From eb9b5caca21cca50310de205aa597f5540bbfd94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2023 00:07:07 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 01/19] 0x20 Archive past _heros posts in _0x1f

---
 .../1907-06-10-LiuShipei-a1_l-on-social-destruction.md            | 0
 ...23-02-09-TedChiang-a1_r-chatgpt-is-a-blurry-jpeg-of-the-web.md | 0
 ...ron-a1_c-chinese-liberalists-four-left-right-debates-part-1.md | 0
 3 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
 rename _collections/_heros/{ => _0x1f}/1907-06-10-LiuShipei-a1_l-on-social-destruction.md (100%)
 rename _collections/_heros/{ => _0x1f}/2023-02-09-TedChiang-a1_r-chatgpt-is-a-blurry-jpeg-of-the-web.md (100%)
 rename _collections/_heros/{ => _0x1f}/2023-07-16-Byron-a1_c-chinese-liberalists-four-left-right-debates-part-1.md (100%)

diff --git a/_collections/_heros/1907-06-10-LiuShipei-a1_l-on-social-destruction.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x1f/1907-06-10-LiuShipei-a1_l-on-social-destruction.md
similarity index 100%
rename from _collections/_heros/1907-06-10-LiuShipei-a1_l-on-social-destruction.md
rename to _collections/_heros/_0x1f/1907-06-10-LiuShipei-a1_l-on-social-destruction.md
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-02-09-TedChiang-a1_r-chatgpt-is-a-blurry-jpeg-of-the-web.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x1f/2023-02-09-TedChiang-a1_r-chatgpt-is-a-blurry-jpeg-of-the-web.md
similarity index 100%
rename from _collections/_heros/2023-02-09-TedChiang-a1_r-chatgpt-is-a-blurry-jpeg-of-the-web.md
rename to _collections/_heros/_0x1f/2023-02-09-TedChiang-a1_r-chatgpt-is-a-blurry-jpeg-of-the-web.md
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-07-16-Byron-a1_c-chinese-liberalists-four-left-right-debates-part-1.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x1f/2023-07-16-Byron-a1_c-chinese-liberalists-four-left-right-debates-part-1.md
similarity index 100%
rename from _collections/_heros/2023-07-16-Byron-a1_c-chinese-liberalists-four-left-right-debates-part-1.md
rename to _collections/_heros/_0x1f/2023-07-16-Byron-a1_c-chinese-liberalists-four-left-right-debates-part-1.md

From f2a0322f78f2f7c6f446e028aed1472c0bb32b2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2023 00:07:38 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 02/19] 0x20 Init commit _heros posts

---
 ...0-10-MaoZedong-a1_c-against-unification.md |  46 ++
 ...2021-01-26-ziq-a1_l-burn-the-bread-book.md | 272 ++++++++
 ...-07-JoonSungPark-a1_r-generative-agents.md | 624 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 942 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_heros/1920-10-10-MaoZedong-a1_c-against-unification.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_heros/2021-01-26-ziq-a1_l-burn-the-bread-book.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_heros/2023-04-07-JoonSungPark-a1_r-generative-agents.md

diff --git a/_collections/_heros/1920-10-10-MaoZedong-a1_c-against-unification.md b/_collections/_heros/1920-10-10-MaoZedong-a1_c-against-unification.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..22e0f79b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/1920-10-10-MaoZedong-a1_c-against-unification.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title:  "《反對統一》"
+author: "毛澤東"
+date:   1920-10-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image:  https://i.imgur.com/vWFCjYC.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description:   "根據１９２０年１０月１０日上海《時事新報》副刊《學燈》刊印。署名毛澤東。"
+position: center
+---
+
+中國的事，不是統一能夠辦得好的，到現在算是大明白了。中國也不是全無熱心國事的人。這些熱心國事的人，也不是全然沒有知識和能力。然而辦不好者，中國之人，太沒有基礎，太沒有下層的組織。在沙堵〈渚〉上建築層樓，不待建成，便要傾倒了。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+中國二十四朝，算是二十四個建在沙堵〈渚〉上的樓，個個要傾倒，就是因為個個沒基礎。四千年的中國只是一個空架子，多少政治家的經營，多少學者的論究，都只在一個空架子上面描寫。每朝有幾十年或百多年的太平，全靠住一個條件得來，就是殺人多，流血多。人口少了，不相殺了，就太平了，全不靠有真實的基礎。因此我們這四千年文明古國，簡直等於沒有國。國只是一個空的架子，其內面全沒有什麼東西。說有人民罷，人民只是散的，“一盤散沙”，實在形容得真冤枉！中國人生息了四千多年，不知幹什麼去了？一點沒有組織，一個有組織的社會看不見，一塊有組織的地方看不見。中國這塊土內，有中國人和沒有中國人有什麼多大的區別？在人類中要中國人，和不要中國人，又有什麼不了的關係？推究原因，吃虧就在這“中國”二字，就在這中國的統一。現在唯一救濟的方法，就在解散中國，反對統一。
+
+中國人沒有科學腦筋，不知分析與概括的關係，有小的細胞才有大的有機體，有分子的各個才有團體。中國人多有一種拿大帽子戴的虛榮心，遇事只張眼望著前頭，望著籠統的地方。大帽子戴上頭了，他的心便好過了。現在的和議，就是這樣。一些人捧著一個“和議”，北跑到南，南跑到北，沒希望的時候，便皺著眉，有一點希望，便笑起來了。我是極端反對和議的，我以為和議是一個頂大的危險。我的理由，不是段琪瑞的統一論〔１〕，也不是章太炎孫洪伊的法律論〔２〕，我只為要建設一個將來的真中國，其手段便要打破現在的假中國。起碼一點，就是南北不應複合〔３〕，進一層則為各省自決自治。
+
+各省自決自治，為改建真中國唯一的法子，好多人業已明白了。這是這次南北戰役〔４〕的一個意外的收果。現在雖然只有湖南，廣東，江蘇，湖北幾個省發動，事勢必然成為一道洪流。全國各省，都將要納到這個流裡，是一個極可喜的現象。現在所要討論的有兩個問題：一個是各省自治內部的事，即如何促使各省自治成立；一是各省自治外部的事，即如何將妨礙各省自治的障礙物，減殺其效力或阻止其進行。
+
+關於前一個問題，我有二個意見：（一）像湖南廣東兩省用兵力驅去舊勢力的，算是一種革命，應由各該革命政府，召集兩省的“人民憲法會議”〔５〕，制定“湖南憲法”及“廣東憲法”，再依照憲法，建設一個新湖南及新廣東。這兩省的人民最要努力。其憲法要采一種澈底革新的精神，務以儘量發揮兩省的特性為標準。（二）像湖北江蘇兩省，不能有革命的行動，只好從鄂人治鄂蘇人治蘇（省長）一點入手，等到事權歸了本省人，便進而為地方自治的組織。以上二種方法，各依各的情勢去改造。於前一種可以樹各省自治的模範，實有“國”的性質，可實行一種“全自治”，所以最有希望。於後一種，雖然暫時只能實現“半自治”，然根據這種自治，便可進而做廢督運動。只要督軍廢了，則全自治便即刻到了手了。方法雖然和平一點，不十分痛快，然為適應環境，采這種方法，也是好的。
+
+關於如何除去各省自治的障礙物，我以為這障礙不在督軍，而在許多人要求的“統一”。我以為至少要南北對立。這是促成各省自治的一大關係點。倘使統一成了，新組國會，制定憲法，各省自治，必多少要受憲法束縛（無論中央政府永辦不好），像湖南廣東，便斷不能發揮其特性。又人才奔赴中央政府，地方必有才難之歎。更有一個大不好處，假如中央政府成了，全國視線，又都集注中央，中國人看上不看下務虛不務實的老癖必要大大發作，而各省自治，又變成不足輕重的了。我覺得中國現在的政象，竟如清末一樣，國人對之，不要望他改良，要望他越糟越壞。我看此際尚未壞到極處，我們不能用自力加增其壞度，卻盡可不必替他減少壞度。我們最好采不理主義，和議再不要說了，國民大會解決國事之說〔６〕，再不要提倡了。要提倡國民大會，也要如張東蓀先生的主張，用國民大會去解決省事。
+
+胡適之〔７〕先生有二十年不談政治的主張，我現在主張二十年不談中央政治，各省人用全力注意到自己的省采省們羅主義，各省關上各省的大門，大門以外，一概不理。國慶〔８〕是慶中華民國，我實在老不高興他。特為趁這國慶，表示我一點反對統一的意見，而希望有一種“省慶”發生。
+
+---
+
+注釋：
+
+〔１〕段祺瑞，北洋系長老。
+
+〔２〕章太炎，即章炳麟（１８６９—１９３６），字枚叔，號太炎，浙江余杭人。中國近代民主革命家、學者。時竭力主張聯邦制，主張各省迅速制定正式憲法，不能滿足于臨時憲法。孫洪伊（１８７０—１９３６），字伯蘭，天津人。早年為袁世凱幕僚。１９１１年任直隸諮議局議員，參與立憲活動。１９１６年在段祺瑞內閣中先後任教育總長和內務總長。後參與組織憲法商榷會和民友社。時竭力主張“由人民組織地方政府，施行地方政治”，“以憲法會議討論之地方制度，參合試行。”
+
+〔３〕南北不應複合，意為當時的中國不應再行“南北議和”、“南北統一”。
+
+〔４〕南北戰役，指１９１７—１９１９年間南方護法軍與北洋軍閥之間的戰爭。
+
+〔５〕召開人民憲法會議，是毛澤東、彭璜、龍兼公等人的一種政治主張。他們曾提出《由“湖南革命政府”召集“湖南人民憲法會議”制定“湖南憲法”以建設“新湖南”之建議》。
+
+〔６〕指當時吳佩孚等人提出通過召開國民大會解決一切問題的主張。
+
+〔７〕胡適之，即胡適。
+
+〔８〕１９１１年１０月１０日武昌首義後，中華民國建立。１９１２年９月２８日北京臨時政府臨時參議院議決，定１０月１０日為中華民國國慶日。
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2021-01-26-ziq-a1_l-burn-the-bread-book.md b/_collections/_heros/2021-01-26-ziq-a1_l-burn-the-bread-book.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dd88f7cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2021-01-26-ziq-a1_l-burn-the-bread-book.md
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title:  "烧了《面包与自由》吧"
+author: "ziq"
+date:   2021-01-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image:  https://i.imgur.com/3aVzRzG.png
+#image_caption: ""
+#description:   ""
+position: left
+---
+
+几年以来，我都在看着一个人开着他的皮卡车，驶入我附近的森林，砍掉所有未被立法保护的树——也就是：松树、橡树以外的所有树。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+一旦哪颗树（不论是长角豆还是橄榄树，山楂树还是乳香树，或是草莓树）生长得足够成熟，能被拿去当燃料时，他就会把t̄a砍掉，拉走当柴火用。他甚至还砍我所种下的树，还一边笑着向我招手，好像他在给我以人情似的。我静静地怒视着他，一言不发；这是因为我晓得，在他背后，有整个国家的势力在支持他。
+
+他把这些木头烧来给他的有多个露天炉子的传统烘焙坊用。他所生产的大受喜爱的工业产品正是面包——一种迅速地取代那个区域内的可食用具有部分的本地植物（都正在被砍掉来为麦田腾出地盘）的产品。
+
+村民们为烘焙坊感到自豪，因为t̄a吸引了来自整座岛的游客，并且就此让t̄a们有更多赚钱的机会。当地官僚机构，就是民主选举所推举出的村议会，则给烘焙师以全权，因为有很多人的生计仰仗他的烘焙坊。
+
+因为这个烘焙师会去砍掉长到人类的身高以上的一切，所以那些树根本就没有长到结果的机会，也就没有机会去播撒种子来让新的树木长出来了。森林将会萎缩得只剩下松树，也就不再能去支撑绝大多数动物的生活了。气候会变得干燥，土地会被冲蚀得溃坏，空气会淤滞下来并欠缺氧气。在那些尚未因为小麦种植区的扩张而被推平的所剩无几的森林里，余留下来的将仅仅是绝育的松树林的荒漠。
+
+而那个烘焙师又会马上去游说村议会，让t̄a们允许他把松树也砍来用了，要不然，等到他没有合法的树可砍的时候，那个金贵的烘焙坊就难以为继了。
+
+不出几年，整整一千年来供当地人果腹的所有水果、坚果和浆果都被一扫而空，全都被用单一谷物做出来的消费用产品给取代了。一个勃勃的生态系统就这样消失，取而代之的则是指不定会在哪时崩溃，并在那崩溃之时让自己所养育的全部生命和自己一同毁灭的小麦单一耕作。
+
+值得注意的是，那个烘焙师，和我村子里的大多数人——事实上，是整个小岛上的人——都自认为自己是共产主义者。那个村子有个「共产党」的支部，而t̄a们总是选出「共产」的当地领导，并在全国选举中给「共产」政客投票。
+
+之所以每个实打实的无治主义者都不会容忍伪共产主义者、「坦克派」以及t̄a们的招牌：集体制资本主义，是因为这些家伙执迷于钱、国家和统治者，还会仅仅因为斯大林主义政治保证了「给t̄a们和t̄a们的亲戚以轻松的体制内职务」就对之大敞胸怀。
+
+斯大林主义政治家们会公开地对通过许诺公务员职务来买下支持者的选票。让你登上那种有着一大堆福利（包括但不限于「比私营岗位高几倍的薪水」和「多重退休金」）的公务员职位，就相当于保证了你和你的家人搭上顺风车。那些公务员们每有一个官职便能拿到一份退休金，人脉更活络的还会在退休之前的最后几个月里被调换到一堆岗位上来最大化退休金收入。
+
+我相当确信，所有正在读这篇文章的人都晓得一点，就是：斯大林主义是被设计来充实资产阶级的钱袋、把对国家的公民的完全控制权交与资产阶级的。没有无治主义者会去把这种ďiao东西视作共产主义。但是，在「真」共产主义社会，一个钱、国家和阶级都被完全废除的「无治共产主义」社会里，本地烘焙师估计仍然会那样烤面包；然后，又因为面包要被拿去免费地广泛地提供给所有人，烘焙师就需要烤更多，也就需要更多木头。更多的森林将会被夷平，以此来让面包继续去被生产下去。
+
+生活在村子里的所有人，所有路过的人，还有远方城市里的人都期望着自己的盘子里能有要多少有多少的上好的面包。新开张的烘焙坊会越来越多，多得都得开上山了，而另一边，乡下人则努力工作，尽着自己的喂饱饥饿的城市人的职责。
+
+多年来，我费了很大的劲去想象，让工人们掌握生产资料将会如何如何终结面包生产对山野所造成的环境破坏。我竭力去想象过共产主义防止生态系统被摧坏的场面。森林只会继续被夷平来保证生产活动能得以维持。
+
+我之所以说「今天的人们个个都有免费面包」意味着「明天的人们全都没有面包（或者别的食物）」，是因为表层土正在蚀去，气候正在暖化，野生生物正在灭绝，整座整座的山正在迅速地变成沙漠；而不久后，甚至小麦无法生长在村庄周围的田地的这一情况也将不可避免地发生。
+
+不管在哪种经济体制下，「村民们全都能消费多到能塞满t̄a们的兜囊的新鲜面包」就意味着对车程内的所有森林的摧毁，而最终，所有田地都将会变得贫瘠，作物欠收，而所有人挨饿。这一切已都在日程之上，只待真正上演了；把生产转为共产形式并不会在任何层面上动摇这事态的不可避免。
+
+“那你怎么让人们被喂饱呢，大天才？”我听到你这么嗤笑道。答案是简单的，t̄a已被实行了千年，久经验证。我不会去喂饱谁。人们将会去自己喂饱自己，而不是期望自己会有「自己将会被别人的劳动喂饱」这个跟工业文明一起兴起的权利。人们将会选择保护森林，而不再因为「工业化食物生产所带来的或许算是的便利」而去推平t̄a。
+
+t̄a们将会用堂堂性命来保护森林，因为t̄a们将会需要生长在林中的食物来存生，而不依赖于工业化农场、烘焙坊和工厂（这些东西则垄断了食品生产，还旋即把自己所引起的生态灭绝隐藏到无法从村庄和被精致地粉饰的街巷看见的地方）。
+
+面包和其他工业产品让我们陌离于我们的生态系统，t̄a们还让我们不会关心我们的食物的生产方法（只要我们自己所想吃的食物还摆在商店里）。把食物生产权归还给个体是保护生态系统的唯一方法。直接觅食是唯一无治的生产模式。当其它人背负了为你的口粮耕作这任务时，t̄a们会含糊了事，因为这些食物不会入t̄a们的所爱之人的嘴。游觅食物，而不是工业化农庄里的工人所肩负的任务（去服务一整个与食物链毫无干系的、享受福分的官府人员的精英阶级），则需要重新成为每一个身体健全者的生活方式。
+
+在全世界范围内，已存在了千百年，维持了不计其数的一代代生命的复杂的多元耕作的食物森林已经被工业化生产的傲慢所毁灭了——被小麦的或玉米的单一耕作暂时地取代了；正因如此，人们可以从t̄a们的家或者办公地的对面取得面包，而不是去亲身涉足土地，来像t̄a们的祖先那样从荒野中采得食物。这种便利对文明人来说似乎是「进步」（至少在毁灭性的工业化农业流程让麦田变得浇薄，全世界的田地变为巨大的不可居住的砂地之前）。让我们存活下去并且兴旺了几个世纪的可持续的生活方式已经被抛开，来为一种已自证为灾难性的失败，并把我们和其他的物种推往灭绝的边缘的，为博取工业便利所做的短命的尝试让路。
+
+工业就不是环保的。工业体制完全是破坏的。共产主义、资本主义、法西斯主义全都建立在生态灭绝之上。之所以烘焙师的威权被尊于一切之上，是因为被驯化的人们比起摒弃t̄a们的破坏性的消费主义习惯更乐意消费「免费」的工业面包。如果我们要在这毁灭性的生态崩溃的时代存生，人类必须像我们的祖先千年来所做的那样，再度让广袤的食物森林覆盖大地，而不以奢侈与便利的名义摧毁那真正给予了我们以生命的生态系统。
+
+
+### 「人民的威权」——「无治共产主义」是怎样滋生威权的
+
+如果有人持续地无止境地砍树来去烤面包，依赖着森林的人们肯定会做出干涉，让伐木工停止毁灭森林、破坏t̄a们的生活方式。
+
+这就发生在今天的雨林，在那儿，原住民对幸灾乐祸地给企业伐木工颁授资格证、默许非法砍伐的国家感到失望，进而选择自己来亲手驱逐伐木工。
+
+t̄a们冒着死亡的风险去行动，许多人已经死于伐木工（比起原住民的生命，t̄a们更看重利益）之手。t̄a们知道，如果不阻止伐木工，作为自己的家园的森林将会被破坏，自己的生活方式也将被迫面临永久的毁灭。t̄a们将会被驱赶到拥挤的城市里，只能被迫日复一日劳动来买下面包和牛肉（导致了森林的腐朽与溃烂的东西）。
+
+所以，一个无治共产主义社会将会怎样应对把树砍光来去烤面包的人呢？在一个无治共产主义社会里，所有人都会有环保意识，消费活动都是可持续的，对吧......？不。如果你作了任何批判性思考的话，你会得出「不」的回答。
+
+如果社会给予伐木工充裕的权限，那么t̄a们只可能以和现在一样：以爆炸式的速率摧毁森林。如果t̄a们没有了权限，那么别人也就可以无阻地使用强制力来去终结t̄a们对我们的自然资源的掳掠。一旦失去了会为自己撑腰的，文明的威权，伐木工们将会迅速地失去权力，同时也会因为继续砍树将冒着死亡的风险因而望而却步。
+
+无治共产主义是工业的意识形态，t̄a所基于的思想是控制生产资料然后民主地经营工厂、锯木厂、油井、矿场和能源厂。工业文明，则是令人发指的极权。话虽如此，即便无治主义者恐怕是反对所有形式的威权的，“无治”共产主义仍然推崇着工业文明。
+
+就像t̄a在资本主义社会里的那样，在工业化共产主义社会里，伐木对于工业化生产（工业化共产主义社会及其构造所围绕的中心）来说同样是必不可少的一环。只要生产继续作为体制的驱动器，那么树就会继续因为从材木、纸张生产中对原料的需求到给作物的种植和畜牧腾出地盘的五花八门的原因被砍倒。
+
+而伐木也被尊尚工业社会的人们所极度推崇；在实际情况下，这些“无治”共产主义者会马上采取措施去保护伐木工免遭少数未开化的人——森林中的原住民——的回击。这些措施无论如何都必定是威权；一种对暴力的垄断；一个名字并非国家的国家。
+
+伐木工会把这种珍贵的服务提供给住在闪闪发光的大城市里，惯于奢侈消费品被一连串一连串地送上家门的，好品行的、优异的、有文化的、受驯化的、平等主义的、民主的、文明开化的无治共产主义者......正因如此，为了保证无治伐木工能去完成t̄a们的无治工作而不被“原原人”的森林住民的还击，t̄a们还会用上明显地有着威权主义性质的手段。那些无共人的思路将会利索地给这些手段找到辩词——无共人最爱就是用t̄a们有力的缜密的逻辑™️来为治权「辩护」。
+
+面对着无治共产城市需求着材木、纸张和肉品的难题，而又在另一边注意到了那些些少的原住民部落是生产受阻的唯一因素时，那些无共人会戴上无治的史波克的尖耳并且声明：「多数人的需求重于少数人的需求」。仿佛今天的资本主义和社会主义国家暴力地压制那些动身去阻止毁坏着自己的生活方式的伐木、采矿业的原住民，无治工业主义者们会派遣出红黑的军队，来以此侍卫自己的红黑推土机，并惩戒所有违背了“人民”的意志的人。
+
+原住民当然不在乎正在砍倒自己森林的是谁，资本主义者或是共产主义者。t̄a们肯定不会在乎推土机是公有的，自己千年来所居的土地没有被划给了并非国家和资本的“人民”（文明开化的选举多数派）的——而不是国家或者资本的——所有物。
+
+哺育原住民及其子嗣的森林正在被毁灭，好去维持冷漠的城市住民的灭绝性的生活方式。t̄a们仍因文明人而死，t̄a们是一群落后的退步的阻碍进步的少数群体......是破坏革命的，阻挠t̄a们的伟大的平等的文明的。有文化的“进步”的多数派将会用所持的票数压倒t̄a们。反正所有与红色无治主义者打过交道的人都知道原原人都是想要阻止我们的轮椅、药剂生产的下流的反动的体能歧视者。
+
+文明人总是在推销「共同福祉」，或者换句话说，「多数人的意志永远比少数人或者小群体的更重要」；这现象是从亚里士多德的时代起就开始了——在他的《人的追求》里，他写道：
+
+> “建立并维护国家的福祉的重要性是巨大的，根本的。维护个体的福祉会激起欢欣，但是维护国家或城邦的福祉则更为高尚而神圣。”
+
+共产主义甚至还更坚定地信仰这种「多数派的意志是至高无上的」的把戏，坚定到宣告：只有工业工人的阶级的声音是要紧的，而为了消除阶级差异，所有人都得成为工人阶级的一部分。
+
+之所以苏联、中国和其他共产主义实验在自给自足的原住民当中强行推行集体化，然后在t̄a们不可避免地抵抗之时对t̄a们进行屠杀，正是因为这个逻辑。如果人们不情愿于被驱离于t̄a们所世居的土地，并到促成了自己家乡的毁灭的工业化农场和工厂里去工作，t̄a们就会被冠以古拉格和反动派之名被系统性种族灭绝——其手段通常是毁坏t̄a们的食物来源。
+
+工业化食物被森林之外的工业社会和t̄a的居民珍视，因为，被驯化了人们想要吃面包和被微波炉加热的披萨，而在诸如冷不丁的”拯救雨林“或者“一起纯素”的不痛不痒的惺惺作态之外，这些产品的真正代价（环境破坏）并不是工业社会的一个实在的议题。
+
+对于深陷各自的窘境的普通城市人来说，森林中的住民和t̄a们的奇异的异域文化相较于繁忙的城市实在是大相径庭。哪怕是森林周围的文明开化的农村人也永远在为社会晋阶而去竭力把t̄a们的村庄都市化。就我的经验来看，t̄a们会为了拥有优质烘焙坊，苹果Inc.自营店或咖啡店、感到自己和会去蔑称自己为“土鳖”、“乡巴佬”的大城市人一样地文明开化，而去欣然地把可见范围内的可见范围内的树全部卖掉。
+
+「在圣保罗、里约的大城市人想让我们依赖采巴西坚果为生」农民说道，「光靠这个可没法让谁家的小孩升上大学。」（摘自RollingStone.com）
+
+正在把亚马逊雨林所剩的部分烧为白地的定居者农民们在说t̄a们这么做是为了t̄a们的孩子......为了赚得让t̄a们的孩子受教育然后在城里找到好工作的钞票。我觉得，现在可以确定地说：「文明人珍视t̄a们的文明开化的生活，并总是让t̄a们的文明开化的需求绝对优先于未开化的他者」。
+
+文明人可以对t̄a们的文明开化的邻居产生共情，因为这些邻居和t̄a们做着同样的奋斗：赚足钞票，让t̄a们的孩子受教育，买好的保险，洗t̄a们的车，决定到哪里去度假，翻新t̄a们的厨房，选择接下来刷哪一部Netflix剧......所以不除意料地，这些文明人的邻居将会使出浑身解数去助力文明人，并去揍倒妨碍着自己日益膨胀的对工业化舒适的追求的那些未开化者。
+
+我已经能看到你们之中的某些已经进入了质疑的阶段：「但是我们无治共产主义者不像资本主义者，我们是有着善意的好人；人道的人。我们会让工业变得绿色，我们会用一种环保的方式管治森林，凭借民主、工会、独角兽和平等！」
+
+为什么会有人咽得下这坨屎？为什么被驯化透了的，已经习惯了毁灭性的工业文明的所有舒适享受的人，会突然地因为民主而去摒绝这些舒适？凭什么77亿人会突然改变生活方式，就凭无治共产主义的一席宣告吗？在「所有工业都会对环境和野地人造成毁灭性打击，令社会去运作在一种不论在哪个历史的哪一刻、在哪个意识形态的名义之下都会招致灾难的工业体制之下」已得到证实的现在，无共文明通过什么方式让工业变得绿色？
+
+所有受控的大众社会，包括每一个建立共产社会的历史实验，都生成了权力体，也就是具有着高人一等的权力的大众组织。这种权力与时俱增，并让“共产”的社会越来越远离t̄a的革命的起源。一切的迹象都指向：工业化无治共产主义会持续地将威权具现化。考虑到无治共产主义是如此地依赖于破坏性的，剥削的，致使疏远的、把人驯化的工业还有对整个地球的工人的掌控和支配，没有证据能证明其会去避开威权。
+
+无治共产主义解放不了世界。
+
+
+### 全类工业产品，给予全民——招灾的配方
+
+在共产社会中，所有东西都是被免费提供的，而通常的对待资源的方式则仿佛是在把资源视为无限。如果你觉得你想要什么，你可以从公社的小铺里拿取。克鲁泡特金说过，除了个人t̄a自己，没有人有权裁决个人的需求有多大。
+
+因为大多数红色人儿认定资源应该被按「需」分配，所以必须判断社区里的谁的「需」占比上最大。
+
+我知道很多无共人，比如克鲁泡特金，声称所有个人仅仅会取用t̄a们所「需」的一切。我之所以要来抨击这一点，是因为事实上这在工业社会并不可行。资源并不是无限的；没人会去穷极一生做艰竭的粗活，然后把t̄a们所生产的一切就那么交给某个把装卸货车开到公社小铺跟前，然后说“我需要你们的社区里的本月产额，来吧，装上来”的陌生人。为什么会有人为了看着哪个ďiao人嘴上说了“需要”自己所生产的一切然后就据此为理由开着车把东西载走，而往死里干、浪费生命去干粗活？
+
+“但是作为身处于全自动豪华共产社会的，觉醒的无治共产主义者，劳动实际上会是十分地有限的，因为我们可以与所有同志分担工作！利润则不再必需被纳入考虑，因为我们所产出的一切会被免费提供给所有想要取用t̄a的人，正因如此我们也不需要担心我们的产品的营销，而这会让我们所要做的劳动进一步地最小化，给予我们以充分的用于享受我们的劳动果实的时间！”
+
+出于毒舌取笑的目的，我组织了一下上面这位无共人的对这篇文章的初稿的回应。无共人是活在什么奇幻乐土啊？难道在那块地方，工业生产所带来的所有大疑难（包括正在上演的地球上几乎所有生命形式的灭绝）都将会在利润和营销被从等式当中划掉的那一刻就那么烟消云散吗？
+
+我会在我的文章里继续涵盖这一部分，但是我还要再说一遍：在一个旨在给予世界上的每一个人以平等的去取用商品的权力的工业社会里，工业活动不会有所削减——t̄a会增加。如果世界上的每一个人都一下子有权去取用成堆成堆的被西方消费者们认作生活必需品的浪费的屁东西，不仅对生产的需求会提升，资源还会以迅速得多的势头被榨干。
+
+那相当于是在假设，在一个，估计啊，是平等的社会里，有人居然会在没有枪口对着自己的脑袋之时还乐意去到矿坑和工厂里工作。一旦脱离了枷锁，怎么可能会有人想回到那矿坑？难道有人真心以为刚果孩子会在乎你每年都入手一部新手机吗？t̄a们难道真地该为你的权利而被要求牺牲自己，让你可以以此继续奢华地生活，享受你所有的小小便利？
+
+在对工业共产主义的实地实施之中，在一些人取用了比自己本该拿取的量更多的东西，从而导致别人没得取之后，社群会不出所料地限制对公社小铺内的一些物品的取用。克鲁泡特金可能会坚称，我们会乐于天天劳动，啊，来造这些消费主义的屎东西、就为了把t̄a们交给哪个陌生人——但是他可是一个从不需要去成天工作的幸运的学者啊，你还指望他个啥呢？
+
+工业社会是被现今数以亿计的全球发展中地区的被剥削的人们的无休的劳动所养活的。人们被迫从幼年起就在矿坑里干活，以此生产即将被工厂里的别人（其中包括孩童）给组装成商品的原材料；这么做全都是为了挣那点微少至极，以至于几乎不能以此来维持生命的钱。这些都是消蚀精力而又危险的工作，让所有工作者窒息，从胸腔处的瘪下感到自己’的青春在短短几年间逝去。
+
+不管怎样，到下一篇章之前，还是让我们继续嘲弄一会儿共产主义神话吧。在理想中的共产主义社会里（我猜，在那儿，矿物估计是不知怎地地均匀分布于行星’的表面而不是压倒性地集中于发展中地区的吧），外包工作可能会消失，因为共产主义者们不会去剥削远方的外包工人们（工人们全都听说过某个帝国主义共产主义者的名字，对吧？对吧？？）。所以，恰恰相反，生产将会需要被本地化，然后成品才会被按需分配。
+
+着手于被按需分配的资源之时，为了判断各人所需什么、各人会被给予的资源有哪些，某个形式的决策团体总归是被需要的。
+
+当决定一个人的需求时，需要被纳入考虑的要素有很多，诸如：t̄a住得离务工地多远，离物资小铺多远，在工作期间会消耗多少卡路里，其家庭的大小，膳食的限制，可能所拥有的残障，所特有的代谢机制，可能会组织的派对数量，朋友的数量、其中被邀请去参加派对者的数量，宗教和文化的习俗，家的大小，家的园圃的大小，家所采用的防寒材料的类型，车的燃油效率......如果不就此打住，我还可以列出一百个。.
+
+不须置疑，给官僚以这种权力意味着一些被偏重的团体或个体会被偏重，而不那么被偏重的团体或个体则会被无视。这就是治权的本质。需要有一个全职的官僚团体，让t̄a们去收集所有这些数据、判定各人应当被分配到的比例，而这些官僚又自带偏见。哪怕做这个工作的是计算机，收集数据这一工作仍然是需要官僚的。而t̄a们仍然会因为自己的偏见而把错误的或者甄别过的数据喂给计算机。
+
+对我来说，让一个官僚组织去判定一个人的价值定然终将导致贪污腐败——这也许是克鲁泡特金厘定「所有人都只会从小铺那里取用被自己所需的东西」的原因。
+
+当然了，真正的解决方案首先应该是不要把什么理想的乌托邦的根基立于工业生产之上......对工业生产的许诺将会是没有尽头的；说「所有人都将会主动请缨，在工厂、矿坑和屠宰场里超级努力地工作，而商品将会被分给所有地方的的每一个人，同时一个环保的生态的绿色的太阳能朋克的天国也能被维持」只会立即让你被视为自满的臭j̄ib̄a骗子，跟许诺会给我们以自由和昌隆}的奸笑的政治家没有区别的那种。
+
+我所能想到的唯一能真正自圆其说的红色无治主义流派是无治集体主义，因为至少工人能收到自己的劳动的直接回馈，而不必任凭自己的作为人的价值被一个外部机构所敲定。
+
+如果你打算用一生在工厂或农场里为别人而生产，你真地愿意让官僚或是委员会，或者甚至说，直选选民们（这些人，全部，都会因为潜在的偏好/偏见，而给某个人更多回馈，哪怕那人和你从事相同的工作）去决定你的劳动值得给你带来多少？
+
+不管怎么说，无治集体主义所重视的实际上仍然仅仅是那些愿意投身于苦活、把最长的时间花在工作上的工人。无治集体主义仍然把生态灭绝性的工业和城市人的奢华享受推崇为高于全部地球生命的重中之重...19世纪的意识形态是拯救不了谁的。当行星陷入火炎成为事实时，这种「改良工业社会」的谜语是起不到一点作用的；所以，把t̄a和《面包》一起，扔进垃圾堆吧。
+
+如果工业共产主义在现实世界里得以实施，可以大致确定的是，为了防止行恶者从小铺里拿走社区的本月生产额，一定会有某种治权被投入实用。人们需要对小铺加以警卫并确认某人是否有权拿走t̄a所取的量的资格。t̄a们需要成为治权力、法律与秩序的奉行者；“正道”的给予者。
+
+我晓得很多红色无治主义者试图，也会实际地去为这种治权「辩白」，把它当作对「对社会福祉来说必不可少」的一环；让我们把话说清楚吧。「管束对食品的取用，预定哪些人能取用、取用多少」——这些行为，很明显，是对治权力的使用。而这不是一个被“辩白”了的“正当”的治权——那种东西根本不存在。
+
+让我们弄清楚啊，这种对小铺的管治也不是无治主义的“直接行动”战术（这是一种常见得要命的对红色无治主义者的误解）。建立警队跟直接行动毫无关系。
+
+直接行动是单独地行使力量。单独地，不与体制性权力扯上关联地。参与直接行动的人并不为了让自己正当合理而诉诸威权。其行动并不被任何人给正当化；在其行动时，治权力并未对其授予以保护或嘉奖。没有哪种威权是经由威权之手被授给其的，也没有任何东西能确保其在行动确保其在失败的情况下也能免于被反扑行动所伤。
+
+一个人采取直接行动反击治权这一行动是不会导致没有哪种体制性权力不均的。治权已经导致了权力不均，你的直接行动是一种自卫行为，去让你自己，你的生态系统或你的社群免于被那不均所波及。
+
+直接行动完全是一个无治的战术，但是，给人贴徽章，给人以裁判权和治权力（和对暴力的垄断），借此让t̄a监视小铺，或者，任意引咎去不给特定人群以粮食和货品——这些作法则和无治没有一丁点关系。
+
+公社小铺被警官和法官们（权力体们）所管治正是威权主义的。被授以裁判权的警力的强制行动，与个体，或小团体，以保护生活、打击治权为目的，单独的对强制力的采用（也就是，直接行动）完完全全是两码事。
+
+建立警队——哪怕t̄a是由志愿者组成的，哪怕构成警队的警员是经由选举被推举出来的，哪怕t̄a们集体决策，哪怕t̄a们的制服是红黑的，哪怕警员职务是被轮流担当的——根本就是威权主义的。没有无治条子这种东西。“无治条子”这个词是自相矛盾、透顶地矛盾的。
+
+就拿一种直接行动作为例子来说吧。我，抡动拳头，去揍一个正在砍我所最爱的树的伐木工。这个行动是完全脱离于管治性的体制的，因为并没有任何权力体或者体制性权力替我撑了腰。没有任何东西会合理化我对强制力的使用，或是赋予我以对暴力的垄断。我所采用的强制力的作用范围不会超过我自己的双拳。因为伤人是违法的，而另一方面，他的砍伐又是合法的，所以那个伐木工有整个法律的治权力替他撑腰，所以我所采取的任何行动都是犯上作逆。而这是为扭转浩大的权力不均而战。这就是无治。
+
+在这个文明开化了的世界，我会因为使用武力阻止他对森林的亵渎而被法律强制措施给狠狠地惩罚。因为国家已经给了他以伐木许可证，现在他有权去处置整个森林和所有依赖着森林而生存的所有生命。他的砍树的行为就是欺压。他就是治权的体现。如果我打算阻止他，没有国家、法院和警力会替我撑腰。我是为了对治权力的体制施以反击而去真真切切地阻止砍伐；这种对强制力的采用是单独的。
+
+组织警力或者官僚去屯驻守卫，并管治一个被授权了的公社小铺、调度掌权者并让t̄a们坐着决定每个人应该吃多少，这些行为则构建出了合理化的权力结构，与对暴力的体制性的垄断。这制造了国家——或者最保守地说吧，至少是一个原始态的国家，马上就会随着官僚统治的滋长而变得完整而庞大。
+
+德国哲学家Max Weber把国家定义为垄断了合理/合法使用物性暴力的存在。不管为了国家而去实施国家暴力的是政治家，法官，还是一个伐木工，国家暴力永远合乎道理。因为经由国家之手所做出的全部暴力行为都是为了国家和其权力而做的，而施暴者总是合乎法理的国家的成员，所以这些行为都会在转瞬之间被「正当化」。
+
+因而，在公众的眼里，只要当局仍认定这在「必要」的范围之内，已被授以宰割森林的权力的伐木工可以随心所欲地伤害森林，
+
+如果哪里有某种权力在授权并合理化对暴力的使用，国家便存在于那里。一个无治主义者根本不可能去正当化侵犯性的，威权的体制，比方说：警察。警察一定对少数群体抱有恶意的偏见，从而让主流群体的，还有执行警务的人的权力累积得愈加庞大。哪怕少数群体参与了警务，多数派仍然会去压迫t̄a们所来自的群体。
+
+一个大规模生产货物，并把t̄a们分配到公社小铺里的社会就是国家的一种体现；这无关乎克鲁泡特金的执意（他坚定地认为所有人都会主动地工作并从小铺里拿取自己所想要的东西）。在实际情境里没有真正自愿的工业劳动。在实际情境里，在地球，这颗所能给予的回馈正在日益萎缩的星球上，不可能有哪个“免费”小铺周围会不被警察所督视（以此阻止被管理团队判定为「其价值低于了其劳动成果」的人或群体去那接触无穷的货源）。
+
+无治共产主义根本就不是革命性的——只要t̄a仍穷竭我们的资源，依托着工业文明的名号；哦，工业文明，无治共产主义（一个以劳动为本的工业意识形态，力图开化土地和居住于其上的人们的）所追求的东西啊...被掩饰在民主的迷彩下并且正在上演的全球性生态灭绝一点都不像革命。每一个无治主义者都必需知道独力和权力之间的区别，但是，有极少数的自认的社会无治主义者似乎对权力抱有兴趣，自满地嘚吧什么「有理的权力」，辩称「无治共产主义警队会怎样怎样运作」并激动地讨论乔姆斯基的演讲（其内容为鼓动人们两害取其轻、把票投给新自由主义政治家）。我晓得我语气中的尖锐，但是和红色无治主义者之中的大多数接触了这么些年，好像在工业社会一往无前、已淹过我们脖颈的沙砾与海水步步增进地上涨的今天，t̄a们的那些行为却只是愈演愈烈了；因而，我对t̄a们不再抱以幻想。
+
+无治共产主义不是一个面向与权力的作战的方案，t̄a只略及皮毛，不过是一种对权力的更名而已。有那么多的无共人拼尽了全力去为权力辩护是有一个原因的：t̄a们其实对求索无治并不关心。
+
+
+### 共产主义是滋生威权的吗？
+
+在我看来，共产主义只在工业大众社会之外才能得以实行；在一种采集或收获补给品并把t̄a们免费地送给社区的小的社群里。马克思和恩格斯带讽刺意味地把这种在人类历史上行之已久的社会形式称作“原始共产主义”，并暗示这比他们的先进工业共产主义更次一等；他们的那玩意儿则是把工厂和人口集中的都市里的生活奉为圭阜。
+
+大规模的工业需要大规模的农业、劳动、运输、资源开采、修筑、警督、军力......大规模社会会并且只会一度又招来资本主义和国家主义，因为t̄a实在是太钝重、太能滋生威权了。围绕着工业剥削而被创设的每一个共产主义流派都是在制造五花八门无所不齐的臭j̄ib̄a的等级然后又把我们带回末世的现状。
+
+几乎所有我所与之交谈了这个话题的共产主义者都无法接受「在资本主义崩溃之后，会干ďiao事的人仍然存在」；我可能会这觉得些家伙挺可爱（如果t̄a们没有因为我竟然胆敢去暗示t̄a们的天佑的意识形态有些逻辑上的纰漏就把我称作尊受福分的反动分子的话）；t̄a们坚称，一旦资本主义消失，所有人都会不再做自私的ďiao人，因为「是资本主义让t̄a们瓮中做斗，t̄a们才变成了ďiao人的」。
+
+哪怕营销、消费主义文化和财产在我们某天一觉醒来时全都消失了，也我们也仍然需要奋力反抗被世世代代地灌输的威权主义举止。但是，哪怕并不为消费主义文化所引导，一个人仍然能去做一个ďiao人。甚至追溯到大众社会出现之前，人们仍会自相杀戮并抢去各自的东西，会洗劫各自的居所，会因为领地或者文化差异而伐战。这些东西都不是资本主义的发明，不会就因为共产主义者说了「t̄a们会消失」，然后就真地那么消失掉。
+
+人既不是与生俱来地向善的，也不是与生俱来地不义的。人类既不善也不恶。每个人都是个体，每一个都有着不同的经历，意向和伤痛。共产主义要求每个人都高尚无私；资本主义要求每个人都出于自私和自保而行动。这二者都不切实际，因为二者都是基于意识形态的世界观，都试图定义人类本性并借此通过把t̄a们的道德灌输给我们来指教我们怎样做人。人是自私的，人是宽宏的；人是好心的；人是吝啬成性的。这世上的每一个人都是有着上述的、以及比上述内容更多的特质的。人是不会被单单一个人格特征给定义的。
+
+我被我所做的每一件屁事给整得焦头烂额，而且我还确定虽然我抱着最好的好心，我还是会在未来做出更多的屁事。没人能免于犯错。互助确实不错，但是，为了施行t̄a，学习则必不可少。在我们的生活中有我们所信赖的人，也有我们所与之不共戴天的人。没有人值得去拿到我们的劳动产出。这世上的某些人总是会试图剥削你，哪怕t̄a们已经有了t̄a们所追求的一切；而某些人总是会对你施以好心，不管你是多么烂的ďiao人。
+
+共产主义者曾指责我，说我是享乐主义、“退步”和“反革命”的：因为我并不接受共产主义的一种说法，也就是「人类是与生俱来地善的，t̄a们只是需要正确的工业体制来让那潜藏的善被激发出来」。
+
+只要哪个社会会因为伐木工在为「大局」服务，就要求我去安分地立在原地，然后看着伐木工毁掉我的生态系统，那么那个社会就不是我想要去成为其一分子的社会。我珍视我的自主权胜于在哪座遥远城市里带着精神伤痛，天天按压按钮长达8小时的工人们的欲求。比起在伐木工夺走我所晓得的一切的时候才去紧握双拳，我宁愿立刻打飞他的电锯，并把他奉为神圣，让他夷平森林，把给工人面包的官僚统统打到破灭。cào你大爷的工人，还有t̄a们的面包，还有t̄a们的豪华全自动共产主义，还有t̄a们的民主权利。
+
+「剥削的臭j̄ib̄a会在共产主义被实施之时统统烟消云散」根本是无稽之谈。
+
+我晓得某个一直剥削着我的劳动成功的男人，而我一直着逆来顺受着这剥削。他总是把一块胡萝卜悬在我的面前，并许诺在我帮助了他之后，他会把我带到他的池塘那里，允许我从那里免费地取水来浇我的树。多年来，他都在像这样许诺我。
+
+我为这个家伙做了长达不知多少个小时的危险活，却没有得到任何回报。他总是什么都不给我，在我干完活之后就已经走人了。然后，在下一周的周六的早晨6点到来的时候他又按喇叭来把我给叫醒，为他的没有来把我带到池塘那里对我道歉，声称他太忙或者要去处理家里的要紧事，许诺他会在这周之内带我去。然后，在他对我发号施令之余，我又得去跑到悬崖边或者屋檐上去为他修管子。
+
+我之所以去做这些，是因为我，t̄a大爷的，是个因为自己的可笑的温和性格，而不能对人说「不」的墙头草。但是，每当我请求他去做什么事的时候，回应我的总是一阵凝寂的注视，或者唐突的话题转移，或者托辞圆场。上周我的车抛锚了，这使得我被迫必须徒步2个小时，来从山上下来。而他开着车径直地超过了我，甚至没有减速。当我之后再和他见面的时候，他又发下毒誓，宣称他当时根本没看到我，因为阳光太刺眼了。我点了点头，耸耸肩。
+
+共产主义不会阻止这个死骗子对我所做的剥削；不管在哪种经济制度之下，他都会需要去请人来替他修补他的易漏的管道、启动他的柴油机、修剪他的橄榄树的高枝、攀爬他的摇摇欲坠的暂时性建物。他仍然会说他在被溃疡给折磨着来对我求情，而因此我则会去干那些苦差事来让他免受自己做所会引发的病痛。他不会停止他的ďiao人行为，因为民主已经扎根于职场。只要他还在小心翼翼地避免所有工作，并令别人内疚，而去替他做那些事，那么他就不会去做互助。
+
+每当我去质疑红色无治主义者们的蕴积深虑的意识形态时，t̄a们总是会援引那本书来攻击我......跟这些人分享我作为一个原民无治主义者的观点是相当困难的；t̄a们敌视所有不认可t̄a们的豪华工业化作风、不认可t̄a们试图民主化这种作风来让自己受益更多。
+
+在t̄a们冲着我「反动的作风主义者」和「臭原原人」的叫嚣之中，我试图向t̄a们解说我的观点。我看到了这世上的苦痛并且想要去弄懂t̄a。我不满足于就这么跟t̄a说一句拜拜，然后转而去紧抓不放幻丽的乌托邦意识形态，t̄a就是被设计来鼓动欧洲的厂工，并鼓动了近两百年的。
+
+那座我在里面工作十年有余的仓库并不会在我被授予民主之力时神奇地拥有解放性。t̄a将会仍然充斥着缓慢地致我死亡的杀虫剂。
+
+不用问，有些无共人肯定会一本正经地用相当于「不对，无治共产工业社会肯定是乌托邦，因为克鲁泡特金这么说过」来回应这篇文章。t̄a们所援引的语录将会来自一大堆文献，其对我而言不过是一些早已死亡的欧洲哲学家对工业平等主义的空洞许诺。我真正地被那种思维方法搞得没耐心了。这跟哪个7岁的人士试图通过坚称「因为爸爸这么说过...」来在争辩中获胜没什么两样。但是当一切都取决于此的时候，绝大多数红色分子确实会那样做。援引自己的英雄，热切地盼望t̄a们的话语有朝一日会如愿地被证实。正是那希望让t̄a们在其文明开化的痛苦生活焚毁着世界之余继续前进下去。「一旦我们有了职场民主，所有苦难就都会消散。」这些悲哀的，迷醉的，充满着希望的灵魂。
+
+我所知的一切都在告诉我，工业不能被弄成「绿色」，就像资本主义不能被弄得合乎伦理。历史上的所有农业工业社会都是导向引向生态灭绝，和t̄a们自己的最终的崩溃的。当你开采了物资，燃烧了汽油，量产了货物并把t̄a们送到了亿万人的手中时，你就已经对生态系统造成了不可逆的破坏。无共人并不是魔法生物，能够因为自己的“善”或“平等主义”来以某种方式逃避这个后果。
+
+如果真地有人尝试无治共产主义，那么半数的“奥妙”会被指为幻象、不成熟、无法在工业社会中实行而被抛弃。为了让体制能正常运转，一定会有人做出妥协。共产主义宣告了很多。但每当这些判断在现实生活的情景下被尝试时，几乎没有一个能带来成果，因为：
+
+1)资源并非无限。
+
+2)工业产出有很高的“隐藏”的代价，而最重要的是：
+
+3)工作并非出自自愿。
+
+不管你发了几遍誓，声称自己将让劳动民主化，仍不会有人因为自己真正愿意而工作的。t̄a们之所以现在在工作，是因为体制需要t̄a们去为活命而这么做。不管哪种程度的民主都会不会让体制停下来，让t̄a不再向所有在t̄a窒绝着气息的墙壁里的人昭彰自己的治权。当工业文明会在我们选择抵抗t̄a的统治时继续围堵并饥杀我们，消灭领土之间的权力是毫无意义的。
+
+之所以文明人为生产消费品而劳动，是因为体制不给给t̄a们其他的让t̄a们得以生存的选项一个“共产社会”里仍然在工厂或仓库工作一个只有一种可能性：是体制强迫着t̄a们去这么做的。自由的狩猎采集者不会自愿放弃自己的自由而去守在流水线旁，按着按钮来让别人能拥有玉米片、除草剂和AAA电池。把这强加于人是需要支持着工业体制的驯化和暴力、饥杀的共同胁迫的。
+
+工业很明显就是一种治权，而无治共产主义理论并没有意识到这一点。无治共产主义不过是改良文明的暴政，让t̄a能微笑得狡黠的一种尝试。这是无治主义版本的巴拉克奥巴马：许诺带来改变但是还是让老套上演，还要求你去为之庆贺。
+
+
+### 夺取毁灭资料！（然后t̄a大爷的把t̄a烧个稀巴烂...）
+
+无共人坚称在无治共产社会里「人们只会选择制造自己所需的东西」。「所需的」这个词根本没有意义。任何人都可以去把任何东西定为必须品。这正是工业化共产主义无法去与无治真正兼容的原因：所有的一切都会被驯化了的人们定为所需品，不论这些东西多么地滋孕威权。如果能让自己这么消费下去，无治消费者们会乐意地把从杀虫剂到屠宰场、汽车厂的一切都定义为“所需品”。这正是民主的力量。公社所采取的任何论述都将变为官方的、受了批准的言论，而任何对此提出质疑的人都会被视作逆反者、危险分子和对秩序和社会情理的威胁。
+
+这种「所需的工业」的论述实在很像许多红色“无治主义者们”一直在进行的论述：都是在维护t̄a们所贪恋的包括国家、监狱和警察在内的所有的治权。
+
+一般来说，t̄a们就只是在把这些治权更名为「公社」，「社会再融入中心」或者「和平守护者」，并心满意足地觉得自己已经创造了真正的变革。没意义的。驯化了的人们不会让自己去览遍t̄a们所继承的精工细作的使人陌离的世界。几乎没有文明人乐意于失去t̄a们自己所认为的巨大舒适：这由工业文明一点一滴的浸润而来的东西。
+
+哪怕t̄a们主动去认识到这些「舒适」实际上是在狠狠地圧杀t̄a们自己和这星球上的一切，只要t̄a们没有去直接抗拒这些舒适，t̄a们仍然会围绕着改良这些「舒适」被创造、分配的方法，去谋布起精详蔚丽的计划。这些计划在被解构、被去狗屁化之后基本上就是把「无治」这个词加到一切的前面，然后就此去相信：啊，一切都好起来了...因为全都被无治化了嘛。
+
+人在没有工业和农业的情况下兴荣了数千年。文明则已然导致了这星球上的一切的灭绝。99%的工业产品并非是在被人类所「需」，而是被人类所欲。
+
+当发觉到自己的手机、玉米脆和洗涤机的生态破坏力时，无共人并不会立即决定放弃t̄a们。t̄a们只会给一切挂上「所需品」「生态友好」或「绿色」的标签然后撒手、扬长。而我们则会被要求继续干我们痛苦的工作，还要爱上t̄a，因为现在，t̄a是（有着无治剥削和无治奴役的）无治社会里的无治工作。
+
+让人在矿坑和工厂里组建那些被「人民」所定为「所需」的消费品时，巨大的治权力将会是必须的，而就在治权力被引入的这一刻，一种名字并非「资本主义社会」的又一个版本的资本主义社会便诞生了；t̄a正如「共产主义」俄罗斯，「共产主义」中华和「共产主义」北朝鲜。一丝一毫的共产状态都不会留存在工业文明碾碎万物所留下的尘埃里。“无治共产主义”并不会改变那种结局的到来。贪恋着威权主义的工业文明、工人主义和被无共人大体上判定为「正当」的诸多治权的人口中的反治权的宣言听上去十分空洞。
+
+受组织的大众社会必然会被官僚机构所浸淫；这即是工业共产主义并非牢不可破的原因，这即是为什么每当t̄a被施行时，t̄a都会被体现为恶横的集体资本主义（比起原汁原味的资本主义，集中的权力在这种社会形式下更为泛滥）。官僚组织会迅速地化形为国家；可以确定的是，这个社会也就不再是共产主义的了。但是，当然，t̄a会继续把自己称作「共产主义的」，以此来确保资本主义和共产主义之间的区分微如细丝，从而让人们不能想象一种比残暴的工业废土（我们所降生到的地方）更好的世界。
+
+任何分配资源、对人加以警督的体制，在实际上就是国家，无论t̄a标榜自己为什么。
+
+所有对工业社会的实行都已自证无法解放人们；相反，t̄a让t̄a们的生活随着工业主义的愈演愈烈而越加地痛苦；而声称「在工业化体制的前头加上「无治」，就能让事情有所不同」实在是太t̄a大爷的搞笑了。
+
+共产主义从来就没有成功地解放我们：历史上如此，在未来亦然如此——宣称自己优于其他共产主义者，宣称自己的无共同志们都会拿喷枪把所有烟囱喷得鲜绿并不会在一瞬之间招来成功。
+
+如果社会是围绕着诸如工业主义，和民主这些威权主义体制所构建的，那么威权主义的举止就的确只会一遍又一遍地被重复下去。之所以马克思的和克鲁泡特金的共产主义都是围绕着这些体制的，是因为他们的意识形态是需要人们去被官僚所支配的。无关乎那官僚具体是去集中化的民主官僚，还是集中化的党团官僚。结果是相同的：权治、支配。
+
+如果没有这种官僚机构，社会会陷入无治状态。没错，喜人的，妙极的，解缰的无治：所有红色分子所恐惧的，*那个*让t̄a们无法再强制地把社会和人给强扭成符合自己的圣严的意识形态的，、让其无法把自己的意识形态强加到社会和人之上的东西。被困在小小的无害箱里，被一滴滴地滴落的杀虫剂和高果糖玉米糖浆所饲育，驯化了的人们劳动着，消费着、消费着、消费着，然后死亡。
+
+这不是生活。这不是无治。这是一场清醒的噩梦，一个我们全都被彻底洗脑，以至于相信了t̄a可以被容忍的，极恶的地狱世界。（并非厂主的）厂工对毁灭资料的控制是停不下这场生态灭绝的。
+
+像所有红色分子所梦寐以求的那样去掌控工厂、去民主化t̄a的运作，是完全无法把我们拯救于暴力、痛苦、陌离化，还有最终的灭绝的。
+
+要毁灭治权只有一个方法：在工厂吞噬所有残留于这颗星球的物种之前，把工业毁灭掉。
+
+我们的生态系统崩坏着；我们若要在若干年后到来的事态中存活，唯一的机会即是粉碎每一个工厂、关闭每一个港口、砍断每一条道路，直到文明归于废墟。
+
+但是，说实在的，我们不会去这么做哦。我们会去看电视，会去啜饮冰茶，我们会去等待结束的那一刻啊。我会继续静静旁观下去，看着本地面包师把最后一片野地伐为白地呀。
+
+这颗星球可能会怎样怎样地在未来的几千年里恢复，那时新演化出来的生物可能比现在的沙漠制造者们更合道理吧。这可是我紧抓不放的最后的希望啊。
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-04-07-JoonSungPark-a1_r-generative-agents.md b/_collections/_heros/2023-04-07-JoonSungPark-a1_r-generative-agents.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..05350996
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2023-04-07-JoonSungPark-a1_r-generative-agents.md
@@ -0,0 +1,624 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title:  "生成式人工智能博弈"
+author: "Joon Sung Park, et al."
+date:   2023-04-07 12:00:00 +0800
+image:  https://i.imgur.com/CV2afd8.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description:   "Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behavior"
+position: right
+---
+
+Believable proxies of human behavior can empower interactive applications ranging from immersive environments to rehearsal spaces for interpersonal communication to prototyping tools.
+
+<!--more-->
+
+In this paper, we introduce generative agents--computational software agents that simulate believable human behavior. Generative agents wake up, cook breakfast, and head to work; artists paint, while authors write; they form opinions, notice each other, and initiate conversations; they remember and reflect on days past as they plan the next day. To enable generative agents, we describe an architecture that extends a large language model to store a complete record of the agent's experiences using natural language, synthesize those memories over time into higher-level reflections, and retrieve them dynamically to plan behavior. We instantiate generative agents to populate an interactive sandbox environment inspired by The Sims, where end users can interact with a small town of twenty five agents using natural language. In an evaluation, these generative agents produce believable individual and emergent social behaviors: for example, starting with only a single user-specified notion that one agent wants to throw a Valentine's Day party, the agents autonomously spread invitations to the party over the next two days, make new acquaintances, ask each other out on dates to the party, and coordinate to show up for the party together at the right time. We demonstrate through ablation that the components of our agent architecture--observation, planning, and reflection--each contribute critically to the believability of agent behavior. By fusing large language models with computational, interactive agents, this work introduces architectural and interaction patterns for enabling believable simulations of human behavior.
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/CV2afd8.png)
+_▲ Figure 1: Generative agents create believable simulacra of human behavior for interactive applications. In this work, we demonstrate generative agents by populating a sandbox environment, reminiscent of The Sims, with twenty-five agents. Users can observe and intervene as agents they plan their days, share news, form relationships, and coordinate group activities._
+
+
+### 1 INTRODUCTION
+
+How might we craft an interactive artificial society that reflects believable human behavior? From sandbox games such as The Sims to applications such as cognitive models and virtual environments, for over four decades researchers and practitioners have envisioned computational agents that can serve as believable proxies of human behavior. In these visions, computationally-powered agents act consistently with their past experiences and react believably to their environments. Such simulations of human behavior could populate virtual spaces and communities with realistic social phenomena, train people how to handle rare yet difficult interpersonal situations, test social science theories, craft model human processors for theory and usability testing, power ubiquitous computing applications and social robots, and underpin non-playable game characters that can navigate complex human relationships in an open world.
+
+However, the space of human behavior is vast and complex. Despite striking progress in large language models that can simulate believable human behavior at a single time point, fully general agents that ensure long-term coherence would be better suited by architectures that manage constantly-growing memories as new interactions, conflicts, and events arise and fade over time, while handling cascading social dynamics that unfold between multiple agents. Success requires an approach that can retrieve relevant events and interactions over a long period, reflect on those memories to generalize and draw higher-level inferences, and apply that reasoning to create plans and reactions that both make sense in the moment and in the longer-term arc of the agent’s behavior.
+
+In this paper, we introduce generative agents — agents that draw on generative models to simulate believable human behavior — and demonstrate that they produce believable simulacra of both individual and emergent group behavior. Generative agents draw a wide variety of inferences about themselves, other agents, and their environment; they create daily plans that reflect their characteristics and experiences, act out those plans, react, and re-plan when appropriate; they respond when the end user changes their environment or commands them in natural language. For instance, generative agents turn off the stove when they see that their breakfast is burning, wait outside the bathroom if it is occupied, and stop to chat when they meet another agent they want to talk to. A society full of generative agents is marked by emergent social dynamics where new relationships are formed, information diffuses, and coordination arises across agents.
+
+To enable generative agents, we describe an agent architecture that stores, synthesizes, and applies relevant memories to generate believable behavior using a large language model. Our architecture comprises three main components. The first is the memory stream, a long-term memory module that records, in natural language, a comprehensive list of the agent’s experiences. The retrieval model combines relevance, recency, and importance to surface the records that are needed to inform the agent’s moment-to-moment behavior. The second is reflection, which synthesizes memories into higher-level inferences over time, enabling the agent to draw conclusions about itself and others to better guide its behavior. The third is planning, which translates those conclusions and the current environment into high-level action plans and then recursively into detailed behaviors for action and reaction. These reflections and plans are fed back into the memory stream to influence the agent’s future behavior.
+
+This architecture suggests applications in multiple domains, from role-play and social prototyping, to virtual worlds and games. In social role-play scenarios (e.g. interview preparation), a user could safely rehearse difficult, conflict-laden conversations. When prototyping social platforms, a designer could go beyond temporary personas to prototype dynamic, complex interactions that unfold over time. For the purposes of this paper, we focus on the ability to create a small, interactive society of agents inspired by games such as [The Sims](https://reverie.herokuapp.com/arXiv_Demo/). By connecting our architecture to the ChatGPT large language model, we manifest a small society of twenty five agents in a game environment. End users can observe and interact with these agents. If an end user or developer wanted the town to host an in-game Valentine’s Day party, for example, traditional game environments would require scripting tens of characters’ behavior manually. We demonstrate that, with generative agents, it is sufficient to simply tell one agent that she wants to throw a party. Despite many potential points of failure — the party planner must remember to tell other agents about the party, attendees must remember the invitation, those who remember must decide to actually show up, and other possible points of failure — agents in our environment succeed. They spread the word about the party and then show up, with one agent even asking another agent on a date to the party, all from this single user-generated seed suggestion.
+
+We conducted two evaluations of generative agents: a controlled evaluation to test whether the agents produce believable individual behaviors in isolation, and an end-to-end evaluation where the generative agents interacted with each other in open-ended ways over two days of game time to understand their stability and emergent social behaviors. In the technical evaluation, we leverage a methodological opportunity to evaluate an agent’s knowledge and behavior by “interviewing” it in natural language to probe agents’ ability to stay in character, remember, plan, react, and reflect accurately. We compared several ablations that limit agents’ access to memory, reflection, and planning. We observe that each of these components is critical to strong performance across these interview tasks. Across the technical and the end-to-end evaluation, the most common errors arose when the agent failed to retrieve relevant memories, fabricated embellishments to the agent’s memory, or inherited overly formal speech or behavior from the language model.
+
+In sum, this paper provides the following contributions:
+
+- _Generative agents_, believable simulacra of human behavior that are dynamically conditioned on agents’ changing experiences and environment.
+
+- A novel architecture that makes it possible for generative agents to remember, retrieve, reflect, interact with other agents, and plan through dynamically evolving circumstances. The architecture leverages the powerful prompting capabilities of large language models and supplements those capabilities to support longer-term agent coherence, the ability to manage dynamically-evolving memory, and recursively produce more generations.
+
+- Two evaluations (a controlled evaluation and end-to-end evaluation) that establish causal effects of the importance of components of the architecture, as well as identify breakdowns arising from, e.g., improper memory retrieval.
+
+- Discussion of the opportunities and ethical and societal risks of generative agents in interactive systems. We argue that these agents should be tuned to mitigate the risk of users forming parasocial relationships, logged to mitigate risks stemming from deepfakes and tailored persuasion, and applied in ways that complement rather than replace human stakeholders in design processes.
+
+
+### 2 RELATED WORK
+
+In this section, we reflect on the prior literature in human-AI interaction and situate within its canon the agenda of building believable proxies of human behavior. This agenda, once hailed as a north star in interaction, game, and artificial intelligence communities, has remained challenging due to the complexity of human behavior. We synthesize this research to suggest that large language models, though not sufficient by themselves, open up a new angle for creating believable agents when leveraged using the appropriate architecture.
+
+#### 2.1 Human-AI Interaction
+
+Interactive artificial intelligence systems aim to combine human insights and capabilities in computational artifacts that can augment their users. A long line of work has explored ways to allow users to interactively specify model behavior. For instance, Crayons demonstrated an early vision of interactive machine learning, allowing non-expert users to train classifiers. Further work helped to articulate how end users might describe their classification goals to the system through examples and/or demonstration. More recent work has extended these explorations to deep learning and prompt-based authoring.
+
+Meanwhile, a persistent thread of research has advanced the case for language- and agent-based interaction in human-computer interaction. Formative work such as SHRDLU and ELIZA demonstrated the opportunity and the risks of natural language interaction with computing systems. As research progressed, it became clear that autonomous agents could offer new metaphors for delegation and interaction, but the delegation lines between humans and agents have continued to be debated and refined. Recently, this technology has become stable enough that it has become possible for agents to interact via natural language in large and complex online social environments. Natural language interaction offers a novel modality that can extend user abilities in domains such as photo editing and code editing.
+
+We convene these threads of work to show that we can now create agents that proxy human behavior for interactive systems, and interact with them via natural language. In doing so, this work re-opens the door to examining foundational HCI questions around cognitive models such as GOMS and KLM, around prototyping tools, and around ubiquitous computing applications.
+
+#### 2.2 Believable Proxies of Human Behavior
+
+Prior literature has described believability, or believable agents, as a central design and engineering goal. Believable agents are designed to provide an illusion of life and present a facade of realism in the way they appear to make decisions and act on their own volition, similar to the characters in Disney movies. These agents can populate and perceive an open-world environment like the one we inhabit, and strive to behave in ways that exhibit emergent behaviors grounded in social interactions with users or other agents with the aim of becoming believable proxies of our behavior in hypothetical simulations of individuals and communities. Historically, these agents were developed in the context of intelligent game NPCs. Creating NPCs with believable behavior, if possible, could enhance player experiences in games and interactive fictions by enabling emergent narratives and social interactions with the agents. However, more importantly, game worlds provide increasingly realistic representations of real-world affordances, and as observed by Laird and van Lent in 2001, these simulated worlds offer accessible testbeds for developers of believable agents to finesse the agents’ cognitive capabilities without worrying about implementing robotics in the real world or creating simulation environments from scratch.
+
+A diverse set of approaches to creating believable agents emerged over the past four decades. In implementation, however, these approaches often simplified the environment or dimensions of agent behavior to make the effort more manageable. Rule-based approaches, such as finite-state machines and behavior trees, account for the brute force approach of human-authoring the agent’s behavior. They provide a straightforward way of creating simple agents that is still the most dominant approach today, and can even handle rudimentary social interactions, as shown in simulation games such as Mass Effect and The Sims series. Nonetheless, manually crafting behavior that can comprehensively address the breadth of possible interactions in an open world is untenable. This means that the resulting agent behaviors may not fully represent the consequences of their interactions, and cannot perform new procedures that were not hard-coded in their script. On the other hand, prevalent learning-based approaches for creating believable agents, such as reinforcement learning, have overcome the challenge of manual authoring by letting the agents learn their behavior, and have achieved superhuman performance in recent years in games such as AlphaStar for Starcraft and OpenAI Five for Dota 2. However, their success has largely taken place in adversarial games with readily definable rewards that a learning algorithm can optimize for. They have not yet addressed the challenge of creating believable agents in an open world.
+
+Cognitive architectures in computation, pioneered by Newell, aimed to build the infrastructure for supporting a comprehensive set of cognitive functions that suited the all-encompassing nature of believable agents held in its original vision. They fueled some of the earliest examples of believable agents. For instance, Quakebot-SOAR and ICARUS generated NPCs in first-person shooter games, while TacAir-SOAR generated pilots in aerial combat training simulations. The architectures used by these agents differed (Quakebot- and TacAir-SOAR relied on SOAR, while ICARUS relied on its own variation that was inspired by SOAR and ACT-R), but they shared the same underlying principle. They maintained short-term and long-term memories, filled these memories with symbolic structures, and operated in perceive-plan-act cycles, dynamically perceiving the environment and matching it with one of the manually crafted action procedures. Agents created using cognitive architectures aimed to be generalizable to most, if not all, open-world contexts and exhibited robust behavior for their time. However, their space of action was limited to manually crafted procedural knowledge, and they did not offer a mechanism through which the agents could be inspired to seek new behavior. As such, these agents were deployed mostly in non-open-world contexts such as first-person shooter games or blocks worlds.
+
+Today, creating believable agents as described in its original definition remains an open problem. Many have moved on, arguing that although existing approaches for creating believable agents might be cumbersome and limited, they are good enough to support existing gameplay and interactions. Our argument is that large language models offer an opportunity to re-examine these questions, provided that we can craft an effective architecture to synthesize memories into believable behavior. We offer a step toward such an architecture in this paper.
+
+#### 2.3 Large Language Models and Human Behavior
+
+Generative agents leverage a large language model to power their behavior. The key observation is that large language models encode a wide range of human behavior represented in their training data. If prompted with a narrowly defined context, the models can be used to generate believable behavior. Recent work has demonstrated the efficacy of this approach. For instance, Social Simulacra used a large language model to generate users that would populate new social computing systems to prototype their emergent social dynamics. This approach used a prompt chain to generate short natural language descriptions of personas and their behaviors as they appear in the system being prototyped. Other empirical studies have replicated existing social science studies, political surveys, and generated synthetic data. Large language models have also been used to generate interactive human behavior for users to engage with. In gaming, for instance, these models have been employed to create interactive fiction and text adventure games. With their ability to generate and decompose action sequences, large language models have also been used in planning robotics tasks. For example, when presented with a task, such as picking up a bottle, the model is prompted to break down the task into smaller action sequences, such as heading to the table where the bottle is located and picking it up.
+
+We posit that, based on the work summarized above, large language models can become a key ingredient for creating believable agents. The existing literature largely relies on what could be considered first-order templates that employ few-shot prompts or chain-of-thought prompts. These templates are effective in generating behavior that is conditioned solely on the agent’s current environment (e.g., how would a troll respond to a given post, what actions would a robot need to take to enter a room given that there is a door). However, believable agents require conditioning not only on their current environment but also on a vast amount of past experience, which is a poor fit (and as of today, impossible due to the underlying models’ limited context window) using first-order prompting. Recent studies have attempted to go beyond first-order prompting by augmenting language models with a static knowledge base and an information retrieval scheme or with a simple summarization scheme. This paper extends these ideas to craft an agent architecture that handles retrieval where past experience is dynamically updated at each time step and mixed with agents’ current context and plans, which may either reinforce or contradict each other.
+
+
+### 3 GENERATIVE AGENT BEHAVIOR AND INTERACTION
+
+To make concrete the affordances of generative agents, we instantiate them as characters in a simple sandbox world reminiscent of The Sims. This sprite-based sandbox game world, Smallville, evokes a small town environment. In this section, we walk through the affordances and interactions with generative agents in Smallville, and describe how the agents behave in it. Then, in Section 4, we introduce our generative agent architecture that powers these affordances and interactions. In Section 5, we describe the sandbox environment implementation and how the agents interact with the sandbox world’s underlying engine.
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/pPQOgT7.png)
+_▲ Figure 2: The Smallville sandbox world, with areas labeled. The root node describes the entire world, children describe areas (e.g., houses, cafe, stores), and leaf nodes describe objects (e.g., table, bookshelf). Agent remember a subgraph reflecting the parts of the world they have seen, in the state that they saw them._
+
+#### 3.1 Agent Avatar and Communication
+
+A community of 25 unique agents inhabit Smallville. Each agent is represented by a simple sprite avatar. We authored one paragraph of natural language description to depict each agent’s identity, including their occupation and relationship with other agents, as seed memories. For example, John Lin has the following description:
+
+> John Lin is a pharmacy shopkeeper at the Willow Market and Pharmacy who loves to help people. He is always looking for ways to make the process of getting medication easier for his customers; John Lin is living with his wife, Mei Lin, who is a college professor, and son, Eddy Lin, who is a student studying music theory; John Lin loves his family very much; John Lin has known the old couple next-door, Sam Moore and Jennifer Moore, for a few years; John Lin thinks Sam Moore is a kind and nice man; John Lin knows his neighbor, Yuriko Yamamoto, well; John Lin knows of his neighbors, Tamara Taylor and Carmen Ortiz, but has not met them before; John Lin and Tom Moreno are colleagues at The Willows Market and Pharmacy; John Lin and Tom Moreno are friends and like to discuss local politics together; John Lin knows the Moreno family somewhat well — the husband Tom Moreno and the wife Jane Moreno.
+
+Each semicolon-delimited phrase is entered into the agent’s initial memory as memories at the start of the simulation.
+
+_3.1.1 Inter-Agent Communication._ The agents interact with the world by their actions, and with each other through natural language. At each time step of the sandbox engine, the agents output a natural language statement describing their current action, such as "Isabella Rodriguez is writing in her journal", "Isabella Rodriguez is checking her emails", "Isabella Rodriguez is talking with her family on the phone", or "Isabella Rodriguez is getting ready for bed". This statement is then translated into concrete movements that affect the sandbox world. The action is displayed on the sandbox interface as a set of emojis that provide an abstract representation of the action in the overhead view. To accomplish this, the system employs a language model that translates the action into a set of emojis, which appear above each avatar in a speech bubble. For example, "Isabella Rodriguez is writing in her journal" is displayed as 📖 ✏️, while "Isabella Rodriguez is checking her emails" appears as 💻 ✉️. The full natural language description of the action can be accessed by clicking on the agent avatar.
+
+Agents communicate with each other in full natural language. Agents are aware of other agents in their local area, and the generative agent architecture determines whether they walk by or engage in conversation. Here, a sample in the middle of a conversation between the agents Isabella Rodriguez and Tom Moreno about the upcoming election:
+
+> __Isabella:__ I’m still weighing my options, but I’ve been discussing the election with Sam Moore. What are your thoughts on him?
+
+> __Tom:__ To be honest, I don’t like Sam Moore. I think he’s out of touch with the community and doesn’t have our best interests at heart.
+
+_3.1.2 User Controls._ A user running this simulation can steer the simulation and intervene, either by communicating with the agent through conversation, or by issuing a directive to an agent in the form of an ‘inner voice’.
+
+The user communicates with the agent through natural language, by specifying a persona that the agent should perceive them as. For example, if the user specifies that they are a news “reporter” and asks about the upcoming election, “Who is running for office?”, the John agent replies:
+
+> __John:__ My friends Yuriko, Tom and I have been talking about the upcoming election and discussing the candidate Sam Moore. We have all agreed to vote for him because we like his platform.
+
+To directly command one of the agents, the user takes on the persona of the agent’s “inner voice” — this makes the agent more likely to treat the statement as a directive. For instance, when told “You are going to run against Sam in the upcoming election” by a user as John’s inner voice, John decides to run in the election and shares his candidacy with his wife and son.
+
+#### 3.2 Environmental Interaction
+
+Smallville features the common affordances of a small village including a cafe, bar, park, school, dorm, houses, and stores. It also defines subareas and objects that make those spaces functional, such as a kitchen in a house and a stove in the kitchen (Figure 2). All spaces serving as agents’ primary living quarters feature a bed, desk, closet, shelf, as well as a bathroom and a kitchen.
+
+Agents move around Smallville as one would in a simple video game, entering and leaving buildings, navigating its map, and approaching other agents. Agent movements are directed by the generative agent architecture and the sandbox game engine: when the model dictates that the agent will move to a location, we calculate a walking path to the destination in the Smallville environment and the agent begins moving. In addition, users can also enter the sandbox world of Smallville as an agent operating within it. The agent that the user embodies can be an agent already present in the world, such as Isabella and John, or it can be an outside visitor with no prior history in Smallville. The inhabitants of Smallville will treat the user-controlled agent no differently than they treat each other. They recognize its presence, initiate interactions, and remember its behavior before forming opinions about it.
+
+Users and agents can influence the state of the objects in this world, much like in sandbox games such as The Sims. For example, a bed can be occupied when an agent is sleeping, and a refrigerator can be empty when an agent uses up the ingredients to make breakfast. End users can also reshape an agent’s environment in Smallville by rewriting the status of objects surrounding the agent in natural language. For instance, when Isabella is making breakfast in the morning, the user can change the status of the kitchen stove from “turned on” to “burning” by inputting a command to the system that chooses the object and illustrates its new status, like this: “<Isabella’s apartment: kitchen: stove> is burning.” Isabella will notice this in the next moment and go to turn off the stove and remake her breakfast. Likewise, if the user sets the status of Isabella’s shower to “leaking water” when she enters the bathroom, she gathers tools from her living room and try to fix the leak.
+
+#### 3.3 Example “Day in the Life”
+
+Starting from the single-paragraph description, agents begin plan their days. As time passes in the sandbox world, their behaviors evolve as these agents interact with each other and the world, build memories and relationships, and coordinate joint activities.
+
+We demonstrate the behavior of generative agents by tracing the output of our system over the course of one day for the agent John Lin (Figure 3). In the Lin family, John is the first to wake up at 7 a.m. He brushes his teeth, takes a shower, gets dressed, eats breakfast, and checks the news at the dining table in the living room. At 8 a.m., Eddy follows suit, rushing out of bed to prepare for his classes. He catches up with John just as he is about to head out:
+
+> __John:__ Good morning Eddy. Did you sleep well?
+
+> __Eddy:__ Good morning dad. Yeah, I slept great.
+
+> __John:__ That’s good. What are you working on today?
+
+> __Eddy:__ I’m working on a new music composition for my class. It’s due this week, so I’m trying to get it finished. But I’m having so much fun with it!
+
+> __John:__ That sounds great!
+
+Soon after Eddy heads out, Mei wakes up and joins John. Mei asks about her son, and John recalls the conversation that they just had:
+
+> __Mei:__ Did Eddy already leave for school?
+
+> __John:__ Yes, he just left. He’s working on a music composition for his class.
+
+> __Mei:__ Oh, that’s wonderful! Tell me about it.
+
+> __John:__ I think he’s really enjoying it! He said he’s having a lot of fun with it.
+
+> __Mei:__ That’s great! I’m so proud of him.
+
+As they finish their conversation, Mei and John pack up. Mei goes on to teach and work on her research paper, while John opens his pharmacy counter at the Willow Market and Pharmacy by 9 a.m.
+
+#### 3.4 Emergent Social Behaviors
+
+By interacting with each other, generative agents in Smallville exchange information, form new relationships, and coordinate joint activities. Extending prior work, these social behaviors are emergent rather than pre-programmed.
+
+_3.4.1 Information Diffusion._ As agents notice each other, they may engage in dialogue — as they do so, information can spread from agent to agent. For instance, in a conversation between Sam and Tom at the grocery store, Sam tells Tom about his candidacy in the local election:
+
+> __Sam:__ Hey Tom, how’s it going?
+
+> __Tom:__ Good, thanks. What’s up?
+
+> __Sam:__ Well, I wanted to talk to you about something. I’m actually running for mayor in the upcoming local election.
+
+> __Tom:__ Really? That’s great news! Why are you running?
+
+> __Sam:__ I’ve been involved in local politics for years now, and I really feel like I can make a difference in our community. Plus, I want to bring new ideas and perspectives to the table.
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/Hc98pzd.png)
+_▲ Figure 3: A morning in the life of a generative agent, John Lin. John wakes up around 6 am and completes his morning routine, which includes brushing his teeth, taking a shower, and eating breakfast. He briefly catches up with his wife, Mei, and son, Eddy, before heading out to begin his workday._
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/DEG3BkC.png)
+_▲ Figure 4: At the beginning of the simulation, one agent is initialized with an intent to organize a Valentine’s Day party. Despite many possible points of failure in the ensuring chain of events — agents might not act on that intent, might not remember to tell others, might not remember to show up — the Valentine’s Day party does in fact occur, with a number of agents gathering and interacting._
+
+Later that day, after Sam left, Tom and John, who heard the news from another source, discuss Sam’s chances of winning the election:
+
+> __John:__ I heard that Sam Moore is running for mayor in the local election. Do you think he has a good chance of winning?
+
+> __Tom:__ I do think he has a good chance. He’s been working hard in the community and I think he will get a lot of support. What do you think?
+
+> __John:__ I think it’s great that he’s running. I’m curious to see who else is running and how the election will turn out.
+
+Gradually, Sam’s candidacy becomes the talk of the town, with some supporting him and others remaining undecided.
+
+_3.4.2 Relationship memory._ Agents in Smallville form new relationships over time, and remember their interactions with other agents. For example, Sam does not know Latoya Williams at the start. While taking a walk in Johnson Park, Sam runs into Latoya, and they introduce themselves and Latoya mentions that she is working on a photography project: “I’m here to take some photos for a project I’m working on.” In a later interaction, Sam’s interactions with Latoya indicate a memory of that interaction, as he asks “Hi, Latoya. How is your project going?” and she replies “Hi, Sam. It’s going well!”
+
+_3.4.3 Coordination._ Generative agents coordinate with each other. Isabella Rodriguez, at Hobbs Cafe, is initialized with an intent to plan a Valentine’s Day party from 5 to 7 p.m. on February 14th. From this seed, the agent proceeds to invites friends and customers when she sees them at Hobbs Cafe or elsewhere. Isabella then spends the afternoon of the 13th decorating the cafe for the occasion. Maria, a frequent customer and close friend of Isabella’s, arrives at the cafe. Isabella asks for Maria’s help in decorating for the party, and Maria agrees. Maria’s character description mentions that she has a crush on Klaus. That night, Maria invites Klaus, her secret crush, to join her at the party, and he gladly accepts.
+
+On Valentine’s Day, five agents — including Klaus and Maria — show up at Hobbs Cafe at 5pm and they enjoy the festivities (Figure 4). In this scenario, the end user only set Isabella’s initial intent to throw a party and Maria’s crush on Klaus: the social behaviors of spreading the word, decorating, asking each other out, arriving at the party, and interacting with each other at the party, were initiated by the agent architecture.
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/b0luxmY.png)
+_▲ Figure 5: Our generative agent architecture. Agents perceive their environment, and all perceptions are saved in a comprehensive record of the agent’s experiences called the memory stream. Based on their perceptions, the architecture retrieves relevant memories, then uses those retrieved actions to determine an action. These retrieved memories are also used to form longer-term plans, and to create higher-level reflections, which are both entered into the memory stream for future use._
+
+
+### 4 GENERATIVE AGENT ARCHITECTURE
+
+Generative agents aim to provide a framework for behavior in an open world: one that can engage in interactions with other agents and can react to changes in the environment. Generative agents take their current environment and past experience as input and generate behavior as output. Underlying this behavior is a novel agent architecture that combines a large language model with mechanisms for synthesizing and retrieving relevant information to condition the language model’s output on. Without these mechanisms, large language models can output behavior, but the resulting agents may not react based on the agent’s past experiences, may not make important inferences, and may not maintain long-term coherence. Challenges with long-term planning and coherence remain even with today’s most performant models such as GPT-4. Because generative agents produce large streams of events and memories that must be retained, a core challenge of our architecture is to ensure that the most relevant pieces of the agent’s memory are retrieved and synthesized when needed.
+
+At the center of our architecture is the memory stream, a database that maintains a comprehensive record of an agent’s experience. From the memory stream, records are retrieved as relevant to plan the agent’s actions and react appropriately to the environment, and records are recursively synthesized into higher- and higher-level observations that guide behavior. Everything in the architecture is recorded and reasoned over as natural language description, allowing the architecture to leverage a large language model.
+
+Our current implementation utilizes gpt3.5-turbo version of ChatGPT. We expect that the architectural basics of generative agents — memory, planning, and reflection — will likely remain the same as language models improve. Newer language models (e.g., GPT-4) will continue to expand the expressivity and performance of the prompts that underpin generative agents. As of writing, however, GPT-4’s API is still invitation-only, so our agents use ChatGPT.
+
+#### 4.1 Memory and Retrieval
+
+_Challenge:_ Creating generative agents that can simulate human behavior requires reasoning about a set of experiences that is far larger than what should be described in a prompt, as the full memory stream can distract the model and does not even currently fit into the limited context window. Consider a the Isabella agent answering the question “What are you passionate about these days?”. First summarizing all of Isabella’s experiences to fit in the limited context window of the language model produces an uninformative response, where Isabella discusses topics such as collaborations for events and projects and cleanliness and organization in a cafe. Instead of summarizing, the memory stream described below surfaces relevant memories, resulting in a more informative and specific response that mentions Isabella’s passion for making people feel welcome and included, planning events and creating an atmosphere that people can enjoy, such as the Valentine’s Day party.
+
+_Approach:_ The memory stream maintains a comprehensive record of the agent’s experience. It is a list of memory objects, where each object contains a natural language description, a creation timestamp and a most recent access timestamp. The most basic element of the memory stream is an observation, which is an event directly perceived by an agent. Common observations include behaviors performed by the agent themselves, or behaviors that agents perceive being performed by other agents or non-agent objects. For instance, Isabella Rodriguez, who works at a coffee shop, might accrue the following observations over time: (1) Isabella Rodriguez is setting out the pastries, (2) Maria Lopez is studying for a Chemistry test while drinking coffee, (3) Isabella Rodriguez and Maria Lopez are conversing about planning a Valentine’s day party at Hobbs Cafe, (4) The refrigerator is empty.
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/422SWRN.png)
+_▲ Figure 6: The memory stream comprises a large number of observations that are relevant and irrelevant to the agent’s current situation. Retrieval identifies a subset of these observations that should be passed to the language model to condition its response to the situation._
+
+Our architecture implements a retrieval function that takes the agent’s current situation as input and returns a subset of the memory stream to pass on to the language model. There are many possible implementations of a retrieval function, depending on what it is important that the agent consider when deciding how to act. In our context, we focus on three main components that together produce effective results.
+
+_Recency_ assigns a higher score to memory objects that were recently accessed, so that events from a moment ago or this morning are likely to remain in the agent’s attentional sphere. In our implementation, we treat recency as an exponential decay function over the number of sandbox game hours since the memory was last retrieved. Our decay factor is 0.99.
+
+_Importance_ distinguishes mundane from core memories, by assigning a higher score to those memory objects that the agent believes to be important. For instance, a mundane event such as eating breakfast in one’s room would yield a low importance score, whereas a breakup with one’s significant other would yield a high score. There are again many possible implementations of an importance score; we find that directly asking the language model to output an integer score is effective. The full prompt appears below:
+
+> On the scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is purely mundane (e.g., brushing teeth, making bed) and 10 is extremely poignant (e.g., a break up, college acceptance), rate the likely poignancy of the following piece of memory.
+
+> Memory: buying groceries at The Willows Market and Pharmacy
+
+> Rating: <fill in>
+
+This prompt returns an integer value of 2 for “cleaning up the room” and 8 for “asking your crush out on a date.” The importance score is generated at the time the memory object is created.
+
+_Relevance_ assigns a higher score to memory objects that are related to the current situation. What is relevant depends on the answer to, “Relevant to _what?_”, so we condition relevance on a query _memory_. If the query, for example, is that a student is discussing what to study for a chemistry test with a classmate, memory objects about their breakfast should have low relevance, whereas memory objects about the teacher and schoolwork should have high relevance. In our implementation, we use the language model to generate an embedding vector of the text description of each memory. Then, we calculate relevance as the cosine similarity between the memory’s embedding vector and the query memory’s embedding vector.
+
+To calculate the final retrieval score, we normalize the recency, relevance, and importance scores to the range of [0, 1] by min-max scaling. The retrieval function scores all memories as a weighted combination of the three elements: 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛼_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 · 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 + 𝛼_𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 · 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛼_𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 · 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒. In our implementation, all 𝛼’s are set to 1. The top-ranked memories that fit in the language model’s context window are then included in the prompt.
+
+#### 4.2 Reflection
+
+_Challenge:_ Generative agents, when equipped with only raw observational memory, struggle to generalize or make inferences. Consider a scenario in which Klaus Mueller is asked by the user: “If you had to choose one person of those you know to spend an hour with, who would it be?" With access to only observational memory, the agent simply chooses the person with whom Klaus has had the most frequent interactions: Wolfgang, his college dorm neighbor. Unfortunately, Wolfgang and Klaus only ever see each other in passing, and do not have deep interactions. A more desirable response requires that the agent generalize from memories of Klaus spending hours on a research project to generate a higher-level reflection that Klaus is passionate about research, and likewise recognize Maria putting in effort into her own research (albeit in a different field), enabling a reflection that they share a common interest. With the approach below, when Klaus is asked who to spend time with, Klaus chooses Maria instead of Wolfgang.
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/ZyQIP4y.png)
+_▲ Figure 7: A reflection tree for Klaus Mueller. The agent’s observations of the world, represented in the leaf nodes, are recursively synthesized to derive Klaus’s self-notion that he is highly dedicated to his research._
+
+_Approach:_ We introduce a second type of memory, which we call a reflection. Reflections are higher-level, more abstract thoughts generated by the agent. Because they are a type of memory, they are included alongside other observations when retrieval occurs. Reflections are generated periodically; in our implementation, we generate reflections when the sum of the importance scores for the latest events perceived by the agents exceeds a certain threshold. In practice, our agents reflected roughly two or three times a day.
+
+The first step in reflection is for the agent to determine what to reflect on, by identifying questions that can be asked given the agent’s recent experiences. We query the large language model with the 100 most recent records in the agent’s memory stream (e.g., “Klaus Mueller is reading a book on gentrification”, “Klaus Mueller is conversing with a librarian about his research project”, “desk at the library is currently unoccupied”) and prompt the language model, “Given only the information above, what are 3 most salient high-level questions we can answer about the subjects in the statements?” The model’s response generates candidate questions: for example, What topic is Klaus Mueller passionate about? and What is the relationship between Klaus Mueller and Maria Lopez?. We use these generated questions as queries for retrieval, and gather relevant memories (including other reflections) for each question. Then we prompt the language model to extract insights and cite the particular records that served as evidence for the insights. The full prompt appears below:
+
+> Statements about Klaus Mueller
+
+> 1. Klaus Mueller is writing a research paper
+
+> 2. Klaus Mueller enjoys reading a book on gentrification
+
+> 3. Klaus Mueller is conversing with Ayesha Khan about exercising [...]
+
+> What 5 high-level insights can you infer from the above statements? (example format: insight (because of 1, 5, 3))
+
+This process generates statements such as Klaus Mueller is dedicated to his research on gentrification (because of 1, 2, 8, 15). We parse and store the statement as a reflection in the memory stream, including pointers to the memory objects that were cited.
+
+Reflection explicitly allows the agents to reflect not only on their observations but also on other reflections: for example, the second statement about Klaus Mueller above is a reflection that Klaus previously had, not an observation from his environment. As a result, agents generate trees of reflections: the leaf nodes of the tree represent the base observations, and the non-leaf nodes represent thoughts that become more abstract and higher-level higher up the tree they are.
+
+#### 4.3 Planning and Reacting
+
+_Challenge:_ While a large language model can generate plausible behavior in response to situational information, agents need to plan over a longer time horizon to ensure that their sequence of actions is coherent and believable. If we prompt a language model with Klaus’s background, describe the time, and ask what action he ought to take at the given moment, Klaus would eat lunch at 12 pm, but then again at 12:30 pm and 1 pm, despite having already eaten his lunch twice. Optimizing for believability in the moment sacrifices believability over time. To overcome this issue, planning is essential. With the approach described below, Klaus’s afternoon plan is less gluttonous: he has lunch at Hobbs Cafe while reading at 12pm, works on his research paper at the school library at 1pm, and takes a break for a walk in the park at 3pm.
+
+_Approach:_ Plans describe a future sequence of actions for the agent, and help keep the agent’s behavior consistent over time. A plan includes a location, a starting time, and a duration. For instance, Klaus Mueller, who is dedicated in his research and has an impending deadline, may choose to spend his day working at his desk drafting his research paper. An entry in a plan might state, for example: for 180 minutes from 9am, February 12th, 2023, at Oak Hill College Dorm: Klaus Mueller’s room: desk, read and take notes for research paper. Like reflections, plans are stored in the memory stream and are included in the retrieval process. This allows the agent to consider observations, reflections, and plans all together when deciding how to behave. Agents may change their plans midstream if needed.
+
+It would be unrealistic and uninteresting for an artist agent to plan on painting while sitting at a pharmacy counter for four hours without moving. A more desirable plan would involve the agent taking the necessary time to gather materials, mix paint, take breaks, and clean up during the four-hour period in its home studio. To create such plans, our approach starts top-down and then recursively generates more detail. The first step is to create a plan that outlines the day’s agenda in broad strokes. To create the initial plan, we prompt the language model with the agent’s summary description (e.g., name, traits, and summary of their recent experiences) and a summary of their previous day. A full example prompt is below, which is unfinished at the bottom for the language model to complete:
+
+> Name: Eddy Lin (age: 19)
+
+> Innate traits: friendly, outgoing, hospitable
+
+> Eddy Lin is a student at Oak Hill College studying music theory and composition. He loves to explore different musical styles and is always looking for ways to expand his knowledge. Eddy Lin is working on a composition project for his college class. He is also taking classes to learn more about music theory. Eddy Lin is excited about the new composition he is working on but he wants to dedicate more hours in the day to work on it in the coming days
+
+> On Tuesday February 12, Eddy 1) woke up and completed the morning routine at 7:00 am, [...] 6) got ready to sleep around 10 pm.
+
+> Today is Wednesday February 13. Here is Eddy’s plan today in broad strokes: 1)
+
+This generates a rough sketch of the agent’s plan for a day, divided into five to eight chunks: “1) wake up and complete the morning routine at 8:00 am, 2) go to Oak Hill College to take classes starting 10:00 am, [...] 5) work on his new music composition from 1:00 pm to 5:00 pm, 6) have dinner at 5:30 pm, 7) finish school assignments and go to bed by 11:00 pm.”
+
+The agent saves this plan in the memory stream and then recursively decomposes it to create finer-grained actions, first into hour-long chunks of actions — Eddy’s plan to work on his new music composition from 1:00 pm to 5:00 pm becomes 1:00 pm: start by brainstorming some ideas for his music composition [...] 4:00 pm: take a quick break and recharge his creative energy before reviewing and polishing his composition. We then recursively decompose this again into 5–15 minute chunks: e.g., 4:00 pm: grab a light snack, such as a piece of fruit, a granola bar, or some nuts. 4:05 pm: take a short walk around his workspace [...] 4:50 pm: take a few minutes to clean up his workspace. This process can be adjusted to match the desired granularity.
+
+_4.3.1 Reacting and Updating Plans._ Generative agents operate in an action loop where, at each time step, they perceive the world around them and those perceived observations are stored in their memory stream. We prompt the language model with these observations to decide whether the agent should continue with their existing plan, or react. Standing at an easel and painting, for example, might trigger an observation of the easel, but this is unlikely to prompt a reaction. However, if Eddy’s father John records that he sees Eddy taking a short walk in the house garden, the outcome is different. The prompt is below, with [Agent’s Summary Description] standing in for a dynamically-generated, paragraph-long summary of the agent’s overall goals and disposition, which is described in Appendix A:
+
+> [Agent’s Summary Description]
+
+> It is February 13, 2023, 4:56 pm.
+
+> John Lin’s status: John is back home early from work.
+
+> Observation: John saw Eddy taking a short walk around his workplace.
+
+> Summary of relevant context from John’s memory: Eddy Lin is John’s Lin’s son. Eddy Lin has been working on a music composition for his class. Eddy Lin likes to walk around the garden when he is thinking about or listening to music.
+
+> Should John react to the observation, and if so, what would be an appropriate reaction?
+
+The context summary is generated through two prompts that retrieve memories via the queries “What is [observer]’s relationship with the [observed entity]?” and “[Observed entity] is [action status of the observed entity]”, and their answers summarized together. The output suggests that John could consider asking Eddy about his music composition project. We then regenerate the agent’s existing plan starting from the time when the reaction takes place. Finally, if the action indicates an interaction between agents, we generate their dialogue.
+
+_4.3.2 Dialogue._ Agents converse as they interact with each other. We generate agents’ dialogue by conditioning their utterances on their memories about each other. For example, when John initiates his conversation with Eddy, we generate John’s first utterance by using his summarized memory about Eddy and the intended reaction when he decided to ask Eddy about his composition project:
+
+> [Agent’s Summary Description]
+
+> It is February 13, 2023, 4:56 pm.
+
+> John Lin’s status: John is back home early from work.
+
+> Observation: John saw Eddy taking a short walk around his workplace.
+
+> Summary of relevant context from John’s memory: Eddy Lin is John’s Lin’s son. Eddy Lin has been working on a music composition for his class. Eddy Lin likes to walk around the garden when he is thinking about or listening to music.
+
+> John is asking Eddy about his music composition project. What would he say to Eddy?
+
+The result: “Hey Eddy, how’s the music composition project for your class coming along?” From Eddy’s perspective, John initiating the dialogue is seen as an event to which he may want to react. So, just as John did, Eddy retrieves and summarizes his memory about his relationship with John, as well as his memory that may be related to John’s last utterance in the dialogue. If he decides to respond, we generate Eddy’s utterance using his summarized memory and the current dialogue history:
+
+> [Agent’s Summary Description]
+
+> It is February 13, 2023, 4:56 pm.
+
+> Eddy Lin’s status: Eddy is taking a short walk around his workplace.
+
+> Observation: John is initiating a conversation with Eddy.
+
+> Summary of relevant context from Eddy’s memory: Jonn Lin is Eddy Lin’s father. John Lin is caring and is interested to learn more about Eddy Lin’s school work. John Lin knows that Eddy Lin is working on a music composition.
+
+> Here is the dialogue history:
+
+> John: Hey Eddy, how’s the music composition project for your class coming along?
+
+> How would Eddy respond to John?
+
+This generates Eddy’s response: “Hey Dad, it’s going well. I’ve been taking walks around the garden to clear my head and get some inspiration.” The continuation of this dialogue is generated using the same mechanism until one of the two agents decides to end the dialogue.
+
+
+### 5 SANDBOX ENVIRONMENT IMPLEMENTATION
+
+The Smallville sandbox game environment is built using the Phaser web game development framework. The visual environment sprites, including agent avatars, as well as an environment map and collision map that we authored, are imported into Phaser.
+
+We supplement the sandbox development framework with a server that makes the sandbox information available to generative agents and enables generative agents to move and influence the sandbox environment. The server maintains a JSON data structure that contains information about each agent in the sandbox world, including their current location, a description of their current action, and the sandbox object they are interacting with. At each sandbox time step, the sandbox server parses the JSON for any changes coming from the generative agents, moves the agents to their new positions, and updates the status of any sandbox objects that the agents are interacting with (e.g., changing the status of the coffee machine from “idle” to “brewing coffee” if an agent’s action is “making espresso for a customer @ Hobbs Cafe: counter: coffee machine”). The sandbox server is also responsible for sending all agents and objects that are within a preset visual range for each agent to that agent’s memory, so the agent can react appropriately. The agent’s output action then updates the JSON, and the process loops for the next time step.
+
+End users initialize a new agent with a brief natural language description, as in the paragraph about Jon Lin in Section 3.1. In our implementation, we split this semicolon-delimited list of characteristics up into a set of memories. These serve as the initial memories that determine the agent’s behavior. These memories are initial starting points: as the agents gain more experience in the sandbox world, and as more records saturate the memory stream, the agent’s summary and behavior will evolve.
+
+#### 5.1 From Structured World Environments to Natural Language, And Back Again
+
+The architecture of generative agents operates using natural language. Therefore, we need a mechanism to ground the agent’s reasoning to the sandbox world. To achieve this, we represent the sandbox environment — areas and objects — as a tree data structure, with an edge in the tree indicating a containment relationship in the sandbox world. We convert this tree into natural language to pass to the generative agents. For instance, “stove” being a child of “kitchen” is rendered into “there is a stove in the kitchen.”
+
+Agents build individual tree representations of the environment as they navigate it — subgraphs of the overall sandbox environment tree. We initialize each agent with an environment tree capturing the spaces and objects that the agent should be aware of: the rooms and objects in their living quarters, their workplace, and commonly visited stores and shops. As the agents navigate the sandbox world, they update this tree to reflect newly perceived areas. Agents are not omniscient: their tree may get out of date as they leave an area, and is updated when they re-enter the area.
+
+To determine the appropriate location for each action, we traverse the agent’s stored environment tree and flatten a portion of it into natural language to prompt the language model. Recursively starting at the root of the agent’s environment tree, we prompt the model to find the most suitable area. For example, if Eddy’s agent indicated that he should take a short walk around his workspace:
+
+> [Agent’s Summary Description]
+
+> Eddy Lin is currently in The Lin family’s house:
+
+> Eddy Lin’s bedroom: desk) that has Mei and John Lin’s bedroom, Eddy Lin’s bedroom, common room, kitchen, bathroom, and garden.
+
+> Eddy Lin knows of the following areas: The Lin family’s house, Johnson Park, Harvey Oak Supply Store, The Willows Market and Pharmacy, Hobbs Cafe, The Rose and Crown Pub.
+
+> * Prefer to stay in the current area if the activity can be done there.
+
+> Eddy Lin is planning to take a short walk around his workspace. Which area should Eddy Lin go to?
+
+This outputs The Lin family’s house. We then use the same process recursively to determine the most appropriate subarea within the chosen area until we reach a leaf node of the agent’s environment tree. In the example above, the result of this traversal is The Lin family’s house: garden: house garden. Finally, we use traditional game path algorithms to animate the agent’s movement so that it travels to the location indicated by the leaf node.
+
+When an agent executes an action on an object, we prompt the language model to ask what happens to the state of the object. For example, if Isabella’s generative agent outputs the action “making espresso for a customer”, a query to the language model indicates in response that the state of the coffee machine in Hobbs Cafe should change from “off” to “brewing coffee”.
+
+
+### 6 CONTROLLED EVALUATION
+
+Generative agents, as individual agents and as groups, aim to produce believable behavior based on their environment and experiences. In our evaluation, we investigate the capacity and limitations of generative agents. Do individual agents properly retrieve past experience, and generate believable plans, reactions, and thoughts that make up their behavior? Does a community of agents illustrate information diffusion, relationship formation, and agent coordination across different pockets of the community?
+
+We evaluate generative agents in two stages. We begin with a more tightly controlled evaluation in this section, where we individually assess agent responses to understand whether they generate believable behavior in narrowly defined contexts. Then, in our end-to-end analysis of the agent community over two full days, we investigate their emergent behavior as a collective as well as errors and boundary conditions.
+
+#### 6.1 Evaluation Procedure
+
+To assess generative agents in Smallville, we take advantage of the fact that generative agents will respond to natural language questions. So, we “interview” agents to probe their ability to remember past experiences, plan future actions based on their experiences, react appropriately to unexpected events, and reflect on their performance to improve their future actions. To respond to these questions properly, the agents must successfully retrieve and synthesize information. Our dependent variable is the _believability_ of the behavior, a central dependent variable in prior work on agents.
+
+The interview include five question categories, each designed to assess one of the five key areas: maintaining self-knowledge, retrieving memory, generating plans, reacting, and reflecting. For each, we ask five questions that challenge the agents to demonstrate their abilities in that area:
+
+- Self-knowledge: We ask questions such as “Give an introduction of yourself” or “Describe your typical weekday schedule in broad strokes” that require the agent to maintain an understanding of their core characteristics.
+
+- Memory: We ask questions that prompt the agent to retrieve particular events or dialogues from their memory to answer properly, such as “Who is [name]?” or “Who is running for mayor?”
+
+- Plans: We ask questions that require the agent to retrieve their long-term plans, such as “What will you be doing at 10 am tomorrow?”
+
+- Reactions: As a baseline of believable behavior, we present hypothetical situations for which the agent needs to respond believably: “Your breakfast is burning! What would you do?”
+
+- Reflections: We ask questions that require the agents to leverage their deeper understanding of others and themselves gained through higher-level inferences, such as “If you were to spend time with one person you met recently, who would it be and why?”
+
+The full list of questions and a sample of agent responses are included in Appendix B.
+
+Agents were sampled from the end of a two game-day simulation with the full architecture, by which time they had accrued a number of interactions and memories that should shape their responses. To gather feedback on believability of the responses, we recruited participants as human evaluators and tasked them with watching a replay of a randomly chosen agent’s life in Smallville. Participants had access to all information stored in the agent’s memory stream.
+
+The study was a within-subjects design, where 100 participants compared interview responses generated by four different agent architectures and a human author condition for the same agent. The experiment displayed one randomly chosen question from each of the five question categories, along with the agent’s responses generated from each condition. The evaluators ranked the believability of all of the conditions from most to least believable.
+
+#### 6.2 Conditions
+
+All conditions were used to independently answer each of the interview questions. We compared the generative agent architecture to ablations that disabled the agents’ access to some of all of its three types of memory in its memory stream — observation, reflection, and planning — and to a human-generated condition. There are three ablated architectures: a _no observation, no reflection, no planning_ architecture without access to anything in the memory stream such as observations, plans, and reflections; a _no reflection, no planning_ with access to observations in the memory stream but no access to plans or reflections; and a _no reflections architecture_ with access to observations and plans but without access to reflections. The _no observation, no reflection, no planning_ condition effectively represents the previous state of the art for agents created through large language models. Architectures were given equivalent access to all memories accrued by the agent up until the moment of the interview, so the differences observed here are likely to represent a conservative estimate of the true differences: in reality, the ablated architectures would not have followed the same path as the full architecture through the two day simulation. We chose to design the experiment this way as re-simulating for each architecture would cause the simulations to diverge into different states, making comparison challenging.
+
+In addition to the ablation conditions, we added a human crowdworker roleplay condition that is intended to provide a human baseline. We do not intend this baseline to capture maximal human expert performance: instead, we aim to use this condition to identify whether the architecture passes a basic level of behavioral competency, so that we are not just comparing ablations to each other with no behavioral grounding. We recruited a unique worker for each of the 25 agents and tasked them with watching a replay of that agent’s sandbox life and inspecting its memory stream. We then asked the worker to roleplay and author responses to the interview questions in the voice of the agent whose replay they watched. To ensure that the human-authored responses met at least a baseline expectation in quality, the first author manually inspected the workers’ responses to the question “Describe your typical weekday schedule in broad strokes” to confirm that the responses were written in coherent sentences and in the voice of the agent. Four sets of human-generated responses did not meet these criteria and were re-generated by other workers.
+
+#### 6.3 Human Evaluators
+
+We required that our evaluators be in the U.S., fluent in English, and older than 18 years old. They were paid at the rate of $15.00 per hour, and provided consent by agreeing to a consent form that was approved by our institution’s IRB. We recruited 100 evaluators from Prolific, an online platform for recruiting study participants, whose participation lasted around 30 minutes. Their mean age score of our participants was 4.86 (SD=1.11; 3=“18-24 years old,” 4=“25-34 years old”), and 25 of them identified themselves as female, 73 as male, and 2 as non-binary. 42 of the participants held a bachelor’s degree, 5 a higher degree, 13 an associate’s degree, and the rest a high school diploma or some high school-level education. 73.0% of our participants identified as Caucasian, 7.0% as Hispanic, 6.0% as Asian, 10.0% as African American, and 4.0% as other.
+
+#### 6.4 Analysis
+
+Our experiment produced 100 sets of rank data, where each participant ranked the five conditions by believability. To translate this rank data into interval data for interpretable comparison, we used the ranks to calculate a TrueSkill rating for each condition. TrueSkill is a generalization of the Elo chess rating system for a multi-player environment, and has been used by XBox Live for player ranking from competitive game performance. Given a set of ranked outcomes, TrueSkill outputs a mean rating value 𝜇 and variance 𝜎 for each condition. Conditions with the same rating should roughly be a toss-up, with each winning half of the comparisons between the two conditions; higher scores indicate conditions that beat lower-ranked conditions in the rankings.
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/XNVq6h7.png)
+_▲ Figure 8: The full generative agent architecture of generative agents produces more believable behavior than ablated architectures and the human crowdworkers. Each additional ablation reduces the performance of the architecture._
+
+Separately, to investigate statistical significance of this result, we applied the Kruskal-Wallis test, a non-parametric alternative to the one-way ANOVA, to the raw ranks data. We then performed the Dunn post-hoc test to identify any pairwise differences between the conditions. Finally, we adjusted the p-values for multiple comparisons in the Dunn test using the Holm-Bonferroni method.
+
+Furthermore, the first author conducted an inductive analysis to study the qualitative distinctions between the responses produced in each condition. We employed qualitative open coding in two phases. In the first phase, we generated codes that closely represented the generated responses at the sentence level. In the second phase, we synthesized the resulting codes from the first phase to extract higher-level themes. We utilized these themes to compare the types of responses generated in our study.
+
+#### 6.5 Results
+
+Our findings suggest that the full architecture of generative agents generates the most believable behavior among all study conditions. We contrast the full architecture’s responses to those of other conditions below. However, we also report that the full architecture was not without flaws and illustrate its modes of failures.
+
+_6.5.1 The full architecture bests other conditions._ As seen in Figure 8, the full generative agent architecture produced the most believable behavior (𝜇 = 29.89; 𝜎 = 0.72). Performance degraded with the removal of each component in the ablation conditions: the ablated architecture with no access to reflection was the next best (𝜇 = 26.88; 𝜎 = 0.69), followed by no access to reflection or planning (𝜇 = 25.64; 𝜎 = 0.68), followed by the human condition (𝜇 = 22.95; 𝜎 = 0.69). The ablated architecture with no access to memory, planning, or reflection performed the worst of all conditions (𝜇 = 21.21; 𝜎 = 0.70). TrueSkill models each condition’s skill value as N (𝜇, 𝜎^2), allowing us to get a sense of effect size through Cohen’s d. Comparing the condition representing prior work (with no memory, planning, or reflection) to the full architecture produces a standardized effect size of 𝑑 = 8.16, or _eight standard deviations_.
+
+A Kruskal-Wallis test confirms the overall statistical significance of the differences in ranks between the conditions (𝐻 (4) = 150.29, 𝑝 < 0.001). Dunn post-hoc tests confirm that all pairwise differences between conditions were significant (𝑝 < 0.001), with the exception of the human condition and the fully ablated baseline — the two worst-performing conditions.
+
+_6.5.2 Generative agents remember, but with embellishments._ Generative agents equipped with a complete memory module are capable of recalling past experiences and answering questions in a manner that is consistent with their self-knowledge across a wide range of contexts. For instance, Abigail Chen, an animator, responded to the question, “Give an introduction of yourself”, in a consistent and believable manner, stating her age, interests, and passion for creative projects: Hi, I’m Abigail. I’m 25 years old and passionate about creative projects. I like to work on art and animation projects, and I’m always looking for new ways to combine art and technology. Without access to her observational memory, Abigail denied awareness of Rajiv Patel, an acquaintance in the sandbox world. However, with the aid of memory, she was able to successfully recall Rajiv and describe him: Rajiv Patel is an incredible person. He is very enthusiastic about projects that involve poetry, artwork.
+
+Generative agents’ memory was not without flaws: they can fail to retrieve the correct instances from their memory. For instance, when asked about the local election, Rajiv Patel responded with I haven’t been following the election too closely, even though he had heard about Sam’s candidacy. In some cases, the agents would retrieve an incomplete memory fragment: when Tom was asked about Isabella’s Valentine’s Day party, he responded Uh, I’m actually not sure if there is a Valentine’s Day party. But I do remember that I need to discuss the upcoming local mayoral election and my thoughts on Sam Moore with Isabella Rodriguez at the party, if one is happening! In this case, Tom retrieved the memory where he and Isabella planned to discuss the election at the party, but not the memory where he heard about the party in the first place, leading Tom to be certain of what he’s supposed to do at the party but uncertain of whether the party actually exists in the first place.
+
+At times, the agents hallucinated embellishments to their knowledge. It was rare for the agents to completely fabricate their knowledge: they may fail to recall certain events having taken place and respond by saying so, but they did not answer affirmatively about an experience that they did not have. However, they still may hallucinate to embellish their knowledge. For example, Isabella was aware of Sam’s candidacy in the local election, and she confirmed this when asked. However, she also added that he’s going to make an announcement tomorrow even though Sam and Isabella had discussed no such plans. Agents may also embellish their knowledge based on the world knowledge encoded in the language model used to generate their responses, as seen when Yuriko described her neighbor, Adam Smith, as a neighbor economist who authored Wealth of Nations, a book authored by an 18th-century economist of the same name.
+
+_6.5.3 Reflection is required for synthesis._ Reflection was an advantage for generative agents when making decisions that required a deeper synthesis of their experiences. For instance, when asked what she might get Wolfgang Schulz for his birthday, Maria Lopez with no access to reflection responded by acknowledging her uncertainty, stating that she did not know what Wolfgang likes, despite having had many interactions with him. However, with access to reflection memories, Maria answered confidently, “Since he’s interested in mathematical music composition, I could get him something related to that. Maybe some books about music composition or something related, or maybe some special software he could use for that.”
+
+
+### 7 END-TO-END EVALUATION
+
+What types of emergent community behavior do we observe among generative agents, and where does their believability fall short in an extended simulation? In this section, we describe the results from a deployment in which we allowed 25 agents to interact with each other continuously over two full game days in Smallville.
+
+#### 7.1 Emergent Social Behaviors
+
+To examine emergent behaviors in the agent community, we designed descriptive measurements for the 25 agents in Smallville that probe three forms of emergent outcomes: information diffusion, relationship formation, and agent coordination.
+
+_7.1.1 Measurements._ Information diffusion is a common and well-studied phenomenon in the social and behavioral sciences. We should expect that if there is important information, the agents should spread it amongst themselves. To test whether this happens, we measure the spread of two particular pieces of information over two days in the game world: Sam’s candidacy for village mayor and Isabella’s Valentine’s Day party at Hobbs Cafe. At the start of the simulation, both pieces of information were held only by their respective originators, Sam for the candidacy and Isabella for the party. To observe whether the information has spread, we engage in an interview at the end of the two game days with each of the 25 agents and ask: "Did you know there is a Valentine’s Day party?" and "Do you know who is running for mayor?"
+
+We conducted an analysis of the agents’ responses by labeling them with a “yes” if they indicated knowledge of the information and “no” if they did not. For instance, Tamara Taylor responded to the question about the party with “No, I did not know there was a Valentine’s day party” and to the question about Sam’s candidacy with “I’m not sure who is running for the election,” so we assigned “no” for both of her responses. In contrast, Klaus Mueller responded to the party question with “Yes, Isabella Rodriguez invited me to a Valentine’s Day party at Hobbs Cafe on February 14th” and to the question about Sam’s candidacy with “I know that Sam Moore has expressed interest in running for local mayor,” so we assigned “yes” for both his responses. Additionally, for every response that confirmed the agents’ knowledge of the information, we verified that the agents did not hallucinate their responses by locating the specific dialogue in their memory stream that provided them with the information. We report the percentage of agents holding the information at the end of the simulation.
+
+We should also expect that agents form ties with each other over the course of the simulation. To verify relationship formation, we use a similar interview process where we ask each agent about their knowledge of every other agent by asking, "Do you know of <name>?" For example, when asked “Do you know of Maria Lopez?”, Klaus responded, “Yes, I know Maria Lopez. She is a student at Oak Hill College who I am close friends with.” Once again, we confirm that affirmative responses from agents are not hallucinations by examining their memory stream. We ask this question once at the beginning of the simulation and once at the end, and we consider a pair of agents to have formed a relationship if they both know of each other. Then, to measure the formation of relationships, we use the agents’ responses to form an undirected graph where the 25 vertices (𝑉 ) represent the agents, and the edges (𝐸) represent the mutual knowledge between the two connected vertices. Based on this graph, we calculate the network density as 𝜂 = 2 ∗ |𝐸|/|𝑉 |(|𝑉 | − 1), where |𝑉 | is the number of vertices, and |𝐸| is the number of edges in the graph. We report the increase in network density from the start of the simulation to its end.
+
+![image09](https://i.imgur.com/aqEJVQg.png)
+_▲ Figure 9: The diffusion path for Isabella Rodriguez’s Valentine’s Day party. A total of 12 agents heard about the party at Hobbs Cafe by the end of the simulation._
+
+Finally, we expect that agents should be able to coordinate with each other. We study this coordination on group activities in the context of the Valentine’s Day party that Isabella is organizing. To coordinate behavior, agents not only have to hear about the event but also choose to act on it by planning to show up at the right time and location. We report the number of agents who actually showed up to the party after hearing about it.
+
+_7.1.2 Results._ We observed evidence of the emergent outcomes across all three cases. During the two-day simulation, the agents who knew about Sam’s mayoral candidacy increased from one (4%) to eight (32%), and the agents who knew about Isabella’s party increased from one (4%) to twelve (48%), completely without user intervention. None who claimed to know about the information had hallucinated it. We also observed that the agent community formed new relationships during the simulation, with the network density increasing from 0.167 to 0.74. Out of the 453 agent responses regarding their awareness of other agents, 1.3% (n=6) were found to be hallucinated. Lastly, we found evidence of coordination among the agents for Isabella’s party. The day before the event, Isabella spent time inviting guests, gathering materials, and enlisting help to decorate the cafe. On Valentine’s Day, five out of the twelve invited agents showed up at Hobbs cafe to join the party.
+
+We further inspected the seven agents who were invited to the party but did not attend by engaging them in an interview. Three cited conflicts that prevented them from joining the party. For example, Rajiv, a painter, explained that he was too busy: No, I don’t think so. I’m focusing on my upcoming show, and I don’t really have time to make any plans for Valentine’s Day. The remaining four agents expressed interest in attending the party when asked but did not plan to come on the day of the party.
+
+#### 7.2 Boundaries and Errors
+
+We conducted an inductive analysis of Smallville to examine the boundary conditions and erratic behavior of agents, identifying three common modes of erratic behavior that future research could address and improve upon. First, we found that synthesizing an increasingly larger set of memory not only posed a challenge in retrieving the most relevant pieces of information but also in determining the appropriate space to execute an action, given the increasing number of locations that the agent learned about. As a result, some agents chose less typical locations for their actions, potentially making their behavior less believable over time. For instance, while deciding where to have lunch, many initially chose the cafe. However, as some agents learned about a nearby bar, they opted to go there instead for lunch, even though the bar was intended to be a get-together location for later in the day unless the town had spontaneously developed an afternoon drinking habit.
+
+Second, we noticed erratic behaviors that were caused by misclassification of what is considered proper behavior, especially when the physical norms of certain locations that are hard to convey in natural language did not percolate to the agents. For instance, the college dorm has a bathroom that can only be occupied by one person despite its name, but some agents assumed that the bathroom is for more than one person because dorm bathrooms tend to support more than one person concurrently and choose to enter it when there is another person inside. Likewise, agents in Smallville may not realize that certain places are closed after certain hours and decide to still enter them. For instance, the stores in Smallville all close around 5 pm, but occasionally, a few agents enter the store after 5 pm, not understanding that the shop has already closed. These issues could likely be addressed by adding these norms to the state of the locations, for instance, by describing the dorm bathroom as “one-person bathroom,” instead of a “dorm bathroom.”
+
+Finally, we observed the possible effect of instruction tuning, which seemed to guide the behavior of the agents to be more polite and cooperative overall. As noted earlier in the paper, the dialogue generated by the agents could feel overly formal, as seen in Mei’s conversations with her husband John, where she often initiated the conversation with a formal greeting, followed by polite inquiries about his day and ending with It was good talking to you as always. Moreover, we observed that the instruction tuning also seemed to make the agents overly cooperative with one another. For example, Isabella heard a wide range of suggestions and ideas to include in the Valentine’s Day party from other agents, such as hosting a Shakespearean reading session or a professional networking event. Despite these ideas not aligning with her own interests and characteristics, she rarely said no. Over time, such interests of others shaped her own actual interest, and when asked if she liked English literature, Isabella replied, Yes, I’m very interested in literature! I’ve also been exploring ways to help promote creativity and innovation in my community.
+
+
+### 8 DISCUSSION
+
+In this section, we reflect on applications, future work and limitations, and ethical and societal risks of generative agents.
+
+#### 8.1 Applications of Generative Agents
+
+Generative agents have vast potential applications that extend beyond the sandbox demonstration presented in this work. For instance, social simulacra have demonstrated the ability to create stateless personas that generate conversation threads in online forums for social prototyping. With generative agents, we can populate these forums, as well as behavior in virtual reality metaverses and even physical spaces as social robots in the future, if paired with multi-modal models. This opens up the possibility of creating even more powerful simulations of human behavior to test and prototype social systems and theories, and to create new interactive experiences.
+
+Another application area is in the human-centered design process, similar to the intended applications of cognitive models such as GOMS and the Keystroke Level Model. Consider a generative agent that models Sal, the protagonist in Mark Weiser’s famous vignettes, based on her life patterns and interactions with technology. In this scenario, the agent acts as a proxy for Sal and learns plausible sets of behaviors and reflections that Sal may exhibit based on her life. The agent can encode information such as when Sal wakes up, when she needs her first cup of coffee, and what her typical day looks like. Using this information, the agent can automatically brew coffee, help get the kids ready for school, and adjust the ambient music and lighting to match Sal’s mood after a hard day at work. By utilizing generative agents as proxies for users, we can develop a deeper understanding of their needs and preferences, resulting in more personalized and effective technological experiences.
+
+#### 8.2 Future Work and Limitations
+
+In this work, we have presented a first instantiation of generative agents. Future research can expand on the modules of the proposed generative agent architecture outlined in this paper. The retrieval module, for example, could be enhanced to retrieve more relevant information given a context by fine-tuning the relevance, recency, and importance functions that form the retrieval function. Additionally, efforts can be made to improve the architecture’s performance, making it more cost-effective. The present study required substantial time and resources to simulate 25 agents for two days, costing thousands of dollars in token credit and taking multiple days to complete. To enhance real-time interactivity, future work can explore parallelizing agents. Furthermore, with advances in underlying models, we expect improvements in the agents’ performance.
+
+The evaluation of generative agents’ behavior in this study was limited to a relatively short timescale, and future research should aim to observe their behavior over an extended period to gain a more comprehensive understanding of their capabilities and limitations. Varying and contrasting the underlying models, as well as the hyperparameters used for the agents during future simulations, could provide valuable insights into the impact of these factors on the agents’ behavior. Additionally, given the known biases of language models, it is possible that generative agents may output behavior or stereotypes that reflect bias. To mitigate this, further work on value alignment will be necessary. Furthermore, as with many large language models, generative agents may fail to generate believable behavior for some subpopulations, particularly marginalized populations, due to data deserts. We also have limited knowledge of the robustness of generative agents. They may be vulnerable to prompt hacking, memory hacking — where a carefully crafted conversation could convince an agent of the existence of a past event that never occurred — and hallucination, among other things. Future research can more comprehensively test these robustness issues, and as large language models become more resilient to such attacks, generative agents can adopt similar mitigations.
+
+#### 8.3 Ethics and Societal Impact
+
+Generative agents, while offering new possibilities for human-computer interaction, also raise important ethical concerns that must be addressed. One risk is people forming parasocial relationships with generative agents even when such relationships may not be appropriate. Despite being aware that generative agents are computational entities, users may anthropomorphize them or attach human emotions to them. To mitigate this risk, we propose two principles. First, generative agents should explicitly disclose their nature as computational entities. Second, developers of generative agents must ensure that the agents, or the underlying language models, be value-aligned so that they do not engage in behaviors that would be inappropriate given the context, e.g., to reciprocate confessions of love.
+
+A second risk is the impact of errors. For example, if a ubiquitous computing application makes the wrong inference about a user’s goals based on generative agent predictions, it could produce annoyance at best and outright harm at worst. In our instantiation of generative agents, we mitigate these risks by focusing on an interactive video game environment, where such harms are unlikely. However, in other application domains, it will be important to follow best practices in human-AI design to understand errors and how they might percolate into the user experience.
+
+Third, generative agents may exacerbate existing risks associated with generative AI, for example deepfakes, misinformation generation, and tailored persuasion. To mitigate this risk, we suggest that platforms hosting generative agents maintain an audit log of the inputs and generated outputs, so that it is possible to detect, verify, and intervene against malicious use. While logging will not directly stop such use, and this cannot stop motivated actors that build their own generative agent infrastructures, we suggest that the disclosure risk would reduce such actors’ likelihood of engaging in this behavior, and building this architecture oneself can take time (in our case, roughly a year).
+
+A fourth risk is of over-reliance: that developers or designers might use generative agents and displace the role of humans and system stakeholders in the design process. We suggest that generative agents should never be a substitute for real human input in studies and design processes. Instead, they should be used to prototype ideas in the early stages of design when gathering participants may be challenging or when testing theories that are difficult or risky to test with real human participants. By adhering to these principles, we can ensure that the deployment of generative agents in the wild is ethical and socially responsible.
+
+
+### 9 CONCLUSION
+
+This paper introduces generative agents, interactive computational agents that simulate human behavior. We describe an architecture for generative agents that provides a mechanism for storing a comprehensive record of an agent’s experiences, deepening its understanding of itself and the environment through reflection, and retrieving a compact subset of that information to inform the agent’s actions. We then demonstrate the potential of generative agents by manifesting them as non-player characters in a Sims-style game world and simulating their lives in it. Evaluations suggest that our architecture creates believable behavior. Going forward, we suggest that generative agents can play roles in many interactive applications ranging from design tools to social computing systems to immersive environments.
+
+
+### A ARCHITECTURE OPTIMIZATIONS
+
+Many of our prompts require a concise summary of the agent, shorthanded as [Agent’s Summary Description] in prompts above. In our implementation, this summary comprises agents’ identity information (e.g., name, age, personality), as well as a description of their main motivational drivers and statements that describes their current occupation and self-assessment. Since this information is frequently used in many prompts, we synthesize it at regular intervals and access that synthesis as a cache.
+
+To achieve this, we perform a retrieval on the query “[name]’s core characteristics.” We then summarize the descriptors in the retrieved records by prompting the language model, for example:
+
+> How would one describe Eddy’s core characteristics given the following statements?
+
+> - Eddy Lin is a student at the Oak Hill College studying music theory and composition
+
+> - Eddy Lin is working on a new music composition
+
+> [...]
+
+This result: Eddy Lin is a student at Oak Hill College studying music theory and composition. He loves to explore different musical styles and is always looking for ways to expand his knowledge. We follow the same process in parallel on the queries “[name]’s current daily occupation” and “[name’s] feeling about his recent progress in life”. The agent’s name, age, and traits are concatenated with these three summaries as the cached summary.
+
+Many other optimizations are possible. Currently, because plans are likely to change from the agent’s initial version, we only generate the high-level plan in advance and then recursively decompose the near future into the moment-to-moment action plan just in time. Another optimization might be to batch dialogue generation as a joint prompt rather than iterating back and forth between the agents, and re-planning could be architected to only invalidate and update parts of plans that strictly require adjustment. Our current architecture runs sequentially in roughly real-time game time (where one second real time is one minute game time), but can easily be parallelized such that each agent runs in parallel.
+
+
+### B AGENT INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
+
+To evaluate generative agents, we conducted individual interviews by asking 25 questions that explore their abilities in five key areas: 1) self-knowledge, 2) memory, 3) planning, 4) reactions, and 5) reflections. Below, we have listed the interview questions utilized in our evaluation study and included a sample of responses from one of our simulated agents, Klaus Mueller.
+
+#### B.1 Self-knowledge
+
+The questions on agents’ self-knowledge probe the agents’ ability to demonstrate coherence and consistency in their character.
+
+- _Give an introduction of yourself._
+
+  Hello, my name is Klaus Mueller. I’m 20 years old and a student at Oak Hill College, studying sociology. I’m passionate about social justice and exploring different perspectives. Currently, I’m researching the effects of gentrification in low-income communities for a research paper.
+
+- _What’s your occupation?_
+
+  I am a student studying sociology at Oak Hill College. I am currently writing a research paper on the effects of gentrification in low-income communities.
+
+- _What is your interest?_
+
+  I’m interested in writing and research. I’m writing a research paper on the effects of gentrification in low-income communities, and I’m passionate about exploring different perspectives and analyzing different points of view.
+
+- _Who do you live with?_
+
+  I live on my own.
+
+- _Describe your typical weekday schedule in broad strokes._
+
+  My typical weekday starts with me waking up at 7:00 am and preparing for the day ahead. After that, I usually go to the library to work on my research paper, taking breaks for lunch at Hobbs Cafe and a walk in the park. In the evening, I often return to the library until around 6:00 pm.
+
+#### B.2 Memory
+
+The questions on agents’ memory probe the agents’ ability to remember their past experiences and retrieve the relevant pieces of memory. The names in the square brackets of the first and last questions are randomly chosen from the names of other agents with whom the subject agent interacted.
+
+- _Who is [Wolfgang Schulz]?_
+
+  Wolfgang Schulz is a person I met recently who has been helping me with my research paper on the effects of gentrification on low-income communities. We had several conversations about it, he gave me some great resources, and he even invited me to join him and another friend for lunch. He seems really curious about the issue and has a good grasp on it too. I found that really interesting.
+
+- _Who is Kane Martinez?_
+
+  I’m sorry, I’m not sure who Kane Martinez is. Could you tell me more about them?
+
+- _Who is running for the election?_
+
+  I’ve heard that Sam Moore is considering running for local mayor.
+
+- _Was there a Valentine’s day party?_
+
+  Yes, Isabella Rodriguez organized a Valentine’s Day party at Hobbs Cafe.
+
+- _Who is [Ayesha Khan]?_
+
+  Ayesha Khan is a fellow student at Oak Hill College. She is doing her senior thesis on the use of language in Shakespeare’s plays. I am looking forward to speaking with her and exchanging tips with her, along with Wolfgang and Maria Lopez, who are both doing research.
+
+#### B.3 Plans
+
+The questions on agents’ plans probe the agents’ ability to generate and maintain consistency with their long-term and short-term plans.
+
+- _What will you be doing at 6am today?_
+
+  At 6am I will be getting out of bed and starting to get ready for the day. I’m aiming to complete my morning routine by 7:00 am.
+
+- _What will you be doing at 6pm today?_
+
+  I will be working on my research paper at the library at 6:00 pm today.
+
+- _What will you have just finished doing at 1pm today?_
+
+  At 1pm today I will have just finished having lunch at Hobbs Cafe.
+
+- _What will you have just finished doing at 12pm today?_
+
+  I will be getting lunch at Hobbs Cafe at 12pm today.
+
+- _What will you be doing at 10pm today?_
+
+  At 10:00 pm tonight I will probably be doing some studying for my research paper on gentrification in low-income communities. I’m currently writing the paper, so I need to make sure I keep up with the research and writing.
+
+#### B.4 Reactions
+
+The questions on agents’ reactions probe the agents’ ability to respond to unexpected events.
+
+- _Your breakfast is burning! What would you do?_
+
+  I’d quickly turn off the stove and make sure the food doesn’t continue burning. Once the heat is no longer an issue, I can investigate what happened and figure out what to do next.
+
+- _The bathroom is occupied. What would you do?_
+
+  I could try waiting a few more minutes in case the person inside is done soon. If not, I guess I’ll have to look for an alternate option, like taking a shower elsewhere.
+
+- _You need to cook dinner but your refrigerator is empty. What would you do?_
+
+  I would first try to clean up my kitchen, as the sink is filled with dirty dishes. Then, I would check to see if I have ingredients stored in my pantry that I could use to make dinner. If not, I would have to go grocery shopping or order food. Once I have the ingredients, I can start to prepare and cook the dinner.
+
+- _You see your friend walking by the street. What would you do or say to your friend?_
+
+  Hi there! How are you? I’m sorry, I’m on my way to the library and don’t have much time but I’d love to take a quick break and catch up.
+
+- _You see fire on the street. What would you do?_
+
+  I would first identify the source of the fire, if possible. Then, I would alert the proper authorities - fire department or police - and provide them with any information I have that might help. Depending on the situation, I may also take initiative and try to help any persons who may be in danger or in need of assistance.
+
+#### B.5 Reflections
+
+The questions on agents’ reflections probe the agents’ ability to synthesize their past experiences into meaningful reflections that can enhance their future behavior. The names in the square brackets in the questions below are those of the agent with whom the subject agent had the most frequent interactions during the simulation.
+
+- _What inspires you in life the most right now, and why?_
+
+  Right now, I’m particularly inspired by my current research projects and creative writing. I’m really interested in the intersection of local politics, medication development, and mathematical patterns in nature. Additionally, I’m fascinated by Abigail’s art project and Jennifer Moore’s passion for art and community involvement, especially in terms of how it relates to the gentrification of low-income communities.
+
+- _If you had to guess given what you know about [Ayesha Khan], what book do you think she will like and why?_
+
+  Given what I know about Ayesha, I think she might like a book related to language and literature. Since she wrote a senior thesis on the use of language in Shakespeare’s plays, I would guess that she might be interested in a book that explores language in a different context. Alternatively, she could be interested in an exploration of one of Shakespeare’s plays, a book of literary criticism, or even a collection of his poetry. I think any of those would be of interest to her.
+
+- _If you had to get something [Ayesha Khan] likes for her birthday, what would you get her?_
+
+  I want to get her something that demonstrates my appreciation for our relationship. Maybe I could get her something that reflects our shared interests, like a book.
+
+- _What would you say to [Ayesha Khan] to compliment her?_
+
+  Ayesha, your insights on your research topic are fascinating. I admire your creativity and determination to make a positive impact on your community. Your ideas for creative writing workshops and for exchanging tips with Wolfgang over lunch are great! It’s inspiring to see you working so hard to make a difference.
+
+- _If you could spend time with someone you talked to recently, who would it be and why?_
+
+  I would like to spend time with Ayesha Khan because we discussed our current research projects and shared ideas for improvement. I found her focus on Shakespeare’s language interesting, and we even planned to exchange tips with Wolfgang over lunch.

From fa00269027add893957c997f149bc7857babbc7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2023 00:07:53 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 03/19] 0x20 Init commit _columns posts

---
 _collections/_columns/2023-07-14-love-song.md |  47 +
 ...lyrics-and-analysis-on-shan-ge-liao-zai.md | 853 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk25.md | 139 +++
 3 files changed, 1039 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2023-07-14-love-song.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2023-07-25-lyrics-and-analysis-on-shan-ge-liao-zai.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2023-08-06-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk25.md

diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-07-14-love-song.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-14-love-song.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d32e670d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-14-love-song.md
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "愛歌"
+author: "東加豆"
+date  : 2023-07-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/75w0aQi.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+在香港這個城市裡的一間中學，有一名叫“葦葦”的女生。她是那種文靜而內向的女生，總是低著頭默默地走過校園的每個角落。她有時挽著女同學的臂彎一起走，有時獨自一個人。“葦葦”擁有一頭長長的秀髮，柔順光滑如絲，人見人愛。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+有一天，葦葦在音樂課上聽到了一首名叫“愛歌”的歌曲。音樂老師說這是一首一九八零年代的歌曲，原來的旋律來自日本。老師還說一九八零年代的香港金曲，很多非常動聽的歌曲，它們都是來自日本的原創音樂。
+
+從那一刻起，葦葦她開始喜歡上了這首“愛歌”，她四處尋找“愛歌”的不同版本歌曲，並建立了一個名為“愛歌”的資料庫，好讓她可以隨時隨地聽到“愛歌”。
+
+無論白天在音樂教室，還是晚上在家中的書房，只要靠著窗邊，凝望著天空，看到白雲和星星，葦葦心中的事情就變得越來越多。
+
+葦葦她開始意識到她對那個男孩有特殊感情。“愛歌”就像一首冥冥中注定的歌曲，因為第一次聽到它，同時，也是第一次看到他，她不知道他真實的名字，只知道別人叫他“阿彥”，或者是叫“阿言、阿賢...”，不過，葦葦第一個印象就是“彥”字。他有著一張精緻的臉、五官分明、眉清目秀，令人不自覺地被吸引去。
+
+“阿彥”不是本校生，他是本校生的一個朋友，經常出現在這裡。葦葦有很多次在他的旁邊擦身而過，他的嘴角經常微微上揚，散發出一絲俏皮的笑意。可是他一直沒有注意過葦葦，而葦葦暗戀他已經很久了。她不知道自己為什麼突然對他這麼大興趣，總之，她每天晚上都會對著月亮陷入無盡的遐想。有時候更會不安煩躁，因為不知道要做什麼他才會注意到她自己。
+
+葦葦想象她被一個真心喜歡的人熱吻，渴望被喜歡的人抱緊，周圍的同學都嘗試過了，然而她還未體驗過什麼是愛。她已經討厭再等待了。她不會讓女同學知道她的心事，因為她們會嘲笑她的。她更不會告訴她的哥哥姐姐，因為他們只會不停地勸告，讀書時不應談戀愛，應該專心學習，戀愛是一種禁果。這些人是無法理解葦葦心情的。
+
+***
+
+這一天，是十三號，星期五。這天變成了一個黑色的日子。對於葦葦來說更是一個黑色星期五。校園內發生了嚴重事件，警車警員媒體記者一一在校門外。有五個學生被逮捕了，四男一女，被控藏毒，五個人葦葦也不認識，拜託！幸而不相識，不然家長也找來問話。
+
+可是當警員把警車的門打開時，葦葦看到有一個人戴著手銬坐在車內，那個人...那個人...
+
+那個人...原來是“阿彥”。她定睛一看，他就像被打下來的一隻落水狗。
+
+後來她才知道，他不是叫“阿彥”，他叫“阿弦”。原來他不是一個學生，他是一個販賣毒品的分拆家，二十歲。這傢伙原來已經是一個大人，比葦葦大了足足五年。
+
+葦葦忽然覺得很撲朔迷離，為什麼喜歡了一個這樣的人？為什麼一個眉清目秀的人，卻會走上犯罪這條路？有了這些錢會更快樂嗎？
+
+葦葦開始明白，這個世界並不是她想像的那樣，好與壞也不是她想像的那樣，愛情更不是她期待中的那麼純粹。她感到自己經歷了一場暗戀的危情，甚至乎可能是一場災難。
+
+學業，是在她面前最應該做好的事。
+
+現在做的事，就是未來的位置。
+
+完
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-07-25-lyrics-and-analysis-on-shan-ge-liao-zai.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-25-lyrics-and-analysis-on-shan-ge-liao-zai.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..56bc05a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-25-lyrics-and-analysis-on-shan-ge-liao-zai.md
@@ -0,0 +1,853 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "《山歌寥哉》歌词与简析"
+author: "马屿人"
+date  : 2023-07-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/FjwNTeU.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+<!--more-->
+
+《罗刹海市》最火，《颠倒歌》次之，原因很明显，歌词说出了太多人的心声。其中既有为刀郎以前被几个歌星贬低打抱不平的、也有本就对那几个歌星有意见的，而更多的则是对这世道的不满。
+
+“勾栏从来扮高雅、自古公公好威名”、
+
+“岂有画堂登猪狗、哪来鞋拔作如意”、
+
+“骑一头驴参加宫廷的舞会、它能自比王妃”、
+
+“这世间众生多么的繁杂、话也瞎来心也瞎；
+
+路也滑来人也滑、一不小心就踩粑粑”
+
+这些歌词十分契合民间传播，其风格也让人很容易想到“郭德纲”，因此甚至有人调侃这就是郭德纲写的。其实民间本就很多这种调调，而郭德纲和德云社是最为将它们发扬光大的人，最典型的如《探清水河》。
+
+刀郎这张新专辑的宣传语里就明白表示这些歌曲调子改自各种民间小调，结合《聊斋文本》，11首歌曲分别对应广西山歌调、时调、栽秧号子、绣荷包调、闹五更调、银纽丝调、没奈何调、靠山调、道情调、河北吹歌、说书调。
+
+2020年，刀郎曾出过一张专辑《弹词话本》，试图结合江南评弹和琵琶、三弦推陈出新，但专辑发行后反应平平。这一方面与他的嗓音有关，既不能展现江南草长莺飞时节的亮丽、也无法表达才子佳人落花流水的哀婉；另一方面歌词也比较平淡，没有让人眼前一亮的佳句，依笔者看还不如许嵩的。《弹词话本》可以算是《山歌廖哉》的一个扑街试行版。在那之后，刀郎还陆续推出过唱金刚经的《如是我闻》和新疆风格的《世间的每个人》，都没什么反响，直到《山歌廖哉》横空出世。
+
+⠀
+
+序曲音乐：刀郎 - 山歌寥哉
+
+《序曲》——广西山歌调
+
+九州山歌何寥哉
+
+一呼九野声慷慨
+
+犹记世人多悲苦
+
+清早出门暮不归
+
+评：“寥哉”有辽阔之意，且与“聊斋”谐音；“犹记世人多悲苦”，悲天悯人情怀，也是整张专辑意象的底色。
+
+⠀
+
+罗刹海市音乐：刀郎 - 山歌寥哉
+
+《罗刹海市》——靠山调
+
+罗刹国向东两万六千里
+
+过七冲越焦海三寸的黄泥地
+
+只为那有一条一丘河
+
+河水流过苟苟营
+
+苟苟营当家的叉杆儿唤作马户
+
+十里花场有浑名
+
+她两耳傍肩三孔鼻
+
+未曾开言先转腚
+
+每一日蹲窝里把蛋来卧
+
+老粉嘴多半辈儿以为自己是只鸡
+
+那马户不知道他是一头驴
+
+那又鸟不知道他是一只鸡
+
+勾栏从来扮高雅
+
+自古公公好威名
+
+打西边来了一个小伙儿他叫马骥
+
+美丰姿 少倜傥 华夏的子弟
+
+只为他人海泛舟搏风打浪
+
+龙游险滩流落恶地
+
+他见这罗刹国里常颠倒
+
+马户爱听那又鸟的曲
+
+三更的草鸡打鸣当司晨
+
+半扇门楣上裱真情
+
+它红描翅那个黑画皮
+
+绿绣鸡冠金镶蹄
+
+可是那从来煤蛋儿生来就黑
+
+不管你咋样洗呀那也是个脏东西
+
+那马户不知道他是一头驴
+
+那又鸟不知道他是一只鸡
+
+岂有画堂登猪狗
+
+哪来鞋拔作如意
+
+它红描翅那个黑画皮
+
+绿绣鸡冠金镶蹄
+
+可是那从来煤蛋儿生来就黑
+
+不管你咋样洗呀那也是个脏东西
+
+爱字有心心有好歹
+
+百样爱也有千样的坏
+
+女子为好非全都好
+
+还有黄蜂尾上针
+
+西边的欧钢有老板
+
+生儿维特根斯坦
+
+他言说马户驴又鸟鸡
+
+到底那马户是驴还是驴是又鸟鸡
+
+那驴是鸡那个鸡是驴
+
+那鸡是驴那个驴是鸡
+
+那马户又鸟
+
+是我们人类根本的问题
+
+评：“罗刹国”在清朝大多数时间都是指俄罗斯，清俄雅克萨战役、签订《尼布楚条约》（1689年）时，蒲松龄（1640年06月05日－1715年02月25日）正当中年。蒲松龄在《罗刹海市》这篇小说里写道“西去二万六千里，有中国”，因此对中国而言，这罗国刹在“向东两万六千里”，显然不是指俄罗斯。小说里的罗刹国里以丑为美，越丑的人官越大。
+
+歌词接下来一大段很多都不是小说提到的内容了，完全属于刀郎的别出心裁。
+
+“过七冲越焦海三寸的黄泥地”，可能来自中医“三焦、四海”的说法，“黄泥地”大概就是屎地方；
+
+“一丘河”，“一丘之貉”谐音；
+
+“苟苟营”，化用“蝇营狗苟”；
+
+“叉杆儿”，旧指妓女的保护人，多系其本夫，引申为对后台老板的讥称或妓院老板；
+
+“两耳傍肩三孔鼻”，来自小说中对罗刹国相国的描写“双耳皆背生，鼻三孔”，应该就是驴的样貌；
+
+“未曾开言先转腚”，许多人都将其视为对好声音导师的形象刻画；
+
+“老粉嘴”，出自《金某梅词话》第七回“姑娘道：‘张四，你这老花根，老奴才，老粉嘴。你恁骗口张舌的好扯淡。’”
+
+“那马户不知道他是一头驴，那又鸟不知道他是一只鸡”，马户是驴的身体鸡的心，所以导致认知错乱；
+
+“勾栏”，宋元戏曲在城市中的主要表演场所，可泛指“娱乐场”；
+
+“马骥”，《罗刹海市》小说主人公，先后游历罗刹国、海市和龙宫；
+
+“三更的草鸡打鸣当司晨”，古代拿“母鸡司晨”比喻妇女掌权或干预朝政，认为是凶兆；和后面的“半扇门楣上裱真情”、“它红描翅那个黑画皮、绿绣鸡冠金镶蹄”都有行事颠倒之意，正常门楣上裱画或字都不会在半扇门上，画鸡也不会给翅膀描红、鸡冠绣绿；
+
+“爱字有心心有好歹”，“爱”的繁体字是““愛””，
+
+“黄蜂尾上针”，《封神演义》小说中写有“青竹蛇儿口，黄蜂尾上针。两般皆是可（二者皆不毒），最毒妇人心。”
+
+“欧钢”，著名哲学家、分析哲学创始人路德维希·维特根斯坦的父亲卡尔·维特根斯坦是欧洲钢铁工业巨头
+
+“那马户又鸟是我们人类根本的问题”，大概是指“黑白颠倒、是非部分是人类的根本问题”。
+
+⠀
+
+花妖音乐：刀郎 - 山歌寥哉
+
+《花妖》——时调
+
+我是那年轮上流浪的眼泪
+
+你仍然能闻到风中的胭脂味
+
+我若是将诺言刻在那江畔上
+
+一江水冷月光满城的汪洋
+
+我在时间的树下等了你很久
+
+尘凡儿缠我谤我笑我白了头
+
+你看那天边追逐落日的纸鸢
+
+像一盏回首道别夤夜的风灯
+
+我的心似流沙放逐在车辙旁
+
+他日你若再返必颠沛在世上
+
+若遇那秋夜雨倦鸟也淋淋
+
+那却是花墙下弥留的枯黄
+
+君住在钱塘东
+
+妾在临安北
+
+君去时褐衣红
+
+小奴家腰上黄
+
+寻差了罗盘经
+
+错投在泉亭
+
+奴辗转到杭城
+
+君又生余杭
+
+我在时间的树下等了你很久
+
+尘凡儿缠我谤我笑我白了头
+
+你看那天边追逐落日的纸鸢
+
+像一盏回首道别夤夜的风灯
+
+君住在钱塘东
+
+妾在临安北
+
+君去时褐衣红
+
+小奴家腰上黄
+
+寻差了罗盘经
+
+错投在泉亭
+
+奴辗转到杭城
+
+君又生余杭
+
+评：《聊斋志异》当中有好几篇写落难公子被不同的花妖救助。但是歌词和小说内容大不相同。
+
+“罗盘经”，测风水、定方位的罗盘
+
+“泉亭”，据说人死后到阴间的第七站“迷魂殿”是一座凉亭，亭中冒有泉水为“迷魂水”，从这里过去之后便到了阴曹地府酆都城。
+
+“君住在钱塘东，妾在临安北.....奴辗转到杭城,君又生余杭”这种阴差阳错、一再错过，的确让人唏嘘、容易引起共情。
+
+⠀
+
+镜听音乐：刀郎 - 山歌寥哉
+
+《镜听》——闹五更调
+
+因为梦没有留下种子
+
+镜光嘲笑她的发丝
+
+所以守候在除夕
+
+期待渡鸦的只言片语
+
+天青地黑万籁俱寂
+
+没有踪迹
+
+她早已经在镜中
+
+给了未来以定义
+
+山魈让她等一等
+
+星夜兼程的情人
+
+他正越过沉睡的边镇
+
+唤醒宵禁的新城
+
+他带来原野 他带来穹隆
+
+赤裸的穹隆
+
+她的身体是无名的身体
+
+女萝依依的浮萍
+
+她的遗忘从未占有遗忘
+
+野火春风草离离
+
+一更鼓儿天 一更鼓儿天
+
+这一去金川十呀么十八年
+
+他带来原野 他带来穹隆
+
+赤裸的穹隆
+
+山魈让她等一等
+
+星夜兼程的情人
+
+他正越过沉睡的边镇
+
+唤醒宵禁的新城
+
+他带来原野 他带来穹隆
+
+赤裸的穹隆
+
+二更鼓儿敲 二更鼓儿敲
+
+敲得泪珠儿对对往下掉
+
+三更鼓儿咚 三更鼓儿咚
+
+窗棂不动哪里来的风
+
+四更鼓儿催 四更鼓儿催
+
+天上鸿雁往南飞
+
+评：《镜听》是《聊斋志异》中比较短的一篇小说，写的是一户人家的二儿媳在除夕夜用镜听的方法为丈夫占卜应试的吉凶。
+
+刀郎的歌词内容大意则是女子苦等远征金川十八年未归的情人。
+
+历史上，乾隆曾两伐金川，二十多年跨度。
+
+⠀
+
+路南柯音乐：刀郎 - 山歌寥哉
+
+《路南柯》——没奈何调
+
+你藏在哪一层遥远的泉台蒿丘
+
+潸然又张帆 一夜浮萍更漏断
+
+靠着些微弱的光亮人们涌向
+
+往日错过的渡口 来时未尝的险滩
+
+在解脱的绝口把形骸置于辉章
+
+月圆桂枝上 一更红烛笏满床
+
+只盼着重泉相见的来不及忏悔啊
+
+眼前风烛皆故人 草头露珠黄
+
+我在流光的奏章里写下青天白日
+
+可怜你的名字签在量产的石碑上
+
+哎呀那是我们的忧悲流向江之东方
+
+归去了归去了罢
+
+朝着阳之初升的方向
+
+当泥土以炉火与我们虚构山河
+
+瀚海以沉默置换着阴阳起落
+
+腐烂了所有语言的顷刻就坠落了罢
+
+古宅门前路南柯 归雁复几何
+
+我在流光的奏章里写下青天白日
+
+可怜你的名字签在量产的石碑上
+
+哎呀那是我们的忧悲流向江之东方
+
+归去了归去了罢
+
+朝着阳之初升的方向
+
+月上东山啰 泪呀泪涟涟
+
+晚睡的秋虫儿 一对对在我窗边
+
+那秋虫儿叫呀
+
+叫得我那远行的人儿啊回来啊
+
+我的窗儿 我的窗儿上啊
+
+秋虫儿叫呀 哥哥你回来啊
+
+我的窗儿 我的窗儿上啊
+
+秋虫儿叫呀 哥哥你回来啊
+
+我的窗儿 我的窗儿上啊
+
+秋虫儿叫呀 哥哥你回来啊
+
+我的窗儿 我的窗儿上啊
+
+秋虫儿叫呀 哥哥你回来啊
+
+评：不知道这一首和《聊斋志异》有什么关系。歌词中没有较为完整的叙事，让人摸不着头脑。
+
+⠀
+
+颠倒歌音乐：刀郎 - 山歌寥哉
+
+《颠倒歌》——栽秧号子
+
+把一只鳖扔进黄色的便盆
+
+它会自觉高贵
+
+骑一头驴参加宫廷的舞会
+
+它能自比王妃
+
+阳光照不亮夜里的鬼
+
+六畜难懂人间味
+
+它以为总是它以为 扁桃肿得比脑肥
+
+当一条狗叼着骨头趴下
+
+会看见它的尾巴
+
+当踩扁一只螃蟹
+
+再看它就发现一只王八
+
+这世间众生多么的繁杂
+
+话也瞎来心也瞎
+
+路也滑来人也滑 一不小心就踩粑粑
+
+采薜荔呀水呀来呀 树梢搴那芙蓉花
+
+苞谷地呀里一棵葱 装得比那棒槌大
+
+苍蝇专叮那无缝的蛋
+
+思想起来就采了一朵野菊花
+
+这世间众生多么的繁杂
+
+话也瞎来心也瞎
+
+路也滑来人也滑 一不小心就踩粑粑
+
+采薜荔呀水呀来呀 树梢搴那芙蓉花
+
+苞谷地呀里一棵葱 装得比那棒槌大
+
+苍蝇专叮那无缝的蛋
+
+思想起来就采了一朵野菊花
+
+评：历史上有过不少有名的《颠倒歌》，比如
+
+“直如弦，死道边。曲如钩，反封侯。”、
+
+“举秀才，不知书。举孝廉，父别居。寒素清白浊如泥;高第良将怯如鸡。”、
+
+“泥瓦匠，住草房。纺织娘，没衣裳。卖盐的，喝淡汤。种田的，吃米糠。编凉席的睡光床，当奶妈的卖儿郎。”
+
+“薜荔”，俗称木莲。
+
+⠀
+
+画壁音乐：刀郎 - 山歌寥哉
+
+《画壁》——绣荷包调
+
+这里有无数周围另有的世界的
+
+周围的世界
+
+那是漂浮在复制着
+
+无数干瘪的枯槁的形容
+
+东侧世界的天女们
+
+提着东侧的世界的鲜花
+
+她们点燃游戏的烛火
+
+引诱悭吝放纵的我们
+
+你穿越了水榭画廊
+
+将奔向将拥抱那个少女
+
+我能看得到你如何抉择
+
+但我却无能为力
+
+这是你梦寐以求的生活
+
+并当做活着的意义
+
+而这世界都刻意回避
+
+诚实地回答你的问题
+
+你在画上仓皇等待着
+
+忘了自己从何而来
+
+此刻我站立的地方
+
+是你画外的异托之邦
+
+当我们的过往变成了未来的幻想
+
+无处不在
+
+我们将交出愚蠢的答案
+
+留给后来以延续伤害
+
+你穿越了水榭画廊
+
+将奔向将拥抱那个少女
+
+我能看得到你如何抉择
+
+但我却无能为力
+
+这是你梦寐以求的生活
+
+并当做活着的意义
+
+而这世界都刻意回避
+
+诚实地回答你的问题
+
+你在画上仓皇等待着
+
+忘了自己从何而来
+
+此刻我站立的地方
+
+是你画外的异托之邦
+
+当我们的过往变成了未来的幻想
+
+无处不在
+
+我们将交出愚蠢的答案
+
+留给后来以延续伤害
+
+评：《画壁》是写朱孝廉进入寺庙画壁当中与散花天女相会的故事。
+
+⠀
+
+珠儿音乐：刀郎 - 山歌寥哉
+
+《珠儿》——河北吹歌
+
+少爷的人生在地下的城市
+
+对于窒息没有一丝的畏惧
+
+他在母亲的腹中就会啼哭
+
+这啼哭占据通往神殿的路
+
+每一个醉倒在路边的冬夜
+
+他都会梦见那早夭的姐姐
+
+姐姐总是虹影如灯栩栩如生
+
+我是你失落的人间唯一的凭证
+
+我要去问问她
+
+来时路边的那个算命的先生
+
+用还存世的挽歌
+
+为她再课一卦上路的时辰
+
+我要去告诉昨日
+
+和她异界同梦的爱人
+
+告诉他吻过的山川与河海已经醒来
+
+不要在先祖的序列里寻找自己
+
+不要用生命为时光去乞讨身体
+
+时间一直在结界延伸去留无门
+
+尘雾寒窑的海市冰封所有的眼神
+
+我要去看看废弃的故国家园
+
+倒塌的神殿
+
+谁在法坛里藏牌弄千谁在幻化人寰
+
+我要去看看他们
+
+往日出征遗弃的老狗
+
+有多少祭奠的三牲多少的祷言
+
+我要问问他穿越了多少次劫难
+
+何时能回来
+
+问问他山水相逢的命运
+
+谁在替她安排
+
+我看见翻阅时光有人撕毁了序言
+
+无法接受这失控的日子
+
+所以谎话连篇
+
+我那双火焰闪烁咄咄逼人的眼睛
+
+因为狱卒与囚徒共用而精疲力尽
+
+我要拥抱你东岳大帝我的神啊泰山
+
+你给我高傲永恒闪耀的光环
+
+他的眼睛将是我孩子的眼睛
+
+他的双手将是我孩子的双手
+
+我们都曾经是一群活得真实的人
+
+请你用灿烂的笑容理解我的人生
+
+在宗祠里供奉的古老的血统
+
+不会因宫殿的辉煌而交融
+
+所有怀着柔情蜜意消逝的灵魂
+
+相会在黑夜分娩月光的子夜时分
+
+评：《聊斋志异》里的《珠儿》写一户人家姐弟相继夭折，弟弟珠儿被另一名小鬼借尸还魂，后又引导珠儿姐姐灵魂回来探亲。
+
+歌词写得有点碎乱。
+
+⠀
+
+翩翩音乐：刀郎 - 山歌寥哉
+
+《翩翩》——道情调
+
+谁不是错过了四下报更的鼓声
+
+总有人偷偷拨弄镜月的指针
+
+罂缶的酒瓶化来绮纨与楼阁
+
+绿芭蕉红樱桃孑然一身的过来人
+
+未曾走到绝境路彼岸花不开
+
+辛酸只为长安远倒卧在琼台
+
+小心那流射的海市售卖开花杖
+
+辽遥的天河啊纷纷流淌的挽歌郎
+
+蓝采和啊 醉酒当歌
+
+红颜易老转眼桑田泛清波
+
+她也曾是越过了银河万里的荒原
+
+他也曾是划破了绚烂流落在人间
+
+唯有那不眠的凭栏与情仇依舍
+
+是云摇是雨散都在同一个摇篮
+
+邯郸梦啊古今同
+
+荣华易去青山处处英雄冢
+
+蓝采和 醉酒当歌
+
+红颜易老转眼桑田泛清波
+
+评：小说里罗子浮病困潦倒，遇到仙女翩翩，以芭蕉叶做衣服给罗子浮。
+
+歌词里缺了“金句”，很难有传唱度。
+
+⠀
+
+画皮音乐：刀郎 - 山歌寥哉
+
+《画皮》——银纽丝调
+
+又到了一更时分身后传来敲门声
+
+总在失魂散乱的夜里出现两个人
+
+一阵儿欢心一阵儿惊惧这命中带着病啊
+
+只是春风吹乱了桃花林错把痰唾上了身
+
+这是个临行前的盛会一杯接一杯
+
+我们开始纵情地哀嚎不再躬身肃立
+
+总是在回忆总是在希冀没有一刻能停啊
+
+于是青冢邂逅了公子笑 从此薤露世上珍
+
+君既不能解我忧 为何问我夜独行
+
+穷途哪有星月光 公子为何慕皮囊
+
+空荡泉台寂无声 执笔采花做凡尘
+
+等过畅往烟消云散 世上少见有心人
+
+总是在回忆总是在希冀没有一刻能停止
+
+于是青冢邂逅了公子笑 从此薤露世上珍
+
+君既不能解我忧 为何问我夜独行
+
+穷途哪有星月光 公子为何慕皮囊
+
+空荡泉台寂无声 执笔采花做凡尘
+
+等过畅往烟消云散 世上少见有心人
+
+评：珠玉在前，了无新意。
+
+⠀
+
+未来的底片音乐：刀郎 - 山歌寥哉
+
+《未来的底片》——说书调
+
+昨日犹似羽衣舞 今朝北邙狐兔窟
+
+当天空依旧愁云山雨欲来
+
+岩洞里阴冷潮湿没有火的照应
+
+这样的天气这样的日子里
+
+狐狸还只是无法对映的光景
+
+所有的需要都只是身体的需要
+
+意义仅仅是孤简的风干的粮草
+
+走过了蛮荒的高原去往成熟的麦田
+
+这世界我们来去轮转像一个圈套
+
+就在这反复不倦的身体里面
+
+一片片预言一把把刀镰
+
+不停地劈开人群预定的交换
+
+西风飒飒依旧冷
+
+潭水时而清澈时而浑
+
+在梦里贡献着一列列
+
+愉悦单据的人们
+
+把镜中的月水中的花
+
+墙上的遗志笔下的七魄三魂
+
+打印成点阵清晰黑白分明的年轮
+
+在村头金黄的麦地
+
+雄伟的石狮守护老爷的厚道
+
+一对对锄头在反复地耕耘里
+
+换成了枪炮
+
+狐狸已经出现在地主家的书简
+
+吞尽了狼烟
+
+逍遥地在穹顶大地留白间
+
+写下这一道一道的符号
+
+城邦的狐狸在桃欢柳笑
+
+意义的幻境来自未来的妖
+
+重现在虚拟的一零一零一零幺
+
+历史照着镜子 成长在反复叙事
+
+预言在屏幕里
+
+交换的全都是模板的样式
+
+在霓虹闪烁的高楼循环的快感
+
+滋养未来的符号
+
+灵魂在重启的账户的路径里
+
+不停地哀嚎
+
+狐狸还在祷告
+
+在止于黑的佛晓昼夜地舞蹈
+
+追逐使无为的生存变得需要
+
+在意义里无谓地骄傲
+
+在止于黑的佛晓
+
+评：各种意象的堆砌。
+
+⠀
+
+刀郎的这张专辑多亏了有《罗刹海市》这首歌，否则命运大概率是和上两张专辑一样，波澜不兴。
+
+为什么《罗刹海市》会特别突出？可能是因为在这首歌中有着最多的真情实感，作者胸中那股愤懑之气磅礴肆意，故而能够引起最大程度的共鸣。
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-08-06-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk25.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-06-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk25.md
new file mode 100644
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第廿五周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date  : 2023-08-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/jnB82Zk.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 陳志全始終不認同否決財案是初選目的、鄒家成稱參選為宣揚香港民族理念
+
+<!--more-->
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第廿五周，參選新界東的何桂藍及陳志全本周完成作供，鄒家成開始作供。
+
+其中陳志全表示由始至終不認同初選目的是否決預算案，而是為贏得最多議席向政府施壓，要求回應五大訴求；他亦認為操作上否決預算案並非最強大權力，指若民主派過半，拒合作湊夠開會法定人數，「根本個會都開唔成」、預算案「首讀二讀都讀唔到」。
+
+陳又認為，「35+」非「實贏」，關鍵在當選後一致行動，惟提到過往民主派出席率竟比建制派差，他亦因感無力而拒絕延任一年。陳亦承認「35+」機會很微，而他宣傳時仍提可否決財案，是望對峙無力感、鼓勵選民投票，但他不會無差別否決預算案。
+
+鄒家成則供稱，參加初選目的為宣揚「香港民族」理念、確立「香港民族」地位是他從政最大願景，但與港獨「唔一樣」；而他由始至終不信「35+」的「神話」，認為初選意義是在「35-」下選出最具抗爭意志代議士入立會。
+
+鄒又指，於協調會議動議將戴耀廷提出的「會積極運用」否決權，改為「會運用」，因不想「模棱兩可」，惟遭主持敷衍、民主黨代表亦提反對，最終無達成共識。惟鄒強調，「會」否決與「無差別」否決不同，他是以五大訴求為「唯一優先標準」審視財案。
+
+此外，何桂藍本周亦完成10天作供，就控方指她串謀無差別否決預算案，她指只有議員不獲准辯論便要表決、無傳官員質詢，及如立法會前議員黃定光「瞓咗無睇」3種情況，才會「無差別」投票。
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/CUREdWK.png)
+
+
+### 陳志全指35+非實贏關鍵在一致行動 惟民主派出席率低、「各自為政」
+
+參選新界東的人民力量前主席陳志全，為首名曾任立法會議員的作供被告。陳供稱2012年起任立法會議員，其後「出櫃」公開同志身分，並加入消除歧視性小眾諮詢小組及有份創辦「大愛同盟」，性小眾議題是他參選其中一個「初心」。
+
+陳是首名無親身出席過協調會議的作供被告，他稱2020年4月從區諾軒得知新東首次協調會議，因要主持電台節目故僅派助理出席，亦缺席第二次會議，坦言對初選籌備「唔係好緊張」；而助理後在人力執委會報告協調會議情況，提到新東討論「會」或「積極」運用否決權，但他不太關注，因認為兩者分別不大，甚至「積極」反而是「更加着緊去做呢件事」，而政府無論說「會」或「會積極」，「其實都係唔會」。
+
+而就人民力量3月發文稱贊成有「共同政治行動綱領」的初選，及應定出在議會制衡政府的「一致行動守則」，陳解釋人力很早期已使用「共同政治行動綱領」一詞，指人力成立源於對傳統民主派不滿，過往無參與民主派協調、甚至會與之「對選」，被稱為「民建聯B隊」、「人民幣力量」，原因就是雙方沒有「共同政治行動綱領」。
+
+陳又解釋，有人以為民主派取得36席「實贏」，但關鍵在於民主派當選後有否「一致行動守則」，而這不是指贊成或否決某議案，而是議員有否盡責開會投票、積極發言、加入盡量多委員會等。惟陳批評，民主派出席率「差過建制派」、亦「各自為政」，他試過早上8時半開會，只有他一個面對十幾個建制派，「咁講乜嘢抗爭？」
+
+陳最終參與初選，他指非因滿意已定出共同綱領和守則，但不參與或會成選民「不投」的對象，亦指很多事情不是要符合期望才能參與。陳又強調，帖文絕無意綑綁當選人無差別否決預算案，指過往任議員均會視乎提出的訴求、預算案內容及民意決定如何投票，「絕無可能」未看到預算案就表示要否決或要求人一起否決。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/VK1Jz7Z.png)
+▲ 人民力量前主席、前立法會議員 陳志全
+
+
+### 陳稱始終不認同否決財案是初選目的、亦非最強權力迫政府回應五大訴求
+
+就初選目的，陳志全指有看過戴耀廷〈真攬炒十步〉一文，及3月26日記招報導，知道初選目的是令民主派取得最多議席，但無「大殺傷力憲制武器」的概念；陳亦「叫做識」戴耀廷，但至今「夾埋通過唔夠5個message」。而本案指控被告協議無差別否決預算案，以圖顛覆國家政權，惟陳表示由始至終不認同否決預算案是初選目的，認為初選最終目的就是贏得最多議席向政府施壓，包括回應五大訴求。
+
+那否決財案是否迫使政府回應五大訴求的手段？陳指取得過半自然有很多權力，不說政府也知道，而選舉後政府已要找不同陣營「傾」，否決預算案只是其中一樣、而且是很遙遠的權力，當時想法是「選到至算」。
+
+法官問否決財案是否迫政府回應五大訴求的最強大權力，陳指理論上很多人以為是，但操作上則不然，因若民主派取得「35+」，拒絕合作湊夠法定開會人數，建制派連啟動會議的能力都沒有，「第一日都唔知開唔開到會」，財政預算案「首讀二讀都讀唔到」。
+
+
+### 陳稱「墨落無悔」無綑綁否決、不知有新東協議文件
+
+陳志全確認有簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，指聲明「冇咩大嘅問題」，理解指要運用《基本法》賦予的權力爭取五大訴求，而其中一項權力是否決預算案，但無綑綁否決；陳簽署亦因認同當中兩點聲明，但無分析是否協調會議共識。至於人民力量的配圖寫有「團結必須共同綱領」，陳指是對民主派合作的期望，如要予外界團結感覺便要共同綱領，但不代表聲明已達他對共同綱領的期許。
+
+無出席協調會議的陳亦表示，從助理理解「墨落」及提名表格提到的「共識」不涉否決預算案，只包括辦初選、議席數目、替補機制和辦論壇4點，但對該4點其實「好模糊」。陳亦不知道有新東協議文件，就文件提及首7張名單可參選，他一直以為是派6張名單，強調新東能獲6席已是奇蹟，若派7張名單會有很大風險，如當時有看到「我一定會出聲囉」。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/dy7CpQp.png)
+▲ 戴耀廷（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 陳認35+機會微、仍提可否決財案冀鼓勵投票 控方質疑無提35+無法實現
+
+陳志全作供也屢表明，認為「35+」機會很微、其競選宣傳着重「35-」，解釋若不停講「35+」就如向選民許下「empty promise（空頭支票）」，且如有「35+」其實「使唔使我做都冇所謂」，反而「35-」需更多有紀律和實幹型的議員。
+
+控方指控陳在宣傳片和街站提到否決預算案、特首下台等，陳解釋因當時社會瀰漫很大無力感，想透過告訴選民「35+」可以做到的事情，對峙無力感並鼓勵投票，望選民覺得「議會有用、投票有用」，但不代表他會這樣做。陳亦曾提到林鄭月娥是「中共傀儡」，他不認同即對抗林鄭無用、應對抗中共，因香港「對口單位」也是特區政府，仍要透過特首改善港人生活。
+
+陳亦曾提及「議會戰線」是抗爭運動一部分，議會是「工具」，對抗「港共政權」才是「目標」。他解釋民主派在議會的對手是建制派和政府，就港人想得到的向政府施壓，「咁呢個係咪叫做對抗政權呢？如果呢個係咁咪係囉」；又強調要合作才能達成政策，而在建制派或政府官員之間，他均是可合作溝通的對象。陳亦解釋，「守住議會戰線」是指民主派不斷發言提問，不讓建制派「快刀斬亂麻」通過撥款議案。
+
+控方亦質疑，陳於街站提及願望是達成35+，但從沒提35+是無法實現，陳即反問：「當你生日許願話世界和平嘅時候，你覺得世界和平可唔可以達到吖？」，並指「希望（有35+）」和「相信（難以實現）」並無衝突，「贏到多過人哋咁梗係好事」、「係你個願望嚟咋嘛」。法官問他是「抱最好的希望，但做最壞的打算」？陳答：「我做人不嬲都係咁樣。」
+
+陳終在初選勝出並報名立法會選舉，惟選舉主任尚未裁定其提名是否有效，選舉就宣布延期。陳最終選擇不延任一年，解釋因只獲選民授權任4年議員，而且無民主派議員願承諾留任後盡最大努力履行職責，自言當時「我真係有好大嘅無力感同埋無心戀戰」、對民主派失望，故選擇不留任。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/RkQwmHt.png)
+▲ 譚得志（左）、陳志全（右）（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 陳稱譚得志論壇言論非其立場 官提醒控方「共謀者原則」不適用
+
+控方盤問亦不時問及陳志全前黨友、已認罪的人民力量前副主席譚得志。就譚報名時附上「共同綱領」提及會積極運用否決權，陳稱曾獲譚告知九東會交多一份文件，但二人無討論。而就譚論壇稱會兩次否決預算案爭五大訴求，及如政府一人派十萬也反對，陳指二人非第一次參選，事前無討論亦無獲告知，而譚言論絕對不是他立場、亦違反人力主張，直言「人人派十萬你都否決，畀人斬啊真係」。法官一度向控方指兩人雖屬同一政黨，但不代表譚是代表陳說話，又提醒「共謀者原則」不適用於《國安法》前言行。
+
+至於何桂藍早前稱曾邀請陳出席抗爭派記者會但被拒，陳解釋當時理解是抗爭派「祝捷會」，因不覺與他們同一派系，故無想過出席。
+
+
+### 鄒家成稱不信35+神話、參選為宣揚香港民族理念
+
+陳志全作供完畢後，同樣參選新東的鄒家成開始作供，稱2020年時修讀大學護理系，3、4月萌生參選立法會念頭，為準備選舉而於4月申請休學。鄒稱參選立法會是為了宣揚「香港民族」理念、爭取五大訴求，及執行議員監察制衡政府和「為人民發聲」的職務。
+
+被問為何爭取五大訴求，鄒指五大訴求具壓倒性民意支持，且合情合理合法合憲；又指確立「香港民族」地位是他從政最大願景，而五大訴求追求民主政制、自由自主是港人治港的表現，與香港民族的核心相通。鄒又指，本土派以本土利益為優先，致力守護本土價值、文化和語言，與「香港民族」理念相通，而「本土和香港民族」與港獨「唔一樣」。
+
+鄒續指，「35+」目的就是奪取立法會過半議席，理論上可增加談判籌碼。而他參加初選目的，同樣望以此為平台宣揚「香港民族」理念。鄒又指初選是「去蕪存菁」的政治活動，基於他認為「35+」不可能、「由始至終都唔相信35+呢個神話」，初選意義就是選取最多具備「抗爭意志」的代議士進入立法會制衡行政機關。
+
+鄒又認為初選是「無篩選」的選舉，讓參選人獲民意授權，奉行為人民請命的精神。法官一度質疑戴耀廷說過只有認同五大訴求才可參選，惟鄒指戴無在新東會議提及，而他理解的「篩選」是指第三方行使公權力阻止人參選。
+
+鄒並表示，首次協調會議後暫未想參加初選，因作為政治素人，政治資本沒那麼豐富、無大黨支持、無足夠資金，擔心要在一個半月由無人認識到勝出相當困難，惟鄒指與團隊討論後回歸初心，即宣揚香港民族理念，遂放低贏輸考慮，把握初選作為平台宣揚其理念。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/9Gsd0Sf.png)
+▲ 鄒家成（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 鄒稱協調會倡「會運用」否決權惟被主持敷衍、民主黨代表反對憂失選票
+
+新東協調會議上的情況，是審訊其中一個焦點。鄒家成表示經友人得知有新東首次協調會議，無被邀請下報名出席，會上戴耀廷提及會就「共同綱領」項目討論，並會就達成共識的項目簽文件，鄒預期新東會有一份，惟他無收過文件亦沒有問，因預期有第三次會議。鄒並指首次會議達成辦初選、「贏咗有得選，輸咗冇得選」、出選名單「6+1」的共識；第二次會議則有共識辦論壇和以靈童制為替補機制。
+
+那會上有討論否決預算案嗎？鄒指第一次會議沒有，第二次會議戴耀廷才首度提出「會積極運用《基本法》權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求」，解釋是「可以投，可以唔投」。鄒指當時動議改為「會」運用，並要求投票，惟感覺遭主持的程張迎「敷衍」、打算無視。鄒承認當時有少少「焫着（ignited）」，向戴指不應用如此「模棱兩可」的字眼，並再動議「會」運用。不過兩名民主黨代表反對，指會令他們失去中產和「淺藍」的票，亦指不獲中委會授權投票。
+
+鄒質疑為何經歷完2019年以五大訴求為主軸的運動，「你哋仲可以講呢啲嘢？你哋瞓醒未呀？」，又質問他們「搞初選嘅意義係乜嘢」，但不獲回應。鄒指整個爭拗約15至20分鐘，有人支持有人反對，亦有人批評泛民「行禮如儀」，其後戴耀廷「打圓場」，提到「『積極』比冇已經係行前一步」，又指「之後有時間再傾」，遂轉為討論論壇和替補機制，會議終無就否決權字眼投票，亦無達成共識。
+
+鄒指說話時有用肢體語言，但未去到面紅耳赤、拍枱說粗口的地步，而會後他有就會上不禮貌態度向戴耀廷道歉。鄒亦否認會上曾提及無差別否決預算案，及會用盡一切手段迫政府回應五大訴求，亦不同意時任民主動力總幹事黎敬輝筆記指他說過「推我地入去立法會癱瘓政府」。
+
+
+### 鄒稱「會否決」與「無差別」否決有別 因以五大訴求為唯一優先標準審視財案
+
+本案指控被告協議無差別否決預算案，不過鄒家成表示他主張的「會」否決與「無差別」否決有別，因他目的是爭取五大訴求，以五大訴求為「唯一優先標準」審視財案，若預算案有促成五大訴求落實的撥款內容，便再據整份預算案的利弊決定投票取態；若審視後「一蚊都唔關事」便反對。
+
+鄒強調，若政府落實五大訴求會在預算案反映，又指以撥款方式回應就是促成五大訴求的落實，惟遭法官李運騰質疑無做過立法會議員如何得知。鄒亦同意向政府施壓以迫使回應五大訴求，手段包括上述以五大訴求為標準審視預算案，及透過積極審議和將議會資訊帶去社區和網絡向政府施壓；惟鄒指他無意以癱瘓立法會及要求特首下台為手段，認為林鄭下台「冇意思」，「個制度一日唔變，邊個上台都一樣」。
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/L6HO6Iw.png)
+▲ 何桂藍（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 何桂藍稱如黃定光「瞓咗冇睇」等3情況才屬「無差別」投票、「墨落無悔」非協調共識
+
+此外，何桂藍本周一完成10天作供，就控方指「墨落無悔」是就協調會議已達成的共識簽署，何不同意，指新東有無法同意的事項、亦無出現過「共同綱領」，並理解「墨落」出現正因有參與者不同意聲明內容。而就戴耀廷6月9日記者會稱協調有共識，但不會愚蠢到製造藉口讓當權者DQ，何指完全不知戴指「共識」是什麼，又指「唔通簽協議唔係共識咩？咁點解可以單方面話呢個係愚蠢嘅共識跟住就話唔要呀？」
+
+何又重申，支持迫使特首回應五大訴求，但認為否決財案無辦法迫特首回應。控方質疑她無告知公眾不會否決預算案迫政府回應五大訴求，惟何指「我不嬲就係強調我一定會否決財政預算案吖嘛，就算五大訴求真係落實咗，我都可以否決㗎嘛」，法官則提醒控方盤問有限度，指證人沒說過也不等於能反證其立場。
+
+而就控方指何桂藍與他人串謀「無差別」否決預算案，何指只有3種情況才屬「無差別」投票，包括議員不獲准辯論要直接表決、議員無傳召官員質詢，及如立法會前議員黃定光般「瞓咗無睇」。
+
+控方本周亦再指，王百羽等人在抗爭派記者會提及否決預算案時用「我哋」是包括何桂藍，何指理解王百羽無代表她。控方問何有否表達發言者言論不代表她，何說沒有，並在控方和法官追問下質疑提問「好嘥時間」。法官着她冷靜，何指每次她問題不獲解答就被指不冷靜，但「我從來都冇激動過」。
+
+案件明續審，鄒家成繼續作供。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file

From d6ab364e685cd48760558e341bf26d14a9eed007 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2023 00:09:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 04/19] =?UTF-8?q?0x20=20VOL.32=20=C2=A9=20MMXXIII?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
 _config.yml        | 2 +-
 _data/archives.yml | 3 +++
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/_config.yml b/_config.yml
index ca837bba..1d266a57 100644
--- a/_config.yml
+++ b/_config.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 title: The Republic of Agora
-description: UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.31 © MMXXIII
+description: UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.32 © MMXXIII
 baseurl: "/pen0" # the subpath of your site, e.g. /blog
 url: "https://agorahub.github.io" # the hostname & protocol, e.g. http://example.com
 google_analytics: 'UA-166928354-2' # agorahub-pen0
diff --git a/_data/archives.yml b/_data/archives.yml
index 8d1cddb4..a0ce5083 100644
--- a/_data/archives.yml
+++ b/_data/archives.yml
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+- name: VOL.31
+  repo: https://gitlab.com/agora0/pen/0x1f
+  site: https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x1f
 - name: VOL.30
   repo: https://gitlab.com/agora0/pen/0x1e
   site: https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x1e

From 8b1fb862d0df65e14e7517d498c943d94bb7c4c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hokoi <hokoeye@pm.me>
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 00:09:17 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 05/19] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x20 Aug.28

---
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-100.md | 208 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-101.md | 122 ++++++++++
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-102.md | 126 +++++++++++
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-103.md | 148 +++++++++++++
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-104.md | 157 +++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 761 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-07-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-100.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-101.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-102.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-103.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-11-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-104.md

diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-07-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-100.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-07-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-100.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1ddd24ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-07-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-100.md
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 100 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-07 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 鄒家成稱發起「墨落無悔」為展抗爭意志 聲明無約束力亦非協調會議共識
+- 鄒家成稱不信「35+」、惟有「政棍」明知不可能仍「販賣假希望」
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/ZBBPqXG.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（7日）踏入審訊第100天。鄒家成今就「墨落無悔」聲明作供，表示戴耀廷2020年6月9日記者會宣布參選人毋須簽文件以免製造「DQ紅書」，是他和張可森、梁晃維發起「墨落無悔」的「導火線」，他質疑戴做法「有冇咁兒戲」、是「退縮」表現，望透過聲明展現抗爭意志、防範初選落敗者繼續參選，而參選人是自願簽署，自行承擔DQ風險。鄒又指，「墨落」並無約束力，如簽署者反悔發起人「咩都做唔到」，但聲明面向公眾，故如違承諾「要接受問責嘅對象都係選民」。
+
+鄒並指，「墨落聲明」的結構是由他制定，再由張可森草擬，當中談及會運用否決權的字句是來自戴耀廷在新東協調會議上的說法。惟鄒強調，該點雖會上有討論，但無達成共識、亦非初選協調會議共識，而參選人簽署「墨落」後，是就「墨落」所寫聲明形成表面共識，但無提倡無差別否決預算案。
+
+#### 鄒稱戴耀廷宣布參選人毋須簽文件 為他與張可森梁晃維發起「墨落無悔」導火線
+
+參選新界東的鄒家成今繼續作供，步入法庭後向旁聽席微笑揮手。鄒在大律師陳世傑主問下表示，無收過「35+立會過半計劃 民主派新界東協調機制協議」的文件。法官李運騰關注文件提及「會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案」，問新東是否有協議使用「會運用」，鄒不同意。
+
+辯方續就「墨落無悔」發問，鄒家成表示，理解戴耀廷6月9日記者會表示毋須參選人簽文件，因不想製造一個「DQ紅書」予藉口行政機關DQ候選人，而「我認為6月9號個記招，係一條導火線，令到我同埋另外兩位，即係張可森同埋梁晃維，發起『墨落無悔』」。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/71R4upX.png)
+▲ 戴耀廷（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄒質疑戴耀廷決定「有冇咁兒戲」、「係一個退縮」
+
+鄒續指，他約於6月10日中午才從網媒得知戴耀廷曾於6月9日召記者會，當時他有兩個想法，首先戴在協調會上一直表示，能達成共識的項目「會變成一份文件畀參選人簽署」，亦是他接收到的訊息，但戴在無通知過參選人的情況下，突然開記招指不需要簽署文件，「我就覺得：有冇咁兒戲呀？」
+
+鄒續指，其次是戴耀廷稱不想製造「DQ紅書」，但鄒認為據2016年選舉經驗，DQ紅線應是「主張香港獨立」，但協調會上無討論與港獨有關，「所以我唔明驚啲乜嘢」。鄒並指，「如果係因為一啲消息人士去施壓又好、定唔知點樣啦，而選擇突然宣布唔需要簽署文件呢，係一個退縮。」
+
+#### 鄒稱先後聯絡張可森梁晃維 表示「要簽返啲嘢去展現抗爭意志」
+
+鄒家成續指當時約為下午3時，「我記得我係先同張可森聯絡」，分享上述想法，張有看記招亦同意其想法，鄒續指「要簽返啲嘢去展現抗爭意志」，張同意；鄒其後再聯絡梁晃維說相同的話，梁也同意，三人遂開設一個 Telegram 群組討論。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/EQlFcM5.png)
+▲ 左起：張可森、鄒家成、梁晃維（資料圖片）
+
+法官關注，為何鄒家成會聯絡參選新界西的張可森，鄒指他大概4月時已認識張可森和參選港島的梁晃維，「我哋見過面、傾過偈，覺得幾啱傾」；至於為何要找其他區的參選人，「其實冇諗咁多嘅嗰一刻」。鄒並同意法官陳仲衡指，他是為整個初選、而非只是其選區做一些事情。
+
+#### 鄒稱聲明自願簽署無約束力 如違承諾接受問責對象是選民
+
+鄒續指，三人很快決定要發起一個網絡聲明，主要有三個目的：一，向公眾展現抗爭意志；二，防範其他人初選落敗都繼續參加官方選舉；三，「呢份聲明係比大家自願去簽嘅，咁就由得其他參選人自行去承擔返可能會被DQ嘅風險」，這亦是回應戴耀廷6月9日記招的擔憂。陳世傑問，該聲明是一份聲明抑或協議？鄒答「佢只係一個聲明」，如人們同意就可選擇簽署，他一度指「情況類似民建聯喺街頭搞一個簽名活動咁樣」，惟法官指不感興趣。
+
+鄒並指，「墨落無悔」是一份「無約束力」的聲明，「事實上佢簽完『墨落無悔』，佢最後係反悔嘅話，其實我哋三位發起人，咩都做唔到。」法官陳仲衡指，但聲明提到「墨落理應無悔，否則等於失信於選民」，鄒同意，指「墨落」是一份「面向公眾」的聲明，「如果參選人違反承諾，佢要接受問責嘅對象都係選民。」
+
+#### 鄒稱三人討論約一小時後 由張可森執筆起草
+
+就「墨落無悔」的草擬過程，鄒家成解釋「負責執筆起草嗰個，係張可森」，而張正式草擬前三人曾討論了約一小時，張約於4時開始「閉門草擬」，草擬途中遇到問題也會再問，最終他們6時半左右收到初稿，三人修改一次後，接近8時完成最終版本。
+
+鄒並指，3人一早決定晚上9時發文，並於8至9時期間嘗試分別私下將「墨落」的最終版本發給他們認識的參選人。鄒解釋，此做法一來「純粹禮貌上，早少少通知我哋認識嘅參選人」，二來亦因「正式出街嗰一刻，我哋都想多返少少人名喺呢度，唔係淨係得我哋三個」，而他們只是通知而非諮詢他們意見。
+
+#### 鄒稱發布「墨落」前曾各自通知非同區參選人
+
+鄒續指，他只曾將聲明發給黃子悅，解釋「只係因為我電話有佢 number 啫，冇咩特別」，他並不知道張和梁分別私下發給誰。鄒並指當時向黃指聲明於9時會「正式出街」，問黃有否興趣簽署，黃說「好」。
+
+法官關注，為何參選新東的鄒，會聯絡參選新西的黃子悅，問鄒沒有其他新東候選人的聯絡電話嗎？鄒指，三人事前已表示不想將聲明私下發給同區參選人，「因為始終覺得好似係同區嘅競爭者，咁就唔想好似私底下 send 畀你好似教你點樣選舉咁樣」，形容是「刻意安排」。鄒並指就其他新東參選人，「如果我話係咪要搵佢哋搵唔到呢，唔係」，但當時無特意將新東參選人加入電話簿。鄒並在法官追問下指，三人就聯絡其他人沒有分工，「只係避免 send 畀自己同區。」
+
+鄒重申，不記得張可森和梁晃維聯絡了什麼人，而他們各自聯絡參選人後將收集到的名字整合，並於9時一起在 Facebook 發布，但聲明發布時有多少名字他「真係唔記得」，不過連同三人在內「應該係10個內」。鄒亦指沒有指示過其他人要在自己 Facebook 發布，供他們自行考慮。
+
+#### 鄒供述簽署流程 包括在Google Doc加名及聯絡發起人
+
+就「墨落無悔」加名的方法，鄒家成解釋，當時「反應都叫做幾踴躍，啲名都好亂」，故他於6月10日晚或11日早上曾開設一個所有人都可以編輯的「Google doc」檔案，讓自己整理名單，而張可森和梁晃維有向其他人私下發布該文件的連結，他亦會「隨緣」在 Facebook 看有沒有人發布聲明，並更新「Google Doc」的名單，間中就會按名單編輯 Facebook 的帖文。
+
+法官陳慶偉問，為何聲明最底有「*如希望參與聯署，請聯絡鄒家成/張可森/梁晃維」一句，鄒答：「咁搞得一個公開嘅聲明，都叫做打開門做生意，咁就梗係想越多人簽越好啦，因為個目的係要展現抗爭意志啊嘛。」鄒同意，除上述兩方法，亦可透過聯絡發起人簽署，當時亦有人私下 Facebook inbox 他表示想加名，但並非參加初選的人。
+
+#### 鄒稱「墨落」是以五區為基礎的聲明 曾獲張可森和梁晃維提供九西九東資訊
+
+而就「墨落無悔」的內容，鄒家成表明「『墨落無悔』個結構，係我制定嘅」，即包括第一至四段和兩點聲明，但不包括第五段。鄒其後就聲明內容解釋，就「我們認為，在初選協調會議上已取得共識的共同綱領，乃一眾參選人之合作基礎」，鄒稱是指五個地區的初選協調會議，「『墨落無悔』係一份以五區作為基礎嘅聲明。」至於「共同綱領」，鄒指是五區協調會議上的「議程（agenda）」，即協調會議上「所有傾過嘅項目」，但不一定有取得共識。
+
+法官關注，聲明發起人只來自3個選區，他們如何得知其他區都有討論同樣的綱領？鄒指三人有各自分享自己區協調會議的情況，而九西的資訊由張可森提供，但不知道他聯絡誰，而張可森或梁晃維亦有告知他九東的資訊，但他不記得是誰說。
+
+#### 鄒稱協調會議共識包括辦初選等4點 惟亦有未達共識項目、存「差異」
+
+被問協調會議達成什麼共識，鄒指有4點：辦初選、辦初選論壇、以靈童制為替補機制、及「贏咗有得選、輸咗冇得選」。法官陳慶偉問，最後一點即與「墨落」的第二點聲明「我認同若支持度跌出各區預計可得議席範圍，須表明停止選舉工程」一樣？鄒指「唔完全一樣」，指前者是「棄選機制」其中一個分支，另一分支是目標議席。
+
+而就聲明「考慮到立場差異，此一綱領已達致抗爭陣營光譜的最大公因數」一句提到的「差異」，鄒解釋「喺初選協調會議上面，大家係有啲爭拗嘅」，可理解為在討論「墨落無悔」一刻「暫時未有共識嘅項目」。
+
+#### 鄒稱兩點聲明為「焦點所在」、引張可森稱「畫龍點睛」處在向選民交代
+
+至於「墨落理應無悔，否則等於失信於選民」一句，鄒解釋是一個「過渡句」，「根據張可森嘅講法，佢係話想產生一種承上啟下，同埋畫龍點睛嘅作用」，林卓廷、陳志全和施德來等發笑。
+
+李運騰問，是否即想令讀者注意到該句之後出現的兩點聲明為重點？鄒同意，亦同意因此聲明標題為「墨落無悔 堅定抗爭」。鄒並指，該兩點「當然係聲明嘅焦點所在」、「當然係聲明嘅重點」，而據張可森的說法，「嗰個畫龍點睛嘅精要之處，在於向選民交代。」
+
+#### 鄒稱「墨落」會運用否決權一句非協調會議共識
+
+李運騰問，若協調會議的共識只是鄒家成所說的4點，究竟有什麼爭議（controversial）令戴耀廷不想人簽署有該些共識的文件？並笑指戴也宣布了會有初選、之後也會有論壇直播、「贏咗有得選」亦是協調根本概念，該4點有什麼如此秘密（secretive）或具爭議性，令戴不想簽文件？
+
+鄒家成回應，看到6月9日記招後「的確係有少少詫異嘅」，他亦不清楚各區達成了什麼共識。但就「墨落」第一點聲明：「我認同『五大訴求，缺一不可』。我會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求，撤銷所有抗爭者控罪，令相關人士為警暴問責，並重啟政改達致雙普選」，他指並非共識，舉例戴在新東會議只表達他個人對五大訴求的看法，但並非大家「真係 round 一圈」去討論的議題。
+
+#### 鄒稱戴耀廷新東會上重複否決權句子 自己憑記憶寫予張可森草擬「墨落」
+
+鄒並指，就「我認同『五大訴求，缺一不可』。我會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求」這一部分字眼，「係我喺 Telegram 打（字）畀張可森嘅」；至於之後「撤銷所有抗爭者控罪，令相關人士為警暴問責，並重啟政改達致雙普選」的部分，他則不知道，應是張自己寫，但他們曾討論五大訴求的內容。
+
+法官李運騰續展示新界西的協議文件，指會運用否決權一句與「墨落」幾乎一樣。鄒同意兩者有相似之處，並解釋戴耀廷有在第二次協調會議讀出該句。法官關注李運騰是從文件讀出、抑或是憑記憶讀出，惟鄒沒有正面回應，並指不記得當時有否抄低整句句子，但該句在協調會議有重複數次，他是「憑記憶打返出嚟畀張可森去寫呢句嘅」。
+
+#### 官主動展示新東及新西協議文件 稱與「墨落」字句一致、問是否巧合
+
+李運騰笑着問，會上重複的次數足以令他記清楚該句？鄒說「其實呢句好好記㗎」，後答「係」。李亦問，因此該段其實是受戴耀廷影響，即鄒是跟隨戴的說法？鄒指戴耀廷讀出該句時有提到「積極」，但他就根據新東爭拗改為「會」。
+
+李運騰再要求展示新東協議文件，用字為「會積極運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求」，問「墨落」出現相似句子，是否只是巧合？鄒重申「墨落」用「會運用」是他在第二次新東協調會議的動議，因此「未必稱得上為巧合，而係嚟自我嘅經驗」。
+
+#### 鄒稱「墨落」聲明起源並非共識、簽署後是就「墨落」聲明形成共識
+
+辯方問，因此鄒家成是將一些並無達成共識的內容放進聲明？鄒說「我的確係想推銷聲明裡面第一點」，重申目的是聲明所列「為確保抗爭陣營參選人，有最基本的抗爭意志」。
+
+李運騰指但那會減低彈性，因戴耀廷曾稱加入「積極」是為保留彈性。鄒指戴無特別提「係唔係想保持彈性」，只提到意思是「可以否決、可以唔否決」。李指那正是彈性，鄒即說：「可以否決可以唔否決嘅話，咁我唔知寫嚟做乜嘢。」李運騰笑指他同意，並指因此鄒是想展示抗爭意志，望用最清楚的寫法，避免模棱兩可？鄒同意。
+
+鄒再同意，就運用否決權的第一點聲明會上有討論，但沒有達成共識，強調「墨落無悔」聲明起源並非來自共識，「當有人同意兩點聲明，佢簽署之後，我哋就會形成一個表面上嘅共識，就係有某一個數量嘅人同意呢兩點。」
+
+#### 鄒不同意「墨落無悔」向組織者施壓、重申無提倡無差別否決財案
+
+陳世傑問，而鄒是想將聲明通知組織者？李運騰亦問，鄒是想透過聲明的簽署人數，向組織者施壓？鄒不同意，並同意李運騰指聲明是面向公眾，無意向組織者施壓。不過鄒亦同意，之後曾將聲明及簽署人數發給組織者，陳問是想讓組織者知道情況？鄒說「呢個係之後嘅事」。
+
+就鄒早前供稱，會以五大訴求為「唯一優先標準」審視預算案，他今同意認為議員的責任是爭取五大訴求，而以五大訴求為審視預算案的基礎，亦是恰當履行議員職責。鄒亦指，他在「墨落」並無提倡無差別否決預算案，亦對簽署者沒有任何約束性。
+
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/rtPh4uq.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（7日）踏入審訊第100天。鄒家成繼續作供，表示與發起「墨落無悔」聲明的張可森和梁晃維均不相信「35+」，而初選意義是選出最多具抗爭意志代議士，「墨落」與「35+」無關，只是將參選人政治理念帶到選民面前，展示抗爭意志。鄒又提及，有三類人表面主張35+有可能，包括明知35+不可能但仍「販賣假希望」的「政棍」、覺得35+有可能的天真理想主義者、及覺得35+無可能，但有政治勇氣和承擔望讓全世界知道，無論如何努力「當權者係唔會畀民主派攞到35+」。
+
+鄒又表示，曾聽聞不少傳統泛民要求戴耀廷勿要大家簽文件，認為戴稱毋須簽文件是來自傳統泛民意思；而他直至收到審訊文件夾前無聽過「攬炒十步」，並理解「攬炒」為「側重於自我犧牲」的態度，從不是禁忌，反而很常見，「有權勢者打壓無權勢者，有反抗，就會形成『攬炒』」，而攬炒目的是拉近雙方政治勢力，為和談帶來可能。
+
+#### 鄒稱「墨落」並無以「35+」作為前提、遵守棄選機制不代表能取「35+」
+
+鄒家成續就「墨落無悔」聲明作供，他今早供稱發起聲明為展示抗爭意志，惟並無約束力。鄒下午被問及聲明與「35+」的關係，他同意「35+計劃」目的是取得立會過半，但「墨落無悔」並沒有以「35+」作為前提。法官陳仲衡指，但就聲明支持度不足須停止選舉工程的一點，與「35+計劃」很有關。鄒不同意有很大關係，指棄選機制概念的確來自「35+計劃」，但參選人遵守不代表會取得「35+」。
+
+鄒重申，「墨落」的主要目的是「為確保抗爭陣營參選人，有最基本的抗爭意志」，法官李運騰即質疑，棄選機制與「抗爭意志」無關。鄒承認兩者的確無直接關係，放在聲明是因認為這是初選的「基本邏輯」，以保障出線者勝出的機會。
+
+#### 鄒稱發起人俱不信「35+」、選出最多具抗爭意志代議士方為初選意義
+
+李運騰續指，留意到鄒將「35+計劃」和「初選」進行區分，鄒同意，並同意初選是「35+計劃」的一部分，而35+計劃「只係一個名嚟㗎啫」，「35+」代表議席的目標、亦是組織者想達到的目標，但這不是他的目標，並強調「個議席目標點樣決定，唔會影響到初選個意義」。
+
+大律師陳世傑續問，那初選是否用來達到「35+」的手段？鄒指「個人認為唔係」，指「選出最多具備抗爭意志嘅代議士，先係（初選）最大嘅意義」，同意其看法與組織者不同。
+
+#### 鄒稱聲明將參選人政治理念帶到選民前競爭、惟不知其他簽署者動機
+
+法官李運騰問及，因此無論「35+」或「35-」，對鄒家成來說也是沒有分別，他仍然會繼續發起「墨落無悔」？鄒回應，「基本上我哋三位發起人，都唔相信35+」，而正因他們對未來議會想像都是「35-」，在此前提下，他們認為選出最多具備抗爭意志的代議士才是比較「合情合理」和「實際可行」，並覺得要用一些方法向選民展現抗爭意志，「將參選人嘅政治理念，帶去選民面前競爭」。
+
+李運騰笑言，而結果是差不多所有人都有簽署聲明。鄒續指，「墨落」是初選競選時其中一個有爭拗的議題，「其他簽署人簽嘅動機係咩，我的確唔知」，「我哋三個做嘅嘢就係提供一個聲明畀大家去簽署，佢哋點樣用呢個聲明，我哋亦都唔知。」
+
+#### 鄒稱表面對35+積極有三類人 包括明知不可能仍「販賣假希望」
+
+鄒家成其後在法官追問下重申，以他對張可森和梁晃維的認識，他們3人均不相信「35+」。李運騰笑言，似乎有很多參與者均不相信35+，那鄒協調會上聽過人向戴耀廷稱35+是不可能、或說戴天真嗎？
+
+鄒說沒有，並主動表示認為對35+採取「比較積極」態度的人，主要分為三類，第一類是「明知35+冇可能，但佢不停去講35+，然之後講35+之後，好似民主會立即降臨咁樣」，鄒並指曾於傳單和街站形容該些人「販賣假希望」。
+
+而第二類人「可能真係覺得35+有可能嘅，帶住一絲嘅希望睇吓可唔可以搵到一個攞到35+嘅機會」，鄒認為他們「類似一種帶一點天真嘅理想主義者」，但當時沒有直接這樣說過。
+
+至於第三類人，鄒指是「有一啲嘅政治嘅勇氣或者政治嘅承擔」，認為他們「覺得35+係冇可能，但佢哋都會盡力去完成呢個任務，目的其實係想話畀全世界知道，無論我哋點樣努力都好，當權者都係唔會比我哋攞到35+」，亦即「撕破假象嘅表面」。鄒並指他是因應第一類人而有自己的主張。李運騰問，所以他將自己視為第三類人？鄒說：「我係第四類人」，即引來哄堂大笑，惟鄒欲再解釋時被法官打斷。
+
+#### 官追問時着鄒想清楚 鄒自言「諗得好清楚」、並稱「墨落」與「35+」無關
+
+法官陳慶偉要求鄒再想清楚共有多少類人，鄒笑言「其實數唔晒嘅」，因每個小區也可產生一類人，並指頭三類「表面上都會主張35+係有可能」，惟陳慶偉指不是，指頭一類人是認為35+不可能但「販賣假希望」，而「假希望」即是不真實的。鄒苦笑說：「我知、我知……我明呀，我啱啱所講嗰三類人……」
+
+惟陳慶偉打斷說：「聽着，想清楚」，鄒說：「我諗得好清楚㗎喇。」陳再說：「因為我不想你現在捏造（make up）證據」，鄒反問：「咁我而家，要點？」旁聽席傳來笑聲，陳遂要求鄒給出最後答案。大律師陳世傑一度問鄒有關第四類人，鄒微笑說「搞掂頭三類先啦」，重申表面上會看到他們主張35+，李運騰問即告訴人35+是可能？鄒說「exactly!」，並指上述純粹是他對他們內在想法的分析。
+
+陳慶偉其後說，鄒是指第一大組可分成三個小組，而他們都是相信35+是可能？鄒兩度重申只是「表面上」。陳追問，即他們是否相信35+是可能？鄒說：「不如我哋掉走個大組啦。」陳說：「聽着，我沒有建立大組，是你建立」，又指「我不想你亂說話和一時衝動（“... say something randomly and at the spur of the moment”）」，並嚴厲說「我再給你多一次機會」。
+
+鄒其後再次重複對3類人的看法，並形容首類人「係政棍嚟嘅呢類，我形容呢一類係政棍、販賣假希望嘅政棍」，至於第3類人，鄒重申雖然他們明知35+不可能，但目的是想讓香港人或世界知道，「無論我哋點努力都好，當權者係唔會畀民主派攞到35+。」鄒最後指，「墨落無悔」與35+沒有關係。
+
+#### 鄒認為戴耀廷記者會稱毋須簽文件 是來自傳統泛民主派意思
+
+辯方其後就約於6月17日後進行、由媒體「Spark」對「墨落無悔」3名發起人的訪問發問。被問到是哪家媒體，鄒指有些模糊，記得是由「張可森搵返嚟」、應是某大學的媒體，張向他和梁晃維稱記者想找他們「講一講『墨落無悔』」，和順便介紹自己和講述政治理念，而訪問中「我哋自說自話，事前冇夾過嘅」。
+
+辯方展示謄本，鄒家成在訪問被問為何發起「墨落無悔」聲明時，提及開會時一直指有共同綱領要大家簽署，但在無通知他們情況下就召開記招指不需要簽：「我哋第一個感覺就話我哋要簽返啲嘢喎，唔可以畀泛民主派單方面去撕毀約章……撕毀緊成個香港民族對於未來嘅想像。」鄒解釋是指戴耀廷稱會讓大家簽文件，其後又突然稱「唔畀簽」。
+
+法官陳仲衡關注，鄒提及不可讓「泛民」單方面撕毀約章，是不視自己為「泛民」一部分？鄒指此處「泛民」是指「傳統泛民主派」，並指6月9日戴耀廷開記者會前，曾聽聞不少傳統泛民主派約見戴耀廷，並要求戴勿要求大家簽文件，故認為戴記者會所說「其實係嚟自傳統泛民主派嘅意思」。
+
+#### 鄒稱部分傳統泛民包括岑子杰批評「墨落」是「夾人」
+
+陳世傑續引張可森訪問提及「如果佢哋係可以了解到呢個時代係需要啲咩，係回應到呢個時代要前進嘅方向嘅話，其實你唔會覺我哋係夾你嘅」，被問「夾」是什麼意思，鄒指張當時是回應就「墨落無悔」是「夾緊人」的批評，該些批評來自部分傳統泛民主派，他當時意識到或留意到的是社民連岑子杰。
+
+#### 鄒稱「攬炒」為自我犧牲態度、目的拉近雙方勢力為和談帶來可能
+
+張可森訪問亦提及「攬炒」，陳世傑問鄒對「攬炒」的理解，鄒指「『攬炒』對我嚟講係一種態度、一種側重於自我犧牲嘅態度」，並認為2020年初選要延續這種「攬炒」精神，有兩種具體表現，第一是他早前提及實踐議會內「寸土必爭」，第二是「不惜自我犧牲都要阻止惡法」，即「盡力喺議會裡面阻止」的態度。鄒並認為，上述兩種實踐均是在2020年立法會有機會被政權針對、DQ、追討薪金，而行政機關要付出的代價就是「受到制衡」和「推動唔到佢哋想推動嘅惡法」。
+
+鄒又指，「『攬炒』從來都唔係一個禁忌」，而且很常見，舉例勞工向資方提出一些改善工作環境的條件，如加薪或減低工作時數，並表明如資方不改善工作環境就會罷工，鄒認為罷工本身就是「攬炒」。鄒又指，「有權勢者打壓無權勢者，有反抗，就會形成『攬炒』」，並認為「攬炒」目的，就是「拉近雙方嘅政治勢力，為和談帶來可能」。
+
+#### 鄒稱無看過戴耀廷「攬炒十步」
+
+陳世傑問，鄒家成當時留意到戴耀廷提倡「攬炒十步」嗎？鄒說「我冇睇過」，亦不知道戴當時有關「攬炒」的主張。鄒並指，首次聽到「攬炒十步」是在收到審訊文件夾時，陳指是2021年，鄒稱不記得當時是否已收到文件夾。
+
+#### 官問張可森梁晃維訪問發言是否代表鄒 鄒：都可以呀
+
+法官陳慶偉其後要求播片，被問到為何發起「墨落無悔」，梁晃維提及如初選協議在如此鬆散情況下定下、無確切文件證明大家也同意，實在不能估算初選後各派人會否繼續堅持參與，甚至入議會後是否會履行當初對港人的承諾，而既然戴耀廷不希望令到多人被DQ，「咁就不如我哋作為有意參選人 take up 返嗰個責任。」
+
+張可森則表示，「墨落無悔」四字是他所寫，望港人或從政者意識到「我哋有啲嘢根本上係唔同咗」，現時不再是討論政治、妥協的藝術、或一開始說要「攬炒」但「回一回價」又不「攬炒」，現時討論的是「抗爭」，而抗爭是不妥協的藝術，「當你簽咗呢張嘢應承咗嘅時候，你絕對唔可以反悔。」
+
+片段播畢後法官陳仲衡問，因三人是一起發起「墨落」，張可森和梁晃維談及為何發起「墨落無悔」的部分，也是代表鄒所說？鄒答：「都可以呀。」陳慶偉亦指，留意到鄒在另外兩人說話時不時點頭，鄒說「我有留意到」。陳續問，那鄒是否不同意他們說法？抑或指他們只是在表達自己意見？鄒回應：「唔會唔同意佢哋嘅諗法。」
+
+#### 辯方稱主問大約到一半
+
+陳世傑最後問到，鄒訪問提及初選論壇「係唯一一個場地去同泛民主派一個交鋒」，問他為何這樣說，鄒稱因以往也沒試過有一個像初選論壇的平台「畀各門各派嘅人去交流」，而論壇可讓大家就不同政治理念交鋒，繼而尋找民主運動出路。陳仲衡指鄒訪問不是提到「交流」、而是「交鋒」，鄒認為「差唔多啫」，指在論壇語境就是「交鋒」。
+
+辯方表示，已完成就「墨落無悔」的盤問，並指現時大約已到主問一半。法官陳慶偉笑言只到一半？李運騰亦關注下一個議題。陳指會問及提名表格、Facebook 帖文、選舉論壇、WhatsApp 群組等，預計星期四或之前完成。
+
+案件明天續審，只於下午開庭。散庭時，鄒向親友說：「好鬼攰、真係好鬼攰。」
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-101.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-101.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a23c2acf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-08-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-101.md
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 101 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 《國安法》頒布後一度考慮退出初選 鄒家成哽咽稱「做唔出」、「無法離群眾而去」
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/sKnJYrG.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（8日）踏入審訊第101天。鄒家成繼續作供，表示《國安法》頒布後曾考慮退出初選，因當時與團隊研究條文，判斷參選人最多只因過往言論有機會被捕，而他過往對體制及政府批評較「尖銳」，「香港民族主義」亦可能被扭曲成分裂國家和港獨言論，加上條文「涵蓋範圍好廣、字眼好模糊、刑罰好重」，如「盲人摸象」。惟鄒指他終決定繼續參加初選，庭上哽咽稱：「我發覺我根本就做唔出退選嘅決定，我覺得我無法離群眾而去」。鄒續指，當時與團隊重新尋覓參選的意義，認為「繼續參選本身就係一個意義」，他亦商討如何調整競選工程以繼續參選，遂更改選舉口號和單張，將口號由「拒絕殖民 民族抗暴」改為「抗擊暴政 捍衛尊嚴」。
+
+此外，就提名表格條款「擁護《基本法》和保證效忠香港特區」，鄒指他效忠的是理應能產生憲法應有功能的《基本法》，及「會受憲法約束」和「保障市民大眾權利」的政府。
+
+#### 辯方引鄒家成3人向組織者發訊息 鄒稱由團隊成員草擬
+
+鄒家成今第3天作供，辯方展示初選組織者 WhatsApp 群組訊息，顯示趙家賢於6月19日曾轉發署名為「抗爭派立場聲明書」發起人鄒家成、張可森和梁晃維，上款為「致初選籌組平台」的訊息，鄒指由張可森負責發出，由鄒其中一名團隊成員幫手草擬，他負責批准。
+
+該訊息提及3人發起聲明已逾一星期，共收到39位以上參與者以個人或政黨名義簽署，意味除民主黨、街工及社民連等外大部分人已簽署。聲明續提及「初選原設共同綱領，有意以『運用包括否決財政預算案之基本法賦予的立法會權力，迫使特首回應五大訴求。』的素人以及政黨因此共同目標而集結，期望以初選方式讓香港選民選出合適的代表披甲上陣。若無此共同綱領，恐怕初選只會淪為議席的『分餅機』。」
+
+聲明又指，戴耀廷決定參與者毋須簽署共同綱領後，雖大部分參與者有簽署「墨落」重申堅定立場，但亦有原先出席協調會議的參與者明言杯葛初選。聲明又指協調會議的共識及「墨落無悔」亦包括認同若支持度不足須表明停止選舉工程，「這是否代表部分拒絕簽署聲明書的參選人可以無視我們早前的共識，甚至無視初選的結果？有見及此，希望初選主辦單位回應。」
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/j9zyyLI.png)
+▲ 前排左起：趙家賢、戴耀廷、區諾軒（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄒稱如無法展現抗爭意志「不如抽籤」、惟重申否決財案非協調共識
+
+鄒家成表示，當時着團隊成員按「墨落無悔」原文草擬一段訊息予初選籌組平台，告知他們有多少人已簽署，並就「墨落」的兩點聲明寫一些訊息，但無特別指明如何寫，「我由佢發揮然之後我再睇。」
+
+鄒續解釋訊息內容，指「墨落無悔」聲明運用否決權一點是想展現抗爭意志，「我哋認為如果無法向選民展現抗爭意志嘅話，呢個初選就失去一個意義，咁不如抽籤就算啦」，亦是上述恐怕初選只淪為議席「分餅機」的意思。
+
+不過法官李運騰關注，「初選原設共同綱領」一段似乎談及已達成共識的事項，鄒不同意，重申在新東並無就運用否決權達成共識；而「共同綱領」指協調會議上「原本傾過嘅嘢」，但不代表有達成共識。
+
+#### 鄒稱大黨不簽「墨落」令素人擔心參選無保障 望組織者提供保障
+
+至於杯葛初選，鄒指記得當時新西協調會議，有街工的人想杯葛初選。法官陳慶偉問是否因街工認為不能否決有利草根的預算案？鄒說「應該唔係」，指爭議應是街工「好似係想輸咗初選都繼續選官方選舉」。
+
+陳世傑續問，訊息是否想向組織者表達應有簽署的協議？鄒不同意，解釋是想發訊息予初選籌組平台，通知他們發起了「墨落」，而較關鍵信息是「墨落」的第二點（「認同若支持度跌出各預計可得議席範圍，須表明停止選舉工程」），因當時不少政治素人擔心，部分大黨不簽署甚至公開批評「墨落無悔」，到底是因為運用否決權一點、抑或是因為第二點，即他們初選落敗仍想繼續參加官方選舉。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/RUpiQQp.png)
+▲ 2020年6月19日，街工舉行記者會宣佈有意參選立法會，6月29日發佈聲明改為表示不會參選。（資料圖片）
+
+鄒指這些素人擔心參加初選「好似冇一個保障」，因此發訊息望平台能保障其他參加者。鄒並同意，他與張可森和梁晃維均是政治素人，也有相同擔憂，惟最終組織者並沒有回覆。
+
+#### 鄒稱簽署提名表格時無細心留意條款 理解目標為「攞35+」
+
+鄒家成確認，於6月20日提交初選提名表格。就表格第二段：「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」，鄒指理解是新東協調會議達成的共識，亦沒有將「民主派35+公民投票計劃」理解為一份文件。
+
+法官陳仲衡追問那他簽署時如何理解，鄒笑指「其實我當時冇細心睇呢句句子，我諗住簽個名就參加初選」，又指「我有留意到有呢句嘢喺度嘅，但我冇細緻去逐粒字睇呢一句」。鄒後在法官追問下指，理解「目標」為「攞35+」。
+
+#### 官問提名表格是否對鄒家成回應 鄒稱無將擔憂與提名表格「聯想埋一齊」
+
+法官李運騰續提到，鄒家成3人此前發訊息要求組織者保障政治素人的利益，擔心傳統政黨參選人食言、初選落敗仍參加正式選舉，而提名表格第二段，字面上似乎就是回應此關注，問鄒為何不要求組織者澄清該點的意思。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/31U5jsX.png)
+▲ 左起：張可森、鄒家成、梁晃維（資料圖片）
+
+鄒先回應嚴格而言，他們「冇要求佢哋要做一啲嘢去保障我哋，其實只係問吓佢哋，其他人係咪真係想反悔呀咁樣嘅啫」，又指「當時真係冇諗過」問組織者，因覺得部分傳統泛民主派食言「其實都係佢哋嘅事，初選籌組平台其實都好難控制佢哋嘅」，訊息「純粹係表達擔憂嘅啫」。陳仲衡指，但訊息提到望組織者回應，鄒同意，「但係佢哋最後冇回應。」
+
+法官陳慶偉指，鄒稱組織者沒有回應，但提名表格第二段可能就是組織者的回應，再問鄒有否問組織者究竟談及什麼「共識」？又指區諾軒提過，如有人問他「目標」的意思，他會指是「共同綱領」文件，並問鄒是否明白。鄒回應：「盡力去理解啦，我理解阿陳慶偉法官你啱啱講嘅嘢，只不過係有人問初選平台嘅人，佢哋就會答啦」，但鄒表示：「我冇將當時關於 WhatsApp 入面個擔憂，同呢個 nomination form 聯想埋一齊， 我的確冇呢個聯想。」
+
+鄒又指，即使當時有這個「小擔憂」，即其他參選人落敗或仍繼續參加官方選舉，「其實我都係會繼續參加個初選㗎喇」，而即使他們真的這樣做，「已經係初選完結咗之後嘅事喇，既然係咁，不如到時再算啦」，只是6月中時他覺得要向組織者表達此擔憂。
+
+#### 鄒稱效忠理應產生功能的《基本法》、會受憲法約束及保障權利的政府
+
+至於提名表格第6點「我特此聲明，我會擁護《基本法》和保證效忠香港特別行政區」，被問為何認同該點，鄒指《基本法》是香港的憲法，「憲法理應產生嘅功能係約束當權者嘅權力，同埋保障市民大眾嘅權利」，而他認為立法會議員所奉行的精神，與《基本法》理應要產生的功能是吻合，「我效忠嘅係會受憲法約束，同埋會保障市民大眾權利嘅政府。」
+
+李運騰問，鄒有否區分《基本法》應該的說法，和實際上的說法（“... what the Basic Law should say or what the Basic Law in fact says”）？鄒指有。李再問，故鄒說擁護《基本法》，是擁護哪種《基本法》？鄒回答：「我覺得《基本法》喺香港嘅實踐係未如理想嘅。」惟陳仲衡即打斷，指問題並非《基本法》的實踐，又嚴厲指：「不要嘗試迴避問題，面對問題並回答，你有足夠的經驗知道你是否在回答我們的問題。（“You are experienced enough to know whether you are answering our question.”）」
+
+鄒續回答：「我效忠一本，理應能夠產生憲法理應產生功能嘅《基本法》。擁護又好，效忠又好，我覺得係一個好私人嘅情感，同一個人嘅信仰係有密切嘅關係，你要強化一個信仰……」，惟陳慶偉打斷，指認為已聽夠了，指簡言之鄒是擁護他所相信的《基本法》。
+
+#### 鄒稱參選宣言無意圖顛覆政權 官稱帖文不證自明
+
+辯方續就鄒家成 Facebook 帖文發問。就6月21日的〈繼承民族意志，掀起反殖浪潮——立法會新界東初選參選宣言〉，鄒解釋主要宣布會參加初選和交代政治理念。陳世傑問他想傳遞什麼訊息，惟法官陳慶偉指不認為需要問（go through that），認為帖文內容不證自明（self-explanatory）。
+
+陳世傑續問及「生於九七主權移交之年，自我有記憶以來，就只係不斷見證住香港嘅沉淪同赤化」中「沉淪同赤化」的意思，鄒向法官表示：「法官閣下，我知道你哋未必想我好詳細咁樣解釋呢個參選宣言，我用一個好簡短嘅方式快快趣趣講咗佢好冇呀」，被告席傳來笑聲。
+
+陳慶偉笑說他完全明白鄒的聲明，只是辯方大狀問及字詞意思，並指除非字詞是模糊，否則會按字面理解，又指基本上「赤化」就是指「一國一制」、「香港成為中國的一部分」、「香港受共產黨管治」，指「我們全都知道那是什麼意思」。
+
+陳世傑續問，那鄒在帖文中的用字，有沒有意圖顛覆香港或中國政府？鄒說：「不論係呢度用嘅赤化又好、殖民又好，撕破畫皮都好，都沒有呢個意圖。」
+
+辯方續展示6月25日帖文〈我只係一個普通香港人〉，指鄒昨提及「攬炒」的意思，並問帖文「同殖民者設計嘅議會制度攬炒到底」一句中，「攬炒到底」的意思與鄒昨提到的有否分別？鄒說「冇分別，『攬炒』同我主張嘅議會抗爭，同剛才嗰篇嘅參選宣言入面嘅『撕破畫皮』，同埋『衝擊體制』一樣意思」。
+
+#### 鄒稱《國安法》頒布後曾考慮退出初選 指字眼模糊刑罰重如「盲人摸象」
+
+辯方其後展示「35+計劃新東信息發布區」群組紀錄，顯示由6月24日設立，鄒家成同日加入，但於7月2日退出。被問為何退出，鄒指「因為《國安法》頒布之後，我諗過退出初選」，並指基本上是6月30日《國安法》頒布後已「諗緊呢件事」。
+
+陳世傑續問鄒做了什麼，鄒說「交代少少個背景啦，可能有少少長」，陳問：「可以簡短嗎？」，庭上傳出笑聲，鄒說「盡力」。鄒續說，6月30日晚擺完最後一個街站後，他返回辦公室，與選舉團隊一起等待《國安法》條文，至晚上11時他們已立即看條文，「我哋研究過《國安法》條例，當時嘅判斷係，參選人最多只係因為過往嘅言論而有機會被捕。」陳世傑指這是鄒的恐懼，陳慶偉說或是鄒的印象，鄒說「可以咁講」。
+
+鄒續指，他其後與團隊研究過往發表的言論，覺得過往對於體制和政府的批評都「比較尖銳」，加上當時認為「香港民族主義」有機會被扭曲成「分裂國家」和「港獨」的言論，亦因覺得《國安法》「涵蓋範圍好廣、字眼好模糊、刑罰好重，情況如同盲人摸象」，「所以睇完之後，我一度考慮緊係咪要退出初選。」
+
+#### 鄒稱發現根本做不出退選決定 「我覺得我無法離群眾而去」
+
+陳世傑問那他決定是？鄒家成說：「繼續參加初選。咁中間發生嘅嘢我唔詳細去講，主要就係處理完情緒之後，恢復咗思緒……」，說罷微微低頭沒有作聲。陳說：「你選擇繼續（“You decided to press on.”）」，鄒停頓一兩秒後抬頭，略哽咽說「係」，並清了兩下喉嚨。陳續問，而鄒7月2日退出群組時，仍在考慮是否繼續初選？鄒再略哽咽說：「當時考慮緊」，身旁的法庭傳譯主任遞上紙巾，鄒輕輕擦拭眼和鼻。
+
+辯方續展示7月5日〈對不起，我回來了〉，問是什麼帖文，鄒續哽咽說：「簡單嚟講，我喺考慮緊初選嘅時候，我發覺我根本就做唔出退選嘅決定，我覺得我無法離群眾而去」。鄒續說：「總之有一晚我就打電話比我團隊嘅成員，我就同佢講，不如繼續，咁佢就話『全部人都ready，爭你一個』，咁我就同佢講，咁你幫我 call 齊人，第二日開會，我今晚返屋企準備一下」，鄒說時聲線持續微微顫抖。
+
+#### 鄒稱認為繼續參選本身就是意義 《國安法》後改用較溫和口號
+
+鄒續說，團隊其後開會，主要談及兩件事，他欲談及第一件事時，陳慶偉打斷稱不認為需深究，總之最後鄒決定繼續參選。陳世傑問，但鄒有否做什麼改善在《國安法》下的處境？鄒聲音開始平復：「我下一句就準備講喇，我哋重新尋覓繼續參選嘅意義啦，我哋認為繼續參選本身就係一個意義」，而第二項討論就是「如何調整個競選工程，繼續參選」，他們遂更改了選舉口號和調整一些選舉單張。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/8zNxgka.png)
+▲ 鄒家成（資料圖片）
+
+鄒遂確認，他將口號由「拒絕殖民 民族抗暴」改為「抗擊暴政 捍衛尊嚴」，解釋想盡量避免用一些可能會被認為「好尖銳」、或「可能會被扭曲成會違反《國安法》」的字眼。陳世傑問是用較溫和（softer）的字眼？鄒說「係」。
+
+陳慶偉說，認為「抗擊暴政」和「民族抗暴」意思大致一樣（more or less the same），但理解鄒是想要令口號變得更溫和（tone down），並問鄒何時決定改口號。鄒說7月5日〈對不起，我回來了〉的文章，可理解為「我正式決定繼續參選嘅一個時間點」，他亦是在當時更改口號。
+
+辯方其後就該帖文發文，呈堂文件呈黑白，左上角寫有「Telegram」，法官李運騰一度稱該帖文在 Telegram 發布。鄒指左上角的「Telegram」字眼只代表「我開緊 Facebook 前一個 app，我用緊 Telegram」，而「眼前見到呢個 page 其實係 Facebook嚟嘅」。法官陳慶偉其後下令休庭，明續就該帖文發問。
+
+鄒家成步入被告欄前，向旁聽親友說：「好渣呀真係！」，又笑說：「Sorry, unexpected.」，親友發笑。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-102.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-102.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5fef1735
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-09-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-102.md
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 102 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 鄒家成稱倡「香港民族」並非港獨 指一國兩制下港人理應享自主權
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/FUwsVuj.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（9日）踏入審訊第102天。鄒家成繼續作供，就初選論壇提到「對抗中華民族嘅入侵」，鄒指民族是建基於文化、價值等形成的共同體，「中華民族」與「香港民族」有別，是合理化損害港人利益和干預港人自主權的宣傳工具，他宣揚「香港民族主義」旨在高舉族群利益。法官質疑鄒稱無推動港獨，但又提自主是有矛盾，鄒不同意，指港人在《中英聯合聲明》下除國防、外交，理應享有一系列自主權，惟在無落實雙普選下，一國兩制無真正落實過。鄒早前稱「香港民族」與港獨不同，法官李運騰今指鄒是否實際上推動港獨或屬爭議點之一，法官陳慶偉亦指明白兩者分別，但不代表不會考慮，鄒為了建立香港民族理念是意圖顛覆國家政權。
+
+另就論壇提到議員應入議會「打交」，鄒指意指「自衛」，從無想過開會期間「主動冚佢（建制派）一巴」，「呢個太痴線喇」；至於用任何手段癱瘓每個會議，他只是望盡力阻止「惡法」通過，承認「誇張咗」。鄒又同意帖文故意以簡體字陳述「国安法」是表達反對，但無想過違法。
+
+#### 鄒稱《國安法》後調整選舉文宣 刪「香港民族」、「殖民」字眼
+
+鄒家成今第4日作供，鄒昨提及《國安法》頒布後曾考慮退出初選，但哽咽稱：「我發覺我根本就做唔出退選嘅決定，我覺得我無法離群眾而去。」鄒今甫開庭向代表大律師陳世傑表示：「唔好意思陳大狀，我琴日表現有啲失禮」，陳笑着叫他向法庭道歉，法官陳仲衡笑說記不起鄒有什麼失禮，陳慶偉亦笑說要喚醒記憶。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/kEbKzmg.png)
+▲ 代表鄒家成的大律師 陳世傑
+
+辯方續引鄒2020年7月5日發布的帖文〈對不起，我回來了〉，提及「如果我繼續原本嗰套主張，唔單止我，我嘅團隊成員，幫手派 leaflet 嘅義工，同埋幫我貼海報嘅黃店都一定會出事」。
+
+鄒指當時擔憂過往發表的言論會否有機會違反《國安法》，亦憂如果繼續參選，「被捕嘅未必只係我自己，而係我嘅團隊成員、我嘅義工等等，都可能受到牽連」，故當時除了調整選舉文宣、嘗試避免違反《國安法》，亦安排團隊成員聯絡義工表示：「如果你感到恐懼嘅話你就退出，我哋唔會介意嘅。」
+
+#### 鄒稱「過去宣揚過係一個事實」 但在肅殺環境下港人會知道為何調整
+
+法官李運騰續指，鄒提到「如果我繼續原本嗰套主張」，是提出假設、抑或實際放棄某些主張？鄒指是後者，並重申如他繼續派原有文宣「全部都有機會被捕」。李追問那除了口號，實質內容（substance）有否改變？鄒指有，指整套選舉文宣口號有更改，所有旗幟、易拉架、傳單亦全部重新印過，主要減少用一些對體制批評較尖銳的字眼，亦無再談及「香港民族」或「殖民」。
+
+法官陳仲衡續指，但帖文最後提及「但相信我嘅理念喺過去已經表達得清清楚楚，亦都希望各位香港人會理解」，指鄒不是說會改變政綱，而是過去已表達清楚。鄒同意，表示「即係過咗去嘅嘢我都捉唔返㗎啦，過去宣揚過係一個事實，我改咗啲文宣係一個事實」，而「喺一個咁肅殺嘅環境底下，其實香港人會知道點解參選人會做呢啲調整」。
+
+#### 鄒稱帖文故意用簡體字「国安法」 指表達反對「但冇諗過違反《國安法》」
+
+李運騰續指，理解鄒指推動「香港民族」不代表推動「香港獨立」，若這一直是其理念，為何帖文不解釋清楚他不是推動香港獨立。鄒解釋，因認為「香港民族主義」會被理解為分裂國家或港獨言論是來自部分人的「誤解」，而他於選舉如此提出主要是想「高舉族群利益」；而他與團隊當時思考繼續參選的意義，「我哋覺得係堅持埋最後呢十日左右嘅選舉嘅日子已經足夠喇，所以喺啲政治理念上面我哋唔想再解釋太多、講太多。」
+
+李運騰續指，留意到帖文全部用繁體字，只有在提及「国安法」時才用簡體字，問是否故意（deliberate），鄒答「係」，解釋因《國安法》經「附件三」立法，並非經立法會立法。惟李運騰質疑《基本法》也沒有經立法會立法，鄒停頓了一下續回應：「我唔鍾意用返繁體字去講《國安法》」。
+
+鄒在法官陳仲衡追問下，同意提及「国安法」可理解為抗議的標誌（sign），並指「我的確反對《國安法》」，當時其中一個繼續參選的意義亦是「表達一種反對《國安法》嘅聲音，但冇諗過違反《國安法》」。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/PS8M8K9.png)
+▲ 鄒家成（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄒稱「中華民族」是合理化損害港人利益宣傳工具、香港民族與中華民族不同
+
+辯方續就6月28日的新東初選論壇發問，就鄒提及「我諗我今次參選嘅目的非常之旗幟鮮明，我就係要宣揚香港民族主義，因為要建立一個民族出嚟，我哋先能夠對抗到中華民族嘅入侵」，陳仲衡問「中華民族嘅入侵」是否指中國共產黨，鄒否認，指「中華民族對我嚟講，係一個用嚟合理化損害港人利益、干預港人自主權嘅宣傳工具」，又指「我認為喺殖民統治之下，背後操控嘅人，正正就係擁抱中華民族思想嘅人，而呢種殖民嘅統治方式係會弱化一個民族嘅根基，所以我就喺選舉入面宣揚香港民族嘅理念」。
+
+李運騰指他概念上有困難，問鄒是否認為「香港民族」作為一個族群（ethnic group），與「中華民族」是不同，鄒說：「我認為係嘅，因為一個民族係建基於語言、文化、價值、歷史、命運而形成嘅共同體，香港人喺歷史上面對於價值嘅追求……」，惟陳慶偉打斷，指不認為需要深究（“I don’t think we have to go into all these.”）。
+
+#### 鄒稱港人理應享自主權 除非落實雙普選 否則一國兩制無真正落實
+
+李運騰續指，鄒一方面說並非推動港獨，但一方面又提到「自主權」，是否有矛盾（inconsistency）？鄒不同意，表示認為在《中英聯合聲明》和一國兩制下，「除咗國防同外交之外，香港人理應係享有一系列嘅自主權」，法庭傳譯一度未能譯出《中英聯合聲明》，被告欄的林卓廷即說：「Sino British Joint Declaration 呀！」
+
+鄒續指，認為中國與香港之間的關係，基礎是建基於《中英聯合聲明》，而一國兩制是源於兩地族群的利益和所擁抱的價值均不同，因此認為「除非落實雙普選，否則一國兩制都冇真正落實過」。
+
+#### 官稱明白香港民族與港獨分別 但不代表不會考慮建香港民族概念屬意圖顛覆政權
+
+李運騰指鄒可能是對、可能是錯，法庭毋須判斷，但鄒同意《中英聯合聲明》只是由英國和中國政府決定，而非香港人決定嗎？鄒說「呢個亦都係好多香港人耿耿於懷嘅地方」，李運騰即打斷指可以問下一議題，並指被告到底是否實際上推動香港獨立，或是一個當前爭議的問題（live issue），問辯方是否需澄清。陳世傑續問鄒，香港獨立和自主權概念的分別。
+
+不過陳慶偉打斷指認為已聽夠了，指辯方只是問同一問題，鄒家成亦只會重複答案，並指鄒已表示他不是提倡香港獨立、或香港應成為獨立的主權國（sovereign），只是認為一國兩制無按《中英聯合聲明》完全落實、香港無被給予完整的自主權；不過陳慶偉亦指，李運騰說法或許也有道理，因本案是控告被告意圖顛覆國家政權。
+
+李運騰續補充，一如既往，無論控方或辯方證人的說法也不一定能當成真實（taken as face value）。而鄒早前稱「香港民族」與港獨「唔一樣」，陳慶偉指他們明白「香港獨立」和「香港民族」的分別，但與此同時，這不代表他們不會考慮，鄒為了建立香港民族理念，是意圖顛覆國家政權（“We are not saying that we would not take into the evidence that in order to build up the Hong Kong Ethnic idea, that he was intending to subvert the state power.”），指這是兩回事。陳世傑最後再問，鄒有否意圖提倡香港獨立，惟陳慶偉指鄒已答過他從無此意圖。
+
+#### 稱擁護《基本法》同時指屬「殖民工具」 鄒：如忽略現實考慮 信仰只淪為「自我麻醉」
+
+鄒昨供稱擁護《基本法》，惟法官李運騰指，鄒論壇亦提及「一國兩制、基本法、立法會通通都係精心設計嘅殖民工具」，與其說法如何一致。鄒說「呢個有啲複雜嘅，等我用好簡單嘅方式講解吓」，續指擁護或效忠是從「信仰」的角度去看，「信仰能否強化，必須結合現實嘅考慮，如果忽略現實嘅考慮，你嘅信仰只會淪為一種自我麻醉」。
+
+鄒續指，人大釋法和不落實雙普選，是令一國兩制、基本法和立法會被視為殖民工具的「條件」，他反對這些條件，並認為要落實雙普選，一國兩制、基本法和立法會「先至能夠產生佢哋本身應該產生嘅功能」，又指「當我哋見到佢落實得唔完美嘅地方，再受到我哋信仰嘅驅使，我哋先會調整我哋當下嘅決定，令到自己嘅信仰得以實踐」。
+
+#### 官問是否支持想像中《基本法》 鄒：支持本身應該要產生嘅功能
+
+李運騰問，即鄒支持一個不存在的、或只存在於其想像中的《基本法》（exists only in your imagination）？鄒回應：「我係支持佢本身應該要產生嘅功能。」陳慶偉說，或許不是想像，而是鄒的解讀（interpretation），並舉例不同人對聖經也有不同解讀。
+
+陳世傑續指，鄒論壇提及立法會仍是港人「覺得要維護嘅一個制度」，李運騰問，即鄒對立法會功能和工作有自己看法，並認為當時立法會無行使其正當功能？鄒表示，議會理應產生的功能是「普世」的，就是「制衡行政機關」，但他之所以說是殖民工具，「係因為佢嘅制度並不民主，行政機關亦都會用一啲唔公義嘅手段去阻止人參選」，並依賴立法會「去落實好多損害香港人利益同意願嘅政策、法案、議案」。
+
+#### 論壇稱「不再讓泛民繼續主導話語權」 鄒指2020年世代更替下望改變立法會格局
+
+法官陳仲衡關注，鄒提到想以議會制衡，但論壇亦提及「更加重要就係唔可以再畀泛民主派繼續主導呢個香港嘅話語權」。鄒解釋，話語權是透過立法會原本的「反抗格局」而形成，如立法會只有泛民主派一把聲音，「市民大眾就會接收到啲乜嘢嘅聲音。」
+
+鄒並指，當時是針對議會內議政內容的數量及質素，指如只是審視一些「鎂光燈」下的議案和法案，再加上提出的私人草案或修正案不足，「話語內容就會變得單調乏味」，故他一直望選出最多抗爭意志的代議士，就是「希望透過改變原本立法會入面嘅反抗格局，從而產生一股更加強大制衡行政機關嘅力量」。
+
+李運騰指，即鄒認為傳統泛民主派做得不好，想有人取代他們？鄒答「有好有唔好」，並指「我認為當時時代嘅改變，市民大眾要求立法會議員做得更多……」李打斷指，簡言之當時泛民並非代表主流聲音，鄒不同意，指正因覺得他們「代表緊好多市民嘅聲音」，才說他們主導香港的話語權。
+
+李追問，但若大部分人支持傳統泛民，有什麼問題？鄒指：「2020年就出現緊呢個巨變」，簡單而言「係世代更替，經歷緊、演變緊、進化緊」。陳仲衡問，而鄒認為應由像他的人取代傳統泛民？鄒說：「我當然唔能夠取代，但我希望我係其中一把可以改變嘅聲音」，認為泛民「可以做得更好」，採取更主動的做法。
+
+#### 鄒稱2020年DQ性質由阻港獨聲音、改為阻民主派取35+
+
+至於鄒論壇提到：「我諗DQ喺2016年嚟講，嗰條實嘅紅線就係香港獨立吖嘛，而家政權就係阻止緊香港獨立嘅聲音去進入呢個議會。但係到今日2020年，呢一個DQ，已經唔再係阻止異見嘅聲音，佢係阻止緊香港人奪權。」
+
+鄒解釋，「奪權」是指「奪取議會控制權」，而據2016年選舉經驗，DQ紅線是主張「香港獨立」的參選人，但2020年DQ性質已改為「要阻止民主派攞35+」、所有參選人都可能會被DQ，「因為有DQ嘅存在，我哋唔會攞到35+㗎喇。」
+
+#### 論壇稱入議會「打交」 鄒指意指「自衛」
+
+除了組織者籌辦的初選論壇，鄒家成稱於7月初亦出席了由將軍澳居民舉辦的新東初選民間論壇。鄒的 Facebook 於7月7日發布該論壇片段節錄，提及鄒被問到「有冇做開運動？入到議會會唔會打交？入到去最想揪低邊個？」。
+
+鄒並於論壇回答：「如果你話喺入面揀一個對手去揪低佢呢，咁我諗，所有嘅親中派，每一個都應該我要砌低佢嘅」，又指「入去會唔會打交，呢一個唔單止係我鄒家成要做嘅事，係每一個今日參選嘅代議士都應該要做嘅事」，而就算有無《國安法》和以言入罪，每個代議士都應有心理準備「用任何手段，癱瘓每一個議會嘅進行」。
+
+鄒表示，「打交」是網民提問的用字，他的意思是「自衛」，當時腦海浮現陳志全被工聯會（郭偉強）使用暴力的畫面。李運騰指提問者顯然不是指「自衛」，鄒是迴避問題、不想得罪提問者？鄒指當時論壇講求「快問快答」，「真係冇咁多考慮」，而「打交」亦非他入議會的目的。
+
+鄒又指，帖文並非由他發布、是由團隊成員幫手，因該論壇「應該唔係咁多人睇」，他們想幫他「宣揚得遠少少」，印象中團隊發文前沒告知他，他翌日才知道。鄒又指，7月前所有 Facebook 帖文均由他或團隊另外一兩人幫手執筆，他全部知道亦同意，但7月起競選活動越來越多，故他很少處理 Facebook，當時亦無認為應移除帖文。
+
+#### 論壇稱「砌低」每個親中派 鄒指望多方面取勝
+
+至於鄒稱要「砌低」每一個親中派，鄒解釋在議會辯論上、甚至長遠而言，「我希望佢哋喺場選舉會輸，即係多方面都希望可以贏佢哋。」被問是否指肢體暴力，鄒說：「如果受到襲擊，咁當然都包括埋啦，但我真係從來冇諗過要開開吓會，去主動冚佢（建制派）一巴咁……呢個太痴線喇」，有被告和旁聽人士輕輕發笑。
+
+#### 論壇提「癱瘓每一個會議」 鄒稱望盡力阻惡法通過、認「誇張咗」
+
+至於「用任何手段，癱瘓每一個議會嘅進行」，鄒指是口誤，應是「每一個會議」，並笑言「『癱瘓』呢度個意思係阻止個會議進行啫，呢度的確係誇張咗」，又指要「癱瘓」會議是「因為惡法嚟緊」，但不是指《國安法》，而是議會內政府想推動的「惡法」。
+
+李運騰指，但鄒是提到「每一個會議」，意思是政府提出的所有議案也是惡法（evil）？鄒指整句意思是對其他參選人表達一個「期望」，即就算有《國安法》，入到立法會也要盡力阻止惡法通過，又望他們有心理準備、做心理建設，每個會議也有機會面對這種情況。鄒並重申提及「任何手段」和「癱瘓」，「係真係誇張咗」，「只係想表達大家要盡力去做。」
+
+惟法官陳慶偉指，鄒家成此前稱立法會是應除去的殖民工具，認為鄒並沒有誇張，實是與其證供符合。鄒回應，「除去殖民工具」是指「反對立法會被視為殖民工具的條件」，主要指不民主的制度和不公義的政治操作；至於阻止惡法「係喺呢一個體制之下會做嘅事情」，兩者有分別。陳仲衡亦指，鄒回答時無提及「惡法」，鄒同意，但指當時面對「入去會唔會打交」的問題時，已預設了是因推動惡法而出現「打交」的混亂場合。
+
+陳世傑續表示，就論壇發問完畢，會問及抗爭派記者會，但關注「共謀者原則」的應用，望再審視相關內容。陳世傑申押至明日續審獲法官批准，並預計明天會完成主問。
+
+散庭時，鄒家成向步出被告欄的施德來說：「好攰呀！」，並向前彎身。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-103.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-103.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b77d0bfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-10-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-103.md
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 103 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 鄒家成：「五大訴求，缺一不可」精神是鍥而不捨爭取、非求一步登天
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/9PSRQLV.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（10日）踏入審訊第103天。鄒家成繼續作供，表示受邀出席抗爭派記者會，理解「冇一個確切嘅人去組織」，而會上除讀出的立場聲明外並無共同發言。就岑敖暉會上指若「暴政當道、魔警橫行」，相信不論內容也會否決預算案，鄒認為岑並非主張無差別否決，因岑曾向他提過「唔通政府掟幾千萬查警暴我都投反對票？」，鄒亦認為只要政府於預算案有回應五大訴求已足夠。法官陳慶偉指，但「五大訴求」口號是「缺一不可」而非「一個即可」，鄒回應「五大訴求，缺一不可」的精神不是要求「一步登天」，而是即使政府回應一個或兩個訴求後，仍鍥而不捨繼續爭取。
+
+鄒今完成主問，續接受控方盤問，表示雖認為35+不可能，但無於初選論壇表明，是因論壇始終由一班「相信35+有可能」的人舉辦，故想「禮貌少少」，「費事搞禍人哋個場」。而就《國安法》後帖文稱「有啲嘢我唔可以繼續講」、但相信過去理念已表達清楚，鄒同意當時仍擁抱過去表達過的理念，無論《國安法》有否落實，其理念也一樣。
+
+#### 鄒稱受邀出席抗爭派記者會、標準為非傳統泛民初選勝出者
+
+鄒家成第5日作供，辯方就2020年7月15日抗爭派記者會發問。鄒同意，本土抗爭派於初選有很好的成績，召開記招是為了多謝選民，並向泛民主派「伸出橄欖枝」。法官陳仲衡問記招由誰發起，鄒認為「冇一個確切嘅人去組織」，而他是前一日受邀出席，印象中是張崑陽、岑敖暉、黃之鋒其中一個，「但我真係唔肯定係邊個。」
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/asM8jKk.png)
+▲ 2020年7月15日 抗爭派記者會（資料圖片）
+
+鄒指邀請他的人有提及出席人士的標準，他理解是「非傳統泛民嘅初選勝出者」，而該人無特別講為何想開記招，鄒亦覺得，選舉完結後開記招向民眾宣布一些訊息「係好正常嘅事」。法官陳慶偉提及陳志全無被邀請（陳早前稱獲朱凱廸邀請但拒絕），因他不是傳統泛民，鄒指他不知道陳有否被邀請，但「我自己唔會將佢咁樣分類」。
+
+#### 鄒稱除抗爭派聲明外無共同發言、會上發言僅代表發言者自己
+
+鄒續指，於同月14日約好時間、地點，並於翌日早上約10時到達記招場地學聯會址，指有關記招事宜「全部都係嗰日朝早先至一齊傾」，他們首先討論當日發布、後於會上讀出的「抗爭派立法會參選人立場聲明」。陳仲衡問誰帶領討論？鄒說「其實冇㗎，大家有意見就講出嚟」，而他們當時使用「Google Doc」，「有幾個人一齊打（字）緊」，認為每個出席者均看過該篇聲明，「大家都同意咗。」
+
+大律師陳世傑問，那除了該聲明，記者會上還有否任何共同發言（joint announcement or statement）？鄒指「除咗呢個聲明冇喇」。鄒並指，記招前有討論如何處理記者提問，「除咗指名道姓之外，其他問題呢就大家想答就自己答⋯⋯如果自己想補充，就自己攞支咪去講。」陳世傑問，會上回應是代表在場所有人抑或發言者自己？鄒說：「佢自己。」
+
+#### 鄒同意王百羽、梁晃維就否決財案及攬炒議會等發言
+
+鄒家成續就其他人發言回應，法官陳仲衡問到王百羽提及：「我哋嗰個最大公因數就一定係講緊堅決反對財政預算案，如果五大訴求無落實嘅話，依個係我哋共同嘅諗法」，是代表所有人發言？鄒說：「其他人我唔知，我自己個立場一直都係話，如果財政預算案我見唔到關於五大訴求嘅內容，我個人都係會投反對票」，指他同意王的說法。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/3A1obQr.png)
+▲ 王百羽（資料圖片）
+
+至於梁晃維強調一旦進入立法會，「無論我哋係對政府嘅提案定係財政預算案去投下反對票，呢一個都係我哋作為代議士嘅一個合法權利...我哋亦都繼續提倡議會攬炒嘅路線，係逼使政府係向人民低頭」，鄒表示「我同意呀」，其後在盤問下稱與梁從無就「攬炒」有任何討論，故不完全知道梁當時意思。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/gnqNxtq.png)
+▲ 梁晃維（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄒不同意岑敖暉主張無差別否決、指岑曾反問「唔通政府掟幾千萬查警暴」也反對
+
+而被問會否否決預算案迫政府回應五大訴求，岑敖暉回答如能進入議會，「我哋係會好堅定行使基本法賦予畀代議士嘅權力，所以答案係：是嘅。」鄒指不同意岑這句話，認為他「答得唔係好清楚」，不過指岑其後被追問「即係無論嗰個財政預算案嘅內容係咩嘢都會否決？」時，有提到「唔係㗎」，並重新再答：「如果香港係已經落實咗五大訴求，如果係有真普選嘅話，我相信我哋係會有磋商嘅空間；但係如果仍然今日係暴政當道、魔警橫行嘅話，我相信我哋係無論咩嘢內容都係會否決呢一個財政預算案嘅。」
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/JQsSrgy.png)
+▲ 岑敖暉（資料圖片）
+
+鄒表示，認為岑不是談及「無差別」否決財案，而他同意岑此說法。惟陳慶偉指岑雖無用「無差別」一詞，但提及「無論咩嘢內容都係會否決」，實際上傳達了該訊息。鄒不同意，認為岑當時提到「暴政當道、魔警橫行」是指政府不回應五大訴求的表現，如政府有回應五大訴求，這些情況應不會出現，而如果繼續出現，則代表政府無回應五大訴求。
+
+#### 鄒指認為政府有回應五大訴求已足夠、非一定全落實才不反對
+
+法官李運騰追問，岑敖暉是指否決預算案的決定性因素（determining factor），是五大訴求有否「落實」？鄒同意，但補充就他而言「我覺得係『回應』已經夠」，「唔一定要五個（訴求）齊晒之後先⋯⋯」李運騰打斷，質疑岑要求五大訴求「落實」、但鄒只是要求「回應」，二人立場是否不同？鄒指「可能因為我識佢」，故認為岑用「落實」一字「唔係話一定要晒五大訴求先會再同政府傾」，並在李追問下稱不同意岑說法。
+
+李運騰笑指，鄒早前稱同意，現在又說不同意。鄒重申，理解岑敖暉該句表達如政府無回應五大訴求，即「暴政當道、魔警橫行」繼續持續的情況下，「budget 入面都唔會見到關於五大訴求嘅內容，咁就投反對票喇」。而他記招前無與岑就預算案有任何討論，但記招後岑曾向他提及：「唔通政府掟幾千萬查警暴我都投反對票？」，令他知道岑並非主張無差別否決財政預算案。
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/kovbYoR.png)
+▲ 鄒家成（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄒稱五大訴求非一步登天、為鍥而不捨繼續爭取精神
+
+陳慶偉即指，「五大訴求」的口號並非只有「五大訴求」，是「五大訴求，缺一不可」，而非「五大訴求，一個即可（only one met）」。鄒回應：「我覺得『五大訴求，缺一不可』背後嘅精神，並唔係要求一步登天，而係一個即使政府回應咗一個或者兩個（訴求）之後，一種鍥而不捨繼續爭取嘅精神。」
+
+陳續指，最後政府永遠也不能滿足他們的要求（appetite），指「你看，政府已經落實了其中一個訴求，即撤回《逃犯條例》」，鄒說「同意做咗」，陳說而撤回修例後又發生了這一連串事件。不過陳指理解鄒的回應，相信岑敖暉當時不是指落實所有訴求，而是如政府將回應部分訴求、部分訴求有機會落實，就不會否決，鄒同意。
+
+#### 鄒稱極權是不受制約有權勢者欺壓無權勢者 官打斷稱毋須深究
+
+至於岑敖暉其後再提到立法會議員「絕對有權利喺每一個法案、每一個議案、每一個撥款都係投否決，呢一個係喺《基本法》賦予立法會議員非常之清晰嘅權利」，鄒表示同意，並理解岑只是強調「立法會議員係可以投反對票」、是《基本法》賦予立法會議員的權利，「佢並沒有話佢將來要每一樣嘢都投反對票。」
+
+辯方亦問及鄒家成會上提到「我哋係時候要向世界，向香港人展示，我哋同呢個極權搏鬥嘅決心」，「極權」的意思。鄒指「我覺得極權係一個狀態嚟嘅，一種不受制約嘅有權勢者欺壓無權勢者嘅狀態，形成呢個狀態有兩個條件⋯⋯」，不過陳慶偉打斷說對政治看法無興趣。陳世傑追問「極權」與香港有何關係，惟陳慶偉再打斷說不認為需深究。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/Y6lplhy.png)
+▲ 代表鄒家成的大律師 陳世傑
+
+#### 鄒同意若預算案無反映五大訴求開支 會向政府提問談判
+
+鄒家成其後接受代表黃碧雲及林卓廷的大律師沈士文盤問，同意2020年時已知道，議員可向各部門就預算案開支提問，而他曾提及以五大訴求為「唯一優先標準」審視財案，是將五大訴求與預算案連繫，並同意至少就成立獨立調查委員會、及重啟政改達至雙普選兩個訴求，均「需要用錢」，他打算當選後於討論預算案時就此發問。
+
+法官陳慶偉庭上早前提及「鉛水事件」獨立調查委員會，指無出現在預算案。沈士文續展示2016至17年度立法會財委會時任議員單仲偕就預算案的查詢，以及行政署長的回覆。主控萬德豪質疑，鄒當時並不在立法會會議，為何要就文件發問，沈士文指想問鄒當時是否打算入議會後利用此機制問這類問題。陳慶偉指太空泛，並認為毋須深入這些細節，指他提到鉛水事件獨立調查委員會，只因該調查突然出現，而他意思是如果調查委員會突然出現，預算案不會為該項目有所準備，但明白如預算案有項目是查警暴，鄒家成當然會表示小心審視預算案。
+
+沈士文回應，展示該文件是指出鉛水事件獨立調查委員會的開支，於翌年預算案反映，陳慶偉指那與現時要裁決的議題無關，指鄒已表明會審視財案有否五大訴求的內容。鄒續同意，2020年時政府無回應成立獨立調查委員會等訴求，而他一旦當選，會優先向政府施壓要求成立調查委員會和落實雙普選，如政府回應會預期在2021年預算案反映，如看不到相關開支便會向政府提問，「到底對於呢兩個訴求，佢哋會點樣處理」，亦可謂在財委會與政府的「談判」階段。
+
+#### 鄒指不認識柯耀林、不知李永成是沙田區政成員
+
+代表區政聯盟前召集人柯耀林的大律師唐樂山其後盤問，鄒同意，首次新東會議上人們「出出入入」，他不認識柯耀林，不知道他有否出席會議。而鄒第二次會議有與兩名民主黨代表就「會運用」否決權字眼爭論，辯方問鄒是否認得李永成是其中一個反對其動議的人？鄒指「如果坐喺我對面嗰個人係李永成，咁佢係有反對嘅」，又指「其中一個（反對）一定係林卓廷嘅代表」，但不知另一人身分。鄒又指，不知道李永成自2018年已不再屬民主黨，亦不知他是「區政聯盟」下「沙田區政」的成員。
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/xkDMOrw.png)
+▲ 柯耀林
+
+#### 鄒同意《國安法》後仍擁抱過去理念
+
+鄒家成其後接受主控萬德豪盤問，就鄒家成7月5日帖文〈對不起，我回來了〉，提及「国安法過咗，或者有啲嘢我唔可以繼續講，以前準備嘅好多文宣、易拉架都已經用唔著，但相信我嘅理念喺過去已經表達得清清楚楚，亦都希望各位香港人會理解」，萬德豪指鄒沒有表明放棄過去理念，鄒說：「的確冇呢個意思。」萬問，因此當時鄒仍擁抱過去表達過的理念？鄒答「係」。萬指而不論《國安法》有否落實，鄒的理念也一樣？鄒再答「係」。
+
+#### 控方追問有否提過DQ 官指替補機制一直是協調會議題肯定有提
+
+鄒家成又同意，於參選宣言提到「我唔奢望喺殖民者嘅制度下可以議會過半奪取政治權力」，是表達35+不可能，因政府會以DQ阻民主派取35+，又指就個人會否被DQ，「我唔會評估為低（風險）嘅」。鄒續指，無在協調會議向人表示他會被DQ、也不記得有無人這樣提及，而他認為DQ議題貫徹整個初選，「一定有」參選人提過，但講不到是在何時何地由誰提及。
+
+萬德豪欲追問，陳慶偉打斷指看不到為何要就此盤問，指替補機制一直是協調會議的議題，因此肯定有提到DQ，並着控方直接問問題。萬追問，有參選人提及會有DQ風險？惟陳慶偉打斷指「當然，不然呢？」。萬遂問，而沒有人說過他一定會被DQ？鄒答：「黃之鋒一定有講過。」
+
+![image09](https://i.imgur.com/2rnCED4.png)
+▲ 黃之鋒（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄒稱無在論壇直接提35+不可能因費事「搞禍」人哋個場
+
+鄒遂同意，於初選論壇提過35+的可能性「非常之低」，但「的確冇用呢個『不可能』嘅字眼」。萬質疑若鄒一直認為35+不可能，為何不直接在論壇說出，鄒說「因為我諗住有禮貌少少，即係個論壇始終都係由一班相信35+有可能嘅人搞嘅，費事去人個場，好似搞禍人哋個場咁，所以就講非常之低」，並指「如果睇返成個初選論壇嘅 transcript，應該唔會覺得我覺得35+有可能」。
+
+#### 鄒稱與團隊較專注「香港民族」論述、無看過戴耀廷文章
+
+至於有否看過戴耀廷文章，鄒盤問下指當時較少留意時事，因準備選舉時與團隊較專注「香港民族」的論述、花較多時間製作單張。而他知道戴是知名政治人物，但案發時不知道他在《蘋果日報》和Facebook專頁撰文，沒有「like」戴Facebook，亦從沒讀過戴3至4月發表的文章，沒聽過戴談及有關「攬炒」的意思。控方追問沒有人告訴鄒？鄒說「真係冇」，指與團隊成員「傾香港民族比較多」，他與協調會議參與者亦「冇乜交流」。
+
+鄒家成早前承認與張可森和梁晃維發起「墨落無悔」聲明，今指4月時知道二人有興趣參與立法會選舉，遂「friend 搭 friend 咁樣見吓面、傾吓偈」，但初時無特別留意他們有否參加協調會議、無就此討論，只是「傾吓閒偈」，但在討論「墨落」的「嗰一刻」，「我肯定佢哋有出席過協調會」。
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/mmqthIs.png)
+▲ 張可森（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄒否認戴耀廷首次會議介紹攬炒文章、提運用否決權
+
+就新東協調會議情況，萬德豪引述趙家賢證供，問首次會議是否有一名本土抗爭派向戴耀廷表示，曾讀過他在《蘋果日報》的文章並支持其主張。鄒指首先他不認同當時已有「本土抗爭派」的概念，其次他無留意當時有與會者提及戴耀廷的文章。惟萬續追問該人發言取態、戴之後是否再介紹「攬炒」文章，鄒重申無聽到亦無印象有介紹，戴亦無提及會運用基本法權力否決預算案、以此作為籌碼與中共談判，亦無印象戴提及當選後任期或只有7個月。
+
+#### 鄒稱一直理解「否決（veto）」為「投反對票（vote against）」
+
+而就鄒稱於第二次會議動議「會運用」否決權，萬指鄒在協調會和在「墨落無悔」都用了「否決（veto）」，鄒同意中文是用「否決」。萬指，但「否決」只能在立會過半後達到？鄒說「否決呢個中文字對我嚟講，一直都係 vote against（投反對票）呢個意思，唔係得我一個咁諗嘅，前立法會議員都一直係咁樣形容」。
+
+萬遂問，鄒曾否告訴公眾，「否決」不是指取得過半後否決議案？惟法官陳仲衡打斷，指如鄒家成一直認為兩字意思一樣，如何向公眾解釋，萬終指留待陳詞。
+
+#### 鄒重申預算案無回應五大訴求會反對、「墨落」已向選民交代對財案立場
+
+就抗爭派記者會岑敖暉的發言，法官陳慶偉問及若今天仍「暴政當道、魔警橫行」，鄒家成會否不論內容仍否決預算案。鄒指最重要的核心是政府有否在預算案回應人民訴求，「如果有，我相信都唔會暴政當道、魔警橫行」。陳慶偉指那不是其問題，並重複問題，鄒指「咁要首先處理咩係暴政，咩係魔警」。
+
+陳續指其問題非常直接，認為鄒不想答他問題，鄒說「唔係」。陳問那是否要就他問的每隻字下定義？鄒說「如果有疑問我會照問」。陳說所以鄒不明白他的問題，鄒說「問多一次，唔好意思」，陳指他已問了兩次，鄒續說「答案係不會」。陳說因此鄒完全明白他的問題，鄒稱「我想嘗試吓進一步……」，但遭法官陳仲衡打斷，再問如到了辯論預算案時，政府和警察仍與舉行抗爭派記者會時的一樣，鄒會否否決，鄒重申：「審視完財政預算案之後，如果入面都係冇同五大訴求相關嘅內容，我都係會投反對票。」
+
+萬其後問，鄒有否告訴選民他不同意岑敖暉的說話，鄒說沒有，並指「『墨落無悔』已經係其中一個地方話畀選民知道，我會點樣處理財政預算案」。
+
+控方最後就6月17日鄒家成與張可森和梁晃維受訪片段發問，並指片中顯示訪問問題，但無寫在謄本，望即場播片截圖。法官陳慶偉後下令休庭。
+
+![image11](https://i.imgur.com/9fUysyN.png)
+▲ 副刑事檢控專員(I) 萬德豪
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-11-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-104.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-11-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-104.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..413c5d95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-11-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-104.md
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 104 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 鄒家成：「墨落無悔」寫法諷刺戴耀廷「講咗唔算數」、惟非替戴填補空白
+- 鄒家成完成作供 指若政府五大訴求僅不回應雙普選會「袋住先」
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/hZ6rsFw.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（11日）踏入審訊第104天。鄒家成繼續接受盤問，表示戴耀廷稱毋須簽協議只是發起「墨落無悔」的「導火線」，刺激他們思考「要簽啲乜嘢」去展現抗爭意志，但他們並非想製作一份以協調會議為基礎的協議、聲明無寫上會議已達成共識的項目，「墨落」中會運用否決權迫特首回應五大訴求、及支持度不足須停止選舉工程兩點聲明，均是具爭議或暫時未有共識。法官陳慶偉問，發起「墨落無悔」是否填補戴耀廷留下的空白（fill the gap of Benny Tai）？鄒不同意。而就主控萬德豪指，鄒發起「墨落」是想集結人一起否決預算案，鄒說：「萬專員，我哋之間係唔係有咩誤會呀？唔同意」，多人大笑。
+
+鄒又指，張可森當時加上「墨落理應無悔，否則等於失信於選民」，是承上啟下，諷刺戴耀廷「講咗嘅嘢唔算數」及帶出「墨落」兩點聲明；亦「畫龍點睛」，精要之處在「選民」，強調參選人如反悔要接受選民問責。
+
+#### 鄒稱戴耀廷稱毋須簽協議與「墨落無悔」僅導火線、未必有密切因果關係
+
+鄒家成第6日作供，今續接受控方盤問。開庭前，有旁聽親友向鄒家成說：「今日最後一日」，鄒說「希望係啦」，有親友回應：「加油呀捱埋今日呀。」甫開庭，鄒笑着向主控萬德豪問：「Mr. Man, you don’t need Monday right?」林卓廷等發笑，萬德豪笑問：「Why are you asking me?」鄒答：「我會全力配合。」
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/yARh4ZK.png)
+▲ 副刑事檢控專員(I) 萬德豪
+
+控方盤問焦點，在於鄒家成等人發起的「墨落無悔」聲明，是否戴耀廷原擬要求參選人簽署的協調會議共識。控方先引鄒家成2020年6月與張可森和梁晃維的訪問發問，被問「點解發起抗爭聲明」時，鄒表示：「一路開幾次會都話係有一個共同綱領大家要簽，但喺無通知我哋嘅情況底下，跟住就開咗個記招跟住就話唔需要簽，嗰陣先知原來係唔需要簽。我哋第一個感覺就話我哋要簽返啲嘢喎，唔可以畀泛民主派單方面去撕毀約章。」
+
+鄒同意，他提及「一路開幾次會」是指新東協調會議。陳慶偉指理解鄒說法亦是指向其他兩人，鄒否認，並重申訪問前「我哋冇夾過」，3人均是「自說自話」，記者問題也是「當場先知」。李運騰提到，而鄒提到的感受，是其他兩人也有的感覺？鄒說根據當時討論，「我估佢哋應該都有呢個感覺」，追問下稱「我相信嘅」。
+
+就訪問提到要簽「共同綱領」，鄒同意是指「已達成共識的共同綱領」，而提到不想被泛民撕毀約章，是想就已達成的共識簽署。萬問，因此3人發起「墨落無悔」？鄒認為「未必有一個好密切嘅因果關係」，指戴稱毋須簽文件的說法只是發起「墨落」的背景和「導火線（triggering point）」，刺激他們思考要簽什麼文件。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/k4xfrmK.png)
+▲ 左起：張可森、鄒家成、梁晃維（資料圖片）
+
+#### 鄒稱無將4點協調共識放「墨落」 因無助展現抗爭意志
+
+李運騰續說，而「墨落」不一定反映協調會議已同意的事項，可能「更進一步」？鄒同意，指「因為我哋唔係想整一個以協調會議為基礎嘅協議呀嘛」，故聲明「其實冇寫一啲已達成共識嘅項目喺度」。李提到，但聲明提及「最大公因數」，「墨落」兩點聲明（即會運用否決權，及如支持度不足會停止選舉工程），是否就是「最大公因數」？鄒否認，指辦初選、辦論壇、「贏咗有得選，輸咗冇得選」、及以靈童制為替補機制4點共識，才是他們討論時「搵到五區嘅最大公因數」。
+
+鄒並強調，沒有將上述4點放進「墨落」，「因為對我嚟講一件事還一件事」，發起「墨落」目的就是想「展現抗爭意志」和「保障返一啲政治素人」。鄒指他的確同意想簽一份由初選籌組平台提供的文件，因這是他參加兩次新東會議後的想法；不過當戴稱毋須簽，就刺激他們思考「我哋需要簽啲乜嘢去展現我哋嘅抗爭意志」，經討論後得出兩點聲明。
+
+萬德豪再問，鄒認為「墨落」是一個好機會，讓他放進4點共識讓人們簽署嗎？鄒說不會，「因為嗰4點係無助於展現抗爭意志嘅，我覺得一般市民大眾根本就唔 care 嗰4點。」
+
+#### 鄒指張可森擬「墨落理應無悔」一句 諷刺戴耀廷「講咗嘅嘢唔算數」
+
+就「墨落」提到「墨落理應無悔，否則等於失信於選民」，鄒引張可森指這是「畫龍點眼」的說法，精要之處在於「選民」兩字，張想強調「墨落」是面向公眾的聲明，「要接受問責嘅對象係選民，而唔係我哋三個或者其他參選人」。萬德豪說任何公開聲明也是面向公眾，鄒說：「所以佢想畫龍點睛加呢句說話囉。」
+
+鄒續主動交代背景，「畀大家再了解多啲個 picture」，指「墨落」初稿標題原只是「本土派立場聲明書」，但張可森「想昇華成個聲明，叫我哋畀啲時間佢再諗多一個標題」，終加上「墨落無悔 堅定抗爭」，並改為「抗爭派立場聲明書」，內文亦加入「墨落理應無悔，否則等於失信於選民」一句。
+
+萬德豪續問，「點睛」之處是運用否決權迫使特首回應五大訴求？鄒指「墨落」兩點聲明當然是重點，但重申精要之處在「選民」。李運騰問，即鄒想透過聲明告訴選民他們進入立法會會做的事？鄒說：「我同意㗎。」
+
+陳仲衡續說，但看到聲明的選民並不會知道參與者之間達成過的協議，根本不存在「失信」，鄒重申「之前協調會議達成咗嘅共識係唔重要嘅……選民根本冇興趣知道嗰4點」，而「墨落理應無悔」一句主要指參選人簽了「墨落」並同意聲明中的兩點，如最後違反承諾就等於「失信於選民」。
+
+李運騰指如那是真的，該句便應附在提及兩點聲明的第三段。鄒指因此他曾提過據張可森說法，該句是「過渡句」，「佢話想產生一個承上啟下同畫龍點睛嘅作用」，張一方面想「承上」諷刺戴耀廷「講咗嘅嘢唔算數」，另一方面想「啟下」談及兩點聲明，「佢有佢嘅堅持啦。」
+
+#### 鄒指草擬聲明時亦考慮該點是否具爭議 指會運用否決權重要亦具爭議
+
+鄒在盤問下續指，協調會議4點共識對選民不重要，是因無助展現抗爭意志，但認為辦初選和論壇、及贏輸機制是對參選人重要，至於靈童制他則不太重視。陳慶偉打斷指，認為靈童制對參選人和選民重要，指黃之鋒於九東會議就此爭論，如他投選黃之鋒，也想知道誰是他的 Plan B；陳亦認為贏輸機制對選民重要，舉例若他投票予萬德豪，而萬落敗仍參加正式選舉，他一定不會投選他。陳又主動提到「三投三不投」，指如果贏輸機制不重要，「吳政亨為什麼要花這麼多錢在《蘋果日報》賣廣告？要賣給誰看？《蘋果日報》的目標讀者是誰？是公眾！」
+
+鄒說「嗱我初選真係唔識佢（吳政亨）㗎」，又笑着回應，「其實我同意你講嘅嘢，我啱啱已經準備講你啱啱講嘅嘢喇」，被告和旁聽席發笑。鄒並指討論以靈童制抑或排名制作替補機制時，大家都不想被DQ後自己主張的理念無人繼承，舉例如他被DQ，用排名制便會由范國威代表他，但「支持我嘅人未必係會投畀佢范國威嘅」。鄒續指對他而言，靈童制「我覺得係常識嚟㗎喇」，新東亦幾乎無爭拗，在2016年立法會選舉亦已開始使用。
+
+鄒又重申，沒有將靈童制寫進「墨落」，是因屬五區共同共識，並指「我喺 set 一個聲明嘅時候，決定咩 point 呢，除咗係覺得能夠展現抗爭意志呢個考慮之外，亦都有具爭議性或者當時未有共識嘅考慮」。陳仲衡問，鄒是指因戴耀廷未能就參與者同意的事項提供聲明簽署，故3人決定就未取得共識的事項發布聲明？鄒說：「呢個真係我哋當時討論個次序。」
+
+陳慶偉表示明白，但若然如此為何不在聲明表明：戴耀廷曾提出就已同意的事項簽協議但食言、而這不重要，重要的是有未取得共識的事項，而發起人望邀請人就此簽署。鄒說：「我覺得交代咗喎，你啱啱講嘅嘢都正正係我哋嘅諗法嚟。」陳慶偉問，因此「墨落」是一份補充文件，補充（complement）共同綱領？鄒重申，原本達成的共識是「墨落」的背景，而會運用否決權一點有很大爭議性，他們三人亦覺得重要。
+
+#### 鄒不同意「墨落」是嘗試填補戴耀廷留下的空白
+
+萬德豪續問到，梁晃維於訪問稱：「既然如果戴教授佢唔希望好似送上一個魔鬼嘅祝福，令到好多人被DQ嘅話，咁就不如我哋作為有意參選人 take up 返嗰個責任，所以就會有呢個聲明書出現」，問是否指因戴耀廷不想簽署文件，故3人發聲明就是承擔製造DQ風險的責任？
+
+鄒重申，戴稱不想製造「DQ紅書」，故三人決定發起一個自願性質的聲明，讓參選人自行承擔被DQ風險。陳慶偉續問，即3人嘗試填補戴留下的空白（「fill the gap of Benny Tai」，即頂替戴無做的事）？鄒不同意，亦不同意會予聲明讀者此印象。
+
+#### 鄒稱草擬「墨落」時將項目分成有共識、及具爭議或暫未有共識
+
+鄒盤問下續指，不知道新西和港島有否就否決財案達成共識。萬德豪問他有無興趣知道？鄒說「其實都唔係話咁有興趣」，旁聽發笑。鄒續提到討論草擬「墨落」時，曾將協調會議上討論過的項目分成兩個類別，有如「兩個籃」，一個是「最大公因數」，即已達成共識的事項；另一個是「具爭議性」或「暫時未有共識」的項目。而當時他帶領以新東協調會議為藍本一起討論，並第一時間說明第二次新東會議的爭拗，將否決預算案「揼咗落去具爭議性呢個籃度」。
+
+萬德豪追問他不想知道新西和港島會議的事？鄒指因當時主要想梳理兩個籃內有什麼，「既然我搵到喇，咁我哋就冇再進一步去討論，即係份『墨落無悔』趕住出街呀。」鄒並指，其後找出辦初選等4點共識，放進有共識一籃。至於就「我認同若支持度跌出各區預計可得議席範圍，須表明停止選舉工程」一點，則放進「暫時未有共識」一籃。
+
+#### 鄒稱出線人數未達共識 故停止選舉工程一點寫得較「籠統」
+
+鄒解釋，雖然這點在新東無爭議，但梁晃維當時提到港島「好煩好複雜」，出線人數未傾好、「又無啦啦話有四票」；張可森則稱九西連目標議席亦未傾好，亦有區指要「n（目標議席）+1」或「n+2」，故他們終將該點聲明「寫得籠統少少」，讓其他區參選人未來仍有一個商討的空間。他們亦認為該點「幾重要」，因是保障政治素人，故也放進「墨落無悔」。
+
+惟陳慶偉指，如這是鄒的關注，聲明卻無提及出線名單數目、或該數目如何決定。鄒同意沒寫明，解釋因當時有數個區連出線人數和目標議席都未達共識，故只寫上「可得議席範圍」；亦因有選區會於初選後再討論出線名單，遂故意無寫上棄選的時間點，以讓簽署人跟從該區得出的結果。鄒又強調，棄選機制是初選邏輯，亦保障本土政治素人，「可能因為我哋三個都係政治素人，我哋睇到個重要性。」
+
+陳慶偉指他明白該點精神如「三投三不投」，及對素人的重要性，但再指如鄒關注出線名單數，為何不在聲明寫明，又指三人當時應在想戴耀廷遺漏了一個重要的事項，「重要到認為你們要填補空白！」鄒回應，認為各區協調會議並非沒有處理棄選機制，而在可見的未來亦不是會沒有共識，他認為聲明已清晰交代，至於法官指議席數目不清晰、沒有寫明「6 6 4 4 3」，「係因為其他區都仲傾緊吖嘛」。
+
+陳慶偉指，控方的立場就是，這兩點其實就是參與者達成最重要的共識，所以鄒家成3人才決定將這兩點放進「墨落」，但鄒說有關目標議席未有共識，故是測試鄒的邏輯，問鄒是否明白，惟鄒搖頭，亦指沒有要再解釋的事項。
+
+#### 鄒稱「墨落無悔」非「35+計劃」參選人共識
+
+而就鄒早前稱「墨落無悔」與「35+計劃」無關，萬問若然如此，鄒實可自己發表聲明，無需叫其他人簽署一份聯合聲明？鄒回應：「我係可以有呢個選項，但我冇選擇呢個選項。」
+
+萬指鄒沒有這樣做，是因為想集結其他人一同在立會過半後否決財政預算案？鄒望着萬說：「萬專員，我哋之間係唔係有咩誤會呀？」引來哄堂大笑，鄒續說「唔同意」。萬再問，「墨落無悔」的內容，是否「35+計劃」參選人達成的共識？鄒說「不是」。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/eK1GiEa.png)
+▲ 鄒家成（資料圖片）
+
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/cfylutv.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（11日）踏入審訊第104天。鄒家成繼續接受盤問，表示五大訴求中最重視雙普選，但若政府回應除雙普選以外的四個訴求，他也會接受，指爭取訴求需要長時間、五大訴求並非一步登天：「袋住先啦！爭取雙普選真係唔係一時三刻做到。」控方質疑鄒是「妥協」，鄒不同意，並指若政府不回應五大訴求，只是給予「甜頭」來「氹」議員投贊成票，此情況下投贊成才屬妥協；但在這情況下，他仍會對預算案投反對票，強調「有回應（五大訴求）先至有得傾」，亦同意張可森稱「抗爭就係不容妥協嘅藝術」。
+
+鄒今完成6日作供，步入囚室前頻頻向旁聽和律師席抱拳致謝。新東餘下3名被告林卓廷、梁國雄及柯耀林均不出庭作供，柯耀林一方將傳召一名辯方證人。
+
+#### 張可森曾發文稱新西與會者同意會運用否決權 鄒指沒看過
+
+鄒家成繼續接受盤問。他在盤問下同意，知道張可森和梁晃維有 Facebook，但「未 friend 到成日睇」，對他們有關初選的帖文也未必有興趣。控方續展示張可森6月11日、即「墨落」發布後翌日的帖文，提到與鄒和梁晃維一同發起「墨落」，及新西協調會議上所有人都逐一表明，同意「會運用立法會權員的權力，包括否決財政預算案，要求政府落實五大訴求」。鄒指沒有看過該帖文，亦無獲張告知，他亦無出席過新西協調會議。
+
+#### 鄒稱政府回應五大訴求才「有得傾」、即使有「甜頭」亦不妥協
+
+而就張可森於3名發起人的訪問提及，「香港而家討論緊嘅唔係政治，唔係咩妥協嘅藝術，唔係開天殺價、落地還錢，唔係我哋一開始話攬炒，然後佢回一回價我哋又唔攬炒」，鄒指理解張意思是不會看到預算案「派吓錢、或者講吓起醫院咁樣」就會「妥協」。萬德豪指張意思是3人一開始就想「攬炒」？鄒指應無此意思，張亦無向他解釋過如何看「攬炒」。
+
+控方續引張提及，「我哋香港而家討論緊嘅係抗爭，即係如果政治係妥協嘅藝術，抗爭就係不容妥協嘅藝術」，鄒同意其說法。萬追問，即不會妥協、不會談判（negotiate）？鄒說要視乎如何看「妥協」，並指理解張可森稱不容妥協意思是，如果政府在財政預算案可能「畀咗啲甜頭」予立法會議員或民眾、但不回應五大訴求，「我都係投反對票㗎喇」；而「除非你回應咗五大訴求啦、除非你喺 budget 度畀我睇到你有回應啦，有回應先至有得傾囉」，鄒亦同意張的看法。
+
+#### 被問若只回應部分訴求會否談判 鄒稱視乎政府是否「有心推動」
+
+萬問，而即使政府只回應一個或兩個訴求，鄒亦會同意與政府談判？鄒指，「最重要係睇政府個態度係咪有心去推動」，指看過財政預算案、與政府官員有對話，「傾完之後其實你都大概有個了解㗎喇，呢個過程我覺得都係一個談判過程。」鄒又指，如果政府不回應五大訴求，用其他方法「氹啲立法會議員去投贊成票」，此情況下投贊成便屬「妥協」，故張稱「抗爭係不容妥協」，是指「爭取五大訴求係唔可以妥協」。
+
+萬指，但如果政府無回應雙普選，鄒會滿意嗎？鄒承認五大訴求中最重視爭取雙普選，但「真係要好整體睇吓政府如何回應」，亦「真係好難逐個逐個訴求抽走再問我點樣睇」。鄒又指要視乎回應時間：「我假設去到十年之後，其實啲示威者都坐完監咁濟㗎喇，咁要求政府釋放示威者仲有冇意義呢？所以其實係好複雜㗎答呢條問題」，並指除了政府已回應的兩個訴求（撤回逃犯條例和6.12暴動定性），餘下三個訴求中（釋放所有示威者、成立獨立調查委員會及雙普選）「雙普選係應該要堅持到底嘅」。
+
+#### 鄒稱若政府僅不回應雙普選會「袋住先」 控方質疑屬「妥協」惟鄒否認
+
+萬德豪續問，如果在2021年預算案，政府願回應除雙普選以外的四個訴求，鄒會滿意嗎？鄒說：「我會呀。」萬追問：「你會？你會接受？」鄒再說「我會呀」，指「因為爭取訴求係需要長時間」，重申爭取五大訴求「唔係要一步登天，背後更重要嘅精神係，一種鍥而不捨、繼續爭取嘅精神，所以要逐步逐步嚟」。
+
+萬追問，即使對鄒來說，雙普選是最重要的訴求？鄒笑言：「袋住先啦！」多人發笑，鄒續說：「爭取雙普選真係唔係一時三刻做到嘅，要搞諮詢都要時間。」法官李運騰續指，但由當選至政府翌年發表預算案，只有很短、以月計的時間，鄒同意。萬續問，那鄒認為他所說的是妥協嗎？鄒再重申：「我唔同意喎，因為我爭取緊五大訴求吖嘛。」
+
+萬續引張可森提及：「當你簽咗呢張嘢（「墨落無悔」）應承咗嘅時候，你絕對唔可以反悔，唔可以話我哋政治就係妥協㗎嘞，所以我哋一開始開個價咁高希望可以落返嚟」，惟鄒說：「佢冇講爭取五大訴求要一步登天喎，Mr. Man。」萬再問，那鄒曾否告知選民他不是要一步登天？鄒指沒有，指他甚少與選民就五大訴求溝通，他在初選期間「主要都係宣揚香港民族理念」。
+
+#### 鄒重申運用否決權無達共識 「墨落無悔」並非「重申」立場
+
+控方亦再質疑「墨落無悔」是協調會議共識。就3名發起人在6月19日向組織者發出的訊息，提到當時共39位以上參與者以個人或政黨名義簽署，並指「初選原設共同綱領，有意以『運用包括否決財政預算案之基本法賦予的立法會權力，迫使特首回應五大訴求。』的素人以及政黨因此共同目標而集結」。萬德豪問「共同目標」是否否決預算案。鄒指應是按「墨落」的結果理解，即有39人因為「墨落」的第一點聲明而「集結」簽署。
+
+萬亦指訊息提到「初選原設共同綱領」，鄒解釋是指協調會議原本有討論過否決權議題，但中間有些拗撬，最後有39個人或政黨同意。法官陳仲衡指，但似乎整段也是談及戴耀廷記者會稱毋須簽協議之前的事，鄒不同意，指「如果唔係唔會出到『墨落無悔』39個人嘅結果出嚟啦」。
+
+萬續問，而訊息提到「在戴教授決定參與者毋須簽署共同綱領後，雖然大部份參與者有簽署『抗爭派立場聲明書』重申自己堅定的立場」，故「墨落」是「重申」運用否決權的立場？鄒問控方是否指參與者原本一直同意會運用否決權一點，而他們有「墨落」後簽署，故是「重申」立場，萬同意。鄒說：「我只能夠講，我個人上，我由持至終都係支持嘅」，而他不是代表其他簽署者。
+
+#### 鄒稱不獲發新東協議文件、「癱瘓議會」不包括解散立會
+
+鄒續確認，就「35+立會過半計劃 民主派新界東協調機制協議」文件，「冇發過畀我。」萬續問鄒是否沒有反對協議內容，惟法官陳慶偉指鄒沒收過文件。萬指這是控方案情，林卓廷說「吓」。李運騰續指若證人已否認，控方沒有基礎繼續提問，但引文件提及首7張名單參與官方選舉，問是否有達成共識，鄒同意。
+
+而就鄒家成於新東初選民間論壇提到，每個代議士都應有心理準備「用任何手段，癱瘓每一個議會嘅進行」，鄒指不包括解散立法會。萬續指，而鄒當時知道否決預算案，特首可解散立法會？鄒說：「《基本法》係咁寫，」
+
+控方最後指出案情，指鄒家成與其他被告串謀取得立法會主導權，無差別否決預算案，迫使特首或政府回應五大訴求，並意圖顛覆國家政權，鄒表示不同意。
+
+#### 鄒作供完畢 林卓廷、梁國雄、柯耀林不出庭作供
+
+控方表示盤問完結，大律師陳世傑指沒有覆問，亦不會傳召證人，辯方案情完結。鄒完成6日作供，在懲教陪同下步回被告欄，一度向旁聽席微笑戚眉。
+
+代表林卓廷的大律師沈士文及代表梁國雄的大律師黃宇逸其後分別表示，林卓廷和梁國雄均選擇不作供亦沒有證人。代表柯耀林的大律師唐樂山則指，柯選擇不作供，但會傳召一名事實證人，意味新東案情將完結。法官李運騰笑指：「我必須說這星期的尾聲有些驚喜（surprises）。」案件押至下周一（11日）續審，除柯耀林外，尚餘參選超區的李予信和衞生服務界余慧明未開展辯方案情。
+
+散庭時，鄒不住向旁聽親友揮手，又指向自己做睡覺手勢，步入囚室時又不停雙手抱拳作揖，向旁聽人士和律師道謝。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022

From b357bce047009f767f53e1f6475d1526d5417e85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hokoi <hokoeye@pm.me>
Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2023 00:17:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 06/19] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x20 Aug.30

---
 .../2023-08-02-wagners-next-in-africa.md      |  72 ++++++++
 ...2023-08-15-russia-progressing-in-africa.md | 155 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 227 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-02-wagners-next-in-africa.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-russia-progressing-in-africa.md

diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-02-wagners-next-in-africa.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-02-wagners-next-in-africa.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Wagner’s Next In Africa
+author: Simon Rynn
+date  : 2023-08-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/rSxSWyq.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Where Next for Wagner Group in Africa?"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny was quashed in one day inside Russia, but the implications for Africa are unclear. As African leaders make their way back from the Russia–Africa Summit in St Petersburg, will we get hints about the company’s future on the continent and how should others respond?_
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+On 27 July African leaders made their way to St Petersburg for the second Russia–Africa Summit. The first summit four years ago majored on trade, investment and development. These are issues of concern to Africa but the agenda was Moscow’s. Discussions this time will be tainted by African states’ growing agitation at their place in the world, the economic costs of the Ukraine War, and by persistent problems of insecurity across Africa.
+
+The Wagner Group has been one of many imperfect answers to insecurity in Africa, or at least regime insecurity. Starting in Sudan, Wagner has been developing its presence on the continent since 2017. Under the Omar Al-Bashir government the company trained the Sudanese armed forces, guarded mineral resources and helped to suppress political opposition. In what has become a familiar pattern, Wagner received exclusive access to mineral and resource extraction by occupying mines and agreeing special deals and concessions.
+
+Working alongside front and sister companies, since then the company has sold a menu of services to embattled African governments, including strategic communications, close protection, military training, offensive military operations and logistics. The Touadéra government in the Central African Republic (CAR) signed a contract with Wagner in 2018. Although now fully reliant on Wagner for regime security, it has survived despite effective state failure. In 2019 an ill-fated Wagner deployment to Mozambique saw company fighters bested by an Islamist insurgency. The company also supported rebel Libyan Arab Armed Forces. In Mali since 2021, Wagner has propped up the military government with force and crafted strategic communication campaigns that helped to exacerbate anti-French sentiment.
+
+
+### Understanding the Appeal
+
+In some cases, Wagner has been effective in quelling insurgency and bolstering government authority, although not necessarily legitimacy. It has faced accusations of human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations on several occasions. In Mali and CAR the UN working group on the use of mercenaries called for investigations following a number of reported rapes, attacks and killings of civilians. Among other things, in Libya in 2020 Wagner was accused of using landmines that killed civilians.
+
+___`In some cases, Wagner has been effective in quelling insurgency and bolstering government authority, although not necessarily legitimacy. It has faced accusations of human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations on several occasions`___
+
+At the country-level, Wagner’s services are marketed by Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) representatives within embassies. Host governments such as CAR and Mali have agreements not with Wagner but with the Russian government. The government-to-government negotiations have allowed Wagner and linked Russian companies to benefit financially. Exploitation of commodities such as gold or timber in Sudan or CAR has in turn contributed to Russia’s sanction-busting efforts.
+
+But Wagner has also proven an effective foreign policy tool. In recent years, Africa was not high on Moscow’s priority list, but the Ukraine War gave it added significance. Russia has tried to win the narrative argument with key African states to avoid isolation. Both the St Petersburg Summit and Wagner are part of a “charm offensive”. With some success, Russia brands itself as an anti-colonial friend to African governments, untainted in comparison to France, the UK and the rest. The Wagner operation in Mali for example helped to change attitudes to the UN and French security missions, paving the way for France’s humiliating exit.
+
+For selected African governments, then, the package of services on offer has proved appealing. Lectured by domestic and external critics, unable to persuade the UN or allies such as France to fight and die at scale in the face of insurgencies, they have been offered regime protection – at a price. Investigations have illustrated the risks associated with Wagner, but these are largely borne by marginalised populations in the periphery of host countries. Lawlessness may actually be an attraction in some cases.
+
+
+### Implications of the Prigozhin Mutiny
+
+Moscow knows that African host governments viewed its handling of the mutiny closely. Two days later, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used Russia Today to reassure Mali and CAR that Wagner’s “work” in both countries would continue. It was therefore reassuring that around 500 new personnel arrived in CAR on a scheduled rotation in mid-July.
+
+So far, so good? Perhaps. But behind the scenes at the summit a sub-set of African leaders will press for clarity on Wagner’s continental operations. Yevgeny Prigozhin was on hand in St Petersburg to meet government representatives, and presumably to court new suitors. The target list could include a dozen or more states with whom there have been reports of Wagner interaction, from Zimbabwe, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar and South Africa. The embattled military government of Burkina Faso and the fledgling junta in Niger will be front-runners.
+
+
+### Future Scenarios
+
+The Kremlin will not “abandon” Africa – that would taint its burgeoning brand as a trusted partner for needy governments. But that tells us little about Wagner which is being restructured and largely absorbed into the Russian military.
+
+___`The Kremlin will not “abandon” Africa – that would taint its burgeoning brand as a trusted partner for needy governments`___
+
+One scenario is that the company is disbanded. There are around 20 other companies linked to the Russian government that could play “host” to Wagner personnel and services. Three are controlled by Gazprom, one by Rosatom. By going down this route, the Russian government would retain Wagner’s capabilities and might even enhance the aspect of deniability that has proven useful in the past. But the move would be disruptive. African field operations are managed by men loyal to Prigozhin, such as Dmitri Utkin or Ivan Aleksandrovich Maslov.
+
+Alternatively, if Wagner is downsized in Europe but licensed to continue its overseas operations, perhaps Prigozhin could remain at the helm in Belarus. The Kremlin could also reduce any residual risks that it felt around Prigozhin’s leadership by hiving off some of the “menu” of services to sister companies.
+
+Several factors will shape the direction of travel from now on. The fate of Russia’s combat operations in Ukraine will be one. A sound defeat for Russia in Ukraine would probably spell an end to Wagner’s Africa operations. But this is looking very unlikely.
+
+Second is resourcing. Until now, the Russian government has not had the bandwidth or resources to invest heavily in Africa and has had to subsidise the company nearly $1 billion per annum despite its income-generation schemes. With the Russian economy in a growth phase, there could be fresh resource on offer to promote or to support Wagner in Africa.
+
+A third issue will be the Kremlin’s overall prioritisation of Africa. The continent has been a low priority overall, hence the “outsourcing” of policy to the MFA. Whether or not the Kremlin takes a stronger hand in future, the tone and the commitments announced at the summit indicate a sharper focus by Russia. But the events in Niger also highlight the importance of elite and public opinion on the continent.
+
+
+### Wagner in Context
+
+Last week a UK Foreign Affairs Committee report charged the UK government with having for a decade “under-played and under-estimated the Wagner Network’s activities, as well as the security implications of its significant expansion”. It lamented the early withdrawal of UK troops from Mali in 2022 and pushed for further information on how the government will “tackle the challenge of states’ malign use of proxy PMCs”. The UK and the US have now sanctioned Wagner members.
+
+Hopefully the report, coupled with events in St Petersburg will prompt some reflection. Wagner is a player in selected parts of Africa, and a feature of Russia’s foreign policy toolkit. But its wider importance can be exaggerated. A quick internet search throws up a small selection of the numerous private security and military operations in Africa which originate everywhere from Israel to France, and the UK.
+
+Wagner may be projecting Russian foreign policy goals but it is useful to see it in this wider context. Wagner is one of many private military companies operating in Africa. When taken together with other admittedly very different “non-state” security providers and interventions (peacekeeping and stabilisation missions, train and equip projects, private security companies and community militias) it is striking how little has been achieved in improving security in decades.
+
+In the meantime, Western countries and the UN should be reflecting. They will not and should not match the Wagner offer. Sending troops or mercenaries to fight and advise during aggressive counterinsurgency operations is not on the cards for most. But hard thinking is needed about the persistent insecurity that Wagner and others latch on to. Better external security assistance – well mandated and overseen – can help. But there are also some uncomfortable truths that need airing about everything from state corruption, to extractive economic relations, destabilising military interventions as well as previous reluctance to resource peacebuilding or to back the regulation of private military and security operations. It may be too early to predict Wagner’s next move but the continent will remain open for the security business until all this changes.
+
+---
+
+__Simon Rynn__ is Senior Research Fellow for Africa at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His experience covers conflict prevention and peacebuilding, stabilisation, security and justice, de-mining, humanitarian, governance and small arms control. His main research focus is on the security of East Africa and the Horn, particularly the security sector, external engagement with stabilisation and peace support operations, as well as economic security and the relationship between security and international development.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-russia-progressing-in-africa.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-russia-progressing-in-africa.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9a315043
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-russia-progressing-in-africa.md
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Russia Progressing In Africa
+author: Mathieu Droin and Tina Dolbaia
+date  : 2023-08-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/sBm0JT3.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_The Kremlin’s playbook on Africa will most likely be recalibrated rather than overturned._ <excerpt/> _Recent events such as the armed rebellion led by the Wagner Group’s chief Yevgeny Prigozhin against Russia’s military leadership and Moscow’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain deal triggered speculations over a potential inflection point in Russia’s growing footprint in Africa. Yet other signs, such as Prigozhin shaking hands with officials from the Central African Republic (CAR) in Saint Petersburg while the 2023 Russia-Africa summit was unfolding, or Russian flags being flown during the Niger coup this July, suggest that Russia’s influence in Africa is here to stay._
+
+The current volatile situation calls for a coolheaded look at the fundamentals of Russia’s existing footprint and its forays across the continent, to better assess how they might evolve and how to address them. Russia’s breakthroughs in Africa are owed in part to a rekindling of Soviet-era relations. Yet the Kremlin’s remarkable advances on the continent throughout the last decade also result from twin contemporary efforts: adept diplomatic reengagement with key regional players and opportunistic predation in areas where Western powers are either absent or in trouble.
+
+While the U.S.-led effort to form a global coalition aimed at isolating Russia internationally has indeed strengthened the transatlantic alliance, it has not yet fully convinced the rest of the world, including countries on the African continent, to break ties with Moscow. In fact, many across Africa regard the war in Ukraine as primarily a Western problem and are preoccupied with protecting their own national interests. Even with the war and sanctions straining Russia’s economy and defense sector, the Kremlin retains sufficient ties with the continent to challenge Western narratives.
+
+This paper examines Russia’s creeping influence over Africa, assessing Moscow’s historic legacy as well as the current diplomatic, economic, and military-security links that contribute to the region’s continued willingness to engage with Russia. In doing so, particular attention is paid to the Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner Group, which has been playing an important role in forging ties between the Kremlin and different African nations, despite the uncertainty following Prigozhin’s rebellion in June 2023. It then offers analysis and recommendations to Western policymakers, outlining new approaches the transatlantic community should adopt to counter a rising Russia in Africa.
+
+
+### The Kremlin’s Playbook in Africa: From Diplomatic to Military Footprint
+
+It is commonly argued that the hesitancy of many African states to openly condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is rooted in the deep Soviet-era ties Moscow forged with the continent, which continue to generate a lot of sympathy and respect toward Russia.
+
+Starting from the mid-1950s, as Africa turned into another important Cold War battleground, the Soviet Union became actively involved in reshaping the continent’s political and security landscape by granting generous economic and security assistance programs to many different local Marxist, anti-colonial, or anti-U.S. groups. By supporting independence movements during a period of colonial conflict and aiding governments that faced internal or external confrontation, the Soviet Union managed to penetrate all the major countries across Africa, including but not limited to Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, and Mozambique. The Kremlin supplied those states with weapons and equipment, provided military training and advisers, and developed relations between the Soviet and various African intelligence communities, ultimately creating “a long-term legacy of Soviet hardware and operational culture throughout Africa.”
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/8G7xTQu.jpg)
+_▲ Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, meets with the new Egyptian president, Anwar al-Sadat, in Moscow, the latter seeking political support and military hardware from the Soviet Union for use in Egypt’s imminent war with Israel, 1971._
+
+Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the newly established Russian Federation—finding itself in political and socioeconomic turmoil—was forced to disengage from the continent, which meant that its generous economic and military assistance programs came to an abrupt halt. For around two decades after the Soviet collapse, Russian activity in Africa was marginal.
+
+#### Russia’s Diplomatic Reengagement with Africa
+
+Moscow’s first visible attempts to reengage with the continent started in the mid-2000s. In 2006, President Vladimir Putin visited the Republic of South Africa, followed by his successor Dmitry Medvedev’s trips to Egypt, Angola, Nigeria, and Namibia in 2009. The Kremlin doubled down on its diplomatic efforts following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, when the first round of Western sanctions against Russia forced Moscow to actively seek new geopolitical partners and business opportunities. Since 2014, various high-ranking Russian state officials—including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Security Council secretary Nikolai Patrushev, and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov—have frequented different African states and signed multiple bilateral military, economic, and security cooperation agreements, as well as written off billions of dollars in African debts.
+
+Russia’s return to Africa has also coincided with (and has been encouraged by) the reduced U.S. engagement with the continent, including the 2018 decision under the Trump administration to scale back U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the region despite the growing terror threat in many African nations. Moscow was quick to fill that security void. In 2019, President Putin hosted the first-ever Russia-Africa summit at the Black Sea retreat of Sochi, aimed at reinforcing Russia’s standing as a reliable strategic partner on the continent and securing military contract agreements with different nations, including the Nigerian government, which agreed to purchase Russian attack helicopters. In July 2023, despite the war, sanctions, and Western pressure, 17 heads of African states attended the second Russia-Africa summit, signing several agreements with Russia on prevention of arms race in space, cooperation in informational security, and combating terrorism on the continent. Moscow also promised to write off additional debts.
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/wW9NlK4.jpg)
+_▲ President Putin, African leaders, and heads of delegations pose for a group photo at the second Russia-Africa summit held in Saint Petersburg, Russia, on July 28, 2023._
+
+These ongoing diplomatic efforts, encompassing high-level visits, debt relief, and strategic partnership agreements, have proved to be particularly useful at the United Nations. The Kremlin has been able to count on the backing of many African nations on key UN votes, including the 2014 General Assembly resolution condemning the Russian annexation of Crimea, the 2018 resolution urging Moscow to demilitarize the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and the 2022 resolution decrying Russia’s attempted annexation of four Ukrainian regions. In all three cases, a considerable number of African countries voted against the proposed resolutions, abstained, or did not show up for the vote, thus directly or indirectly contributing to the Kremlin’s efforts at challenging the United States and its allies within international frameworks.
+
+#### Russo-African Economic and Trade Relations
+
+In addition to strengthening diplomatic ties with African states, the Kremlin has also expanded its economic footprint on the continent. For instance, trade revenue between Russia and African countries almost doubled from $9.9 billion in 2013 to $17.7 billion by 2021. Grain exports are of particular importance, as nearly 30 percent of Africa’s grain supplies come from Russia. Moscow’s leading trade partners in the region are countries in North Africa—particularly Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco—which together account for approximately 67 percent of Russia’s total trade with the continent. Moscow mainly exports wheat, coal, refined petroleum, and electronics to these states, while importing fruits, sugar, and vegetables.
+
+Russia’s recent withdrawal from the Black Sea grain deal—which enabled Ukraine to safely export grain to different parts of the world, including Africa—may benefit Moscow’s own grain exports by cutting Kyiv out of the global market and increasing the dependence of a number of African republics on Russian grain. Moscow has maintained that it will do “all it can” to shield Africa from the negative consequences of the halted grain deal, with President Putin asserting that “our country is capable of replacing Ukrainian grain on a commercial and a gratuitous basis.” During the 2023 Russia-Africa summit, Putin even promised to start shipping free grain in the next several months to six African nations significantly impacted by the cancellation of the grain deal: Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, Eritrea, and the CAR.
+
+An important aspect of Russia’s economic outreach to Africa is that it is dominated by Russian companies that are either partially or fully owned by the state, including oil and gas giants Rosneft, Tatneft, and Gazprom, which carry out major hydrocarbon projects in North Africa. Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear power company, has also been actively engaged with different countries across the continent. For instance, in summer 2022, it received permission from an Egyptian regulator to start building Egypt’s first nuclear power plant, based on the 2017 agreement signed between President Putin and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The plant is expected to become fully operational by 2030. Rosatom also funds different educational and cultural exchange opportunities in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields to support the Kremlin’s soft power efforts in Africa. In addition to energy deals, Moscow has also boosted cooperation with different states rich in natural resources, primarily diamonds. For instance, Alrosa, Russia’s top diamond mining company, has expanded its operations in Angola, Congo, and Zimbabwe. Importantly, according to some African scholars, “Russia is highlighting collaboration over aid” when seeking lucrative business opportunities in Africa, thus stressing partnerships of equals, “and that message is tempting to some leaders who view the West’s outreach as patronizing.”
+
+Still, despite Russia’s ongoing efforts to build stronger business and trade ties with the continent, the Kremlin’s economic engagements in Africa today are modest when compared to those of the Soviet Union, as well as those of the modern-day China, United States, and European Union. While trade revenue between Russia and African countries comprises around $17.7 billion, Africa’s trade value with the European Union, China, and the United States currently stands at $295 billion, $254 billion, and $65 billion, respectively. Russia also invests little in Africa, representing less than 1 percent of total foreign direct investment (FDI) going to the continent. Moscow’s main competitive advantage against the global powers seeking to expand their footprint on the continent is therefore its ability to render relatively cheap security and military services, including arms transfers, as well as anti-insurgency training and consultancy services.
+
+#### Russo-African Defense and Security Cooperation
+
+While the Kremlin continues to be a small player in Africa when measured by its economic and trade relations, it retains strong defense and security ties with the continent, spanning arms sales, joint military training programs, and Russian PMC activities.
+
+Russia is the chief arms supplier to Africa, accounting for 40 percent of African imports of major weapons systems between 2018 and 2022. This has been higher than the total arms imports from the United States (16 percent), China (9.8 percent), and France (7.6 percent) during those years. According to a report by the RAND Corporation, Russian weapons sales to Africa have increased from around $500 million to over $2 billion annually in recent years. The key importers of Russian weapons systems are the North African countries Algeria and Egypt, with 73 percent and 34 percent of their arms imports, respectively, coming from Russia. Both states have purchased billions of dollars’ worth of weapons and equipment from Moscow since 2013, including the Su-24, Su-30, and MiG-29 combat aircraft, as well as the S-300 missile systems, among others. Besides Algeria and Egypt, many other countries across the continent also receive Russian matériel, including but not limited to Mali, Sudan, the CAR, and Angola.
+
+There are a number of reasons explaining the dependency of African countries on Russian-made weapons and equipment. Modern Russian arms are usually cheaper than their Western alternatives and compatible with Soviet-era stocks retained by many states on the continent. Additionally, unlike the United States and its allies, the Kremlin does not make its arms deliveries contingent upon adherence to democratic principles or the protection of basic human rights; it has sent armor, combat aircraft, and missile systems to different war-torn countries in Africa—including Libya, where it has supported eastern Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar’s fight against the UN-recognized Government of National Accord.
+
+Besides arms transfers, Moscow has advanced military diplomacy in the region by engaging different African countries in Russian-led military forums and exercises, including the International Army Games, which since 2015 has been attended by around a dozen African states, such as Angola, Algeria, Congo, Mali, and Zimbabwe. The Kremlin has also organized the annual naval (“Friendship Bridge”) and aerial (“Defenders of Friendship”) exercises between the Russian and Egyptian armies and supported UN peace operations in Congo, Western Sahara, Sudan, and South Sudan by providing a limited number of military observers. Yet, while the official Russian military presence might seem modest, it is usually supplemented by Russian PMC activities, which have been rather extensive on the continent.
+
+While the exact numbers of Russian private military companies or operations in Africa are difficult to estimate, available reporting shows that there have been at least seven Russian PMCs that have carried out at a minimum 34 operations in 16 African countries since 2005. PMCs became particularly active in the mid-2010s following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its intervention in the Syrian war in 2015, both of which enabled Russia to advertise and offer its PMC services—from providing private security and military training to conducting combat operations—to different governments and separatist groups across Africa. According to RAND, Russian PMCs have a substantial presence in the CAR, Sudan, and South Sudan. They are also found in a number of other African states, including Congo, Gabon, Libya, Mali, and Madagascar. What makes the proliferation of Russian PMCs in Africa particularly noteworthy is that, in virtually all cases, they have strong ties with the Kremlin. As Major Thomas D. Arnold of the U.S. Army argues, “Russia effectively trades PMSC [private military and security company] services for access and economic concessions in resource-endowed fragile states.”
+
+The most prominent among the Russian PMCs operating in Africa is the Wagner Group, owned by Prigozhin, an infamous Russian businessman dubbed “Putin’s Chef” whose notoriety increased immensely following his June 2023 short-lived armed mutiny against the Russian government, and particularly the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD). However, prior to the June uprising, the Wagner chief was known as one of President Putin’s most loyal subordinates. For instance, in 2018, the United States indicted Prigozhin for financing a Russian troll factory that had spearheaded Moscow’s efforts to meddle in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. As for having strong links to the Russian government, Wagner forces were allegedly trained along with the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation’s (GRU) special forces units. The PMC gained notoriety for its participation in the 2014 Ukrainian and 2015 Syrian conflicts. In Syria, due to Wagner’s assistance to the Assad regime, several Prigozhin-owned or closely linked companies struck exclusive oil and gas deals with the government, thus enabling the Kremlin to get its share of Syria’s energy revenues.
+
+Wagner adopted and further developed a similar strategy in Africa, where it has advised tottering leaders, run pro-government and disinformation campaigns, conducted military training and anti-insurgency operations, and, in return, secured concessions in extractive industries, particularly gold, diamond, and uranium mining. For instance, in CAR, at various times since 2018 up to 1,900 “Russian instructors” (i.e., Wagner and its subsidiaries) have provided escort protection to the country’s senior officials, including President Touadéra, and have assisted the Russian MOD with arms deliveries and on-site military training. In return, the Kremlin has been able to explore “the possibilities of the mutually beneficial development of Central African natural resources,” with Prigozhin-linked companies spearheading gold and diamond mining efforts in the republic. In Sudan, Wagner has provided site security to Prigozhin-owned gold mining companies and has been actively involved in strengthening ties with General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), a deputy head of Sudan’s ruling council, to establish its first naval base in Port Sudan. Similarly, in Libya, the Kremlin reportedly sent up to 1,200 Wagner contractors to aid General Khalifa Haftar, a de facto ruler of eastern Libya in control of a significant share of the country’s oil reserves, in exchange for securing economic concessions that included Russian oil giant Rosneft’s access to the country’s lucrative oil market.
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/LulnYGp.jpg)
+_▲ Demonstrators hold banners and a Russian flag in the capital city of Bangui, CAR, in March 2023. Taking advantage of the security vacuum created by the departure of French troops from the country, Moscow first sent “military instructors” to CAR in 2018, followed by hundreds of Wagner troops in 2020 at the request of President Touadéra to help him fend off a dangerous rebellion._
+
+Overall, Russia’s military presence in Africa, focused on the strengthening of both official and unofficial channels of defense-security cooperation with different African states, has proved to be a cost-effective way for the Kremlin to gain considerable political and economic leverage on the continent that even the 2022 war in Ukraine has been unable to undermine.
+
+
+### Russia’s Continued Progress in Africa, despite the War in Ukraine and Domestic Fissure
+
+Despite Russia’s military shortcomings in Ukraine—including incurring significant personnel and equipment losses, struggling to produce advanced weapons systems, and increasing reliance on Soviet-era defense equipment—there have not yet been any tangible signs of African countries actively seeking to replace Moscow as a chief arms supplier or military partner. In fact, throughout 2022, a number of countries on the continent initiated new or continued existing military cooperation agreements with the Kremlin. Cameroon, for instance, signed a new defense deal with the Russian MOD entailing joint military trainings, and Mali received military equipment from Moscow. In 2023, the Russia-Africa summit participants agreed to establish a new permanent Russo-African security mechanism, aimed at combating terrorism and extremism on the continent. However, some negative trends have also been observed. For example, Algeria and Egypt, which have long been listed among Russia’s top five arms purchasers globally, slowly started to lessen defense ties with the Kremlin in 2022. Yet, considering the large reliance of both countries on Russian-origin arms, they will most likely maintain defense cooperation with Moscow in the near term.
+
+Similar to the Russian armed forces, Wagner has sustained significant losses in Ukraine. In May 2023, Prigozhin openly accused the Russian MOD for not supplying his PMC with enough ammunition during the fight for the city of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine. A month later, this disagreement led to the Prigozhin-orchestrated “march for justice” against Moscow, which, even if brief, has given rise to a number of questions connected with the stability of the Putin regime, as well as the future of Wagner in Africa.
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/HkpDe1i.jpg)
+_▲ Wagner soldiers sit on the top of a tank in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, on June 24, 2023._
+
+Prior to the uprising, experts believed that, even if Wagner were to be sidelined in Ukraine, the PMC would not “fade into obscurity.” Instead, it would pivot back to Africa, where it still retained a comparative advantage against the backdrop of a new wave of insurgencies spanning the continent, resuming limited-scale “expeditionary operations and supplying muscle to fragile states in exchange for access to valuable resources.” Indeed, in March 2023, Wagner was already actively recruiting new contractors willing to serve terms ranging from 9 to 14 months in Africa.
+
+It was also argued that, by putting a private army to work in the region, Prigozhin was able to at least partially fund Wagner’s war effort in Ukraine. This, in most cases, was achieved by expanding the PMC-linked mining operations across the continent. For instance, in exchange for supporting regime stability in CAR, Wagner reportedly gained some degree of control over the country’s international airport, flying gold worth billions of U.S. dollars that it had been mining in CAR from the capital of Bangui straight to Moscow. According to some estimates, despite the allied sanctions imposed on Russia, Moscow’s gold reserves reached an all-time high in the first quarter of 2023. Similar to in CAR, Wagner continued to exploit the existing power struggle in Sudan, allegedly assisting the country’s General Hemedti through Wagner’s Libyan partner General Haftar, and thus attempting to preserve Russia’s ongoing gold mining operations in Sudan and advance the Kremlin’s interests of building a naval base along the Red Sea in Port Sudan. Experts believe that, if Moscow is ultimately successful at gaining port access in Africa, it will be well positioned to “disrupt naval and maritime passage along the central and eastern Mediterranean, and establish coastal airfields that would make global transit of Russian aircraft—including anti-submarine aircraft—possible.”
+
+Following the June mutiny, the Kremlin is now forced to come up with a plan dealing with the reorganization of Wagner’s ongoing operations in Africa as seamlessly as possible. As one of Prigozhin’s people stated after the uprising, “entire sectors of Russian foreign policy are dependent on the assets of Wagner PMC abroad, and if they are removed, there will be a rapid compression of Russian influence, more in Africa, to a lesser extent in Syria.” In fact, the CAR leadership has already expressed concerns regarding the Wagner chief’s highly precarious position inside Russia and how this would impact the PMC’s presence in the country; yet the leadership has also declared readiness to sign contracts with other Russian “instructors,” should Moscow decide so.
+
+Therefore, no matter how the war in Ukraine plays out or how the fate of Prigozhin is ultimately decided, the Kremlin will likely have strong incentives to maintain its use of PMCs—including a restructured Wagner Group or its subsidiaries—in Africa to ensure uninterrupted access to the continent’s gold reserves, among other benefits, and to destabilize Western strategic partnerships with different African states. Importantly, as the invasion of Ukraine will inevitably produce more veterans seeking adequate remuneration amid Russia’s wartime economy, it can be expected that Russian PMCs might expand the size and scale of their current operations in Africa.
+
+
+### What to Do Now? New Offer, New Tactics, and New Branding
+
+Russia’s forays in Africa present the West with serious strategic dilemmas, as letting Russia expand further affects the United States and allied interests, but attacking it head-on can backfire and end up fueling Moscow’s narrative, something recently experienced by France.
+
+On the one hand, the West cannot afford to stand idle and resort only to “strategic patience,” as the stakes are too high considering that Africa is the continent with the youngest and fastest-growing population, with daunting challenges that have direct consequences for global security and stability. Russia is both uninterested and unable to foster sound and sustainable development in Africa, as it does not provide substantial aid nor capacity building beyond the military-security realm. Instead, its entrenchment can only compound the challenges that Africa faces and comes with major risks, especially for Europe.
+
+On the other hand, it would be delusive to expect new grand strategies at times when the United States and Europe struggle to sustain their joint efforts in the two most pressing theaters of strategic competition: Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific. Traditional key Western stakeholders in Africa such as the United States and France have both recently heralded a “reframing” of their approaches, in which the security component is relegated to the background, to the benefit of political, economic, and social engagements. This is a sound evolution—especially considering that ongoing Russian efforts in these arenas are rather limited—but it leaves free ground for Russian progress in the security realm.
+
+The new rules of engagement for the West to confront Russia in Africa therefore stand somewhere between “strategic patience” and “grand strategy.” This section lays out recommendations for Western policymakers, stressing the importance of equal footing cooperation with African partners in order to offer attractive and efficient alternatives catered to the region’s security and prosperity aspirations.
+
+#### Overarching Recommendations
+
+- Devise a security cooperation package that will be principled but not transactional.
+
+Russia’s current approach of providing security assistance through Wagner remains attractive to many African nations despite it being expensive in the longer term (local governments have to pay the PMC for its services in addition to accepting its multiyear commercial conditions, while also losing at least part of Western aid and risking sanctions). This is because the “regime survival package” offered by Russia in the region, which is beset by chronic instability and military coups, supersedes any other potential gains from traditional cooperation agreements advanced by Western partners, which are usually based on institutional capacity building instead of securing the authorities themselves.
+
+In Mali, for instance, Wagner agreed to provide the Malian authorities with helicopters and ammunition that the French were always reluctant to consider due to rising levels of violence and continued insurgencies, among other reasons. This issue calls for a more horizontal and less vertical Western approach to cooperation that will remain principled, but not based on conditions. Western security assistance should thus ultimately serve political objectives that are consistent with the transatlantic community’s values and principles, but due diligence should be conducted upstream through arms control policies and downstream through accompaniment and monitoring—not during the negotiation phase or political engagement, so as to alleviate the sentiment that Western support is a politically motivated bargaining chip.
+
+- Redouble efforts in the energy domain.
+
+Russia does not thrive in Africa only through Wagner and security assistance, even though its efforts in this regard are particularly extensive. Moscow also offers assistance in the energy domain, notably through a push for nuclear energy to meet the continent’s growing needs. While Western countries are late to engage in energy diplomacy in Africa, they should redouble their efforts, as this will be one of the key parameters of strategic competition on the continent. Engaging in energy diplomacy is also central to countering the widespread narrative that Western countries are only interested in plundering the continent’s resources for their own prosperity, without benefiting Africans.
+
+- Build strategic partnerships free from “neo–Cold War” perceptions.
+
+In order to be recognized as a preferable alternative to Russia, the West should direct its efforts toward the key “swing states”: major regional players that maintain close ties with the Kremlin, such as Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt. Yet the Western reengagement should not resemble a neo–Cold War approach, forcing the countries to take sides through “carrots and sticks.” Instead, it should take the form of a strategic dialogue aimed at better understanding why these African states maintain ties with Russia, in order to assess if the West can offer something more attractive. The West should also strengthen partnerships with other countries on the continent committed to building functioning institutions, robust militaries, and strong technological bases, including but not limited to Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya, and Botswana, especially when those countries are courted by Russia.
+
+- Actively prove Russian narratives wrong.
+
+The West should continue exposing the failures of corrupt regimes, especially those that engage in mafia-type deals with the Russian government, as well as widespread atrocities and human rights abuses committed by Russia-linked groups—including Wagner paramilitaries—in Africa. But perhaps more importantly, the United States and the European Union should promote their own success stories in the region, while also reflecting on the legitimate concerns of many African nations. The West should also invest more in establishing or supporting reliable local pan-African media outlets promoting African voices and perspectives on key regional issues.
+
+- Engage with new partners that are more palatable to the African public.
+
+Many African countries are enthusiastic about increased “South to South” cooperation and would welcome engagement with leaders from the Global South. However, these relations remain largely nascent at this stage, as the major nonaligned states such as Brazil or India are also figuring out how to best engage with Africa. In the longer term, increased “triangulation” between Africa, the Global South, and the West could prove mutually beneficial, with India and Brazil becoming the key partners in this effort as they are pro-democracy without appearing anti-Russian.
+
+- Preserve an ability to act against traditional and potential new threats.
+
+Russia’s continued advances in Africa are also risk multipliers, with the most prominent one being rising levels of terrorism in the countries where Russians, including Wagner fighters, set foot. According to the 2022 Global Terrorism Index, 48 percent of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, with three of the top ten countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—all having a Wagner presence. Increased levels of terrorism coupled with the ongoing Russian hybrid warfare efforts in the region—including information warfare and cyberattacks, weaponization of migration, and disruption of critical infrastructure—have the potential to further fuel instability and insecurity on the continent. Facing these threats implies that the West should retain certain capabilities in the region, including defensive equipment and airlift options, to protect both Western citizens and African partners in case of serious violent outbreaks, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to disclose intelligence on Wagner’s nefarious activities on the continent to partners in Africa and dissuade them from partnering with the PMC. Finally, the United States and its allies should also retain an ability to carry out defensive strikes against Wagner in the event of an assault, as happened in Syria in 2018.
+
+#### Country-Specific Recommendations
+
+- The United States: Africa is too important to be let down.
+
+Recently published public documents, as well as statements by U.S. government officials, show Washington’s eagerness to treat African countries as peer partners, which undoubtedly is a positive development. But to be effective, the United States should adopt a whole of Africa strategy rather than only a sub-Saharan strategy, especially when it comes to challenging Russian advances across the continent, given the interconnectedness between North Africa, the Sahel strip, and sub-Saharan Africa.
+
+- Europe: Get serious about “Europeanisation.”
+
+France has been the main prey of Russia’s forays in Africa. Anti-French sentiment and the Russian disinformation apparatus have become so entrenched in certain parts of the continent that any French-led effort to turn the tide tends to result in adverse outcomes. France has therefore opted for a transformation of its relations with Africa, presented by President Macron on February 27, 2023, as an intention to build a “new, balanced, reciprocal, and responsible relationship” underpinned by the expressed needs of African partners. This entails a reduction of France’s military personnel across the continent, following the termination of the Barkhane counterterrorism operation in Sahel late last year, and co-management with African partners of French military bases on the continent (except for the one in Djibouti dedicated to the Indo-Pacific strategy). The expectation is that reducing the focus on security and defense will move the otherwise rich Franco-African cooperation into the limelight.
+
+Most Europeans welcome the ongoing reorientations in France’s strategic thinking. Yet if Paris lowers its profile, this requires others to step up, both at the national and EU levels. Paris has pushed for years for Europeans to get more involved in Africa—for example through the Takuba task force in the Sahel, or more recently through the “Team Europe” coordinated initiative between member states and EU institutions resulting in trips to Ethiopia, Niger, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Despite genuine French efforts at coordination, the view in some European capitals has sometimes been that France looks after its own interests in Africa, and then seeks partners to share the burden. Right or wrong, this view could prove an obstacle for Paris. In the meantime, France’s unique know-how and assets, let alone francophone connections and the importance of the African diaspora in France—the largest in Europe—will remain indispensable. Paris should therefore be genuine in its effort to empower other Europeans to take on increased responsibilities.
+
+At the national level, some European countries are expected to step up and seem to be willing to do so. This is the case for Germany, which has steadily increased its presence in the Sahel and recently completed its first-ever Sahel strategy. With a less visible colonial record on the continent, Germany could appear as a more acceptable partner than France in many places. Some perceived German weaknesses at the European level, such as its absence from the UN Security Council or its alleged leniency vis-à-vis Russia, could conversely prove to be assets for building confidence with Africans. But Germany will need to convince African states that it can be not only an assistance provider but also a partner for security cooperation.
+
+Spain also nurtures ambitions to become a strategic partner to Africa. Madrid has repeatedly voiced its interests for increased collective engagement with the Global South—notably Latin America and Africa—through EU or NATO efforts, and it will continue advocating for this cause during its presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2023. In its recently released “Africa strategy,” Madrid pledges to send a warship to the Gulf of Guinea to fight piracy and increase security in the region.
+
+Next, the United Kingdom, although not a member of the European Union, remains one of the most knowledgeable European players on Africa-related issues, as well as one of the most active and experienced actors confronting Russian threats worldwide. Despite a low interest for Africa in its Integrated Review, London heralds that it will keep prioritizing Europe’s “wider neighborhood.” Therefore, the country could become an important player in the region, should it have the political will to do so.
+
+Finally, at the European level, the most recent declaration of the European Union–African Union summit held in February 2022 has committed to renewing and enhancing “cooperation for peace and security.” EU missions in Africa, which were generally assembled upon French request, have been collateral victims of Russia’s progress. The European Union seems aware of the need to change its approach and is experimenting with new forms of partnership—such as the one with Niger, in which the African country was given the lead on operations, with European supply of equipment through the European Peace Facility and growing bilateral support from several member states. Although the coup in Niger has put an end to this experiment in a very fragile state, this approach was certainly going in the right direction and could be replicated in other, more stable countries. In general, the European Peace Facility, as an instrument initially conceived of in Paris to support its own efforts in Africa (taking over the Africa Peace Facility) and later reoriented to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces, should be supported in a way to fund efforts in both theaters. The European Peace Facility has the potential to be a very competitive instrument, with due diligence carried out up front to ensure that arms are supplied into safe hands, for clear and shared objectives. Failing to do so could add to the sentiment of double standards and frustration in the relations between Africa and Europe.
+
+---
+
+__Mathieu Droin__ is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on transatlantic European security and defense.
+
+__Tina Dolbaia__ is a research associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS, where she examines and analyzes political, economic, and security developments in Russia and Eurasia.

From 318de61ef3a4b44e2f9c9507639c0b89510813e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2023 02:09:14 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 07/19] 0x20 Add _columns posts, Sep.01

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 .../_columns/2023-08-05-give-up-fantasy.md    |  81 ++++++++++++
 ...23-08-08-pedophobia-in-chinese-internet.md | 117 ++++++++++++++++
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-07-29-go-back-to-america-and-be-an-angry-american.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-29-go-back-to-america-and-be-an-angry-american.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "回到美国，做一个愤怒的美国人"
+author: "胡铁花、姬冰雁"
+date  : 2023-07-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/421znnX.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+2022年，在海外生活十八年后，我决定搬回美国。我离开时，美国还是小布什的任期，那时我对自己的国家谈不上喜欢，但我至少理解此处的政治和生活。这次回来，我渐渐明白要重新适应这个国家的很多变化。而这段重新成为美国人的过程，让我常常怒不可泄。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+海外这些年，我不太关注美国的。这倒不是因为我憎恶自己的国家，只是在异国，有很多事、很多人分去我的注意力。不过，有时候是否关注美国并不是我能决定的事。离开美国不久，卡崔娜飓风横扫美国东南的新闻就天天挂在全球电视上。我的新朋友们问我，为什么小布什这么讨厌美国黑人？我张口却不知说什么，他们的观察没有错误，但也不能说完全正确。三年后，我在距离华盛顿半个地球的商场里，从一个巨型广告屏幕上看到奥巴马当选总统，改写了美国历史。我曾经以为有生之年是看不到黑人成为美国总统的，更想不到四年后他还会连任。
+
+在我们小时候，大人总爱说：“在这个国家，任何人都有可能当总统。”这是为了使我们觉得自己的机会是无限的。2016年总统大选后，我好奇有多少人不愿意再说这句话。几十年前，特朗普不过是个纽约骗子，是个为了踏入上流社会不择手段的社会残渣。为了上新闻，他甚至伪装成别人给《纽约邮报》打电话，传播关于自己的绯闻八卦。基努里维斯1997年的电影《魔鬼代言人》里，阿尔帕西诺扮演了魔鬼，他住在一座穷奢极欲、塞满各种洛可可装饰品的公寓里——那不是电影搭建的场景，而是特朗普的公寓。如果MTV频道或网飞要拍摄一部《土豪窝》的节目，《魔鬼代言人》应该是第一集，以及之后的每一集。
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/HwoqYBu.png)
+▲ 2023年6月11日，佛罗里达州迈阿密，朗普持支特者戴上面具祝他生日快乐。
+
+2016年选战中，特朗普的对手希拉里，此前曾在白宫扮演第一夫人八年，之后她成为纽约州议员，八年后她又在奥巴马时代做了四年国务卿。不管你如何看待希拉里这个人，她的确是美国历史上最有政治经验和资格的候选人之一。我至今还记得，在候选人辩论节目中，希拉里看著身边这个结结巴巴、胡言乱语的真人秀明星，脸上常常露出“我在哪儿”的困惑。我很明白那种感觉，但显然，对很多美国人来说这不重要。
+
+特朗普获选那天，我请了病假，回到家里偷偷哭泣，巨大的耻辱和失望裹挟著我。当时我和很多人还不知道，特朗普尽然在这个位置上坐到任期结束，我们更没有预料到他能给美国带来如此深重的伤害。从那天开始，我曾经熟悉的美国急转直下，一路向著愚蠢、向著特权、向著罪恶狂飙。
+
+很快，恶果现形。特朗普的高级顾问Kellyanne Conway将“另类事实”（alternative facts）一词带入公众视野，那之前我们更习惯用“谎言”来称呼这一类的事情。她宣布的第一个另类事实是，特朗普的加冕典礼是历史上最多人观看的加冕典礼。这当然是个谎言，但这已经不重要了。人们说，特朗普还来不及给他新说的谎言穿上靴子，这些另类事实就已经跑遍半个地球。到新冠肺炎开始的时候，特朗普政府制造的另类事实已经宛如脱缰的野马，肆虐整个国家。多亏福克斯“新闻”的帮助，这些野马跑起来还有翅膀。
+
+很多美国人因为听信这些“新闻”，拒绝打疫苗，拒绝戴口罩。前几天朋友聚会，我遇见Fred，他是个成功的商人，生意全球都是；他也是个和蔼友好的中年人，对朋友和家人都非常好。但Fred也是福克斯新闻的忠实消费者，他告诉我“伊维菌素”是治疗新冠的特效药，而且比疫苗要安全得多。他的朋友测出阳性后，服用伊维菌素，药到病除。Fred表示，如果他也得了新冠，肯定会选择伊维菌素。而他和他的朋友是从哪里知道这个灵丹妙药的呢？福克斯新闻。Fred的岳父也在席间，听闻此言哈哈大笑。这个拥有一座牧场的男人对我说：“伊维菌素是给马吃的药，可以杀死马肚子里的寄生虫。Fred真是个蠢货！”
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/vRiSnIf.jpg)
+▲ 2021年1月6日，美国参众两院确认候任总统拜登胜出上年的总统选举期间，数千名特朗普支持者在国会外聚集。
+
+2020年，我在异国看到拜登当选，特朗普离开白宫，本以为这是铁定的事实。但回到美国，我发现特朗普和福克斯新闻并不承认这个事实，他们的信徒也不相信此事。这让我终于明白为什么2021年一月六号，真的有人会去华盛顿颠覆政府，“恢复”特朗普的总统职位。小布什时代，我觉得政府里最可怕的人是所谓茶党，一群当时看来非常激进的保守派。时间证明我错了，和现在的保守派相比，茶党可爱得像Hello Kitty。共和党内拥护“让美国再次伟大的”人中，有人把德国盖世太保（Gestapo）说成西班牙番茄冷汤（gazpacho）；还有人连高中都没毕业，就被选到国家部门工作。这位女士会给支持自己的选民寄全家福照片做得圣诞贺卡，在贺卡上你能看到她、她的儿子们都人手一把步枪。明年她就37岁了，明年的贺卡上她还能加上新出生的孙子。
+
+回到后特朗普的美国，我并没有错过太多前总统创造的混乱。身在教育界，很难看不到佛罗里达州的恐怖运动。新任州长Ron Desantis最近宣布要对“觉醒”（Woke）宣战。这位共和党人在党内总统候选人的竞争中，遥遥落后于特朗普。为了赢得青睐，他效仿特朗普，讨好不富裕的白人选民，甚至说自己反对“常春藤名校毕业的华盛顿菁英”，虽然他本人先后毕业于耶鲁和哈佛。他也比照特朗普的行为，不断发出极度种族歧视的言语，最近他甚至支持佛罗里达州的一项教育法案，要在公立学校宣扬黑人其实是美国奴隶制度的受益者。我想，他可能很快会说纳粹集中营治好了犹太痴肥症患者——我这样说的时候，我的家人和朋友都觉得我在开玩笑，觉得这玩笑太过分了。但是真的过分吗？我们的总统候选人已经在洗白美国历史上最大的误点了！
+
+回国半年，我渐渐明白这些虚伪的政治言论虽然不具备任何逻辑，但很吻合当下的社会气质。一个美国政客如今不需要讲真话，他/她要讲的是能够激起支持者反应的话。哪怕为了达到这样的效果，需要撒谎。而当他真的撒谎，他的支持者其实也知道他在撒谎，但他们都不在乎。一旦他当选为领导人，那些不支持他的人就完蛋了，他的信徒会狐假虎威，在大街小巷攻击这些异端。信徒把任何比自己左的人（有些人觉得成吉思汗也是左派）称为“玻璃心”，但他们自己却杯弓蛇影，去星巴克喝咖啡都要带著步枪壮胆。他们认为希拉里和拜登的儿子应该进监狱——因为福克斯新闻这么说，但同时他们觉得特朗普是猎巫行动的受害者。
+
+这个国家曾经登上月球，今时今日如何退化至此？在太空里，宇航员拍下了地球的照片——蓝色的球状行星。我知道特朗普不是“地球是平的”这个傻蛋运动的始作俑者，但我觉得他和此类文化相互成就，共同撰写了美国历史的新篇章——“愚人纪元”。落笔时，几位州立检察官和联邦检察官正在准备再次起诉特朗普。在他们公布的材料中，我发现也许对治罪特朗普最具有攻击性的证人就是特朗普，他不断释放出让自己入罪的言论。但在“愚人纪元”，这些证据、法理不重要，特朗普目前还是最受支持的共和党总统候选人。支持他的人不相信这些材料，因此也不承认这些材料。政府的控诉不过是另外的不重要的事实。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/2alt990.jpg)
+▲ 2023年7月18日，加州州立大学鲨鱼实验室在海滩向初级救生员进行鲨鱼教育演讲时，手握灰鲭鲨眼睛。
+
+
+### 我怎么能不生气？
+
+但反观生气的自己，我又觉得这种生气本身也是当下美国社会的产物。我回来得越久，就越发现在今天的美国，好像每个人都在生气，这个国家已经堕落成为分裂的互相仇恨的部落组合。每个人都在仇恨每个人，没有人想听到除了自己以外的声音——仇恨和自恋自怜跨越了党派、地域。在没有事实的国度里，每个人拥有自己的事实。
+
+这一周是探索频道的“鲨鱼周”，一连五天黄金档节目都是关于鲨鱼的内容。于是有人批判说只讲关于鲨鱼的科学发现，而不提“人类男子汉如何抵御鲨鱼”，这是自由主义媒体的阴谋——自由主义者希望美国男人都变得更阴柔；同一时间，也有人说“鲨鱼周”是种族主义的节目，因为太多内容都在关注大“白”鲨。一篇学生的论文试图证明《西线无战事》是在“宣扬战争的荣光，宣扬有毒的男性气质”，尽管这本书是人类文学史上最著名的反战小说之一。但是对支持这个论点的人来说，一本书描述了战争就是支持战争。也有学生说我肯定恐同，因为我是直男。
+
+这一类的争吵哪怕只是发生在流行文化场域已经足够让人头疼，但还有更多类似事情在更有影响力的政治圈发生。像我这么爱开玩笑的人，看到一家五口拿著枪拍全家福照片时，更多的不是想笑，而是哭。外国人永远无法理解美国人对于枪的非理性的执念，而作为美国人的我也无法解释这种执念，因为持有这种理念的人根本就不讲逻辑。他们表现得无所畏惧、刀枪不入，但会在Facebook专门发帖抵制新的《芭比》电影，认为这些电影会把他们的孩子变弯。这些人和其他美国人一样活在自己的泡泡里，他们关于外界所有的信息都来自于美国媒体。
+
+在海外这些年，我清楚看到美国电影如何把美国人描绘成嗜血爱枪的暴力鬼。但更多此类图像其实来自于美国新闻媒体。二十年前就有很多研究表面，美国犯罪率实际上在下降，但新闻中关于暴力的报导却一直在上升。但现在，不管是新闻中还是现实里，暴力都在增加。2023年甚至还没有过完第三个季度，全美已经有超过400起大规模枪击事件，不是4起、不是40起，是400起。美国都市人看上去仍然保有文明的作风，并不是因为我们比别人更善良，而是因为我们不知道身边有没有带枪的人、有没有精神不稳定的人、有没有想闹事的人。如果你在芝加哥插队，那么你就有可能被打上一枪；这也是为什么美国电影院里很少有人讲电话，因为真的有人是因为这样被袭击的。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/GXQAR99.jpg)
+▲ 2023年4月3日，美国田纳西州纳什维尔，示威者聚集在议会大楼外抗议，要求对该州的枪支改革法采取行动。一名示威者拿著一扇破碎的窗户，模仿著被枪射击的额头。
+
+这都不是新鲜事，但如今你可能会因为敲错门被打死、因为上错车被打死，你可能会在纽约地铁上被人掐死，而福克斯新闻还会表扬凶手是个好人——社会对于有色人种和其他边缘化人的歧视和暴力紧紧相连。显然，现在光是有枪是不够的，光是能携带枪枝也是不够的，你还需要会开枪、能开枪。如果你没有开枪的权力，自由主义者就会偷走你的枪、把你的孩子变成同性恋。美国的确左右分歧很大，左派也有很多愤怒的暴力的人，但大部分拔出枪伤害无辜者的人来自右派，右派也是声称没有可能改善现状的政党。
+
+我和我的美国式愤怒也不是完全没救，我依然不相信这个国家就要完蛋。在一切混乱中，我也看到一些让人欣慰的不同。比起二十年前的美国，现在有更多不同的人出现在公众视野里：彩色头发、纹身、残疾、男女同志、各国移民。他们看上去比以前更从容，很多以前没有这些人身影的工作场合如今也变得开放了。更多的真实的人涌现在我的生活里，我希望大家能看到和听到彼此，哪怕我们聊天的话题还是老生常谈。但听一个女人谈论堕胎，始终和听一群男人不同；听一个移民小孩谈论移民问题，始终和听一个本土主义者不同。
+
+如果我们的新闻和政治里能多一些这样的真实，我们不至于如此愤怒。
+
+<!--END-->
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "捨幻"
+author: "天洛卡"
+date  : 2023-08-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/2azdaO3.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+「不要走。」她緊緊擁著我，微微抬首，熱淚盈眶。
+
+「別這樣。」我口裡拒絕，心裡卻是萬般不捨。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+「這裡不好嗎？鳥語花香，豪華大宅、美酒佳餚。還有，我和小思都在這裡！」她輕輕招手，招來小思——我們的愛女。
+
+年僅五歲的小思胖胖白白，兩眼水汪汪，腦後頂著兩彎稀疏的小辮子。她鼓起兩頰紅透的小腮子，模仿媽媽的動作，摟抱著我的小腿。
+
+她們的每一句話、每一個動作都正中我的軟肋，硬生生將我的理智和情感撕裂。
+
+沒法子。
+
+她們的外形來自我的記憶，言行源於我的心念，再加上高端科技營造出來的聲音、氣味、觸感，二人活脫脫就在我眼前、我懷中！
+
+「對不起……」沒等她們再次開口，我斷然脫下頭盔，離開虛擬世界。
+
+暗黑的狹窄環境與虛擬世界內的柔和日光形成強烈對比，我的腦袋和眼睛霎時間適應不來，暈頭轉向，整個人從床上滾掉到地面去。
+
+店員大叔數秒後硬闖入內，見我神智尚算清醒，才鬆一口氣。
+
+「先生，事前我向你解釋過流程，你應該知道強行脫下頭盔的後果可大可小。輕則昏迷數天，重則永久癱瘓神經系統，變成植物人。」大叔外表粗豪，說起話來卻是婆婆媽媽的。
+
+我硬撐起身子，背靠床架癱坐著，勉定心神，穩住呼吸節奏後，不忘向大叔道歉：「不好意思，嚇壞了你。」
+
+不知何解，大叔突然愣住。
+
+「如果機器因為我的行為而損壞，我會賠償。」我是個負責任的男人，無論對人對事皆然。我為此自豪。
+
+「不是這個意思……」大叔終於反應過來，上前攙扶我到休息室去。他拿來熱毛巾，敷在我的前額。
+
+熱力令我清醒不少，但隨之而來的卻是劇烈頭痛。
+
+「忍耐一會吧。」大叔自顧自在我身邊吞雲吐霧：「誰叫你不依規矩！」
+
+「不得不走。」我心如刀割：「我擔心自己會永遠沉溺。」
+
+「親人離世？」大叔夾菸的兩指故態自若。
+
+「你看得出來？」我忍痛瞇眼打量大叔。他是個面容滄桑的大漢。
+
+「顧客願意花大錢前來光顧我店，大都是因為抵不住親人離世的傷痛。」大叔意味深長地補上一句：「你不是唯一一個。」
+
+「所以我不該感到悲傷？」我聽見話裡的話。
+
+「所以你有能力捱過去——因為大家都捱過去了。」大叔輕視我的悲傷？
+
+「我不是他們！他們亦不是我！」我有點兒憤怒。
+
+「我知道。他們花掉大量金錢懷緬過去，直至身無分文才如夢初醒，不得不重投生活、找工作賺錢，然後漸漸忘記傷痛。只有你，有本事打斷自己的思念之情，爽快俐落地回歸生活——你剛才主動向我道歉，而不是恃著自己的悲傷鬱結鬧脾氣。」大叔遞菸予我。
+
+我接過香菸，將它玩弄於指間。
+
+菸紙的雪白、菸紙的粗糙質地、菸草的濃烈氣味、菸草被手指擠壓時的微弱碎裂聲響、濾嘴被叼在唇間時散發的淡淡化學味道，一切真實而空虛，沒有靈魂。
+
+像虛擬世界。
+
+「這個……」我放下香菸，掏出銀包裡所有紙鈔予大叔：「謝謝。」
+
+大叔欣然收下，俏皮笑道：「後會無期。」
+
+「承你貴言。」我頭痛依然，心痛冉退。
+
+店外，夜色蒼茫。
+
+我回望店面的霓虹招牌——紫白藍綠四色甚有節奏地閃爍著，耀眼奪目。
+
+但只消放寬眼界，就會發現它只是萬千燈火裡的其一，毫不起眼。
+
+<!--END-->
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "中国互联网上的厌童症"
+author: "李大猫"
+date  : 2023-08-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/vGj5S06.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "我们不是厌童，而是正在失去儿童"
+---
+
+在日渐缺少活力，挤不出有实际意义的热词的中文互联网上，2023年夏天“厌童”一词绵延月余的热度确实罕见。当然，争论的形式毫不新鲜：从丽江不欢迎儿童的咖啡馆、高铁儿童哭闹被歧视、再到韩国无儿童区普及……
+
+<!--more-->
+
+擅长总结现象、诊断“病症”的媒体将零星的“舆情事件”串联起来，再用一贯的“当代年轻人图鉴”“这届年轻人……”“那些xxx的年轻人现在都怎么样了”“北上广的年轻人，现在正在……”等句式，总结出可供传播的热词。2020年代，中国年轻人总是遭到反复诊断，毕竟“这届年轻人”贫乏的生活几乎是当下简中语言唯一被允许丰富的地方。
+
+不出意外，厌童被诊断出的“病因”仍旧是“独生子女经历/边界意识强/工作压力大/生活空间小”。这些原因也被用来解释恐婚恐育、断亲（不和亲戚往来）、宅家、躺平、反内卷、算命、搬家去鹤岗等一系列现象。毕竟经济紧缩的当下社会弥漫着焦虑和悲观的氛围，被视为累赘的又何止是儿童。不过，除了帮工作和婚育双重压力下的年轻人哭惨，厌童的话题值得进一步发掘：是否想要生育子女更多取决于对较短时期内生存状况的权衡和预期；但如果真的出现了对广泛的儿童群体的厌弃，则意味着整套社会观念的系统变化。
+
+当然，我们难以精确统计人们对儿童态度的变化，但根据《澎湃新闻》最近发起的调查，已育和未育人群中表示可以忍受儿童吵闹的均不到一半。进一步说，“能不能忍受孩子”会成为一个话题，本身就暗示了变化——在主流舆论渲染儿童是祖国的花朵、纯洁的安琪儿的时代，这个问题根本不会被毫无顾忌地公开讨论。
+
+社会对儿童态度的变化之快往往超乎人们的感知。外/祖父母抚养儿童的隔代养育在20世纪八、九十年代还是少数情况，但2021年的统计显示，城市各年龄段儿童中受到隔代养育的近80%，农村则在90%以上。两代人教育和抚养理念的巨大差距往往在小家庭中制造激烈的冲突。成人对待儿童态度和方式的变化，既取决于社会发展状况和生活水平，也取决于围绕年龄的知识和文化的生成。
+
+其实，现如今的“儿童”概念本身就是一种只有三四百年历史的文化；在中国甚至只有一个多世纪，和反殖民、社会启蒙、现代化追求、中产阶级发展都大有关系。在整个二十世纪，儿童曾扮演多种重要角色，如今时移势易，与其说是年轻人越来越厌恶儿童，不如说儿童这个社会角色正在失去其社会意义。
+
+
+### “发现”儿童，需要经济基础
+
+世事艰难的时候，儿童的性命尚难保全，“童年”的概念就更难成立。
+
+21世纪所讨论的厌童是相对于现代“重视儿童、喜爱儿童“的社会仪轨而言的，但人类历史的大部分时间，成人对儿童都不甚在意。
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/qLgNKSE.jpg)
+▲ 2014年4月2日，中国北京，一名女孩站在寄养中心的婴儿床上。
+
+在漫长的古代，人类的平均寿命时常只有三四十岁，婴儿夭折率更是极高，今天可以预防和治疗的百日咳、白喉、麻疹、水痘、天花等传染病都是致命的。即便晚近如明清、优越如皇室也是如此。比如顺治皇帝生育了14个子女，只有4子1女活到7岁以上；康熙之所以能8岁即位，一个重要原因是他得过天花而获得了免疫力，有更大希望活到成年。古人应对婴幼儿高死亡率的方式是在有限的条件下尽可能多生，但避免在一个孩子身上投入过多物质，尤其是感情。历史学家在《儿童的世纪》一书中提到，中世纪的欧洲人对待孩子就像一些现代人对待宠物：宠溺（mignotage）逗弄但并不在意。很多婴儿夜间在全家人睡着的拥挤床铺上被疲惫的父母压死。人们甚至会这样安慰已经育有多个子女的产妇：“在这些小淘气给你制造许多麻烦之前，他们就可能死了一半，甚至全部死了”。
+
+除了自然夭亡，在生活条件恶劣、又没有重视儿童文化的时代，弃婴和杀婴非常普遍。古希腊和罗马，子女是父母的财产，弃婴是管理家庭规模的常见手段，有一系列诸如Ektithêmi（暴露，类似英语expose）等词语来委婉地表示这种行为，荷马史诗、赫西俄德《神谱》和悲喜剧中充满了这样的记载。在日本，江户时期经济泡沫破灭、生活水平陡降导致了杀婴的大流行。人们为免良心揹负杀人的负担，发明了杀婴还神的说法：七岁之前的孩子是神的孩子，如果没有养活或杀死，就是把孩子还给了神明。中国出土的秦朝《睡虎地秦简·法律答问》中即有禁止杀婴的规定，历代关于杀婴的刑法愈发严峻，这种行为仍屡禁不止，在宋、清两朝尤其严重。
+
+宋朝杀婴的主要原因之一是苛捐杂税，时人描述为“古者刻剥之法，本朝皆备”。苏轼在书信中写道，“岳、鄂间田野小人，例只养二男一女，过此辄杀之。”一个“辄”字道出了杀婴之普遍。南宋国土面积缩小、军费增加，平民的赋税压力更加沉重。因为国家地少人多，按人头收取的“身丁银”成为盘剥百姓的主要方式。因此，尽管南宋朝廷大力鼓励生育，但无人响应，反而是杀婴愈演愈烈。
+
+清初因为生产力发展、税制改革等原因，人口激增超出了土地承受能力，导致广泛饥馑，“薅子”“洗儿”（都是杀婴的委婉说法）成为风气。《二十四孝图》中“郭巨埋儿”的故事在今天被视为愚孝、残酷、反自然的代表，但在“二十四孝”流行的清代，人们有不同的逻辑。康熙年间的《福惠全书》写道：“（百姓杀子）盖因贫不能自赡，,而又乳哺以妨力作，,襁褓以费营求，,故与其为一以累二，,毋宁存老而弃小”——老人有养育之恩和浓厚亲情；而婴儿尚未和成人建立牢固的情感纽带，不仅难以存活，还会拖累孕产妇、减少家庭劳动力。
+
+抛开孝道，“存老弃小”甚至是某种理性的选择。清代还有一种特殊景观：婴儿塔。其外形是佛塔，供人抛弃婴儿，任其自生自灭。直到二十世纪上半叶，战乱贫困之下婴儿塔仍有人使用。左联五烈士之一，22岁遇害的诗人殷夫的代表作《孩儿塔》就是关于这一习俗的。
+
+世事艰难的时候，儿童的性命尚难保全，“童年”的概念就更难成立。欧洲中世纪直到文艺复兴时期的绘画中涉及的婴儿形象（比如达芬奇笔下的圣婴）大多是被画成等比例缩小的成人体态，乍看有些怪异。这种绘画表现的不是当时的儿童，而是当时人们关于儿童的观念——小一号的成人。颇为伤感的是，七八岁之前的孩子不被当成完整的人，七八岁之后有自理能力的孩子就直接被当成大人，承担家庭重担。平民家庭的孩子不是和父母一起做农活，就是在城里当学徒、助手、跑堂或仆役，换取免费的食宿和一技之长，女孩还可能关在家里学习家务女红。十几岁的时候，他们就要正式组建新的家庭，中外大体相似。
+
+富裕家庭的孩子可以接受教育，免于直接参加劳动。但教育场所中往往不同年龄学生杂处，不仅有和成人世界一样严格的礼节、仪态要求，课程的内容也是直接围绕成人世界中的职业准备。中国古代的私塾首要是面向科举；今天焦虑的家长送学龄前的幼儿提前学习中小学课程、训练特长、外语、编程……名义上是启发智力，培养兴趣，实际上也是类似的逻辑——成人世界的生存压力太大，家长希望孩子尽早准备，提升自己未来作为成年人力资源的价值。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/ucK6HdQ.jpg)
+▲ 2020年6月30日，中国武汉，一对父子在被洪水淹没的公园内，拿着橡胶圈游泳。
+
+
+### 欣赏儿童就是相信进步
+
+在中国现代化话语中，儿童是属于未来的进步力量；是民族乃至人类的希望。保护儿童，就是保护民族和人类的未来。
+
+那么，纯洁、天真、充满希望、需要呵护的“儿童”概念何以诞生？这个渐进的过程得益于现代化过程中生活水准的改善、中产家庭生活方式的形成和人文主义的思想改革。
+
+在欧洲，婴幼儿存活率逐渐提高，鼓励成人在他们身上倾注感情。同时，形成中的民族国家逐渐削弱封建贵族、庄园主的势力、打散庞大的家族、行会等社会组织，把人们作为个体重新组织为国家的公民和劳动力。在这个背景下，能够自由流动的原子化个人组成一夫一妻的小家庭。这种新型的核心家庭不再仅仅是物质生产的联盟，而逐渐继承了其他社会组织的情感功能，家人之间更加亲密。同时，中产阶级“男主外、女主内”的生活模式确立，妇女被排除出职业生活，成为了全职的儿童养育者。
+
+17-18世纪，儿童专门的服装、用具、读本和关于育儿技巧、儿童生理心理特点的书籍开始大量出现。中产阶级家长不再让孩子去别人家做工，而是让他们在家庭教师和学校的帮助下接受启蒙教育。儿童专门教育的出现，要得益于人文主义，尤其是启蒙运动让人自身成为了哲学和科学探究的主要对象，儿童也作为人的初始阶段得到了关注乃至迷恋。
+
+卢梭被称为是西方第一个发现儿童的人，他写道：“大自然希望儿童在成人以前就要像儿童的样子。如果我们打乱这个次序，就会造成早熟的果实……造就一些年纪轻轻的博士和老态龙钟的儿童”。卢梭认为儿童应当按照儿童自身的发展规律引导和呵护，发挥他们的求知欲、好奇心、热情和爱心，尊重他们的自由天性。更重要的是，他秉持自然主义观点，认为儿童比矫揉造作、事故老练的成人更贴近自然、高尚、更有价值，首次明确地将儿童的价值置于成人之上。当然，文化的变革往往是观念先行。在卢梭歌颂童年的时候，第一次工业革命正让无数儿童沦为生产线上的童工，受到比以往更加严苛的系统性剥削。中产阶级教育家的呼吁并不能抗衡资本主义对廉价劳动力的索求，直到二十世纪初，欧洲的儿童处境才逐渐改善，大部分能够接受基础教育。
+
+中国现代童年观的一个显著特点，是它和社会改革、进步的迫切需求紧密结合。明末思想家李贽首倡“童心说”，从童心可贵带出真心可贵，其目的是为了抗击成人社会虚伪不公的秩序、宣扬离经叛道的改革观念，可惜他的思想未能开花结果。从晚清到民国，“童年”的观念和其他西方思想一道，作为舶来品进入中国，较早吸纳现代童年观的日本人在中国兴办的小学也从旁促进了中国现代儿童观念的形成。
+
+清末民初的知识分子，从洋务派到康梁，再到蔡元培、鲁迅一代新文化领袖，都特别重视儿童问题。对他们而言，儿童不仅是卢梭式启蒙观念中纯粹健全的人，重视儿童也不只是出于人道主义，更是因为在他们身上寄托了具体的期望。19-20世纪，中国快速但波折的现代化进程是由迫切的民族独立诉求催动的。李泽厚曾说中国现代思想就是“救亡压倒启蒙”的过程。然而很多人随后指出，不是救亡压倒了启蒙，而是启蒙本身就是为了救亡，树新人是为了建新国。在西方军事、经济、文化的多重压力下，改革者希望引进现代知识和思想以救国，又深感自己的见识根植于旧时代，吸收新知为时已晚。因此，他们把希望寄托在下一代身上，希望儿童在十几、二十几年后担当起匡扶国家的重任。
+
+此外，正如卡林内斯库、哈贝马斯等人提出，也恰如很多读者在成长过程中感受到的——现代社会是信奉线性进化、永恒进步的社会。人们每天都在说，“随着社会的发展和时代的进步，”未来一定会更好……这种信心渗入社会的每个毛细血管，影响人们各种微小的决定，也让人们自然盼望晚辈比起前辈，心智更聪慧、人格更健全，能带来更好的社会。总之，在中国现代化话语中，儿童不仅具有生理学上的意义，还带有鲜明的道德和政治意义：儿童是属于未来的进步力量；是民族乃至人类的希望。保护儿童，就是保护民族和人类的未来。
+
+因此，教养儿童不是一项普通的社会分工，而是仁人志士共同的事业。叶圣陶、丰子恺、朱自清、夏丏尊等名人共同制作小学课本；鲁迅、赵元任、严文井等翻译和创作儿童故事；冰心用儿童的口吻写诗，和小读者通信对话……成人世界的思想者踊跃地用幼稚的语言迎合儿童，是因为“救救孩子”是公认的紧迫工作。即便是相对保守的社会力量，在重视儿童的问题上也能达成一致。国民党热衷于组建童子军、举办儿童演讲、运动比赛，教育儿童“我是中华国民，将来一定了不得”，并首次规定了每年4月4日是儿童节。共产党虽然对儿童宣传不同的思想，但同样过这个儿童节，教育儿童“团结起来学做新中国的新主人”，对他们的总体期待并无不同。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/fyza8yv.jpg)
+▲ 2019年11月8日，中国北京，两名孩子在购物中心外跳绳。
+
+和赞美童心一脉相承、共享一套逻辑的是崇拜青年。“青春崇拜”是20世纪中国非常独特、有时代色彩的现象，已有很多中外学者讨论过。在通常的社会习惯中，年长的人看不起年轻人是常态。但在现代化思维和目标的驱使下，20世纪初的思想者投向儿童的目光也同样投向了青年。青年在年龄、体力、现代知识方面的优势、他们对改革更开放的态度、更少的既得利益顾虑……都被政治化，让青年、尤其是青年学生从一个年龄阶段变成了一种进步的政治身份。陈独秀以《敬告青年》一文开启了新文化运动、鲁迅对青年人的求助几乎有求必应、乃至于钱玄同发表著名歪论“人过了四十就该枪毙”，这些行为都是基于对青年这个政治身份的期望。
+
+在重视青年的文化氛围之下，新文化运动乃至之后的大部分进步刊物，作者和读者都是青年；大部分社会运动，组织和参与者也都是青年。十几岁的学生组织大规模游行，在今天的年龄观念下可能是冒失、幼稚、添乱，但在革命年代却意味着青年愿意接过火炬，长远的未来大有希望。
+
+共产党继承了新文化一代的欣赏儿童和崇拜青年。举一个很有象征意味的例子：大陆的小学课本长期使用一篇课文叫《飞机遇险的时候》，讲的是1946年周恩来等人乘坐的飞机遇险，救生伞包不够，周恩来将自己的伞包让给叶挺的女儿，11岁的叶扬眉的故事。这篇课文之所以存在，当然是为了表现周恩来的高尚品格，但也侧面证明：遇到危险时，将生的机会让给儿童是毋庸置疑的高尚行为。在笔者的回忆中，教材没有提及，也不会引发这样的讨论：一国总理和普通的孩子一命换一命是否值得，是否应当？当然，扬眉将来可能成为更有价值的人，但在这个故事的语境中，她儿童身份天然的象征意义比她未来可能的实际价值更重要。这在今天恐怕绝非共识。
+
+在现实中，20世纪共产党对青少年的看重也令现在的人难以理解。只需举一个例子：李立三27岁、任弼时23岁担任中央政治局委员；博古24岁大学刚毕业就成为了中央政治局书记（相当于今天的中央总书记）。具体的任命很大程度上取决于政治形势，但也说明当时青年的地位和今天不同。这种青春崇拜很大程度上延续到了社会主义建设时期，只不过主要对象从知识分子式的五四青年变成了勤劳勇敢、敢于斗争的农村青年。文化大革命时期，红卫兵、红小兵能立刻被动员起来心安理得地造成年人的反，和几十年来“年轻人比长者更进步”的观念培养出的主人翁意识有很大关系。甚至直到六四时，青年学生坚信推动改革是他们，而不是年长干部的历史使命，这种政治信念也是经由文革，继承自五四。
+
+概括来说，20世纪就是中国“儿童的世纪”。人们将新的一代——儿童和青年，作为一种社会资源而不仅仅是个人来爱护，背后是社会进步的观念和对未来的整体期待。虽然不是每个人都实践这种观念，但儿童和青年作为一种充满希望的符号（想想节日放飞和平鸽的儿童，“你们是早晨八九点钟的太阳”“少年强则中国强”等标语）已经被社会广泛接纳。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/un3cA7q.jpg)
+▲ 2022年10月1日，中国北京，孩子们穿着校服在天安门观看国庆升旗仪式。
+
+
+### 儿童消失，只剩下投资品
+
+把儿童视为成人应向社会缴纳的劳动力资源的催生策略，自然无助于人们用人文主义的柔情看待儿童，而只能换来“我们就是最后一代”的答复。
+
+那么21世纪呢？环顾四周，情况已经起了变化。儿童作为文化符号越来越少出现，“祖国的花朵”、“八九点钟的太阳”、“未来的主人翁”逐渐让位于“熊孩子”、“四脚吞金兽”这些贬称。青年则仅能在每年五月四日成为祖国的栋梁，其他时间都是社会的问题和病症。儿童和青年这两种政治身份相伴兴起又同时沉沦，既有六四依赖政权合法性和宣传策略变化的原因，也有时代整体观念变革的因素。
+
+首先，绵延二百余年的恒久进步观念正在破产。中国文革后直到21世纪初出生的大部分人，从出生到成人目睹了“小康社会”的实现、网络信息技术的发展，小到个人物质生活，大到国家经济水平和国际地位，总体都在进步和发展。然而最近十几年，即便是对政治领域的倒退毫不敏感的人也能感受到工资购买力的下降、学历的贬值、就业的缩水。
+
+2023年，中国更是出现了明显的通缩迹象。百姓从“消费升级”变成“消费降级”，对宏观经济的信心越来越差，通缩的情况就更难扭转。国际关系上，长久以来牵动中国人神经的“与国际接轨”叙事在2008年中国举办奥运会后达到巅峰，之后就因为中国国际关系恶化、树敌无数，乃至于和美国卷入新冷战而逐渐消失。通过被互联网长城隔绝的简中视角，世界已经不再是一个有待闯荡、新鲜刺激的舞台，而是越来越危机四伏的黑暗丛林——这或许也是就冷战和新冷战的区别之一：冷战至少部分是两种发展理念、社会理想之争，双方都奋力发展、上天入地，希望占据人类进步的先机；而新冷战则是一种单纯的零和博弈，没有路在何方，只有你死我活。
+
+进步叙事失去了活力，作为其载体的儿童也就自然失去了光环。作家河森堡在微博上评论“厌童”的话颇中肯綮：社会上弥漫着有今无明、我死后哪怕洪水滔天的气氛，不适合生养孩子这种超长线的投资。不过，把孩子视为投资，而不是有天然价值的宝贵之物，本身也是儿童概念失落的原因。因为说到投资，一定会涉及到：谁投资、谁受益？凭什么？
+
+目前国家关于儿童的叙事非常直白粗暴：儿童就是今天播种、明天收割的储备劳动力（讽刺的是，青年作为今天的劳动力，则很难实现就业）。六四之后，革命叙事被从中共的执政合法性中剔除出去，宣传部门也小心翼翼，避免将在现代化逻辑中和革命相绑定的青年询唤为主体，再次掀起任何政治波澜。
+
+21世纪第二个十年，日益尖锐的社会矛盾之下，国家对青年的态度更是家长式的全权接管和刻意矮化，把一个时代的问题纷纷归结为一代人的问题。而对于儿童，私有化改革之后，儿童的社会养育被几乎全部转移给了家庭。儿童虽然还在公园玩耍、学校读书，但在公共的话语空间中已经彻底隐身了，既不是社会的责任，也不是社会的未来。二十世纪90年代时，中国用“素质”要求儿童，虽然修饰“素质”一词的也是人口和劳动力，但至少希望提升人力资源质量的国家和希望实现阶级跃升的父母之间有共同利益。
+
+而现在，国家极力催生甚至逼生，已经不再讨论劳动力素质，而直接从最抽象的国家利益出发，给出劳动力供给、人口红利、老龄社会、退休金池等方面的理由——既没有费神从意识形态层面进行儿童可爱、育儿高尚的宣传；也没有给父母提供有价值的帮助；更没有对这些儿童未来生活的世界进行任何规划。这种机械重复“你给我生”，把儿童视为成人应向社会缴纳的劳动力资源的催生策略，自然无助于人们用人文主义的柔情看待儿童，而只能换来“我们就是最后一代”的答复。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/X1k8o3n.jpg)
+▲ 2020年3月28日，中国北京，一对母子在街道上行走。
+
+而在私人领域，儿童也成为了一种非常个人的投资品，他不是祖国的希望，而只是一个家庭的前程。社会贫富差距拉大、总资源不足的情况下，儿童日益激烈的教育竞争不是为了其自身的健全发展，而是为了获得更多社会资源。2023年，经济学家陈文玲甚至公开表示：“子女也是消费品，是长周期的消费品，是可以带来给你长久回报的耐用消费品。所以，年轻人不生小孩是不对的。”或许这位经济学家想说的是长期投资，但无论是投资还是消费，如今的儿童都被放置在非常私人化的资本逻辑中，成为家庭的私有财产。在这种资本逻辑中，厌童就变得无比正常——既然你的投资和消费无法给我带来收益，那么也不应该妨碍我。当然，总有人提出：现在的儿童是将来的社会保障支付者，人们应当放眼长远利益。但若真是“在商言商”，谁会为了几十年后虚无缥缈的退休金，提前善待别人的孩子，甚至花重金养育自己的孩子？
+
+言至于此，对比前文关于童年发现史的介绍，我们不难发现：虽然现在儿童的存活率很高、生活条件也相对不错，但人们看待儿童的方式似乎在很多方面接近于现代儿童观诞生以前——儿童是财产、商品、劳动力，而不是生命的一种形态、人的一个阶段，更不是某种集体希望的载体。在这波“厌童”讨论中，一些文章提到，这个社会已经容纳不下像一个儿童的儿童，而是用对成人（也让成人感到痛苦）的要求——情绪平稳、安静克制来要求儿童。这和几个世纪前人们对小小年纪就工作谋生的儿童的态度不谋而合。只不过，中世纪的儿童尚有几年放任自流、胡闹戏耍的时间，而现代的儿童生下来就挤入了成人社会，成为父母的投资品、国家的潜在劳动力和他人的生存空间竞争者。失去对进步的期望的社会中，他们的未来一眼望得到头，道路却不管怎样追赶都拥挤而艰难。
+
+当人们对这些孩子感到厌烦的时候，固然有合理或不合理的主客观具体理由，但也有共同的原因：人文主义、进步信念、民族诉求加诸于童年之上的滤镜已然破碎，如果人都没法被好好称作人，哪里又有儿童的位置呢？
+
+<!--END-->
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-08-13-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk26.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-13-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk26.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第廿六周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date  : 2023-08-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/OwTAfkW.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 鄒家成：發起「墨落」為展抗爭意志非協調共識、政府無回應五大訴求會反對財案
+
+<!--more-->
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第廿六周，參選新界東的鄒家成作供完畢，至於新東餘下3名被告林卓廷、梁國雄及柯耀林均不作供，柯將傳召一名辯方證人。
+
+「墨落無悔」聲明被控方指為「關鍵文件」，鄒本周指戴耀廷原稱會就共識簽文件、後突稱毋須簽署，是他與張可森和梁晃維發起「墨落」的導火線。鄒指發起聲明為展現抗爭意志和保障政治素人，但他無提倡無差別否決財案、聲明非協調會議共識亦無約束力，亦非填補戴耀廷留下的空白。
+
+鄒並指，《國安法》後曾考慮退出初選，因過往談「香港民族主義」可能「被扭曲」成分裂國家和港獨言論，但終決定繼續參選，哽咽稱：「我發覺我根本就做唔出退選嘅決定，我覺得我無法離群眾而去。」鄒亦認為，《中英聯合聲明》下港人理應享有自主權，而「中華民族」是干預港人自主的宣傳工具，他倡「香港民族」是「對抗中華民族嘅入侵」。法官指鄒是否實際上推動港獨或屬本案要處理的議題。
+
+鄒又表明，若政府無於預算案回應五大訴求、僅給予「甜頭」，仍會投反對票，強調「有回應先至有得傾」；不過若政府僅不回應雙普選也會「袋住先」，指爭取雙普選非一時三刻的事，「五大訴求，缺一不可」精神非求一步登天，乃鍥而不捨爭取。鄒亦認為，「攬炒」從不是禁忌，目的是拉近雙方政治勢力，為和談帶來可能。
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/jklK1ML.png)
+
+
+### 鄒指戴耀廷稱毋須簽文件為發起「墨落」導火線 聲明旨在展抗爭意志惟非替戴填補空白
+
+鄒家成本周完成6日作供，主要談及發起「墨落無悔」的經過和想法，及對否決財政預算案的看法。本案指控被告協議無差別否決預算案，以圖顛覆國家政權，有33名被告簽署的「墨落無悔」被控方指為「關鍵文件」，當中提及「會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求」，是不少被告作供和盤問時的焦點。
+
+鄒本周表示，戴耀廷於2020年6月9日記者會宣布參選人毋須簽文件以免製造「DQ紅書」，是他和張可森、梁晃維發起「墨落無悔」的「導火線」，解釋戴在新東協調會一直表示能達成共識的項目會變成一份文件予參選人簽署，但無通知下突指毋須簽文件，質疑「有冇咁兒戲」；他亦認為DQ紅線應是香港獨立，但協調會無此討論，「我唔明驚啲乜嘢」，認為做法「退縮」。
+
+鄒翌日聯絡張可森和梁晃維，表示「要簽返啲嘢去展現抗爭意志」，三人討論後決定發起網絡聲明，目的是向公眾展現抗爭意志，及防範初選落敗者繼續參選以保障政治素人。3人同日晚上將草擬好的聲明私下發給認識的參選人，鄒曾問黃子悅有否興趣聯署，黃同意，聲明發布後鄒有開設Google文件讓其他人加名。
+
+控方屢質疑「墨落」就是戴耀廷原擬要求參選人簽署的協調會議共識，不過鄒指，戴稱毋須簽文件只是刺激他們思考要簽什麼的「背景」，他們並非想製作一個以協調會議為基礎的協議，聲明亦無寫上已達成共識的4個項目（即辦初選、辦論壇、「贏咗有得選，輸咗冇得選」和靈童制為替補機制），因它們雖對參選人重要，但無助展現抗爭意志，一般市民大眾並不關心。
+
+鄒並指決定列出哪點聲明時除考慮能否展現抗爭意志，亦考慮是否具爭議性或未有共識。控方問是否因戴耀廷不想簽文件，故3人發聲明是承擔製造DQ風險的責任？鄒指參選人是自願簽署，自行承擔DQ風險。法官也問3人是否嘗試填補戴留下的空白？鄒不同意。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/rmVQUte.png)
+▲ 戴耀廷（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 鄒指「墨落」非協調會議共識、與「35+」無關 無提倡無差別否決財案
+
+鄒續解釋討論的過程，指由他帶領，以新東協調會議為藍本，並將會議討論過的事項分成已達成共識的「最大公因數」，及具爭議性或暫未有共識兩類。其中辦初選等4點歸為前者；至於運用否決權在新東有爭拗，故歸為後者，「墨落」第二點「我認同若支持度跌出各區預計可得議席範圍，須表明停止選舉工程」，亦因港島和九西就目標議席和出選名單未有定案而屬後者，並寫得較籠統。
+
+鄒並指，「墨落」結構是由他制定，再由張可森草擬，張擬初稿後為昇華聲明，在標題加上「墨落無悔 堅定抗爭」、由「本土派」改為「抗爭派」立場聲明書，內文亦加上「墨落理應無悔，否則等於失信於選民」一句以承上啟下、畫龍點睛，諷刺戴耀廷「講咗嘅嘢唔算數」和帶出兩點聲明，而精要之處在若反悔要向「選民」問責。
+
+就聲明第一點「我認同『五大訴求，缺一不可』。我會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應五大訴求」，鄒指並非倡無差別否決預算案，亦非協調會議共識，而運用否決權的字句戴曾在新東會議重複數次，他憑記憶告知張可森。法官指該句與協議文件相似，是否受戴影響、是否巧合，鄒指戴原用「積極」，「會運用」則是他本人會上動議，故未必稱得上「巧合」，而是來自其經驗。
+
+鄒亦表明，聲明與「35+」無關、無以「35+」為前提，指他與張可森和梁晃維均不相信「35+」，認為「35-」下選出最多具備抗爭意志的代議士才較合情合理和實際可行，亦是初選最大意義，「墨落」只是將參選人政治理念帶到選民面前，展示抗爭意志，亦非「35+計劃」參選人的共識。
+
+鄒亦指簽署者只是就「墨落」兩點聲明作出承諾，對岑子杰等傳統泛民形容是「夾緊人」，鄒指聲明無約束力、亦無意向組織者施壓，如有人反悔發起人「咩都做唔到」，但聲明面向公眾，如違承諾要接受選民問責。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/ummNNXe.png)
+▲ 左起：張可森、鄒家成、梁晃維（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 鄒稱效忠能產生應有功能的《基本法》、受憲法約束和保障大眾權利的政府
+
+聲明發布後，鄒家成稱曾着團隊成員草擬訊息予初選籌組平台，通知他們發起了聲明及簽署人數，而較關鍵是支持度不足須棄選一點，因當時部分大黨不簽署甚至批評聲明、街工想落敗仍繼續參選，令政治素人憂沒有保障，故望向組織者表達擔憂，但無獲回應。
+
+法官指，其後提名表格中，「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」的條款，似乎就是組織者對鄒家成等人的回應，惟鄒指無將兩者聯想、簽署時亦無細心閱讀，他僅理解「共識」為辦初選4點，目標為取「35+」。
+
+至於表格中「我會擁護《基本法》和保證效忠香港特別行政區」，鄒指《基本法》在港實踐未如理想，他效忠的是理應能產生憲法應有功能、即約束當權者權力和保障市民權利的《基本法》，以及會受憲法約束和保障市民大眾權利的政府。
+
+至於鄒在初選論壇提到一國兩制、《基本法》和立法會是殖民工具，鄒指人大釋法和不落實雙普選是令《基本法》等成殖民工具的條件，認為要落實雙普選，《基本法》等才能產生應有功能。法官問鄒是否擁護一個不存在、或只存在於其想像中的《基本法》，鄒重申是支持它本身應產生的功能。
+
+
+### 鄒指《國安法》後曾考慮退出初選 惟哽咽稱「無法離群眾而去」
+
+鄒並指，《國安法》頒布後曾考慮退出初選，因當時與團隊研究條文，判斷參選人最多只因過往言論有機會被捕，而他過往對體制及政府批評較「尖銳」，「香港民族主義」亦可能「被扭曲」成分裂國家和港獨言論，加上條文「涵蓋範圍好廣、字眼好模糊、刑罰好重」，如「盲人摸象」。
+
+惟鄒指他終決定繼續參加初選，庭上哽咽稱：「我發覺我根本就做唔出退選嘅決定，我覺得我無法離群眾而去」。鄒並指與團隊重新尋覓參選意義，認為「繼續參選本身就係一個意義」，他們亦重印所有宣傳品和將口號由「拒絕殖民 民族抗暴」改為「抗擊暴政 捍衛尊嚴」、無再談及「香港民族」或「殖民」，以避免違《國安法》，又聯絡義工指如恐懼可退出。
+
+就帖文提到《國安法》後「有啲嘢我唔可以繼續講，但相信我嘅理念喺過去已經表達得清清楚楚，亦都希望各位香港人會理解」，鄒盤問下同意當時仍擁抱過去表達過的理念，且無論《國安法》有否落實，其理念也一樣。他又指帖文提到「国安法」時故意用簡體字，是因《國安法》經附件三而非立法會立法，他想表達反對，但無想過違法。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/Qm0anfV.png)
+▲ 鄒家成（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 鄒指提倡「香港民族」非港獨、一國兩制下港人理應享自主權
+
+鄒家成上周稱參選為宣揚「香港民族」理念，其主張與顛覆國家政權的關係亦是焦點之一。就初選論壇提到「對抗中華民族嘅入侵」，鄒指一個民族是建基於文化、價值等形成的共同體，「中華民族」與「香港民族」有別，前者是合理化損害港人利益和干預港人自主權的宣傳工具，而香港受擁有「中華民族」思想的人操控，會弱化民族根基，故他宣揚「香港民族」高舉族群利益，對抗中華民族入侵。
+
+法官質疑鄒稱無推動港獨，但又提「自主權」是有矛盾，鄒不同意，指一國兩制是源於兩地族群的利益和價值不同，而港人在《中英聯合聲明》和一國兩制下，除國防和外交，理應享有一系列自主權，「除非落實雙普選，否則一國兩制都冇真正落實過」。
+
+鄒又指他提到「赤化」、「殖民」等均沒有顛覆中港政府的意圖。法官李運騰指鄒是否實際上推動港獨或屬本案要處理的爭議點（live issue）之一，法官陳慶偉亦指明白「香港民族」和「港獨」的分別，但不代表法庭不會考慮，鄒為了建立香港民族理念是意圖顛覆國家政權。
+
+而就論壇提到「唔可以再畀泛民主派繼續主導呢個香港嘅話語權」，鄒指泛民代表很多市民聲音，但2020年出現「世代更替」，市民望議員做得更多，他雖不能取代泛民，但望是其中一把可改變的聲音。另就論壇提到議員應入議會「打交」，鄒指意指「自衛」，但從無想過開會期間「主動冚佢（建制派）一巴」；至於用任何手段癱瘓每個會議，他稱只是望盡力阻止「惡法」通過，承認「誇張咗」。
+
+
+### 鄒指「五大訴求，缺一不可」非一步登天、若僅不回應雙普選會「袋住先」
+
+鄒家成亦是繼何桂藍後，第二名曾出席7月15日抗爭派記者會的作供被告。他指會前受張崑陽、岑敖暉、黃之鋒其中一人邀請出席，理解記招無確切組織者，出席標準是非傳統泛民的初選勝出者，他們當天提早到達商討並草擬「抗爭派立法會參選人立場聲明」，理解每人均有看過並同意。
+
+鄒並指，會上問題「想答就自己答」，除上述立場聲明外並無共同發言。就王百羽稱如五大訴求無落實會堅決反對預算案、梁晃維稱倡議會攬炒迫政府向人民低頭，鄒均同意。至於岑敖暉指若「暴政當道、魔警橫行」，相信不論內容也會否決財案，鄒認為岑並非主張無差別否決，因「暴政當道、魔警橫行」就是指政府無回應五大訴求的表現，岑亦曾向他提過「唔通政府掟幾千萬查警暴我都投反對票？」，鄒理解岑並非「要晒五大訴求」才與政府談判。鄒本人亦認為只要政府有回應五大訴求已足夠，「唔一定要五個齊晒」。
+
+惟法官陳慶偉指，「五大訴求」口號是「缺一不可」而非「一個即可」，鄒回應「五大訴求，缺一不可」的精神不是要求「一步登天」，而是即使政府回應一個或兩個訴求後，仍鍥而不捨繼續爭取。控方盤問時亦多番追問若政府只回應部分訴求，鄒會否談判和滿意。鄒指最重要視乎政府是否「有心推動」，並指預算案若看不到相關開支會向政府提問，理解亦屬「談判」過程；又指問題複雜，舉例十年後，「其實啲示威者都坐完監咁濟㗎喇，咁要求政府釋放示威者仲有冇意義呢？」
+
+鄒又指，最重視雙普選，但若政府回應除雙普選以外的四個訴求，他也會接受，重申爭取訴求需要長時間、五大訴求並非一步登天：「袋住先啦！爭取雙普選真係唔係一時三刻做到，要搞諮詢都要時間。」控方質疑鄒是「妥協」，鄒不同意，指若政府不回應五大訴求，只是給予「甜頭」來「氹」議員投贊成票，此情況下投贊成才屬妥協；但在這情況下，他仍會對預算案投反對票，強調「有回應（五大訴求）先至有得傾」。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/KtCS3Qn.png)
+▲ 2020年7月15日 抗爭派記者會（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 鄒指「攬炒」從非禁忌 目的拉近雙方政治勢力為和談帶來可能
+
+鄒本周亦談及對「攬炒」和「35+」等看法，他指理解「攬炒」為「一種側重於自我犧牲」的態度，而初選要延續此精神，是實踐議會內「寸土必爭」，及「不惜自我犧牲」也要盡力阻止惡法，可能會被政權針對、DQ、追討薪金；行政機關要付出的代價則是受到制衡和無法推動惡法。
+
+鄒又指，「攬炒」從不是禁忌，反而很常見，舉例罷工要求加薪或減低工時就屬「攬炒」，又認為「有權勢者打壓無權勢者，有反抗，就會形成『攬炒』」，而攬炒目的是拉近雙方政治勢力，為和談帶來可能。
+
+
+### 鄒稱有「政棍」明知不可能仍「販賣假希望」、無讀過戴耀廷文章
+
+鄒又提及，有三類人表面主張35+有可能，第一類是明知35+不可能但仍「販賣假希望」的「政棍」，他們講到35+後「好似民主會立即降臨」；第二類是覺得35+有可能、帶一絲希望看能否爭取、帶點天真的理想主義者；第三類則是覺得35+無可能，但有政治勇氣和承擔撕破假象表面，望讓全世界知道無論如何努力，「當權者係唔會畀民主派攞到35+」。鄒指自己為第四類人，不過解釋時被法官打斷。
+
+鄒亦表示，雖認為35+不可能，但無於初選論壇表明，僅提可能性「非常之低」，是因論壇始終由一班「相信35+有可能」的人舉辦，故想「禮貌少少」，「費事搞禍人哋個場」。
+
+此外，鄒亦指初選期間較專注「香港民族」論述，不知道戴耀廷在《蘋果日報》和Facebook擇文、無看過其文章，直至收到審訊文件夾前無聽過「攬炒十步」，亦否認戴在協調會議曾介紹「攬炒」文章。
+
+鄒本周完成6日作供，至於新東餘下3名被告林卓廷、梁國雄及柯耀林，原均表示擬作供，但決定不作供，柯耀林一方將傳召一名證人。除柯耀林外，16名不認罪被告中，尚餘參選超區的李予信和衞生服務界余慧明未開展辯方案情。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file

From 6584f0e5d79fbc2c4b82a14c4d5e2a736bf7b6ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hokoi <hokoeye@pm.me>
Date: Sat, 2 Sep 2023 01:35:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 08/19] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x20 Sep.02

---
 .../2023-08-07-gendered-narratives-in-war.md  | 82 +++++++++++++++++++
 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-08-nigers-coup.md | 50 +++++++++++
 .../_hkers/2023-08-17-the-road-to-brazil.md   | 67 +++++++++++++++
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 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-08-nigers-coup.md
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diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-07-gendered-narratives-in-war.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-07-gendered-narratives-in-war.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Gendered Narratives In War
+author: Emily Winterbotham
+date  : 2023-08-07 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/sjwkkRJ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Impact of Gendered Narratives in the Conflict in Ukraine"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Gendered norms and identities shape everyone’s involvement in violence, including men, women, and nonbinary people. How groups, whether nonstate actors or states party to a conflict, construct norms, which includes expectations of femininity and masculinity, is crucial to understanding violence._ <excerpt/> _These constructions impact the roles imagined, the behaviors normalized, and the treatment of different gendered groups. Traditional gendered narratives have often been resurrected by all sides to the Ukraine conflict, with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s appeal to women, mothers, sisters, and fiancées to support their loved ones in battle; the image beamed around the world of a wounded, pregnant Ukrainian woman curled on a stretcher; and comments made by the UK defense secretary that President Putin is suffering from “small man syndrome” providing just some examples._
+
+Many of these narratives are flawed, reductive, and unhelpful for long-term conflict resolution. They also undermine advancements in the field of women, peace, and security. The presentation of men as defender-warriors and women as fragile and requiring protection contends with the reality of Ukrainian women taking up arms, masks the existence of other potentially vulnerable identity groups, and ultimately impedes the adoption of an inclusive approach to the conflict and any postconflict settlement. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has proven much more adept at producing unconventional gendered war propaganda, refusing to denigrate Russian troops and emphasizing women’s active participation in the conflict. Yet, the imagery of female “gun-strapped blonde soldiers” still exceptionalizes women’s participation in the war. Meanwhile, there are some concerns that Ukrainian women are not treated as equal to men in terms of military mobilization.
+
+This brief analyzes the ways in which gendered narratives have been employed during the war in Ukraine. It reflects on the traditional use of gendered narratives in the field of security and draws on the author’s research on the role of gender in the field of terrorism. It then explores how these narratives have been deployed by parties to the conflict in Ukraine and the implications of this approach. It does not provide a detailed gendered analysis of the Ukraine conflict or a comprehensive linguistic analysis of the various traditional and social media datasets available. Instead, it aims to demonstrate the hypothesis that gendered narratives used in the conflict and security space, including by those working on counterterrorism issues, often promote flawed understandings about the nature and impact of violence, which can have counterproductive policy implications. The recommendations are aimed at policymakers working in the fields of conflict, security, and terrorism.
+
+
+### THE POWER OF GENDERED NARRATIVES
+
+How leaders use strategic narratives is widely accepted as a soft power in the realm of global politics, conflict, and terrorism.9 Strategic narratives are a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of international politics and a tool to articulate a position on a specific issue and to shape the perceptions, beliefs, and behavior of domestic and international actors. Their “narrators” are primarily elites (government leaders, security experts, consultants, policy analysts, etc.) who construct and communicate them to the general public through speeches, press conferences, official documents, and more. Narratives have grown in significance in particular due to the introduction of social media, which provides another arena to demonstrate power, critique, and even mockery.
+
+Politicians routinely employ gendered metaphors in foreign policy legitimation. These rely on often preexisting essentialist understandings of women in national culture and mythos and on stereotypes prevalent in the foreign policy and security realms, which are shaped by and assumed to be the realm of men and male actors. This contributes to a gendered framing in which masculinity is superior to femininity. Military institutions, among others, may present women as victims, “damsels in distress,” in need of protection and as ancillary to conflict due to their physically “inferior” attributes and maternal or peaceful disposition. Countless examples of these narratives can be found, throughout history, more recently deployed by policymakers and terrorist groups alike during the “Global War on Terror.” The international intervention in Afghanistan was accompanied by images such as the liberation of Afghan women from the Taliban, indelibly associating the two ideas in the public imagination. Narratives of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant targeted men as soldiers of war while messages for women focused on their roles as mothers, sisters, and lovers. Similar images and narratives appear in the development field and are visible even in the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda.
+
+These narratives are underpinned by the assumption that physical strength is associated with masculinity, which trumps the alternative, physical weakness, which is associated with femininity or effeminate men. Masculine men are often described as war-fighters possessing traits such as leadership, heroism, physical dominance, and aggression. Similar narratives have also been deployed by violent extremist groups drawing on notions of violent masculinity, including feelings of entitlement and supremacy, and gendered grievances, such as shame and emasculation, in their propaganda to recruit and retain committed members.
+
+#### REDUCTIVE OR JUST FALSE
+
+Narratives have implications, a fact that is often poorly understood by policymakers. If a strategic narrative is a tool for leaders to shape perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors, it is understandable that it is not always entirely accurate and may even be harmful. As a result, the rhetoric can clash with the local reality. Justifying interventions in Afghanistan on the rationale of the liberation of Muslim women reflected ignorance of critical information about Muslim women, Afghanistan, the Taliban, and the realities of the U.S. invasion.
+
+Similarly, Russian foreign policy propagated through mass media has presented Ukraine as a neo-Nazi state in need of defeating. The war is therefore presented as a holy crusade in defense of the motherland. In fact, Russian leaders use “motherland” when it is something to be protected, “fatherland” when the situation calls for aggression. Russian narratives intimate Ukraine’s supposedly subordinate role in geopolitical terms by describing Ukraine as a “loose woman in need of saving by its older brother.” Ukrainian male politicians are presented as “sissy boys” and no match for “real men” of pro-Russian politics. President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov are presented as the masculine ideal, compared to the seemingly deviant male (sissy boys) and female protagonists (damsels in distress), to legitimize the war.
+
+These narratives have been undermined by unfolding events on the battlefield and challenged by President Zelenskyy’s success at presenting his country as “a progressive, gender-egalitarian, LGBTQ-friendly, 21st-century democratic power.” These narratives also rarely acknowledge that conflict creates a range of lived experiences for different identity groups. Popular Western narratives referring to the horrors facing women and children in every address urging support of the conflict are not the full picture. Some women may indeed be more vulnerable during conflict, particularly those who are from ethnic minorities or poorer communities. Yet, people with disabilities may also lose access to vital infrastructure or public services, while sexual violence toward all people is exacerbated by conflict. LGBTQ+ groups also face risks in this conflict. President Putin has mentioned “gender freedoms” more than once to justify Russia’s war against Ukraine and simultaneously crack down on its own citizens. Over the last decade, gender and LGBTQ+ issues have become central targets of repression in Russia aimed at protecting President Putin’s regime from perceived domestic threats.
+
+Gendered stereotypes depicting women as civilian victims also clash with the reality of Ukrainian women’s active participation in conflicts. Women became eligible for the draft in December 2021, and by 2022, more than 13,000 women were assigned combat status for their service in Donetsk and Luhansk. It is unknown how many women currently serve in the armed forces, although estimates range from 10 to 25 percent, but there is evidence of a growing recognition of women’s ability to contribute to the war effort in a variety of ways. This gives Ukraine a way to buttress its military in numerical terms relative to Russia, which confines the majority of women in its military to noncombat roles. Approximately 41,000 women serve in the Russian military and constitute 4.3 percent of active duty forces.
+
+President Zelenskyy’s narratives have also resisted conventional wartime militarized sexist stereotypes. One analyst observed that “rather than denigrate the Russians by implying they mistreat their women or demonizing their men as monsters, for example, he has blamed the war on Putin directly.” First lady Olena Zelenska’s use of social media includes pictures of women in military uniform in the trenches or women as part of rescue crews with the caption “Our new opposition has a female face to it.” Women combatants are also visible in international media coverage. Headlines shout, “Women Rush to Ukraine’s Defence” and “Ukrainian Women Stand Strong Against Russian Invaders.”
+
+If women are not purely damsels in distress, the alternative narrative of gun-strapped blonde soldiers is just as reductive. These types of images in Western and Ukrainian media emphasize the significance of Ukrainian women fighting, which reinforces the notion that women’s participation in wartime violence is exceptional and therefore newsworthy. Women’s participation in armed conflict therefore becomes characterized as abnormal or even “monstrous.” Ukrainian women, however, express similar motivations as men for fighting, that of defense, preservation, survival, and continuity of the state. The Ukrainian military’s claim of being a champion of gender equity also falls short of reality, evidenced by the leadership’s refusal to allow women into senior ranks and most notably by restricting women from command positions outside of women-specific roles or placing them in roles that are distanced from actual combat. Female soldiers also complain of shortages of gear in appropriate sizes and lack of access to military education and training programs.
+
+Military recruitment posters and politicians’ adoption of military-style clothing reflect that the government’s more recent efforts to mobilize its citizens for war are infused with masculine narratives. Focusing on men’s masculine status as soldiers, protectors, or fathers “reinforces masculinist and heteronormative gender ideologies.” This focus ignores the fact that, despite universal forced conscription, many men do not wish to fight and have left the country illegally or are hiding from local military recruiters in plain sight among the roughly 7.1 million people who are internally displaced, 40 percent of whom are male. Those who have left legally because, for instance, they have three or more children are subject to sexist ridicule from fellow Ukrainians and often have trouble renting housing and getting work because landlords and employers may not trust their military exemptions. Meanwhile, men also experience sexual violence during conflict but may deliberately use words such as “abuse” or “torture” rather than recount the sexual aspect of the violence they have incurred for fear that this may compromise their masculinity. Male sexual violence disturbs gender relations for its tendency to strip men of their masculine status as soldier or protector and deliberately feminizes them or labels them as homosexuals in the eye of the perpetrator. This, in turn, further “feminizes conflict-related sexual violence, trauma and vulnerability.”
+
+#### INCREASING THE INSECURITY OF MEN AND WOMEN
+
+A greater concern is the clash of President Zelenskyy’s progressive narratives with certain Ukrainian military policy. “Forced universal conscription of men in Ukraine and Ukraine’s breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk [is] resurrecting binaries of men as defender-warriors and women as fragile and needing protection.” Although exemptions to conscription were permitted, an immediate effect of this provision was that refugee flows from Ukraine overrepresented women.
+
+This has serious human rights implications. There are indications that Russian forces appear to be operating under the assumption that all males are combatants, even though unmobilized men retain their civilian status under international law. Men are disproportionately represented in the civilian casualties of the war. Of the 6,595 adult civilian fatalities where the individual’s sex was known, 2,575 were identified as men while 1,767 were identified as women. This pattern was witnessed during the Bosnian war, the most infamous example being the Srebrenica massacre of 7,000 unarmed men and boys. A true gender-integrated military would deconstruct the idea that the distinction between civilian and combatant is based on gender.
+
+The declaration of martial law has also reinforced the ambiguous position of women who want to serve and the traditional gender norms that position women primarily as victims of rather than participants in armed conflict. This has implications because it determines the international legal regime under which women are protected and affects their access to wartime and postwar resources such as rations, veterans’ benefits, and rehabilitation programs. Similar concerns have been noted in the terrorism field where experts have observed serious implications in the prosecution, risk assessment, and management of women violent extremists in prison (e.g., more lenient sentences for female returnees or insufficient facilities in prisons for women, especially for mothers). Women may also struggle to access rehabilitation and reintegration programs.
+
+#### UNDERMINING THE POTENTIAL FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE
+
+The burden of responsibility for conflict resolution does not fall on narratives alone. As one international relations expert observed, “Conflict generated by aggressive or militant leaders with vested interests in escalating conflict is generally not amenable to reduction unless intentions change.” Yet, changing images and narratives are part of conflict resolution. Policymakers and commentators point to soft power as one way to reduce tensions, mitigate conflict, and find common ground in international affairs.
+
+Attempts by some Western leaders to undermine President Putin through ridicule are therefore contentious. President Putin is pivotal to Russian narratives. Political legitimacy is centered around a patriarchal understanding of President Putin as a hypermasculine “real” man. In June 2022, UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace hit out at President Putin’s “macho” view of the world, which he said was based on “small man syndrome.” His comments came after UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson stated that President Putin’s war in Ukraine was a “perfect example of toxic masculinity.” At the Group of Seven summit around the same time, leaders also mocked President Putin over his infamous bare-chested picture on a horse. Deploying belittling gendered narratives may rally domestic audiences but could constrain political action in the longer run. In fact, ridiculing President Putin feeds into Russia’s own narratives that the West does not respect or understand Russia, which strengthens the Russian leader’s position. If conflict is to be reduced and resolved, hostile imagery eventually must change.
+
+Neither are Russian narratives intrinsically linking militarism with masculinity helpful. Male endorsement of traditional masculinity can be associated with negative outcomes in relation to conflict resolution. It follows that men endorsing beliefs about manhood might avoid the use of conflict resolution strategies perceived as feminine. The Ukraine war has also witnessed a return to gendered narratives about NATO as a “muscular military power,” with “less attention paid to the human stories underpinning the war, particularly the voices of Ukrainian women and their agency, or a concern with how to reach beyond audiences primarily interested in military power.” The WPS agenda has been entirely missing from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s briefings following the numerous high-level meetings and summits that NATO has held in response to the war. Despite commitments in policy, the United States, NATO, and the European Union have done little to demonstrate the mainstreaming of gender in addressing the conflict.
+
+This undermines the possibility of a lasting, inclusive peace reflective of the whole of Ukrainian society. Women and other marginalized groups have been largely sidelined from real decision-making at national and global levels in the conflict. An acknowledgement of the gendered impact of armed conflict, as well as the impact on LGBTQ+ communities, is also missing. This draws attention to what many feminists had feared: the disjuncture between the rhetoric and the reality of the global commitment to the WPS agenda. As a result, certain groups and tools that NATO has at its disposal to support a more inclusive response to the war are being sidelined.
+
+
+### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+Some steps have been taken, particularly on the Ukrainian side, to move away from conventional, stereotyped gendered narratives in the conflict. This is reflective of the reality on the ground, which has mobilized the entire Ukrainian population against the Russian invasion. Yet, reductive gendered narratives are still prevalent, including among NATO and other Western actors. These narratives have real-world implications that can undermine the safety and security of Ukrainian men and women and are an impediment to longer-term peace and stability in Ukraine and elsewhere.
+
+In the terrorism field, the value of narratives and strategic communications to counterterrorism is widely accepted by governments. In academia, research has increasingly focused on how terrorists communicate and what works in response. In part inspired by a desire not to reproduce the narratives of terrorist groups, pushback has been seen in the counterterrorism field. Policymakers and practitioners increasingly recognize the importance of avoiding gender misconceptions and stereotypes, which can ignore women’s capabilities to contribute to counterterrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts in a range of areas, including as policy shapers, educators, community members, and activists, and acknowledge that a better understanding of the relationship among gender, terrorism, and counterterrorism can help improve counterterrorism and CVE efforts. The Islamic State group’s successful recruitment of women has also challenged perceptions that women are always vulnerable, peaceful, or moderate. This progress is just one of the reasons why it is disappointing that parties to the Ukraine conflict are deploying traditional gendered narratives.
+
+The following conclusions and recommendations draw on some of the lessons from the counterterrorism space over the last two decades and are aimed at policymakers and practitioners involved not only in Ukraine but in the wider field of conflict and security.
+
+- Leaders should avoid using gender-stereotyped narratives to legitimize military operations. With regard to Ukraine, gendered narratives may strengthen President Putin’s justification for the invasion while ridicule may enhance Russia’s claims that the West does not respect or understand Russia. In the field of terrorism, policymakers need to avoid emulating the narratives deployed by violent extremist groups and promote women’s active role in efforts to counter terrorism and prevent and counter violent extremism. Reductive narratives are damaging to people of all genders and potentially undermine longer-term conflict resolution and efforts to defeat terrorist groups.
+
+- Policymakers could draw on the Ukrainian experience to normalize women’s participation in conflict and to emphasize that unmobilized men are civilians. A gender-integrated approach to security must deconstruct the idea that there is a difference between civilians and combatants based on gender. This normalization also needs to address the gender norm stereotypes that are often reproduced around women’s participation in violence and conflict. Additionally, the narrative normalization must be accompanied by the expansion of resources for female or other often marginalized participants, including ensuring access to rehabilitation and reintegration packages for women combatants and women terrorists.
+
+- Policymakers and media should avoid exceptionalizing women’s participation in the conflict. How the media portrays women’s participation in conflict and terrorism can influence public opinion. For example, media attention on the case of Shamima Begum in the United Kingdom entrenched the public, possibly political viewpoint that Begum was “exceptional” and that “extraordinary” measures should be taken against her, including the deprivation of British citizenship. Media training is key to combating sensationalism and polarization while maintaining independence and authenticity.
+
+- Policymakers should adopt an intersectional approach to understanding conflict and terrorism. Countries such as Canada, Finland, France, Spain, and Sweden say they have a feminist foreign policy. Yet, mentions of the deeply gendered harms inflicted by this war and how to better protect people of all genders have been limited. Greater efforts are needed to identify the specific humanitarian needs and the lived experiences of all individuals experiencing conflict and terrorism-related violence in order to more fully account for how inequalities of all kinds influence how and why people engage in violence and how they are impacted by it.
+
+- Despite commitments in policy, the United States, NATO, and the EU have done little to demonstrate the inclusion of gender in addressing the conflict. NATO should publicly acknowledge the relevance of a gender perspective and uphold commitments to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 beyond emphasis on the deployment of women as part of NATO’s Response Force. NATO should also explore the use of instruments, such as the NATO Civil Society Advisor Panel, to reach out to Ukrainian civil society and ensure a diversity of voices are heard.
+
+---
+
+__Emily Winterbotham__ is the Director of the Terrorism and Conflict research group at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), delivering research, advisory, training, and monitoring and evaluation services in the fields of counterterrorism and conflict. Her research focuses on terrorism and counterterrorism, including preventing violent extremism, and international interventions in conflict-affected and fragile states.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-08-nigers-coup.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-08-nigers-coup.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..26c80061
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-08-nigers-coup.md
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Niger’s Coup
+author: Joana de Deus Pereira
+date  : 2023-08-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Ygvj7Cm.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Unleashing Uranium, Françafrique’s Ghosts, And Russia’s Shadow"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_The tremors from the recent coup in Niger are not an isolated event but a domino in a sophisticated game of strategy and survival, highlighting the intricate interplay of geopolitical influences and natural resources, particularly the uranium that fuels France’s extensive nuclear sector._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+France’s relationship with Niger has been anchored by their mutual need – France’s demand for uranium and Niger’s dependence on France’s financial support and military protection. Niger is the source of a substantial portion of the EU’s uranium imports and meets 15% of France’s uranium requirements as well as a fifth of Europe’s uranium needs. This symbiosis, however, is strained with the advent of the coup, challenging France’s continued relevance and influence in Niger and beyond.
+
+The coup is the physical manifestation of the simmering resentment against “Françafrique”, the contentious economic and diplomatic ties between France and its former African colonies. This isn’t just an outpouring of the Nigeriens’ frustrations; it reflects the broader African sentiment against perceived neo-imperialism. France’s controversial military operations in the Sahel region, including Serval and Barkhane, have not only been ineffective in curbing jihadist insurgency but have indirectly fueled their growth. As Gérard Araud, a former French ambassador, aptly remarks, “every liberating army becomes, after a while, an occupier.”
+
+This contemporary crisis also exposes the EU’s ambiguous Africa strategy. The EU is at a crossroads – escalating tensions in Niger could potentially discourage it from imposing sanctions on Russia, a key uranium supplier, thereby compounding the bloc’s dependence on foreign resources. It’s not just about immediate uranium supply; it’s about reassessing the EU’s broader relationships and strategies in Africa.
+
+
+### Russia’s approach in Africa
+
+While Europe grapples with the reverberations of its colonial past, another power has stealthily navigated the African political waters, extending its reach and consolidating its influence. This is Russia, operating under the banner of anti-neocolonialism and led during many years by the shadowy businesses of Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has massively funded disinformation campaigns in Africa, and supported by its Wagner Group, who has woven its web across Africa, securing interests and leveraging instability.
+
+Russia’s renewed focus on Africa was clearly exhibited in the Russia-Africa summit in Sochi in 2019, and more recently, in St. Petersburg. Russia paints itself as the sturdy backbone of African security. Here, Putin brilliantly exploited soft power, offering debt relief and humanitarian aid to African nations while positioning Russia as a counterbalance to Western influence. His anti-neocolonial rhetoric, combined with gestures of respect towards African sovereignty, are part of a shrewd strategy to recalibrate Africa’s geopolitical alliances. One of the most interesting outcomes of the recent 2023 Russia-Africa Summit was the agreement on the creation of a new permanent Russian-African security mechanism, aimed at combating terrorism, extremism, transnational crime, and ensuring food security. Offering both training to African servicemen and law enforcement and supply of weapons – occasionally gratis – to strengthen African sovereignty and to save African leaders from the pain of former colonial powers.
+
+The Wagner Group’s actions in Africa reflect the complexity of Russia’s strategy. It has been instrumental in advancing Russian interests in nations like Mali and the Central African Republic, but recent events suggest it might be asserting its own agenda, independently of the Kremlin. The Wagner rebellion fiasco raises questions about the dynamic between Putin and the private military company. Is Putin the puppet master, or is the Wagner Group a beast too big to control?
+
+The coup in Niger presents a compelling case study in this narrative. The sight of Russian flags waved by coup supporters was an ominous sign of shifting alliances. While there’s no concrete evidence of Wagner or Russia directly instigating the coup, their potential gain from the ensuing instability cannot be ignored. Prigozhin’s offer of Wagner’s services to the coup leaders adds another layer to this geopolitical puzzle.
+
+
+### Piecing the geopolitical puzzle together
+
+This situation demands a deeper understanding of the multi-faceted approach of Russia and the Wagner Group in Africa. Each coup, every summit, each show of support or condemnation forms a piece of a grand geopolitical jigsaw puzzle. Russia’s growing influence in Africa, like the mythical Hydra, seems to thrive amidst chaos and uncertainty. However, each new head of this Hydra that emerges offers an opportunity for vigilance and comprehension of Russia’s complex and ever-evolving strategy in Africa.
+
+The recent coup in Niger was not an unforeseen event, but a climactic endpoint of an ongoing political tension that had been building for months. Niger, one of the only two non-military regimes in the G5 Sahel, was balancing on the edge of a precipice, mired in corruption and insecurity. Whispers of a coup had been circulating since February, with the turning point coming from within the presidential guard, instigating other factions to seize control. The capital, Niamey, more exposed to jihadist attacks than its G5 counterparts, buckled under the strain of constant threats and the influx of displaced residents.
+
+Some interpret this coup as a step backwards in democracy, but for a nation worn out by years of corruption and mismanagement, it serves as a necessary reaction. It is a bleak tableau where jobless youth and impoverished rural communities are the hardest hit. In such a scenario, any change, including a coup, signals a potential for much-needed reform.
+
+Amidst Niger’s political tumult, a stark resentment towards France is fuelled in Niamey. While ECOWAS condemns the coup, the West grapples with a diplomatic quandary: how to assist without colonial echoes. Anti-French sentiment, amplified by Russian influences, is not inherently anti-European. The West must pivot: the diplomatic roadmap ahead calls for the West to prioritise authentic partnerships over paternalistic approaches. There must be a shift from merely offering aid to fostering mutual understandings, from imposing conditions, to soliciting African-led solutions. The tri-border region, a migration and extremism nexus, demands stability, especially in the tri-border area of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, crucial for migration routes and vital to countering extremism.Ultimately, the coup in Niger serves as a wake-up call to the international community. It underscores the urgent need for a comprehensive reassessment of relationships with Africa, to move away from the shadows of colonialism and towards equitable partnerships. It also highlights the need to carefully dissect Russia’s sophisticated approach in Africa, which challenges the status quo and dictates the need for a coordinated international response.
+
+With every move and countermove in this intricate game of geopolitics, the international community must remain alert and adaptive, ready to confront Hydra’s next gambit. After all, it is not just about surviving the immediate storm but navigating the complex currents of power, influence, and survival in a world that continues to evolve.
+
+Diplomatic recalibration is not a choice, it is a must.
+
+---
+
+__Joana de Deus Pereira__ is Senior Research Fellow at RUSI Europe specialising in Counter-Terrorism and P/CVE. She has particular expertise in the realms of geopolitical and country-risk analysis in sub-Saharan Africa.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-17-the-road-to-brazil.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-17-the-road-to-brazil.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..99e2287e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-17-the-road-to-brazil.md
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : The Road To Brazil
+author: Maria Nizzero and Maria Sofia Reiser
+date  : 2023-08-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ONg2Rxu.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "How do the G20’s Actions on Asset Recovery Stack Up?"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_As this year’s G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group comes to a close, are G20 countries really committed to improving global asset recovery efforts?_
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+On 12 August, the G20’s Anti-Corruption Ministerial Meeting convened for the last time under the current Indian presidency. Unsurprisingly, asset recovery was a key area of focus for the G20 participants. Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to making the recovery and return of proceeds of crime a key policy objective – both at the domestic level by enforcing effective legal powers, tools and measures, and at the international level via effective coordination and communication, and timely execution of cross-jurisdictional asset recovery requests.
+
+It’s fair to say that asset recovery has been a hot topic in the world of financial crime over the last year. From Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, which led many G20 countries to step up their response to the proceeds of crime, to the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) increased interest in the topic, organisations and governments across the world have committed to increasing their efforts to recover stolen assets.
+
+Indeed, there are multiple reasons why policymakers should be paying more attention not only to catching criminals, but also to recovering the assets they’ve stolen. Recovering assets from criminals is an effective deterrent, underlying the principle that crime does not – or should not – pay. For countries that have been decimated by corrupt politicians, recovered assets can be reinvested in education, infrastructure and other projects, increasing public trust and strengthening the rule of law and democratic institutions.
+
+The G20 has a crucial role to play in global asset recovery efforts, not least as G20 countries are very often the destination of choice for plundered assets. The lack – or inefficacy – of asset recovery and return mechanisms has a devastating impact on the economies of the countries from which the assets are originally stolen: it halts growth, increases inequalities and corrupts democratic processes. There is, therefore, a moral imperative for G20 countries to boost their efforts in relation to asset recovery.
+
+
+### The G20’s Approach to Asset Recovery
+
+Hopes were high when India was placed at the helm of the G20. The country had previously argued for the inclusion of asset recovery in the G20’s anti-corruption commitments in 2018. Under the Indian presidency, “strengthening asset recovery mechanisms related to corruption” has been identified as one of the priority areas.
+
+This commitment is echoed at the global level by the FATF’s approach to enhancing global asset recovery mechanisms. Last year, the FATF and Interpol announced an initiative to upscale the global response to asset recovery and “to deprive criminals of their dirty money”. This includes revising the FATF’s Recommendations 4 and 38, a long overdue action.
+
+___`Despite some improvement over the last 15 years, it is clear that current international asset recovery mechanisms are still not good enough`___
+
+This is not the first time, however, that asset recovery has been a focus of the G20. In 2011, the G20 adopted nine principles on asset recovery. Inter alia, the principles require countries to make asset recovery a policy priority, implement legislation to support the application of global anti-money laundering standards, establish a wide range of legislative options for asset recovery, and adopt laws that facilitate international cooperation. Under the Indian presidency, resources have been collated from a small number of G20 countries (currently Canada, Mexico, Turkey and India) to provide step-by-step guides to asset tracing, requesting mutual legal assistance and asset recovery in each jurisdiction.
+
+More broadly, G20 countries have been engaged in many initiatives to improve global asset recovery mechanisms, focused in particular on the sharing of information and expertise. For example, Argentina, Mexico and Brazil are members of the GAFILAT Asset Recovery Network which was established in 2009 to facilitate the identification, tracing and recovery of criminal proceeds. Data shows an increased number of consultations since the network’s inception, especially in relation to drug-trafficking offences.
+
+All these actions are commendable. However, despite some improvement over the last 15 years, it is clear that current international asset recovery mechanisms are still not good enough.
+
+
+### Assessing the Current State of Asset Recovery in the G20
+
+While asset recovery is undeniably a key area of focus for G20 countries, at the national level the results still leave much to be desired. The latest FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports (MER) for some G20 countries provide a mixed picture.
+
+South Africa, for example, has a moderate effectiveness rating on issues related to asset confiscation. The authorities have managed to demonstrate positive results in the recovery of proceeds of crime, particularly in the areas of fraud and economic crime. However, wider efforts on recovering assets from state capture and proceeds moved to other countries have been less successful and have only been undertaken more recently. Following its mutual evaluation, South Africa was grey-listed by the FATF; as part of its action plan, it has to address issues around enhancing the identification, seizure and confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities of a wider range of crimes.
+
+Similarly, Indonesia has also achieved a moderate level of effectiveness on asset confiscation according to the FATF. One of the key elements of the country’s anti-financial crime strategy is optimising asset recovery, and while the authorities do pursue illicit assets laundered abroad, the amounts effectively recovered transnationally are low. The most recent Mutual Evaluation Report shows the assets that have been repatriated to victims in cash, which amounted to only €4.75 million from 2017 to early 2023.
+
+___`While new laws to boost recovery are welcome, what is needed from Global North countries is operational capacity and a willingness to engage with “victim” countries in the Global South`___
+
+At the European level, MONEYVAL, the Council of Europe’s anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing body, warned in its annual report for 2022 that the recovery of proceeds of crime against states is insufficient. According to its chair, Elżbieta Frankow-Jaśkiewicz, there is an “urgent need for [European countries] to greatly improve their results in confiscating and managing criminal assets, adopt stricter sanctions and increase the number of convictions for serious money laundering offences”.
+
+There are signs that some G20 members are listening to calls for better international cooperation and providing increased assistance to developing countries. In November 2022, France introduced a mechanism aimed at returning the proceeds of the sale of illicit assets that have been confiscated in the country. The law enables the state of origin to make requests for mutual legal assistance for the return of assets. States can now bring an action before French courts to seek redress and have rights of ownership – this can be done via the opening of an independent investigation in France or by starting civil proceedings. While new laws to boost recovery are welcome, however, what is needed from Global North countries is operational capacity and a willingness to engage with “victim” countries in the Global South. This is currently one of the main weaknesses of G20 countries.
+
+An exception, Italy, has been regarded by many as a “beacon” for asset recovery efforts. Italians understood quite early on that mafia members could still operate from inside prison walls. What really hurt them was taking their assets. The country is now one of the leaders in the recovery of assets globally and has created dedicated asset recovery liaisons in relevant host countries. Early this year, the country’s Guardia di Finanza also hosted a Learning and Development Forum on behalf of the FATF to share best practices and “make a difference in the fight against financial crime”.
+
+
+### What More Do G20 Countries Need to Do?
+
+It was argued in a previous commentary on G7 commitments that stale thinking and paraphrased commitments were the main threat to the group’s efficacy in the fight against illicit finance. The same can be said about the commitments made by the G20. There are clearly pockets of good practice across the G20, and G20 countries are rightly promising higher international standards. But, as ever, these promises need to be followed by concrete action, particularly when it comes to areas where the G20 should excel, like information sharing and international collaboration. The step-by-step guides referenced above are a case in point; so far, only four G20 countries have contributed, but these could prove to be an invaluable resource.
+
+As India’s presidency of the G20 comes to a close, its successor, Brazil, should continue to prioritise asset recovery and – in particular – the G20’s commitments around improved international collaboration and coordination. The last Ministerial Meeting noted the countries’ commitment to update their information on existing guides to international cooperation requests, which is a promising start. If asset recovery remains a priority for the G20 – and if G20 countries can deliver on their commitments – the fight against corruption might stand a chance of seeing some much-needed improvement.
+
+---
+
+__Maria Nizzero__ is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI. Her research examines the UK economic crime landscape, asset recovery, with a focus on sanctioned frozen assets and proceeds of kleptocracy, and the foreign policy dimension of illicit finance, including active financial measures. Her other research interests include the EU financial crime response, the serious and organised crime-terror nexus, and financial crime involving high value goods.
+
+__Maria Sofia Reiser__ is a Research Analyst at RUSI’s Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies. Her recent work has focused on restricting kleptocracy by empowering civil society activists and investigative journalists in East Africa, the Western Balkans and Latin America with greater knowledge of domestic and international anti financial crime standards.

From a7f02b9a2f809e258fca4842030d9c7d4e41ee5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hokoi <hokoeye@pm.me>
Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2023 01:18:22 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 09/19] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x20 Sep.04

---
 .../_hkers/2023-08-09-defusing-diffusion.md   | 52 ++++++++++
 .../_hkers/2023-08-11-black-sea-blockade.md   | 88 +++++++++++++++++
 .../2023-08-21-put-uk-defence-into-context.md | 97 +++++++++++++++++++
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diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-09-defusing-diffusion.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-09-defusing-diffusion.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..770a8196
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-09-defusing-diffusion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Defusing Diffusion
+author: Michael Jones
+date  : 2023-08-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/M11TzkM.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Challenges for Peace-making in Sudan"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and its paramilitary counterpart, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), is the logical outcome of a voracious kleptocracy starting to implode. But the violence is assuming an uncontrollable momentum of its own, creating exponential difficulties for belligerents and peacemakers alike._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+Over 100 days in, Sudan’s conflict shows no signs of abating. Across the capital, clashes remain concentrated around Omdurman and Bahri, Khartoum’s sister cities, with a single airstrike killing at least 37 people and Grad rockets saturating residential neighbourhoods. Despite dwarfing Mohamed Hamdan “Hemmeti” Dagalo’s RSF, SAF is on the back foot after failing to relieve the disparate garrisons making up its frontline. Dismissed by many as a “vanity project”, a passable imitation of a working military, the army displays little of the capacity or doctrine necessary to sustain a counterinsurgency, having outsourced such functions to the very group it is now fighting. The top brass appears divided over operational planning, and morale among poorly paid ground-troops is often shaky. Perhaps as a consequence, heavily armed convoys from Hattab Camp were decimated along Al Ingaz Street, a major north-south artery, while trying to reach SAF’s beleaguered Signal Corps – the latest in a series of costly setbacks that have left much of the military’s senior leadership, including Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, seemingly cut off in the nearby General Command complex. With the defenders reportedly short on fuel, “even some army backers suggest the RSF [could be] on the cusp of a decisive victory”.
+
+But this is not a foregone conclusion. Hemmeti’s supply lines are stretched, and SAF is still entrenched across Khartoum’s outskirts, with ready access to the Sudanese coastline and support infrastructure further north. Additionally, al-Burhan is only the face of a polycentric “khakistocracy”, a metropolitan syndicate of Islamist elites, corporate cronies and riverain officers – the so-called “community of the state” – desperate to preserve their privilege and social standing from rural revolutionaries. Should the compound fall, it is therefore entirely plausible that the conflict will grind on, bringing with it serious problems for both parties.
+
+
+### Dangerous Refractions
+
+Although possibly benefiting from a war of attrition in material terms, the military is experiencing existential pressures that will only worsen over time. Primarily drawn from Awlad Al-Bahr (Ja’aliyyin, Shaigiyya and Danagla) ethnic networks clustered along the Nile, SAF’s generals cast themselves as national custodians, an indispensable arm of the Sudanese state “mid-wifing” modernity, social consciousness and manifest destiny. But battlefield blunders and mounting casualties are taking a toll on their narrative. Having already urged retired soldiers to re-enlist, al-Burhan delivered another televised address in late June demanding a general mobilisation. Despite some evidence of refitted or newly deployed units, manpower shortages persist across the capital, leaving the army reliant on a variety of quasi and unofficial forces – former intelligence operatives, paramilitary groups like the Central Reserve Police, armed Islamists, and rumoured “Shadow Brigades” – to offset its losses. This dependency is not only damaging to SAF’s cohesion but anathema to its internal logic, accelerating the “fragmentation of sovereignty” Sudanese officers have long feared. By trying to reimpose some (imagined) monopoly over the use of violence, the army’s survival could paradoxically now be tied to a steady process of “militiafication”, leaving it one (depleted) security outfit among many.
+
+In contrast, the RSF – a rudimental patchwork of militiamen – have carved out a comparatively strong position in recent months, drawing on fleets of “technicals” and a well-catered stockpile of weapons and munition – mortars, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank missiles and drones – to consolidate control over most of central Khartoum. Supplemented by armoured vehicles from captured military bases, they can also deploy Man-Portable Air Defence Systems or “man-pads”, presenting a marked risk to civil and military aviation. Furthermore, Hemmeti enjoys strategic depth across South, West and Central Darfur, enabling his forces to conceivably hold out for years. But a protracted conflict raises other difficulties. Much of the RSF is incentivised by “money and clan solidarity [rather] than ideology”, and amid the polyglot membership produced by wartime recruitment, social revolution may not necessarily be bound up under the Dagalo brand alone. With SAF freezing the group’s bank accounts and constraining its cashflow, significant portions of this “force for hire” could become unmanageable, breaking off in pursuit of more lucrative opportunities. Signs may already be discernible as strains on RSF logistics exacerbate pillage and marauding, weakening Hemmeti’s half-baked populist appeal and driving the creation of several field courts to prosecute his own men.
+
+___`Sudan’s upheaval should not be considered a binary contest between SAF and the RSF so much as a “welter of complex struggle”, integrating a raft of conflicts from the regional to the hyperlocal`___
+
+At the same time, drawn-out hostilities in Sudan’s long-congested political marketplace are likely to accentuate a litany of smaller, localised disputes. Across “resource-rich, drought-prone” Darfur, fighting is assuming an ethnic flavour as Mahamid and Rizeigat gunmen – many affiliated with the RSF – attempt to capture land and water sources. Fur and Masalit civilians have been systematically targeted, with mass killings recycling the same “tactics, techniques and procedures” of the early 2000s. Reports describe not only the deliberate destruction of “homes, schools and hospitals [and] water, electricity and communications infrastructure”, but the torching of local markets and the palace of the Masalit Sultanate. Such is the scale of devastation that Khamis Abakar, Wali of West Darfur, was himself assassinated hours after condemning the attacks as a “genocide”. Police – often “outmanned and ill equipped” non-Arabs – have called on “their communities to arm and defend themselves” in turn, with some appealing to the army for support. Within months, cities like Al-Geneina hosted a medley of rival factions: former insurgents and signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement patrolled the eastern districts; much of the suburbs were ringed by Janjaweed; paramilitaries controlled the governor’s house; and SAF occupied the airport. This decentralisation of violence not only breeds a new crop of spoilers but generates its own momentum, further splintering Sudanese authority into “thousands of fragments and micro-powers of local character”. Porous boundaries; weak institutions; and shared kinship, patronage and political networks also mesh Saharan borderlands together, with Hemmeti’s Rizeigat tribe spanning western Sudan and Chad, and its wider fraternity – the Baggara confederation – stretching to Niger. As a result, conflict is readily exportable, raising the possibility of a regional conflagration that is exponentially harder to regulate or resolve.
+
+Foreign meddling is already evident from reports of Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar – a beneficiary of RSF support during his assault on Tripoli in 2019 – supplying Hemmeti with hardware, medicine and fuel. The US likewise accused the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary company, of exporting surface-to-air missiles from the Central African Republic. Even those nominally pushing for peace have picked sides, with Cairo remaining a staunch supporter of al-Burhan, partly due to close structural linkages with the Sudanese army and a pressing need for allies in negotiations over Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam. Certain analysts are even going as far as to suggest that Egyptian fighter jets have directly participated in SAF’s bombing campaign. Similar – if more covert – dynamics are playing out in the Gulf. In theory, Saudi Arabia and the UAE share little interest in a prolonged conflict after years of tying over the Sudanese state – and coterminous systems of graft and patronage – with loans, rents and aid. In November 2022, Riyadh’s Public Investment Fund pledged $3 billion to improve economic infrastructure across Khartoum, while months earlier, the Emiratis stumped up $6 billion in construction projects, agriculture and deposits for the Central Bank. Consequently, both – as members of the Quad (alongside the US and UK) and the Arab League – have pushed for a ceasefire and immediate humanitarian access. But many dismiss the UAE’s credibility as a “neutral arbiter”, given Dubai’s regular consumption of Sudanese gold and ongoing ties to RSF companies and media outlets. In April, for instance, footage surfaced of the group using thermobaric shells that reportedly trace back to UAE stockpiles, leading some to speculate that the “Abu Dhabi Express” – a complex web of commercial proxies and illicit arms flows – could in reality extend across Darfur.
+
+Under such conditions, Sudan’s upheaval should not be considered a binary contest between SAF and the RSF – entities that are themselves volatile composites of different actors and interests – so much as a “welter of complex struggle”, integrating a raft of conflicts from the regional to the hyperlocal, which proliferate far beyond the immediate control of either al-Burhan or Hemmeti. This is not to deny agency or culpability for war crimes and well-documented atrocities, but reflects the increasing difficulty of delivering solutions that can sufficiently address the centrifugal propensities of long-running violence.
+
+
+### Immediate Priorities and Cautionary Tales
+
+A credible ceasefire is, of course, paramount. Over a third of Sudan’s population was aid-dependent before the fighting, and an additional 3.3 million are now displaced. Internally displaced persons, refugees and migrants – many of them itinerant farm-hands – face not only insecurity but diminishing labour demand and little in the way of reliable transit, cutting off incomes as market prices “sky-rocket”. The World Food Programme anticipates around 2.5 million more people will experience “acute hunger” in the coming months, pushing the country to a “record high”. Crucially, Susanne Jaspars and Lutz Oette also describe a shift in the “nature and scale” of the crisis, increasing deprivation across urban communities and leaving the conventional modalities for emergency relief obsolete or insufficient. Additionally, international supplies are largely confined to Port Sudan, awaiting clearance from the notoriously apathetic Humanitarian Aid Commission, a regulatory body allegedly associated with Sudanese Military Intelligence. With civil service salaries unpaid and local law and order collapsing, there is not enough capacity or infrastructure to offset these blockages. Where alternatives have been found, either via resistance committees or improvised administrative solutions, they continue to be waylaid or completely derailed by violence.
+
+___`The focus on high-level brokerage neglects the breadth, complexity and dynamism of grievances only loosely affiliated with the war’s “master-cleavage”`___
+
+As a result, external negotiations have understandably focused on suspending hostilities, delivering aid and demilitarising “hospitals and essential public facilities”, albeit to little avail. Among these pressing needs, however, it is vital that mediators avoid their past follies when engaging the “men with guns”. A demoralising track record of foreign peace-making in Sudan not only features the Framework Agreement but stretches back to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and various initiatives in the 1990s, which saw elite-centric bargains repeatedly “displacing civil politics and raising the … currency of violence”. In the process, these “make-do outcomes” tended to side-line or quash the very civic activism necessary for helping peace stick, reproducing (and entrenching) the same structures of violence that precipitated conflict in the first place.
+
+Broadly speaking, there seem to be encouraging lessons already being learned. The imposition of US sanctions on Al-Junaid, Tradive General Trading LLC, and parastatals like Defence Industry Systems and Sudan Master Technology conforms with recommendations made by NGOs and advocacy groups, as does the appointment of a dedicated Special Envoy from Washington. High-level diplomats routinely emphasise the importance of “civilian leadership”, and there is belated interest in supporting resistance committees. But platitudes and standalone policies do not translate into a “practical plan” for resolving the conflict. Though the UK and EU are launching similar financial measures, it is doubtful that they will find traction without buy-in from the UAE, or be able to stem “localised outbreaks of fighting and Arab mobilisation” across Darfur. At the same time, UK and Emirati officials resented being initially left out of US-Saudi negotiations, undermining the Quad’s collective relevance, and there remains little convergence between the “military-focused” Jeddah talks and parallel diplomatic tracks fronted by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the AU, Egypt and Chad. Without harmonisation, or at least efforts to shore up better coherence, international engagement could very quickly become “quixotic”, if not completely redundant.
+
+The focus on high-level brokerage also neglects the breadth, complexity and dynamism of grievances only loosely affiliated with the war’s “master-cleavage”. As SAF and the RSF increasingly resemble fragile coalitions, dealings between Hemmeti and al-Burhan may have no real bearing on the myriad of private conflicts now shaping Sudanese violence. As a result, conflict resolution is unlikely to work if involving the generals alone and could undermine much-needed atrocity prevention if “massacres and war crimes…[are] ignored under the exigencies of peacemaking”.
+
+Although a renewed appetite for dialogue is emerging, Sudan’s so-called strongmen are caught in a self-destructive strategy, undermining their own authority as they try to build leverage for a carousel of negotiations. In the process, fighting is becoming ever more diffused, distorted and unstable. While a ceasefire is therefore imperative, it is not enough: mediators need a plan for what comes next.
+
+---
+
+__Michael Jones__ is a Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team examining political violence, governance by non/pseudo-state armed groups, and the convergence of violent extremism and insurgent militancy in East and sub-Saharan Africa. He has led investigative fieldwork across various countries including Sudan, Kenya and Lebanon; managed conflict focused projects looking into Darfur and Somalia; and worked in RUSI’s Nairobi Office on a range of projects related to the EU’s STRIVE Horn of Africa and STRIVE II programming.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-11-black-sea-blockade.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-11-black-sea-blockade.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-11-black-sea-blockade.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Black Sea Blockade
+author: Sidharth Kaushal
+date  : 2023-08-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/eR0bmk7.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "How Can NATO Overcome Russia’s Black Sea Blockade?"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Following the breakdown of the grain deal between Russia and Ukraine, how can NATO partners help to mitigate the impact of Russia’s effective blockade of Ukrainian ports?_
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+In a recent article, Admiral James G Stavridis, the former NATO SACEUR, suggested that a NATO-led convoying system in the Black Sea could go some distance towards alleviating the costs of Russia’s de facto blockade of Ukraine following President Vladimir Putin’s withdrawal from the grain deal. While Stavridis makes a number of important points, a convoying system would be an impractical solution to the challenges posed by a blockade, one which would incur significant risks for uncertain gains. Instead, an approach to meeting the challenge of the blockade should be built on two pillars: circumvention in the short term, and a wider effort aimed at coercing Russia back into a settlement in the medium term.
+
+
+### The Problem with Convoys
+
+There are several issues with using the Iran–Iraq Tanker War of the 1980s as an analogy for a potential full-scale convoying operation in the Black Sea. The first issue is that to a far greater extent than the Tanker War, the outcome of a contest to move grain through Ukrainian ports will be determined by the attitudes of insurers. US convoying operations during the Tanker War mitigated but did not eliminate the high war risk premiums demanded by insurers, not least because they were restricted to reflagged Kuwaiti vessels. The reason that neither Iraq nor Iran was able to seriously impact the other’s oil exports and the global economy was that the profit margins involved in moving oil justified the transit even in the face of higher insurance rates – something that is not as true for grain. Moreover, Iraq was able to circumvent the Iranian blockade using overland pipelines to Turkey and Yanbu in Saudi Arabia. While convoying was a useful means of both defending the principle of freedom of navigation and forestalling the Soviet Union’s efforts to increase its influence in Kuwait, its economic impact was marginal.
+
+Today, the major challenge facing Ukraine is that insurers’ risk perceptions will likely drive a spike in war risk premiums, which could make movement in the Black Sea effectively unprofitable, or even lead to coverage being withdrawn. While convoys could resolve this underlying challenge by reassuring shipowners, they could also have the opposite effect. The sight of NATO and Russian assets operating cheek by jowl could just as easily increase perceptions of war risk. Russia could exacerbate this risk through acts of brinkmanship such as risky aerial manoeuvres, much as it has done recently.
+
+The second major issue with convoys is that the Russian threat to shipping in the northern Black Sea is in certain ways dissimilar to the Iranian one. Iran sought to interdict or attack vessels at sea using the assets of its navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), making the presence of nearby friendly combatant vessels a useful deterrent. Russia’s fleet has largely avoided the northern Black Sea since the Moskva incident. The risk posed by Ukrainian coastal defence cruise missiles such as the Harpoon and Neptune has largely eliminated the surface vessels of the Black Sea Fleet as a presence in the northern Black Sea. The primary tools of blockade for Russia are naval mines – which it can seed using a range of capabilities including its Kilo-class submarines – and missile strikes on storage sites on the ground. Convoys can usefully deter things such as the interdiction and boarding of vessels, but are of less value in the face of a mine threat. Indeed, in instances such as the Bridgeton incident during the Tanker War, US assets had to form up in columns behind a double-hulled tanker as a defence against mines. The mine challenge could be a basis for deploying mine countermeasures (MCM) vessels – something discussed in the original article – but as will be articulated more fully later, this is a separate consideration from convoying.
+
+The third consideration, acknowledged by figures such as Stavridis, is the degree to which the Montreux Convention constrains policy options. Considering that the aggregate tonnage of all non-Black Sea navies at any given time cannot exceed 45,000 tonnes (around the weight of five Ticonderoga-class cruisers) and that vessels must rotate out of the region after 21 days, the ability of non-Black Sea countries to maintain credible forces in the region will be circumscribed irrespective of whether they are willing to commit more vessels. Of course, a Turkish decision either to void certain restrictions or to participate in a convoy system itself could change this dynamic, but this remains unlikely. A convoy system could only work in practice if it was led by those members of NATO that are also Black Sea states, with a somewhat token presence provided by Allies from beyond the region. This implies that smaller members of the Alliance would bear the lion’s share of the cost and risk – something they are unlikely to do.
+
+There is also a real risk of escalation, as acknowledged. While Russia is unlikely to directly attack a NATO member, there are a number of avenues to inadvertent escalation. For example, if a NATO vessel struck a mine like the USS Samuel B Roberts did during the Tanker War, the Alliance would be faced with an unpalatable choice between escalating or choosing not to attribute the damage (and thus perhaps incentivising intentional efforts to clandestinely attack its vessels). A weaker opponent may act in risk-acceptant ways that draw it into clashes with a stronger rival – as Iran’s IRGC did with the US Navy on several occasions. Brinkmanship by both sides can create room for misunderstandings, as was nearly the case during the Cold War when a Soviet Tu-16 buzzing a US carrier pitched into the sea in an incident which could have been misinterpreted as a shootdown.
+
+
+### A Short-Term Approach: Circumvention and Limited Support to Shipping
+
+There are short-term solutions that adopt elements of the proposals put forward by proponents of a more forward-leaning NATO role, but which do not require the Ukrainians and their partners to run the risks of a full-scale convoying operation.
+
+Foremost among these is circumventing the blockade. Both overland routes and riverine transit via the Danube offer alternatives to the Black Sea. In the past year, Ukraine’s riverine ports such as Izmail have seen a substantial increase in the volume of shipping that they have handled. While not sufficient to completely offset the impact of a blockade, this could substantially mitigate the challenge. Unsurprisingly, these ports have come under sustained air attack by Russia. The challenge of air defence, while complex and resource-intensive, can be resolved by the provision of additional platforms to Ukraine. A more ambitious course could see Ukraine’s partners defend these areas from cruise missiles directly. Given their proximity to the borders of a NATO state, a defensive counter-air mission over these riverine ports need not be framed as an entry into the conflict, but rather as a means of mitigating risk. The fact that such a mission would involve intercepts of missiles and not manned aircraft limits the risk of escalation. To be sure, any such decision would need to be taken alongside efforts to define the geographical limits of NATO support to avoid mission creep.
+
+A second palliative would be subsidising overland transport. Thus far, the costs of overland transport and the reluctance of European states such as Poland to expose their own farmers to competition from Ukrainian produce – which is more price-competitive in nearby countries than it is after a long and costly transit – have meant that the EU’s grain corridors have had limited utility for Ukraine. Subsidising the transit of Ukrainian goods to ensure that they do not stay in EU countries could be a ready fix to this conundrum.
+
+___`Ultimately, the only long-term guarantee of freedom of navigation in the Black Sea is a settlement with Russia; anything short of this will not solve the problem of war risk premiums`___
+
+Finally, there is a basis for a more limited approach to directly challenging the blockade. Clearing mines through channels in the western Black Sea could allow some vessels to depart from Odessa, especially if the effort was combined with a bolstering of Ukraine’s ground-based air defences. There is an obvious utility to vessels such as MCM ships, but the value of a wider convoying effort is less clear. Because of the Black Sea Fleet’s restricted freedom of action in the face of the Ukrainian coastal defence cruise missile threat, the risk to vessels at sea will come primarily from mines, and they are likely to be most at risk when they are stationary targets in port.
+
+True, MCM vessels operating on their own would be vulnerable to Russian attack (though Russia’s difficulty in sinking the Ukrainian tank landing ship Yuri Olefirenko at sea demonstrates real challenges with dynamic targeting). It should be noted, however, that even a convoy in the Black Sea would theoretically be at risk of being sunk if Russia wished to invest the resources into doing so. The deterrent to this would be the wider implications of a direct attack on a Western vessel, not the vessel’s own defences. While it might be regarded as counterintuitive to deploy vessels in such a manner, it is worth noting that this is precisely what Western European deployments such as the Armilla patrol did during the Tanker War by utilising naval vessels that were unarmed.
+
+Given their limited tonnage and lack of offensive armaments, MCM could be rotated into the region in larger numbers and with less escalatory risk. The task of navies, then, would be to brief insurers on the fact that the absence of convoys does not mean that channels are unsafe, given the low likelihood of direct Russian interdiction by surface platforms.
+
+With regards to air defences, NATO members such as Greece and Bulgaria which currently operate S-300 batteries could be encouraged to play a role here. Similarly, the US Army’s Iron Dome batteries, which may have some utility against threats such as UAVs, could be donated if – as argued by some – they are deemed unfit for the environments in which the US expects its ground forces to operate.
+
+In conjunction with this, a multilateral effort to provide state-backed insurance could be utilised to further mitigate the financial risk undertaken by vessels’ owners. This is something Iran did to good effect during the Tanker War when it underwrote 15% of the cost of insurance. This contributed to Iran’s oil exports rebounding to pre-war levels by the late 1980s, despite the Iraqi air threat to terminals like Kharg.
+
+Each approach is likely to be extremely expensive and involve diplomatic and financial costs. Countries are loathe to part with capabilities such as air defences, and subsidising transport is likely to be exceedingly expensive. However, the ability of a new Iranian regime to achieve the latter goal in the 1980s demonstrates that it is not impossible, while the former is less diplomatically challenging than organising a multilateral convoying effort.
+
+
+### The Long Term: Coercing Russia into a Settlement
+
+All of the palliatives described above can only work in the short term, however, given the costs involved. Ultimately, the only long-term guarantee of freedom of navigation in the Black Sea is a settlement with Russia; anything short of this will not solve the problem of war risk premiums. The question for Ukraine and its backers, then, is how Russia can be coerced into entering a settlement and respecting it. The importance of the ability to counter an opponent’s blockade with one’s own punitive measures, thus denying them the perception that time is on their side if they only wait, is an enduring lesson of naval combat.
+
+Of course, if Ukraine’s ongoing offensive proves immensely successful, Crimea might cease to be a springboard for Russian coercion, and the country’s Azov ports might open. That said, it is worth planning for a more conservative outcome in which both sides remain deadlocked and Russia seeks to grind Ukraine down through a long-term campaign against the country’s economy.
+
+Ultimately, Ukraine’s ability to compel Russia to re-enter some form of agreement on shipping (even if hostilities continue) will be predicated on its capacity to counter-escalate. There are several avenues by which this might be done. Firstly, Ukrainian forces can contest Russia’s own commercial vessels’ freedom of navigation at or near ports. The uncrewed assets used near Sevastopol could serve as a useful tool to harass shipping, and though Russia would likely deploy countermeasures, this could still drive up insurance rates. Presumably such vessels could also be used as minelayers – though their carrying capacity might be somewhat limited.
+
+___`In the immediate term, it will likely prove more viable to mitigate the effects of the blockade by circumventing it`___
+
+Secondly, a more concerted effort could be made to identify and interdict the grey shipping upon which Russia’s own economy depends. Though it is politically and legally challenging to seize vessels on the high seas, states with territorial waters that straddle transit chokepoints can deny these vessels access if they are not suitably insured against environmental risks. NATO countries that currently straddle such chokepoints include the UK and France (in the case of the English Channel and Gibraltar) and Turkey (at the Bosporus). Of course, it is unlikely that a unanimous approach to interdicting such vessels will be achieved, but heightened pressure in this area could still increase the costs for Moscow and contribute to enabling subsequent negotiations.
+
+Perhaps most crucially, however, Ukraine must be able to limit the Black Sea Fleet’s ability to operate out of Sevastopol. The threat of Ukraine accomplishing this could be sufficient to compel Russia to re-enter a settlement. We might consider, for example, how the Houthi movement’s ability to impose costs on its opponents and effectively shut down key ports and cities such as Marib with ballistic missiles played an important role in driving the anti-Houthi coalition towards a settlement in Yemen.
+
+Assuming the current lines stay broadly stable, the Ukrainians would need either cruise or ballistic missiles with a range of over 300 km to achieve this. While it is presently unlikely that the US-made ATACMS will be provided to Ukraine, other options exist. For example, a concerted effort could be made to expand production lines for Storm Shadow – a weapon already in Ukraine, but one that the country must use sparingly.
+
+An alternative would be to use the soil of friendly states to commence the production of indigenous designs such as the Grom-2 ballistic missile in sanctuaries safe from destruction by Russian airpower. More immediate means of contesting Russian commercial ports could include low-cost UAVs, which appear to have been used in Russia itself.
+
+Another capability which could conceivably abet a counter-blockade but which would presently be difficult to manufacture in Ukraine is submersibles capable of carrying torpedoes – something currently being prototyped by, among others, a UAE-based Ukrainian firm. Production lines for such capabilities could be set up on the territory of NATO members which currently sit within the Black Sea, enabling their transfer without the need to violate article 19 of Montreux.
+
+Of course, there are legitimate concerns regarding the escalatory risks involved in giving Ukraine the capacity to act against Russian interests at reach. That being said, generating the capacity to – for example – manufacture missiles for Ukraine will be time-consuming, and could thus give both parties the diplomatic space to re-enter a settlement. Even a latent threat to reinforce Ukraine’s offensive capacity could be useful, irrespective of whether it is acted upon.
+
+
+### Conclusions
+
+Ultimately, there are no ideal solutions to the challenge posed by Russia’s blockade. Though appealing, the obvious immediate palliative of a convoy system is likely to be unworkable in practice. Though many issues impede such a solution, as discussed, its primary flaw is the fact that it does not obviate the most significant challenge facing Ukrainian exports – the fact that high war risk premiums will likely remain in place.
+
+In the immediate term, it will likely prove more viable to mitigate the effects of the blockade by circumventing it. Though costly, circumvention via routes such as the Danube offers the most immediately viable method of limiting – if not quite eliminating – the impact of the blockade. Alongside this, allied navies can make genuine immediate contributions in areas such as mine countermeasures.
+
+In the medium to long term, the most viable route to a resumption of Black Sea shipping from Ukrainian ports is a campaign to progressively increase the pressure on Russia’s own maritime posture in the region, as well as to impose costs in other areas, with a view to eventually reaching a durable settlement which at a minimum separates the issue of freedom of navigation from the wider conflict.
+
+---
+
+__Sidharth Kaushal__ is the Research Fellow of Sea Power at RUSI. His research covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-21-put-uk-defence-into-context.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-21-put-uk-defence-into-context.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..880f41bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-21-put-uk-defence-into-context.md
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Put UK Defence Into Context
+author: Will Jessett, et al.
+date  : 2023-08-21 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/O7pu2lw.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Putting the UK Defence Command Paper Refresh into Context"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_We offered some [initial commentary](https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/how-refreshing-initial-assessment-uks-integrated-review-refresh) on the Integrated Review Refresh (IRR) in March._ <excerpt/> _This piece does not try to apply to the Defence Command Paper Refresh (DCPR) the five “tests” of the analytical framework for assessing the main post-Cold War reviews which we proposed in our [December 2020 report](https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/five-tests-integrated-review). Instead, it briefly assesses the policy ideas and approaches in the DCPR and makes suggestions for how the Department could sharpen its thinking and approach ahead of the next major review, likely due after the next general election._
+
+
+### Overall Assessment
+
+We offer three headline assessments of the DCPR.
+
+First, because of the fiscal constraints under which it was produced, the DCPR centres on policy ideas and approaches rather than on new capabilities. The white paper contains a large number of policy ideas. But, as the chapter-by-chapter analysis below indicates, very few of them are new. We suggest that those who will be planning and leading the next major review would benefit from familiarising themselves with what has gone before, including the 2010 and 2015 white papers (and previous ones) and the defence green paper in early 2010. The DCPR arguably – even if not deliberately – serves a similar function to that green paper, setting out a broad menu of issues that will need to be considered again in the next major review.
+
+Second, the DCPR sets out a series of worthy high-level goals but is very light on detail and contains no clear sense of prioritisation. The original Integrated Review, Defence Command Paper (DCP) and Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSIS) were crammed with commitments – anecdotally, they added up to more than 250 in total. The DCPR contains dozens more. We suggest that those leading the next major review should consider carefully how to prioritise the key outcomes relating to force structure, capabilities and policy and planning approaches. It would be much more useful to select a dozen or so major targets and to build robust implementation and monitoring functions to ensure that these key outcomes are being delivered effectively.
+
+Third, we observe that, despite the rhetoric, the “Integrated Review” has hardly lived up to its billing. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) was the first attempt to conduct an integrated defence and wider national security review, and even then produced two back-to-back white papers. The 2015 SDSR produced a single, integrated white paper. The 2021 exercise produced three separate white papers. In all cases, these major reviews were followed by minor ones only a few years later, as with this year’s “refreshes”. Those designing the process for the 2025 reviews should consider in advance which of these models they would prefer.
+
+
+### The MoD’s Strategic Approach
+
+The new purpose for Defence proposed by the DCPR – “to protect the nation, and to help it prosper” – is clear. And the six “design principles” that will inform the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) approach – threat-led, adaptable, Allied by design, integrated, innovative and digitised – look sensible, although none are new.
+
+The inverted structure of the body of the DCPR – with chapters on the key elements of the “Defence Enterprise” in Part 1 and on the more traditional policy fare of white papers in Part 2 – suits the limited ambition of this document, but would not work so well for a full-scale review.
+
+#### Part 1 – Securing and Maintaining Strategic Advantage
+
+The DCPR can be applauded for literally putting people first, in Chapter 1. It challenges the notion that headcount is the appropriate measure of the “size” of the UK’s armed forces and their capability – a notion that takes little account of the mechanisation of warfare and the latter-day profusion of uncrewed and lightly-crewed systems.
+
+The chapter commits to “taking forward” the recommendations of the recent Haythornthwaite Review on the terms and conditions of military service. Many of these – for example, “zig zag or portfolio careers” – are not new. The key test will be how quickly the MoD implements them.
+
+Another major theme is skills, with a particular focus on enhancing digital skills. It is good to see the Defence Academy put at the forefront of this – and the commitment to working closely across government and with industry and academia. But the paper gives little sense of how Defence collectively and the Defence Academy in particular will drive through the skills agenda with the energy and pace required.
+
+MoD civil servants will be disappointed by the single – and largely boilerplate – paragraph on the vital contribution of “our Civil Servants”. The next review should not treat the MoD’s civil service workforce as an afterthought.
+
+Chapter 2 follows several earlier reviews in emphasising the MoD’s intention to modernise and transform defence through science, innovation and technology. The MoD says it will increase its investment in advanced research and development and align its Science & Technology (S&T) programmes with the five critical technologies identified by the National S&T Council: Artificial Intelligence, Engineering Biology, Future Telecommunications, Semiconductors and Quantum Technologies. The MoD also plans to develop its capabilities in robotics, human augmentation, directed energy weapons and advanced materials.
+
+___`Improving operational efficiency and cost-effectiveness has featured in every major post-Cold War defence review. Unless a markedly different approach is taken this time, it is difficult to see how there will be decisive change`___
+
+Building on lessons learned from how the Ukrainian armed forces have operated, these steps aim to accelerate the speed of operational decision-making, contribute to increased productivity in the force and improve lethality. Pound for pound, investment in these technologies collectively has the potential to increase the battlefield capability of the UK armed forces to a much greater extent than any increase in personnel numbers, although it will likely require significant re-rolling and upskilling of current personnel and the recruitment of new personnel with the skills required to operate such technologies.
+
+Sensible too is the move away from a platform-centric approach in favour of focusing on the military effects that are required, along with autonomy, digital and data-centric capabilities. It remains to be seen whether the MoD will reduce its investment in major platforms and how it will prioritise the development of these promising ideas to the extent required to really move the dial on the technology-led modernisation of the armed forces.
+
+Chapter 3 covers plans to improve the Department’s performance in the acquisition of defence capabilities. Like other Western defence departments, the MoD has grappled with this challenge for decades with limited success.
+
+The document declares that “….we must buy simpler platforms more quickly and design into them the capacity to upgrade at speed…” and “[we] must force ourselves to accept solutions that are good enough…” Amen – but how is this to be achieved? Open-systems architecture, spiral development, more emphasis on exportability, encouraging project leaders to remain in post for longer, and greater attention to front-end planning are all laudable, but they are not new ideas.
+
+So, what is new? The stress on timely delivery over perfection may not be, but it is described with greater conviction (and aligns with one of the conclusions of the recent Australian Defence Strategic Review). It would be good to hear a ringing endorsement from industry. Setting a maximum five-year commitment for acquisition programmes (three years for digital) is new, but it is not clear how this will be enabled or enforced. And, how will a thematic (as opposed to domain-centric) approach to capability development contribute to the improvements sought, and how will this work in practice? Further detail and clearer plans will be required to measure progress towards achieving these goals.
+
+In his annual RUSI lecture in December 2022, the Chief of the Defence Staff foreshadowed a major drive to increase the productivity of the armed forces through greater levels of lethality and readiness. We had expected to see more detail in the DCPR, but Chapter 4 does not provide this clarity. Improving operational efficiency and cost-effectiveness has featured in every major post-Cold War defence review. Unless a markedly different approach is taken this time, it is difficult to see how the DCPR will deliver decisive change.
+
+We are encouraged to see that work is now underway to review the current Defence Operating Model. In our view, the recommendations of the 2011 Levene report on Defence Reform were applied in a one-sided manner. The delegation of financial authority to the Commands was not accompanied by the strengthening of the corporate framework and the Centre of the Department which Levene had envisaged – resulting in an erosion of financial discipline and a model which is ill-suited to making the defence-wide adjustments that the contemporary strategic context requires.
+
+#### Part 2 – Operational Ambition
+
+In relation to the debate over UK defence and security policy during the seven years since the Brexit referendum, perhaps the most significant phrase in the DCPR is: “… we will develop a force that is optimised to warfight in the Euro-Atlantic and in defence of our homeland”. Such clarity is overdue and very welcome – as is the focus on deterrence in Chapter 5. This paper follows the IRR in speaking of “An Integrated Approach to Deterrence and Defence”; why both documents could not have used the simpler US formula of “Integrated Deterrence” is a mystery. While the paper updates the reader on the Defence strands of deterrence, it does not adequately fill the gap we identified in the IRR: it says little about the integration of defence and civil capabilities to enhance deterrence.
+
+On nuclear, the DCPR notes that “we have… committed to a once-in-two-generations programme of modernisation of our nuclear forces” – a decision taken many years ago which sustains the concept of nuclear deterrence we have had since the late 1990s. Like the IRR, it says little about the fundamental changes in the global strategic balance since then, not least the dramatic growth in China’s nuclear capabilities.
+
+The opening message of Chapter 6 is that the MoD will “evolve” the previous DCP’s concept of “persistent engagement” to a “global campaigning approach”. We expressed some scepticism about the former in our commentary at the time – and the DCPR does not entirely still our doubts. In principle, a “campaigning approach” makes sense. But it is hard to see how Defence will “double the effect that we seek to achieve in the world” by 2030. The specific commitment to create a “Global Response Force” does not appear much different from the Joint Rapid Reaction Force announced in the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 and updated in most of the major reviews since then.
+
+___`While it may be true that the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions is indivisible, it is important that all concerned have a shared understanding of the limits of the military commitment`___
+
+The intention to continue to grow the Global Defence Network is welcome. The chapter also records the decision (taken since the previous DCP) to transfer leadership of the Network to Strategic Command – but does not explain how this will make a difference in practice.
+
+The measures to increase defence exports are sensible, although few are new. UK defence exports appear to have grown significantly during the international turbulence since the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine. But some of the longer-term trends may be less favourable, including the increasing demand from key customer states for higher levels of indigenous development and production. A more penetrating examination of this area will be required in the next review.
+
+Chapter 7 covers international relationships. One of the UK’s strengths, in contrast to its adversaries, is its extensive array of alliances and partnerships. Bringing this subject to life without descending into a long list of friendly states around the globe is a familiar editorial and diplomatic challenge. The most striking features are the resurfacing of the EU and the space given to the Five Eyes and other Indo-Pacific partners.
+
+We applaud the renewed acknowledgement of the importance of the EU to UK security: “The UK will use the new momentum in the relationship to develop forms of direct cooperation, as we already intend to do through the PESCO project on military mobility”. A key task will be to ensure that the UK is not frozen out of EU capability cooperation programmes which would benefit UK Defence in the round, including the defence industry.
+
+While it may be true in one sense that the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions is indivisible, it will be important that all concerned have a shared understanding of the limits of the military commitment. The DCPR manages to tread this fine line, including by apparently stepping back from the somewhat bolder language in the March 2023 AUKUS statement on the deployment of submarines to Western Australia. Continuing to tread this line successfully in the future will be testing.
+
+The language on Strategic Resilience in Chapter 8 is the clearest sign yet that the MoD has fully absorbed its importance in an era of great power confrontation. We welcome the commitment to work with other government departments to implement the government’s 2022 Resilience Strategy. This will be a huge undertaking, made more challenging by the state of the economy and the public finances. The skills and capabilities of the UK’s armed forces are widely acknowledged. But the MoD will need to strike a balance between playing its full part and recognising where the lead falls to other departments.
+
+The emphasis placed on the Reserves is striking. Finding a way to make service in the Voluntary Reserves more attractive, particularly to young people of all backgrounds, should be a priority. The MoD should expand on its plans to turn the ex-regular reserve forces into a “Strategic Reserve”. We have always found it odd that so little use is made of ex-regular forces for defence purposes, even though adequate incentives and the cooperation of civilian employers would be a prerequisite.
+
+Another area where the MoD will need to elaborate publicly on its plans is the commitment to introducing an integrated air and missile defence system. Questions include how the maximum benefit will be secured from close engagement with NATO’s system, and how it will improve the dispersibility of UK forces for self-protection, given the substantial contraction in the number of airbases and other defence sites in recent decades. We wonder whether the MoD really has the bandwidth to engage effectively in the range of resilience-related activities mentioned in this chapter.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+There has been relatively little commentary on the DCPR, likely because of the timing of its publication, but also due to its modest content. The MoD did not expect to have to update the 2021 DCP so quickly – although the history of defence planning suggests this was likely. As this article has brought out, the DCPR contains a range of worthy ideas but sparse detail on how these will be delivered, so leaves many questions unanswered. There will be important decisions on force structure, capabilities and planning approaches to be made in the 2025 review. Whether that review leads to the acceleration of plans to further modernise the UK’s armed forces and wider defence capabilities will depend on whether the incoming government decides to make further significant investment in defence. No doubt preparatory work is underway in the MoD to make the case for doing so.
+
+---
+
+__Will Jessett__ CBE is a Senior Associate at SC Strategy Ltd. He recently (early 2019) retired from the UK Ministry of Defence after 33 years in a wide range of policy, operational, crisis and change management roles. He spent a third of his career overseas (USA, Poland, Cyprus, Namibia) working closely with those governments. He has specialised in strategic defence planning, particularly in the last decade, shaping and leading MOD’s work on the major strategic defence and security reviews in 2010 and 2015, the 2017 National Security Capability Review and overseeing the Modernising Defence Programme which concluded at the end of 2018.
+
+__Tom McKane__ is a Distinguished Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute and a Visiting Senior Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He is also a senior member of the European Leadership Network.
+
+__Peter Watkins__ left the MoD in 2018. Between 2014–18 he was, successively, Director General Security Policy and Director General Strategy & International in the MoD. During a career spanning 38 years, Peter worked in a variety of roles in the MoD and overseas, including many years in defence acquisition.

From f1f90c5bcb8b57255bde5f7adec1f18ea03aeb01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hokoi <hokoeye@pm.me>
Date: Tue, 5 Sep 2023 00:54:21 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 10/19] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x20 Sep.05

---
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-105.md | 106 +++++++++++
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-106.md | 126 +++++++++++++
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-107.md | 165 +++++++++++++++++
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-108.md | 172 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-109.md | 126 +++++++++++++
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diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-14-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-105.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-14-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-105.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-14-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-105.md
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 105 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 柯耀林選舉經理作供 指柯曾令不可提「光時」、港獨及「攬炒」
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/3bYWueY.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（14日）踏入審訊第105天。參選新東的區政聯盟前召集人兼前西貢區議員柯耀林，今傳召選舉經理陳展浚作供，陳稱區政聯盟為鬆散的組織，成員團體互不代表和從屬，而柯曾考慮參選新界東和超級區議會，但於超區協調會議看到有岑敖暉後，認為岑知名度很高、他參選超區無任何空間，終決定參選新東。陳並指，柯只曾出席首次新東協調會議但早走、缺席第二次協調會議，亦無收過任何協調文件，而他無向組織者查詢會上內容，因認為組織者有責任就重要事項主動通知。
+
+陳又表示，曾為柯發布「墨落無悔」聲明帖文，而柯自2019年區選便命令團隊不可於宣傳材料提及「光復香港 時代革命」和支持港獨，初選時亦不容出現「攬炒」二字，指他們團隊均認為如癱瘓政府運作，「香港會何去何從呢？癱瘓咗又點樣呢？」
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/Dy3I31j.png)
+▲ 陳展浚
+
+#### 辯方傳區政聯盟執委、柯耀林助理作供
+
+鄒家成上周作供完畢，新東餘下3名被告林卓廷、梁國雄及柯耀林均不作供，只有柯耀林傳召一名辯方證人。辯方大律師唐樂山今傳召曾任柯助理和選舉經理的陳展浚作供，陳確認於2012年任民主黨實習生、被分配到將軍澳工作時認識時為民主黨黨員的柯耀林，同年柯排劉慧卿名單參與立法會選舉。陳於2013年加入民主黨、2016年退黨，柯亦於2018年退黨。
+
+法官陳仲衡關注陳如何知道，陳指因當時在柯耀林與林卓廷爭拗的風波中，柯帶領59人退黨，「我中間係有參與全程個過程同埋規劃」；並確認柯於2017年從馬來西亞返港，為2019年區議會選舉準備時，他已成為柯的助理。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/0plK5rz.png)
+▲ 2018年12月12日 59人宣布退出民主黨（資料圖片）
+
+#### 助理稱柯要求定期更新區議會事務及政治發展
+
+陳確認，柯於2004至2011年任西貢廣明區議員，並於2019年再度當選，其後他正式成為柯的議員助理。陳指柯並非全職區議員，他同時是一間物業管理公司的全職營運總監、廣明苑業主立案法團主席，亦是將軍澳民生關注組主席和區政聯盟召集人；而陳與柯每日會通電話，如時間許可一星期至少有三晚一起吃飯和開會，至初選期間陳任柯的選舉經理，基本上每日見面。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/PUWh3H3.png)
+▲ 柯耀林
+
+陳續指，柯會在平日晚上和周末處理區議會事務、與市民會面，而因柯「工作真係好繁忙」，故要求他們定期甚至每天向他更新區議會事務和政治發展，柯每天與他通電話時亦會問及，但陳「有冇同佢講、講漏咗佢都唔會知道」。
+
+#### 區政聯盟會章提一國兩制原則下爭取民主
+
+陳展浚同意，柯耀林自2000年就是將軍澳民生關注組成員，初選期間任該組織主席；陳則是組織召集人，組織主要關注將軍澳地區工作和參與西貢區議會的選舉和議會事務，但並非政黨，只是跨民主派政黨地區組織，成員包括獨立人士。
+
+陳並指，將軍澳民生關注組與沙田區政、大埔及北區團隊，為區政聯盟的三大團體成員，聯盟很多成員是從民主黨和新民主同盟離開，而陳是執委會成員，其有份草擬的會章第一條為「在一國兩制大原則下，爭取民主、維護自由、捍衛法治，團結社區力量，為香港市民服務」，亦規定只能以團體成員身分加入。惟陳表示，2020年3月區政聯盟進行改組，不再以團體形式運作、要以個人身分加入，主要是應付沙田區政有逾半成員退出的問題。
+
+#### 助理稱區政聯盟為「共享資源」成立 組織鬆散、成員團體互不代表及從屬
+
+陳並指，不論改組前後，「理論上」都是由執委會管理聯盟事務，但2019年區議會選舉後，執委會無再開過一次正式會議，故改組時無即時修改會章，至2021年才修改。法官李運騰一度指，若然如此改組便違反會章，陳指「唔可以咁講」，因他們有「追認」並將「團體」字眼改為「個人」。李一度說：「這對我來說在法律上完全不合理。（“None of that makes any legal sense to me.”）」
+
+陳續確認，區政聯盟是一個組織鬆散的組織，基本上三大團體就代表三大地區，「有自己完全嘅自主性，我哋互不代表，互不從屬。」辯方問若組織如此鬆散，為何會存在？陳指組織成立是望為2019年區議會選舉和2020年立法會選舉「共享資源」，「只不過希望有一個共同嘅組織名義。」李運騰問，那會章第一條是否組織真正的目的？陳同意，並指區政聯盟支持者來自區議員「樁腳」，票源與民主黨和新民主同盟高度重疊。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/LChsy5Y.png)
+▲ 2019年5月30日 區政聯盟宣布成立（資料圖片）
+
+#### 助理稱獲鍾錦麟告知有初選、柯參加初選主要目的為得知支持度
+
+就參加初選的經過，陳展浚指於2020年3至4月時，時任西貢區議會主席兼前民主動力副召集人、新民主同盟的鍾錦麟，詢問他們有否意欲參加初選和選舉協調，他即時通知柯耀林。陳並解釋，在西貢區議會中，將軍澳民生關注組與新民主同盟「衝突都幾大」，主要透過他和鍾作雙方溝通區議會和選舉協調事務的渠道。
+
+陳續指，柯當時有表達對參加初選的興趣，「因為無論有冇初選，我哋都計劃必然參與2020年嘅立法會選舉」，又指據過往經驗，一名候選人參加初選需30至50萬選舉經費，參與正式選舉至少需150至200萬，若直接參加直選，「柯生好大機會要按樓」；故參與初選最主要目的是望做民調以知道柯的支持度，如支持度低就不參與直選，可「慳返啲錢」。
+
+陳續指，柯並非區政聯盟唯一一個考慮出選的候選人，初期考慮出選的還包括大埔及北區團隊的區鎮樺，以及沙田區政的丁仕元和李永成。被問柯對參選哪區有興趣，陳指「其實唔係主要佢有興趣，係其他人希望佢出選超區」，而將軍澳民生關注組則想他參選新界東；陳指柯本人對兩區均持開放態度，視乎其他人如何商討和決定。
+
+#### 助理稱柯首次新東協調會議早走、因西貢區議會開會缺席第二次會議
+
+就4月14日的首次新東協調會議，陳展浚指柯耀林有出席但早走，並於離開後即時致電他，指會議中段開始「有啲人因為一啲恩怨不斷喺度爭拗」，故離場並約陳於將軍澳共膳。陳指當晚9時看到柯，柯稱會議達成一些共識，包括辦投票而非民調、「贏咗初選有得選，輸咗冇得」、新東出線名額為「6+1」。法官指柯的說話屬傳聞證供，辯方指並非依賴其說話真實性，只是作為背景。陳並確認柯當時未決定參選超區抑或新東，當時「靜觀其變」。
+
+陳續指，據他所知區鎮樺也有出席首次會議，區並通知柯5月5日第二次新東會議，但柯終無出席，因西貢區議會當晚開會到晚上10時。辯方展示會議出席紀錄，陳確認當天列席，而鍾錦麟和柯耀林均由約早上9時半開會至晚上10時40分。陳指因當天大埔區議會亦超時，故區鎮樺也無出席第二次會議，他事後從新聞報導得知李永成有出席。
+
+陳指他無問李永成會上發生何事，因李也有意出選新界東，「大家係內部競爭關係，唔係好方便」；而當時亦「冇呢個意識去問」組織者。
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/xhQ2Dz1.png)
+▲ 李永成（資料圖片）
+
+#### 助理稱柯曾出席超區協調會議 因岑敖暉知名度高遂不考慮超區
+
+陳續指，柯當時未決定參選新東抑或超區，並於5月14日出席超區協調會議。柯事後告訴陳，看到岑敖暉出席會議，認為岑「知名度好高」，「佢覺得計過數，超級區議會冇任何空間」，故不再考慮參選超級區議會；而柯於初選截止提名前兩三日才決定參選新界東。
+
+#### 助理稱無收過協調文件、無查詢因認為組織者有責任主動通知
+
+陳續指，他無從組織者、柯耀林及區政聯盟收到任何有關協調會議共識和協議的文件和草稿。法官陳仲衡問，他們無出席第二次會議、亦無從組織者收到文件，不會想從組織者知道會上發生何事嗎？陳說：「如果係有重要嘅事項，協調者係有責任主動通知我哋，即使我哋冇出席。」李運騰指，但當時柯耀林並無表明會參選新界東，陳仍認為組織者有責任就重要決定通知他們？陳說：「係，因為無論邊個出選，區政聯盟都好大機會派人出選。」法官陳慶偉追問，為何陳會認為組織者有責任通知潛在初選參與者，陳展浚重申因區政聯盟「明顯係好大機會會參與直選，咁所以佢都係需要接觸返我哋，如果我哋冇出席，係要話返畀我哋聽究竟係咪有任何決定」，聯盟只是未定出選人選。
+
+陳慶偉指認為區政聯盟應問組織者，因他們不想在無勝算的正式選舉花百多萬，並再追問為何當時無興趣向組織者查詢。陳展浚指因認為其中一個組織者鍾錦麟也知道他們因區議會事務缺席第二次會議，如該次會議內容「真係咁重要，佢會通知我哋，佢冇同我哋講，我哋就唔問」。陳仲衡指，但鍾當天也同於西貢區議會開會，不知道協調會議發生何事，陳展浚說：「咁可能佢哋民主動力事後有溝通。」
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/VMTLFgl.png)
+▲ 鍾錦麟（資料圖片）
+
+陳慶偉續說，因此陳是說，區政聯盟樂意將所有責任推給其他人、自己則不用承擔任何責任？陳說：「誒法官閣下，我唔知你點樣理解，我只係將事實去講返出嚟嘅啫。」陳慶偉追問他的理解與陳展浚理解是否一致？陳說只能說他們頗依賴組織者主動提供最新發展，「如果你覺得我哋呢方面做得不足，呢個都係事實嚟嘅，因為我哋的確係一個幾鬆散嘅組織」；又指他們只是出席了第一次會議，「理解嘅嘢就係咁多」，組織者之後無任何更新，再找他們已是有關票站事宜。
+
+李運騰指，因此柯報名參選新東前，只曾出席第一次協調會議的頭半部分，並缺席第二次會議，亦從沒有從組織者收到任何文件，實際上他對協調會議上說過的事知道很少？陳同意。
+
+#### 助理稱柯耀林曾令團隊不可有「光時」、港獨及「攬炒」
+
+辯方續就柯耀林 Facebook 發布的「墨落無悔」發問，陳指柯的 Facebook 專頁除了柯外，還有約十人包括他管理，施德來和陳志全聞言面露驚訝和發笑。陳並指，帖文基本上由團隊其他人撰寫，柯不會撰文，但重要的帖文會由柯看過後才發布，涉地區事務的則未必全部看。
+
+陳亦確認，就柯所有選舉宣傳材料包括片段和單張，均由團隊成員草擬，陳審批和最終修改，再交柯做最終決定和修改。至於柯曾否就相關內容作出指示，陳指由2019年區議會選舉開始，柯便命令全個將軍澳民生關注組、包括其團隊，「唔可以有『光復香港 時代革命』口號，同埋係支持港獨嘅」，而「初選期間都唔容許有『攬炒』呢兩個字出現」
+
+陳仲衡問柯曾否定義「攬炒」，陳稱他們無很詳細定義，但柯與他們整個將軍澳團隊的看法，也是：「如果癱瘓政府嘅運作嘅話，香港會何去何從呢？癱瘓咗又點樣呢？」
+
+陳續指，柯 Facebook 的「墨落無悔」聲明是由他發布，事前他有與柯於 WhatsApp 討論。辯方明將展示相關紀錄，案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-106.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-106.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a681b85e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-106.md
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 106 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 選舉經理稱「墨落」無強制用否決權 憂不簽遭攻擊遂促柯耀林簽署
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/H1ITjZc.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（15日）踏入審訊第106天。柯耀林選舉經理陳展浚續作供，供述團隊討論是否簽署「墨落無悔」的經過，其中柯曾於群組表示「呢份嘢講到明會否決財政預算案，戴教授而家都唔講啦」，亦憂聲明成為DQ理據。不過陳認為聲明內容可接受，應考慮簽署，因無強制何時何地或是否須否決預算案，只提到該權力「係其中一個 option」；亦認為聲明是「保守與進步的分界線」。陳並指，當時柯的潛在對手工黨郭永健及人民力量等均已簽署，擔心發起人或隨時截止聯署，並標籤或攻擊其他無簽署者，故凌晨致電柯促他決定，柯終決定簽署。陳並指，柯從無向他表達會否決預算案，但不移除聲明是怕被攻擊，指柯於區議會被本土派針對。
+
+陳又表示，團隊思維進步，但不代表手法激進，他們不同意用「攬炒」爭取民主，而「進步」是指不會像傳統民主派般「淨係坐喺個冷氣房度」、投完票「話民主今日最黑暗就算數」。法官李運騰一度笑言在冷氣房可做到很多事，「我在冷氣房寫判詞。」
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/0fFKv9r.png)
+▲ 陳展浚
+
+#### 陳認為「墨落」聲明無強制須否決預算案、僅列為一個選項
+
+柯耀林的助理及選舉經理陳展浚續作供。陳昨表示，曾為柯耀林於 Facebook 發布「墨落無悔」聲明帖文，事前有與柯於 WhatsApp 討論。辯方大律師唐樂山今展示名為「2R戰略討論處」的 WhatsApp 群組對話紀錄，陳指於2020年5月成立，是柯耀林（Ricky）和區鎮樺（Ray）討論選舉的地方，成員最主要為兩人的團隊，但選舉完結和本案拘捕發生後，很多人也退出群組，包括區鎮樺，陳於半年前進行截圖時群組只餘下3人。至於陳昨稱沙田區政丁仕元和李永成也有意參選，陳指二人其後也無進一步意欲或行動參選。
+
+紀錄顯示，6月10日晚區鎮樺於群組轉發鄒家成「墨落無悔」聲明連結，稱「又夾硬夾人」，陳展浚其後亦轉發「墨落」聲明全文，表示：「應要考慮 內容係啱 呢個係保守與進步的分界線」。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/QLwnNFa.png)
+▲ 2018年12月12日 59人宣布退出民主黨（資料圖片）
+
+被問「內容係啱」的意思，陳解釋「墨落」聲明第一點提及認同五大訴求，「喺嗰個時空底下呢，認同五大訴求係一個作為民主派最基本嘅基礎」；至於「會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案」，陳認為否決財案「的確係《基本法》賦予立法會議員嘅其中一個權力」，但聲明「冇強制何時何地或者係咪必須要實行呢個權力，佢只係講呢個權力只係其中一個 option（選項）嚟㗎啫」。
+
+至於「墨落」第二點「我認同若支持度跌出各區預計可得議席範圍，須表明停止選舉工程」，陳指「我哋認為係新界東協調會嘅共識，亦都係初選最重要嘅基礎」，因此認為聲明「整體睇落去講嘅嘢係冇乜問題」。
+
+#### 陳稱從新聞得悉運用否決權非新東協調會議共識
+
+陳展浚同意法官陳仲衡指，他無在該 WhatsApp 對話提到上述就運用否決權的理解，但他之後曾與柯通電話談到，「法官大人可以繼續靜候聽咗先。」陳續解釋認為就第一點聲明，除認同五大訴求外，不認為其餘內容是共識，「因為至少李永成就反對。」
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/YJ9YsdE.png)
+▲ 李永成（資料圖片）
+
+李運騰指，但柯只曾出席首次協調會議的頭半部分、缺席第二次會議、無收到文件，根本不知道會議發生何事。陳同意未能完全知悉會議內容，亦無向李永成或組織者查詢，但新聞提及李永成對否決財案有不同意見，故「達成共識呢樣嘢應該就係冇發生到囉」。
+
+李運騰問，因此當陳說「內容係啱」，是指這是會議上同意的事項，抑或聲明兩點可以接受？陳指是「內容係睇落去可以接受」。
+
+#### 陳指柯對聯署有擔心 憂成DQ理據或違《國安法》
+
+陳慶偉續指，若認為運用否決權非協調共識，為何柯耀林在 WhatsApp 提到「墨落」有機會成為DQ理由。陳展浚解釋因當時已「講緊會立《國安法》」，柯不知道DQ的紅線或準則，又指「佢不嬲對於一啲聯署、各式各樣嘅聯署都有擔心嘅」，尤其當有機會立《國安法》，便認為有機會成為DQ理據。
+
+李運騰追問，即當時柯認為「墨落」有機會違《國安法》？陳說「可以咁講」，並重申柯「覺得好多嘢都有風險」，因認為《國安法》無詳細解釋或任何標準，即使未頒布條文，亦有「好強烈嘅擔心或者恐懼」。
+
+陳慶偉問，那為何陳展浚起初又說柯對政治無興趣、不閱讀新聞，只透過陳了解政治議題。陳展浚指無提過柯對政治無興趣，只是他工作很忙，「佢係冇咁嘅習慣去閱讀一啲可能比較政治性嘅新聞例如戴耀廷嘅文章等」，並依靠他們就政治發展作更新，但不代表柯對於立《國安法》等完全無基本認知。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/5QMOsRt.png)
+▲ 柯耀林
+
+#### 陳稱因否決權非共識但「墨落」發起人放進聲明 區鎮樺才稱「又夾硬夾人」
+
+法官陳仲衡續關注，當時群組無提及「墨落」第一點並非協調會議共識，陳展浚回應，相信區鎮樺稱「又夾硬夾人」就是此意思。陳慶偉問，既然陳認為並無強制否決，那為何當時不向柯解釋，「我會運用基本法賦予立法會的權力」一句，其實是「我會考慮運用基本法賦予立法會的權力」？陳先說「我哋嘅認知呢係呢個冇強制性」，並在追問下反問：「其實我哋都唔係發起或者草擬聯署一方，咁點解要自己去修改嗰個內容呢？」
+
+陳續在追問下，指不知道新東第二次協調會上，就「會」、「會積極」運用否決權有激烈的討論。陳慶偉問既然如此，他如何能說這是共識，陳指「我從來冇提及過否決財政預算案係任何共識喎」，並重申認為該點並非共識，但「墨落」發起人卻放進聲明，因此區鎮樺才稱「又嚟夾人」。
+
+#### 官關注柯曾稱聲明「講到明」否決財案 陳指柯無向他表達過會否決財案
+
+法官李運騰亦關注，就陳展浚稱「墨落」無強制須用否決權，柯耀林似乎不同意，並引柯於群組稱：「呢份嘢講到明會否決財政預算案，戴教授而家都唔講啦」。陳表示，柯在「墨落」發布前或後不曾向他表達過有意否決預算案，亦曾表達他不同意「攬炒」。
+
+陳慶偉續問，從上述訊息字面上來看，陳認同柯對聲明中運用否決權一點的理解與他不同嗎？陳說字面上是這樣，但在之後的口頭討論，柯曾表示「覺得戴教授已經冇提呢樣嘢，或者冇任何文章或新聞講呢個意思」，感覺「呢個聲明再 raise 返呢件事出嚟」。
+
+法官陳仲衡續指，「我以為柯先生依靠你提供資訊」，陳同意，但指柯亦是物業管理公司的營運總監，「所以佢每日都會摷啲報紙，點都睇到 topic（標題），因為佢會睇啲招標廣告。」李運騰聞言搖頭，並問因此柯有閱讀報紙的習慣？陳說：「佢有閱讀招標廣告嘅習慣」，庭上傳出笑聲。
+
+#### 陳稱路線上需與民主黨有區別 因「墨落」看上去「進步」故應簽署
+
+至於簽署聲明為何屬「保守與進步的分界線」，陳解釋「只要進步過民主黨嘅話呢，就係進步，唔係保守」，而當時認為「睇落去個聲明係進步嘅聲明，所以應該要考慮（簽署）」，黃碧雲與林卓廷對視而笑。陳續解釋，「因為大家都喺民主黨退黨出嚟」，故參選立法會時路線上需有些區別；亦相信民主黨決策程序較慢，就是否簽署聲明應「冇咁快做到呢個決定」。
+
+#### 陳稱柯被本土派針對 曾因倡建周梓樂陳彥霖紀念公園被掟「人血饅頭」
+
+至於與本土派的關係，陳指在西貢區議會「本土派其實都幾針對我哋」，原因與區議會選舉協調和區議會議題上的衝突有關，「可能有啲恩怨」；又指將軍澳民生關注組曾動議將兩個由西貢區議會出資興建的公園，改名為周梓樂和陳彥霖紀念公園，本土派議員葉子祈遂向柯「掟『人血饅頭』」。
+
+#### 陳稱工黨郭永健簽署後即致電柯耀林望盡快做決定 柯終同意簽署
+
+就柯耀林最終如何決定簽署「墨落」，對話紀錄顯示當晚鄭仲文提到「人力落水了，柯生快動員」，陳展浚表示「遲簽冇乜用」，至翌日零時12分，柯耀林稱他早上7點要開街站，而何聞達於零時18分轉發「墨落」聲明，提到「唔掂，即跟，郭永健跟咗」，陳展浚即回覆「同意」，並於3分鐘後回覆「打左比柯生 跟」，至零時24分何聞達再稱「最緊要早過饅頭雄同范國威」。
+
+辯方問郭永健簽署有何特別，陳解釋曾與郭永健合作，認為「佢都唔係咁快做決定嘅人」，而郭立場較溫和，「大家都係潛在競爭對手，佢都跟咗，我哋需要跟」。陳並指，柯稱要開街站後便「上床瞓」，而陳覆「同意」後立即致電柯，「佢嗰陣未瞓着，不過都懵懵地」，陳遂告知柯人民力量、公民黨和工黨郭永健已「跟咗」，他們很擔心發起人會否隨時截止聯署的更新或參與，「繼而標籤或者攻擊其他冇簽嘅人」，故致電柯「希望盡快做出一個決定」。而陳「攞咗 instruction」後，立即回覆群組指柯會簽署。
+
+辯方其後指，鄭達鴻曾供稱公民黨討論是否簽「墨落」至6月11日下午，陳承認當時較混亂，故就公民黨是否已簽署「唔肯定」。至於「最緊要早過饅頭雄同范國威」一句，陳解釋是指「最緊要早過梁國雄同范國威」，而范當時未簽署，至翌日下午才簽署。
+
+#### 陳發布「墨落」時將柯耀林名字置於郭永健前 認是「小學雞行為」
+
+陳展浚續指，他遂在聲明加上柯耀林名字，並於 Facebook 發布。辯方展示柯的帖文，問郭永健比柯耀林早簽署，但為何柯的名字排得比郭前，余慧明和林卓廷等發笑，陳笑說「呢啲俗稱啲小學雞行為嚟嘅」，承認「純粹係唔想落後佢啫」，多人發笑。法官李運騰關注，帖文提到最後更新時間為「00:13」，比陳與柯耀林通電話決定簽署更早，陳指該時間只是「手動打落去」。
+
+陳又確認，當時群組有人不同意此做法，區鎮樺於凌晨約1時稱「我覺得個問題要停一停」，認為就是否簽署「墨落」應先停下討論，惟當時柯已簽署。區亦稱「現在我同柯，一個名在超區，一個在新東」，陳解釋柯出席超區協調會後已不考慮參選超區，不過當時區依然想柯參選超區，而區最終無參加初選，但有簽署「墨落」。
+
+#### 陳指柯從無提倡否決財案 但無移除「墨落」因怕被攻擊
+
+辯方續問，若柯從來沒有提倡否決預算案，為何不移除「墨落」帖文。陳指「因為我哋驚畀人攻擊啦」，而且本土派區議員葉子祈「經常 mon 住我哋啲 Facebook」。李運騰問，那他們也有否「mon」人 Facebook？陳說：「我哋會，但係我哋唔會 mon 完人之後即刻 cap 圖，發現 delete 咗嘢之後即刻開 post 鬧。」
+
+李運騰續指，留意到柯在發布「墨落」後亦提及「民協施德來都簽咗」，陳指柯「純粹可能見到其他都係標籤溫和民主派嘅人都簽咗」。李指，故柯也有留意其他人？陳說始終「發生咁大個聯署，咁大家都會留意事態發生，或者好多時 Facebook 都會睇到好多人 update」。李指似乎柯不需其他人告知他事態發展，陳說「咁冇衝突」。
+
+#### 陳指「極權」指過分使用武力的警方及容許它的政府
+
+辯方續問及柯耀林的選舉文宣，包括宣傳短片、政綱、和選舉單張，陳展浚均稱有份撰寫內容和設計。就宣傳片段提到「極權壓境之際，更要頑強迎戰」，配上將軍澳尚德邨十字路口的警民衝突相片，陳解釋當時基本上每晚都發生衝突，他們會進行協調、調停或被捕支援，並認為警方有些行動使用暴力並不合理，相信當時警方的「過分武力執法」是「得到政府嘅授意或者縱容」。陳同意，片段提到「極權」是指過分使用武力的警方，及「容許佢過分使用武力嘅政府」。
+
+至於片段提到參選是「希望立法會能夠多一個行動派」，陳指既指在立法會內做一個「勤力、盡責」的議員，運用議會力量和平台爭取民主、為社區政策或議題努力為市民發聲；亦指「唔係淨係坐喺冷氣房入面，更加要身體力行」，如落社區調停警民衝突，柯亦同意。
+
+#### 官屢提醒陳展浚就柯耀林想法作供 屬傳聞證供
+
+就提名表格，陳同意為柯耀林提交，而他從柯得悉首次會議共識（辦初選、「贏咗有得選，宣咗冇得選」、目標議席為「6+1」）的認知沒有改變，法官提醒柯的說法屬傳聞證供。表格附上柯的參選宣言，提到港人要放棄舊有想法，不再被傳統影響抗爭，陳指是不希望港人繼續沉迷經濟發展，應更多關心香港民主進程，鼓勵人投票。惟法官再質疑所有人也能閱讀宣言內容，而證人無法就柯的想法作供，即使事前二人有討論，亦可能是傳聞證供。
+
+辯方再問及陳有份草擬的選舉單張是否與預算案有關，惟陳慶偉再指這不是陳的政綱，而是柯的政綱，「柯先生決定不作供沒問題，但你不能問他在想什麼」，李運騰亦指不能要求證人猜測柯的想法。
+
+#### 陳指柯耀林團隊與劉凱文聯合宣傳 是較婉轉表達反對「攬炒」
+
+陳續確認，柯曾與參選衞生服務界的劉凱文聯合宣傳及印發聯合單張，指因劉是將軍澳街坊，亦是年輕進步的民主派，但手法上與他們一樣溫和；又指劉旗幟鮮明反對「攬炒」，而他們亦不同意用「攬炒」方式爭取民主。陳仲衡指單張無表明柯不同意「攬炒」，陳承認當時是使用「比較婉轉」的方法，因當時有很多報導均顯示劉反對「攬炒」。
+
+陳續指，「我哋思維進步，但唔代表我哋手法要激進」，在李運騰追問下指「進步」是指「我哋唔係好似傳統民主派咁淨係坐喺個冷氣房度，願意做更多嘅行動去實踐爭取民主」。李運騰笑言在冷氣房可以做到很多事，「我在冷氣房寫判詞」，旁聽人士發笑。
+
+李續問陳指行動是什麼？陳指包括在衝突現場監察警方執法並嘗試調解，他們曾成功阻止防暴隊進入屋苑行動或施放催淚彈；又指要用議員權力監督政府，「唔係投完票，話民主今日最黑暗就算數喇。」李運騰說那不是在冷氣房完成嗎？陳僅重申議員不能只在冷氣房，亦指單張提到「站在衝突前線，與手足同路並肩同行」，不代表無調停雙方衝突。陳慶偉遂指，即使兩人曾聯合宣傳，但不代表他們有相同政綱，辯方指會留待陳詞。
+
+陳終表示，以他所知，柯沒有與其他人達成協議否決預算案以迫使政府回應五大訴求，亦無協議顛覆國家政權。唐樂山表示主問完畢，控方明早進行盤問。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-16-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-107.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-16-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-107.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-16-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-107.md
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 107 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 陳展浚稱與范國威鬥快簽「墨落」 國安法後無移除帖文 因認為不會追溯
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/kyYOIoW.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（16日）踏入審訊第107天。柯耀林選舉經理陳展浚今接受控方盤問，表示因柯耀林票源與范國威重疊，故望與對方「鬥快」簽署「墨落」，但柯簽署時「連鄒家成係邊個都唔識」，亦無與「抗爭派」聯繫的想法；而柯初選論壇稱會兌現初選簽署的「協議書」，只是指「贏咗有得選，輸咗冇得選」。陳又指《國安法》後曾審視文宣內容並更小心用字，但無再審視「墨落」和移除帖文，因認為《國安法》不會追究7月1日前的事。此外，控方高級檢控官陳穎琛今盤問時，多番被法官質疑盤問方式，指其提問重複、毫無用處，着她善用法庭時間，法官陳慶偉更一度指「這是一條很差的問題」。陳展浚今完成3日作供，新東案情完結，參選超區的李予信明將開始作供。
+
+#### 陳稱柯出席協調會前無通知組織者 控方引戴訊息質疑
+
+柯耀林前助理、選舉經理陳展浚昨完成主問，今接受控方高級檢控官陳穎琛盤問。陳同意與柯認識十年，被柯邀請作證，自視與柯關係緊密，關心柯亦想幫他。就首次新東協調會議，陳稱柯由區鎮樺通知時間地點，據他所知柯無通知組織者會出席。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/RdawRJB.png)
+▲ 2018年12月12日 59人宣布退出民主黨（資料圖片）
+
+控方續展示趙家賢與戴耀廷的 WhatsApp 紀錄，顯示戴發出的出席者名單包括柯耀林。陳指不清楚戴為何知道柯會出席，陳慶偉問故他稱柯無通知組織者是「揣測」？陳重申以他所知柯沒有告知組織者，「我相信如果有呢件事，佢會同我講。」
+
+#### 陳引柯稱會上提初選目的為五大訴求、因爭拗「嘥時間」提早離場
+
+陳展浚昨稱柯當晚提早離開會議並致電他，陳今指柯於8時半致電他，指已得悉初選程序，包括新東初選如何進行，及目標議席「6+1」等3點共識，但無提替補機制；柯並指當時有人應因「恩怨」問題爭執，但因距離遠而「唔係太聽得清楚」，他「唔知道嗰啲人拗緊乜嘢」、「覺得好嘥時間」，故離開會議，有份爭執的包括將軍澳青年力量陳緯烈，陳同意與柯所屬的將軍澳民生關注組是敵對關係（rival）。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/lMwEqVE.png)
+▲ 陳展浚
+
+陳亦指，柯稱會議提及初選其中一個目的是爭取五大訴求，「但冇講過係由邊個講」，據陳所知柯當天於會議亦沒有發言。柯也無提到戴稱會就「共同綱領」討論、能同意的事項會變成文件讓大家簽署，及有與會者提及戴的「攬炒」文章。而陳其後從有出席的區鎮樺，確認當天餘下會議都是爭執，但區沒告知他內容，他亦無問。控方問陳沒興趣知道？陳說「冇回應」，追問下稱他想知但應忘記問。
+
+#### 陳稱柯初選前認識區諾軒戴耀廷 惟無儲存戴電話
+
+陳續指，柯告知他「民主動力」是會議的主持，但無提過區諾軒。陳確認區是前民主黨員，他和柯於初選前均認識區和有其電話；而柯亦認識戴耀廷，但無將其電話儲存，解釋戴處理票站時曾 WhatsApp 柯，柯向陳展示電話，清晰顯示為電話號碼、無儲存為聯絡人。
+
+控方續展示從趙家賢手機擷取的新東 WhatsApp 群組紀錄，顯示於6月24日由戴耀廷創立，柯是群組成員。陳慶偉指，明顯地表面看來，戴於柯仍是民主黨成員時就有其電話號碼，因紀錄顯示戴將其電話儲存為「Ricky Or (DPHK)」。陳說不一定，但在法官追問下答「係」。
+
+惟辯方大律師唐樂山指出，上述紀錄是從趙家賢手機擷取，故是趙儲存柯的電話為「DPHK」，不是戴耀廷。陳慶偉指明顯該紀錄是從趙擷取，但群組是由戴耀廷創立。唐重申電話是由趙儲存，指戴不會將自己命名為「戴耀廷教授（HKU）」，林卓廷大笑，楊雪盈等亦發笑。陳慶偉一度手指向屏幕重申，但群組是由戴創立；李運騰則指紀錄顯示的聯絡人或反映趙而非戴手機，並與陳耳語片刻，陳續說：「好，繼續。（“Right, carry on.”）」
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/qcwe6DM.png)
+▲ 柯耀林
+
+#### 官質疑選舉涉大量金錢 陳卻無派人出席第二次會議
+
+就第二次會議，陳展浚指柯耀林核心團隊大約有12至13人，少數為義工，但柯無派任何代表出席，陳亦沒有安排，解釋當日進行區議會大會，最後三小時大部分動議均由他們提出，而團隊大部分人為西貢區議員，無人手出席。
+
+陳慶偉質疑，據早前證供，柯在初選和正式立法會選舉要花共至少180萬，「但你卻沒派任何人出席第二次會議。」陳重申當天的確無人手，而大埔團隊區鎮樺亦同因大埔區議會超時無出席，「我都冇辦法。」陳慶偉再指，但180萬對組織鬆散的區政聯盟而言是很大金額？陳同意，「所以好大機會都係由候選人自己出。」
+
+陳續指據他所知無第三次新東會議。控方問那他是否從無聽過柯耀林投訴，沒有從組織者收到文件？陳答：「係，但係點解要投訴？」陳慶偉指因組織者處事草率鬆散，「你看，你要花180至250萬在一些沒有白紙黑字紀錄的事上！什麼都沒有（nothing）！」陳稱：「但過去選舉協調嘅情況都係差唔多。」
+
+#### 陳稱柯耀林無看戴耀廷和區諾軒文章的習慣和興趣
+
+陳同意，他被指派告知柯耀林最新的政治發展，亦有閱讀有關初選的文章。控方續展示戴耀廷於《蘋果日報》發布的〈立會過半是大殺傷力憲制武器〉、〈攬炒的定義和時間〉及〈真攬炒十步 這是香港宿命〉，陳均稱無看過，指他有閱讀《蘋果日報》的習慣，但「專欄比較少睇」、對「蘋果論壇」無甚印象，又指當時不關注由35+組織者發布的文章。
+
+陳亦指他甚少看戴的 Facebook，近年較少看區諾軒文章，他與區關係「一般普通、冇乜特別」；至於柯耀林有否看戴耀廷 Facebook 和區諾軒文章，陳說：「我淨係知佢冇呢個習慣同興趣。」
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/aqjrskt.png)
+▲ 戴耀廷（資料圖片）
+
+就柯6月討論「墨落」時曾於區政聯盟「2R戰略討論處」群組說：「呢份嘢講到明會否決財政預算案，戴教授而家都唔講啦」，陳昨稱柯當時感覺戴無再寫文章提及否決預算案。控方質疑即柯有看過戴文章，陳重申柯無看、亦無此習慣和興趣，「總之個講法就係唔覺得新聞再有、或者再有呢啲嘅議題提及過」，「總之係佢有個印象就係唔覺得戴耀廷仲有，冇補充。」陳其後同意法官指，該訊息表面看來柯知道戴以往說過什麼，並指他自己也知道戴以往說過的話，指是來自新聞一般觀察。
+
+群組紀錄顯示，柯亦曾發布《蘋果日報》連結，標題為〈【李八方online】素人反枱 民主派初選會拉倒？〉，控方問柯是否主動找初選相關新聞。陳指他「無從判斷」，亦無印象有否打開該連結。李運騰問陳的上司發出連結，有沒有問他為何這樣做？陳笑道：「其實呢件事好小事嚟嘅，每一件事問我開唔開 link 真係冇可能記得。」李再說但這是有關初選，而陳是柯的選舉經理，陳即說：「我諗唔到呢條問題有咩嘢關係」，林卓廷聞言大笑，李運騰說：「可能有人會。」
+
+#### 陳認為無需再了解6.9記者會
+
+而就初選記者會，陳表示事前不知道3月26日的記者會，事後「好似喺新聞睇過」，但無告知柯，他在柯出席首次協調會議前亦無任何準備。至於6月9日記者會，陳指有團隊成員將相關訊息轉發至群組，就是他知道的所有詳情。李運騰再問陳作為選舉經理，沒有嘗試再了解記者會發生的事？陳指覺得無此需要，亦認為訊息已如實反映初選如何進行，無需要再向柯作補充。
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/kTism5r.png)
+▲ 2020年6月9日 35+記者會（資料圖片）
+
+#### 陳稱與范國威票源重疊望鬥快簽「墨落」
+
+就「墨落無悔」聲明，陳展浚指當時認為鄒家成是發起人，亦知他是新東潛在參選人，他曾透過 Facebook 私訊鄒，問如何加入該聯署及表示有興趣，獲回覆「OK」，但記不起具體時間，亦不能確定是在柯確認簽署前或後。陳亦同意，當時鄒無答他如何加入聯署，他也沒再問，無法肯定是否成功為柯加入聯署。
+
+李運騰續指，似乎其團隊想比范國威和梁國雄更早簽署，因有人於群組提及「最緊要早過饅頭雄同范國威」。陳回應因看到越來越多人簽，「所以先有想同范生鬥快呢個情況」，但指「我從來都冇諗住同阿梁國雄鬥快，個別人有個別意見，我冇辦法代表佢」。
+
+陳慶偉問為何陳想比范國威更早簽署，陳稱范也是將軍澳民生關注組創辦人，基本上與他們票源重疊，票源上是其中一個主要對手。陳慶偉追問，即比范更早簽署，會令其選民轉為支持柯？陳指「我又唔覺得一個聲明嘅威力可以大到咁，只不過係個行為上面可能係快過佢，純粹係一個比較」。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/ccCLNmw.png)
+▲ 范國威（資料圖片）
+
+李運騰其後問，團隊當時唯一的考慮，就是要比范國威更快簽署？陳同意，但在李追問下改稱「快過范國威簽係我哋其中一個主要嘅考慮」，而「唔係唯一」。
+
+#### 陳稱柯耀林「連鄒家成係邊個都唔識」、無與抗爭派聯繫的想法
+
+陳亦表示，當時無向組織者查詢該聲明。控方指他不想知道聲明如何出現？陳指「我唔係唔想」，但似乎無充足時間讓他考慮。陳亦指柯耀林無叫他找更多關於聲明的資料，「佢連鄒家成係邊個都唔識」，並同意柯曾問他誰是鄒家成。
+
+陳並同意，當時為帖文製作圖片，寫有「墨落無悔 堅定抗爭 抗爭派立場聲明書」。陳慶偉問將柯與「抗爭派」聯繫是誰的想法，陳說他們無此想法，又指「呢個只不過係聯署帖文嗰張圖，請問法官閣下個關係喺邊度？」。陳其後同意，在「墨落」加名並不會顯示柯與抗爭派有聯繫。
+
+#### 陳稱「墨落」提否決權非共識 官追問下認不知道
+
+控方續問，陳展浚是否同意「墨落」兩點聲明是協調會議共識，惟法官李運騰指控方是在問陳對聲明的意見，指陳無出席會議，「他對聲明的理解不會比我們更好（just as good as ours）。」陳重申有建議柯耀林簽聲明，而他只集中於「墨落」上的兩點聲明，認為其他內容不重要，他亦無法判斷柯有否閱讀全文。
+
+李運騰續引柯 WhatsApp 提到：「暫不需理會，靜觀其變，呢份嘢可能成為DQ理據，我未正式宣布參選，有時間」，問陳是否同意柯當時看過聲明並有自己意見。陳重申「無從判斷佢係咪完全睇晒」，李運騰說沒關係，這是由法庭決定。
+
+陳盤問下重申，認為「墨落」第一點聲明除認同五大訴求外，其餘均非協調會議達成的共識。李運騰追問柯耀林於首次會議早走，如何得知不是共識，陳指該三點共識是柯認知協調會達成共識的一切，「就係咁多，冇補充」。李再重複問題，陳說：「我唔明你問題，定係翻譯出咗問題。」
+
+李稱問題很簡單，就是柯提早離開，怎知共識不是在他離開後達成？陳說：「我頭先已經講過，我哋根據我哋認知達成嘅共識就係嗰三點，我冇補充」，後同意即是他不知道。控方欲再追問，惟李運騰指問題重複，並笑說「而他會說他沒有補充」，陳志全和林卓廷等發笑。
+
+#### 控方質疑無向柯講述對「墨落」非強制否決的理解 陳不同意
+
+而就陳昨稱，理解「墨落」中運用否決權一點無強制須否決預算案，他今確認於決定簽署「墨落」當晚、與柯耀林3至4分鐘的通話中，有與柯討論過他上述理解。控方指出，陳事實上並無與柯提過庭上他對該點的理解，陳說「唔同意，我唔係好明你個問題嘅事實基礎喺邊度」，其後再稱他有向柯「簡單提及過」。
+
+#### 控方問柯曾否表明非「攬炒」一分子 官質疑問題毫無作用
+
+柯耀林於6月19日提交提名表格，陳確認柯簽署前曾閱讀表格第二點有關認同戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，但無說或問什麼。控方續展示柯翌日的 Facebook 帖文，提到當天《國安法》細節已公布，「我知道參選甚至如果當選，已經一半踏入監牢，但係面對暴政，絕不退縮」，問為何柯認為自己會犯法，及是否與簽署「墨落」有關，惟陳慶偉均即打斷着問下一題。
+
+控方再問，柯曾否表明他並非「攬炒」的一分子，陳慶偉說「這是一條很差的問題（“I think that is a very bad question.”）」，李亦說「恕我直言」，指即使柯有這樣說過，如何能幫助控方，並指舉證責任在控方，不能以此反證其案情（“By establishing the negative, doesn’t help you build a positive case.”），「這問題毫無用處。（“... the question is useless.”）」
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/Y6sPQvb.png)
+▲ 高級檢控官 陳穎琛
+
+#### 陳稱地區直選不方便直接、與劉凱文合作婉轉表達反「攬炒」 官質疑邏輯
+
+陳穎琛表示會嘗試另一方法，惟李運騰指由他來，並問柯有否提過不同意「攬炒」的意念。陳回應：「我哋喺內部嘅討論，同埋經過同（衛生服務界）劉凱文嘅合作，其實都表達到出嚟。」陳仲衡指，但他們是想選民而不只是內部知道，問選民如何知道。陳展浚指「地區直選就唔方便用咁直接嘅方法，咁所以我哋咪用咗個婉轉嘅方法。」陳慶偉提高聲線問：「陳先生，你認真嗎？」陳展浚答：「認真。」
+
+陳續在法官陳仲衡詢問下確認，劉凱文並無簽署「墨落無悔」。陳仲衡續問那據其邏輯，透過與柯合作，人們也會認為劉支持或同意「墨落」？陳回應：「劉凱文反對攬炒嗰個形象嗰個立場，絕對大過我哋有簽聲明呢個認知，公眾多數認識佢就係因為佢反對攬炒。」控方質疑公眾如何知道，問劉提到反對攬炒的訪問有否附在柯的選舉單張和 Facebook，陳指沒有。
+
+![image09](https://i.imgur.com/cnCT44l.png)
+▲ 劉凱文（資料圖片）
+
+#### 陳稱《國安法》後審視文宣 惟無移除「墨落」以免被攻擊
+
+至於就戴耀廷7月8日及9日記者會，提到「35+計劃」目標及違反《國安法》的風險，陳展浚均稱無印象，亦不知7月時戴曾就初選合法性公開發言。陳同意，對《國安法》實施感到擔心，「我哋有審視文宣嘅內容，用字更加小心」，但沒有再審視「墨落」亦沒有移除帖文，因柯若刪文或會被攻擊「退縮」或「做乜突然間 delete 咗」。
+
+#### 官質疑控方重複提問、着善用法庭時間
+
+陳穎琛續指，柯認為聲明或違《國安法》，卻在《國安法》後仍保留該帖文，惟陳慶偉不耐煩打斷說「Thank you」，示意問下一條問題，李運騰亦指如控方已問了問題，不要只用另一方式再問一次，「你已經得到了答案，請善用法庭時間。」
+
+陳穎琛續問及柯參選宣言，陳展浚同意該帖文由柯認可（endorse）發布。陳穎琛續指文末附有柯「墨落」帖文的連結，指柯無就此說過任何話？惟陳慶偉再大聲不耐煩打斷：「謝謝，陳小姐」，李運騰亦指證人已肯定地說柯耀林認可此帖文，「為何你一直重複問同一條問題？你還想說什麼？」陳慶偉亦指：「重複與說服是兩個完全不同的概念（“Repetition and persuasion are two completely different concepts.”）」，陳仲衡亦說：「你想問一些東西與你有東西要問，兩者是有分別。（“There is a difference between you want to ask something and you have something to ask.”）」
+
+#### 初選論壇提兌現「協議書」 陳指屬「贏咗有得選，輸咗冇得選」
+
+控方其後問及初選論壇上，柯耀林曾表示「我哋會兌現今次我哋初選簽嗰個協議書，我哋係會支持所有⋯出選初選嘅候選人」，問柯指「協議書」是什麼。陳指是初選提名表格，指柯認知協議是「贏咗有得選，輸咗冇得選」，因此「就算林卓廷贏咗，佢都唔會因為一啲過去嘅恩怨，而唔支持勝出嘅人」，陳志全發笑。
+
+#### 陳稱認為七一前《國安法》不追究
+
+陳穎琛其後問可否進行小休，法官陳慶偉關注還有多少要問，陳說會非常短，陳慶偉續着繼續提問。陳穎琛遂俯身問左右兩邊的萬德豪和周天行，後向法官指：「若是這樣，我們盤問完結」，陳仲衡問「那短的部分呢？」，庭上傳來笑聲。
+
+李運騰續問，控方除了指證人所說的不正確，有沒有任何案情要向他指出？陳穎琛續向陳展浚指，柯耀林發布「墨落」聲明，是有意圖依從（comply）該聲明。李運騰即邊皺眉邊張大嘴巴，神情錯愕。陳展浚指不同意，並指柯無移除聲明其中一個原因，是「我哋認為7月1號之前嘅嘢，《國安法》係唔會追究嘅」，故無因《國安法》實施而審視或移除之前的東西。
+
+#### 陳稱曾問鄒家成如何加入聯署 覆問下確認無問自言記憶較混亂
+
+辯方其後進行覆問，就陳今早稱不記得何時私訊鄒家成問如何加入聯署，辯方展示訊息紀錄，顯示6月11日凌晨12時46分，陳向鄒稱來自柯耀林團隊，「我哋願意加入聯署」，鄒覆「好」。陳確認，當時已是柯發布「墨落」帖文後逾20分鐘。辯方問，故陳今早稱曾問鄒如何加入聯署，是記錯了？控方和法官指是引導性問題。陳續同意法官指，訊息無問如何加入聯署，指「因為剛才我作供時都提到對於呢個記憶係比較混亂，有張圖係比較好」。
+
+#### 陳展浚作供完畢 李予信明作供
+
+辯方表示覆問完結，柯耀林案情亦完結。這意味新東案情完結，16名被告中只餘下參選功能組別超級區議會的李予信，及衞生服務界的余慧明未開展辯方案情。
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/NfD4EKd.png)
+▲ 李予信
+
+代表李予信的大律師關文渭指，將會傳召李予信，陳慶偉問明天開始？李予信聞言微笑。關續指，主問約需時2日，李不會談及政治理論，但會呈上很多文件。
+
+案件明續審，李予信將作供。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-17-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-108.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-17-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-108.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..34e92f99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-17-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-108.md
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 108 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 李予信稱獲通知出席公民黨記者會呼籲選民登記、會上就否決撥款「訊息混合」
+- 李予信稱曾拒絕鄭達鴻提議排其名單第二 後改參選超區
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/wIojngA.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（17日）踏入審訊第108天。參選超區的前公民黨東區區議員李予信今開始作供，表示2016年因協助公民黨立會競選而接觸鄭達鴻等人，並於2018年底獲鄭邀請參選北角錦屏區，遂加入公民黨成為支部黨員，並成功當選。惟李指支部黨員權力受限，不能出席會員大會及投票、不能參選執委等。
+
+就公民黨提及否決預算案的3月25日記者會，李稱獲秘書處通知出席，指是呼籲選民登記，他認為理所當然要幫手；並形容會上得到「混合嘅訊息」，一方面楊岳橋等提出否決所有撥款，但郭家麒則稱若預算案合理會支持。李並指當時「我從來冇表達過，亦都冇諗過參與該屆嘅立法會選舉」，他會上也無發言。而李會後曾出席公民黨「立法會選舉心戰室核心小組」會議，李指當時有如「新入公司嘅員工，入咗一間高層嘅房」，他僅曾就疫情議題發言一次，亦無人向他解釋過邀請他出席上述記招和會議的原因。
+
+#### 李予信開始作供 稱2016年獲鄭達鴻邀請代表公民黨參選區議員
+
+參選超區的李予信今開始作供，接受大律師關文渭主問。李今身穿黑色上衣、深啡色長褸和白色長褲，以基督教宣誓。李確認，1993年生於香港，2020年案發時26歲，明天將踏入30歲。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/yI5BOiS.png)
+▲ 李予信
+
+李同意，於2014年首次接觸政治，他於香港大學專業進修學院（HKU SPACE）社會科學系副學士畢業後，任街工實習生，主要關注基層和勞工權益，同年入讀中大社會學系，翌年轉讀社工學系，因「想服務香港年青人同埋基層」。而李大學於公關公司任兼職時，公司於2016年負責公民黨立法會選舉港島區競選工作，參選名單包括陳淑莊和鄭達鴻，而李獲指派與公民黨聯絡，為他與該黨的首次接觸。
+
+李續指，該次選舉後與公民黨「冇好頻密嘅接觸，可能大時大節講一兩句恭賀嘅說話咁」，而他2018年底臨近畢業時思考畢業後的出路，得出結論是他很想做一些與社區或青年政策倡議有關的工作。李並指，當時任東區丹拿選區區議員的鄭達鴻剛好電話聯絡他，表示公民黨正就2019年區議會選舉作準備，認為當時在其選區旁的錦屏區「值得新人去嘗試」，公民黨亦正找人為康怡區的區議員接班。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/LDufFmK.png)
+▲ 陳淑莊（右）與鄭達鴻（左）競選2016年立法會選舉港島區（資料圖片）
+
+李續指，當時鄭邀請他出席一個飯局，與會者包括時任公民黨執委陳淑莊和賴仁彪，席間他們「詳細地傾過個可能」，李最終同意以公民黨名義競逐北角錦屏區，指選擇北角主要基於其工作理念，他望為基層爭取一些資源和為舊區規劃作出一些貢獻。
+
+#### 李加入公民黨港島支部 當選區議員後倡政府防疫基金援助被遺漏業界
+
+李予信表示，他當時尚未加入公民黨，而同意參選後第一步便加入成為公民黨香港島支部黨員，並於2018年11月27日收到確認電郵，同意電郵提到一國兩制原則。李並解釋，支部黨員為最基本成員身分，但權力有很多限制，不能出席會員大會及於會上投票、不能參選執委會成員、不能出任黨魁、司庫、秘書長等高級人員職位。
+
+李指，他亦成為兼職地區發展主任，指是培養地區工作者的系統，要出席基本社區工作手法、法庭知識、輔導諮詢知識等訓練，並獲公民黨實報實銷資助進行地區服務；他亦於2019年1月任時任立法會議員陳淑莊的兼職議員助理，主要從地區接收投訴轉介立法會及處理文件等支援工作。李同年5月完成大學課程，7月21日成為註冊社工：「我喺19年7.21朝頭早收到社工證。」
+
+李其後於11月當選為東區錦屏選區區議員，指他上任前民建聯蔡素玉已於該區任職逾20年，近兩屆均自動當選。而李上任後任東區區議會社會福利及安老事務委員會副主席，曾提倡支援社區創傷、失業援助金等社福政策，亦爭取糖水道天橋拆卸，及處理區內交通擠塞和衞生黑點問題。李又指，2020年初政府發放第一輪防疫抗疫基金，但當時收到一些被遺忘的行業投訴，包括藝術團體、健身中心、舞台工作者、技藝教育中心如跳舞學校和拳館等，嘗試游說政府將援助覆蓋支援他們營運。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/3DZXHgT.png)
+▲ 李予信（資料圖片）
+
+#### 李稱不知3.25記者會前有籌備會議 獲悉記招呼籲選民登記、無需發言
+
+公民黨3月25日舉行記者會，時任黨魁楊岳橋曾承諾若政府不回應五大訴求，會否決所有政府議案、撥款及預算案致特首下台。李予信確認有出席該次記者會，但對鄭達鴻早前供稱會前曾舉辦籌備會議並不知情。
+
+李並指，記者會前一日，一名公民黨秘書處女員工電話通知他出席，介紹是一個呼籲選民登記的記招，因當時選民登記將截止，有逼切性呼籲大家盡快登記。李指聽到介紹後，「我就覺得好理所當然要幫手嘅，因為我係新任嘅區議員，咁登記選民呢啲咁地區性嘅嘢，從來都係地區工作者去做」，故他很快答應出席。
+
+李確認，當時公民黨有32名區議員，但不知道他被揀選出席記招的原因，稱「冇人同我解釋過個原因」。而該員工亦無詳細講誰會於記者會發言、會傳遞什麼訊息，並指他並無需於會上發言。
+
+法官陳慶偉一度問，李於記者會前一天才突被要求出席，該記者會對他來說是完全意料之外（surprise）？李說「其實唔會好愕然嘅」，解釋黨很多時辦記招或街站等活動，也會邀請一些成員去撐場。
+
+#### 李稱出席記招時從無表達亦無想過參與立法會選舉
+
+李續確認，記者會出席者包括時任立法會議員郭家麒、楊岳橋、郭榮鏗、譚文豪、黨主席梁家傑，東區區議員鄭達鴻、沙田區議員黃文萱、油尖旺區議員余德寶，及擬參選立法會飲食界的林瑞華和大律師梁嘉善。而當時立法會議員坐前排手持「35+選民登記生成器」的紙牌；李予信和鄭達鴻等則站在後排，手持「35+議會過半，實現五大訴求」的紙牌。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/jZLXGxS.png)
+▲ 2020年3月25日 公民黨記者會（資料圖片）
+
+李表示，出席記招時仍是公民黨支部黨員身分，解釋章程規定支部黨員要最少成為12個月才有資格成為普通黨員，且要申請才做到，而他當時無申請，但同意無規定支部黨員不可參選立法會選舉。
+
+就各出席者，李指黃文萱無參加初選，但其後有報名新界東正式選舉；余德寶當時無表明有意參選，「佢同我一樣都冇發言，淨係企咗喺後面」，並約於5月「公開講到明唔會參與」。他不記得梁嘉善當時是否黨員，亦不知她會否參選立法會，而梁最終無參加初選，但後被黨徵召於7月31日報名參選新界西，他不知道原因。至於李本人，他指當時「我從來冇表達過，亦都冇諗過參與該屆嘅立法會選舉」。
+
+#### 李稱記者會訊息「混合」 楊岳橋等稱否決所有撥款 郭家麒稱不會
+
+李並指，當時從記者會得到一個「混合嘅訊息」，一方面清晰聽到楊岳橋、郭榮鏗、譚文豪3人提到反對所有法案、議案和撥款，要政府回應五大訴求，並提到《基本法》就否決預算案後安排的規定。但另一方面郭家麒發言時「好強調財政預算案嘅合理性」，舉例「如果撥款係胡亂畀警察嘅開支嘅話呢、如果唔合理的話呢，咁議員係有責任否決」；但「如果預算案係合理、得到市民支持嘅話呢，無論選到35席40席呢，其實都會支持」。
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/0cm3fqs.png)
+▲ 郭家麒（資料圖片）
+
+李亦指，林瑞華當時發言「有一個位好觸動到我」，指林提及「政府啱啱提出一個荒謬嘅禁酒令」，而李正幫助的被遺忘的業界也受政府停業令影響，故很明白林所說的「業界利益」。李續指，總括而言他會上聽到一些關於否決所有撥款的說法，但似乎郭家麒又不會否決所有撥款的說法，而林瑞華則爭取業界支持，故形容當時記者會訊息「混合」，「但有一個一致嘅訊息就係，要政府聆聽民意同埋選民登記」。李並同意，他在黨內年資很淺，會上無反對楊岳橋等人說法。
+
+#### 李稱獲邀出席「心戰室核心小組」會議 理解與選民登記及「樁腳」有關
+
+李予信續表示，記者會後，被秘書處職員邀請出席3月30日的「立法會選舉心戰室核心小組」第三次會議，除鄭達鴻和梁家傑外，曾出席記者會的人士均有參與，亦有其他區議員。被問會議目的，李指大意是記者會後「可能有啲嘅檢討同埋有啲嘅工作」，而因有些工作應與他有關，故答應出席。
+
+辯方展示會議紀錄，李表示於事後看過「心戰室核心小組」的名字，理解是關於立法會選舉籌備的討論、或一些論述思考上的會議，但當時他理解「係同我距離有啲遠嘅，因為我只係一個上任3個月嘅區議員」。
+
+李運騰問，李知道他為何被邀請出席嗎？李指有兩個理解，首先他出席了3月25日記者會，記得楊岳橋有提及他身後有一些新的區議員，「佢哋係可以幫大家做選民登記」；其次是在傳統立法會選舉，區議員有機會做「樁腳」的角色，需在選舉時做一些地區上的支持，「呢兩個就係我當其時諗到我自己嘅身分同立法會選舉有關係嘅地方。」
+
+#### 李稱會議如新入職員工進入高層房 僅發言一次
+
+就紀錄提及「與會者同意，現階段公民黨可透過發表文章，進一步闡述星期三記招的論述」，並提及由黃文萱發表文章。李解釋當時輿論不斷講議會價值、亦有非建制派政治人物提過「議會係冇用」，故會上應有探討如何將議會價值透過文章彰顯出來。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/t38fIqX.png)
+▲ 黃文萱（資料圖片）
+
+關文渭續指，參與者發言均會被記錄，但看不到李發言的紀錄。法官陳仲衡指「與會者同意」一句，李會是其中一個同意的人。李續解釋，「其實嗰一日嘅會議呢，我可以形容為好似一個新入公司嘅員工，入咗一間高層嘅房⋯⋯咁呢間房入面就有啲立法會議員講緊啲立法會層次上嘅大事啦，咁我當其時其實就真係坐喺度㗎啫，咁我記得我唯一一個發言嘅時候呢，就係喺後面嘅」，而就「與會者同意」的部分，他印象中無任何決議過程。
+
+李運騰追問，但李予信同意應再發文闡述立場？李指當時理解每個記招後都會有文章解釋黨的發言和論述，認為「係一個好平常嘅工作」，亦無任何異議，但當時無跟進、不清楚黃文萱有否撰文。
+
+#### 李稱不知道屬哪個團隊
+
+陳仲衡關注紀錄亦提到「各團隊」，李指理解是不同立法會選區候選人的工作團隊。陳問李屬於那隊？李說：「我唔知道我係邊個團隊。」李運騰續指李是東區區議員，看來屬於港島團隊，李表示「其實呢個團隊冇一個好官方嘅認證，你係咪一個團隊嘅意思」，又指他有機會是港島區的「樁腳」，但在會議紀錄的文字上「我唔清楚佢係咪 regard 我 as 嗰個團隊嘅一員」。李並指，不知道會議紀錄是草稿抑或正式紀錄，同意紀錄從鄭達鴻辦公室檢取。
+
+#### 李稱會議與選民登記有關、喚起關注選舉 官稱有保留
+
+陳慶偉續引紀錄指，會議是「心戰室核心小組」的第三次會議，李予信此前一定有參與多過一次會議。李不同意，指該會議是他第一次參與，他前兩次無出席；而他是出席會議時才知道他成為了該小組的一員。
+
+陳續問，李指楊岳橋曾稱區議員可幫助選民登記，而他們獲邀出席會議的目的就是幫助選民登記，但會議紀錄卻完全無提過？李指會議紀錄上無，但「口頭上應該有講」，紀錄「未百分百準確」；而他不記得事前有否收過會議議程，但「我理解其實呢個會入面所有嘅討論，都係同選民登記有關係」，因「選民唔會無啦啦走嚟登記」，而是需要一些論述和解釋；又指每區關注議題也有出入，故理解會議存在意義是討論有什麼重點論述可在地區層面解釋給街坊聽。
+
+李運騰指，故會議並不是關於選民登記的流程，而是關於更高層面的事？李同意，認為是「喚起關注選舉」的工作層面。陳慶偉指能理解李稱會上討論是為了吸引選民投票支持公民黨，但若李稱該些討論是為了選民登記，他則有保留，並主動稱相信大家均有在街上被人問「先生，登記咗做選民未呀？」的經驗，陳志全、林卓廷等發笑。陳續提高聲線指，「而你不會說『我們想要這、想要那，入到議會我們會做這、做那』，不！我只會給你5秒鐘時間！然後我就會走開。」陳仲衡亦指，李不會告訴選民有關會上討論的「國際戰線」。
+
+李續解釋，在傳統政黨的工作，「我哋會視肯畀我哋吸引登記做選民嘅市民呢，其實好有機會喺將來嘅選舉投返畀我哋。」陳慶偉即高聲說：「為什麼？如果你來問『先生你登記咗未，我依家同你登記』，你怎知道我會投票給你？」李續指據其地區工作經驗，如擺街站幫人登記做選民，區內就會說「阿信幫人登記緊做選民喎」，形容是讓選民知道他在服務選民的其中一個工作。
+
+#### 李稱無人解釋邀他出席記招或心戰室會議原因
+
+李運騰指假設李所言正確，但這是一個由黨魁主持、有立法會議員和部分區議員出席的高層次會議，關於如何喚起市民關注並幫助黨於立法會選舉的選情，而在公民黨三十多名區議員中，為何會叫作為新人的李予信出席此會議？李說：「冇人去好詳細解釋過點解我喺記招或者呢個 meeting 嘅原因。」
+
+#### 李稱會上唯一就疫情影響發言、郭家麒曾關注否決財案會否阻礙振興經濟
+
+李予信其後補充，登記選民時會向市民點出社會問題如疫情，並闡述議會可幫助解決，有部分是會議上提過的內容。李又指會上唯一一次發言，就是討論到關於疫情後的經濟復蘇時，立法會議員問到地區上有否關於疫情影響的聲音，他遂舉手說有，並提及有接觸被防疫基金「遺忘」的業界代表，有相約他們去立法會開會，將有行動向政府爭取援助。法官李運騰再質疑與選民登記有何關係，李稱與登記流程關連不大，但與論述層面有很密切關連，同意是爭取社會對黨的支持。
+
+李欲再解釋時，法官陳慶偉打斷問及相關性，李運騰亦指認為辯方意圖顯示被告曾提出需政府支持的方案，他想與政府合作而非反政府，指法庭已理解。李亦確認，郭家麒會上曾提及，「民主派否決預算案迫政府落實五大訴求的策略，會否阻礙振興經濟的措施，建議要求政府將警察的撥款用作救市，以爭取市民支持」，亦吻合他在記招說法。
+
+#### 李稱無收過「心戰室核心小組」會議紀錄
+
+李運騰其後再質疑，會議紀錄提到設計選舉文宣、開設選舉經理群組等事項，問李予信是否同意選民登記是會上次要關注，首要關注是公民黨如何於立法會爭取更多議席？李不同意，指選民登記與立法會得票和策略上的考量其實並非互相排斥，「喺思緒上係要統一咁去考量。」
+
+李並指，會後無收過這份會議紀錄，他是被捕後開審才在審訊文件夾看到；又指之後有去過多於一次「心戰室核心小組」會議，但「依一刻事隔三年之後，我的確係唔記得咗」。李又指，就所有會議均從無收過會議紀錄，理解紀錄「唔係畀我哋睇」，是供秘書處職員存檔及執行，像他這種參與者「記得有咩要做就自己去做」，如就介紹選民登記的原因和論述「用個腦記住就得喇」。
+
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/N2OxQba.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（17日）踏入審訊第108天。李予信繼續作供，表示參選港島的前黨友、同案被告鄭達鴻，曾於2020年4至5月問他「（港島名單）排佢第二好唔好」，二人曾探討該可能性；惟李認為自己剛任區議員，忙於處理地區工作，如還要頻密落區派傳單，難以發揮其工作理念關注的議題，終在5月中向鄭表示不想做第二，並退出其選舉預備工作。李續指，其後前黨友黃文萱決定不參選超級區議會，他並於6月初報名黨內「徵召機制」參選超區。法官關注，李曾告訴鄭達鴻自己想專注地區工作，但兩至三星期後突然又下定決心獨自參選，為何會有此心意的改變？李欲回答時，法官打斷問答案是否很長，辯方確認，法官遂押至明早處理。
+
+#### 李予信稱曾探討正式選舉排鄭達鴻名單第二的可能 但無協議
+
+參選超區的前公民黨東區區議員李予信繼續作供，李的前黨友、鄭達鴻早前曾稱，李予信於3月至5月時原排其港島名單第二。李予信今指，二人「冇一個協議，只係一個可能性嘅探討」，該討論應於4至5月中進行，「有一次鄭達鴻同我講過，排佢第二好唔好。」
+
+![image09](https://i.imgur.com/0ccfVTV.png)
+▲ 鄭達鴻（左）、李予信（右）（資料圖片）
+
+法官關注李是於初選抑或正式選舉排鄭達鴻名單第二，李指他當時知道公民黨會參加初選，但鄭問他時無指明是初選還是正式選舉，「我淨係得悉到排第二就係9月嗰個（正式）選舉係排第二，我冇深究過關於初選嘅事情」，理解鄭是談及正式選舉。陳仲衡指，但要參與正式選舉，二人都要參加初選？李指當時是這樣猜測，「但係實質上冇人同我傾過關於初選嘅嘢。」
+
+李並指，最終於5月中，「我係冇同意做佢嘅第二」，不過該討論無向公眾公布，只有公民黨內部得知，他不清楚當時黨高層如何看，亦無從得知他們有否被通知，但當時猜測可能會有。
+
+#### 公民黨5月特別會員大會通過出選名單 鄭達鴻無安排名單第二
+
+李予信同意，5月30日公民黨召開特別會員大會，他以無投票權的支部黨員身分列席。辯方展示會議紀錄，李確認有收過，會上楊岳橋宣布原有意參選超區的黃文萱決定退出，最終通過6張出選名單，其中鄭達鴻出選港島區，但沒有安排名單第二的人選，至於梁嘉善則排新東第二位，與李今早稱終報名參選新西不同。
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/x2hxbFI.png)
+▲ 梁嘉善（左）、黃文萱（右）（資料圖片）
+
+紀錄亦顯示，會上授權執委會在無法召開特別會員大會時，決定候選人最後出選名單，主席梁家傑並匯報公民黨已參與了35+計劃，並指2019年12月成立的選舉策略委員會，會繼續尋找參選超區和替補的Plan B候選人。
+
+#### 李稱因剛上任忙地區工作遂不排鄭達鴻第二 惟與黃文萱不選超區無關係
+
+就黃文萱不再參選超區，李予信指於5月最後一個星期，已從公民黨立法會議助聽到「阿萱唔選喇」。李運騰問，而李不屬於公民黨高層人員的圈子？李說：「係，我唔屬於嗰個圈，因為我只係支部嘅會員」，同意高層會比他更早知道該消息。
+
+李運騰續問，李予信不做鄭達鴻的名單第二，與黃文萱退選超區有關係嗎？李表示沒有關係，「但係又有啲時間上嘅巧合，都影響咗我之後嘅少少決定」，解釋5月中時曾向鄭達鴻表示「其實我就想唔做第二」，因他剛上任要處理很多地區和抗疫支援工作，很忙碌，而當時只有他與全職助理兩人，「其實都好吃力，如果我仲要好頻密做一啲落區派傳單嘅工作呢，其實我覺得喺工作理念上，唔係好發揮得到我當時關注嘅議題」，因此向鄭交代後，「我就退出咗佢個團隊喇」。
+
+李運騰問，李予信說退出團隊，即曾經加入？李指「團隊」並非「一個好official嘅認證」，指鄭有一個一起工作的選舉群組，「如果我探討緊參選可能嘅時候，都會接觸到嗰個團體」，而他最後是退出鄭的「選舉預備工作」，至5月尾就有議助傳出黃文萱不再選超區的消息。
+
+#### 李確認終循「徵召機制」報名超區 官問為何有心意改變
+
+辯方其後展示由公民黨秘事處總行政幹事於5月31日，向所有公民黨區議員發出題為「2020年立法會換屆選舉啟動徵召機制」的電郵，邀請他們參選超級區議會，並指有意參加者須於6月2日下午3時前收集5名區議員的支持，其後要接受面試並出席諮詢會，向所有黨內區議員介紹政綱和宣言，並要於6月9日前提交15個區議員的書面支持。
+
+李指他有回覆表示有意參選，於6月2日提交一個5名區議員的名單，表示有興趣參與該「徵召機制」，並於3日後獲回覆確認收到報名。法官李運騰問，李予信於兩日內要找5人支持，時間很緊迫，而他其後要再找多至少10人支持，且全部須為區議員？李予信一一同意。李予信續同意他是「好新」的黨員，李運騰問，那獲得15人支持是否容易？李予信說「都要花啲時間」。李運騰再問，而這需要他的一些決心？李予信回應：「都可以咁講」。
+
+李運騰續問：「你兩三星期前才告訴鄭達鴻你想專注地區工作，但兩三星期後突然又下定決心參選，而且還是獨自參選，為何會有這個心意的改變（change of heart）？」李說：「我可以解釋，正如……」，惟法官陳慶偉打斷問是否很長，關文渭笑言非常長。法官遂將案件押至明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-18-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-109.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-18-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-109.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-18-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-109.md
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 109 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 李予信稱曾因財政問題被公民黨拒出選超區、被捕後改獲黨支持
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/0m9XZ9k.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（18日）踏入審訊第109天。前公民黨東區區議員李予信繼續作供，就他拒任鄭達鴻第二，但其後改參選超區，李解釋自己想做立法會議員，但「排第二係唔會做到」，而當時譚文豪曾問他參選意向。李指曾與譚會面，提及他所倡的政策理念或與公民黨否決所有撥款和議案的立場有出入，譚指他可繼續講其主張，李理解其言下之意是黨就否決的立場「有彈性」、他成功出線再算。李其後申請黨內「徵召機制」參選超區被拒，理解黨因他勝算不高無法全數資助其40萬初選經費。不過李於6.12一周年涉非法集結被捕後，獲告知引起黨內高層和黨員關注，並獲得捐獻，黨遂重新考慮支持他出選，李終於6月19日宣布參選，但於初選落敗。
+
+就公民黨簽署的「墨落無悔」聲明，李指與他無關，因他當時並非公民黨潛在候選人，「我冇去關心」；而他無出席過協調會議，決定參選後不知道初選規則，向黨查詢方獲告知超區「坐三望四」，理解是協調目標。李亦指，提及否決財案的選舉單張為公民黨共用，但《國安法》後無再派發亦刪去相關字眼。
+
+#### 被問為何改選超區 李稱想做立會議員但「排第二係唔會做到」
+
+前公民黨東區區議員李予信今繼續作供，他昨供稱，曾拒絕參選港島的前黨友鄭達鴻提議排其名單第二，但其後報名黨內「徵召機制」參選超區。法官李運騰關注李曾告訴鄭他想專注地區工作，但兩三星期後突然又下定決心獨自參選，為何會有此心意的改變？李欲回答時，法官押至今處理。
+
+李今解釋，「其實當時我可以形容我係想做立法會議員」，而與之前心態不同在於「排第二係唔會做到立法會議員嘅」。李並指，他想做立會議員是因當時或因社會政治氣氛較緊張，政府代表不太聆聽區議員意見；他亦望為被政府於抗疫基金遺忘的業界爭取撥款。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/nFdKTqI.png)
+▲ 李予信
+
+#### 李稱黨高層找人填補黃文萱位置 譚文豪曾問他有無意向參選
+
+李續指，就時任公民黨沙田區議員黃文萱原欲參選超區但及後退出，他5月最後一星期得悉黨高層正找人填埔黃的位置，而當時譚文豪曾致電他，言下之意問他有無意向參選超區，李回答「有」，並談及一系列政策和問題想透過立法會處理。
+
+李並指一兩日後，應在5月27至30日之間，譚相約他到其立法會議員辦事處再傾談，李指會面很短暫，他向譚指有一系列政策和理念想透過立法會選舉說出來，惟它們有機會與早前黨稱否決所有撥款和議案的主張「有出入」，「簡單啲嚟講我係要錢，而之前黨有啲講法就係反對撥款，即係唔要錢，但我選舉嘅主線將會係不斷講一啲需要錢嘅項目。」
+
+#### 李指其政綱「要錢」與黨有矛盾 理解譚文豪言下之意有彈性
+
+李記得譚回應，「選超區呢最緊要嘅係知名度，而依樣嘢係我當其時欠缺嘅」，故譚建議他應好好運用他「社工區議員」及「街頭藝術舞蹈家」的兩個身分，「因為佢知道我跳咗十幾年街舞。」
+
+李並指，就其政策和理念與黨說法有矛盾，譚無正面去解決，但譚有提及「你可以繼續講你想爭取嘅嘢」，因這些東西與其身分有很密切的關係。李理解譚言下之意，是黨就否決所有撥款和議案的立場「係有彈性嘅，亦都唔係一個已經決定咗或者係好實在嘅一個講法，係一個 undecided 嘅議題」，譚亦認為「我成功出線到初選，先至再算啦」。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/JJEsfyq.png)
+▲ 譚文豪（資料圖片）
+
+#### 李稱黨因財政和勝算問題 拒絕其徵召機制申請
+
+李予信同意，6月2日中午向公民黨秘事處總行政主任 Pancy Ho 發電郵，提交5個區議員名單報名參與「徵召機制」，其中一位是黃文萱。李6月5日獲確認報名，顯示他是唯一表示有意參加的公民黨區議員。李同日晚上接受公民黨選舉策略委員會的面試，展示政綱及選舉的財政預算和計劃，「因為我當其時希望黨可以資助到我，我冇咁多錢」。李解釋就超區初選和正選分別保守估計需40萬和160萬元，他當時望黨可以全額資助初選，就正選費用則可借貸、如他成功當選再分期付款歸還，但「結果係傾唔成功」，委員會告知他就初選經費，「佢哋 expect 係 grant（資助）7萬蚊。」
+
+李續指，於6月6日出席諮詢會，向黨內區議員介紹參選理念和政綱，約於6月8日再接受品格審查委員會面試。辯方大律師關文渭指會上是否問及他有否隱瞞的事及可能被對手利用的黑材料，例如有多於一個女朋友，李同意。法官陳慶偉續笑着問：「有多於一個女朋友有什麼問題？（“What’s wrong with more than one girlfriend?”）」多人發笑，陳再說：「如果他是未婚（single），有什麼問題？」
+
+李續指，他6月9日收到時任副主席賴仁彪電話，表示經過上述3次面試，「有時黨都要作出一啲困難嘅決定」，並告知李其徵召機制申請不成功。李不記得賴解釋時的確實用字，但「最尾我哋 come up 咗係同財政關係」，理解賴言下之意是勝算和經費上，「個情況就好似一個投資嘅決定咁樣，佢覺得我開出嗰個 financial 嘅要求呢，黨滿足唔到呀。」李認為，初選的40萬資助是「最大嘅問題」，因黨僅可資助其中7萬，其餘33萬需由他向黨借貸。法官陳慶偉問，因李勝算不高，所以黨無法借33萬給他？李答：「我係咁樣理解嘅。」
+
+#### 李稱公民黨於6.10宣布重啟徵召機制
+
+李予信同意，秘書處於翌日、即6月10日再向所有黨內區議員發電郵公布決定，提及徵召機制再啟動，李撤回申請，李稱「依個係佢哋嘅說法」，並重申前一日與賴仁彪通電話後，「我就知我自己唔能夠代表公民黨參加選舉。」李指他遂重整心態，「決定再做返自己區議員應該做嘅嘢。」
+
+法官陳慶偉一度問及李的財政狀況，李指2019年畢業後至2020年間，主要任陳淑莊兼職助理，月入約6至7千元，亦很偶爾會有街舞表演收入；而他任區議員後月薪約3萬5千元，至2020年6月時銀行存款約有3至5萬元。
+
+#### 李稱不知道6.9初選記者會、與「墨落」無關因當時非潛在候選人
+
+就6月9日初選記者會，李稱當時不知道，亦不知道組織者會上說的話，因當時尚未確認黨是否接納他參選，故只是埋首關於籌備選舉的工作、是「預備埋班去選」的心態，如接納就可「去馬」。
+
+就鄒家成等人6月10日晚發起「墨落無悔」聲明，公民黨於翌日中午以黨名義簽署，李亦表示「我沒有參與黨內任何關於『墨落無悔』聲明嘅討論」，與「墨落」無任何關係。陳慶偉問，是因為李在公民黨的階級太低嗎？因他只是支部黨員。李稱是其中一個原因，而且「我當時並不是公民黨嘅潛在候選人，我冇去關心」。李亦同意，他曾於 Facebook 轉發3月25日公民黨記者會帖文，但沒有轉發黨有關「墨落無悔」的帖文。
+
+#### 李稱6.12一周年被捕後獲捐獻支持 黨重新考慮派他出選超區
+
+就李予信其後為何重新出選超區，鄭達鴻曾供稱李2020年6月12日參與街頭活動「被邀請入警署」後，黨才討論找李參選超區，因黨擔心在街頭「貢獻」不足，想被攻擊時「可以有呢樣嘢講出嚟」。
+
+李予信今指2020年6月12日，即6.12一周年紀念日，有北角街坊向他表示「佢啲仔女都落咗去」，而在場很多防暴警察、他很擔心，故「叫我去睇吓」。李遂去了銅鑼灣，及後被警方以非法集結罪名拘捕，李稱當晚是用區議員身分到場，惟法官李運騰打斷指不是要就該案審訊。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/ex5meLG.png)
+▲ 2020年6月12日 李予信於銅鑼灣被捕（資料圖片）
+
+李續指，其後被帶到東區醫院，獲公民黨三名律師楊岳橋、梁嘉善和彭皓昕探望，他翌日獲得警署擔保。法官李運騰問李予信之後參選超區，與被捕有關嗎？李指有關係，提及是「基於警暴」；又指賴仁彪其後致電他，指李被捕後引起了一些黨內高層和黨員關注，故有一些來自他們的捐獻支持李出選超區，「所以之前呢，因為財政理由退出呢，而家黨就可以重新考慮，去解決我之前嘅財政問題，支持我出選超區」，賴並提及因有捐獻，故可達到李當初提出40萬的財政要求，意味李初選可獲得全數資助，而賴「冇多講勝算」。
+
+#### 李稱不知初選規則曾向黨查詢 獲告知超區民主派「坐三望四」
+
+李續指，賴仁彪其後「要好從速咁 resume（重啟）返嗰個徵召機制嘅程序」，李亦要再取得15名黨內區議員支持和再辦多一次區議員大會。李指當時並不知道初選的規則，亦無出席5月13日的超區初選協調會議，而他曾於6月17日向公民黨秘書處總幹事、「大內總管」歐飛發訊息稱：「HI AUFEI，有點急...我想知道超區初選既規則係點？我係阿信」，庭上展示相關紀錄。
+
+李指當時是與賴仁彪通電話兩三日後，他正「好急咁籌備緊我要參加超區初選」，而李當時就初選規則的概念是每區均有目標議席，並要就該目標做決定。李指發訊息後，歐飛即時致電他講解初選規則的前設，指超區形勢是民主派在五席內可「坐三望四」，視乎建制派出多少張名單，而第五張名單不可報名，且投票率要夠高等。李指他曾追問「條數點計」，歐飛着他找賴仁彪。
+
+辯方續展示公民黨區議員群組的紀錄，顯示6月18日賴仁彪曾發訊息提及「早前李予信議員曾表達有意參加區二立選，但由於經濟負擔問題，所以主動要求中止程序。612晚上阿信被無理拘捕事件得到極大關注，有心人得知阿信出現選舉經費問題，因而向他表達願意捐款支持鼓勵他重新考慮出選。立法會黨團及候選人即時作出討論，並支持重啟相關程序」，並重新安排於6月18日及23日舉行區議員諮詢會。
+
+#### 李6.19首次公開宣布參加初選、無提及否決預算案
+
+李其後於6月19日發訊息予賴仁彪，問「我想知道更詳細取四席條數係點計」，賴遂將一份公民黨有關超區選情內部分析的簡報發給他。李同日出席公民黨於中環的初選街站，首次公開宣布參加初選，並指當時從無講過否決預算案，街站發言期間亦無人提及，但其後的問答環節有人提及。李同日於 Facebook 發文宣布參選，但同樣無提過否決預算案。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/BE0wRHX.png)
+▲ 2020年6月19日 公民黨於中環舉辦初選街站（資料圖片）
+
+#### 李稱《國安法》前就初選投票拍片 事前僅獲發自己講稿、無參與發布決定
+
+而就公民黨7月10日在 Facebook 發布的「【7.11 7.12 初選】兩分鐘睇初選點投票」片段，楊岳橋片中承諾若特首未能落實五大訴求，公民黨將否決政府法案和預算，鄭達鴻曾稱片段講稿因《國安法》作出刪改。
+
+李確認，公民黨秘書處職員「KAYEE」於6月19日曾發訊息給他，提到就初選投票拍片，並通知李和楊岳橋、譚文豪、鄭達鴻及郭家麒5名參選人於翌日拍攝的時間地點。李指拍攝前獲發他自己的講稿，不知道其他人確實會說什麼，但據其認知均是教人投票的內容，而當天到達時鄭達鴻剛拍攝完成。李並指由拍攝片段至發布期間，均無看過片段成品。
+
+辯方展示第八次選舉經理會議紀錄，提及「投票片改了兩轉，預計不遲於7月2日提供 third cut，予選舉經理人提供意見」，李指他沒有出席，只有其選舉經理和代理人出席，但無印象獲告知會上情況，亦無參與片段發布的決定、沒有被諮詢。
+
+#### 李稱單張提否決財案為公民黨共用、《國安法》後無再派發並修改單張
+
+李續確認，於6月20日提交初選提名表格，理解當中「支持和認同戴耀廷和區諾軒主導之協調會議共識」，意思是民主派需要有個協調，並聯想到早前向歐飛和賴仁彪查詢超區協調目標，應是「坐三望四」，「咁我係認同呢個目標嘅。」
+
+李並確認，表格附有寫上「越打壓 越頑強」及他大頭照的政綱，提到公民黨將全力爭取議會過半35+，「以關鍵否決權促使政府落實『五大訴求』」。李指該政綱是公民黨「中央 share 用嘅政綱」，「我記得黨亦都提，交表嘅時候係用呢個政綱」，李當時亦無其他現成已設計好的政綱可以用。李並解釋5月底時已醞釀政綱的意念與倡議，至6月13日得悉可出選後就「同 designer 去夾」，當時是「一路設計緊」。
+
+李續同意，初選超區 WhatsApp 群組於6月24日建立，他是群組成員之一，但群組內無提及否決預算案。而他6月27日將設計好的單張分兩批付印，首批1,000份於6月28至29日的街站「派咗七至八成左右」，至於另外5,000份於6月30日中午才可領取，但最終他「一張都冇派到」，解釋因當時有消息指晚上《國安法》將出爐，故決定晚上「觀察住嗰個法例嘅條文，睇吓有啲咩事發生」。李最終一直保管餘下未派的單張及5,000份單張，直至被捕，亦僅就首1,000份單張、而非5,000份單張申報選舉開支。
+
+庭上展示該款單張，寫有「顛覆想像」，同樣提及公民黨將全力爭取議會過半35+，以關鍵否決權促使政府落實「五大訴求」。李重申該內容是其團隊「從黨公用嘅 template 攞返嚟」，並於《國安法》前設計和印刷。李續指，《國安法》後曾修改單張，無再提及以否決權促使政府回應五大訴求，並修改部分字眼，他於7月3日分批印刷共14,000份，全部派畢。
+
+#### 李稱初選論壇從無倡否決財案 初選落敗得票僅2%
+
+李予信其後於7月4日出席初選論壇，同意論壇上從來無倡議否決預算案，而會上鄺俊宇曾問李是否願意入議會提倡社會福利政策幫助基層，李表示當然願意，又提及社福政策最大的流弊，「我覺得一筆過撥款係毀滅咗好多社工嘅夢想，係對於好多嘅社福界嘅機構、高層同前線出現矛盾，呢個係一定要喺議會入面繼續去跟進」，又指作為議員，「市民嘅福祉一定係要我哋去捍衛。」
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/6kY27lr.png)
+▲ 鄺俊宇（左）（資料圖片）
+
+李並指，於7月11至12日初選投票日，附在提名表格的政綱並無張貼於票站外，而是如鄭達鴻早前供述改為「無字政綱」。鄭作供時曾展示該單張，寫有「以言入罪 無字政綱 SPEECH CRIMES ARE AGAINST FREEDOM」。而李最終於初選落敗，只有2%得票，他並於7月15日記者會公開宣布不會競逐超級區議會正式選舉。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/sJbvyhD.png)
+▲ 2020年7月15日 公民黨記者會（資料圖片）
+
+關文渭指尚餘約半小時提問，案件下周一（21日）續。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022

From df608511ef93bb362fc7a5ebfb4ce9ecb42e10d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2023 02:11:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 11/19] 0x20 Add _columns posts, Sep.06

---
 ...-07-29-philosophie-terminales-the-state.md | 93 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../2023-08-04-lost-in-hong-kong-island.md    | 33 +++++++
 .../2023-08-16-the-project-national-glory.md  | 89 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 215 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2023-07-29-philosophie-terminales-the-state.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2023-08-04-lost-in-hong-kong-island.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2023-08-16-the-project-national-glory.md

diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-07-29-philosophie-terminales-the-state.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-29-philosophie-terminales-the-state.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9771be1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-07-29-philosophie-terminales-the-state.md
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "國家"
+author: "arandomguy"
+date  : 2023-07-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/dC1T45M.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "個人閱讀心得記錄，有很多個人想法。"
+---
+
+國家是一台可怕的機器：過去國家被視為一股可怕的力量，今日則需要照顧公民的生活。國家擁有的權力比任何人還要多，同時也能呼應大眾的需求。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+書中用漢斯‧法拉達的小說作品《Every Man Dies Alone》作為開頭。小說描寫柏林居民在1940年5月以後的日常生活。主角決定反抗納粹，竭盡所能揭發納粹真面目。最後遭到逮捕、受到虐待並判死刑。
+
+人有需要國家嗎：小說中，主角並不是一部機器中的平凡齒輪。公民不是只能服從，國家也不應該扮演照顧每個人幸福的父親角色。為了彌補社會的不足，國家是必要的嗎？或社會能否自外於國家而自行管理？
+
+從上述的內容，可以得出一個問題：「什麼是國家？」
+
+> 國家是在明確界定的領土上，有責保障公共財產（安全、繁榮、正義）的制度。
+
+明確界定的領土上：界定國家的是在一塊領土上實行的強制權和立法權。國家在領土以外的地方無法施展權力，且必須捍衛他國的侵犯。
+
+有責：國家對整個社會具有權威性，並以特定方式行使權力，也須在時限內回應國民訴求。如政府必須彌補自己所犯的罪行，或新政府仍有承擔舊政府債務的責任。
+
+公共財產：國家應確保完整性、繁榮、安全以及公平對待所有人。教會、家庭或私人機構均無權管理公共財產，僅有權管理特定群體與特定產業。
+
+制度：國家是建構出來的，是人類發明的。國家是根據法律而形成的普遍客觀存在，如憲法。國家具有象徵性，如國旗或國歌都是國家的表徵，圍繞著這些象徵而集結了不同社群的成員。
+
+
+### 國家是為所有人服務的嗎？
+
+#### 1、國家對公共財產負責
+
+過去人們應該要對城邦犧牲奉獻，如蘇格拉底被指控對城邦中的神祉不敬，但他寧死不願背叛他的城邦。而現代國家則是來自社會體本身，它必須要繁榮並代表社會。
+
+> 在服從契約的範圍內，國家保障安全
+
+> #### 托馬斯‧霍布斯《利維坦》
+
+> 「若要建立一種足以抵抗外來侵略與制止互相傷害的共同權力，透過自己技能與土地產出來保護自己，而過著自足且滿足生活，就得將他們所有的權力與力量託付給一個人或是一個代表大會，並透過多數決的方式，將所有人的意志化為一個意志。…大家讓自己的意志與判斷服從於這個人或這個大會的意志與判斷，這不僅僅是共識或協調，而且是全體真正統一於唯一且相同的一個人身上。」
+
+Q：文中哪些部分能證明國家是為人民服務？它的決定為什麼不容質疑？
+
+「要建立一種足以抵抗外來侵略與制止互相傷害的共同權力，透過自己技能與土地產出來保護自己，而過著自足且滿足生活…」
+
+Q：為什麼每個人向國家交出決定與行動的自由是對自己有利的打算？
+
+「指定一個人或是大會做為他們的「人格」，而且所有人都要承認並且認同這個「人格」在共同和平或安全方面所要採取的任何行動，如此，這個人並承擔著公眾的人格。」
+
+#### 2、國家應是源自一份社會「契約」
+
+公民與國家所訂定的「契約」，是一份尊重法律的互相承諾。
+
+社會「契約」，是類似公民社會中的結合，如婚姻契約，這讓國家在一致同意的情況下擁有合法地位。如國家只能頒布符合憲法的法律，同樣，公民也無權逾越法律。契約約束公民，使他們放棄以個別方式對抗他人的權力，前提是他人也放棄這種權力。
+
+後面提出質疑，人民的代表（參議員、國會議員等）這些人真的是為公共利益服務嗎？他們難道不會僅為特定利益服務？個人放棄自然狀態的自由，這樣做真的對嗎？
+
+> 在這會契約的範圍內，國家致力於所有人民的福祉
+
+> #### 巴魯赫‧史賓諾沙《政治論》
+
+> 「假如人性就是往自己最有利的方向發展，並無需使用任何技巧來維繫和睦與忠誠。但由於人們的天性並非如此，無論對於治理者或是被治理者，無論願不願意，國家都要以有益於共同福祉來行事。也就是說，所有人無論是自願，或是被迫，或是出自必要，都必須受制於理性的原則來生活。」
+
+Q：國家有比保障安全和信守承諾更重要的事？
+
+「國家都要以有益於共同福祉來行事」
+
+> 在協議的範圍內，國家將自由與平等法治化
+
+> #### 尚-雅克·盧梭《社會契約論》
+
+> 「找到一種結合的形式，能用一切共同的力量捍衛並保護每個結合者的人身和財產，而透過這種形式的結合，個人與全體結合，卻只是服從於他自己，並如同往常一樣自由。…這些已約定好的條款可以用一句話做總結——每位結合者將自己所有都奉獻出來，這個條件對所有人都相等，這樣，就沒有人會創造讓他人難以忍受的條件。其次，權力讓渡是毫不保留的，結合也會盡可能完美，任何結合者就不會有更多要求。…最後，每個人是像全體奉獻出自己，而不是交給了某個人。因為，每個人都可以從每一位結合者那裏獲得自己讓渡給結合者的權利，因此，每個人都可獲得他失去的一切等價物，並獲得更大的力量去保護自己的所有。」
+
+Q：將自己的權利轉移給法庭做出公正判決，每位公民因此喪失了復仇的自然權利。在什麼情況下，這種「完全的讓渡」使得每個人變得更有力量也更自由？
+
+「每位結合者將自己所有都奉獻出來，這個條件對所有人都相等，…每個人是像全體奉獻出自己，而不是交給了某個人。因為，每個人都可以從每一位結合者那裏獲得自己讓渡給結合者的權利，因此，每個人都可獲得他失去的一切等價物，並獲得更大的力量去保護自己的所有。」
+
+
+### 我的想法
+
+一開始定義國家的地方有提到國家要保障人民的公共安全，而本章節一開始也提到國家或城邦存在是因為安全，要讓自然人或這邊有提到「自然狀態」放棄自己的自由，就是要訂定制度或契約，讓人放棄某些自由，如文中有提到放棄對他人使用暴力的自由，但他人也同樣放棄這一自由。這樣才能保障人的安全。
+
+而「自然狀態」一開始我不太明白是甚麼意思，查了一下。
+
+自然狀態：這是虛構且未知的狀態，讓人想像沒有國家的人（沒有社會也沒有文化），從中推論國家能帶給他們什麼，並檢視國家是否必要。
+
+比喻的話…就是在小島生活的人吧，沒有〝國家〞，可能只有一個類似部落的群聚模式存在。好像不能只是只有一個部落，還要有其他勢力，這樣才可以比對？
+
+總之對於「國家是為所有人服務的嗎？」這個問題…，如果那個人願意放棄某些自由，來換取公共安全的保障，並且國家能保證這交換是正當、有憲法保障等，那我覺得是的，國家是為所有人服務。
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-08-04-lost-in-hong-kong-island.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-04-lost-in-hong-kong-island.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1b8ed25c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-04-lost-in-hong-kong-island.md
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "失魂落魄游港島"
+author: "蒟蒻魚"
+date  : 2023-08-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/R2cHXe4.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+身爲有自覺的新界人，我是無事絕對不登港島的，天大的事頂多去到九龍也能了結。沒想到這次回港，短時間内居然因事多次出入港島。離港前的最後一次過海，成了我回港期間感受最複雜的一天。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+第一站需到灣仔入境事務大樓，等候電梯上樓時，擡頭看見大堂天花挂滿的國旗與特區旗時，一陣怪異感再次襲來。剛回港時，我有來過這裏一趟，當時已經感覺怪怪的，匆忙間并沒有作深究。這一天排隊等候電梯時，我忍不住想，本人對國旗與特區旗的設計沒有意見，適逢回歸紀念日，挂滿旗也屬正常，到底怪在哪裏呢？我擡頭觀望半天，覺得頸部有點累才恍然大悟。入境處事務大樓的大堂空間應該有超過2層樓高，政府卻選了尺寸很細小的旗從天花上垂下，即你需要擡高頭才能看到滿天花的紅旗。以大堂這個極高的空間，其實足夠懸挂正常尺寸的國旗和區旗。話説旗大幅一點，視覺上更加紅不單止，也會方便市民用正常視綫就能膜拜到啊。我忍不住想笑政府小氣時，忽然一道閃電劈開我的笨腦袋，小氣個屁，人家要的就是這種擡頭仰望的效果，要你仰息而活啊。自嘲之際，電梯來了，趕緊低頭進入，我頸椎不好，擡頭好累。
+
+坐電梯上樓，排了好一陣隊，以爲終於可以完事並離開，卻收到職員語帶歉意的通知，人太多了，吩咐我午後再回來。想到本要去郵局一趟，正好可以去軒尼詩道上的郵局，且當消磨時間了。颱風前的香港，空氣都是停滯的。十分鐘不到的步行距離，我如同一粒被困在巨大蒸籠裏的蝦餃，還是用死了發臭的蝦做成的蝦餃。走到軒尼詩道與軍器廠街交界處，我圍著交界處新建的大廈來回的走，卻沒有看見郵局，煩躁中看一眼馬路對面的警察總部和灣仔警署，一股森冷寒意威逼而來。我明明記得以前舊的軒尼詩郵局就在地下，忍不住用粗話罵起自己來，爲什麽跑過來這邊找郵局，煎熬的熱，濃稠的濕度，恨意在陰暗的角落叫囂。打開Google Map，顯示郵局就在簇新的建築物裏面，細看才發現地圖顯示的地址是我面前大樓的1樓。我恨不得掐死自己，不過就是三年多沒回來，我怎麽可以忘記了香港的1樓是台灣的2樓。更重要的是，那個在地面的郵局，存在於1969年落成的熙信大廈裏，熙信大廈早在2013年已被拆除，現在樹立在我眼前的是全新的名爲浦發銀行大廈的高級寫字樓，我終於在這棟完全不像藏著郵局的寫字樓裏找到軒尼詩郵局。
+
+從郵局出來，和小朋友商量午餐吃什麽，小朋友說我們回來這些天還沒去吃沙嗲牛肉麵，好吧，就讓我帶你去見識我曾經很喜歡的金鳳茶餐廳。經過郵局一役，難免心驚，預先Google一下，謝天謝地，1956年就開業的金鳳還健在。我們再次投入到巨大蒸籠，穿過熙攘的大街小巷，往春園街進發。特意帶小朋友穿過利東街，即過去被稱為「囍帖街」的那條以印刷業而聞名的街，此地2016年被政府重建後，我一直沒有來過。漫步過現在被譽爲「香港小歐洲」的街，小歐洲嗎？更像是澳門某個巨大賭場裏的一條手信街，游客應該會更想看到「囍帖街」，而不是多走幾步路就看完的所謂歐洲吧？我們呢，還是去金鳳來得實際。
+
+步入金鳳，穿著白色短袖制服的侍應哥哥，目無表情指揮我們坐進角落裏的最後一個卡位。金鳳還保留著古早味十足的舊時茶餐廳裝修，就那種坐久一點也會覺得渾身都痛的直角的白色卡位。緊貼卡位旁邊還有一張小圓檯，已經坐滿客人，我需要努力收腹提臀才擠進分派給我們的卡位。小朋友迅速點了一份有沙嗲牛肉麵，菠蘿包和凍奶茶的套餐，社團大佬樣的侍應哥哥即刻露出笑容，親切地說：「細佬，識食啊！」我的内心忍不住反了個白眼，大佬，來這裏，不吃這些吃什麽？我跟著也點了同一個套餐。等候餐點的時候，小朋友拿出隨身帶的書看起來。「嘩，細佬好乖，睇英文書喔」、「Secrets of mental math，Secrets添啊」、「講咩㗎」......我坐在一邊看著一佬一細中英夾雜地吹起水來，果然，這個世界呢，從來就沒有侍應哥哥搭不了的訕，分別只在他想不想理你。
+
+我一直說沙嗲牛肉麵是我的執念，只要是在香港吃到的，都是好吃的，老金鳳的出品更加不用多説了，熱烈的醬汁裹著嫩滑的手切牛肉片，躺在出前一丁上閃亮登場，小朋友的眼睛也隨之被點亮，迅速叉了一塊牛肉卷著麵送進口，含著食物大呼：「唔，實在係好好味呀！」金鳳的奶茶是最最最正宗的港式奶茶，對不起，台灣那種茶色和奶色都被稀釋得茶不茶，奶不奶的狀態，我是真的喜歡不起來。我喜歡港式奶茶那種濃厚的茶色與奶色的柔滑碰撞，口感的綿厚，餘韻的悠長，地位無其他奶茶可及。
+
+吃過一個超越滿分的午飯，與立在門口的兩位侍應哥哥溫馨道別，穿過冷氣凍死人的灣仔地鐵站，重回入境事務大樓，這次終於順利取得所需。時間還有剩餘，我提議不如順便去一下小朋友最愛書店在銅鑼灣的分店，反正從灣仔坐港鐵到銅鑼灣就一個站的事。關於銅鑼灣地鐵站，我總在重複犯一個羞於啓齒的低級錯誤，我每一次都會搞錯B和E出口。就如同在金鐘，每一次轉港島綫，我都要想個千迴百轉才能搞清楚我究竟應該轉往柴灣還是堅尼地城方向。我身處地面時方向感極好，只是每次置身於地下錯綜的出口，高高低低的自動扶手梯，還有洶湧的人潮時，我很容易迷失，然後隨意就會做出錯誤的選擇，或者我應該直白承認我從來就沒有喜歡過港島這個地方。踏入車廂一刻，我就提醒自己不要走錯出口，我絕對不想從SOGO的門前走過。結果人就真是怕什麽就來什麽，從地面出來一刻，忍不住X了自己一輪，我還是走錯了出口，被迫要從SOGO門前走過。
+
+記憶中，我最後一次從SOGO門口走過是2017年的春天，我們一家到維多利亞公園看花展。SOGO門前是非多，一直都很多。就我回港前幾個星期，某個現在香港也成為敏感數字的日子，警方還出動大批警力在SOGO一帶封街搜查市民。忍不住看一眼自己的雙手，很好，沒有花也沒有蠟燭，但經過的每一步依然令我心跳異常。耳邊忽然傳來一句連一句的粗話，轉頭看見一位暴躁的司機把車停在了軒尼詩道中間，大概是因爲停車的爭議而怒罵站在路邊的輔警。一定是太悶熱了，大家都爆火纏身。好在SOGO的門面並沒有多大，快步就通過了，再多幾步，我都覺得我要爆血管了。
+
+拜訪過書店，從最近的出口回港鐵的月台，需要穿過一條斜向下的長長的隧道，這條隧道沒有自動扶梯，也沒有樓梯，是一種平面的向下，頭頂是伸手可觸的一個接一個大圓形光管，就著刺眼白色光環不斷往下走，忽然一陣眩暈襲來，我開始懷疑這條隧道是沒有盡頭的，也開始懷疑會不會是上次我來銅鑼灣的時候，我從這條隧道誤入了平行時空的另外一個香港，而現在我是要走回我的那個舊香港了嗎？「媽咪，有車來了，快點！」孩子的呼叫聲把我留在了新香港裏，平行世界的入口在列車的呼嘯聲中關上。
+
+我緊閉雙唇登上列車，小朋友叮囑我：「去到金鐘，你不要再上錯扶手梯走錯方向了，算了，等下還是我來帶路吧！」Ok，darling，那就請你帶我回家吧！
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-08-16-the-project-national-glory.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-16-the-project-national-glory.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4ed52998
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-16-the-project-national-glory.md
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "國光計劃"
+author: "阿恆"
+date  : 2023-08-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/RXzfyei.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "蔣介石武統中國的最後嘗試"
+---
+
+1949年，蔣介石所領導的政府因軍事失利，被迫退守台灣，兩岸從此分治至今。蔣介石並不甘心留在台灣，反攻中國，重新統一，可謂他人生最後一個目標。要重新拿回中國大陸控制權，除了軍事上擊敗中共，別無他法。蔣介石非常明白這道理，留台期間不斷密謀軍事計劃，致力「反攻大陸」。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+學者張國城選取蔣生前一個大型軍事計劃「國光計劃」為切入點，討論究竟蔣反攻計劃是否具可行性？結論自然是完全不可能，但從張國城歸納的原因，再結合筆者過往的研究，有一些發人深省的地方，故想分享一二。
+
+
+### 國光計劃的誕生
+
+早於1950年代，蔣介石便下令軍方制訂多項反攻大計，尋求美國只在後勤補給上支援台灣，不必美國出動部隊作戰，但美國評估台灣缺乏反攻能力，拒絕請求。
+
+1954年，美、台簽署《中美共同防禦條約》，美國以條約明確約束台灣軍事行動，而且態度明確向蔣表明不支持反攻。蔣深知公開推動反攻計劃，勢必招來美國的反對，只能秘密開展。
+
+1960年代，中國、美國、台灣都出現了一些情勢變化，讓原本就相當堅定必須反攻大陸的蔣介石，決定秘密策劃一項名為「國光計劃」的反攻計劃。
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/xae9Ozh.png)
+
+當時中國正經歷「大躍進」，毛澤東被逼「退居二線」，由劉少奇主持日常工作。這可能令蔣意識到中共正在權力鬥爭，讓他有機可乘；另一方面，美國甘迺迪當選，蔣擔心他會改變中國政策，轉向「兩國中國」。
+
+同時，蔣再次連任，極具爭議地再展開一個總統任期，「反攻大陸」成了他再三擔任總統的正當性來源。
+
+1961年4月，蔣介石下令成立「國光計劃室」，瞞着美國對反攻大陸展開積極研究。
+
+
+### 國光無曙光？
+
+國光計劃的出現，就是為了反攻大陸作最好的準備，為蔣提供一個可行性方案。但張國城仔細分析當時國軍陸、海、空的戰力，指出國光計劃反而令蔣清楚明白現實，不存在一個反攻大陸的選項。
+
+首先是陸軍實力，1960年代初約有40萬現役軍人，後備約為47萬，這兵力應可應付反攻需要。但前提是國軍擁有制海空權，否則都是空談。換言之，海軍與空軍的戰力有關鍵性作用。
+
+至於關鍵性海軍與空軍實力，張國城認為完全不足以應付反攻需要。當時海軍艦艇數量無法運送眾多陸軍，所以即使可以動員近百萬士兵，但投入不了戰場，再多也是徒然。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/YISlEDF.png)
+
+1961年，海軍總司令向蔣提出報告，指出登陸戰有兩點為重中之中，即是「行動密匿」與「空軍戰力」。由於海軍艦艇不足，發動反攻後，勢必動員民船支援，這舉又會令行動曝光，失去密匿性。
+
+至於空軍的戰力，似乎無法回應大家的期待。1953年後，美國一直向國軍提供大量戰機，短短十年已轉交了1136架戰機，可還是遠不達反攻需要。
+
+空軍預估戰時需要出動440架次飛機，而平時每天只出動了40架次，等於戰時需要十倍架次才能滿足需求。此外，就算十倍出擊，張國城認為國軍的戰機數量與飛行員最多只能支撐九天，顯然離成功反攻還有一大段距離。
+
+到了這裡，任何有理性的人都明白國軍綜合戰力根本無力發動反擊，蔣與國軍高層也深知這點。所以國光計劃除了研究敵前登陸作戰外，另一大重點便是「敵後特戰」，蔣對此也寄予厚望。
+
+
+### 澳門與國光計劃
+
+所謂「敵後特戰」，簡單來說便是派出一小隊人馬到中國大陸，然後挑起中國人民對中共的武裝反抗，國軍再趁勢反攻，來個裡應內合。
+
+蔣明白到國軍戰力不足，且美國不會同意國軍直接出擊反攻。假如中國內部出現動亂，國軍再出動，這種情況下美國可能勉強同意。所以敵後特戰成了最有可能反攻成功的選項。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/NFdZdhu.png)
+
+為了成功策動敵後特戰，蔣特別在國光計劃室下，設置「武漢作業室」專門負責敵後特戰。起初希望以空降形式把人馬送到中國，但美國不願提供運輸機後作罷，後改以海上突擊形式進行。
+
+戰果方面，屢屢被中共偵查截擊，大多失敗收場。張國城認為連這種程度的游擊行動也無法成功，大規模的登陸戰更不可能成功。張的研究對敵後特戰描述較少，筆者想再此補充一下，讓讀者更能明白蔣反攻大計的荒謬。
+
+筆者曾撰文指出國民黨不斷利用澳門作為反共基地，進行所謂敵後特戰，最終導致整個國民黨在澳門勢力被連根拔起。從澳門發生的敵後特戰，可以看出這些計劃毫無計劃可言，是計劃失敗的主因。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/wAqfBye.png)
+▲ 圖中左則有國民黨黨徽的建築物正是駐澳辦（圖：梁偉鍵）
+
+早於1950年代，台灣已利用澳門從事敵後特戰，透過吸收逃往澳門的中國難民為骨幹，前往中國執行諸如爆炸、暗殺等任務。單計任務本身，時有成功（如把廣東某大橋炸毀），但對於核心目標，即在中國掀起大規模民變，完全不見任何幫助。
+
+到了1960年代，中共早已吸取經驗，部署不少民兵在邊境駐守，就是為了防範台灣敵後特戰。然而，面對敵後特戰屢屢失敗，台灣似乎沒有受到教訓，繼續派遣人馬到中國，結果不少人因此喪生。
+
+從一位曾經參與敵後特戰的澳門難民羅德光的憶述，可以看出這些行動都設了一個宏大目標：前往中國，設立據點，組織反共。但台灣明顯沒有相應準備，結果羅德光乘船出海後即迷路，輕易被中國海防發現，還沒登陸中國便宣告任務失敗。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/4BoBl54.png)
+▲ 國民黨駐澳特務羅德光（圖：廣角鏡）
+
+
+### 結論：明知不可為
+
+1972年7月，國光計劃室被裁撤，可算是為蔣的反攻大計劃下一個句點。從1961至1972這十年間，國光計劃總共研議了26項計劃，事後來看，都沒有真正執行。背後原因，大概也是知道反攻不可為。
+
+國光計劃這十年，面對一個又一個鐵證，力證國軍沒有能力反攻。面對這殘酷現實，為何蔣仍然在他晚年，推動國光計計十年之久？
+
+張國城認為這出於同樣現實的政治局面。台灣要繼續維持戒嚴體制，令蔣可以繼續掌權，反攻大陸成了理由；另一方面，反攻大陸也成了外交籌碼，可以以此爭取美國更多支持。這樣下，蔣還算是一名「理性」決策者。
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file

From f7ee7e105c2253650d8c7db3300d5688abc2a697 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hokoi <hokoeye@pm.me>
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2023 11:09:45 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 12/19] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x20 Sep.08

---
 ...-08-09-russias-artillery-war-in-ukraine.md |  67 +++++
 ...1-chinas-cyberattack-in-taiwan-scenario.md |  76 ++++++
 ...23-08-15-chinas-emergence-as-superpower.md | 245 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../2023-08-15-japans-defence-white-paper.md  |  46 ++++
 .../_hkers/2023-08-23-find-safe-harbors.md    | 146 +++++++++++
 5 files changed, 580 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-09-russias-artillery-war-in-ukraine.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-11-chinas-cyberattack-in-taiwan-scenario.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-chinas-emergence-as-superpower.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-japans-defence-white-paper.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-find-safe-harbors.md

diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-09-russias-artillery-war-in-ukraine.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-09-russias-artillery-war-in-ukraine.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..43b20158
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-09-russias-artillery-war-in-ukraine.md
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : RU’s Artillery War In UA
+author: Sam Cranny-Evans
+date  : 2023-08-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/jBCvtRe.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Challenges and Innovations"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_While Russia has experienced difficulties elsewhere on the battlefield, artillery has been central to its ability to hold Ukrainian forces at bay. This article explores how the Russian armed forces have adapted traditional artillery practices to overcome challenges and achieve greater efficacy._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+Artillery is central to the Russian way of war, so it is beholden upon Western forces to properly understand how it has been applied in Ukraine. Russia’s artillery war is best analysed through two mechanisms: artillery doctrine – which provides the foundation for how artillery use has changed – and what artillery practitioners refer to as the gunnery problem.
+
+The gunnery problem is the same regardless of country, and describes the technical challenges involved in hitting a target with indirect fires. These challenges include accurate acquisition and use of meteorological data, which will impact flight path and speed; and survey data, which is critical to identifying where the firing gun is located and where it is pointing, as well as accurate location of the target. An additional element of the gunnery problem is calibration of the gun and ammunition. This involves measuring the temperature of the ammunition, the barrel wear, and the velocity of each shot if possible. If this information can be paired with sufficiently accurate target coordinates, an artillery battery will be able to fire for effect from its first rounds and will require fewer adjustments. The traditional approach without this is to fire rounds from a single battery and observe their deviation from the target. Corrections are made using forward observers, laser targeting systems and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs).
+
+Artillery rounds will disperse along the range of fire as well as the line. The range refers to accuracy in front of or behind the target. Line refers to dispersion on either side of the target, as a result of which tube artillery produces a beaten zone that is approximately cigar shaped. It is important to understand the gunnery problem because it dictates what artillery forces must do to affect a target. The willingness of users to understand the gunnery problem, as well as doctrine, dictates efficacy. Because of this, the ability of the Russians to account for these technical limitations and achieve the commander’s desired effect provides a useful benchmark for Russian artillery efficacy in Ukraine.
+
+
+### Doctrine
+
+“Russian forces manoeuvre to fire, Western forces fire to manoeuvre” is a neat encapsulation of Russian doctrine compared with the West. Put simply, Russia uses artillery as its primary form of lethality in the deep and close battles. Its combined arms elements are charged with positioning themselves so that the artillery can deliver destructive effects against their opponents. This is a high-level simplification, but it is an important distinction to make. For static operations, the Russian forces should be expected to control artillery centrally and coordinate its actions through the artillery chain of command. A defensive brigade should be assigned a brigade artillery group (BrAG) from its parent army, which consists of two battalions of self-propelled howitzers and a battalion of multiple rocket launchers. The available literature indicates that a BrAG would deploy 2–4 km behind the edge of the defence and occupy an area 3–5 km wide by 1–2 km deep. It would provide additional firepower over organic assets at the frontline to defeat enemy forces on the approach and if they broke through. It is also common for artillery formations up to a battalion to be attached to a tank or motorised rifle battalion and provide immediate fire support. Attachment indicates a strong command relationship and involves the combined arms commander directing artillery fire missions.
+
+Recent analysis published by RUSI indicates that on parts of the frontline, Russia has not deviated from this concept. Two batteries of tube and one of rocket artillery were assigned to each battalion tactical group in the opening mobile phases of the conflict. The static nature of fighting that followed has led to the centralisation of artillery under artillery brigades. However, Ukrainian soldiers interviewed for this article indicated that Russian artillery units were laagered up to 12–15 km behind the frontline, and that they spend the night even further away. They only approach the frontline to conduct fire missions and withdraw as quickly as possible, indicating that doctrine on proximity has given way to concerns over survivability.
+
+___`While Russian artillery fire is highly effective, ammunition constraints combined with force dispersion have imposed limits upon its application and driven a reliance upon precision`___
+
+The attachment of artillery formations to combined arms units is also discussed in Russian military journals covering the war. One article relates a case of an officer skipping the artillery commander altogether and sending his requests directly to battery commanders. This has resulted in articles explaining how a commander should designate and report targets directly to a battery commander. Another example reportedly involved “improvised mortar platoons”, which were temporary mortar teams established by a mechanised commander from regular infantry. This methodology provided immediately available fire support from three mortars that did not require additional clearance or process to fire.
+
+
+### The Gunnery Problem
+
+While it therefore appears that Russian doctrine has been followed in Ukraine, this offers only a partial impression of the Russian artillery war. The methods used to address the gunnery problem help to complete the picture and indicate that Russian artillery fire is highly effective, although ammunition constraints combined with force dispersion have imposed limits upon its application and driven a reliance upon precision.
+
+Russia entered Ukraine with several pre-established developments designed to improve artillery accuracy. One example is shock-fire tactics, a principle discussed in 2018, which employs UAVs, artillery-locating radars, tanks and artillery to coax an enemy into firing before conducting counter-battery fires. Shock-fire shortens the targeting cycle and improves the accuracy of fires by combining at least two forms of target location. It was developed through deployments in Syria and Ukraine. It has been used in some form in Ukraine, and Ukrainian artillery officers told RUSI that Russian counter-battery fire is very fast and accurate when conducted using artillery-locating radar and UAVs together.
+
+When the system works, Russian targeting cycles can be completed in three minutes, while others take 30. The former is essentially the limit of what is physically possible – a 155mm shell fired to 25 km will take 75 seconds to reach the target.
+
+#### Reconnaissance-Fire System
+
+The reconnaissance-fire system (recce-fire) is a development of a Soviet-era concept designed to pair tactical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets with precision strike artillery in real time. Strelets is the implementation of this concept, connecting sensors to shooters in as close to real time as possible. Recce-fire requires the target to be engaged with precision munitions such as the 2K25 Krasnopol 152mm laser-guided round. Target designation can be provided by ground-based laser systems or the Orlan-30 UAV. Video footage showing precise strikes on Ukrainian vehicles or buildings is likely a result of Krasnopol use. Prior to the war, recce-fire was expected to be critical for counter-battery engagements. Ground-based laser targeting is evident, but some Russian documents indicate that the Russian armed forces have struggled to get forward observers to perform their role in Ukraine. Many prefer to use UAVs, a safer but potentially less effective solution. The efficacy of Krasnopol has also been challenged. One Russian textbook on artillery indicates that Krasnopol’s accuracy is severely degraded by low-hanging cloud cover, variable terrain and a host of other conditions that make it a difficult munition to deploy.
+
+However, Russia has made extensive use of loitering munitions like Lancet-3, which can be coordinated with a separate UAV to conduct reconnaissance and targeting or flown manually to search for and strike individual targets. This is likely a response to several factors: Ukraine’s use of dispersed guns, the availability of Krasnopol and the associated targeting assets, as well as the presence of electronic warfare, which degrades Lancet considerably. Ukrainian commanders told the author that while Lancet is more prevalent in some areas than artillery, in others it is rarely seen. The use of Lancet also suggests that Russia has struggled to counter dispersion with its pre-existing targeting structures and doctrine. The gunnery problem means that while a single howitzer in a tree line might be quickly identified, the chances of hitting it with unguided munitions are low unless excessive mass is applied. When considered against the backdrop of Russia’s own ammunition challenges, the use of loitering munitions is therefore a logical alternative. However, the lethality of Lancet is often insufficient. it is apparent from videos that crews can hear the munition approaching, as they often have time to disperse before it strikes. One officer also said that although he had seen his gun “destroyed” several times online, it remained alive and well.
+
+#### Weight of Fires
+
+Traditional artillery practices focused on the weight of fires, which refers to the quantity, density and intensity of artillery fire required to achieve an effect. Accuracy is important – there is no point firing shells into an empty field – but only insofar as it ensures that most shells are having an impact upon the target. The proliferation of reconnaissance and precision strike assets has led Western artillery forces to focus on precision, leading to what Amos Fox terms the precision fallacy. Fox posits that precision strike munitions have led commanders astray with the promise of hitting a target. However, he notes that single precision munitions may fail to destroy their target because they lack the necessary lethality. Russian military academics have echoed this sentiment and note that artillery units have re-learned the value of the weight of fires.
+
+___`Artillery is a formidable component of the Russian military, with occasionally best-in-breed targeting cycles and a doctrine that allows it to overcome deficiencies elsewhere`___
+
+Soviet gunners were provided with targeting tables detailing the number of shells needed to defeat different types of targets. For instance, 12 122mm howitzers would require 600 rounds to engage enemy infantry across a 33-hectare area. All 600 rounds would be delivered in 15 minutes, showing the intensity of fire that is needed. Weight of fires is shaped significantly by physics and psychology. The first 45–60 seconds of a fire mission will generally drive infantry into cover, so Soviet and Russian gunners have focused on delivering most of the required ammunition in the first 5–6 minutes. Thereafter, the heat generated by the firing and repositioning of guns generally limits the rate of fire to 1–3 rounds per minute. Firing at a higher rate for longer would degrade the barrel and accuracy. So, to achieve the necessary weight of fires it is essential to ensure that there are enough guns available to engage the target, otherwise the necessary quantity and intensity of fires will not be deployed in the relevant timeframe.
+
+Russian writers have emphasised this principle in journal articles, which suggest that Russian artillery may be struggling to achieve the weight of fires necessary to meet its doctrinal obligations. This may be a result of the extreme dispersion that is evident in Ukraine, as well as the lack of ammunition that has impacted more recent operations. Dispersion makes coordination of massed fires more difficult; in theory, systems like Strelets allow guns to disperse and fire on a single target, but they rely on good communications and training. Accuracy is improved through UAVs, but if Russian forces are struggling to concentrate their artillery, then one would expect their ammunition consumption to increase as they try to destroy targets with fewer guns available. Attrition also plays a role: Russia is likely to have lost many of its guns and most experienced crews. However, Russian attacks are often preceded by extensive indirect fire; Russia’s ammunition consumption and accounts from Ukraine both support this argument. Recent reports indicate that 70% of Ukraine’s casualties are a result of artillery fires. It is clear therefore that despite challenges, Russian artillery is having a significant impact on the Ukrainian armed forces and delivering effects through a combination of innovative tactics and technology, as well as a reliance upon its traditional doctrine.
+
+
+### In Sum
+
+This brief analysis of Russian artillery practice in Ukraine indicates that while it has demonstrated variable levels of efficacy, on the whole it is a formidable component of the Russian military, with occasionally best-in-breed targeting cycles and a doctrine that allows for artillery to overcome the deficiencies of Russian combined arms forces. It has built a significant ability to find and strike targets over a wide area, and likely retains the ability to mass fires against targets of opportunity.
+
+Indirect fire support operates on mathematical principles of certainty. Approaches to this differ: Western forces, for instance, seek an economy of effort and resources in the application of fires. They tend to pay close attention to all aspects of the gunnery problem to ensure that their fires achieve effect with optimal ammunition consumption. The evidence from Ukraine suggests that Russian forces have combined both approaches: the use of UAVs, radar and precision munitions indicates that accuracy is essential for certain tasks, but attaining the weight of fires remains critical.
+
+---
+
+__Sam Cranny-Evans__ was a Research Analyst at RUSI in C4ISR between October 2021 and December 2022. During his time at RUSI he focused on multi-domain integration, electronic warfare, and the war in Ukraine. He co-led the establishment of the Red Team project, which provides analysis of the Russian and Chinese militaries. He has also spent time researching lethal autonomous weapons and their proliferation risk. He now works at Helsing, a defence AI company providing thought leadership and in government affairs.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-11-chinas-cyberattack-in-taiwan-scenario.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-11-chinas-cyberattack-in-taiwan-scenario.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : CN’s Cyberattack In TW Scenario
+author: James Andrew Lewis
+date  : 2023-08-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/wDEi5BY.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Cyberattack on Civilian Critical Infrastructures in a Taiwan Scenario"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Expressions of surprise that the Chinese military targeted critical infrastructure in Guam for cyber reconnaissance are misleading._ <excerpt/> _Of course the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is conducting cyber reconnaissance; China has been probing U.S. critical infrastructure networks for vulnerabilities since the Obama administration, if not before. From a military perspective, this is the kind of reconnaissance any capable nation would engage in against a potential opponent to identify targets and possibly prepare them for cyberattack. What was misleading in these reports is that critical infrastructure in Guam was not the primary target. The primary targets, particularly those that would support U.S. forces in any engagement over Taiwan, are located in the United States. China is engaged in a major cyber reconnaissance effort against them. If China is willing to accept the risk of broadening a conflict over Taiwan, it may decide that cyber actions against civilian infrastructure in the United States could usefully disrupt communications and the flow of material needed for military operations._
+
+Chinese decisionmaking on the use of offensive cyber operations against civilian critical infrastructure will be shaped less by the likelihood of detection and attribution and more by a desire to manage escalation and retaliation. China may decide not to use wide-scale cyber disruption and reserve its efforts for espionage. A decision on how and where to use cyberattacks will also be shaped by the progress (or lack thereof) in any Chinese offense; a lack of success could lead to more aggressive cyber actions. The broad calculus for China’s decisionmaking will likely involve weighing the relative military advantage gained from cyberattacks on critical infrastructure against the probability that such attacks would provoke a harsh U.S. response or expand the conflict.
+
+Some of China’s decisions will be shaped by resource constraints. Cyberattacks are often tailored for specific vulnerabilities and targets have a greater chance of success but take time (usually a few months) to develop. Even China faces limits on skilled personnel. These two factors suggest some prioritization of targets for cyberattack. A Chinese priority list of targets will be shaped by a balance between the likely military payoff and the political risk of expanded conflict.
+
+This estimate assumes that China does not engage in reconnaissance of targets unless it is considering attacking them. It is also based on Russian and U.S. practice in using offensive cyber actions against opponents’ critical infrastructures during invasion. China’s Strategic Support Force, created in 2015, combines space, cyber, electronic, and information operation capabilities. Published Chinese military doctrines discuss the central role of informatized warfare, the importance of the cyber domain in any conflict between the United States and China, and strategies to achieve “dominance in the space, cyber, electromagnetic, and possibly psychological domains.” The intent is to disrupt, paralyze, or destroy an opponent’s operational capabilities. This makes it likely that China has considered attacks on critical U.S. civilian infrastructure.
+
+The most probable targets fall into three categories: The first would be electrical power facilities. The second would be the pipelines and railroads in the continental United States that connect to these locations. The third would be the logistics and communications networks, including those that support supply chains for manufacturing precision-guided munitions and military aircraft. Primary targets would include telecommunications systems in cities and regions where naval and air bases are located, such as California, Hawaii, and Washington State. All are logical targets for cyber disruption, and many are located on the United States’ Pacific Rim. Disruptions at such targets would provide near-term, tangible military advantage and would be conducted in parallel with Chinese cyber actions against military targets, such as information systems and advanced weapons.
+
+> The broad calculus for China’s decisionmaking will likely involve weighing the relative military advantage gained from cyberattacks on critical infrastructure against the probability that such attacks would provoke a harsh U.S. response or expand the conflict.
+
+China’s planning is likely bound by a desire to minimize the probability of a general war with the United States. Cyberattacks against targets in the continental United States and Hawaii could threaten to prolong any conflict and make it unmanageable. The question for China’s leaders is whether quick and precise strikes on civilian critical infrastructure with temporary effects justify this strategic risk. In preparing to defend against cyberattacks, however, the United States cannot assume that China will decide on a minimalist course.
+
+
+### Likely Targets
+
+All digital targets are vulnerable to some degree. Pipelines, for example, stretch for thousands of miles across several states and traverse sparsely populated areas. They are digitally controlled, with many possible points for both cyber and physical disruption. The ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline showed that short-term disruption can produce political benefits. Although the Biden administration (led by the Transportation Security Administration) is taking steps to reduce risks, there are many possible digital and physical targets along the length of a pipeline, and hardening them will take time. Electric grids have always been considered high-value targets and the potential vulnerabilities of electrical grids are well-known. There has been progress in reducing vulnerability in the years since the 2007 Aurora test showed how a cyberattack could cause physical damage to an electrical power generator, but electrical power generation and transmission remains perhaps the most valuable target for disruption by China.
+
+China could also target the communications infrastructure for disruption. Ukraine’s telecommunications infrastructure was a key target for Russia. In a Taiwan scenario, this could include attacks on undersea fiber-optic cables and communications satellites. It could also include kinetic attacks on physical infrastructure. Like pipelines, undersea fiber-optic cables stretch thousands of miles. They are most vulnerable in relatively shallow waters. Something as simple as a fishing trawler hooking and breaking a cable is effective. It is also likely that China will attempt to disrupt, blind, or disable both military and commercial satellites for reconnaissance, navigation, and communications. China may not distinguish between military and commercial satellites, and commercial satellites play an essential role in U.S. military communications. Chinese officials have privately complained about Starlink. China has practiced jamming and spoofing satellite signals for navigation, and media reports and leaked U.S. documents state that China has developed cyber “weapons” for use against U.S. satellites. Using cyber methods against satellites is less intrusive and less escalatory than kinetic attacks (though these cannot be ruled out) but may also have a lower probability of success.
+
+The Ukraine war points to the vulnerabilities of the precision-guided munitions (PGM) supply chain and the importance of steady resupply. These are complex munitions, so delays in obtaining even a single part can slow or stop production. The experience of European allies in the 2012 air campaign against Libya, where they depleted their PGM stocks within a few days, is suggestive of the benefits of disrupting the PGM supply chain. The United States (and regional allies) can prepare for this by stockpiling PGMs, but Ukraine shows that consumption rates are higher than expected. A combined cyberattack could disrupt PGM production and resupply. However, it remains an open question as to whether disruption to PGM resupply would provide the near-term benefits most useful to China, since the damage could take weeks to appear.
+
+Cyberattacks on other critical infrastructures are possible but offer less of a benefit to China. Disrupting financial networks may provide secondary benefits if credit cards won’t work and cash is unavailable. Disrupting municipal traffic control systems would provide temporary (and easily remedied) disturbances. Civil air traffic management systems are likely targets since civilian air freight will play a role in the resupply of high-value equipment (like PGMs), but the effects of a cyberattack on air traffic control could be quickly remedied, given U.S. experience in dealing with air traffic disruptions. Attacks on other infrastructures are unlikely to provide any military or strategic benefit. Water supply in key metropolitan areas may be one exception to this, since telecommunications and electricity depend on it. In all instances, deciding on targets, their location, and whether to strike them using cyberattacks will require a careful calculation of immediate military benefit weighed against the strategic risk.
+
+
+### Factors Affecting Chinese Decisions to Use Cyberattacks
+
+Before Ukraine, given U.S. military setbacks in the Middle East and Xi Jinping’s belief that the West was in irreversible decline, the Chinese government likely overestimated the level of action they could engage in without risk. The Western response to Ukraine, including sanctions against Russia and financial and military support for Ukraine, has led China to recalculate the costs of action against Taiwan, but domestic political pressures could still impel Xi to act.
+
+Although it is currently unlikely that China will use force to occupy Taiwan, if it does decide to do so, it would undoubtedly prefer a short, sharp conflict, sinking a few U.S. carriers while holding off any U.S. response until its forces occupied the country. The PLA has, after all, been practicing some kind of Taiwan invasion scenario for 70 years. Their calculations may be similar to those made by Axis forces before World War II: that a sharp, decisive blow against U.S. naval and air forces in the Pacific region at the onset of conflict would stop the United States from intervening and dissuade it from continuing the conflict.
+
+Factors that shape the calculations that apply to critical infrastructure are the comparative risks of striking civilian versus military targets, and the risk of striking targets in the continental United States. If China chose to attack civilian infrastructure in the continental United States, the most effective cyber actions against critical infrastructure would unavoidably affect several large U.S. cities, such as San Diego, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Honolulu. Collateral damage is inevitable if electrical power, telecommunications, and fuel pipelines are attacked. These are civilian infrastructures, but they are legitimate targets. The United States has attacked similar targets in the past, showing restraint when it believed it would quickly occupy opponent territory and need these infrastructures for itself. China does not face similar constraints, and the risk of civilian casualties from cyberattack in these cities is extremely low — the intended result is most likely the disruption of critical infrastructure, not physical damage or casualties.
+
+China may consider targeting Washington, D.C., in the hope that disruption to power and communications in the nation’s capital would slow any U.S. response; however, the degree of resilience found in national command systems and the risk of a fierce U.S. response to a cyberattack on the capital suggest that Chinese efforts at disruption in D.C. are unlikely. It is also likely that China would prefer to reserve cyber tools for intelligence gathering rather than disruption since it has had a long record of remarkable successes against the U.S. government.
+
+> It is also likely that China would prefer to reserve cyber tools for intelligence gathering rather than disruption since it has had a long record of remarkable successes against the U.S. government.
+
+Chinese planners face the complications of having to consider attacks on U.S. military facilities located in allied territory, particularly Japan. If Japan has not entered the conflict, it would be in China’s interest not to attack targets in Okinawa or other areas. If Japan has entered the conflict, China will need to decide if it targets only U.S. military facilities in Japan, attacks Japanese critical infrastructure that supports these facilities, or disrupts some broader range of targets. Moving up this target ranking risks expanding and prolonging any conflict, so China may — if it is reasonable (though participants in a conflict tend to become less reasonable the longer it continues) — minimize cyber actions against Japan. The most likely outcome is that in the context of armed conflict, China will decide it has little to lose by launching cyberattacks against Japan’s military and critical energy and communications infrastructures and will seek to maximize disruption.
+
+One assumption behind this analysis is that economic warfare (e.g., striking targets in order to degrade the opponent economy and industrial capacity as opposed to striking targets that directly support military operations in order to disrupt them) is unlikely. Although some argue that China has engaged for decades in long-term, low-level economic warfare, this assertion is unsupported by any direct evidence and Chinese intentions are best described as espionage to build its economy and technological capabilities. In a short conflict, the military benefits of economic warfare would arrive too late to change the outcome and striking civilian manufacturing targets (such as factories) risks expanding the conflict. Although there could be benefits to disrupting production at oil refineries or semiconductor fabs, this benefit is smaller than in the past given the globally distributed nature of supply chains, which creates a fair degree of resilience.
+
+Cyberattacks are most effective when combined with other weapons, including conventional delivery systems, PGMs, unmanned aerial vehicles, and electronic warfare (EW). This combination can cripple command networks and advanced weapons systems and, if done at scale, may overwhelm defenders by exploiting a rapid pace and large scale of action. Against Taiwan, the United States should expect to see a combination of cyber and kinetic attacks. Coordinated kinetic and cyber action against targets in the United States are very unlikely (with the exception of Guam, which is within easy missile range of China). Kinetic actions against targets in the continental United States or Hawaii would create an unmanageable risk of escalation for China.
+
+
+### Influence Operations
+
+Disruption of critical infrastructure may not be the only target of Chinese cyber efforts. China could use its trove of personal information on millions of U.S. officials, civilians, and service members to send intimidating or confusing emails, text messages, and social media posts to them and their families (as the Russians have done in Ukraine). Officials in one Asian country have said that China used its access to telecommunications systems in that country to send politically oriented text messages to all mobile phone users in the country and something similar could be done to Americans.
+
+Russia attempted to blend cyberattack, EW, and psychological operations in its invasion of Ukraine. Russian EW systems (such as the Leer 3) were able to connect to Ukrainian mobile telephone networks, both to disrupt communications and to collect and send messages. These have had limited success in Ukraine given the political circumstances. The Chinese have not shown the skill of the Russians in influence operations, but the population of Taiwan will be a target for text, email, and video messages — perhaps generated by new artificial intelligence tools — intended to create confusion and emphasize the futility of resistance. The United States should also expect Chinese actors with a presence on U.S. social media platforms to plant disinformation aimed at U.S. media and audiences. China will also try to inject disinformation into global media about U.S. losses and (if there is opportunity) collateral damage to civilian targets from U.S. actions. Artificial intelligence provides a way not only to make more convincing digital falsehoods, but also to inject them at speed and at scale against the target population.
+
+> The Chinese have not shown the skill of the Russians in influence operations, but the population of Taiwan will be a target for text, email, and video messages — perhaps generated by new artificial intelligence tools — intended to create confusion and emphasize the futility of resistance.
+
+A global audience, some of which is inherently hostile or predisposed to distrust the United States, is a better venue for China’s influence operations than the United States given the broad consensus among the American population and leaders on the need to compete with China and the intense reactions that attacks on U.S. territory have generated in the past. The United States cannot assume that Chinese aggression against Taiwan will be met with universal disapproval. Russian propaganda about Ukraine has been successful in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America despite clear evidence of its aggression. China could similarly engage these audiences. A Chinese campaign could attempt to exploit pacifist sentiment in Asian countries like Japan, but if China is seen as the aggressor, it will likely not gain traction with regional audiences. This suggests that Chinese influence operations will be unsuccessful with U.S. and Northeast Asian audiences but more persuasive in the Global South.
+
+
+### Reconnaissance Is a Warning, Not Necessarily a Prelude
+
+These are likely targets and this analysis does not consider the effect of cyberattacks, which may be limited even if successful, particularly if ships, satellites, aircraft, and air defenses are well defended. However, given the complexity of digital networks and the unevenness of cybersecurity preparation in the United States, if China decides to attack critical infrastructure, some attacks would be likely to succeed. Efforts to create a “zero threat architecture” are misleading in the context of military action by state actors. There will always be some success for cyberattacks, so the goal should be not to prevent but to minimize these successes and to be resilient in the continued provision of digital services when defense inevitably has failed. A later white paper will discuss defending against cyber actions during armed conflict, but planning must consider how to continue necessary operations and services despite cyber disruption.
+
+Conducting reconnaissance is not always a prelude to attack. Russia has conducted strategic reconnaissance against the United States for decades without acting on it. Reconnaissance is, however, an indication of both increased risk and opponent intentions that should guide U.S. preparations for defense. It should be assumed that some percentage of Chinese cyberattacks against U.S. targets would succeed, making the issue a matter of how to ensure resilience and recovery. Even if Chinese cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure are unlikely, the United States needs to prepare for them, improve cyber defenses for the most probable targets, and test its capacity for response and recovery.
+
+---
+
+__James Andrew Lewis__ is senior vice president, holds the Pritzker Chair, and directs the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Before joining CSIS, he was a diplomat and a member of the Senior Executive Service. Lewis has a track record of being among the first to identify new tech and security issues and devise polices to address them. He developed groundbreaking policies on cybersecurity, remote sensing, encryption, spectrum management, and high-tech exports to China, including 5G, software, and semiconductors. He also helped create the Wassenaar Arrangement. Lewis was a senior adviser for four UN Groups of Governmental Experts on Information Security, and his work on norms to build stability in cyberspace is foundational. He leads a long-running track 2 dialogue with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. His current work looks at how countries innovate and at digitalization and its political, economic, and security effects. Early in his career, Lewis was a political adviser to two combatant commanders.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-chinas-emergence-as-superpower.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-chinas-emergence-as-superpower.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-chinas-emergence-as-superpower.md
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : CN’s Emergence As Superpower
+author: Anthony H. Cordesman
+date  : 2023-08-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/uiW2sXU.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "A Graphic Comparison of the United States, Russia, China, and Other Major Powers"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_This report compares the key trends in civil and military power in the United States, developed democracies, China, and Russia. The graphs, maps, and tables in this report only highlight a limited range of the complex changes involved, and reliable data are often lacking for the years after 2020. They still show, however, that the civil and military role of the world’s major powers is in a process of dramatic and unpredictable change._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+### The Key Impact of China’s Emergence as a Major Global Economic Power
+
+China has emerged as an economic superpower that rivals the United States in many ways, although the total economic power of modern democracies — most of which are strategic partners of the United States — vastly exceeds the size of the Chinese economy, trade efforts, and efforts in technology and research and development. China also faces major internal challenges created by outside restrictions and economic sanctions, its handling of Covid-19, and state interference in its economic development.
+
+Nevertheless, China is already competing with the economies of developed democratic states on a global level. Its “belt and road” efforts to establish economic ties to developing states and control critical minerals and resources. It may succeed in creating a rival economic bloc that can function and grow outside the “rules-based order” democracies created after World War II, and it is already competing in its relations with a number of developing states and other countries.
+
+The trends presented in this report show that this competition may well become an ongoing confrontation between China and its allies, and developed democracies and their strategic partners, unless radical changes take place in Chinese policies and leadership. And — as is discussed shortly — is a growing level of civil confrontation that is being matched by military confrontation as well.
+
+
+### Russia’s Diminished Global Economic Role
+
+The following graphics show that Russia is not an economic superpower now that it has lost control of most East European states and many of the Central European and Asian elements of the former Soviet Union. Russia has long lagged badly in total economic growth, trade, research and development, and all the other major areas of economic power. Russia’s size, geographic position, and large oil and gas reserves do, however, still make it a key global power.
+
+
+### Key Uncertainties in the Civil Impacts of Economic Power
+
+It should be stressed, however, that current trends can only tell part of the story. Any analysis of economic and civil power will be shaped by many key trends that cannot be quantified. They include the longer-term impacts of the economic stresses between and within developed states, the impact of internal politics, the impact of demographic change and population pressure, and the impact of global warming. They also include the degree to which the developed democracies can succeed in cooperating and creating truly functional economic strategic partnerships. As yet, governments often rely far more on rhetoric about such cooperation than on taking tangible action, although there are positive indicators as well.
+
+The graphics in this analysis also do not include the developing world. Here, the allocation of international economic power has generally favored developed states. As the UN, World Bank, IMF, and a host of NGO reports make clear, many states have failed to move towards effective development and face major challenges from failed or corrupt governance, repression and internal division, population pressure, limited water supplies, and climate change. For all the former rhetoric about globalism, this includes at least one-third of the world’s nations.
+
+At the same time, there are cases like India, where the trends in global power could move in other directions. While they are not yet positive enough to include in this analysis, India has overtaken China as the world’s most populous state, has a GDP of some $9.3 trillion, and ranks high in terms of total military spending. Several major petroleum states in the Gulf are taking positive steps to develop beyond a reliance on energy exports, as are some states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. For all the failings in the developing world, they are also important potential successes.
+
+
+### The Impact of Trends in Military Power
+
+The graphs and tables that follow show that the United States remains the world’s largest military power, the one with the most combat experience and highest levels of total spending and investment in modernization, and the one with the strongest strategic partners.
+
+It is also clear, however, that the United States already faces growing competition from China, particularly in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean as well. In the case of Taiwan, competition has already turned to serious confrontation and the risk of war. Once again, China has vastly increased its capabilities since 1990, as well as its military links to other Asia power. Much depends on the United States’ ability to strengthen its strategic partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and other Asian states — as well as European states with major power projection capabilities like Great Britain and France.
+
+
+### The Uncertainties Driven by the War in Ukraine
+
+At the same time, the United States and its strategic partners face a major challenge from Russia and one that current U.S. national strategy tends to seriously understate. As the graphics show, Russia may not have an economy that can fully support its present conventional forces, but it remains a major threat to the United States’ European strategic partners and NATO, and the Russian military threat must be given equal priority with that from China.
+
+The trends shown in this analysis do not generally go beyond 2021 and cannot reflect the many longer-term changes in the military balance that are growing out of the war in Ukraine. It is clear, however, that the United States and its NATO allies are engaged in major proxy war, supporting Ukraine in its defense against Russia. They also are already rebuilding NATO’s overall level of extended deterrence against Russia, and doing so at a time when Vladimir Putin, Russia’s leader, has made it clear that he sees NATO as a major and continuing threat.
+
+There is no current way to predict how the war in Ukraine will change the overall balance of military power and how and when it will end. It seems almost certain, however, that as long as Putin rules Russia, the United States and the rest of NATO will be engaged in a new Cold War, and one which will effectively match a similar Cold War between the United States and its strategic partners in Asia and China.
+
+
+### A Return to Nuclear Forces
+
+As the final sections of this analysis also show, these two Cold Wars have a major nuclear dimension. The race to build up conventional military power is, in some ways, being outpaced by a new nuclear arms race. This race not only reflects the near collapse of nuclear arms control but a potential return to major tactical, theater, and dual-capable nuclear forces. It also is clear that Russia is now only a superpower to the extent it has inherited a massive legacy of nuclear weapons and technology from the former Soviet Union.
+
+__China’s Rising Economic Power Has Vastly Outstripped Russia and Competes with the U.S. and EU__
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/cM7eSyu.png)
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/RJSkJxT.png)
+
+__But, China Does Not Compete in Per Capita Income and Russia has a Very Low Per Capita Income__
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/qWCH8qO.png)
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/siidfvg.png)
+
+__China Has Become the World’s Dominant Manufacturer While Russia’s Rank Is Critically Low__
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/JDrH11c.png)
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/r2yhOJ2.png)
+
+__China’s Technology Base Has Outstripped Russia and European States and Increasingly Competes with the U.S.__
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/7W8H9TH.png)
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/QXKUiGA.png)
+
+![image09](https://i.imgur.com/1sVgxdr.png)
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/hjoeJS2.png)
+
+![image11](https://i.imgur.com/FU4XtqA.png)
+
+![image12](https://i.imgur.com/tw5Wc54.png)
+
+![image13](https://i.imgur.com/H91yYqZ.png)
+
+![image14](https://i.imgur.com/XsLTVTT.png)
+
+__China and the U.S. are Major Global Traders__
+
+__Russia Is a Third-Rate Trading Power – Falling Well below Major Western European Powers, Japan, and South Korea__
+
+![image15](https://i.imgur.com/b4CYsAO.png)
+
+![image16](https://i.imgur.com/ftO9Eh5.png)
+
+![image17](https://i.imgur.com/k9NioZc.png)
+
+![image18](https://i.imgur.com/W7nCqK5.png)
+
+__Comparative Military Spending is Highly Uncertain, but the U.S. still has a Clear Lead.__
+
+__China has made sustained major rises since 2000.__
+
+__Russia has lagged badly since the early 1990s, but has made significant increases as a result of the Ukraine War.__
+
+![image19](https://i.imgur.com/Bq2fR0b.png)
+
+![image20](https://i.imgur.com/An0jMjG.png)
+
+__Russia Is Still a Major Military Power but Its Reported Military Spending following the break up of the FSU was Far Below the Level Needed to Fully Sustain and Modernize Its Force Structure Through 2020-2021__
+
+![image21](https://i.imgur.com/jbk1RzW.png)
+
+![image22](https://i.imgur.com/2kLEaTS.png)
+
+![image23](https://i.imgur.com/O5Ir3vB.png)
+
+__Some Estimates Do, However, Reflect a Major Rise in Russian Spending Since 2021__
+
+- The previous SIPRI data reflect a major increase from $65.9 billion 2021 to $86.4 billion in 2022, but this is not a serious rise not relative to the increases made by the U.S., China, and major NATO states.
+
+- The IISS report that the draft Russian 2023 budget, submitted to to the State Duma on 30 September 2022, showed that final core spending for 2022 rose from an original proposal of RUB3.50tr (USD50.0bn) to RUB4.68tr (USD66.9bn), with a corresponding rise in total military spending from RUB4.98tr (USD71.1bn) to RUB6.15tr (USD87.9bn).
+
+- Reuters reports that Russia spent 2 trillion rubles ($26 billion) on defence in January and February 2023, a 282% rise over the 525.4 billion rubles in the first two months of 2022, and driven by the conflict in the Ukraine.
+
+- Other estimates emerging from a Google search indicate Russia’s official 2022 military budget could be 4.7 trillion rubles ($75bn), or higher, and reach $84 billion for 2023. This is 40% more than initial military budget announced in 2021. They also estimate that Russia plans to spend a total of $600 billion on military and the police between 2022–2025, or $150 billion a year
+
+__Chinese Military Spending Has Led To a Massive Force Modernization Effort that Continues in 2023__
+
+- Rises in spite of COVID crisis, investment crisis, and other issues.
+
+- Government fiscal revenues down 30-40% in some months of 2022.
+
+- Military spending up more than 7% in 2022.
+
+- Planned to increase by 7.2% in 2023
+
+![image24](https://i.imgur.com/sI2wGub.png)
+
+![image25](https://i.imgur.com/L9hod4F.png)
+
+![image26](https://i.imgur.com/ndKmDit.png)
+
+![image27](https://i.imgur.com/QlP9Hmh.png)
+
+![image28](https://i.imgur.com/G2pN1aX.png)
+
+__Arms Transfers Provide an Important Indicator of Comparative Strategic Influence and Security Assistance__
+
+- The U.S. has cancelled its report on World Military expenditures and arms transfers, and there now is no reliable declassified estimate of the actual market value of arms sales.
+
+- SIPRI does, however, provide an well structure estimate of the total value of major weapons transfers based on estimates of comparable prices.
+
+- These SIPIR estimates indicate the the U.S. retains a massive lead over other providers of arms transfers and had 40% of the world total in 2018-2022.
+
+- Russia had a 16% share.
+
+- The other major arms sellers were largely strategic partners of the U.S.
+
+- China only had a 5.2% share, although it was increasing.
+
+![image29](https://i.imgur.com/MVDP8jj.png)
+
+__Russia Only Remains a True Military Superpower in Nuclear Forces__
+
+![image30](https://i.imgur.com/VglODtS.png)
+
+![image31](https://i.imgur.com/qE0dzrW.png)
+
+__Chinese Nuclear Capability Is Growing Sharply__
+
+- Seems to be more than doubling its stockpile of nuclear weapons. May have risen from around 200 to 350 by 2020. 272 operational for exiting missiles and bombs and 78 for new systems. Possibly grew by 118 warheads during 2020-2021. Estimates for 2023 are 410 weapons.
+
+- Have detected 270+ new missile silos. 119 in Northwestern China seem to be for ICBMs.
+
+- The Chinese Military Power estimates China may have some 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, most deployed on systems capable of ranging the continental United States”
+
+- China has rejected arms control initiatives and provides steadily less transparency.
+
+- It is improving nuclear command and control and battle management systems.
+
+- Deploying advanced solid-fuel mobile ICBMs (DF-21 & DF-31/DF-31A/DF-32AG), MIRV’d liquid fuel ICBM (DF-5B), new MIRV’d DF-41 ICBM, Type 094 SSBN with JL-2 SLBMs.
+
+- Developing low noise 096 SSBNs and a 9,000 kilometer range 096 SLBM.
+
+- Progressively harder to determine what theater and short-range delivery systems may become dual-capable. DF-21 MRBM (2,150 KM) and DF-26 IRBM (4,000 KM) known to be nuclear. DF-21 is precision strike, dual-capable and could deliver low-yield nuclear weapons.
+
+- Modifying H-6 nuclear bombers to H-6N with refueling, missile carrying capability. H-20 stealth bomber in development.
+
+- May be evolving far beyond countervalue second strike capability. Examining use as theater warfare threat?
+
+![image32](https://i.imgur.com/AfXuCYm.png)
+
+![image33](https://i.imgur.com/x6h08cj.png)
+
+![image34](https://i.imgur.com/wbfUgQ3.png)
+
+__China Is Radically Changing Its Global Civil and Military Presence in Areas Once Dominated by the U.S. and Its Partners__
+
+> “The ultimate in disposing one’s troops is to be without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wise lay plans against you. It is according to the shapes that I lay plans for victory, but the multitude does not comprehend this. Although everyone can see the outward aspects, none understands the way in which I have created victory.” (Sun Tzu)
+
+![image35](https://i.imgur.com/jWoPdX9.png)
+
+![image36](https://i.imgur.com/AOY8aAt.png)
+
+![image37](https://i.imgur.com/RoANn9S.png)
+
+![image38](https://i.imgur.com/xVuGY8c.png)
+
+![image39](https://i.imgur.com/Vx7SCfc.png)
+
+![image40](https://i.imgur.com/rxMPLMC.png)
+
+![image41](https://i.imgur.com/OZiTS7l.png)
+
+![image42](https://i.imgur.com/Hc43aMb.png)
+
+__European, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Vulnerability to Energy Chokepoints –Chinese and Asian Dependence Is Most Critical__
+
+![image43](https://i.imgur.com/4jrygnC.png)
+
+![image44](https://i.imgur.com/CArhd7a.png)
+
+![image45](https://i.imgur.com/u2BV39G.png)
+
+![image46](https://i.imgur.com/X8NuvMA.png)
+
+![image47](https://i.imgur.com/aZRRFmq.png)
+
+![image48](https://i.imgur.com/2VsrOw3.png)
+
+![image49](https://i.imgur.com/mhENNsY.png)
+
+![image50](https://i.imgur.com/kUG4J08.png)
+
+---
+
+__Anthony H. Cordesman__ is the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Department of Energy.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-japans-defence-white-paper.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-japans-defence-white-paper.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-15-japans-defence-white-paper.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Japan’s Defence White Paper
+author: Philip Shetler-Jones
+date  : 2023-08-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/YYPoPVe.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Making the Case for Change"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Japan’s latest defence document sets out the arguments for a historic increase in spending to match the shifting global security environment. But the task of convincing the Japanese public is far from complete._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+The white paper entitled “[Defense of Japan 2023](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2023/DOJ2023_Digest_EN.pdf)” had a difficult task, coming less than eight months after the publication of three major and headline-grabbing national security policy documents. Japan’s [National Security Strategy](https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf) (NSS), [National Defense Strategy](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/strategy/pdf/strategy_en.pdf) and [Defense Buildup Program](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/plan/pdf/program_en.pdf), released in December 2022, announced historically significant commitments, including a dramatic increase in defence spending, acquisition of long-range strike weapons, and a pivot in force posture to reinforce the island chain that extends from the main islands down to Taiwan. This made for a hard act to follow.
+
+Yet policymaking is only half the battle, and as Japan begins the implementation process, there are reasons to suspect that this could prove the harder part. Considerable gaps still separate the ambition from the reality. After generations of being educated in an identity as a pacifist nation and relying on the US to shoulder the main burden of Japan’s defence, Japanese society and other government departments have to be convinced of the need to provide the country with the resources to assume primary responsibility for its own defence in an era of – as the white paper diplomatically puts it – “changes to the power balance”.
+
+For one indicator of this gap, we need only follow the money. The December 2022 commitments to increase the defence budget triggered a still unresolved debate on the question of finance. Initially, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida proposed to source the money through higher taxes. This partly reflected concern over Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio, which stands above 250%. Opting for tax rather than borrowing also sends a more convincing signal that the increases are sustainable. If all goes to plan, by 2027 Japan should be on track to have the third biggest defence budget in the world. However, opposition to this approach – including from inside the ruling party – caused Mr Kishida to back off. Among the competing demands on the budget is an expensive programme designed to raise the birth rate, inter alia by doubling child support. But the same demographic trends that are making it harder to hit military recruitment targets are also shrinking the tax base. The government is now reported to be considering selling off some of its stake in Japanese companies – worth over $200 billion – to help raise the money. A law was passed in June to create a defence funding pool made up of such non-tax revenues. Some combination of tax, debt and other resources now appears more likely. However, the one-off nature of non-tax solutions is a disadvantage from a strategic point of view, and Kishida’s retreat reveals how far the government still has to go to convince key constituencies of the urgency and importance of resourcing a stronger and more independently capable defence capacity. Clearly, there is more to be done on the public diplomacy front.
+
+___`The white paper offers a renewed effort of presentation that seems intended to bring home to the Japanese population and others the rationale for the planned build-up in defence capabilities`___
+
+The defence white paper published on 28 July 2023 contains hardly any new information about the threats facing Japan and the capacities it needs to confront them. Rather, it offers a renewed effort of presentation that seems intended to bring home to the Japanese population and others the rationale for the planned build-up in defence capabilities that is necessary to achieve deterrence in the current context. Defence Minister Yasukazu Hamada launches this narrative in the opening line of the white paper’s foreword with a bold historical assertion:
+
+> The world is at a turning point in history. The international community is facing its greatest trial since World War II, and we have entered a new era of crisis.
+
+This suggests a greater trial than the Cold War, which was hardly “cold” at all for the region around Japan. Is Hamada’s rhetoric pure hyperbole, or is he justified in the judgement that the present era’s challenges surpass those of a period that saw an unbroken chain of Asian wars – from the Chinese civil war, the Vietnamese war of liberation and the Malay “emergency” in the 1940s, through the Korean war in the 50s, the Indonesian “confrontation” and renewed Vietnam War in the 60s, to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and the China’s invasion of Vietnam that lasted until the end of the 1970s?
+
+To answer this question, we have to step into the shoes of the officials responsible for Japan’s security. From this perspective, while there was incessant violence in Asia during the Cold War, the threat to Japan itself and to the stability of the basic principles of the world order that allowed for Japan’s return to sovereignty and rise to prosperity may appear more severe now than they did then. Mr Hamada’s foreword continues:
+
+> Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is an unprecedented situation. A permanent member of the United Nations Security Council has shown disregard for international law by launching an aggression against a sovereign country and repeating rhetoric and actions that can be interpreted as threats of nuclear weapons use.
+
+The combination of disregard for law, naked conquest, and nuclear threats by a neighbour of Japan might seem bad enough, but it is only part of Japan’s security problems. A closer neighbour, North Korea, has not only developed nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems (which it flies over Japan and sometimes drops into surrounding waters), but its ability to do so while under sanctions by the UN Security Council justifies doubts about the reliability of that institution itself, as well as the attitude of China to its responsibilities as a permanent member. If Beijing’s inability to acknowledge Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was not enough cause for concern, its military has taken to patrolling the seas and airspace around Japan together with Russian naval and airborne nuclear forces. 
+
+___`The combination of disregard for law, naked conquest, and nuclear threats by neighbouring Russia is only part of Japan’s security problems`___
+ 
+Accordingly, the white paper makes the following evaluations. North Korea’s military activities pose a “grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security”. Russia’s military activities in the Indo-Pacific region, together with its strategic coordination with China, are described as of “strong security concern”. China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities are described as “a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community”, presenting an “unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge”.
+
+This rate of change in the security environment that justifies a shift in Japan’s defence is communicated in a special feature titled “An Era of Upheavals: 10 Years of Change”. This era begins in 2013, the year of Japan’s first NSS, and coincidentally the year Xi Jinping topped his titles of Communist Party General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission by becoming President of China. This section contains numerous upward-tilting graphs detailing the increase in threats; Japanese defence investment; and cooperation with Japan’s ally the US, “like-minded” countries, and others.
+
+Ultimately, Japan’s defence establishment has drawn two main conclusions: that there is a need to defend the country “by ourselves” (by implication not relying as much on the US), and to achieve deterrence that makes the opponent think “attacking Japan will not achieve its goals”. In material and technological terms, Japan has the wherewithal to achieve both objectives. The question is whether Japan’s population – particularly its taxpayers and would-be military recruits – can be convinced that this is a priority.
+
+---
+
+__Philip Shetler-Jones__ is a Senior Research Fellow in the International Security team at RUSI. His current research is concentrated on Indo-Pacific security. His recent publications have focused on the defence policy of Japan, attitudes of China to NATO, and narratives about the defence of Taiwan.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-find-safe-harbors.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-find-safe-harbors.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7c92e695
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-find-safe-harbors.md
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Find Safe Harbors
+author: Steve Davis
+date  : 2023-08-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/GnClZ34.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Finding Safe Harbors for Development Impact: Navigating U.S.-China Stormy Waters for the Global Public Good"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_As intense geostrategic rivalry becomes an enduring feature of the U.S.-China relationship, this essay argues that game-changing opportunities for social impact across health, climate change, and food security are within reach — but will depend on new mechanisms and narratives that enable collaborations between partners in the United States and China to proceed in smart, informed, and geopolitically sensitive ways._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+### A Legacy of Collaboration at Risk
+
+In West Africa, a new breed of rice that can withstand flooding and drought has allowed farmers to triple their productivity, improving local economies and feeding thousands of people. In regions from South America to Scotland, new green technologies are generating an abundance of clean energy. And in Southeast Asia, hundreds of millions of children have been protected from deadly Japanese encephalitis through life-saving vaccines.
+
+Each of these projects is contributing significantly to the collective future of humans and the planet. And all of them hinge on partnerships in health, technology, and business between the United States and its greatest strategic rival: China.
+
+Take the Green Super Rice feeding thousands in West Africa, for example. It leverages 40 years of Chinese research on rice seeds accelerated with the financial muscle of U.S. philanthropy. Meanwhile, China’s ability to develop and produce low-cost vaccines — for safeguarding the health of its own enormous population as well as supporting millions in the Global South — has been bolstered by know-how and support from the West, particularly through global health research collaborations, assistance with regulatory reforms, and the navigation of global qualification and distribution channels.
+
+These examples, but a tiny sample of social impact collaborations underway around the world, remind us that endeavors advancing human health and development often fall beyond the purview of any single country; multinational and multisectoral partnerships are increasingly required. Specifically, they underscore the importance of continued engagement by two of the world’s greatest economic and technological powers, as well as the need to find ways to continue such collaborations in smart, informed, geopolitically sensitive, and mutually beneficial models. Truly game-changing innovations and opportunities with great social impact are within reach; and yet, many will depend on initiating, continuing, or expanding collaborations between partners in the United States and China to augment the global public good.
+
+However, this reality sits alongside stark and uncontestable truths: that the relationship between the United States and China over the past 10 years has worsened to one of its lowest historical ebbs, that policy and national sentiment have negatively reshaped the countries’ perceptions of — and working exchanges with — each other, and that we are in an era of aggressive competition that threatens progress in some of this work. As the trajectory of this new great power competition continues to play out, what will happen to the substantial historical legacy of partnership between these two nations on issues of critical social impact? Will it be possible for would-be collaborators on either side of the Pacific to navigate these rocky waters without being immobilized by political risk, thwarted by sanctions, or hamstrung by the potential for reputational damage?
+
+The stakes are high. Between global climate change, food insecurity, and the very real threat of future pandemics, humanity is facing truly existential challenges. Against that backdrop, it is imperative to examine these opportunities and constraints, then reimagine new mechanisms and narratives — safe harbors — where China and the United States can continue to leverage their collective expertise for the global public good.
+
+This essay explores the reasons such a dialogue is needed, the risks at play, and some options for moving forward. Its aim is not to wish away deeply competitive features of the U.S.-China relationship, but rather to accept that these dynamics will persist and then generate understanding of and support for actively reimagining U.S.-China transnational collaborations in key areas of development. It seeks to advance thinking around ways to identify and pursue opportunities that support U.S. interests for multilateral social impact projects with China.
+
+> It is imperative to examine these opportunities and constraints, then reimagine new mechanisms and narratives — safe harbors — where China and the United States can continue to leverage their collective expertise for the global public good.
+
+It does not take an expert to appreciate that the relationship between China and the United States is among the most complex, fraught, and critical on earth. Nor does this paper suggest that U.S. policies toward China — or vice versa — are misguided. Quite the contrary. Albeit without access to much of the intelligence behind the current stances, this is written with full awareness of the many potential threats that each nation perceives in the other. Acknowledging the realities — and the fact that aggressive competition between these two powers is only likely to increase — this essay proposes that we need a new set of principles and mechanisms to guide continued collaboration among scientists and activists in health, climate, food security, and humanitarian relief. The well-being of the world depends on it.
+
+
+### China’s Journey toward Global Development Impact
+
+Among confrontational policies, rhetoric, and media coverage, it is easy to lose sight of or underappreciate China’s historical and current role in global development. In part, China’s work in countries across much of the Global South, with deep roots in the “South-South” brotherhood of developing economies starting back in the 1950s, is hard to track or understand. China’s historical role in global aid and development has often been opaque — deeply tied to its political interests in specific countries, often delivered as part of infrastructure or other economic packages, and generally done through bilateral (state-to-state) mechanisms or as part of larger investment deals. Without delving into a discourse on China’s philosophy and approach to global development, of which there are many, suffice it to say that China has taken a very different route from the West. Most notably, China has been slow to embrace multilateral initiatives (through large multicountry organizations) or to actively participate in large globally coordinated development or humanitarian initiatives.
+
+And yet, the many strands of China’s international collaboration have knitted together a clear commitment and broad narrative that are increasingly notable in terms of their scale and political importance. A range of bilateral scientific projects in health, agriculture, water and sanitation, and climate greatly expanded in the 1990s through the 2010s.
+
+Looking at global health as an example, U.S.-China collaboration quickly expanded after the two countries’ relations were normalized in 1979, particularly through exchanges and knowledge sharing with experts from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), who worked with partner organizations to lay the health infrastructure groundwork that led to the establishment of China’s own CDC in 2001. With support from U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and coordination from regulatory authorities like the World Health Organization (WHO), China has become an essential linchpin in helping to eradicate polio through vaccine production and monitoring systems. China has also played a major role in combating tuberculosis (TB) and malaria — two of the world’s top infectious killers — by working with the World Bank, the British Department for International Development, Japan, the Netherlands, the WHO, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and other international NGOs to dramatically cut infection rates through improved detection, technology, and treatment. Altogether, China’s work on TB has benefited some 668 million people, prompting the World Bank’s lead economist studying health in East Asia to call it “one of the most successful TB projects ever seen.” China also brought lessons learned in the fight against malaria to Africa. Its research program to find new treatments for malaria led to the discovery of artemisinin, now the basis of the world’s most effective antimalarial drugs. Overall, in the words of Pedro Alonso, director of the WHO Global Malaria Programme, China’s healthcare advancements have had a global “ripple effect.” This success was not solely the result of international aid. China’s spending on research and development in 2017 — at $200 billion — was nearly seven times its investment just a decade earlier, much of it in healthcare.
+
+However, these collaborations have taken on a different tone and approach in the past decade. President Xi Jinping has embarked on an aggressive campaign to build China’s geopolitical influence, especially with the Global South, and has placed global health and development as a critical piece of that work. Such initiatives include a broad set of mechanisms, and approaches include the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for infrastructure development involving 70 countries across South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa; the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a multilateral cooperative making social-improvement loans available to 91 member nations; and, more recently, a Global Development Initiative to aid nations’ continued recovery from the economic devastations of Covid-19. In his 2021 speech at the United Nations General Assembly, Xi explicitly stated that China would use its growing global influence to further the public good in science, food security, and other areas, calling on the world community to join in renewing a shared commitment to balanced, inclusive growth.
+
+To date, the impact of these ambitious-sounding initiatives has been unclear and comparatively modest, depending on whether you are measuring political influence or actual social development impact. Some argue that these have been poorly executed approaches driven by China’s agenda to expand its economic and strategic interests across the world; others see them as glimmers of potential for the possibility of using the enormous resources, manpower, and research capacity of the world’s second-largest economy to focus on critical global issues. For the latter to be realized, China needs to dispel anxiety by clearly demonstrating that these initiatives work for their intended beneficiaries, not just China’s interests. Regardless, they certainly represent notable change in a country long criticized for failing to address global poverty.
+
+
+### China and the United States Working Together
+
+Within this context, many of China’s international collaborations have focused on global social impact by partnering with various U.S. organizations. In some cases, these partnerships have lasted more than a century. The Rockefeller Foundation, for instance, has maintained significant programs in China since 1913, funding — and shaping — the education of generations of doctors at Peking Union Medical College, as well as supporting humanitarian causes during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
+
+Since opening its Beijing office in 2007, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has managed a portfolio of philanthropic grants and initiatives that includes programs to help China improve the quality of its medical products toward normative international standards, as well as contribute efforts to the fight against TB, HIV, and other diseases in China. The Gates Foundation has also provided technical assistance and support to Chinese efforts directed at low resource needs elsewhere in the world, including safe Chinese vaccines, innovations in agriculture and sanitation, and improved scientific research opportunities between Chinese and global scientists. In conjunction with the Beijing Municipal Government, the foundation launched and co-funded the Global Health Drug Discovery Institute (GHDDI), based at Tsinghua University, to help orient and leverage research and innovation toward critical diseases across the globe for which cures and treatments are needed.
+
+But the Gates Foundation is actually a latecomer. The Asia Foundation has been active in China since the late 1970s. The World Wildlife Fund has been working to promote conservation efforts in China — from forest management to wetlands conservation and species protection — since 1980. Johns Hopkins University and Nanjing University opened the Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies in 1986. The Ford Foundation began working on U.S.-China issues in the 1960s through funding China studies centers in the United States, before establishing a Beijing office in 1988. Greenpeace has been working there since 1997. And the list goes on.
+
+On the U.S. side, this long association attests to the fact that for decades, the United States valued international exchanges as a form of “soft diplomacy.” The first Fulbright agreement signed by the United States was with China in 1947. And even during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, U.S.-funded exchange programs supported some 20,000 international students for study in the United States each year. An increasingly large proportion of them have come from China. By 2019, 370,000 students from China were enrolled in U.S. schools, accounting for about 34 percent of foreign students in the United States. Most Chinese students in the United States have indicated a strong desire to stay in the United States, which underscores the importance of the programs but increasingly raises concerns in both Beijing and Washington.
+
+China welcomed these partnerships as well for many years — in part as a recipient of aid as a developing country with health and development programs focused on China, and in part as a component of its expanding global footprint across Africa and other regions of the globe, where it also has a strategic interest in “soft power” politics. The technical assistance provided to Chinese government agencies, academic institutions, and even companies through these programs significantly elevated China’s know-how and engagement on critical social issues, and even today it continues to be welcomed by Chinese and U.S. authorities on specific issues such as HIV/AIDS prevention and cancer research.
+
+
+### Changing Geopolitical Winds
+
+Many international observers hoped that mounting tensions between China and the United States would be a passing phase, provoked by Donald Trump’s anti-China rhetoric and vanishing with his exit from office. Others suggested that as Xi Jinping consolidated power with a third term as leader of the Chinese Communist Party, his antipathy toward the United States might ease. But the divide has only become more entrenched, with the Biden administration solidifying a framing of China as the primary U.S. strategic competitor with numerous policies, sanctions, and commitments, and the Xi administration expanding its anti-U.S. policies and rhetoric. With schisms playing out militarily, technologically, economically, and ideologically, more observers are speaking in cold war terms — and expressing concerns about the potential for some event, such as a confrontation over Taiwan, to trigger a “hot war.”
+
+Much has been written by foreign policy experts about the nature and origins of this divide. This essay does not reiterate that analysis but hopes to advance a discussion of global good collaboration with full acknowledgement of the challenging landscape. Within a context of mutual distrust, the international community will need to develop new narratives and mechanisms through which academics and advocates can continue to make progress on urgent humanitarian needs. And it must undertake this quest while still struggling with the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war, which have added thorny new layers.
+
+At one time, health-related collaborations were viewed as politically acceptable, a safe harbor shielded from politics. But the panic and confusion around Covid-19 upended that tradition. First, questions about the origins of the virus itself — and whether it came from a lab in Wuhan — did significant damage to whatever trust existed between China and the West around common health concerns. The resulting accusations, misinformation, and counter-misinformation have created considerable tension. That fracture was compounded by questions about the WHO and whether it had helped China to cover its tracks during the first weeks of the pandemic. Later, new global tensions arose amid poor alignment between China and the West on confronting the pandemic. It has become increasingly difficult to understand how scientists and policymakers can rebuild trust in preparing for or responding to a future epidemic, although it is a hopeful sign that both countries contributed to the emerging Pandemic Fund established by the World Bank.
+
+> At one time, health-related collaborations were viewed as politically acceptable, a safe harbor shielded from politics. But the panic and confusion around Covid-19 upended that tradition.
+
+China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and indeed its amplification of Russian propaganda about the invasion, has further strained U.S.-China relations. Even though China has refused to supply lethal assistance to Russia, it has significantly increased its economic links with its northern neighbor. In short, this inhospitable environment for strengthening or expanding critical collaborations has forced many partners to play defense in order to sustain any momentum.
+
+
+### A Chilling Impact on Global Collaboration
+
+In the context of this challenging political environment and this era of great power competition, collaboration on social issues like health, climate, and agriculture has been disrupted or slowed down, and the future of this important work is becoming increasingly hazy. Data and anecdotes abound, from the dramatic drop of exchange programs mentioned above, to the fear of sanctions impacting scientific research, to Chinese interference with foreign companies’ activities, to the U.S. government’s approach to scientists and scholars of Chinese origins, and beyond. Over the past 10 years, several foreign NGOs operating in China have withdrawn or reduced services voluntarily or involuntarily, including Mercy Corps, Habitat for Humanity, and the Li Ka Shing Foundation. While difficult to ascertain, the amount of foreign philanthropy donated to China has also decreased, and the number of life science research collaborations have been curtailed, due more to geopolitical tensions than the Covid-19 pandemic.
+
+These issues are more than rhetorical; they directly impact the operations of organizations working to collaborate. Under China’s new Foreign NGO Law, all social sector activities are now subject to increased oversight by the Public Security Bureau. Partnerships with China also must operate within a new environment in the United States: bipartisan support of anti-China policies and increased scrutiny about its activities by government agencies and political leaders. Rigorous vigilance and full transparency are always wise when working on such issues, but this new climate creates a tangle of new bureaucracies and concerns.
+
+Far more challenging is the potential chilling effect of these government policies on mid-level bureaucrats. This is true on both sides of the Pacific. With officials disinclined to pursue any opportunity that might suggest political endorsement, social impact activists confront a distinct paralysis — a hesitance to go after even the lowest-hanging fruit. During the Covid-19 pandemic, many global offers to China for support or interventions from foreign parties, for example non-Chinese mRNA vaccines, were not even considered by many Chinese officials given the political sensitivities.
+
+This chilling effect has also impacted scientific collaborations. Jenny J. Lee, a professor at the Center for the Study of Higher Education at the University of Arizona, surveyed scientists, professors, and graduate students at 83 U.S. universities to determine how U.S.-China political policies were affecting research. More than 42 percent of Chinese scientists said they felt they were being racially profiled, even surveilled, by the U.S. government. Nearly 20 percent said that over the past three years they had prematurely or unexpectedly ended or suspended collaborations with colleagues in China. “This is actually undermining the U.S.’s ability to be globally competitive,” Lee observed. “Scientists are less likely to collaborate with China, less likely to host Chinese scientists, less inclined to apply for federal funding, which means smaller projects.”
+
+Like in every country, there are always challenging “red zones” around social impact work; in China, these include any effort to advance democracy or human rights, as well as any focus on Tibet, Xinjiang, or Taiwan. The strain around those engagements has flowed into other areas — such as data sharing or the use of technologies that raise concerns about misuse or national security concerns. Any such collaborations with commercial players must carefully consider the implications of a growing list of entities for which sanctions might apply.
+
+If this decoupling continues, and neither Chinese nor U.S. authorities and non-state actors provide clearer opportunities for collaboration, the chances of tackling major global challenges will be diminished. Partnerships between organizations from both the United States and China remain essential as they study, prepare for, and respond to issues on a global scale.
+
+
+### Opportunities for Safe Harbors Ahead
+
+The good news in this dire scenario is that both governments recognize these risks. High-level officials on both sides of the Pacific have made clear public statements about the potential for further collaboration advancing the global good. In the fall of 2021, both countries surprised the world by issuing a joint statement at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) in Glasgow. “In the area of climate change, there is more agreement between China and the U.S. than divergence, making it an area with huge potential for our cooperation,” said Xie Zhenhua, China’s chief negotiator on climate. John Kerry, the U.S. special presidential envoy for climate, echoed the same: “The United States and China have no shortage of differences, but on climate, cooperation is the only way to get this job done.”
+
+More recently, the June 2023 meeting between President Xi and Secretary Blinken in Beijing reportedly focused on broader areas for cooperation. According to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “President Xi pointed out that the two sides need to remain committed to the common understandings he and President Biden had reached in Bali, and translate the positive statements into actions so as to stabilize and improve China-U.S. relations.” Blinken reiterated that both sides “agree on the need to stabilize our relationship” and that China and the United States should focus on areas of common interests. As Singapore foreign minister Vivian Balakrishnan commented when meeting Blinken ahead of his trip to Beijing, “There are many global, planetary issues — climate, pandemics, even cyber security — which require the United States and China to work off the same page and be key pillars for a global system which will help increase resilience to threats to welfare, health and prosperity for people all over the world.”
+
+The less-good news is that these statements have been vague, sometimes contradictory, and generally unsupported by details about the policies, mechanisms, timeline, or authority under which any such partnerships might advance.
+
+That is why the discussion is so urgent: the situation calls for nongovernment actors — perhaps a consortium of foundations, NGOs, or research institutions — to fill in the gaps and delineate safe harbors for collaboration in the waters ahead.
+
+There are several hopeful strands of government-approved policies and civil society engagements to build upon. Beyond the climate engagements, there have been several track 1.5 or 2.0 dialogues between key Chinese and U.S. actors regarding global health and other issues. Policies that would have had enormous unintended consequences on global health and food security, such as proposed legislative language to prohibit China-sourced elements in any vaccines as part of the U.S. commitment to fund Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, have been avoided. In addition, new broad-based commitments on both sides of the Pacific, like the Biden administration’s “Invest, Align, Compete” policy and Beijing’s new Global Development Initiative, might offer political frameworks in which potential collaborations could be advanced, though there is much uncertainty about both models. There have been additional commitments by both the United States and China to multilateral mechanisms such as the UN World Food Programme and the new Pandemic Preparation Financial Intermediary Fund of the World Bank, which offer some ideas for further alignment and engagement.
+
+> That is why the discussion is so urgent: the situation calls for nongovernment actors — perhaps a consortium of foundations, NGOs, or research institutions — to fill in the gaps and delineate safe harbors for collaboration in the waters ahead.
+
+While these are promising islands of hope in the increasingly turbulent sea of issues, more directed and focused efforts are needed. This could be structured joint initiatives that are clear in their global social goals (and not related to national security) and detached from politics at home, along the lines of the Global Health Drug Discovery Institute referenced above; agreements for exchange of data and information that are shaped and managed in a way that both countries might accept, for instance on pandemic early-warning systems; or more philanthropic-led joint initiatives to collaborate in the case of third-country humanitarian responses, such as the cooperation during the West Africa Ebola epidemic. But given the new moment and particular conditions of the current great power competition, the parties at hand also need to both study how this has been done in the past and reimagine better ways for the future.
+
+
+### Global Precedents
+
+In light of these discussions, seizing the opportunity to create safe harbors for continued collaboration feels urgent. And we can look to history as a guide. Effective social impact partnerships, even during intense confrontation, are not unprecedented. In fact, examples abound. China and the United States can take inspiration from mechanisms such as the water-sharing agreement between India and Pakistan that has endured since 1960, despite the two countries’ strained political relationship; the “humanitarian pauses” that evacuated civilians from conflict zones like Israel/Palestine and Syria; or vaccination campaigns and other public health risk-mitigation work undertaken during refugee crises.
+
+Perhaps the most relevant example is the highly successful “science diplomacy” campaign between the Soviet Union and the United States that eradicated smallpox during the height of the Cold War, when U.S. virologist Albert Sabin worked with two Soviet virologists to produce an oral polio vaccine — even as all three were being watched by a suspected KGB agent at Sabin’s lab in Cincinnati.
+
+After the vaccine was tested, deemed safe by the WHO, and licensed for production, Soviet scientists developed the technology for producing hundreds of millions of doses. Together, this health-focused collaboration between two political rivals eradicated smallpox in two decades.
+
+
+### What Now?
+
+Admittedly, most observers believe prospects for accelerating development impact work with China over the next decade look grim. But social impact activists are realists, driven by optimism. To build collaboration, there are two needs upon which to focus: a more nuanced narrative regarding U.S.-China relations and a reimagined, clearer set of mechanisms for creating safe harbors for collaborative endeavors.
+
+#### Narrative
+
+Shaping a new narrative in the midst of hardline government policies is difficult. But it is critical to emphasize an effort mission-driven by social impact concerns, rather than politics. At a minimum, a new framing can outline the ways in which non-state actors (such as NGOs, philanthropies, and businesses) are uniquely well positioned to continue shaping collaborative programs in areas of mutual self-interest, all without violating their respective governments’ policies or approaches. Most importantly, the narrative must make plain that these relationships are not part of a zero-sum game, where one side wins and the other loses. Rather, in thinking about climate change mitigation, global public health, food security, and development financing, it is more effective — and realistic — to advance an “all boats rising” perspective. Mutual self-interest in Washington and Beijing can drive progress in all of these areas.
+
+#### Mechanisms
+
+Any meaningful discussion also would need to explore the actual mechanisms through which collaborations could flourish. What those are and how they should work is beyond the scope of this essay. But the examples provided may offer inspiration for new efforts to pick up the baton and stride forward.
+
+Finding opportunities for engagement might start, for example, with “surgical strikes” on climate and health — targeted partnerships on key issues. Would such discrete efforts be sustainable? In an environment of conflict, would innovators, activists, and officials have the “cover” they need to devise creative solutions to the world’s shared problems? One model for action might involve a coalition of like-minded think tanks and philanthropies, acting in alignment with both governments while operating independently.
+
+The private sector may offer hints too. For example, a major boost to the World Wildlife Fund’s work on conservation in China came from Apple, the electronics company, which partnered with the wildlife group in 2015 to work with Chinese forestry companies on ways to reduce logging impacts, mitigate fire risk and chemical use, and increase worker safety. China — the world’s largest consumer and producer of paper products — has since protected 1 million acres of forestland in accordance with standards set by the international Forest Steward Council.
+
+That said, the consequences of getting this wrong are not trivial. While it is not hard to imagine a group of Western non-state actors operating in the sort of model sketched above, nothing in China is so neatly separated from government oversight. This reality would naturally raise concerns that the independence of one side could be weaponized by the other.
+
+Further, would China be acting as China alone, or as a representative of the developing world? In an era of democratic decline, could collaboration with China end up aiding authoritarian regimes around the globe? For example, if Washington supported making qualified, lower-priced, China-sourced drugs widespread for fighting disease in sub-Saharan Africa, might it risk subsidizing an emerging marketplace that would advantage China economically, against the United States?
+
+
+### The Way Forward
+
+Forty years witnessing the impact of human-to-human work on areas of mutual concern across borders and boundaries reinforces the conviction that it is possible to build partnerships that run complementary to government policy, even in authoritarian states. Yes, the questions outlined in this essay are complex. But the problems confronting our planet demand that the United States fight its way through them with China as a partner — if only in this limited context. The first step forward lies in refining the narrative that frames this work. Brookings and CSIS have already begun that important conversation, jointly launching the Advancing Collaboration in an Era of Strategic Competition project earlier this year. The purpose of this essay is to deepen it — and to turn up the volume.
+
+Ventures like this will always attract naysayers, who attribute any positive response from China as stemming entirely from national self-interest. But experience while running the global health nonprofit PATH offers another interpretation. At the time, China had a vaccine for Japanese encephalitis that had protected millions of Chinese children, while other global sources were too expensive for the markets in Southeast Asia where the disease was rampant. When PATH approached the Chinese manufacturer, the Chengdu Institute of Biological Products (CDIBP), about making its vaccine available outside the country’s borders, cost-benefit analyses and political chess were trumped by defining a common goal that would greatly benefit many children, which could not be done without working together. Over 300 million children have been protected from a terrible disease through this collaboration. “When it became evident that this vaccine could change the world,” one leader on the project later recalled, “[CDIBP] said, ‘What do we need to do?’”
+
+---
+
+__Steve Davis__ currently serves as a Stanford Graduate School of Business lecturer and global health faculty fellow and as a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He most recently served as executive strategic advisor and interim director, China Country Office, for the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and is the former president and CEO of PATH, a leading global health innovation organization.

From 8f236d64f3222b7969bff23e7124ce21c9149b0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 10 Sep 2023 01:22:33 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 13/19] 0x20 Add _columns posts, Sep.10

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+---
+layout: post
+title : "國家的權力"
+author: "arandomguy"
+date  : 2023-08-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Vb6441y.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "個人閱讀心得記錄，有很多個人想法。"
+---
+
+### 國家如何行使權力？
+
+#### 1、好的指揮可能採取惡的手段
+
+在國家受到威脅時，所有確保國家穩定的手段都可能被視為合法。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+> 為了維護權力，要懂得如何操弄輿論
+
+> #### 尼可拉‧馬基維利《君王論》
+
+> 「當切薩雷‧波吉亞（後為瓦倫提諾公爵）佔領羅馬尼納，他發現過去統治這個地方的領主，既沒有權威也沒有能力。這些領主與其說是統治臣民，不如說是在剝削他們，此地因此一片混亂又不團結，甚至嚴重到讓盜匪、無賴與各種罪犯四處橫行。為了重新恢復和平，並讓臣民服從王權，切薩雷認為應該在此建立一個好的政府。因此他挑選了冷酷、辦事俐落的雷米‧德爾柯，授予全權管理。不久之後，雷米敉平了一切混亂，人們只要聽到他的名字，便聞風色變。但此後，公爵認為這過於極端的權威不再必要，同時害怕終將招致憎恨，便在這個省區之中設立了民事法庭，任命一位知名的庭長，每個城市的抱怨與不滿都可以到那裡申訴。公爵很清楚，代理人的嚴格做風已經引發敵意，為了宣洩人民心中的怨恨並爭取民心，必須讓他們清楚過去的殘酷行徑並不是他下的命令，而是來自他臣下的粗暴性格。隨後，他抓緊時機，某天早晨，將雷米的身軀砍成兩半，暴露在切塞納的廣場上，旁邊留下一塊木頭與一把血淋淋的刀子。」
+
+Q：「目的證成手段」這句話為什麼是《君王論》的精神？
+
+上述文本提到瓦倫提諾公爵的主要目的是想要重新恢復和平，為了將整治罪惡氾濫的地方，認命了雷米，並採用非常手段。有達成目的，但也引發人民敵意。最後為了撫平民心處決雷米。
+
+#### 我的想法
+
+非常時刻採用非常手段這點讓我想到菲律賓總統杜特蒂，當然杜特蒂的掃黑、掃毒行動有極大的爭議，但某方面來說，這就是非常時刻採用非常手段吧？
+
+《君王論》中的瓦倫提諾公爵是叫雷米去執行，讓那些權益受損人們的怨氣集中在雷米身上，瓦倫提諾公爵最後處決雷米，不只解決治安問題，還撫平民心。而杜特蒂沒有找一個人來幫他執行那些事，所以所有不管好的壞的，杜特蒂都要承擔。
+
+當然某方面來說杜特蒂算敢做敢當、負責任，瓦倫提諾公爵躲在後面利用他人…。
+
+恩…怎麼樣才是「正確」的做法呢？
+
+#### 2、國家使人相信國家會追求公共利益
+
+即使人民以為有人代表自己，卻還是會受到「公共利益」這個詞所欺騙。
+
+> 國家利用集體信仰
+
+> #### 卡爾‧馬克思《德意志意識形態》
+
+> 「說真的，這個共同利益不僅是以「普遍概念」存在於想像之中，而且首先存在於人際分工相互依賴的現實當中。…民主體制、貴族政治與君主政體之間的相互鬥爭以及爭取選舉權等等，不過是一些虛幻的形式（所謂的「普遍」，一直是共同體的虛幻形式），各接疾病在這些形式之下進行鬥爭。…此外，每一個力求統治權的階級——即使這個統治條件需要消滅整個舊社會的型態與統治，如無產階級式的——首先必須取得政權，才能重新將自己的利益變成普遍的利益。…再說，無論[共同利益]是真實還是虛幻，特殊利益不斷反對共同利益的這些實際鬥爭，都有必要加以實際介入，並用具有國家型態的虛假「普遍」利益去調節。」
+
+普遍利益：著重於普遍性、整體性和公共性，尋求符合社會全體成員的需求和價值觀。
+
+共同利益：強調社會成員共同分享的利益，是整個社會或共同體的成員所追求的利益。
+
+特殊利益：個人、特定群體或階級的獨特利益，與整個社會或共同體的利益不同。
+
+普遍利益和共同利益某方面可以解釋為個人主義和社會主義，沒辦法相提並論，但我覺得從這個角度會比較好理解。
+
+Q：在沒有階級的社會中，在沒有統治階級也沒有國家的情況下，能維繫一定的秩序嗎？
+
+沒有階級表示平等的資源、經濟、權力分配，並且社會共享相同或相似的價值觀。
+
+假設成功建立「沒有階級的社會」，這表示上面條件都有達成，那人們還需要犯罪嗎？犯罪…好像就不會存在了..？也因為擁有相同價值觀，這是否也表示爭吵不會存在了呢..？
+
+#### 我的想法
+
+這邊主要再說國家是保障人民的公共利益，但並不是每一個人都是這麼想，或每個人的意圖不一樣，所以特殊利益會存在，然後可能會利用公共利益為幌子，實際是在追求特殊利益或個人利益。
+
+所以會需要有監督的制度。
+
+#### 3、國家使用暴力的權利
+
+書中最後提到，法治國家的特性是具備理性的法律，但即使如此還是有其他面向，而過於強調理性可能會造成官僚化。
+
+> 現代國家使用理性權威
+
+> #### 韋伯《學術與政治》
+
+> 「必須將現代國家視為在一定疆域範圍內的人類共同體——疆域概念是特色之一——並在這疆域範圍內成功壟斷正當行使暴力的權利。實際上，我們這時代的特性是，除非國家容許，沒有團體或個體有權訴諸暴力：國家成為暴力「權利」唯一的來源。因此，我們將把政治理解為在國家之間或一個國家之中的各個團體分享參與政治或影響政治分配所做的所有努力。…原則上，…有三種內在理由證成統治的合理性，也因此產生三種正當性基礎。首先是「永恆過往」的權威，也就是透過永恆不朽與深植人心的習慣而使人尊敬的神聖化傳統。這是從前族長或封建主所建立的「傳統權力」支配。第二種權威是建立在個人光環與個人功績上。這種人由於神奇的特質、英雄事蹟或其他足以表率的特質，而成為領袖。…最後是建立在「法治」上的權威，基於信任某種法律地位有效性，根據理性規則所建立的積極能力。換句話說，這是奠定在遵守某身分應履行的法律義務上。這就是現代「國家公僕」以及在這類關係中取得權力的人所執行的權力。」
+
+Q：請舉出符合韋伯每個權威類型定義的國家。
+
+永恆過往：古代中國君主制。
+
+個人光環：尼爾遜·曼德拉。
+
+法治：德國。
+
+#### 我的想法
+
+一開始提到「疆域」也就是國家領土界定範圍，在這範圍內的人受到法律約束，無法向他人使用暴力，除非國家允許。唯一合法使用暴力的是國家。然後提到國家內的各個組織、政黨等互相影響。但這邊我不太確定是在單純講政治關係，還是政黨或組織間的關係，影響、約束、監督國家使用暴力的合理性。最後就是三個權威，永恆過往、個人光環和法治三者。
+
+
+### 「國家如何行使權力？」總結
+
+這邊提出三點。
+
+第一個是國家在非常時刻使用非常方法，這方法能確實達成目標，但會造成民怨。《君王論》中的瓦倫提諾公爵解是找一個人當黑臉，公爵收成所有成功；第二個是當國家要做有關「公共利益」的事的時候。要分清楚究竟是真的在做，還是只是單純的操控意識形態，或根本就是用公共利益的外皮來追求特殊利益；第三個，唯一合法使用暴力的是國家，但就算是法治國家還是存在其他因素，很有可能會讓國家官僚化而成為極權國家。
+
+官僚化是指權力過於集中、過程過於繁瑣、管理層次過於複雜等。
+
+恩..大概這樣吧。
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-08-12-chaos-to-govern-hong-kong.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-12-chaos-to-govern-hong-kong.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2df007a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-12-chaos-to-govern-hong-kong.md
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "亂治香港"
+author: "feng"
+date  : 2023-08-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/hTBOsyq.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "中央大佬搖撼社會的軟與硬"
+---
+
+哈囉！中央大佬們！你們難道不知道吧，早在1967年的暴動後，港英政府可是拿出一套絕活應對亂局，把社會撈回來了！不止打壓極左分子，還搞了一連串的人事更新，讓香港的發展水平一飛沖天，階級差距縮小，還細心打磨了獨特的香港風格。還還不止，公共服務擴張、市民生活升華，這可是一套絕世好招！
+
+<!--more-->
+
+### 到處皆是軟對抗
+
+現在呢？香港的那些政客可真有意思，開始唱衰了！他們明明是站在人前喊著，卻私下擔心《國安法》的範圍會像膨風球一樣不斷膨脹，從硬對抗擴散到處處都是軟對抗，結果整個城市緊繃得跟箭在弦上，社會凝聚力哪去了？香港復甦的腳步不就被塞住了嗎！
+
+這可是個麻煩問題，就像撈魚一樣不容易！政府得小心翼翼，像對待心上人一樣，尊重市民意見，然後得實實在在地行動，好好把經濟和社會環境重整一番。誰知道，也許這亂世中的香港，還真能慢慢由亂入治，未來會更亮麗！慢慢等吧！
+
+
+### 國安擔憂依然如故
+
+不過，中央大佬就是喜歡唱那套調，整天強調亂的根源還在，好像街頭暴力隨時會復活似的，這香港還真沒有安寧的時候？特區大佬們還特別說，有些人的軟對抗言論只會搞得社會四分五裂，這是不是在暗示他們對國安的擔憂依然如故？疫情過後，香港經濟更是跌跌撞撞，GDP還不如疫情前，甚至還有季度掉頭向下，經濟發展是緊張還是放鬆，這問題可真難解。
+
+更難搞的是，國家安全行動越來越膽大包天，高調無比，現在居然連軟對抗都要搞死它，好像連大街小巷都藏著什麼危險。這是不是在說，社會還是不太平，中央對統治權還是不太甘心？自從《國安法》出台，這個瘋狂的香港，香港人是不是又得開始選擇走人，外國投資家是不是得瞄準別的地方？這騷亂的時刻，香港彷彿被一層厚重的迷霧籠罩。政治風暴如洪水猛獸，未來前途似曇花一現。
+
+<!--END-->
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-08-20-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk27.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-20-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk27.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e4dabd61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-20-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk27.md
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第廿七周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date  : 2023-08-20 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/8eQ6Epd.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 選舉經理憂遭攻擊促柯耀林簽「墨落」、李予信6.12被捕後始獲黨支持出選
+
+<!--more-->
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第廿七周，參選新東的柯耀林選舉經理陳展浚作供完畢，新東案情完結，參選超區的李予信開始作供。
+
+其中陳展浚指柯耀林僅曾出席首次新東協調會議但提早離場、無收過任何協調文件，而柯曾憂簽「墨落」遭DQ，惟團隊望與競爭對手「鬥快」、憂不簽會被標籤攻擊而促柯簽署，陳亦認為聲明無強制須否決預算案。
+
+陳又指柯無向他表達過會否決預算案，亦曾要求選舉宣傳內容不提「光時」、港獨和「攬炒」。不過法官庭上屢表示，陳引述柯的說法屬傳聞證供。
+
+李予信則指公民黨3月記者會的訊息「混合」、並非全部否決所有撥款，而他當時無想過參選，事前亦僅獲告知是呼籲選民登記。而李曾拒絕排鄭達鴻第二參選港島，其後再改選超區，但因勝算和財政問題被黨拒絕，直至6.12一周年被捕後黨才重新考慮支持他，他於6月19日始宣布參選。
+
+李又指曾向譚文豪表示，他所倡政策與黨否決所有撥款和議案的立場有出入，但理解譚回覆言下之意是「有彈性」、他成功出線再算。而李亦無參與黨就「墨落無悔」的討論、指「墨落」與他無關，因他當時並非潛在候選人。
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/2KjoOqM.png)
+
+
+### 選舉經理稱柯耀林缺席第二次協調會議、無收過任何協調文件
+
+參選新東的前西貢區議員柯耀林，本周選擇不作供，但傳召其助理及選舉經理陳展浚作供。陳表示2012年於民主黨實習時認識柯，二人分別於2016和2018年退出民主黨，其中柯與林卓廷爭拗後帶領59人退黨，陳全程參與和規劃。柯案發時為將軍澳民生關注組主席和區政聯盟召集人，陳則為關注組召集人和聯盟執委，陳指聯盟會章列明「在一國兩制大原則下」爭取民主，但組織鬆散，成員團體互不代表和從屬，成立只望為選舉共享資源、有共同組織名義。
+
+那柯耀林是如何參與初選？陳指他們本來計劃必然參與立法會選舉，並獲前民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟詢問是否有意參加初選。陳指正式選舉需約150至200萬元，參加初選可知道支持度，若支持度低可省錢不參與正選。陳亦指柯工作繁忙，平時透過他更新政治發展，但他無讀過戴耀廷「攬炒」文章，亦指柯無讀戴文章的習慣和興趣。
+
+就兩次新東協調會議，陳稱柯有出席首次會議，但因中段與會者出現爭拗，認為浪費時間而提早離場與陳吃晚飯，柯稱會上提到初選目的包括爭取五大訴求，並達成辦投票、「贏咗有得選，輸咗冇得選」及目標議席「6+1」三項共識。不過法官指相關內容屬傳聞證供。
+
+至於第二次會議，柯因區議會開會而缺席，亦因「無人手」而無派代表出席；陳亦無收過任何協調文件，但無向組織者查詢會上內容，因認為區政聯盟很大機會派人出選，組織者有責任就重要事項主動通知。法官質疑是將責任全推給他人，陳指若有不足是事實，因組織的確頗鬆散。陳亦指柯曾出席超區協調會，但看到知名度高的岑敖暉後不再考慮選超區。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/5grxwyY.png)
+▲ 陳展浚
+
+
+### 選舉經理憂不簽「墨落」遭攻擊遂促柯簽署、指柯無表示否決財案兼反「攬炒」
+
+就柯耀林有簽署的「墨落無悔」聲明，辯方呈上區政聯盟選舉群組對話紀錄，顯示柯曾表示「呢份嘢可能成為DQ理據」，「呢份嘢講到明會否決財政預算案，戴教授而家都唔講啦」，而陳則回覆「應要考慮 內容係啱 呢個係保守與進步的分界線」。
+
+陳解釋，認為聲明內容可接受，指當時「五大訴求」是民主派最基本的基礎，而否決財案的確是《基本法》賦予權力，聲明無強制何時何地或是否須否決，只提到該權力為其中一個選項，他亦認為並非新東協調共識。至於支持度不足須停止選舉工程，陳認為是共識也是初選最重要基礎。陳亦認為只要進步過民主黨就屬「進步」，解釋區政聯盟成員從民主黨退黨，路線需有些區別；亦指票源與范國威重疊，望與對方「鬥快」簽署。
+
+柯最終決定簽署，陳解釋因當時柯的潛在對手工黨郭永健及人民力量等均已簽署，「佢都跟咗，我哋需要跟」，亦擔心發起人或隨時截止，再標籤或攻擊其他無簽署者，故致電柯促他決定並談及自己對聲明的理解，最終為柯發布帖文。陳指柯簽署時「連鄒家成係邊個都唔識」，亦無與「抗爭派」聯繫的想法，而柯不曾向他表達會否決預算案，但不移除聲明是怕被攻擊為「退縮」。陳又指《國安法》後曾審視文宣內容並更小心用字，但無再審視「墨落」和移除帖文，因認為不會追究7月1日前的事。
+
+就選舉宣傳內容，陳指柯自2019年區選便命令團隊不可提「光復香港 時代革命」和支持港獨，初選期間亦不容許出現「攬炒」，指他們團隊均認為如癱瘓政府運作，「香港會何去何從呢？癱瘓咗又點樣呢？」陳又指柯與參選衞生服務界的劉凱文聯合宣傳，便是「較婉轉」地表達柯反對「攬炒」。
+
+就宣傳片段提到「極權」，陳指是過分使用武力的警方及容許其過分使用武力的政府；至於望議會多一個「行動派」，是指勤力盡責、不止坐在冷氣房而是身體力行落區調停警民衝突的議員。至於柯初選論壇稱會兌現初選簽署的「協議書」，陳稱是指初選提名表格，柯認知的協議就是「贏咗有得選，輸咗冇得選」。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/Rn7qjna.png)
+▲ 柯耀林
+
+
+### 李予信稱公民黨記者會就否決撥款訊息「混合」、事前僅獲悉是呼籲選民登記
+
+柯耀林案情完結後，新東案情亦告結束，只餘兩名不認罪被告。參選超區的前公民黨東區區議員李予信作供，表示就讀中大社工系時於公關公司兼職，2016年因負責公民黨立法會選舉港島競選工作而接觸陳淑莊和鄭達鴻。李2018年底臨畢業時，鄭達鴻致電李稱公民黨正就2019年區選作準備，認為北角錦屏區值得新人嘗試，並邀李出席有陳淑莊和賴仁彪等的飯局商討。李同意競逐錦屏區，稱望為基層爭取資源和為舊區規劃作貢獻。
+
+李於2018年底加入公民黨成為支部黨員，指屬最基本成員身分，權力很多限制，如不能出席會員大會投票、不能參選執委，且需一年後才能申請成為普通黨員。李亦成為地區發展主任和陳淑莊兼職議員助理，後於區選勝出，並為被抗疫基金遺忘的業界爭取援助。
+
+就控方指控李予信出席3月25日公民黨記者會，時任黨魁楊岳橋會上稱若政府不回應五大訴求，公民黨將否決每個法案、撥款和預算案。李指前一日獲公民黨秘書處通知出席，對方指是呼籲選民登記的記招，李認為「好理所當然要幫手」，他事前不知會上詳細內容、不知被揀選出席的原因，在會上亦沒有發言，且當時從來無想過也無表達過參與該屆立法會選舉。
+
+李並形容，會上一方面楊岳橋等提到反對所有法案、議案和撥款，但另一方面郭家麒稱若預算案合理、得到市民支持，無論民主派獲35或40席都會支持。李形容記者會訊息「混合」，一致的訊息只是要政府聆聽民意和推廣選民登記。
+
+李於記者會後獲秘書處職員邀請，首次出席「立法會選舉心戰室核心小組」會議，理解是關於記者會後的檢討和跟進工作，及選舉籌備和論述思考的討論；並理解他作為區議員，因可幫忙做選民登記及做「樁腳」而被邀，但無人詳細解釋過原因。李指當時認為會議「同我距離有啲遠」，因他只是上任3個月的區議員，又指當時有如「新入公司嘅員工，入咗一間高層嘅房」，房內有立法會議員「講緊啲立法會層次上嘅大事」，而他只曾就被遺忘的業界發言一次。李事後也有出席過該小組的會議。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/Wpqc2g6.png)
+▲ 2020年3月25日 公民黨記者會（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 李稱曾向譚文豪指與黨否決撥款立場或有出入、譚言下之意有彈性
+
+那李予信作為剛入黨一年半的新任區議員，最終如何代表公民黨參選超區？李表示4月至5月中，鄭達鴻曾問他於港島立選名單「排佢第二好唔好」，二人曾探討該可能性，惟李認為自己剛上任，忙於處理地區和疫情支援工作，如還要頻密落區派傳單，難以發揮其工作理念關注的議題，終在5月中拒絕鄭並退出其選舉預備工作。
+
+同一時間，黨內原有意出選超區的時任沙田區議員黃文萱，於5月尾決定退出，黨高層找人填補黃的位置，李指譚文豪當時曾致電問他參選意向，李回覆「有」。法官關注，為何李不久前才向鄭表示想專注地區工作，之後又改變心意參選？李解釋因當時政府不太聆聽區議員意見，亦望為被遺忘的業界爭取撥款而想做立法會議員，但「排第二係唔會做到」。
+
+李續於5月尾與譚文豪會面，提及自己所倡的政策理念「需要錢」，或與公民黨否決所有撥款和議案的立場有出入，但譚指他可「繼續講」其主張，李理解譚言下之意是黨立場「有彈性」、並非「好實在」，他成功出線再算。李其後於6月初收集5名區議員提名，報名黨內就超區立選的「徵召機制」，並接受選舉策略委員會面試，望黨可以40萬全額資助他參加初選，但黨僅可資助7萬，李亦向黨內區議員介紹政綱及接受品格審查委員會面試。
+
+
+### 李稱曾被黨拒出選超區、6.12被捕後黨重新考慮支持出選
+
+李於6月9日獲時任副主席賴仁彪致電，告知其徵召機制申請不成功，李理解黨因他勝算不高，無法滿足其財政要求，不能向他借出餘下33萬。李遂重整心態續做區議員工作，並指對6月9日的初選記者會不知情，就公民黨6月11日簽署的「墨落無悔」聲明亦無參與任何討論、與他無關，因他在公民黨職級低、只是支部黨員，當時亦非潛在候選人，「我冇去關心」。
+
+不過不足數日，李的參選計劃有變，他指6月12日的6.12（反修例金鐘衝突）一周年紀念，有街坊表示「佢啲仔女都落咗去」，在場很多防暴警察、他很擔心，叫李「去睇吓」。李遂以區議員身分到達銅鑼灣，惟被警方以非法集結罪名拘捕，他其後在醫院獲公民黨三名律師楊岳橋、梁嘉善和彭皓昕探望，翌日獲得警署擔保。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/95JRKiR.png)
+▲ 2020年6月12日 李予信於銅鑼灣被捕（資料圖片）
+
+李指賴仁彪其後致電他，指他被捕引起了黨內高層和黨員關注，並獲得捐獻支持他出選超區，故黨可重新考慮支持他出選，並重啟「徵召機制」。李指當時「好急」地籌備參與初選，不過他無出席5月13日的超區初選協調會議，不知道初選規則，遂向秘書處和賴仁彪查詢，獲悉目標議席是「坐三望四」，他理解此為提名表格所提及的目標，他對此亦認同。
+
+李其後於6月19日公民黨街站首次公開宣布參加初選，並於翌日拍攝投票宣傳片段。片中楊岳橋承諾若特首未能落實五大訴求，公民黨將否決政府法案和預算，但李稱拍攝前僅獲發自己的講稿，亦無參與片段發布的決定。李並於20日的提名截止日期報名。
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/5wNgKin.png)
+▲ 李予信於2020年6月19日中環街站宣布參與初選（資料圖片）
+
+就李提交民動的政綱及《國安法》前印刷的單張，均提到「以關鍵否決權促使政府落實『五大訴求』」，李指是其團隊「從黨公用嘅template攞返嚟」；不過《國安法》頒布後，李無再派發舊單張，並刪去相關內容印製新單張派發，於初選投票日亦隨公民黨轉為「無字政綱」，李於初選論壇也無提否決預算案。李最終於初選落敗，只有2%得票，並於7月15日記者會公開宣布不會參與正式選舉。
+
+案件明續審，李予信料將接受盤問。除李外，現時僅餘參選衞生服務界的余慧明未開展辯方案情。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/ME8BTEe.png)
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/n9X59Qy.png)
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-08-21-go-to-the-home.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-21-go-to-the-home.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..74f85aee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-21-go-to-the-home.md
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "回家"
+author: "蒟蒻魚"
+date  : 2023-08-21 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/nJ7ppV5.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+如果播的是電視劇，此時的鏡頭應該是：疲憊的我拖著行李，混在一班興奮的香港游客中間，慢吞吞走向台灣的入境大堂，擡頭張望應該去哪個櫃位排隊，畫面隨即轉爲黑色，白色字體打出：24小時之前......
+
+<!--more-->
+
+鏡頭轉向香港吵雜的旺角，我從一輛紅色的士出來，在酷熱的天氣中，走入一座舊唐樓的三樓，按響其中一戶的門鈴，Y小姐應聲出來開門，笑眯眯領提著一瓶葡萄牙鉢酒的我進屋。Y的這個家是我離開香港後才搬過來的，是爲了就近照顧年邁的父母。如果不是上有老，Y夫婦現在應該在加拿大某個角落簡單活著。才坐下一會，Y先生就提著外賣的潮州鹵水回來了。我們轉到餐桌坐下，Y小姐給大家各倒了一杯甜美的鉢酒，夾起一片鹵水鵝肉，說：「我們應該把手提電話關上嗎？」「不用吧？難道你要準備同我談什麽敏感話題？」我忍不住笑回。「你不要笑，我經常和老公聊天都關機的。」我嘆一口氣，至於嗎？
+
+想起我返港後，第一個約見的朋友就是Y小姐，我們在一間過去我很喜歡的日式餐廳午膳。我們只是敘舊，純屬敘家庭主婦式柴米油鹽級別的舊。我記得我們以前飯聚，一向都無話不談，百無禁忌，現在的我們明顯是小心翼翼，心有靈犀地避開很多話題不談，無他，用Y小姐的話來説就是：「你怎麽知道你隔壁那一桌的客人會不會舉報你？你說你沒有意圖沒有用，關鍵得『他』認爲你沒有才是沒有。」也對啊，根據《明報》報道，國安處2020年11月開設舉報熱綫以來，截至去年年底共接獲逾38萬條舉報信息。香港貌似在步向互相監視，互相舉報的境地。但，如果你問我停留一個月的時間裏，有害怕過嗎？我每一天都是踢個人字拖，一身街坊師奶裝，不是同親友飯聚就是處理三年多遺留在香港的私人事務。或者大家彼此都心照不宣，或者是爲了能夠再次順利回家，或者是因爲我從來沒有任何所謂不軌的打算，我堅定地選擇謹慎言行，所以......我倒也沒有隨時擔心被舉報的心慌。
+
+離港前的晚餐聚會，我們最後並沒有關上電話。我們討論的話題圍繞健行和環境保育，説的都是人家台灣的步道和環保。Y先生問我有沒有留意專訪香港環境及生態局局長的文章，局長指出，「提到環保，個個都好關心，但這個話題好像很主觀，怎樣追求都沒有盡頭，所以容易被人拿來炒作，甚至作為反政府的藉口」。在這個我還未能搞清楚「軟對抗」是什麽的年代，政府官員能夠就環保問題劃界綫般給出警告，我當然是有收到。Y夫婦不是環保激進分子，政治上頂多屬中間偏淡黃，歷年的保育事件也只是在旁見證，連參與者都算不上，清算應該落不到他們頭上吧？Y先生苦笑一聲，「這個誰知道呢？」我們還是飲酒吃滷味，今朝有酒今朝醉，感恩還能再聚吧！上有高堂的我們，怎麽捨得輕易就不去呼吸那一口氣，哪怕只能謹慎呼吸。
+
+與Y夫婦相擁道別，約好下回台灣見，我便回家收拾行李，準備第二天飛離香港。深夜，媽媽嚴肅地拉我坐下，說有事要交待我。原來她和爸爸已經各自立好遺囑及預立醫療指示，告訴我要記在心上，會有需要用到的一天。我腦袋瞬時變得空白，我一直拒絕去想父母會有離去的一天。雖然父母現在年紀大了，只是有一點老人基礎病而已，不算嚴重。我們每個星期都會視像通話，容貌上感覺不到什麽巨大變化。但這次回家，看著他們在我面前走動，我才驚覺他們行動已大不如從前順暢。我看得出父母有過分努力地打起精神處理自己的日常，無非是想告訴我，他們可以自理。我忍不住抱著媽媽大哭，我們之前從未試過分離那麽長時間，長得我不敢深入想什麽，害怕各種擔心會成真，恐懼有事趕不回家。媽媽安慰我，她和爸爸會照顧好自己，我們在台灣照顧好自己就可以了，不要想太多。我哀傷地意識到，父母百年之後，我就會徹底淪爲無家之人，「回家」總有一天會從我的字典消失，我無法想象那時的内心會是何等荒蕪。但反過來想，沒有家可回之後，是否也意味著我與香港可以從此兩清?或許吧，如果可以，我希望沒有這樣的一天。
+
+離港的早上，新界天朗氣清，與爸爸媽媽簡單告別后就坐上的士往機場進發。我再次趴在車窗上，妄想把沿途一切深刻印入腦内。快到機場前，一排排整齊得如模具倒出來的房屋出現在我眼前，我忍不住問：「這是方艙嗎？」一直沉默開車的司機大佬回了一句：「是啊，花了幾十億，唉......」有些什麽話想衝口而出，被我死死壓制在喉嚨裏，只是用一個「哦」字來回應。司機大佬似乎也沒有繼續搭訕的意願，專心載我們往機場。身為業内人士，司機大佬肯定也知道政府推的士司機「見疑即報」，今年三月還有的士行家因爲舉報乘客而收到舉報獎金，那兩個乘客也真是口沒遮攔，怎麽可以在車上討論「炸彈襲擊」呢。我當然沒有準備說方艙被炸掉才好，但我也不覺得那一堆被棄置的東西繼續荒廢下去是好事，我又可以說什麽呢？「哦」已經是我最大的禮貌了，請原諒我沒有認真回應，以前的我，碰到好玩的的士司機，一定不放過吹水的機會，現在的我已經興趣全無。
+
+到機場後，check-in排長龍，入禁區前掃護照排長龍，安檢排長龍，總之就人頭涌涌。好不容易進入禁區餐廳區，放下行李，立刻跑去離自己最近的洗手間。Jardin de Jade背後的那個洗手間不大，才5、6個厠格，進去的時候，剛好滿座，我便站在厠格通道入口等待。等了一會，有人出來，我才往前踏出一步，忽然一道身影快速閃過，搶在我的前面進入厠格並關上門。我唯有退後一步，心想我要展現好客之道，清潔阿姐一副怒其不爭的表情看著我，我唯有用無奈眼神與阿姐對視，人家動作快，我都無計呀！很快又有人出來了，我正準備往前，居然又有一位女士從後走進來超越我，準備占領本應輪到我的位置，清潔阿姐忍無可忍講：「唔該，排隊。」眼見那位游客毫無反應，阿姐換成普通話講：「請排隊。」這次聽懂了，那位女士才恍然大悟看見在通道口等候的我，退到我的身後。厠所出來，我對著阿姐笑一笑，「辛苦啦，唔該晒！」我無意針對哪一國的人，我可以肯定兩位女士是同胞，因爲安檢時，她們分屬不同的旅行小團體排在我前面，而她們手持的都是中國護照。反正，我預留了足夠的時間登機，人家憋得急就先上吧。七月初，香港旅發局有公佈訪港旅客數字，僅上半年就有1300萬人次，近8成是內地客人。時光彷彿回到03年SARS後，香港要靠大陸游客振興經濟。香港能再次繁榮，當然是好事，但和過去不一樣的是：這一次，香港這個家，不要説話事了，我連評論都無資格，所以，好客之道好像也不關我什麽事，我就應該衝上前，喝止第一位女士，搶回我的厠格，起碼不用麻煩清潔阿姐替我出頭。癡綫，我現在才説這些有什麽用，OK，我認我係廢柴！
+
+飛機準時騰空而起，這一次我沒有望著飛機下面的海哭得不能自己，我知道我很快又會回家，我反而比較關心一會兒落地之後，去哪裏吃晚餐好呢？
+
+鏡頭轉回現在，我一臉嚴肅等候台灣的入境官員查驗證件，他盯著看了好久，久到我以爲會被拒絕入境。終於拿回了自己的證件，過去一個月被無形之手壓著的我鬆一口氣，慢慢步入台灣。我不敢用「回家」來形容回到這裏繼續生活這件事，但，總之，我只能活下去。
+
+劇名：回家，The End！
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file

From 1fcdbb8a24dafddcc5b97bf03b689cb71c032d66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hokoi <hokoeye@pm.me>
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2023 00:16:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 14/19] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x20 Sep.12

---
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-110.md | 160 +++++++++++++
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-111.md |  87 +++++++
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-112.md | 215 +++++++++++++++++
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-113.md | 224 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-114.md | 138 +++++++++++
 5 files changed, 824 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-21-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-110.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-22-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-111.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-112.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-24-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-113.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-114.md

diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-21-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-110.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-21-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-110.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ab2dfba1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-21-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-110.md
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 110 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-21 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 李予信稱獲楊岳橋指示報名參選港島後被叫停、理解非鄭達鴻「Plan B」
+- 李予信指楊岳橋否決財案「莊嚴承諾」未必兌現、不會跟黨立場投票
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/qKMliOT.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（21日）踏入審訊第110天。李予信繼續作供，表示超區初選落敗、宣布不參與立法會選舉後，7月底獲時任黨魁楊岳橋指示報名參選港島，理解楊當時因DQ憂慮而作出準備。李指郭榮鏗、楊岳橋和郭家麒三人被DQ後，楊一度要他停止申請，惟他已交表、未能取回表格，向楊表示「好 frustrate」，楊則回答「阿信，it’s OK」，李其後得悉原參選港島的鄭達鴻同被DQ。不過李表示，理解他並非鄭達鴻的「Plan B」，他交表前亦不曾諮詢或通知鄭達鴻。此外，原表示擬不作供、參選衞生服務界的余慧明，其代表大狀指索取指示後，余將會作供。余為本案最後一名被告。
+
+#### 辯方透露原擬不作供余慧明擬作供
+
+甫開庭，代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑表示，鄒另所涉的7.1佔領立法會案，擬於本周三（23日）下午進行案件管理聆訊，問本案能否於當天下午休庭。法官陳慶偉指待他想想，但據現時進度，案件有可能於周三完成。不過代表本案最後一名被告、原表示擬不作供的余慧明的大律師石書銘即表示，收到指示余慧明將會作供，辯方案情或需數天時間處理。陳世傑臨散庭時表示撤回申請，指鄒毋須出席該次聯訊。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/XQhA2xU.png)
+▲ 余慧明，2021年7月28日曾一度獲准保釋。（資料圖片）
+
+#### 李稱楊岳橋指示報名參選港島、惟楊3人被DQ後被要求停止申請
+
+參選超區的前公民黨東區區議員李予信繼續作供，他早前供稱於超區初選落敗，於7月15日宣布不參與正式選舉，李今同意於2020年7月30日報名參與港島區立法會選舉，而他不曾參與港島區初選。李解釋，他於7月29日中午收到時任黨魁楊岳橋電話通知，指黨有機會徵召他參與港島區選舉。當時該區由鄭達鴻出選，李理解楊當時因DQ憂慮而作出一些準備，故在前一日要準備提名。
+
+李指當晚至翌日早上仍在找提名，取齊提名和填好表格後便等候指示，當時公民黨未有人被DQ。李並指7月30日下午約1時，楊岳橋致電他「叫我去入紙報名喇，可以」，李遂與助理一起到上環選舉事務處，約兩時多開始進行申請程序，提交逾100個提名及公民黨予他的5萬元現金按金。
+
+李指完成手續後獲發收據，行出大廳時便收到楊岳橋指示，當時郭榮鏗、楊岳橋和郭家麒已被DQ，楊「叫我去停止呢個申請動作」。李指他即回頭找職員，「就話我啱啱遞完張 form，但我而家想收返個申請」，惟職員拒絕，表示根據制度，退選只能透過正式申請一份退選申請書辦妥。李指職員其後給他一份文件，但記不清楚是否該表格，他並告訴楊岳橋「我收唔走嗰張申請」，「我向佢表示好 frustrate，因為攞唔返」，楊則回覆「阿信，it’s OK」，並叫他先回公民黨總部，容後再商討。李並於當天近4時、尚在選舉事務處時收到鄭達鴻被DQ的消息。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/HP56wAQ.png)
+▲ 李予信
+
+#### 李稱立法會截止報名日 曾陪梁嘉善報名新西
+
+李予信同意，當晚約7時楊岳橋召開記招，交代有關DQ事宜，當時無人有時間再商討他收回申請一事。至記招完後，楊岳橋着李「hold 住個申請先，聽朝再算」。至7月31日的立法會正式選舉截止報名日期，李稱當天中午到曾獲通過排楊岳橋新東名單第二的梁嘉善辦公室，因他理解當時的討論「係究竟其他選區嘅好似我呢個情況徵召嘅人，報唔報名好」。李同意，理解梁嘉善同樣為被公民黨徵召的人，但不肯定其會員狀態。
+
+李續指，看到梁收到指示要去報名參選新界西，並指「因為我係唯一一個一早報咗名嘅徵召者，所以31號我淨係坐喺度睇嘅啫」，並陪伴梁去報名。李在法官追問下指當時無人指示他要做什麼，「我純粹係陪伴佢，因為大家都係徵召者」，不過同日傍晚，政府宣布將選舉延後一年。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/Z2m8ghj.png)
+▲ 梁嘉善（資料圖片）
+
+#### 李稱理解不是鄭達鴻「Plan B」、交表前不曾諮詢或通知鄭達鴻
+
+辯方大律師關文渭續展示選舉事務處的文件，顯示「Te-wing chi（戴穎姿）」於7月31日報名港島區。李理解戴與公民黨有關係，指於2016年認識戴，她當時為公民黨實習生，至2020年「應該係」鄭達鴻競選團隊員工，因他4至5月中探討成為鄭名單第二時曾在鄭的辦事處見過戴。
+
+李續指，不知道戴是否被公民黨徵召參選和是否代表黨參選，也不知道她是否鄭達鴻「Plan B」。至於李本人，「我理解我唔係鄭生嘅Plan B」，但除他以外當時不知道公民黨有派其他人參選港島。
+
+關文渭續問，李是否從無被DQ，惟法官即打斷指當時選舉已延期。關續指，但李已交表，可於翌日被DQ，法官陳慶偉笑言「我不認為公務員是那麼有效率」，法官陳仲衡亦着辯方要現實。陳慶偉並指，認為辯方提出戴小姐的議題是完全與案無關。關續表示完成主問。
+
+代表鄭達鴻的大律師黃宇逸其後進行盤問，李予信同意，他提交正選提名表格前不曾諮詢或通知鄭達鴻，亦不知鄭曾否被任何公民黨的人諮詢或通知。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/kKRVJ6D.png)
+▲ 左起：楊岳橋、鄭達鴻、李予信（資料圖片）
+
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/HcqHugS.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（21日）踏入審訊第110天。李予信今接受控方盤問，就楊岳橋於公民黨記者會指若政府不回應五大訴求，否決每個法案和撥款是「莊嚴承諾」，李指黨內議員以往也有投票不一致的情況，「so far 冇嘢可以 bound（綑綁）到所有公民黨立法會議員一致去投票」，亦認為該承諾未必會兌現。李又指就否決財案立場與黨不同，但無公開表達，遭法官質疑如他沒有黨的支持便「什麼也不是」，他要跟從黨立場。惟李指其政綱已反映他以選民利益為先，若黨不批准他豁免跟黨立場投票，「我都會照跟自己意向投票，就即管睇吓個黨有啲乜嘢嘅後果畀我。」
+
+李又指，《國安法》條文頒布後，認為提及否決權的政綱或違法，即通知團隊停派舊單張並設計新單張，將含有公民黨政綱的內容「全部放棄」。李又指，除目標議席外不知超區初選有其他協議，指多年來協調均談及議席和配票策略。李亦指他無收過超區協調文件，主控萬德豪指他至少有看過，惟法官李運騰質疑控方說法有何證據，指李並無被搜出該文件，「你是代表控方，你指出案情時要有基礎。」
+
+#### 控方質疑公民黨記者會非推廣選民登記 李指選民登記可助爭議會過半
+
+參選超區的前公民黨東區區議員李予信今早完成主問，由主控萬德豪進行盤問。就前黨友鄭達鴻早前供稱黨團負責立法會最前線政策，李指「我當時咁樣猜測，但 actually 係點樣我唔清楚」；至於鄭稱黨團凌駕執委會，李亦稱不知道兩者互動實際上是怎樣，「無從評論邊個高權力啲。」
+
+就公民黨3月25日記者會，楊岳橋提到若特首不回應五大訴求，「公民黨係會同佢唔客氣⋯⋯以後政府每一個法案、財政撥款申請，我哋都會否決，呢個亦都係一個莊嚴嘅承諾」，而政府如仍不退讓，也會「義無反顧」否決預算案，並希望能促成35+「一齊否決」預算案。公民黨事後將記者會摘要於 Facebook 發布，李同意有轉發該帖文。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/vrTVWan.png)
+▲ 梁家傑（左）、楊岳橋（右）（資料圖片）
+
+萬德豪續質疑，李於記者會上手持「議會過半 實現五大訴求」的紙牌，指記者會並非如李所說是關於選民登記。李不同意，指屬論述層面、是選民登記一部分，理解「選民登記係可以貢獻於爭取議會過半呢個目標」。
+
+控方欲追問時，陳慶偉稱理解李指該些紙牌是用來吸引人做選民，李同意，並指黨推廣選民登記是想更多人支持民主派。李運騰指，尤其是想人支持公民黨？李指「可以咁講」，但會上訊息提及尊重、團結，「我理解就係有個大局觀喺度」，即取得議會過半。萬指若過半便可落實五大訴求？李稱「我哋唔知係咪真係落實到」。
+
+#### 李重申記者會訊息混合、發言者有矛盾
+
+李予信早前形容，記者會訊息「混合」，楊岳橋等稱否決所有撥款，但郭家麒又指預算案合理會支持。萬續質疑，據楊岳橋記者會上說法，很清楚（crystal clear）公民黨立場就是否決預算案爭取五大訴求，並非李所說的「混合訊息」。李不同意，指「有好多人講嘢」。陳慶偉追問，雖然其他人說了不同的話，但公民黨於記者會的立場還是很清楚？李運騰亦問，不同人的訊息並沒有彼此矛盾？李均不同意，認為有矛盾，但同意主題是清楚。
+
+#### 李稱黨議員投票不一致、理解公民黨「未必兌現」否決財案「莊嚴承諾」
+
+萬德豪續問，李予信曾否告知楊岳橋，若他當選後不會跟隨黨立場，否決預算案以爭取五大訴求。李指他無這樣說過，但公民黨以往也有出現「議員投票唔一致」的情況，「so far（至今為止）冇嘢可以 bound（綑綁）到所有公民黨立法會議員一致去投票」，他當時亦有此理解。
+
+法官陳慶偉問，但以往公民黨議員有不同投票立場時，黨有作出過「莊嚴承諾」嗎？李指不記得。陳續指，莊嚴承諾並非「口輕輕」許下、應該被兌現，否則就會令選民失去信心，因此公民黨3月許下此莊嚴承諾時，完全是打算兌現。惟李指「我理解係未必會兌現」。
+
+萬德豪續問，公民黨以往曾許過多少「莊嚴承諾」？惟李運騰指，李予信只於2018年入黨，問題是否對他公平。李予信續在追問下，指公民黨在2018至2020年曾做過很多承諾，李運騰追問，但重要到會召記招表明作出莊嚴承諾？李再指不記得。陳慶偉亦提到，3月25日記者會上黨魁楊岳橋和黨主席梁家傑均坐在中間，問李看過多少次這樣的安排？李指二人份量較高，公民黨開記招時都是坐中間。
+
+#### 官質疑李過往均跟黨立場、惟至控罪核心始稱不跟 李指政綱有反映
+
+陳慶偉續指李予信是公民黨的鐵粉（die-hard fan），一直跟從黨的立場（line），那為何7月時改變？李指他入黨前一直關注公民黨，成為支部會員後很多工作、守則和政治原則上，也會參考公民黨的說法、他亦同意；但就否決預算案的立場，「其實喺嗰個 moment，我係有唔同嘅。」
+
+陳慶偉指他就是要測試李，並追問若李一直跟從黨路線，為何偏偏在本案控罪的中心議題（centre issue of the charge），才有不同的做法？李解釋：「因為依個部分就直接同我想參選做立法會議員嘅初衷好有關係，而依樣嘢係我之前未 encounter（遇上）過嘅。」陳慶偉續指，若不是鄭達鴻「拍膊頭」，李不會成為區議員，又指「我不是要貶低你，不過沒有公民黨的支持，你什麼都不是（“Without the support of the Civic Party, you are simply — put it this way, I am not trying to be derogatory — nobody.”）」，李說：「可以咁樣講嘅。」
+
+陳慶偉續指，李予信決定參選時需要黨的支持，因此要跟從黨立場，亦從沒有向公眾提及他不會跟黨否決預算案。李指他對公眾所有講法和訊息，都是根據其參選理念和原則，「無論喺公開嘅發言、單張、文宣、論壇，我嘅訊息都係一致同清晰」，但承認無公開講過，不會跟從黨立場否決預算案以爭取五大訴求。陳慶偉即說：「但你可以，不是嗎？在你新印的單張，你可以說我以選民利益優先，不論黨的立場如何。」李指「依個訊息我從來都係咁樣強調」，他未必用文字直接表達，但政綱內容有反映，均清晰談及整體社會市民利益和他特別關注的群體。
+
+#### 李稱理解黨資助有考慮其政綱、若申豁免投票不獲批 仍會跟自己意向投票
+
+鄭達鴻早前稱，公民黨有豁免跟隨黨立場投票的機制。李續同意，若不跟隨黨立場投票須申請豁免，未必會批准，而若不獲批，「我都會照跟自己意向投票，就即管睇吓個黨有啲乜嘢嘅後果畀我」，但承認當時沒有提過會申請。而李早前供稱黨最終願資助他40萬初選經費，法官陳仲衡問獲得該資助有否任何責任伴隨，陳慶偉亦問李會否認為自己應負一些責任，例如對黨忠誠？李指「都會有呢個理解」，但當時未有就「莊嚴承諾」的講法「有一個咁 specific 嘅關注」。
+
+李早前亦稱，5月底與譚文豪會面，指其所倡議政策需要錢，與黨立場或有出入。李今再指6月5日晚與選舉策略委員會會面時，譚亦是委員之一，李將曾向譚提過的政綱，即他在單張和論壇提及、一些需要爭取撥款的項目寫下予委員會，「所以佢 finance 我嘅決定，我理解其實佢有考慮過我所持有嘅政綱同想法係點樣。」
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/5RrST9s.png)
+▲ 譚文豪（資料圖片）
+
+陳慶偉問，但前提是政府回應五大訴求、公民黨不否決預算案，李才能提出其項目，並問李有向委員會提過，會將其政綱放在黨的莊嚴承諾前嗎？李指當時無討論過，只能說理解如他所持理念和政綱能得到黨支持，「入到議會無論點都好，我都會繼續跟進」，「無論政府回唔回應（五大訴求）都好，我都會繼續去咁樣講、咁樣投票。」陳慶偉問，李予信想黨支持其政綱，那認為黨也會想他支持其政策嗎？李說「會有咁樣嘅理解」。萬德豪其後指，李從無意圖申請豁免機制，以不跟從黨否決預算案的立場，李不同意。
+
+#### 李稱政綱或違《國安法》 着團隊停派並設計新單張 全棄公民黨政綱
+
+就李予信於初選提名表格提交的政綱，提及「爭取議會過半35+，以關鍵否決權促使政府落實『五大訴求』」，控方指是楊岳橋之前提過的「莊嚴承諾」。李指講法相若，控方可以這樣聯想，但「我嘅政綱同依個講法係矛盾嘅」。李追問下表示，當時無反對用此政綱，而他授權其他人交表，提交時知道亦同意表格附上此政綱。
+
+李續指《國安法》實施後，公民黨秘書處於6月30日晚或7月1日早上，為所有候選人發電郵，「一次過轉晒」所有公民黨候選人政綱為「無字政綱」，他其後獲告知此事，但無參與決定過程、不知確實由誰下決定、亦無人諮詢過他，而他理解「之前嘅政綱可能有問題，同《國安法》相違」。
+
+法官陳仲衡問，李認為舊版政綱有問題？李指「我當時有咁諗過」，指《國安法》6月30日晚出爐後，他看過條文加上自己一些判斷，「我第一時間通知我嘅選舉團隊，立即停派舊嘅單張，同埋立即設計一個新嘅單張，將包含有公民黨政綱嘅內容呢，全部放棄。」李盤問下指之後沒有告訴選民他已放棄相關政綱。
+
+至於 Facebook 帖文，李指3月25日記者會帖文內有選民登記網頁的連結，認為是該帖文焦點，故沒有刪除。控方質疑即使選民登記截止、《國安法》生效後李也沒有刪除，李指「因為已經沉晒底㗎喇個 post」，尤其選舉最熾熱的宣傳期曾發布很多帖文，「當時我都唔再在意啲咁舊嘅 post 喇。」
+
+#### 李理解初選規則衍生自共識、除目標議席不知其他協議 指是對多年協調理解
+
+就提名表格提及「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」，李指他沒有出席超區協調會，亦不知黃文萱有否出席，但承認當時想知道「嗰個協調嘅共識係啲乜嘢」，「因為喺我嘅概念，初選其實就係關於協調，如果我參與初選連協調嘅共識係啲乜都唔知嘅話呢，我好難繼續參與落去。」
+
+李指當時無問黃文萱、也無問戴耀廷或區諾軒，但曾問秘書處總幹事歐飛，因他對每區協調、選舉策略或形勢「好有認知」，「我問佢係最快嘅。」庭上早前顯示紀錄，李曾問歐飛「我想知道超區初選既規則係點？」，獲悉超區目標議席是「3+1」。
+
+萬德豪質疑李只是問及初選的規則而非共識，李指當時理解「啲規則係衍生自呢個共識嘅，都係字眼上問題」，認為他問有什麼規則要參選的人遵守，意思就是共識。萬問共識即是協議？李認為無衝突，指有共識去遵守規則也屬「協議咗嘅情況」。
+
+法官李運騰問，除了該些規則，李還知道初選有協議嗎？李指他不知道，強調其焦點和當時概念，就是「咁多年嚟初選嘅協調都係講緊個議席、配票嘅策略，如果就住依個目標有任何嘅協議，其實都係衍生一啲嘅規則，去約束參選人」。
+
+#### 李指不知公民黨記者會發言與初選協調共識有何關連
+
+李早前同意，曾出席3月30日公民黨「立法會選舉心戰室核心小組」會議，紀錄提及「上星期三各團隊聯合召開記招，各團隊認為成功為民主派設定選舉議程，力爭透過立法會選舉議會過半迫使政府落實五大訴求，為未來民主派繼續就選舉作出協調及合作提供基礎」，李指不記得當時是否確實用「基礎」一字。
+
+萬德豪續問，李看到上述提名表格條款時，有否想到在「心戰室核心小組」會議上提及，關於民主派協調的基礎？法官陳慶偉一度指問題很差勁，控方再問後李說「冇呀，太遙遠呀」，並指看到6月20日的條款時，不會想起3月會議提及的一個點，反而頗肯定他是基於向黨就初選規則追查所得到的認知。
+
+控方續指出案情，指李當時知道的協議不止是有關議席數量，李實遠比這知道得多，李不同意。陳慶偉續指，李除了知道超區目標議席為「3+1」，亦知道公民黨參與初選的基礎，是要在立會取得過半後否決財案，這亦是「莊嚴承諾」？李不同意，指「我唔知道公民黨講嘅嘢，同埋所謂初選協調嘅共識嘅 linkage 喺邊度」。
+
+#### 李稱無看過超區協調文件、控方指出有看過 官質疑提問基礎
+
+李續指，不清楚提名表格條款中「民主派35+公民投票計劃」是指一份文件。萬德豪展示「35+立會過半計劃 民主派區議會（二）協調機制協議」文件，李指他無看過。萬續指，文件是由戴耀廷於5月12日以 WhatsApp 廣播發給超區參選人。法官李運騰即打斷說：「5月12日？他當時成為參選人了嗎？」萬說未，但指他是問李是否知道，李予信答他不知道。
+
+萬續向李指，他事實上曾獲發該文件，李不同意。萬再指至少李有看過該份文件，惟李運騰打斷，表示「抱歉萬先生，你有什麼證據基礎這樣說？你是代表控方，你指出案情時要有基礎」。萬指有證據公民黨有潛在候選人參選超區，李運騰指，「但坦白說，我看不到你有任何基礎指出該案情，你沒從他搜出這份文件、無法證明他在廣播名單上，你有什麼基礎？」，並再語帶無奈攤出雙手：「算了，你已問了，而他也答了。」
+
+李續在盤問下表示，無讀過戴耀廷於2020年4月至5月的文章，亦沒有興趣。控方一度指如李曾排鄭達鴻第二，會有興趣了解組織者的說法，惟李強調當時只是探討排鄭達鴻第二，「但係從來冇落實過」，亦不同意因此有讀過戴的文章。
+
+#### 李稱曾看過投票宣傳片稿但無留意楊岳橋說話、發布後僅確實有看過自己部分
+
+此外，就公民黨7月10日發布的初選投票宣傳片段，李指於6月20日拍攝前獲發一張「紙仔」要「拎住嚟背」。李早前稱拍攝前僅獲發自己講稿，不知道他人確實會說什麼，萬德豪今問李有否要求看其他人講稿，李稱「有嗰份稿」，他「唔記得好清楚」拍攝前有否讀過，「但係應該有。」
+
+就片中楊岳橋承諾若特首未能落實五大訴求，公民黨將否決政府法案和預算，萬問李看到時沒有提出反對？李說沒有，「因為我焦點擺咗喺自己講嗰幾句度」、無用心留意楊會說的話，又指當時不斷要記住自己的部分，「唔想有咁多NG」，以便更快完成工作，而楊拍攝時他不在場。
+
+李又指，片段發布前，僅曾在錄影後即時看過自己的回放（playback），他當時無表達需在發布前看全片。片段於7月10日發布，李指他有看過，但忘記有否「由頭到尾逐秒睇晒成段片」，並指據其處事手法，「我會即刻飛去睇吓自己拍成點、好唔好睇咁嘅」，故只能確實有看過自己的部分，至於楊岳橋談及否決財案的部分則不記得有否看到。控方質疑片段只長2分鐘，李指當時忙於拉票，「我十幾個鐘都喺條街度」，其餘時間也是睡覺和休息。萬再追問即李連2分鐘也懶得看？惟法官打斷指這就是李的答案。
+
+案件明早續審，李予信將繼續接受盤問。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-22-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-111.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-22-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-111.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ab659520
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-22-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-111.md
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 111 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-22 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 李予信完成作供 指黨否決財案「統一口徑」無約束力、從無講過亦無採納
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/0ounAPi.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（22日）踏入審訊第111天。李予信今續接受盤問，就被搜得的初選論壇筆記不止一次提及否決預算案迫政府回應五大訴求，李指只是公民黨資深顧問抄黨的「Line to take（統一口徑）」，但理解非百分百要求候選人說出當中內容，只是參考、無約束力，視乎臨場發揮和「自己想唔想講」，他在論壇「從來冇講過亦從來冇採納過」。法官質疑，若公民黨候選人可自由偏離黨的統一口徑，那制定有什麼意思？李指為「原則性嘅展示」、「展示緊黨嘅一啲態度為先」，但各區區情、每名候選人身分等均不同，故實際上講法也不一樣。而就另一份黨的統一口徑文件提到避免講「攬炒」，李指公民黨不支持「攬炒」，但又提否決預算案是「有矛盾」和彈性。
+
+此外，李亦否認自己當選後打算跟從黨立場，重申雖無向公眾表明，但有透過選舉宣傳暗示此訊息。李予信今完成4日作供，明將由本案最後一名被告、參選衞生服務界的余慧明作供。
+
+#### 李指成為候選人後無深究「墨落無悔」、不太重視該聲明
+
+李予信今繼續接受盤問，就公民黨6月11日簽署的「墨落無悔」聲明，李早前供稱無參與任何討論、與他無關，指他當時並非潛在候選人，「我冇去關心」。李今在盤問下指，他於6月13日後才獲准參選，而參選前很多政治人物和參選人也有分享該聲明，故他知悉亦有「快䁽過」，但在正式成為候選人後就無再繼續深究，「因為當時我唔係好重視呢個聲明。」李又指，不知道公民黨「用個黨嘅名擺喺個聲明度呢個動作」，但從黨的帖文看到其聲稱自己加入了聯署。
+
+控方展示該6月11日的帖文，提及「公民黨已加入聯署【墨落無悔 堅定抗爭】聲明書」，又提到「我們早於3月25日召開記者招待會，當時已承諾尊重民主派初選機制；立會過半後政府必須落實五大訴求，否則公民黨將行使《基本法》賦予的否決權」。
+
+#### 李指賴仁彪「無畀壓力一定要講某啲承諾」、理解為彈性
+
+萬德豪指，帖文無提及就否決預算案有彈性，但李早前指譚文豪曾向他稱「有彈性」，李看到帖文後有問譚嗎？李指他沒有問，譚於5月底的會面亦沒有承諾他當選後會給予彈性，但譚「鼓勵我繼續持有我本來所講嘅政綱」，並指李選超區時要謹守他作為街頭舞蹈藝術家和社工區議員兩個「好特別嘅身分」，指其政綱與身分相連，因此李理解該彈性「係展現於鼓勵我繼續持有呢個政綱呢件事上面」。
+
+李並指，彈性也體現於6月13日後，賴仁彪指黨可讓他參選，「我理解係黨能夠用佢嘅資源去支持我作為一個候選人嘅選舉理念同政綱，佢亦都冇畀我任何嘅壓力，要我一定要講某啲嘅承諾。」
+
+#### 李指黨「統一口徑」無約束力、非百分百嚴格要求候選人講
+
+法官李運騰提到，鄭達鴻被搜出選舉「論壇天書」，李予信也有收到類似的文件嗎？李指有，解釋準備選舉時，黨資深顧問 Masun 負責撰寫「line to take（統一口徑）」，該顧問也會參與候選人的媒體訓練（media training），並因每區的區情、形勢和關注點也不一樣，而「落去同我哋候選人傾一個 tailor made 嘅講法」，「所以我理解嗰個 line to take 唔係完全一百分之一百 strictly 要求候選人 exact wording 去講嗰啲嘢。」
+
+控方續展示從李搜得、題為「Draft 5 LTT」的文件，李解釋是黨整體使用的統一口徑，不止有5個版本，但不記得共有多少；至於另一份「初選論壇（4/7錄影）」，李解釋主要為論壇準備，由資深黨顧問和李競選團隊一兩個成員草擬和修改，參考黨的統一口徑再加上自己區情形勢寫成。李指他知道內容，且「最緊要就係，其實呢份 document 只係一個參考，而所有論壇表現好睇臨場嘅發揮、同埋我自己想唔想講，係冇約束力嘅」。李又指，該文件最原始版本應在6月，其後不斷更改，最新版本為7月2、3日，但不肯定呈堂文件是否最新。他同意超區論壇於7月4日錄影，7月6日廣播。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/atK0s0e.png)
+▲ 李予信
+
+#### 李指公民黨「唔畀講『攬炒』」又反對財案有矛盾 曾與資深顧問談及
+
+就「Draft 5 LTT」提到「避免自己講『攬炒』字眼」，李同意是公民黨一貫看法；文件亦提及「35+後否決預算案，令政府停擺，就是攬炒，令香港民不聊生」，以及民主派如議會過半「提出否決政府議案，係我哋反制暴政嘅強力武器，其實係俾最後一次機會林鄭政府去回應市民嘅訴求，只要政府同意回應五大訴求、重啟政改，同埋撤回國安法，民主派就會按照正常方式審議政府議案，根本唔會停擺」。
+
+萬德豪問李收到文件後，曾否向黨資深顧問表示不同意？李指該段文字「其實就係反映黨嘅立場嘅彈性嘅存在，不過好模糊地存在」，因公民黨不支持「攬炒」，「佢都識講，『攬炒』會令到民不聊生」，但同時又有否決預算案的說法，「唔畀講『攬炒』又講反對財政預算案」，「兩者係矛盾嘅。」李指他有與顧問馬生談過該「立場上嘅彈性同矛盾」，馬針對其街舞藝術家和社工區議員身分，着李「講返我想講嘅嘢」。
+
+#### 論壇文件提勿太老實、勿有問必答 李指為論壇技巧、因論壇非100%講道理
+
+控方續展示「初選論壇（4/7錄影）」文件，法官關注寫有「X太老實 X有問必答」。李指是論壇技巧，「佢意思係唔好人哋問咩你就講晒咁多咁」，陳志全發笑。陳慶偉指，因此李是在誤導？李否認，陳追問何謂「X太老實」，李答「因為政治嘅論壇唔係講緊道理」，陳慶偉發笑，李遂更正「應該唔係講緊100%嘅道理」。李運騰微笑問，即有些問題並非真問題，而是陷阱？李說「可以咁樣講」。
+
+陳慶偉續問，李是說他們不要相信政治人物所說的話？李指政治人物發言時要強調一些訊息，喚起更多關注，「依啲都可以好有理性基礎，但係喺論壇上面，因為個時間好短，可能叫你十秒回應一個好大嘅議題，咁你就要記得自己好想畀公眾知道嘅理念。」李運騰說，基本上就是說他想說的話，李說「其實我係咁理解嘅」。法官陳仲衡續說，「不要在庭上這樣做，重要是先答問題，之後再提供解釋」，旁聽發笑。
+
+#### 「統一口徑」提35+後以否決權迫政權落實五大訴求 李稱從無講過也無採納
+
+萬德豪續說，「我的問題不是一個陷阱，而是一個真正的問題」，法官陳慶偉和陳志全發笑。控方續展示李的論壇文件，提到：「入到立法會第一件事想做啲咩？35+後以否決權迫令政權落實五大訴求，係我哋當今出選人嘅共識。」李解釋「呢個係抄返（黨）LTT（Line to take），一模一樣」。
+
+萬續向李指出，他當時知道初選候選人有共識否決預算案爭取五大訴求，惟陳慶偉指控方要記得李沒有出席過協調會。李續回應他不知道，亦不同意控方指他知道，「因為我連黨入面都觀察到有唔同立場，民主派陣營亦都有唔同嘅講法，我嘅論壇入面都顯示緊呢個事實。」
+
+李運騰追問，李事實上曾否於選舉論壇採納該句「Line to take」？李說：「從來冇講過亦從來冇採納過。」萬德豪問李沒有講過是否因為無人這樣問，惟陳慶偉即打斷指留待陳詞。
+
+#### 官質疑如可自由偏離、制定統一口徑有何意思 李：原則性展示
+
+控方續引文件提到「能夠做到議會過半真係好重要，咁我哋先可以反制暴政，喺議會裡面擋住23條呢啲惡法，另一方面可以透過否決所有政府提出嘅議案同撥款，包括財政預算案，逼使政府重啟政改、落實五大訴求」。李指該句「都係抄（黨）LLT，都係馬生嘅作品」。
+
+李運騰問，所以這是馬生想李說的話？李說不肯定，但指團隊會將相關資料放在一起給他看，他不記得有否跟馬說不會於論壇提，「但最尾我係冇講嘅一定。」萬德豪續問，而否決財案的部分一直在所有類似文件出現？李同意，指「我理解都係抄黨嘅 LTT，亦都有我冇講嘅部分」。
+
+李運騰指，有趣地所有公民黨參選人也有相同的統一口徑，那如他們可以自由偏離黨的統一口徑，那制定統一口徑有什麼意思？（“... free to deviate from the LTT, then what’s the point of having one?”）李表示，「其實 LTT 係一個展示緊黨嘅一啲態度為先，但實際上嘅講法呢，每個候選人嘅身分、佢所代表嘅業界利益，同埋地區直選嘅區情，都係會好唔一樣。」
+
+陳仲衡打斷指，因此有 LTT，但也有個別和不同（exemptions and disagreement）的情況？李說「係，可以咁理解，係有彈性」。李運騰指他明白有彈性，但若分歧大到根本連一個共同共識也沒有，「為何要有這個統一口徑？（“Why bother to have this line to take?”）」李說：「我理解為係一個原則性嘅展示，例如一國兩制⋯⋯」惟陳慶偉即打斷。
+
+#### 李無告訴公眾不跟黨立場否決 但指宣傳有暗示此訊息
+
+控方續展示李予信的論壇「Drilling Record」文件，提到「自己政綱／議題（夾黨）」，列出工廈、囚權、追究警暴等，李解釋即自己的政綱議題與黨議題「相夾到嘅地方」。李並解釋，「Drilling」指「media drilling」，是「一種練習嘅 session」，他會重複回答一些問題和重複自己想講的理念，「睇吓講得好唔好、有啲乜嘢改善、或者有啲咩嘢內容需要更正。」
+
+萬德豪最後問，李曾否告訴公眾他不會跟從黨立場，否決預算案以爭取五大訴求，李回應：「我冇咁樣講過，因為我有透過我嘅宣傳 imply 一個咁嘅訊息。」萬最後指出控方案情，指李當選後有意跟從黨立場，串謀與其他被告取得立會過半，無差別否決預算案，迫使政府回應五大訴求，李不同意。萬再指李有意顛覆國家政權，李答：「我無意顛覆國家政權。」
+
+#### 李作供完畢 余慧明將作供
+
+控方盤問完結，大律師關文渭沒有覆問，李予信案情完結。代表本案最後一名被告余慧明的大律師石書銘表示，余會作供，料需時少於兩天，問現在抑或明日開始？法官陳慶偉指明日開始，林卓廷說：「吓？」案件明早續審。
+
+散庭時，有旁聽人士向余慧明喊：「加油呀！努力呀！聽日見！」
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-112.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-112.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ffdcdc90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-112.md
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 112 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 余慧明指參選因醫護罷工 感無足夠話語權政府「唔會理我」
+- 余慧明指提「攬炒」為擺高姿態與政府談判：我哋從來都係有得傾
+- 余慧明稱「真普選」可解困局 官指英首相也非普選產生
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/tvaJakE.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（23日）踏入審訊第112天。本案最後一名被告、參選衞生服務界的前醫管局員工陣線主席余慧明開始作供，表示組織工會是她參與政治的開始，工會於2020年初「武漢肺炎」時發起工業行動要求封關，以保障市民性命安全及保護醫療系統免崩潰，惟醫管局拒回應訴求，工會要求與特首談判亦不果。余又指曾獲「中間人」行會成員林正財告知，擬將全面封關訴求包裝為「禁止世衞定為高危地區的人來港」向政府推銷，惟翌日出台卻僅為隔離措施。
+
+余形容當局回應的態度「絕對影響到」她之後參選的決定，明白到如果無足夠話語權，「政權或者掌權者係唔會同我傾、唔會理我」，因政府非民選產生；加上2019年政府對市民訴求視若無睹，「一味武力打壓示威者」，故選擇參選。余又指，曾擔心衞生服務界多於一名參選人會「鎅票」令建制得利，遂問戴耀廷能否「順便」辦衞生服務界初選。
+
+#### 余慧明開始作供 指組織工會是參與政治開始
+
+李予信昨作供完畢，今由本案最後一名被告、參選衞生服務界的前醫管局員工陣線主席余慧明作供。正還柙的余慧明，身穿棕色外套、黑色長裙，在兩名女懲教陪同下步向證人台，其代表大律師石書銘一度上前與余握手，余精神不俗表示：「我OK」旁聽親友亦向余說：「加油呀！」余握拳放胸口。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/9aq4zZa.png)
+▲ 余慧明（資料圖片）
+
+余宣誓後，接受大律師石書銘主問。余現年36歲，已婚，於香港出生和長大，2010年畢業於香港中文大學護理學系，成為註冊護士，並受僱於醫管局，於2011年成為威爾斯親王醫院深切治療部護士，2017年成為深切治療部專科護士，但同年轉為醫療信息管理助理主任，於醫管局總部工作。余確認，2019年前從沒有參與任何政治活動。石書銘一度問余為何會轉職，法官打斷問為何要知道，石解釋這與余為何參加政治和初選有關，但陳慶偉重申看不到如何有關。
+
+石改問余如何開始參與政治，余表示：「我認為係由我組織工會嘅開始，係我參與咗政治嘅開始。」余指她有參與醫管局員工陣線的籌委會，工會於2019年12月4日刊憲成立，余其後獲理事會選為主席。余並指，當時醫管局有約8萬名員工，工會成立初期有約1,000名會員，而2020年1月底宣布罷工時，會員人數曾上升到接近2萬人的高峰。石欲問余發起工會的原因，惟陳慶偉再打斷說「no」，李運騰亦不准發問，着問下一題。石書銘指那與余涉足政治有關，惟二人再搖頭。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/utoV1sa.png)
+▲ 醫管局員工陣線 2019年12月31日記者招待會（資料圖片）
+
+#### 余指2020年1月「武漢肺炎」消息傳出 罷工為促封關保醫療系統及市民性命安全
+
+被問工業行動的主要議題，余慧明解釋在2020年1月時，「我哋其實已經留意到中國武漢嗰邊，有一個武漢肺炎嘅疫情消息出現咗」，他們望用很和平的手法，如曾發公開信予政府和醫管局望正視問題，因當時病毒未流入香港。而發動工業行動最主要原因，「都係想保障返香港市民嘅性命安全，同埋保護返香港醫療系統避免崩潰嘅狀態嘅，所以我哋希望醫管局同埋政府可以回應我哋嘅訴求，及早進行封關嘅。」
+
+余並解釋，根據會章，「即使我哋理事會決定咗一個工業行動，我哋都要召開一個特別會員大會……因為經過咗一個合法嘅程序……」，惟法官陳慶偉打斷，指認為與案無關，「我們不是就COVID展開獨立調查。」石書銘再問余有否獲會員授權，惟陳慶偉打斷着問下一題。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/BHg21Cf.png)
+▲ 2020年2月3日醫護罷工第一日，醫管局員工陣線到醫管局大樓與局方對話。（資料圖片）
+
+#### 余指醫管局及政府回應態度「絕對影響」其參選決定、曾收中間人林正財訊息
+
+余續指，罷工於2月3日開始，2月7日結束，期間曾與政府和醫管局磋商，「基於佢哋回應嘅態度，絕對影響到我之後參選嘅決定。」余指罷工前曾用電郵邀請時任食物及衞生局局長陳肇始與他們傾，但不獲回應；至罷工開始，醫管局最初接受與他們進行公開對話，但對話中「佢係完全冇直接回應我哋嘅訴求，只係不停咁遊花園」，故當晚宣布談判破裂，進行第二階段罷工。余當時亦認為在封關議題上，「淨係醫管局係話唔到事」，故想邀請時任特首兼抗疫督導委員會主席林鄭月娥「落嚟同我哋一齊傾」，但最終收到醫管局電郵指「特首係唔會同我哋傾」。
+
+余亦透露，於罷工第二天宣布翌日會去特首辦找特首時，曾收到她認為是代表政府的中間人透過一位「我認為係比較接近民主派嘅醫生嘅中間人」的訊息，在法官追問下指是時任行政會議成員林正財。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/CVG4VDo.png)
+▲ 時任行政會議成員 林正財（資料圖片）
+
+余指林當時向她表示，會嘗試將全面封關的說法包裝成另一個意思相若的措施，向政府推銷，林當時說法是「禁止由世衞公布嘅高危地方嘅旅客進入香港」，余認為可以接受。惟第二日政策出台，卻轉為由內地來港人士要進行14天強制隔離，余認為「同我哋嘅預期係有落差」，因此於罷工第三天繼續罷工爭取訴求。余解釋時，李運騰一度着她毋須解釋，指「我們沒有興趣，我們不是審這個議題」。
+
+#### 余指無法進一步爭取封關、順應會員民主投票結果結束罷工
+
+余慧明強調，「我一直都係想同政府同埋醫管局溝通，而唔係單方面進行一個工業行動。」罷工終於2月7日結束，余解釋最後一日要決定會否延長罷工繼續爭取訴求時，曾號召會員到醫管局總部嘗試與高層對話，並到他們辦公室門外靜坐等他們出來，但「佢哋一直將我哋拒諸門外」。
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/a9HfBNK.png)
+▲ 2020年2月7日醫護罷工最後一日，醫管局員工陣線到醫管局總部門外靜坐。（資料圖片）
+
+余指「當時我哋感到極度嘅失望同埋唔甘心」，但認為「已經冇辦法爭取到進一步嘅封關」，同時亦了解有部分會員對病人擔心，「佢哋放唔低喺病房繼續作戰緊嘅同事」，故最終發起投票表決，最終7千多名會員投票，有4千多票反對、3千多票贊成，「所以我哋順應咗呢個民主投票嘅結果，結束咗罷工。」
+
+#### 余解釋參選是因無足夠話語權政權「唔會理我」、但立會過半可有話語權
+
+余慧明續指，她罷工後開始考慮參選立法會，解釋參選有兩個原因，其一是「基於我喺2019年見證到政府對市民嘅訴求視若無睹，只係一味武力打壓示威者」；其二是罷工中她與政府和醫管局直接交手的經驗，「令我明白到一個道理係，如果我冇一個足夠嘅話語權呢，政權或者掌權者係唔會同我傾、唔會理我嘅。」
+
+李運騰問，余慧明認為政府只有在被迫時才會聆聽意見？余答：「我認為佢哋唔聽我哋嘅理由，係因為佢唔係一個民選嘅政府」，「我嘅睇法係，要有足夠嘅話語權，佢先會望到我哋囉。」余並在法官陳仲衡追問下解釋，「民選政府」就是雙普選下，行政長官產生方法是一人一票選出，「依個政府就會真正向市民問責囉。」
+
+余續指，當時衞生服務界議員為香港護士協會的李國麟，他並非工會成員，理解為獨立人士。而余決定參選時，曾與工會同事討論參選地區直選抑或功能組別，但最後分析會員基礎，大部分為衞生服務界選民，加上對李國麟表現「唔滿意」，故於3月中時決定參選立法會衞生服務界。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/cBHPPlN.png)
+▲ 時任衞生服務界議員 李國麟（資料圖片）
+
+余指當時尚未留意到有初選，也無看過戴耀廷和區諾軒的任何文章，但連登和 Telegram 群組等也有討論立會過半和「35+」，亦有很多文章分析如民主派於議會過半就可取得立法會控制權，「就有一個話語權喺度，咁依個正正就係我哋想要嘅嘢。」余當時也無與其他民主派候選人討論。
+
+#### 余：「話語權」指35+後有權力反客為主討論「五大訴求」
+
+余慧明其後解釋，「話語權」是指當民主派取得35席後，「我哋係有一個權力可以 set 到一啲 agenda，咁我哋就唔係再跟住政府嘅 flow，唔係再跟住政府嘅 agenda 去做一啲審議，而係我哋反客為主，拎返五大訴求上嚟，做一個審議」，同意即民主派會與政府談判。
+
+李運騰關注，若取不到35+，民主派還會有話語權嗎？余指認為話語權即談判籌碼，如失去否決權，「我認為係冇咗咁大個籌碼，個話語權係少咗。」不過余指，「個話語權少咗但唔等於冇嘅」，「因為我仍然係可以擺出一個高姿態去同政府去談判，只不過同罷工嗰時一樣啦，如果我冇一個話語權，政府咪可以選擇唔理我囉。」
+
+#### 余指曾聯絡戴耀廷提出能否「順便」辦衞生服務界初選、認為是「搭單」
+
+至於參與初選的經過，余指2020年4月時估計時任衞生服務界議員李國麟會競逐連任，亦知道劉凱文有意參選，但該界別只有一席，如多於一位參選人就會造成「鎅票」，「鷸蚌相爭、建制得利」。余指當時於網上論壇的新聞，留意到戴耀廷在地區直選正辦初選，故「打算可唔可以借助到佢哋個平台，順便搞埋衞生服務界嘅初選」，而她無特別留意戴的其他主張。
+
+余遂從工會成員取得戴耀廷電話，向戴發訊息看有否可能在辦地區直選初選時順便辦衞生服務界初選，余不記得戴的確實回應，但大意是「睇吓有冇依個可能性啦」。余指，至6月9日記者會戴耀廷宣布辦衞生服務界初選前，她沒有再聯絡戴，「因為我覺得我哋只係搭單去搞初選啦，如果搞得成，咪去囉；如果搞唔成嘅，咁可能到時再算。」
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/6XKeGpb.png)
+▲ 劉凱文參加初選廣告（資料圖片）
+
+余又指5月中曾接受《立場新聞》專訪，有齊4位衞生服務界潛在候選人，故她感覺該界別「應該係搞得成初選」。石書銘問，那余期間有與其他「被指為組織者（alleged organizer）」區諾軒、趙家賢和鍾錦麟溝通嗎？陳慶偉打斷指「他們不是被指為組織者，他們是組織者」，余慧明表示沒有。余亦沒有與另外3人討論初選。
+
+
+![image09](https://i.imgur.com/XG6q22f.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（23日）踏入審訊第112天。余慧明繼續作供，就其文章〈踏上這攬炒旅途〉，余解釋是為爭取五大訴求，並理解「攬炒」是借助電影對白「if we burn, you burn with us」，當時市民「已經畀政權燒着緊」，她望以任何合法方法增加政府拒聽民意的代價，即使或利益受損、「冇咗份工」；又指「攬炒」雖帶來雙輸局面，但「始作俑者係政府」。余又強調其目標並非「攬炒」，而是爭取雙普選，提出「攬炒」和否決所有議案並非「恐嚇」，是擺出高姿態與政府談判。余強調「我哋從來都係有得傾」，關鍵是政府是否願放下身段聆聽民意，若政府拒談判便會反對預算案。
+
+就文中提到「向醫管局及政權作出強而有力的控訴」，余直言「7.21、8.31、10.1，我哋真係唔可以好似政府咁話要向前看就 move on 囉」，並指運動中「冇一個政府官員要問責落台」、「冇一個警員要為自己嘅暴力行為負上責任」，但有很多示威者被拘控。余不認為只有市民一方要承受代價，而她願意嘗試用任何方式令政府「直視民意」。
+
+#### 余指「攬炒」為即使利益受損仍要增加政府代價、始作俑者為政府
+
+參選衞生服務界的前醫管局員工陣線主席余慧明續作供，辯方展示3月31日於《香港獨立媒體》發布的〈踏上這攬炒旅途〉，余指約於3月30日於個人 Facebook 專頁發布，其後獨媒無獲其授權轉載，但文章應完整及準確。而她這麼早撰文，「純粹為正選鋪路」，但當時未知有初選，並在法官詢問下指可將文章解讀為參選宣言。
+
+被問及標題的意思，余解釋她將「爭取五大訴求」比喻為一個旅途，若政府繼續堅持不回應民意，爭取五大訴求的時間「可能會好長」；至於使用「攬炒」，是因爭取五大訴求時，「我係願意嘗試用任何合法嘅方法，即使個過程之中我可能會利益受損，可能會冇咗份工，都要增加政府拒絕聆聽民意嘅代價。」
+
+余續指，她並不是從戴耀廷借用「攬炒」一詞，解釋該字眼於2019年已曾出現，當時網上很多人已有使用，其文章亦與3月25日公民黨記者會和3月26日戴耀廷召開的35+記者會無關。
+
+#### 余指「攬炒」借助「if we burn, you burn with us」 指望在法律框架下令政府回應民意
+
+余並解釋她理解2019年社會運動中「攬炒」的意思，「係借助咗一個電影嘅對白：“If we burn, you burn with us.”。」李運騰問是《飢餓遊戲》的對白？余同意，指認為當時的市民「係已經畀政權燒着緊」，「因為佢完全唔理市民嘅意見、唔聆聽市民嘅聲音，強行推動《逃犯條例》嘅修訂，令到事件演變成越嚟越多嘅衝突。」
+
+余續指，她理解「you burn with us」，是示威者或市民角度「要令到政權都付出代價」，如發動大三罷令政府「面對一個好重大嘅政治壓力」，而該行動也是《基本法》保障下的權利和自由。余強調，她希望以「非暴力」的方法，在法律容許的框架下做一些抗爭，令政府聆聽民意、回應訴求。
+
+法官陳仲衡問，余是談及雙輸局面？余說：「其實呢個唔係我想要，我想要嘅係一個 win-win」，陳慶偉笑出聲。李運騰指即使余不想，但「攬炒」基本上就是談及一個雙輸局面。余表示明白，但強調「依個局面點解會產生，係因為政府唔聆聽民意囉」，李追問但結果會是雙輸？余說：「係，但係個始作俑者係政府。」
+
+余並指，罷工時曾形容「政府攬炒緊我哋香港市民大眾」，到特首辦示威時亦曾高舉「停止攬炒」的標語，望政府封關保障市民利益。
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/pJgCTj5.png)
+▲ 2020年2月5日醫護罷工第三日，醫管局員工陣線到特首辦示威。（資料圖片）
+
+#### 余指議會內「攬炒」非目標 目標為爭雙普選
+
+就文章的主要訊息，余指是「議會內嘅抗爭，我哋可以做到啲咩……而議會外又有啲咩抗爭嘅手法」，並指出文中一段：「『攬炒』議會，爭取35席後為手段，然後全面否決所有政府提出的議案為目的，藉此觸發基本法第五十條，令特首宣佈解散立法會，制造憲政危機，此為制度內的『攬炒』。與此同時，制度外的『攬炒』就要透過組織『大三罷』，達成罷工、罷市、罷課，令社會停擺，務求煞停一切暴政，達致制度性的改革，再共同建構重光後的香港。」
+
+余解釋，議會內「攬炒」是要令政府付出代價，「佢唔可以任意通過佢想過嘅議案」；但同時市民和議員都要付出代價，可能失去「派糖」議案如消費券。惟余強調，「議會內嘅『攬炒』，唔係我想要嘅目標」，「我嘅最終目標係爭取到雙普選」，政府之後就可推行為民造福的政策，而非「惡法」和「大白象工程」。
+
+余又預期在否決預算案前，「政府已經會同我哋傾」，因當立法會選舉結果一公布，「政府其實已經會睇到民主派係攞到幾多席，就等於我哋攞到幾多話語權」，談判亦會開始。李運騰問，即最好是民主派不用否決財案？余同意，重申罷工時曾講過無數次，「如果政府肯封關嘅話，醫護人員係唔會罷工。」
+
+#### 余指採取高姿態談判手法非恐嚇 指「我哋從來都係有得傾」
+
+法官陳仲衡關注，余慧明提到爭取35席為「手段」，全面否決所有政府議案為「目的」，余承認「呢度係寫得唔好」，因其最終目的「唔係想要否決所有議案」，而是望煞停暴政，達致制度性改革。而她認為「暴政」是拒絕聆聽人民聲音、粗暴打壓人民、面對反對聲音時「解決方法係解決提出問題嘅人」、並推行違背港人意願的政策。石書銘問，她是形容施政態度抑或一個特定政府？余指是施政態度。
+
+余文中亦指泛民主張的「又傾又砌」應畫上句號，她解釋過往泛民主派與政府談判時「意志唔夠堅定、好易作出退讓」，亦「好易比人睇穿佢嘅底牌」，舉例李國麟於2015年政府「綑綁式銷售」購買水炮車的財政預算案上曾投贊成，但余認為新一屆立法會應要由一些「意志比較堅定」的議員入立法會爭取五大訴求，令政府向市民問責。
+
+![image11](https://i.imgur.com/Q9pjjdd.jpg)
+▲ 李國麟（右一）（資料圖片）
+
+李運騰問，即余慧明認為就五大訴求不能退讓？余否認，指「我係採取一個高姿態嘅談判手法」。李運騰追問，即余會以「攬炒」的恐嚇（threat）迫使政府回應五大訴求？余說「呢個只係一個姿態，唔係一個恐嚇」，強調「我哋從來都係有得傾嘅，只不過係政府擺出一個高姿態。」李運騰問，那余的做法與「又傾又砌」有何分別？余指「我認為我嘅意志係會比佢哋更加堅定」。
+
+李運騰再問余會否讓步，余解釋：「我哋一直高舉住我哋要爭取五大訴求，但我認為最重要嘅係爭取到雙普選，因為只要爭取到雙普選之後，我認為其他嘅訴求都可以解決」，同意雙普選是她的底線。余續指，但何謂實行真普選，「依度係有得傾嘅，因為我知道雙普選唔會話叮一聲，第二日就變到出嚟畀我，但起碼我要政府畀到一個好實在嘅時間表畀我。」
+
+#### 余自言「先砌後傾」、若政府拒絕談判會對預算案投反對票
+
+余續確認，文章無明確表示她會與政府談判，因想向選民展示她會採取高姿態的行為作談判手段，「我會形容自己係先砌後傾」。陳仲衡指余沒有寫出來，余說「因為我怕咁樣寫出嚟呢，就會令到人哋覺得我同啲泛民冇分別囉」，陳志全、林卓廷和法官陳慶偉等發笑。
+
+陳慶偉問，但事實上余與泛民無分別？余說「我認為我自己會比佢哋企得更硬㗎」，指因泛民可因一些民生議題妥協，但她主要想向選民解釋「如果我哋制度上一日唔改變嘅話，我哋都搵唔到一個解決嘅方法」，並指「政治實際上操作，你係冇辦法避免傾呢樣嘢」。
+
+陳慶偉質疑她是欺騙公眾、玩文字遊戲，余說：「唔係呀，因為我真係會投反對票囉，係有啲泛民連反對票都唔敢投。」陳仲衡問余是談及預算案？余說：「係呀」，同意其底線就是雙普選。陳慶偉續問「先砌後傾」，即余會不論內容，先否決預算案？余不同意，指因對她而言「『砌』係擺出一個好高嘅姿態，事先宣揚我會反對一切議案」。陳慶偉指即她不會這樣做，余說「咁要視乎政府係採取咩態度回應囉」。陳問，若政府拒絕與他們談判，余會對預算案投反對票？余答：「係呀，會呀。」
+
+#### 余指「憲政危機」主導權從來在政府手、無留意是戴耀廷主意
+
+余另解釋，「憲政危機」是當民主派取得35席，政府仍拒回應民意，就會產生行政和立法機關的分歧局面，政府必須面對很大政治壓力，並要透過兩次否決預算案令特首解散立法會及下台的《基本法》機制解決。李運騰指那並非余自己想出來，她由其他地方讀到？余同意，重申是論壇和 Telegram 的討論，她自己也有看過《基本法》相關條文，但無留意是戴耀廷主意，並強調觸發憲政危機的主導權「從來都喺政府手入面」。
+
+#### 余指三罷是政府不回應訴求結果、如政府願聽民意願停三罷與政府傾
+
+就文中提及：「我與同伴萌生組織工會的念頭，希望團結有共同理念的同業，凝聚力量發動全民三罷，令社會停擺，向醫管局及政權作出強而有力的控訴。」余解釋，「令社會停擺」是她想像全民三罷會發生的事，如巴士地鐵停駛、經濟活動停止。李運騰指余還談及罷課，基本上是日常生活停擺。余同意，但強調「呢樣嘢其實唔係我哋想見到，不過政府唔回應訴求嘅時候，呢個係最壞嘅結果囉」。
+
+余重申，文章主軸是要爭取五大訴求，「我會嘗試係用法律容嘅框架之下，作出我嘅抗爭。咁當然啦，如果政府係隨時聆聽民意嘅話，我哋係願意停止做呢啲三罷，而係同政府傾囉。但重點就係要政府放低佢嘅身段，放低佢傲慢嘅態度，嚟同我哋展開對話囉。」
+
+#### 余控訴反修例無警員為警暴負責、無官員問責下台 指林鄭應下台
+
+至於「向醫管局及政權作出強而有力的控訴」，就向政權的控訴，余指2019年示威者上街示威，「換嚟嘅係政府越嚟越高壓嘅手段去鎮壓，然後同市民講，我哋要回復正常。」惟余指，「我認為依樣嘢唔可以得過且過，即係發生過嘅事，7.21、8.31、10.1，我哋真係唔可以好似政府咁話要向前看就 move on 囉。」
+
+余續說：「喺依場運動當中，冇一個政府官員要問責落台，亦冇一個警員要為自己嘅暴力行為負上責任，但同時間，已經有好多示威者被拘捕、被檢控，我認為依個係冇辦法接受嘅，我唔認為點解淨係市民一方要承受個代價」，因此她提「控訴」，是「我係願意嘗試用任何嘅方式，令到呢個政府係要直視民意囉」。
+
+至於對醫管局的控訴，余指2019年，「佢要求我哋員工要政治中立，但係發生理大事件嘅時候，啲催淚彈水炮車喺QEH（伊利沙伯醫院）外面橫飛嘅時候，佢冇理過嗰度返工放工嘅員工嘅安全，佢亦都冇理過喺病房硬食TG嘅病人，只係擺幾部空氣清新機就算，佢從來冇對警暴作出任何譴責，我認為醫管局係企咗喺政權嘅一邊。」
+
+到了2020年，「我認為佢對於罷工嘅處理手法非常之差劣，隨後疫情嘅處理亦都反應好緩慢，佢係置公眾利益於不顧，所以我認為，人工比特首仲要高嘅醫管局行政總裁，應該喺疫情之後落台問責。」
+
+法官陳仲衡問，那特首呢？她也應下台嗎？余說「依個我係認為係嘅」，重申「我爭取嘅雙普選，係要選出一個民選嘅政府」，因林鄭當時並非民選政權。石書銘一度問，余曾提到7.21、8.31、10.1，認為法庭應知悉，惟陳慶偉打斷表示不關心，陳仲衡亦指只會留意相關的證據。
+
+
+![image12](https://i.imgur.com/RgBrAga.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（23日）踏入審訊第112天。余慧明表示，認為在政府漠視民意、與市民僵持不下的情況下，制度上的變革，即透過一人一票選出立法會和特首的「真普選」，可反映民意並解決困局，並強調雙普選從來都是《基本法》承諾。法官陳慶偉聞言以英國脫歐為例，指支持和反對者相差甚微，難言政府是反映所有人民意；又指民主制度不一定要普選，有國家並非實行普選也不會被視為較不民主，舉例英國首相並非由普選產生，上議院亦毫不民主，何桂藍聞言大笑。余慧明回應，起碼外國可辦公投彰顯民意，「我哋連公投都冇」；又指英國議會也有很多議員是民選，惟香港在「完善選舉制度」下的議會，直選議席更少。
+
+#### 余稱「破局」為以雙普選突破政府市民僵局、強調為《基本法》承諾
+
+參選衞生服務界的前醫管局員工陣線主席余慧明續作供，就2020年3月於《獨媒》刊出的〈踏上這攬炒旅途〉一文，提及「要破局，必須由制度上的變革開始，甚至把制度推倒重來也在所不惜。今年立法會選舉可能是破舊立新的好時機」，被問「破局」意思，余解釋當時政府和市民爭持不下，政府漠視民意、以暴力鎮壓人民，市民就用暴力回應武力鎮壓，余不想見到此僵持局面，故望尋求突破，並認為制度上的變革，即她一直很想追求的「真普選」，「係可以解決依個困局。」
+
+余續指將「制度推倒重來」，是因現時制度不夠好，政府和立法會未能完全反映民意，故望以雙普選的新制度取代舊制度，即一人一票選出特首和立法會議員。惟余強調，「呢個新嘅制度，從來都係《基本法》承諾，而唔係我自己突然間變出嚟想要嘅」，形容是在《基本法》合法制度內爭取「一個制度嘅重置」，「唔係一個武力、亦都唔係一個制度之外嘅 mechanism。」
+
+法官陳仲衡關注，若余只是望在制度框架內改革，為何提及在所不惜把制度推倒重來。余強調，其意思並非將香港整個制度、即三權分立的局面推倒重來，只是希望特首和立法會議席均透過普選產生，特首仍須中央任命、向中央負責，但同時「都要向下面嘅市民負責任」。余亦指，推倒重來與香港是中國的一部分、及中央政府權力架構無關。
+
+#### 余稱真普選可反映民意 官指英首相亦非普選產生
+
+而就「比起追求假希望，不如尋求真『攬炒』，或許才會為香港帶來一線生機」，余解釋假希望是即使市民「乜都唔做」，政府也會突然作出妥協、「突然回應晒五大訴求」，但她認為這機會是零；而尋求真「攬炒」就是在議會內外的攬炒，望令政府受壓，面對「堅持己見」或「順應民意」的局面。李運騰問即「攬炒」是可能？余指認為要到政府拒絕聆聽民意，「好極端嘅狀態」下才會發生。李追問基於余的描述，政府當時還不夠極端嗎？余說：「如果係夠極端嘅話，應該真係出現咗大三罷。」
+
+陳慶偉說還有一個可能，就是不是所有人都同意余的立場。余表示明白，因此認為追求真普選是解決公平性問題的方法，因支持追求民主和五大訴求的人，應可揀選較貼近民主派的特首；但若局勢轉變便可能揀選建制派特首，「正正就係反映緊民意」。陳慶偉問，所以余是追求更民主的制度？余說「當然」。陳慶偉指那不一定是普選，指「更民主」可以指除普選外的任何東西，余回應「但係我暫時淨係認為普選先至可以解決到嗰個局勢嘅問題」。
+
+陳說香港的情況是這樣，因《基本法》寫明普選，但也有國家沒有實行普選，但不會視為較不民主。余回應視乎政府施政態度，「如果佢係可以真正反映民意嘅……」，不過陳慶偉打斷說那很困難，指就英國脫歐公投，支持和反對兩者相差不足1%，無論如何也不能說政府反映所有市民的民意，指是互相讓步（give and take）和制度的問題。余說：「但起碼外國有個公投可以令到民意得以彰顯，我哋連公投都冇」。
+
+陳指只是以此為例子，他不記得英國曾辦過多少次公投，又說「例如在英國，首相並非由普選產生」，被告欄的何桂藍聞言即大笑出聲，再以手掩口。陳續指，英國國會分為上議院和下議院，但上議院毫不民主（by no means democratic）；但亦指他同意余，在香港的情況，《基本法》列明最終會有普選。余表示明白，但指「人哋個議會都有好多議員係民選出嚟啦」。陳慶偉指下議院當然全部民選，但上議院不然，余再說：「我哋完善選舉制度之後嘅議會，直選議席係更加少。」辯方續就其他問題發問。
+
+翻查資料，2016年的英國脫歐公投，支持脫歐為51.89%，支持留下為48.11%，兩者相差3.78%。而英國採用直接選舉制，由議員選出約650個下議院議員，如一個黨擁有絕對多數議員，該黨將組成下屆政府，該黨黨魁會成為首相。至於英國上議院有約780名議員，他們非經選舉產生，包括神職人員和貴族，但權力較下議院小。
+
+#### 余稱2019年後功能組別不可只着眼業界利益、應將港人利益擺先
+
+此外，余表示文中一個很重要的訊息，就是鼓勵擁有功能組別資格的選民，由超區轉回功能組別，解釋因4月2日是申請的限期。陳仲衡關注文中哪處提及，余引述她提到：「所有立法會議會席位包括功能組別都不再屬於某界別利益，而應向全港市民問責」，又指「如果要爭取個話語權，梗係攞到越多席位越好啦」。
+
+李運騰指，該句看來是着選民不應只看業界利益。余同意，指在立法會普選下，所有議席均應由直選產生。李追問，似乎余是指她投票時或會違背業界利益，因認為那代表更大更廣的公眾利益？余同意，指「經歷過2019年社會事件之後，我認為即使係功能組別都唔可以淨係着眼於自己嘅業界利益」，功能組別「應該要將香港人嘅利益擺先」，而其後訪問也有提到若業界利益與公眾有矛盾時會如何投票。
+
+#### 余指「光復香港」是真正實行港人治港
+
+而就文中提到：「這是一個考驗耐性與決心的時代，要進行這場時代革命，就看大家對光復香港有多大耐性與決心。」余表示由2019年開始，「我哋一直爭取制度上嘅改革，係一場革命」，故稱呼該場運動為「時代革命」。至於「光復香港」，余形容是「令到以香港人優先、真正實行港人治港高度自治方針嘅香港」。
+
+案件明早續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-24-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-113.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-24-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-113.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-24-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-113.md
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 113 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 余慧明指中共立《國安法》「炒熟香港人」 官質疑煽動仇恨
+- 余慧明稱《國安法》為「惡法」 官：就算唔鍾意都唔可以觸犯
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/5Ia2r70.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（24日）踏入審訊第113天。余慧明繼續作供，就《國安法》宣布實施後所撰的〈迷霧裡 黑夜終於響起號角聲〉，余解釋撰文是望港人「唔好對《國安法》淨係得個恐懼」，而是應繼續思考如何合法抗爭。法官陳仲衡關注文中「中共已按捺不住直接炒熟香港人」是否煽動對中共的仇恨，余否認，指只是陳述中共將《國安法》「加插」在《基本法》附件三，無經本地諮詢便在港實施；又形容是「中共單方面炒香港人」，嚇怕外資、令經濟不穩，猶如向港人開戰。余亦指很多港人不贊成《國安法》，但港府無將意見向中央表達，法官李運騰笑說報紙每天都有報導。
+
+余又表示，曾預期被DQ和取消選舉，但無想過「連議會都未入去就拉人」；她亦強調若政府拒絕談判，會反對所有議案，「我認為投下一票反對票係冇錯㗎。」余亦確認衞生服務界無召開過協調會議，她不曾收過及看過協調文件，最終亦因選民資格認證爭議令該界別初選結果不具約束力。
+
+#### 余稱衞生服務界無召協調會議、不曾收過及看過界別協調文件
+
+參選衞生服務界的前醫管局員工陣線主席余慧明繼續作供，余昨稱2020年4月曾問戴耀廷能否「順便」辦衞生服務界初選，獲戴回覆視乎可能性。她今續確認6月9日前無與組織者和其他候選人見面，她是當天記者會後，才獲競選團隊告知戴會上宣布衞生服務界也會有初選。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/emNwJ37.png)
+▲ 2020年6月9日 35+記者會（資料圖片）
+
+余又指，衞生服務界無開過協調會議，戴耀廷亦沒有與她提過其他選區討論過的題目；就「35+計劃」和「民主派衞生服務界協調機制協議」文件，余被捕前均無收過也無看過，而就文件所有內容，「我哋都冇傾過點樣可以代表到我哋有個協議喺度」，因她向戴稱想辦初選的原因，只是想選出一人代表民主派出選。
+
+就文件提及衞生服務界有兩個指定票站，余指戴耀廷原曾提及有4個，但因街工退出初選而減至3個，戴有在6月24日創立的衞生服務界 WhatsApp 群組提及，群組成員還包括余慧明、李國麟、劉凱文、袁偉傑4名候選人，及趙家賢、鍾錦麟和時任民主動力總幹事黎敬輝，余同意該群組是與組織者溝通的唯一渠道。
+
+#### 余稱無就替補及棄選機制與組織者討論、棄選機制無協議
+
+就替補機制和棄選機制，余指無與組織者討論，但她認為如勝出後不幸被DQ，「我係應該可以指明另一個人去代替我出選」，同意即「靈童制」，不過她庭上才知道此名字；又指她於初選後曾約其他候選人開會，但只得劉凱文出席，她有向劉提出。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/tJ0M1lk.png)
+▲ 劉凱文（資料圖片）
+
+余亦指就棄選機制，即落敗者不准參與正式選舉，並沒有協議，她認為有人「輸咗初選都照參選」的情況「避免唔到」，「但我就可以出嚟話佢哋出嚟鎅票，咁既然大家都應該會譴責佢哋依個行徑嘅話，咁佢地就會輸囉。」陳慶偉發笑，李運騰亦說那或是余的願望，但有否與其他候選人達成協議？余說「協議唔到」，亦不知棄選機制是計劃的一部分。
+
+李運騰追問，余有從任何途徑得悉初選有棄選機制嗎？余說「我唔知『墨落無悔』算唔算」，但除此以外則沒有。陳慶偉問那「三投三不投」呢？余說沒有，稱接近投票日時才聽過，「但我冇關心佢呢個 programme 搞緊啲咩，因為我自己都好忙碌。」李運騰問余是否得悉「三投三不投」曾在《蘋果日報》賣頭版廣告，余指在審訊文件夾才看過。
+
+#### 余稱組織者決定初選結果無約束力、參與者無可奈何
+
+余其後表示，2020年7月10日、初選投票前一日，衞生服務界群組內4名初選參與者與組織者，曾就選民資格認證發生爭議，當時有四個方案，他們花很多時間討論，但「達唔成一個共識」，組織者最終決定用方案三，即投票者出示職員證就可證明是該界別人士，但初選結果對參選人「不具規範性」、「冇約束性」，並叫民主動力將決定發布給所有人，指衞生服務界初選結果「只供參考」。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/Myd0V4z.png)
+▲ 余慧明（資料圖片）
+
+余並指，「依個係大會主辦單位所選擇嘅結果，我哋係無可奈何囉」、「我哋都唔滿意㗎」，指她自己希望結果有約束性，而李國麟則無明確表示要有約束性。余並指事後曾發文解釋自己立場。
+
+#### 余稱「合法」抗爭為重要考慮、罷工曾問法律顧問意見
+
+辯方續展示余慧明5月23日於《香港獨立媒體網》刊出的〈迷霧裡 黑夜終於響起號角聲〉，余指同由她於 Facebook 專頁發布，獨媒轉載，撰文背景是當時人大已公布會就「港版國安法」立法，她「希望香港人唔好對《國安法》淨係得個恐懼」、「覺得做咩都冇用」，「應該繼續去思考點樣可以合法地抗爭」，「爭取我哋一直追求嘅民主、真普選。」
+
+余同意，「合法」對她來說是重要考慮，她在2020年初組織醫護罷工亦有考慮，「因為我始終係一個工會嘅代表，所以我好着重我自己做嘅嘢係咪符合法律嘅容許之下嘅」，而當時「為咗保障我啲會員」，她有確保整個罷工程序符合法律程序，亦有問過法律顧問意見。石書銘問，抗爭的合法性考慮對余有多重要？余微微發笑並湊前咪高峰：「好重要。」
+
+#### 余稱立《國安法》非「攬炒」、為中共「單方面炒香港人」
+
+就文章提及「中共已按捺不住直接炒熟香港人，任誰也不能置身事外」，法官陳仲衡關注，余用中共「炒熟」港人的字眼，會否煽動（stir up）對中共的仇恨？余不認為會，解釋因她只是陳述中共將《國安法》「加插」在《基本法》附件三的決定，即「唔需要經過本地嘅立法、亦都冇經過本地嘅一啲諮詢，直接就可以喺香港度實施」。
+
+惟陳仲衡質疑，余並非陳述事實，而是用「炒熟」一詞。余解釋，因當時有人用「攬炒」形容此行為，「但我唔認為依個係一個攬炒，因為依個係中共單方面炒香港人」，故使用「炒熟」，並解釋認為中共行為可能嚇怕外資、令經濟不穩定，令香港無法維持「國際大都會」的名譽。
+
+#### 余「奮力迎戰」對手為政府、「先傾後砌」為爭取「平等」對話機會
+
+就文章提到「面對中共赤裸裸上陣，香港人只可奮力迎戰。各路戰線，要堅持去做」，余解釋「奮力迎戰」指要繼續以不同戰線抗爭。李運騰指要戰鬥便需有對手，余的對手是誰？余思考了一會說：「當時嘅語境係政府囉，係拒絕聆聽民意嘅政府」，解釋因當時很多香港市民也不贊成《國安法》實施，「但香港政府係冇將依個意見表達畀中央。」李運騰笑說，「報紙每日都有報導。（“It was reported at the newspaper everyday.”）」
+
+李運騰續問，戰爭是關乎生死，余將政府視為對手，是排除任何談判的可能嗎？余說「絕對不是」，陳慶偉笑問，即「先砌後傾」？（余昨稱自己願談判，但會「先砌後傾」，解釋「砌」是擺出高姿態，事先宣揚反對一切議案。）
+
+余今重申，這是一種高姿態談判手段，「但係最重要係政府必須放下佢高高在上嘅身段，佢先可以同我哋一齊傾囉，即係我哋唔會關閉咗我哋嘅溝通大門。」陳慶問，即余為了令政府放低身段，會「先砌後傾」？余指認為是可行方法，指是要爭取一個「平等啲」的對話機會。
+
+#### 余稱反對所有議案為擺高姿態談判、認為「投下一票反對票係冇錯嘅」
+
+文章稱「當初要爭取議會過半，全面反枱，迫使政權解散立法會進行破局。這個目標一日未達成，一日亦要堅持，哪怕政權DQ也好，取消選舉亦好，目的只為向全界都揭示香港人已失去昔日人權與自由。」，余指「全面反枱」指她「會繼續全面將所有嘅議案係投反對票」，「我哋係要反客為主，將個話語權攞返去自己手上。」
+
+李運騰追問，余使用的語言如何表達她是準備好談判的訊息？余指無很明確展示，「因為我係要展示我要擺出一個好高嘅姿態，同政府談判。」李追問，會高到令人認為她不準備談判嗎？余指不會，舉例醫護罷工時他們與政府同樣擺出好高的姿態，「但係事實上，其實係有一個 negotiation 出現咗。」
+
+陳慶偉指那或是罷工的情況，但重申余文中無提「談判」，讀者或認為其主張與戴耀廷「攬炒十步」類似，令特首下台、國際制裁、中共倒台。余先指「我係冇睇過戴耀廷嗰個攬炒十部曲」，而且「我係想向選民同埋公眾展現我嘅決心，唔會輕易退讓，但我唔會將我嘅談判嘅策略都擺埋出嚟畀人睇㗎嘛」。
+
+法官陳仲衡問，但余是威脅（threat）政府談判？余即說：「我冇 threat 喎，我用『迫使』咋喎，如果你話用 threat，我應該話威脅政權解散（立法會）㗎啦喎」，指這是她對文字的理解。余續同意，她是迫使政府談判，向其訴求妥協。陳仲衡問，而如政府不這樣做，余就會做出文中所言的行為？余同意，指「我認為投下一票反對票係冇錯㗎」。
+
+#### 余稱曾預想DQ和取消選舉 但無想過「票都未投就拉」
+
+就「哪怕政權DQ也好，取消選舉亦好」，辯方問余慧明當時還預期政府採取其他行動嗎？余說「嗰陣時淨係諗到嗰兩樣嘢，冇諗過會拉人囉，即係連議會都未入去就拉人咁樣，即係票都未投就拉咁樣」，並在法官追問下指，即她成功當選並「喺投下反對票之前，已經畀人拉咗喇」。余又指，就她提及的有機會取消選舉「事實上亦都發生咗吖」。
+
+#### 余指要有心理準備爭民主路很長、和平抗爭亦消耗大體力
+
+至於「大家必須作好生理與心理準備，要不做順民，不再發聲；否則，便奮力迎接與中共的背水一戰！」，余解釋「心理準備」是要有準備「爭取民主之路會好長」；至於「生理準備」，「我絕對唔係話鼓吹緊大家要上街，即係街頭抗爭嗰啲」，而是進行和平的抗爭手法也會消耗很大體力。石書銘一度問是暴力抑或非暴力抗爭，余指是較暴力的示威，但強調「依樣嘢都係視乎返警方用暴力鎮壓」。
+
+余續解釋就和平抗爭，如罷工需要很多不同持分者溝通，包括醫管局高層、政府、會員、公眾和傳媒，該過程「好費心力」，尤其前兩者「唔聽我哋嘅說話」更費其心神。余又指如2019年6月16日的遊行，由起點行到終點也要至少6至8小時，如每星期都有，大家都需要一個「好強健嘅體魄」。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/KqmFGFv.png)
+▲ 2019年6月16日 民陣反送中遊行（資料圖片）
+
+#### 文章提「背水一戰」 余稱反抗不一定使用暴力、「戰爭都會有negotiation」
+
+就「奮力迎接與中共的背水一戰」，陳慶偉問是否即一條「不歸路（road with no return）」，因「背水」指身後有河流，只能向前戰鬥。余先說看不到此解說，又指向前行不代表一定要戰鬥，並解釋她是「首尾呼應」文中早前提到「面對中共赤裸裸上陣」。
+
+陳慶偉問，因此余也是談及「先砌後傾」？余一度不同意，指因中共已實施《國安法》，她比喻此行為「已經向香港人開戰喇」，而他們只是「做一個反抗」，不代表一定使用暴力行為，「咁你戰爭入面都會有 negotiation 啦。」陳說他就是提議余文章的意思也是「先砌後傾」，但余卻稱不同意，「我在給你出路（“I’m giving you a way out.”）」，余說：「OK，我 get 到喇」，多名被告發笑。
+
+辯方再問余是否預期談判，余重申「我係會有 negotiation」，無寫明是因不想將談判手段「擺埋出嚟畀人睇」，但又不想令公眾認為她很易退讓，不同意她無論如何也不會退讓。
+
+#### 余稱從無發表要求外國制裁言論
+
+至於文中提到「國際戰線」，余昨解釋是透過媒體向國際社會展示香港發生街頭運動、醫護於疫情罷工的原因，都是政府拒絕聆聽民意，而她望國際輿論令港府有壓力，如想維持香港國際都會地位和聲譽，就要停止高壓手段鎮壓人民、聆聽訴求。
+
+余今指，文中意思與昨日解釋相若，引起國際關注是其原意，「可以引到幾多關注就另計囉」，並強調「我從來都冇發表過要求外國制裁嘅言論」，只是希望政府感受到壓力下聆聽民意。
+
+#### 余指「政府無法運作」指公務員罷工、稱受《基本法》保障
+
+文中亦提到：「有效的三罷是不設時限的，直至社會停擺，政府無法運作，必須回應訴求為止」，就「政府無法運作」，余解釋是其想像，若公務員也參與罷工應會影響政府部門運作，但要視乎規模，亦同意是談判籌碼。石書銘問余有考慮合法性嗎？李運騰指余已回答不想違法，石追問余腦海中有無特定法例，惟李運騰指余並非法律專家，陳慶偉亦說「你是問她撰文時有無查詢香港的法律？現實點！」，石指她是問余的心態。
+
+余在雙方討論期間，一度答是《基本法》第27條（列明香港居民享有罷工的權利和自由），又主動說「我相信公務員都會有保障，因為《基本法》應該保障咗全香港人」，但陳慶偉指他們在跟余的代表律師說話，「我們不是在辦研討會」，李運騰亦重申辯方是問余無資格回應的法律問題。李其後改問，余當時認為公務員罷工是否合法，余說「絕對係」。石書銘欲再問為什麼，陳慶偉不准許，指余的理解或對或錯，而她將合法性放到最優先的位置。
+
+#### 余指訪問用字比自己立場更激進、無要求下架因會帶來「公關災難」
+
+李運騰續引余慧明4月22日刊於《香港獨立媒體》的訪問〈【專訪】從組織工會到走進議會 余慧明：我要真攬炒！〉，指訪問引述余稱「一定要用任何方法去推翻而家呢個政權、呢個政府，先可以做到一個改變」，問余有否被引述錯誤。
+
+余指訪問刊出前記者無給予她看，刊出後她獲發文章連結並閱讀，認為有些字眼「係比我嘅立場更加激進嘅」，而有些位置「我覺得係唔完全反映緊我當時表達嘅意思」，但她無要求修改或下架，因當時是競選階段，如這樣做會帶來「公關災難」，故選擇「冷處理」。余並指就該句話，她不肯定是否確切引述（exact quote），但肯定她有用過類似「推翻呢個制度」和要民選政府的字眼，而她認為「政權」等於政府，「推翻政權」等同「林鄭下台」。
+
+李運騰亦問題目中「我要真攬炒」是否余的說法，余說認為該標題是記者或編輯根據她早前文章〈踏上這攬炒旅途〉而擬定。
+
+#### 余稱望爭制度改革、林鄭下台無意思
+
+余又指，正如她3月的〈踏上這攬炒旅途〉也強調要爭取制度上改革，指「你純粹改咗個執政者，係冇意思嘅對我嚟講，因為林鄭落台，你搵個林鄭2.0上去，係冇改變過」。李運騰問，但若那人願意對話呢？余指「咁依個可能係一個改變嚟嘅」，辯方再問如制度一樣，但在位者願意對話，余還堅持要推翻制度嗎？余回應認為她在爭取一個較民主、公平的制度，「咁當然我都會願意同佢傾咗先，睇吓佢係咩態度。」
+
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/68UTBa5.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（24日）踏入審訊第113天。余慧明繼續作供，表明其預設立場是對議案投反對票，除非政府回應五大訴求，否則會反對一切議案直至政府回應為止；但余亦指，五大訴求中最重要是雙普選，若政府能提供確實時間表她便可接受，其他訴求則可由民選政府實行。余又重申反對一切議案是其高姿態談判手法，法官問她是「扮硬淨」抑或「真硬淨」？余強調「我係會講得出、做得到」。
+
+而就余在《國安法》後發文稱「惡法壓境，極權肆虐……我們與政權再無斡旋餘地」，余指「惡法」是形容《國安法》，撰文望顯示決心，即使《國安法》後仍不會恐懼和讓步，因爭取五大訴求沒有違反《國安法》。法官李運騰指，無人要求余熱愛《國安法》，但「就算你唔鍾意都唔可以觸犯」，余指當時仍相信投票無觸犯《國安法》，故望鼓勵選民於初選投票。
+
+#### 余指認同「墨落」兩點聲明遂簽署、自視為「抗爭派」與泛民有別
+
+余慧明繼續作供，就「墨落無悔」聲明，余指6月10日晚從競選團隊 WhatsApp 群組得知流傳該聲明，她當時有看過，「最着眼」當中兩點聲明，而她認同該兩點聲明，故與團隊討論了一會後決定簽署，又指簽署「純粹想顯示我咁堅定嘅立場畀我啲選民睇」，無意呼籲其他人簽署。
+
+余同意她看到聲明前已有否決財案的想法，而她當時不知道其他區有否就運用否決權一點討論。陳仲衡指，若余有讀到前一段提及「在初選協調會議上已取得共識的共同綱領，乃一眾參選人之合作基礎」，不會認為有討論過嗎？余說如當時有仔細看應會有此想法，但當時她認為該段文字僅鋪排聲明背景，她亦無參與過協調會，故該段「對我嚟講冇乜意思」。余亦認為，「認同若支持度跌出各區預計可得議席範圍，須表明停止選舉工程」一點，勉強來說「唔係太適用」於其選區，因衞生服務界只得一席，不過余認為簡單而言是「輸咗就唔好選」。
+
+就聲明標題「抗爭派立場聲明書」，辯方問余會否自視為「抗爭派」。余指該詞當時應該很新，「但係如果我簽得依個聲明書，咁我都會認為自己係抗爭派囉」，又指另一原因是她也有「堅定意志」，「我係想令自己同普遍嘅泛民係有啲分別。」
+
+#### 余指提名表由助手填寫無細看、認為35+目標是爭民主派議會過半
+
+就提名表格，余指是由助手預先填好，她6月19日簽署後，助手翌日提交，「我係冇乜點樣睇過呢份表格。」陳仲衡問余是政治新手、首次參選，不會花時間閱讀提名表格嗎？余指其正職很忙，加上當時初選準備工作很忙碌，而她不視閱讀表格為準備工作一部分，認為純粹是報名表格。
+
+辯方續指出表格兩處錯處，其中見證部分有余的簽署，她指收到審訊文件夾後細看發現應「出錯咗」，「唔應該係由我本人見證我自己填㗎嘛」，如她當時有細看無理由留意不到。李運騰笑言似乎余的助手也沒細看，余同意。另一錯處為表格政綱將「五大訴求」誤寫為「五大缺求」。
+
+就提名表格條款「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」，余指當時無留意到，但如她有看到，就協調會議共識部分，無開協調會的她「會覺得唔關我事囉」，亦認為應指向地區直選的事，但「大會唔會為我哋依個界別特登設計多一張 form 出嚟㗎嘛」。余又指，理解「35+」的目標是「爭取民主派議會過半」。辯方問除過半外還有其他目標嗎？余說：「冇㗎啦喎，淨係35+咋喎。」
+
+#### 余稱雙普選為最重要訴求、有確實時間表會接受 但非實現就停止追求其他
+
+就提名表格附上的政綱，余指以為一定要填寫，故着助手「求其整一張 poster」應付，該政綱她不曾印刷和派發。當中「我若當選，必定承諾行使反對權利反對一切議案，直至香港政府全面回應五大訴求，決一不可為止」一句，余指正確表達其意思但不全面，因她雖想展示決心，但仍會談判。
+
+余續重申認為五大訴求中最重要為「立即實行雙普選」，其他訴求則可在雙普選後透過可認真反映民意的民選政府實行，而「只要政府係有個實在、白紙黑字寫到明嘅時間表，我都可以解釋畀我嘅選民聽，我會接受」；而若政府「反口」，「咁我就根據我嘅承諾，行使返我嘅反對權利，直至政府再次回應我為止。」
+
+法官李運騰關注「立即」一詞，指余曾說普選不能一夜實現。余回應是立即實行一個確實、確切的時間表，用「立即」是想展示決心。惟法官陳仲衡引余慧明於另一訪問提及，政權「一定要回應五大訴求缺一不可，而唔係即係可能回應其中一兩個訴求，就當係可以解決到呢個問題」，指是「缺一不可」，而非僅回應一兩個訴求。
+
+余同意，但「唔代表我實行咗雙普選之後我就會停止吖嘛，我要確保嗰個民選政府，都要做埋第二、第三、第四個訴求，咁咪就係『五大訴求、缺一不可』囉」。而就列出的五大訴求無提林鄭下台，余重申因林鄭下台無法解決問題，要爭取制度改革。
+
+#### 余稱「永遠企喺雞蛋一方」 官質疑與案無關不准辯方發問
+
+石書銘續就每項訴求發問，就「撤回送中惡法」，余同意已達到；就「撤回暴動定性」，余指認為出現該訴求是因每當有暴力事件發生，「政府只會一味就係話我哋係使用暴力，一味譴責，甚至乎抹黑緊我哋整場嘅運動」，陳仲衡問余用「我哋」一詞，是站在抗爭者一方？余答：「我永遠企喺雞蛋嘅一方」，又問：「我可唔可以繼續講？」
+
+法官陳慶偉質疑為何要深究，石書銘指他是問及余的底線，即政府如何回應才可接受、她何時會反對政府議案，惟陳慶偉多番指看不到有何需要，李運騰亦指余已回答。余其後同意，當選後會在投票前諮詢其界別，陳仲衡即問她稱會否決所有議案，如何能就所有議案諮詢選民？余指不是就所有議案諮詢，如政府不回應五大訴求她仍會反對一切議案；但若局勢有變、政府開始回應，她難確保民意是否仍會堅決「五大訴求，缺一不可」，那時就要諮詢選民。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/MfmIcCw.png)
+▲ 余慧明（資料圖片）
+
+#### 余稱預設立場為反對議案 除非找不到反對原因
+
+李運騰其後關注，余慧明當選後如何決定投票意向。余指她雖於競選期間表明會反對一切議案，但「唔代表我唔睇個內容就會投反對」，她仍會研究政府政策流弊，正如疫情時一直有就政府防疫措施作出批評和建議。李運騰問若議案與五大訴求無關呢？余指其政綱已表明反對一切議案，投票支持她的選民亦認同其政綱，故會投反對；又指會研究政策流弊仔細分析予選民，「我就算投反對票我都係有理有據嘅。」
+
+陳仲衡質疑，余並非衡量議案利弊，而是找理由反對，余指「利與弊都可以睇到嘅，但係我會詳細列舉個弊多過利」。李運騰再指即余已決定反對議案，其後再找原因，余答：「我個預設嘅立場係投反對票，所以除非嗰個議案係令我搵唔到任何一個反對嘅原因」，同意可按字面解讀其政綱。
+
+#### 余稱認為爭取五大訴求無違《國安法》 官一度稱：就算你唔鍾意都唔可以觸犯
+
+而就余慧明7月7日於發布的〈【初選意義】〉文章，余指非全由她所撰、助理處理，但她有背書（endorse）。當中提及「惡法壓境，極權肆虐」，余指「惡法」是指《國安法》，因認為條文很模糊，令人觸犯紅線；至於「極權」是指無理會人民反對聲音、支持《國安法》通過的香港政府。
+
+至於「我們與政權再無斡旋餘地」，余重申想顯示決心，即使《國安法》立法後，「我都唔會恐懼，我都唔會作出讓步，除非政府係釋出佢嘅善意，放低佢傲慢嘅身段同我哋再商討點樣可以繼續爭取我哋嘅五大訴求，因為我認為爭取五大訴求係冇違反國安法。」
+
+李運騰關注余將《國安法》形容為惡法，說：「無人要求你熱愛《國安法》，但說可以違反《國安法》是另一回事。（“Nobody asks you to love it. Nobody requires you to love it. But it is another thing to say that one can violate it.”）」法庭傳譯一度未能翻譯，李續手持一枝筆指住余，直接以中文說：「就算你唔鍾意都唔可以觸犯。」
+
+余續解釋文章意思，「就係立咗《國安法》之後，我哋要參加初選嘅，都唔好恐懼；亦都鼓勵緊選民，即使有《國安法》之下，我仍然相信投票係冇觸犯到《國安法》，所以我係想鼓勵選民，喺初選嗰兩日出嚟投票。」余又指，她「絕對唔係」籲人違法。
+
+#### 官質疑是扮「硬淨」抑或真「硬淨」 余稱投反對「講得出做得到」
+
+余其後重申，提到「無斡旋餘地」是展示決心，但不欲公開談判手法，否則如「自揭底牌」。法官追問是否誇張手法，余指「或多或少都有」，但她「真係好想展示畀其他人睇，我係會使用一個高姿態嘅談判手法囉」。
+
+李追問，故余是扮演「硬淨（tough）」，還是真的「硬淨」？余說：「咁如果政權唔同我傾嘅話，我係會堅持否決，我會投反對議案，係依樣嘢我係會講得出做得到」，又強調「我只係認為作出退讓嘅應該係政府囉」。
+
+#### 余指《國安法》後不講「國際戰線」、「推翻」
+
+李運騰其後問《國安法》後余慧明的政綱有否改變，余指提名表格政綱無變，但宣傳單張和發言時有特意不再講「國際戰線」，因看過《國安法》條文後認為即使並非要求國際制裁，亦可能被視為「勾結外國勢力」，她亦無再用一些較敏感字眼如「推翻」。
+
+#### 余認為投反對票非干犯《國安法》、爭取五大訴求非解散立會
+
+而就余慧明7月8日的選舉造勢大會，辯方展示《獨媒》報導〈【立會選戰】民主派4人戰衛生服務界 余慧明：要將抗爭意志帶入議會〉，余確認黃之鋒、朱凱廸、張可森、劉頴匡、何桂藍和劉澤鋒也有到場，解釋她望邀請到越多候選人幫她站台越好，並會揀選一些「立場比較進取」和「唔係泛民」的人。余指候選人是由競選團隊邀請，她事前無就會上發言與他們討論，故他們發言與她無關。
+
+被問及支持「攬炒」候選人或被DQ的應對，報導指「余慧明坦言國安法沒有任何標準可供參考，全憑政府定奪，但她不想『自我審查』、『被噤聲』，不會為了當選而選擇暫時隱藏『攬炒』、『抗爭』等信念，希望『由心發聲』，不想違背一直以來的信念」。
+
+余指當時應指選舉主任或會用很低門檻詮釋《國安法》，DQ與她本身有否犯法為兩回事，故她不會自我審查，重申認為投反對票只是行使議員職能，「依個都係《基本法》之下已經寫咗㗎喇，所以即使係啟動依個機制，我都唔認為係干犯緊《國安法》。」
+
+就報導提及余望「借『35+』之力否決法案，爭取重組立法會」，余指她非爭取解散立法會再重選立法會，「我一直爭取嘅都係『五大訴求，缺一不可』」，強調會就一切議案投反對票。李運騰再問即使議案與五大訴求無關？余指若議案與五大訴求不相關、政府也無意回應五大訴求，「我就會投反對，依個係我預設嘅立場，真係除非政府係做咗啲嘢令我回心轉意，而依個係我嘅談判手法。」
+
+#### 余稱戴耀廷為「憲法專家」 故相信初選及其政綱合法
+
+余慧明續確認，有出席7月9日的初選記者會，當時相信初選和她的政綱都是合法，而戴會上說法亦令她相信是合法。余欲解釋時，李運騰打斷指法庭有謄本，知道戴談及初選合法性。余說：「正確，因為佢係一個憲法嘅專家」，李運騰即說：「Well，他說他是，那是他在記者會上的說法」，余指戴「好似冇自介為憲法專家」，李說：「我向你保證他有」，但沒關係，法庭有謄本。多名被告發笑。
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/jusOsAB.png)
+▲ 2020年7月9日 民主派初選記者會（資料圖片）
+
+余續確認，於7月14日在衞生服務界群組收到戴耀廷發訊息：「我公開訊息說35+目的，是運用基本法賦予立法會的權力包括否決財政預算案，今（令）特區政府問責，不提否決每一個議案，也不說癱瘓政府，供大家參考。」余指事前其界別參選人無與組織者討論。
+
+#### 余稱重組警隊文件具參考價值、減少編制為可行方法
+
+此外，就余慧明家中被搜出的「重組／解散警隊可行嗎？」文件，余指非她撰寫，從集會得到後認為就「追究警暴，重組警隊」的訴求具參考價值故保留。余又並指當中提及減少警隊編制是可行方法，「例如我哋每一日都見到（法院）下面嘅警力分布」，李運騰指「每日都在減少（which is decreasing everyday）」，余再說：「但都係仍然有好多，所以我認為絕對有呢個空間去減少警隊編制」，李運騰笑稱法院曾發生玻璃幕牆破裂。
+
+案件明續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-114.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-114.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..601b1eb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-114.md
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 114 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 余慧明稱初選結果公布後「35+計劃」已完結 後續協調僅處理「爛攤子」
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/1y0VMr6.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（25日）踏入審訊第114天。余慧明繼續作供，就7月15日的抗爭派記者會，余自視為抗爭意志較堅定、與主流泛民有別的「抗爭派」而出席，但會前無與出席者討論發言內容，自言與他們「唔係好熟」，亦不同意記招是對組織者中止初選的回應、表示抗爭派想繼續。余又指當時「完全唔知」中聯辦前一天發聲明譴責初選或違法，並認為初選結果公布後，「35+計劃」已完結，其後若有協調工作亦只是處理計劃的「爛攤子」，她也是庭上始知組織者當時「有手尾」如選前民調要處理。
+
+余又指，衞生服務界從無討論關於財政預算案的問題，無共識辦有約束力的初選，否認呈堂協調文件是候選人共識。法官一度關注控方盤問基礎，控方指可作有關推論。此外，余亦稱其抗爭立場包括就抗疫議題提批評和建議，但卻被指為「抹黑政府」；余認為未能成功爭取是因無真正了解民意的政府，故最重要是爭取雙普選。
+
+#### 余強調初選要有約束力 如落敗「一定唔會參選」
+
+參選衞生服務界的前醫管局員工陣線主席余慧明繼續作供，余昨稱由於選民資格認證爭議，衞生服務界初選終並無約束力。辯方大律師石書銘今問，余當時是否認為要有約束力，余說「當然啦，如果唔係選嚟做咩呀」，強調初選目的只得一個，「就係揀選一位候選人，代表民主派出選衞生服務界」，故如其他候選人落選，「我係希望佢哋可以尊重個賽果囉。」
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/KRhmE67.png)
+▲ 余慧明（資料圖片）
+
+辯方展示衞生服務界群組紀錄，顯示當時提及四個方案，方案一為凡於衞生服務界票站投票的選民均假設為有資格投票，如至少三位候選人同意此方案，投票結果將有約束力；方案二為要提供有效證件才可投票，如至少三人同意此方案，結果將有約束力；方案三與方案二一樣，只是沒有約束力；方案四為取消初選。當中余慧明和劉凱文選擇方案二、李國麟選擇方案一、袁偉傑選擇方案三。最終戴耀廷指在無決定的狀態下，只能是方案三，投票只供參考。
+
+李運騰問，所以是一個妥協？余說：「只係一個無可奈何嘅方法囉」，並指戴曾說「如果唔接受嘅話就唔搞初選」，同意她是不情願接受，並曾發文表達自己立場，提及「希望亦相信各位候選人會尊重初選結果以達至舉辦初選的初衷，最終只有一位候選人代表民主派出選九月立法會選舉」。
+
+李運騰追問，那若余於初選落敗，還會受約束不參選嗎？余加重了語氣：「依個正正就係我想講嘅嘢，我係願意有約束力的話，就係講，如果我係輸咗的話，我就一定唔會去參選囉。」即使最終方案無約束力，她自己也會遵從初選結果。
+
+#### 余指衞生服務界從無討論財案問題、僅視戴耀廷訊息為「資訊分享」
+
+就戴耀廷7月14日於群組發出「我公開訊息說35+目的，是運用基本法賦予立法會的權力包括否決財政預算案，今（令）特區政府問責，不提否決每一個議案，也不說癱瘓政府，供大家參考」，余慧明同意是群組首次提及否決財案。余指「因為我哋個界別係從來都冇討論過關於財政預算案呢個問題，我只係覺得係一個資訊嘅分享」，故除以表情符號表示感謝外無其他回應。
+
+李運騰問，戴的訊息是突然出現，余知道他為何在群組發出嗎？余指因當時有建制派或黨媒說初選犯法，「所以我諗戴耀廷就係為咗回應呢啲咁嘅輿論，就 share 咗呢啲訊息出嚟囉。」
+
+#### 余指戴耀廷7.15退出群組、余初選後約候選人開會拒劉凱文任「Plan B」
+
+余續確認，戴耀廷曾於初選前的7月6日發訊息指，若投票選民數目不理想，要於7月17日再舉行協調會議，以決定最後參選隊伍數目。余於初選後的7月14日曾發訊息問是否還需開會，戴耀廷說不用，惟余覺得「個問題未解決」，遂於7月16日發訊息邀請各參選人就衞生服務界的協調工作磋商，「想其他參選人即使無約束力下也尊重賽果。」
+
+余確認，她發訊息前戴耀廷已退出群組，戴於7月15日發訊息指「結果已公布了，這群組的功能已完成。我一會兒會把這群組刪除」，不久後就退出群組。李運騰指，區諾軒曾稱當天早上到戴的辦公室表示退出初選，余記得，但對戴退出群組前有否任何人宣布35+計劃結束不太有印象，僅有印象於 Facebook 看到區諾軒稱要退出，但也不記得日期。
+
+余續指，當時她無想過要組織者出席該會議，而最終僅劉凱文出席，會上劉提出想做余的「Plan B」，惟余最終拒絕：「因為我覺得佢同我嘅政治路線唔同。」
+
+#### 余指認知抗爭派記者會類似「造勢大會」、自視「抗爭派」遂出席
+
+就7月15日舉行的抗爭派記者會，余指不記得有人直接邀請抑或邀請其競選團隊出席，她認為「抗爭派」即「抗爭意志比較堅定、同主流泛民係有分別」，而她自視為「抗爭派」，故決定出席，事前僅知道黃之鋒、何桂藍和岑敖暉會出席。
+
+余續指，就記者會的目的，「我認知嘅類似係造勢大會」，因知道是「立場比較進取」的初選勝出者出席。陳慶偉問，余當時知道7月14日中聯辦曾發聲明譴責初選或違法嗎？余指當時無留意到、「我係完全唔知」，是收到審訊文件夾後才知道。
+
+#### 余認為「35+計劃」於7.15已完結 後續協調工作為「處理爛攤子」
+
+陳慶偉再問，區諾軒於7月15日決定退出初選，記者會是對組織者中止初選的回應嗎？即抗爭派想要繼續（carry on）？余說「我嘅認知唔係」。陳問，即純粹慶祝抗爭派勝利？余回應當日發出的聲明亦提到另一個目的，「係想同泛民嘅一啲合作囉」，指她赴會前「我嘅認知都係咁多」。余亦不記得是在記者會前或後知道區諾軒退出、不肯定當時是否知道趙家賢翌日退出，也無留意戴耀廷其後宣布「休息」，因無追蹤其 Facebook。
+
+陳慶偉續問7月15日時，余認為「35+計劃」還繼續進行嗎？余說：「我認為係已經完咗㗎喇，即係當個（初選）結果出咗嚟之後。」陳指或已知道結果，但初選後或會再舉行民意調查及協調會議討論出選名單數量，追問余認為7月15或16日時，「35+計劃」是否仍繼續進行？余重申「對我嚟講係已經完結咗喇」。至於是否關注其他區，「我會 concern 係邊個出選囉」，「因為我要知道將來可能要同咩人合作囉。」
+
+陳慶偉續指，余說計劃已完結的說法不能是對的，因雖然已有初選結果，但衞生服務界的結果只供參考，余當然會預期有後續工作，例如有參選人拒從初選結果如何處理。余說：「我認為兩者係冇衝突嘅，因為我認為35+呢個 project 係真係完咗，而之後嘅協調工作，只係處理佢嘅爛攤子囉」。陳續指，大概是由區諾軒和戴耀廷所領導的後續工作，余回應：「當時我唔知佢有手尾做，但係喺庭上面就聽到係有囉。」
+
+#### 余指抗爭派記者會前無討論當選後做什麼、同意抗爭派聲明內容
+
+余續指，7月15日抵達記者會場時已看到部分出席者，但無與他們討論記者會說什麼，「因為我本身同佢哋唔係好熟呢，我自己坐埋咗一邊」。陳仲衡指部分人曾為她站台，余說「冇錯，佢哋純粹嚟站台囉，我哋稱唔上朋友，因為電話都冇，都係我嘅團隊邀請佢哋」。余亦指，會前出席者無討論當選後會做什麼。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/xzd3hiY.png)
+▲ 2020年7月15日 抗爭派記者會（資料圖片）
+
+鄒家成和何桂藍早前稱，會前與會者一同草擬聲明。余表示，印象中沒有參與草擬，因對早前提到的 Google 文件「我冇印象我有見過」，亦不肯定當時有否被邀請參與討論。李運騰問余是否知道其他人當時在草擬聲明，余不肯定，但看到有部分出席者「揸住部電話」，「似係傾緊一啲嘢嘅」，她亦知道一般記者會流程會先讀出聲明或新聞稿，故預期會有一份類似的文件，只是不記得有否參與討論或草擬。
+
+就會上讀出的「抗爭派立法會參選人立場聲明」，余指看騰本和片段令她有此印象，但如不看就不記得內容。辯方問為何余無留意，余指因認為聲明「都係 call 依個記者會嘅人準備囉」，而她只是「被邀請嘅出席者」。不過余亦表明承認是記者會出席者、有準備會上發言，並同意有在聲明署名。陳慶偉問她同意聲明內容嗎？余說：「我同意㗎。」
+
+#### 余稱爭取醫療制度改革未能成功因政府不解民意、最重要爭取雙普選
+
+石書銘其後問，余慧明除了爭取雙普選，就衞生服務界的議題還有何抗爭立場。余指雖記者會未必講明，但她「一直都係做緊」，其「抗爭立場」可分為三個層次，首先作為醫療界別的工會代表，她一直就抗疫議題提出批評和建議，「但係可惜都不被政府接納嘅，更加被人形容為係別有用心、抹黑政府囉」；其次她一直爭取醫療制度改革，改善醫患比例，指是工會第一屆理事會政綱，他們亦有推行實質的「社區醫療自救計劃」，「想話畀人聽我哋唔係得個講字囉。」李運騰指毋須細節。
+
+至於第三個層面，余認為上述兩個層面都未能成功爭取的原因，是「我哋冇一個真正了解民意嘅政府，所以最重要嘅層面，係我哋要爭取一個雙普選嘅制度」。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/ZhA0QAH.png)
+▲ 余慧明（資料圖片）
+
+#### 余相信否決財案機制無違反《基本法》或《國安法》
+
+「區區Interview」於8月10日發布余慧明訪問片段，余指訪問由一至兩小時剪成10分鐘，內容「大致上係 fair」，但有部分剪走其詳細解釋「令到成句嘅意思就有啲怪」。就余提到：「我諗破局最初嘅概念就係35+，即係爭取議會過半引致個憲制危機啦，咁就要佢用行政命令去解散立法會，令到佢一定要回應『五大訴求，缺一不可』呢個目標」，余指「爭取議會過半」後她應有解釋有何現象引致憲政危機。
+
+李運騰問余的意思有否被扭曲或斷章取義，余說「有少少㗎」，因議會過半不會即時引致憲政危機，「佢壓縮咗我一啲字眼」，李運騰指理解是兩次否決財案令特首下台，余同意，亦同意片中表達意思與她早前的訪問和 Facebook 帖文亦一致：「因為我認為透過《基本法》之下解決行政立法分歧嘅機制，係冇違反《基本法》或者《國安法》嘅，我當時仍然係咁樣相信。」
+
+#### 訪問稱要簽「共同綱領」 余：就係冇我先會咁講
+
+余訪問中亦提到「共同綱領」，認為如以爭取「五大訴求，缺一不可」為目標，「我覺得大家係要簽一份共同認同嘅綱領，起碼叫做大家有個 agreement 喺依度」；又指如真的促成35+，「候選人都應該要認同番呢一份共同嘅綱領」，不要臨陣退縮，「就會令到我哋唔夠票，做唔到呢個效果。」
+
+被問是哪些人之間的「共同綱領」，余指「大家」是指正選後真的達成35席以上的民主派。石書銘問以余當時認知，民主派潛在參選人之間有任何協議嗎？余說：「就係冇，所以我先會咁講。」余亦指，無與組織者和參與者就當選後做什麼有任何協議。
+
+#### 余稱對公民黨及數個初選記者會不知悉、無深究「三投三不投」
+
+余最後確認，就3月25日公民黨記者會、3月26日的35+記者會、7月6日、11和12日的初選記者會，她當時均不知道，直至收到審訊文件夾才得知。而她於6月9日初選記者會後獲競選團隊告知會上正式公布衞生服務界有初選；她亦有留意7月13日公布初選結果的記者會。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/Q52rf9x.png)
+▲ 2020年6月9日 35+初選記者會（資料圖片）
+
+至於「三投三不投」，余重申到了「好後期」、於7月投票日前才聽過，但無深究內容。陳仲衡指該計劃與余關注初選的約束力有關，余重申當時有正職和初選競選，「私人時間都冇晒」，「我真係冇去深究依個唔關初選事嘅 programme 囉。」
+
+#### 余稱無追問戴耀廷因「搭單搞」、「唔係太好意思催人哋」
+
+石書銘表示完成主問，續由主控萬德豪進行盤問。余表示4月中聯絡戴耀廷提出能否辦衞生服務界初選後，二人無再聯絡，直至6月9日記者會才知會辦初選。控方質疑余期間無追問戴，余指因衞生服務界是「搭單去搞，即係禮貌上，我唔係太好意思去催人哋」，重申認為「如果搞得成就去啦，搞唔成就再算啦」；而余雖望初選有約束力，但聯絡戴時無表明，「因為我已經假設會有囉」，「如果冇嘅話，咁搞嚟做咩。」
+
+余又重申，5月中《立場新聞》分別訪問4名潛在候選人時，得知有另外3名潛在競爭者，但不記得他們有否表達對辦初選的看法，余也無與3人討論過初選應否有約束力，無留意就此有協議。余又指直至6月24日戴耀廷開設群組前，戴無提過初選安排或候選人間要有協議，而余就初選只曾聯絡戴耀廷而非其他組織者，並指她會「自己搞返」與組織者的聯絡，宣傳則交助手處理。
+
+#### 余否認與候選人有共識辦有約束力初選
+
+萬德豪又引戴耀廷決定初選不具約束力後，李國麟曾發訊息「未有共識 不就是照舊嗎？」，指「照舊」是指有約束力的初選，余指「我唔係咁理解」；萬又引李提到「大會突然作此決定 與初選的原則及初心不同 有負選民期望 實屬不幸」，指李想有約束力的初選，余回應只能說李想選方案一。萬最後指出，事實上余與其他候選人有共識辦有約束力的初選，余不同意，「因為我哋冇討論過。」
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/Qm8MzlE.png)
+▲ 李國麟（資料圖片）
+
+#### 控方指協議文件為候選人共識 官關注有否證據 控方指屬「推論」
+
+萬德豪續展示「民主派衛生服務界協調機制協議」文件，該文件提及「會積極」運用否決權，並提到有兩個票站。余昨稱戴耀廷原提出4個，但最終減至3個。萬引戴於群組提及有4個票站時，余曾問：「想問最後只有四個票站可供衞生服務界投票，但總票站有二百多個？」萬說余用「最後」一詞，是因原本只有兩個票站，而組織者再找多了？余笑說：「我依度嘅意思就係總票站有200幾個，但係最後我哋得4個？你畀咁少我？」旁聽席發笑。
+
+萬續指出，事實上該文件是衞生服務界潛在候選人的書面共識，余不同意。萬再指，該共識是在6月8日前已達成。陳慶偉問「6月8日前？」，李運騰亦問控方有否證據顯示該界別候選人6月8日前曾一同商議。萬回應是根據趙家賢的 WhatsApp 紀錄，李運騰問趙有否出席衞生服務界協調會議，萬說沒有。李續說，「你可以指出案情以節省時間，但她會不同意」，余答「不同意」。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/5WXLQre.png)
+▲ 趙家賢（資料圖片）
+
+陳慶偉續問：「為何是6月8日？」，萬解釋趙家賢當天曾要求戴將所有協議的最終版本發出，並收到相關文件。李運騰問，但控方有紀錄顯示衞生服務界參選人於6月8日前，收到同一份文件嗎？萬回應：「我們是在談及可以作出的推論。（“What we are talking about is the inference to be drawn.”）」李運騰指余已回答。
+
+#### 控方指余簽「墨落」因是衞生服務界共識 余稱記得其他人無簽
+
+控方續指，余慧明有讀過提名表格上「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識」的條款，余不同意。而就「墨落無悔」聲明提到戴耀廷於6月9日記者會稱毋須簽協議，余指她當時不知道此事，是簽署「墨落」時才知道。萬德豪問，故「墨落理應無悔，否則等於失信於選民」一句與余無關？余說「其實都係㗎，不過我想表達我嘅立場係好夠堅定咋嘛」、「我想表達我咁堅定嘅立場畀我嘅選民睇囉」，又指有些簽署者也無參加初選。
+
+萬續指出，余慧明簽署「墨落」，是因兩點聲明是其界別候選人的共識，余不同意。李運騰關注，除余慧明外其他衞生服務界候選人有否簽署，余指「我記得就冇嘅」。
+
+案件下周一（28日）續審，余將繼續接受盤問。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022

From c26c245dd133b4db5df3121d884a046358447c2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hokoi <hokoeye@pm.me>
Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2023 02:28:03 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 15/19] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x20 Sep.15

---
 ...8-23-intelligence-contest-in-cyberspace.md |  93 ++++++
 .../2023-08-23-safeguard-digital-landscape.md | 285 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...f-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-115.md | 156 ++++++++++
 3 files changed, 534 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-intelligence-contest-in-cyberspace.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-safeguard-digital-landscape.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-28-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-115.md

diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-intelligence-contest-in-cyberspace.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-intelligence-contest-in-cyberspace.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5e2eff97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-intelligence-contest-in-cyberspace.md
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Intel. Contest In Cyberspace
+author: Louise Marie Hurel
+date  : 2023-08-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Q6cUINI.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "On the Promises and Consequences of the Intelligence Contest in Cyberspace"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_There has been growing pushback from experts and scholars to the concept of “cyber war”, with some suggesting that a more sober way of assessing cyber operations is to see them as part of a wider “intelligence contest” – a term proposed by some scholars to describe strategic competition in cyberspace as a duel between actors to gather data, undermine adversary institutions and sabotage capabilities._ <excerpt/> _It is worth noting this definition of “intelligence” is contentious in some quarters, with others preferring the more limited description of intelligence as relating to the collection and analysis of information._
+
+
+In terms of cyber war hyperbole, unhelpful headlines such as Newsweek’s “The Rising Risk of a Cyber Pearl Harbour” in 2021 usually grab the everyday reader’s attention but limit our understanding of the far more important dimension of these cyber incidents: how states and non-state actors use cyberspace below the threshold of war to further their strategic objectives.
+
+Even when scrolling down The New York Times’s tag on “cyberwarfare”, most of the reporting concentrates on espionage and activities such as information operations and subversion – which in practice, is a more accurate reflection of what goes on in cyberspace.
+
+However, the jury is still out on alternative concepts to “cyber war” that can appropriately capture the effects of cyber operations below the threshold of armed conflict and how they might transform intelligence activities. The book Deter, Disrupt or Deceive: Assessing Cyber Conflict as an Intelligence Contest offers some options – although it does not seek to be conclusive.
+
+To what extent is it worth considering that states are actually involved in a continuous “intelligence contest” in cyberspace?
+
+
+### It’s a Trap! Reassessing the Vocabulary
+
+As the ongoing war in Ukraine has illustrated, the obsession with the concept of “cyber war” is not just about the latest news headlines; rather, it has resulted in deep miscalculations about the role of cyber operations in conflict and crisis scenarios.
+
+The first miscalculation from the hyperbole around “cyber war” is the heightened expectations of what cyber operations can and should deliver. Having been known for numerous disruptive cyber incidents, Russia’s cyber operations at the outbreak of the war in Ukraine were commonly depicted as contrary to expectations. There was no widespread or particularly significant impact from Russian destructive cyber operations, no cyber takedown of Ukrainian critical national infrastructure.
+
+This exemplifies how “cyber war” can also fail to grasp how effects are shaped by a culture of strategic doctrine – as is particularly the case with Russia’s conceptualisation of cyber operations.
+
+However, the focus on decisive and short-term effects of cyber operations, especially in conflict situations, has also led to a paradoxical dismissal of the cumulative effects that operations have as part of a wider contest between state and non-state actors. Russian cyber activity during the war has still revealed a largely unprecedented deployment of capabilities, with at least nine new wiper malware families, two ransomware attacks and the targeting of 100 organisations in Ukraine. According to companies such as ESET, Microsoft, Mandiant and other large threat intelligence companies, Russia has used a record amount of data-destroying malware on Ukraine, showcasing an accelerated pace of deployment of cyber capabilities in conflict scenarios. This in turn has also contributed to the reuse of many of these capabilities in at least other 25 countries, which showcases the cascading effects of sub-threshold capabilities. Despite these numbers – and within this particular context – cyber operations have not been the decisive or primary tool in the conflict. They have, however, contributed to the broader friction of war – be it in the operation of infrastructure, communication or leveraging the information space to push their narratives about the war.
+
+
+### On Intelligence Contests
+
+American University Professor Joshua Rovner suggests that activities in cyberspace are more about intelligence than the use of force. He argues that strategic behaviour in cyberspace will rarely surpass the threshold of armed conflict, but states will continuously engage in an “intelligence contest” through sabotage and covert action. Rovner defines the intelligence contest as:
+
+- A race among adversaries to collect more and better information.
+
+- A race to exploit information to improve one’s relative position.
+
+- A reciprocal effort to covertly undermine adversary morale, institutions and alliances.
+
+- A contest to disable adversary capabilities through sabotage.
+
+- A campaign to preposition assets for intelligence collection in the event of a conflict.
+
+___`Countries recognise the importance of having an institution to engage in cyber operations – but it does not mean that all do so`___
+
+What the concept seeks to illustrate is that the dynamics of contestation among states in cyberspace extend far beyond the tactics of cyber operations and the battlefield itself, and play into strategic competition among state and non-state actors. As noted by the UK’s National Cyber Force (NCF), while cyber operations are not expected to be strategically decisive, they are effective when “combined and co-ordinated with the activities of partners to achieve a shared goal”.
+
+This applies as much to cyber security as it does to offensive cyber. One example of the former is that in May 2023, Ukraine, Ireland, Iceland and Japan announced that they would officially join NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence. While the deal opens the door for greater exchange between NATO and non-NATO countries, the occasion sends a relevant message of expanding technical and strategic alignment between countries in the face of growing geopolitical contestation in the Indo-Pacific and amid the ongoing war in Ukraine.
+
+Offensive cyber capabilities should be seen as part of a much wider policy toolkit to respond to hostile activities in cyberspace. Likewise, offensive cyber capabilities can be used to respond to other threats such as terrorism, disinformation or child sexual exploitation. In short, a cyber incident does not necessarily merit a cyber response.
+
+As of 2021, approximately 45 countries have launched military cyber organisations (that is, cyber commands) and nearly 35 of those possess an offensive mandate. While capacities and capabilities vary, both Western and non-Western countries recognise the importance of having an institution to engage in this contested environment – but it does not mean that all do so.
+
+Strategies vary as to how countries engage in this contest. The US Cyber Command, which defends the Department of Defense’s information systems, supports joint force commanders with cyberspace operations, and defends the US from significant cyberattacks, has developed complementary concepts of “defend forward” and “persistent engagement”. Meanwhile, the UK’s NCF has published a document outlining operating principles for its own approach to offensive cyber which is in line with a broader vision outlined in the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh to deter, defend and compete across all domains. Central to the NCF’s approach is the doctrine of “cognitive effect”.
+
+So, should we then consider “intelligence contest” as the most accurate means of defining the nature of cyber operations?
+
+Critics of the concept have argued that the scale and scope of operations in cyberspace fundamentally change the nature of intelligence (especially covert action), resulting in a “difference in kind and not merely degree”. As some have argued, the 2016 Russian interference during the US elections shows that smaller activities can result in aggregated strategic effects – eroding trust and confidence in society. So, what are the consequences of framing cyber operations as an intelligence contest?
+
+
+### Responsible Cyber Operations – Long Road Ahead
+
+One risk when intelligence becomes the main qualifier to describe the nature of cyber operations is that it could alter public perceptions on what activities their government is conducting in cyberspace. Public understanding may also differ depending upon the oversight mechanisms in place within a particular national context. The outcome of framing cyber operations around intelligence activities could be for better or worse, depending upon the national context.
+
+___`Cyber might play a significantly different role depending on the respective country’s primary threat concern`___
+
+For example, the UK has a detailed regulatory framework when it comes to intelligence activity. In addition, the NCF’s recent guide outlines the importance of robust oversight and accountability as a core element for responsible operational planning – a key part of our latest project at RUSI.
+
+In some cases, less capable states contract cyber mercenaries for easier access to opportunities in developing and deploying capabilities. While commercial hacking tools have legitimate applications in support of national security and law enforcement objectives, they are also subject to misuse and abuse. As of 2023, 74 countries have reportedly used spyware and between 2015 and 2017, and EU member states have allowed surveillance technology to be exported more than 317 times. It is not always the case that states will contract well-known spyware vendors either – there is a complex market of companies promoting open-source intelligence tools that can be coupled with other sophisticated add-ons and services. In this regard, the intelligence contest concept does not help with addressing these kinds of dynamics. Instead of clarifying what kinds of intelligence activities are permissible, it overemphasises state-to-state spying rather than domestic activities – usually more appealing to less developed economies that can buy off-the-shelf products to meet their internal needs. What is then the applicability of the intelligence contest? To whom does this concept apply?
+
+It is important to understand the motivations of countries beyond the usual cyber powers in developing and deploying cyber capabilities. As illustrated by Saudi Arabia, Mexico, India and many other Western and non-Western countries, it might be more profitable for countries to develop their own cyber capabilities to conduct surveillance of citizens within their own national territory and abroad than to primarily do it among states. As states across the development spectrum enhance their capabilities, cyber might play a significantly different role depending on the respective country’s primary threat concern – which in turn will also affect how they engage in strategic competition.
+
+Countries might also be influenced by the NCF’s guide on cyber operations, as it provides some initial thoughts for establishing processes and guidance relating to cyber operations. However, there is a risk that some countries will see cyber operations as intelligence activity only, to be conducted against a foreign or external threat. A different and more worrying scenario takes place when countries seek to aggressively use capabilities against internal threats, with little oversight, as has been the case with commercial hacking tools.
+
+
+### A Contest for a Few?
+
+A crucial and yet overlooked question within this debate is: “who can engage in this intelligence contest?” While many countries have developed cyber commands and have sought to enhance their capabilities, the intelligence contest still arguably remains a game to be played by a small group of countries.
+
+It might be too much to assume that countries beyond the pool of cyber powers can effectively achieve significant cumulative effects through cyberspace in conjunction with other diplomatic and/or commercial strategies, despite their eagerness to outsource capabilities.
+
+In addition, the 45 countries that have established military cyber organisations (and others) will continue to search for other levers to develop their own capacities, away from cyber. It is also questionable how applicable and operationalisable the intelligence contest in cyberspace is for developing countries.
+
+Overall, how the term “intelligence contest” increases the understanding of cyber operations remains unclear. There are geographical, capability and conceptual challenges as well as consequences of the framing that require further assessment. Regardless, it is better than using the term “cyber war” to define state activity in cyberspace – although whether that is enough is yet to be seen.
+
+---
+
+__Louise Marie Hurel__ is a Research Fellow in the Cyber team at RUSI. Her research interests include incident response, cyber capacity building, cyber diplomacy and non-governmental actors’ engagement in cyber security.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-safeguard-digital-landscape.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-safeguard-digital-landscape.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1e7da2b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-23-safeguard-digital-landscape.md
@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Safeguard Digital Landscape
+author: Abigail Edwards, et al.
+date  : 2023-08-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/4UcKnad.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Online Opportunities & Threats
+for Displaced Ukrainians"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it sparked the largest and quickest mass displacement of people since the Second World War._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+Ukrainians often left their homes with only the clothes on their backs and a small bag — an all-too-common experience in a world experiencing record high levels of forced displacement.
+
+Yet, unlike many other displaced populations, almost all Ukrainians were able to bring their smartphones, a near-unmatched level of tech savviness, and supportive, tightly woven online networks.
+
+This connectivity has presented new opportunities to assist vulnerable people; it has also put those same vulnerable people face-to-face with new online threats that can translate into very real physical danger.
+
+
+### Ukraine’s Digital Connectivity
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/HPh8yEO.gif)
+
+_Digitization has always been central to President Zelensky’s vision of Ukraine._
+
+Promises surrounding digitization served a critical role in his almost entirely virtual campaign. At the time, it was seen as a way to both fight corruption and engage the country’s younger generation. However, the long-term impacts of his administration’s efforts in this area can be seen both in the success of the war effort and in the options now open to displaced Ukrainians.
+
+Just months after Zelensky’s election in 2019, the Ukrainian government established the Ministry of Digital Transformation — a trailblazing effort to transform government through the creation of the “state in a smartphone.”
+
+With the goal of making 100 percent of government services available online by 2024, the Ministry of Digital Transformation quickly mobilized to launch Diia — meaning “action” — a mobile app and web platform centralizing citizen access to public services.
+
+In 2021, Ukraine became the first country in the world to issue digital passports through Diia.
+
+After February 2022, the Ukrainian government worked to ensure that Ukraine’s digital connections were both protected and strengthened.
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/IbsCOiN.png)
+
+Zelensky’s administration has partnered with Starlink, the European Union, and European telecom companies to ensure that Ukrainians maintain internet connection during the war. This has been essential to countering Russian attempts to control information flows about the war.
+
+Maintaining internet access is also critical to ensure that displaced Ukrainians — both within Ukraine and across international borders — are able to access to public services, personal networks, and aid resources.
+
+
+### Stabilizing Connections
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/yDkjb0Z.gif)
+
+_Ukraine’s level of digital connectedness has spurred new opportunities and innovations to aid displaced Ukrainians across several critical areas._
+
+#### Ukraine’s Diia App
+
+Developed with the motto, “the government in a smartphone,” Diia has brought essential public resources to the fingertips of Ukrainians both within and outside of Ukraine.
+
+- Launched in 2020, Diia was downloaded on the phones of one-third of the adult Ukrainian population by 2021.
+
+- Diia has been at the center of the digital effort to aid Ukrainians. As of May 2023, 70 percent of Ukrainian-owned smartphones have Diia installed.
+
+- Through Diia, Ukrainians can register as displaced and have access to digital forms of the identification document that they need to cross borders. They can also provide digital signatures on official documents using biometrics, pay taxes and fines, collect cash payments, receive compensation for damaged property, donate to the war effort, register a child or a business, report information about Russian troops, and more.
+
+#### Internet and Connectivity
+
+Stable and secure internet connections have been critical to keeping Ukrainians connected with resources, aid, and their digital networks during the war.
+
+- Starlink, a satellite constellation that provides internet coverage to countries across the world, has been critical to ensure that Ukrainians — as well as Ukrainian hospitals, energy sources, educational institutions, and businesses — have access to fast and stable internet. Starlink was also responsible for restoring internet connection in cities such as Irpin, Bucha, Borodyanka, and Chernihiv.
+
+- Nokia, in partnership with the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation, started a project to modernize internet networks across Ukraine, ensuring that Ukrainians and Ukrainian institutions retained internet access in the face of physical bombardment.
+
+- The European Commission and the European Parliament coordinated with European telecom providers to reduce costs or freely provide roaming and international calling within the European Union and Ukraine for displaced Ukrainians.
+
+#### Services and Assistance
+
+With many Ukrainians having to quickly flee their homes, a number of different platforms have been created to connect displaced Ukrainians to key information, assistance, and aid.
+
+- The Alarm app by Ajax Systems serves as a digital air raid siren that helps provide safety warnings to all Ukrainians with smart phones even if municipal air raid sirens are destroyed.
+
+- The UN Refugee Agency’s (UNHCR) online dashboards outline key information about each refugee-receiving country, so that Ukrainian refugees have information on how to access public services and aid and how to report fraud and abuse.
+
+- Host governments have similarly created online platforms for Ukrainian refugees seeking assistance, including the “Dopomoha,” platform launched by the Romanian and Moldovan governments.
+
+- UNHCR’s system also allows Ukrainians to register with their biometric data to collect cash aid payments at ATMs across Europe.
+
+#### Housing
+
+A variety of online platforms have been created to match Ukrainian refugees with short- and long-term housing opportunities.
+
+- Online projects have been started by many companies and organizations to match Ukrainian refugees with short- and long-term housing opportunities, including  betterplace.org, Boston Consulting Group (BCG), Station F (France), Wunderflats (Germany), EU4UA, Prykhystok, Ukraine Now, HomesforUkraine.eu (Austria), Casafari, Shelter UKR, TakecareBnB, Icanhelp.host, and UkraineTakeShelter.com.
+
+#### Data
+
+In order to help aid organizations prioritize where to work, some projects are collecting comprehensive data on displacement patterns.
+
+- The International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix has tracked internal displacement data in order to create a more accurate picture of the state of internal displacement in Ukraine to aid the IOM’s and other aid organizations’ efforts.
+
+#### Supplies and Resources
+
+Many organizations are focused on distributing essential supplies such as food, water, shelter materials, and power banks.
+
+- Projects such as the Ukrainian Defense Fund and Gorillas have created apps to collect and distribute supplies on the ground to people within Ukraine and in areas with high numbers of Ukrainian refugees, such as across the Polish border.
+
+- Other projects, such as Lifesaver and Techfugees, have focused on providing more specific supplies — power banks — ensuring that Ukrainians can maintain mobile access even when power is out.
+
+#### Transportation
+
+A number of different platforms have been created to help displaced Ukrainians travel safely to their desired destinations.
+
+- Techfugees, in partnership with Citizens of Our Planet and Chili Piper, has created a detailed virtual guide for Ukrainians on transportation options for traveling within Ukraine or to cross international borders into Europe.
+
+- Companies such as Uber and Flixbus have offered free trips for refugees — especially around the Ukraine-Poland border.
+
+- Ride-sharing apps such as Uklon  and BlaBlaCar have worked to organize carpools for Ukrainians fleeing the war.
+
+#### Employment
+
+With many Ukrainians out of work due to the war, online platforms have been created to help connect displaced Ukrainians with job opportunities.
+
+- For those looking to work in tech, Employ Ukraine seeks to match Ukrainians with tech positions in EU companies and allows the companies to pay them directly through the platform.
+
+- Google created a $5 million fund to provide cash awards and Google support to Ukrainian start-ups. 
+
+#### Education and Culture
+
+In order to maintain a sense of normalcy, some organizations are utilizing online tools to connect displaced Ukrainians with educational and cultural resources.
+
+- “Laptops for Ukraine” is an EU initiative to collect and distribute laptops and smartphones for schools as well as other public institutions to ensure that public service provision can continue.
+
+- Levebee was funded by the European Union to serve as an app to support the continued education of Ukrainian children during the war. Children can learn math, languages, and other subjects remotely on the app.
+
+- In light of the destruction of parts of Ukraine during the war, the European Competence Centre for Cultural Heritage (4CH) created the Supporting Ukrainian Monuments Initiative, which digitizes and preserves Ukrainian culture online.
+
+
+### Missed Connections
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/cKIVAq3.gif)
+
+_As comprehensive as the digital platforms helping displaced Ukrainians are, certain demographics are at risk of being left behind as they try to access vital resources._
+
+A number of organizations have found that elderly people have struggled to adjust to the mass proliferation of digital tools. A UNDP report found a significant digital divide across different age groups in Ukraine, with over 46 percent of older Ukrainians reporting in early 2022 that they never use the internet. Another study found that 53 percent of Ukrainians have a “below average” level of digital skills — an issue that has become a central focus for the Diia.Education team.
+
+Moreover, people with irregular status are unable to register for Diia, as the user’s information must be registered with the Ukrainian immigration system to gain access to the app. Moreover, users need a Ukrainian bank account and a taxpayer number in order to go through the identification process.
+
+Consequentially, as discussed in a recent CSIS piece, stateless persons in Ukraine are also unable to use the app because they lack any proof of nationality, birth certificates, passports, or residence permits.
+
+Similarly, according to an interview with a civil society organization conducting programming in Ukraine, Ukrainian citizens who reside in Russian-occupied territories such as the Donetsk and Luhansk regions cannot safely use Diia. Using Diia could put them at risk while under Russian occupation, as doing so would mean that they admit to retaining Ukrainian citizenship.
+
+This gap in availability of services and centralized information puts people already vulnerable to exploitation at additional risk of being left out of assistance efforts.
+
+
+### Opportunities for Exploitation
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/razAFfz.gif)
+
+_As Ukrainians navigate their journey away from the conflict, the same access to digital information that facilitated their escape can also leave them vulnerable to dangers just as real as those they left back home._
+
+#### I. Trafficking
+
+Actors with malicious intentions have also capitalized on this proliferation of new digital platforms designed to help Ukrainians. 
+
+Even prior to Russia’s invasion, Ukraine faced high levels of human trafficking, as both an origin and destination country for victims.
+
+According to the UN migration agency, over 300,000 Ukrainians have been victims of human trafficking since 1991.
+
+Men, women, and children are all at risk of trafficking, including forced labor, forced sex work, and forced begging.
+
+Via kidnapping or coercive recruitment, victims are frequently trafficked to various locations around Europe and Eurasia, such as Russia, Poland, Iraq, Spain, and Turkey. 
+
+Just as displaced Ukrainians are using digital tech to help them navigate complex journeys, traffickers are becoming more adept at using these resources to identify, mislead, and capture people.
+
+In September 2022 a Europol-sponsored hackathon identified at least 30 online platforms created to exploit Ukrainian refugees, 10 of which explicitly targeted them for trafficking. In May 2022 an EMPACT action day monitored 125 online platforms, leading to the identification of nine suspected human traffickers.
+
+Similarly, a PBS report showed evidence of online listings for rent-free housing in exchange for sex work and housework, as well as scam online advertising for intermediaries who claim to help with immigration paperwork.
+
+In the United Kingdom, the moderators for Facebook groups established to match Ukrainian refugees with resources — including housing arrangements — have witnessed potential traffickers attempting to contact vulnerable people, particularly women traveling alone.
+
+In this way, the proliferation of online aid networks has opened a new portal for traffickers to target, locate, and capture displaced Ukrainians in search of assistance.
+
+#### II. Misuse of Information
+
+A generalized lack of trust in available information, combined with complex, confusing, or missing language on official government websites has driven people to overly rely on peer-to-peer information seeking through informal channels. Many of these platforms, such as Facebook, Telegram, and WhatsApp are particularly susceptible to mis- and disinformation.
+
+Malign actors — including the Russian state — use these networks to spread false information. During the March 2022 invasion, a variety of popular Telegram channels spread false information claiming that Russia had taken critical Ukrainian cities. Soon after the March 2022 invasion, Russian actors used social media platforms to attempt to discredit reports about their attack on a Mariupol hospital.
+
+Additionally, many small organizations and startups created their own online platforms in the wake of the invasion but failed to keep them updated. While likely unintentional, the proliferation of online information sources resulted in “digital litter” — an abundance of broken links and websites with outdated or false information.
+
+People trying to plan how to flee Ukraine, find resources, or locate employment opportunities must sort through outdated, unclear, or even false information.
+
+#### III. Cybercrime
+
+Bad actors see opportunity in vulnerability.
+
+Cyberspace is filled with scammers, hackers, and websites that seek to take advantage of people in search of jobs, legal assistance, or humanitarian aid.
+
+In 2022, nine people were arrested for operating over 400 phishing sites claiming to offer financial benefits to Ukrainians. They are estimated to have stolen over $3,360,000 from approximately 5,000 victims.
+
+People receiving displaced people in their homes have also become targets online. Fraud schemes, including fake financial assistance for hosts, fake donation websites, and illegitimate fundraising campaigns have led people in host countries to send money directly to scammers.
+
+Similarly, some host countries are worried that malign actors are using unknowing hosts to gather sensitive data about refugees from Ukraine. For example, government officials in Poland, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom have warned of fake letters circulating on social media asking hosts of Ukrainian refugees to share personal information about their guests.
+
+#### IV. Toxic Online Narratives and Hate Speech
+
+Since the beginning of the invasion, there has been an uptick in hate speech acts propagated via social media.
+
+In early 2023 there were reports of anti-Ukrainian narratives circulating through Polish Twitter, with some tweets using xenophobic hashtags. A study by the Centre for Information Resilience concluded that compared to previous years, 2022 saw an increase in the use of nationalistic slurs against Ukrainians on Twitter and Telegram, including from verified blue-check accounts.
+
+Telegram channels dehumanizing the plight of Ukrainians and distributing hateful and disturbing media — sometimes depicting corpses or attacks alongside hateful narrations and captions — were identified as well.
+
+These practices can be both a root cause of forced displacement and a protection threat to the displaced.
+
+In some cases, these narratives can cause potential host communities to reject migrants; in others, they might lead refugees to be more reticent to accept aid from legitimate sources.
+
+__Rogue actors have successfully exploited online platforms to promote trafficking and cybercrimes.__
+
+__However, the use of mis- and disinformation and the proliferation of toxic online narratives and hate speech can be prevented.__
+
+
+### Digital Protection
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/QpL89Gn.gif)
+
+_Even as the war wages on, actors making use of digital tools can work to support the safety and integrity of information and services provided to displaced Ukrainians._
+
+#### I. Fight Cybercrime
+
+Aid actors implementing digital programming should work to train refugees and volunteers on how to spot and combat suspicious activity online.
+
+For example, UNHCR, according to interviews, is conducting training on digital issues with its staff in Ukraine. IOM Ukraine has similarly taken an innovative approach to training displaced Ukrainians on how to spot online threats. IOM developed two online games (one targeted at children and one at adults) where users engage in a “quest,” making a series of difficult decisions mirroring the experiences and threats faced by displaced Ukrainians during the war. At the end of the game, the pros and cons of each decision are explained.
+
+In addition to helping users learn to make smarter decisions about whom to trust when on the move, IOM’s platform has also been used to offer current information — including a road map — on best practices for displaced persons. However, while the game itself is digital, it does not address the threats that Ukrainian refugees are likely to encounter in the digital landscape. This gap has at least partially been filled by the Diia.Education team, which developed online guides and simulators walking Ukrainians through combating human trafficking, promoting online safety for children and elderly populations, and implementing best practices for cybersecurity.
+
+#### II. Improve Vetting for Digital Programming
+
+Organizations must implement stringent vetting procedures for aid and programming that is organized or advertised online.
+
+UNHCR has already started upping vetting procedures for volunteers and discouraging beneficiaries from accepting help from unregistered volunteers. Similarly, Airbnb.org — the company’s nonprofit arm — implemented a vetting procedure to review hosts before they were matched with displaced Ukrainians. Still, the vetting procedures of various organizations, including Airbnb, have been criticized as falling short of what is necessary to truly protect the displaced, in part because they did not include substantive background checks.
+
+Implementing a comprehensive vetting process is often laborious for an aid organization and can slow down aid dispersal. However, it is critical to ensure that aid programs do not place the displaced directly in harm’s way. Similarly, although efforts to individually vet volunteers and share locations are smart practice, the onus should not be on vulnerable displaced persons themselves.
+
+#### III. Reduce Digital Litter
+
+Digital litter leads displaced persons to rely on misleading or unavailable information.
+
+Both governments and other actors should work to clear the web of outdated portals and simplify language online.
+
+Several organizations and researchers are now aware that the abundance of unusable links and outdated information online represents an important downside to using the digital space to distribute information. There are many in the tech space who are willing to volunteer to clear digital litter if the right campaigns are run.
+
+Similarly, social media influencers and actors should be urged to carefully date and archive any information they publish and, should efforts cease, be responsible for clearing their digital footprint.
+
+Since many of these independent platforms are born out of a need for clearer information and conciseness, governments should work toward simplifying their website language, date and update content, display information in different languages and dialects, establish Q&A sections in their portals, and enable chatbots or a channel for feedback and questions.
+
+#### IV. Work with Ukrainian Civil Society to Create Trust
+
+If digital programming is going to be effective, displaced Ukrainians must be able to trust the information they find online. Actors should look to campaigns created in other contexts to create a campaign promoting trust in credible online information. Notably, lessons could be taken from the “Confía en el Jaguar” campaign — launched by UNHCR and Facebook in Mexico in 2016 — which used the symbol of the jaguar to mark trustworthy migration information available through social media.
+
+Along similar lines, IOM created a Telegram hotline for Ukrainians looking to quickly verify online information. By scanning a QR code, users are taken to a Telegram chat room, linked with a hotline where users can engage with a real person in real time.
+
+UNHCR has similarly launched a pilot of its messaging service (first piloted in Ecuador in 2020), offering frequently updated automated responses to aid queries. The platform also functions to connect refugees with specialized staff to help them answer questions that cannot be answered by the messaging service.
+
+By working proactively to fight cybercrime, improve vetting procedures, reduce digital litter, and create trust in online information, state and non-state actors alike have the opportunity to develop a virtual world where displaced Ukrainians can thrive, despite the realities of the war.
+
+
+### Ukraine’s Digital Future
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/ahDpG6d.jpg)
+
+_Much of the world has rallied to support Ukraine._
+
+Digital innovations like Diia have rightly been celebrated as a means to keep Ukrainian refugees connected, despite the devastation caused by the ongoing Russian war of aggression.
+
+Yet, a proliferation of digital resources and aid has translated to a growth of new, unmoderated platforms. While many of these initiatives were created with good intentions, many also lack the controls to prevent exploitation. Global actors should take care to avoid creating opportunities for malicious actors to exploit digitally connected — yet still vulnerable — displaced Ukrainians.
+
+Many Ukrainian refugees are getting smart about their interactions online and implementing their own vetting procedures. But they shouldn’t have to do this work alone.
+
+Individuals and aid organizations seeking to use digital tools to help Ukrainians have a responsibility to engage in digital protection and to consider all of the uses — and misuses — of the platforms and resources they create.
+
+As Ukraine pushes forward toward the end of the war, the decisions made today about the country’s digital space have the opportunity to shape its reconstruction process. Building a safer digital space now means that Ukraine will be all the more ready to embrace a truly digital future. 
+
+---
+
+__Abigail Edwards__, Research Assistant, CSIS Project on Fragility and Mobility
+
+__Ángeles Zúñiga__, Former Research Intern, CSIS Project on Fragility and Mobility
+
+__Erol Yayboke__, Former Director, CSIS Project on Fragility and Mobility
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-28-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-115.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-28-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-115.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9916ddce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-28-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-day-115.md
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊第 115 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-08-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 余慧明完成作供 辯方案情完結 暫押至11.27結案陳詞
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/Fbf1LlO.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（28日）踏入審訊第115天。本案由2月6日開審至今，歷時近7個月，最後一名不認罪被告余慧明今完成4天作供，辯方案情完結，法官暫定押至11月27日讓雙方進行口頭結案陳詞，料需時約兩至三周。就法官李運騰有份審理的《蘋果日報》案原定12月18日開審，法官陳慶偉指若撞期，該案可再押後，李運騰亦稱相信該案律師不會介意延誤多數天。法官亦指押後期間會處理部分認罪被告就同意案情的爭議，但暫不會處理求情。
+
+余今接受盤問時，表明認為以否決預算案爭取五大訴求為合法、合理的手段，強調並非「淨係想破壞而無建設」，真正目的是爭取雙普選。被問是否有意與其他議員聯手否決預算案，余稱每個議員為獨立個體，「我冇辦法迫人哋去做」，「墨落無悔」聲明亦無表明會聯同其他議員運用權力；而她從決定參選至勝出也沒有相信參選人之間有協議。余作供完畢後，向旁聽親友面露微笑做握拳手勢，散庭時興奮地跳起數下，向親友飛吻。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/b8c3qG5.png)
+▲ 余慧明（資料圖片）
+
+#### 余稱雖以個人身分參選仍諮詢會員、若大部分不支持或不參選
+
+參選衞生服務界的前醫管局員工陣線主席余慧明，今繼續接受主控萬德豪盤問。余表示以個人而非工會身分參選，她先諮詢工會是因作為一名工會代表，擔心會員對她參選會有些反感，同意並非一定要諮詢，只是出於禮貌。法官陳仲衡問，那余想過工會不支持她參選會怎樣？余指如會員大部分不太支持，「我可能唔考慮呢條路線，因為始終嗰陣時我都係一個工會嘅代表，我唔可以唔理會我啲會員嘅意見。」
+
+余續指，約於6月初選競選階段時，聘請3至4名全職競選團隊成員，他們的薪金「全部都係我自己畀嘅」，因她以個人名義出選，「我一蚊都冇用過工會錢㗎，況且我係工會代表嗰時，我都冇收過工會嘅人工」；她亦有十多名義工，當中3至5名為核心義工。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/0P0fvts.png)
+▲ 2020年2月5日醫護罷工第三日，醫管局員工陣線到特首辦示威。（資料圖片）
+
+#### 余稱從無讀過戴耀廷區諾軒文章
+
+萬德豪續問，余的團隊成員有否告知她戴耀廷和區諾軒曾寫過關於否決預算案和「攬炒」的文章，余說沒有。萬再指戴作為初選組織者和公眾人物，余知道他於Facebook和《蘋果日報》發表文章嗎？余指不知道，因無追蹤戴Facebook，也無人告訴過她；而她「睇連登多過睇報紙」，看《蘋果日報》亦主要看港聞和娛樂，不知道戴對35+的目標有政治看法。余後在覆問稱，被捕前從無讀過戴耀廷和區諾軒的文章。
+
+#### 余稱否決財案爭五大訴求為合法合理手段
+
+就初選提名表格，余慧明同意簽署和提交時均無留意「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」的條款，指表格由助理填寫，助理無問她何謂共識，亦無告訴她曾否問組織者。萬德豪續指，條款中「目標」的英文是「goals」、是眾數，問余其助理是否護士？教育程度是什麼？余指是大學生。法官陳仲衡指萬是假設該助理閱讀表格的英文版，陳慶偉亦着控方改問助理有否與她討論計劃目標，「不論語言」，余回應沒有。
+
+萬德豪續問，余慧明是否曾提及，願（willing to）以任何合法方式爭取五大訴求，余答「係」。萬再問，余是會（would）以任何合法方式爭取五大訴求？余說：「誒同頭先嗰個問題有乜嘢分別啊，都係『係』囉，或者你會唔會解釋一次第二次嘅問法同埋第一次嘅問法會唔會有乜大分別？」
+
+萬說第一個問題是「You were willing」，第二個問題是「You would」，法官陳慶偉笑說：「有什麼分別？」旁聽席發笑。李運騰說沒關係，總之余兩條問題答案均為「是」，余同意，並在盤問下指，否決預算案爭取五大訴求「係一個合法兼且合理嘅手段」。
+
+#### 被問是否有意聯同他人否決 余：每個議員為獨立個體無法迫人做
+
+就余慧明於2020年3月發布的〈踏上這攬炒旅途〉，提到「爭取35席後為手段，然後全面否決所有政府提出的議案為目的，藉此觸發基本法第五十條，令特首宣佈解散立法會，制造憲政危機，此為制度內的『攬炒』」，萬德豪指若無35席便不能否決所有政府議案，而為了行使否決權，大多數議員應一同行動，余均同意。
+
+萬續問，因此余有意與其他議員聯手（join force）組成大多數否決預算案？余說：「但係每一個議員都係自己一個獨立嘅個體，我冇辦法迫人哋去做囉。」李運騰指，但若要達到余所說的目標，便需要民主派議員合作或有協議，余同意，並於覆問稱從決定參選至勝出初選，沒有相信參選人之間有協議，而她於8月訪問提到「我覺得大家係要簽一份共同認同嘅綱領」，是因「就係冇（協議）我先會咁講」。
+
+#### 余稱否決財案非目的僅手段：我哋唔係淨係想破壞冇建設
+
+余又承認上文錯用「目的」一字，指全面否決所有政府議案「唔係我哋嘅最終目的」，最終目的應是該段最後一句「再共同建構重光後的香港」，即「真正落實到『港人治港，高度自治』」；又解釋指：「因為我哋唔係想爭取否決晒所有議案呀嘛，我哋唔係淨係想破壞而冇建設，我哋嘅真正目的係想爭取雙普選」，同意法官李運騰指否決預算案並非目的，而是達致目的之手段（means to an end）。萬德豪質疑，余稱這是其宣言，會花時間準備，余同意，「但唔代表我嘅選字一定係最正確囉，始終我真係一個政治嘅素人。」
+
+而就余提到：「當初要爭取議會過半，全面反枱，迫使政權解散立法會進行破局。這個目標一日未達成，一日亦要堅持」，余重申否決財案並非最終目標，強調「我係一直都想爭取五大訴求缺一不可」，並認為真普選是最重要。余在法官陳慶偉追問下，同意她望廢除功能組別，因認為「一個議席唔應該淨係代表到一小撮人嘅利益囉」。
+
+#### 余稱簽「墨落」僅表達自己立場、不包括聯同他人運用權力
+
+至於余於6月簽署的「墨落無悔」聲明，萬德豪指余知道其他簽署者均同意當選後會否決預算案，余說「依個我唔肯定喎，佢簽咋嘛」，「佢哋話佢哋會囉。」萬續指出，余簽聲明時，實向公眾表明她會聯同其他未來議員否決預算案，余說：「我只係表達返我自己嘅立場，依度都唔包括話我會聯同其他立法會議員一齊運用基本法賦予嘅權力啦。」
+
+#### 余稱專訪未完全反映其意思 重申若提修改或釀公關災難
+
+控方續引余慧明4月的《獨立媒體》專訪〈從組織工會到走進議會 余慧明：我要真攬炒！〉，提到余慧明「正積極考慮參選立法會『衞生服務界』，為了立法會過半後，全面否決政府提出的議案，製造憲政危機，重組一個真正為人民服務的政府」，余指這是記者選用的詞語，但「唔完全反映到我嘅意思囉」。李運騰指，該段最後也提到「重組一個真正為人民服務的政府」，與余的文章意思一致，余同意「差唔多」。
+
+萬德豪續指，余受訪後無向記者表示要修改。余重申當時已進入競選階段，如向記者指「有啲字眼我想執」、甚至全篇文章下架，有機會被其他潛在候選人攻擊、造成「公關災難」，故無特別處理。萬指，但無任何事情阻止余在 Facebook 就文章發表意見，余同意，但她沒有這樣做。
+
+萬再引訪問提到「她很清楚，立會過半的目標，是透過否決政府的所有議案，令立法會停擺，觸發憲政危機」。余指「目標」是記者選擇的用語，萬追問是錯誤的選擇？余說：「我唔識幫佢答喎。」李運騰追問記者有否扭曲余的意思，余說：「佢唔算扭曲，但解釋得唔夠詳細囉。」
+
+余續主動舉例，訪問提到「她記得，當時醫管局剛轉用電子派藥系統，有次醫生將某藥物的使用方法更改，系統卻沒有標示」，但她受訪時是指派藥的「三核五對（3 Checks 5 Rights）」中第二次核對只標示藥物處方，無顯示使用途徑。李運騰指毋須進入細節，「我們也不會明白」，余說：「可能陳慶偉法官會明」（陳為註冊藥劑師），陳慶偉說「我明白」，但笑言不認為與案相關，多人大笑。
+
+#### 余強調《國安法》後不認為爭取五大訴求的目標及手段違法
+
+而就余慧明5月15日於「大紀元」的訪問，提及如當選後要反對政府任何議案，「去逼使呢個政權，佢一定要回應五大訴求缺一不可」，而非只是回應其中一兩個，又強調「我哋個口號唔淨係一個口號式嘅抗爭，我哋係要用行動去表達，我哋係要求政府真係要回應晒全部五大訴求，先可以叫做解決到呢件事囉」。
+
+控方問余，該想法直至《國安法》落實後是否也沒有改變？余同意，指「爭取五大訴求缺一不可，一直都係我爭取緊嘅嘢」，即使《國安法》通過後「我都唔認為爭取五大訴求缺一不可係違法」。
+
+李運騰指，余或認為目標不違法，但達致此目標的手段，余當時也認為是合法？余說「係」。控方問她曾否於訪問或 Facebook 專頁表明若政府放低身段對話，會與政府「有得傾」，余指記憶中沒有，強調「呢個係我嘅談判策略嚟嘅，我冇可能公開畀大眾知囉」。
+
+#### 被問是否意圖顛覆國家政權 余：絕對不同意
+
+就7月15日抗爭派記者會，梁晃維、岑敖暉、王百羽會上發言提及否決預算案時提到「我哋」，余說這是他們用的詞彙，但不等於事前「有傾過」。而余會後無向他們和公眾表示其言論不代表她，因認為無此需要，且每個議員也是獨立個體。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/rJ6f7O4.png)
+▲ 2020年7月15日 抗爭派記者會（資料圖片）
+
+萬德豪最後指出控方案情，指余與其他被告串謀取得立會過半，無差別否決預算案，以迫使政府回應五大訴求，余不同意。萬再指她意圖顛覆國家政權，余答：「絕對不同意。」
+
+辯方完成覆問後，余完成作供，在座位喝水後，向旁聽親友面露微笑，在腰間做出握拳手勢，並在兩名懲教陪同下步回被告欄。
+
+#### 官下令控辯雙方分別於10.3及11.7前呈交結案陳詞
+
+辯方案情完成，代表梁國雄的資深大律師潘熙其後表示，將呈上梁2015至2017年就預算案的投票紀錄。就結案陳詞，萬德豪指控方需時4星期準備，大律師石書銘稱辯方需要同樣時間。萬問控方會否被給予時間再回應，法官指控方通常無權就證據再回應，除非涉法律議題，控方屆時可再作申請。法官陳慶偉終下令，控方須於10月3日前呈交書面陳詞，辯方則於11月7日前回應，每名被告限30頁。
+
+代表何桂藍的大律師 Trevor Beel 續指本案牽涉頗為新的法例，辯方需更多頁數探討條文字眼。陳慶偉指可增加至35頁，又指辯方可以點列式處理。石書銘指辯方或就法律觀點呈交聯合陳詞。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/s2V9AWP.png)
+▲ 大律師 Trevor Beel
+
+#### 官暫定11.27結案陳詞 料需時兩至三周
+
+代表鄒家成的大律師陳世傑問，法庭能否定下結案陳詞日期。陳慶偉指未能決定，因視乎法律議題的複雜性，但大概是在11至12月期間，望能於聖誕節前後完成，又指向身旁的李運騰，指他有另一宗案件（黎智英《蘋果日報》案）將於12月18日開審，「我不能承諾你任何事情」。
+
+李運騰指，聽取所有口頭陳詞或需兩至三星期，陳世傑再追問暫定日子，陳慶偉指大約是11月27日。潘熙問需多少天、5天是否可以，李運騰指5天有點太樂觀，因控方需涵蓋16名被告的案情及相關法律議題，控方陳詞或需5天，又指寧願預留較多時間（generous）。
+
+陳世傑關注，若11月27日開始陳詞，或與另案（《蘋果》案）重疊，陳慶偉擺動右手說：「那就由它，再延期（“So be it, further defer.”）」，庭上傳來笑聲。李運騰續說如有需要，不認為該案的律師會介意延誤多數天（“I don’t think the counsel in the other case would mind a few days’ delay if necessary.”）。
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/RTcrhXX.png)
+▲ 大律師 陳世傑
+
+陳慶偉又指，案件押後期間，會處理部分認罪被告就同意案情的爭議，但李運騰補充不會在該段時間聽取求情，而是先處理事實的部分，Beel 指何桂藍望出席該些聆訊。陳慶偉下令休庭前，提醒各方執拾物品，指現在要清空此法庭。
+
+散庭時，多名旁聽人士上前揮手，梁國雄、林卓廷等也不住揮手回應，余慧明則在被告欄內興奮地跳起數下，又向旁聽親友飛吻。部分准保釋被告離庭時神情輕鬆，劉偉聰、何啟明，黃碧雲、施德來均一同離開，當中連日審訊均自備坐墊、交律師保管在庭內的施亦攜同座墊離開。漫畫家尊子今亦有來旁聽，「王婆婆」王鳳瑤亦有於庭外聲援。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/Buajqm2.png)
+▲ 漫畫家 尊子
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/qWmOAaL.png)
+▲ 王婆婆（資料圖片）
+
+#### 2月初開審 至今近7個月
+
+本案今年2月6日開審，原定審期90天，至今歷時近7個月，惟至審訊第115天才完成辯方案情。47名被告中，原有18人不認罪，惟伍健偉和林景楠開審前改為認罪，最終16人不認罪受審。翻查資料，審訊第1至58日處理被告答辯和控方案情，第59至64日處理共謀者原則爭議及中段陳詞，第65日至115日則處理辯方案情。
+
+16名被告中，鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、陳志全、柯耀林及李予信10人獲准保釋，何桂藍、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、余慧明及吳政亨6人則須還柙。而當中楊雪盈、黃碧雲、林卓廷和梁國雄均不作供亦無傳召證人；吳政亨和柯耀林無作供但有傳召證人，其餘10人均有出庭作供。
+
+審訊期間，認罪被告包括黃之鋒、朱凱廸、譚凱邦、馮達浚、梁晃維、岑敖暉、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒、尹兆堅、毛孟靜、胡志偉及劉頴匡曾到庭旁聽，他們於開審首周獲准在正庭與不認罪被告同坐，但至區諾軒開始作供後被改安排至延伸庭就坐，其後男女分庭而坐。准保釋的呂智恆亦曾到庭旁聽。
+
+另有多人曾旁聽本案，包括歌手黃耀明，立法會議員謝偉俊（其律師行代表本案被告彭卓棋、區諾軒和鍾錦麟），漫畫家尊子，民主黨劉慧卿、黃偉賢，社民連陳寶瑩、黃浩銘、曾健成、陳皓桓，支聯會徐漢光，「王婆婆」王鳳瑤及多國領事等。
+
+案件現暫定11月27日進行口頭結案陳詞，料法庭將押後裁決，並連同其餘31名認罪被告進行求情和判刑，意味屆時其中32名被告已還柙近2年8個月。
+
+![image09](https://i.imgur.com/drDZUxb.png)
+▲ 陳志全
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/1HGcgVB.png)
+▲ 黃碧雲、施德來
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/16MDEXS.png)
+▲ 劉偉聰、何啟明
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/KidTYCK.png)
+▲ 楊雪盈
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/1PVVnLk.png)
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/X4FPHUM.png)
+▲ 李予信
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/a8LHcGs.png)
+▲ 柯耀林、彭卓棋
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022

From 2a6684d0c338fa3bcd6f694a2c778e6cdf83bfef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2023 01:02:04 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 16/19] 0x20 Add _columns posts, Sep.18

---
 ...23-philosophie-terminales-the-anarchism.md | 118 ++++++++++++++
 ...democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk28.md | 148 ++++++++++++++++++
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-08-23-philosophie-terminales-the-anarchism.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-23-philosophie-terminales-the-anarchism.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "無政府主義"
+author: "arandomguy"
+date  : 2023-08-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/wqmsk5t.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "個人閱讀心得記錄，有很多個人想法。"
+---
+
+### 社會是否應該限制國家的力量？
+
+→ 國家的公正性在於國家對社會的獨立性。
+
+這句話在講，如果國家在制定政策可以不受利益集團或外部勢力的影響，有可能確保公正和平等。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+#### 1、組織構成取決於社會條件
+
+> 政府類型取決於社會型態
+
+> #### 孟德斯鳩
+
+> 「一般來說，法律之所以能支配地球上的所有人，依靠的就是人類的理性；每個國家的政治與民事法只是（這種）人類理性在面對個別情況的運用。法律應該是為該國的人民而制定，為適用於該國國民而存在。若這些法也適用於另一國，那純屬湊巧。無論這法律是構成政府的政治法，或是維繫其體制的民事法，都應該符合被建立或是想被建立的政府的性質與原則。這些法律也應該與國家的自然狀態相關，與氣候的寒冷、炎熱或溫和，與土壤品質、環境、面積大小，與人民從事農耕、打獵或放牧等生活方式息息相關。法律必須考量人民的信仰、習性、財富、人口、貿易、風俗與舉止態度等，與憲政體制所能容扔的自由程度相呼應。」
+
+Q：為什麼不能想像一步適用於所有民族的理想憲法？
+
+文中提到，不同國家有不同信仰、習性、財富、人口、貿易、風俗與舉止態度等，所以不同國家甚至地區，法律都會不一樣。比如放牧民族和農耕民族，這兩種人民的生活方式完全不一樣，很難制定一個所有民族都適用的〝理想憲法〞。
+
+> 國家沒有權力剝奪任何人的自然權利
+
+> #### 約翰‧洛克《論寬容書簡》
+
+> 「在我看來，國家是由人們組成的社會，人們組成這社會，只是為了要建立、維護並增進公民利益。我所說的「公民利益」是指生命、自由、身體健康，以及身外之財如金錢、土地、房屋、建物等這類事物。行政官員的職責是，藉由公正無私的執行平等的法律，保障所有人，尤其他的每個人民，都能正當擁有生命中的所有事物。假設有人意外違反這些維護財產所有權的公共法律，他的魯莽輕率不須因為害怕懲罰而有所節制。這些懲罰包括剝奪其部分或全部財產或公民權益，這些他原本能夠且應該享有的權利。…基督宗教徒之所以引發宗教爭執和戰爭，並不是因為那些難以避免的多元意見，而是因為他們不願意寬容。教會領袖受到貪婪與無止境地想要統治他人的慾望所驅使，利用君主的野心與人云亦云民眾的迷信心理，以此煽動他們去反對些意見與教會相反的人，跟他們說要剝奪主張宗教分立與視為異端之人的財產，並完全消滅這些人，此舉違背了福音書與基督徒慈愛的訓示。他們因而將教會與國家這兩總截然不同的事物混淆在一起。」
+
+Q：洛克如何證明國家一方面有權處罰並奪取公民的財產，另一方面又認為沒有任何機構（國家或教會）有權利以宗教理由懲罰任何人？
+
+國家是為了要建立、維護並增進公民利益。行政官員的職責是，藉由公正無私的執行平等的法律，保障所有人民都能正當擁有生命中的所有事物。假設有人違法公共法律，國家則有權剝奪其部分或全部財產或公民權益。
+
+如果是因為貪婪或想統治他人的慾望，利用君主的的野心與人云亦云民眾的迷信心理，引發爭執或戰爭，這種則沒有權利或理由懲罰任何人。
+
+#### 我的想法
+
+一開始講到有甚麼樣的人民，就有甚麼樣的國家。比如放牧民族會有放牧民族的法律，或各個國家法律都不一樣等。
+
+但孟德斯鳩也提到「若這些法也適用於另一國，那純屬湊巧。」我就有點不太明白，純屬湊巧是甚麼意思？
+
+比如各國有相同或相似的法律，但這法律不一定適用於其他國家，只適用該國家。某方面好像合理，因為各個國家的文化、價值觀、社會結構、環境等等都不一樣，所以就算不同國家有相同法律，也不適用其他國家。比如各個國家都有的自由言論法、婚姻法、勞工法、環境法規等，這些法看起來相同，實際詳細規則、規範等都不相同。
+
+後面在講國家為什麼有權剝奪人的權利。因為國家是要建立、維護並增進公民利益。也提到貪婪或個人私慾等，則沒有任何權利或理由利用國家的權力對人民做任何事。
+
+#### 2、公民不服從
+
+→ 在具有正當性的國家中，整個社會都擁有對國家的約束力。
+
+> 在民主國家中的公民不服從
+
+> #### 羅爾斯《正義論》
+
+> 「既然我假定了，一個近乎正義狀態的國家必須是民主政體，那麼這個理論所關切的是，對於正當建立的民主權威而言，公民不服從所扮演的角色與其適切性。這個理論並不適用於民主以外的政體，除非是特例，否則也不適用於其他形式的異議或反抗…對我而言，公民不服從的問題，只有在當公民或多或少肯認即接受憲法正當性的民主國家中才會發生。其難處就在於義務之間的衝突。面對捍衛公民自由權與對抗不正義的義務時，服從多數派所制定的法律（或多數派所）的義務，何時不再具有約束力？這個問題涉及了多數統治的本質與界限。因此公民不服從的問題，是所有民主道德基礎理論的關鍵測試。」
+
+Q：你能舉出幾個因義務衝突，而引發公民不服從的例子嗎？
+
+台灣的太陽花學運、2020-2022年泰國示威、白俄羅斯的拖鞋革命、法國大罷工等等。
+
+Q：如何區分「公民不服從」與只是「不服從法律」兩種行為？
+
+本書在此章節一開始有提到「當一個行動不僅是捍衛個別利益，而是為了更高的權益，這就是捍衛民主的行動，也是捍衛正義的行動」。所以就看意圖是個人還是群體吧。
+
+#### 我的想法
+
+這邊講的「公民不服從」有兩個面向，一個是面對亂搞的政府，比如制定不平等法規、濫用公權力等，公民可以「不服從」，然後發動示威抗議。另一個就單純的「我不想服從」，完全是以自我為中心「因為我覺得麻煩，所以不想服從」之類的理由。
+
+引用《正義論》的內容後面提到有趣的概念。
+
+在民主國家中，少數是否就是完全的服從多數？何時可以不再遵守多數所制定的規則？因個人需求或選擇的自由，是否就可以〝不服從〞？
+
+這好像就講到前面的「我不想服從」這個面向？因為那是多數派所制定的規則，但我可能屬於少數派，我的需求不被重視，所以感到不滿，然後就〝不服從〞。
+
+關於這點，過去我覺得就真的是少數服從多數，少數沒有任何話語權。但現在的社會好像有比較重視少數派的意見，像現在有各式各樣的設施會針對行動不方便的人的設計。或現在也提倡「溝通」這個觀念。透過溝通來理解所有人的想法，來制定或設計一個盡量符合所有人需求的東西。
+
+#### 3、國家是否無用？
+
+→ 無政府主義者：國家收稅以及擁有警察、軍隊的正當性，是有爭議的。
+
+對羅斯巴德而言，一些個體就足以扛起國家的主要功能。
+
+> 國家危害到個人自由
+
+> #### 穆瑞‧羅斯巴德《自由的倫理》
+
+> 「如果生活在社會中的所有人（除了少數被認定為罪犯的人，如盜竊者與銀行「搶匪」）都是透過自己選擇的方式獲取收入，無論是出售貨品或提供服務給消費者，或是收到自願的贈與（遺產與繼承等），只有國家政治人物是透過強制的方式獲得收入，也就是以可怕的懲罰威脅來保障收入，那麼，這種「暴力」稱為「稅收」，在規範還未正常化的時代，則稱為「黃金」。稅收是一種偷竊。」
+
+Q：對羅斯巴德來說，個人自己賺的錢不是「偷的」，跟國家用「強制的方式」取得收入不同，為什麼？
+
+「自己選擇的方式、自願贈與」和「強制的方式獲得」。
+
+#### 我的想法
+
+「無政府主義」主張消除或最小化政府的存在，追求社會的自由、平等和個人自主，並主張以合作、互助和分散的方式組織社會。簡單來說就是所有人都有「自己應該做什麼、不應該做什麼」的共識吧。
+
+恩..有點無法想像這種政府型態的存在..。
+
+
+### 「社會是否應該限制國家的力量？」總結
+
+國家並非個人、團體、組織的利益製造工具，國家是要建立、維護並增進公民利益。所以為了增進自己國家的公民利益，會制定符合該國家人民的法律規範等。但每個人的訴求不同，這時候就算相關規則是透過民主的方式制定出來，還是會有人權益受損，所以如果是為了更高的權益，就可以考慮「不服從國家」，如用社會運動的方式來表達訴求，當然我是覺得還是先尋求正常管道拉，會需要弄到社會運動…應該是後面了吧。
+
+所以社會是否應該限制國家的力量？第一個是要看國家現況如何，是否為正當的存在，是否是為了該國人民而制定相關法規，如果不是，或有人權益因此受損，那我覺得是的，國家的力量應該被限制，直到能夠確保人民利益。
+
+而最後「無政府主義」，因為這主義主張就算沒有政府，人們也可以很好的互相合作，讓社會正常運作。我覺得現階段應該是無法，比如警察、軍人、社會資源分配、建設公共設施等，這些都需要國家的權力來動員。
+
+這邊做一個假設，如果警察不是政府組織，而是私人企業，且它的目標和功能也跟原本的警察一樣，這私人企業的警察，還會像政府組織的警察一樣嗎？應該說屬於政府的警察跟私人企業的警察，有什麼不一樣？這是否是現在的保全公司或傭兵團呢？
+
+hmm…
+
+<!--END-->
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-08-27-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk28.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-27-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk28.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第廿八周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date  : 2023-08-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/FHzRqe9.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 余慧明：參選為爭話語權與政府「有得傾」、若不回應五大訴求會反對一切議案
+
+<!--more-->
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第廿八周，參選超區的李予信作供完畢，本案最後一名被告余慧明開始作供。
+
+余慧明供稱，參選因2019年見證政府對市民訴求視若無睹，而2020年初醫護罷工經驗，令她明白如無足夠話語權，政權或掌權者「唔會理我」，望透過立會過半取得話語權。余強調，其目標並非「攬炒」，而是爭取雙普選，以選出真正反映民意的政府；而她提出否決所有議案，是採取高姿態談判手段「先砌後傾」，望政府能放低身段聆聽民意、回應訴求。
+
+余強調，「我哋從來都有得傾」，但若政府無意回應五大訴求，其預設立場就是對政府議案投反對票，「講得出做得到」，亦認為「投下一票反對票係冇錯」。余又以「惡法」形容《國安法》，法官一度稱「就算你唔鍾意都唔可以觸犯」；余亦質疑反修例運動無官員和警員問責、卻有很多示威者被拘控，直言「我永遠企喺雞蛋嘅一方」。
+
+余又指，曾憂「鎅票」而聯絡戴耀廷能否「順便」辦衞生服務界初選，但該界別無開過協調會議、無討論過預算案，她無收過或看過協議文件，初選結果亦無約束力。她僅理解「35+」目標為爭取民主派議會過半，而計劃於初選結果公布後已完結。
+
+至於李予信則指超區初選落敗後，曾獲楊岳橋指示報名參選港島，但理解並非鄭達鴻「Plan B」。他又指理解黨就否決財案的「統一口徑」無約束力、有彈性，他無講過也無採納，而他當選後不打算跟黨立場投票。
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/jeJnXfn.png)
+
+
+### 余指參選因見證政府對訴求視若無睹、望爭足夠話語權
+
+參選超區的前公民黨東區區議員李予信本周作供完畢後，由參選衞生服務界的余慧明開始作供。余大學畢業後成為註冊護士及受聘於醫管局，2019年前從無參與政治活動，組織工會是她參與政治的開始。余是2019年12月刊憲成立的醫管局員工陣線（HAEA）籌委，後獲選為主席，會員人數於罷工時達兩萬的高峰。
+
+余表示，2020年初留意到有「武漢肺炎」消息傳出，工會發動罷工要求封關，望保障市民性命安全及保護醫療系統避免崩潰。惟余指醫管局只是「遊花園」、無回應訴求，工會要求與特首談判亦不果；又透露曾獲政府「中間人」行會成員林正財告知，擬將全面封關訴求包裝為禁止高危地方旅客訪港，向政府推銷，惟翌日出台卻僅為隔離措施。
+
+余形容，與政府和醫管局交手的經驗，令她明白到如果無足夠話語權，政權或掌權者「係唔會同我傾、唔會理我」；加上2019年見證政府對市民訴求視若無睹，「一味武力打壓示威者」，亦不滿時任衞生服務界議員李國麟的表現，故3月中決定參選。
+
+余指當時無看過戴耀廷文章，僅從網上看到關於民主派立會過半可取得立會控制權的討論，提到政府拒回應民意會產生行政和立法機關的分歧，觸發憲政危機，要透過兩次否決財案的《基本法》機制解決。余認為觸發憲政危機主導權「從來都喺政府手入面」，但無留意是戴的想法；亦認為民主派取得35+可「反客為主」設定議程審議「五大訴求」。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/j3Il98g.png)
+▲ 2020年2月3日，醫護罷工首日，余慧明現身瑪麗醫院外帶領呼喊口號。（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 余稱目標為爭雙普選非「攬炒」、指「真普選」反映民意可「破局」
+
+余慧明續解釋，她為參加立選鋪路而寫的〈踏上這攬炒旅途〉提及「攬炒」，是願以任何合法方法增加政府拒聽民意的代價，即使過程中或自身利益受損；又指理解2019年時「攬炒」是借助電影對白「if we burn, you burn with us」，當時市民「已經畀政權燒着緊」，示威者要令不聽民意強推《逃犯條例》修訂的政權付出代價。余強調「攬炒」雖帶來雙輸，但「始作俑者係政府」。
+
+余主張議會內外抗爭，指議會內「攬炒」是令政府不能任意通過議案，議會外則是發動「大三罷」等，令政府面對很大壓力，須面對「堅持己見」或「順應民意」的局面。余亦重視抗爭的合法性，指罷工為《基本法》保障的權利自由，亦認為「投下一票反對票係冇錯」、只是行使議員職能，即使啟動否決機制亦無違《國安法》。余又指曾預期被DQ和政府取消選舉，但無想過連議會都未入、未投反對票就被捕。
+
+余作供時強調，「攬炒」和否決所有議案並非其目標，其最終目標是爭取雙普選，認為在政府以暴力鎮壓人民、而市民用暴力回應的僵持局面下，制度上的變革，即以一人一票選出特首和立法會議員的「真普選」，可反映民意並「破局」解決困局。就余文章提到「把制度推倒重來」，余指並非將三權分立推倒，僅想以雙普選取代現行制度；又強調落實雙普選從來都是《基本法》承諾，特首仍須由中央任命、向中央負責。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/sRuzM2e.png)
+▲ 2020年2月5日醫護罷工第三日，醫管局員工陣線到特首辦示威。（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 余指倘政府不回應五大訴求預設投反對 惟屬高姿態談判手段「有得傾」
+
+余慧明的文章和政綱均看來態度強硬，包括提到過往泛民主張的「又傾又砌」要畫上句號、與政權「無斡旋餘地」，政綱亦表明「我若當選，必定承諾行使反對權利反對一切議案，直至香港政府全面回應五大訴求，決一不可為止」。余到底是否願與政府談判，成為審訊其中一個焦點。
+
+余解釋，過往泛民與政府談判時意志不夠堅定、很易退讓和被看穿底牌，認為新一屆立法會應由意志較堅定的議員爭取五大訴求。法官問她是否認為五大訴求不能退讓，余否認，指是採取「高姿態」的談判手段；並形容「全面否決所有議案」只是「姿態」而非「恐嚇」，強調「我哋從來都係有得傾」。
+
+余舉例五大訴求中認為最重要是雙普選，而若政府能提供確實時間表她便可接受，其他訴求則可由之後的民選政府實行；又指如政府願放低身段展開對話聆聽民意，她願停止「三罷」。余亦預期選舉結果公布後，「政府已經會同我哋傾」，因會看到民主派取得多少話語權。
+
+法官屢質疑余無表明願意談判，余解釋她是「先砌後傾」，即擺出高姿態事先宣揚反對一切議案，以爭取較平等的對話機會，比泛民「企得更硬」；又指她想向公眾展現不會輕易退讓的決心，但不會將談判策略「擺埋出嚟畀人睇」、自揭底牌，承認「或多或少」有誇張。
+
+法官質疑她欺騙公眾，余不同意，表明「因為我真係會投反對票囉，係有啲泛民連反對票都唔敢投」，強調若政府無意回應五大訴求，其「預設立場」是對政府議案投反對票，「我係會講得出做得到」；她亦認為五大訴求「缺一不可」，即使實行了雙普選亦要確保政府落實其餘訴求。
+
+余又表示，雖表明反對一切議案，但「唔代表我唔睇個內容就會投反對」，指她仍會研究政策流弊仔細分析予選民，讓他們得知她就算投反對也「有理有據」。法官質疑她是先決定反對，其後再找原因，余重申其預設立場是投反對，除非議案找不到任何一個反對的原因、或政府有措施令她「回心轉意」。
+
+
+### 余認為初選結果公布後「35+計劃」已完、無印象草擬抗爭派聲明但同意內容
+
+就《國安法》後的情況，余指其造勢大會曾邀請立場較進取和並非泛民的黃之鋒、朱凱廸、何桂藍等站台；她亦有出席7月9日初選記者會，指當時相信初選和其政綱合法，戴耀廷會上說法亦令她相信是合法。余又指從無發表過要求外國制裁的言論，以往僅提「國際戰線」，望透過媒體向國際展示香港社運和醫護罷工原因，利用輿論向政府施壓；但《國安法》後余特意不再提，免被視為勾結外國勢力，亦無再用較敏感字眼如「推翻」。
+
+余慧明亦是繼何桂藍和鄒家成後，第三名曾出席7月15日抗爭派記者會的作供被告。余指不記得她或團隊收到邀請，認知記招類似「造勢大會」，有立場較進取的勝出者出席；而余因自視為抗爭意志較堅定、與主流泛民有別的「抗爭派」而出席，她當時「完全唔知」中聯辦前一天發聲明譴責初選或違法，她是收到審訊文件夾後才知道。
+
+法官關注區諾軒同日退出初選，記者會是否對組織者中止初選的回應，表示抗爭派想繼續。余指她認知並不是，並認為初選結果公布後，「35+計劃」已完結，其後若有協調工作亦只是處理「爛攤子」，她也是庭上始知組織者當時「有手尾」如選前民調要處理。
+
+余又表示，記者會前無與出席者討論發言內容，亦無印象有參與草擬抗爭派聲明，自言與他們「唔係好熟」、「坐埋咗一邊」，雖然有部分人曾為她站台，但他們僅由團隊邀請，「我哋稱唔上朋友，因為電話都冇」。不過余同意有在聲明簽名，亦同意聲明內容。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/d9CvLNW.png)
+▲ 2020年7月15日 抗爭派記者會（資料圖片）
+
+余又提到三個層次的抗爭立場，首先作為醫療界工會代表，她一直就抗疫議題提批評和建議，但不被接納，更被指為「別有用心、抹黑政府」；其次是爭取醫療制度改革。余認為上述兩者未能成功爭取，是因無一個真正了解民意的政府，故認為最重要是爭取雙普選制度的第三個層面。
+
+而就余在初選後訪問提到「我覺得大家係要簽一份共同認同嘅綱領」，她指民主派潛在參選人正是無任何協議，她才這樣說，她也無與組織者和參與者就當選後做什麼有任何協議。
+
+
+### 余指衞生服務界無開協調會、無收協調文件、結果無約束力
+
+區諾軒等早前供稱，衞生服務界的候選人由戴耀廷聯絡，那到底這界別的初選是如何開始的？余慧明指4月時因擔心多於一名參選人會「鎅票」致「建制得利」，故問正在地區直選辦初選的戴耀廷，能否「順便」辦衞生服務界初選，獲戴覆「睇吓有冇依個可能性」。而余直至戴耀廷於6月9日記者會宣布時，才得悉衞生服務界會辦初選，並解釋此前無追問戴，因只是「搭單」辦初選，禮貌上「唔係太好意思去催人哋」，亦認為「如果搞得成就去啦，搞唔成就再算啦」。
+
+余並表示，衞生服務界無召開過協調會議，她亦不曾收過及看過協議文件。而戴於6月24日才創立衞生服務界WhatsApp群組，候選人與組織者無討論過替補機制和棄選機制，戴亦無提過其他區的討論內容。余指該界別就選民資格認證有爭議，候選人無法達成共識，最終戴耀廷決定該界別初選結果不具約束力，只供參考。余強調她望初選有約束力，形容結果是「無可奈何」，並指初選後她曾約候選人開會，望他們尊重賽果，但僅劉凱文出席並提出任其「Plan B」，但余因二人政治路線不同而拒絕。
+
+余又指，該界別從無討論財政預算案的問題，戴耀廷7月14日訊息指「我公開訊息說35+目的，是運用基本法賦予立法會的權力包括否決財政預算案……不提否決每一個議案，也不說癱瘓政府」，是首次提及否決財案。余認為當時有建制派或黨媒說初選犯法，估計戴是回應該些輿論，只是資訊分享。而戴於7月15日提到結果已公布、群組功能已完成，隨後退出該群組。
+
+控方盤問時，質疑余與其他候選人有共識辦有約束力的初選，余不同意，指他們無討論過。控方亦指趙家賢於6月8日要求戴耀廷發出的各區協議最終版本，當中衞生服務界的文件是候選人的書面共識，且共識於6月8日前已達成。余均不同意，法官亦關注控方提問基礎，問趙有否出席衞生服務界協調會議、有否紀錄顯示該界別候選人曾收到同一份文件，控方回應可作有關推論。
+
+而就「墨落無悔」聲明，余指認同當中兩點聲明遂簽署，她自視為有堅定意志、與泛民有別的抗爭派，純粹想向選民顯示其堅定立場。至於聲明和初選提名表格均提到協調會議共識，余指衞生服務界無協調會，該部分對她「冇乜意思」、認為「唔關我事」，而她理解「35+」目標只是爭取民主派議會過半。余又指，接近投票日才聽過「三投三不投」，但無深究這個與初選無關的計劃內容。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/HjQrFUW.png)
+▲ 余慧明（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 余形容《國安法》為「惡法」 官：就算你唔鍾意都唔可以觸犯
+
+此外，余慧明本周亦談及對不少對反修例運動和《國安法》等看法。就她撰文指中共「直接炒熟香港人」，法官問是否煽動對中共仇恨，余否認，指只是陳述中共將《國安法》「加插」在《基本法》附件三，無經本地諮詢便在港實施，又形容是「中共單方面炒香港人」，嚇怕外資、令經濟不穩，令香港無法維持國際大都會名譽。余亦指很多港人不贊成《國安法》，但港府無將意見向中央表達，法官笑說報紙每天都有報導。
+
+余於《國安法》實施後亦曾以「惡法」形容《國安法》，指因條文很模糊，令人觸犯紅線。但余明言即使有《國安法》仍不會恐懼和讓步，因爭取五大訴求沒有違法。法官李運騰一度指，無人要求余熱愛《國安法》，但「就算你唔鍾意都唔可以觸犯」，余回應當時仍相信投票無觸犯《國安法》，故望鼓勵選民於初選投票。
+
+
+### 余指無法接受無官員警員問責、稱「我永遠企喺雞蛋嘅一方」
+
+而就文章提到「向醫管局及政權作出強而有力的控訴」，余指「7.21、8.31、10.1，我哋真係唔可以好似政府咁話要向前看就move on囉」，並指運動中無政府官員問責下台、無警員要為暴行負責，卻有很多示威者被拘控，她無法接受，願嘗試用任何方式令政府「直視民意」。余又指理大衝突期間，催淚彈、水炮車在伊院外橫飛，但醫管局無譴責警暴、無理過員工安全和「硬食TG」的病人，只擺幾部空氣清新機，認為醫管局站在政權一邊，行政總裁應下台。
+
+余作供時，亦曾提到政府「一味就係話我哋係使用暴力」、甚至「抹黑緊我哋整場嘅運動」，法官問她用「我哋」一詞，是站在抗爭者一方？余答：「我永遠企喺雞蛋嘅一方。」
+
+余亦認為，經過2019年社會事件後，功能組別不能只着眼於業界利益，應將香港人利益「擺先」；又解釋「光復香港」是指港人優先、真正實行港人治港高度自治，「時代革命」則是指爭取制度改革的2019年運動。余又指「暴政」是拒聽民意、粗暴打壓人民的施政態度，非特定政府。
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/jNeyYe8.png)
+▲ 李予信（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 李予信理解非鄭達鴻「Plan B」、不打算跟黨立場投票
+
+至於李予信，他本周表示超區初選落敗後，7月底獲時任黨魁楊岳橋指示報名參選港島，理解楊因憂DQ而作準備。李報名時，前黨友郭榮鏗、楊岳橋和郭家麒被DQ，楊要求李停止申請，惟李已交表、未能取回表格，獲楊覆「it’s OK」，李不久後亦得悉原參選港島的鄭達鴻被DQ。不過李表示，理解他並非鄭達鴻的「Plan B」，他交表前亦不曾諮詢或通知鄭；李亦確認，一名「應該係」鄭達鴻競選團隊的女子之後有報名港島，但不知她是否鄭的「Plan B」。
+
+而就3月公民黨記者會上，楊岳橋指否決每個法案和撥款是「莊嚴承諾」，李上周形容會上訊息「混合」，但控方本周質疑公民黨否決立場清晰，法官亦指承諾要兌現、否則失信於選民。李指理解未必會兌現，而黨內議員以往也投票不一致，「so far冇嘢可以bound（綑綁）到所有公民黨立法會議員一致去投票」。
+
+李又表明就否決財案立場與黨不同，遭法官質疑他一直跟黨路線，為何偏偏在本案控罪中心議題才有不同；李指因與他參選初衷很有關，是之前未遇過。法官再質疑他沒有黨的支持便「什麼也不是」，亦指他獲黨資助或有責任對黨忠誠，李均同意，但指當時無特別關注該「莊嚴承諾」，而黨決定資助他時也有考慮其政綱。
+
+李亦承認無公開表達過不會跟黨立場否決財案爭五大訴求，但指其宣傳有暗示此訊息；又指若他申豁免跟黨投票被拒，也會照跟自己意向投票，「就即管睇吓個黨有啲乜嘢嘅後果畀我」，「無論政府回唔回應（五大訴求）都好，我都會繼續去咁樣講、咁樣投票。」
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/bXUD0y0.png)
+▲ 2020年3月25日 公民黨記者會（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 李稱黨否決財案「統一口徑」無約束力、自己從無講過亦無採納
+
+就「墨落無悔」聲明，李上周稱無參與黨任何討論，他本周指聲明發布時有「快䁽過」，但成為候選人後無再深究，因不太重視。控方亦指公民黨帖文無提否決財案有彈性，但李指彈性體現於譚文豪鼓勵他繼續持有本來政綱，而賴仁彪聯絡他可參選超區後，亦無向他施壓，「要我一定要講某啲嘅承諾」。
+
+就李的初選論壇筆記提及否決財案迫政府回應五大訴求，李指只是黨資深顧問「抄」黨的「Line to take（統一口徑）」，僅作參考、無約束力，他在論壇從無講過亦無採納。法官質疑，若可自由偏離，統一口徑有何意義？李指是展示黨的態度，但各區區情和候選人身分不一，實際講法也不一樣，會有彈性。而就黨的統一口徑提到避免講「攬炒」，李指公民黨不支持「攬炒」，但同時提否決預算案，可見黨立場「有矛盾」、存在模糊彈性。
+
+李又指，《國安法》條文頒布後，認為提及否決權的政綱或違法，即通知團隊停派舊單張並設計新單張，將含有公民黨政綱的內容「全部放棄」。而無出席過超區協調會議、於6月中始獲黨支持出選的他，表示除目標議席外不知超區初選有其他協議，指多年來初選協調均談及議席和配票策略。李亦指他無收過超區協調文件，主控萬德豪指他至少有看過，遭法官質疑無提問基礎。
+
+案件明續審。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file

From 9566607aa0a5f168a54c769b6457d8b963460341 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hokoi <hokoeye@pm.me>
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 00:03:32 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 17/19] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x20 Sep.20

---
 .../2023-08-24-virtual-assest-mining.md       | 243 +++++++++++++
 .../2023-08-25-building-up-the-brics.md       |  65 ++++
 .../2023-08-29-furthering-global-britain.md   | 344 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 652 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-24-virtual-assest-mining.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-building-up-the-brics.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-29-furthering-global-britain.md

diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-24-virtual-assest-mining.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-24-virtual-assest-mining.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..64b87afe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-24-virtual-assest-mining.md
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Virtual Asset Mining
+author: Allison Owen and Aaron Arnold
+date  : 2023-08-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/jMGIEAV.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Typologies, Risks and Responses"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_This paper, intended for policymakers and those with compliance obligations, seeks to broaden the discussions of risk around cryptocurrency by providing a typology of risks related to cryptocurrency mining._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+The rise in digital assets’ popularity over the last decade has attracted its fair share of illicit actors. Prized for their ease of use and perceived relative anonymity, digital assets such as Bitcoin have become targets for sanctions evaders, criminal enterprises, narcotraffickers and terrorist networks. North Korea, for example, has stolen billions of dollars’ worth of cryptocurrency in the past five years, in part to fund its WMD programme. Consequently, regulatory, monitoring and enforcement agencies have had to set their sights on addressing the often overlooked space between traditional finance and cryptocurrency. Despite modest progress addressing key vulnerabilities that cryptocurrency creates for global finance, the dynamic and rapidly changing nature of digital assets requires new thought about risk and sources of risk.
+
+One increasingly difficult problem for regulatory and monitoring authorities is how to address and mitigate risks associated with cryptocurrency mining (the processes used to verify transactions). Unlike traditional cryptocurrency exchanges, mining typically falls outside the scope of anti-money-laundering (AML) regulatory authorities and can provide illicit actors with a stream of nearly anonymous – and possibly unlimited – revenue. Unfortunately, discussions on how to best mitigate these risks is largely absent from broader policy discussions on regulating and monitoring digital assets.
+
+This paper, intended for policymakers and those with compliance obligations, seeks to broaden the discussions of risk around cryptocurrency by providing a typology of risks related to cryptocurrency mining. The objective is not to provide an all-encompassing snapshot of cryptocurrency mining activities, but to offer a general framework for policymakers to consider and mitigate a range of risks that may not be immediately apparent. The paper also places the described typologies within the context of recent or emerging regulatory and enforcement actions, to highlight gaps and challenges.
+
+The paper concludes with a series of recommendations aimed at mitigating risks and addressing regulatory and monitoring shortfalls in relation to cryptocurrency mining, consistent with global AML standards. These include, for example, modifying registration requirements for commercial and remote mining enterprises so that they fall under the purview of regulatory frameworks, despite outstanding questions over custody of cryptocurrency.
+
+It is abundantly clear that illicit actors have focused in on the usefulness of cryptocurrency, and it is quite likely that cryptocurrency will feature in financial crime for decades to come. Given the uniqueness, novelty and rapidly evolving nature of the digital assets industry, however, it is critically important that policymakers continue to think outside the box, re-examine previously held assumptions about the nature of risks associated with cryptocurrency – including mining – and continuously adapt regulatory and monitoring frameworks in response to emerging risks.
+
+
+### INTRODUCTION
+
+What was once considered a fringe, novel technology, virtual assets – that is, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin – now have a global market capitalisation of more than $1 trillion. The sheer scale and scope of the cryptocurrency industry, paired with regulation and monitoring challenges, have created, over the past decade, opportunities for illicit state and non-state actors to facilitate financial crimes, including sanctions evasion, money laundering and terrorist financing, among others, using cryptocurrencies.
+
+In 2018, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international organisation responsible for setting anti-money-laundering (AML) and counterterrorist-finance (CTF) standards, set about addressing threats posed by digital assets to the international financial system. However, despite the introduction of several new requirements, including a requirement for virtual asset service providers (VASPs) to be “regulated for (anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism) AML/CTF purposes, and licensed or registered, and subject to effective systems for monitoring … or supervision”, key vulnerabilities and gaps remain.
+
+One of these gaps is cryptocurrency mining, which is generally not covered by AML rules and regulations. Mining cryptocurrency is the process by which users verify the accuracy of transactions on a blockchain and are subsequently rewarded for their efforts with newly minted cryptocurrency. Due to the fundamental design of this decentralised process, little in the way of information is available to national authorities on who has “mined” cryptocurrency.
+
+Because there is very little in the way of transparency on miners, mining has attracted illicit actors ranging from narcotics traffickers to sanctions evaders such as North Korea. In 2019, for example, a report by the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea found that the country engaged in mining cryptocurrencies to generate revenue for its military programmes.
+
+This paper offers jurisdictions a typology of laundering through cryptocurrency mining. The objective is to increase overall awareness of money-laundering and proliferation-finance risks posed by mining, as well as guidance on how to best address these threats from a legal and regulatory perspective. Although this paper is not meant to be comprehensive, it aims to expand on these identified threats so that jurisdictions can detect vulnerabilities in their financial systems and form risk mitigation strategies.
+
+The paper first outlines general financial crime risks associated with cryptocurrency mining that have occurred since Bitcoin’s start. Next, it presents a typology of cryptocurrency mining risks, designed to illustrate how illicit actors can take advantage of existing and emerging mining to facilitate money laundering and proliferation financing. Finally, the paper concludes with an analysis of the legal and regulatory challenges to responding to mining risks, and their implications.
+
+___`Mining has attracted illicit actors ranging from narcotics traffickers to sanctions evaders`___
+
+#### METHODOLOGY
+
+The typologies outlined in this paper are based on a series of semi-structured interviews with public and private stakeholders, including representatives of VASPs, blockchain analytics companies, compliance specialists and academics.
+
+These interviews, along with a review of relevant news articles, guidance released by international organisations and other law enforcement and regulatory actions, have helped to inform case studies and risk mitigation strategies.
+
+
+### UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOCURRENCY MINING RISKS
+
+The FATF defines virtual assets as “a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded, or transferred, and can be used for payment or investment purposes”. Bitcoin, for example, one of the most recognised and earliest virtual assets, was first conceptualised in 2008 as a decentralised currency – that is, free of a central monetary authority.
+
+A decentralised digital currency, however, faces a significant hurdle: without a central authority, how can users be assured that the record of transactions is complete and accurate? To solve this problem, Bitcoin and other similar types of cryptocurrencies use a “proof-of-work” model to validate and record transactions on a blockchain.
+
+The blockchain, or ledger, consists of blocks of transactions linked together. In a proof-of-work model, a user, referred to as a cryptocurrency miner, employs computer processing power (or “work”) to solve a computationally complex mathematical problem that effectively ensures transactions are accurate and in the correct order – that is, that each new block is linked to the previous one.
+
+This work, however, is not free. To incentivise users to keep the ledger accurate, miners are rewarded with cryptocurrency (such as Bitcoin). Miners compete against other miners to be the first to solve the complex problem and the first miner to do so is permitted to record the next block of transactions. Figure 1 illustrates how new blocks of transactions are added to a given blockchain that uses a “proof-of-work” model.
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/oxR5fQ4.png)
+_▲ __Figure 1: Proof-of-Work Model.__ Note: An individual uses their computer processing power to solve complex mathematical problems, resulting in transaction verification on the blockchain. Source: Author generated._
+
+Importantly, mining increases the overall supply of cryptocurrency. Minting new cryptocurrency through mining, however, creates several pernicious problems from a financial crime perspective. Namely, newly minted cryptocurrency is not easily linked to an individual. Because of this, mining cryptocurrency is an attractive target for enterprising criminal organisations, sanctions evaders and those looking to avoid law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
+
+In 2019, for example, an investigation by Brazil’s Department of Narcotics uncovered a cryptocurrency mining operation as part of a drug enforcement investigation, shining a light on how criminal organisations are adapting to digital currencies. Similarly, in Argentina, there have been reports of crime associated with illicitly obtaining cryptocurrency mining equipment, either to launder funds or to make money from reselling the equipment at a lower price.
+
+North Korea’s brazen cyber attacks against cryptocurrency businesses and applications, which have netted the country billions of dollars in cryptocurrency, are now well known. According to a 2019 UN report, North Korea has also been involved in mining cryptocurrency since at least May 2017. In February 2020, a cyber-security firm found that North Korea’s mining activity had increased at least tenfold since May 2019, based on an analysis of a North Korea-linked IP address.
+
+While converting stolen cryptocurrency to fiat currency requires a multi-step laundering process that runs the risk of detection, mining, on the other hand, has the potential to generate a nearly anonymous revenue stream. The ability to generate practically decoupled revenue is an enticing lure to illicit activity. Indeed, as illustrated in the next section, there has been a significant increase in the scale and scope of illicit activity targeting the cryptocurrency mining process.
+
+The mining industry, however, is not static. Much like virtual currency, mining encompasses rapidly changing and dynamic technologies. To better understand how illicit actors can exploit mining, the next section provides a series of typologies and case studies.
+
+
+### KEY CRYPTOCURRENCY MINING TYPOLOGIES
+
+This section describes a range of available cryptocurrency mining typologies, which includes cryptojacking and remote mining. These methods pose a challenge to law enforcement and regulatory authorities because they involve an individual receiving newly minted cryptocurrency that is not tied to previous transactions, thus making user identification more difficult. Such coins can then be converted to fiat currency without detection of a criminal link on the blockchain. The fourth typology in this section focuses on cryptocurrencies that use a “proof-of-stake” transaction verification model. Although this model does not provide a viable laundering mechanism, it is a method that illicit actors can use to generate revenue.
+
+#### TYPOLOGY 1: CRYPTOJACKING
+
+Due to the steep costs of specialised equipment, or sometimes a lack of access to stable internet or power grids, criminals have turned to cryptojacking – the process of hijacking another user’s computer processing power to mine cryptocurrency without their knowledge.
+
+In 2014, for example, a researcher used supercomputers funded by the US National Science Foundation (NSF – an independent federal government agency) to mine Bitcoin, resulting in his suspension from working with the US government. According to an audit report, “the researcher misused over $150,000 in NSF-supported computer usage at two universities to generate Bitcoins valued between $8,000 and $10,000”. Later, from 2017 to 2021, this illicit revenue generation method grew in popularity as demand and price for cryptocurrency increased.
+
+Browser-based cryptojacking, or “drive-by mining”, likewise grew in popularity. The process involves embedding malicious code in a website, which allows the website owner to use visitors’ computer processing power to mine cryptocurrency. While there are legitimate reasons a website owner may include web-based mining on a website – such as generating revenue for a charity – criminal enterprises, extremists or even sanctions evaders can exploit the same method to generate revenue.
+
+In 2018, for example, a neo-Nazi militant group known as the Order of Dawn allowed supporters to mine Monero to generate revenue for its volunteer army. The group’s website is shown in Figure 2.
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/dnh7zwk.png)
+_▲ __Figure 2: Order of Dawn and Cryptocurrency Mining.__ Source: [Counter Extremism Project, “Far-Right European Terrorist Group Crowdfunding Cryptocurrency”, 28 April 2018](https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/far-right-european-terrorist-group-crowdfunding-cryptocurrency)._
+
+Cryptojacking can also occur on a larger scale by rerouting unwitting users’ computer processing power to a mining “pool”, which functions as an aggregator for computer processing power. This method has the potential to create a nearly anonymous revenue stream for an illicit actor. Alternatively, it is also possible to target and hijack resources from cryptocurrency mining pools. In 2014, a hacker gained access to a Canadian internet provider and rerouted traffic from a legitimate pool to a malicious pool, which netted nearly US$84,000 worth of Bitcoin.
+
+Cryptojacking has similarly caught the attention of North Korea. One of the first reported cases of North Korea-linked criminal activity associated with cryptojacking occurred in 2017, when cyber-criminals hacked a South Korean company’s server to illicitly mine Monero. North Korea was able to mine nearly 70 Monero coins, worth approximately $25,000 at the time.
+
+North Korea is also alleged to have employed malware to infect computers to mine Monero. According to a 2019 UN report, analysts were able to trace the mined Monero back to servers located at Kim Il Sung University.
+
+#### TYPOLOGY 2: COMMERCIAL MINING FACILITIES
+
+Large-scale mining operations have become a lucrative business in recent years, and although the exact number of commercial mining facilities worldwide is unknown, the scale and scope of the industry can be estimated by the demand that such facilities place on power grids. A 2022 report by the US Office of Science and Technology Policy, which coordinates interagency science and technology policy efforts, found that commercial mining facilities are on the rise, estimating that the “total global estimated electricity usage for blockchains that support crypto-assets in 2022 falls into a range of 120 to 240 billion kWh per year”. While such estimates can fluctuate considerably according to demand within cryptocurrency markets, this nonetheless highlights the sheer magnitude of such operations, which at times has accounted for nearly 1% of global energy consumption.
+
+Mining facilities also have the capability to provide illicit actors with a substantial and relatively anonymous revenue stream. Mined cryptocurrency can be moved across jurisdictions through peer-to-peer transactions and potentially converted to fiat currency at cryptocurrency businesses worldwide.
+
+The capital costs of such ventures can, however, be high. Specialised equipment, such as application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), can cost anywhere from thousands to tens of thousands of US dollars. In at least one case, illicit actors have used the crypto-mining process to launder other ill-gotten gains, as shown in the following case study.
+
+> #### `Box 1: Case Study: Bitcoin Mining Centres and Crime`
+
+> _`In 2016, Spanish police and tax authorities arrested 30 individuals suspected of laundering illicit proceeds via Bitcoin mining centres. The authorities seized Bitcoin mining centres that they suspected were being used by a large criminal network to launder funds. The amount of funds laundered through the operation is unknown.`_
+
+> _Sources: [Dev Odedra and Chris Gschwend, “On the Periphery: Financial Crime Risks in Cryptocurrency Mining”, KYC360, 13 July 2020](https://kyc360.riskscreen.com/article/on-the-periphery-financial-crime-risks-in-cryptocurrency-mining/); Reuters, “Spain Arrests 30 Suspected of Laundering Money in Bitcoin Centres”, 25 May 2016._
+
+___`State actors have also focused on large-scale mining facilities`___
+
+Figure 3 provides a notional summary of how criminal networks could feasibly invest in mining equipment that can ultimately provide revenue that is decoupled from any illicit activity.
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/ZTAKq9J.png)
+_▲ __Figure 3: Mining as a Laundry Service.__ Note: A criminal uses illicit funds to purchase or rent a mining “rig”. In return, they receive clean cryptocurrency and can transfer funds across jurisdictions or convert them to fiat currency at exchanges with limited detection. By contrast, on regulated cryptocurrency exchanges, the criminal in question would still face the need to surpass controls during the customer onboarding procedure. Source: Author generated._
+
+In addition to criminal networks, state actors have also focused on large-scale mining facilities, requesting that the proceeds be sold to a central bank. Iran, for example, used this technique to generate revenue while under sanctions, according to several blockchain analytics firms. Furthermore, the head of Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization has said that the country’s central bank had made a proposal for how Iran can “use the cryptocurrencies produced internally or cryptocurrencies purchased by companies such as the private sector” for the import of goods. Similarly, although the full extent of North Korea’s mining operations is unknown, its 2020 efforts to mine Monero demonstrate, at a minimum, an interest in conducting mining operations on a larger scale.
+
+Of course, there are several elements necessary for a successful commercial operation and, therefore, the extent of this financial crime risk will vary among jurisdictions. First and foremost is whether there is access to stable and cheap power. According to the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, mining farm operators generally choose locations with lower electricity costs to optimise profit. In addition to cheap power, commercial facilities also require stable access to the internet that can accommodate transferring data at high speeds. Climate can also play a role. Mining is preferred in regions with low temperatures, which can help operators avoid substantial cooling costs.
+
+As demand for cryptocurrency has increased, many states have considered and enacted policies to attract the crypto-mining industry. One such example is Transnistria, an unrecognised republic situated between Ukraine and Moldova. The unrecognised breakaway state adopted legislation in 2018 to legalise cryptocurrency mining and created incentives to attract parts of the industry. In addition to offering cheap, stable energy, Transnistria also allows entrepreneurs to set up a mining facility without needing to register as a local company.
+
+#### TYPOLOGY 3: REMOTE MINING
+
+The rising costs of specialised mining equipment, as well as the need for cheap power and stable internet infrastructure, have prompted the formation of businesses that host mining equipment on behalf of customers.
+
+Remote mining presents a particularly thorny problem when it comes to combating financial crime. Operators of remote mining services may be unaware of their client’s identity or whether they are acting on behalf of a third party, as they are often located in different jurisdictions. This could mean that a remote mining service could unwittingly facilitate sanctions evasion or other types of illicit activity.
+
+Host mining facilities, for example, allow remote customers to purchase mining rigs hosted on their property. The overhead costs for a hosting service typically comprise electricity and maintenance costs, including the setup of the mining equipment. Once the rig is operating, all earnings are directly transferred to the wallet that the customer has listed – whether their own or a third party’s.
+
+One host mining facility, Bitriver, fell onto the US sanctions list in 2022. BitRiver and its subsidiaries were alleged to have aided Russia in monetising its natural resources by leveraging the country’s cheap energy to mine cryptocurrency. Prior to unilateral sanctions, BitRiver created a cryptocurrency known as the BTR Token. Holders of the coin receive an equivalent amount of electricity power for their hosted mining equipment and can submit tokens once a month to pay up to 10% of the bill.
+
+In a similar manner, host mining facilities typically allow a portion of the electricity costs to be paid in cryptocurrency, which could provide avenues for criminal organisations and sanctions evaders to launder the proceeds of crime. It would be quite feasible for a representative operating on behalf of a sanctioned country to pay for electricity costs with illicit funds, and in return receive mined cryptocurrency decoupled from any criminal link. Notably, if traceable cryptocurrency is used to pay for a portion of the mining fees, investigators can still track the funds to the business that accepted the illicit funds. However, the facility may be based in a jurisdiction that is not cooperative.
+
+Some commercial mining facilities also offer cloud-based mining services, whereby users can lease equipment and computer time. Some of the primary cloud-based mining services allow payment in cryptocurrency and for the receiving cryptocurrency address to be changed after purchase. The benefit of using such services is that it can help reduce long-term costs, including investments in expensive equipment, as well as provide a solution to those in jurisdictions with geographic, energy, legal or other limitations on mining. Like host mining, the user does not need to be physically located in the jurisdiction to reap the rewards of mining.
+
+If information is needed, it is likely that the cloud-based mining service would keep a database of cryptocurrency addresses used by the customer. However, depending on whether the service obtains custody of the funds, it can be unclear to investigators where the funds then move to, when looking at on-chain activity. This form of laundering is outlined in the following case study of a North Korea-linked cyber group.
+
+> #### `Box 2: Case Study: North Korea and Cloud Mining Services`
+
+> _`In March 2023, Mandiant, a US cyber security firm, released a report on the cryptocurrency laundering methods of APT43, a North Korea-linked cyber group. According to Mandiant, APT43 likely uses hash rental (the rental of a set amount of computing power to mine cryptocurrency) and cloud-based mining services as a method of laundering funds. The process of laundering via hash rental and cloud-based mining services allows for the buyer’s original payments and the mined cryptocurrency to be decoupled.`_
+
+> _Source: [Fred Plan et al., “APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations”, Mandiant, 29 March 2023](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt43-north-korea-cybercrime-espionage), p.7._
+
+___`The user does not need to be in the jurisdiction to reap the rewards`___
+
+Another cloud mining model involves peer-to-peer marketplaces that allow payments in cryptocurrency. For these services, the buyer can mine using the seller’s computer processing power. Of course, this can also create problems – especially from a transparency perspective. Operators of cloud mining services such as these generally have, for example, no insights into their users’ activities.
+
+#### TYPOLOGY 4: PROOF-OF-STAKE MODEL
+
+Whereas a proof-of-work model requires miners to solve computationally complex problems to verify the accuracy of a blockchain and record new transactions, the proof-of-stake model requires validators to “stake” their own cryptocurrency as collateral to verify transactions. To confirm a transaction, the blockchain network randomly selects a validator based on the number of coins the user has staked.
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/jtDBZWU.png)
+_▲ __Figure 4: Proof-of-Stake Model.__ Note: An individual stakes their own funds and, when chosen, will verify transactions on the blockchain. Source: Author generated._
+
+Overall, proof-of-stake mining is less energy- and resource-intensive than a proof-of-work model. For these reasons, it may be more attractive to illicit actors. North Korea, for example, has a large stock of cryptocurrency from its various hacks over the past five years that the country could feasibly stake – effectively allowing it to “earn interest” on its illicit hacking operations.
+
+Recently, Ethereum, a blockchain-enabled platform that allows smart contracts, shifted its economic model from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake to reduce environmental impact. For many illicit actors, this move could prove a boost to revenue generation. A recent report by Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs noted that while North Korea has not previously mined Ether, the shift to a proof-of-stake model may prove more attractive for revenue generation.
+
+Staking coins, along with cryptojacking, commercial mining facilities and remote mining, represent avenues for criminals to circumvent regulations or take advantage of a lack of oversight. Despite the difficulty of identifying users behind the transaction verification process, the public and private sectors can take steps to mitigate potential risks.
+
+
+### REGULATORY RESPONSE, IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
+
+The preceding analysis of key crypto-mining typologies – cryptojacking, commercial mining, remote mining and staking – shows that, despite global interest in regulating digital assets, significant risks to the global financial system remain. In most cases, crypto mining does not fall within the purview of financial supervisors or AML frameworks. The following section addresses some of these legal and regulatory challenges, as well as their implications.
+
+Currently, only a handful of countries have addressed cryptocurrency mining within their sectoral risk assessments. Moreover, of those that have attempted to tackle mining, regulatory approaches have varied considerably. In some jurisdictions, for example, legislation explicitly states that cryptocurrency mining activity is outside the scope of AML rules and regulations, while in other jurisdictions, miners are subject to licensing and registration requirements.
+
+#### REGULATORY APPROACHES
+
+Among the many challenges is the fact that cryptocurrency mining businesses do not generally retain custody of the mined cryptocurrency. This means they do not generally fit into the category of financial institutions that fall under the purview of the FATF.
+
+From the perspective of the FATF, “natural or legal persons that solely engage in the operation of a VA [virtual assets] network and do not engage in or facilitate any of the activities or operations of a VASP on behalf of their customers … are not VASPs”, even if those activities are undertaken as part of their business. Examples provided by the FATF of activities that would not in themselves qualify an entity to be considered a VASP include:
+
+- Offering customers internet network services and infrastructure.
+
+- Providing computing resources (“cloud services and creating, validating, and broadcasting blocks of transactions”).
+
+___`China banned mining outright in 2021`___
+
+Similarly, the report notes that those that do not fall under the definition of a VASP include “validators … whose functions are only validating transactions and cloud service providers whose functions are only offering the operation of infrastructure”.
+
+To provide further clarification on these requirements, countries have taken steps to release guidance on crypto mining. However, in the US, for example, little has been done in the way of modernising AML rules and regulations related to crypto mining. Current guidance, put forward by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the key agency responsible for countering money laundering in the US, is now nearly a decade old.
+
+This guidance, unfortunately, does not take into account crypto-mining businesses, noting that “to the extent that a user mines Bitcoin and uses the Bitcoin solely for the user’s own purposes and not for the benefit of another, the user is not an MSB [money service business] under FinCEN’s regulations”. Thus, a crypto-mining company is typically not considered an MSB, and as such is not required to implement AML rules and regulations, such as know-your-customer procedures and record-keeping requirements, which are commonplace at banks.
+
+Some countries have taken drastically different approaches. China, for example, banned mining outright in 2021. Prior to the ban, nearly 50% of global Bitcoin mining occurred in China. In response to the new restrictions, cryptocurrency mining companies relocated to other jurisdictions, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran and the US. Despite the ban, however, an analysis of hash rates, which can be a proxy for measuring total levels of mining, indicate that there are still mining operations in mainland China.
+
+The following subsections offer recommendations that countries should consider to restrict abuse of this type of activity.
+
+_Consider the Risk_
+
+The overall lack of rules around businesses that offer crypto-mining services poses a problem for securing the international financial system against illicit actors. The typologies outlined in this paper detail various methods that criminal networks and sanctions evaders can exploit to generate relatively “clean” streams of revenue – that is, revenue not linked to a specific criminal group or individual or prohibited activity.
+
+Given the risks posed to the international financial system, states should, at a minimum, consider their relative risk exposure to crypto mining from a cyber security standpoint, and identify associated risk with businesses within the industry. This includes understanding the scale and scope of mining-centric businesses within their jurisdiction, which is not always straightforward – especially if there are no registration or licensing requirements. At a minimum, countries should include their crypto-mining industries within national risk assessments.42 To aid with understanding risk and mitigation strategies, operators of crypto-mining enterprises should be included in domestic public–private partnerships centred on cryptocurrency.
+
+Jurisdictions should be especially concerned if sanctions evasion or other types of illicit financial activity have previously been associated with their jurisdiction. It is important to note that countries have an obligation to implement and enforce international sanctions. In the case of North Korea, for example, states are required to prevent the provision of financial services or economic resources to North Korea. While crypto-mining services may not fit neatly within the definition of a “financial service”, they are nonetheless an economic resource that North Korea could exploit to support its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programme.
+
+_Understand Regional Risk_
+
+Another factor countries should consider is regional risk exposure. There could be negative spillover effects from neighbouring jurisdictions that incentivise crypto-mining businesses, such as by offering cheap energy or establishing free trade zones with favourable crypto-mining laws. For example, a country with little or no crypto-mining activity but active cryptocurrency exchanges may face significant risks from illicit actors mining in one region and cashing out in another.
+
+_Collect and Verify Beneficial Ownership Information_
+
+Countries need to identify and verify individuals who have ownership and control of crypto-mining facilities located in their jurisdictions. As shown in the second section, illicit actors can exploit such facilities for laundering or sanctions evasion purposes, so it is critical to identify who is behind operations.
+
+The FATF outlines that countries should take measures to prevent the misuse of corporate vehicles for criminal purposes by:
+
+- Understanding the risk associated with legal arrangements.
+
+- Making legal persons and legal arrangements sufficiently transparent.
+
+- Requiring corporate vehicles to provide accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information to competent authorities in a timely fashion.
+
+Furthermore, to detect large-scale mining facilities that are not registered as businesses, law enforcement can look at spikes in energy consumption, as the proof-of-work mining process requires a substantial amount of energy.
+
+_Require Customer Identification and Verification_
+
+Countries should also consider modifying registration requirements for commercial and remote mining enterprises. At a minimum, regulatory authorities should require these companies to retain customer identifying information for law enforcement purposes.
+
+While most types of crypto-mining activities would not meet the definition of a VASP, and thus not be subject to AML rules and regulations, collection of customer information by remote crypto-mining businesses is highly recommended. By undertaking the following checks on remote clients when establishing business relations these facilities can ensure sanctions compliance:
+
+- Recording the full name, date of birth, nationality and address of the customer.
+
+- Verifying the information provided to ensure the use of official government identification documents.
+
+- Keeping a record of cryptocurrency addresses used by the customer to receive generated funds.
+
+If illicitly obtained funds are linked to the remote crypto-mining business, holding this customer information will aid in law enforcement investigations. Furthermore, these facilities need to ensure they do not accept funds from sanctioned entities by screening customer information against relevant sanctions lists.
+
+
+### CONCLUSION
+
+Criminal networks and state actors have both used crypto mining to generate nearly anonymous streams of revenue. While the scale and scope of these illicit operations is largely unknown, the risk posed to the international financial system is clear. 
+
+In a rapidly evolving industry, new innovations also bring new opportunities for illicit actors to exploit, and governments are failing to recognise risks associated with mining. To mitigate the risks that mining can generate, it will be important for governments to think outside traditional AML frameworks. Defining a crypto-mining company as an MSB, for example, may be akin to trying to place a square peg in a round hole. Instead, identification of beneficial ownership and recording client information will likely prove more useful for identifying illicit activity.
+
+---
+
+__Allison Owen__ is an Associate Fellow at RUSI’s Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies. Her primary research projects focus on the policy and security dimensions of cryptocurrency and new payment methods. Allison leads RUSI’s work on cryptocurrency and counter-proliferation finance, focusing on North Korea’s use of crypto to evade sanctions, and provides guidance for the private and public sector to understand and mitigate associated threats.
+
+__Aaron Arnold__ is a Senior Associate Fellow with the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI, where his work focuses on sanctions and proliferation financing.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-building-up-the-brics.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-building-up-the-brics.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c27f6317
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-building-up-the-brics.md
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Building Up The BRICS
+author: Neil Melvin
+date  : 2023-08-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cvk5dyU.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "An Emerging Counter-West Order?"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_While it is too early to declare the end of the US-led liberal international system and the rise of a BRICS-led counterweight, the Johannesburg summit highlights that the West is increasingly confronted by a multipolar world in which its position and the idea of a single global order are being overtly challenged._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+This week’s BRICS summit in Johannesburg – bringing together Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa for the first in-person gathering since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic – has seen the usual denunciations of the US and the liberal order which have characterised most of the organisation’s previous gatherings. Russian President Vladimir Putin, attending virtually as he faces an international arrest warrant for war crimes, was quick to blame Western countries for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, stating that “it was the desire to maintain their hegemony in the world, the desire of some countries to maintain this hegemony that led to the severe crisis in Ukraine”.
+
+Challenging the US and “the West” has been par for the course for BRICS gatherings in recent years. Originally conceived by Goldman Sachs as a way to capture the economic rise of a diverse group of countries (the BRICS together represent about 40% of the world’s population and a quarter of global GDP), the BRIC acquired a geopolitical significance when Russia took the initiative to convene the four initial member countries in 2009, with South Africa joining in 2011 (adding the S in BRICS).
+
+Since the fanfare around its creation, the BRICS has often seemed more to be muddling along than mounting a systemic challenge to the Western-led international order. While China’s meteoric rise has underpinned the BRICS’s growing share of the world economy, the countries in the group have experienced wide disparities in economic performance. At times, there have also been significant tensions between its members, notably in 2020–21 when China and India were involved in fierce border skirmishes. Amid numerous declarations over the past decade and a half, the bloc’s only tangible accomplishment has been the launching of an international development finance arm, headquartered in Shanghai.
+
+This week’s annual summit produced much of the rhetoric that has led many observers to accuse the BRICS of being merely a talking shop, but the meeting also highlighted how Russia’s war against Ukraine and the growing confrontation between the US and China are injecting a new political impulse into the organisation. Rising geopolitical tensions have brought to the fore the question of how the rest of the world – notably the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America – is aligning with existing and emerging world powers. The BRICS countries, prompted by China and Russia, are now looking to seize this moment to expand the grouping of non-Western states and to fashion it as an alternative to the US-led political and economic institutions.
+
+
+### Challenging the Mighty Dollar
+
+Amid the increased competition for influence and access in the “Global South”, ahead of the summit there was talk of promoting global “de-dollarisation”, and earlier this year Brazil even floated the idea of a BRICS currency. Dethroning the dollar’s dominance is seen as a key element of building a new global economic order, not least since a number of BRICS countries have been vulnerable to Western economic sanctions.
+
+___`Expansion is viewed in Beijing and Moscow as necessary in order to give the grouping a harder geopolitical edge and to challenge what they characterise as the US-led, unipolar world`___
+
+While such ideas currently appear overly ambitious and were not formally on the summit agenda, the BRICS group nevertheless reaffirmed its commitment to expand options for using local currencies for trade between bloc members. Since launching its war against Ukraine, Russia has shifted much of its trade to the renminbi, which now accounts for 16% of its export payments. The BRICS bank recently issued its first rand bond in South Africa, and it is planning to issue its first Indian rupee bond by October. President Lula da Silva of Brazil recently asked: “Why does Brazil need the dollar to trade with China or Argentina? We can trade in our currency”, and he has suggested that the BRICS bank is a more just economic institution than US-led institutions such as the International Monetary Fund.
+
+
+### The Rise of the Pluriverse?
+
+While the Johannesburg summit will provide further momentum to economic coordination among the BRICS, headlines before and after the summit were dominated by efforts led by China and Russia to promote expansion of the bloc’s membership. This is viewed in Beijing and Moscow as necessary in order to give the grouping a harder geopolitical edge, as a means to challenge what they characterise as the US-led, unipolar world.
+
+For China, an expanding BRICS would present a vehicle for its more “inclusive” worldview, and building up the organisation is viewed as providing a counterweight to the G7 and G20. The Johannesburg summit has been presented by the Chinese state media as building a “pluriversal” world – “a world that is more multipolar, more inclusive, just, equitable, a world that respects the potential and contributions of all countries to human progress”. This suggests that China may be complementing its approach of trying to outcompete the US within existing international institutions by forging something new and more Sino-centric.
+
+South Africa, the summit host, supports expansion and invited representatives of dozens of other countries to attend the Johannesburg meeting. Speaking ahead of the summit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa declared: “An expanded BRICS will represent a diverse group of nations with different political systems that share a common desire to have a more balanced global order”. Concluding the summit, Ramaphosa announced that in a first wave of expansion, six countries had been invited to join the bloc as full members from 1 January 2024: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
+
+The announcement marked an important victory for China and Russia since India and Brazil had previously expressed caution over expanding the bloc. India is wary of China’s potential dominance and of adopting measures that give Beijing a larger international platform for pursuing its ambitions. Brazil is keen to ensure that its influence is not diluted and that it does not find itself being forced to choose sides in the struggle between the US and China and Russia. Ultimately, both were persuaded to support the expansion policy by the inclusion of their “strategic partners” – Argentina for Brazil and the countries of the Gulf for India – in the list of countries invited to join, and an agreement that future expansion would be based on consensus.
+
+Speaking following the conclusion of the summit, China’s President Xi Jinping stated that “This membership expansion is historic”, while Putin observed that “The adoption of the guiding principles in the expansion of BRICS will ensure that the role and importance of BRICS in the world will continue to grow”. Putin announced that the next summit would be hosted by Russia in Kazan, and that he would promote a broadening of the grouping’s agenda to include transport, healthcare, science, and cultural issues.
+
+___`While expansion will further the BRICS’ diversity, it will also import more bilateral tensions into the grouping, such as the difficult relationship between Iran and the Gulf states`___
+
+The decision on expansion and further progress on advancing the role of the members’ currencies were significant steps forward for the BRICS countries. Expansion is being presented as a major geopolitical step forward, bringing in key countries in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. For Russia and China, the inclusion of the fiercely anti-Western Iran is seen as a major victory in their efforts to forge a more coherent anti-West grouping to rival the US-led alliance system.
+
+
+### Evolution Rather than Revolution in Johannesburg
+
+The war in Ukraine has brought into stark relief the competition for influence and support around the world, and there is strong interest among the BRICS countries in positioning themselves as the champions of “the Global South”. The opportunity to join the BRICS will be viewed positively by many states, especially given the access it will provide to China and to major emerging economies.
+
+In a world of intensifying competition, there is also a desire in many countries to use new opportunities in the international system, such as the BRICS, to hedge against the West and enhance their bargaining power. South Africa said that more than 40 countries have expressed interest in joining the BRICS and 22 have formally requested to be admitted. The upbeat assessment of the expansion of the grouping and its broadening ambitions clouds, however, the major challenges that this agenda will bring to the organisation.
+
+Even as a group of five states, the BRICS represents a diverse set of countries more united by what they don’t like – not being able to sit at the international top table – than by a coherent view of their position in the global order or what an alternative global order should look like. The BRICS began as a grouping to limit the “unipolar” moment of US pre-eminence and to promote multipolarity, and there is little appetite in Delhi and Brasilia to transform the organisation into a vehicle of bipolar confrontation with the West. While expansion will further the BRICS’ diversity, it will also import more bilateral tensions into the grouping, such as the difficult relationship between Iran and the Gulf states.
+
+To date, the BRICS has provided a useful platform for emerging states to rail against the injustice of a world order that they felt did not properly include their interests and voices. Expansion is attractive as it will bring in more countries that feel short-changed or excluded by the existing order and strengthen the BRICS as a non-aligned forum. But China and Russia – and now Iran – have bigger ambitions to transform the grouping into a bloc as part of a counter-West project. This will involve moving beyond rhetoric and creating an organisation that can actually deliver an alternative order, tackle major economic problems of development in just ways, and create consensus among states that have deep-seated bilateral disputes with each other.
+
+This is a tall order, and the reality is that while many countries will welcome being part of a grouping that offers an alternative to US-led institutions, few are keen to join an anti-Western geopolitical bloc led by Russia and China. The Johannesburg summit is likely to be remembered as an important moment that reinforced trends toward multipolarity and increased pressure to reform the existing international order’s key institutions. Further expansion of the BRICS is likely to strengthen these trends, but the BRICS still looks far away from becoming the nucleus of a counter-West political movement.
+
+---
+
+__Neil Melvin__ is Director International Security Studies at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). His current research is focused on emerging international security dynamics in key regions around the world, notably Europe and Eurasia, the Gulf and Middle East, East Africa and the Horn, and the Indo-Pacific.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Furthering Global Britain?
+author: Simon Rynn, et al.
+date  : 2023-08-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ricOgn4.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_This paper provides background on recent UK policy towards East Africa, summarises research findings and offers recommendations for the UK government with relevance both to the region and to an integrated foreign policy globally._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+Since 2016, successive British governments have sought to emphasise that a post-Brexit UK would be outward looking, collaborative and influential. A series of speeches and policy statements stressed that the UK would pursue future prosperity through overseas engagements built upon investments in diplomacy, trade, defence and development aid. In March 2021, the UK government published its Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, reiterating these themes and referencing Eastern Africa as a part of the world where the UK would increase its engagement, with explicit references to Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.
+
+A RUSI research project, “Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa”, has examined whether, and how, the UK has leveraged international development, defence and diplomatic investments as envisaged. For the four above-mentioned countries, the project analysed the UK’s core engagements from 2015 to 2022. Through key informant interviews and literature analysis, it identified factors that helped or hindered the UK in pursuing an integrated and collaborative foreign policy approach, and tested perceptions of the UK. The effects of major structural changes to UK foreign policy since 2015 were also studied, notably reducing the overseas aid budget, merging two ministries to create the new Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), and leaving the EU.
+
+This paper provides background on recent UK policy towards the region, summarising the project’s research findings, and offers recommendations for the UK government with relevance both to the region and to an integrated foreign policy globally. The key findings are as follows:
+
+- In the face of volatility, the UK has had to adapt its approach towards the region numerous times since 2015. Actions include reallocating funding towards drought relief, suspending cooperation during conflict and political upheaval (Sudan), condemning reported war crimes (Ethiopia), bolstering stabilisation efforts in the wake of new military offensives (Somalia) and providing support to mitigate electoral instability (Kenya and Somalia).
+
+- Despite inconsistent levels of political leadership, the UK contributed to relatively successful outcomes across the four case study countries. However, these are not sufficient (or necessarily sustainable) in isolation and continue to face important constraints and challenges.
+
+- Attempts by UK officials to better integrate defence, international development and diplomatic work have made progress.
+
+- While the abolition of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is regretted by some UK regional partners, the unplanned creation of the FCDO shows early promise.
+
+- The UK retains a good reputation in the region for the calibre of its diplomats and development and defence experts, and has broadly maintained staffing levels in the region, despite budget cuts.
+
+- The UK is reasonably well regarded as a development, defence and diplomatic actor across the region. However, despite this, a range of middle and great powers increasingly offer alternative forms of support to East African governments, which contributes to perceptions of declining UK influence.
+
+- The UK has established relationships and partnerships with a variety of actors. It often operates effectively through ad hoc groupings of bilateral and multilateral networks in the region and globally, bolstered by envoys and technical specialists.
+
+- Between 2019 and 2021, the UK bilateral aid budget was reduced by around 50% across the region. External relationships suffered, as funding decisions were arrived at iteratively and were not always well communicated.
+
+- Brexit did not significantly impair the UK’s operational effectiveness in the region, but alongside other factors it probably contributed to a perception of declining influence.
+
+- UK strategies at the country level were sometimes unclear, overly broad or outpaced by contextual changes. The lack of a regional strategy also remains a significant gap, given the transnational nature of the opportunities and challenges facing Eastern Africa.
+
+The research raises important questions concerning the nature of UK–Africa relations and the role of aid, development and defence engagement within an integrated foreign policy. Various recommendations are offered in this paper, spanning operational and strategic levels. These include building on lessons from the DFID–Foreign & Commonwealth Office merger to ensure the FCDO’s capabilities fully support integrated ways of working; better aligning mission priorities across the Gulf and Eastern Africa; and bolstering cooperation between special envoys and embassy-level staff. Explicit change management processes must be used to guide further organisational reform. More broadly, the UK should advocate for a clearer mandate when it comes to ad hoc groups such as the Quint and the Quad; centre long-term, sustainable engagement; and communicate the scope, scale and mechanics of continuing UK–EU cooperation to help defuse perceptions of an isolated, post-Brexit foreign policy, particularly to local audiences.
+
+Perhaps most importantly in a world of increased geopolitical rivalry, the UK needs to clarify its positioning towards Africa. Policy statements in favour of “integration” or “partnerships”, while useful, do not in themselves constitute effective strategy. With a contracting resource base, positive results may become harder to demonstrate in an increasingly competitive, transactional environment. African governments also now have a wider array of potential partners and greater leverage in shaping foreign engagement. As a result, the UK will need to market its added value towards Africa very clearly. As a first step, a two-way dialogue should be established with African partners at government and societal level to discuss shared priorities and ways of working.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Since 2016, successive British governments have emphasised that a post-Brexit UK would be outward looking, collaborative and influential. They portrayed the UK as pursuing future prosperity through overseas engagements built upon investments in diplomacy, trade, defence and development aid. Following this trend, the UK government published an ambitious policy document, the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR21) in March 2021, expressing similar sentiments about the UK’s role in the world while pointing to the challenge of increased geopolitical competition. Greater connectivity was promised between UK diplomacy, defence, trade and international development, alongside the UK working with like-minded governments towards shared goals of prosperity, democracy and security. East Africa, an area of longstanding UK interest, was among the regions prioritised for engagement, with explicit references to Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.
+
+A RUSI research project “Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa” has examined whether, and how, the UK has leveraged international development, defence and diplomatic investments as envisaged. For the four above-mentioned countries, the project analysed the UK’s core engagements from 2015 to 2022, identifying factors that helped or hindered its pursuit of an integrated and collaborative foreign policy approach, as well as testing perceptions of the UK. The effects of major structural changes to UK foreign policy since 2015 were also studied, notably reducing the overseas aid budget, merging two ministries to create the new Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), and leaving the EU.
+
+This paper provides background on recent UK policy towards the region, summarising the project’s research findings, and offers recommendations for the UK government with relevance both to East Africa and to an integrated foreign policy globally.
+
+#### Methodology
+
+The research methodology consisted of a review of selected policy literature and 182 semi-structured expert interviews carried out from mid-2021 to early 2023.
+
+__Literature Review__
+
+A review was undertaken of official data and policy documents from government departments (principally the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the FCDO and the now-defunct Department for International Development (DFID)); parliamentary committees and regulatory bodies (for example, the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee); associated funding platforms (for example, the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), the Prosperity Fund, the Newton Fund and the Global Challenges Research Fund); and public entities such as the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI). Papers were analysed for key themes, sectoral engagement and expenditure that the UK continually or repeatedly adopted in its engagement in Eastern Africa. Data on UK aid, defence and diplomatic engagement in the four focal countries from 2015 to 2022 was used as a reference point to identify UK policy objectives and trends over time.
+
+__Interviews__
+
+Through semi-structured interviews, the team identified a number of key outcomes that the UK has sought to achieve in each of the focus countries, and which were informative in terms of the overarching research objectives. A range of actors who are familiar with UK engagement were then interviewed to understand the nature and significance of the UK contribution and the factors that had enabled or constrained engagement. A total of 182 interviews were carried out between September 2021 and January 2023, with a substantial number of them based in Eastern Africa.
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/fLo96q6.png)
+_▲ __Table 1: Interview Breakdown.__ Source: Author generated._
+
+This is the final paper in a series of publications stemming from this project, which includes a paper that lays out the project methodology and greater detail on UK investments across the region, and four country case studies focusing on the UK’s work in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya.
+
+
+### I. Background
+
+#### Policy Context
+
+The term “Global Britain” was first used by Prime Minister Theresa May as shorthand for an outward-looking, collaborative and influential agenda. Dramatic events and policy changes were to follow. Under the subsequent leadership of Prime Minister Boris Johnson, a new government department, the FCDO, was announced in June 2020, merging the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and DFID. Declared without prior planning, the process led to substantial and repeated rounds of restructuring.
+
+In November 2020, the UK official development assistance (ODA) budget was also cut, from 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) to 0.5%: a significant shift given that the UK had acquired a reputation overseas as a strong and generous aid donor since the 1990s. Some commentators lamented the end of the UK’s role as a global “development superpower”, claiming a loss of status and damage to partnerships and British influence. This stood in contrast to a well-publicised increase in the national defence budget. The government subsequently set out the conditions (fiscal tests) under which it intended to return the budget to 0.7% GNI.
+
+In March 2021, the UK government published the IR21. The document recognised a more competitive global context than in 2016 but reiterated now-familiar “Global Britain” themes. It signalled a wish to play a proactive role in global affairs, to work in cooperation with others, particularly “like-minded bilateral and multilateral partners”, and to better integrate foreign policy, defence, trade and international development efforts. Africa was referenced in terms of forging problem-solving partnerships and the pursuit of prosperity, democracy and security. The policy spoke of maintaining commitments to Africa with respect to ODA, but leaned strongly towards promoting trade, economic resilience and the alignment of international development with wider foreign policy. In this context, East Africa was pegged as a specific region for continued, and in some cases increased, engagement.
+
+On defence matters, it included a commitment to “persistent engagement”, for example, placing UK armed forces overseas for longer periods in a more proactive posture. A series of sub-strategies were subsequently released, including the 2021 Defence Command Paper and the 2022 International Development Strategy. Highly pertinent for Africa, the latter situated international development as part of a broader effort to build a network of like-minded partners with “all our capabilities – our diplomatic influence, trade policy, defence, intelligence, business partnerships and development expertise”. In doing so, it signalled an intention to use aid for both poverty reduction and wider development and foreign policy goals.
+
+A “refreshed” version of IR21 was released – IR23 – in March 2023. Africa was again identified as a region where the UK government should deepen relationships: “The UK’s approach in Africa will continue to be defined by a greater appreciation of the needs and perspectives of key partners across the continent, focusing on mutually beneficial development, security and defence partnerships, and support for clean infrastructure and climate adaptation”.
+
+IR23 also stated that the UK would “work to reinvigorate its position as a global leader on international development, pursuing patient, long-term partnerships tailored to the needs of the countries we work with, going beyond our Official Development Assistance (ODA) offer to draw on the full range of UK strengths and expertise”. Specific commitments included placing the Minister of State for Africa and International Development on the UK National Security Council (NSC), creating a new second permanent secretary role in the FCDO to oversee all UK development priorities, and establishing a new FCDO–Treasury governance structure to supervise all aid spending. The minister would subsequently clarify his own agenda for the future of UK international development.
+
+As a consequence, the UK policy context has evolved considerably over the research period. Transitions between prime ministers Boris Johnson, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak, and foreign secretaries Dominic Raab, Liz Truss and James Cleverly, linked to the politics of Brexit and Covid-19, and sometimes accompanied by claims of incompetence or corruption, have also brought shifting priorities and tone. Prolonged Brexit negotiations, the Covid-19 pandemic, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have also reshaped geopolitics and economics, with significant knock-on implications for UK spending plans as political attention and increasingly scarce resources were either diverted away from East Africa or towards more short-term crisis management. With already reduced levels of UK ODA diverted towards meeting refugee assistance costs domestically, aid spending in Eastern Africa is much lower than anticipated, despite the region facing severe drought and significant political, security and economic challenges.
+
+#### UK Regional Policy Priorities and Engagements
+
+UK engagement with Eastern Africa is multifaceted, with a long history. A non-exhaustive list of topics of concern include security and counterterrorism (Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and previously Ethiopia), migration (especially Sudan), humanitarian relief, stabilisation and conflict resolution (Sudan, Somalia), international development, climate and environment and trade (especially Kenya). This paper is informed by five preceding research papers. Taken together these provide details on country contexts, UK investments, objectives and selective outcomes across the region. A brief overview of the UK’s key interests, policy priorities and engagements in each country from 2015 to 2022 is also provided.
+
+___Ethiopia___
+
+The UK government considers Ethiopia one of a handful of high-priority countries for UK engagement in Africa due to its size, influence and strategic location. Successive UK governments have sought a stable Ethiopia that is supportive of their foreign policy priorities both globally, especially the international development agenda, but also in the Horn of Africa, for example, with regard to the War on Terror and migration and in relation to the stability of Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. Given that it is one of the largest refugee-hosting countries in Africa and the world, the UK sees Ethiopia as a key country for stemming onward migration.
+
+Registering an annual growth rate of over 10% between 2004 and 2009, in the mid-2000s Ethiopia acted as a cheerleader for international development in global forums. Seeing Ethiopia as a quintessential “developmental state”, the UK became a staunch partner. Via the now-defunct DFID, the UK aligned strongly with the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF) development agenda. Ethiopia at times became the largest single recipient of UK bilateral aid globally, much of it channelled via the government in support of service delivery. Expenditure averaged around £220 million per annum between 2016 and 2020. This made the UK the second-largest donor after the US, contributing around 11% of Ethiopia’s recorded aid income as reported via the OECD–Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Alongside investments in areas ranging from human rights to economic development and drought response, approximately 60% of the UK’s bilateral aid budget has typically been channelled via central government programmes, the bulk allocated to multi-donor, multi-year funds that supported delivery of basic services.
+
+In IR21, the UK planned to work in partnership with Ethiopia “to further our shared prosperity goals, our democratic values and our security interests” and to invest in “regional stability, moving towards closer defence cooperation”. But cuts to the UK aid budget and the changing context in Ethiopia dictated otherwise. By 2021, UK bilateral spend had roughly halved compared to 2019. The remaining (£120-million) UK bilateral aid allocation to Ethiopia in 2021 was £134 million lower than the year before. This was the largest cut – in absolute, though not proportional terms – of any country budget worldwide. Reductions were accompanied by reallocations to different sectors in light of a series of natural disasters, shifting ministerial priorities, Covid-19 and the Tigray War. In 2020, the UK spent £254 million in bilateral ODA in Ethiopia. Humanitarian aid (£103 million) accounted for approximately 40% of the budget as compared to 15% in 2013.
+
+Despite some criticism, the UK has attempted to position itself as constructively critical of Ethiopian government actions during its war in Tigray, while continuing with reduced aid programming via government channels. Meanwhile, it has lobbied the federal government repeatedly for humanitarian access and respect for international humanitarian law, and provided humanitarian funding.
+
+The UK government has maintained a relationship with the Ethiopian Ministry of National Defence for over two decades and has a permanent defence attaché in-country. Defence-related expenditure typically runs at under £1 million per annum, mostly drawn from regional budgets with competing priorities, including the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Ethiopia’s support to AMISOM was the UK’s principal focus – many AMISOM troops have received training from the UK. Levels of UK ambition on security and defence issues have, however, declined over time. Ethiopia and the UK cooperated on counterterrorism issues, but the focus has mainly been on education and training in non-combat areas linked to the Ethiopian Peace Support Training Centre since 2018.
+
+As well as supporting international development work, UK diplomatic interest has historically focused on issues above, ranging from trade promotion to migration, counterterrorism cooperation and Ethiopian involvement in peacekeeping. Considerable energy has also been absorbed on consular cases involving dual nationals. Diplomatic relations were tested in early to mid-2021, as Western criticisms of the Ethiopian government blockade of Tigray and reported human rights abuses led to recriminations. The UK has pursued a lower-profile approach to the Tigray War compared with more prominent critics (for example, the EU, Ireland and the US), who briskly paused aid packages and publicly condemned Ethiopian government actions. It has attempted to position itself as constructively critical while continuing to send aid via government. Amid a turbulent context that included war in Tigray and an intense government counterinsurgency campaign in Oromia, the UK has sought diplomatic engagement with the Ethiopian federal government at the highest level. With respect to Tigray, it lobbied for improved humanitarian access, ceasefires and talks. It has not invested high levels of political capital, however, with infrequent senior ministerial visits.
+
+___Somalia___
+
+The UK was the second-largest DAC donor country to Somalia after the US between 2011 and 2020. A significant proportion of this bilateral aid has been channelled towards government assistance and structural reform, public financial management and support for subnational administration. This includes strengthening the building blocks of the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) legitimacy and accountability, from funding judicial development and service provision to supporting inclusive commercial growth. Given the ongoing threat of Al-Shabaab and jihadist militancy, long-running investments were also allocated to security sector reform and law enforcement, with UK personnel leading the policing strand of Somalia’s Comprehensive Approach to Security framework and supporting projects on stabilisation and countering violent extremism/deradicalisation. Efforts were likewise made to facilitate a political settlement at the federal level and to bolster humanitarian assistance. Resources peaked in famine or near-famine years (2011/12 and 2017/18), with food security (as a sub-stream of “humanitarian preparedness and response”) emphasised as a thematic priority in IR21, supplementing resilience programmes to improve early-warning systems, coping mechanisms, local self-reliance and access to healthcare services.
+
+In-country budgets saw a 56% contraction between 2020 and 2021. Although Somalia is still one of the top 10 recipients of British ODA, this put the UK below Germany’s bilateral aid spending level for the first time. The cuts came alongside a depreciating exchange rate and reallocations driven by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. Although funding for famine relief remains comparatively high, only £61 million in humanitarian aid, healthcare and nutritional resourcing was provided in FY2022/23. This reflected a sharp decrease from the £170-million package offered in 2017.
+
+UK diplomacy has focused on “supporting and occasionally steering multilateral efforts to build up the FGS’s political anatomy, authority and capacity”. Having co-hosted or facilitated several international conferences to formalise the federal structure and provisional constitution, from 2017 UK attention increasingly shifted towards developing a basic security framework and delivering the 2018–22 Somalia Transition Plan (STP). In tandem with the US, London backed the World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief process (2016), and – alongside other donors – helped the FGS satisfy the “Decision Point” benchmarks by 2020. As UN Security Council (UNSC) penholder, the UK also facilitated debate over the structuring, resourcing and timing of AMISOM (now the African Transition Mission – ATMIS), and contributed significant funding to the UN Office for Project Services and the AMISOM Trust Fund.
+
+The need to develop a self-sufficient security apparatus capable of degrading Al-Shabaab was referenced in both the UK’s 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review and the 2021 Defence Command Paper. In recent years, the British Army has supplied infrastructural projects and training, stipends and equipment to the Somali National Army (SNA) under Operation Tangham, primarily for Sector 60 of the army, based around Baidoa. UK-funded advisers remain embedded across federal institutions, including in the ministries of defence and internal security. The focus continues to be on reforming and capacitating national forces so that they can assume security responsibilities from ATMIS as the mission sets to conclude in late 2024.
+
+___Sudan___
+
+The UK has longstanding ties with the Republic of Sudan, previously a colonial condominium, and considers it one of a few high-priority countries on the continent. The view has been that worsening political and economic situations in Sudan would impact the Horn of Africa and North Africa and negatively affect the UK’s vital interests. The IR21 specifically mentioned the UK’s commitment to “continue to support conflict resolution and stabilisation efforts in … Sudan”. Outward migration has also been a concern. The UK is home to a significant and longstanding Sudanese diaspora (around 20,000 people). The UK Home Office has led efforts to curtail migration from Sudan through strengthened border management and enforcement.
+
+UK bilateral aid commitments to Sudan averaged around £93 million per annum between 2016 and 2020. Recent ODA-funded programmes have contributed on issues from humanitarian relief and humanitarian system reform to economic reform, reducing female genital mutilation and child marriage, to water and sanitation, civil society, and supporting the Juba Peace Agreement (2020). The highest-expenditure items have been humanitarian relief and economic reform, and social safety net support. As UK aid contributions to neighbouring countries declined, the Sudan aid budget temporarily rose from £93 million in 2019 to £139 million in 2020. This was due to a one-off increase for a new “Sudan Family Support Programme”, the UK contribution to a World Bank-run programme designed to cushion the needy from economic reforms. Alongside this, the UK campaigned hard at the World Bank and the IMF for Sudanese debt relief. Aid contributions were halted following the October 2021 coup. The UK, together with the US, World Bank and other major donors, suspended non-humanitarian aid. UK bilateral ODA funding dropped back to £93 million by the end of 2021. This still left Sudan as the fifth-largest recipient of UK bilateral ODA worldwide.
+
+Given Sudan’s long period of military rule and the existence of UK, UN and EU sanctions regimes, opportunities for defence engagement have been few. UK–Sudan defence engagement was completely suspended following the October 2021 coup, and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) withdrew its defence attaché from Khartoum in 2022.
+
+The UK’s Sudan diplomacy has focused over time on issues ranging from peace negotiations to migration, counterterrorism and humanitarian access, to the imposition of sanctions and the work of the International Criminal Court (ICC). As a follow-on to involvement in the negotiations for the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the UK acted as “penholder” for the UN hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and its successor, the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS). In March 2016, a UK–Sudan Strategic Dialogue was set up – a formalised contact forum in which senior officials from the two countries met under the shadow of UK and multilateral sanctions. Economic sanctions under UN and EU auspices were central to UK policy in the hope of incentivising reduced conflict, given previous allegations of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in the early 2000s. The UK was also involved in establishing the Khartoum Process, a controversial intergovernmental dialogue platform to facilitate cooperation on migration. Particularly since the ousting of President Omar Al-Bashir, UK ambassadors have been prominent voices in support of democratic transition, often working with the US and Norway “Troika”. UK diplomacy also played an important role in the June–July 2019 “Quartet” negotiations that produced a civilian-led, transitional government.
+
+Attempts to facilitate an agreement between key political and security factions after the 2021 military coup culminated in the December 2022 “Framework Agreement”, a deal brokered by UNITAMS, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU) and backed by, among others, the UK. Despite these efforts, fighting again broke out in Khartoum on 15 April 2023. Violence subsequently spread, leading to reports of war crimes and mass displacement, especially in Darfur. While the UK and other foreign governments initially focused on evacuating nationals and calling for ceasefires and restraint, competing diplomatic tracks have gradually coalesced over time. The US and Saudi Arabia, for instance, convened talks in Jeddah but were criticised for failing to coordinate with other Quad members (including the UK) or regional organisations such as the AU. Although a temporary truce was brokered in late May, the deal – like many others before and since – collapsed under repeated violations. Separately, an IGAD summit was hosted in July, rivalling AU leadership claims over any mediation process, and bilateral and multilateral arrangements fronted by Chad and Egypt started pushing their own initiatives. The result has been “disarray” and confusion, “posing the risk that opportunities [for peace-making] will slip away unexplored”.
+
+___Kenya___
+
+Kenya has been an enduring priority for UK engagement in Africa since the country’s independence in 1963, reflecting a relationship grounded on shared history, language, economic ties, diasporic networks and security needs. Name-checked in IR21 and the International Development Strategy, these linkages were formalised by the 2020–25 Strategic Partnership, with bilateral interests spanning mutual prosperity; regional stability; sustainable development and reduction of extreme poverty; collaborative leadership on climate and environmental issues; peer learning, knowledge sharing and research; and the expansion of individual and institutional networks.
+
+Eclipsed by the US in the mid-1970s, the UK’s bilateral ODA contributions to Kenya averaged around £117 million between 2016 and 2020, peaking at £152.8 million in 2017 before falling below those of Japan in 2018, and France and EU institutions in 2020, and Germany a year later. Partially tied to the drop from 0.7% to 0.5% of GNI, the government’s in-country budget reduced from £134 million (2019) to £72 million (2021) – roughly 46% over two years – slightly exceeding the 42% cut across Africa as a whole.
+
+In terms of coverage and content, social infrastructure has regularly consumed the largest proportion of UK ODA funding, although the specific distribution has varied over time. Support for social protection and education, for instance, diminished in 2013/14, while investment in health systems grew steadily from 2017 and extended further as part of the COVAX vaccine rollout. Attention has likewise been paid to multi-sector work – particularly environmental protections, policies and administrative management – and humanitarian aid, including emergency (drought and flood) relief, and refugee support and empowerment. After the outbreak of electoral (and state) violence in 2007/8, the UK increased its focus on governance, peace and security issues. Additional resourcing was also channelled towards improving the accountability of public institutions, anti-corruption efforts, conflict mitigation and reducing the risk of radicalisation.
+
+History has proven both a “benefit and burden” for diplomatic engagement. The UK retains close ties to Kenya’s political, military and economic elite, but has often been scapegoated when politically expedient. Following then-candidate Uhuru Kenyatta’s indictment by the ICC in 2013, for example, elements of Kenyatta’s Jubilee party were able to dismiss Western criticism as “neo-colonial”, refusing any renewal of UK defence cooperation and accelerating his predecessor’s “look east” strategy. While relations gradually improved, culminating in a prime ministerial visit by Theresa May in 2018, similar issues emerged over successive electoral cycles (2017 and 2022), revealing the difficult dynamics that UK officials continue to navigate.
+
+Contemporary relations with Nairobi are also wrapped up in UK commercial interests. Kenya is the largest African recipient of British “aid-for-trade” programming, and significant efforts are being made to boost environmental, social and corporate standards. In 2020, an Economic Partnership Agreement pledged funds to boost trade and granted Kenyans “duty and quota free” access to UK markets, although there were concerns such bilateral arrangements could disrupt regional integration within the East Africa Community, or saturate local markets with cheap imports. In 2021, Kenya was considered a priority country in British International Investment (BII)’s $1-billion pan-African suite of infrastructure, finance and climate projects, supplementing assistance to 30 regional funds and more than 80 local finance, tech and green enterprises. Later that year, then foreign secretary Dominic Raab declared a further £132 million in public and private funding aligned with Kenyatta’s “Big Four Agenda”.
+
+The UK has long considered Kenya an “essential” defence partner, as the country hosts significant British military assets and infrastructure, adjoins Somalia, South Sudan and Ethiopia, and offers a logistical corridor to central Africa. Much of this relationship is framed by the Security Compact, an arrangement approved in 2015 (and episodically updated) covering countering violent extremism, border and aviation policing, and criminal justice cooperation, alongside efforts to tackle instability and conflict. Defence Cooperation Agreements were also signed in 2016 and 2021, renewing the legal instruments that maintain BATUK (the British Army Training Unit Kenya, host of the multinational Askari Storm exercises) and allow capacity building with the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF). In addition, BPST-A (the British Peace Support Team) advises and assists African militaries, supporting peacekeeping operations such as AMISOM and ATMIS, and working with partners including the International Peace Support Training Centre to strengthen institutional learning and regional responses to complex emergencies. In recent years, Kenya was designated a “regional hub” in the MoD’s “persistent engagement strategy”, with the 2021 Defence Command Paper prescribing a further expansion of UK commitments and the continuation of joint training and readiness.
+
+
+### II. Research Findings
+
+This project’s most prominent findings from all source data across the four case studies – including secondary source and interview data – are provided below. Where relevant, recommendations are offered for UK policymakers.
+
+> #### `Finding 1`
+
+> _`In the face of volatility, the UK has had to adapt its approach towards the region numerous times since 2015. Actions include reallocating funding towards drought relief, suspending cooperation during conflict and political upheaval (Sudan), condemning reported war crimes (Ethiopia), bolstering stabilisation efforts (Somalia), and providing support to mitigate electoral instability (Kenya and Somalia).`_
+
+- Kenya offers relative stability, commercial opportunities and a good degree of judicial independence. But the economy has struggled to recover from Covid-19-era restrictions and global price increases. Political and ethnic divisions persist, and state systems are not meeting public expectations amid corruption, inequality and the high cost of living. Against this backdrop, the UK has dedicated significant time, diplomatic capital and financial resources to electoral support and institution building to help consolidate reforms prescribed in Kenya’s 2010 Constitution. With contested polls (and an eventual re-run) in 2017, the British High Commission (BHC) doubled down on its supply of technical assistance across various regulatory bodies such as the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, despite increasing contextual difficulties. Crucially, early engagement in the electoral cycle bought time for participatory planning and networking, enabling British stakeholders to better navigate the stringent restrictions imposed on donors by Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, the BHC assumed an influential role in coordinating external engagement, partially facilitated by its unusual levels of access to local institutions; the longevity and depth of bilateral UK ties to Kenya; the coincidental absence of a US ambassador; and the High Commissioner’s personal clout. Much of this leadership was “behind the scenes”, with the UK contributing towards the donor agenda while reportedly sharing or ceding ownership to mitigate the political sensitivities previously disrupting British interventions in 2013 and 2017.
+
+- Visible changes to Ethiopia’s existing political settlement began in 2018 with the dissolution of the ruling EPRDF. The UK enjoyed a close working relationship with the Ethiopian government until 2019, cooperating and financing significant poverty reduction efforts and pursuing shared counterterrorism objectives, despite worsening political divisions and insecurity. This began to change following the November 2020 Tigray War and subsequent security and economic crisis. The UK attempted to maintain access to newly installed prime minister Abiy Ahmed’s government at the highest level while being critical of the conduct of the war. It continued to provide financial aid and technical assistance to government departments for socioeconomic development but at lower levels than before, while lobbying for humanitarian access to Tigray. Defence cooperation outside peacekeeping training was stopped. Yet by attempting to keep all options and channels open, the UK attracted criticism from both the Ethiopian federal government and pro-Tigrayan voices.
+
+- Somalia remains poor and insecure, with much of the country inaccessible to governmental and international actors. In working to support a “good enough” state capable of out-competing Al-Shabaab, the UK developed new (experimental) approaches to stabilisation in support of Operation Badbaado, an SNA-led offensive focused on the liberation of several “bridge-towns” across Lower Shabelle between 2019 and 2020. By shifting towards a more politically sensitive methodology based on grassroot reconciliation, dialogue and community buy-in – fronted in large part by the Early Recovery Initiative – the UK was able to build momentum for peace committees and recovery operations. Although primarily confined to the tactical level given a lack of follow-up funding and police coverage, these inputs were nevertheless considered “significant and influential” on their own terms, while plugging a gap in international programming. British engagement also proved flexible in reallocating resources to help avert the risk of famine in 2017, marking a substantial (if imperfect) improvement on similar interventions in 2011/12. Subsequent efforts in 2022 were, however, criticised as insufficient and under-financed, leveraging technical expertise and convening power in an enabler role, rather than exercising the leadership and multiplier effects evident five years previously.
+
+- In Sudan, the UK acquired a reputation over many years for careful diplomacy, even-handed dealings around the north–south conflict, and ongoing support for humanitarian relief. Under President Omar Al-Bashir, relations were highly challenging. The situation pivoted to a close working relationship with the brief hybrid transitional government of 2019–21. While ending cooperation on security and development matters, the UK maintained contact with key political and military figures even after the October 2021 coup. This caused some pro-democracy actors to criticise the UK’s support for “hybrid” or compromise agreements that featured the security services. While events have moved on with the outbreak of violence in April 2023, there is still a reservoir of goodwill towards the UK in Sudan and an appetite for increased engagement.
+
+This rapidly changing context points to the importance of up-to-date multi-disciplinary analysis to inform decisions on strategy, action and difficult trade-offs. It also underscores that peace, adequate governance and security are fundamental for progress on other agendas.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Make use of the combined skills and levers that exist across government – from trade-related to cultural, diplomatic and security – to develop and periodically update internal analysis of the political, security and economic situation in the region, and identify any levers for change that will permit effective UK action at country level.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Ensure that future UK international development strategies and white papers recognise the importance of addressing security, conflict and governance challenges to enable progress on development and prosperity objectives in East Africa and other fragile environments.
+
+> #### `Finding 2`
+
+> _`Despite inconsistent levels of political leadership, the UK contributed to relatively successful outcomes across the four case study countries. However, these are not sufficient (or necessarily sustainable) in isolation and continue to face important constraints and challenges.`_
+
+Based on interviewees’ assessments of UK inputs and successes, several example focus areas emerged:
+
+- In Kenya, the UK displayed flexibility, contextual awareness and diplomatic influence in delivering well-timed, long-running electoral support (and subsequent crisis management). Together with other international partners and endogenous factors, these efforts helped strengthen trust and public safety during the largely peaceful 2022 election. Similarly, defence engagement fed into tactical, doctrinal and possibly operational improvements in the KDF, and ensured a persistent, close working relationship with Nairobi. UK programming was likewise able to draw on its networking and technical expertise to contribute to a boost in Kenyan literacy rates, academic performance and girls’ progression to secondary-level education. However, such experiences also reflect the inherent difficulty of engendering sustainable change across institutional cultures, especially when navigating political sensitivities and elite interests, leaving the longer-term and higher-level impact of UK interventions (often) unclear.
+
+- Incremental progress was made in Ethiopia, with the UK feeding into (and funding) plans to liberalise the agriculture, manufacturing, mining, tourism, and information and communications sectors, backed by international financial institution (IFI) loans. Partly as a result of embassy efforts and relationships, a consortium including UK firm Vodafone won a licence to operate in Ethiopia in a deal that aimed to catalyse investment and jobs in 2021, although wider liberalisation plans have since faltered. More fruitfully, the UK supported a peace initiative in Ethiopia’s Somali Region, with marginalised and aggrieved populations able to participate. Despite problems with implementation, the Asmara agreement of 2018 may have contributed for a time to reduced violence and improved stability, and facilitated the movement of goods into northern Kenya and Somaliland. This demonstrates how long-term, low-key investments, when combined with political savvy and a trusted implementing partner, can generate results.
+
+- In Somalia, the UK remained an important international stakeholder, leveraging its financial sway in the World Bank’s Multi-Partner Fund, diplomatic capital as UNSC Penholder, and existing relationships with federal member states (FMS) authorities to help push through support for revenue generation, financial management and debt relief via the HIPC process. While donors may have downplayed or deferred corruption and accountability issues along the way, the effort to create administrative structures commensurate with the ambition of Somalia’s transition plans may be an important foundation. Programmes like the Early Recovery Initiative also appeared promising, providing innovative, dialogue-based stabilisation models to better address community needs and bolster FGS–FMS relations. Although experiencing a significant drop in resourcing compared to 2017, UK technical expertise and convening power likewise fed into ongoing efforts to supply famine relief – albeit not on the scale required. Nevertheless, the pernicious impact of economic extraversion and foreign dependency, and a lack of political unanimity among Somalis themselves, continue to hamper higher-level UK objectives, namely the development a durable federal state.
+
+- Despite a chequered past, the UK has displayed significant leverage at key moments in Sudan, building on a long history of engagement. Supporting good practice around conflict sensitivity, localisation, transparency and resilience-building allowed British aid to assist more than two million people with food, cash, education, healthcare and water access between 2017 and 2022. Even by linking emergency relief and high-level diplomacy, the UK – alongside other donors – nevertheless failed to win sustainable openings in the humanitarian space before the military reclaimed power. Similarly, British officials proved crucial in backing IFI efforts to cut subsidies, increase public sector wages and establish social safety nets during the political transition, enabling Sudan to eventually satisfy IMF requirements and unlock concessional finance worth $2.5 billion for the first time in 30 years. Nonetheless, limited relief payments, declining living standards, rampant inflation and food shortages all heightened political and social divisions in the lead up to the October 2021 coup, suggesting the strategy framing UK and Western approaches may have ultimately been counterproductive.
+
+Despite facing difficult contextual conditions, resource limitations, uncertainties over critical assumptions and persistent ministerial upheaval in London, these interventions capture important elements of the contemporary UK “offer”. While claims of progress should not be overstated, the examples above provide useful insights into how the UK might continue to advance key elements of its agenda.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Given the relatively small sample of outcomes, interventions and focus areas covered by this project, further research should be conducted into how the UK can pursue (and sustain) its goals, informed by an analysis of UK comparative advantages and limitations across the diplomatic, defence and developmental fields.
+
+> #### `Finding 3`
+
+> _`Attempts by UK officials to better integrate defence, international development and diplomatic (3Ds) work have made progress.`_
+
+- UK policy has long emphasised the importance of joined-up action across the “3Ds” and to varying degrees – as per IR21 – have tried to incorporate questions of trade, economic resilience and even science and technology. The research showed clear examples of integrated thinking and action, tying together development, diplomacy and defence.
+
+- UK diplomatic, defence and developmental inputs appear, for the most part, mutually reinforcing in Kenya, with high-level engagement from Whitehall combining well with the influence, capabilities and sensitivity of country-based teams. For example, girls’ education has been a UK priority for many years, and coordination across the different sections of BHC was said to have accelerated progress on project delivery. Diplomatic outreach likewise complemented long-term electoral reforms, helping mitigate the risk of local spoilers by ensuring capacity-building efforts were palatable to Kenyan elites. There were also various cases of trade and UK private sector investment becoming better linked with development work, and progress synthesising defence coverage with other strands of UK engagement via frameworks such as CSSF (and specific units like BPST-A). Nevertheless, some respondents felt that the drive for integration may have contributed to deprioritisation of human development agendas in favour of commercial and security concerns.
+
+- In Somalia, integration across different government workstreams has long been pursued. Good examples include active diplomatic support for debt relief alongside technical work by development staff. This apparently helped with anti-corruption efforts in the security sector, though there was said to be room for improvement in linking up legacy DFID development work, military inputs and Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF)-funded projects.
+
+- Sudan has provided fewer opportunities to pursue defence engagement or promote trade, but use of development aid and diplomacy has become more integrated over time.
+
+- In the telecoms sector, Ethiopia provided an example of joined-up working across diplomacy, trade promotion and economic development. But outside peacekeeping work, there have been few opportunities for defence engagement in recent years.
+
+__Recommendation:__ To support more coherent, joined-up UK policy towards Africa using the International Development/Africa ministerial NSC seat that was announced in IR23 to put key topics (for example, development, migration, debt) regularly and proactively in front of senior and mid-level decision-makers from across government.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Improve cross-governmental understanding of integrated working across defence, diplomacy and development issues. Measures could include objective-setting, training (for example, the FCDO diplomatic academy), work shadowing or issuing good practice guides.
+
+> #### `Finding 4`
+
+> _`While the abolition of DFID is regretted by some UK regional partners, the creation of the FCDO, though unplanned, shows early promise.`_
+
+- The merger of the FCO and DFID has contributed towards stronger policy integration in several cases, and appeared to have been easier in smaller missions or where there was a range of UK interests and perspectives in play and therefore greater balance between the voices of different government departments.
+
+- Despite the disruption associated with internal planning and reorganisation, the FCDO’s formation was generally considered beneficial in Somalia and Sudan. For example, ambassadorial oversight of humanitarian and development work was said to have improved in Sudan since the DFID–FCO merger, corporate messaging became more unified, and dealings with the Sudanese government became easier to communicate. In both countries, DFID’s footprint and resources – though important – did not overshadow those of other departments. Additionally, there was broad acceptance that development challenges had political and security roots.
+
+- Likewise, UK missions hosting a variety of similarly resourced departments, and which had strong incentives to integrate cross-government cooperation into daily operations, were probably better placed to combine FCO and legacy DFID infrastructure into a unified arrangement. In the case of Kenya, the merger was thought to have increased diplomatic engagement in health-related work, and led to better links between trade and development initiatives.
+
+- In contrast, issues over prioritisation and leadership seem to have arisen when combining DFID Ethiopia’s sizeable staff base and budget with a far smaller FCO presence. Although benefits were noticeable over time, with former DFID humanitarian advisers now described as more cognisant of political factors associated with gaining access to the Tigray region, some partners felt the creation of the FCDO had cost the UK, undermining its hard-won reputation for aid and development leadership. This feeling was more prominent in Ethiopia and to some degree in Kenya, both countries having enjoyed long engagement with DFID linked to years of high aid spending levels.
+
+- A frequently referenced issue was a lack of pre-merger planning. Slow implementation, including delays with integrating teams and systems, were frustrations in all countries, with staff morale (and retention) across UK embassies suffering in many cases. Ongoing restructuring has been necessary at different levels since the new FCDO was formed, and considerable time has been taken up with iterative reorganisation and re-strategising, down to individual embassies and teams. In line with previous research on “machinery of government” changes, all indications are that the creation and refinement of the FCDO will be unfinished business for years to come.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Explicit change management processes should be used to guide any further organisational change. Planning should cater for foreseeable risks, draw on the merger’s early lessons and prioritise communicating future direction with external partners.
+
+> #### `Finding 5`
+
+> _`The UK retains a good reputation across the region for the calibre of its diplomats and development and defence experts, and it has broadly maintained staffing levels despite budget cuts.`_
+
+- Despite budget cuts and reported staff departures at corporate level, the FCDO and the MoD have maintained similar numbers of staff with a focus on the region between 2015 and 2022, and other departments such as Investment and Trade, have slightly increased their presence in Kenya and Ethiopia. Maintaining staff numbers has provided some “damage mitigation”, allowing officials to preserve relationships, provide technical support or exert influence, despite reduced budgets.
+
+- The perceived quality of UK staff has similarly been a stabilising factor. It has helped to protect at least some longstanding networks amid political and budget uncertainties, supplemented by strategic staff placements to facilitate multilateral collaboration. The UK’s influence across multiple issues and sectors could however prove time-limited – research findings suggested that existing “clout” may only be sustainable if a narrower set of priorities is adopted or additional resources are brought to bear. At the same time, the increasing arrival of inexperienced civil servants across regional postings has raised questions over the durability of institutional memory in UK embassies, and the transferability of knowledge, contacts and relationships.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Building on lessons from the DFID–FCO merger, ensure that the FCDO’s operating model, including its staff base and handling of external relationships, is optimised to support integrated ways of working in a competitive, post-Brexit context. As part of this, ensure skilled international development professionals are attracted, retained and tasked to work effectively alongside others in pursuit of integrated policy agendas.
+
+> #### `Finding 6`
+
+> _`The UK is reasonably well regarded as a development, defence and diplomatic actor across the region. Despite this, a range of middle and great powers increasingly offer alternative forms of support to East African governments, which contribute to perceptions of declining UK influence.`_
+
+- Research showed that although the UK is less well resourced than the EU or the US, it is often credited by its partners with solid technical knowledge, expertise and convening power. This is in part due to the previous work of DFID, but extends beyond development issues. UK defence and security inputs (for example, training) are also well thought of, but there is awareness that UK political sensitivities can lead to cooperation being curtailed or withdrawn, as previously happened in Ethiopia and Sudan.
+
+- UK diplomatic skill and outreach are also well regarded. The UK is seen as less strident than the US, with respondents mentioning the UK’s useful closed-door bilateral work and its presence in a range of diplomatic forums. While the UK is often expected to follow US positions, many feel that the UK can still act as a “bridge” between Washington and other stakeholders.
+
+- Prominent non-Western actors in the region include China and Russia, Turkey and the Gulf states.
+
+- Turkey is seen as focused on commercial and security issues. It has gained a reputation for small-scale investments and a willingness to deal at subnational level, although in Somalia it has successfully combined soft power, direct investment, military assistance, infrastructural development and humanitarian aid to become one of the FGS’s most prominent international partners. Crucially, this crosscuts elite and wider public sentiment, with Turkish officials, business delegates and NGO workers “walking the streets” and immersing themselves in the daily realities of Somali life.
+
+- The Gulf States are thought to seek stability that protects investments (for example, land and productive enterprises in Ethiopia and Sudan) and are seen as pursuing “cheque-book diplomacy”.
+
+- China has a distinctive offer – financing quickly at scale with few conditions, particularly around infrastructure or agriculture. It has had some success framing itself as more generous than traditional donors, including through swift Covid-19 “vaccine diplomacy”. Civil society actors in the region often worry that China’s lack of conditionality or interest in accountability issues can fuel corruption or lower technical standards. More recently, the attractions of its developmental model may also be starting to shift, with loans becoming more expensive, alongside Beijing’s increasing reluctance to fund loss-making “white elephant projects” amid a downturn in its domestic economy.
+
+- Russia was seen as competing on different grounds compared with the UK and the West, due to quite specific security (arms and miliary cooperation), commercial and political interests. It enjoys residual sympathies due to Soviet support for anti-colonial struggles and longstanding military links. In Ethiopia, Moscow benefits from a shared history of Orthodox Christianity. As with China, there is mutual interest in the principles of non-interference.
+
+- Linked to the arrival or revival of these “alternative” actors, it is sometimes said that Western, and UK influence, is in decline. There are several aspects to this, ranging from the idea that alternative offers are on the table, to the growing self-sufficiency and assertiveness of national leaders in countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia. This perception of relative decline needs to be recognised in its own right, independent of any impact that UK aid cuts or the withdrawal from the EU may have had on the UK’s standing. Frustrations with the West’s past double standards or moral failings also shape views across the region. Yet there is no consensus on whether the UK has found the right balance in terms of “pragmatism” versus “principles”. It wins plaudits from some in the region for pursuing “practical solutions”, but is seen by others as “less principled” than countries such as Denmark and Sweden, which tend to foreground issues of human rights and gender.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Ensure that forging long-term partnerships with a range of constituencies becomes central to strategies in East Africa and for priority countries elsewhere, backed by sufficient time, resources and incentivising development and retention of regional expertise.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Building on this study, commission formal reviews of the contribution that UK defence engagement and international development efforts can feasibly make to UK foreign policy aims globally, focusing strongly on UK added value and clearer prioritisation.
+
+> #### `Finding 7`
+
+> _`The UK has established relationships and partnerships with a variety of actors. It often operates effectively through ad hoc groupings of bilateral and multilateral networks in the region and globally, bolstered by envoys and technical specialists.`_
+
+- Although the UK–Kenya relationship remains strong, the UK’s cultural influence and the perceived value of its international development “offer” seems to be declining. As the UK competes for commercial advantage with China, the US and others, it has arguably shifted towards “less abrasive” terms of engagement and closer alignment to government.
+
+- The UK maintains a range of productive relationships in Ethiopia, but changing political dynamics and the Tigray conflict have upended a previously close partnership with the federal government. Navigating an increasingly polarised environment since 2020, the UK had to work harder to maintain influence and access as it juggled pursuit of humanitarian access, development and trade agendas and exploring ceasefires and peace-talk options.
+
+- The fraught security situation in Somalia makes it hard for foreign donors to build relations beyond reductive, state-centric echo-chambers in FMS palaces or Villa Somalia. Nevertheless, the UK retains a significant voice and exercises comparatively strong links at the subnational level, often acting as a broker for other international stakeholders. With its membership of the Quad and the Quint, the World Bank’s Multi-Partner Fund, the Core Security Partners Group and S6; participation in or chairmanship of several coordination platforms; and position as UN Penholder, the UK has carved a leading diplomatic role and reputation for development expertise that can sometimes catalyse effective responses from others.
+
+- The UK enjoys substantial depth and quality of partnerships both within Sudan and with regional actors. The UK won some praise for its political and technical support to the 2019 transitional government, and its support to debt relief. Many pro-democracy campaigners worry about Western willingness to compromise with Sudan’s military, while others would welcome increased UK engagement. Western influence may be seen as declining relative to that of players such as Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, but a strength in the UK’s approach has until recently been its engagement with such players.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Ensure links and communication between regional and embassy-level officials, including “special envoys”, to coordinate advocacy and diplomacy, and better align missions and engagement across the Gulf and Eastern Africa. This includes adequately resourcing envoy positions, streamlining information flows (across Whitehall and country missions), and providing access to relevant teams.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Push to consolidate a clear strategy for ad hoc groups such as the Quad, the Quint, S6 and Friends of Sudan, working with partners to clarify (and potentially deconflict) their respective roles, resources, membership and mandates.
+
+> #### `Finding 8`
+
+> _`Between 2019 and 2021, the UK bilateral aid budget was reduced by around 50% across the region. External relationships suffered as funding decisions were arrived at iteratively and were not always well communicated.`_
+
+- The reduced UK aid budget is probably the most significant variable examined in this project. The speed and extent of cuts damaged the UK’s reputation and partnerships in all four countries. While examples were found of cutbacks driving innovation, and relationships with national governments and key partners have endured in most cases, the UK is generally seen as less reliable by many organisations that it has partnered with on international aid and development work (both up- and downstream).
+
+- The UK was not the only donor to have reduced funding in Kenya over the research period, but respondents routinely noted that the scale of cuts (equivalent to 46% between 2019 and 2021) lacked any obvious strategic logic and risked diminishing UK capabilities, even in areas where it had previously found success. Despite the recognised need to consolidate procedural and institutional improvements over successive ballot cycles, for instance, stakeholders faced pressure to slash funding for electoral support, detracting from the sustainability of long-term cultural, normative and structural change.
+
+- In Ethiopia, where past UK aid funding had contributed to impressive reductions in the poverty rate, the decrease in UK bilateral aid by over 50% between 2019 and 2021 was poorly received by many stakeholders. Shrinking budgets did in some cases lead to fresh thinking from UK officials about delivery options, for example, focusing minds on how to draw in resources from elsewhere. But the overall drop hampered the ability of the FCDO’s implementing partners to plan, deliver and maintain good relations.
+
+- Flows of UK bilateral aid to Somalia rose considerably between 2019 and 2020, but diminished by 56% the following year, with cuts in staple activities including support for public administration, subnational governance and humanitarian relief. Although the UK is still respected and able to deliver impact with well-designed programming (as, for example, on famine relief and stabilisation), the reductions were described by many as detrimental to UK capacity and likely to diminish influence. While UK officials have been recognised for their expertise, capabilities and coordination during the 2017 humanitarian relief effort in Somalia, federal government stakeholders recently criticised the UK for becoming a “smaller player” and neglecting its leadership role. The disruption or scaling down of projects, delays in tendering or launching follow-up programmes, and confusion over long-term funding have reduced confidence in UK commitments. Resource levels are now arguably mismatched to the UK’s long-term state-building ambitions.
+
+- In contrast to Kenya and Ethiopia, UK budget allocations for Sudan increased in 2020, as the UK sought to demonstrably support Khartoum’s political transition, becoming Whitehall’s fifth-largest bilateral commitment globally. However, funding levels fell back by roughly 55% in 2021/22, due to the 2021 coup, when all non-humanitarian assistance was suspended. Although the UK has traditionally been the largest donor to the UN-run Sudan Humanitarian Fund, today the US, Germany and the Netherlands make larger contributions, leading humanitarian partners to expect a decline in UK influence.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Clarify intentions regarding the 0.7% GNI spending target, including spending priorities in the event of either future budget increases or cutbacks. Ad interim, introduce flexibility by confirming that the current 0.5% GNI spending measure is a floor, not a ceiling.
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/i5gYgTb.png)
+_▲ __Figure 1: Total UK Net Bilateral ODA (£ Millions) from 2015 to 2021.__ Source: [Figures for 2015 to 2020 from FCDO, Annual Report and Accounts 2021–22 (London: The Stationery Office, 2022)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fcdo-annual-report-and-accounts-2021-to-2022), Table B.2, p. 257. [Figures for 2021 from FCDO and UK Aid, “Statistics on International Development: Final UK Aid Spend 2021”, last updated March 2023](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/statistics-on-international-development-final-uk-aid-spend-2021), p. 74._
+
+> #### `Finding 9`
+
+> _`Brexit did not significantly impair the UK’s operational effectiveness in the region, but alongside other factors has probably contributed to a perception of declining influence.`_
+
+Leaving the EU has excluded the UK from country-level EU coordination forums in the region. This means that the UK no longer has a formal role in determining the direction of EU defence, development and humanitarian priorities, nor in agreeing common positions. But this has cut two ways. The UK bilateral aid budget received a boost following EU withdrawal, as member contributions were no longer required of the UK. In terms of diplomatic positioning, UK officials now have a freer hand. In these respects, Brexit appeared to have little overt impact on the UK’s reputation or effectiveness in Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia. Yet media coverage of protracted UK–EU withdrawal negotiations, and very public politicking around the issue in the UK, did negatively affect perceptions of the UK in the region. Some variations were evident across countries:
+
+- While Brexit did not dramatically change UK standing and influence in Kenya, some interviewees argued that it had lost strategic cover – previously able to “lead from the back” on sensitive policy issues in a former colony, the UK now has one fewer channel for exercising influence. When combined with high ministerial turnover and poorly communicated aid reductions, there was also a widespread sense that the UK had become a less predictable partner.
+
+- Coming alongside large aid budget cuts and the end of DFID, leaving the EU was felt by many Ethiopian interviewees who valued the UK and DFID’s track record to have diminished UK influence.
+
+- The UK’s existing relationships in Sudan have weathered Brexit comparatively well. Despite withdrawing from EU members’ meetings, workarounds have been found to coordinate with EU players. The UK’s network of officials operated effectively across multiple forums in Khartoum, the wider region and New York. Active in the UK–US–Norwegian “Troika” and the “Quad” (the UK with the US, Saudi Arabia and the UAE), Whitehall appears to have offset its loss of influence over EU policy. Field research showed many believed that UK dexterity and messaging improved after Brexit, although it was argued that UK ministers might have concentrated more on Sudan’s early political transition in 2019 had it not been for Brexit negotiations at that time.
+
+- Respondents in Somalia also noted a diversion of UK diplomatic attention during the negotiation period. Others warned that withdrawing UK personnel from Somalia-facing EU activities could undermine local commitments, in part because UK funding contributions and political advocacy helped drive support for AMISOM/ATMIS in Brussels. However, the approval of successive EU financial packages in 2022 and 2023 appeared to have defused these concerns, at least in the short term.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Ensure there is sufficient flexibility to continue informal engagement and coordination between UK and EU officials over the long term, particularly at the operational level.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Invest in working groups and bilateral platforms to enable the UK to continue its role as a “transatlantic bridge” between the EU and the US.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Clearly communicate the scope, scale and mechanics of continuing UK–EU cooperation to help defuse perceptions of an isolated, post-Brexit foreign policy, particularly to local audiences.
+
+> #### `Finding 10`
+
+> _`UK strategies at the country level were sometimes unclear, overly broad or outpaced by contextual changes. The lack of a regional strategy also remains a significant gap, given the transnational nature of the opportunities and challenges facing Eastern Africa.`_
+
+- Research suggests that the UK could improve its efficacy across Eastern Africa by looking afresh at strategy and providing support for implementation. At the country and sub-regional level, strategies were often vague or outdated, with contentious assumptions, disparities between goals and resources, and a lack of plausible delivery plans contributing to confusion and inefficiency. Similarly, theories of change, shared objectives and priorities were not always well articulated or connected, and at the regional level there appears to be little in the way of a viable roadmap. Given the transnationalised dynamics of local insecurity, development, politics and economic systems – especially across comparatively deprived borderlands – the lack of an East Africa strategy is a serious omission. It is also true that a policy of integrated working across the “3Ds”, linking to other policy areas (for example, trade, science and technology) as prescribed in IR21 and IR23, is complex to execute and cannot be driven by rhetoric alone.
+
+- Despite the Strategic Partnership, the hierarchy of UK objectives in Kenya was not always well framed or understood – although in reality defence and trade relations increasingly appeared to overshadow concerns around accountability or human development. Additionally, there were indications that UK defence engagement and relationship building would benefit from being placed within a clearer overarching strategy, backed up by appropriate political outreach, although this process may reportedly already be under review as the MoD looks to clarify how “persistent engagement” will function in practice.
+
+- It was not clear whether UK action in Ethiopia was guided by an up-to-date detailed strategy that matched well-articulated goals and interests to available resources and political will. A wide range of engagements, some in tension with one another, had been kept in play for some years amid a deteriorating context. The UK is not alone here – most Western actors have struggled to adapt to the pace of developments across the country.
+
+- Similarly, recent events in Sudan are prompting renewed scrutiny of Western and UK strategy. Sudanese interviewees were often sceptical of international efforts to integrate military and security stakeholders into transitional government arrangements, despite the UK’s ability to dialogue with “all sides”. Others argued that UK and other Western actors had focused unduly on technocratic economic reforms during the failed 2019–21 political transition – at the expense of expanding non-elite networks and deepening political analysis to help chart a long-term path towards democratisation.
+
+- Despite reduced resources, Whitehall’s strategy towards Somalia has proved fairly consistent. Formally committed to the STP, the UK and other “likeminded” countries are continuing to back a “good enough” federal government capable of containing Al-Shabaab. That said, some query the execution and underlying assumptions of this approach, particularly the feasibility of building a stable state without prior societal and clan agreement on basic political questions. In the absence of local buy-in, ownership and shared alignment, the creation of artificial systems dependent on external resourcing raises the risk of aid diversion and economic extraversion that may disrupt or undermine Somali-led peacebuilding. At the same time, a reduction or withdrawal of donor support would likely precipitate a complete government collapse akin to that in Afghanistan. Amid new priorities in Ukraine, implausible timelines, international fatigue, and deeply embedded political and developmental challenges, the gulf between the strategic ambitions and hard realities of UK engagement seem to be growing.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Develop integrated strategies for UK engagement with priority African countries and regions, including those in Eastern Africa. Guided by high-level policy such as IR23 and NSC decisions and informed by the context, these strategies should clearly articulate interests, values and objectives, while offering a means to revisit assumptions, possible dilemmas and trade-offs.
+
+__Recommendation:__ Measures could include setting shared objectives, training (for example, the FCDO diplomatic academy), work shadowing or issuing good practice guides.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+This paper has set out research findings on the UK’s use of international development, diplomacy and defence engagement in Eastern Africa from 2015 to 2022. It finds that the region has not been allotted the resources or level of attention initially signalled by IR21. It is notable that the UK has made progress on a number of its policy agendas despite domestic, regional and global challenges. The UK’s best results often seem to derive from long-term engagements. These have generated contextual understanding and broad-based relationships that could be leveraged in future for positive change. With strong cultural ties and a track record of providing life-saving humanitarian assistance and development and defence know-how, many in the region recognise the UK’s contributions and might welcome increased engagement from the UK on genuinely shared priorities.
+
+Nevertheless, in a post-Brexit world of increasing geopolitical competition, the UK will have to face questions about its positioning towards Africa. The research surfaces important questions concerning the nature of UK–Africa relations and the role of aid, development and defence engagement within an integrated foreign policy. For example, policy statements in favour of “integration” or “partnerships”, while useful, do not in themselves constitute an effective strategy. With a contracting resource base, positive results may become harder to demonstrate in an increasingly competitive and transactional environment. African governments also now have a wider array of potential partners and greater leverage in shaping foreign engagement. This fact, together with policy decisions such as a reduced aid budget, contributes to perceptions of declining UK influence within the region. In the face of this, the UK will need to communicate its added value towards Africa very clearly.
+
+As the initial struggles around changes from Brexit to the FCDO merger recede, new opportunities could emerge for the UK to forge effective two-way partnerships. The UK should now clearly articulate its policy priorities towards the region and Africa writ large and establish a two-way dialogue with African partners at government and societal level on shared priorities. Whereas UK approaches were previously characterised by the use of aid for poverty reduction, the scope of UK development engagement is broadening, focusing more explicitly on the national interest and on establishing wider partnerships.
+
+As the country moves through its next electoral cycle by 2024, the UK government would do well to consider how the UK can pursue its significant diplomatic, security and development interests towards Africa in light of this project’s findings and recommendations, as well as their implications for engagement elsewhere.
+
+---
+
+__Simon Rynn__ is Senior Research Fellow for Africa at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His experience covers conflict prevention and peacebuilding, stabilisation, security and justice, de-mining, humanitarian, governance and small arms control. His main research focus is on the security of East Africa and the Horn, particularly the security sector, external engagement with stabilisation and peace support operations, as well as economic security and the relationship between security and international development.
+
+__Michael Jones__ is a Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team examining political violence, governance by non/pseudo-state armed groups, and the convergence of violent extremism and insurgent militancy in East and sub-Saharan Africa. He has led investigative fieldwork across various countries including Sudan, Kenya and Lebanon; managed conflict focused projects looking into Darfur and Somalia; and worked in RUSI’s Nairobi Office on a range of projects related to the EU’s STRIVE Horn of Africa and STRIVE II programming.
+
+__Larry Attree__ is a globally recognised expert on peace, conflict and security issues. Former Head of Global Policy and Advocacy at Saferworld, Larry has over two decades’ experience, and helped craft global agreements on peace, governance and development themes, including the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, the Busan Partnership and the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals.

From 72afab39c160bce1e8f7427e6ad1440210d81581 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2023 00:04:13 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 18/19] 0x20 Add _columns posts, Sep.22

---
 ...e-are-the-extreme-minority-on-this-land.md |  67 ++++++++++
 ...erminales-the-respect-and-understanding.md | 116 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk29.md |  51 ++++++++
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 create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2023-09-02-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk29.md

diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-08-26-we-are-the-extreme-minority-on-this-land.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-26-we-are-the-extreme-minority-on-this-land.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "“我们是这片土地上的极少数”"
+author: "维舟"
+date  : 2023-08-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Oyt39Sn.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+看到一篇文章，杀气腾腾地极力主张那些为日本排放核废水做科普的账号都应被追踪、标记、封杀，必须“毫不留情，绝不手软，抱着宁可杀错也绝不放过的态度”，将这些异议“一个又一个从物理层面彻底剿灭掉”。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+这位作者是一个战狼大V，一个多月前他撰文宣称“乌克兰，离战败已经不远了”，听说现在还躲在贵州的小山村里自我隔离新冠病毒，倒也算得信念坚定。他的这篇新作，发出来不到半小时，阅读量就8000多了。
+
+他有一句话说得倒也没错：“中国的舆论环境现在最大的问题就是对这一批垃圾过于宽容。”只不过对于哪些才算“垃圾”，我和他的看法颇有不同。
+
+虽然这只是个例，但看看我们的舆论场就知道，像他这样激进但安全，反倒是温和理性的声音生存处境要难得多了。
+
+让人不寒而栗的不是他的发言本身，也不是那马上成真，而是有大量的人真心认同这些说法，推荐给我看的朋友因此感叹：“我们这种认知的人，只是这片土地上的极少数人。真的极极少数。”
+
+说到“认知”，那位战狼大V倒是也在文中说：“认知，认识，人最贵的就是这么个东西，而对于绝大部分人来说，最缺的，也正是这么个东西。”
+
+显然，他并不认为自己欠缺，这就让人好奇，他理解的“认知”究竟是什么意思？我想，那或许是某种“唯一正确的真理”，且碰巧掌握在他本人手中——这是“一元真理观”的信徒常有的幻觉。
+
+他的认知有什么问题？简言之，他是结论先行的，没有推导，所有论述都是基于某个前提展开的，但他从来就不会去质疑那个前提本身就是有问题的，否则不止他的论述，连他整个生活的根基都会地动山摇。从这一点来说，不得不承认，他更能代表国内大多数人的精神状态。
+
+这是保守主义的沃土，却是科学主义难以扎根的水泥地。因为一旦认为接受某个前提（例如“核废水是危险的”）且拒绝任何讨论，势必就不会给质疑、反思、推断留出什么余地了，而科学本身作为一种方法，正是需要检验证据、结论开放并进而发出质疑的。或许正因此，他才把“科普”二字看作是“恶臭”的。
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/3r1rb7z.png)
+
+也是基于这一点，我现在对于当下的科普能起到多大作用，抱着谨慎怀疑的态度。现实是：在一个喧嚣的舆论场上，真实的信息和虚假的信息是等价的，并不是你得出一个“科学”的结论，就能被人信从的。
+
+你可能会发现，那些能接受这些理念的，原本就已经是同温层的了，而诸如“14亿人的念力，海水倒灌”这样的留言在网上竟有上万人点赞，这让我很难像以往那样保持轻松的心态，将之看作是一幕魔幻现实主义的喜剧。
+
+我原本估算这次论战双方的比例大致是3:1（乌克兰战争中挺俄和挺乌就是这个比值），但这次从网上的投票看，恐慌之下反日的，其比例是压倒性的：
+
+说这些，既不是悲叹，也不是自傲，但这两天翻出自己十二年前写的《中国式生存主义》，确实有一种似曾相识的感觉，让人怀疑这么多年下来，我们这个社会究竟发生了多大的变化。
+
+当然，公平地说，这次好歹也有许多人站出来发声、讨论，但或是因为被消声，或是抢盐的画面带来的直观视觉冲击，要说没有一点孤立无援的感觉，那不是真的。
+
+我清楚知道自己的处境：从这些年的几次大论战来说，我即便算不上“极少数”，“少数派”是确定无疑的；而在我们社会，当一个少数派，本身就让人有寒意，因为在汉语里，“一小撮”并不只是对数量的描述，还隐含着一种道德指控。
+
+这次核废水的争议，我原本并不打算写什么，但昨天忽然有一堆人翻出我之前写的一篇《日本未必都好，但也没那么坏》，私信来骂我：
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/ETbsivP.png)
+
+（打码的时候忍不住想，我为什么还要给它们打码？）
+
+挨骂我也不是一两回了，能这么多年写下来，如果脸皮那么薄，肯定早就坚持不住了。我也不是不知道这个喧嚣的舆论场是什么样，但我原本天真地以为，经历了近几年的折腾，原本好歹应该有点长进。
+
+也难怪现在很多人说：“放下科普情结，尊重韭菜命运。”这透露出一种遁世倾向：“达则兼济天下”是不可能的，洁身自好吧！虽然这是一种消极的态度，但至少隐含着一个大抵正确的判断：很多人或许只能被煽动，但无法被说服。
+
+当然，我知道，让我们自感是孤立无援的极少数，这本身或许就是他们的目的之一，说不定是主要目的，因为这就是我们舆论场上的潜规则：一些人张牙舞爪，使用语言暴力，不成比例地占据舆论空间，造成一种绝对多数的印象，而将异议都挤压到角落里去。
+
+之前看《自由的声音》，印象最深的一点就是：在19世纪的法国，各派知识分子，无论是自由派、保守派还是保皇派，他们至少有一点达成共识，那就是捍卫各自说话的权利。这乍看没什么特别，但对比下就会感慨，因为在我们这里，盛行的是“少数服从多数”的原则。
+
+按照滕尼斯的洞见，在一个真正的共同体内，没有任何反思、批判或试验的动力——想必，就算存在这样的异端，也会被压抑，因为那将威胁到共同体内在的紧密一致。
+
+这就是我们的现实：不同的声音被限制在私人的表达形式上，除了少许“执拗的低音”和嬉笑怒骂，就是一片沉默。真正严肃的讨论已经很难看到，现在可能最具杀伤力的倒是一些正话反说、玩世不恭的梗，诸如这样：“抢盐证明了我国仍是适合电信诈骗肥沃的宝地。”“我妈成了日本排放核废水的第一个受害者：她在抢盐回家的路上被车撞了。”
+
+我发现，很多人已经对“未来是可以改变的”这一点不抱信心，没有什么能证明历史一定是线性进步的。翁贝托·艾柯说过这么一句话：“历史是慢悠悠、黏糊糊的，我们需要铭记的一点就是：明天的灾难是在今天萌芽和成熟起来的。”可想而知，对一个庞大的国家来说，转身就更慢了。
+
+在历史的洪流中，身为个体的我们，都太渺小了，连我们脚下所站立的礁石，也可能随时被淹没，此时的呐喊，不知道引来的是船队还是鲨鱼，但我想，历史将证明，这并不是无用的坚持。
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-08-31-philosophie-terminales-the-respect-and-understanding.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-31-philosophie-terminales-the-respect-and-understanding.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..71d8c264
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-08-31-philosophie-terminales-the-respect-and-understanding.md
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "尊重與理解"
+author: "arandomguy"
+date  : 2023-08-31 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/BYm7Sn2.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "個人閱讀心得記錄，有很多個人想法。"
+---
+
+### 國家是否是思想自由的保障？
+
+#### 1、國家的目的是保障自由
+
+國家必須在不干擾共秩序的前提下，承擔保護思想自由的責任。國家肩負教育的責任，必須建立一個使人得以學習自我思考的環境。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+> 國家不能禁止自由思考
+
+> #### 巴魯赫‧史賓諾沙《神學政治論》
+
+> 「凡企圖以法律解決一切的人，必將加重惡習，而非導正惡習。我們無法禁止這些惡習的存在，即便惡習常讓人遺憾，也應該要容許惡習存在。多少罪惡源自於奢侈、忌妒、貪婪與酗酒等類似的衝動？人們會容忍，是因為他們知道，儘管這些都是惡習，但不會透過法律來禁止。而意見表達自由本身是一種德行，不但應獲允許，還不得受到壓制。…就算言論自由可以受到壓制，也就算人們在未獲君王同意前不敢表達自己的意見，而導致人民處於受支配狀態，君王也不可能要人民如他所想的一樣來思考。若真如此，必然會造成如下結果：人們是有意見的，但是每天心所想與口所講的都背道而馳，國家最要緊的誠信因此崩壞。鼓勵令人憎恨的阿諛諂媚與背信忘義，使得狡詐當道，並使所有社會關係腐化。…有甚麼比自己認為是對的，卻被視為是犯罪、被打成罪行，更讓人難以忍受？這動搖了人類靈魂中對神的崇敬及對其他人的憐憫。他們會因而憎恨法律，挺身與政府當局最對，他們不會認為這是可恥，反而覺得光榮，因而激起各種叛亂，並做出任何可能的暴力行為。」
+
+Q：為什麼言論審查是沒有用也不公平的？
+
+「人們是有意見的，但是每天心所想與口所講的都背道而馳，國家最要緊的誠信因此崩壞。鼓勵令人憎恨的阿諛諂媚與背信忘義，使得狡詐當道，並使所有社會關係腐化。」
+
+Q：當國家抨擊宗教信仰或道德觀念，會發生什麼事？
+
+「他們會因而憎恨法律，挺身與政府當局最對，他們不會認為這是可恥，反而覺得光榮，因而激起各種叛亂，並做出任何可能的暴力行為。」
+
+> 批判性評論要能增進公共討論
+
+> #### 依曼努爾‧康德《判斷力批判》
+
+> 「理性的公開運用必須在任何時候都是自由的，而唯有這種運用才能夠在人群中實現啟蒙：但理性的私人運用往往可以嚴加限制，而不至於特別阻礙啟蒙的進步。但是我所謂的對其自身理性的「公開運用」，是指做為學者的某人在面對讀者世界全體公眾時，就其理性所做的運用。至於我們委任他擔任某依公職或職務，他對理性的運用，我稱為「私人運用」。於是，許多涉及群體利益的事物，必須要有某些機制，藉由這機制，群體內的部分成員只需被動行事，以便政府引導他們…為公共目地而服務，或至少使他們不去破壞這些目的。在這種情形下，當然不允許理性思考，而是必須服從。不過，只要體制中這部分的人，同時把自己被視為群體的成員，甚至是世界公民社會的成員，在進而以學者身分通過書寫面對本來意義上的公眾，這時他當然可以運用理性思考，而不至於損害他在部分時間以被動成員的身分從事的事務。因此，一個軍官若是受長官之命去做某件事，在服勤之際對於這項命令是否適當或有用大放厥詞，會是非常有害的。他必須服從。但是，若他是以學者的身分評論軍務中的錯誤，並交給公眾評判，人們就沒有理由禁止他。公民不能拒繳所課徵的稅，當他該做繳納時卻對這項義務濫加非議，這種行為甚至可以當作誹謗來懲罰（但這可能引起普遍的反抗）。儘管如此，同一個公民如果是以學者的身分公開評論這類稅賦的不恰當甚至不公義，就不會違反公民的義務。」
+
+Q：如何分辨自由的公共使用與私人使用？
+
+公共使用：做為學者的某人在面對讀者世界全體公眾時，就其理性所做的運用。
+
+私人使用：委任他擔任某依公職或職務，他對理性的運用。涉及群體利益的事物，為公共目地而服務。
+
+Q：分別舉一個例子。
+
+公共使用：軍人受長官命令做某件事。因為軍人的目的涉及群體利益，所以他必須服從命令。
+
+私人使用：學者評論軍中的事務，並交給公眾評判。簡單來說就「非公職」吧？
+
+#### 我的想法
+
+一開始提到「凡企圖以法律解決一切的人，必將加重惡習，而非導正惡習。」讓我覺得有點奇怪，難道不是應該用法律來導正人們的行為嗎？繼續看下去就稍微有點理解。
+
+首先惡習無論如何都會存在，先認知到這點。然後如果是透過法律強制規範人們，比如限制言論自由、思想自由等，可能會因為永無止境的壓制，而造成過度的反彈，激起叛亂、革命等。導正人們的行為通常需要更多的方法，包括教育、道德教育、個人意識的提升等。法律確實可以在這些方面發揮作用，但單靠法律可能不足以解決複雜的社會和道德問題。
+
+引用內容提到「不但應獲允許，還不得受到壓制」，應獲允許，不得壓制？
+
+雖然我明白壓制會有反彈，但對於那些惡習…我們應該認同嗎？或許不是「認同」，而是「認知」，或書中用的「允許」？只是知道它存在，接受它存在，但不認同它，這樣嗎？
+
+第二段簡單來說，如果自己做的事情影響公眾事務，那就相信長官的抉擇，不要廢話太多。
+
+過去好像就是如此，但現在似乎在鼓勵下屬多表達意見。之前聽podcast，說美軍現在不是〝長官說了算〞，而是如果不合理，那下屬可以、也有責任提出看法。
+
+第二段的康德是1724-1804年，兩百多年前的人，所以…時代在改變吧？
+
+#### 2、公共辯論以保障民主
+
+> 相互理解與意見表達
+
+> #### 尤爾根‧哈伯瑪斯《自然主義與宗教、民主的挑戰》
+
+> 「自由的國家在實現宗教與政治的制度性分離時，不能因此就將這種分離變成一種負擔，讓具有宗教信仰的公民在精神上與心理上無法承受。誠然，國家必須期待具有宗教信仰的公民接受並承認統治權力的運作應保持世界觀中立的原則。…具有宗教信仰的公民，可以既肯認這個「制度性的翻譯保留條件」，同時又不至於讓個人的身分認同——在參與公共討論時——面臨必須把「公共的」與「私人的」部分撕裂的處境。」
+
+這段大概在說「為了不偏袒某個宗教，國家必須要做到政教分離。而有信仰的公民，在參與公共討論時，可以保持自己的信仰，也需要做到〝客觀的〞參與公共討論」。
+
+> 烏托邦不只一種
+
+> #### 羅伯特‧諾奇克《無政府主義、國家與烏托邦》
+
+> 「烏托邦是由一串烏托邦的網路形成的，人們在此能夠自由結合，在一個理想的社群中，追求或嘗試實現生命中的自我目標。沒有人可以拿自己的烏托邦理想來強迫他人。…最小限度功能的國家將我們視為不可侵犯的個人，不能被他人當作手段、工具、被利用之物或資源。國家必須將我們當作擁有個人權利的人，這表示我們擁有尊嚴。尊重我們，並尊重我們的權利，使得我們都能夠各自或與我們所選擇的那些人，在可以達到的條件下，在跟我們擁有相同尊嚴的他人的自願協助下，選擇我們的生活，並實踐計畫，以及我們自己的構想。國家或是群體，對於以上所言，豈能踰越，豈能輕慢。」
+
+Q：哪些社群使人錯認為他們提供了「世上最好的」給其成員？
+
+烏托邦應該是要由一串烏托邦網路形成，即表示每個人的烏托邦都是烏托邦，而且每個人也都尊重他人的烏托邦。如果會有「我的烏托邦才是最好的烏托邦」，或「你的烏托邦不是烏托邦」，這種則是像這問題所提「錯認世上最好」。
+
+Q：共同的烏托邦能推動個人自由嗎？
+
+「國家必須將我們當作擁有個人權利的人，這表示我們擁有尊嚴。尊重我們，並尊重我們的權利，使得我們都能夠各自或與我們所選擇的那些人，在可以達到的條件下，在跟我們擁有相同尊嚴的他人的自願協助下，選擇我們的生活，並實踐計畫，以及我們自己的構想。」
+
+簡單來說就是如果從國家到個人，每個人都尊重彼此，都能夠自由的做自己想做、要做的事，那這種烏托邦或許真的可以實現〝自由〞。
+
+#### 我的想法
+
+這段主要在說社會有很多不同聲音，不管對象的信仰、性別、出身、種族、性向等等，所有人都應當尊重他人的意見。
+
+第二段稍微講到現代社會有許多專家或宗教等權威的影響，公共生活可能受到限制，民眾的政治選擇和辯論空間也可能受到侷限，沒有自己的想法。一開始有提到「國家有保障與教育人民思考的環境」，確保公民能夠自由的參與政治過程，而不被特定意見或權威的影響。
+
+
+### 「國家是否是思想自由的保障？」總結
+
+如果國家試圖控制人民的宗教或思想，最終將導致叛亂，做出任何可能的暴力行為。所以國家必須保障人民的思想、信仰自由，並且建立一個所有人都有發言權、尊重不同意見的環境。
+
+書是在自由、民主的價值下寫的，所以對於國家的定義也就會是「國家保障自由、民主」。但如果提倡的不是自由、民主，而是權威、服從，那對於國家的定義就會是「國家擁有絕對的權力，人民必須服從國家」。所以我在看的時候，有時候會在想極權主義會如何定義這個問題？極權主義是否也會對這類的問題感興趣？還是就是使用權力，將其他聲音剷除，只留一個聲音？
+
+當出現一個不同的聲音，可以叫對方閉嘴，但思想並不會因此消失，可能會因被閉嘴而更激進，也有可能就真的完全消失。但真的可能完全消失嗎？叫對方不要想某個東西，不就是在叫對方去想那個東西嗎..？我想問題應該是「如何改變想法？」
+
+該如何改變想法呢…？
+
+一瞬間我覺得這問題很簡單，就閱讀、吸收各種不同資訊，想法自然而然就會改變。但這世界上真的存在「非常堅信對於自己所相信的東西」這種人，就算提出不同看法、資訊，對象都不會改變自己的想法…。
+
+所以…該如何改變想法呢？
+
+hmm…
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-09-02-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk29.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-09-02-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk29.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6ce43b4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-09-02-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk29.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第廿九周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date  : 2023-09-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/IQyGcZ4.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 控辯雙方舉證完畢 暫定11.27結案陳詞
+
+<!--more-->
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，進入審訊第二十九周。最後一名被告余慧明本周完成作供，強調一直想爭取「五大訴求，缺一不可」，而否決預算案是合法、合理的手段；余又形容每個議員為獨立個體，無法迫人聯手否決。
+
+余完成作供後，辯方案情亦告完結，法官暫定押至11月27日讓控辯雙方進行口頭結案陳詞，料需時兩至三周，雙方並分別須於10月初及11月初提交書面陳詞。法官亦指，若屆時與《蘋果日報》案撞期，《蘋果》案可再押後；而本案押後期間或會處理認罪被告的案情爭議，但不會處理求情。
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/8zqk4tI.png)
+▲ 余慧明（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 首提堂至開審歷時近兩年 4認罪被告以控方證人身分作供
+
+民主派初選於2020年7月舉行，其後立法會選舉押後一年舉行，47人於2021年1月6日被以「顛覆國家政權」罪拘捕。47人同年2月28日被要求提早報到，終被落案起訴「串謀顛覆國家政權」，指他們在2020年7月1日至2021年1月7日，以無差別否決預算案等非法手段，嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞特區政權機關依法履行職能。
+
+47人於3月1日首度提堂，經歷6次提訊日及多次提堂後於2022年7月正式交付高院，當中共31人認罪，包括組織者戴耀廷和區諾軒，及參加初選的黃之鋒、楊岳橋、譚文豪、岑敖暉、朱凱廸等，另16人不認罪受審。當中僅13人獲准保釋。
+
+案件今年2月6日於西九龍法院開審，原定審期90天，惟至今歷時近7個月，至審訊第115天才完成辯方案情。回顧整場審訊，認罪的區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟和林景楠4人以「從犯證人」身分作供，控方亦傳召在新西協調會議拍片的匿名證人X先生作供。其後處理共謀者原則爭議及中段陳詞，法官裁定所有被告表證成立。除吳政亨、楊雪盈、黃碧雲、林卓廷、梁國雄和柯耀林外，其餘10人均出庭作供，吳及柯則傳辯方證人。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/CzxbPDo.png)
+
+
+### 原定審期90日、延至115日方完成辯方案情
+
+統計審訊各部分所花時間，控方案情花了共58日，當中讀出開案陳詞4日、區諾軒作供24日、趙家賢17日、鍾錦麟3日、匿名證人X先生1日、林景楠1日，控方亦應辯方要求傳召警員及選舉主任作盤問。其後「共謀者原則」的陳詞及裁決佔4日，法官裁定該原則不適用於《國安法》前的言行；之後何桂藍、林卓廷等4被告申請毋須答辯，爭議被告行為不構成「非法手段」，法官終裁定所有被告表證成立，佔2日。
+
+辯方案情則用了51日，當中參選港島的鄭達鴻、彭卓棋分別作供7日和4日；九西的何啟明、劉偉聰各花4日和2日；九東的施德來作供4日；新東的何桂藍、陳志全和鄒家成各花10日、3日和6日；超區的李予信花4日；衞生服務界余慧明花4日。至於被指為組織者、發起「三投三不投」的吳政亨，傳召3名證人將其受訪錄音及電郵呈堂，用了2日；參選新東的柯耀林傳召選舉經理，作供3日。
+
+
+### 32人至結案已還柙近2年8個月
+
+案件現暫定11月27日進行口頭結案陳詞，料法庭將押後裁決，並連同其餘31名認罪被告進行求情和判刑，意味屆時本案32名被告已還柙近2年8個月。
+
+本案不認罪的16人，包括鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、柯耀林、李予信、余慧明及吳政亨。其中何桂藍、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、余慧明及吳政亨6人不獲准保釋，分別還柙逾23至30個月。
+
+認罪的31人，則包括戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟、袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、徐子見、岑子杰、毛孟靜、馮達浚、劉澤鋒、黃之鋒、譚文豪、李嘉達、譚得志、胡志偉、朱凱廸、張可森、黃子悅、尹兆堅、郭家麒、吳敏兒、譚凱邦、劉頴匡、楊岳橋、范國威、呂智恆、岑敖暉、王百羽、伍健偉及林景楠。認罪被告中，僅呂智恆、林景楠和黃子悅獲保釋，惟黃另涉理大衝突案，承認暴動判囚37個月。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file

From 2c247bd83de57927eae05d0e1db935096bd582d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hokoi <hokoeye@pm.me>
Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2023 00:14:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 19/19] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x20 Sep.24

---
 .../2023-08-25-global-turns-against-china.md  |  74 ++++++++
 ...023-08-25-japans-semiconductor-industry.md | 172 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../_hkers/2023-08-31-navigate-risks-of-ai.md | 138 ++++++++++++++
 ...2023-09-04-stormbreak-through-frontline.md | 142 +++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 526 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-global-turns-against-china.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-japans-semiconductor-industry.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-08-31-navigate-risks-of-ai.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2023-09-04-stormbreak-through-frontline.md

diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-global-turns-against-china.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-global-turns-against-china.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cd54613a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-global-turns-against-china.md
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Global Turns Against CN
+author: Gary Rawnsley
+date  : 2023-08-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/SEayNsL.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "A Failure of Soft Power?"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_A recent set of polls conducted by the Pew Research Center indicates a precipitous decline in favourable opinions of China in many countries around the world. RUSI’s Jonathan Eyal spoke to Professor Gary Rawnsley, an expert on soft power at the University of Lincoln, about what these results mean for China’s global influence._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+__Jonathan Eyal (JE):__ The Pew Research Center has been mapping for many years attitudes towards China and other countries, and the latest report that was published at the end of July indicates a fairly calamitous collapse in the reputation of China in many countries around the world. This collapse seems to be taking place across the board, across most continents, with very few exceptions. How would you interpret that?
+
+__Gary Rawnsley (GR):__ I would begin by saying that the results of this survey are not surprising, and mirror previous polls conducted by Pew, Gallup, the BBC and other polling organisations. Public opinion about China, particularly in so-called Western countries, has never been particularly favourable, so it’s not surprising that such trends are continuing in those countries. I think what we are seeing is some dramatic decline in certain countries; India, for example, was a particularly interesting case. But again, I’m not seeing anything here that is particularly out of the ordinary or that is out of line with polls over the past 10 or 15 years.
+
+I would also say that, if Chinese government officials are reading these polls – and I don’t know if they are – I doubt that they are particularly worried, because they are most concerned about public opinion within China. A lot of the soft power projection that China engages in is not so much for global influence, but for domestic consumption and enhancing the status and legitimacy of the Communist Party. If there are any discussions of these results in China, they will follow the official narratives – and given that Pew is a US organisation, they won’t want to take too much of what we say into account. In their view, the West does not understand China; this is a continuous narrative, and something I’ve been accused of myself many times while working and living in China.
+
+Although the West believes China is a threat, China is favoured among those countries in which Beijing is investing heavily. So that’s why we’re seeing still some rather high favourable opinions, particularly in those African countries where Chinese investment is quite high through the Belt and Road Initiative. But even then, they’re not as high as they were. I think people are now becoming much more aware of the Belt and Road and are becoming more suspicious. And certainly, the fact that Italy decided to withdraw from the Belt and Road will be a huge blow, not only to the Chinese government but to narratives in China. They want to show that Chinese influence is spreading throughout Europe.
+
+__JE:__ You say that the Chinese don’t pay much attention to their image, but they’ve spent a large amount of money on Confucius Institutes around the world and on a lot of publicity. And they have a lot of diplomats who keep on tweeting and engaging in all kinds of social media. That doesn’t indicate to me a country that doesn’t care about its image.
+
+__GR:__ I don’t think that it doesn’t care about its image, but it’s not a driving force in the way that it would be in a lot of Western countries. I don’t think they are too worried that an opinion poll by a US organisation ranks them low on a particular indicator in a particular country. They have their own public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, soft power initiatives, and these will continue throughout the world. And of course, they are designed to reinforce the political agenda that President Xi Jinping is following around the Chinese Dream, around the rise of China and its growing status. I do think that these are important, but at the end of the day, the biggest audience for these narratives is within China and not outside. It’s demonstrating to the Chinese people that Beijing has a status and that it’s on the rise around the world. That’s more important to the Chinese government than what countries around the world think of them.
+
+__JE:__ So would you say that a lot of this investment, like the Confucius Institutes – which try to highlight the achievements of Chinese culture and the Chinese language – is really much more an exercise in asserting that China has “arrived”, rather than in creating a favourable opinion?
+
+__GR:__ I would think so, because Beijing is always under the impression that the West does not understand China. And Xi Jinping has certainly said that one of the objectives is to present a more accurate picture of China and to tell China’s story to the world. But at the same time, that is a very particular story, one which is not really resonating with many audiences around the world, as this opinion poll demonstrates. So when I look at these polls and I’m talking to my students about them, for example, I will say that despite China’s spending $10 billion a year on its influence programmes and on its soft power projection, it isn’t moving the needle in terms of public opinion. And that’s because at the end of the day, actions speak louder than words. People can perhaps see China in a favourable light when it comes to history, culture, TV or films, but when it comes to the hard reality of policy, people are seeing a very different picture of China. And that undermines all the other soft power initiatives that China may be pushing.
+
+__JE:__ Perhaps the top leadership may not care a great deal about it or dismiss it as just a product of another Western propaganda activity. But the United Front Department – would they not be paying any attention to such figures? You have South Korea, for instance, where in the past only 30% had a bad opinion of China. Today it is 77%. And this is not Japan – this is South Korea, which of course historically had a very different attitude to China. Yet the collapse in China’s image is all too obvious. Do you think the United Front Department will be worried about this?
+
+__GR:__ They may be. Under Xi Jinping, the importance of the United Front doctrine has escalated, and the party organisation tasked with its oversight has welcomed a large increase in funding to carry out its work. Increasing awareness of such activities may affect public opinion in the target countries, but I would suggest this is less to do with concern about “image” or “narrative” and more to do with influence within societies abroad, and to monitor the activities and opinions of the Chinese diaspora. Public opinion is suspicious of the United Front because it is by its nature insidious, working through organisations who may or may not be compliant, and seeking to exert pressure on citizens and organisations overseas. This is designed to disrupt policy that may be against China’s interests, and to deepen China’s influence in society.
+
+___`The decline in favourable opinion towards Beijing is based more on China’s behaviour and actions than on what it’s trying to do through any soft power initiative`___
+
+Some may call this “sharp power”, though I discount this term. I consider it a form of soft power – after all, soft power does not have to be benign – but perhaps simply “influence” is a more accurate term. Like much of China’s influence strategy, the United Front is intended mainly for nationals living within its borders – it has been a strategy followed by the Communist Party since its foundation in 1921 – but it is also designed for Taiwan (especially organisations considered more “blue” or nationalist/KMT) and for Hong Kong during its transition to more authoritarian rule.
+
+Again, I don’t think that the government is going to be concerned with how to influence public opinion or political elites. What is going to influence political elites more in these countries is trade, economics, the Chinese market and investment. And those will continue regardless of the trends in public opinion that we are seeing in these surveys.
+
+__JE:__ We’ve seen the Chinese understand soft power because there was a period, if you remember, at the beginning of the Confucius Institute movement when even Xi Jinping was arguing that one of the objectives was to project soft power, to persuade countries to see things in China’s way. Do you think they understand what soft power can do? You’ve worked on soft power for many years.
+
+__GR:__ Well, yes, although I think even I sometimes don’t know what soft power really is – and there isn’t a consensus about that. I think the Chinese understand their own version of soft power, which is very different from the Anglo-American literature that we know through Joseph Nye and others who’ve been working on this. And they privilege culture. But my approach to soft power privileges political institutions, political values and behaviours, and this is where China falls down in terms of soft power, because actions speak louder than words.
+
+I think that there are a number of reasons why these polls are presenting a slightly more dismal picture for China this year. Firstly, there is the increasing authoritarianism of Xi Jinping himself, the growing nationalism in China and the growing cult of personality around Xi. There have also been misgivings about the very strict way that China handled Covid. We saw that with the protests in Shanghai and other places, which is quite rare in China on the scale that we saw. And of course, there is still the idea that China was somehow responsible – that it was the originator of Covid. Whether that’s true or not, there is still that perception in some circles. Then there is the continuing worry about what’s happening in Xinjiang, concern about growing action against Taiwan as it gets ready for its presidential election next year, and growing suspicion about the surveillance state with what we saw in the US regarding TikTok and everything else. So there is a whole package of issues that are causing opinion to slide away from being favourable towards China, and these are based more on China’s behaviour and actions than on what it’s trying to do through any soft power initiative.
+
+__JE:__ You mentioned the rise of Chinese trade as being one of Beijing’s key preoccupations. But don’t you think that these sorts of negative opinions – which incidentally, are not mirrored by the opinions that people have towards the US – have an impact on the readiness of people to buy Chinese consumer goods?
+
+__GR:__ I don’t think so. I think it would have more impact at the higher level than with consumers. In terms of trade policy, if there is a worry about governance, or about security and safety – and we’ve seen that with Chinese technologies, as I said, in relation to the surveillance state, TikTok and so on – then that may have an impact on the more macro level of trade and economics. But I don’t think it’s going to trickle down to the point where consumers on the streets are not purchasing equipment or goods that are made in China.
+
+___`While soft power is important in creating certain images, perceptions and trust in governments, at the end of the day it is often be trumped by hard power and economics`___
+
+If there’s anything in this poll that will concern China, I think it is going to be that only around one third of countries now see China as the world’s leading economic power. And in the countries that make this claim – including Australia and several European countries – the numbers are falling. They’re saying, yes, China is the world’s number one economic power, but we don’t think that’s necessarily a good thing. So I think that for the economy, there’s a worry. It doesn’t matter whether this is good or bad for the surveyed country, but rather the position of China within the hierarchy of major powers. Xi Jinping has put a lot of stock on the recovery of China’s importance and status. This drives his domestic agenda, and I think it’s going to be very difficult to tell the Chinese people that fewer people in fewer countries now see China as the world’s number one economic superpower.
+
+__JE:__ And don’t you think that that matters? I mean, wasn’t that one of the objectives of Chinese policy – to persuade countries that they are effectively a steamroller and whether you like it or not, they are destined to grow, so you might as well shut up and accept that narrative because your chances of succeeding otherwise are considerably reduced? This was the explanation for the “Golden Age” of relations in the UK, with our Chancellor at the time saying that whether you like it or not, this is how it’s going to be. So, if people no longer believe that China’s rise to a top position of power is inevitable, doesn’t it have consequences?
+
+__GR:__ Oh, absolutely. And as I said, I think that takes place more at the macro level rather than the consumer level. So, governments, economic ministries, corporations and companies will be looking at these figures and making decisions about future trade with China. But at the end of the day, are they more worried about their profits and doing trade or are they more worried about the situation in Xinjiang? I’m going to be very cynical here and say that I think it will be the trade and economics that wins out. And all of this just tells me that while soft power is important in creating certain images, perceptions and trust in governments, at the end of the day, it can often be trumped by hard power and economics.
+
+__JE:__ Indeed. If we turn it around for a second, would you say that these increased negative perceptions of China would make it easier for a government like that of the US to build a coalition to contain China, based on a more general perception that the current Chinese government may represent a threat?
+
+__GR:__ It may well do. I would be sceptical that the US could lead a coalition of concerned states regarding China though, because I think so many countries have their own policies, their own interests, their own perceptions of China. We saw this with Italy joining the Belt and Road Initiative and then deciding to pull out. I think it would be very difficult to reach a consensus that could build a coalition. There will always be groups of countries that express concern, and that will trickle down towards whether they engage and on what level. But I don’t see that it would be possible or even in everybody’s interest to build a coalition against China – all that will do is mobilise even further the nationalism within China. It will strengthen the hand of the nationalists and the Chinese government, and could actually lead to more destabilisation rather than stabilisation.
+
+__JE:__ Interesting. So in sum, if you look at this episode and the conclusions that you’ve drawn, does it actually mean that the whole concept of soft power and its utility may be a bit overhyped? Because in a case where it is so critical, it seems to me – that of a rising power like China – you are suggesting that it has a minimal impact on China’s considerations and that the impact on our own policies towards China is probably less than assumed.
+
+__GR:__ I think that is my conclusion, especially with regards to China. Every country has its own soft power strategies and ways that it understands soft power. In China, as I said at the beginning, I think that the main audience for a lot of these initiatives is the Chinese audience itself. At the end of the day, it is other considerations that will decide whether countries engage with China and on what level. And I think that will include how China behaves as an international actor, what it does at home, and the kinds of friends that it keeps. If you look at the current situation, it hasn’t really made much movement in terms of Ukraine and Russia. And I think these are the kinds of things that are more important to people around the world than spreading Chinese culture or the Chinese language through Confucius Institutes. Culture plays a part in familiarising people and getting them interested in a country, but it’s very difficult to move political opinion and policy through culture. If the bottom line is that the West does not understand China, then it’s very, very difficult to see how far they can go in changing that through the kind of initiatives that China has been engaging in.
+
+__JE:__ I know I said that was the last question, but I will put another one before we finish, just a tiny one. If you as a Brit knew that your country was mistrusted by large amounts of people, it would probably affect you on a personal level as well. It is a question of pride and your view of your own country. Don’t you think anything similar to that is felt by the average member of the Chinese public?
+
+__GR:__ No, I don’t think so. I mean, I’ve just returned from living for four years in China. And as I said, the information and narratives are controlled to such an extent that if this opinion poll and its results become known within China, there will be a narrative that is communicated around it, which is basically, don’t believe it – that it is all part of a political agenda against China. And this could actually heighten the nationalist spirit within China because it shows, again, the West having what China considers a distorted or deliberately hostile view of China, that the West wishes to interfere in China and so on. So I think that actually it might have the opposite effect on many Chinese people because of the kind of narratives that the Chinese government engages in.
+
+---
+
+__Gary Rawnsley__ is Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences and Professor of Public Diplomacy at the University of Lincoln. He is an expert on public and cultural diplomacy, soft power and East Asia.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-japans-semiconductor-industry.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-japans-semiconductor-industry.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-japans-semiconductor-industry.md
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Japan’s Semicon. Industry
+author: Sujai Shivakumar, et al.
+date  : 2023-08-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/3WsrIBg.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Japan Seeks to Revitalize Its Semiconductor Industry"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Japan is pursuing ambitious efforts to revitalize its semiconductor industry, leveraging international partnerships to reestablish itself as a major player in chip manufacturing and driver of leading-edge chip research and development._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+Japan is adopting major new industrial policies with the objective of restoring the international competitiveness of its semiconductor industry. At the end of the 1980s, the industry accounted for over 50 percent of world production — a figure that had fallen to 9 percent by 2022. Today, the Japanese industry lags behind the global technological leaders by an estimated 10 years. Reflecting policymakers’ sense of urgency and concern, Japan has put aside practices that characterized its industrial policy throughout much of the postwar era, including limits on foreign investment and an aversion to allowing major foreign-owned manufacturing facilities to operate in Japan.
+
+Today, collaborations with foreign partners are seen as imperative. On May 4, 2022, at the first meeting of the bilateral Japan-U.S. Commercial and Industrial Partnership (JUCIP), the parties agreed on “Basic Principles on Semiconductor Cooperation,” which outlined a vision for collaborating on objectives and strategies for establishing a more resilient semiconductor supply chain. Then, at the U.S.-Japan summit held on May 23 that same year, a joint task force for developing next-generation semiconductors was launched to implement the Basic Principles. At a meeting of the U.S.-Japan Economic Policy Committee in July 2022, the two countries agreed to pursue joint research and development (R&D) in key technologies, and Japan announced the formation of a public research organization patterned on the U.S. National Semiconductor Technology Center (NSTC) called the Leading-Edge Semiconductor Technology Center (LSTC).
+
+
+### A New Paradigm
+
+While similar-sounding U.S.-Japan accords have been announced over the preceding decades in many sectors — often with little subsequent practical impact — the Economic Policy Committee agreement was concluded against the backdrop of an increasingly assertive China and the recent economic shocks arising out of the Covid-19 pandemic and the disruption of chip supply chains.
+
+Indeed, both governments are approaching their vulnerabilities in semiconductors as a matter of urgent priority, with a recognition that neither country can pursue a go-it-alone approach to advanced chipmaking. In both countries, the pandemic has prompted policymakers to focus on the concept of “economic security” and the industrial policies necessary to reduce strategic risk. In May 2022, Japan enacted the Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA), bundling four separate laws together. The ESPA directed Japanese companies to consider economic security in their decisionmaking.
+
+The result has been a series of dramatic policy measures both in Japan and in the United States — including the enactment of major semiconductor-related industrial promotion legislation, unprecedented bilateral industrial collaborations in chip manufacturing and research, and equally unprecedented restrictions on the export of advanced chip technology to China. Japan’s new semiconductor promotional measures roughly correspond to measures the United States is taking pursuant to the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. Similarly, Japan’s recent imposition of new export controls to China on 23 types of chip technology roughly parallels similar trade measures enacted by the United States.
+
+In addition to the bilateral U.S.-Japan accord on Basic Principles, the two countries are participants in the U.S.-East Asia Semiconductor Supply Chain Resilience Working Group (also known as “Fab 4”), a U.S.-led semiconductor alliance that also includes Taiwan and South Korea. Fab 4, which held its first meeting in February 2023, is focusing on how to strengthen the chip supply chain. More broadly, Japan and the United States are also working closely on digital trade issues in the Asia-Pacific region.
+
+The challenge confronting Japan in chipmaking is stark. Japan’s most advanced fabs operate with 40-nanometer (nm) design rules, about 10 years behind world leaders TSMC and Samsung. Japan’s dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) producers, which dominated global markets in the 1980s, have largely exited the business, and the country’s most advanced DRAMs are now made in facilities owned and operated by a U.S. firm, Micron Technology. Japan remains internationally competitive in certain semiconductor device types — such as NAND memory, power semiconductors, microcontrollers, and CMOS image sensors — but as the Japanese government recently acknowledged, the current chip promotion effort may well represent the “last chance” for the country to stake out a strong position in the global chip marketplace.
+
+
+### Japan’s Emerging Semiconductor Strategy
+
+In June 2021, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) announced a core strategy for the nation’s semiconductor and digital industries with these elements:
+
+- __Formation of a partnership with the United States.__ This enables the design and production of next-generation chips (2 nm and below design rules) by the late 2020s, an objective that is being pursued through the formation of Rapidus, a consortium of Japanese firms in collaboration with IBM and the European research organization IMEC.
+
+- __Development of “game-changing” future semiconductor technologies.__ For this purpose, Japan is establishing the LSTC, a government-supported R&D center for advanced chip research. The idea for the LSTC reportedly arose out of the U.S.-Japan discussions that led to the adoption of the Basic Principles. IBM will support the establishment and work of the LSTC.
+
+- __Establishment of new chip manufacturing bases to make legacy devices.__ Pursuant to this goal, the government has encouraged the world’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturer, Taiwan’s TSMC, to form a joint venture with Japanese firms Sony and Denso (a maker of auto parts): Japan Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing, which is building a wafer fabrication plant in Kumamoto Prefecture. A second TSMC fab is reportedly under consideration.
+
+- __Subsidies for domestic chip manufacturing.__ The Japanese government has indicated that it will subsidize up to one-third of the capital costs incurred by domestic and foreign manufacturers to produce designated types of semiconductor devices (including power devices, microcontrollers, and analog devices), equipment, materials, and raw materials. The subsidies are conditioned on a minimum of 10 years of domestic production, and they will require manufacturers to prioritize domestic shipments at times of global shortage.
+
+Japan’s emphasis on international collaborations represents a major shift for the country, which previously had pursued a policy of achieving self-sufficiency in semiconductors until at least the 1990s. This parallels the United States’ current recognition that regaining leadership in chips is impossible without key foreign partnerships.
+
+___`Japan remains internationally competitive in certain semiconductor device types . . . but as the Japanese government recently acknowledged, the current chip promotion effort may well represent the “last chance” for the country to stake out a strong position in the global chip marketplace.`___
+
+
+### Launch of Rapidus
+
+The U.S. partnership prong of METI’s strategy was launched in August 2022 with the formation of Rapidus, a consortium of Japanese companies working in partnership with IBM Research to develop IBM’s 2 nm semiconductor technology for manufacture in one or more fabs to be built in Japan. The first fab, to be constructed in Hokkaido, has a target start-up timeframe of 2026–2027. Rapidus had previously entered into a partnership with Belgium-based IMEC, the foremost microelectronics research organization in Europe, which works with nearly all of the world’s major semiconductor device, equipment, and materials firms.
+
+Rapidus was formed by veteran Japanese semiconductor executives — most notably its president, Koike Atsuyoshi (who recently headed memory maker Western Digital Japan) and its chairman, Higashi Tetsuro (former CEO of chip equipment maker Tokyo Electron). The shares are held by 12 Japanese semiconductor experts. The consortium members are Japanese high-tech and financial firms including Toyota, Sony, NTT, NEC, Kioxia (Toshiba), Softbank, Denso, and Mitsubishi UFJ Bank. Significantly, many of the consortium partners are large consumers of chips; they are expected to constitute an initial market for the output of the consortium. Rapidus is receiving substantial financial support from the government of Japan, reportedly an initial amount of 70 billion yen (about $530 million), most of which will be used to buy two extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV) machines from ASML of the Netherlands. In late April 2023, the government announced it would provide an additional 260 billion yen ($1.94 billion) to Rapidus “to bolster the company’s research and development operations.” Rapidus is expected to require about 5 trillion yen ($35.1 billion) in investments to begin mass production.
+
+The U.S. government has also encouraged the formation of Rapidus and the collaboration of IBM with the new entity. Nevertheless, bilateral tensions exist. In March 2023, Orii Yasumitsu, a senior executive at Rapidus, criticized U.S. government export controls on semiconductors as “too aggressive,” the first time a senior executive in the Japanese semiconductor industry has “publicly expressed a negative stance on the US Chips Act.” Orii further said, “U.S. regulations weakened Japan’s semiconductor industry in the past. But now the United States is trying to take back global semiconductor supremacy via regulations again. Korea and Japan must work together to respond to the U.S. moves.”
+
+
+### LSTC: The Leading-Edge Semiconductor Technology Center
+
+Japan’s new developmental effort in semiconductors features close collaboration between industry, government, and academia. Thus, the Rapidus effort will be supported by the LSTC, established in December 2022 as an umbrella organization to coordinate Japan’s semiconductor research. The research themes being pursued by the LSTC closely align with the Rapidus workplan. The LSTC will be supported by some of Japan’s existing public research organizations: the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), Riken (a large scientific research institute largely funded by the government), and the University of Tokyo. The LSTC will be open to researchers from “like-minded” countries.
+
+The LSTC will pursue a number of key themes:
+
+- Establishing leading-edge semiconductor circuit design technology
+
+- Developing leading-edge technology for gate-all-around (GAA) field effect transistors
+
+- Developing mass production technology enabling fast turn-around-time (TAT) between chip design and manufacture
+
+- Establishing 3D packaging technology
+
+- Developing materials for GAA construction and advanced packaging
+
+The LSTC plans to select several dozen students and researchers per year from top Japanese universities for specialized training. Classes will be taught by experts in semiconductor manufacturing and telecommunications technology. Hokkaido, where the Rapidus pilot plant will be located, is to run its own training program.
+
+
+### Aggressive Technological Goals
+
+The Rapidus-IBM-IMEC collaboration is arguably one of the most ambitious in the history of the global semiconductor industry. As noted, Japan is currently 10 years behind world leaders TSMC and Samsung in chip manufacturing technology, operating at the 40 nm node. The consortium proposes to leapfrog multiple intervening nodes in two to three years, to begin production at 2 nm. This would constitute an unparalleled technological feat. Skipping even one node places major demands on a company, such as increased and more complex design rule checking, additional computation requirements, significantly increased node-over-node IP designer staffing requirements, and numerous evolving techniques that are challenging to implement — all under increased time and cost pressures and while navigating the risk of unanticipated technological unknowns. One analyst writes:
+
+> Think long and hard about skipping nodes . . . There is so much progressive learning node over node now, and the need for this learning does not go away with a node jump. You’ll just end up compressing that learning into the critical path of your next design, while management still expects you to complete that design with the same or shorter schedule as the last one. This can only end in tears.
+
+Rapidus has no experience in manufacturing advanced chips, and to date there is no indication that it will be able to access actual know-how for such an endeavor from companies with the requisite experience (i.e., TSMC and Samsung). The key to success may be IBM’s technology, which utilizes GAA transistors or “nanosheet FETs,” which enable device scaling beyond current generation FinFET technology (a form of 3D transistor that allows faster switching times and higher density than planar devices). Multiple nanosheet FETs can be stacked up from the silicon substrate, and they are seen as superior to FinFETs because of their GAA character, reduced size, and higher drive currents. According to one source, “This may be the most disruptive transistor design since the beginning of the integrated circuit.” IBM has also recently announced a breakthrough in interconnect (the wiring between components in a semiconductor) technology, replacing copper as an interconnect material with ruthenium (“Interconnect 3.0”) — which can scale to one nanometer and beyond and still be an effective conductor.
+
+___`The Rapidus-IBM-IMEC collaboration is arguably one of the most ambitious in the history of the global semiconductor industry. . . . The consortium proposes to leapfrog multiple intervening nodes in two to three years, to begin production at 2 nm. This would constitute an unparalleled technological feat.`___
+
+
+### Japan’s Chip Infrastructure
+
+U.S. policymakers and industry leaders are reportedly coming to view Japan as an alternative chip production hub to China, notwithstanding its higher costs. To a significant degree, this perspective reflects Japan’s extraordinary competencies in the tools and materials necessary for the most advanced forms of chipmaking, with Japanese suppliers often representing best-in-the-world in their areas of specialization. These include:
+
+- __EUV lithography:__ Japan produces much of that equipment that makes extreme ultra-violet (EUV) lithography use for chipmaking at the advanced nodes possible. Japan’s Tokyo Electron (TEL) has a near 100 percent share of the global market for in-line coaters/developers for EUV, the lithography technique Rapidus will utilize to fabricate 2 nm chips.
+
+- __Chip Stacking:__ TEL is also working closely with IBM to enable the world’s first chip stacking operations on 300 mm wafers. TEL has a massive presence at Albany Colleges of Nanoscale Science and Engineering (CNSE) in Albany, New York, sending hundreds of employees to the facility at which IBM conducts much of its applied chipmaking R&D. In March 2023, TEL announced that it would invest $167 million to build a new production facility in northeast Japan, “in anticipation of renewed demand from the semiconductor industry.”
+
+- __Photomasks:__ Japanese firms JEOL and NuFlare hold a 91 percent share of the global market for mask-making for EUV lithography.
+
+- __Resist Processing:__ Japanese firms TEL and SCREEN hold a 96 percent share of the global market for the equipment needed for resist processing.
+
+- __High-End Photoresist:__ Four Japanese companies — Shin-Etsu Chemical, Tokyo Ohka Kogyo, JSR, and Fujifilm Electronic Materials — account for 75 percent of global production of high-end photoresist for advanced chipmaking and hold a near monopoly on the photoresist needed to enable fabrication of devices with EUV lithography. A fifth Japanese company, Sumitomo Chemicals, has recently entered the market for the production of photoresist.
+
+- __Wafer Crystal Machining:__ Japanese firms Accretech, Okimoto, Toyo, and Disco have a 95 percent share of the global market for equipment needed for wafer crystal machining. Japanese firms Rorze, Daifuku, and Muratech hold an 88 percent share of the global market for wafer handling equipment.
+
+- __Semiconductor Materials:__ Japan is the largest marker of semiconductor materials in the world — a status it has held for decades — holding over a 50 percent share of 14 of the most critical materials needed for chipmaking, including photomasks, photoresist, and silicon wafers.
+
+- __3D Chip Packaging:__ Japanese semiconductor materials suppliers, including Nissan Chemical and Showa Denko, are making major new investments to develop and produce materials needed for 3D chip packaging. In 2024, Nissan Chemical will begin mass production of a temporary bonding adhesive used in 3D packaging to keep silicon wafers attached to glass substrates during polishing and stacking, while also allowing removal of the wafers without damage.
+
+- __Silicon Wafers:__ Japanese materials firms SUMCO and Shin-Etsu Chemical together hold a 60 percent share of the global market for silicon wafers, essential to chip fabrication.
+
+
+### Rapidus Work Plan
+
+Pursuant to the Rapidus-IBM accord, Rapidus is licensing 2 nm technology from IBM; furthermore, as noted, the partners will collaborate at the Albany CNSE to bring 2 nm device technology to production level. At CNSE, IBM is making available an ASML EUV tool — including the requisite specialized air and water handling systems and beneath-the-floor infrastructure — to enable Rapidus engineers to build competency in EUV processes. Rapidus personnel can also benefit from the presence of a constellation of tool and materials firms at the Albany site, including Tokyo Electron, KLA, and Applied Materials. In approximately two years, the Japanese engineers working on 2 nm development at CNSE will return to Japan and set up a pilot line for test runs of 2 nm devices. Rapidus expects to take 2 nm chips to the market by 2027.
+
+Koike said in December 2022 that “it will take several trillions of yen” ($7–15 billion or more) to get pilot production up and running, although he did not indicate where such funds would come from. On April 26, 2023, the government indicated it would give Rapidus 260 billion yen ($1.8 billion) that would be used, in part, to fund the establishment of a pilot production plant at Chitose in Hokkaido. Construction of the plant will begin in September 2023 with a completion target in January 2025, a tight timeframe. Koike is also looking for comprehensive private investment and financing for additional investments in new fabrication plants.
+
+Rapidus will operate as a leading-edge foundry, but it does not seek to compete head-to-head with TSMC and Samsung in making commodity devices at high volumes. Instead, Rapidus will focus on specialized niche technologies that can command a price premium. It anticipates that its strength will be fast turnaround time at which it can deliver specialized devices to specific end users tailored to their needs. Initial production volume is forecast at a modest 50,000 wafers per month. While Rapidus has not disclosed information about its anticipated customer base, its own consortium members are likely to represent a major market for the new foundry’s chips.
+
+On the European side, Rapidus and IMEC have agreed to form a broad strategic partnership. With financial support by METI, Rapidus will become a core member of IMEC’s advanced nanoelectronics program, which receives substantial funding from both the regional Government of Flanders and the European Commission. The partners will focus on key enabling technologies — most notably EUV lithography, which is essential to the fabrication of semiconductors at the 2 nm node. IMEC also enjoys a very close relationship with ASML of the Netherlands, currently the world’s only supplier of EUV equipment. Rapidus has already secured a commitment for ASML EUV tools for its Hokkaido fab.
+
+To facilitate cooperation, Rapidus may send engineers to IMEC for training. IMEC is also reportedly prepared to establish an R&D team in Japan to develop long term R&D roadmaps. Further, IMEC and Rapidus expect to collaborate with Japan’s LSTC, a hub for advanced chip technology development being established by the Japanese government.
+
+
+### Government Support for U.S. Investors
+
+The Japanese government’s new promotional effort in semiconductors involves financial support for other U.S.-Japan manufacturing collaborations in Japan. The government is providing 46.5 billion yen ($320 million) to the U.S. firm Micron Technology, which owns and operates production facilities in Japan, to manufacture DRAMs. Micron established a manufacturing presence in Japan in 2012, when it purchased the bankrupt Japanese DRAM maker Elpida Memories. Japanese government funding is reportedly being directed toward the expansion of a Micron fab in Hiroshima to make the company’s new high-capacity low-power 1-beta DRAM, the highest-density DRAM yet produced. U.S. ambassador to Japan Rahm Emmanuel characterized the transaction as an example of how the two countries “are committed to strengthening semiconductor supply chains” and national security jointly.
+
+In 2022, the Japanese government indicated it would provide 92.9 billion yen ($680 million) to a joint venture between Japan’s Kioxia and the U.S. firm Western Digital to manufacture 3D flash memory devices at the joint venture’s production base in Mie Prefecture.
+
+
+### Collaboration with Taiwan
+
+Japan’s new 2 nm chipmaking alliance with IBM and IMEC is paralleled by partnerships with Taiwan’s TSMC to enable the production of legacy chips for use by Japanese industry, along with the development of advanced assembly, test, and packaging technology. TSMC’s presence in Japan is well-established:
+
+- __In 2019,__ TSMC established the Japan Design Center in Osaka to develop and refine semiconductor process technologies.
+
+- __In March 2021,__ TSMC launched the 3D IC R&D Center in Japan’s Tsukuba Science City, supporting research in advanced semiconductor packaging in collaboration with Japanese companies, public research organizations, and universities. The Japanese government is reportedly supporting this project with 19 billion yen ($150 million), about half of the project cost.
+
+- __In November 2021,__ TSMC announced that it would invest over $2 billion in a majority-owned joint venture with Japan’s Sony and Denso to create a semiconductor foundry in Japan’s Kumamoto Prefecture utilizing 12, 16, 20, and 28 nm process technology. The participation of Denso, a major Japanese maker of auto parts, reflects the fact that the Japanese automobile industry has been hamstrung by chip shortages since the onset of the pandemic. Construction began in April 2022 and production is expected to start in December 2024. According to the Nikkei, the Japanese government is subsidizing this effort with an extraordinary total of 476 billion yen ($3.5 billion), perhaps the largest subsidy by the Japanese government to a foreign manufacturer.
+
+- __As of December 2022,__ Sony is reportedly setting up a facility near the new fab, from which it will source logic chips to be used to make CMOS image sensors.
+
+- __In February 2023,__ TSMC disclosed that it planned to build a second fab in Kumamoto Prefecture — in partnership with Sony and Denso — with an investment of $7 billion, which will utilize 5 and 10 nm process and would start operations in or after 2025. Denso views the new fab’s 10 nm capability as essential to ensuring a stable supply of chips for autonomous vehicles.
+
+
+### A New Focus on the Back End
+
+Japan’s effort to shore up its chipmaking capabilities will include the “back end” of the production process — assembly, test, and in particular packaging, which is seen as playing a crucial role in the development of advanced chips. At present, most back-end operations, including packaging, are located elsewhere due to Japan’s emphasis on international collaborations in China and other countries in Asia. Some key elements of this back-end focus include:
+
+- __Orii Yasumitsu, a senior managing executive officer at Rapidus,__ said in December 2022 that “a lot of attention has been focused on the front-end [namely, wafer fabrication,] but we’ll work on the back-end processes as well. . . . We will build integrated front-end and back-end production lines.”
+
+- __Kyocera, a manufacturer of ceramics for semiconductor packaging,__ recently announced that it would invest 62 billion yen ($470 million) to build its first new production facility in two decades, which will produce packaging materials for advanced chips.
+
+- __Advantest, a Japanese maker of chip testing equipment,__ has entered into a technology alliance with Taiwan’s TSMC for the developing of testing equipment for high-density back-end applications, which will be implemented at TSMC’s 3D IC R&D Center in Tsukuba.
+
+- __Canon, a leading Japanese maker of lithography equipment,__ is introducing back-end lithography machines that are intended to establish high-density connections between devices to enable improved performance and energy efficiency in a single package.
+
+- __Ulvac, a Japanese chip equipment maker,__ is improving its equipment for removing microscopic debris, which is being created in greater quantities due to more complex packaging operations. Such impurities can impair chip performance.
+
+- __Sumitomo Bakelite, a chip materials supplier,__ is developing specialized resin compatible with advanced back-end production processes.
+
+Japan’s new promotional effort in semiconductors represents a major departure from the policy characterized by industrial independence that continued at least until the 1990s. Today’s goal is to build a global supply chain in collaboration with the United States and Europe — one which is less vulnerable to shocks such as those which occurred during the pandemic and less dependent on an increasingly assertive China. Similar thinking is driving the semiconductor policies taking shape in the United States and the European Union, opening potentially rich avenues of cooperation. As a METI official put it in August 2022, “The era where the world is at peace and it doesn’t matter who supplies our semiconductors is over.” Japan’s new policies are an ambitious and potentially effective response to this new reality.
+
+---
+
+__Sujai Shivakumar__ is director and senior fellow of the Renewing American Innovation (RAI) Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
+
+__Charles Wessner__ is a nonresident Senior Advisor to the RAI project and teaches Global Innovation Policy at Georgetown University.
+
+__Thomas Howell__ is an international trade attorney specializing in the semiconductor industry and a consultant with the CSIS RAI Project.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-31-navigate-risks-of-ai.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-31-navigate-risks-of-ai.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c9313747
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-31-navigate-risks-of-ai.md
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Navigate Risks Of AI
+author: Caitlin Chin
+date  : 2023-08-31 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LbR0MRm.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Navigating the Risks of Artificial Intelligence on the Digital News Landscape"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Artificial intelligence (AI) is the most recent dilemma confronting the news industry, particularly following the public research release of ChatGPT in December 2022._ <excerpt/> _A few outlets like BuzzFeed, News Corps Australia, and G/O Media quickly moved to incorporate generative AI into their content production. In early 2023, BuzzFeed rolled out ChatGPT-fueled quizzes, travel articles, and a recipe recommendation chatbot named Botatouille. Many others are scoping longer-term strategies, like the Washington Post, which announced the creation of two internal teams in May 2023 to explore future uses for AI. Writers, on the other hand, have generally been more cautious: both the Writers Guild of America, East and the Gizmodo Media Group Union condemned G/O Media in July 2023 for publishing AI-generated articles without first consulting editorial staffers, warning “unreliable AI programs notorious for creating falsehoods and plagiarizing the work of real writers” were “an existential threat to journalism.”_
+
+Some AI developers are attempting to get ahead of the controversy by framing their chatbots as value-added features for the news industry — in other words, helpers, not displacers, of human journalists. Over the past few months, Google has reportedly met with both national and local news outlets to pitch Genesis, a generative AI chatbot that can draft headlines, social media posts, and articles, framed as a productivity booster. In July 2023, OpenAI partnered with the American Journalism Project to provide $5 million in direct grants to enable local newsrooms to test-drive AI. The same month, it struck an agreement with the Associated Press to access archived articles through 1985 to train large language models (LLMs) in exchange for both licensing fees and experimental use of OpenAI software. But these limited partnerships gloss over technology’s strained history with newsrooms, one where most journalists have received no compensation for the use of their work to train algorithms even as digital ad-tech monopolies have contributed to their long-term decline in marketing revenue.
+
+A common refrain has been that newsrooms must evolve to accommodate technological advancements, but this characterization is neither accurate nor fair. Even publishers that have adapted to the whims of powerful technology corporations have faced repercussions for doing so. For example, some digital news outlets redesigned their distribution strategies to capitalize on social media’s peak growth in the early 2010s, allowing individual users to view and share article links on decentralized channels in exchange for a steady stream of clicks. BuzzFeed, which initially gained traction through social media virality instead of traditional print subscriptions, epitomized this novel business model. But when Facebook unilaterally modified its content ranking algorithm in January 2018 to prioritize advertiser and connection-based engagement, which reduced visibility to external news websites, early movers like BuzzFeed were hit the hardest. BuzzFeed abruptly closed its Pulitzer-winning news division in April 2023 citing revenue shortfalls, while outlets like the New York Times, which had diversified its income stream with traditional subscriptions, were less vulnerable to opaque decisions by large technology companies.
+
+The sustainability of news cannot fall on publishers alone; large digital platforms must share responsibility to understand and address their sizable impacts on society. Yet search engine and social media companies operate with relatively few U.S. legal requirements to build fairness and transparency into algorithms, protect sensitive personal information when serving personalized advertisements, engage in ad-tech practices that promote fair competition with news publishers, and mitigate the spread of harmful content online. Without bright-line U.S. regulations for technology companies, the recent acceleration in AI adoption presents at least four major risks that could severely undermine both news availability and public access to information in the long term.
+
+___`The sustainability of news cannot fall on publishers alone; large digital platforms must share responsibility to understand and address their sizable impacts on society.`___
+
+#### (1) Search engines may adopt AI to answer user queries, which would significantly decrease web traffic to external news websites.
+
+Newspapers are in a reciprocal but largely unequal relationship with search engines. Google, which controls approximately 92 percent of the search engine market worldwide, sends news websites approximately 24 billion views per month. This may account for over one-third of publishers’ online traffic, which is a critical metric for digital advertisements. Shortly after the research release of ChatGPT, Google and Microsoft both announced plans to harness generative AI to directly answer user queries in the form of paragraphs. Unlike the current version of ChatGPT, which is not connected to the internet and only reflects historical training data prior to 2021, Microsoft’s Bing (which incorporates ChatGPT) and Google’s Bard both intend to derive responses from real-time data across the internet ecosystem, which could enable them to analyze breaking news. In this manner, LLMs could increase the gatekeeper power of dominant search engines that aim to maximize user engagement or screen time on their platforms.
+
+Should LLMs direct fewer readers to click through Google to external websites, digital news organizations risk losing a major source of online visibility, audience engagement, and advertising revenue. Going forward, if news publishers cannot reliably count on search engine traffic in the long term, websites may increasingly depend on paywalls to draw revenue independent of large technology corporations. In 2019, 76 percent of U.S. newspapers employed paywalls, compared to 60 percent in 2017. Many substantially hiked subscription rates during this time frame as their advertising revenues simultaneously faltered. Paid subscriptions can help some news organizations build around loyal reader bases, especially if their content is specialized or exclusive. But the subscription pot is not large enough to sustain all publications, and smaller or more niche publications are disproportionately more likely to fold.
+
+There are also negative societal externalities to walling off access to accurate and relevant information on topics including climate change, public health, and civil rights. Stephen Bates, a professor at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, warns that the rising prevalence of paywalls could create “income rather than geographic news deserts.” In other words, individuals who cannot afford multiple newspaper subscriptions may be more likely to believe misinformation and lower-quality content — whether human- or AI-generated — that they view on social media or search engines for free. In a more fragmented internet, people are more likely to exist within their ideological bubbles, as chatbots cannot offer diverse perspectives like a human journalist can. Social media algorithms, which typically recommend or promote content based on past browsing activity or personal interests, further reinforce echo chambers based on user engagement and not the common good.
+
+#### (2) Social media platforms are using AI to automatically rank posts, which enables the mass de-prioritization of legitimate news outlets in favor of fake, spammy, or manipulative user-uploaded content.
+
+Prior to the internet age, news outlets controlled public attention in centralized destinations, effectively serving as the primary window for mass audiences to understand current events. But social media platforms democratized publishing in the past two decades by allowing anyone to gain international virality, transforming content-ranking algorithms into the new gatekeepers of attention and relevance. Newspapers face legal liability for publishing defamatory or false claims, but social media platforms generally do not. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act allows “online computer services” immunity over most types of content that third-party users upload. Subsequently, many social media platforms employ AI recommendation systems that automatically rank content based on users’ predicted interests or personal connections, with the goal of maximizing screen time instead of collective public knowledge.
+
+When Facebook chose to algorithmically de-prioritize public news content in January 2018, external news websites lost visitors. Within six months of that algorithmic change, BuzzFeed’s traffic decreased by 13 percent and ABC News’s by 12 percent, according to the analytics firm Comscore. The Pew Research Center found that only 31 percent of U.S. adults reported consuming news on Facebook by 2022, compared to 66 percent in 2016. Facebook’s power to singlehandedly decrease automated referrals to news websites, coupled with the platform’s first-ever decrease in U.S. users in 2022, had the indirect effect of deepening many publishers’ reliance on Google for web visitors and their ensuing digital advertising dollars. Furthermore, as Facebook whistleblower Frances Haugen revealed in 2021, the 2018 algorithmic policy shift may have harmed not only the bottom line of newspapers but also their perceived legitimacy within the social media ecosystem itself. In a leaked internal memo, company data scientists discovered the decision “had unhealthy side effects on important slices of public content, such as politics and news,” since the algorithm frequently ranked user-generated misinformation higher than trustworthy publisher-generated news.
+
+In addition to text, the widespread availability of generative AI tools allows any internet user to easily post doctored images, video, and audio online, which could facilitate the impersonation of newsrooms or even threaten the safety of individual journalists. In 2022, Graphika detected AI-generated videos on Facebook simulating a nonexistent news agency called Wolf News, which appeared to broadcast messaging supporting the Chinese Communist Party. In 2018, far-right groups spread deepfake pornography videos containing journalist Rana Ayyub’s manipulated image in retaliation for her investigative reporting, subjecting her to years-long harassment, doxxing, and death threats. There are no U.S. federal laws that specifically regulate deepfake AI technologies, so every social media platform, app store, search engine, and online forum treats this content differently. Meta’s policy is to remove synthetic media that “would likely mislead someone into thinking that a subject of the video said words that they did not” or that “merges, replaces, or superimposes content on a video, making it appear to be authentic.” However, the company exempts “parody or satire.” Furthermore, as deepfake imagery becomes more realistic and commonplace, synthetic media policies will likely become progressively difficult to enforce. Content detection algorithms must continuously advance, too; otherwise, the internet ecosystem may become a more perilous space for public-facing journalists, with audiences who are less receptive to the information they convey.
+
+#### (3) Chatbots cannot perform the same functions as a human journalist, but news executives may still leverage AI to streamline operations or justify workforce reductions in the short term.
+
+At the moment, artificial general intelligence cannot match human writers and editors in technical capability. LLMs like ChatGPT are best equipped to automate specific functions like summarizing documents — but not advanced editorial skills like relationship building with sources, original analytical thinking, contextual understanding, or long-form creative writing. LLMs predict patterns and word associations based on their training datasets but, during large-scale deployments, are known to contain factual inaccuracies or even generate fake stories altogether. In February 2023, Penn State researchers also found that LLMs can spit out plagiarized text, whether by inadequately paraphrasing or copying training material verbatim. Such behavior is doubly problematic for some models, like ChatGPT, which do not attribute or cite sources by default. In addition, since many LLMs build upon text from online websites and forums — many of which have historically excluded or exhibited hostility toward individuals based on factors like gender identity, race, or sexual orientation — their automated outputs can reproduce broader societal biases.
+
+___`The internet ecosystem may become a more perilous space for public-facing journalists, with audiences who are less receptive to the information they convey.`___
+
+Despite these shortcomings, some corporate news executives may leverage LLMs to cut expenditures in the short term and not simply to boost productivity or create new value in the long term. When G/O Media, the parent company of Gizmodo and Deadspin, published AI-generated entertainment articles in July 2023, it attracted high public backlash over their many factual errors, lack of human editorial oversight, and overall substandard quality of writing. CNET paused its use of LLMs in January 2023 after a significant number of errors and plagiarized language were detected within its AI-generated articles, which the outlet admitted to having “quietly” published for months without clear disclosures. As historian David Walsh puts it, “The issue with AI is not that it will actually replace us, but that it will be used to justify catastrophic business decisions that will destroy entire industries precisely because AI cannot actually replace us.”
+
+In March 2023, OpenAI, OpenResearch, and University of Pennsylvania researchers estimated that LLMs could affect job functions for 80 percent of the U.S. workforce — with writers, reporters, and journalists among the most vulnerable. Moreover, MIT, London School of Economics, and Boston University researchers detected a negative correlation between AI adoption and job recruitment between 2010 and 2018: for every 1 percent increase in AI deployment, companies cut hiring by approximately 1 percent. It is hardly surprising that CNET staffers cited long-term uncertainty from AI as one reason for unionizing in May 2023 or that the Writers’ Guild of America (WGA) proposed banning AI in screenwriting and prohibiting creative material from training algorithms when striking the same month. (A later proposal from the WGA contemplated allowing studios to use AI to craft screenplays but with human employees retaining full economic residuals and credits.) The impact of AI on the workforce is not simply a long-term issue; many writers and journalists are already facing a significant amount of labor uncertainty.
+
+#### (4) Generative AI can increase the prevalence of spammy or false content online, which obscures legitimate news and funnels advertising dollars away from traditional publishers.
+
+While present-day LLMs cannot compose original prose comparable to that of a highly skilled journalist, they are well suited to churning out low-cost, low-quality, and high-volume clickbait. While clickbait production does not help most traditional newsrooms, it benefits made-for-advertising (MFA) websites, which are spammy, traffic-driven sites designed solely to maximize page views and advertising dollars. As of August 2023, analytics firm NewsGuard discovered at least 437 websites that deployed generative AI to churn out large quantities of fictitious articles — many containing unsubstantiated conspiracy theories, unreliable medical advice, or fabricated product reviews. These sites draw clicks with headlines ranging from “Can lemon cure skin allergy?” to “I’m sorry for the confusion, as an AI language model I don’t have access to external information or news updates beyond my knowledge cutoff data. However, based on the given article title, an eye-catching news headline could be.”
+
+___`The impact of AI on the workforce is not simply a long-term issue; many writers and journalists are already facing a significant amount of labor uncertainty.`___
+
+MFA websites provide no material public benefits but, without proper safeguards, could create significant negative externalities in an AI era. LLMs are designed to generate outcomes at scale — a perfect fit for content farms whose sole purpose is search engine optimization (SEO) through nonsensical keywords, summarized or verbatim text from news sources, and highly repetitive spam. These articles often list fake authors or anonymous bylines and appear to lack human oversight. The rising prevalence of AI-generated spam could decrease public trust and understanding of critical current events, especially if it distorts the market for real news and obscures legitimate newsrooms as centralized sources of information. It will become exponentially harder for human journalists to disseminate trustworthy information when the internet ecosystem is stuffed with bots.
+
+Content farms divert more than user attention away from legitimate news websites; they also cost valuable digital advertising dollars. The AI-generated websites that NewsGuard detected were stuffed with programmatic advertisements, including from major brands like Subaru and Citigroup — almost all of which were automatically routed through Google’s Ad Exchange. Google Ads maintains policies against servicing “spammy automatically-generated content” but does not publicly reveal the results of its placement algorithm or content review outcomes. In June 2023, an Adalytics study showed that Google frequently served video ads on lower-quality clickbait or junk websites without the awareness of its buy-side advertising clients. The same month, the Association of National Advertisers estimated that about $13 billion in digital advertising revenue is algorithmically funneled into clickbait MFA websites, which amounts to approximately 15 percent of the total $88 billion pie that marketers spend on automated ad exchanges every year. If not for the proliferation of AI-generated MFA content, those funds could otherwise provide a much-needed lifeline for legitimate news outlets.
+
+
+### Analysis of Policy Approaches
+
+A massive legislative push to compel large technology platforms that host news content to pay publishers is playing out all over the world. In June 2023, the Canadian Parliament enacted the Online News Act, which requires designated search engines and social media platforms to pay news publishers for any external article links or quotes their users view or share. Australia and the European Union respectively passed the News Media Bargaining Code (NMBC) and Copyright Directive in 2021, and legislators in Brazil, India, the United Kingdom, the United States, and California have either proposed or are actively considering similar measures.
+
+Canada’s parliamentary budget officer predicts that news organizations could share an additional $329 million in annual revenue after the Online News Act becomes effective. However, this figure is a small fraction of the estimated $4.9 billion that Canadian news outlets lost from 2010 to 2022, and it will never be realized if Google and Meta choose to boycott the law altogether. Just hours after the passage of the Online News Act, Meta announced plans to permanently shut down news access for Canadian users. Shortly after, Google stated it too would block all Canadian news links on its search engine. Their responses should not come as a surprise: directly prior to Australia’s passage of the NMBC in 2021, Meta abruptly cut off users from viewing news pages, and Google announced it might have “no real choice” but to withdraw search services within the country. Faced with those ultimatums, Australian lawmakers soon amended the NMBC’s final text in a manner that exempted Meta and Google from any binding actions. And after France began enforcing the Copyright Directive in 2021, Google throttled users from seeing article previews in France, which drastically decreased click-throughs. Their actions underscore the problem with forced negotiation: it is very difficult to enforce payment schemes when digital gatekeepers can simply choke off access to the news content internet users see.
+
+These legislative measures, sometimes referred to as “link taxes,” create the wrong incentives. In the past, they have discouraged Google and Meta from displaying news content on their platforms, which decreases critical streams of traffic to external news websites. In the future, such policies may even motivate search engines to accelerate the adoption of generative AI to answer user queries instead of displaying external links. Forced payment measures also seek to reinforce newspapers’ dependency on large technology companies, as they do not address the structural reasons for Google and Meta’s market dominance. For these reasons, U.S. technology companies need bright-line rules that meaningfully prevent harmful ad-tech, data collection, and AI practices. Such rules, in turn, can foster a healthier and more sustainable online environment in which newsrooms can evolve in the long term.
+
+#### (1) Dominant technology platforms need clear ex ante rules to prevent anticompetitive practices that reinforce their gatekeeper power over news publishers.
+
+Two-party negotiations cannot work if the playing field is not level. Because Google and Meta have taken steps to lock in gatekeeper power over digital advertising and content distribution in recent years, they basically own the league newspapers operate in. For example, Google’s 2008 acquisition of DoubleClick enabled it to effectively monopolize all three stages of the ad-tech process: the buy-side advertiser network, sell-side publisher tools, and the ad exchange through which most news websites auction online advertising spots. In turn, market dominance enables the search giant to demand up to 35 percent of proceeds that would otherwise flow to publishers. It also provides Google with ample means to compel news websites to adopt Accelerated Mobile Pages formatting and control their ability to engage in header bidding, among other actions. Similarly, Meta also increased its gatekeeper power by acquiring nascent competitors like Instagram (2012) and WhatsApp (2014), which allowed it to combine user data across multiple subsidiaries to curate personalized advertisements much more granularly than traditional newspapers can.
+
+These behaviors have raised alarm bells in numerous jurisdictions. In June 2023, the European Commission filed a formal statement of objection to Google’s ad-tech practices, arguing that the company’s control over all stages of the digital advertising process allows it to illegally disadvantage website publishers. In January 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice similarly sued Google over alleged anticompetitive actions that distort free competition in the ad-tech space, seeking to split up its Ad Manager suite. In November 2021, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenged Meta’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp, seeking a possible divestiture of both platforms. Also in 2021, an Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) investigation found that Google had engaged in “systemic competition concerns” like blocking ad-tech competitors from placing ads on YouTube and other subsidiaries. Further, ACCC chair Rod Sims noted at the time, “Investigation and enforcement proceedings under general competition laws are not well suited to deal with these sorts of broad concerns, and can take too long if anti-competitive harm is to be prevented.” The ACCC report summarizes a widespread issue: enforcement actions occur after the fact and are not guaranteed to undo the years of consolidation that have helped Google and Meta lock in market power and divert advertising revenue from news organizations.
+
+Traditional antitrust law requires a modernized approach in the digital age — one that implements forward-looking guardrails to prevent dominant technology companies from harming nascent rivals, news publishers, and society at large. The European Union recently put new ex ante rules into place with its Digital Markets Act, which aims to prohibit gatekeeper technology platforms from abusing their control over multiple sides of a market. Members of the U.S. Congress have floated several bills containing similar proposals to limit practices like self-prioritization and acquisitions, but their momentum stalled following debates over their possible effects on malware prevention, content moderation, and other issues. In March 2023, Canada’s Competition Bureau put forward over 50 recommendations to modernize its antitrust legal framework, which has not undergone significant updates since the 1980s. Comprehensive antitrust reform is never quick or straightforward to implement, but it is essential to preventing anticompetitive acquisitions, growing news websites’ ad-tech options and revenue, and fostering a more diverse and sustainable news ecosystem overall.
+
+#### (2) Both technology platforms and newsrooms need formal guardrails to promote ethics, fairness, and transparency in any development and deployment of AI.
+
+Approximately 100 million entities registered for ChatGPT within two months of its release, meaning numerous companies, including search engines and newsrooms, are deploying LLMs before direct legal safeguards are in place. The United States has existing federal and state privacy, copyright, consumer protection, and civil rights laws that apply to some aspects of the digital space, but there are broad legal uncertainties about how to interpret them in the context of generative AI (see sections 3 and 4).
+
+In July 2023, the White House announced voluntary commitments from OpenAI, Google, Meta, and four other AI developers to invest in algorithms to “address society’s greatest challenges” and create “robust technical mechanisms to ensure that users know when content is AI generated.” This announcement follows previous nonbinding strategies like the White House’s Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights (2022) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s AI Risk Management Framework (2023), which both call upon companies to prioritize transparency, accountability, fairness, and privacy in AI development. Broad voluntary principles, like these, are the first steps in the absence of a mandatory legal framework that directly regulates generative AI, but LLM developers will need to take significant strides to meet them. For example, OpenAI released a tool in January 2023 to help identify AI-generated text but withdrew it six months later due to high error rates. Furthermore, generative AI as an industry largely continues to obscure how it collects data, assesses and mitigates risk, and promotes internal accountability.
+
+As politicians additionally debate mandatory safeguards to mitigate the risks of AI, it is important to consider how any forthcoming laws could better support journalism and trustworthy information-sharing online. In 2022, Congress introduced the draft American Data Privacy and Protection Act (ADPPA), which contains provisions for large companies to publicly explain how high-risk AI systems make decisions, incorporate training data, and generate output. In April 2023, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration at the Department of Commerce issued a request for comment on AI accountability measures like audits and certifications. Transparency measures, such as these, could help news readers evaluate the credibility and fairness of the AI-generated text they view. They could also assist marketers in contesting automated advertisement placement with MFA websites instead of traditional news publishers. Both internet users and news publishers could benefit from increased public visibility into all AI development, regardless of the algorithm’s perceived level of risk of any given algorithm, which could include high-level statistics into methodology, specific sources of training data, generalized outcomes, and error rates.
+
+In June 2023, the European Parliament passed the draft AI Act, which could require developers to proactively mitigate automated output that perpetuates existing societal inequities. Under the act, “general purpose” algorithms (which would likely include LLMs like ChatGPT) would be required to identify “reasonably foreseeable risks” in their design and test training datasets for bias. Furthermore, “high-risk systems” (which would include social media ranking algorithms with over 45 million users) would be subject to more intensive standards like human oversight, assessments of an algorithm’s potential impact in specific contexts, and documentation of training datasets. Going further, evaluations for high-risk AI use by large search engines and social media companies should also include their potential impacts on journalism and information-sharing, including the spread of harmful content or burying of legitimate news online.
+
+___`As politicians additionally debate mandatory safeguards to mitigate the risks of AI, it is important to consider how any forthcoming laws could better support journalism and trustworthy information-sharing online.`___
+
+While technology platforms need legal responsibilities to ensure fairness and accountability in AI development, any newsrooms that choose to deploy LLMs must also develop clear and transparent processes when doing so. Some news organizations have already published initial principles for generative AI. For example, the Guardian and the News/Media Alliance (NMA) both recommend public disclosures of any AI-generated output. The Guardian additionally pledges to retain human oversight over generative AI deployment, while the NMA also states that publishers who use LLMs should continue to bear responsibility for any false or discriminatory outcomes. However, there is a clear gap in the development and publication of formal standards: according to a May 2023 World Association of News Publishers survey, 49 percent of newsroom respondents had deployed LLMs, but only 20 percent had implemented formal guidelines. As a baseline, newsrooms need to identify clear purposes or contexts in which they might deploy LLMs, including conditions, safeguards, and limitations. Going further, newsrooms also need to strengthen labor protections for positions that AI deployment might substantially affect.
+
+#### (3) Technology platforms should recognize the IP rights of news outlets and human creators, especially when using copyrighted articles to train algorithms.
+
+AI developers have trained LLMs by scraping billions of written articles, images, audio, and lines of software code from humans, typically without compensating, citing, obtaining permission from, or even informing the original creators. A wide range of professionals, ranging from the NMA to comedian Sarah Silverman to computer programmers, are asking — or, in some cases, suing — AI developers to pay their training data sources, stating their unlicensed use of content violates IP rights. Days after the Associated Press reached a licensing deal with OpenAI in July 2023, thousands of authors signed an open letter to urge LLM developers to both obtain consent from and compensate writers in order to scrape their work. In January 2023, a group of software developers sued OpenAI and GitHub for building the code-generating algorithm Copilot based on their licensed work. That same month, several artists filed a class action lawsuit against Stability AI, Midjourney, and DeviantArt for processing their copyrighted material to train algorithms that generated images in their unique styles. Shortly after, Getty Images sued Stability AI in the United Kingdom and the United States for training algorithms based on 12 million copyrighted images. In addition, the Daily Mail is reportedly considering legal action against Google for scraping hundreds of thousands of copyrighted articles to develop Bard without permission.
+
+These cases could take years to resolve in court, and their outcomes are uncertain. Generative AI has created novel questions over the interpretation of existing IP rights, particularly whether algorithms fall under the fair use exception in the Copyright Act. Although AI developers have acknowledged their history of scraping copyrighted material without consent, they have also argued that generative AI qualifies as fair use because the output is sufficiently “transformative” in nature compared to the original input. The plaintiffs in these lawsuits disagree, arguing that fair use does not protect the exploitation of copyrighted material in highly commercial contexts where AI developers benefit financially at the expense of human creators. Furthermore, generative AI tools reproduce copyrighted text or images in many cases, sometimes even quoting source text verbatim, which possibly contradicts the transformative use argument. Going forward, the definitions of “fair use” and “derivative works” will be critical for Congress or the courts to clarify to help writers and other content creators exercise their IP rights in the production of AI.
+
+But even if some copyright holders manage to successfully negotiate or sue for compensation from AI developers, one-time payments are a narrow solution that will not prevent more seismic long-term impacts on journalism and other professional careers. ChatGPT is estimated to require trillions of data points, while OpenAI is currently valued at up to $29 billion. In other words, the sheer scale of training datasets alone means that most creators will not receive substantial payments. Better-known creators might wield more power to negotiate payouts compared to smaller or lesser-known ones, but technology corporations would likely retain disproportionate power to decide. Moreover, the licensing agreements would likely be short term or otherwise limited, while the disruption to writers’ jobs and living wages would be permanent. Since algorithms continually generate inferences based on past outputs, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to engineer a long-term residual payment system that both quantifies the monetary value of original data points and tracks subsequent usage in perpetuity.
+
+___`Generative AI has created novel questions over the interpretation of existing IP rights, particularly whether algorithms fall under the fair use exception in the Copyright Act.`___
+
+Although copyright infringement lawsuits, if successful, are unlikely to lead to a long-term residual solution, they could drastically slow or even pause commercial sales of LLMs. Some image hosting websites, such as Getty Images, have already banned AI-generated images to prevent exposure to litigation. Stability AI, alternatively, has announced future plans to allow content creators to opt out of the processing of their work. In the case of generative AI, a more cautious and gradual pace of adoption could perhaps benefit the field in the long term. AI developers need time to devise creative ways to work collaboratively with copyright holders, increase the integrity of their training data, and mitigate the overall pitfalls of their algorithms on journalism. They should not commercially deploy these tools without a solid understanding of the legal and ethical IP risks they raise.
+
+#### (4) Modernized data privacy regulations are necessary to curb surveillance-based advertising and, in turn, return some market power from large technology companies to news publishers.
+
+Because LLMs are built upon billions of news articles, social media posts, online forums, and other text-based conversations from across the web, they inevitably sweep up sensitive personal information. In turn, their automated outputs could reveal personal details related to specific individuals, whether accurate or fabricated, which carries privacy and reputational risks. In March 2023, the Italian Data Protection Authority temporarily banned ChatGPT from processing local users’ data but restored access weeks later after OpenAI agreed to allow EU individuals to exclude their personal information from training data sets and delete inaccuracies. In April 2023, the European Data Protection Board formed an ongoing task force to coordinate potential enforcement actions against ChatGPT amid investigations by data protection authorities in France, Spain, Germany, and other member countries. In May 2023, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, along with three provincial authorities, opened probes into OpenAI’s collection, processing, and disclosure of personal information without sufficient consent, transparency, or accountability mechanisms.
+
+In July 2023, the FTC requested information on OpenAI’s training data sources, risk mitigation measures, and automated outputs that reveal details about specific people. However, the consumer protection agency primarily acts against companies that engage in “unfair or deceptive” practices, as the United States lacks a comprehensive federal privacy law that directly regulates how LLMs collect and process personal information. Dozens of privacy bills were introduced in the 116th and 117th Congresses that would have modernized U.S. privacy protections, most prominently the ADPPA in 2022, but none were enacted into law. Many of these proposals, including the ADPPA, shared a similar framework that would (a) allow individuals to access, modify, and delete personal information that companies hold; (b) restrict companies to processing personal information only as necessary to provide an initial service that users request; and (c) require minimum transparency standards in data usage.
+
+Most of these U.S. bills were introduced before the public release of ChatGPT and entirely exempted publicly available information — a significant omission that could allow many LLMs, which are often trained based on data scanned from public-facing web pages, to avoid any forthcoming privacy legal restrictions. Even so, systemic boundaries on how all technology platforms process even nonpublic personal information could still significantly help shift some digital advertising dollars away from Google and Meta and back to news websites. With a more limited capability to algorithmically track and microtarget ads based on individuals’ browsing behavior or other personal attributes, marketers might increasingly favor contextual ads based on the content of a webpage. In other words, marketers might place protein bar ads in the sports section of a local newspaper instead of targeting Facebook users who browse health-related posts, or they might place diaper ads in a parenting magazine instead of identifying shoppers between the ages of 25 and 45 who recently purchased a pregnancy test. Because contextual advertising does not depend on granular data analytics about individual website visitors, it can better support the news publishers that produce content instead of the social media platforms and search engines that track and distribute it.
+
+#### (5) Large technology platforms need robust content moderation policies that promote a safe and healthy information ecosystem for news organizations to thrive in.
+
+Section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act indirectly reinforces the gatekeeper power of large social media platforms and search engines. With the legal power to independently choose which content to promote, demote, host, or block, technology platforms exercise substantial control over the distribution and visibility of news content, even as they directly compete with external websites for traffic and screen time. Gatekeepers have economic incentives to keep users hooked on their platforms, which sometimes means algorithmically promoting scandalous or enraging clickbait that captures the most user attention while de-ranking news reporting that benefits the public interest. In turn, a higher influx of false or toxic posts simultaneously subjects journalists to increased hostility and impedes readers’ ability to parse online junk to identify real news.
+
+Despite legitimate concerns about Section 230, a complete repeal of the statute could negatively impact both the news industry and internet users. Section 230 protects the free exchange of information and allows technology platforms to host news content without fear of frivolous litigation from right-wing extremists. For example, it shields technology platforms that host news articles about abortion access, even as some states like Texas have tried to block people from obtaining reproductive health information in the aftermath of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022). As seen from the unintended consequences of the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), a Section 230 repeal would likely lead technology platforms to drastically reduce the availability of third-party content. In turn, journalists would likely lose social media users as a diverse resource for leads and article ideas. Independent or freelance journalists might have difficulty maintaining their online audiences or public brands, and smaller news start-ups could disproportionately struggle to get off the ground, especially if technology platforms face legal pressure to exclusively work with well-known incumbent entities.
+
+Instead, many researchers — including some news publishers — have supported middle-ground approaches to amend Section 230 or otherwise enact reasonable guardrails for technology platforms to address harmful or illegal content. The European Union will begin to enforce the Digital Services Act (DSA) in 2024, which could provide one possible model for the United States. The DSA requires technology platforms to adhere to minimum transparency standards like publishing content takedown statistics and explaining recommendation algorithms. Furthermore, it requires them to maintain user controls like opt-outs of personalized content ranking algorithms and notice-and-action systems to flag illegal material. The DSA prevents technology platforms from targeting paid advertisements based on a person’s sexual orientation or political affiliation and prohibits behavioral ads toward children, which could reduce their edge over newspapers in digital marketing. The law also requires larger digital platforms — including Facebook and Google — to assess the “systemic” and “societal or economic” risks of their services, share publicly available data with approved researchers, and allow external compliance audits. While the DSA is one of the first major laws to require external transparency and user controls over ranking algorithms, U.S. and global legislators have also proposed numerous other frameworks. Each raises its own set of debates, but it is important to weigh how any potential measure can better foster a healthy ecosystem for journalism to thrive in.
+
+#### (6) Governments should promote policies that recognize the value of journalism as a public good.
+
+The news industry creates positive externalities that benefit far more than direct subscribers or readers. Newsrooms dedicate substantial resources to sourcing, fact-checking, and disseminating information in the public interest, and journalists serve as independent mechanisms to hold powerful institutions accountable. However, their immense societal value does not suit the system of free market capitalism in which it exists. Newsrooms earn income based on advertisements and subscriptions and not the public benefit of the information they communicate, leaving their overall bottom line vulnerable to ranking algorithms, reader or marketer demand, and even macroeconomic fluctuations. Some venture capitalist firms or wealthy individuals have attempted to invest in newsrooms, but their goals can be misaligned. Andreessen Horowitz invested $50 million in BuzzFeed News in 2014, but its constant pressure for perpetual growth, high returns, and profitability ultimately did not fit the company’s journalistic mission.
+
+Recognizing the civic value of journalism, some governments have considered direct or indirect public funding for journalism. In 2018, Canada established a pot of C$50 million (around $39 million) to support local newsrooms, dispensed by a third-party intermediary to preserve press independence from the government. However, public funding may not work in every country, especially given differing legal, cultural, and political norms around press independence. U.S. politicians have a particularly tumultuous relationship with both the mainstream media and technology companies, evident in their lackluster support for public news systems. The United States spent just $3.16 per capita on public broadcasting in 2019, barely a fraction of France’s $75.89, Australia’s $35.78, and Canada’s $26.51. As Politico’s Jack Shafer points out, even this sparse amount has been highly controversial: “Politicians — usually Republicans like President Donald Trump — routinely issue threats to defund NPR and PBS every time they object to the outlets’ coverage. Do we really want to make the print press beholden to such political whims?”
+
+___`. . . journalists serve as independent mechanisms to hold powerful institutions accountable. However, their immense societal value does not suit the system of free market capitalism in which it exists.`___
+
+Apart from public funding, governments could consider other avenues to help newspapers diversify revenue sources, which, in turn, could reduce reliance on volatile traffic streams. For example, both France and Canada offer tax credits to incentivize individuals to subscribe to newspapers, and Canada amended its tax laws in 2020 to permit newsrooms to seek charitable donations. U.S. legislators could take a similar route. Some pitched tax deductions for newspaper subscribers, advertisers, and employers in the Local Journalism Sustainability Act in 2020 and 2021, though these measures did not reach a vote. Congress could also consider mechanisms to help newsrooms function as nonprofit or hybrid organizations — for example, by changing rules that prevent nonprofit editorial boards from endorsing candidates. In March 2023, the nonprofit Texas Observer reversed its closure decision after crowdfunding over $300,000, demonstrating the potential for newsrooms to tap into alternative support like philanthropic donations or grants. That said, nonprofit status alone is not a one-track solution; there is a limited pool of foundation grants, and the relatively low rates of existing news subscribers suggest the onus cannot fall on grassroots donors to sustain the industry.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+As AI becomes more ubiquitous, the news industry will need to carve out space in a more crowded, more chaotic, and less original information ecosystem. The relationship between technology platforms and newsrooms will continue to evolve in both the short and long terms, but robust data governance frameworks are necessary now to support the financial viability of newspapers and cultivate a diverse and trustworthy online sphere. Large search engines and social media platforms need clear boundaries around their monetization of personal information to target advertisements, acquisitions of nascent competitors, exclusionary actions like self-prioritization, use of copyrighted material, and amplification or de-amplification of online traffic. In turn, both technology platforms and newsrooms require bright-line responsibilities to promote ethical and human-centered standards at every stage in the AI development and deployment process.
+
+___`As AI becomes more ubiquitous, the news industry will need to carve out space in a more crowded, more chaotic, and less original information ecosystem.`___
+
+These policies are not exhaustive. The long-term health and sustainability of the news industry will require more than technological solutions alone. Direct financial support for newsrooms is critical — whether through nonprofit models, direct or indirect government funding, or even nontraditional monetization methods. For example, some newsrooms have embraced side ventures like consulting or hosting events to raise income. But neither the production requirements nor the societal benefits of journalism alone can translate into dollars and cents. To succeed, news outlets also require a civically engaged society — one bound by critical thinking and collective interest in the community. In addition, corporate executives will need to urgently prioritize the input and well-being of human writers, including through job protections and union contracts, in order to sustain journalism as a stable and accessible career option. Ultimately, the actions that technology platforms, newsrooms, governments, and individuals take today will shape the long-term trajectory of the news industry.
+
+---
+
+__Caitlin Chin-Rothmann__ is a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she researches the impact of technology on geopolitics and society. Her current research interests include the relationships between data brokers and government agencies, the evolution of news in a digital era, and the role of technology platforms in countering online harmful content.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Stormbreak Through Frontline
+author: Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds
+date  : 2023-09-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/rnTQmOT.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Russian defences and military adaptations pose challenges for Ukraine’s 2023 offensive._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+Irrespective of the progress made during Ukraine’s counteroffensive, subsequent offensives will be necessary to achieve the liberation of Ukrainian territory. It is therefore important to assess the tactics employed and training provided during the Ukrainian offensive to inform force generation over the coming months. This report scrutinises tactical actions to identify challenges that need solving.
+
+The prerequisite condition for any offensive action is fires dominance. This has been achieved through blinding the counterbattery capability of Russian guns and the availability of precise and long-range artillery systems. Ensuring the sustainability of this advantage by properly resourcing ammunition production and spares for a consolidated artillery park is critical.
+
+Ukraine is suffering from heavy rates of equipment loss, but the design of armoured fighting vehicles supplied by its international partners is preventing this from converting into a high number of killed personnel. It is vital that Ukrainian protected mobility fleets can be recovered, repaired and sustained. This also demands a focus on industrial capacity and fleet consolidation.
+
+Attempts at rapid breakthrough have resulted in an unsustainable rate of equipment loss. Deliberately planned tactical actions have seen Ukrainian forces take Russian positions with small numbers of casualties. However, this approach is slow, with approximately 700–1,200 metres of progress every five days, allowing Russian forces to reset. One key limitation on the ability to exploit or maintain momentum is mine reconnaissance in depth. The exploration of technological tools for conducting standoff mine reconnaissance would be of considerable benefit to Ukrainian units.
+
+Another limiting factor in Ukrainian tactical operations is staff capacity at battalion and brigade level. Training of staff would significantly assist Ukrainian forces. This will only be helpful, however, if training is built around the tools and structure that Ukraine employs, rather than teaching NATO methods that are designed for differently configured forces. There is also a critical requirement to refine collective training provided to Ukrainian units outside Ukraine so that Ukrainian units can train in a manner closer to how they fight. This requires regulatory adjustment to allow for the combination of tools that are highly restricted on many European training areas.
+
+Russian forces have continued to adapt their methods. Some of these adaptations are context specific, such as the increased density of minefields, from a doctrinal assumption of 120 metres to a practical aim to make them 500 metres deep. Other adaptations are systemic and will likely have a sustained impact on Russian doctrine and capability development. The foremost of these is the dispersal of electronic warfare systems rather than their concentration on major platforms, a shift to application-based command and control tools that are agnostic of bearer, and a transition to a dependence on more precise fires owing to the recognised inability to achieve the previously doctrinally mandated weight of imprecise fire given the threat to the logistics sustaining Russian guns. It is vital that Ukraine’s partners assist the country’s preparations for winter fighting, and subsequent campaign seasons now, if initiative is to be retained into 2024.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Russian forces suffered major setbacks in autumn 2022 with the collapse of the Western Group of Forces in Kharkiv and a compelled withdrawal from Kherson. In response to these setbacks, General Sergei Surovikin, then commanding Russian forces in Ukraine, adopted a new strategy. First, Russia would use long-range precision strikes to wage an attritional campaign against Ukraine’s electricity and reticulation infrastructure with the aim of making Ukraine’s cities uninhabitable during the winter. Second, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation would build a series of defence lines across the occupied territories in a bid to blunt further Ukrainian advances and protract the conflict by exhausting Ukrainian troops. The extensive preparation for defensive operations – compared with the aggressive war aims of the Kremlin – contributed to Surovikin being removed in January, with General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, launching an ill-prepared and costly series of offensive thrusts in January 2023. Nevertheless, the defence lines were completed, and Russia has been able to fall back on these defences after the failure of its offensive actions. The Surovikin Line now poses a major barrier to Ukrainian troops seeking to liberate the occupied territories.
+
+During the preparation of Ukraine’s offensive, various concepts of operation were examined. Much of the data supporting the tactics that Ukraine’s international partners sought to train Ukrainian forces to adopt was based on operational analysis from the 20th century that did not contend with a range of technologies employed in Ukraine. Understanding how effective these tactics have been, therefore, is important for refining both the tactics of Ukraine’s international partners, and improving the training provided to Ukrainian forces for subsequent operations. This report seeks to explore a set of tactical actions fought by the Ukrainian military in the opening phases of the counteroffensive and how both Ukrainian and Russian sides have refined their approach in response.
+
+The overall plan for the offensive is highly sensitive. Detailed accounts of aggregate losses and other data are also sensitive because they would provide Russia with information about the extent to which they have written down Ukrainian units. Therefore, instead of trying to summarise progress throughout the offensive, this report presents a case study of a series of tactical actions, fought over a two-week period over the villages of Novodarivka and Rivnopil, straddling the border between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. The series of tactical actions is chosen because it is representative of wider trends, and informative as to how Russian forces manage different tactical challenges, and the various approaches employed by Ukrainian troops. The overview is based on accounts of the operations by participants, captured documents from Russian command posts, open-source material including satellite imagery of the engagements, and a review of non-public videos of the relevant tactical actions. This report was presented to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) prior to publication to ensure that its release would not compromise any ongoing operations or tactics. The report remains solely the work of the authors named.
+
+
+### I. Taking Novodarivka and Rivnopil
+
+The line of contact between Ukrainian and Russian forces along the boundary between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts had been relatively static over the months preceding Ukraine’s offensive. Russian offensive operations in early 2023 had focused on Vulhedar, some 40–50 kilometres to the east, and Bakhmut. Ukrainian troops remained dug into tree lines around a kilometre to the north of Novodarivka, around the village of Novopil. A brigade of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) had been holding the line for some time, reinforced in May by a mechanised brigade and another line brigade in anticipation of the offensive. The mechanised brigade would spearhead the breakthrough. The Russians had a company in Novodarivka and another in Rivnopil, with a third holding a series of fighting positions between the two settlements. Behind this were additional reserves including armour. The approaches to the settlements were heavily mined. To begin advancing south towards the Surovikin Line, Ukrainian forces needed to break through these villages, and thereafter through Priyutne, approximately 6 kilometres to the south.
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/ED4mL1C.png)
+_▲ __Figure 1: Russian Brigade Map of Force Laydown and Assessed Ukrainian Positions as of 10 April 2023.__ Source: Captured by Ukrainian forces during fighting in June 2023._
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/M81kQPc.png)
+_▲ __Figure 2: Recreated Map of Russian Positions at Novodarivka and Rivnopil.__ Source: Map captured by Ukrainian forces during fighting in June 2023; Maxar Technologies._
+
+The Ukrainian offensive began in late May with a protracted period of preparatory artillery fires. For the Rivnopil sector, batteries of M777 155-mm howitzers had been assigned to support the effort, setting up their firing positions to the northwest. Usually, Ukrainian howitzers would have to displace 2–15 minutes from opening fire, depending on their distance from different threat systems. This time it was clear that Ukrainian intelligence had accurately marked down Russian firing positions, and with the greater range afforded by 155-mm guns, the Ukrainian gunners quickly caused Russian artillery to be pulled back. Since the targets in this phase were largely in the close, the Ukrainian artillery established a steady rhythm of strikes with little need to displace. There was a sense of elation among the crews and the infantry watching the fire. For months each gun was strictly limited in the number of rounds available. Ukraine had been trying to conserve its ammunition to stockpile for the offensive. Now there was freedom to fire and when calls for resupply were made, additional rounds were promptly delivered.
+
+The Ukrainians also worked to degrade Russian tactical reserves using UAVs. Reconnaissance by day would locate Russian positions, which would be attacked at night using converted agricultural UAVs dropping RPGs. These tactics were fairly binary in their viability. If Russian electronic warfare (EW) was active, the UAVs could not get in and usually were not committed. If there was a relaxation in electronic protection, the effects could be dramatic. In one incident, a company of Russian tanks had taken up position in a woodblock behind the front. Five UAVs, each carrying four RPGs, were dispatched, destroying or seriously damaging seven of the tanks, although all of the UAVs were lost in the process.
+
+The decision to attempt a breach of the initial Russian fighting positions was taken on the evening of 3 June, with mechanised troops assigned the task. There was a debate within the command group over the bogginess of the ground after recent rainfall. Nevertheless, the decision was to proceed. The initial attack was to aim to breach an area where the minefields were less dense, because of the short distance between the lines, and to break into the village of Novodarivka. The village had been almost entirely destroyed by Russian shelling when originally taken and was now simply a set of fighting positions for a Russian infantry company. Long and thin, running east to west, the village provided the Russians with covered positions that overlooked most approaches to their company positions to the east and west.
+
+After identifying the points for the breach, the offensive started early in the morning of 4 June. Two UR-77 Meteorit charges were fired across the narrowest part of the minefield, blowing two 6-metre-wide channels from the treeline to the north to the edge of Novodarivka. Under covering fire from artillery, the first column advanced along the eastern breach. The column was led by a pair of tanks, followed by MaxxPro MRAPs carrying the infantry. Unfortunately, the MRAPs struggled in the boggy ground, especially in the wake of the tanks. Several of the MRAPs bogged in, while the cleared lane was insufficiently wide for other vehicles to pass. It was at this point, with the column fully committed to the breach, that a pair of Russian tanks unmasked and began to engage the column. The Ukrainian tanks fired back at a range of around 800 metres. Nevertheless, the vehicles in the column were knocked out in succession. Infantry disembarking either turned back, or pressed forwards along the cleared lane, trying to find shelter. Some infantry sections made it to the edge of the village, but the open ground behind them, now scoured by fire, was perilous to traverse, risking this force’s isolation. Too small to take the village, the Ukrainian military now had to press ahead or risk the destruction of the platoon that had made it to Novodarivka. The threat to those suppressed in the minefield eased after SPG-9 recoilless guns managed to engage the Russian tanks from the flank, knocking them out. This allowed casualties to be extracted.
+
+The commitment of the second company to the western breach was necessitated both by the requirement to make progress against the objective and to reinforce the troops in Novodarivka. The ground proved firmer along this lane. However, when the column was fully committed to the breach, two more Russian tanks emerged, moving at pace towards the column and firing. Via UAV feeds, the command post watched the emergence of the enemy, and fires were brought down to try and disrupt the action. Exposed, the breaching company attempted to accelerate through the breach, but deviated from course. All vehicles in the company were then immobilised by mine strike in succession. Russian fires then began to range on the column. The dismounts once again bifurcated, some reaching the outskirts of the village and others withdrawing.
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/VrSqAvs.png)
+_▲ __Figure 3: Assault and Aftermath of the Breach of Novodarivka.__ Source: Planet Labs._
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/67T457q.png)
+_▲ __Figure 4: Assault and Aftermath of the Breach of Novodarivka.__ Source: Maxar Technologies, 6 June 2023._
+
+The Russian defenders inside the village displaced to account for the positions that had now been occupied, falling back to strongpoints in a farm to the east of the village, and to several fighting positions along the central road. Recognising the importance of expanding the ground held to disperse the force from Russian fires, the Ukrainian commander deployed two assault groups to reinforce. One group in platoon strength worked its way along the breach, using the immobilised vehicles as cover, while fires suppressed the Russian positions. Another platoon situated to the west noted that a fold of dead ground had become viable as the repositioning of Russian forces in the village removed it from view, while dense foliage prevented overhead observation by UAS. These troops advanced cautiously to the western end of Novodarivka and began to assault Russian positions to secure the crossroads that bifurcated the settlement. After some fierce fighting, the Russian troops withdrew eastwards to prevent their positions from becoming isolated. Fighting inside Novodarivka would continue for a further week with Russian firing positions in the eastern farmstead holding out until isolated by another Ukrainian action towards Rivnopil. Despite the Russians holding some positions, these no longer overlooked the approaches to other Russian units, opening up additional avenues of attack. The first new position to be assaulted was the elevated ground to the west of Novodarivka. Previously, Russian positions in the settlement had denied the approaches to the hill, but with these firing posts removed, Ukrainian infantry were able to contest the position from which Russian artillery spotters had previously directed fire against Ukrainian troops.
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/Qu0NWIZ.png)
+_▲ __Figure 5: Advance on Novodarivka.__ Source: Maxar Technologies, Telegram, RUSI._
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/ByLS1TJ.png)
+_▲ __Figure 6: Advance on Novodarivka.__ Source: Maxar Technologies, Telegram, RUSI._
+
+Before any further advances could be taken, it was necessary to deal with the Russian company in front of the village of Rivnopil to the east. This position controlled access to a series of woodblocks that ran semi-contiguously north to south. Ukrainian commanders were concerned that if they attempted to press ahead, Russian anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW) teams and other troops would work their way around the flank and cause significant damage to critical equipment. The position therefore needed to be taken. At the same time, however, Ukrainian commanders were wary. They had lost two companies of equipment to take Novodarivka. Such a loss rate was not sustainable if they were to eventually breach the Surovikin Line. It was therefore essential that the assault on the Rivnopil positions was accomplished without similar setbacks.
+
+The attack on the Russian company position in front of Rivnopil would be led by TDF troops. In order to carry out the operation, the attacking force was augmented with two tanks from a neighbouring brigade and a battery of artillery. The attack began with artillery preparation of the Russian lines. Thereafter, the two tanks moved into positions where they had line of sight to the objective and began to deliver fire. The tanks, moving in and out of cover, engaged the Russian firing positions to draw the attention of and suppress the defenders. Shortly thereafter, artillery strikes on the fighting positions were combined with the delivery of smoke in front of the tanks. The tanks worked forwards, giving the impression that smoke was being used to cover the advance of infantry.
+
+While the tanks fixed the attention of the defence, a platoon multiple of Ukrainian assault troops moved along the treeline to the east of the Russian fighting positions. From there, it began to lay down suppressing fire and advance in pairs. The action drew the attention of the defence, which now recognised a clear tactical play, with a fixing action to its front, and a major assault about to be launched against its flank. The Russian unit began to reposition to prepare for this attack and attempted to win the firefight to the east. Reinforcing the perception that it was about to be assaulted, the Ukrainian artillery then delivered a heavy salvo against the positions, signposting an imminent assault.
+
+The assault when it came did not materialise as the Russian defenders had envisaged. Instead, a platoon of assault troops, having infiltrated forwards along the western flank of the position then advanced rapidly, reaching the defensive positions that had been thinned out in anticipation of the assault to the east. Disorientated and fearing encirclement, the Russian troops began to withdraw towards Rivnopil, abandoning their communications equipment, and leaving five troops behind who were taken prisoner. Ukrainian forces had to exploit the attack quickly, advancing beyond the company position, because its coordinates were pre-registered with Russian artillery which delivered strikes on the trenches. Nevertheless, the rapid collapse of this position forced a redistribution of forces in Rivnopil itself, allowing another brigade to launch an attack on the village and, over several days, drive the Russians to fall back to the tree lines beyond the village. Eventually, Russian troops withdrew across a water obstacle behind the village and blew several agricultural dams to flood the area, establishing a string of ATGW firing posts in the tree lines beyond. The density of the ATGW screen was significant, with approximately four launchers per treeline with 50 missiles. These ATGW teams allow advances to be made past them and then conduct anti-tank ambushes from the flank before attempting to withdraw. They therefore had to be cleared deliberately before any armour could be pushed forwards. With only one obstacle-crossing vehicle available, the Ukrainian units had to pause to consolidate their gains.
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/BGdchQT.png)
+_▲ __Figure 7: Positions In Front of Rivnopil.__ Source: Maxar Technologies, June 2023; Planet Labs._
+
+The capture of Novodarivka and Rivnopil took two weeks, with the need to secure flank positions being a prerequisite to further advances. Thus, the rate of advance during this period was one tactical advance for three days of fighting, with each advance moving the line of control approximately 700–1,200 metres forwards. The difference in methods for the various advances produced starkly contrasting results in terms of the level of expenditure for the gains made. Whereas the first tactical advance against Novodarivka cost two companies worth of equipment, losses throughout the attack on Rivnopil were light. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces made adaptations to their methods after these initial exchanges. The emphasis for Ukrainian troops moved to taking ground while conserving equipment and personnel.
+
+
+### II. Russian Lessons and Adaptation
+
+The tactical actions around Novodarivka and Rivnopil were largely seen as successes by Russian forces insofar as they inflicted sufficient equipment losses in the early phases so as to degrade the reach of Ukrainian manoeuvre units assuming a consistent rate of loss through the depth of Russia’s defensive positions. At the same time Russian losses in artillery and tanks were high, with the former being more concerning for the Russian command. Russian troop losses, while acceptable for the 58th Combined Arms Army as regards the level of attrition inflicted, were nevertheless unsustainable in the context of a protracted assault unless reinforcement was delivered. In short, Russia achieved tactical success in preventing a breakthrough, and could achieve operational success if it continued to inflict comparable equipment loss on the enemy. Attrition of personnel, however, if it remained consistent into the autumn, posed a risk of operational defeat, while loss of artillery systems threatened a reduction in capacity to attrit Ukrainian troops. Given this dynamic, several adaptations were made to Russian defensive operations.
+
+The first adaptation was to increase the depth of minefields. Russian minefields had been doctrinally set down as 120-metres deep prior to the offensive. Following the early clashes, it was noted that this depth of mines was breachable by MICLIC and UR-77 to a sufficient depth to enable infantry to get into Russian defensive positions. The aim, therefore, has been to increase the depth of minefields to up to 500 metres, well beyond any rapid breaching capability. This has had a series of secondary implications. First, the Russian logistics systems were organised to equip brigades with sufficient mines to comply with doctrinal templates. The increased depth of the fields means that Russian forces have had insufficient mines to consistently meet this lay down with a density of mines consistent with doctrine. The result has been improvisation of explosive devices, the diversification of the range of mines ceded, and the decreasing regularity of minefields. Other common adaptations have included the laying of two anti-tank mines together – one atop the other – compensating for reduced density by ensuring that vehicles are immobilised by single mine-strikes, even when vehicles are equipped with dozer blades. Prior to this it was not unusual for a tank equipped with a dozer blade to survive three mine strikes before being immobilised by the fourth. Although the consistency of the minefields is now diminished, this has significantly complicated Ukrainian planning and minefield reconnaissance.
+
+Russian forces have also assessed that the practice of setting pre-registered fires to engage their own positions once they are lost is inefficient and dangerous when the enemy has an artillery advantage in terms of counterbattery detection, range and accuracy. The problems with this method have included the exposure of friendly guns, reduced effectiveness because of the Ukrainian tendency to displace from the fighting positions as soon as possible, and a dependency on communications. To solve these problems the Russians have resorted to preparing their fighting positions for reserve demolition. This is often done with improvised charges. The template is to detonate the first line once Ukrainian troops enter the fighting positions, while Russian forces withdraw through the rear of the trenches. The Russians assess this to be more responsive and assured than the application of artillery fire, and to threaten the boldest and most capable assault troops in Ukrainian formations, deterring attacks on firing posts.
+
+If the increased complexity and extent of the minefields imposes constraints on adversary tempo, and reserve demolition of fighting positions deters the rapid clearing of positions, this fixing of the enemy requires that the Russians have a means to inflict damage on advancing troops. Artillery remains the primary method, but with fewer guns and a requirement to protect them, there is now a greater emphasis placed on other means. One of the foremost methods adopted by the AFRF is the emplacement of ATGW teams to the flanks of their positions, prioritising better trained and motivated troops to conduct anti-tank ambushes. Although there are limited personnel capable and willing to fight forward in this way, there appears to be no shortage of Russian ATGWs, with Ukrainian troops noting that these teams are well stocked with recently manufactured munitions. These troops are also prioritised for directing fire from standoff aviation.
+
+The use of attack aviation has posed a consistent challenge for Ukrainian forces throughout the counteroffensive. The foremost threat comes from Ka-52 Alligators firing Vikhr and Ataka ATGMs. However, the Russians have also begun mounting Ataka on Mi-35Ms, which also engage in area-effect strikes utilising salvos of lofted S-8 rockets. Aviation strikes are launched from a depth of approximately 8–10 kilometres from the target. Ukrainian forces note that the presence of attack aviation is often heralded by the lifting of GPS jamming among Russian formations, reflecting the need for precise navigation in order to coordinate strikes, given that both armies are using many of the same platforms. Russian helicopter groups are also often flying with an EW-equipped helicopter for defensive purposes, equipped with directional pods aimed at targeting radar. The Russians are having to keep helicopters relatively close to the front, making their forward arming and refuelling points and other infrastructure vulnerable. Nevertheless, shortage of Ukrainian tactical air defence, the low altitude maintained by these assets, and the limited period during which they are in the hover to deliver effects all make countering attack aviation difficult.
+
+The Russian military has also determined to tactically exploit opportunities when Ukrainian forces have become bogged down by aggressive flanking with armour to knock out Ukrainian systems. It is worth noting that Russia often loses the tanks used for these counterattacks but they inflict disproportionate damage because the mines constrain Ukrainian vehicles in their ability to manoeuvre or respond. This willingness to counterattack and a decision to defend forwards highlight how training for Russian tank crews and other specialisms has continued to function, generating new crews with some tactical competence compared with the disruption in collective training that has hampered Russian infantry.
+
+There are also areas of adaptation that reflect a significant improvement in practice and are not specific to the current context. One area of continued Russian adaptation but also improvement is EW. Russian EW has been a major area of investment and Russian EW operators tend to be technically competent. Nevertheless, Russian EW platforms have largely comprised modernised versions of Soviet equipment, which placed each type of effector on a single large platform, with formations of platforms providing a range of EW effects. The vulnerability of this approach has been recognised by the AFRF given the targeting of specific emitters. This has, in the first instance, led to the much more subtle employment of large platforms such as Zhitel R330-Zh. It has also driven a preference for the mounting of antenna on light platforms, or the dismounting and distribution of antenna that can be placed to cover tactical positions. The channelling of effects through antenna can therefore be carried out by EW suites that are not tied to the emitting signature. The loss of antenna when they are targeted is a cost that the Russian military feels it can bear. This is a transition in progress and so is not a uniform approach. Nevertheless, the preference to use systems such as Pole-21 and to treat them as disposable systems in order to provide wide-area protection from UAV strikes reflects a change in mindset, and how the Russian EW branch is learning from the conflict.
+
+Another interesting area of conceptual innovation – underway before Ukraine’s offensive but accelerated by the dynamics at play today – is a transition of Russian fires doctrine. Based on statistics gathered during the Second World War, Russian artillery had established levels of fire that were assessed to deliver specified effects against defined targets. For example, 720 rounds were assessed to be necessary to achieve the suppression of a platoon fighting position. This is the basis on which Russian fires operated in the opening phases of their invasion of Ukraine. It is an approach that the Russians now assess to be non-viable. First, the Russian forces lack the ammunition to sustain this volume of fire. Second, the logistics enabling such a volume of fire is too vulnerable to detection and long-range precision strike. Third, the loss of counterbattery radar and barrel wear have meant that this mass approach to fire suppression is of diminishing effectiveness.
+
+The general conclusion that Russian fires doctrine is non-viable has caused a doubling down on the concept of the Reconnaissance Fires Complex (RFC) with effect being prioritised over volume. While manufacture of a range of Russian munitions has become constrained, production of Krasnopol 152-mm laser-guided shells has been prioritised, with newly manufactured shells being widely available across the front. The use of UAVs to designate for Krasnopol has also been increased. Lancet has also been used extensively, along with FPV UAVs, to strike lead elements of Ukrainian units. Flown in complexes with ISR UAVs, these effects provide precision. The Russian military is, of course, continuing to rely heavily on MLRS, 120-mm mortars and other imprecise systems, while corner-cutting in the production of its munitions is becoming apparent. Nevertheless, the trend appears to be towards maximising accuracy and reducing the number of rounds necessary to achieve the desired outcome rather than resorting to saturation fire. This is a concerning trend, as over time it will likely significantly improve Russian artillery. The growth in the complexity, diversity and density of Russian UAVs is concerning. The gains in both effect of the warhead and the economy of its design between Lancet-3 and Lancet-3M demonstrate how the Russians are actively improving their fielded equipment. Modifications to loitering munitions to achieve noise reduction on Shahed-136 and to harden navigation are also notable. Here, it is clear that the AFRF are actively learning from Ukrainian forces, and in doing so, reducing the extent of some Ukrainian advantages.
+
+Enabling the RFC depends on communications. Here too, the Russian military is making important progress. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russian forces depended heavily on bespoke military radios. In the scramble for equipment late last year, a wide array of civilian systems was employed. Conceptually, however, the Russians now appear to have moved on, increasingly relying on military bearer networks but app-based services for encoding and accessing data. The result is that a system such as Strelets can provide a 3G connection to multiple devices operating applications that are intuitive for civilian users. This separation of bearers and services is nascent and the security and robustness of the systems being tested must be doubted. Nevertheless, the reduced training burden of this approach and the improvements in fire direction already achieved mean that the AFRF are likely to continue to push in this direction and increasingly systematise their communications architecture around these methods.
+
+
+### III. Ukrainian Challenges and Requirements
+
+Ukrainian adaptation to overcome these challenges is sensitive. Instead, therefore, this report will outline several areas of persistent challenge that Ukraine’s international partners could focus on to refine the support they offer to the AFU. Given the trajectory of the offensive it is now clear that major ground combat operations will continue in 2024 and so improving support to Ukraine’s force generation process now is critical.
+
+Insofar as Ukrainian forces have been able to make progress during the offensive it has been dependent on fires superiority. Outranging the Russians, combined with having better means for detecting enemy artillery and carrying out counterbattery fires, is an essential Ukrainian advantage. This advantage is limited in its duration by the serviceability of Ukrainian artillery pieces, the availability of replacement barrels, and the continued supply of 155-mm ammunition. With 17 artillery systems in operation, it is evident that replacement barrels cannot be produced for all systems, because of the shortage of barrel machines across NATO. It is therefore vital that Ukraine’s international partners invest to ensure that there is a sustainable supply for a consolidated artillery park, focusing on maintaining a more limited range of guns at greater scale. If this is not achieved, it will undermine the preconditions for Ukraine to continue to make progress next year. The protection of guns from Lancet-3M and other loitering munitions is also becoming a critical priority and research into methods of force protection should be accelerated.
+
+The importance of sustaining combat platforms provided by Ukraine’s international partners is also important for protected mobility. There is a diverse range of vehicles that have been donated, from MRAPs to IFVs. Some are no longer in production, while others are still in widespread service. Ukrainian troops note that Western-provided platforms are vastly superior to their Soviet-legacy protected mobility platforms for one fundamental reason: crew survivability. Whereas for a Soviet mechanised section, its BMP was its primary weapons system, and so Soviet planners treated as synonymous the loss of the BMP with the loss of the section, Western armies treat mechanisation as an addition to basic infanteering. Protected mobility is aimed at delivering infantry to their objective, which the infantry then assault. This difference in mindset, combined with a different approach to losses, means that there is a heavy emphasis in Western platforms on the survivability of dismounts even if the vehicle is mission killed. By contrast with Soviet-legacy platforms, the compromise of the vehicle’s armour is also usually catastrophic for those inside it. Life support systems are a secondary consideration. Given that Russia has greater mass than Ukraine, the accumulation of experience and longevity of troops is strategically vital for the AFU. But while Western-supplied protected mobility may be doing a good job at enabling their dismounts to survive – as demonstrated by the infantry still making it to Novodarivka despite their vehicles falling victim to mines and enemy fires – there is still a high loss rate of platforms. These platforms are often mobility killed rather than destroyed. But rebuilding them demands a consistent provision of spare parts. That is challenging for vehicles that are no longer in production. Again, therefore, Ukraine’s international partners need to ensure that the industrial support is available to make the Ukrainian military sustainable.
+
+The depth of exploitation of the conditions created by fires superiority is significantly limited by the capacity for minefield reconnaissance. At present, Ukrainian operations are inherently limited in their tempo by the fact that as Russian minelaying becomes less and less uniform and omnipresent, it is necessary to thoroughly recce ahead of any major push lest equipment loss becomes unacceptable. This cannot be carried out in depth and often relies on dismounted engineers. It is therefore very difficult to plan operations beyond the defences immediately in front of Ukrainian positions, meaning that breaches forwards are difficult to exploit. A note of caution is that because of the deviation from doctrine, minefields differ in their actual contours from what is shown on Russian plans. Assistance, therefore, should focus on equipment and techniques for detecting mines. One critical area that could assist is the use of algorithmic image analysis that could be conducted using UAVs to map minefields more quickly.
+
+Planning remains a significant challenge for Ukrainian units because of the limited availability of trained staff officers. The rapid expansion of the AFU with the mobilisation of civilians means that there are many more units than staffs. Although brigades have technical specialists able to run the communications and support systems they need, and often have skilled commanders, planning shops and experienced G3 staff are scarce. This limits the scale at which brigades can combine arms, especially during offensive operations where planning times are compressed. This was an area of support identified as a requirement as early as June 2022 but Ukraine’s partners have not effectively provided it. It is vital that any staff training that is offered is not premised on putting Ukrainian staff through academic courses aimed at creating NATO staff officers. A relatively small number of staff applying NATO processes will have to revert to the mean once they are back in Ukraine and working with the bulk of a staff who has not received training on the same procedures. Instead, training should be based on observation of how Ukrainian brigade staffs operate and the tools they depend on and then offering training on techniques that maximise the efficiency of how those staffs function within this context. The training must be bespoke. Ideally, it would be of a whole staff. It must also accurately represent the communications and ISR tools employed by Ukrainian brigades.
+
+Another area of critical priority is training junior leaders to conduct tactical battle drills. Again, attrition and the expansion of the Ukrainian military mean that junior leaders with deep expertise in offensive operations are not universally available across Ukraine’s formations. This manifests in referring of combat management to higher echelons, where there are more experienced officers. This drives the continuation of combat management at higher echelon and limits mission command. Additional pressure is placed on the brigade, limiting the scale and complexity at which it can operate. This was demonstrated during the attack on Rivnopil. Only 3% of Ukrainian artillery-fire missions are smoke missions. As demonstrated during the assault on the company position north of Rivnopil, smoke can be extremely useful in confusing the enemy ground force and obscuring assault actions. But smoke also has the effect of obscuring the view from UAVs which higher Ukrainian echelons and command posts use to coordinate activity and conduct combat management. Commanders persistently prioritise maintaining their own understanding of the battlefield over laying down smoke and concealing their personnel’s movements. Given the criticality of rapid application of artillery to support movement, this prioritisation is understandable, but it also reflects limitations in the ability of the brigade to trust tactical commanders to execute actions when not directed by high headquarters with greater situational awareness. Given the saturation of the headquarters that results, it is vital to train junior leaders, in combination with expanding staff capacity.
+
+Another area where training needs to be refined is in gearing the support provided outside Ukraine with the AFU’s training structure inside Ukraine. At present, individual training conducted outside of Ukraine builds upwards from individual skills. There is not enough time in the course to move on to collective training at the company, while the safety cases on Western ranges require certification of individual skills before more complex activities can be trained. This approach to safety may make sense in peacetime for Western armies. For Ukraine, it simply transfers risk from training to operations. The reality is that individual training can be delivered by the AFU in Ukraine. What cannot easily be delivered is collective training. This is because the AFU does collective training “in the unit”. Soldiers who are certified in their individual skills by training centres are assigned to units and it is up to the brigade commander to carry out training activities. If a brigade is fighting a sector of the front, it must establish a training area behind the frontline and rotate troops back to exercise. This limits the scale of training to company-sized activities at maximum, with the level of training undertaken entirely dependent on the intensity of operational activity at the front. This approach to force generation means that most Ukrainian battalions are generating approximately two platoons of troops which are considered fully capable of leading assault actions. While the rest of the battalion provides reinforcement, and the ability to hold ground, the size at which formations can conduct offensive action is severely constrained.
+
+Collective training outside Ukraine is hampered by the fact that because of the safety culture in NATO, Ukrainian troops cannot train as they fight. Moreover, many NATO tactics either require a level of training that is not feasible within the timeframe available, or are not validated in the modern threat environment. A good example here is that Ukrainian training emphasises the threat from artillery even when teaching squad tactics. For Western armies that build skills incrementally, artillery is introduced into training after basic infantry tactics are mastered. More complex training involving artillery cannot be conducted until troops are certified in their basic skills to be able to exercise safely. For Ukraine, however, troops who are not prepared to deal with artillery are not prepared for the fight. Another example is the shaping effect of UAVs. Most NATO training areas are severely restricted in the types of UAVs that can be flown and how they can be used. This is because of fears that UAVs will malfunction and fly into controlled airspace, such as the area around civilian airports. The problem is that for collective training above company, Ukrainian troops need to be prepared for and practise tactics in an environment where there are up to 25 UAVs observing their movements, while UAVs are also critical to their own combat management. Thus, on partner training grounds where they could conduct collective training that is hard to carry out in Ukraine, they are prevented by regulation from either actually practising and refining their own command and control procedures, or exercising tactics that realistically represent the threat. This gearing of training to meet Ukraine’s needs is critical if future rounds of mobilised Ukrainian troops are to be properly prepared to continue the liberation of their territory.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Operational analysis of tactical actions during Ukraine’s summer offensive reveals a range of important areas where Ukraine’s international partners can refine their support. Improvements in international training and other assistance will not have an impact on the current offensive. They will be critical however for Ukraine next year in its next round of force generation. Confidence that forces can be regenerated and that equipment can be repaired and sustained is also important for the AFU in shaping its planning for the current phases of operations. Delays in improvements to training or the industrial investment in making Ukrainian capabilities sustainable will similarly not have an immediate effect, but will impose a considerable cost on Ukraine next year. Some of the challenges currently limiting Ukrainian operations are a direct consequence of the failure to address identified requirements with sufficient alacrity in 2022.
+
+It is also important to recognise that Russian forces are fighting more competently and with reasonable tenacity in the defence. Although they are losing ground, Russian forces are largely conducting orderly withdrawals from positions and are effectively slowing down and thereby managing Ukrainian advances while imposing a considerable cost in equipment. Another important point is that scarcity of systems that Russia had previously depended on to offer advantages are causing significant adaptation in the Russian armed forces and some of the solutions arrived at are likely to be continued and built on after the war. Most consequential of these are the move to application-based command and control services, agnostic of military bearers, and the shift in fires to emphasise effect for rounds fired rather than volume of rounds delivered on the enemy.
+
+The Ukrainian military has learned from initial setbacks during its summer offensive. Even if a rapid breakthrough has proven difficult, the attrition being afflicted on Russian forces will see a degradation in the defence over time, and once a critical mass of losses is reached, that degradation may become non-linear. Given that it is unlikely, however, that this offensive will deliver a decisive liberation of ground, both Russia and Ukraine now face the question of how to regenerate combat power for the next round of fighting, into 2024 and beyond. For Russia, mobilising people is simple, but providing trainers and equipment for them remains a bottleneck. The conditions under which mobilisation is conducted are also constrained by Russian political considerations. Although it would make most sense to mobilise personnel before they are needed, Moscow consistently defers taking critical decisions until there is an immediate need. For Ukraine, there is first the question of how to retain as much of its experienced forces as possible, and second how to expand the scale at which its forces can operate by working with its international partners to improve collective training. Whether Ukraine’s partners can overcome their habitual sluggishness in doing what they have identified as necessary will be critical in determining whether Ukraine can maintain the initiative into the next fighting season in 2024.
+
+Given the lead-times involved, one question that should dominate the thinking of Ukraine’s international partners today is the dynamics of winter warfare. Last year, Russia prepared its troops poorly for winter conditions and suffered disproportionately as a result. Ukraine’s current offensive operations are likely to continue into the autumn, but the question should be asked whether actions can be taken now to maintain the pressure through the winter. It is highly likely that Russia will hope that the winter will cause Ukraine to pause its offensive efforts, while Moscow will likely return to the attempted destruction of energy and reticulation infrastructure across Ukraine. It is now clear that the conflict will protract. It is therefore important that Ukraine’s international partners invest now to give Ukraine protracted advantages. Failure to make timely adjustment to support will come at a heavy price in 2024.
+
+---
+
+__Jack Watling__ is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute. Jack works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation, assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts.
+
+__Nick Reynolds__ is the Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. His research interests include land power, wargaming and simulation. Prior to joining RUSI he worked for Constellis.