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+---
+layout: post
+title : "“中美国”的崩塌"
+author: "杨山"
+date : 2023-04-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/a0xF5ZU.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "新冷战是资本竞争的冲突，无关意识形态？"
+---
+
+拜登上台之后的中美关系走向，如今足以说明两国关系的崩坏是系统性的对抗，而非特朗普时代的一时“疯癫”。但时至今日，另一个也许还没有破除的迷思则是：如果不是习近平执政，而是一个更具宽容性、更加自由化的中国政府，是否中美对抗能够避免？毕竟，终身制和权力的极度集中，如今是许多中国社会问题绕不开的“房间里的大象”。但也因此，许多人对当前中国处境的判断，完全建立在这个维度之上。
+
+
+
+香港出生的约翰斯·霍普金斯大学教授孔诰烽（Ho-Fung Hung）在2022年出版的一本小册子也许能为这个问题提供另一种解答思路。这本题为《帝国冲突：从“中美国”到“新冷战”》（Clash of Empires: From “Chimerica” to the “New Cold War”）的小书并不长篇大论，但对“新冷战”的起源和动力给出了一种颇为令人信服的政治-经济解释。在这一解释中，中美的对抗要追溯到江泽民和胡锦涛时代，而习近平时代无疑扮演了某种加速的作用，但看起来极为不同的统治风格，并不意味着中美关系中的基本经济互动有任何本质的改变。
+
+
+### “中美国”如何成为可能？
+
+> 不同于那些认为中美冲突主要由意识形态、地缘政治或领导人个人风格决定的说法，孔诰烽试图给出的解释更加聚焦在全球经济和资本主义的发展之上。
+
+不同于那些认为中美冲突主要由意识形态、地缘政治或领导人个人风格决定的说法，孔诰烽试图给出的解释更加聚焦在全球经济和资本主义的发展之上。
+
+全书最重要的论述之一，是关于中美在1990年代如何化解冲突的介绍。1989年天安门屠杀后，中美在意识形态上的冲突达到高点。明显，那时的中国不会很快变成一个自由的国家。贯穿整个1990年代，中美看起来的对抗比如今还要夸张——台海危机直接导致了导弹试射和美国航母战斗群的部署，南斯拉夫战争导致中国大使馆被北约炸毁。
+
+与此同时，随着冷战的结束，中美同盟的重要性下降了，克林顿政府在1993年上台后，一开始深受民主党内强调人权的派系，如南希·佩洛西等人的影响，主张将中国改善人权作为中美关系改善的条件。并以贸易中给予中国的最惠国待遇为筹码推动这一外交政策。
+
+但尽管如此，两国关系主体还是没有成为人权和意识形态对抗，反而在其后的2000年代经历了一个“小阳春”，以至于有人在那之后提出了中美一体的“中美国”论述。
+
+
+▲ 1992年4月23日，中国第一家麦当劳餐厅开幕。
+
+孔诰烽认为这一转变的关键动力来自于美国的商界。在整个1990年代，美国商界，尤其是很多类似AT&T、波音和通用电气这样的巨型企业，纷纷认为中国蕴含着巨大的生意潜力，所以非常乐于游说美国政府改善对华关系。比如，AT&T是克林顿助选时的重要捐助方，他们的高管在1993年到访北京，专门表态支持给中国最惠国待遇。
+
+所以，按照孔诰烽的论述，美国后来“建设性接触”实际上并不是说美国政府中有什么无条件热爱中国的“熊猫派”，而更多应该理解为民主党政治精英试图推动的强硬对华政策，最终向商界的游说作出了妥协。
+
+这一论述并非无懈可击，孔诰烽也指出了其中较为吊诡的一点，即实际上后来受益于中美贸易的企业这时候反而很谨慎。比如直到1997-98年乔布斯和库克主掌苹果之后，苹果公司才开始推行把生产线搬到中国的策略，在此之前他们多在加州生产。而沃尔玛的服装生产商直到2000年代初才大规模从美国南部向中国迁移。因而，为何那些大企业在当时热衷于为中国游说，仍然是一个值得详述的故事，比如，中国石油系统和布什家族在德州的产业是否构成一层往来的联系？
+
+但孔诰烽的论述指出的另一点重要之处是：美国恰到好处地延续了对中国的沟通和最惠国待遇，事实上帮助了中国实现自身的经济转型。1980年代中国改革开放初期的经济模式是沿海的出口加工业和内地的大量乡镇企业。到了1990年代，中国遇到了很大的通货膨胀问题。朱镕基政府上台后，试图采取的策略是，停止支持乡镇企业，释放出劳动力进入出口加工业，但这一进程如果没有美国在进口关税的开放，是难以实现的。从而，重新回看这一段历史，按照孔氏的理解，可以认为是美国通过给中国最惠国待遇，把1990年代的中国邀请进入了全球化，成为了真正意义上的“世界工厂”。这个过程给予了美国的资本和企业以巨大的空间，但同时也让中国保留了自己的威权政治体系。
+
+
+### 中国和美国体系的冲撞
+
+> 孔诰烽更“经典”地把中国当作世界体系中出现的又一个“普遍”的资本主义帝国来分析。
+
+孔诰烽的师承脉络中包括了著名的意大利左派历史学家乔凡尼·阿瑞基（Giovanni Arrighi）。有趣的是，阿瑞基的中国门徒们往往是中国左派，他们更加倾向于接着阿瑞基晚年的《亚当斯密在北京》，论述说中国体系将为世界提供一个美国体系之外的，不一样的替代选择。但孔诰烽则更“经典”地把中国当作世界体系中出现的又一个“普遍”的资本主义帝国来分析。
+
+按照阿瑞吉的研究，二战之后的美国主导的世界模式的核心是高工资、高福利、高消费的凯恩斯主义模式。这个体系在二战之后得以依托金本位制和整个布雷顿森林体系确立。但在1970年代之后，随着欧洲和日本的经济崛起，又随着资本利润率的走低，到了1980年代，美国又主导了“新自由主义”的转型，这个转型的核心是：用自由贸易政策迫使发达国家的工人和发展中国家的低薪、无工会的工人竞争。
+
+
+▲ 2010年5月26日，中国广东，苹果iPhone的主要供应商、富士康工厂内的工人们。
+
+“新自由主义”体系的结果是美国变成了全球最大的资本输出国和消费国。美国资本在全球开设工厂，生产出的廉价产品再由美国消费者消费。孔诰烽认为这是美国独特的历史形成难以复制的政治经济结构。这一过程还有一重支撑，即美元作为全球储备货币的地位。这意味着美国是世界上唯一可以通过印钞将内部赤字外部化的国家，能够支撑起一个高度依赖资本输出和进口消费的经济结构。
+
+孔诰烽认为，上世纪90年代，中国开始顺利整合进入美国体系。美国成为中国最大的出口对象和外汇来源。通过出口，中国积累了大量的外汇盈余，政策又通过货币和管控政策，驱使很多人将这笔钱变成人民币，从而给了中国的国有银行向包括房地产在内的经济领域大量放贷的底气。
+
+然而，中国既是美国体系的受益者，也是抵抗者。其仍然保留了非常多的冷战中发展主义国家的特征。比如中国一直拥有着产业政策，也在很多层面上寻求保护和培植本国产业最终替代外国公司。孔诰烽认为，在2008年之后，中国在经济上呈现出高度资本化和党国模式回潮的双重特征。这一特征体现在，国家仍然扶植出口加工业，予以补贴和政策优惠，而出口领域获得的收入，成为银行向国有企业出借的重要凭证，因为国企更容易从国有银行借到钱，所以这一趋势下国企的负债率走高，效率走低。
+
+整个大趋势都可以理解为：中国政府在推行一种“拿美国企业来快速提升中国企业能力”的政策，这导致中国市场对美国企业的吸引力大减。
+
+伴随着这一过程的是美国企业投资日益受阻。比如，曾经预想着在中国电信领域大干一场的AT&T在中国的投资被缩到很小的，局限于几个地方的规模，和他们在1990年代初所期待的形成了鲜明的对比。与此同时，已经进入中国的美国企业发现自己面临着越来越大的或明或暗的转让技术和专利的压力。包括美国一方一直抗议的“窃取知识产权”在内，整个大趋势都可以理解为：中国政府在推行一种“拿美国企业来快速提升中国企业能力”的政策，这导致中国市场对美国企业的吸引力大减。就在2010年前后，美国企业在中国投资的扩张也暂停了。
+
+随着“中国制造2025计划”浮出水面，也随着各种各样的知识产权和市场准入问题导致诉讼（大量的诉讼因为中国政府以发起反垄断调查或者诉讼为威胁被美国企业自行撤回了），美国企业和中国政府的蜜月期大约在2010年代就已经快要走到尽头。孔诰烽指出，这时候在美国已经形成了一个新的游说集团，主要由在中国受挫的美国企业组成，他们虽然有些时候不敢得罪中国政府，但都很愿意私下游说华府更强硬对待中国，以争取美国企业的利益。2010年，包括National Association of Manufacturers（美国制造商协会）和中国美国商会在内的组织联合游说白宫，投诉中国“系统性地以牺牲美国企业为代价建设他们的国内企业”。而到了2011年，在和胡锦涛会谈时，美国总统奥巴马直接专门提出了市场准入和歧视问题。
+
+随着曾经帮助北京游说的企业转向对华施压，在美国国内能够压制鹰派的对中力量没有了。孔诰烽认为这样的处境，使得中美在外交关系上变得非常难以修复。
+
+
+▲ 2017年5月14日，北京人民大会堂举行的“一带一路论坛欢迎宴会”，其中晚宴的餐具。
+
+难以修复关系的另一个维度在于，维护中国资本的海外利益对北京来说也变得重要。2008年后，中国应对危机的政策促成了经济增长，但也催生了高负债，并降低了企业的利润率。这是马克思主义意义上的经典的“过剩”处境。在寻求解决过剩问题时，中国选择了通过“一带一路”向外输出过剩的资本和包括基础设施建设行业在内的过剩产能。2018年的美国研究测算显示，一带一路五年之后，89%的合同商都是中国公司，使用中国材料。
+
+但一带一路扩张对中美关系的一大影响，是开启了对美国的全球投资和消费体系的挑战。随着中国资本的出海，美国公司不仅发现中国市场上要面对中国公司在政府保护下的竞争，在海外的市场也要被中国公司挤占了。
+
+也就是说，按照孔氏的分析，中美的真正冲突是资本构成和竞争的冲突，这一冲突从中国的国内市场逐渐延伸到了全球市场。而很难想像这种冲突能被资本规律以外的东西——如地缘政治利益或某个彼此欣赏的跨国利益集团——所加以节制。
+
+
+### 想像美中对抗
+
+> 在2000年代后，中国采取了一个“帝国转向”，这样的结果是中国无论是否自觉都会寻求以自己为中心的世界体系。
+
+但按照孔诰烽的分析，中美对抗实际上也是可以化解的，只是必须以完全不一样的方式来想像解法了。
+
+他在最后一章里直截了当地指出了一点：在2000年代后，中国采取了一个“帝国转向”，随着资本的扩张，中国在全球资本的维度上也变得和美国、欧洲这些以资本主义生产过剩为特点的“旧帝国”一样，向外寻求原材料、市场和资本输出。这样的结果是中国无论是否自觉都会寻求以自己为中心的世界体系。
+
+孔氏将之类比为二十世纪初欧洲的帝国竞争。那么，帝国竞争可能有什么样的结果呢？回看历史上对帝国主义和竞争的分析，他指出考茨基（Karl Kautsky）曾经认为帝国们也许会合作分赃，而列宁则认为帝国竞争更多会带来战争。孔诰烽提到，研究一战德国的历史发现，德国的资本输出和产品输出是构成英德冲突的一大背景，包括德国为了向海外输出过剩的产品和资本，也促进使用帝国马克。这很像今天的中国在推行的人民币国际化策略。可以认为，他暗示了中美有很大的可能性爆发更直接的军事冲突——因为结构性的冲突，尤其是经济上的，的确是积重难返。
+
+如果我们来延伸孔诰烽的观点，可以得到哪些推论或者新的视角呢？
+
+一是会意识到外交和地缘政治甚至意识形态的冲突和争斗，并不由其自身决定。比如，中美要缓和冲突，要么就必然需要两边在全球资本议题上达成“分肥”的合作。这点如今看起来几乎不可能实现——要么就是其中一方或者双方一起在资本扩张上向后退场，要么就是彻底打破传统的全球消费和生产模式。
+
+
+▲ 2021年11月16日，中国北京，户外大屏幕播放中美元首线上峰会情况。
+
+二来这意味着，中美争斗的缓和，既有可能以其中一方的失利而告终，也有可能以双方共同找到对生产过剩的解决之道而实现。但还有一种并非不可能的情况，如中国选择向内收缩市场，变成一个新的朝鲜式的国家，那么未来中美冲突也是有可能避免的。这就体现出了“新冷战”和“旧冷战”的区别之处：新冷战更多是资本主义竞争驱动的，源于市场的开放，而旧冷战更多是彼此为壑，拉上意识形态的高墙。
+
+引申来说，回答本文开头提出的问题，如果不是习近平执政，而是一个更加自由化的中国政府，是否中美对抗能够避免？
+
+如果孔的分析成立，即中美冲突存在着资本竞争的巨大推力的话，很可能冲突也无法避免。一方面，在孔氏的分析框架中，私营资本和国营资本在助长中美冲突中扮演的其实没有区别。就算中国政府不再走“国进民退”的道路，中美的经济冲突的大框架都会持续。另一方面，假设习时代中国真的“复古”全面转向国家控制的向内计划经济，那么国际市场和欧美社会甚至会在潜意识里感到一些释然和欢迎——因为这样将会极大地降低中美冲突的可能性。
+
+所以，也许并不存在一个中国又繁荣又自由又不对外帝国主义的路线——反倒可能是又繁荣又自由又帝国主义的模式，也是更像美国模式、容易导向战争的模式。
+
+当然，现实中的中国很可能会保持在一种无法摆脱昔日红利的停滞路线上——一方面，外向的出口加工业路线很难调整，也是传统优势，必然会尽力维持；另一方面，中国也会继续像一个传统的发展中国家一样坚持产业政策和某种进口替代模式，并挑战美国在经济上的统治地位。看起来这是当前最保守和理性的“既要、也要”的决定。只不过这意味着结果很可能是既做不好前者，也做不好后者，更不可能触及根本的矛盾框架之所在。
+
+（杨山，评论人，国际政治观察者）
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-04-27-kurdish-women-and-feminism.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-27-kurdish-women-and-feminism.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d3533ada
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-04-27-kurdish-women-and-feminism.md
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "库尔德女性与女权主义"
+author: "茉莉"
+date : 2023-04-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/lOr4Fx6.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "从库尔德女性的经历来思考，在一个抛弃了民族国家的框架下，“女性”是什么？在“性别与民族平等”自治区中，民族主义与女权主义的矛盾是否真的不复存在？"
+---
+
+库尔德这个族群被称为没有国家的民族；而在库尔德地区及中东冲突中，库尔德女性始终身处前线。对她们来说，女权是什么？
+
+
+
+和我们一般印象中的女权运动不同，在对抗父权制、民族主义、与资本主义的过程中，库尔德女性运动呈现出显著的交叉性。随着1978年库尔德工人党（Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê，PKK）成立与库尔德解放运动扩大，库尔德女性解放运动发端且不断发展：作为库尔德人，她们争取民族平等、反抗政治压迫；作为女性，她们反对性别歧视，又寻求男性战友及当地社会对女性的尊重。
+
+库尔德女性运动中的“双重斗争”，反映了当下围绕“民族主义”与“女权主义”矛盾的辩论：在后殖民解放斗争与民族国家构建过程中，“女性解放”往往成为现代化与民主化标志，是后殖民国家全民解放的重要前提。女性加入国民武装一定程度上显示了象征意义的性别平等：一方面，女性与男性平等承担军事义务；另一方面，所有性别共同履行保家卫国的责任。
+
+然而，后殖民女权主义与跨国女权主义则认为，民族主义存在着明显的性别化规范，与女权主义内核相冲突。民族解放运动中的女性通常代表着和平、土地与荣誉，男性则被描绘为国家捍卫者与建设者。强调“男性气质”的战争与军国主义将会加深父权制影响，即使女性在武装与政治抵抗中发挥了关键作用，她们仍会在冲突结束后被要求回归私人领域。
+
+不同于中东以往的民族主义运动，在罗贾瓦革命中，女性不再是被动的文化与传统象征，保护土地与女性的责任不仅属于男性。在PKK领袖阿卜杜拉·奥贾兰意识形态及库尔德女性日常实践中，女性成为“自身、其他女性乃至全人类解放积极推动者”。作为罗贾瓦地区正在实施的政治制度，“民主邦联制”并不寻求建立独立的库尔德民族国家，而追求建立各民族、性别平等共存的自治区，并强调女性解放是反后殖民主义斗争胜利的重要基石。同时，奥贾兰提出女性学（Jineology），以此支持库尔德女性争取自由、平等与民主的运动。
+
+然而，在这样的“性别与民族平等”自治区中，民族主义与女权主义的矛盾是否真的不复存在？罗贾瓦女性是否拥有更大的自主权？
+
+
+▲ 1999年2月20日，伦敦，库尔德妇女在库尔德工人党领导人阿卜杜拉·奥贾兰被土耳其军事情报局拘捕后上街示威。
+
+
+### 在民族与国家的边缘上
+
+1926年，土耳其通过《民法典》，推动性别平等。然而，相比城市上层阶级的土耳其女性，《民法典》难以惠及作为边缘少数族裔的库尔德女性，其困境也被土耳其女权主义者长期忽视。随着60年代土耳其左派运动兴起与70年代PKK成立，库尔德女性这个群体才逐步被纳入论述，并开启政治、社会与军事参与进程。1971年土耳其军事政变后，公民社会遭到严厉镇压，左翼组织被迫由直接政治参与转为秘密活动。1973年，奥贾兰与六位同学在安卡拉大学创立PKK前身“马克思—列宁主义共学社”，并将招募范围扩大至土耳其东南部库尔德地区。1978年11月27日，PKK成立大会确立了马克思列宁主义的核心意识形态，认为“人民战争”是解放“被殖民的库尔德斯坦”的唯一途径，强调武装斗争的重要性。
+
+这一时期，与其他民族解放运动一样，女性解放被认为是库尔德民族解放运动的必然结果，在党内并未得到重视。
+
+成立后不久，PKK在土耳其东部针对与政府合作的库尔德地主发动首次袭击，遭到土耳其民族主义者的强烈反攻。随后，土耳其政府宣布在13个库尔德省实施戒严。1979年，女性领袖萨奇娜·詹瑟兹（Sakine Cansız）与其他成员在土耳其东部被捕。为躲避土耳其军队搜捕，奥贾兰及其追随者逃往叙利亚。在叙利亚总统哈菲兹·阿萨德的默许下，PKK在土叙边境发展壮大。与此同时，土耳其国内矛盾激化导致1980年军事政变，接踵而至的是1980-1983年军政府针对新生团体与政党的残酷镇压，更多的PKK成员逃亡国外或被捕入狱。1980—1982年，萨奇娜等人在迪亚巴克尔监狱进行绝食抗议。这种狱中反抗在一定程度上转移了土耳其政府的注意力，为PKK在叙利亚的重新组织提供时间；同时，抗议也在精神上凝聚了流亡海外的同伴。
+
+库尔德女性运动始于狱中斗争，并在反抗土耳其镇压平民的运动中得到发展。80年代至90年代初，PKK成为最重要的库尔德力量，在库尔德地区对土耳其政府构成军事与政治威胁，二者关系日趋紧张。政府镇压进一步激发了库尔德群众抵抗，许多女性加入PKK参与游击战，在抵抗过程中被政治化。1987至1993年，PKK女性入党率从1%提高至15-20%，约2000人。在民族主义运动中，女性的行动常常比男性更具隐蔽性，她们也因此承担了许多基层工作与传达机密信息等关键性任务。随着更多女性的加入，协调不同地区运动的妇女委员会与女性民兵组织得以建立，为进一步动员女性提供可能。来自不同背景的女性在城镇与山间开展斗争，塑造了库尔德女性运动雏形。
+
+女性在斗争中的卓越表现促使奥贾兰反思女性在库尔德民族革命的地位。1993年，奥贾兰提出建立独立女性武装。这一提议最初遭到党内男性成员反对，但女性成员自下而上争取，加上奥贾兰的推动，党内第一届妇女代表大会于1995年宣布成立库尔德斯坦自由女性部队（Yekîtiya Azadiya Jinên Kurdistan，YAJK）。作为首支真正意义上脱离男性进行自我组织的库尔德女性武装，YAJK的成立标志着库尔德女性自治初具规模。
+
+然而，这仍是一个内外交困的艰难时期：对外，民族解放运动仍是PKK的核心诉求，新创立的女性武装缺乏组织经验，在与土耳其国家机器的对抗中艰难求生；在PKK内部，“性别斗争”则成为日常。90年代末期，PKK中的女性成员约占到了30%，但高层权力仍牢牢把控在男性手中。许多男性党员仍然对女性在斗争中的角色与能力存在质疑，这迫使女性为证明个人能力而超越生理极限，造成不可逆的身体损伤与牺牲。
+
+
+▲ 1999年2月，土耳其驻伦敦大使馆外，抗议阿卜杜拉·奥贾兰被土耳其当局逮捕的示威中，一名女孩拿著库尔德工人党领导人阿卜杜拉·奥贾兰的照片。
+
+
+### 在政党内，双赢与压抑
+
+80年代中期以来，奥贾兰意识到在党内也有塑造“自由女性”认同的重要性。这一时期，动员当地妇女参战的最大障碍来自道德层面，即如何维护“荣誉”（namûs），因为在传统库尔德社会，女性身体与贞操，与男性及家族荣誉紧密相连。在早期理论中，奥贾兰认为这种“贞操观”剥夺了女性的权利与地位，她们因此被关在家中、长期依赖男性，还常常面临着损害男性荣誉的指控。只有消除这种障碍，库尔德女性才能走出家门参与运动，将她们自己从“家庭与民族国家的双重压迫”下解放出来。
+
+因此，为说服更多家庭允许女性加入运动，PKK严格限制男女党员之间的情感与性关系，对女性“荣誉”的监督权也从家庭转移到党内。
+
+90年代初期，奥贾兰建立了这样的论述：女性解放是男性与整个社会解放的先决条件。他将女性力量与母系社会传统相联系，表示美索不达米亚平原上的女性在新石器时代拥有决定自己命运的权力，女性神明也在这一时期得到极大尊崇。因此，女性需要将自己从奴隶制束缚中解放出来，以重新发现她们内心的“女神”，而男性则肩负着“终结男性霸权”（killing the dominant man）的任务。
+
+在奥贾兰意识形态中，“女神”形象是去性化的，而非基于传统的母亲或照护者角色，“女性解放”则建立在为党的事业自我牺牲之上。然而，女性转变为“女神”的说法也存在矛盾。正如其他反殖民解放运动一样，女性只有“去性化”、去除女性气质之后，才能够成为一名合格的党员、进入政治领域、获得职业晋升。在话语上，两性在PKK内部被视为平等的同志，但他们所追求的“爱”，意味着对土地的保护与对自由的争取，而其他身体或个人的欲望则受到抑制。
+
+为动员更多女性参与库尔德民族解放运动，奥贾兰于1998年3月8日正式发布“女性解放意识形态”，其中主要的五条原则是：保卫生活的土地、女性的自由思想与自由意志、自我组织、奋斗精神以及追求新的审美与道德标准。这一意识形态成为指导库尔德女性运动的理论基础，越来越多女性开始担任领导职务，女性的组织与军事能力增强、士气上涨，推动库尔德女性运动黄金时期的到来。这一时期，奥贾兰总是有意识地确保女性领导人不被忽视，其与女性党员的合作旨在实现一种双赢：前者通过女性巩固自己的党内势力，后者则通过前者的地位推动女性解放运动发展。
+
+但随着1999年奥贾兰的被捕，PKK党内出现父权思想回潮。女性代表试图将YAJK从女性武装改组为独立的全女性政党“库尔德斯坦劳动妇女党”（Partiya Jinên Karker a Kurdistanê，PJKK），但遭到男性领导层的激烈反对，他们认为独立的女性政党将削弱PKK的中央权力。经过两年的权力斗争，PJKK被改造为隶属于PKK的自由妇女党（Partiya Jina Azad，PJA）。尽管无法独立于PKK与男性领导层开展工作，PJA仍努力在土耳其各地开设妇女协会促进基层文化教育，为当地妇女提供少数民族权利、库尔德语与土耳其语、妇女及儿童卫生健康、女性历史等课程，并不断推动库尔德女性与其他国家及国际妇女组织的经验交流。
+
+
+▲ 1999年，一名库尔德人自焚，以抗议库尔德工人党领导人阿卜杜拉·奥贾兰遭逮捕。
+
+
+### 抛弃Nation State之后：“民主邦联主义”与“女性学”
+
+1999年被捕的奥贾兰，在狱中重新规划对于土耳其与库尔德地区民主的愿景。他意识到民族主义运动及民族国家模式的局限性，放弃了建立独立库尔德斯坦的目标。受无政府主义社会生态学家默里·布克钦（Murray Bookchin）等西方思想家影响，奥贾兰提出“民主邦联主义”：这是一套自下而上的社会系统，基于公民自治、直接民主、性别平等、民族平等、生态主义、多元主义等原则，在社会重建的同时发展超越民族国家与资本主义的社会结构。根据这一理论，PKK下属的武装部队不再开展游击战，只行使“自卫权”。
+
+在“民主邦联主义”指导下，女性组织在PKK党内蓬勃发展。2003年，库尔德女性活动家们成立“自由女性代表大会”（Kongreya Jinen Azad，KJA）作为土耳其境内所有库尔德女性运动组织的联盟，为运动提供更加制度化的框架。在这一框架下，PJA更名为库尔德斯坦女性自由党（Partiya Azadiya Jina Kurdistan），负责意识形态指导；自由女性联盟（Yekitiyên Jinên Azad）组织政治与社会运动；自由女性部队之星（Yeknîyên Jinên Azad Star）是反军国主义的自卫部队，抵御任何形式针对女性及危害社会解放的暴力；女性青年组织（Komalên Jinên Kurdistan）从事青年教育、动员与组织工作。通过对各类组织进行统筹、分工，KJA改进了不同领域的女性工作。2005年3月，民主邦联主义正式被写入党章，成为PKK指导思想。
+
+不久之后，奥贾兰提出“男女共治”政策，即各级领导职位都由一位男性与一位女性共同担任，二者拥有相同权力，这项政策后被广泛运用于库尔德地区不同组织与机构。同时，40%女性性别配额制也被引入PKK。然而，由于内部男性阻挠，直到2007年，党内女性才有机会成立独立选举委员会、自行选择女性候选人。
+
+2008年，奥贾兰通过研究女性受压迫的历史，总结库尔德女性多年的斗争经验，提出“女性学（Jineology）”概念作为“民主邦联主义”的重要组成部分。从词源上来看，“Jineology”可分为两部分：前半部分源于库尔德语单词“jin”（女性），后半部分取自英语“-logy”（各种学科的词尾）。在其倡导者眼中，女性学是从女性视角还原历史的哲学，是对男性垄断知识生产的挑战。同时，女性学也在探索一种新的政治实践方式，即通过学习、讨论、发展女性学，库尔德女性运动动员更多参与者，使她们了解本应属于女性的社会地位，一同讲述被遗忘的女性历史。
+
+女性学对母系社会与女神崇拜作出积极评价。其历史观认为，人类社会至今发生了三次性别割裂（Sexual Rupture）：随着母系社会走向尾声，斗争与掠夺出现，男性凭借身体优势成为主导，第一次性别割裂发生。在这一时期，各地涌现出许多男性神明，取代了原始社会中女性神明的主导地位，这为男性树立权威、奴役女性创造了意识形态基础，奥贾兰将这一转变称为“反向革命”（counter-revolution）。随着一神教逐渐取代多神教，女性完全走下神坛，造成第二次性别割裂。男性以“至高无上的神”之名制定规则，束缚与奴役女性，将她们编织进“羞耻文化”之中。这种文化框架之下，作为权威的男性不会犯错，而女性必须为人类灾难与厄运负责。第三次性别割裂发生在进入资本主义时代之后。资本主义割裂社会，强化社会个体间的差异与歧视。社会在剥削女性免费劳动上进行资本积累，将女性从事的生育、抚养孩子、家务等劳动定义为毫无经济价值的工作。
+
+奥贾兰认为，其他社会形态都无法达到资本主义系统化剥削女性的程度，父权制压迫在资本主义形态下达到顶峰。
+
+由于奥贾兰一直以来对于女性运动的支持，其作为男性领导人在女性学发展中的地位却被不断强调。然而，“女性学”的形成不应只归功于奥贾兰一人，而是库尔德女性集体。女性学倡导者们立足于四十多年以来政治与武装斗争经验，共同书写集体知识，寻找新的语境来理解她们正在对抗的多重困境。
+
+早在90年代，女性就已经在监狱中进行库尔德女权主义讨论。但在该时期，女权主义被认为是与资产阶级相关的外来概念，许多女性讨论因此遭到否定。如今，库尔德女性学仍有意将自己与女权主义进行切割，强调女性学是一门全新的学科与话语体系。其拥护者虽然肯定了女权主义的历史影响与实践经验，但认为其仍无法摆脱资本主义、自由主义、民族国家等约束，因此无法真正超越社会性别刻板印象、改变父权统治结构。
+
+而许多女权主义学者则认为，女性学反对的是“西方自由主义女权”，而女性学本身是从女性视角出发，对第三波女权主义浪潮中出现的跨国女权主义、后殖民女权主义、本土女权主义、生态女权主义与交叉性女权主义的补充。
+
+
+▲ 2003年4月6日，伊拉克北部山区，库尔德武装组织KADEK的女战士。
+
+
+### 中东地区的女性革命：叙利亚罗贾瓦革命
+
+“民主联邦主义”提出后，PKK及库尔德活动家不仅着眼于土耳其内部的权力斗争与知识生产，而且寻求跨国合作，推动该理论的实践与发展。在叙利亚驻扎期间，PKK奠定了群众基础。90年代起，一万多名叙利亚库尔德人加入PKK。1999年，奥贾兰被阿萨德政府驱逐后，追随他逃亡的旧部留在叙利亚，并于2003年成立民主联盟党（Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat，PYD）。PYD在2003-2011年间秘密发展壮大政治网络，并在叙利亚内战中逐渐获得库尔德地区政治与军事的垄断地位。
+
+在叙利亚库尔德地区，女性无论在前方战场还是在后方建设中都发挥了重要的作用。2011年，混合性别武装“自卫部队”（Yekinêyên Xweparastina Gel，YXG）成立，部队三名总司令中有两名为女性。2012年，YXG改组为人民保护部队（Yekîneyên Parastina Gel，YPG），并于2013年成立了全女性武装YPJ，共同隶属于PYD。2012年7月后，叙利亚政府军从北部撤军，YPG控制了叙利亚北部贾兹拉、科巴尼与阿夫林地区，并于2013年11月宣告构建各民族平等的罗贾瓦自治区。与此同时，圣战分子不断涌入幷包围叙利亚北部，并于2014年6月29日正式宣布成立IS。在军事前线，大量库尔德女性参与对抗IS，在科巴尼、拉卡、巴古斯等重要战场上击溃恐怖分子，成为女性抵抗与争取解放斗争的重要标志。在2019年3月23日占领IS最后据点巴古斯村的战役中，女性发挥了至关重要的作用。
+
+在战场后方，女性根据“民主邦联主义”模式与女性学理论建设地方组织结构与支持网络。在女性联合会“联盟之星（Kongra Star）”指导下，涉及经济、政治、社会、文化等方面的女性机构纷纷建立，其中包括女性之家与专属女性的学院、公社、合作社。2014年1月，自治区开始实施临时宪法《社会契约宪章》，规定“童婚、强迫婚姻、一夫多妻制、支付嫁妆、名誉杀人与基于性别的暴力（如强奸与家庭暴力）非法”、“堕胎合法化”。同时，该宪法沿用了性别配额制与男女共治政策，规定“妇女参与政治、社会、经济与文化生活的权利不可侵犯”，“立法议会及所有管理机构、委员会，必须设置40%的女性代表。”2018年11月25日国际消除对妇女暴力日，“女性之家”（Jinwar）村庄正式落成，其人口由丈夫在战争中丧生的妇女与自愿选择不结婚以改变传统性别角色的女性构成。
+
+罗贾瓦革命对于库尔德女性运动的意义至关重要，是中东地区的“女性革命”。在传统战争中，女性往往承担着后勤与照护伤员的角色，或者成为胜方的战利品。战争常常被描述成“为了妇女、儿童而战”，男性在上阵杀敌，女性在后方等待家人的归期。然而，YPJ女兵颠覆了传统战争中的性别分工与刻板印象，成为对抗“强势的原教旨主义”男性的中坚力量，参军成为女性追求性别平等的“重要武器”。当女性走出家门、拥有自我意识与自我赋权之后，传统性别角色与父权制统治结构逐渐模糊，当地女性被压迫地位得到一定程度改变。
+
+另一方面，传统女权主义认为，女性参军无法改变父权社会结构、提升女性地位，因为女性的努力会随着战争结束而付之东流。因此，罗贾瓦女性通过法律、政治与社会参与创新女性自治机制，防止女性在重建阶段再度被边缘化，保留女性斗争成果。随着女性代表增加，女性获得更多话语权，女性视角在政策制定过程中得以呈现，进一步促进女性解放。罗贾瓦经验创造了对于性别平等社会的新想象，为各地库尔德运动与女性运动提供了新动力。
+
+
+▲ 2014年10月23日，叙利亚，一名哀悼者在库尔德战士的葬礼上举著一面印有库尔德工人党领导人阿卜杜拉奥贾兰的旗帜。
+
+
+### 民族主义与性别化，想象与现实的差距
+
+虽然罗贾瓦革命在女性赋权与性别平等上取得了令人鼓舞的成就，但运动及社会内部与国际环境的多重困境仍在持续，库尔德女性的双重斗争仍在上演。在罗贾瓦社会内部，父权思想仍根深蒂固，尤其在乡村地区，家庭依然对女性施加至关重要的影响，当地人难以接受女性扮演与男性相同的社会角色。
+
+通过走访家庭，PKK干部说服更多家庭同意家中女性加入YPJ或其他妇女机构。然而，许多家庭的允许是基于这些机构中没有任何男性，或由于战争与制裁造成的经济困难；机构负责人也向参与者的家庭保证，加入的女性将远离一切不符合传统社会规范的活动，并获得可观的收入。同时，YPG与YPJ成员沿袭了PKK针对情感关系与性关系的规定，当地的政党、军队与妇女组织取代了家庭维护女性“荣誉”的角色，以获得保守家庭的支持。
+
+尽管妇女组织的做法是为了适应当地情况、动员更多女性，但明确的性别隔离限制了两性之间的正常交往，减少了男女之间进一步相互理解的可能。此外，在相对开放的家庭中，女性也面临着来自各方面的压迫。即使女性拥有赚钱养家的经济实力，她们仍必须承担所有家务劳动与养育子女的责任。结婚与生育还对女性职业发展产生负面影响，通常只有单身女性会被推荐至更高岗位，而育有多个幼年子女的女性往往无法平衡工作与家庭的双重责任，最终选择离职。为了在工作中得到晋升，当地女性只能选择放弃婚育，但大龄未婚状况又将在当地社会遭到歧视。
+
+罗贾瓦地区的外部环境也不容乐观，其仍面临着土耳其、IS残余分子等多重夹击。自治以来，土耳其因担心PKK再度壮大，持续对该地区进行轰炸，并伴随多次地面行动，大面积占领罗贾瓦土地，对其治理与发展造成严重打击。此外，罗贾瓦自治政府还指控土耳其支持IS残余分子活动，外交发言人凯末尔·阿基夫（Kemal Akif）表示：“拉斯艾因（Ras-al-Ayn）等叙利亚边境城市处于土耳其占领之下，许多前IS领导人逃往土耳其占领区避难，并在土耳其的帮助下策划新的攻击，其中2022年1月针对哈塞克监狱的袭击是2019年IS战败后发动的最大袭击。”
+
+与此同时，叙利亚政府至今尚未承认罗贾瓦自治合法性。然而，自哈菲兹时期开始，库尔德人便与叙利亚政府保持微妙的关系，这种关系延续至巴沙尔时期。位于叙利亚北部的罗贾瓦是叙利亚政府抗击反对派、制衡土耳其、抵御恐怖组织的天然屏障，叙利亚政府不仅希望将YPG与YPJ编入叙利亚军队以加强国防力量，还想利用罗贾瓦革命成果及丰富的地区资源支持叙利亚重建。虽然罗贾瓦武装力量是基于奥贾兰理论中“正当防卫”的原则建立的，但长期冲突局面很大程度将罗贾瓦军事化，这种军事化往往对应着“男性气质”的强调，女性与儿童则成为受害者。如果冲突一直持续，全面军事化将再度加深当地的性别割裂。同时，面对并不明朗的外部环境，已经实现的性别平等建设成果很可能由于冲突的突然爆发在一昔之间毁于一旦。
+
+此外，罗贾瓦革命似乎仍未真正跳出民族主义的桎梏。库尔德女性解放运动始于PKK的民族主义动员，并在持续斗争中发展出“超越民族国家范畴”的“民主邦联主义”。然而，这种意识形态仍然具有深刻的性别化色彩，进步的“自由女性”本质上代表了运动所向往的“非国家民族”式的民主邦联实体，而这一实体在一定程度上覆刻了民族国家的想象。“女性解放”在这一实体中成为动员当地所有民族女性参与经济与社会建设的口号，邦联实体的利益仍被置于个人自由之上。“自由女性”形象依托于“纯洁性”、对土地与人民的爱、坚定不移与无惧牺牲的奉献精神。这也意味着，女性应该为实现该民主邦联主体的“共同理想”让渡个人权益甚至生命。
+
+不过，左派人士与学术界仍对这一“乌托邦”保持谨慎的乐观。诚然，当地男性仍保留着更多权力，周边局势也不会在短时间内发生变化，但女性在争取解放与平等过程中做出的努力是不可磨灭的。库尔德妇女解放运动确认、重现、再造了民族主义与女权主义之间的复杂关系。尽管可能存在民族主义与女权主义之间的矛盾，这场妇女运动在性别平等与公正方面取得了长足进步。女性自治结构的历史发展、保护女性权利的现行机制、罗贾瓦的实践创新与库尔德人的持续抵抗使该地区女性进一步解放成为可能。罗贾瓦革命至今仅十余年，而这场运动仍在继续。
+
+（茉莉，法国社会科学高等研究院博士候选人，从事叙利亚库尔德女性问题研究）
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-05-06-a-dream-of-shanghai.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-06-a-dream-of-shanghai.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "上海的一场梦"
+author: "维舟"
+date : 2023-05-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ELK15Yt.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+五一假期上海外滩人山人海。有人感叹：“看到这样的外滩我终于松了一口气，原来那不过是一场梦，现在梦醒了。”有人不以为然：“噩梦的阴影远没有消失。”他们都认为一年前的上海封城是一个梦，争议只是梦醒了没有。但我的第一反应是：其实当下这转瞬即逝的繁华才是一场梦，而去年那两个月倒是暴露出没有遮掩的现实。
+
+
+
+我也不是不能理解这些人的心态：过去的就让它过去吧，重要是当下的每一天。carpe diem（活在当下）这一道德律令，有时是一种面对现实生活的积极抗争，但此刻随时能和“及时享乐”混同，因为人们掩埋了过去，也没有未来，而所谓“最好的现在”，又意味着“熟悉的那个过去回来了”。
+
+这种“过日子”的实用主义态度，难免遭到更具批判精神的知识分子嘲讽和痛恨，但公平地说，即便是这样的历史观也不是“政治正确”的，因为它隐含着这样一个基本判断：那个“梦”是正常生活的一次异常和中断，是自己不愿再回首的伤痛往事，然而根据官方叙事，有的只是团结和胜利。
+
+“过去”并没有真正过去，它只是被压抑进了潜意识，就像每一个车水马龙的城市，都带着看不见的伤痕。我因此不止一次想起库切在《铜器时代》中所说的：
+
+> 让我告诉你，当我在南非这块土地上走过时，我的感觉仿佛是走在黑色的面孔上。他们已经死了，但是他们的魂灵还没有离体，他们沉沉地躺在那里，等待我的脚踩过他们，等待我离开，等待复活的机会。
+
+城市就像人，它也有诞生、衰老和死亡，而这座城市就曾经猝死了一次。无法忘记，曾经灯火通明、充满活力气息的地方，突然间充满了大型的末日废弃感。时至今日，它也没有完全复活，就在人山人海的外滩不远处，曾经人来人往的文化街福州路一片萧条。并不是所有机体组织都能再生。
+
+空间就是记忆。在外人看来平平无奇的荒原、河流、草木，对土著来说则承载着他们世代以来的记忆，看到祖先走过的道路、童年时玩耍的地方荒芜，他们潸然落泪。城里人也没什么不同，只不过特定空间可能堆叠、沉淀着许多记忆，就像考古的底层，但又随着城市空间的改造不断地摧毁、重组、更新。
+
+一想到自己作为一个有尊严、有自理能力的成年人，在那些灰暗的日子里沦入野蛮的境地，我一些朋友在深感羞耻之余，甚至一度陷入抑郁。“为什么这样？”人们张开嘴，得不到一个答案，但可以尝尝自己的泪珠。
+
+在困守家里的那两个月里，我身体被禁锢，但头脑却每天都远离此地，承受着密集的信息轰炸。在看了种种议论之后，我当时和朋友群聊时有一个断言：如何评判封城期间的上海，是一个人价值观的可靠试金石。这个观点我到现在也没有改变。
+
+怎样看待这段记忆，在当时就已充满争议。网上充斥着对上海“拉胯”表现的讥讽和谩骂，“中国城市的天花板”此时被奚落为“的确是天花板，不过是地下室的天花板”。
+
+有人相信，上海人是在为全中国人受难，一次悲壮的受难，在生死关头展现出市民应有的尊严、体面和勇气；但也有人认为，受难就是受难，它毫无意义——这或许不失为一种绝望的清醒，然而正因此，它需要更坚强的神经才能面对虚空所带来的重负，因为人可以承受任何苦难，但不能承受这一苦难是无意义的。
+
+病毒是一张试纸：我们所面对的那个不可见的敌人，其实就是我们自身政治生活的病理写照，就《癌症传》里所说的，“在癌细胞的分子核心所具有的超活跃性、生存力、好斗性、增殖力以及创造性，都是我们自身的翻版”。我们所表现出来的生存力、恢复力和创造力，并不是伟大医生所赋予的品质，而是患者在与疾病斗争的过程中彰显出来的自身品质。
+
+如果把城市看作一个有机体，那么它不是别的，正是像你我这样一个个的细胞所组成的。城市就是人。如果不是因为当时被封号，我原本想写一篇《上海不相信眼泪》，正是上海人在这一时刻激发出来的市民精神，让我在上海居住了二十年之后，第一次真正把自己看作是上海人了。
+
+那时一度似有某种不稳定的共识：拒绝宏大的感动，要有人性互助的感动。确实，普通人可能是依靠着彼此才活了下来，但那种紧急状态一旦结束，曾有的联结也就再度分崩离析。“市民精神”或许也像一个城市的潜意识，所谓“时穷节乃见”，在特定时刻才被完全激发出来。
+
+当然，我也知道，对很多人来说，那些都好像从没发生过。有人和我说，他现在都不问了，因为之前问起各地亲友封控期间怎么样，得到的回答都很一致：“没什么影响，玩玩手机看看书，本来也不出门。”——这就像是一个自动运作的系统，哪怕是如此明显的刺激，也未能进入意识层面。
+
+如今，那段往事回想起来，已经被看作是一场梦，但什么是“梦”？梦就是集体无意识，“现实”本应是我们的显意识，然而在我们这里，真实由于太难以面对而被压抑进潜意识，被视为一场噩梦，无意识反倒引导着我们的现实生活。
+
+这不是从梦中醒来，而是回避现实，进入梦中。这样一个人，无法醒来，因为他理解的“醒来”，恰恰是在“睡去”，而他所理解的那个梦将一直困扰着他。正如Michel de Certeau曾说的，被压抑的过去终将会作祟于现在。这就是为什么我们需要勇气，因为面对过去，才有真实的现在，才有未来。
+
+
+▲ 2022年春，暴雨前的上海
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-05-15-victory-day-turned-into-shame-day.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-15-victory-day-turned-into-shame-day.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "从“胜利日”到“耻辱日”"
+author: "吴言"
+date : 2023-05-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/jtZpzTo.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "俄乌战争如何重置反法西斯胜利的记忆"
+---
+
+5月9日是许多原苏联国家的法定节日“胜利日”，全称为“红军和苏联人民在1941-1945伟大的卫国战争中战胜纳粹德国胜利日”。如今，俄乌白三国庆祝胜利日的方式各不相同。俄罗斯和白俄罗斯借胜利日为侵略行为正名；乌克兰则将胜利日并入欧洲传统之中。
+
+
+
+今年的“胜利日”一大早，白俄罗斯总统卢卡申科先是在明斯克胜利广场参加节日游行，为胜利纪念碑献上花环，然后迅速赶往莫斯科参加俄罗斯的红场阅兵。中亚五国元首再加上亚美尼亚和白俄罗斯领袖齐聚莫斯科，以示“独联体”对普京的支持。
+
+另一边，乌克兰总统泽连斯基向国家议会最高拉达提交草案，重置“胜利日”——将原本苏联遗产下的5月9日卫国战争胜利日更名为“欧洲日”。他在全国演说中表示，“从明天5月9日起，每年我们都将纪念我们的历史性团结——所有摧毁纳粹主义并将击败鲁莽主义的欧洲人的团结。”而将5月8日定为“纪念二战反法西斯胜利日”，他在推特上指出，“世界上大多数国家都在5月8日纪念战胜纳粹的伟大胜利。”1945年5月8日德国在柏林正式签订投降书，标志着欧洲战场取得了胜利。5月9日，斯大林签署苏联红军最高统帅令，宣布伟大的卫国战争胜利。在美欧国家，每年的5月8日庆祝欧战胜利纪念日；原苏联东欧国家多在5月9日庆祝伟大的卫国战争胜利日。乌克兰的这一做法，相当于是按照欧洲传统来进行庆祝，彻底和俄罗斯划清界限。
+
+2023年5月9日前后，我在白俄罗斯见证了这里的伟大卫国战争胜利纪念日。由于白俄罗斯官方将伟大的卫国战争置于其民族国家建构工程的核心地位，加上民间社会的高度认同，这里的胜利日像往年一样热闹非凡。与此同时，今年的胜利日又很不同，恰逢俄乌战争进行到第440天。普京发动俄乌战争的口号之一就是“去纳粹化”，这使得俄乌战争常和二战联系在一起。69年前胜利的伟大卫国战争和至今看不到头的俄乌战争并置，历史和现实之间产生了一种相互呼应的奇异观感。
+
+在白俄罗斯，并非所有见闻都让人愉快。从战争的奇观化和娱乐化，到被国家所垄断的胜利话语，这一切都令人深思，究竟什么是更好的纪念过去的方式，以及如何真正走向和平。正在进行中的战争，让“胜利日”看起来不值得欢庆，甚至可耻——因为它意味着巨大的失败，指明过往对于战争反思的无效。特别是对于普京政权而言，伟大的卫国战争和俄乌战争同样都只是东西方对抗的历史周期律的再现，二战中反法西斯的经验已被遗忘。当“胜利日”彻底沦为一场政治展演和游戏，它也就彻底失去了警世的意义和功能。一种更好的庆祝胜利日的方式或许是从民族国家那里拿回反思战争的主动权。
+
+
+▲ 2023年5月9日，白俄罗斯总统卢卡申科出席俄罗斯莫斯科克里姆林宫墙举行的胜利日献花仪式。
+
+
+### 乌克兰过哪一个胜利日
+
+> 白俄罗斯和乌克兰形成了一对完全相反的案例：一个将独立后的民族国家建构建立在苏联遗产的基础上，一个则建立在反苏联的基础上。
+
+乌克兰今年将胜利日提前到5月8日，这已经不是乌克兰第一次在如何庆祝“胜利日”的问题上试图与俄罗斯划清界限了。2013-2014年的乌克兰危机之前，“伟大的卫国战争”的说法还在官方文件中使用。而在教科书中，从1991年苏联解体、乌克兰独立以来使用的是“二战”的提法，直到亲俄的总统亚努科维奇上台以后统一改作“伟大的卫国战争”。早就有人提出，到底叫“二战”、“苏德战争”还是“伟大卫国战争”是有讲究的，每个名称背后都有不同的意识形态色彩。2015年，前总统波罗申科任上，乌克兰最高拉达通过法律，以“第二次世界大战”取代“伟大的卫国战争”的说法。这一举措的背景是波罗申科推出“去苏联化”政策，为此出台了一揽子法案，“伟大的卫国战争”更名是其中一部分。此外还有专门的《关于批判在乌共产主义和纳粹主义极权政权及禁止其符号宣传法》。这一法案直接导致乌共在乌克兰成为和纳粹一样的非法组织，被禁止活动。镰刀锤子符号、与苏联相关的人名地名、列宁斯大林像全部从大街小巷被抹去。“伟大的卫国战争”被认为是一个苏联词语，因此同样不被允许使用。此外，2015年的法案将5月8日定为“胜利与和解日”，与欧洲的传统相连接；5月9日庆祝“第二次世界大战反法西斯胜利日”。2023年这次更进一步，把“胜利日”直接挪到5月8日。除了名称，使用的纪念符号也要改变。在乌克兰，胜利日的符号是红罂粟，以取代俄罗斯的圣格奥尔基丝带。事实上，原苏联加盟国各国都有自己的胜利日符号，但只有乌克兰引起了争议。在白俄罗斯使用的是与国旗同色的红绿丝带和苹果花。圣格奥尔基丝带在白俄罗斯也被视作胜利日的象征。
+
+反苏联的法案至今在乌克兰依然有效。这使得白俄罗斯和乌克兰形成了一对完全相反的案例：一个将独立后的民族国家建构建立在苏联遗产的基础上，一个则建立在反苏联的基础上。乌克兰反苏联是全方位的：反对其民族关系、意识形态、政治经济体制和地缘政治。在乌克兰一方看来，苏联的历史是大俄罗斯民族压迫，甚至穿插着种族清洗的记忆；苏联政权是极权主义的帝国政权。乌克兰要独立，就要先摆脱苏联。今天的俄罗斯是苏联的继承者，有企图恢复苏联的帝国野心，因此要摆脱俄罗斯，融入西方。俄乌战争对于乌克兰来说恰恰是印证了以往的这些看法。
+
+
+▲ 2023年5月8日，乌克兰利沃夫的胜利日纪念，人们在前集中营遗址的十字架附近纪念树上悬挂红色罂粟花。
+
+乌克兰的割席每一次都必然引起俄罗斯跳脚，这次也不例外。按俄外交部发言人扎哈罗娃的说法，泽连斯基是叛徒，是21世纪的犹大，她说取消了5月9日胜利日意味着永远背叛了自己的先辈。
+
+我的白俄罗斯友人Svetlana和Liudmila也理解不了乌克兰的选择。她们觉得俄罗斯人、乌克兰人和白俄罗斯人共同经历了那场战争，大家曾经拥有共同的命运，为什么要还要区分出圣格奥尔基丝带和罂粟花。“一个纪念日被当作政治牌来打。”Svetlana说。
+
+但在乌克兰人Sasha看来，俄罗斯才是把胜利日政治化的一方，关于胜利日的一整套叙事已经成为普京政权对乌策略的一部分。圣格奥尔基丝带现在已经是俄罗斯侵略的象征。她回忆起自己上中学的时候，每个胜利日都被学校组织去参加游行，给老兵献花。收到鲜花的老人一般反应都不是开心，而是痛哭流涕。Sasha的姥姥在1941年开战时已经差不多10岁，能记事了。她不愿意讲战争的事情，只要一提这事就哭。年幼时Sasha理解不了大人的反应，她只知道“胜利日”从来不是一个开心的日子。据她说2014年克里米亚战争以前人们还会去参加阅兵、游行，参观二战博物馆，2014年以后就越来越少了。但今年还有人去无名英雄纪念碑献花。
+
+2015年的改弦更张曾经在乌克兰引起争议。一些人坚持按照旧的苏联传统来庆祝“胜利日”，比如佩戴圣格奥尔基丝带，捧着老兵像参加不朽军团游行。结果导致了极右翼团体和这些人的冲突。俄乌战争之后，乌克兰国内政治版图发生剧烈变化，或许更多人会接受一个欧洲式的二战胜利日。
+
+
+### 在白俄罗斯经历“胜利日”
+
+> 那场人类经历过的空前的灾难被赋予了一种民族性，是民族的受难史，也是英雄史，并要求将这一资源在一代又一代人中传承下去。
+
+“胜利日”在白俄罗斯的意义格外特殊。白俄罗斯官方将伟大卫国战争作为最重要的国家象征，没有之一。每年5月9日都作为公共假期来庆祝，是一年中最盛大的国家节日。白俄罗斯被认为是原苏联加盟国最像苏联的国家之一，主要是因为它继承了很多苏联的代表符号，包括公假体系。胜利日是其中之一。白俄罗斯也庆祝十月革命节，但规模不及“胜利日”。对于白俄罗斯来说，伟大卫国战争是一场不远不近的记忆，许多亲历者至今虽然高龄但还健在，还能讲述往事。跟许多国家的民族史学书写一样，那场人类经历过的空前灾难被赋予了一种民族性，是民族的受难史，也是英雄史。为的是保卫国境线不被进犯，国民生命安全不被伤害。国家将胜利打造为记忆中的黄金时代，并要求将这一资源在一代代人中传承下去。
+
+
+▲ 2017年6月30日，白俄罗斯明斯克，军人和家属在胜利广场合影。
+
+明斯克的主街道——独立大街绵延穿城而过，在市中心串起城市主要建筑之一——胜利广场。那是每一个来到明斯克的人不可能错过的一道城市景观。广场上纪念碑高耸，镶嵌着白俄罗斯苏维埃社会主义共和国的镰刀锤子麦穗国徽，顶端是一颗红星。纪念碑下方是长明火，后方建筑顶端用红色写着“人民的功绩不朽”字样。除此之外，全白俄罗斯大大小小的城市乡镇中心区域都有类似的纪念碑。在城市景观中，卫国战争的记忆无处不在。
+
+起初我以为“胜利日”在白俄罗斯只是一个官方节日，和当地人聊起来才发现没有这么简单。对于白俄罗斯人来说，5月9日是一个家庭节日，尤其是为了家里的老人而过的节日。人至中年的话剧演员Liudmila告诉我，她的爷爷奶奶还健在的时候，每年这一天是去老人家团聚的日子，他们会一次次怀念起战争中永远失去的和幸存的亲人。有的家庭甚至会一起观看二战主题电影。爷爷奶奶去世后，大家仿佛没有动力再团聚了。
+
+Svetlana和Liudmila年龄相仿，在环保组织工作。她告诉我说，“胜利日”这么重要，是因为那场战争是所有白俄罗斯人的共同经历。“每家每户都有战争的亲历者，没有例外。有的人是游击队员，有的人是红军老兵，有的人进过集中营。当然老兵现在在世的可能没有几个了。”Svetlana的祖辈则经历了列宁格勒围困。“‘胜利日’和每个白俄罗斯人息息相关。”
+
+大学生Alina告诉我，年轻人不太有专门庆祝“胜利日”的习惯，一般取决于每个家庭具体安排。但大家普遍很认同这个节日：“我们的先辈为我们能够生活在一个自由的世界里而奋斗，这是无价的。”围绕着伟大卫国战争，个人、家庭的记忆融入国家、民族的记忆，群体的记忆串联起个体的记忆，使得“胜利日”不论在白俄罗斯官方还是民间地位都不可撼动。
+
+2023年白俄罗斯通过调休把“胜利日”变成了为期4天的小长假。为了避开假期，白俄罗斯的许多公共部门5月4日就开始过节。明斯克的一所大学在5月4日组织了“胜利日”游园会。布置二战主题展览、唱苏联军歌、向人民英雄纪念碑献花都是每年一度的保留节目。身披黑袍，脖子上挂着金色十字架的东正教神甫赶来为“胜利日”祝福。
+
+
+▲ 2022年5月9日，俄罗斯明斯克，女士们跳舞庆祝胜利日。
+
+除此之外，午休时间还专门供应“士兵粥”。校领导和神甫坐在遮阳伞下的座位上吃，学生们排着长队席地而坐吃。5月的明斯克刚经过一个漫长的冬天，满眼绿意。人们一边晒太阳一边吃粥，有说有笑。起初我担心出于忆苦思甜的目的这粥可能味道不太令人愉快，没想到是牛肉和大麦煮的咸粥，完全没有让大家吃苦的意思。士兵粥并不是二战的产物，可以说是一项俄罗斯传统，据说可以追溯到18世纪苏沃洛夫时期。制作士兵粥的目的是要好吃、营养且顶饱，以供行军所需。最初会放小麦、荞麦、猪油、洋葱、胡萝卜和豆子，现在已经类似一道家常菜，有现成的食谱。除了粥，学校还会发一杯加了白糖的俄式红茶。
+
+作为白俄罗斯最主要的宗教，白俄罗斯东正教会各堂区在5月9日会为伟大卫国战争中牺牲的战士举行祈祷仪式。在采访中，我问一名神甫，教会为什么要庆祝世俗节日。他的回答是，“胜利日”对于教会来说是不该以世俗还是宗教节日为标准来划分的。“胜利日”是全民族的节日。从伟大卫国战争开始的第一天起，教会就响应国家的号召，呼吁教众捍卫自己的祖国，为营造武器捐资。我又问他是怎么看待一场“正义”的战争的。战争本身不是违反了基督教“毋杀人”的戒律？他回答说，敌人都来进犯了，当然要先保家卫国。基督徒也要捍卫自己的国家，这是我们的使命的一部分。如此看来，在战争面前，最具有普世性的基督教价值也要服从于民族国家价值，对于永恒天国的追求要让位于速朽的地上王国。
+
+
+### 过去的胜利和进行中的战争
+
+> 整个景区里持续的爆裂和轰炸反复撞击我的神经，有那么一瞬间脑袋里燃起一股无名火：不远处就有真正的战争正在发生，为什么这里的人们还能带着娱乐的心态观看战争展演？
+
+国境线这边，白俄罗斯热热闹闹地过节，庆祝近70年前的胜利。国境线的另一边，乌克兰的土地上激战正酣。胜利庆典和前线战势的消息一齐出现在新闻里，历史和现实荒谬地交织，一种当代魔幻现实主义。二战以来欧亚地区第一次爆发如此大规模的战事使2023年的“胜利日”带上了特殊的意味。对于今年的“胜利日”，泽连斯基的提法是，“我们在反法西斯胜利日为新的胜利而战斗。”他还曾在2022年战争爆发之初称俄乌战争为“乌克兰人民的伟大卫国战争”。二战期间的“纳粹”、“法西斯主义”这些词汇在当下也作为高频词重现。不同于以往的是，二战中人们未曾怀疑过谁是法西斯主义者，而在当下这些词语的含义则发生了混淆：先是俄罗斯要将乌克兰“去纳粹化”，再是乌克兰提出了“俄西斯主义”（ruscism）的概念。“法西斯主义”是一句从历史里学来的脏话，像泼污水一样似乎可以随便丢给谁。今天的Z字又取代了当年的黑色大蜘蛛符号，成为了奇异的对仗。在胜利日演说中，泽连斯基这样谈道：“我们的敌人幻想我们拒绝庆祝反法西斯胜利日，这样就可以让‘去纳粹化’成真。数百万的乌克兰人正在与纳粹主义斗争。我们将纳粹主义者赶出了卢甘斯克、顿涅茨克、赫尔松、梅利托波尔和别尔江斯克……”
+
+
+▲ 2023年5月9日，俄罗斯莫斯科红场，俄罗斯士兵在胜利日阅兵式上。
+
+俄罗斯在今年的红场阅兵被拿来和1941年斯大林的红场阅兵相提并论。普京以历史上的胜利为当下正名，从祝福二战老兵引向赞扬如今前线的俄罗斯士兵。末了还提到“俄罗斯不想与东西方任何民族为敌，只想要和平、自由、稳定的未来。”但今年俄乌边境地区的7个州均取消了阅兵活动，在全国都没有举行不朽军团游行。不朽军团游行是2011年在俄罗斯出现的一项纪念伟大卫国战争老兵的活动。以往的“胜利日”，人们会捧着老兵和战争牺牲者的遗像在各城市列队游行。这项活动获得了俄罗斯官方的支持和推广。然而，俄乌战争爆发后，俄罗斯国内的反战力量以各种方式持续抵抗，前线兵员的糟糕处境被频繁曝光。俄方担心纪念二战老兵会引发对当下事件的负面联想，因此取消了游行。
+
+今年白俄罗斯总统卢卡申科破天荒地没有发表“胜利日”演说，改由国防部长赫列宁代劳。他模仿俄罗斯的提法：“这是西方文明和东斯拉夫文明之间的军事对抗。西方假乌克兰之手为自己的利益而战，为的是在全世界建立他们自己的秩序。我们的军队会尽一切所能捍卫自己的领土，不会让别人对白俄罗斯人怎么生活指指点点！”战争以来白俄罗斯在对外问题的立场和俄罗斯是一致的，一直在渲染西方和乌克兰威胁论。为此要加强西部和南部边界的防卫，以慑止北约的进犯。然而发动战争的是谁？受害者又是谁？白俄罗斯在开战一年多以来，在俄罗斯施压其间接参战的情况下毫发无损，难道不已经是侥幸？
+
+5月8日，在我前往明斯克郊区的斯大林防线景区参加“胜利日”活动的途中，出租车司机说起斯大林防线平时没什么游客，但每年5月8日和9日都有胜利日特别节目，因此人非常多。果然一早抵达，进入景区的车辆已经排成了长队。而人流还在不停地涌来。斯大林防线明斯克段位于明斯克西北20公里，原是为了抵御二战时期的巴巴罗萨计划，但并没能真正顶住纳粹德国的进攻。园区里到处是斯大林像。小孩子把当年留下的壕沟当作迷宫玩，在里面钻来钻去。
+
+最火爆的旅游项目之一是实弹射击，一发弹药价格从5到40白俄卢布不等，越重型的武器价格越高，坦克射击最贵。人们非常乐意花钱体验兵器，立即就排起了长队。每一发坦克射击都伴随着一声巨响，先喷射出火焰，然后是冲天的黑烟。我在此之前还没见过如此荷枪实弹的军事旅游，几乎被不绝于耳的射击声和爆炸声吓到。
+
+中午时分，在景区里上演了二战情节实景演出。蜂拥而至的人潮把看台围了个水泄不通。演出又一次使用实弹。天上军机嗡嗡地低空飞行，地下还有火药在爆炸。尽管观众离舞台有些距离，但扬起的沙土还是会飞到脸上。整个景区里持续的爆裂和轰炸反复撞击我的神经，有那么一瞬间脑袋里燃起一股无名火：不远处就有真正的战争正在发生，为什么这里的人们还能带着娱乐的心态观看战争展演？为什么暂时身处和平中的人对于眼前的武器没有丝毫警觉：也许这里的装甲和大炮模型有一天会还魂成真？或者，即使战争并不会到来，但游客们又为什么不曾想到，已经有生命因为同样的轰炸声而受到威胁？我愤然从景区逃了出去。景区外是一望无际的郁郁葱葱的林地，蝴蝶在柔软的草地上飞。我面朝着森林，然而还是躲不掉身后的枪声炮声。
+
+
+▲ 2022年5月9日，俄罗斯圣彼得堡中央大道涅瓦大街的不朽军团游行，人们举着参加过二战的亲属画像，以纪念第二次世界大战结束77周年。
+
+
+### “耻辱日”：被民族国家劫持的历史
+
+> 当民族国家占有了胜利，便轻而易举地剔除了人们长久以来对于意识形态和社会愿景的反思，对于极权主义、种族主义、暴力和压迫的反思。
+
+对于当下的国际关系来说，战争往往发生在民族国家之间，因此胜利很吊诡地总是为国家所垄断。胜利似乎总属于民族，属于爱国主义。当民族国家占有了胜利，便轻而易举地剔除了人们长久以来对于意识形态和社会愿景的反思，对于极权主义、种族主义、暴力和压迫的反思。反法西斯主义只剩下一副空壳，一种国家话语。当人们接受民族国家庆祝胜利的方式之后，也自然而然地接受了这样一种观念：敌人是邪恶的，我们是善良和正义的。我们只是被动的受害者，除了拿起武器别无选择。因此只要以怀念的名义，将战争奇观化和娱乐化就可以被接受——为的是我们同样善良正义的先辈。暴力只适用于邪恶的敌人。敌人来了，连基督福音都会失效，遑论其他。在俄白两国将乌克兰和西方视为威胁的当下，这样的善恶论显得格外可笑。后者在某种程度上正是战争的根源。
+
+俄罗斯政治哲学家伊利亚·布德赖茨吉斯谈到，当下俄罗斯官方的历史观是周期性而非线性的。在普京的历史观中，俄罗斯和西方的对抗是一以贯之的核心。从古至今，西方以各种面目出现，波兰人、条顿骑士团、天主教会、德国人、美国人……他们永远扮演着俄罗斯安全敌人的角色，而俄罗斯要一次次将其企图粉碎。俄罗斯历史上的重要事件，包括伟大的卫国战争也被置于这个框架下来审视。这从一个重要的方面导致俄罗斯的反法西斯经验被抹除。何为纳粹的概念变得不重要。“如果您反对俄罗斯，您就是纳粹；如果您支持俄罗斯，您就是反法西斯……结果就是，每一个认为自己是乌克兰人，并且认为乌克兰国家有权存在的人都是纳粹。”如此看待战争的方式永远不会带来和平。君不见，70年来庆祝胜利也没能制止战争再次发生。今天的俄乌战争就是“胜利日”的耻辱。
+
+“胜利日”政治化也导致乌克兰处理其反法西斯战争经验时处于尴尬位置。乌克兰同样是二战的参与方和受害者。这解释了扎哈罗娃的话：不庆祝5月9日就是叛徒。然而，时至今日，“胜利日”已经沦为为俄罗斯国家意识形态服务的工具，乌克兰进而不愿再与俄罗斯共享这个共同记忆。乌克兰复杂的历史一直被俄罗斯抨击。二战时反苏的极右翼乌克兰民族主义者斯捷潘·班德拉及其领导的“乌克兰民族主义者组织”（Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists）曾经试图与德国纳粹合作，以争取民族独立。但事实证明那场独立运动只是为希特勒所利用，最终以失败落幕。今天的乌克兰并不回避这一段不光彩的历史。2010年亲俄的亚努科维奇上台促使极右翼力量上涨，2013-2014年的尊严革命又给了极右翼在街头施展拳脚扩大影响的机会。为了抵抗俄罗斯，2014年以来乌克兰国内对这些团体保持了一定的宽容度，人们在反对其暴力和排外同时也肯定其捍卫乌克兰的功劳。但无论如何，极右翼不管在议会还是在民间社会都是边缘化的少数派。从极右翼力量消长的规律来看，他们往往在俄罗斯威胁强化的背景下强化，是仇恨播种出的仇恨。为满足普京帝国野心的“去纳粹化”只会适得其反，将极端民族主义的火苗越烧越旺。
+
+
+▲ 2023年5月9日，胜利日的波兰华沙，乌克兰示威者建造了一个装置，模仿坠落的乌克兰平民墓地和被俄罗斯火箭击中的住宅楼，前方是写着俄乌战争遇难者姓名和年龄的十字架。
+
+白俄罗斯人Dasha是一名新手妈妈。她曾经参加过2020年反卢卡申科的示威和2022年的反战游行。谈起胜利日，她的感受很复杂。她说爷爷奶奶真的很喜欢过“胜利日”；但她作为年轻一代，无法忍受阅兵时机枪大炮开到大街上这些做法。她觉得这是一个悲伤的日子，不是拿来欢庆的。“而现在，我们每一天都记得正在发生的战争。”
+
+我很难跟乌克兰朋友谈论胜利日。或许对他们来说，70年前的胜利无论多么惨痛都已经没那么重要，重要的是现在要活下去。战争给人带来的心理创伤是难以想象的。战时的乌克兰连烟花都是危险品。乌克兰从2014年开始立法限制燃放烟花，因为顿巴斯人听到烟花的爆炸声可能会产生应激反应，惊恐发作。2023年4月乌克兰最高拉达通过法律对禁放烟花做了更严格的规定，可使用的烟花必须危险性低，爆炸声不得超过60分贝。乌克兰朋友Sasha讲她在国外有一次遇到放烟花的场合，被吓得立即躲进屋里，要戴上耳机才行。她已经再也不想听到任何爆炸声了。
+
+5月9日夜幕降临之后，明斯克市中心的高尔基公园被警察团团围住，以保证节日的最后一项重要活动——烟花秀能正常进行。在胜利之夜燃放烟花的传统1945年就有了，一直沿袭至今。晚上11点，胜利的烟花准时绽放在城市上空，在很远的地方都能看得一清二楚。就在当晚，根据新闻报道，俄军针对乌克兰各地的轰炸还在持续进行。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-05-19-milk-tea-generations-thailand-general-election.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-19-milk-tea-generations-thailand-general-election.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "奶茶世代的泰国大选"
+author: "冯嘉诚"
+date : 2023-05-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LxdvUvR.jpg
+image_caption: "泰国“前进党”（Move Forward Party）42岁党魁皮塔（Pita Limjaroenrat）在清迈与支持者合照。"
+description: "一场见证泰国政治范式转移的选举，以及前往变数满途的航程。"
+---
+
+泰国选举结束，结果出乎意料由“前进党”（Move Forward Party）横扫152个议席，荣登国会第一大党宝座，相比预期100席，可谓超额完成。党魁皮塔（Pita Limjaroenra）及后宣布已经准备就绪，成为泰国第三十任总理。
+
+
+
+
+▲ 2023年5月15日，泰国大选前进党党魁皮塔（Pita Limjaroenrat）在曼谷的党总部参加选后的新闻发布会。
+
+从竞选期间以来，多项民调都倾向认为传统第一大党“为泰党”（Pheu Thai Party）将会继续保留最大党地位，而“为泰党”精神领袖、前总理他信（Thaksin Shinawatra）的幼女贝东丹（Paetongtarn Shinawatra）亦有望成为总理，延续他信家族影响力。
+
+这次选举结果出现如此戏剧性的发展，意味着泰国政治已经出现一场范式转移。
+
+
+### Z世代、Y世代，要新口味
+
+泰国政治在过去二十年的政治论述，始终离不开他信与军人政变之间的割裂，主流的政治价值观都是建基于民众对他信和他主张的民粹主义的取态，从而衍生出“红衫军”（支持他信）及“黄衫军”（反对他信）的分裂。这并不代表社会上完全没有其他主张，但往往它们都被“他信问题”所压下。
+
+
+▲ 2023年5月14日，泰国总理巴育在大选投票后见记者。
+
+不过，2014年由陆军总司令巴育（Prayuth Chan-o-cha）发动政变，推翻他信妹妹英禄（Yingluck Shinawatra）留下的看守政府以后，泰国才稍为摆脱红黄衫军之争。
+
+有别于相对年长的旧世代，Ｙ世代（1981年—1996年生）较年轻的一群和Ｚ世代（1997年—2004年生）经历得较多的，是这个时代背景的乱象。随着拉玛九世普密蓬驾崩，拉玛十世哇集拉隆功继位，泰国政治并没有因为“新人事”而出现更好的气象。相反，军队在这段转折期肆意动用“侮辱王室罪”、“电脑罪行法”、“煽动罪”等严刑峻法打压公民社会，导致民众对旧时代的依恋更显依稀。对比起上一辈，这一代的青年人显然缺少了“旧日美好时光”的怀缅。“为泰党”终日强调自己与他信的联系，显然无法吸纳新世代的选票。
+
+2020—21年的社会运动，更是加速重塑新世代政治论述及主张。年青社运人士从最初要求总理巴育下台，到演变成呼吁改革王室，直接冲击泰国政治的传统禁忌。事件导致多名社运领导者因触犯“侮辱王室罪”而被捕，但同一时间亦把泰国新生代的政治论述从“他信问题”的囚牢中释放出来：“改革王室”成为了量度政治准则的主要标准，至于“他信家族”回归与否已经不碍事了。
+
+与此同时，社会运动遭到政权强硬回应，虽然元气大伤（甚至出现内斗状况），但却催生出一股强大的参政意愿。著名的青年社运人物钟提查（Chonticha “Kate” Jangrew）以背负着两项“侮辱王室罪”控罪的姿态参选，她解释自己深明泰国司法体制的不公之处，明言只能透过国会议员身分加入体制，才能运用权力限制王室的预算“还富于民”，以及启动修改“侮辱王室罪”的工程。这次选举中，钟提查便以“前进党”的党员身分，负责守护该党在巴吞他尼府（Pathum Thani）第三区的地盘，以高达45.22%得票率进入议会。钟提查只是其中一个较著名的例子。事实上，由于这次选举Ｚ世代及Y世代占整体选民约42%，其庞大影响力亦促使不同政党向年青从政者招手。
+
+
+▲ 2020年10月16日泰国曼谷，示威者用雨伞抵挡警方发射的水炮。
+
+
+### 选民转会、老少配
+
+新世代的意识形态，对政治价値观及意识形态的坚持，已非旧时代的政客所能提供。年青人对上届政府不满自然不在话下，总理巴育的“统一泰国建国党”（United Thai Nation Party）、副总理巴威（Prawit Wongsuwan）的“国民力量党”（Palang Pracharath Party）、副总理阿努庭（Anutin Charnvirakul）的“泰自豪党”（Bhumjaithai）、甚至是保守阵营的“民主党”，都难以符合学运世代的口味。
+
+“为泰党”对修改“侮辱王室罪”的取态左摇右摆，最开始又没有斩钉截铁拒绝与“国民力量党”合作，早已酿成青年人的不满。在竞选期间，民望一直领先的“为泰党”更犯下两大主要错误。第一，“为泰党”要求选民把两张票（每名选民有“地区议席票”及“政党议席票”）投向该党，意味有必要时将牺牲友党“前进党”；第二，“为泰党”向所有潜在盟友订下“三大法则”：未来盟友必须支持“为泰党”提名的总理候选人、未来所有重要内阁职务由“为泰党”负责、未来需要支持“为泰党”所提出的所有议案。这些条款及安排苛刻之余，更容易激发选民对“专制政治”的联想。
+
+这一连串对比之下，导致本来属于“为泰党”铁票的票源都“过户”到“前进党”手里。最明显不过的，应该是“为泰党”大本营的清迈及清莱。这两个选区、联同伊善区（泰国东北）向来都是“为泰党”的票仓所在，一直都是他信用来抗衡保守派势力的最大动力。不过，在这次选举中，伊善区的选民有一部分却转投支持本地农业产品的“泰自豪党”，而北部清莱及清迈的选票，却有部分转投“前进党”。清迈区原本10个议席，就有7个被“前进党”成功争取，另一个则被“国民力量党”乘渔人之利取得。这些“转会”的选区里，更包括他信家乡山甘烹。他信家族一直以来都尝试把这位前总理打造成的“英雄”形象，最终敌不过时代洪流。至于“为泰党”本来垄断曼谷地区大约一半议席，在这次选举中却面临滑铁卢式挫败，现时手上仅余1席，其余32席尽归“前进党”所有。余下1席，也只是比排名第二的“前进党”参选人多出4票而已。除了他信外，盘据曼谷、春武里府等政治世家在这场选举中，也有不少败于“前进党”手中。
+
+
+▲ 2023年5月12日，泰国曼谷举行为泰党选举集会，贝东丹（Paetongtarn Shinawatra）和斯雷塔（Srettha Thavisin）与支持者自拍。
+
+要促成如此激烈改变，除了“为泰党”自身的弱势之外，也不能看轻“前进党”深入社区的能力。在2019年选举之中，“未来前进党”（Future Forward Party，“前进党”前身）能够挤身议会成为第三大党，某程度是看准新世代求变的声音及动员能力，故积极透过社交媒体建立互动，才建立出如此成绩。
+
+然而，随着“未来前进党”在2020年因收受党魁他纳通（Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit）的贷款被逼解散后，领导层被禁参政十年，反而激起他们组织“进步运动”推动草根政治，并大幅吸纳社运人士，从“线上”走到“线下”宣扬政治理念。以上所提及的年青世代，就是透过此路径从街头走进议会。
+
+至于“前进党”作为另一个承袭“未来前进党”意向的载体，继续展示其坚持改革立场的特色：继续在改革王室、性小众权益、加强施政透明度、提升地区自治等议题发声，姿态明显比“为泰党”等民主派坚定。在选举期间，党魁皮塔更屡次强调自己绝不会与军人政党（“统一泰国建国党”及“国民力量党”）结盟，即使自己要成为在野党四年也没有问题。尽管“前进党”在竞选期开始前夕曾经爆出党内冲突，更有党员因为党内运作不透明而退党，但事件对皮塔及“前进党”造成的破坏似乎有限。
+
+而且经历了时间的考验，“前进党”也打破了“为泰党分队”的定型，有助攻陷保守派的票仓。“为泰党”与“前进党”在选举前夕，都共同表态改革军队制度，除了推动军政分离，要求提升低阶士兵的权利，两方都支持废除“征兵抽签制”（即强制征兵，不过以抽签决定，一旦抽中便要服两年兵役）。两者立场相近，但惟独“前进党”能够成功突围而出，在传统军方势力范围的曼谷中心地区横扫所有议席。曼谷选区以外，连传统属于保守阵营的罗勇府（触发2020年学运爆发点之一）和布吉府的“地区议席”，均由“前进党”夺得。相反，“为泰党”在这些选区不是排名第三，便是敬陪末席。
+
+更有趣的，是泰国南部这些同样是传统保守阵营的票仓，一样出现“配票”情况。由于每名选民手上握有两票，他们大多倾向在“地区议席”一票中投给当地保守派代表，而另一票“政党议席”票则拱手相让给立场回异的“前进党”，以致出现“蓝橙配”的反差。在南部一共60个选区中，“前进党”只有3个“地区议席”的席次，但在25个选区的“政党议席”票数排名第一。这个状况很有可能打破了“他信时代”建立的“北红、南蓝”两极化迷思——即北部永远属于他信阵营、而南部永远属于反他信的保守阵营。这个结果可见南部选民对巴育长年累月的管治感到厌倦。
+
+面对政局新形势，也并非只有“为泰党”一个遭殃。除了“泰自豪党”以外，“民主党”、“国民力量党”及“统一泰国建国党”几乎都只能在传统势力范围内互相攻讦。“民主党”本来雄霸南部的版图，在上届已经被“国民力量党”和“泰自豪党”侵蚀了少许。这届更要面对从新成立的“统一泰国建国党”，所有保守党派犹如笼里互斗，元气大伤。在保守阵营里，只有一直强调自己能够履行竞选承诺——大麻合法化——的“泰自豪党”有所进帐，晋升国会第三大党。
+
+
+### 新气象冒头，尚在混沌中行驶
+
+“前进党”在选举大胜，却不代表它能够自定组阁成功。泰国的政治制度，毕竟不是真正的民意授权。2017年通过的新宪法，设下非民选的“参议院”担任保护栏的角色，保障“王室的敌人”不能煽动民意获取权力，因此规定任何总理都必须获得参、众议院合共750席中过半数支持，即376席，才能够成功当选。“前进党”（152席）如今连同“为泰党”（141席）及其他少型政党结盟，暂时只得313席，距离满足拜相要求，尚差63席。泰国选委会将于未来50几日内正式公布选举结果，及后便将召开新一任国会，分别选出国会议长及总理。换言之，“前进党”未来一段日子仍要积极争取支持，才能跨过拜相门槛，实践“去军事化”、“打破垄断”、“下放权力”的执政目标。
+
+如果皮塔执意要担任总理，那么理论上他只能透过三个方法：一，挟着民意游说部分参议员支持，特别向那些来自专业界别、与军方关系不强的参议员招手，亦即现时“民主派”联盟尝试达成的目标，暂时有个别参议员表态支持，但亦有更多因为捍卫王室而拒绝合作；二，放下成见，与“泰自豪党”合作，不过合作条件可能包括放弃部分竞选承诺，尤其是关于重新把大麻列入监管药物和修改“侮辱王室罪”两项重大议题；三，放下更多成见，与“国民力量党”或“民主党”合作，但这个决定等同政治自杀，背弃自己一直以来的承诺。如果皮塔始终无法动摇足够的参议员数目，他还是有机会要向“泰自豪党”或是“民主党”招手，毕竟两党都并非真正的军人政党，算是二害取其轻。
+
+
+▲ 2023年5月12日，泰国曼谷举行前进党选举晚会，前进党党魁皮塔等人在台上感谢支持者。
+
+即使皮塔组阁成功，泰国的政治“前进”旅程也只是刚刚踏入另一阶段。凌驾民选政治的还有军方、宪法法院、和王室等所谓“深层国家”的角色在背后密切监视着。陆军总司令纳潘隆（Narongpan Jittkaewtae）在选举前夕高调发言，表示大家都不应该随便使用“政变”一词，指出“过去我们的确有出现（政变），但现在出现的机会是零。”不过，过往军方发动政变前，往往都是呈清军队无意介入政治，但结果有目共睹。
+
+同理，皮塔在选举期间被对手指控持有4万多份媒体公司（ITV）的股份，涉嫌违反宪法禁止媒体公司持股人参选的规定，现时案件交由选委会处理。若果最终案件经由宪法法院审理，皮塔很有可能遭到他纳通一样的命运，很可能被取消议员资格。不过，该媒体公司现时已经中止运作，假若宪法法院介入否决皮塔资格，到时候民间的反弹不可想像。
+
+的确，皮塔也好、“前进党”也好，甚至是泰国政途，都只是刚刚驶进一个混沌未明的格局。在这个充满未知性的时代，固有的论述及想法或许不再适用于这个变动中的泰国。正如2015年昂山素季能够以大比数姿态胜出缅甸国会选举，担任“国务资政”一角，然而却在2021年以同样的理由，黯然被军方推翻。2022年，又有谁会想到马来西亚的安华成功组织团结政府，一圆多年的拜相梦？再悲观也好，但泰国无疑经历了一场浩浩荡荡的转变，为东南亚的民主化之旅留下一个重要印记。
+
+（冯嘉诚，日本早稻田大学亚洲太平洋研究博士候选人，东南亚观察者）
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-05-21-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk15.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-21-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk15.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c7bbadbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-21-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk15.md
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第十五周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-05-21 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/GKAaUFv.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 控方傳畢證人 押5.29續審，處理「共謀者原則」法律爭議
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第十五周。控方案情接近尾聲，本周應辯方要求傳召多名證人接受盤問。其中同案認罪被告林景楠稱曾獲沈旭暉邀請參選立法會功能組別，後因「制度敗壞」決定不參選進出口界，改為參選新界東，在初選表現不佳後再重返進出口界。時任新界東選舉主任則稱從政制及內地事務局獲得何桂藍FB帖文並要求她解釋，惟不信納她真誠擁護《基本法》及效忠特區遂作出DQ。
+
+至於拘捕何桂藍的警員，供稱曾向何指有理由相信她參與初選目的在達成戴耀廷提倡的「攬炒香港十步曲計劃」，惟承認不知「攬炒十步」說什麼；國安警亦稱曾收取《立場》、《獨媒》和《蘋果》按「提交物料令」交出的資料，惟有人無看過提交物料令，對相關資料也不清楚。
+
+此外，國安警供稱其隊伍共用一個名為「鄧奇」的假名FB帳戶，截圖顯示該帳戶曾在戴耀廷帖文下留言「唔犯法都等天收啦你!!!!!」，警承認只有警員能使用該帳戶，同意法官指可激起他人進一步留言。帳號於警員作供後數小時已變為無法查看。
+
+控方本周確認傳畢所有證人，案件押至5月29日續審，待雙方就「共謀者原則」等法律爭議準備陳詞。法官關注《國安法》生效前的言行能否納為共謀者原則的證據，辯方透露擬呈交聯合書面陳詞。
+
+
+▲ 林景楠（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 林景楠擬參選進出口界後轉選新東 曾形容界別「制度敗壞」
+
+控方本周應辯方要求傳召多名證人接受盤問，包括同案認罪被告林景楠、時任新界東選舉主任及6名警員。
+
+其中林景楠供稱，2020年3月曾獲沈旭暉聯絡邀請參選立法會功能組別，並曾出席沈主持的協調會議，但與初選無關。林曾宣布參選進出口界，並提名何桂藍參加初選，但其後發文稱「面對制度敗壞」決定不參選進出口界，改為參選新界東。林盤問下形容功能組別屬「小眾」，同意法官指制度不公，而他定義自己為「非建制」，並指進出口界選民多為建制派，他勝算不大。
+
+法官質疑，法律界大部分選民為民主派又是否「敗壞」，林指進出口界多年均在無競爭下由建制派當選，且成為該界別選民並不容易，加上當時社會氣氛故使用「咁強硬」的字眼。林承認於新東初選表現不佳，而其後再宣布參選進出口界，是受朋友游說既然無人參加，而他有資格，「不如試一試」，但認為自己勝算不大。林亦指，不曾出席任何地區協調會議。
+
+
+### 選舉主任指官員曾「特別提點」留意參選人言行 不信何桂藍真誠支持護國安遂DQ
+
+至於時任新界東選舉主任楊蕙心，則就如何裁定何桂藍提名無效作供。她供稱2020年立會選舉提名期前，曾獲官員「特別提點」要考慮參選人言行會否令人懷疑不會真誠擁護《基本法》及效忠香港特區；而她在何桂藍報名後，獲政制及內地事務局提供其FB帖文，何提及「義無反顧」反對《國安法》和轉載「墨落無悔」等，楊發信要求何解釋，何回應《國安法》多處牴觸《基本法》、衝擊司法制度和侵犯港人自由。
+
+楊指何的答覆「冇所謂啱定錯」，她亦沒有考慮參選人政治背景，但認為《國安法》已加入保障權利自由的條文，何的解釋不成立，亦清晰顯示她並非真誠支持特區維護國安，故決定DQ她。她並同意，DQ文件是由他人草擬，她自己同意並簽署。
+
+辯方一度提出，政府有意DQ所有民主派，惟法官質疑問題誤導，因並非所有參選被告均被DQ。楊其後同意，就新東8名參選被告，她曾向何桂藍、劉頴匡、楊岳橋和陳志全4人發信，並DQ頭3人，陳志全提名則處理中；至於范國威、林卓廷、鄒家成和馮達浚4人則未發信，並因選舉延後而未作出決定。
+
+楊又同意，就陳志全，並無考慮他在其他場合的發言，只掌握「墨落無悔」聲明並就此提問；而她考慮取消資格時，不會考慮當事人往續，只視乎他在信件的答覆。
+
+
+### 國安警FB帳戶於戴耀廷帖文留言「唔犯法都等天收」 拘捕警認不知何謂「攬炒十步」
+
+此外，本周控方亦傳召6名警員接受盤問。其中負責網上蒐證的國安處警員馮小敏，供稱2020年7月初選舉行前獲指示調查網上有關35+初選的資料，並因過程中知道戴是初選的「主要人物」而着重調查他。
+
+馮指其隊伍共用一個名為「鄧奇」的 Facebook 帳戶，「鄧奇」是假名，她並以此帳戶進行截圖。辯方展示警方截圖，顯示戴耀廷7月回應中聯辦譴責初選違法的帖文下，「鄧奇」曾留言「唔犯法都等天收啦你!!!!!」，馮指沒印象發出此留言，但承認該帳戶只是由警員使用。
+
+法官問，該留言是否可激起（provoke）其他人進一步留言，馮答「冇錯」，惟相關帳戶在馮作供後數小時已變為無法查看。另國安警長梁樂文亦承認以「鄧奇」帳戶擷取何桂藍專頁與初選有關的帖文。
+
+
+▲ 國安處警員馮小敏
+
+此外，3名國安警黎啟東、王錫輝及梁晉榮分別供稱曾收取《立場新聞》、《蘋果日報》公司和《獨立媒體》按「提交物料令」交出的初選廣告相關文件，惟有警員承認沒看過該提交物料令，對相關資料也不清楚。梁晉榮另亦負責從公共圖書館和電影、報刊及物品辦事處，搜尋戴耀廷2019年6月至2020年8月於報章發表的文章，並檢取47篇進行複印掃描。他同意無法確認戴耀廷是文章作者，但認為戴的公開發言與文章大致吻合。
+
+至於拘捕何桂藍的反黑組警員黃柏烽，表示於拘捕時曾向何指，有理由相信她參與初選目的在進入立會否決預算案，迫使特首辭職，以達成戴耀廷在《蘋果日報》及各大媒體提倡的「攬炒香港十步曲計劃」，惟同意當時沒有獲發戴的「攬炒十步」文章，亦不知道「攬炒十步」說什麼。
+
+
+### 控方傳畢證人 押5.29處理「共謀者原則」法律爭議
+
+控方確認已傳召所有證人，案件押至本月29日續審，以待控辯雙方呈交有關「共謀者原則」的法律陳詞，何桂藍一方亦會爭議匿名證人錄音和片段的呈堂性。
+
+法官李運騰指《國安法》沒有追溯力，關注《國安法》生效前未成為罪行的言行，是否可納為共謀者原則下的證據；以及先加入串謀的人之言行，能否用來指證後加入者。辯方透露擬提交聯合書面陳詞。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-05-24-the-last-night-of-the-workers-museum.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-24-the-last-night-of-the-workers-museum.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2b5ec66c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-24-the-last-night-of-the-workers-museum.md
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "打工博物馆的最后一夜"
+author: "沈佳如"
+date : 2023-05-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/DAYu9xy.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+5月20日，打工文化艺术博物馆度过了它的最后一夜。
+
+这家博物馆是中国大陆唯一一家由打工者自己创办的公益博物馆，位于北京东五环和东六环的城中村皮村内。皮村位于城乡结合部，生活成本低，两万多名外来务工者在此居住，是北京有名的劳工村。
+
+
+
+打工文化艺术博物馆由服务外来劳工的民间机构北京“工友之家”发起，工友之家创办人孙恒和工友们将一处旧厂房租下，收集了首批500件展品，于2008年5月1日正式对外开放。
+
+中国有近3亿外出劳工。1978年改革开放之后，城市经济发展需要更多的劳动力，吸引大量农民进城务工。但中国大陆的户籍制度和城乡区别管理使得他们无法在城市落户，他们只能出卖劳力，赚取微薄的生存物资，吃住简陋，处在城市的底层，是被边缘化的群体。
+
+打工文化艺术博物馆为这群被忽视的外来务工者留存了被看见的空间。
+
+这个在微信朋友圈里多次面临拆迁和经费困难、宣告濒危的博物馆，一次次幸存了下来，直到这一次，再无侥幸。博物馆所在的这一片区都要被政府拆迁，按照规划变为绿地。
+
+博物馆负责人、同时也是皮村工友之家负责人的王德志决定在5月20日傍晚6点，为他付出了15年心血的博物馆举办一个告别会。
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+▲ 打工文化艺术博物馆展示了流动工人从农村到城市的工作和生活状况。1978年中国大陆改革开放，城市经济的发展需要更多的劳动力，3亿农民进城务工。他们无法在城市落户，吃住简陋，被城市管理机构驱赶，被老板欠薪，子女难以就地入学，或成为留守儿童，或就读条件较差的民办打工子弟学校。
+
+这个消息5月17日在微信公众号“皮村工友”上发出后，很快获得了几万次浏览。
+
+人们留言道：“第一次去是和伙伴们一起去做社会实践，印象里并不是很大的地方，但很震撼，也很难过，有的东西需要被纪录，哪怕是被淹没了（的）声音。”“在大的历史记忆和社会价值观念面前，打工博物馆的立馆价值，是『非专业』标准建设博物馆的样板，更是回顾、观察、研究、探索、预见社会发展水平的刻度测量机。”相对于主流媒体，人类学和社会学的研究者及学生对皮村更关注。博物馆要关闭的帖子，在这些微信群和圈子里被多次转发。
+
+在英国伦敦大学攻读人类学硕士学位的前资深媒体人Chelsea很早就关注皮村和打工文化艺术博物馆，在香港中文大学读书时还以此为例写过工人文化的论文。她一直关注皮村，知道博物馆要被关闭了。
+
+Chelsea说：“很多人习惯通过诠释，评价甚至代表新工人群体来输出自己的价值观。其实新工人很厉害，他们有自己的生活方式，有自己的策略与身处的境遇‘纠缠’。只不过那种方式和策略，与知识界与文艺工作者想像中的工人启蒙叙事是不一样的。想想杀马特是什么，那是真正的工人文化。”
+
+5月20日，人们三三五五到达打工文化艺术博物馆。从未到过此地的司机师傅挠头问：“这儿不是奥特莱斯啊？这儿今天有什么活动吗？”
+
+傍晚6点钟，现场来了100多个人。绝大部分是文艺青年、学生，还有一些媒体、短视频up主，架着专业的相机和录影设备，对准即将发表告别感言的王德志。
+
+王德志说：“今天搞得这个阵仗，稍微出乎我们的意料，本来我们就想（和）十个八个的朋友在一块聊聊，今天来的，一个是带小孩的注意安全，还有就是，有没有外媒呀，外国的媒体？我们不接受外媒的采访。”
+
+正如2016年年末那波“清理低端人口”运动波及皮村工友之家之时，王德志既无奈又不希望外媒介入，担心引发政府不满。
+
+
+▲ 打工文化艺术博物馆的大门，一侧墙面上写着“拆除”两个字。
+
+北京工友之家在皮村租住了3个院落，除了博物馆和社区活动中心之外，还有办公住宿区、同心互惠社会企业的库房。
+
+当时，金盏乡政府想要强征这块地，对他们断水断电。王德志称不想把事情往大了搞，想在国内范围解决，这也是村里面利益群体的打算。
+
+用他的话说，他在这个村里生活了近20年，和村官们低头不见抬头见，都是熟人。虽然有过不愉快，但现在工友之家的地面铺设和大门，是在村委会和乡政府的支持下建成的，政府还为新工人影院和剧场提供了放映设备、音响和空调。“我们做的这些事情也离不开各级政府对我们的支持。”
+
+王德志觉得，改革开放四十多年、国家经济飞速增长，工人做出了很大的贡献。博物馆里跨越35年的展品，体现了大时代变迁下，进城务工者经历的艰难流动、打工热潮，以及对新公民新工人身份和权益的呼吁和争取。
+
+“这么多人关注打工文化博物馆，是因为博物馆代表了工人群体，确切地说是农民工。”他说。他不认同将这些进城务工的农民称作“农民工”，他认为应该叫“新工人”。因为离开了原有的土地，不再回乡进行耕作，农民们也就不能再被称之为农民。
+
+打工文化博物馆存留的，正是从1978年改革开放之初到2013年，新工人们无偿捐赠的物品：
+
+有工作调动介绍信，有粮票等各种购物券，有乡镇企业的相关票证，有工资条、工资单，有流水线工人日记、打卡上工纪录、房费电费帐单、被处罚纪录、家书，有工伤认定和艰难维权，有留守儿童和打工子弟的照片和生活用品，还有曾经存在过的NGO刊物。
+
+每一件展品，都是个体化的记忆，是3亿多人的群体令人窒息的现实生活。如今，随着博物馆将被拆迁，这些记忆又将安放何处？
+
+王德志向众人宣布了博物馆未来的几种可能结果：第一，中华全国总工会的工业研究室想做一个关于工人运动的展览，想把博物馆的展品拿过去一部分，将新工人群体做一个版块；第二，皮村的村支书提议自己给村党支部写个申请，希望村党支部支持打工博物馆作为皮村的符号象征和提升名片，最好能继续在皮村或者其他地方留存；第三，河北有高校愿意接收博物馆的展品，湖南一位爱心人士亦愿意提供自己的住所存放展品；第四，一家北京的公司愿意尝试将博物馆数字化，变成线上数字展览。
+
+未来不甚明朗，但今夜，一众在这儿工作过的工友们一一和它作别。
+
+
+▲ 参加告别式的人们。
+
+
+### 这建造与废墟的过程 和工友们的生活何其相像
+
+诗人、摇滚歌手胡小海写了一首诗《最后的打工博物馆》，送给它即将被拆迁的命运：
+
+一个五月的隐喻
+
+推土机 切割机 纸一样薄 粉碎一切
+
+一群人的离开
+
+奋斗的 留下的 海水的咸 渗透生存
+
+不久之后这里将是一片废墟
+
+这本是在废墟上建造出的一个奇迹啊
+
+这建造与废墟的过程
+
+和工友们的生活何其相像
+
+朋友 也不必过于悲观
+
+皮村这片现实的开荒地
+
+理想的试验田才刚刚开始
+
+物理的空间随时可被拆除
+
+精神的凝聚才能星火燎原
+
+那就让我们带上这微小的火种
+
+各自上路吧
+
+顶着冰雹 迎着风雪 怀揣胸中那份热
+
+匍匐着 蹒跚着 倔强着星夜疾驰
+
+相信吧 所有的道路都是连着的
+
+所有的水也终将汇于一处
+
+在山高水长蜿蜒曲折的漫漫路上
+
+日后我们当以光相认
+
+1987年出生的胡小海15岁半就出来打工，曾经在长三角和珠三角的流水线上辗转工作13年。他特别理解当年富士康工人13连跳那种觉得生命没有意义的绝望。
+
+他读书，写诗，玩摇滚，觉得摇滚能释放能量，还给摇滚界的大咖们发微博私信，表达自己的感受。只有张楚回覆了，跟他来来回回聊了一年多，把胡小海推荐到了皮村的新工人乐队。
+
+新工人乐队和每周六的文学小组，使得皮村和别的地方不一样，成为北京最有文艺范儿的打工人聚集地。孙恒是新工人乐队的创始人，这支乐队最初叫“打工青年文艺演出队”，几经更名，现在叫“谷仓乐队”。
+
+师力斌、袁淩、余秀华、陈年喜、张慧瑜等大学教授和知名作家都来过文学小组授课。胡小海把这里当成他的精神支柱。文学小组还出了一位月嫂作家范雨素，她最近刚出了一本新书《久别重逢》。
+
+
+▲ 打工文化艺术博物馆。
+
+
+### 没有我们的历史 就没有我们的未来
+
+同是文学小组成员的四川家政女工，朗读了她很佩服的志愿者苑长斌的诗《别了，打工文化艺术博物馆》：
+
+打工文化艺术博物馆，全国首家属于打工人的博物馆
+
+就要成为拆字的最后一集，无限期闭馆了
+
+这个事件也将写进打工博物馆的历史
+
+让我来和你告个别吧
+
+和没有暂住证的孙志刚告别
+
+和开胸验肺的张海超告别
+
+和摆地摊的崔英杰告别
+
+和黑砖窑事件的31名农民工告别
+
+让我来和你告个别吧
+
+和讨薪的民工告别
+
+和维权的工友告别
+
+和雨中登三轮车的兄弟告别
+
+和流水线上的姐妹告别
+
+让我来和你告个别吧
+
+和被称为流动儿童的孩子们告别
+
+和主持打工春晚的小崔告别
+
+和煎饼大姐的驾驶车告别
+
+和建筑工人的安全帽告别
+
+既然时代的进程中有这样一段历史
+
+为什么我们要让它空白？
+
+既然历史是人民书写的
+
+为什么要漠视我们的存在？
+
+一部打工群体的历史
+
+伴随着一个时代
+
+打工文化艺术博物馆
+
+向人们昭示
+
+没有我们的文化
+
+就没有我们的历史
+
+没有我们的历史
+
+就没有我们的未来
+
+这位女工朗诵完，说：“我看这么多（现场来的）那（些）个戴眼镜的，都是咱们这社会的精英。这个社会的精英现在也开始关注这个，我特别欣慰，也特别感谢，因为说真话，现在已经很少有人关注我们了。所以说特别感谢这些年轻人、这些社会的精英、社会的未来、社会的栋梁。感谢你们。”
+
+“官场的话说得还挺好的哈。嗯，大家也别太当真啊。”作为主持人的王德志接话道，他和同路人从2002年开始关注打工人群体。那时，中国大陆有特别多的大学生关注“三农”问题（编按：“农民、农村、农业”三大问题，此概念于1996年由经济学家温铁军提出。2000年初，湖北省监利县棋盘乡党委书记李昌平致信时任总理朱镕基，将三农问题概括为“农民真苦，农村真穷，农业真危险”，引发社会上广泛讨论），关注进城务工工人，而且很多高校都成立了“三农社团”。
+
+他感慨道，这十来年大学生对打工人的关注热情急剧下降。“真的是少了非常多，我估计连以前的1/3都不到了。也不知道是什么情况导致阶层之间的鸿沟更深了一些，也不知道怎么才能打破这种（鸿沟），当然是完全打破是不可能的，但是最好不要再继续拉深，这样的话对我们这个和谐社会是不太好的。”
+
+尽管这些年作为关注打工者权益及其子女教育的NGO皮村工友之家生存维艰，王德志一直在用和谐正向的叙述表达，“我们对未来是特别乐观的，对工人群体的将来也是非常乐观的。我感觉有一些事情的发展是不可阻挡的，就是它有一个必然趋势。所以说历史地看，我个人是非常乐观的。”
+
+
+▲ 在博物馆里参观的人们。
+
+
+### 行路难，就是我们今天的心情
+
+一直低头沉默的骂大勇，是皮村文学小组的“两秀才之一”。他吟诵了李白的《行路难》其一：
+
+……
+
+行路难！行路难！多歧路，今安在？
+
+长风破浪会有时，直挂云帆济沧海。
+
+他的声音闷闷的：“讲到李白的行路难，就正好是我们今天的心情。”
+
+一个曾经参加和报导过皮村工友之家很多活动的前记者表达了不舍。王德志安慰道：“我们不要搞得太沉重啊，我们还是乐观一点儿啊，毕竟未来还是好的。”
+
+一个戴眼镜的中年男人分享了自己写的散文。
+
+生于安徽淮北农村的徐怀远是名医药商务，亦是文学小组的“骨干”。他此前在家乡电缆厂工作的时候就爱好文学，发表过“豆腐块”文章，还是安徽省作家协会会员，来到北京皮村之后，找到文学小组，成为组员。
+
+这篇两百多字的散文来自于几年前徐怀远坐4号线地铁的真实经历，标题为《京骂》。“就是有的老北京（人），你在坐地铁或者干嘛，就发现有的人虽为北京人，但是他的那个形象或者语言他很粗鲁。你越尊敬他，他越骂人，就你会发现北京的京骂就是一种特色嘛。”
+
+《京骂》记录了徐怀远目睹的一次北京人骂人的经过。待他念完，众人已笑翻。
+
+王德志赶紧来打圆场：“这是极个别的现象啊，你这是扩大了……哎，你这是哪个出版社出的？这出版社该关了，你这种作品还能给发表啊。”
+
+
+▲ 皮村生活。
+
+
+### 我们在这儿来日方长
+
+拍摄游牧民族题材的独立纪录片导演顾桃是王德志的内蒙古老乡。他说和王德志相识于中国内地还有独立电影的年代（大致是2003年前后）。因为皮村距离首都机场近，每5分钟，就会有一架飞机从头上呼啸飞过，低得可以辨认出是哪家航空公司的飞机。
+
+顾桃一直在看飞机。他的电影音乐人朋友卫华开始调音，弹奏背景乐。
+
+“这和在其他地方看飞过的飞机，感觉是不一样的。”顾桃说。疫情三年，很多东西都停止了。“从现在开始应该重视一下自己的生命。不管我们是以什么样的身份、以什么样的方式在生存，要有一种生活的态度。”
+
+他看着聚集在这片城乡结合部参加博物馆告别式的文艺青年们，说：“表达自己的时代到了，我们现在真的要拥有自己的这口气息，去做自己喜欢做的事儿。这是我五十多岁的人给年轻人的一个建议。”
+
+最后，顾桃邀请在场的人们一起唱李叔同1915年填词的《送别》:
+
+长亭外，古道边，芳草碧连天。
+
+晚风拂柳笛声残，夕阳山外山。
+
+天之涯，地之角，知交半零落。
+
+一瓢浊酒尽余欢，今宵别梦寒。
+
+人们有的唱，有的寒暄，有的抓紧去参观博物馆。
+
+在人群中，有一位带着头盔的工人，远远地拿着手机，录下告别会。
+
+
+▲ 一个工人在用手机拍摄告别式。
+
+胡冬竹带着4岁多的女儿故地重游。
+
+胡冬竹是樱井大造帐篷剧在中国大陆的翻译和介绍者，2005年曾带着樱井大造造访皮村，2010年在皮村的新工人剧场前，胡冬竹他们搭造了一个具有圆穹顶的帐篷，排练帐篷剧。后来，崔永元在这儿主持了打工春晚（2012年-2014年），舞台使用了帐篷剧当时搭的架子。
+
+她和王德志回忆当年的往事，排练需要小动物，当时剧方在这里养了小鸡和小猪。王德志笑道，小猪后来养大了，被他们吃掉了。
+
+如今，小猪没了，帐篷架子没了，博物馆也要没了。
+
+“我们在这儿来日方长，来日方长。”王德志说，告别式结束了。
+
+一些人去吃晚饭，顺便体验皮村的便宜物价和夜生活。一些人执着地在打工文化艺术博物馆里用手机和相机拍摄每一个角落。
+
+一个着牛仔衣的女生，指着粮票向王德志提问“这是什么”。王德志给她讲那段不能自由买卖，只能凭票有限指定购买的历史。一个戴眼镜的男生，拿着相机，在当年震惊中国的农民工新闻展板前逐个拍摄：青年孙志刚收容致死事件；为了证明自己是尘肺职业病，张海超开胸验肺；崔英杰被城管逼迫误杀城管；黑砖窑31个农民工的命运；13名富士康工人跳楼自杀；广州大学城环卫工人劳资集体谈判始末……
+
+还有年轻人在有着“镇馆之宝”之称的人形易拉宝身后，翻读每一位女工的故事。“每个人”的身后，都有一本翻开的书，装订在固定的铁书架上，记录着她们的经历。
+
+一些人在翻阅最新一期的《新工人文学》——这是皮村文学小组的双周刊刊物，范雨素写了卷首语。未几，免费的《新工人文学》被拿完了。
+
+
+▲ 同心互惠公益商店。
+
+晚上八点多，人们陆续散去。几个带着酒气的工人，穿着拖鞋来博物馆里晃了一圈。几个女工在隔壁的“同心互惠”公益商店里挑选二手衣。
+
+“这是我第一次来，却是最后一次来。”一位女生和同伴耳语着，走出博物馆。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-05-30-contradictory-china-hong-kong-contradictions.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-30-contradictory-china-hong-kong-contradictions.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1e2e87c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-05-30-contradictory-china-hong-kong-contradictions.md
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "矛盾的中港矛盾"
+author: "DuncanLau"
+date : 2023-05-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/fTDi63W.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+還記得2015年，中國和香港在世界盃外圍賽同組，在備戰時，雙方足總各出海報打氣叫陣。那時的香港足總仍可以理直氣壯回應，而且自稱只是「香港」，不是「中國香港」，並沒有引起任何非議。
+
+
+
+用「中港」似乎好像平起平座，如果像其他事情，一律改稱「中國香港」，那會變成是「中國和中國香港之間的予盾」，或如某廢老所言，應該是「內地和中國香港之間的矛盾」，能否簡稱「內中矛盾」，或者「內港矛盾」，好像都不太順口，而且這樣突如其來，每次使用新稱謂時，少不免要註解，即是以前叫的甚麼甚麼囉。跟那些半紅不黑的藝人突然改名一樣，總要附帶提醒就是以前叫甚麽的人囉，其實相當無謂。而且改甚麼稱謂也好，最終不就是承認彼此之間有矛盾囉！死蠢！
+
+只是不夠一個星期的時間，事件連環爆發，所謂的「中港矛盾」連番升級，有一種水落石出的感覺，之前還有人不願承認，意圖淡化這個矛盾，一味談包容一下，模糊一下，甚麼矛盾只是若隱若現，你見佢唔到。但現在潮水退去，所有矛盾都顯現眼前，不得不面對之餘，又無計可施，只好裝胸作勢大罵港人。我相信絕大部份港人在幾天聽到的，都只覺忿怒無比。不過，我想指出，潮水退後，那些如房間裡的大象的石頭，變成顯然易見，無法迴避，也同時讓大家看清楚，很多人沒有穿泳褲！
+
+可能有讀者並不住在香港，未必知道詳情，在這裡簡單表述一下。
+
+一、器官捐贈。早前正苦宣布，器官捐贈的資料將會中港互通，大家的理解是，港人願意捐出的器官可能會被送中，正苦並沒有詳細說明，只是認為是中港融合的表現，坊間不見有太多討論和異議的聲音。但突然正苦走出來，指有「不尋常」數字的人取消器官捐贈，甚至有人根本之前沒有簽署承諾捐贈，卻申請取消。更進一步指，有人在網上散佈謠言，鼓勵其他人取消，甚至有可能已替別人取消，已經轉介公安展開調查。最後更大罵這些人無恥，破壞系統，攪軟性對抗。其實一個自願性質的列表，在先進地區一向行之有效，有人進有人退，平常不過。況且即使願意捐贈，亦未必一定合用，據資料，一年只有十宗八宗器官移植個案，正苦卻因此大發雷霆，痛斥港人無恥，沒有血濃於水的同理心。那麼強調血緣，那居港的非華人是否不被歡迎參與器官捐贈呢？那一些外國地方如加拿大，由各種移民的國家，是否不用攪器官捐贈了？這根本和血緣無關的事情，卻偏偏要突顯這部分的矛盾，居心何在？
+
+二、國泰航班服務員事件。這個應該有最多外國傳媒報道，大家可能已略知一二。問題便是大家只有片面之詞，卻全力開火，將問題升級，去突顯中港矛盾，有點匪夷所思。第一，大家不知道航班服務員國藉，而國泰的員工可能來自週邊的東亞國家，不懂華語，所以要用英語溝通，那如何說成是中港矛盾？第二，航班服務員是在職員區互相交談，被人偷錄，然後放上網公審，並沒有向國泰投訴，這種舉報文化才叫人擔心。第三，言談之間，有人說這番話，另兩人只是聽及附和，也構成同等罪行，要即時解雇。算不算過於嚴厲，明顯是因為群情洶湧，情願息事寧人。那將來如何？所有飛內地的航班全部用內地職員？那就可以確保一切順利？第四，其實正苦在事件中有何角色？為甚麼要第一時間衝出來指責，只是一個公司的服務問題，他們理應有機制和程序去跟進，正苦不用火上加油。如果是內地航班服務員對港客做同樣事情，正苦會同樣手法處理？
+
+三、兩呅（二元）搭車。在香港，原本六十五歲的市民，可以申請長者咭，再用長者八達通，有乘公共交通的優惠。那時是有不同的計算，例如天星小輪完全免費，電車是差不多是四折，只要一元三角，其他的各有不同折扣計算。當時也有濫用的情況，於是重新設計，長者八達通改名為樂悠咭，需要登記有照片，每人只限一張，有遺失或破損需更換，要付款買另一張。當時也改例，所有交通工具（除機場線及某特別路線外）一律兩呅，而且還將年齡限制調低至六十歲。那時已有人提醒，這個方案可能做成沉重負擔，因為用者只付兩呅，餘額由正苦補貼，短程的十元八塊也要補貼六至八元，如果長程，甚至離島渡輪，一程正價要三四十元，正苦便要補貼三四十元，如果小數已怕長計，那大數呢？（今次仆街了）！而且還放寬年齢限制，一下子多幾十萬人可以受惠，當時正苦民望低，急於推出有掌聲的正策，所以一意孤行。
+
+在實施了年多之後，終於發覺條數計唔掂，大概要做些修改，又不想自打嘴巴，於是一出來便指控有人濫用！更特別針對「長程短搭」，即是乘坐長程的路線，通常車費較高，但只是兩三個站便下車。正苦煞有介事，但完全沒有數據支持，很難服眾。而且這個長者優惠其中的說法，是鼓勵長者多些出外活動，但人家真的多出街，又說別人濫用，那如何界定呢，一日坐五、六次算多嗎？十次呢？同樣，又沒有數字來支持他們的說法，那如何討論？
+
+沒有人能知道當初他們是如何構思，又沒有甚麼公開諮詢，一刀切全部兩呅最簡單最容易，有甚麼漏洞弊處，大概可以留給下一任正苦去處理，不用想得那麼長遠。真的出問題了，也不反思政策的不足，便先來鬧咗先算，怪責咗先算，恐嚇咗先算，擺擺官威。但欺善怕惡，出來的效果比較似大媽在計「婆乸數」，「頭先個賣菜婆幾衰呀，計多我兩呅喎！」真的小家小氣。如果這些給長者的交通優惠會影響正苦財政，那麼其他的項目呢？一項郭安費用，不用審批，不用列出項目開支，即批八十億，立法會不能過問。然後一年未夠，便馬上要求追加五十億，即批，不用過問。之後又走出來指責某些長者濫用交通優惠，不是本末倒置嗎？
+
+中港矛盾發展到今時今日，已經不單是兩地人民的互相敵視，現在連中國的媒體，特別是網絡的，和香港正苦各部門，基本上已是同一陣線，有事發生，可能是港苦第一時間衝出來譴責港人，而其他可以申訴的渠道都已經消失了，港人只能硬食，無力感亦從而而來，也是現時中港矛盾的矛盾之處！
+
+
+▲ 這個告示沒有簡體中文，算不算是歧視只懂簡體字的人？
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-06-04-the-34th-anniversary-of-8964-in-hong-kong.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-04-the-34th-anniversary-of-8964-in-hong-kong.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..66986ee4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-04-the-34th-anniversary-of-8964-in-hong-kong.md
@@ -0,0 +1,559 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "【六四・34周年・香港】"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-06-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/8jUNjd1.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+### 警方銅鑼灣帶走至少6人 藝術家三木：香港人唔好驚
+
+
+
+`#六四34 #銅鑼灣 #三木`
+
+#### 2023-06-03
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】明日是八九六四34周年，警方傍晚在銅鑼灣帶走至少6人，指他們有煽動意圖，或作出煽惑行為，包括2名在東角道以行為藝術悼念六四的藝術家。藝術家三木在被警方帶走的時候，高叫：「不忘六四！香港人唔好驚！香港人唔洗驚佢哋！」
+
+【23:27更新】警方表示，今日下午發現有人到港島銅鑼灣一帶，展示具煽動性字句的示威物品，以及在公眾地方叫囂「作出違法行為」。警方分別以涉嫌干犯「在公眾地方擾亂秩序」或「作出具煽動意圖的作為」罪即場拘捕4人，並另外帶走4名涉嫌破壞社會安寧的人返回警署作進一步調查。
+
+警方稱，高度關注有人企圖作出煽動及鼓吹他人進行危害國家安全、公共秩序及公共安全的違法行為，會繼續加強巡邏及收集情報，遇有任何違法行為定必果斷介入，嚴正執法。
+
+
+
+維園今日起一連三日，舉行由26個省級社團同鄉會籌辦的家鄉市集。前支聯會義工關振邦、香港天安門母親成員劉家儀，下午近6點到維園噴水池，計劃在6點04分起在維園絕食24小時。他們到場後隨即被警方帶上警車，現場警員指二人有煽動意圖。
+
+
+
+有藝術家今年一如既往，在六四前夕到銅鑼灣東角道外，以行為藝術悼念六四。至晚上8點，藝術家陳美彤手持一卷黑紙，閉上眼睛默站，並不時轉換位置。在默站近5分鐘後，數十名警員拉起橙帶包圍，警員在陳美彤身上搜出黑手套，隨即將她帶上警車。
+
+
+
+另外，現場一對身穿白衣的男女同被警方帶走，男子掛肩袋內有一束白菊花。他們在被帶走的時候表情平靜，警員搜身後將兩人帶上警車。
+
+藝術家陳式森（三木）在被警員帶走時，則激動高喊：「不忘六四！香港人唔好驚！香港人唔洗驚佢哋！」他被數十名警員包圍，並帶上警車，警員警告他停止作出煽惑行為。記者問現場警員，兩人是否被正式拘捕，警員未有回應。
+
+
+
+另一行為藝術家Dung則在其T-shirt前後貼上「銅鑼灣 香港兩大文化產地」的紙，一時行走，一時打開摺櫈坐一會兒，先後坐在崇光百貨、維園門口。現場及後下大雨，他舉起黃雨傘行走，最後離去。
+
+Dung表示「兩大文化」要香港人自行聯想，笑言「我估佢哋（警員）睇唔明」。被問到為何參與行為藝術，Dung就稱：「有啲嘢如果好重要嘅話，就好似古董咁，要間唔中攞出嚟抹下。」
+
+
+### 女子銅鑼灣舉寫有「公投」紙張 被警員帶走
+`#六四34 #銅鑼灣`
+
+#### 2023-06-04
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】今日是八九六四34周年，下午兩點，一名女子手持寫有「公投Referendum」、「龟公Free HK」的紙張，在銅鑼灣循記利佐治街步行至怡和街，最後被警員拉入封鎖線，並帶上警車。
+
+
+
+
+
+該名女子遭警員截停，但她拒絕停下，又不滿指：「警察可以騷擾人嘅咩，唔比我講嘢嘅咩！」有警員就回應指「唔使勞氣，關心下啫」。
+
+女子隨後進入恒隆中心旁的松本清，有便衣警員尾隨，該名女子及後離開。兩名軍警員在怡和街將該名女子拉入封鎖線，她情緒激動，又高叫「唔好掂我」、「打劫」和「非禮」等，並被帶上警車帶走。《獨媒》向警員查詢是否正式拘捕原因，警員表示「暫時答唔到」。
+
+
+
+
+
+消息指警方今日部署5,000至6,000警力，在銅鑼灣維多利亞公園、金鐘政府總部等加強布防和高姿態巡邏，並會在各區加強巡邏。
+
+
+
+警方今早在銅鑼灣停泊「劍齒虎」裝甲車、大型戰術巴士、豬籠車及衝鋒車在場戒備，維園外亦有至少28名穿防刺背心的軍裝，及便衣警員巡邏戒備。
+
+
+
+
+
+
+### 鄒幸彤獄中絕食34小時：哪裡有燭光哪裡是維園
+`#六四34 #支聯會 #鄒幸彤`
+
+#### 2023-06-04
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】因涉支聯會顛覆國家政權案還柙的前支聯會副主席鄒幸彤，其支持者設立的專頁「小彤群抽會」昨日表示，鄒幸彤將於獄中絕食34小時，附上的圖片寫有「哪裡有燭光，哪裡就是維園」。
+
+鄒幸彤的支持者設立的專頁「小彤群抽會」表示，鄒幸彤將於獄中絕食34小時，並附上「悼念無罪」、「6434justice」、「說出真相」、「拒絕遺忘」、「尋求正義」及「呼喚良知」的標籤。同案的前支聯會主席李卓人及副主席何俊仁，前者去年六四亦曾禁食一日，並點起火柴悼念。
+
+
+
+1989年身處北京的前學聯代表陳清華指，懲教署以另一理由將鄒幸彤轉到「水飯房」單獨囚禁，「恰巧在她絕食的同期進行」。
+
+今年維園是連續第四年沒有合法的悼念集會，過去兩年警方皆引用《公安條例》通宵圍封維園。今年維園足球場則有多個同鄉社團舉辦的市集，活動日期跨越六四，由6月3日至5日。警方則續在銅鑼灣及維園一帶重兵駐守，昨日6月3日晚在該處拘捕4人、帶走4人。
+
+
+
+鄒幸彤另因參與支聯會及六四涉多宗案件。2021年六四悼念晚會遭警方禁止，鄒幸彤在六四前夕在Twitter和《明報》發表文章，被指煽惑市民前往維園參與未經批准集結，被判罪成。惟鄒幸彤於高院上訴得直，撤銷定罪及刑罰。律政司上訴至終審法院，將於6月8日開庭處理。
+
+2020年六四集會同被警方禁止，惟當時支聯會成員如常到維園集會，事後多年被控。其中鄒幸彤「煽惑未經批准集結」及「明知而參與未經批准集結」罪成，判囚12個月。
+
+鄒幸彤與另2人涉「沒有遵從通知規定提供資料」罪，今年3月被判囚4.5個月。他們提出定罪及刑期上訴，暫未有聆訊日期。
+
+
+### 曾健成帶金花到維園外 警截查後放行
+`#六四34 #銅鑼灣 #維園 #曾健成 #社民連`
+
+#### 2023-06-04
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】今日是六四事件34周年，警方自早上在銅鑼灣維園及崇光百貨外嚴陣戒備。社民連成員曾健成「阿牛」下午與太太帶同金花到維園外，遭警方截查，最後獲放行。他指大家都不敢忘記，「六四朵花係咩，大家唔敢忘記。」
+
+
+
+下午約1時45分，近20名警員在維園噴水池旁，拉起橙帶封鎖線，截查身穿深藍色上衣、社民連成員「阿牛」，其同行的太太則身穿黑色上衣。期間「阿牛」除下口罩，應警員要求打開雨傘及背囊。有警員要求在場人士「企後啲」，亦有一名操流利普通話的中年女士自拍直播，將鏡頭指向警員，高興地道「我們一起來看看香港的帥哥」。約5分鐘後，兩人登記身分證後獲警方放行。
+
+
+
+
+
+> #### 帶金花到維園 阿牛：大家唔敢忘記咩意思
+
+阿牛向《獨媒》表示，他與太太去完教會經過維園，前往乘車途中遭到截查，又指過去數十年的六四都會在維園出現。曾健成稱向警員問及是否因為六四才要截查他，「佢話咩附例200，都唔知佢噏乜叉。」至於手持的花朵，他稱「六四朵花係咩，大家唔敢忘記。」
+
+多名民主派人士在六四前夕皆收到警方來電，曾健成亦不例外，指有警員禮貌勸諭他不要經過維園。惟他認為自己手持花朵並無犯法，「個個人驚就冇人出嚟㗎啦，又冇犯法。」「我自己去，都唔得呀？係咪？唔好驚到咁緊要啦，係你特區政府自己將六四擺得咁重，要擺六千警力係到。」
+
+
+
+> #### 阿牛嘆「今年六四不一樣…以前素色，依家紅色」
+
+維園今日續舉行由多個同鄉組織舉行的家鄉市集，他在被截查前曾在維園外圍直播約3分半鐘，稱六四悼念晚會不復存在，「依家維園舞龍舞鳳，載歌載舞」，慨嘆「今年六四不一樣……以前素色，依家紅色。」
+
+直播期間，曾健成一度與一名藍衣市民發生口角，該名市民自稱是「狗」，向阿牛高呼「我狗嚟㗎！……我屌你啊」，阿牛回斥「屌大聲啲！」
+
+曾健成是前東區區議員，他在2020年因參與七一遊行，被判「煽惑他人參與非法集結」罪成，判囚10個月，去年5月刑滿出獄。
+
+
+### 「劉公子」原擬到同鄉市集 遭10警包圍截查10分鐘：咩雅致都冇晒
+`#六四34 #銅鑼灣 #維園 #劉公子`
+
+#### 2023-06-04
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】今日是六四事件34周年，維園舉行的是同鄉市集而非悼念集會。富商「劉公子」劉定成下午約三時半，在維園遭約10名警員截查10分鐘後獲放行。他稱原擬到市集觀看藝人陳百祥賣鮑魚，但指「咩雅致都冇晒」，不會進入市集。
+
+
+
+> #### 「劉公子」稱欲看阿叻賣鮑魚
+
+截查期間，警員仔細翻查「劉公子」銀包及袋，過程長達10分鐘，期間「劉公子」不斷用濕紙巾作扇撥涼。他獲放行後向記者表示，得悉維園有「搞到好大規模、好大陣仗、自出世以嚟都未見過咁大」的市集，又言從報道中得悉藝人陳百祥在市集賣鮑魚，「見阿叻賣鮑魚賣得咁辛苦，咁有錢嘅人喺度賣鮑魚，我實要過嚟睇吓撞唔撞到佢，然後俾個like佢」，認為今日為「喜慶日子」，特意前來逛逛。
+
+
+
+他自言沒有留意到警方在銅鑼灣一帶部署大量警力，突然遭到警方截查使其意興闌珊，「突然間俾人查身份證，咩雅致都冇晒….依家熱血沸騰，搞到我好熱，要坐多陣」。
+
+
+
+「劉公子」身穿左胸口有花刺繡的黑上衣及黑褲，他表示不敢穿白衣，「我唔敢著白衫，白衫會斬死人，咁我咪着黑囉」。最終「劉公子」稱與朋友吃下午茶，沒有進入市集便離開維園。他表示今夜將會逛街購物，「睇下有無啲衫，有朵花喺到，咁咪買囉，我鍾意花嘛」。
+
+
+
+> #### 有市民遭警方查看手機
+
+銅鑼灣街坊盧先生手持黃色DONKI購物袋路過維園噴水池旁時拍照，不足一分鐘便被警員截查。他向傳媒表示警員查問其個人資料，並兩度要求他解鎖手機，查看其WhatsApp訊息及手機相簿，「佢攞咗就開始睇入面啲媒體、上嘅網，同埋訊息。我無拒絕嘅，我有解鎖俾佢，佢冇問我可唔可以睇入面有咩，就直接開咗嚟睇」。
+
+
+
+
+
+
+### 王婆婆持鮮花舉「五一」手勢 被帶上警車
+`#六四34 #銅鑼灣 #維園 #王鳳瑤`
+
+#### 2023-06-04
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】今日是六四事件34周年，大批警員在銅鑼灣維園附近駐守，並在記利佐治街劃封鎖區，至少9人被帶走。「王婆婆」王鳳瑤於下午五時許到封鎖範圍附近，她身穿黑衣、背囊掛有黃傘吊飾，手持粉紅色花束並舉起「五一」手勢，迅即被警員帶上警車。現場多人圍觀，有人鼓譟並高叫「揸紮花都有罪」、「蝦老人家」、「黃婆婆加油」等，亦有人以普通話表示「她沒犯事」。
+
+
+
+
+
+警方於下午2時和3時許先後帶走3名女子，其中一人手持寫有「公投Referendum」、「龟公Free HK」的紙張。警方繼續截查市民，期間兩名女子被帶入封鎖區内搜袋，二人隨後被帶上警車。其中一名女子袋上掛豬嘴及頭盔圖案吊飾，上衣有「香港民主女神像」圖案，另一名女子則袋上有黃傘裝飾。另一名戴黑色帽男子手持「六四舞台」書籍《5月35日：創作．記憶．抗爭》，亦在被截查後帶上警車。
+
+
+
+
+
+社運人士嚴敏華的母親、保健推拿師區家寶則在下午約4時40分，身穿寫有「為民保健」字眼的黑衣在怡和街舉起紙張，高聲叫喊呼籲不要做膝關節手術；其紙張則寫「關節疼痛只是身體過分勞累」、「只要放鬆肌肉，很快恢復正常」等字，被帶上警車。
+
+
+
+至約6時，一名穿黑衣男子在維園近記利佐治街入口，被逾20名警員拉起封鎖線截查。搜查期間，他的相機不慎從背囊滑出，他嘗試影相測試相機功能惟被制止。警方其後搜出一個寫有「六四」字眼的蠟燭模型裝置，遂將他帶走。
+
+
+
+
+### 美領、歐盟辦事處續窗邊擺蠟燭悼念
+`#六四34 #美國駐港澳總領事館 #歐盟駐港澳辦事處`
+
+#### 2023-06-04
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】今日是六四事件34周年，美國駐港澳總領事館及歐盟駐港澳辦事處一如往年，傍晚在窗邊擺放電子蠟燭，悼念六四事件。有警員在場截查記者，著記者拍攝後盡快離開，以免惹人聚集。
+
+
+
+美國駐港澳總領事館今早更換Facebook專頁封面圖片，圖中有一漆黑點燃的燭光，以及寫有「34th Anniversary of Tiananmen Square」和「June 4, 1989」文字。
+
+
+
+加拿大駐港澳總領事館專頁亦換上漆黑中眾多燭光的封面圖片，澳洲駐港澳總領事館亦發文稱，澳洲與世界各地一起悼念1989年6月4日發生的事件，堅定承諾會繼續捍衛人權，包括結社自由、言論自由、宗教或信仰自由以及政治參與自由。
+
+
+
+美國駐港澳總領事館和歐盟駐港澳辦事處傍晚在窗戶擺放電子蠟燭後，一輛衝鋒車於晚上約7時15分駛至美國駐港澳總領事館對出，警員落車戒備。《獨媒》記者其後被警員截查，並著記者拍攝後盡快離開，以免惹人聚集。此外，附近的香港公園亦有多輛警車戒備，有警員在附近巡邏。
+
+
+
+美國國務卿布林肯發聲明表示，1989年6月4日中國政府派出坦克進入天安門廣場，殘酷鎮壓和平集會的民主抗議者和旁觀者，受害者的勇氣不會被遺忘，並將繼續激勵全世界，美國將繼續在中國和世界各地倡導人民的人權和基本自由。
+
+
+
+
+### 多人銅鑼灣被帶走 包括前職工盟鄧建華、前支聯會徐漢光
+`#六四34 #銅鑼灣 #徐漢光 #鄧建華 #杜志權`
+
+#### 2023-06-04
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】警方晚上持續在銅鑼灣及維園一帶截查市民，多人被警方帶走，「被懷疑」的理由眾多，包括身穿的服飾、手持蠟燭、書籍甚至亮著手機燈。
+
+晚上7時20分，2008年發起維他奶工潮的杜志權，身穿「不想回憶，未敢忘記」黑色上衣到銅鑼灣。他被警員截查約數分鐘後被帶上警車。
+
+
+
+> #### 有市民開手機燈被帶走
+
+在維園記利佐治街入口，一名藍衣男子被逾15名警員拉入封鎖線搜身，逾10分鐘後獲放行。他年過70，向記者表示過往每年皆有參與六四悼念晚會，今日特意前來維園。他原打算手持過去在悼念晚會取得的電子蠟燭，繞場一圈以悼念六四，「悼念我哋中華民族悲慘經歷，我唔希望真係好似我哋偉大祖國咁，完全忘記咗六四。」
+
+
+
+不過他遭警方警告「可能會引致人群聚集」，籲盡快離開。他明言來年會再到維園繞場一周悼念，「最多唔點蠟燭」。此外，一名男子因開着手機燈，被警方帶上警車。
+
+
+
+另一名被截查的市民黎先生，因手持書籍《人民不會忘記——八九民運實錄》沿維園遊走。他獲放行後向傳媒明言是來悼念，「我嚟行個圈啫，盡自己責任」，又稱可以不同形式悼念，「可以subtle啲啦，唔洗淨係帶蠟燭同鮮花，因為一定俾人周，奈何我拎書都係俾人周」。他認為今次突顯了香港制度的荒謬，「但香港人係唔會咁容易忘記，咁容易俾人打冧，總之一日有合法機會、途徑，一百萬、二百萬、三百萬（人）都好，會再次出返嚟」。
+
+一名身穿印有漫畫《SPY×FAMILY間諜家家酒》的人物安妮亞戴「豬咀」，寫有日語「禁止獻花」黑色上衣，並穿有黃色「香港加油」襪的女子同被拉入封鎖線，截查數分鐘後被多名警員拉着雙臂帶上警車。女子期間一度掙扎及與警員理論，並高呼：「我乜都冇做過！」
+
+
+
+
+
+> #### 鄧建華、徐漢光被帶走
+
+晚上8時許，職工盟前副主席鄧建華，身穿印有《文匯報》八九六四頭版報導的黑色上衣，被帶進警方封鎖線截查，及後被帶上警車。他在Facebook上稱被帶到灣仔警署「協助調查」。
+
+
+
+
+
+前支聯會常委徐漢光晚上亦手持電子燭光現身崇光百貨外，惟隨即被警員帶往對面馬路搜查，不足兩分鐘便被帶上警車，徐漢光上車後仍手持燭光，表現平靜。
+
+
+
+
+
+晚上8時18分，一名戴白帽穿黑衫男子被帶進記利佐治街封鎖區，七分鐘後被帶上警車。晚上8時30分，有四名穿黑衣男子及一名白衣男子被截查，及後獲放行；警方亦要求在附近商場和行人路的市民勿逗留在原位。
+
+
+
+
+### 旺角朗豪坊外念佛 女長毛哽咽：去維園連企喺度嘅機會都無
+`#六四34 #旺角 #女長毛 #雷玉蓮`
+
+#### 2023-06-04
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】今日是六四34周年，社運人士「女長毛」雷玉蓮晚上7時半現身旺角朗豪坊外，她身穿「南無阿彌陀佛」灰色T-shirt，多名警員隨即將她包圍直至她離開。被截查期間念佛的雷玉蓮哽咽稱「如果我今日去維園，我只有一個命運，把我拉上警車車走，我連企喺呢度嘅機會都無。」
+
+
+
+「女長毛」於晚上抵達朗豪坊後，未有任何行動，隨即被數十名警員包圍，並拉起橙帶搜查。警員在她的布袋中搜出佛珠、口罩、紙扇、雨傘等物品，在等候期間，本身信佛的雷玉蓮站起來，在橙帶範圍內一邊繞圈，一邊默念「南無阿彌陀佛」，在15分鐘後獲放行，有警員緊隨著她離開一段路。
+
+
+
+
+
+雷玉蓮其後向記者表示「佛珠係佛門最重要嘅嘢，比花更加重要」，稱是「我用自己嘅方法去悼念我自己心目中嘅事情」。她續指「其實我能夠喺呢度企到幾分鐘，比其他人今日一出（銅鑼灣）站就帶上警車嗰個命運⋯⋯我已經做咗我應該要做嘅嘢」。
+
+她說著更不禁哽咽，泣嘆十分難過，「行出嚟要嘅勇氣都好大，並唔容易，如果我今日去維園，我只有一個命運，把我拉上警車車走，我連企喺呢度嘅機會都無」。
+
+
+
+
+
+
+### 陳寶瑩被帶走逾2小時後獲准離開、不須擔保
+`#六四34 #銅鑼灣 #香港記者協會 #麥燕庭 #陳寶瑩 #社民連`
+
+#### 2023-06-04
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】今日是六四事件34周年，警方全日駐守銅鑼灣，並帶走多人，包括社民連主席陳寶瑩及記協前主席麥燕庭。社民連指，陳寶瑩被帶走逾2小時後，在晚上9時15分獲准離開警署，無須任何形式擔保。
+
+社民連主席陳寶瑩於晚上近7時到達銅鑼灣，隨即被拉入銅鑼灣記利佐治街封鎖區。她身穿黑色背心長裙，背紅色背包，手持黃色摺紙花及寫上「支持天安門母親」的電子蠟燭。她被多名警員拉著雙臂及背包，被帶上警車，期間與警員有拉扯。她被帶走時現場有人高叫「Hello Hong Kong」。
+
+
+
+社民連在晚上表示，陳寶瑩被帶到灣仔警署，至晚上9時15分獲准離開，不須任何形式擔保。
+
+> #### 前記協主席麥燕庭同被帶走
+
+下午6時35分，香港記者協會前主席麥燕庭身穿黑衫褲及涼鞋現身。她在銅鑼灣地帶商場門口被逾10名警察截停及包圍，約四分鐘後被帶上警車離開。
+
+
+
+
+### 有女子被四腳朝天抬走 高呼：係咪以後六四都會係咁樣？
+`#六四34 #銅鑼灣 #維園`
+
+#### 2023-06-04
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】踏入過往六四晚會舉行時間，警方亦續不斷截查及帶走在銅鑼灣及維園的市民。有女子拒絕截查並步離維園，多名警員阻止，並宣布以「阻差辦公」罪名拘捕。多名警員將她四腳朝天抬上警車，她在警車上高呼「係咪以後六四都會係咁樣？」
+
+晚上9時37分，一名身穿黑衣女子在維園圍觀警方截查其他市民期間。目擊者稱，警員因看到她手機上展示一張黑底蠟燭的相片，故上前要求搜查。該女子拒絕並欲步行離開維園，多名警察上前阻止。女子質問「呢度係咪香港，香港係咪有法治？」，有警員大叫「唔好再推啦！」該女子被多名警察以橙帶包圍，期間高呼：「我好驚香港嘅警察，原來香港嘅警察咁恐怖」，「原來香港而家六四係唔可以出街嘅」，「究竟香港變成一個點樣嘅社會，一啲咁基本嘅自由都冇。」
+
+
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+
+
+
+警方其後指，由於女子多次拒絕聽從指示，故以「阻差辦公」正式拘捕。該女子續與警方理論：「原來香港警察係咁樣對市民嘅」，「我只係嚟行街，返屋企都唔得，然之後唔畀人走嘅」。多名警察其後上前捉住該名女子，她則坐在地上拒絕離開並掙扎，被多名警員四腳朝天抬上警車。她在警車上續高呼：「我要返屋企！我嚟行吓街都唔得！」「以後六四都會係咁樣，係咪以後六四都會係咁樣？」
+
+多名市民亦被截查，晚上8時多，身穿黑衫黑褲、黑襪及黑鞋的李先生，在20分鐘內兩度遭帶入記利佐治街封鎖區。他向《獨媒》表示第一次被截查時，自己停留在記利佐治街，第二次則在銅鑼灣地帶樓梯口，指自己「冇企喺行人路」，只是站著觀察周圍環境，但被警員指阻止其他人行街，懷疑有煽動行為，要求他離開。
+
+晚上8時33分，一對夫婦被截查6分鐘後放行。男子戴黑口罩、穿黑衫褲及黑鞋；女子則穿黑衫、灰裙及黑鞋，她帶有印上「hongkonger」字樣的黑口罩及V煞面具頸鏈。
+
+晚上9時52分，三男一女遭截查後全部被帶上警車。四人身穿黑衣，其中一名男子身穿印有黃色字「叫我香港人」的T恤，另外一人衣服上則印有蒙羅麗莎畫像。
+
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+
+
+晚上約10時，一名耳戴助聽器、坐在維園近記利佐治街入口處樓梯邊的老翁，因背囊邊插有發光電子蠟燭，被警方拉進封鎖線。他問警員「而家熄咗佢，係咪就唔使去（警署）？」，警員回應「唔得，今日見到你第二次」，並將他帶上警車。
+
+
+
+
+### 大學生持北島詩集「行街」 向內地客講解
+`#六四34 #銅鑼灣 #維園`
+
+#### 2023-06-04
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】2023年6月4日是六四34周年，維園連續第四年沒有「合法」燭光晚會，多名市民以「自己的方式」在附近悼念。有大學生打開詩人北島的詩集「行街」，向內地遊客講解六四歷史。
+
+> #### 北島詩集與國安膠扇
+
+6月4日下午，兩名分別就讀哲學以及政治與經濟學的大學生在記利佐治街「行街」，其中沈同學手持詩人北島的詩集《守夜》，打開書中載有「回答」一詩的頁數，並手持在維園同鄉市集獲得的國家安全膠扇。「回答」是北島於1976年的創作，最為人熟知的詩句是「卑鄙是卑鄙者的通行証，高尚是高尚者的墓志銘」。
+
+沈同學表示多人在銅鑼灣及維園被捕，覺得「條（紅）線好模糊」。他指三十多年來，一代又一代人守護六四記憶，「點解而家國安法過咗之後，就忽然之間唔可以做任何嘢」，「見到呢個情況，更加應該出嚟見證。」他稱不少內地遊客不知道六四事件，故「行過去同佢哋解釋返，原來34年前係有六四事件。」
+
+> #### 穿黑裙提白花
+
+同樣在下午在東角道，鄺小姐身穿黑裙，手提白花「行街」。她向《獨媒》表示自己是附近街坊，十多年來皆會在6月4日身穿黑衣及帶同白花悼念，並在附近散步。她稱晚上會換上黑衣「跑個步」。
+
+
+
+> #### 口罩貼「毋忘初心」、「加油」
+
+年約40多歲的李先生身穿黑衫黑褲，戴上空氣淨化口罩，口罩上貼上「毋忘初心」、「加油」、「堅持才會看到希望」等貼紙，背包帶則縫上「良知」標籤。
+
+李先生向《獨媒》表示口罩「焗都要戴，周圍好多菌」，又指自己三年來皆作如此裝扮，原因為「靚」，並反問記者「香港自由㗎嘛，唔係嘅咩？」他自然免不過被警員截查，但稱「感受到香港個溫暖，至少十個人圍住我，我覺得好安全」，警員態度「好好，好客氣。我哋咁辛苦納稅，值得嘅。」
+
+李先生表示今日是到維園參與「家鄉市集嘉年華」，「開心香港。我去完之後覺得開心咗。」李先生最終被警員指阻止其他人行街，懷疑有煽動行為，要求他離開。
+
+
+
+> #### 有市民維園讀《5月35日》劇本
+
+不過維園仍有不少未被帶走的市民，在公園內一角靜靜以自己方式悼念。在往來天后至銅鑼灣的通道，大批警員不斷反覆巡邏。通道旁的座椅上，有人在Youtube重溫六四晚會的歌曲之一《自由花》，有人讀著《5月35日》的舊版劇本書，亦有人亮起手機燈。
+
+
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+
+
+讀劇的曾女士身穿黑衫黑褲、戴黑口罩，頸上掛有十字架。她本身為基督徒，過往每年六四皆會到場祈禱，惟現在無法再為事件發聲，「佢唔畀我點蠟燭，我無點呀，但我喺度睇一本關於六四嘅書。」
+
+曾女士慨嘆六四事件死難者家屬無法發聲，「佢唔可以公開為自己嘅仔女做啲嘢，然之後好似呢套戲入面咁樣講，話我想為嗰個仔女去點一支蠟燭都唔得，要剝削咗我嘅權利。」一邊讀劇，她亦一邊思考香港目前的狀況「諗返究竟對我哋……姐係香港同六四事件有咩相同或者我哋可以參考嘅地方。」「好似蒲公英咁，將啲嘢散咗開去，喺世界各地到做。」
+
+
+
+今年18歲、剛考完DSE的Ethan亦特意身穿黑衣到銅鑼灣，望為死者「發聲、悼念」。他指與家人政見不同，自己是從網上和朋友得知關於六四的訊息，首次參與六四集會已是最後一次合法集會（2019年）Ethan坦言，2019年社會事件令他覺醒，望為所有爭取自由的人發聲，雖然不少朋友因擔心而未有到來，而他看到很多人被拉上警車也會感到擔心，但認為「世界上少咗一個人發聲，就少咗一個自由。」
+
+
+
+今年是維園連續第四年沒有「合法」燭光晚會。2020年，維園晚會被當局以疫情為由被禁，是香港六四晚會歷史上首次不獲批，但當日仍有大量市民進入足球場悼念。2021年及2022年，當局則引用《公安條例》在六四前夕圍封維園。今年6月4日的維園，則由多個同鄉組織租用作舉行市集。
+
+
+
+
+### 波蘭交換生維園點蠟燭：望為亡者及不能發聲的人禱告
+`#六四34 #銅鑼灣 #維園`
+
+#### 2023-06-05
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】昨日是六四34周年，雖然再無集會，但不少市民以「自己的方式」悼念。晚上約10時在維園，來自波蘭的中文大學交換生Filip被警方截查約10分鐘後放行。他向《獨媒》表示，自己原到場點起蠟燭，但十多秒便被吹熄，他欲再點蠟燭時被警員叫停並截查。警員向他表示，在維園內點蠟燭屬違法，他的行為可能煽動他人，沒收他的蠟燭後獲放行。
+
+
+
+傍晚已到達銅鑼灣一帶的Filip坦言，相比起其他本地人，警察對他頗為有禮貌，認為警方可能也擔心拘捕他這名交流生的觀感：「當一個交流生被警察包圍，不止是香港，全世界也在看。」
+
+他坦言擔心被捕，但指自己只是望為亡者和不能發聲的人禱告（pray for the dead and the living who don’t have the voice），是很個人的事；又指在波蘭，祈禱是紀念死者的傳統、是表達尊重的方式，「如果我在波蘭這樣做，沒有人會說什麼」。
+
+
+
+
+### 麥燕庭稱被騙上警車 批警方手法無賴
+`#六四34 #銅鑼灣 #維園 #警察 #麥燕庭 #香港記者協會`
+
+#### 2023-06-05
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】昨日是六四事件34周年，警方全日重兵在銅鑼灣及維園一帶佈防，巡邏及截查市民，又將部分人帶到警署，包括正在採訪的記協前主席麥燕庭。她今早在電台節目指，本來被指示前往封鎖區搜身後放行，但最後被帶上警車，她感覺被騙；她被扣留至晚上11點後才獲釋，認為警方目的是阻礙她採訪。她在警署扣查期間，發現大部分被帶走的市民，只是穿著了沒有口號的黑衫，有一家四口吃完生日飯並途經銅鑼灣，疑因穿黑衫即被全家帶返警署。麥燕庭批評警方做法離譜，「做嘢光明正大，大家有規有矩唔好玩陰招，如果真係唔想人悼念，就講明唔准悼念，唔准著黑色衫」。
+
+警方昨晚發稿稱，以涉嫌破壞社會安寧帶走23人，並以「妨礙警務人員執行職務」拘捕1人。
+
+【18:45更新】被捕女子已獲准保釋候查，須於7月上旬向警方報到。
+
+> #### 表明記者身份仍被帶走
+
+被帶走的23人當中包括麥燕庭，她今早在商台《在晴朗的一天出發》憶述事件，她當日以外媒記者身份工作，站在銅鑼灣東角道警方豎立的帳蓬附近觀察，期間有警方「傳媒聯絡」人員曾與她對答，一直相安無事。惟突然有一批警員要求她進入「封鎖區」搜身。麥燕庭問警員因何事搜身，對方稱「懷疑」，即使麥燕庭表明身份對方也不理會。
+
+隨後有兩批警員先後警告她，若再不合作就告她「阻差辦工」，麥燕庭要求警方「傳媒聯絡」協作調停，但「傳媒聯絡」反叫她配合警方搜身，稱若搜身後無發現便可獲放行。當時她基於「唔好阻住我做你嘢」，配合警方行動，但她發現被帶往警車，她知道上警車意味將被帶離現場，「我好討厭，上警車係另一回事」。有男警喝令她「你唔上，我就抬你上」，她雖然感到被騙和憤怒，但亦無奈登上警車。
+
+> #### 男警態度兇惡：你唔上，我就抬你上
+
+在抵達北角警署後，她向警員表示「可唔可以快手少少」，因為她希望繼續採訪工作。她指在晚上8時多，其實警方已經完成程序，抄寫其個資料，以及為其隨身物品拍照，但一直未獲放行。她曾向警員表明，若她因被拖延而無法完成工作，便有足夠理止懷疑警方阻止她採訪。她最後仍被扣留至晚上11時多才獲釋，基本上在維園的事件已結束。
+
+在警署期間，沒有警員向她解釋被帶走原因，反而有警員問她「你知唔知自己因為咩入嚟」。直至她獲釋後，才得知警方發稿稱她「涉嫌破壞社會安寧」，她反問「我企喺樓梯十幾分鐘，旁邊係無人嘅，我想問我點樣破壞社會安寧，如果唔係佢哋（警方）埋嚟，根本唔會有人理我」。
+
+> #### 有少女問黑衫「邊度買」 被視同夥帶走
+
+麥燕庭指在警署等待期間，向其他被帶走的市民了解起因，「覺得共通點係大家都著黑色衫」，她直言「喂，黑色唔係罪嚟㗎喎」；另外有兩個青年的襪寫著「香港加油」，在銅鑼灣SOGO過馬路時被警員截停。麥燕庭形容其中一個少女更慘，沒有身穿任何黑色裝束，僅因為曾與一名被帶走的人交談十秒，問「你件衫幾靚喎，邊度買」，兩個人就被一同帶走。
+
+而另一個她認為相當離譜的個案，一家四口的家庭，兒子於6月4日生日於是一家全部穿著黑色衫，當晚於灣仔酒店食完自助餐後，途徑SOGO時被要求進入封鎖區檢查，一家四口聽從指示，不料最後全部被帶返警署。
+
+> #### 麥燕庭：真係唔想人悼念，就講明唔准悼念
+
+麥燕庭批評警方手法「好無賴」，她直言不如在六月四日設封鎖區，講明不准著黑衫，「做嘢光明正大，大家有規有矩唔好玩啲陰招。如果真係唔想人悼念，就講明唔准悼念、唔准著黑色衫，咁咪算囉，但佢又唔講喎」。她暫時仍未決定是否就昨晚待遇投訴警方。
+
+警方表示，昨日（6月4日）中午至晚上，發現有人於港島灣仔區及北角區一帶的公眾地方涉嫌破壞社會安寧。警方稱在晚上約9時40分，在維園近噴水池巡邏期間，發現一名女子形跡可疑並上前截查，惟該女子拒絕合作並拒絕出示身分證明文件，向她作出口頭警告不果後，以涉嫌「妨礙警務人員執行職務」拘捕該名53歲姓區女子，案件交由東區警區刑事調查隊第二隊跟進。
+
+《獨媒》記者當時亦在場，據目擊者指該名女子在手機展示黑底蠟燭的相片，被警方要求搜查，該女子拒絕，最後被四腳朝天抬上警車。
+
+警方亦以涉嫌破壞社會安寧帶走11男12女，年齡介乎20至74歲，返回警署作進一步調查。當中包括職工盟前副主席鄧建華、支聯會前常委徐漢光、社民連主席陳寶瑩及記協前主席麥燕庭，全部人皆已獲釋。
+
+
+### 保安局譴責聯合國人權辦及記協假借自由之名顛倒是非
+`#六四34 #麥燕庭 #香港記者協會 #聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處 #保安局`
+
+#### 2023-06-05
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】警方在昨日（6月4日），在維園及銅鑼灣一帶拘捕1人，「帶走」23人，包括表示正進行採訪的記協前主席麥燕庭，聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處和香港記者協會分別發聲明批評。保安局今日發聲明，稱包括上述兩個組織「假借言論、新聞和集會自由之名對警方合法執法行動作出顛倒是非和污衊抹黑的無理言論」，強烈反對及予以譴責。
+
+就昨日六四警方拘捕及「帶走」多人，聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處稱感到震驚，促請釋放任何因行使言論與和平集會自由而被拘留的人，並呼籲當局充分履行《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》規定的義務。
+
+香港記者協會亦發聲明，指被「帶走」的麥燕庭為法國國際廣播電台特約記者，促警方尊重新聞採訪工作，不應無理拘留新聞工作者及阻礙採訪工作，要求作解釋。
+
+保安局今日晚上發聲明，點名聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處和香港記者協會，「假借言論、新聞和集會自由之名對警方合法執法行動作出顛倒是非和污衊抹黑的無理言論，表示強烈反對並予以譴責。」
+
+局方發言人指人權受《憲法》和《基本法》保障，不過有關權利和自由並非絕對，《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》亦有訂明，在必要保障國家安全、公共安全、公共秩序或他人的權利和自由等情況下，可依法限制部分權利和自由。保安局重申是依法對有關人士採取執法行動，不論政治立場或背景，而新聞從業員亦必須遵守法律。
+
+局方指「任何嘗試詆毀特區法治和自由，試圖破壞香港繁榮穩定的行為，只會徒勞無功。」執法部門會繼續無畏無懼和不偏不倚地執法，維護國家安全和社會秩序。
+
+
+### 六三被捕4人皆獲准保釋 包括劉家儀及三木
+`#六四34 #銅鑼灣 #三木 #劉家儀 #關振邦`
+
+#### 2023-06-05
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】警方在六四前夕的6月3日，在銅鑼灣拘捕4人，包括前支聯會義工關振邦、香港天安門母親成員劉家儀，以及行為藝術家三木（陳式森），涉「作出具煽動意圖的作為」及「在公眾地方行為不檢」，4人於今日皆獲准保釋候查，須於七月上旬向警方報到。
+
+警方今午表示，6月3日拘捕的50歲姓劉女子、51歲姓關男子、54歲姓李女子及60歲姓陳男子皆已獲准保釋。
+
+6月3日當日下午近6時，前支聯會義工關振邦及香港天安門母親成員劉家儀在維園噴水池表示將於晚上6時04分起絕食24小時，他們隨即被警方帶走。
+
+同日晚上，藝術家三木一如過往，在東角道進行行為藝術，隨即被警員包圍帶上警車。三木被帶走時高呼：「不忘六四！香港人唔好驚！香港人唔洗驚佢哋！」此外，《獨媒》記者亦目擊藝術家陳美彤及另一對穿白衣的男女被帶走。
+
+本身為台大研究生的劉家儀，昨日台大研究生協會在台北舉行記者會聲援，保安局則發聲明，斥協會罔顧事實、混淆是非、企圖透過抹黑警方合法行動而模糊焦點的行為予以譴責。
+
+
+### 8964燈柱被圍封 路政指舊柱鏽蝕須更換 六四下午已解封
+`#六四34 #元朗 #8964燈柱 #路政署`
+
+#### 2023-06-05
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】位於元朗馬田路旁的FA8964燈柱，在六四前夕突然被圍封，有市民將路燈被封的照片上載至社交網站，引發坊間關注事件是否與「敏感日子」有關。路政署回覆《獨媒》查詢，承建商於5月下旬年檢時發現FA8964燈柱底部出現明顯鏽蝕，須盡快更換燈柱；承建商於6月1日進行工程，並更換新燈柱及進行灌漿固定。路政署指，沙漿於6月4日已完全乾涸，同日下午已移走臨時護欄。
+
+
+
+
+
+根據網上照片，FA8964燈柱被3個膠馬圍封，上面的工程告示顯示正進行「道路照明工程」，但未有寫上開工日期及預計竣工日期。《獨媒》向路政署查詢施工細節及原因，傍晚獲回覆指，路政署承建商於5月下旬為元朗市中心的路燈進行每年一次的定期檢查，期間發現編號FA8964路燈燈柱底部出現明顯鏽蝕，須盡快更換燈柱，以保障公眾安全。
+
+
+
+承建商向路政署報告燈柱情況，於6月1日進行更換工程。路政解釋指，由於以螺絲穩固燈柱金屬腳掌在底座上後，用以填縫金屬腳掌與底座面之間罅隙的沙漿需時乾涸，因此承建商在6月1日安裝新燈柱後需設置護欄臨時圍封有關範圍，面積約1平方米，以確保加固。沙漿於6月4日已完全乾涸，承建商遂於同日下午移走臨時護欄。
+
+
+
+
+### 警方：蠟燭掛畫涉「煽動意圖」、根據「移走煽動刊物」移除
+`#六四34 #西貢 #陳嘉琳 #西多 #警察`
+
+#### 2023-06-06
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】由前西貢區議員陳嘉琳等開辦的西貢士多「西多」，昨日（6月5日）其懸掛於門外的蠟燭掛畫被警方派員收走，她傍晚則被警員登門要求協助調查。警方回覆《獨媒》查詢時指，橫額內容涉嫌干犯香港法例第200章《刑事罪行條例》下的「煽動意圖」罪，案件由黃大仙警區重案組第一隊跟進。
+
+昨日早上約7時，數名警員於西貢士多「西多」門外，拆除掛在閘外的蠟燭掛畫，並留下一張告示，著其與西貢警署聯絡。
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+昨日晚上，警員到陳嘉琳位於黃大仙的住所，要求她到警署協助調查，她未有被捕。
+
+警方回覆《獨媒》表示，警員於昨日上午於西貢普通道一帶巡邏期間，發現一幅面積約兩米乘一米的橫額向公眾展示，橫額內容涉嫌干犯香港法例第200章《刑事罪行條例》下的「煽動意圖」罪。警方根據《刑事罪行條例》第14條「移走煽動刊物」所賦予的權力，將相關橫額移除。案件現交由黃大仙警區重案組第一隊跟進調查。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-06-08-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk16.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-08-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk16.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dd5b8bbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-08-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk16.md
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第十六周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-06-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/jXV76D4.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 「共謀者原則」法律爭議 法官裁定不適用於《國安法》生效前言行
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第十六周。控辯雙方上周就能否引用「共謀者原則」舉證作法律爭議，最終法官裁定「共謀者原則」只適用於2020年7月1日《國安法》生效後的共謀者言行，而《國安法》前的言行只能以「非傳聞證據」的用途呈堂，換言之控方不能依賴相關言行所述為事實，作為被告參與本案串謀的證據。法官亦強調現時只處理呈堂性的問題，但就證據比重未下決定。
+
+翻查資料，控方開案陳詞從沒提及「共謀者原則」，該原則是於開審初期由法官提出，稱相信控方會依賴。控方其後確認會引用此原則，並在辯方要求下提交相關證據列表，繼而於審訊中途陸續指未有被捕和被起訴的前觀塘區議會主席蔡澤鴻、前民主動力總幹事黎敬輝及前公民黨立法會議員郭榮鏗3人，同為本案「共謀者」。
+
+究竟「共謀者原則」是什麼？控方為何引用此原則舉證？辯方反對的理由又是什麼？法官的裁定又意味什麼？《獨媒》為讀者整理此法律爭議的來龍去脈，讓讀者掌握審訊進度。
+
+此外，控方案情上周完結，林卓廷、黃碧雲、何桂藍及吳政亨4人擬要求法庭裁定本案表證不成立，被告毋須答辯，案件周四（8日）續審。
+
+
+### 控方開案無提「共謀者原則」 辯方及法官要求下始交證據列表及「共謀者」名單
+
+控辯雙方上周就能否引用「共謀者原則」舉證作法律爭議。翻查資料，控方開案陳詞從沒提及「共謀者原則」（co-conspirators rule），該原則是於開審第4天由法官李運騰提出，指留意到開案陳詞中許多言行均出自其他認罪被告如戴耀廷、區諾軒及趙家賢，相信控方是依賴此原則舉證。
+
+辯方批評控方開案陳詞沒有說明，並要求控方交代會依賴旳證據。控方於審訊第10日確認會引用此原則，並於區諾軒完成主問後、審訊第16日呈交「共謀者原則」下針對各被告的25頁證據列表，包括公民黨和抗爭派記者會片段、社民連網站、個別被告FB帖文等，控方確認全用以指證所有被告。
+
+控方其後陸續指控未有被捕和被起訴、名字亦不在起訴書上的人士同為本案「共謀者」。控方先於審訊第32日，援引區諾軒轉述前觀塘區議會主席蔡澤鴻有關九東會議的訊息時，在法官詢問下確認視蔡澤鴻為「共謀者」之一，指他出席了多次協調會議，可推論對謀劃知情。
+
+控方於兩日後，在展示趙家賢和前民主動力總幹事黎敬輝的WhatsApp對話時，確認黎也是「共謀者」。法官認為情況非常不理想，指已開審多時，籲控方提供一份共謀者名單，控方終在審訊第41日披露完整名單，指除蔡澤鴻和黎敬輝外，還指前公民黨立法會議員郭榮鏗為「共謀者」，並向辯方提交修訂證據列表。
+
+控方於審訊第58天確認傳畢控方證人，法官遂押後兩周待雙方就「共謀者原則」等法律爭議呈交陳詞，並於上周一（5月28日）起進行法律爭議。
+
+
+
+
+
+
+### 控方：串謀始於20年1月、被告涉公職行為失當 共謀者原則適用於《國安法》前言行
+
+根據「共謀者原則」，各共謀者的言行即使屬「傳聞證據」，也可用以指證所有被告參與串謀。「傳聞證據」指「聽人講」的證據，即「某人告訴法庭另一人曾對他說過什麼」。一般而言，考慮到相關證據未必可靠也未經盤問，「傳聞證據」在刑事審訊中不可呈堂，即不能依賴所述內容為真實來指證被告，但某些情況，例如引用「共謀者原則」則例外。
+
+本案不少證據均屬傳聞證據，包括戴耀廷的文章、控方證人轉述戴耀廷的說法、黎敬輝向趙家賢發出的協調會議筆記等，當中關乎涉案共識有否達成、參與者立場等，而不少均於《國安法》生效前發生。但當該些言行未變成違法，還可用作指證被告干犯本案控罪嗎？「共謀者原則」是否適用於《國安法》生效前的共謀者言行，便成了控辯雙方爭議的其中一個重點。
+
+控方的立場，是本案串謀協議由區諾軒和戴耀廷於2020年1月的飯局達成，他們當時已有無差別否決預算案迫使政府回應五大訴求的非法「共同目的」，涉同意濫用立法會議員職權，串謀公職人員行為失當；而被告於《國安法》前的言行如招募共謀者、提倡和宣傳串謀等，均一直促進和建立該串謀；由於該串謀的非法共同目的由始至終維持不變，故《國安法》前的言行均可用以指證被告干犯本案控罪，即串謀顛覆國家政權。
+
+
+▲ 2020年6月9日初選記者會
+
+但若不引用此原則，是否代表《國安法》前的證據就不能依賴？事實上，控方同意法官所指即使沒有該原則，相關言行仍可作為「背景」或「環境證供」推論被告的犯罪意圖和思想狀態，及串謀的性質範圍；但控方引用該原則的目的，是為了證明共謀者的言行內容「屬實」，以指證被告參與串謀。換言之，若「共謀者原則」適用，則控方證人轉述戴耀廷稱各區已達成共識等說法，即使戴本人沒有親自作供，也可直接視為事實來指證所有被告。
+
+不過法官庭上屢質疑控方說法。就控方稱串謀協議於2020年1月已達成，法官指當時並沒有達成任何協議，區諾軒亦稱與戴耀廷目的不同，而否決預算案議題直至5月才被關注，控方說法可能有錯。而對控方開審50多天才首稱被告《國安法》前涉「串謀公職人員行為失當」，以作為支持「共謀者原則」適用的理據，法官亦多番質疑控方為何沒有一早說明，質疑對被告造成不公。
+
+法官陳慶偉一度問，按控方立場，若他提出推翻政府時並不違法，控方是否認為50年後可用他這番言論來指證他？並指那一輩子都要很小心了，因說過的話餘生都能指證他。控方回應視乎串謀是否持續。法官李運騰亦直言要慎交朋友，因朋友日後若成為罪犯，即使二人以往交往多清白，他們的言行也可能變成違法。
+
+此外，控方亦承認只找到一宗1950年的美國上訴法院案例支持其立場，但法官和辯方均質疑案例與「共謀者原則」無關，亦無就此作出任何決定。
+
+
+### 辯方：《國安法》生效前「共謀者原則」不適用、控方突提公職行為失當有違公平
+
+辯方反對控方引用「共謀者原則」，當中除鄭達鴻、梁國雄和柯耀林的13名被告同提交一份聯合書面陳詞。辯方的立場，是《國安法》前討論無差別否決預算案不構成任何罪行，控方亦不能以「公職人員行為失當罪」類比作「顛覆國家政權罪」，因此「共謀者原則」不可能適用；加上被告《國安法》生效前未必能預料當時言行或違法，控方以此指證被告有違公平。辯方亦批評，控方於法律爭議階段才突提及公職人員行為失當的指控是「不公平至極」，因辯方若早知如此，抗辯方向或有所不同。
+
+辯方亦表示，引用「共謀者原則」的前提為有證據顯示涉案串謀存在、亦有「獨立及合理的證據」顯示被告為串謀一分子。但辯方強調本案不曾達成無差別否決預算案的協議，即使有協議也只是辦初選為民主派爭取勝算的協議；也沒有足夠證據顯示被告參與該串謀，包括無證據他們收過戴耀廷發出的協議文件，提名表格和按金收據也沒有說明達成了什麼共識。
+
+至於被指為組織者的吳政亨，辯方強調吳雖與戴耀廷有聯繫並發起「三投三不投」約束初選參選人，但吳僅着重團結民主派，無意加入戴耀廷無差別否決預算案的串謀，與戴耀廷即使達成協議，該「串謀」也與本案「串謀」不同。
+
+
+▲ 吳政亨
+
+
+### 控方列被告及共謀者加入串謀最早及後備日期 官多番質疑
+
+此外，各共謀者和被告加入串謀的時間亦屬關鍵，因會影響指證被告的證據——控方同意，被告加入串謀前的證據僅能顯示串謀的性質和範圍，只有加入後的證據才能顯示其參與程度。
+
+事實上，法官早在審訊第11天已指串謀何時開始，及每名被告何時加入串謀是控方需處理的議題，不過控方到了法律爭議第2天、即審訊第60天，在法官要求下才指可於翌日交代。
+
+那控方指串謀何時開始形成？各被告和共謀者又於何時加入？據庭上控方與辯方和法官的討論，控方仍指串謀最早於2020年1月飯局開始形成。
+
+至於其他被告，則被指最早於收到協議文件或出席協調會議時已加入串謀。其中前公民黨鄭達鴻被指最早於3月25日公民黨記者會已加入串謀，控方另列出7個後備日期，包括3月26日港島會議、5月19日港島參選人就協議字眼達共識並由戴耀廷於6月8日發出、及6月11日「公民黨」簽署墨落無悔等，指該些日子的證據均可供法庭推論。
+
+不過法官曾質疑，鄭記者會上只是舉紙牌，而「公民黨」簽署聲明也不代表所有公民黨黨員都是共謀者。代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑亦批評，控方沒有清晰立場，僅列出一堆日子讓法庭決定的做法是不能接受。
+
+
+▲ 2020年3月25日 公民黨記者會
+
+至於被指為共謀者的黎敬輝、郭榮鏗和蔡澤鴻，控方指黎3月出席首次港島會議已加入串謀，指會上談及否決預算案，黎知悉下仍多次出席會議和設計提名表格。惟法官質疑黎只是受薪工作，不代表同意會上說法；就如法官受僱於司法機構才須每天出席審訊，但不代表同意控方說法，強調「單單知情從不足以令人成為串謀一分子」。控方則稱是依賴一連串行為推論。
+
+至於從沒參與任何協調會議、也沒參加初選的郭榮鏗，控方指他於3月25日公民黨記者會上發言，已加入串謀，又指郭7月12日亦出席公民黨的初選街站。至於有份參與九龍東協調的蔡澤鴻，法官指他曾負責組織和主持九東協調會議，提供開會場地和向與會者轉發文件等，不同意辯方指其情況與黎敬輝相若。
+
+
+### 官裁定「共謀者原則」僅適用於《國安法》生效後言行 證據比重尚待決定
+
+經過3天的陳詞後，法官最終於上周五（2日）裁定，「共謀者原則」只適用於2020年7月1日《國安法》生效後的共謀者言行，而《國安法》前的言行只能以「非傳聞證據」的用途呈堂，詳細理由押後頒布。
+
+換言之，《國安法》前的「傳聞證據」如黎敬輝的協調會議筆記、或證人引述戴耀廷稱已將協議文件發給參與者等，控方均不能依賴相關言行內容為事實以證明被告參與本案串謀，最多只能證明相關言行曾發生，即戴耀廷和黎敬輝的確如此說過。至於辯方反對將匿名證人就新西協調會議的片段和錄音呈堂，法官指相關證據與本案有關，無充分理由拒絕呈堂，但同裁定僅可用作「非傳聞證據」的用途。
+
+值得留意的是，法官強調現時只處理證據「呈堂性」（admissability）的問題，但就證據的「比重」（weight）未下任何決定。這意味《國安法》生效後的共謀者言行，例如是7月15日抗爭派記者會，雖可納為「共謀者原則」下的證據呈堂，即可依賴所述內容為事實指證其他被告的參與；但法官考慮被告是否有罪時，認為該證據有多相關或可信、會給予多少比重，則尚待決定。
+
+
+
+
+### 四被告擬爭議表證不成立 官一度質疑控方傳證人浪費時間
+
+法官宣布決定後，控方表示案情完結，林卓廷、黃碧雲、何桂藍及吳政亨擬作出中段陳詞，指控方證據不足，申請被告毋須答辯（no case to answer），案件押至周四（8日）續審。
+
+此外，控方於法官就「共謀者原則」宣判前，曾傳召兩名負責數碼法證的警長作供，其中一人為吳政亨一方要求傳召，另一人則由控方傳召，就戴耀廷一篇Facebook帖文作供。控方原稱只需5分鐘，惟最終花近40分鐘，翌日指沒有其他問題，遭法官陳慶偉質疑浪費時間，又在控方欲解釋時說：「Shut up and sit down please！」
+
+案件周四（8日）續審。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-06-10-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk17.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-10-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk17.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2e999fa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-10-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk17.md
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第十七周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-06-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/N7xRWqZ.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 4被告申毋須答辯 官裁16不認罪被告全表證成立
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第十七周。法官上周裁定「共謀者原則」不適用於《國安法》生效前言行，林卓廷、黃碧雲、何桂藍及吳政亨一方本周作出中段陳詞，爭議控罪的「非法手段」在《國安法》下無清晰定義，而政府於被告被控後才修訂法例，列明無差別反對政府議案不屬擁護《基本法》，辯方指該條文無追溯力，故被告案發時行為不構成「非法手段」，要求法庭裁定表面證供不成立。控方則認為上述條文僅就現行法律作闡釋，認為被告濫用《基本法》權力迫使政府妥協仍屬「非法手段」。
+
+法官聽取雙方陳詞後，裁定16名不認罪被告全部表證成立，須要答辯。其中除了吳政亨、余慧明及楊雪盈3人料暫時不作供，其餘13名被告，括鄭達鴻、梁國雄、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、林卓廷、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、柯耀林、李予信均擬作供，部分人會傳召辯方證人和呈交文件證據，法官料辯方案情或需時共39天。案件下周一（12日）續審。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-06-13-ukraines-summer-counteroffensive.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-13-ukraines-summer-counteroffensive.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b4b0ac8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-06-13-ukraines-summer-counteroffensive.md
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "乌克兰夏季反攻分析"
+author: "战略风格"
+date : 2023-06-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/pJmFv3K.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+乌克兰军队于2023年6月初发动大反攻，主要攻击方向是由札波罗热州（Zaporizhzhia）往南攻击。然而，乌军精锐部队如第1、4、17战车旅以及九个北约旅中的七个，都尚未动用，目前的激战地点可能都是佯攻。
+
+
+
+俄乌战争的战况并非一面倒，战线持续拉锯，自俄罗斯瓦格纳雇佣军（Wagner Group）宣称，于2023年5月20日攻陷俄乌两军争夺已久的巴赫姆特（Bakhmut）后，俄罗斯占领的乌克兰领土约10万平方公里；实际上，俄罗斯在去年5月之际，曾一度控制16万平方公里的乌克兰领土。经过长达15个月的交战，俄军所占领的乌国领土持续丢失。
+
+俄军消失的六万平方公里控制区，其中乌克兰北部基辅（Kyiv）附近、苏梅（Sumy）、切尔尼哥夫（Chernihiv）等区域的土地是俄军主动放弃，但是哈尔科夫州（Kharkiv Oblast）与赫尔松州（Kherson Oblast）大批领土的收复，则是由于乌军在2022年9至11月进行大反攻的战果。
+
+
+### 乌军2023年夏季攻势截至6月上旬概况
+
+> #### `突出部`
+
+_`突出部指战场上突入敌方领土后，多面被敌方包围，攻势进入敌军后方区域。一旦突出部深入，将形成一个孤立地带，补给线恐将因此遭截断。`_
+
+6月4日开始，乌军在乌克兰南部战线，发动较大规模的南下攻势，分别是右路由奥里希夫（Orikhiv）往南，目标可能是交通枢纽托克玛克（Tokmak），中央由大诺沃西尔卡（Velyka Novosilka）往南，意图切断附近的俄军突出部，左路由胡立达尔（Vuhledar）往南，目标可能是打通前往马里乌波尔（Mariupol）的H20公路。
+
+乌军至少投入了第23、31、37、47、65、68这六个旅，其中37与47两个旅是由北约协助组训，并且配备豹2式战车与M2A2步兵战车等西方装备，俗称“北约旅”的精兵。北约旅共有九个，乌军已经投入两个，被认为是反攻正式开始的讯号。
+
+目前两军还在激战中，虽然乌军的装甲部队损失不小，包含豹2A4/A6战车、M2A2步兵战车都有不少被确认击毁，但是乌军在这几路攻势的中央部分颇有斩获，夺占了俄军突出部的几个村镇。
+
+但以乌军的精锐部队如第1、4、17战车旅以及九个北约旅中的七个，都尚未动用的情况下，乌军的主攻势未必已展开，甚至目前的激战地点可能都是佯攻，为了再创2022年反攻声东击西的战法。
+
+
+▲ 2023年4月26日，乌克兰顿涅茨克地区与俄罗斯军队发生最激烈战斗的巴赫穆特，一座建筑物冒出浓烟。
+
+
+### 2022年乌军秋季大反攻成功原因
+
+2022年乌克兰反攻前夕，乌军高调宣传，并且集中大军攻击地聂伯河（Dnieper river）右岸，赫尔松州的俄国占领区，包含俄国唯一在开战后占领的州首府赫尔松市，逼着俄军调派相当多的精锐部队与装备，包含空降军与海军步兵、大量砲兵守备，双方爆发激战。
+
+乌军在俄军的强大火力前攻坚，损失惨重且进展缓慢，但实际上在赫尔松战场的乌军，是以诱敌为主的苦肉计部队，实际的战法是声东击西，在1000公里外的北方哈尔科夫州，乌军集结了超过两万名军人，以机动车辆为主的突击火力，向俄军防线进攻。
+
+由于俄军没有料到乌军会在该地大举进攻，守备兵力薄弱，只有不到2000人，在10倍兵力的乌军压力下，只能迅速撤退，让乌军收复了哈尔科夫州9000平方公里的领土，并攻入原本俄军已经完全占领的卢甘斯克州。
+
+由于2022年此次大反攻战果丰硕，显示俄军防御并非铁板一块，加上北约诸国援助了乌军大量的武器装备，因此自2022年冬季起，乌军就宣示即将展开足以扭转战局的决定性大反攻。
+
+
+### 2023年乌军大反攻路线选择的战略意义
+
+目前俄乌战场的前线，北起俄乌边境的奥斯基尔河（Oskil river），南到第聂伯河（Dnieper river）出海口，横跨俄军占领的卢甘斯克州、顿涅茨克州、扎波罗热州、赫尔松州等地，总长度超过1000公里。
+
+这几这个州的俄军占领区，从顿涅茨克州南部开始，在亚速海北岸形成一条狭长的走廊地带（以下简称亚速海走廊），从前线到俄国边界或亚速海的纵深大约仅60公里，最后连接到俄占克里米亚半岛。
+
+这么绵长的两军接触线，乌克兰反攻俄军的路线非常多，至少有五条路线可以选择，由北到南简述如下：
+
+路线一：从最北面的奥斯基河沿线发动，穿越克尔米那（Kreminna）后，即可席卷卢甘斯克州的大平原地形，进而收复北顿涅斯克与利西昌斯克双子城。
+
+路线二：从占线中央的赛佛尔斯克与马林卡一线找俄军弱点突破，直接进攻俄国占领的乌东最大城顿内次克市。
+
+路线三：从胡立达尔（Vuhledar）一线往南攻，目标在收复亚速海沿岸的大城马里乌波尔（Mariupol），切断亚速海走廊。
+
+路线四：从札波罗热市（Zaporizhzhia）往南，可以向西迂回收复乌克兰最大，占发电能力25％的札波罗热核能发电厂，或是攻击梅利托波尔到别尔江斯克一线，攻下两城其中之一，就能切断亚速海走廊。
+
+路线五：从赫尔松市出发，强渡地聂伯河，收复克里米亚半岛北部的赫尔松州，切断克里米亚半岛与亚速海路廊的联系，并伺机进攻克里米亚（除了陆上攻击，还可能采用两栖攻击）。
+
+但由于位于乌克兰南部新卡霍夫卡（Nova Kakhovka）第聂伯河（Dnieper River）上的水库大坝，当地时间6月5日晚间被目击在大爆炸后，坝顶崩溃，产生一个大缺口，大坝流出的洪流对赫尔松市和第聂伯河沿岸其他人口稠密地区造成重大破坏，所造成的泛滥区，也让乌军至少在一个月内，无法从此处发动反攻。
+
+根据2022年秋季大反攻的经验，有这么多条反攻路线，对于乌军是一项利多，因为乌军在任何一点达到作战目标，对于俄军都是重大威胁，俄军必须要在每一条可能的进攻路线后方，都调派大军防守，并且构筑工事，让俄军兵力备多力分。
+
+乌军目前选择前述第四条，即从札波罗热市往南的路线。首先，因为乌军反攻的大部队，集结在札波罗热市到巴甫洛格勒市（Pavlohrad）一带的范围内，所以后勤补给能够较快送达前线。
+
+这条进攻路线同时威胁亚速海走廊或是札波罗热核能发电厂，让俄军需要猜乌军真正的目标，如果俄军猜错就需要调动兵力，除了让部队必须离开坚固工事外，兵力调动往往拖着长长的后勤补给部队，也就是俗称的后勤尾巴。
+
+乌军能够以美国与英国援助的海马斯火箭弹（HIMARS）或风暴阴影飞弹（Storm Shadow），攻击在路上运动的俄军或后勤部队，当然比乌军部队直接撞向单一目标，突破俄军防御的打法，断后勤会更有胜算。
+
+但乌军并非一定要从南线反攻，也有可能把俄军主力吸引过来后，再从其他几路发动真正的反攻，从俄军防线薄弱处突破战线，完成战略目标。
+
+
+▲ 2023年6月4日，从乌克兰哈尔科夫看到的俄罗斯别尔哥罗德地区向乌克兰发射的火箭炮。
+
+
+### 拖延乌克兰反攻的因素
+
+乌克兰的气候与地形、乌军装备与训练转换不如预期、俄军持续加固战场与打击乌军弹药库，及瓦格纳雇佣军动向一再拖延乌军反攻节奏。
+
+乌克兰的大反攻，从2022年冬季就已宣告，却一直到了2023年进入夏季的6月，才发动初步攻势，原因值得探讨，因有部分原因可能影响到最终的胜败，并非乌军发动攻势后，这些因素就自动消失，其中有四点最重要因素：
+
+#### 乌克兰的气候与地形限制反攻季节
+
+在乌克兰战场要进行大规模机械化作战，必须要避开“泥将军”（The rasputitsa, also known as “General Mud”），指的是乌克兰黑土地结合降雨，所产生的特殊地形。
+
+“泥将军”分别于春季与秋季出场，春季泥将军的由来，在于冬天动辄摄氏负10度以下的极严寒气候，路面下方的地表层都被冻成冰，路面亦被层层的积雪覆盖。随后到了3月左右的春季，气温逐渐升高，积雪与冻在地表层内的冰溶化，与泥土形成深而黏的泥浆，除了覆盖田野更蔓延至道路上，使得道路泥泞不堪，严重妨碍轮式车辆运动，甚至连履带车辆都会整辆“沉入”泥浆中，情况不会比轮式车辆好上多少。
+
+春季泥浆待水份退去后，灾难还没结束，脱水的泥浆形成厚重的尘土，车辆驶过就尘土飞扬，常常严重堵塞车辆引擎进气过滤装置，如未加以清理将导致马力锐减、甚至直接造成引擎故障。
+
+
+▲ 2023年4月28日，乌克兰顿涅茨克地区，一名44岁的乌克兰军人Oleksandr在前线清理战壕底部的泥浆，这是俄罗斯对乌克兰的袭击。
+
+春季泥浆已够耽搁军事行动，乌克兰还于每年10月到11月底之间，会有密集的秋雨，大雨滂沱之下，许多地区也直接变成泥海。通常秋季泥将军没有春季泥将军威力强，但仍足以妨碍军事行动。
+
+如果要在春季与秋季进行大规模的机械化攻势，并非不能执行，但部队重型车辆只能沿着有限的大型道路前进，很容易被侦查与攻击。但夏季（6－8月）与冬季（11月－2月），地面干硬或是被冻结，大型机械化部队就能运用道路之外的地面，进行机动和展开。
+
+换句话说，如果乌军的反攻行动没有办法在10月前取得明显战略优势，到秋雨一来，地面进入泥泞期，任何攻势可能都必须要停顿，让俄军有机会重整战线。
+
+#### 乌军武器装备与训练转换不如预期
+
+4月中旬，在波兰接装豹2A4战车的乌克兰士兵，在训练过程发生两辆豹式战车追撞事件；这也凸显，乌军接收北约装备，不是点收就完毕，还需要大量的重新训练。
+
+这起事件为一辆豹2战车进行倒车训练，不慎骑上另一辆豹2式，并将该车的砲塔整个撬出车体，砲管上的排烟器也有明显撞击痕迹，虽然没有造成人员伤亡，但是战车受损严重，势必返厂大修。
+
+实际上，这批送去接装豹2A4的战车兵，已经是乌军的菁英，但是苏系战车与欧美系战车的设计理念与细节差异不小，转换训练并没有预想中容易，实在急不来，训练时间不断延长——这也是导致乌军不断推迟春季大反攻的重要原因之一：再强的武器也要等操作的战士熟悉与上手，才能发会战力。乌军也因反攻在即，大量缩短训练时数，在紧迫的有限时间下，反而状况连连。
+
+
+▲ 2023年5月14日，乌克兰军方于试验场对豹2坦克进行训练。
+
+除了训练问题，北约的装备供应也并未准时到位，日前美国爆发的泄密事件，才使部分情况让外界知晓。
+
+3月1日，电玩游戏Minecraft的玩家Discord留言板，突然出现一百多张标有“最高机密”的文件与图片，包含俄乌战场情况，美军援乌计划，乌军训练情况，还有关于美国对中国、印太战区、中东和反恐计划等敏感内容。
+
+机密文件上除了机密字样，还有标注Secret/NoForn字样，代表这是美国不与外国分享的情资。原本以为此为假造的或玩笑，直到美国FBI SWAT特警于麻省逮捕一名21岁的国民兵杰克特谢拉（Jack Teixeira），才让事件升高到泄密。这名国民兵服役于奥迪斯空中国民警卫军基地（Otis Air National Guard Base），是第102情报大队的网管人员，所以能收发最高机密文件。
+
+从这批外泄的文件内容观察，其实与在媒体上所见有一定落差，以俄乌战争情况为例，有几个影响乌军反攻的情形被纰漏。
+
+首先，组训乌国北约旅装备训练严重未到位。乌军至少准备了15个旅的部队，认真准备进行春季大反攻，但欧美援助的许多武器与更重要的弹药，以及人员训练，都没有准时到位，拖延情况越来越严重。例如新组建的46空降旅、82空突旅、与21、32、33、37、47、117、118机械化旅，需要至少253辆战车、380辆步兵战车或装甲运兵车、571辆HMMWV装甲车、480辆卡车、147门大口径野战砲等重武器或装备，但装备交付率截至文件日期3月1日，平均仅50％。
+
+人员训练方面问题更为严重，因为乌军过去多使用俄式装备与操典，所以操作北约武器与战术，需要从头训练，但平均完训程度为20％，最高的是46空降旅的60％，还有5个旅是0％，也就是根本还没有开始训练。
+
+其次，俄军在战场有兵力与火力优势。俄军在战线后方已集结大量兵力，在关键战场如顿内次克，俄军对比乌军已经达到2：1，每条防线俄军都有越来越多的时间加固与囤积大量武器弹药。因此，假若4月乌克兰战场的泥泞期过后，乌军要发动春季攻势，以目前部队的装备交付与训练情况，基本上是不可能的状态，甚至连5月都难以发动。
+
+同时，值得注意的是，文件揭露乌军消耗北约库存弹药已尽、且来不及补充，而乌军弹药补给的情况同样也十分很严峻。例如文件显示，2月28日乌军全军只补充700发155mm榴弹的炮弹和17发海马斯系统的火箭弹，但仅从2月22日到2月27日，乌军平均每天消耗3400发155mm砲弹和13发海马斯火箭弹。
+
+整个战争期间乌军已发射107万发155mm砲弹与接近1万发海马斯火箭弹。北约中，军工生产能力最强的美军，每年生产的155mm砲弹为16.8万发；换言之，也就是乌军已经打光了美军六年多的产量。
+
+美军在2023年将155mm砲弹的产量提高到每月两万发、即每年24万发，但对于乌克兰战场的消耗，明显仍然不够，但更大量生产陆军弹药会排挤美国针对海空军的资源；海空军兵力却是对抗解放军，援助台海战场的重点。
+
+155mm砲弹还只是援乌的一种陆军弹药，其他如海马斯火箭弹、反战车飞弹、刺针防空飞弹的消耗量，都已经抽光了美国大部分的库存，可能严重到影响美军自身的战备情况。虽然美国紧急找韩国进口50万枚砲弹支援，但这恐怕也会影响韩国对朝鲜的战备，以及可能支援台海的海空军武器产能。
+
+
+
+#### 俄军持续加固战场与打击乌军弹药库
+
+俄军在2022年9月发布动员令，征召30万人后，就停止了较大规模的攻势，除了由瓦格纳雇佣兵担任主攻的巴赫姆特（Bakhmut）战役，以及配合卢顿州民兵攻击顿内次克市（Donetsk）周边的乌军城镇外，大部分地区都转为守势，并且构筑了大量的工事。
+
+俄军对乌军前述可能的反攻方向正面，都构筑了至少由三条防线组成的加固阵地，第一条是反战车壕沟，第二条是龙齿构筑的反战车阵地，第三条是人员固守的壕沟阵地，后方还有砲兵阵地，每一条防线距离约300公尺，并埋设人员杀伤与反战车地雷。
+
+甚至连克里米亚半岛的海岸，都已经构筑了类似的多条防线阵地，以避免乌军用两栖突击的方式，绕过俄军大部队防线，直接登陆克里米亚半岛。
+
+俄军也不断运送弹药与人员到前线，并且分散在小型弹药库，随着乌军反攻时间的延迟，俄军不但有充裕的时间加固阵地、补充弹药、甚至动员的30万人也有充裕的训练时间，再好整以暇的进入阵地。
+
+为了要突破俄军的坚固阵地，乌军必须集中更多的兵力，配置更强的火力，不可避免的需要囤储更多的弹药与补给，这也给了俄军打击乌军补给线的机会，不断以滑翔炸弹、长程火箭或地对地飞弹打击乌军弹药库，持续拖慢乌军对大反攻的物资准备。
+
+
+▲ 2023年6月7日，俄罗斯圣彼得堡郊外的路边展示着宣传瓦格纳私人雇佣兵团服务的广告牌。
+
+#### 瓦格纳雇佣军的动向影响乌军
+
+瓦格纳集团（Wagner Group）雇佣兵的动向，也是乌军大反攻能否成功的关键因素，台湾媒体报导中的瓦格纳，经常以“佣兵”、“囚犯兵”、“人海战术”等形象出现，感觉就是一群乌合之众。
+
+但在苏勒达尔（Soledar）战役中，三个乌军正规旅一万人联合防御，仍被瓦格纳佣兵击败，苏勒达尔不幸沦陷。在巴赫姆特（Bakhmut）战役，乌军至少三万人的部队，10多个旅级单位拚命防守，对阵瓦格纳集团仍然陷入苦战，令人质疑：“为什么乌克兰正规军打不过俄国佣兵？”
+
+事实上，瓦格纳集团投入乌东战场的兵力众多，核心部队是约一万名俄军的退役军人，再加上新募集的四万名俄国囚犯或外国佣兵组成，总兵力达到五万人，纯以兵力论已经达到“军级单位”（Corps）的规模。
+
+瓦格纳集团的武力组成除了轻步兵外，在其编制内有直属装甲部队，配备俄国除T-14外最强的T-90M战车（混编T-72B3，战车总数可能超过100辆）与BMP-3步兵战车，直属砲兵部队（操作81mm迫砲～152mm重榴弹砲）、直属工兵部队、以及拥有自己的后勤车队。
+
+整体来看，瓦格纳集团已经是整个乌克兰东部战场，俄军火力最强的机械化合成野战军，能自己执行进攻任务。再者，瓦格纳的进攻战术也非常灵活，最常用的战法是以小队步兵火力侦查敌军防线，敌军火力单薄，就在装甲部队支援下消灭掉，如前述瓦格纳自己就有装甲部队，火力支援即时、不会贻误时机。如果敌军实力难以攻破，瓦格纳不会硬拚，立刻退回攻击发起线，呼叫后方砲兵消灭目标，除了瓦格纳自己的砲兵，还有其他俄军部队的火炮与多管火箭接力炸射。
+
+乌军也承认，在乌东战场的俄乌砲兵火力严重失衡，光是火炮数量的差异就达到10：1，这也是瓦格纳部队的最大本钱。
+
+因此，不是乌军正规军打不过瓦格纳佣兵，实际上乌军对付的是换上瓦格纳皮的俄军机械化重兵集团。因此这只军团在打完巴赫姆特战役，宣布要整编休息一个月之久，显示损失也很严重，究竟能否及时投入对抗乌军大反攻，也成战场悬念之一。
+
+
+▲ 2023年5月31日，在乌克兰顿涅茨克地区的Avdiivka镇附近，俄罗斯进攻乌克兰期间，第55独立砲兵旅的乌克兰军人向俄罗斯军队发射了一门凯撒自行榴弹砲。
+
+
+### 重演历史？库斯克会战拖到输的殷鉴不远
+
+如前述几个因素如果不是欺敌作战，而真的是如外泄机敏情资所示，导致的结果，就是乌军的春季大反攻得一路拖到6月，成为夏季攻势。
+
+从战史来看，1943年7月5日，德军集结了四个军团，包含大批的装甲兵力，攻向原本预计在春季进攻，但是因为各种因素拖延（主要是等新战车完成），最后7月初才发动的攻势，预计切断苏联红军为在库斯克（Krusk）的巨大突出部战线。
+
+但是苏军已经根据各种迹象（德军重兵与补给集结）以及敌后情报，早在该年2月就知道德军想要进攻库斯克突出部，因此利用德军拖延的几个月，前苏联动员大批人力与兵力，在该地构筑了三道防御线，防御纵深超过100英里，完整防御体系由大量互相紧密配合的战壕、铁丝网、反战车火力点和反战车沟壕以及雷区组成，并在德军最可能的进攻方向上，聚集了大量的防御兵力。
+
+也就是德军因为拖延，攻击目标从可以被轻松南北夹击攻破的突出部，变成给了苏军几个月拚命加固的要塞化防线，191万苏军以逸待劳等待80万德军进攻，苏军的武器数量也占优势，战车5100辆超过德军的2900辆，火炮更以2.5万门超过德军的1万门，基本上武器性能亦不相上下。
+
+结果德军的装甲部队啃不穿苏军坚固阵地，反而因雷区、反战车炮伏击、战车对战等连续战斗后不断战损，苏军则待德军装甲部队消耗差不多后，对德军发动逆袭，最终反而攻占了德军出发点的阵地。
+
+这就是二次大战的关键战役“库斯克之役（Battle of Kursk）”，就发生在今日乌东战场附近。库斯克之役后，苏军掌握了战场主动权，从此就是苏军不断进攻，德军不断防御，直到苏军攻入德国首都柏林为止。
+
+换句话说，由于乌克兰高调宣传将反攻超过半年，也让俄军在可能被进攻的几条战线上，足足加固防线超过半年，会不会重演库斯克之役的情况，让不少观察家担忧，但是相信美欧与乌军高层也清楚这个情况，可能会改变战法或有其他应变方式，且在泄密事件后，相信保密程度会再提高，更难取得公开资讯，吾人只能持续观察战场局势。
+
+（战略风格，战略所硕士，战略视角观点解析时事）
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-03-28-NATO-a1_c-cognitive-warfare.md b/_collections/_heros/2023-03-28-NATO-a1_c-cognitive-warfare.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c3a0dd32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2023-03-28-NATO-a1_c-cognitive-warfare.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2160 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "Cognitive Warfare"
+author: "NATO"
+date: 2023-03-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/7Crk156.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare"
+position: center
+---
+
+The NATO Science and Technological Organization (STO) Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Exploratory Team (ET) 356 performed an assessment of the Science and Technologies required to mitigate and defend against Cognitive Warfare (CogWar). The ET-356 proposed a Science and Technology (S&T) roadmap to guide NATO and Allied Partners in future research activities and investments.
+
+
+
+For NATO to have the capability to acquire and preserve Decision and Cognitive Superiority over their adversaries and across the conflict spectrum, scientific based knowledge is needed to support and increase NATO’s operational readiness to respond to CogWar. CogWar is not necessarily new but has emerged as a product of the integration and confluence of many technological advances and as availability and access to information and technology has increased. CogWar takes well-known methods within warfare to a new level by attempting to alter and shape the way humans think, react, and make decisions. CogWar has emerged replete with security challenges due to its invasive, intrusive, and invisible nature and _where the goal is to exploit facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence, or modify human decisions_ (proposed by ET-356).
+
+CogWar represents the convergence of a wide range of advanced technologies along with human factors and systems, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML), Information Communication Technologies (ICT), neuroscience, biotechnology and human enhancement that are being deliberately used by NATO’s adversaries in the 21ˢᵗ century battlespace. CogWar presents a significant risk to global defence and security at every level including economic, geopolitical, social, cultural, as well as threatening human decision making.
+
+The task of ET-356 was focused solely on identifying and suggesting defensive S&T to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence against CogWar and improve NATO’s and national resilience critical to NATO’s core tasks to safeguard Allied nations, societies, and shared values.
+
+CogWar gives rise to the adversaries’ ability to shape human cognition, perception, sensemaking, situational awareness, and decision making at all levels. The ability to intentionally (mis)use information within digital networks and disseminate it globally on various platforms such as social media has given rise to new tools and methods for the adversary. CogWar also aims at disrupting relationships and targets human vulnerabilities, such as trust and cognitive bias, at both individual and national levels, and its impact is across all operational domains. This report presents a summary of the key areas of S&T that are required to mitigate and defend against CogWar.
+
+The proposed S&T Road map is based on a “House Model,” developed by ET-356, and is linked to the operational Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) decision cycle. The House Model represents seven main _S&T knowledge areas and enablers_ that are cross-cutting and intersectional related: Pillars: Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive and Behavioral Science, Social and Cultural Science; and Bars: Situational Awareness and Sensemaking, Cognitive Effects, Modus Operandi and Technology and Force Multipliers. The seven areas provide the basis for research discussions within NATO STO and its Panels and Groups.
+
+This report provides guidance for future research within NATO STO, Allies, and national S&T investments for defence against current and future CogWar and to strengthen NATO’s technological edge and strategic advantage against CogWar. The work by the HFM ET-356 underpins the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept and its Warfare Development Initiative Cognitive Superiority, and the new NATO Strategic Concept declared at the NATO Madrid Summit 2022.
+
+
+### Chapter 1 ‒ TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETENCIES FOR FUTURE NATO OPERATIONS
+
+> #### Janet M. Blatny
+> #### Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
+> #### NORWAY
+
+> #### Yvonne R. Masakowski
+> #### US Naval War College
+> #### UNITED STATES
+
+_Strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks define our broader security environment. The threats we face are global and interconnected... We will invest in our ability to prepare for, deter, and defend against the coercive use of political, economic, energy, information and other hybrid tactics by states and non-state actors._
+
+#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION – A NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
+
+The complexity of the 21ˢᵗ century operational environment has increased significantly since the turn of the 20th century. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has expanded its membership and increased the level of multinational military coalition operations, as well as the range of missions, including humanitarian, disaster relief, counterterrorism, regional conflicts, and traditional warfare. The complexity, diversity and tempo of these multinational military operations has increased, driven by factors such as the influence of technological advances, increase in regional conflicts and asymmetric warfare, as well as the emergence of conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war where Russia invaded Ukraine 24 Feb 2022 (Zinets and Vasovic, 2022).
+
+During the NATO Summit in Brussels 2021, the following was stated (NATO 2021, Brussels Summit):
+
+- _We remain concerned with China’s frequent lack of transparency and use of disinformation._
+
+- _We are increasingly confronted by cyber, hybrid, and other asymmetric threats, including disinformation campaigns, and by the malicious use of ever-more sophisticated emerging and disruptive technologies._
+
+The NATO 2030 Reflection Group stated (NATO 2030 Reflection Group, 2020):
+
+> NATO and Allies must develop more capabilities for operating in the cognitive and virtual dimensions, including at the tactical level. These capabilities are needed to detect disinformation and provide support in preventing or limiting its impact, including by better understanding people, networks, online information, and related narratives. Simultaneously, NATO and Allies need to establish the legal and ethical framework to be able to operate in these dimensions effectively and legitimately.
+
+These statements clearly highlight the need to have defence and security measures against hybrid tactics including CogWar approaches that our adversaries might and can use against NATO.
+
+The 2010 Strategic Concept in NATO specified NATO’s core missions: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security (NATO, 2010). These three-core mission concepts were discussed in the NATO Strategic Concept 2022, declared at the NATO Madrid Summit 2022 (NATO, 2022). The Madrid Summit 2022 highlighted the concern of the radically changed security environment and stated, _“Today we endorse a new Strategic Concept to ensure our Alliance remains fit and resourced for the future”_. Furthermore, the concern stated in 2021 at the Brussel Summit was again stressed during the Madrid Summit 2022: _“We are confronted by cyber, space, and hybrid and other asymmetric threats, and by the malicious use of emerging and disruptive technologies”_. The new 2022 Concept emphasizes NATO’s responsibility of ensuring the collective defence using a 360-degree approach to strengthen deterrence and defence across all domains and threats and enhances the need for military and civilian collaboration especially within cyber defence.
+
+NATO faces an environment that is dynamic, global, complex, and uncertain. The boundaries between peace and conflict, political and military, strategic and tactical, kinetic, and non-kinetic are blurring. Potential strategic competitors continuously seek to undermine NATO’s political and military-strategic objectives by deploying increasingly sophisticated strategies, often through coordinated political, military, economic, and information efforts. This has required new ways of thinking and approaches resulting in the important strategic NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) document (2021) that addresses temporal, spatial, functional, and structural aspects of the Alliance’s approach to long term warfare development and warfighting (Tammen, 2021).
+
+This concept describes NATO’s focus on the new Alliance thinking and approach towards a simultaneous, non-linear paradigm to balance the efforts across the operational contexts of shaping, contesting, and fighting. This is critical, especially as the traditional peace, crisis, and conflict paradigm increasingly constrains NATO’s ability to out-think and out-perform an adversary. _This report highlights the Science and Technology Roadmap to defend against the influence and impact of Cognitive Warfare._
+
+The NWCC focuses on five Warfare Development Imperatives (WDI) to accomplish NATO’s core missions: cognitive superiority, layered resilience, influence and power projection, collaboration and coalition of cross-domain command, and integrated multi-domain defence (see call-out box, below). CogWar is centered in Cognitive Superiority (NWCC, WDI) and has ramifications _for layered resilience, influence and power projection and cross-domain command_.
+
+> #### `NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) Warfare Development Initiatives (WDI)`
+
+__`Cognitive superiority:`__ _`Truly understanding the operating environment, the adversary and the Alliance’s goals entails cohesive and shared political-military understanding of the threats, adversaries and environment NATO operates in, from tech and doctrine, to JISR and big data. Equally, it will focus on providing the right tools for the political-military level to operate effectively (rapidly and dynamically) and safeguard decision making in the modern information age.`_
+
+__`Layered resilience:`__ _`Underpinning deterrence, the Alliance needs to be able to withstand immediate shocks to supply lines and communications, as well as effects in the cognitive dimension. It must be prepared to persevere in challenging situations over long periods and be ready from day zero.`_
+
+__`Influence and power projection:`__ _`To shape the environment to its strengths, including generating options and imposing dilemmas on adversaries, the Alliance must be proactive in taking initiative through various means to reach its objectives.`_
+
+__`Integrated multi-domain defence:`__ _`The threats that the Alliance faces are no longer in any one domain, so a joint and flexible approach to a fluid environment is essential to protect the Alliance’s integrity against all threats, regardless of their origin or nature.`_
+
+__`Cross-domain command:`__ _`Command insight at the blink of an eye, the hallmark of great generals, may be out of reach in a multi-domain and integrated battlespace. Investing in our people, the art of command, critical thinking and audacious action will underpin success. `_
+
+The impact of Emerging Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) relates to the five WDIs, as technology is one of the main drivers for WDI. Technology and Cognitive Superiority are critical elements to counter CogWar. Technological advances, as well as advances in cognitive neurosciences will influence our ability to achieve situational awareness and maintain the decision advantage in military operations (NATO STO, 2021). The strategic defence against CogWar requires that NATO maintain technological and cognitive superiority to strengthen NATO’s resilience and military operational readiness.
+
+In addition to the five operational domains (land, air, sea, cyber and space), discussions within various communities are ongoing to consider a new domain: “the cognitive (or the human) domain” (Cole and Le Guyader, 2020). The cognitive dimension represents a space where intra and inter domain cognitive operations can be conducted. This discussion is addressed in Chapters 11 and 12.
+
+The NATO HQ ACT Concept Development Branch is currently developing a NATO concept on CogWar (2022). The work is part of the implementation of the NWCC, and the CogWar Concept is a delivery under the WDI Cognitive Superiority Initiative. The concept work started in 2021 and the proposed end state of the concept work is for NATO to regain the initiative by establishing a better, shared understanding of the cognitive dimension, the creation and countering of cognitive effects, and the protection of NATO’s decision-making processes. Also, the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) is conducting a study on Standards for Cognitive Augmentation for Military Applications (NIAG, 2022).There are several definitions of CogWar put forth, however, there is not yet a commonly accepted definition of CogWar. For example, CogWar is a multidisciplinary approach combining social sciences and innovative technologies to directly alter the mechanisms of understanding and decision-making to destabilize or paralyze an adversary (Pappalardo, 2022). Du Cluzel (2022) describes CogWar as the manipulation of the enemy’s cognition aimed at weakening, influencing, delaying, and even destroying the enemy (Claverie et al., 2022). This type of warfare aims at influencing the heuristic of the human brain to win the “war before the war” (Takagi, 2022). Attacks of this type now no longer target policymakers or military decision-makers alone, but a broad mass that can potentially influence national decision-making (Takagi, 2022). In general, CogWar addresses the human’s ability to process information and use it conflicting purposes, such as influencing military and civilian populations, organizations, and nations.
+
+_`The HFM Exploratory Team 356 has therefore proposed the goal of CogWar as to exploit facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence, or modify human decision making. This covers decisions also made by technological advances, as humans will always be a part of all operations.`_
+
+The first NATO symposium on CogWar was held in Bordeaux, June 2021, arranged by the NATO ACT innovation Hub and the Ecole Nationale Superieure de Cognitique (ENCS), France (Claverie et al., 2022).
+
+#### 1.2 THE CHALLENGES AND IMPACT OF COGNITIVE WARFARE
+
+CogWar has been described as a multidisciplinary approach that provides a means for altering human thought, understanding, and decision making (Pappalardo, 2022). Adversaries infiltrate global digital networks at all levels to achieve their strategic objectives. CogWar attacks aim to create chaos, confusion, disrupt societies and government, and shape the geopolitical and social environments in accordance with an adversary’s strategic objectives. CogWar has been viewed as an extension of Information Warfare and Psychological Operations (PsyOps). However, CogWar differs as it is the convergence of PsyOps, Information Operations (Ops) and Cyber Operations, integrated with Artificial Intelligence (AI) / Machine Learning (ML) networks and capabilities that extend its reach globally to military and civilian populations. CogWar attacks impact the broad mass population to influence and impact civilian and military decision making. Advances in AI/ML technologies have made this technology a force enabler for the dissemination of misinformation and disinformation. Adversaries exploit these advances to set the conditions in the physical and digital battlespace in accordance with their military and national agendas.
+
+Traditional warfare is being and will continue to be transformed by advances in AI/ML and BMI technologies. Advanced AI/ML technologies have given rise to the design of cognitive-inspired systems, which have facilitated the dissemination of misinformation and disinformation campaigns aimed at shaping human thinking, behavior, and actions. EDTs such as AI, ML, big data, cloud computing, IoT, GANs, multi-reality tools, modern ICTs, biotechnology, neuro-technologies, and other human augmenting technologies have contributed to the “power of CogWar” (NATO S&T Technology Trend Report, 2020). Increased access to information has augmented the velocity and accuracy of attacks and threats to civilian and military populations.
+
+CogWar presents a danger to national and global stability and security at every level, including economic, geopolitical, social, and cultural. The technologies that facilitate the rapid dissemination of information to a global audience do it at a lower cost and present less risk to the aggressor. The recent COVID-19 pandemic provides evidence of the impact of disinformation campaigns on social media platforms. Lessons learned because of the spread of COVID-19 disinformation were recently published by Gill and Goolsby (2022).
+
+> _The use, misuse, and even the weaponization of information and advanced cognitive-inspired systems, serve as a critical threat to human thinking and decision making, not only between humans but between humans and machines, as well as autonomous machine decision making._
+
+CogWar targets human vulnerabilities as a means of creating chaos and confusion in the mass consciousness, across nations, and the within militaries. Adversaries will target vulnerabilities in the OODA decision-making framework (Chapter 9) as a means exploit cognitive vulnerabilities, or to deliver cognitive effects. Thus, NATO nations must invest in S&T tools, techniques, and technologies that will defend against CogWar.
+
+To address these threats, there is a need to understand the future impact of convergence between human and machine as technology develops and advances. “It becomes increasingly clear that the teaming of human and computers will become essential for any form of CogWar, whether offensive or defensive” (Chapter 9). Future human-machine teams will work collaboratively to transform the future battlespace, influencing military and civilian communities, and impacting society, including economic and political domains.
+
+CogWar capability to impact decision making (positively or negatively) across all domains within the OODA decision framework highlights the need to develop tools for information validation and measures to ensure that data is dependable, accurate and from a trusted source. As technologies and tools evolve, there is a need to prepare to counter the effects of such tools when used by the adversary and ensure that the NATO Alliance can defend against potential attacks.
+
+> _CogWar transforms the battlespace and presents challenges and threats/danger. There is therefore a strategic and operational imperative to develop Science and Technology (S&T) initiatives to mitigate and defend against CogWar if we are to ensure the defence and security of NATO and Allied Partners’ nations._
+
+Misinformation and disinformation campaigns, as well as “poisoned” training datasets embedded in algorithms may be introduced into trusted networks or social media, and/or databases to influence human thought and behavior towards supporting an adversary’s strategic agendas. Thus, human cognitive processes can unwittingly be manipulated to shape human decisions and behaviors that align with those of an adversary. _“Trust” is the adversaries’ target and an essential component of CogWar in which the human is the vulnerable target._
+
+#### 1.3 TO DEFEND AND MITIGATE
+
+The operational environment consists of physical, virtual/cyber, and human/cognitive dimensions ‒ in other words – a socio-technological environment. Therefore, increasing defensive CogWar capabilities within NATO requires multidisciplinary responses across these dimensions and where they interface.
+
+NATO nations must address CogWar from a defensive position by building resilience and defence into AI/ML data networks that will defend against intrusions, attacks, and manipulation by adversaries.
+
+Investments in multidisciplinary research such as cognitive and neuroscience, cognitive and behavioral science, and social and cultural studies in addition to technology is essential to defend against CogWar.
+
+NATO nations need to develop cognitive security measures to defend information pathways and protect it from manipulation, modification, and the influence of an adversary’s intrusions. Cognitive Security sits at the intersection of multidisciplinary fields including neuroscience, brain research, human cognition, perception, and decision making. Thus, there is a need to conduct research on CogWar and cognitive security to ensure the development of a defensive toolbox for countering the influence and impact of all aspects of CogWar.
+
+#### 1.4 HFM-ET-356 SCOPE, AIMS, AND PROPOSED OUTCOMES
+
+The NATO STO HFM Exploratory Team (ET) 356 __“Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare”__ aimed to increase understanding of how defensive CogWar will provide effective prevention and mitigation strategies and countermeasures to increase defence and security within the NATO Alliance. As humans are part of all military operations and understanding the human and the brain is a central element in CogWar, the NATO HFM Panel included and highlighted “Cognitive Warfare” to its Program of Work (PoW) in 2021. Other STO Panels do have ongoing S&T activities that are associated with CogWar defence measures, from a technological or a systems analysis perspective.
+
+The HFM-ET-356 team developed the “House Model” as the foundation for the development of a S&T strategic roadmap. This model was linked with the operational Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) decision framework to highlight and facilitate understanding and the important synergy between research and operational communities.
+
+The House Model represents seven main S&T knowledge areas and enablers that are cross-cutting and intersectionally related: Pillars: Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive & Behavioral Science, Social and Cultural Science and Bars: Situational Awareness and Sensemaking, Cognitive Effects, modus operandi and Technology and Force Multipliers.
+
+The House Model was presented at the Cognitive Warfare Workshop during the Scientific Track of the NATO ACT Tide Sprint conference (4‒8 April 2022, Sopot, Poland).
+
+The current report presents the House Model framework to guide the NATO Alliance towards their S&T priorities. The Authors provide summaries of selected S&T areas (not exclusive), their relevance to defensive CogWar and propose various areas of research to eliminate capability gaps. Narratives are also provided to expand the description of the research areas and their relevance to defensive CogWar.
+
+Given the complexity of CogWar and dynamic military operations, it has been necessary to consider strategies for developing education and training methods to prepare leaders for future CogWar challenges.
+
+CogWar is an essential component of future military defence and warfare. It is therefore incumbent upon the S&T community to address the technology gaps that will ensure future cognitive security and the ability to defend against CogWar.
+
+__The aim of this report__ is to enhance each nation’s awareness of CogWar, provide a S&T roadmap for the development of tools, technologies, education, and training that will support NATO’s and partner nation’s defence against CogWar. The investment in S&T research will strengthen NATO and its Allied partner nation’s ability to counter the influence and potential impact of future CogWar.
+
+#### 1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
+
+This report examines the S&T efforts for defending against CogWar and mitigating its influence and impact on human perceptions, thinking, and decision making. This report can be read in full, or individual chapters can be selected and read independent of the whole report.
+
+> #### Chapter 1 ‒ Towards a Framework of Science and Technological Competencies for Future NATO Operations
+
+Introduces the concept of CogWar as a multidisciplinary approach combining social sciences and innovative technologies to directly alter the mechanisms of understanding and decision making to destabilize or paralyze an adversary. CogWar is discussed within the context of NATO’s strategic concept.
+
+> #### Chapter 2 ‒ Towards a Science and Technological Framework “The House Model”
+
+Introduces the need to develop a framework of human and technological competencies for future NATO operations. The chapter presents the key S&T topics related to the evolution of the CogWar. The HFM-ET-356 House Model serves as a guide for investment in S&T research in the defence against CogWar. The House Model represents the intersection of multidisciplinary S&T topics and the intersection with the characteristics of the OODA decision framework that can be seen as underpinning military operations (i.e., sensemaking, SA, social, cultural, and political contexts that influence operations). The House Model reflects a multifaceted and multidimensional approach to CogWar and lays the foundation for the development of the S&T Roadmap. The HFM-ET-356 House Model aims to capture an array of independent academic fields that become interdependent when operationalized and viewed through the lens of NATOs defence against CogWar.
+
+> #### Chapter 3 ‒ Cases and Scenarios of Cognitive Warfare
+
+This chapter introduces scenarios of CogWar to illustrate the range of activities, challenges and techniques associated with CogWar. The range of CogWar attacks at all levels from civilian, societal, and military operations, requires an ability to defend against adversaries in all environments. The purpose of this section is two-fold. The first purpose is to illustrate the breadth of activities, as well as supporting techniques, which constitute CogWar, as well as diversity and range of potential target audiences. The second purpose is to link the varies incidents (case studies) to specific components of the House Model. This chapter is essential for understanding how best to defend against CogWar and which S&T topics must we invest in to ensure adequate defence against future CogWar.
+
+> #### Chapter 4 ‒ The Influence and Impact of Social and Cultural Sciences in Cognitive Warfare
+
+This chapter aims to discuss the role of the social and cultural sciences in CogWar. It offers unique insight into the issue of CogWar. Specifically (but not limited to) the socio-technical mechanics of audience engagement and psycho-social effects generation, as well as potential interventions or responses to neutralize, mitigate or counter cognitive attacks on audiences. In other words, the social and cultural sciences offer insight into and can help inform the development of both offensive and defensive facets of CogWar, particularly at the meso- and macro- levels of analysis (i.e., characteristics of social interaction between groups and organizations through large-scale societal interactions).
+
+> #### Chapter 5 ‒ Cognitive and Behavioral Science (Psychological Interventions)
+
+This chapter focuses on the Cognitive and Behavioral Science (CBS) pillar of the House Model. It focuses on the ways that adversaries target human vulnerabilities in the cognitive and behavioral domain. Furthermore, this chapter discusses ways that adversaries may exploit human psychological vulnerabilities to their advantage in CogWar. This chapter highlights the need to defend cognitive vulnerabilities and develop tools and technologies that will mitigate and defend against future CogWar targeting human cognitive and psychological vulnerabilities.
+
+> #### Chapter 6 ‒ Developing Cognitive Neuroscience Technologies for Defence Against Cognitive Warfare
+
+This chapter focuses on advances in our understanding of brain function and the development of sophisticated neuroimaging tools and analysis methods from biomedical/neuro-engineering fields. These advances have influenced the development of novel neural network models of human cognitive processes embedded in AI/ML network designs. This area of research plays a critical role in future CogWar. The evolution of Brain-Machine-Interfaces (BMI) presents opportunities for adversaries to seek news ways of hacking the human brain. This further suggests that adversaries may also find ways to hack the BMI network integrated with future command and control systems. This chapter addresses advances in neuroscience, brain research and the development of BMIs. These are critical areas of research that may prove to be the most significant areas of defending against CogWar in the future.
+
+> #### Chapter 7 ‒ Defence Against 21ˢᵗ Century Cognitive Warfare: Considerations and Implications for Emerging Advanced Technologies
+
+This chapter focuses on the emergence of disruptive technologies on future CogWar. For example, how the evolution of AI/ML algorithms, BMI, genetics, quantum computing will continue to advance and afford adversaries the opportunities to weaponize technologies and transform the battlespace. This chapter discusses the ethical challenges associated with the development of advanced super-intelligent machines, and the ethical deployment of such technologies. This chapter focuses on addressing the challenges and evolution of CogWar and seeks ways to forecast the best defence against CogWar.
+
+> #### Chapter 8 ‒ Situational Awareness, Sensemaking and Future NATO Multinational Operations
+
+This chapter focuses on Sensemaking and Situational Awareness as critical for effective decision making in military operations. CogWar focuses on the weaponization of information, including how adversaries distribute information, how it is understood, and how information influences human thought, behavior, and decision making. This chapter examines the relationship between human understanding and the OODA decision framework. Further, it highlights the impact of the evolution of AI/ML networks and the development of independent, sentient robots with independent decision-making capabilities that will present vulnerabilities in the future CogWar battlespace.
+
+> #### Chapter 9 ‒ Human-Machine Teaming: Towards a Holistic Understanding of Cognitive Warfare
+
+This chapter presents the evolution of CogWar and its technologies from each era. This chapter takes an historic perspective of warfare wherein Sun Tzu sets the foundation for the discussion that takes us from the spear to the Human-Machine teaming age. Sun Tzu’s philosophy of “Know thy enemy” is the theme to monitor throughout the ages as it provides a means of understanding intent and motivation of potential adversaries. This discussion includes the expansion of the OODA framework transformed into a “bow tie” model that reflects the complexities of human-machine decision making. The latter model highlights the need to consider the nested nature of the holistic model of CogWar if we are to defend effectively against CogWar.
+
+> #### Chapter 10 ‒ Education and Training for Cognitive Warfare
+
+This chapter highlights the need to develop more in-depth knowledge and advanced tools for supporting training in the defence about CogWar. For example, as CogWar focuses on the weaponization of information, the military should develop more awareness of the multiple CogWar practices and be able to detect and counter disinformation campaigns at an early stage. Virtual environments and wargaming provide a means of developing the skills required to operate in CogWar. The complexities of future CogWar mandate the need for more sophisticated training content, methods, and tools to meet the demands of the future CogWar environment. This requires the development of an overall framework for detecting, mitigating, countering, and developing CogWar operations on both the strategic and tactical levels.
+
+> #### Chapter 11 ‒ SOMULATOR: Developing CogWar Resilience Through Social Media Training
+
+Given the current state of propaganda and disinformation on social media, training needs to be provided for a broad range of users. This chapter summarizes the issues that were considered when a tool called ___“Somulator”___ was developed for social media training purposes. A range of open-source tools were chosen to emulate different social media platforms and presented to stakeholders. Feedback received laid the foundations for additional, custom development that were used to integrate core elements into a complete training solution. In addition, the core lessons learned from early use of the tools is discussed. The results of this pilot study have implications for defence against CogWar. Thus, the Somulator tool that emerged from this research holds great promise in contributing to research and training to defend against CogWar in the future.
+
+> #### Chapter 12 ‒ Legal and Ethical Implications Related to Defence against Cognitive Warfare
+
+The legal and ethical implications discussed in this chapter serve as a lens for evaluating how we might address the defence of CogWar. Today, there is no legal framework directly applicable to CogWar. This chapter discusses the implications for addressing the challenges of CogWar from a moral and legal perspective. This chapter presents challenges related to military actions within the cognitive domain and the unlawful use of force. It presents an argument for the need to develop legal policies and doctrine like those developed for cyber warfare, which define the legal parameters of CogWar itself.
+
+> #### Chapter 13 ‒ Cognitive Warfare and the Human Domain: Appreciating the Perspective that the Trajectories of Neuroscience and Human Evolution place on Cognitive Warfare are at Odds with Ideas of a Human Domain
+
+This chapter focuses on the discussion surrounding whether CogWar is unique or merely part of the “Human Domain.” The general argument is that a Cognitive Domain is too restrictive as it does not sufficiently encompass the action space in which human thinking and behavior is being weaponized. This chapter takes perspective of a ‘human domain’ as it does not a priori align with the trajectory of neuroscience and of human evolution in the context of CogWar. Instead, it argues for S&T approaches that focus on a cognitive domain, where CogWar attacks are directed and hence what needs to be protected.
+
+> #### Chapter 14 ‒ Science and Technology Roadmap Based on the House Model
+
+This chapter focuses on the development of a S&T roadmap as guide to invest S&T to ensure NATO and partner nation’s military readiness to meet the demands of future CogWar. The S&T roadmap is based upon the House Model and aims to guide the development of an effective S&T defence strategy. There are seven main S&T knowledge areas and enablers that are cross-cutting and intersectional related: Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive & Behavioral Science, Social and Cultural Science, Situational Awareness and Sensemaking, Cognitive Effects, modus operandi and Technology and Force Multipliers. The Chapter assess technological gaps and potential vulnerabilities associated within the scientific areas of the House Model, which is linked to the overarching military OODA decision-making objective.
+
+> #### Chapter 15 ‒ Conclusion and Recommendations
+
+This chapter highlights the main results of examining critical S&T topics within selected technologies and human factors. Examples are ICT, AI/ML, BMI advances, command and control, human-machine teaming, as well as social and cultural and cognitive & behavioral factors and their impact and/or function in CogWar. The complexity of CogWar increases with each technological advance and innovation and must be addressed within a socio-technical system perspective. There is a need to address future challenges by anticipating the intersection of multidisciplinary scientific topics and how these advances may be dual purposed by adversaries to their strategic advantage. Nations must anticipate and prepare to defend against such threats to global security. This chapter concludes with a series of recommendations for future S&T investment and technological development to ensure an effective defence against CogWar.
+
+#### 1.6 REFERENCES
+
+Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. (2022). Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 2021. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France.
+
+[Cole, A. and Le Guyader, H. (2020). NATO Sixth’s Domain of Operations. FICINT document. Norfolk (VA, USA), NATO ACT Innovation Hub](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/NATO%27s%206th%20domain%20of%20operations.pdf).
+
+Gill, R. and Goolsby, R. (2022). COVID-19 Disinformation: A Multi-National, Whole of Society Perspective. Springer Cham.
+
+NATO (2010). Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon 19‒20 November 2010. NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Belgium.
+
+NATO (2021). Brussels Summit Communiqué. Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021.
+
+[NATO (2022). NATO Strategic Concept 2022. Adopted at the Madrid Summit, 29‒30 June 2022](https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html).
+
+NATO 2030 Reflection Group (2020). United for a New Era. Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General 25 Nov 2020.
+
+NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) (2022). NIAG-N (2022)0005, NIAG Study on Standards for Cognitive Augmentation for Military Applications.
+
+NATO STO (2020). NATO Science &Technology Trend Report, 2020. Science & Technology Trends 2020‒2040. Exploring the S&T Edge. NATO Science & Technology Organization, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France.
+
+NATO STO (2021). AC/323-N (2021)0023. NATO Science & Technology Board Read Ahead for the Fall 2021 Executive Session. Agenda Items 7 and 8 – STO Plans & Programmes Workshops 2021 and 2022.
+
+[Pappalardo, D. (2022). Win the War Before the War? The French Perspective on Cognitive Warfare. War on the Rocks, 1 August 2022](https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/win-the-war-before-the-war-a-french-perspective-on-cognitive-warfare/).
+
+[Takagi, K. (2022) The Future of China’s Cognitive Warfare: Lessons from the War in Ukraine. War on the Rocks. 22 July 2022](https://warontherocks.com/2022/07/the-future-of-chinas-cognitive-warfare-lessons-from-the-war-in-ukraine/).
+
+Tammen, J.W. (09 July 2021). NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept: Anticipating the Changing Character of War. NATO Review.
+
+[Zinets, N. and Vasovic, A. (2022). Missiles Rain Down Around Ukraine](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-military-operations-ukraine-demands-kyiv-forces-surrender-2022-02-24/).
+
+
+### Chapter 2 ‒ TOWARDS A SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK “THE HOUSE MODEL”
+
+> #### Benjamin J. Knox
+> #### Norwegian Armed Forces Cyber Defence
+> #### NORWAY
+
+#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION
+
+CogWar is transformative and affords the adversary the opportunity to gain the strategic advantage by exploiting advances in technologies such as, AI, ML, BMI, as well as exploiting existing technologies in new ways. The weaponization of advanced technologies drives the need to develop tools, techniques, procedures, education, and training methods to counter the CogWar threat. The adversary uses CogWar to shape and affect the tactical, operational, strategic, and geopolitical environment in an insidious and often invisible manner to support achieving their strategic objectives. Therefore, developing an S&T roadmap that lays the foundation for how NATO can mitigate and respond to CogWar is a critical first step.
+
+To this end, the House Model (Figure 2-1) was developed to guide S&T research concerning how NATO can ‘get ahead’ in the realm of CogWar. Getting ahead implies a journey involving a catching-up process to identify where the vulnerabilities are that need defending and what, therefore, are the knowledge needs to counter CogWar.
+
+The House Model reflects the multifaceted and multidimensional nature of CogWar. Planned and applied with old and new methods, CogWar achieves overt and covert objectives below and above the threshold of war, affecting how we think, act, and make decisions. It does this by exploiting facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence, or modify human decision making. With modern technological enablers that act as force multipliers, these goals become more realizable with less effort, resources, and risk. Novel methods and ways of operating (modus operandi) inspired by, or grounded in fields of contemporary or existing knowledge, allow adversaries to deliver cognitive effects that target our situational awareness and ability to sense-make by penetrating and permeating the conscious and subconscious of individuals and the collective. As such, the HFM 356 roadmap model aims to capture an array of independent academic fields that become interdependent when operationalized and viewed through the lens of NATOs defence against CogWar. The following is an introduction to the House Model. Further details can be found in Chapter 14.
+
+#### 2.2 THE HOUSE MODEL
+
+The CogWar House Model aims to guide the delivery of scientific outcomes that go beyond conventional thinking by challenging what we think we already know and exploring what we know we don’t know. Through well-defined research goals that reflect the cross-cutting model architecture, we can learn how to support the NATO warfighter in perceiving CogWar and comprehending it when it has occurred, and/or when it is already delivering its effect(s). Finding ways to ‘catch-up’ and ‘get ahead’ in terms of prediction and developing counter measures, or counter effects, can only occur when the right tools (cognitive and technological) operate within, or at that the edge of, _NATO Security and Defence, NWCC, Legal and Ethical Frameworks (ELSEI)_, without adversarial interference. This then ensures our sensemaking is precise and timely enough that our Situational Awareness (SA) is formed from trustworthy input data.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 2-1: The House Model Developed by HFM-ET-356._
+
+> #### 2.2.1 The Pillars
+
+The three pillars in the model identify primary fields where knowledge is required to influence or modify a Target Audience (TA) (Figure 2-2). The pillar titles (Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive and Behavioral science, and Social and Cultural science) identify priority areas (or fields) that require research effort, including applied interventions. CogWar is a multi and inter-disciplinary concept. As such, each pillar intends to be inclusive, opening space for broad and niche research involvement. The pillars acknowledge and encourage research that exposes, investigates, and aims to understand discipline, organizational, and institutional overlaps. It is here where the adversary may be operating unchecked.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 2-2: The Scientific Pillars of Knowledge ‒ House Model of CogWar ET 356._
+
+> #### 2.2.2 The Horizontal Bars
+
+The horizontal bars identify enablers and force multipliers to the knowledge pillars (see call out box, below). The aspects of SA & Sensemaking, Cognitive Effects, modus operandi, and Technology Enables are independent areas of research that have inter-dependencies across and between the pillars of knowledge. They present opportunities to consider the ‘HOW & WHEN’ of S&T knowledge needs.
+
+> #### `Enablers and Force Multipliers`
+
+__`Situational Awareness (SA) / Sensemaking:`__ _`Examination of the factors that enable or block attempts to make sense of an ambiguous situation. Sensemaking informs and is a prerequisite to decision making. It requires trusted data input, evaluation of meaningful information, integration with knowledge and experience to achieve an understanding of evolving non-linear events.`_
+
+__`Cognitive Effects:`__ _`Describes the effects an actor may try to create on a target audience IOT achieve desired goal. Could be doctrinal effect verbs, e.g., distort, distract, etc., or more elaborate descriptions, e.g., degrade TA’s trust in democratic institutions or politicians, persuade TA to believe A instead of B, etc. Related to neurobiology the effects could be to, for example, injure or impair cognitive functions, stimulate emulative functions, or trigger social contagion.`_
+
+___`modus operandi:`___ _`Examination of adversary methods and stratagems to generate the desired effect on the target/target audience, including when methods/stratagems are employed to exploit ‘cognitive openings’ and other opportunities for intervention (i.e., how and when). This effort is also concerned about the synchronization of activities by adversaries to psychologically prime and target. A better understanding of when and how adversaries conduct CW provides insights on the development and validation of countermeasures and defensive strategies.`_
+
+__`Technology Enablers and Force Multipliers:`__ _`Use technology to enable the actor to utilize one, two or all of the three knowledge pillars simultaneously, in pursuit of the goal. This aspect enables the above aspects. e.g., EDTs ICT CIS / Big Data / AI & ML / Social Media / Directed Energy / Biotech / Nanotech, etc.`_
+
+#### 2.3 SUMMARY
+
+Future NATO military leaders will face a wide range of dilemmas as CogWar has the potential to pervade and influence all aspects of NATOs role to safeguard the Allies’ freedom and security by political and military means. The intrinsic, invasive, and invisible nature of CogWar with its global network of technological enablers, will provide a continuous challenge regarding identifying the truth and making sense of what to trust in data, and data sources. Advancements in areas such as Deep Learning, Synthetic media, Neuroscience and Human-machine teaming means the Information Environment will become more contested, significant, and defining. Understanding, acknowledging, and managing the long and short-term effects from CogWar activities and operations requires we educate and train our leaders and warfighters with new approaches and adaptive ways of viewing competition, conflict, and warfare. This is essential if we are to address the challenges CogWar brings to SA and decision making. Only then can we ensure effective and accurate mitigation and response tactics – the Cognitive Superiority needed – to possess and apply faster, deeper, broader and / or more effective military thinking and understanding than adversaries. The resulting effect enables NATO and Allies to hold the information initiative and not be influenced by the potential impact of CogWar.
+
+Future military operations will encompass the range of topics presented within the House Model. Most significantly it is likely they will be revealed at the points of creation and discovery where the pillars and the horizontal bars overlap in novel ways. We anticipate that this framework can be used to inform those who will lead competency and capability development for future NATO operations. We contend that nations would benefit from using the House Model as a reference and guide to the development of their respective national S&T research portfolio. The model encourages intra, inter and multi-disciplinary activities that can fill gaps in understanding and allow us to gain some advantage as we look to defend the entire socio-technical system against the effects of CogWar.
+
+The following chapters will begin the discussion of each of these pillars and provide insight as to the role that each topic will play in future CogWar as a means of evaluating and assessing ways to mitigate and defend against CogWar.
+
+
+### Chapter 3 ‒ CASES AND SCENARIOS OF COGNITIVE WARFARE
+
+> #### Matthew A. Lauder
+> #### Defence Research & Development
+> #### CANADA
+
+> #### Eskil Grendahl Sivertsen
+> #### Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
+> #### NORWAY
+
+#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION
+
+There are a myriad of forms or types of Cognitive Warfare (CogWar) occurring at all levels of operation and across the spectrum of conflict, from peacetime through limited intervention, irregular warfare, and major combat operations. For example, at the tactical level, CogWar may take the form of SMS text messages disseminated to specific geographic areas (i.e., narrowcasting) and designed to undermine the morale of enemy soldiers by spreading disinformation about defections, non-payment of the soldier’s salary, promoting contempt of senior officers, or simply threatening retaliation. In some cases, the messages are combined with a kinetic attack, such as an artillery or missile strike, to further antagonize the intended recipient. In other cases, CogWar can occur at the operational and strategic levels by targeting entire populations, policy makers, or political and military leaders. For example, large populations may be manipulated by through advanced psycho-behavioral modeling, artificial intelligence, and machine learning to target individual psychological pressure points and societal fault lines, ultimately amplifying political dissent, and encouraging internecine violence. In other cases, mass media can be manipulated to create a false understanding of a political decision, which could lead to false assumptions about the enemy and undermine the decision-making process of senior political and military leaders.
+
+The purpose of this section is two-fold. The first purpose is to illustrate the breadth of activities, as well as supporting techniques, which constitute CogWar, as well as diversity and range of potential target audiences. The second purpose is to link the varies incidents (case studies) to specific components of the house model.
+
+#### 3.2 COGNITIVE WARFARE CASE STUDY #1: CHRYSTIA FREELAND SMEAR CAMPAIGN
+
+Although largely occurring in Canada – or at least much of the effort appears to have been executed in Canada – the smear campaign conducted against Chrystia Freeland was arguably designed to undermine the credibility of the Canadian government as well as the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) presence in Eastern Europe, primarily Ukraine, but also Latvia. Literally launched the same day that Freeland was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Kassam, 2017), the smear campaign started with a series of posts on a pro-Russian social media account, seemingly located in Canada, on 10 January 2017 that cited documents from the archives of the Alberta government about Freeland’s grandfather, Michael Chomiak, and accused her of being sympathetic to Nazism.
+
+The following day, an editor from VICE magazine, who was conducting an interview on an unrelated matter at the Russian embassy in Ottawa, was handed a dossier from an unidentified embassy staff member detailing Freeland’s grandfather’s interaction with the German military in occupied Ukraine during World War II (Ling, 2017; Glavin, 2017b). Like the previous day’s social media posts, the dossier was based on publicly available information held in the archives of the government of Alberta.
+
+A week later, on 19 January 2017, a lengthy and detailed article written by John Helmer appeared on his blog, Dances with Bears, and also in the Russia Insider, a pro-Russian newspaper believed to be funded by Konstantin Malofeev (a Russian oligarch close to Putin and accused of having funded pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine and the attempted coup in Montenegro), as well as other pro-Russian social media sites (Shekhovstov, 2015; Helmer, 2017a). Seemingly based on archival documents, the article claimed Freeland lied about her grandfather’s interaction with the German army during WWII and stated that she was actively “preaching race hatred of Russians” (Helmer, 2017a). Helmer, a former White House aide, who moved to Moscow in 1989, is reputed to have been an agent for the KGB (Glavin, 2017a).
+
+Between 19 and 26 January 2017, more than 30 different pro-Russian Twitter accounts posted or re-tweeted the claims regarding Freeland’s grandfather or linked to and promoted the Helmer article. Many of the social media accounts, some of which had thousands of followers, were known Russian social media trolls belonging to or affiliated with the Internet Research Agency (IRA) On 27 January 2017, a computer-generated audio recording reciting the text of Helmer’s article was posted to YouTube as well as several other social media platforms. The Helmer article was published by the Strategic Culture Foundation, a Russian thinktank and online journal operated by the Russian foreign intelligence (SVR) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a known outlet of Russian propaganda and disinformation (Ponce de Leon and Andriukaitis, 2020). Within a week, the story of Freeland’s grandfather, and accusations that Freeland was sympathetic to Nazism, went viral across several social media platforms.
+
+Just over a week later, Stanislav Balcerac, a Polish journalist known to support rightwing political movements, published an article on the same topic in the Warszanka Gazeta (Warsaw Gazette), a weekly publication known to publish hate-based and anti-Semitic articles (Balcerac, 2017; Glavin, 2017a). The same article was also published in Polska Bez Censury (Poland Without Censorship). Later in February, Arina Tsukanova, a pro-Russian journalist allegedly based in Crimea (Global Engagement Center, 2020), published an article in Consortium News, a US-based independent, online news service repeating many of the claims from the Balcerac article (Tsukanova, 2017). Although Consortium News sued a Canadian news network for claiming it was part of an elaborate Russian cyber-influence campaign (Lauria, 2020), Tsukanova was subsequently reported to be a sock puppet (i.e., a fictitious persona) operating for the Russian foreign intelligence service through the Strategic Culture Foundation (Global Engagement Center, 2020; Ponce de Leon and Andriukaitis, 2020).
+
+During a press conference on 6 March 2017 about the extension to Operation UNIFIER, the Canadian military training mission to Ukraine, a reporter asked Freeland about Russian media outlets and websites and claims her grandfather was a Nazi collaborator. In response, Freeland stated that Russian disinformation and other smear campaigns, like those that recently occurred in the US and Europe, should be expected. However, the question of her grandfather’s role during WWII at the press conference, which was covered by several Canadian national news media agencies, served not only to push the story into the mainstream but also provided an opportunity for the Russian government – through Kirill Kalinin, the press secretary of the Russian embassy in Ottawa – to publicly criticize Freeland and question her credibility. The story of Freeland’s grandfather’s role in WWII, and Freeland’s warning of Russian disinformation, effectively dominated news media reporting and overshadowed the announcement of Canada’s renewed commitment to Operation UNIFIER in Ukraine, which was likely the objective of the Russian disinformation campaign (Glavin, 2017a; Glavin 2017b).
+
+However, that was not the end of the smear campaign. On 21 March 2017, leveraging the story of Freeland’s grandfather and accusing her of lacking integrity and engaging in anti-Russian bias, the Russian Congress of Canada lodged a formal complaint with the Prime Minister. In addition to making spurious claims that Freeland lacked the proper qualifications for the job (as Minister of Foreign Affairs), the letter implied a connection between her grandfather’s role in WWII and her support for Ukrainian exiles and related political issues, suggesting she acquired pro-fascist sympathies from her grandfather (Russian Congress of Canada, 2017).
+
+While initially generating significant news media attention and public interest in Canada and abroad, as well as generating some negative coverage, some of which called into question the veracity of claims the incident was an act of Russian disinformation, the smear campaign was and is still used in Russian information confrontation, especially those designed to shape the opinions of Russian linguistic audiences in Eastern Europe (Glavin, 2017b). In addition, the smear campaign is often referenced in other disinformation activities designed to undermine Ukrainian political support abroad, particularly in Canada (Brown, 2019).
+
+In response to the smear campaign and the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom by GRU agents, the Canadian government announced the expulsion of four Russian diplomats in March 2018. The diplomats, who were based in Ottawa and Montreal and included Kalinin (who was alleged to have orchestrated the smear campaign by sending information about Freeland’s grandfather to various news agencies), were identified as intelligence officers and alleged to have interfered in the operation of democratic institutions, including to have engaged in a campaign to shape Canadian public opinion (Guly, 2018). Three of the four were also identified as having conducted cyber-influence activities while based at the Russian consulate in Montreal, specifically an effort designed to discredit the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and spread other disinformation related to Canadian institutions (Fife and Carbert, 2018).
+
+_Model Components to the House Model:_
+
+- __Required Knowledge:__ Cognitive and behavior science, social and cultural science.
+
+- __Technology Enablers:__ Social media platforms and accounts, sock puppets, and online advocacy/populist news media.
+
+- __Modus Operandi:__ Smear campaign, combined with disinformation, highly emotive topics.
+
+- __Cognitive Effects:__ Attempted to create uncertainty and serve as a distraction.
+
+- __Situational Awareness/Sensemaking:__ Use of highly emotive language was an attempt to confuse and undermine the government’s ability to respond to the smear campaign.
+
+- __Goal:__ To undermine credibility of the target and the Canadian government, more generally, but also to disrupt decision-making about Canadian military contributions to NATO.
+
+#### 3.3 COGNITIVE WARFARE CASE STUDY #2: NOVI SANZHARY COVID-19 RIOTS
+
+With a population of less than 10,000 people, Novi Sanzhary is a small town approximately 335 kms east of Kiev in central Ukraine. On 18 February 2020, a plane carrying evacuees from China (45 Ukrainians and 27 foreign nationals, including flight personnel) arrived in Kharkiv, Ukraine. However, as soon as the plane landed, rumors started to circulate on various social media platforms that the passengers were infected and in the process of being transferred to an unidentified medical facility. In response to the rumors, the Ukrainian government confirmed the arrival of the plane, but indicated that the passengers had been tested prior to departure and that no infections or positive COVID-19 tests were reported. Ukrainian government representatives confirmed that all the passengers would be transferred to a national guard medical Center located in Novi Sanzhary and placed in a 14-day quarantine as a precautionary measure.
+
+Following the government announcement, however, additional disinformation about the evacuees was posted and shared across multiple social media platforms, including Viber, Facebook, and Instagram. Moreover, local politicians and residents asserted they were not informed of the evacuees prior to the arrival of the plane and complained of a lack of information from the central government officials in Kyiv. Angered by the situation, residents of Novi Sanzhary started to mobilize on 19 February using social media and constructed barricades to block the arrival of the evacuees at the medical clinic. Residents also gathered and protested at the city center. Later that day, dedicated channels on various social media platforms were created which disseminated dire warnings of “countless deaths” and spread disinformation about the evacuees, as well as to encourage residents to ‘take action,’ including confronting soldiers and setting fire to the hospital (Miller, 2020). Some of the social media channels also suggested residents watch online broadcasts about the situation from NASH TV, a station own by a pro-Russian politician, as well as other online pro-Russian broadcasters (Velichko, 2020). In some cases, the administrators of social media channels did not conceal their Russian identities and overtly promoted a pro-Russian narrative and provided links to Russian news media outlets.
+
+Dozens of police officers and security personnel, including members of the National Guard, arrived in Novi Sanzhary by the morning of 20 February 2020. However, rather than alleviating concerns, the arrival of the security services heightened tensions and, at least to residents, served as confirmation of the rumors the evacuees were infected. Increasing the level of collective anxiety, a spoofed health advisory (which was sent to the entire contact list of the Ministry of Health) confirming that at least five of the evacuees were positive with COVID-19 was released from what appeared to have been the Ukrainian Health Ministry email address. While government officials declared the email to have been spoofed, rumors of the infections still took hold and, along with paid agents provocateurs on the ground inciting violence, the situation in Novi Sanzhary reached a tipping point (Velichko, 2020). As the buses carrying the evacuees arrived in Novi Sanzhary, several hundred residents manned barricades and set fires to block their progress. In response, police in riot gear attempted to push the protesters back and clear a path for the buses, using armored personnel carriers to move vehicles blocking the road. The situation quickly degenerated into violent clashes, with residents throwing stones and other projectiles at the passing buses (Melkozerova and Parafeniuk, 2020). Aggravating the situation and adding to the uncertainty, additional disinformation was released by at least one news media outlet suggesting the staff at the medical center resigned in protest over concerns about a lack of proper equipment and training.
+
+Later that day, and to defuse the situations, Oleksiy Honcharuk, the Ukrainian prime minister, arrived in town, along with Arsen Avakov and Zoryana Skaletska, the interior and health ministers, respectively. However, the appearance of national political officials as well as public statements, including a Facebook post by Ukrainian President Zelensky pleading for calm, did nothing to reassure the residents. By the time the riots subsided, at least nine police officers and one civilian were injured, and 24 people arrested. Both Honcharuk and Skaletska were subsequently dismissed from their government positions.
+
+_Model Components to the House Model:_
+
+- __Required Knowledge:__ Cognitive and behavior science, social and cultural science.
+
+- __Technology Enablers:__ Social media platforms and accounts, sock puppets, television broadcasts, online news media, email spoofing.
+
+- __Modus Operandi:__ Disinformation combined with highly emotive topics and exploitation of uncertainty to generate rumors, cyber-attacks.
+
+- __Cognitive Effects:__ Exploiting pervasive fear, created an elevated level of uncertainty and anxiety and undermined public confidence in Ukrainian government institutions.
+
+- __Situational Awareness/Sensemaking:__ Campaign took advantage of a lack of information released from the Ukrainian government and a general distrust of political institutions.
+
+- __Goal:__ To undermine the credibility of and trust in the Ukrainian government.
+
+#### 3.4 COGNITIVE WARFARE CASE STUDY #3: RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR (2008)
+
+The exact event that triggered the five-day war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 is difficult to pinpoint. At the time, Mikheil Saakashvili, the President of Georgia, was blamed by many analysts for being reckless and for antagonizing Russia, which was also how the Russian government wanted the conflict to be portrayed (Lauder, 2019). However, those claims have been revisited by scholars, and many now assert the Russian government carefully planned and escalated the incidents to provoke the Georgian government into a disproportionate response which was then used by the Russia government to justify military intervention (Lauder, 2019). The provocative activities by the Russia government included an assassination attempt on the head of the Georgian-backed administration in South Ossetia, attacks on Georgian police officers, indiscriminate shelling of Georgian towns by South Ossetian militias, threats that Cossack militias and other volunteers were mobilizing, and a series of computer network attacks that disrupted the ability of the Georgian government to communicate with the public.
+
+After a week of increasingly violent skirmishes between South Ossetia militias and Georgian defence forces, which included the arbitrary shelling of residential areas, and based on intelligence that Russian troops were about to invade through the Roki Tunnel, Saakashvili ordered the Georgian military to mobilize and advance into South Ossetia on the early afternoon on 7 August. At the same time, Georgian personnel vacated the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) headquarters, which included a joint monitoring force of Russian, South Ossetian and Georgian military representatives.
+
+Although the situation was tense and unpredictable, Saakashvili hoped that pushing Georgian defence forces into South Ossetia would force an end to the artillery strikes and prevent the Russian military from entering the region. Shortly after the mobilization, Saakashvili declared a unilateral ceasefire and ordered a halt to the advance. This decision was based on input from the Russian military representative at the JPKF who indicated that the Russian military did not have control of South Ossetian militias, implying that Russia was not responsible for the current situation. The Russian military representative also suggested Georgian authorities order an immediate stop to the mobilization and declare a unilateral ceasefire, which Saakashvili did. Later in the day, both Russian and South Ossetian diplomatic representatives failed to appear at a prearranged meeting with Georgian authorities to negotiate a settlement. Saakashvili provided an update on live television and publicly called for negotiations with South Ossetian and Russian officials. Saakashvili also reconfirmed a promise of unrestricted autonomy for South Ossetia and pleaded for the international community to intervene. Taking advantage of the ceasefire, South Ossetia militias renewed their shelling of Georgian towns, which forced civilians to flee. Sensing there was no other remedy or way to curtail the violence, Saakashvili rescinded the ceasefire and, at approximately 23:30 hours on 7 August, re-ordered the Georgian military to move into South Ossetia. Within hours of that-order, two Russian motorized rifle brigades passed through the Roki Tunnel and entered South Ossetia. The brigades, which were a part of the Russian 58ᵗʰ Army, recently participated in Kavkaz-2008, a joint counterterrorism and peacekeeping exercise. While some of the participants of the exercise returned to their bases, the two brigades were sent to the Russian side of the tunnel and told to wait for the order to enter South Ossetia. Putin, then Prime Minister of Russia, denounced the Georgian mobilization as an act of aggression against South Ossetia and threatened a Russian response. Russian news media, many of whom were prepositioned in South Ossetia by the Russian government days prior to the conflict, also accused Georgian authorities of atrocities against the civilian population.
+
+While Georgian defence forces made some early gains, the next five days (8–12 August) saw Russian forces, as well as the various militias operating in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, make significant advances into Georgian territory, with the main Russian armored column halting less than 60km from Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. During this period, Putin, who was attending the 2008 Summer Olympics in China, arrived in North Ossetia and took charge of the military operation. Putin also claimed the Georgian government’s actions were criminal, and that more than 30,000 refugees fled the country and dozens of civilians were killed by Georgian forces. Despite a willingness on part of Georgian authorities to negotiate, the Russian military, along with supporting militias, conducted offensive operations along numerous fronts. Russia also conducted a well-organized cyber operation that employed both professional hackers and hacktivists which effectively crippled Georgian government, law enforcement, financial sector, and news media websites and attempted to smear Saakashvili by defacing government websites with Nazi symbols.
+
+By 13 August, the conflict was largely over, as both sides agreed to a peace plan hastily brokered by France. On 26 August, Dmitry Medvedev, the President of Russia, signed a Presidential decree recognizing the Republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. The decree also authorized cooperation and mutual assistance agreements, including on defence and military support. Several features of this operation suggest that maskirovka was employed by the Russian military and a significant degree of reflexive control of the Georgian leadership may have been achieved. First, the timing of the intervention, which followed closely on Kavkaz-2008, was designed to allow the Russian military to mass troops along the border without causing undue suspicion. Second, the Russian military did not make a concerted effort to conceal their position or intention to invade, including permitting South Ossetian border guards to use Georgian telephone lines to report the initial movement of a Russian armored unit through the Roki Tunnel in the early hours of 7 August. These phone calls, which were intercepted by Georgian intelligence services, helped frame Saakashvili’s understanding of the situation, and seemingly substantiated his concerns that Russia was invading, which ultimately led him to mobilize the Georgian military and push into South Ossetia (the false-optimal solution). Third, and likely sensing a degree of trepidation on part of Saakashvili, as well as his reputation for impulsivity, the Russian military exploited his eagerness to negotiate a settlement by suggesting he should halt the advance, announce a unilateral ceasefire, and have emissaries meet to discuss a peaceful solution, a meeting that both Russian and South Ossetian representatives failed to attend. There is also evidence suggesting the Russian government generated and published an extensive psychological profile of Saakashvili, which may have been used to design the manipulation (Blandy, 2009). This manipulation of Saakashvili by the Russian military served to critically delay the arrival of Georgian troops in South Ossetia which provided enough time for the remaining Russian forces to transit through the tunnel. Lastly, and while he thought he was acting in self-defence, Saakashvili’s mobilization of Georgian defence forces provided the Russian government with the moral and legal justification to invade. Moreover, this pretext was further reinforced by Russian government accusations of human rights violations by the Georgian military, including claims of ethnic genocide, which may have served to prevent Western military intervention in the conflict. In this example it seems as though the Georgian government, specifically Saakashvili, never recognized the extent to which the Russian government was manipulating the situation.
+
+_Model Components to the House Model:_
+
+- __Required Knowledge:__ Cognitive and behavior science, social and cultural science.
+
+- __Technology Enablers:__ State-controlled and aligned news media, DDoS attacks, digital graffiti, and defacements.
+
+- __Modus Operandi:__ Disinformation and cyber-attacks.
+
+- __Cognitive Effects:__ Elevated level of uncertainty about adversary intentions.
+
+- __Situational Awareness/Sensemaking:__ Sent mixed signals to confuse the target, disrupted the ability of the Georgian government to function.
+
+- __Goal:__ To disrupt the ability of Saakasvili to make timely decisions and to choose a false-optimal solution.
+
+#### 3.5 REFERENCES
+
+[Balcerac, S. (08 February 2017). The New Foreign Minister of Canada Chrystia Freeland – Proud Granddaughter Collaborator! Warszanka Gazeta](http://warszawskagazeta.pl/polityka/item/4562-nowa-minister-spraw-zagranicznych-kanady-chrystia-freeland-dumna-wnuczka-kolaboranta).
+
+[Blandy, C.W. (2009). Provocation, Deception, Entrapment: The Russo-Georgian Five-Day War. Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/97421/09_january_georgia_russia.pdf).
+
+[Brown, C. (17 January 2019). Top Russian News Host Takes Aim at Ukrainian Canadians. CBC News](https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/top-russian-news-host-takes-aim-at-ukrainian-canadians-1.4980859).
+
+[Fife, R. and Carbert, M. (29 March 2018). Russian Spies Aimed to Discredit WADA, Spread Disinformation about Canada with Cyber Campaigns. The Globe and Mail](https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-russian-spies-aimed-to-discredit-wada-spread-disinformation-about/).
+
+[Glavin, T. (8 March 2017a). Terry Glavin: Enter the Freeland-Nazi Conspiracy – and Amping-Up of Russia’s Mischief in Canada. The National Post](http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/terry-glavin-enter-the-freeland-nazi-conspiracy-and-the-amping-up-of-russias-mischief-in-canada).
+
+[Glavin, T. (14 March 2017b). How Russia’s Attack on Freeland Got Traction in Canada. MacLeans](https://www.macleans.ca/politics/how-russias-attack-on-freeland-got-traction-in-canada/).
+
+[Global Engagement Center. (August 2020). Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russia’s-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf).
+
+[Guly, C. (13 April 2018). Smear Campaign Against Freeland Linked to Russian Diplomats’ Expulsion, says Trudeau. The Ukrainian Weekly](http://www.ukrweekly.com/uwwp/180711-2/).
+
+[Helmer, J. (19 January 2017a). SCOOP: Canada’s New Foreign Minister Lying about Family’s Ukrainian Nazi Past. Russia Insider](https://russia-insider.com/en/victim-or-aggressor-chrystia-freelands-family-record-nazi-war-profiteering-and-murder-crakow-jews).
+
+[Kassam, A. (10 January 2017). Canada Names Chrystia Freeland, Leading Russia Critic, as Foreign Minister. The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/10/canada-chrystia-freeland-foreign-minister-russia-critic).
+
+[Lauder, M.A. (2019). Limits of Control: Examining the Employment of Proxies by the Russian Federation in Political Warfare. Journal of Future Conflict, Issue 1](https://www.queensu.ca/psychology/sites/psycwww/files/uploaded_files/Graduate/OnlineJournal/Matthew_Lauder-Limits_of_Control-Examining_the_Employment_of_Proxies_by_the_Russian_Federation_in_Political_Warfare.pdf).
+
+[Lauria, J. (13 October 2020). Consortium News Sues Canadian TV Network for Defamation Over Report CN was Part of ‘Attack’ ‘Directed’ by Russia. Consortium News](https://consortiumnews.com/2020/10/13/consortium-news-sues-canadian-tv-network-fordefamation-over-report-cn-was-part-of-attack-directed-by-russia/).
+
+Ledeneva, A.V. (2016). How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped post-Soviet Politics and Business. Cornell University Press.
+
+[Ling, J. (3 March 2017). Canada’s Foreign Minister Warns of Russian Destabilization Efforts – and She Might be a Target. VICE](https://www.vice.com/en/article/8xmyna/canadas-foreign-minister-warns-of-russian-destabilization-efforts-and-she-might-be-a-target).
+
+[Media Bias/Fact Check. (n.d.). Consortium News. Media Bias Fact Check](https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/consortium-news/).
+
+[Melkozerova, V., and Parafeniuk, O. (3 March 2020). How Coronavirus Disinformation Caused Chaos in a Small Ukrainian Town. NBC News](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/how-coronavirus-disinformation-caused-chaos-small-ukrainian-town-n1146936).
+
+[Miller, C. (20 February 2020). A Viral Email about Coronavirus Had People Smashing Buses and Blocking Hospitals. BuzzFeed](https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/christopherm51/coronavirus-ukraine-china).
+
+[Ponce de Leon, E., and Andriukaitis, L. (24 September 2020). Facebook Takes Down Assets Linked to Russian Disinformation Outlet. Medium](https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-takes-down-assets-linked-to-russian-disinformation-outlet-acab0164e3d4).
+
+Russian Congress of Canada. (21 March 2017). Appeal to Prime Minister Trudeau to Question Minister Freeland’s Integrity. Russian Congress of Canada.
+
+[Shekhovtsov, A. (23 November 2015). Is Russia’s Insider Sponsored by a Russian Oligarch with Ties to the European Far Right? The Interpreter](https://www.interpretermag.com/is-russia-insider-sponsored-by-a-russian-oligarch-with-ties-to-the-european-far-right/).
+
+[Staff Writer. (26 January 2017). And You Are a Nazi, Too! EU East StratCom Task Force](https://us11.campaign-archive.com/?u=cd23226ada1699a77000eb60b&id=d50f54d197).
+
+[Tsukanova, A. (27 February 2017). A Nazi Skeleton in the Family Closet. Consortium News](https://consortiumnews.com/2017/02/27/a-nazi-skeleton-in-the-family-closet/).
+
+[Velichko, L. (28 February 2020). Masters of Panic: A Pro-Russian Network in Ukraine Organized a Riot in Novi Sanzhary. Texty](https://texty.org.ua/articles/100356/specoperaciya-imeni-portnova-ta-shariya-yak-rozhanyaly-paniku-v-novyh-sanzharah-i-hto-za-cym-stoyit/).
+
+
+### Chapter 4 ‒ THE INFLUENCE AND IMPACT OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SCIENCES IN COGNITIVE WARFARE
+
+> #### Matthew A. Lauder
+> #### Defence Research & Development
+> #### CANADA
+
+#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION
+
+Informed by a variety of academic disciplines (e.g., anthropology, sociology, psychology, cultural studies, political sciences, communication sciences, and development studies, amongst others) and generally defined as _scientific activities focused on better understanding social behaviors, patterns, processes, and structures_, the social and cultural sciences offer unique insight into the issue of cognitive warfare (CogWar), specifically (but not limited to) the socio-technical mechanics of audience engagement and psycho-social effects generation, as well as potential interventions or responses to neutralize, mitigate or counter cognitive attacks on audiences. In other words, the social and cultural sciences offer insight into and can help inform the development of both offensive and defensive facets of CogWar, particularly at the meso and macro levels of analysis (i.e., characteristics of social interaction between groups and organizations through large-scale societal interactions).
+
+#### 4.2 METHOD AND THEORY
+
+A distinctive feature of the social and cultural sciences is the breadth of methodological approaches, research techniques, and theories and analytical frameworks that can be employed to examine or underpin CogWar. For example, the social and cultural sciences includes both qualitative (e.g., case studies, participant observation, unstructured surveys, focus groups, etc.) and quantitative research methods (e.g., data surveys, correlational research, longitudinal surveys, etc.), which can also be integrated to support a mixed methods approach. Moreover, the social and cultural sciences are inherently flexible, allowing for the use of grounded theory (i.e., building theory from evidence) or more traditional approaches, such as hypothesis testing and theory validation through experimental research. Although a comprehensive list is beyond the remit of this report, some of the more prominent theories employed in the social and cultural sciences to enhance understanding of the socio-technical mechanics of, and the psycho-social effects generated by, CogWar, include:
+
+1) __Social identity theory:__ Originally developed by Henri Tajfel and John Turner (2004), social identity theory asserts that an individual’s affiliation to a group, and the perceived status, legitimacy, and distinctions of that group, play a significant role in determining social behavior, including both social-constructive and anti-social behaviors. Two fundamental aspects of social identity theory include ingroup favoritism (showing preferential treatment to those affiliated with the ingroup) and out-group (or social) comparison (evaluating the in- to out-groups to establish a favorable perception of status), both of which play a role in developing a positive social identity and have an impact on group processes, norms, and structures as well as intergroup relations.
+
+2) __Symbolic interaction theory (symbolic interactionism):__ Less of a theory and more of a framework for understanding, symbolic interactionism asserts that actors respond to the subjective meanings attached to social phenomena and states that meaning may be modified through social interaction. In other words, meaning is adaptable, negotiated and reciprocal, and that reality is primarily a social product (i.e., socially constructed).
+
+3) __Structural functionalism (or functionalism):__ Structural functionalism is not a single, unifying, or grand theory; but a family or constellation of sometimes competing theoretical approaches and conceptual frameworks that comprehend society as a complex, open system in which the component parts strive for and maintain a degree of dynamic, interactive stability (i.e., homeostasis). Structural functionalism examines the system structures, relationships, interdependencies, functions, and conditions of a given society, the aggregation of which gives meaning to and regulates (i.e., bounds) human action.
+
+4) __Conflict theory:__ Commonly associated with Karl Marx, conflict theory refers to a set or constellation of theories that posits society is in a perpetual state of conflict because of competition for and access to limited resources, and that social order is maintained through power, primarily through political suppression and economic exploitation (Lauder, 2022). However, this theory posits that rather than an entirely destructive force, conflict is regarded as the engine of social change and transformation, such as through revolution.
+
+5) __Framing theory:__ Popularized by Irving Goffman, framing theory (also known as _frame analysis or simply framing_) is a multidisciplinary research method used to examine the process of selecting and creating as well as the transference, assessment, and the effects of message content on individuals and collectives (Lauder, 2022). Framing theory is often applied to news media reporting, political campaigns, and social movements, particularly to examine the construction and maintenance of meaning and account for behavioral effects. As a central component of framing theory, frames (what may also be called interpretative schemas) provide a way for people to interpret and understand social phenomena (i.e., events, issues, behaviors, etc.) by describing and giving them meaning in ways that appeal to and leverage shared knowledge structures.
+
+6) __Structural strain theory:__ More of a class of theories or frameworks than a single theoretical construct, structural strain theory asserts that society puts pressure on individuals to achieve a range of abstract normative goals, such as being successful. Perceiving a gap between one’s status and societal goals, and lacking the means to attain these goals, people often resort to criminal activity to gain financial security. As a result, unconventional, deviant, and other anti-social behaviors become normalized. In other cases, people join sub-cultures, which allows them to reject mainstream society and substitute societal goals with more achievable goals (i.e., achieve an alternate definition of success).
+
+7) __Rational choice theory:__ A widely employed theory, rational choice theory proposes that an individual, motivated by self-interest, will conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine the most profitable or beneficial option (i.e., to maximize utility or achieve the highest payoff).
+
+8) __Chaos theory:__ Applied across a range of disciplines, from anthropology to mathematics, chaos theory posits that, while appearing random, complex systems (such as social systems) can be distilled to underlying patterns, which can be used to predict system behavior. A central concept of chaos theory is that of the butterfly effect, which posits that, due to sensitive dependence on initial conditions, slight changes in a system can result in massive, downstream effects.
+
+9) __Complexity theory:__ Also referred to as _complex adaptive systems_ and borrowing from chaos and systems theory, complexity theory posits that complex systems, while dynamic and adaptive, may be viewed as interdependent and constrained by order-generating rules that may predict system behavior.
+
+#### 4.3 AREAS OF INVESTIGATION WITHIN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SCIENCE IMPACTING COGWAR
+
+There are several areas of investigation to which the above-listed theories and analytical frameworks may be used to examine, or underpin the development of, CogWar. The following summary provides a list of broad topics for further consideration:
+
+1) __Amplifying and exploiting social and political divides:__ One facet of CogWar is for the adversary to stoke internal rifts in a target country, such as political, ethnic, economic, or class divides. The idea is that, by manipulating national discourse, often through disguised social media accounts (i.e., pretending to be a member of the targeted audience, also called _sock puppets_) and the employment of highly emotive, symbolic, and sometimes offensive language, an adversary can amplify divisions and lead to violent confrontation between groups and the state. A better understanding of the socio-technical mechanics and effects of this approach may be understood by several theories, particularly social identity theory, conflict theory, framing theory, and structural strain theory. For example, social identity theory, conflict theory and structural strain theory may offer insights into social, economic, and political divisions that may help us understand how audiences may be encouraged or incited towards rejecting normative structures, processes and engage in extreme violence, typically targeting other groups or the state. Moreover, framing theory may offer insights into how grievances are formalized, presented, and rationalized to inspire collective action.
+
+2) __Disseminating rumors, gossip, and disinformation to generate collective anxiety and uncertainty:__ Another key approach of CogWar employed by adversaries is that of rumors, gossip, and other forms of disguised or unattributed (e.g., black) disinformation (e.g., smear campaigns) that are specifically designed to be disseminated by and through social networks, whether virtual Peer-to-Peer (P2P) or Face-to-Face (F2F). The purpose of these attacks is to capitalize on and amplify uncertainty and create debilitating levels of fear and anxiety in a population so that they are not able to properly function. Another goal is to create conditions of social and political instability by generating distrust between the public and the state, particularly by creating a crisis of credibility on part of the state and normative structures. A range of theories can enhance an understanding of this area of investigation, including symbolic interactionism, structural functionalism, and complexity theory. For example, symbolic interactionism may offer insights into how meaning is generated and disseminated within specific audiences, particularly to ensure a high degree of message resonance. Likewise, structural functionalism and complexity theory may support better understanding of the role of social structures, including institutions and norms, in mitigating effects of negative or hostile messaging, as well as how messages spread throughout social networks.
+
+3) __Exploiting cognitive errors in the decision-making process:__ Often referred to as reflexive control and employed as a part of _maskirovka_ (operational masking), and closely associated with perception management, the Russian government intentionally seeks to gain indirect and external control of a target’s decision-making process, specifically to create conditions that lead the target to unwittingly make a false-optimal decision (i.e., a decision that favors the instigator). This may be achieved through the careful creation, selection, management, and release of information to the target, particularly to leverage and amplify any faulty perceptions, erroneous assumptions, or other cognitive errors, such as cognitive distortions, cognitive biases, and logical fallacies, et al., on part of the target. Critical in this approach is that the false-optimal decision may be selected voluntarily rather than coerced or forced upon the target by the instigator of reflexive control. In other words, the target must always cling to the idea of the _illusion of control_ created by the instigator (Lauder, 2022). Other theories may help us to develop countermeasures to reflexive control and maskirovka, including framing theory, rational choice theory, and chaos theory.
+
+4) __Building societal resilience to disinformation:__ A range of factors have been identified as limiting societal resilience to disinformation, such as increased polarization of society, political populism, economic incentives to produce fake news, pervasive distrust of expert knowledge, mainstream news media and governance structures and traditional institutions. The question remains: How can societies build resilience to mediated forms of disinformation (i.e., disinformation that is technologically enabled)? Most solutions revolve around regulating social media platforms or identifying and removing disinformation from the information environment. However, other solutions, such as developing tools to help people evaluate information quality, address deeply embedded structural deficiencies or creating a culture of media literacy. There has been a limited amount of research conducted regarding these solutions, however, the issue of mediated disinformation continues to evolve rapidly due to changing tactics and technology. Thus, there is an array of theories presented to offer insights into how to build societal resilience, including complexity theory, structural functionalism, and symbolic interactionism.
+
+#### 4.4 MODUS OPERANDI – A CROSS-CUTTING ENABLER
+
+Modus operandi is the deliberate, rigorous, and scientifically informed examination of methods, stratagems, and other patterns of behavior designed and operationalized by adversaries to generate the desired psycho-social effect on an audience, including activities employed to psychologically prime and create cognitive openings and other opportunities for adversarial intervention (i.e., pre-propaganda). Modus operandi is not limited in scope to the examination of specific tactics or tools, such as using a loudspeaker or a fraudulent social media account (although that is a part of the investigation) but is concerned with the holistic application and synchronization of a range of methods and resources across the dimensions of the information environment (i.e., cognitive, informational, and physical) to generate psycho-social effects.
+
+The purpose of examining modus operandi is twofold. First, achieving a deep understanding of _what, when, and how_ adversaries conduct CogWar can provide insights to support the development and validation of countermeasures and defensive strategies, such as programs to help build and/or maintain societal resilience or developing technological responses that significantly increase the cost of CogWar to adversaries while reducing or minimizing their effectiveness (i.e., deterrence by denial). Second, a deep understanding may offer insights into an adversary’s own weaknesses and vulnerabilities, which can then inform the development and execution of offensive capabilities. For example, a close examination of Russian military reflexive control practices, and the underpinning theories and conceptual models, indicates that several vulnerabilities exist when these practices are executed, including the inadvertent release of intelligence by the instigator and the ability of the target (of the deception) to take control of the process by covertly manipulating the instigator’s sense function (e.g., release of false data, technical manipulation of sensors, etc.) or the employment of perception management techniques (Lauder, 2022). Another risk of reflexive control is that the instigator of the effort can fall victim to a range of cognitive errors, particularly if the time-to-decision is artificially compressed (i.e., a hasty decision is provoked) by the target or if the instigator’s analytical function is overwhelmed by a deluge of (false and positive) information or if the instigator’s plans are revealed. The quick declassification and public release of classified information by the US intelligence community about the Russian government’s intention to invade Ukraine during a specific time-period in February 2022 is an excellent example of undermining an instigator’s attempt at reflexive control through pre-emption.
+
+#### 4.5 REFERENCES
+
+Lauder, M.A., (2022). The Illusion of Control: A Pragmatic Retelling of Russian Military Maskirovka and Reflexive Control (DRDC-RDDC-2022-D024). Defence Research and Development Canada.
+
+Tajfel, H., and Turner, J.C. (2004). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In J.T. Jost and J. Sidanius (Eds.), Political Psychology: Key Readings, pp. 276-293. Psychology Press. Doi: 10.4324/9780203505984-16.
+
+
+### Chapter 5 ‒ COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE (PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS)
+
+> #### Benjamin J. Knox
+> #### Norwegian Armed Forces Cyber Defence
+> #### NORWAY
+
+#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION – COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE (PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS)
+
+The Cognitive and Behavioral Science (CBS) pillar intends to allow for research that can establish ways to be proactive, rather than reactive when approaching CogWar from a tactical, operational, and strategic perspective. Our adversaries study and target our psychological assets and vulnerabilities. Therefore, we must seek to know ourselves better, from an objective meta-perspective, and understand our adversaries’ way of thinking and behaving from an equally critical perspective. Finding new approaches, applying known methods, and combining human and data-driven techniques in novel ways, can help learning processes that answer the question ‘why’ things are happening. Thus, leading to research concerned with informing decisions about ‘what’ should be done in response. Hence, the Cognitive and Behavioral Science pillar describes a field that is multi-disciplinary and emphasizes the criticality of psychological interventions in CogWar research.
+
+Research on psychological processes and mechanisms in the last century have given psychologists a better understanding of human behavior, emotion, and cognition. Research in cognitive and behavioral science has identified, for example, factors of persuasion, manipulation, behavior change, and social processes (Cialdini, 1993; Hadnagy, 2010) that can be targeted in CogWar. For example, by understanding how dual processes of cognition function (emotional and rational cognitions), one can use this information not only to understand how CogWar techniques attack vulnerabilities but also how to increase resilience and mitigate such attacks. Seemingly then, research from the cognitive and behavioral sciences has identified factors to understand the goals of CogWar. Arising from a fundamental knowledge of human behavior, science has and must continue to focus on analyzing the requisite knowledge for identifying, securing, defending, and countering adversarial CogWar goals. This involves the complex process of creating causal understanding, establishing cause and effect between events, and the meaning of short and long-term attack methodologies and patterns. This knowledge is critical for military decision-making at the individual level, and necessary for the development of collective sustainable modes of resilience and countermeasures.
+
+#### 5.2 INFLUENCE OF COGNITIVE WARFARE
+
+Today, targeted, arbitrary, and experimental cognitive operations occur within the information space of humans primarily through the virtual domains (Montañez et al., 2020). Advancements in CogWar are interwoven with the application and integration of narrow AI into our daily lives, and these target basic cognitive functions that were evolved for survival. For example, social media giants evoke the same mechanisms by altering their algorithm to increase user engagement by dosing their feed with stories that can trigger emotional responses which leads to more heuristic processing and automatic behavior (Stieglitz and Dan-Xuan, 2013). Our emotions are driven by the autonomic nervous system and can be difficult to regulate since they can steer both attention and behavior. As an example of how CogWar can target emotional processes, research has shown that inciting outrage causes intense emotional responses in individuals (Berger, 2016; Fan et al., 2014) that in turn can create a social emotional contagion that can cause groupthink which can lead to more risky decision-making at higher strategic levels (Kramer et al., 2014).
+
+CogWar can also target other cognitive aspects. The mind operates through a process of pattern recognition since working memory has limited capacity, and any information that does not fit known patterns will cause increases in working memory usage to make sense of what is happening, including emotional processes. Increase in working memory can quickly be stressful as we are processing information and coping with any outcomes that can happen. The increase of working memory use decreases attention to other factors that may be relevant. In other words, CogWar can target increasing an individual’s workload so that they can be distracted or unable to identify other pertinent information. For example, when one considers that humans have such a strong tendency to impose context onto ambiguous stimuli, how one manages to redirect or override one’s own projections and perceive information as it truly exists, demands a high level of deliberate effort. Should an attacker layer his/her effort with a culturally consistent narrative, present a motivation for hypervigilance, and use social media as an amplifier, this can reinforce and further direct (or mis-direct attention depending upon attacker intent) attention (Canham et al., 2022). Today, this idea is made possible through technologies such as AI, or Generative Neural Networks (the architecture responsible for creating Deepfakes), that can be applied with a policy of, “let’s see what’s possible.” These are experiments at scale without any clear principles, rules of law, rules of engagement, ethical or moral engagement as to what the outcome may be. Whether it is used to boost or manipulate information around you, or to anchor you, or to change your opinion, one needs to be cognizant of what drives our attention, and meta enough to see something when it is interfering with our predictions, judgements, and biases (Sütterlin et al., 2022).
+
+#### 5.3 COGNITIVE WARFARE AND SELECTIVE ATTENTION
+
+This point highlights the overlap with all the horizontal factors in the model. Just as we grapple with explainability issues and bias in AI, this pillar investigates what it is like to be human and the continuous effort and motivation needed to understand the cognitive barriers and strategies that explain a state i.e., control of cognitive and behavioral factors that may be affecting current SA, such as explainability issues and bias. To use the social engineering example, while social engineering tactics have been understood in marketing and persuasion, only recently has research begun to emerge that places effort into mapping individual and cognitive-emotional factors affecting susceptibility to- and resilience against social engineering attacks in cyber domains (Brangetto et al., 2016). When CogWar operations act to influence a person, or persons, to take an action that may or may not be in their best interest; then, it will be achieved by applying well-established tactics of persuasion, such as social proof or reciprocity, depending on the target. What is new is the available technologies that can affect the _input_ data into our brains to grab or manipulate our attention to induce an emotional reaction. By redirecting attention towards internal processes such as the significance of emotional reactions or gut-feelings, this leads to impulsive decision-making: _output_. This occurs due to a manipulation to increase attentional processes to more emotional and subjective aspects instead of more reflective and more objective evaluations thus decreasing the possibility to critically examine the current situation and take more critical and reflective decisions.
+
+CogWar operations tend not to be transparent. This mirrors certain technologies such as AI in our daily lives. Operations happen in a black box and outcomes often cannot be explained. The current unstoppable state in terms of super-human technological development for the good of society is that explanation and transparency is unnecessary so long as the outcomes improve human intelligence, efficiency, and economic productivity (mostly in the eyes of technologists and industry). In the pattern detection of new properties that were once inconceivable to humans that lead to the production and advancement of antibiotics, education, and entertainment, we see narrow AI finding combinations that a human could never have seen or predicted. This is unquestionably positive. However, the inevitable industrialization of this technology and its dual-use potential should be addressed as a threat and not tolerated by NATO. As such, from a NATO S&T perspective, explanations of outcomes and transparency is essential as this knowledge can reduce the effects of CogWar. Whether the effects are unintended, self-inflicted, or induced, cognitive harm may occur. Such cognitive impairment (temporary or permanent) may accrue from naive over-exposure to certain technologies that may impact cognitive processes and/or development. It may also be the case that cognitive attacks remain obfuscated by the technological state of our lives and may target basic cognitive process such as cognitive bias. These technologies may have been designed by well-intentioned developers, or by consciously malicious technology companies linked with an adversary. Whatever the motivations, the goal is cognitive control, and by targeting the less regulated or vulnerable parts of the brain to encourage maladaptive behaviors, or to trigger an emotional response and shift our attention, adversaries exert control over cognitive processes and initiate disruption, social contagion, undermining our innate cognitive processes and shape decision-making in support of their objectives.
+
+#### 5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+When technology companies use researchers and ML, or deep learning techniques to study user data to understand behavior, they make rediscoveries, and identify ways to anticipate, but not understand user behavior. In the __short-term__ the Cognitive and Behavioral Science pillar should engage with behavior science experts to perform and inform studies that anticipate and test for the potential dual use of technologies. Together they can explore where technologies have been designed and operationalized already and see if users have been harmed in unintended ways. This knowledge driven approach to building understanding concerns how certain technologies are being designed and how they can be used to do harm, intentionally or unintentionally. It will allow NATO to respond not just in redirecting user behavior, but predicting CogWar operations and gain the foresight, grounded in sensemaking, to defend known human cognitive vulnerabilities before they are exposed to technologies that are intentionally designed, or misappropriated to exploit them.
+
+In the __medium-term__ S&T needs to investigate social engineering when it occurs at scale, across multiple perceptual levels, and through different modes of delivery, enabled by modern technology. The complexity lies in developing ways to build self-regulatory skills (such as metacognition) that lead to greater collective vigilance. Research needs to find the balance where being reserved can equate to vigilance, rather than revealing victim behaviors. This multi-disciplinary and multi-method approach is novel and combines cognitive science, social psychology, social and cultural science, and the neuroscience pillar. When this is discussed relating to national security, military intelligence, and NATO collective defence, research needs to address the multiple perceptual levels involved in CogWar. As shown above, CogWar can be a combination of things targeting perceptions. Therefore, people can’t be vigilant all the time. Methods need to be found that augment and help people learn to be vigilant intuitively. Like battle inoculation training in simulated conditions to prepare soldiers for deployments in combat, the same basic concept can be developed to level up performance in CogWar. Preparing soldiers for the effects by exposing them to the attack, helps to prepare them and enables them to learn methods for coping in a CogWar context. This will also help them regulate their own behaviors, so they become learned System 1 intuitive behaviors. When training and education for CogWar pivots to vigilance and meta-cognitive skills development, cognitive security is likely to increase as CogWar operations and attacks become more salient as the mechanisms are no longer hidden in the complexity of plain sight. Just as previous operational and combat experience helps to prepare soldiers for future situations, experiencing CogWar, teaching soldiers how it happens, letting them imagine and develop scenarios, and then perform the attack on each other. This pedagogic approach gives the learner the tools, but the process will involve such things as group consensus and individual differences, both of which CogWar targets to achieve its goals.
+
+Doing this can mark the beginning of the __long-term__ process of recognizing CogWar intuitively in real world situations before their working memory is blocked or overloaded by the attack. The process of making intuition a positive resource rather than a bias involves individuals understanding the mechanisms of CogWar, so they have a greater chance of intervening. This does not involve every service member becoming a cognitive scientist, but it does require awareness of the factors in NATO and the alliance (or a society) that can be targeted, knowledge of individual-level cognitive vulnerabilities that make them susceptible to attack and which skills can mitigate those vulnerabilities, and implementation of individualized and collective training efforts.
+
+This pillar will direct research in Cognitive and Behavioral Science through psychological interventions. Research will shed light on how today’s technological context is enabling such things as narrow AI to guide and lead our decision-making without us being aware of it too often. When an adversary is piggybacking, hijacking or part of the development process of this technology; then, it is critical that we have the knowledge and tools to minimize and defend against instances to prevent this from happening.
+
+#### 5.5 REFERENCES
+
+Berger, J. (2016). Contagious: Why Things Catch On. Simon and Schuster.
+
+Brangetto, P., and Veenendaal, M.A. (May 2016). Influence Cyber Operations: The Use of Cyberattacks in Support of Influence Operations. In 2016 8ᵗʰ International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), pp. 113-126, IEEE.
+
+Canham, M., Sütterlin, S., Ask, T.F., Knox, B.J., Glenister, L., and Lugo, R. (2022). Ambiguous Self-Induced Disinformation (ASID) Attacks: Weaponizing a Cognitive Deficiency. Journal of Information Warfare, 21(3), pp. 43-58.
+
+Cialdini, R. (1993). Influence: Science and Practice, 3ʳᵈ Edition, New York. Harper Collins College Publishers.
+
+Fan, R., Zhao, J., Chen, Y., and Xu, K. (2014). Anger is More Influential than Joy: Sentiment Correlation in Weibo. PloS one, 9(10), p.e110184.
+
+Hadnagy, C. (2010). Social Engineering: The Art of Human Hacking. John Wiley & Sons.
+
+Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
+
+Kramer, A.D., Guillory, J.E., and Hancock, J.T. (2014). Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion through Social Networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(24), pp.8788-8790.
+
+Montañez, R., Golob, E., and Xu, S. (2020). Human Cognition Through the Lens of Social Engineering Cyberattacks. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, p. 1755.
+
+Stieglitz, S., and Dang-Xuan, L. (2013). Emotions and Information Diffusion in Social Media ‒ Sentiment of Microblogs and Sharing Behavior. Journal of Management Information Systems, 29(4), pp.217-248.
+
+Sütterlin, S., Lugo, R.G., Ask, T.F., Veng, K., Eck, J., Fritschi, J., Özmen, M.T., Bärreiter, B., and Knox, B.J. (2022). The Role of IT Background for Metacognitive Accuracy, Confidence and Overestimation of Deep Fake Recognition Skills. In International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction, pp. 103-119, Springer Cham.
+
+
+### Chapter 6 ‒ DEVELOPING COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEFENCE AGAINST COGNITIVE WARFARE
+
+> #### Claude C. Grigsby
+> #### US Air Force Research Laboratory
+> #### UNITED STATES
+
+> #### Richard A. McKinley
+> #### US Air Force Research Laboratory
+> #### UNITED STATES
+
+> #### Nathaniel R. Bridges
+> #### US Air Force Research Laboratory
+> #### UNITED STATES
+
+> #### Jennifer Carpena-Núñez
+> #### US Air Force Research Laboratory
+> #### UNITED STATES
+
+#### 6.1 INTRODUCTION – COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: DEFENCE AGAINST COGNITIVE WARFARE
+
+Future battles will involve far less permissive environments, agile logistics, and adaptive command-and- control. With the increased role of automation, artificial intelligence-enabled virtual teammates, and remote control/supervision of technology, there is a new focus on Cognitive Warfare (CogWar). CogWar targets the human brain/mind by using disinformation, propaganda, and information overload to confuse the enemy and exploit cognitive vulnerabilities. There is a pressing need for the DoD to invest in the emerging area of CogWar, a capability that does not yet exist for allied nation’s military, but near-peer adversaries are aggressively developing such capabilities. Adversarial advances in offensive CogWar must be proactively matched and exceeded by leveraging expertise in cognitive and brain sciences, brain-machine interfaces, applied psychology and AI/ML to enhance the warfighter’s ability to counter such attacks and prevail in the modern battlefield.
+
+In a military context, a warfighter’s cognitive abilities are extremely important in the modern battlespace. There is a need to process vast amounts of data/information rapidly and accurately and ensure that information garnered from such processing is trustworthy, accurate, and dependable. Errors in processing may have dire cascading consequences for effective decision making in the operational environment. These abilities are often suboptimal under conditions of stress and fatigue and may further degrade information management in the command and control chain in modern joint all-domain operations. The impact of such shortfalls is detrimental to human performance and may well increase cognitive and information workload, as well as challenges related to adversaries who will exploit such errors to their advantage. These ever-increasing demands of war have led to the new concept of Cognitive Warfare. A recent NATO-sponsored study described CogWar as the _“weaponization of the brain sciences”_ and contended that advances in CogWar will offer our adversaries _“a means of bypassing the traditional battlefield with significant strategic advantage, which may be utilized to radically transform Western societies.”_ According to Claverie and Cluzel (2022), CogWar is _“the art of using technological tools to alter the cognition of human targets, who are often unaware of any such attempt,”_ or alternatively to _“manipulate an enemy or its citizenry’s cognition mechanisms to weaken, penetrate, influence or even subjugate or destroy it.”_ The ambit of CogWar can extend beyond military to target the entire nation’s human capital.
+
+As du Cluzel stated (Du Cluzel, 2021), CogWar _“does not focus strictly on the field of ‘information’ but on that of ‘cognition’, i.e., what the brain does with information. [...] the cognitive effect is not a consequence of the action; it is its goal.”_ As such, it threatens cognition across all levels, and from the complex psychological aspect may negatively influence and/or impact human interaction and socio-political factors to the most basic physiological (neurological) pathways associated with cognition. While CogWar remains intangible for the time being, this may not be the case for future CogWar. Simply put, neuroscience knowledge products along with emerging neurotechnologies will soon facilitate tangible avenues for CogWar.
+
+Below we highlight three key areas within cognitive neuroscience (and associated fields) that will heavily influence the future of CogWar:
+
+#### 6.2 NEUROSCIENCE AND NEUROMODULATION TECHNIQUES
+
+In contrast to PSYOPS, CogWar focuses on the exploitation of cognitive vulnerabilities including attention overload, perceptual narrowing (“tunnel vision”), and cognitive biases and errors of judgment that detrimentally influence decision making (Figure 6-1). This aspect of CogWar is particularly relevant to Command and Control (C²) operations. Claverie and Cluzel (2022) noted that Gen. Desclaux defined the C² strategic processes as “a cognitive triangle involving knowledge dominance, cyber confidence, and decision superiority.” Given that attention serves the decision maker by selectively acquiring the information needed to decide, attention and decision- making are highly interconnected. Hence, these two aspects of cognition serve as a central focus and distinguisher of the CogWar domain.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 6-1: Differences Between CogWar and PSYOPS (Claverie and Cluzel, 2022)._
+
+Over the last decade, nations have made tremendous advancements in our understanding of brain function due to the accelerating pace of research in neuroscience and psychology coupled with the development of sophisticated neuroimaging tools and analysis methods from biomedical/neuro-engineering. We now have a better understanding of the neural processes that are associated with learning, memory, stress, arousal, attention, emotions, and motor control – attributes that are highly relevant to cognitive performance and decision making. We have also witnessed the development of novel neural network models that describe and predict cognitive biases and their neural substrates and that, in doing so, now allow the systematic targeting of deviations from rationality that lead to suboptimal decision outcomes. In addition, emerging technologies such as non-invasive neuromodulation have shown great promise in modulating many aspects of performance enhancement.
+
+Notably, both neuroscience and neurotechnology are critical elements to future Counter-CogWar. Advances to neuroscience and neurotechnology including neuroimaging, multi-modal sensors, and signal decoding, etc., will provide the means to assess human cognitive states (workload, stress, emotion, and fatigue) real-time; Active monitoring of attention during future ops will enable enhanced (faster, more accurate and dependable) human-machine teaming via AI-enabled decision aids (see AI segment below). Other advances to neuropsychopharmacology and neuromodulation paradigms will provide the means to reduce fatigue, increase learning, and overall improve cognitive performance, increasing resilience against CogWar. For example, non-invasive neuromodulation (e.g., targeted transcranial electric and magnetic stimulation, peripheral nerve stimulation) and interface and interaction design (e.g., human-centered design, adaptive information portrayal) will deliver performance augmentation by selectively targeting attention and decision making.
+
+While allied nations and defence services have promising research efforts in cognitive neuroscience, nations have not focused their research efforts on the development of defensive CogWar capabilities. In contrast, adversarial national strategies for military-civil fusion with a focus on NBIC and CogWar has left our nation at an immense risk of being over-shadowed by adversaries in a domain that will be increasingly critical in future warfare. Indeed, CogWar is a bleeding-edge challenge space that does not exist across allied forces. Thus, an allied Counter-CogWar strategy is essential if we are to enhance our military readiness and requires that we develop programs to expand our knowledge, establish training paradigms, propel technology innovation, and deploy tactical and strategic interventions that effectively target CogWar.
+
+> #### 6.2.1 Neural and Brain-Machine Interfaces
+
+One controversial emerging neuro-technology is the concept of Brain-Machine Interfaces (BMI). This game-changing technology holds the promise to reduce cognitive burden during future wars via enhanced human-machine symbiosis and faster communication in contested environments. BMI also contextualizes the means to perform direct ‘read’ and ‘write’ from the brain, and to enable brain-to-brain communication. The most technologically mature aspect of BMIs (the ‘low hanging fruit’) is the ‘read’ element. BMIs with ‘read’ capabilities enable defensive CogWar by identifying physio-cognitive states that predict high vulnerability to adversarial CogWar, such as lapses of attention, fatigue, stress and uncertainty, and high workload. By classifying these emergent states in warfighters, the BMI system can seamlessly select and administer interventions in an autonomous manner. With ongoing efforts within the military and industry to increase the spatial resolution of “read” BMIs through new sensors/devices, it will become possible to issue commands to technology (e.g., bring up a surveillance camera feed, select a menu, etc.) through simple thought. BMIs with ‘read’ and ‘write’ capabilities, on the other hand, open a realm of possibilities for operators. For instance, closed loop monitoring of human operator attention combined with Artificial Intelligence- (AI-) driven decision aids, secure visual displays content, and Augmented Reality (AR) displays may provide the means to delivering information directly to the brain – like BMI concepts presented in the movie ‘The Matrix.’ Such technology poses clear threats to human autonomy and societal democracies, not just in terms of ELSEI and other privacy concerns but also in the context of cyber security and cyber supremacy. As stated by Orinx and Swielande, _“the development of more and more sophisticated means such as artificial intelligence, (...) and neurosciences facilitate manipulation”_ (Orinx and Swielande, 2022) [of cognitive and decision-making processes]. Thus, future wars will rely heavily on secure means of information delivery, i.e., networks and cognitive processes that can warrant cognitive security and superiority.
+
+> #### 6.2.2 Automation, Autonomy, and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Improved Human-Machine Teaming and Decision Making
+
+As mentioned, attention and decision making are key players in CogWar. Thus, capabilities that leverage automation, autonomy, and AI assistants that assist cognition will be increasingly critical. Such capabilities will facilitate communication between man and machine, reduce burden on cognitive load, and accelerate the speed and volume of information processing. Mission spaces including C², cyber defence, remotely operated vehicle control, and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) all utilize massive quantities of data and information that are prone to information overload, cognitive bias, and/or attention tunneling. Operators often make decisions quickly under a variety of stressors (fatigue, workload, uncertainty, etc.), and their decision making is more likely to be influenced negatively by biases and misinformation. As the battle space becomes increasingly complex, adversaries will seek to gain military advantage by exploiting misinformation and injection of unprecedented levels of uncertainty, making it more challenging for decision makers to confidently detect and exploit reliable information amid the noise. CogWar capabilities that leverage or improve human-machine teaming and decision making via automation, autonomy, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) will provide cognitive security by ensuring the means to discretely and objectively informing decision makers. Such capabilities will safely modulate key brain areas associated with wakefulness and attention, helping each analyst/C² decision maker accelerate information processing speed, sustain attention, and reduce fatigue.
+
+Counter-CogWar capabilities assisted by AI will help monitor the types of tasks, the number of tasks, and the specific tasks that an operator is attending. Critically, this will allow autonomy/AI to provide customized support to operators such as target recognition technologies, neuromodulation, or alterations in display content, to help them maintain performance in times of distress and augment performance when necessary. Such tools can also provide the means to identify and deter threats associated with future capabilities, e.g., direct ‘read’/’write’ from the brain. These may help ‘orient’ decision makers at times of cognitive overload or CogWar attacks.
+
+> #### 6.2.3 Technical Areas Requiring De-Risking for Effective Counter-Cognitive Warfare
+
+
+
+_▲ Table 6-1: Technical Areas of Neurotechnology Requiring De-Risking._
+
+#### 6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
+
+It is evident that future CogWar will benefit from capabilities that adaptively select and administer neuro-enhancing techniques to boost attention and enhance decision making. Such capabilities must protect against key cognitive stressors (fatigue, uncertainty, and information overload) during critical warfighter tasks, insulating warfighters against adversarial CogWar and empowering them to administer offensive CogWar. To accomplish this, nations must shift focus from offensive to defensive mechanisms that mitigate adversarial CogWar and interrupt their offensive campaigns. Said strategies include developing tools and technologies to increase awareness of CogWar, penetrating and disrupting misinformation campaigns, securing information sharing platforms and preventing breach, developing counter Neurotechnologies, and establishing frameworks that unify CogWar efforts. Future CogWar concepts will thus require coordinated operational imperatives, robust platforms, infrastructures and data pipelines or architectures that secure our cognitive domain and penetrate and dissolve adversarial practices. Furthermore, Nations must orchestrate efforts to:
+
+- Improve understanding of the psychological, sociological, and emotional variables influencing cognition.
+
+- Identify and address factors that increase vulnerability in individuals or groups of individuals.
+
+- Identify vulnerabilities and turning points (e.g., via modeling and War Games) within decision-making OODA-loops (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act).
+
+- Identify communication/information pathways (e.g., within social or cyber networks/platforms) and points of intervention.
+
+- Identify and deter cognitive attacks by ‘passive’ (i.e., via ‘ground truth’ campaigns) and ‘active’ (i.e., via neuro-interference and secure BMIs) means.
+
+- Identify critical warfighter tasks that must be secured/insulated against adversarial CogWar.
+
+- Identify militarily relevant BMI and other neurotechnologies.
+
+- Identify and address gaps between commercial/clinical technologies and military use cases (i.e., populations, needs, and operational environments).
+
+- Develop hardware/software optimization, protocols, and data processing pipelines that accelerate the development of Counter-CogWar technologies.
+
+- Identify and address barriers-to-adoption of Counter-CogWar technologies (including neurotechnology, neural or brain-machine interfaces, AI, etc.) created by the lack of evaluation criteria and baseline metrics.
+
+- Establish common practices, requirements, capabilities, and evaluation/validation criteria.
+
+- Develop a suite of “neuro-weapons” in the form of a highly trained workforce and BMI-enabled warfighters.
+
+> #### 6.3.1 Technical Gaps Limiting the Adoption of BMI Systems into Military
+
+Additional hurdles impact the development, deployment, and integration of BMIs. Whilst some arise from ELSEI concerns, a significant number are technical in nature. Below is a list of key technical gaps liming the adoption of BMIs into military CogWar concepts:
+
+1) Testing and evaluation of current and emerging Brain-Machine Interface (BMI) technologies.
+
+2) Quantification and assessment of signal quality, usability and comfort, and hardware and software limitations on relevant populations.
+
+3) Evaluation of system/operational requirements (i.e., form factor/power restrictions, signal/noise processing, network security, etc.).
+
+4) Non-human subjects engineering tests, sensor positioning accuracy and repeatability testing using 3D scanning, and BMI device property characterization procedures.
+
+5) Delivery of data-driven decision matrices for codification of strengths and weaknesses of BMI technologies and their relevance to career domains and use cases.
+
+6) Development of virtual reality maintenance environments and relevant tasks with the ability to quantify research subject motion dynamics.
+
+7) Strategic partnerships with leaders and organizations developing BMI technologies.
+
+8) Provide strategies for engagements/links between the BMI and operational communities.
+
+#### 6.4 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTIONS: THE WAY AHEAD
+
+Below we delineate the near-term and long-term state of neurotechnology:
+
+- __Now (1‒2 years):__ Mature cognitive state assessment technologies, predictive algorithms, and cognitive augmentation approaches to defend against CogWar. Leverage new sensors and stimulation techniques to increase spatial resolution for future read and write to the brain applications.
+
+- __Next (3‒5 years):__ Develop closed loop monitor and augment systems for personalized sustainment, augmentation of Operator performance. Develop brain activity “libraries” to read user commands directly from the brain using high-resolution BMI technology.
+
+- __Future: (5+ years):__ Mission specific modular systems for cognitive/physical state assessment with real-time sustainment and augmentation feedback tech; BMI with full read and write capabilities.
+
+#### 6.5 REFERENCES
+
+[Claverie, B., and du Cluzel, F. (2022). Cognitive Warfare: The Advent of the Concept of “Cognitics” in the Field of Warfare. In Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03635889/document).
+
+[Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. (2022) Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 20201. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, pp.8, 1-6](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Cognitive%20Warfare%20Symposium%20-%20ENSC%20-%20March%202022%20Publication.pdf).
+
+[Du Cluzel, F. (2021). Cognitive Warfare, a Battle for the Brain. STO-MP-AVT-211 (KN3-1 ‒ KN3-12)](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Cognitive%20Warfare%20Symposium%20-%20ENSC%20-%20March%202022%20Publication.pdf).
+
+[Orinx, K., and Struye de Swielande, T. (2022). China and Cognitive Warfare: Why Is the West Losing? In Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 20201. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03635889/document).
+
+
+### Chapter 7 ‒ DEFENCE AGAINST 21ˢᵗ CENTURY COGNITIVE WARFARE: CONSIDERATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF EMERGING ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES
+
+> #### Yvonne R. Masakowski
+> #### US Naval War College
+> #### UNITED STATES
+
+> #### Eskil Grendahl Sivertsen
+> #### Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
+> #### NORWAY
+
+_The same wide span of Fourth Industrial Revolution technology (data, processing, connectivity, AI, robotics, biosciences, autonomy and so forth) that is changing how we live, work and play will now transform the way war is waged ‒ in a process spanning at least a generation ... Military transformation will largely be about the rapid adoption and adaptation of civil-sector-derived technology and methods in disruptive military applications ... The future of military success will now be owned by those who conceive, design, build and operate combinations of information-based technologies to deliver new combat power._
+
+> #### General Sir Richard Barrons (Uppal, 2022)
+
+#### 7.1 INTRODUCTION
+
+Twenty-first century advances in technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML), Autonomous systems, Robotics, drones, and the emergence of a vast array of Social Media platforms have transformed the 21ˢᵗ century battlespace. Cheap, commercially available drones have proven to be effective Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets that may also deliver effects in the cognitive dimension. Small drones are silent and difficult to detect. Equipped with sensors as well as explosives, such as hand grenades, and off-the-shelf drones may have a significant psychological impact on troops on the ground. Combined with other technologies, such as facial recognition software, drones become a major force multiplier for cognitive warfare. Indeed, these technologies have reconfigured the battlespace and altered the character of warfare. The evolution of advanced technologies has given rise to Cognitive Warfare (CogWar). Du Cluzel describes CogWar as the “manipulation of the enemy’s cognition” aimed at weakening, influencing, delaying, and even destroying the enemy (Du Cluzel, 2021; Claverie and Du Cluzel; 2022, Claverie et al., 2022). This type of warfare influences human heuristics and decision making and extends its reach to the public, society and to the military. CogWar represents the convergence of Psychological Operations (PsyOps), Information Operations (INFO OPS), and cyber operations with the advance of AI/ML networks that serve as an enabler for the distribution of the adversary’s strategic agenda in exploiting human vulnerabilities and shaping human understanding of events (Guyader, 2021).
+
+Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) have changed warfare. Today, these technologies enable actors to infiltrate the cognitive dimension of the Information Environment (IE) more effectively. Overt and covert influence and interference methods are being employed systematically by malign actors to shape and manipulate the situational awareness and decision-making process on all levels – from the international political level to the military strategic, operational, tactical, and sub-tactical level.
+
+Even in the most remote and less developed regions of the world, most people have Internet access, smart phones, and social media accounts. This enables them to document and share observations and information about their surroundings including military equipment, troop movements and tactics. Also, most troops are connected and have social media accounts, even if they may not use their devices on the battlefield. Commercially available drones, facial recognition software, artificial intelligence, geo-tagging, and satellite imagery have added another layer of both risks and opportunities to be understood, mitigated, and exploited by all parties, civilian and military, in areas of conflict.
+
+The permeation of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) in operation (AO) poses obvious risks to Operation Security (OPSEC), Information Security (INFOSEC) and freedom of maneuver for any part in any conflict. For example, in the aftermath of the downing of Malaysian Airlines MH17 over Ukraine in 2014, Bellingcat was able to identify and document Russian personnel, equipment, tactics and locations using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) techniques including mapping of videos, images and social media accounts belonging to both civilians and Russian troops (Bellingcat, 2019). For all parts of an armed conflict today, ICTs offer vast opportunities for intelligence gathering, improved Situational Awareness (SA), Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), shaping of the battlefield and deception. However, as with all technology, the flipside of increased opportunity is increased risk. CogWar represents a new, insidious, and invisible threat to human decision making across all domains. CogWar influences human perception and decision making across the military, political, economic, and societal environments. Information has been weaponized across a wide array of platforms and used to target individuals, governments, and the mass consciousness as a means of justifying an adversaries’ strategic objectives. Thus, the Tide Sprint Cognitive Warfare workshop was focused on addressing how best to defend against CogWar as we anticipate that this trend will continue to accompany future emerging technological advances in the coming years.
+
+Namely, advances in brain research, brain-machine interfaces, neuroscience, quantum computing power, and genomic research, etc., will continue to be integrated in the design of future technologies. The integration of advances in AI and ML algorithms has provided adversaries with a new type of weapon.
+
+The automated production of content is now possible with minimal effort as enormous amounts of information may be generated and used to target individuals, governments, and the mass consciousness at a rapid rate. This capability empowers individuals such that one person may influence a wide audience across thousands of social media accounts to influence and create confusion. Adversaries may spread their influence by setting up proxy sites, such as fake news sites or blogs, which has become quick and easy (Hao, 2020). Deep fake technology is becoming readily accessible, enabling anyone with decent computer skills to create images, voice, and video recordings that seem authentic but are not. While fake, extremely convincing content may be effective in manipulating target audiences, it may also have a chilling effect, as the increased presence of deep fake material on the Internet may lead to decreased trust in digital evidence. Thus, the Internet and social media serve as vehicles of information for transmitting their message and agenda. We anticipate that this trend will continue and shape future CogWar.
+
+Likewise, it is easy to develop facial recognition technology that may be readily configured to identify adversaries in the battlefield. One single soldier with a cheap camera or camera drone, facial recognition software and internet access may be able to identify opposing soldiers in the battlefield. In Ukraine, drones equipped with facial recognition and social media have been used to identify Russian soldiers (Clayton, 2022). In several hundred cases, Ukrainian forces have sent photos of dead Russian soldiers to their families to stir up dissent in Russia (Lonas, 2022). So too, drones equipped with facial recognition technology has been used to conduct BDA and identify family members who were killed during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
+
+Adversaries may now corrupt AI/ML networks by integrating poisoned training datasets into ML algorithms (Dickson, 2021). Adversaries can now integrate poisoned datasets into social media sites and training datasets used to develop new ML algorithms (Steinhardt, Koh, and Liang, 2017; Gregory, 2021; Koh, Steinhardt and Liang, 2022). Thus, this practice may be used to poison an entire database as it spreads like a virus throughout the social media network. At the center of this debate, AI/ML technologies are increasingly weaponized in support of adversaries’ agendas and national interests.
+
+CogWar is a reality in the 21ˢᵗ Century NATO operational environment. Information, as part of CogWar, is disseminated via an insidious and invisible digital network whose fingerprints are difficult to detect within the deeply embedded AI digital network. Advances in natural language, AI/ML algorithms, and the intersection of emerging scientific advances in neuroscience, genomics, quantum computing, social media platforms, and gaming will make this even more challenging in the future. The trend to enhance independent thinking via embedding advanced AI/ML algorithms in Robotics, drones, Brain-machine interfaces, etc., and developing systems with human-like logic and reasoning capabilities presents challenges for future decision makers (Aberman, 2017; Arkin, 1992; 2007; Chandra, 2017; Cole and Singer, 2020; Cummings 2007, 2010; Masakowski, 2020). These advanced Robotics, drones, and human Brain-modeled machines, etc., will evolve as colleagues, collaborators and partners designed with independent decision-making capabilities (Aberman, 2017; Arkin, 2007; Cummings, 2007; 2017; Ishiguro, 2021; Wallach and Allen, 2009; Masakowski, 2020, 2022). Thus, there is a need to imagine a future replete with advanced technologies that will outstrip current computing limitations and envision a future where autonomous AI/ML agents and machines will complement, augment, and at times, eliminate the human-in-or-on-the loop in the OODA-like decision environment.
+
+#### 7.2 SOCIAL MEDIA AND CYBER NETWORKS
+
+Social media is a powerful technological enabler of CogWar on all levels, from enabling the shaping of strategic narratives and influencing mass consciousness, to tactical deception on the ground. Examples of common tactics include the use of fake and stolen accounts to infiltrate and influence domestic conversations, micro-targeting of individuals and exclusive audiences, and the distribution of false and misleading content and coordinated inauthentic behavior to amplify or suppress selected narratives or material.
+
+As societies become increasingly reliant on computer networks and digital services, vulnerabilities for CogWar attacks increase. With the advent of 5G networks and the Internet of Things (IoT), the physical and the digital worlds merge, and the possibilities for data exploitation and manipulation grow. Attacks in the cyber domain may provide adversaries with valuable information that can be (mis)used to create cognitive affects ranging from discrediting countries, organizations, or key personnel to reducing trust in democratic institutions or computer systems (Pappalardo, 2022).
+
+The NATO Tech Trends report (NATO, 2022) highlights the potential impact of emerging, disruptive technologies that will transform the future battlespace. AI/ML, drones, robots, and BMIs will become the military defence arsenal of the future (Giordano, Kulkarni, and Farwell, 2014; Masakowski, 2020). Advances in super-intelligent AI/ML technologies will provide a new means of collaboration and decision making among human-machine teams (Dobbyn and Stuart, 2003; Dutt and TaheriNejad, 2016; Ishiguro, 2021, Wallach and Allen, 2009; Forrest, 2015; Lin, Bekey and Abney, 2017; Masakowski, Smythe and Creely, 2014; Masakowski, 2020; 2022). Autonomous AI systems will relate to BMI as part of the new command and control network (Cole and Singer, 2020; Masakowski, 2020, 2022).
+
+These technologies will include intelligent, integrated, and resilient artificial intelligence, analytics and decision capabilities across the technological spectrum as follows:
+
+- __Autonomous Systems:__ Artificial intelligence-enabled autonomous systems capable of some level of autonomous decision making. Such autonomous systems may be robotic, platform-based or (digital) agent-based.
+
+- __Humanistic Intelligence:__ The seamless integration of psycho-social-techno-systems supporting enhanced human-machine teaming and synergistic behaviors.
+
+- __Knowledge Analytics:__ Advanced analytical methods (including AI) exploring large data sets and advanced mathematics to provide insights, knowledge, and advice hitherto impractical.
+
+__Interconnected:__ Exploitation of the network (or mesh) of overlapping real and virtual domains, including sensors, organizations, institutions, individuals, autonomous agents, and processes.
+
+- __Trusted Communications:__ The use of technologies such as distributed ledger technologies (e.g., blockchain), Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), post-quantum cryptography and AI cyber-agents to ensure trusted interactions and information exchange.
+
+- __Synergistic Systems:__ The development of mixed (physical or virtual) complex systems-of systems allowing for the creation of novel ecosystems (e.g., smart cities).
+
+__Distributed:__ Decentralized and ubiquitous large-scale sensing, storage, computation, decision making, research and development.
+
+- __Edge Computing:__ Embedding of storage, computation and analytics/AI into agents and objects close to information sources.
+
+- __Ubiquitous Sensing:__ Embedding of low (or lower cost) sensors to create large sensor networks across the human-physical-information domains.
+
+- __Decentralized Production:__ Exploitation of AI-assisted design, novel materials, and (mixed material) 3D/4D printing technologies, to support just-in-time local digital manufacturing and production.
+
+- __Democratized S&T:__ Reducing costs of design and production, increasing computational capabilities and the broad availability of S&T information will increase innovation and the generation of novel science.
+
+__Digital:__ Blending of the human, physical and information domains to create new physiological, psychological, social, and cultural realities.
+
+- __Digital Twin:__ A digital simulacrum of physical, biological or information entities digitally linked (often in near real-time) to the original, supporting predictive analytics, experimentation, and assessment.
+
+- __Synthetic Realities:__ The creation of new perceived cognitive or physical realities based on the integration of psycho-socio-technical systems. Such realities may be augmented, virtual, social, or cultural in nature.
+
+The NATO S&T Trend Report (2020) considers the intersection of multidisciplinary scientific areas of research associated with security challenges in the future CogWar operational environment as illustrated in the House Model (Chapter 2, Figure 2-1). Thus, the HFM-ET-356 team contends that S&T investment meet the demands of the future battlespace environment and include research on the following topics.
+
+Intelligent and Distributed Autonomous AI/ML Systems, networks and Agents aimed at enhancing human capabilities also serve as a force multiplier. The development of AI-enabled Autonomous systems and Intelligent Agent networks will facilitate more sophisticated and effective decision making, support complex human-machine teaming, and expand capabilities in the cyber defence networks (Porat, Gilad, et al. 2012; Lin, Bekey and Abney, 2017; Shim and Arkin, 2012). Brain-Machine Interfaces (BMI) that may be used by warfighters as part of direct communication with command and control centers may provide enhanced Situational Awareness (SA) but may also present a vulnerability that must be defended (Giordano, Kulkarni and Farwell, 2014).
+
+AI-enabled Autonomous systems and intelligent agents will facilitate rapid data analysis and provide strategic advisory support for operational and tactical mission planning, as well as support the OODA-Loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act). This enhanced intelligent agent network will accelerate the speed of the decision-making cycle and require new methods of symbiotic human-machine teaming and interactions. The evolution of ML algorithms will continue to enhance SA, with faster and more accurate sensemaking strategies and facilitate the operational effectiveness across a wide spectrum of operational domains (i.e., land, air, sea, cyber, and space.)
+
+The interconnectedness of AI/ML digital networks will afford the development of agile and adaptive de-centralized Command and Control networks that will empower and enable operators to maintain greater SA in the battlespace. However, these AI/ML networks and human brain-machine interfaces will be targeted and subject to disinformation campaigns, cyber intrusion, and/or physical attacks. The invasive nature of cognitive attacks could be initiated prior to conflict and aim to disrupt information flow, and/or strike indirectly at personnel, logistics, information, financial, economic, medical, or other critical elements of military operational and strategic networks. Thus, CogWar presents challenges as adversaries exploit advances in AI/ML technologies and use AI/ML digital networks as a vehicle for disseminating mis-and disinformation campaigns to spread their influence aligned with their agenda (Orinx, Struye de Swielande, 2021). Consequently, CogWar mandates the need to develop defence systems that will ensure the cognitive security of the AI/ML network, as well as defend against social engineering attempts and the intrusion of systems on human perceptions, cognitive processes, and decision making.
+
+#### 7.3 COGNITIVE SECURITY AND SECURING THE FUTURE
+
+Cognitive Security (COGSEC) will be required to defend the security and reliability of information that is essential for maintaining trust with our Allied Partners. Malicious attacks across social media platforms and the intrusion of poisoned data sets being used to train ML algorithms highlights the need to develop security measures and policies regarding the source of data being used to develop AI/ML digital networks. The issue of trust in data and the resilience of the digital networks are critical for ensuring that we are sharing information that is valid, reliable, and trustworthy as that is the foundation for mission planning and decision making.
+
+This is especially critical for the development of trustworthy AI/ML algorithms and trustworthy AI networks. According to the literature, trustworthy Artificial Intelligence networks, must have the following set of characteristics:
+
+- __Validity:__ To guarantee that an AI-based system will do only and all of what it is intended to do.
+
+- __Security:__ To ensure robustness and resilience within adversarial conditions.
+
+- __Explainability:__ Provide understandable and context relevant justifications and explanations.
+
+- __Responsibility:__ Compliant with ethical, legal, and regulatory frameworks.
+
+For the warfighter, such advances will help to shape SA and influence decision making. For the adversary, these advances will serve as a force multiplier that may be weaponized to their strategic advantage. China and Russia view emerging technologies as opportunities to exploit dual-use technologies to their strategic advantage and develop military defence capabilities that will ensure technological superiority and global supremacy across all domains, including space and satellite defence (Orinx, Struye de Swielande, 2021).
+
+Recently, China expressed their intent to destroy Elon Musk’s ___Starlink___ satellites as they perceived it as a threat to their national security (Turner, 2022). This type of attack in space represents a new element of warfare! Satellites provide surveillance capabilities for managing networks of military defence systems on a global scale. “Hard kill” weapons refer to the ability to physically strike and attack a target; “Soft Kill” weapons refer to the ability to jam systems and satellites and laser weapons (Turner, 2022). The point is that this is just the beginning as satellite capabilities evolve and defence systems are required to prevent intrusion whether on the Internet and/or in Deep Space. Such attacks on satellites in space would have grave cascading consequences across the military, nations, and the global economy. We can no longer focus just on the traditional domains, land, air, sea, cyber but must include space defence. Indeed, we must also consider the impact of CogWar on the human domain; namely, think of ways to defend cognitive processes and decision making at all levels, including mass consciousness. We anticipate that this trend will become a pattern of defence in the future.
+
+Therefore, as the need for increased security forces continues to emerge, the focus on advances in AI, computing power and cyber technologies is viewed as a means of enhancing our military readiness and force capabilities. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) is the primary step for framing and preparing an effective mission plan. Autonomous, unmanned systems provide military leaders with SA across the battlespace and are an essential component for mission planning and operational success. CogWar requires the development of defensive technologies if we are to successfully defend NATO and Allied Partners’ freedoms.
+
+#### 7.4 DEFENDING AGAINST COGNITIVE WARFARE
+
+Nations must develop countermeasures to ensure operational readiness and defend their military strategic and operational plans from adversaries who would undermine their military operations on a global scale. The question is, how do we defend against CogWar? We must anticipate the impact of emerging technologies and that of the intersection of scientific areas to be effective in our defence strategy against CogWar. This CogWar report highlights various topics in the S&T roadmap chapter that reflect a strategy for the development of a defensive arsenal of advanced technologies such as AI/ML, BMIs, et al. technologies to defend against CogWar. Nations must consider the defence against CogWar as a national and global security imperative.
+
+A cognitive attack may be launched to target an individual or to shape mass consciousness and justify a nation’s military strategic objectives. Today, we are witnessing the influence and impact of CogWar in the Russia/Ukraine invasion. Russia is reshaping the geopolitical environment by its attack on Ukraine and provoking responses via its information network used to justify their military agenda. They are indoctrinating their youth with their version of the true enemy (New York Times, 2022). The influence of CogWar is evidenced by the level of civil unrest, political upheaval, and societal division based on perceptions and beliefs associated with manipulated information in the social media environment. This is a powerful tool for weaponizing information and inciting individuals to act based on misinformation that aligns with the adversary’s agenda. This trend is dangerous and makes us all potential victims as adversaries continue to manipulate human perceptions and decisions. The threat of CogWar is not to be taken lightly as technological superiority is the enabler for adversaries to achieve military superiority and global supremacy. CogWar is a weapon in the adversary’s toolbox used to achieve their objectives, shift our attention, reshape human understanding of events, trigger civil unrest, undermine democracies, and reshape the geopolitical and economic environment to their nation’s advantage. Russia and China have made great strides in moving toward their strategic objectives by controlling their nation’s messaging to their people, weaponizing information to global competitors, and leveraging strategic capabilities by controlling information dissemination on a global scale.
+
+#### 7.5 COUNTERING COGNITIVE WARFARE
+
+NATO and its Allied Partners, Partners for Peace (PfP) nations, et al. must develop a defence strategy against CogWar. Nations need to develop Cognitive Security programs to defend AI/ML digital networks from adversarial intrusion, manipulation, misinformation/disinformation campaigns across all domains. The time is now to develop defensive networks and systems to protect individual data and national data across all AI/ML digital networks. The manipulation of information and data associated across the AI/ML network may be weaponized to destroy a nation’s economy, undermine governments and threaten national, global security, as well as fracture democratic societies across the globe.
+
+NATO and its Allied partners must develop guidelines, rules-of-the-road, and recommendations for ensuring the security of data bases used in military operations. Nations must ensure that AI/ML networks are reliable, resilient, trustworthy, and secure by embedding forensic threat detection capabilities and trust analytics in their system designs to ensure the security of future networks. Adversarial data poisoning of AI/ML algorithms is emerging as a major threat to military defence (Dickson, 2021; Waltzman, 2017). Indeed, Ullrich, Dean of the SANS Technology Institute has stated in his RSA Keynote address: “One of the most basic threats when it comes to Machine Learning is one of the attackers being able to influence the samples that we are using to train our models...” (Gregory, 2021; Ullrich, 2021). Nations need to develop guidelines, policies, source certification processes and forensic tools to defend against these intrusions and defend against future attacks (Stokes, England, and Kane, 2021; Steinhardt, Koh, and Liang, 2017, 2022; Koh, Steinhardt and Liang, 2021).
+
+Education must also play a pivotal role in the development of future critical thinkers. Children should be taught early in school how to recognize _fake_ information on social media platforms. Children must also be taught critical thinking skills, including how to challenge assumptions, apply logic and reasoning to their thinking and develop the skills to defend against manipulation of their perceptions and reasoning. Nations must address the vulnerabilities of AI/ML networks and systems as well as defend against data breaches, poisoning of training datasets and the unrestricted exploitation of social media platforms, news networks that are used to shape public perceptions aligned with information that threatens to undermine NATO’s democratic commitment.
+
+NATO must develop the guidance to help nations develop their strategic plans for defence against CogWar. The NATO HFM-ET-356 Science and Technology roadmap is a first step toward establishing the policies and practices, as well as the technologies, which will need to be developed in the defence against CogWar.
+
+#### 7.6 ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES
+
+NATO needs to develop leaders who will understand how to ethically deploy advanced technologies in CogWar. It is important for military personnel and leaders to understand the ethical and legal implications of employing advanced technologies in CogWar. Given the way that adversaries are using AI/ML networks and social media platforms to engage with the population (civilian and military); there is a need to educate military personnel on the ethical issues related to CogWar attacks. NATO leaders may see these new technologies used against them on the battlefield or must make decisions on how to use new technologies within the law of armed conflict. Some of the legal and ethical questions raised by these new technologies can be addressed by the NATO Alliance in advance, but there will be unanticipated applications in contested environments that cause ethical challenges for the leaders in the immediate moment. NATO leaders must be prepared to make right decisions that are ethical, effective, and efficient in the chaos of combat.
+
+Future technological advances could fundamentally change NATO Command and Control military operations. Even if NATO determines it will not employ a new technology, potential adversaries may choose to develop and employ the capability. Consequently, we must recognize and be prepared to address new, asymmetric threats. NATO has a duty to preserve peace and security as well as ensure the safety of its personnel.
+
+For example, AI/ML systems, Robots, etc., will be the _digital partner_ of future leaders by providing a range of options and decisions based on its ability to manage vast amounts of data from distributed networks. Today, the human maintains the principal authority for decision making. However, the level of responsibility for military operations will be shared with AI-enabled systems, Robots, and networks. Robots will be partners, collaborators, and decision makers in future military operations. Regardless of the technology, i.e., Robot, drone, weaponized AUV, or an AI-enabled weapon system, the decision to implement these technologies raises grave ethical consequences for the military leader and for society itself (Department of Defense, 2012; Masakowski, 2022). Advances in our understanding of the brain and biological modeling will contribute to future advances in AI designs and autonomous unmanned systems. However, NATO must prepare its leaders to operate in the future CogWar environment that will be replete with advanced technologies that are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. Technology will continue to develop in both complexity and capability, however, decisions to employ such technologies ethically must be retained by the human decision-maker. We must defend against the misuse of advanced technologies and at the same time, prepare to defend against adversaries who might use such advances against us in CogWar.
+
+#### 7.7 THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETENCY
+
+NATO must provide military personnel with the education, training, and experience that will prepare them for the defence against CogWar. There is a need to develop a military person’s technological competence for understanding the capabilities that advanced technologies provide to both the warfighter and the adversary. To this end, S&T investment needs to be focused on developing training tools that build Social Media expertise, provide wargaming opportunities for military to develop understanding of the technological capabilities and shortfalls of each technology, as well as provide field experience so that the military learns to employ these technologies ethically and effectively.
+
+NATO personnel must acquire an understanding of CogWar and the role that technologies will play in shaping the operational environment. Today, it has become more complicated with the intrusion of misinformation embedded in social media platforms. Information warfare has taken on a new level of meaning and one that is difficult to counter amid the complexity of integrated AI/ML digital networks. Therefore, military personnel must achieve technological competency and understand the capabilities and risks associated with the deployment of advanced technologies such as AI/ML networks, etc., They must also understand the ethical, moral, and legal consequences for integrating advanced technologies as part of their mission plans. Military personnel must be made aware of the gaps and vulnerabilities of these AI/ML networks that may be targeted by adversaries.
+
+Military leaders must be made aware of the ethical consequences associated with extensive AI/ML networks that support social media platforms, AI facial recognition surveillance systems, AI Situational Awareness systems, autonomous weaponized systems, autonomous unmanned systems, AI Robotics, etc., that present significant challenges in the defence against CogWar. These technologies impact civilian, military and society itself and thus play a critical role in how we defend against them in CogWar (Loten and Simons, 2017). Military personnel must understand how adversaries might use these technologies to their advantage if they are going to be able to counter these attacks and mitigate against their influence. Education, training, and experience will prove to be pivotal elements in NATO’s CogWar defence strategy for the future.
+
+#### 7.8 CONCLUSION AND THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
+
+CogWar is aimed at weaponizing information to support the adversary’s agenda and will continue to capitalize on technological innovations that support their cause. It is NATO’s duty therefore to think defensively in anticipation of such events. NATO must ensure the safety and security of its allied partner nations and its respective military personnel by developing an S&T defence strategy that will ensure the development of tools, techniques, and technologies in NATO’s defence against CogWar.
+
+We anticipate that the emergence and integration of scientific discoveries will continue to provide adversaries with opportunities for the development of new weapons of war. However, we must also take the opportunity to develop defensive measures that will counter the adversary’s advance and potential success in CogWar. NATO must be prepared to defend against CogWar across all domains.
+
+The future security environment will continue to challenge NATO with its uncertainty and complexity. NATO and its adversaries will continue to exploit advances and innovation in technologies in the conduct of CogWar. The rapid rate of technological innovation adds to the level of importance in advancing S&T research for defensive technologies.
+
+NATO must provide the guidance for its partner nations and the HFM-ET-356 S&T roadmap will serve as a compass to guide and direct nations to invest in S&T research that will facilitate the development of critical tools and technologies. The Science and Technology roadmap (Chapter 14) will provide the coordinates for mapping out a plan for designing the future defence against CogWar.
+
+#### 7.9 REFERENCES
+
+[Aberman, J. (27 February 2017). Artificial Intelligence Will Change America. Here’s How. The Washington Post (Online)](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capitalbusiness/wp/2017/02/27/artificialintelligence-will-change-america-hereshow/?utm_term=.3e325159efd9).
+
+Arkin, R.C. (1992). Modeling Neural Function at the Schema Level: Implications and Results for Robotic Control. In R.D. Beer, R.E. Ritzmann and T. McKenna (Eds.), Biological neural networks in invertebrate neuroethology and robotics (pp. 383-410). Cambridge, MA: Academic Press.
+
+[Arkin, R.C. (2007). Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture. (technical report GIT-GVU-07-11). Atlanta: Georgia Tech GVU Center](http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robotlab/onlinepublications/formalizationv35.pdf).
+
+[Bellingcat Investigation Team (19 June 2019). Identifying the Separatists Linked to the Downing of MH17](https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/06/19/identifying-the-separatists-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/).
+
+[Chandra, R. (2017). An Affective Computational Model for Machine Consciousness](http://arxiv.org/abs/1701.00349).
+
+[Claverie, B., and du Cluzel, F. (2022). Cognitive Warfare: The Advent of the Concept of “Cognitics” in the Field of Warfare. In Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. (Eds.). Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 2021. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03635889/document).
+
+[Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. (Eds.) (2022). Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 2021. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France. NATO Collaboration Support Office, pp.8, 1-6, 2022, 978-92-837-2392-9. hal-03635930](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Cognitive%20Warfare%20Symposium%20-%20ENSC%20-%20March%202022%20Publication.pdf).
+
+[Clayton, J. (13 April 2022). How Facial Recognition is Identifying the Dead in Ukraine. BBC News](https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-61055319).
+
+Cole, A., and Singer, P.W. (2020). Burn-In. A Novel of the Real Robotic Revolution. Mariner Books, Houghton-Mifflin Harcourt. Boston. New York.
+
+Cummings, M.L., and Guerlain, S. (2007). Developing Operator Capacity Estimates for Supervisory Control of Autonomous Vehicles. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 49(1), 1-15. doi:10.1518/001872007779598109.
+
+Cummings, M.L., Clare, A., and Hart, C. (2010). The Role of Human-Automation Consensus in Multiple Unmanned Vehicle Scheduling. Human Factors: The Journal of Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 52(1), 17-27. doi:10.1177/0018720810368674.
+
+Department of Defense. (2012). Autonomy in Weapon Systems (DoD directive Number 3000.09). Washington, DC: Department of Defense.
+
+[Dickson, B. (2021). Adversarial Machine Learning: The Underrated Threat of Data Poisoning. The Machine: Making Sense of AI](https://venturebeat.com/ai/adversarial-machine-learning-underrated-threat-data-poisoning/).
+
+Dobbyn, C., and Stuart, S. (2003). The Self as an Embedded Agent. Minds and Machines, 13(2), 187-201. doi:1022997315561
+
+Du Cluzel, F. (2021). Cognitive Warfare, a Battle for the Brain. In: Applying Neuroscience to Performance: From Rehabilitation to Human Cognitive STO Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Panel Symposium 11‒12 October 2021, Rome, Italy. NATO STO Meeting Proceedings. STO-MP-HFM-334-KN3. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France.
+
+[Dutt, N., and TaheriNejad, N. (2016). Self-Awareness in Cyber-Physical Systems. Paper presented at the 29ᵗʰ International Conference on VLSI Design and 15ᵗʰ International Conference on Embedded Systems (VLSID), Kolkata, India](http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7434906/).
+
+[Forrest, C. (2015). Chinese Factory Replaces 90% of Humans with Robots, Production Soars](https://www.techrepublic.com/article/chinese-factory-replaces-90-ofhumans-with-robots-production-soars/).
+
+Giordano, J., Kulkarni, A., and Farwell, J. (2014). Deliver Us from Evil? The Temptation, Realities, and Neuroethico-Legal Issues of Employing Assessment Neuro-Technologies in Public Safety Initiatives. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 35(1), 73-89. doi: 10.1007/s11017-014-9278-4.
+
+[Gregory, J. (2021). Data Poisoning: The Next Big Threat. Security Intelligence](https://securityintelligence.com/articles/data-poisoning-big-threat/).
+
+[Guyader, H. (2021). Cognitive Domain: A Sixth Domain of Operations. In Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. (Eds.). Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 2021. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03635898/document).
+
+[Hao, K. (14 August 2020). A College Kid’s Fake, AI-Generated Blog Fooled Tens of Thousands. This is How He Made it. MIT Technology Review](https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/14/1006780/ai-gpt-3-fake-blog-reached-top-of-hacker-news/).
+
+Ishiguro, K. (2021). Klara and the Sun. Knopf Publishers, New York, New York.
+
+[Koh, P.W., Steinhardt, J. and Liang, P. (2021). Stronger Data Poisoning Attacks Break Data Sanitization. defenses. Machine Learning. 111(3): 1-47. December 2021, vs.2](https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.00741).
+
+[Lin, P., Bekey, G., and Abney, K. (2008). Autonomous Military Robotics: Risk, Ethics, and Design](http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA534697).
+
+[Lonas, L. (2022). Ukraine Has Used Facial Recognition Tech to Notify Russian Families of Dead Soldiers. The Hill via Nexstar Media Wire. April 18, 2022](https://www.wavy.com/russia-ukraine-invasion/ukraine-has-used-facial-recognition-tech-to-notify-russian-families-of-dead-soldiers-report/).
+
+[Loten, A., and Simons, J. (2017, Jan 04). Leadership Evolves Amid Tech Changes ‒ Management Styles Shift to Embrace Shorter, More Frequent Data-Fueled Development Cycles. Wall Street Journal](https://search.proquest.com/docview/1855011133?accountid=322).
+
+Masakowski, Y.R. (2020). Artificial Intelligence and Global Security: Future Trends, Threats, and Considerations. Emerald Press Publishing, UK.
+
+Masakowski, Y.R. (2022). Leader Development in the 21ˢᵗ Century. In NATO HFM RTG 286, Leader Development for NATO Multinational Military Operations. Chapter 6. August 2022.
+
+[Masakowski, Y.R., Smythe, J.S., and Creely, T.E. (2016). The Impact of Ambient Intelligence Technologies on Individuals, Society, and Warfare. Northern Plains Ethics Journal, 4(1), 1-11](http://www.northernplainsethicsjournal.com/NPEJv4n1/The%20Impact%20of%20Ambient%20Intelligence%20Technologies%20on%20Individuals.pdf).
+
+NATO Science & Technology Trends 2020‒2040. Exploring the S&T Edge. NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2020.
+
+[Orinx, K., Struye de Swielande, T. (2021). China and Cognitive Warfare: Why Is the West Losing?](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03635930/document).
+
+[Pappalardo, D. (2022). Win the War Before the War? The French Perspective on Cognitive Warfare. War on the Rocks, August 1, 2022](https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/win-the-war-before-the-war-a-french-perspective-on-cognitive-warfare/).
+
+Porat, T., Oron-Gilad, T., Rottem-Hovev, M., and Silbiger, J. (2016). Supervising and Controlling Unmanned Systems: A Multi-Phase Study with Subject Matter Experts. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 568. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00568.
+
+Shim, J., and Arkin, R.C. (2012). Biologically Inspired Deceptive Behavior for a Robot. International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior. From Animals to Animals 12, pp. 401-411.
+
+[Steinhardt, J., Koh, P.W., and Liang, P. (2017). Certified Defenses for Data Poisoning Attacks. In NIPS ‘17 Proceedings of the 31ˢᵗ International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, pp. 3520-3532](https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3294996.3295110).
+
+Stokes, J., England, P., and Kane, K. (2021). Preventing Machine Learning Poisoning Using Authentication and Provenance.
+
+[Troianovski, A. (16 July 2022). Putin Aims to Shape a New Generation of Supporters, Through Schools. New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/16/world/europe/russia-putin-schools-propaganda-indoctrination.html).
+
+[Turner, B. (2022). Chinese Scientists Call for Plan to Destroy Elon Musk’s Starlink. Live Science](https://www.livescience.com/china-plans-ways-destroy-starlink).
+
+[Ullrich, J. (2021). The Five Most Dangerous New Attack Techniques. Presentation at RSA Conference](https://www.rsaconference.com/Library/presentation/USA/2021/the-five-most-dangerous-new-attack-techniques).
+
+[Uppal, R. (31 December 2022). NATO Thrust on AI, Data, Space and Hypersonics as Strategic Disruptor. Future Military Operations. International Defense, Security and Technology (CA, USA)](https://idstch.com/geopolitics/nato-thrust-on-ai-data-space-and-hypersonics-as-strategic-disruptors-for-future-military-operations/).
+
+Wallach, W., and Allen, C. (2009). Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong. New York: Oxford University Press.
+
+[Waltzman, R. (2017). The Weaponization of Information: The Need for Cognitive Security](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT473/RAND_CT473.pdf).
+
+
+### Chapter 8 ‒ SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, SENSEMAKING AND FUTURE NATO MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
+
+> #### Benjamin J. Knox
+> #### Norwegian Armed Forces Cyber Defence
+> #### NORWAY
+
+> #### Yvonne R. Masakowski
+> #### US Naval War College
+> #### UNITED STATES
+
+_“Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors got to war first and then seek to win.”_
+
+> #### Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” 5ᵗʰ century China
+
+#### 8.1 INTRODUCTION
+
+Success for Sun Tzu meant determining the path of success before you go to war. This meant planning prior to any engagement and applying a “know your enemy” philosophy to potentially avoid war. Sun Tzu’s goal was to “subdue the enemy without fighting” and to achieve this, entailed sensemaking and SA to understand your enemies’ perspectives, capabilities, and strategic objectives. The ‘Art of War’ codifies the philosophies of war adopted by Sun Tzu and reflect the importance of developing strategy and tactics prior to conflict engagement. The concept of winning the battle but losing the war can be understood from this philosophy wherein we may realize a pyrrhic victory, but at a punishing cost that leaves us with a devastating loss of life, wasted resources or high financial costs related to the battle. Leaders must learn to achieve competency in sensemaking and SA if they are to forge effective mission plans and achieve success without incurring severe losses. The importance of this leader competency cannot be overstated as it serves as the foundation for all mission planning. Leaders must evaluate the goodness of information across all domains and in that process, recognize truth, identify trustworthy information, evaluate its value, and assess the reliability information sources, as these elements are the building blocks for mission success and victory in war.
+
+This chapter focuses on the “Sensemaking and Situational Awareness” aspect of the House Model. These processes have considerable implications for how NATO confronts future military operational dimensions, such as the cognitive. Given the dynamic, rapidly evolving nature of warfare, there is a need to consider how information is received, perceived, processed, and transformed from sensemaking of data input to transforming it into SA. Military leaders are presented with a wide array of information from graphical displays, databases, HUMINT, SIGINT, OSINT to name but a few. These information sources encompass a wide array of elements, including human input, technological input, and AI programs. To this end, this chapter will provide a means of understanding how decision makers make sense of data and information from such a complex and vast network.
+
+For this discussion, let us review the House Model and examine its relationship to the topics of sensemaking and SA.
+
+As illustrated in Figure 8-1, the horizontal bars are an examination of the factors that enable and/or block attempts to make sense of ambiguous, uncertain situations.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 8-1: The House Model: Sensemaking and Situational Awareness._
+
+#### 8.2 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: A HUMAN ENDEAVOR
+
+Situational Awareness is a conceptualization of the current situation (Geissler, 2019). It requires experts use a holistic process involving situation recognition and pattern matching to memory structures to make accurate, and when necessary, rapid decisions. In a NATO Defence context, SA is supported by technology enablers that can sense, aggregate and process data at great speed to help build a recognized picture of a war fighting domain.
+
+However, irrespective of the technology resources available, SA remains a human endeavor. It is a cognitive skill to interpret and communicate information in an abstract way, with insight, contextual awareness, and creativity. At any hierarchical level, or at any time point or phase in the awareness building process or perceiving and comprehending, a situation can be affected in a way that can influence decision making. This may be a consequence of own [avoidable] self-inflicted actions, such as poor procedures, behavioral biases, poor memory structures, or novice level pattern matching. Or by actions of an adversary that aim to induce, infer, inflict, or impose an awareness or way to behave upon us. This may occur either directly or indirectly, but it will almost always include the manipulation of ‘input’ data. What or whoever the source is that [mis]shapes our understanding to influence decision making, leading to [un]favorable outcomes, it is the input data going into the brain that is the subject of interest in CogWar. If the input data can be affected, then the effect occurs on the output.
+
+SA requires metacognition for accuracy. Meaning that our level of metacognition can influence SA. The fact that metacognition is a skill, means when it is lacking, we can be targeted and exploited. It can also be trained, and developed to adjust maladaptive thinking behaviors, such as overconfidence in own abilities. The importance of _getting ahead_ emerges here as we look to modes of cognitive security to counter CogWar and ensure we are aware of, and resilient to, adversarial metacognitive training that aims to, for example, covertly elicit impulsive and addictive behaviors.
+
+For SA to lead to a level of understanding that can enable better decision making, it requires trusted data input, evaluation of meaningful information, and integration with new knowledge and experience. To achieve this level of understanding in evolving non-linear events, that may or may not have been deliberately interfered with, is reliant on sensemaking ability.
+
+Sensemaking informs and is a prerequisite to decision making. In contrast to SA, sensemaking concerns the process of achieving outcomes such as knowledge of the current data elements, inferences drawn from these data, or predictions made from these inferences. Sensemaking is about the strategies and the barriers encountered that constitute an explanation of a state. Sensemaking requires continuous effort and motivation to understand connections among people, places, and events (the system of systems) to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively.
+
+#### 8.3 COGNITIVE EFFECTS: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PILLARS
+
+This horizontal bar expresses the need for S&T to contribute to understanding the _Cognitive Effects_ an actor will attempt to have on a target audience (group or individual) to cause change. Linking fields of science is what can be transformative in protecting, defending against the cognitive effects of CogWar, as well as ethically and legitimately finding countermeasures.
+
+The effects can be a doctrinal, such as distort, distract, degrade. They can also be more varied and experimental: menace, disorientate, unravel, encourage, nudge, confuse, reduce, doubt, remove. They can be short term (temporary) to include memory loss or gain, creating a state of confusion or clarity, shock or calm, outrage or passivity, lack of coordination or improved group coordination and perception. Effects can also be long term (permanent) such as altering declarative memory or inducing a general lack of, or improvement in, emotional stability. Or in the case of for example instigating a mass psychosis, lack of control over one’s actions. Ultimately, the unifying purpose of a ‘cognitive effect’ is to (passively or actively /overtly or covertly / legally or illegally / invasively or non-invasively) change psychological processes through some form of augmentation or change in cognition that can affect emotion, attention, motivation, or sensory function.
+
+S&T can begin to understand adversarial cognitive effects-based approaches by applying a holistic understanding of the operational environment to any research investigation. Looking at both physical and behavioral aspects of a system of systems in a conflict state and defining it by its associated Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure (PMESII) elements. Additionally, S&T must consider implications when the operating environment is the mind, these elements can be challenged regarding how we consider effects as the system complexity of PMESII expands and opens opportunities for new ways of planning and delivering known and novel cognitive effects. Any enhancement, modifier or malignantly induced change can have side effects and unintended outcomes. This point is especially salient since it may not be scientifically possible to accurately predict the outcome of an effect due to the dynamic nature of the human nervous system, and isolated mind[s], as an operating environment.
+
+Cognitive effects will need to be studied with ‘own’ center of gravity as a key component. Considering the mind as a source of strength and balance, we can analyze how it could become an adversarial goal or objective (Ends) and identify what actions/effects can be achieved (Ways), and what resources and requirements an adversary will need to perform the ways (Means), can potentially provide NATO with requisite knowledge to maintain freedom of action, physical strength, and the will to fight.
+
+When we consider effects, and the case for research that contributes to cognitive security, such as building cognitive skills, there is a need to identify effective education and training techniques that focus effort on defending against an adversary who is not only targeting what we think, but also how we think. This means S&T has to focus on capabilities to monitor, evaluate and adapt own cognition and behaviors. These are essential to performance and maintaining clarity of mind when and the adversary is bent on exploiting the competition space between peace and war.
+
+Side cognitive effects (real or perceived) and second order cognitive effects of for example augmentations, whether they be technological, biological, or neurological are serious risk factors that will need a great deal of S&T focus.
+
+#### 8.4 DECISION MAKING AND THE OODA LOOP IN COGNITIVE WARFARE
+
+John Boyd is described as the fighter pilot who changed the art of war (Coram, 2002). When studying military history, Boyd found a common thread: none of the victorious commanders threw their forces head-to-head against enemy forces. Instead, they used deception, speed, fluidity of action, and strength against weakness. Leaders used tactics that disorientated and confused – tactics that, in Boyd’s words, caused the enemy “to unravel before the fight.”
+
+John Boyd, US Air Force Colonel, was the architect behind the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop created during the Korean War in the mid-1950s. Boyd applied the concept of combat operations to the OODA process of decision making. The model accounted for the agility of decision making under conditions of uncertainty in a dynamic environment.
+
+Boyd (1987, p. 18) suggested a similar conclusion in terms of shared orientations: Arrange the setting and circumstances so that leaders and subordinates alike are given the opportunity to continuously interact with the external world, and with each other, in order to more quickly make many-sided implicit cross-referencing projections, empathies, correlations, and rejections as well as create the similar images or impressions, hence a similar implicit orientation, needed to form an organic whole.
+
+He accounted for the need to evaluate information as it unfolded and interacted with information in the environment. Initially, according to Boyd – the cycle was far too dangerous to be fully explained. “If someone truly understands how to create menace and uncertainty and mistrust, then how to exploit and magnify the presence of these disconcerting elements, the Loop can be vicious, a terrible destructive force, virtually unstoppable in causing panic and confusion,” he said.
+
+#### 8.5 THE OODA LOOP DECISION MAKING CYCLE
+
+The OODA Loop (Boyd, 1986; 1987; 1996; Coram, 2002; 2004), is a four-step approach to decision making that focuses on filtering data input (Figure 8-2), putting it in context, deciding while knowing that changes may be made when more data becomes available. For those unfamiliar with the OODA loop created by John Boyd (1996, p.3), there are four steps of the OODA loop:
+
+1) __Observe__ – Data collection phase from multiple sources, i.e., aggregation of information from all sources.
+
+2) __Orient__ – Filter, analyze, and enrich information, i.e., information is analyzed, evaluated, and prioritized.
+
+3) __Decide__ – Actionable insights enable best available response, i.e., choosing between options and courses of action.
+
+4) __Act__ – Execute decision, determine if action was correct i.e., testing hypothesis, executing your decision, and determining if your hypothesis was correct.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 8-2: The OODA Loop Decision Cycle (John Boyd, 1986)._
+
+The OODA loop is a means for understanding the decision-making process. For the military, the OODA loop serves as a framework for decision making. The OODA loop allows decision-makers to adapt to changes as they gather information in real time. This approach to decision making affords them the ability to anticipate threats as it takes advantage of additional data as it is integrated into their mental model. It allows them to test different hypotheses, integrates updated data/information and helps them to select the optimal course of action.
+
+The OODA loop is not a mission planning tool, and although speed is important, understanding it simply as a loop, where doing it faster than your adversary leads you to victory, is missing what Boyd had in mind. One key factor that is highly relevant to our thinking about CogWar is that understanding the OODA loop enables a commander to compress time – that is, the time between Observing a situation and taking an Action. As the commander compresses his own time, he causes time to be stretched out for his opponent, as he is forced to pause, to wonder, to question. Therefore, Boyd included the “Implicit Guidance and Control” from “Orientation” to both “Observation” and “Action” in his model.
+
+For the OODA framework to enhance their decision-making capabilities military commanders need to process information, i.e., Sensemaking, if they are to ensure accurate SA for operational success. To this end, the S&T roadmap highlights the need to develop sensemaking tools, techniques and technologies that will support building SA for human decision-makers.
+
+#### 8.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
+
+Today, auto designers have developed enhanced tools and technologies embedded in the auto’s interface design such that cars can now park themselves, provide early alerts to drivers of oncoming traffic, and alert the driver to icy road conditions. The vehicle now cognitively augments the human. Military personnel need tools for seeing Over-the-Horizon, as well tools to make sense of the socio-technical operating environment to increase levels and accuracy of SA. Technologies equipped with AI and adaptive ML algorithms have the potential to support sensemaking capabilities for enhanced SA in the future security environment.
+
+Technologies are being designed to enhance medical diagnosis and surgical treatment that may also give rise to military applications in the battlegrounds of the future. Sensemaking and SA technologies merit further exploration and research. There is opportunity for discovery amid the intersection of capabilities provided by designers in the auto industry, medical technologies, and in Robotics and autonomous systems that may facilitate decision-support technologies for future military combat missions. These research topics may further provide opportunities for leveraging capabilities that will enhance the military decision maker’s operational readiness. S&T will lead the way to develop tools that will enhance the military’s ability to sense-make as a defence against future CogWar.
+
+Orientation is not a new concept for the military. Within this context, military personnel attend to meaningful information in the operational environment and seek opportunities to take the decision advantage. S&T needs to develop technologies that will enhance human Orientation abilities and provide an intuitive understanding of dynamic changes within the operational environment. By so doing, we can potentially help our servicemen and women bypass parts of the OODA cycle, and Act on CogWar at Observation. Today’s technology designers must consider the challenges presented in CogWar and provide tools to defend against an adversary that adapts fluidly to technological advances in the CogWar operational environment. Cognitive Superiority demands innovation, being adaptive and prescient if we are to ‘get ahead’ and take advantage of emergent technologies.
+
+Advances in AI technologies (O’Flanagan, 2018; Masakowski, 2020, 2022a, 2022b) and the power of Quantum Computing will inform and facilitate sense-making and enhanced SA through the design and application of decision-support tools. Similarly, these same advances in emergent AI-enabled technologies will contribute to the complexity and impact of the CogWar environment. As great power competitors and adversaries weaponize AI enabled autonomous systems, the potential threat is elevated in the pursuit of strategic objectives.
+
+It is therefore incumbent upon us to establish and maintain a clear awareness of these future challenges and potential threats. This requires we develop and operationalize the capabilities (tools, technologies, and techniques) to successfully anticipate and orientate us to such advances. Where we can leverage AI autonomous systems, with for example adaptive ML algorithms, to provide the decision advantage for the military commander; we must also explicitly and continuously consider the ethical implications and consequences for these technologies. As a whole-of-society challenge, negotiating and integrating these issues into mission planning must include lawyers, philosophers, ethicists, and society.
+
+The evolution of autonomous unmanned systems has accelerated rapidly and with little time for consideration of the ethical consequences of their application in the military operational environment (Masakowski, 2019). As the introduction and application of AI and ML continues to evolve and transform the character of warfighting, systems with a capacity for self-awareness, and self-organization and self- explanation will be designed to make informed, rational decisions based on logic and reasoning capacities. The human role in sensemaking may well be out-looped and subject to the direction of these advanced agents and/or sentient robots. Indeed, such advancements combined with computational modeling have moved research in the direction of affective machine consciousness (Chandra, 2017; Aberman, 2017). Traditionally, humans do not remove progress but rather continue to explore, invent, and move forward as a society, continuously seeking ways to improve and integrate advances in technology aimed at improving the quality of our daily life and ensuring the security of society. Our adversaries are not no different, only they seek ways to modify advances in technology to their strategic and tactical advantage. We must, therefore, not shy from taking the perspective of the adversaries most dangerous course of action when we plan defence in CogWar. Adversaries will continue to challenge nations by attempting to create chaos, confusion, surprise, shock, and disorientation to keep their strategic opponent at a disadvantage in understanding the situation and impeding their ability to develop effective countermeasures. To this end, nations must strive to develop the tools and technologies to defend against such aspects of CogWar that target our capability to sense-make and build SA.
+
+#### 8.7 REFERENCES
+
+[Aberman, J. (27 February 2017). Artificial Intelligence Will Change America. Here’s How. The Washington Post (Online)](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-business/wp/2017/02/27/artificialintelligence-will-change-america-heres-how/?utm_term=.3e325159efd9).
+
+[Boyd, J.R. (1986). Patterns of Conflict. (Unpublished briefing)](http://dnipogo.org/john-r-boyd/).
+
+[Boyd, J.R. (1987). Organic Design for Command and Control. (Unpublished briefing)](http://dnipogo.org/john-r-boyd/).
+
+[Boyd, J.R. (1996). The Essence of Winning and Losing. (Unpublished briefing)](http://dnipogo.org/john-r-boyd/).
+
+[Chandra, R. (2017). An Affective Computational Model for Machine Consciousness](http://arxiv.org/abs/1701.00349).
+
+Coram, R. (2004). Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. Back Bay Books; Reprint Ed. May 10, 2004.
+
+Coram, R., (2002). Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. Little, Brown & Company, NY, U.S.
+
+Geissler, H. (2019). Bless the Fog of War. How Panopticon Will Lose the War in Metropolis. Thesis published by the US Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
+
+Masakowski, Y.R. (2019) Ethical Implications of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence Enabled Systems. Institute of Navigation Cognizant Autonomous Systems for Safety Critical Applications Conference. Miami, Fl. September 16‒17, 2019.
+
+Masakowski, Y.R. (2020). Artificial Intelligence and Global Security: Future Trends, Threats and Considerations. Emerald Publishing. UK.
+
+Masakowski, Y.R. (2022a). Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Warfare. Naval War College Foundation, Newport, RI. 23 February 2022.
+
+Masakowski, Y.R. (2022b). AI and Global Security: The Influence and Impact of Cognitive Warfare. Navy ROTC: The College of the Holy Cross. Worcester, MA. 01 March 2022.
+
+[O’Flanagan, T.P. (2018). A Breach of Trust: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Society and Military Operations. Thesis published by the US Naval War College, Newport, RI](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1079769.pdf).
+
+[Tzu, S. [496 BC] (1910). SunTzu on the Art of War. Trans. L. Giles. London: Luzac and Co.](https://archive.org/details/the-art-of-war-by-sun-tzu-trans.-by-lionel-giles-m.-a.-1910/page/n3/mode/2up)
+
+
+### Chapter 9 ‒ HUMAN-MACHINE TEAMING TOWARDS A HOLISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF COGNITIVE WARFARE
+
+> #### Frank Flemisch
+> #### Communication, Information Processing and Ergonomics (FKIE)
+> #### GERMANY
+
+#### 9.1 INTRODUCTION
+
+__What can we learn from history about cognitive warfare and human-machine teaming?__ Despite the continuing necessity for physical warfare, there is an increasing tendency in the defence community to think warfare beyond the physical realm. An example is the cyber domain, e.g., as cyber warfare, or in combination with conventional warfare as hybrid warfare, or the cognitive domain, e.g., as Cognitive Warfare (CogWar). What looks revolutionary on the first glance has already a long history, but with AI and autonomous machine capabilities it also enters a new stage, which might have disruptive effects for any future defence operation.
+
+Looking deeply back into history, Dalheim (2020) provided an historical perspective in the description of one of the earliest wooden weapons of war, the Schöningen wooden throwing spears that were excavated between 1994 and 1998 in an open-cast coal mine in the Helmstedt district of Germany (Figure 9-1). These throwing spears, dated between 380,000 and 400,000 years old, represent the oldest preserved hunting weapons of prehistoric Europe yet discovered. (Thieme, 1997; Dalheim, 2020). These spears are not only an early example of weapon technology, but also of Human Factors, for which Homo heidelbergensis (Smithsonian, 2022), a pre-runner of Homo sapiens, was already able to combine different techniques like cutting to carve and fire to harden an effective tool and adapt it to the individual bearer. These spears are also an early example of Human Systems Integration, which is understood as integration of humans, technology, organization, and environment: Close to the location of the spears, many horse bones were found. Anthropologists reconstructed that obviously a tribe of Homo heidelbergensis hunted, rounded up, speared, and ate these horses. Especially the production of the spears, which can be seen as a clever use of or integration with the environment, and the cooperative hunting took a degree of organization, which was not available to other rival species. What we can also derive from hunting techniques of animals, of so-called primitive societies or even from modern hunting traditions is that it was not only about organizing the own tribe, but to disrupt and disorganize the opponent, to trick the flock of prey in a way that they had no chance to escape. This technique represents CogWar at its early stage. It also becomes increasingly clear that these weapons, together with the cognitive development of Homo species, was quite disruptive for other animals, one of the first known disruptive technologies as defined by Christensen (1997).
+
+
+_▲ Figure 9-1: One of the Spears of Schoeningen as an Early Example of Human Factors, Human Systems Integration and of Cognitive Warfare (Thieme, 1997)._
+
+Given this precedent (Christensen, 1997), we must prepare to defend against CogWar just in case cognitive warfare is as disruptive for us as this early example was for the horses. It becomes increasingly clear that not only the physical layer of these spears, transporting deadly energy over distance and temporarily out of hand of the original thrower was revolutionary and highly disruptive, but the cognitive layer of this hunting came was the one which really made a difference in survival of this Homo species. Tomasello (2014) describes how human cognition evolved together with the ability to create and handle such tools, and especially how the cooperation and shared intentionality fostered the evolution of Homo towards Homo sapiens as one of the most dominant species on this planet. Cooperation and teaming were obviously essential for this early hunting, cooperation and teaming might also be essential for today’s challenge of AI-based systems and CogWar. Weapons like these spears became not only a normal part of hunting, but also of warfare:
+
+> _The necessity of fighting very soon led men to special __inventions to turn the advantage__ in it in their own favour; in consequence of that the mode of fighting has undergone great alterations; but in whatever way it is conducted its conception remains unaltered, and fighting is that which constitutes war. (Clausewitz 1831, 1968)_
+
+Thinking before fighting, and about fighting, i.e., cognition about warfare became an integral part of any sophisticated military. Sun Tzu, military philosopher at least well known in China, especially in the Peoples Republic of China, which is considered “a challenge to NATO’s interest, security and values” (NATO, 2022), speaks about “knowing,” which is an essential part of any CogWar: Hence the saying: “If you know the enemy and you know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and you know Earth, you may make your victory complete” (Tzu, 496 BC).
+
+While the first part of Sun Tzu’s quote is quite familiar for Western ears and cognitions, the second part might sound strange at the first glance but is truly remarkable: It points not only towards weather and terrain, but towards a cognition, which is open to a much bigger, holistic picture than just of yourself and a potential enemy. It might be exactly that feeling of strangeness in our ears or that of our NATO colleagues and comrades, which should make us think twice and ask ourselves: Is there something valuable not only in the first, but also in the second part of Sun Tzu’s insight that could help us to evolve our own cognitive abilities, before a system rival starts to outperform us with a more sophisticated cognition?
+
+Centuries later, Stephen Biko (1971) would carve another mighty weapon of cognitive defence into words, describing a fundamental cognitive relationship between opponents, which applies not only in an asymmetric warfare, but also in a hybrid war of 2022: “The most potent weapon of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed” (Woods, 1971; Peters, 2018).
+
+Sun Tzu and Stephen Biko each refer to the knowledge, minds, and cognitions of humans. For many centuries, cognition was thought to be a privilege of _Homo sapiens_. This would change with a gradual revolution, starting with the first process-controlled computer Z1 of Konrad Zuse in Berlin, 1936, followed by the Mark I built 1944 by Howard Aiken and the IBM team which was used to support the Manhattan Project. In close relation with this revolution in hardware, another scientific revolution happened regarding the software and scientific model. Norbert Wiener authored his famous book in which he introduced Cybernetics in 1950. It remains one of the most influential books of the twentieth century. Interestingly, Wiener is often misquoted to have written about computers. His book is more general about control and communication mechanism both in animals and machines, and sparked a revolution of system science beyond computers, especially in biology and psychology.
+
+Wiener’s Cybernetics is describing cognition in action, regardless of whether animals, humans, or machines, forming feedback loops which influence or even control situations (for an overview how this applies to safety critical systems see Flemisch et al. 2022). Later, Licklider (1960) sketched the Man/Human-Computer Symbiosis and sparked a whole research stream on joint cognitive systems. Our discussion on AI ties right into this research stream of cybernetics and human-computer symbiosis.
+
+#### 9.2 COGNITIVE WAR AND HUMAN COGNITION
+
+With all the discussions with Artificial Intelligence (AI), it becomes increasingly clear that this is a development towards an Artificial Cognition (Ritter, Barrett, Santoro, and Botvinick, 2017), which forms a joint cognition system in the sense of (Hollnagel and Woods 2005), together with human cognition. That is, Artificial Cognition can be thought of as a hybrid discipline that combines machine behavior and cognitive models that may be inferred from data elicited via experimentation vs directly observed. (Ritter et al. 2017).
+
+Based on Sun Tzu’s prescient forecast, it also becomes increasingly clear that it is not enough to look only at one human or one artificial cognition but elevate our view beyond that to a more holistic picture.
+
+__Step by Step from the Small to the Bigger Systems__
+
+What are integral parts of a more holistic model of CogWar, and where should we start? A good starting point is to look at a single cognition and describe it in a way that it can be applied both to humans and artificial cognition (Figure 9-2).
+
+Figure 9-2 shows a typical loop of perception of and action on a situation. What makes these feedback loops a cognition is that this perception and action is not arbitrary, but with an intent to develop the situation towards a good situation and avoid bad situations. While Figure 9-2 shows a fundamental fork in the road of life, Figure 9-3 shows more detail, especially addressing a fundamental dilemma in any safety and time critical system like in military systems.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 9-2: Cognitive Loop and Perception-Action Cycle of Humans or Machines. (Inspired by Wiener 1950, including John Boyd’s OODA loop, based on Flemisch et al. 2012, Flemisch et al. 2022)._
+
+As Clausewitz already describes as “fog of war,” there is always uncertainty in information about the situation, e.g., the capabilities and intent of an opponent. Figure 9-3 left shows the most fundamental aspect of uncertainty with the detection of a signal, which might lead to an action and non-action: The signal can be present or absent, and the perception and response can be there and not there, leading to two positive situations “Correct Hit” or “Correct Rejection,” and two negative states of “Miss” and “False Alarm.” Applied to action and non-action e.g., of military systems, Figure 9-3 right shows “Action” and “Non-Action,” where the valence is still undetermined, and the four possible outcomes “Correct Action,” “Correct Non-Action,” “False Non-Action,” or “False Action.”
+
+
+_▲ Figure 9-3: Top: Signal Detection Theory; Bottom: Cognitive Loop and OODA Loop of Humans or Machines, with Decision to Action or Non-Action Under Uncertainty (“In the Fog of War”)._
+
+An example for this fundamental dilemma is the recommendation of an AI leading to an action or non-action of a soldier, which can cause in a correct or incorrect use or non-use of military action. Even if there is hope that AI might alter this equation, (e.g., Wallace 2018), what makes this dilemma so problematic is time: In military combat, the price for non-action often increases with every second, while the information might still be not reliable enough to determine action to be a correct action. Soldiers sometimes call these dilemma situations “one foot in jail, one foot in the grave.” Ironically, after the combat, e.g., in a court trial, there is ample time to determine all the minute details of law and regulations.
+
+To understand these issues of time and cognition better, over the decades of research models or patterns have been developed which describe how to act on the world and the ability to learn (e.g., Wiener, 1950). Many years later, Damasio (1994) would describe that at least with human cognition, these models and their interactions with the world are also associated, almost inseparable with emotional states and with bodily perception (somatic markers). Kahneman (2011) outlines two systems, (i.e., autonomous, and automatic vs analytical and deliberate) models of human cognition, which work at different speeds and at different cognitive quality.
+
+Another example for the modelling of cognitive processes is the OODA loop (Figure 9-4), originally described by (Boyd, 1996), modelling the decision cycle for military combat/war situations. The OODA loop describes perceiving, thinking, and acting of agents in four stages of decision-making:
+
+- __Observation:__ Gathering of outside information and matching them with unfolding circumstances and unfolding environmental interaction.
+
+- __Orientation:__ Judging the observation in the light of previous experiences, genetic heritage, cultural traditions, and analyses.
+
+- __Decision:__ Selecting one of several hypotheses and putting them to test with reality.
+
+- __Action:__ Implementing the decision.
+
+Figure 9-5 shows another important step towards a more holistic model of CogWar: Based on Licklider’s concept of human-machine symbiosis, Rasmussen (1983) proposed the term cooperation, Hollnagel and Woods (1983) and Sheridan (2002) describing initial principles, Hoc and Lemoine (1998) and Hoc (2000) described the common ground and know-how-to-cooperate as important parts of developing human-computer cooperation.
+
+A major breakthrough was to think of cognition not only as something separated/assigned to individual agents, but also as Joint Cognition or Joint Cognitive System. Hollnagel also sketches how these Joint Cognitive Systems can be nested, from the small to the big, and already prepared the ground for a system-of-systems approach. Flemisch et al. (2019) described how humans and machine cognition can cooperate on levels with different time frequencies, yet still work together like the blunt end and the sharp end of a spear. Flemisch et al. (2020) extended this view also to conflicts that can happen between agents in cognitive systems, and how these can be mitigated.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 9-4: A Look into the Details of Cognitive Processes in Individuals or Organizations: Example OODA Loop of Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action (Boyd, 1996)._
+
+
+_▲ Figure 9-5: Human-Machine System and Cooperation with Other Agents, Forming Joint Cognitive Systems of Interlinked OODA-Loops._
+
+It becomes increasingly clear that the teaming of human and computers, e.g., in the form of AI, will become essential for any form of CogWar, whether offensive or defensive. The more cognitive processes are enabled by computer networks, the more cyber defence becomes important. A similar equation could be true for AI: the more cognitive processes are influenced, hopefully enhanced with AI, the more cognitive (warfare and) defence becomes important. This becomes even more important if the acceleration of the last decades continue (e.g., Rosa, 2013), and fighting at machine speed spreads out from its early beginnings in the realm of fast paced air and space defence systems, also to other domains or even offensive operations. Taking (Kahneman, 2011) seriously, who describes our cognitive systems No. 1 as fast, intuitive and emotional, but also as more vulnerable to mis-judgement compared to the slower but more deliberative and more logical cognitive system No. 2, an essential part of CogWar is about time and speed: Outperform an opponent in a way that he cannot unfold his full cognitive potential, and on the other side of the same coin, design systems with enough time for humans to use their system No. 2.
+
+#### 9.3 THE HOLISTIC BOWTIE MODEL
+
+This connection is even more important with the fast interconnectivity between the different layers of our systems, e.g., our defence systems with the political system. With the goal to make this more transparent, Figure 9-6 combines Hollnagel and Woods idea of the joint cognitive system with the idea of a bowtie diagram, originally derived in the incident and accident analysis of safety critical systems and adapted to a holistic bowtie diagram for the design and human systems integration of any system by Flemisch et al. (2022).
+
+Figure 9-6 shows the next step towards a holistic model of CogWar. It puts the core cognitive systems of few human and AI agents in the center, nested by a system-of-systems layer, organizational and societal layers. In the extreme, it is our global environment, sometimes called biosphere, which is nesting and hosting all these layers. The transversal cognitive layer depends on the physical layer and permeates all layers from the small human-machine system to the larger systems like organizations and societies.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 9-6: Holistic Bowtie Model of Human- Machine Cognition (Adapted from Flemisch et al. 2022)._
+
+It becomes increasingly clear, that cognitive processes occur on each of these layers and that these layers mutually influence it other. In these layers from the smallest to the largest, cognition can be considered as distributed and interrelated. Siebert in Flemisch et al. (2022) summarizes Hutchins (1995) theory of distributed cognition by “thinking about cognition in terms of the emergence and interactions of component parts.” The theory of distributed cognition focuses not on how individual actors make decisions considering social and environmental features but focuses on a broader class of cognitive events that surpasses the individual. It is an approach to understanding cognition from a distributed perspective across members of a group, environment and through time. The goal of the holistic bowtie model is aimed at enabling a distributed, holistic perspective on cognition distributed between humans, machines, system-of-systems, organizations, societies, environment, and through time.
+
+Figure 9-7 shows an example how this holistic model can be used. It can help to show essential connections between the layers, e.g., how commensurate transparency helps to cultivate trust between the layers, how authority is distributed and respected, and how ability is enabled, and together with control, leads to a fair accountability for all agents, soldiers, and civilians alike, in this nested system. Figure 9-7 also shows how these essential streams and loops of authority, cognitive ability, and trust, as one of the most essential enablers of our defence cooperation in NATO, might also be attacked and corrupted, and with those cognitive processes be degraded and disturbed. It also provides a map how an adversary’s cognitive processes could be disturbed, disrupted or, if necessary, in defensive action of a major attack, be destroyed.
+
+Damasio (1994) also makes it clear that cognition is combined with our emotions and even bodily feelings. What becomes increasingly clear is that this applies not only for an individual agent, but is connected, from the smallest to the largest, from individuals, groups, human-computer/AI systems up to whole societies. Many of these connections and feedback loops are less understood, described, or remain yet undiscovered. A more holistic model might help to explore those connections. As CogWar might not only affect the battlefield, but all layers up to society and global environment, it will be crucial to understand and consciously shape these connections.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 9-7: Holistic Bowtie Model of Cognitive Warfare, with Examples for Defence and Attack Vectors, and One Feedback Loop from Accountability to Ability, Authority, Transparency, and Trust._
+
+#### 9.4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: HOW TO PROCEED WITH COGNITIVE WARFARE AND BEYOND
+
+How holistic, how big should our picture be? Flemisch et al. (2022) describe a commensurate holism, which limits the scope with a pragmatic argument of estimated influence. We should not forget that this might still be a Western tendency to simplify, to focus, while Eastern military philosopher, Sun Tzu’s philosophy on warfare is still the basis of Asian/Chinese warfare and taught in Chinese military academies, speaks about nothing less than heaven and Earth.
+
+To understand that Sun Tzu is not only speaking about the weather or the load-bearing capacity of Ukrainian soil, it might also help that Sun Tzu’s perspective is related to the Chinese concept of Tianxia 天下 “(all) under Heaven,” and is understood as the entire geographical world, including humans and animals. Despite the fact, that it was used for centuries to describe the outreach of the Chinese emperor, it is also a philosophical principle, described e.g., by Daoist philosopher Guanzi how to expand the perspective from a family to a village to a state or an entire world. It was also used in Japanese history as a leitmotiv to unify Japan (by military force and balance of power), and in more recent times, this philosophy was used by Chinese philosopher Zhao Tingyang (2009) to describe a potential global perspective.
+
+We should not leave this potential cognitive revolution towards a holistic perspective, which connects the small with the large, humans with machines/AI’s, to our Chinese adversaries. Rather, we proposed the following objectives along short-, mid- and long-term recommendations:
+
+- Do not think CogWar as something only related to human cognition.
+
+- Think CogWar across all levels and in all domains, including space. Think of CW as warfare with and on distributed and joint cognition of humans, machines/AI including networks, organizations, societies, and a global environment.
+
+- Bring and hold together inter- and transdisciplinary teams of soldiers, engineers, human factors and Human Systems Integration specialists, cyber defenders, organizational and societal scientists, and politicians to refine these thinking models, to identify potential attack vectors, and to design and implement potential defence systems.
+
+- Develop and test defence philosophies, doctrines, and systems against cognitive attacks, in an analogous way as we acted on the cyber domain, but even more integrated with individuals, societies, economics, and politics.
+
+- In parallel, constantly work on the narratives, especially the defensive deterrence of NATO against any attack, physical or cognitive.
+
+- In parallel, cooperate with the political side and with arms control: The more we mutually agree on, assert and be able to trust not using certain techniques, the safer it will be for all of us.
+
+If we want to prevent the next war, or at least not lose it, we should seriously consider the lessons of Sun Tzu and not stop at the physical and cognitive layer but think beyond it. Once again, a lesson from history for many nations is that fighting power (e.g., in the sense of van Creveld, 1982), whether physical or cognitive, might not be enough:
+
+> _War in its literal meaning is fighting, for fighting alone is the efficient principle in the manifold activity which, in a wide sense, is called war. But fighting is a trial of strength of the __moral and physical forces__ by means of the latter. That the moral cannot be omitted is evident of itself, for the __condition of the mind has always the most decisive influence__ on the forces employed in war. (Clausewitz, 1968, Book 2, Chapter 1)_
+
+Today we might talk more about ethics than moral, but the essence is quite similar. We face a system rival China, where at least two senior air force officers obviously have read not only Sun Tzu, but also Clausewitz and Creveld, and wrote about an “Unrestricted warfare” including terrorism, economic and network warfare (超限戰, Qiao et al., 1999). We face a system rival Russia, which is testing a less restrictive warfare in the Ukraine with the threat to escalate to unrestricted warfare. With a clear view in these system rivals, we in NATO are forced, motivated and already engaged to rethink, re-group, balance, and, if necessary, boost up our ethical, cognitive and physical forces, to whatever level necessary (Figure 9-8).
+
+In closing, future consideration about the defence against CogWar should include research on human cognition, artificial cognition, and especially shared, joint cognition in Robotic and Autonomous System design. Future warfare will integrate the human-machine team as part of the cohesive military force and thus, shared Situational Awareness will include AI-embedded Robots. Future research programs must be established to invest in S&T to enhance team performance, including humans and AI, and ensure the integrity and trustworthiness of cooperative systems with autonomous, AI-based functions that will serve as collaborators and partners in the future operational environment.
+
+Let us continue to foster our defensive but cooperative and strong fighting power, physically, cognitively, and ethically. Let us discuss and cultivate a common ground and work on a common balance, from a defensive but strong position to fence off any potential attack, whether physical, cognitive, or ethical. Based on a commonly agreed ethics and a defensive but strong position, let us work together towards physical, cognitive, and ethical peace, on our common home Earth, under the same Heaven.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 9-8: Outlook, Holistic Bowtie Model, Including an Ethical Layer into Physical and Cognitive Warfare._
+
+#### 9.5 REFERENCES
+
+[Boyd, J.R. (1996). The Essence of Winning and Losing. Ed. C. Richard and C. Spinney. Bluffton, South Carolina](https://ooda.de/media/john_boyd_-_the_essence_of_winning_and_losing.pdf).
+
+Christensen, C.M. (1997). The Innovator’s Dilemma. When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail. The Management of Innovation and Change Series. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business Review Press.
+
+[Dalheim, R. (16 September 2020). Schöningen Spears ‒ Mankind’s Earliest Wooden Weapons](https://www.woodworkingnetwork.com/wood/schoninger-spears-mankinds-earliest-wooden-weapons).
+
+Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes’ Error and the Future of Human Life. Scientific American 271(4), p. 144. Doi: 10.1038/scientificamerican1094-144.
+
+Flemisch, F., Abbink, D.A., Itoh, M., Pacaux-Lemoine, M.P., and Weßel, G. (2019). Joining the Blunt and the Pointy End of the Spear: Towards a Common Framework of Joint Action, Human-Machine Cooperation, Cooperative Guidance, and Control, Shared, Traded and Supervisory Control. Cogn Tech Work 21(4), pp. 555-568. DOI: 10.1007/s10111-019-00576-1.
+
+Flemisch, F., Baltzer, M., Abbink, D., Siebert, L., Diggelen, J., and Draper, M. (2022). Towards a Dynamic Balance Between Humans and AI-Based Systems: Holistic Bowtie Model for Ability, Responsibility, Authority, Autonomy, Meaningful and Effective Control, and Accountability. In L. Siebert and D. Abbink (Eds.). Handbook on Meaningful Human Control. Cheltenham, Gloucester, UK: Edward Elgar (in press).
+
+Flemisch, F., Heesen, M., Hesse, T., Kelsch, J., Schieben, and A., Beller, J. (2012). Towards a Dynamic Balance Between Humans and Automation: Authority, Ability, Responsibility and Control in Shared and Cooperative Control Situations. Cognition, Technology & Work 14 (1), pp. 3-18. DOI: 10.1007/s10111-011-0191-6.
+
+Flemisch, F., Pacaux-Lemoine, M.P., Vanderhaegen, F., Itoh, M., Saito, Y., and Herzberger, N. (2020). Conflicts in Human-Machine Systems as an Intersection of Bio- and Technosphere: Cooperation and Interaction Patterns for Human and Machine Interference and Conflict Resolution. In: 2020 IEEE International Conference on Human-Machine Systems (ICHMS). Rome, Italy, 7‒9 Sept 2020: IEEE, pp. 1-6.
+
+Hoc, J.M. (2000). From Human-Machine Interaction to Human-Machine Cooperation. In Ergonomics 43 (7), pp. 833-843. DOI: 10.1080/001401300409044.
+
+Hoc, J.M., and Lemoine, M.P. (1998). Cognitive Evaluation of Human-Human and Human-Machine Cooperation Modes in Air Traffic Control. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology 8(1), pp. 1-32. DOI: 10.1207/s15327108ijap0801_1.
+
+Hollnagel, E, and Woods, D.D. (1983). Cognitive Systems Engineering: New Wine in New Bottles. In International Journal of Man-Machine Studies 18(6), pp. 583-600. DOI: 10.1016/S0020-7373(83)80034-0.
+
+[Hollnagel, E., and Woods, D. (2005). Joint Cognitive Systems. Foundations of Cognitive Systems Engineering. Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press](https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/subhh/detail.action?docID=263746).
+
+Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild. Massachusetts: MIT Press.
+
+Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
+
+Licklider, J.C.R. (1960). Man-Computer Symbiosis. IRE Trans. Hum. Factors Electron. HFE-1 (1), pp. 4-11. DOI: 10.1109/THFE2.1960.4503259.
+
+[NATO (2022). NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. Adopted at the Madrid Summit, 29‒30 June 2022](https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/).
+
+[Peters, M. (18 October 2018). The Most Potent Weapon in the Hands of the Oppressor is the Mind of the Oppressed. Red Pepper Magazine](https://www.redpepper.org.uk/the-most-potent-weapon-in-the-hands-of-the-oppressor-is-the-mind-of-the-oppressed/).
+
+Qiao, L., Santoli, A., and Wang, X. (1999). Unrestricted Warfare. Brattleboro, Vermont: Echo Point Books & Media.
+
+Rasmussen, J. (1983). Skills, Rules, and Knowledge; Signals, Signs, and Symbols, and Other Distinctions in Human Performance Models. In IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics SMC-13(3), pp. 257-266. DOI: 10.1109/TSMC.1983.6313160.
+
+Ritter, S., Barrett, D.G., Santoro, A., and Botvinick, M.M. (2017). Cognitive Psychology for Deep Neural Networks: A Shape Bias Case Study. International Conference on Machine Learning, pp. 2940-2949.
+
+Rosa, H. (2013). Social Acceleration: Columbia University Press.
+
+Sheridan, T.B. (2002). Humans and Automation. System Design and Research Issues. New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc.
+
+[Smithsonian Institute, (1 July 2022). Homo heidelbergensis. Human Origins. Smithsonian Institute](https://humanorigins.si.edu/evidence/human-fossils/species/homo-heidelbergensis).
+
+[Thieme, H. (1997). Lower Palaeolithic Hunting Spears from Germany. Nature 385, pp. 807-810. DOI: 10.1038/385807a0](https://www.nature.com/articles/385807a0).
+
+Tingyang, Z. (2009). A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-Under-Heaven (Tian-xia). Diogenes 56(1), pp. 5-18. DOI: 10.1177/0392192109102149.
+
+[Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Harvard University Press (ProQuest Ebook Central)](https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kxp/detail.action?docID=3301383).
+
+[Tzu, S. [496 BC] (1910). SunTzu on the Art of War. Trans. L. Giles. London: Luzac and Co.](https://archive.org/details/the-art-of-war-by-sun-tzu-trans.-by-lionel-giles-m.-a.-1910/page/n3/mode/2up)
+
+Van Creveld, M. (1982). Fighting Power. German and US Army Performance, 1939‒1945. Contributions in Military History, 32. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
+
+Von Clausewitz, C. (1968). On War. London: Penguin Books.
+
+Wallace, R. (2018). Carl von Clausewitz, the Fog-of-War, and the AI Revolution. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
+
+Wiener, N. (1950). Cybernetics. In Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 3(7), pp. 2-4. Doi: 10.2307/3822945.
+
+Woods, D. (1991). Biko. 3ʳᵈ rev. ed. New York: Holt.
+
+
+### Chapter 10 ‒ EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR COGNITIVE WARFARE
+
+> #### J.E. (Hans) Korteling
+> #### The Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)
+> #### THE NETHERLANDS
+
+#### 10.1 INTRODUCTION
+
+The actual and practical execution of CogWar is not simple and may include a range of inherent complexities concerning the concrete, underlying psychological mechanisms and effective psychological strategies and tactics. In addition, according to Verall et al. (2016), compared to the Eastern cultures, the Western world, historically, has been less comfortable with psychological deception as a recognized tool for military influence. Western culture and open democracy are protected by respective government rules with layers of highly valued ethical checks and balances in the open-source, mass-media. Overt lying and feigning of information from sources such as government and/or organizations, is not tolerated nor accepted. However, Western nations and NATO countries have placed a low priority on developing pro-active countermeasures to detect, deter, and defend against CogWar. To date, research studies have focused on information manipulation from a reactive, defensive response to CogWar. For example, Korteling and Duistermaat (2018) concluded that this ad hoc, defensive, and reactive focus may be a risky approach given the deep and long-term nature of hybrid and information campaigns. Our reactive (instead of pro-active) approach may continue our relatively weak and unthreatening position in the world-wide arena. A more pro-active approach will focus on the weakening, destabilization, and undermine the position of the opponent and influence his decisions. This should be done within the boundaries set by our juridical and ethical principles that prevent us from obvious lying, feigning, or massive production and the dissemination of disinformation. In some cases, these boundaries may have a significant limiting consequence for the range of feasible CogWar possibilities.
+
+We contend that a pro-active approach may be more beneficial as it will focus on mitigating and undermining the adversaries’ ability to achieve their objectives, as well as weaking and destabilize their sphere of influence on a global scale. NATO should develop defence strategies against CogWar within the legal and ethical boundaries required. NATO and Allied partner nations must develop strategic defence strategies within the legal, juridical, and ethical boundaries of their respective nations. The development of countermeasures requires additional investment in training military personnel to prepare them with the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to defend against CogWar. One must develop measures to detect disinformation and misinformation campaigns at an early stage that may influence public opinion and the mass consciousness. Thus, nations must invest in the development of advanced training tools and methods for education and training personnel to recognize psychological deception and manipulation. Education and training will increase individual’s awareness and help to develop resilience with the knowledge and skills acquired to detect and mitigate deception and manipulation. Individuals must acquire the skills to counter the influence of misinformation with reliable, trustworthy, and verifiable facts. This pro-active approach to education and training will require investment in the development of effective training tools but are essential for facilitating the development of military personnel to respond rapidly and effectively.
+
+The development of such advanced training methods and tools is a critical first step in forging each nation’s defence against deception operations of CogWar. Virtual technologies and environments provide a means to design scenarios that will help to build the skills necessary to counter the effects of CogWar. Such scenarios in a wargaming virtual environment facilitates the individuals’ ability could practice strategic and tactical analysis across an array of hybrid scenarios based on realistic or imaginary threats (e.g., various forms of strategic gaming). This will increase awareness regarding the possible and current impact of psychological deception, as well as improve the knowledge, experience. capabilities and resilience of military personnel.
+
+To date, however, there is no consensus regarding the best means of training military personnel to defend against CogWar. There is a need to develop a sophisticated tool consisting of many modules, scenarios, and elements aligned with military defence measures such as those of Stratcom. For example, a prototype module might be developed that would include the steps that are essential for the execution of _critical preparatory activities_:
+
+- Analysis of the problem;
+
+- Goal definition;
+
+- Knowing and understanding the target group, their culture, views, and needs;
+
+- Determining other relevant actors or agencies and possible media;
+
+- Historical (context) analysis.
+
+This model could be expanded and tailored in design to address numerous deceptive stratagems (or tactics), scenarios, narratives, and challenges presented in a multi-media platform wherein several social media platforms may be used to verify information, develop risk management procedures, and mitigation strategies could be developed. For example, a model could be developed to focus on the analysis and selection of deceptive tactics or stratagems. This model could be used across media platforms as narratives, messages, with collaborators as a means of developing risk management procedures.
+
+#### 10.2 TRAINING AND EDUCATION
+
+The first question in this respect concerns the specification of adequate training objectives (training goals) and training trajectories, not only for initial training, but also for experts in CogWar. The questions raised are, what skills need to be developed? What are the best methods and formats for this type of training? Training objectives may vary from initial levels of making people aware of the issue and of what is (already) possible, and what can be practically done to more expert-level recurrency team training in realistic scenarios. Several years ago, TNO, in collaboration with the NLDA, organized two workshops focused on discussions concerning the knowledge, practices, policies, and possible scenarios regarding CogWar. These workshops were carried out with participants of the Dutch Armed Forces who were professionally trained on the topic of information operations. These workshops indicated that these professionals do not seem substantially more sophisticated in psychological deception and manipulation than most other well-educated civilians. Specifically, the military’s level of knowledge and experience concerning the psychology of subconscious influence and manipulation of information was equally elementary to that of a civilian staff member’s level of psychological knowledge (Korteling and Duistermaat, 2018).
+
+Although this was not explicitly investigated or tested, we would place (on a ‘best guess’) the level of competence of the workshop participants in the two bottom levels of the _Hierarchy of Competence_, i.e., unconscious incompetence and conscious incompetence (see Figure 10-1). This assessment is illustrated by expressions of participants like: “Since we now know that unconscious influence is normal in our daily lives, for instance in commerce and politics, targeted, strategic undermining and manipulation is also business-as-usual for the army.” Basic awareness is often highly under-developed, even on the highest levels of political and military decision making (e.g., president Biden emotionally calling President Putin a “war criminal” shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, may be considered very disputable from a psychological point of view.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 10-1: Hierarchy of Competence._
+
+This overall lack of knowledge and experience in the military seems to be supported by a brief survey among NATO partners involved in the NATO HFM Panel 356 on CogWar. In this survey we asked our partners (from Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Norway, Sweden, UK, US) the following questions regarding the education and training practices in five fields of information operations that are discerned by the Dutch defence:
+
+1) Monitoring the information environment;
+
+2) Understanding target groups;
+
+3) Countering disinformation/influence;
+
+4) Influencing; and
+
+5) Strategical Communication:
+
+> _a) Are there substantial Education and Training practices already carried out in your nation (or other nations you know) and if “Yes” on which ones of the above five fields is this done?_
+
+> _b) Which types of O&T and which methods/tools (like simulation, gaming, etc.) are used for which kinds of training goals (e.g., board games/constructive simulations/Instruction video’s/books for the training goal of Increasing awareness of “OODA hacking” or how to counter disinformation._
+
+The results of this simple survey on NATO CogWar education and training practices can be summarized as follows:
+
+- No substantial or dedicated education and training on the principles and methods of CogWar:
+
+ - Few initiatives with doubtful results.
+
+ - Governmental initiatives, e.g., debunking misinformation, are minor or negligible.
+
+- CogWar education and training is still an emerging topic in its initial stage:
+
+ - Basic awareness about the impact of internet, cyber, and social media usage.
+
+ - General awareness education is in line with public and academic initiatives not much of dedicated military training.
+
+- Lack of good teaching material and training methods:
+
+ - Wargaming under development (low priority).
+
+ - Some classrooms as well as “hands-on” exercises.
+
+#### 10.3 KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT
+
+The basic level of consciousness on this topic implies that there is a need for defence departments to educate and train military professionals and develop their critical thinking skills if they are to master a range of such competencies. The initial basic training on the development of critical thinking skills would focus on becoming aware of your vulnerabilities (e.g., cognitive bias) and the pervasive effects of influence (including how you yourself are – easily – influenced). Second, skills could be developed by training military personnel how to mitigate the influence of information operations and finally how to practically apply the basic principles to influence others or protect yourself from external influence.
+
+Most prominently, the military should become deeply aware of how deceptive thinking and practices are endemic in a connected, technology-driven international arena. For example, various research projects are being conducted in the Netherlands to expand knowledge, not only regarding the psychological aspects of CogWar, but also related to the physical and informational aspects. Research is being done with military personnel to gain insight on these topics by participating in strategic wargames. There are many types of these games, such as: Matrix gaming, Dilemma games, Connecting-the-dots games, Campaign games, or Interactive scenario-based discussion). Most games are mainly aimed at raising awareness (and some understanding) of the increasing importance and possibilities of hybrid aspects of modern conflicts, which are largely fought in the information domain. What is still lacking in these games is the training of more awareness and insight into the manifold psychological mechanisms of influence (and indoctrination) and how these are translated into concrete activities of psychological deception.
+
+Another topic is how to cope with the emotional impact and stress that may be induced by CogWar and misinformation campaigns. Dealing with these campaigns can be psychologically demanding, cause a lot of distress and therefore undermine cognitive performance. Finally, how to address erroneous data and disinformation on the internet. This may involve detecting hacks and identifying the sources or hidden intentions behind disinformation. However, this is sometimes only possible to a very limited extent due to legal and ethical provisions in the field of managing the public or public data. Simulating data can then offer a solution but it is complex, labor-intensive, and expensive.
+
+To develop effective training and education, good lessons-learned can be drawn from research in (neuro-cognitive science and other fields of psychology such as, how to influence consumer behavior (Adams, Sartori, and Waldherr, 2007; Cialdini, 1983; Hansen, 2013; Jowett and O’Donnell, 1992). Chapter 11 describes one training toll that has recently been developed by Bergh. Additional educational content can be drawn from neuro-psychological knowledge on how cognitive biases, originating from neural and evolutionary characteristics of the brain, can be exploited to manipulate human thinking and decision making (Heuer, 2013; Janser, 2007; Kahneman, 2011; Korteling, Duistermaat, and Toet, 2018; Korteling, Brouwer and Toet, 2018; Korteling and Toet, 2022).
+
+In addition, valuable insights are also available from the creative professions, such as film set design for physical deception, and from commercial marketing (Verrall et al., 2016). Since our totalitarian opponents are less hindered by ethical and juridical restrictions than we are, this vast body knowledge on influencing human perception, decision making, and behavior can be used to develop more subtle information interventions (Korteling and Duistermaat, 2018). Much attention should be paid to target audience analysis and the methodological aspects of CogWar (e.g., analysis, campaign planning, intervention, risk management, measuring effect). In general, the inclusion of how to apply our deep insights into influencing (or manipulation) human decision making needs to be one of the corner stones of the training courses to be developed.
+
+#### 10.4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+Although the allied military remains committed to maintain its capacity for traditional warfare, military leaders recognize that hybrid approaches with an increasing informational and psychological character have become the prevailing mode of conflict. Therefore, military organizations in Western/NATO countries, who strive towards stability, need to rely more heavily on advanced informational and psychological methods and concepts to effectively engage in these hybrid conflicts. However, there seems little awareness, knowledge, or experience to integrate the cognitive aspects of operating in the CogWar dynamic information environment at a sufficient level within the NATO armed forces. In contrast to the former Soviet Union and Russia, the Western world has not yet intensively engaged in developing in-depth knowledge, experience, and adequate tools for CogWar. Improvement of this situation may require progress in the field of recruitment and selection of personnel. However, we must first design the framework for good education and training programs with proper educational content, methods, and didactics. Finally, adequate tools (like simulation and virtual and real-time wargaming) for supporting training and for the defence, preparation, and execution of CogWar must be developed.
+
+#### 10.5 S&T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+__To be implemented now (1‒2 years):__
+
+For the short-term- basic training programs can be implemented focusing on pro-active awareness and more literacy regarding the well-known pervasive effects of military influence, deception and manipulation by the weaponization of information. This includes how we ourselves are – easily – manipulated in our thinking and decision making, for example by the exploitation of our psychological vulnerabilities, such as our cognitive biases. Most prominently, the military should become much more profoundly aware that deceptive thinking and practices are endemic in a connected, information- and technology-driven international arena. Wargaming seems an effective way to promote increased awareness of the complex information environment and for recognizing the interplay of the many forms of influence and deception. It has been shown to be particularly useful for strategically complex problems and offers the possibility to analyze the potential cascading chain of events that emerge because of such actions. An important challenge is that (during the preparation phase) the processing of personal data is only possible to a limited extent – only if there is a legal basis or mandate. This makes it difficult to practice with real data and limits the possibilities in the use of ICT tools. In addition, the narrative to train in the information domain needs to be changed and clearly communicated. Regarding research with more in-depth knowledge and experience must be developed on how psychological influence and deception in a military context works or how the workings may be augmented. This knowledge will facilitate and shape the content and development of more sophisticated training methods and programs to be developed in the next phase.
+
+__Next (3‒5 years):__
+
+Practicing within the information environment is essential to acquire the necessary skills for effective maneuvering with information. Apart from the training of the defensive and reactive aspects of CogWar, NATO allies need to foster the practical application of pro-active stratagems and tactics in valid operational contexts. Therefore, in-depth knowledge and experience on the cognitive mechanisms of influence and manipulation, such as how to deal with emotion and distress and how cognitive biases can be exploited for manipulation, must be further developed. Based on this knowledge, the educational methods and content for more sophisticated (than just awareness and literacy) operational readiness training programs and methods need to be extended. In-depth knowledge on the manifold psychological mechanisms of influence (and indoctrination) must be captured in well-structured models. These models will then be applied for the translation of tactical and strategical issues into concrete chains of military CogWar operations. This also concerns a further development of technology supporting the training of how to effectively deal with data, such as social media the large amount of information and communication on the internet. People will have to learn to work effectively with AI technology that may support the detection and identification of misinformation, disinformation and hacks carried out by opponent actors. To train the relevant competencies, this may require the provision of more sophisticated synthetic and simulated data, as well as realistic scenarios, which is difficult, labor-intensive, and therefore, expensive. Finally, more people within the military should be trained to develop critical thinking skills and become “strategic thinkers” across a broad range of relevant (sub)domains. This also requires the development of (selection tools), training methods, and didactic content to train the involved cognitive and communication skills.
+
+__Future towards the next level (5+ years):__
+
+So, for the first 5 years to come, we must focus on the (further) development of in-depth knowledge, training methods, training content, and probably some basic support tools for CogWar. When this knowledge (and experience) has been sufficiently developed, it will become possible to focus more on the R&D of advanced (support) tools. In this “medium-to-long-term” we need the development of advanced (e.g., AI-endowed) methods and tools to support the military in the integral chain of defensive, pro-active, and offensive CogWar. In this regard, allies will need a coherent framework of different support systems, which is closely and flexibly linked to the operational environment. This approach also includes an overall shell (or framework) for detecting, mitigating, countering, selecting, designing, developing and executing CogWar operations (a “CogWar Engine”). This approach, at least on both the strategic and tactical levels, would prove helpful for the development of technical competencies required for the defence against CogWar. For example, such a model or tool must support certain critical preparation operations, such as: understanding and seeing through the opponent or selecting, preparing and executing certain cognitive tactics (operations, stratagems). Elements of CogWar for which tooling could be developed to support the integral chain of necessary activities in a coherent way are:
+
+- Detection of opposing psychological influence and deception, e.g., recognizing it.
+
+- Disinformation:
+
+ - How to recognize false information.
+
+ - How to mitigate or counter or bend weaponized information, as well as dealing with emotion and distress.
+
+- Analysis and understanding of the opponent (and the other relevant actors).
+
+- Selection and definition of strategic issues for CogWar operations.
+
+- Specification of a strategic or tactical CogWar goal to obtain.
+
+- Analysis of the relevant global and local circumstances.
+
+- Selection and specification of the kind of CogWar operation to use.
+
+- Means (narratives, storyboards, training scenarios), tools and media that may be used.
+
+- Target groups and operation levels on which to act.
+
+- Division of tasks, authorities and responsibilities.
+
+- Execution of CogWar operations (per actor, target, stratagem, timing, means, etc.).
+
+- Orchestrating the whole of the CogWar operation.
+
+- Contextual issues, involvement of the mass and social media.
+
+- Analyses of risks and potential negative outcomes.
+
+- Development of advanced support tools or tooling concepts for different phases/aspects.
+
+- Educate people to become “strategic thinkers.”
+
+In closing, there is a significant amount of research that remains to be done that will focus on the development of advanced training content, methods, and tools that will support the development of military and civilian personnel in the defence against CogWar.
+
+#### 10.6 REFERENCES
+
+[Adams, B.D., Sartory, J., and Waldherr, S. (2007). Military Influence Operations: Review of Relevant Scientific Literature. Report No. CR 2007-146. Toronto: Defence Research and Development Canada](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA477201).
+
+Cialdini, R.D. (1983). Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. New York: Harper.
+
+Hansen, W.G. (2013). Influence: Theory and Practice. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School.
+
+Heuer, R.J. (2013). Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counter Deception. In: H. Rothstein, and B. Whaley (Eds.), The Art and Science of Military Deception, pp. 105-133, Boston/London: Artech House.
+
+Janser, M.J. (2007). Cognitive Biases in Military Decision Making. US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
+
+[Jowett, G and O’Donnell, V. (1992). Propaganda and Persuasion, 2ᶮᵈ edition, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 122-154](http://people.ucalgary.ca/~rseiler/jowett.htm).
+
+Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. London: Penguin Group.
+
+Korteling, J.E., Brouwer, A.M. and Toet, A. (2018). A Neural Network Framework for Cognitive Bias. Frontiers in Psychology 9:1561. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01561
+
+Korteling, J.E. and Duistermaat, M. (2018). Psychological Deception. Report TNO R11532. Soesterberg: TNO Defence, Safety and Security.
+
+Korteling, J.E., Duistermaat M. and Toet. A. (2018). Subconscious Manipulation in Hybrid/Psychological Warfare. Report TNO 2018 R11543. Soesterberg: TNO Defence, Safety and Security.
+
+Korteling, J.E. and Toet, A. (2022). Cognitive Biases. In S. Della Sala (Ed), Encyclopedia of Behavioral Neuroscience, 2ᶮᵈ edition, ISBN 9780128216361, Elsevier. pp 610-619. DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-12-809324-5.24105-9.
+
+Verrall, N., Mason, L, Ellis, B. (2016) Military Deception. Baseline Understanding for Contemporary Information Activities. DSTL/TR90060 v1.0. UK: Dstl.
+
+
+### Chapter 11 ‒ SOMULATOR: DEVELOPING COGWAR RESILIENCE THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA TRAINING
+
+> #### Arild Bergh
+> #### Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
+> #### NORWAY
+
+#### 11.1 INTRODUCTION
+
+Realistic simulations are beneficial for those preparing for military responsibilities. For the Trident Juncture exercise, NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre used a commercial software package that provided __Facebook__ and __Twitter__-inspired features to provide a social media element in this large, multinational exercise (Tomlin, 2016). Encouraged by the results of this, the C-SPI project at the Norwegian Defence Research Institute (FFI) undertook a research activity aimed at providing an updated social media experience for training purposes. This activity resulted in a complete tool designed for non-IT experts in a range of training and exercise situations. This tool, known as ___Somulator___, provides an online service, either through the Internet or on closed networks.
+
+This chapter will summarize the issues that were considered when selecting the core elements of the training tool. Then, we will discuss the feedback received from users that laid the foundations for additional, custom development that were used to integrate the core elements into a complete training solution. Lastly, we will discuss the core lessons learned from this study.
+
+#### 11.2 ISSUES RELATED TO SOCIAL MEDIA TRAINING
+
+Previous chapters have highlighted the challenges that NATO may face from the adversaries’ use of social media platforms and technologies in CogWar. There is a need to develop and train military personnel to understand and manage social media effectively. This is especially critical in CogWar where adversaries have weaponized information and disseminate it globally and invisibly across the global digital network on social media platforms.
+
+Thus, given the influence and impact of social media platforms, to train military personnel to understand and manage information presented on social media platforms is no longer optional. Rather, it is an essential competency that all military personnel must achieve as part of CogWar defence. Furthermore, social media is deeply embedded in everyone’s daily life, and exerts influence on everyone’s perceptions and decisions. Thus, we can no longer ignore or disconnect from information presented in social media, doing so would entail great risks. Nor can we view this as an intelligence or communication specialist issue as the wide dissemination of propaganda, disinformation and misinformation campaigns across global social media platforms affects everyone and must be addressed by each person. Indeed, information has already been weaponized across all media platforms and used by adversaries to target both the military and mass civilian population.
+
+There are many challenges in learning to counter CogWar in the social media environment. For example, although it would be free to open any number of social media accounts on real social media platforms and use them for training, this would immediately run into several issues. First, some social media, like Twitter, display all content by default. This would restrain the ability to train freely on any scenario and being able to fail without fear of causing offence or being ridiculed. Furthermore, most social media platforms ban the use of fake logins. Military personnel/staff would either break platform rules or face exposure. Unlike other military uses of real-life locations for regular military exercises, these limitations prohibit this approach.
+
+An alternative could be to simply describe a scenario, such as “fake news about an impending attack by a terrorist group is spread through Twitter.” Although this approach is often used in high-level war gaming, this would leave a lot to be desired when training practitioners in different fields. In some ways it would be akin to doing target practice through notes – social media content is chaotic and overwhelming; using a naturalistic setting is thus a better way to start build resilience.
+
+#### 11.3 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
+
+Given these constraints, we researched how we could achieve a realistic social media simulation that would provide high quality training for a wide array of military personnel, ranging from intelligence cells in the home guard to communications staff in a government department. Attempting to recreate even a subset of a real social media platform’s functionality from scratch would be costly. It would also require the establishment of an ongoing development team to fix bugs. Furthermore, there are different types of social media platforms that each have different affordances (Bergh, 2019, p. 17), training someone on __Twitter__ does not necessarily help them on a video-based platform like __YouTube__.
+
+Therefore, we decided to utilize open-source “clones” of several different social media platforms in an overall tool called ___Somulator___. ___Somulator___ integrates five individual web-based applications with custom software to make them suitable for use in training. The term, open source, denotes that one is allowed to modify the software according to one’s needs. For example, we were able to amend newspaper software, so it automatically creates three newspapers for use in training. Each of the five web applications were selected after an evaluation of different products, they are:
+
+- Friendica (Facebook type social media platform, i.e., friends-based platform that allows sharing of many different media).
+
+- Mastodon (Twitter type social media platform, i.e., micro-blogging content) (Figure 11-1).
+
+- Pixelfed (Instagram type social media platform, i.e., photo sharing).
+
+- Peertube (YouTube type social media platform, i.e., video sharing).
+
+- Drupal (Content management software that provides online newspaper functionality).
+
+Each of the four social media platforms implement the key features of the originals. This includes uploading diverse types of content, communicating with, and subscribing to other users, showing content in constantly updated feeds and search results, providing tools for sharing and commenting on information, and so on. The fifth application, Drupal, is a general content management system used by many newspapers and magazines, such as the ___Economist___. Like other online newspapers, Drupal has built-in comments and article sharing tools.
+
+What these platforms lack are the advanced machine learning tools used by commercial social media networks to analyze uploaded content and users’ interests which are used to show content that is of interest to the individual users. This is the main aspect of social media that is manipulated for cognitive warfare purposes (Bergh, 2020, p. 17). In a training situation, this will therefore need to be replaced by manually planned and executed deployment of content. This will be discussed briefly at the end of this chapter.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 11-1: Screenshot of Mastodon, the Twitter Clone._
+
+#### 11.4 DESIGN METHODS
+
+> #### 11.4.1 Input from Potential Users and Core Goals that Emerged
+
+The decision to utilize existing open-source software that has been tested and is continuously developed was followed by an analysis of what customizations were required to turn these individual, separate applications into a coherent training platform. As a part of this analysis ___Somulator___ was discussed with different potential stakeholders. These included experienced, regional organizers of media training, staff at NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre, workshop, and exercise organizers at national public bodies in Norway, as well as the staff at the Norwegian Cyber Defence and fellow FFI researchers.
+
+Based on these discussions the following key requirements emerged for the different user types. Namely, we developed key requirements for 1) Trainers; and 2) Training event organizers.
+
+> #### 11.4.2 Low Threshold for Use
+
+The type of training discussed here is often done by subject specialists who do not necessarily have in-depth IT expertise. A simple method to deploy ___Somulator___ was therefore required. This requirement was managed by developing an automated means of deploying of ___Somulator___ after asking just three questions through a regular web page (see Figure 11-2). ___Somulator___ is thus what is known as “software as a service.” The ease with which ___Somulator___ can be deployed also means that it can easily be de-commissioned without worrying about the cost of deploying it again. This avoids having to keep services and servers running for longer than required due to re-deployment costs.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 11-2: Second of the Five Steps When Deploying Somulator._
+
+__11.4.2.1 Ease of Organizing Training__
+
+Informants with practical training experience highlighted the workload involved in setting up tools for participants to use, typically by creating accounts and emailing login information before the training event. To handle this, a web-based administration tool was developed for ___Somulator___. This has, among other things, a built-in registration module where any number of emails can be copied into a text box and accounts will automatically be set up and the new users will be alerted through emails.
+
+__11.4.2.2 Content Control__
+
+Finally, trainers needed simple and efficient means by which to control how and when content is published through the different social media platforms. It is the content that will facilitate learning. Content publishing therefore needs to be controlled in such a way that it can tie in with an overarching scenario (Figure 11-3).
+
+___Somulator___ therefore has a module for the “white cell” (also called Excon) to upload and distribute content through the different social media platforms that have been deployed. The main purpose of this tool is:
+
+1) To be able to spread copious amounts of content in a brief time, as one experiences it on social media; and
+
+2) Choose services and profiles used for diverse types of posts.
+
+The latter is used because different profiles have distinctive characteristics that can change participants’ perception of the shared content. A profile claiming to be a retired general may seem more authoritative on military matters than a home maker’s profile. This is also how real influence campaigns operate.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 11-3: Prepared Content Ready for Deployment in Somulator._
+
+__For researchers:__
+
+- ___Somulator___ is also a tool for researchers to learn more about how CogWar through social media works, and through this research contribute to the development of new training approaches. The features discussed above make it considerably easier to organize casual experiments for different groups that require customized setups. This makes it easier to test ideas with different scenarios/groups. In addition, it is possible to extract the data from an experiment to analyze in retrospect.
+
+__For organizations:__
+
+- Finally, organizations, whether the armed forces or government agencies tasked with handling crises, have some overarching requirements. Although not clearly spelled out, they emerged during conversations with stakeholders that represented diverse types of organizations.
+
+- First, it would be very costly if a training tool in such a dynamic arena as social media was static. The ability to extend the software is therefore of paramount importance. Somulator is extendable as it uses open-source software that users may freely modify. Furthermore, users actively develop these applications within a large community of developers, who add features over time, thereby, keeping the feature set up to date. The open nature of the underlying social media platforms also means that any custom enhancements are distributed and implemented in the overarching administration tool that can be shared with other organizations.
+
+- Secondly, training tools that users share with other organizations are beneficial in terms of lower costs but also because the pool of people who know the software expands. Interoperability is a key feature to achieve this, and all the social media platforms used in Somulator implement the Activity Pub protocol (Webber et al., 2018). This allows two different organizations using for example Mastodon (the Twitter type platform), to connect these via the Internet if they do joint training at some point. The organization could be two different defence educational outfits or even armed forces from two different NATO member states.
+
+#### 11.5 LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
+
+___Somulator___ was evaluated in a pilot experiment where media students from a local high school prepared disinformation-based content and worked in the white cell. Members of a youth wing of an independent defence related Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) participated in the actual experiment.
+
+The key finding from this experiment highlighted the importance of content that feels relevant to the participants, not only in the current experiment but also in relation to their everyday life and work. Social media is deeply embedded in everyone’s daily life. Thus, humans filter out irrelevant content, and tailor information streams according to individual interests and relevant needs. Disinformation or propaganda content that seems too outrageous may therefore simply be ignored rather than providing opportunities for learning. This may therefore be more a case of “train as you live” than train as you fight, perhaps an appropriate sentiment given that our cognition straddles everyday life and not only our defence.
+
+This point also shows the need during training to replace the social media platforms’ algorithms that continuously evaluate what information you are most likely to prefer, with careful preparation and deployment of information through relevant profiles. Otherwise, the content will have negligible effect on the learning as it will seem to be random information of no particular concern to the individual person undergoing training.
+
+Social media training therefore require considerable preparation in terms of creating relevant content for an experiment or training workshop. The possibility of using machine learning models such as GPT-2 to generate content may provide one way forward, and research is currently taking place to explore how difficult it would be to train Norwegian language models to create copious quantities of disinformation automatically.
+
+Looking ahead, ___Somulator___ will be used as part of a three-year project funded by the Norwegian DoD. There are also numerous actors within the Norwegian Total Defence who are eager to use ___Somulator___ in different training contexts.
+
+The results of this pilot study have implications for defence against CogWar. The ability to have AI/ML tools and technologies developed that will facilitate filtering of irrelevant information, detection of fake information, and information that is not valid will be more easily detected and rendered irrelevant to the end user. Thus, the ____Somulator___ tool that emerged from this research holds great promise in contributing to research and training to defend against CogWar in the future.
+
+#### 11.6 REFERENCES
+
+[Bergh, A. (2019). Social Network Centric Warfare: Understanding Influence Operations in Social Media (FFI-Rapport No. 19/01194; p. 65). Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)](http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12242/2623).
+
+[Bergh, A. (2020). Påvirkningsoperasjoner i sosiale medier ‒ Oversikt og utfordringer (FFI-rapport No. 20/01694; p. 58). Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)](http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12242/2724).
+
+[Tomlin, G.M. (2016). #SocialMediaMatters: Lessons Learned from Exercise Trident Juncture. Joint Force Quarterly](http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/793264/socialmediamatters-lessons-learned-from-exercise-trident-juncture/).
+
+Webber, C., Tallon, J., Shepherd, O., Guy, A., and Prodromou, E. (2018). ActivityPub-W3C Recommendation. W3C Social Web Working Group, 23ʳᵈ January.
+
+
+### Chapter 12 ‒ LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS RELATED TO DEFENCE AGAINST COGNITIVE WARFARE
+
+> #### Lea Kristina Petronella Bjørgul
+> #### Norwegian Defence Research Institute
+> #### NORWAY
+
+#### 12.1 INTRODUCTION
+
+The sophistication of new digital technologies and advances within artificial intelligence, machine learning, and autonomous systems coupled with the increasingly widespread use of social media has made it possible for actors to reach larger audiences with customized and targeted content at machine speed. This development has arguably altered the character of warfare and given rise to Cognitive Warfare (CogWar). CogWar takes well-known and novel approaches within information, cyber, and psychological warfare to a new level through the implementation of these modern technologies by not only attempting to alter the way people think, but also how they react to information.
+
+States are increasingly taking advantage of these methods to achieve their strategic objectives. The end goal of CogWar is to gain some sort of advantage over another party. Consequently, the aim of CogWar is arguably the same as within the other warfighting domains; to impose ones will upon another state. This is in line with one of the main elements of Clausewitz’s definition of war: “...an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will” (Von Clausewitz, 1968, p. 101). According to Clausewitz, war is conducted for some second-order purpose. States do not go to war simply to commit violence, but to impose their will upon other states. Despite the common aim, the concept of cognitive warfare raises several new legal and moral challenges that should be carefully considered by those involved in determining the status and response to CogWar. These issues should be resolved before NATO decides whether to implement the cognitive domain as its 6ᵗʰ warfighting domain. The challenges in question are both related to the issue of _why or if_ a war should be fought (_jus ad bellum_), and _how_ a war should be fought (the conduct of war or _jus in bello_).
+
+#### 12.2 DEFENDING AGAINST COGNITIVE WARFARE: ISSUES RELATED TO JUS AD BELLUM
+
+Several measures are needed to defend against CogWar. Obvious measures include (amongst others) making society more resilient against actions in the cognitive domain across all sectors (civilian and military), to prevent the actions of an adversary to be successful. However, other defensive measures should receive thoughtful treatment. Important examples include deterrence and defensive counterattacks, as well as the problem of attribution (the problem of ambiguity as to the identity of the attacker). Against whom is one to retaliate when the identity of the perpetrator cannot be firmly established? How is deterrence to work if the punitive threat of retaliation cannot be accurately aimed? Ethical reasoning in the form of judgements about good versus harm done, the level of proof required to act, and the matter of _when and how_ to respond to actions in the cognitive domain will all be of critical importance moving forward.
+
+A specific issue regarding _jus ad bellum_ and defensive counterattacks that needs to be investigated is related to Article 5 (The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, Art. 5). The result of treating the cognitive domain as a warfighting domain is the implication that an action within this domain can be characterized as an act of war, and potentially trigger the right to national self-defence (and Article 5). Consequently, one main issue that the Alliance potentially needs to resolve is: _when should an action within the cognitive domain be considered an unlawful use of force?_
+
+One approach to this challenge is to revisit the debate that took place when NATO declared the cyber domain as an operational domain. The main issue for the participants in this debate was that cyberattacks are non-kinetic, and most importantly, the argument that the existing international frameworks could not accommodate cyberattacks because they do not appear to use physical or violent _means_ as they only involve the manipulation of computer code. However, given the potential consequences of cyberattacks, many argued that it was implausible to suggest that no state could ever use military force to protect itself from them. This debate resulted in a definition of force that applies the existing laws of war to actions within the cyber domain only when these actions are likely to result in conventional physical harm (Petkis, 2016, p. 1431; Schmitt et al., 2013, p. 93). More specifically, the threshold suggested for the cyber domain was that actions that _directly_ and intentionally cause significant physical effects, qualify as a use of force (and could potentially trigger the right to national self-defence). Some authors have suggested that this framework can be revised and used to develop legal definitions and metrics for cognitive acts of war (Bernal et al., p. 36).
+
+Although a useful starting point, this definition of force, and the framework suggested for the cyber domain might not be satisfactory for establishing governing principles within the cognitive domain. Several arguments can be made for why the framework suggested for the cyber domain might not be appropriate for the cognitive domain. Most importantly, it appears that many forms of current CogWar will often not involve death and widespread physical destruction. As previously mentioned, the aim of CogWar is to alter the way people _think and react_ to information. With this aim a state could have several different goals, but one of the most well-known examples is policy change through election influence (such as the Russian influence operation targeting the American public in connection to the 2016 presidential election). Although a significant challenge to modern democracies, these types of actions do not fit the criteria of resulting in “significant physical effects.” One could argue that influence campaigns with the goal of destabilization and encouragement to violence can in fact lead to significant physical effects. However, these effects would be indirect, not direct, as the current consensus encourages (Bjørgul, 2021). The implication of this is of course that very few (if any) cognitive attacks will ever trigger a nation’s right to self-defence. However, the potential consequences of certain types of CogWar (such as influence operations) on democratic stability, raises the question of whether there are other effects than physical harm which should be considered to give rise to a _casus belli_.
+
+In conclusion, CogWar arguably represents a significant and new challenge to our moral and legal understanding of war and the right to self-defence. Consequently, there is a need for critical thinking about when this new type of warfare should be used, and how it should be regulated. One important and difficult challenge for the Alliance moving forward is to think fundamentally new about which actions in the cognitive domain should be considered unlawful actions of war if it decides to implement the cognitive domain as the 6ᵗʰ warfighting domain. A framework needs to be developed, from which a set of principles and legal articles can be derived, so that acts of CogWar can be identified and appropriately be responded to.
+
+This work will likely take time. Academics began the process of defining cyberwarfare as early as in the 1990s (Ashraf, 2021, p. 275), and the first ethical analysis of this new kind of warfare was not published until 2010 (Dipert, 2010). There is no reason to think that dealing with similar issues within the cognitive domain should be a less comprehensive task.
+
+#### 12.3 THE CONDUCT OF WAR: THOUGHTS ON ISSUES RELATED TO JUS IN BELLO
+
+The previous section of this chapter dealt some of the most critical issues related to _why or if_ a war should be fought (_jus ad bellum_). This next section will briefly describe some implications of CogWar on the conduct of war, or the issue of how a war should be fought once it has been initiated (_jus in bello_).
+
+One important topic in connection with the conduct of war, which is put under pressure in CogWar, is the issue of whom it is ethical to fight. In conventional war, non-combatants (those who take no direct part in the hostilities), are protected from both direct and collateral injuries. In other words, there should be no direct hostilities directed at civilian populations (Koskenniemi, 2006, para. 374). This is a principle which stands in direct contrast to one of the central elements of CogWar, namely that civilian populations often are the main targets of operations in the cognitive domain. How should this dilemma be approached?
+
+This leads to another important question that needs answering: _Who is, and who isn’t a combatant in the cognitive domain?_ In traditional warfare civilians may be considered legitimate targets if they directly participate in hostilities. The issue of deciding who is and who is not a combatant in the cognitive domain, and consequently who should be considered legitimate targets, is a puzzling question for several reasons. One complicating aspect is that civilian actors are often used as proxies. One example is the use of PR agencies or influencers in influence operations (Aukia, 2021; Seitz, Tucker and Catalini, 2022; Henley, 2021).
+
+Another prominent issue is that of the kind and degree of force it is ethical to use in different situations. The starting point of this discussion is the _in bello_ proportionality principle, which governs the degree and kind of force used to achieve a military goal by comparing the military advantage gained to the expected damage caused to civilians and civilian objects. Taking into consideration that the effects of CogWar are usually not physical damage, how should this comparison be conducted?
+
+#### 12.4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
+
+CogWar arguably represents a significant and new challenge to our moral and legal understanding of war. Consequently, there is a need for debate regarding how this new type of warfare should be regulated. More research on the normative and legal aspects of CogWar is essential. This should include questions regarding justifications for the resort to military force (_jus ad bellum_) and what may justifiably be done in the use of force (_jus in bello_).
+
+This chapter has pointed to several specific research questions which should be explored to better our understanding of CogWar, as well as its implications for war ethics and international law. First: When should an action within the cognitive domain be considered an unlawful use of force (and potentially trigger the right to national self-defence)? One might begin by considering whether there are secondary effects, other than physical harm, which should be considered that may give rise to a _casus bello_. These issues may lead to another argument regarding whether a _conventional attack_ can ever be a proportional response to an enemy _cognitive attack_.
+
+It is also recommended that issues related to _jus in bello_ are explored. Specific examples of potential research questions include: What defines who is and who is not a combatant in the cognitive domain? Who is a legitimate target in the cognitive domain? And lastly, how should _in bello_ proportionality be evaluated, taking into consideration that the effects of CogWar are usually not physical damage?
+
+In addition to supporting research efforts, NATO should organize a symposium to open the discussion for the development of policies, doctrine, and directives to guide the way ahead for the defence against CogWar. There are significant consequences for the potential abuse of information in the social media environment in CogWar.
+
+Workshops should also be focused on the __Human Element of Cognitive Warfare__ and how best to defend people legally and ethically from the influence and impact of CogWar. The workshop may reveal topics related to human fatigue, cognitive impairment, physiological and psychological impacts, stress, anxiety, attention deficit issues, etc., related to CogWar and pave the way to highlighting the results of CogWar that might otherwise remain hidden and unknown. Like the Havana Syndrome, the impact of cognitive attacks may be challenging to prove. Once the evidence is examined, the focus shifts to identifying the level of psychological harm or cognitive impairment and a defensive strategy can be developed to prevent, mitigate and defend against such attacks in the future. So too, there is a need to take a focused examination of the human element that is influenced negatively in CogWar. What are the consequences of such influence? How can we legally and ethically defend against the impact of CogWar? What level of CogWar crosses the Rubicon and defines it as an act of war to which we are legally responsible to defend? These questions must be addressed if we are to mitigate and defend against CogWar.
+
+Lastly, we anticipate that as the level of sophistication increases in advanced technologies such as AI/ML and BMI designs, there will be an exponential increase in the level of adversarial activity to deploy CogWar attacks at an increasing rate. Therefore, it is important to ensure that education and training are done on a continuous basis to ensure military readiness to counter the effects of CogWar. We must advocate for changes in international law that define the parameters of an act of “CogWar”, and establish levels of response, penalty to counter and mitigate the unethical use of technology for CogWar purposes by potential adversaries against NATO forces.
+
+#### 12.5 REFERENCES
+
+Ashraf, C. (2021). Defining Cyberwar: Towards a Definitional Framework. Defense & Security Analysis, 37(3), pp. 274-294.
+
+[Aukia, J. (June 2021). China as a Hybrid Influencer: Non-State Actors as State Proxies. The European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats](https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-research-report-1-china-as-a-hybrid-influencer-non-state-actors-as-state-proxies/).
+
+[Bernal, A., Carter, C., Singh, I., Cao, K., and Madreperla, O. (2020). Fall 2020 Cognitive Warfare: An Attack on Truth and Thought](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/Cognitive%20Warfare.pdf).
+
+Bjørgul, L. (03 November 2021). Cognitive Warfare and the Use of Force. Stratagem.
+
+Cook, J. (2010). “Cyberation” and Just War Doctrine: A Response to Dipert. The Journal of Military Ethics 9(4), pp. 411-423.
+
+Dipert, R. (2010). The Ethics of Cyberwarfare. Journal of Military Ethics, 9(4), pp. 384-410.
+
+Eberle, C. (2013). Just War and Cyberwar. The Journal of Military Ethics Vol. 12(1), pp. 54-67.
+
+[Elkins, L. (2019). The 6ᵗʰ Warfighting Domain. OTH](https://othjournal.com/2019/11/05/the-6th-warfighting-domain/).
+
+[Henley, J. (2021). Influencers Say Russia-Linked PR Agency Asked them to Disparage Pfizer Vaccine. The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/may/25/influencers-say-russia-linked-pr-agency-asked-them-to-disparage-pfizer-vaccine).
+
+[Janson, J. (2018). It’s Time to Take the Human Domain Seriously. ISCYBERCOM is Our chance. OTH](https://othjournal.com/2018/05/18/its-time-to-take-the-human-domain-seriously-uscybercom-is-our-chance/).
+
+[Koskenniemi, M. (2006). Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law. United Nations](https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf).
+
+[NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949), Article 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm).
+
+[Ottewell, P. (2020). Defining the Cognitive Domain. OTH](https://othjournal.com/2020/12/07/defining-the-cognitive-domain/).
+
+Petkis, S. (2016). Rethinking Proportionality in the Cyber Context. Georgetown Journal of International Law. Vol 47, No. 4, pp. 1431-1458.
+
+Roscini, M. (2010). Worldwide Warfare – “jus ad bellum” and the Use of Cyber Force. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Vol 14, pp. 85-130.
+
+Schmitt, M.N. (2013). Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Cambridge University Press.
+
+[Seitz A., Tucker E., and Catalini M. (2022). How China’s TikTok, Facebook Influencers Push Propaganda. AP News](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-eileen-gu-winter-olympics-technology-business-12de242ee53092693c0711b932c1da5c).
+
+Silver, D. (2002). Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force Under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. International Law Studies Vol 76, pp. 73-97.
+
+Von Clausewitz, C. (1968). On War. Penguin Classics.
+
+
+### Chapter 13 ‒ COGNITIVE WARFARE AND THE HUMAN DOMAIN: APPRECIATING THE PERSPECTIVE THAT THE TRAJECTORIES OF NEUROSCIENCE AND HUMAN EVOLUTION PLACE COGNITIVE WARFARE AT ODDS WITH IDEAS OF A HUMAN DOMAIN
+
+> #### Torvald F. Ask
+> #### Norwegian University of Science & Technology
+> #### NORWAY
+
+> #### Benjamin J. Knox
+> #### Norwegian Armed Forces Cyber Defence
+> #### NORWAY
+
+#### 13.1 INTRODUCTION
+
+Advances in neuroscience combined with evolving technological, cyber, and social engineering capabilities converge to form novel methods of influencing human cognition. The potential for weaponizing these methods, to wage war on the cognitive integrity of a target population, has spawned a resurgence of attention to Cognitive Warfare (CogWar). What constitutes CogWar is currently ill-defined and the existing literature arguing for its novelty struggles to make a critical look at existing literature and challenges the wide-ranging and anthropocentric convincing distinction between CogWar and psychological and influence operations (e.g., Claverie et al., 2022). An alternative position found in the literature is that CogWar is an old form of warfare made relevant with novel weapons for influencing cognition at both tactical and mass levels (e.g., Canham et al., 2022; Dahl, 1996, pp. 23-34; Whiteaker and Valkonen, 2022).
+
+While arguing for the novelty of CogWar, some authors have taken issue with the ‘Cognitive Domain’ as a domain of operations (Claverie and du Cluzel, 2022a, 2022b; Cole and Le Guyader, 2020; du Cluzel, 2020; Le Guyader, 2022). The general argument is that a Cognitive Domain is too restrictive as it does not sufficiently encompass the action space in which human thinking and behavior is being weaponized. For instance, one author asks whether the potential threat of biotechnologies and nanotechnologies are addressed by a Cognitive Domain, and whether an individual or a community can be _“solely defined by its cognitive capacities”_ (Le Guyader, 2020, p. 3). To address the potential limits of a Cognitive Domain, the authors suggest that we are moving towards a ‘Human Domain’ of operations (Claverie and du Cluzel, 2022a, 2022b; Cole and Le Guyader, 2020; du Cluzel, 2020; Le Guyader, 2022).
+
+This suggestion naturally begs the question of what exactly the Human Domain is. This chapter takes perspective of a ‘human domain’ as it does not a priori align with the trajectory of neuroscience and of human evolution in the context of CogWar. Instead, it argues for S&T approaches that focus on a cognitive domain, where CogWar attacks are directed and hence what needs to be protected.
+
+#### 13.2 THE HUMAN DOMAIN AS DEFINED IN THE LITERATURE
+
+Cole and Le Guyader (2020) argue that the Human Domain is _“the one defining us as individuals and structuring our societies”_ (p. 8) and that it is based on many sciences including (but not limited to) _“political science, history, geography, biology, cognitive science, business studies, medicine and health, psychology, demography, economics, environmental studies, information sciences, international studies, law, linguistics, management, media studies, philosophy, voting systems, public administration, international politics, international relations, religious studies, education, sociology, arts and culture ...”_ (p. 8). They argue that these sciences are being weaponized by adversaries, that none of the sciences are addressed by other domains of operation and that a Cognitive Domain would not suffice to address them (Cole and Le Guyader, 2020).
+
+One author (Le Guyader, 2020) argues that the Human Domain is based on the Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH), that the SSH do not fall naturally into the five existing domains but can be _“found, simultaneously, in all five current domains”_ and that they _“precede, explain, and lead to all domains”_ by providing the key ingredients to modern threats and by being _“both inside and outside”_ of all domains thus encompassing them. The author then asserts that the _“Human Domain IS a domain as such, but it is also the “womb” for all other domains whose existence is solely based on and justified by this 6ᵗʰ domain”_ (Le Guyader, 2020, pp. 3-4).
+
+In an article reviewing several of the threats facing human cognitive integrity (du Cluzel, 2020), the Human Domain was described as not being the military human capital but encompassing _“the human capital of a theater of operations as a whole (civilian populations, ethnic groups, leaders...), but also the concepts closely related to humans such as leadership, organization, decision-making processes, perceptions, and behavior.”_ (p. 28). The article then suggests a tentative definition of the Human Domain of operations: _“the sphere of interest in which strategies and operations can be designed and implemented that, by targeting the cognitive capacities of individuals and/or communities with a set of specific tools and techniques, in particular digital ones, will influence their perception and tamper with their reasoning capacities, hence gaining control of their decision making, perception and behavior levers in order to achieve desired effects.”_ (Du Cluzel, 2020, p. 33).
+
+Two authors (Claverie and du Cluzel, 2022a, 2022b) argued that the _“human enhancement networks”_, brought about and facilitated by the increased interconnectedness between humans and information technology, are typical of the Human Domain _“where the ability to solve complex problems is dependent on how information is represented, understood and developed”_ (Claverie and du Cluzel, 2022a, p. 7).
+
+In short, and according to the literature, the Human Domain can be understood as everything that involves humans and human societies. It encompasses the cause and outcome of all warfare, and getting an asymmetric advantage requires knowledge in SSH as well as the hard sciences.
+
+There are several issues with this domain as it is currently described. First and foremost, a domain where everything explains everything (like a model consisting of all variables) where one needs to know every SSH, and related science is hardly useful. A Cognitive Domain would be more useful in this regard because it indicates where attacks are directed thus what needs to be protected. Moreover, the explanations and definitions provided by du Cluzel (2020, p. 33) and Claverie and du Cluzel (2022a, p. 7) can be fully addressed by a cognitive domain. Most of the future threats addressed in the literature (du Cluzel, 2020; Le Guyader, 2020) are related to neurobiological and cognitive factors as well as information technology. Thus, to sufficiently address these threats, it will specifically require that focus is allocated to cognitive science, neuroscience, and information technology. One could also argue that the argument for moving towards a Human Domain is too anthropocentric in the sense that it may be a move in the opposite direction of the trajectory of neuroscience and of human evolution.
+
+#### 13.3 COGNITIVE WARFARE AND THE HUMAN DOMAIN: IS A HUMAN DOMAIN AT ODDS WITH THE TRAJECTORY OF NEUROSCIENCE AND HUMAN EVOLUTION?
+
+Developments in neuroscience result from applying common principles for how molecules and materials interact, and how information is represented statistically. Some of these advancements are a result of being able to avoid the bias of thinking about cognition in a human (or anthropocentric) manner, and rather identify the statistical frameworks and models underlying the brain’s ability to perceive and understand the world. Examples range from perceiving objects (Nirenberg and Pandarinath, 2012) to complex representations of physical space (Gardner et al., 2022). To understand the neuronal networks that give rise to these statistical models, neuroscientific researchers are developing tools that can be used to manipulate the networks. These tools combine material science with virus technology as delivery mechanisms; being human has little to do with it.
+
+Another problem with conceptualizing an anthropocentric domain is the fact that humans are increasingly becoming cyborgs and merging with technology. At the most extreme, humans are getting implants and replacing organs to attain superhuman abilities (e.g., perceptual, kinetic, etc., Tsui, 2020). If humans are becoming less human over time it begs the question of how relevant a “Human Domain” will be in the future. Cognition is cognition regardless of whether it is occurring in a machine, a human being, or an animal belonging to another species. If one accounts for the possible trajectories that human evolution may take, one could argue that a Human Domain is more restrictive than a Cognitive Domain.
+
+#### 13.4 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
+
+The conception of a Domain of Operations should be actionable by practitioners and not solely justify the existence of academic pursuits. A Human Domain as it is currently described in the literature is arguably too wide-reaching to be actionable. It is also not clear how it is better at addressing current threats than a Cognitive Domain. The trajectory of neuroscience (including cognitive neuroscience) and human evolution is arguably moving in the opposite direction of that of a Human Domain. To keep up with- and get ahead of the threats associated with these developments, as well as being at the forefront of research that can further understanding of the brain’s ability to perceive and understand the world, efforts need to be directed towards S&T that facilitate this. Doing so can lead to anticipatory actions based upon the ability to make sense of how sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used. The outcome is the ability to apply improved and appropriate tools and methods and time relevant defensive strategies in the near and distant future.
+
+Anthropocentric approaches may be a mistake as we risk losing sight of cognition as processes or actions, and how manipulations (positive or negative / offensive or defensive) to these can guide our behavior. The knowledge available in the current neuroscience literature is highly applicable and can be used to develop powerful neuro-ergonomic tools to manipulate brain physiology to alter how individuals experience and interact with the world. This information can be applied by non-academic individuals to improve brain function and optimize performance (e.g., increase dopamine receptors to improve motivation and grit). The same tools can be applied by adversaries to degrade brain function and performance (e.g., reduce dopamine or other neuroactive molecules that facilitate in-group coherence). These dual-use potentials need to be mapped out to effectively defend against them.
+
+For the short term, the HFM-356 House Model can be used as a tool to critically assess existing [grey] literature and analyze perceived CogWar attacks. This will allow for more academic rigor to be applied regarding the how and when CogWar currently occurs, in peace, crises and war.
+
+In mid-term, taking the lead from neuroscience and human evolutionary trajectories, in terms of the opportunities and consequences of human-machine integration, research should proceed by avoiding the biases of ‘humanizing’ CogWar effects and instead focus on the cognitive vectors that become available to affect behavior change. In other words, identifying the how and when can it occur.
+
+Lastly, for the longer term, close collaboration with intra-disciplinary neuroscientists and neuroscience labs (e.g., labs and researchers that has experience with computational-, social-. cognitive-, human-, molecular- and cellular neuroscience, and in using nanotechnological and other material science methods) will be necessary to both get a sufficient SA of the current dual-use potential of neuroscientific tools and for developing sufficient defensive strategies. For instance, understanding how current virus- or molecular-based tools can be applied to manipulate human cognition (e.g., increase the likelihood of risk-taking behaviors) may provide tools for both detecting and molecularly countering such cognitive attacks. This collaborative approach needs to be combined with academically ‘plugging into’ industry technology developers to help understand how developing technologies can facilitate or interact with molecular or more indirect (yet neuro-ergonomic) methods for attacking cognition.
+
+#### 13.5 REFERENCES
+
+Canham, M., Sütterlin, S., Ask, T.F., Knox, B.J., Glenister, L., and Lugo, R. (2022). Ambiguous Self-Induced Disinformation (ASID) Attacks: Weaponizing a Cognitive Deficiency. Journal of Information Warfare, pp. 1-17, in press.
+
+[Claverie, B., and du Cluzel, F. (2022a). The Cognitive Warfare Concepts. NATO ACT Innovation Hub](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/COGWAR%20article%20Claverie%20du%20Cluzel%20final_0.pdf).
+
+[Claverie, B., and du Cluzel, F. (2022b). Cognitive Warfare: The Advent of the Concept of “Cognitics” in the Field of Warfare. In Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France., pp. 2, 1-7, 2022, 978-92-837-2392-9](https://hal.univ-lyon2.fr/IMS-BORDEAUX-FUSION/hal-03635889v1).
+
+[Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. (2022). Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 20201. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, pp. 8, 1-6. Hal-03635930](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Cognitive%20Warfare%20Symposium%20-%20ENSC%20-%20March%202022%20Publication.pdf).
+
+[Cole, A., and Le Guyader, H. (2020). NATO Sixth’s Domain of Operations. FICINT document. Norfolk (VA, USA): NATO ACT Innovation Hub](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/NATO%27s%206th%20domain%20of%20operations.pdf).
+
+[Dahl, A. B. (1996). Considering a Cognitive Warfare Framework. Command Dysfunction: Minding the Cognitive War, Air University Press: Montgomery, AL](http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep13807.9).
+
+[Du Cluzel, F. (2020). Cognitive Warfare. NATO ACT Innovation Hub](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/20210122_COGWAR%20Final.pdf).
+
+Gardner, R.J., Hermansen, E., Pachitariu, M. et al. Toroidal Topology of Population Activity in Grid Cells. Nature 602, pp. 123-128 (2022). DOI: 10.1038/s41586-021-04268-7.
+
+[Le Guyader, H. (2022). Cognitive Domain: A Sixth Domain of Operations? In Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. (2022) Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 20201. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, pp. 4, 1-17, 2022, 978-92-837-2392-9](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03635898/document).
+
+Nirenberg, S., and Pandarinath, C. (2012). Retinal Prosthetic Strategy with the Capacity to Restore Normal Vision. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109(37), pp. 15012-15017. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1207035109.
+
+[Tsui, K. (27 May 2020). Transhumanism: Meet the Cyborgs and Biohackers Redefining Beauty. CNN](https://edition.cnn.com/style/article/david-vintiner-transhumanism/index.html).
+
+[Whiteaker, J., and Valkonen, S. (2022). Cognitive Warfare: Complexity and Simplicity. In Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. (2022) Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 20201. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, pp.4, 1-17, 2022, 978-92-837-2392-9](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03635948/document).
+
+
+### Chapter 14 ‒ SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP BASED ON THE HOUSE MODEL
+
+> #### Janet M. Blatny
+> #### Norwegian Defense Research Establishment
+> #### NORWAY
+
+> #### Yvonne R. Masakowski
+> #### US Naval War College
+> #### UNITED STATES
+
+#### 14.1 INTRODUCTION
+
+The HFM-ET-356 has proposed a S&T Roadmap on “Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare”. The intent was to increase understanding of CogWar and identify S&T that would increase NATO’s and each nation’s ability to defend against it. The process of understanding CogWar enables identification of key areas where S&T can support and affect how NATO’s and Allied nations improve deterrence capabilities and to ensure military readiness and collective defence capabilities (NATO Strategic Concept, 2022). Ensuring military readiness and collective defence capabilities in the context of CogWar will increase military resilience and provide more effective approaches to cognitive security.
+
+There will be second and third order effects that cascade through societies due to the immediate and/or longer-term effects of CogWar. Civil unrest, civil conflicts and political upheavals reflect the influence of CogWar such as evidenced by the COVID-19 pandemic, the US Congressional riots and the Russia invasion of Ukraine. NATO nations must prepare the warfighter to meet the demands of future CogWar effects via education, training, and technology development.
+
+The “House Model” (Figure 14-1) provides an illustration of the cross-cutting multidisciplinary topics that need to be addressed in this regard. The scientific fields that overlap and/or intersect with critical applied operational military dimensions of CogWar, such as enabling technologies, _modus operandi_, cognitive effects, and processes of sensemaking, and SA, represent a critical aspect of this report. NATO must be prepared to understand and address the potential impact along these convergent S&T areas, as adversaries will most surely view them as vulnerabilities and opportunities for further exploitation. Each of the horizontal bars in the model has the potential to enable the emergence of disruptive military capabilities. This report focuses on the assessment of S&T topics and their potential impact on future NATO military operations.
+
+The S&T roadmap guides:
+
+- Technological and socio-technological efforts necessary to give NATO nations the advantage when faced with dangerous and unpredictable security threats, and opportunities presented by CogWar and its associated processes and activities.
+
+- NATO in the development of its CogWar S&T defence strategy, policies, doctrine, and directives to deter, identify, and defend against CogWar.
+
+The S&T road map is further aligned with NATO’s S&T priorities, “Advanced Human Performance and Health,” “Cultural, Social & Organizational Behaviors”, “Information Analysis & Decision Support”, (NATO, 2016).
+
+The “House Model” (Figure 14-1) presents principal topics of S&T pertaining to CogWar. It serves as a strategic framework for developing short- and long-term perspectives on research programs, depending upon S&T knowledge requirements concerning own or adversarial approaches. By illustrating the multidisciplinary scientific topics and the intersection of these key areas, the model serves as a tool for guiding increased S&T investments.
+
+When the House Model is viewed with the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) decision cycle model, it is possible to gain further insight and understanding of the cooperation between the evolution of science and the operational military community (Figure 14-2 and call-out box, below).
+
+
+_▲ Figure 14-1: The House Model Proposed by HFM-ET-356._
+
+
+_▲ Figure 14-2: The Link Between the House Model and the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) Loop._
+
+> #### `Enablers and Force Multipliers`
+
+__`Situational Awareness (SA) / Sensemaking:`__ _`Examination of the factors that enable or block attempts to make sense of an ambiguous situation. Sensemaking informs and is a prerequisite to decision making. It requires trusted data input, evaluation of meaningful information, integration with knowledge and experience to achieve an understanding of evolving non-linear events.`_
+
+__`Cognitive Effects:`__ _`Describes the effects an actor may try to create on a target audience IOT achieve desired goal. Could be doctrinal effect verbs, e.g., distort, distract, etc., or more elaborate descriptions, e.g., degrade TA’s trust in democratic institutions or politicians, persuade TA to believe A instead of B, etc. Related to neurobiology the effects could be to, for example, injure or impair cognitive functions, stimulate emulative functions, or trigger social contagion.`_
+
+__`Modus operandi:`__ _`Examination of adversary methods and stratagems to generate the desired effect on the target/target audience, including when methods/stratagems are employed to exploit ‘cognitive openings’ and other opportunities for intervention (i.e., how and when). This effort is also concerned about the synchronization of activities by adversaries to psychologically prime and target. A better understanding of when and how adversaries conduct CW provides insights on the development and validation of countermeasures and defensive strategies.`_
+
+__`Technology Enablers and Force Multipliers:`__ _`Use technology to enable the actor to utilize one, two or all of the three knowledge pillars simultaneously, in pursuit of the goal. This aspect enables the above aspects. e.g., EDTs ICT CIS / Big Data / AI & ML / Social Media / Directed Energy / Biotech / Nanotech, etc.`_
+
+Technological developments in areas such as AI/ML, BMI, system integration, modelling, quantum computing, adaptive algorithms, neuroscience, biotechnology, human enhancement, and human augmentation will have significant impact on the future of conflict and competition. Individually these developments present both performance opportunities and challenges (NATO S&T Trends, 2020) across all operational domains. The intersection of these advances in technology will yield new military capabilities giving operational and strategic advantage, as well as potentially unforeseen disruptive effects. The integration of advanced technology and systems within the social, organizational, and cultural environment will contribute to the complexity of CogWar.
+
+It is important NATOs gains a better understanding of the vulnerabilities and exploitability of technology, digital eco-systems, human cognition, and other human vulnerabilities that can be targeted by adversaries to manipulate and shape human understanding, behaviors, and decision making. S&T will remain a strategic imperative as technologies continue to advance and evolve, contributing to new methods of CogWar.
+
+#### 14.2 OVERVIEW OF OVERALL FUTURE S&T AREAS
+
+Chapters presented in this report reflect an analytical discussion of S&T topics, military operational requirements, and their relevance and importance in the defence against CogWar as illustrated in each pillar and horizontal bar of the House Model (Figure 14-1). The House Model may be read top-down (defensive perspective or bottom-up (offensive perspective). The HFM-356 Team focused solely on the defensive perspective.
+
+The Three pillars identify the fields of knowledge required to influence a Target Audience (TA). These are __Cognitive Neuroscience__ (how brain functions to integrate an individual’s knowledge, experience, and information to make an informed decision), Cognitive and Behavioral Science (psychological knowledge related to sensemaking, decision making, which may be influenced by aspects of human behavior) and __Social and Cultural Science__ (socio-technical mechanics of individuals/societies, psycho-social effects, interventions). The horizontal bars identify enablers and force multipliers of the knowledge pillars: the SA and Sensemaking factors, the Cognitive Effects, the modus operandi, and the specific Technology Enablers and Force Multipliers. The horizontal aspects show the interdependence between the pillars of knowledge. They also present opportunities to consider the __“how and when”__ S&T knowledge needs.
+
+The triangle at the top states the Goal of CogWar on an individual and societal level according to the HFM-ET-356. “The goal of CogWar is to exploit facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence or modify human-decision making.” Changing perception or cognitive capability is a means to an end, the end being creating favorable conditions for achieving own strategic goals.
+
+The fundamental bar represents strategic, ethical and legal guidelines for NATO security and defence.
+
+#### 14.3 COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, BEHAVIORAL, AND SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PILLARS
+
+> #### 14.3.1 Pillar One: Cognitive Neuroscience
+
+Pillar One is concerned with the micro-cognitive methods that affect cognitive abilities such as sensemaking and decision making. These cognitive processes are equally context sensitive and must adapt to situational complexity. Cognition is a complex process as it reflects brain functions that integrate an individual’s knowledge, experience, and the information processed to make an informed decision. There are cognitive constraints that may interfere with these processes such as fatigue, cognitive bias, and emotion. Adversaries may influence each of these cognitive processes at multiple levels such as biological, mechanistic, and socio-technical influences.
+
+There is extensive research in Brain-Machine interfaces (BMI) to support military operations and the neuroscience and brain research chapter (Grigsby and McKinley, Chapter 6) summarizes the development and evolution of enhanced BMI capabilities. As BMI research advances, there is the potential for intrusion, manipulation, and modification to human cognitive processes, as well as adversaries inducing deliberate emotional and behavioral responses to achieve their objectives. While BMI systems are designed to reduce cognitive workload and enhance attention and vigilance capabilities, such advances do so at increased cognitive risk. The evolution of BMI will yield further opportunities for adversaries to conduct CogWar on a new level. There is a need to develop defence systems that guard and defend against malevolent data input into the human BMI as adversaries may target human attention and emotional responses to alter behaviors in support of their military objectives. _The subjective experiences of those equipped with BMI to facilitate optimized cognitive performance and enhanced Situational Awareness must be investigated from a defensive perspective to ensure that vulnerabilities, biases and potential harm are not being introduced._ The BMI connectivity to command and control is further elaborated in Chapter 14.3.4. Nations must anticipate the evolution of the CogWar battlespace with a focus on ensuring the safety and security of individuals, warfighters, and the civilian population, as well as future military command and control systems and ensure national resilience.
+
+CogWar also addresses the impact of advanced neuroweapon attacks such as the “Havana Syndrome” attack of US Embassy personnel in Cuba (Dilanian, 2022; Giordano, 2021, 2022; Moore, 2022; Terra, 2021). Symptoms such as memory loss, lack of cognitive processing capabilities, fatigue, dizziness, et al., are among the symptoms experienced by Embassy personnel. Cognitive impairments, whether temporary or long term, reflect the need to invest in the development of tools and technologies that will detect, deter, and defend against the weapons of CogWar.
+
+> #### 14.3.2 Pillar Two: Cognitive and Behavioral Science
+
+The Cognitive and Behavioral Science (CBS) pillar represents the psychological knowledge related to sensemaking, and decision making, which may be influenced by aspects of human behavior such as communication, affect, and persuasion. As CogWar targets human vulnerabilities, it is easy to recognize the potential for manipulation in this regard.
+
+Researchers need to assess the gaps and vulnerabilities along these dimensions and find novel approaches to defending information networks and human cognitive capacities. NATO nations need to understand the elements in the OODA-loop decision chain (Chapter 9) and determine how best to defend decision making and socio-cultural attacks and manipulations at all levels (Figure 14-2). For example, SA and sensemaking are linked within the first “O” of the OODA-Loop and refers to the “Observe” phase. During the Observe phase, it is important to learn what is happening and gain clarity regarding the meaning, motivation, and uncertainty of the situation (Chapter 9).
+
+> #### 14.3.3 Pillar Three: Social and Cultural Science
+
+The application of interdisciplinary methods to better understand structural and institutional factors in social, cultural, economic, and political contexts that uphold, shape, constrain and/or empower individual and collective behavior is needed. The social and cultural sciences offer insight into and can help inform the development of both offensive and defensive facets of CogWar, particularly at the meso- and macro- levels of analysis (i.e., characteristics of social interaction between groups and organizations through large-scale societal interactions).
+
+Pillars Two and Three are concerned with macro-cognitive problems, such as anticipating events and adapting to dynamic contexts, uncertainty, and increased complexity. Where cognition can be individual or shared among individuals (e.g., teams, organizations, society), it is a macro-cognitive issue. Micro-cognitive research may benefit by being contextualized by macro-cognitive theory and method (Klein, et al. 2003).
+
+Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive list of theories related to the social and cultural aspects related to CogWar. These theories facilitate our understanding of the role of socio-cultural aspects that may be used to influence and shape CogWar. However, the following suggestions are potential areas of investigation to better understand how to counter the impact of CogWar along the Social and Cultural Science pillar (Lauder, Chapter 4).
+
+- Countering amplification and exploitation of social and political divides.
+
+- Countering dissemination of rumors, gossip, and disinformation to generate mass anxiety and uncertainty.
+
+- Countering exploitation of cognitive errors in decision making – the maskirovka/operational masking used to gain indirect control of a target’s decision-making process.
+
+- Building societal resilience to disinformation.
+
+The socio-cultural aspects of warfare are relevant for the conduct of CogWar. Russia “justified” the invasion of the Ukraine as an act of defending Russian citizens from a Ukraine Nazi movement that threatened Russia’s citizens. This manipulation of social and cultural aspects serves as a tool to be weaponized by adversaries in CogWar. It remains for nations to understand how adversaries may use these theories and practices as weapons for conducting future CogWar.
+
+#### 14.4 SENSEMAKING AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: PRECURSORS TO ACHIEVING DECISION SUPERIORITY
+
+The Sensemaking, SA bar illustrates its role in the OODA-loop decision-making framework (Chapters 8 and 9) and the importance of integrating information that is trustworthy, reliable, and emanates from a valid and certified source. Adversaries are conducting information warfare and psychological operations across all elements and domains of information platforms. Data poisoning of datasets being used to train ML algorithms highlights the need to develop software tools to defend against the introduction of uncertified, poisoned datasets. Thus, it is important to ensure that the tools and technologies used in a priori steps for human sensemaking and SA processes are based upon accurate data.
+
+John Boyd’s OODA-loop (Chapter 9) (Figure 14-3) germinated from the iterative, adaptive decision-making processes experienced by fighter pilots in military combat operations. The model describes the interaction of the human’s perceptions and cognitive processes related to observing, orienting, and modifying according to dynamic changes in the environment. Pilots in such dynamic air combat settings had to continually modify their actions. Such agile, adaptive behavior is humanistic and facilitates cognitive processes that are essential for survival in a combat environment. So too, human cognitive resilience is essential for decision making across all domains. In addition, such adaptive behavior extends to human-human teams, as well as human-machine teams. Indeed, human-machine teaming is an important element within the OODA-decision cycle loop. Chapter 9 on human-machine teaming highlights the need to understand CogWar from the individual perspective, the team level, as well as understand the adversaries’ perspectives.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 14-3: OODA-Loop of Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (Boyd’s)._
+
+#### 14.5 COGNITIVE EFFECTS AND MODUS OPERANDI
+
+The second bar, ‘Cognitive Effects’ relates to the second “O” (i.e., Orient) in order to understand the situation and the adversaries’ decision approach to CogWar. _Why is it happening?_ Adversaries design CogWar to their strategic advantage and aim to create chaos, confusion, disruption, distortion and undermine democracies and social order.
+
+_Modus operandi_ is the deliberate, rigorous, and scientifically informed examination of methods, stratagems, and other patterns of behavior designed and operationalized by adversaries to generate the desired psycho-social effect on an audience, including activities employed to psychologically prime and create cognitive openings and other opportunities for adversarial intervention (i.e., pre-propaganda). _Modus operandi_ is not limited in scope to the examination of specific tactics or tools, such as using a loudspeaker or a fraudulent social media account but is concerned with the holistic application and synchronization of a range of methods and resources across the dimensions of the information environment.
+
+The _modus operandi_ in the third horizontal bar is linked with the “D” (i.e., Decide) course of action. How to counter CogWar? What methods and strategies might be employed to undermine, mitigate, interfere with CogWar? How to reduce risks associated with defence against CogWar and minimize second and third order effects?
+
+#### 14.6 TECHNOLOGY ENABLERS AND FORCE MULTIPLIERS
+
+The Technology Enabler and Force Multipliers, the fourth horizontal bar, links with the entire OODA loop. Technology enables the user (or the adversary) to take advantage of all three pillars in pursuit of their goal.
+
+ICTs have changed warfare, not least with regards to enabling actors to infiltrate the cognitive dimension of the IE more effectively. Malign actors are systematically employing overt and covert influence and interference methods to shape and manipulate the SA and decision-making process on all levels – from the international political level to the military strategic, operational, tactical and sub-tactical level. Even in remote and less developed areas, most people have Internet access, smartphones and social media accounts. This enables them to document and share observations and information about their surroundings including military equipment, troop movements and tactics. In addition, most troops have social media accounts, even if they may not use their devices on the battlefield. Commercially available drones, facial recognition software, AI, geo-tagging and satellite imagery have added another layer of both risks and opportunities to be analyzed, mitigated and exploited by all parties, civilian and military, in areas of conflict.
+
+The permeation of ICTs in the AO poses obvious risks to operational security (OPSEC), information security (INFOSEC) and freedom of maneuver for any part in any conflict. For example, in the aftermath of the downing of Malaysian Airlines MH17 over Ukraine in 2014, Bellingcat was able to identify and document Russian personnel, equipment, tactics and locations using operational security intelligence (OSINT) techniques including mapping of videos, images and social media accounts belonging to both civilians and Russian troops. For all parts of an armed conflict today, ICTs offers vast opportunities for intelligence gathering, improved SA, battle damage assessment, shaping of the battlefield and deception. However, as with all technology, the flipside of increased opportunity is increased risk.
+
+Other examples of technological enablers are AI/ML, adaptive algorithms, autonomous systems, system integration, unmanned systems, digital/cyber networks, modelling, quantum computing, deep fakes, neuroscience, facial recognition, biotechnology and human enhancement/augmentation (Chapter 5).
+
+Below are examples of how technological enablers can impact CogWar.
+
+> #### 14.6.1 Adaptive Command and Control, Brain-Machine Interfaces and SA
+
+The development of adaptive command and control networks and systems will offer distinct advantages for future military operations. The BMI will enable the development of an agile command and control (C²) capability (Chapter 7). These advantages do not come without risk. Whereas the advanced C² environment can facilitate enhance connectedness across all domains, cyber, space, maritime, land and air, and in a full multinational context, technology alone cannot ensure total defence and security. There are societal, cultural, organizational, political, and global challenges to be met, as well as considering that humans are part of all operations (human factors).
+
+The NATO’ defence and information environment must address the vulnerabilities associated with BMI’s that will become part of the global C² environment (Chapter 6). This entails understanding the complexity of the operational and information environment in which these BMI systems will be employed, and their interactions with the entire system; people/individuals, society, organizations, technology, and their respective policies, legal and ethical constraints (Chapter 12) also to guide military personnel and ensure the safe distribution of such technologies. As military personnel become equipped with embedded BMI, there is a need to develop defence mechanisms to ensure the security of brain interfaces to defend against hacking of these systems at a system, group and/or at an individual level. AI/ML technologies and BMI will continue to be designed to augment human capacities including cognitive, sensory, and physical abilities. However, there is a need to address the safety and security of such advances that may have potential long-term impact on the cognitive processes and health of the individual.
+
+The call-out box below provides an example of technological advances within brain research and its ethical/legal implications relevant for CogWar measures and that will have an impact on the development of future adaptive C² network (Binnendijk, Marler, and Bartels, 2021).
+
+> #### `Example of Technological Advances within Brain Research Relevant for CogWar Measures.`
+
+_`Brain research has yielded advances in the treatment of patients with Parkinson’s disease with brain interfaces to facilitate psychomotor response, that is used for Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) (Arlotti, et al. 2021).The intersection of the multidisciplinary sciences such as cognitive science, neuroscience, and genomics will give rise to new medical treatments to minimize the effects of Alzheimer’s, Multiple Sclerosis, et al., as well as give rise to advances in BMIs that soldiers will be equipped with for specific knowledge, skills, and abilities. This may sound like science fiction; however, the reality of such transformational technology lends itself to dual-use design that is continuously being exploited by China, which has already conducted human experimentation to create biologically enhanced super soldiers (Dilanian, 2020). Rather, each technological advance in neuroscience, brain science, genomics and BMI is examined for its dual-use application in China’s military defence arsenal. NATO nations abides by ethical requirements to ensure human subject safety and seek to identify potential medical treatment benefits associated with technological advances.`_
+
+C² must be considered within the complex socio-political- technological system as technologies evolve within the geopolitical and societal environments and are used by people within the framework of their respective organizations. Thus, command and control systems consisting of with AI/ML algorithms and BMI connected to individual soldiers, become part of a matrix of national and international security systems that are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, hacking, and cyber/cognitive attacks.
+
+Digital AI/ML networks must be capable of self- defence and detect, deter intrusions from external networks aimed at manipulating, poisoning data, and/or regulating the networks themselves. The C² environment is one that is robustly designed as a collection of C² nodes which provides access to information, aimed at sharing and distributing information within the network. _It is essential to ensure the security of such networks to avoid and mitigate any vulnerabilities such as data poisoning, networks, manipulation of information and attacks within the networks themselves._
+
+Building an understanding of the situation requires analysis and data framing, testing hypotheses along a range of perspectives to ensure an accurate understanding of events as they develop, adapting to changes in the environment and maintaining the ability to share awareness among NATO nations.
+
+> #### 14.6.2 Human-Machine Teaming and Training
+
+Chapter 9 on human-machine teaming highlights the need to understand CogWar from the individual perspective, as well as understanding the adversaries’ perspectives. Human-machine teaming will enhance military capabilities and speed information dissemination, analysis, and decision making. War gaming, joint military exercises, and simulated virtual war gaming exercises provide a means for the military to gain experience with these advanced technologies, as well as assess their shortcomings, and human relationship (cognition). At the operational level, it is critical to understand the capabilities and shortfalls of these technologies. The range of human actors, adversaries, enemies, and adversarial AI intelligent agents may also need to play a role that should be included in these wargaming exercises. For the military leader, there are potentially ethical and moral consequences related to the deployment of future weaponized, autonomous systems that may yield unintended second and third order consequences. All aspects of war gaming should be exercised as part of military training and education.
+
+Military personnel must also be educated in the development of critical thinking skills, the influence of cognitive biases and how to overcome these, as well as trained in the development of analytical skills for effective decision making. Their failures will teach them to recognize the impact of their cognitive biases and help them to become more aware of the impact of perceptual and cognitive biases that mislead and misinform them in their decision making.
+
+There is a need to develop adaptive, applied training tools that will provide users with hands-on experience that can be used on an individual level, as well as shared with teams and/or across organizations to develop skills to counter the impact of CogWar misinformation and disinformation campaigns. Training tools (Chapter 11) that can be shared with organizations provide unique benefits associated with the training of teams and groups of people that can gain insight and expertise on propaganda, disinformation/misinformation, PsyOps, and InfoOps campaigns.
+
+#### 14.7 ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
+
+As future military environment unfolds, replete with advanced technologies, human performance and challenges in the CogWar environment, there is a need to consider ethical and legal challenges associated with the deployment of technology as part of decisions made by humans. For example, those associated with the deployment of weaponized, autonomous systems, and advanced robots making decisions formerly made by humans (Chapter 12). The ground and fundamental bar in the House Model addressing ethical and legal policies and guidelines needs to consider such aspects.
+
+Policies related to the role and ethical and legal responsibilities of military personnel working in fast tempo operations where human-machine teaming collaboration is aimed at reducing workload and accelerating the decision cycle (Chapter 14.3) should be developed. What happens when things go wrong, and the intelligent AI-enabled machine made the error? How to handle the collateral damage of such errors? These are but a few of the ethical and legal questions raised that must be addressed by policy makers, doctrine authors and war game designers, and allow humans the opportunity to gain experience and insight regarding how best to work in human-machine teams ethically and effectively (Chapter 12). NATO may need to address some of these initiatives as formal doctrine in the future C² environment as netted BMI systems may become an integral part of the future C² environment.
+
+Several strategic documents outline the need and goal for defending against CogWar and lay at the foundation of the House Model (i.e., the bottom horizontal bar: “NATO Security and Defence, NWCC, and Legal and Ethical Frameworks (ELSEI)”). Among these documents, are the NATO Warfare Capstone Concept (NWCC) and therein, the Warfare Development Initiative Cognitive Superiority. The ethical and legal aspects, as well as the Conduct of War and Law of Armed Conflict (von Clausewitz, 1968, and UN Charter, should be considered when combating CogWar (Chapter 12).
+
+#### 14.8 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+This roadmap report summarizes the intersection of S&T topics illustrated by the House Model that require further investment in the development of human skills and advanced technologies to defend against CogWar. It is also critical to address the need for the E&T of military personnel to learn how best to implement, integrate and ethically deploy autonomous systems, advanced AI/ML digital networks etc. into the operating environment. There is also a need to develop the ethical and legal policies, directives, and guidance necessary for the ethical deployment of advanced technologies in the defence against future CogWar.
+
+The S&T road map provides a means of examining the House Model linked with the OODA decision loop. The goal of the CogWar is to exploit facets of cognition to disrupt, manipulate, influence or modify human decision making. Defence against CogWar calls for S&T activities involving the following cross-cutting areas:
+
+__Pillars:__
+
+- Cognitive Neuroscience (Including AI/ML, et al.);
+
+- Cognitive and Behavioral Science; and
+
+- Social and Cultural Science.
+
+__Bars:__
+
+- Situational awareness and sensemaking;
+
+- Cognitive effects;
+
+- Modus operandi; and
+
+- Technology and force multipliers.
+
+Recommendations for S&T investment will be discussed further in Chapter 15.
+
+#### 14.9 REFERENCES
+
+[Arlotti, M., Colombo, M. Bonfanti, A., Mandat, T., Lanotte, M.M., Pirola, E., Borellini, L., Rampini, P., Eleopra, R., Rinaldo, S. Romito, L., Janssen, M.L.F., Prior, Al, and Marceglia, S. (2021). A New Implantable Closed-Loop Clinical Neural Interface: First Application in Parkinson’s Disease](https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnins.2021.763235/full).
+
+[Binnendijk, A., Marler, T., Bartels, E.M. (2021). Brain-Computer Interfaces: US Military Applications and Implications, an Initial Assessment. RAND Corporation](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2996.html).
+
+[Dilanian, K. (2022). Havana Syndrome Symptoms in Small Group Most Likely Caused by Directed Energy Attacks Says US Intel Panel of Experts](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/havana-syndrome-symptoms-small-group-likely-caused-directed-energy-say-rcna14584).
+
+[Giordano, J. (2021). Nations Must Come Together to Tackle Havana Syndrome](https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/10/15/nation-must-come-together-to-tackle-havana-syndrome).
+
+[Giordano, J. (2022). Embassy Encephalopathy: Findings, Effectors, and Ethical Address. Video Presentation at UTSW’s Havana Syndrome Webinar. February 11, 2022](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ix_Kscvk-6g).
+
+Klein, G., Ross, K.G., Moon, B., Klein, D.E., Hoffman, R.and Hollnagel, E. (2003). Macro-Cognition. Intelligent Systems, IEEE. 18. 81-85. 10.1109/MIS.2003.1200735.
+
+[Moore, T. (2022). For Your Ears Only: What Is Really Behind Havana Syndrome](https://www.smh.com.au/national/for-your-ears-only-what-s-really-behind-havana-syndrome-20220506-p5aj70.html).
+
+NATO (2016). AC/323-D(2016)0008-COR1 (INV). 2017 NATO Science & Technology Priorities.
+
+[NATO (2022). NATO Strategic Concept 2022. Adopted at the Madrid Summit, 29‒30 June 2022](https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html).
+
+[NATO STO (2020). NATO Science &Technology Trend Report, 2020. Science & Technology Trends 2020‒2040. Exploring the S&T Edge. NATO Science & Technology Organization. NATO Science & Technology Organization, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/4/pdf/190422-ST_Tech_Trends_Report_2020-2040.pdf).
+
+[Terra, J. (2021). Havana Syndrome the Perfect Disease for a Post-Truth World](https://balkaninsight.com/2021/11/30/havana-syndrome-the-perfect-disease-for-a-post-truth-world/).
+
+Von Clausewitz, C. (1968). On War. London: Penguin Books.
+
+
+### Chapter 15 ‒ CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+> #### Janet M. Blatny
+> #### Norwegian Defense Research Institute
+> #### NORWAY
+
+> #### Yvonne R. Masakowski
+> #### US Naval War College
+> #### UNITED STATES
+
+#### 15.1 INTRODUCTION
+
+Cognitive Warfare (CogWar) presents an emerging battlespace used to influence and shape global security environments in novel ways.
+
+Defensive CogWar must be approached from a socio-technical systematic perspective, including technological developments, as well as human and organizational factors.
+
+The next decade will produce advances in AI/ML technologies that will significantly alter the conduct of war and impact how NATO conducts military operations. CogWar is not new, but what is emerging is an area of operations that needs to be understood and a more nuanced, academic, and operational picture of the full extent of its current capabilities and future potential must be established. This includes how CogWar shapes the geopolitical environment, affects military operations, impacts global economics, commercial enterprises, distribution of resources (e.g., food, energy, and materials) and how information may be misused within global digital networks. It is essential to understand the social, cultural, cognitive, and behavioral context of the environment in which CogWar is executed.
+
+NATO STO HFM Exploratory Team (ET) 356 “Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare” aimed to increase the understanding of how to defend against CogWar, and to increase NATO’s defence, security and resilience. The HFM-ET-356 team developed the “House Model” (Chapter 2) as the foundation for an S&T Strategic Roadmap and made links to the operational Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) cycle. The House Model presents seven S&T knowledge fields and enablers that are inter-relational:
+
+__Pillars:__
+
+- Cognitive Neuroscience.
+
+- Cognitive and Behavioral Science.
+
+- Social and Cultural Science.
+
+__Bars:__
+
+- Situational Awareness and Sensemaking.
+
+- Cognitive Effects.
+
+- _Modus operandi_.
+
+- Technology and Force Multipliers.
+
+These seven areas provide the basis for more in depth research activities that need to be explored within NATO STO and its Panels and Groups in order to identify and deliver effective countermeasures to CogWar. The combination and intersection of multi-disciplinary topics in the House Model, gives rise to methods for influencing and destabilizing offensive CogWar processes. Despite several definitions of CogWar, the HFM-ET-356 uses the following:
+
+_`The goal of CogWar is to exploit facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence and/or modify human decision making in accordance with the adversaries’ strategic and tactical objectives.`_
+
+Recommendations for research to defend against CogWar are provided in the following sections.
+
+#### 15.2 EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND COGNITIVE WARFARE
+
+CogWar impacts all domains and dimensions of military operations. Technology is one main enablers and force multiplier in both offensive and defensive CogWar (House Model Figure 2-1, Chapter 2).
+
+The effects of CogWar will impact “Trust” at every level of C² and present challenges in decision making. The adversaries’ _modus operandi_ could use technological advances to their strategic advantage. NATO nations should collaborate to:
+
+- Conduct research on the impact of cognitive-inspired AI/ML machines that can affect all stages of the OODA decision cycle.
+
+- Develop certification doctrine and training dataset sources to ensure that valid, reliable datasets are used for development of AI/ML algorithms.
+
+- Develop and design technologies that will contribute to overall accuracy and trust of information and evaluate the validity and reliability of the information.
+
+- Develop validation tools to ensure accurate, reliable, and trustworthy datasets/information before they are integrated into nations’ networks and into NATO’s military C² systems.
+
+Future designs of technological systems and networks will alter the role of the human in the OODA decision cycle. AI/ML adaptive robots will be designed with human-like cognitive processing. As these systems become more cognitively capable, there will be more human and AI machine collaboration as “equal partners.” Decision making will no longer be the singular capability of the human. Therefore, “trust” between humans and human-machines becomes an important element in CogWar and decision making. NATO nations need to:
+
+- Defend against manipulation of advanced AI machine/technologies that may interfere with sensemaking capabilities.
+
+- Identify and act to close the vulnerability gaps within the OODA decision-making cycle, where human and AI machine converge to build SA.
+
+- Research, design and provide cognitive security interventions to ensure defence against second and third order CogWar effects.
+
+#### 15.3 FUTURE HUMAN SYSTEMS, FACTORS, AND PERFORMANCE AND COGNITIVE WARFARE
+
+Education plays a pivotal role in the development of leaders who will be capable of ethically deploying advanced technologies in the operational environment. Technologies and tools that will enhance human performance and capabilities must be understood by those using these advanced tools. Future military operations will see an increase in human-machine teaming wherein machines will be collaborators, and decision makers. Emerging and advanced technologies will expand military capabilities, but these advances do not come without risk. The military must educate their personnel to understand the ethical and legal implications of human-machine teaming and deploying such technologies. The evolution of such advanced tools, technologies, and systems will reconfigure the battlespace, as well as the role of the human in the decision-making cycle. NATO nations need to develop:
+
+- Training and education methods and tools for military personnel at all levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) regarding the capabilities and shortfalls of each advanced technology that will be used in the operational environments. This is to include understanding the importance of ethical decision making relating to the role of modern technologies in the operating environment.
+
+- Training scenarios, including various (simulated) environments and operations (multi-domain), to evaluate defence processes given adversaries’ potential modus operandi and attempts to affect sensemaking and SA.
+
+Using false information to gain strategic advantage is not new, however, new technologies afford adversaries a means of initiating misinformation and disinformation campaigns on a global scale. Adversaries seek to manipulate the mass population and leverage extremist’s causes to their strategic advantage. NATO nations need to:
+
+- Counter the impact of adversarial cognitive intrusions and influence effects.
+
+- Ensure NATO nations understand human vulnerabilities and the role cognitive security can play in defending against CogWar.
+
+Decision making is iterative and based upon a process of continually updating data input associated with environmental changes (Chapter 9). NATO nations need to:
+
+- Develop tools that will design, facilitate, and enhance accurate sensemaking, SA, and decision making. As well as validate data, to support Cognitive Superiority.
+
+The inability to overcome the emotional impact and influence induced by CogWar campaigns may induce fatigue, emotional distress and negatively impact performance. Thus, NATO nations need to:
+
+- Develop strategies and tactics to mitigate the emotional impact of CogWar to reduce the threat to judgment, decision making, physical and mental exhaustion.
+
+Misinformation campaigns are effective in inducing distrust within society and elevates the level of social pressure on individual and communities. Current internet /software systems and tools do not provide a means of validating the source of information. NATO nations need S&T to:
+
+- Develop tools that facilitate the ability to detect socio-technical manipulations and ensure the dissemination of valid information.
+
+- Develop defensive, agile, resilient digital networks that can defend against fake news, manipulation of socio-cultural aspects, political elections, intrusions on government, economic, and policies.
+
+- Develop defensive tools and techniques to detect, deter, and counter intrusions and manipulations.
+
+Humans make errors in judgment that often are based on misinformation or non-factual reasoning. NATO nations need S&T to:
+
+- Examine the impact of CogWar on human cognitive processes, emotional processes, cognitive workload, fatigue, vigilance, and safety.
+
+- Develop training and education material to enhance human cognitive processes and critical thinking skills.
+
+- Conduct research on human fatigue, emotional stress, and the influence of cognitive bias for human decision making.
+
+- Develop tools for accelerating the decision cycle, reducing chaos, eliminate the fog of war and reduce information overload, and reduce cognitive dissonance.
+
+Advances in BMI have revealed gaps in the understanding of how to defend against manipulation and hacking of the human brain. NATO nations need to:
+
+- Research on the use of neuro-enhancing techniques to boost attention and enhance decision making.
+
+- Develop the means to identify and deter both passive and active cognitive attacks via neuro-interference and secure BMIs.
+
+- Address barriers-to-adoption of Counter-CogWar neurotechnology.
+
+- Counteract the development and effects of “neuro-weapons.”
+
+Human Factors research includes methods for assessing cognitive workload in humans. Task analysis methods and physiological measures are often used to evaluate impact of interfaces, equipment, and technological advances. Cognitive workload analysis and task analysis methods provide an objective measure of assessment. This is especially effective when these assessments are linked with psychophysiological measurements, such as heart rate, eye movements, and pupil dilation. Eye movements and changes in pupil dilation provide valuable information regarding how users interact with complex visual displays. Pupil changes also serve as an indication of level of cognitive processing. NATO nations need to:
+
+- Assess human brain and cognitive processes, including cognitive modelling, human performance assessment, cognitive workload analysis, eye movement/tracking research, and the evaluation of cascading consequences for the integration of advanced technologies.
+
+CogWar represents a significant and new challenge, as it also targets the civilian population, to our moral and legal understanding of war. NATO nations should determine:
+
+- If CogWar actions trigger Article 5 – the right to national self-defence (e.g., conventional attack as a proportional response to an adversary’s cognitive attack).
+
+- How to deal with CogWar attacks against civilians as non-combatants.
+
+- Question the legal principles required to establish levels of response, penalty to counter and mitigate the unethical use of technology for CogWar.
+
+#### 15.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
+
+The S&T recommendations presented in this report are provided to increase the ability of NATO nations to defend against CogWar. This report highlights S&T gaps and provides recommendations for investing in future S&T within NATO nations. This report also echoes the recommendations of NATO’s strategic documents, including NATO’s (2020‒2040) S&T Tech Trend Report.
+
+It is incumbent upon NATO to ensure the ability to collaborate, cooperate and defend against future CogWar. Failure to do so will have global cascading consequences.
+
+> #### `REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE`
+
+1.Recipient’s Reference
+
+2.Originator’s References
+
+> `STO-TR-HFM-ET-356 AC/323(HFM-356)TP/1120`
+
+3.Further Reference
+
+> `ISBN 978-92-837-2433-9`
+
+4.Security Classification of Document
+
+> `PUBLIC RELEASE`
+
+5.Originator
+
+> `Science and Technology Organization`
+
+> `North Atlantic Treaty Organization`
+
+> `BP 25, F-92201 Neuilly-sur-Seine Cedex, France`
+
+6.Title
+
+> `Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare`
+
+7.Presented at/Sponsored by
+
+> `This technical report documents the findings of HFM Exploratory Team 356.`
+
+8.Author(s)/Editor(s)
+
+> `Y.R. Masakowski and J.M. Blatny`
+
+9.Date
+
+> `March 2023`
+
+10.Author’s/Editor’s Address
+
+> `Multiple`
+
+11.Pages
+
+> `146`
+
+12.Distribution Statement
+
+> `There are no restrictions on the distribution of this document. Information about the availability of this and other STO unclassified publications is given on the back cover.`
+
+13.Keywords/Descriptors
+
+> `Artificial intelligence; Autonomous; Cognition; Cognitive warfare; Enhancement; Human performance; Machine learning; Military; Neuroscience; Social and behavioral; Social and cultural; Warfighter`
+
+14.Abstract
+
+> `The NATO STO HFM-ET-356 performed an assessment of the Science and Technologies (S&T) required to mitigate and defend against Cognitive Warfare (CogWar). CogWar has emerged replete with security challenges due to its invasive and invisible nature and where the goal is to exploit facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence, or modify human decisions (proposed by HFM-ET-356). CogWar represents the convergence of a wide range of advanced technologies along with human factors, used by NATO’s adversaries in the 21ˢᵗ century battlespace. CogWar is a risk to global defence and security and threatens human decision making.`
+
+> `The ET-356 proposed a S&T Road map to guide NATO and Allied Partners in future research activities and investments. The proposed Road map is based on a “House Model,” and linked to the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) decision cycle. The Model represents seven main S&T knowledge areas and enablers that are cross-cutting related: Pillars: Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive and Behavioral Science, Social and Cultural Science; and Bars: Situational Awareness and Sensemaking, Cognitive Effects, modus operandi, and Technology and Force Multipliers.`
+
+> `This work underpins the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept and its Warfare Development Initiative Cognitive Superiority, and the NATO Strategic Concept 2022.`
+
+
+### List of Acronyms
+
+AI – Artificial Intelligence
+
+AUV – Autonomous Undersea Vehicle
+
+BDA – Battle Damage Assessment
+
+BMI – Brain Machine Interface
+
+C² – Command-and-Control
+
+COGSEC – Cognitive Security
+
+CogWar – Cognitive Warfare
+
+DRL – Deep Reinforcement Learning
+
+ELSEI – Legal and ethical frameworks
+
+FFAO – Framework for Future Alliance Operations
+
+ICT – Intelligence Communication Technology
+
+IE – Information Environment
+
+INFOSEC – Information Security
+
+IPB – Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
+
+ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
+
+ML – Machine Learning
+
+NBIC – Nano, Biotech, Information tech, Cognitive
+
+NGO – Non-Governmental Agency
+
+OODA – Observe-Orient-Decide-Act
+
+OPSEC – Operational Security
+
+OSINT – Operation Security Intelligence
+
+PfP – Partners for Peace
+
+PSYOPS – Psychological Operations
+
+PTSD – Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome
+
+QKD – Quantum Key Distribution
+
+R&D – Research and Development
+
+S&T – Science and Technology
+
+SA – Situational Awareness
+
+TAP – Technical Activity Proposal
+
+
+### Acknowledgements
+
+The Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Exploratory Team (ST) 356 on __Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare__ (HFM-ET-356) operated in the context of the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Panel. The ET-356 team consists of representatives from Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, and the United States. Representatives from the NATO STO Information Systems Technology Panel (IST) Panel also took part.
+
+We would especially like to acknowledge the support of the NATO STO HFM Executive and NATO CSO staff.
+
+The Chair (Norway) and Co-Chair (United States) of HFM-ET-356 are grateful for all the efforts by the HFM-ET-356 Team. Over the course of its 1-year mandate, the Team held numerous virtual meetings, virtual due to the impact of COVID-19. Still, the HFM-ET-356 Team has successfully enabled the establishment of new networks and relationships through its work.
+
+Members of HFM-ET-356 participated in the NATO __Tide Sprint Spring Cognitive Warfare (CogWar) Workshop__ hosted in Poland, April 4‒8, 2022. The hosts of this conference provided support for the Tide Sprint CogWar workshop and facilitated virtual participation for members and participants. We would like to acknowledge the Directors, Organizers, Staff, and Facilitators of the NATO ACT Tide Sprint Spring Conference for their support of the CogWar workshop and share our team’s appreciation for their generous hospitality and the logistical support they provided.
+
+
+### Disclaimer
+
+This publication contains the opinions of the respective authors only. They do not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of their institution, NATO, or any agency or any government.
+
+STO may not be held responsible for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this report and is not responsible for the content of the external sources, including external websites referenced.
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-05-19-C6Xian-a1_l-c6-xian-leaders-communique.md b/_collections/_heros/2023-05-19-C6Xian-a1_l-c6-xian-leaders-communique.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title: "中国—中亚峰会宣言"
+author: "C6西安"
+date: 2023-05-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/cTG3gjG.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "中国—中亚峰会西安宣言（全文）"
+position: left
+---
+
+2023年5月18日至19日，中华人民共和国主席习近平、哈萨克斯坦共和国总统托卡耶夫、吉尔吉斯共和国总统扎帕罗夫、塔吉克斯坦共和国总统拉赫蒙、土库曼斯坦总统别尔德穆哈梅多夫、乌兹别克斯坦共和国总统米尔济约耶夫在西安共同举行中国—中亚峰会。
+
+
+
+各方在热烈、友好和相互理解的气氛中全面回顾中国同中亚五国友好交往历史，总结各领域互利合作经验，展望未来合作方向，并声明如下：
+
+一、各方一致认为，中国同中亚五国保持富有成效的全方位合作，符合六国和六国人民的根本利益。面对百年未有之大变局，着眼地区各国人民未来，六国决心携手构建更加紧密的中国—中亚命运共同体。
+
+二、各方宣布，以举办此次峰会为契机，中国—中亚元首会晤机制正式成立。峰会每两年举办一次，中国为一方，中亚国家按国名首字母排序为另一方，双方轮流举办。各方愿充分发挥元首外交的战略引领作用，加强对中国同中亚国家关系发展的顶层设计和统筹规划。
+
+各方将加快推进中国—中亚机制建设，在重点优先合作领域尽快成立部长级会晤机制，充分发挥本国外交部门作用，研究成立常设秘书处可行性，全方位推动中国—中亚合作和相关机制建设。
+
+三、各方重申，在涉及彼此核心利益问题上互予理解和支持。中方坚定支持中亚国家选择的发展道路，支持各国维护国家独立、主权和领土完整以及采取的各项独立自主的内外政策。
+
+中方支持中亚国家间加强合作，高度评价中亚国家元首协商会晤机制，认为该机制是维护地区安全、稳定和可持续发展的重要因素，高度评价中亚国家为维护地区及世界和平发展所作重大贡献。
+
+中亚国家高度评价中国共产党的宝贵治国理政经验，肯定中国式现代化道路对世界发展的重要意义。中亚国家重申恪守一个中国原则。
+
+四、各方一致认为，维护国家安全、政治稳定和宪法制度意义重大，坚决反对破坏合法政权和策动“颜色革命”，反对以任何形式和任何借口干涉他国内政。
+
+各方强调，民主是全人类的共同追求和价值。自主选择发展道路和治理模式是一国主权，不容干涉。
+
+各方认为，立法机构交往对促进和平、安全与稳定的全球合作具有重要作用。
+
+五、各方高度评价共建“一带一路”倡议对引领国际合作的重要意义，将以共建“一带一路”倡议提出十周年为新起点，加强“一带一路”倡议同哈萨克斯坦“光明之路”新经济政策、吉尔吉斯斯坦“2026年前国家发展纲要”、塔吉克斯坦“2030年前国家发展战略”、土库曼斯坦“复兴丝绸之路”战略、“新乌兹别克斯坦”2022－2026年发展战略等中亚五国倡议和发展战略对接，深化各领域务实合作，形成深度互补、高度共赢的合作新格局。
+
+六、各方认为中国同中亚国家经贸合作潜力巨大，愿充分发挥中国—中亚经贸部长会议机制作用，全面提升贸易规模。挖掘中国—中亚电子商务合作对话机制潜力，拓展数字贸易、绿色经济等新兴领域合作。
+
+各方愿提升经贸合作的质量和水平，持续推动贸易发展，促进贸易结构多元化，简化贸易程序。
+
+各方注意到共同制定中国—中亚新经济对话战略的重要性，包括采取相应举措保障贸易畅通，扩大各国产品供应量，建立产业合作共同空间。
+
+各方愿推动基础设施和工程建设合作发展，加快数字和绿色基础设施联通，共同推进基础设施和工程建设合作可持续发展。各方愿研究建立绿色投资重点项目数据库的可能性。
+
+各方宣布成立中国—中亚实业家委员会，支持贸促机构、商协会及相关组织在贸易投资促进方面密切合作，为促进中国同中亚国家经贸合作发展发挥更大作用。
+
+各方愿定期举办中国—中亚产业与投资合作论坛，升级中国同中亚国家投资协定，鼓励扩大产业合作，提升地区产业发展水平，维护地区产业链、供应链的稳定和效率，创造共同价值链，鼓励提高本国外商投资政策的稳定性、公平性、透明度、可持续性，持续打造市场化、更具吸引力的投资和营商环境。
+
+七、各方商定逐步有序增开航班，研究中国—中亚合作商务旅行卡等人员往来便利化举措可行性。加快推进现有口岸设施现代化改造，研究增开口岸，实现边境口岸农副产品快速通关“绿色通道”全覆盖，开展国际贸易“单一窗口”互联互通、优化口岸营商环境、促进跨境通关便利化等合作交流，积极发展地区物流网络。
+
+各方强调，应巩固中亚作为欧亚大陆交通枢纽的重要地位，加快推进中国—中亚交通走廊建设，发展中国—中亚－南亚、中国—中亚－中东、中国—中亚－欧洲多式联运，包括中－哈－土－伊（朗）过境通道，途经阿克套港、库雷克港、土库曼巴什港等海港的跨里海运输线路，发挥铁尔梅兹市的过境运输潜力。
+
+各方愿共同完善交通基础设施，包括新建和升级改造现有的中国至中亚铁路和公路。
+
+各方指出完成中吉乌铁路可研工作的重要性，将推进该铁路加快落地建设。各方同时指出，建设中哈塔城－阿亚古兹铁路以及保障中吉乌公路畅通运行，实现中塔乌公路和“中国西部－欧洲西部”公路常态化运营具有重要意义。
+
+各方指出，研究制定从中亚国家往返东南亚和亚洲其他国家的最佳过境运输方案具有重要意义。
+
+各方将采取有效举措提升包括边境口岸在内的过货量，构建中国同中亚全方位、复合型、立体化、绿色低碳、可持续的交通基础设施体系。
+
+八、各方愿深挖中国同中亚国家农业合作潜力，促进农畜产品贸易。中方愿增加进口中亚农产品的种类。
+
+各方愿积极发展智慧农业，加强节水、绿色和其他高效技术应用和先进经验交流。
+
+各方愿推动在荒漠化土地和盐碱地治理开发、节水灌溉、病虫害防治、畜牧兽医等领域开展技术与人才交流合作，增强农业系统可持续发展韧性。
+
+各方欢迎2023年在乌兹别克斯坦举行国际粮食安全会议的倡议，注意到在气候变化背景下于2023年3月9日至10日在阿什哈巴德举行的国际粮食安全合作会议成果。
+
+各方重申愿共同努力保障气候变化条件下的粮食安全，指出以保护生物多样性、合理利用水资源和土地资源等更加生态的方式开展农业的重要性。
+
+各方指出共同完善在减少贫困、提高就业、增加收入和创造劳动岗位等方面政策的重要性，愿加强上述领域合作，出台有效社会帮扶政策，开展专家和业务交流。
+
+九、各方支持建立中国—中亚能源发展伙伴关系，扩大能源全产业链合作，进一步拓展石油、天然气、煤炭等传统能源领域合作，加强水力、太阳能、风能等可再生能源合作，深化和平利用核能合作，实施绿色技术、清洁能源等项目，践行创新、协调、绿色、开放、共享的发展理念。
+
+各方指出稳定的能源供应对发展经贸投资合作的重要性，支持加快中国—中亚天然气管道D线建设。
+
+各方指出，能源合作是本地区可持续发展的重要组成部分。
+
+各方注意到关于制定旨在发展低碳能源的联合国战略，以及在联合国主导下制定优先发展氢能国际合作路线图的倡议。
+
+十、各方愿继续巩固教育、科学、文化、旅游、考古、档案、体育、媒体、智库等人文合作，推动地方省州（市）交流，促进更多地方结好，丰富青年交流形式，开展联合考古、文化遗产保护修复、博物馆交流、流失文物追索返还等合作。
+
+中方邀请中亚五国参与实施“文化丝路”计划，促进民心相通。
+
+各方指出进一步加强旅游合作和共同制定中国—中亚旅游线路的重要性。
+
+各方认为应进一步深化卫生医疗合作，推进中医药中心建设，开展草药种植及加工合作，打造“健康丝绸之路”。
+
+各方指出在生物安全、危险传染病预防等领域扩大合作的重要性，支持关于在联合国主导下建立国际生物安全多边专门机构的倡议。
+
+各方强调加强人文合作、促进民心相通具有重要意义，欢迎中国同中亚国家人民文化艺术年暨中国—中亚青年艺术节启动。
+
+各方支持推动高校和大学生交流，支持举办青年文化节、论坛和体育赛事。
+
+各相关方将积极推动互设文化中心。中方愿继续向中亚国家提供政府奖学金名额，组织相关领域专业人才赴华参训、进修和交流。各方愿促进“鲁班工坊”职业教育发展。
+
+各方鼓励拓展人工智能、智慧城市、大数据、云计算等高新技术领域合作。
+
+十一、各方重申《联合国气候变化框架公约》及其《巴黎协定》作为国际社会合作应对气候变化的主渠道地位和基本法律遵循，强调各国应恪守《公约》及其《巴黎协定》目标、原则和制度框架，特别是共同但有区别的责任原则，推动《巴黎协定》全面有效实施，共同构建公平合理、合作共赢的全球气候治理体系。
+
+各方支持在气候变化适应和可持续发展领域开展更紧密的合作，强调共同实施绿色措施是减缓气候变化影响的有效途径。
+
+各方愿加强应急管理部门协作，深化防灾减灾、安全生产、应急救援以及地震科学技术等领域交流合作。
+
+中方欢迎2022年7月21日在吉尔吉斯斯坦乔蓬阿塔举行的中亚国家元首协商会晤上通过的中亚《绿色议程》地区方案，各方支持实施绿色技术领域的地区计划和项目。
+
+各方指出，2021年11月联合国教科文组织第41届大会通过的由吉尔吉斯斯坦提交的“加强山地冰川监测研究”决议、第76届联合国大会关于宣布2022年为“国际山地可持续发展年”的决议及第77届联合国大会“山地可持续发展”决议宣布在2023年至2027年实施《山区发展五年纲要》具有重要意义，高度评价2022年9月19日在纽约举行的山地可持续发展高级别会议对加强山地议题国际合作与落实的重要作用。
+
+各方指出，塔吉克斯坦提交的关于宣布2025年为国际冰川保护年的联合国大会决议具有重要意义，高度评价2023年3月22日至24日由塔吉克斯坦和荷兰在纽约联合主办的联合国水事会议。
+
+各方欢迎关于在阿什哈巴德建立由联合国主导的中亚气候技术地区中心并将其作为适应和减缓气候变化影响技术转让平台的倡议。
+
+各方注意到乌兹别克斯坦倡议的关于宣布咸海地区为生态创新和科技区联大特别决议的重要性。
+
+各方注意到关于在阿拉木图建立联合国可持续发展目标中亚及阿富汗地区中心的倡议。
+
+十二、各方认为，一个稳定、发展和繁荣的中亚符合六国和世界人民的共同利益。
+
+各方强烈谴责一切形式的恐怖主义、分裂主义和极端主义，愿合力打击“三股势力”、毒品走私、跨国有组织犯罪、网络犯罪等活动，加强重点项目、大型活动安保经验交流，保障战略性合作项目安全稳定运营，共同应对安全威胁。
+
+各方注意到2022年10月18日至19日在塔吉克斯坦杜尚别举行了“打击恐怖主义和防止恐怖分子流窜的国际和地区安全与边境管控合作”高级别会议。
+
+各方重申包容性对话对发展国家关系的重要作用，指出土方提出的将2023年定为“国际对话保障和平年”的倡议是推进国际社会维护和平、增进互信的重要手段。
+
+各方欢迎“撒马尔罕团结倡议——为了共同安全与繁荣”，该倡议旨在维护和平与稳定、开展广泛的国际合作、促进人类可持续发展。
+
+各方愿继续同国际社会一道，帮助阿富汗人民维护和平稳定、重建社会基础设施、融入地区和世界经济体系。
+
+各方强调推动阿富汗建立各民族和政党广泛参与的包容性政府的重要性。
+
+各方注意到关于在联合国支持下建立国际谈判小组的倡议。
+
+各方支持把阿富汗建成一个和平、稳定、繁荣，免受恐怖主义、战争和毒品威胁的国家。
+
+各方指出应合力打击毒品走私，研究在联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室参与下制定联合禁毒行动计划的可能性。
+
+十三、各方认为，安全和发展是当今国际社会面临的突出问题。中亚国家高度评价并愿积极践行中方提出的全球发展倡议、全球安全倡议和全球文明倡议，认为上述倡议对实现联合国可持续发展目标、维护世界和平与安全、促进人类文明进步具有重要意义。
+
+十四、各方支持在《全球数据安全倡议》框架内构建和平、开放、安全、合作、有序的网络空间，共同落实好《“中国—中亚五国”数据安全合作倡议》，共同推进在联合国主导下谈判制定关于打击为犯罪目的使用信息和通信技术全面国际公约，合力应对全球信息安全面临的威胁和挑战。
+
+十五、各方将坚定维护联合国在维护国际和平、安全和可持续发展中的核心关键作用，弘扬和平、发展、公平、正义、民主、自由的全人类共同价值，反对将人权等问题政治化。
+
+各方重申恪守《联合国宪章》宗旨和原则，强调各国领土完整和主权不容损害。各方坚定捍卫多边主义以及公认的国际法和国际关系准则，维护国际公平正义，推动国际秩序和全球治理体系朝着公正合理的方向发展。
+
+各方愿加强在联合国、上海合作组织、亚洲相互协作与信任措施会议等多边机制内的对话与合作，就地区和国际热点问题及时交换意见、协调立场。
+
+各方肯定国际原子能机构在和平利用核能方面的重要作用，指出该机构成员国有权充分参与该机构所有决策程序，支持该机构《规约》规定的主权平等进程，支持中亚国家加入该机构相关地区小组。
+
+各方对中方高水平举办中国—中亚峰会表示感谢。
+
+各方商定第二届中国—中亚峰会将于2025年由哈萨克斯坦主办。
+
+> #### 中华人民共和国主席
+> #### 习近平
+
+> #### 哈萨克斯坦共和国总统
+> #### 卡瑟姆若马尔特·托卡耶夫
+
+> #### 吉尔吉斯共和国总统
+> #### 萨德尔·扎帕罗夫
+
+> #### 塔吉克斯坦共和国总统
+> #### 埃莫马利·拉赫蒙
+
+> #### 土库曼斯坦总统
+> #### 谢尔达尔·别尔德穆哈梅多夫
+
+> #### 乌兹别克斯坦共和国总统
+> #### 沙夫卡特·米尔济约耶夫
+
+2023年5月19日于西安
+
+
+▲ 5月18日晚，西安市大唐芙蓉园，六国领袖贵宾前往元功门欢迎宴会。
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-05-20-G7Hiroshima-a1_r-g7-hiroshima-leaders-communique.md b/_collections/_heros/2023-05-20-G7Hiroshima-a1_r-g7-hiroshima-leaders-communique.md
new file mode 100644
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@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "G7 Communiqué"
+author: "G7 Hiroshima"
+date: 2023-05-20 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/HTfH8S8.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué"
+position: right
+---
+
+We, the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7), met in Hiroshima for our annual Summit on May 19-21, 2023, more united than ever in our determination to meet the global challenges of this moment and set the course for a better future. Our work is rooted in respect for the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and international partnership.
+
+
+
+__We are taking concrete steps to:__
+
+- support Ukraine for as long as it takes in the face of Russia’s illegal war of aggression;
+
+- strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, towards the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all;
+
+- coordinate our approach to economic resilience and economic security that is based on diversifying and deepening partnerships and de-risking, not de-coupling;
+
+- drive the transition to clean energy economies of the future through cooperation within and beyond the G7;
+
+- launch the Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security with partner countries to address needs today and into the future; and
+
+- deliver our goal of mobilizing up to $600 billion in financing for quality infrastructure through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII)
+
+as outlined in the reference documents of this Communique.
+
+__We are determined to work together and with others to:__
+
+- support a free and open Indo-Pacific and oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion;
+
+- foster a strong and resilient global economic recovery, maintain financial stability, and promote jobs and sustainable growth;
+
+- accelerate achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), recognizing that reducing poverty and tackling the climate and nature crisis go hand in hand;
+
+- promote the evolution of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs);
+
+- strengthen our partnerships with African countries and support greater African representation in multilateral fora;
+
+- preserve the planet by accelerating the decarbonization of our energy sector and the deployment of renewables, end plastic pollution and protect the oceans;
+
+- deepen cooperation through Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), the Climate Club and new Country Packages for Forest, Nature and Climate;
+
+- invest in global health through vaccine manufacturing capacity worldwide, the Pandemic Fund, the future international agreement for pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, and efforts to achieve universal health coverage (UHC);
+
+- cooperate on international migration and strengthen our common effort to fight the trafficking and smuggling of human beings; and
+
+- advance international discussions on inclusive artificial intelligence (AI) governance and interoperability to achieve our common vision and goal of trustworthy AI, in line with our shared democratic values.
+
+2) __We will champion international principles and shared values by:__
+
+- upholding and reinforcing the free and open international order based on the rule of law, respecting the UN Charter to the benefit of countries, large and small;
+
+- strongly opposing any unilateral attempts to change the peacefully established status of territories by force or coercion anywhere in the world and reaffirming that the acquisition of territory by force is prohibited;
+
+- promoting universal human rights, gender equality and human dignity;
+
+- reiterating the importance of multilateralism including the role of UN and international cooperation in promoting peace, stability and prosperity; and
+
+- strengthening the rules-based multilateral trading system and keeping pace with the evolution of digital technologies.
+
+3) We will work with our international partners to achieve a world that is human-centered, inclusive and resilient, leaving no one behind. In that spirit, we welcomed the participation of the Leaders of Australia, Brazil, Comoros, Cook Islands, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, and Vietnam.
+
+
+### Ukraine
+
+4) We once again condemn in the strongest possible terms the war of aggression by Russia against Ukraine, which constitutes a serious violation of international law, including the UN Charter. Russia’s brutal war of aggression represents a threat to the whole world in breach of fundamental norms, rules and principles of the international community. We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine for as long as it takes to bring a comprehensive, just and lasting peace. We issued the G7 Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine, and with the clear intention and concrete actions set forth in it, we commit to intensifying our diplomatic, financial, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine, to increasing the costs to Russia and those supporting its war efforts, and to continuing to counter the negative impacts of the war on the rest of the world, particularly on the most vulnerable people.
+
+
+### Disarmament and Non-proliferation
+
+5) Together with the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, we express our commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, through taking a realistic, pragmatic, and responsible approach. We reaffirm the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation efforts to create a more stable and safer world. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We remain committed to the universalization, effective implementation, and strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention. We welcome the steps taken to strengthen effective and responsible export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognize the central role of multilateral export control regimes in this regard.
+
+
+### Indo-Pacific
+
+6) We reiterate the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is inclusive, prosperous, secure, based on the rule of law, and that protects shared principles including sovereignty, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, and fundamental freedoms and human rights. Given the importance of the region, G7 members and our partners have taken respective IndoPacific initiatives to help strengthen our engagement. We underscore our commitment to strengthen coordination with regional partners, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states. We reaffirm our unwavering support for ASEAN centrality and unity and our commitment to promoting cooperation in line with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We also reaffirm our partnership with Pacific Island countries and reiterate the importance of supporting their priorities and needs in accordance with the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We welcome and further encourage efforts made by the private sector, universities and think tanks, which contribute to realizing a free and open IndoPacific.
+
+
+### Global Economy, Finance and Sustainable Development
+
+7) The global economy has shown resilience against multiple shocks including the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and associated inflationary pressures. Nevertheless, we need to remain vigilant and stay agile and flexible in our macroeconomic policy amid heightened uncertainty about the global economic outlook. In striving for strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth, we are committed to a stability- and growth-oriented macroeconomic policy mix that supports medium-term fiscal sustainability and price stability. Inflation remains elevated and central banks remain strongly committed to achieving price stability, in line with their respective mandates. Meanwhile, fiscal policy should continue to provide, as appropriate, temporary and targeted support to vulnerable groups suffering from the increase in cost of living and catalyze investment needed for the green and digital transformations while the overall fiscal stance should ensure medium-term sustainability. We also reaffirm our existing G7 exchange rate commitments. We reemphasize the importance of supply-side reforms, especially those that increase labor supply and enhance productivity. We also stress the crucial role of women and under-represented groups for the long-term success of our economies through promoting inclusion, diversity and innovation. We look forward to a successful review of the G20/Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance to strengthen sustainability and resilience of the private sector. Recognizing that our economic and social structures have undergone dynamic and fundamental transformation, we underscore the multidimensional aspects of welfare and that these aspects should be brought into policymaking in a practical and effective manner. Such efforts will help preserve confidence in democracy and a market-based economy, which are the core values of the G7.
+
+8) We will continue to closely monitor financial sector developments and stand ready to take appropriate actions to maintain financial stability and the resilience of the global financial system. We reaffirm that our financial system is resilient, supported by the financial regulatory reforms implemented after the 2008 global financial crisis. We strongly support the work of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and standard-setting bodies on enhancing the resilience of non-bank financial intermediation. We will continue policy deliberation on digital money to harness the benefits of innovation such as payment efficiency as well as financial inclusion while addressing potential risks to the stability, resilience and integrity of the monetary and financial system. Effective monitoring, regulation and oversight are critical to addressing financial stability and integrity risks posed by crypto-asset activities and markets and to avoid regulatory arbitrage, while supporting responsible innovation.
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+9) We re-emphasize our strong political commitment towards the swift global implementation of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework Two-Pillar Solution to address the tax challenges arising from globalization and the digitalization of the economy and to establish a more stable and fairer international tax system. We recognize significant progress in the negotiation of the Pillar 1 Multilateral Convention (MLC) and reaffirm our commitment to the swift completion of the negotiation so that the MLC can be ready for signature within the agreed timeline. We welcome the progresses in domestic legislation toward the implementation of Pillar 2. We will further provide developing countries with support for strengthening their tax capacity to build sustainable tax revenue sources, highlighting the importance of assistance for the implementation of the Two-Pillar Solution.
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+10) We recognize that achieving the sustainable development goals by 2030, reducing poverty, responding to global challenges including the climate crisis, and addressing debt vulnerabilities in low and middle-income countries are urgent, interrelated and mutually reinforcing. We are determined to do our part to mobilize the private and public resources needed to meet these challenges and support a just transition. Recognizing the importance of providing and protecting global public goods, we will support efforts to embed building resilience, sustainability and inclusiveness as integral elements in MDBs’ efforts to reduce poverty and promote shared prosperity. We will strive to enhance the development finance toolkit to mobilize additional financing from international financial institutions, bilateral partners, and the private sector to more effectively reduce poverty by better addressing vulnerabilities including climate change. We will work together and with partners to deliver this ambition and make concrete progress on this agenda at key moments over the coming year starting with the Summit organized in Paris on June 22-23 to revitalize global development financing, and continuing the momentum through the G20 Summit in New Delhi, the SDG Summit in New York, the 2023 World Bank Group (WBG) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Annual Meetings in Marrakech, the G20 Compact with Africa Conference in Berlin, and the 28th meeting of the Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC-COP 28) in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
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+11) We are determined to take on a leading role in reversing the setback of progress towards the SDGs. Recognizing that 2023 is the halfway point to achieve the SDGs, we highlight the importance of the SDG Summit in September and will ambitiously contribute to a successful outcome. We reaffirm our commitment to revitalizing international cooperation and strengthen multilateralism. We will accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), and will do so in a comprehensive and gender-transformative manner including through locally-led development. We will also promote the concept of human security in the new era aiming to realize a society that leaves no one behind. We stress the critical role of development cooperation and international partnerships in addressing global challenges and the need to engage with international partners in solidarity. We also call for further domestic resource mobilization and efficient use of existing resources as well as mobilizing private financial assets to address financing gaps for sustainable development. We underscore the need for continued efforts to scale up official development assistance (ODA) and expand its catalytic use including through innovative financing mechanisms, recognizing the importance of respective commitments, such as the 0.7% ODA/GNI target that some countries adopted.
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+12) We remain concerned that serious challenges to debt sustainability are undermining the progress towards the SDGs and low-and middle-income countries are disproportionately affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and wider global challenges. We reiterate the urgency of addressing debt vulnerabilities in these countries and fully support the G20’s effort to improve the implementation of the Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) in a predictable, timely, orderly and coordinated manner, providing clarity to participants. We welcome the recent approval by the IMF board of a program for Ghana. Beyond the Common Framework, debt vulnerabilities in middle income countries (MICs) should be addressed by multilateral coordination. In this respect, we welcome the launch of the creditors’ meeting for Sri Lanka under the three co-chairs, France, India, and Japan, and look forward to a swift resolution as a successful model for future multilateral efforts to address MICs’ debt issues. We also stress the importance of private creditors providing debt treatments on terms at least as favorable to ensure fair burden sharing in line with the comparability of treatment principle. We welcome the development of Climate Resilient Debt Clauses (CRDC) to enhance the safety net for borrowers facing the impacts of climate change. We welcome work by our finance ministers on this topic and encourage more creditors to offer CRDC for loan agreements. In order to enhance debt data accuracy and transparency, we invite all official bilateral creditors to join the data sharing exercise for debt data reconciliation, including through further advancing the G20’s initiative in the area of debt data accuracy.
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+13) We encourage MDBs and Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) to accelerate their efforts to increase their capacity to leverage private finance, including through implementing MDB reforms. In this regard, we strongly support and encourage to expedite the ongoing work on the evolution of the MDBs to review and transform their business models to better address transboundary challenges such as climate change, pandemics, fragility and conflict, which are integral to achieving poverty reduction and shared prosperity. This evolution should come with the most efficient use of their existing capital. To this end, we will contribute to developing an ambitious G20 Roadmap on implementing the recommendations of the G20 MDB Capital Adequacy Framework Review and call on MDBs to make further progress in a comprehensive manner while safeguarding MDBs’ long-term financial sustainability, robust credit ratings and preferred creditor status. Building on key reforms to the WBG’s mission and operational model along with financial reforms that can add up to $50 billion of financing capacity over the coming decade, we look forward to further progress at the WBG toward the 2023 WBG and IMF Annual Meetings and beyond so that ambitious reforms can be made on a continual basis. We encourage other MDBs to join this initiative for a coordinated approach of MDBs as a system. We also call on MDBs to make the best use of policy and knowledge support, and explore strengthened approaches to promote mobilizing domestic resources and private capital as well as private sector engagement. We have further advanced our joint efforts to support countries most in need through the voluntary channeling of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) or equivalent contributions. We welcome that additional pledges by Japan and France, amongst others, together with our previous contributions and commitments, put the global ambition of $100 billion within reach and call for the delivery of existing pledges and for further pledges from all willing and able countries to fulfill the ambition. We support the IMF achieving its agreed 2021 fundraising targets by the 2023 WBG and IMF Annual Meetings and identifying all available options to put the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) which supports Low Income Countries (LICs), on a sustainable footing with a view to meeting the growing needs of LICs in the coming years. We will further explore viable options for enabling the voluntary channeling of SDRs through MDBs, while respecting national legal frameworks and the need to preserve the reserve assets character and status of SDRs.
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+14) We stress the importance of narrowing the infrastructure investment gap in low and middle income partner countries, including by delivering financing for quality infrastructure, supporting efforts to advance policy reforms needed to attract investment, operationalizing country-led partnerships, and promoting upstream support including project preparation support. We reaffirm our shared commitment to the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) and to working together and aiming to mobilize up to $600 billion by 2027.We will continue strengthening global partnerships for public and private investments in sustainable, inclusive, resilient and quality infrastructure with partner countries. We will mobilize the private sector for accelerated action to this end. Our offer is fair and transparent and aims at accelerating global sustainable development with the focus on delivering impact at local level. We welcome the Factsheet on PGII that demonstrates how the G7 and partners have made concrete progress in fostering investments that will create lasting positive impacts and promote sustainable development. We reiterate our support to the G20 Compact with Africa as a key framework to enhance the business environment in Africa and call on reform-oriented partners to join and strengthen this initiative.
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+15) We shared our determination to promote transparent and fair development finance and work together to address the gap in implementing existing principles such as debt transparency and sustainability, fair appraisal, selection, and lending practices for quality infrastructure investment. In this regard, we call on all actors to adhere to international rules, standards and principles, including the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment, the G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. These rules, standards and principles also include measures to safeguard the integrity of infrastructure investments.
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+16) We note the importance of addressing development, humanitarian, peace and security issues together. We are determined to address the unprecedented number of humanitarian crises, focusing on women and girls and those in vulnerable situations. In this regard, we commit to providing over $21 billion in total to address the worsening humanitarian crises this year, including in response to urgent food crises. Bearing in mind that many countries are vulnerable to disasters, including Small Island Developing States, we will accelerate international disaster risk reduction cooperation in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the output of its midterm review conducted by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). We emphasize the importance of a disaster preparedness approach and investment in human capital, goods and infrastructure that contribute not only to “risk transfer” but also to “risk reduction,” resulting in the strengthening of anticipatory actions. We remain committed to holding ourselves accountable, in an open and transparent way, for the promises we have made. In this regard, we endorse the 2023 Hiroshima Progress Report, following up on the G7’s development-related commitments on food security and nutrition as well as refugees and migration.
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+17) We emphasize the transformative power of cities worldwide as drivers for every aspect of sustainable development. We will continue our cooperation on sustainable urban development and task our relevant Ministers to consider the development of principles on carbon neutral, resilient and inclusive cities and on the digitalization in cities, and to accelerate the use of data and technologies for cities. This work will support exchanges with our global partners, whose cities face some of the most significant challenges relating to climate change.
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+### Climate Change
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+18) Our planet is facing unprecedented challenges from the triple global crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution as well as from the ongoing global energy crisis. We are steadfast in our commitment to the Paris agreement, keeping a limit of 1.5°C global temperature rise within reach through scaled up action in this critical decade, halting and reversing biodiversity loss by 2030, and ensuring energy security, whilst leveraging synergies and recognizing the interdependent nature of these challenges. While Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine impacts energy markets and supply chains globally, our goal to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050 at the latest remains unchanged. We emphasize our strong concern, amplified by the latest finding of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and its Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), at the accelerating and intensifying impacts of climate change, and highlight the increased urgency to reduce global GHG emissions by around 43 percent by 2030 and 60 percent by 2035, relative to the 2019 level, in light of its latest findings. We reiterate our commitment made in Elmau last year to rapidly implement domestic mitigation measures aimed at achieving our Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets and to increase our ambition including, for example, by adopting or strengthening sectoral targets, by developing non-CO2 sub targets, and by adopting stringent implementation measures. Mindful of our leadership role, and noting that emissions have already peaked in all G7 countries, we recognize the critical role of all major economies in limiting increases in global temperature over this critical decade and in subsequent decades. In this context, we underscore that every major economy should have significantly enhanced the ambition of its NDC since the Paris Agreement; already peaked its GHG emissions or indicated that it will do so no later than 2025; and in particular, included economy-wide absolute reduction targets and that cover all GHGs in its NDC. Accordingly, we call on all Parties - especially major economies - whose 2030 NDC targets or longterm low GHG emission development Strategies (LTSs) are not yet aligned with a 1.5°C pathway and net zero by 2050 at the latest, to revisit and strengthen the 2030 NDC targets and publish or update their LTSs as soon as possible and well before UNFCCC-COP28, and to commit to net zero by 2050 at the latest. Furthermore, we call on all Parties to commit at UNFCCC-COP28 to peak global GHG emissions immediately and by no later than 2025. We reaffirm our commitment to the Global Methane Pledge and we will step up efforts to collectively reduce global anthropogenic methane emissions by at least 30 percent below 2020 levels by 2030. We commit to actively contributing to securing the most ambitious outcomes of the first global stocktake (GST) at UNFCCC-COP28, which should result in enhanced, immediate and ambitious actions across mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation and support. We call on all Parties to submit their next round of NDCs and LTSs well ahead of UNFCCC-COP30 that are informed by the outcomes of the GST, reflecting economy-wide absolute reduction targets including all GHGs, sectors and categories. These should reflect significantly enhanced ambition aligned with a 1.5°C pathway and should also include their revisited and strengthened 2030 targets.
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+19) Noting the importance of increasing the pace and scale of action on climate change, biodiversity loss and clean energy transitions, we will globally advance and promote a green transformation, working together to realize transformation of our economies to reach net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 at the latest. We will engage with developing and emerging countries to accelerate emission reduction, including by supporting their transitions to climate resilient, circular, and nature positive economies and net-zero GHG emissions through various and practical pathways taking into account national circumstances. To that end, we reaffirm our strong commitment to supporting developing countries’ just energy transitions, which will be supported by coordinated actions, including through the PGII. We welcome progress achieved on JETPs with South Africa, Indonesia and Vietnam, and also continue our discussions with India and Senegal. We take note of initiatives that are intended to support clean energy transition in countries around the world, such as Asia Zero Emission Community (AZEC) initiative, the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA), 2050 Pathways Platform, Net Zero World (NZW), and the Global Carbon Pricing Challenge and underscore the importance of actions taken through such initiatives being aligned with a 1.5°C pathway. We will take further action on supply-side measures and recognize the need for further decarbonization efforts on the demand-side such as promoting changes in infrastructure and material use and end-use technology adoption as well as promoting sustainable consumer choice. We also recognize the vital role of sub-national governments in collaboration with other stakeholders and partners to advance climate and energy actions based on local needs and environmental conditions. We reaffirm the important role of high integrity carbon markets and carbon pricing to foster cost-efficient reductions in emission levels, drive innovation and enable a transformation to net zero, through the optimal use of a range of policy levers to price carbon. We support appropriate policy mixes including carbon pricing, non-pricing mechanisms, and incentives that effectively reduce emissions, and note that these could vary reflecting countryspecific circumstances. We strongly support the OECD Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches (IFCMA). We look forward to advancing the open, cooperative, and inclusive Climate Club, in collaboration with international partners, to advance industrial decarbonization. We encourage private entities to commit to GHG net-zero emissions throughout the value chain via credible net zero pledges and transparent implementation strategies. We also encourage and promote private entities’ work to foster innovation contributing to the emission reduction of other entities through decarbonization solutions. We welcome the progress of the Industrial Decarbonization Agenda (IDA) that decided to start working on implementation of the new Global Data Collection Framework for steel production and product emissions. We reaffirm our commitment to a highly decarbonized road sector by 2030, and recognize the importance of reducing GHG emissions from the global fleet and the range of pathways to approach this goal in line with trajectories required for keeping a limit of 1.5°C within reach. We are committed to the goal of achieving net-zero emissions in the road sector by 2050. In this context, we highlight the various actions that each of us is taking to decarbonize our vehicle fleet, including such domestic policies that are designed to achieve 100 percent or the overwhelming penetration of sales of light duty vehicles (LDVs) as zero emission vehicles (ZEV) by 2035 and beyond; to achieve 100 percent electrified vehicles in new passenger car sales by 2035; to promote associated infrastructure and sustainable carbon-neutral fuels including sustainable bio- and synthetic fuels. We note the opportunities that these policies offer to contribute to a highly decarbonized road sector, including progressing towards a share of over 50 percent of zero emission LDVs sold globally by 2030. Considering the findings of the International Energy Agency (IEA)‘s Energy Technology Perspective 2023, we also note the opportunity to collectively reduce by at least 50 percent CO2 emissions from G7 vehicle stock by 2035 or earlier relative to the level in 2000 as a halfway point to achieving net zero and to track the progress on a yearly basis. We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen global efforts to achieve GHG lifecycle zero emissions from international shipping by 2050 at the latest. We commit to support this target and introducing intermediate targets for 2030 and 2040 for the revised International Maritime Organization (IMO) GHG reduction strategy, in line with efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels through a credible basket of measures. We commit to accelerate global efforts to achieve the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)’s goal of net-zero emissions in international aviation by 2050, including making an effort for promoting and introducing sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), introducing new technologies and improving operations, also building on ICAO’s Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA).
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+20) In the face of the increasing threats posed by climate change, supporting climate-vulnerable groups is essential for ensuring human security and achieving resilient and sustainable development. We will continue to scale up and enhance support to strengthen the resilience of climate-vulnerable groups through enhancing climate change adaptation and climate disaster risk reduction, response and recovery and early-warning systems including through the Global Shield against Climate Risks and other initiatives related to early warning systems and the adoption of climate-resilient debt clauses. We reaffirm our commitments to the developed country Parties’ goal of jointly mobilizing $100 billion annually in climate finance by 2020 through to 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. We will work together with other developed country Parties in order to fully meet the goal in 2023. We welcome discussions on an ambitious and fit-for-purpose new collective quantified goal (NCQG) which contributes as a global effort, from a wide variety of sources, public and private, to reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement, including making finance flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate resilient development. Recognizing the critical role of the G7 and that developed country parties should take the lead in mobilizing climate finance, we underscore the need for all countries and stakeholders, who have the capabilities and are not yet among the current providers of international climate finance, to contribute to global efforts in this regard.
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+21) We are committed to accelerating our own efforts to making financial flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate resilient development, in line with Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement. We stress the importance of mobilizing finance especially including private finance focusing on further implementation and development of clean technologies and activities. We underline our commitment to consistent, comparable and reliable disclosure of information on sustainability including climate. We support the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) finalizing the standards for general reporting on sustainability and for climate-related disclosures and working toward achieving globally interoperable sustainability disclosure frameworks. We also look forward to the ISSB’s future work on disclosure on biodiversity and human capital, in line with its work plan consultation. We remain committed to supporting the implementation and monitoring of the G20 Sustainable Finance Roadmap. We highlight the need for corporates to implement their net-zero transitions in line with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement based on credible corporate climate transition plans. We also highlight that transition finance, in line with keeping a limit of 1.5°C temperature rise within reach, avoiding carbon lock-ins and based on effective emissions reduction, has a significant role in advancing the decarbonization of the economy as a whole. We look forward to an ambitious and successful second replenishment for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and reaffirm the need for robust G7 pledges. We urge other countries to do the same and underscore the need to broaden the GCF’s contributor base by encouraging all potential contributors. We continue to accelerate efforts to respond to the Glasgow Climate Pact that urges developed countries to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing countries from the 2019 level by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources. We also urge MDBs to commit to ambitious adaptation finance targets, announcing revised and enhanced 2025 projections, and call on non-G7 countries to enhance provision and mobilization including private finance for adaptation. We stress the key role of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in mobilizing finance and call on them to mainstream climate and environment issues in their policies, investments, operations and governance. We also urge MDBs to increase finance for global public goods including climate finance and support ambitious regulatory reforms in developing countries via policy-based finance in order to foster the transition to net zero and enable private sector investment. Furthermore, in order to promote the development of carbon markets while ensuring their environmental integrity, we endorse the “Principles of High Integrity Carbon Markets” to facilitate their implementation in carbon credit markets. We emphasize our extreme concern at the scale of impacts that are already resulting in economic and non-economic loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change and being felt globally, particularly by the most vulnerable. Alarmed by the adverse effects of climate change globally, we will scale up action and support to avert, minimize and address loss and damage, especially for the most vulnerable countries. This will include implementing the UNFCCC-COP27/The 4th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA4) decision to establish new funding arrangements, including a fund, for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, in the context of article 8 of the Paris Agreement, and providing support identified in the “G7 Inventory on Climate Disaster Risk Reduction, Response and Recovery”.
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+### Environment
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+22) We commit to realizing the transformation of the economic and social system towards net-zero, circular, climate-resilient, pollution-free and nature-positive economies and to halting and reversing biodiversity loss by 2030, in an integrated manner, while ensuring sustainable and inclusive economic growth and development and enhancing the resilience of our economies. Highlighting that enhancing resource efficiency and circularity along value chains reduces primary resource use and contributes to achieving our climate and other environmental goals, we encourage stakeholders and in particular businesses to strengthen their action. Thus, we endorse the Circular Economy and Resource Efficiency Principles (CEREP). We will increase domestic and international environmentally-sound, sustainable and efficient recovery and recycling of critical minerals and raw materials and other applicable materials while increasing circularity along the supply chains. We reaffirm that management and governance of water-related ecosystems are essential for all life on earth. We are actively engaging in relevant international fora including following up on the UN Water Conference successfully held this year.
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+23) Building on the G7 Ocean Deal, we commit to act towards realizing clean, healthy and productive oceans. We reaffirm our commitment to end illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and will take further actions to address this phenomenon in all its dimensions, including supporting developing countries and strengthening policy coordination among our relevant agencies and task them to take stock of their progress on this issue by the end of this year. In particular, we encourage non-parties to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA) to join for further global acceptance and effective implementation of the PSMA. We welcome the conclusion of the negotiations for an international legally binding instrument under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) and call for its rapid entry into force and implementation. We will continue to actively engage in the development of a regulatory framework on deep seabed mineral exploitation under the International Seabed Authority (ISA) that ensures effective protection for the marine environment from harmful effects which may arise from such activities, as required under the UNCLOS. We are committed to end plastic pollution, with the ambition to reduce additional plastic pollution to zero by 2040. With this in mind, we are determined to continue and step up our actions based on the comprehensive life cycle approach. We support the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) process, look forward to the next round of negotiation in Paris with a view to completing its work with an international legally binding instrument covering the whole life cycle of plastics by the end of 2024 and call for ambitious outcomes. We will make as much progress as possible on these issues and on the broader agenda of ocean protection by the UN Ocean Conference in 2025.
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+24) We welcome the adoption of the historic Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030, which is fundamental to human well-being, a healthy planet and economic prosperity, and commit to its swift and full implementation and to achievement of each of its goals and targets. In this regard, G7 members that are parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) commit to revise, update and submit our National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) aligned with the GBF and its goals and targets, or to communicate national targets reflecting as applicable all the goals and targets of the GBF in 2023 or sufficiently in advance of CBD-COP16. We will identify incentives, including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity by 2025, and redirect or eliminate them while scaling up positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity by 2030 at the latest, taking initial steps without delay. We call on all signatories to swiftly implement their commitments under the GBF and stand ready to provide support to developing countries. We reiterate our commitment to substantially increase our national and international funding for nature by 2025. We will ensure that our international development assistance aligns with the GBF. We call on the MDBs to increase support for biodiversity including through leveraging financial resources from all sources and deploying a full suite of instruments. To implement the GBF, we commit to substantially and progressively increasing the level of financial resources from all sources, and to align all relevant fiscal and financial flows with the GBF and call on others to do the same. We commit to supporting the establishment of the GBF Fund within the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and its successful launch at the GEF Assembly in Vancouver in August 2023, noting the importance of financial contributions from all sources to capitalize the new fund. We reaffirm our commitment to enhance synergies between finance for climate and biodiversity, including increased funding for Nature-based Solutions. We also commit to supporting and advancing a transition to nature positive economies, including through sharing knowledge and creating information networks among the G7 such as the G7 Alliance on Nature Positive Economy. We call on businesses to progressively reduce negative and increase positive impacts on biodiversity. We look forward to the publication of the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures’ (TNFD’s) market framework and urge market participants, governments and regulators to support its development. We stress our commitment to achieving the target of effectively conserving and managing at least 30 percent of terrestrial and inland water areas, and at least 30 percent of marine and coastal areas by 2030 (30 by 30), nationally and globally, according to national circumstances and approaches through promoting the designation and management of protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures (OECMs). We commit to conserving and protecting global marine biological diversity and sustainably using its resources based on the best available scientific evidence. In this context, we reconfirm our commitment under the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) to adopt, as a matter of urgency, proposals to designate Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in Eastern Antarctica, the Weddell Sea and the Western Antarctic Peninsula, based on the best available scientific evidence. In this regard, we will support other countries by sharing best practices for protected areas and OECMs to achieve the GBF target of 30 by 30. We will enhance international cooperation on measures against invasive alien species. We reiterate our commitment to halting and reversing forest loss and land degradation by 2030, and are committed to conserving forests and other terrestrial ecosystems and accelerating their restoration, supporting sustainable value and supply chains as well as promoting sustainable forest management and use of wood. We will work together, with high ambition to deliver integrated solutions to support the protection, conservation and restoration of high-carbon, high-biodiversity ecosystems, including by coordinating our offers through Country Packages on Forests, Nature and Climate, especially in countries which host vital reserves of carbon and biodiversity, with an initial focus on forests. We commit to continuing our efforts to reduce risk of deforestation and forest and land degradation linked to the production of relevant commodities and enhance cooperation with various stakeholders on this issue. We will, if appropriate, develop further regulatory frameworks or policies to support this.
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+### Energy
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+25) We commit to holistically addressing energy security, the climate crisis, and geopolitical risks. In order to address the current energy crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and achieve our common goal of net-zero emissions by 2050 at the latest, we highlight the real and urgent need and opportunity to accelerate clean energy transitions also as a means of increasing energy security at the same time. While acknowledging various pathways according to each country’s energy situation, industrial and social structures and geographical conditions, we highlight that these should lead to our common goal of net zero by 2050 at the latest in order to keep a limit of 1.5 °C within reach. In this regard, we invite the IEA to make recommendations by the end of this year on options how to diversify the supplies of energy and critical minerals as well as clean energy manufacturing. Through this, together with our partners, we seek to holistically address energy security, climate crisis, and geopolitical risk including the expansion of global use of renewable energy in order to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 at the latest and keep a limit of 1.5 °C temperature rise within reach. Through our experience in coping with past and current energy crises, we highlight the importance of enhanced energy efficiency and savings as the “first fuel,” and of developing demand side energy policies. We also need to significantly accelerate the deployment of renewable energies and the development and deployment of next-generation technologies. The G7 contributes to expanding renewable energy globally and bringing down costs by strengthening capacity including through a collective increase in offshore wind capacity of 150GW by 2030 based on each country’s existing targets and a collective increase of solar PV to more than 1TW by 2030 estimated by the IEA and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) through means such as each country’s existing targets or policy measures. We recognize that low-carbon and renewable hydrogen and its derivatives such as ammonia should be developed and used, if this can be aligned with a 1.5 °C pathway, where they are impactful as effective emission reduction tools to advance decarbonization across sectors and industries, notably in hard-to-abate sectors in industry and transportation, while avoiding N2O as a GHG and NOx as air pollutant. We also note that some countries are exploring the use of low-carbon and renewable hydrogen and its derivatives in the power sector to work towards zero-emission thermal power generation if this can be aligned with a 1.5°C pathway and our collective goal for a fully or predominantly decarbonized power sector by 2035. We will enhance our efforts to develop the rule-based, transparent global market and supply chains for low carbon and renewable hydrogen based on reliable international standards and certification schemes adhering to environmental and social standards. We affirm the importance of developing international standards and certification including for a GHG calculation methodology for hydrogen production and mutual recognition mechanism for carbon intensity-based tradability, transparency, trustworthiness and sustainability. We reaffirm our commitment to achieving a fully or predominantly decarbonized power sector by 2035, and prioritizing concrete and timely steps towards the goal of accelerating the phase-out of domestic unabated coal power generation in a manner consistent with keeping a limit of 1.5°C temperature rise within reach and urge others to join us. We will work towards ending the construction of new unabated coal fired power generation as identified in the IEA’s Coal in Net Zero Transitions report in 2022 as one of the primary actions to be taken in line with the IEA net zero by 2050 scenario. We call on and will work with other countries to end new unabated coal-fired power generation projects globally as soon as possible to accelerate the clean energy transition in a just manner. We highlight that we ended new direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation in 2021. We call on other countries, especially major economies to join us in fulfilling their commitments to do the same. We acknowledge that Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS)/carbon recycling technologies can be an important part of a broad portfolio of decarbonization solutions to reduce emissions from industrial sources that cannot be avoided otherwise and that the deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) processes with robust social and environmental safeguard, have an essential role to play in counterbalancing residual emissions from sectors that are unlikely to achieve full decarbonization.
+
+26) We underline our commitment, in the context of a global effort, to accelerate the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels so as to achieve net zero in energy systems by 2050 at the latest in line with the trajectories required to limit global average temperatures to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels, and call on others to join us in taking the same action. We reaffirm our commitment to the elimination of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 or sooner, and reaffirm our previous calls for all countries to do so. In view of the emerging need for net-zero and circular industrial supply chains in the transformation towards a 1.5°C pathway, we recognize the opportunities associated with decarbonized, sustainably and responsibly produced non-combustion feedstocks, and are committed to supporting our workers and communities in this transformation. We also highlight that we ended new direct public support for the international unabated fossil-fuel energy sector in 2022, except in limited circumstances clearly defined by each country consistent with a 1.5 °C warming limit and the goals of the Paris Agreement, recognizing the importance of national security and geostrategic interests. It is necessary to accelerate the phase out of our dependency on Russian energy, including through energy savings and gas demand reduction, in a manner consistent with our Paris commitments, and address the global impact of Russia’s war on energy supplies, gas prices and inflation, and people’s lives, recognizing the primary need to accelerate the clean energy transition. In this context, we stress the important role that increased deliveries of LNG can play, and acknowledge that investment in the sector can be appropriate in response to the current crisis and to address potential gas market shortfalls provoked by the crisis. In the exceptional circumstance of accelerating the phase out of our dependency on Russian energy publicly supported investment in the gas sector can be appropriate as a temporary response, subject to clearly defined national circumstances, if implemented in a manner consistent with our climate objectives without creating lock-in effects, for example by ensuring that projects are integrated into national strategies for the development of low-carbon and renewable hydrogen. We will further utilize neutral and impartial statistical data made available by international organizations such as the IEA and strengthen their data-collection and analysis functions, with a view to stabilizing energy markets. We emphasize the importance of strengthening forums for communication and cooperation between producing and consuming countries with a view to stabilizing energy markets and mobilizing necessary investment consistent with climate goals. Those G7 countries that opt to use nuclear energy recognize its potential to provide affordable low-carbon energy that can reduce dependence on fossil fuels, to address the climate crisis and to ensure global energy security as a source of baseload energy and grid flexibility. They commit to maximizing the use of existing reactors safely, securely, and efficiently, including by advancing their safe long-term operation, in addressing the current energy crisis. They also commit, domestically as well as in partner countries, to supporting the development and construction of nuclear reactors, such as small modular and other advanced reactors with advanced safety systems, building robust and resilient nuclear supply chains including nuclear fuel, and maintaining and strengthening nuclear technology and human resources. They will work with likeminded partners to reduce dependence on Russia. The G7 underlines that the highest standards of nuclear safety and security are important to all countries and their respective publics. We welcome the steady progress of decommissioning work at Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings (TEPCO)’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, and Japan’s transparent efforts with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) based on scientific evidence. We support the IAEA’s independent review to ensure that the discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) treated water will be conducted consistent with IAEA safety standards and international law and that it will not cause any harm to humans and the environment, which is essential for the decommissioning of the site and the reconstruction of Fukushima.
+
+
+### Clean Energy Economy
+
+27) Emphasizing that the global climate and energy crisis highlights the urgent need to accelerate the clean energy transition towards achieving net-zero emissions no later than 2050 and to transform our energy systems, we underline the necessity of economic diversification and transformation, including in supply chains. In order to further promote clean energy transitions on a global scale, we are determined to increase our efforts and, in particular, will pursue secure, resilient, affordable, and sustainable clean energy supply chains, including those for critical minerals and clean energy technologies. In implementing energy transitions, we also reaffirm the importance of working collectively to avoid market distortions and ensuring a global level playing field. We will continue to work with international partners to realize a clean energy economy through concrete actions as laid out in the Clean Energy Economy Action Plan.
+
+
+### Economic Resilience and Economic Security
+
+28) Ensuring economic resilience and economic security globally remains our best protection against the weaponization of economic vulnerabilities. Recalling our commitment from the 2022 G7 Elmau Summit, we will advance economic policies that enhance global economic resilience and economic security to protect against systemic vulnerabilities. To this end, we will engage in dialogue and follow a cooperative approach within the G7 as well as with partners beyond the G7 and globally, including in collaboration with developing countries. In so doing, we will promote international rules and norms in order to facilitate trade and promote economic resilience, based on the rules-based multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its core. Our efforts will include taking action to make our supply chains and those of our partners around the world more resilient, sustainable and reliable, as well as appropriate measures to promote prosperity for all. We will also promote trust and security in critical infrastructure. We will enhance ongoing collaboration to address non-market policies and practices that exacerbate strategic dependencies and systemic vulnerabilities, harm our workers and businesses, and can undermine international rules and norms. Building on our resolve in Elmau to increase vigilanceand enhance our cooperation to address risks that undermine global security and stability, we will enhance collaboration by launching the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to increase our collective assessment, preparedness, deterrence and response to economic coercion, and further promote cooperation with partners beyond the G7. We will deepen our strategic dialogue against malicious practices to protect global supply chains from illegitimate influence, espionage, illicit knowledge leakage, and sabotage in the digital sphere. We affirm our shared responsibility and determination to coordinate on preventing the cutting-edge technologies we develop from being used to further military capabilities that threaten international peace and security. In this context, we hereby adopt the G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security.
+
+29) We reaffirm the growing importance of critical minerals in various fields, especially for the global clean energy transition, and the need to manage economic and security risks caused by vulnerable supply chains. We support open, fair, transparent, secure, diverse, sustainable, traceable, rulesand market-based trade in critical minerals, oppose market-distorting practices and monopolistic policies on critical minerals, and reaffirm the need to build resilient, robust, responsible, and transparent critical mineral supply chains. We are committed to strengthening our preparedness and resilience against emergencies such as market disruptions, and considering ways to jointly address any such disruptions, including through the support of the IEA’s “Voluntary Critical Mineral Security Program.” We welcome joint progress in efforts to diversify supply chains, including the refining and processing of critical minerals, such as the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). We will support local value creation in critical minerals supply chains in line with the WTO rules. We will promote domestic and international recycling of critical minerals in collaboration with developing countries. We affirm that strong environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards will ensure benefits to local communities, including people living in the vicinity of areas with mineral reserves and refining and processing plants, protect workers’ rights, and promote transparency, while giving due consideration to upstream and midstream environments. In order to further promote the clean energy transition we reiterate the need to establish sustainable an resilient supply chains for critical mineral resources and products manufactured using such resources. We welcome the “Five-Point Plan for Critical Mineral Security” adopted by G7 Climate, Energy and Environment Ministers and instruct them to implement the plan.
+
+
+### Trade
+
+30) We stand united in our commitment to free and fair trade as foundational principles and objectives of the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core, which proves more important than ever in the current geopolitical environment. We confirm that honoring these foundational principles is essential to creating resilient global supply chains that are transparent, diversified, secure, sustainable, trustworthy, and reliable, and that are fair for all and responsive to the needs of global citizens. We affirm our attachment to transparency, coordination and to the respect of WTO rules in our respective policies. This global trading system must be inclusive and ensure that the prosperity it can bring is felt by all, including those that have been traditionally underrepresented. To this end, we will continue to work with non-G7 partners, in particular developing country partners, which are integral partners in supply chains and in the global trading system. Based on the outcome of the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) and looking ahead to achieving a successful MC13, we underscore the importance of working towards WTO reform, including by conducting discussions with the view to having a fully and well-functioning dispute settlement system accessible to all Members by 2024 and by reinforcing deliberation to respond to global trade policy challenges. In addition, we call on all WTO members to work together to secure the prompt entry into force of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, to engage constructively on recommendations for additional provisions that would achieve a comprehensive agreement on fisheries subsidies, and the plurilateral initiatives including the joint statement initiatives (JSIs), and to make permanent the Moratorium on Customs Duties on Electronic Transmissions. We are committed to accelerating the WTO JSI ECommerce negotiations and working to conclude an ambitious outcome by the end of 2023. The outcome should be high standard and commercially meaningful. Free and fair trade flows, consistent with our commitment to our multilateral trading system, play an important role in the green and just transition. We will continue our collaboration at the WTO including to facilitate and promote trade in environmental goods and services, and technologies. We reaffirm our shared concerns with non-market policies and practices, including their problematic evolution, that distort global competition, trade and investment. We will further step up our efforts to secure a level playing field through the more effective use of existing tools, as well as development of appropriate new tools and stronger international rules and norms. We will seek to ensure that our responses to unfair trading practices will not create unnecessary barriers to our partners’ industries and are consistent with our WTO commitments. We reaffirm that export controls are a fundamental policy tool to address the challenges posed by the diversion of technology critical to military applications as well as for other activities that threaten global, regional, and national security. We affirm the importance of cooperation on export controls on critical and emerging technologies such as microelectronics and cyber surveillance systems to address the misuse of such technologies by malicious actors and inappropriate transfers of such technologies through research activities. We task our Trade Ministers to deepen these discussions towards the G7 Trade Ministers’ Meeting in October, and to explore, both within and beyond the G7, coordinated or joint actions where appropriate against trade-related challenges, including economic coercion.
+
+
+### Food Security
+
+31) We remain deeply concerned with the ongoing and worsening global food security and nutrition situation, with the world facing highest risk of famine in a generation. Multiple factors including the COVID-19 pandemic, soaring energy prices, the climate crisis and shocks, biodiversity loss, land degradation, water security and armed conflicts have contributed to the global disruption and disorder in food systems and supply chains and the deterioration in global food security in recent years. In particular, Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has drastically aggravated the global food security crisis. We are committed to continuing our efforts to address pressing issues to improve global food security including through initiatives already launched by the G7 and relevant international organizations, building on the positive outcomes achieved. Stressing that we have exceeded our joint commitment of $14 billion to the global food security announced at the 2022 G7 Elmau Summit, we will continue to provide assistance in the food and nutrition related sectors to vulnerable countries and regions affected by the current food security crisis, in particular in Africa and the Middle East. Given the scale of the needs across the Horn of Africa, we have collectively met our commitment from Elmau and have effectively delivered assistance to tackle one of the worst droughts in the region’s history. We also call on other international donors to step up their contributions in this regard. We further call on Russia to lift its measures that hinder the exports of Russian grain and fertilizers. Given Ukraine’s essential role as a major exporter of food to the world, we are seriously concerned about the current and future impact of Russia’s deliberate disruption of Ukraine’s agricultural sector on food security in the most vulnerable countries. Building on our commitment made at Elmau, we continue to provide support for the restoration of Ukraine’s agriculture sector, including support to its efforts in identifying and evidencing illegal seizure of Ukrainian grains by Russia, through the creation of a grain database which can be used to verify the origin of grain shipments. We reaffirm the importance of the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes and President Zelenskyy’s Grain from Ukraine Initiative. We reiterate the critical importance of continued and scaled-up implementation of the UN and Türkiye-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) in order to further facilitate grain exports from Ukraine and enable stable supply to those in need. We call on Russia to stop threatening global food supplies and to allow the BSGI to operate at its maximum potential and for as long as necessary. We reiterate the importance of ensuring rules-based, open, fair, transparent, predictable, and non-discriminatory trade and avoiding unjustified restrictive trade measures to keep the food and agricultural markets open and call on our G20 partners to do the same. We welcome the Ministerial Decision on World Food Programme (WFP) Food Purchases Exemption from Export Prohibitions or Restrictions adopted at the MC12 and call for its full implementation. We call for more concrete actions to address export restrictions imposed by agricultural producer countries on global food security, recognizing that such measures have a disproportionate effect on countries at greater risk of famine and acute food insecurity. We emphasize the necessity of market transparency and accurate information backed by neutral and impartial data and analysis to prevent arbitrary measures and reduce market volatility in addressing ongoing and future food crises, and commit to strengthening the G20 Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) as well as various efforts by international organizations in this regard. We underscore the importance of strengthening the capacity of low and lower-middle income countries to collect, analyze and use high quality agricultural, market and food security data and maintain the quality of data. We also recognize the value of dialogue between food exporting countries and importing countries to develop a shared understanding on crisis responses.
+
+32) We share the view that it is essential to focus on each human and enable stable access to affordable, safe, sufficient and nutritious food for each and every individual. In our pursuit to ensure that all people can progressively realize their right to adequate food, we affirm the need to protect and assist members of the most vulnerable populations, including women and children, in all aspects of food security from short-term food crisis responses through medium to long-term efforts to make food systems sustainable. Nutrition is also fundamental from the viewpoint of a human centered approach, and we highlight the importance of improving access to healthy diets, including through school meal programs. We recognize the urgent need of establishing inclusive, resilient and sustainable agriculture and food systems including through enhancing, diversifying and ensuring sustainability of local, regional and global food supply chains as well as through solving structural bottlenecks. This includes increasing local production capacities by making use of existing domestic agricultural resources and by facilitating trade, sustainable productivity growth with climate adaptation and mitigation and biodiversity conservation, and sustainable food consumption. We promote a wide range of innovations and technology which is suitable for local, environmental and farming conditions and benefits all stakeholders including smallholder farmers. We also underscore the role of the private sector, including small and medium enterprises and startups, in research and development (R&D) as well as responsible investment. We recognize the need to maintain the availability, affordability and accessibility of fertilizers, to diversify the production to reduce the impact of supply chain disruptions, and to promote more efficient and responsible use of fertilizers and soil health, including through the use of appropriate and safe fertilizers, for stable and sustainable agricultural production. We acknowledge the importance of supporting fertilizer value chains including local fertilizer production in line with WTO rules and through supporting the use of local sources of energy in consistency with a 1.5°C warming limit and the goals of the Paris Agreement. We strengthen broader partnerships on those efforts including through the UN Food Systems Stocktaking Moments. We commit to taking concrete steps with partner countries as outlined in the annexed “Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security”, and call for broader cooperation in the international community.
+
+
+### Health
+
+33) We renew our strong commitment to developing and strengthening the global health architecture (GHA) with the World Health Organization (WHO) at its core for future public health emergencies to break the cycle of panic and neglect, recognizing that the COVID-19 pandemic has made an unprecedented impact on the international community. To this end, we commit to further enhancing political momentum toward more coordinated and sustained leader-level governance for health emergency prevention, preparedness and response (PPR) that ensures legitimacy, representation, equity, and effectiveness, noting the ongoing discussions including on a new instrument on pandemic PPR (WHO CA+), targeted amendments to the International Health Regulations (IHR), and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) High-Level Meeting (HLM) on pandemic PPR in September 2023 and the need to avoid duplication and ensure coherence between these processes, stressing the leading role of WHO. We also applaud the landmark decision at the 75th WHA to work towards increasing the share of assessed contributions to 50 percent of WHO’s 2022-2023 base budget, and which takes into account the importance of monitoring of budgetary proposals as well as progress on reforms, with a view to sustainably finance the organisation to fulfil its leading and coordinating role in global health. We also reaffirm our commitment to strengthening collaboration between Finance and Health Ministries for pandemic PPR including through the ongoing and essential work of the G20 Joint Finance and Health Task Force (JFHTF). We welcome the launch of the Pandemic Fund (PF), look forward to the successful execution of its first call for proposals, and encourage active participation and increasing contributions to the PF from a broader donor base. We also commit to working together, including by sharing work plans and tracking, encouraging efforts and progress in priority countries to achieve the G7’s target of supporting at least 100 Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) in implementing the core capacities required in the IHR, for another 5 years until 2027 as committed in 2022. We also highlight the need for strengthening financing for pandemic response. To this end, we commit to thoroughly assess how existing financing sources can be used in pandemic response and to explore a surge financing framework that allows us to complement existing mechanisms through better coordination and deploy necessary funds quickly and efficiently in response to outbreaks without accumulating idle cash. In this respect, we welcome the G7 Shared Understanding on Finance-Health Coordination and PPR Financing endorsed by the G7 Finance and Health Ministers at their joint session. Reaffirming that strengthening international norms and regulations is essential to enhance pandemic PPR, guided by equity, we reiterate our commitment to contributing to and sustaining momentum on the negotiations of WHO CA+ with a view to adopting it by May 2024 and on the negotiations of targeted amendments to strengthen the IHR, together with all stakeholders. Furthermore, we reiterate the importance of timely, transparent and systematic sharing of pathogens, data and information in a safe and secure manner, ensuring the respect of relevant data protection rules, for multisectoral and integrated surveillance of emerging and ongoing health threats both in ordinary times and in emergencies, in line with the G7 Pact for Pandemic Readiness. We also recognize the importance of strengthening and maintaining sufficient and high-quality human resources for health worldwide at all times, such as the public health and emergency workforce including consideration of Global Health Emergency Corps. We will support the further enhancement of a global network of experts and trainings, including through initiatives such as the WHO Academy, promote decent work with equal payment for work of equal value and protect health workers during emergencies and conflicts among others. We recognize the integral role civil society plays, including by reaching those in vulnerable situations, and recommit to working together for a healthier future for all.
+
+34) We commit to reverse the first global decline in life expectancy in more than seven decades emphasizing the importance of achieving UHC by 2030 and accelerating progress toward SDG 3. We recommit to working alongside global partners to assist countries to achieve UHC by supporting primary health care (PHC) and developing and restoring essential health services, to achieve better than pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2025, as part of our effort to strengthen health systems in ordinary times. We commit to supporting countries to strengthen PHC delivery, including through health workforce strengthening We also commit to support bringing survival rates back to better than pre-pandemic levels, including by reducing maternal, newborn and child mortality, and consistent with the full range of SDG targets and indicators related to UHC on which we will also support progress. We recognize the importance of financial risk protection to prevent people from slipping into poverty due to health care costs. To this end, we endorse the “G7 Global Plan for UHC Action Agenda” and note the importance of a global hub function, in support of relevant international organizations, including for financing, knowledge management, and human resources on UHC. We reaffirm the essential role of UHC in addressing various health challenges significantly set back by the pandemic, including in humanitarian contexts, such as tackling communicable diseases including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, hepatitis, malaria, polio, measles, cholera, and neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), antimicrobial resistance (AMR), noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) including mental health conditions, realizing comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) for all, and promoting routine immunization, healthy ageing, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). We are committed to spearheading research in this regard, including with a focus on understanding post COVID-19 conditions. We noted the historic outcome of the Global Fund’s 7th replenishment and welcome the financial support from the G7 and further countries towards ending the epidemics of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. We call for continued support to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) to stay on track for polio eradication by 2026. We will build on the success of the Tokyo Nutrition for Growth (N4G) Summit in 2021 for the Paris N4G in 2024 to improve nutrition. We also commit to further promoting comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) for all individuals, including maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health, especially in vulnerable circumstances. Recognizing the increasing need for overarching, system-level coordination and alignment of global health partnerships including the Global Health Initiatives and their interface, we will take collective actions to avoid fragmentation and duplication, ensure accountability, maximize impacts, and reinforce country leadership with a view to enhancing governance in global health and to supporting the achievement of UHC. In this regard, we look forward to the outcome of the Future of Global Health Initiatives. We reiterate our determination to further contribute to achieving UHC, including through making the most of and ensuring synergies among the upcoming UNGA HLMs on UHC, tuberculosis, and pandemic PPR. In order to contribute to global health towards the post COVID-19 era, with a view to supporting the achievement of UHC as well as strengthening PPR, we highlight our financial contributions totaling more than $48 billion from the public and private sectors. We also call for further domestic resource mobilization as well as efficient use of existing resources. We emphasize the important role of the private sector towards sustainable financing in global health, including through impact investments and endorse the Triple I (Impact Investments Initiative) for Global Health.
+
+35) We reaffirm that innovative initiatives including those related to digital health are keys to strengthening GHA and achieving UHC. We will reiterate the urgent need to foster innovation and to strengthen research and development of safe, effective, quality-assured and affordable medical countermeasures (MCMs) as underlined by the 100 Days Mission. We commit to enhancing equitable access to MCM, including by addressing issues relating to manufacturing and delivery. In this regards, we will continue to contribute to ongoing processes, including in the G20, on an end-to-end MCM ecosystem, aligned with the ongoing discussions on the WHO CA+ and which should actively contribute to the diversification of MCM production and address the priority of the most vulnerable partner’s needs and expectations, including in terms of global governance, in cooperation with relevant partners including the WHO, the WB, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Global Fund, Gavi the Vaccine Alliance, Global Health Innovative Technology (GHIT) Fund, Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND) and Unitaid and Medicines Patent Pool, regional organizations and the private sector. To this end, we announce the G7 Hiroshima Vision for Equitable Access to MCMs and launch the MCM Delivery Partnership for equitable access (MCDP) to contribute to more equitable access to and delivery of MCMs based on the principles of equity, inclusivity, efficiency, affordability, quality, accountability, agility and speed. We commit to work across providers of development finance, for the purpose of identifying concrete options this summer for providing for the liquidity for global health organizations to procure and deliver MCMs earlier in a crisis. This supports the mapping exercise for surge financing to be conducted by the WHO and World Bank and presented at the G20 Finance and Health Task Force and the UNGA HLM, contributing to ongoing negotiations on the WHO CA+. We also reiterate our commitment to addressing global health threats including those exacerbated by climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution through integrated measures and by applying a holistic One Health approach. Recognizing the rapid escalation of AMR globally, we continue to commit to exploring and implementing push and pull incentives to accelerate R&D of antimicrobials as well as promoting antimicrobial access and stewardship for their prudent and appropriate use toward the UNGA HLM on AMR in 2024. We remain committed to promoting policies and resources to care for people living with dementia and welcome the development of potentially disease modifying therapies for the various types of dementia, including Alzheimer’s disease.
+
+
+### Labor
+
+36) We emphasize the importance of investment in human capital to ensure a just transition, in response to structural changes such as digital and green transformations as well as demographic changes including societies that are ageing, in part due to declining birth rates. In order to facilitate these transformations, we commit to supporting individuals through reskilling and upskilling measures, along with a combination of appropriate social protection and active labor market policies. As reskilling and upskilling to support workers to adapt to these changes are investments in human capital and should not be seen as a cost, we must continue to provide adequate investment necessary to address workforce transition needs including vocational training and life-long learning. We commit to efforts towards achieving a virtuous cycle of workers’ well-being and social and economic vitality, which will lead to sustainable growth and real wage growth in line with productivity, contributing in turn to further investment in human capital. We emphasize that freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining play an important role in promoting decent work and wage growth. We are resolved to build an inclusive labor market that ensures decent and good quality jobs for all and leaves no one behind, especially, women and under-represented groups, including persons with disabilities, older persons and youth, while engaging constructively with social partners and other stakeholders. We also work towards quality job creation, universal access to social protection, and further improving gender equality in the labor market. The COVID-19 pandemic has disproportionately affected women and girls, and has highlighted the unequal distribution of care work as a key cause of gender inequalities, while showing the essential role paid and unpaid care work plays in the functioning of our societies and economies. We commit to addressing underlying discriminatory social and gender norms, such as unequal sharing of paid and unpaid care-work and housework, promoting and protecting social security including parental leave, providing support for childcare and other field of care work and care economy, including by facilitating access to infrastructures and longterm care. In particular, we reaffirm the need to support and promote parenthood protection to ensure parents can combine work and family and personal life and actively contribute to all spheres of our society. We also highlight the need to recognize, reduce and redistribute unpaid care, reward care workers fairly, while generating sufficient care jobs to meet the demand for care, and give care workers representation in social dialogue and collective bargaining. We recognize the importance of enhancing work engagement and worker retention through various measures such as promoting health and well-being at work, ensuring occupational safety and health, and supporting the inclusive and equitable career development of workers. We commit to promoting decent work in line with SDG 8, including through technical cooperation, as well as ensuring respect for international labor standards and human rights in global value chains, in particular the fundamental conventions adopted by the International Labor Organisation (ILO). We reiterate our commitment to the effective abolition of all forms of forced and compulsory labor and child labor. We reaffirm our commitment to taking measures to strengthen our cooperation and collective efforts towards eradicating all forms of forced labor from global supply chains. We commit to continuing to promote decent work and protect rights-holders in global supply chains through a smart mix of mandatory and voluntary measures, including through legislation, regulations, incentives and guidance for enterprises and to engage constructively in discussions at the UN and the ILO in close consultation with all relevant stakeholders to explore ideas and options for a consensus-based legally binding instrument at the international level that adds value to the existing legal and policy approaches and is implementable. We endorse the Action Plan for Promoting Career Development and Greater Resilience to Structural Changes developed by Labor and Employment Ministers.
+
+
+### Education
+
+37) We commit to making progress for ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education, including vocational education, and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all to build resilient, just and prospering societies. Recent crises have led to decreased access to education and increased learning loss amongst children and youth, especially girls, and those in the most marginalized and vulnerable situations. As education is a catalyst to achieving all of the SDGs, we reaffirm the importance of upholding education and building more resilient education systems, especially following the COVID-19 pandemic. We reiterate our firm determination to uphold the G7’s previous commitments to protecting educational opportunities for all learners, and to promoting gender equality as well as the empowerment of all women and girls in all their diversity, in and through education including by prioritizing global ODA in this regard. We welcome the UNSG’s Transforming Education Summit (TES) in September 2022, and call for continued support to the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), Education Cannot Wait (ECW) and UN agencies including the UNESCO and UNICEF as key partners in helping countries to build stronger education systems for the most marginalized children. We also reiterate the importance of foundational learning and the need for the G7 to increase investment in people in a more equitable and efficient way to provide quality learning opportunities that prepare all learners, especially children with the knowledge and skills they need to thrive and improve their own well-being, noting that education is a human right. We continue to break down gender-related barriers and underlying discriminatory social norms from pre-primary through higher education for more resilient, inclusive and gender-transformative education. We continue to encourage international exchanges between youth and international talent mobility and circulation among academics, students, and researchers, as well as cooperation between higher education and research institutions. We acknowledge the importance of investment in support of human resources that can contribute to resolving social issues while simultaneously achieving economic growth through education. We will strive for an educational environment and lifelong learning opportunities where every child can fulfil their own potential, including through the improvement of instruction. This could include promoting small class size, an improved Information and Communication Technology (ICT) environment and the effective use of digital technology to support teaching and learning, while not exacerbating the digital equality gaps.
+
+
+### Digital
+
+38) We recognize that, while rapid technological change has been strengthening societies and economies, the international governance of new digital technologies has not necessarily kept pace. As the pace of technological evolution accelerates, we affirm the importance to address common governance challenges and to identify potential gaps and fragmentation in global technology governance. In areas such as AI, immersive technologies such as the metaverses and quantum information science and technology and other emerging technologies, the governance of the digital economy should continue to be updated in line with our shared democratic values. These include fairness, accountability, transparency, safety, protection from online harassment, hate and abuse and respect for privacy and human rights, fundamental freedoms and the protection of personal data. We will work with technology companies and other relevant stakeholders to drive the responsible innovation and implementation of technologies, ensuring that safety and security is prioritized, and that platforms are tackling the threats of child sexual exploitation and abuse on their platforms, and upholding the children’s rights to safety and privacy online. We continue to discuss ways to advance technology for democracy and to cooperate on new and emerging technologies and their social implementation, and look forward to an inclusive, multi-stakeholder dialogue on digital issues, including on Internet Governance, through relevant fora, including the OECD Global Forum on Technology. We commit to further advancing multi-stakeholder approaches to the development of standards for AI, respectful of legally binding frameworks, and recognize the importance of procedures that advance transparency, openness, fair processes, impartiality, privacy and inclusiveness to promote responsible AI. We stress the importance of international discussions on AI governance and interoperability between AI governance frameworks, while we recognize that approaches and policy instruments to achieve the common vision and goal of trustworthy AI may vary across G7 members. We support the development of tools for trustworthy AI through multi-stakeholder international organizations, and encourage the development and adoption of international technical standards in standards development organizations through multi-stakeholder processes. We recognize the need to immediately take stock of the opportunities and challenges of generative AI, which is increasingly prominent across countries and sectors, and encourage international organizations such as the OECD to consider analysis on the impact of policy developments and Global Partnership on AI (GPAI) to conduct practical projects. In this respect, we task relevant ministers to establish the Hiroshima AI process, through a G7 working group, in an inclusive manner and in cooperation with the OECD and GPAI, for discussions on generative AI by the end of this year. These discussions could include topics such as governance, safeguard of intellectual property rights including copy rights, promotion of transparency, response to foreign information manipulation, including disinformation, and responsible utilization of these technologies. We welcome the Action Plan for promoting global interoperability between tools for trustworthy AI from the Digital and Tech Ministers’ Meeting. We recognize the potential of immersive technologies, and virtual worlds, such as metaverses to provide innovative opportunities, in all industrial and societal sectors, as well as to promote sustainability. For this purpose, governance, public safety, and human rights challenges should be addressed at the global level. We task our relevant Ministers to consider collective approaches in this area, including in terms of interoperability, portability and standards, with the support of the OECD. We express our interest in possible joint cooperation in research and development on computing technologies. We also task our relevant Ministers to consider ways to further promote digital trade.
+
+39) We reaffirm that cross-border data flows, information, ideas and knowledge generate higher productivity, greater innovation, and improved sustainable development, while raising challenges related to privacy, data protection, intellectual property protection, and security including that of data and cloud infrastructure. We reiterate the importance of facilitating Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT) to enable trustworthy cross-border data flows and invigorate the digital economy as a whole, while preserving governments’ ability to address legitimate public interest. We stress our intention to operationalize this concept and our support for cooperation within the G7 and beyond to work towards identifying commonalities, complementarities and elements of convergence between existing regulatory approaches and instruments enabling data to flow with trust, in order to foster future interoperability such as through supporting multi-stakeholder engagement, leveraging the role of technologies, and clarifying domestic and municipal policies and due processes. In this regard, we endorse the Annex on G7 Vision for Operationalising DFFT and its Priorities from the Digital and Tech Ministers’ Meeting, and the establishment of the Institutional Arrangement for Partnership. We task our relevant Ministers to continue working to deliver substantive outcomes and subsequently report back to us. We welcome the OECD Declaration on Government Access to Personal Data Held by Private Sector Entities as an instrument to increase trust in cross-border data flows among countries committed to democratic values and the rule of law. We emphasize our opposition to internet fragmentation and the use of digital technologies to infringe on human rights. In this context, we should counter unjustified obstacles to the free flow of data, lacking transparency, and arbitrarily operated, which should be distinguished from our measures implemented to achieve the legitimate public policy interests of each country. We seek to increase trust across our digital ecosystem and to counter the influence of authoritarian approaches. We recognize the importance of secure and resilient digital infrastructure as the foundation of society and the economy. We are committed to deepen our cooperation within the G7 and with like-minded partners to support and enhance network resilience by measures such as extending secure routes of submarine cables. We welcome supplier diversification efforts in ICTS supply chains and continue to discuss market trends towards open, interoperable approaches, alongside secure, resilient and established architecture in a technology neutral way. Under the Japanese G7 Presidency and against the background of early deployments of Open Radio Access Network (RAN), we have exchanged views on open architectures and security-related aspects and opportunities. We recognize the need to bridge the digital divides, including the gender digital divide, and the importance of initiatives to use data and technology for cities, such as smart city initiatives, to promote digital inclusion and address challenges in urban development. We will facilitate inclusive development and enable greater employability and movement of digital experts, and restate our commitment to supporting other countries to increase digital access under principles of equity, universality and affordability while ensuring that security, interoperability, the protection of personal data and respect for human rights including gender equality are built into global connectivity.
+
+
+### Science and Technology
+
+40) We support the development of advanced technologies, research infrastructures and highlyskilled human resource networks that will drive innovation to solve global challenges and enable the next stage of economic growth. To this end, we promote international talent mobility and circulation. The G7 will promote open science by equitably disseminating scientific knowledge, publicly funded research outputs including research data and scholarly publications following the Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, and Reusable (FAIR) principles. This will enable researchers and people to benefit from and contribute to creating knowledge, innovation and solutions to global challenges. We further commit to working together to promote responsible global science and technology cooperation and use of emerging technologies such as advanced computing and biotechnology with partners sharing common values and principles in research and innovation. This includes a better understanding of the seas and the ocean in the context of climate change and utilizing very large research infrastructures. We are committed to fostering and promoting a common understanding of values and principles in research and innovation through dedicated multilateral dialogues, including in the area of research security and research integrity, and international joint research based on the philosophy of open science. We welcome the forthcoming launch of the G7 Virtual Academy and release of the Best Practices Paper on Research Security and Integrity. These efforts will contribute to addressing the various challenges that arise at the intersection of security, economy, and scientific research.
+
+41) We reiterate our commitment to promoting the safe and sustainable use of outer space, given our ever-greater reliance on space systems. Restating the importance of addressing the issues of space debris, we strongly support the implementation of international guidelines adopted at the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as urgent and necessary. We welcome national efforts to develop further solutions for space debris mitigation and remediation as well as further research and development of orbital debris mitigation and remediation technologies. Furthermore, we commit not to conducting destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing and encourage others to follow suit in order to ensure the security, stability and sustainability of outer space.
+
+
+### Gender
+
+42) Achieving gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls is fundamental for a resilient, fair, and prosperous society. We endeavor to work with all segments of society to ensure full, equal and meaningful participation of women and girls in all their diversity as well as LGBTQIA+ persons in politics, economics, education and all other spheres of society, and to consistently mainstream gender equality in all policy areas. In this respect, we commit to redoubling our efforts to overcome longstanding structural barriers and to addressing harmful gender norms, stereotypes, roles, and practices through such means as education and achieve a society where diversity, human rights and dignity are respected, promoted and protected and all people can enjoy vibrant lives free from violence and discrimination independent of gender identity or expression or sexual orientation. We welcome the work of the Gender Equality Advisory Council (GEAC) and look forward to strengthening it further. We look forward to the first revision of the G7 Dashboard on Gender Gaps and the publication of the first implementation report this year, which aims to monitor past G7 commitments to make progress on gender equality.
+
+43) We express our strong concern about the rollback of women’s and girls’ rights in particular in time of crisis and we strongly condemn all violations and abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms for women and girls and LGBTQIA+ people around the world. We further recognize the essential and transformative role of comprehensive SRHR in gender equality and women’s and girls’ empowerment, and in supporting diversity, including of sexual orientations and gender identities. We reaffirm our full commitment to achieving comprehensive SRHR for all, including by addressing access to safe and legal abortion and post abortion care. We are committed to championing, advancing and defending gender equality and the rights of women and girls in all their diversity, at home and abroad, and will work together to thwart attempts to undermine and reverse hard-won progress in this area. In this regard, we commit to advancing, implementing and strengthening the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda including its application to disaster risk reduction (DRR), through partnership with the WPS-Focal Points Network and support for National Action Plan development, and to promote intersectional approaches. We highlight the leading role of women in preventing violent conflict, delivering relief and recovery efforts, and forging lasting peace, and pledge to champion the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in peace and political processes. We commit to strengthening our efforts to eliminate conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, and the importance of providing comprehensive support and meaningful participation for victims and survivors, using a survivorcentered approach. We further commit to eliminating all forms of sexual and gender-based harassment and abuse both offline and online as well as aid-related sexual exploitation and abuse. We are committed to ensuring the right to education for all, and emphasize the importance of promoting equitable access to safe, gender-transformative quality education as well as to taking measures to close the gender gap in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) sectors and education, and close the gender digital gap. We see this as key to promote women’s entrepreneurship, which is an essential building block to address the climate, nature and development challenges. We also commit to promoting reskilling and upskilling, fostering decent work conditions, strengthening financial inclusion of women in all their diversity, and eliminating the gender pay gap. We further reiterate our commitments to promoting women’s full empowerment as well as their full and equal participation in decision-making processes at all levels, including in leadership positions. We recognize that quality care plays an essential role in the functioning of our societies and economies, but is a key cause of gender inequalities due to its gender unequal distribution.
+
+44) To advance our commitments, we emphasize the need to overcome the fragmentation and marginalization of gender equality issues by enhancing our efforts to integrate and deepening gender mainstreaming for a substantial transformation of our societies. In this regard, we call for a continuous, holistic and comprehensive approach to promote gender equality by creating a “nexus” that bridges the political and security, economic and social spheres and advocate for maximizing the efficiency and the impact of multi-sectorial policies and of our actions across diverse dimensions of policy implementation. We stress the importance of such a nexus approach in our foreign and sustainable development policy and in our ODA and endeavor to support the nexus. We reaffirm our commitment to make every effort to collectively increase the share of our bilateral allocable ODA advancing gender equality and women’s and girls’ empowerment over the coming years. In this regard, we welcome “the Fact Sheet: Promoting Gender Mainstreaming through the nexus approach” made by our experts and look forward to further progress in this area.
+
+
+### Human Rights, Refugees, Migration, Democracy
+
+45) We reaffirm our commitment to upholding human rights and dignity of all, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, so that everyone can participate fully and equally in society. We commit to firmly speaking out against human rights violations and abuses, and at the same time, listening to and assisting the countries and civil society organizations that seek to defend and promote human rights through dialogue and cooperation. Recognizing the need to deepen discussions within and beyond the G7 on business and human rights, we intend to strengthen cooperation and collective efforts, including by accelerating exchange of information, towards ensuring respect for human rights and international labor standards in business activities and global supply chains, and further enhancing resilience, predictability and certainty for businesses, and call upon others to join us in these efforts. We reaffirm our commitment to protecting refugees, supporting forcibly displaced persons and supporting host countries and communities, ensuring the full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of refugees and displaced persons, and defending and promoting the rights of marginalized people or persons facing vulnerable conditions exacerbated by conflict, crisis, and displacement, including freedom from sexual and gender-based violence. We call upon the international community to follow suit. We commit to fighting against impunity and holding perpetrators to account for the most serious crimes of international concern, including conflict-related sexual violence, together with improving documentation. In this regard, we recall the need to strengthen international architecture to prevent conflict-related sexual violence in the future. We acknowledge the importance of the discussions of the International Law Commission’s draft articles on the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity. We continue to work with the international community towards the second Global Refugee Forum in December 2023. We reaffirm our commitment to support the inclusion of refugees, in the spirit of international cooperation and in line with the Global Compact on Refugees, national policies, legislation, and circumstances, ensuring full respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms.
+
+46) We reaffirm our commitment to ensuring the safe, orderly, and regular migration around the world. We recognize the important economic and social benefits that migrants can bring to our countries. We commit to ensure full respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms regardless of their migration status. We remain committed to preventing irregular and often highly dangerous migration whether by land or sea. We commit to joint efforts to tackle the organized criminal networks which facilitate illegal migration and the dangerous journey of migrants and asylum seekers, profiting off some of the most vulnerable. We call for firmness in dealing with this ruthless criminality that puts lives in danger and poses risks to the internal security of G7 partners. In this regard, we will intensify efforts to break the business model of organized criminal networks, including through cooperation to disrupt the supply chains that enable the criminal and exploitative operations of those engaged in the trafficking and smuggling of human beings. To this end, we will task relevant Ministers to deepen partnerships to enhance our understanding of the root causes and work together with partners around the world to address this complex challenge.
+
+47) We reaffirm our shared belief that democracy is the most enduring means to advance peace, prosperity, equality and sustainable development. We reaffirm our commitment to protecting the information environment by supporting media freedom and online freedom, including protection from online harassment and abuse, internet shutdowns and disruptions, as well as addressing foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation, which is designed to undermine trust in democratic institutions, and sow discord in the international community. We strongly condemn the widespread use of information manipulation and interference by Russia in order to gain support for its war of aggression against Ukraine and to obscure the facts of its aggression. Through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), we will work to strengthen our collective efforts to counter threats to democracy, including such manipulation, with full respect for international human rights law, in particular freedom of expression. We will work towards ensuring that fact-based, quality and trustworthy information is promoted, and call on digital platforms to support this approach. We will increase cooperation on these issues with government and non-governmental partners from all regions who share the determination to promote access to such information, including through supporting relevant international initiatives, such as the Partnership for Information and Democracy, and efforts by the UN and OECD.
+
+
+### Countering Terrorism, Violent Extremism and Transnational Organized Crime / Upholding the Rule of Law / Anti-Corruption
+
+48) We reiterate our strong commitment to working together with all relevant actors to counter all forms of terrorism and violent extremism, both online and offline, as well as transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, child sexual abuse and exploitation, corruption, fraud, intellectual property theft, ransomware threats, cybercrime and environmental crimes, as well as money laundering and terrorist financing in a unified, coordinated, inclusive, transparent and human-rights-based, gender-responsive manner. In countering the exploitation of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes and countering the misuses of technologies for criminal purposes, we will continue our utmost efforts to enhance global cooperation and digital response capacity. In this regard, building on our collaboration and on efforts through existing frameworks such as the Christchurch Call, and recalling previous commitments, including maintaining tightly controlled lawful access, we call on the private sector to step up their efforts to address the problem of dissemination of terrorist and violent extremist content online and to prioritize safety by design, and stop, in particular, child sexual exploitation and abuse on their platforms. We support the efforts of our partner countries to sign and ratify the relevant international agreements such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and those of the Council of Europe such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, in the wide spectrum of cooperation by criminal justice and other relevant authorities that form the basis for efficient cross-border cooperation. We also recognize the significant public health and security threat of illicit synthetic drugs and will strengthen our cooperation to address it, engaging with other willing countries and the private sector.
+
+49) We will also strengthen bilateral, regional and multilateral coordination and cooperation in the field of law and justice, such as providing technical assistance to countries to develop and implement laws, and capacity building related to the justice sector. We will continue to step up our fight against corruption, promoting good governance and strengthening accountable, transparent, equitable and community-oriented law enforcement to make progress on many of our shared priorities, which will lead to safer and more secure societies and thus contribute to the promotion of the rule of law and respect for human rights. We further recognize that corruption and related illicit finance and proceeds of crime drain public resources, can often fuel organized crime, enable kleptocratic systems to accumulate wealth and power at the expense of citizens, and undermine democratic governance. We will pursue a stronger and more unified approach in rigorously enforcing international anti-corruption obligations and standards, and enhancing law enforcement cooperation, including through relevant regional and international organizations, and holding corrupt actors accountable. Recalling the importance of beneficial ownership transparency for the integrity and transparency of democratic systems, we reaffirm the importance of supporting African partners in establishing and strengthening registers of beneficial ownership.
+
+
+### Regional Affairs
+
+50) We stand together on core foreign policy and security challenges to build a more secure and prosperous future. We also reaffirm our determination to work with a wide range of partners to address pressing global challenges and to ensure that the international system is able to respond effectively to these issues.
+
+51) We stand together as G7 partners on the following elements, which underpin our respective relations with China:
+
+- We stand prepared to build constructive and stable relations with China, recognizing the importance of engaging candidly with and expressing our concerns directly to China. We act in our national interest. It is necessary to cooperate with China, given its role in the international community and the size of its economy, on global challenges as well as areas of common interest.
+
+- We call on China to engage with us, including in international fora, on areas such as the climate and biodiversity crisis and the conservation of natural resources in the framework of the Paris and Kunming-Montreal Agreements, addressing vulnerable countries’ debt sustainability and financing needs, global health and macroeconomic stability.
+
+- Our policy approaches are not designed to harm China nor do we seek to thwart China’s economic progress and development. A growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest. We are not decoupling or turning inwards. At the same time, we recognize that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversifying. We will take steps, individually and collectively, to invest in our own economic vibrancy. We will reduce excessive dependencies in our critical supply chains.
+
+- With a view to enabling sustainable economic relations with China, and strengthening the international trading system, we will push for a level playing field for our workers and companies. We will seek to address the challenges posed by China’s non-market policies and practices, which distort the global economy. We will counter malign practices, such as illegitimate technology transfer or data disclosure. We will foster resilience to economic coercion. We also recognize the necessity of protecting certain advanced technologies that could be used to threaten our national security without unduly limiting trade and investment.
+
+- We remain seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas. We strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion.
+
+- We reaffirm the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity in the international community. There is no change in the basic positions of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated one China policies. We call for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.
+
+- We will keep voicing our concerns about the human rights situation in China, including in Tibet and Xinjiang where forced labor is of major concern to us. We call on China to honor its commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, which enshrine rights, freedoms and a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong.
+
+- We call on China to act in accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular relations, and not to conduct interference activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities, the integrity of our democratic institutions and our economic prosperity.
+
+- We call on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression, and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Ukraine. We encourage China to support a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on territorial integrity and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter, including through its direct dialogue with Ukraine.
+
+52) There is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and we oppose China’s militarization activities in the region. We emphasize the universal and unified character of the UNCLOS and reaffirm UNCLOS’s important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings, and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties.
+
+53) We strongly condemn North Korea’s unprecedented number of unlawful ballistic missile launches, each of which violated multiple UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). We demand that North Korea refrain from any other destabilizing or escalatory actions, including any further nuclear tests or launches that use ballistic missile technology, which undermine regional stability and pose a grave threat to international peace and security. Such reckless actions must be met with a swift, united, and robust international response. This must include further significant measures to be taken by the UN Security Council. We reiterate our unwavering commitment to the goal of North Korea’s complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and any other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs in accordance with relevant UNSCRs. We are concerned about North Korea’s choice to prioritize its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs over the welfare of the people in North Korea. We call on North Korea to accept repeated offers of dialogue, including from Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea. We urge North Korea to respect human rights, facilitate access for international humanitarian organizations, and resolve the abductions issue immediately.
+
+54) We remain deeply concerned about the deteriorating security, humanitarian, human rights, and political situation in Myanmar, and we express our solidarity with its people. We continue to support ASEAN’s efforts including its continued engagements with all stakeholders in Myanmar to implement the Five-Point Consensus, including through Indonesia as the ASEAN Chair and ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar. We continue to call on the Myanmar military to immediately cease all violence, release all political prisoners and those arbitrarily detained, create an environment for an inclusive and peaceful dialogue, and return the country to a genuinely democratic path. We reiterate our call on all states to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar. We also call for full, safe, and unimpeded humanitarian access to all people, especially the most vulnerable.
+
+55) We note with grave concern increased threats to stability and the dire humanitarian and economic situation in Afghanistan. We call on the Taliban to uphold its counterterrorism commitments and to ensure the territory of Afghanistan cannot be used to threaten or attack any country, to plan or finance terrorist acts, or to shelter and train terrorists. We express our strongest opposition to the Taliban’s systematic violations on human rights and fundamental freedoms, and call for the immediate reversal of unacceptable decisions, especially those against women and girls. All Afghans must enjoy full, equal, and meaningful participation in all spheres of public life, and have access to humanitarian assistance and basic services. We call upon the Taliban to respect UNSCR 2681/2023 and the UN Charter, including Article 8, and to ensure unrestricted operations of the UN in Afghanistan. To remedy the persistent lack of political inclusivity and representation, we urge the Taliban to take significant steps to engage in credible, inclusive and Afghan-led national dialogue, in which all Afghans can be involved. We recognize the need for conveying unified messages to the Taliban in coordination with other international partners.
+
+56) We reiterate our clear determination that Iran must never develop a nuclear weapon. We remain deeply concerned about Iran’s unabated escalation of its nuclear program, which has no credible civilian justification and brings it dangerously close to actual weapon-related activities. A diplomatic solution remains the best way to resolve this issue. In that context, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action continues to provide a useful reference. We call on Iran to take prompt and concrete actions to fulfill its legal obligations and political commitments, including nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards obligations. We reiterate our profound concern over Iran’s systemic human rights violations and abuses, including its repression of popular feminist protest as well as the targeting of individuals, including women, girls, minority groups, and journalists, in and outside of Iran. We call on Iran’s leadership to end all unjust and arbitrary detentions.
+
+57) We express our grave concern regarding Iran’s continued destabilizing activities, including the transfer of missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related technologies to state and nonstate actors and proxy groups, in breach of UNSCRs including 2231 and 2216. Iran must stop supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In particular, we call upon Iran to cease transferring armed UAVs, which have been used to attack Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and kill Ukrainian civilians. We welcome initiatives to improve bilateral relations and de-escalate tensions in the region, including Iran and Saudi Arabia’s recent agreement to restore ties. We emphasize the importance of ensuring maritime security in the Middle East’s waterways and call on Iran not to interfere with the lawful exercise of navigational rights and freedoms by all vessels.
+
+58) We call on Israelis and Palestinians to take steps to build trust toward the realization of a twostate solution. To this end, all parties must refrain from unilateral actions, including settlement activities and incitement to violence. We reiterate our support for the historic status quo in Jerusalem. We welcome the recent meetings between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and the United States and hope their commitments will be fulfilled in good faith. We will continue our support for Palestinian economic self-reliance and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
+
+59) We remain firmly committed to an inclusive, UN-facilitated political process consistent with UNSCR 2254 in Syria. We reaffirm that the international community should only consider normalization and reconstruction assistance once there is authentic and enduring progress towards a political solution. We express our continued support for the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and are committed to accountability for those responsible for the use of chemical weapons and violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable. We call for full and unhindered humanitarian access to all Syrians in need, particularly through UN cross-border aid for which there is no alternative in scope or scale. We remain committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS, including durable solutions for ISIS detainees and displaced persons remaining in Northeast Syria.
+
+60) We further express our support to preserve stability and prosperity in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa. Regarding Yemen, we call on all parties to secure a durable ceasefire and work towards a comprehensive, durable, and inclusive Yemeni-led political process under UN auspices. We encourage the Tunisian government to meet the democratic aspiration of its people, to address its economic situation and to reach an agreement with the IMF. We also support efforts to achieve stability and unity in Libya under the auspice of the UN in coordination with the African Union and the Arab League. We urge all Libyan stakeholders to work constructively on the political process in order to hold free, fair, and inclusive presidential and parliamentary elections by the end of 2023.
+
+61) We reaffirm our engagement with Central Asian countries to address various regional challenges, including the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression, the destabilizing effect of the situation in Afghanistan, food and energy security, terrorism, and climate change. We are determined to foster trade and energy links, sustainable connectivity and transportation, including the “Middle Corridor” and associated projects to enhance regional prosperity and resilience.
+
+62) We are deepening our partnerships with African countries and regional organizations, including the African Union. We have each expressed support to African calls for stronger representation in international fora, notably the G20. We reiterate our strong commitment to supporting governments in the region to address, in a manner consistent with international law, the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, violent extremism, and instability across Africa. We are seriously concerned about the growing presence of the Russia-affiliated Wagner Group forces on the continent and their destabilizing impact and human rights abuses. Keeping in mind the situations in West Africa and the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes regions, we will work together to support African-led efforts on peace, stability and prosperity on the continent. In this regard, we welcome the positive developments stemming from the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, and call on both parties to remain committed to full implementation. We also call for international support for the Somali President’s reform priorities and the fight against al-Shabaab. We reaffirm our commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo. We welcome the cessation of hostilities agreed in March and call for its full implementation. We condemn the advance of the UNsanctioned March 23 Movement armed group (M23) and join African leaders in calling for M23 to withdraw unconditionally from all territories it controls. We are also seriously concerned about the spread of terrorist threats and activities towards coastal countries in West Africa, and are available to lend our support in addressing those threats.
+
+63) We strongly condemn the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. This threatens the security and safety of civilians, undermines efforts to restore Sudan’s democratic transition, and could affect the stability of the region. We urge the parties to end hostilities immediately without pre-conditions and return civilian-led democratic government. We call on all actors to renounce violence and take active steps to reduce tensions, and ensure the safety of all civilians, including humanitarian personnel. The parties to the conflict must uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law, ensure the safety of all civilians, including humanitarian personnel, and not impede or restrict the delivery of life-saving aid. We commend the bravery and fortitude of humanitarian agencies working in Sudan. We acknowledge the generosity of Sudan’s neighbors who, despite facing significant humanitarian challenges of their own, host a growing number of Sudanese refugees. We commit to supporting response operations in Sudan and across East and North Africa and the Sahel region for refugees and returnees.
+
+64) We highlight the importance of enhancing cooperation with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to uphold shared interests as well as values. We are committed to working with regional partners to address economic challenges, climate change, biodiversity loss, natural disasters, and other global issues. We reiterate our commitment to strengthen coordination with Latin American and Caribbean partners and other actors to promote the rule of law, respect for human rights, and meet the elevated humanitarian and security needs in the region, especially in Venezuela, Haiti, and Nicaragua. With respect to the ongoing crisis in Haiti, we underscore the importance of working towards Haitian-led solution for a return to stability and need to hold accountable those who cultivate violence, corruption and instability.
+
+65) We welcome the Agreement on the path to normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia and its Implementation Annex, reached under the EU facilitated dialogue in Brussels on February 27 and in Ohrid on March 18 respectively. In order to unlock its full potential for the citizens of Kosovo and Serbia and for advancing good-neighbourly relations in the Western Balkans, we call on both parties to implement expediently and in good faith their respective obligations.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+66) We appreciate the exchanges with and the inputs from the G7 Engagement Groups. We are furthermore grateful for the valuable contributions from the Heads of the IEA, the IMF, the OECD, the UN, the WB, the WHO and the WTO who joined us in Hiroshima.
+
+__Reference documents:__
+
+- G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament
+- G7 Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine
+- G7 Clean Energy Economy Action Plan
+- G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security
+- Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security
+- Factsheet on the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment
+
+
+▲ The G7 leaders at the Itsukushima Shrine on Miyajima Island, on May 19.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : An Unfamiliar Challenge
+author: Antonio Giustozzi
+date : 2023-05-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/GUsbUVk.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "How the Taliban are Meeting the Islamic State Threat on Afghanistan’s University Campuses"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This paper examines the understudied presence of the Islamic State for Central and South Asia (IS-K) on Afghanistan’s university campuses and the counterterrorism effort that the Taliban regime has mounted against it. How effective have the Taliban’s efforts been and whether has IS-K been able to adapt?_
+
+
+
+It assesses the performance of the Taliban in one case study of counterterrorism (IS-K activities in the campuses) and the adaptation of IS-K in response. It is based on a series of 25 interviews with IS-K militants, Taliban security and intelligence officials, and university staff and students, carried out after the regime change in Kabul in August 2021. In order to set out the operating environment of Taliban counterterrorism, the paper also describes in detail, with new evidence, the sophisticated IS-K approach to recruitment on Afghanistan’s university campuses, combining face-to-face and remote techniques. IS-K’s recruitment is aimed at a relatively small niche, largely Salafi and Salafi-leaning students, and can yield only a limited number of recruits, certainly not exceeding the low hundreds annually. Nonetheless, these are high-quality recruits, on which the highly ideological and disciplined IS-K must rely to sustain its operations. Indeed, the Taliban seem to have paid considerable attention to the problem.
+
+By denying the space they once had on the campuses to IS-K activists, the Taliban have constrained IS-K’s ability to recruit, but this could well be only temporary, especially as IS-K adapts and refines its recruitment techniques, relying more on private social media channels, moving more of its social media activists abroad, and warning its members and sympathisers about the risk of Taliban infiltrators and provocateurs. Moreover, the underlying conditions favouring IS-K recruitment persist, including serious harassment of Salafi students by some of their Hanafi colleagues; heavy-handed treatment of suspects by Taliban police and intelligence; widespread student frustration at their conditions and lack of prospects; and Taliban pressure on non-violent extremist groups that have roots among students, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Jami’at Eslah and others, which might drive some of their members towards IS-K.
+
+The Taliban’s approach to counterterrorism on university campuses has, in other words, been focused on repression, with seemingly little, if any, effort towards prevention. The ability of the Taliban to reduce IS-K activities using heavy-handed measures runs the risk of delivering both short-term positive results and long-term counterproductive ones, not least because the Taliban struggle to restrain the behaviour of their sympathisers and indeed anyone holding anti-Salafi views.
+
+
+### INTRODUCTION
+
+The branch of the Islamic State for Central and South Asia, which calls itself Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K) and is also known as the Caliphate’s Wilayat (Province) Khorasan, might have been eclipsed from UK media, but it remains a major terrorism concern in South and Central Asia, because of its highprofile attacks, mostly involving the ruthless slaughter of civilians. Over the years, IS-K has taken heavy casualties from both the Taliban and the US, but has been able to (at least in part) regenerate its force, drawing from limited but rather loyal constituencies both inside and outside Afghanistan. The role of the group’s once dominant Pakistani component has been reduced by the establishment of Wilayat Pakistan, a new ‘province’ of the Islamic State that effectively competes with the Caliphate’s original branch, Wilayat Khorasan, for funding and recruits. Another development that reduced the number of IS-K’s Pakistani recruits present in Afghanistan was the leadership’s decision to transfer of hundreds of them to the former tribal areas of Pakistan, where they have been increasingly active against the Pakistani security forces. As a result, the group’s sources of recruits inside Afghanistan have become more important than ever.
+
+The two main such sources have so far been the Salafi community and university students (there is some overlap between the two). The Islamic State is today essentially a Salafi organisation, so it is not surprising that it primarily attracts Salafis in Afghanistan too, the more so as there has been friction for years between Salafis and Hanafis, especially Deobandis like the dominant faction of the Taliban, and Sufis, who are also well represented among the Taliban. Until the 1970s, virtually all Afghanistan’s Sunnis had been Hanafis. The arrival of strictly ‘fundamentalist’ Salafi missionaries from Pakistan gradually led to the conversion of much of the population of eastern and northeastern Afghanistan. Among the Hanafi, traditionalist currents such as Sufism and less strict ‘fundamentalist’ tendencies such as Deobandism were especially antagonised. This paper examines the hitherto understudied IS-K presence in Afghanistan’s university campuses and the counterterrorism effort that the Taliban regime has mounted against it, asking how effective the Taliban’s efforts have been and whether IS-K has been able to adapt. The focus is on the Taliban’s counterterrorism, as opposed to the wider Taliban counterinsurgency effort, because the tools the Taliban deployed against IS-K in the campuses have been typical counterterrorism ones: policing rather than fighting, with infiltration and intelligence gathering being prominent.
+
+The Taliban’s counterterrorism efforts focused on IS-K after their return to power in August 2021 are a rather unexplored field. There is little evidence that the Taliban’s approach to counterterrorism has drawn on Western understandings, even if there is some superficial overlap in tactics. Counterterrorism tactics shared by the Taliban and Western authorities include intelligence-driven raids, infiltration of extremist groups and manipulation of media reporting, among other things. Nevertheless, as the Taliban’s Emirate (the Taliban’s de facto government, established in August 2021) does rely on a number of advisers who served in the previous government, some indirect influence cannot be ruled out. The lack of desire to take inspiration from Western counterterrorism is unsurprising, given that the Taliban were the target of Western counterterrorism efforts for almost 20 years, and that those efforts are seen by the Taliban as having failed to keep them out of power. Since the first Taliban Emirate (1996–2001) did not experience a terrorist threat (although it did face insurgencies), and the challenge posed by IS-K to the Taliban in 2015–21 was of a different nature – clashes between the two groups’ armed units – the second Emirate’s counterterrorism effort had to start with a blank slate when IS-K resumed terrorist attacks a couple of weeks after the Taliban had taken power.
+
+Clearly, the character and effectiveness of Taliban counterterrorism is important in determining both the fate of the Emirate and state resilience in Afghanistan in the near term. Another reason for examining this area is to assess the impact and effectiveness of an approach to counterterrorism that, if not necessarily consciously designed as an alternative to Western doctrine, is certainly not directly shaped to conform with it.
+
+This paper is part of a wider effort to gather data on and analyse the Taliban’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, and it does not presume to offer a final and complete analysis of the subject. The intent is to contribute data and emerging thoughts on a regime that had no incentive to adopt Western counterterrorism doctrine or practice (or that of any other power). Instead, the Taliban have had to find their own way in dealing with a terrorist threat. Why is their experience relevant to anybody interested in counterterrorism? Concern remains, in the region and beyond, about the existence of a local branch of the Islamic State. Further, non-Western practice in counterterrorism is an emergent field of study and this paper aims to contribute to it. Afghanistan under the Taliban can be taken as an exemplary case study of a regime confronting terrorism (and specifically IS) while lacking any external backing (financial or otherwise), having little resources of its own, and suffering from a lack of specific skills and knowhow. This will be a not-so-rare state of affairs in the future, and studying emerging counterterrorism practices is bound to yield useful insights.
+
+Note that this paper does not discuss Taliban counterterrorism doctrine, which may well not even exist, but rather their practice as it has been emerging. Indeed, the Taliban appear to be moving tentatively through a trial-and-error process, often driven by provincial-level officials, with limited intervention from the centre.
+
+#### METHODOLOGY
+
+This paper examines IS-K’s campaign in the campuses and how the Taliban have been responding to it, and offers an assessment of the impact of the two campaigns (terror and counterterror). Given that the Taliban’s counterterrorism campaign is still underway, any findings of this paper can be only partial and preliminary. There are also obvious limitations to the research methodology adopted, with research by necessity limited to oral sources, with limited support from news reports and no access to primary written sources, assuming there are any. It is not clear to what extent the Taliban have a formal decision-making process in counterterrorism, and they cannot be expected to share any documents that they might have seized from their enemies.
+
+This paper seeks to sketch developments in one particular (but important) aspect of Taliban counterterrorism, a new art with which they have been busy since taking power. Researching this topic required a number of methodological compromises, as reaching out to sources in the context of Afghanistan under the Taliban is extremely difficult. IS-K recruiters and members were, of course, the most difficult ones to speak to. As a result, the body of data collected is inevitably incomplete; gaps abound and following up on specific themes was often not possible. The analysis contained in the paper inevitably reflects this.
+
+The paper is primarily based on 20 interviews with students, university staff and Taliban security officers, all carried out in October and November 2022, as well as three interviews with IS-K militants, carried out in June 2022, and two interviews with Taliban intelligence officers, carried out in November 2021. The interviews were conducted by three researchers who did not know each other, in order to avoid the risk of collusion in manipulation of the content of the interviews. The interviewees were told that their answers would be used in a publication, the type of which was not specified. All the interviews have been anonymised and all data that could lead to the identification of interviewees has been removed. The risk that respondents could use the interviews to influence or misrepresent the facts was assumed from the start as a precautionary measure. This risk was mitigated by using different types of sources, representing contrasting points of views, by interviewing individuals separately and without them being aware of other interviews taking place, and by inserting questions where the answer was already known. Public-domain sources have also been used, where available, to check the credibility of interviewees.
+
+The paper is organised into five sections. The first briefly discusses what is known about IS-K activities on university campuses before regime change in 2021. The next section discusses IS-K activities after regime change, up to autumn 2022, when research for this paper was completed. The third section is dedicated to Taliban counterterrorism efforts on campuses, and is followed by a fourth section, on how IS-K adapted to the Taliban’s repression, and the prospects of IS-K overcoming the obstacles placed by the Taliban in its path on Afghanistan’s university campuses.
+
+
+### IS-K ACTIVITIES ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES BEFORE 15 AUGUST 2021
+
+The recruitment of Afghan university students by IS-K was an established fact before the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in August 2021. In 2015, at least two students were reported to have volunteered to fight in Syria with IS. One was a computer science student, allegedly radicalised while attending an Islamic culture course at Kabul University. Then, in 2018, some students in the economics department were detained by the security services of the previous regime. In 2019, the National Directorate of Security detained three lecturers from the Sharia faculty and two former students on charges of recruiting for IS-K. The confession of one of the former students appears to show that the lecturers first tried to attract students towards Salafism, and only once that was achieved would they try to recruit them into IS-K. IS-K has long been attracting recruits from Kabul University’s Sharia faculty. Recruitment has been facilitated by the poor quality of university education in Afghanistan:
+
+> Ramin Kamangar, a researcher based in Kabul, said that historically many extremist groups had deep roots in Afghan society. The academic curriculum was designed in such a way that every group could manipulate academic textbooks, including Sharia law textbooks, which are mandatory courses for every faculty across the country. ‘The textbooks of Islamic law are not academic,’ Kamangar said. ‘They present that Islam is the best religion and speak in the form of ideological black and white.’
+
+The previous regime did not clamp down heavily on pro IS-K clerics (ulema) and teachers, for fear of a backlash from the wider Salafi ulema community, whom it considered useful allies against the Taliban.
+
+Already in 2020, researcher Borhan Osman found that Kabul University, Nangarhar University and Al-Biruni University (a private university) were major sources of IS-K recruits. The leader of the original IS-K Kabul cell was in fact a graduate of Al-Biruni University, located in Gulbahar, a town split between the provinces of Parwan and Kapisa. The dormitories of state universities were a hotbed of IS-K activity, to the extent that the authorities restricted their availability to students. A staff member at Kabul University confirms that under the previous regime (2001–21), recruitment by violent extremist groups was widespread in Kabul’s dormitories. Osman also learned that IS-K in Kabul recruits largely among Tajiks, usually from old strongholds of Jami’at Islami, originally a moderate Muslim Brotherhood organisation that ‘romanticised jihad’ in the 1980s and then exposed itself to IS-K criticism for failing to implement an Islamic regime in the 1990s. Typically, recruits went through Salafi activism first, and/or joined non-violent groups such as the pan-Islamist Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) and militant student organisation Jami’at Eslah. A group of female Salafi–jihadist activists sympathetic to IS-K was also identified at a private university in Kabul in this period.
+
+
+### IS-K ACTIVITIES ON AFGHANISTAN’S CAMPUSES AFTER THE TALIBAN TAKEOVER
+
+Even before the Taliban took power, tension between Salafi and Hanafi students was running high on campuses, and physical fights were not uncommon. Since the change of regime, the Taliban have been restricting Salafi activities, and Hanafi students have felt encouraged to become more assertive, with some harassing Salafis, and Salafi students mostly forced to keep a low profile and avoid responding. A few Salafi students have continued to quarrel with Hanafis and have attracted the attention of IS-K, which is particularly interested in individuals with a militant Salafi profile. There are also reported still to be several university staff members and students who are active Salafi preachers and proselytisers. Sympathy for non-violent extremist groups, especially HuT and Jami’at Eslah, was widespread among university students as the Islamic Republic was unwinding.
+
+#### THE IMPORTANCE OF STUDENTS TO IS-K
+
+IS-K sources have been proudly acknowledging their efforts to recruit university students. In the words of a commander:
+
+> These university students, whom we call ‘consciousness’ members, are very good in the recruitment of fighters and members through social media because they know Islam very well and are very good at convincing people to join jihad in Afghanistan. We have been very good in recruitment of students.
+
+This is noteworthy as a statement about the value of educated members to IS-K. Another commander relayed a common IS-K motto: ‘One consciousness fighter or commander is much better than 100 uneducated fighters’. These highly ideological members are considered the backbone of IS-K, because they are very good at encouraging other members to ‘fight for Islam against non-believers and against those who are misusing the name of jihad and Islam for power, like the Taliban’. Interviews showed that the recruitment focus remains on the Sharia faculty, but students coming from other faculties would be approached if they showed strong religious interests, even if they were not Salafis already.
+
+A source from the Taliban’s intelligence agency, the GDI, confirmed in November 2021 that IS-K was focusing much of its recruitment effort on Kabul University, in particular the Sharia department, where many had been recruited in previous years. At that time, Kabul University was closed, but intelligence sources were reporting that IS-K was already ordering its teams to resume recruitment activities.
+
+#### IS-K ASSETS ON CAMPUSES
+
+Afghanistan’s higher education sector includes both public (39 as of 2020) and private (up to 145) universities, with 400,000 students in 2020, about one-third of whom study at private colleges. Numbers are believed to have fallen after the Taliban takeover, even before women’s access to higher education was suspended in December 2022. While public universities are free, admission exams represent an obstacle for many who would like to get a degree. Private universities, by contrast, are only accessible to wealthy families.
+
+The GDI believed in late 2021 that there were IS-K cells in Kabul University and also some teachers linked to IS-K. They believed that IS-K was also active in some private universities in Kabul, and viewed blocking IS-K recruitment as a top priority. Another GDI source stated that they had identified three IS-K networks active in Kabul University and in Al-Biruni University. At that time, only the private universities were open, and the GDI was focusing its monitoring efforts on these. The Kabul University networks were allegedly led by Sharia faculty teachers and supported by networks active on social media.
+
+In mid-2022, sources confirmed IS-K being active in Kabul and Gulbahar but added that Nangarhar University and Badakhshan University were the other recruitment hotspots. It is worth noting the considerable overlap of the findings of this research with Osman’s findings, reported above, and the addition of Badakhshan University. An IS-K recruiter confirmed in November 2022 that IS-K still had many sympathisers in Nangarhar University, even if they needed to lie low to avoid detection. Indeed, at that point IS-K still considered Nangahar to be its main student recruitment ground. According to this source, there were several cells of IS-K recruiters active in the university, each with three members. Considering their respective sizes, Kabul University (with almost three times as many registered students as Nangarhar) appears to have been less affected: the six IS-K cells reportedly operating on the Kabul University campus, with two to three members each, were mostly active within the Sharia department.
+
+While there might be variations between locations, the IS-K structure on the campuses seems to be organised into the following dedicated sections: ‘targeting’, ‘media and culture’, ‘chatting and inviting’, and ‘face-to-face communication’. The ‘targeting’ section is the largest, in terms of staffing. Most of the cells operate within the Sharia and law faculties.
+
+#### IS-K RECRUITMENT TECHNIQUES
+
+‘Targeting’, as discussed by IS-K sources, is essentially an intelligence activity, aimed at identifying potential recruits. The targeter’s job is described as being ‘to single out and target the most religious students, who have the greatest interest in religious issues and especially Salafism’. Within this category, the targeters prioritise those known to have suffered at the hands of what a source called ‘extremist Hanafi students’, or whose family members were caught up in the Taliban’s repression of IS activity. Typically, in a class of 40 to 50 students, there will be one to two worth targeting. Once a targeted student is identified, the targeting structure tries to get their mobile number. Then, the ‘media and culture’ section takes over. The job of the media and culture team, who are based outside the university, even as far away as Europe, is to send to prospective recruits videos of ‘cruelties, killing, torturing and arresting of Salafi scholars, common Salafis, women and children by Taliban’, messages about Salafism, and videos and news about the Taliban negotiating with the Americans. Before the regime change of 2021, the propaganda material had been about ‘foreigners bombing Muslims’ and the ‘torturing and arresting of Muslim men, women and children by Americans’. If there is a negative reaction, the ‘invitee’ is immediately cut off from messaging. If the response is positive, WhatsApp and other social media apps start to be used. The media and culture team also adds targeted students to various IS-K Telegram accounts, some of which advertise the activities of IS-K, while others propagate negative propaganda against the Taliban.
+
+The next stage, after the ground has been prepared by exposure to ‘media and culture’ work, sees the ‘chatting and inviting’ team take over, opening a one-on-one chat room on Telegram or WhatsApp and tasking its cadres to befriend specific individuals. These one-on-one chats focus on the situation of Salafis in Afghanistan, on the ‘cruelties’ of the Taliban against Salafis, on harassment suffered at the hands of Hanafi students and Taliban on campus, on the ‘jihad’ and the activities and aims of IS-K, and on IS’s ‘Caliphate’, as well as many other issues. During this phase, the recruiter regularly visits the target both on the university campus and outside it, to learn more about their mindset and views, build up trust and develop a friendship. Prospective recruits are directly fed or directed towards hundreds of speeches and lectures by well-known Salafi preachers, for example:
+
+- Sheikh Abu Obaidullah Mutawakil, a member of the Sharia faculty at Kabul University, who was detained under the Islamic Republic for acting as an IS-K recruiter, and abducted and assassinated after the Taliban takeover, in September 2021.
+
+- Mubashir Muslimyar, also a member of the Sharia faculty at Kabul, assassinated in Kabul in February 2021.
+
+- Marouf Rasikh, a third member of the Sharia faculty at Kabul, who was detained and released under the Islamic Republic, only to be assassinated in February 2021 in Kabul.
+
+- Abdul Zahir Da’ee, another member of the Sharia faculty, Kabul, and the only one of this group still alive and active. He was detained under the Islamic Republic.
+
+Once the targeted student is familiar with such preachers’ thinking, they are invited by the recruiter to convert to Salafism or, if already Salafi, to adopt a stricter attitude. If this works out well, the target is invited to join openly pro-IS-K private chats on Telegram. Some recruits are ready at this stage to volunteer for IS-K, while others might need more work. In the latter case, targets’ reactions to the private IS-K channels are observed over a period of several days. If the reaction is positive, the targeted individual is invited to join the jihad against the Taliban and anyone else who is opposed to Salafism and the Caliphate.
+
+Before being invited to join IS-K, prospective recruits are invited to embrace Salafism or, if they are already Salafis, to start practising it more strictly. After a while, the targeted students are invited to join the jihad against the Taliban and anybody who is against Salafism and the Caliphate. If the invitation is accepted, the invitee is offered a face-to-face meeting. This is when the ‘faceto-face’ team takes over. Soon afterwards, this team offers training to the prospective recruit in one of the IS-K camps in preparation for fully joining as a member. The entire process typically takes up to three months.
+
+Most of those who reach the stage of being fed IS-K propaganda agree to join, although not all. Because up to this point potential recruits have only been contacted via social media, they present only a limited risk to IS-K: all they can do is alert the authorities that something is going on, but they cannot compromise any individuals. Most university recruits are not interested in becoming fighters, even if they do join. For this reason, they are often offered roles such as being a support element in a terrorist cell, social media activist, preacher/indoctrinator, working in logistics, or looking after safe houses, among other things. Some do become terrorist cell leaders.
+
+
+### TALIBAN COUNTERTERRORISM
+
+#### PRACTICE DIVERGES FROM POLICY AND PRINCIPLES
+
+Public universities closed immediately after the Taliban took Kabul in August 2021. The Taliban declared that they wanted to determine how to gender-segregate campuses before reopening them. Simultaneously, the Taliban restricted discourse on politics, human rights and Islam. When the universities reopened in February 2022, the Taliban knew they were going to face trouble on the campuses, because as a movement they always had little appeal among university students and were perceived as hostile to secular education.
+
+Their approach to the IS-K presence on university campuses should be viewed within the context of the Emirate’s wider approach to counterterrorism. The Taliban do not appear to have formulated any specific or explicit counterterrorism policy. The previous government, the Islamic Republic, did formulate policies, but it did not implement them systematically. Those policies were based on ‘Western’ counterterrorism concepts, of which respect for the rule of law and human rights were, in theory, essential elements – notwithstanding the fact that, in practice, Afghan security forces and Western actors might often disregard such elements. Indeed, the security forces of the Islamic Republic by and large maintained a high degree of scepticism about these policies. The following summary of their critique derives from a series of interviews with Afghan enforcement officials, carried out in 2015–21, during the years of the Islamic Republic:
+
+1. The rule of law slows the counterterror effort and wastes precious time.
+
+2. The rule of law, with the high standards of evidence required, makes it difficult to convict.
+
+3. In terror emergencies, qualified relevant personnel, such as adequately trained police officers, are scarce and it is very hard to gather sufficient evidence for a conviction, the more so in Afghanistan, where qualified personnel were scarce even before the insurgency began.
+
+4. Torture and physical pressure deliver quick results during interrogation.
+
+5. Highly motivated terrorists are not going to be deterred by the threat of ordinary custodial sentences and are unlikely to be convinced to collaborate without extreme forms of pressure.
+
+6. Media freedom is not useful when tackling terrorism, as it advertises the achievements of the terrorists while embarrassing the authorities with the exposure of their failures and/or ruthless methods.
+
+7. Civilian supporters are a key asset of insurgents and terrorists and must be targeted aggressively as well.
+
+As discussed below, the Taliban, while not deliberately intending to imitate the former regime’s critics of Western counterterrorism, in many cases shared these attitudes to varying degrees and incorporated them (either individually or as an organisation) into their own practice once they rose to power, despite their commitment to operate under the Sharia and therefore under a type of rule of law. The adoption of counterterrorism practices based on the above assumptions could be a consequence of having been on the receiving end of such practices, of a shared cultural understanding of what effective counterterrorism should be or of any number of other reasons. Determining the cultural and political sources of the Taliban’s approach to counterterrorism is beyond the scope of this paper. What is important to note here is the presence of specific attitudes, operating at either individual or organisational levels, that – as in the time of the Islamic Republic – influenced the counterterrorism effort of the Taliban’s Emirate.
+
+Concerning the rule of law (points 1, 2 and 3 above), while the Taliban are in principle committed to introducing their own version of the rule of law, based on Sharia, they have often been wary of applying the protection afforded by the religious texts to rebels, especially IS-K ones. Whether as a result of a deliberate policy or uncontrolled rhetoric freely flourishing in Talibancontrolled media, the term ‘Kharijites’ (khawarij), implying an extreme and even heretical approach, has been in regular use when referring to IS-K. This disparaging term has often been used by governments of countries affected by Islamist insurgencies to justify reliance on extreme measures against seditious elements, who are essentially treated as apostates and therefore worthy of indiscriminate repression. Certainly, the use of such a term can only encourage Taliban practitioners of counterterrorism to bypass whatever Sharia-based rule-of-law constraints may be there in principle.
+
+The Taliban have, in fact, been inconsistent in the way they deal with IS-K militants, sometimes treating them and suspected supporters as ‘Kharijites’ and sometimes using more standard sanctions against them, even on some occasions attempting to use negotiations and political agreements to draw community elders away from IS-K and undermine it. As far as university campuses go, the treatment of Mutawakil is a good example of arbitrary treatment: as noted above, he was first abducted and then arbitrarily executed, reportedly by the Taliban, in September 2021. The Taliban denied responsibility but were widely seen as responsible by the media.
+
+The use of torture and physical pressure by the Taliban (points 4 and 5 above) have been noted in a number of reports from international organisations. It was also confirmed as an issue in interviews for this research. An IS-K member noted that he joined following a direct clash with one of his teachers, who was strongly hostile to his Salafist views. He was then detained by the Taliban for two days and tortured and threatened. He was released after promising to change his ideology and then suffered harassment by Hanafi students. When IS-K approached him, he was ripe for recruitment and became an IS-K recruiter.
+
+An example of the Taliban adopting an inconsistent approach is their handling of media reporting (point 6 above). Despite verbally committing to ‘media freedom’ from the start of its second Emirate, the Taliban have been sporadically banning reporting of violent incidents and counterterrorism activities in the belief that it would play into the hands of IS-K if its actions (and the subsequent repressive measures) received media exposure. This also applied to reporting detentions of suspects on the campuses. The Taliban have not been keen to advertise the extent of their repression there. A dozen students and staff on different campuses (out of 15 who were contacted) had the feeling that the Taliban were withholding information regarding arrests of students or staff. At other times, however, the Taliban have used their media apparatus to describe IS-K as ‘Kharijites’.
+
+Related to point 7 above – and again seemingly in breach of Sharia – is the Taliban’s approach towards radical groups that in the West might be described as ‘non-violent extremists’ and that the Taliban describe as ‘Salafileaning’ or ‘pro-Caliphate’. Groups such as HuT, Jami’at Eslah and Najm were banned early on by the Taliban and some alleged HuT members were even detained. Although these groups do not support IS-K or IS Central, the Taliban appear concerned that HuT, for example, advocates the advent of the Caliphate worldwide, and is an international organisation. In the words of a member of the GDI: ‘They advocate the Caliphate in the entire world but we want Sharia only for Afghanistan and we don’t want to interfere in the internal issues of other countries’.
+
+That the Taliban’s jihad is a national one is now a key claim of the Emirate’s foreign policy effort, although the Taliban continue to host foreign jihadist groups such as the Pakistani TTP (Tehrik Taliban Pakistan, or Movement of the Pakistani Taliban), Al-Qa’ida and others. Jami’at Eslah has also been viewed with suspicion because of its Salafi influences, which make its ideology ‘closer to Daesh’ (or IS-K). Especially in Badakhshan University (Faizabad), there is a belief that HuT – reportedly quite popular there – facilitates, directly or indirectly, recruitment into IS-K. However, one student at the private Al-Biruni University (in Gulbahar) noted that HuT continued to operate freely there, despite Taliban control, and that the group did not hide its online recruitment activities. He also noted that online activism by HuT was undertaken secretly before the Taliban takeover, but then began to be conducted more openly. A Taliban security source disputed this, saying that HuT and Jami’at Eslah had been active at Al-Biruni, but that neither was still able to operate.
+
+In any case, in its online propaganda, HuT appears to have adopted a line of ‘constructive criticism’ of the Emirate, and certainly does not endorse violent opposition to it.56 Overall, the Taliban’s approach seems to have varied from location to location, often involving attempts to distinguish in practice between members of non-violent extremist groups who establish links to IS-K, and those who do not, even if the standards of proof for charging and detaining individuals are never clear. At the end of November 2022, the Taliban reiterated their ban on organisations suspected of Salafi sympathies or of advocating the Caliphate, suggesting an awareness that the ban was being only loosely enforced at the grassroots level.
+
+#### IMPACT: MIXED RESULTS
+
+In terms of stopping IS-K recruitment on campuses, the Taliban have faced a serious challenge, strapped as they are for resources, both human and financial. Especially in the early days of the second Emirate, the Taliban lacked suitably trained security and intelligence personnel. In the only publicly available (as of April 2023) breakdown of the Emirate’s budget, released in January 2022, expenditure on security appears at around 40% of the total budget, which would mean up to $800 million per year in 2022. Around 16% of the Emirate’s total budget (about $320 million as of 2022) went specifically to the GDI. This compares unfavourably with the $2.15 billion available to the Islamic Republic in 2021 for defence and public order and safety (54% of the operating budget), on top of billions of US money being pumped directly into the Afghan security forces. While the Taliban have so far confronted a much less threatening situation than the Islamic Republic did in its later years, the salary burden of civil servants alone, inherited from the Islamic Republic, amounted in 2021 to over $170 million per month.
+
+Judging by the interviews for this paper, it would appear that, by and large, they have succeeded in turning the campuses into significantly less permissive environments for IS-K to operate in, thanks to a mix of intensified intelligence operations targeting what they call Kharijites and takfiri (‘excommunicators’) on campus, strict control over the campus environment, and effective Taliban deterrence against any form of dissent. Students and staff are investigated for even the most indirect links to IS-K or any other group opposed to the Taliban. Harsh punishment for those suspected of supporting opposition groups also acts as an additional deterrent. Although around a quarter of the 20 individuals contacted (students, university staff, Taliban security officers) believed that recruitment by extremist groups had not halted since the Taliban takeover, the group mentioned most often as being active was HuT, not IS-K. Evidence of ongoing IS-K presence on campuses is scant, in contrast to what was happening before August 2021, when extremist groups were able to spread propaganda in the dormitories. As noted earlier, Kabul University’s dormitories had been identified as a previous hotspot for IS-K activity. In 2021, Taliban security sources said that IS-K activities were taking place on the Kabul campus for some time after the regime change in August 2021, but that, following arrests, these activities stopped. However, some evidence suggests that this was a premature assessment. A year later, one Taliban security source confirmed that arrests of students for IS-K links in university dormitories had occurred in the previous six months. The GDI provided Taliban security officials with a list of students active in takfiri propaganda, who were then arrested. Kabul University students linked to IS-K who came from Logar and Nangarhar provinces were also arrested when they returned to their home provinces, following cross-province coordination between Taliban and GDI officials. This source optimistically stated that no violent extremist activity was ongoing.
+
+Despite the optimism of some Taliban officials, others were more worried. This was particularly so in relation to the Faizabad campus of Badakhshan University. Some research contacts, including one in the Taliban’s campus security, believed that recruitment efforts were still going on in Faizabad. Taliban sources have often been evasive about details of arrests, but they confirmed that there had been several. On the Badakhshan University campus, a Taliban source claimed that professors who were inclined toward Salafism and affiliated with IS-K and HuT had been arrested, and that further arrests were likely. He also confirmed detentions of students on the grounds of links to HuT and IS-K. Other Taliban security sources, in Gulbahar and Nangarhar, confirmed arrests on both campuses, but did not provide details.
+
+In many cases, students or staff have been directly aware of arrests taking place, especially on the Faizabad campus, where all sources knew of regular arrests being made, even if the reasons were not always clear. One student at Kabul University was aware of one arrest of a student on allegations of links to IS-K. At Nangarhar University, in the recent past there have been numerous disappearances of students accused of having links with IS-K.
+
+The extent of Taliban success in stifling online IS-K activism is much more questionable. This paper does not draw on direct investigation of IS-K online activities, but rather on interviews and contacts, so any assessment of these activities would be on shaky ground. Moreover, students were unsure about the extent of online activism. One student, for example, claimed that while social networks were a recruitment site for extremist groups, such groups had only a minimal online presence. University staff members offered contrasting views. One stated that the social media recruitment activities of violent extremist groups had increased since the Taliban takeover, but did not give further details or evidence to support these claims. Another, in Badakhshan University, held the opposite view, stating that the Taliban takeover had led to an unprecedented decrease in use of social media by IS-K. Probably the most reliable view is that of one Taliban security officer, who acknowledged that the Taliban were monitoring groups online, and that activism was ongoing.
+
+The predominant view was that IS-K online activities have become somewhat riskier but are continuing. Revealingly, IS-K has been warning its followers through its social media accounts of Taliban infiltration efforts, exploiting IS-K recruitment efforts on social media. Another risk factor is that the Taliban regularly search mobile phones and monitor students’ social media accounts on campus. According to one student in Parwan, students were too afraid to carry their phones on campus; any content that could be traced to Taliban opponents (even a single photograph) was likely to result in arrest.
+
+IS-K sources claim that, despite the Taliban’s measures, they have still been able to recruit on campuses. Assessments offered by IS-K sources could be questionable, of course, but when cross-checked with each other’s accounts and viewed in the overall context, these accounts do not offer a picture of overwhelming success and seem, therefore, rather plausible. IS-K appears to have coped comparatively well on the Nangarhar University campus. An IS-K source claims that from March to November 2022 the organisation was able to recruit more than 30 students at Nangarhar, most of whom ended up in combat units, with several also joining as preachers and indoctrinators and being dispatched to various locations. In Kabul, by contrast, recruitment into IS-K slowed greatly following the Taliban’s takeover, largely because the Taliban have created an especially thick network of spies and informers there. One cell was reportedly identified by the Taliban but managed to flee before its members were detained. Overall, therefore, considering the distribution of Salafism around Afghanistan (largely confined to the east and northeast) and that Nangarhar University is one of the largest recruitment grounds for IS-K, the yearly recruitment output of IS-K on the campuses could be estimated at not much more than 100 people. These recruits will, however, all be valuable cadres.
+
+While recruitment is still going on, the ease with which IS-K is able to attract members should not be exaggerated. One recruiter in Kabul said that of five potential recruits that he chose for targeting and passed on to the followup teams, one joined and four refused; a sixth was being processed as of November 2022.
+
+
+### IS-K COUNTERMEASURES AND PROSPECTS
+
+#### ADAPTATION
+
+IS-K has not been idly watching while the Taliban tries to shut down its recruitment networks on Afghanistan’s university campuses. Indeed, the majority of interviewees assumed that IS-K recruitment activities were ongoing on social media, but hidden in private channels, even if most of them claimed not to know how recruitment on social media worked. A Taliban security officer explained that while the Taliban can infiltrate Facebook groups, and the use of Facebook by IS-K has decreased, IS-K has switched to using Telegram, Instagram, WhatsApp and Signal. Growing reliance on private social media channels has thus been an important form of adaptation. A staff member at Parwan University agreed that IS-K does not operate directly through social media networks, because of Taliban scrutiny. He concurred that private channels are used to invite potential recruits, giving the examples of WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger. Islamic materials, including innocuous ones such as hadiths (the Prophet’s sayings), are published on these private channels to attract pious students, who are then shown more political material. A student at Parwan University noted that students are added to WhatsApp groups that share a mix of generic religious material and more specific Salafi propaganda, whether they like it or not. These groups are reportedly run anonymously. Another student, in Kabul, claimed that he knew that ‘violent extremist groups’ published material on social media, but since these groups were invite-only and he was not a member, he could not give more information. These accounts corroborate the data that emerged from interviews, discussed above, regarding IS-K activities on Afghanistan’s campuses after the Taliban takeover.
+
+Another form of adaptation by IS-K has been to move its social media activities abroad, especially to Europe, where there is a large Afghan diaspora. A Taliban security official admitted that even Facebook accounts promoting the downfall of the Emirate are still operated, but by IS-K members based abroad. Following engagement with such outputs, potential recruits could then be passed on to anonymous WhatsApp and Telegram channels, where further vetting takes place before formal recruitment occurs. The Taliban cannot, of course, do much against IS-K propagandists based abroad.
+
+Aside from investing more in reshaped online activities, IS-K might well be still adjusting to the Taliban’s presence on campus. At the time of making these enquiries, only 10 months had passed since the Taliban reopened the campuses, and IS-K may be assessing the new landscape and/or waiting for the Taliban to relax their scrutiny before restarting recruitment activities. To bypass Taliban focus, recruiters could seek to intensify recruitment in Salafileaning mosques that students frequent, for example. The Taliban appear to think the same, and such mosques have time and again been subject to severe restrictions.
+
+#### A PROMISING ENVIRONMENT
+
+University campuses could again become a favourable environment for IS-K recruitment in the longer term, due to widespread student discontent on campus, anti-Taliban sentiment, and a broad sense of despondency and lack of hope for the future. Judging from 15 interviews with university students and teaching staff on four different Afghan campuses (Kabul, Jalalabad, Gulbahar and Faizabad), students are struggling to adapt to new Taliban rules on campus, such as gender segregation and the need to adhere to Taliban dress codes. The threat of Taliban violence for those not abiding by the new rules and the precedent of the Taliban targeting offenders’ families appear to be a source of distress for many students. Many students also feel patronised by the Taliban’s treatment, with research respondents commenting that they were already committed to Islam before the Taliban takeover and did not appreciate being forced to follow the Taliban’s interpretation of the religion. Students claim that they have been forced to repeat prayers because the Taliban does not believe that they have already prayed; that they have been beaten for falling asleep following prayers during Ramadan; that they are forced to listen to preaching by Taliban-affiliated mullahs after prayer time; and that men are forced to wear traditional Afghan clothing to campus, while women were forced to wear black niqabs (before the ban on women in higher education was imposed). Although frustration deriving from these issues is not likely to drive students towards IS-K per se, it is likely to reduce cooperation with the Taliban authorities among students, and therefore make counterterrorism measures harder to implement.
+
+Almost all students cited pessimism regarding the job market postgraduation. Several students expressed a desire to emigrate from Afghanistan immediately following graduation, because of doubts about their ability to find work in the country. A staff member at a private university in Gulbahar claimed that up to 90% of students in private universities had dropped out due to feelings of despondency about the future.
+
+Five different university staff members agreed that reductions in teachers’ salaries, increased teaching hours and the departure of large numbers of qualified teachers from Afghanistan were affecting the quality of education. University teachers were reportedly unmotivated and overworked, in particular as a result of the increased teaching hours necessitated by gender segregation (before the ban on women in universities came into place). Students also noted a decline in teaching quality.
+
+While the vast majority of students faced with an uncertain future in Afghanistan will seek to emigrate, a minority of more Salafi-oriented students could become susceptible to IS-K recruitment. Students inclined to Salafism are likely to have taken specific offence at some of the Taliban’s practices on campus for religious reasons, as Salafism runs contrary to several of these, such as the Taliban-mandated dress code for men and women. The Salafis have their own interpretation of Sharia, and what might look like minor differences to outsiders would have major implications for those involved. With anti-Salafi practices widespread on campuses, Taliban attempts to dominate the religious discourse in universities, and the targeting of Salafi scholars and madrasas, strong feelings among Salafi students are likely to be still making them susceptible to IS recruitment. One Taliban security source hinted that for a period after the regime change, Salafis had initially been keen to work with the Taliban, after the Taliban had targeted some of their ulema, but he acknowledged that anti-Taliban sentiment had significantly increased on Badakhshan University campus since.
+
+
+### CONCLUSION
+
+This paper examined the understudied IS-K presence on Afghanistan’s university campuses and the counterterrorism effort that the Taliban regime has mounted against it. It set out to assess the performance of the Taliban in one case study of counterterrorism – against IS-K activities on the campuses – as well as the ways in which IS-K sought to adapt. The research team gathered evidence of a sophisticated IS-K approach to recruitment on Afghanistan’s university campuses, combining face-to-face and remote techniques. It is also clear that IS-K’s recruitment is aimed at a relatively small niche: largely Salafi and Salafi-leaning students. As such, the approach can yield only a limited number of recruits, certainly not exceeding the low hundreds annually. Nonetheless, these are high-quality recruits, on which the highly ideological and disciplined IS-K must rely to sustain its operations.
+
+The Taliban seem indeed to have paid considerable attention to the problem. The days of the Islamic Republic’s half-hearted efforts to deal with IS-K are certainly gone. By denying to IS-K activists the space they once had, the Taliban have constrained IS-K’s ability to recruit. However, the underlying conditions favouring IS-K recruitment persist. These are:
+
+- Harassment of Salafi students by some of their Hanafi colleagues, which reinforces resentment against the dominant Hanafi school.
+
+- Heavy-handed treatment of suspects by Taliban police and intelligence, which pushes some towards joining IS-K to seek revenge.
+
+- Widespread student frustration over conditions and lack of prospects.
+
+- Increasing Taliban pressure on non-violent extremist groups that have roots among students, such as HuT, Jami’at Eslah and others, which might drive some of their members towards IS-K.
+
+The Taliban’s approach to counterterrorism on university campuses has, in other words, been focused on repression, with seemingly little, if any, effort towards prevention. The ability of the Taliban to reduce IS-K activities using heavy-handed measures runs the risk of delivering both short-term positive results and long-term counterproductive ones, not least because the Taliban struggle to restrain the behaviour of their sympathisers and indeed anyone holding anti-Salafi views.
+
+The lack of a stable prevention policy means that the IS-K’s pool of potential recruits is likely not shrinking, assuming that drivers of recruitment, such as student frustration and Hanafi–Salafi friction, remain constant. Taliban repression might have reduced IS-K’s ability to tap this pool, but this could well be only temporary, especially as IS-K adapts and refines its recruitment techniques. Indeed, even over the relatively short time elapsed since regime change in Kabul (one year and five months at the time of writing), there were already signs that IS-K was adapting by:
+
+- Relying more on private social media channels.
+
+- Moving more of its social media activists abroad.
+
+- Warning its members and sympathisers about the risk of Taliban infiltrators and provocateurs.
+
+The high level of tension between Hanafi and Salafi on the campuses makes it difficult for the Taliban and Salafi elders to trust each other. Hence, it does seem clear that future prevention policies will be hard to develop and implement. Regardless, without some form of preventive measures, the Taliban might be forcing upon themselves a very long campaign against IS-K.
+
+---
+
+__Antonio Giustozzi__ is a Senior Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team at RUSI. He has been working in and on Afghanistan since the 1990s and has published extensively on that conflict, and especially on the Taliban and the Islamic State. His main research interests are global jihadism in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, the security sector and state-building, and insurgencies.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-15-international-call-to-fight.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-15-international-call-to-fight.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-15-international-call-to-fight.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : International Call To Fight
+author: Jessica White
+date : 2023-05-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/NqIShm2.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Addressing Implications of Participation in and Impacts of Fighting in Ukraine"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there was wide-ranging support of the call from Ukraine for foreign volunteers to join its military efforts based on nations’ perceived alliances, considerations of European security, and concerns over threats from Russia and its interests and allies._ _This brief addresses the implications and impacts of the international call to fight in Ukraine in order to gauge potential threats and to encourage preparations for the successful return and reintegration of volunteers into civilian life. It raises awareness of the societal reintegration preparations needed by the countries of origin for the mental, physical, and potentially ideological challenges these foreign volunteers may have faced while responding to the defense of Ukraine._
+
+When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there was an outcry across Europe, the West, and nations globally, questioning the legitimacy of the war. Although there had been Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory and associated conflict since 2014, the invasion sparked a new, distinct phase of interstate conflict with geopolitical considerations and socioeconomic impacts. Initially, there was relatively wide-ranging support of the call from Ukraine for foreign volunteers to join its military efforts based on nations’ perceived alliances to Ukraine, considerations of European security, and concerns over threats from Russia and its interests and allies.
+
+In the initial days of the conflict, however, with official processes to join the International Legion of Defence of Ukraine still not fully in place, there was confusion over the legality of this type of active participation in a foreign conflict. For many, this dynamic resonated with the topical issue of foreign fighters, who traveled to fight with Daesh in Syria and Iraq, and the challenges of how to handle their status and return or perhaps with the less-discussed status of those who traveled to fight against Daesh outside of sanctioned military operations. Thus, it is important to clarify the distinctions among types of individual participation in foreign conflicts under the international legal system set up to govern armed conflict, including categories of foreign terrorist fighters, foreign fighters, foreign volunteers, and mercenaries.
+
+Ukraine worked quickly to establish a process by which foreign volunteers could officially and in a widely and internationally sanctioned manner join the ranks of the International Legion, a division of its national military. Even with this process of volunteering to fight as part of a national military rather than joining paramilitary groups in place, questions remain around the legality of this process and how much process and preparation, which would normally be a part of military engagement, has been put in place to prepare foreign volunteers to fight. Additionally, due to the ideologically charged nature of the invasion, justification narratives from Russia, and the historical context of the conflict, there are concerns of exposure to far-right ideological influence for those traveling to participate. The pre-invasion context from 2014 to 2022 was certainly imbued with ideological threats, with thousands traveling to fight there in support of far-right ideological purposes. Although paramilitary units often encouraged this kind of participation, they largely have now been absorbed into the official military establishment, and the far-right ideological narrative has been discouraged. Nevertheless, there remains a concern that foreign volunteers may be exposed, due to the conflict context itself or through the belief systems of their comrades, to extremist ideologies that they may carry home.
+
+This brief addresses the implications and impacts of the call to fight in Ukraine in order to gauge potential threats and to encourage preparations for the successful return and reintegration of volunteers into civilian life. Reportedly, there have been more than 20,000 volunteers from 52 countries, but other estimates suggest that the number of those who entered Ukraine with the intention of fighting is closer to 2,000. Therefore, this brief provides an overview of the status of those fighting in the Ukraine conflict because this impacts potential responses, such as tracking, monitoring, and engaging with these individuals. Finally, it raises awareness of the preparations needed by the countries of origin for the mental, physical, and potentially ideological challenges these foreign volunteers may have faced while responding to the call to defend Ukraine to ensure their successful societal reintegration.
+
+Because these private citizens are traveling to fight in an armed conflict outside of their domestic military services, they could be left without a range of support that would be available to them as domestic military veterans. Without these services in place, they face potential challenges with a civilian system largely ill-equipped to understand or address their needs. The counterterrorism community has focused on disengagement, deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of those classed as foreign terrorist fighters. Yet, there is seemingly little preparation in place at the national government level for assessment and provision of similar services, where needed, for foreign volunteers returning from the conflict. Especially due to the emergency nature of this call, processes of predeployment training, mental and physical well-being monitoring, or event postdeployment support for those who have been involved in combat are unclear. It is therefore essential that countries with citizens who have volunteered to participate in this conflict are preparing for their return and providing services to them in support of their mental and physical well-being.
+
+
+### DEFINITIONS OF PARTICIPATION
+
+With the current counterterrorism policy focus on the return of foreign fighters, in relation to returning those who traveled to fight with Daesh in Syria and Iraq, it becomes important to clarify the distinctions among foreign terrorist fighters, foreign fighters, foreign volunteers, and mercenaries under the international legal system set up to govern armed conflict. In order to be prosecuted as a foreign terrorist fighter, which is a legal classification established in response to the large number of individuals traveling to fight with Daesh, an individual must be fighting on behalf of a proscribed terrorist organization. In the international framework, this classification was established by UN Security Council Resolution 2178 in 2014. It remains controversial, however, with many still opting to retain use of foreign fighter versus foreign terrorist fighter because it binds member states to criminalize a wide range of activities related to foreign fighting and blurs the distinction between terrorism and participation in armed conflict that may be legal under international humanitarian law.
+
+Those who traveled prior to the establishment of a defined pathway for volunteering for Ukraine’s International Division qualify for penalization as foreign fighters, which is often subject to national legal interpretation and influenced by political appetite. The individuals who joined as foreign volunteers with the International Legion under national constitutions that allow citizens to fight in foreign militaries have entered the conflict legally and would not be subject to prosecution for participation within the boundaries of international humanitarian law. Regardless of the legality under international humanitarian law, however, foreign military volunteering remains illegal under the national constitutions of some countries. Mercenaries are those who are contracted to fight in a foreign country for pay.
+
+The concern this raises with regard to individuals who traveled prior to the official pathway to volunteer is that those who fought with paramilitary groups prior to February 2022 have been prosecuted in some cases for crimes as foreign fighters and linked to far-right ideological threats of violent extremism. Some countries (e.g., the Czech Republic, Germany, the United Kingdom) have acted to criminalize participation in the 2014–2022 conflict. Yet, some countries, often those with less political will or well-defined far-right–focused laws, chose to largely ignore this participation. For example, as application of U.S. counterterrorism law was dependent on the legal definition of the group they were joining as a foreign terrorist organization, thousands of Americans traveled to fight with ideologically far-right paramilitary groups between 2014 and 2022 and often were not prosecuted or provided with services or deradicalization programming after their return. This was seen by some counterterrorism professionals as a fault in the counterterrorism framework’s design, with its myopic focus on Islamist violent extremism and in stark contrast to those prosecuted as foreign terrorist fighters due to the designation of organizations such as Daesh and al-Qaida as foreign terrorist organizations.
+
+With it being legal under international humanitarian law to become a foreign volunteer and with relatively open and easy travel to the conflict zone, tracking those who have gone to fight might be difficult, especially if they traveled prior to the formation of the formal process. Travel outside the formal process of volunteering for the International Legion raises the legal question of foreign fighter status rather than foreign volunteer status, which adds the difficulty of whether to prosecute these individuals. Also, even for those who volunteered through the official avenue, there will inevitably arise situations of illegal battlefield conduct in violation of international humanitarian law, which will present complex legal challenges.
+
+
+### IMPLICATIONS OF THE APPEAL
+
+Although it would be incorrect to assume that everyone who traveled to fight from 2014 to 2022 did so for far-right ideological reasons or that everyone who has traveled to fight after February 2022 would come into contact with these ideological influences, it is important to acknowledge that far-right influences present in Ukraine have not disappeared. For example, the Azov Battalion, which formed in 2014 and was later integrated into the Ukrainian National Guard, and the Azov Movement, a far-right nationalist network of military, paramilitary, and political organizations that grew out of the Azov Battalion, have extensive ties to the transnational far-right ecosystem. Also, the narratives surrounding the initial Russian invasion were highly ideological. Although these narratives were largely wielded as a political tool, there have been or are far-right ideological motivations on both sides of the conflict.
+
+As has been discussed in research on extremism within the security forces, there is a potential vulnerability created in environments of extreme in-group/outgroup formation, such as in the case of the military unit bonding experience. Research has shown this can especially be true in combat-focused units, often elite military units subject to intensive unit building, with a dehumanization of the enemy out-group potentially encouraging ideologies of superiority (e.g., white supremacism, ultranationalism, misogyny). The combination of these “othering” narratives, individual expectation, and the physical and mental toll of combat environments could potentially increase the appeal of far-right ideologies and decrease resilience to radicalization or recruitment. Additionally, the combat and weapons skills obtained by these individuals make them a high-value target for those trying to recruit individuals into violent extremist groups.
+
+In relation to this, it is important to note the highly gendered narrative of the conflict and of the appeal for volunteers. The rhetoric of this conflict, although varied, in the case of appealing to foreign volunteers often focused on a sense of hypermasculine patriotism, with a call for men with combat experience to take up arms in defense of those who could not defend themselves (e.g., pregnant women being bombed). Largely due to the perception of military service being a masculine space, the call clearly was aimed to appeal to the gendered essentialisms that able-bodied men should protect women and children and that it is their duty to fight and die to defend the oppressed. This creates an environment in which the hypermasculine definition of patriotism becomes an impossible bar for performance. Expectations such as this and the mental pressures that they place on an individual can result in a spectrum of dangers—at one end, hypermasculine conceptions of patriotism that radicalize individuals to misogyny, ultranationalism, and xenophobia and, at the other end, feelings of inadequacy and failure that can fuel radicalization.
+
+The implications of the call to arms are significant in the aftermath of a conflict and to an individual fighter’s pathway to postcombat rehabilitation and reintegration into civilian life. The realities of combat environments, whether an experienced professional or not, are unpredictable and often different from the expected experience. Many different elements can make the point of separation from a militarized identity and the transition to civilian life a point of concern. Sometimes, such a strong identity is formed with the military/unit group that it becomes difficult to regain individual identity; sometimes, traumas experienced during conflict leave lasting physical and mental (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder) scars; and sometimes, failed expectations of heroism or of lack of a resolution to the conflict can damage individual identity. Additionally, in some cases, these concerns will be compounded by the fact that some of those who traveled were veterans who were already struggling to form a civilian identity and seized on the opportunity to participate again in the military environment. This could potentially compound existing challenges if they do not feel adequately satisfied by their participation or if there is an undesired or unresolved end to the conflict.
+
+
+### IMPACTS OF COMBAT AND NECESSARY SUPPORT SYSTEMS
+
+Joining the military in times of crisis or conflict impacts the environment, tempo, and conditions into which individuals enter, even in the case of individuals joining their own standing national militaries, demanding that service members integrate, adapt, and prepare quickly. These effects would be amplified exponentially when a volunteer joins an international division of a foreign military during an active conflict. In most cases, the support systems in place as part of national military training, welfare, and so on would be much more comprehensive than what the foreign volunteers received, and it is essential to be aware of the impacts of the environment in which they enlisted after their return.
+
+In the military, there is normally a “boot camp” environment at the entry point in which unit formation is emphasized. This may exist in a limited fashion for the foreign volunteers, but it would presumably be a truncated experience due to the pressing nature of the conflict dynamics. This could have implications in relation to the dangers presented earlier. Additionally, in the military there is often a focus on predeployment training and preparation or, in some cases, mission training and preparation. These systems are in place to ensure a clear understanding of purpose; a time for mental preparation, if possible, for what is to come; and an understanding of roles and responsibilities within the unit, among other things. For a quickly deployed international division, it is likely that these systems were limited and often challenged by the different backgrounds, languages, ranks, and expectations represented by the influx of volunteers from numerous countries and from various backgrounds.
+
+There would likely be a stark contrast between those volunteering with previous military service and those who might have come from backgrounds with less, little, or no organized combatant training. Organized militaries are required to train their service members on international humanitarian law and the codes that govern interstate conflict and armed combat, but not all the volunteers may have received that training. This type of training often also focuses on preparation for the traumatic nature of combat, including preparation of individuals mentally and physically for responding to torture or being captured or held as prisoners of war. Without this, the volunteer’s experience might be exponentially more traumatic, they could endanger themselves or their unit, or they could engage in war crimes or illegal battlefield conduct.
+
+Additionally, there is a question of the volunteers returning to their civilian lives without a postdeployment debrief and physical and mental health check and without clear access to support services of which they might be in need. Most militaries have put these systems in place, either through military systems for those remaining on active duty or through veteran’s programs for those leaving service. To varying degrees, these programs monitor the physical and mental well-being of these individuals and help them to process the impacts of combat. Also, even though these efforts are often much less substantial than they should be, there is the onus on these systems to assess service members as potential security threats, in cases in which radicalization or recruitment may be happening or they may commit acts of violence, such as domestic violence or self-harm. The military jurisdiction over these support systems is often separated from civilian social care services and is especially equipped for the needs of those who have participated in combat. So, if foreign volunteers are returning to their home countries but do not qualify for support systems associated with domestic military service, there is a clear danger that they might go unmonitored or not be able to access through civilian pathways the type of services that would be best acclimated to meet their needs and understand their risks and vulnerabilities.
+
+
+### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+Due to the implications and impacts of the call to fight in Ukraine, it becomes apparent how important it is to ensure that there is preparation at the national level for the return of citizens who have traveled to participate. Some lessons on monitoring, rehabilitation, and reintegration concerns and programming can be taken from the adjacent contexts of services that militaries provide after combat or to veterans or in some cases services that counterterrorism or civil society organizations are preparing or implementing for returning foreign fighters. Yet, many different dynamics to this interstate conflict must be fully considered to ensure that the law has been upheld and that the transition of these individuals back to civilian life does not present a danger to themselves or to society. There should be preparations made now, presumably to address some individuals who have already returned and to have support systems in place for others who are yet to return from Ukraine.
+
+As noted, transition points between military and civilian life can be especially vulnerable. No matter the experience of individuals, there will undoubtedly be physical and mental implications of participation in an active combat zone; left unsupported, these can quickly present challenges that turn into security threats to the individuals, their families and friends, or even to society in cases of radicalization. There are often service systems in place with established national militaries that would normally oversee the pre- and post-deployment needs of those participating in combat. In the case of the pressing needs of Ukraine and the hasty establishment of their volunteer International Legion in the conflict, however, responsibility for these types of services will likely fall largely on the national governments of the countries to which these volunteers might return. Therefore, awareness of potential concerns must be raised, including devising who can best offer the most effective and appropriate services, so that preparations can be made to support these individuals.
+
+- Wherever possible, the traveler and legal status of participants in the conflict should be established. Policy and necessary resources should be in place to track their return so that there is a clear process for relevant security, health, legal, and other actors and a point of contact for the individuals after their return.
+
+- Consideration should be given by national authorities to who would be the relevant and responsible authorities in the case of these individuals, especially for those who have traveled legally as foreign volunteers, and how much oversight there can be of their postdeployment debrief or assessment in coordination with offering of services.
+
+- For those who did not travel legally, either based on their national laws or their traveling prior to the establishment of the official process for foreign volunteering, or for those who may have committed battlefield crimes, agreements should be established by which it will be the national responsibility to investigate and prosecute or where this would fall under the remit of an international tribunal. Some lessons could be taken from evidencegathering techniques applied in other contexts (e.g., the prosecution of foreign fighters).
+
+- Communications policy should be put in place to govern the public governmental response to the participation of individuals from their country, whether this participation is considered to reflect positively or negatively, and to moderate any public response. This is to ensure coordination but also the well-being and safety of the individuals returning (e.g., to ensure coordinated governmental voice and lack of dynamic politization on support for volunteering or support for rehabilitation and reintegration of these individuals or to avoid negative or harmful stigmatization of returning fighters in countries where public opinion might be less supportive or divided).
+
+- Jurisdiction of relevant physical and mental health and other support services should be considered because often the types of services that would be best equipped and knowledgeable about the needs of these individuals would be under the military or veteran services rather than civilian services. If these individuals are to be connected with civilian service providers, sufficient training should be given to these providers on the impacts and implications of participation in active combat zones.
+
+- Awareness should be raised among policymakers, security actors, and service providers on the context of the far-right ideological dynamics espoused as part of the narrative of this interstate conflict to avoid stigmatization of those who have volunteered to fight and to help anticipate any potential threats of fighters returning radicalized or with links to transnational far-right networks.
+
+---
+
+__Jessica White__ is a Senior Research Fellow in RUSI’s Terrorism and Conflict group. Her expertise encompasses counter-terrorism and preventing and countering violent extremism policy and programming, as well as gender mainstreaming strategies. She has over a decade’s worth of experience as a researcher and security practitioner, with a prior career as an intelligence and language analyst in the United States Navy.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-15-the-global-nuclear-balance.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-15-the-global-nuclear-balance.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : The Global Nuclear Balance
+author: Anthony H. Cordesman
+date : 2023-05-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/UjcZFnu.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Nuclear Forces and Key Trends in Nuclear Modernization"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This survey uses a wide range of summary official and expert estimates of global nuclear forces to illustrate the rapid changes that are now taking place in the global nuclear balance, which are summarized in the slide that follows this page._ _While it addresses the forces of all the world’s nuclear powers, it focuses on the trends in the United States, Russian, and Chinese nuclear balance. It provides an unclassified overview of recent U.S. official force planning and intelligence data on U.S. Russian, and Chinese nuclear forces; and compares summary estimates of global nuclear and related missile forces by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, House of Commons Library, U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Roual United Services Institute (RUSI), and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)._
+
+Its final section contains summary data on U.S. force improvement plans taken from the testimony of General Anthony J. Cotton, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, before the House Armed Services Committee on Strategic Forces on March 8, 2023, and on U.S. plans and strategy on the aspects of missile defense that affect the strategic balance.
+
+#### Shifts to Three Major Nuclear Powers and Increases in the Strength and Modernization of British, French, Iranian, Israel, Pakistani, and Indian Nuclear Forces
+
+Its main purpose is to illustrate the extent to which nuclear forces have again become a key factor shaping international security, and some of the different ways that experts now portray the changes taking place in nuclear modernization and in the balance between the major powers. It shows that the balance between the major powers has shifted from the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia to one where China is emerging as a nuclear great power; and where important shifts are the shifts taking place in the strength and modernization of other nuclear forces like those of the United Kingdom, France, North Korea, Iran, Israel, India, and Pakistan.
+
+#### Focusing on the Problems in Estimates Based on Unclassified Data
+
+At the same time, its summary comparisons of different expert assessments highlight the many areas where key data on nuclear forces and nuclear warfighting are not available or present major issues in terms of uncertainty or conflicting data. Such summary data can only illustrate a limited number of the different ways in which experts now estimate the nuclear balance, but the analysis draws upon some of the most respected unclassified sources now available to illustrate the range of data now available and its limitations.
+
+> #### `Major Shifts in the Nuclear Balance`
+
+- `Chinese shift to major nuclear forces`
+
+- `Russian, Chinese, and U.S. nuclear modernization`
+
+- `Russia has threatened the collapse of New Start and other US-Russian arms control efforts. China refuse to engage.`
+
+- `Ukraine-related Russian tactical nuclear threats, nuclear arms transfers to Belarus (?)`
+
+- `Rising North Korean threat, Iranian break out capability.`
+
+- `Decades of rising counter-value vulnerability.`
+
+- `Future status of non-strategic and reserve non-deployed nuclear weapons.`
+
+- `Advances in missile and drone defenses, anti-satellite warfare.`
+
+- `Impact of AI, new satellite capabilities, for targeting and retargeting, conflict management and assessment, shift from tactical to counterforce to countervalue strikes and restrikes.`
+
+This survey has been substantially updated and expanded as of May 2023 in response to outside comments and suggestions that reviewed an earlier draft, but the estimates it summarizes continue to change and evolve, and the updated data on force strengths in 2023 and on future modernization are especially uncertain. However, even a book-length comparison totaling some 200 pages must ignore much of the work done by the experts it draws upon.
+
+The source of each estimate is listed at the end of each summary, and full text of the work by national governments, Hans M. Kristensen. Matt Korda, Robert Norris, and others in the country-by-country Nuclear Notebooks published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, in the SIPRI annual yearbooks, the various reports by the Congressional Research Service, and the reports by Claire Mills for the House of Commons Library are particularly helpful in comparing different countries, understanding the limits and uncertainties in such data, and the extent to which many estimates are dated, uncertain, or based on uncertain sources.
+
+#### Limits to the Coverage of this Analysis
+
+Other key limits to the data presented include the fact that the official data on U.S., Russian, Chinese, British, and French programs have consistently tended to underestimate the costs, technical, and delivery date risks in the actual modernization efforts. They also understate the probability of major changes in major national programs as countries deploy new systems warfighting capabilities and change their strategies. Estimates of future forces are also based on current plans that do not reflect in the impact of the war in Ukraine, the collapse of many arms control efforts, and ongoing increases in Chinese forces and tensions over areas like Taiwan and the Koreas.
+
+These serious uncertainties in the data that are available on nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Many of the data on the type of non-U.S. nuclear weapon — fission, boosted, or thermonuclear — and its yield are uncertain. So are the background data on the level of technical sophistication in designing the weapon, upgrades and serving of weapons over the years, and its reliability in a real-world delivery on target.
+
+Data on the actual level of success in each country’s explosive tests of nuclear weapons and progress in weapons design are often uncertain, and so is progress in testing weapons designs using simulated weapons with low levels of enrichment remain classified — although both India and Pakistan are reported to have used such methods. The readiness of stored weapons is not assessed, and the ability to use existing weapons assemblies in missiles and other delivery systems that are normally assessed as having conventional warheads is unknown.
+
+More generally, the summary estimates of existing forces generally only reflect a limited portion of the history of their development, changes in declared national strategy, long-standing questions about the real-world success of given powers in developing advanced systems, the history of arms control efforts, and national nuclear politics. Many of these details are uncertain and debated at the expert level. The narrative summaries of national nuclear efforts in Wikipedia often provide extensive background in these areas but also have serious gaps, are often badly dated, and vary sharply by country in their coverage.
+
+#### Uncertainties in Data on Delivery Systems
+
+There are few reliable estimates of the changes that most nuclear powers are making to their delivery systems, and much of the data focuses on the performance of individual missiles, aircraft, SSBNs, and potentially dual-capable systems, rather than the numbers to be deployed, actual deployment, and impact on war fighting.
+
+Many of the data on non-U.S. missiles are based on estimates of range based on the type and size of the missile rather than actual flight test data. Estimates of accuracy are often based on the maximum capability of the guidance platform rather than actual missile tests; accuracy is not tied to reliable estimates of nuclear weapons yield, and no reliability data based on actual tests of even the missile system alone are normally available.
+
+Data are lacking on the targeting and retargeting capabilities of given countries, and on their ability to retarget, launch on warning, and accurately detect and characterize nuclear strikes on their own territory and enemy territory, and characterize the difference between counterforce strikes on nuclear and other military forces, and countervalue strikes on civilian populations, key economic and infrastructure targets, and other critical nonmilitary and recovery capabilities.
+
+#### Failing to Examine Changes in Warfighting Capability
+
+More broadly, the unclassified data now available on nuclear capabilities focus almost exclusively on nuclear delivery systems and nuclear weapons, rather than analyzing actual warfighting capabilities, and the results of a possible nuclear conflict. The unclassified data on nuclear strategy often consists of little more than national political statements about no first use, a desire for arms control, and a focus on deterrence rather than war fighting — none of which may apply in a crisis and at a time when most of the U.S. and Russia nuclear arms control efforts have been canceled or have an uncertain future, China does not participate in meaning arms control negotiation, and smaller nuclear power make statements that are ambiguous and given no clear picture of what might happen in a crisis.
+
+Open-source efforts to analyze the warfighting impact of actual nuclear exchanges largely ended after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, as most tactical and theater nuclear forces were withdrawn from active service, and as arms control seemed to create a truly stable balance of strategic nuclear deterrence. As a result, there are only a handful of credible data on how a nuclear war might now lead to given patterns of counterforce strikes against an opposing side’s nuclear and other military forces, and the impact of fall out and the countervalue impact of counterforce strikes.
+
+There is little recent unclassified analysis of how a nuclear war might lead to countervalue strikes against populations, economies, and recovery capabilities, and of the levels of damage and casualties that might result in a world with radically different economic structures and target bases from that exist at the time of the Cold War. There is also little meaningful open-source analysis of the shifts taking place in key aspects of vulnerability to nuclear attacks, like dependence on imports, manufacturing capability, and changes in the economic value of given cities, key infrastructure targets, and key industrial centers.
+
+Furthermore, only limited data are available on the major changes that have taken place in the ability to use space and other assets to provide reliable warning of attacks, analyze nuclear engagements in near real-time, change counterforce and countervalue targeting dynamically in near real time to reflect the actual course of nuclear exchanges, and assess the value of given counterforce and countervalue targets in both warfighting terms and in terms of recovery capability.
+
+This lack of open-source analysis of the changing nature of actual nuclear warfighting seems increasingly dangerous. China is emerging as a major nuclear power and radically changing the potential nature of nuclear warfare between the major powers. Past efforts to actually analyze nuclear warfighting ignore the fact that there are now three major groups of nuclear forces: the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China. This not only presents major problems in modeling the possible patterns in nuclear warfighting and escalation, but it also presents the problem for the United States that any exchange with only Russia or China would make the power that stayed out of the conflict the de facto winner in a major nuclear exchange.
+
+#### Dual Capability and a Return to Theater Nuclear Warfare
+
+The war in Ukraine has shown that Russia is willing to make nuclear threats, and much of the arms control efforts in Europe and between the United States and Russia have now ended or have an increasingly uncertain future. China has so far refused to engage in arms control negotiations. The end result is that there is a major risk that the deployment of theater nuclear weapons, dual-capable delivery systems that can be armed with nuclear or conventional warheads, and strategic nuclear warheads with yields suitable for theater warfare will increase steadily in the near future. The analysis shows that smaller nuclear powers have remained a relatively limited global threat but pose a steadily growing strategic threat to given nations in their region. Proliferating states like Israel, North Korea, India, and Pakistan are modernizing and increasing their forces, and the potential nuclear efforts of nations like Iran illustrate the rising risk proliferation may pose in the future. North Korea has also been reported to have declared that it has already deployed delivery systems that have both nuclear and conventional warheads.
+
+#### Other Key Areas of Uncertainty
+
+There are several other major areas of uncertainty that affect the estimates of nuclear forces in this summary analysis:
+
+- One is proliferation. Key cases involve the steady rise in Indian and Pakistani near force capabilities, the uncertainties surrounding the real-world nuclear capabilities of Israel, North Korean efforts to develop and deploy ICBMs, and the risk of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and its impact on the development of nuclear forces by Iran’s Arab neighbors.
+
+- Another is the ways in which nuclear forces can be used in combat and the extent to which the ability to manage a nuclear war in near-real time is becoming far more dynamic. There has been almost no open-source discussion of the potential impact of space sensors, AI, and big data in radically changing the current and future ability to provide reliable launch-on-warning capability and real-time data on the exact nature of nuclear strikes and their effects.
+
+- These advances in technology may allow the managers of an actual nuclear war to rapidly retarget, shift in near real-time from counterforce to countervalue targets, and fight even the highest levels of nuclear combat dynamically in near real-time. These issues are now being publicly explored in designing forces for advanced forms of conventional Joint All-Domain Operations, but there has been little public discussion of how they might change the modernization of nuclear war fighting.
+
+- A third area of uncertainty, as the 2023 edition of the ODNI’s Annual Threat Assessment highlights, is the risk that new forms of biological warfare pose a rising strategic threat and one that could be used anonymously and to produce a wide range of lethalities and economic and social effects.
+
+- A fourth is the fact that most existing U.S. and Russian, and NATO and Russian, arms control agreements have either been halted or suspended, while China has not engaged in arms control negotiations with the United States.
+
+- A fifth is the fact that the number of precision-strike theater and tactical missiles that are dual capable is steadily increasing, but there is no indication of whether U.S. and Russian tactical and theater nuclear weapons will be returned to active deployment in Europe or elsewhere, and whether today’s U.S., Russian, and Chinese “triads” will become a “quad” that includes theater and dual-capable nuclear forces.
+
+- Similarly, no reliable estimates exist of the future development and deployment of missile and air defense weapons capable of intercepting nuclear delivery systems, or of cyber, antisatellite, and other systems that can degrade the ability to escalate and conduct nuclear warfare.
+
+- Finally, as noted earlier, no reliable unclassified estimates seem to exist of the impact that counterforce strikes launched to destroy an opponent’s nuclear forces would have on the opponent’s civil population, economy, and recovery capabilities. Past studies indicated that the real-world difference between counterforce and counter value could be limited by fall-out and longer-term weapons effects in major counterforce exchange, but they are now seriously outdated. It should be noted that the comparative summary analysis in this report shows that few nuclear powers provide full national statements of their nuclear modernization efforts, the full spectrum of their current and future nuclear capabilities, and actual warfighting capabilities. Statements like “no first use” are matters of doctrine that any nation can declare and ignore in a crisis, and no nuclear state has declared possible limits to its uses of nuclear weapons, possible ways in which it might agree to halt nuclear escalation once it begins, and limits to its countervalue targeting.
+
+
+### Summary Comparisons of U.S. Russian, Chinese, European, Iranian, and North Korean Nuclear Forces
+
+
+_▲ __Six Decades of a Global Nuclear Arms Race.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen. Matt Korda, and Robert Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” 2023, Federation of American Scientists (FAS), March 29, 2023](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/)._
+
+
+_▲ __U.S. and Russia are the Major Nuclear Powers. China Lags But Its Nuclear Inventory Has Grown Sharply Over the Last Few Years.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen. Matt Korda, and Robert Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” 2023, Federation of American Scientists (FAS), March 29, 2023](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/)._
+
+
+_▲ __SIPRI Estimate of Global Nuclear Forces in 2022.__ Source: [SIPRI, 10. World Nuclear Forces](https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022/10)._
+
+
+
+_▲ __SIPRI Estimate of World Nuclear Forces in 2022.__ Source: [SIPRI, “10. World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2022, p 342](https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022/10)._
+
+
+_▲ __Guesstimating the Future: Open Source Report on U.S. Intelligence Estimate of balance for 1999 and 2020 made in 1999.__ Source: [FAS, The Decades Ahead: 199-2020, July 1999, p. 38](https://nuke.fas.org/guide/israel/nuke/)._
+
+
+### Summary Comparisons of U.S. Russian, Chinese, European, Iranian, and North Korean Holdings of Enriched Uranium and Separate Plutonium
+
+
+_▲ __SIPRI Estimate of World Holdings of Separated Plutonium in 2021.__ Note: See original source for footnotes and description of major uncertainties in the data. Source: [Moritz Kütt, Zia Mian and Pavel Podvig, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “10. World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2022, p 424-427](https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022/10)._
+
+
+_▲ __SIPRI Estimate of World Holdings of Highly Enriched Uranium in 2021.__ Note: See original source for footnotes and description of major uncertainties in the data. Source: [Moritz Kütt, Zia Mian and Pavel Podvig, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “10. World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2022, p 424-427](https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022/10)._
+
+
+_▲ __SIPRI Estimate of Significant Global Uranium Enrichment Facilities and Capacity in 2021.__ Note: See original source for footnotes and description of major uncertainties in the data. Source: [Moritz Kütt, Zia Mian and Pavel Podvig, International Panel on Fissile Materials, “10. World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2022, p 424-427](https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022/10)._
+
+
+### Potential Role of U.S. and Russian Reserve/Non-Deployed Weapons in Redeploying Theater Nuclear and Dual-Capable Conventional and Nuclear Warheads
+
+
+_▲ __The Critical Potential Role of Reserve/Non-Deployed U.S. and Russian Weapons.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen. Matt Korda, and Robert Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” 2023, Federation of American Scientists (FAS), March 28, 2023](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/)._
+
+
+### The Uncertain Impact of Arms Control
+
+_For a summary overview of the history of arms control, see Amy F. Wolf, Paul K. Kerr, and Mary Beth Nitikin; Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements, Congressional Research Service, Updated April 25, 2022_
+
+> #### `The Uncertain Future of New Start`
+
+- Russia Stops Sharing New START Data April 11, 2023
+
+ Russia terminates New START data exchanges with the United States. Facility for tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus to be completed by July, according to Russia. U.S. lawmakers want more nuclear weapons to counter China.
+
+- U.S. Cites Russian Noncompliance with New START Inspections February 9, 2023
+
+ U.S. determines Russian noncompliant with New START due to ongoing on-site inspections suspension and refusal to reschedule a required treaty meeting. Pentagon estimates Chinese nuclear arsenal climbs above 400.
+
+- U.S., Russia Discuss Threats of Nuclear Use November 17, 2022
+
+ Some senior Russian officials have discussed the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, according to reports. The United States and Russia will meet soon for a meeting of New START’s Bilateral Consultative Commission. Majority of G20 condemns Russian aggression in Ukraine and nuclear threats.
+
+- U.S., Russia Agree to Call for Negotiating New START Successor September 8, 2022
+
+ The United States and Russia agree to language supporting arms control talks on a successor to New START at the 10th review conference for the NPT. Moscow temporarily pauses New START on-site inspections. Washington sees no possibility of imminent Russian nuclear use.
+
+- U.S.-Russian Dialogue Remains Paused as Putin Wields Nuclear Threats July 19, 2022
+
+ This issue of the newsletter recaps developments related to arms control and disarmament since the beginning of 2022. This includes Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons against any country seen as interfering in Ukraine, the pause of the U.S.-Russian dialogue to discuss future arms control, and the release of NATO’s new strategic concept, naming Russia as its biggest threat.
+
+> #### `Other Cancelled or Suspended Nuclear-Related Arms Control Efforts`
+
+- U.S. Announces will withdraw from Open Skies Treaty in Six Months: May 27, 2020
+
+- U.S. Threatens to Withdraw from Open Skies Treaty: October 17, 2019, stating that Russia has violated the treaty by imposing restrictions on certain flights over its territory.
+
+- NATO rejects a proposal from Russia regarding a moratorium on INF range missiles: October 2019.
+
+- U.S. Withdraws from INF Treaty August 2, 2019, stating Russia has not complied for years and has deployed the the SSC-8 or 9M729 ground-launched, intermediate-range cruise missile.
+
+- Russia gives official notice of its suspension of the INF Treaty on March 20, 2019. The United States is planning to flight-test two INF-Treaty range missiles this year.
+
+- United States withdraws from 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on June 13, 2002. Announced withdrawal six months in advance on December 13, 2002.
+
+- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signed 26 September 1996 is still in force for some states, but are major exceptions. Eight states, including China, U.S. Egypt, Israel, and Iran have signed but not ratified. Ten state have not supported or ratified, including India, Pakistan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.
+
+- Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was concluded during the last years of the Cold War and established comprehensive limits on key categories of conventional military equipment in Europe. It potentially could have limited conventional systems that could be used to delivery nuclear weapons. In 2007, Russia “suspended” its participation in the treaty, and on 10 March 2015, citing NATO’s alleged de facto breach of the Treaty, Russia formally announced it was “completely” halting its participation in it as of the next day.
+
+
+_▲ __Arms Control Limits in START, Moscow Treaty, and New Start.__ Source: Amy F. Woolf, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, Congressional Research Service, R45861, April 21, 2022, p. 35._
+
+
+_▲ __U.S. and Russian Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements.__ Source: [Arms Control Association, Ukraine, Nuclear Weapons, and Security Assurances at a Glance, Feb 2022](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreements)._
+
+
+_▲ __Trends in U.S. & Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New Start.__ Source: U.S. State Department; [Arms Control Association, The Three-Competitor Future: U.S. Arms Control With Russia and China, March 2023](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-03/features/three-competitor-future-us-arms-control-russia-china); [Note that the State Department description of inspection and verification measures in described in the “New Start Treaty”](https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-arms-control-verification-and-compliance/)._
+
+
+_▲ __Arms Control Association Estimate of U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New Start — III.__ Source: [Arms Control Association, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START, April 2022](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USStratNukeForceNewSTART)._
+
+
+_▲ __U.S. Nuclear Forces Under New Start.__ Source: Paul K. Kerr, Defense Primer: Strategic Nuclear Forces, Congressional Research Service, IF10519, February 2, 2023, p. 1._
+
+
+_▲ __U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under START I and START II.__ Source: Amy F. Woolf, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, Congressional Research Service, RL33640, December 14, 2021, p. 6._
+
+
+_▲ __Russian Strategic Forces and Arms Control START: 1994-2009, New START: 2011-2019.__ Source: Amy F. Woolf, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, Congressional Research Service, R45861, April 21, 2022, p. 35._
+
+
+### U.S. Nuclear Forces
+
+
+_▲ __Posture Review — U.S. Nuclear Forces Modernization Plan as of October 2022.__ Source: [2022 Nuclear Posture Review, DoD, October 27, 2022](https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF)._
+
+
+_▲ __Posture Review — U.S. Shifts in Nuclear Strategy and Forces: Plan as of October 2022.__ Source: [2022 Nuclear Posture Review, DoD, October 27, 2022](https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF)._
+
+
+_▲ __Arms Control Association — Other Aspects of US Modernization Plans as of January 2022.__ Source: [Shannon Bugos, “Nuclear Modernization Program Fact Sheet,” Arms Control Association](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization#snapshot)._
+
+
+_▲ __Shifts in U.S. Nuclear Strategy ad Key U.SA. Modernization Activities: STRATCOM Posture Statement in 2023.__ Source: [Statement of Anthony J. Cotton . Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, before the House Armed Services Committee on Strategic Forces, March 8, 2023](https://www.stratcom.mil/Portals/8/Documents/2023%20USSTRATCOM%20Congressional%20Posture%20Statement.pdf?ver=bFFdbYI2D5Tju5nPNsebbw%3d%3d)._
+
+
+_▲ __CRS — U.S. Nuclear Modernization of ICBMs and Warheads: 2023.__ Source: Paul K. Kerr, Defense Primer: Strategic Nuclear Forces, Congressional Research Service, IF10519, February 2, 2023, pp. 1-2._
+
+
+_▲ __CRS — U.S. Nuclear Modernization of SLBMs and Warheads: 2023.__ Source: Paul K. Kerr, Defense Primer: Strategic Nuclear Forces, Congressional Research Service, IF10519, February 2, 2023, pp. 1-2._
+
+
+_▲ __CRS -U.S. Nuclear Modernization of Heavy Bombers and Warheads: 2023.__ Source: Paul K. Kerr, Defense Primer: Strategic Nuclear Forces, Congressional Research Service, IF10519, February 2, 2023, pp. 1-2._
+
+
+
+_▲ __US Nuclear Weapons Modernization: House of Commons Library: 2022.__ Source: [Claire Mills: Nuclear Weapons at a Glance: United States, House of Commons Library, July 28, 2022](https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9082/CBP-9082.pdf)._
+
+
+_▲ __U.S. Nuclear Weapons: 1960-2021.__ Source: Amy F. Woolf, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, Congressional Research Service, RL33640, December 14, 2021, pp. 3._
+
+
+
+_▲ __US: IISS Estimate of Strategic Nuclear and Defense Forces in 2023.__ Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2023, “United States”._
+
+
+
+_▲ __United States: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 2023.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Nuclear Notebook: United States nuclear weapons, 2023](https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-01/nuclear-notebook-united-states-nuclear-weapons-2023/#post-heading/)._
+
+
+_▲ __SIPRI Estimate of US Nuclear Forces in 2022 — I.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “10. World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2022, p 344-345](https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022/10)._
+
+
+_▲ __United States: Operational Missile Forces.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of the United States,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/united-states/)._
+
+
+### Russian Nuclear Forces
+
+
+_▲ __Russia: ODNI’s Summary Threat Analysis in 2023.__ Source: [Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2/6/23](https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf)._
+
+
+_▲ __Russia: STRATCOM Posture Statement in 2023.__ Source: [Statement of Anthony J. Cotton . Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, before the House Armed Services Committee on Strategic Forces, March 8, 2023](https://www.stratcom.mil/Portals/8/Documents/2023%20USSTRATCOM%20Congressional%20Posture%20Statement.pdf?ver=bFFdbYI2D5Tju5nPNsebbw%3d%3d)._
+
+
+_▲ __Russia Has a Major Nuclear and Missile Modernization Effort Underway In Spite of Resource Constraints — CRS: 2022.__ Source: Amy F. Wolf, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces and Modernization, Congressional Research Service, R45861, March 21, 2022, pp. 28-30; https://crsreports.congress.gov._
+
+
+_▲ __Russian Nuclear Delivery Modernization Efforts: CRS 2022.__ Source: Amy F. Woolf, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, Congressional Research Service, R45861, April 21, 2022, p. 24._
+
+
+_▲ __Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces — CRS: 1949-2022.__ Source: Amy F. Woolf, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, Congressional Research Service, R45861, April 21, 2022, p. 12._
+
+
+_▲ __Russian Strategic Nuclear Warheads by Delivery System — CRS: 1949-2021.__ Source: Amy F. Woolf, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, Congressional Research Service, R45861, April 21, 2022, p. 14._
+
+
+_▲ __Russian ICBM Systems — CRS: 2022.__ Source: Amy F. Woolf, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, Congressional Research Service, R45861, April 21, 2022, p. 18._
+
+
+_▲ __Russian Ballistic Missile Submarines and Missiles — CRS: 2022.__ Source: Amy F. Woolf, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, Congressional Research Service, R45861, April 21, 2022, p. 19._
+
+
+_▲ __Russian Heavy Bombers — CRS: 2022.__ Source: Amy F. Woolf, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, Congressional Research Service, R45861, April 21, 2022, p. 20._
+
+
+_▲ __Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons — CRS: 2022.__ Source: Amy F. Woolf, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, Congressional Research Service, R45861, April 21, 2022, p. 21._
+
+
+
+
+
+_▲ __Russia: Nuclear Weapons Modernization: House of Commons Library: 2022.__ Source: [Claire Mills: Nuclear Weapons at a Glance: China, House of Commons Library, July 29, 2022](https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9088/CBP-9088.pdf)._
+
+
+_▲ __Russian Bases for Strategic Nuclear Forces.__ Source: Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, Congressional Research Service, R45861, April 21, 2022, p. 17._
+
+
+_▲ __Russian Nuclear Storage Facilities.__ Source: Amy F. Woolf, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, Congressional Research Service, R45861, April 21, 2022, p. 42._
+
+
+
+_▲ __Russia: IISS Estimate of Strategic Nuclear and Defense Forces in 2023.__ Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2023, “Russia”._
+
+
+
+_▲ __Russia: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 2022.___
+
+
+
+_▲ __SIPRI Estimate of Russian Nuclear Forces in 2022.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “10. World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp 356-357](https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022/10)._
+
+
+
+_▲ __Arms Control Association Estimate of
+Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New Start.__ Source: [Arms Control Association, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START, April 2022](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Russian-Strategic-Nuclear-Forces-Under-New-START)._
+
+
+_▲ __Russia: Operational & In-Development Missile Forces.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of Russia,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/russia/)._
+
+
+_▲ __Russia: Land-Based Missile Forces.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of Russia,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/russia/)._
+
+
+### Chinese Nuclear Forces
+
+
+_▲ __Chinese Nuclear Capability Is Growing Sharply.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen. Matt Korda, and Robert Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” 2022](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces); [SIPRI Yearbook, Section 2: China’s Nuclear Forces: Moving Beyond a Minimal Deterrent, 2021](https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/Chapter_3_Section_2--Chinas_Nuclear_Forces_Moving_beyond_a_Minimal_Deterrent.pdf); and DIA, China, Military Power, 2021._
+
+
+
+_▲ __China: STRATCOM Posture Statement in 2023.__ Source: [Statement of Anthony J. Cotton . Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, before the House Armed Services Committee on Strategic Forces, March 8, 2023](https://www.stratcom.mil/Portals/8/Documents/2023%20USSTRATCOM%20Congressional%20Posture%20Statement.pdf?ver=bFFdbYI2D5Tju5nPNsebbw%3d%3d)._
+
+
+_▲ __China: ODNI’s Summary Threat Analysis in 2023.__ Source: [Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2/6/23](https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf)._
+
+
+
+
+
+_▲ __US Department of Defense: Chinese Nuclear Developments in 2022.__ Source: US Department of Defense, China Military Power 2022, pp. 94-97._
+
+
+
+_▲ __China: IISS Estimate of Strategic Nuclear and Defense Forces in 2023.__ Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2023, “China”._
+
+
+
+
+_▲ __China: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 2023.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Reynolds, Nuclear Notebook: Chinese nuclear weapons, 2023](https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-03/nuclear-notebook-chinese-nuclear-weapons-2023/)._
+
+
+
+
+_▲ __China: Nuclear Weapons Modernization: House of Commons Library: 2022.__ Source: [Claire Mills: Nuclear Weapons at a Glance: China, House of Commons Library, July 29, 2022](https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9088/CBP-9088.pdf)._
+
+
+_▲ __SIPRI Estimate of Chinese Nuclear Forces in 2022.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “10. World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp 380-390](https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022/10)._
+
+
+_▲ __US Department of Defense: Estimate of Chinese Missile Forces: 2022.__ Source: US Department of Defense, China Military Power 2022, p. 167._
+
+
+_▲ __China: Operational Missile Forces.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of China,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/)._
+
+
+_▲ __China: Ballistic and Cruise Missile Forces.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of China,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/)._
+
+
+_▲ __China’s Regional Missile Threats.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of China,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/)._
+
+
+### United Kingdom Nuclear Forces
+
+
+
+_▲ __United Kingdom: Refresh of the Integrated Defense Review: 2023.__ Source: [Cabinet Office, Policy paper, Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world, 13 March 2023](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-review-refresh-2023-responding-to-a-more-contested-and-volatile-world/integrated-review-refresh-2023-responding-to-a-more-contested-and-volatile-world)._
+
+
+_▲ __United Kingdom: House of Commons 2022.__ Source: [Claire Mills, Nuclear weapons at a glance: United Kingdom, House of Commons Library, 28 July 2022](https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9077/CBP-9077.pdf)._
+
+
+_▲ __United Kingdom: IISS Estimate of Nuclear Forces in 2023.__ Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2023, “France and United Kingdom”._
+
+
+
+_▲ __United Kingdom: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 2023.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: How many nuclear weapons does the United Kingdom have in 2021?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 13, 2021](https://thebulletin.org/premium/2021-05/nuclear-notebook-how-many-nuclear-weapons-does-the-united-kingdom-have-in-2021/)._
+
+
+_▲ __SIPRI Estimate of British Nuclear Forces in 2022.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “10. World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp 369-34](https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022/10)._
+
+
+
+
+_▲ __United Kingdom: House of Commons Library: 2022.__ Source: [Claire Mills: Nuclear Weapons at a Glance: United Kingdom, House of Commons Library, May 3, 2022](https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9077/CBP-9077.pdf)._
+
+
+_▲ __United Kingdom: Operational & In-Development Missile Forces.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of the United Kingdom,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/united-kingdom/)._
+
+
+### French Nuclear Forces
+
+
+
+
+_▲ __France: Strategic Update 2021.__ Source: [Ministere des Armees, Strategic Update, 2021](https://www.stjornarradid.is/library/03-Verkefni/Almannaoryggi/Thjodaroryggismal/France%20-%20Strategic%20Review%202021.pdf)._
+
+
+_▲ __France: Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation: 2020.___
+
+
+_▲ __IISS Estimate of French Nuclear Forces in 2023.__ Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2023, “France United Kingdom”._
+
+
+
+_▲ __France: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 2019.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Nuclear Notebook: French nuclear weapons, 2019](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1556003?needAccess=true)._
+
+
+_▲ __SIPRI Estimate of French Nuclear Forces in 2022.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “10. World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp 375-379](https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022/10)._
+
+
+
+_▲ __France: Nuclear Weapons: House of Commons Library: 2022.__ Source: [Claire Mills: Nuclear Weapons at a Glance: France, House of Commons Library, July 28, 2022](https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9074/CBP-9074.pdf)._
+
+
+_▲ __France: Operational & Obsolete Missile Forces.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of France,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/france/)._
+
+
+### North Korean Nuclear Forces
+
+
+_▲ __North Korea: ODNI’s Summary Threat Analysis in 2023.__ Source: [Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2/6/23](https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf)._
+
+
+_▲ __North Korea: STRATCOM Posture Statement in 2023.__ Source: [Statement of Anthony J. Cotton . Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, before the House Armed Services Committee on Strategic Forces, March 8, 2023](https://www.stratcom.mil/Portals/8/Documents/2023%20USSTRATCOM%20Congressional%20Posture%20Statement.pdf?ver=bFFdbYI2D5Tju5nPNsebbw%3d%3d)._
+
+
+_▲ __North Korea: Nuclear Weapons: CRS Estimate 2023.__ Source: Mary Beth, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs, Congressional Research Service, IF10423, January 23, 2023._
+
+
+_▲ __IISS Estimate of North Korean (DPRK) Nuclear Forces in 2023.__ Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2023, “North Korea/DPRK”._
+
+
+
+_▲ __North Korea: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in 2022.__ Source: Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, “North Korean nuclear weapons, 2021,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 2021._
+
+
+
+_▲ __SIPRI Estimate of North Korean Forces with Potential Nuclear Capability in 2022.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “10. World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp 410-423, https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022/10)._
+
+
+_▲ __Wikipedia Estimate of North Korea’s Nuclear Forces.__ Source: [“North Korean and weapons of mass destruction.” WIKIPEDIA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction), accessed 19.4.23._
+
+
+
+_▲ __North Korea: Nuclear Delivery Systems: CRS Estimate 2023.__ Source: Mary Beth D Nitikin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs, Congressional Research Service, IF10423, January 23, 2023._
+
+
+
+_▲ __North Korea: Nuclear Weapons: House of Commons Library: 2022.__ Source: [Claire Mills: Nuclear Weapons at a Glance: North Korea, House of Commons Library, May 17, 2022](https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9071/CBP-9071.pdf)._
+
+
+
+_▲ __North Korea: Missile Forces.__ [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of North Korea,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/)._
+
+
+### Iranian Nuclear Program
+
+_For summary historical data see [Wikipedia article on Nuclear Program of Iran](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_program_of_Iran) and reporting by the IAEA._
+
+
+_▲ __Iran: ODNI’s Summary Threat Analysis in 2023.__ Source: [Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2/6/23](https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf)._
+
+
+_▲ __Iran: Nuclear Weapons: CRS Estimate 2023.__ Source: Paul K/ Kerr, Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production, Congressional Research Service, IF121063, April 14, 2023._
+
+
+_▲ __Iran: Missile Forces.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of Iran,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/iran/)._
+
+
+### Israeli Nuclear Forces
+
+
+_▲ __IISS Estimate of Israeli Nuclear Forces in 2023.__ Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2023, “Israel”._
+
+
+_▲ __Israel: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 2021-2022.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: Israeli nuclear weapons, 2022,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January 17, 2022](https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-01/nuclear-notebook-israeli-nuclear-weapons-2022/)._
+
+
+_▲ __SIPRI Estimate of Israeli Nuclear Forces in 2022.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “10. World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp 404-409](https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022/10)._
+
+
+_▲ __Wikipedia Estimate of Israeli Nuclear Forces: 2023.__ Source: [“Nuclear Weapons and Israel.” WIKIPEDIA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_and_Israel), accessed 19.4.23._
+
+
+_▲ __Israel: Nuclear Weapons: House of Commons Library: 2022.__ Source: [Claire Mills: Nuclear Weapons at a Glance: Israel, House of Commons Library, July 28, 2022](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9075/)._
+
+
+
+_▲ __Israel: Nuclear Weapons: FAS Estimate: As of ?__ Source: [Nuclear Weapons, FAS](https://nuke.fas.org/guide/israel/nuke)._
+
+
+_▲ __Israel: Operational & Obsolete Missile Forces.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of Israel,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/israel/)._
+
+
+_▲ __Israel: Ballistic and Cruise Missile Forces.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of Israel,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/israel/)._
+
+
+### Indian Nuclear Forces
+
+
+_▲ __IISS Estimate of India’s Nuclear Forces in 2023.__ Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2023, “India”._
+
+
+
+_▲ __India: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 2021-2022.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: How many nuclear weapons does India have in 2022?,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists , July 11, 2022](https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-07/nuclear-notebook-how-many-nuclear-weapons-does-india-have-in-2022/)._
+
+
+_▲ __SIPRI Estimate of Indian Nuclear
+Forces in 2022.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “10. World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp 391-397](https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022/10)._
+
+
+
+_▲ __India: Nuclear Weapons: House of Commons Library: 2022.__ Source: [Claire Mills: Nuclear Weapons at a Glance: India and Pakistan, House of Commons Library, July 29, 2022](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9070/)._
+
+
+
+
+_▲ __Wikipedia Estimate of India’s Nuclear Forces in 2023.__ Source: [“India and weapons of mass destruction.” WIKIPEDIA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction), accessed 19.4.23._
+
+
+_▲ __India: Operational, In Development, and & Obsolete Missile Forces.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of India,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/india/)._
+
+
+_▲ __India: Ballistic and Cruise Missile Forces.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of India,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/india/)._
+
+
+### Pakistani Nuclear Forces
+
+
+_▲ __ISS Estimate of Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces in 2023.__ Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2023, “Pakistan”._
+
+
+
+_▲ __Pakistan: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 2021-2022.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: How many nuclear weapons does Pakistan have in 2021?” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September 7, 2022](https://thebulletin.org/premium/2021-09/nuclear-notebook-how-many-nuclear-weapons-does-pakistan-have-in-2021/)._
+
+
+_▲ __SIPRI Estimate of Pakistani Nuclear Forces in 2022.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “10. World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp 398-403](https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2022/10)._
+
+
+_▲ __Pakistan: Congressional Research Service: 2016.__ Source: Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nitikin,, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service, RL34248, August 1, 2016._
+
+
+
+_▲ __Pakistan: Nuclear Weapons: House of Commons Library: 2022.__ Source: [Claire Mills: Nuclear Weapons at a Glance: India and Pakistan, House of Commons Library, July 29, 2022](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9070/)._
+
+
+
+_▲ __Wikipedia Estimate of Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces (Dated).__ Source: [“Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction.” WIKIPEDIA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction), accessed 19.4.23._
+
+
+_▲ __Pakistan: Operational & In-Development Missile Forces.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of Pakistan,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/pakistan/)._
+
+
+_▲ __Pakistan: Ballistic and Cruise Missile Forces.__ Source: [Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of Pakistan,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018](https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/pakistan/)._
+
+
+### U.S Strategic Command Summary of U.S. Nuclear Modernization Priorities
+
+_Adapted from statement of Anthony J. Cotton, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, before the House Armed Services Committee on Strategic Forces, March 8, 2023._
+
+__NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (NC3):__ The NC3 enterprise is essential to the President’s ability to command and control the Nation’s nuclear forces. Acknowledgement of this vital mission and the unique challenges facing NC3 modernization were the impetus behind the Secretary of Defense’s establishment of my role as the DoD NC3 Enterprise Lead in 2018. With these responsibilities and authorities, we are taking a holistic enterprise approach to develop and deliver the next generation of NC3 — a flexible, resilient, and assured architecture spanning all domains and enhancing strategic deterrence.
+
+_NC3 Next Generation / Modernization:_ The modernization of the NC3 enterprise underpins the nuclear triad and sustains assured command and control capabilities in the evolving threat environment. We are partnering with NC3 stakeholders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and levying requirements on the Services to modernize all NC3 capability areas, integrating global nuclear forces with the means to provide strategic deterrence.
+
+In the next five years, we will transition from Milstar to the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite constellation, gaining greater capacity, survivable worldwide NC3 reach, and the ability to provide direction to our forces in degraded environments. Our national leadership conferencing, currently using a voice-only legacy technology, will transition to voice and video displays. In our warning layer, we are moving away from the Defense Support Program and towards the Space Based Infrared System to maximize warning time. Efforts are already underway on our submarines, E-6B aircraft, and bombers to replace previous generation radios with improved systems that are more resilient to jamming and other electromagnetic effects.
+
+In the next ten years, the launch and use of Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared geosynchronous and polar satellites will replace legacy systems with a space-based missile warning constellation to detect and track threats around the globe. The Space Development Agency’s Proliferated Warfighting Space Architecture is aimed at building a constellation of satellites in low and medium earth orbit that can monitor maneuvering hypersonic missiles flying below the range of today’s ballistic missile detection satellites and above the radar of terminal-phase targeting systems. These satellites will complement other efforts to detect and track maneuvering hypersonic missiles that are difficult targets for current missile warning capabilities.
+
+Finally, we will use polar satellite communications capability with the Enhanced Polar System Recapitalization program to provide message relay. Our submarines, E-6B aircraft, bombers, and missile fields will receive communication systems that increase survivability of weapon systems in a crisis situation. We are focused on achieving our vision — a modernized NC3 _enterprise that remains resilient, reliable, and available at all times and under the worst conditions._
+
+_NC3 Cybersecurity and Technological Improvements:_ We have confidence in our ability to protect, defend, and execute the nuclear deterrent mission. The resilience and redundancies of the systems comprising the Nuclear Command and Control System, combined with ongoing cybersecurity enhancements, ensure our ability to respond under adverse cyber conditions.
+
+___E-4B Nightwatch:___ The E-4B Nightwatch aircraft serves as the National Airborne Operations Center and is a key component of the National Military Command System for the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The E-4B recapitalization program — the Survivable Airborne Operations Center — will serve as the next generation airborne command center platform. In case of national emergency or destruction of ground command and control centers, the aircraft provides a highly survivable command, control and communications center to direct U.S. forces, execute emergency war orders and coordinate actions by civil authorities. For these reasons, we must continue to develop and deliver this platform on time to prevent any capability gaps associated with this important national asset.
+
+___E-6B Mercury:___ The E-6B Mercury accomplishes two missions: Emergency Action Message (EAM) relay to all legs of the nuclear triad (Take Charge and Move Out/TACAMO) and an alternate USSTRATCOM command center providing EAM origination and ICBM secondary launch capability (Looking Glass). E-XX is the follow-on platform to the E-6B airframe and will execute the TACAMO mission only. In coordination with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Joint Staff, USSTRATCOM and the NC3 Enterprise Center are conducting an evaluation of alternatives (EoA) to consider all missions and platforms to deliver the Looking Glass capabilities currently performed by the E-6B. Recommendations from the EoA should be available by mid- summer. We must complete recapitalization by the E-6B’s projected end of service life in FY38.
+
+___RECAPITAIZATION OF TRIAD___ is a once in every-other-generation event that will ensure we have capable forces into the 2080s to defend the U.S. homeland and deter strategic attack globally. I am closely monitoring the transition of our major programs: OHIO to COLUMBIA, D5 LE to D5 LE2, Minuteman III to Sentinel, B-2 to B-21, Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) to LRSO, and modernization of NC3 capabilities. It is essential to sustain our current platforms until new systems are at full operational capability. Correspondingly, we are coordinating with the Services on efforts to mitigate operational impacts should delays occur in the delivery timeline for new capabilities.
+
+___LAND-BASED TRIAD COMPONENT:___ The ICBM remains our country’s most responsive option for strategic deterrence. The Minuteman III (MMIII) force provides a responsive, highly reliable deterrent capability, supported by a secure command and control system. Geographically dispersed ICBMs deny potential adversaries the possibility of a successful first strike.
+
+MMIII’s weapon system replacement, the LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM, will deliver MMIII’s key attributes while enhancing platform security, streamlining maintenance processes, and delivering greater operational capability needed for the evolving threat environment. Sentinel’s program scope and scale cannot be overstated — our first fully integrated ICBM platform includes the flight system, weapon system, C2, ground launch systems, and facilities.
+
+The Sentinel program is pursuing mature, low-risk technologies, design modularity, and an open system architecture using state-of-the-art model-based systems engineering. Sentinel will meet our current needs, while allowing affordable future technology insertion to address emerging threats. USSTRATCOM is actively supporting the Sentinel engineering and manufacturing development process and looks forward to the first Sentinel developmental flight test. Sentinel will deploy with numerous advantages over MMIII and will provide a credible deterrent late into this century. Sentinel fielding is a whole of government endeavor. We appreciate continued Congressional support, both for Sentinel and sustainment of MMIII.
+
+__SEA-BASED TRIAD COMPONENT:__ The Navy’s OHIO-class SSBN fleet, equipped with the Trident II D5 SLBM, patrols the world’s oceans undetected, providing an assured second strike capability in any scenario. Our SSBN fleet continues to provide a resilient, reliable, and survivable deterrent. However, the life of the OHIO-class SSBN fleet has been extended from a planned 30 years to an unprecedented 42 years. The average age of the SSBN fleet is now 32 years. As the hulls continue to age, the OHIO-class will face sustainment and readiness challenges until it is replaced by the COLUMBIA-class. Similar to Minuteman III, we must maintain OHIO-class hulls until the COLUMBIA is available. The Navy has already invested in the Integrated Enterprise Plan to shorten construction timelines for COLUMBIA hulls two through twelve to meet USSTRATCOM at-sea requirements. Continued investment in revitalizing our shipbuilding industry is a national security imperative.
+
+_The first COLUMBIA-class_ submarine must achieve its initial strategic deterrent patrol in FY31 with an initial loadout of D5 LE missiles and a steady transition to the D5 LE2. The program of record delivers at least twelve SSBNs — the absolute minimum required to meet sustainment requirements. A life-of-hull reactor and shorter planned major maintenance periods are intended to deliver greater operational availability. COLUMBIA will deliver improved tactical and sonar systems, electric propulsion drive, and advanced hull coating to maintain U.S. undersea dominance.
+
+___The Trident II D5 LE2___ program will field a modern, reliable, flexible, and effective missile capable of adapting to emerging threats and is required to meet COLUMBIA-class SLBM loadout requirements. Stable funding for D5LE2 is vital to maintaining program benchmarks and ensuring a viable SSBN deterrent through the 2080s. COLUMBIA’s ultimate success depends on a missile that is both capable and flexible.
+
+Additionally, shore infrastructure readiness is fundamental to supporting current OHIO-class SSBN and future COLUMBIA-class SSBN operations. Provision of military construction and operation & maintenance funding facilitates the Navy’s modernization of shore infrastructure supporting the nuclear deterrence mission. One immediate example is the modernization and expansion of the SSBN training and maintenance facilities in Kings Bay. These facilities are critical for maximizing the combat readiness of SSBNs and their crews daily, requiring a commitment to multiple years of funding.
+
+___Anti-Submarine Warfare:___ Anti-submarine warfare threats continue to evolve. The Navy’s Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) provides vital information concerning adversary submarine and surface ship operations, enabling U.S. forces to maintain favorable tactical and strategic positions while supporting deterrent patrol operations. Surveillance performed by IUSS also provides the theater undersea warfare commander situational awareness required for maritime defense of the homeland. Advances in adversary submarine stealth underscore the importance of IUSS recapitalization.
+
+Our submarines are formidable weapon systems; however, we must address potential adversaries’ anti-submarine warfare advances to maintain an effective and viable SSBN fleet well into the future. Adversary investments in submarine quieting, acoustic arrays, and processing capabilities may challenge our acoustic superiority in the future and consequently, SSBN survivability. Development and employment of advanced sonar sensors, advanced materials science and coatings, and other efforts within the Navy’s Acoustic Superiority Program are vital to maintain our undersea advantage.
+
+__AIR-BASED TRIAD COMPONENT:__ The bomber fleet is our most flexible and visible leg of the triad. We are the only country with the capability to provide long-range bombers in support of our Allies and partners, enabling the U.S. to signal resolve while providing a flexible option to de-escalate a conflict or crisis. In a force employment model known as the Bomber Task Force (BTF), USSTRATCOM supports global deterrence and assurance objectives. BTFs allow dynamic employment of the Joint Force and clear messaging as potential adversaries watch these missions closely. As bombers conduct missions throughout the globe, they enhance national objectives by demonstrating unity with Allies and partners, and testing interoperability. As a complement to the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept, we must consider increasing forward-based maintenance capability to support persistent, episodic global presence while retaining the ability to increase nuclear readiness posture as needed. As we sustain legacy systems and field new capabilities, it will be important to invest in bomber support forces and infrastructure to adequately sustain flexibility and effective nuclear deterrence posture.
+
+___B-52H Sustainment:___ The B-52H continues on as the workhorse of our bomber fleet. The B-52’s longevity is a testament to its engineers and maintenance professionals, but it must be modernized to remain in service into the 2050s. Essential B-52 upgrades include the Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP), Radar Modernization Plan, global positioning system military code signal integration, and survivable NC3 communications equipment. These improvements will keep the B-52 flying and able to pace the evolving threat. CERP will replace the B-52’s 1960s-era TF-33 engines, which will enable longer unrefueled range, reduce emissions, and address supply chain issues afflicting the legacy engines. The B-52’s very low frequency and advanced extremely high frequency modernization programs will provide mission critical, beyond-line-of-sight connectivity.
+
+___B-2 Sustainment:___ The B-2 fleet remains the world’s only low-observable bomber, able to penetrate denied environments while employing a wide variety of munitions against high-value strategic targets. The DoD must protect this unique operational advantage as the Air Force transitions from the B-2 to the B-21 fleet. Successful transition requires full funding for B-2 sustainment and modernization programs until the B-21 completes development and certification for both conventional and nuclear missions, and is fielded in sufficient numbers to preclude any capability gap.
+
+___B-21:___ The B-21 Raider will provide both a conventional and nuclear-capable bomber supporting the triad with strategic and operational flexibility across a wide range of military objectives. The program is on track to meet USSTRATCOM operational requirements, and continues to successfully execute within cost, schedule, and performance goals. The B-21 will be the backbone of our future bomber force, providing a penetrating platform with the range, access, and payload to go anywhere needed in the world. Consistent funding of the Air Force’s B-21 program is required to prevent operational shortfalls in the bomber force and ensure delivery of this critical combat capability.
+
+___Air-Delivered Weapons:___ The air-delivered weapons portfolio consists of the ALCM, the B83-1 gravity bomb, and the B61 family of weapons, providing a mix of standoff and direct attack munitions to meet near-term operational requirements. The ALCM provides current stand-off capability to the strategic bomber force, but is reaching its end-of-life. LRSO will replace the ALCM as our country’s sole air-delivered standoff nuclear capability. It will provide the President with flexible and scalable options, and is capable of penetrating and surviving against advanced air defenses — a key attribute and important component in USSTRATCOM operational plans. The LRSO is complementary to the ICBM and SSBN recapitalization programs and an important contribution to strategic stability. The B61-12 will soon replace most previous versions of the B61, providing a modernized weapon with greater accuracy and increased flexibility. Finally, USSTRATCOM is actively supporting the National Defense Authorization Act requirement to conduct a study on options to hold at risk hard and deeply buried targets.
+
+___Tanker Support:___ A robust tanker fleet is essential to sustaining global reach for all USSTRATCOM missions. The 65 year-old KC-135 is the backbone of the Air Force’s air refueling force but is facing increasing maintenance and sustainment issues. Limited air-refueling aircraft increases bomber response timing and constrains bomber deterrence posture agility. Concurrent mission demands between strategic, theater, and homeland defense require continued tanker modernization and expansion efforts. USSTRATCOM fully endorses and supports the Air Force’s effort to modernize and sustain the tanker fleet, including certification of the KC-46 to support the nuclear mission. A conflict with a peer adversary would put previously unseen demands on the tanker force.
+
+__WEAPONS INFRASTRUCTURE AND NUCLEAR SECURITY ENTERPRISE (NSE):__ Today’s nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective. However, our country has not conducted a large-scale weapons modernization in over two decades. Stockpile and infrastructure modernization must ensure our systems are capable of pacing and negating adversary threats to our Nation, Allies, and partners. Over the past five years we have made significant investments in the NSE, but most programs take a decade or longer to field a meaningful capability.
+
+The NNSA, as part of and informed by the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), has developed a comprehensive plan to put these identified capacities and capabilities in-place. When realized, it will enable our country to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile to meet strategic deterrence needs. In the interim, I look forward to working with NNSA and other NWC partners to find the best solutions to mitigate operational risks. I commend Congress for its support of the NNSA’s budget for weapons activities for FY23. Stockpile and NSE programs can take a decade or more to deliver and will require consistent, uninterrupted funding to provide the needed capacities and capabilities on time to sustain and modernize the strategic deterrent force. We must continue to look for ways to accelerate our stockpile and NSE modernization and recapitalization programs.
+
+As we shift focus beyond life extension to modernizing existing weapons and fielding new systems, we must overcome challenges that delay program execution. There are many NSE programs with just-in-time schedules or that are late-to-need, including pit production, uranium processing, and radiation case manufacturing. Failure to execute and deliver timely NSE modernization programs results in accumulation of operational risk by requiring the retention of aging weapons and components in the stockpile decades longer than intended. In FY22, the NSE took action on a number of issues impacting the readiness and modernization of the nuclear deterrent force. Some areas — for example, the W93, B61-12, and W88 Alt 370 — saw progress, while others such as the W80-4 and W87-1 stockpile modernization programs are experiencing milestone delays and increased schedule risk. I look forward to working with NNSA and other NWC partners to improve our rates of success in these latter areas.
+
+Production of essential components is a critical issue. NNSA has identified critical capability gaps affecting components essential for stockpile modernization. It is also vital that the NSE re-establishes a plutonium pit manufacturing capability of no less than 80 pits per year as close to 2030 as possible. Weapon production is a multi-decade task that must address current enterprise limitations as we simultaneously modernize the stockpile, infrastructure, and platforms while sustaining the current force until it can be replaced. For over a decade, our adversaries have dedicated significant resources to modernizing and expanding their nuclear capabilities. As our systems continue to age, funding a modern stockpile, supporting infrastructure, and a robust science, technology, and engineering base is essential.
+
+__NUCLEAR SECURITY:__ Nuclear security continues to be one of my top priorities; we will commit the resources required to protect our fielded weapons, weapon platforms, and personnel. Adhering to the Nuclear Weapon Security Standard ensures denial of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons and prevents loss of custody. A defense-in-depth strategy starts at every nuclear weapon and builds outward with a cohesive design to deter, detect, delay, deny, and defeat security threats.
+
+___MH-139A Grey Wolf Replacement Helicopter:___ The Joint Force achieved a significant ICBM security milestone with the Air Force’s award of a contract to replace the UH-1N helicopter fleet with the new MH-139A “Grey Wolf.” The MH-139A offers enhanced speed, range, endurance, payload, and survivability versus the UH-1N. We will continue to work with the Services to deliver this capability.
+
+Countering Small Unmanned Systems: The rapid proliferation and growing technological sophistication of small unmanned systems is an increasing threat to the nuclear enterprise. To counter the threat, the Department continues to field Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS) capabilities and is refining tactics, techniques, and procedures. Similarly, the advancement of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles may soon emerge as a threat to our SSBNs and supporting infrastructure, requiring a comprehensive force protection system to defend both pier-side and in-transit SSBNs.
+
+___Weapon Generation Facility (WGF):___ As we modernize nuclear weapons and platforms, the Air Force will replace aging weapon storage areas with new WGFs which are vital to security, sustainment, and fielding of the Sentinel, B-21, and LRSO triad modernization programs, and their associated weapons. The Air Force will conduct weapon maintenance, storage operations, and (as required) weapons generation activities in a single reinforced WGF facility at each strategic base. This will further increase security, recapitalize aging infrastructure, and enhance efficiency throughout the mission. The WGFs are a critical part of the larger nuclear modernization effort and must be fully funded to deliver on time in support of each program of record delivery schedule.
+
+__JOINT ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM OPERATIONS (JEMSO):__ Per the Unified Command Plan (UCP), CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for advocating for JEMSO and electromagnetic warfare capabilities, providing contingency electronic warfare support to other CCMDs, and supporting CCMD joint training and planning related to controlling the EMS. Potential adversaries understand our dependency upon the EMS and have developed technology to effectively contest our use of it. Additionally, increased civil and commercial use of spectrum bandwidth significantly congests the EMS and constrains DoD use. Multiple USSTRATCOM assessments have identified JEMSO readiness shortfalls, which are growing. Our adversaries have dramatically increased their offensive and defensive capabilities in recent years; the DoD must similarly improve our ability to operate in a degraded electromagnetic warfare environment.
+
+We must continue to pursue a DoD-wide effort to achieve EMS superiority and mission. To support the goals of the DoD EMS Superiority Strategy, USSTRATCOM is executing twelve assigned tasks, including establishing an organization, led by a 2-star, called the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Center (JEC). The JEC will lead execution of the eleven other USSTRATCOM assigned DoD EMS Superiority Strategy tasks. Additionally, USSTRATCOM has led development of JEMSO cells at other CCMDs to enable these functions. We are also working with the DoD Chief Information Officer to develop a software system for use by CCMD JEMSO cells in planning, coordinating, and controlling the EMS. Following multiple assessments from Northern Edge — USINDOPACOM’s tier 1 exercise — USSTRATCOM is pursuing accreditation authorities for Joint Force EMSO readiness that will help close capability gaps. USSTRATCOM is also establishing an EMSO training and education capability to coordinate DoD EMS joint training, streamline training processes, and promote standardization.
+
+__MISSILE DEFENSE:__ Missile defense capabilities are a key part of integrated deterrence to deny our potential adversaries coercive abilities or the benefit of attacks against the homeland, Allies, and partners. The proliferation of missile technology and employment techniques designed to circumvent missile defenses demands a Department-wide missile defeat approach with continued investment in systems integration and collaboration with Allies and partners. This comprehensive approach uses the entire range of available activities to counter the development, acquisition, proliferation, and use of adversary offensive missiles of all types, as well as limiting damage from such use. An important element of this approach is integration of space- and terrestrial-based sensors for warning, attribution, and tracking of ballistic, maneuvering, hypersonic, cruise missile, and UAS threats to optimize the effectiveness of our limited inventory of kinetic interceptors. A comprehensive sensor architecture that gives commanders and civilian leaders situational awareness over all threats and incursions to our air and space domains is imperative.
+
+MMIII’s weapon system replacement, the LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM, will deliver MMIII’s key attributes while enhancing platform security, streamlining maintenance processes, and delivering greater operational capability needed for the evolving threat environment.
+
+Sentinel’s program scope and scale cannot be overstated — our first fully integrated ICBM platform includes the flight system, weapon system, C2, ground launch systems, and facilities.
+
+The Sentinel program is pursuing mature, low-risk technologies, design modularity, and an open system architecture using state-of-the-art model-based systems engineering. Sentinel will meet our current needs, while allowing affordable future technology insertion to address emerging threats. USSTRATCOM is actively supporting the Sentinel engineering and manufacturing development process and looks forward to the first Sentinel developmental flight test. Sentinel will deploy with numerous advantages over MMIII and will provide a credible deterrent late into this century. Sentinel fielding is a whole of government endeavor. We appreciate continued Congressional support, both for Sentinel and sustainment of MMIII.
+
+__HYPERSONIC WEAPONS:__ Long-range conventional hypersonic weapons will provide senior leadership additional strike options to hold distant and/or defended high-value, time-sensitive targets at risk without crossing the nuclear threshold. Conventional HSWs ensure long-range power projection in contested environments and enables more efficient and effective application of the nuclear force. While HSWs are not a replacement for nuclear weapons, these systems show promise as the conventional complement that the nuclear force needs to expand integrated deterrence options.
+
+The ability to quickly strike defended targets at long range is an important capability that the Joint Force and multiple CCMDs require. Rapid development and fielding of conventional HSWs is a top USSTRATCOM priority. The goal of fielding the first offensive hypersonic strike system is on the horizon with the Army scheduled to field a Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon battery in late 2023, followed by the Navy Conventional Prompt Strike program beginning in the mid-2020s. The Air Force has demonstrated successes in the Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon program and hypersonic cruise missile technology pathfinder efforts. A robust scientific and industrial base is vital to ensure that HSWs are fielded in sufficient quantities. Additionally, a program for continuous technological improvement is important to meet the evolving security environment over the coming decades.
+
+USSTRATCOM is committed to ensuring HSWs are ready to employ on day one of fielding as these weapons directly contribute to USSTRATCOM’s UCP-assigned strategic deterrence and global strike responsibilities. To operationalize these new capabilities in the near term, we are working across the Department to develop a concept of operation for HSW support to integrated deterrence.
+
+USSTRATCOM is working through policy, planning, and C2 processes, and — in conjunction with the Services and other CCMDs — is testing HSWs through a rigorous exercise program. Hypersonic weapons will have an immediate impact to operational plans by deterring and holding adversaries at risk while providing the nation with credible, strategic, non-nuclear response options when faced with armed conflict. Additionally, HSW-related agreements with Allies will further reinforce collective security, promote interoperability, and facilitate optimal deployment of these capabilities.
+
+
+### U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Missile Defense
+
+___U.S. Missile Defense Strategy and Nuclear Forces: 2022 Missile Defense Review.__ Source: [Department of Defense: 2022 Missile Defense Review](https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF)._
+
+As outlined in the NDS, integrated deterrence is a framework weaving together all instruments of national power — with diplomacy at the forefront — to work seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, and our network of alliances and partnerships. Tailored to specific circumstances, integrated deterrence applies a coordinated, multifaceted approach to reducing competitors’ perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraint. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-credible forces and backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
+
+Missile defenses, as one component of this integrated, multilayered framework, are critical to the top priority of defending the homeland and deterring attacks against the United States. Whether protecting the homeland, deployed U.S. forces, or our Allies and partners, missile defenses deny the benefits of an attack by adversaries and limits damage should deterrence fail. The continued evolution and progress of missiles as a principal means by which adversaries seek to project conventional or nuclear military power makes missile defense a core deterrence-by- denial component of an integrated deterrence strategy. Missile defense capabilities add resilience and undermine adversary confidence in missile use by introducing doubt and uncertainty into strike planning and execution, reducing the incentive to conduct small-scale coercive attacks, decreasing the probability of attack success, and raising the threshold for conflict. Missile defenses also reinforce U.S. diplomatic and security posture to reassure Allies and partners that the United States will not be deterred from fulfilling its global security commitments. In the event of crisis or conflict, missile defenses offer military options that help counter the expanding presence of missile threats, and may be less escalatory than employing offensive systems. Damage limitation offered by missile defenses expands decision making space for senior leaders at all levels of conflict, and preserves capability and freedom of maneuver for U.S. forces.
+
+Within the framework of integrated deterrence, missile defense and nuclear capabilities are complementary. U.S. nuclear weapons present a credible threat of a robust response and overwhelming cost imposition, while missile defenses contribute to deterrence by denial. If deterrence fails, missile defenses can potentially mitigate some effects from an attack. Missile defense contributes directly to tailored U.S. deterrence strategies to dissuade attacks on the United States from states like North Korea, and contributes to extended deterrence for U.S. Allies and partners, and our respective forces abroad.
+
+To address intercontinental-range, nuclear threats from Russia and the PRC, the United States will continue to rely on strategic deterrence — underwritten by safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces — to deter such threats as outlined in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Ensuring the continued credibility of this deterrent will require investments in missile warning, missile tracking, and resilient NC3 to keep pace with the evolving PRC and Russian threats, and avoid the possibility of evading U.S. sensor networks in a surprise attack. For states like North Korea, missile defenses and the U.S. nuclear arsenal are complementary and mutually reinforcing, as both capabilities contribute to deterring an attack against the United States and our Allies and partners.
+
+__Homeland Missile Defense.__ The Department’s top priority is to defend the homeland and deter attacks against the United States. For the purposes of this review, homeland missile defense refers to the defense of the 50 states, all U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia against missile attacks. Missile defenses can raise the threshold for initiating nuclear conflict by denying an aggressor the ability to execute small-scale coercive nuclear attacks or demonstrations. Further, the presence of missile defense complicates adversary decision-making by injecting doubt and uncertainty about the likelihood of a successful offensive missile attack.
+
+Missile defense systems such as the GMD offer a visible measure of protection for the U.S. population while reassuring Allies and partners that the United States will not be coerced by threats to the homeland from states like North Korea and potentially Iran. In the event of crisis, globally integrated domain awareness capabilities increase warning and allow for flexible decision-making to respond, as necessary and appropriate, with escalatory options such as kinetic strike. Should deterrence fail, missile defenses can help mitigate damage to the homeland and help protect the U.S. population.
+
+The U.S. homeland ballistic missile defense architecture centers on the GMD system, consisting of interceptors emplaced in Alaska and California, a network of space-based and terrestrial-based sensors, and an integrated C2 system. Together, these U.S. homeland defense capabilities provide the means to address ballistic missile threats from states like North Korea and Iran. Though the United States maintains the right to defend itself against attacks from any source, GMD is neither intended for, nor capable of, defeating the large and sophisticated ICBM, air-, or sea- launched ballistic missile threats from Russia and the PRC.
+
+The United States relies on strategic deterrence to address those threats. As part of an integrated approach to deterrence, the United States recognizes the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive systems. Strengthening mutual transparency and predictability with regard to these systems could help reduce the risk of conflict.
+
+As North Korean ballistic missile threats to the U.S. homeland continue to evolve, the United States is committed to improving the capability and reliability of the GMD system. This includes development of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) to augment and potentially replace the existing Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI). In addition to the GMD system, the United States will leverage and improve its full spectrum of missile defeat capabilities, complemented by the credible threat of direct cost imposition through nuclear and non-nuclear means, to continue to counter North Korean missile threats to the homeland. To deter attempts by adversaries to stay under the nuclear threshold and achieve strategic results with conventional capabilities, the United States will examine active and passive defense measures to decrease the risk from any cruise missile strike against critical assets, regardless of origin.
+
+Within the context of homeland defense, an attack on Guam or any other U.S. territory by any adversary will be considered a direct attack on the United States, and will be met with an appropriate response. Additionally, Guam is home to key regional power projection platforms and logistical nodes, and is an essential operating base for U.S. efforts to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The architecture for defense of the territory against missile attacks will therefore be commensurate with its unique status as both an unequivocal part of the United States as well as a vital regional location. Guam’s defense, which will include various active and passive missile defense capabilities, will contribute to the overall integrity of integrated deterrence and bolster U.S. operational strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
+
+__Regional Missile Defense.__ The United States will continue to strengthen defenses for U.S. forces, and with Allies, and partners against all regional missile threats from any source. As part of an integrated, interoperable, and multi-layered approach to deterrence, IAMD capabilities need to keep pace with expanding regional missile threats, while protecting and enabling U.S., Allied, and partner maneuver forces to conduct operations.
+
+Regional missile threats continue to expand in capability, capacity, and complexity, challenging existing U.S., Allied, and partner regional IAMD capabilities and placing all at risk. Likely designed for employment below the U.S. nuclear threshold, adversaries are pursuing and demonstrating advanced, long-range space and missile systems capable of traversing entire Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility (AORs). Attacks from these systems could increasingly blur the line between regional and homeland defense and challenge existing IAMD architectures. In addition to missile threats, U.S. forces, Allies and partners also face the proliferation of lower-tier threats (e.g., rockets, armed UAS, etc.) as adversaries seek to take advantage of these relatively inexpensive, flexible, and expendable systems while exploiting inherent difficulties with attribution and its implications for deterrence.
+
+Cooperation with like-minded nations is crucial. The United States will continue to seek ways to integrate and interoperate with Allies and partners as well as encouraging greater integration among Allies and partners to fill gaps against the increasing spectrum of regional threats. Additionally, as the ability to share sensor information and data is critical to regional defense, the United States will continue to streamline processes for information and data sharing, while encouraging Allies and partners to enhance their information protection posture and cyber security.
+
+The United States will also continue to develop active and passive defenses against regional hypersonic missile threats, and pursue a persistent and resilient sensor network to characterize and track all hypersonic threats, improve attribution, and enable engagement. Acquisition strategies for new sensors, interceptors, and C2 systems must be fully aligned — with sensors as the priority. As appropriate, the United States will pursue joint research and development on hypersonic defense programs with key Allies and partners.
+
+__IAMD.__ Nested within our broader missile defeat approach, IAMD is the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the homeland, Allies and partners, protect the Joint and combined forces, and enable freedom of action by negating an adversary’s ability to create adverse effects with air and missile capabilities. IAMD represents an effort to move beyond platform-specific missile defense toward a broader approach melding all missile defeat capabilities — defensive, passive, offensive, kinetic, non-kinetic — into a comprehensive joint and combined construct.
+
+Developing and fielding IAMD systems is a complex problem set. To address the rapidly evolving threat, the acquisition community must continue to exploit adaptive acquisition approaches to ensure the timely and cost-effective development, procurement, sustainment, and improvement of IAMD systems, while providing a clear investment strategy over the near-, medium-, and long-terms. The Department must develop, design, acquire, and maintain Joint IAMD systems that are integrated, interoperable, and sufficiently mobile, flexible, and affordable to protect the homeland and dispersed joint and combined maneuver forces from the full spectrum of air and missile threats. Interoperability breeds efficiency and economy of resources. To enhance this effect in IAMD, the Department must develop and exercise innovative combinations of Service, national, and Allied and partner capabilities to meet mission needs.
+
+One area of importance related to IAMD is the increasing challenge of counter-UAS (C-UAS). UAS are an inexpensive, flexible and plausibly deniable way for adversaries endeavoring to carry out tactical-level attacks below the threshold for major response, making them an increasingly preferred capability for state and non-state actors alike. UAS capabilities are also growing in variety, quality, and quantity. The homeland and regionally forward deployed forces require the fielding of technical and integrated C-UAS solutions with cross-DoD and interagency synchronization to ensure they can meet the range of threats and appropriately hedge against future advancements. Within the homeland, protecting the population from UAS threats is a combined interagency mission.
+
+__Future Technologies.__ The United States requires responsive, persistent, resilient, and cost- effective joint IAMD sensor capabilities to detect, characterize, track, and engage current and emerging advanced air and missile threats regionally, and to improve early warning, identification, tracking, discrimination, and attribution for missile threats to the homeland. Sensors must be integrated into a cohesive architecture with increasingly capable C2 in order to provide leaders with a maximized decision space for informed actions.
+
+Sensors should be able to seamlessly transition from theater-level threats, to homeland defense, to global threats, by sharing and transmitting data with C2 as threats move in and out of the atmosphere. Because of their global nature, persistence, and greater access to denied regions, resilient space-based infrared, radar, and associated data transport systems will be critical to any future integrated sensor network. Likewise, modern over-the-horizon radar capabilities are essential to improving warning and tracking against cruise missile and other threats to the homeland.
+
+Advanced sensor capabilities need to facilitate different mission areas simultaneously. These include strategic and theater missile warning and tracking to: alert national leadership and cue missile defenses in the event of a missile launch; offer space domain awareness to provide indications and warning of threats; support mission assurance of the space architecture; and prompt ISR to provide persistent, and often unwarned, global information essential to the whole of government. Therefore, the ability to operate these sensors through common, joint and combined all-domain integrated and survivable C2 networks and architectures is paramount. The United States will continue to leverage industry, academia, government, and allied and partner solutions to augment existing Department of Defense capabilities and foster rapid future capability employment.
+
+Advanced and innovative technologies and more effective battle management will be crucial to moving the United States towards a cost-effective and integrated set of offensive and defensive capabilities. To cope with rapidly increasing adversary development of missile-centric Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) threats, the Department must seek new technologies and hedge against continuing adversary missile developments and emerging capabilities such as hypersonic weapons, multiple and maneuvering warheads, and missile defense countermeasures. Future air and missile defense capabilities must also be more mobile, flexible, survivable, and affordable, and emphasize disaggregation, dispersal, and maneuver to mitigate the threat from adversary missiles. Finally, these technologies and platforms — including those enabling NC3 — must be inherently cyber-secure, joined by resilient, redundant and hardened networks, and monitored by an agile defensive cyber force operating under a clear, unified C2 construct.
+
+---
+
+__Anthony H. Cordesman__ is the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Department of Energy. Dr Cordesman also served as the national security assistant to Senator John McCain, and he previously held the position of adjunct professor at Georgetown University.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-16-uk-german-quiet-alliance.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-16-uk-german-quiet-alliance.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : UK-German Quiet Alliance
+author: Ed Arnold
+date : 2023-05-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/qYorxrd.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "UK-German Defence & Security Cooperation"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The UK-German defence and security relationship is sometimes referred to as the “quiet alliance”. It is understudied and underutilised compared to both UK-France and Franco-German cooperation._ _Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the relationship attracted more attention, and the intergovernmental relations have intensified after Brexit. However, despite this intensification, the political drivers, alongside differing threat perceptions and strategic cultures, have thus far been insufficient to deepen the relationship in a way that would match the potential for cooperation between these two leading European countries._
+
+___`The UK and Germany are the European top defence spenders and top supporters of Ukraine in military, economic and humanitarian assistance. They have significant diplomatic, defence and security influence, and cooperation would maximise this influence.`___
+
+___`Enhanced cooperation would also signal that the UK and Germany are able to work together for the benefit of Europe and maintain unity through the challenges ahead.`___
+
+___`Substantial differences between the respective outlook and approaches of the UK and Germany on defence and security are unlikely to be resolved but can be mitigated in certain areas with continued pragmatism and compromise.`___
+
+Russia’s large-scale reinvasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 was an inflection point for European security. It has prompted a refresh of the UK’s 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR2021), which was published on 13 March 2023 as the Integrated Review Refresh policy paper (IRR2023), and a refresh of its Defence Command Paper (DCP), which will be published in June 2023. Germany is also currently developing its first ever National Security Strategy (NSS), at a time when Ukraine has underlined the fundamental importance of allies and alliances.
+
+This policy paper argues that the transformative effect of the war in Ukraine has made enhanced UK-German defence and security, and foreign policy cooperation more attractive, viable, and necessary, which would benefit European security; and moreover, that this period of joint policy development is the ideal moment to develop a more structural relationship. This shared agenda should be developed with Transatlanticism and Euro-Atlantic security at its core and with helping to lead the development of a European pillar of NATO as a key objective.
+
+#### KEY FINDINGS
+
+1. The Ukraine war has transformed European Security, and Russia will continue to be the defining security challenge to 2030. There is now a window of opportunity to lock in structured and planned cooperation – focussed on helping to lead a European Pillar of NATO, rather than the ad hoc and transactional approach that has characterised the current relationship.
+
+2. The UK and Germany are currently the top two European defence spenders and top two supporters of Ukraine in volume of military, economic and humanitarian assistance. London and Berlin have significant diplomatic, defence and security influence, and thus cooperation on any initiative would maximise this influence and provide a greater chance of its being agreed. It would also signal to allies as well as adversaries that the UK and Germany are able to work together for the benefit of Europe and maintain unity through the challenges ahead.
+
+3. The war in Ukraine has helped create practical areas for post-Brexit UK-EU defence and security cooperation, which include sanctions and military mobility. These activities, coupled with the agreement of the Windsor Framework, has demonstrated what pragmatism can achieve.
+
+4. Despite an overall improvement of UK-European relations, there remain substantial differences between the respective outlook and approaches of the UK and Germany on defence and security. These are unlikely to be resolved but can be mitigated in certain areas with continued pragmatism and compromise.
+
+5. European defence industry is similarly being transformed by the war in Ukraine as demand signals increase and business models adapt to a new security environment. UK and German defence industries are well placed to adapt, but political and structural differences between the UK and Germany are unlikely to provide a step change in cooperation without a corresponding high-level political statement of intent.
+
+The extant 2021 UK-German Joint Declaration is accepted as a comprehensive baseline for future cooperation; this paper provides additional recommendations that could further enhance the relationship. These 19 recommendations are provided in the table below by category – Political, Policy, Operational, and Dialogue and Knowledge Sharing – which are also provided throughout the paper.
+
+
+
+
+### METHODOLOGY
+
+This project was initiated within the framework of the annual __FES-RUSI British-German Dialogue on Defence and Security Policies__. Official and expert participants agreed that there was considerable scope to enhance the UK-German defence and security relationship in the context of the war in Ukraine and the early days following the Chancellor’s Zeitenwende speech. What was more uncertain was the level of ambition on both sides and identifying the practical areas for cooperation that would produce the most benefit. The discussions helped frame the overarching research questions that this policy paper seeks to answer. The vision timeframe of 2030 was selected to match those of the UK’s IR2021 and IRR2023, NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, and the EU’s 2022 Strategic Compass.
+
+The RUSI-FES (London) project objectives were to:
+
+1. Identify areas for enhanced defence and security cooperation to promote mutual benefits between the UK and Germany and strengthen wider European collective security;
+
+2. Identify political opportunities and constraints for enhanced UK-German defence and security cooperation, and how these might be addressed; and
+
+3. Build a road map of prioritised and actionable areas for enhanced UK-German defence and security cooperation.
+
+To achieve these, the project convened two expert-led joint workshops to consider, respectively, the UK-German relationship within the European security architecture, and UK-German defence industrial cooperation. These workshops provided the foundation material for a research visit to Brussels to understand the EU context. These research activities were augmented by consultations with current and former UK and German officials and the expert community in both countries. Finally, desk-based research was conducted on primary sources such as speeches, government statements and policy documents, alongside extensive media reports.
+
+#### STRUCTURE
+
+This paper is structured in four chapters. The first chapter baselines the current UK-German relationship, deconstructs the extant vision of the June 2021 UK-German Joint Declaration, and develops an updated and more specific vision to 2030. Chapter 2 explains how the war in Ukraine has created more favourable conditions to significantly enhance UK-German defence and security cooperation and outlines the associated benefits. Chapter 3 considers defence, security, and foreign policy cooperation, focusing on first, Russia and the Euro-Atlantic, and second, China and the Indo-Pacific, in line with the priorities established by the Joint Declaration. Chapter 4 identifies opportunities for operational cooperation, including those with the defence industry. Recommendations are provided throughout the paper and a summary table is provided in this Executive Summary. These recommendations are categorised as: Political, Policy, Operational, or Dialogue and Knowledge Sharing.
+
+
+### `CHAPTER ONE`
+### A VISION FOR UK-GERMAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION
+
+The first chapter provides an overview of the contemporary UK-German defence and security relationship and its recent developments. It considers the 2021 Joint Declaration vision and proposes an enhanced vision for cooperation to 2030.
+
+#### A GROWING RELATIONSHIP
+
+The intellectual underpinnings of the Zeitenwende can be traced back to February 2014. Then Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier (now President of Germany) delivered a speech at the 50th Munich Security Conference in which he declared that Germany must be “ready for earlier, more decisive and more substantive engagement in the foreign and security policy sphere” and assume more responsibility. Subsequently referred to as the “Munich Consensus”, it signalled a change in mentality at the very top of government, especially between then President Joachim Gauck and then Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen.
+
+Germany then began to do more. Having already deployed soldiers to Mali in 2013, in 2015 the Bundeswehr joined anti-ISIS operations in Syria and Iraq, became the European colead of the “Normandy Format” which sought to mediate the growing Russia-Ukraine conflict and, in 2016, became the framework nation for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Lithuania. While these developments demonstrated increased, if modest, operational activity, core Germany foreign policy towards Russia and energy security endured. Aylin Matlé suggests less of a change than first appears and that “it is difficult to discern a sound strategy behind all these actions and commitments – unless assuming more responsibility is a strategy in and of itself”. At the UK-hosted NATO Wales Summit later in 2014, Germany also agreed to meet the NATO two per cent GDP Defence Investment Pledge by 2024.
+
+As German activity increased, the UK 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) declared that “We will work to intensify our security and defence relationship with Germany”. This statement elevated the UK-German relationship to “Tier 1” status alongside the US and France, and this language was mirrored in the 2016 German Defence White Paper which promoted “the security partnership with the United Kingdom, which has a long tradition and which we aim to further expand in all areas of common interest”.
+
+The Brexit vote in 2016 and the UK’s leaving the EU in 2020 required a reconsideration of the two countries’ intergovernmental relationship during a period of intensely strained political ties due to the UK decision and approach. In October 2018, a Joint vision Statement was signed by the countries’ respective Defence Ministers to commit to stronger defence cooperation, including retaining a permanent UK military presence in Germany, which is the extant framework for bilateral defence cooperation. This statement was agreed in 2016 but the signing was delayed for two years due to the political consequences of the Brexit process. The IR2021 namechecks Germany, alongside France and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) with the ambition to “improve interoperability with Euro-Atlantic allies”.
+
+In June 2021 the UK-German Joint Declaration was signed, which committed to holding an annual Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue on “all matters of foreign policy and international affairs”. The first Strategic Dialogue was held on 5 January 2023 with support for Ukraine, energy security, and climate change the main agenda items. The German Foreign Minister spoke of the desire to “further intensify” the relationship. The UK Labour Party also expressed its intent that a defence partnership, or Partnerschaft, could be agreed between the two countries in the future.
+
+Therefore, over the last decade there has been a stronger desire for cooperation and more common ground identified, yet practical activity has remained modest – compared to the potential – and largely ad hoc and opportunistic where it has occurred.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 1 – Political`
+
+_`The UK and Germany should develop a strategic approach to bilateral cooperation, instead of the ad hoc approach that has characterised the past relationship, by setting clear mutual goals and establishing the right mechanisms and processes for delivery, managed through the UK-German Strategic Dialogue or a more ambitious future agreement.`_
+
+THE 2021 UK-GERMAN JOINT DECLARATION
+
+The 2021 UK-German Joint Declaration outlines a “shared strategic vision” across four foreign and security policy priorities:
+
+1. The Transatlantic relationship;
+
+2. Russia;
+
+3. China and the Indo-Pacific; and
+
+4. Climate change and biodiversity.
+
+While the priorities are right, the Joint Declaration is too comprehensive and broad to provide specific measures for intensified cooperation. It is most detailed on foreign policy, covering all global regions with high-level ambition statements, rather than concrete ideas on how to achieve them. Thematically, it is similarly general, referring to a wide range of security issues without any prioritisation. Moreover, it already feels dated in a post-Ukraine security environment, even referencing the Normandy Format and Minsk Process to achieve stability and security within Ukraine.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 2 – Policy`
+
+_`The UK and Germany should update the 2021 Joint Declaration following the publication of the UK IRR2023 and German NSS to provide a shared vision on the measures necessary to strengthen European defence and security and how best to ensure long-term support for Ukraine.`_
+
+> #### `Recommendation 3 – Political`
+
+_`Extend the annual Strategic Dialogue from Foreign Ministers only, so as to include Defence Ministers as a “2+2” format, to better reflect the defence policy orientation of the Zeitenwende and the UK’s contribution to the defence of the Euro-Atlantic area.`_
+
+_`This should be accompanied by regular dialogues between the Prime Minister and Chancellor to set the level of ambition and maintain political momentum, including official government-to-government consultations.`_
+
+THE UK AND GERMANY ARE MORE ALIKE THAN THEY REALISE
+
+The UK-German relationship is an “Alliance of values”, founded in the principles of the UN Charter, a strong belief in the value of a Western-orientated international system, and a recognition that each country has benefitted greatly from it. Transatlanticism and NATO are at the core of their respective defence policies and strategic cultures, with Germany’s EU membership also of critical importance. The UK and Germany are the two leading European defence spenders and are also the leading European suppliers of military, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. They each possess strong domestic defence industries of strategic importance and there are multiple advanced defence industrial relationships, such as the Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land (RBSL) joint venture, which demonstrates how a highly capable structure can be quickly created when the need arises. The intergovernmental relationship is well complemented by other non-governmental fora, such as the annual Königswinter Conference (since 1950) and the specific Defence Königswinter Conference (since 2010).
+
+Strong ties exist between the two countries, exemplified by His Majesty the King’s first state visit to Germany; in addition, on 30 March 2023, he became the first British monarch to address the Bundestag, speaking in German, which was a strong signal of British-German friendship. Moreover, following the first Strategic Dialogue, the UK-Germany Cultural Commission met for the first time in 30 years, an event which highlights the strength of the wider relationship outside of defence and security.
+
+LIMITING FACTORS AND STRATEGIC CULTURE
+
+Structurally, the principal differences in defence and security are that the UK is a nuclear weapons power – with bipartisan commitment to the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent – and has permanent membership (P5) in the UN Security Council (UNSC), while supporting a future permanent seat for Germany, and the UK is no longer a member of the EU and its security apparatus. There are also fundamental differences in strategic culture, and prior to the Ukraine war, differing threat perceptions regarding Russia.
+
+There are multiple volumes of works dedicated to explaining German post-war strategic culture development and how it was shaped by its traumatic experience of nationalism and militarism. It evolved a culture which has been characterised by a strong preference for soft power and a rejection of hard power and unilateralism, a belief in trade as the primary basis for promoting positive external relations, and a lack of confidence in external security policy where the military instrument is required. Moreover, the post-war political and electoral system was designed specifically to favour consensus, which has inhibited controversial policy choices and translated into an enduring strong preference for operating multilaterally in international relations, with the Bundeswehr as a “parliamentary army”, always requiring mission approval from the Bundestag.
+
+But public attitudes have been changing. The traditional aversion to hard power and the use of force has gradually reduced as the Bundeswehr has increasingly been deployed, especially outside of Europe, albeit on modest missions, as the external environment has grown more hostile. However, this aversion still remains high, with 51 per cent opposing military operations (down from 65 per cent in 2019) and 50 per cent rejecting increases in military spending. The war in Ukraine has had an immediate impact, with high levels of support for the Zeitenwende vision and continuing support to Ukraine, despite the direct economic costs to Germany and its citizens. Indeed, the societal and cultural change required in Germany is critical to realising a true Zeitenwende, whereby simply allocating more money for defence is not the answer and will not deliver or sustain a transformation.
+
+In contrast with Germany’s preference for multilateralism and collective solutions, the UK has always preferred a more flexible approach, combining multilateral (through NATO mainly, but with a strong commitment to the UN), through minilateral (5 Eyes, JEF, etc) and through bilateral defence engagement, primarily with the US. When these options do not meet UK objectives, it is comfortable operating in coalitions of the willing, including operations involving the use of force. As the UK has gradually orientated toward operating in a world with more acute great power competition, it has continued to accept that effective foreign policy needs an active defence component, demonstrated by the UK approach to both Iraq and Afghanistan, and most recently exemplified by significant military support to Ukraine and its European allies and partners, and its enhanced military engagement within the Indo-Pacific.
+
+These embedded differences do not necessarily prevent cooperation. Compromises will be required on both sides to unlock enhanced cooperation. Indeed, the key to a successful UK-German partnership will be predicated on reconciling or mitigating these essential differences by unifying around a common aim. Coalescing around strengthening Euro-Atlantic security and support for Ukraine will also gradually make these differences less significant. Moreover, enhanced UK German cooperation could also prevent the fragmentation of European security:
+
+“Initially it might seem counterproductive, or even contradictory, to promote deeper cooperation between two countries with diverging perspectives on strategic culture and European integration. Yet it is exactly because of these differences that Berlin and London should strengthen their relationship. At a time of change across the Atlantic and within Europe, especially with the ongoing Brexit negotiations, it is essential that Germany and the United Kingdom prevent divergences from growing.”
+
+The war in Ukraine has made this even more necessary and the need is only going to grow stronger as the war continues. Moreover, the primacy of NATO is the most significant entry point for enhancing the relationship and the institution where the two countries could add the most value.
+
+AN UPDATED JOINT 2030 VISION
+
+This paper proposes that the UK and Germany, as leading European defence and security actors with shared values and security challenges, should commit to:
+
+- Revitalising and deepening the defence and security bilateral relationship between our two countries with Transatlanticism and Euro-Atlantic security at its core;
+
+- Co-leading the development of a European pillar of NATO, building on the leadership of their respective Framework Nations Concepts, in order to increase European burden sharing;
+
+- Securing long-term support for Ukraine;
+
+- Growing defence industrial collaboration through more joint defence procurement projects; and
+
+- Cementing readiness at the heart of current and future force structures.
+
+
+### `CHAPTER TWO`
+### WHY THE WAR IN UKRAINE MAKES ENHANCED UK-GERMAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION MORE VIABLE, NECESSARY, AND BENEFICIAL
+
+This chapter argues that the war in Ukraine and the security challenges it has unleashed have created strong drivers to invest in the UK-German defence and security relationship. It articulates why enhanced defence and security cooperation is beneficial for both countries and for wider Euro-Atlantic security.
+
+#### THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
+
+The war in Ukraine is transformational for European security and Russia will remain the defining challenge for the remainder of the decade. The UK and Germany are second and third respectively in military, humanitarian, and financial assistance to Ukraine. If Germany’s share of EU support is included, then it ranks second to the US overall. The UK has already committed to match the 2022 support of 2.3 billion pounds in assistance in 2023 and German support could significantly ramp up this year with more funding requested.
+
+The war has already had a significant impact on the security environment and will likely be the primary driver of transformation for the remaining decade. Within one year it has:
+
+- Hardened NATO defence postures, driven Alliance transformation, and solidified a near unanimous view of the threat posed by Russia;
+
+- Produced structural changes, with Finland joining NATO and Sweden hoping to be not too far behind, and Denmark having removed its EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) opt-out through a referendum;
+
+- Shifted Europe’s politico-military centre of gravity eastward, with Warsaw, rather than Berlin, London or Paris, becoming a focal point. US President Biden has visited twice within a year, and given a major speech to mark the anniversary of the invasion. When support to Ukraine is measured as a percentage of GDP, the Baltics come out on top; and
+
+- Significantly increased defence expenditure and investment, especially in Germany, France, and Poland, to levels seen at the end of the Cold War, which has changed defence industry business models.
+
+The war makes UK-German defence and security cooperation more viable and necessary for four principal reasons:
+
+1. The Zeitenwende vision unlocks broader and deeper opportunities for defence and security cooperation than have previously been viable;
+
+2. UK and German threat perceptions are in greater alignment and the war has reaffirmed the importance of alliances, allies, and the need for greater cooperation;
+
+3. If this transformational moment is mismanaged, there is a risk that European security will fragment, which would be against UK and German interests and therefore it provides a strong incentive to jointly mitigate this risk. Enhanced UK-Germany defence and security cooperation would send a strong signal to allies and adversaries alike about the importance of Euro-Atlantic unity in the face of growing threats; and
+
+4. A poor global economic outlook and the requirement for defence modernisation and increased stockpiling creates strong drivers to realise long-term economic efficiencies.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 4 – Political and Policy`
+
+_`The UK and Germany should explore the potential for and content of a bilateral Treaty-based defence and security relationship, consistent with NATO obligations and transparent to EU security structures, to realise the current untapped potential that such an agreement could deliver. This agreement should build on work already undertaken through UK and German leadership of their respective Framework Nations Concepts and should focus on increasing European burden sharing and enhancing readiness of forces.`_
+
+Its objectives should include:
+
+- Enhanced cooperation on Northern European security;
+
+- Increasing European burden sharing to shape a European pillar of NATO;
+
+- Developing further effectiveness and interoperability, with the principle of complementarity and specialisation; and
+
+- Expanding defence industry cooperation and developing cooperative equipment programmes.
+
+#### THE ZEITENWENDE
+
+The powerful Zeitenwende speech of 27 February 2022 fundamentally accelerated the process of change which had begun with the Munich consensus and marked a point of no return. In the speech, the Chancellor committed to a dual funding settlement of first, a 100 billion euro special defence fund for long-term military projects, outside of the regular budgetary process and, second, meeting the NATO two per cent defence spending target by fiscal year 2022–2023, which in any case will not be met. These announcements complemented other decisions that month to halt the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, exclude Russia from the SWIFT global financial transaction service, rapidly diversify away from Russian oil and gas imports, and approve the delivery of lethal aid to Ukraine, which together marked a seismic shift in Germany’s geopolitical position.
+
+In just one year, Berlin has progressed from promising 5,000 helmets to suppling MBTs, artillery, and air defence systems to Ukraine. The establishment of the 100 billion euro special fund also required changes to the Constitution – an action that the chancellor described as “the starkest change in German security policy since the establishment of the Bundeswehr in 1955”. The criticism of Germany regarding the implementation of its strategic shift has been fierce at times, but there are deep cultural sensitivities towards defence and security that still exist in Germany which partners need to understand and need to appreciate the substantial steps that have already been taken. Germany is currently undergoing significant change in many policy fields, with the Bundeswehr and defence being the most difficult area to change, requiring adequate time for involved departments to prepare for this.
+
+While much of the criticism has been unjustified, 15 months after the Chancellor’s speech, much of the actual scope of the Zeitenwende remains to be clarified beyond the financial commitments. There is also debate about the significance of the announced reforms, with some in the analytical community arguing that real change has yet to begin, and that shifts in energy security have far exceeded steps toward military modernisation. There is also a widespread concern that the sense of urgency and political momentum for a transformative change might already be lost.
+
+What has also become clear since the February speech is that, while more money helps, in view of the starting point for German defence it is insufficient to enact the change demanded. To be sustained and enduring, any change needs to ensure far-reaching shifts in German strategic culture – something which Chancellor Scholz explicitly acknowledges in his Global Zeitenwende essay. Without such change, practical reforms are difficult to drive through. Thus, while the new Defence Minister is credited with bringing the required purpose and energy to his department, some observers argue that the Bundeswehr is actually in worse shape one year after the Zeitenwende speech, as the 100 billion euro fund is yet to make an impact. Moreover, the Defence Minister has already requested an additional 10 billion euros for the regular defence budget in 2024 but faces difficulties in gaining agreement from the FDP Finance minister Christian Linder. Again, the complexity of overhauling the Bundeswehr, reforming procurement, and absorbing new funds while at the same time supporting Ukraine is a significant challenge and such cultural changes cannot be made overnight.
+
+With the Zeitenwende approach still developing, there are opportunities for allies and partners to shape its future and to assist Germany in accelerating this process. The UK is supportive of the Zeitenwende vision, and should offer support where necessary to internationalise it as it would obviously strengthen European security, but the UK remains unconvinced about its delivery, especially over the long-term.
+
+#### THE MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US
+
+The most important bilateral relationship for both the UK and Germany is with the US, and both have a transatlantic security outlook. Their mutual strategic objective is to keep the US as engaged as possible in European security. This synergy should be fundamental for enhanced cooperation as initiatives that mutually support this goal will be well supported.
+
+A longstanding US request of partners has been to take on more responsibility, and the issue of burden sharing within NATO has been a perennial problem for Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. The war in Ukraine, coming just 6 months after European doubts regarding US leadership after the fall of Kabul, has highlighted the fundamental role the US plays in European security, evidenced by the pace and scale of US support to Ukraine. The 2022 US National Defense Strategy prioritises the “pacing challenge” of China in the Indo-Pacific over the Russian challenge to Europe. Therefore, now more than ever, the US needs European countries to step up.
+
+With London and Berlin acutely aware of the possibility of US policy changes, following the 2024 US Presidential election, it is in their mutual interest to mitigate any possible future unity challenges between the US and Europe by preparing now. The UK and Germany are already committed to increasing European burden sharing and capabilities, within a NATO context, through leadership of their respective NATO Framework Nations. Yet, with a worsening security environment there is considerable scope for expanding the Framework Nation approach and developing European capabilities. Indeed, combined, the UK and Germany already have experience and are best placed to provide the required leadership and set a vision and level of ambition to other European countries.
+
+#### THE MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH FRANCE
+
+Any strengthening of the UK-German relationship must consider how it might impact existing relationships with France. Moreover, strengthening the UK-German relationship does not serve as a replacement for the one which they both enjoy with France. The two other sides of the “E3 triangle” are well established and bolstered by bilateral treaties. The UK-France relationship is governed by the Lancaster House Treaties of 2010. These treaties are substantial and cover a broad range of security areas, including nuclear and the establishment of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF).
+
+The Franco-German relationship is governed by the enduring Élysée Treaty, which celebrated its 60th birthday on 22 January 2023, with a summit that committed to enhancing Franco-German and European security and defence cooperation, particularly on closer EU-NATO cooperation and capability development. This relationship was reinforced with the 2020 Treaty of Aachen on Franco-German Cooperation and Integration, which committed to deeper cooperation in foreign, security and defence policy including strengthening the ability for Europe to act autonomously.
+
+While both relationships are structurally strong, they are vulnerable to the political weather. Brexit, and then the September 2021 Australia-UK-US “AUKUS” defence partnership, which undercut the French defence industry, has damaged the UK-France relationship. However, there have been recent positive developments with the first UK-France Summit since 2018 on 10 March 2023, which included deepening defence and security ties in all domains.
+
+There have been mounting Franco-German disagreements over a hydrogen pipeline from the Iberian Peninsula to Central Europe and a unilateral German 200 billion euro energy aid package, which contributed to an October 2022 Summit being cancelled at short notice. Defence cooperation is also under strain with reports that the Franco-German Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) programmes are both experiencing trouble.
+
+Similarly, the UK and Germany have Brexit legacy complications to cooperation, which appear to be fading with the formal adoption of the Windsor Framework. Moreover, support to Ukraine has brought the UK, Germany, and France closer together and has provided a long-term mutual objective for defence and security cooperation.
+
+
+### `CHAPTER THREE`
+### A VISION FOR UK-GERMAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION
+
+This chapter considers options for enhanced UK-German foreign, defence and security policy cooperation. It focusses heavily on Euro-Atlantic cooperation based on the 2030 timeframe of the roadmap and the priorities established by the Joint Declaration.
+
+#### EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY AND THE THREAT FROM RUSSIA
+
+The UK was already well attuned to the Russian threat, notably because of Russia’s use of chemical weapons within the UK in Salisbury in 2018, which was called out explicitly in the IR2021. Despite the Russia challenge being well analysed in the 2016 White Paper, many German politicians and policymakers did not think that the war would happen, certainly not at the scale that was unleashed on 24 February 2022. The German leadership was confronted for the first time with the brutality and proximity of the Russian threat and the new government has had to manage a steep learning curve.
+
+#### THE PRIMACY OF NATO FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY
+
+The 2021 Joint Declaration is unequivocal to the shared importance of the transatlantic alliance, stating that “NATO is the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security. It remains the bedrock of our collective defence. We recognise the importance of a stronger and more capable European contribution to this. We remain jointly committed to NATO-EU cooperation”.
+
+Since the Joint Declaration was signed, NATO’s response to the war in Ukraine and Russian aggression was enshrined in the 2022 Strategic Concept, which significantly hardened its defence and deterrence posture to “defend every inch of NATO territory”. There was close coordination between London and Berlin in strengthening the eFP to deploy a Brigade headquarters in their respective multinational battlegroups (Estonia and Lithuania) and to scale to that echelon quickly if the threat dictates. While the Baltic states had requested Divisions, which the UK and Germany cannot currently credibly field, this agreement seems acceptable to them and allows the UK and Germany the necessary time to improve readiness of their own forces.
+
+NATO is also developing an ambitious New Force Model with more substantial forces at much higher readiness. Germany was the first to commit forces publicly, including an armoured division, while the UK has also committed significant forces. The UK and Germany are also framework nations for NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (vJTF), which Germany is leading in 2023, before handing it over to the UK for 2024. The 2021 DCP commits to investing in existing UK storage facilities in Germany to increase readiness and recognises this as a critical location for the forward deployment of UK forces.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 5 – Policy`
+
+_`The UK and Germany should lead by example and, further to the commitment of initial forces to NATO’s New Force Model, they should jointly develop and lead alliance readiness initiatives to help correct problems within their own forces and incentivise other allies to invest in and prioritise readiness. Such a common initiative would strengthen European Security by making a European pillar of NATO more credible and build trust amongst allies.`_
+
+> #### `Recommendation 6 – Dialogue and Knowledge Sharing`
+
+_`Germany should offer positions for UK liaison officers for the 2023 vJTF rotation to help support UK planning and ensure a smooth handover for 2024. This should then be institutionalised for further rotations.`_
+
+The UK and Germany also lead separate NATO Framework Nations Concepts (FNCs), which were championed by Germany in 2014 to increase the breadth and depth of European NATO capabilities. The German Framework Nation largely focusses on capability development through a “coherent capability package”. In contrast, the UK contribution, through the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is an operational framework that has significantly increased its activity in response to the Ukraine war. While the benefit and value of JEF is well understood by its members, there is a scepticism by some of its non-members, including Germany. Our research suggests that this scepticism stems from a lack of understanding about the JEF and its development, rather than an inherent dislike for the framework. It would be advantageous to the security of Northern Europe for Germany to be more closely aligned with the JEF, especially as Germany leads the eFP battlegroup in Lithuania and has highly integrated land forces with the Netherlands.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 7 – Dialogue and Knowledge Sharing`
+
+_`The UK should better communicate the JEF and its likely future development to German and other non-member audiences. This should include an offer to host German liaison officers at the JEF operational headquarters`_
+
+This could support the use of JEF + Germany formats and initiatives (and +Poland), such as the physical and cyber protection of critical national infrastructure in the North and Baltic Seas, which has emerged as a common vital interest. Germany is a central player in Northern Europe – the UK’s Euro-Atlantic priority – and the Baltic Sea in particular, especially for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and operations. Moreover, following the Nordstream 1 and 2 pipeline attacks, the need to protect critical national infrastructure in the region has been elevated, for which the UK has procured two multi-role Ocean Surveillance ships to be in service by 2023. Germany has ordered the P8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) which the UK and Norway both operate and is an area where the three countries have significant interoperability.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 8 – Operational`
+
+_`The UK should invite Germany to join its trilateral agreement on P8 Poseidon MPA with the US and Norway to increase availability and sustainability of ISR in the North Atlantic, High North and Baltic Sea region and provide more continuous coverage for each sub-region.`_
+
+CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UK AND EU
+
+The third paragraph of the 2021 Joint Declaration affirms the unshakeable German commitment to the EU – “For Germany, its membership of the European Union remains a key reference point and it supports cooperation between the EU and the UK” and it will ensure the “highest possible level of transparency” regarding bilateral undertakings with the UK. Therefore, any UK-Germany bilateral cooperation is heavily dependent on good UK-EU relations which are at a post-Brexit high following the adoption of the Windsor Framework.
+
+The war in Ukraine has already strengthened the potential for future UK EU defence and security cooperation for several reasons. First, this has been accomplished through practical cooperation on Russian sanctions. Second, this is further aided by the common goal of support for Ukraine which the EU has conducted through the European Peace Facility. Third, the UK has now joined the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project on Military Mobility, which opens up the possibility of joining other projects. Finally, the war has helped to clarify the division of labour between the EU and NATO, through their third Joint Declaration, which signalled less competition and more cooperation and complementarity with each other. These have already led to discussions on further UK-EU defence cooperation, including counter terrorism and cyber.
+
+Closer UK-EU ties will require balance and concessions for both the UK and Germany. Germany wants a close relationship with the UK, but also wants to strengthen the CSDP to move towards greater strategic sovereignty. This might require accommodating the UK preference for bilateralism and ad hoc cooperation, in contrast to German and EU strategic culture. In turn, the UK will likely have to accept and foster more formal and institutional links with the EU.
+
+CHINA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC
+
+For Europe, the direct threat that Russia currently poses to the Euro-Atlantic is the highest priority, but the importance of China and the Indo-Pacific will only grow throughout the remainder of the decade, especially for defence policy. China has achieved 28 consecutive years of military growth – the longest uninterrupted period of spending growth in the SIPRI military expenditure database.
+
+There is little European consensus on China, as the approach must balance economic and trade interests with the harder defence and security policy realities. The pandemic and the war in Ukraine have exposed the risk of being heavily reliant on authoritarian regimes for raw materials and supply chains. This balance will be difficult to manage by reducing economic dependencies and risk (China is Germany’s largest trading partner and the EU’s second largest) while also cooperating more on issues such as climate change. This lack of consensus was highlighted during President Macron’s April 2024 state visit to Beijing, alongside EU Commission President Ursula von Der Leyen, which received heavy transatlantic criticism for comments on his perceived European view on Taiwan.
+
+The German government coalition agreement committed to develop a China strategy, to be adopted imminently, which is likely to follow a harder line on China, especially over “massive human rights violations”. Not only is this an opportunity to reconcile policy differences within the coalition and influence EU policy, with a desire to Europeanise its own policy, but also to establish concrete priorities. Both Chancellor Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock have recently visited Beijing, with both taking a tougher stance.
+
+The UK IRR2023 describes China as an “epoch-defining challenge” and Foreign Secretary James Cleverly set out three pillars of UK policy: to strengthen UK national security protections where threatened; to deepen cooperation and strengthen alignment with partners in the Indo-Pacific and globally; and to engage directly with China, bilaterally and multilaterally, to maintain relations.
+
+Current UK and German approaches show signs of pragmatism, are consistent with the 2021 Joint Declaration, and develop synergies, especially Pillar Two of the UK approach. With development ongoing, it is unlikely that there will be immediate substantial areas of cooperation. However, an increase in dialogue can help develop those strategies and create greater synergies, especially as the UK and German positions are closer than those of France at present; moreover, having a closer position between two leading European nations will influence a more coherent European position.
+
+#### MARITIME COOPERATION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
+
+The UK and Germany, alongside the Netherlands and France, are the only European countries to have developed Indo-Pacific strategies, in addition to the EU as a whole. The IRR2023 designated the Indo-Pacific as the second geographic priority but noted that the prosperity and security of the region and the Euro-Atlantic were inextricably linked. Moreover, it also noted that the Indo-Pacific “tilt” of the IR2021 was now complete and achieved through largely non-military means. In September 2020, Germany published its Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific Region which aimed to strengthen strategic and security policy partnerships and cooperate in tackling human-induced climate change and diversifying and strengthening economic ties.
+
+European military cooperation within the Indo-Pacific, thus far, has been ad hoc and transactional. Moreover, Indo-Pacific partners have limited capacity to absorb increased and uncoordinated European deployments. In 2021, the UK sent a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) to the region with a Dutch escort frigate. At the same time, Germany deployed the Bayern frigate for a solo tour, to support its international obligations and demonstrate that it is a reliable partner in the world. Unlike the UK and France, Germany does not have the history or the territorial assets to support a more ambitious deployment.
+
+The IR2021 wanted to “look for ways to work more closely with European partners, including France and Germany” and increased naval deployments to the Indo-Pacific would add value bilaterally and for Europe more broadly. The UK and France, at the March 2023 summit, agreed “to coordinate their carrier deployments to provide complementary and more persistent European presence in regions of shared interest”. Closer cooperation here would allow Germany to participate in a region of growing importance more actively and enhance power projection nationally and add to a significant European presence, in line with the 2021 EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, as the majority of the 100 billion euro special fund will be absorbed elsewhere, Germany might need support in the maritime domain and could also become an area of closer cooperation, especially in the Baltic Sea, for future deployments, exercises, or a coordinated maritime presence.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 9 – Operational`
+
+_`The UK should invite Germany, along with other EU partners, to provide an escort ship, or a marine contingent, to a future Carrier Strike Group deployment to the Indo-Pacific. This would meet the Defence Command Paper commitment to “partner more often with Germany on operational deployments, such as air policing and naval missions outside the Euro Atlantic area”.`_
+
+REFAMILIARISING WITH ISSUES OF NUCLEAR SECURITY
+
+The war in Ukraine and the risk of escalation is bringing the fields of European security and nuclear strategy back together, following a divergence after the Cold War. A conventionally weakened Russia, especially in the land domain, will likely increase its use of nuclear and hybrid levers to achieve its political and strategic objectives. Moreover, on 21 February 2023, President Putin announced the “suspension” of Russian participation in the New Start Treaty – the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty between Russia and the US – reducing mechanisms for strategic stability, communication and predictability and which could, potentially, pave the way to a resumption of nuclear testing. The war in Ukraine requires an updated way of thinking about how nuclear weapons interact with conventional crises and warfare and how they are being employed by Russia as a tool of coercion and behavioural signalling.
+
+IR2021 already developed the UK’s nuclear deterrence policy and doctrine towards an era of great power competition, including raising the cap on the UK’s overall weapon stockpile, reversing a trend of a decline in numbers since the Cold War, and posing a challenge in terms of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a non-nuclear weapons power, the German contribution to the debate is naturally very different to the UK position and nuclear arms control is of great significance to Germany. It is heavily influenced by its commercial sector and there are differing views from inside the coalition government.
+
+An early Zeitenwende decision was to procure 35 F-35A, which allows Germany to continue to participate in the US nuclear sharing agreement, thereby clearly signalling continued Transatlanticism. However, Germany also participated as an observer in the first meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This reflects the priorities of maintaining alliance solidarity and maintaining a principled approach to disarmament.
+
+Nevertheless, strategic stability and risk reduction are interconnected, and the security environment has forced Europe to widen its sense of what risk reduction, including deterrence, involves. Moreover, Europe collectively needs more options to manage escalation. For such discussions, non-governmental fora are the safest ground to meet on.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 10 – Dialogue and Knowledge Sharing`
+
+_`The UK and Germany should establish a British-German nuclear dialogue with the objective of raising both the UK and Germany’s “nuclear IQ” and encouraging a more public debate on nuclear weapons and the nuclear threats increasingly posed by hostile state actors (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea), escalation, risk reduction and strategic stability, as well as the joint challenge of nuclear proliferation.`_
+
+> #### `Recommendation 11 – Policy`
+
+_`The UK and Germany should commit to developing new Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), within an OSCE framework, and adapt them to the needs of the 21st Century, accounting for new technologies and better protection of civilian populations.`_
+
+
+### `CHAPTER FOUR`
+### UK-GERMAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONAL COOPERATION
+
+This chapter assesses the practical opportunities for enhanced cooperation between the UK military and the Bundeswehr, and between the UK and German defence industries.
+
+The UK military and the Bundeswehr have a long history and a deep cultural understanding which was gained through longstanding basing of UK troops in Germany. This is exemplified by the formation of the binational German-British Amphibious Engineer Battalion 130, which specialises in bridging capabilities. They have operated together in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Mali and cooperated in countering ISIS in Syria and Iraq, amongst numerous military exercises. Most recently, the RAF and Luftwaffe have flown joint NATO air policing missions over Estonia for the first time, including the interception of a Russian aircraft, as the UK takes over the NATO rotation from Germany.
+
+#### DEFENCE MODERNISATION AND READINESS FOR WARFIGHTING
+
+Within NATO, the UK and Germany both lead eFP multinational battlegroups, are vJTF framework nations, lead Framework Nations, and aspire to operate at divisional level. However, the UK and German militaries, especially their land forces, need to modernise quickly to live up to their current NATO commitments. Indeed, there is uncertainty over whether committed UK and German divisions will be available to NATO and ready on time. Following the war in Ukraine, both militaries have been accused of eroding their own warfighting capabilities with underinvestment and being distracted with expeditionary operations. There is even an odd similarity in the current Infantry Fighting vehicle (IFv) problems with the UK Ajax further delayed into service and significantly over budget, and the German Puma IFv experiencing multiple problems, including breaking down during exercise conditions.
+
+The UK and Germany are currently the first and second largest European defence spenders respectively. The 2020 UK spending review provided defence with an additional 16.5 billion pounds over a four-year settlement which was described as the “largest sustained increase in the core defence budget for 30 years”. Despite the war in Ukraine, the UK Spring Budget allocated only an additional 11 billion to the defence budget for 2027/28, which will mainly go to the capital budget. This places UK defence spending at 2.1 per cent with an aspiration to increase to 2.5 per cent when “fiscal conditions allow” and as part of a broader change to the NATO Defence Investment Pledge. However, these increases might still not be enough to transform the UK military, with the National Audit Office concluding that the Equipment Plan to 2031 is highly ambitious and that UK NATO commitments are in jeopardy.
+
+In contrast, the war in Ukraine prompted larger increases in German defence spending. Despite the financial commitments of the Zeitenwende, Germany missed the 2022 two per cent GDP NATO target and is forecast to miss it in 2023 as well. The Bundeswehr is in a similar state following decades of underinvestment. Its return as a lever of national power and collective defence is now the number one priority and was a central part of the Zeitenwende speech, with Chancellor Scholz declaring “The goal is a powerful, cutting-edge, progressive Bundeswehr that can be relied upon to protect us”.
+
+Despite a cash injection and rising overall spending for the Bundeswehr, it is unlikely to be enough or truly transformational, especially with inflation and fluctuations in currency, for several reasons. First, the approach is based on capability retention through equipment modernisation by providing replacements for existing equipment and programmes, so no “new” capabilities will be delivered. Much will be absorbed by the procurement of basic military equipment such as helmets and night vision. Second, the special fund is based on a 2018 capability profile, not future requirements, which will largely be developed by analysing data from the war in Ukraine. Third, due to slow procurement processes, the contracts for the special fund are only just materialising, 12 months later, and are yet to have an impact.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 12 – Policy and Dialogue and Knowledge Sharing`
+
+_`The UK and Germany should lead a broader European debate on defence specialisation to make the most of their comparative advantages and build on work already undertaken in their respective NATO Framework Nations. While specialisation is not a new concept in European security, the war in Ukraine has revived it and created political and economic drivers, and a greater degree of unity and focus on European defence and security than past initiatives.`_
+
+DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION AND CAPABILITIES
+
+The 2021 DCP specifically references the 40 years of cooperation between the UK and Germany on combat air and the desire to expand this to other areas such as land systems, space, and cyberspace. Bilaterally there is only one bilateral defence procurement project between the UK and Germany – the Wide Wet Gap Crossing project – which builds on joint development of bridging capabilities. There are currently eight multinational projects in the land, sea, and air domain. Moreover, there are multiple common or similar equipment programmes in each domain which are already developing.
+
+The Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation (OCCAR) model provides a highly effective framework for defence cooperation that the UK and Germany, as founding members, can base bilateral cooperation on. As the other joint European procurement programme is the European Defence Agency (EDA), OCCAR is currently the only realistic option for the UK, unless the UK is able to secure a deal with the EU for third party participation.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 13 – Policy`
+
+_`The UK and Germany should use the OCCAR framework as a foundation for joint procurement and use the tried and tested framework for any bilateral joint procurement projects identified.`_
+
+According to the CEO of German defence company Hensoldt, the war in Ukraine has already transformed their business model, with demand so high that manufacturers can produce weapons without pre-orders. Operationally, the war in Ukraine has also reaffirmed the vital importance of common systems and their sustainability in production and logistic support.
+
+UK and German industry is well placed to adapt to these changes and there is potential to strengthen their industrial capabilities through closer cooperation, though the war in Ukraine has not yet been decisive in this regard. To date, equipment cooperation has occurred largely by chance and has been arrived at independently. Any post-Ukraine revisions of UK and German industrial strategies would begin to enable more formal and structured cooperation. Moreover, if closer cooperation is to make a step change, the priority is to provide a political declaration to send a strong signal to UK and German industry to provide reassurance and build trust.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 14 – Political`
+
+_`The UK and Germany should commit to a joint high-level statement to make the case for a cooperative strategy to industry, which outlines the associated benefits, to provide the demand signal to industry and best prepare them for any change of approach.`_
+
+However, political and structural differences will likely remain with system level cooperation limited due to diverging political and industrial preferences, with Germany favouring national or EU procurement and the UK favouring national or US imports. While this might improve, it is unlikely to change. Instead, focussing on a sub-system level could develop collaborative opportunities.
+
+For example, in the air domain, cooperation is limited by the emerging cooperative plans of the UK-Italy-Japan trilateral Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) and the Franco-German Future Combat Air System (FCAS) to produce sixth generation fighters. However, there is scope for cooperation at a sub-component level on Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4), sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW), complex weapons and other systems which could be applied across programmes for system levels of co-operations, many of which are already highlighted in UK and German industrial strategies.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 15 – Operational`
+
+_`The UK and Germany, as members of GCAP and FCAS respectively, should lead on identifying collaborative opportunities at a sub-component level and champion cooperation and commonality where possible.`_
+
+Export controls, which caused a diplomatic problem between the UK and German in 2019 over UK exports of Eurofighter Typhoon, have come into sharper focus due to military support to Ukraine. Without strong communication and desire to mitigate and provide workarounds, arms export policies could continue to have repercussions for the European defence industry and be a significant roadblock to future cooperation. The earlier these issues are aligned the better.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 16 – Policy`
+
+_`The UK and Germany should compare respective arms export policies and regimes in greater depth, including Parliamentary scrutiny, to create more standardised processes across Europe and increase export potential.`_
+
+The war in Ukraine has also highlighted the importance of air and missile defence to protect military forces and civilian populations which has long been a European capability gap. The recent establishment of the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) seeks to establish a European air and missile defence system through common acquisition of interoperable and off-the-shelf solutions.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 17 – Dialogue and Knowledge Sharing`
+
+_`The UK and Germany, as heavyweights of cooperation in the European Sky Shield Initiative, should undertake analysis to enhance the initiative to move from joint procurement of common capabilities towards joint acquisition in order to understand future requirements and support NATOs Integrated Air and Missile Defence.`_
+
+An early decision of the Zeitenwende was that the Bundeswehr will procure armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAvs) for the first time, concluding a debate that began in 2012. The “drone” debate in Germany has been difficult and conflated with the US operation of drones and questions of autonomous killing. By mid-2024, the Heron TP drone, currently leased by Germany, will be armed, then replaced with the Eurodrone by 2032. In contrast, the UK has been operating armed UAvs for decades and has experience in integrating these into operational use across services and domains.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 18 – Dialogue and Knowledge Sharing`
+
+_`The UK should establish a UAv knowledge sharing programme for a German audience on operating armed UAvs in conflicts, covering the full range of associated issues such as legality, ethics, targeting processes, collateral damage assessments, and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) handling for operators. This would allow the Bundeswehr to operationally integrate armed UAvs much more quickly.`_
+
+Land cooperation is a growing area with joint experience on the Boxer programme, which will be enhanced through the new Boxer user group. Indeed, UK-German leadership on Boxer will be needed as rising demand starts to create supply bottlenecks. Moreover, both the UK and Germany are continuing to improve their MBTs, both using the L55A1 turret and developing standardised ammunition to enhance NATO interoperability.
+
+Moreover, there are potential collaborative opportunities in developing long-range precision strike capabilities as the war in Ukraine has provided a stark demonstration of its military value and of current Russian vulnerabilities in this area. As European militaries develop their new doctrinal concepts and identify lessons from the war, it has provided a sharper focus, with knowledge sharing and joint procurement options, such as closer alignment for Germany with the UK’s Complex Weapons Programme or the UK with the German-Dutch Apollo Project on Ground-based air and missile defence. Part of land warfare development, and understanding warfighting lessons from Ukraine, is influenced by prototype warfare, integration, and doctrinal advancement, which is a leading area for the UK.
+
+> #### `Recommendation 19 – Dialogue and Knowledge Sharing`
+
+_`The UK should invite the Bundeswehr to visit, and potentially join, its Experimentation Battlegroup, based in Cyprus, which leads on prototype warfare and capability development for the British Army.`_
+
+
+### A 2030 Roadmap for Enhanced Cooperation
+
+___`The transformative effect of the war in Ukraine has made enhanced UK-German defence and security, and foreign policy cooperation more attractive, viable, and necessary; and moreover, this period of joint policy development is the ideal moment to develop a more structural relationship. Enhanced UK-German cooperation should be focussed on helping to lead a European Pillar of NATO, rather than the ad hoc and transactional approach that has characterised the current relationship. The strategic approach to bilateral cooperation should focus on setting clear mutual goals and establishing the right mechanisms and processes for delivery, managed through the UK-German Strategic Dialogue or a more ambitious future agreement.`___
+
+___`Germany and the UK should include Defence Ministers in the annual Strategic Dialogue and intensify regular dialogues between the Prime Minister and Chancellor to set the level of ambition and maintain political momentum. The two countries should also explore the potential for and content of a bilateral Treaty-based defence and security relationship. This agreement should build on work already undertaken through UK and German leadership of their respective Framework Nations Concepts and should focus on increasing European burden sharing and enhancing readiness of forces. They should commit to developing new Confidence and Security Building Measures, accounting for new technologies and better protection of civilian populations.`___
+
+___`They should use the OCCAR framework as a foundation for joint procurement and use the tried and tested framework for any bilateral joint procurement projects identified. The two countries should compare respective arms export policies and regimes in greater depth, including Parliamentary scrutiny, to create more standardised processes across Europe. Germany and the UK should implement measures for increased dialogue and knowledge sharing, such as the creation of liaison officers, the establishment of a British-German nuclear dialogue, and leading a broader European debate on defence specialisation.`___
+
+---
+
+__Ed Arnold__ is a Research Fellow for European Security within the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His experience covers defence, intelligence, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, within the public and private sector. His primary research focus is on British defence, security, and foreign policy, specifically relating to the European security architecture and transatlantic cooperation. Ed has a particular interest in UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Reviews.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-18-cyber-operations-and-capabilities.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-18-cyber-operations-and-capabilities.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-18-cyber-operations-and-capabilities.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Evolving Cyber Defense
+author: James A. Lewis, et al.
+date : 2023-05-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/BcjQwNP.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Evolving Cyber Operations and Capabilities"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The war in Ukraine shows that cyber defense requires a different approach with new actors and strategies that will be complex for nations to construct. This report examines cybersecurity in Ukraine, with a look to the larger debate around cyber capabilities and defense._
+
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+_JAMES A. LEWIS_
+
+Most networks can be breached, and most software has exploitable flaws. This can give unparalleled advantage to attackers, but the situation in Ukraine suggests that an energetic and thorough defense can prove more than adequate in matching this advantage. The Ukraine experience can guide decisions on cyber defense, and it suggests that adequate cyber defense will require different approaches, involve new actors, and be complex for nations to construct and coordinate. As part of the UK National Cyber Security Centre’s efforts to shape debate and discussion around cybersecurity issues, this collection of essays examines the war in Ukraine, with a view to the wider debate around the role and value of cyber capabilities.
+
+The “information space” is one of the key spaces in this conflict. Both sides have vied to shape public narratives and international opinion. Much has been written about the West’s use of the rapid declassification of strategic intelligence to counter and debunk Russian lies about actions in Ukraine. Similarly, much debate amongst academics and commentators has sought to understand whether or not the world is witnessing “cyber war” in Ukraine, or whether and how cyber operations add value to furthering a state’s strategic objectives. Originally, this discussion had a focus on cyber’s offensive utility. The following essays shift the focus toward the use of cyber capabilities for defensive or protective purposes and look at the Ukraine conflict through the lens of cyber defense to identify critical lessons from Ukraine on the construction of cyber resilience.
+
+Serious thinking about cyber defense has largely transitioned from giving deterrence a central place in defensive strategies to focusing on the concept of resilience. Democracies cannot expect to deter adversaries from attempting to use cyber operations to advance their national objectives. This leads to the conclusion, discussed in all of the essays, that the goal for national policy must be cyber resilience: the ability to minimize disruption to critical data and services. Advocating for deterrence still serves a political purpose by signaling a desire to avoid conflict, but it is no longer the foundation of national cyber defense.
+
+A good example of this is the new national cyber strategy published in March by the United States. The strategy never uses the word “deterrence” because, in the view of those responsible for its drafting, deterrence had failed routinely in cyberspace. Deterrence assumes that an adversary can be dissuaded from action; resilience assumes that adversary cyber action is inevitable. This has led to the conclusion that resilience is a better approach to cyber defense, particularly against a range of adversaries we confront, which includes not only states but also criminals and proxy forces. In this sense, cyber resilience protects against a much wider — and future — set of threats.
+
+These essays explore different aspects of defense and resilience — including the actors that contribute to it — and identify lessons that Western countries can draw from the Ukrainian experience to build robust, collective cyber resilience. This includes the power of partnerships, whether in responding to cyberattacks or ensuring the continuation of vital services amidst conflict, and the unprecedented coalition of government, multinational, industry, and civil society actors whose efforts have enabled a stronger Ukrainian defense.
+
+It should be noted that the most important aspect of resilience is only discussed indirectly in the essays: the need for political and social resilience. Lonergan, for example, notes that the political implications of cyber actions have proven to be more important than their military effect. One of Putin’s many miscalculations was the belief that Ukrainian defenses would quickly crumble. A Russian analyst (now in exile) suggests the precedent of Afghanistan as shaping Russian expectations, since in that case a well-equipped and Western-trained army evaporated in a matter of a few weeks. Putin may have expected Kyiv to react like Kabul. However, Ukraine’s leaders and people were not ready to concede to Russian suzerainty. The keystone of resilience is the political will to continue to resist. While it can be an elusive term, this political will forms the basis for diplomacy and defense.
+
+The essays point out that the Ukraine conflict demonstrates that political resilience must be strengthened in cyberspace, by attention to both the digital technologies that create the information space messages and the content itself. This is not only because of the struggles over the narratives that shape opinion (and thus political will), nor solely because of the possibility of disrupting critical infrastructure, but also because cyber actions provide the tools and the structure to build a resilient community for defense — a community, as the authors note, that has transcended the boundaries of Ukraine and Russia.
+
+There is more to cyber resilience than political will, of course (although without political will other actions are superfluous) — people, technology, organization, planning. Nor can cyber resilience be thought of as solely the remit of government. Indeed, what the Ukraine conflict has demonstrated is the broad, diverse range of actors participating in a conflict.
+
+A more diverse set of participants in the conflict raises questions of how it is that the roles and responsibilities within cyberspace are understood, as well as what the norms and rules are that dictate how actors conduct themselves. Ukraine has demonstrated the value of coalitions in cyberspace, and of collective defense, including robust and distributed data and network architectures. Partnerships with civil society, the private sector, and other governments are crucial. Organizing this multi-party effort requires an ability to connect and communicate with all actors, and this requires reinforcing established channels for media and official communications with the use of distributed and decentralized messaging services, like Signal and Telegram. All of the essays explore the new digital landscape where cyber conflict will occur and which nations must defend: a landscape created by fiber optic networks, mobile telephony, the “cloud,” and satellites.
+
+The essays draw several lessons from the Ukrainian experience. The first is that many cyber strategies, in light of that experience, can now be seen to be incomplete or inadequate in their definitions of what is critical for defense. A second is the need to establish deep relations with allied and partner nations for sharing intelligence, technology, and tactics. Ukraine had an advantage in that its cyber conflict with Russia began in 2014, allowing government agencies to develop greater collaboration in responses and Ukraine to build mature relationships with allies. Similarly, establishing relations with global service providers and civil society on an ongoing basis is critical. The ability to use resources and support from the private sector and civil society gave Ukraine an advantage in defense that Russia was unable to match.
+
+The authors recognize the need to exercise a degree of caution in drawing on the Ukrainian experience. Russia’s military proved to be startlingly incompetent; future opponents may not be similarly afflicted. Russia’s brutal and unprovoked invasion created a wave of sympathy and support among democracies and civil society. Other conflicts, where moral and ethical distinctions are not as stark, may not produce the same response. One task for national cyber agencies is to build now the supportive relationships with nongovernmental actors that are needed for conflict: both the constant ongoing low-level conflict that defines cyberspace and the eventuality of a conflict that crosses the threshold of the use of force, something that seems much closer than it did a decade ago.
+
+The essays included in this collection predict that many different categories of actors will be enmeshed in future cyber conflict. This aspect of the Ukraine conflict provoked a confusing discussion in the broader cybersecurity literature on the legality of using proxies and the implications for the global norms on responsible state behavior in cyberspace that were agreed upon at the United Nations. Frankly, this debate seems to be based on misunderstanding. The UN discussions made it clear that the agreed norms do not apply during armed conflict — which is the sphere of different norms and laws, in particular the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC). There are ambiguities, of course, created by the nature of cyberspace when nations attempt to apply LOAC, given that distinctions among participants and targets that can be clear in the physical world are opaque in cyberspace, but the authors discuss whether the use of proxies and militias has become a normal and (if done in accordance with LOAC) legal part of warfare and most likely an element of any cyber conflict in the future.
+
+The essays raise these points in greater detail and clarity. Lonergan’s discussion of proxies makes the important point that while there is little evidence of effect from “hacktivism” on opponent decisionmaking or military capabilities, there is strong evidence that the primary effect is political and international — to build a community of support and to shape the narrative of the conflict for national and international audiences. The proxy actors’ apparent relationship with the “sponsoring” state is a key determinant of this, combined with a greater international orientation to shape the narratives of the conflict, and a focus solely on cyber effects may miss the most important impact created by proxies. Lonergan criticizes the tendency among policymakers and media to default to hyperbolic language to depict the effect of proxies, regardless of their true impact — noting that hyperbolic rhetoric about cyber proxies only reinforces their narratives and becomes a tool to rally their constituencies.
+
+Voo’s essay notes that the internet has become a political battleground and that Ukraine offers important strategic lessons for the key foundations of successful cyber defense. She asks fundamental questions of whether the responsibility for defense lies in the voluntary actions of tech companies or whether special rules for social media, dual-use technology, and the participation of volunteers are needed in periods of conflict. She emphasizes the need for organization and the importance of integrating cyber defense strategies into a country’s wider military and intelligence strategies.
+
+She and Ertan both note that private sector actions are not driven solely by altruism, since Russia’s cyber actions harm the space in which they do business, and there is only an ad hoc business model for private sector actions. Voo asks what has become the central question for international cybersecurity: whether consequences are needed for norms to have any meaning. Ertan suggests that countries may need to develop (individual or collective) funding mechanisms to remedy this with suggestions for remodeling cyber resilience from a NATO allies perspective. She also makes the critical point that “cyber war” is a flawed concept, since most adversary action remains below the use-of-force threshold. The increasing ease with which authoritarian states use cyberspace to undermine a rules-based order creates an uneasy space that is marked by conflict rather than peace. Garson also points to early misunderstandings of the complexity and limitations of cyber operations that confused expectations for the Ukraine war. She explores the sheer depth of the private sector’s involvement in cyberspace, along with the complexity this creates for companies as they seek to navigate engagement and risks within complex geopolitical crises — as well as the implications that the private sectors’ actions hold for long-term stability in cyberspace, as the lines between defensive and offensive activity become increasingly blurred in conflict.
+
+These brief synopses do not do justice to the essays, and indeed barely touch upon many of their most salient points. There are also the caveats that the conflict has not ended and that the full details have not emerged. But with these caveats, the essays provide a deeper understanding of the use of cyber operations in the war — and how democratic countries should, in light of this, prepare their cyber defenses and resilience, whether within or outside of a conflict.
+
+
+### The Implications of Cyber Proxies in the Ukraine Conflict
+
+_ERICA D. LONERGAN_
+
+#### Introduction
+
+In the lead-up to Russia’s invasion in February 2022, much of the expert commentary within the cyber community about the Ukraine conflict focused on three things: the extent to which Russia would launch a cyber “shock and awe” campaign to coerce Ukraine into submission; fears of a Russian cyber onslaught against the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe to deter Western intervention or retaliate against economic sanctions; and speculation about the degree to which Russia would effectively integrate cyber and kinetic operations on the modern battlefield. Yet, after more than one year of war, none of these issues has been a defining feature of the cyber dimension of the conflict in the way that most analysts expected. Instead, one of the most significant cyber features of the war has been the role of third-party actors as belligerents — cyber proxies — aligned to Russia or Ukraine. While the concept of cyber proxies is not novel, it has taken new and evolving characteristics in the context of the Ukraine conflict, offering a potential preview of how cyber proxies may play a role in future crises and conflicts.
+
+Moreover, an important feature of cyber proxies in the Ukraine conflict is their willingness to conduct cyberattacks beyond the theater of operations, including against the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe. While policymakers issued warnings about potential Russian cyberattacks that might spill over beyond Ukraine, they did not necessarily anticipate the form in which they would ultimately occur — specifically, low-impact, disruptive cyber activity carried out by hacktivist groups. For instance, in late January 2022, the National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) in the United Kingdom cautioned that Russia was likely to target the private sector via cyber means and advised companies to “bolster their cyber security resilience in response to the malicious cyber incidents in and around Ukraine.” And in February 2022, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a stark warning to private companies that Russia has “used cyber as a key component of [its] force projection over the last decade . . . The Russians understand that disabling or destroying critical infrastructure — including power and communications — can augment pressure on a country’s government, military, and population and accelerate their acceding to Russian objectives.” However, Russian advanced persistent threat actors have largely avoided conducting major, significant cyberattacks against Western targets. Instead, there has been a significant volume of disruptive cyber activity carried out by proxy actors with far more ambiguous relationships to the Russian government.
+
+The prevalence of cyber proxy groups was immediately apparent in the opening days of the Ukraine conflict. For example, on February 24, 2022, the Anonymous hacker collective declared via its Twitter account that it was “currently involved in operations against the Russian Federation. Our operations are targeting the Russian government.” Shortly after that, Killnet, which was previously a modest hack-for-hire group, morphed into a politically motivated hacktivist entity and began a sustained effort to conduct low-cost, disruptive cyberattacks against a range of Western targets. Around the same time, the newly established IT Army of Ukraine, a volunteer hacker army that includes individuals from Ukraine and around the world, began to launch attacks against targets within the Russian Federation. In other words, the Ukraine conflict is characterized by a notable resurgence of proxy warfare — but with novel characteristics and permutations. Specifically, many of these cyber proxy groups are operating more as transnational social and political actors — creating platforms for political mobilization and influence — than as traditional proxies conducting cyber effects operations on behalf of a state government for the purposes of coercion or warfighting.
+
+In light of the reality that cyber proxies are a consistent feature — not an aberration — of this conflict, governments should anticipate that future wars may give rise to similar patterns. Yet, policymakers seem to be overlooking this aspect of the war, instead focusing more on dissecting the causes of Russia’s apparent underperformance in cyberspace or on emphasizing their own roles in contributing to Ukraine’s cyber defenses. However, because a significant portion of the cyber activity occurring in the context of this war is being perpetrated by different types of cyber proxy actors, it is important for policymakers to assess the implications of the novel ways in which cyber proxies are influencing the Ukraine conflict to better anticipate their roles in future contingencies.
+
+#### Traditional Concepts of Cyber Proxy Warfare
+
+The notion of “proxy war” in cyberspace is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, governments have formed ambiguous, plausibly deniable relationships with a variety of cyber actors — both witting and unwitting — for as many decades as cyber conflict has existed. These actors range from criminal organizations at varying levels of sophistication (such as a ransomware groups); to patriotic hackers or hacktivists; to private firms; and to advanced persistent threat actors with closer, but still plausibly deniable, relationships with governments. Most discussions of cyber proxies focus on the different ways in which states direct (with varying degrees of overtness) or enable non-state actors to conduct cyber operations on behalf of or aligned with the interests of the state.
+
+Russia has been an especially prolific actor in the cyber proxy realm, leveraging these groups not only for cyber effects operations but also for broader purposes of information and psychological warfare. This is not surprising given the Russian doctrine, which conceptualizes cyberspace and cyber warfare as only one element of a broader “information confrontation.” For example, Moscow has established longstanding relationships with cyber criminal organizations: providing them safe haven, protecting them from prosecution, and turning a blind eye to their criminal activities in exchange for their tacit agreement to avoid targeting Russian interests in cyberspace and to be available when called upon to act on behalf of the government. More recently, Russia has permitted ransomware groups to operate from its territory and conduct costly attacks against Western targets (even if it does not direct or order them to do so), including the spate of ransomware attacks in 2021 against U.S. firms such as Colonial Pipeline and JBS meat processing. Yet, Russia’s tolerance of cyber criminal groups is sometimes tested, such as its announcement in January 2022 that the Federal Security Service (FSB) had dismantled the ransomware group REvil, arresting some of its members and seizing its assets.
+
+Russia has also leveraged both witting and unwitting cyber proxies to complement its military campaigns. As part of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, it is likely that the Russian government facilitated the creation of online forums to distribute malware and coordinate cyberattacks against Georgian targets. Cyber proxy groups were also prolific in the context of Russia’s 2014 annexation and occupation of Crimea. For example, in October 2014 the hacktivist group CyberBerkut, which experts suspect has connections to APT28 (the Russian advanced persistent threat actor linked to the GRU, Russian military intelligence), compromised Ukraine’s election systems and posted exfiltrated data online just prior to the parliamentary elections. And in 2015, APT28 carried out the first-known cyberattack against a state’s power grid, disrupting Ukraine’s grid for several hours during the winter. It is likewise notable that Ukrainian patriotic hacker groups were also active during Russia’s 2014 military campaign — such as the Ukrainian Cyber Army, which conducted website defacements and similar types of low-impact attacks.
+
+Historically, states have found working with cyber proxy groups appealing for a range of reasons. The ambiguous and secretive nature of these relationships enables governments to plausibly deny their role in cyber incidents, shielding themselves from potential retaliation by adversaries or from paying political costs in the context of their own domestic politics. In some cases, a government may see benefits in tacitly permitting proxy groups to engage in more aggressive, disruptive, or offensive actions than it would otherwise be willing to conduct directly, or it may permit them to attack certain types of targets that the government might otherwise see as being off limits for its own cyber forces, such as civilian critical infrastructure. Encouraging action by cyber proxy groups can also serve as a means of diverting domestic political or nationalist pressure during international crises, acting as a form of pressure release. Permitting cyber proxies can also keep potential threats to a regime busy: rather than applying their cyber skills against the government, would-be hackers can be directed against both internal rivals and external threats to a regime. Additionally, particularly for less mature cyber powers, proxy groups can provide a much-needed augmentation of a state’s cyber capabilities or skilled personnel. In some cases, highly organized cyber criminal enterprises may be more sophisticated than some nation-state actors. From the perspective of the cyber proxy group, implicit or explicit state support provides a number of benefits. Most importantly, the legal protections offered by states can shield proxy groups from prosecution or even extradition by international law enforcement, enabling groups to carry out their enterprises without scrutiny. Cyber proxies may also perceive gains from resources, technologies, training, and capabilities to which they might otherwise lack access.
+
+Yet, there are also risks. In particular, with respect to the state, cyber proxy groups could exceed their mandate, creating risks of blowback or retaliation against the government or increasing the chances of inadvertent escalation. In a different vein, cyber proxies may simply be ineffective, shirk responsibilities, or divert government resources toward their own desired objectives. Finally, cyber proxies could turn against their state sponsor, engaging in cyber activities that directly or indirectly undermine the sponsor’s interests or political stability. Therefore, a core aspect of cyber proxy warfare hinges on the nature of the relationship between the proxy group and the state sponsor. The extent to which a state has effective command and control over the activates of a proxy group — directing it to conduct cyber operations in its interests — or whether it risks both under- and over-performance by a proxy shapes the benefits and risks of working with cyber proxies.
+
+#### Traditional Forms of Cyber Proxy Behavior in Ukraine
+
+The 2022 Ukraine conflict has seen a significant amount of this type of traditional cyber proxy behavior — where a state implicitly permits or more directly urges affiliated non-state actors to conduct cyberattacks. In this sense, the current conflict reflects a level of continuity with Russia’s past approaches. One example of traditional cyber proxy warfare is the failed attempt by APT28 on April 8, 2022, to replicate its 2015 success in disrupting Ukraine’s power grid. While ultimately unsuccessful (Ukraine’s Computer Emergency Response Team and a Slovakian cybersecurity firm were able to halt the attack), it appears to have been an effort by Russia to apply cyber power as part of a broader warfighting approach via leveraging traditional proxy groups. Indeed, evidence indicates that the attackers had gained access to the power grid’s system in the first phases of the conflict.
+
+The Ukraine conflict has also been characterized by the activation of Russian-aligned hacktivist groups with more ambiguous relationships with Moscow that are likely under much looser command and control structures — similar to Russia’s mobilization of these groups in 2008 in Georgia and 2014 in Crimea. Indeed, many of these groups claim to have no formal affiliation with the Russian government, even as they operate in Russia’s interests. Specifically, these Russian-aligned hacktivist groups have been active in attacking targets of interest within Ukraine, including critical infrastructure, even if the sophistication and severity of their attacks has been minimal. For example, on August 15, 2022, the People’s CyberArmy conducted a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against a Ukrainian state-owned nuclear power company, Energoatom. The hacktivist group unleashed 7.25 million bot accounts, which flooded the power company’s website with bogus traffic. Nevertheless, Energoatom was able to thwart the DDoS attack within a few hours, and the People’s CyberArmy quickly moved on to other Ukrainian targets. In another illustrative example, on July 1, 2022, XakNet, a Russian-aligned hacktivist group, claimed that it had conducted a cyberattack against DTEK, Ukraine’s largest energy holding company, posting to its Telegram channel screenshots that were meant to serve as proof of its successful breach of the company’s networks. This cyber incident occurred at the same time as Russian missile attacks against DTEK’s Kryvorizka thermal power plant in Kryvyi Rih, although the connection between the cyber and kinetic incidents is likely spurious.
+
+#### New Forms of Cyber Proxy Warfare
+
+At the same time, the Ukraine conflict is revealing new permutations of cyber proxy warfare that are more internationalized, just as the broader conventional conflict itself has drawn in multiple external participants. Specifically, a significant portion of the cyber activity that is taking place in the political context of the Ukraine conflict is being carried out by hacktivist groups that are attacking targets beyond the theater of operations — either within the Russian homeland or against targets in the West, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) member states. Moreover, these groups are drawing on participants from around the world who are aligned to their political orientation, even if they may lack the level of skill and sophistication of other threat actors, such as APT28, that are more directly aligned with governments. Examining just two different examples of these types of cyber proxy actors — Killnet and the Ukraine IT Army — reveals some of the similarities as well as the variation across these groups and how they are changing the nature of cyber proxy warfare.
+
+In particular, while these two groups express diametrically opposed political orientations and differ in the extent of their affiliation with a government (the Ukraine IT Army was initially created by a government official, while Killnet claims to be independent of Moscow), they are primarily focused on conducting disruptive or nuisance cyber campaigns against targets beyond the battlefield in Ukraine. Additionally, both cyber proxy groups maintain active social media forums where they provide direction to their members about planning and executing cyberattacks. But these forums also serve to communicate political messages and act as a form of virtual political mobilization, rallying cadre around a cause and shaping the narrative of the conflict.
+
+It is this combination of more internationally-oriented membership and targeting, coupled with the use of cyberattacks as a vehicle for political mobilization, that makes this form of cyber proxy warfare particularly interesting and novel in a warfighting context. In this sense, these cyber proxies act as both transnational and local actors — conducting operations beyond the battlefield as a means of cultivating their own internal political narratives, while at the same time shaping broader narratives about the conflict. In other words, these groups are playing a role in the Ukraine war not simply by virtue of how their cyber effects operations are impacting the course of the conflict, or through deterring or coercing external parties. After all, the types of operations these groups conduct are low-cost, disruptive cyberattacks that do not do much in the way of damage. Rather, their cyber campaigns are a way for groups to further political narratives about the war and shape the perceptions of different audiences, and it is through this lens — not that of cyber effects — that their impact can be best understood.
+
+#### Killnet
+
+Killnet, a Russian-aligned hacktivist group that became active in the initial stages of the conflict, is a formerly small and obscure botnet for hire organization that has since rebranded as an internationally known hacktivist group. Politico has described the group as “more like an angry, nationalist online mob armed with low-grade cyber-offensive tools and tactics,” contrasting it with more sophisticated Russian threat actors. Indeed, Killnet’s adherents are not particularly skilled and the group almost exclusively conducts straightforward DDoS campaigns, publishing simple scripts on its social media channels for followers to use. Yet, Killnet has received a significant amount of attention from analysts and the media due to its near-routine targeting of Western entities, including critical infrastructure. This distinguishes Killnet from other pro-Russia hacktivist groups, which have largely focused on targets within Ukraine, perhaps in coordination or at least alignment with Russian conventional military operations.
+
+For example, in early February 2023, Killnet launched a wave of DDoS attacks against more than a dozen hospitals in the United States. But, like many of Killnet’s prior disruptive attacks, the actual impact on U.S. hospitals was minimal. According to Cloudfare, the largest of these attacks peaked for only ten seconds, with the total attack lasting for only six minutes. Similarly, the American Hospital Association stated that the “impact appears to have been minimal and temporary.” This cyber activity is a hallmark of Killnet’s approach: conducting low-impact disruptive cyber campaigns against Western critical infrastructure and other targets. In these types of campaigns, Killnet does not appear to be focused on actually having an impact with its disruptive attacks — or at least does not particularly care if its self-generated bravado matches reality. Despite the negligible effects of its cyber operations, Killnet appears to relish in hyperbolic and triumphalist language to rally supporters around its cyber campaigns.
+
+Against smaller countries, particularly the Baltic states, Killnet has been more successful in sustaining disruptive attacks over longer periods of time. For example, in May 2022 as part of its declaration of “war” against countries supporting Ukraine, Killnet launched DDoS attacks against dozens of targets in Latvia, a NATO member state, ranging from government and transportation to finance. Accompanying these attacks were calls on Killnet’s Telegram channel and other social media sites for cadre to carry out additional cyberattacks against Latvia. Killnet targeted Latvia again in July with a large disruptive attack — including a 12-hour disruption of Latvia’s public broadcasting center — after the government stated it would take down Soviet-era monuments. August saw another disruptive attack, this time against the website of Latvia’s parliament after the body declared Russia to be a state sponsor of terrorism. All this followed a 10-day wave of DDoS attacks against Lithuania in June in response to that government’s decision to block certain Russian exports. Moreover, these represent only a handful examples of the disruptive attacks conducted by Killnet and similar groups against Latvia and Lithuania which, along with Estonia, are routinely targeted in this manner by cyber proxies.
+
+In some ways, the bluster may be the point. Specifically, an important aspect of Killnet’s success as an organization derives from its Telegram channel and associated media sites, where members routinely congratulate one another and even leverage Western media reports about their cyberattacks to bolster their credibility internally and improve morale within the group. Killnet’s Telegram channel, which is only in Russian, has over 90 thousand subscribers. Indeed, as Dark Reading reported, Killnet has seen a significant increase in its social media followers stemming from the public nature of its DDoS campaigns (even as they are not causing any meaningful effects): “Killnet’s’ pro-Russian DDoS crusade has also begun attracting many more followers and fans.” Killnet has even become a feature of Russian war-related pop culture. Last summer, Russian rapper Kazhe Oboyma published a song glorifying Killnet called “KillnetFlow (Anonymous diss).” In October 2022, Killnet launched a jewelry collaboration with Russian jeweler HooliganZ, and the group also sells other Killnet-branded merchandise. This “serves as a form of propaganda, helping to recruit new members and promote the group’s cause.”
+
+Like other Russian-aligned hacktivist groups, Killnet’s leader, Killmilk, staunchly disavows any formal relationship with the Russian government and claims that the group is entirely self-organized and sustaining. Yet, it is clear that Killnet is serving Russia’s broader political purposes in the conflict. The fact that Killnet’s Telegram channel is only published in Russian, for instance (coupled with its attempts to gain a foothold in broader Russian culture), provides insights into the audience the group is interested in mobilizing — domestic Russian or near-abroad Russian speaking audiences. In this sense, Killnet is ostensibly a useful tool of Moscow’s efforts to maintain domestic support around continuing Russian military involvement in Ukraine — while at the same time keeping potential spoilers and discontented would-be cyber actors busy. This aligns with recent research on the use of cyber proxies during international crises, where states have been found to use these actors as a means of placating certain domestic political audiences. While that research was focused on the role these groups play in facilitating the de-escalation of crises, it reflects an important insight that there are domestic political considerations in the use of cyber proxy groups that may be as significant to a government, if not more so, than international ones.
+
+#### The IT Army of Ukraine
+
+While Killnet and the IT Army of Ukraine are on opposite political sides of the conflict and engage vastly different audiences, there are several important similarities between the two groups. This is suggestive of emerging trends in cyber proxy warfare stemming from the Ukraine conflict. Both the IT Army of Ukraine and Killnet have transnational characteristics in terms of the international representation of their volunteers and the scope of their targeting. Specifically, both groups focus their efforts on attacking targets — such as civilian critical infrastructure — outside of the theater of operations in Ukraine. While Killnet largely conducts DDoS attacks against the West, the IT Army of Ukraine has directed its efforts almost exclusively against Russian targets within the Russian Federation (rather than on the battlefield), as well against Belarus. Additionally, both Killnet and the IT Army prefer low-cost, disruptive cyberattacks, likely because this enables wider participation by would-be volunteers, making it easier for sympathetic individuals to join the cause. Finally, both groups leverage social media platforms (albeit in different ways) as part of their efforts to facilitate political mobilization and shape the information narratives around the war.
+
+Yet, there are also key differences between the groups. One important distinction is the nature of each group’s relationship with government — a core element of cyber proxy warfare. While it is clear that the Russian government benefits from Killnet’s activities, there is no evidence of a formal link between the two. In contrast, while the Ukrainian government has publicly denied any role in the IT Army’s activities, the group was initially created in February 2022 by Ukraine’s deputy prime minister and minister of digital transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, reportedly at the suggestion of Yegor Aushev, a Ukrainian tech entrepreneur. Moreover, in March 2023, the Ukrainian government announced that it is in the process of developing legislation to formalize the IT Army and incorporate it into the country’s regular armed forces. Additionally, there is far less plausible deniability in the relationship between Kyiv and the IT Army. As Newsweek depicts it, the Ukrainian government “is the first country, certainly the first European democracy, to openly embrace a hacktivist militia during a shooting war.” Similarly, Wired describes the IT Army as “a government-led volunteer unit that’s designed to operate in the middle of a fast-moving war zone.” That said, it is important to note that the idea of a decentralized volunteer cyber citizen militia is not an entirely novel concept in Europe, with the exemplar being the Estonian Defence League’s Cyber Unit.
+
+In fact, while IT Army maintains that it operates independently of the Ukrainian government (at least until the new legislation is passed), researchers have suggested that the organization is actually segmented into two distinct groups. The first is a large, public-facing, globally engaged network of volunteers who conduct disruptive cyber operations against Russian targets. Notably, however, the size of its membership has been declining over time, estimated to be nearly 300,000 subscribers in February 2022 to just under 200,000 in March 2023. The second element of the IT Army is an “in-house team likely consisting of Ukrainian defense and intelligence personnel that have been experimenting with and conducting ever-more complex cyber operations against specific Russian targets.” This latter component, therefore, embodies a traditional concept of cyber proxy warfare (characterized by plausibly deniable connections between military and intelligence organizations and cyber actors), while the former resembles newer permutations of cyber proxies.
+
+Additionally, the IT Army of Ukraine is far more disciplined than Killnet in terms of its organization and approach, professing to be deliberate in its targeting decisionmaking. For example, in response to a query from a Newsweek reporter, an IT Army spokesperson noted that the group is “focused on causing economic damage to Russia in order to weaken its ability to wage war against Ukraine . . . We do not target ordinary citizens, and we take great care to adhere to the laws of armed conflict.” The group has developed mechanisms for organizing and prioritizing different types of targets, identifying the anticipated level of skill that a given attack demands, and coordinating and deconflicting among different efforts. Its Telegram channel also maintains a routinized tasking process for disruptive attacks, where marching orders are given at the same time each day (0900 Central European Time) and targets are typically organized by a theme (such as food delivery services on a weekend to make everyday life slightly more difficult for Russian citizens — suggesting the IT Army may indeed sometimes target ordinary civilians). Despite this level of organization — ostensibly more so than Killnet — there is little evidence that the IT Army’s disruptive cyberattacks are having any meaningful impact on the Russian government’s decisionmaking or on the Russian population’s support for the war.
+
+This suggests that, like Killnet, the cyberattacks themselves (and, by extension, their effects) do not represent the primary contribution of the IT Army to the broader conflict. Instead, the IT Army of Ukraine has leveraged social media to create both a local (Ukrainian) and international (largely Western) community of supporters aligned with its cause. The act of collectively conducting relatively simple cyberattacks thus builds and reinforces community, providing something around which to rally and energize supporters. How these two groups use their social media platforms is also suggestive of the different audiences they are aiming to mobilize. Killnet’s Telegram page is focused on shaping the perceptions of Russian-speaking audiences. In contrast, the IT Army’s Telegram page is in both Ukrainian and English, which reflects the Western-oriented audience the group aims to engage. Indeed, while the group’s first Telegram post on February 26, 2022, was in Ukrainian, the second was in English and contained the following message: “For all IT specialists from other countries, we translated tasks in English. Task # 1 We encourage you to use any vectors of cyber and DDoS attacks on these resources.” What followed was a list of Russian targets organized by sector, from “business corporations” like Gazprom and Lukoil, to “banks” such as Sberbank, and to “the state” including the Office of the President, the Ministry of Defense, and others. In this sense, the IT Army of Ukraine is a microcosm of Ukraine’s broader effort to shape the information environment within Ukraine and — importantly — among Western audiences, whose political support is essential for enabling military support to the country.
+
+#### Policy Implications
+
+Several policy implications follow from this analysis. One clear finding is that future crises and conflict are almost certain to involve a range of cyber proxy actors that are diverse in terms of their level of skill, connection to a central government, and willingness to engage different types of targets. Some of the cyber proxies aligned to the Russian government have conducted (or attempted to conduct) more sophisticated attacks against key targets in Ukraine; others have engaged in low-cost attacks within Ukraine; and still others have conducted disruptive attacks beyond the theater against Western targets.
+
+Some have argued that the proliferation of cyber proxy behavior in the context of the Ukraine conflict has negative implications for international norms about state sponsorship of cyber proxy groups. Western states have sought to promote a norm that states should be held accountable for any cyberattacks that they enable or permit by failing to restrain or turning a blind eye toward proxy groups that emanate from their sovereign borders. Moreover, in the March 2021 final report of the United Nations Open Ended Working Group, nearly all states have agreed to uphold norms of responsible behavior, including norms around preventing the misuse of information and communications technologies. As a result, some have argued that Ukraine’s public support for cyber proxy groups conducting attacks against Russia (such as the IT Army of Ukraine) “stands in stark violation of recently agreed-to norms on state behavior in cyberspace, as well as the foreign policy positions of NATO members and the European Union.” Yet a key challenge with this line of reasoning, as others have pointed out, is that armed conflict represents a fundamentally different context than peacetime or even times of international crisis — one in which “cyber norms should be expected to fall by the wayside before or along with the transition from IHRL [International Human Rights Law] to LOAC [Law of Armed Conflict].” Therefore, policymakers should exercise discretion when considering the normative implications of this conflict and avoid muddying the waters between cyber behavior during wartime versus during routine competition — especially because this may inadvertently undermine important efforts to establish cyber norms where they are actually applicable.
+
+Additionally, policymakers should not apply a one-size-fits-all approach to these different actors. Traditional policy tools — such as placing diplomatic pressure against state sponsors of cyber proxy groups (like Biden’s warning to Putin in June 2021 at the Geneva summit against permitting groups to conduct cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure) coupled with law enforcement action and disruptive campaigns, may be more effective in addressing traditional cyber proxy actors, especially those over whom a state has more effective command and control. These approaches (likely together with credible threats of retaliation, such as repeated public affirmation that NATO’s Article 5 applies to the cyber domain) appear to have worked in dissuading Russia from directly ordering or enabling more advanced threat actors from conducting major cyberattacks against NATO member states. While speculative, it is plausible that Russia’s decision to dismantle the ransomware group REvil in January 2022 — just one month prior to the invasion — was in part meant as a signal to other groups of Russian control, perhaps to deter them from taking unwanted cyber action or to nudge them fall in line with Moscow’s goals. One potential example of this is the February 25 statement by the Conti ransomware group on its Dark Web site that it was “officially announcing a full support of Russian government” and would respond to any “war activities against Russia.” This is notable because, previously, Conti was not a politically motivated actor and was instead decidedly focused on cyber crime for financial gain. Indeed, the group’s decision to become political caused an internal rift and likely motivated a significant leak of internal documents.
+
+However, it is unlikely that these traditional tools will be as effective against groups such as Killnet that have a more indirect relationship with central government and that draw on a more international base of support. These groups are likely to be less dependent on the safe haven provided by a government (especially because their lack of sophisticated infrastructure, reliance on open-source tools, and global membership make them relatively easy and low-cost to dis- and reassemble). This means that applying traditional levers to shape the behavior of these groups through putting pressure on state sponsors is a fruitless endeavor.
+
+Furthermore, the impact new cyber proxy actors are having on the Ukraine conflict — more in terms of shaping political mobilization and cultivating or reinforcing narratives about the war, and less in terms of the actual effects of their cyber operations — complicates how policymakers are typically inclined to address these groups. In some ways, from a policy perspective, it is more straightforward to focus on thwarting, mitigating, or improving resilience against cyber effects operations than it is to counter political narratives or offer credible competing ones. Yet how these cyber proxies are shaping the conflict is more akin to political warfare than coercion. This relates to a broader challenge Western policymakers are facing in the context of the Ukraine war — namely, that while advanced liberal democracies are largely united and have remained more cohesive than expected in pushing back against Russian aggression, a significant part of the world is either Russian-sympathetic (such as China) or non-aligned (such as India). Of course, cyber proxy groups like Killnet and the IT Army of Ukraine are only one element of the broader contest to shape the perceptions of different audiences. Nevertheless, in evaluating the impact of these groups (and, by extension, applying policies to address them) through the lens of “hackers for hire,” policymakers are missing their real role in the conflict.
+
+Additionally, there is a tendency among policymakers and media to default to hyperbolic language when depicting the workings of various cyber threat actor groups, regardless of their true stature. But blustery rhetoric about these cyber proxy groups only plays into their narrative, which groups in turn use as a tool to further rally their constituencies. Therefore, policymakers should take care to avoid inadvertently playing into groups’ political narratives and providing fodder that enables them to increase their own visibility within their audiences.
+
+Finally, the recent announcement that the IT Army of Ukraine may be absorbed into Ukraine’s armed forces suggests broader implications for cyber defense and resilience. The head of Ukraine’s National Coordination Center for Cybersecurity, Nataliya Tkachuk, shared with Newsweek that the government was motivated to formalize the IT Army so that the group would, “become the basis for building the state’s cyber defense capabilities, engaging cyber volunteers in these activities, and creating a cyber reserve.” The IT Army appears to support this effort, commenting that, “We fully trust the efforts of the working group to legalize a massive fight in the cyber sector and welcome the moment when it will stop being the grey zone. We . . . believe that the integration of the IT Army into the cyber reserve will help in building a more effective defense against cyber threats.” This transition is likely unprecedented. There are no known examples of an informal hacktivist group becoming incorporated into a state’s regular armed forces. However, other states have employed volunteer models for cyber defense. Estonia, for example, has pioneered one approach to leveraging volunteer cyber defenders through its Estonian Cyber Defence League — which itself was created in response to Russia’s cyberattacks against the country in 2007. One key issue for Ukraine is how a force that had previously been conducting a largely offensive mission will be able to shift to one focused on defense, both in terms of skills and commitment to a different type of mission. The level of expertise required to carry out low-cost disruptive attacks against Russian-aligned targets is different from that which is necessary to defend domestic networks and systems. Another important question is which elements of the IT Army will transition into regular forces, particularly given the group’s current international composition — as well as the extent to which the government will be able to control the activities of those elements of the IT Army that do not get subsumed under traditional command structures and prevent them from going rogue. Western policymakers should closely follow how this process unfolds in Ukraine, as it could offer important lessons for how governments could better integrate and leverage their own civilian cyber talent to improve cyber defense and resilience.
+
+
+### Lessons from Ukraine’s Cyber Defense and Implications for Future Conflict
+
+_JULIA VOO_
+
+#### Introduction
+
+More than a hundred countries reportedly possess the capability to launch state-sponsored cyberattacks. The Russia-Ukraine conflict presents a case study of two capable cyber powers applying their capabilities to achieve national objectives in direct opposition to one another over a sustained period. This conflict has illuminated an eight-year cyber struggle that escalated to include kinetic components last year. With conflicts between states now frequently unfolding in the ambiguous space between peace and war, many national governments should examine Ukraine’s cyber defense as a learning opportunity. Reorganizing to better defend against cyber threats and maximizing capabilities in cyberspace was already a priority for numerous governments before this conflict. While two-thirds of governments worldwide have introduced strategies to defend against threats in cyberspace, more comprehensive measures are needed. The effectiveness of Ukraine’s defense, combined with the high number of countries capable of launching offensive cyber operations, highlights the necessity for the proper structures and relationships to approach cyber defense holistically and effectively. This cyber conflict is notable for how Ukraine — with support from national governments, civil society, and the private sector — conducted a strong cyber defense against a top-tier cyber power.
+
+It is likely that 2023 will see Russia escalating its cyberattacks against Ukraine, and perhaps NATO partners, to further its objectives. While it is challenging to generalize the lessons from Ukraine’s cyber defense so far, there are several key takeaways that other states should derive from the past year as they face cyberattacks from not only Russia.
+
+#### Russia-Ukraine Conflict and the Value of Cyber Defense
+
+Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the world had not witnessed a kinetic conflict between two highly capable cyber powers. Contrary to the anticipated crushing defeat many expected Russia to deliver to Ukraine due to Russia’s extensive record as a capable offensive cyber actor, Ukraine has managed to successfully defend its interests while demonstrating the role of cyber capabilities in conventional conflict. Ukraine had been encouraged for years to build its cyber defenses and implement a “whole-of-society” cyber defense. As a result, the lessons from this conflict are challenging to generalize given their specific context, including a pre-existing gray zone conflict and unprecedented resources from international actors and the private sector. Nonetheless, Ukraine’s cyber defense thus far merits reflection by other national governments looking to strengthen their own moving forward.
+
+__EXPERIENCED CYBER DEFENDERS__
+
+Although Russia officially crossed into Ukrainian territory on February 24, 2022, Ukraine has been defending itself from Russian cyberattacks since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, with attacks escalating ahead of the invasion. Over the past decade, Ukraine’s public, energy, media, financial, business, and nonprofit sectors repeatedly suffered from Russian attacks. In 2015, Russia shut off part of Ukraine’s electricity grid, leaving 230,000 people without power for six hours. In 2017, NotPetya malware deployed by the GRU (Russian military intelligence) targeted hundreds of firms and hospitals worldwide, including Ukraine’s power grid. Russia’s cyber operations since the beginning of the kinetic conflict have ranged from preventing access to basic services to data theft, disinformation, wiper malware, DDoS attacks, phishing emails, and surveillance software. Despite these challenges, Ukraine has managed to marshal its capabilities, resources, and relationships to block and recover from setback after setback in cyberspace. A crucial component of cyber defense is investment in both financial resources and human capital to ensure the recruitment and retention of skilled cybersecurity professionals. The maturity of Ukraine’s security operations and incident response, along with its battle-hardened cyber defenders, is difficult to overlook.
+
+__HOLISTIC NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY__
+
+More than two-thirds of countries now have some form of cybersecurity strategy to guide their overall cyber defense. A notable step in Ukraine’s consolidation of its national cyber capabilities was the adoption of its 2016 National Cybersecurity Strategy, which recognized the importance of all stakeholders in strengthening Ukraine’s cyber defense, both inside and outside of government. National governments can increase their cyber resilience in several ways: by introducing laws and regulations on cybercrime and cybersecurity; by implementing technical measures to ensure that expertise is available to enhance cyber resilience; by establishing organizational measures to ensure coordination between government agencies and relevant actors; and by developing capacity through the growth of domestic cybersecurity industries, investments in R&D programs, and skills development. The Ukrainian government sought to enhance collaboration among all government agencies, local authorities, military units, law enforcement, research institutions, and civil society to improve Ukraine’s overall cyber defense.
+
+The most effective cyber defense strategies are integrated into a country’s wider national strategies, including military operations and intelligence gathering. Furthermore, cyber strategies must be continuously updated and adapted to keep up with evolving threats and increase national resilience. Through the experience of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there were key expansions to Ukraine’s 2021 strategy that involved “a wider range of participants, including business entities, public associations, and individual citizens of Ukraine” in addressing Ukraine’s national cybersecurity system.
+
+__CENTRALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT CYBER DEFENSES__
+
+Increasingly, national governments are streamlining the various departments responsible for different aspects of cyber operations. There are clear roles within governments for structures such as intelligence agencies, the military, law enforcement, and the foreign service; but for cyber defense, these often separate components need to work in tandem. The 2016 Ukrainian cyber strategy also led to the creation of the National Cybersecurity Coordination Center (NCCC). The NCCC, which brings together aspects of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, supervises and analyzes the state of national cybersecurity, including preparedness for combating cyber threats and detecting and forecasting potential and actual threats. The NCCC also hosts international and interdepartmental training courses. Ukraine’s effective centralization and coordination of its governmental cyber defenses demonstrate that these capabilities need to work seamlessly together to ensure maximum effectiveness.
+
+__ALLIES SHARING INTEL AND TECH BEFORE AND DURING CONFLICT__
+
+One of the game-changing aspects of Ukraine’s cyber defense is the international support it received and continues to receive. This support has come in the form of cyber expertise and intelligence from other governments, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as governmental organizations like the European Union and the NATO.
+
+International cyber partnerships and support for Ukraine started well before the February invasion. Since 2014, international partners, including the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, have mobilized resources to enhance Ukraine’s cyber defenses while also boosting their own. The United States and Ukraine hosted the first bilateral cyber dialogue in 2017, which included participants sharing approaches on organizing cybersecurity structures and cyber incident response procedures. Since then, the United States has provided $40 million in cyber capacity development assistance to Ukraine. In 2021, the European Union launched a cyber dialogue with Ukraine to strengthen its resilience and legislation in the area of cybersecurity. In the months leading up to the invasion, cyber experts from U.S. Cyber Command and Ukrainian Cyber Command conducted defensive cyber operations side by side to increase cyber resilience in critical networks.
+
+Allies have continued to strengthen Ukraine’s cyber defense since the beginning of the invasion. For example, the United States and the United Kingdom have provided intelligence briefings on Russian cyber operations, including cyber threat intelligence on potential and ongoing malicious attacks such as Industroyer2 malware, firewalls for defense, and DDoS protection. The U.S. government has also assisted Ukraine with identifying and procuring hardware and software to support network defense. Notably, since the beginning of the conflict, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has supplied technical experts to support essential service providers and offered 6,750 emergency communication devices, including satellite phones and data terminals, to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure networks and the government. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union deployed a cyber rapid response team to help with threat detection and mitigation and has provided €29 million (roughly $31 million) to increase Ukraine’s cyber and digital resistance. Germany has also earmarked some of its 2023 budget to defend Ukraine against Russian cyberattacks.
+
+While the full extent of Russia’s cyber operations against Ukraine and NATO allies has not been made public due to the secrecy surrounding respective vulnerabilities, information sharing between Ukraine and its allies has been two-way. Senior Ukrainian cyber defenders have also met bilaterally with national governments to learn from each other as the conflict continues. Allies who have sent reinforcements in the form of personnel are in turn provided with expertise to better defend their own national networks against similar attacks. This two-way learning is set to continue, with Ukraine becoming an active participant in NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence in March 2022, which, through knowledge sharing, will result in a strengthening of expertise for the alliance.
+
+__PRE-EXISTING PRIVATE SECTOR CYBER DEFENDERS__
+
+The Russia-Ukraine war has involved not only conventional military forces and proxies but also, most notably for Ukraine, technology companies. This is unsurprising, as most of the digital infrastructure in Ukraine is owned and operated by private companies. Moreover, it has long been recognized that a strong partnership between the government and the private sector is needed for robust cyber defenses. The cumulative power of the private sector has enhanced Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, including its ability to recover from attacks, improve its battlefield effectiveness, and enhance its global appeal.
+
+The collaboration between the private sector and Ukraine demonstrates an unprecedented case of what is possible when there is an alignment of interests between a country at war and commercial technology companies with significant resources at their disposal and an interest in one side’s victory. It remains unclear whether this is a one-off case or a harbinger for future conflicts, but the implications for policymakers are considerable.
+
+As an example, Microsoft played a critical role in defending Ukraine against Russian cyberattacks, although it was not the only company to do so by far. In early 2022, Microsoft identified a novel trojan horse wiper malware named FoxBlade, which was aimed at Ukraine’s government ministries and financial institutions. After updating its virus detection systems to block the malicious code, Microsoft contacted Anne Neuberger, the U.S. deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technologies, and established a secure line of communication with cyber officials to help bolster Ukrainian defenses. Since then, Microsoft and others have continued to work with the U.S. government, NATO, and EU cyber officials to communicate any evidence of threat actor activity spreading beyond Ukraine.
+
+While Microsoft has been a significant contributor to Ukraine’s and the wider community’s cyber defense, it is only one of many private sector companies that came to Ukraine’s aid. An important part of the private sector’s contribution to Ukraine is not only the considerable resources received from specific entities but also the collaboration between them to jointly provide Ukraine’s cyber defense. A collective of private sector and civil society organizations has volunteered to deliver and maintain Ukraine’s immediate cyber defense needs since the beginning of Russia’s invasion, forming a “Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative for Ukraine” (CDACU). This informal group of volunteers leveraged relationships with Ukraine’s NCCC, building on pre-existing trust and rapport, to understand how the private sector could help. The CDACU received requests for assistance ranging from intelligence analysis, advice, and sharing to licenses, tactical services, and coordinated support.
+
+__BACKING UP CRITICAL DATA OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF CONFLICT__
+
+At the beginning of the conflict, Ukrainian government data was concentrated in data servers located within Ukraine as an effect of data-localization policies. However, pragmatism on Ukraine’s part — acknowledging the likelihood of an attack on these servers — combined with assistance from the private sector resulted in Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud, and Microsoft migrating the data from Ukraine to servers located outside of the conflict zone to enhance resilience. To defend against attacks that seek to immobilize businesses or data, it is critical to build redundancy not only in networks but also by backing up data outside of the zone of conflict. This protects data servers and facilitates rebuilding the economy at a later date. Currently, there are moves in some countries towards data localization. The example of Ukraine underlines the need to protect the physical components of cyberspace — and, in the likelihood of damage, to move data servers out of harm’s way.
+
+__HACKTIVISM AND VOLUNTEERS__
+
+On February 26, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister and minister of digital transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov officially announced the formation of a volunteer IT Army of Ukraine. There appears to be some coordination from the Ukrainian government, and state officials have clearly encouraged their activities. The creation of this 150,000–200,000-strong volunteer-organized cyber force is unprecedented. The IT Army has affected more than 600 online resources in Russia, including the federal post office and pension fund, online banking, and video conference platforms. Anonymous, a hacking collective, has also declared “cyber war” on Russia and claimed credit for DDoS attacks that took down the official websites of the Kremlin and the Ministry of Defense, as well as hacking Russian state TV channels and posting pro-Ukraine content. While unorthodox, Ukrainian cyber defenses have been bolstered by this volunteer force.
+
+#### Looking Forward: Challenges
+
+__THE OPEN INTERNET AND INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS__
+
+This ongoing conflict provides valuable insights into the nature of warfare across the “splinternet,” where two or more internets are fragmented and governed in differing ways. In this case, Russia has a tightly controlled information space, and Ukraine is part of a more open data space. In Russia’s internet space, the narrative is pro-Russia. China and a few others have aligned their narrative with Russia’s. However, Ukraine’s information space — part of the broader more open internet — has been the target of a stream of influence operations.
+
+The Russia-Ukraine conflict has been dubbed “the first TikTok war,” highlighting the role of social media in modern conflicts. Social media has not only been used by warzone citizen journalists but also by people with power and authority. Ukrainian president Zelensky, a former comedian and actor, has effectively used social media to champion the cause of Ukraine and rally international support. Russian state media has also leveraged the same platforms to disseminate fake news and propaganda. Meta, Twitter, Microsoft, Alphabet, and TikTok have all taken steps to remove their content from their platforms. The Biden administration has even taken to briefing TikTok influencers on U.S. strategic goals. While social media companies are instrumental in stemming the flow of propaganda, graphic material, and hate speech, questions remain. Should social media companies be solely responsible for making these decisions during a conflict? Should there be special rules during periods of armed conflict? What bodies could or should be involved in a shared oversight framework for prominent platforms? While policymakers have been grappling with these and similar questions since before the Russia-Ukraine war, the conflagration has made such issues more pressing than ever.
+
+An open internet presents a significant challenge for national governments who support it — not only because they are more vulnerable to malign attempts to influence public opinion, but because it is not possible, nor desired, to control all information flows. Beyond considering the roles and responsibilities of platforms in the face of malign influence campaigns, there is also the question of the psychological defense and resiliency of the individual to these influences. If the convergence between information operations and cyber operations in this conflict is a new norm in cyber warfare, then building societal psychological defense, or the collective ability of society to resist foreign malign influence activities and disinformation, will likely become an institutionalized and extended part of many national cyber defense efforts in societies that intend to maintain a “free and open” internet.
+
+__FUNDING PRIVATE SECTOR ALLIES__
+
+In the case of Ukraine, the private sector was willing and able to support its national defense, rapidly influencing the situation on the ground. While the private sector’s efforts have been crucial to Ukraine’s defense, they have also come at a significant cost. Microsoft has spent over $400 million on the conflict and will continue to provide gratis services throughout 2023 to the tune of an additional $100 million. Starlink is providing critical connectivity infrastructure to Ukraine, reportedly costing $20 million a month to maintain. Amazon is backing up the Ukrainian government, critical infrastructure, and university data outside of Ukrainian territory at considerable cost. Many U.S. tech companies have suspended the delivery of products and services to Russia.
+
+The behaviors of these tech companies should not be confused with altruism. For example, Microsoft’s business outside of Ukraine could be affected by spillover from the conflict, so it is in its interest to step up and defend against cyberattacks. More broadly, these predominantly U.S. tech companies could face regulatory and social backlash in key markets in the United States and Europe if they were to remain neutral or continue conducting business with Russia. Therefore, certain questions regarding the sustainability of this support remain. For one, how long will firms be willing or able to provide these critical capabilities? While U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin III and UK prime minister Rishi Sunak have committed to support Ukraine for the “long haul,” it is unclear whether this will also extend to supporting the private sector. Further, will private sector companies request government subsidies for their efforts? How will these companies decide which future conflicts to support, in kind or otherwise? And how would their bottom lines be affected by taking a more active NATO-aligned worldview? It is still not clear how long these types of firms will be willing and able to effectively donate these expensive services to Ukraine for the remainder of the conflict, or if this kind of support would be replicable for any other besieged country in the future.
+
+__CONTROLLING DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES__
+
+DJI, a consumer commercial drone manufacturer, has inadvertently become an arms dealer in this conflict. Both Russia and Ukraine have utilized commercially available drones, such as the DJI Mavic 3, which costs under $2,000. These affordable drones have extended the range of the Ukrainian army and provided enhanced intelligence and communication capabilities. The Ukrainian army has even transformed some of these hobbyist drones into unmanned kamikaze bombers capable of carrying munitions up to 800 grams and of steering toward Russian targets. While DJI announced it would halt drone sales to both Moscow and Kyiv in response to their use in the conflict, commercial drones can still be sourced from other suppliers. This example of a technology that is commercial first but could be used for defense purposes presents the problem of some dual-use technologies. It also raises the issue of the difficulty for some allies to access equivalent primarily defense technologies and raises questions around how these two issues could be addressed.
+
+__FUTURE INDUSTRY ADVERSARIES__
+
+Most of the large consumer tech companies involved in this conflict are American, with the notable exceptions of Chinese-owned TikTok and DJI. However, it is worth considering an alternative scenario involving a conflict with China; how would we expect commercial Chinese actors to behave in relation to the CCP? What frameworks exist around governing tech companies in case kinetic conflict between technological superpowers (e.g., the United States and China) were to emerge? How could companies that would potentially ally with an adversary behave in such a conflict? How would cyber defenses need to adapt if equivalent consequential technology companies instead supported the adversary? What would happen if a future conflict occurred in an environment where a sympathetic private sector actor did not control various aspects of critical infrastructure?
+
+Over 30 countries, representing more than half of the world’s economy, have announced sanctions and export controls targeting Russia due to its military operations in Ukraine. These actions have impacted the development of Russian technology and e-commerce. While sanctions against Russian technology make sense as an attempt to force compliance with international will, it is important to consider the long-term effects of exacerbating the bifurcation in technology stacks, which is largely driven by U.S.-China tensions. While bifurcation will decrease dependency, it is essential to consider the potential consequences of creating a more fragmented global technology landscape in terms of access to resources and allegiances of companies with strong links to adversaries.
+
+__ACCOUNTABILITY IS NEEDED__
+
+Negotiations at the United Nations created norms on responsible state behavior for the acceptable use of cyber capabilities. UN member states have committed to abide by 11 cyber norms. These norms include interstate cooperation on cybersecurity, preventing the misuse of information and communication technologies in sovereign territory, not damaging critical infrastructure, protecting critical infrastructure, taking steps to ensure supply chain security, and not interfering with emergency response teams. Despite this significant milestone, issues remain, including the lack of accountability.
+
+States are constantly engaging in cyber operations to achieve their national objectives. However, some states exert more restraint than others, with checks and balances in place at the national and international level placing guardrails around their cyber operations — as the United Kingdom has described it, “responsible cyber power.” However, this results in a situation where there is a group of states who are less restrained in their cyber operations (e.g., Russia, China, and Iran), posing significant threats to other states that comply with regulatory frameworks and exercise restraint (e.g., the United Kingdom and the United States). The United States and its allies have made efforts to hold state actors to account for their cyber operations which has manifested in the form of attribution. There are numerous cases of attribution of state actors for hacking attempts and commercial espionage. However, attribution does not appear to deter states from behaving badly. Stronger forms of accountability and consequences need to be developed so that there are consequences for states that do not uphold international norms, which in turn could collectively enhance international cybersecurity.
+
+__WHAT PROTECTIONS FOR VOLUNTEERS?__
+
+Ukraine’s cyber defense has relied on hundreds of thousands of IT volunteers who have supported cyber operations against the Russian state, but it is not clear to whether they are afforded any protection under international law. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, examples of participation in hostilities include activities that “directly cause harm to another party, either directly inflicting death, injury or destruction, or by directly harming the enemy’s military operations or capacity . . . interfering electronically with military computer networks and transmitting tactical targeting intelligence for a specific attack.” It is unclear to what extent a cyber operation conducted by a civilian — based in Ukraine or beyond — on Russia’s government, propaganda apparatus, and industrial base would qualify as direct participation, or whether volunteers are covered by international norms as non-state actors. For example, hackers geographically based in some territories, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, joining Ukrainian cyberattacks, could be breaking national law. The involvement of volunteer cyber forces from different geographies thus presents new challenges for international norms and laws designed with states in mind.
+
+#### CONCLUSION
+
+There are significant ramifications from the conflict in Ukraine for the global cybersecurity community. Significant investment in defense is essential to ensure cyber resilience in the face of evolving threats. While this was clear before Russia’s invasion, it was not obvious that Ukraine’s cyber defense would be as effective as it has been so far. What is clear in Ukraine’s case is that the near-decade of having to defend its national interest in cyberspace — which necessitated collaboration across government and with the whole of Ukrainian society, combined with working with allies and the private sector — has resulted in its strong cyber defense to date. Investing in cyber defense, preparing for hybrid warfare, prioritizing information security, and fostering a culture of cyber awareness throughout society has enhanced its resilience and ability to withstand Russia’s cyber and information campaigns.
+
+Russia will likely remain an acute and persistent threat for many countries in the Western alliance. Therefore, there is a lot that can and should be learned from Ukraine’s experience so far to put cyber defenders on a stronger footing in the face of adversarial threats in cyberspace. Significant questions still remain around whether or not this varied and novel alliance between allies, volunteers, and the private sector in cyberspace can be replicated in another scenario. But what all will note from the Ukrainian case so far is that a good defense is perhaps just as effective as a good offense.
+
+
+### From Script Kiddies to Cyber Warriors
+
+> #### The Private Lines of Defense in the Ukraine Conflict
+
+_MELANIE GARSON_
+
+#### Introduction
+
+From the early days of the Ukraine conflict, pundits globally awaited the first “cyber war.” Building on assumptions of the evolution of warfare in the digital age and Russia’s consistent gray zone cyber activity in Ukraine since 2014, governments and security analysts were anticipating the accompanying cyber “bomb,” and they quickly began to puzzle over the lack of a clear cyber front. Many of these questions stemmed from a fundamental misunderstanding of the complexity of offensive cyber activity, as well as of its limitations in delivering widespread guaranteed impacts in the same way as kinetic activity. However, one year on, the State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection of Ukraine (SSCIIP) reports that cyberattacks on Ukraine continue to escalate from their pre-Christmas levels, with a particular focus on public institutions and civil infrastructure. Global cyber activity has reached some of the highest levels ever observed, heavily concentrated on Ukraine; however, due to the continued efforts of a new collective cyber defense alliance, their ability to further Russia’s kinetic activity has been limited.
+
+The unlikely combination of tech companies, tech platforms, tech workers, hobbyists, and hacktivists that helped Ukraine working alongside governments and international organizations has mounted “arguably the most effective cyber defense in history.” By ensuring that the internet infrastructure is secure and operational, that internet services are accessible, and that information is available and not weaponized, these non-state actors were able to rapidly alter Russia’s military communications strategy. This new cyber defense alliance continues to be able to thwart Russia’s cyber ambitions to impact critical communications pathways and has materially contributed to tipping the balance of power in the conflict.
+
+Whilst the rapid integration of these disparate cyber actors at the core of Ukraine’s wartime cyber command can provide many lessons for states in their approach to a more holistic and cooperative cyber defense, the strategy opens up a new set of risks. Bringing in civil society and commercial actors into active cyber combat puts pressure on key laws and norms, including the blurring of defensive and offensive cyber activity and the extent that this legitimizes non-state actors as parties to the conflict — and, by extension, places them as well as states as legitimate targets for retaliation.
+
+This paper explores the role of these new defenders of the digital sphere and draws on the discussions of the roundtable held with representatives of the platforms, infrastructure and content distribution networks, and civil society actors as to provide recommendations for building clarity into the engagement with tech companies and non-state cyber defenders and disrupters when these are thrust onto the frontline of cyber defense.
+
+#### The Never-Ending Consolidated Threat Surface
+
+Russia’s vision of offensive cyber sits within a wider approach of “information confrontation” or “information warfare” that encompasses both the network attacks that are at the basis of most Western conceptions of offensive cyber activity and the information operations that usually sit within the U.S. definition of cognitive warfare. This has been reflected in Russian Defence Ministry statements clearly defining a strategy of disruption to both the physical network infrastructure and the information space in order to degrade the societal fabric of an opponent. Compounded by the rise of drone warfare and the multi-domain battlefield, the control of a stable internet source is a key element of strategic success.
+
+With this conception of cyber, defense must span multiple physical and digital threat surfaces, from the information layer through to the backbone of the internet infrastructure, most of which are out of the control of states. Tech companies are now diversified throughout the internet stack, from the information layer, down through the hardware and device layer, into essential services and access control, and all the way to the backbone infrastructure. Meta owns more kilometers of subsea cables than British Telecom, and Starlink’s mega-constellation of LEO satellites far outpaces that of the United Kingdom and the United States, with 3,236 satellites currently operational.
+
+Simultaneously, the communications infrastructure is being consolidated, with a few companies being able to provide services throughout the internet stack.
+
+
+_▲ __Major Providers: Communications Infrastructure.__ Source: [Pete Furlong and Melanie Garson, Disrupters and Defenders: What the Ukraine War Has Taught Us About the Power of Global Tech Companies (London: Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2022)](https://www.institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/disrupters-and-defenders-what-ukraine-war-has-taught-us-about-power-global-tech-companies)._
+
+This consolidation has increased throughout 2022 and into 2023, as companies have added to their assets at all levels of the communications infrastructure. Elon Musk’s purchase of Twitter in October 2022 added a platform to the Space X family, Google Cloud’s acquisition of Mandiant increased its cloud security, and Microsoft’s investment into OpenAI suggests that the trend towards developing representation throughout the internet stack as well as control over new and emerging tech is set to continue.
+
+With vast amounts of the core communication infrastructure now sitting in the hands of commercial companies, the ability and agility to materially interfere with Russia’s multi-level cyber and information warfare could not be achieved without the active and willing cooperation of tech companies.
+
+#### The Front Line of Commercial Cyber Power
+
+Before the tanks had rolled into Ukraine, many of the large tech companies had already started shoring up Ukraine’s cyber defenses alongside governments and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre for Excellence, most notably Microsoft’s detection of the Foxblade malware attack on February 23, 2022. This marked the escalation of both high-profile and more subtle commercial cyber power taking on the defense of Ukraine and limiting Russia’s actions across the physical and digital components of the communications ecosystem, as well as supporting the dissemination of life-saving real time information and applications for Ukrainians. Russia found itself up against the brightest cyber minds as well as the collective might of the global cyber community.
+
+#### Building Resilient Internet Infrastructure
+
+The internet “backbone” — the wires, pipes, and servers that keep it operational — is notoriously fragile to both environmental events and deliberate interference. Regaining operational function once it is damaged can often be challenging, such as in Tonga which suffered nearly five weeks of internet outage after its subsea cable was damaged in a volcanic eruption. Similarly, the recent Cyclone Gabrielle in New Zealand and the earthquake in Turkey left vast areas with limited connectivity.
+
+In Ukraine, human internet traffic dropped as much as 33 percent in the days immediately after the invasion. This was driven by Russia’s encroachment on the routing of data — leaving parts of Ukraine reliant on Russian cables and subject to Russia’s restrictions and limitations — such as the Viasat KA-SAT attack that impacted routers in Ukraine and consistent physical degradation to fiber optic cables and electrical power facilities from targeted bombings. Through the strategic destruction of over 4,000 mobile base stations, thousands of kilometers of fiber optic cable, and 18 Ukrainian radio broadcast towers, Russia has prevented local residents from sharing information or receiving information on humanitarian corridors. Russia also keeps its own soldiers in a media blackout so they cannot question their actions. As Russia physically occupies cities, it also occupies the digital ecosystem, with internet traffic rerouted from Ukrainian networks to Russian ones and Ukrainian internet service providers threatened with the loss of their communication equipment unless they join the Russian networks. A parallel more resilient and operational internet became critical to Ukraine’s ability to counter the Russian offensive.
+
+Starlink’s rapid response to Mykhailo Fedorov’s tweet that saw 500 terminals on the ground in Ukraine within five days, 25 of which were transmitting data within a week, has now been widely confirmed as being determinative in ensuring military and civilian communications. Between mid-March and December 2022, Starlink traffic in Ukraine increased by 1,600 percent. Highly resilient and able to withstand electronic jamming attacks more adeptly than previously anticipated, Starlink’s shoring up of Ukraine’s internet infrastructure has been the lynchpin of basic battlefield communications, from weapons supply arrivals to its more controversial use in drone warfare.
+
+In parallel, internet backbone carriers were withdrawing their service provision in Russia. By March 7, 2022, Cogent and Lumen — two of the world’s largest internet service providers, who had provided transit for Russia’s key national fiber backbone operators including Rostelcom and Transtelcom, its key mobile phone operators, and Russia’s search engine Yandex — stopped providing services. Driven by the possibility that the networks could be used as part of Russia’s offensive cyber activity and concern for its employees, with downstream impacts felt as far as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Iran, this exit left Russia with the challenge of finding alternative infrastructure provisions to enable its strategic internal and external cyber operations.
+
+#### Embedding Internet Security
+
+Activities on the Ukraine-Russia cyber front had been bubbling since 2016. However, the increase of malicious cyber activity in the months prior to the physical invasion provided governments and tech companies opportunities to secure the digital domain more effectively than the physical battlefield. The CyberPeace Institute has tracked over 1,408 cyberattacks and operations from across 87 different threat actors related to the Ukraine conflict, and whilst these numbers are significant, they likely still do not capture the full picture of the cybersecurity threat. Cloudflare has reported that in March 2022 application layer attacks in Ukraine rose by 1,300 percent and that between February 2022 and February 2023 an average of 10 percent of all traffic to Ukraine was mitigations of potential attacks. At its high point on October 29, 2022, 39 percent of total traffic to Cloudflare’s Ukrainian customer websites was DDoS attack traffic.
+
+As previously noted, Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence Centre (MSTIC) had been working closely with Ukraine’s government and was able to mitigate the “Foxblade” wiper software on 19 government and critical infrastructure entities across the Ukraine government on the day before the war started. It continued to provide support, identifying and protecting against numerous destructive cyberattacks on nearly 50 Ukrainian agencies and entities as well as over 128 targets including government agencies and nongovernmental agencies in 42 countries. Similarly, Cisco Talos was working closely with the government of Ukraine to respond to the WhisperGate malware in January 2022 and translated their responses into protections for customers across Ukraine. Other companies, such as ESET and Recorded Future, have provided key services, tools, and threat intelligence. Google has also reported its role in countering the 250 percent increase in phishing attacks targeting Ukraine and 300 percent increase targeting NATO countries (as compared to 2020), as well as more destructive attacks in Ukraine than in the previous eight years.
+
+Both Microsoft and AWS were pivotal in securing Ukraine’s public sector infrastructure by facilitating the transfer of its data from physical data centers to the cloud within 10 weeks of the Ukraine government passing an urgent amendment to its data protection law on February 17, 2022, to allow data to be held externally. Microsoft provided $107 million of technology services to facilitate this transition. Ukraine’s deputy prime minister and minister of digital transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, highlighted the contribution of AWS in migrating key public registers and records to the cloud as “one of the biggest contributions to Ukrainian victory.”
+
+And while large companies like Google have provided cybersecurity protections for over 150 humanitarian organizations from DDoS attacks through its Project Shield, smaller companies essential to the cybersecurity ecosystem have also thrown their weight into the collective defense of Ukraine’s internet. Cloudflare has been providing internet availability monitoring services to Ukraine’s government, moving secure encryption key data for customers out of at-risk data centers in Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus, and providing free protections for Ukrainian organizations under its Project Galileo. Romanian company BitDefender offered a year’s worth of free cybersecurity assistance to business, government, and private citizens of Ukraine. Similarly, California based Vector AI offered its services free of charge for targets or organizations under attack, and companies such as SentinelOne, Avast, and CrowdStrike offered services or decryptors for free.
+
+#### Ensuring Internet Accessibility
+
+The number of companies controlling the distribution of content (content distribution networks or CDNs) is very small and critical in facilitating internet accessibility. Companies with a very small market share can have a large impact on access to the internet and companies such as Cloudflare — with 80 percent of market share — are in a key position to keep the internet accessible. The role of internet accessibility in countering Russia’s cyber offense is more nuanced than that of ensuring security, as it requires managing compliance with sanctions alongside providing access to the internet to balance Russia’s information warfare. While companies such as Fastly, alongside a number of other web companies, quickly ceased working with Russian-based companies altogether, other CDNs stopped paid services to comply with international sanctions but continued to provide free services. Cloudflare, which had been threatened with Russian shutdowns previously, has taken the position that Russia would celebrate their closure if they were to exit and opted to continue providing free, open, private, and secure internet services to the Russian people to counter Russia’s attempts to raise a digital iron curtain.
+
+Similarly, Virtual Private Network (VPN) providers have continued to counter Russian attempts to separate from the rest of the internet by providing avenues for Russians to stay connected to international media sources. VPN use in Russia reached a peak demand of 2,692 percent above average on March 14, 2022. as access to the open internet became constricted. Canada’s Windscribe publicly committed to providing an extra 30GB of data freely to both sides of the conflict, ensuring that Russians have access to the open internet. ProtonVPN waived all fees from Russian customers on the basis of a “strong moral obligation” to be there and ensure the Russian people have freedom of access to the internet.
+
+#### Secure Hardware for Hard War
+
+The communications hardware and the apps that run on it have also become key determinants in the offense-defense balance. Access to personal communication devices has become key, both for soldiers on the battlefield and civilian threat alerts. Affordable hardware is required for the internet, but the sanctions regime has restricted most providers including Apple, Samsung, Lenovo, HP, AMD, Dell, and Intel from operating in Russia and selling the semiconductors, computers, phones, and server hardware that form the physical end point of the communications system. This also impacts the dual-use hardware that enables critical technologies, such as unmanned drones. Ukraine can rely on diversified sources of communications hardware to enable sophisticated battlefield technologies; however, Russia is buying communications hardware, such as electronic jammers, on Chinese-owned AliExpress. This access to diversified supply of trustworthy and secure hardware, in order to both operate and process the information gathered from drones, has reshaped Ukraine’s ability to continually resist Russia.
+
+#### Defending the Information Frontier
+
+With Russia’s cyber strategy heavily rooted in the battle for control of the information domain, it is at this level that tech companies have had to fight some of their hardest battles. Russia’s physical digital occupation strategy — restricting internet access through physical means, such as by rerouting networks — has been accompanied by an equally draconian censorship strategy both inside Russia and in occupied parts of Ukraine. While Russia’s media law punishing “fake news” — which was passed in the early days of the conflict — led to most media companies and platforms being forced to leave Russia, its physical occupation in parts of Ukraine have left Ukrainians without key information sources including Instagram, YouTube, and the messaging app Viber. Google’s search engine was disabled in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kherson on the claim that it was advocating violence and terrorism against Russians, and Russia claimed to have shut Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube in parts of Zaporizhzhia.
+
+The role of tech platforms in balancing information flows and countering Russia’s massive influence operations capacity became critical for both strategic and humanitarian reasons even before the kinetic offensive began. Early signs of the Russian invasion were spotted by open-source researchers monitoring traffic data on Google Maps, requiring Google to disable it in order to protect Ukrainian citizens from detection. And as Russian state-owned media became the driving force of disseminating false content about the invasion, platforms such as Meta, Reddit, TikTok, Alphabet (the parent company of Google and YouTube), Microsoft, Spotify, and Telegram restricted access to RT and Sputnik news in Europe — and in some cases globally — and their apps were banned from app stores. Adobe prevented Russian government-controlled media organizations from accessing its creative and document cloud services to avoid being complicit in the creation of harmful information. Google, YouTube, Twitter, and Meta restricted Russian state-based entities from being able to monetize ads on their platforms, and companies including Snapchat and the Japanese-based company Viber implemented wider bans on displaying ads across their apps. Search engines including DuckDuckGo, Google, and Bing downranked links associated with Russian disinformation. Even Chinese platforms such as Douyin, Weibo, WeChat, and Bilibili undertook a process of blocking accounts spreading information that could put Chinese students in Ukraine at risk.
+
+In order to counterbalance Russia’s information offensive and recognizing the strategic and humanitarian imperative to secure access to information, commercial tech companies across the ecosystem were quick to facilitate alternative access to information, both for Ukrainians and Russians. Google disrupted over 1,950 instances of Russian information operation on its platforms in 2022, including claims that Ukraine operates biolaboratories for generating biological weapons and information operations linked to destructive malware attacks. Microsoft’s Russian Propaganda Index run by its AI for Good Lab also recorded significant increases in traffic to Russian propaganda websites from January 2022, with a rise of 216 percent in the last week of February 2022. Through identifying the scope of the disinformation globally, tech companies enabled governments, companies, and other organizations to implement counter-responses and neutralize the disinformation strategies. Google’s Trust & Safety team has disabled accounts associated with coordinated information operations, including the disruption of YouTube channels, blogs, and AdSense accounts, and has removed domains from Google News surfaces.
+
+Tech companies have also sought to balance this by providing alternate sources for legitimate information to the Russian people. Twitter launched a parallel site on the dark web alongside its shadow-banning of Russian government accounts. Media outlets have taken advantage of the increased Telegram use to create new sources of news distribution, and Microsoft’s Skype extended free communication in and out of Ukraine. Cumulatively, these rapid and far-reaching actions have restrained the impact of Russia’s digital information blockade, as a strategic tool to facilitate both the active conflict and its supporting actions.
+
+#### Private Companies in the Trenches
+
+Behind the tech companies, however, there is another cadre of private actors and companies in the trenches of the cyber elements of the conflict. The cyber defense ecosystem also relies on a complex web of ethical hackers, or “cybersecurity researchers,” who report vulnerabilities to companies and governments. Prior to the conflict, ethical hacking was illegal in Ukraine, with fines for those found detecting bugs in state computers. In early February 2022, however, in the face of mounting cyberattacks, the Ukraine government committed to decriminalize bug bounties to allow for better detection of security vulnerabilities. At the outset of the war, homegrown cybersecurity companies such as Cyber Unit Technologies approached the government to offer their help, forming the basis of Mykhailo Fedorov’s 150,000–200,000-strong IT Army. Hacken.io, the Kyiv-based bug bounty platform, also launched a “Cyber Army” to encourage security researchers on its platform to search for vulnerabilities in Russian websites to be used by the government. Similarly, the Estonia-based bug bounty platform HackenProof invited disclosure of critical vulnerabilities in both Ukrainian and Russian infrastructure, with commitment to disclose them to the Ukrainian authorities for both defensive and offensive use. U.S.-based cybersecurity research companies such as HackerOne, in compliance with the sanction regimes, were able to continue facilitating bounty payments to Ukrainian cybersecurity researchers after resolving some technical difficulties, but they paused payments to researchers in Belarus and Russia.
+
+#### Challenges of Private Cyber Defenders in Geopolitical Crises
+
+Whilst the response of tech companies to defend across the cyber ecosystem has been unprecedented and contributed significantly to Ukraine’s success to date, it has not been without challenges. The limited exposure of tech companies to engagement at this level has led at times to a lack of appreciation of the complexity of their actions, as well as a lack of consistency and coherence across policies. From diplomacy by Twitter to navigating sanctions regimes, political pressure, and the negative impacts of rapid decisionmaking, the lack of experience that private cyber defenders have in navigating geopolitical crises has led to conflicting actions that could at times undermine internet resilience and fail at countering Russia’s offensive cyber operations.
+
+#### Moving Fast and Breaking Things
+
+The rapid action of tech companies in the early days of the crisis reflects an agility that can be valuable to tip the balance of power in a conflict. Whether responding to political and corporate pressure from the outpouring of support for Ukraine, a need to protect employees, fear of sanctions, Russia’s “fake news law,” a genuine demonstration of disapproval, or in some cases even to increase their public relations value, companies moved fast and were far-reaching in their actions. Whilst this may have had measurable impacts at the time, it may also not have offered sufficient time to consider the full ramifications of their actions for long-term cyber stability. This at times has led to backtracking or possibly undermining avenues to counter Russia’s cyber operations.
+
+The sanctions regime threatened the right of Russians to have universal connectivity and left the Russian people more at risk of government information control strategies, as well as threatening the basic nature of the open, globally connected, secure and trustworthy internet. After significant lobbying by Access Now and the Wikimedia Foundation, in April 2022 the U.S. government issued an advisory providing exemptions for companies providing internet services, recognizing the need to keep information flows accessible to people in Russia and Belarus. However, this came too late for key companies such as Lumen and Cogent Communications, who had already withdrawn their services from Russia, partly due to unclear policy. At the other end of the spectrum, the bug bounty platform HackerOne found itself disabling payments to Ukrainian cybersecurity researchers whilst they sought to amend their systems to comply with the sanctions regimes. This prevented them from providing crucial support to Ukrainian researchers — as well as access to knowledge of key vulnerabilities at a critical time, potentially.
+
+While some companies tried to move slower to strike a more balanced position between supporting Ukraine and preserving the integrity of the internet and access to information for Russians, they found themselves under greater pressure from public calls from Ukraine’s government and consequent stakeholder pressures rather than that of their own governments. In Myanmar, civil society organizations urged Telenor to stay in place as an alternative might be complicit with the regime, thereby worsening the situation. Navigating this level of geopolitical foresight is out of the scope of normal operating procedure for many companies and opens the question of how home governments can shield companies that may have to make unpopular decisions for long-term cybersecurity and internet stability.
+
+#### Finding Coherence to Complexity
+
+The Ukraine conflict has highlighted the challenge for commercial companies to find coherence and consistency when navigating information warfare in the heat of complex geopolitical crises. While companies may have acted quickly, this has sometimes been inconsistent with previous actions or policies and has required them to backtrack on their actions. Meta was challenged by inconsistencies within their own content moderation policies when evidence emerged that they had provided a temporary change to their hate-speech policies to allow calls for violence against Russians and Russian soldiers, including Russian president Vladimir Putin and Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko. They then had to revise, limit, and reverse decisions in the face of accusations from Russia that they were fueling hate against the Russian people.
+
+Social media platforms also found themselves caught in a dilemma when placed in the position of being the evidence repository of war crimes that could be crucial for future criminal tribunals, particularly with how this may intersect with their own terms of service preventing illegal and harmful content. Furthermore, Twitter’s turn to international humanitarian law as the basis of banning tweets showing images of prisoners of war highlighted not only the potential that private companies could be considered parties to the conflict but the lack of clear internal or external guidelines for commercial actors’ decisionmaking in complex geopolitical crises. Tech companies also found themselves caught in balancing public disclosures of their support, having to tread carefully between protecting employees, following corporate principles, and ensuring that their information does not provide strategic advantages for Russia — decisions outside of the norms of its responsibility.
+
+Companies reported that legal counsel was not always nuanced, making it hard for many to carry out a holistic assessment of the wider geopolitical implications of their actions and manage the competing priorities inherent to the cyber dimensions of the conflict. Key to this challenge is that companies are used to assessing risks through a financial lens, rather than through societal priorities or by seeking to reduce their liabilities. For a company that deals with encryption standards, an exit from Russia may be a reduction of liability; but with a long-term geopolitical focus on cyber stability, if that company is replaced by a Russian equivalent, the cyber ecosystem may be more insecure. If cyber stability is going to depend on the controllers of the communications infrastructure being able to navigate through the complexity of both cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent warfare, then new mechanisms are going to be required in order to guarantee greater coherence in times of crises. This includes greater understanding of the decisionmaking procedures that companies undertake in addressing their involvement in geopolitical crises, as well as mechanisms to provide companies with the foundational understanding of the impact of discrete actions through the internet stack — such as withdrawal of service — on geopolitical conflict.
+
+#### Wavering Clarity and Commitment
+
+As tech companies responded both independently and under overt and covert political pressure to counteract Russia’s deliberate strategy of cutting or destabilizing internet access, they could not predict the level of long-term commitment this would entail. This has led to tech companies wavering in their commitments and trying to limit the use of their infrastructure provisions, possibly creating greater instability. Starlink — despite its importance to Ukraine’s defense, with over 150,000 Ukrainians using it daily to access the internet by May 2022, and its role in enabling surveillance and reconnaissance aerial vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles — threatened to stop funding the program and asked the Pentagon to take over the costs. Although a large proportion of terminal and internet use costs were being covered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other partners, Starlink was seeking further support. Further, SpaceX has restricted the use of Starlink for drones, highlighting that the support was intended for humanitarian purposes but not to be weaponized — possibly putting Ukraine at greater risk, both through the action itself and through the public declaration of their position.
+
+In November 2022, Microsoft pledged a further $100 million to Ukraine’s digital alliance, promising that Ukraine would be able to use Microsoft’s cloud and data centers in Europe throughout 2023. While the continued support is generous, as Microsoft chairman Brad Smith stated at the Munich Security Conference in February 2023, it is a “one year at a time” approach. This stands in contrast to state positions, such as the U.S. promise to stand by Ukraine “for as long as it takes.” Questions arise as to the dangers of dependency on critical infrastructure or cybersecurity support that can be withdrawn on a whim or under corporate pressures and obligations to shareholders.
+
+#### Cyber Defenders as Legitimate Targets
+
+While Microsoft has been clear that its support in the Ukraine conflict is entirely defensive, as any offensive action would violate its pledge made as a part of the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, from a legal standpoint commercial tech companies may find themselves technically participants to the conflict and thus legitimate targets for attack, particularly with the lines between consumer and military tech becoming more blurred and many militaries relying on consumer tech for military. Even the most sophisticated companies might not anticipate this, with Starlink’s restriction on the use of its terminals for offensive purposes reflecting that they hadn’t fully anticipated this possibility. This would turn quite closely on the nexus between the private company’s action and the consequent military action, or whether the data held in a private cloud was military data. The recent attempt by Ukraine to draft a law to legalize its volunteer IT army into part of its cyber command may help to mitigate the ambiguity for some individual security researchers. However, companies may still remain exposed. Actions such as that of Hacken.io’s “Cyber Army,” in which the intention to hand vulnerabilities to the Ukrainian authorities is clearly stated, could be construed as voluntary participation in hostilities — and thus open the possibility of a private company becoming a legitimate target in retaliation.
+
+__PREPARING FOR THE NEXT CYBER-ENABLED CRISIS__
+
+In an era of increasing converging crises, the risks exposed by the Ukraine war are not fading. Ukraine benefited from strong Western support, both politically and in the public sphere, making the case for tech company action relatively clear. In other contexts, it may not be so straightforward. Tech companies have struggled to balance their engagement in more complex crises such as ones in Myanmar and Ethiopia, and the closure of international offices as part of the tech downturn — such as that of Twitter’s only African office — could leave them ill-prepared to address future global challenges. It is also still not clear how companies will fully address the crisis-inducing potential of generative AI systems and similar emerging technologies that could be exploited in misinformation campaigns by reducing the barrier to generating synthetic media, deepfakes, and malicious content.
+
+The conflict in Ukraine has highlighted the challenges and dangers to cyber stability of trying to formulate sensitive policies under pressure, along with the urgent need for tech companies to be able to assess the impact of their individual and cumulative actions in a crisis or in post-crisis stabilization and reconstruction. New mechanisms are needed, similar to Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) frameworks or Covid-19 protocols, that embed geopolitical risk considerations into the corporate governance of those companies responsible for the cyber ecosystem, in order to ensure coherence and consistency across geopolitical crises. Companies should also seek to embed tech geopolitics experts who see beyond liability into more holistic geopolitical impacts in their decisionmaking procedures, as well as civil society organizations that can provide more nuanced pictures of situations in a country.
+
+At the same time, governments and the international community need to rethink their interactions with big tech to ensure that they are providing sufficient support for companies to balance their actions with the core principles and norms of the liberal and democratic world order. The role of the company in the internet stack often determines its level of interaction across the cyber ecosystem. Tech companies have highlighted the need for neutral convenors to assist in helping align action without it appearing like big tech collusion or strong-arming. Newer agreements and partnerships, such as the Declaration for the Future of the Internet and the Freedom Online Coalition, have been formulated with these kinds of issues in mind but have struggled to gain influence and traction.
+
+Internet stability is at the heart of the multi-domain era of warfare. As militaries invest in increasingly interconnected and intelligent weaponry, access to stable, resilient, and secure communications is crucial. And as offensive strategies expand from the depths of the sea to potential interference in interplanetary networking, the range of actors required to defend these domains far expand the capabilities of most militaries alone. Cyber power will belong to those states that create the mechanisms to ensure the coherence, consistency, transparency, reliability, and geopolitical responsibility of those private actors currently defending the cyber front lines of the Ukraine conflict.
+
+
+### Facing the Cyber State Threat
+
+> #### A Strategic Approach
+
+_AMY ERTAN_
+
+#### Introduction
+
+In 2002, the NATO formally acknowledged the need to defend against cyber threats. Over the following two decades, cyber defense was institutionalized and understood as a core part of national defense, by both allies and the alliance. As an example, since 2016, NATO allies have recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea. At the national level, the majority of states have evolved their position on cyber defense through the development of national strategies, the establishment of national authorities responsible for defending against cyber threats, and a range of additional initiatives designed to deter, detect, defend against, and respond to malicious cyber activity.
+
+These developments are intrinsically linked with changes in the increasingly complex cyber threat landscape. Now more than ever, adversarial states have shown a willingness and capability to use cyber operations to support their strategic objectives. As a result, cyberspace now plays a key role in strategic competition.
+
+As NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept explains, “Malign actors seek to degrade our critical infrastructure, interfere with our government services, extract intelligence, steal intellectual property and impede our military activities.” For that reason, though recognizing that nations must defend themselves against the full breadth of cyber threats, this paper specifically focuses on state-sponsored threat actors, who attempt to use cyberspace to undermine their target’s national security to further their own strategic and military objectives.
+
+The war in Ukraine, for example, has highlighted Russia’s willingness to leverage cyber operations in the run-up to — and during — the invasion, against Ukraine and others. Russia has used cyber operations to support a range of strategic objectives in Ukraine, from destructive malware to disrupt and degrade the activities of the Ukrainian government and military to attacks on civilian infrastructure — including critical national infrastructure — to undermine public confidence and trust in the Ukrainian government. The uptick in Russian state-sponsored activity against Ukraine in the months leading up to and including the start of the invasion also showed that the attackers were maximizing their access to data and systems to support intelligence gathering, stealing or leaking sensitive information to further their narratives. Some public reports reveal the targeting of state and non-state actors through cyber operations and kinetic military strikes simultaneously, though it remains unclear if these were coordinated.
+
+Beyond those involved in Ukraine, there are a number of state and state-sponsored actors that pose a threat to NATO allies and like-minded states. The United Kingdom has highlighted that China and Russia pose the greatest threat to its national security due to evidence of their sophisticated cyber capabilities, followed by Iran and North Korea. Disruption due to malicious cyber activity has been felt recently across and beyond the alliance. These include a significant disruption from major cyberattacks against Albania’s national information infrastructure in mid-2022, which Albania and other nations have publicly attributed to Iran. More recently, in March 2023, North Macedonia hosted a NATO senior stakeholder visit concerning its ongoing experience defending against hybrid attacks, including cyberattacks. Beyond the significant loss of communications in Ukraine, a major cyberattack against private satellite provider Viasat in February 2022 was reported to have caused disruptions across Europe, far beyond Ukraine’s borders. Throughout 2022, multiple industry research reports have highlighted an increase in malicious cyber activity on users across NATO countries and have linked the activity to several state-sponsored threat actors, largely under the direction of Russian government agencies as well as China-sponsored cyber actors. Nor has Russian malicious cyber activity been limited solely to targets in Ukraine. According to Google, phishing attacks against users in NATO countries from Russian government-sponsored cyber threat actors increased by 300 percent in 2022 compared to 2020. These cyber campaigns are aimed at a broad range of targets, from government and critical infrastructure to private sector organizations and citizens.
+
+So far, malicious activity in cyberspace against NATO has been assessed as falling below the level of armed conflict. Researchers focusing on cyber defense and national security nonetheless face a conceptual challenge: while “cyber warfare” appears to set the bar too high, given that most cyber operations are below the threshold of war, it is also inaccurate to say that current activity in cyberspace represents a “peaceful” state. Experts have presented conceptual models to understand the current nature of cyberspace, speaking of a state of “un-peace,” or attempting to understand cyber operations within the strategic studies lenses of “sub-threshold” or “gray zone” warfare. In essence, the message for policymakers, as well as senior political and military leaders, is clear: there is no peace in cyberspace.
+
+The consensus at NATO is that, as stated firmly in the 2022 Strategic Concept, “Cyberspace is contested at all times.” It is no longer exceptional that states, including NATO members, face disruption to their critical infrastructure due to malicious cyber activity. Reflecting on recent cyberattacks against Ukraine, research by the Economic Security Council of Ukraine argues that the opportunistic use of cyberspace to seek strategic advantages is not expected to change any time soon. Instead, increasing aggression in cyberspace is the “new normal,” and in the context of growing instability internationally, this has several key implications for cyber defenders.
+
+Recognizing this new escalated baseline for state-sponsored cyber activity against NATO and like-minded countries, including Ukraine, this paper reflects on the current cyber threat landscape to consider how NATO allies and like-minded states may effectively defend themselves in this new normal. With a particular focus on the strategic landscape, the paper attends to the need for dynamic strategic positioning for cyber defense, national and international resilience-building efforts, and sustainable engagement with relevant industry actors in peacetime, crisis, and conflict.
+
+#### A Comprehensive Strategic Approach to Cyberspace
+
+Beyond Ukraine, attacks on NATO nations add to the growing body of evidence that cyberspace is always contested. Russia “seeks to establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation,” using “conventional, cyber and hybrid means against us [NATO members] and our [their] partners.” It is not alone. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) “strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains,” using “malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation to target Allies and harm Alliance security.” More generally, growing geopolitical instability over the past year has brought security to the forefront of state agendas around the world and prompted a revisiting of assumptions around national security and defense postures. Cyber defense must be considered within this reckoning, reflecting how the cyber threat landscape has evolved.
+
+Defending the rules-based international order requires a cohesive strategic vision, and states cannot go this alone. Broadly speaking, democratic states must not loosen their commitment to the rules-based order — they must instead, as the 2023 Munich Security Conference report reflected, do more to ensure a stable proposal to make this order work for a greater number of states that may otherwise be attracted to Russia and China’s attempts at revisionism. In the cyber domain, there is an equal need to agree on how democratic states can continue to cooperate to develop norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, address issues of cyber deterrence, and raise the cost of malicious cyber activity against them. The 2023 U.S. Cybersecurity Strategy outlines an ambitious national agenda for cyberspace that will only be strengthened by sustainable partnerships and the effective use of international organizations, such as NATO, to form a coherent international approach to adversarial state threats. Consensus commitment to using international frameworks to address strategic international threats in cyberspace, whether at the NATO alliance level or beyond, provides a level of collective strength that exceeds any individual state’s efforts to challenge the contested geopolitical landscape.
+
+More specifically, the increasing ease with which authoritarian states use malicious cyber activity to undermine the current rules-based international order requires a commitment from NATO allies and like-minded states to refuse to tolerate this “new normal” and impose painful consequences in response to these escalating levels of malicious cyber activity. This includes a refusal to accept the normalization of state-sponsored malicious cyber activity against critical infrastructure. Democratic states can steer a proactive course by explicitly noting recent escalation in cyberspace and refusing to be complacent to this new, raised baseline of more frequent and disruptive cyberattacks by adversarial state-sponsored actors. This will involve renewing their pledge to a norms-based approach to cyberspace, embracing a dynamic approach to develop new policies and impose costs in line with the evolving cyber threat landscapes, and not sacrificing any commitment to the principles of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, even as adversaries attempt to shirk them in attempt to gain offensive advantages. Any alternative course risks being perpetually on the back foot, handing the initiative to authoritarian states for them to shape cyberspace to their advantage.
+
+Various international organizations can help facilitate this shift in vision to different degrees, including but not limited to the NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). NATO has made it clear that a single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities may reach a level of an armed attack, at which point NATO’s North Atlantic Council may invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This decision is to be taken on a case-by-case basis. Yet for this threshold of “armed attack” to be meaningful, it is essential to have a clear understanding of baseline activity. This means being proactive and refusing to become, as one NATO colleague puts it, a “boiling frog” — referring to an analogy in which a frog in a pot does not realize its worsening situation if the water around it comes to a boil gradually. States must ensure that they do not unwittingly build a tolerance to escalated activity, thus prompting future escalation. Therefore, to prevent adversarial actors subtly raising the threshold of acceptable malicious cyber behavior, states must both deliver on their rhetoric to hold responsible threat actors accountable and double down on resilience to decrease the success of subsequent malicious cyber campaigns.
+
+The decades-long debate on how deterrence applies in cyberspace has highlighted the complexities of feasibly and consistently holding adversaries accountable. It has become clear that NATO deterrence in cyberspace is underpinned by the ability to deliver meaningful consequences to malicious cyber threat actors. Norms work if they are upheld; states thus require the ability to impose costs on others who intentionally seek to undermine them. The discourse on international norms in cyberspace reveals a contested and complex environment in which in which many nations may have different positions. Still, NATO allies have made it clear in a 2022 statement that NATO is “ready to impose costs on those who harm us [its members] in cyberspace.” It also pledged to revise the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture, including in cyberspace. The successful application of these principles will call for action from beyond the NATO alliance.
+
+Such a stance not only requires a vision that plans for a variety of future threat landscapes but one that also enables collaboration between states and international organizations to develop a comprehensive answer to cyber defense and deterrence. Within NATO, a coherent allied approach on how cyber contributes to overall deterrence and defense will lay out the consequences of malicious activity in cyberspace to malign state actors. This signaling, in addition to existing diplomatic and economic tools such as joint cyber attribution or responses in other non-cyber domains, shows that allies can be dynamic and act firmly where norms continue to be challenged by states.
+
+At the national level, relevant stakeholders and decisionmakers across defense communities must understand the nature of cyberspace and the challenges surrounding cyber deterrence concepts. Crucially, they must also understand that the pace and scale of cyberattacks are unlikely to slow down unless actions are taken to adapt and respond proactively. While cyber defenders might feel they are constantly firefighting attempted cyberattacks, failing to make time to elaborate a strategic vision to respond to these attacks risks “missing the forest for the trees” and remaining stuck in a reactive posture in which the firefighting will never cease — and may in fact increase. Without a consistent conceptual approach to cyber deterrence, accompanied by adherence to a comprehensive strategic vision both nationally and internationally, states remain disadvantaged when adversarial states appear to act unpredictably. Strategic thinking also needs to include, and take place on, a supra-national level.
+
+#### Remodeling Cyber Resilience
+
+Growing instability across the international landscape has prompted a refocus on cyber defense and resilience as an integral part of national defense. Resilience in this context refers to society’s ability to resist and recover from shocks and combines both civil preparedness and military capability; cyber resilience extends this state to systems relying on cyber resources. There is a growing recognition that governments need greater insight into their cyber resilience posture across the entire national ecosystem, including across the private sector and especially relating to critical infrastructure. In line with a forward-looking strategic vision, a strong cyber resilience posture has been recognized as essential to deter, detect, and prevent malicious cyber activity. Many states have set out their intended plans to enhance their cyber resilience, either as part of a cyber defense strategy or within broader national security doctrine.
+
+Resilience forms a core part of NATO’s founding principles, in which Article 3 outlines the responsibility of allies to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” via “self-help and mutual aid.” For cyber defense specifically, NATO encourages nations to strengthen their defensive posture in cyberspace through three mechanisms: the NATO Defence Planning Process, which includes cyber-related capability targets for allies over a four-year cycle; the Cyber Defence Pledge, whereby since 2016 allies have committed to enhancing their cyber defenses with a focus on seven key objectives; and more broadly, the support of each NATO nation’s seven baseline requirements for national resilience.
+
+As mentioned above, many NATO allies have already articulated their cyber defense vision. However, resilience is a continuous and iterative process, and as states face the escalating security situation in the Euro-Atlantic area, their momentum must not falter. Not only must states work to overcome persistent challenges facing capability building relating to cyber defense, but they must also adapt to the threat landscape considering activity in and beyond Ukraine.
+
+Regarding the former, some challenges are systemic and experienced by the majority of states to some degree, when it comes to strengthening their cyber defense and resilience posture. Limited investment, a shortfall in the skilled cyber workforce (particularly in the public sector and the defense forces), organizational resistance to change, legacy systems, and disengaged leaders can all lead to stagnancy in maturing a state’s cyber defense and resilience posture. To address and overcome barriers to greater cyber defense and preparedness, states must be able to track progress and react whenever they risk falling short of delivering their strategic visions. This requires top-level leadership across government and defense forces, a framework for effective civil-military cooperation — particularly in the high-level transition from peacetime to crisis or conflict — and a consideration of how cyber activity on critical infrastructure may impact military mobility. Enhancing resilience and situational awareness means tackling systemic challenges relating to information-sharing at the national level and between allies. Further, in recent years greater attention has been given to the importance of a healthy national ecosystem of cybersecurity industry actors who can swiftly offer support in a crisis and who are resilient themselves.
+
+Effective resilience also means taking a comprehensive approach to cyber defense, which includes tackling challenges in new ways. For example, while many states have now released plans addressing the education of a cyber workforce, there is room for improvement. Few states have a defined strategy for the retention of cyber expertise within the public sector, where they risk losing experts to competitive industry packages, and few states have published a declarative perspective on how they are approaching recruitment of cyber experts for the public sector or the military. For all states, there is a great deal of opportunity to explore in hiring through targeting diversity of all kinds, whether based on gender, career stage (e.g., attracting mid-career talent from other sectors into cyber defense), or discipline (e.g., attracting economists or psychologists into the field). This example of recruitment is one of many in which adjusting to the modern defense environment requires a gear-change in tactics, and states must continue to look forward to acting proactively and decisively.
+
+Looking at current events, Ukraine has shown a significant amount about cyber resilience in times of conflict. Significant commentary has focused on the fact that the large-scale cyber campaigns leveraged against Ukraine have had little apparent success. The foremost reason for this is often credited to Ukraine’s cyber resilience, much of which had been actively developed in response to previous Russian aggression against Ukraine, particularly from 2014 onwards. Cyber capacity-building measures appear to have contributed substantively to Ukraine’s resilience, and in turn, the war in Ukraine has prompted states to reflect on cyber defense within broader resilience and crisis management response plans. There are opportunities across the board to strengthen preparedness for a cyber crisis, whether it is by ensuring that there is a cyber crisis response plan or by including cyber in national crisis response frameworks. Such plans should be comprehensive, involving stakeholders across the public and private sectors, with regular exercising to maximize readiness in case of crisis.
+
+A related view on Ukraine’s impressive cyber resilience posture heralds the significant assistance Ukraine received from the United States and others since 2014, which allowed it to decrease its reliance on insecure software and implement many of the cyber defenses that protected it against of Russia’s activity in cyberspace. Outside of armed conflict, the principle of assistance to allies remains much the same and is increasingly relevant beyond formal NATO structures. Ukraine showed allies how critical it is that where a state needs help to protect itself against an aggressor, it gets the support required. Certainly, within the NATO alliance, the principle of resilience follows the adage “a rising tide lifts all ships”; as the relatively more vulnerable states mature their national resilience to malicious cyber activity, the alliance becomes more resilient overall.
+
+Beyond current commitments, NATO members and like-minded states must be empowered to highlight the best use of capacity-building measures, perhaps by using national cyber maturity assessments (or similar) to check where a state is not meeting minimum baseline levels of security or where they are not making progress over time. The use of a metric-driven approach to cyber resilience — taking care to choose appropriate metrics, of course — would enable states to check their progress over time and to highlight where they are struggling with progress and may need assistance, such as the sharing of best practices, from allies.
+
+Furthermore, events in Ukraine and beyond have highlighted the need for effective assistance coordination mechanisms, which could be activated in response to significant malicious cyber activity. Currently, there are no comprehensive frameworks for effectively coordinating cyber assistance in a crisis. Ukraine highlighted this need for a coordinator to swiftly prioritize needs and allocate tasks to a range of public and private actors offering bilateral assistance. Such a framework would need to think about how the receiver prioritizes its most urgent needs in a cyber crisis (or a crisis with cyber aspects); articulates these needs to potential helpers; deconflicts offers of assistance from various actors; arranges the logistics of assistance, including physical movement and access to technology; and deconflicts any issues relating to legal constraints or privileges and immunities, ensuring those offering support in a crisis are legally protected should their actions inadvertently cause damage, in “Good Samaritan” fashion. Therefore, in taking a comprehensive approach, national cyber crisis frameworks and response plans should consider how states could offer, but also receive, cyber assistance from outside actors, including other states and industry providers. Using NATO as a platform, allied states are working to operationalize these activities through the development of a virtual cyber incident support capability, which will operate on a voluntary basis and use national assets.
+
+The final aspect, once an effective resilience plan is in place that accounts for all aspects of cyber defense and crisis management, is to ensure that it works in practice via a comprehensive and holistic approach to exercising and training, including national and international cyber exercises as well as meaningful integration of cyber into joint exercises. These exercises, when mimicking a national crisis, benefit from drawing in stakeholders across military and civil communities as well as from a range of relevant national actors, such as critical infrastructure operators and the cybersecurity industry providers that would likely be engaged in a real-world cyber crisis. While care is needed to avoid duplication against existing exercises or training fatigue where a limited set of skilled expertise is constantly refreshed instead of conducting business as usual, exercising should be leveraged to ensure preparedness across a range of aspects.
+
+#### Sustainable Resilience and Private Sector Engagement
+
+Any analysis of Ukraine’s cyber defense activities through 2022 would be incomplete without analyzing the critical role of industry actors, many of whom donated (among other things) licenses, software packages, and infrastructural services. In the immediate run-up to, and early stages of, the invasion in February 2022, Ukraine rapidly ingested a range of private sector and bilateral state assistance in cyberspace. Actors from the private sector proved instrumental in helping Ukraine react rapidly and defend against cyber threats through the provision of cyber threat intelligence, cloud data storage, and a range of cyber defense products including denial of service mitigation services, incident response capabilities, and security software licenses. In the information space, for telecommunications and broader support of digital infrastructure, Starlink’s satellite terminals have been critical in maintaining communications by the Ukrainian military and civilian authorities. Private sector support for Ukraine’s cyber defense efforts has played a significant role in reshaping the conflict. This has been so significant that it has been recognized by the Ukrainian government, to the extent that in May 2022, Google received the first Peace Prize from Ukraine in recognition of the company’s support, which included a significant cybersecurity assistance package.
+
+This aspect of direct private sector involvement has prompted a more urgent approach to private-public engagements, with the United States among those claiming to have increased collaboration with industry partners on cybersecurity issues as a direct result of activity in Ukraine. Increased private sector participation, alongside the cyberattack against Viasat, also prompted discussions around private sector actors’ place in a conflict, such when they may be considered legitimate military targets in cyberspace. More broadly, there is an emerging and increasing concern around private sector dependencies and the sustainability of private sector engagement in a crisis, particularly in cases where states may be reliant on industry providers to provide or operate critical infrastructure support. Nowhere is this illustrated more neatly than in the case of SpaceX’s Starlink, a satellite internet service that has been essential in maintaining connectivity for critical services in Ukraine — and the Ukrainian military — since February 2022. When SpaceX announced it was no longer planning to offer the satellites or licenses to Ukraine without cost — having already spent almost $100 million supporting Ukrainian’s internet service — it prompted a scramble in which other actors came forward to sponsor ongoing service delivery. During a dramatic series of public exchanges in autumn, SpaceX highlighted that the company could not “indefinitely” fund Starlink connectivity in Ukraine. While service availability was eventually maintained with external assistance, the loss of these services, which Ukraine has become reliant on during the conflict, could have been devastating to Ukraine’s war effort.
+
+While Starlink may be an extreme example, with few competitors in the market of portable satellite communications technology, the war highlights the sheer number and breadth of actors now enmeshed in the provision of rapid cyber assistance to a state in conflict. Private sector actors cannot afford to give products for free or below cost indefinitely. Ultimately, shareholders have a say, and as more organizations announce their inability to donate services, the limits of this type of ad hoc free support will likely be revealed over time. While Microsoft has announced its support free of charge until the end of 2023, for example, the Telegraph reported that the company likely faced some business impact as a result, turning down new cloud clients in mid-2023 due to capacity constraints.
+
+While private-public cooperation for cyber defense is by no means a novel topic for governments, there is no agreed current market model for private sector actors to sustainably provide cyber assistance in the context of a conflict or where receiving actors cannot necessarily cover the costs involved. Much like the required coherent strategic vision for cyber deterrence discussed in an earlier section, the United Kingdom and its allies will have to face the challenge of market sustainability soon as they look towards Ukraine and beyond. Acknowledging the evolving cyber threat landscape in which we expect governments to continually face cyber crises in the future, stakeholders need market incentives to ensure that they do not end up continually rallying in an ad hoc manner, as in the case of Starlink in Ukraine.
+
+There are two kinds of incentives to encourage private sector actors to provide support to states who may not have the resources to pay them directly. First, encouraging donations through the perspective of norms and in support of democratic values. This admittedly relies on a moral incentive targeting the values and strategic positioning of service provider — but it can be encouraged. When announcing continued support for Ukraine free of charge through 2023, Microsoft referenced their support of “international stability and the protection of fundamental rights across Europe and around the world.” Recognizing that for-profit organizations have different overarching goals from government defense stakeholders, there is nonetheless a path forward for defense stakeholders to harness and shape the way industry increasingly engages with norms. Second, coordinating alternative funding mechanisms that might include ad hoc bilateral assistance from other states. This may involve the creation of an emergency or sustained funding mechanism through which states with greater resources can contribute funds to shore up a state’s cyber defenses, in line with the international resilience-building measures discussed above.
+
+A focus exclusively on the first option — appealing to private sector non-financial motivations — is unlikely to succeed in the long term. For the latter option, it is not yet clear what kind of body or group of states might coordinate such a fund, or if this fund is politically feasible given the expectation of future attacks. A sustainable approach will need to include both kinds of incentive to work for everyone involved and ensure adequate market participation in the long term. This is a market challenge greater than any one nation; it will require states to come together to determine an appropriate framework for engagement. Any framework, in addition to accounting for sustainable provision of services in terms of funding, must also clarify the roles and authorities where private sector organizations provide digital or cyber defense services to ensure seamless integration into national defense. In spring 2023, SpaceX acted to restrict the Ukrainian military’s use of Starlink connectivity for drone control, claiming that the organization’s technology was being weaponized by Ukraine in a way not originally intended and at odds with its terms and conditions of service. While private organizations must retain the right to provide their services as they wish, unexpected changes to the service provision mid-conflict are not, putting it lightly, an effective way to engage and build a commercial relationship. Mechanisms coordinating private sector assistance, in times of cyber crisis and broader conflict, must set out clear frameworks for engagement at the start to avoid such ad hoc surprises.
+
+Again, the driving force for any framework would be to take an active approach to the coordination of assistance. This means setting structures in place so that when nations need to request external industry support during a major cyber incident, mechanisms to arrange this support already exist and can be agile while also accounting for sustainable deployment and maintenance.
+
+#### Conclusion
+
+The current strategic landscape demonstrates that cyberspace continues to be fertile ground for pushing the boundaries of conflict and raising the level of malicious activity against states beyond what is considered acceptable in the rules-based international order. Cyberspace is increasingly used by state-sponsored actors to conduct malicious cyber activity, where they can achieve asymmetric effects while maintaining plausible deniability and provocatively challenge the rules-based order championed by NATO and like-minded nations.
+
+This contested cyberspace is well on the way to becoming the “new normal,” with a baseline that has incrementally increased over time to the levels of pervasive disruption seen today. State-sponsored cyber operations against critical infrastructure are happening more frequently, and nations must take a proactive stance on cyber’s role in defense. States defending the norms-based order cannot be complacent nor unaware of the “boiling frog” scenario; they must not subconsciously adjust to this new baseline of malicious cyber activity and they must resist becoming more tolerant of their adversaries’ disruptive actions. Instead, policymakers and political leaders must unite at a strategic and political level to present a strategic vision for the rules-based order. For cyberspace, this strategic vision must address deterrence in cyberspace and intolerance to adversarial activity. Second, resilience must remain a priority, particularly for all states struggling to make progress on systemic challenges including resources, capacity-building, and funding. Enhancing resilience means helping all those on whom one depends for overall security. Learning from Ukraine, resilience must also include the ability to adapt quickly in a crisis, with the ability to receive and deliver cyber assistance as required. Finally, there is a future in which cybersecurity providers to Ukraine all withdraw their donated support due to their capacity constraints in a market economy, and this would be hugely disruptive to Ukrainian cyber defense capabilities. The international community needs a model for sustainable private sector provision of assistance — not just for Ukraine, but to be employed in principle wherever a state needs emergency assistance and has funding constraints. The best time to have created such a framework would have been before facing the risks of over-reliance on the private sector in the middle of a difficult conflict. The second-best time is now.
+
+---
+
+__James A. Lewis__ writes on technology and public policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he is a senior vice president, holds the Pritzker Chair, and directs the Strategic Technologies Program. Before joining CSIS, he was a diplomat and a member of the Senior Executive Service with extensive negotiating, politico-military, and regulatory experience. Lewis developed groundbreaking policies on remote sensing, encryption, high-tech exports, and cybersecurity. He helped organize the Wassenaar Arrangement and led the first U.S. delegation to its Experts Group.
+
+__Georgia Wood__ is the program manager and research associate for the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In this role, she manages the Strategic Technologies Program and conducts research on cybersecurity, emerging technologies, digital innovation and transformation, and digital governance.
+
+__Amy Ertan__ is a cyber and hybrid policy officer at NATO Headquarters where she supports the development of cyber policies and initiatives across the alliance. Previously she was a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, a visiting fellow with the Hague Program on International Cyber Security, and a cybersecurity fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
+
+__Melanie Garson__ is the cyber policy lead and acting director of geopolitics at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. Her work focuses on cyber policy, the geopolitics of the internet, the rise of tech companies as geopolitical actors, data governance as well as the intersection of emerging tech, foreign policy and diplomacy.
+
+__Erica Lonergan__ (nee Borghard) is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point. She is also a research scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Prior to that, she held positions as a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Atlantic Council.
+
+__Julia Voo__ is a cyber fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center where she leads the team behind Harvard Belfer’s National Cyber Power Index. She was formerly the research director for the China Cyber Policy Initiative. Her other areas of research concern geopolitics, technical standards, and the Digital Silk Road.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-19-collision-on-syria-policy.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-19-collision-on-syria-policy.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Collision On Syria Policy
+author: Daniel R DePetris
+date : 2023-05-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/RzrX1Rk.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The West and its Arab Partners are Heading for a Collision on Syria Policy"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_With Bashar al-Assad having outlasted his armed opponents, Syria’s neighbours have long since given up on trying to oust him. As Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Arab states normalise their relations with Damascus and welcome the Syrian strongman to his first Arab League summit in 13 years, Syria is no longer the regional pariah it once was – to the West’s dismay._
+
+
+
+Syria, ravaged by a 12-year civil war and divided by a constellation of foreign forces, economic mismanagement, population displacement and political stalemate, has been pushed to the bottom of the international community’s agenda. The West, while strongly opposed to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s rehabilitation, has nonetheless become comfortable with the status-quo ante that has governed Syrian affairs since the collapse of the Islamic State’s territorial caliphate in 2019. Whereas the US was an early backer of the armed rebellion against Assad’s government, Washington now treats Syria as a counterterrorism problem. On 17 April, US special forces killed senior Islamic State leader Abd al-Hadi Mahmud al-Haji Ali during a helicopter raid in the northeast – just one of the dozens of counterterrorism operations the US has conducted in Syria this year.
+
+Syria’s Arab neighbours, however, don’t have the luxury of ignoring what happens in the country or typecasting it as a security problem. In part due to the facts on the ground, the majority of the Arab world has slowly come to the realisation that perpetual isolation of the Syrian government is neither a wise nor a particularly effective policy. Even the Assad regime’s foremost opponents, most notably Saudi Arabia, have concluded that mending ties with Damascus – at least to an extent – holds a better chance of eliciting Assad’s cooperation on issues of mutual interest than a wholesale policy of pressure. The imperative to move in the direction of normalisation has only increased since the February earthquake in Turkey and northern Syria, which claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people. As Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan remarked during the Munich Security Conference shortly after the earthquake, “in the Arab world there is a consensus growing that the status quo is not workable”.
+
+
+### The Arab World Moves on from Syria’s War
+
+Even before the Saudi foreign minister’s comments, Middle Eastern governments were busy exploring whether a détente with Syria was possible – not necessarily because they approved of Assad personally or believed he could be turned into a reliable partner, but because the years-long policy of using diplomatic isolation and economic pressure to coerce Damascus into political reforms had few if any accomplishments to show for it. The UAE re-opened its embassy in Damascus in December 2018 after a six-year hiatus, a move quickly followed up by Bahrain. Jordan, Syria’s neighbour to the south, re-opened a major border crossing in 2018 after Syrian government forces wrested back control of the southern city of Daraa (the cradle of the anti-Assad revolution); the crossing’s closure had had significant economic ramifications for Jordanian businesses based in the border city of al-Ramtha, reportedly resulting in over 80% of stores shutting their doors due to a steep drop in commerce. Iraq, which viewed the anti-Assad rebellion warily, ended restrictions at the crossing between the Iraqi city of Albu Kamel and the Syrian city of Al-Qaim in September 2019, despite external pressure on then-Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdel Mehdi to keep the area shuttered.
+
+The diplomatic movement between Syria and its Arab neighbours has been even more dramatic than the economic front. In October 2021, Jordan’s King Abdullah accepted a phone call from Assad for the first time since the civil war began a decade earlier. The call was significant less for its substance than for the fact that it occurred at all; Abdullah was one of the first Arab leaders to call for Assad’s resignation after the Syrian army was placed on a war-footing and began utilising tanks and aircraft against peaceful anti-government demonstrations. The UAE, which eyed the growth and consolidation of Iranian influence in Syria warily, made a concerted decision years earlier to reach out to Assad in the hopes of coaxing him away from Tehran. UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed flew to Damascus to meet with Assad in November 2021, the most senior Emirati official to do so at the time. Assad has visited the UAE twice since then, most recently in March 2023, when he held meetings with UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed and was given state honours, which included Assad’s plane receiving an escort by Emirati fighter aircraft. The Egyptians, meanwhile, welcomed Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad to Cairo in April 2023, the first such trip since 2011 and yet another sign that regional players were becoming more interested in putting relations with Damascus on a less adversarial footing.
+
+The most consequential shift, however, involves Saudi Arabia, one of the biggest backers of the anti-Assad insurgency during the civil war’s deadliest years. No policy change moves quickly in Riyadh, but it appears as if Syria policy is an exception. In March 2023, the same month Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to resume diplomatic relations after a seven-year freeze, the Saudis announced that a similar effort was ongoing with the Syrian government. The bid was likely accelerated due to the February earthquake, which prompted Riyadh to dispatch planes carrying humanitarian assistance to Syrian government-controlled airports. Saudi Arabia and Syria arrived at an agreement in April to resume consular services in one another’s countries and to restore direct flights. To underscore the point, Syrian Foreign Minister Mekdad flew to Saudi Arabia on 12 April, the first trip by a Syrian official to the kingdom in more than a decade; Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal returned the favour with his own trip to Damascus six days later. On 9 May, Saudi Arabia and Syria officially confirmed the mutual re-opening of diplomatic facilities in one another’s countries; days earlier, the Arab League agreed by consensus to re-admit Syria after a suspension of nearly 12 years.
+
+___`In part due to the facts on the ground, the majority of the Arab world has slowly come to the realisation that perpetual isolation of the Syrian government is neither a wise nor a particularly effective policy`___
+
+The reasons for the Arab world’s outreach to Syria vary depending on the specific country involved, although a healthy dose of realism can explain much of the momentum. There is a general recognition in the region that while Assad is a weak head of state governing a country split between US and Kurdish forces in the northeast, Turkish forces in the north and northwest and pro-Syrian militias at key border crossing points, he nevertheless controls most of Syria’s population centres, airports and highways and all of its ports. There is no notable opposition within the Syrian government to Assad’s continued rule, or at least not enough to warrant a threat to his position, and whatever political opposition that exists on the outside doesn’t have a strong constituency within the Syrian public at large. Assad retains strong military, economic and political support from his benefactors in Iran and Russia, and despite the Russian military’s formidable challenges in Ukraine, Assad’s state visit to Moscow in March suggests Russian President Vladimir Putin isn’t going to cut off that support anytime soon – saving Assad from being overthrown and solidifying the Syrian government’s position has been a significant Russian foreign policy achievement in the Middle East. Armed opposition to Assad still exists, but it’s limited to a jihadist faction hemmed into the north-western Syrian province of Idlib and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeast, which have expressed a desire for their own talks with Damascus.
+
+Jordan and Saudi Arabia have even more of an incentive to end frosty relations with Damascus. Both countries are primary markets for the illegal captagon trade that is booming inside Syria. The Saudi and Jordanian security forces don’t have the capacity to tackle this scourge on their own and have concluded that the Syrian government needs to be brought in as a partner if they are to have any chance of stemming the drug’s flow. The fact that the Syrian security forces are directly involved in the production and distribution of captagon is either brushed aside or ignored. Assad has in effect created yet another regional problem that only he can solve.
+
+
+### The West’s View of the Syria Rapprochement
+
+The US, the UK and the EU remain staunchly opposed to any reconciliation with Assad, a man who has committed unspeakable acts during the course of Syria’s civil war, including but not limited to the use of chemical weapons in highly populated areas to quash the insurgency against his rule. The collective Western position is one of begrudging acceptance: while Assad will continue to serve as Syria’s president for a long time to come, it would be a fundamental mistake to reward him for shooting, bombing, gassing and starving his way to victory. In Washington, any hint of normalisation with a war criminal is a political non-starter, particularly in the US Congress, which was the principal force behind the comprehensive Caesar Act sanctions regime.
+
+Despite the latest regional developments, the Biden administration’s position hasn’t changed. The White House is adamant that while cross-border aid flows will continue in cooperation with the UN, diplomatic recognition and reconstruction assistance are off the table until Damascus satisfies a list of demands, most crucially UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a “Syrian-led political process” leading to the formation of a new constitution on the road to free and fair elections. The US Congress is even more hard-line than the White House; a bill mandating additional sanctions on the Syrian government and prohibiting any US funds from being used in a way that implies US normalisation of Assad’s government quickly cleared the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Even so, it’s highly unlikely that Biden administration officials and US lawmakers believe demands on political reform will ever be met. Given the facts on the ground and dwindling support for the Syrian opposition from even its traditional backers, Assad has no incentive to negotiate a political transition, which he sees as an unnecessary concession to Syrians he views unapologetically as traitors who deserve no reprieve, let alone a stake in the Syrian power structure.
+
+___`The Biden administration would prefer not to sanction partners like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the UAE for investing in Syria or financing its reconstruction, but such sanctions may be inevitable given US law`___
+
+Europe has largely followed the US lead on the Syria file. Indeed, the EU’s Syria policy is almost identical to Washington’s. “There will be no end to sanctions, no normalisations and no support for reconstruction until a political transition is underway”, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell told the European Parliament in March 2021. This position was ratified again in January 2022 by the EU Foreign Affairs Committee. One year later, during a UN Security Council debate on Syria, the French delegation reiterated the EU’s general stance: “Any shift in French and European positions regarding the lifting of sanctions, normalisation and reconstruction is conditional upon the regime’s commitment to a credible and inclusive political process”. Upon learning of Syria’s re-entry into the Arab League, UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly emphasised London’s disapproval of the move: “we cannot just wish away the actions of the Assad regime over the last few years; the brutality against Syrian people cannot just be ignored. And the UK certainly won’t brush that under the carpet”.
+
+
+### The West and the Arab World at a Crossroads
+
+With respect to Syria policy, the West and its partners in the Middle East are increasingly singing from a different song sheet. The former wishes to preserve and build upon the economic sanctions regime that was established years ago, with the expectation that a lack of foreign investment and reconstruction assistance will over time compel Assad to seriously re-engage with the UN-facilitated dialogue process. The latter, with different priorities and interests at play, want to distance themselves from an approach that relegates Syria to the status of an international outcast until an unlikely democratic system emerges. This juxtaposition was on display during US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s 2 May call with Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, in which he advised Cairo that “those engaging with the Assad regime should weigh carefully how those efforts are addressing the needs of the Syrian people”.
+
+Caught in the middle of the two poles are the Syrian people. More than 12 million, or 55 percent of Syria’s population, are food insecure. An astounding 90% of Syrians are living below the poverty line. More than 14 million have fled their homes since the outbreak of conflict in 2011 – nearly 7 million of whom remain internally displaced despite fighting between Syrian government and opposition forces plummeting since 2020, when Turkey and Russia backed a ceasefire in the Idlib region that largely froze the fighting. Estimates of Syria’s reconstruction costs vary but are usually pegged in the hundreds of billions of dollars.
+
+Managing these differences will only become more difficult as the divergence in policy between the West and Syria’s Arab neighbours grows wider. The Biden administration would prefer not to sanction partners like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the UAE for investing in Syria or financing its reconstruction, but such sanctions may be inevitable given US law. The Caesar Act states that the president “shall impose” financial penalties on any foreign person who “knowingly provides significant financial, material or technological support to, or knowingly engages in a significant transaction with” the Syrian government or an entity owned or controlled by it. The Syrian government’s extensive involvement in the Syrian economy means that any financial assistance would presumably incur repercussions from Washington. The US sanctions regime is likely to deter any large-scale foreign investment in Syria for the foreseeable future.
+
+However, investment from the Gulf states cannot be entirely excluded over the long term, particularly if economic activity is crucial to making diplomatic rapprochement with Damascus a success. In such a contingency, the West will have to determine if sanctions are appropriate – and if so, whether the costs of a breach with partners in the Gulf are worth the benefit of sticking to principle. Over time, the US and Europe could discover that maintaining a stringent sanctions regime on Syria in perpetuity, on behalf of wholly unrealistic goals, is an unsustainable or unnecessary obstacle in pursuit of its wider objectives in the region.
+
+---
+
+__Daniel R DePetris__ is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-19-meatgrinder.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-19-meatgrinder.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4e307dba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-19-meatgrinder.md
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Meatgrinder
+author: Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds
+date : 2023-05-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ze5DMTW.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The scale of Russian losses in 2022, combined with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation confronting NATO systems they had not previously contended with, has caused a significant deviation in Russian operations from the country’s doctrine._ _This report seeks to outline how Russian forces have adapted their tactics in the Ukrainian conflict and the challenges this has created for the Ukrainian military that must be overcome. The report examines Russian military adaptation by combat function._
+
+Russian infantry tactics have shifted from trying to deploy uniform Battalion Tactical Groups as combined arms units of action to a stratified division by function into line, assault, specialised and disposable troops. These are formed into task-organised groupings. Line infantry are largely used for ground holding and defensive operations. Disposable infantry are used for continuous skirmishing to either identify Ukrainian firing positions, which are then targeted by specialised infantry, or to find weak points in Ukrainian defences to be prioritised for assault. Casualties are very unevenly distributed across these functions. The foremost weakness across Russian infantry units is low morale, which leads to poor unit cohesion and inter-unit cooperation.
+
+Russian engineering has proven to be one of the stronger branches of the Russian military. Russian engineers have been constructing complex obstacles and field fortifications across the front. This includes concrete reinforced trenches and command bunkers, wire-entanglements, hedgehogs, anti-tank ditches, and complex minefields. Russian mine laying is extensive and mixes anti-tank and victim-initiated anti-personnel mines, the latter frequently being laid with multiple initiation mechanisms to complicate breaching. These defences pose a major tactical challenge to Ukrainian offensive operations.
+
+Russian armour is rarely used for attempts at breakthrough. Instead, armour is largely employed in a fire support function to deliver accurate fire against Ukrainian positions. Russia has started to employ thermal camouflage on its vehicles and, using a range of other modifications and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), has significantly reduced the detectability of tanks at stand-off ranges. Furthermore, these measures have reduced the probability of kill of a variety of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) at ranges beyond 1,400 m.
+
+Russian artillery has begun to significantly refine the Reconnaissance Strike Complex following the destruction of its ammunition stockpiles and command and control infrastructure by guided multiple-launch rocket systems (GMLRS) in July 2022. This has resulted in much closer integration of multiple UAVs directly supporting commanders authorised to apply fires. Russian artillery has also improved its ability to fire from multiple positions and to fire and move, reducing susceptibility to counterbattery fire. The key system enabling this coordination appears to be the Strelets system. There has been a shift in reliance upon 152-mm howitzers to a much greater emphasis on 120-mm mortars in Russian fires; this reflects munitions and barrel availability. Responsive Russian fires represent the greatest challenge to Ukrainian offensive operations. Russian artillery is also increasingly relying on loitering munitions for counterbattery fires.
+
+Russian electronic warfare (EW) remains potent, with an approximate distribution of at least one major system covering each 10 km of front. These systems are heavily weighted towards the defeat of UAVs and tend not to try and deconflict their effects. Ukrainian UAV losses remain at approximately 10,000 per month. Russian EW is also apparently achieving real time interception and decryption of Ukrainian Motorola 256-bit encrypted tactical communications systems, which are widely employed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
+
+Russian air defences have also seen a significant increase in their effectiveness now that they are set up around known, and fairly static, locations and are properly connected. Although Russia has persistently struggled to respond to emerging threats, over time it has adapted. Russian air defences are now assessed by the Ukrainian military to be intercepting a proportion of GMLRS strikes as Russian point defences are directly connected to superior radar.
+
+Russian aviation remains constrained to delivering stand-off effects, ranging from responsive lofted S-8 salvos against Ukrainian forming-up points, to FAB-500 glide bombs delivered from medium altitude to ranges up to 70 km. The Ukrainian military notes that Russia has a large stockpile of FAB-500s and is systematically upgrading them with glide kits. Although they only have limited accuracy, the size of these munitions poses a serious threat. The Russian Aerospace Forces remain a ‘force in being’ and a major threat to advancing Ukrainian forces, although they currently lack the capabilities to penetrate Ukrainian air defences.
+
+Following the destruction of Russian command and control infrastructure in July 2022, the Russian military withdrew major headquarters out of range of GMLRS and placed them in hardened structures. They also wired them into the Ukrainian civil telecommunications network and used field cables to branch from this to brigade headquarters further forward. Assigned assets tend to connect to these headquarters via microlink, significantly reducing their signature. At the same time, from the battalion down, Russian forces largely rely on unencrypted analogue military radios, reflecting a shortage of trained signallers at the tactical level.
+
+An overview of Russian adaptation reveals a force that is able to improve and evolve its employment of key systems. There is evidence of a centralised process for identifying shortcomings in employment and the development of mitigations. Nevertheless, much of this adaptation is reactive and is aimed at making up for serious deficiencies in Russian units. The result is a structure that becomes better over time at managing the problems it immediately faces, but also one that struggles to anticipate new threats. The conclusion therefore is that the Russian Armed Forces pose a significant challenge for the Ukrainian military on the defence. Nevertheless, if Ukraine can disrupt Russian defences and impose a dynamic situation on them, Russian units are likely to rapidly lose their coordination. Changes in the air combat environment, for example, have led rapidly to incidents of Russian fratricide.
+
+For Ukraine’s international partners, supporting Ukraine in liberating its territories is arguably shifting from an emphasis on key systems, to the need for dedicated training and the assurance that equipment provided to the Ukrainian military can be sustained. Tactics will be critical to the effective disruption of Russian forces and their eventual defeat.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+By any reasonable metric, 2022 was a disaster for the Russian military. After its invasion of Ukraine, a combination of uneven and inadequate training, poor force employment, and insufficient forces for sustained large-scale combat operations collectively caused the loss of many of its most capable troops and much of its modern equipment. The ground forces bore the brunt of these losses, though elements of the navy and aerospace forces suffered substantial attrition. Moreover, as international support for Ukraine has led to many Western weapons systems being employed against Russian troops for the first time, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) are confronting challenges they have not previously dealt with.
+
+Nevertheless, Moscow’s policy has been to continue the war. The ongoing reconstitution of Russian forces, and the pressure from new battlefield factors, have led to significant changes in how the Russian military fights. The study of the AFRF has often been heavily focused on the parsing of Russian doctrine. The relevance of Russian doctrine to how the AFRF fights, however, is becoming increasingly uneven. For Ukraine’s partners to calibrate their ongoing provision of support, it is important that Russia’s emerging tactics are properly understood. It is also important that NATO members, recapitalising their forces to ensure the future deterrence of Russia, understand how the threat is evolving. Although the Russian military may change considerably before its forces directly confront NATO, the evolution is worth tracking.
+
+This report describes how Russia is currently carrying out its combat operations in Ukraine. It does not outline in detail which of these tactics are more or less successful, or describe Ukrainian tactics, as these are operationally sensitive. The material contained in this report has been primarily assembled from interviews with and observations of Ukrainian military units in April and May 2023, supported by similar material assembled throughout 2022. This included interviews in April and May 2023 with members of the 1st, 17th, 24th, 25th, 30th, 31st, 51st, 58th, 71st and 112th Brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) across all officer ranks and some enlisted troops. The interviewees had a wide range of experience throughout the war, including the defence of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Bakhmut and Avdiivka, and participated in offensive operations in Kherson and Kharkiv. The authors also spoke to several officers responsible for data collection, assessment and dissemination of lessons within the General Staff of the AFU, and with members of the staffs from Ukraine’s operational-level commands. The contents of these interviews were compared with the observations of a range of Ukraine’s international partners and from public source imagery and accounts.
+
+The report divides the descriptions of Russian tactics by combat function, spanning infantry, engineers, artillery, armour, electronic warfare, air defence, aviation, and command and control. It concludes with an overview of the priorities for those wishing to support Ukraine in liberating its territory. This report should not be considered an academic analysis as it was written in Ukraine from field notes and does not engage extensively with wider literature. Nor, given the limitations on what can be publicly discussed, does it fully endeavour to analyse the implications of what is covered as doing so properly would breach the AFU’s operational security. Instead, this should be understood as reportage informed by sustained and extensive engagement and debriefing of Ukrainian combat units.
+
+There are ways in which this report – if inappropriately exploited – could be misleading. In the first instance, an analysis that is premised on interviews could easily be a collection of anecdotes, thereby suggesting that isolated examples are reflective of wider trends. To avoid this, this report very rarely cites individual examples but instead outlines points of consistency between multiple accounts from combatants with experience from different sectors. Conversely, however, a report that seeks to describe a general Russian approach risks implying a level of uniformity, coherence and intentionality to tactics that may be very uneven in their application. It is noteworthy that there are regular studies conducted by different technical institutes of the Russian military and their findings are disseminated to combat formations, recommending alterations to the employment of equipment, and structure and application of formations. There is an ongoing process at work in the Russian military to identify lessons. Without unit rotation and collective training, however, it is hard for many of these recommendations to be implemented by troops in contact and the result is differing levels of adoption. At the same time, some tactics are emerging from the bottom up and are being distributed along the front. The reader should bear in mind therefore that the descriptions of how Russia is fighting in this report do not represent the result of a coherent redesign of force structure or combined arms tactics, but rather the adaptation within branches of the Russian military.
+
+Perhaps most importantly, this report is not an operational study and does not seek to predict the likelihood of success in any Ukrainian offensive operations. Public reflections would be utterly inappropriate before any such actions are attempted. Given the roughly 1,200 km of front along which forces are engaged to varying levels of intensity, Russian positions are not uniformly well defended; there are gaps. Equally, not all of that front offers suitable ground for offensive manoeuvre. Just because the Russians have an approach to layered defence does not mean that those defences are well served or equally sophisticated in all sectors. Nevertheless, the tactical challenges outlined in this report are ones that Ukrainian forces will have to contend with to varying degrees in whichever direction they move to reclaim their territory. The authors hope that in outlining these challenges, this report can properly calibrate the expectations of Ukraine’s partners and indicate where their support can make the greatest difference in liberating Ukraine’s land and preserving the lives of its soldiers.
+
+
+### Infantry
+
+At the beginning of the war, the Russian military operated in mechanised Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) which were supposed to be combined arms formations comprising mechanised infantry, tanks, artillery and other attached enablers. The Russians had insufficient infantry in their BTGs, while the units lacked cohesion or sufficient staff capacity to properly employ their combined arms elements. Casualties and the failure of the approach have led the AFRF to revert to relying on four infantry unit types: disposable; line; assault; and specialised. These are used in combination in both attack and defence, in a manner shaped by current operational challenges that is not formally codified in doctrine. Line, assault and specialised infantry are generated through the normal Russian recruitment and training system. Line infantry are generally based on mechanised units. They differ from assault infantry in that they have not received specific assault training and are therefore mainly used for supporting tasks, improving and occupying defensive positions. Assault infantry have received additional training, closer to what would be expected of NATO light infantry forces, and are considered to be a skilled and valuable asset. As such, they are spared some of the mundanity and back-breaking labour of digging in for defensive operations in order to prevent fatigue and attrition, and to allow them to conduct rehearsals for offensive operations. Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) and naval infantry units are generally, though not universally, assault units in practice, with a cultural expectation that they will have an esprit de corps, level of competence and appropriately aggressive mindset. Wagner Group and other Russian private military companies (PMCs) have also been involved in the formation of assault units. Specialised infantry might be generated from the infantry, VDV, the professional elements of Wagner Group, Spetsnaz or other corps, but have received additional role-specific training and equipment which allow for a particular kind of employment.
+
+Russia’s disposable infantry should be considered fundamentally different and are drawn from three principal sources: conscripts from the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (heavily attrited from early rounds of fighting); prisoners drafted by the Wagner Group; and under-trained mobilised Russian civilians. These troops were originally formed into companies of approximately 60 people, but have since been broken down into platoons of approximately 15. They are issued with small arms. Ukrainian troops report that they often appear to be under the influence of amphetamines or other narcotic substances, with material recovered from the battlefield indicating that these are commonly taken in liquid form.
+
+In the attack, disposable infantry are the first to be employed. Disposable platoons are assigned to those avenues of approach to Ukrainian positions that are deemed to offer some cover and thus could prove viable. Although these have been described colloquially as ‘human wave attacks’, they no longer involve a dense concentration of infantry conducting an assault in a single mass. Rather, a disposable fire team of two to five personnel is sent from a forming-up position in the Russian front line and advances to contact. There may be up to five fire teams pushed across an axis at any one time, but normally only one or two teams will be able to work forwards. The team will skirmish with Ukrainian defensive positions on contact, often until killed. Ukrainian troops noted that many continued to advance, even after being wounded. On more than one occasion Ukrainian soldiers report that disposable infantry have been shot from Russian positions when attempting to retreat. As teams are destroyed by defensive fire, Russian forces will commit successive teams forward by the same line of approach. Ukrainian forces must continuously defend their positions against consecutive waves, expending ammunition, exposing the locations of their defensive positions, and exhausting their personnel.
+
+If these attacks were executed by capable assault troops motivated by factors other than coercion and narcotics, they would be roughly equivalent to historical assault tactics such as the ‘short attacks’ of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army in the Korean War. The term ‘human wave attacks’ is certainly misleading for probes by successive small assault teams against enemy defences. However, the way that they are conducted is not conducive to successful assaults nor to the maintenance of momentum. Rather, the continuous conduct of this activity, across all axes, is a form of reconnaissance that allows the Russian forces to do two things. First, they find points of weakness in the Ukrainian defences where these troops make surprising amounts of progress or face very limited fire. These are then prioritised for deliberate assault. Alternatively, where the defence is strong, the revelation of Ukrainian firing positions allows specialised troops to begin targeting them.
+
+Russian specialised troops are deployed as irregular groupings of snipers, artillery spotters and support weapon operators. While Ukrainian forces are suppressing disposable infantry, additional disposable troops are often pushed forwards as working groups to dig fox holes and prepare firing positions closer to Ukrainian defences. These personnel are withdrawn and replaced by specialists who can establish observation and sniping posts or set up heavy weapons. They can then be used to direct accurate fire against Ukrainian firing posts from a range of up to 2 km and inflict attrition.
+
+Conversely, if a weaker point is identified and a deliberate assault is planned, the approach is to move additional disposable troops to dig forward positions for specialised infantry. Rather than seeking to simply attrit the defence, this becomes a base of fire. Furthermore, artillery fire shifts from harassment to barrage, enabling Russian assault infantry to attack – often favouring a flank. Assault infantry tend to advance in company strength with the support of armour and, among better Russian units, utilising a mixture of artillery systems. 152-mm howitzers fire until the assault is 400 m from the target position, after which fire is taken over by 122-mm howitzer or 120-mm mortar fire until the assault closes to its final assault positions. The final advance is covered by infantry mortars and then grenades are used before entering the target position. These troops tend to endeavour to turn the flank of a defensive position. On taking a position, they are often withdrawn and replaced by line infantry and additional disposable troops who set about fortifying the position so that it can be held as a base for further probing actions.
+
+It should be noted that, in the attack, Assault Detachments (‘Штурмовые отряды’) have long held a place in Soviet and Russian military doctrine, and the Russian military has produced updated manuals detailing how these should be structured and employed. In some ways the guidance provided is reflected in Russian offensive operations. The digging of forward positions in preparation for attacks, the use of artillery, the way that armoured vehicles are used separately for stand-off fire support, the use of specialist enabling teams, and the division of infantry platoons into three-to-five-man fire-teams, are all in evidence, although with great variation from the strict doctrinal task organisation provided. Furthermore, probably because to do so would be politically untenable, the doctrine makes no distinction between the specially trained assault infantry teams that form the backbone of assault detachments and their disposable counterparts. The divergence between doctrine and observed practice likely owes much to the inability of the AFRF to either train according to the doctrine or implement it effectively and consistently.
+
+In the defence, Russian forces largely occupy company fighting positions with platoon-sized elements that utilise minefields and obstacles to slow down and fix attackers before calling for heavy defensive artillery fire. If forced from their positions, they will utilise artillery fires to prevent either breakthroughs or consolidation by the attacker. Although Russian defensive operations have been criticised as being overly positional, they do hold ground combat units in reserve for mobile defence. Although their less capable units have consistently proven sluggish and reactive, on occasion they have launched rapid, aggressive counterattacks to retake lost positions in response to successful Ukrainian assaults.
+
+It is notable that Russian doctrine, with a heavy emphasis on direct and indirect fires, has long prescribed that formations should dig in as soon as possible when static. If no engineering support is available, they are to do so by hand, and are to continue to improve their positions for the duration that they occupy them. As a result, Russian positions often include an extensive range of well-prepared fighting positions. Once Russian troops have taken a position, it is reliably fortified within 12 hours through the digging of fox holes or blasting on less favourable ground. This is rapidly augmented in frontline positions with cut-down trees to create strongpoints for support weapons. Positions are reinforced with concrete where possible, although this is rarely the case in the first line. They also make limited use of decoy positions to obscure the layout of their actual defensive positions and fires plan, although the extent of this practice varies across units.
+
+Although Russian defence lines are significant and the units holding them post sentries, the Russians make very little use of observation or listening posts pushed forward of their main positions. Active reconnaissance, other than advancing to contact with disposable troops, is largely carried out by UAVs. Indeed, Russian troops appear to be reluctant to expose themselves through reconnaissance. Even when reconnaissance units work forward, it is usually to launch UAVs. It is typical for there to be between 25 and 50 UAVs from both sides operating over the contested area between the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and forward line of enemy troops (FLET) at any given time for each 10 km of frontage.
+
+Overall, this force structure is a cynical but coherent solution to the problem facing the Russian Ground Forces; they are able to mobilise large numbers of personnel but most units are poor quality and suffer from a chronic lack of training capacity that might otherwise rectify the problem. The segmented tasking within an unevenly trained force places correspondingly uneven burdens on its different components. The losses among disposable infantry are extremely high. Conversely, because specialised troops are largely held back and often fight from well-prepared positions, the Russians are able to preserve these soldiers thereby steadily increasing the skill of these operators. Meanwhile, assault troops are preserved from some of the worst of the fighting and receive better body armour and equipment. They are often only committed under the most favourable circumstances, meaning they can achieve their objectives and be rotated out with limited losses. On the other hand, when they are committed under less favourable circumstances, whether because of Ukrainian deception measures or miscalculation by their command, these forces are assigned the most dangerous task and are thus prone to mass casualty incidents. It is also worth noting that the competence of these units varies considerably and depends on the proportion of replacements in the force, the level of training received and their resulting unit cohesion. VDV and naval infantry units, for example, have seen significant qualitative decline over the course of the war owing to regeneration. By contrast, because Wagner assault units often comprise companies, they are either lost or succeed. Moreover, the higher pay attracts experienced personnel from contract infantry and leads to more capable specialist Wagner units.
+
+The critical and yet most elusive variable in assessing the strength of Russian military units is morale. Generally, it is low, with a rise in prosecutions for desertion, observed instances of wounded comrades being abandoned, and very little depth of junior leadership. Personnel are also rarely rotated and there is considerable weariness across the force. In theory, this should make Russian units brittle. In practice, they appear to be able to take very heavy punishment without collapsing. Instead, morale problems appear to manifest in poor cooperation within units and even less between them. The result is a tendency for coordination and cohesion to fracture under pressure. This is likely to make Russian units underperform in defence if they can be forced to move or engage in a dynamic action.
+
+
+### Engineers
+
+Perhaps one of the least discussed elements of the Russian forces during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been its engineers. In contrast to much of the Russian forces, its engineers have performed well. The aforementioned speed with which Russian infantry dig, and the scale at which they improve their fighting positions, is noteworthy and is supplemented by combat engineers. Two engineer companies are assigned to each brigade, one focused on mining and the other on force protection engineering.
+
+Russian force protection engineering has largely followed its doctrine, with little methodological change since the Cold War. Russian defensive positions generally comprise two to three lines, depending on the context. The first line, along the line of contact, comprises the fighting positions made by the infantry. The second constitutes properly made trenches – as compared with fox holes in the first – and concrete firing posts where possible. Several obstacle belts are laid in front of these positions, usually formed with a 4-m-deep and 6-m-wide anti-tank ditch, dragons’ teeth and wire track entanglements. The trench positions are usually structured as company fighting positions in wood blocks and on ridge lines, placed to cover areas of open ground with fire, rather than as contiguously occupied front lines. The depth of the defence line is usually 5 km from the first, and each belt of physical defences tends to span between 700 m and a kilometre, so that the entire obstacle series is covered by fire. The third line usually comprises fall-back fighting positions and concealed areas for reserves, with positions dug for vehicles. Command posts (CPs), meanwhile, tend to be subterranean and fortified with concrete. The overall depth of defensive fortifications exceeds 30 km on some axes.
+
+Minefields are another element of the Russian defence line. These rarely follow a discernible pattern and are seldom marked. Ukrainian forces note that the Russians have no shortage of mines, creating mixed fields containing both anti-tank (AT) and anti-personnel (AP) mines. Russia is not a signatory of the 1997 Ottawa Treaty, meaning its forces freely utilise victim-initiated AP mines. They tend to leave lanes for rearward movement between the forward, first and second defence lines. There is also a strong preference for mining the approaches to natural choke points. In some cases, an AP mine may be placed directly on top of the AT mine. Initiation mechanisms are also often mixed. It is common for AP mines, for example, to be initiated by a seismic sensor and to have an immediately adjacent mine initiated by wires, which are laid out in a cross from the device. The Russians have also made extensive use of magnetically activated AT mines delivered via multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). Although Russian forces have been successful in tracking the routes through their own minefields, they have performed less well in breaching mine belts laid by the AFU.
+
+Another area in which the Russians have demonstrated persistent competence is in the emplacement of bridges. These are largely held at the Combined Arms Army level and assigned to support operations. Engineering units usually emplace them rapidly and there is no evidence that the Russian Ground Forces lack for pontoon bridges, even if their river crossing operations have exhibited serious shortcomings overall. Russian forces are sufficiently confident that they can rapidly deploy bridging that they have at times destroyed bridges, even on routes that they intend to utilise, because they assess that the disruption to Ukrainian forces is greater than the burden of having to erect pontoons across the gap.
+
+
+### Artillery
+
+Artillery reamins at the heart of the Russian military. During the initial invasion, between one and two batteries of howitzers were assigned to each BTG along with an MLRS battery. By summer 2022, the Russians had consolidated artillery into artillery tactical groups. Russia is currently utilising artillery brigades, which allocate batteries in support of axes, and hold a significant force under direct command for counterbattery fire and to support the sector’s main effort. Russian fires continue to be the main shaping effect on the fighting. The rate of Russian fire during the first quarter of 2023 fluctuated between 12,000 and 38,000 rounds per day. The number of days in which Russian fires exceeded 24,000 rounds is now much scarcer, and it is notable that – in terms of the allocation of fires – Russian artillery ammunition and barrel allocations are assigned to fewer priority axes. There has also been a shift in the calibres being most widely utilised with a relative reduction in the volume of 152-mm fire and a significant increase in the volume of 120-mm mortar fire. Thus, whereas total ammunition expenditure in 2022 was approximately 12 million rounds, fluctuating between 20,000 and 60,000 rounds fired per day, Russian fires in 2023 are currently trending closer towards 7 million rounds if the current rate of fire is maintained for the remainder of the year. Ukrainian estimates place current Russian shell production at 2.5 million rounds per year. This is likely to increase, although access to explosive energetics constrains it. Due to the disparity in expenditure versus production, additional rounds are purchased from the international market. Nevertheless, with a projected consumption rate of 7 million rounds over the whole of 2023, Russia will have to be more discerning in where it prioritises its fire.
+
+Ammunition availability has shaped employment. The Russians had no difficulty in amassing ammunition around their guns in Donbas in summer 2022. After HIMARS strikes disrupted these supply practices, and the availability of accurate long-range Western howitzers in the AFU made this stockpiling difficult, the Russian approach to fire control was disrupted. What has followed has been a process of experimentation and refinement that is beginning to produce new tactics. The Russians have introduced two terms into their fires lexicon: ‘immediate value’; and ‘weight of salvo’. The first reflects the uneven effects of fire based on the tactical context and thus the need for precise timing of the delivery of fires in relation to the wider actions of a unit. Thus, fires planning is now framed as a series of decision points. The second – weight of salvo – is also reflective of a shift in emphasis to the timing of effects, desiring to land the greatest weight within a defined period to maximise effect. The patterns of fire are being described as ‘Nomadic Cannon’, ‘Fiery Carousel’, ‘Roaming Platoon’ and ‘Umbrella Cover’. The Nomadic Cannon reflects harassing fire, delivered from mobile firing points, often to draw counterbattery fire or conduct artillery raids. The Fiery Carousel reflects a means of maintaining survivability while sustaining barrage. The Roaming Platoon concept envisages manoeuvring guns maximising the weight of salvo deliverable against a target. Umbrella Cover is essentially a means of suppression. Gun positions are no longer dug. Instead, a battery will conceal itself in a woodblock and move to a firing position where ammunition will have been placed for a defined salvo. It will then move to the next. If fixed by counterbattery fire, operators tend to leave their guns and seek cover, only returning to them when it is safe to do so.
+
+Fire is not only used to strike Ukrainian defensive positions but also, vitally, to blunt assaults. If the Russians learn that an assault is being prepared, the area is often saturated with fire to prevent its execution. Another common tactic is for the Russians to withdraw from a position that is being assaulted and then saturate it with fire once Ukrainian troops attempt to occupy it. Ukrainian forces report that while the weight of artillery fire remains high, MLRS launches are significantly less than in previous months, suggesting munitions shortages. It appears that Russia has a steady supply of Krasnopol laser-guided 152-mm rounds as there is an observed increase in the number of Orlan-30 flights and the use of designators by specialised infantry to deliver more accurate strikes on Ukrainian defensive positions. Russian counterbattery fire has also shifted away from the saturation of detected Ukrainian positions to the firing of Lancet loitering munitions. Although these have a limited success rate, their speed and accuracy make it challenging to maintain sustained firing for Ukrainian guns to support manoeuvre. Lancets are also used for reconnaissance to actively hunt for Ukrainian artillery.
+
+More consequential than adaptations in firing sequences has been the refinement of the Russian Reconnaissance Fires Circuit (Russian term for the kill chain) to make it more responsive and more flexible in delivering fire to support manoeuvring forces. Each commander of an axis will generally retain an orbit of Orlan-10s above the fighting to provide both information to the CP and targets for responsive and accurate fire to the assigned batteries. The artillery brigade commander also often retains several Orlan-10s, coordinated in a complex above areas of interest. Thus, Ukrainian forces often find that they are being observed from two different Orlan-10 complexes – each able to call down different effects. The time for artillery engagements from these systems remains rapid at around 3–5 minutes. Engagement from electronic warfare (EW) detection is longer at around 20–30 minutes.
+
+One underappreciated aspect of Russian fires reconnaissance early in the conflict was the Strelets system. It allows multiple feeds from ground-based sensors or detections by reconnaissance troops to be programmed and transmitted through a wide range of bearers, which are then integrated into Russian digital fire control. Few Russian units were found to have Strelets during the initial invasion, and even among those that had it, it was often not set up properly or left in baggage. Although the low quality of training among Russian troops means that it is still not prevalent, it is widely used among specialist infantry assigned to VDV and Wagner formations. These personnel use Strelets to either place sensors close to Ukrainian positions or report and correct for fire for Russian artillery to enable accurate engagements. The combination of calls for fires enabled by Strelets, combined with the Reconnaissance Fire Complexes (RFCs) of higher echelons fires using organic ISR is outlined in Figure 1. The figure shows three interlocking kill chains or ‘reconnaissance fires circuits’ from a direct link between reconnaissance and fires assets, to a link between reconnaissance assets through a fire control to a battery, and the ability of a higher headquarters to assign alternate ‘means of destruction’ against a detected target.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Model of the Reconnaissance and Fire Circuit Formed During Hostilities in Ukraine.__ Source: Overview of developments in Russian artillery doctrine, shared by the Ukrainian General Staff, May 2023._
+
+The actions of Russian assault groups against the village of Artemivske in December 2022 provides a useful illustration of the application of the RFC as it has developed in Ukraine. Several UAVs were used to fly above the assault groups in the city: one conducted reconnaissance outside the city against the positions of the Ukrainian artillery; another maintained observation over possible routes for transferring reserves; a third preceded the assault group to identify Ukrainian ambushes and firing positions; and a fourth flew above the assault group itself, giving the assault group commander real time observation of the tactical situation. If any of the UAVs identified a target, the UAV operator would pass the coordinates to the assault group commander. If the target was to be engaged with artillery this would be either ordered by the assault group commander and carried out by the artillery attached to the group, or transferred to the higher command, operating its own UAVs over the area, which could take over the fire mission with its assets. In this instance, the engagements were managed by the Strelets system. The applied architecture for this bypassing of centralised fire control for the delivery of effects through a tiered RFC is outlined in Figure 2. In the figure, information flows from the UAV both to the CP, but also to a fire observer directly to the barrels via the Strelets system, indicated by the black line. Thus the commander is on, but does not need to be in the loop for the engagement to proceed.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: Approximate Scheme of the Management of a Mortar Platoon of the AFRF in the Absence of the Platoon’s Command and Observation Post.__ Source: Overview of developments in Russian artillery doctrine, shared by the Ukrainian General Staff, May 2023._
+
+
+### Armour
+
+The Russian use of armour has evolved significantly during the conflict. The BTG concept included the use of armour in company groups to punch into operational depth. After taking massive losses, the Russians shifted to using armour for attempts at breakthrough when conditions were propitious. Now, tanks are very rarely used in this way, with the destruction of a Russian naval infantry brigade in Vuhledar attempting such an armoured thrust, reinforcing Russia’s caution in using such tactics under current conditions.
+
+Instead, tanks tend to operate in three ways. First, they are used to supplement artillery capabilities through indirect engagements. This is particularly notable in sectors off the Russian main effort where there is not a sufficient allocation of air defences to protect a robust logistics architecture capable of supporting a large numbers of guns. Because of the low angle of indirect fire engagements by tanks, they make for an inefficient form of artillery. Nevertheless, these engagements can often be made from positions that would not be viable for artillery because of the tanks greater protection and thus reduced vulnerability to counterbattery fire, enabling tanks to fill in the gap in firing while guns displace or become suppressed.
+
+Second, tanks are used as highly accurate fire support assets able to stand off at 2 km and utilise their enhanced optics to identify and knock out firing positions. It is important to note that while the introduction of older tanks such as the T62 and T55 to the field has been mocked online, these vehicles are largely being used in the role of the fire support function offered by BMPs and other infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). They represent an increase in range, protection and kinetic effect over these IFVs, and therefore pose a serious battlefield threat when there are a limited number of anti-tank guided weapons able to reach them at their stand-off range.
+
+A third use of armour is in raiding. Because of the continual pressure that Russian infantry place Ukrainian positions under, this requires regular troop rotations. Striking troops during these rotations significantly increases the likelihood of inflicting casualties, so the Russians often conduct gun raids with tanks when they detect troop rotations. These are often carried out at night, specifically utilising T80BV with its better thermal optics. The aim is to rapidly approach the target sector, fire as many rounds as possible within a short space of time and withdraw.
+
+One important development is that the Russians have made several modifications to their tanks that are reducing the effectiveness of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). First, they are fitting vehicles – as well as many defensive positions – with anti-thermal material, which is proving highly effective. Second, modification to the engine deck and thus the heat plume from the vehicle’s exhaust and engine is reducing the reliability of where certain ATGMs engage the target. Third, by fighting at dusk and dawn when the vehicle temperature is most similar to the ambient temperature of the surroundings (known as ‘thermal crossover’), the vehicles are harder to detect through thermal imagery. The result is a significant decrease in the probability of kill from several ATGM types, although this is only achievable by imposing a range of tactical constraints on the employment of Russian armour.
+
+Exceptions to the patterns outlined above can be found in urban fighting where distances often collapse. Although Russian forces have proven very cautious in using armour in Bakhmut, they have pushed armour in a supporting fire role for infantry in other urban battles. Here, tanks have proven critical for both suppression of urban structures and rapid breaching of buildings to avoid entering through choke points and known avenues of advance. The use of older tanks as assault guns in this role appears to be preferred as the urban environment does not give more modern Russian tanks with advanced optics and multispectral concealment a sufficient tactical advantage to justify their loss. Of course, as tanks are drawn into urban areas for this purpose, they also risk coming into direct contact with enemy armour, with armoured clashes sometimes taking place from distances as close as 50 m.
+
+Tank-on-tank engagements have become relatively rare, but when they occur they usually take place within 1,000 m. Engagement speed has been the determining factor in these clashes. Ukrainian tankers note that one-shot kills are possible if the point between the turret and glacis is hit. Russian explosive reactive armour (ERA), however, has proven highly effective, preventing most anti-tank systems from defeating the tank’s armour. Some operators have reported hitting tanks multiple times with barrel-launched ATGMs without knocking them out. Significantly, Ukrainian tankers report that mobility kills against the vehicle’s tracks are also an effective means of removing Russian armour from the field because they usually cause the crew to abandon the vehicle. This is because a tank’s mobility is considered the best means of protection against artillery and its survivability is compromised if it is immobilised. On several occasions, this tendency for stricken armour to be abandoned has led to extended skirmishing by both sides to try and recover damaged vehicles. On balance, Russian fires superiority tends to prevent Ukrainian troops from successfully lifting enemy armour under these conditions, meaning the vehicles are usually denied with artillery to prevent their recovery and repair.
+
+
+### Electronic Warfare
+
+Electronic warfare remains a critical component of the Russian way of fighting. While there was an extremely high density of EW systems in Donbas in 2022, the AFRF now employ approximately one major EW system per 10 km of frontage, usually situated approximately 7 km from the frontline, with more specialised EW capabilities sat at higher echelon. These platforms are usually aimed at controlling and defeating UAVs. Interestingly, there is minimal interest among Russian crews in synchronising these effects with other activities or with deconflicting their effects. Instead, for the period when an EW team is deployed, it is weapons free with its system and tends to aggressively attack Ukrainian systems. The Shipovnik-Aero is proving a particularly effective system because it has a low signature and can further obfuscate this by imitating other emitters and communications devices. It also has a sophisticated range of effects for downing UAVs. The Russian military is also continuing to make extensive use of navigational interference in the battle area as a form of electronic protection. This is contributing to a Ukrainian loss rate in UAVs of approximately 10,000 per month.
+
+Another function of Russian EW troops is interception and decryption of Ukrainian military communications. The Russian military is proving highly capable in this area. Ukrainian officers recalled one incident in which the Russian headquarters gave pre-emptive warning to its units of an artillery strike based on Ukrainian troops calling in a fire mission. The Ukrainian troops were communicating with Motorola radios with 256-bit encryption, but it appeared that the Russians were able to capture and decrypt these transmissions in near real time. The most likely system for such functions is the Torn-MDM. When the Russians are not intercepting traffic, Ukrainian units note that they are reliably able to suppress the receivers on Motorola radios out to approximately 10 km beyond the FLET.
+
+Alongside large systems such as the Shipovnik-Aero, the Russian military has been extensively rolling out EW effectors to be organic to units at all echelons. This includes counter-UAS capabilities assigned to each platoon, which usually include directional jammers and arrays for hijacking UAVs. Ukrainian forces now assess that at least one of these systems is available to each platoon within Russian line infantry units. Another EW function in the counter-UAS fight is deception measures that generate a large number of fake UAVs on enemy systems and replicate ground control stations. While the Russian military is yet to widely exploit the creation of a large number of false targets, it has the capability to do so – and these actions are growing more prevalent.
+
+
+### Air Defence
+
+The performance of Russian air defence systems has steadily improved. Early setbacks due to poor coordination and planning saw Ukraine successfully strike Russian formations during the initial week of the war. The Russians rapidly established a more robust coverage over their tactical formations, which quickly denied airspace to the Ukrainian Air Force. Nevertheless, this was premised on a large number of dispersed air defence systems, and these proved vulnerable to complex attacks involving anti-radiation missiles and EW effects. The Russians also found that dispersed air defence systems were incapable of intercepting a range of threats, including guided multiple launch rocket systems (GMLRS) used to devastate Russian command and control and logistics in July 2022.
+
+Russian air defences have become significantly more robust since the autumn of 2022. Complexes of SA-21 and SA-23 are now stationed around key logistical and C2 hubs. Critically, they appear to have SA-15 and SA-22 connected to their fire control radars, significantly improving the situational awareness and track data quality of these short-range air defence (SHORAD) systems. This has had two principal effects. First, the long-range radar, combined with systems such as the 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude radar, have proven highly effective in denying airspace to Ukrainian aviation. Second, Russian SHORAD systems have massively improved their point defence efficiency. Along with the successful interception of most high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs) fired by Ukrainian aircraft, the Russian air defence network is now assessed to be achieving a significant number of intercepts against GMLRS munitions. The exact intercept rate depends on the depth of the target and the number of GMLRS fired, so that a precise proportion of intercepts cannot be meaningfully given. Russian air defences are clearly much more effective in defence when they can be properly connected, than in a dynamic context where they are having to cover advancing forces. This allows Russian crews to achieve optimal efficiency against the current range of threats. It is noteworthy however that Russian crews have always lagged in reacting appropriately to new threats, and struggle to maintain effective blue force tracking, leading to several blue-on-blue engagements.
+
+The efficiency of Russian long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) against the Ukrainian Air Force has also remained significant. The longest-known shoot-down against Ukrainian aircraft was at 150 km when the aircraft was flying lower than 50 feet. This appears to have been cued by a 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude radar with the air defence missile achieving a post-apex lock on the target. The strength of the air defence network is bolstered by persistent combat air patrols at medium altitude by Russian Su-35Ss. Using R-37 missiles, these aircraft pose a significant threat at very long range. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, the longest-range recorded kill by a Russian R-37 was at 177 km. Although separate from the air defence system, the combination of threat from long-range ground-based anti-air capabilities, medium-altitude look-down radar, long-range air-to-air missiles, and effective point defence systems makes the air combat environment extremely lethal. For this reason, most Ukrainian fast air and attack aviation engagements utilise S-7 rockets, fired in a lofted profile from above Ukrainian positions.
+
+
+### Aviation
+
+Despite the greater density and integration of Russian air defences, the VKS continues to be reluctant to push into Ukrainian airspace. Russian aviation has largely continued to conduct stand-off attacks. First, aviation-launched cruise missiles now constitute the majority of stand-off effects used for the protracted targeting of Ukrainian sites. The Tu-95 fleet remains the backbone of this capability. It is noteworthy that a large number of aircraft are assigned to these strikes, with a relatively small proportion of aircraft firing the munitions. Here, the VKS has adapted in response to the limited number of strikes possible per month leading to Ukrainian defences gaining significant warning time of strikes through the take-off of these aircraft. Given that Russian industry can deliver approximately 40 long-range missiles of varying types per month, the VKS launches large numbers of aircraft to increase the number of potential axes of threat, using Shahed-136 UAVs as pathfinders to identify gaps in Ukrainian air defence and then firing from a small number of aircraft to maximise the proportion of missiles that reach their target.
+
+Stand-off effects are also the principal means of the VKS conducting strikes in tactical depth, largely employing FAB-500 bombs with glide kits launched from Su-35Ss; with a potential range of up to 70 km, these munitions have relatively poor accuracy. The AFU notes that the VKS holds substantial stockpiles of FAB-500s and is systematically preparing glide kits for them, potentially providing a large number of available heavy bombs. For now, Russian use of these munitions has been small, although strikes have been persistent. It is anticipated, however, that these strikes are providing data for the refinement of the glide kits and, more importantly, for the calculation tables used to determine when they are released, which may see an improvement in accuracy over time. If employed with greater concentration, it is also anticipated that this capability will begin to be employed against battlefield targets.
+
+The other stand-off strike method is lofting S-8 unguided rockets from both fast air and aviation assets on a long arcing trajectory at distant targets. The technique, first seen soon after the invasion, has been the subject of significant curiosity due to its inefficiency and inaccuracy.
+
+However, when conducted at ranges of approximately 12 km at area targets such as Ukrainian ground formations attempting to form up for attacks, the concentration of effect has proved sufficient to break up these formations and prevent attacks from taking place. Interestingly, these lofting strikes appear to be the primary use of Russian attack aviation on the current battlefield. Although the technique is used across the front, its most pronounced effects are in areas where the Russians have a dearth of ground-based fires, as the responsiveness of this method of attack can increase the threat to Ukrainian troops with very little notice. The second use of Russian aviation is the application of EW effects. There are believed to be eight Russian Mi-17s with EW suites operating in southern Ukraine. These are being utilised to some effect for the purposes of electronic attack against Ukrainian command and control, and through their altitude are able to do so in greater depth than is achievable by comparable systems based on the ground.
+
+The VKS remains something of an enigma in the conflict. On the one hand, it retains significant firepower and a large fleet of available aircraft with munitions. On the other hand, its presence is limited. The challenge for Ukraine is that Russian fast air, and particularly its large extant attack aviation fleet, could inflict massive damage if committed in numbers, even if this would be costly. So long as this represents a latent threat, it must have a shaping effect on Ukrainian offensive operations, as advancing Ukrainian forces are likely to face similar challenges to the Russians in advancing their air defence coverage.
+
+The prize to be fought for in this regard is the ability to operate at medium altitude beyond the engagement ceiling of shoulder-fired man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS). Whichever side can operate sustainably in this altitude band can more easily identify targets and bomb with much greater range and accuracy. At present, the VKS is deterred by the SAM threat from adopting such a profile over the Ukrainian frontlines. However, probably the single greatest extant threat that could change the tactical dynamics on the ground is if the VKS gains the freedom to operate at medium altitude over Ukrainian positions.
+
+
+### Command and Control
+
+GMLRS strikes by Ukrainian forces in July 2022 pushed Russian headquarters back to beyond 120 km from the FLOT. In autumn 2022, this distance imposed significant tactical challenges on Russian forces. However, these challenges had largely been overcome by winter. Russian headquarters are now more dispersed and are connected to forward CPs by wiring. This has often been achieved by commandeering the Ukrainian telecommunications network on the occupied territories, which is dense and robust. The Russian military then connect its CPs to the closest point in the civilian network via extended ground-laid telecommunications cables. Brigade CPs remain pushed back from the front line, usually to a distance of 20 km, but are often well protected, being situated underground in reinforced structures.
+
+The dispersion of orders from CPs to key assets such as air defence, EW and other systems has been observed to depend on microlinks in the first instance, often using relay vehicles to increase the range at which combat management can be carried out. Microlink use has significantly decreased the detectability of these systems. It is noted that brigade to battalion CPs are often either connected via microlink relays or field cable, which are usually laid within 24 hours of a CP being established.
+
+In contrast to the low detectability of these command links, Russian communications from the battalion CP downwards are not just dependent on radios but often on analogue military systems and tend to be communicated in clear rather than encrypted. This is presumed to be the result of the limited training provided to many components of the force. Moreover, while some units have developed forms of veiled speech, most do not adhere to these practices. The exception to this is among reconnaissance units and artillery observers able to utilise systems such as Strelets and Azart.
+
+As regards cooperation between units, Russian forces continue to struggle to be horizontally integrated in their C2. The layering of fires, for example, between combined arms army assets, brigade artillery and battalion mortars, demonstrates reasonable fires integration between echelons. However, there is limited application of cross-boundary fires between sectors. Nor is there much evidence that units have the means to communicate laterally. Instead, information is passed upwards, then across at the brigade level or higher, and then downwards. This is a major limitation in Russian defensive operations as it creates seams that must be covered by higher echelons with organic assets. Integration of VKS capabilities also remains tied to the Combined Arms Army CP.
+
+
+### Priority Assistance for the Armed Forces of Ukraine
+
+As Ukraine prepares for offensive operations, it is important to consider the tactical challenges that the AFU will face. How Ukraine plans to overcome these challenges is operationally sensitive and will not be detailed in this report. Nevertheless, some priorities for those supporting Ukrainian forces can be identified through the analysis of Russian capabilities outlined above, and by some of those issues facing the AFU which are already clearly identifiable in open sources. Russian infantry, when properly supported, can make Ukrainian offensive operations challenging. Specifically, the volume of Russian fires, their protection by air defences, the extent of Russian force protection engineering, and the ability to disrupt mobile command and control all represent tactical challenges.
+
+While Russia’s defensive operations are positional, a cardinal sin among adherents of manoeuvre warfare, defeating the layers of prepared defences still presents a problem. These defences are not absolutely positional, with Russian forces utilising some mobile reserves at the tactical level. The depth of the defences means that Ukraine must generate serious combat power to penetrate the Russian lines, and the extent of Russian defensive fortifications across the front makes bypassing them nearly impossible. Even if Ukrainian forces achieve a breakthrough in future, and regain their ability to manoeuvre, this will require localised breakthroughs and mopping up operations against bypassed defensive positions. This means that, although there are a variety of likely tasks for Ukrainian ground units and they will need to be able to manoeuvre, training for assault operations against fortified positions constitutes a critical training priority for Ukrainian troops.
+
+The first obstacle for Ukrainian forces is winning the indirect fires duel. In the face of enemy artillery dominance, offensive manoeuvre is extremely costly. Ukraine’s international partners have provided a large number of artillery systems and the country is receiving a consistent supply of ammunition, although the natures provided do not always reflect the balance of calibres available to the AFU. However, the real issue is that the priority for provisioning Ukrainian artillery for defence has left its fires system lopsided in its capabilities. Ukrainian artillery has ample means to blunt Russian advances, with an effective fire control architecture and the ability to coordinate engagements from multiple dispersed guns. However, suppression of a superior number of Russian artillery systems requires counterbattery capabilities to rapidly detect and engage enemy firing positions. It is evident that if Ukrainian forces are to set the conditions in any sector for offensive action, its international partners should prioritise the provision of detection systems for directing counterbattery fire.
+
+Winning the firefight in direct engagements is also critical, as suppressing enemy positions during assault actions is essential. As regards heavy weapons, a significant emphasis has been placed on . calibre heavy machine guns equipping Ukrainian units. While these are highly effective, their fire has a very flat trajectory. They would be complemented well by automatic grenade launchers such as the Mk. 19 Grenade Machine Gun (GMG), which would pose a greater threat to enemy troops in trenches or dug into open positions, given the arcing trajectory of rounds. Assisting Ukrainian forces with winning the direct firefight is also worthwhile because, unlike some other capabilities, it can be improved in a standalone fashion, the training and weapons systems in question not requiring other dependencies to be in place before adding value.
+
+Mine clearing and breaching is another area where Ukraine’s partners must prioritise support. The key requirement is likely minefield reconnaissance. The utilisation of machine learning tools with UAV reconnaissance could be a means of identifying fields. Nevertheless, reconnaissance in this function is also likely to require human scouting and marking, which is a difficult skill and should be taught so Ukrainian reconnaissance troops can do this at night. It is also important to note that while offensive obstacle breaching at tempo is something that Western militaries have under-resourced, counter-IED equipment and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) developed during the war on terror do have applicability. The challenge is adapting these to work under an indirect fire threat that was not significant when these tactics were first employed.
+
+Much of the emphasis for international support has understandably been on equipment. Tactics, however, will be decisive in determining whether Ukrainian infantry are able to succeed on the battlefield, particularly the challenge of taking entrenched and fortified positions protected by minefields and supporting fires. While there are several critical skill sets that can be identified, there are a variety of common battle drills that are the bread and butter of well-trained ground combat and combat support units.
+
+Unfortunately, Ukraine faces multiple pressures which serve as major impediments to honing the skills, tactical coordination and group cohesion of its units. It is required to deploy its best units on ongoing operations along an extended front line in eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, Ukraine’s training establishments are having to process an influx of new recruits with limited prior military training. These recruits must both replace the casualties from existing units and facilitate the expansion of the AFU. This is no easy feat and comes after the training establishments were severely disrupted early in the war, including in some cases being physically overrun by Russian Ground Forces, or having the instructors and students mobilised at the beginning of the war as an emergency measure.
+
+The scale of training assistance required should therefore not be underestimated, for it is substantial and complex. Collective training for units must be prioritised, with a particular focus on fire control for direct and indirect fire support units to maximise suppression without wasting ammunition, effective tactical command and control of, and between, fire support, engineering and assault units to ensure effective suppression during breaching and assaults without fratricide, and the conduct of assaults themselves. The relevant battle drills are not particularly complex conceptually, but they must be understood well enough by all involved for there to either be no requirement to submit a planning process beforehand, or for that planning and delivery of orders to be quick and concise so as to minimise vulnerable pauses in operational activity. They require thorough practice under realistic conditions to build sufficient coordination to be effective, and for there to be the speed and momentum to prevent the enemy from responding effectively.
+
+The need to build effective assault units with common tactics also speaks to a wider requirement for company-level collective training to ensure consistent TTPs and develop unit cohesion. Here, developing leaders who are able to coordinate multiple elements as part of platoon-, company- and battalion-strength tactical engagements at pace will be vital. The emphasis on individual soldiering skills in UK training provided to Ukrainian recruits, while an important foundation, underplays the vital importance of building formed units if offensive actions are to succeed. If this means slowing down the number of trainees passing through the UK programme by adding an additional couple of weeks of collective training, then the trade-off would be worthwhile.
+
+If Ukrainian units break through the defences, it is vital that they can exploit the gap they have created. If their offensive operations lack momentum, this will lead to a series of sequential assaults against prepared Russian defences – a slow and disproportionately costly way to take ground. Conversely, they will maximise the return on the costs of each assault if they are able to breach and exploit forwards, thereafter, keeping Russian forces on the back foot. To do this, they must maintain tempo and remain protected as they move forwards. This leads to two requirements. For the maintenance of tempo, the availability and serviceability of equipment is vital. While this can be done in defence by recovering vehicles and having trained mechanics work on them, the maintenance of equipment provided by international partners during offensive operations will largely depend on the proficiency of crews in keeping them fighting. For this reason, it is critical that there is an available stockpile of spare parts for all donated equipment, that user manuals have been translated into Ukrainian and distributed to the appropriate units, and that crews have time to properly familiarise themselves with equipment that follows a very different maintenance methodology from platforms on which they have previously operated.
+
+A second critical requirement for maintaining momentum is the protection of forces that have broken through from counterattacks by those Russian forces held in reserve. Reserve manoeuvre elements can be fixed with artillery so long as they can be located. Defensive enemy artillery fire must be obviated by maintaining momentum and therefore denying the enemy real-time location data on targets. This means disrupting their means of holding units under observation. Meanwhile, protecting units from aviation is critical to prevent a responsive set of strikes to blunt a breakthrough. For the defeat of enemy artillery, some deployable EW capabilities may be useful, but whether for UAVs or aviation, tactical air defence is by far the greatest priority. The ability to have air defence move with and shield manoeuvre elements is a vital area that requires potentially novel support from Ukraine’s partners.
+
+Finally, the disruption of enemy counterattacks or strikes from artillery and aviation would be greatly assisted by the destruction of enemy command and control infrastructure. For this, suppression of the air defences protecting these targets will be important. Assistance in both stand-off electronic attack and the use of tools such as UAVs to threaten and displace air defences or else saturate them with false positives or non-economical targets could all greatly assist in creating confusion, overwhelming enemy decision-making and reducing the level of protection to maximise the impact of Ukrainian GMLRS strikes.
+
+
+### Conclusions
+
+The tendency in much of the international discourse surrounding the Russian military has been to write it off as tactically inept, technically deficient and morally broken. These criticisms have more than a grain of truth to them. Nevertheless, they tend to extrapolate from the performance of certain Russian units to the whole force. Alongside their deficiencies, Russian forces have demonstrated that much of their equipment is effective, highly lethal and adaptable to a range of threats. While there are serious deficiencies in Russian capabilities, these are most pronounced in conducting offensive operations. Conversely, many of Russia’s combat support arms have not only demonstrated reasonable proficiency but have also shown that they are able to adapt to emerging threats.
+
+Although Russian forces have started to resolve a range of tactical challenges besetting their forces, it is noteworthy that many of these adaptations are reactive. The role specialisation of infantry has been driven by an inability to train enough troops, not by proactive force design. The acceleration and simplification of fire control has been driven by failing to deliver effective responsive fires early in the war. It thus remains unclear the extent to which these adaptations will become permanent aspects of the Russian military. It is also evident that as an institution the Russian military continues to fail to anticipate new threats. Air defence units, for example, show a growing proficiency against threats over time, but the introduction of any new strike system or tactics on the Ukrainian side usually causes a period of disruption and friendly fire. Most of all it is evident that the Russian military is systematically struggling to coordinate different functions; this can be exploited. The callousness of Russian approaches towards its own personnel continues to ensure that they underperform versus their potential, usually because of poor unit cohesion.
+
+The critical capability underpinning the Russian military remains its fires. Here, it is less clear that its approach is sustainable, or that the pace of adaptation is sufficiently fast. Ultimately Russia has used its massive stockpile of ammunition in a highly inefficient manner and is exceeding its manufacturing rate as regards both shells and barrels. Firepower has been employed by the Russian military as a crutch to compensate for its tactical shortcomings in other areas. If the weight of salvo the Russian military can generate diminishes then it is not at all clear that Russia’s infantry can effectively hold ground. Perhaps the greatest danger for Ukraine, therefore, as regards the longer term trajectory of Russian forces, is if another country provides tooling and workers to establish additional production capacity in Russia for munitions and barrels.
+
+Ukrainian troops, while superior in their morale and often in their training, continue to face a range of hard military tactical challenges in reclaiming their country’s territory. Overcoming these challenges requires sustained and appropriately targeted support from their international partners that reflects the evolution of the tactical situation. Overcoming Russian forces will also increasingly depend upon the tactical proficiency of Ukrainian training, force generation, and equipment maintenance, rather than on the introduction of additional systems. The complexity of Russian fortifications requires Ukraine to undertake a multifaceted process of shaping, breaching and exploitation demanding the preparation of its units and a range of complex capabilities. It is vital that Ukraine’s partners prioritise establishing a sustainable process for individual, collective and staff training to the AFU. Ukraine, today, has the initiative. But as the Russian military adapts, there can be no room for complacency.
+
+---
+
+__Jack Watling__ is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute. Jack works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation, assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts.
+
+__Nick Reynolds__ is the Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. His research interests include land power, wargaming and simulation. Prior to joining RUSI he worked for Constellis.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-25-stalking-the-seabed.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-25-stalking-the-seabed.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Stalking The Seabed
+author: Sidharth Kaushal
+date : 2023-05-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/zWCHjoG.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "How Russia Targets Critical Undersea Infrastructure"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_With attention increasingly focusing on Russian activity against Western critical infrastructure at sea, what is the nature of the threat and how can it be countered?_
+
+
+
+The recent disclosure of Russian naval activity in the vicinity of key maritime infrastructure in the North Sea including cables, windfarms and pipelines should not necessarily come as a surprise. Russia has spent a considerable amount of effort investing in capabilities that would allow it to pose a threat to European critical infrastructure, and has viewed this as an imperative since the Soviet era. An emphasis on demonstrating the ability to target economically vital assets can be found in Russian thinking on escalation management, which presumes – correctly or otherwise – that the ability to inflict economic harm represents a means of containing local conflicts on Russia’s periphery by deterring external intervention. In a conflict with NATO, damage to infrastructure at sea along with the targeting of infrastructure ashore would be a key part of Russia’s overall war effort, aimed at gradually eroding popular support in the West. This article will examine some of the tools at Russia’s disposal for the prosecution of a campaign against European infrastructure at sea, the organisational structures that manage them, and the ways in which the threats they pose can be mitigated.
+
+
+### Russian Seabed Warfare: An Intelligence Function, not a Naval One
+
+The task of maritime special operations is spread across different organisations within the Russian system, including the Russian Navy and the Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research (GUGI). These organisations field somewhat different capabilities and likely own different aspects of the function of maritime sabotage. Notably, however, although the Russian Navy plays a key operational role, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the GRU – Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency – appear to control activity in organisational terms, both through the GUGI and the Russian Naval Staff’s Intelligence Directorate.
+
+The GUGI represents a particularly interesting and specialised body. Founded within the navy in 1965 and given its present organisational status in 1975, the organisation exists independent of naval command and has the status of a directorate within the Russian MoD. While independent of the navy, it draws personnel from the 29th Separate Submarine division, a formation based at Olenya Guba which exists to operate platforms for the GUGI. The body operates a number of specialised submarines including the Paltus, X-Ray, Kashalot and Losharik (which is currently undergoing repairs). These submarines share the characteristic of being titanium-hulled, enabling them to sustain the pressure of operating at extreme depths. In the case of the Losharik, the submarine also has a unique internal arrangement, with its hull comprised of seven joined spherical chambers which distribute pressure, enabling it to operate at depths of up to 2,500 metres. The submarines have typically been equipped with manipulator arms, and in the case of the X-Ray, a diver lock-out. Though nuclear-powered, these submarines are relatively small, making the sustainment of crews for extended periods difficult – something experienced by the US Navy with analogous vessels such as the NR-1. As such, they need to be supported by motherships on longer voyages. For this role, the Soviets and then the Russians have typically used stretched versions of retired nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) such as the Yankee class and nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) such as the Oscar class. The GUGI’s two current motherships, the Belgorod and the BS-64 Podmoskovye, are respectively a stretched Oscar-class SSGN and a Delta-class SSBN.
+
+In addition, the GUGI operates surface vessels that nominally act as research vessels to gather intelligence. These include the Yantar, which received attention for activity around sensitive cables near the UK in 2019. The vessel is equipped with a variety of sensors and appears capable of acting as a host vessel for the Pr18610 – a three-man deep-diving submersible capable of operating at depths of 20,000 feet. In addition, the vessel likely hosts a range of remotely operated and autonomous underwater vehicles.
+
+While understandable attention has been paid to the GUGI’s likely role in damaging critical infrastructure in the event of an escalating conflict, it is important not to assume that this is its only function. The organisation is tasked with the emplacement of sensors associated with Russia’s Harmony network, surveillance of foreign assets in Russian waters, and the removal of foreign surveillance assets, including taps on wires. In addition, the Belgorod will apparently host a part of the Russian nuclear arsenal in the form of the Poseidon nuclear torpedo.
+
+___`In a conflict with NATO, damage to infrastructure at sea would be a key part of Russia’s overall war effort, aimed at gradually eroding popular support in the West`___
+
+The time that naval personnel spend within the GUGI sees them paid considerable salaries without breaking the relationship between rank and pay, by treating their effective salaries as a deployment bonus related to the time they spend at extreme depths. As a result, in 2012, GUGI personnel were earning 600,000 roubles a month (around $20,000 at the time). The reason for this level of compensation is that the organisation is an extremely specialised one. During the Soviet era, in order to qualify, an individual had to be an officer and have served for five years within the submarine service, and would then have to go through a gruelling course based on the training of Soviet cosmonauts. The list of individuals killed in the 2019 fire which broke out on the GUGI deep-diving submarine Losharik – all officers – suggests the force remains a highly specialised one.
+
+The GUGI does not own the entirety of the task of maritime sabotage, however. A key role is also played by the Intelligence Directorate of the Main Staff of the Russian Navy. Since 1977, the director of Russian Naval Intelligence has also typically been the deputy director of the GRU, and the Intelligence Directorate was made subordinate to the fifth directorate of the GRU, which reflected the subordination of naval intelligence to the latter – a process which accelerated under the tenure of Admiral Vladimir Chernavin.
+
+Notably, the Russian vessel most recently spotted near European infrastructure – the Akademik Vladimirsky – belongs to the Russian Navy and not to the GUGI. Though the precise suite of sensors on board the ship are unknown, in a 2012 research expedition to the South Pole it deployed a proton magnetometer, which could also be used to discover metallic objects on the seabed such as pipelines. During the Cold War, the Soviet Navy also maintained a number of auxiliary surveillance vessels based on common trawlers, which were tasked with a range of intelligence gathering functions, and regional fleets controlled Spetsnaz units with an explicit sabotage role. Moreover, the Navy was charged with managing relations with Soviet fishing fleets, which could be co-opted into both intelligence gathering and sabotage functions. The recently revealed use of civilian vessels to survey wind farms in the North Sea suggests that this practice has been continued and is likely a task of the Navy rather than the GUGI. The Spetsnaz units controlled by regional fleets can be inserted into theatre using a range of mechanisms such as swimmer delivery vehicles, and can be used for both surveillance and covert operations against military and civilian targets. The Northern Fleet’s Spetsnaz have trained for operations against SOSUS, and those of the Baltic Fleet have allegedly been involved in covert sabotage. Like all Spetsnaz, these units are under the ultimate control of the GRU.
+
+The bifurcation of responsibilities between naval intelligence, which answers to the GRU, and the GUGI – which apparently sits as a directorate within the Russian MoD – would seem to create an artificial divide between assets performing similar functions. There is nothing entirely unusual about an intelligence agency controlling assets that are especially sensitive; the CIA, for example, directly controlled the U-2 spy plane and directed many of the operations of spy submarines like the NR-1. However, leaving some assets with the Russian Navy (albeit under ultimate control of the GRU) while conferring others on the GUGI is an interesting organisational choice.
+
+One possibility is that sensitivity is the primary consideration, although given the likely involvement of the GRU in highly sensitive unconventional operations including both sabotage and assassinations, this seems unlikely to be the case. Another possibility is that because the fifth directorate is responsible for operational intelligence, its responsibilities include more strictly military tasks such as trailing Western naval assets, whereas the GUGI retains control over those assets needed for activities that are more strategic. A final reason why these assets were removed from the navy’s control may have been the reassertion of control by the Russian General Staff over the Soviet Navy under the tenure of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov and then-Soviet Defence Minister Dmitri Ustinov.
+
+___`Navies will likely need to have the organisational structures to coordinate with a broader range of actors in order to meet the challenge of maritime sabotage`___
+
+In any case, the GUGI appears capable of organising its assets along with naval capabilities on a task-specific basis. For example, one investigation of the Nord Stream blasts alleged that elements of both Unit 45707 and the 313th Special-Purpose Detachment for Combating Underwater Sabotage of the Baltic Fleet were involved. As such, it would appear that the GUGI can draw on assets from the wider fleet as needed.
+
+
+### Challenges to Critical National Infrastructure
+
+The different components of Russia’s overall maritime sabotage capability pose different challenges to the critical infrastructure of European countries, which encompasses undersea cables, gas pipelines and windfarms, among other things.
+
+Deep-diving submarines can sever cables at depths which make repairs extremely difficult. They can also tap sensitive undersea cables. However, these capabilities are limited in number and operated by only a few very specialised individuals. The GUGI, moreover, has a number of additional operational obligations, such as maintaining Russia’s undersea sensor networks and conducting surveillance near its maritime bastions. Additionally, the motherships on which deep-diving submarines depend for longer transits, such as the Belgorod, are likely to be detectable by NATO anti-submarine warfare assets to roughly the same degree as the submarines on which they are based were. A more pressing challenge than detecting capabilities is establishing rules of engagement, particularly in peacetime. In territorial waters, countries can prosecute foreign submarines they detect aggressively – something the Soviets frequently did with US submarines during the Cold War, and vice versa. In international waters, however, this is likely to be more of a challenge. That said, Western navies can complicate the activity of Russian special purpose submarines in other ways. For example, activity at or near the sensor networks for which the GUGI is responsible can force it to allocate scarce resources to more defensive functions. Alternatively, civil-military partnerships can be used to remove deniability. To use an example, the Italian Navy recently struck an agreement with the country’s largest internet provider to share data. Many private-sector actors operate sensors, including unmanned underwater vehicles and pressure detectors, to monitor damage. If claims made by a navy regarding the activity of a submarine in the vicinity of undersea cables can be verified through a private partner, this could raise the risk of attribution and set the conditions for other policy instruments such as sanctions to be used.
+
+The challenge posed by a combination of auxiliaries and surface vessels operated by the Russian Navy is a somewhat different one. These vessels cannot necessarily damage infrastructure such as undersea cables at depths that would make repairs especially difficult, but by virtue of being inconspicuous they are harder to track and identify. As the ambiguity around the Nord Stream blasts illustrates, this can pose a substantial challenge for attribution. That being said, there are also methods of interdiction against surface vessels that do not exist for subsurface assets. The 1884 Cable Convention, to which Russia is a signatory, allows navies to board and search ships in international waters if they believe them to be tampering with undersea cables – a right the US has exercised. Similarly, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) allows countries to constrain the activities of civilian vessels conducting surveillance relevant to economic exploitation within their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) – and most of these activities overlap substantially with the sort of surveillance a ship would need to do to survey infrastructure. In the Baltic and North Seas, which are almost entirely straddled by Western EEZs, this could be a basis for significantly limiting the freedom of action of Russian auxiliary ships while remaining within international law. To be sure, UNCLOS allows military vessels the right of surveillance within EEZs, but such vessels are readily identifiable in both peacetime and conflict, enabling attribution in peacetime and interdiction above the threshold of war.
+
+The challenge with regards to auxiliary ships is primarily one of classification. This challenge is in some ways not dissimilar to constabulary activities such as counter-smuggling or counterpiracy: it requires a suspect vessel to be identified in the midst of a large number of ships conducting normal economic activity. A number of measures could make this more robust. For example, we might consider recent work on the use of machine learning as well as more traditional algorithmic tools to identify irregular patterns of activity by a vessel. That said, to build the body of data needed to support these processes, Western navies will need presence in key theatres and greater levels of situational awareness than naval assets alone can provide. As the efforts of CTF-151 in the context of counterpiracy have illustrated, the sheer number of vessels needed for this level of presence means such efforts must necessarily be multinational. Given that NATO’s standing maritime groups typically do not control the assets needed for these functions in peacetime (though this may be changing), such functions could be achieved on a regional basis through framework nation constructs. In addition, the tasks of both surveillance and attribution would likely be made considerably easier if assets from across and beyond militaries could be used to both achieve domain awareness and attribute malign activity. Recent efforts by countries such as Italy to build relationships between its navy and the private sector stand out as examples. Similarly, the decision by France to make seabed security a national strategic concern coordinated across government may represent a step towards achieving this imperative. While naval assets will remain crucial for tasks from surveillance to interdiction, navies will likely need to have the organisational structures to coordinate with a broader range of actors in order to meet the challenge of maritime sabotage.
+
+---
+
+__Sidharth Kaushal__ is the Research Fellow of Sea Power in RUSI. His research at RUSI covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-29-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-59.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-29-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-59.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-29-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-59.md
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 59 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-05-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方首稱被告《國安法》生效前涉公職人員行為失當 官質疑不公
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（29日）踏入審訊第59天，處理「共謀者原則」的法律爭議，包括該原則是否適用於《國安法》生效前的言行。控方表示，區諾軒和戴耀廷於2020年1月的飯局已達成串謀協議，有無差別否決預算案迫使政府回應五大訴求的不合法「共同目的」，而被告當時同意濫用立法會議員職權，或涉串謀公職人員行為失當，認為共謀者於《國安法》生效前的言行，可用來指證被告干犯本案控罪。惟法官質疑，飯局上並沒有達成任何協議，區諾軒亦稱與戴耀廷目的不同；又指控方已處理本案兩年半，但開審50多天才首稱被告《國安法》生效前或早已違法，質疑對被告造成不公。
+
+控方亦援引一宗1950年的美國上訴法院案例，指控罪生效前的言行可納為「共謀者原則」下的證據，但同意是控方能找到的唯一案例，遭法官質疑案例不適用於本案。辯方陳詞時則批評，控方於法律爭議階段才突提及公職人員行為失當的指控是「不公平至極」，又強調《國安法》生效前討論無差別否決預算案並不構成任何罪行，故共謀者原則不可能適用。
+
+#### 控方：區諾軒戴耀廷2020年1月已有無差別否決財案「共同目的」
+
+控方早前傳畢所有證人，案件押至今就「共謀者原則（co-conspirators rule）」等法律爭議陳詞。根據該原則，各共謀者的言行均可用來指證所有被告，而控方早前指並非本案被告的蔡澤鴻、黎敬輝和郭榮鏗均是本案共謀者。
+
+法官陳慶偉甫開庭表示，關注《國安法》生效前共謀者的言行可否被納為共謀者原則下的證據，望先聽取這方面的陳詞。主控周天行表示，辯方就共謀者原則提交聯合書面陳詞，惟鄭達鴻、梁國雄和柯耀林沒有參與，另外提交陳詞。
+
+周天行先表明，控方立場並非指《國安法》具追溯力，只是認為共謀者在《國安法》生效前的言行均可用來指證各被告。周續引案例，指援引此原則的重點是在串謀的「共同目的（common purpose）」，而非所控的「罪行」；而控方認為本案串謀協議由區諾軒與戴耀廷於2020年1月底的飯局達成，他們同意無差別否決預算案，以迫使政府回應五大訴求，而此「共同目的」由始至終維持不變。
+
+
+▲ 副刑事檢控專員(III) 周天行
+
+#### 官質疑飯局無達成協議、區諾軒稱與戴耀廷目的不一 控方或出錯
+
+周續指，共謀者於《國安法》生效前的言行均一直促進（in furtherance）和建立（build up）本案的串謀，例如招募潛在的共謀者、提倡和宣傳串謀等，並逐步擴大規模；並指即使《國安法》未生效，各被告的串謀協議亦是違法，可能干犯串謀公職人員行為失當，故當時的言行均可納為「共謀者原則」下的證據，用來指證被告串謀顛覆國家政權。
+
+法官陳慶偉指，控方在開案陳詞沒有如此說明，這是他第一次聽到此說法。李運騰亦指，在50多天的審訊中控方從無提及此立場。周天行同意，並強調被告的共同目的維持不變。
+
+惟陳慶偉指「我個人有懷疑」，指在一開始的飯局「沒有同意任何事，甚至沒有同意舉辦公民投票（“Nothing has been agreed, not even the holding of a civil voting.”）」，而區諾軒的證供是「戴耀廷可能有他的目的，但我有不同的目的」。周天行欲解釋，遭陳打斷指明白控方立場，但「我是指出你可能有問題，因為你說早在1月的飯局已達成共同目的，我是說你可能有錯（mistaken）」。
+
+#### 控方引1950年美國案例 指控罪生效前言行可納為證據 同意僅唯一案例
+
+控方同意，若法庭不接納就共同目的之陳詞，將會依賴一宗美國聯邦第二巡迴上訴法院於1950年的案例United States v. Dennis，以說明控罪生效前的言行，仍可納為共謀者原則下的證據。李運騰問，故在所有的普通法管轄區，控方只是找到一宗案例支持他們的說法，而且該案例還是來自美國的上訴法院？周天行同意。
+
+根據該案例，有共產黨領袖被控於1945至1948年串謀暴力推翻美國政府，違反1940年通過的《史密斯法案》（The Smith Act）。周引案例指，沒有合理原因將串謀的證據限於控罪期間，因若串謀於控罪日期前發生，相關共謀者的言行亦同樣有力；又指其他共謀者促進串謀的言行可被視作被告的言行。
+
+惟陳慶偉指出，案例亦表明只適用於控罪期間發生的言行；辯方亦反駁根據該案例，共謀者言行只是用來指證作出相關言行的本人，而非其他人。
+
+#### 官問50年前無罪言論是否可用作指證被告 稱「一輩子都要很小心」
+
+陳慶偉續舉例，若3名主審法官稱要推翻政府，而提出的當刻並不犯法，控方是否認為50年後，可用他50年前的言論指證他們3人？周天行僅重申，控方立場是由於共謀者一直懷有共同目的，故用以建立串謀的言行均可用來推論串謀的範圍性質及被告的參與。陳笑言，「那即是說我們這輩子都要很小心了」，因一旦他將內心想法說出口，說過的話餘生也可用來指證他，林卓廷大笑。控方回應是視乎串謀是否持續。
+
+控方確認，現時批評政府的言行日後可用作檢控。陳慶偉續指他不明白，指《國安法》生效前並沒有「顛覆國家政權罪」，那又怎麼可能有「串謀」？控方又怎能利用被告的意念和協議來控告之後的行為？陳仲衡指，因此控方要援引公職人員行為失當罪，以證被告於《國安法》生效前的協議已違法，周天行同意。
+
+#### 官質疑控方開審50多天才首提《國安法》生效前已違法 對被告不公
+
+李運騰指，這是控方首次提出被告的行為在《國安法》生效前已可能違反普通法下的罪行，指他在開審首天已提出對該原則的關注，「為何我們要到了開審50多天，才知道你有這個後備立場（fallback position）？」，質疑對被告構成不公。陳慶偉亦質疑周天行已處理本案兩年半。
+
+控方澄清，無意控告被告公職人員行為失當，只是為了顯示被告自2020年1月起已懷有違法的共同目的，以爭論共謀者原則適用於本案；又指此前沒機會提出，但法官反問：「何謂沒機會？」
+
+#### 官指被告言行可推論串謀範圍 控方稱引共謀者原則為證涉案言行真實性
+
+李運騰續提出，《國安法》生效前的言行，如戴耀廷的文章，可作為背景或環境證供推論被告的犯案意圖和思想狀態，並不需要依賴共謀者原則才可呈堂；陳慶偉亦指區諾軒作供時已供述串謀的目的。控方同意，但指援引共謀者原則是要證明共謀者言行所指的「真實性（truth）」，顯示被告的參與。
+
+主控萬德豪續指，該美國案例提及可考慮與被告屬同一黨派的其他共謀者言行。惟李運騰質疑，該案例只是將相關言行視為被告犯案的背景和環境證供，而非用以證明他們陳述的真實性，與本案的共謀者原則無關，亦不適用於本案；又指若控方只是以相關言行推論串謀範圍，他可以接受，但若控方是以此證明其案情，如接納戴耀廷說已將所有文件發給參與者、或戴耀廷向趙家賢確認新東第二次會議曾進行投票的說法為真實，「那情況就非常不同了，不是嗎？」
+
+控方同意，並承認所援引的案例只是法官向陪審團表達的「附帶意見（obiter）」，承認「這是我們唯一能找到的（“I have to admit that is all we can find.”）」，但重申該案例與共謀者原則有關。陳慶偉其後指，並非指控方不能依賴戴耀廷的說話，只是不能將戴所說視為事情的全部真相並用以指證所有被告，指那涉及另一個問題。
+
+#### 官屢追問為何無於開案提公職人員行為失當 控方指控罪已提及
+
+就法官對控方從未提及公職人員行為失當罪的質疑，萬德豪回應，控方的確從沒有在開案陳詞提及該控罪，但認為開案陳詞目的只是向法庭講述控方會援引的證據。李運騰指開案陳詞不止是複述證供（recital of evidence），還要讓法庭和辯方得知控方對案件的主張（case theory），直言這是很重要的部分。陳慶偉亦指，控方無可避免應列出公職人員行為失當罪的詳情。
+
+萬德豪重申之所以沒有事先說明，是因控方並非控告被告於《國安法》生效前干犯公職人員行為失當，只是望以此說明共謀者原則適用於本案，不希望就此技術問題令法庭混淆；又指知道控方案情完結前有機會向法庭說明。惟陳慶偉搖頭謂：「我對這個論點不滿意，謝謝。（“I am not impressed with this line of argument, thank you.”）」萬德豪強調，並非要以此「突襲（ambush）」任何人。
+
+李運騰續指，控方控罪提及被告以非法手段犯案，追問有什麼阻礙控方於案件開初便說明指控被告干犯公職人員行為失當？萬指經再考慮（on second thought）下，或許在起初說明是較合適；並指控罪有關非法手段的第四細項也提及被告「承諾或同意在該選舉中當選後，及／或煽動、促使、引致、誘使他人在該選舉中當選後，故意或蓄意不履行，或故意或蓄意疏於履行其立法會議員職責」，指該指控實質上也與公職人員行為失當罪一致。
+
+李運騰總結指，控方立場是雖然開案陳詞沒有表明，但某程度上在控罪上已有此暗示；但質疑其說法不一致，因萬德豪兩分鐘前才承認是第一次提及，現在又說控罪一早已提及。陳慶偉亦搖頭重申，控方可在開案陳詞說明，並指已聽夠相關論點。
+
+#### 官質疑控方立場或影響辯方盤問、主問從無提「濫權」
+
+萬德豪續提及下一點是關於「公平」，陳慶偉問：「對控方的公平？」庭內傳出笑聲，萬指是有關審訊的公平，因望回應辯方引案例談及案件的公平性。李運騰問，若控方一早表明欲指控被告干犯公職人員行為失當，會影響辯方盤問控方證人嗎？萬指不認為會，惟李指這不是控方說了算。
+
+李並指，現時辯方盤問主要集中在達致35+的可能、被告是否有權否決預算案、以及被告是否盡責和細心的議員等，但沒問及他們的協議是否會濫用立會議員的職權，即公職人員行為失當罪的基礎；陳慶偉亦指，控方沒有傳召證人葉劉淑儀，但若控方有相關指控，相信辯方如 Trevor Beel 可能會有不一樣的盤問。庭上早前透露，葉劉淑儀的證供與解散立法會程序及議員職責相關。
+
+萬德豪僅回應，本案重點是無差別否決預算案，即被告是否有共同決心以否決預算案作武器，迫使政府回應訴求，又指那是「明顯的濫權（abuse of power）」。李運騰即指，在主問過程，控方從沒提及「濫用」，萬同意，但認為可從證據推論，不認為控方證人需就被告是否濫權給出意見、相關意見亦與案不太相關。
+
+陳慶偉續笑着翻動手中開案陳詞，並一手拿起，指「這是我所處理過最厚的開案陳詞，但沒有一隻字提及公職人員行為失當」。萬同意，但重申控罪詳情已足以讓辯方知道控方的指控。控方其後表示陳詞完畢。
+
+#### 辯方批控方突指控公職人員行為失當「不公平至極」、《國安法》前討論否決財案非刑事
+
+代表黃碧雲及林卓廷的大律師沈士文其後就辯方的聯合陳詞發言，表示本案唯一的控罪就是《國安法》，而《國安法》生效前的言行是合法，並不構成任何罪行。李運騰指，但控方立場是一直指控被告公職人員行為失當。惟沈士文指那完全與案無關，並指若控方一早表明被告可能干犯此罪，辯方便會循此方向抗辯；惟控方在爭議共謀者原則時，才突然作此指控，「我看不到比這更不公平的事」、批評是「不公平至極」，指控方竟「夠膽」談及公平。
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲（左）、李予信（右）
+
+就控方指被告的共同目的維持不變，沈士文反駁指「公職人員行為失當罪」和「顛覆國家政權罪」的法律條文完全不同，亦同意法官陳慶偉指，認罪被告的案情摘要也沒有公職人員行為失當的指控。沈並指，控方曾有很多機會說明立場，包括開案陳詞、及呈交共謀者原則的證據列表時，但控方也完全沒提及相關指控。李運騰補充「濫權」一說更是今天口頭陳詞才首次提及。
+
+沈士文續指，共謀者原則適用的前提，還包括相關共謀者言行必須是促進串謀協議（in furtherance of the conspiracy），以及於串謀待實現期間發生（during the pendency of the conspiracy）；惟沈強調，《國安法》生效前，一起討論無差別否決預算案並非「刑事串謀」，故上述條件也不可能成立。
+
+案件押至周三（31日）續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-30-the-art-of-tasseography.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-30-the-art-of-tasseography.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9f7fc93f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-30-the-art-of-tasseography.md
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : The Art Of Tasseography
+author: Thomas des Garets Geddes
+date : 2023-05-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/KE1EmnK.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "China–Russia Relations as Viewed from China"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Analysis of Beijing’s relationship with Moscow tends to focus on official statements and diplomatic behaviour. But what do Chinese experts have to say about the matter? And how might they be advising their government?_
+
+
+
+The dynamics of Beijing’s relationship with Moscow remain as opaque as the inner workings of the Chinese Communist Party. As a result, we rely on body-language experts to dissect every aspect of a handshake between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin to help confirm what we think we already know. Are China–Russia ties so plagued by mutual distrust that they are set for an inevitable weakening or even collapse? Or are they now so strong that they might develop into a formal alliance or lead China into providing military support to Moscow? Arguments continue to be made in both directions, some more convincing than others. Ultimately, however, we are mostly just reading the tea leaves, and this article will likewise attempt to do just that.
+
+
+### Security as China’s Main Driver
+
+Since having frank and open conversations with Chinese government officials is almost impossible, following academic debates has become one of the few ways of gleaning hints about how Chinese leaders may be reflecting upon certain issues and the type of advice that they may be receiving. Zhao Huasheng (赵华胜), one of China’s most renowned Russia experts, may provide a few clues. In one of the more comprehensive analyses of China–Russia relations to have been published in China since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Zhao explains why he believes that his country should maintain its close ties with Moscow in spite of the drawbacks.
+
+Unsurprisingly, he describes security as being Beijing’s foremost interest in its bilateral relationship with the Kremlin. “With China’s greatest strategic pressure coming from the sea”, he says, “good Sino-Russian relations can ensure that China has … a relatively stable strategic rear … This has enormous strategic benefits for China. The significance of this is invisible and seemingly unremarkable in times of peace, but its strategic relevance to China will be revealed were our country to be faced with a major upheaval [变故] coming from abroad.”
+
+This goes beyond simply stabilising China’s 4,300-km-long border with Russia. On account of Moscow’s remaining influence in and around China’s neighbourhood, “good Sino-Russian relations can at the very least ensure the basic stability of half of Eurasia”, Zhao argues. Conversely, “a deterioration in Sino-Russian relations would plunge the entire Eurasian continent into a state of turmoil and uncertainty”. This would be highly detrimental to China’s “security and economic interests”.
+
+With its hinterland stabilised, Beijing is able to focus most of its energy and military resources on its coast, the surrounding seas and – most importantly – Taiwan. The island, according to Zhao, “is the greatest strategic challenge facing China. In a sense, it is like the sword of Damocles hanging over [our] head. We do not know when it will fall, perhaps suddenly, perhaps in the more distant future. But in any case, China cannot [afford] not to prepare itself for all the possible changes [that might affect] the situation in the Taiwan Strait. If the mainland were one day obliged to reunify using military means, we can be sure that China would then find itself in an extremely difficult and complex international environment”. And although Zhao does not expect Russia to be “completely” supportive of China (不期望俄罗斯完全支持中国) in the event of such a crisis – perhaps much like China’s stance over Ukraine – he does expect Moscow to maintain its ties with Beijing and to not take part in imposing sanctions on his country. Zhao reminds his readers that, “Among the major powers, Russia is probably the only one that is not opposed to China”. Were US-China relations ever to descend into outright confrontation (对峙), Moscow could well seek to play both sides. “But so long as it does not side with the US, this will be a strategic success for China”, he adds.
+
+___`Perhaps more damaging to China than the war in Ukraine itself has been Beijing’s refusal to distance itself from the aggressor`___
+
+Economically, Russia may only represent a small share (roughly 3%) of China’s foreign trade, Zhao says, but “in the event of a major international crisis, Russia would be the most important foreign source of energy – and [perhaps] even the only foreign source of oil – that China could conceivably continue to preserve”. Other scholars in China also highlight Russia’s important role in helping to achieve some of Beijing’s broader economic and financial objectives, such as the internationalisation of the yuan and the continued quest for a credible alternative to Western cross-border payment systems, with the aim of reducing China’s and the world’s dependence on the current US-dominated financial system. More broadly, Moscow is regularly portrayed as a key partner, if not Beijing’s most important partner, in what Zhao calls “China’s push to build a new international order” – in other words, an order that would be less dominated by the West and more in line with the interests of Moscow, Beijing and other members of the Global South. Losing the support of a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a key participant in such groupings as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation would inevitably jeopardise such plans. Summarising the China–Russia relationship, Wang Xiaoquan (王晓泉), a Russia specialist from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, remarks: “China and Russia are ‘half of the sky’ [半边天] for each other’s security and development”.
+
+
+### The Positive and Negative Impact of the War in Ukraine on China
+
+Russia’s invasion of Ukraine came as a shock to most experts in China. Chinese academia has its fair share of Russia apologists who blame the war on both Washington and NATO’s eastward expansion. However, even they occasionally bemoan the adverse consequences that the war has had for China. To be sure, some see the conflict as having helped to push Russia further into China’s orbit and to accelerate the emergence of the desired new multipolar and less Western-centric world order, and even as having distracted – albeit temporarily – the US from its “containment” of China in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, in these scholarly discussions at least, the negatives seem to outweigh the positives. As Chinese economist Xu Mingqi (徐明棋) noted last year: “The repercussions of the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine have been largely negative [for us] and I cannot see China benefitting from it … First, it has hindered the world economy’s [post-pandemic] recovery; second, it has fuelled the ideological trend towards deglobalisation; and third, it has put global economic governance in jeopardy.” Stability abroad continues to be key to sustaining China’s economic development, Xu adds. In that respect at least, the war in Ukraine has evidently run counter to his country’s interests.
+
+But perhaps more damaging to China than the war itself has been Beijing’s refusal to distance itself from the aggressor. A few months after the invasion, Yan Xuetong (阎学通), one of China’s leading international relations experts, acknowledged that “refusing to condemn Russia has strained China’s relations with some of its neighbours and distanced Beijing from many developing nations”. Like many others in China, Zhou Bo (周波), a well-known former senior People’s Liberation Army colonel turned think-tanker, regrets the negative impact that the war has had on China’s relations with Europe in particular. In his words: “The last thing China wants is a deterioration in its relations with European countries. It is very important to us that Europe is not always on the side of the United States.” Yang Jiemian (杨洁勉), another notable figure in China’s think-tank world (and brother of former top diplomat and politburo member Yang Jiechi), worries about the deep rift and growing hostility that has emerged between Russia and China on the one side and the West and its allies on the other (he blames this on Washington, of course). Like many of his peers, he is particularly concerned about the impact that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is having on cross-Strait relations, with the West more intent than ever on providing diplomatic and military support to Taiwan. Instability, decoupling, confrontation and containment are written all over these assessments, and Ukraine is depicted as a major catalyst of this trend.
+
+
+### An Imperialistic, Messianic and Reckless Partner
+
+Although censorship, self-censorship and China’s propaganda machine ensure that China–Russia relations are mostly portrayed as flourishing, disapproval of Russia’s actions does occasionally transpire even among China’s staunchest Russia sympathisers. Wang Wen (王文), for instance, who is the director of Renmin University’s Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies and a former Global Times journalist, recently asked Russian intellectual Aleksandr Dugin (who is also nicknamed “Putin’s brain” in China) “why Russia’s elite do not advise President Putin to do his best to avoid conflicts or to adopt approaches that might be better than [his] special military operations”. Also present in the writings and speeches of Chinese scholars are the occasional jabs at both Putin and Russia for their alleged imperialistic tendencies, messianic ideology and reckless behaviour. Feng Yujun (冯玉军), one of China’s most outspoken critics of Moscow since the beginning of the war and the director of Fudan University’s Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, stresses that “the imperial logic underlying both the rejection of Ukraine as a national entity and the overt claim to restore [Russia’s] traditional territories is alarming”. He describes Russian culture as suffering from a superiority complex and Putin’s conservatism as an empty “discursive bubble”, a mere tool for Moscow to advance its political interests and bolster its legitimacy.
+
+Historical grievances against Russia run deep in China and regularly resurface even among ordinary citizens. As Yuan Gang (袁刚), then a professor at Peking University, once noted: “In recent times, China has had its share of invasions and abuse at the hands of the Great Powers, yet Russia’s seizure of Chinese territories was the greatest scourge of all.” Memories of betrayals, bullying and even aggression by China’s former Soviet brother are surely still very much alive, particularly among President Xi’s generation, which lived through some of the tensest moments of China–USSR relations.
+
+___`Chinese scholars do not hesitate to point out that Russia’s vision of a new world order differs greatly from China’s`___
+
+Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye’s (卢沙野) recent comments, which appeared to question the legal status of former Soviet states, should not distract from the palpable unease among Chinese intellectuals over Russia’s approach to national sovereignty – a concept that continues to be paramount for China. Shortly after Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Yuan asked ironically: “Could China’s Tannu Uriankhai consisting of 170,000 square kilometres of territory, which was seized by the Soviet Union under Lenin and [later] replaced by the so-called “Tuvan Autonomous Republic”, be returned to China by a vote of the local inhabitants, who have long been inclined towards separatism, with the promise of a tripling of their pay by China? Even worse, if a majority of the Taiwanese were to vote in favour of independence, would China resign itself to this fate?” He continued: “The Russians have also openly introduced the concept of ‘strategic space’, going so far as to treat the territories of other countries as their own ‘space’ and claiming that they cannot stand the West ‘encroaching’ on their ‘strategic space’. What is the difference between this and Hitler’s cry for ‘Lebensraum’?” Yuan is admittedly on the extreme end of the spectrum when it comes to criticising Russia (and his own government), but milder versions of his views continue to exist in China. Whether President Xi and his colleagues are closer to Ambassador Lu’s perception of former Soviet states or to Yuan’s is difficult to tell. But their official rebuttal of Lu’s controversial comments and their refusal to recognise Russia’s annexations in eastern Ukraine (including Crimea) show at the very least that Russian behaviour poses a challenge to one of China’s most fundamental principles.
+
+Despite all the vaunted camaraderie between Xi and Putin and the former’s recent parting words to his “dear friend” that the world is undergoing its biggest change in a century and that “we are driving this change together”, Chinese scholars do not hesitate to point out that Russia’s vision of a new world order differs greatly from China’s. Zhao Long (赵隆), a researcher at one of China’s top think tanks (SIIS), notes that “while China emphasises the careful reform and improvement of the [current] order, Russia hopes for its complete disintegration”. Huang Jing (黄靖), a well-known “returnee scholar” from the US, says much the same, adding that Moscow’s desire to confront and weaken the West does not align with China’s developmental interests. Feng adds that if Putin does indeed seek to overturn the current order, then he should at least have a credible alternative to offer, but he does not. While most Chinese scholars may not go as far as Feng in his criticism of Russian mentality, politics and society in general, many point to the increasingly visible weaknesses in Russia’s economy, military and technological advancement. Tang Shiping (唐世平), another prominent international relations scholar from Fudan University, describes how Russia’s overall strength and influence have been severely damaged by the war and concludes (in English) that, “Although Russia remains an important strategic partner of China, the China-Russia strategic partnership surely faces growing challenges”.
+
+Overt calls by Chinese scholars for Beijing to distance itself from Moscow are rare for obvious reasons. Somewhat more common are implicit and explicit criticisms of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, though Chinese censors have prevented at least some of these voices from being heard. While – as Feng points out – mentions of China’s “no limits” partnership with Russia have indeed faded from Chinese official pronouncements, relations with Moscow are still going strong 15 months into the war, and China–Russia joint military exercises continue apace. Challenges to the relationship there may be, but few predict a sudden and significant repositioning of Beijing’s approach to Russia, barring a major upset.
+
+
+### China–Russia Relations Through the Lens of a Chinese Realist
+
+Given Beijing’s recent posture towards both Russia and Ukraine, Zhao’s analysis of China–Russia relations in the context of this conflict remains one of the most compelling. He acknowledges that his government’s refusal to condemn Moscow for its actions has tarnished China’s image, particularly in the West. But he sees the benefits of maintaining close ties with Moscow as outweighing those that Beijing might gain by condemning (and offending) Russia. Zhao is a self-professed proponent of realpolitik and a critic of values-driven diplomacy. Like many of his peers, he probably does disapprove of Russia’s actions, but does not say so explicitly, simply noting that “maintaining Sino-Russian cooperation does not imply supporting all of Russia’s actions and policies”. He claims to be neither pro-US nor anti-US, and neither pro-Russia nor anti-Russia. Rather, he is guided first and foremost by his country’s national interests. “Russia is not infringing China’s core interests, so why should [we] take the initiative to destroy a friendly relationship?”, he asks. “There is a saying that nothing is more difficult to build up and easier to destroy than trust. The friendship between China and Russia has been extremely difficult to achieve. Destroying it would be much easier. All it would take is a condemnatory statement [by China] and participation in sanctions against Russia and the foundation of friendship and trust that China and Russia have built up over decades would collapse.” Like Zhao, many – if not most – Chinese experts do not believe that joining the West in condemning Russia would have led Washington to soften its approach to China. Siding more closely with the West and Ukraine would, as the Chinese expression goes, have been akin to “giving a bride away on top of losing one’s soldiers” (赔了夫人又折兵).
+
+Now, if one were boldly to assume that China’s leadership is assessing its relationship with the Kremlin through a similar lens to that of Zhao and other like-minded Chinese realists, then Beijing’s neutrality in this conflict would seem all the more difficult to sustain. If moral values must give way to a country’s strategic interests, then China would need Russia to come out on top or – at the very least – not to lose too badly in Ukraine. This is essentially what Tang was suggesting in a piece last year. Yang Jiemian would probably agree: “In the unlikely event that Russia were to be continually weakened to the extent that it would be unable, unwilling or afraid to continue its struggle against the US and the West”, he writes, “this would ultimately lead to an extremely unfavourable strategic situation for China”. Feng Shaolei (冯绍雷), another prominent Russia specialist, worries about what would happen if either a pro-Western regime or an even more radical force than Putin’s were to take over the Kremlin and become China’s neighbour. Feng has thus called on his government to take a more “proactive” stance in trying to resolve this conflict and to use the influence that it has to encourage peace talks.
+
+___`Being dragged further into the Ukraine quagmire is the last thing that China wants, and safeguarding its already tense relations with the West remains one of its top priorities`___
+
+The question of whether China might ever provide military support to Moscow (it has denied that it will) is a particularly thorny one that would necessitate more careful consideration than a short analysis of Chinese scholarly views. However, to continue using Zhao’s realist lens, it would seem logical for Beijing to want to prevent both an unknown neighbour from suddenly appearing on its doorstep and the Kremlin from being so weakened that it leaves a power vacuum in China’s fragile Central Asian neighbourhood. Needless to say, China brazenly shipping military goods directly to Russia is hard to imagine and would not be in keeping with its peace-promoting, non-aligned and non-interfering posture. But there are, of course, other ways of keeping a friend afloat. What is also abundantly clear from these discussions is that being dragged further into this quagmire is the last thing that China wants, and safeguarding its already tense relations with the West remains one of its top priorities.
+
+Earlier this month, a UK civil servant specialising in China–Russia relations wrote a piece under a pseudonym in which he/she warned that China–Russia ties were likely to strengthen and that they might even develop “into some form of formal alliance structure as each looks to the other for support against perceived Western encirclement”. The argument that what the Chinese would call “contradictions” with the West – and more specifically with the US – are the main binding force and driver of China–Russia relations is certainly a very strong (and widely held) one. But in the light of what Chinese experts have been advocating, the author’s suggestion that Beijing’s partnership with Moscow might develop into a formal alliance appears somewhat less convincing. The author apparently bases part of his/her argument on two Chinese sources recommending this change, the first being Yan Xuetong and the other “a government-commissioned national security ‘blue book’” written by CICIR, a key think tank linked to China’s Ministry of State Security. Unfortunately, no valid link to this report was provided, but since pro-alliance views have previously been expressed in China, one must assume that this was indeed part of its recommendations. That being said, one report published almost 10 years ago is insufficient to substantiate the idea that Chinese experts are currently pushing for this change. In fact, the director of CICIR’s Institute of Eurasian Studies, Ding Xiaoxing (丁晓星), published a paper just last month in which he maintains that “forging a partnership without forming an alliance [结伴不结盟] is more conducive to the long-term development of Sino-Russian relations”. As for Yan, most China watchers will know that he has long been arguing for his country to form alliances with some of its neighbours but, as he has stated himself, his proposal has been rebuffed not only by most of his colleagues, but also by his government.
+
+Although a more comprehensive overview of both Chinese and Russian opinions on this topic would be welcome, none of the papers reviewed for this article signalled that the tide might be turning in favour of implementing such a change. Quite the contrary. Ding, Zhao and others believe that a formal alliance would create unnecessary risks for a relationship that remains both inherently fragile and scarred by the failures of the previous Sino-Soviet alliance. But were a new alliance ever to be formed, writes Ding, “the possibility of another breakdown in relations between the two countries cannot be ruled out if inequalities in the relationship were to reappear”. Indeed, Chinese scholars are deeply aware of the impact that the dramatic shift in their country’s relative power is having on such a proud country as Russia. Moreover, an alliance would risk exacerbating the bipolarisation of world politics, dragging the Chinese into conflicts that are not theirs to fight and negating Beijing’s vaunted principle of non-alignment. Beijing is better off with a vaguer and more malleable cooperative framework, they say. “Unless Washington increases its strategic pressure on Beijing and Moscow to such an extreme that both states feel compelled to consolidate a formal alliance, China and Russia will continue to pursue a hedging strategy but avoid entering an outright alliance”, concludes Wang Dong (王栋), a professor at Peking University.
+
+The war in Ukraine has been a defining moment in China–Russia relations, and Beijing has shown that it is willing to put up with relatively high costs in order to preserve its ties with the Kremlin. Beijing says that its relationship with Moscow has a “bottom line”, but how far Putin could still go before breaching it is rarely addressed in China. So far, few Chinese scholars have hinted at a significant shift in Beijing’s current policy towards Moscow. The war has certainly presented the China–Russia relationship with “challenges” that are yet to be addressed, but Russia appears to be too strategically important for China to risk losing it right now. A toppling of Putin by a pro-Western force or a crippling of the Kremlin would in all likelihood be a disaster for Beijing. Nevertheless, suspicion of and – for some – even deep-seated antipathy towards this important partner is also evident in these discussions. That is one reason why so many Chinese experts continue to argue against forging a formal alliance with Russia. Distrust (on both sides) points once again to the underlying fragility of China–Russia ties and is perhaps one of the reasons why Beijing has been quite so afraid of offending its partner.
+
+---
+
+__Thomas des Garets Geddes__ is the founder and editor of Sinification, a newsletter focusing on foreign affairs as viewed from China.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-31-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-60.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-31-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-60.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-31-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-60.md
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 60 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-05-31 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 法官要求控方交代各被告及共謀者加入串謀日期 辯方指被告未料《國安法》前言行違法造成不公
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（31日）踏入審訊第60天，續處理「共謀者原則」的法律爭議。法官陳慶偉今表示，被告何時加入串謀屬重要，惟控方沒有說明，要求控方明天提交各被告及共謀者加入串謀日期的列表。控方在法官追問下，指若法庭不同意本案於2020年1月飯局已形成串謀，下個形成串謀的日期為3月25日公民黨記者會，惟法官質疑該記者會與戴耀廷和區諾軒無關，亦指似乎無證據前民主動力總幹事黎敬輝為共謀者。
+
+對控方指被告或涉「公職人員行為失當罪」，辯方質疑不能與「顛覆國家政權罪」類比，而被告《國安法》生效前未必能預料當時言行或違法，控方以此指證被告構成不公；又指控方引用的美國案例與共謀者原則無關，對本案無約束力。法官多番追問，該案例有否提及控罪生效前已形成串謀協議，並指若然如此便需慎交朋友，否則朋友日後犯事，即使以往交往多清白，也可能成為犯罪言行。控方最終承認案例沒有如此提及。
+
+#### 官數度追問串謀形成日期 控方一度稱3.25公民黨記者會 官質疑與戴耀廷無關
+
+控辯雙方前日（29日）就能否於本案援引「共謀者原則」陳詞，案件押至今續。法官陳慶偉甫開庭先澄清辯方立場，以戴耀廷文章為例，指據現時的同意事實和證據，似乎除了代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 外，相關證據的呈堂性並沒有被挑戰，可納為環境證供，辯方只是爭議控方使用證據的目的。
+
+陳續指，因此據控陳詞，似乎被告何時加入串謀屬重要，但控方並沒有明確說明，並指控方說法是串謀於2020年1月已由戴耀廷和區諾軒形成，問若法庭不同意這個日子，控方指串謀開始的下一個日期是何時？主控周天行指是3月25日，因公民黨當天舉行記者會。惟法官李運騰和陳慶偉即指，該記者會與戴耀廷和區諾軒無關。
+
+
+▲ 副刑事檢控專員(III) 周天行
+
+陳慶偉續問，若法庭不同意3月25日的日子，下一個日期會是何時？周天行指是6月8日，因當天趙家賢要求戴耀廷發送最終協議文件。陳再問，若不同意6月8日呢？周天行指是被告提交提名表格的日子，陳即反問為何不是6月9日的初選記者會。
+
+#### 官要求表列被告及共謀者加入串謀時間、指看來無證據黎敬輝是共謀者
+
+周天行未回答，李運騰便指若控方是指串謀首先由組織者如戴耀廷、區諾軒和趙家賢等形成，可理解控方指串謀是由6月8日開始；但其他被告或於不同時間加入串謀。他並指，控方就被告加入串謀之前和之後的證據在「共謀者原則」下的使用有所區分，控方指被告加入前其他共謀者的言行可顯示串謀的性質和範圍，而被告加入後，相關言行便可顯示其參與，因此控方須說明每名被告何時加入串謀。
+
+陳慶偉補充，不止是被告，還包括控方指同為共謀者的前觀塘區議會主席蔡澤鴻、前民主動力總幹事黎敬輝，及前公民黨立法會議員郭榮鏗，認為控方要準備顯示每名被告和串謀者加入串謀日期的列表。李運騰並指，特別關注為何控方指黎敬輝是串謀的一分子，以及有何獨立證據證明黎是共謀者之一，笑指現時所有有關黎的資料都是由趙家賢提供，但表面看來沒有證據顯示他是共謀者，因黎只是被要求出席會議和抄筆記，「他不是在那裡發表任何個人意見。」
+
+
+▲ 6月9日初選記者會
+
+#### 控方一度稱未能列加入確實時間 後同意明日交列表
+
+陳慶偉續要求控方在列表列出各人被指加入串謀的日期，以及其他後備的日期，又以楊雪盈為例，指加入串謀日期可能是港島區首次會議、6月8日分發協議最終版本、6月9日初選記者會、6月13日提名期開始、6月20日提名期結束、楊實際交表日期、6月30日《國安法》實施、7月1日、或7月11日和12日的初選投票日，望控方能說明。
+
+李運騰補充，法庭現時並非要就被告加入串謀的日期作裁斷，只是關注控方就「共謀者原則」證據的使用。周天行回應會嘗試，但指未必能列出被告加入的確實時間，問能否列明他們「最遲」加入的時間。陳指控方可另闢一欄處理，但亦要說明何時加入，直言「如果我們容許你提及最遲加入的時間，我肯定你只會說是2020年6月30日」。控方確認明天可提供此列表。
+
+#### 辯方質疑公職人員失當與顛覆國家政權不同 不能作類比
+
+代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的大律師黃宇逸其後陳詞。就控方稱各被告於《國安法》生效前涉違串謀公職人員行為失當，因此相關言行均可納為「共謀者原則」下的證據，黃宇逸指「公職人員行為失當罪」的控罪元素包括「故意」作出不當行為，但戴耀廷在《國安法》前稱認為初選是合法，因此並非「故意」違法。惟法官質疑，無證據顯示其他被告當時也相信戴耀廷說法，且不同被告對否決預算案的取態不一，辯方不能一概而論。
+
+不過法官表示，理解辯方指「公職人員行為失當罪」與「顛覆國家政權罪」是不同的罪行、控罪元素不一，因此控方在運用證據時，不能以「公職人員行為失當罪」類比「顛覆國家政權罪」；而若辯方得悉控方指控被告公職人員行為失當，辯方抗辯和盤問會非常不同，黃宇逸同意。
+
+#### 辯方質疑被告未能預料《國安法》前言行變違法 引「共謀者原則」屬不公
+
+黃宇逸續解釋，一般而言任何傳聞證供（hearsay）均不能呈堂，惟在「共謀者原則」下例外；而引用「共謀者原則」的前提是被告同意追求一個「非法」目的，故所有促進該目的之言行均可用以指證所有共謀者。
+
+
+▲ 代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的大律師 黃宇逸
+
+惟黃認為，控方現時採納尚未變成「非法」的言行，是擴闊共謀者原則的用途，違背該原則的精神；又指被告《國安法》生效前未必能預料其言行或共同目的可能違法，控方以此指證被告，是剝奪他們基於刑事責任而選擇退出計劃的機會，有違首要的「公平性」原則。至於《國安法》後言行，黃認為只要符合相關前提，控方亦能接納為「共謀者原則」下的證據。
+
+就控方提出的1950年美國案例 United States v. Dennis，黃指控方只是找到一份案例支持其說法，但該案例與共謀者原則無關，也沒說明應用共謀者原則的條件，對本案沒有約束力。
+
+#### 辯方批無獨立證據證被告參與串謀
+
+代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 則表示，控方要援引「共謀者原則」，須有獨立證據證明何桂藍參與該串謀，惟現時無相關證據。李運騰指「墨落無悔」聲明書可佐證，惟 Beel 指控方已援引此為「共謀者原則」下的證據，故不屬「獨立證據」，但控方亦沒有其他證據，包括提名表格亦沒有明確顯示被告同意的「共識」是什麼。
+
+至於控方指援引「共謀者原則」是為證明共謀者言行的「真實性（truth）」，代表李予信的大律師關文渭則指，控方並非意圖證明真實性，例如並非要指戴耀廷批評政府的說話為真。法官回應，控方目的是要藉相關文章顯示串謀的起源、性質和範圍，關文渭指即使沒有「共謀者原則」，相關證據也可呈堂，而控方真正目的是要指當一個人說某些話，是代表（acting as agent）所有其他被告說話。
+
+
+▲ 李予信（右）
+
+#### 官重申美國案例無就「共謀者原則」作決定 惟控方堅稱有關
+
+主控萬德豪其後表示就辯方陳詞作簡短回應。就辯方對控方引1950年美國案例 United States v. Dennis 之質疑，該案涉有共產黨領袖於1945至1948年串謀暴力推翻美國政府，違反1940年通過的《史密斯法案》（The Smith Act）被定罪。
+
+萬重申該案例與共謀者原則有關，提及共謀者在控罪生效前的言行不能納為證據是不合理，又指本案的背景非常不同。陳慶偉表示那是常識（common sense），萬回應他會說更多關於常識的東西，惟陳即搖頭指不要說，並謂：「如果你只是想作簡短回應，便做一個簡短回應，然後你就可以坐下，我不是來聽學術辯論的，謝謝。」
+
+陳慶偉並指，該案唯一受爭議的證據，是有關被告以外的共產黨教師，於《史密斯法案》（The Smith Act）在1940年通過前到訪莫斯科接受馬克斯主義的訓練，但那只是用以說明串謀起源的環境證供，不需用到共謀者原則，該案例亦沒有就該原則作出任何決定。惟萬德豪堅稱是有關共謀者原則的應用。
+
+#### 官追問案例有否稱串謀於法例生效前形成 稱若然如此需小心交友
+
+李運騰問及，該案例有否裁定1940年前，該批教師已形成串謀協議推翻美國政府，並指「如果有，告訴我們第幾段」。萬德豪未有正面回應，僅稱判詞指該些教師與被告屬同一政黨，惟陳慶偉指那與串謀推翻政府是兩回事。李運騰亦指他們可能因有共同興趣而一同研習，但若案例指他們當時已形成協議，便要很小心選擇朋友，因若該些朋友日後成了罪犯，「即使以往的交往多清白，也可能會變成犯罪的言行。」
+
+萬德豪未有正面回答，李運騰再多次追問，又向萬指「我想你也很努力嘗試，我們欣賞你的努力，你還有沒有什麼想說？」，惟萬均沒有正面回應。陳慶偉指不認為案例有指明已形成協議，又着萬明天告訴法庭。李運騰最後再指，他的問題很簡單，只需答「是」或「否」，不是要猜謎，萬最後承認案例沒有如此提及。案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-31-turning-the-page.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-31-turning-the-page.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-05-31-turning-the-page.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Turning The Page
+author: H.A. Hellyer
+date : 2023-05-31 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ApG9IFi.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Saudi Arabia’s New Diplomatic Approach"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The Arab League meeting earlier this month was one of the more interesting in the last couple of decades, mostly due to the host, Saudi Arabia, using it for messaging the West, particularly on Israel and Syria. More recently, Riyadh has engaged in new diplomatic moves towards Canada, a country with which it has had a rocky relationship. All of these moves follow a particular pattern, and we are likely to see more of the same._
+
+
+
+_Jonathan Eyal (__JE__) asked our Senior Associate Fellow, H A Hellyer (__HH__), about the significance of these events._
+
+___JE:__ What do you think Saudi Arabia was looking to accomplish in this latest flurry of diplomatic engagement at the Arab League? Is it an isolated move?_
+
+___HH:___ Riyadh was the host for this particular Arab League summit, so it’s natural enough that the meeting might take something of a Saudi flavour to it. But Riyadh went beyond that, and that’s down to the current Saudi leadership’s overall foreign policy agenda matching its domestic policy agenda. Foreign observers will be looking at the impacts on relations with the West, Israel and so on – but really, Riyadh’s focus is on the domestic arena, and its geopolitical relationships – alongside its formulation of its own regional position – are critically linked to that focus. So, no, it’s not an isolated move, and it’s very much about the leadership’s overall vision for the Kingdom. For lack of a better expression, one might call it the “turning the page” approach, which is closely connected to Riyadh’s “Vision 2030”, a phrase that came out of Saudi Arabia’s comments at the Arab League.
+
+___JE:__ So, there is a macro-level strategy at work here, this “turning the page” approach – can you lay out what this means more generally?_
+
+___HH:___ Riyadh has been on a geopolitical offensive, after dealing with the fallout from its (admittedly rather brief) pariah status in the West which followed particularly from the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, as well as to some extent the Saudi-led war in Yemen. The leadership has been keen to build bridges with Western capitals, especially Washington, and has clearly banked on the idea that if it waits it out, Western leaders and elites will eventually move past their antipathy towards the Kingdom. There’s been a lot of attention towards all of this, and it perhaps reminds us that in international relations, there are no permanent allies or permanent enemies, but permanent interests, as Lord Palmerstone famously said.
+
+This geopolitical offensive is most interesting in terms of regional dynamics, though. The Khashoggi affair led to strained relations with Turkey, where the murder took place; but the Saudi leadership took up the opportunity to mend ties with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan once an overture was made, presumably due to Turkey’s economic woes. The Saudis had led efforts to isolate Qatar in 2017, but they were also the ones who ended the GCC-wide spat, despite objections within their own camp. The Saudis have expressed incredible antagonism vis-à-vis Iran and its regime, but despite no change in Tehran’s behaviour, Riyadh has recently de-escalated with the Iranians too. More moves have taken place with regards to Yemen as well.
+
+None of this means that the Saudis have been perfect in how they’ve engaged regionally, or that they’ve suddenly done a 360 in terms of their view of the world. Rather, it means they’ve decided that it is in the Kingdom’s interest to have fewer conflicts to deal with externally, and I think that’s because they want to focus their energies internally as much as possible. The Arab League meeting was more evidence of this strategy playing out. And then there was the normalisation of diplomatic relations with Canada, following the fallout in 2018 over Canadian diplomatic representations in favour of women’s rights activists in Saudi Arabia; an agreement to return ambassadors was reached in late May. “Turning the page” indeed.
+
+___JE:__ What did Riyadh seek to accomplish with regards to the West and Ukraine at the Arab League?_
+
+___HH:___ It’s interesting. Saudi Arabia is no doubt aware that there is antipathy vis-à-vis Ukraine in much of the Global South, while at the same time there is full support for Kyiv against the Russian invasion in the West. Riyadh didn’t invite the Ukrainian president as part of a joint decision by various Arab League member states – it took the decision pretty much unilaterally, which seemed to ruffle a few feathers due to some Arab states’ alignments with Russia.
+
+___`Holding off from normalisation with Israel makes Riyadh stronger in the regional and international context, because it means there is still a bargain to be struck`___
+
+But Riyadh gained substantial and significant credit with Western capitals by doing so. Zelensky is iconic now; he is the only Western leader involved in a direct military conflict with a competitor of the West (Russia) on the global stage. Moreover, he is involved in that conflict as the result of a defensive action – Ukraine didn’t invade Russia, Russia invaded Ukraine – and that makes him a resistance leader of great stature across the West. It was Riyadh that brought Zelensky into direct conversation with senior representatives from across the Arab world, to make his case and state his purpose. No one else has done that in the region, and as such the Saudi move is going to play quite well in Western capitals – not least in Washington and anywhere where solidarity with Ukraine is perceived as a crucial and critical Western interest. It doesn’t hit the reset button on Saudi-Western relations, but it certainly helps.
+
+___JE:__ But the West is also concerned about other issues with regards to Saudi Arabia, particularly the Abraham Accords – how has this played out?_
+
+___HH:___ There has been a push in parts of the DC “Beltway” to get Riyadh to accede to the Abraham Accords, despite Saudi Arabia’s repeated refusal to do so. Maybe one day Riyadh will sign up, but the current mood in the Kingdom is not remotely sympathetic to such a step.
+
+Of course, from the Israeli perspective, normalisation with Riyadh would be an achievement of epic proportions, and Netanyahu is clearly trying to find any way to make it happen. This is perhaps because he hopes that massive economic investment will follow, which would serve as a “great diversion” from Israel’s domestic political woes.
+
+There’s just one small issue with this strategy: there is little upside to acceding to the Abraham Accords that Riyadh cannot already attain. Normalisation would not strengthen Riyadh’s regional position. On the contrary: holding off from official normalisation makes Riyadh stronger in the regional and international context, because it means there is still a bargain to be struck – thus giving the Kingdom a modicum of leverage.
+
+DC correctly understands that while the region is not made up of democratic regimes, public opinion does have an impact (even if it’s not remotely as critical as in electoral systems). Normalising with the most right-wing government in Israeli history is hardly attractive to Riyadh. The most stalwart of the Abraham Accords signatories is the UAE, and a prominent Emirati figure recently declared that no more Arab states would normalise ties with the Israelis, as the Israeli government was “putting everyone off” – indeed, she went as far as to say that her own government was “embarrassed in front of the Arab people”. Riyadh is certainly not interested in being put in the same position.
+
+___`Syria’s reintegration may come back to haunt Riyadh. Assad hasn’t changed, and his regime continues to be unstable, even with Russian and Iranian backing`___
+
+Again, there may be a time when the calculus changes for Riyadh, but it’s not now – especially not with continued US congressional antipathy towards Riyadh, which makes it unlikely that DC could provide sufficient incentives to Saudi Arabia that would also be able to pass through Congress. It’s a bit peculiar that the idea of normalisation keeps being raised, especially when a US official said this month – albeit off the record – that recent statements by Saudi officials should “put to rest talk of a major US push for Saudi-Israeli normalisation”, and that the talks were “a campaign full of hot air blown by well-meaning folks mostly in Israel”. Ideological aspirations aside, I think the trend is pretty clear, hence Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s repeating of demands for an end to the Israeli occupation and for the general parameters of the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 – which was itself a Saudi enterprise – to be adhered to.
+
+___JE:__ The event that was all too evident in advance was Bashar al-Assad’s appearance. Saudi Arabia backed his exclusion from the League for years, but recently that’s changed. What are you seeing there?_
+
+___HH:___ On Syria, Riyadh didn’t begin the push for normalisation with Assad’s regime. But it did run with it, and hard. This is all part of Riyadh’s calculation that its domestic agenda requires de-escalation in its regional policy, so that its full attention is focused within.
+
+But Assad’s reintegration may come back to haunt Riyadh. Assad hasn’t changed, and his regime continues to be unstable, even with Russian and Iranian backing. There are millions of Syrians who view Assad as the most brutal leader in their history, and that isn’t a recipe for good times.
+
+Assad’s Syria is often described as a new “narco-state” in the Middle East, and that is also a source of societal instability for regional states. Yes, the Arab League suggested “conditions” for reintegration, but this conditionality isn’t going to be taken seriously at all.
+
+It was Riyadh that pushed the normalisation through, going over the heads of a number of states that were not ready for this step. Even its former adversary in the GCC (Qatar) has fully accepted Riyadh’s pole position in the region, and is keen not to take steps that would cause tensions.
+
+___JE:__ How does this all bode for the future?_
+
+___HH:___ The Turkish AK Party promulgated its “Zero-Problems” approach to regional dynamics some two decades ago, including in its electoral platform a promise to “improve relations with Turkey’s neighbours”. Of course, Ankara faced a lot of problems in trying to uphold this pledge, and in recent years it has engaged in far more confrontational moves. To draw another parallel, the “ethical foreign policy” approach of the early years of the Tony Blair government in the UK gave way to the Iraq War in 2003; political events often take on lives of their own which go far beyond expectations.
+
+With all that being said, I suspect we will see further moves towards de-escalation from Riyadh. In Sudan, where the Sudanese army is engaged in a power struggle against an assorted group of militias, Riyadh is trying to de-escalate the situation; in Lebanon, I think we’ll also see moves by Saudi Arabia to reduce tensions. It’s less about Riyadh trying to cast itself in a new role of regional mediator, in my opinion, and more a reflection of the fact that as Riyadh focuses more of its energy internally, it wants fewer distractions or spoilers externally.
+
+---
+
+__H.A. Hellyer__ is the Senior Associate Fellow of RUSI. Specialising in geopolitics, security studies, political economy, and belief, he has more than 20 years of experience in governmental, corporate advisory, and academic environments in Europe, USA, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-01-quiet-cyber-front.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-01-quiet-cyber-front.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0fb7ad8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-01-quiet-cyber-front.md
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Quiet Cyber Front?
+author: Pia Hüsch and Joseph Jarnecki
+date : 2023-06-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/hrZOXHO.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "All Quiet on the Cyber Front? Explaining Russia’s Limited Cyber Effects"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Russian cyber operations in Ukraine have not met expectations that a ‘cyber Pearl Harbour’ would form part of the next large-scale military confrontation. Victor Zhora, Deputy Chairman and Chief Digital Transformation Officer of the SSSCIP (the State Special Communications Service of Ukraine), provided his perspective on the lack of Russian success in the cyber domain._
+
+
+
+Ukraine, having long been targeted by Russian cyber operations, has been subject to an uptick in attacks both before and since the Russian invasion in February 2022. These can be divided into three types of cyber operations: cyber espionage that seeks to collect information and data; subversive operations including propaganda, influence and information operations; and destructive and disruptive operations – for example, those seeking to disrupt communications systems. Zhora’s contribution focused primarily on Russian destructive and disruptive operations against Ukraine and their limited success to date.
+
+Zhora suggested that some key Russian accesses to Ukrainian networks were compromised before the February 2022 invasion. This denied Russia the ability to leverage these to deliver cyber operations. Attempts to secure new accesses are time-consuming and complicated, thereby delaying any potential impact operations.
+
+Further, Zhora identified several resource challenges to Russian operations that he argued have limited their effectiveness. He argued that the emigration of Russian tech professionals has seen a ‘brain drain’ of vital skills from Russia, which has constrained its ability to deploy sophisticated hacking capabilities against Ukraine as the war has unfolded.
+
+Zhora also asserted that Western sanctions have played a part in limiting Russia’s cyber effectiveness. Many states, led by the EU and the US, have imposed increased sanctions against Russia since February 2022, including in the area of technology. Zhora argues these sanctions have made it challenging for Russia to expand sovereign cloud systems. Instead, Russia has to rely on servers abroad, an unattractive choice given that many Western tech companies have stopped selling cloud services in Russia, and that the Kremlin also fears that data stored on foreign cloud services is more easily monitored by foreign intelligence agencies. Zhora believes that, among other things, this has hampered Russia’s ability to launch cyber operations.
+
+___`Private sector support is a vital part of Ukraine’s cyber defence, and cooperation with international partners has been key to Ukrainian success`___
+
+In addition, Zhora acknowledged the fundamental point that in a brutal kinetic conflict like Russia’s war against Ukraine, destructive cyber operations are simply much less relevant. Russia is using traditional kinetic weapons to achieve desired effects on critical infrastructure, rather than attempting to undertake complex cyber operations.
+
+
+### Russian Weaknesses Meet Ukrainian Strengths
+
+Alongside Russia’s issues, Zhora highlighted the strength of Ukrainian cyber defence as a decisive factor limiting Russian successes in cyberspace. As Russian weaknesses and Ukrainian strengths are two sides of the same coin, it makes sense to take a closer look at what makes Ukraine’s cyber defence successful. He highlighted two factors: continued private sector support, and the support of overseas governments and volunteers who have joined Ukrainian efforts in cyberspace.
+
+
+### Private Sector Support for Ukrainian Cyber Defence
+
+Ukrainian cyber defence has been bolstered by the rapid delivery of cyber capacities and capabilities by the private sector. This has, broadly, materialised in two ways. First, companies have provided direct support to the Ukrainian government ecosystem. In this case, big tech companies such as Microsoft, Google and Amazon have been forward-leaning across diverse areas including the provision of licenses, threat hunting and cloud migration. Second, companies have been contracted by foreign governments to provide support. The UK Ukraine Cyber Programme, for example, has engaged partnerships with industry to provide incident response to support Ukrainian government entities against malicious attacks and tools to limit attacker access to vital networks. Private sector support is a vital part of Ukraine’s cyber defence, and cooperation with international partners has been key to Ukrainian success.
+
+
+### Volunteers Supporting Ukrainian Cyber Defence Efforts
+
+Throughout his talk, Zhora repeatedly stressed the importance of efforts by ‘volunteers’ to Ukrainian successes – including in cyberspace. Zhora explicitly mentioned private sector-led schemes which allow volunteers to identify vulnerabilities in Ukrainian networks; however, the label also encompasses Ukrainian patriotic hackers who launch offensive cyber operations, including against Russian civilian infrastructure. The level of involvement by the Ukrainian government with these networks is problematically unclear, given that the extent of government control has consequences under international law. While Ukrainian officials frequently claim there is no coordination, there has at the very least been encouragement from the authorities. For example, Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov urged ‘digital talents’ to join the ‘Ukrainian IT army’ – essentially a loosely organised movement made up of members of a Telegram chat who not only identify and patch Ukrainian vulnerabilities, but also target Russian and Belarusian infrastructure. The Ukrainian IT army has raised questions concerning international law, including fears that the civilianisation of cyber operations is ‘a risky trend’. Throughout the conversation, Zhora was careful not to refer directly to the ‘Ukrainian IT army’, but instead spoke exclusively of the supporting role of volunteers and Ukrainian plans to incorporate a cyber reserve into military structures, a proposal that is reportedly inspired by the Estonian Cyber Defense Unit.
+
+___`While there have been no overwhelmingly destructive cyber attacks in Ukraine so far, the cyber front is far from ‘quiet’`___
+
+
+### Cyber Warfare in Ukraine Setting Precedents
+
+The absence of a strategically significant destructive cyber campaign targeting Ukraine does not mean that the role of cyber operations in interstate relations should be underestimated. On the contrary, countries will continue to monitor the effectiveness of cyber operations in Ukraine, as it represents a pivotal case study. Both China and Taiwan will doubtless be looking for lessons to improve their respective capabilities. More broadly, other countries need to ask themselves what they can do to strengthen their cyber defences. Zhora spoke about a number of measures taken to improve Ukrainian cyber defences, repeating often heard but nonetheless vital calls for greater cyber security awareness, education and training. However, implementing procedures and protocols requires a trained cyber workforce – a global problem which is not unique to Ukraine.
+
+
+### No Reason to Relax on Cyber Defence – Support for Ukraine Remains Needed
+
+When asked whether he expects destructive Russian cyber attacks will continue to have minimal impact, Zhora stressed that this depends largely on Ukrainian defence capabilities. He warned that Russia persists in seeking greater effect through its cyber operations, pointing to ongoing efforts to identify vulnerabilities in Ukrainian systems. For Ukraine’s allies, this means that support for the country’s cyber defence must be maintained. Continued support from international partners – notably those within the NATO alliance like the US and UK – and support from the private sector remain pivotal. Zhora explained, for example, that Ukrainian budgets for cyber defence have decreased given the need to purchase kinetic weapons. Without the necessary resources – whether it is money, people or technology – Ukraine’s cyber defence risks faltering.
+
+While there have been no overwhelmingly destructive cyber attacks in Ukraine so far, the cyber front is far from ‘quiet’. Cyber remains a key domain across which Russia seeks operational effects to impact and disrupt Ukraine, as well as to influence and undermine its position. As such, continued efforts towards cyber defence must remain crucial for Ukraine, its supporters and its allies – be they in the public or private sector.
+
+---
+
+__Pia Hüsch__ is a Research Analyst in cyber, technology and national security. Her research focusses on the impact, societal risks and lawfulness of cyber operations. Prior to joining RUSI, Pia conducted her doctoral research on the lawfulness of low-intensity offensive cyber operations in international law, particularly under the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Her other research interests include the governance of cyberspace, election interference, cyberwarfare and the relationship between law and technology, including cyber and artificial intelligence.
+
+__Joseph Jarnecki__ is a Research Fellow in cyber threats and cyber security. His research focuses on cyber security capacity building and how advanced technologies pose opportunities and risks to economic security. Prior to joining RUSI, he worked as a research assistant at King’s College London on projects focusing on practices of democratic oversight and control over intelligence services, as well as on risk and responsibility in cyber security. His research interests include UK cyber policy, both foreign and domestic, as well as transnational data security, ransomware, the development of smart cities and the place of the internet in developing democratic and economic participation.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-01-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-61.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-01-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-61.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7b33cc31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-01-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-61.md
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 61 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方呈各被告及共謀者加入串謀時間 官多番質疑
+- 辯方指被告不曾就無差別否決財案達協議 法官周五就「共謀者原則」裁決
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（1日）踏入審訊第61天。控方今應法官要求提交列表，說明本案串謀形成、及各被告和共謀者加入串謀的時間。控方重申本案串謀於2020年1月飯局由區諾軒和戴耀廷形成，惟法官質疑區諾軒當時並無同意戴耀廷運用否決權的主張。控方又指，鄭達鴻出席公民黨記者會、公民黨以黨名義簽「墨落無悔」均可顯示鄭參與串謀，惟法官質疑並非所有公民黨黨員都是共謀者。
+
+此外，控方指前民主動力總幹事黎敬輝於參與協調會議時加入串謀，指會上談及否決預算案，黎知悉下仍多次出席會議和設計提名表格。惟法官質疑，黎只是受薪工作，不代表同意會上說法；又舉例法官受僱於司法機構才須每天出席審訊，但不代表同意控方說法，強調「單單知情從不足以令人成為串謀一分子」。
+
+#### 控方列表包括傳聞證供 官指不能用以顯示串謀存在
+
+控辯雙方本周就「共謀者原則」作法律爭議，法官陳慶偉昨要求控方提交列表，列明本案串謀形成，及各被告和共謀者加入串謀顛覆國家政權的日期。控方今早向法庭及辯方提交列表，當中控方須有獨立證據證明被告參與串謀，才能援引「共謀者原則」。
+
+法官李運騰甫開庭先指出，文件有部分段落顯示為藍色，示意為傳聞證據（hearsay evidence），該些證據須引「共謀者原則」才能呈堂；法官陳仲衡亦指，要顯示被告加入串謀便須有該些證據外的獨立證據。周天行指若然如此，可以不理會相關部分。法官陳慶偉其後指，控方不能同時用相關言行顯示串謀的存在，又再引「共謀者原則」指該些言行證明了其他共謀者說法。
+
+#### 控方稱串謀於2020年1月形成 官質疑區諾軒無同意戴耀廷稱否決財案
+
+就串謀於何時形成，李運騰關注控方是否準確反映本案證據，舉例控方指由於2020年1月的飯局上戴耀廷提及「大殺傷力憲制武器」，故串謀當時已由戴耀廷和區諾軒形成。惟李指據他記憶，區諾軒無提及於飯局已同意戴耀廷稱運用否決權迫特首下台，區是在後來才意識到計劃的目的，區也沒被問及1月時是否已形成協議。周天行指最終會由法庭決定給予區諾軒證供多少比重，但認為表面上（prima facie）在飯局時，戴耀廷有與區諾軒談及否決權或「攬炒」，區在飯局後亦有作出一連串行為。
+
+
+▲ 副刑事檢控專員(III) 周天行
+
+惟陳慶偉即指，區只是同意為35+計劃進行協調的行政工作，認為計劃只是為爭取立會過半才同意參與；而當時亦未決定是否採用公民投票。陳續指，區明確提及5月5日第二次新東會議後才有「風向轉變」，參與者始關注否決預算案的議題，而區稱一直不同意戴耀廷，只是沒提出反對。陳並語帶嚴厲問控方：「因此你怎能說2020年1月，串謀已經形成？」
+
+周天行回應，是依賴區諾軒一直知悉否決預算案的想法。陳慶偉指區或者知悉，「但我不關心他是否知悉，我關心他何時加入串謀。」周重申是2020年1月底。李運騰終無奈指：「如果這已是你能做到的最好，那就這樣吧。（“If that is the best that you can do, then so be it.”）」
+
+#### 控方稱鄭達鴻3.25公民黨記者會已加入串謀 稱顯示充分知悉黨立場 官質疑僅舉紙牌
+
+李運騰續提到，控方指鄭達鴻於3月25日公民黨記者會已加入串謀，並列出另外7個後備日期。李指該記者會是否「35+計劃」的一部分有待決定，陳慶偉亦指記者會上「鄭達鴻除了拿着紙牌站在那裏，什麼都沒有做」。周指「至少能顯示他充分知悉（fully aware）公民黨的立場」，惟李指除了「知悉」，控方亦須有鄭以行動支持該說法的證據。
+
+陳慶偉亦指：「每個讀過戴耀廷文章的人都會知道他的意圖，但他們有沒有加入（串謀）？」周續解釋，控方並非只依賴3月的證據，亦依賴鄭達鴻之後的一連串行為，以讓法庭推斷他最早於3月已加入串謀。而對控方指鄭3月26日出席港島首次協調會議顯示參與串謀，陳慶偉質疑會上雖提出否決預算案，但司馬文提出反對，沒有達成共識，「你怎能說鄭達鴻於3月26日加入了串謀？」
+
+
+▲ 2020年3月25日 公民黨記者會
+
+#### 控方承認無直接證據鄭達鴻收到協議文件
+
+控方亦提及，5月19日港島初選參選人已就協議的字眼達成共識，戴耀廷並於6月8日將協議發出組織者群組。李運騰問有否證據顯示鄭達鴻於5月19日收到該份文件，周說可以作推論。李指區諾軒只是聽到戴耀廷稱已傳閱文件，追問控方基於什麼推論，周指是因鄭有出席會議。惟李笑指，區也曾稱協議文件不一定是會議的決議，只是戴耀廷嘗試加諸他人身上的個人意見。
+
+周在追問下，指可據6月8日戴耀廷發出的文件推論鄭有收到文件，惟同意鄭達鴻不在組織者群組，但指可顯示各區已達成共識，林卓廷輕聲說「嘩」。周最後承認並沒有直接證據鄭收到該文件，重申依賴法庭推斷。
+
+#### 控方稱公民黨簽「墨落」顯示鄭達鴻加入串謀 官反問是否所有公民黨員都是共謀者
+
+陳慶偉續引列表，指公民黨於6月11日簽署「墨落無悔」聲明書，但問為何控方指公民黨簽署就等於鄭達鴻加入了串謀。周天行答因鄭是公民黨黨員，惟李運騰問：「那是否代表所有公民黨黨員都變成了共謀者？當然不是。」
+
+李追問，控方立場是否指鄭於3月25日成了共謀者，而其他日子的證據均是讓法庭用作推論。周起初否認，陳慶偉續再追問，周一度望着法官靜默，陳說「不要望着我」。周續同意，列表上所有證據均可用以推論鄭達鴻於3月25日已加入串謀，而若法庭不同意該日期，則可採納之後的後備日期，而所有證據均可用來佐證。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+#### 官問有何證據黎敬輝為共謀者 指黎屬民動總幹事、設計提名表格屬工作
+
+此外，控方亦指前觀塘區議會主席蔡澤鴻、前民主動力總幹事黎敬輝，及前公民黨立法會議員郭榮鏗為共謀者。就黎敬輝，控方指他於3月26日首次港島協調會議加入串謀。惟李運騰指，黎只是被趙家賢要求出席會議，問除了他在場抄筆記外，還有沒有其他獨立證據顯示他是串謀的一分子。
+
+周天行指黎也是民主動力總幹事。李運騰即笑說：「但這是他的工作。」周回應，即使協調會議有談及否決預算案，黎仍多次（repeatedly）出席會議。陳慶偉即提高聲調說：「這是他的工作！他的工作！他必須在那裡！拜託！（“It's his job! His job! He has to be there! Please!”」周天行指黎也有設計提名表格，李運騰指那不代表他同意當中內容。陳慶偉亦指黎是民主動力總幹事、是唯一的全職員工，「如果不是他設計，那由誰設計？」周回應表格有顯示計劃的「共識」，惟陳指那是另一議題。
+
+陳慶偉再追問還有什麼證據顯示黎是共謀者，周指「基本上這就是我們的所有證據」，陳再語帶不耐煩，語氣稍重說：「聽着！因為我是香港政府司法機構的員工，所以我才每天要來這裡，記錄你說的話」，李運騰亦指「不代表我們同意你的說法」。周僅重申是因黎有出席協調會議，陳慶偉再大聲問：「除了那以外，還有什麼？」周再答：「那就是我們所有的。（“I think that is all we have.”）」
+
+李運騰總結，控方立場是否即由於黎出席會議，為35+計劃提供支援，所以他自願支持整個計劃，周同意，亦同意法官指趙家賢曾稱民主動力工作報告是由職員所撰寫，故不僅依賴黎出席會議來顯示他為共謀者。
+
+#### 官稱黎敬輝僅會議出席者、單單知情不足以成為串謀一分子
+
+就控方指黎敬輝於3月26日首次港島會議加入串謀，李運騰重申當天會上戴耀廷雖談及否決預算案，但對此無共識，「他（黎敬輝）可能聽過（戴耀廷說法），但這令他成為串謀一分子嗎？」，指聽過不代表同意，陳仲衡亦指黎也有聽到會上反對運用否決權的看法。
+
+周續指，黎有出席的5月8日新西會議上「會運用」獲一致通過，惟李運騰再指黎嚴格來說並非計劃參與者（participant），只是會議出席者（attendee）。周重申因黎「一直都知道（否決預算案的想法）」，惟李強調「單單知情從不足以令人成為串謀一分子（“Knowledge alone is never sufficient to make one a party to conspiracy.”）」，周天行同意，並指是依賴一連串行為來推論黎參與了串謀。
+
+#### 官問郭榮鏗於35+角色、指郭無參加初選 控方指曾出席宣傳初選街站
+
+至於郭榮鏗，控方同指他於3月25日公民黨記者會加入串謀。李運騰問，除了他在場並支持會上發言，他在整個「35+計劃」有何角色？直言「他從沒參與任何協調會議、從沒參加初選」。周天行指郭於該記者會上發言、亦是公民黨一員，其後公民黨也有簽署「墨落無悔」。李重申並非所有公民黨員都成為共謀者，周指他不是說所有黨員都是，李追問那為何要單獨挑出郭，周再重複指因郭在記者會上發言，並於7月12日出席公民黨街站。
+
+
+▲ 郭榮鏗
+
+由於今早始收到控方列表，辯方表示需時準備，押後約一小時作出回應。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，踏入審訊第61天。控方應法官要求交代各被告和共謀者加入串謀的時間，並列出可顯示被告參與串謀的證據。惟多名辯方大狀均指相關證據不充分，亦強調本案不曾達成無差別否決預算案的協議，只是從政者嘗試參與初選和表達一些主張，即使有協議也只是同意舉行初選為民主派爭勝算。
+
+其中吳政亨被控方指為組織者，其代表大狀強調吳雖與戴耀廷有聯繫並發起「三投三不投」約束初選參選人，但吳僅着重團結民主派，無意加入戴耀廷無差別否決預算案的串謀，與戴耀廷即使達成協議，也與本案協議不同。法官周五（2日）將就控方能否援引「共謀者原則」作出裁決。
+
+#### 辯方：提名表格和收據無說明各區確實達成之共識 不足以顯示參與串謀
+
+控方今應法官要求提交各被告和共謀者加入串謀日期的列表，遭法官多番質疑，辯方其後進行回應。代表黃碧雲和林卓廷的大律師沈士文重申，《國安法》生效前的共謀者言行不能在「共謀者原則」下指證各被告，如要應用該原則便須先有獨立合理證據證明有串謀存在。而該原則如適用，則以被告加入串謀的日子為分界，此前的傳聞證據（hearsay evidence）均不得在該原則下呈堂，僅能顯示串謀的性質和範圍，只有此後的證據才能顯示被告的參與程度。
+
+沈並指，控方依賴被告報名初選的提名表格和按金收據作為各被告參與串謀的證據，但該兩份文件本身並沒有說明各區確實達成的共識，不足以證明被告參與串謀。
+
+#### 控方搜林卓廷筆記提積極運用否決權 辯方稱或有他人準備、初選論壇言論相反
+
+就控方指從林卓廷家搜得「初選Debate Notes」可顯示他參與串謀，當中就會否反對預算案，筆記稱「胡志偉一再公開回應話會積極運用」和「其實我立法會四年沒有贊成過財政預算案」。沈士文指筆記從沒被使用，可能由他人準備，即使由林準備也可能只是草稿或出錯；又指林在初選論壇表明若政府建醫院和學校就不會否決預算案，直言不能顯示林同意該筆記內容。李運騰表示控方或指可從所有證據作推論，惟沈指那是不能接受。
+
+至於控方指從黃碧雲電腦搜得九龍西的協議文件，沈指不代表是由戴耀廷發給她。李運騰指若黃有該文件，或能推論她是知悉文件內容下報名參加初選，合理推論她參與串謀，惟沈認為仍不足夠；沈亦指，黃沒有如控方稱出席首次九西協調會議，據區諾軒稱會議亦無就否決財案達成共識，而黃於初選論壇僅稱可用不同《基本法》權力爭取五大訴求，無證據她同意無差別否決。
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲（左）、李予信（右）
+
+#### 辯方稱初選僅從政者表達主張無達成協議、公民黨簽「墨落」不代表鄭達鴻認同
+
+代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的大律師黃宇逸則重申，區諾軒作供時稱與戴耀廷的「初心」不同，無明確證據協議何時形成。他亦認為公民黨簽署「墨落無悔」不能代表鄭達鴻，指所有其他參與者均以個人名義簽署，只有公民黨以黨名義簽署，背後一定有原因。黃又指鄭只是在3月25日公民黨記者會上站着舉紙牌，不足以證明當時已加入串謀。惟陳慶偉指，若鄭於會上只是單單站着望向某處，可接受他未必同意會上內容，李運騰補充或者他搖頭示意；陳仲衡亦指需考慮所有因素，包括鄭參與初選等。
+
+黃宇逸強調，本案任何階段均沒有達成涉案串謀協議，只是從政者嘗試參與初選和表達一些主張，李運騰笑指即是他們說出誇大的話而沒有意圖實踐，黃笑言「基本上那是所有從政者做的事」，李稱不肯定他的當事人會否同意。黃亦指，無證據鄭達鴻和梁國雄收到協議文件，而控方有關郭榮鏗是共謀者的證據薄弱（flimsy），李運騰回應法庭會仔細審視控方依賴的每則證據。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+#### 辯方稱港島無就否決財案達共識 官反駁指司馬文退出初選可見有協議曾達成
+
+代表楊雪盈的大律師張耀良則指，控方依賴趙家賢稱楊出席首次港島會議，惟趙當天遲到早走，相反區諾軒負責協調該區，記憶較可靠，而區稱楊僅派代表出席。張又指，區稱港島所有會議均無就否決財案達共識，惟法官陳慶偉不同意，指由於司馬文反對運用否決權而退出初選，可見會上一定有達成協議。但張表示對說法存疑。
+
+
+▲ 楊雪盈
+
+#### 辯方稱本案沒有無差別否決預算案協議 有被告指協議僅舉行初選爭民主派勝算
+
+多名辯方大狀均指本案沒有達成無差別否決預算案的協議，包括代表彭卓棋的大律師盧敏儀和代表何啟明的大律師阮偉明。阮指即使有協議，也只是舉行初選爭取民主派立會勝算的協議。自行代表的劉偉聰亦反對控方所有指稱他加入串謀的日期，認為沒有任何獨立證據顯示他參與涉案串謀。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+
+▲ 何啟明
+
+#### 辯方指蔡澤鴻與黎敬輝情況相若 官不同意 指蔡非僅與會者
+
+代表施德來的大律師黃廷光亦認為沒有任何串謀，也無證據證施參與串謀；並認為控方指為共謀者的蔡澤鴻情況與前民主動力總幹事黎敬輝相若，只是於35+計劃進行後勤（logistic）工作。惟法官李運騰不同意，認為蔡的參與更多，負責組織九東協調會議、發電郵、提供開會場地和協助主持會議，會後亦向與會者發送文件，非單純的與會者；又指蔡曾向組織者稱九東參選人望簽協議、否則會「兵變」，因此施德來等人才提交共同綱領。李運騰又問為何關注蔡澤鴻，指即使他非共謀者，若施與戴耀廷達成串謀協議，相關證據也可納入考慮；黃指若蔡非共謀者，其證據便不可用來指證參選九東的施。
+
+
+▲ 施德來（右）
+
+#### 辯方指「墨落」不代表倡無差別否決財案、提名表格僅限協調會議共識
+
+代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑則表示，就控方援引4月14日會上鄒家成提及「要用盡方法去迫政府回應五大訴求」，只是趙家賢的證供，惟趙會上不專注，供詞與區諾軒和鍾錦麟不一致，若依賴或有疑慮。至於控方援引新東協議文件，陳指區諾軒亦不肯定是否如實反映各人共識。
+
+就5月5日新東第二次會議，陳指會上或有激烈討論否決權，但最終投票不果。陳慶偉指是鄒家成要求投票，其他人不同意，「那不是反映他想加入戴耀廷的串謀嗎？」陳世傑回應控罪並非只指一兩個人串謀，而是所有被告。陳慶偉指那不重要，李運騰亦指只要有人與戴耀廷達成協議便可成立，與其他被告是否無辜無關。陳世傑另指，「墨落無悔」並無提倡無差別否決預算案，而提名表格列明要同意的亦僅限於協調會議上的共識。
+
+#### 辯方批控方列出後備日期讓法庭決定做法不能接受
+
+陳世傑最後就控方列出後備日期的做法回應，認為控方應有清晰的立場，如說「Plan B」就是「Plan B」，而不是列出「Plan A至Z」，再讓法庭決定，指做法是不能接受，李運騰微笑說法庭今早已表達過相似的情緒。
+
+代表李予信的大律師關文渭則指，部分控方證據為傳聞證供、不能接納，包括無證據李曾收過超級區議會的協議文件；就「公民黨」簽署「墨落無悔」也無清楚證據顯示何為公民黨，李運騰一度回應是已通過清盤的政黨。關又指在6月的公民黨街站李予信沒有發言，惟法官指李當天在場或可證他支持。
+
+#### 辯方指吳政亨與戴耀廷達成的協議與本案指控不同、僅關注初選是否具約束力
+
+代表吳政亨和余慧明的大律師石書銘則表示，控方以吳政亨與戴耀廷於3月的 WhatsApp 對話紀錄指吳參與串謀，但該些對話不能得出二人共同目的就是否決預算案。李運騰稱控方是指雖然吳沒參選，但透過發起「三投三不投」確保參選人服從協調機制，支持「35+計劃」；石書銘同意，但強調控方是指控被告同意無差別否決預算案，而上述證據或未能指向此，同意法官總結吳參與的串謀與本案控罪不同。
+
+石書銘其後援引吳政亨文章〈【初選聯署】立會有初選啦！但有無約束力？睇你簽唔簽名〉，提及「執筆之時，戴耀廷教授剛於訪問中透露直選協調進展」，又指「好消息當然是五區協調成功」。李運騰質疑若吳作為局外人，為何會得知發生何事；陳慶偉亦指文章提及「怎料，看了細節，比預期更佳！先前傳聞令一衆候選人爭持不下的『共同綱領』，也達到完滿結果。所有參與會議的五區候選人都同意簽署協議書『會（積極）運用』基本法賦予權力，包括否決財政預算案」，指吳似乎也讀過共同綱領。惟石指吳只是從戴耀廷訪問以及「先前傳聞」得知，吳亦沒有表明是否同意運用否決權。
+
+石又指，吳的重點是在團結民主派，而本案所有證據也顯示他只關注初選是否具約束力，沒有提過否決預算案。而他與戴耀廷最後一次 WhatsApp 對話是2020年7月3日，之後二人沒有對話，吳並於7月28日與戴講再見。惟法官李運騰指，吳政亨也在《蘋果日報》就初選登廣告並發給戴，亦曾就撰寫的新聞稿徵詢戴意見，並要求戴向其他參選人分發，戴回應已辦妥。石書銘強調，無論吳政亨和戴耀廷同意了什麼，也是與本案不同的另一個串謀，該協議的範圍也很有限。
+
+
+▲ 吳政亨
+
+#### 官以打劫為喻問知情而買車者是否共謀 辯方強調吳政亨無意加入否決財案串謀
+
+陳慶偉其後主動打比喻，假設三名法官計劃打劫銀行，而他的書記雖然不認識其餘兩人、也不知計劃細節，但得悉大概的計劃後與陳達成協議，同意為陳買車和擔任司機，那書記是否本案的共謀者？二人的串謀協議與打劫計劃是否分開？並指書記可類比吳政亨。
+
+石回應被告要定罪不僅在於他知情、亦需同意該共同目的，惟吳政亨的情況不同。但陳仲衡指，石援引的文章正顯示吳知道35+是關於否決預算案；李運騰亦指被告不一定需「打劫」，只是參與整個計劃的一部分也可入罪。石重申吳無意加入戴耀廷無差別否決預算案的串謀。
+
+#### 法官周五就能否引「共謀者原則」頒決定
+
+法官陳慶偉終表示，將於周五（2日）就能否援引「共謀者原則」作出裁決，其中黃碧雲、林卓廷、何啟明、何桂藍等或會視乎結果提出毋須答辯。
+
+控方其後應石書銘要求傳召一名警方社交媒體專家證人作盤問，控方亦另傳召一名警方社交媒體專家證人，就戴耀廷一則帖文作供。法官李運騰一度驚訝指以為控方已傳畢所有證人。
+
+就第二名證人，控方原稱只需5分鐘，惟最終該證人作供逾半小時仍未完成。陳慶偉面露不快，大聲叫控方問好問題，又質問控方為何只稱需5分鐘，並將案件押至明早續。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-02-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-62.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-02-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-62.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-02-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-62.md
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 62 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 法官裁定「共謀者原則」不適用於《國安法》生效前言行
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（2日）踏入審訊第62天。控辯雙方就「共謀者原則」作法律爭議3日後，3名《國安法》指定法官今裁定，「共謀者原則」只適用於2020年7月1日《國安法》生效後的共謀者言行，而《國安法》前的共謀者言行並不能納為該原則下的證據，只能以非傳聞證據的用途呈堂，意味不能依賴相關言行所述為事實來指證各被告參與本案串謀。而對辯方反對將匿名證人就新西協調會議的片段和錄音呈堂，法官指相關證據與本案有關，無充分理由拒絕呈堂，但同裁定僅可用作非傳聞證據的用途，詳細理由押後頒布。控方表示案情完結，林卓廷、黃碧雲、何桂藍及吳政亨表示擬申請毋須答辯，法官下令雙方呈交書面陳詞，並押至下周四（8日）處理。
+
+#### 法官裁定《國安法》前言行不能納為「共謀者原則」下證據 包括匿名證人新西會議片段
+
+3名《國安法》指定法官今裁定，共謀者於2020年7月1日《國安法》生效前的言行並不能納為「共謀者原則」下的證據，但仍可以非傳聞證據的用途（non-hearsay purpose）呈堂。至於《國安法》生效後的共謀者言行，法官認為已滿足案例列明的條件，故「共謀者原則」適用。法官並強調，現時只處理證據呈堂性的問題，但就證據的比重未下任何決定。
+
+代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 早前反對匿名證人X的錄音和片段呈堂。法官今裁定，基於上述決定，相關證據亦不能在「共謀者原則」下呈堂，但仍可以非傳聞證據的用途呈堂；並指相關證據與考慮本案控罪有關，沒有充分理由運用酌情權剔除。法官會押後頒布詳細理由。
+
+
+▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel（資料圖片）
+
+#### 控方指引「共謀者原則」目的為證涉案言行真實性 辯方稱有相應門檻須符合
+
+控辯雙方本周處理「共謀者原則」的法律爭議，涉控方能否引用「傳聞證據」指證各被告。「傳聞證據」指「聽人講」的證據，即「某人告訴法庭另一人曾對他說過什麼」。一般而言，考慮到相關證據未必可靠也未經盤問，「傳聞證據」在刑事審訊中不可呈堂，即不能依賴所述內容為真確來指證被告。但某些情況例外，如在「共謀者原則」下，其他共謀者的言行即使是「傳聞證據」，也可用作指證各被告。
+
+綜合連日陳詞，辯方稱引用「共謀者原則」的前提為有證據顯示涉案串謀存在、亦有「獨立及合理的證據」顯示被告為串謀一分子，以及相關言行是為推動該串謀而進行；而被告加入串謀前的證據僅能顯示串謀的性質和範圍，只有此後的證據才能顯示被告的參與程度。
+
+本案中不少證據均屬傳聞證據，包括戴耀廷的文章、控方證人轉述戴耀廷的說法、前民主動力總幹事黎敬輝向趙家賢發出的協調會議筆記等，當中不少均於《國安法》生效前發生。辯方曾強調，《國安法》前的言行不構成任何罪行，「共謀者原則」並不適用；但控方指被告當時已涉串謀公職人員行為失當，具有非法的共同目的，故「共謀者原則」也適用於當時的言行。
+
+法官曾指，即使沒有「共謀者原則」，《國安法》生效前的言行仍可作為背景或環境證供推論被告的犯罪意圖和思想狀態，及串謀的性質範圍。控方同意，但強調望引用該原則證明共謀者的言行內容屬實，以指證被告參與串謀。而根據法庭今天的裁定，即意味《國安法》前共謀者的言行，例如區諾軒引述戴耀廷稱已將協議文件發給參與者、趙家賢稱獲戴確認新東第二次會議曾投票通過「會運用」否決權、黎敬輝的協調會議筆記、新西協調會議的片段等，相關說法或內容都不能被視為真實以證明被告參與本案串謀；只能用作非傳聞證據的用途，如證明戴耀廷和黎敬輝的確有如此說過。
+
+
+
+#### 控方指已完成案情 黃碧雲等擬申毋須答辯 押下周四陳詞
+
+法官宣布決定後，控方表示已完成控方案情，黃碧雲、林卓廷及何桂藍一方均表示擬作中段陳詞，要求毋須答辯（no case to answer），即爭議本案表面證供不成立。
+
+代表黃碧雲及林卓廷的大律師沈士文預計書面陳詞有40頁，惟法官陳慶偉指太長，亦認為沈指預計在下周五（9日）作口頭陳詞所需時間太長。代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 則指其陳詞會在10頁以內，陳慶偉指這正是他打算設下的頁數上限。代表吳政亨的大律師梁麗幗則指需時索取指示，吳或會要求毋須答辯。
+
+陳慶偉最後表示，各被告的書面陳詞不可多於10頁，並須於下周一（5日）前呈交控方及法庭，控方則須於下周三（7日）前呈交不多於30頁的回應，雙方於下周四（8日）作口頭陳詞。陳強調就頁數限制已是「非常慷慨（very generous）」，李運騰亦指若真的證據不足，辯方無需長篇幅交代，「你說得越多，機會就越少。」
+
+代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的大律師黃宇逸一度指，得悉沈士文的陳詞會提及有關法律的議題，望能保留對相關裁決的權利。法官質疑若他要作申請便提出，陳仲衡亦指「你不能做 freerider」，李運騰並指若法庭有相關裁決會適用於所有人，但現時尚未是時候處理。
+
+#### 官質疑控方花時間在無用證據上 控方致歉
+
+此外，控方昨傳召一名警方社交媒體專家證人，就戴耀廷一則 Facebook 帖文作供，但由於他作供逾半小時，比起原先稱的5分鐘用更多時間，遭法官批評。署理助理刑事檢控專員羅天瑋今早甫開庭指，沒有其他問題向該警員發問。法官陳慶偉質疑為何控方要傳召該名警員，羅指因相關部分未納為同意事實，惟法官李運騰指似乎該部分僅對辯方有利。
+
+陳慶偉語帶不滿問：「為何需要花近一小時在無用的證據上？」在延伸庭的黃之鋒及吳敏兒均發笑。陳慶偉又向控方強調：「聽住，你要注視在整體大局上（look at the big picture）」，並問有關證據如何協助控方案情。此時副刑事檢控專員周天行站起代為回答，指由於該帖文提及同意運用否決權，而戴耀廷向參與者發出後獲回應，控方望依賴相關回應。
+
+陳慶偉不耐煩重申：「要看整體大局，而非只看微小的事情（“Look at the big picture, not only look at one tiny tiny tiny matter.”）」，周天行指有全面看，惟陳即追問：「那為何你會容許你的下屬（junior）在這方面花近一個小時？你是本案的主控！是你作出決定！」周天行遂向法官道歉，但陳慶偉不滿道：「這是沒有用的」，並指不能每次犯錯都只是道歉，但之後又繼續犯錯，延伸庭的吳敏兒及譚凱邦不禁發笑。周天行回應會善用相關證據，陳慶偉指對那不感興趣，並着他住口及坐下：「Shut up and sit down please!」
+
+
+
+案件下周四（8日）續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-05-kingdom-of-change.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-05-kingdom-of-change.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..51117331
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-05-kingdom-of-change.md
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Kingdom Of Change
+author: Tobias Borck
+date : 2023-06-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/gknTPoC.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Saudi Arabia’s Evolving Foreign Policy"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_What lies behind Riyadh’s recent spate of diplomatic initiatives – and how likely are they to succeed?_
+
+
+
+Over the past few months, Saudi Arabia has attracted international attention with one diplomatic initiative after another – from its beginning of normalisation with Iran, to peace talks with the Yemeni Houthis, to the reintegration of Syria into the Arab League, to efforts to broker a ceasefire in Sudan, to hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during the Arab League Summit in Jeddah in mid-May.
+
+Media coverage under headlines like ‘Saudi Arabia’s journey from troublemaker to diplomat’ seems to suggest that this is the result of some sort of recent about-face in Saudi foreign policy. In reality, however, it reflects a coming to the fore of what has long been the Kingdom’s preferred approach to foreign affairs. It highlights an evolution in how Saudi Arabia is positioning itself and operating on the regional and international stage, but without indicating a change in the country’s strategic direction.
+
+One of the primary objectives of Saudi foreign policy has always been to counter and contain instability in the Middle East in order to keep threats at bay, limit risks to the free flow of oil exports from the Gulf and facilitate the Kingdom’s domestic economic development.
+
+Since the rise to power of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the mid-2010s, this has become even more explicit. Riyadh’s number-one priority is the implementation of Vision 2030, the hugely ambitious socio-economic reform programme that is supposed to transform Saudi Arabia into a modern, globally integrated knowledge economy which is less and less reliant on its hydrocarbon riches. The primary task for Saudi foreign policy is to support and enable this process, not least by reducing the threats posed to the Vision by instability or conflict in Saudi Arabia’s neighbourhood.
+
+The various actions during the early years of the Mohammed bin Salman era that earned Saudi Arabia a lot of international criticism and a reputation for imperious foreign policy adventurism were driven by this same objective.
+
+In Yemen, Saudi Arabia saw the Houthis as posing an unacceptable threat to its national security that it hoped to remove with a short and decisive military intervention. But Saudi Arabia both underestimated the Houthis and overestimated its own military capabilities, and since its start in 2015, the conflict has essentially become the Kingdom’s own ‘forever war’, one which it is increasingly eager to extricate itself from.
+
+The diplomatic and economic boycott that Saudi Arabia and others in the region imposed on Qatar in 2017 was supposed to rein in Doha’s regional activism, which Riyadh regarded as undermining regional stability. But Qatar proved to be more resilient than anticipated, and most countries around the world – including Saudi Arabia’s partners in the West – regarded the rift between the Gulf monarchies as an entirely unnecessary irritant.
+
+The November 2017 attempt to pressure then-Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri to resign in protest against Hezbollah and Iranian interference was part of a wider Saudi effort to push back against what Riyadh saw as Tehran’s malign and destabilising behaviour across the region. But the move only sparked international controversy and outrage, while Iranian influence grew.
+
+___`Saudi Arabia is not looking to substitute Beijing for Washington – it has no illusions that China would want or be able to become the main guarantor of maritime security in the Gulf`___
+
+Just as international observers could assess that these and other Saudi actions did not lead to the desired outcomes, decision-makers in Riyadh – including Mohammed bin Salman – will likely also have concluded that their approach was not working. This was also helped by the fact that Mohammed bin Salman had increasingly identified capable and trusted individuals for key positions, including his brother Khalid bin Salman at the Ministry of Defence (as Deputy Minister since 2019 and Minister since 2022) and Prince Faisal bin Farhan as Minister of Foreign Affairs (since 2019).
+
+This sense that something needed to change was further reinforced by an increasing disillusionment with US policy towards the region. Ups and downs in the bilateral relationship between Riyadh and Washington are nothing new, but over the past two decades, Saudi Arabia has grown ever more doubtful of the US’s commitment to upholding the Middle East’s basic regional order. The George W Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq, and the Obama administration’s pursuit of a nuclear deal with Iran over the heads of Saudi Arabia and other regional countries, were key moments in this regard.
+
+But the most important moment came in September 2019. A drone and missile attack on some of the Kingdom’s most important oil installations in Abqaiq and Khurais, which was widely attributed to Iran, painfully demonstrated Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability in any potential military confrontation with the Islamic Republic. More importantly, the lack of a decisive US response to the attack was taken as a sign that Washington could not be relied upon to stand up for the Kingdom’s security, or even for the security of the oil industry.
+
+In the years since, Saudi Arabia has recalibrated its foreign policy, continuing to focus on the same overall objective of supporting Vision 2030, but looking to leverage Saudi instruments of power in a more patient and pragmatic manner. This includes trying out new approaches to existing challenges while being prepared for the fact that they might not work out, and working with alternative partners where suitable, even in the face of criticism from Washington or other Western capitals. Riyadh remains open to collaborating with the US – as is evident from the current joint Saudi-US mediation efforts in Sudan – but in areas where it feels that the US has adopted an unhelpful position or is not sufficiently engaged, it is prepared to go it alone or to solicit help from China or others.
+
+Much ink has been spilled over the past year about the state of the US-Saudi relationship, with many interpreting Riyadh’s dealings with Beijing or Moscow as specifically directed against Washington or signifying an attempt to move away from the West’s orbit and towards the East. From Riyadh’s perspective, however, this is not what it is trying to do.
+
+Saudi Arabia is not looking to substitute Beijing for Washington – it certainly has no illusions that China or any other country would want or be able to take on the mantle of being the main guarantor of maritime security in the Gulf, which has been worn by the US Fifth Fleet for decades. It still sees the US and – to a lesser extent – the UK and France as its most important defence partners, and still sees Western economies as key sources of inspiration, technology and investment for making Vision 2030 a reality. The West also remains the favoured destination for investments by Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund.
+
+However, without wanting to put any of this in jeopardy, Riyadh is also looking to expand ties with China, which it increasingly regards as a strategic partner capable of much more than buying up large quantities of Saudi oil – particularly with regard to technology transfer; and with Russia, which Saudi Arabia sees as an indispensable partner in trying to manage and influence international oil markets within the context of OPEC+.
+
+Overall, Saudi Arabia is trying put itself in a position in which it can have constructive relations with everyone – including global powers that are at odds with one another – and in which disputes on specific issues do not have to lead to ruptures in relations, but can be tolerated by agreeing to disagree. This is also the posture Saudi Arabia has adopted with regard to regional affairs.
+
+___`Buoyed by impressive economic growth and a sense that its international image has mostly recovered from the crisis of the late 2010s, Saudi Arabia feels that things are going its way`___
+
+The 2017–2021 dispute with Qatar was not so much resolved as simply declared to be a thing of the past. Riyadh and Doha still do not see eye to eye on everything, but there seems to be a mutual acceptance of the need to look for ways to work together while managing disagreements quietly.
+
+Saudi Arabia has entered the process of normalising relations with Iran without any illusions that the regime in Tehran and its destabilising regional agenda have changed or will fundamentally change anytime soon. Instead, it hopes that China will exert sufficient influence over Iran to reduce risks to security in the Gulf and secure Iranian buy-in for de-escalation of the war in Yemen. At the same time, Riyadh is looking to improve its ability to defend itself against future Iranian attacks, while making a long-term bet that the success of its domestic socio-economic reforms will eventually inspire change in Arab countries dominated by Iran and, ultimately, in Iran itself.
+
+In Yemen, Saudi Arabia has – however begrudgingly – accepted that the Houthis cannot be militarily defeated for now. Working with trusted interlocutors like Oman, and hoping for Chinese influence to restrain Iran, it is therefore trying to arrive at a new modus operandi with the group, which remains in control of the Yemeni capital of Sanaa and much of the northern part of the country. It wants to secure a permanent end to cross-border attacks – especially the missile and drone strikes that threaten Saudi cities and tarnish the Kingdom’s image as an attractive place to invest and do business – and adopt a position as the main mediator between all Yemeni factions, including the Houthis and those aligned within the fragile Presidential Council arrangement. Here, it would also like the UN to be involved again.
+
+With regard to Syria, Saudi Arabia has essentially embraced and supercharged an initiative put forward by Jordan to re-engage Damascus in order to address pressing challenges. Based on a sense that the West has lost all interest in Syria now that the threat from Islamic State has been contained and overall levels of violence have decreased, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and others have come to the conclusion that they have no other option but to engage with the Assad regime in order to deal with Syrian refugee populations (a major concern for Jordan) and – most immediately – the flow of drugs from Syria, for which un- and underemployed young people across the Arab world, and especially in the Gulf, are a significant customer base.
+
+The question is, of course, what kind of concessions Saudi Arabia and its partners can actually elicit from the Syrian regime, for which the drug trade appears to be a primary source of income. The normalisation process is supposed to follow a step-for-step approach, but thus far Damascus appears to have offered next to nothing.
+
+In fact, the outcomes of all of these diplomatic initiatives by Saudi Arabia are highly uncertain. Much of it is simply outside the Kingdom’s control – from China’s actual willingness and ability to exert influence over Tehran, to the machinations of the various components of the Iranian and Syrian regimes, to the readiness of the Houthis to abandon years of intransigence. On the global stage, too, Saudi Arabia may want to be able to freely develop and expand its relations with all major powers at the same time, but it would find it very difficult indeed to navigate a world in which the US and China were to tie their own willingness to deal with the Kingdom to Riyadh shunning the other power.
+
+For the moment, Saudi Arabia’s answers to such questions reflect its self-confidence. Buoyed by impressive economic growth on the back of windfall oil revenues and a sense that its international image – and that of its Crown Prince – has mostly recovered from the crisis of the late 2010s, Saudi Arabia feels that things are going its way. It insists that it is in a strong enough position – as the world’s leading oil exporter, a G20 member with the ambition to soon be among the world’s top 15 economies, and the Arab and Islamic world’s centre of gravity – to chart its own course and to resist any pressure to choose sides. And in the region, it feels that even if its own initiatives might not be perfect, they are at least better than what anyone else has come up with in recent years.
+
+That said, should things fall apart, Saudi Arabia and its foreign policy will continue to adjust. What will remain the same, however, is Riyadh’s central mantra: doing whatever it takes to secure the ongoing development and modernisation effort at home.
+
+---
+
+__Tobias Borck__ is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East. He also co-leads the development and delivery of the RUSI Leadership Centre’s programme of executive education training courses, including for diplomats, military personnel, and security professionals from the Middle East and beyond.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Developing Bad Habits
+author: Tom Keatinge
+date : 2023-06-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Ar52et6.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "What Russia Might Learn from Iran’s Sanctions Evasion"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_It can be expected that Russia will learn to adapt and seek to establish parallel financial relations that aim to evade the sanctions set against it by Ukraine’s allies._
+
+
+
+As Western nations and their allies across the globe impose a growing raft of sanctions on the Russian economy, evidence is emerging of adaptations in Russia’s financial and trade strategy. Examples include the switching of ownership of companies and properties to family members or affiliates, the use of trading companies to source foreign exchange to avoid the sanctions imposed on the Central Bank of Russia, and import substitution, which the country has adopted since it was first targeted by Western sanctions in 2014. Alongside these steps, Russia is now gravitating further towards other states that have faced similarly sweeping restrictive measures or that facilitate sanctions evasion, to learn best practice, secure necessary services and establish trade relationships.
+
+By highlighting the experience of other rogue states, this paper examines the question of how Western governments, notably in Europe, and their private sectors could strengthen their sanctions implementation and enforcement strategies in light of potential changes in Russia’s financial activity. In particular, the paper considers techniques that Russia might learn from rogue states to create a similar – or interconnected – parallel financial system.
+
+In this regard, Iran represents a notable case study. The country has faced financial sanctions from the international community for years, seeks to fund its economy through the export of hydrocarbons, and has most recently had to adapt to the reimposition of sanctions by the US, following former US president Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), under which Iran originally received certain UN, unilateral and national sanctions reliefs related to its nuclear programme.
+
+Iran also demonstrates the kinds of symbiotic relationships (or mutually beneficial commercial partnerships) between rogue states and non-state actors (including designated terrorist groups) that can benefit from the move to clandestine finance systems. For example, Iran’s funding and resourcing of Hizbullah is reciprocated in numerous ways, including through support for the state’s intermediary oil trading schemes. Such joint ventures or marriages of convenience between rogue states and their proxies may possibly be mirrored in the ways in which private military companies patronised by Russia advance Russian interests (and enable the circumvention of sanctions) globally.
+
+To facilitate its trade and finance ambitions, Iran also co-opts service providing states, such as financial centres, where supervision and enforcement of financial crime regulations is weak.
+
+While evidence has yet to emerge of the complete adaptation of the financial systems needed by Russia to run its economy in defiance of allied sanctions, given the likely prolonged isolation of Russia from the international financial system, similar to Iran, it can be expected that it will seek to establish parallel financial relations that seek to evade the sanctions set against it by Ukraine’s allies.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+The underlying logic of the use of sanctions measures is coercion through economic restriction. If a state cannot sell goods and services to generate hard international currencies or cannot use such currencies to buy the items it needs to sustain its activities or support its regime, then eventually – the theory goes – that state will need to reconsider its course of action. To beat sanctions, therefore, targeted states need to find ways to sustain domestic economic activity and trade.
+
+Iran has been subject to some form of economic sanction since 1979. The country has had decades in which to develop finance and trade networks that facilitate the evasion of Western sanctions, from those banning Iranian imports to the US following the 1979 hostage crisis through the US designation of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984 and a range of nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions resolutions in the early 2000s to the more recent reimposition and ramping up of sanctions under former president Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign following the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018. Other countries have likewise developed mechanisms for evading Western sanctions. North Korea has established networks and structures for continuing to source the materials and funding it needs to pursue its ambition to develop its nuclear programme; Venezuela has similarly facilitated the export of oil in contravention of US sanctions; and countries as diverse as Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe have similarly grappled with evading the sanctions net imposed by the US, the EU or their allies that dominate the global financial system.
+
+But, with an economy estimated to be worth US$90 billion, and a need to export its oil and import the goods required to support its domestic and military economies, it is Iran that has developed the most sophisticated and wide-reaching mechanisms. Such mechanisms seek to allow it to operate beyond the reach of Western economic sanctions and the financial systems controlled by the US, the UK and the EU. This is particularly so since the collapse – in essence – of the JCPOA. This deal, struck in 2015, provided certain nuclear-related sanctions reliefs to Iran which, when Trump removed his support for the deal in 2018, saw sanctions on Iran “snap back”. Although the remaining signatories to the deal sought to sustain it via negotiation and financial engineering, the latter an attempt to facilitate continued trade with Iran in the face of US sanctions, the dominance of the US and the US dollar in global trade and finance has neutered these efforts.
+
+Against this background, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western officials have expressed concerns over Russia’s growing proximity to Iran and other rogue states, and the impact of these relationships on the future of the international order. One anticipated development is that these states – all subject to sanctions regimes – will share lessons on how to avoid restrictive measures and abuse the international financial system for their own malign purposes.
+
+Until February 2022, for most parts of the global financial and economic system, Russia represented a business and profit-making opportunity. Since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this position has, of course, rapidly reversed as wide-ranging sanctions have been imposed on the Russian economy and financial system. This reversal of integration has presented challenges that will require Western allies to pay detailed attention to any ongoing economic connection with Russia, while at the same time, the Kremlin will face the challenge of maintaining both its civilian and military supply chains in the face of the rupturing of previously reliable funding and resourcing connections.
+
+This paper seeks to answer the question: how should Western governments, notably those in Europe, and their private sectors strengthen their sanctions implementation and enforcement to counter changes in Russia’s financial activity that have been borrowed from rogue states?
+
+The paper has four chapters. Chapter I reviews the key measures taken by the international community to restrict the financial activity of rogue states and assess the various means by which these states have sought to blunt these efforts. To illustrate these concepts in more detail, the case of Iran is used in Chapter II to detail particular activities that may be relevant to the newest member of the rogue state club, Russia. Chapter III focuses on Russia and why and how these tools may be relevant as Western sanctions in response to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine tighten and isolate the country from its traditional markets. Chapter IV considers the current weaknesses in the financial system that are exploited by rogue states. The paper concludes with recommendations for Western policymakers and those supervising and operating in the international financial system to refocus their efforts to ensure that they are equipped with the understanding and tools to blunt the effort of rogue states to finance their malign activities via alternative financial and economic systems, described by some – and in this paper – as “clandestine finance systems” (CFSs).
+
+What emerges is a picture of varyingly complex CFSs with shared family characteristics, which use, among other techniques, overseas front companies and ledger systems to mask the financing and transacting of trade. Of particular concern, beyond the need to ensure that financial and economic restrictions placed on a country’s activities to support international security objectives are implemented, is that this activity can also be used by rogue states to transfer funds to their proxies. As the example of Iran shows, the development of a CFS can provide new avenues for state-sponsored terrorist financing, and indeed can make a virtue of a necessity by actively involving the designated terrorist group in the management of a CFS. An analysis of the activities of Russia’s private military company the Wagner Group suggests that such activity is clearly a very real possibility as Russia adapts to the pressure of international sanctions.
+
+#### Methodology
+
+This paper is informed by a review of English-language open source literature on the evasion techniques used by countries currently under stringent sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and/or coalitions of Western states. Specifically, this review was undertaken in the first quarter of 2023 and draws on material from official documents produced by international organisations such as the UN and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global anti-money-laundering and counterterrorist-financing standard setter, and national governments’ institutions and agencies, such as the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the US’s main sanctions administrator. It considers academic and policy research from online searches via Google and dedicated research databases such as EBSCO and JSTOR, and, in addition, reputable and corroborated media reporting. The research draws on credible leak databases, notably Wiki Iran, and sources relied on by professionals in governments and the private sector to support their identification of sanctions evasion activity.
+
+The research faced a number of constraints as there is limited open source information on the mechanics of CFSs. The operational effectiveness of CFSs requires those controlling them to protect “tradecraft” secrets, and those agencies dedicated to interdicting them will be wary of sharing this knowledge publicly, if known, for fear of prompting a change in the target’s behaviour. This means that much of what is known relies heavily on the public statements of government agencies taking enforcement action (most commonly OFAC) or when an international organisation is mandated to provide a review of sanctions evasion activities (such as through one of the Panel of Experts (PoEs) tasked with reviewing the implementation of UNSC resolutions). Bearing in mind the clandestine nature of this activity, interviews were only used to validate the credibility of certain sources, in particular Wiki Iran.
+
+#### Definitions and Terminology
+
+The paper uses a number of terms which vary in use and novelty. “Rogue states” was a phrase first used in 1994 by then US National Security Adviser Anthony Lake to describe countries which consistently flouted international standards and took an adversarial position towards the US and its allies. This definition is used in this paper and applied to those states that are also subject to severe UNSC and/or Western bi- or multilateral sanctions as a result of their behaviour: Belarus, Iran, Myanmar, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela.
+
+The term “clandestine finance system” is new, and – notwithstanding its use in a 2022 Wall Street Journal article on Iran – does not have wide currency in academic or policy debate. In this paper, it refers to a method, or set of methods, used by a government, government agency or a non-state actor to undertake illicit economic and/or financial activities without detection.
+
+For a third key term, “terrorist financing”, the paper draws on the work of contemporary researchers such as Jessica Davis, who define it as a set of financial activities – raising, using, storing, moving, managing and obscuring funds – undertaken to fulfil terrorist purposes, whether those purposes are operational, such as mounting attacks, or organisational, such as providing ongoing day-to-day support for the group or network. In terms of terrorist financing, the paper focuses mainly on the raising and moving of funds from states to their terrorist dependents, while also discussing active and intentional state support for terrorist groups, rather than passive state support or negligence, which might allow terrorists or their supporters to conduct financing activities unimpeded. Although some researchers treat passive support as a form of “state sponsorship of terrorism”, if included here it would potentially bring in several states for consideration not widely recognised as rogue states. A noted recent example would be Qatar, which was sanctioned by several of its regional neighbours from June 2017 to January 2021 for allegedly supporting terrorism and criticised – but not sanctioned – by the US for its failure to do enough to tackle terrorist fundraising more generally.
+
+
+### I. Targeting Rogue States
+
+his chapter reviews the methods by which the international community has targeted the financial and economic activities of rogue states and how these states have responded.
+
+There is a wide range of literature reviewing the use of sanctions, both in a historical context and considering more contemporary use from a policymaker perspective. The private sector also produces extensive research on the topic in support of banks and other regulated sectors that are required to implement asset freezes under sanctions designations. This chapter does not intend to revisit in detail this literature, but highlights why it is that rogue state CFSs have developed as a result.
+
+Sanctions are most commonly deployed by states or groups of states facing national security challenges to coerce a state back to acceptable behaviour, or at the very least punish the regime of that state. For example, the 2021 US Treasury Sanctions Review argues that the use of sanctions against Iran to prevent it from
+
+> using the international financial system and commercial markets to generate revenue through oil sales and other activities that support its nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation and support for terrorist activities ... pushed Iran to the negotiating table on its nuclear program in 2015.
+
+In the case of Iran, the review also claims that US sanctions “so significantly impaired Hizballah funding streams that in 2019 the organization had to reduce salaries for its military arm and media efforts and publicly solicit donations”.
+
+The most widely recognised sanctions are those issued by the UNSC, to which all 193 UN member states are required to adhere. Outside the UN, there are also a growing number of autonomous sanctions regimes, including those of the US, the EU, Canada, the UK and Australia. Of these, the most potent is that of the US, which uses the power and ubiquity of the US dollar in international trade not only to prevent its own nationals and businesses from engaging with designated targets (primary sanctions), but also on occasion those of other nations (secondary sanctions).
+
+The elements of these autonomous national regimes vary. Depending on the targeted country and the issuing authority, some of the most common areas of designation include: embargos on arms; military materiel and technology; trade and investment bans on key export/import sectors; and asset freezes and travel bans on individuals and entities linked to the regime or malign activities. The Western allies’ latest sanctions on Russia have gone further to also include prohibiting the use of airspace, roads and ports, and a ban on certain media outlets. There can also be asset freezes and bans on transactions for designated financial institutions, as well as restrictions on access to the infrastructure of international finance such as the SWIFT messaging system, currently affecting financial institutions in Iran (extensively) and Russia (partially).
+
+In sum, for states whose economies rely on access to international markets for trade (such as the sale and purchase of oil and other hydrocarbons) and finance, sanctions should pose a material restriction. Yet rogue states have agency, and the next section considers how these states might choose to respond.
+
+#### Rogue State Responses
+
+As noted, the underlying logic of these sanctions measures is coercion through economic restriction. If a country cannot sell goods and services to generate hard international currencies or cannot use such currencies to buy the items the state needs to sustain its activities or support its regime, then eventually – the theory goes – that state will need to reconsider its course of action. To beat sanctions, therefore, targeted states need to find ways to sustain domestic economic activity and trade.
+
+The responses of rogue states to this predicament have been varied, although there has been a familiar rhetorical commitment to self-sufficiency from states such as South Africa during the apartheid era and Iraq after the first Gulf War in 1991. In 2007, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei coined the term “resistance economy”, a concept which has developed since into a programme of initiatives which include reduced consumption and waste and more efficient use of domestic economic resources. Rogue states have also sought to continue economic interactions in commercial sectors where sanctions are more ambiguous. For many years, North Korea has sought to continue working between the cracks of UN sanctions, providing construction workers, medical services and other forms of cheap labour to sympathetic states, for example in sub-Saharan Africa. Although the UNSC required UN members to repatriate all North Korean workers by 22 December 2019, UN PoE reports continue to suggest their presence overseas.
+
+Others have continued to trade openly in commodities that are subject to unilateral sanctions (for example, sanctions from the US or the EU), but not UN-backed sanctions. Russia has sought to work around the Western designations of its oil sales by finding new buyers among “neutral” states such as China and India, who have not applied sanctions to Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A further area of open activity has been the negotiation of barter deals, which, by relying on the physical exchange of equally valued goods, potentially avoids points of contact with the US dollar or other international currencies where activity should be identified and blocked by the banking system. Such deals are being attempted between sanctioned states, such as Iran and Venezuela, but also between sanctioned and neutral partners, such as Iran and Pakistan, since December 2021. Heavily sanctioned states – Russia and Iran, for example – have also started denominating bilateral trade in their local currencies, as well as looking to trade in non-Western currencies, such as the Chinese renminbi and UAE dirhams, as a form of alternative international settlement currency to the US dollar. Last, to support the development on non-G7 currency trade, countries are establishing connected domestic currency settlement systems. For example, Russia and Iran are reportedly integrating both their national financial messaging systems and their individual bank card networks (respectively called Mir and Shetab), which is expected to facilitate the de-dollarisation of financial transactions related to bilateral trade.
+
+> #### `Case Study: The Asian Clearing Union (ACU)`
+
+_As global trade becomes more fragmented under the pressure of sanctions and efforts by those subject to sanctions to circumvent the reach of the US dollar and other G7 currencies, as indicated earlier, advance barter trade is becoming more prominent. Barter trade is a form of exchange that has existed for millennia, but in the modern era its relevance has resurged in the face of national capital controls that restrict cross-border payments, and liquidity shortages created by bilateral payment clearing between nations._
+
+_As a result of these restrictions, various settlement systems have been developed that allow for payments to be “netted”, which means that where groups of countries trade with each other, only balancing payments – rather than gross payments – need to be made between central banks._
+
+_One such settlement forum is the ACU. Formed in 1974 at the initiative of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the ACU now comprises nine members, including Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka._
+
+_In essence, the ACU facilitates trade between the member nations without the need for payment beyond a final settlement payment. Such a structure is tailor-made to support sanctions evasion as it allows countries to trade without an accompanying financial transaction. While the ACU has accounts with the formal financial system to facilitate the netting of these “IOUs” between countries, where a final balancing payment is needed, this payment can also be made in a local currency, avoiding the need to use the Western banking system. With the advent of central bank digital currencies, such balancing payments, made beyond the reach of Western authorities, are likely to become even easier._
+
+_Such settlement platforms, originally established to enhance regional trade, are likely to face a renaissance as countries face new financial system restrictions, this time caused by sanctions rather than liquidity or capital controls._
+
+_Source: [Asian Clearing Union, “ACU in Brief”](https://www.asianclearingunion.org/Home.aspx)._
+
+
+### II. Iran’s Journey of Financial System Innovation
+
+Against this outline of the different ways in which rogue states and those that facilitate their activity operate, this chapter considers the specific case of Iran.
+
+Overt trade efforts with friends and neutrals are only one aspect of how sanctioned states continue to survive. Clandestine activities are also key. Facing the dominance of US dollar pricing in international trade, rogue states need to find ways to generate dollars they do not currently have, and ways to spend them. In the first half of the requirement – making money – two methods commonly appear: secretly converting domestic currency and assets; and generating funds through committing illicit acts.
+
+Iran has a long history of seeking to respond to sanctions. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review this history, which has been addressed in detail by others. This paper therefore considers contemporary examples, taken primarily from sanctions designations made by OFAC, to demonstrate the way in which Iran has used CFSs to operate its economy while under sanctions, specifically considering currency conversion and intermediary trading.
+
+#### Currency Conversion
+
+Currency conversion requires the physical transfer of domestic currency out of the rogue state, its conversion into physical US dollars, and its successful return. In recent years, the US has outlined publicly two such cases of currency conversion linked to Iran. In May 2018, OFAC revealed a scheme where the regime’s elite military unit, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), transferred Iran’s domestic currency, the rial, in bulk to the UAE, where it was then converted into US dollars by complicit money exchange houses, an activity that was hidden from authorities through the creation of forged documentation. In a further designation in September 2021, OFAC identified another scheme involving the IRGC, where currency and gold were smuggled on commercial flights to Turkey operated by the Iranian airline Mahan Air, itself a US-designated carrier. Once the trade was completed, the currency and gold were sold via a complicit intermediary, and the proceeds were transferred by commercial flight back to Iran.
+
+#### Intermediary Trading
+
+It is, however, unrealistic to expect bulk conversion of domestic currencies – or the increasingly reported use of cryptocurrencies – to be feasible on the kind of scale necessary to support even a mid-sized economy such as Iran’s, where imports and exports are valued in the tens of billions.
+
+Some rogue states, such as North Korea, supplement this approach by conducting illicit activities. Since the 1970s, North Korea has built up an extensive charge sheet, including the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics; the counterfeiting and trafficking of pharmaceuticals, cigarettes and US currency; and the smuggling and sale of high-value items, including precious metals, stones and illegal wildlife. More recently, however, the North Korean state’s direct involvement in some of these schemes has waned, most notably narcotics trafficking, superseded by a focus on cybercrime, and in particular the theft of cryptocurrency. According to research by Chainalysis, a blockchain analytics firm, North Korean hackers stole the equivalent of US$400 million in cryptocurrencies in 2021, a figure that will be far surpassed in 2022, following hacks that have included the theft in March of US$600-million worth of cryptocurrencies from online game platform Ronin Network’s Axie Infinity game. A high proportion of these funds are reportedly cashed out over time into renminbi through offshore cryptocurrency exchanges.
+
+While converting domestic cash and generating illicit funds can make hard currency, neither provides an immediate way to use those funds to buy goods on the open market. A more sophisticated and dual-sided mechanism, allowing both the generation of funds and the means to spend them, is needed.
+
+The solution that Iran has developed is to continue trading by hiding its activities behind intermediaries, or “hidden subsidiaries”, as senior Iranian official Gholamreza Mesbahi-Moghaddam described them in a live debate in January 2021. These schemes are not identical, but they rest on similar structures and patterns, described below in a simplified composite form, drawn from explanations in several sources and illustrated in more detail with case studies:
+
+1. Entities within the rogue state, for example, Iranian banks, rahbar (“pioneer”) companies and exchange houses in Iran, are tasked with facilitating sanctioned international trade – whether exports or imports – for designated domestic sectors or businesses.
+
+2. In this, they rely on existing networks of businesses and agents based overseas who are tasked with setting up front companies and accompanying bank accounts through which to accomplish trade. These overseas networks might be managed by rogue state nationals, others posing as third country nationals, or by actual trusted third country nationals.
+
+3. When the sanctioned state needs to export goods, the front company will sell the designated product or commodity to a buyer, knowingly or otherwise, using falsified documentation. The front company will also engage complicit logistics firms to transport the goods, often using well-known techniques to hide the origin of goods, including changing ship names at sea, transferring goods ship-to-ship with electronic tracking turned off, camouflaging goods with non-designated items, or blending and relabelling commodities such as oil at major transhipment hubs. The funds for the sale will be paid into the front company’s bank account.
+
+4. Although some funds might be withdrawn and couriered back to the rogue state, most will be used instead to support import activity. Requests for imports from other designated firms or institutions will be issued to the front company, which will then apply similar techniques to buy and transport goods without revealing their destination, paying for the goods with the funds previously received into its account in receipt of exported items. To ensure that this trade balances, centralised institutions such as the Central Bank of Iran monitor this activity and run ledgers which ensure that countervailing transactions are made domestically to ensure exporters receive compensation for the original sale.
+
+These schemes can vary enormously in their complexity. For states under more limited designation, they can be relatively basic and only used to provide a cut-out for exports; for example, according to 2021 research by civil society group Justice for Myanmar, the US-designated Myanmar Timber Enterprise, the main state-owned exporter of timber in Myanmar, uses a single layer of private and undesignated Myanmar-based companies to sell its goods on to US importers. By comparison, and explored further below, the matrix of companies now being used by Iran to sell oil and related goods to customers in South, Southeast and East Asia is multilayered, with various front companies based in locations such as Turkey, the UAE and Hong Kong being used to hide the connection to Iran, sometimes “trading” the commodities with each other before dealing with the end customer in South, Southeast or East Asia.
+
+The following three case studies illustrate these forms of clandestine finance activity.
+
+> #### `Case Study 1: Iranian Petrochemical Sales`
+
+_Following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA under the Trump presidency, Iran’s intermediary trading networks were revived in response to the reimposition of sanctions by the US. Starting in 2019, OFAC designations on various components of Iran’s vast intermediary trading network aimed to forestall the country’s efforts to sell its petrochemical products in contravention of US sanctions, mostly to markets in East and South Asia. These OFAC designations are focused on interdicting the networks around two crucial brokerage nodes, Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC) and Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd. Once designated, all property and interests in property of these entities subject to US jurisdiction are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them. Importantly, furthermore, foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate significant transactions for, or persons that provide material or certain other support to, the subjects of these designations risk exposure to sanctions that could sever their own access to the US financial system or block their property and interests in property under US jurisdiction._
+
+- _In June 2019, OFAC sanctioned Iran’s largest and most profitable petrochemical holding company, PGPIC, and 39 of its subsidiaries and foreign-based sales agents, at the time accounting for 40% of Iran’s total petrochemical production capacity and 50% of its petrochemical exports._
+
+- _In January 2020, OFAC took action against Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd, a broker based in Hong Kong which ordered the transfer of the equivalent of millions of dollars to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) as payment for petroleum products (PPs) delivered to the UAE and China, concealing their Iranian origin. Other companies based in Hong Kong (Sage Energy HK Limited), China (Peakview Industries Co. Limited) and the UAE (Beneathco DMCC) were sanctioned by OFAC for the same reason._
+
+- _In September 2020, six entities based in the UAE and Hong Kong were designated for supporting Triliance’s sanctions evasion efforts by, among other things, acting as the purchaser on behalf of Triliance for hundreds of thousands of metric tonnes of Iranian PPs for onward sale. Other companies were used to settle fees owed by Triliance and to facilitate the shipment and resale of PPs._
+
+- _Further Iranian, Chinese and Singaporean companies were sanctioned in October 2020 for similarly supporting Triliance’s sanctions evasion by settling, processing and transferring the proceeds of PP sales it had brokered for Iranian producers. Chinese and Emirati companies providing shipping services and conducting financial transactions for Triliance as front companies were sanctioned in December 2020._
+
+- _More front companies for Triliance and PGPIC and enabling entities were designated by OFAC in June 2022 (including an Indian national, Mohammad Shaheed Ruknooddin Bhore, who managed multiple Triliance front companies), July, August, September and November 2022, and February and March 2023._
+
+- _The latest of these designations, in March 2023, is of particular note. As described by OFAC, 39 entities, “constituting a significant ‘shadow banking’ network”, were sanctioned, representing “one of several multi-jurisdictional illicit finance systems which grant sanctioned Iranian entities ... access to the international financial system and obfuscate their trade with foreign customers”. This and similar networks involving front companies in jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, Singapore and the UAE operate precisely the ledger systems referred to in this paper as CFSs that allow Iran to generate “the equivalent of tens of billions of dollars annually for the Iranian regime”._
+
+_As illustrated in this most recent designation by OFAC, front companies and enabling entities are almost always based in Iran, China, Hong Kong or the UAE, with some further entities based in Singapore, Malaysia and India. Resembling a game of “whack-a-mole”, it would appear that US designations and sanctions action serve to expose small portions of a vast network momentarily, only for the network to adapt and compensate with the formation and use of new companies. That sanctioned entities are all based in just a few countries speaks to the lacklustre approach – and thus high-risk nature – of these countries to taking prudent action against Iran’s intermediary trading scheme, even after multiple rounds of OFAC actions targeting companies based in their jurisdictions._
+
+_Sources: [The White House, “President Donald J. Trump is Ending United States Participation in Unacceptable Iran Deal”](https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/); [US Department of the Treasure, ...](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1330)._
+
+> #### `Case Study 2: Sitki Ayan/ASB Group`
+
+_A further example of how front companies in permissive jurisdictions can facilitate sanctions evasion is provided by the case of Sitki Ayan and ASB Group._
+
+_A dossier of business contracts and bank documents leaked in late 2022 detail the years-long involvement of a Turkish businessman (and close contact of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) and his network of companies in facilitating Iran’s sanctioned oil trade and clandestine finance schemes. Accusations made against Sitki Ayan and his Gibraltar-registered holding company ASB Group of Companies were substantiated with an extensive designation from OFAC made hours after the leak, which outlines how Ayan and his business network facilitated and concealed the sale and shipment of oil from NIOC._
+
+_Following the reimposition of US sanctions on Iran following Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, ASB found a niche in supporting Iran’s re-energised illicit oil enterprise by leasing shipping tankers through its subsidiaries to transport oil from Iran to China. ASB also routed payments through an elaborate network of shell companies and banks in India, Russia and the UAE, which, as payments were denominated in foreign currency (most commonly US dollars), were inevitably settled by international banks such as Commerzbank and J P Morgan, which failed to identify their connection with Iran. Oil shipments to Russia also relied on barter for payment, with sanctions-exempt foodstuffs including wheat and sunflower oil offering camouflage for petroleum product purchases, and leaving Iran with both valuable foreign currency and other scarce consumer goods._
+
+_Sources: [Politico, “The Turkish Connection: How Erdoğan’s Confidant Helped Iran Finance Terror”](https://www.politico.eu/article/sitki-ayan-recep-tayyip-erdogan-terrorism-hezbollah-iran-turkey-lebanon/); [US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Sanctions Evasion Network Generating Hundreds of Millions of Dollars for Qods Force Oil Sales”](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1151)._
+
+> #### `Case Study 3: IRGC/Quds Force and Hizbullah`
+
+_Alongside the widespread use of front companies in countries offering opaque corporate structures and/or with weak supervisory regimes, the Iranian state also mobilises proxies to facilitate its financial activity, notably the IRGC and its Quds Force. As a parallel security structure to Iran’s armed forces, these offer Iran a useful functionality for operating its sanctions evasion regime, particularly where operatives are based outside the country._
+
+_In March 2020, OFAC designated several IRGC-controlled front organisations used to hide its money-laundering and illicit revenue-generation activities, including a scheme involving a charitable organisation supposedly dedicated to maintaining Shiite shrines in Iraq, donations to which were redirected to supplement the IRGC’s own budget._
+
+_In the same way, and emulating a strategy employed by North Korea, Iran’s foreign embassies offer useful cover for the illicit movement of funds. Iran International reported in January 2023 that the country’s embassy in Iraq had been the site of an IRGC-maintained money-laundering operation aiding the repatriation of revenues from Iran’s illicit petrochemical product sales. Here, embassy staff receive export revenue in cash from Iraqi currency exchanges and then deposit it into the embassy’s accounts, supposedly to fund legitimate embassy operations._
+
+_Last, Lebanese Hizbullah, often assumed to be a mere recipient of funds from Iran and an ideologically aligned group, also plays a part in facilitating the CFSs of its host and benefactor. For example, to pay for its imports of Iranian oil, in 2022 Venezuela reportedly shipped gold from Caracas to Tehran using Iran-controlled Mahan Air, with senior Hizbullah officials identified as being involved in easing these shipments, later liquidated in Turkey and other nearby countries._
+
+_Sources: [OFAC’s designation of the Reconstruction Organization of the Holy Shrines in Iraq, in US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Vast Network of IRGC-QF Officials and Front Companies in Iraq, Iran”, 26 March 2020](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm957); Daniel Salisbury, “From Missions to Missiles: North Korea’s Diplomats and Sanctions-Busting”, RUSI Emerging Insights, November 2022; [Iran International, “Exclusive: IRGC Runs Iran’s Money Laundering Network in Iraq”, 2 January 2023](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202301317124); [Mojtaba Pourmohsen, “Iran Smuggling Venezuelan Gold to Finance Hezbollah: Document”, Iran International, 12 December 2023](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202212124467)._
+
+As these case studies demonstrate, complex corporate structures and financial engineering have allowed Iran to continue to operate its economy – at times by exploiting large international banks – by developing CFSs that benefit both its economy and proxies operating internationally on behalf of the country.
+
+
+### III. The Russian Response
+
+This chapter considers the Russian context, as the Kremlin seeks ways to evade the tightening Western sanctions imposed in response to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
+
+Since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western allies have placed a wide range of economic and trade sanctions on Russia to reduce its ability to fund and resource its military machine. These sanctions have targeted financial flows by reducing the Kremlin’s access not only to the international financial system but also to sales of goods – such as high-tech chips – needed to restock Russian military supplies. They are also being felt in the ability of Russia to export its oil and other hydrocarbon products, as well as to source Western expertise, such as servicing for its Airbus and Boeing civil airliners.
+
+As a result of these restrictions – and with no sign that President Vladimir Putin intends to reverse his course in Ukraine – Russia is increasingly needing to find new sources to fund its military materiel and resourcing requirements, which is encouraging the Kremlin to gravitate towards those other jurisdictions – notably Iran – that have developed their own responses to Western trade and financial sanctions.
+
+Among these responses, discussions of their experience of de-dollarisation took place during Putin’s meeting with Khamenei during the summit between Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on 19 July 2022. A reported statement from the Iranian Supreme Leader emphasised “long-term cooperation between Iran and Russia as being greatly, deeply beneficial to both countries”, marking a clear rapprochement between the countries.
+
+In November 2022, Russian and Iranian leaders met again in Tehran, with a visit from Russian Security Council secretary Nikolai Patrushev, a leading ally of Putin, to Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi to deepen trade and security cooperation. The increasingly closer connections materialised in January 2023 with the reporting of the decision of Iran and Russia to connect their interbank communication and transfer systems to help boost trade and financial transactions, overcoming their ban from SWIFT, a model that Russia could look to replicate with other key trading partners to mitigate the SWIFT messaging system restrictions more broadly.
+
+In the latest political move, the deputy foreign ministers of Russia, Turkey, Syria and Iran were scheduled to meet again in Moscow in March 2023, but the meeting will now be held at a later undisclosed date.
+
+In line with these growing political ties, Russia is widely reported to have been sourcing military equipment – notably drones – from Iran as it seeks to overcome the resupply challenges posed by Western sanctions. In response – and demonstrating the seriousness with which Ukraine’s allies are treating this growing relationship – Western allies are increasingly targeting Iranian entities with sanctions.
+
+For example:
+
+- On 8 September 2022, OFAC designated Safiran Airport Services, an air transportation service provider, for its involvement in the shipment of Iranian UAVs to Russia for its war against Ukraine. Additionally, OFAC designated Paravar Pars Company, Design and Manufacturing of Aircraft Engines, and Baharestan Kish Company and its managing director, Rehmatollah Heidari, for their involvement in the research, development, production and procurement of Iranian UAVs and UAV components, including the Shahed series of drones, for Iran’s IRGC and its Aerospace Force and Navy.
+
+- On 15 November 2022, OFAC designated Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center, the firm responsible for the design and production of Shahed-series UAVs used by Russian forces in Ukraine. OFAC also designated Success Aviation Services FZC and i Jet Global DMCC for facilitating the transfer of Iranian UAVs to Russia. To complement the US State Department’s designation of the Wagner Group, OFAC also targeted two individuals for facilitating Wagner’s acquisition of UAVs from Iran.
+
+- On 6 January 2023, OFAC designated six executives and board members of US-designated Qods Aviation Industry Company, a key Iranian defence manufacturer responsible for the design and production of UAVs transferred for use in Ukraine, now updated on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, to include its new alias, Light Airplanes Design and Manufacturing Industries. OFAC also designated the director of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization, the key organisation responsible for overseeing Iran’s ballistic missile programmes.
+
+- On 9 March 2023, OFAC designated a China-based network of five companies and one individual for supporting Iran’s UAV procurement efforts to the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA). HESA has been involved in the production of the Shahed-136 UAV model that Iran has used to attack oil tankers and has also exported to Russia.
+
+While the advancement of financial ties and the sourcing of drones are the most high-profile examples, other connections are also important and growing. For example, unable to have its aircraft serviced in the West, Aeroflot has reported that it is starting to send planes to Iran for servicing; Russia has also been learning lessons from Iran on how to develop a shadow fleet of tankers for transporting oil in circumvention of sanctions.
+
+On top of these clear links between Russia and the provision of Iranian drones, the US Departments of Commerce, Treasury and Justice have also recently provided warning of the methods being adopted by Russia to evade sanctions. This Russian activity reflects the Iranian playbook, with the Tri-Seal Compliance Note observing Russia’s “use of third-party intermediaries or transshipment points to circumvent restrictions, disguise the involvement of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDNs) or parties on the Entity List in transactions, and obscure the true identities of Russian end users” and providing a range of red flags that can be indicative of such activity.
+
+Although the sanctions placed on Russia by allied nations are comprehensive, Russia has agency, and it is already developing measures to circumvent these restrictions to continue to fund and resource its military. Indeed, in the March 2023 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, the Kremlin makes no secret of its interest in supporting the development of circumvention measures, asserting:
+
+> The abuse by certain states of their dominant position in some spheres intensifies the processes of fragmentation of the global economy and increases disparity in the development of states. New national and trans-border payment systems are becoming widespread, there is a growing interest in new international reserve currencies, and prerequisites for diversifying international economic cooperation mechanisms are being created.
+
+As this paper has reviewed, many of the challenges that sanctions are placing on Russia have been faced previously by other rogue states – notably Iran – that have themselves developed means by which to limit the impact of these restrictions. This experience is inevitably instructive for Russia. Evidence is already emerging of Russia taking lessons from Iran’s playbook (for example, its development of a shadow oil tanker fleet); partnering with Iran in financial services and technical expertise that it can no longer source from Western nations; and developing financial and trade structures that obfuscate beneficiaries. If allied nations are to create the impact they wish with their restrictive measures, they will need to study the lessons Russia is likely to draw and ensure they anticipate and restrict the attempted adaptations that follow as a result.
+
+
+### IV. Weaknesses in the Financial System Response
+
+As emerges from the previous chapters, the evasion techniques employed by Iran often rely on the use of the formal financial system, which has for decades been required to closely monitor the transactions it facilitates for abuse – including sanctions evasion activity. Yet the formal financial system continues to be associated with sanctions evasion, suggesting that the system and those that supervise it need to consider how they should adapt and work harder and smarter to minimise opportunities for abuse.
+
+The integrity of the global financial system is monitored via the implementation of the standards of the FATF. As a result, in the face of rogue state subterfuge, countries that follow the FATF standards and those that have developed their own unilateral sanctions regimes should have measures in place to detect and prevent sanctions evasion, many of which rely on and are implemented by the private sector.
+
+As the gatekeepers of the financial system under the FATF standards, financial institutions and other obliged entities are required to undertake client due diligence (CDD) when they “onboard” a client, and periodically thereafter; and to monitor client transactions and report suspicious activity to the authorities. Under national laws, they are also required to ensure that sanctions are not breached, which most businesses do by screening customer names and transactions for the presence of, or connection with, designated entities and individuals.
+
+That is the theory, but these requirements are well known to rogue states and their supporting networks, and thus for many of the techniques discussed in this paper, anti-financial crime and sanctions measures are likely to be irrelevant. The funds being transferred to support a rogue state and its proxies will not enter the financial system (for example, because bulk cash is being used) or, if they do enter it, they will either not be moved through the wider international financial system but be channelled through an institution where measures have already been subverted, in a jurisdiction potentially subject to malign outside influences (such as that of Iran over parts of the Iraqi banking system), or else they will be sufficiently disguised such that banks are unable to easily detect the malign connection of the transactions they are processing.
+
+While circumvention opportunities will always exist, and the formal financial sector is not always involved in these schemes, there is certainly room for financial crime and sanctions detection measures to provide more effective barriers with regard to the sorts of intermediary trading schemes detailed in this paper that rogue states are using to avoid sanctions. In the case of Iran, documents provided by sources such as Wiki Iran clearly indicate that funds appear to be moving unchallenged through the international financial system, and through accounts set up and/or held by major financial institutions.
+
+This occurrence indicates that CDD checks are either not properly informed or have been subverted by those tasked with setting up front companies and bank accounts. The potential reasons for failure are numerous and could include malfeasance or negligence on the part of the financial institution, but could just as easily reflect the quality of the malign actors’ tradecraft and paperwork, taking advantage of weak supervision and controls in countries that turn a blind eye to the activities of rogue states such as Iran. Furthermore, CFSs are set up precisely to avoid interaction with the formal financial system and thus avoid even the most diligent private sector checks.
+
+Either way, as rogue states have their financial activity increasingly limited, financial institutions and those that monitor and audit their activities, as well as those that control and police the financial system, such as central banks and payment settlement systems, must clearly be more diligent if there is any chance of restricting these CFSs as they develop.
+
+As Western financial institutions seek to raise their game, particular challenges must be overcome. For example, those regulated entities charged with monitoring transactions and screening clients rely on measures to identify unusual patterns that do not match expected account conduct and/or have transactional links to those entities that have already been designated under sanctions regimes. These measures take time to have an effect, however, because the platforms require ongoing streams of data to identify unusual or suspicious patterns, and even then are far from fool-proof, having a reputation both for generating a high proportion of false positives and missing well-disguised false negatives.
+
+Further difficulties are potentially created by the internal operational “split” within banks between sanctions screening and transaction monitoring. The identification of a sanctions match will lead to the suspension of a transaction and a report to a national sanctions administrator, but this relies on screening revealing a link to a designated individual or entity. If no such link is identified, transactional activity might be identified separately as unusual or suspicious, but not necessarily sanctions related. The sanctions evasion activity might therefore be filed instead as a suspicious activity/transaction report (SAR or STR, depending on the country) to a national financial intelligence unit (FIU). Whether the potential sanctions-related aspects are identified is uncertain, and likely to depend on the effectiveness of an individual national FIU’s data analytics and channels for intelligence sharing with other agencies, including the sanctions administrator. Although the capacity of FIUs will vary between countries, available evidence suggests that the majority of SARs/STRs received by many FIUs, even in the developed world, are not immediately exploited, serving instead as a secondary database for investigations.
+
+These basic weaknesses in the system can be exacerbated further by contextual factors at a national level. Some countries that have become central to sanctions circumvention activity have a weak record of implementing anti-financial crime measures, both in the public and private sectors. The UAE, which has been a primary jurisdiction for the establishment of Iranian front companies and has emerged as a hub for Russian investment and financial activity since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, was added to the FATF’s list of “Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring” (so-called “grey list”) in March 2022 for its failure to take effective action against a range of financial crimes, including terrorist financing. Turkey, another common presence in Iranian sanctions circumvention trading schemes, has also been on the FATF grey list since October 2021, under a requirement to address fundamental failings in the policing of its financial system.
+
+It is noticeable, moreover, how many front companies in Iranian schemes are based in major Asian trading entrepôts such as Hong Kong, which boast large numbers of small import/export firms. Although this might be a coincidence, it is plausible that these firms are set up in locations where they are much more likely to be able to hide in plain sight. By leveraging these permissive environments, rogue states and their agents can gain access to the international finance system at its weak points, and from there move illicit funds throughout the legitimate system.
+
+
+### Conclusion: Refocusing the System
+
+This paper has sought to illuminate the ways in which rogue states, in particular Iran, develop alternative financial systems to circumvent Western sanctions and how a heavily sanctioned state such as Russia might adopt similar practices. It concludes by assessing how Western governments and their private sectors should strengthen and refocus their responses to confront the development of such CFSs by rogue states.
+
+As the case studies in this paper have demonstrated, rogue state CFSs are consistent in the jurisdictions in which they choose to facilitate their activities. The tools used by the international community to improve national financial crime standards, notably FATF evaluations and (where necessary) greylisting, are clearly insufficient to address this malign activity, designed as they were with criminal finance in mind. As this paper has argued, a much greater focus needs to be placed on strengthening the whole financial system against this abuse, not only relying on the private sector but also involving greater commitment and effort from governments via their control of the financial infrastructure (such as clearing and settlement systems) and the development of new standards (such as expanded financial reporting) designed to address the threat from an expansion of CFSs by rogue states.
+
+The international community’s response to illicit finance is built on the FATF and its standards, first developed in 1989 in response to the use of the formal financial system to support the laundering of the proceeds of the narcotics trade between South and North America. Over time, these standards have evolved, but their focus – aside from addressing the implementation of UN sanctions on states engaged in the proliferation of WMDs – has been on identifying and disrupting the proceeds of criminal activity (so-called “predicate offences”), rather than the activity of rogue states.
+
+Alongside the FATF, sanctions – whether applied on a multilateral basis by the UN or on a bilateral basis by individual states or groups of states – have been a cornerstone of the international community’s response to security threats for decades. The success of sanctions in coercing behavioural change is varied. In the case of Iran, some, such as the US Treasury, point to the role sanctions played in bringing the regime to the negotiation table to agree the 2015 JCPOA; yet Iran, labelled in 2019 by the US State Department as “the world’s worst state sponsor of terrorism”, has also been subject to terrorism-related sanctions for nearly 40 years, and has shown no sign of diminishing its funding and resourcing of designated terrorist organisations.
+
+As this paper has reviewed, underpinning the response to sanctions of rogue states such as Iran is the development of complex CFSs that allow states to bypass those traditional financial mechanisms that are dominated by Western nations who seek to coerce changes in behaviour via sanctions.
+
+For many European countries, despite the existence of sanctions regimes for decades, it was not until the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that the reality of sanctions implementation dawned.
+
+And herein lies the contradiction. Most European countries perform well in the evaluations undertaken of their anti-financial crime systems and controls by the FATF; yet their awareness of and engagement with the steps required to secure their financial systems against sanctions evasion contrasts poorly, primarily because they have not felt compelled to focus on sanctions implementation before 2022. This suggests that more specific focus and measures are needed to strengthen the financial system against sanctions evasion activity and related CFSs that go beyond mere FATF compliance.
+
+In light of this need for greater awareness of sanctions evasion activity, the necessity to focus more diligently on sanctions implementation and identify systemic vulnerabilities that allow sanctioned jurisdictions to circumvent economic restrictions to continue funding their malign and threatening activity, including financing designated terrorist groups, this paper presents the following recommendations, focused in particular on European governments.
+
+#### Recommendations
+
+- __Build on Russia sanctions collaboration.__ Western unity on Russia sanctions, together with Asian allies, has been notable since February 2022. While gaps between regimes need to be addressed, commitment to designating entities and restricting relevant Russian economic activity has been strong. Allied nations need to build on this unity to ensure that other rogue states that abuse the financial system are presented with an equally united front to ensure gaps in the responses (notably provided by countries that are well known for their weak compliance with global standards) are not arbitraged by bad actors.
+
+- __Acknowledge the threat posed by parallel financial systems.__ As the hegemony of the Western-controlled financial system weakens, Western countries must be alert to the development of parallel financial systems that allow for sanctions circumvention.
+
+- __Educate the private sector.__ Driven by the rising awareness of growing Russian attempts to circumvent sanctions, significantly greater effort must be made by Western governments to raise awareness of the sanctions evasion methods and activities of rogue states. Typologies – such as those in the US government Tri-Seal Compliance Note – are not sufficiently specific. Details of sanctions designations must be actively used, along with the provision of other open source case studies, to inform the private sector of the specifics of CFSs.
+
+- __FATF is only part of the solution.__ Even where states have received strong reviews from the FATF, they should recognise that FATF-related anti-financial crime responses provide only part of the solution for addressing rogue state activity, as it is a system designed primarily to respond to the proceeds of crime, not the development of CFSs. Although FATF pressure is helpful for raising financial crime standards in general, its sanctions-related focus is narrowly defined and thus fails to address those sanctions regimes that are not based on UNSC resolutions.
+
+- __Review financial infrastructure.__ Governments are, for the most part, responsible for key elements of the financial system, such as banking settlement systems (TARGET2 for the Euro area, for example). Although it is unrealistic for these systems to monitor transactions in the way required by commercial banks, greater scrutiny must be applied to the standards of those banks that access these systems. Just as correspondent banks are required to ensure the compliance standards of their client banks, so too should clearing and settlement systems satisfy themselves that those using their services have appropriate controls and policies in place to defend against abuse.
+
+- __Identify sanctions evasion platforms.__ This paper has highlighted the way in which platforms such as the ACU could be used to facilitate sanctions evasion. Western governments should ensure they are aware of and securing against this potential repurposing of such platforms, for example by highlighting these risks to those providing banking and settlement services.
+
+- __Strengthen reporting requirements.__ Recognising the growth in sanctions evasion activity, government-mandated private sector reporting requirements (such as those Iran-related reporting requirements policed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission – SEC) must be updated to reflect the greater risk of abuse from rogue states. For example, following the lead of the SEC, European regulators should introduce specific reporting requirements related to “high-risk” countries such as Russia and Iran.
+
+- __Review competency of EU member state sanctions architecture.__ As research has identified, sanctions implementation capabilities across Europe vary considerably. The EU should apply greater scrutiny to and auditing of these capabilities and consider the introduction of an EU-level authority responsible for ensuring harmonisation and high standards of EU sanctions implementation.
+
+- __Empower the private sector and clarify responsibilities.__ For many in the private sector, sanctions are a compliance challenge. But as frontline actors, the private sector, particularly large globally operating banks, have a central role to play in ensuring compliance of financial systems in lower-capacity countries by using their leverage over these actors to ensure their compliance with financial restrictive measures. Furthermore, as the threat from CFSs rises, clearly private sector responsibility should be apportioned to ensure the right actors are engaged in the challenge of identifying and disrupting this form of emerging sanctions evasion. Too often it is left to the banks to act as the sole element of the financial frontline. Other actors such as auditors should feel equal responsibility to ensure a systemic response to the threat posed by rogue states.
+
+In sum, as rogue states grow in number and have their financial activity increasingly limited, financial institutions and those that monitor and audit their activities, as well as those that control and police the financial system, such as central banks and payment settlement systems, must clearly be more diligent and alert to the threat posed by CFSs. This challenge will grow significantly as allied nations continue to tighten financial and trade restrictions on Russia. Merely relying on the traditional methods designed to respond to the proceeds of crime will not be sufficient to identify and disrupt this activity. New thinking, new approaches and new capabilities will be needed if those seeking to secure the financial system against rogue state abuse are to stand a chance.
+
+---
+
+__Tom Keatinge__ is the founding Director of the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies (CFCS) at RUSI, where his research focuses on matters at the intersection of finance and security. He is also currently a specialist adviser on illicit finance to the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee ongoing enquiry.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-06-jamming-jdam.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-06-jamming-jdam.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..66640f37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-06-jamming-jdam.md
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Jamming JDAM
+author: Thomas Withington
+date : 2023-06-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ul9c5i5.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Threat to US Munitions from Russian Electronic Warfare"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Leaked US documents show that Russian electronic warfare may be having a negative effect on US-supplied Joint Direct Attack Munitions, a panoply of kits outfitting “dumb” bombs._
+
+
+
+The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) began life in the wake of the US-led Operation Desert Storm which evicted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. Lessons learned from the campaign by the US armed forces included the need for an all-weather precision munition. The concept would harness the US Global Positioning System (GPS) Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) satellite constellation. GPS had been a star performer in Desert Storm. Catapulted into the public consciousness, GPS systems used by the Coalition helped weapons find their targets and troops reach their objectives. Since then, GPS has become a standard feature of military and civilian life.
+
+
+### What is JDAM?
+
+The JDAM’s name is – to an extent – a misnomer, as it is not a weapon per se. Instead, the term covers a panoply of kits outfitting an array of “dumb” bombs. These kits equip the mid- and tail-section of an unguided bomb and contain the GPS and an Inertial Guidance System (INS). The INS, which does not depend on GPS PNT signals, also helps the weapon’s precision. Today, 15 different JDAM kits are in service, equipping a range of bombs weighing from 500 lb (225 kg) to 2,000 lb (900 kg).
+
+The basic concept of operations for JDAM is for the guidance kit to be loaded with the target’s coordinates, most probably latitude and longitude. These coordinates are either transferred from the aircraft or loaded before the sortie. Target coordinates can also be updated during the mission. The weapon is released, and the tail unit continually receives signals from the GPS constellation on the bomb’s position relative to the target. The bomb’s trajectory is continually adjusted by the fins on the tail unit as it heads towards the target, based on the PNT information it is receiving and the data provided by its INS. Publicly available figures indicate that JDAM guidance kits can hit within 5 m (16 ft) of a target or less. Should the GPS signal be unavailable, the INS can steer the bomb to within 30 m (98 ft) of the target.
+
+
+### Into Ukraine
+
+JDAM deliveries commenced in 1997, with the weapon making its combat debut two years later during NATO’s Operation Allied Force in 1999. NATO’s air campaign was directed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to end the suppression of Kosovar ethnic Albanians. Since then, JDAM has been used in successive conflicts involving the US, with JDAM kits exported to over 30 countries, including Ukraine. The latter received the JDAM Extended Range (JDAM-ER) system, which gives a 500 lb bomb similar accuracy, but an extended range of 43 nautical miles (80 km). This helps Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) jets deploying the weapon to stay outside the engagement envelope of Russian short-range air defence systems like the Pantsir-S1 (NATO reporting name SA-22 Greyhound).
+
+___`It is no secret that Russian land forces have deployed scores of electronic warfare systems into the Ukrainian theatre of operations`___
+
+Exact information on the effectiveness of JDAM-ER in Ukrainian hands has not reached the public domain for understandable reasons. Nevertheless, in March, a UAF spokesperson praised the bombs’ accuracy and urged the US to supply more. JDAM was in the news again one month later, but this time for less auspicious reasons. A trove of classified US Department of Defense documents revealed concerns over the efficacy of Russian electronic warfare (EW) jamming of JDAM and other US-supplied weapons using GPS.
+
+
+### Russian Counter-GPS Tactics
+
+The documents articulated US concerns that Russian jamming was causing some JDAM-ER munitions to miss their targets. It is no secret that Russian land forces have deployed scores of EW systems into the Ukrainian theatre of operations. Some of these are specifically designed to jam GPS transmissions, the Russian Army’s R-330Zh Zhitel system deployed at the tactical level being a notable example. The R-330Zh detects and attacks radio signals across wavebands from 100 MHz to 2 GHz. Open sources say the system can transmit jamming signals with 10 kW of power. Signals from the US GPS satellites which JDAM kits use are transmitted on wavebands from 1.164GHz to 1.575GHz. These fall squarely within the R-330Zh’s catchment area. Official documents seen by the author state that the system has a jamming range of up to 30 km (18.6 miles).
+
+GPS signals are very weak by the time they have travelled the 10,900 nautical miles (20,200 km) from the satellite to Earth. Radio signal strength is typically measured in decibels-per-milliwatt (dBm). GPS signals can have a strength of circa −127 dBm by the time they reach Earth. Such weak signals can be easy to jam with comparatively little power. To put matters into perspective, a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the R-330Zh can generate a jamming signal strength of −70 dBm. Like a long-distance runner, radio signals lose strength the further they travel. Thus, the R-330Zh’s signal may reduce by between −123 dBm and −126 dBm, depending on the jamming frequency, by the time it travels its full 30 km range. Nonetheless, even at between −53 dBm and −56 dBm, it is still notably stronger than the strength of the GPS signal arriving from space. Moreover, the closer the GPS receiver is to the R-330Zh’s jamming antenna, the stronger the jamming signal becomes.
+
+The US has made strenuous efforts to mitigate the jamming risk to JDAM. In the early 2000s, the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SASSM) upgrade was rolled out across the JDAM fleet. This included the addition of guidance kits using M-Code GPS transmissions. M-Code is the encrypted military GPS signal. The JDAM’s GPS receiver will only accept signals with this encryption, excluding all others. Technically, if jamming signals are being transmitted from an R-330Zh, the JDAM munition should ignore these as they lack the appropriate encryption.
+
+
+### Why is This Happening?
+
+Despite the steps the US has taken to safeguard JDAM’s resilience to global navigation satellite system (GNSS) jamming, it may still be vulnerable. One senior EW expert told the author that, even with SASSM, the sheer brute force of a powerful jamming signal can prevent the JDAM’s GNSS receiver from obtaining the encrypted signal. Steps can be taken to try to nullify any jamming. The exact capabilities of the JDAM’s GNSS systems are understandably classified. Counter-EW provisions may include the system recognising a jamming signal and its direction. The receiver may then be able to “block out” signals coming from that direction, while continuing to receive GNSS signals from unaffected areas. A GNSS receiver will typically need to “see” – that is, have an uninterrupted Line-of-Sight (LOS) with – at least four satellites. Often, a GNSS receiver has more satellites than this within range. Thus, blocking off the direction of the jamming signals will not necessarily deprive the receiver of being able to “see” other satellites.
+
+___`Jamming is not causing JDAMs to stop working, but it is risking their accuracy – arguably a key selling point of the weapon`___
+
+However, it is possible that Russian forces may choose to protect potential JDAM targets with multiple jammers, enabling signals to hit the GNSS receiver from two or more directions. This could deprive the receiver of the LOS range to unjammed GNSS signals. Above all, the problem may well be the sheer power of the jamming signal that can be brought to bear, as shown by the R-330Zh.
+
+One problem for the Russians is that a powerful jamming signal may be comparatively easy for Ukrainian EW experts to detect. Once the jamming signal is detected and identified as such, the jammer’s latitude and longitude could then be determined. These coordinates could be passed to artillery and engaged with kinetic fires. This tactic may help to explain some of Russia’s EW equipment losses.
+
+Another problem is that transmitting a huge amount of jamming power across the frequencies used by PNT signals has the potential to jam any other radio traffic weaker than the jamming signal. This could include friendly receivers like satellite communications terminals and GNSS systems. For example, Russia’s GLONASS GNSS constellation transmits some signals which are similar to GPS. These risk being jammed by friendly signals. Evidence from Ukraine suggests that the Russian Army regularly suffers electromagnetic fratricide to this end. The force often exhibits scant concern for jamming friendly signals when attacking its enemies.
+
+The EW expert also told the author that it is possible to spoof GNSS signals. For example, an EW system receives the incoming M-Code transmitted from space. It takes the signal and retransmits it, but with a stronger amplification. The JDAM system may recognise this signal as legitimate, but the fake signal may be subtly modified to feed false information into the GNSS system. Hypothetically, the M-Code could be modified and retransmitted in such a way as to deceive the JDAM vis-à-vis its position in time and space. This could then affect the munition’s accuracy.
+
+
+### What Now?
+
+Although Russia’s GNSS jamming activities may not be cost-free from an electromagnetic fratricide and hard kill vulnerability perspective, the leaked US documents show that it is having an impact. Jamming is not causing the JDAMs to stop working, but it is risking their accuracy – arguably a key selling point of the weapon. This is a potential problem when comparatively small targets are being engaged. US GNSS engineers may have to rethink how they safeguard JDAMs for the wars of tomorrow, based on the conflicts of today.
+
+---
+
+__Thomas Withington__ is an award-winning analyst and writer specialising in electronic warfare, radar and military communications. He has written widely on these subjects for a range of specialist and general publications. He also works as a consultant and adviser in these areas for several leading government and private sector clients.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-63.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-63.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-63.md
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 63 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 辯方爭議被告行為不構成「非法手段」 要求裁定林卓廷等表證不成立
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，踏入審訊第63天。林卓廷、黃碧雲、何桂藍及吳政亨一方作出中段陳詞，要求法庭裁定表證不成立，被告毋須答辯，法官押至周五（9日）下決定。本案被告被控串謀以「非法手段」顛覆國家政權，辯方爭議「非法手段」在《國安法》下無清晰定義，而案發時政府尚未通過公職人員宣誓修例，將「無差別反對政府議案」列為「不屬」擁護《基本法》及效忠特區的行為，故當時否決預算案不構成「非法手段」。控方則指，上述條文雖於2021年5月始生效，惟僅就現行法例作出闡釋，認為被告濫用《基本法》權力迫使政府妥協仍屬「非法手段」。
+
+辯方亦認為，控方除無差別否決預算案，亦須證明被告有意圖迫使特首解散立法會及下台，惟現時證據不足；控方則認為毋須就所有控罪詳情舉證。而就辯方稱林卓廷於選舉論壇提及政府派3萬元便會贊成預算案，控方反駁林僅迴避問題，而該黨立場實同意否決預算案，以避免被邊緣化。
+
+#### 控方指控罪詳情全屬串謀「公開作為」 辯方指屬「控罪元素」須全部舉證
+
+法官上周五裁定「共謀者原則」不適用於《國安法》生效前言行，控方案情完結，林卓廷、黃碧雲、吳政亨及何桂藍一方今作出中段陳詞，要求法庭裁定控罪表證不成立，被告毋須答辯。
+
+雙方早前呈交書面陳詞，今作口頭補充，並主要就控罪詳情列明的「非法手段」，及控方須舉證的控罪元素等作爭議。本案指控各被告串謀以「非法手段」嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞香港特區政權機關依法履行職能，並於控罪詳情列出4項行為，包括濫用職權無差別否決預算案，以迫使特首解散立法會及下台等。
+
+> 被告被控在2020年7月1日至2021年1月7日，在香港一同串謀及與其他人串謀，旨在顛覆國家政權而組織、策劃、實施或者參與實施，以威脅使用武力或其他非法手段，即：
+
+> （i）為以下目的宣揚、進行或參與一個謀劃，旨在濫用其在當選立法會議員後根據《基本法》第73條所受託的職權；
+
+> （a）在立法會取得大多數控制權，藉以對香港特區政府提出的任何財政預算或公共開支，不論當中內容或內容的利弊如何，均不予區別拒絕通過；
+
+> （b）迫使香港特區政府根據《基本法》第50條解散立法會，從而癱瘓政府運作；
+
+> （c）最終導致行政長官因立法會解散和重選的立法會拒絕通過原財政預算案而根據《基本法》第52條而辭職；
+
+> （ii）為達致該謀劃，參選或不參選立法會選舉，及/或促致、煽動、引致、誘使他人參選或不參選該選舉；
+
+> （iii）承諾或同意當選立法會議員後，及/或煽動、促使、引致、誘使他人當選立法會議員後，在審核或通過政府提出的財政預算或公共開支時，按照該謀劃，行使或不行使其根據《基本法》第73條所訂的職權；
+
+> （iv）承諾或同意在該選舉中當選後，及/或煽動、促使、引致、誘使他人在該選舉中當選後，故意或蓄意不履行，或故意或蓄意疏於履行其立法會議員職責，即擁護《基本法》，效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區，盡忠職守，遵守法律，廉潔奉公，為香港特別行政區服務；
+
+> 嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞香港特別行政區政權機關依法履行職能的行為。
+
+代表林卓廷及黃碧雲的大律師沈士文爭議，就控罪列出（i）至（iv）的行為，均是控方全須舉證的「控罪元素」，而非僅用來推論串謀協議存在、毋須舉證的「公開作為」（overt acts）；又指除了無差別否決預算案，控方亦須證明被告意圖迫使特首解散立法會和下台，才足以證明案情。
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲（左）
+
+惟副刑事檢控專員萬德豪反駁，何者屬「公開作為」和「控罪元素」是由控方而非辯方判斷，而控方一直主張該4項行為全屬毋須舉證的「公開作為」，對被告無造成不公；又指本案控罪詳情頗長，難以想像控方要將控罪書每一隻字都毫無合理疑點舉證。萬又強調，控方於修訂的開案陳詞已列明屬「核心議題（core matter）」的控罪詳情，即同意無差別否決預算案以迫使特首解散立法會及下台，旨在顛覆國家政權。
+
+#### 辯方：政府僅於前年修法列明無差別否決議案違法 被告行為不構成「非法手段」
+
+辯方亦爭議，《國安法》沒有清晰定義何謂「非法手段」。沈士文稱，政府為了填補這個法律定義的空白（vacuum），才在案發後的2021年5月通過《2021年公職（參選及任職）（雜項修訂）條例草案》，於《釋義及通則條例》新增第3AA條「對擁護《基本法》和效忠特區的提述」，該條例於5月21日刊憲生效。
+
+當中列明「不屬」擁護《基本法》及效忠香港特區的行為，包括第3AA(3)(f)的「作出損害或有傾向損害《基本法》中以行政長官為主導的政治體制秩序的行為」，其中一項為「無差別地反對特區政府提出的議案，並（A）意圖以此要脅特區政府；（B）意圖以此使特區政府無法正常履行職務和職能；或（C）意圖以此逼使行政長官下台及推翻特區政府」。
+
+沈認為，該條文並無追溯力，因此被告於案發時、即條文通過前作出相關行為，並不屬「非法手段」。代表吳政亨的大律師梁麗幗亦表示，該條文內容此前並無在《基本法》或任何香港法例列明。
+
+#### 控方：被告具不良動機和濫用《基本法》權力亦屬非法、涉發假誓
+
+不過控方引用黎智英申請永久終止聆訊的高院判詞，指該新條文只是陳述明顯的事實（state the obvious）、就現行法例給出定義，沒有就《國安法》或《基本法》新增任何內容。萬德豪又舉例，被告協議立會過半後以否決預算案為籌碼、迫使政府妥協，問從常理而言會否說是合法？
+
+萬續引「程介南案」，指立會議員即使是行使其職權，但具不良動機和濫權仍被定罪，而本案被告正是濫用《基本法》賦予的權力顛覆國家政權。他又強調，「非法」是一個很闊的概念，除刑事行為外亦包括「違憲」行為，舉例被告當選後須宣誓擁護《基本法》及效忠香港特區，但基於他們的串謀協議，他們必然會干犯發假誓。
+
+#### 辯方稱除無差別否決 同須證被告圖迫特首解散立會及下台 惟證據不足
+
+沈士文續回應，明顯地《釋義及通則條例》第3AA(3)(f)條是因本案才新增，而控方開案陳詞列明本案的關鍵元素亦與該條文（A）至（C）的行為相符，可見控方嘗試應用該新法例。沈續指，假若該條文真如控方所說，其內容早於2020年7月1日已存在於現行法律，則控方除了須證明被告同意無差別否決預算案，亦要證明被告意圖迫使特首解散立法會及下台；惟沈指相關證據不足，即使將控方案情推到最高，充其量只能說其當事人同意否決，但非無差別否決，因此應裁定表證不成立。
+
+#### 辯方稱非法手段須包含武力威脅元素
+
+代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 亦爭議，何謂「非法手段」無清楚定義、控方無足夠證據證明被告行為是非法，現時「只因控方說是非法就假設是非法」，甚至沒有傳召憲制專家就此作證，批評控方案情有漏洞，「單單說是濫權不代表是濫權」。他亦認為「非法手段」應包含具威脅使用武力的元素。
+
+
+▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel
+
+惟李運騰質疑是否合憲是由法庭決定，毋須傳召專家；陳慶偉亦指區諾軒也談及無差別否決預算案的後果是特首解散立法會及下台。惟 Beel 指那並非必然發生，指行政長官不一定解散立會。李運騰指他不明白，指若預算案不獲通過，政府或缺乏撥款運作，包括不能支付法官的薪金和法援等，「除了解散立法會，還能怎樣解決這個死局？」Beel 回應那就需政治的操作。
+
+#### 控方：林卓廷論壇稱會贊成財案僅迴避問題免DQ 民主黨不主張否決財案會遭邊緣化
+
+就針對各被告的證據，辯方指林卓廷於選舉論壇曾表示若政府向每名市民派3萬元會贊成財政預算案，可見他無意無差別否決。惟控方不同意，指「派3萬元」與一整份預算案無法相比、即使否決了政府也能如常運作，認為林只是很巧妙地迴避會否「攬炒」或否決預算案的問題。
+
+至於林被搜得的「初選Debate Notes」，提及「財政預算案會否投反對？胡志偉一再公開回應話會積極運用。況且，其實我立法會四年沒有贊成過財政預算案」，辯方爭議無證據顯示由林準備及使用。惟控方不同意，指前民主黨主席胡志偉在論壇上曾稱該黨同意否決預算案，前副主席尹兆堅亦指該黨願簽「墨落無悔」、只是不願簽無限民間聲明，而黃碧雲在論壇亦如林的筆記般，引述胡志偉稱該黨會否決財案，控方直言該黨立場頗為一致。李運騰一度指法庭已裁定「共謀者原則」不適用於《國安法》前言行，控方能否如此引他人言論，惟萬指並非引用該原則，而胡志偉言論是否代表民主黨立場會交由法庭裁斷。
+
+萬又指，黃碧雲和林卓廷當時均是民主黨立法會議員，而林之所以沒有說出筆記的話，是避免被取消資格（DQ）。萬續指戴耀廷於6月9日記者會稱參選人毋須簽協議，因不會愚蠢到製造藉口讓當權者DQ，惟當「墨落無悔」出現、抗爭派望將協議公開，民主黨便被「逼埋牆」，因此當黃碧雲在論壇被問及對「攬炒」的立場時須作出發言，胡志偉亦同樣。
+
+萬又指，民主黨沒公開表示否決預算案，不代表他們沒有同意；又指該黨立場原與激進抗爭派有別，但若他們不改變立場與其他參選人站在同一線，便要付出代價，即無法獲接納參與初選、並會如2019年區選般被邊緣化，直言民主黨於2020年的舉動「是他們可以生存下去的唯一方法（only way they can survive）」。萬續指，戴耀廷在辦初選之初已提及他的目標和計劃，包括「大殺傷力憲制武器」，認為被告參選必然知道背後的目標。
+
+#### 辯方指無證據吳政亨有無差別否決「共同目的」 官質疑明知目的仍協助教唆
+
+至於吳政亨，代表吳的大律師梁麗幗強調無證據顯示他與其他被告有無差別否決預算案的共同目的。李運騰總結控方指吳雖沒參與初選，但他與戴耀廷達成協議並作出支持「35+計劃」的行為，包括提倡勝出初選者才能參與正式選舉，及會動員選民不投票予落選仍繼續參選的人。陳仲衡指吳的角色有如「訓導主任」，陳慶偉亦指於2020年7月1日《國安法》生效前，吳一直「協助和教唆（aiding and abetting）」該串謀計劃，而7月1日後吳於《蘋果日報》刊登「三投三不投」頭版廣告，仍繼續「協助和教唆」，並成為本案「共謀者」。
+
+李運騰續指，吳政亨於2020年4月曾發文「【初選聯署】攬炒豈憑匹夫勇 有謀方為藝術家」，提及「大家要記著，要議會攬炒，首要條件是人數過半，35+」，指吳表明「議會攬炒」；並指吳政亨的宣傳或對計劃起影響，因原本不傾向辦初選的九龍東，於4月提及有人建議辦初選。
+
+梁麗幗續提出比喻，指現時情況有如戴耀廷和吳政亨正討論研發一架可載35人或以上的車輛，但在吳缺席下，戴與其他人就使用車輛的特定目的討論並達成協議，而證據僅能支持吳和戴有就研發車輛、而非使用車輛的目的討論。惟陳慶偉指，問題是吳政亨曾表明他知道戴的目的，但沒有表明反對，並繼續支持戴耀廷；李運騰亦指，戴耀廷曾應吳政亨要求向參與者轉發有關約束參選人的新聞稿，「你會說表面上沒有達成協議嗎？」梁續表示完成陳詞。
+
+
+▲ 梁麗幗
+
+#### 辯方：無證據何桂藍意圖顛覆政府 指否決財案致特首下台過程為《基本法》所載
+
+至於何桂藍，Beel 指無證據顯示她有意顛覆國家政權，指兩次否決預算案引致特首解散立法會和下台的過程均是《基本法》所列明，並不構成顛覆。惟李運騰回應，「《基本法》賦予了頗多權力，但那權力有否被濫用就是另一個問題。」Beel 指那是另一議題，又稱沒證據證明被告顛覆國家政權。李指那問題就是被告是否同意濫權以嚴重影響政府運作、導致政府倒台。
+
+Beel 回應，特首只是政府的首長，即使下台也不會影響政府運作，陳慶偉問即政府能自行運作？Beel 說政府足以自行運作（strong enough to run by itself），陳慶偉笑說「那我們完全不需從政者了」，Beel 笑說「有些人會說這樣世界會變得更好」，黃碧雲和林卓廷發笑。
+
+#### 辯方指何桂藍不曾提倡否決預算案、「墨落無悔」非倡無差別否決
+
+Beel 亦指，控方稱何同意無差別否決預算案的唯一證據只是「墨落無悔」聲明書。李運騰問及何桂藍在選舉論壇、訪問和抗爭派記者會的發言，Beel 指她在該些場合均不曾提及否決預算案，即使為《洛杉磯時報》撰文提及當選後會有權否決，但也沒有提倡否決。Beel 並指，「墨落無悔」僅提及會否決預算案迫使政府回應五大訴求，而非「無論如何也會無差別否決預算案」，故認為相關證據不足。
+
+四名被告陳詞完畢，法官押後至周五（9日）裁定表證是否成立。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-64.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-64.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c258ccc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-64.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 64 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-06-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 法官裁定所有不認罪被告表證成立 13人擬作供
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（9日）踏入審訊第64天。林卓廷、黃碧雲、何桂藍及吳政亨一方昨提出中段陳詞，申請毋須答辯，法官今裁定16名不認罪被告全部表證成立，各被告須答辯。其中除了吳政亨、余慧明及楊雪盈3人暫時料不作供外，其餘13名被告，包括鄭達鴻、梁國雄、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、林卓廷、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、柯耀林、李予信均擬作供，預料主問需時約13天。法官李運騰指盤問或需主問的兩至三倍時間，法官陳慶偉預料辯方案情連盤問或需時共39天，但指不代表需用盡。案件下周一（12日）續審，料將開展辯方案情。
+
+#### 官裁表證全成立 吳政亨、余慧明、楊雪盈擬不作供
+
+林卓廷、黃碧雲、何桂藍及吳政亨一方昨提出中段陳詞，爭議被告行為不構成控罪的「非法手段」。法官聽取雙方陳詞後，今裁定所有不認罪被告表證成立，被告均須答辯，詳細理由押後頒布。
+
+辯方就會否傳召證人表達意向。代表吳政亨和余慧明的大律師石書銘表示，吳政亨現時傾向不會作供，但會傳召兩名辯方證人，預料需時1.5小時，將分別就一段與吳政亨的錄音對話，及吳發出的電郵作供，並將相關文件呈堂；至於余慧明則沒有辯方案情。代表楊雪盈的大律師張耀良亦表示，楊傾向不作供。
+
+#### 13被告擬作供 部分或傳辯方證人
+
+其餘13名被告均表示擬作供，部分或傳召辯方證人。代表鄭達鴻和梁國雄的資深大律師潘熙表示，二人作供料需時約1天，或各傳召一名辯方證人。代表李予信的大律師關文渭表示，李作供料需時半天，另傳召1名事實證人，並會呈交部分文件。代表施德來的大律師黃廷光表示，施將作供，或傳召1名辯方證人，料需時2天。
+
+至於其他被告均不會傳召辯方證人。代表彭卓棋的大律師盧敏儀表示，彭作供料需時少於1天，並會呈交一些區議會文件。代表何啟明的大律師阮偉明表示，何料需時2至3小時。自行代表的劉偉聰預料需少於2小時。代表黃碧雲和林卓廷的大律師沈士文亦指二人料需時約2小時。
+
+代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 表示，何料需時2天。代表陳志全的大律師馬維騉、代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑和代表柯耀林的大律師唐樂山，均指其當事人料需時約1天。
+
+法官陳慶偉總結，辯方案情預料需13至14天。法官李運騰笑指盤問至少會如主問般長，「若不是雙倍時間，就需3倍時間」，因控方應有頗多文件要向被告發問。法官陳仲衡亦指，部分辯方律師或需向其他被告作出盤問。陳慶偉指，假設辯方案情需13天，再加上盤問的26天，辯方案情或需共39天，但指那不代表需用盡該39天時間。李運騰笑說即還要多審兩個月。
+
+案件押至下周一（12日）續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-14-ukraines-counteroffensive-begins.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-14-ukraines-counteroffensive-begins.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..341b6e85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-14-ukraines-counteroffensive-begins.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : UA’s Counteroffensive Begins
+author: Jack Watling
+date : 2023-06-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/POcfAnj.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Begins: Shall the Leopards Break Free?"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Ukrainian forces are making gains, but the offensive is some way from its decisive phase; we must refrain from premature pronouncements of success or failure._
+
+
+
+Ukrainian forces have launched their long-anticipated offensive in an attempt to break through Russian defence lines to liberate the occupied territories. Ukrainian troops have broken through initial fighting positions along a broad part of the front, but remain some distance from Russia’s main defence line. Kyiv has yet to commit the bulk of its forces as its lead elements try to set the conditions for a breakthrough.
+
+The fighting so far has been tough. Russia’s initial fighting positions constituted fox holes and hand-dug trenches, but behind these were complex minefields of anti-tank and antipersonnel mines, covered by Russian UAVs and artillery. The main defence line, still 15–20 km from Ukrainian positions, has properly dug trenches and concrete-reinforced firing posts, tank obstacles, ground-laid cable to coordinate artillery strikes, and even more mines. Behind that are the reserve fighting positions of the third defence line.
+
+The fighting will likely get tougher. As Ukrainian forces penetrate deeper into the defences, they will come into range of more Russian artillery firing posts. Moreover, their own artillery will be able to deliver fewer counterbattery missions, and the Ukrainian lines of advance will become more predictable, as they must follow the breaches identified in the minefields. As Ukrainian troops push forwards, they will also be covered by fewer air defences, and will likely come under greater attack by the Russian Aerospace Forces and aviation.
+
+Given these threats, the Ukrainian military is currently trying to achieve three things. Firstly, there is an intense counterbattery duel being fought, with both sides trying to strike each other’s logistics, command and control, reconnaissance, and artillery systems. The Russians are hunting for Ukraine’s artillery with Lancet UAVs. The Ukrainians are utilising Storm Shadow and GMLRS to try to destroy Russian command and control and munitions stockpiles.
+
+Secondly, the Ukrainians are trying to get the Russians to commit their reserves, moving troops from the third defence line to bolster sectors under pressure. Once these troops are pulled forwards, it will become easier to identify the weak points in the Russian lines, where a breakthrough will not be met by a new screen of repositioned forces.
+
+___`Success is binary, not linear. The line is either broken or it is not, and Kyiv must shape the battlefield to maximise the probability of a breach`___
+
+Thirdly, the Ukrainian military is trying to put pressure across the front to advance through the first line of defences in as much breadth as possible. The reason for this is to increase the options for attacking the main defence line and to keep Russian forces uncertain as to where the main effort will be launched. Furthermore, with such a long front, stretching out Russian troops limits their ability to stack units in depth, pulling more forward.
+
+At some point, the Ukrainians will have to decide where to commit their main assault units, and the offensive will enter its decisive phase. This decision must be conditions-based. It isn’t about adhering to some fixed timeline. When these units are committed, the offensive will either achieve a breakthrough or fail. Success is binary, not linear. The line is either broken or it is not, and Kyiv must shape the battlefield to maximise the probability of a breach.
+
+The extent of a success will be determined by how much progress is made on the other side of the breach. If a breach can be achieved, then the critical question will be how many units Ukraine has in reserve to surge forward and exploit the success. If operations are currently methodical, once a breach in the line occurs, speed will be of the essence.
+
+The uncertain variable in the current offensive is Russian morale. Russian units are currently fighting from prepared positions and their command-and-control infrastructure is mostly intact, though some key command posts have been struck. If Russian units can be forced to reposition, however, the poor training and discipline of Moscow’s forces could see the defence become uncoordinated and susceptible to collapse. Bringing about such conditions would require some significant actions by the Ukrainians to get the Russians moving, but it is possible under such conditions for the strength of the defence to crumble rapidly. Ukraine can endeavour to bring such a situation about, but it cannot be counted on.
+
+For Ukraine’s international partners, the summer is likely to be deeply uncomfortable. Losses will mount and success will take time. It is vital, however, that there is no diminution in the strengthening of the training programmes allowing Ukraine to continue to generate combat units, or the mobilisation of defence industry to put supply to the Ukrainian military on a sustainable basis. However much territory is liberated in this offensive, the critical variable is convincing the Kremlin that even if its defeat comes in stages, it is coming.
+
+---
+
+__Jack Watling__ is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute. Jack works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation, assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-16-blacklist-russia.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-16-blacklist-russia.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4e7f6fa3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-06-16-blacklist-russia.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Blacklist Russia
+author: Olha Vasylevska-Smahliuk
+date : 2023-06-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/2FfHUBe.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Blacklisting Russia Should be a Priority for the FATF"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_In reply to a recent RUSI analysis, as a Ukrainian MP, I insist that the FATF should use all measures at its disposal to respond to Russia’s aggression – including placing the country on its blacklist._
+
+
+
+This commentary was prompted by the recent publication of a RUSI article entitled “The Financial Action Task Force’s Challenge with Russia”. Rather than representing a genuine attempt at a balanced analysis, the piece appeared to be timed for the upcoming FATF plenary session scheduled for 19–23 June 2023, where another attempt to blacklist Russia is expected. I therefore think it is important to present some counterarguments to the position outlined in the RUSI contribution.
+
+The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the international organisation that establishes and polices the implementation of global standards for combatting money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing. Since its establishment in 1989, the mandate of the FATF has expanded from exclusively tackling the former to also include the latter two. Together with the expansion of its mandate, the organisation’s authority and reputation have also grown, turning the FATF into a global standard-setter and watchdog. Despite increasing its role enormously, the organisation still presents itself as a technical rather than a political body.
+
+In her piece, the author states that:
+
+> “… for those that view the FATF as a politically motivated organisation, such a decision will further erode the FATF’s integrity and negatively impact its reliability, as well as facilitating the further politicisation of the organisation. Rather than conceding to political pressure and blacklisting Russia, the FATF should aim to devise more thorough and better crafted standards to ensure that illicit finance threats do not remain outside the scope of its recommendations and country assessments”.
+
+Sadly, this position is extremely similar to that of one of the FATF’s permanent members – Russia. Namely, Russia blames the FATF for neglecting its recent mutual evaluation results and for politicising the process as a whole. While some might suggest improving FATF procedures instead of blacklisting the country, we should keep in mind that Russia’s violent aggression has already taken the lives of tens if not hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, and will take hundreds of thousands more if not stopped using all available means.
+
+According to the FATF’s mandate, one of the organisation’s tasks is “Identifying and engaging with high-risk, non-co-operative jurisdictions and those with strategic deficiencies in their national regimes, and co-ordinating action to protect the integrity of the financial system against the threat posed by them”. The FATF maintains a list of High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action (also known as the “blacklist”). These countries exhibit “significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation”.
+
+In March 2022, the FATF admitted that Russia’s actions ran contrary to the organisation’s core principles, representing a gross violation of the commitment of FATF ministers to implement and support the FATF Standards. Later, in April 2022, FATF ministers recognised that Russia’s actions posed a threat to the integrity, safety and security of the international financial system. Furthermore, in June 2022, the FATF decided to limit Russia’s role and influence within the FATF. The limitations were tightened even more in October 2022, until eventually in February 2023 Russia’s membership of the organisation was suspended.
+
+___`Russia’s violent aggression has already taken the lives of tens if not hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, and will take hundreds of thousands more if not stopped using all available means`___
+
+Meanwhile, Russia is engaged in terrorist financing. Alongside its regular armed forces, Russia uses the private military company Wagner to conduct hostilities in Ukraine. The latter organisation operates in coordination with the armed forces, has a hierarchical structure and acts in the interests and with the consent of the highest military and political leadership of the country. Wagner is openly provided by the Russian authorities with military equipment including tanks, howitzers, multiple rocket launcher systems, armoured vehicles and fighter jets. However, the group’s activities go far beyond the Russian-led war in Ukraine and endanger international security on a global scale. Wagner’s engagement in a number of other armed conflicts around the globe, combined with the threats posed by its leadership, falls under the criteria for “terrorist activity”.
+
+In 2017, the US designated Wagner as being responsible for or complicit in – or having engaged in, directly or indirectly – actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of Ukraine. Furthermore, in November 2022, the Department of State designated Wagner for operating in the defence and related materiel sector of the Russian economy. Moreover, Wagner has been sanctioned by Australia, Canada, Japan, the UK and the EU. Most recently, in February 2023, the Ukrainian Parliament also designated Wagner as an international criminal organisation.
+
+Another area of concern falling directly under the FATF mandate is proliferation financing. Beginning in 2022, Russia has deployed Iranian-made drones to attack Ukrainian territory, including civilian targets. This has been confirmed by multiple public sources. Furthermore, the transfer of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia has been acknowledged by Iranian officials. This is an obvious infringement of the 2015 UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which explicitly prohibits any country from receiving these types of drones from Iran without prior approval by the Security Council. Given that no such approval was sought from or granted by the Security Council, these transfers represent violations of resolution 2231.
+
+Recent media reports confirm that cooperation between Russia and Iran on armed drones is of a continuous and sustained nature. Moreover, intricate schemes including the use of a state-owned airline are being deployed to illegally deliver UAVs from Iran to Russia. The expanding range of arms and technologies being supplied confirms the long-standing nature of cooperation between the two states. This obviously requires an immediate response by the FATF, as it entails immense proliferation financing threats.
+
+At the very least, the examples mentioned above prove that Russia poses a danger to the international financial system, as it is engaged in terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation activities. Therefore, these activities have to be addressed using all available instruments.
+
+According to its mandate, the FATF assesses the compliance of individual countries with international standards, and in cases where states fail to comply with the rules, it has powers to sanction them – namely by putting them on either a “blacklist” or a “greylist”. This should not be regarded as a “punishment”, but rather as an incentive for the sanctioned country to take the necessary steps in order to fix its deficiencies.
+
+However, when it came to protecting the international financial system from an FATF member aggressively violating everything the organisation stands for, the FATF took a cautious stance, asserting its “non-political” status. But it should be pointed out that the FATF’s response in this case is dramatically different to what would be (and in fact has been) rapidly applied to Iran, for example – which suggests a political rather than a technical position on the organisation’s part.
+
+___`If a respected organisation such as the FATF cannot deal with a criminal at its table, this casts a dark shadow on its viability in the long run`___
+
+The designation of a particular country as high-risk is a comprehensive technical process with many safeguards built into it. The FATF has already applied a phased approach involving the gradual application of stringent measures, which makes it hard to accuse the organisation of overstepping its mandate or acting impulsively. Moreover, the organisation’s steps reflected the actions of Russia, meaning that the measures taken were in response to a blatant breach of the FATF’s mandate and principles. Prompt and meaningful steps from Moscow’s side would obviously have prevented further negative consequences for Russia, but there are no signs that such steps could be expected in the foreseeable future.
+
+Furthermore, during the technical process of assessing whether or not Russia has the necessary protective measures in place to prevent threats to the integrity of the global financial system, the international community managed to incorporate unproductive discussions on the political nature of such an assessment in cases where the breaching jurisdiction is a member of the watchdog. This can only have been a cause of satisfaction for the Russians. In order to keep the discussion going, the aggressor country is even resorting to intimidation of FATF members. It is threatening to terminate contracts important to FATF member states if they dare to support its nomination to the greylist.
+
+The idea of revising the FATF standards as well as considering the role of the organisation appears to be an attempt to move the discussion away from the main problem. The reality is that the FATF is constantly striving to improve. Most recently, it agreed upon a new updated Mutual Evaluation Methodology and updated its Mutual Evaluation Procedures. In particular, the FATF decided that the next round of assessments will have a greater focus on effectiveness and will take a more risk-based, targeted approach. Moreover, future assessments will be more frequent, with the time between assessments halved to six years. Given the above, it is important to avoid conflating separate issues. It is true that the mutual evaluation mechanism should be improved, but this has nothing to do with immediate response to an FATF member aggressively violating everything the organisation stands for. And the only possible response is blacklisting the violator.
+
+Interestingly, the RUSI article claims that “if the aim is to target illicit finance originating from Russia, then while blacklisting will ‘name and shame’ the country, it will fail to systemically address the illicit finance problem emanating from Russia, which either has not been detected or has been underestimated for many years”. Since there is no explanation for this statement, I would put forward an opposing view: that blacklisting Russia will actually block most of the mechanisms currently used by the aggressor state and designed by Russia’s Central Bank, Ministry of Finance and intelligence services to evade sanctions and continue polluting the global financial system.
+
+There have been regular reports of Russian agents establishing entities around the world with the involvement of offshore jurisdictions – as well as “neutral” countries and those where Russian spy networks are stronger – with the aim of purchasing components for weapons including cruise missiles, bombers and even intercontinental ballistic missiles. Classical GRU (Russian military intelligence) and SVR (Russian political/economic intelligence) covert operations are difficult to trace in the current circumstances. However, any money transfer originating in Russia could attract additional attention from correspondent banks and financial intelligence units around the world at the very beginning of its path if Russia is blacklisted – and this will significantly complement the sanctions regimes in place.
+
+Some may be cautious about isolating Russia from the global financial system. However, one should think of the threat it poses, the moral case for action, as well as the authority of those making decisions. If a respected organisation such as the FATF cannot deal with a criminal at its table, this casts a dark shadow on its viability in the long run – one only needs to look at the latest statements from the UN, which is facing the exact same situation. In addition, we need to be smart enough to look beyond the horizon for looming threats in the not-so-distant future, sending a loud and clear signal to those that consider themselves to be superpowers: “The rules are the same for everyone and have to be respected. No crime will pay”.
+
+---
+
+__Olha Vasylevska-Smahliuk__ is a Ukrainian MP and Chair of the Subcommittee on the Functioning of Payment and Information Systems and Prevention of Money Laundering of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Committee on Finance, Taxation and Customs Policy.
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title: The Republic of Agora
-description: UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.28 © MMXXIII
+description: UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.29 © MMXXIII
baseurl: "/pen0" # the subpath of your site, e.g. /blog
url: "https://agorahub.github.io" # the hostname & protocol, e.g. http://example.com
google_analytics: 'UA-166928354-2' # agorahub-pen0
diff --git a/_data/archives.yml b/_data/archives.yml
index 1ab47bf9..8d325daa 100644
--- a/_data/archives.yml
+++ b/_data/archives.yml
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+- name: VOL.28
+ repo: https://gitlab.com/agora0/pen/0x1c
+ site: https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x1c
- name: VOL.27
repo: https://gitlab.com/agora0/pen/0x1b
site: https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x1b