considerable sacrifices to its force availability in East Asia. Similarly, China’s fleet of Type 075 and Type 076 LHDs and LHAs, although growing in number, is still small relative to the scale of some of the tasks required by the PLAN in the First Island Chain.</p> + +<p>Platforms such as the Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) could be used as an alternative to surface vessels for deployments beyond the First Island Chain because they are both more self-sustaining and have limited prospects of escaping the First Island Chain in a conflict (and so have bounded utility in this theatre, where China’s diesel electric submarines are more useful). However the Type 093 is relatively noisy, which, it has been suggested, appears to be a function of its propulsion systems and deficiencies in its anechoic coating, and this would limit its military utility. Since the prospective bases which might give the PLAN access to the Atlantic are likely to be in Africa, there is also a political dimension to the issue which must be considered. SSN deployments, although not strictly speaking contrary to the Treaty of Pelindaba (which declares Africa a nuclear weapons-free zone), would also create political complications for both China and the host nation. That said, there may be other rationales for extended deployments, including habituating Chinese submariners to longer periods at sea, which is presently a challenge as illustrated by the mental health issues that extended deployments are causing among Chinese submariners who are not used to them. The logic of using extended rotational deployments as a means of exposing the PLAN to the rigours of sustained activity at sea would also apply to surface vessels, but it would suggest deployments comparable to the UK’s periodic carrier strike group deployments to the Indo-Pacific, rather than a standing presence. These deployments, should they occur, would have diplomatic significance – and would represent a means for European navies to gain situational awareness of the PLAN – but their military significance in the Euro-Atlantic would be limited.</p> + +<p>The ability of the PLAN to operate from bases in states such as Gabon and Equatorial Guinea – and presumably hold at risk US platforms – would require a degree of willingness on the part of these states to take risks on behalf of China in both establishing bases and allowing their use. In the short to medium term, this level of risk acceptance is unlikely in what are largely transactional relationships. While the concept of the PLAN using dual-use commercial facilities to resupply distant vessels has been considered by the PLAN as a more non-committal option through which to rely on prospective partners, this is more useful to enable deployments in support of diplomacy and engagement than it is to sustain credible naval forces. It is relatively unlikely, for example, that volatile goods, such as munitions, can be stored in civilian ports for long, even if neutral ports could be used for refuelling in wartime. While the pursuit of bases by the PLAN cannot be ruled out, it is unclear whether these facilities would have a significant military role. The risk of SLOC interdiction could in the final instance be offset by other means, including stockpiling and overland transport of goods to ports in third countries to which the US is not constraining access for onward transport. In effect, the problem of resourcing a distant blockade would remain for the US, and the use of the PLAN to protect Atlantic SLOCs appears unlikely to be viable for some time.</p> + +<p>Similarly, the prospects for a Chinese SSBN bastion in the Arctic are constrained by several factors. First, the PLAN does not currently operate SSBNs capable of operating under ice, although its future Type 095 SSN and Type 096 SSBN may be able to do so. Thus far, however, the only indicators of this are academic research, which is inconclusive. Even if this is the case, the Type 096 (for which construction began in the early 2020s) will only be fielded in numbers necessary to ensure a consistent presence at sea by the end of this decade. Second, following the arrival of the first Type 096, the PLAN would need to spend additional years habituating its submariners to operations under ice (which relatively few NATO navies, such as the US Navy and Royal Navy, can do). Third, Chinese SSBNs would need to transit chokepoints such as the Bering Strait to enter the Arctic, meaning that a survivable presence would require at least one SSBN out of a planned fleet of six to be permanently in the Arctic (meaning, in effect, that the majority of the fleet would need to be committed to resourcing this mission). This would also mean that Russian support would be vital to sustain China’s undersea deterrent since Russia is the only non-Western state with experience operating submarines under ice – a strategic commitment neither nation indicated a desire to undertake. And fourth, an Arctic SSBN presence is considerably more complex to deliver than China’s other means of assuring its second strike. China is currently placing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, which permit a missile to deliver multiple nuclear warheads to different targets on road-mobile DF-41 ICBMs. This has the effect of ensuring that even a small number of missiles which survive a first strike can both deliver a large number of warheads and pose a complex problem to missile defences. China is also expanding its number of missile silos, increasing the number of targets that the US would need to strike to cripple its arsenal. These palliatives are far more readily achievable than an under-ice SSBN patrol.</p> + +<p>It is likely, then, that within the next 15 years, material constraints on the PLAN will make a military presence capable of supporting Chinese interests in a high-intensity scenario either in the Euro-Atlantic or its environs unlikely. It is still plausible, however, that China is attempting to create optionality for itself and set the conditions for a more expansive presence, should this be deemed desirable and feasible. But this is unlikely to be the case for well over a decade.</p> + +<h4 id="other-potential-uses-of-chinas-maritime-power">Other Potential Uses of China’s Maritime Power</h4> + +<p>There are other functions that naval and maritime power can fulfil for China in the Euro-Atlantic.</p> + +<p><em>Diplomatic Signalling</em></p> + +<p>Naval activity can be used as a tool of diplomatic signalling for both Europe and other actors. As noted, China has conducted several joint exercises with the Russian navy in the previous decade, including the 2017 Naval Interaction exercises in the Baltic Sea, exercises in the Mediterranean and more recent exercises with the Russian and South African navies on the periphery of the Atlantic. A PLAN Type 052D guided missile destroyer also took part in Russia’s Navy Day celebrations in St Petersburg in July 2024. One aim of joint exercises with Russia may be to signal China’s capacity to play a more significant and not entirely welcome role in Europe, should European states become more engaged in the Indo-Pacific. While not wishing to stoke paranoia, this paper notes that the coincidence of a Chinese exercise in Belarus at the same time as the NATO Summit in July 2024 and on the back of the participation of several European states in RIMPAC 24 (Rim of the Pacific Exercise, the world’s largest international maritime exercise) could be seen as exactly the kind of behaviour that best illustrates this scenario. It may be intended to signal China’s capacity to insert itself into the European security environment if European states play a larger role in the Pacific.</p> + +<p><em>The PLAN as a Supporting Arm in the Euro-Atlantic</em></p> + +<p>Importantly, naval activity would in this instance not be China’s primary threat to Europe – rather it would represent a relatively costly signal of China’s potential willingness to employ other tools that may be more immediately consequential. While China is unlikely to have considerable local military strength in the Euro-Atlantic over the next 15 years, it can have an indirect impact on the security of the region. For example, China could reinforce Russia’s capacity to generate export revenue. Russia still relies on Protection and Indemnity (P&amp;I) Club-insured shipping for the transfer of 45% of the vessels carrying hydrocarbons from terminals in the Baltic Sea. Russia’s continued reliance on vessels that depend on Western insurers and thus probably obey the oil price cap, and the decrepitude of the vessels in Russia’s “shadow fleet”, all point to the limits, as a means of sanctions evasion, of any Russian effort to substitute its shadow fleet for international carriers that are exposed to Western pressure. The environmental risks that older vessels pose could also be a legal basis for their eventual denied access to ports and key straits. If the major bottleneck is a lack of available seaworthy ships, Chinese state-owned oil tankers might offer Russia a means of transporting oil at above price-cap rates, particularly since the two largest global operators of oil tankers are Chinese. So far, China’s financial institutions have shied away from transactions that might fall foul of these sanctions – given the exposure of Chinese banks trading in dollars and euros to international sanctions. However, Russia’s growing reliance on Chinese-made dual-use goods and its trade deficit with China mean that transactions in renminbi would give Russia access to a currency for which it has increasing use, despite it being less tradeable than the US dollar. China could also collaborate with Russia in the production of commercial shipping for Russian state-owned firms – a possibility floated by the head of Russia’s VTB Bank Andrey Kostin as a means of clearing the backlogs in Russia’s Zvezda shipyard – or China could sell excess capacity to third-party carriers dealing in Russian oil.</p> + +<p>China’s military support for Russia could also take more direct forms. The idea that Chinese shipyards could provide Russia’s navy with capacity was, apparently, hinted at by Vice Admiral Sergei Avakyants, then head of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, after joint exercises between the Russian navy and the PLAN. Avakyants suggested that the proportion of modern PLAN vessels allocated to exercises with the Russian Pacific Fleet partly reflected a desire to advertise China’s shipbuilding capabilities. While this assessment may or may not have been accurate, it is often the case that military support that begins as covert or partially deniable assistance escalates to more direct forms over time. Additionally, it is notable that China has recently announced that it will sell the Type 052 destroyer internationally, since few Chinese partners other than Russia have a rationale for procuring the vessel, or the funds to do so.</p> + +<p><em>China’s Presence in Africa</em></p> + +<p>Chinese and Western security interests may well clash in third-party states where China seeks a growing security footprint. To some extent this may have already occurred. In July 2024, Italian authorities interned a Chinese vessel carrying Wing Loong UAVs to Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, in contravention of the UN arms embargo on Libya. The reality of Chinese-operated ports on Europe’s immediate periphery may make similar interdictions more difficult to achieve in the future. China also has a growing security presence in states such as the DRC, where it has supplied the government with CH-4 UAVs to fight rebel forces, and the Chinese aeronautics company, China National Aero-Technology Import &amp; Export Corporation, has offered to supply the DRC with J-10 aircraft. If longstanding Chinese investment (which comes with fewer political strings than Western alternatives) is combined with more lenient terms, military support between China and Russia could, unchecked, leave both countries with an even greater level of control over Western economy supply chains than they currently enjoy. China can support such activity through the provision of advise and assist missions and by acting as an alternative partner to Western states on issues such as counterpiracy, as it has with Nigeria.</p> + +<p><em>Sabotage</em></p> + +<p>There is also potential for Chinese limited and deniable coercive activity in the Euro-Atlantic, in tandem with Russia. Consider, for example, the alleged sabotage of the Balticconnector pipeline (a natural gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia) by the NewNew Polar Bear (a vessel registered in China owned by several Russian and Chinese commercial entities) which appears to have dragged its anchor over the pipeline. Chinese survey ships and commercial companies associated with the cable industry or deep sea mining could step up activity near submarine cables in the Atlantic in areas with a lighter NATO presence, such as the Azores Fibre Optic System, and near connections from West Africa such as the Cabo Verde node. The surveying activity being conducted by the Ministry of National Resources could certainly support this, particularly since data gathered must be shared with the PLA. However, there are several impediments to the option of sabotage activity in the Atlantic. China is itself seeking to become a major, if not quite monopolistic, provider of cable services linking European companies to East Asia – a concern that led the US to force China Telecom out of the consortium building the SEA-ME-WE-6 cable (an optical fibre submarine communications cable system that carries telecommunications between Singapore and France) in 2023. Notably, China chose to bankroll an alternative cable linking Asia and Europe (Europe–Middle East–Asia, known as the EMA). Any suggestion of China’s involvement in sabotage would make it considerably easier to build a political consensus for excluding Chinese companies from sensitive projects in the Euro-Atlantic.</p> + +<p>Unlike Russia, China has not invested heavily in the specialised military equipment needed to target infrastructure, such as cables at depths that make repair difficult, although civil capabilities such as uncrewed underwater vehicles, built for exploring the seabed, could be used in a military capacity.</p> + +<p>While it is not possible to entirely exclude sabotage as a tool of dissuasion, it remains relatively unlikely.</p> + +<p><em>Transfer of Data</em></p> + +<p>A more significant challenge is the prospect of China becoming a key provider of services related to the transfer of data, which can be employed for intelligence gathering. The latter contingency would, however, only become an extreme consideration if China became a monopolistic actor in the cable market, and with Chinese companies such as HMN Tech (which provides submarine network system solutions) currently holding a 10% market share, this is some way off, although ensuring this remains the case is a policy consideration for Western states.</p> + +<p>While the PLA can support foreign policy aims in the Euro-Atlantic and its environs that are contrary to European interests, it is these policies themselves rather than the military presence involved in them that are the major concern. For the most part, the PLA will be a supporting element in the Euro-Atlantic, reinforcing Chinese foreign policy aims as a tool of military signalling and engagement. These functions can, however, set the conditions for a more militarily credible presence in the long term, and the evolution of the PLAN’s footprint should be monitored.</p> + +<h3 id="conclusions-and-lessons-for-european-navies">Conclusions and Lessons for European Navies</h3> + +<p>For European navies, the direct military threat posed by the growing Chinese presence in the Atlantic will be low for at least the next 15 years. Moreover, most Chinese activity relevant to the Atlantic will occur just beyond the peripheries of the Euro-Atlantic, off West Africa, in the South Atlantic, and the Arctic. The key consideration for Europe’s navies will be how much capacity they allocate to hedging against the prospective evolution of China’s Atlantic posture, given the resource demands of contending with other acute threats.</p> + +<p>There appears to be no consensus from Beijing on requirements for a significant military presence in the Atlantic, although considerable attention is paid to the question of expanding “strategic space” in other ways. While China faces tangible risks to some of its supply lines in the Atlantic, there is little that it can do to rectify this challenge in military terms in the medium term. Moreover, there are non-military means by which China can mitigate risk, including diversification, stockpiling and rerouting goods. It is conceivable, however, that the PLAN could pursue rotational deployments in the South Atlantic within the next two decades as a means of both setting the conditions for a more substantial presence in the longer term and habituating the force to operations at reach.</p> + +<p>In all likelihood, much of the activity that this entails will effectively amount to Phase 0 shaping activity in areas adjoining (but not part of) SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, including the South Atlantic and the Arctic. Port visits by PLAN vessels, maritime data acquisition, military cooperation on non-traditional security issues, and defence engagement in the form of arms sales can, collectively, set the conditions for the PLAN to secure access in areas such as the South Atlantic. While these pursuits are not immediately threatening, they do accord to the importance of European navies remaining engaged in regions that many of them may wish to de-emphasise to refocus resources on the much more pressing challenge of deterrence regarding Russia. While the prioritisation of acute threats represents a rational choice, an economy-of-force effort to match China’s Phase 0 activity should be retained as an economy-of-force task. This need not always involve the deployment of assets – in the Gulf of Guinea, for example, the Anglo-French MDAD-GoG (Maritime Domain Awareness Trade-Gulf of Guinea) has arguably been the most useful European contribution to the safety of regional shipping. Frameworks allowing for the pooling and rotational commitment of ships to tasks such as engagement might also be a means for European navies to manage competing commitments with limited force structures, and this might be a role for the Anglo-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, which has lost its original rationale (resourcing expeditionary commitments comparable to the 2011 intervention in Libya).</p> + +<p>Operating in proximity to the PLAN may also offer it information-gathering opportunities, much as was the case in 2021 when the activities of Chinese Type 093 SSNs near the UK’s carrier strike group revealed (or at a minimum provided the opportunity to verify) a number of details regarding the platform’s acoustic signatures. This represents not only an information-gathering opportunity, but potentially also a constraint on Chinese activity in the Atlantic if this activity raises the prospect of sensitive data regarding deployed vessels being gathered.</p> + +<p>In contrast to China’s limited naval presence, China’s engagement on the peripheries of the Euro-Atlantic could have immediate effects. For example, deeper Chinese engagement with Russia as a means of derisking some of China’s own supply lines and pressuring European states cannot be ruled out. In economic terms, China can substantially increase Russia’s capacity to generate revenue both through China’s own deeper engagement with Russian hydrocarbons extraction in the Arctic and by enabling Russia to circumvent oil price caps without having to rely on an old and relatively small fleet of dark ships (unregistered and uninsured vessels that have turned off or disabled their automatic identification systems).</p> + +<p>In military terms, China’s capacity to serial-produce vessels such as the Type 052D represents the last plausible avenue through which Russia could generate a blue-water surface capability. While China’s engagement with Russian hydrocarbons remains relatively cautious, there are sound reasons for this to change, including the fact that Russia offers China a means of hedging against the Malacca dilemma. Moreover, China’s export of dual-use military goods to Russia illustrates a willingness in principle to engage in defence exports.</p> + +<p>These possibilities do not change any of NATO’s core missions, but they do mean that planning for deterrence with regard to Russia should include the possibility that in areas where Russia is currently assessed to have relatively dim prospects (such as long-term growth and the size of its surface fleet), Chinese support is one of the few means that could enable Russia in the near future.</p> + +<p>In effect, the optimal direct response for Europe’s navies to a PLAN with a limited but gradually expanding Euro-Atlantic footprint should be one premised on mirroring the non-committal but potentially useful Phase 0 shaping activities that the PLAN itself appears to be undertaking. It should further set the conditions to constrain a more assertive China if need be, without overreacting to a prospect that may never materialise.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Sidharth Kaushal</strong> is Research Fellow for Sea Power at RUSI. His research at RUSI covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century, and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.</p> + +<p><strong>René Balletta</strong> was the First Sea Lord’s Visiting Fellow at RUSI until August 2024. He has served much of his career at sea in a variety of surface platforms that include frigates, destroyers, amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers.</p> + +<p><strong>Philip Shetler-Jones</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow in the International Security research team at RUSI. His current research is concentrated on Indo-Pacific security. His recent publications have focused on the defence policy of Japan, attitudes of China to NATO, and narratives about the defence of Taiwan.</p> + +<p><strong>Elizabeth Lindley</strong> is an analyst of politics of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese foreign policy, and cross-strait relations. She has a degree in Chinese Studies (First Class Hons) from the University of Cambridge, which included advanced Mandarin study in Taipei.</p>Sidharth Kaushal, et al.This paper outlines the likely scope of a putative presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in and around the Euro-Atlantic in the next 15 years and the nature of the foreign policy it will support.【黎智英案・審訊第 97 日】2024-11-27T12:00:00+08:002024-11-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-97<ul> <li>陳梓華指稱黎智英欲領導勇武派 黎反駁:荒誕可笑、不可能這樣說</li> </ul> @@ -11767,431 +12097,4 @@ <p><strong>Gregory B. Poling</strong> is a senior fellow and director for the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS.</p> -<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow for the Futures Lab in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>Harrison Prétat, et al.The Philippines’ fragile energy outlook threatens to undermine efforts to secure its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis an assertive China.State Behav. &amp; Cyber Security2024-10-18T12:00:00+08:002024-10-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/state-behaviours-and-cyber-security<p><em>This paper seeks to identify how state “permissive” behaviours can contribute to the proliferation of offensive-cyber tools and services.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>Commercial cyber tools and services have many legitimate applications, from corporate penetration testing (an authorised simulated cyber attack on an IT system) to law enforcement and national security operations. But they are also subject to misuse and abuse, when they are used in ways that are contrary to national or international law, violate the human rights of their targets, or pose risks to international security. Some states are currently grappling with this policy challenge. Meanwhile, collective international initiatives for action are underway.</p> - -<p>For example, there is the US’s 2023 Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware and the UK- and France-led Pall Mall Process of 2024. Ultimately, one aim of these initiatives is to enable states to harmonise their policy interventions where possible.</p> - -<p>To inform principles and policies for intervention at national and international levels, it is necessary to understand the dynamics that encourage or facilitate offensive-cyber proliferation. This paper identifies a range of “non-state proliferating factors” (NPFs) and “state permissive behaviours” (SPBs), and its findings draw on desk-based research on the international commercial offensive-cyber market. These findings were supplemented by a data validation and consultative workshop with industry stakeholders held in person at Chatham House in March 2024. This half-day validation workshop drew on the expertise and insights of 44 participants predominantly based in the UK, the US and Western Europe. To facilitate candid discussion, remarks made at the workshop are not attributable, and the identities of participants are not referenced here.</p> - -<p>In this paper, NPFs and SPBs are categorised into five areas:</p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p>Regulation of corporate structure and governance.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Legal frameworks for product development, sale and transfer.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Diplomatic support and engagement.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Development of cyber-security ecosystem and workforce.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Integration with defence and security industrial base.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<p>Using these categories, this research analyses the roles of both state and non-state actors. It identifies critical inter-relationships between different SPBs and NPFs that serve to facilitate or enable potentially irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation.</p> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>Commercial cyber tools enable a variety of capabilities, including gaining access to technical systems, moving through technical ecosystems, providing visibility of user activity, and exfiltrating data. The goals of users of these tools vary greatly. In the mass market, cyber-security professionals use them to determine where an organisation or individual may be susceptible to attack so that necessary steps can be taken to mitigate this risk. In the more limited law enforcement market, governments may use these kinds of tools to monitor criminal activity and capture evidence for prosecution, or to gain access to technical assets to investigate or prevent crime. There is also a variety of commercial services that offer offensive capabilities along similar lines, for example penetration testers, which intentionally emulate the behaviour of attackers in order to report to clients the opportunities for and impact of an intrusion into their systems.</p> - -<p>The demand for commercially accessible offensive-cyber tools and services has expanded markedly in recent years, with at least 80 states having purchased offensive tools. Unfortunately, these commercial cyber products and services are also subject to misuse and abuse. There are broad reports of these tools and services being used in ways that are contrary to national or international law, violating the human rights of their targets, and posing risks to international security. The proliferation of these products and services presents an expanding set of risks to states and, in some cases, challenges commitments to protecting openness, security and stability in cyberspace. From selling products to conducting operations, paid attackers and companies are routinely hired on behalf of governments or other customers.</p> - -<p>“Offensive-cyber proliferation” refers to the increasing access that a wider range of actors has to increasingly advanced cyber capabilities. Proliferation may occur purposely and legally as a market process: for example, a law enforcement agency may purchase a licence for a phone-cracking tool, subject to local laws and import/export controls. Other proliferation may be legal but unethical or abusive: for example a law enforcement agency using licensed offensive-cyber tools in a way that either directly breaches human rights or facilitates later human rights violations. Proliferation may also occur unintentionally and/or illegally, including instances of software piracy.</p> - -<p>Like-minded states have engaged in international discourse on offensive-cyber proliferation in a range of forums. In March 2023, a group of 11 states made a joint statement on the proliferation and misuse of spyware, with a further six signing in 2024. In February 2024, the UK- and France-led Pall Mall Process kicked off with a declaration on commercial cyber-intrusion capabilities, signed by a larger collection of states and regional bodies. As part of an ongoing and evolutionary process, further discussions on offensive-cyber proliferation are anticipated at future events, including in Paris in 2025.</p> - -<p>This paper seeks to inform these ongoing deliberations by identifying how state “permissive” behaviours can contribute to the proliferation of offensive-cyber tools and services. “State permissive behaviours” refers to state action (or inaction) that directly or indirectly shapes offensive-cyber market conditions. For example, in this context, “behaviour” may include active diplomacy on behalf of firms (active), but it could also include insufficient guidance or regulation (inactive). The identification of these permissive behaviours is intended to facilitate constructive analysis and discussion about the scope for targeted interventions and recalibration of the market.</p> - -<p>This is one of two papers on this topic. The other paper, authored by the researchers and published by Chatham House in October 2024, draws on the findings in this paper and identifies a range of “principles” that could be used to build a code of conduct that governments could use to counter irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation.</p> - -<h4 id="methodology">Methodology</h4> - -<p>The findings of this paper draw on desk-based research on the international commercial offensive-cyber market. This research included non-academic sources (for example, news reports) and interdisciplinary academic literature. Given the dynamic nature of the commercial offensive-cyber market, relatively contemporary literature (sources published within the past five years) has been favoured. However, historical sources have been included where useful: for example, where contemporary equivalents are unavailable or need contextualisation. The desk-based research phase ran from November 2023 to early March 2024 and mainly covered literature from 2019 to March 2024. The findings for this research were validated by a half-day data-validation and consultative workshop with commercial offensive-cyber industry stakeholders held in person at Chatham House in March 2024. The workshop drew on the expertise and insights of 44 participants, predominantly based in the UK, the US and Western Europe. Attendees represented a broad spectrum of the commercial offensive-cyber industry, including developers, brokers, contractors and government entities. To facilitate candid discussion, remarks made at the workshop are not attributable, and the identities of participants are not referenced here.</p> - -<h4 id="limitations">Limitations</h4> - -<p>Some limitations of this research should be noted. First, the diffuse and dynamic nature of the commercial offensive-cyber market means that the endeavour to succinctly map and analyse a wide range of indicative behaviours may lack depth and nuance. A single paper could focus on any one of the behaviours detailed here. Second, although the research team significantly revised the paper and its framing(s) following the validation phase, the dynamic nature of the market – as well as ongoing national and international efforts to calibrate market behaviours – means that some findings may become outdated. Third, the paper focuses on analysing the state of play in market behaviours that influence proliferation. The paper does not identify possible interventions. “Principles” of possible interventions are proposed at length in the companion paper published by Chatham House. However, further interdisciplinary research from academics, researchers, policy stakeholders and industry could assess and substantiate this paper’s findings, and identify opportunities for calibration or intervention in the market.</p> - -<p>The paper has two chapters. Chapter I offers an overview of the offensive-cyber industry. Chapter II draws on examples of state permissive behaviours that interact with proliferating market practices. The paper concludes with reflections on the challenges and opportunities that these permissive behaviours present for policy interventions.</p> - -<h3 id="i-overview-of-the-offensive-cyber-industry">I. Overview of the Offensive-Cyber Industry</h3> - -<p>The commercial offensive-cyber industry is an overlapping supply chain and can be divided into different operational elements. For example, research from 2021 distinguished between “vulnerability research and exploit development”, “malware payload generation”, “technical command and control”, “operational management” and “training and support”. These capabilities are common across both legitimate (security testing and law enforcement) and illegitimate or malicious activity, and it is not possible to draw a distinction between these activities at a purely technical level. In addition, these elements are linked, rather than existing in a vacuum, with resources and knowledge shared or exchanged within and between market actors. A single “zero-day” chain may draw components from multiple sources and may itself operate as a component of a product comprising a broader set of capabilities. The supply chain is highly complex and interdependent. Figure 1 presents a simplified representation of the commercial hacking market. Table 1 complements this figure, highlighting contextual characteristics of different tools and services. It is also a simplified representation of a complex market. For example, although the target market for surveillance capabilities is likely to be government entities, there are secondary markets, such as the mass and criminal markets.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/g0ggd5E.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: Complexity and Interdependence of Commercial Hacking Markets</em></p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jqWrZJL.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Table 1: Contextual Characteristics of Goods and Services of the Commercial Hacking Market</em></p> - -<p>Additionally, it should be recognised that there is significant scope for supply chain and/or operational overlap between market actors (government agencies, commercial firms and criminal entities). Ultimately, this interdependency, combined with the inherently international nature of the market and the intangible nature of software products, arguably provides fertile ground for proliferation.</p> - -<p>The purpose of this paper is to identify state permissive behaviours (SPBs) and non-state proliferation factors (NPFs). To do this, it is necessary to outline a clear and accessible understanding of which market phenomena are in scope. This is achieved by: defining cyber intrusion capabilities; narrowing the focus to “commercial” practices; and drawing a dichotomy between “authorised” and “unauthorised” cyber intrusion.</p> - -<p>This research project was an evolutionary process. The description of the markets that appears in this paper is the final version that was decided on by the research team following both the data-validation workshop in March 2024 and follow-up consultative discussions with industry stakeholders. The research team recognises that providing an overview of such a highly diverse, dynamic and inter-/intra-layered industry in the broad-brush strokes necessary for a research paper is, in part, a process of simplification that may not capture fine-grained nuance. Nonetheless, doing so offers a common framing that is intended to be accessible to a wide audience and serves as an important foundation for subsequent analysis. This framing is also applied in the companion research paper, published by Chatham House, which outlines principles for international intervention.</p> - -<p>The three stages of framing are:</p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p>Scoping cyber-intrusion capabilities to varied components, which contribute to the ability of an actor to gain remote access to a target host or network. The components include: vulnerability discovery and exploitation; development of a functional exploit for a vulnerability; the technical infrastructure for command and control of that malware; and broader training and support.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Focusing on commercial activity where at least one of the components is obtained through a financial transaction. This could include, for example, the sale of a product or the provision of licensed services. Commercial cyber-intrusion capabilities may be traded either on the open market or to exclusive clientele. A range of actors are involved in the commercial offensive-cyber ecosystem, including developers, vendors, service providers, brokers, resellers and system integrators. All of these actors are in scope in this paper. Their activities take place in an interlinked nexus, which may be mapped from the point of “initial research”, where raw novel exploits are identified, to implementation, and finally, in some cases, to a product that a client can acquire and use. This nexus is both nuanced and complex.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Distinguishing between authorised and unauthorised cyber intrusion. In cyber security, tools developed and sold primarily for defensive testing purposes can often be abused for offensive purposes. Likewise, activities undertaken for security research or good-faith hacking services are often the same as those undertaken for more malicious purposes. As such, a distinction drawn on how tools or services operate will be moot, and will not help understanding of SPBs and NPFs. Rather, use cases must be examined to better understand behaviours in the market, which leads to a distinction between authorised and unauthorised cyber intrusion.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<p>Authorised intrusion takes place with the permission of the owner/lessee, operator or manufacturer of a device, system or network. An example could be corporate penetration testing, participation in a bug bounty program, or employee workstation surveillance tools. If the use of a cyber-intrusion capability is not approved by the owner/lessee, operator or manufacturer, it is categorised as unauthorised. There are exceptions, particularly with regard to national security and law enforcement operations. For example, in the UK, a minister and a judge may authorise offensive-cyber operations.</p> - -<p>Although this paper categorises the landscape into authorised and unauthorised markets, in truth there is a vast array of products and services included in the ecosystem, and a range of attitudes, approaches and priorities among vendors. Tools and services offered specifically for unauthorised intrusion are most often the ones that are discussed in research disclosures, news stories or lawsuits relating to malicious campaigns against journalists, activists or governments. Tools and services in this market are typically designed to avoid detection. For this reason, and due to the go-to-market dynamics discussed in Chapter II, vendors in this market tend to operate in relative secrecy. As a result of all these factors, many public sources on proliferation and abuses of commercial cyber tools focus on just a few vendors and tools. This is reflected in the references quoted in this paper, and while the researchers believe the points highlighted are also true beyond the limited examples cited, the hidden nature of this market makes it challenging to present broader public examples.</p> - -<p>Understanding the diversity of the two markets is critical to examining the dynamics at play, and potentially developing mitigation strategies or policy proposals. While the examples and public analysis in this paper often focus on the more extreme and secretive vendors and offerings, it is important to recognise that they are only one part of the picture. These markets also include well-established defence contractors, and cyber-security vendors offering broad market offerings. These organisations are themselves highly varied, generally operate in legitimate markets and are answerable to investors, customers and employees. These organisations are more likely to adopt new, or adapt existing, behaviours in response to calls for more responsible approaches to the sale and development of commercial cyber tools.</p> - -<h3 id="ii-the-role-of-permissive-behaviours-in-commercial-offensive-cyber-proliferation">II. The Role of Permissive Behaviours in Commercial Offensive-Cyber Proliferation</h3> - -<p>The proliferation of offensive-cyber tools is fed by supply and demand. Given the relative novelty of offensive-cyber activities and their relationship with states, the proliferation is also dependent on a range of “permissive behaviours”. These are behaviours that encourage or stimulate other actors to enter or expand the market. The research for this paper scopes these permissivebehaviours to states, focusing on the interaction of a range of SPBs in relation to NPFs. The paper also addresses behaviours of other stakeholders, for example vendors, but only inasmuch as they reflect the permissive behaviours of states.</p> - -<p>Some caveats and clarifications are needed. First, both supply and demand factors are in scope. Second, the term “permissive behaviour” is not used as a synonym for “negative behaviour”, nor is there an implication that behaviours will always lead to harmful or unwarranted proliferation. Third, permissive behaviours can refer to both action and inaction. Fourth, it should be noted that while the behaviours described have been observed and documented, this does not imply that they are widespread across all stakeholders in each category. In some cases, behaviours will likely be associated with only specific types of stakeholder; nevertheless, their impact is significant enough to be worth noting. Last, it should be acknowledged that a degree of permissive behaviour is required for the offensive-cyber market to be viable. As states seek to identify ways to scrutinise and/or regulate the proliferation of offensive-cyber tools, it may be assumed that “fully permissive” or “fully restrictive” regimes would not be desirable.</p> - -<p>Context is important. It is necessary to understand the crossover and functional overlap between behaviours and market actors. Additionally, while behaviours may be individually influential, it is likely that the cumulative effect of multiple permissive behaviours can markedly increase scope for unchecked proliferation and irresponsible behaviour. NPFs and permissive behaviours are categorised into five distinct areas:</p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p>Regulation of corporate structure and governance.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Legal frameworks for product development, sale and transfer.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Diplomatic support and engagement.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Development of cyber-security ecosystem and workforce.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Integration with defence and security industrial base.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<p>These areas are not comprehensive, but in this paper they capture areas of potential proliferating interaction between market actors. For each area, the research examines whether states play roles as customers, investors, detectors or regulators, for both authorised and unauthorised markets. The research highlights examples of NPFs and SPBs. Again, these are not comprehensive, as they are used as examples of proliferating conditions or activity (see Table 2). The objective is to demonstrate the link between an NPF and an SPB, rather than to list all possible NPFs and SPBs. Additionally, the paper identifies pre-existing global “indicators” (for example, indexes) that may be applied in future research to provide substantive granular comparisons between state and market practices across a range of states.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/02S8f2S.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ Table 2: Types of NPFs and SPBs</em></p> - -<h4 id="area-1-regulation-of-corporate-structure-and-governance">Area 1: Regulation of Corporate Structure and Governance</h4> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF1: Offensive-cyber firms may be operating with limited internal checks or balances on sales.</code></strong></p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB1: Inadequate regulation or enforcement of corporate ethics and corporate social responsibility procedures.</code></strong></p> - -<p>Notwithstanding limited and relatively recent export controls, the desire for continued opacity (from some buyers) has enabled an environment in which there is a continued lack of supply chain transparency among offensive-cyber developers, vendors and markets. In a context of generally poor transparency across the market, firms are disincentivised to increase oversight, as this could reduce sales and/or disrupt supply chains.</p> - -<p>Of an indicative sample of eight offensive-cyber firms (of those with a public presence), there is a wide degree of variation in transparency regarding oversight of sales and use of services or tools that may be used for unauthorised intrusion. Some firms have no ethics statements, while others have ethics statements that concern issues such as the environment and/or modern slavery in their supply chain, but do not have public-facing policies on their products or services. Some firms may claim that they have oversight of clients in some instances, but claim they have no oversight in other cases.</p> - -<p>More transparently, firms may place example end-user licence agreements on their webpages, which can include outcomes such as cessation of service or refusal to renew a contract. Other firms produce transparency and human rights reporting or statements, including indicative data on refused sales, the composition of their external ethics committee, or mention of internal review processes on the use of their products. However, such reports contrast with allegations of use of offensive-cyber products in human rights abuses. Experts have argued that such documentation does not constitute “a transparency report in any meaningful way”.</p> - -<p>It is not possible to conclude that there is an inevitable ethical race to the bottom. Firms – particularly those operating relatively openly – will operate degrees of self-regulating oversight either because they believe it is the right thing to do, or as a means of avoiding negative consequences. These could include bad press, loss of investor or customer confidence, and impacted staff morale. However, beyond overt export control embargo lists and sanctions regimes, firms do not have clarity on how they should sell, and who they legally can, but should not, sell to or purchase from. Grey areas exist beyond the usual suspects – such as Iran, North Korea and Russia – from whom purchase requests are from law enforcement agencies in strategic-ally states where there may be recorded human rights breaches. In these instances, exporting states may be reluctant to provide clarity in writing and there may be a perceived risk of destabilising higher-priority diplomatic engagements. This links to a behaviour discussed later, SPB5.</p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF2: Complex corporate structure crossing multiple jurisdictions.</code></strong></p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB2: Lack of transparency on corporate ownership and transnational subsidiaries.</code></strong></p> - -<p>Like many industries, the offensive-cyber industry has benefited from multi-jurisdictional spread, for instance drawing on tax and oversight regime divergence to increase potential for corporate secrecy. However, there is also scope for additional complexity in corporate structure for the purpose of obfuscating activities, ownership or clients, or sidestepping legal boundaries. For example, firms may operate a range of different company names in different jurisdictions. Additionally, personnel, senior leadership or investors may be involved in more than one commercial offensive-cyber firm, and may operate in fluid locations. As one regime tightens oversight or restrictions on a particular individual, that individual may move to a less rigorous jurisdiction. Feasibly, this fluidity could engender a transfer of intellectual property between firms, and firms themselves may be distinctly transitory. This may include sensitive and strategically significant intellectual property relating to advanced unauthorised intrusion capabilities. Senior leadership in firms that are blacklisted may create new – ostensibly different – firms to continue product or service development and gain new sales. There is, arguably, significant scope for increased alignment in sanction regimes with respect to commercial offensive cyber, as well as more robust enforcement of existing multilateral regimes, such as EU regulations. Beneficial ownership requirements could be enforced to counter shell corporation structures.</p> - -<p>Two suggested global indicators may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 1:</p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p>The level of compliance with the UN’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Scores on the World Bank Governance Index – Regulatory Quality.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<p>These could be used by stakeholders to benchmark and assess the degree to which states and offensive-cyber firms design and implement successful human rights oversight mechanisms.</p> - -<h4 id="area-2-legal-frameworks-for-product-development-sale-and-transfer">Area 2: Legal Frameworks for Product Development, Sale and Transfer</h4> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF3: Offensive-cyber firms may sell to high-risk countries or inappropriate domestic actors.</code></strong></p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB3: Inadequate export controls, internal and/or insufficient training or guidance.</code></strong></p> - -<p>As noted in NPF/SPB1, there is a lack of meaningful clarity internationally regarding the “responsible” sale of offensive hacking tools and services. Meanwhile, there is a wide-ranging catalogue of allegations regarding the sale of offensive-cyber tools to state entities for uses that may be in breach of international human rights obligations. It is possible that there is nuance regarding legal but irresponsible cyber proliferation. For instance, a state may design a legal oversight regime for the export of offensive-cyber tools – unauthorised surveillance software – for the purposes of counterterrorism. However, the impracticality of an international definition of “terrorism” has become a cliché in international politics. In some jurisdictions, “terrorism” or “national-security risk” may be interpreted sufficiently broadly to include non-violent political opposition and civil society groups.</p> - -<p>Additionally, in the absence of guardrails, and the failure of existing mechanisms such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, there is a risk of intentional or unintentional seepage proliferation from both private and state actors. For example, there are instances where hacker-for-hire firms, including those offering services to private investigators working on behalf of individual clients, have reportedly gained access to the NSO Group’s Pegasus software, and have claimed that they can spin up their own control centre to covertly snoop on a target’s digital presence.</p> - -<p>It is also possible that state entities may gain legitimate access to offensive-cyber tools but leak these tools to other agents for illegitimate or illegal use. It is of course also of note that the use of a zero-day exploit against a target can also expose the exploit – for instance, through forensic investigation – to the target entity and/or others. Use, therefore, can pose a proliferation risk.</p> - -<p>Combined, these issues highlight two distinct but linked regulatory or oversight gaps: there are arguably inadequate access control and oversight measures across the market; and there is a lack of cohesion in tools or processes that could be used to restrict irresponsible proliferation.</p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF4: Vulnerability researchers may choose to sell to black or grey markets.</code></strong></p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB4: Lack of effective vulnerabilities equities process, notification or disclosure processes, and/or insufficient legal protection for researchers.</code></strong></p> - -<p>The activities undertaken by vulnerability researchers are often indistinguishable from those undertaken for malicious purposes. Both sets of actors look for vulnerabilities or configuration issues in third-party computing systems that can provide opportunities for access. Outside bug bounty programs, independent researchers will typically conduct their investigations without the knowledge or authorisation of the system owners or end-users. As a result, many researcher activities may be unauthorised and possibly illegal under a jurisdiction’s anti-hacking laws.</p> - -<p>Few states have legal carve-outs or exemptions that protect or support security research activities. In some jurisdictions, anti-hacking laws not only expose researchers to risk of criminal prosecution, but also contain civil causes of action that enable technology manufacturers to bring lawsuits against researchers. This legal environment imperils researchers, and, in some cases, incentivises them to go underground, selling their findings to brokers who will not ask questions, or governments that will not prosecute them, rather than disclosing them to the relevant technology manufacturer or operator.</p> - -<p>In addition, the dynamics regarding exploit sale and/or notification may be inadvertently incentivising unmoderated proliferation of offensive-cyber tools. Vulnerability researchers who discover new vulnerabilities and develop new exploits may choose to sell their knowledge to private firms, vulnerability brokers or government entities. Researchers may be motivated to provide their knowledge to particular actors on the basis of a range of diverse factors, including reputation, alignment and pricing.</p> - -<p>Buyers and platforms may have ranging payment values and structures. Receivers of exploits may not perform any form of vetting of the sources of exploits, beyond determining that the exploit itself is valid. This lack of oversight could be in response to market pressures – the preference of sellers to remain anonymous – or due to the receiver’s own preference or resource constraints. Additionally, as an emerging trend, exploit developers may gain greater income by maintaining their monopoly on their novel exploit and selling their access “as a service”, reducing scope for the exploit to be traded, identified and rectified.</p> - -<p>Exploits may be framed simultaneously as both high-value private and public good commodities. Similarly, national security agencies may be incentivised to hold and deploy novel exploits for offensive operations, rather than share their knowledge with the owner(s) of impacted systems. Some commentators have advocated for an international vulnerabilities equities process (VEP) that holds states accountable to specific standards, or sets boundaries for keeping or disclosing vulnerabilities. Even at a national level, existing VEPs are few, and hindered by contention between the interests of offensive-cyber stakeholders and defensive or privacy cyber stakeholders. Nonetheless, the absence of binding reporting, disclosure or bug-purchase mechanisms leaves the market in a relative free-for-all, enabling opportunities for proliferation to occur unchecked.</p> - -<p>Four suggested global indicators that may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 2 are:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>World Justice Project.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Freedom House Index (Rule of Law).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Bertelsmann Transformation Index.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>Although these global indicators are an imperfect solution, stakeholders could draw on them to contextualise proliferation across a range of jurisdictions. They are notably less direct and/or cohesive than those proposed for Area 1 and some other Areas. An overarching finding from this research is that existing proxy indexes have severe limitations. Put simply, it is not possible to use existing indexes or other open sources to meaningfully quantify the degree to which permissive behaviours have causal or correlative links to commercial cyber proliferation. This is an important dilemma. Stakeholders should consider how the Pall Mall Process and other initiatives can not only urge action against irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation, but also form new processes through which activity can be monitored and assessed.</p> - -<h4 id="area-3-diplomatic-support-and-engagement">Area 3: Diplomatic Support and Engagement</h4> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF3: Offensive-cyber firms may sell to high-risk countries or inappropriate domestic actors.</code></strong></p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB5: State actors may deploy offensive-cyber firms as a means of establishing or strengthening diplomatic relationships.</code></strong></p> - -<p>States with an economically and strategically significant presence of offensive-cyber firms may feel an incentive to promote proliferation in certain circumstances, where this feeds into broader diplomatic goals: for instance, maintaining strategic alignment or improving bilateral trade. It is notable that following the blacklisting by the US of offensive-cyber firms NSO Group and Candiru, both the Israeli government and the firms themselves lobbied Washington to reverse the decision.</p> - -<p>Furthermore, given the strategic exclusivity of some offensive-cyber tools, including advanced spyware, firms can possibly be used as bargaining chips in a broader diplomatic context. There have been alleged instances where offensive-cyber firms have halted trading with some states, for example following negative press, but have later resumed trading after intervention from their own government. In this way, cyber proliferation may be used as a tool of soft-power projection.</p> - -<p>It is also worth noting that, in some contexts, states may use diplomatic or economic levers to entice existing offensive-cyber firms to establish a presence in their territory. For instance, some states have incentivised companies through tax incentives and/or fast-tracked citizenship applications. As demonstrated by the case of Israeli QuaDream and its Cypriot partner InReach, such practices could be a tacit encouragement of SPB2 and could feed or stimulate NPF2.</p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF5: Hackers-for-hire may undertake unauthorised intrusion against third parties, on behalf of public relations firms, law firms or private investigative ecosystems.</code></strong></p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB6: State entities may cover up, downplay or inadvertently encourage the use of hackers-for-hire.</code></strong></p> - -<p>Clients from the private and public sectors may commission the support of public relations and law firms, which in turn contract a hacking-for-hire entity for an offensive-cyber operation for which the victim has not provided consent.</p> - -<p>Hacker-for-hire organisations may use an array of techniques, ranging from basic social engineering combined with open source hacking tools, to hacking with illicit copies of Pegasus. Targets of such unauthorised activity have reportedly included judges, investors, NGO figures and politicians. It is important to emphasise, however, that victims do not need to be public or high-profile figures. There are indications of hackers-for-hire conducting commissioned non-consensual hacking against romantic partners, landlords and competitor firms. Reporting indicates that this is a global issue, with mixed success for international prosecutions.</p> - -<p>Although the commissioning of hacking is illegal in many jurisdictions, there may be some instances where a client or private investigator may wish to commission hacking because they perceive a window of opportunity for hacked material to be used in court, for example in a divorce case. This contradiction may encourage pseudo-legal or illegal proliferation of hacking activity. Despite previous UK government interest in regulating this sector, and the role of private investigators in facilitating historical hacking scandals on behalf of tabloids, UK private investigator activity remains relatively self-regulating.</p> - -<p>Additionally, investigations have identified hacker-for-hire operators who offer intrusive and unobtrusive services to disrupt rival political campaigns; these include a firm promoted on an Israeli Ministry of Defense website. Amid potential controversy and embarrassment associated with such linking, government entities may refuse to comment. Entities in the offensive-cyber industry that are subject to negative reporting may use anti-libel law firms and courts to prohibit the production and dissemination of such reporting. Combined, these behaviours indicate possible ways in which state apparatuses can be used overtly or tacitly as vehicles to obfuscate proliferating practices.</p> - -<p>Three suggested global indicators may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 3:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>National Cyber Security Index (diplomatic engagements).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>UN open-ended working group positions on sharing of technologies and tools as part of capacity-building programmes.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>UN Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrime positions on criminalisation carve-outs for security researchers.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>These indicators may be used by stakeholders to analyse the degree to which different states are overtly or tacitly facilitating commercial cyber proliferation through promotion and/or enticement of market actors through diplomatic and/or economic channels.</p> - -<h4 id="area-4-development-of-cyber-security-ecosystem-and-workforce">Area 4: Development of Cyber-Security Ecosystem and Workforce</h4> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF6: Unrewarding legal avenues for individuals to use hacking skills.</code></strong></p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB7: Lack of engagement or regulation to promote adoption of bug bounty programs, hackathons, “capture the flag” contests, or other forms of paid vulnerability research.</code></strong></p> - -<p>Vulnerability researchers have a range of ethical avenues for disseminating the vulnerabilities or exploits that can enable – although do not constitute – offensive capabilities. These avenues may include actively or retrospectively permissioned vulnerability disclosure programs, some of which may be fee-based bug bounty programs or commissions from software or service providers. However, there is a lack of government guidance on or regulation of how buyers should operate these types of programs, particularly to create greater security and awareness for technology users. This is an unresolved regulatory gap that feeds ambiguity and creates space for crossover between defensive and offensive research.</p> - -<p>Payment agreements may include non-disclosure agreement (NDA) clauses; in essence, the security researcher takes a payment in exchange for their silence after they share their knowledge of an identified vulnerability. Acceptance of the NDA can be a prerequisite for both payment and “safe harbour”: in other words, an agreement by the organisation not to seek prosecution for the hacking. This may be in addition to other vetting procedures, such as ID and banking checks. The rationale for an NDA is understandable; the “buying” organisation is placing a monetary value on exclusive knowledge and will not want the vulnerability to be broadcast to other actors until it is rectified. In some cases, vendors may decide not to disclose the vulnerability at all, for example to avoid reputational impact. It is also possible that the vulnerability may not be fixed altogether – “buying” the details could be viewed as a partial solution to the vulnerability itself. This lack of transparency may frustrate vulnerability researchers and provides an opportunity for them to break the NDA – unbeknownst to the technology manufacturer – to further monetise their findings by secretly selling the information to a vulnerability broker.</p> - -<p>At present, where formal and legal buyers develop a reputation for “sitting on” disclosures or making incomplete payments to researchers, the researchers may be motivated to sell to grey-market entities or otherwise publicly broadcast the vulnerability. As such, regulation that encourages public disclosure may be useful as a form of expectation management for both parties. Public disclosure also encourages mitigation or patching of vulnerabilities, reduces risk for users of the technology, and negates the value of the vulnerabilities in the grey or black markets.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, government intervention in disclosure processes should be carefully calibrated to avoid unintended consequences. There are suggestions, for example, that disclosure laws in some jurisdictions, including recent developments in China, may reduce public disclosure. This may create possible security dilemmas where government entities hold vulnerabilities that remain unpatched.</p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF7: Computer science students may not receive sufficient training in ethics or law.</code></strong></p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB8: Possible gaps in cyber-security and STEM education policy.</code></strong></p> - -<p>An increase in the number of computer science graduates across major economies has been widely reported as necessary for both economic prosperity and cyber security. However, the increased number of skilled computer science graduates has implications for offensive-cyber proliferation. Notwithstanding the emergence of cyber-security degrees, which may include content on ethics, commentators have emphasised that there may be opportunities to improve ethics training in computer and data science training programmes. Additionally, the offensive skills that a student may learn on an “ethical hacking” course for defensive purposes are transferable to offensive markets, including unauthorised activity.</p> - -<p>Given a potential pay disparity between defensive and offensive markets, graduates may be incentivised to offer their skills to offensive operations, even in cases where these may be illegal or pseudo-illegal. This may be exacerbated in regions with high unemployment, or where technical roles may be more limited in pay or scope. In these cases, technical employees may work a primary job and supplement their incomes with hacking or exploit research on the side.</p> - -<p>Ethical hackers may acquire validation through Certified Ethical Hacker, Offsec Certified Professional or other certifications, and clients may use these to filter providers. However, without guidance and guardrails, the voluntary nature of certification gives hackers space to use the adjective “ethical” even if they offer services or use methods that may be in breach of computer misuse laws. Given the international nature of the market, it is also important to note that “legal” and “ethical” are distinct, and can also vary significantly across jurisdictions. Practices that are legal in one country may be illegal and/or unethical in another.</p> - -<p>Four suggested global indicators may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 4:</p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p>International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Global Cybersecurity Index.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>ISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study 2023.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre, University of Oxford, Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model (Section 3).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>HackerOne top participant countries.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<p>These indicators may be used by stakeholders to appraise the status of and possible issues within the cyber-security workforce, and education and training systems in a range of jurisdictional contexts.</p> - -<h4 id="area-5-integration-with-defence-and-security-industrial-base">Area 5: Integration with Defence and Security Industrial Base</h4> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF8: Competitive pressures on existing defence companies to develop offensive-cyber tools.</code></strong></p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB9: Application of unwieldy or inappropriate export and security policies to new technologies.</code></strong></p> - -<p>As noted regarding NPF3/SPB3, export licence regimes can be sufficiently malleable to enable relatively unchecked offensive-cyber proliferation. Additionally, it must be acknowledged that, due to their nature, offensive-cyber tools themselves hold a complicated regulatory position. A single cyber tool may include multiple components for propagation, exploit and payload, each composed of computer code that can be readily disseminated globally and reclassified. Where components are open source code, these may be protected under the First Amendment of the US Constitution. Complicating matters, there are suggestions that states may circumvent export restrictions by encouraging cross-hiring between international and domestic cyber-security vendors.</p> - -<p>In this light, commentators have suggested that given the unique nature of cyber tools and the highly diffuse nature of the offensive-cyber ecosystem, “know your supplier” due diligence may be a pragmatic means by which suppliers and contractors can be regulated with the aim of reducing unchecked proliferation of unauthorised capabilities. Such oversight must account for the multilayered nature of supply chains, as it may be relatively common for arms suppliers to subcontract production of offensive-cyber tools. This increases the opportunity for parts of the supply chain to draw on grey-space exploit markets</p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">NPF9: Revolving door between private companies and military/security positions.</code></strong></p> - -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">SPB10: Uncompetitive remuneration and lack of controls on career trajectories, post-deployment travel or intellectual property restrictions.</code></strong></p> - -<p>Observers have noted that there is a revolving door between defence and the private offensive-cyber industry, although it should be recognised that the door operates across the whole of the defence sector.</p> - -<p>Experienced personnel can draw on their advanced training, tactical skillsets, security clearances and networks to gain more lucrative employment in the private sector. It has been noted that in some national contexts, former defence personnel constitute a majority of founders of cyber-security startups, and research teams may be formed almost exclusively of former military or intelligence personnel. The porosity between private and defence activity should also be set against the backdrop of the challenge of pay gaps between the public and private sectors, with public entities often unable to match the higher salaries offered by the private sector. It is in this context that some states are seeking to loosen controls on career trajectories, giving space for personnel to move more seamlessly between defence and private sector positions.</p> - -<p>The revolving door also has ramifications for cyber proliferation. Private firms, motivated to grow and generate revenues, will be incentivised to offer their services and products to a diverse array of clients across intrusion markets. This creates potential space for advanced techniques or products to filter to lower market tiers (for example private hacker-for-hire firms) and less restrained state actors. Concerted thought should be applied to how the benefits and risks of inter-sector movement can be managed through guardrails, restrictions and observation.</p> - -<p>Three suggested global indicators may be used for monitoring the NPFs and SPBs associated with Area 5:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute military spending databases (expenditure, company value and export value).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Global Organised Crime Index (law enforcement score).</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>Stakeholders may use these indicators to benchmark and contextualise the size and scope of national security and law enforcement markets in different jurisdictions. Although an imperfect and partial solution, these indicators can be used to provide insight into commercial offensive cyber against the backdrop of military–commercial cultures.</p> - -<h3 id="conclusions-and-implications-for-interventions">Conclusions and Implications for Interventions</h3> - -<p>This paper has identified that offensive-cyber proliferation is facilitated by a range of SPBs and NPFs. While those identified in this research are non-exhaustive, it is of significant note that there is clear inter-relationship and reinforcement between some of them. National and international endeavours to promote responsible use of offensive-cyber tools and services will need to be multifaceted and nuanced. Commercial offensive-cyber tools and services perform a vital role in authorised activities, for example, by enhancing cyber-security standards through penetration testing. Similarly, commercial offensive-cyber tools and services are intrinsically necessary to empower responsible state activity, particularly with respect to national security and law enforcement operations.</p> - -<p>As states collectively seek to navigate their endeavour(s) to mitigate irresponsible cyber proliferation and maximise responsible behaviours, it is important to acknowledge and accommodate the multi-faceted activities within the offensive-cyber ecosystem. In instances of concerted irresponsible behaviour, sanctions and blacklisting may be useful tools. However, as identified in this paper, firms, investors and personnel may be motivated to evade such regimes, enabled by the fluid nature of cyber products and services, and incentivised by possible complicity of some state actors. The building of international consensus is thus important to increase the costs of business for the lowest-common-denominator actors.</p> - -<p>More broadly, the building of international consensus is also vital to feed into softer intervention approaches that can draw on the goodwill and societally beneficial intentions of responsible commercial actors. The lowest-common-denominator actors are impactful and significant, but they are not representative of the industry at large. Industry actors, from researchers and brokers through to sellers and consumers, engage in this arena because they want to improve cyber security and shut down illegal activity (among many other positive motivations). In these contexts, such actors may welcome rationally designed and carefully calibrated guidance from the community of state jurisdictions in which they are based, to which they sell, and from whom they source.</p> - -<p>Additionally, the research for this paper reinforces the need to view (ir)responsible cyber proliferation through a “whole-of society” lens. Although the inclusion of publicly accessible hacker-for-hire services and advanced state-oriented offensive capabilities into one research paper necessitates potentially problematic broad-brush strokes, this has fed into an important finding: offensive-cyber proliferation is porous. A cyber capability developed for state actor use may, in time, find its way into private hacking commissioned by everyday citizens. There is a clear and tangible risk that this democratises irresponsible and criminal activity. This reality raises both the stakes and the necessity for action by states that are willing to encourage, enforce and demonstrate responsible behaviours.</p> - -<p>Opportunities for impactful policy interventions at national and international levels may be seen as a two-stage process.</p> - -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Contributions such as this paper help to develop the breadth and depth of understanding of the scale of offensive-cyber proliferation.</strong> In the absence of clear toolkits for further understanding, the paper has proposed a range of possible open source indicators across the five areas of NPFs and SPBs. In principle, these could be adapted or combined with other data points for use in future monitoring. Stakeholders could produce heatmaps of proliferation risk across differing jurisdictions and markets. As previously noted, however, these open sources are imperfect. As like-minded states continue to identify and consolidate positive practices while mitigating irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation, it will also be necessary to consider how multi-stakeholders can implement trusted measures of assessment and monitoring.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Building on these monitoring efforts could lead to assessment of the feasibility and efficacy of national and international interventions.</strong> Some key examples could include:</p> - - <p>2.1. <strong>International government coordination and collaboration on norms and regulation.</strong> Elements of the offensive-cyber ecosystem have shown that they are geographically and structurally flexible. Existing controls, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, are insufficient to keep offensive-cyber proliferation in check. Additionally, future internationally-agreed control mechanisms are likely to be achieved on a long-term, rather than short-term, basis. Combined, these factors mean that states should collectively continue to explore immediate unilateral mechanisms. International stakeholders from government, industry and the third sector should monitor and observe existing unilateral controls, such as the US sanctions against NSO Group and Candiru. Looking ahead, broader mechanisms could include export restrictions, limitations on lobbying and oversight of contracting. The recently started Pall Mall Process is an ideal forum through which national governments and regional bodies can push for greater inter-governmental alignment and collaboration on responsible behaviour regarding offensive-cyber proliferation. While it is promising that like-minded stakeholders are convening to discuss issues relating directly to offensive-cyber proliferation, it is notable that many states and actors have not necessarily (yet) been represented. There may be a challenge in the endeavour to widen participation while maintaining meaningful principles. Nonetheless, where consensus is achieved, a limited coalition of influential states may still be able to influence the wider market where universalism is unobtainable.</p> - - <p>2.2. <strong>Requirements for greater vendor transparency, governance and accountability.</strong> The opacity of many offensive-cyber firms and marketplaces, which encompasses obfuscated or confusing corporate structures, legal liability and public presences, may be helpful in certain environments, such as with core national security-oriented activity and criminal enterprise. This nebulous composition is highly problematic from the standpoint of countering or restricting unchecked offensive-cyber proliferation. Given the diffuse and inter-related nature of the ecosystem, it is unlikely to be possible to counter proliferation meaningfully without responsibly increasing transparency and oversight across commercial intrusion markets.</p> - - <p>2.3. <strong>Adoption of robust vulnerabilities equities and counter-proliferation processes.</strong> The potential for seepage of advanced offensive-cyber capabilities should be a serious concern, in addition to indications that lower-tier hackers-for-hire may have been able to gain access to illicit copies of Pegasus. These cases should be seen as tangible, real-world examples of what happens when cyber proliferation goes wrong. Policymakers and stakeholders must assume that exploits developed for legitimate national security purposes can, and occasionally will, leak into the wrong hands. This is a rallying call for counter-proliferation efforts.</p> - - <p>2.4. <strong>Increased support and protections for vulnerability research.</strong> The vulnerability market ecosystem is vital. Currently, a range of implicit incentives may be feeding proliferation to the grey market – where exploits may be acquired by a range of actors for offensive purposes – rather than prompting cyber-security improvements. Serious concerted thought should be given to how the balance can be meaningfully tipped in favour of defensive-first cyber-security research. This could include greater legal recognition of the necessity for vulnerability researcher disclosures, engagement and support for the development of responsible market behaviours, which may include adherence and transparency for VEPs.</p> - </li> -</ol> - -<p>These suggested interventions are merely a starting point. As is often the case in discussions relating to cyber security, there are no simple solutions, or solve-all mitigations. While there are unlikely to be easy wins to mitigate unchecked offensive-cyber proliferation, it is vital for national, societal and economic security that serious efforts continue. As the research for this paper shows, some governments are now leading on international initiatives. Their success depends on the involvement of various groups from wider society in the design and implementation of interventions to tackle this complex market.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Gareth Mott</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Cyber research team at RUSI. His research interests include governance and cyberspace, the challenges (and promises) of peer-to-peer technologies, developments in the cyber risk landscape, and the evolution of cyber-security strategies at micro and macro levels.</p> - -<p><strong>James Shires</strong> is the Co-Director of both the European Cyber Conflict Research Incubator (ECCRI CIC) and the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative (ECCRI).</p> - -<p><strong>Jen Ellis</strong> works to reduce cyber risk for society. Partnering with security experts, technology providers and operators, civil society and governments, she creates greater understanding of cyber-security realities and promotes collaboration to advance adoption of security strategies and practices. Jen serves on the UK Cabinet Office’s Government Cyber Advisory Board and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology’s Cyber Resilience Expert Advisory Group.</p> - -<p><strong>James Sullivan</strong> is the Director of the Cyber research team at RUSI. He founded and has grown a research group at RUSI that explores topics such as the role of national cyber strategies, the cyber threat landscape, cyber security and risk management, commercial cyber proliferation, offensive cyber, cyber statecraft and diplomacy, and ransomware.</p> - -<p><strong>Jamie MacColl</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Cyber research team at RUSI. His current research interests include ransomware, the UK’s approach to offensive cyber operations, cyber insurance and the role of private companies in global cyber governance. He has led a range of public and private projects for RUSI, with a particular focus on UK cyber policy.</p>Gareth Mott, et al.This paper seeks to identify how state “permissive” behaviours can contribute to the proliferation of offensive-cyber tools and services.European Economic Security2024-10-18T12:00:00+08:002024-10-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/european-economic-security<p><em>Amid heightened geopolitical tensions, the concept of “economic security” has rapidly come to dominate domestic and international policy agendas. Recent global shocks have exposed the fragility of international financial systems and revealed significant security vulnerabilities in economic dependencies.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>While a general understanding of economic security is gradually emerging, the definitions, objectives and strategies associated with the concept continue to vary greatly. This ambiguity severely hinders the ability of like-minded countries to work together towards coordinated and constructive economic security outcomes. Such efforts are further hampered by the fact that the finance and security communities are often siloed. To bridge this divide and bring clarity to the current policy debate, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI has launched a European Economic Security Taskforce (the Taskforce).</em></p> - -<p>CFS is uniquely positioned to deliver this timely initiative, given its reputation as a leading research programme based in Brussels and London that specialises in the intersection of finance and global security. As part of RUSI, the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank, CFS has used its cross-disciplinary expertise and multi-jurisdictional network to convene this Taskforce. The Taskforce brings together international policymakers, geoeconomic academics, and experts from security, industry and the private sector. Taskforce members contribute their expertise in a personal capacity and do not represent their organisations, which include numerous EU member state governments, the European Commission and associated institutions, NATO, and the key allies of Australia, Japan and the UK.</p> - -<p>The first meeting of the Taskforce took place on 9 September 2024, and this report provides an overview of the main findings. To best reflect the breadth and fluidity of the discussion, the report does not provide a linear summary of the matters raised. Instead, it first outlines the economic security definition proposed by CFS to establish a conceptual foundation for the work of the Taskforce. Second, the report groups the observations, insights and consensus points that emerged during the meeting under two broad themes: the impact of ambiguity; and the importance of public–private partnerships (PPPs). These themes did not emerge in isolation from one another, but as interconnected considerations. Finally, the report concludes by summarising three key findings identified by Taskforce members when considering the case study of supply chains. As the meeting was conducted on a non-attributable basis, the names and affiliations of participants are not disclosed.</p> - -<h3 id="economic-security-as-a-concept">Economic Security as a Concept</h3> - -<p>The meeting began with a presentation by CFS on the history and meaning of economic security. The use of economic tools to advance security interests has been a feature of international relations for millennia. Indeed, the imposition of trade sanctions by the Athenian Empire is widely considered a causal factor of the Peloponnesian War. In the 21st century, the idea of identifying economic security as a national security priority has emerged primarily as a reaction to a series of global shocks. Over a period of 15 years, Europe has been confronted with an economic collapse after the 2008 financial crisis, the geopolitical ramifications of the 2016 Brexit vote, the cross-sectoral upheaval caused by the Covid-19 global pandemic, and an unprecedented energy crisis following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. At the same time, China has increasingly deployed coercive economic practices with growing scale, sophistication and intensity. These events have compelled international policymakers to reexamine the security risks that arise as a result of global financial integration.</p> - -<p>The European Commission responded to these shocks by unveiling an Economic Security Strategy in June 2023, which identifies four risk areas: the resilience of supply chains; threats to critical infrastructure; technology security and leakage; and the weaponisation of economic dependencies or economic coercion. The strategy proposes mitigating these risks via a three-pillar approach that involves: promoting competitiveness; protecting against economic security risks; and partnering with the broadest possible range of like-minded partners. In January 2024, the Commission adopted a package of five initiatives aimed at strengthening the EU’s economic security across trade, investment and research. This was followed in July 2024 by European President Ursula von der Leyen designating economic security as a central plank of the 2024–29 European Commission’s economic foreign policy, and by the creation in September 2024 of a new portfolio of Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security.</p> - -<p>Despite this flurry of activity, the concept of economic security remains relatively undefined, with no definition provided in the European Commission’s Economic Security Strategy. This is understandable, given the complexity of the topic, breadth of policy implications, and difficulty gaining multilateral consensus. However, it was crucial to establish a common understanding of economic security among Taskforce members to avoid miscommunication. To facilitate an open and wide-ranging discussion, CFS crafted a three-layered definition of economic security, as visualised in Figure 1. The first layer addresses the security risks and opportunities that arise due to a financially interconnected and increasingly unstable world. Opportunities are considered alongside risks because it is important to acknowledge that, while international integration can create vulnerabilities, effective responses often require collaborative actions. The second layer overlays the first, and covers the tools, systems and capabilities employed by countries and alliances to manage these risks and opportunities. Inherent in this layer is how these levers and structures can be weaponised by hostile and non-aligned actors. Finally, the third layer, which overlays and impacts the first two layers, encompasses how the geopolitical context influences the relative weight policymakers place on security, sovereignty and prosperity priorities.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UxbTmrF.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: Economic Security Definition Created for the Taskforce</em></p> - -<h3 id="theme-1-the-impact-of-ambiguity">Theme 1: The Impact of Ambiguity</h3> - -<p>The presentation of the CFS economic security definition prompted Taskforce members to consider the implications of the lack of definitional clarity at the EU level. Some participants expressed frustration that there had not been a formal discussion among member states to determine what economic security is and, importantly, what it is not. Without a definition, several Taskforce members raised the concern that “everything gets securitised”. A few policymaker participants expanded on this point, commenting that it was important to define and maintain boundaries between trade policy and national security. These participants argued that using trade instruments for national security purposes would undermine international trade regulations and jeopardise the “level playing field”. There was pushback against this assertion from a security specialist, who remarked that the playing field is already uneven precisely because of deliberate acts by hostile, non-aligned and even allied actors. Therefore, pursuing a level playing field inherently requires a strategy that involves both prosperity and security considerations.</p> - -<p>The debate on this point exemplified the main impact of definitional ambiguity identified by Taskforce members – that a lack of clarity can encourage and exacerbate siloed thinking on economic security. Many policymaker participants pointed to the fact that economic security concerns are currently being managed within member states by a multitude of ministries, including defence, national security, foreign affairs, home affairs, finance, economics, environment, industry and trade. Despite several participants highlighting the recent creation of economic security portfolios by their governments, there was general consensus that policymaking on this topic remains disjointed. This conclusion was reinforced by the experiences of some non-policymaker Taskforce members. Academic and industry participants commented that it was almost impossible for an outsider to understand which ministry, if any, had central oversight on economic security issues. These Taskforce members each shared personal anecdotes of consulting with numerous different agencies on economic security matters, only to become increasingly frustrated when it appeared that the agencies were not communicating with one another.</p> - -<p>There was agreement that this domestic fragmentation is compounded by the absence of EU governance structures capable of addressing economic security issues in a cohesive manner. This is largely due to a clash of competences – whereas most economic affairs fall under the authority of the EU, national security remains largely under the jurisdiction of member states. As a result, EU-level thinking on economic security is rooted in trade policy, and member states generally retain control over the enactment, implementation and enforcement of economic security measures. While Taskforce members emphasised the importance of preserving member state sovereignty, many acknowledged that institutional barriers prevent the EU from strategically addressing matters at the intersection of economics and national security. To illustrate the impact of this in practice, one policymaker participant noted that discussions on economic security issues (though often not explicitly framed as such) are occurring across multiple European Council working parties and different sectors of the EU system, yet no mechanism exists to unify these conversations. Another Taskforce member took this argument even further, to claim that the lack of an effective economic security governance framework prevents the EU from leveraging its economic power to strengthen the national security of member states, and global security more broadly.</p> - -<h3 id="theme-2-the-importance-of-ppps">Theme 2: The Importance of PPPs</h3> - -<p>A consensus point that emerged from the discussion was that the lack of conceptual clarity on economic security, combined with fragmented domestic and international policymaking, had led to a largely ineffective relationship between policymakers and the private sector. There was general agreement that a productive partnership with industry is vital to any economic security strategy, but it was felt by many participants that public–private engagement in Europe was less constructive than in other regions, such as North America or the Asia-Pacific. Some participants attributed this disparity to the fact that countries in those regions had faced increased incidents of direct economic coercion, which provided opportunities for policymakers to work intensively with the private sector and “learn under pressure”. One example discussed by Taskforce members was Australia’s ability to withstand the most comprehensive punitive trade measures enacted by China in recent history.</p> - -<p>While a sovereign country can exercise greater policy decisiveness and operational agility than a multilateral organisation like the EU, some Taskforce members felt there were specific structural and cultural barriers within the EU that prevented an optimal partnership between the European public and private sectors. Several participants criticised the European Commission for constructing its Economic Security Strategy under the “promote”, “protect” and “partner” pillars without providing a framework to work across these pillars or guidance on how they interact. Other Taskforce members expressed concern that the European Commission had failed to effectively communicate to the private sector the objectives and progress of its economic security risk assessment process, resulting in confusion. These critiques were echoed by one participant, who gave the example of being told by a prominent European company that it was more concerned about economic security measures being enacted erratically by the EU and member states than about economic risks coming from China.</p> - -<p>This anecdote led many participants to comment that there needs to be significant improvement in the communication of economic security priorities to the private sector. One lesson from Australia that was shared with the Taskforce was the fundamental importance of a “feedback loop” between policymakers and companies to enable the effective identification of vulnerabilities. This requires coordinated action across administrative silos to provide a combined assessment of sector-specific economic, security and geopolitical risks. Companies can then be supported to make informed risk assessments, implement diversification strategies, and combat the impact of trade weaponisation. By contrast, one industry participant commented that the current disjointed communication from the EU and member states often results in company executives relegating economic security issues to their legal teams, who enact a tick-box approach. The participant concluded by arguing that if agencies “joined the dots” between themselves, a clearer, more coordinated message could be communicated to industry about its role in economic security policies.</p> - -<p>Several Taskforce members also commented that ineffective information sharing on economic security risks is preventing private actors from accurately assessing the trade-offs they are making between efficiency and security. A key example raised by participants of an economic security vulnerability that is commonly underestimated by the private sector is the risk posed by convertible loans. While these lending structures may seem lucrative, particularly to startup companies, they can result in the loss of company equity and intellectual property to hostile states. The 2023 European Investment Bank Investment Survey appears to support the view that the private sector remains focused on optimising cost-effectiveness over risk mitigation, as it reports that less than half of firms surveyed had changed, or were planning to change, their sourcing strategy. The fact that 96% of those firms had experienced disruptions to trade reflects the view of some Taskforce members that simply increasing private sector awareness is not sufficient – companies need to be incentivised to prioritise economic security risks. Participants suggested that this incentivisation could come through incorporating economic resilience into how valuations are arrived at by the financial markets, as well as more effective enforcement of economic security-related regulations, to encourage greater compliance.</p> - -<h3 id="case-study-supply-chains">Case Study: Supply Chains</h3> - -<p>Taskforce members raised several economic security examples to illustrate their thinking on the themes of definitional ambiguity and the importance of PPPs, including technology leakage, direct foreign investment and electronic vehicles. However, the discussion predominately centred around the case study of supply chains, and this enabled Taskforce members to explore the impact of the two themes in practice. From this dialogue emerged three key findings which, although framed in the context of supply chains, have broad application.</p> - -<h4 id="finding-1-common-objectives">Finding 1: Common Objectives</h4> - -<p>There was general agreement that, without clearly defined economic security goals, it is almost impossible to differentiate between supply chain risks, prioritise sectors according to their vulnerabilities, reach agreement on standards, and implement instruments coherently across the EU. One policymaker commented that this ambiguity prevents the incremental national security responses of member states from coalescing into a strategic convergence on European supply chain priorities. Another policymaker expressed the opinion that greater clarity would enable member states to understand how much weight to place on each of the three pillars of the European Commission’s Economic Security Strategy, particularly given that the “promote” and “protect” pillars often conflict in the context of supply chains.</p> - -<p>A group of Taskforce members expanded on this point by proposing the idea that, once common goals had been established, member states would be able to construct a decision tree to navigate the three pillars. These participants suggested that such a framework could require member states to prioritise protecting the supply chain at first instance, before promoting economic resilience through innovation, diversification and other risk mitigation strategies. The final stage of the framework would involve developing an industrial policy, which would include building strategic partnerships. The discussion on this decision tree concluded with Taskforce members commenting that each stage would involve a different degree of public and private sector responsibility</p> - -<p>On a more granular level, many Taskforce members supported the adoption of a sector-specific approach in relation to the development of economic security objectives. This would begin by identifying the main priorities for a certain sector or, where appropriate, for a strategically significant supply chain within that sector. From that analysis, the tools, systems and capabilities required to manage the relevant economic security risks would emerge, which would enable the alignment of national and European strategies. These strategic objectives could then be shared with key allies, either bilaterally or through forums such as the G7, as well as with private sector partners, and be pursued in a coordinated manner. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act and the European Chips Act were raised by many Taskforce members as two examples of how the identification of sector-specific objectives can bring clarity and cohesion to economic security policies. While the limitations of these instruments were acknowledged (such as the validity of the targets and effectiveness of the tools chosen to implement them), several participants felt they were still a useful model for achieving coordinated, strategic action on economic security.</p> - -<h4 id="finding-2-quality-data">Finding 2: Quality Data</h4> - -<p>To develop economic security objectives, it is necessary to have access to relevant, accurate and timely data. However, there was consensus among Taskforce members that the current level of information on supply chains is insufficient to enable EU policymakers to identify and prioritise economic dependencies. One participant commented that it was an immense challenge, if not impossible, for EU institutions to receive trade data of consistent quality and granularity across the different member states. This is supported by a report on economic security practices requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade, which found that: “Data that would allow for a comprehensive understanding of exposures is often lacking (e.g. intra-EU firm level trade data) or incomplete (e.g. Eurostat production data or data on multinational corporations’ geographic distributions of revenue, assets and profits)”. Another Taskforce member expressed concern that China has much greater access to this type of data, which gives it a sophisticated understanding of economic dependencies. This participant cited China’s export controls on critical minerals as an example of how China effectively uses trade data to exploit European economic vulnerabilities, without creating unintended consequences for its own manufacturing sector.</p> - -<p>Many participants noted that any attempt to gain information on supply chain patterns and detect potential pinch points that are vulnerable to weaponisation would be pointless without private sector cooperation. Despite some policymakers arguing that there was an entrenched corporate aversion to sharing commercial data, other participants commented that companies are much more aware of the impacts of economic security risks than they were even 10 years ago, and that there was an increased appetite for information exchange. Indeed, one Taskforce member referenced a recent BusinessEurope report on economic security, which calls for greater intelligence sharing between the public and private sectors because it would “empower companies to better identify and address security risks through effective mitigation measures, while it will also help authorities to better calibrate policies”. There was general agreement that to enable empirical, data-driven risk identification, more efficient PPPs on economic security information sharing need to be developed.</p> - -<h4 id="finding-3-analytical-capacity">Finding 3: Analytical Capacity</h4> - -<p>Once policymakers and companies are in possession of quality data, they need the capacity to analyse and assess it effectively. However, most participants agreed that there was insufficient investment in economic security analytical competencies, both within and between the public and private sectors. Some Taskforce members commented that addressing this deficiency requires the integration of security expertise with economic analysis, citing the whole-of-government approach adopted during contingency planning in the defence sector as an example. A security expert elaborated that applying national security logic could enhance economic security policymaking, specifically the “acquisition, analysis, assessment, decision” framework used to make security decisions in pursuit of a strategic concept. This framework involves gathering intelligence, analysing the information, and producing an agreed statement of the situation, which is presented to the decision-maker. The expert acknowledged that tasking a multilateral agency to produce an agreed statement on an economic security situation would be significantly more challenging and politically contentious than a traditional national security assessment. However, the meeting was characterised by a shared desire among participants for greater precision and practicality on economic security issues, which some Taskforce members suggested could be achieved by drawing lessons from the defence and security communities.</p> - -<p>The Australian experience with Chinese economic coercion illustrates why the analytical capacity needed to manage modern economic security threats requires the convergence of economic, trade and national security competencies. Traditionally, assessments of supply chain weaknesses have focused on economic and trade dimensions. However, an Australian representative shared with the Taskforce that China frequently weaponises supply chains not only because they are economically significant, but also to send a political message. For instance, while the scale of Australian beef, barley and wine exports to China does not match that of the iron ore industry, these products are symbols of Australia’s agricultural prowess and represent its success in establishing a profile within the Chinese consumer market as a producer of premium goods. Beyond the symbolic, China’s targeting of these industries has significant electoral implications, because many Australian politicians, particularly those from rural constituencies, rely heavily on support from the agricultural sector. As tensions between Europe and China are expected to escalate over the coming decade, it will be crucial for policymakers and companies to develop the analytical capacity needed to accurately map their risk exposure to politically motivated economic coercion.</p> - -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> - -<p>The inaugural meeting of the RUSI European Economic Security Taskforce highlighted the conceptual and concrete impacts of the lack of clarity, common priorities, and cohesive strategy on economic security within both member states and the EU. At the close of the meeting, one participant commented that the discussion “only emphasised the importance of initiating this Taskforce”, as it was a reminder that Europe is at the very beginning of designing and implementing the data-sharing mechanisms, analytical capacity, and PPPs necessary to achieve a more resilient and secure economy.</p> - -<p>A second meeting of the Taskforce will build on these findings by examining how unstable geopolitical conditions and escalating geoeconomic threats influence the security, sovereignty and prosperity trade-offs that policymakers must navigate when developing domestic and multilateral responses to economic security risks.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Eliza Lockhart</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. Her research examines matters at the intersection of law, finance and global security. Eliza is a lawyer and legal policy expert with experience advising on economic security, hybrid/state threats, electoral integrity, risk and compliance, and disruptive technologies.</p>Eliza LockhartAmid heightened geopolitical tensions, the concept of “economic security” has rapidly come to dominate domestic and international policy agendas. Recent global shocks have exposed the fragility of international financial systems and revealed significant security vulnerabilities in economic dependencies. \ No newline at end of file +<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow for the Futures Lab in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>Harrison Prétat, et al.The Philippines’ fragile energy outlook threatens to undermine efforts to secure its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis an assertive China. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/hkers/2024-11-28-china-in-the-euro-atlantic.html b/hkers/2024-11-28-china-in-the-euro-atlantic.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ff8b0973 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-11-28-china-in-the-euro-atlantic.html @@ -0,0 +1,293 @@ + + + + + + + + + + China In The Euro-Atlantic · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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China In The Euro-Atlantic

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China’s Strategic Options in the Euro-Atlantic

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Sidharth Kaushal, et al. | 2024.11.28

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This paper outlines the likely scope of a putative presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in and around the Euro-Atlantic in the next 15 years and the nature of the foreign policy it will support.

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China is becoming an ever-more prominent actor in the global maritime commons, emerging as a key player in sectors such as global shipping. China is also gradually expanding its military footprint outside its region and developing the capacity for power projection at reach. For policymakers in the Euro-Atlantic, this raises the prospect of a Chinese military presence in the region and its environs (such as the South Atlantic and the Arctic). This paper seeks to outline the likely scope of a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) putative presence in and around the Euro-Atlantic in the next 15 years and the nature of the foreign policy it will support.

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Key Findings

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    While there is some rationale for a PLAN presence in the Euro-Atlantic and its environs, the challenges of maintaining an extra-regional military presence at any scale will limit its scope. China’s blue-water capabilities are still nascent and even after likely growth, resourcing either a rotational or permanent deployment of PLAN capabilities will impose challenging force structure trade-offs on a navy that already faces the daunting task of competing in both the Pacific and Indian oceans.

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    Despite this, the bottlenecks in key Chinese supply chains that begin in the Atlantic may provide incentives for a future Chinese leader to decide that a military presence at scale is warranted – such a choice will probably not be made in the medium term (10–15 years). Much of China’s military activity, including defence engagement, is likely to be Phase 0 shaping to set the conditions if such a shift is chosen.

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    While China will represent a very limited military challenge in the region, it is likely to seek coercive options towards Europe. Beijing’s most likely foreign policy towards Europe would combine elements of coercion and engagement, since China needs the European market, but seeks a degree of leverage.

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    China has several coercive options that leverage maritime power. Its central role in port infrastructure and support to Russia’s economy and military are two options that it might leverage. While many of these options either do not involve the PLAN, or involve it primarily as a supporting element, they can have second-order ramifications for European navies.

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Although a future PLAN presence should not be a basis for strategic distraction from the core tasks of Europe’s navies in terms of deterring Russia, its shaping activities in the region should be monitored and where possible constrained.

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Introduction

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In 2019, NATO’s then Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg voiced concerns that although “there’s no way that NATO will move into the South China Sea … we have to address the fact that China is coming closer to us, investing heavily in infrastructure”. The prospect of China moving into the Euro-Atlantic area poses new questions for the UK and its partners in the region. Given that China has not yet emerged as a major defence and security actor in the Atlantic (although it wields considerable economic influence), policymakers and ministries of defence will benefit from an understanding of the potential scope of China’s regional ambitions, and their ramifications.

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To explore China’s likely approach to the Euro-Atlantic, this paper’s analysis is based on some assumptions about the principles driving China’s foreign policy. These are derived from public statements and published scholarship.

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The nature of China’s engagement in the Euro-Atlantic is apparent more from its conflicting economic imperatives than its modest military presence. The capacity of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) for sustained power projection remains limited. However, China has strong incentives to maintain stable relations with states whose markets partly sustain its investment-led, export-dependent economy. There are also reasons for China to pursue coercive leverage over European states that have, to some extent, cooperated with US efforts to economically contain China (most notably through exercising control over key technologies, such as semiconductors). An assessment of how Beijing might balance these conflicting imperatives and the emerging military implications of its approach will help European leaders avoid either complacency or overreaction. The Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre and the Centre for Strategic Studies of the French Navy (CESM) have supported this project, conducted by RUSI and the Council on Geostrategy. The project examines how China may evolve as a power in the Euro-Atlantic. The research for this paper, conducted in July 2024, involved a review of existing literature on China’s capabilities and wider geostrategic imperatives.

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There are several trajectories that China’s foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic may take, each of which corresponds to a different set of naval priorities. It might opt for an increasingly coercive approach, aimed at fixing US and European assets in the region and thus giving it more of a free hand in the Indo-Pacific. This approach has been advocated by members of China’s military and analytical communities. It might entail the deployment of forces in the Atlantic at a scale sufficient to occupy the attention of a meaningful number of US forces and to give European states pause on their commitments to the Indo-Pacific. More explicit support to Russia than has been offered by China thus far might also constitute a coercive approach.

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At the other end of the spectrum is the view, espoused by others in China, that Europe’s consumer economies represent “the endpoints” for many of the infrastructure projects that form part of the Belt and Road Initiative – a large number of which would serve the primary role of linking Chinese producers with European markets (since few other markets in Eurasia are of a comparable scale). While strategic engagement in the Euro-Atlantic is part of this view of China’s priorities, the main focus is not to alienate European states. To do so would drive them to coordinate with the US more closely, which incentivises non-military forms of regional engagement.

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These are not mutually exclusive options, as coercion and engagement can form complementary strands of a state’s foreign policy. However, a nakedly coercive foreign policy makes engagement more difficult.

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This paper contends that dissuasion is the foreign policy that Beijing is most likely to embark on in the Atlantic. China needs the markets of Europe, given its own structural export surpluses, which will prove difficult to export elsewhere. However, China’s latent capacity for coercion can serve as a useful means of dissuading policies that directly impact China’s interests in its immediate periphery. It is thus likely that China’s foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic will attempt to maintain a constructive relationship with Europe (eschewing some aggressive foreign policy tools) while attempting to ensure that the principles on which the relationship rest are amenable to Beijing’s interests, particularly with respect to European policies in the Indo-Pacific.

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The direct military ramifications of a strategy of dissuasion are likely to be limited in the short to medium term. While there are some reasons for China to seek a military presence in the vicinity of the Euro-Atlantic area (for example, in the Arctic and South Atlantic), there are considerable practical limitations, which are likely to prove enduring. China is likely to engage in what Western military parlance would term “Phase 0 shaping activities” in the South Atlantic and potentially also the Arctic. Phase 0 activities would be designed to cultivate regional influence, habituate the PLAN to longer deployments, and set the conditions for a more substantial presence in the longer term. Naval presence and activities, such as joint exercises with Russia, might also be used as a means of signalling to Europe China’s capacity to indirectly play a more significant security role in the Euro-Atlantic. For example, China might provide more explicit military and economic support to Russia as one way of seeking to reinforce a strategy of dissuasion.

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The main conclusion of the paper is that for Europe’s navies, the presence of the PLAN in the Atlantic is a relatively distant and low-probability concern, but that growing Chinese interests in the region will lead to an increase in activity, which should at this stage be monitored and matched as an economy-of-force effort. In the long term, China may become increasingly dependent on sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the South Atlantic and may have the capacity to commit significant resources to their protection. Similarly, its footprint in the Arctic might grow, for reasons that are discussed in the paper. While it is not likely that China’s presence will materialise until well beyond the next decade, it is a contingency to plan for, and the shaping activity that might enable this eventual development should be monitored. In the period most relevant to national defence reviews, the most significant consideration from a security standpoint is the Sino-Russian relationship in the High North and beyond, which might have more direct military ramifications in Europe.

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The paper has three chapters. Chapter I describes the underlying assumptions about China’s foreign policy drivers on which the assessment of its military engagement with the Euro-Atlantic is based. Chapter II provides further detail on Beijing’s strategic imperatives in the Euro-Atlantic that have a plausible maritime dimension. Chapter III describes the employment and potential limitations of China’s naval power in the Euro-Atlantic. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of a Chinese presence in the Euro-Atlantic for European navies.

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I. Assumptions About Drivers for China’s Foreign Policy

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The assessments in this paper are based on a number of underlying assumptions for the next decade. The first is that the US will increasingly prioritise strategic competition with China. This will involve a rebalancing of US military capabilities towards the Indo-Pacific, potentially leaving gaps in the European security architecture. The 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy released by President Joe Biden’s administration, for example, explicitly states an intention to “renew our focus on innovation to ensure the U.S. military can operate in rapidly evolving threat environments” in the Indo-Pacific region. It is likely that the US Indo-Pacific Command, which already absorbs 60% of critical capabilities, such as nuclear attack submarines, will see its allocation of naval assets grow. One outcome of this refocusing is that, much like the British and German fleets before the First World War, the US Navy and the PLAN might fix much of the other’s naval power in static opposition within a single region, ironically limiting the extra-regional footprints of both global aspirants. Both navies may seek to maintain an extra-regional presence to secure lines of communication and, in the case of China, to potentially fix US resources elsewhere. However, the very fragility of the regional balance of power will limit each navy’s slack capacity for deployment elsewhere.

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The second assumption is that, to the greatest extent possible, China will remain committed to securing its supply chains and maintaining market access. Beijing’s economic plan hinges on a delicate balancing act: constructing a trade framework that supports regime security and self-sufficiency while fostering in other countries greater economic dependence on it. China’s trajectory of economic growth is heavily reliant on expanding its share of global manufacturing, a strategy which necessitates sustained increases in both production capacity and global market penetration. Beijing recognises the vulnerability of its economic model to external disruptions and will continue to pursue strategies to mitigate these risks.

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The third assumption is that China’s efforts to reduce its dependence on external markets and technology through initiatives such as the “dual circulation” economy and “Made in China 2025” are unlikely to fully materialise by 2032. However, if this changes, it will affect the likelihood of a coercive foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic by setting the economic incentive structures of China and European states at odds. Although these initiatives are aimed at mitigating reliance on foreign technologies and markets, China remains deeply integrated in the international systems from which it seeks to partially detach, and its growing role in some sectors (such as electric vehicles and solar panels) will also create new dependencies on suppliers in regions such as West Africa.

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The fourth assumption is that Beijing will be heavily influenced by status concerns as well as security interests. The two may significantly overlap since global acceptance of China as a rule-setter in key regions will aid its economic and security interests. As China continues to rise on the global stage, Beijing will be increasingly motivated by the desire to be recognised as a great power and to shape international norms and institutions in the image of the values and interests of the Communist Party of China (CCP). Evidence for this desire to be a rule-setter rather than a rule-follower is apparent in initiatives such as the Global Development Initiative (2021), the Global Security Initiative (2022) and the Global Civilisation Initiative (2023).

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Many of the instruments that China will apply to deliver this engagement are non-military, although a limited military presence can serve several aims for China. These include enabling certain forms of engagement (such as coordination on non-traditional security threats) and supporting China’s scientific establishment, as well as the efforts of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to generate maritime domain awareness and setting the conditions for a more ambitious military posture, should political and military circumstances require it.

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II. China’s Strategic Interests in the Euro-Atlantic

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China has several major areas of strategic interest in the Euro-Atlantic and adjoining regions to which its position in the maritime domain may be relevant. These are:

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    Securing SLOCs and access to critical resources.

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    Maintaining market access to Europe.

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    Protecting Chinese overseas interests.

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    Maintaining the capacity to put pressure on the US and other Western states on “exterior lines”.

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Securing Sea Lines of Communication

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While energy supplies that traverse the Indian Ocean have historically been an area of focus for Chinese strategists, a number of critical Chinese supply chains have bottlenecks in the Atlantic. For example, 98% of China’s cobalt is imported, with the majority from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Cobalt plays a vital role in several industrial processes, including oil refining. Similarly, much of China’s manganese, used in the production of steel and anodes for lithium-ion batteries, is procured from South Africa, Gabon and Ghana. This can have long-term military ramifications. Despite the fears of Chinese strategists, the prospect of a US blockade of the Strait of Malacca has always been remote: it would also have an impact on countries within the cordon (and the PLAN would inflict considerable attrition on any enforcing vessels). Many of China’s avenues to securing other key inputs, such as cobalt, are far more fragile.

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The efforts of the US and its allies to control flows of key industrial and military inputs that must cross the South Atlantic in a conflict are, in theory, more militarily achievable. The US Navy could constrain flows of these inputs with a close blockade in more militarily permissive waters. Whether the US has an appetite to enforce such a cordon on distant neutral states is debatable, especially as this would also rob the US Navy of resources it would need in the Pacific. However, it would seem logical that a country that has spent decades treating the “Malacca dilemma” as a real concern should be equally worried about the prospects of such a blockade. It should perhaps not be surprising, therefore, that the PLAN is reportedly seeking bases capable of hosting its aircraft carriers in West African states such as Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, and that it has conducted visible naval exercises with Russia and South Africa. Chinese military authors have posited that aircraft carriers have an important role in protecting SLOCs and a carrier strike group acting as a fleet in being need not be preponderant to significantly complicate SLOC interdiction.

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Nonetheless, there are a number of alternative and arguably less risky methods of supply-chain derisking available to China, including diversification and stockpiling – the same approach China applies to oil. Moreover, in a conflict, the precedence taken by military production over civilian consumption and the ability of a sophisticated economy to engage in import substitution is typically a limiting factor on the immediate impact of a blockade. Short of imposing something analogous to the Navicert system on vessels leaving African ports, it is unclear how the US Navy could impose a blockade, since most shipping to China occurs on vessels that are not Chinese-flagged. It is entirely plausible that the assertions of the Chinese military community regarding the need for “far seas protection” reflect institutional beliefs and interests of the PLAN rather than China’s strategy. If this is the case, it might well be that these interests will not translate into a military presence adjacent to the Euro-Atlantic, with some questioning the evidence that China has indeed sought a base in West Africa.

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At a minimum, however, a plausible rationale for a military presence does exist and China has reportedly already set up military infrastructure, such as telemetry stations in Kenya. If the naval protection of SLOCs becomes a core mission for China, this would place sizeable Chinese forces within the Atlantic. On balance, this paper argues that this is unlikely to occur until well beyond the next decade, but efforts to set the conditions for a Chinese naval presence in the Atlantic, should a future leader opt to create one, may be visible during the next 15 years.

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Maintaining Market Access to Europe

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Market access to the consumption-led economies of Europe represents a second area of focus for China. The country has invested substantially in efforts to increase its connectivity across Eurasia through the Belt and Road Initiative, and the ability to move finished goods to European markets is likely to remain a significant driver of Chinese foreign policy, especially as its investment-led economic model will make it difficult to shift to a consumption-led economy.

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Strategic investments in port infrastructure in Europe, including Piraeus in Greece and Hamburg in Germany, as well as ports in countries such as Egypt, give Chinese companies a controlling share in a number of critical maritime nodes, with Chinese firms owning or having a stake in all 15 of the world’s busiest ports. Chinese firms are deploying sophisticated logistics management platforms such as LOGINK, which already has agreements with at least 24 ports, and security inspection equipment manufactured by Nuctech. These technologies provide unprecedented opportunity for covert gathering of intelligence about maritime traffic, trade flows, cargo data and even biometric information of individuals working at ports. In principle, there are sound commercial reasons for China’s port investments and they do not necessarily provide Beijing with control over operations. However, a central position in global transport networks can be employed as a coercive instrument. Port operators are bound by national laws and cannot easily refuse services on political grounds, but countries can exercise other forms of control over their companies and capital. Consider, for example, recent US restrictions on the ability of US nationals to work with Chinese companies in key sectors. Moreover, coercive activity can be presented as administrative procedure, as was the case during China’s 2010 rare earths embargo on Japan (under the aegis of production issues) and its embargo on Norwegian salmon after the latter hosted the dissident Liu Xiabo (under the aegis of health inspections, conducted repeatedly until the produce rotted).

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Economic entanglement, even if not designed explicitly for coercion, can create latent coercive tools – consider how networks such as SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications – the leading provider of secure financial messaging services) have been weaponised against Russia and Iran. The dominance of Chinese companies, such as engineering giant ZPMC, in providing critical port equipment such as ship-to-shore cranes, enhances Beijing’s potential influence over port operations. For navies, a major consideration is likely to be that, for many deployments, routine resupply of non-sensitive goods depends on suppliers operating through civilian ports.

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Protecting Chinese Overseas Interests

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The protection of China’s overseas interests, including the considerable number of Chinese nationals who work abroad, is also an increasingly important goal, the salience of which was illustrated by events such as the 2011 non-combatant evacuation operation for Chinese nationals in Libya carried out by the PLAN.

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Other overseas interests include exploration for resources in international waters, which falls under the purview of the State Oceanic Administration. In the past decade, Chinese authors have highlighted the fact that there was scope for China to increase the number of applications it made to the International Seabed Authority for mining rights in the Atlantic, with a specific focus on metallic sulphides in the South Atlantic. China has recently concluded its first deep-sea expedition in the Atlantic, in which the State Oceanic Administration’s research ship Shenyai Yihao (which can operate a range of submersibles) played a leading role. China has also conducted a number of scientific expeditions in the Atlantic in the past decade, with a particular focus on the South Atlantic. A number of Chinese scholars and analysts have also expressed interest in resource extraction in areas such as the Arctic, which, although not part of the Euro-Atlantic, have a symbiotic relationship with it, particularly since several NATO members are Arctic states. Activity in the Arctic can serve a range of aims, including setting the conditions for access to seabed resources in international waters and generating usable data to support navigation that Chinese entities, including the PLA, can leverage.

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China has committed significant resources to scientific activity in the Arctic, coordinated through the State Oceanic Administration, but which the PLA supports with personnel. The PLA is also represented on China’s Polar advisory committee. To date, China has completed 13 scientific expeditions to the region, employing platforms such as the polar icebreaker Xuelong-2, and its share of research outputs related to the region is growing rapidly. In addition, China has sought to increase its regional access through investments in infrastructure, including an abortive bid by China Communications Construction Company to construct airports in Greenland.

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Thus far, however, China has worked primarily (but not exclusively) through Russia, an approach that dovetails with Russia’s own aspirations to become a primary goods provider in the Indo-Pacific. For example, in 2021 Russia articulated plans to fill gaps in the Chinese coal sector left by China’s decision to embargo Australian coal. Much of Russia’s coal mining occurs in the Arctic and the country maintains coal mines in geopolitically sensitive Svalbard, Norway. Similarly, since 2014, Russia has relied on China for financial support to underpin its efforts to tap its liquefied natural gas (LNG) reserves in the Arctic and, in February 2021, Novatek (Russia’s second-largest gas producer) and China’s investment company Shenergy Group signed a deal to ship several million tonnes of LNG from Russia’s now-sanctioned Arctic LNG-2 project to the Yamal peninsula in northwest Siberia for onward transit to China. Despite this, China’s embrace of Russian hydrocarbons remains lukewarm. Although coal exports from Russia have risen, nearby Indonesia has been the primary beneficiary of China’s frictions with Australia, while Arctic LNG-2 has had to suspend operations due to a paucity of tankers following Western sanctions. Moreover, China’s foreign policy aspirations to be regarded as a “near Arctic” state have roused suspicions in Moscow.

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Maintaining Pressure on Western States’ Exterior Lines

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The idea of expanding strategic space on exterior lines is a common feature of Chinese analytical discourse. China is, as mentioned, likely to seek latent coercive levers to apply to Europe, if only to shape European behaviour regarding its own interests in Asia. China’s foreign policy, however, beyond its immediate environs, has thus far largely (but not exclusively) eschewed military coercion. While not averse to flexing the state’s economic muscle (for example when then Premier Wen Jiabao cancelled trade talks with France in 2007 after the latter hosted the Dalai Lama, or cutting off imports from Lithuania in 2021 over the latter’s decision to open a Taiwan Representative Office), China has by and large limited its coercive statecraft to economics and has been judicious in its use of non-military coercive tools.

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Several Chinese analysts suggest that maritime presence in the Atlantic should be part of a strategy of operating on exterior lines and a means of relieving pressure in East Asia, although there is a lack of consensus to some degree on whether such a strategy should be militarised. Some advocate a cautious approach, emphasising geo-economics and investments in port infrastructure in which the PLAN should focus on multilateral engagement and cooperation with European states on non-traditional security threats such as piracy – partly as a means of countering the narrative that it represents a threat. Other Chinese analysts, such as Hu Bo of Beijing University, have called for a force of two to three carrier strike groups to be deployed beyond East Asia to “pin down” US assets that might be deployed to the region. Similarly, China’s premier doctrinal publication, The Science of Military Strategy, calls for aircraft carriers to be deployed to protect Chinese SLOCs. By and large, discussions of operating on exterior lines tend to focus on the Indian Ocean and Central Pacific. However, and as discussed in subsequent sections of this paper, the practicalities of operating in the Atlantic will limit possibilities for the PLAN over the next decade. Advocates of a larger presence in the Atlantic do consider the prospect of a more prominent role for Chinese “escort forces” in the region in the future but appear to recognise that the PLAN’s presence will be limited for the foreseeable future.

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The idea of operating on exterior lines may also be relevant to China’s nuclear deterrent. While China’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would struggle to break out of the First Island Chain in a crisis, the Arctic in theory offers a safe bastion and an energy efficient route for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) such as the JL-3 (successor to China’s current SLBM) to reach the US, leading the Pentagon to raise the prospect of Chinese submarines operating in the Arctic. However, the practicalities of operating in the Arctic make this a highly questionable means of increasing the survivability of China’s second-strike capabilities, for reasons which are explored in greater depth in the next chapter.

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In practice, the PLAN’s presence in both the Euro-Atlantic and its immediate peripheries (the Arctic and South Atlantic) is for the next decade likely to be relatively modest, but the deployment of such a limited presence to set the conditions for a more significant presence beyond the next decade should not be overlooked. Moreover, while China may not have a direct regional security presence, it can have an indirect impact on the security environment in the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) Area of Responsibility in ways that bear considering, primarily through its relationship with Russia.

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III. China’s Blue-Water Navy as a Foreign Policy Instrument

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The past three decades have seen China grow as a maritime power, moving from a regional power, built for contingencies related to Taiwan and the South China Sea, into a more expeditionary force. A continued build-up of maritime capability meant that, by 2022, the PLAN had more hulls than the US Navy. Nonetheless, the US Navy remains the largest in terms of gross tonnage, while the PLAN is still in the process of moving from a regional force with a large number of smaller vessels towards a blue-water navy.

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This ambition has been manifested in projects such as the Type 055 cruiser (equipped with a higher vertical launch system capacity than the US Navy’s Ticonderoga-class, since its individual cells are larger), and the Type 076 landing helicopter assault (LHA) carrier, which may be equipped with CATOBAR (catapult launchers). Similarly, the People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC) has grown five-fold in the past decade, with an explicitly stated focus on expeditionary missions. Notably, contingencies involving Taiwan remain the preserve of the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF), which controls the six heavy amphibious brigades in the Eastern Theatre Command and retained this despite the growth of the PLANMC. Moreover, since 2015 the PLA has added “far seas protection” to the list of the PLAN’s missions. It seems clear, then, that China desires the capacity to project power beyond its environs, but the answers to the questions of where, to what end and to what extent are less clear.

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It should be noted that despite its substantial growth, the PLAN still has relatively limited (although rapidly growing) blue-water capabilities. For example, the force fields fewer major surface combatants (vessels of destroyer size or larger) than the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) – the PLAN operates 31 destroyers and cruisers to the JMSDF’s 36 destroyers. The PLAN also fields four Type 075 landing helicopter docks (LHDs) in support of its marine corps. It is likely that the PLAN will also grow rapidly, but it will have significant regional commitments even within the First Island Chain, given the scale of the area the chain encompasses. For example, the Spratly Islands are 1,200 kilometres from China’s nearest land-based airfields on Hainan Island off China’s south coast. Moreover, most contemporary Chinese discussions of PLAN activity beyond the First Island Chain tend to focus on the Pacific and Indian Oceans, where establishing a militarily significant naval presence will prove highly resource intensive.

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Practical Limitations of China’s Naval Power

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In principle, the fact that most of the several critical materials on which China relies, including cobalt and magnesium, come from a limited number of West and South African providers, including the DRC, Gabon and South Africa, provides a cogent rationale for a Chinese presence in the Atlantic, which would be entirely consistent with the logic of far-seas protection. That Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are states that China has reportedly approached to secure a facility large enough to house an aircraft carrier would also be consistent with the logic of SLOC protection.

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However, there would be several impediments to the emergence of a standing PLAN presence in the Atlantic. The most obvious is the fact that in the Atlantic the PLAN would be operating at considerable distances from the wellsprings of Chinese power and in an area where the US and its allies militarily dominate – a fact acknowledged by most Chinese strategists.

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It could be argued (as have analysts such as Bo) that China can secure its major aims at reach by creating a distant fleet in being large enough to make the US enforcement of a blockade unfeasibly costly (especially if the US were also confronting China in East Asia). Indeed, it is precisely the difficulty of managing both a distant blockade and events in the First Island Chain (which, as several studies have noted, is not viable) that would, in theory, incentivise the US to focus on bottlenecks. Such bottlenecks include China’s access to materials that come from a small number of states where a close blockade could be more readily enforced given the absence of a Chinese naval or anti-access threat beyond the Indo-Pacific.

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The issue with this reasoning, as discussed, is that the immediate demands of balancing commitments within China’s region and outside it are considerations for China as well. Despite its rapid recent growth, the PLAN has a limited blue-water fleet (it fields just eight Type 055 cruisers, for example). This will change in due course, but even a much larger PLAN fielding the six aircraft carriers that China aspires to have by 2035 will be bound by the logic of force structuring. Factors such as vessel maintenance cycles and workup periods impact all navies, and experience suggests that perhaps half of the PLAN’s notional future carrier fleet will be at sea at any given time. The forward deployment of a carrier battlegroup, particularly one that includes the nine escort cruisers, frigates and destroyers discussed by Chinese analysts, would imply that China would have to make considerable sacrifices to its force availability in East Asia. Similarly, China’s fleet of Type 075 and Type 076 LHDs and LHAs, although growing in number, is still small relative to the scale of some of the tasks required by the PLAN in the First Island Chain.

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Platforms such as the Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) could be used as an alternative to surface vessels for deployments beyond the First Island Chain because they are both more self-sustaining and have limited prospects of escaping the First Island Chain in a conflict (and so have bounded utility in this theatre, where China’s diesel electric submarines are more useful). However the Type 093 is relatively noisy, which, it has been suggested, appears to be a function of its propulsion systems and deficiencies in its anechoic coating, and this would limit its military utility. Since the prospective bases which might give the PLAN access to the Atlantic are likely to be in Africa, there is also a political dimension to the issue which must be considered. SSN deployments, although not strictly speaking contrary to the Treaty of Pelindaba (which declares Africa a nuclear weapons-free zone), would also create political complications for both China and the host nation. That said, there may be other rationales for extended deployments, including habituating Chinese submariners to longer periods at sea, which is presently a challenge as illustrated by the mental health issues that extended deployments are causing among Chinese submariners who are not used to them. The logic of using extended rotational deployments as a means of exposing the PLAN to the rigours of sustained activity at sea would also apply to surface vessels, but it would suggest deployments comparable to the UK’s periodic carrier strike group deployments to the Indo-Pacific, rather than a standing presence. These deployments, should they occur, would have diplomatic significance – and would represent a means for European navies to gain situational awareness of the PLAN – but their military significance in the Euro-Atlantic would be limited.

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The ability of the PLAN to operate from bases in states such as Gabon and Equatorial Guinea – and presumably hold at risk US platforms – would require a degree of willingness on the part of these states to take risks on behalf of China in both establishing bases and allowing their use. In the short to medium term, this level of risk acceptance is unlikely in what are largely transactional relationships. While the concept of the PLAN using dual-use commercial facilities to resupply distant vessels has been considered by the PLAN as a more non-committal option through which to rely on prospective partners, this is more useful to enable deployments in support of diplomacy and engagement than it is to sustain credible naval forces. It is relatively unlikely, for example, that volatile goods, such as munitions, can be stored in civilian ports for long, even if neutral ports could be used for refuelling in wartime. While the pursuit of bases by the PLAN cannot be ruled out, it is unclear whether these facilities would have a significant military role. The risk of SLOC interdiction could in the final instance be offset by other means, including stockpiling and overland transport of goods to ports in third countries to which the US is not constraining access for onward transport. In effect, the problem of resourcing a distant blockade would remain for the US, and the use of the PLAN to protect Atlantic SLOCs appears unlikely to be viable for some time.

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Similarly, the prospects for a Chinese SSBN bastion in the Arctic are constrained by several factors. First, the PLAN does not currently operate SSBNs capable of operating under ice, although its future Type 095 SSN and Type 096 SSBN may be able to do so. Thus far, however, the only indicators of this are academic research, which is inconclusive. Even if this is the case, the Type 096 (for which construction began in the early 2020s) will only be fielded in numbers necessary to ensure a consistent presence at sea by the end of this decade. Second, following the arrival of the first Type 096, the PLAN would need to spend additional years habituating its submariners to operations under ice (which relatively few NATO navies, such as the US Navy and Royal Navy, can do). Third, Chinese SSBNs would need to transit chokepoints such as the Bering Strait to enter the Arctic, meaning that a survivable presence would require at least one SSBN out of a planned fleet of six to be permanently in the Arctic (meaning, in effect, that the majority of the fleet would need to be committed to resourcing this mission). This would also mean that Russian support would be vital to sustain China’s undersea deterrent since Russia is the only non-Western state with experience operating submarines under ice – a strategic commitment neither nation indicated a desire to undertake. And fourth, an Arctic SSBN presence is considerably more complex to deliver than China’s other means of assuring its second strike. China is currently placing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, which permit a missile to deliver multiple nuclear warheads to different targets on road-mobile DF-41 ICBMs. This has the effect of ensuring that even a small number of missiles which survive a first strike can both deliver a large number of warheads and pose a complex problem to missile defences. China is also expanding its number of missile silos, increasing the number of targets that the US would need to strike to cripple its arsenal. These palliatives are far more readily achievable than an under-ice SSBN patrol.

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It is likely, then, that within the next 15 years, material constraints on the PLAN will make a military presence capable of supporting Chinese interests in a high-intensity scenario either in the Euro-Atlantic or its environs unlikely. It is still plausible, however, that China is attempting to create optionality for itself and set the conditions for a more expansive presence, should this be deemed desirable and feasible. But this is unlikely to be the case for well over a decade.

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Other Potential Uses of China’s Maritime Power

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There are other functions that naval and maritime power can fulfil for China in the Euro-Atlantic.

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Diplomatic Signalling

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Naval activity can be used as a tool of diplomatic signalling for both Europe and other actors. As noted, China has conducted several joint exercises with the Russian navy in the previous decade, including the 2017 Naval Interaction exercises in the Baltic Sea, exercises in the Mediterranean and more recent exercises with the Russian and South African navies on the periphery of the Atlantic. A PLAN Type 052D guided missile destroyer also took part in Russia’s Navy Day celebrations in St Petersburg in July 2024. One aim of joint exercises with Russia may be to signal China’s capacity to play a more significant and not entirely welcome role in Europe, should European states become more engaged in the Indo-Pacific. While not wishing to stoke paranoia, this paper notes that the coincidence of a Chinese exercise in Belarus at the same time as the NATO Summit in July 2024 and on the back of the participation of several European states in RIMPAC 24 (Rim of the Pacific Exercise, the world’s largest international maritime exercise) could be seen as exactly the kind of behaviour that best illustrates this scenario. It may be intended to signal China’s capacity to insert itself into the European security environment if European states play a larger role in the Pacific.

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The PLAN as a Supporting Arm in the Euro-Atlantic

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Importantly, naval activity would in this instance not be China’s primary threat to Europe – rather it would represent a relatively costly signal of China’s potential willingness to employ other tools that may be more immediately consequential. While China is unlikely to have considerable local military strength in the Euro-Atlantic over the next 15 years, it can have an indirect impact on the security of the region. For example, China could reinforce Russia’s capacity to generate export revenue. Russia still relies on Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Club-insured shipping for the transfer of 45% of the vessels carrying hydrocarbons from terminals in the Baltic Sea. Russia’s continued reliance on vessels that depend on Western insurers and thus probably obey the oil price cap, and the decrepitude of the vessels in Russia’s “shadow fleet”, all point to the limits, as a means of sanctions evasion, of any Russian effort to substitute its shadow fleet for international carriers that are exposed to Western pressure. The environmental risks that older vessels pose could also be a legal basis for their eventual denied access to ports and key straits. If the major bottleneck is a lack of available seaworthy ships, Chinese state-owned oil tankers might offer Russia a means of transporting oil at above price-cap rates, particularly since the two largest global operators of oil tankers are Chinese. So far, China’s financial institutions have shied away from transactions that might fall foul of these sanctions – given the exposure of Chinese banks trading in dollars and euros to international sanctions. However, Russia’s growing reliance on Chinese-made dual-use goods and its trade deficit with China mean that transactions in renminbi would give Russia access to a currency for which it has increasing use, despite it being less tradeable than the US dollar. China could also collaborate with Russia in the production of commercial shipping for Russian state-owned firms – a possibility floated by the head of Russia’s VTB Bank Andrey Kostin as a means of clearing the backlogs in Russia’s Zvezda shipyard – or China could sell excess capacity to third-party carriers dealing in Russian oil.

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China’s military support for Russia could also take more direct forms. The idea that Chinese shipyards could provide Russia’s navy with capacity was, apparently, hinted at by Vice Admiral Sergei Avakyants, then head of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, after joint exercises between the Russian navy and the PLAN. Avakyants suggested that the proportion of modern PLAN vessels allocated to exercises with the Russian Pacific Fleet partly reflected a desire to advertise China’s shipbuilding capabilities. While this assessment may or may not have been accurate, it is often the case that military support that begins as covert or partially deniable assistance escalates to more direct forms over time. Additionally, it is notable that China has recently announced that it will sell the Type 052 destroyer internationally, since few Chinese partners other than Russia have a rationale for procuring the vessel, or the funds to do so.

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China’s Presence in Africa

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Chinese and Western security interests may well clash in third-party states where China seeks a growing security footprint. To some extent this may have already occurred. In July 2024, Italian authorities interned a Chinese vessel carrying Wing Loong UAVs to Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, in contravention of the UN arms embargo on Libya. The reality of Chinese-operated ports on Europe’s immediate periphery may make similar interdictions more difficult to achieve in the future. China also has a growing security presence in states such as the DRC, where it has supplied the government with CH-4 UAVs to fight rebel forces, and the Chinese aeronautics company, China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation, has offered to supply the DRC with J-10 aircraft. If longstanding Chinese investment (which comes with fewer political strings than Western alternatives) is combined with more lenient terms, military support between China and Russia could, unchecked, leave both countries with an even greater level of control over Western economy supply chains than they currently enjoy. China can support such activity through the provision of advise and assist missions and by acting as an alternative partner to Western states on issues such as counterpiracy, as it has with Nigeria.

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Sabotage

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There is also potential for Chinese limited and deniable coercive activity in the Euro-Atlantic, in tandem with Russia. Consider, for example, the alleged sabotage of the Balticconnector pipeline (a natural gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia) by the NewNew Polar Bear (a vessel registered in China owned by several Russian and Chinese commercial entities) which appears to have dragged its anchor over the pipeline. Chinese survey ships and commercial companies associated with the cable industry or deep sea mining could step up activity near submarine cables in the Atlantic in areas with a lighter NATO presence, such as the Azores Fibre Optic System, and near connections from West Africa such as the Cabo Verde node. The surveying activity being conducted by the Ministry of National Resources could certainly support this, particularly since data gathered must be shared with the PLA. However, there are several impediments to the option of sabotage activity in the Atlantic. China is itself seeking to become a major, if not quite monopolistic, provider of cable services linking European companies to East Asia – a concern that led the US to force China Telecom out of the consortium building the SEA-ME-WE-6 cable (an optical fibre submarine communications cable system that carries telecommunications between Singapore and France) in 2023. Notably, China chose to bankroll an alternative cable linking Asia and Europe (Europe–Middle East–Asia, known as the EMA). Any suggestion of China’s involvement in sabotage would make it considerably easier to build a political consensus for excluding Chinese companies from sensitive projects in the Euro-Atlantic.

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Unlike Russia, China has not invested heavily in the specialised military equipment needed to target infrastructure, such as cables at depths that make repair difficult, although civil capabilities such as uncrewed underwater vehicles, built for exploring the seabed, could be used in a military capacity.

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While it is not possible to entirely exclude sabotage as a tool of dissuasion, it remains relatively unlikely.

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Transfer of Data

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A more significant challenge is the prospect of China becoming a key provider of services related to the transfer of data, which can be employed for intelligence gathering. The latter contingency would, however, only become an extreme consideration if China became a monopolistic actor in the cable market, and with Chinese companies such as HMN Tech (which provides submarine network system solutions) currently holding a 10% market share, this is some way off, although ensuring this remains the case is a policy consideration for Western states.

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While the PLA can support foreign policy aims in the Euro-Atlantic and its environs that are contrary to European interests, it is these policies themselves rather than the military presence involved in them that are the major concern. For the most part, the PLA will be a supporting element in the Euro-Atlantic, reinforcing Chinese foreign policy aims as a tool of military signalling and engagement. These functions can, however, set the conditions for a more militarily credible presence in the long term, and the evolution of the PLAN’s footprint should be monitored.

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Conclusions and Lessons for European Navies

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For European navies, the direct military threat posed by the growing Chinese presence in the Atlantic will be low for at least the next 15 years. Moreover, most Chinese activity relevant to the Atlantic will occur just beyond the peripheries of the Euro-Atlantic, off West Africa, in the South Atlantic, and the Arctic. The key consideration for Europe’s navies will be how much capacity they allocate to hedging against the prospective evolution of China’s Atlantic posture, given the resource demands of contending with other acute threats.

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There appears to be no consensus from Beijing on requirements for a significant military presence in the Atlantic, although considerable attention is paid to the question of expanding “strategic space” in other ways. While China faces tangible risks to some of its supply lines in the Atlantic, there is little that it can do to rectify this challenge in military terms in the medium term. Moreover, there are non-military means by which China can mitigate risk, including diversification, stockpiling and rerouting goods. It is conceivable, however, that the PLAN could pursue rotational deployments in the South Atlantic within the next two decades as a means of both setting the conditions for a more substantial presence in the longer term and habituating the force to operations at reach.

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In all likelihood, much of the activity that this entails will effectively amount to Phase 0 shaping activity in areas adjoining (but not part of) SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, including the South Atlantic and the Arctic. Port visits by PLAN vessels, maritime data acquisition, military cooperation on non-traditional security issues, and defence engagement in the form of arms sales can, collectively, set the conditions for the PLAN to secure access in areas such as the South Atlantic. While these pursuits are not immediately threatening, they do accord to the importance of European navies remaining engaged in regions that many of them may wish to de-emphasise to refocus resources on the much more pressing challenge of deterrence regarding Russia. While the prioritisation of acute threats represents a rational choice, an economy-of-force effort to match China’s Phase 0 activity should be retained as an economy-of-force task. This need not always involve the deployment of assets – in the Gulf of Guinea, for example, the Anglo-French MDAD-GoG (Maritime Domain Awareness Trade-Gulf of Guinea) has arguably been the most useful European contribution to the safety of regional shipping. Frameworks allowing for the pooling and rotational commitment of ships to tasks such as engagement might also be a means for European navies to manage competing commitments with limited force structures, and this might be a role for the Anglo-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, which has lost its original rationale (resourcing expeditionary commitments comparable to the 2011 intervention in Libya).

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Operating in proximity to the PLAN may also offer it information-gathering opportunities, much as was the case in 2021 when the activities of Chinese Type 093 SSNs near the UK’s carrier strike group revealed (or at a minimum provided the opportunity to verify) a number of details regarding the platform’s acoustic signatures. This represents not only an information-gathering opportunity, but potentially also a constraint on Chinese activity in the Atlantic if this activity raises the prospect of sensitive data regarding deployed vessels being gathered.

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In contrast to China’s limited naval presence, China’s engagement on the peripheries of the Euro-Atlantic could have immediate effects. For example, deeper Chinese engagement with Russia as a means of derisking some of China’s own supply lines and pressuring European states cannot be ruled out. In economic terms, China can substantially increase Russia’s capacity to generate revenue both through China’s own deeper engagement with Russian hydrocarbons extraction in the Arctic and by enabling Russia to circumvent oil price caps without having to rely on an old and relatively small fleet of dark ships (unregistered and uninsured vessels that have turned off or disabled their automatic identification systems).

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In military terms, China’s capacity to serial-produce vessels such as the Type 052D represents the last plausible avenue through which Russia could generate a blue-water surface capability. While China’s engagement with Russian hydrocarbons remains relatively cautious, there are sound reasons for this to change, including the fact that Russia offers China a means of hedging against the Malacca dilemma. Moreover, China’s export of dual-use military goods to Russia illustrates a willingness in principle to engage in defence exports.

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These possibilities do not change any of NATO’s core missions, but they do mean that planning for deterrence with regard to Russia should include the possibility that in areas where Russia is currently assessed to have relatively dim prospects (such as long-term growth and the size of its surface fleet), Chinese support is one of the few means that could enable Russia in the near future.

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In effect, the optimal direct response for Europe’s navies to a PLAN with a limited but gradually expanding Euro-Atlantic footprint should be one premised on mirroring the non-committal but potentially useful Phase 0 shaping activities that the PLAN itself appears to be undertaking. It should further set the conditions to constrain a more assertive China if need be, without overreacting to a prospect that may never materialise.

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Sidharth Kaushal is Research Fellow for Sea Power at RUSI. His research at RUSI covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century, and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.

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René Balletta was the First Sea Lord’s Visiting Fellow at RUSI until August 2024. He has served much of his career at sea in a variety of surface platforms that include frigates, destroyers, amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers.

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Philip Shetler-Jones is a Senior Research Fellow in the International Security research team at RUSI. His current research is concentrated on Indo-Pacific security. His recent publications have focused on the defence policy of Japan, attitudes of China to NATO, and narratives about the defence of Taiwan.

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Elizabeth Lindley is an analyst of politics of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese foreign policy, and cross-strait relations. She has a degree in Chinese Studies (First Class Hons) from the University of Cambridge, which included advanced Mandarin study in Taipei.

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Europe And The Sahel

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Europe, Beyond Its Southern Border

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Carlota G. Encina | 2024.12.04

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Widespread instability and the growing influence of China and Russia has increased the strategic importance of the Sahel to European security. A reset in relations between Europe and the region is direly needed.

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Introduction

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The Sahel is acquiring a new importance due to recent events that have exponentially increased its capacity to influence the stability and security of the Mediterranean. It is an inhospitable area that is often discussed interchangeably with North Africa. But the Sahel and North Africa are quite distinct and are facing different realities, making it difficult to formulate a single strategy for both regions. North Africa will likely continue its current trajectory of closer integration with Europe, while the Sahel will continue to lag behind in terms of modernization, integration, security and stability, and economic development. The Sahel, therefore, currently requires the most attention from both the European Union and NATO, as well as from southern European nations.

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The Sahel

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The first difficulty in addressing the multiple challenges facing the region lies in defining its boundaries. Sahel means “edge” or “coast” in Arabic, and from this point of view, the Sahel would be a 5,000 kilometer strip stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. But these boundaries have no cultural, historical, or economic meaning and include 12 very different countries. For this reason, it is more usual to use the term to refer to a group of five countries with common historical, economic, cultural, and social characteristics: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Historically, these areas were part of the great Sahelian empires based on trans-Saharan trade. They were subsequently colonized by France, which left a common political and cultural legacy. This legacy currently coexists with the fundamental role of Islam as the majority religion throughout the region.

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In 2014, the five countries established the G5 Sahel, born as a result of the conviction of these governments (and of European pressure) about the need to jointly implement a comprehensive approach to ensure the conditions for peace, development, security, and governance. In 2017, a joint force was added to the organization to coordinate counterterrorism efforts, aiming to curb the expansion of armed groups that seriously threaten regional security. The efficacy of this organization is uncertain now, since three of its five founding members have left it, but officially the organization has not been dissolved.

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There are also other partially Sahelian states geographically — such as Algeria, Nigeria, and Senegal — which, despite their different historical experiences and current situations, influence the evolution of Sahelian developments.

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The Challenges

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The Sahel is one of the least habitable regions in the world. It has been characterized by a combination of great political instability, little economic development, and very unfavorable environmental conditions, the latter of which has exacerbated the unstable political context and driven migratory flows toward Europe. The lack of instruments to respond to these challenges has long been a source of structural weakness, resulting in a dependency on contributions from the United Nations, the European Union, or third countries. But perhaps the most worrying element is the Sahel’s position as the world epicenter of jihadist terrorism, an issue that has increased in severity since 2016. Not only is it fertile ground for recruiting rootless and disaffected youth into terrorism, but it also provides safe havens for terrorist organizations to plan and launch international attacks. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are expanding violently in the region and the Sahel suffered 47 percent of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2023.

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The crises already known to have been lurking in the Sahel for more than a decade are, however, entering a new stage due to two main reasons: the domestic political climate and the regional impact of the war in Ukraine.

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The political climate in the G5 Sahel has become more volatile in the last three years with the success of a series of military coups: in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, in Burkina Faso in September 2022, and in Niger in July 2023. The latter is perhaps the most significant because it happened following the military coup in Mali in 2021, where French troops on the ground as part of Operation Barkhane were forced to conduct an accelerated withdrawal. Paris then decided to move its operational center to Niger, becoming the focal point for a renewed security partnership in the Sahel based on lessons learned from previous failures. The Nigerien government was also keen to host other European forces to counter Islamist insurgent groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State — so much so that the European Union decided to organize a three-year mission to train the Nigerien army. Niger had thus become the focal point of security efforts in the region.

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After the 2023 coup, however, this delicate balance has shifted. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) — the main regional organization — has been unable to respond effectively, showing its weakness and causing Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali to leave its ranks. The G5 Sahel has also been abandoned by its own members. In December 2023, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their withdrawal from the G5 Sahel joint military force, echoing Mali’s departure in May 2022, while Mauritania and Chad have accepted these sovereign decisions. The military juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have also signed a new security agreement under the name of Alliance of the Sahel States (AES), whose priority will be the fight against terrorism. Outside the continent, France is consolidating a military withdrawal that began in Mali in 2022, continuing in Burkina Faso and more recently in Niger, although it maintains operations in Chad.

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The United States, for its part, has tried to maintain military collaboration with Niger, where it has built one of the largest drone bases on the continent in Agadez. And yet, despite U.S. wishes and after months of tensions, Niger’s ruling military council announced that it was ending the agreement that allowed U.S. forces to be based in the country. Among the disagreements between the two governments was the desire of Niger to supply Iran with uranium and work more closely with Russian military forces. The United States had completed its military withdrawal from the country by early August 2024, a blow to its counterterrorism effort — and to the broader security situation in the Sahel.

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Secondly, Russia’s military offensive against Ukraine is having a significant impact on the region. For one, it has decreased food security, exacerbating the harsh living conditions of Sahelians with rising wheat, fuel, and fertilizer prices. The energy crisis in Europe due to the war has also heightened Europe’s need to strengthen its partnership with African countries, whose natural resources attract them. Thus, in July 2022, Algeria, Niger, and Nigeria signed a memorandum of understanding for the formalization of the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline, which could have great potential for the transportation of gas supplies to Europe.

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But the war in Ukraine has also made the Sahel more permeable to international influence efforts. In fact, it has grown in prominence within the framework of strategic competition, with the growing influence of Russia and China potentially challenging the security of NATO and the European Union.

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Although relations between Russia and the Sahelian countries were established decades ago during the Cold War, today the presence of the Wagner Group in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger stands out. Its presence has been demonstrated in the last three years through participation in antiterrorist operations and support to the armed forces of some countries in the area. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Moscow has continued to expand its influence in the Sahel, as shown through the Africa-Russia summit held in July 2023. That said, the death of the head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has led Moscow to create a new military structure under the Ministry of Defense called Africa Corps, with which it intends to replace Wagner’s mercenaries.

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China’s presence, on the other hand, is more linked to the economic sphere and to the Sahel’s natural resources. China’s state-owned companies operate in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger. Mali potentially has one of the world’s largest lithium reserves, and the Chinese company Ganfeng Lithium has invested heavily in the country. China is the second-largest investor in Niger, with projects led by PetroChina (a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation) and China National Nuclear Corporation. Investments in the oil sector in Chad have also been significant and have made the Chadian army one of the best equipped forces in Africa. And some reports suggest that China would be willing to use the conflicts in the Sahel to test its weapons products, although it seems more plausible to think that it will prioritize the protection of its interests in the region.

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This growing influence and presence of Russia and China fuels the idea that the countries of the Sahel — along with those in North Africa — are aligning more closely with these two powers, or at least that they want to reinvigorate their foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis the West in line with that of other countries of the “Global South.” In both cases, this is connected to the relative decline of the influence of Western powers in the region.

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This growing influence and presence of Russia and China fuels the idea that the countries of the Sahel — along with those in North Africa — are aligning more closely with these two powers, or at least that they want to reinvigorate their foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis the West in line with that of other countries of the “Global South.”

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The European Union

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After the coup d’état in Niger, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stated in her last State of the Union address to the European Parliament that the European Union should engage more with African countries. She stated that Europe had to show the same unity of purpose toward Africa as it has shown toward Ukraine, focusing on cooperation with legitimate governments and regional organizations. The president further accused Russia of sowing chaos in the Sahel and stated that military coups destabilize the region, making it prone to the risk of terrorism.

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The European Union’s concerns about developments beyond the Mediterranean directly impacting the continent’s security and prosperity are not new. But the results of its actions have been disappointing, perhaps because of tactical errors in its approach or inadequate attention paid to the issue.

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For years, the perceived risks emanating from the Sahel have generally remained low due to the intangible nature of many of them and the belief that they were somehow under the control of the intervening countries in North Africa. These are countries with which Brussels cooperates under the European Neighborhood Policy, with programs in a wide range of sectors, such as democratic and economic development, rule of law, and migration. The Sahel region was therefore perceived by European policymakers as largely a remote desert area prone to drought and in need of infrastructure and humanitarian aid.

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Since the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime in Libya in 2011 and the ensuing security crisis in Mali, however, Europe accelerated the process of expanding the borders of its immediate southern neighborhood into the Sahel. It committed more spending, launched more development and stabilization programs, and intensified its external military presence in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, which were beginning to be seen as part of the “gateway to Europe” — a source of dangerous population growth, unwanted migration, and violent extremism, not to mention the favored territory of Russian mercenaries.

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In 2011, the European Union became involved in the Sahel with the adoption of the EU Sahel Strategy (2011–2020), which was reinforced in 2015 with the Regional Action Plan for the Sahel. These two strategies had a strong militarized approach focused on security. But Brussels also opened new embassies in the region, and an EU high representative for the Sahel was appointed to demonstrate continued diplomatic engagement. The European Union additionally became a founding member of the Sahel Alliance in 2017, pledging to coordinate international development spending in the region.

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But the expected results were not adequately achieved and the European Union decided to move away from a preeminently security-oriented approach to a more integrated intervention, adopting the EU Integrated Sahel Strategy 2021. This was formulated at a time when most of the current crises had not yet emerged. Indeed, migration flows were fairly under control, political instability in the Sahel was not yet fueled by the ensuing succession of coups, the presence of the Wagner Group was not yet threatening the region, and the European Union was not facing a war on its eastern border. The strategy today must cope with a different and more hostile situation than initially planned.

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In general, EU policies toward the Sahel have sought to satisfy different interests: to solve the migration issue for the countries bordering the Mediterranean with long-term development programs in the region, to support the French military efforts over the last decade, and to introduce a European dimension to the security and development sector in the region. But the European Union has proven itself not yet ready to respond in all of these dimensions. This lack of European success must be coupled with the unilateral French stance in the Sahel, which has caused considerable frustration among European partners and seems to have had a fragmenting effect on European efforts in the region. More recently, successive military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and especially Niger have imposed a limit on the Europeans’ military response capacity. And the latest worrying decision made by EU member states was to not extend the fifth mandate of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) beyond May 18, 2024, although it was due to expire in January 2025. The reason given was the evolving political and security situation and consultations with the Malian authorities.

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In general, EU policies toward the Sahel have sought to satisfy different interests: to solve the migration issue for the countries bordering the Mediterranean with long-term development programs in the region, to support the French military efforts over the last decade, and to introduce a European dimension to the security and development sector in the region.

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European governments are reluctant to support undemocratic governments because they undermine Europe’s own priorities, in particular that of advancing democracy. But at the same time, shutting down security support leaves the door open for other actors — such as the Wagner Group — to fill the void and offer support to governments in the aftermath of coups. For now, there seems to be no “good” for Europe in the Sahel. And yet, despite the current paralysis, the region remains of strategic importance to the European Union.

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NATO

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NATO’s southern flank has always existed, although it has been considered strategically secondary to its eastern flank. NATO’s southern members have historically been most concerned about security issues in the Mediterranean and its adjacent regions; they have also been among the most vocal advocates for NATO to pay more attention to its southern neighborhood. However, there is room for improvement in terms of the cohesion of the alliance’s approach, to the extent that, at times, the Mediterranean has become an area of competition rather than coordination among NATO’s southern members. It should not be forgotten that NATO is an alliance of sovereign countries, some of which have permanent interests in the south. That is why NATO accepted the UN Security Council’s invitation to protect civilians in Libya in 2011: it was reflecting French and Italian interests in North Africa. Similarly, in 2012, regional interests were at play when it was decided at the Chicago Summit to erect a southward-oriented missile shield for the alliance. Ultimately, it is the member states that decide to project stability in the south — bilaterally, regionally, or through the European Union, the United Nations, or NATO.

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In general, NATO has not been very explicit in addressing risks emanating from the Sahel region. It was only in 2016 that the alliance formally launched the so-called 360° approach, which addresses threats from all fronts and ensures a focused and tailored response. Thanks to the political commitment of countries such as Spain and Italy, NATO began to adopt — at least theoretically — this global vision that valued all its borders with equal concern. Since then, NATO has tried to reformulate its policies toward the southern region according to the notion of “stability projection,” with the idea of contributing to a stable environment in NATO’s vicinity by increasing regional understanding and situational awareness and by supporting capacity building in partner countries.

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The most recent NATO Parliamentary Assembly regional outlook reports have identified the security environment in North Africa and the Sahel as among the key trends that will shape the future. They point to the importance of the region because of its geographical proximity to Europe, as well as its cultural, social, economic, postcolonial, and migratory links. In addition, the latest strategic concept adopted in Madrid in 2022 confirmed the alliance’s commitment to work with its partners in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sahel regions “to address shared security threats,” including war, terrorism, and the growing challenges related to climate change — a commitment that would be reaffirmed at the summit in Vilnius the year after. A few months later, the secretary-general appointed an independent group of experts whose findings of a “comprehensive and deep reflection process” on the southern flank were reflected in a report published in May. The report laid the ground for “an action plan for a stronger, more strategic and result-oriented approach toward our southern neighborhood,” including the Sahel area, an idea that managed to be incorporated into the Washington Summit Declaration of 2024. It should also be noted that the declaration refers to new efforts in the fight against terrorism and the identification of key areas for long-term effort, one of which is undoubtedly the Sahel. The Washington summit also produced the establishment of a special representative for the southern neighborhood, a position to which Spanish deputy assistant secretary general for political affairs and security policy Javier Colomina was appointed shortly thereafter.

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All this aside, the Eastern flank is still considered by the allies the immediate and primary challenge to NATO, while in the long term the Indo-Pacific is beginning to stand out. As a result, the alliance’s political and military leeway to the southern flank risks being limited. What does seem to be clear among the allies, however, is that the increasing instability in the Sahel makes it necessary to consider that a southward-oriented NATO strategy should not necessarily stop at the Mediterranean and its immediate areas of influence. Beyond the Maghreb, Africa is an integral part of the European and transatlantic security calculus.

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But an extension of the security space beyond the Mediterranean and North Africa would imply closer cooperation with regional institutions and partner countries. Countries like Senegal and Nigeria could be important in NATO’s effort to “project stability” to the south. But from an operational point of view, NATO’s global engagement has obvious limits. It is therefore important to distinguish between the idea of NATO’s role in the Global South and the alliance’s role as a forum for the discussion of broader strategic concerns and policy coordination. From a political point of view, NATO’s southern flank can extend as far as the allies agree to take it.

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When it comes to challenges such as terrorism, instability, and the migration crisis affecting Europe, NATO is not and should not be the first responder. National authorities, the European Union, and ad hoc coalitions should lead the way. Maritime, humanitarian, and low-intensity counterterrorism issues are indeed particularly promising scenarios for NATO-EU cooperation. Practical and effective collaborative strategies already exist, as demonstrated by the support provided by NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian to the European Union’s Operation Sophia, which aims to disrupt criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers operating in the Mediterranean. However, several other crises in the area have not been addressed through NATO-EU cooperation, exemplified by the current situation in Libya.

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Planning for the long term in a manner that builds on the alliance’s strengths and is sustainable over time is thus an urgent need — even if this amounts to a relatively modest effort.

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National Interests

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In an increasingly unstable international environment in which a Global South is ascending regardless of Western diplomatic pressure, organizations such as the European Union and NATO are limited in their ability to influence countries beyond the West on security and defense issues. But in the Sahel, there is perhaps still room for them. In the Sahel in particular, governments have traditionally given more importance to relations and cooperation with states, such as France, Italy, and Spain, than relations with multilateral organizations.

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France

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The current wave of postcolonial African — and, specifically, Sahelian — unease with France may have originated in 2014, when France launched Operation Barkhane to fight jihadism in several countries in the region, starting with Mali. The operation lasted eight years, and although it achieved military successes on the ground, it prevented the collapse of Mali’s government and territorial integrity against a jihadist threat coming mainly from the north of the country. Its continued presence also created resentment and a focal point for growing public discontent with France. A wave of pan-Africanism, centered on anti-Westernism, has been on the rise, mobilizing sectors of the military and political elites in the Sahel countries and highlighting anti-French sentiment as a lever to seize power.

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More than any other country, France has been exposed in Africa because of its military footprint and its adoption of measures perceived as neocolonial. It is the only former colonial power with a wide range of bases from Senegal to Djibouti, via Gabon, the Ivory Coast, and Chad. Since the independence of these countries, Paris has carried out more than 50 military operations or interventions on the continent. However, given the size of the region, its objectives were too ambitious for such a small military force, and this military solution was only a “band-aid” that failed to address the structural weaknesses of regional states. Seen from this perspective, France is reaping the consequences of its interventionism in Africa and its failure to successfully curb terrorism.

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Hence, when powers like Russia, with no colonial history in the region, offered aid in fighting jihadism, they were welcomed, even if they were financed by appropriating part of the natural wealth of the Sahel countries. This is what French president Emmanuel Macron described as “the baroque alliance of the pseudo-Pan-Africanists and the new imperialists.” Reflecting on the above mistakes, Macron has expressed the desire to develop a relationship with Sahelian states “without paternalism or weaknesses,” warning that the recent string of coups in the region entails “a risk of weakening the West and especially Europe.” That is why Paris bet on Niger — but the partnership has not worked out.

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France, however, will likely continue to have a military and diplomatic presence in Africa because it has (primarily geostrategic) interests to preserve. Moreover, France signed the Quirinale Treaty with Italy in 2021, which reflects a will to bet on reinforced bilateral cooperation, the effects of which have begun to be visible in the Sahel. It should be noted that this cooperation does not apply to North Africa, a region in which Rome and Paris have each developed deep ties with local elites, even if this has involved engaging in a struggle for influence that has benefited certain oligarchies.

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Italy

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Italy is another major European player in the Sahel, with a strategy reflecting a “return” to Africa. The focus on the Sahel fits into a more general reorientation of Italian foreign policy — in line with its European partners — manifested by an increase in diplomatic activities, including the opening of new embassies, and an involvement in bilateral military operations and European cooperation.

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Niger has so far been the clearest representation of Italy’s new activities in the area, mainly because of its position as a transit country for migratory flows from sub-Saharan Africa. In its bilateral engagement, for example, Italy reinforced the contingent of its project MISIN (Missione Italiana di Supporto in Niger), which has been present in the country since 2018. Italy has also increased its support of European initiatives in the region, for instance by holding key positions on the ground during European missions and by appointing Emanuela del Re as EU high representative for the Sahel.

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However, Italy’s engagement with the Sahel is not without attention to the political and security dynamics of North African countries. The links between the protracted conflict in Libya and the destabilization of the Sahel have long been a subject of debate in Italy, for example. This has manifested in the widespread adoption of the “wider Mediterranean” — an area of interest encompassing countries from West Africa to the Horn of Africa, including the Sahel — into Italian policy. At the European level, Italian engagement is also reflected in the recent creation of the “One Desert Initiative” committee, with Italy as the interlocutor between the European Union, Libya, and the Sahel. Thus, Italy’s new involvement in the Sahel, built through new bilateral proposals and greater leadership within European initiatives, also represents an important search for legitimacy, not only with African partners but also with European ones.

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The latest impulse has been the presentation of the “Piano Mattei per l’Africa” initiative as a new model for Italy’s cooperation with the continent and, in particular, with the Sahel. It consists of three pillars: immigration control, regional development with investment in various productive sectors, and cooperation in the field of energy. It was presented at the Italy-Africa Summit organized by the government in January 2024 as the inaugural event of its upcoming presidency of the G7. However, it was precisely the Sahel countries that decided not to participate in the summit.

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Given Italy’s ambitions and efforts in the Sahel, NATO’s decision to choose the Spanish Colomina as representative of the southern neighborhood was very badly received by the Meloni government, which sent a letter of protest to Secretary General Stoltenberg. But Italy has not given up the game and will resume efforts to push for an Italian candidacy for the post with the new NATO secretary general, Mark Rutte.

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Spain

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Spain could become a leading force on behalf of Europe in the Sahel. In fact, some international actors have spurred Spain on to play a larger role and increase cooperation in the region. In October 2023, Spain and the United States inaugurated the first meeting of the U.S.-Spain Working Group on the Sahel, which highlights the urgency of addressing the critical situation in the region and the role that Spain could play.

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Madrid has consistently promoted and defended the need to devote more attention to the Mediterranean and surrounding areas, promoting cooperation frameworks and building trust between partners. But Spain’s main priority and concern is the Maghreb and, in particular, the spiral of tension between Morocco and Algeria, both fundamental countries with which Spain works bilaterally.

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Spain is the only EU member state that has been in every civilian and military mission deployed in Africa since 2003. In some missions, such as EUTM-Mali, Spanish soldiers have accounted for nearly 60 percent of the total number of troops deployed. Spain has also played an important role in two international coalitions for the region: the Coalition for the Sahel, which has addressed security, governance, and development issues, and the Alliance for the Sahel, whose assembly it chaired for three years until July 2023.

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However, unlike other major countries such as France, Germany, Italy, or Poland, Spain does not have a summit at the political level that reinforces its role with the African continent — beyond bilateral meetings or other bodies such as the G5 Sahel — despite the fact that Spain is the only European country that maintains a land border with Africa.

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Therefore, despite having shown initiative and sometimes leadership capacity in this part of the planet and despite having supported the French and international military presence there, Spain has not managed to establish itself as a leading military actor in the Sahel. It was reluctant to extend the support provided by its armed forces to the Barkhane operation beyond logistical support, and it was absent from the Takuba special force entirely. And yet, the image of Spain’s presence in this region is generally positive — mainly because it has not played a colonial role in it.

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For the last 15 years, Spain has done invaluable work for the improvement of West Africa and the Sahel, strengthening the capabilities of some countries in the region and strengthening international cooperation. It has done so in multiple areas and initiatives, establishing its own format in its relations with countries such as Mauritania. However, in recent years it has been unable to expand its role in parallel with the new needs that have arisen. This has meant that other European countries, such as Germany or Denmark — with fewer direct interests and less influence in the region — have filled the void left by Spain.

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The good news is that Spain does not want to leave the Sahel behind. In addition to the aforementioned bilateral cooperation with the United States, Spain launched a series of new projects in Mauritania in 2024 with the support of the European Union. These include the development of green hydrogen and a broader strengthening of the partnership between Mauritania and the European Union, which will also serve as an engine for the stability of the Sahel.

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Conclusion

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The challenges emanating from the Sahel are growing more complex, and international attention devoted to the region has risen exponentially. European states must reflect on their existing policies, which are often inadequately adapted to local challenges, and move beyond an agenda focused primarily on containing threats instead of on addressing structural problems. Given the complexity of the current situation — the entire security architecture built over the last decade that was contingent on external support having collapsed in the last year — a reset in relations between Europe and the Sahel is direly needed.

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A new geopolitical framework is emerging in the region where Europe and the West increasingly seem out of place. This situation seems to be leading southern European countries, mainly France, Italy, and Spain, to review their policies toward the region while prioritizing bilateral efforts ahead of multilateral ones.

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This approach is a mistake, given the complexity of the challenges emanating from the Sahel. A better solution would be for these countries to set aside rivalry among themselves and coordinate to address the challenges emanating from the Sahel. France, Italy, and Spain are well known in the region and can work together to coordinate agendas, particularly as all have the tacit support of the European Union and NATO. At the same time, both the European Union and NATO could take advantage of the potential coordinated effort of these three countries to harmonize their strategies toward the region, thus reducing intra-European power struggles and increasing efficiency.

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France, Italy, and Spain should also coordinate with the United States, which remains concerned about instability in the Sahel. Given the mediocre results of EU and NATO efforts in the region, the United States has recently been trying to approach southern European countries individually to find effective solutions to specific countries and challenges. With the assistance of NATO’s new southern neighborhood representative, it is time for Paris, Rome, and Madrid to engage in coordinated talks with Washington to try to find new solutions for the Sahel, again leaving aside the perceived competition between them.

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Carlota G. Encina is a non-resident senior associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.; a senior analyst for the United States and transatlantic relations at the Elcano Royal Institute, a Spanish think tank; and a lecturer in international relations.

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UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.47 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
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Europe And The Sahel

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Carlota G. Encina | 2024.12.04
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Widespread instability and the growing influence of China and Russia has increased the strategic importance of the Sahel to European security. A reset in relations between Europe and the region is direly needed.

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Soviet Lessons Recalled

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Ford Hart | 2024.11.21
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This paper argues that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political institutions, the CCP’s practical behavior, and continued veneration of Marxism-Leninism in the CCP constitution highlight the Soviet model’s deep influence on Beijing. As such, lessons from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) can help us understand the CCP’s approach to governance today.

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