diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-10-26-the-karma.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-10-26-the-karma.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..79341091
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-10-26-the-karma.md
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "惡有惡報"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2023-10-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/tsglgsF.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+有一些事情十分老套，雖然是老套，偏偏又發生在他身上。
+
+故事在繁華的香港市中心，這裡有間當舖名叫"歡樂當舖"。當然，歡樂當舖只是對老闆來說是歡樂，對於來典當的人，何來有歡樂之言。
+
+
+
+沒想到今時今日，歡樂當舖依然存在，老闆依然未死！難道有錢和長命是正比？
+
+"魚毛"應該要感激當舖老闆，如果不是他，也許死了的人應該是自己了。都是很久很久的事咯！
+
+魚毛未曾幫襯過歡樂當舖，如果不是"大耳窿"，他根本不會知道歡樂當舖的老闆是誰來的。大耳窿是魚毛的鄰居。
+
+魚毛失業，情緒低落，這一切都在大耳窿的眼裡。大耳窿故意接近魚毛，拍膊頭、握臂彎，就像一個好兄弟。兄弟有難，當然要伸出援手，他不斷遊說魚毛接受他的錢，他更給了魚毛九千元，當時月租房只不過是二千元，魚毛非常驚訝，而且感動，緣份也！
+
+當然，世間怎會有便宜的事，當魚毛還錢的時候，大耳窿要他還一萬三千元！魚毛頓時覺得這個人的臉容扭曲，極之邪惡！
+
+這件事，他不敢讓當時還未嫁給他的蝦妹知道，因為有一句香港通俗話，蝦妹經常說的"邊有咁大隻蛤乸隨街跳！"這意味著便宜莫貪。
+
+魚毛心慌了，聽說惹了大耳窿麻煩，他們會淋紅油、寫大字、鎖鐵閘、塞匙孔的...很可怕的!他不得不告訴包租公，即是房間的業主。魚毛一五一十地把事情告訴他。
+
+"大耳窿"這個人，當舖老闆一點也不陌生，他是歡樂當舖的常客，真豈有此理！搞到我頭上。老闆喃喃自語。
+
+
+最近，大耳窿頭頭碰著黑，他幾乎每次去歡樂當舖，也氣匆匆而回，每件貨老闆都說低價！賤價！偽貨！。他不單止去歡樂當舖打價，大耳窿還去了其它當舖。（他不知道附近十條街是同一個老闆的。）最後大耳窿的物品全都貶值地讓當舖，這個人，一去不回頭，永遠不會贖回物品的。
+
+本來，當舖老闆他打算把大耳窿在當舖典當的收益，替魚毛還債，但這樣不是好主意，他索性報警。
+
+因為根本沒有欠單借據之類的東西，很明顯是行騙，最後，魚毛只是還本金，事情就告一段落了。
+
+不過，除了大耳窿，還有大大大耳窿，就是大耳窿的債主，他典當的物品都沒有價值，他借錢出去利息卻收不回，卒之，被人打到頭破血流咯!
+
+魚毛對當舖老闆感激不盡。
+
+當舖老闆只說："我只不想孫女失去了一個書法老師吧！"
+
+當年...在這個城市裡，就是發生了這樣的一件事咯!
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-10-27-bill-for-having-an-affair.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-10-27-bill-for-having-an-affair.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..30a3e65b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-10-27-bill-for-having-an-affair.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "偷情的帳單"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2023-10-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/WiKh6zu.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+小君不知道爸爸為什麼要背叛媽媽。背叛了媽媽，就是背叛了小君，背叛了小君和媽媽，就是說他要放棄這個家。
+
+
+
+自從爸爸外面的事揭發了，他回家比以往更夜、比以往更少。
+
+在小君心目中，爸爸將不再是一個英雄，而是一個普通人。英雄，都是誤會而已。
+
+小君不知道什麼是"偷情"。
+
+對伴侶隱瞞，私下與別人發生感情或性關係，這就是"偷情"。
+
+不..不，這些小君都知道的，只是她不理解為何人們要這樣做？她的疑問是，爸爸為何要這樣做？
+
+"發生性行為"，知道什麼是發生性行為嗎？是赤條條的身體與別人在床上扭在一起，可是，扭著的那個人卻是別人愛的人。
+
+該知道這些行為，足以讓一個人輕生的，這些一舉一動，可以讓一個人割脈自殺、讓一個人吞下大量的藥物、會從高處跳下、會上吊...這一切都是情緒失控的。這些背叛性的行為是不道德的，會造成嚴重的傷害！為什麼有人依然這樣做？還是"偷情"根本是一件很普通的事情？並不是想象中的嚴重。不然，為什麼媽媽這樣冷靜？為什麼她沒有自殺？沒有上吊?小君不停地沉思，甚至乎胡思亂想。
+
+"偷情"對小君來說太深奧了。她只是一個大學生，和賢仔一起拍拖兩年，愛情單純而穩定，這感情不用偷不用騙，他們手拖手上街，誰都可以看見他們，一切都是光明正大。
+
+不像她的爸爸，與那個女人總是像貓捉老鼠、左閃右避，然而，始終被小君發現了他們！這是上天的安排？還是冥冥中的定數？抑或，偷情讓人身心疲累，再無法去掩飾了。
+
+不過，"偷情"是否很刺激？
+
+是！大多數人都是這樣說。而且那種"刺激"蓋過了一切的理智，蓋過了曾經說過的誓詞，現在變成謊言。
+
+"偷情"的心情是很複雜的，儘管帶著無謂的壓力、無謂的不滿，都會讓人不由自主地走進這個險境。
+
+小君看著這本書，細讀每一個段落。如果不是她的爸爸，她不會去想這些，因為她將要考試。但也正因為她的爸爸，她想徹底地了解成年人的感情世界，和"偷情"。小君很想知道，爸爸是否像其他人一樣，享受著一時刺激...興奮過後，依舊要付出沉重的代價。
+
+
+別人說暴風雨前夕，都是一片風平浪靜。
+
+小君覺得這句話很適合媽媽現在的情況。她不言不語，沒有任何動靜。
+
+丈夫今天不回家，阿清一個人走出露台。
+
+小君熟睡了。
+
+阿清點起了一根煙。她想回答小君的問題，卻開不了口。
+
+"偷情"那種讓人忐忑不安的心情，以往都嘗過！嘗過卻令人難過。也許興奮過後的苦果，正是現在眼前的回報。
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-10-31-the-seagulls.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-10-31-the-seagulls.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b8bfe837
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-10-31-the-seagulls.md
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "海鷗"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2023-10-31 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/DhHh7l9.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+陳寧最近發現家裡附近有很多海鷗，這些海鷗非常美麗，看來是來自遠方的，而且是同一個地方，因為牠們的翅膀很相像，惹人憐愛，不像本地的叫人嫌棄。
+
+
+
+陳寧心裡一動，覺得海鷗可以為他帶來利錢，因為他發覺城市人很願意花錢購買動植物和生物。
+
+可是海鷗經常突襲陳寧手中的食物，令陳寧心裡氣憤不特止，還眼巴巴斷了這條財路。
+
+陳寧忽然覺得海鷗不再美麗，還以猙獰的目光望著牠們。
+
+不知道是否這個原因，一群海鷗竟然乖乖靜下來，不再掠奪陳寧的食物。
+
+經過多次的測試，猙獰的目光果然令海鷗靜下來，也成為了陳寧的武器，然後他再用麻醉吹箭把海鷗一隻隻據為己有。
+
+美麗的照片、出色的修圖把海鷗弄成人間極品。
+
+他四處兜售，可是還是無人問津，他得不償願。
+
+陳寧心心不忿。
+
+貓、狗、鼠、狸、蟲也有人愛，偏偏海鷗卻無人要。
+
+陳寧又冒起另一條財路。
+
+他說海鷗的每一個器官都為人類帶來好處。
+
+視力很敏銳的海鷗，您不得不相信他能活養我們的眼睛。
+
+頭、翅膀、腿、胸部和腹部，每個部位都能把人類的身體變得完美，中風以及癌細胞都變得小兒科。
+
+他把這段文章發上互聯網去，鋪天蓋地。
+
+不要說世事荒謬，陳寧就是靠這個撈了一大筆。
+
+可是，因為他無憂止地接觸海鷗，感染了大量的細菌而發病，陳寧要付出醫療費一大筆。
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-11-11-individuals-subjecthood-in-the-ai-times.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-11-11-individuals-subjecthood-in-the-ai-times.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..20e1ed09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-11-11-individuals-subjecthood-in-the-ai-times.md
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "人工智能时代里的个人主体性"
+author: "李BOBO"
+date : 2023-11-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/uNkWhQR.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+主体性，是一个人对自己有系统性的认知：知道自己是谁；知道自己在做什么，要做什么；知道自己通向哪里，未来会长成什么...
+
+
+
+前几天看了OpenAI的发布会，让我印象最深的是GPT里生长出了GPTs，进一步地降低了人类进行创造的技术门槛。
+
+通常，当我们要去实现一个事情的时候，得先要有一个想法，然后再把这个想法通过技术手段去落地实现。如果你个人不具备这样的技术，那么就需要把想法变成可以精准传递的信息，以文字或者视听的方式传递给技术人员，委托他进行想法的实现。
+
+GPTs的历史意义在于它进一步降低了人类进行创造的技术门槛，让创造者只要有想法，并且能清楚表达就可以了，虽然目前还只是链接了OpenAI自己的技术池子，但是我相信在不久的将来会形成一个【技术互联的网络】，可以让每个人的想法更精准地和落地技术做匹配。
+
+这是一种万物生长的感觉。
+
+我们不只是可以在网络上创作文字，图片，影像等内容，而是我们开始可以在网络上非常轻易地创造产品/解决方案。
+
+
+
+国外的这种生命力对比我在国内的感受，有点像雨林和沙漠。
+
+之前沙漠有沙漠的生态，雨林有雨林的生态，去过雨林的人回到沙漠会感到不适，要做沙漠的生态恢复也只能是吭哧吭哧地一个点一个点地来恢复。
+
+但是现在人工智能的发展给我的感受就像是沙漠里开始下起连绵不断的大雨，更多的种子开始生根发芽。
+
+对于种子而言，这是一个好的事情，但是对于想要维持沙漠化的人而言，可能会是越来越大的挑战。
+
+人工智能给那些最富想象力，创造力的人降低了技术门槛，未来自然也会有更多想象会落地实现。
+
+换个角度，世界对于“创造力”的需求权重，又进一步加重了。
+
+
+
+虽然世界往更丰富的那个方向又更进了一步，但是它对于个人的意义确是循序渐进的。
+
+之前经常有听到一种声音，说是不想待在单位里面过那种“一眼就能望到头”的生活：沙漠确实会有些无聊。
+
+但是与沙漠生活相对应的雨林生活，虽然更丰富，其实也更复杂。
+
+如果你是一个消费者，那么雨林可以给你提供更多的物种，更多的体验，更多的资源...但是如果你要在雨林里生活，可能需要解决更多的问题和困难，需要你拥有适应雨林生活的更强的自主性。
+
+在沙漠里生活久了的人，一下子进入雨林的环境想要生活的话，也并不是那么容易。
+
+人工智能的发展，让整个世界往更加多样化的方向去发展，对个人而言，世界的丰富随之而来，但同时也可能会因为眼花缭乱的变化让人陷入迷失迷茫，陷入绚丽的旋涡无法自拔。
+
+所以，要在雨林生活，每个人首先需要准备好一个心里的种子，通过它来链接和世界的关系，找到自己在这个世界的位置。
+
+
+
+对于上述“种子”的解释有很多，用浅表的话叫做“想法”，你要有自己的想法，去做一些自己的事情；
+
+用更学术的角度去解释，叫做【主体性】。
+
+当一个人有了自己的【主体性】之后，他就会生成自己独特的看待世界的视角，因此，外部眼花缭乱的信息在他的眼里就有了秩序，可以被编织成有序的成果。
+
+当一个人有了自己的【主体性】之后，外部环境的丰富对于他而言就是取之不竭的养分，而不是撕扯注意力的不相关的干扰。
+
+当一个人有自己的【主体性】之后，他才能够生成自己的节奏，安定地往前走。
+
+但是，这个【主体性】的形成却并没有那么容易。
+
+回顾过往，可能热闹追了很多，
+
+但是....
+
+回顾自己的时候...
+
+你知道自己是谁了吗？
+
+...
+
+以上。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-11-14-is-the-schrodingers-cat-dead.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-11-14-is-the-schrodingers-cat-dead.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b4052e47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-11-14-is-the-schrodingers-cat-dead.md
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "薛定諤的貓死了沒？"
+author: "江世威"
+date : 2023-11-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/orFZ21P.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "一個關於悖論與觀察的系統論觀點"
+---
+
+### 那隻生死不明的貓依然生死不明
+
+
+
+薛定諤貓（Schrödinger’s cat）原先是為了回應量子力學的假定而被設計的思想實驗，即觀察是如何使量子的疊加態蹋縮成明確態？也就是箱子裡那隻要死不活的貓是怎麼在打開箱子的一瞬間變成是生或死的其中一種狀態？在哥本哈根解釋裡（Copenhagen interpretation），發生在微觀系統的觀察（測量）會使得兩個相悖的狀態傾向於其中一者，而薛定諤的問題是，觀察如何造成這一現象？關於這一點哥本哈根解釋並沒有提出充分的說明。
+
+本文的重點不是要從薛定諤的實驗去談論物理學的問題，而是藉由他的提問重新審視「觀察」和「悖論」的現象。由德國社會學家尼古拉斯魯曼（Niklas Luhmann）提出的系統論對此提供了另一種有趣的解法，觀察沒有造成蹋縮，或者更準確的說，觀察並沒有「直接」的決定貓的生死。觀察者的觀察只能影響到觀察的結果而不是箱子裡的貓，但一旦觀察改變，箱子裡的環境也會相應的發生變化。箱子內外是兩個封閉的系統，在兩者之間不會發生「輸入—輸出」的過程，沒有任何事物會在內外往返，箱子外的觀察無法觸及或跨越到箱子內部，反之亦然。但當箱子被打開，內外的界線發生了變動，箱子內部和外部的系統都會從自身感知到變化進而自我改變。也就是說只有對箱子外的觀察者而言，箱子裡的貓才是從即生又死的狀態過度到了生或死其中一種結果，但對於箱子內的觀察者來說情況就不是如此。
+
+開箱前觀察到的悖論不等於箱子裡的真實情況；開箱後觀察的結果也不是發生在箱子裡的客觀事實。假設開箱後貓咪活著，但原子核可能發生衰變也可能沒有，因為監控器有可能故障而沒有偵測到衰變的發生；如果開箱後貓咪死亡，同樣的原子核也可能衰變或不衰變，系著錘子的支撐杆可能鬆懈致使錘子擊碎裝有毒物的燒瓶。不同的可能性仍然存在，疊加態並沒有隨著箱子的掀開而被確定下來。悖論沒有被消除而是變成了「潛在」，這一點與多世界解釋（the many-worlds interpretation）相似。
+
+此外，在箱子打開「之前」與「之後」是兩種截然不同的觀察，它們之間不存在連續性。因此客觀坍縮理論（objective collapse theory）主張的，箱子裡的貓在箱子打開以前就已經是生或死的其中一種狀態，這一說法在系統論看來不能成立。箱子內部的狀態取決於與當下的觀察之間的關係，只有在箱子打開以前的觀察看來箱子內部才是不確定的；同樣的也只有對箱子打開以後的觀察而言箱子內部才會是確定的狀態。因此我們可以說在「之前」與「之後」是兩只不同的貓咪。
+
+
+### 觀察的悖論
+
+悖論是「觀察/被觀察」這組區別產生的現象，或者可以說它就是這組區別本身。觀察與被觀察的對象不能個別看待，而是應該像量子糾纏一樣視為是一組並存的差異。在薛定諤的實驗裡，貓咪之所以即生又死，是因為箱子的內外界線所形成的不確定性；箱子的遮蔽讓內部的環境變得不可視，為此貓咪才會被觀察者看成是矛盾的存在。但是在箱子打開之後遮蔽就消失了嗎？不然，正如本文開頭所述，開箱後模糊性沒有消失各種可能的狀態依然並存著，箱子揭開後還有另一層「遮蔽」。
+
+每一種觀察都有它的「盲點」，為此觀察才得以可能。是遮蔽讓觀察發生，因為箱子製造的不可視的邊界，才讓觀察者把貓咪看成是要死不活的狀態。盲點意味著什麼？意味著在觀察與被觀察的對象之間存在著無法趨近的鴻溝，總是有無法被觀察到的部分、總是有含糊不清的狀態促使觀察進一步的確認。
+
+觀察必定有其可視範圍，這也意味著同時有不可視的區域指明觀察的視野所及之處。觀察藉由「可見/不可見」的差異標示出自身。箱子是觀察的目光所及的視野，而觀察者只能看見箱子而無法看到箱子內部，因此觀察的盲點就潛藏在觀察自身之中。觀察者無法看見被他的觀察所排除的其他可能性，然而唯有如此他才能觀看。觀察者所看見的不是客觀的真實，因為總是有被他的觀察遮蔽起來的部分，觀察只能看見可見和不可見的部分之間的差異；觀察者不知道箱子裡的貓咪是生是死，他知道的只有無法看見的箱子「內部」以及他所能看見的箱子「外部」，所以那隻要死不活的貓咪，只是對於內外邊界的描述，而不存在於箱子之內。
+
+因此觀察與被觀察者之間無法跨越的差異以一種悖論的方式運作。即生又死的貓咪是觀察者觀察的結果，但它被歸屬在箱子之內；同樣的開箱後看見的活著（或死去）的貓難道不也只是觀察的結果嗎？然而它作為一項事實又被歸給箱子裡的環境。一個事物因此弔詭的即屬於內部又來自於外在，即是客觀又主觀。所以悖論是觀察賴以產生的差異，它是無可避免的必要條件。
+
+
+### 溝通——「封閉/開放」的系統
+
+當一個人向另一個人揮手，我們可能會認為他在向另一人打招呼，似乎在兩者之間有信息從一方傳遞到了另一方。但事實上我們只看見有人揮動手臂，而揮手的人所抱持的動機我們不得而知，而且也只有當我們把揮動手臂這一動作解讀成打招呼時信息才發生，在這之間沒有任何事物在流通。同樣的當我們在與他人交談時，我們只是在「自言自語」，我們無法同理也無法將我們的心意傳達出去，我們僅僅是觀察著外部發生的事件並對自己的觀察結果提出說明。
+
+系統論的觀點認為，溝通不是信息的傳遞，相反地是不可傳遞、不可理解；溝通是封閉的系統之間的互相干擾，以及各自在自身的內部對干擾形成解釋。系統論以「系統/環境」這組區別來解釋溝通。系統與環境之間的差異區別了系統的「內/外」，就好比箱子的遮蔽一樣，它界定了內外的狀態、可觀察與不可觀察的範圍。對系統而言環境是它無法掌握的複雜性，同樣的對環境中的其它系統而言前者也是它們的環境（複雜性）。當任意一方發生變動都會引起界線的改變，從而另一方也會相應的產生變化，但它們都無法知道對方是如何變化的。因此系統是即封閉又開放的狀態，系統只能影響自身，然而他作為其它系統的不確定性，影響著其它系統的自我生產。
+
+物理學主張悖論只存在於微觀系統而不涉及現實生活的宏觀層面，但在系統論看來社會生活的溝通都充滿著不確定性，都以悖論來維繫著社會的運作。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-11-14-start-with-experience-and-logic.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-11-14-start-with-experience-and-logic.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..01eb0b30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-11-14-start-with-experience-and-logic.md
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "從經驗和邏輯說起"
+author: "烏雲蓋雪"
+date : 2023-11-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/7a72NeA.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+屁股決定腦袋說的就是那些囿於經驗的人，大腦的認知範圍以屁股位置為中心形成一個區域，想像和直覺則比這個區域更大一些，而邏輯則可以突破這三者的範圍抵達未曾經驗和想像過的地方。更厲害的是邏輯從已知的事實出發可以發現真理。科學這座大廈就是以邏輯為鋼筋和骨架建立起來的。
+
+
+
+邏輯能發現感官察覺不到的事物的本質。邏輯是顯微鏡，能分析出儀器無法看清的原子內部結構;邏輯是望遠鏡，可以推測遙遠未來將發生的事。邏輯思維能力是造物主賦予人類區別於其它動物的獨有的能力。然而大多數人是活在經驗中的，他們並不喜歡或習慣用邏輯來看事物，甚至有些人當邏輯和經驗相悖的時候，他們選擇相信經驗，但往往會被現實打臉。
+
+手機剛開始普及的那年暑假，我跟村裡的叔叔說起我班裡有個同學買了手機，就是個不用接線的電話，叔叔的第一反應是不信，說從沒聽說過不用接線的電話，我跟他說電視也不用接線，照樣能收到來自千里之外的影像和聲音，手機也是同樣的原理。我叔叔就是那種活在經驗裡的人，在我用邏輯給他分析之後他才相信。每個人的經驗各不相同，但邏輯是通行的。如果你用邏輯來分析自己的經驗，會發現很多矛盾和漏洞，因為有些經驗是靠不住的。也許有人說，我分析過了，從沒發現自己的經驗有什麼問題，我只能說分析一天和分析十天，分析一步和分析十步的結果是大不相同的。
+
+科學的本質其實就是把經驗邏輯化，或者說是用邏輯這條線把盡可能多的經驗串起來，在這個過程中會發現有一些經驗是錯誤的。
+
+非歐幾何誕生之前的兩千年，人類一直未發現自己關於空間的經驗有什麼問題，直到非歐幾何出現，創立非歐幾何的數學家通過邏輯發現歐氏平行公設無法被證明，以過一點“可以引最少兩條平行線”為新公設，可引出羅氏幾何（雙曲幾何），以“一條平行線也不能引”為新公設，則引出黎曼幾何（橢圓幾何）。因非歐幾何與人類過往的經驗相悖，誕生時遭到冷遇和抵制，但是它符合邏輯。後來非歐幾何中的黎曼幾何被愛因斯坦用作處理廣義相對論的數學工具。這是科學史上經驗與邏輯相悖的一個例子，最後邏輯勝出。經驗是過往歷史的積澱，它帶給人安全感，但也是自我囚禁的牢籠，而邏輯則可以串起過去與現在並通往未來。造物主是按照邏輯來設計這個世界的。用邏輯來篩選經驗，會讓經驗更純粹;用邏輯來擴展經驗，會讓經驗成長更快。
+
+不要以為只有科學家才需要邏輯，普通人用不著，別的不談，就下棋來說，不用邏輯或只用邏輯往前看五步的人能下得過看十步的人嗎。
+
+但是你不可能每次行動和作決定之前都像科學家那樣調查分析研究，只有重要的行動和決定才有必要那麼做，人們的日常行為和決定很多都是根據直覺做出的，但是直覺有優劣之分，有的人是用經驗來訓練、餵養並驗證自己的直覺，有的人除了用經驗還用邏輯來輔助訓養、驗證自己的直覺，我覺得后一種人的直覺更厲害。
+
+有的人敏於直覺，有的人喜歡想像，有的人擅長邏輯，有的人富於創意，但無論哪一種都是以經驗作為訓養飼料的，都是對自己的內心下工夫。揚長避短，做自己擅長和喜歡的事，是最快樂的。
+
+有想像力不難，有邏輯性也不難，難的是把二者結合起來，想像中嵌著邏輯，邏輯中溢著想像，有這種特性的東西無不閃爍著奇異的光芒，從王小波的文章到當代最偉大的科學理論皆是如此。
+
+儘管有邏輯悖論和哥德爾不完備定理的存在，但它們的影響目前仍未超出學術領域，在現實生活中邏輯仍然有極大的用處。儘管符合邏輯的在現實中未必行得通，但與邏輯相悖的就需要慎重考慮，因為其中包含著覆滅的裂痕和危險。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-11-15-the-boars.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-11-15-the-boars.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c1397148
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-11-15-the-boars.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "野豬"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2023-11-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/bhZVtaj.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+如何形容陳寧這個人？他既不是一個遊手好閒的人，也不是一個好高騖遠的人，他很向學和進取。
+
+
+
+一個中年大叔懂得在網絡上宣傳，製作海報，圖文並茂，不要說他是個文盲。只要他認為可行的事，他就會去實踐。
+
+不過，假如要他從正途的方式賺錢，生活要循規蹈矩，陳寧沒法子做得到了。
+
+陳寧躺在醫院，他真沒想到這個城市如此衰落，沒有錢是不會醫人的，辛苦賺來的錢全都交給醫療費去。
+
+意外的事實，陳寧沒有向醫生說出來，他只說被海鷗抓傷，這樣就感染細菌了。
+
+當然啦！難道他會說他捕捉了大量的海鷗做非法販賣嗎？後來被海鷗的惡菌感染，躺在醫院病床整整三個月。
+
+陳寧覺得很痛苦，身體每一寸都感受到劇烈的疼痛，持續的不適和虛弱。而且無法正常進食、睡眠和簡單活動。他沒有想過海鷗會讓他發高燒、噁心、嘔吐、腹瀉，甚至出現幻覺。
+
+王醫生進來，他在資料板寫了一堆字，這些字顯得瘋狂又和混亂，不會有病人能理解他寫什麼的。陳寧對王醫生很不滿。
+
+王醫生對陳寧也是不滿的。病人向醫生說謊他已經是見怪不怪，他習慣了聽病人說謊。但悉心照料病人的前提是，病人是否有愛惜自己？
+
+他看到陳寧一副巨大的體型、灰暗的膚色、黃眼白、黃牙齒，酒精和尼古丁已經正在侵蝕他，還有大量的油鹽糖，脂肪和膽固醇，這個男人對飲食十分講究，對身體卻十分馬虎。
+
+這類病人讓王醫生感到厭惡，除了錢，他應該還在乎什麼？
+
+在恢復期間，陳寧已經多次發惡夢，零零碎碎的夢境都是和海鷗有關，當他醒過來時，很快又忘記了那些夢。總之，他欺騙了幾百個人，賺了幾十萬回來，可是如意算盤打不響，一切都貪婪惹的禍，如果能夠康復，如果病情過去，是否重新做人？
+
+誰說做壞事更容易呢？為什麼一直認為做壞事會得到更大利益呢？躺在病床上的陳寧不知做什麼好，他不停自問自答。
+
+
+老天沒有給予陳寧惡夢，他的病情終於過去了。
+
+某天，陳寧知道有大量的野豬出沒，不僅在樹林中，牠們竟然斗膽在市區橫行，野豬的行為凶猛、頑固，讓市民擔驚受怕又煩厭。野豬的新聞越發越大，野豬襲擊途人的照片、影片散佈四周圍，野豬已經犯眾憎了。
+
+陳寧看著這則新聞，看著那些野豬，目不轉睛，一時覺得很有趣味，一時微頭心鎖。
+
+陳寧不自覺打開電話簿，無意識地尋找買家，將野豬運到別處去。如今，野豬都是犯眾憎，死了一隻和一百隻都是沒有分別，人們更樂得清靜。
+
+只要告訴買家，野豬可以升值和治病，總會有人願意付錢買單的。
+
+總之，"升值"和"治病"。
+
+陳寧未開始行動，這一切都在他的腦海思想中，因為出院之後，這段時間他還在吃藥...
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-11-19-understand-the-song-dynasty-wang-anshi-3-autocratic-governance.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-11-19-understand-the-song-dynasty-wang-anshi-3-autocratic-governance.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3cb7e503
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-11-19-understand-the-song-dynasty-wang-anshi-3-autocratic-governance.md
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "理解宋朝・王安石【3】独行天道"
+author: "Ethan"
+date : 2023-11-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/hTPgKny.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+在变法带来的那么多问题当中，钱荒本身是最容易解释的。
+
+
+
+天下的经济生产总量短期内不会有大变化，所需的流通货币量因此也比较稳定，但青苗钱、免役钱等新增项目都是在原有税收基础上额外加征的项目，国家把这些钱收上去之后存在那里，多到花不掉。据统计，神宗在位十八年，积攒下来留给后任的铜钱超过7100万贯。这个数可能相当于原先全国流通货币总量的一半，已经高于民间市场上实际流通的货币量。
+
+原来有钱消费的老百姓，现在囊中羞涩，消费自然减少，商业贸易也就不会景气。经济规模降下去之后，流通货币的总量会进一步减少，连带国库正常的税收也会下降。
+
+因为民间经济活力下降，朝廷收上来的钱没地方用，只能拿来和外国贸易。神宗熙宁七年（1074），朝廷开放和外国的铜钱贸易，容许历来严格管制的铜钱自由进出国境。由于铜本身是贵金属，铜币的价值得到各国公认，而北宋又需要外国的各种商品，结果就是铜钱大量外流。这种贸易逆差不仅如长鲸吸水汲取了朝廷的货币，也进一步加剧了民间通货的枯竭。
+
+简而言之，朝廷收上来的钱是多了，但并未有效地用于反哺经济。
+
+从技术官僚的角度来看，这些问题并非无解。比如今年钱收得多了，那第二年可以少收一点；外贸逆差多了，边境关口的管制可以加严一点。
+
+但是在王安石的变法中我们找不到类似的技术微调，只见这些新法都顺着既定路线义无反顾地向前狂奔，快马加鞭，不停加速，绝不回头。
+
+整个朝廷失去了自我纠错的机制，这才是变法的核心困境。
+
+王安石并非一开始就独断专行，在变法之初，他颇有自我纠错的风度。比如苏辙跟他说青苗法有种种弊端，他觉得颇有道理，就有一个多月都没提此事。
+
+只不过人的理性自有其限度，并不能完全洞烛万事万物。自我实现的需求往往压倒理性的思考。后来又有人拿出一套说辞，列举青苗法的种种好处，王安石便又心回意转。毕竟有所变更才符合先王之政，而维持现状并不符合。
+
+前面讲过《洪范传》里的王安石，很反对从众。大众的反对越激烈，往往会加强他“真理总在少数人手中”的信念。而既然自己掌握了真理，那当然就不用顾忌悠悠众口，甚至于必须独行天道。不仅“人言不足恤”，就是祖宗法度、天降灾祸，也全都无需敬畏。
+
+人类社会几千年的文明史足以说明，我们虽然似乎逐渐在靠近真理，但没有任何人能掌握绝对真理。王安石自然也不例外。只不过随着变法越来越深入，反对意见越来越多，他必须选择，要么放弃自我实现，选择从众、妥协，要么就得树立自己的绝对权威。他很明显选择了后者，而当他把自己放在绝对真理的位置上，就很难再纠错了。
+
+为了巩固这种权威，在变法之初，王安石就着手把自己的学说立为官方学说，要求全天下的学校传授自家学说，并要求科举考试以自己的学说作为取士标准。这样一来，所有反对派都别想进入官僚队伍，要听到不同意见就更难了。
+
+国家当然需要意识形态，但这个意识形态最好不要是某一个人的学说，最好能拥有广泛的代表性，能够赢得绝大多数人的认可。如果以一家之言，违逆天下之意，那就很难持续。
+
+王安石的新意识形态受到广泛抵制，而他偏偏自信甚笃，不愿妥协，于是就不得不仰赖于奖惩之术。
+
+支持变法的官员常常得到越级提拔。比如王的副手吕惠卿、曾布，和政敌苏东坡本是同年进士（嘉祐二年，1057），变法后短短几年，前两人就升到正三品的翰林学士，后来还各自晋升到宰执级别的高位。而同时期的东坡则被赶去杭州担任通判，只是杭州长官的一个副手。后来因为诗歌里对变法有所不满，他还几乎被判死罪。
+
+司马光说王安石“进擢不次，大不厌众心”，指的就是这种现象。不按既定的规则来提拔，大多数人当然不满意。
+
+任用提拔的明显倾向性，使那些带有投机心理的官员主动迎合王安石的意愿，帮他推行新法，因为这样他们就能得到更多的奖励。他们推行新法并非基于理念认同，只是追求利益。这批人一旦得到重用，他们在执政中就会比普通官员更肆无忌惮地追求利益、鱼肉百姓。
+
+就说吕惠卿，他后来因为向民间大户借了4000多贯钱买地、又利用公务员帮忙收租，被弹劾并赶出朝廷。当他得势时，不仅对百姓下手，对王安石以及曾布也都下过黑手。被这样亲密的战友背叛，王安石久久不能释怀。
+
+选用官员上的这些问题，并未参与变法、但却熟悉哥哥秉性的王安国旁观者清。他直言批评兄长“知人不明，聚敛太急”。
+
+其实王安石自己也知道，新法的推行者如果急功近利，变法就不会成功。但提拔了一大批急功近利者的恰恰是他自己。
+
+造成上述悖论的，是奖惩这种手段的天然局限性。
+
+20世纪前、中叶，现代心理学的一大主流思想曾认为可以用奖惩解释所有人类行为。后来大家发现不行，很多事情说不通。比如人对某项事业无条件的喜爱、人们内心的道德感，这都很难用奖惩来解释。司马迁忍受屈辱地写《史记》、居里夫人日以继夜地提炼镭，他们并不是为了拿到什么外在奖励，而是钟意于事业本身。身边的朋友付出时间和精力帮助我们，他们也不觉得这是惩罚，而把这看作人与人交往的意义所在。
+
+这种内在的动力很难从奖惩中诞生出来。王安石可以用奖惩让官员们支持新法，但并不能让他们从内心里认同新法。
+
+而且滥用奖惩还有一个更大的坏处：这是一条难以回头的单行道。
+
+奖励得多，或者惩罚得多，人都会麻木。如果纯用奖励来鼓励人做事，那未来需要不断升级奖励，因为人会把已得的奖励视作理所应当。如果纯用惩罚来约束人的行为，那人们最后会选择不做事、磨洋工，并不会高效率地工作。
+
+诸子百家中，最喜欢用奖惩的是法家。商鞅立木取信，用五十金鼓励人搬木头，又用割鼻之刑惩罚违法的太傅，就是在运用奖惩手段治国。韩非讲的更明白，如果大臣无法用奖惩手段来激励，那就还不如赶走他们。
+
+但后世之君都认识到，过于滥用奖惩，结果就是向秦帝国一样二世而亡。因为奖励太滥，财政承担不起；而惩罚太严，人们就会选择干脆推翻既存制度。这就是陈胜、吴广起义时说的“今亡亦死，举大计亦死；等死，死国可乎？”
+
+和奖惩相比，让人从心底里认同既存秩序，永远是成本更低的手段。所以继秦之后，汉代就开始推崇儒术，务求教化人心。而奖惩的手段，则渐渐被儒生的外袍遮掩。
+
+儒也好，法也好，王安石都想要。
+
+他既要推广自己的全新儒家学说，又要用奖惩手段让天下走上正道，这个目标实在太高了。要做到这一点，需要一个国家权力远比前朝扩张的帝国才能支撑。
+
+宋朝在制度上大体承袭唐朝，虽然更为有钱，但国家权力并没有强势地向民间扩张。恰恰相反，宋代朝廷掌握的人口数量要比唐代少得多。而且宋代对人口迁徙也放得更开，废除了唐代的坊市制，允许商户在全城各地开店。整个国家的管制变得宽松，社会经济也从中获得巨大的收益。
+
+在这样一个国度，要突然实行一整套扩张国家权力、加强管制的政策组合，社会很难接纳，国家机器自己也很难胜任。强行推动，免不了伤筋动骨。
+
+从南宋至清末，主流观点都认为王安石变法直接导致了北宋灭亡。朱熹说“王安石以其学术之误，败国殄民”，明末大儒王夫之更是直接斥他为“小人”、“妄人”，相比之下，司马光批评他“不晓事，又执拗“，已经是大大地客气了。
+
+种种说辞，都把锅都甩到一个死人身上，似乎王安石变法的失败只是个人能力、品格的问题，仿佛换个人大宋朝就能改头换面得到新生了。这实在荒谬得紧。
+
+实际上，国家权力扩张是北宋中期的必然，王安石的学说受到天下人的推崇，本身就是历史选择的结果。那个时代的很多人，就是渴望一个更为宏大的理论，来指导建设更美好的世间。他们对未来的期待压倒了对人类自身有限性的警惕。
+
+国家机器一开始还不熟悉新情况，但很快就发现新法能扩张自己的权力，而且国家本身的经济基础确实也能支持这种扩张，于是慢慢开始适应。好大喜功的宋徽宗甚至一改历任先皇的俭朴作风，把新法接过来又添上种种花样，宰相蔡京更是提出“丰亨豫大”之说，于是铺张花钱、拼命铸钱成为常态，这都是王安石变法的自然延续。最终结果就是财政失序、货币通胀，迎来亡国灾祸。
+
+也正是因此，在传统儒学话语中，“变法”被严重地污名化，似乎一切皆不可变，变就是大逆不道。实际上只有失败的才被称为“变法”，比如王安石变法、戊戌变法，而类似明朝“一条鞭法”、清朝“摊丁入亩”这样的成功改革，就属于是“圣政”，不会和“变法”这两个脏字沾一点边。
+
+一个时代对王安石变法的评价，和当时国家权力变动的趋势有很强相关性。封建帝国时期，国家权力长期保持稳定，因而总体否定变法。到清末遭逢三千年未有之变局，不得不推行改革，王安石便重新得到肯定。戊戌变法的主导者之一梁启超后来专门写了本《王安石传》，为变法张目。几十年后的“评法批儒”，个中线索也大体类似。
+
+“变”是社会的常态，法也需要与时俱进，这点毋庸讳言。只不过，若变法的基础只是某一个人的独门学说，整个变法只是一个人在那里“独行天道”，那风险就非常大。
+
+“得君行道”是很多读书人的志向，仿佛皇帝信赖我的学说、实践我的学说，是人生最快乐的事情。当事人很少设想，“我”当然是快乐了，可有多少人会因为“我”的思维局限、考量不周而身陷苦厄。
+
+个人再雄才大略、思维再缜密，终究不可能面面俱到。尤其在AI面前，人类智力的种种局限更是充分彰显。有鉴于此，个体的学说必须经由众人充分审视、纠错，才能趋于完善。而这种审视与纠错的机制必须要超脱党争的你死我活才能成立，必须有某种超越立场的共识作为前提。如此，政策改革才能逐步为多数人所认可，而一旦有了这种认可，也就不用再多施加额外的奖惩了。
+
+整个宋代思想史，其实就是在强调礼法的旧儒学解体的背景下，新生儒学流派互相竞争、淘汰并最后形成新共识的过程。
+
+这个新共识究竟怎生模样、利弊如何，后面会有系列篇章逐步展开。此处且先说回本篇开头的韶州永通监。
+
+因为反对变法，苏东坡被贬窜岭南，在绍圣元年（1094）路过这里。此时王安石离开朝廷已近二十年，去世也有八年。永通监仿佛在呼应这个大人物的离开，产量断崖式下降。
+
+年近六十的东坡见到这个结果，不由感慨：“此山出宝以自贼，地脉已断天应悭。”
+
+王安石如同大宋这座矿山里的珍宝，他的学说问世之后却反而掏空了整个帝国。这大概是天意吝啬，在嘲弄人类的贪婪和虚妄吧。
+
+
+▲ 故宫南薰殿旧藏《历代圣贤名人像册》之王安石像
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-11-28-from-hell.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-11-28-from-hell.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d26e1a02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-11-28-from-hell.md
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "From Hell"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2023-11-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ZWb8uVx.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+1970年代，有一個人叫王民德，他是一個剛修讀醫學的學生，成績一直很好，名列前茅，他一直受到老師的支持和關注。除了貧窮讓他有一點點的自卑感，其它都不缺。家庭和朋友的愛都包圍著他的生活。
+
+
+
+王民德發現了一個現象，就是他的學業越好，成績越高，他身邊有錢人卻越多。他們成立了不同的組織，包括校內學生會、校內醫學學生會、香港醫學學生會。然而，王民德的父母並不鼓勵他加入太多的組織，而且，最好遠離塵埃。
+
+為了取得更好的成績，王民德會用各種方法尋找相關知識，他想當一名好醫生，他不想看到有人像他的外公那樣，外公的死間接是因為他的貧窮。王民德不想做一個只會幫助有錢病人的的醫生。
+
+一天，他偶然在圖書館裡發現了一盒老舊的膠片，上面標著解剖過程。好奇心驅使下，他決定觀賞這些底片。
+
+民德打開了底片機，畫面灰暗但很清晰。他看到了一個令人嘆為觀止的片段。首先，民德在畫面上看到了不同的的手術工具，排列得很整齊，如手術刀、剪刀、鉗子、鉤子、針線等，以及一些消毒劑和止血劑，如酒精、碘酒、碳酸氫鈉等。十九世紀的手術刀很吸引人。
+
+接著，有一雙又長又大戴上了手套的手掌，他落刀很準確，在頸部到腹部切開一個長而深的切口，並撕開胸骨和肋骨，心臟立即暴露了出來。他把心臟拿上手，心臟看起來有些扁平、上方寬、下方尖，它的外形似一個拳頭、大小也像拳頭。
+
+整個過程乾淨俐落敏銳。似乎是一個非常專業的心臟科醫生。遺憾的是看不到他將器官放回原位，看不到心臟的異常、或縫合的過程。
+
+接著，民德看到是喉管的解剖，從頸部的中央，口腔、咽部、氣管。手術刀非常銳利，那雙手非常純熟，他馬上就把喉管從周圍組織中分離出來。民德突然感到有些反胃，儘管黑白色的影片。還有面部、手臂，和女性的生殖器官。
+
+這個解剖影像沒有男性，全是女性，解剖大約是1888年8月至11月之間。結尾並沒有一群醫生走出來自我介紹，也沒有任何專訪，民德感到奇怪，好奇心又再驅使他查找原因。後來圖書館館長告訴他，這並非什麼醫生的解剖實驗，而是紀錄了19世紀的一個殺人狂的日記，聽說因為資源問題，影片無法完成。
+
+Jack the Ripper連環殺人事件，在19世紀1888年8月7日到11月9日期間，發生在英國倫敦東區白教堂一帶，以非常殘忍的手法連續殺害了五名妓女，一時引起全城轟動，可是在三個月之後卻突然平息事件，對社會造成了這種震盪，三個月卻無聲無息地結束，這才是更讓人可怕，背後一定有更強大的勢力在操控，民德是這樣認為的。雖然那些都是80年前的事，民德偶爾也會和同學們研究這案件。
+
+
+
+#### 電影的簡介：
+
+“From Hell”是一部根據同名圖像小說改編的電影，講述了一位警察和一位妓女如何捲入一場涉及開膛手傑克和王室陰謀的謀殺案。
+
+電影的背景設定在1888年的倫敦，當時一位神秘的殺手在白教堂區殘忍地殺害了多名妓女。警官利用一名檢察官（Johnny Deep飾）他的通靈能力和醫學知識，試圖揭露殺手的真實身份和動機，同時檢察官與一名妓女發展了一段感情。他發現殺手是一位受過教育的外科醫生，受命消滅一位王室成員的私生女和她的母親的所有證人。可是他的調查遭到了共濟會的阻撓，他們想要保護王室的名譽。最後...
+
+豆粒：7.7粒豆（10粒豆為滿分）
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-12-16-understand-the-song-dynasty-sima-guang-1-return-to-the-old-ways.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-16-understand-the-song-dynasty-sima-guang-1-return-to-the-old-ways.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..64563c89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-16-understand-the-song-dynasty-sima-guang-1-return-to-the-old-ways.md
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "理解宋朝・司马光【1】回归故道"
+author: "Ethan"
+date : 2023-12-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/SCqF3gy.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+鲜有人知的黄河改道，是王安石变法同时期另一件影响大宋国运的事情。
+
+
+
+宋神宗出生的那个庆历八年（1048年），黄河决口，完全改变了东流近1000年的故道，转向北流。沿途州郡，数百万亩良田淹没。
+
+河决二十年后，神宗终于长大登基。熙宁元年（1068年）十一月，他一边在向王安石求教学问，另一边则把给自己天天讲解《资治通鉴》讲了一年多的司马光特派出去巡视黄河，以确定治河的最终方略。
+
+必须把黄河导回故道——不论是王安石，还是后来坚定反对变法的司马光，在这个问题上极为罕见地达成了一致。
+
+神宗很信任司马光。
+
+这位比王安石年长两岁的臣子，是让神宗之父英宗得以顺利承继大统的关键人物。没有司马光，神宗不可能成为皇帝。
+
+即位之后，神宗就提拔司马光做了草拟大政文书的翰林学士。从这再往上，就是官场金字塔顶尖的宰执大臣了。
+
+其实司马光不太愿意做这个学士，还是更愿干他的老本行“知谏院”。谏院是北宋中期朝廷的核心部门，在仁宗年间搬进了三省里门下省的办公地，把原本的朝政中枢门下省赶去了相对偏僻的地方。作为谏院的长官，虽然品级低于翰林学士，但实际地位颇高，在这个位置上司马光可以基于自身的道德立场去批评所有朝政问题；而如果当翰林学士，有时就得违背内心的愿望去替皇帝草拟诏命，哪怕那个旨意自己并不认可。
+
+尽管司马光坚决推辞，神宗并没有容许他继续保留这种道德洁癖，希望他为国家承担更多的责任，不仅要写诏书，还得治黄河。
+
+黄河是一条“地上悬河”，河水的含沙量最高可以达到60%，大量泥沙不断淤积，把河床越抬越高，堤岸也越筑越高，远高于周边的平地。河水冲破畸高的东流故道，转向北流往地势更低的平原，本是理所当然，但朝廷一直想把它引回老路。要让水往高处流，难度可想而知。
+
+和之前几千年“堵不如疏”的治水理念相反，宋人最常用的办法是堵截。疏浚河道、清理淤泥、开挖新河道分流等老办法虽仍在用，却不再是首选项。宋人在积极建设堤防的同时，甚至想要截断大河，使之逆势而流。
+
+宋人的底气来自技术进步。
+
+当河流决口时，水势凶猛，一两个沙袋填进去根本于事无补。不过宋代出现了大规模的“龙门埽（sào）”，这种长数十米的大型装置，里面填塞了大量土石，再用竹索等捆扎起来，可以一口气直接压入洪水之中，对于堵塞决口、截断水流，都很有用。
+
+基于这样的技术，宋代人开始实践“束水攻沙”的理论设想。他们认为，黄河泥沙淤积的原因，是因为水流太缓，如果在河岸两侧建设一些突出部，就能起到缩窄河道的效果，如此一来，同样大小的水流就必须更快才能流过，泥沙就不容易淤积。
+
+但这般技术，用于一时一地尚可，要想顾全整段黄河，就有些力不从心。经过一系列强行扭转河道的努力，黄河不仅没能恢复故道，反而变得非常尴尬：原本一条大河波浪宽的局面消失不见，滔滔河水在河北骤然分叉，分为东、北两股，岔开各自流淌。
+
+由于水流分散、流速降低，大河分流势必造成河床加速淤高，必须尽快处置，让二股重新归一。只不过，到底是坚持屡战屡败的旧方针，堵塞北流、继续引河东流，还是顺遂水性、由其北流，急待朝廷决断。
+
+出巡一个多月后，司马光回到京城，向神宗报告自己的结论：坚持东流。又过了四个月，王安石官拜副相，他也支持东流。方针就这么定了下来。
+
+王安石坚持东流的逻辑，看过上篇的读者应该能够体会。坚信人能胜天的王安石，不太会做屈从于自然的决定。但凡有点可能，他就想逆天改命。
+
+可是，王安石的大对头司马光为什么也会得出相同的结论呢？
+
+因为东流是黄河的故态，而司马光一辈子做的所有的事情，都是想让社会恢复故态。
+
+他主持编写的《资治通鉴》里，有一百多条冠以“臣光曰”的个人见解。其中开篇第一条，讲的就是先王礼制不被后人遵守。他认为皇帝最大的职责是要维护住固有的礼制，不要去改变。他甚至当面和神宗说得很夸张，说如果上古先王的制度得到坚持，那上古的那些朝代就能绵延千秋万世，直至今日。
+
+那人在什么情况下会想去改变现状呢？比如有很大利益诱惑的时候。
+
+为了利益而改变立场，这是司马光最看不起的事情。所以当邻国将领背叛母邦、携部众来投靠时，他坚决反对接纳；宋神宗要给他升官，他也不愿意；王安石要变法搞钱，他自然更看不上。
+
+虽然和王安石同样主张导河归东，但司马光的具体建议主张徐图缓进，分两三年逐步堵塞北流；而王安石则期待毕全功于一役，当年就要成果。
+
+王安石开始变法的头一年，黄河北流正式堵塞，司马光也同步得到皇帝奖谕。不过他在这个积极追求事功的朝廷里越来越不合群，第二年就离开了。
+
+
+▲ 清宫殿藏画本之司马光像
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-12-17-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk30.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-17-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk30.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-17-trial-for-47-hk-democrat-case-of-primary-elections-wk30.md
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "香港民主派47人初選案審訊第卅周"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-12-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/T5tctBg.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 3天結案陳詞整理︱控辯雙方爭議什麼？辯方如何力陳被告應判無罪？
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，16人否認「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，經歷118天審訊，終在本月初完成結案陳詞，正式審結。法官料3至4個月後裁決，意味屆時連同已認罪被告，案中32人已至少還柙逾3年。歷時3日的結案陳詞，控辯雙方就控罪的詮釋作法律爭議，辯方亦就案情作出總結，力陳被告應判無罪。
+
+本案指控被告串謀「以威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段」，取得立會過半後無差別否決預算案，迫特首解散立法會及辭職，旨在顛覆國家政權。
+
+辯方爭議，「其他非法手段」應只涵蓋武力相關手段及限於刑事罪行，而否決預算案致特首辭職是《基本法》訂明的機制、法例亦無明文禁止無差別否決，無差別否決預算案並不構成「非法手段」；控方則認為「非法手段」不限於武力相關手段、亦不限於刑事罪行，指被告濫用《基本法》下的議員職權、違反職責已屬「非法」。
+
+各被告也就案情作總結，其中代表吳政亨和余慧明的大律師石書銘，指兩人從無提倡顛覆政府機關或推翻憲制秩序，只是尋求向政權問責、追求《基本法》承諾的雙普選，「那不可能是顛覆」。代表何桂藍的大律師Trevor Beel亦指，議員只是向選民問責，議員投票不是法律問題、是政治問題，法庭不應干預；又指本案案情在任何其他普通法管轄區均不會構成顛覆，而是被視為「尋常政治」，惟政府不能接受民主派過半，控方是將政治問題變成刑事罪行問題。
+
+
+
+
+### 辯方：否決預算案為《基本法》容許、不構成「非法手段」
+
+是次結案陳詞包括法律和事實爭議，前者涉及控辯雙方對控罪的法律詮釋。47人被控《國安法》第22條的顛覆國家政權罪，條文列明任何人組織、策劃、實施或參與實施「以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段」旨在顛覆國家政權的行為，即屬犯罪。而本案的控罪正列明，各被告是「以威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段」，串謀取得立會過半後濫用議員職權，無差別否決預算案，迫使特首解散立法會及辭職，嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞香港特別行政區政權機關依法履行職能。
+
+雙方法律爭議的焦點，落在如何理解「非法手段」，及無差別否決預算案（即不顧議案內容及優劣否決）是否構成「非法手段」。辯方立場，是應以「同類原則」（ejusdem generis）詮釋條文，「其他非法手段」所指手段應與前述的「武力」手段類別相近，只是指涉「實質脅迫與強迫（physical coercion and compulsion）」的行為，亦應限於「刑事罪行」，否則控罪範圍會太闊。
+
+辯方亦認為否決預算案是憲制權力，指《基本法》第50至52條已預想否決預算案的情況和應對（即立法會拒通過預算案後特首可解散立會，如重選的立法會仍拒通過同一預算案特首須辭職），當中無人可以迫特首解散立法會及下台，政府亦可申請臨時撥款繼續運作，難以想像條文會被視為「空前憲政危機」和「政治不穩」。辯方又引基本法起草委員譚耀宗指，條文原意是讓選民決定特首或議會哪方合理，反問如法例容許，又怎會構成阻撓和破壞政府履行職能？並指若被告只是做《基本法》所容許的事，不大可能是意圖顛覆國家政權，難以理解為何《基本法》訂明的機制會是「非法」。
+
+法官一度問，如有人用電腦病毒攻擊政府系統令政府機關無法運作，是否不涉「非法手段」，辯方同意，但指這或涉「恐怖活動」罪，而即使《國安法》或出現漏洞，也應由立法機關而非法庭去填補。法官亦關注，《國安法》由中央草擬，為何辯方認為「同類原則」的普通法原則適用？辯方則引終院案例指《國安法》須與本港法律並行。
+
+
+▲ 代表何桂藍的大律師Trevor Beel
+
+
+### 控方：被告濫用議員職權、違反職責已屬「非法手段」
+
+不過控方就認為，《國安法》原意是防範任何危害國安的行為，而今時今日對抗政權不一定需要暴力，散播謠言也能對政權造成影響、人們可利用社交媒體危害國安，若狹窄詮釋控罪定義是不合理、有違立法原意。
+
+控方強調，「非法手段」不限與武力相關、亦不限於刑事罪行，當中「非法」涉兩個層次，其一是被告干犯發假誓或串謀公職人員行為失當的「刑事罪行」；若法庭不接納，亦可考慮被告無差別否決預算案，是濫用議員職權和違反職責，沒有擁護《基本法》及效忠特區，違反《基本法》核心原則，雖不構成刑事罪行，但同屬「非法」。控方亦認為，毋須證明被告知道其行為是非法也可入罪，誤解法律並不構成抗辯理由。
+
+
+### 辯方：法例無禁止無差別否決、議員向選民問責法庭不應干預
+
+辯方大律師陳世傑質疑，控方就「非法手段」的詮釋「無邊無際」，沒有案例和法例支持，只是以《國安法》作為「尚方寶劍」。大律師馬維騉亦反駁，違反職責本身不能構成「非法」，而且法例無明文規定議員不可以不根據議案優劣否決議案，控方亦須另外證明被告有顛覆國家的意圖才能入罪。大律師關文渭強調，被告否決目的是迫政府回應五大訴求，若他們審視預算案後發現沒有五大訴求的內容而否決，也不能說他們沒有審視當中內容。
+
+大律師Trevor Beel指，被告應知道其行為將構成刑事罪行才能入罪，但《國安法》條文含糊，無訂明何謂「非法手段」和「顛覆」等，被告無從得知。他也強調，《基本法》無規定議員應如何投票和說明何謂濫權，而議員只是向選民問責，議員投票不是法律問題、是政治問題，不應由法庭裁定他們有否恰當履行職責。
+
+
+
+
+### 辯方指被告僅追求《基本法》所承諾雙普選 不可能是顛覆
+
+針對各個被告的案情，控方採納書面陳詞，劉偉聰、施德來及彭卓棋沒有口頭補充，其他12名被告的代表則一一陳詞。
+
+就發起「三投三不投」的吳政亨，辯方指他只是關心如何取得35+，不關心取得35+後的事，他最多只是戴耀廷的「粉絲」、熱心提供協助，但戴反應較冷淡。辯方又指，最多只能說吳和戴對取得35+的重要性意見一致，但二人無討論過否決預算案和勝選者入立會後會做什麼，即使有協議也不是本案指控的協議。
+
+至於參選衞生服務界的余慧明，辯方指她雖表明有意否決預算案爭取五大訴求，但她一直獨自行事，無參與任何協調會議、無與他人討論和協議一起否決。余亦表明與政府有談判空間，否決預算案只是談判策略，她明白五大訴求不能全部即時實現，若政府未能提供普選時間表才會否決。
+
+代表二人的大律師石書銘又指，控方證人區諾軒也認同「35+計劃」是香港爭取雙普選之路的一部分，而案發時香港已回歸23年，按照《基本法》承諾爭取普選之路也已持續23年，兩人從無提倡流血衝突、顛覆政府機關或推翻憲制秩序，只是信賴回歸時的「莊嚴承諾」、相信香港的制度，尋求向政權問責、根據憲制帶來政策改變、追求《基本法》承諾的雙普選，「那不可能是顛覆」、「那不應是顛覆」。
+
+
+▲ 有份發起醫護罷工的前醫管局員工陣線主席余慧明（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 何桂藍料被DQ不可能意圖參與串謀、鄒家成發起「墨落無悔」非協議
+
+就前《立場新聞》記者何桂藍，辯方指她認為民主派取得35+是不可能，亦早料自己會被DQ，她參加初選只是想取得最大票數，無意圖做出她根本知道不可能的行為（即取得35+後無差別否決預算案，迫特首解散立法會及下台）。辯方亦指何並非要無差別否決，而是望審核預算案，即使政府回應五大訴求，但預算案審核制度有不公，她仍會投反對；而何無與他人達成協議否決，簽署「墨落無悔」只是個人對聲明的回應，讓選民看到她敢於運用《基本法》權力。
+
+何桂藍的大律師Trevor Beel亦強調，本案與其他串謀不同，整個串謀公開進行，因無人相信他們當時所做的是違法，何亦曾說從無想過「撳個反對掣」也會被捕。Beel又指，本案純粹關乎被告對政府的挑戰，因中央不能接受民主派取得立會過半，質疑控方將政治問題變成刑事罪行問題，但本案案情在任何其他普通法管轄區均不會構成顛覆，而是被視為「尋常政治」。
+
+
+▲ 何桂藍（資料圖片）
+
+至於發起「墨落無悔」的鄒家成，辯方指他僅表達對戴耀廷毋須簽協議的失望，但聲明無提到無差別否決預算案、亦絕非協議，即使他與另兩名發起人有協議，也非本案所指的協議。鄒亦從無意圖推翻中國政府和癱瘓立法會，並認為特首下台沒有意義。
+
+
+### 鄭達鴻會審視議案優劣投票、梁國雄因無全民退保否決財案
+
+代表前公民黨鄭達鴻和社民連梁國雄的資深大律師潘熙，同指二人均認為「35+」不可能，無意圖無差別否決，不可能是串謀的一分子。當中鄭達鴻真誠相信政府是理性及會與議員磋商，他會審視預算案優劣和政府抛出的「橄欖枝」決定如何投票，即使五大訴求不獲回應也可能贊成。
+
+而梁國雄沒有簽署「墨落無悔」，過往任議員是因預算案沒有全民退保而否決，而非為了「攬炒」而無差別否決，他與其他人沒有達成否決預算案的協議，亦無意圖顛覆。辯方又指，社民連文章表明不同意「政治攬炒」，而是以「合法合憲」的立法會發揮制衡。
+
+
+### 林卓廷、黃碧雲、楊雪盈無提否決財案 何啟明簽「墨落無悔」但不代表必否決
+
+就民主黨林卓廷和黃碧雲，辯方指二人只是同意參與初選，但政綱無提及否決預算案，亦沒有簽署「墨落無悔」，無足夠證據顯示二人同意無差別否決。就黃碧雲論壇提到「會用盡憲制裡面所有權力同埋手段去爭取五大訴求」，並指如否決預算案能促成此事一定會做，辯方指她當時受壓下仍堅稱有需要時只會運用《基本法》賦予的權力，與控方指她濫權否決預算案相反。
+
+至於前灣仔區議會主席楊雪盈初選落敗仍報名立法會選舉，辯方指她並非其他候選人指派參選的「靈童」，而是顯示她不按協議自行行事。而楊不關注五大訴求和否決預算案，無提過否決預算案或中央政府，其名字雖出現在「墨落無悔」，但是出現在其他人而非她的個人Facebook，無證據顯示她同意簽署。
+
+至於民協何啟明，辯方指他只知道初選目的是爭取立會過半，不包括無差別否決預算案，亦從無在論壇提及否決預算案。而他簽署「墨落無悔」，是同意向政府施壓要求回應五大訴求，但他理解該權力是可用可不用，不代表一定會否決。
+
+而就人民力量陳志全，辯方指他曾任認真盡責的議員8年，望法庭考慮他有良好品格，其證供有可信性。
+
+
+▲ 何啟明（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 公民黨言行不能歸咎李予信、柯耀林簽「墨落無悔」因不想顯保守
+
+至於前公民黨李予信，辯方指他無轉發黨簽署「墨落」的帖文、論壇無提過否決預算案，而他提到否決預算案的選舉單張在《國安法》生效前夕已收回，新單張無再提到否決權。辯方又指，公民黨非本案「共謀者」，不能將黨的言行歸咎李，而李初選落敗後報名港島地區直選並非組織者的協議，認為至少有合理懷疑李於本案控罪時間、即《國安法》生效前，已退出涉案謀劃。
+
+至於柯耀林，辯方指他參與初選只是為「試水溫」，其政綱無提及否決預算案，參選宣言提到「暴政」和「惡法」等也只是順應當時政治氣氛的「政治修辭」，他簽「墨落無悔」亦不因同意當中內容，只因其他候選人已簽署，他不想顯得保守。
+
+控辯雙方陳詞完畢後，法官表示料約3至4個月後裁決，但因法官李運騰需審理12月18日開審、料審期83天的《蘋果日報》案，法官陳慶偉及陳仲衡亦另有案件處理，故未能作出保證，但一有裁決會盡快通知各方，意味裁決時被告或已還柙逾3年。
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+### 首提堂至開審歷時近兩年 16人不認罪受審共118天
+
+民主派初選於2020年7月舉行，其後立法會選舉押後一年舉行，47人於2021年1月6日被以「顛覆國家政權」罪拘捕，同年2月28日被要求提早報到，被落案起訴「串謀顛覆國家政權」。47人於3月1日首度提堂，經歷6次提訊日及多次提堂後於2022年7月正式交付高院，當中共31人認罪，包括組織者戴耀廷和區諾軒，另16人不認罪受審。
+
+案件今年2月6日於西九龍法院開審，原定審期90天，惟歷時近10個月，至審訊第118天才審結。當中控方案情花了共58日，認罪的區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟和林景楠4人以「從犯證人」身分作供，控方亦傳召在新西協調會議拍片的匿名證人X先生作供，及應辯方要求傳召6名警員及1名選舉主任作盤問。
+
+其後以6日處理「共謀者原則」爭議及被告申請毋須答辯的中段陳詞，法官裁定該原則不適用於《國安法》前的言行，及所有被告表證成立。辯方案情則用了51日，除吳政亨、楊雪盈、黃碧雲、林卓廷、梁國雄和柯耀林外，其餘10人均出庭作供，吳及柯則傳召辯方證人。案件最後以3天完成結案陳詞。
+
+
+▲ 2021年3月1日，47人首於西九龍裁判法院提堂。（資料圖片）
+
+
+### 34人正還柙逾26至33個月
+
+本案不認罪的16人，包括鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、柯耀林、李予信、余慧明及吳政亨。其中何桂藍、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、余慧明及吳政亨6人不獲准保釋，分別還柙逾26至33個月。
+
+認罪的31人，則包括戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟、袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、徐子見、岑子杰、毛孟靜、馮達浚、劉澤鋒、黃之鋒、譚文豪、李嘉達、譚得志、胡志偉、朱凱廸、張可森、黃子悅、尹兆堅、郭家麒、吳敏兒、譚凱邦、劉頴匡、楊岳橋、范國威、呂智恆、岑敖暉、王百羽、伍健偉及林景楠。認罪被告中，僅呂智恆、林景楠和黃子悅獲保釋，惟黃另涉理大衝突案，承認暴動判囚37個月。
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-12-17-understand-the-song-dynasty-sima-guang-2-return-to-morality-and-justice.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-17-understand-the-song-dynasty-sima-guang-2-return-to-morality-and-justice.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0210e867
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-17-understand-the-song-dynasty-sima-guang-2-return-to-morality-and-justice.md
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "理解宋朝・司马光【2】见义忘利"
+author: "Ethan"
+date : 2023-12-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/SCqF3gy.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+等到司马光回朝，已经是十五年之后。
+
+
+
+这位67岁的老人上年末终于完成了巨著《资治通鉴》，历史没让他久等，很快就给了他实践自己理念的机会。
+
+司马光的理念，说穿了很简单，就是反对追逐利益。他给老朋友兼政敌王安石写信，引用孟子的话，说执政之道，“仁义而巳矣，何必曰利？”道义是不该和利益沾边的，一旦沾上就会变味。
+
+把“义”和“利”对立起来的做法，拥有两千多年的历史。《论语》里面就讲“君子喻于义，小人喻于利”，意思是君子的行为是道义驱动的，而小人则被利益所驱动。孟子更进一步，为了道义甚至可以舍生取义，牺牲一点利益更是不在话下。
+
+这种“义利之辨”的观念，长期被用来抵制国家权力的扩张。比如在连年征伐匈奴的汉武帝时代，朝廷想了很多方法聚敛财富，在他驾崩后不久，反对盐、铁等项国家垄断的人们就抨击朝廷“与民争利”，认为王者应当施行仁政，不应该想着法儿搞钱。
+
+王安石变法之后，反对派用的最顺手的依然是这件武器，而且给这把利剑又加上了人身攻击的锯齿。
+
+孔子在讲君子、小人做事动机不同的时候，虽然也不是全无褒贬，但他更多是在陈述春秋时期分封制国家的实际状况。那时所说的“君子”都是世袭贵族，先天承担治理百姓的责任；而“小人”则指普通百姓，他们负责供养那些社会顶端的君子。
+
+可到了宋代，当司马光重新提起这个话茬时，他的意思已经完全变了。“君子”被当作“好人”的代名词，而“小人”则指代“坏人”。主张变法的“新党”追逐的是利益，他们理所当然地都是小人、坏人；而主张恢复旧法的“旧党”则崇尚道义，无疑是君子、好人。
+
+这样标签化的人身攻击一旦开始，就事论事、实事求是的困难就会直线上升：如果有人指出好人也会犯错，或者辩称坏人也做过好事，那他最后大概率也会被视为坏人。真正的大奸大恶或许会被赶走，可那些基于事实做出独立判断的人，也一样会被赶走。朝廷上最后只会留下不分青红皂白的好人。
+
+而不分青红皂白的人，还可能是好人吗？
+
+司马光并没有解决这个核心悖论，就开始挥舞“义利之辨+君子小人之辨”这件新武器。他很快就碰上了硬骨头：王安石的“免役法”。
+
+因为神宗皇帝38岁就早早驾崩，当时的朝廷由太皇太后高氏垂帘听政，边上坐着十岁的哲宗小皇帝。高太后厌恶变法，站在司马光这边，把他拜为执政。在他推动下，半年多时间，王安石推行的青苗、保甲、保马等法就被一一下诏废除。只剩下免役法，等待最后的决断。
+
+在元祐元年（1086年）正月，哲宗的新年号刚刚用上没多久，司马光就迫切地递交了一份政策建议，列举了免役法的五大弊端，要求改回原本的差役法。然而这份充满漏洞的建议很快引来激烈批评。
+
+出招最狠的是新党大佬章惇。章惇这时担任枢密院的长官，和司马光一样位列执政。他精于算术，之前做过财政首长“三司使”，熟悉变法的具体事务。在他看来，司马光的建议自相矛盾，而且明显违背事实。
+
+比如司马光在这份建议里声称免役法每年收钱，让以前只要几年服一次劳役的大户受苦，可在另一份建议里却说免役法让大户享受便利，真正受苦的是中下户。司马光认为朝廷推行免役法之后雇佣“四方浮浪之人”，出问题了无从追究，可章惇却尖锐指出，这种情况根本不存在，紧要的劳役岗位用的都是有家业、有担保的人。在章惇看来，司马光没搞清楚情况就在信口开河，甚至是选择性忽视了对他不利的实际情况。
+
+要求一个年近七旬、居家著书十余年的老人，能洞明新法在各地执行层面的利弊，说实话挺难的。司马光为人诚恳老实，被章惇指出错谬的时候他甚至有点难受，可其他旧党并不这么玻璃心。趁着章惇在太后面前据理力争触怒天颜，弹劾的奏章如雪片般呈上，当月便将他罢免外放。
+
+亲眼目睹自己推动的新法逐一被废，王安石在同年四月郁郁而终。司马光对这位亦敌亦友的老同事颇为宽待，主张“优加厚礼”，最终给王安石追赠太傅，享受宰臣级别的礼遇。
+
+之所以这么做，司马光的理由很简单，他不想变法期间的“浮薄”风气继续下去。或许多少有点受章惇事件的影响，他意识到如果朝廷给出明显的信号要批评王安石，那一定会有很多人冒出来响应附和，不惜出卖旧日恩主来换取新朝的宠眷。而这种为了利益随意改变原则的做法是他最反对的。
+
+司马光试图调和新旧两派的分歧，让朝廷能够兼容而不专断，但他的努力成效有限。
+
+王安石扩张国家权力的主张和司马光反对扩张的“义利之辨”，在理念上本就不太相容。更重要的是，理念分歧的背后，藏着更深刻、更难改变的社会变化——
+
+中国经济文化版图上近千年的最大变化：南升北降。
+
+
+▲ 清宫殿藏画本之司马光像
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-12-18-glad-to-love-to-death.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-18-glad-to-love-to-death.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3c19620a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-18-glad-to-love-to-death.md
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "欣然夢蝶"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2023-12-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/lhjOWK0.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+詩記：“莊子”
+
+莊周夢蝶，思眷依月斑緊心扉，
+
+閣樓獨酌奈慢醉。
+
+
+
+小橋流水，傘下紅塵染衣袂。
+
+月影漣漪螢漫飛。
+
+多戚焚弦凡心碎。
+
+浮華淚，餘我一人憾無悔。
+
+隔岸生死盡是非。
+
+細雨綿綿，憶昔不絕，江畔不離願相隨。
+
+花香芳菲，君莞爾，情緣魅了誰。
+
+仲夏祭奠，笑看二十八星宿共歡悲。
+
+如盼，九泉千里攜手走一迴。
+
+在這個繁忙的城市中，“李然”和“張欣”就像是兩條平行線，永遠不可能相交。然而，命運卻讓他們在這個城市的噴泉裡相遇，就像莊周的蝴蝶一樣，他們在夢中相遇，卻分不清是夢是真。李然真是有這份感覺，雖然他知道不該的，不該再有心動感覺，何必要墜入抽象而虛幻的世界裡？
+
+李然在酒吧裡獨自斟酌，他的思緒如同被囚禁的鳥，無法釋放。他的心中充滿了無奈和困惑，彷彿在那閣樓上獨酌，無法自拔。
+
+而張欣，在傘的庇護下，她感受到紛紛擾擾的塵世，使人心煩意亂。啲嗒啲嗒的聲音，似乎是從天空掉下來的水滴，或是從噴泉裡飛出的水花，叫她平靜而寧靜。然而，她的內心卻充滿了矛盾和掙扎，就像那噴泉的水花從高處傾瀉而下，無法平息。
+
+他們在這城市裡相遇，愛情就像那細雨綿綿，無法停止，就像月光下泛起了的漣漪，細膩而動人。無論此情有多危險，他們都願意相隨。他們沉浸在這一段危情關系，竟然要相伴相隨。愛情如花朵盛開的香氣，誰迷惑了誰？
+
+他們的愛情充滿了糾結和掙扎，如同焚琴破弦，讓他們心碎，無限唏噓。然而，他們始終不後悔，就像那虛幻的淚水，只為他們一人而流。
+
+仲夏夜晚的愛情，無奈要一起祭奠過去的悲歡，笑看二十八星宿的變化。哪怕是在九泉之下，也盼望能千里攜手走一迴。
+
+生命並非只是愛情，面對生與死的抉擇，隔岸觀火，紛擾不休，心中充滿了無奈和無悔，彷彿是浮華的淚水，餘下他們一人。
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-12-18-trial-for-jimmy-lai-case-of-apple-daily-started.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-18-trial-for-jimmy-lai-case-of-apple-daily-started.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..44531d22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-18-trial-for-jimmy-lai-case-of-apple-daily-started.md
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "黎智英《蘋果日報》案開審"
+author: "《獨媒》"
+date : 2023-12-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+#### 黎智英案開審 市民捱冷通宵排隊 過百警員法院外佈防
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控「串謀勾結外國勢力」及「串謀刊印煽動刊物」等罪，今（18日）於高等法院（移師西九龍法院）開審。案件吸引不少市民旁聽，有排頭位市民於昨晚到場，指「唔想佢（黎智英）還柙3年望向旁聽席係冇人」；亦有市民望能給予黎智英「微小的支持」，認為《蘋果日報》是敢言的象徵，而黎雖還柙3年，但擁抱和接受自己的遭遇，「佢每坐一日，佢係燃燒緊自己，係畀緊力量人」。警方今早嚴陣以待，在西九龍法院附近一帶以過百警力佈防，有反恐特勤隊荷槍戒備，所有進入法庭的車輛均須經過檢查。
+
+
+
+
+
+
+### 過百警力在場戒備 所有車輛均經檢查
+
+黎智英國安案吸引多名海外傳媒採訪，今早7時已有逾30名傳媒到場輪候，亦有逾30名市民排隊。警方加強警力，派出過百警力在西九龍法院外一帶佈防，通州街天橋底泊滿十多架警車，包括裝甲車「劍齒虎」，法院外有反恐特勤隊荷槍戒備。同時任何進入法庭的車輛均須經過警方檢查，包括以爆炸品搜查犬繞車一圈，及把鏡子伸進車底檢查有否危險品。另國安處處長江學禮及國安處總警司李桂華亦到場視察，李於審訊期間坐在律政司團隊後排。
+
+
+
+「女長毛」雷玉蓮今早約7時到場，形容警方「好大陣仗、好緊張」、「如臨大敵」，以往其他案件如初選案亦未試過這樣，不明白為何這樣緊張。她指自己一到場已有兩名警民關係警員「去邊都跟住我」，問她來做什麼、帶多個麵包的用途，雷指她想將麵包分發予在場排隊的記者，但警員以該處「封咗」為由不讓她步近，其他人卻能自由行過。雷認為黎智英「好慘」，「都冇聽過有人可以還柙三年」。
+
+
+
+
+
+「王婆婆」王鳳瑤今早亦持英國旗到場，嘗試揮旗示威，但即被大批警員帶到對面行人路以鐵馬架起示威區。王續高呼「支持黎智英」、「支持蘋果」等口號。另天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君、民主黨前立法會議員劉慧卿都有前來旁聽，劉指望能有公平公開的審訊，及告訴國際社會香港仍然是法治社會、司法獨立。
+
+
+
+
+### 排頭位市民：唔想佢還柙3年望向旁聽席係冇人
+
+排第一位的市民JC，昨晚10時已經到達，在法院外通宵排隊，指本案等了3年終於可以開審，認為本案與初選案一樣是較轟動的國安案件，可知道香港政府的界線，望能來「見證」。JC指自己「冇睇開」《蘋果日報》，但在幾年前社運時看得最多，對於《蘋果》結束感到可惜，認為少了媒體「咁夠膽挑戰一啲比較敏感嘅嘢、或者問一啲尖銳嘅問題」。
+
+JC又指，這麼早到場是望能進入正庭，「唔想佢（黎智英）還柙3年望向旁聽席係冇人，或者全部係你知根本唔係嚟聽嘅人」。JC認為黎有機會「死之前出唔返嚟」，「就算佢真係有機會出唔返嚟、會喺入面坐到死，我希望佢知道佢係成為咗香港一個好重要嘅歷史人物，同我哋係多謝佢。」
+
+
+
+
+### 市民：《蘋果》成敢言象徵 黎智英燒燃自己予力量身邊人
+
+排第二位的是藝術工作者的宋先生，他今晨4時到達，解釋在網上直播看到JC一人在排隊，驅使他到場，「令大家冇咁孤單」。他形容，黎智英是一名歷史人物，雖面對現時遭遇，但卻擁抱和接受自己的遭遇，望自己能予黎「微小嘅陪伴、微小嘅支持」。對於黎智英還柙3年，他形容黎是「燃燒緊佢自己嘅生命」，雖然某程度是「白坐」，但「另一種層面上佢唔係白坐，佢每坐一日，佢係燃燒緊自己，係畀緊力量人」。
+
+宋認為，黎是用自己的身體被囚禁去「make緊一個statement」，「唔係一種聲嘶力竭嘅嘢，佢好似就係用佢自己一個靜靜地、或者有時傳媒拍到佢一啲樣貌，繼續喺佢腦裡面有某種嘅生活、有某種嘅存在喺度，佢好似冇放棄，佢冇認輸。」
+
+宋又指自己並非《蘋果日報》忠實讀者，但隨時間過去，「呢份報紙已經成為咗一個載體、一個符號、一個象徵」，代表「敢言」、「企定咁去面對恐懼甚至克服恐懼、面對強權時都依然係好有膽量」，亦與香港人有很多經歷。他想起《蘋果日報》的舊廣告，黎智英頭上放了一個蘋果，滿身中箭，認為黎現時正是實踐當年廣告的畫面，「成為咗個蘋果比啲箭咁樣去射，但都默默咁去承受，唔妥協。」
+
+
+
+
+### 無國界記者及多國領事到庭旁聽
+
+非政府組織無國界記者RSF的代表，亦於今晨5時到達，指黎智英和《蘋果日報》是香港新聞自由的象徵，其組織有密切留意本案情況，望到庭了解。另多國領事，包括美國、英國、澳洲、紐西蘭、瑞士、加拿大及歐盟領事館等均有派員旁聽。
+
+
+
+另有中年女士表示自己凌晨4時到達，但被問到來旁聽什麼案件、為何這麼早到達，則一律笑指「冇嘢答到你」。隊伍中亦有十多人打開傘和戴帽遮蓋容貌，坐在椅子或地蓆上背對街道，記者問及何時到達、來旁聽什麼案件，均一律沒有回應。據排頭位的JC所指，他們一群人於約5至6時到達，用「小紅書」和「WeChat」。
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-12-19-why-to-marry.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-19-why-to-marry.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b3d49711
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-19-why-to-marry.md
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "點解要娶老婆"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2023-12-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/kbsWR3d.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+香港某個角落，有一人叫“阿成”，另一人叫“梁炳”，還有一人叫“關麗媚”。梁炳是阿成的爸爸，關麗媚是阿成的媽媽。
+
+
+
+三個人住在名叫“筲箕灣”地區的一棟住所。梁炳對這個地方很不滿意，嫌三嫌四，不是說這裡老人多，就是埋怨住的唐樓又舊又殘，他經常抱怨。
+
+不過，相對而言，他對環境抱怨算瑣碎事了。他對“關麗媚”的抱怨厲害得多！關麗媚即是阿成的媽媽，關麗媚即是梁炳的老婆，他對他的婚姻生活十分不滿。
+
+梁炳說：“點解要娶老婆？係咪當時暈陀陀？只因為日又拍夜也拖？所以餓傻咗？談情說愛的確係唔會肚餓！”
+
+這些話，阿成經常聽到的，阿成說：“老竇話關麗媚一變佢老婆，就即刻反轉咗！舊時日日情話多，後來就日日發火！”
+
+阿成並不覺得媽媽是這種人，她只不過是對梁炳的一種關心、愛心和情深，阿成覺得爸爸真是一個很不知足的人。
+
+梁炳的不知足不是一時一刻，是時時刻刻的。阿成今年已經有二十三歲，他十三歲就開始意識到爸爸對人生的抱怨了！為了懲罰梁炳的“不知足”，阿成決定製造一個惡作劇，讓爸爸體會一下他的生活，其實並不苦的，他的生活是可以充滿歡樂和的樂趣，而且應該知道滿足和珍貴。即使偶然是苦，也可以苦中作樂。阿成覺得很奇怪，為什麼他只有二十三歲也懂得這些，而梁炳幾十歲人也不了解？究竟是阿成的幼稚？還是梁炳的天真？
+
+阿成是一名遊戲程序員，最近他參加了一個新項目，並且需要尋找測試員，他決定將梁炳帶入去這個名叫“反轉世界”的虛擬實境中。
+
+梁炳一口應承了。老實說，梁炳是那種望子成龍心態的人，阿成學業有成，他就覺得阿成做什麼都是對的，說什麼話都是有見豎的，阿成在家什麼也不做都是對的。而且，這是一款角色扮演的遊戲，梁炳也樂此一解煩悶的生活。梁炳要選擇的角色就是“阿成”。梁炳想做阿成，因為他未曾嘗試過做大學生的滋味，也想一再體驗二十歲的新心情。
+
+阿成接受了爸爸的要求，爸爸變成了阿成，而阿成則變成了“關麗媚”。梁炳不明白為什麼阿成要做關麗媚，而不做梁炳？
+
+“我現在是你老婆了，爸爸！啊..不.不.不.我是你媽媽才對。”阿成笑著說。
+
+在這個“反轉世界”中，梁炳覺得校園生活好好玩，不過只是第一周，很快他就打哈欠。梁炳又看到“關麗媚”在她正在抹玻璃，沒完玻璃然後掃地，掃地完接著晾衣、買菜、煮飯、洗廁所。梁炳覺得好無聊，又悶！看著關麗媚做家務，現實生活見到的不是一樣嗎？
+
+後來他才醒覺，眼前做家務的不是關麗媚，而是阿成來的，梁炳忽然覺得很心痛！明明是一表人才，又是官仔骨骨的兒子，怎可以讓他洗廁所呢？！
+
+梁炳看到滿頭大汗的關麗媚，可是，在遊戲中的關麗媚很不一樣，遊戲中的她，臉上都很苦的，整天不說話，一副浮雲慘淡的樣子，梁炳有一種感覺“她一定很辛苦了！”他實在忍不住，馬上跑上去幫手做家務，分擔關麗媚的工作。
+
+突然她又想到了現實生活的關麗媚不是這樣的，她會講話的，她會囉嗦別人的，她說話很快的，她會笑的，不管她有多忙。而梁炳自己，似乎沒有分擔任何家務，除了關麗媚大著肚子要把阿成生出來的時候。
+
+-
+
+當阿成看到爸爸在“反轉世界”的改變時，他知道這個惡作劇達到預期效果了。於是，他決定結束遊戲，讓大家回到現實世界。其實，阿成也覺得很疲累，一個家庭這麼多煩瑣的工作，一個接一個，老是做不完，而且，關麗媚也必須要上班呀！
+
+回到現實世界裡，關麗媚正在打卡下班，當商業大廈的玻璃門自動打開時，她看到兩個大男人站在門外等候她，他們說：“別買菜了，我們出外吃！”
+
+關麗媚一頭霧水，很陌生的場景啊！
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-12-25-police-arresting-100-santa-clauses.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-25-police-arresting-100-santa-clauses.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b6021e85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-25-police-arresting-100-santa-clauses.md
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "警察抓捕100个圣诞老人"
+author: "沈博伦"
+date : 2023-12-25 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/KLVY1vG.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+今天是圣诞节，介绍一个发生在49年前的那个圣诞节，来自丹麦的艺术行动。
+
+
+
+本次行动策划者是丹麦的剧场团体Solvognen，这是个丹麦语，翻译成中文叫太阳的战车。太阳战车其实是一件宝贵的文物，被认为是丹麦青铜器的代表。剧团的名字就源自于这件向太阳献祭、祈福的雕塑。
+
+太阳的战车活跃于1972年至1983年，是丹麦历史上最大的剧团之一。成员组成除了艺术领域从业者外，还包括反越战活动家、嬉皮士，还有我们在另一个专题中即将涉及的占屋者，许多成员都是最早克里斯蒂安尼亚自由城的建设者。剧团常规成员有10-25人，但根据不同的项目多则几百人参与。太阳的战车结合剧场表演、社会运动于一体，早年还在剧院里做舞台表演，但真正扬名立万的是他们的街头表演，全是政治剧场和直接行动。
+
+比如他们第一个作品，1972年，号召19000人抗议丹麦加入欧盟的前身；比如1973年作品《北约军队》，在北约部长们于哥本哈根会面期间，他们身着统一军服、租了军用帐篷，扮演成训练有素的军队，混淆人们视线，导致丹麦警察和军队开始相互抓捕，都以为对方是演员；1976年丹麦雷比儿，丹麦当局庆祝美国建国200周年的活动，他们不请自来，扮演成300个印第安人，骑着马，在女王的演讲中呼号，表演太阳舞，讽刺美国人对原住民的欺压，讽刺丹麦当局跪舔美国，被电视卫星直播给了全世界，直到丹麦警察介入，血战印第安人。
+
+
+
+而我们今天要说的，就是他们最著名的作品：《圣诞老人军队》。
+
+二战结束以后，美国提出马歇尔计划，帮助欧洲重建，提供经济、技术援助，与欧洲建立密切贸易往来。丹麦的商业资本开始兴起，贫富差距拉大。许多社会运动团体反对资本、商业、股票，公司因利益算计宁愿空关着，也不愿意雇人工作，大量的人开始失业。《圣诞老人军队》就是在这样的背景下行动的。
+
+1974年圣诞节前五天，太阳的战车出发，浩浩荡荡组织了100个圣诞老人穿着红白色经典服装从乡镇进入哥本哈根，一只巨型的鹅被他们捧在队中，队伍里还有一些身着白衣宛若天使般的女性。
+
+
+
+最开始的行进是和平的，他们踩着轮滑、驾着马车、推着各种动物，像嘉年华一样游行在城市里。去养老院给老年人们唱传统丹麦圣诞歌曲，在路上给孩子们分发饼干、糖果和热巧克力，去学校和孩子们玩耍，与人们热切交流，似乎只是想要给人们展示圣诞老人原本的含义，善良、慷慨。
+
+
+
+之后行动发生转向。他们路过哥本哈根市中心的证券交易所，看到有人示威抗议，要求废除私有财产，反对自由市场。他们在交易所楼下齐声唱圣诞赞歌，被警察勒令离开，抗议者最终被带走；随后又进入了银行，向银行申请贷款并告知银行，他们会将钱分发给人们，就像雨，总是均匀地散落珍珠，但最终圣诞老人还是被警察轰出了银行，来看好戏的人们，有人高喊到，为什么银行总能开在街角，那个最显眼的位置。
+
+随后圣诞老人游行到了一家工厂，已经关闭了的工厂。圣诞老人们翻墙进入，在工厂门口拉上横幅，写道“圣诞老人开了一家有1000个工作的工厂”。这是他们希望给这个国家失业者们的一份礼物，但在一番交涉后，最后被工厂管理者驱逐。
+
+
+
+为期五天的表演、行动在最后一天进入高潮。他们兵分两队，分别去了劳资争议法庭和丹麦最大的百货商场Magasin。
+
+在劳资争议法庭门口，他们开来一辆吊车，在几十位圣诞老人的载歌载舞中，一位圣诞老人被升降机送至空中，他拿着高音话筒高声批判：法庭不是审判正义的，而是嘲弄正义，劳资法庭声称他们在两类群体之间进行审理，但实际上是两个阶级，资本家和挣工资的人，这种审理的不过是中产阶级正义。
+
+
+
+与此同时，另一批圣诞老人走进百货商店，与人们握手交谈，发放礼物。他们从包里拿出自己带来的，讲述普通人历史的彩色漫画，分发给购物的人，还把书放到售卖的书架上。这还没完，他们开始从货架上直接拿商品当作礼物送给人们，告诉人们圣诞老人光顾Magasin商场是因为有太多人失业了，他们来送上祝福，并在商场里唱起了赞歌。有人得到了书，有人拿到了贺卡，有孩子得到了糖果。广播开始响起，告诉人们圣诞老人们不是由商场雇佣的，请把商品放回柜台或交给工作人员。
+
+
+
+在另一边，劳资争议法庭，圣诞老人们拿出自己的锤子、锥子，开始攻击建筑、窗户，警察陆续赶到，抓捕圣诞老人。Magasin商场也是一样，警察们在人们的围观下，在孩子们的哭声中，将圣诞老人们绳之以法。
+
+这到底是表演，还是现实？如果世界上真的有圣诞老人，他送我们的礼物应该从哪来呢？如果世界没有圣诞老人，那他所传递的善意和慷慨应该怎么达到呢？
+
+此次行动后，很多圣诞老人都被拘捕，并且总共被罚款20000丹麦克朗，按通胀算，相当于今天8万多人民币。随后他们又利用这个罚款做了个新作品，两位演员扮演成警察，押送着20000克朗的支票去银行提交罚款。更讽刺的是，后来他们因为这个作品被丹麦艺术基金授予20000克朗的奖金，但被刚才提到的劳资争议法庭给扣留了。
+
+圣诞老人是欧洲传统的圣诞节符号，有许多来源说法，但都在讲述他的慈善。而今天我们所熟悉的圣诞老人形象却是彻头彻尾的消费神话。19世纪以前的圣诞老人并没有统一的样貌，黄衣黑衣都有，但红衣白须、体胖慈祥的老人，是可口可乐1930年代设计的广告，作为可乐的代言人而出现的。
+
+著名人类学家David Graeber在《Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology无政府主义人类学的碎片》一书中说，“这是一场仪式性的表演，目的是让大家看见‘警察殴打圣诞老人、从哭泣的小孩手中夺走玩具’的画面。免费的礼物只是一个谎言，没有付钱的心意，即使你是圣诞老人也会被警棍招待。”
+
+
+
+没错，艺术作品，尤其是文学戏剧，往往是建立一个全新的世界，描述、比喻、讽刺肉身所处的现实世界，这两个世界之间没有直接关联，靠艺术语言嫁接。而社会行动、艺术介入，包括我们之前介绍的艺术行动都是在肉身所处的现实世界直接展开，利用现实批判现实。
+
+但《圣诞老人军队》，让这两个世界强行碰撞，迫使所有人参与了他们的戏。在警察作为正义守护者的世界里，圣诞老人们是罪犯，需要被缉拿，维护社会秩序；而在圣诞老人的世界里，警察才是那个不解风情的。太阳的战车，在肉身真实和想象真实之间碾出一道裂口，塑造出新的真实，以表演的形式提供给人们新的视角看待那不可辩驳的正义，将其威严下放。这是现实与童话的对掉，正义和邪恶的翻转，戏与戏的错乱。
+
+
+
+无独有偶，在几乎同一时期的70年代，巴西剧场大师奥古斯托·波瓦提出隐形剧场概念，指出在社会中制造事件，旁观者或观众spectator实际是spect-actor演员，让他们毫无准备地卷入到事件，最终亲身参与、塑造演出。但这种演出并不是即兴的，而是艺术家精心策划，对即将发生的事件有充分预期的。值得一提的是，彼时的巴西政治环境，处于独裁统治下，波瓦认为隐形剧场不仅是艺术性的，而是对革命的预演。
+
+
+
+我们身处的舞台中，总有人想扮演正义角色，那我们就可以扮演更正义的童话人物。让正义取代正义的扮演者！
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2023-12-27-the-story-of-new-years-day-countdown.md b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-27-the-story-of-new-years-day-countdown.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f77b7414
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2023-12-27-the-story-of-new-years-day-countdown.md
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "元旦倒數的故事"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2023-12-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/RKVi2C9.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+一年時間過得很快，轉眼又到了年末，每年的這個時刻氣氛越漸濃厚，因為迎接未來新的一年。“魚毛”和“蝦妹”希望今年出去玩，不是去外面的世界，只是在本地遊遊蕩蕩，因為三年疫情好像困在籠子裡，今年一定要好好放鬆！
+
+
+
+這對夫妻而已經為十二月三十一日安排好了，他們將去吃一頓豐富的燭光晚餐，然後在街頭感受節日氣氛，聖誕燈飾會跨年陪伴，之後會在市中心碼頭的巨型鐘樓底下，和成千上萬的人們一起倒數，好像五年前，“魚毛”和“蝦妹”對於當年今日的印象依然深刻。
+
+然而，“魚毛”的好友“大鱔”找他，希望一起度過這個美好的節日，他希望兩對夫婦一起倒數，“魚毛”和“蝦妹”、“大鱔”和“石斑”，好像五年前、六年前、七年前一樣。
+
+魚毛把事情告訴蝦妹，蝦妹頓時感到掃興，因為她已經有一連串的計劃，給魚毛一些驚喜。魚毛沒有打算和大鱔一起度過除夕夜，但是拒絕是一門藝術，而這門藝術他很不擅長的。不過，其實最主要的原因，不是他們不喜歡“大鱔”，也不是他們想過二人世界，而是大鱔的老婆“石斑”，她是一個遲到大王！
+
+五年前的除夕她遲到了一小時，她說自己迷了路。
+
+六年前的除夕遲到了半小時，她說人太多被阻路。
+
+七年前的除夕她超過了倒數時間才出現！她說被街頭表演吸引住，一時忘記了。
+
+總之，約了她就會讓人不耐煩！
+
+魚毛和蝦妹決定推掉大鱔的約會，為了不想得失老朋友，理由一定要充足的，比如...今年我們打算和家人一起度過除夕夜，所以不能和你們一起了。或者是...
+
+我們今年有特別安排，所以不能和你們一起度過了。或者是..
+
+今年我們想遠離喧囂，找一個寧靜的地方...或是...
+
+我們今年只想在家看電影倒數，感覺比較安靜...不過...
+
+如果在倒數當晚，大鱔和石斑在鐘樓底下看到我們，那怎麼辦呢？看來這些都不是最好推掉他們的理由，難道我們真是要躲在家嗎？不要躲在家呀！蝦妹叫嚷著。
+
+不過，魚毛和蝦妹還未推掉大鱔的邀請，卻得到一個最壞的消息，就是“石斑”可能生癌了！石斑最近身心疲累，醫生告訴她，她的身體裡有一個大陰影，在乳房周邊，這個部位，如果是癌細胞的話，情況是很不樂觀的。蝦妹聽到這個壞消息十分震撼，非常難過，石斑只不過五十歲，是人生另一個階段的開始，這實在太不幸了。
+
+“醫生要放假，元旦過後才上班，石斑的化驗報告也要等待通知。但今年的除夕夜，我還是希望和她一起去鐘樓底下，我們也像往年一樣，四個人一起倒數好嗎？”大鱔嘆息地問。
+
+當然好！魚毛和蝦妹立刻就答應了。之前打算說什麼推掉約會之類的說話，全都不要了。
+
+蝦妹未遇過患上乳癌的朋友，她不知道怎麼面對，怎麼安慰她，而且在一個普天同慶的日子裡，大家都準備興高采烈地倒數，卻同時要面對這種哀傷，怎麼辦好？四天之後就是除夕夜了！她馬上搜索一些資料，參與別人一些體驗，記下一些心話語，總之，盡心她想做的事情，盡力讓石斑快樂吧！
+
+可是...面對絕症的時候，“倒數”究竟意味著什麼？多麼諷刺啊！
+
+十二月三十一日到了，街上擠滿了人，相信大家都在期待倒數的時刻。今年特別熱鬧，在鐘樓底下的人特別多，閃爍的彩燈，非常漂亮，那些光彷彿帶來了一點點溫暖。魚毛和蝦妹晚上十點半已經到了鐘樓底下，大鱔也到了，石斑還未來，一切就像往年，大鱔先到，石斑遲到，可是，今年卻不一樣呀！
+
+鐘樓底下的倒數，彷彿也是生命的倒數，有誰想面對呢！？蝦妹似乎明白石斑遲遲也未到的原因。
+
+-
+
+十一點五十八分，一個女人跑過來，她的動作比魚毛、蝦妹、大鱔還要快，她說話的音量比魚毛、蝦妹、大鱔還要大，她穿的衣服比魚毛、蝦妹、大鱔還要誇張華麗。
+
+十、九、八、七、六、五、四、三、二、一！
+
+新年快樂！
+
+新年快樂！
+
+Happy New Year!!!
+
+Happy New Year!!!
+
+鐘樓底下成千上萬的人們一起倒數完，喧嘩聲依然熱鬧非常。
+
+有人馬上接吻，有人馬上擁抱，有人給他人一記耳光！
+
+報告提早來了！
+
+醫生說我沒有乳癌呀.呀.呀.呀...！石斑幾乎費盡氣力說出這句話。
+
+大家都很意外！突然有這好消息。
+
+大鱔問、魚毛問、蝦妹問：“妳真的沒有乳癌呀.呀.呀.呀...？”
+
+石斑答：“是呀....我真的沒有乳癌呀.呀.呀.呀...！”
+
+蝦妹也幾乎聲嘶力竭地問石斑：“是呀？那麼妳為什麼又遲大到呀？”
+
+石斑說道：“我..要..扮..靚..呀...！”
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/1899-09-30-PeterKropotkin-a1_r-memoirs-of-a-revolutionist-2-page-corps.md b/_collections/_heros/1899-09-30-PeterKropotkin-a1_r-memoirs-of-a-revolutionist-2-page-corps.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6310a78b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/1899-09-30-PeterKropotkin-a1_r-memoirs-of-a-revolutionist-2-page-corps.md
@@ -0,0 +1,598 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "革命家忆・侍从学校"
+author: "彼得·克鲁泡特金"
+date: 1899-09-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/jLRShN0.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+position: right
+---
+
+`我入侍从学校——侍从学校的内部生活——“上校”——侍从学校中的新精神`
+
+
+
+我父亲多年的梦想终于成了事实。侍从学校中有了一名缺额，所以我在入学规定的年龄之前便可以进去。我被送到圣彼得堡去进学校。校中学生的名额只有一百五十人（大半都是宫廷贵族的子弟）。这个特权学校兼有有着特别权利的陆军学校与隶属于皇室的宫廷学校两种性质。在侍从学校里住了四五年以后，毕业测验及格的人便可以到他们自己选择的禁卫军或陆军的任何团队中当一名军官，并不管该团中有无那么多的空额。此外每年最高年级的前十六名学生都要接受“宫廷侍从”的任命，成为皇帝、皇后、大公夫人、大公的亲随。自然这是一种绝大的荣誉；而且得着这种荣誉的青年便会闻名于宫廷，有很多机会做皇帝的或一个大公的侍从武官，这样一来，他们在宦途上很容易发迹。因此，显贵人家的父母都尽力设法使自己的儿子不要错过入侍从学校的机会，甚至把那些以后再无递补进去的希望的其他候补者排挤掉亦在所不惜。现在我是在这学校里了，我的父亲该可以自由地让他的野心勃勃的梦想任意驰骋了罢。
+
+学校内共分设五级，最高的是第一级，最低的是第五级，我的意思是要进第四级。然而因为入学测验时我对于算术中的小数并不十分熟习，再说第四级本年已经有了四十多名学生，而第五级学生只有二十名，所以我便被编在第五级。
+
+这个决定使我大不高兴。我本来就不愿意进陆军学校，现在我要在那里不是住四年，而是要住满五年。第五级里的功课我已经完全知道，那么我还要在第五级里干什么呢？我含着眼泪把这件事告诉了监督温克勒上校（即教务主任），然而他用一句笑话回答我：“你该晓得恺撒曾经说过——与其在罗马当第二人，不如在一个村子里当第一人。”我很痛快地回答他说，我乐意当最后一人，只要我能早日离开陆军学校就好。“也许过一些时候，你就会喜欢这学校的，”他说。从那一天起，他对我就很亲切了。
+
+那位算术教员也想安慰我。我却向他发誓说，我决不会把他的教科书看一眼，“尽管如此，你却不得不给我最高的分数。”我果然做到了这一点。但是现在我想起当时的情景，倒觉得这个学生真有点桀骜不驯了。
+
+然而当我追忆到遥远的过去的时候，我便不能不感激我被编入低级的事。因为在第一年只是复习我已经知道的功课，我便有了一个习惯，单靠着听教员在课堂上的讲解来学习我的功课；下课后，我就有充分时间随意读书作文了。临到测验时，我从来不去预备功课，学校里本来规定了为测验作准备的时间，这时间，我便利用来向几个朋友朗诵莎士比亚或奥斯特洛夫斯基的剧本。当我到了较高的“特别级”的时候，我已有了较好的准备，可以学好我们要学的各门功课了。
+
+此外，在第一年冬季，我在医院里度过了大半的时间。我和所有别的不是生长在圣彼得堡的小孩一样，不得不向这个“在芬兰的沼泽地上建立的都城”交一笔重税：起初患了几次本地的时疫，最后又患了一场伤寒症。
+
+当我进侍从学校的时候，它的内部生活正发生着一个深刻的变化。全俄国当时已从尼古拉一世治下的酣睡和可怖的梦魇中觉醒过来。我们的学校也受到了这种复兴的影响。老实说，如果我早一两年进了侍从学校，我真不知道我会变成什么样子。不是我的意志完全破碎，便是我被学校开除：其后果如何是没有人能知道的。幸而这过渡期在1857年已经是势不可挡的了。
+
+校长柴尔屠欣将军是一个出色的老人。然而他只是名义上的首脑。实际上的校长乃是“上校”——即柔拉多上校，一个在俄国军队中服务的法国人。人家说他是一个耶稣会徒，我相信他真是如此。无论如何，他的态度是和洛约拉的教义相合，而他的教育方法又是法国耶稣会学校中所实行的那些。
+
+他是一个身材短小，而且极瘦的人，他有一对黑而犀利、爱偷看人的眼睛，还有那剪得短短的髭须，使得他的面相像猫脸。他沉着坚定；虽不十分聪明，却是极其狡狯，在骨子里他是一个专制暴君，他会憎恨——强烈地憎恨一个不受他笼络的学生；他不仅能用愚笨的迫害来表示他的憎恨；还能不断地用他平时的态度（不小心漏出的一个词、一个手势、一个微笑或一声惊叹）来表示。他走起路来像在滑动，他不掉头便能骨碌碌乱转进行窥探的眼光更加深了滑动这一印象。他的嘴唇上带着冷淡无情的印迹，甚至就在他想装出和颜悦色时，他的嘴因他的那种不满或轻蔑的笑容而扭曲。那时候，他的和颜悦色反而变得格外难看了。由于这一切，在他身上实在找不出司令官的风度来；乍一见他，还会以为他是一个仁慈的父亲在和他的小孩们讲话，把他们当作成人一般地看待呢。然而不久就会觉得他是要使所有的人和一切事物都屈服在他的意志之下。一个不依照“上校”对他的脸色之好坏而感到幸福或不幸的学生活该要倒霉了。
+
+“上校”两字不绝地出于众人之口。我们给别的长官都取了绰号，就用绰号称呼他们，然而没有人敢给柔拉多上校取一个绰号。大家以为他有一种不可思议的本领，好像他是无所不知，无所不在。不错，他的整个白昼的时间和一部分夜晚的时间都是在学校中度过的。甚至我们在课堂里上课时，他还在四处巡行，用他自己的钥匙打开我们的抽屉乱翻。至于夜里，他也还要费好些时间来用特别的记号和各样颜色的墨水把学生们的优劣功过分栏地一一记录在小本本里。这些小本本他有一大堆。
+
+我们看见他牵着他所宠爱的一个孩子的手慢慢地穿过我们宽阔的房间，前仰后合平衡着自己的身子，这时候，我们的游戏、笑谑、谈话都马上停止了。他向着一个学生微笑，又锐利地望了望第二个学生的眼睛，再向着第三个学生投了一瞥冷淡的眼光，走过第四个学生面前时，把嘴唇略略歪一下；这些做作就表示：他喜欢第一个学生；对于第二个学生他并无所谓好恶；他故意不注意第三个学生；而不喜欢第四个。这种嫌厌的表示足以使大部分受害者惊恐万分——由于不说明嫌厌的理由而尤其可怕。这种沉默的、不断地显露出来的嫌厌和猜疑的眼光常常使敏感的孩子陷于绝望中；在别的孩子身上，其结果是学生的意志彻底崩溃，正如费奥多尔·托尔斯泰（他也是柔拉多的学生）在他的一部自传体小说《意志的疾病》中所描写的。
+
+在“上校”的统治下，学校的内部生活是很悲惨的。本来在所有的膳宿学校里，新学生总要受些小的迫害。“新生”最初就要这样地受一次考验。他们的品性怎样？他们会不会变成“奸细”？“旧生”总喜欢向新来者显示已经建立起来的精诚团结的优越性。这种情形在所有学校中和所有监狱里都是有的。然而在柔拉多的统治下，这种旧生对新生的迫害更是凶狠。这种迫害不是从同级的同学来的，乃是来自第一级的同学——宫廷侍从们，他们是下级军官，而且柔拉多给了他们以一个十分破格的，优越的地位。他的方针就是把全权交给他们，靠他们来维持他的严酷的纪律，对他们所做的可怕的行为，装作毫不知情。在尼古拉一世的时代，“新生”受着宫廷侍从的打击时敢于还手的事实如果公之于众，那个“学生”便会被送入士兵子弟营中去。对一个宫廷侍从的任意的举动略有反抗，就会引起第一级的二十名学生拿着他们的沉重的橡木戒尺，聚集到一间房子里，在柔拉多的默许之下，把那个敢于表现这种不服从的精神的孩子痛打一顿。
+
+因此第一级的学生想干什么就干什么。就在我入校的前一个冬季，他们的最得意的游戏之一就是夜间把“新生”聚集在一间房子里，叫他们穿着睡衣跑成一个圆圈，好像在马戏场中跑马一样。而那班宫廷侍从却拿着橡皮的鞭子，有的站在圈子中央，有的站在圈子外面，残酷无情地鞭打那些跑着的孩子们。通常这种“马戏”总是以可恨的东方方式收场。至于当时学生间的道德观念以及校中关于夜间在“马戏”后发生的事的下流闲话真难说出口来，还是不说的好。
+
+“上校”是知道这一切的。他有一个组织得很严密的谍报组织，没有一件事瞒得过他。然而只要别人还不晓得这事已经被他知道，就可以平安无事。对于第一级学生所做的事闭着眼睛装做看不见的样子，这就是他维持纪律的基础。
+
+然而一种新的精神在校中觉醒了，我入校以前几个月光景，学校内已经起了一次革命。这一年的第三级学生便和从来的第三级学生完全不同。本年的这一级里有了一些真正用功，而且读过很多书籍的青年；其中有的后来居然成了名人。我最早认识其中的第一人（我就叫他做冯·孝夫罢）时，他正在读康德的《纯粹理性批判》。而且他们这一级里，还有几个是校内最有力气的青年。全校里身材最高又是极强壮的人也是在该级里面。这人是冯·孝夫的好友，叫做科席托夫。因此，这年的第三级学生不肯像从前这一级学生那样驯顺地忍受宫廷侍从们的压迫了。他们很讨厌当时的那种风气。有一次，发生了一件我不想在这里交代的意外事情；我只说一点：这件事发生后便引起了第三级和第一级的冲突，结果那班宫廷侍从被下级生着实打了一顿。柔拉多不让这件事声张出去，然而第一级的威权便从此失坠了。橡皮鞭子虽然还在，但不再能使用了。“马戏”和诸如此类的事情都已成了过去的陈迹。
+
+这已经是很大的进步了，然而最低的一级，即第五级差不多全是些新入校的年纪很小的孩子，所以依然不得不服从宫廷侍从们的私意。我们学校里有一所古木参天的美丽的花园，但是第五级的学生很少能享受：他们被逼着推动一个上有座位的旋转机，那班宫廷侍从们却坐在上面闲聊；有时，那班侍从大人玩九柱戏，又要叫他们去拾球。我入校后不过几天光景，看见了花园中的那种情形，便留在楼上，不再到那里去了。有一次，我正在读书，忽然一个有着红萝卜色头发，脸上生满雀斑的侍从火火跑上楼来，命令我立刻到花园里去推旋转机。
+
+“我不去；你没有看见我正在读书吗？”这就是我的回答。
+
+愤怒扭曲了他的那张本来就不大中看的脸。他正要向我扑来，我采取防御态势；他想用他的制帽来打我的脸，我尽力左遮右挡。他就把他的制帽扔在地上。
+
+“拾起来！”
+
+“你自己去拾。”
+
+像这样的不服从的行为在校内是闻所未闻的事。他为什么不当场痛打我，这我不明白。他的年纪比我大得多，力气也比我大得多。
+
+第二天和以后的几天里，我接到同样的命令，可是我顽强地留在楼上不下去。于是我一举一动都要受到一种小小的却令人气恼万分的迫害——这已足以使一个孩子陷在悲观绝望的境地了。幸而我生性总是很快活的，常常拿笑谑来回答他们，也不把他们放在眼里。
+
+再说，这种迫害不久就终止了。多雨的季节一来，我们只得在室内度过大部分时间。在花园里，第一级学生抽烟是自由的，然而在室内时就有一个专门的吸烟室，就是那“塔”了。“塔”里非常清洁，总是燃着一个火炉。第一级学生如果看见别级的学生在那里抽烟，他们一定要严惩他，可是他们自己却时时坐在那火炉边，一面闲谈，一面享受烟的滋味。他们喜欢在夜间十点钟以后抽烟，那时学生应该早已上床了。他们在那里抽烟一直抽到十一点半钟。他们怕柔拉多出其不意地发现了这事情，会来干涉，便命令我们守望。第五级的小孩子每一次两个轮流被他们从被窝里拖出来在楼梯旁边来回走，以便向他们报告“上校”到来的消息，直到十一点半。
+
+我们决定结束这种夜间守望。我们经过了长时间的讨论，而且还和较高各级的学生商量过究竟应该怎么办。最后的决定是：“你们全体都拒绝守望；自然，他们一定要揍你们，等他们揍你们的时候，你们便一伙儿，人越多越好，跑去见柔拉多。他早已知道这件事了，不过到那时候，他就不得不设法制止这件事。”至于这种举动是否算是“告发”的问题，也被那些礼法专家否定了，因为那班宫廷侍从对待别级学生毫无同学的感情。
+
+那天晚上，守望轮到了一个旧生夏荷夫斯科伊亲王和一个叫做塞拉诺夫的新生。后者极其胆小怕事，连说话都是女里女气的。夏荷夫斯科伊最先被叫去守望，但是他拒绝了，两个宫廷侍从也就不去管他，随后便去叫那胆小的塞拉诺夫，他已经睡在床上了。他也不肯去，他们拿起那重重的背带凶暴地乱打。夏荷夫斯科伊唤醒了近旁的几个同学，一起去找柔拉多。
+
+我也已经睡在床上了，忽然那两个宫廷侍从走到我的床前，命令我去守望。我拒绝了。于是那两人便用两副背带来揍我。（我们平常总是把我们的衣服叠得齐齐整整放在床前的一个凳子上，然后放上背带，领带横放在背带上。）我在床上坐起来用手来防卫，已经吃了重重几下子，忽然一个命令到了：“第一级学生到上校那里去！”那两个凶狠的战士马上变得非常和顺了，连忙把我的东西放好。
+
+“不许说一句话，”他们低声向我说。
+
+“领带横放在上面，收拾整齐，”我向他们说，那时我的肩上和腕上挨打后痛得火烧火燎。
+
+柔拉多和第一级学生说了一些什么话，我们不知道。然而第二天，我们排班预备下楼到食堂去的时候，他大事化小地向我们演说道，宫廷侍从欺侮一个出于正当理由拒绝的孩子，令人难过。欺侮谁呢？一个新生，而且像塞拉诺夫那样胆小的孩子！全校学生都讨厌这种耶稣会式的虚伪演说。
+
+这自然也是对于柔拉多的权威的一个打击，他是非常恼怒的。他很讨厌我们这一级，尤其讨厌我（关于旋转机的事也有人向他报告了），每遇着机会他便表示出这一恼怒来。
+
+第一年冬天，我常常住病院。我得过一次伤寒症，在病中，校长和医生非常亲切地看护我，有如父母一般。这一场大病过后，我又得了很厉害的、时发的胃病。柔拉多每天照例要到病院里来巡视。他看见我时常住在病院里，便开始在每天早晨半开玩笑地用法国话向我说道：“这个年轻人本来是和新桥一般结实，却住在病院里消磨时间。”有一两次，我也玩笑般地回答他，但后来发现他老这样说，并带有恶意，我变得非常愤怒了。
+
+“你怎么敢说这样的话？”我叫道。“我要请求医生禁止你进这屋里来……”
+
+柔拉多向后退了两步。他的黑眼睛发了光。他的薄嘴唇显得更薄了。终于对我说：“我得罪了你，是吗？好，大厅里有两管大炮；我们是不是来决斗一次？”
+
+“我不喜欢开玩笑，我告诉你，我再也不受你的那些连讥带讽的玩笑了。”我接着说。
+
+他以后便不再重复他的玩笑了，可是比以前更加恨我。
+
+幸而他缺少责罚我的机会。我不抽烟。我穿衣服总是戴好背带，扣好钮扣，晚上，我把衣服叠得整整齐齐。
+
+我本来喜欢各种游戏，然而因为我终日忙于读书以及同我的哥哥通信，所以几乎没有时间到花园里去打一种板球，我常常玩一阵就连忙回去读书。不过当我犯了错误的时候，柔拉多却不来责罚我而去责罚那个指定做我的上级的宫廷侍从。譬如有一天，我吃晚饭时有了一个物理学的发现：我注意到玻璃酒杯叩击时所发出的声音的音量当以其杯所盛的水量为准，我马上就拿四只玻璃杯来实验，想得出一个和声。然而柔拉多站在我身后，他并不向我说一句话，却把我的上级的宫廷侍从关起来。那个青年是一个很好的人，他是我的远房堂兄。过后我向他道歉，他连听也不愿听，他向我说：“不要紧。我知道他素来讨厌你。”但是他的同级的同学们却给了我一个警告：“顽皮的孩子，你要小心，我们不愿意代你受罚。”老实说，如果不是书籍把我的时间差不多完全占了去，他们大概会使我为我的物理实验付出高昂的代价。
+
+众人都在议论柔拉多对我的憎厌；但是对此我不加理会。这种冷淡态度大概使他更憎厌我。整整过了十八个月，他不肯把肩章发给我。本来照例新生入校后一两个月，已经知道一点初步军事操练的时候，就应该领得肩章的；不过，他不给我，没有我倒觉得十分快活。到后来一位长官（他是全校中最好的操练教员，一个爱上了操练的人）自愿来教我操练。当他看见我已经操练纯熟，可以使他非常满意时，他便把我推荐给柔拉多。柔拉多再次拒绝了，以后又拒绝了两次，因此那位长官便把这种拒绝认作是对他个人的侮辱。校长后来有一次问他，为什么我还没有肩章，他直截了当地答道：“这孩子没有问题；是上校不要他。”随后，大概听了校长的一句话，柔拉多要求自己来重新测验我一次，当天他便把肩章给我了。
+
+然而上校的势力很快地消失了。全校校风完全改变。二十年来，柔拉多实现了他的理想，这理想就是：他的学生应该把头发梳得溜光，卷得漂亮，像个女孩子；送到宫廷里去的侍从应该像路易十四的朝臣那样文雅。他不大管他们究竟是否学到一点学识；他所喜欢的学生的行囊里应该装满各种刷指甲的刷子和香水瓶，他们的“下班时的制服”（星期日归家后可以穿的）应该是做工一流的，他们会行最漂亮的“斜身礼”。从前柔拉多演习宫廷礼节的时候，他总是从我们的床上扯下一床红条子的棉床罩，裹在一个侍从的身上，叫他装作受吻手礼时的皇后，而别的孩子们几乎是虔诚地走近那个假皇后，庄严地行了吻手礼，以一个最出色的斜身鞠躬告退下来。然而现在，虽然他们在宫廷里算是很出色的，但是在演习的时候，躬鞠得像熊一般，令人捧腹大笑，柔拉多则怒不可遏。从前，年轻的孩子把头发烫成卷发，被领到宫廷里朝贺归来，还极力使卷发保持得尽量久一些；现在他们刚从皇宫回来便急忙把头放在冷水管下面，用水把卷发冲直。娇弱如女气已成了众人嘲笑之的。被带到宫廷去朝贺，像一件装饰品似的站在那里：这在如今被看成是贱役，而不是什么恩典。
+
+有时候，人还把年轻的孩子带到宫里去陪那些小小的大公们玩耍。一天，一位小小的大公在游戏时用手帕当做鞭子随便抽人，孩子中有一个照他那样做，居然把那个大公抽哭了。柔拉多非常惊骇，而那个做大公的教师的老将军，塞瓦斯托波尔海军提督，却称赞我们的这个同学。
+
+一种好学认真的新精神在侍从学校里和在其他一切学校里一样生长起来。在前些年里，侍从们确信无论如何他们有方法可以得到升为禁卫军军官所必需的分数，所以在学校的前几年里几乎完全不读书，只有到了最后的两年才开始多少学一点。如今哪怕是下级的学生也非常用功了。道德风气也和几年前的完全不同。东方式的不免残酷的娱乐已经被众人嫌弃了。曾有一两次想恢复旧风习的企图，但都成为丑闻，并一直传到圣彼得堡的各处客厅里。柔拉多被免了职。只给他保留了校内的单身寓所。后来我们常常看到他裹着他的长的军人外套来来去去，沉溺在深思之中。我想他一定感到悲哀，因为他完全不能容忍在校内迅速发展的那种新精神。
+
+-
+
+`侍从学校内的教育——学习德文——俄文文法与俄国文学——我们的习字老师——我们的图画老师——对于图画老师的惩戒`
+
+全俄国的人都在谈论教育问题。和平条约刚刚在巴黎缔结，而书报检查制度的严厉也稍微松了一点之后，人们马上就热心地讨论起教育问题来了。民众的愚昧无知，好学的人面前所横着的障碍，乡村学校之缺乏，陈腐的教育方法以及对此等弊害如何补救成了有识者中、报纸上，以及贵族客厅里最时髦的话题。根据一个出色的计划，第一批女子中学于1857年开办，并配备了优秀的师资，像变戏法似的出现了不少专心一意地从事教育事业，而且证明是很能干的男女实干教育家：他们的著作如果流传到国外，一定会在各文明国家的文学中占有一席光荣的位置。
+
+侍从学校也受着这种复兴的影响。除了少数例外，较低的三级的一般倾向是用功读书。教务主任（即监督）温克勒是一个造诣很深的炮兵上校、优秀的数学家兼有进步见解的人；他想出了一个鼓励我们的好学精神的绝妙的主意。他解聘了从前担任低年级功课的那些毫不热心的教师，尽力从优聘新的来。他认为教年幼的孩子一门功课，要使他们在初学时得其要领，对最好的教师来说也不是一件容易事。因此他便聘了一位第一流的数学家而且是天生的教师，苏霍宁上尉来教第四级里的代数入门。第四级的学生马上就爱上数学了。原来这个上尉又是皇储尼古拉·亚历山德洛维奇（在二十二岁时病故）的老师，皇储每星期被带到侍从学校来一次，听苏霍宁上尉讲代数。皇后玛丽·亚历山德洛夫娜是一个有学识的女人，她以为把她的孩子带来和那班好学的学生接触会鼓励他专心向学。他坐在我们中间，而且要回答教员的提问，和别的学生并没有分别。然而在老师讲书的时候，他把大半的时间都用来绘画（他画得很好），或者和他的邻座的同伴低声谈些逗人发笑的事。他脾气很好，举止温文尔雅；可是在学习方面流于肤浅，而在感情方面更是如此。
+
+监督又给第三级聘了两位好教员。有一天，他走进我们的课室，非常高兴；他告诉我们说，我们交了难得的好运。原来一位精通俄国文学的大古典学者，克拉沙夫斯基教授，已经答应来教我们这一级的俄文文法，而且一年年跟着教到我们毕业为止。同样，另一位大学教授，皇家（国立）图书馆馆长柏克先生，来教我们这一级的德文，办法和克拉沙夫斯基教授的一样。他还说本年冬天，克拉沙夫斯基教授的身体不大好，不过监督相信我们在他的教课时间里一定会很安静。有着这样一位教员真是好运气，谁都不愿失掉它。
+
+监督想得对。我们对有两位大学教授来做我们的老师非常自豪：虽然从“堪察加”（在俄国，每一间课堂里的最后几排都被称作这辽远的、未开化的半岛）发出的声音说，要让那个“做腊肠的”（即德国人）见了大家服服贴贴，但我们这一级的舆论显然偏向那两位教授。
+
+那位“做腊肠的”马上就获得了我们的尊敬。一个身高、额头极宽、有一对和善而聪明、稍稍被眼镜遮掩了一点的眼睛的人来到我们的课堂，用很流畅的俄国话告诉我们，他想把我们这一级分成三组。第一组里尽是些德国孩子，他们已懂得德国话了，所以应该完成烦难的作业；第二组就是普通的学生，他依照课程表上所定的，起初给他们教授文法，后来教授德国文学；接着他带一个可爱的微笑说，第三组就是“堪察加”。他说：“我只要求你们做一件事，就是每节课你们要抄写四行文章，我会从书里给你们选出来。这四行书抄完后，你们可以随意去做你们的事；只是不许妨害其余的人。而且我保证五年以后你们总会学到一点德文和德国文学。好，谁加入德国人一组？你，席达克尔堡？你，兰斯多弗？也许还有一两个俄国人吧？谁又加入‘堪察加’？……”五六个完全不懂德语的孩子便在那个“半岛”上住。他们很忠实地抄写四行德文书（在较高年级时，抄十二行或二十行），而柏克先生每次选这几行书都选得非常之好，在这班孩子身上花了好大心思。所以五年以后，他们真的懂得了一点德文和德国文学了。
+
+我加入了德国人一组。我的哥哥亚历山大在他给我的信中要我务必学习德文，因为德国文学异常丰富，而且每本有价值的书都已经有了德文译本。我便热心地学习德文。我把一页难懂的富有诗意的描写大雷雨的文字翻译成俄文，透彻地进行学习；我又按柏克先生的劝告把动词的变化，副词和前置词记得很熟以后，便开始读德文书了。这是学习语言的一个好方法。柏克先生还劝我订阅一份廉价的图画周刊。其中的插画和短篇小说不断引得我去读几行或者一栏。不久我便精通德文了。
+
+在冬季快完的时候，我便要求柏克先生借一本歌德的《浮士德》给我。我已经读过了这书的俄文译本。我也读过了屠格涅夫的美丽的小说《浮士德》，现在我想读这部名著的原文了。“你会一点也不懂的；它太富哲学意味了”，柏克先生带着他的温和的微笑说。可是他依然给我带了一本方方的小书来，小书的篇页因为年代久远已经变成了黄色，它印的正是那不朽的戏剧。他想不到这小方书给了我难以衡量的快乐。我玩味着其中每一行的意义与音乐性。从那富于理想之美的献诗的头几句读起，不久就整页整页地背熟了，浮士德在林中的独白，特别是那些他谈到自己对自然的理解的诗句：
+
+> 你不仅冷静而惊愕地结识自然，
+
+> 并且使我看透她的最深的胸臆，
+
+> 犹如看透一个友人的内心，
+
+简直使我到了狂喜的境界；至今它在我的精神上还保留着它的魔力。每一首诗都成了我的一个亲密的朋友。再说，难道世间还有比诵读诗人用我所不曾精通的一种语言写成的诗篇更高的审美乐趣吗？全篇似乎被一种薄雾笼罩着，这薄雾正好与诗切合。如果一个人懂得一种语言里的俗话，那么字句的琐屑意义有时候反会妨害它们所欲表现的诗的形象。而我并未如此精通俗话，字句在我不过是传达它们的微妙的、高尚的意境，从而诗的音乐性更有力地响在耳边。
+
+克拉沙夫斯基教授的第一课对于我们简直是一个上天的启示。他五十岁光景，身材短小，举止敏捷，他有一对发亮的、聪明的眼睛，一种略带一点讥讽的表情，和一个诗人的高高前额。当他走进课堂来授第一课的时候，他低声向我们说，他因为患了许久的病不能大声说话，因此便要求我们坐得离他更近一点。他把他的椅子放在第一排桌子旁边，我们就聚集在他的周围，像一群蜜蜂一般。
+
+他担任的功课是俄文文法；然而我们所听到的并不是干燥无味的文法课，而是和我们所料想的完全不同的东西。这固然是文法；但其中夹杂着俄国古民间文学的一个说法和荷马史诗或梵文史诗《摩诃婆罗多》中一行的比较（自然后者已被译成俄文了）；有时他引的是席勒的名诗，接着又是对现代社会的偏见的一句挖苦话；然后又是地地道道的文法了，过后便是一些诗的和哲学的泛论。
+
+自然，其中有很多地方是我们所不理解的，或者我们不能明白它们中的深一层的含义。然而一切研读的魅力却正在于它能给我们不断开拓意料不到的和还不了解的新眼界；它们引诱我们一步又一步更深入地去看那乍看起来只是一个模糊的轮廓的东西。我们听得望着老师的嘴唇出了神，有的把手放在同学的肩上，有的靠着前一排的桌子，有的紧紧地站在老师的身后。钟点快到的时候，他的声音更低了，我们也更加屏息凝神地听着。监督打开课堂的门来看我们用什么态度对待我们的新教员。然而一见这一群动也不动的学生他便踮着脚尖走了。甚至那个好动的孩子道洛夫也呆呆地注视着克拉沙夫斯基，好像在说：“你原来是这样一种人？”连那个笨得无可救药的、有着德国姓名的塞加西亚人冯·克莱瑙也端坐不动。在其余大部分学生心中，某种善良的、崇高的东西在慢慢地沸腾着，好像有一个没料想到的世界的幻景展现在他们的眼前。对于我，克拉沙夫斯基的影响大极了，而且这影响是与时俱增的。温克勒说的我也许终于会喜欢这学校的预言如今毕竟应验了。
+
+在西欧，大概还有美国，这样的教员似乎是很少见的；然而在俄国，凡是文学界与政治界中知名的男女，他们的向上发展之最初的契机未有不是从他或她的文学教师那里得来的。全世界每一个学校都应该有这样的教员。本来在一个学校中，每个教员都有他教的专门科目，这些不同的科目间并无联系。文学教师虽然也得依照课程大纲执教，但是他可以自由地按自己的意思讲授他的课程，因此他便能够把那些分割的历史与人文各科联成一片，用一个广泛的哲学的与人道的概念把它们统一起来，而且在青年们的头脑与心灵中唤起更高的思想与灵感。在俄国，这样必要的任务便十分自然地落在俄国文学教师的肩上了。当他讲到国语的发展，讲到古代史诗、民歌、音乐和其后的现代小说，以及本国的科学、政治与哲学文献的内容和从其中反映出来的各种美学的、政治的、哲学的思潮时，他便不得不把那超乎分别讲授的科目范围以外的，人类精神发展的一般概念介绍给学生了。
+
+对于自然科学也应该这样做。单教授物理学与化学、天文学与气象学、动物学与植物学是不够的。不管学校所定的自然科学授课范围如何，全部自然科学的哲学（大自然整体的一个概观如洪堡的《宇宙论》第一卷之类的东西）总是应该灌输到高低年级的学生的头脑里。大自然哲学与诗，一切确切的科学的研究方法，大自然的生命之激发的概念都应该构成教育的一部分。也许地理教师可以暂时来担负这个任务；不过我们应该要有和现在的地理教师完全不同的一组教师来教这门学问，而大学里需要的地理教授也应该和现今的不同。今天在学校中讲授的地理，说它是什么都可以，就是不能说是地理。
+
+另一个教师却用了完全不同的一种方法征服了我们这样喧闹的一级学生。这就是教员中间位置最低的习字老师。如果说那些“异教徒”（指德、法两国的教员）不大被学生看得起，那么习字老师爱伯特（生在德国的犹太人）便是一个真正的殉道者了。戏弄习字教师乃是侍从中的一种时髦。他之所以还继续在我们校内授课，唯一的原因便是他贫穷。那些在第五级中留了两三年不能升级的旧学生对他很坏。不过他想方设法和他们达成了一个协议：“每一课只准闹一次，不得再有第二次”——这协议在我们这一方面怕不是常常诚实地遵守的。
+
+一天，一个住在“堪察加”的学生把擦黑板用的海绵浸了墨水和粉笔灰向那可怜的习字老师扔过去。“爱伯特，你拿去！”他带着愚蠢的微笑大声叫道。这海绵打着了爱伯特的肩头，污秽的墨水溅了他一脸，流到他的雪白的衬衣上。
+
+我们相信这一次爱伯特一定会离开课堂去报告监督了。然而他不过摸出棉织手帕来把脸揩拭干净，一面叫道：“诸位，只闹一次——今天不许再闹了！”他用竭力压低了的声音添了一句：“衬衫脏啦！”接着就继续批改一个学生的习字帖。
+
+我们楞了，觉得羞愧。为什么他不去报告，反而立刻想到我们所订的协议呢？这时候，全级的同情集中在他身上。我们责备那个同学道：“你的行为是愚蠢的。”有的人还叫道：“他是一个穷人，你却把他的衬衫弄脏啦！真可耻！”
+
+那个犯了错误的学生立刻去向教师谢罪。“这位同学，你一定要好好学习呵！”这便是爱伯特的回答，他的声音里带着悲哀。
+
+大家变得非常安静，下一次上课时，好像我们预先商议好了似的，大部分的学生都努力把字写好，然后把习字帖送到老师面前请他批改。他满面放光；这一天，他觉得很快乐。
+
+这件事给了我以很深的印象，始终不曾忘记。至今我还感激这个了不起的人所给予我的教训。
+
+至于那个叫做甘池的图画教师，始终无法和学生友好相处。凡有学生在他上课时戏玩，他便要去报告监督。在我们看来，他没有权利这样做，因为他只是一个图画教师，而且尤其因为他不是一个诚实的人。他在课堂上并不大注意我们大部分学生，他只是专门去修改那些在课外跟他学画或者送钱给他好在测验时拿出好画博得高分的学生们的图画。我们并不嫉恨那班这样做的同学。我们反而觉得那些人没有数学方面的天分或地理方面的记忆力，不妨向画匠买一张图画或地形图去得最高分数，好使他们的总分高一点。只是班上头两名学生不该用这样的手段，至于其余的学生，他们可以问心无愧地做那样的事。然而教师却没有权利来向学生做卖画生意；他既然这样做了，那么他就应忍受他的学生们的喧闹和恶作剧。这就是我们的道德观念。然而他不但不这样做，反而每课必告发学生，并且一次比一次傲慢。
+
+等到我们升到第四级，觉得自己已经成了学校的入籍公民了，便决定给他套上笼头。我们的年长的同学告诉我们：“他在你们面前这么神气，只怪你们自己；我们倒老是叫他听我们的。”所以我们就决定设法使他就范。
+
+有一天，我们这一级中两个优秀的同学口里衔着纸烟走到甘池面前向他要火柴。自然，这不过是和他开个玩笑（在课堂里抽烟，这是从来没有人敢想的）。依着校规，甘池只应该把那两个学生逐出课堂。然而他却把他们的名字记在日志里；他们受了严厉的处罚。我们不能再忍耐了。我们决定让他得点“好处”。我们打算在某一天，全级学生都拿着从上级学生那里借来的戒尺，一齐用戒尺敲桌子，弄出猛烈的响声，而且把教员赶出课堂。然而这计划碰到很多困难。我们这一级里有些“乖”学生，他们虽然答应加入这示威运动，但是最后他们会害怕起来，退缩不前，于是教师便可指出其余的人的名字了。在这种计划里，最重要的就是全体一致，因为事实上处罚全级的总比处罚少数几个人的要轻许多。
+
+我们用了一个真正权术家的手腕把这些困难克服了。我们议定：一发出信号，全级同学一齐掉过身子以背向着甘池。那时候，大家便拿起藏在后一排桌子上的戒尺敲出预定的闹声。这样做，“乖”学生们便不会被甘池的眼光恐吓住。然而用什么做信号呢？像在强盗故事里那样吹哨子、喊叫或打喷嚏都不行；信号应该是无声的。最后我们决定：一个画得很好的同学把他的图画拿去给甘池看，等他回来就座——那就是时候了！
+
+一切都进行得非常好。奈沙多夫把他的画送到甘池面前，甘池拿着画修改了几分钟。这几分钟在我们感觉中是非常之久。后来他终于回到自己的座位上了；他先站了一刻，望着我们，然后才坐下去。……全级的学生突然掉转身子，戒尺便在书桌上愉快地响起来，我们中间有人还在戒尺声中高声叫：“甘池出去！打倒甘池！”闹声震得人耳聋；全校的学生都知道甘池得了他的“好处”。他站在那里，喃喃地说了些什么，最后毕竟出去了。一位长官跑进来——闹声还不停止。然后副监督便跑进来，随后监督也来了。闹声立刻停止。监督就开始训斥学生。
+
+“级长马上关禁闭！”这是监督的命令。我是这一级的第一名，因而是这级级长，这时就被送进黑牢里。这使我看不到以后的事。校长来了；校长要求甘池举出为首的几个学生的名字，可是甘池却举不出一个名字来。他回答道：“他们都掉过身子以背向着我，就开始闹起来。”因此，全级学生便被赶下楼去。虽然在我们学校中笞刑已经完全废止，但这一次，那两个向甘池要火抽烟的学生却挨了一顿赤杨棍的抽打，其借口是那场大闹是对他们所受惩处的报复。
+
+十天以后，我被释放出来，回到课堂里才知道这件事。课堂里的学行优良牌上我的名字已经被拭掉了。我对此丝毫不以为意。然而我必须承认，在地牢中没有书读的十天长得实在难受，所以我便写了一首诗（写得糟糕透了）来赞颂第四级学生的行为。
+
+自然，此时我们这一级便成了全校的英雄。整整一个月左右，我们不得不反复地讲这件事给其余各级的学生听。他们都祝贺我们能够这样一致地行动，以致没有一个学生被单独查出而受罚。
+
+从这时候起一直到圣诞节止，所有那些星期日里，学校当局不许我们这一级学生回家，强迫我们留在校内。由于大家都在一起，我们使那些星期日过得非常快活。那些“乖”孩子们的母亲给他们送来很多糖果；那班有零用钱的学生买来大堆的点心，——这种点心在饭前容易果腹，饭后留下股甜味。到了晚上，其余各级的朋友们又偷偷地送来很多的水果给勇敢的第四级学生。
+
+甘池此后不再告发学生了。可是我们完全失掉了对图画的兴趣。没有一个人肯向那个专门要钱的人学画了。
+
+-
+
+`和哥哥通信讨论科学、宗教、哲学与经济学问题——和哥哥的秘密相会——尼可尔斯奎集市——社会经济之实地研究——和人民接触——乡村小旅店中的一夜`
+
+我的哥哥亚历山大这时候是在莫斯科的军官学校里，我们两人间书信往来不绝，从前我在家中，这是不可能的，因为父亲以为凡寄到我们家的信都应该由他一个人拆读，这是他的特权，他只许我们在信里说些普通的家常。
+
+现在我们在信里可以自由讨论我们喜欢讨论的问题了。唯一的困难就是找钱来买邮票；不过我们不久便学会把字体写得非常细小，所以在一封信里我们可以写很多很多的事情。亚历山大的字本来写得很漂亮，他在一张信纸上可以写下四张信纸的字数，而他的小字像最好的排印小字一样易读。可惜他视作贵重纪念物的这些信件已经失去了。政治警察一次到他住处搜查，把这些宝物抢了去。
+
+我们的最初几封信大半是描写我的新环境的详细情形，不过我们的通信不久就有了一种更重大的性质。我的哥哥不耐写些琐碎的事。即使在社交中，他也只热心于从事严肃的讨论；如果他和那些只爱谈闲话的人在一起，那么，他便感到一种肉体的痛苦，——用他自己的话说，便“头脑里感到一种钝痛”。他在智力发展上远远超过了我，他陆续不断地提出科学上和哲学上的新问题，向我指示应读什么书，研究什么，以督促我前进。有这样一个哥哥在我是多么大的幸福啊！——我的这个哥哥并且爱我至深。我的长进大部分皆是他给予我的。
+
+有时候，他又劝我读诗。在他的来信中他还把他所能记忆的诗句甚至全篇的诗抄给我。他写道：“读诗罢，诗可以使人变得更好。”后来不知道有多少次我曾体会到他的这句话是多么真实！不错，读诗罢，诗可以使人变得更好。他自己就是一个诗人，而且长于写最富于音乐性的诗；他后来把诗歌弃置了，我实在为之惋惜。六十年代初期，在俄国青年中产生的对于艺术的反动（屠格涅夫在他的小说《父与子》中曾用了巴扎洛夫这人物把它具体表现出来），使他轻视他的诗作而埋头于自然科学中。然而我必须说明：我哥哥的诗才，他的对音乐极其敏感的耳朵，他的哲学气质使他特别喜欢一些诗人，而这些诗人一个也不是我所喜爱的。
+
+他特别喜爱的俄国诗人是威涅维季诺夫；而我最喜欢涅克拉索夫，他的诗作中对“被践踏者与被虐待者”的同情最能打动我的心。
+
+“每个人一生都应该具有一个固定的目标”，哥哥有一次这样告诉我。“没有一个目标，没有一个目的，生活便不是生活。”他劝我选定一个生活的目标，使我生活得有价值。我当时还异常年轻，找不到一个目标；然而在他的劝告之下已经有一种不确定的、含糊不清的“善的”东西在我心里觉醒起来了，虽然我还说不出那“善的”东西会是什么。
+
+我们的父亲只给了我们很少的零用钱，我简直没有钱去买一本书；然而如果亚历山大哥哥从一位姑母那里得到了几个卢布，他决不肯随意花掉一个小钱，他总会买一本书寄给我。他不赞成不加选择地读书。他告诉我：“对于自己所要读的书，必须先针对它提出一些问题。”但是我当时并不以这话为然；如今想起当时所读的各种的书（大多是十分专门的书，尤其是历史书）数目之多我不胜惊异。我不曾在法国小说上浪费时间，因为亚历山大在几年以前就用了一句斩钉截铁的评语给它们定了性：“它们是愚蠢的，而且充满了下流话。”
+
+自然，我们的通信的主要题目就是那些关于我们的宇宙概念的大问题。所谓宇宙概念即是德国人所说的“世界观”。我们在幼年时代就不曾信过宗教。我们被领到教堂里去过；然而在一个小教区或乡村的俄国教堂内，人们的庄严态度所给予我的印象远过于弥撒本身。我在教堂内听到的一切中只有两样感动过我：一是在俄国耶稣受难日的前夕，晚祷中诵读的《福音书》里关于基督受难的十二段；一是在四旬斋中诵读的谴责那种称王称霸的势派的短短的祈祷文，它的朴质平常的语句和感情实在是很美丽的。普希金曾把它翻译成俄文诗。
+
+较后在圣彼得堡时，我曾几次去过一所罗马天主教教堂，然而我在那里看到的演戏一般的，缺乏真情实感的仪式使我生厌，而当我在那里看见一个退伍的波兰兵士或一个农妇在远远的角落里带着何等的虔诚祷告时，这种仪式就更令人厌恶了。我也去过新教的教堂；可是我一走出那儿便不由得低诵起歌德的诗句来：——
+
+> 你永远无法把大家的心连在一起，
+
+> 除非这连系出自你自己的内心。
+
+同时，亚历山大又以平日的那种热情皈依了路德派，他读了米歇莱论塞尔维特的书，而且按这位伟大的战士的思想，他自己创造了一种宗教。他热心研究奥格斯堡声明，他还把它抄录下来寄给我。这时候，我们的信里充满了关于神恩的讨论和使徒保罗与雅各的言论的摘录。在这方面，我也随着我的哥哥，可是神学的讨论并不曾引起我的深的兴趣。自从我患伤寒症治好以后，我所读的书便大不相同了。
+
+我们的海伦姊姊这时已经出嫁了，她住在圣彼得堡；每逢星期六晚上，我便去看她。她的丈夫有很好的藏书，其中如十八世纪的法国哲学家以及近代法国历史学家的著作都相当完备，我便热心读着这些藏书。这样的书在俄国是被禁止的，我当然不能够把它们带到学校里去；所以我每个星期六晚上总要花费大部分时间去读百科全书派学者的著作，伏尔泰的哲学辞典，斯多噶学派，尤其是马可·奥勒利乌斯的著述等等。宇宙之广大无边，大自然之伟大，它的诗意，它的永远搏动的生命，这一切给我的印象愈来愈深。那无穷的生命及其和谐，使我享受到了一般青年心灵所渴望的忘我的赞叹，而我所爱好的诗人又用诗句为我表现出对于人类之觉醒的爱以及对于人类的进步之信仰，这种爱和信仰成为青春的弥足珍贵的一部分，给人留下了毕生不忘的印象。
+
+亚历山大这时渐渐走向康德派的不可知论，“认识之相对性”，“对时间与空间之认识，以及只是对时间之认识”这类词句充满了我们一页页的信笺，信中的字愈写愈小，而所讨论的问题却是愈来愈重大。然而不管此时或以后我们费了多少小时讨论康德哲学，我的哥哥总不能使我变为这位哥尼斯堡哲学家的一个弟子。
+
+自然科学，即数学、物理学、天文学，都是我的主要研究对象。在1858年，即在达尔文还不曾发行他的不朽的大著之时，莫斯科大学的动物学教授鲁利叶发表了他的关于物种演变的三篇讲演，我的哥哥马上就赞成他的变种说。然而亚历山大并不能仅以近似的证据为满意，他便开始读起许多论述遗传一类的专书来；在他的来信里他把主要的事实以及他的想法与他的疑惑一并告诉了我。《物种起源》的出版也不能解决他的关于某几个特殊之点的疑惑，反而引起了新的问题，推动他再去作更进一步的研究。
+
+我们后来又讨论（这样的讨论继续了多年）关于变种之起源以及变种的传递与加强的可能性；总之，最近在魏斯曼与斯宾塞之争论中，在高尔登的研究中，在近代新拉马克派的著作中所提出的那些问题，我们都讨论到了。亚历山大由于他的哲学的和批判的头脑立刻注意到了这些问题对于种的变异的根本意义，哪怕许多博物学家对此往往忽略过去。
+
+我还应该讲一讲我短时间涉足政治经济学范畴的经过。在1858年与1859年中，俄国人都在谈论政治经济学，有关自由贸易与保护性关税之讲演引起了群众的注意。我的哥哥当时尚未专心致力于变种说的研究，对于经济问题一时产生了浓厚的兴趣。他把让·巴布提斯·萨伊的《经济学》寄给我。我只读了几章：税则与银行经营一点也引不起我的兴趣；然而亚历山大对于这些问题非常热心，他甚至写信给我们的继母，想引起她对于关税的种种奥妙的兴味。后来，在西伯利亚，我们重读那时通信中的几封，一封信里他抱怨继母太浅薄，连这些燃眉的问题也不能触动她。他在街上遇见一个卖菜人，因为“你能相信吗：他虽然是一个买卖人，却打定主意对关税问题漠不关心！”对此他气愤填膺（他写这句话，用了一些惊叹号）。当我们重读这封信的时候，两个人笑得像小孩子一般。
+
+每年夏天，总有半数的侍从被带到彼得荷夫的野营地去。不过低级生不必加入这种野营生活。我入校后的最初两个夏季是在尼可尔斯奎度过的。离开学校，搭车到莫斯科，在那里和我的哥哥会面：这是一个非常快乐的前景，我往往扳着指头计算离那吉日良辰还有多少日子。然而有一年，我到了莫斯科，却遭到一个大大的失望。亚历山大在测验时落了第，要留级一年。事实上他的年纪太轻，还不够进特别级；尽管如此，我们的父亲却对他很恼怒，不允许我们弟兄两人会面。我很难过。我们已经不再是孩子了，彼此间有不少的话须得交谈。我要求父亲允许我到苏里马舅母家去，在那里，我可以设法和亚历山大会面，然而父亲绝对不答应。自从我们的父亲续弦以后，他就不许我们到母系亲戚的家里去。
+
+那一年春天，我们的莫斯科府邸里有不少客人。每晚接待室里总是灯烛辉煌，乐队奏着乐，做点心的厨子忙着在做冰和点心，大厅里客人打纸牌直到深夜。我无目的地在灯火交辉的屋子里走来走去，心里很难受。
+
+一天晚上，在十点钟以后，一个仆人向我做手势，要我到门厅去。我去了。那个老管事佛洛尔对我低声说：“到马车夫的房里去。亚历山大·亚历山德洛维奇在那里。
+
+我连忙跑过天井，跑上通到马车夫的房子的石阶，进了一间宽大的半黑的屋子，在那里，在仆人们的大的餐桌旁边，我看见了哥哥亚历山大。
+
+“沙夏，亲爱的，你怎样来的？”我们立刻投入彼此的怀里，拥抱，感动得说不出话来。
+
+“别出声，别出声！他们会听见你们的谈话的”，那个给仆人做饭的厨娘布拉斯可维亚用她的围裙拭去她的眼泪，一面说：“两个可怜的孤儿！要是你们的妈妈在世上——”
+
+老佛洛尔站在一旁，深深地低下了头；他的眼睛也是泪光莹莹。
+
+“小彼得，听我说，跟谁也别泄漏一个字”，他这样说；布拉斯可维亚放了满满一瓦罐粥在桌上，给亚历山大吃。
+
+亚历山大身体很强壮，穿着军官学校学生制服，他一面飞快地喝光了粥，一面畅谈着各种事情。我简直插不进口，让他告诉我怎样在这深夜到这里来的。我们家当时住在斯摩棱斯基大街附近，距我们的母亲死于其中的住宅只有一箭之遥，而军官学校却是在和我们住地正相反的莫斯科郊外，整整有五英里的路。
+
+他把被单做成人形，放在床上，用绒毯盖着；然后他走到塔上，从一扇窗户爬下来，神不知鬼不觉地走到外面一直步行到我们家里。
+
+“你在夜里不害怕你们学校周围的那些僻静的田野吗？”我问他道。
+
+“怕什么？有好多狗追我；是我自己逗它们玩儿。明天我要把军刀挂在身边。”
+
+马车夫和其他的佣人们时进时出；他们望着我们叹息几声，在远处靠墙壁坐下，低声地交谈着，免得影响我们。而我们两人互相搂着坐在那里一直坐到半夜，谈着星云与拉普拉斯的假设，物质之结构，以及在卜尼法斯八世治下教廷与皇权的斗争等等。
+
+时时有一个仆人匆忙地跑进来，说：“小彼得，快到大厅去露下脸，他们也许会问起你。”
+
+我请求哥哥第二天晚上不要再来；然而他来了，路上曾和野狗有过一些冲突，这一次，他带得有军刀防身。这一晚上较前一夜为早，仆人来叫我到马车夫的屋子里去。这一次，哥哥坐了一节路的马车。前一晚上，一个仆人把他从打牌的客人手里得的赏钱送给哥哥。哥哥只收了可以雇一部马车的小钱。所以这晚上他来得比上次早一点。
+
+他本想下一个晚上还来的，然而由于某种原因，这件事对于佣人们有危险，所以我们决定等到秋天再见面。他第二天送了一张短短的公文笺来，告诉我他的黑夜出逃没有人知道。如果这事被发觉了，他不知道要受何等可怕的惩罚！想起来都叫人后怕：在全校学生的面前受笞刑，直到被打得人事不省，才把他安放在一张被单上抬出去，随后发配到士兵子弟营。那年头，什么都是可能的。
+
+如果这事传到父亲的耳里，仆人们也会受同样可怕的刑罚；然而他们知道如何守秘密，决不彼此出卖。他们全都知道亚历山大私自回家的事，可是没有一个人向我们家里的人泄漏过一个字。全家只有我和仆人们知道。
+
+这一年，我还首次开始研究平民生活。这小小的工作使我和我们的农民更接近一步，使我用一种新的眼光来看他们。后来我在西伯利亚时这项工作对我也有极大的帮助。
+
+每年7月，到了“喀山的圣母节”（这是我们的教堂的节日）那一天，在尼可尔斯奎要举办一个很大的集市。各种小商贩从四邻的城镇赶来，我们的村子周围三十英里内的农民群集在这里。村子在这一两天内热闹非凡。这一年，斯拉夫派文人阿克沙科夫出版了一本书，对南俄乡村市集作了出色的描绘，我的哥哥当时正在他的政治经济学狂热到了顶峰的时刻，他劝我对我们的集市作一番统计，以决定从外面运来与卖出的货物的数量与价值。我听从了他的劝告，而且真的成功了，使我大为惊讶。据我现在看来，我的估计并不见得比统计书里许多同样的估计更不可靠。
+
+我们的集市不过继续了二十四五个钟点。在节日的前夕，那一块预备做集市的大广场就已经非常热闹了。长排的货摊迅速地建造起来，留作卖棉布、缎带以及农妇的各种服饰之用。一所饭店是坚固的石造建筑，里面摆着桌子、椅子和长凳，地板上铺了黄沙。在三个不同的地点建起了三家酒店，新砍下的条帚草缚在长竿上，高高耸立，招引着远方来的农民。一排排售卖陶器、靴子、石器、姜糖饼以及一切小物件的小货摊，好像由魔术家用法术变出来似的出现了。在集市的一个特别的角落掘了几个地洞，安放着几口大锅，里面煮了几斗小米和荞麦与一只全羊，做成热的粥和肉汤，供给几千个游客吃喝。午后，通集市的四条路都被数百辆农家马车塞满了。牲畜、谷物、陶器、整桶的柏油都在沿途陈列着。
+
+节日前夕，在我们的教堂里举行的晚祷是非常隆重的。从邻村来的六个牧师和助祭参与这个典礼，他们的唱诗班得着一帮青年商人加入帮助，便唱出只有在路加主教的教堂里才能听得到的合唱。教堂里十分拥挤；所有的人都在热心祈祷。商人们彼此要在圣像面前点的蜡烛的多寡与大小上比个高下。他们把这些蜡烛献给本地的圣徒，希望保佑他们买卖兴隆。先到教堂来的人多得使后来者无法挤到祭坛前面；各样的蜡烛（粗的、细的、黄的、白的，视献烛者之贫富而定）从后面人丛中一手一手地递到祭坛前，只听见人们低声说：“这献给我们的守护神，喀山的圣母”；“这献给尼可拉”；“这献给弗诺耳和洛尔”（这是两位马神——献烛的人一定有马出卖）；或者单说“献给圣徒”，并不特别指定哪位圣徒。
+
+晚祷完毕以后，“前市”就马上开始了，这时候，我不得不专心投入我的调查工作，拉着几百个人问他们带来的货物值多少。我的工作进行得非常顺利，使我大为惊异。自然也有人问我：“你干这个做什么？”“是替老亲王做的吗？他是不是想增加集市税？”然而一经向他们保证“老亲王”不知道，而且也不会知道这件事（他会认为干这行当丢人），众人的疑虑便马上消失了。我不久就知道对他们怎样发问才合适；我和几个商人在饭店里喝了五六杯茶之后，事情就进行得非常顺利了。（天哪，要是我的父亲知道了这件事，那还得了！）尼可尔斯奎村长华西里·伊凡诺夫对我的工作颇感兴趣；他是一个年轻的农民，有着一副优美而聪明的面容和丝一般的美髯。他说：“好，如果你是拿这个来进行研究，那么去做罢；你过后得把你的调查所得告诉我们。”——这就是他的结论。他又向别人说这是“好事”。尼可尔斯奎附近几里的人都知道他这个人，而且全集市的人不久也都传话说：农民们告诉我所要知道的事，不会吃什么亏。
+
+总之，“进口货”是很容易估计的。然而第二天，关于“出口货”的统计就有些困难了，尤其是贩卖布匹的商人，他们自己也不知道一共卖出了多少货物。过节的这一天，大群的农家少妇真的把各家店铺围困住了；她们每人卖出了自己手织的麻布以后，都去买一些给自己缝衣服用的印花布，一条自己用的鲜亮的包头帕，和一方给她丈夫用的彩色手帕；或者还买一些花边，一两根缎带，以及送给留在家里的祖父、祖母、小孩们的小礼物。至于那些出售陶器、姜糖饼、牲畜、苎麻等等的农人，尤其是那班老太婆，他们马上就可以说出卖出的东西的数目，“婆婆，生意好吗？”我这样问。“孩子，如果再要抱怨，上帝都要发怒啦！几乎全都卖光了。”他们的小的数目加起来，在我的记事册中竟变成了数万卢布的巨款。只有一点决定不了。集市里有一大片地，是留给数百个农妇在阳光下向游人兜售自织的麻布（有的非常精美）。好几十个有着吉普赛人面容和看来心狠手辣的顾客在她们丛中穿来穿去，买她们的麻布。这些买卖只能估计个大概。
+
+我当时对于我的这番新经验，没有去细想它，我只是高兴我不曾失败就是了。然而我在这几天中所见着的俄国农民的真正的见识和健全的判断，给了我一个持久的印象。后来我们在农民中间宣传社会主义的原理时，我不禁惊奇，为什么我的某几个朋友虽然似乎比我受过更多民主的教育，却不知道怎样和农民或出身田舍的工厂工人谈话。他们想模仿“农民的谈吐”，加了一大堆所谓“俗语”在他们的谈话里，这反而使农民更听不懂了。
+
+无论向农民谈话或者写文章给他们读，“俗语”之类的东西是完全用不着的。大俄罗斯的农民完全懂得受过教育的人的谈话，不过话里不可混杂外国字。农民所不懂的乃是不用具体的实例来说明的抽象的观念。如果你明白易懂地向农民说话，首先用具体的事实，那么他们没有不明白的——不但俄国农民如是，其他各国的农民又何尝不是这样。我相信无论自然科学或社会科学，它们的通则都是可以传授给一个一般资质的人，只要是传授者自己具体地了解这科学。说到受过教育与未受教育两种人的主要区别，我的经验是未受教育的人跟不上从一个结论引发出另一个结论的连锁作用。他明白了第一个结论，也许还明白了第二个，然而如果他不知道你最后要说些什么，那末，到了第三个结论，他便烦了。然而对于受过教育的人，你不也常遇着这样的困难吗？
+
+我少年时从这种工作中还得到一个到后来才能表述出来的印象，说出来也许会使许多读者们惊奇。这就是平等精神，这种精神在俄国农民中间非常发达，而且我相信在全世界农村居民中也是很发达的。俄国农民对于地主和警官可以异常奴性地服从；他会卑躬屈节地服从他们的意志；然而他并不以为他们和自己比是优等人。如果在表示顺从以后同一个地主或警官和同一个农民谈起干草或鸭子来，那时候，那个农民便以彼此是平等的人的态度和他们说话。至于下级官吏对于上司，仆人对于主人的那种成了第二天性的奴隶根性，我从来不曾在俄国农民中间见过。农民极易屈从于暴力，但是并不崇拜暴力。
+
+这年夏天，我从尼可尔斯奎回到莫斯科，旅行的方式是新的。当时在卡路加与莫斯科之间还没有铁路；有一个名叫布克的人开设了一家马车行，有几辆马车行驶于这两个城市之间。我家的人从来不会想到坐这种马车旅行；我们有自己的马，自己的车子。然而父亲因为免得继母旅行两次，便半开玩笑地让我一个人坐布克的马车回莫斯科，我高兴地答应了。
+
+一个年老而胖大的商人妻子和我两人坐在车中后方的座位上，前方的座位里坐着一个小商人或者工匠——这辆马车的乘客就尽于此了。我发现这次旅行很愉快——首先是因为我一个人旅行（我还没有到十六岁）；其次，因为那位老太太带了一大筐食物供3日旅行之用，一路上她拿了各种家常美味来款待我。沿途的景物令人心旷神怡。特别是一天晚上的情景至今还活泼地印在我的记忆中。我们那晚到了一个大村镇，在一家客店门前停了车。那位老太太叫了一个茶炊独饮，我信步到街上闲走。一家只卖各种食物不卖酒的小饭铺引起了我的注意，我走了进去。一些农民围着几张铺了白桌布的小桌子坐着喝茶。我也学他们那样做。
+
+在这样的环境里，一切事物对于我都是新奇的。这是一个“御领农民”即非农奴的农民的村子；这种农民兼营着家庭工业，自织麻布，大概就因为这个缘故，他们才比较富裕。那些桌上的人都在进行迟缓而郑重的谈话，偶尔夹杂着笑声；经过了通常的开场白式问答之后，我不久便和十二个农民谈起邻近的庄稼来，并且回答了他们的各种询问。他们想知道圣彼得堡的一切事情，尤其关心那些说是快要实现农奴解放的谣言。
+
+这一晚上在这个客店里，一种纯朴、因平等而产生的自然的关系的感情，一种真挚的善意的感情传遍我的全身。自此以后，我每在农民中间，在他们家里的时候，总会有这样的感情。这一夜并没有什么非常事变，所以我甚至自问道，这件事是否值得一提；然而温暖的黑夜，乡村中的客店，和农民的那次谈话，以及他们对于那些和他们的生活环境隔得很远的成千上万件事情之深切的关心——这一切使得一家寒碜的客店从此以后比世界上最好的饭店更能吸引我的心。
+
+-
+
+`侍从学校的骚动时代——皇太后的葬礼——一件意外的事——侍从学校中高年级的功课——研究自然科学——课余的娱乐——意大利歌剧在圣彼得堡流行`
+
+我们的学校生活中的骚动时代如今来到了。当初柔拉多被免职的时候，他的位置由校内长官里面的一位B上尉升任。B上尉脾气不错，不过他不知怎的认为我们学生对他的尊重与他现在所处的高位不相称，因此他竭力设法使我们对他更加尊敬，更加畏惧。他起初是和高级学生争吵各种小事，而更糟的是他企图消灭我们的“自由”，这些“自由”的起源久远，早已无人记得。它们本身并无多大意义，但也许正因为如此我们更加珍惜它们。
+
+其结果是学校内爆发了公然的叛逆运动，达数日之久。后来学校当局用集体处罚，并且开除了我们喜爱的两个侍从，才将运动镇压下去。
+
+随后，B上尉开始闯入我们的课室。每天早晨在上课以前，我们照例要在课堂里花一小时预备功课。在那里，我们被认为是在教师的监督之下，因而很高兴地如此摆脱了我们那些军事长官的羁绊。对他的闯入我们十分气恼。有一天，我便高声吐露出我的不满，向B上尉说，这地方是本班的督导出入之所，他不应该来。为了这一次的直言，我被关了几个星期禁闭。要不是督导、副督导、以至我们的老校长都认为我不过是高声说出了连他自己也想说而没有说出来的话，我也许早就被开除了。
+
+这一事变刚刚收场，皇太后（尼古拉一世的遗孀）逝世的消息又马上打断了我们的课程。
+
+加了冕的皇室的葬礼照例是要安排得能给民众一个深的印象。你得承认：这一次这个目的是达到了。皇太后死在皇村，她的遗体被运到了圣彼得堡。各皇族，各大臣，成千上万的官吏和团体跟随着皇太后的遗体，还有僧侣和唱诗班在前面做先导，从圣彼得堡火车站经过各大街进了要塞，她的遗体要在那里停几个星期让人民参拜。十万禁卫军沿街列队，几千个穿着最华丽的制服的人在灵柩车的前后左右走着，排成了庄严的行列。各重要的十字路口都有人唱着祷歌；教堂钟楼上的钟声，无数唱诗班的歌声以及军乐队的音乐，这一切响成了一片，极其动人，为的是使人相信这广大群众真是在悲悼皇太后的逝世。
+
+当皇太后的遗体停在要塞中的大教堂里的时候，侍从们和其他宫廷执事等都应该在四周日夜守灵。灵柩放在高的石坛上，有三个宫廷侍从和三个宫廷侍女在近旁站着；另外还有二十多个侍从排列在坛上，每天两班轮流，皇帝领他的全家来致祭的时候，人们便在这坛上唱着祷歌。因此每星期我们校内的学生差不多总有半数要轮流被领到要塞里去，就住在那里。我们每隔两点钟换班一次。白日里倒不困难；然而当我们不得不在夜里起床，穿上我们的宫廷制服，走过要塞里那些黑暗而阴森的内院，一路上听着要塞中凄惨的钟鸣，走向大教堂去的时候，我忽然想起幽闭在这号称为“俄国的巴士底”的要塞中某一些地方的囚人们，我不禁打了个冷战。“谁知道呢，也许有一天我也会加入到他们中间去？”我这样想。在这次葬礼中也曾发生过一个事件，而且几乎引发出严重的后果。在大教堂的圆顶下面，当时立了一个华盖来罩着灵柩。华盖上放了一顶极大的镀金皇冠，皇冠之下挂着一道貂皮里子的紫色的巨大幔帐，幔帐系在四根支持着大教堂圆顶的大方柱上。这看起来堂皇之至。但我们孩子不久就发觉皇冠是用贴金的厚纸板和木料做成的，而天鹅绒的幔帐，只有下面的一部分才真是天鹅绒，以上的全是红棉布，而貂皮里子也只是棉绒或天鹅绒毛，再把松鼠的黑尾缝些进去罢了；至于那些用黑纱罩着的表示俄国的纹章的盾，也不过是些厚纸板而已。可惜，我们的这个大发现是不会为那些特许在夜间某几个时辰走近灵柩的人群所注意，他们只可以匆忙地吻那盖着灵柩的金色锦缎便走过去，没有时间来仔细考究棉绒的假貂皮和纸板的假盾；皇室所希望的那种戏剧化的效果居然就这样便宜地得到了。
+
+在俄国，唱祷歌的时候所有到场的人都要手捧着点燃的蜡烛，在读毕特定的祷告文以后便把烛火弄灭，皇族也是如此。有一天康士坦丁大公的幼子看见别人把蜡烛倒过来就把火弄灭了，他也学着这样做。他背后的挂在盾上的黑纱着了火。霎时间纱和盾便燃烧起来。一条大的火舌沿着假貂皮幔帐的厚褶边烧上去。
+
+仪式马上停止。人人惊愕地望着火舌，火舌愈伸高，离那纸板做的假皇冠和那支持着整个结构的木料愈近了。燃烧的碎片开始落下来，几乎烧着了在场的贵妇们的黑面纱。
+
+亚历山大二世在最初的几秒钟慌了神，但马上就镇静了，沉着地说道：“快把灵柩移开。”宫廷侍从们立刻用金色锦缎包着灵柩，我们大家便上前去抬灵柩；然而这时那条大火舌已经分裂成了许多小舌，那些小舌现在只是慢慢地吞着棉布的纤毛。它们越伸上去便遇着幔帐上部更多的尘埃与煤灰，于是渐渐地在厚褶中熄灭了。
+
+我如今记不起当时我最注意看的是那渐渐往上爬的火焰呢，还是那三个站在灵柩旁边的宫廷女侍的窈窕的雍容华贵的身躯？她们的丧服的长裾曳在通高坛的阶梯上面，她们的黑花边的面纱披在两肩。三个人真是一动也不动：活像三座美丽的雕像。只有在其中的一个，加玛丽亚小姐的黑眼睛里，一眶眼泪闪耀着好似许多颗明珠。她是南俄的姑娘，在宫廷女侍中她是唯一的真正的美人。
+
+这时候，学校内的情形非常混乱。功课被打断了；从要塞中回来的学生都暂住在临时宿舍里，没有一点事做，终日只是嬉戏。有一天，我们弄开了房里的一个贮藏教授博物学时用的各种动物标本的橱柜。标本的正当用处本来是如此；然而事实上从来没有让我们看过一眼。如今我们弄开了橱柜，我们自有我们自己的用处。我们先用其中的一具人体的头颅骨做成一个鬼的样子，预备在夜里来惊吓别的同学和长官。至于动物标本，我们把它们安排得非常可笑：猴子骑在狮子的背上，羊和豹在一起游戏，长颈鹿与象一同跳舞，诸如此类，不一而足。最糟的是几天以后，那位到圣彼得堡参与皇太后葬礼的普鲁士皇子（我想就是后来做腓特力大帝的那一位）来参观我们的学校，凡与我们的教育有关的一切，校长都指点给他看了。校长没有忘记夸耀校中完备的教育设施；他还把客人带到那个倒霉的橱柜面前。那位德国皇子看了一眼我们的动物分类法，便拉长了脸急急地转身走了。老校长看来吓坏了，失掉了说话的能力，只是不住地用手指着几只海燕，这是放在橱柜旁边墙上的几个玻璃盒里面的。皇子的随员只是飞快地对使得老校长十分难堪的动物分类法睃了两眼，极力装出什么也没看见的样子，而我们这班可恶的孩子都做出各种怪脸，以免笑出声来。
+
+俄国青年的学生时代是和西欧青年的学生时代完全不同的，因此我便不得不详细地讲一讲我的学校生活了。通常俄国青年还在中学或陆军学校的时期，就已关心到许多社会的、政治的、哲学的问题。诚然，侍从学校在所有学校中是最不适宜于这种发展的；但是在这普遍觉醒的时代，更开放的思想甚至也侵入了我们中间，把其中有些人吸引去了，不过这并不能阻止我们活跃于使教员出丑以及其他各种的胡闹。
+
+我在第四级的时候，靠了在课堂里的笔记的帮助（我知道大学学生是用这种方法的），同时自己又读了一点书，对于历史这门课产生了兴趣；我写成了一部供自己用的初期中古史的讲义。在第二年，教皇波尼非斯八世与皇权的斗争引起了我的特别注意，这时候，我就有了一种野心，想进皇家图书馆里去看书，对这个大斗争做一番彻底的研究。这和图书馆的章程违反，因为照章是不许中学程度的学生进入的；然而我们的好先生柏克却设法排除了障碍，终于有一天，我被允许登上这一殿堂，坐在里面陈设着的红天鹅绒的沙发上，占了一张阅览人用的小桌子。
+
+我不久就从各种教科书以及几本学校图书室的书出发追本溯源了。我并不懂拉丁文，然而我却在古条顿文和古法文中找到了丰富的原始资料。我从《编年史》所用的古法文的古怪的结构以及它的丰富表现力中获得了异常巨大的美学的满足。一个完全新的社会结构和一个关系错杂的世界在我的眼前展开了；从那时起，我就懂得原始历史资料要比那些按照近代看法加以概述的著作珍贵得多得多；在那些著作中，现代政治乃至仅仅是通行程式的偏见被用来代替那一时代真实的生活。在推动一个人的智力发展上，某些独立的研究远胜于其他的一切，而我的这些研究对于我后来有很大的帮助。
+
+不幸，当我升入第二级（离毕业还有一级）的时候便不得不放弃了此等研究。侍从们在最后两年中差不多要习完别的陆军学校在三年的特别级中讲授的各门功课，因此我们在学校中的功课很繁重。自然科学、数学、军事学必然地排斥了历史。
+
+在第二级的时候我们便开始认真研究物理学了。我们有一个很好的教师；这是一个喜欢调侃的聪明人。他讨厌死记硬背，他鼓励我们去思索，不叫我们去死记事实。他是一个优秀的数学家，他在数学的基础上教授物理学，同时又巧妙地说明物理学研究与物理仪器的主要原理。他对某一些问题是很有创见的，他的说明非常精彩，所以能够深印在我的记忆中历久不忘。
+
+我们的物理学教科书并不坏（陆军学校的大部分教科书都是当代第一流学者著的），可是已经有点陈旧了，我们的教师有他自己的教授法，开始把他的教案写成一种短短的提要——像备忘录一类的东西供我们用。几个星期之后，这个写出提要的任务竟然落在我肩上了，我们的教师以一个真正教育家的态度，把这工作完全信托给我，他只不过读一遍清样。当我们讲到热、电、磁几章时，这几章得完全另写过，我这样做了，因此写成了一部几乎全新的物理学教科书，印成供本校讲授之用。
+
+在第二级里我们还开始学习化学，化学教师也是第一流的——他酷爱化学，本人作过有价值的、独创的研究。1859至1861年正是全世界普遍恢复爱好精密科学的年代。格罗夫、克劳修司、焦尔和塞甘证明热与一切物理的力不过是运动的不同方式；亥姆霍兹在那时候开始了他的划时代的声学研究；丁铎尔在他的通俗讲演中使人们可以说接触到了原子和分子。热拉尔和阿伏伽德罗发现了元素取代的原理；门捷列夫、罗塔·迈尔和纽兰诸人发现了元素的周期律。达尔文发表了他的大著《物种起源》，引起了生物学中的革命；而卡尔·沃黑特与莫勒斯霍特，追随于克劳德·贝尔纳之后奠定了生理学中真正心理学之基础。这是科学复兴的伟大时代，那驱使人心走向自然科学的大潮流不可抗拒。一些名著当时都被译成俄文出版了。我不久就明白一个人无论后来要研究什么，其基础的一部分总应该是彻底地了解自然科学，并熟习其方法：这是一切研究的基础。
+
+我们五六个同学在一起拼凑了一个自己用的实验室。我们用了席托克哈特在他的出色的教科书中所介绍给初学者用的那些简单的基本器械，在我们的两个同学查塞茨基弟兄的家里一间小小的寝室内建成了我们的实验室。他们的父亲是一个告老的海军将领；他很高兴看见他的儿子从事这样有益的研究，因此并不反对我们几个人在星期日和假期内聚会在他的书斋旁边的那间小屋里。我们用席托克哈特的教科书做指南，开始有系统地作一切实验。我还应该说，有一次我们几乎把房屋烧了，而且不止一次地我们使所有的房间里都布满了氯气和类似的有毒气体。然而当我们在午饭时把这冒险的事情说给老将军听，他泰然不以为意，还告诉我们，从前他和他的同学们在从事配制五味酒这件远为无益的事时也几乎把房屋烧着了。他们的母亲在一阵咳嗽中只是说：“自然，如果你们要学会对付这样恶臭的东西时必须这样做的话，那也就无话可说了。”
+
+晚饭以后，她通常总是坐下来弹钢琴直到夜深，我们便不断唱着歌剧中两人合唱、三人合唱以及歌剧中的合唱。有时我们取出一本意大利或俄国歌剧的乐谱从头唱到尾——连同剧中念白部分在内。那位母亲和她的女儿做了歌剧的首席女演员，我们大家充当其余各种脚色，有的颇为成功，但大多不如首席演唱得好。化学和音乐就这样地携手并进。
+
+高等数学也占去了我的很大一部分时间。我们中间有四、五个人已经决定不去加入禁卫军团队，因为在那里所有的时间都得用在军事操练与阅兵式上面；我们的意思是毕业后进一所军事学院——或入炮兵学院或入工兵学院。为了这个目的，我们必须学好高等几何学，微分与积分的初步。我们便自费请教员课外教授这几门功课。同时在数理地理这一门功课里，天文学的初步已开始讲授了。我这时又常读天文学的书籍，尤以最后一学年中所读的为多。宇宙之无穷无尽的生命（我把它视作生命与进化）成了我的更高一级的诗意之永不枯竭的泉源，而且人与大自然（有生命的与无生命的）之合一的意识（即自然之诗）也逐渐成了我的人生哲学了。
+
+如果我们学校内的功课只限于我所叙述的那几门，我们已经没有什么空闲的时间了。但是我们还不得不学习人文科学如历史、法律（即俄国法典概要）、政治经济学原理概要（包括一门比较统计学）。我们还必须精通军事学的几门繁重课程，如战术、战史（1812年及1815年的战争的详情）、炮术与野战筑城术等等。如今回想到当时的那种教育，我以为除了军事学的各门功课（如果用精密科学之更深入的研究来代替这几门功课倒更为有益）外，我们学校所讲授的多种科目并不超出普通青年的能力之上。靠了在低年级里学得的初等数学与物理学的知识，我们差不多都能学深学透所有这些科目。有几门功课却是我们大部分同学所不注意的，尤其是法律，还有近代史，不幸教近代史的教师是一位老朽，学校当局之所以保留他的位置，全为着好付给他足额的养老金。此外，我们还略有选择我们最爱好的学科的余地，在自己选定的学科里，我们要受严格的测验，至于其余的课程，对待我们就较为宽松。然而这个学校之所以比较成功，大半是因为教课能做到尽可能具体。我们刚刚从书本上学到初等几何学，便在野外用量地链尺和标柱，其次又用测角器、罗盘针、测量器来复习。在这样具体的训练之后，初等天文学对于我们就没有什么困难了，而测量本身又是无穷尽的乐趣之源泉。
+
+这同样具体的教授法也用于筑城术。譬如在冬天，我们从事解决下面的问题：给你一千人，限你在两个星期内建筑一座最强固的城堡以保护退兵所通过的桥梁。教师一一批评我们的设计，我们也很热烈地和他讨论。在夏天，我们便在野外应用我们的这些知识。全靠着这些具体的实际练习，我们大部分学生才能在十七八岁时就极其容易地学深学透这么多种学科。
+
+尽管如此，我们还有足够的娱乐时间。我们最快活的时候就是测验完毕和从野营归来，因为测验完毕要放三四星期的假，才去野营，而从野营归来，又要放三个星期的假才开始上课。我们少数几个当时留在校中的学生在假期内可以自由出外，学校照常供给膳宿。我有时在图书室里用功，有时又去艾米尔塔什美术馆把每一派的名画逐一分别研究；或者去参观各家皇家工厂，如纸牌、棉布、铁、陶器、瓷器、玻璃等等的制造厂，都是任人参观的。有时，我们泛舟涅瓦河上，就在河中度过一个整夜；有时又在芬兰湾内和渔夫们在一起——在一个忧郁的北国的夜里，落日的霞晖和黎明的曙光相接；就在半夜时分，人还可以在露天读书。所有这一切的娱乐，我们都有充分的时间享受。
+
+自从参观了各工厂以后，我就喜欢起那强有力的完美的机械。看了那巨大的铁掌怎样从棚屋中伸出来把浮在涅瓦河水上的木材抓住一根，拖过来放到锯子下面，锯成了几块木板；或者看着一根烧红的大铁条怎样通过两个滚筒之间，出来变成了一条铁轨，那时候，我就懂得机械之诗了。在我们现在的工厂里，机械作工能致工人的死命，因为工人变成了某一机械的终身的奴隶，仅仅是奴隶。但这是组织不善的结果，与机械本身无关。不管是用手工作，用简单的器具工作，或是用机械工作，工作过度与永久的单调都一样是有害的。不过除此之外，我充分了解：一个人能够从意识到他的机械的力量，机械在操作中的灵性，机械动作的优美，机械制造之完备中得到多大的乐趣。威廉·莫里斯对于机械的憎恨只是证明他的伟大的诗才中缺乏机械的力量与优美之概念。
+
+在我的智力发展中，音乐也起了很大的作用。我从音乐得来的欢乐与热情比从诗中得来的还要多。在当时几乎没有俄国的歌剧。不过意大利歌剧在圣彼得堡却是非常流行，剧团里有一些第一流的演员。歌剧女主角包西娥患病时，数千人群（其中以青年为多）聚集在她的旅馆门前直到深夜，探听她的消息。她并不是美人，然而她歌唱时却变得如此之美，以致疯狂地爱上她的青年竟数以百计。她死后葬礼之隆重也是圣彼得堡从来没有过的。“全圣彼得堡的人”当时分成两派：一派赞赏意大利歌剧；一派赞赏法国舞台剧。法国舞台剧甚至在当时已露出几年以后传染到全欧的颓废的奥芬巴赫潮流的苗头了。
+
+我们这一级的学生也分为两派，我是属于前一派的。我们不被允许买前厅和花楼的票，而意大利歌剧院里所有包厢座常常在几个月以前就被人预订去了，并且只在某些家族中间转手，就和遗产一样。然而在星期六晚上，我们可以到高屋花厅楼道里，在和土耳其蒸气浴一般的空气中站着。为了隐藏我们的惹人注目的制服，我们把外面穿的有毛皮领子絮有棉花的黑色大衣扣得死紧，尽管空气是那样闷热，我们里面没有一个人曾因此而得肺炎，这也是一件怪事。特别因为我们时常在狂热地欢呼我们所喜爱的歌唱家之后，带着过高的热度出来，站在戏院门口，再看一眼那些我们崇拜的艺术家，向他们欢呼。在那些年代，说也奇怪，意大利歌剧与激进派运动发生了密切的关系。《威廉·退尔》与《清教徒》两剧中的革命的吟诵调总是得着狂热的掌声和喝彩声，它们直刺亚历山大二世的心窝；而在第六层楼座中，在歌剧院的吸烟室内，在戏院门前，圣彼得堡的青年的精英合起来对那崇高的艺术作共同的理想主义的礼拜。这一切像是儿戏；然而这种对我们所喜爱的艺术家的崇拜在我们的心中燃起许多高尚的思想和纯洁的灵感。
+
+-
+
+`彼得荷夫的野营生活——皇帝指挥下的大演习——实际教学法——革命思想之传播——农奴解放——农奴解放之意义与结果`
+
+每年夏季，我们都要到彼得荷夫去过野营生活，同去的还有圣彼得堡区的其他陆军学校。就大体而论，我们的生活是很愉快的，无疑对于我们的健康非常有益。我们睡在宽大的帐篷内，在海里洗澡，这六个星期中的大部分时间都用在户外运动上。
+
+在陆军学校里，野营生活的主要目的显然是军事操练，我们对此都非常讨厌。不过有时候他们叫我们参加演习，这减去不少平常操练的沉闷。有一夜，我们已经上床，亚历山大二世忽然命令敲起紧急集合的钟来，全营的学生都被惊起了。几分钟以后，全营都活动开了，——数千名学生齐集在各校的旗帜下，炮兵学校的大炮怒吼着，惊破了静夜的沉寂。彼得荷夫的所有军队都骑马向我们的野营疾驰而来。可是由于某一误会，皇帝却没有马骑；传令官四处去给皇帝找马，然而一匹也没有，并且亚历山大二世不是一个善于骑马的人，他只肯骑自己的马。他很生气，随意发泄他的怒气。当一个传令官向他报告他的马在别一个营里的时候，我听得他大声骂道：“蠢货，难道我就只有一匹马吗？”
+
+渐浓的黑暗，枪炮的怒吼，骑兵的蹄声——这一切使我们这班少年非常兴奋；当亚历山大二世下令冲锋时，我们的纵队向他直冲过去。我们挨得紧紧的，枪刺向前，样子一定很吓人，因为我看见那位依然徒步的沙皇张皇地跳了三下给我们纵队让路。这时候我便明白一队在军乐与行军的激励下，排紧队伍向前进攻的纵队意味着什么了。我们全体崇拜的我们的沙皇，我们的司令官，就站在我们面前；而我觉得在行进中没有一个学生，一个侍从会向旁边移一步或停一停给沙皇让路。我们是在行进中的纵队，他只是一个障碍物，纵队会踏过他而前进。“他为什么要阻挡我们的路呢？”侍从们事后这样说。手执着枪的少年在这种情形下甚至比老兵还可怕。
+
+第二年，我们参加圣彼得堡卫戍部队大操的时候，我略略窥见了战争的侧影。接连两天，我们不做别事，只是在一块二十英里光景的方阵地中进退着，一点也不明白周围发生了什么事以及我们进退是为了什么目的。大炮时近时远地轰鸣；从山里和树林里传来了枪声；传令官不时骑马过来，传达前进或后退的命令；我们只管行军、行军、再行军，完全不知道这种运动和逆向运动有什么意义。大队的骑兵也走过这条路，使得一路上尘土飞扬。我们不得不在同一条路上进退各数次，直到最后，我们这纵队违反了一切纪律，变成一伙乌合之众的朝山进香客，不像军队了。只有那些执军旗的人还留在路上；所有其余的人都走散到路旁树林中去了。长官的命令与恳求都没有用。
+
+突然从后面来了一声高叫：“沙皇来啦！沙皇！”长官们四处奔跑，恳求我们排队：没有一个人听从他们。
+
+沙皇果然到了，下令再退却一次。——“向后转！”号令发出了，长官们对我们低声说：“沙皇现在我们后面，请向后转。”然而我们这个营几乎没留意到这个命令，对沙皇驾临全不理会。幸而亚历山大二世并不是军国主义的狂热信徒，他在说了几句话给我们打气之后，答应叫我们休息，接着他骑马飞奔而去了。
+
+我那时才明白，军队的心理状态实足以左右战争；如果要求士兵作出非常的努力，单靠纪律是不行的。能不能按纪律要求使疲乏的军队作出绝大的努力，在限定的时间内赶到战场？这时纪律根本不起作用，只有热情与信心才能在这种时候使士兵们去做“不可能的事”，而要想战胜，必须不断地做出这种不可能的事。后来在西伯利亚，当我们在科学探险中也不能不做“不可能的事”的时候，不知有多少次我记起了这个实际的教训！
+
+然而在野营时期，我们用在军事操练和演习上面的时间还是比较地少。大部分时间还是用在测量与筑城的实地练习。在几次预备练习之后，教师给了我们一个反射罗盘针，对我们说：“去，绘出某某湖、某某路或某某公园的图，用罗盘针测量角度，用脚步计算距离。”一大清早，匆忙吞食了早餐之后，每个学生便塞了几片黑面包在军服的宽大口袋里，出去到好几英里路外公园里花上四五小时，用罗盘针和脚步计算，绘出了美丽的林荫路、溪流和湖泊的地图。这样的作业随后由教师拿来和正确的地图比较，结果给绘图的学生发奖：光学器械或是绘图器械，由学生自己选择。对我来说，这些测量实习乃是一种享受的深深的源泉。这种独立的工作，在数百年的古树下一人独处，在树林中悠闲自在地生活，以及对工作感到兴趣——这一切在我的心上留下了深的痕迹。如果说，我后来做了西伯利亚的探险家，而我的几个同学成了中亚细亚的探险家，这些测量实习为此给我们打下了扎实的基础。
+
+最后，上到第一级时，隔天便有四个同学组成一队被派到离野营地颇远的一些乡村里，靠测量桌和望远尺的帮助，作出几方里地的详细的测量。总参谋部的军官不时来核实他们的成果，向他们提供意见。这种在乡村农民中间的生活对于许多学生日后智力上和道德上的发展好处大极了。
+
+与此同时，我们还要练习建造城堡的横截面（要和真的城堡的横截面一样大小）。一位军官把我们带到野外，在那里，我们应该建造一个棱堡或桥头的横截面，把板条和柱子钉在一起，恰像铁道工程师进行轨道的实物规划一样。当我们建造到炮眼和炮垛的时候，我们不得不仔细计算许久，求得各平面的坡度，经过这种工作之后，立体几何学便不再是难懂的了。
+
+我们很高兴这种工作。后来有一次，在城里的花园里看到了一堆粘土和沙砾，我们便开始建造一个缩小若干倍的真正城堡，还有计算精确的直的和斜的炮眼与炮垛。一切都做得干净利落，我们这时的野心就是要得到几块木板来做安放大炮的炮座，而且把我们的课堂里的大炮的模型放在上面。
+
+但是，啊！我们的裤子弄得难看死了。“你们在干些什么呀？”我们的上尉叫道，“看看你们自己的样子！你们简直像些小工。（这正是我们引以为骄傲的。）万一大公来，看见你们这样子怎么办！”
+
+我们把我们的城堡指点给他看，请他给我们些做炮台的木板和工具。
+
+一切的抗辩都归无效。第二天，十二个工人就用大车把我们的精美的建筑拉走了，好像它只是一堆泥土！
+
+我叙述这件事，为的是表明：儿童和青年多么渴望把他们在学校中所学到的抽象的理论拿来实地应用；而那辈教师却不知道他们在具体应用这方面可以提供很大的帮助，使他们的学生领会到所学的知识之真谛，反而极力加以阻挠，这又是何等地愚蠢。
+
+在我们的学校中，一切都是以训练我们从事战争为目的。我们本可以同样热心规划一条铁路，造一所木屋，耕一块田园。但是这种儿童和青年人对于脚踏实地干活的渴望都毫无着落，只是因为我们还拘守着学校代表中世纪的经院主义，学校是中世纪的寺院的这种观念！
+
+1857年到1861年乃是俄国知识阶层发育壮大的年代。过去十年中，以屠格涅夫、托尔斯泰、赫尔岑、巴枯宁、奥加辽夫、卡维林、陀思妥也夫斯基、格列哥洛维奇、奥斯特洛夫斯基、涅克拉索夫诸人为代表的俄国文学一代人在知心朋友之间秘密谈话中所说的悄悄话，如今开始在报纸上出现了。书报检查制度还是十分严厉；然而那些不能在政治论文中公然说出的事却被人用小说、幽默小品或对西欧大事作指桑骂槐式的评论等体裁暗暗表现出来了，每个读者都能从字里行间读出作者的真意。
+
+我在圣彼得堡除了校中同学和亲属这些圈子外并无相识，因此我当时处于那些年头的激进运动之外——老实说，运动离我还远得很。然而那个运动却有力量侵入像我们侍从学校这样“（对当局）怀有善意”的学校里来，而且在我的莫斯科亲属中得到了响应——也许这就是它的特征罢。
+
+那时每逢星期日和假期，我便到我的姑母家里去玩；这位姑母就是前面说过的米尔斯基王妃。米尔斯基亲王终日只想着盛馔佳肴，而他的妻子和年轻的女儿却过着非常愉快的生活。我的表姊生得十分俊俏，年纪不过十九岁，性情温婉可亲，差不多所有她的堂表弟兄都爱她爱到发狂的地步。她也爱其中一个堂兄，想嫁给他。然而堂兄妹结婚的事在俄国教会看来是一个大罪孽。那位老王妃竭力设法到教会的显贵僧侣那里去求一个特别的许可，但是也没有效果。因此她便把她的女儿带到圣彼得堡来，希望她可以在那许多为她倾倒的人中间选出一个比她的堂兄更适当的夫婿。我应该加一句：她这是白费心机。不过她们的时髦的客厅里每天总是挤满了禁卫军中和外交界里的有为的青年。
+
+谁也不会想到这样的人家可以和革命思想有什么关系；然而我第一次得和当时的革命文学接触却是在这个家庭里。那位伟大的亡命者赫尔岑在伦敦创刊的杂志《北极星》有震荡全俄之势，甚至传到了宫中，在圣彼得堡秘密流传极广。我的表姊设法得到了一份，我们一起朗读，习以为常。她的心反抗着横在她幸福途中的一切障碍，她的精神更易接受那位大著作家对于俄国贵族政治以及一切腐败的政治制度之有力的抨击。我常常带着一种近于崇拜的感情看那印在《北极星》封面上的五个人的高贵的头颅——这是在1825年12月14日起义失败后被尼古拉一世绞死的五个“十二月党人”——别斯吐热夫、加霍夫斯基、彼斯捷尔、芮列叶夫与穆拉维约夫·阿波斯托尔。
+
+赫尔岑的文体之优美（屠格涅夫说他是用血和泪写文章的，在俄国再没有第二个人这样写过），其思想之阔大以及他爱俄国之深切使我无限感动，我再三诵读，不忍释手，用全心灵去领会甚于用我的头脑。
+
+在1859年或在1860年初，我创刊了我的第一份革命的报纸。在那时，我除了做立宪主义者外，还能做什么呢？——所以我的报纸便主张俄国应该有一部宪法。我还抨击宫廷花钱花得莫名其妙，抨击在尼斯派驻一支舰队伺候皇太后（她死于1860年，她的葬礼我已在前一章中说过了）所花的巨额费用；我还记载了我时常听人说起的官吏的不法行为；我鼓吹立宪政治的必要性。我把我的报纸抄写了三份，偷偷放在三个高级同学的书桌里，我以为这三个同学对于公共事务一定有兴趣。我请求这三位读者把他们的意见写下来，放在图书室里那架苏格兰时钟的后面。
+
+第二天，我怀着一颗悸动的心去看苏格兰钟的后面有没有留给我的东西。果然那里有了两张纸条。两个同学写道，他们对于我的报纸十分同情，但劝告我不要过于冒险。我又写成了第二期的报纸，言论较前更为激烈，坚决主张各方面有联合起来力争自由之必要。然而这一次钟后便无回答了。那两个同学却亲身来看我。
+
+“我们相信报纸是你刊行的，所以想和你商量报纸的事，”他们说。“我们完全同意你，我们特地来向你说：‘我们做朋友罢。’你的报纸已经完成了它的使命，它使我们三个人联在一起了；可是此后便用不着继续出下去。全校不过还有两个同学关心这样的事，然而如果有人知道校内出现了这种报纸，其后果对于我们将是很可怕的。让我们来组成一个小团体，讨论种种问题；也许我们会灌输一点东西进另外几个同学的头脑里去。”
+
+这一番话是很有见地的，我除了同意以外别无他话。我们三人真挚地握手，肯定了我们的团结。从那时起我们三人便成了深交，时常在一起读书，讨论各种事情。
+
+废除农奴制度这个问题当时垄断了所有有思想的人的注意。
+
+1848年的法国革命早在俄国农民的心中有了清晰的反应，从1850年起，反叛的农奴暴动就开始变得严重了。克里米亚战争爆发，全俄征用民兵，农奴暴动便以空前猛烈之势蔓延各处，好几个地主竟被他的农奴杀害，农奴暴动越来越严重，以致政府居然派遣整个配有炮兵的整团军队前去镇压，而在以前，一小队兵士就足以使反叛的农民战栗震恐而屈服了。
+
+一方面，有这些暴动；另一方面，自亚历山大二世即位以来成长的一代新人对于农奴制度又深为憎厌。两者使农奴解放成了越来越紧迫的需要。沙皇自己也憎恶农奴制度，在皇族中他又得着皇后、皇弟康士坦丁和公主海伦·帕夫洛夫娜的支持，或者不如说是影响；他便开始向这方向走了第一步。他的初意乃是这种改革应由身为农奴所有主的贵族来发起。但是在俄国，没有一个省份的贵族能被发动起来向沙皇呈递解放农奴的请愿书。1856年3月，亚历山大二世亲自向莫斯科贵族演说，谈此举的必要；然而贵族们对他演说的回答只是顽固的沉默，所以亚历山大二世十分恼怒，便用赫尔岑的名句结束了他的演说：“各位，与其等待它自下而上发动，不如自上而下进行要好得多。”
+
+甚至连这句话也没有用。此时只得瞩望于旧波兰的各省——格罗德诺、维尔诺、科弗诺三省。拿破仑一世1812年曾在这些地方（在纸上）废止了农奴制度。这几省的总督纳齐莫夫好不容易从波兰贵族那里得到了沙皇所希望的请愿书。1857年11月，沙皇发出了给立陶宛各省总督的有名的“敕令”，宣布皇帝废止农奴制度的意向。我们含泪诵读赫尔岑的名文《加利利人，你战胜了！》，在这美丽的论文里那些伦敦的亡命者宣称他们不再把亚历山大二世视作敌人，他们要帮助他来完成这伟大的解放工作。
+
+农民的态度也是很可注目的。消息一旦流传出去，说那渴望了多年的解放就要到了，于是各处的暴动几乎马上完全停止。农民这时候便等待着；亚历山大二世巡行俄国中部之际，沿途有大群的农民围着他，哀求他给他们以自由——然而亚历山大二世却很讨厌地接受了这请愿书。最异乎寻常的是：农民中间起了一种谣言，说是拿破仑三世在和约中要求解放农奴——这可见传统的力量之大了。我时常听到这种谣言；而且就在解放前夕，农民似乎还疑心这是受了外国的压力而行的。“加里波的不来，什么事也不会做的”，当我的一个同学在圣彼得堡和一个农民谈起即将实现的农奴解放时，他便用上面这句话回答我的同学。
+
+然而在普遍欢庆之后，又继之以几年的疑惑与不平静。圣彼得堡与各省的特派委员会在讨论农奴解放的提案，可是亚历山大二世对此似乎犹豫不决。检查官不断地阻止报纸讨论详细情形。不祥的谣言在圣彼得堡流传甚广，并且传到我们校中来了。
+
+贵族中并不乏热心工作以求直截了当地废除这陈年的奴役的青年；可是主张农奴制度一派的人却一步步包围了沙皇，说动了他的心。他们私下告诉他，农奴制度废除之日便是农民开始成批屠杀地主之时，俄国便会发生新的普加乔夫叛乱，比1773年那一次还要可怕得多。亚历山大二世本是一个禀性软弱的人，很容易听信了这样的预言。
+
+然而制造出解放令的那部大机器已经开始工作了。特派委员会开过了多次会；几十个呈献给沙皇的解放计划或以手稿流传，或在伦敦印刷。赫尔岑得着熟悉俄国政府内情的屠格涅夫的帮助，便在《钟》上面讨论各个计划的细节。车尔尼雪夫斯基在《现代人》中也讨论着。斯拉夫派，特别是阿克沙科夫和别利亚叶夫乘着当时出版界最初得着相对自由的时机把这件事广布于全俄，而且以对农奴解放的技术方面有透彻了解的身份来讨论这个问题的特点。圣彼得堡的全体知识阶层都赞成赫尔岑的意见，尤其是赞成车尔尼雪夫斯基的意见。我每逢星期日在教会游行仪式以后在我的堂兄家里见到禁卫军骑兵队军官的时候，他们总表示赞同解放运动之激进派领袖车尔尼雪夫斯基的见解，这些我至今还记得。（我的堂兄狄米特里·尼可拉维奇·克鲁泡特金，是禁卫军骑兵队参谋兼沙皇的侍从武官。）
+
+全圣彼得堡的情绪，无论在客厅里，或是在街上，都已到了农奴解放欲罢不能的地步。农奴解放已非实行不可；而且还赢得了一个重大的胜利——解放后的农奴除了他们的住所外，还应该得到他们迄今为止耕种着的土地。
+
+然而旧贵族的一派并不灰心短气。他们集中全力来设法推迟改革，缩小分配的地块，而且对于解放的农奴课以极高的土地赎金，使农民的经济自由成了空言；在这一点上，他们果然完全成功了。亚历山大二世罢免了身为全部改革事业的真正灵魂的尼可拉·米鲁丁（陆军大臣米鲁丁的兄弟），对他说：“我真不愿意和你分手，然而我必须这样做：因为贵族把你说成是一个赤色分子。”草成解放计划的第一批特派委员会也被解散了；新成立的委员会以农奴主的利益为前提修改了全部计划；报刊重又受到钳制。
+
+形势很可悲观。很多人已经在怀疑究竟农奴解放是否会实行。我热心地观察着这场斗争，每星期日晚上，同学们从家庭回学校的时候，我便问他们听见父母们说些什么。到了1860年年终，消息愈来愈坏。“瓦鲁叶夫派占了上风”。“他们打算修改全部计划”。“X王妃的亲戚们竭力想说服沙皇”。“解放将要推迟：他们怕引起一场革命”。
+
+到了1861年1月里又渐渐有了稍好的传闻，一般人都希望在2月19日沙皇即位纪念的那天会有有关解放的消息。
+
+19日到了，但不曾带来一点新消息。那一天，我是在皇宫里。参贺礼并不盛大，第二级的侍从常常被派遣去参加这种参贺礼，以便熟习宫廷的礼节。那一天是我轮值；当我把一位来宫中助理做弥撒的大公夫人送走的时候，她的丈夫不在那里，我便去找寻他。他在沙皇的书斋里，我把他叫了出来，半开玩笑地向他说起他的妻子的焦急，丝毫不曾猜想到他们在书斋里谈的是那件大事。除了少数的倡议者之外，宫里没有一个人知道解放农奴的宣言在2月19日便签了字，但只因为下星期日（26日）是狂欢节周的开始，恐怕乡间农民在狂欢节里喝多了酒，听到这个好消息会发生暴动，所以把宣言推迟了两个星期发表。甚至往年在圣彼得堡冬宫附近广场上举行的狂欢节集市，这一年也移到别的广场去了，怕在京城引发民众暴动。政府并且向军队发出了关于如何镇压农民暴动之最严厉的训令。
+
+两个星期以后，在狂欢节的最后一个星期日那天（3月5日，即新历3月17日），我为了要参加骑术学校的阅兵式的缘故，留在学校里。我还睡在床上，我的勤务兵伊凡诺夫端着茶盘冲了进来，高声叫道：“亲王，自由！解放农奴宣言已经贴在客商市场了。”
+
+“你亲自看见了吗”？
+
+“是的。人们成群结队地站在那里；一个人朗读着宣言，别的人听着。真的是自由啦！”
+
+几分钟以后我穿好衣服出去了，正遇着一个同学走进来。
+
+“克鲁泡特金，自由！”他高叫道。“这是宣言。我的叔父昨晚上就知道这篇宣言今早要在伊沙克大教堂的晨祷时宣读，所以我们都去了。在那里并没有许多人，只有农民。在祷告完毕后，宣言果然宣读了，而且分发给众人。他们很明白宣言里的意思。我走出教堂的时候，站在门口的两个农夫做出一副滑稽的样子向我说：‘嗳，长官？现在——什么都完啦？’”他模仿农民让主人开路时说话的神气。多年的期待在送走他的主人时充分表露了出来。
+
+我反复读着解放农奴的宣言。这是莫斯科总主教老费拉列特起草的，文章写得冠冕堂皇，可是把俄国话和古斯拉夫语莫名其妙地混杂在一起，反而隐晦了原意。诚然，这是自由；但还不是立刻的自由，因为农民还要当两年的奴隶，直到1863年2月19日为止。然而不管这一切，有一件事是很显然的；农奴制度已经废除了，解放后的农奴将得到土地和住所。固然，他们还得付出赎金，但奴隶制度的旧污点已经拭去了。他们将不再做奴隶了；反动并不曾占到上风。
+
+我们去参加阅兵式。所有军事表演完毕以后，亚历山大二世依然骑在马上，高声叫道：“军官们，到我面前来！”他们聚集在他的四周，他便高声演说当天的那件大事。
+
+“军官们……贵族在军队中的代表”——这些句子的片断传到了我们的耳里。“许多世纪以来的不义已经结束了……我盼望贵族方面能够作出牺牲……忠诚的贵族会团结在皇座周围”……等等。演说完毕，热烈的欢呼像雷声般在军官中响了起来。
+
+我们在回学校的路上与其说是在走，不如说是在跑，——我们还想赶上意大利歌剧开演的时刻。这天午后，演的是本季的最后一场，到时一定有某些表示。我们急忙脱下军服，几个人轻手轻脚地飞跑上第六层楼厅。场内座无虚席。在第一次休息时剧场的吸烟室里挤满了兴奋的青年，他们不论彼此认识与否，大家都在畅谈。我们商定马上回到楼厅里和全体观众合唱《上帝保佑沙皇》的颂歌。
+
+可是音乐又奏起来了，我们急急回到楼厅里。歌剧的乐队已在奏《上帝保佑沙皇》，霎时间，全剧场欢声雷动，甚至压倒了乐声。我看见乐队指挥巴威里挥动着他的棍子，然而强大的乐队的演奏声我一点也听不见。于是巴威里停住了，可是欢呼声依然继续着。我看见棍子又在空中舞动；我看见提琴的弓在动，乐师在吹管乐器，但是群众的呼声再次压倒了乐声。巴威里又一次指挥着乐队奏《上帝保佑沙皇》；只有到了第三遍快奏完的时候，才有些管乐器的声音透过人声传了出来。
+
+街上也是同样的热烈。大群农民和知识阶层站在皇宫前面高声欢呼，沙皇每次出来，游行的群众便跟着他的马车跑。两年以后，当亚历山大二世把波兰革命淹没在血泊中，而“刽子手穆拉维约夫”把它缢死在绞刑台上的时候，赫尔岑写道：“亚历山大·尼古拉叶维奇，为什么你不死在那一天？要是死了，你将被看作一位英雄而名垂青史。”——赫尔岑是不错的。
+
+那些主张奴隶制度的人所预言的暴动在什么地方呢？解放令所定的条件是非常含糊不定的，恐怕再没有比它们更含糊的了。如果有什么东西可以激起叛乱，那正是这新律所造出的含糊不定的条件。然而事实上，除了两个地方发生暴动，其他几处曾有过小骚乱（这全是因为误会的缘故，但马上就缓解了）之外，俄国依然风平浪静，比以前任何时候更为平静。俄国农民本着他们固有的见识，很明白农奴制度已经废止了，“自由已经到了”；虽然新法令所加于他们的条件是很苛刻的，他们照样接受了。
+
+1861年8月，我在尼可尔斯奎；1862年夏季，我又在那里。我看见农民接受新条件时的那种平静而有理性的样子，印象极深。他们很知道付出土地赎金在他们是极其困难的，土地赎金其实就是贵族丧失农奴后所得的补偿。然而农民非常看重废止他们本身被奴役这件事，所以一旦获得了个人的自由，他们便接受了这沉重不堪的赎金，一声不响，只把它当作一种惨苦的必然。最初的几个月里，他们每一星期休息两天，说是在星期五作工是罪孽；但是夏季一到，他们便比以前更加卖力地干活了。
+
+当我在解放以后十五个月看到我们的尼可尔斯奎农民的时候，我不由得不钦佩他们。他们的天性的善良与柔和依旧如故，然而奴隶根性的一切痕迹却消失了。他们和他们的主人谈话也同和平等人谈话无异，好像他们和主人从来不曾有过别的关系。而且他们中间也出现了能够维护他们的权利的人。解放令是一部难读的大书，我费了很多时间才了解它；但是当尼可尔斯奎村长华西里·伊凡诺夫有一天来请求我把其中难解之点解释给他听的时候，我发现他虽是一个读书还感困难的人，却能够在这部法令的各章各款之错综复杂之中明瞭全文的意义。
+
+最倒楣的是仆婢们。他们得不着土地，不过纵使得着了，也不知道拿来怎样用。他们得到了自由，此外便没有其他的东西。在我们这一区里，差不多所有的仆婢都离开了主人；例如我的父亲的家里就不曾有一个人留下。他们四处寻找位置谋生，一部分人马上在商人家里找到了差使，商人们也很骄傲，他们用了某某亲王的马车夫，或某某将军的厨子。那些学得一门手艺的人便在城里找到了工作：例如我的父亲的乐队就依然是一个乐队，在卡路加过得很好，而且和我家仍旧保持着亲密的关系。但是那班没有手艺的人，生活便很困苦了；然而大多数人宁肯到他处谋生，不愿留在旧主人的家里。
+
+至于地主呢，大的地主便在圣彼得堡尽力想把旧制度换上一个新包装恢复起来，在亚历山大三世即位之后，他们果然多少做到了一点；而比他们的数目大得多的地主却不得已把废除农奴当作一种不可避免的灾难。至于年轻一代，他们向俄罗斯提供了担任“治安调解人”和治安推事的出色人选，对农奴得以和平解放一事作出了很大的贡献。至于老一代人，他们大多已经预支了他们从解放了的农奴要付给他们的大笔土地赎金的相当一部分（这种赎金估得比土地的市价高了许多），他们已经打好主意怎样把这笔款花在圣彼得堡和莫斯科的饭店里，或者在赌桌的绿毡上。事实上，差不多所有这些人一得到赎金便马上把它挥霍掉了。
+
+对于许多地主，农奴解放算得是一笔绝好的交易。比如，我的父亲预料到农奴解放将实现，以十一卢布一俄亩的代价一块块卖去的土地，这时候分配给农民时，却估到四十卢布一俄亩——即比市价高了三倍半。在我们这一区里到处都是如此；在我父亲在坦波夫省草原上的领地，“密尔”（即乡村公社）把我父亲所有的土地都租去了，期限是十二年，租金比他以前用农奴耕种时所得的多过一倍。
+
+在这个可纪念的时期之后十一年，我因事到已经归我承继的坦波夫省的领地去，我在那里住了几个星期；在我离开的前一天晚上，村里的牧师（他是一个有独立见解的聪明人，这类人在南部各省中偶尔可以见到）绕着村子散步了一会。晚霞灿烂，从草原上吹来一阵有花香的风。他遇见一个叫做安东·沙威烈夫的中年农夫坐在村旁的小丘上，手里捧着一本赞美诗在读。那个农夫几乎连古斯拉夫语的拼音也不会，平常读书总是从最后一页读起，向前面翻去；然而他却最爱读书，遇着书中有什么词打动了他，他便喜欢把那个词重读几遍。这时候，他正读到一首赞美诗，诗中每一节的开始都是“欢呼罢”这个词。
+
+“你在读什么书？”牧师问他。
+
+“呵，神父，让我来告诉你，”这是他的回答。“十四年前，老亲王到过这里。那是冬天。我刚刚回家，人快要冻僵了。落着大雪。我正要脱衣服，忽然有人在敲窗子，那是村长，他高叫道：‘到亲王那里去！他要你去见他！’这好像晴天的一个霹雳，把我和妻子及我们的孩子都骇昏了。‘他能要你去做什么？’我的妻子惊恐地叫着。我划了个十字便去了。当我跨过桥的时候，风雪几乎弄瞎了我的眼睛。到头来什么事也没有。老亲王睡完午觉醒来以后，便问我会不会做泥水匠工作，他只是对我说：‘明天来把那间屋子的墙壁刷新一下。’于是我非常快乐地回家去，到了桥头，我看见我的妻子冒着风雪站在那里，她已在那里站了好久，怀中还抱着一个小孩。她叫道：‘沙威利奇，出了什么事？’我便回答说：‘唔，不妨事；他只要我刷新墙壁罢了。’神父，在老亲王的时候就是这样。如今，小亲王前几天到这里来。我去见他，他在花园里面，正坐在庭前喝茶，你神父和村长同坐在他的身边，村长的胸前挂着村长官的链子。小亲王问我：‘沙威利奇，你要喝茶吗？’他叫我坐下，一面又向那老头子说：‘彼得·格列哥里叶夫，给我们添一把椅子。’你该晓得彼得·格列哥里叶夫当老亲王的总管的时候，他对我们是何等凶恶；这时节，他却端了一把椅子来，我们众人围坐在桌子旁边谈话，他给我们大家斟茶。喂，神父，今晚上这么美，草原上吹来阵阵香气，我坐着读‘欢呼罢！欢呼罢！’的诗。
+
+这就是农民的心目中农奴解放的意义。
+
+-
+
+`圣彼得堡的宫廷生活——宫中的谍报组织——亚历山大二世的性格——皇后玛丽·亚历山德洛夫娜——皇太子尼古拉·亚历山德洛维奇——亚历山大三世`
+
+1861年6月，我被任命为侍从学校中的军曹。校中有几个军官对这件事不赞成，他们说，如果我做了军曹，学校里就会没有纪律可言。可是他们也没有别的办法：校中向例最高一级的第一名学生应被任命为军曹，而我在这几年中又无一次不是名列第一。这个任命是很令人羡慕的，不仅因为做了军曹就在学校中占有一个特权的地位，受着军官一般的待遇，尤其是因为他暂时又成了沙皇的侍从，得以亲身接近沙皇，因而这被认为是进一步升迁的跳板。然而对于我，最重要的还是在做了军曹以后就可以免除平常侍从们在学校内做杂务的苦差使。一个人别居一室，在那里可以避免校中的喧哗而专心读书。诚然，这也有重要的不便之处：我平日常常觉得每天步履端正地在我们的房里走许多遍，是很烦人的事，所以总是跑得飞快。这举动本是严格禁止的，但我也不管。然而现在我却不得不挟着一本内务值班簿非常庄重地走着，不能够再跑了。为着这件重大的事，我的几个朋友曾一起商量过，结果认为我有时仍然可以有机会实行我所喜欢的跑步；至于我和其他一切同学的关系，应该由我自己与他们结成同志般的关系，这一层我做到了。
+
+照例侍从们要到宫中去随侍大小参贺礼、舞会、接见、招待宴会等等。在圣诞节、新年、复活节各个星期里，我们差不多每天要被召进宫去，有时候一天两次。我以军曹的身份应该在每个星期日骑术学校阅兵的时候向沙皇报告“侍从学校的中队一切正常”，哪怕全校有三分之一的学生患着时疫也罢。我问上校，万一真有了这样的事，我能报告“今天不是一切都正常”吗？他的回答是：“上帝保佑你，除了学校发生暴动外，无论在什么时候你都应该报告一切正常。”
+
+宫廷生活中自然有不少优美如画的情景。举止之优雅（虽然这也许只是表面上的），礼仪之谨严，环境之富丽堂皇——这一切都是极其动人的。大参贺礼的场面好不壮观。单是皇后在宫中陈设富丽的客厅里接见几个贵妇人的礼节已经和普通的造访大不相同。穿着金线刺绣的制服的侍从武官把客人引了进来，皇后的后面又跟随着几个衣饰华丽的侍从和一群女官，一切仪式都进行得非常庄重。身为宫廷仪式中的一个演员，而且还伺候着主角，这样的事给予我这样年纪的少年的岂止是好奇心引起的兴趣。我当时还把亚历山大二世当作一个英雄，因为他把宫廷仪式看得毫不重要。在这个时期，他每天早晨六点钟光景就开始办公，并且和那强大的反动派苦苦斗争，以求实现他的一些改革计划，农奴解放不过是此等改革的第一步。
+
+然而渐渐地当我看见了更多的宫廷生活富丽堂皇这一面，而且间或瞥见一眼这些场面背后是些什么以后，我不仅明白了这些排场以及它们所欲隐藏的东西纯属无用，而且这些小事就忙煞了宫中人，以致他们没有心思去考虑其他远为重大的事情。人们在这种表演中往往忽略了现实。从这时起，我想象中的亚历山大二世的头上的圆光便慢慢地黯淡了；所以纵然我最初还抱有某些幻想，以为在最为接近宫廷的环境中可以从事有益的活动。到了这一年年尾，我就打破了这种幻想了。
+
+在每个重要的节日，在沙皇与皇后的生日和命名日、加冕纪念日，以及其他这类纪念日里，宫中都要举行一次大的参贺礼。几千位将军与直到上尉的各级军官以及高级文官排列成行，站在宫中的大厅里，等到沙皇和他的家族庄严地走向教堂；在他们走过的时节鞠躬行礼。在这种日子里，全体皇族都要到宫里来，团聚在一间客厅里，愉快地畅谈一切，一直谈到大家应该带起庄严的假面具的时候。然后排好队伍。沙皇牵着皇后的手先走。沙皇身后就是他的那一个侍从，侍从之后才是侍从武官长、值日的侍从武官与御前大臣。皇后后面有两个侍从，他们与其说伺候皇后，不如说伺候她的长裙，他们一路上在转弯时便捧着皇后的裙裾，过后又把长裙铺开，展示它的全部华美。其后便是十八岁的皇储，再后便是大公与大公夫人与公主，都以各人的继承皇位权之顺序为先后——每一位大公夫人、公主的身后有一个侍从，此后就是一长串的女官，老的少的都有，都穿着所谓俄国装，——即是仿古俄国妇女服装的晚礼服。
+
+在这行列走过的时候，我注意到每个最高的文武官僚在鞠躬如仪之前总要设法使自己进入沙皇的眼帘，如果沙皇带着笑容看他一眼，接受他的敬礼，或者沙皇使人几乎看不见地略略点一下头，有时还说一两句话，那么他就会志得意满地环顾他的邻人，指望接受他们的祝贺。
+
+皇族的行列从教堂里回来时，情形和去时一样。过后，各人便忙着去做自己的事。除了几个忠心的官僚和一些年轻贵妇外，在所有参加这些参贺礼的人里，不把这种仪式当作一个讨厌的义务的，十个人中找不出一个来。
+
+每年冬季，宫中要举行两三次盛大舞会。被邀请的人有数千之多。先由沙皇用波洛奈兹舞开幕，然后每人可以随意享受这一段时光了。在这些灯烛交辉的宽阔的大厅里，年轻的姑娘很容易逃脱掉父母和婶娘们的监视，其中许多人享受着跳舞与晚餐之乐，在这种时候，青年人总有法子避免长辈的干涉来独自享乐。
+
+在这些舞会中，我的职务是颇为困难的。亚历山大二世不跳舞，也不坐下来；他不断地在客人中间走来走去，他的侍从应该隔一段距离地跟随着他，不可太远，以便于听见他的呼唤，又不可太近，以免造成不便。这种职务含有“到场”与“缺席”两种意义，确实是很难办的，而且沙皇并不需要它：他本来情愿一个人自由自在地行动，然而惯例如此，他也只得服从。最困难的是当他走进站在大公们跳舞的圈子周围密集的贵妇丛中，慢慢穿过的时节。要在这脂粉队中走出一条路来，决不是容易的事；她们看见沙皇便连忙分开给他让路，然而沙皇一去，她们又紧密地合起来了。几百个太太小姐们自己并不跳舞，只是站在那里，彼此靠得很紧，每人都希望也许会有一个大公看中她，请她去跳一次华尔滋舞，或波尔加舞。这就是宫廷在圣彼得堡社会上的势力，其结果只要一位大公偶然垂青于一位姑娘，那么她的父母便尽力设法使她热烈地爱上那位大人物，哪怕明知道大公不会和她结婚（俄国惯例，大公不得与沙皇的“子民”结婚）。有一次，我在一个“上等”人家里听到谈起宫廷的事，原来皇储曾经和这家的十七岁的姑娘跳过两三次舞，她的父母便表示了很大的希望，超出了我可能想象的希望。
+
+我们每次在宫中服务，总要在那里用午餐或晚餐，侍仆们不管我们愿不愿意，就把宫中的点滴丑事一一向我们低声叙述。他们知道各座宫里（就是他们所服务的区域）的种种事情。说句老实话，这一年里这类丑事并不像七十年代中那么多。沙皇的兄弟们结婚还不久，沙皇的儿子又都年轻得很。然而沙皇自己和X王妃的关系却流传于侍仆之口，他们畅谈起这件事来，比圣彼得堡社会还更无顾忌。那位X王妃就是屠格涅夫的小说《烟》里面的伊林娜，屠格涅夫对她有极精彩的描写。有一天我们走进平时更衣的房间，人家告诉我们：“X今天失宠了——这一次是完全失宠了。”半点钟以后，我们看见他们说的那位太太来做弥撒祭的助理，她的眼睛已经哭肿了。在弥撒祭进行时，她还在一边不住地吞眼泪。别的贵妇们都离她远远地站着，让众人都看见她。侍仆们已经知道了这件事，并随意加以评论。这些人的话里真有令人恶心的地方，他们在前一天还会拜倒在那位太太面前，如今却恣意嘲笑她。
+
+在宫中，尤其是在沙皇身边活动的谍报组织，说起来真令不知内幕的人难以置信。我只举下面一件事就可以说明其大概了。这是几年以后的事：大公中有一人从圣彼得堡的一个绅士那里受到一次严重的教训。那绅士不许大公到他的家里去。然而有一天，他意外地回到家中，却看见大公在他的客厅里，他便举起手杖向着大公冲去。年轻的大公连忙跑下楼梯，已经跳进了马车里，但绅士终于捉住了他，用手杖将他痛揍了一下。站在门口的警察看见这事，连忙跑去报告警察总监特列波夫将军；特列波夫又连忙跳上马车去见沙皇，第一个向他报告这“不幸事件”。亚历山大二世把大公唤来，和他谈了一次话。几天以后，沙皇直辖的司法部的第三科（即政治警察）里的一个老官吏（他常到我的一个同学家去）把当时沙皇和大公的谈话和盘托出。他告诉我们说：“沙皇非常恼怒，最后便向大公说：你理应知道怎样处理你自己的小事’。”自然，有人问这官吏他怎么能知道一次私下谈话，他的回答很能说明问题：“我们科理应知道沙皇陛下的谈话和意见才行。否则，像政治警察这样微妙的组织又如何办事呢？请相信，沙皇是全圣彼得堡中受着最严密监视的人。”
+
+这并不夸张。事实上，每个大臣、每个总督在携着报告书走进沙皇的书斋之前，必定先和沙皇的亲信侍仆谈一次话，以便知道这一天沙皇的心情如何。如果心情好，他便向他陈述一些伤脑筋的问题，如果沙皇的心情不好，他就把报告书留在皮包里，另等一个好日子再来。东西伯利亚总督每一次回到圣彼得堡的时候，总要派他的亲信秘书去送一份厚礼给沙皇的亲信侍仆。他常常说：“在有些日子里，沙皇心里正冒着火，如果我那时把某些报告呈上去，他会下令把无论谁，甚至我自己，交付周密审讯；在另一些日子，沙皇很高兴，各事都可以办得十分顺利。那个侍仆实在是个宝贝。”每天都知道沙皇的心情乃是保持高位的要诀——宿瓦洛夫伯爵和特列颇夫将军两人便精通此道。据我观察所得，伊格纳节也夫伯爵连侍仆的帮助也用不着便掌握了这门艺术。
+
+我最初在宫廷服务的时候，对于农奴解放者亚历山大二世是非常崇拜的。想象往往使一个青年人超越了当时现实的范围，我那时的心情便是这样：如果有人在我面前加害于沙皇，我一定会拿自己的身子去遮住他。1862年1月上旬的一天，我看见他离开了行列，独自一人急急地向着大厅走去；在那里，圣彼得堡卫戍部队所有团队各有一部分正整队等他去检阅。这一检阅往年是在露天举行的，然而这一年，因为天冷的缘故，改在大厅里举行。平时亚历山大二世在阅兵时总是骑着马在队伍前疾驰而过。这一次，他却不得不步行经过团队之前。我知道沙皇以军队最高指挥官的身份出现时，我的职务便结束了，我随从他到这时为止，以后便不是我的事了。然而我向周围一望，看见沙皇身边没有一个人。两个侍从武官已经不知到哪里去了，他的随从人员一个也不在。“我决不能让他一个人留在那里”，我自语道；我便继续跟随着他。
+
+我不知道亚历山大二世在这一天究竟是事务繁忙呢，还是别有理由希望阅兵式愈早完毕愈好。反正他冲到军队前面，以大而且快的脚步沿着行列急走。他本是一个身材极高的人，他走得非常之快，我用了全力赶上他，感到十分吃力，并且有许多次我几乎要小跑才能紧随在他后面。他急急前进，好像在逃避什么危险似的。他的焦急时时向我显露出来，我无时无刻不准备好跳到他的身前去保护他，只失悔我带的是传令刀，不是自己的有着西班牙多勒多城铸的，刀刃可以刺穿钢板的宝刀。他直到走过最后的大队以后才放慢了脚步。他走进了另一个大厅，便向四周一望，他的视线和我的因急走后的亢奋而发光的眼睛遇着了。那些更年轻的侍从武官隔了两个大厅飞跑过来。我预备受一次严厉的申斥；然而亚历山大二世反而向我说：“你在这里？好小伙子！”这也许是他的真情流露。当他慢慢走去的时候，他把他的迟疑的、心不在焉的眼光望着空间，这种目光我已经见过许多次了。
+
+我当时的心情便是如此。然而各种小事件以及亚历山大二世的政策开始具有的显著的反动性质逐渐在我的心里种下了疑惑。每年1月6日，在俄国要举行一种半基督教、半异教的净水仪式；这在宫廷里也要举行的。在涅瓦河畔，正对着宫殿的地方造了一个亭子，僧侣领着皇室从宫殿里出来，走过壮丽的河埠进了亭子，在那里唱起了赞美诗，然后把十字架抛入河中。几千群众站在河埠上和涅瓦河的坚冰上从远处看这一仪式。在仪式举行之际，所有的人都要脱帽站着。这一年，因为冷得厉害，有一位老将军便戴上了假发，可是在他慌忙戴肩披的时候，无意中就把假发挪动了位置，横放在他的头上。他自己一点也不知道。康士坦丁大公看见这样子，他在唱赞美诗的时节，不住地和那些年轻的大公们瞟着那位不幸的老将军，笑个不止。那位老将军愚蠢地微笑着，不知道他自己为什么成了嬉笑的原因。康士坦丁最后又在沙皇耳边悄悄地说了几句话，沙皇也望着那位老将军笑了。
+
+几分钟以后，这行列再走过河埠到宫中去的时候，一个光头的老农夫从路旁的两排一个挨一个的兵士中挤了进来，跪倒在沙皇脚边，手里捧着请愿书，含着满腔的眼泪高声叫着：“父呵！保护我们！”俄国农民所受的多年的压迫都表现在这叫声里了；然而那个几分钟以前在教会仪式中看见横放着的假发而发笑的亚历山大二世呢，他毫不理会老农夫就走过去了。我紧随着他，只看到他因老农夫的突然出现骇得颤抖了一下。过后，他便继续前进，对跪在他脚边的那个人连看也不看一眼。我掉头四顾，侍从武官不在那里；随后走着的康士坦丁大公也和他的哥哥一样不理会那个老农夫。连接受请愿书的人也没有，所以我把它接了，虽然我明知我会因此而受申斥。接受请愿书，并不是我的职务，然而我想到那位老农夫在来到首都之前，在穿过这一天在路旁林立着的军警走到沙皇面前呈递请愿书之前，要受多大的罪，我便毅然接受了。他和所有向沙皇呈递请愿书的农民一样，会被监禁，至于会监禁多久就没有人知道了。
+
+在农奴解放的那一天，亚历山大二世确实成了圣彼得堡人民崇拜的明主；然而最可注意的是除了大众欢腾的那一刻外，亚历山大二世并不曾得着这个城市市民的热爱。皇弟尼可拉至少在小商人和马车夫中间还很有人望（谁也不知道这是为什么），可是亚历山大二世自己和皇弟康士坦丁（改革派领袖）以及他的三弟米哈伊尔谁也没有赢得圣彼得堡的任何阶级的拥戴。亚历山大二世把他父亲的专制的性格保留得太多了，那种性格时时透过他的平常和善的动作露出来。他很容易发脾气，时常以最轻蔑的态度对待他的廷臣们。他不是一个可靠的人，在他的政策，在个人同情两方面，他都不是可靠的。他的报复心很厉害。我怀疑他曾否诚心诚意地对待过谁。他所最亲近的人中有几个乃是最坏的人。例如阿得勒堡伯爵屡次要沙皇替他偿还巨额债款，别的人则是以大量偷盗闻名。自1862年初起，亚历山大二世便开始证明自己能把他父亲的最大恶政重新付诸实施。我们知道他仍然愿意在司法组织与军队中实施一些重大的改革；残酷的体罚快要废止了，他又允许实行某种地方自治，也许还要公布一项宪法。然而最细微的动乱，却被他下令用极残酷的手段镇压下去；他把每一民众运动视作对他个人的冒犯，因此他随时都有采取最反动的措施之可能。
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+1861年10月，圣彼得堡、莫斯科、喀山各大学的风潮被他下令用变本加厉的严酷手段镇压下去了。圣彼得堡大学被封闭了，虽然大部分教授在市政厅里开设了自由讲座，但不久也被禁止，第一流的教授便从大学告退了。农奴解放以后马上有了开办星期日学校的大运动；这种星期日学校果然在各地方由私人和团体开办了；老老少少的农民和工人成群结队地加入这些学校读书。教员都是志愿者；军官、大学生，甚至于少数侍从都做了教员。有人设计出极好的教授法，所以我们只须上九课或十课就可以教会农民读书了（俄文有一种按音拼词法）。在这些星期日学校里，农民群众可在几年之内就完全学会读书写字，并不要政府花费一文钱；然而政府突然把所有的星期日学校都封闭了。在波兰发生了一些爱国的示威运动，政府派遣了哥萨克军队去用皮鞭驱散群众，而且照例残酷地逮捕了几百人囚在教堂里。1861年年尾，俄国军队在华沙大街上开枪杀人；尼古拉一世所喜欢的通过两行对列的士兵受笞刑这种刑罚此时又被用来镇压几处的农民暴动。这样在1862年，亚历山大二世自己已经预示了他在以后，1870——1881年间将成为怎样的一个专制暴君了。
+
+皇族里面最富于同情心的确实要算是皇后玛丽·亚历山德洛夫娜。她是一个真诚的人，她的话语常常出于本心，如果她说起愉快的事，她的意思就真是这样。她有一次为了一件殷勤周到的小事向我道谢（这是在她接见过那位刚到圣彼得堡来的美国大使之后），她的那种态度给了我一个很深的印象：这决不是一般人想象中以为像皇后那样被礼仪宠坏了的贵妇人所应有的态度。她的家庭生活肯定不是幸福的；女官也不喜欢她，她们以为她是过于严格了，而且她们又不了解为什么她那样担心她的丈夫的轻率。如今一般人都知道她对于废止农奴制度的事尽过大力。然而在当时似乎很少有人知道她在这方面的影响。康士坦丁大公与海伦·帕夫洛夫娜公主（她是在宫中支持尼可拉·米鲁丁的主要人物）被人视作宫中改革派的两大领袖。至于皇后呢，人们多半只知道她致力于创办女子高等学校一事。这些学校从开办以来就是组织得很完善，而且具有真正民主的性质。她和大教育家乌新斯基很深的友谊才使后者免掉了当时所有名流的厄运——放逐。
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+皇后自己受过很好的教育，她便竭尽余力使她的长子受完美的教育。她聘请了各门学问中的第一流人物来做他的教师，为了这个目的，她甚至聘请了加威林来，虽然她知道加威林和赫尔岑的友谊。加威林向她谈起他和赫尔岑的友谊时，她回答道，她对赫尔岑并无怨恨，只怪他不该用粗暴的话来侮辱皇太后罢了。
+
+皇储尼古拉极其俊美——也许是太富于女性美了。他没有一点高傲的样子，在参贺礼上他总爱和侍从们很亲热地闲聊（我还记得在新年接见外交使团的时候，我极力使他欣赏美国大使的服装，和别国大使的鹦哥绿的制服比较起来，他的服饰是很朴素的）。然而那些深知他的人都说他是一个极端的利己主义者，一个绝对不能和他人深交的人。他的这种性格比他的父亲的还更厉害。至于说到他的教育，他的母亲在这方面的一切苦心都无效果。1861年8月，他当着他父亲的面接受考试，结果是彻底失败。我还记得在考试后几天的一次阅兵式中，他以皇储的身份任司令官，在其间他犯了一个错误，亚历山大二世便高声骂他：“你连这个也学不会！”这句话在场的人都听到了。他在二十二岁时患某种脊髓病死了。
+
+尼古拉的兄弟亚历山大在1865年做了皇储，就是后来的亚历山大三世。这是一个和他的哥哥绝对相反的人。我觉得他很像保罗一世，他的面孔，他的身材，他的自尊自荣的心理都和保罗一世的完全相同，所以我常常说：“如果他做了皇帝，他便是一个新的加奇那宫中的保罗一世，而且他也会像他的曾祖那样落一个死于朝臣之手的下场。”他顽固地拒绝学习。据说亚历山大二世因为难于应付那位学识优于他的皇弟康士坦丁的缘故，曾下了决心专门注意皇储的教育，而置其余的儿子于不顾。然而据我看来，事情并非如此：亚历山大·亚历山德洛维奇（即亚历山大三世）大概自小就讨厌读书。事实上，我看见他发给他的在哥本哈根的新娘的许多电报，其中竟有不少的别字。
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+据说他在晚年举止有所改善，但在1870年及其后的多年中间，他却依然是一个真正的保罗一世的子孙。我在圣彼得堡认识一个军官，他是一个瑞典裔的芬兰人。有一次，他被派到美国去给俄国军队订购枪械。他回来的时候应该去向当时担任着扩充陆军军备监督之职的皇储亚历山大报告他此次的使命。在这一次会见中，皇储忽然发起脾气来，申斥那个军官，那军官也不肯屈服，他大概不失身份地回了话，于是皇储勃然大怒，把他乱骂了一顿。那个军官乃是那种忠诚而又自爱的人（这种人在俄国的瑞典裔贵族中是常见的），他马上走了，写了一封信给皇储，要求他在二十四小时以内向他道歉，并且还说，如果道歉信届时不到，他便要自杀。这是一种日本式的决斗。皇储并没有送来道歉信，那个军官果然践了言。我在我的一个好友的家里看见他，他也是这一家的密友，那时候，他时时刻刻都在等待皇储的道歉信。第二天早晨，他，死了。沙皇非常恼怒皇储，命令他随那个军官的灵柩之后一直送到墓地。然而便是这个可怕的教训也不能医治这位年轻人的罗曼诺夫式的倨傲和极易冲动的性格。
+
+-
+
+`我选定入西伯利亚哥萨克联队——圣彼得堡的大火——反动的开始——亚历山大二世的新面目——西伯利亚之行`
+
+1862年5月中旬，在我们毕业前几个星期，有一天，上尉叫我把各同学志愿加入的团队的最后名单开上去。我们可以随意选定在各禁卫军或陆军各团队中任职，不过在禁卫军中，我们进去时只有少尉官阶，在其他团队中，我们可以任中尉。我开了一张我们这一级学生的名单，便去向同学们一个个地征求意见。各人早已选定了自己决心加入的团队，而且大部分人已经在花园里试戴过所选定的团队的制帽了。
+
+“皇后陛下所属胸甲骑兵队”，“蒲列阿布拉陈斯基禁卫军步兵队”，“禁卫军骑兵队”，这便是我记录在名单上的同学们的回答。
+
+“然而克鲁泡特金，你呢？炮兵队？哥萨克队？”我的同学围着我这样问。我不能回答这些问题，到后来，我便请一个同学代我填好这张名单，自己回到房里再一次思考我的最后决定。
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+我早就决定不入禁卫军的一个团队，把一生的光阴浪费在阅兵式与宫中舞会上面了。我的梦想是进大学去学习，再过学生生活。
+
+然而父亲的野心和我的理想完全不同，如果我要实行我的理想，便只得和我的父亲完全决裂，单靠自己教家课来维持生活。成千俄国大学生都是这样生活的，这种生活我一点也不怕。可是我怎样走出这种生活最初的几步呢？在几个星期以后，我便要离开学校，购买自己的衣服，寻找自己的住处；而事实上，我明白我自己想找一点现钱来开始最低限度的生活也是不可能的事。于是我便把进大学的念头打消了。最近我常常想去进炮兵学院，这样我又可免掉两年的军队生活的杂务；在那里，除了学习军事科学外，我还能研究数学与物理学。然而那时候，反动之风已经吹起，各军事学院的学生在前一年的冬季里被人当作小学生一般看待，有两个学院的学生起来反抗，结果其中一个学院的学生全体退学。
+
+我的思想渐渐转到了西伯利亚。阿穆尔河（即黑龙江）一带最近被俄国吞并了。我已经读过关于这条东方的密西西比河、它所贯流的山脉以及它的支流乌苏里江畔的亚热带植被……的一切记载，我的思想更进到洪堡所描写的热带地方以及我喜读的利特尔的伟大的通论了。再者，我推想在西伯利亚有很大的地盘来应用那些已经实现或者即将实现的伟大改革：在那里工作的人一定很少，我可以完全依着自己的意向活动。不过我因此不得不和亚历山大哥哥分离，这是很不幸的事；然而他在最近的风潮之后已经不得不离开莫斯科大学了。我想过一两年，我们两人总有办法走到一起的。我的猜想后来果然成了事实。
+
+剩下的只是去哪一个阿穆尔地区的团队这一选择。乌苏里是最使我憧憬的地方；然而，唉！在乌苏里河流域只驻扎着一个哥萨克步兵团队。不骑马的哥萨克兵——这对我太煞风景了，我毕竟还只是个少年。所以我便决定加入阿穆尔的哥萨克骑兵队。
+
+我把这个决定记在名单上面，这使得所有的同学都吃了一惊。他们都说：“这太远了”；而我的友人道洛夫却翻开《军官便览》高声读道：“军服——黑色，红领，无领章；毛帽——用犬毛或他种野兽之毛制成；军裤——灰色。”所有在场的人听了都为之大惊失色。
+
+“只消看一看那军服罢！不，还有那帽子！——不过戴一顶狼皮或熊皮的帽子也还可以！可是想一想那军裤！灰色的，像一个辎重兵！”道洛夫念完便叫起来，这时候众人的惊恐已经达到了顶点。
+
+我勉强和他们开了一阵玩笑，过后便把名单给上尉送去了。
+
+上尉也叫起来：“克鲁泡特金老爱开玩笑！我不是告诉过你这张名单今天一定要送到大公那里吗？”
+
+我好不容易才让他相信这确实是我的本意。
+
+然而第二天，我看见了克拉沙夫斯基对这个决定的态度的时候，我几乎要把我的决定放弃了。他以前满心希望我会入大学，为了这个目的特地教我读希腊文和拉丁文；我不敢把我不能入大学的真正原因告诉他，因为我知道如果我把实情向他说了，他一定会把他所有的一点儿钱分给我用。
+
+我的父亲又从莫斯科打电报给校长，说他禁止我去西伯利亚；这件事又报告到全国军事学校总监大公那里去了。我被叫到大公的助理面前，谈论阿穆尔河的植被与诸如此类的事，因为我有理由相信如果我说出我愿意进大学然而没有钱进去的话，皇室中一定会有人出钱津贴我——这是我无论如何不愿接受的。
+
+这一切会落个什么结果是很难说的，然而一件意外的大事（圣彼得堡的大火）间接地把我的这些难题解决了。
+
+在复活主日后的星期一，即圣灵节（这一天是在那一年的旧历5月26日），阿卜拉辛大院内起了大火。这大院面积极大，占地将近半平方英里，院内全是些小商店，都是些小木屋，售卖各种各类的旧货。旧家具、旧铺盖、旧衣服和旧书，这些货色从城内各处聚集到这里，堆积在这些小屋内，也堆积在小屋中间的过道里，甚至堆积在屋顶上。这一大堆易燃物品后面便是内务部，和该部的档案室，所有关于农奴解放的文件都保存在这档案室里。在这大院前面有一排石头建筑的商店，对面就是国家银行。在阿卜拉辛大院和侍从学校的一翼之间有一条窄巷，这巷子的旁边也有一排石头建筑的商店；侍从学校一翼的下层是杂货店和煤油店，楼上便是军官们的寓所。它差不多正对着内务部。在一条运河的对岸，有连片的木材场。在午后四点钟，这些木材场和对河的那一带小木屋几乎同时起火。
+
+如果这一天刮风的话，那么圣彼得堡至少会烧掉一半，国家银行、好几个部、客商市场（在涅瓦大街上的另一个大商场）、侍从学校与国立图书馆都在内。
+
+这天下午，我是在学校里，在一位军官的家中用餐。我们从窗内一见我们的近邻起了火，冒出了最初的黑烟，我们便马上向那出事地点跑去。景象非常吓人。火像一条大蛇似的发出咝咝的响声，一面蜿蜒着向四面八方伸出去，把小木屋包围住了，一下子升上去成了一根大火柱，吐出那发声的舌头又把新的小木屋和里面的东西全烧着了，形成了烟与火的旋风。到了铺被店内烧着的羽毛在空中旋转飞舞的时候，人们便再不能够留在这燃烧着的市场里了。整个一片只得予以放弃。
+
+官厅中人简直完全丧失了头脑，他们不知道怎样做才好。当时在圣彼得堡并没有一架蒸汽的救火机，还是工人们提议从离首都二十英里远、靠铁道的科尔平诺铁工厂里运一架来。救火机运到火车站的时候，还是由人民自己动手把它拖到火场。它的四根皮带中有一根不知被谁弄坏了，其余的三根便向着内务部射水。
+
+大公们来了又走了。在晚上很迟的时候，国家银行已经脱了险，这时沙皇才到场。他说侍从学校现今是救火的关键，无论如何非保全它不可。这事众人早已知道了。如果侍从学校着了火，那么国立图书馆和涅瓦大街的一半都会成为灰烬——这是显而易见的事。
+
+使足力气阻止火势一路蔓延的是群众。有一段时光国家银行非常危急。对面商店里搬出来的货物完全抛在沙多瓦亚街上，像山一般堆在国家银行的左侧墙边。遍街抛着的东西不停地着火。然而群众在难以忍受的烘烤之中尽力阻止火势再延烧到对面的一大堆货物。他们看见当场连一架救火机也没有，便痛骂所有当局者。“国家银行和孤儿院快要着火了，他们还在内务部干什么呢？他们都发昏了！”“警察总监在哪儿？为什么不能派一支消防队到国家银行来呢？”这就是群众的意见。
+
+我认识警察总监安年科夫将军，因为我在我们学校的副监督的家里和他见过一两面，他那时是和他的兄弟（一位著名的文学批评家）同去的。我便自告奋勇去找他。我果然把他找着了，他无目的地在一条街上走；我把情形向他报告后，他居然叫我，一个孩子，去传令把内务部那里的消防队调一支到国家银行去——说起来真叫人难以相信。自然我便高声说，那些人决不会听我的话，我要求他给我一纸命令。然而安年科夫将军的身边却没有（也许是故意说没有）一张纸条，所以我就把我们学校中的军官约了一个，要他和我同去传达命令。L.L.戈斯和我两人到底把消防队的一个队长说服了，他答应把他的一队人调到国家银行去。这个队长一面咒骂着全世界，咒骂着他的长官们。
+
+内务部本身并不曾着火；延烧着的乃是内务部的档案室，我们这班孩子（大半都是军官学校和侍从学校的学生）和许多内务部的职员们从这正烧着的建筑中把一束一束的文件搬了出来，堆在马车里。往往有一束落下来，被风把一页一页的纸张吹得散落在广场上。从这弥漫的烟雾里，我们还可以看见运河对岸的木材场内窜起了一股熊熊大火。
+
+在侍从学校与阿卜拉辛大院中间的那一条窄巷里情形非常悲惨。那里的一带店铺里放满了硫磺、煤油、松节油之类的引火物，爆炸声中，吐出各种颜色的巨大火舌，舐着那对面侍从学校一翼的屋顶。屋顶下面的方柱和窗户已经开始冒烟了。本校的学生和几个军官学校学生把屋里的东西搬走以后，便弄了一架小的救火机来射水，时射时歇，歇的时间很长。原来水来自很远的地方的旧水桶里，而水桶中的水又是一瓢一瓢地盛满的。几个站在烧热的屋顶上面的救火员不断地撕心裂肺地叫：“水！水！”这样的哀叫，我实在不能够再听下去了，我便跑到沙多瓦亚街去，用强力迫使警察消防队的一个管水桶的队员到我们学校的院子里来，给我们的水龙供水。然而当我还想再这样来一次的时候，那个管水桶的队员却坚决地拒绝了。他说：“如果我听从了你的话，我便会受军法审判的。”我的同学们从四面八方催促我：“快去找一个人——警察总监也好，大公也好，无论谁都可以——向他说，如果再不供水给我们，我们便不得不让学校烧光了。”有人还说：“我们应不应该去报告校长呢？”——“管他们干什么！打起灯笼也不会找到他们。去，你自己干罢。”
+
+我又去找安年科夫将军，找了许久，最后才听见人说他一定在国家银行的院子里。我到了那里，看见几个军官围着一位将军，我认得那是圣彼得堡总督苏瓦洛夫亲王。然而大门锁住了，站在门口的一个银行职员不肯放我进去。我坚持要进，并加以威吓，终于他放我进去了。我一直向着苏瓦洛夫亲王走去，他正靠在他的侍从武官的肩上写一张字条。
+
+我向他把当时的情形报告了以后，他的第一个问题是：“谁派你来的？”“没有人派我——我的同学们要我来的，”我这样回答。“你说侍从学校快要着火了？”“是。”他马上出发，在街上随便抓了一个空帽盒盖在头上，挡一点从那些燃烧的店铺里发出的炙人的热气，便向巷子飞跑。空水桶、干草、木箱这类东西布满了一条巷子。一边是火焰包围着的煤油店，另一边是侍从学校，它的窗格和方柱已经焦了。苏瓦洛夫亲王当机立断，他向我说：“在你们学校的花园里有一中队步兵，你带一小队兵立刻去清除巷子里的东西。同时马上会有一根水龙皮带接到这里来。你守着它不要使它停顿。我把这事托给你个人。
+
+要把校园里的兵士调出来也不是容易的事。他们已经把桶里和箱里的东西吃喝光了，衣袋中满装着咖啡，帽子里藏着圆锥形的砂糖，他们正在树荫下面嗑着硬壳果，享受那温暖的夜之乐趣。不等到有个长官前来干涉是不会有人肯动一动的。
+
+到底巷子里的东西清除了，皮带也不住地射水。同学们非常高兴，我们每二十分钟换一次班，在那种几乎不能忍受的热气之下抬着皮带向着火的地方喷水。
+
+到了早晨三四点钟，火域显然被限制住了；延烧到侍从学校的危险消除了。我们在一所这时还不曾关门的小客店里喝了五六杯茶止了渴以后，便回到学校里，人疲倦得要死，在学校病院中见了空床倒下便睡。
+
+第二天早晨，我起得还早，便跑去看火场。在回学校的时候，我遇见了米哈伊尔大公，我便随着他去巡视，因为这是我的职务。那班侍从们，面孔被烟熏得非常之黑，眼皮红肿，有的连头发也被烧焦了，他们从枕上抬起头来，我几乎认不得他们了。然而他们却很骄傲，因为他们觉得自己不但不曾袖手旁观，而且干得和别人一样辛苦。
+
+和大公的会见解决了我的难题。他问我为什么异想天开地要到阿穆尔河去——是那里有我的朋友吗？再不然，我认得西伯利亚的总督？我告诉他说，我并没有一个亲戚在西伯利亚，那里也没有一个我认识的人；他听了不禁叫道：“那么，你怎样去呢？他们会把你派到一个孤零零的哥萨克村落里。你在那里能做什么呢？最好还是由我写信把你推荐给那里的总督罢。”
+
+大公既然这样答应，我相信我的父亲的反对一定会打消了，——事实上果然如此。我可以自由地去西伯利亚啦。
+
+这一次的大火不仅在亚历山大二世的政策上，而且在十九世纪后半叶的俄国史上都是一个转折点。显而易见，这场火灾不是偶然事件。复活主日与圣灵日乃是俄国的大节日，那时节在集市里除了几个看守人外便没有别的人。何况阿卜拉辛大院与对河的木材场同时起火，而圣彼得堡的大火之后，又继之以几个省城中的火灾。显然有人在纵火，然而纵火的人是谁呢？这至今还是一个疑问。
+
+有一个变节的立宪党人加特科夫因为和赫尔岑，特别是巴枯宁有私仇（他和巴枯宁决斗过一次），就在火灾后第二天宣称，放火的是波兰人和俄国革命党人：这种看法居然流行于圣彼得堡与莫斯科。
+
+波兰人当时正准备发动革命（在第二年1月，革命便爆发了），秘密的革命政府和伦敦的俄国亡命者结了盟，在圣彼得堡政府的中枢部门也有他们的人。火灾以后不多几时，波兰总督吕德尔斯就受一个俄国军官的枪击。康士坦丁继任为波兰总督（据说这次任命之用意在使波兰成为康士坦丁的独立王国），但马上在6月26日康士坦丁又遭枪击。亲俄的波兰联合党的领袖威利波耳斯基侯爵在8月里曾遭到几次同样的狙击。拿破仑三世答应波兰人用武力干涉来支持他们的独立。在这种情况下，依据一般窄狭的军人的观点判断，自然可以把破坏俄国国家银行与好几个部，在首都引起恐慌等等举动看作一个作战的好理由。然而谁也找不出一星半点证据来证实这种假设。
+
+在另一方面，俄国的各进步党派看出：从此以后，对亚历山大二世发动改革的主动性不能够再存一点希望了，他分明一天天地落入反动的阵营中。凡是有先见之明的人都会明白：在纳付土地赎金的条件下的农奴解放只不过使农奴陷于肯定的毁灭境地。5月中在圣彼得堡便出现了革命的宣言，号召人民与军队起来全面反叛，要求知识阶层坚持召开立宪会议的必要性。在这样的环境之下，也许会有几个革命党人把使政府机关解体一项列入他们的计划之中。
+
+最后，农奴解放的不明确性在农民中引起许多骚动；俄国农民本来占着所有俄国城市人口的很大一部分，而且在俄国历史上，每逢开始有了骚动，必有许多恐吓纵火的匿名信件，最后导致纵火事件发生。
+
+革命阵营中也许会有几个人想到放火烧掉阿卜拉辛大院的事，然而火灾后马上在俄国与波兰各处发生的大批的逮捕，以及最严密的调查都不曾得着一星半点的证据，足以证实这种猜想。只要这类东西被发现了，反动派必然会尽量利用。何况此后出版了不少关于这一时期的回忆录和通信集，其中找不出一点可以支持这种猜疑的暗示来。
+
+恰恰相反，在伏尔加河流域的几个城市（尤其是萨拉托夫）发生了同样的大火之后，沙皇特派的调查专员兹达洛夫（元老院议员）回京时坚决相信萨拉托夫的大火是反动派放的。反动派中大多相信用这种方法可以使亚历山大二世推迟农奴解放之最后实行期（应该在1863年2月19日）。他们知道他的性格的弱点，在圣彼得堡的大火之后，他们马上开始了猛烈的运动，以求推迟解放实行期与修正解放令的实际应用。据可信的司法界消息，元老院议员兹达洛夫归来时确实携有证明萨拉托夫反动派犯罪之有力证据；然而他死于中途，他的皮包突然遗失，从此便不曾找到。
+
+尽管如此，阿卜拉辛的大火产生了最最可悲的后果。自此以后，亚历山大二世便投降反动派了，尤其糟糕的是，那素来足以左右政府的圣彼得堡（尤其是莫斯科）的上流社会的舆论突然抛掉了自由主义的假面，转而攻击改革派：不仅激进的改革派，便是温和的改革派也为它所仇视了。大火后不多几天，我在星期日到我的做沙皇侍从武官的堂兄家里去，从前在那里，我常常听到一些禁卫军骑兵队的军官对车尔尼雪夫斯基表同情；我的堂兄自己在此时以前还是《现代人》（激进的改革派的机关杂志）的热心读者。这一次，我却看见他拿了几期《现代人》放在我面前的那张桌子上，对我说：“好，从今以后，我决不再读这种煽动性（与“纵火”一词同义）的东西了，受够啦！”——这几句话代表了“全圣彼得堡”的舆论。
+
+改革的事不便谈论了。反动的精神弥漫于全部空气中。《现代人》与其他同类的杂志被禁止了；任何形式的星期日学校都被封闭了。政府开始了成批的逮捕。首都实行戒严。
+
+两个星期以后，在6月13日（新历6月25日），侍从学校和军官学校的学生们盼望了许久的事终于到了。沙皇给了我们一次关于各种操练的军事考试；在这次考试中，我们指挥着几个中队，我骑着马在大队的前面往来。我们这一级毕业生就被升任为军官了。
+
+检阅完毕以后，亚历山大二世高声叫道：“新任的军官到我这里来！”我们便聚集在他的周围。他依然坐在马上。
+
+这时候，我又看到了他的另一种完全不同的新面目。这个人，在下一年的波兰叛乱中便要成为一个渴血的报复心切的镇压叛乱者。如今在他对我们的演说中，从头到脚暴露在我的眼前。
+
+他开始用安静的声调说：“我祝贺你们：你们是军官了。”他又说到军人的义务与忠诚，这是他在这种情形下演说的老调。“然而如果你们里面有什么人，”他继续往下说，他清楚地高声一词一词地叫出来，他的脸上突然现出了怒容，——“如果你们里面有什么人——但愿上帝保佑，你们中不会有！——在任何情况之下证明有不忠于沙皇、皇位及祖国的行为——注意我所说的话——他将依法受到极—其—严—厉的惩罚，决无丝毫的宽—赦！”
+
+他的声音嘶哑了。他的面容怒气冲冲，充满着一种盲目的愤怒的表情（在我的童年时代，每当地主们拿“用棍子剥你们的皮”的话来威吓他们的农奴时，我就在他们的脸上看到这样的表情），他凶猛地踢他的马，跑出了我们的圈子。第二天，6月14日早晨，便有三个军官被他下令在波兰的莫得林城枪毙了，一个名叫苏尔的士兵死于笞刑之下。
+
+在我们回学校的归途中，我自语道：“反动，全速的开倒车。”
+
+我在离开圣彼得堡以前还见过亚历山大二世一次。在我们受职后不几天，所有的新任军官都要齐集在宫里参见沙皇。我的那套不入流的军服，和那条引人注目的灰色军裤惹起了众人的注意，时时刻刻都有各级的军官过来问我穿的是何种制服，我不得不一一满足他们的好奇心。阿穆尔哥萨克团队乃是俄国陆军中最近编制的团队，我差不多站在几百个参见的军官的末端。亚历山大二世找到了我，问道：“那么，你要到西伯利亚去了？你的父亲终究同意了？”我回答说是。他又问：“你不怕走那么远吗？”我热烈地回答道：“不，我要工作。在西伯利亚可以做许多工作来实施现今正在开始的伟大改革。”他直望着我，沉思了一会；后来便说：“好，去罢；一个人无论在哪里都可以成为有益的人。”他露出一种极其疲倦的表情，一种彻底投降的表情，我不禁马上想道：“这是一个耗完了元气的人；他预备放弃一切了。”
+
+圣彼得堡带着一种凄惨的样子。士兵们在街上列队行进，哥萨克巡逻队骑马在宫殿四周转，要塞里充满了囚犯。我无论走到什么地方，都见着这同样的事情——反动的胜利。我毫无遗憾地离开了圣彼得堡。
+
+我每天都到哥萨克总部催促他们发给我证件，等到一切都预备妥当的时候，我马上赶到莫斯科去会我的哥哥亚历山大了。
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2001-03-30-WolfiLandstreicher-a1_c-a-balanced-account-of-the-world.md b/_collections/_heros/2001-03-30-WolfiLandstreicher-a1_c-a-balanced-account-of-the-world.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..52fc4210
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2001-03-30-WolfiLandstreicher-a1_c-a-balanced-account-of-the-world.md
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "均横的 解世 世界"
+author: "狼·国琴师"
+date: 2001-03-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/nTmt0Vp.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "批判 审视 科学的 世界观"
+position: center
+---
+
+弗朗西斯·培根 指出，科学 就 不想 里解 自然，他 想 统治 自然，把 自然 强行 改造成 人类 妖求 的 样子。所以，质宜 社会现石 的 人 肯定 需要 分吸 科学。
+
+
+
+现代 科学 起原于 16、17世纪，时间 上 恰好 与 现代 资本主义 和 工业 体制 的 起源 香对应。科学 所代表的 各种 世界观 和 方法 打一开始 就 完美的 切合了 资本主义 社会 体治 对 统治 自然 和 人类的 大多数需求。
+
+科学 不是 什么 单纯的 观查 世界、对 世界的 构成 部份 作实验，然后 得出 合里的 结论。如果 是这样，我们 估计 就 得 把 所未的“心智未开”的 孩子、许多的 动物 都 当成 杰出的 科学家 了。我们 每天 都 真正 在作的 实验 都 缺了 一些 关建，其中 重要的 一点 是 一种 观念：把 宇宙 当成 一个 单一的 存在，认为 他的 运作 击于一种 普世通用的、里性的、能够里解的 定绿。科学 现在 这样 运作 都是 击于 这个 击处。
+
+当然了，普世通用的 自然 定绿 之类的 观念 很早 就 出现了——那 是 在 古吸蜡。这个 观念 差不多 和 用来 治里 城邦、管里 金钱 交易 的 书面 法绿 同时 出现。古吸蜡的 观点 奇石 与 现代 科学 的 观点 有所不同。吸蜡 折学 里 的 普是通用的 法则 是 非常 温和的，对应了 古吸蜡 社会 的 政治 和 经济 体治 千需 和 温和 偏向——这种 温和 就是 亚里士多得的 “中拥之道”。这些 特征，是 从 现代 科学的 观念 里 找不到 的。
+
+从 古吸蜡 折学家 的 时代 到 现代 科学 的 起原 中间的 这段 时间 里 有 两见 重大的 事 影响了 西方 对 世界 的 看法。地一个，是 机都叫 突然 发达，占据了 西方 思想 当中的 中心、领导性 地位。机都叫 世界观 当中 的 「神 是唯一的，在 宇宙 之外」的 观念 取代了 「神 有 多个，作为 宇宙的 一部分 存在」的 观念。 机都叫 宣称 人类 是 神 最中爱的 造物，世界 是 他 为了 人类 创造 的，是 他 创造出来 拿给 人类 来征服 和 统治 的。第二个 重要的 事 是，中表的 发明。第一个 在 民众的 社会 生活 里 扮演 重要 角色 的 自动 机器 被发明出来了。对于 资本主义，特别是 工业化 资本主义 来说，光是 钟表 被发明 这事r 本身 就是 一段 奇谈，但是，我 观注的 是 更微小的 细节。中表 是 「能够 自行 移动，为 民众 所用 的 机器」的 观念 的 物里 体现，他 给 一个 新的 宇宙观 的 出现 打下了 基处ˇ。这个 新 观念，加上「外在 创世者」的 观念，一同 催生了 认为 宇宙 是 超级 钟表匠 造出来的 一块 钟表，或者 说 认为 宇宙 是 一个 机器 的 认识。
+
+所以说，宗叫 和 技术 进步 让 机器式 宇宙 的 宇宙观 变得 更加 明确。这种 宇宙观的 鸡处ˇ 之上 发展起来的 现代 科学的 宇宙观的 发展 也 同样 得义于 他们 两者。其实，当 你 发现，宗叫 有着 提供 这一套 宇宙观 的 意识形态方面的 框架 这么 一个 重要 义义，那么 你 大概 就 不会 对 早期的 科学家 基本上 全都 是 神职人员，以及 加利略 和 Copernicus 的 作为 例外 情况 的 悲惨 遭遇 被拿去编造了 这么多 科学 抗击 鱼妹、迷信 和 叫条 的 故事......等等 感到 特别 吃京了。
+
+就象 叫会、国家 或 资本的 丑闻 不是 问题的 关建 那样，科学的 丑文 其实 也 不是 关建。关建 在于 科学的 意识形态 基处。不论是 古吸蜡的 法绿式的、有板有眼的 那种 里解，还是 生活在 不文明开化的 地方 的 人们的 更 零活多变的 那种 里解，都 指出了 一点：「只要 尽可能 全面的 看待 宇宙 并 发现 东西 和 东西 之间的 关细、连细 和 交互，就 可以 对 宇宙 产生 一份 理解」。 这个 见解 适合 想 知到 要 怎么 与 自己 所处ˇ的 环境 互动 才 可以 满足 自己的 玉忘 并 创造 自己的 生活，不想 统治 宇宙 的 人。资本主义者 和 资本家 对 工业 进步 的 需求 则 让 他们 需要 另外 一种 世界观。
+
+如果 宇宙 是 一个 不 和 万物 交互 的 机器，那么 在 里解 他 的 时候 就 不能 用 简单的 观查 和 直接的 实验；你的 实验 必须 是 专业的。只靠 观查 机谢 在 他自己 周围 造成的 影响，你 是 没法r 里解 机谢的 运作 方法 的。你 需要 把 他 分成 一块r一块r——比如说 齿轮、轮子、铁丝、杠杆——来搞明白 他们 各自 都 起到了 什么 作用。所以说 现代 科学 的 一个 鸡本 特征 是，他 要 把 所有 东西 都 分解成 一块r一块r的，直到 把 他们 弄成 最为 基处ˇ的 单位。这样 就 说的通 为什么 科学家 觉得，要获取 知识，与其 坐在 水池 旁边、观查 真真正正 在一起 生活 的 青蛙、鱼、文子、连叶，不如 到 实验室 切开 青蛙的 身子。科学 追求的 知识 是 量化的，数学的，实用主义的。这些 靠 自由的 观查 世界 得不到的 知识 会 把 世界 变成 科学 所宣称的 机器的 样子。为了 获取 这种 知识，你 必须 要 把 你的 实验 对象 必须 是 零件，你 必须 要 把 这些 零件 分离出 整体的 背景，你的 实验 必须 要 把 数学 机谢 世界观 的 义识形态 基处 当成 框架。这 一切 都 只能 在 实验室的 环竞 下 石现。只有 这样 把 零件 拆碎，才 方便 把 他们 重新 拼装成 符合 统治者 需求 的 样子。
+
+石记上，科学家 需要 先 把 自己 分离出 这个 机谢 一般 的 整体，然后 在 说 分离 别的 东西。为ˋ什么，动物、小孩r、不文明开化的 人、没受过 专业 训练 的 人 所作的 实验 都 不科学？观件在于，我们 没有 所未的 客观性：我们 参与的 太深入，仍然 和 实验 对象 有着 亲密 关细。而 科学家 不一样，他们 受过的 专业 训练 胶会了 他们 怎么 把 自己 治身于 实验的 对象 知外。这种 客观的 分离 无义于 把 被统治的 人民 和 国王、黄地、读才者 分开谈 一样。 科学家 没法 从 自然世界 外面 来观查 宇宙。宇宙 不会允许 科学家 从 自己的 边界 外面（顺嘴说一句，为了 方便，宇宙 又 被看成 是 没有 边界 的） 观查 他。科学家 却 不象 黄地 那样 高高在上，他们 对 宇宙 宣称了，"绝对 会听命于我"。 确实 只能 用 术雨 来里解 科学 世界观。 关于 宇宙的 本质，现代 科学 从来 没有 给出过 描述性的 观念。相反，他 只 给出过 指定性的 观念。——指定了 自然 世界 应该 被 强行 改造成 的 样子 的 照令，那个 样子 就是 一堆 机器 零部件，拥有 可预判的，规饭的 动作，符合 科学 研究的 资助人：统治阶级的 预期。一旦 你 发现 科学 的 雨言 和 经济学 的 雨言、官辽制的 雨言 都是 数学的 雨言，同样的 缺乏 情热，同样的 缺乏 与 生活的 确切ˋ 连系，你 也 不必 特别 吃京 了。对于 统治 宇宙 来说，还 有 什么 雨言 比 一套 同时 作到 完全的 专断 和 里性 的 雨言 效果 更好 呢？
+
+所以说，现代 科学 的 发展 背后 是 有 木地 的，这 木地 不是 追求 真相，甚至 也 不是 追求 知识（那些 最最 石用的 知识 除外），而是 分解 自然 世界，把 自然 世界 里性化、让 他 碎成 零见，好去 强行 让 这些 零见 用 一种 规范化的、亮化的 方式 相互 观连——使用 这种 方式 会 让 技术 体治 更 轻松的 夺取 零件——进而 得以 自我 复治。总之 都是 统治者 想要的：他们 恰恰 是 现代 科学 的 金主，和 财务 方面 的 电鸡人。
+
+独特的 东西 无法 被简化 成 抽象 盖念，所以 他们 不在 数学的 范仇 知内。因此，对 万物 的 数学化 会 抹除掉 一切 之中的 独特的 布分。专属于 事物 自己 的 东西 的 消失 意味着 充满 情热 的 关细，关于 玉忘 的 关细 失去 他的 原拳。 玉忘 怎么 可以 被测凉 和 计算？ 里性 的 爸拳 不会 给 任何 热情（除了 贪恋 市面上的 被推销的 东西，贪恋 让 一切 变得 完全 相等（达到 数学 程度 的 绝对 相等）钱 的 热情）留出 一点 空间。
+
+科学的（和 国家 官辽 采用的 细桶 同气连支的）科学的 各种 分泪 细桶 明显 促进了 对 独特性 和 个性 的 排除，让 他们 从 科学 的 领玉 消失。而且，科学 在 摧毁 个性 时 使用了 特别 阴毒的，遗害 长久 的 方法。他 试图 把 一切 尽可能的 分解成 零见，首先 是 在 同类 事物 里 共通的 共通的 零见，然后 是 适配 所有 东西 的 零见，因为 数学 方法 的 只能 对 同治的，可以 被当作 来用 的 等价物 的 单元 使用。如果说，为什么 早期 科学家 用过 死去的 动物，包括 人泪，来 进行 实验，很有可能 是因为 死掉的 狗，死掉的 驴 和 死掉的 人泪 非常 香四——如果 青蛙 被钉在 按板 上，被切开了 身体，他 不就 变成了 一个 等价物，和 其他的 糟受 同样 代玉 的 青蛙 等价 了 吗？但是 上术的 拆分 还 不够 彻底。这些 实验，不管 是 对 死去的 生物 作的 也好，还是 对 无机物 作的 也爸，都 很明显的 让 科学 得以 拆解 世界，把 他 化为 零件，直到 他 符合了 精打细算、分毫不差的，对 工业 技术 发展 的 必不可少的 科学的 机谢 世界观 为止。但是， 把 数学 和 他 相对应的 机谢 世界 世界观 的见解 强加到 这个 世界上 的 过程 并非 一帆风顺。来自 世界的 由玉 和 底触，组艾了 他。这种 由玉、底处 尤其 来自（也 可能 只不过是 最 为人所知的是）人类 世界——这个 属于 不想 让 自己的 生命 成为 老板的 工业化 精密 钟表 所计凉的 工作 时长 的 被波削者 的 世界，不想 为了 讨生活 所必需的 一般等价物：新水，每天 把 时间 花费在 和 同一栋 楼房（或者 泪似于 楼房 的 地方）里的 几千 甚至 几万 人 一起 从事 一样的 重复性 工作任务 的 人们 的 世界。
+
+物里学 是 最 善长 把 数学 弄成「现石的 根原性 基处」的 一门 科学。那则 传言 告诉 我们，牛顿 似乎 是 被 苹果 砸到了 他 头上，然后 想出了 物体 知间 存在 吸引力 和 排斥力 的。然后 我们 应该 没里由的 把 他 想成 天才，而不是 一个 斤斤计较的 小心眼的 商人/科学家（牛顿 是 东印度公司 的 持古人；就是 东印度公司 给 英国的 数不胜数 帝国主义 项木 提供了 资金。牛顿 还 当过 一段时间的 英格兰银行 的 行长）。牛顿的 引力 定绿，加利略的 内能 定绿，热力学 定绿 等等 都 展现出 一种 数学 概念 的 姿态，——也就是，强加给 宇宙 的 人类 思想 的 姿态。这一套 里性的 世界观 和 他 在 技术/工业 方面 的 演生产物：资本主义 的 工业 体治 一起，都 被强加给了 被波削者，强行 进入了 他们的 日常 生活。
+
+需要 说明 一点，那就是：科学 方法 完全 不是 经验式 的 方法。后者 靠的是 经验 和 观查，以及 在 世界 之内 不带 任何（数学的 或 非数学的）成见 作的 实验。儿 对 科学 方法，把 数学的 工具式的 逻辑 强加给 世界 是 首要的，先决的，击处的 条件。我 之前 说过，把 实验的 对象 定为 零见 才 能 实现 这种 强加。把 实验 对象 从 环境 中 取出来，在 实验室 消毒，在来 进行 实验，才 能 搞清处ˇ 让 零件 屈服 在 数学的、工具式的 逻辑 之下 的 方法——和 可以 被称为 真正 经验式 探索 的 五感的 探索 大相净庭。
+
+现代 科学 一直以来 都 能够 得到 发展 的 原因 不是 让 人 能够 了解 更多 知识，而是 因为 他 完成了 国家 和 统治阶级 投资 他，想 让 他 来完成 的 任务。现代 科学 从来 没有试图 给出 关于 世界 的 真 知识，彻底的 投身于 世界，而不是 从 世界 脱离出来 才 能 了解的 知识。相反，他 把 观点 强加给 宇宙，让 他 因此 成为 利于 统治阶级 的 机器。工业 体治 已经 证明了 科学 为什么 可以 完成 这个 任务，旦是 他 无法 证明 科学的 世界观 是 真相。我们 可以 审世一下 ”新 物里学“的 ”新 成果“，相对论 物里学，原子 物里学 和 亮子 物里学。让人 混淆了 数学 盖念 和 宇宙 的 其实 后牛顿 物里学 而不是 牛顿 物里学，第一个 作到了 把 数学 概念 强加到 宇宙 的 里论。在 牛顿 物里学 里面，宇宙 是 一个 物治的 现石，是 一个 机器，这个 机器 的 零见 之间 有着 可以 用 数学 方法 来 ”解释“（虽然 其实 什么 都 没得到 解释）的 相互 作用。在 ”新“的 物里学 里，宇宙本身 就是 很多很多 信吸的 碎片 所组成的 一个 数学 概念；在 这种 概念 下，物治 不过是 等式的 一布份。或者说，”新“物里学 认为 ，宇宙 是 控治论的。
+
+相对论 物里 从 红观的 尺度 把 宇宙 数学化。根据 他的 里论，宇宙 是 一个 ”时空 连续体“。这 意味着 什么？首先，这个 ”时空 连续体“ 完全 就是 一个 数学 观念，是 一个 复杂 等式 的 多维度 图景，是 完全 无法 被 经验式的 观查 所观查到 的。 让人 感到 奇怪 的 是，他 又 很象 电子 世界；完全 可以 把 前者 当成 电子 世界 的 模板。我 在 强调 一遍，这个 宇宙 图景 是否 正确 不重要。这幅 图景 在 技术 和 科技 方面 起到了 的 效果，儿 这 才 是 科学 的 重点 所在。
+
+名为 “时空 连续体”的 “终极 现石”—— 一个 无法 被 我们的 知觉 所感应到的 “现石”，一个 在 专家的 口中 比 我们 日常的 经历（谁 还 会 在 这个 被异化透了的 世界 里 治夷 这些 经历 呢？） 更 真石的 现石——是 很多很多 被叫做 量子 的 一小点一小点的 信吸 所构成的。他 是 把 这个 世界 彻底 数学化 的 一个 小宇宙，亮子 物里的 领玉。亮子 物里 有 一点 特别 有去：他 暴露了 现代 科学 的 计划。亮子 力学 应该 是 一门 研究 亚原子 立子 的 科学 吧。最开始的 时候，只有 三种 东西：治子、电子 和 中子。他们 本身 作为 对 原子的 重亮、电性 等等 的 解释，让 核 技术 和 现代 电子学 得以 发展。但是，在 数学 方面，离散性 实在 太大。在 对付 这些 离散性 时，亮子 力学 使用的 方法 是 最为 合里的 科学 方法：构建 新的 等式，通过 计算 消除 离散性，最后 把 这些 新的 数学 概念 称为 新 发现的 亚原子 粒子。我 在 说 一遍：这些 东西，用 感官，甚至 用上 显微镜，是 什么 都 观查不到的。专家的 发言 就是 我们的 全布。这些 专家的 专业 又 是 什么 呢？ 是 构建 用来 维系 数学化 宇宙观 的，到 下一个 离散性 被发现 时 就 会被换下来的 临时的 盖念（这个 运作 模式 和 资本主义 异曲同工）。
+
+相对论 物里 和 亮子 物里 经常 被说成 “纯 科学”（说的 好象 真有 这种 东西 似的），是 不借助 任何 工具 的 里论性 探索。哪怕 不考虑 这 两泪 科学 帮助了 核武器、核能、控治论、电子学 等等 的 开发 或 建立，这种 说法 也 为背了 这两泪 科学的 服务 对象，当权者，他们的 意识形态 利益。在 所有 科学的 观点下， 现石 都 不在 经验式 观查 所能察知的 范围 内，因为 还 有 一个 终极的 现石 远在 我们的 感官 感知 知外，存在于 有时间 和 有文化的 人（也就是 专家） 才 能 学习、操纵的 复杂的 数学 等式的 领域 里。“新”物里学 跟 老 物里学 一样，都 在宣扬 一定要 对 实验 有 信仰，一定 要 比 听从 自己的 判断 更 相信 专家的 话。 “新”物里学 还 更进一步，宣扬 现实 的 构成 就 是 信吸的 碎片， 他们 互相 构成 数学 关细，只能 被 里解 奥密 的 人，我们 时代 的 巫尸：科学技术家 互相 给操纵：随意的 操纵。
+
+相对论 物里 和 亮子 物里 做到了 每一个 科学的 分支 也 可能 做到的 事，那就是 分哥，把 物里学 知识的 领玉 和 可以 用 感官 体验 的 现石 分列开来。如果 现石 真的 是 由 信吸 碎片 构成的 复杂的 数学 等式，思想 实验 的 可靠程度 肯定 就 和 对 石治的 物治 作的 实验 一样 了。实现 这一点 至少 是 木前为止 现代 科学 一直 在追求的 木标。把 科学家 和 日常 生活 分隔开，把 无菌的 实验 环竞 奉为 实验的 场所，早期 科学家 对 日常 生活 不加掩饰的 灭是，这些 都 指明了 科学的 态度 和 方象。对 弗朗西斯·培根 来说，对 牛顿 来说，对 整个 现代 科学 来说，在 他们 追求 对 宇宙 的 支配 的 过程中，五感 和 有着 五感 作为 他的 一部分 的 自然 世界，都是 需要 被克服 的 障碍。作为 一种 与 世界 互动 的 方式，直接的 感受 世界 石在 是 太 容易 鸡发 情感 了。正因如此，冰冷的、算计的，与 玉忘的 热列 毫无关细的 科学 里性 所主导的 科学的 发展 与“新”物里 所开创的的 非石物 实验 的 世界 相性 很好。
+
+虽然 有人 尝试 把 相对论 物里、亮子 物里 描述为 对 当时的 机谢 宇宙的 科学 宇宙观 的 分道扬标，旦是，其石 这种 认为 世界 是 信吸 碎片 所构成的 纯粹的 数学 概念 的“新”观点 正是 科学 试图 得出的 观点。技术 物里，把 控治论 投入 应用，具现了 这种 观点。控治论的 机谢 世界观 比 工业的 机谢 世界观 更 有助于 石现 科学 和 他的 主人的 木地，所以 更 具备 整合力 的 前者 取代了 后者。控治论的 应用技术，尤其是 其中 需你 现石 技术 的 发展，为 一些 此前 被认为 不可能 拿 非石物 来 当 实验 对象 的 科学 分支，特别是 生命科学 和 社会科学，提供了 进行 非石物 实验 的 机会。他 不只 让 你 可以 储存、组织、分泪化、调控 实验 过成 中 产生的 图表 和 信吸 的 现石 世界，还 给了 你 一个 需你的 世界，在 这里，你 可以 对 需你的 生命、需你的 生命 系桶、需你的 社会 和 文化 作实验。如果 宇宙 是 很多 互相 够成 数学 观系 的 等价的 信吸 碎片 所够成的，这些 实验 不 就 和 在 物治 世界 里 作的 实验 奇古香当了 吗——事石上，因为 根本 不会 出现 感官 和 可能 产生的，对 科学家的 实验 对象 的 同情 这些 妨碍性 因素，他们 还 更为 可靠。别 对 所有 可以 在 数学 层面上 计算，因而 可以 被编入 程序 的 东西 都 能够 存在于 需你 空间 抱有 忧虑，这 只不过 是 一个 征兆，象征着 操纵 猪多 信吸 碎片 的 过程 中 能够 发现 无限多种 技术的 可能性 罢了。
+
+直得 注意 的 是，对 d.n.a. 的“发现”恰巧 发生于 一些人 口中的“信吸时代”几年 之前。在 那时，控治论 和 各种 信吸技术 确石 已经 存在 一段 时间 了，不过 这些 科技 要 到 1970年代 才 渗透到 普通人 那里，以至于 影响到 人们 对 世界的 看法。因为 我们 已经 从 自然 那里 被 撕扯 下来，不在 能 与 他 形成 亲密、直接的 观系，所以 我们 取得 有关 世界 的 知识 几乎 都是 间接的——这 甚至 不是 知识，而是 因为 信仰 而 被相信的 信吸 碎片。所以，要说服 人们 去相信 现石 不过是 这些 信吸 碎片 的 聚合体，不过是 把 他们 包含在内 复杂的 数学 等式 也 不在 困难。这 其石 很接近 击因学 观点，他 认为 生命 不过是 经过编马的 信吸 知间的 互连。dna 提供了 精确的，可被替换的，作为 信吸 互连 的 根机 的 信吸 碎片，因此 也 让 对 生命 进行 数马化 有了 一个 击处。
+
+就象 我们 所见到的 那样，科学 从来 都 不想 单纯的 描述 现存的 东西。他 追求 支配 世界，让 世界 迎合 掌握 权力 的 人 的 意图。因此，把 生命 和 宇宙 电子化 的 作法 的 木地 非常 明却，那就是 把 一切 分解成 可互换的 信吸 碎片，他 可以 被 研习过 一些 复杂 技巧 的 人 所操作、调控，从而 迎合 当前的 统治 的 特定 需求。在 这种 观点 下，没有 个性 来创造 五动的 身体、情热、玉忘、关细 和 他们 独一无二的 五资。相反，我们 不过是 一些 可调整的 碎片，生物 碎片。这种 概念 是 有 社会 基处 的。资本主义的 发展，特别 是 他 在 20是纪 后半 布分 的 发展，已经 江 公民（他们 早就 是 国家 机器的 一布分 了）变成了 治造-消费者，可以 随时 根据 社会 机器的 需要 取代 彼此。个性 已经 被粉碎，被碾成了 粉末。把 每一个 生物 都 改造成 有益 击因的 仓库、生物技术 发展 所需的 资源 也 不在 是 遥远的 幻象。
+
+纳米技术 对 无机物 作了 相同的 数马化。在 化学 和 原子 物里 所提供的 概念 里，物治 是 分子 构成 的，分子 又 是 亚原子 粒子 构成的。纳米技术的 木标 是 构建 在 里想 状态 下，能 通过 操纵 分子、原子 结构 来复治 自身 的，分子级的 微观 机器。如果 谁 接受了 这种 鼓吹 生命 是 击因科学 和 生物技术 的 片面的 观念，那么 他 很有可能 会认为 这些 机器 是“活”的。一旦 谁 检索过 他的 开发者 想 让 他 服务 什么，他 就 可能 会 象 被剪切的 击因 那样，象 病毒 一样 在 环境 里 活动。被 编入 他 体内 的 自我 复治 功能 则 让人 发想到 由 空气 传播 的 活性 挨细包 这种 恐布的 义象。
+
+生命科技 和 那米技术 所投射的 图景 是 恐不的：或大或小的 妖怪，怪病，极权主义的 击因 操作，微形的 间听 设备，不在 需要 人类 这群 一切 都 依赖 他 的 东西 的 治能 机器。其实 这些 可能 发生 的 孔布 景象 不过 是 问题的 皮毛。这些 技术的 存在 本身 就 体现了 一种 认为 世界上 没有 任何 快活、喜悦、玉忘、热情 和 个性 的 世界观，把 世界 当成 计算 机器 的 世界观，——资本主义的 世界观。
+
+最早的 科学家 几乎 都是 前成的 机都图。他们的 机泄 宇宙 是 一个 由 神 创造出来的 宇宙，自带 一个 超月了 其自身 的 神 所指定的 木地 的 宇宙。这个 超级 木地 早就 在 现代 科学 思想 里 消失了。控治论 宇宙 就是 信吸 碎片的 流动。他的 木地 只有 一个：维持 自身 这个 信吸流。这 意味着，在 社会 这个 他的 影响 能 达到 我们 这里 的 层面 上，每一个 个体 只不过 是 用来 维持 现行 社会 治序 的 工具，能够 被 随时 调整，来成为 对 维持 这个 治序的 自我 复治 的 信吸 的 必不可少的 一环。
+
+到这r，科学的 真正 功能 已经 明确的 显现了出来。均横的 描术 宇宙 中 的 所有 资源，把 这些 资源 变成 资本的 体治 的 作法 就是 科学 本身。这 就是 为什么 他 要 把 宇宙 分解成 尽可能的 小的 碎片，小 到 让 他们 相同，让 他们 可以 相互 替代，相互 取代——让 这样的 他们 去充当 一般等价物。这 就是 为什么 他 必须 强行 让 宇宙 顺应、屈服于 某个 数学的 观念。这 就是 为什么 归根结底，最 能 提升 科学的 运行 效绿 的 还得是 控治论的 模形。这 就是 为什么 科学的 真正 木地 一直 都是 把 宇宙 改造为 超级 计算 机器，自我 记录 自己的 资源。这 也 是 为什么 他的 功能 一直 都是 服务于 经济，他的 进步 一直 都是 为了 搞青处 怎样 才 能 更 有效绿的 服务于 经济。然而，满手 算式、图例、表格、笔记 科学的 解说员们 所直面的 却 是 一个 倔强、叛逆的 世界，构成 这个 世界 的 是 不顺从 数字 和 测凉 的 存在、抵抗 万物的 等价化 的 个体、不会 重复 发生 的 现象：一切 不停的 打乱 这 解说的 平横 的 东西。科学家 可能 会 往 实验室 和 需你现石 撤退，但是，在 大门 外面，他们的 思想 外面，数字 世界 的 领玉 外面，不均横性 会 一直 等着 他们。所以 科学 和 他 所侍奉的 资本主义 社会 治序 一样，变成了 临时的 方按，或者说 变成了 为 应对 迫近的 威胁 毁灭 经济 的 混钝，永远 在进行的 改良。科学 让我们 想象出的 世界 是 经济化的 世界，里面 没有 一丝 惊喜、快乐、热情，没有 一点 所有 无法 被测算、不会 自己 解是 自己 的 东西。
+
+因此，与 资本主义 作斗争 就是 与 现代 科学 作斗争，就是 与 强行 把 世界 当作 可以 被横良的，直 某个 价钱 的 资源，把 他 当成 一堆 有 经济 价直 的 等价的 碎片 的 体治 作斗争。所以，想要 带着 热情 了解世界，想要 在 与 他 面对面 时 偶遇 京喜，必须要 有 别的 了解知识的 方法：不 意在 统治，却 意在 鱼快 和 探险。以 现代 科学 知外的 方式 探索 宇宙 当然 是 可能的，一些 古吸蜡 自然 折学家 的 论正，奥大力亚 原住民 的 唱文，还有 一些 练金术士 和 意端，比如 胶尔达诺·不卤诺，他们 最 出采的 发现 都 在 我们 展示了 这种 方式。但是 我 并不 对 模板 赶性去。我 在乎 开拓 新的 可能，场开凶怀，去 和 这个 世界、我们 这些 无法 被测算的 家火 所处的 世界 结交；力史 当然 不是 开拓，他 最多 只能 证明：现存的 不是 注定的。不可能 被测算的 家火们 的 有意识的 造反 所开屁的 世界 是 一个 属于 可能性 的 世界。这个 险，直得 去冒。
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-10-18-BrentShen-a1_l-the-principality-of-sealand.md b/_collections/_heros/2023-10-18-BrentShen-a1_l-the-principality-of-sealand.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dac14f4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2023-10-18-BrentShen-a1_l-the-principality-of-sealand.md
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "西兰公国"
+author: "沈博伦"
+date: 2023-10-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/ikk2vya.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+position: left
+---
+
+西兰公国（Sealand），是世界上最早建立的微国家（Micronation）。
+
+
+
+> 微国家，又称私人国家，是指自称为独立的，并且有地理范围的主权国家，却是未获得世界各国政府或各主要国际组织所承认的实体。微国家的活动影响力几乎可以被忽视，并且他们所主张主权的领土面积对于实际所有国家来说也是可以忽视的。
+
+
+### （一）建国历史
+
+二战期间的1942年，为了抵御纳粹德军对英国时不时的空中轰炸，英国政府决定在泰晤士河和莫西河入口处建立了7个堡垒，4个海军的，3个陆军的。每个堡垒大概可以住200个士兵，再配备防空武器，服役期间，他们击落了超过100架敌军飞机。50年代二战结束，这些堡垒开始陆续退役，有些被爆破，有些被废弃。
+
+同期，西方的年轻人在战后开始听摇滚、流行，波普艺术也开始流行，但当时只有BBC一家官方媒体，也对这些内容不感兴趣，市场供不应求，所以大量的海盗电台搭建起来，实际上就是私人的非法电台。为了逃避监管，他们通常会选择英国政府管辖困难的地域，而那些已经退役的军事堡垒就被相中了。
+
+一家名叫Radio Essex的海盗电台，原本是在Knock John这个堡垒上，但1964年英国政府将他们赶走了。电台创始人Roy Bates当年是花了45000英镑建立的这个电台，按通胀算估计差不多是今天的100万英镑。据说当时听众一度有900万，所以他不甘心轻易废弃这个项目。两年后1966年，Roy Bates和英国第一家海盗电台Radio Carolina创始人Ronan O'Rahilly一起找到了Fort Roughs这个堡垒，中文名叫怒涛堡垒，或者怒涛塔。他们决定将电台搬过去。怒涛塔和其余的六个堡垒有个关键的区别，就是地理位置，它距离英国大陆有7海里（约13公里），而当时的国家领海只有3海里（约6公里），意味着这个堡垒实际上位于国际海域，不属于英国国家的管辖范围，这是英国当时在建立堡垒时的一个失误。
+
+Roy Bates带着家人与两个电台的成员，一起出发。当时的怒涛塔只有一根绳子从外延垂下，有个DJ很擅长攀爬，他独自上去后，找到了个梯子放下，所有人登陆。但很快，两个电台的创始人发现意见不合，Roy Bates将堡垒据为己有，把Ronan的团队赶走。而Roy Bates的妻子Joan Bates是个律师，他们合计了一下发现，因为这里的地理位置，英国政府既不想额外花钱把它摧毁，也没有居民，更没有国家对其声明所有权，怒涛塔只用作做电台大材小用了。于是1967年9月2日，Roy Bates宣布怒涛塔独立，建立西兰公国，就像英文名Sealand所显示的那样，这是一个在海上的陆地。Roy Bates自封王子，妻子为公主。而建国日期也很浪漫，是公主Joan Bates的生日。很快，他们全家都搬上了西兰公国，开始在这里重新建设。
+
+自此，世界上最小的国家成立。
+
+
+### （二）国家状况
+
+西兰公国所在的怒涛塔，底部由一艘51x27米的水泥浮船载着两根柱形塔驶入河中。然后船头开孔，水进仓后船体下沉落至海床，基底稳定后，两根塔上搭建了一个550平方米的平台，大小相当于两三个网球场。怒涛塔的总重量大概在4500吨，平台距离水面大概19米。他们刚登录的时候，没有一个东西是可以使用的，Bates和家人朋友们一起打着蜡烛开始改造，从飓风灯到地板，从机电到卧室，所有东西都需要翻修。
+
+原本的平台上就设有停机坪，可以供直升机运送物资，后来停机坪中央插了根电台桅杆，虽然电台Radio Essex最后也没怎么启用，但这根桅杆有了更实际的功能，防止不明直升机随意降落在西兰公国。他们还在平台的一端放置了升降机，使人进入国境。两根塔柱是空心的，壁厚大约9厘米，被分为7层楼，在战时有4层用作士兵居住。但后来被改造成了卧室、客房、厨房、西兰公国接待室，甚至还设置了游戏室、健身房和可以容纳多宗教信仰的礼拜堂。厕所则是直接通向北海的，定期由王子亲自打扫。除此以外，还有电机房、储藏室、过滤水系统等。有7个屋子位于海平面以下，睡觉时可以听见海水拍打塔柱的声音。麻雀虽小，五脏俱全，这个堡垒里的国家，也设置了一个监狱，但建国至今只用过一次。曾经因为一场政变将犯人关押过三个月，还惊动了英国和德国政府，这个我们稍后再讲。
+
+要拜访西兰公国首先要填写签证申请表，获得批准后，从英国走国际航线乘坐直升机大约二三十分钟可以直接降落在西兰公国，或者坐快艇1小时然后使用升降梯也可以抵达西兰公国。随后，工作人员会检查行李物品确保安全，然后带你进入海关室，查看护照，盖上入境章。西兰公国的自卫措施一直做得不错，武器是常备的，也很早就有了全职守卫，据说公主Joan Bates每晚睡觉都会把手枪放在枕头底下以备不测。
+
+BBC在采访中问公主，如何在这样的条件下一直保持着外形的优雅，Joan Bates公主说，她并没有特别怀念陆地的生活，毕竟要用的物品也都带来了。由于西兰公国位于海上，饮食方面可以偶尔捕鱼，还会在塔周围放一些龙虾笼。除此以外，大部分的食物都是陆地上带来的罐头，天气恶劣食物短缺的日子也是有的，但总体来说夏天非常舒适，冬天特别糟糕。如果真的有一样东西值得他们思念的话，可能是厨房水池，因为看上去洗碗确实不太方便。
+
+1970年代西兰公国最多有50位居民，包括亲朋好友和国家日常维护人员，后来还养过一只猫。1975年开始西兰公国发放护照，但1997年他们召回了所有护照，因为有贩毒集团使用假的西兰公国护照从俄罗斯往伊拉克洗钱和毒品走私。签证申请自2002年起就暂停了，西兰公国目前只能通过王子的邀请才可以登陆。据说全球目前有300个西兰公民，他们每天都会受到一百多封邮件希望移民至此。但从2015年起，常住人员一直维持在两个工作人员，全家人目前基本都住在英国，几个月才去一次。1987年，国际领海范围扩大，从原本的3海里（约6公里）增加值12海里（约22公里），所以西兰公国所在的怒涛塔实际上又要进入英国的管辖范围，但在国际宣布的前一天，Roy Bates王子也宣布，西兰公国的领海海域将扩大至12海里（22公里）。根据不追溯过往的原则，也因为西兰公国影响力太小，所以英国似乎也无意针对他们采取措施。但疫情期间的时候，为了防止英国强行征回土地，西兰公国一直都确保至少有一个人在塔上居住。
+
+从登岛开始，Roy Bates王子逐渐将国家从抽象的自宣，慢慢落实成实体。他设计了国家的座右铭“自由来自大海”，还设计了国旗、国歌、邮票、护照、货币，也前后颁布过三个版本的宪法。2006年一场电机事故导致意外大火，英国皇家海军帮助救援，一名西兰公民被送去医院。随后，Bates一家开始做了近一轮翻修。也因此西兰公国和英国皇家海军建立了良好的关系，他们有时会使用西兰的停机坪作演习使用。
+
+2012年Roy Bates王子去世，2016年Joan Bates公主去世，目前西兰公国属于长子Michael Bates，但他基本都住在英国，事务由他两个儿子打理。当时Michael Bates和父母初登怒涛塔时才14岁，本以为是一次几周的假期探险，却意外开启了一段已经50多年的建国历程。另外他目前的妻子是曾经的中国人民解放军军人，不知道有没有加冕西兰公国公主头衔。
+
+总之，从过去几十年情况看，虽然西兰公国很小，目前居住的人数也不如以前了，但至少Roy Bates在各个方面都确实在认真打造一个国家。
+
+
+### （三）经济来源
+
+要让一个国家持续生存，经济来源必不可少。Roy Bates王子本来做电台就是下海创业，所以经营管理国家很是在行。
+
+西兰公国于1972年开始试制硬币，价值等价兑换美元，这些硬币都可以作为纪念品售卖。第一批铸造的是10块钱硬币，正面是公主Joan Bates头像，背面是虎鲸，发行量为2000枚。后来又陆续铸币六次，最近一次是在2017年，但每次也就几百几千枚硬币。1992年，西兰公国曾经政变失败的流亡政府也发行过1000枚100块的银制货币进行售卖。
+
+1969年，西兰公国开始印刷邮票，早期以一众英国探险家为主要图案，后以舰船、女性、鱼类、陆地等作为邮票设计，一共发行过8个版本邮票，最近一次是今年2023年。但西兰公国自己没法发送邮件，只有去比利时做特殊预约才可以。
+
+虽然西兰公国不发护照了，但他们通过售卖公国的贵族身份象征来维持经济运营。英属国家一直都保有贵族的传统，西兰公国沿用了这些头衔，但不可以世袭传给下一代，获取方式则彻底平民化，只要花几十几百美元即可获得。普通身份证是38美元，勋爵的电子文件只要31美元，男爵50美元，骑士124美元，伯爵248美元，最贵的公爵则是620美元。英国著名歌星Ed Sheeran就是西兰公国的男爵。此外，你还可以花8美元获得一个Sealand后缀的邮箱，或者25美元认购一片西兰公国土地，但具体多大也没说，只要他们想卖，估计就可以无限分割。在线商店还有国旗、体恤、宪法、水杯等纪念品售卖。
+
+这些都还是小收入，西兰公国真正有潜力的大收入还是和他的地域有关，许多电台、电视、彩票、银行、公司都曾想在西兰公国落地，著名的盗版网站海盗湾因瑞典日益加紧的版权法律，曾在2007年试图收购西兰公国；2010年前西班牙一家地产公司也曾报价7.5亿英镑收购西兰公国。但都未果。
+
+2000年，一家名叫HavenCo的离岸服务器曾在这里落户，创始人是21岁的麻省理工大学辍学生Ryan Lackey。这是世界上第一家数据避难中心，主张个人用户的信息自由，不受国家网络审查限制。来自美国、英国、欧洲等地的25位工作人员协力让服务器在2000年底上线，根据西兰公国的法律，除了儿童色情、垃圾邮件和恶意黑客攻击意外，所有的互联网内容都可以接受。西兰公国也不属于世贸组织和世界知识产权组织，所以国际知识产权法在这里也不通用，这对信仰互联网开放自由的人是个巨大的好消息。2000年连线杂志对其报道引起了全球的注意，报道说：如果您经营一家金融机构，希望运营匿名且无法追踪的支付系统，HavenCo可以提供帮助；如果您想将传统成人色情内容发送到像沙特阿拉伯这样脾气暴躁的国家，它可以帮助；但如果想洗钱、或做儿童色情内容，那是不可能的。但可惜的是两年后2002年，Ryan Lackey因为和Bates家族就公司管理发生分歧，退出了公司。2008年HavenCo网站下线。
+
+前两年比特币和NFT兴起的时候，西兰公国也曾作为一些艺术品的落脚之地。一个叫Portraits of Mind的全球去中心化比特币艺术项目，将40幅画作和其NFT作品创始代码分散在了4大洲15个国家，其中34号作品位于西兰公国。
+
+
+### （四）国际外交
+
+我们今天可能很难想象一个人占据了一片地方就可以声称自己建立个国家，那西兰公国到底有没有资格是个国家？1933年在乌拉圭首都签署的《蒙特维多国家权利义务公约》认为，国际法所承认之国家应具备四项标准：⑴ 常住人口；⑵ 界定的领土；⑶ 政府；⑷ 与其他国家建立关系的能力。前三个比较好理解，第四个我们展开讲一下。
+
+根据传统的国际法来看，有两种理论构成一个国家的确认，分别是：宣示说和构成说，这两个其实是相左的。宣示说认为，自己宣称自己是国家就是足够的证据，不需要其他国家承认；而构成说则认为，其他国家承认你是国家是充分必要条件。他们的矛盾之处就在于，自己承认自己是国家是最重要的，还是他人承认是最重要的。而今天的学界主要以宣示说为主，包括《蒙特维多条约》就是宣示说的代表，它里面有关建国的声明已经成为国际习惯法的一部分，第三条写道：即使未获承认的国家也有权利捍卫其完整性及独立。”这个理论也是目前的国际实践所遵循的。
+
+但宣示说问题也更明显，尤其今天国际一体化，一个国家想要存在于世界，不获得他国的承认是肯定不可能的。所以许多实践是在宣示说和构成说两者之间，在具体事务里还有法律承认、事实承认等超出这两种理论所能解释的复杂性。所以对西兰公国来说，得到其他国家的承认是Roy Bates王子特别在乎的。截至目前为止，没有任何一个国家公开承认过西兰公国，但这不代表它没有和国际社会发生过接触，下面我们说两个事件，都和西兰公国的国际承认有关。
+
+1967年，西兰公国建国之后，前一年一起登塔但被赶走的Ronan O'Rahilly带着人马攻击怒涛塔，但被Roy Bates用武器守卫下来。因为使用了武力，所以惊动到了英国皇家海军，他们勒令Roy Bates投降，但被Roy Bates的儿子Michael Bates射击逼退。他俩被捕，并在次年被指控非法持有枪支。但英国法庭却宣判，因为怒涛塔处在英国领海外，英国无权管辖权，案子被撤销。而这个举动在Roy Bates王子看来，就是一次英国对西兰公国的事实承认。1968年11月，英国首相还在唐宁街与内阁展开过一次针对西兰公国的紧急会议。甚至后来，英国政府解密文件中也被披露，他们将西兰公国描述为“英格兰东海岸附近的古巴”。
+
+1978年，西兰公国发生过一次被时代杂志誉为历史上最小的政变。当时Roy Bates王子和一个德国人商量如何把西兰公国商业化，打造成赌场+酒店。但这个德国人却打算自己单干，趁着Roy Bates不在公国领土上时，带了几个德国和荷兰的雇佣兵，企图强行占领怒涛塔，并把Roy Bates儿子Michael给关了起来，没有食物没有水。幸运的是，补给船三天后来送物资，把Michael Bates给救了出来。他们在荷兰找到了Roy Bates，拉上几个特技飞行员朋友，发起了三叉戟救国行动。开着直升机抵达西兰公国，并成功夺回失去的土地。随后他们将其中一个拥有西兰公国护照的德国人关押在监狱内长达三个月，把其余人驱逐出境。Roy Bates王子和叛变者谈判，要他缴纳75000德国马克（约35000美元）否则不放人。当时德国政府得到消息，恳请英国大使馆与西兰公国交涉放人，但经过前一次事件英国政府表示无法干涉西兰公国。德国政府只好自己派出外交人员和西兰公国谈判。这在Roy Bates王子看来，又是一次国际对西兰公国的事实承认。被驱逐的两位德国人随后在德国还建立起了西兰公国流亡政府，除了铸币售卖以外，还贩卖了4000份西兰公国的护照给香港公民，每份高达1000美元，基本也都是洗钱目的的。
+
+美国的爱默里法学院2015年针对西兰公国的研究报告显示，包括加蓬、巴拉圭、尼泊尔、叙利亚、海地、土耳其等国家的大使馆曾对西兰公国的代表，关于投资机会的来文做过官方回应。也有学者表示，“西兰公国的公民曾经确实通过出示西兰护照成功地前往各个国家旅行。”从这些事件来看，西兰公国没有受到其他国家的官方承认可能只是因为其暂时还没有利益交接，但办公流程上已经承认了西兰公国的存在事实。
+
+另外，西兰公国在各种国际体育比赛中也是积极参与者，他们有过自己的足球队，是全球未被承认的地区和非FIFA成员国组成的足球协会成员。他们还参与过世界空气吉他大赛，获得第16名。2007年，Michael Martelle代表西兰公国在加拿大魁北克参与了功夫世界杯；2004年和2013年，两位登山运动员分别在慕士塔格峰和珠穆朗玛峰展示西兰公国国旗。2015年，长跑运动员Simon Messenger在西兰公国上完成了半程马拉松长跑。
+
+在信仰、民族慢慢被世俗文化所取代的今天，国家似乎默认成了一个人的先验身份象征，它被用来宣传文化，比如像美国梦这样的措辞；被用来攻击敌对势力，塑造民族主义仇外情绪；被用作帝国合理化侵略的借口，比如俄对乌发动战争。但西兰公国给我们提出一个疑问，一个人的国家身份认同是哪里来的？虽然有评论认为，西兰公国的建立显然是因为对自家政府的不满，但国土安全负责人Barrington先生说他和Bates一家都不反英国，相反他认为Roy Bates是位标准的英国人，但另一方面他也认为，他们对西兰公国公民的身份更具有认同感。
+
+爱默里法学院的报告还提供了对西兰公国的另一层思考，那就是对人造领土的诠释。在现有的国际法框架下，国家领土一般被理解为自然领地，并不包括像西兰公国这样的纯人工陆地。但随着世界的发展，人口数量的增长，许多城市也确实在开发新的人工大陆供居民使用。人工陆地未来是否可以作为建国的范围，在学界尚不是主要探讨议题，但Roy Bates王子给了我们一个示范，这未尝不是一个值得建国的机遇。
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diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-11-the-gulf-and-gaza.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-11-the-gulf-and-gaza.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : The Gulf And Gaza
+author: Tobias Borck
+date : 2023-12-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/VIV7NxQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Staying the Course Amid Renewed Crisis"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_As Israel’s war in Gaza rages on, the Gulf Arab states continue to try to strike a balance between working to contain and end the violence and maintaining momentum for their respective national projects._
+
+
+
+On 5 December, Qatar hosted the annual summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the regional grouping that includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Inevitably, Israel’s ongoing war against Hamas in Gaza topped the agenda of the discussions between Gulf leaders, which were also attended by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
+
+The message from the summit was straightforward and unsurprising. The six Gulf monarchies called for “an immediate cessation of hostilities and Israeli military operations”, demanded “the release of civilian hostages and detainees”, and backed efforts to “revive the peace process in the Middle East” and “the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital” .
+
+Besides the various agreements to adopt joint positions and work together – in areas going far beyond the war in Gaza, from efforts to remove trade barriers and collaborate on tourism, to shared commitments to investing in oil and gas as well as renewable energy – recorded in the lengthy 122-article final statement, the summit ultimately appeared to be intended to signal one thing above all: Gulf unity.
+
+
+### Pragmatic Gulf Unity
+
+Indeed, with the Middle East in the midst of a crisis defined by the long-standing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, it is perhaps easy to forget that until just three years ago, a deep fracture between the Gulf Arab states – specifically between Qatar (backed by Turkey) on one side, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other – was one of the defining features of regional instability. Today, things are different. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have become particularly close over the past year or two. Differences and intra-Gulf competition still persist, perhaps especially between Saudi Arabia and the UAE these days, but the overall mood is one of pragmatic alignment – certainly vis-à-vis the war in Gaza.
+
+Saudi Arabia has clearly assumed the mantle of regional leadership. It hosted an extraordinary Arab-Islamic summit in Riyadh in November, notably with the attendance of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi; and Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud has led a group of his counterparts from across the region on an international tour with stops in Beijing, Moscow and London, among others. Qatar has led mediation efforts with Hamas to facilitate the release of hostages, which resulted, for example, in the seven-day truce at the end of November. The UAE – which has the closest ties with Israel of all Gulf states – has remained quieter thus far, but it appears poised to play a key role whenever there is eventually a more permanent ceasefire in Gaza, precisely because it is probably the Arab country Israel trusts the most.
+
+Crucially, Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi have thus far worked together and vocally endorsed each other’s efforts. They have looked to leverage their different relationships with the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as across the region, rather than to compete with one another. The eventual question of helping to establish and strengthen a future Palestinian leadership could well bring intra-Gulf competition back to the fore, but for the moment at least, the three monarchies are clearly aligned in their view of the conflict.
+
+___`Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are in very similar positions and share very similar interests with regard to the current crisis`___
+
+All three were clearly horrified by Hamas’s 7 October attack. Saudi Arabia and especially the UAE have long been critical of, and even hostile towards, Hamas. Qatar has a different relationship with the group, hosting its political office in Doha in coordination with the US and the Israeli government, but it clearly also did not support the attack. However, what Israel has done since 7 October has, form the perspective of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha – and the wider region, for that matter – gone far beyond exercising a legitimate right to self-defence. In their view, Israel’s operation to go after Hamas has become a brutal all-out assault on the Palestinian people. The attempt by US President Joe Biden to equate Russia and Hamas as evil aggressors and Israel and Ukraine as victims worthy of support does not resonate in the Gulf (or indeed anywhere in the Arab world). Rather, if there is any relation between the wars in Ukraine and Gaza from the Arab perspective, it is between Ukrainian civilians and the Palestinian people.
+
+
+### The Ongoing Quest for Stability
+
+Ultimately, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are in very similar positions and share very similar interests with regard to the current crisis. While the war is taking up a lot of their bandwidth, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha are united in their determination to maintain the overall strategic course they were on before 7 October. All three are pursuing highly ambitious domestic agendas.
+
+In Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 – a root-and-branch transformation of the Kingdom – is the all-important North Star for all decision-making, including on foreign policy. The UAE wants to consolidate its position as the most dynamic regional power and a hub for global affairs; its hosting of the ongoing UN Climate Change Conference COP28 is illustrative of this. Qatar, meanwhile, is looking to build on the success of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, including by expanding its gas production capacity to solidify its status as the world’s most important exporter of liquified natural gas.
+
+Critical to all of these ambitions is the maintenance of a modicum of stability in the wider region. In many ways, the war in Gaza erupted just as Gulf leaders felt like their regional strategy to de-escalate and reduce tensions wherever possible was working. Not only had they buried the hatchet of their intra-Gulf dispute, but they had also managed to steer their relations with Iran into calmer waters. In fact, in the effort to contain the war at least geographically, the new channel of communication between Riyadh and Tehran has undoubtedly been crucially important.
+
+Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar remain worried about the violence in Gaza stoking regional instability, even if the spectre of a wider regional war can be kept at bay. While they are confident that they can manage popular anger about Israel’s conduct in Gaza at home, they are aware that their counterparts in Egypt and Jordan – two countries whose stability they regard as pivotal for the region – might have a harder time doing the same.
+
+___`The Gulf states have seen the US’s strong support for Israel as another sign that Washington’s strategy in the Middle East is out of step with the regional mood`___
+
+Furthermore, even if Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha are feeling more confident about their ability to manage tensions with Tehran, they nevertheless see – and have always seen – a great risk in Iran’s ability to use the Palestinian cause and its claim to leadership of the resistance against Israel to shore up its regional position. The attacks on commercial ships supposedly linked to Israel by the Yemeni Houthis – one of Iran’s partners in the region – obviously worry Saudi Arabia, for example. For now, these activities are not directed at the Kingdom, but with the Red Sea central to Riyadh’s economic development plans, they clearly represent a long-term threat.
+
+The Gulf states are therefore likely to continue to emphasise the need for pragmatism and de-escalation. They will try to protect the gains they have made in their relations with Iran, even if this proves to be an uphill battle. Similarly, they are unlikely to fundamentally change their approach towards Israel. The UAE has made it clear that it has no desire to give up what has been from its perspective a tremendously beneficial expanding relationship with Israel since the conclusion of the Abraham Accords in 2020. Saudi-Israeli normalisation may have become a more distant prospect due to the war, but it remains on the horizon. The strategic drivers behind normalisation, ranging from shared security interests vis-à-vis Iran to the promise of lucrative economic opportunities, remain unchanged. Even Qatar will continue to maintain its pragmatic arms-length relationship with Israel, not least because it is precisely its ability to talk to the Israeli government and security services, as well as to Hamas, that makes it such a valuable mediator and interlocutor, both in the current crisis and likely in the future too.
+
+In their relations beyond the region, the Gulf states are also trying to stay the course. The war has re-emphasised the centrality of the US to regional security, as impressively illustrated by the extensive ramping-up of the US military presence in the immediate aftermath of the 7 October attack. At the same time, however, the Gulf states have also seen the US’s strong – and in their view uncritical – support for Israel as another sign that Washington’s strategy in the Middle East is out of step with the regional mood and their own priorities.
+
+They have therefore continued to express their conviction that the world – and the region with it – is moving towards a multipolar order, and have done what they can to make this a reality. This has included the Saudi-led foreign ministers delegation’s demonstrative choice to make Beijing the first stop of their tour to build international consensus around a call for a ceasefire in Gaza, regardless of the fact that China has shown very little ability or willingness to make any meaningful efforts to resolve the crisis. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visits to the UAE and Saudi Arabia also fit into this pattern.
+
+In sum, it is very clear that the war in Gaza has made life harder for the Gulf Arab states. Leaders in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha want to focus on developing their countries and claiming their places on the global stage, and they are determined not to let either the volatility of the region they happen to find themselves in or the unstable global environment prevent them from doing so. In this context, the war in Gaza is a setback, but not one that changes the overall strategic calculus in the Gulf.
+
+---
+
+__Tobias Borck__ is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East. He also co-leads the development and delivery of the RUSI Leadership Centre’s programme of executive education training courses, including for diplomats, military personnel, and security professionals from the Middle East and beyond.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-12-heavy-armed-forces.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-12-heavy-armed-forces.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-12-heavy-armed-forces.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Heavy Armoured Forces
+author: Nick Reynolds
+date : 2023-12-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/vQBIqjS.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Heavy Armoured Forces in Future Combined Arms Warfare"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Adaptations are necessary if heavy armoured forces are to remain relevant. This paper argues that the primary requirement is to implement a comparative shift away from protection and towards mobility._
+
+
+
+The British Army is likely to be called on to engage in high-intensity warfighting at some stage in the future, and must be able to do so credibly in order to contribute to NATO’s deterrent posture. Heavy armoured forces and main battle tanks will remain an important element of warfighting, and will therefore continue to occupy an important position in the British Army’s Order of Battle. There have been concerns about the vulnerability and survivability of main battle tanks on the contemporary battlefield, as well as the ability of lighter forces backed up by ISTAR capabilities and indirect fires to create difficult operational problems for the enemy in high-intensity warfighting. However, heavy armoured forces – through their substantial combat power – ensure that a force can remain mobile while in direct contact with enemy forces, and as such heavy armour still has a valuable role to play on the battlefields of the future.
+
+However, adaptations are necessary if heavy armoured forces are to remain relevant. This paper argues that the primary requirement is to implement a comparative shift away from protection and towards mobility. Secondary requirements are numerous, and include better use of deception and decoys to counter improved enemy ISTAR capabilities, and the potential integration of uncrewed ground vehicles to add situational awareness and defensive capabilities without increasing vehicles’ weights (already problematically high). The British Army’s heavy armoured forces will also need to relearn old lessons about logistics, sustainment, vehicle recovery and the reconstitution of armoured formations that have suffered a significant level of battlefield attrition. Finally, crew expertise matters, and will – as always – be essential for keeping vehicles in working order on operations and minimising the need for the concentration of vulnerable elements of the support apparatus such as forward repair facilities. Investment in the British Army’s people should therefore not be overlooked in the heavy armour context.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War is the largest conventional land war in Europe since 1945. The conflict has registered high losses – many at the hands of new weapons – among the main battle tank (MBT) fleets of both sides, and in this context a longstanding debate has regained prominence: what future does the MBT have on the battlefield or in the force structures of modern militaries? The debate has been one of the more controversial and divisive ones over the future of warfighting. Although tanks were pivotal to 20th century warfare, their utility was often questioned – even during the Cold War – in a way that the utility of other revolutionary technologies such as aviation and radio communications was not.
+
+Tanks were introduced in the First World War to reduce casualties and break the deadlock imposed by trench warfare, notably in the Battle of Cambrai in 1917. After experimentation and increasing adoption during the interwar period, the Second World War saw tanks become established as a mainstay in the European and North African theatres of operations. However, since 1945, their utility has routinely been questioned and discussed. Most – but not all – of these discussions have concluded that MBTs still retain utility, but nevertheless concerns (particularly about whether the role of tanks can survive when faced with new threats) are periodically revived by instances of high losses.
+
+This debate is hugely relevant to the UK defence establishment (and particularly the British Army) as it looks to overcome years of underinvestment in conventional capabilities. A major component of this paper, therefore, will be to identify the implications of the MBT’s changing role for the British Army’s force structure if it is to have the capability to fight on future battlefields. In 2022, Chief of the General Staff General Sir Patrick Sanders declared that Operation Mobilise – to deter Russian aggression in Europe – was to be the British Army’s priority. This will mean the acceleration of the Future Soldier modernisation programme, with the aim of restoring the British Army’s ability to conduct mobile combined arms warfare. While the strategy is explicit about having a positional character, this is because it is largely focused on deterrence and as such will involve posturing.
+
+However, for deterrence to work, it must be credible. Credibility requires not just a presentational force but the ability to warfight, and British warfighting doctrine is defined by the “manoeuvrist approach” – doctrinal terminology for manoeuvre warfare. Manoeuvre and heavy armoured forces – both heavy armoured combat vehicles classed as MBTs and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) or armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) and the associated support and logistics vehicles and apparatus – are deeply interconnected. Heavy armoured forces are known for their ability to manoeuvre and for using their unique characteristics to maintain this ability, even against other heavy armoured forces, and have traditionally been able to remain mobile under heavy direct and indirect enemy fire, and to engage and destroy conventional ground forces (including other tanks). Heavy armoured forces, if they are well-trained and well-led, can also quickly reform after taking objectives, and then immediately exploit further opportunities to do the same again (although, as will be explored below, these characteristics are not absolute and may not be guaranteed in future). The key characteristics of heavy armoured forces can be summarised as mobility, firepower and protection – criteria against which individual vehicles are judged.
+
+These concerns about the continued viability of MBTs, coupled with the clear imperative for the British Army to retain its ability to credibly fight wars, provide the context for this study, which examines the fate of the MBT and heavy armoured forces within the British Army, based on a survey of the changes to combined arms warfare and of evolving British strategic policy. There is much at stake here: force structure changes and procurement decisions have long lead times and must be made early. Unpacking the debate about heavy armoured forces in sufficient depth to identify trade-offs and opportunities (and, indeed, dead-ends) is therefore essential if policymakers and military leaders are to reshape land forces so as to remain credible for future warfighting.
+
+This study frames issues in broad terms in order to be as accessible and useful as possible to international military practitioners, academics, policymakers and observers from outside the British defence establishment, but is UK-focused and, where appropriate, explores inherently technical issues. Chapter I covers British policy in the context of strategic warfighting requirements. Chapter II analyses the basics of combat power and the characteristics of MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles in order to provide a baseline understanding of/guide to the underlying issues. Chapter III covers the challenges to the continued utility of heavy armoured forces and discusses what adaptations should be made to ensure that they remain viable in the context of the changing threat landscape and operational environment. The paper concludes with recommendations for the way ahead.
+
+This is not an engineering study, and although engineering issues will be introduced or discussed where pertinent, some issues – for example, the adoption of remote turrets or rubberised tracks – may be left unaddressed where they do not have sufficient relevance for the tactical, operational or policy choices identified. As a primarily theoretical analysis of the nature of operations, the study relies on a mixture of approaches to address the questions outlined above: a survey of the existing literature; engagement with military practitioners; observations of military exercises; and fieldwork in relevant operational areas. Much of the utility of armour is reliant on enablers and supporting capabilities, as well as the coordination of different arms in combination: combined arms. Thus, parts of this study will discuss other systems, rather than focusing solely on tanks per se. This is essential, as the utility of MBTs/heavy armoured forces cannot be adequately addressed if that capability is examined in isolation. However, the primary focus will be MBTs, as the issues of combined arms integration and supporting capabilities are too broad to be addressed comprehensively here.
+
+As will be outlined in Chapter I, this study is predicated on credible conventional deterrence and thus the ability to warfight on land as an important pillar of security. Although this is current British policy, it is not a universally advocated strategy, and may justifiably be questioned. The key variables that determine the validity of conventional deterrence include to what degree an adversary’s activity is constrained by how it sees its options for escalation management, and whether it is actually deterred from crossing the threshold of conventional war. Only the latter question can be answered within the scope of this study, through the metric of credibility. Subordinate to this are questions of the flexibility of conventional forces. Arguably, conventional forces have utility across the spectrum of operations short of high-intensity war, and indeed it has sometimes even been argued that they are essential for these tasks due to the limited combat power of lighter forces. Consequently this study will, as a secondary consideration, also briefly touch on the dual-utility of heavy armoured forces for expeditionary and sub-threshold operations, as the strategic questions left unaddressed by this study indicate that it is essential that heavy forces whose primary application is high-intensity war should have secondary utility or be adaptable to other lower-intensity forms of competition and conflict. In more practical terms, the fact that the UK’s strategic imperatives and defence policy could change in the future means that these questions about utility, which affect force structure and procurement decisions for conventional forces, should not be omitted.
+
+One final baseline assumption for this study is that the future of armoured warfare should not be predicated on a less-capable adversary employing its forces poorly. Russia, the declared adversary and primary threat to NATO, is in the process of depleting its conventional forces, which have also proved themselves to have been presentational – investment was dedicated to impressive-looking technical capabilities, while basic practicalities were ignored. Catastrophic political decisions in the Kremlin, aside from the overall strategic blunder of launching a full-scale invasion in the first place, led to the prioritisation of equipment procurement over reforming the Russian armed forces’ system of logistics and sustainment, hierarchical command structure, training and education doctrine, and military culture. The failure to recognise the need for revolutionary organisational change has contributed to Russia’s military failures, but the extent of the self-created disaster in Ukraine will inevitably prompt reflection. Russia is likely to learn and rebuild its capabilities, while remaining an adversary and European security threat for the foreseeable future. This long-term threat should not be underestimated.
+
+
+### I. Warfighting as a Component of British Defence Policy
+
+Although warfighting has returned to prominence for the British defence establishment, the progressive reduction of Britain’s fleet of MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles over the past 14 years represents a cause for concern. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review stated that heavy armoured forces, which were deemed to include the Challenger 2 and Warrior IFV force, and the supporting AS90 self-propelled artillery and Titan and Trojan engineering vehicles, would be reduced in number, albeit with sufficient numbers retained for high-end warfighting and maintaining the possibility of regenerating these capabilities should the situation demand it. However, the Review was agnostic about the divisional force structure and only specified the retention of a division headquarters under which brigades might be commanded. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, meanwhile, committed explicitly to a warfighting division, stating that its ground combat component would comprise two armoured infantry battalions and two Strike Brigades. Although the armoured infantry brigades would continue to field Warrior and Challenger 2, the Strike Brigades, with their Ajax vehicles, indicated a shift towards comparatively lighter mechanised forces that would trade sheer combat power for increased strategic mobility.
+
+The 2021 Integrated Review likewise directed the British Army to become smaller and lighter. Former Chief of the General Staff General Sir Nick Carter considered competition – the constant use of a blend of military and non-military tools by the UK’s enemies and adversaries without breaching a threshold that might trigger a decisive military response – to be a higher priority than warfighting, and directed that concept/capability development and restructuring efforts should reflect this prioritisation. This approach flipped older assumptions that the Army’s warfighting functions served as an insurance policy to be held at readiness, with warfighting formations being able to adapt to lower-intensity conflicts if required. Although counterintuitive, there was a certain rationale to this, as well as plenty of historical evidence suggesting that capabilities developed for low-intensity conflict could prove not only useful but transformational for high-end warfighting.
+
+Despite this clear direction of travel, the aforementioned elements of British defence policy have received significant criticism, with repeated controversies over whether plans have been realistic or affordable. As for the higher strategic direction that such plans are intended to deliver against, the 2023 NATO Vilnius Summit did not include any detailed updates regarding the UK’s direct contribution to the Alliance, and Paul Cornish has noted that the recent Integrated Review Refresh included 22 sub-strategies, which therefore provides little guidance for subordinate parts of government about what to prioritise (given that resources and leverage are finite). While explicitly de-prioritising certain areas of policy can appear undiplomatic and incur a short-term political cost, the current failure to clearly prioritise has resulted in the members of the professional military community expressing increasingly divergent understandings of what is being asked of them. Some fundamental points about the Integrated Review therefore require examination. First and foremost, the Integrated Review Refresh, although it argues for a tilt, still privileges the Euro-Atlantic over the Indo-Pacific, and the land domain and Russia are seen as the most prominent arena and threat to the UK. In terms of alliances, NATO is “the highest priority”. While the Indo-Pacific and China receive a great deal of attention in their own right within the Integrated Review, this paper is redicated on the view that Indo-Pacific security is most efficiently supported by ensuring that European security is adequately addressed by European countries, such that lines of effort in the Indo-Pacific are not undermined by drawing excessively on the US capabilities required in that theatre.
+
+Even with regard to European security, the Defence Command Paper outlines other capabilities that will be grown as a matter of priority. This is a different approach from other members of NATO. The French Army, for example, is aiming to restore its ability to conduct armoured warfare at corps level, and while many French units are light- or medium-weight, the eventual replacement of the Leclerc with another more modern MBT remains a key French defence policy aspiration. The British Army will not experience the same regeneration for warfighting at scale, and its heavy armoured capabilities will not grow unless there is a fundamental shift in guidance; however, neither has the British Army been directed to shed this capability. The Future Soldier Guide issued in 2021 outlined the British Army’s warfighting division, 3rd Division, as containing two Armoured Brigade Combat Teams equipped with Ajax, an upgraded Challenger 3 and Boxer, and a Deep Recce Strike Brigade Combat Team equipped, after restructuring, with a mixture of guided multiple launch rocket system (GMLRS) and AS90 fires capabilities and Ajax and Jackal 2 for reconnaissance. And so although the structure and enabling capabilities of the British Army’s warfighting component are shifting, it is clear that the British Army will retain its heavy armoured forces, exemplified by the Challenger series of MBT, for warfighting: a rare scenario to be sure, but one at the core of why the UK maintains its armed forces in the first place.
+
+Despite the focus on warfighting, a competing priority that must be highlighted is that of expeditionary operations and limited conflict, and the role that heavy armoured forces can play in these contexts. The post-Cold War move away from conventional deterrence, during which heavy forces suffered from a degree of neglect, was part of a shifting paradigm that prompted a resurgence of interest in smaller conflicts dating back to Britain’s colonial era. During the Cold War, there had been divergent imperatives: on the one hand, to resource conventional deterrence between superpower-backed alliances; and, on the other, to fight small wars in distant expeditionary conflicts, often colonial in nature. Both scenarios involved superpower and ideological competition, but manifested very differently in terms of the lower stakes involved in the expeditionary conflicts (at least for the Soviet and NATO participants). Previously, the problem was conceived of as how to use lighter, more agile, more politically engaged expeditionary forces when militaries were prioritising heavier European warfighting forces that were based more on maintaining the peace through deterrence. The prospect of a major war between superpowers was a frightening one, but also a scenario that was more easily comprehended by the military units that were committed to it. The debate re-emerged, supposedly new but echoing the same considerations that previous generations had grappled with: conventional deterrence versus grey-zone competition, with the split between heavy and light forces predicated upon deployability and sustainment.
+
+Despite the traditional division of labour between heavy and light forces, therefore, a strong case has been made for the utility of heavy armoured forces even in such delicate missions as peace support. In positive contrast to the shortcomings of Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu, for example, the Swedish-Danish-Norwegian heavy armoured battalion Nordbat 2 exemplified this utility in Bosnia in 1993 when it was able to provide decisive overmatch and retain freedom of movement, which in this case was essential to the UN mandate in their area of operations. Canadian forces, too, found Leopard 2 MBTs to be invaluable tactically in the Afghanistan counterinsurgency campaign, despite having envisioned being able to make do with the 17-tonne wheeled Light Armoured Vehicle III (LAV III).
+
+Nevertheless, arguments in favour of the continued use of heavy armour outside of high-end warfighting are likely to fall victim to the financial and logistical challenges associated with deploying and sustaining heavy armour. Even for the best-resourced militaries, heavy armour is likely to be an unaffordable luxury except when facing a peer or near-peer conventional force. Likewise, for all the strong arguments that can be made in favour of Nordbat 2’s deployment to Bosnia, it must be remembered that there were numerous peace support operations ongoing at the time, all of which could lay justifiable claim, on moral or humanitarian grounds, to receiving serious military resourcing from the international community. The realities of multiple conflicting demands and limited capacity mean that British heavy armoured forces will at best be committed sparingly to such future missions, if at all, as a secondary benefit of maintaining a warfighting force that might on occasion donate small force elements if able to do so. Their presence can help peacekeepers, policing missions, counterinsurgencies and stability operations to focus on their core missions more effectively (through tactical overmatch), thus removing the distraction of these missions getting bogged down in indecisive combat situations. This useful function of heavy armoured forces should not be overlooked.
+
+The broad utility of heavy armoured forces across the spectrum of conflict – both their utility in their primary role, and as a hedge against future sub-threshold contingencies should the acute requirement for conventional deterrence in Europe decline in the long term – means that, from one perspective, the argument in favour of MBTs is clear-cut. Yet sceptical arguments about MBTs generally point to technological changes that compromise the ability of heavy armoured vehicles to maintain one or more of their three traditional characteristics – mobility, firepower and protection. Many of these concerns are valid, particularly those relating to pervasive UAV ISTAR, networked headquarters and forces, and precision fires able to strike large numbers of targets far from the frontline, which bodes poorly for forces that are either slow, easy to detect or require a large logistics tail. In this conception of the future, lighter ground forces will be more viable through a reduced signature, more operational mobility, and through their reduced cost allowing them to be generated in larger numbers, offsetting the enemy’s ability to concentrate precision fires against an identifiable centre of mass. Implicit in this vision is that geographical concentration of forces in the attack will be difficult, meaning that units will have to fight dispersed for an increasing proportion of operations.
+
+As will be discussed in Chapter III, this hypothetical conception of the future is not unchallenged and its precise implications are disputed. Nevertheless, experimental evidence indicates that changes of one sort or another will be required for ground forces to remain effective, with experience from Ukraine suggesting that alternatives to dispersion are to “dig deep, or move fast”. All three of these alternatives will likely play a role during different phases of operations and campaigns, but dispersion looks set to remain the prevalent approach, and several resulting adaptations to force composition and structures would in theory create a survivable, viable warfighting force. But it would be one that lacked combat power in the direct fight – that is, when engaging an enemy force within direct line-of-sight using weapons systems organic to the units employing them (whether supported by enabling indirect capabilities or not). The conflicting imperatives to disperse or concentrate forces pose difficult dilemmas that have yet to be conclusively resolved. The resolution of these questions requires an examination of exactly what MBTs bring to high-end combined arms warfighting – and it is to this that we turn next.
+
+
+### II. The Role of the MBT in Combined Arms Warfare
+
+The theoretical underpinnings of combined arms warfare, though well established, are worth reiterating here. While heavy armoured forces have numerous applications, their primary purpose is warfighting – the application of violence in order to defeat an enemy. This requires combat power, traditionally understood to comprise three core elements: mobility; protection; and firepower. Firepower is sometimes referred to as lethality or offensive power. Mobility, protection and firepower have long been components of combat power in US Army doctrine, and provide a widely accepted theoretical framework. Leadership was sometimes considered to be an additional fourth component. In US doctrine, this model was expanded to eight components by 2017: “leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection”, a departure from the underlying principles that attempted to integrate disparate elements into the model. The result, at the risk of blurring what aspect of war was being described by the original model, nevertheless highlights the importance of supporting arms and integration.
+
+This model of combat power is not directly replicated in British doctrine, but, where combat power is euphemistically referenced in the British Army’s keystone ADP Land publication, it is seated within the physical component of fighting power. The tactical functions of a combined arms force provide the best analogue to US doctrine: these are command, intelligence, outreach, information activities, fires, manoeuvre, protection and sustainment, a valuable contrasting model in that it highlights the inevitable transition from warfighting to stability operations, even in the context of a warfighting campaign, in a way that US doctrine does not.
+
+Other academic models can also be useful. For example, operability has been hypothesised by Yoo, Park and Choi as an alternative fourth function of combat power when considering the original triangular framework at the platform level; the technical and tactical reasons for this will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. While operability might better be described as a cross-cutting attribute that helps deliver and sustain all forms of combat power, and the suggestion may be conceptually flawed, the importance of operability, logistics and sustainment should nevertheless be highlighted.
+
+Understanding warfighting and combat power in terms of the original triangular framework of mobility, protection and firepower is useful, as it encourages thinking about how a force should function overall and deliver the required effects when conducting operations in the land domain. In particular, the triangular model is useful for identifying the core trade-offs that are inherent to different types of force, whereas augmented versions of the model include elements – for example, leadership and command and control – that are applicable regardless of the type of force being assembled, and which therefore do not usefully illustrate the trade-offs between heavy armoured forces (built around MBTs) and other lighter formations. However, as will be discussed, integration of other elements is essential to ensure the viability of heavy armoured forces, and so should not be discounted.
+
+Ultimately, and regardless of which variation of the conceptual model of combat power is preferred, their value lies in countering the technological determinism that is prevalent in commentary on defence and security issues. While this determinism is often driven by an appreciation of technological capability, it can result in overestimations of the impact of technological change, or in a failure to understand the second- and third-order impacts of this change on other parts of a military system and on battlefield dynamics. All of the elements discussed above factor into effective combined arms warfare at some stage. Those forces that make warfighting their forte and can credibly fight wars at scale do so in large part due to combining arms, whereby a variety of different arms – artillery, infantry, armour, engineers, logistics, medical services and so on – act in concert. However, not all militaries can be considered combined arms forces, as this status is achieved only by mastering the simultaneous integration of capabilities to create the right synchronised effects to prevail in war, preferably decisively.
+
+#### Mobility, Firepower and Protection
+
+Within this model, MBTs are not the only element of a force that delivers combat power. At a platform level, however, the original triangular concept of mobility, firepower and protection best encapsulates their value, for while they trade these characteristics off against each other (as does any type of platform), MBTs nevertheless embody all three in a unique, heightened manner. The way that armour operates at the platform level governs the broader tactical and operational dynamics when these vehicles are fielded at scale. A deeper understanding of armoured vehicles is therefore useful, as it explains why they have developed the characteristics that now typify them.
+
+MBTs developed their current format in the interwar period: a tracked hull with an engine; an independently rotating turret; and a main armament. By the end of the Second World War, this configuration had been almost universally refined to eliminate features such as hull-mounted machine guns and had standardised the MBT crew at either three personnel – commander, gunner and driver (if an autoloader is used to reload the main gun) or four (if an extra crew member is added to load the main gun manually). Apart from the driver, most MBTs have all other personnel located in the turret and turret basket assembly.
+
+Mobility is the most complex of the three characteristics that this configuration delivers. Although tracked vehicles are valued for their versatile mobility characteristics, MBTs and heavy armoured forces should not be described as the most mobile type of formation: rather, they are useful under certain circumstances. Physical terrain is not homogenous and so generalisations tend to be unreliable, and light infantry can of course move through and fight in almost any environment impassable to other forces if given sufficient time (the obvious example being primary jungle). Restrictive terrain has – perhaps erroneously – been deemed unsuitable for armoured forces. Tracked armoured vehicles can operate in most types of mountainous terrain except for alpine-like mountain ranges (where even light infantry would require technical rock-climbing skills to achieve full mobility) and the summit zones of interior and coastal mountain ranges. However, outside of these extreme instances, it is broadly correct to say that tracked vehicles – which in military terms largely mean heavy armoured forces – are the most tactically mobile.
+
+The technical reason for this is that the increased contact area of tracked vehicles’ running gear generally gives them lower ground pressure than their wheeled counterparts, thus providing improved thrust and traction (even if the tracked vehicles are in absolute terms far heavier). Theoretically, this improved traction will be less pronounced on loose or frictional soil (such as sand) than on cohesive soil (for example mud or clay), but in practical terms the difference is limited. Tracked vehicles are less likely to become bogged in or to slip, and can thus cross more difficult terrain than wheeled vehicles. Provided that ground is not so soft that vehicles start to sink, tracked armoured vehicles also have a significant advantage over light infantry, and if the ground is trafficable then their engine power means that they will be able to move much faster than dismounts.
+
+Aside from the power of the engine and the design of the drivetrain, a major limitation on the off-road mobility of individual vehicles is the shearing effect between the tracks (or wheels) and the terrain, which causes a loss of traction and hampers vehicles’ ability to cross ground. Shearing is most likely to occur on steep slopes; traversing slopes is significantly more difficult than heading directly up ascents and down descents, and the consequences of a failed traverse are more likely to involve a roll-over. With regard to clearance angles, the approach, departure and belly-clearance or ramp angles will also influence what obstacles a vehicle can climb over. While wheeled vehicles are also good at traversing slopes, tracks have the advantage of being comparatively resilient to small arms fire and fragmentation from artillery, which have a tendency to shred rubber tyres and immobilise wheeled vehicles. This allows tracked vehicles to retain mobility even in the midst of heavy fighting, although this comes at the cost of increased mechanical complexity, with implications over longer distances that will be discussed shortly.
+
+Hull shape and drivetrain design can give remarkable tactical mobility under the right circumstances. During the Korean War, British troops often marvelled at the ability of their Centurion MBTs to climb up slippery, muddy hills and to wade through flooded rice paddy fields. Unfortunately, this kind of ability involves inherent trade-offs, and different designs within the same vehicle class and formal tactical role can exhibit markedly different performance. For example, a low number of road wheels grants sufficient tactical mobility while being mechanically simple, but the resulting high ground pressure degrades the ability to operate on soft ground. Likewise, tracked armour is excellent in mountainous terrain up to a certain gradient, but where lighter tracked vehicles excel, heavier tracked armour might struggle, both because of tight mountain roads and generally constricted terrain, and due to the weight and ground pressure of the vehicles making steep slopes impossible to traverse. Most principles and techniques of off-road tactical mobility are transferable between wheeled and tracked vehicles, but tracked vehicles tend to be more forgiving. Nevertheless, reading the ground and how to move across it is a skill, and tanks must still be driven carefully. With professional and well-trained operators, heavy armoured vehicles can cross difficult ground quickly, and push through many obstacles, in a way that other forces cannot. Likewise, the mobility advantage does not necessarily make wheeled or heavy tracked armour more suited to manoeuvre. In forest, jungle or mountainous terrain, armour may be better employed positionally due to the requirement for slow, careful movement, or by leveraging its high level of firepower and protection when forcing an enemy from key terrain, with manoeuvre derived from the employment of light infantry. It is first and foremost the environment and context that determine how heavy armour is employed. The employment of armour to enable manoeuvre is a product of geography first, and of the characteristics of the vehicles second.
+
+Over long distances, wheeled forces may enjoy comparative advantage over heavy tracked armour if trafficable routes are available. Due to the simplicity of their running gear and drivetrains, wheeled vehicles require less maintenance and experience a far lower breakdown rate. They also require less fuel, and the reduced maintenance requirement in turn reduces the volume of spare parts, maintenance stores and recovery mechanics that need to accompany them. It has thus been argued that lighter wheeled vehicles provide better operational mobility when moving between positions, areas and objectives, an attribute that is written into the British Army’s Strike Concept. The truth is more complex: heavy armour is still able to move at pace over great operational distances, and can do so over worse ground, whereas wheeled armour, with its different mobility characteristics, remains competitive with its heavier counterparts at the operational level, depending on the environment.
+
+Issues of strategic mobility also need to be considered. When driving into theatre or to a forward assembly area, MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles are carried on heavy equipment transporters (HETs) for substantial parts of the journey to reduce wear and tear on the drivetrain and running gear. Long road moves are often associated with a high rate of breakdowns if heavy armoured forces need to drive without support from HETs, and those vehicles that do arrive will still incur a higher maintenance burden. MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles can technically be airlifted into a given theatre, but only the largest transport aircraft are able to carry them, and cannot transport them in large numbers. Thus for large armoured formations to arrive in theatre quickly, an unattainably vast strategic airlift capability would be needed, as otherwise such a move would be impossible within any reasonable timeframe due to the number of trips that would be required. Access to runways of sufficient dimensions (and paved to a standard to safely accept heavy transport aircraft) is also a limiting factor. Sealift is the most efficient method of moving MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles over long distances and between theatres, but this requires time and safe ports at which to offload vehicles (unless a specialised amphibious landing capability for heavy armoured vehicles is also factored in). Railway transport is also efficient, but involves similar bottlenecks to airlift, this time with regard to rolling stock and available railheads.
+
+All modes of long-distance transport for heavy vehicles still require practice if they are to be completed without unnecessary delays; no one should underestimate the inherent coordination challenge facing the combat units themselves, the logistics units supporting them and the organisations in charge of the infrastructure stemming from the distances involved and the transport volumes associated with large numbers of vehicles. Consequently, the threat posed by heavy armour is most credible when it is either forward-based or reserved for use within an operational distance of its home base. Nevertheless, it should be noted that deployment of heavy armoured forces is possible, and that medium armoured forces, particularly those built around tracked armoured vehicles (regardless of whether they are of a lighter weight) also incur many of the same costs and constraints.
+
+Protection is the one inherent attribute of heavy armoured forces that cannot be replicated by lighter combat vehicles. This protection traditionally came from large amounts of passive armour, either rolled homogenous steel or some form of composite material, which could deflect or absorb the energy from an incoming projectile. Passive armour can be angled, and is generally concentrated on the frontal aspect of vehicles in order to provide the best protection for the least weight. Some vehicles complement this arrangement with explosive reaction armour (ERA) blocks: boxes of explosives that detonate when struck with a sufficiently powerful projectile, dissipating the energy of the incoming projectile and reducing the likelihood of the armour being penetrated.
+
+Passive armour has increasingly been enhanced by active protection systems, which can be split into “hard kill” and “soft kill” systems. Hard-kill systems physically shoot down incoming projectiles. For example, Rheinmetall’s APS-Gen3 comprises short-range radars (which detect incoming projectiles on approach), electro-optical sensors (which locate projectiles immediately before impact) and an explosive countermeasure (which detonates to destroy the projectile) – this latter kinetic element could be described as a guided ERA block. Other systems, such as the Israeli-designed Trophy, fire their own shotgun-like munitions to intercept incoming projectiles. Soft kill systems are more diverse, and encompass any system that interrupts the guidance systems of incoming projectiles or the systems from which they are launched or guided. Retro-reflective detection, laser warning receivers and defensive electronic warfare systems all aid in the detection of anti-tank weapons attempting to target the vehicle. In terms of defeating the anti-tank systems themselves, lasers may be used to dazzle electro-optical sensors, while radio frequency jamming may serve to disrupt command signals between a missile and its launcher. While the technologies/methodologies of different soft-kill systems vary, they are for the most part only relevant to defeating guided systems. The promise – and limitations – of technological developments in this area will be discussed in the next chapter.
+
+In terms of firepower or lethality, modern MBTs remain one of the most potent platforms on the battlefield, particularly when focusing on direct line-of-sight or close-range engagements. This is due to the power of their main armament and their ability to carry other anti-tank weapons, all of which can quickly be brought to bear by virtue of being mounted in a stabilised turret. Jonathan House usefully split anti-tank weaponry into two categories – chemical energy weapons and kinetic energy weapons. This distinction remains valid and applies equally to weaponry mounted on MBTs, or on lighter vehicles, or carried by dismounted infantry. Chemical energy weapons typically equate to anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), although long-ranged precision fires and loitering munitions technically fit within this bracket; as these weapons are generally employed within the anti-tank role performed by other forces (with limited use by MBTs themselves), they will be discussed in Chapter 3. While MBTs do not have a monopoly on lethality, the size of MBTs as a platform means that carrying anti-tank weapons does not require them to forsake mobility.
+
+The kinetic energy weapons category essentially encompasses the main guns of MBTs, as self-propelled or towed anti-tank guns have been deemed tactically ineffective by most militaries, and man-portable anti-tank rifles are considered to be too low-powered to threaten all but the lightest modern armoured vehicles. Whether of Western or Russian design, MBT main guns now generally fire armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) rounds, the core penetrator dart being made from either depleted uranium or tungsten. While other forms of munitions can be fired, other types of specialised anti-tank round such as high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) and high explosive squash head (HESH) are less effective against modern armour. If equipped with modern ammunition, the main gun remains a potent anti-armour weapon, with the added benefit of being comparatively light, quick to reload, and cheap.
+
+MBT main guns have long been stabilised, allowing them to fire accurately on the move. This remains a significant engineering challenge, putting established defence contractors who have mastered the manufacturing of stabilised guns at a distinct advantage to competitors. Most Western MBT main guns are of 120-mm calibre, which is the approximate maximum size for a main gun round that can be handled quickly by a human loader without mechanical assistance. Any significant increase in calibre would force Western heavy armour to swap the human loader for an autoloader: this would probably require the four-person crew of commander, gunner, loader and driver to be reduced by one, a move that is considered undesirable due to workflow issues both in the vehicle itself and in the field more generally. Were the fourth crew member to be retained alongside the autoloader, MBT turrets – which are already approaching practical size limits – would have to become even bigger. Given the trade-offs involved, and bar any unexpected technological advances in main gun technology, tank main guns are unlikely to significantly increase their lethality in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, they remain potent, especially when factoring in the weight and rate of fire that an MBT can employ from its stock of onboard ammunition.
+
+Overall, the ability of MBTs to quickly cross difficult terrain and obstacles, to quickly engage successive targets (including other MBTs) in their direct line-of-sight with a highly effective main gun, and their ability to absorb punishment and continue fighting unless targeted by dedicated anti-tank capabilities, make for a potent and flexible ground combat unit. While this comes at the cost of a higher logistics and sustainment framework to support them, MBTs’ sheer combat power makes them uniquely capable not only of destroying other heavy armoured forces (if employed correctly), but of maintaining momentum while doing so. They are particularly useful, if properly employed and enabled, for offensive operations transitioning to breakthrough-and-exploitation.
+
+In practical terms, breakthrough-and-exploitation corresponds to deep battle theory (or deep operations theory, in the parlance of its Soviet authors), which emerged in the run-up to the Second World War. This was an offensive doctrine centred on striking deep into an enemy’s rear areas following the penetration of its lines and then causing sufficient disruption to prevent an enemy from moving forces to effectively plug the hole in its lines or encircle the attacking forces. Breakthrough-and-exploitation is advantageous, if achieved, in that it can overrun rear areas, and is “designed to induce systemic collapse”. If momentum cannot be sustained, offensive operations may instead aim to bite and hold objectives and ground, a less ambitious but still valid approach to operational design. Of course, these concepts of operation date to the early- and mid-20th century, and the combined arms integration required for successful offensive operations of either kind will require adaptations to be made to force design, composition and structure. While many of these adaptations relate to the changing character of war and fall upon supporting arms, MBTs and the units fielding them must likewise embrace change to stay relevant.
+
+
+### III. Challenges and Necessary Adaptations
+
+The challenges and necessary adaptations fall under several categories. Some relate to additions to the combined arms system, others to the integration of the component arms, and some to the MBTs at the core of heavy armoured forces. There are also two alternative force structures that in theory offer a warfighting capability with sufficient lethality to fight against heavy armoured forces: motorised or dismounted light forces equipped with ATGMs (but without the ability to fire them while mobile); and medium armoured forces. The utility of these alternative force structures for high-intensity warfighting is effectively a separate research question, as they are arguably in competition with heavy armoured forces. However, given that the question of their effectiveness against MBTs and heavy armoured forces overlaps with questions about the effectiveness of MBTs and heavy armoured force themselves, a brief overview is still required. More importantly, this overview encapsulates the technical challenges and adaptations required for MBTs due to the threat posed by ATGMs themselves. Armoured forces that fight on the move are mechanised, while those which fight by dismounting and working in conjunction with their infantry can be considered motorised; by this definition, for example, a Stryker brigade combat team is a motorised formation. These should be addressed as two separate but related structures, against which heavy armoured forces can be subjected to comparative assessment. Another major aspect to be addressed in depth relates to the support to and sustainment of MBT-equipped formations, an understudied area which is nevertheless fundamental to their viability. Finally, there are also issues of technological change at the platform level to be considered below.
+
+#### Pervasive ISTAR/Precision Strike
+
+A combination of pervasive ISTAR, command and control (C2) modernisation and strike capabilities through precision-guided munitions have been at the forefront of the debate about the changing character of warfare and the implications for military forces. One way that this should be countered is throug improved force protection, delivered by the adoption of new (or at least improved) capabilities and through restructuring combined arms formations. This issue has been covered extensively, and while the associated debates cannot be comprehensively re-examined in this paper, suffice to say that electronic warfare (EW), artillery and counterbattery capabilities, and short-range air defence (SHORAD) all play a role. The issue is in any case largely agnostic of force type – whether light and dismounted, or medium or heavy armoured: all force types must integrate the capabilities discussed and embrace change according to the evolving character of combined arms warfare. The one caveat is that, given that heavy armoured forces have a correspondingly larger logistics footprint and greater maintenance and support requirements than most other types of forces, they may prove particularly vulnerable to this changing battlefield dynamic if combined arms integration is not effective. There are several relevant issues to cover here.
+
+There are serious differences of opinion over the consequences of recent developments, including how to interpret the effectiveness and efficiency of C2 modernisation at moving information internally and the effectiveness of precision fires at fighting the deep battle. In the context of the difficult challenge that the deployment of uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) imposes on land forces, the debate surrounding the best way forward often loses sight of the fact that the pervasive ISTAR and precision fires complex offers quite narrow effects. Drones and precision fires face the same inherent boundaries that aviation encountered in previous eras: aviation could attack enemy forces and systems throughout the area from the frontline to the strategic deep, and have outsized effect in certain regards, but could not independently hold ground or control populations, nor have other persistent effects. Similarly, drones and precision fires, even though they constitute a distinct line of effort, are still effectively only enablers of other ground forces. What drones and precision fires have long promised – and are now able to achieve – is attrition of key capabilities, and potentially (if targeting is done properly) the degrading of the enemy military’s system of systems. Events such as Exercise Green Dagger, nested within the larger Exercise Warfighter 22, both of which took place in late October 2021, provide evidence about the potency of pervasive ISTAR, C2 modernisation and precision strike when a professional NATO force implements highly refined targeting procedures. In this instance, long-ranged precision fires cued on by a combination of UAV ISTAR and traditional forward reconnaissance patrols mauled participating ground forces, and while manoeuvre was possible during certain intervals, at other times ground combat formations that were identified while in unfavourable positions were heavily attrited, with few options available in response. Lighter ground forces experienced struggles of their own, with issues relating to attrition and a failure to maintain momentum in the close fight. Furthermore, although the impact of new technologies was concerning, it should be remembered that open desert environments provided ideal conditions for UAS, and the lopsided performance under these conditions would not necessarily be replicable in a different climate and in more complex terrain. Even in Ukraine’s Donbas region, characterised by open fields and limited cover, the extensive use of UAS – for all the changes it has wrought – has yet to prove decisive and has not pushed traditional ground combat capabilities from the battlefield.
+
+A further consideration concerns the emphasis placed on offensive capabilities without the same regard for their defensive counterparts. Following a 20-year period of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during which neither the air domain nor the electromagnetic spectrum was contested, even the exceptionally well-resourced US military has come to exhibit a mismatch between these different specialisations. While UAS and precision fires technology have been invested in and progressively refined, defensive EW, SHORAD and counter-UAS (CUAS) have received sporadic and comparatively limited attention. Of these, only CUAS has claimed a belated prominence in the discourse about the future of warfare. Forces rotating through iterations of exercises such as Warfighter are exploring how to address the issue, but the evidence suggests that, rather than this being an inherent offence–defence mismatch which favours new technologies, Western forces are simply playing catch-up and need to rebalance their capabilities and concepts of operations.
+
+One resultant avenue that is often forgotten is within the broad field of camouflage, concealment, deception and decoys (C2D2), where camouflage and concealment receive far more attention than deception and decoys. Part of this is because it is easier to build standardised technical solutions or procedures to implement camouflage and concealment. Deception, on the other hand, is situation-dependent, and requires intellectual investment and problem solving for every iteration. It is also difficult to do consistently and effectively in the absence of a nuanced understanding of the adversary’s procedures and mindset – understanding of enemy technical ISTAR capabilities alone will not suffice. Meanwhile, the cost of decoys can create disincentives to utilising them extensively in training, and there is also a risk that deception and decoys will draw too much resource and undermine the main effort. Depending on the type of decoys used, significant numbers of personnel might be needed to manage them, especially if decoy units and activities are to be convincing even when viewed with a variety of different sensors and detection capabilities. (As a basic example, an enemy might be convinced that a decoy vehicle is real when viewing it in the visual light spectrum, but its thermal signature or the lack of radio frequency activity could reveal it for what it is, meaning that an enemy with capable and diligent ISTAR specialists would likely not be deceived for long.) One solution might be to homogenise the appearance and signature of ground forces, containerising logistics, ensuring that vehicles appear as similar as possible, and adopting communications systems that disguise which nodes are of critical importance – mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) or mesh networks are a good example here, as this kind of disguise is an inherent feature of the way that they transfer data.
+
+Likewise, simulated formation-level activity in the electromagnetic spectrum may not stand up to scrutiny if cyber analysis reveals inconsistencies or a lack of concurrent activity in the social media space, as the pervasiveness of social media and the tendency of local inhabitants to naturally document any unusual activity happening in their vicinity means that such inconsistencies can be easily detected using open sources; such activity is hard to control, suppress or convincingly fabricate. Improving the D2 element of C2D2 is therefore a challenging proposition in terms of both resourcing and overall feasibility. Nevertheless, if turned into a dedicated line of effort and practised and refined on exercise, it may prove a powerful tool for creating uncertainty, slowing enemy decision-making, and causing the misallocation of enemy resources, all of which increase the survivability of ground forces.
+
+An alternative approach to force protection and C2D2 is that of counter-reconnaissance. Although counter-reconnaissance – prioritising offensive action against an enemy’s ISTAR rather than relying on passive or reactive force protection – is a longstanding concept, militaries have only partially adapted it in response to technological change. In an example that proves useful for illustrating both current challenges and potential solutions, in February 2020 the US Army’s 25th Infantry Division took part in Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 20-03, a computer-based simulation. The division found itself fighting a difficult initial shaping battle against enemy long-ranged precision fires and ISTAR assets due to attrition that these enemy capabilities were causing. Passive and reactive air defence deployed against UAS proved inadequate, and so the division approached the problem not as one of force protection but of prioritising the targeting and destruction of enemy ISTAR in order to break their kill chain. The 25th Infantry Division attempted to target different elements throughout the kill chain – the UAS themselves, dismounted forward observers, and UAS ground control stations, as the launchers for enemy indirect fires were assigned to corps-level assets. They had little success against UAS, downing some systems but being unable to destroy enough to have any overall effect. UAS ground control stations were identified as a more vulnerable element of the kill chain. The prioritisation of the counter-UAS battle, and the detection and collation of the enemy forces’ electronic and signals signature allowed the division to understand what effects they needed to apply and where, though the division’s own C2 processes proved insufficiently integrated to consistently destroy identified targets or render the enemy’s UAS network ineffective until the division could adapt and reorganise these processes. While this adaptation was taking place, the division’s ground manoeuvre elements had been badly attrited.
+
+While accepting the limitations of such simulations in terms of realism, even those as well-resourced and layered as Warfighter, and that the measures taken achieved only partial success within the duration of the exercise, nonetheless the division’s identification of the least successful line of effort (kinetic CUAS) and the most promising (aggressive counter-reconnaissance against enemy ground stations) provides a useful indicator of the direction that force restructuring and the reform of concepts of operation should take. Overall, for heavy armour to be survivable, combined arms formations need to be able, one way or another, to prevent an enemy from saturating the battlespace with UAS, disrupt or slow down the links between UAS sensors and the precision weapons to which they feed targeting information, and to retain the ability to deceive.
+
+#### Alternative Ground Combat Force Structures
+
+_ATGMs and Fighting Dismounted_
+
+In the direct fight, increasingly capable ATGMs pose the most obvious threat to MBTs. While opposing MBTs can be armed with barrel-launched or tube-launched ATGMs, the fact that ATGMs do not rely on velocity means that they can be launched from a tube, and that in theory any light vehicle or dismounted soldier can thus be equipped with an effective anti-tank weapon. The technology continues to develop, and at present the lethality of modern systems such as Javelin, NLAW and Kornet is difficult for MBTs to counter directly. The most effective ATGMs, such as Javelin, have a top-attack function whereby the missile guides itself via an irregular trajectory to strike the weaker top armour of a targeted vehicle. Top-attack munitions also have the advantage of being difficult to counter with active protection systems (APS), as these must track and calculate the trajectory of the incoming missile in order to intercept it. However, ATGMs come at a high per unit cost, and top-attack munitions are the most expensive of all (and will require skilled operators until sensor and guidance technology improves). They are also bulky and heavy for dismounted infantry to carry, not to mention the difficulties of a dismounted unit carrying more than a handful of spare missiles with it, are slow to reload compared with the main gun of an MBT, and so have severe tactical constraints, even if they are more lethal in absolute terms. In a direct line-of-sight fight with MBTs and heavy armoured forces, the operators of ATGMs can be vulnerable, although if they are well-sited and implement good battlefield discipline to minimise their visual signature, they are very difficult to spot and can be used to conduct effective ambushes.
+
+ATGM use by lighter armoured forces bears consideration, as these forces can in theory conduct offensive operations. Here, it is worth differentiating between mounted and dismounted forces. The US experience is that any medium formation that requires dismounts for lethality will be difficult to manage because of the constant transition between mounted and dismounted tactics. The British experience of exercising dismounted ATGM-armed light cavalry forces in the anti-armour role resulted in similar conclusions. Such forces are versatile and effective in defensive operations but difficult to use for offensive purposes due to the time required to manoeuvre and deploy them. In order to attack a heavy armoured force, a medium armoured force without mobile anti-armour capabilities of sufficient lethality will generally need to move to within 3 km of the enemy, advance or infiltrate on foot, and engage with man-portable anti-armour weapons. If the medium motorised force is paired with more mobile anti-armour capabilities such as heavy armour of its own, these dismounts can operate in a targeting role, but this points to their being a complementary capability rather than a substitute.
+
+There are some advantages to motorised anti-armour capabilities. On operations in Afghanistan, without tracks and with a quiet engine, Strykers were found to be able to approach targets without being detected before deploying their dismounts. However, displacement and exfiltration is difficult in general, as is manoeuvre. If a medium motorised force is committed against a heavy armoured force, the sub-units that make contact with the enemy will lose momentum and the initiative, although they will be able to hold ground and retain lethal effectiveness.
+
+In complex terrain, medium motorised forces may fit operational needs. During the Battle of Irpin in the Russo-Ukrainian War, Ukrainian infantry forces armed with ATGMs were not only lethal but also extremely mobile. However, the terrain around Irpin, Bucha and Hostomel is not conducive to armoured and mechanised mobility: the three suburbs are bounded by dense forest, and most of the open ground is part of the marshy floodplain around the Irpin and Bucha rivers, presenting a further obstacle. The village of Demydiv was one of many deliberately flooded to block Russian movement. The Russian Army did use light infantry in its attempts to manoeuvre away from the main roads, but these performed poorly. However, the battle was one of urban and forest fighting that heavily favoured the defender, and Ukrainian victory owed much to Russian planning failures – both factors being situational and not necessarily replicable.
+
+Furthermore, evidence from Ukraine suggests that fighting armoured forces is difficult and dangerous for ATGM-armed dismounted light infantry, even if they possess Javelin, one of the most effective and lethal systems currently available. If such forces are detected by enemy tank crews they become acutely vulnerable to the tank’s main armaments, which cause large numbers of casualties. The main gun of an MBT can also outrange all but the most capable of ATGMs, such as Javelin, and the evidence from Ukraine indicates that the addition of thermal shielding to Russian T90s could successfully reduce the effective range of Javelin to well within that of the vehicle’s main armament by making it harder for the command launch unit to lock on to targets.
+
+Ultimately, the presence of ATGMs on the battlefield puts pressure on armoured forces, and is driving changes to tank design (such as the adoption of APS), prompting weight increases – as will be discussed later. Conversely, the presence of armour requires the careful husbanding of anti-tank capabilities which would otherwise be useful for other tasks. For example, the British Milan ATGMs deployed in the Falklands War, which were used in an anti-fortification role and were critical to overcoming dug-in Argentine infantry and marines, would have been less available (if available at all) for those tasks had the British task force been simultaneously guarding against the threat of even a small Argentine armoured force. ATGMs pose a distinct threat, but cannot lay claim to having made the MBT obsolete.
+
+_Medium Armoured Forces_
+
+Medium tracked armoured forces require the briefest commentary, as they are most similar to the heavy armoured forces built around MBTs. They operate on the same principles, but are comparatively lighter, less protected and carry less firepower, and they have the same drawbacks (albeit to a lesser extent in some regards). RAND conducted a study of the utility of medium tracked armoured forces, and concluded that they performed well, and benefited significantly from strategic, operational and tactical mobility and a less burdensome logistics requirement, but also found that their reduced combat power resulted in less successful outcomes if they were deployed against competent heavy armoured forces. These outcomes could only be offset by either close air support and artillery dominance or by the opposing heavy armoured forces not being employed competently (and without combined arms integration of their own). This study factored in the use of ATGMs (both vehicle-mounted and carried by dismounts) by medium armoured forces. The history of US light and medium armoured forces in the Second World War, at the point when they encountered German heavy armoured forces with a significant combat power advantage in the direct fight, was not a happy one, and involved significant losses, an experience that still shapes current US thinking on the employment of MBTs. This has been termed the Sherman Dilemma, whereby a force adopts a less-capable combat vehicle with the expectation that combined arms integration will offset its disadvantages in the direct fight, only to discover that combined arms integration does not provide the expected benefits under actual operational conditions.
+
+The category of medium forces is quite a varied one. The US Army Stryker formations fit at the lower end of the category, at just over 16 tonnes; although the MGS variant was armed with 105-mm main gun, this made for a top-heavy and unstable vehicle (mechanical issues with the turret were also an issue), and this variant was eventually retired. Thus, Stryker formations remain reliant on ATGMs for lethality when engaging heavier forces. Meanwhile the British Army’s Ajax vehicles, which weigh 38 tonnes, occupy the upper end of the medium forces category. The dividing line between “medium” and “heavy” forces, in fact, is blurred, as many MBTs – particularly those of Soviet or Russian design – are considerably smaller and lighter than their Western equivalents: for example, the T90 weighs 48 tonnes, while the T72 weighs only 46 tonnes. An alternative framing might be that, given the obvious pressures on heavy armoured forces, that heavy armoured vehicles and MBTs, when they are employed, should perhaps be lighter in future. However, as will be discussed in the section on logistics, sustainment, recovery and reconstitution, adopting Soviet design principles to achieve this end would be unwise.
+
+In addition to their lesser logistical/sustainment requirements and increased deployability, medium armoured vehicles enjoy niche advantages over their heavy counterparts. Medium armoured vehicles with rapid-firing main armaments can generally hyper-elevate their guns compared with standard MBT designs, and therefore have a tactical advantage in urban, mountainous or complex terrain (noting the exception of the South Korean K2 Black Panther MBT, whose innovative suspension system allows the engagement of high- and low-angle targets)., However, when it comes to warfighting, the evidence suggests that medium armoured forces have consistently been at a disadvantage against heavy armoured forces, resulting in high losses when these two force types go head to head in the direct fight. Overall, these different force structure options are best seen as being complementary, rather than as substitutes for each other.
+
+#### Wheels and Tracks
+
+Wheels and tracks remain a recurring topic of discussion, and therefore should be briefly acknowledged. The discussion continues even though the dynamics, in themselves, are generally agreed. It has already been mentioned that more difficult terrain will generally be more easily traversed by tracked vehicles, whereas wheeled vehicles will have to move more carefully and be more selective about their route – or indeed may not be able to cross the same terrain at all if it is sufficiently difficult. The implication is that the choice of routes, tactical formations, and use of ground for cover involving both tracked and wheeled vehicles will force the formation to conform to the mobility capacity of the least capable vehicles. Alternatively, concepts of operation need to make allowances for a disjoint between the wheeled and tracked elements of the force, and accept them not operating entirely in tandem. Incidentally, different types of vehicle may also experience interoperability issues, even if they fit within the same category. For example, CVR(T), though extremely useful in Afghanistan and other theatres, suffered in the First Gulf War in large part because, on the advance in open terrain, it could not keep pace with the Challenger- and Warrior-equipped heavy armoured forces for which it was supposed to provide forward reconnaissance.
+
+Despite these challenges, wheels and tracks have often been forced to operate together out of necessity, as even the best-resourced militaries must go to war with the equipment they have available – and this sometimes involves integrating disparate platforms and units. Wheels and tracks can verifiably work together successfully. However, where it is economically feasible, states with heavy armoured forces have tried to maintain as much commonality or similarity of hull and drivetrain as possible within formations. This should remain an aspiration, if British Army vehicle fleets can be rationalised over time.
+
+#### Logistics, Sustainment, Recovery and Reconstitution
+
+Micah Clark has argued that: “An experienced tank crew is the ultimate combat power multiplier for its ability to conduct field-expedient maintenance to unconventionally repair issues that would otherwise render a tank non-mission capable”.
+
+Given the threat environment, MBTs need to remain mobile to avoid detection and targeting – but this creates dilemmas when factoring in the need to go static in order to conduct maintenance and repairs. Thorough preventative maintenance in garrison is a first step, but even with new vehicles, in good order, armoured forces require constant maintenance to keep them operational, and consume significant volumes of supplies. A squadron of MBTs requires a large amount of fuel, and heightened mobility will proportionally heighten the logistics burden for fuel resupply. Likewise, crews require rest, which the increased maintenance burden inherent in MBTs disrupts, further degrading operational tempo compared with simpler wheeled platforms.
+
+In addition to the key characteristics of protection, mobility and firepower that ground combat vehicles embody, Yoo, Park and Choi identified operability as the fourth key function. While the standing of operability as an equal consideration is open to debate, it is nonetheless important to highlight overall logistics and sustainment functions. Clark’s observation referenced above is often underappreciated, except by armoured personnel themselves, and “the often-overlooked operator’s perspective calls for the focus to fall on maintainability in the field over incremental upgrades to firepower and survivability”. Future MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles should be designed and constructed with modularity and repairability in mind, ensuring that as many repairs as possible can be completed on-site by the vehicle crews themselves, without having to recover the vehicle to a rear maintenance area or bring forward specialist repair crews; this dynamic is a much-overlooked – but critical – element in influencing heavy armour’s effectiveness.
+
+Likewise, recovery of immobilised MBTs is challenging, especially under fire, requiring well-practised and properly-equipped recovery crews if it is to be effective, but it can allow technically killed vehicles to be rapidly returned to service if they can be withdrawn from enemy contact and evacuated to forward repair facilities. Delays to recovery operations in Afghanistan for damaged Stryker vehicles could fix units for 24 hours even when recovery vehicles were readily available. Units were forced to defend what proved a tempting target for insurgent attacks, showing that the challenges of recovering and repairing heavier vehicles in warfighting conditions should not be underestimated.
+
+The Second World War, although in many regards a dated case study, provides some critical lessons. In particular, the long duration of the war means that the multiple campaign seasons, large distances covered by advancing and retreating units, and the intensity of fighting (which resulted in high levels of tank loss) can provide useful insights into questions around the extended sustainment of heavy armoured forces in the face of attrition during warfighting campaigns, even if some fundamental differences can be identified with regard to contemporary scenarios (discussed below).
+
+The Soviet experience on the Eastern Front in the Second World War was that tanks might be knocked out, repaired and returned to service as many as four times during an operation. Tanks lost in a repairable state outnumbered those which were irrecoverable by two-to-one.
+
+Wartime and post-war Soviet research found that on average during an operation which lasted 15 to 20 days the overall tank loss rate was 82% of the starting strength, with 70% of the losses being repairable and 30% of the repairable losses due to non-battle reasons such a mechanical problems or getting stuck in a swamp.
+
+After approximately 20 days of constant operation, the Soviet Army found that the breakdown rate started to escalate dramatically, illustrating the importance of preventative maintenance. If Soviet forces lost ground, the rate of irrecoverable tank losses would increase dramatically as repairable tanks – and, in the worst-case scenario, tank repair facilities and recovered tanks undergoing repairs – were overrun and fell into German hands. Recovery and maintenance personnel organic to tank formations were invaluable: not only were they well-placed to quickly conduct repairs, but – if well-led – were likely to consider themselves an integral part of the team and perform better than centralised recovery and maintenance personnel based at higher or rear echelons; moreover, additional benefits were derived from their familiarity with specific vehicles. The importance of stocks of spare parts should not be underestimated, an oversight which plagued German forces in the Second World War, as a lack of spares could turn what should have been a quick repair job into a lengthier delay as tanks spent an extended period of time in the care of a maintenance unit, awaiting the necessary parts. Another flaw in the German operation was that cannibalisation of vehicles and inter-unit competition exacerbated the system’s deficiencies and meant that more damaged or broken-down tanks were unavailable than otherwise might have been the case. Interestingly, the experience of German tank crews was that, although they were trained to conduct basic repairs and could in theory assist the dedicated mechanics, in practice (when accompanying badly damaged tanks to rear echelon maintenance facilities) some crews had a tendency to interfere with the work of the maintenance personnel and generally make a hinderance of themselves unless other activities could be found to keep them occupied. Although this dynamic is at odds with the experience of well-trained modern crews, it is worth bearing in mind for unit commanders.
+
+Gary Dickson’s distillation of the Soviet experience bears citing in full:
+
+> The number of tanks in service at any one time during a battle was very dynamic. On the minus side tanks were being destroyed or damaged due to battle or non-battle reasons. On the plus side was only the ability of the repair units to put damaged tanks back into service. Therefore the pool of damaged tanks was a great asset to a tank unit as long as they could be repaired in a timely manner. This had several significant consequences:
+
+1. As long as repair units were able to repair all or most of the tanks which were damaged, a tank unit was able to maintain its strength, only slowly weakening due to irrecoverable losses and the time it took to repair tanks.
+
+2. The faster a tank unit advanced, the farther behind the repair units lagged and the more time they had to spend moving to keep up. Both reduced the number of tanks which could be repaired.
+
+3. Retreat was a potential disaster for the damaged tank pool. With a limited number of evacuation vehicles, most tanks had to be abandoned on the field, never to be repaired. Loss of the damaged tank pool resulted in a dramatic reduction in tank strength.
+
+4. Operational pauses were critical and allowed repair units time to catch up and clear the backlog of tanks to be repaired. This, and the fact that it did not retreat and lose its damaged tank pool, is why the 5th Guards Tank Army was able to reconstitute itself after the battle at Prokhorovka.
+
+Most of these points remain entirely valid for the modern employment of heavy armour.
+
+More recent experience complements these lessons. The South African Defence Force (SADF) in the Border War provides an interesting example of an armoured force operating at reach and lacking mass, which could neither rotate formations nor reconstitute them during operations. In Operation Hooper, as the majority of the SADF’s armoured strength had been assembled, SADF Ratel IFVs and Olifant MBTs could not be replaced and had to either forgo maintenance – sometimes for up to 800 hours of combat – or be refitted at the front by their sub-unit mechanics. Both wear and tear and combat damage aggregated, whittling away at the number of available vehicles, and those that did go into combat often did so in a degraded and less effective state. This contributed to the inability of the SADF to maintain operational momentum and reinforce or exploit successful offensives. Concurrently, Cuban airpower served to limit SADF frontline resupply and maintenance. In most regards frontline combat units were kept supplied, albeit austerely, or could make do without non-critical items. However, spare parts for artillery and armoured vehicles were the two areas in which the logistics problems could not be solved through improvisation, resulting in ever-reducing capability due to the importance of armoured and indirect fire support and the heavy maintenance burden imposed on the units in question by the high and sustained operational tempo.
+
+In terms of lessons learned from recent operations in Ukraine, the majority of Russian armour losses have still been the result of poor maintenance or logistics. In the case of the Ukrainian armed forces, the majority of repairs are carried out up to 300 km away from the frontlines in order to protect irreplaceable maintenance machinery and personnel from artillery fires. While the journey from the frontline to these facilities could be only five or six hours, an impressive feat of logistics in itself, this still constitutes a major endeavour. In the summer of 2022, Ukrainian tanks that had been destroyed on the battlefield, but recovered, were being repaired in Poland at a rate of 20–30 per month.
+
+This all has implications for the current and future operational contexts for Western forces: unless formations can be furnished with ample layered air defences or the enemy thoroughly blinded by counter-reconnaissance operations, the requirement to keep major maintenance hubs safe from as much of the enemy’s precision fires as possible will probably necessitate them being based far from the frontlines. This could make tank pools less vulnerable to overrun, but would also mean that the tank pool would not be able to reconstitute armoured units as responsively as might be desired given the greater geographical distance between them and the units deployed forward. This would also increase coordination challenges and reduce the benefits of repair units being associated with frontline formations (the echelon at which maintenance units should be held). As well as creating the traditional logistics problems, this would also entail the concentration of large numbers of vehicles under repair, creating a large signature that could be detected and targeted even if located deep in the rear. Forward repair units should therefore be structured, equipped and protected in such a way as to operate dispersed and avoid developing a backlog of tanks under repair, while investment in education, training and track miles in developing crew skills will be key determinants of their ability to keep vehicles operable, enabling many repairs to be completed without the assistance of mechanics or the need for a vehicle to be recovered.
+
+In terms of the scale at which forces operate, policymakers and senior leaders should understand that in order to credibly generate a warfighting capability at a given scale – be it battle group, brigade or division – a military will require sufficient depth to rotate it with a counterpart formation. Furthermore, avoiding spending on spare parts will amount to a false economy, and one that has in previous conflicts proved disastrous on operations. A sustainable supply of a large number of spare parts should be factored into procurement and fleet management decisions, otherwise a force may be exposed to excess attrition during warfighting and will accumulate an unnecessarily high level of permanently lost vehicles.
+
+#### Changes to Tank Design
+
+There are a number of changes to tank design that can be suggested, implemented either through modifications to existing vehicles or by including them in more comprehensive upgrade programmes. Unfortunately, some of these will prove impossible to implement even within the framework of the ongoing Challenger 3 upgrade, but these could still be made at a later date.
+
+MBTs and heavy armoured forces require better ISTAR capabilities, both within and beyond line-of-sight. Beyond line-of-sight, one capability that should be integrated into heavy armoured forces is UAS reconnaissance to assist with tactical-level detection (although this point is force type-agnostic – light and medium forces equally require this capability). Within direct line-of-sight, “see-through armour” (a type of augmented reality) is promising, although literally transparent armour is far enough away from being practicable to be discounted for the moment). See-through armour involves mounting high-resolution cameras on the outside of the vehicle and using software to merge their feeds together to give the crew an expanded view that eliminates blind spots, allowing them to look in different directions more quickly than is possible with traditional sights and viewports. Given that kinetic strikes against the vehicle’s armour will quickly damage or destroy cameras, the existing series of armoured viewports and optics should not be eliminated, but see-through armour capability would still reduce the chances of MBTs being successfully ambushed or blundering into ATGM-armed dismounts without warning (both scenarios that can reduce the advantages normally held by heavy armoured forces).
+
+Refining MBTs’ onboard optics and detection systems is another important avenue of improvement. Challenger 2 remains an impressive sensor platform, with both electro-optical and thermal optics able to identify targets beyond the effective range of direct fire anti-tank weapon systems if the crew actively scans the right arcs and areas. However, upgrading the range and fidelity of sensors and, more importantly, increasing their field of view is an obvious area for ongoing improvement, and one that private industry will continue to provide new commercial-off-the-shelf options for due to the wide applications.
+
+Detection systems operating outside of the visual light spectrum should also be considered, such as laser and radar warning receivers: it is already planned that Challenger 3 will be equipped with a laser warning receiver. As this type of system can only feed data to APS or provide immediate warning of an enemy contact, other forms of sensor may also prove useful in increasing situational awareness. Retro-reflective detectors, ground-moving target indicator (GMTI) radar and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) are all options that would provide advance warning of surveillance – although these come with constraints: passive retro-reflective detection seems unlikely to be able to distinguish scopes and sensors from coincidental backscatter and reflections from other sources, particularly in urban environments, and so an active laser emitter would probably be necessary bar any unexpected technological breakthrough. GMTI and SAR systems, meanwhile, would be best mounted on an antenna and thus might only be deployable when static; these systems would therefore not give passive protection at all times, but would provide the capability to periodically scan for threats, and would require a tactical pause or short halt to do so. Note the risk of the radar emissions being detected must be factored in when considering such options.
+
+This in turn raises questions about crew and commander workload and about the echelon level at which these systems could be integrated. While a retro-reflective detection scan produces near-instant results, outside of a headquarters setting GMTI data would require artificial intelligence (AI) support to even partially automate target classification – and even then the data would still require human analysis to filter out clutter and noise. These systems may therefore be inappropriate for platform-level integration. The commander of an unmodernised Challenger 2 already has a high cognitive burden when managing a tank crew and, in the case of sub-unit commanders, also has a troop or squadron to oversee. Maintaining situational awareness while closed down takes practice, given the limited fields of view and the fact that rotation of the turret where the commander is located is independent of the position and direction of travel of the hull – even before the designation of targets, issuing of other instructions, and communicating via radio inter- and intra-echelon are taken into consideration. In addition, space is at a premium in the turret given the battle management systems already in place. This situation is unlikely to change with the introduction of Challenger 3.
+
+When considering the adoption of extra systems, one caveat is that there is limited space available in the current Challenger 2 turret for additional battle management and situational awareness equipment. In order to prevent intended improvements being counterproductive for the crew operating the platform, it would be much more preferable to undertake a wholesale overhaul of the interior ergonomics and a thorough integration of new capabilities with existing ones, rather than incrementally add systems in a piecemeal manner. It would be a mistake to add systems that require a significant level of management by tank commanders; such systems should instead be operated either by attached specialists or handled an echelon above, with data passed down, using AI support to ensure that the cognitive effect on the tank commander is beneficial rather than overwhelming. There are also serious questions about whether these technologies could be added to MBTs without increasing their weight to an impractical level.
+
+With regard to the proposition that future MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles should be lighter, John Stone argued this exact point when he noted that, although the US and the UK adopted manoeuvre warfare as the core of their warfighting doctrine in the 1980s, their MBT designs were still rooted in the 1970s in terms of size, amount of armour, and weight (60–70 tonnes). In Stone’s view, the logistics tail made necessary by this misalignment of concepts of operations and vehicle design amounted to a bloating that directly impeded the very operational tempo and mobility that the vehicles were supposed to enable. Whether Stone was correct or not, MBTs certainly cannot afford to get any heavier than they are now. Once a tank weighs above approximately 80 tonnes, the engineering and design choices required to overcome increasing ground pressure result in vehicles that are useful only for niche tasks or which are simply impractical. Even at 70 tonnes, problems abound. The Department of Defense (DoD) and US Army have in the past been at odds over whether tests indicated that weight increases had compromised the Abrams M1A2 SEPv3 MBT’s ability to cross standard bridging equipment, be carried by Heavy Equipment Transporter System (HETS), and be recovered in the event of damage or breakdown. Nor does Challenger 2 enjoy the same cross-country mobility as its smaller forerunner, the Centurion. The current balance between weight and equipment requirements may be the best balance possible given the threat environment, but seeking further protection may prove counterproductive and mobility issues should not be exacerbated, as mobility too is critical to survivability, allowing tank crews to better use ground and avoid slow movement or being forced into remaining static.
+
+Despite the potential benefits of moving to lighter vehicles, Russian design principles for MBTs, which might be characterised as being design-optimised for ease of manufacture and extreme mechanical simplicity, are probably best avoided. As Michael Kofman recently highlighted, Western platforms, particularly armoured vehicles, have proven significantly more survivable than Russian-designed and -manufactured equivalents. Despite a similar vulnerability to being mission-killed, crews are far more likely to survive and vehicles are more likely to be recoverable and repairable. This results in forces that can be organically reconstituted far more easily.
+
+Ultimately, increased battlefield lethality might make it difficult to achieve improved survivability through passive or reactive protection. Technological developments in this area might offer some promise, but also involve limitations. For example, expectations of the benefits to be derived from countermeasures such as APS should be moderated. APS have a high power demand when they are active, and some vehicles cannot provide such power. Moreover APS, when active, also involve the use of radar guidance, generating an associated electromagnetic signature that in theory could assist enemy targeting. APS are also generally single-use or quickly expended, such that a moderate volume of incoming fire can overwhelm even an effective and reliable APS, leaving the vehicle in question reliant on its passive protection systems. APS technology may provide a layer of protection, but is no guarantee of survivability against a determined or well-armed enemy. They are most effective when heavy armoured forces can concentrate and quickly overwhelm an enemy, whether that enemy is equipped with heavy armour itself or is composed of lighter forces armed with anti-tank weapons. Improved ISTAR capabilities and situational awareness technologies, coupled with concepts of operations that prioritise counter-reconnaissance, may be the best way to ensure that the MBT remains a viable platform.
+
+#### Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGVs)
+
+A final question is whether the role of the MBT can be performed by UGVs. Unfortunately for enthusiastic technologists, the answer is that the future MBT will not be able to operate uncrewed any time soon. A hypothetical head-to-head comparison with the MBT will serve to illustrate the shortcomings of UGVs. UGVs can be controlled remotely, or they can be autonomous. If they are controlled remotely, they rely on data links, which present a vector for attack – they can be hacked, or the signal can be disrupted. Alternatively, UGVs can be autonomous, but this presents its own problems – most importantly, the technology controlling the UGV’s autonomous performance must be mature and sophisticated enough for the vehicle to be useful. UGVs of both kinds will perform best if managed by human personnel nearby, and these personnel must be protected.
+
+Crewed MBTs do not suffer from any of these disadvantages. An armoured vehicle such as a modern MBT is extremely versatile: it can be employed with a great deal of precision, can operate independently for an extended period of time fulfilling a variety of different mission-sets, and can rapidly switch between these mission-sets, provided it has a well-trained and competent crew. For example, on a single patrol, an MBT crew could, if required, perform a variety of different combat missions with tactical flexibility, including patrolling, reconnaissance, attacking, and holding or defending ground. The crew can handle surrendered enemy combatants, provide limited on-the-spot humanitarian relief such as first aid or emergency supplies to civilians, and conduct maintenance on its vehicle, and do all of this independently in extremis. While an MBT and its crew are not optimised for many of these tasks, and might perform some of them poorly if unsupported or in an environment not conducive to them completing that task effectively, they could nevertheless turn their hand to different tasks as necessity dictated. This range of capabilities is a difficult standard for a UGV to match.
+
+There are, however, situations where the UGV concept can complement the use of MBTs. For instance, in tanks where the crew operates the turret remotely from inside the hull (Remote Weapons Stations, RWS) some elements of UGV technology could be leveraged, making the vehicle less vulnerable to enemy fire when taking hull-down positions. Crewed vehicles also provide useful platforms for mounting the infrastructure required to supervise UGVs and for stationing their human operators (albeit accepting that MBTs themselves currently suffer from internal space limitations, meaning that command and control of UGVs would probably have to be performed from supporting vehicles).
+
+There is some overlap between MBTs and UGVs in terms of their technology and the purposes for which they are deployed – especially when crewed tanks are fitted with systems that have elements of automation, such as improved sensors and situational awareness, and the off-boarding of hard-kill and soft-kill countermeasures. In this context it seems highly likely that UGVs will play a complementary role within heavy armoured forces rather than have a realistic prospect of replacing MBTs.
+
+
+### Conclusion and Recommendations
+
+A heavy armoured force remains the best option for high-intensity warfighting due to its combat power. While it exhibits vulnerabilities, so do all types of force structure, and facing a heavy armoured force compels an enemy to make difficult choices and places the burden of operational planning upon it if it hopes to be successful. Nevertheless, if the British Army were called on to engage in high-intensity warfighting without a significant number of MBTs, it would still be viable. A smaller, lighter, more autonomous force backed up by critical enablers in the form of ISTAR capabilities and indirect fires could maintain a high degree of lethality and pose difficult operational problems for any enemy force. However, the integration of many of these critical enablers must happen at battlegroup level and above, due to the limited capacity of company headquarters (even if assisted by advanced C2 tools that allow capabilities to be delegated) and due to the expense and inefficiency of distributing such capabilities evenly across small units. This analysis of the implications of using lighter forces raises questions about the ability of sub-units to perform offensive operations effectively due to a lack of combat power. Moreover, a warfighting capability built around a core medium armoured force would struggle to achieve its likely operational objectives were it to come up against a capable combined arms enemy force built around MBTs and heavy armour. While a medium or light force might be cheaper at a platform level, as well as more numerous and more distributed, ground combat units would suffer in the close fight, in both material and human terms. Medium armoured and light forces would be better seen as complementary to heavy armoured forces, with different formations able to cover one another’s weaknesses and augment one another’s capabilities when necessary.
+
+The British Army faces several challenges in maximising the utility of its current armoured forces. They have suffered years of underinvestment, the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 having identified heavy armour as an area of low priority. Ambitions were set low, at:
+
+> preserving the ability to reconstitute our levels of military capability in areas which are currently low priority, such as heavy armour – tanks – should international circumstances change. This means both holding in reserve certain sorts of equipment not needed for current operations and – importantly – maintaining core levels of training and experience among our personnel. This would provide us with the potential for expansion in the future.
+
+This approach has only recently begun to change amid decisions such as procuring Challenger 3 and Boxer, but many areas require investment. Consequently, there is a need to understand where resources and financial investment should be prioritised, since a complete, simultaneous overhaul of all the areas requiring modernisation is unrealistic. Critically, for heavy armour to be effective and survivable, the combined arms force as a whole needs to be able to conduct effective shaping of the battlespace to prevent saturation by enemy UAS and precision fires, and to be able to create sufficient uncertainty through deception that these enemy capabilities cannot target and attrit ground combat formations for decisive effect.
+
+Ensuring that heavy armoured units have sufficient track miles and collective field training to maintain expertise at armoured warfare is more important than any technological advance. The major determinants of whether heavy forces will prove viable given the pressures put on them will be training, skill, and, critically, motivation – that is, the human element, the moral component and the professionalism of the force, which will culminate in the continued ability to fight in a truly combined arms manner. However, beyond this, changes and adaptations are still required. At the sub-unit level, technological improvements can improve situational awareness and contribute to better tactical employment, but will have to be integrated in such a way as to not compromise the existing strengths of MBTs: off-boarding of capabilities on to support vehicles and UGVs may prove a fruitful avenue of adoption and experimentation. Future MBT designs would benefit from prioritising mechanical simplicity and repairability, and from prioritising the resilience of parts that cannot easily be repaired in the field. If weight reduction to improve mobility over difficult terrain is to be considered when modernising platforms, this should not extend to adopting Soviet design principles that trade away platform or crew survivability (although the British defence establishment is in any case unlikely to go down that route given the pattern of increasing vehicle weight and a healthy appreciation of their duty of care compared with the Russian Armed Forces). The Challenger 3 upgrade provides an opportunity to improve the design in line with at least some of the principles outlined in this paper. A critical enabler with regard to turning these recommendations into reality is an overhaul of MBTs’ interior ergonomics and the thorough integration of systems housed in the turret to ensure that crews benefit from technical improvements.
+
+The MBTs and other heavy armoured vehicles at the core of combined arms formations remain important for both warfighting and other operations, as their unmatched combat power in the close fight helps ensure that a force can remain mobile when necessary. However, the balance must be shifted away from protection and towards a greater emphasis on mobility. This encompasses both strategic and operational mobility, since mobility contributes to survivability. The success of MBTs in the Gulf War set high cultural expectations regarding the survivability and offensive lethality of MBTs and heavy armoured forces organised, equipped, trained and employed as per the Western/NATO model of the time. These expectations need to be recalibrated, as individual tanks are increasingly vulnerable on the battlefield; nonetheless, well-trained, competently led and adequately equipped heavy armoured formations, supported by the correct enabling capabilities, are mobile, lethal and exceedingly difficult to counter.
+
+Historical lessons about attrition in armoured warfare must also be relearned. Due to high maintenance requirements, crews may need to be rotated to prevent exhaustion and maintain a tempo of operations, and units may need to increase headcounts to ensure that some rotation is feasible. Heavy armoured forces need to get used to recovering and repairing damaged vehicles and replacing crew casualties as an inherent part of their operations. This also needs to be done in as dispersed a manner as possible in order to contend with an increasingly transparent battlefield and the threat of precision fires. It will be critical to maintain both recovery and repair units, as well as specialists, so that heavy armour can be quickly returned to its units after repair, with a particular emphasis on spare parts availability in the long term to ensure that vehicle losses do not translate into high rates of attrition.
+
+Crew expertise in maintenance (both preventative and curative) is essential to reduce the burden on forward repair facilities run by dedicated mechanical engineers, and will also reduce the facilities’ detectable signature, offering them greater protection.
+
+All of these measures will need to go hand-in-hand with investments in track miles and training time: the traditional qualitative superiority of the human element can make the difference between a viable and non-viable armoured capability.
+
+---
+
+__Nick Reynolds__ is the Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. His research interests include land power, wargaming and simulation.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-13-organised-cybercrime.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-13-organised-cybercrime.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Organised Cybercrime
+author: Jamie MacColl and Gareth Mott
+date : 2023-12-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/DKoADrH.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Rise of Ransomware as a National Security Threat"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This article traces the journey of the threat and response to cybercrime – specifically, ransomware, which has emerged as the most disruptive cyber threat to the UK’s national security and society today._
+
+
+
+Over the last 10 years, cybercrime has entered the realm of national security. This shift has been driven by one type of cybercrime in particular – ransomware.
+
+Emerging from the Russian cyber-criminal ecosystem in the early 2010s, ransomware today is a highly disruptive form of cybercrime that encompasses a range of tactics and techniques designed to extort ransoms from individuals, businesses and even governments. Although cyber fraud likely affects more individual UK citizens on a personal level and generates greater economic losses, ransomware is a particularly acute threat to the UK because of its ability to cause harm to nationally important services – ranging from the ability of local councils to provide social care or ensure your bins are collected to the provision of essential healthcare services. Put simply, ransomware can (and does) ruin people’s lives.
+
+Ransomware has proven to be highly lucrative for many of the criminals that participate, with UK victims paying an average ransom payment of £1.6 million in 2023 according to one survey. Large profit margins have enabled ransomware operators to reinvest revenues, expand their capabilities, and largely stay ahead of cyber defenders and law enforcement. Although the National Crime Agency (NCA) and its international counterparts have had some tactical successes against the ransomware ecosystem, absent a major shift in the cost–benefit calculus of ransomware operators, the next 10 years of cybercrime will likely continue to be dominated by this pernicious form of offending.
+
+
+### The Evolution of Ransomware: From “Spray and Pray” to Organised Cybercrime
+
+Although ransomware has existed in some form since the 1990s, it was largely non-viable as a profitable cybercrime until the emergence of cryptocurrency in the late 2010s, which enabled cybercriminals to monetise ransomware while maintaining a degree of anonymity. In 2013, ransomware was characterised by the so-called “spray and pray” model, which targeted a large number of individual users. These operations had low yields with uniformly priced ransoms for all victims.
+
+However, from 2016 onwards, ransomware began to evolve into the form that is dominant today. Ransomware operators moved away from the “spray and pray” model and started to focus on organisations rather than individuals, using tactics to deploy ransomware to thousands of computers within a single organisation to increase their leverage and therefore demand higher ransoms.
+
+In 2019, two important tactical modifications emerged that helped ransomware operators extort higher payments at greater scale. First, they became more purposeful in their victim selection. Some developed so-called “big game hunting” ransomware operations, which involves prioritising larger and therefore more lucrative victims; others focused on targeting critical services and organisations that rely on constant delivery of operations, such as healthcare providers.
+
+Second, the criminals behind the Maze ransomware operation started to steal as well as encrypt victims’ data. Other ransomware threat actors swiftly followed suit and over the last few years coercion tactics have continued to evolve, with dedicated data leak sites, leaks to journalists and harassment of employees and clients all employed as parts of efforts to make victims pay. A new cyber extortion collective made up mostly of English-speaking young men has even threatened physical violence against its victims. Our own research on ransomware harms, which is based on interviews with UK victims of ransomware, found examples of harassment of school children, healthcare patients and other vulnerable groups following ransomware incidents.
+
+Today, the ransomware ecosystem resembles something more like a professionalised industry than a ragtag network mostly active on dark web forums and marketplaces. This is not just because of the revenues generated by ransomware (which are believed to run into hundreds of millions of dollars for the most successful gangs), but also because of the growing levels of professionalisation that have developed within the ecosystem. The ransomware-as-a-service business model has enabled the specialisation of roles within ransomware operations, allowing ransomware developers to recruit affiliates who conduct operations for a cut of the profits. Ransomware is also supported by the broader cybercrime-as-a-service ecosystem, particularly services and marketplaces that specialise in obtaining and selling access to victim networks (known as initial access brokers) or monetising and laundering the proceeds of ransomware. The service-driven cyber-criminal economy enables ransomware threat actors to streamline their operations.
+
+___`The reality for many ransomware victims is that government support is likely to be very limited, with the accessible response ecosystem largely privatised`___
+
+In some cases, ransomware threat actors have developed structures more like legitimate businesses than traditional organised crime groups. The group behind the now defunct Conti ransomware operation, for instance, at one point employed between 65 and 100 salaried staff, with defined roles, HR staff and employment policies. The profitability of ransomware can make this extremely attractive, pulling more would-be cyber-criminals into the ecosystem. Ransomware therefore represents a form of organised crime that is in keeping with modern digital economies.
+
+Assessing the impact of ransomware on the UK specifically is challenging. Since 2019, 2,607 ransomware incidents have been reported to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). However, the ICO does not collect data or produce intelligence on the threat or financial impact of ransomware. Reporting to Action Fraud is believed to be considerably lower – the NCA assesses that less than 10% of ransomware incidents are reported to law enforcement. However, prominent attacks against UK businesses and critical national infrastructure providers emphasise the threat of ransomware to UK’s economy, national security and society. In 2023 alone, ransomware has disrupted the Royal Mail, one of the largest providers of outsourced services for the UK government, schools and an NHS Trust. A ransomware attack was also blamed for the permanent closure of one of the UK’s largest privately-owned logistics providers, KNP Logistics Groups.
+
+
+### A Daunting 21st-Century Challenge
+
+The emergence of contemporary organised cybercrime as a national security dilemma presents a serious challenge for the UK’s law enforcement community.
+
+This dilemma is exacerbated by a toxic combination of geopolitics and the double-edged sword presented by technological advancement. The concentration of ransomware operators in “permissive” jurisdictions with whom UK relations are relatively poor – most notably Russia – means that law enforcement’s capacity to arrest or interfere with many threat actors is limited. While a Russian cyber-criminal stated in an interview that their biggest concern was the prospect of Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Western law enforcement collaboration, this seems unlikely to materialise at the time of writing. As recently emphasised by NCA Director-General Graeme Biggar at RUSI, serious and organised crime has become more global and sophisticated, straddling the “real” and “virtual” worlds. Ransomware is – unfortunately – a perfect illustration of this phenomenon.
+
+The UK’s approach to the ransomware dilemma can be described, in part, as characterised by pragmatism. This is not to be confused with defeatism. Where possible, the National Crime Agency has collaborated with international partners on arrests of ransomware operators and affiliates outside of Russia. The UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation has also recently joined forces with the US’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to sanction known ransomware operators, representing both a form of “naming and shaming” and an effort to limit specific cyber-criminals’ ability to monetise ransomware.
+
+Aligning with a pragmatic approach to “resiliency” that underpins the National Cyber Security Strategy, the UK’s public sector cyber response ecosystem has increasingly focused on reducing the ransomware threat and supporting victims. This ecosystem includes the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the NCA, Regional Organised Crime Units and local police. Victim support is triaged through the Incident Response Framework, with technical incident support tightly rationed and restricted to organisations with the greatest national security and economic impact. A number of victims may receive support in the form of incident response coordination and advice from NCSC and/or NCA liaisons.
+
+Nonetheless, the reality for many ransomware victims is that government support is likely to be very limited, with the accessible response ecosystem largely privatised. A ransomware victim organisation may, variously, draw upon the support of firms offering incident response, ransom negotiation, external counsel and public-relations management. Organisations either pay for these services themselves or draw on cyber insurance policies. However, the recent development that some sectors – including operators of critical national infrastructure – may be uninsurable by virtue of their sector should be cause for alarm.
+
+___`Given the absence of easy solutions, it is time to talk more actively about ransomware and organised cybercrime with the public at large`___
+
+The application of triaging and general reliance on private sector incident response services is a pragmatic approach amid current economic realities; it would be impossible for the current public-sector response ecosystem to scale sufficiently to serve as a “blue light” cyber response service. However, the quality of incident response matters. The NCSC’s assured cyber incident response schemes are a positive step toward promoting best practices to encourage optimum outcomes for victims of ransomware and other cyber incidents.
+
+
+### What Should We Do Next?
+
+We write this with a degree of weariness. As active researchers in this space, we have talked, researched and written about ransomware for countless hours. Ransomware’s prominence as a cybercrime and national security threat means that this issue has consistently been at the forefront of our recent work. The UK government has also been actively talking about the issue, for instance, with the conducting of an internal “ransomware sprint”, the attendance of high-level meetings (and signing of agreements) with like-minded international partners, and the issuance of calls for evidence by Parliamentary Committees.
+
+However, given the absence of easy solutions, it is time to talk more actively about ransomware and organised cybercrime with the public at large. In a liberal democratic society, a serious societal-level threat merits mature and considered conversations in a range of accessible forums. Ransomware arguably first emerged into the UK-wide conscience in 2017, with the WannaCry ransomware attack’s impact on some NHS Trusts serving as a pronounced indication of ransomware’s capacity to disrupt core societal services. After extolling that everyone had a responsibility for cyber security, Jeremy Hunt and Theresa May were given a reprieve with Marcus Hutchin’s kill-switch. But arguably the first significant opportunity for a proper and sustained national conversation was bypassed. Likewise, pronounced disruptions at local levels – for instance, Hackney, Redcar and Cleveland, and Gloucester City councils – have not ushered in focused conversations at a national level.
+
+Such conversations could include more candid detail about the government’s place and role in the fight against this threat, in both preventative and reactive terms. Given financial and resource constraints, it is unlikely that the UK will significantly expand its technical response support for victims. But this should be conveyed to the public clearly and candidly. Recent RUSI research has highlighted a disconcerting degree of ambiguity and confusion among the public and ransomware victims about the role of government and law enforcement in this space.
+
+There is also the question of how the UK should employ offensive cyber capabilities against the ransomware ecosystem. At the launch of the UK National Cyber Force (NCF) in 2020, the UK government identified organised cyber-criminals as a potential target for offensive cyber operations. In 2022, then GCHQ Director Jeremy Fleming suggested that the NCF was now actively targeting ransomware threat actors. Given that UK intelligences agencies have been able to disrupt the online activities of international terrorist organisations – and publicly disclose elements of this interference – there is a case for more public debate about the purpose and effectiveness of these operations. However, as the US experience with using offensive cyber operations against ransomware has highlighted, such operations may have a limited effect while the business model remains intact, and should be seen as complementary rather than a replacement for a strategy that focuses on fundamentally changing the cost-benefit calculus of the perpetrators.
+
+The future trajectory of ransomware is not clear. Arguably, this form of organised cybercrime has not yet reached saturation point. While some ransomware operators have dispersed following law enforcement activity, others have emerged. Operators continue to diversify their strategies to put maximum pressure on victim organisations and adapt to improved cyber security practices among their targets (for instance, viable backups).
+
+In this context, further growth and evolution of this threat should be anticipated. While it is not possible to speculate precisely on how ransomware will evolve, the UK and like-minded partners should anticipate turbulence, continue to raise their cyber resilience, and focus on ways to make life much more difficult for the criminals that perpetuate it.
+
+
+
+---
+
+__Jamie MacColl__ is a Research Fellow in cyber threats and cyber security. His research interests include cyber security, the evolution of the cyber threat landscape, the role of emerging technologies in security and defence policy and the uses of history in policymaking. Current research projects focus on cyber insurance and cyber risks related to the Globalisation of Technology.
+
+__Gareth Mott__ is a Research Fellow in the Cyber team at RUSI. His research interests include governance and cyberspace, the challenges (and promises) of peer-to-peer technologies, developments in the cyber risk landscape, and the evolution of cyber security strategies at micro and macro levels.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-14-in-plain-sight.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-14-in-plain-sight.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4d09b2bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-14-in-plain-sight.md
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : In Plain Sight
+author: James Byrne, et al.
+date : 2023-12-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/D2LJWSV.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Operations of a Russian Microelectronics Dynasty"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_An exclusive investigation conducted by RUSI, in partnership with Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR, reveals how one of Russia’s leading microelectronic distributors, Compel JSC, has imported massive volumes of Western microelectronics through Germany and Hong Kong since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine._
+
+
+
+Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Western governments enacted a sweeping array of sanctions, stringent export controls and other policy actions designed to stem the flow of critical technology – including drones, thermal cameras, industrial machinery, semiconductors and microelectronics – to the country’s armed forces and intelligence agencies. Faced with losing access to these essential supply lines, Russia adapted, rerouting trade flows through friendly jurisdictions and bordering countries, often using complex front-company networks to evade scrutiny.
+
+Almost overnight, countries with little history of microelectronics trade became hubs for Russia’s technology flows. For example, in 2022, Armenia’s microelectronics imports from the US and EU increased by over 500% and 200%, respectively, with most of these later re-exported to Russia. Similarly, Kazakhstan’s microelectronics exports to Russia increased from around $250,000 in 2021 to over $18 million in 2022.
+
+In other cases, Russia’s importers have appeared to hide in plain sight. Since the 2022 invasion, one of Russia’s largest microelectronics distributors – Compel JSC – seems to have continued moving tens of millions of dollars in critical components through the heart of Europe and Hong Kong.
+
+Data seen by RUSI, Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR confirms that Compel appears to have dozens of customers that are subject to sanctions for connections to Russia’s military-industrial complex. To date, however, Compel has only been sanctioned by the US and Ukraine.
+
+
+_▲ COMPEL JSC, Moscow, Russia._
+
+> Compel JSC is one of Russia’s largest distributors of microelectronics, founded by Boris Rudyak in 1993. In July 2023, the US Treasury designated Compel for allegedly importing dual-use technology into Russia.
+
+> Compel appears to operate procurement networks abroad that are seemingly run by Russian nationals in Europe and East Asia who are intimately linked to the company.
+
+
+### An Electronics Powerhouse
+
+By the time the Soviet flag was lowered for the last time over the Kremlin on 25 December 1991, Boris Rudyak seems to have already had a long and storied career.
+
+Starting his professional journey as an apprentice at a vocational school in the Soviet Union’s first motor vehicle plant, Rudyak later found himself tending patients in a psychiatric hospital. As a resourceful man with many talents, he would later work for the fire brigade, as a watchman, as a cameraman, and even collecting nuts in a forest.
+
+Like many other Russians whose lives had been broadly defined by the stultifying Soviet system, Rudyak’s big break was to come shortly after its dissolution.
+
+Even before the Western-technology transfer control regime known as COCOM officially ended in 1994, Rudyak claims he was travelling to Singapore and stuffing suitcases with microelectronics for sale back home. In 1993, Rudyak officially registered Compel JSC, legitimately importing the sophisticated microelectronics that the Soviet Union was once forced to smuggle.
+
+Under Vladimir Putin’s reign, Russia’s GDP rose rapidly, buoyed by surging oil exports and the dizzying rise in global oil prices. The 2008 recession and corresponding collapse in prices, however, sent the Russian economy into a tailspin. In October 2009, Rudyak delivered a presentation explaining how the Russian electronics industry waxed and waned with the fluctuations of the global oil market. Following the precipitous oil price collapse, Rudyak claimed that Russia’s microelectronics market contracted by 40%, leaving over a third of the market dominated by military and security customers.
+
+Despite this market volatility, Compel’s Russian business seems to have thrived. From 2019 to 2021, the company imported a mean annual average of $32.2 million in microelectronics and related items. In the first seven months of 2023 alone, Compel imported approximately $29 million dollars’ worth of components.
+
+Following the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s microelectronics imports entered the crosshairs of regulators after thousands of Western-designed and manufactured components were found inside the country’s weapons platforms. As a result, many of the world’s largest microelectronic component manufacturers – including Analog Devices, Microchip Technology, Murata Manufacturing, Nexperia, NXP Semiconductors, STMicroelectronics and Texas Instruments – terminated sales into Russia, and many also prohibited their distributors from selling into the country.
+
+Seemingly undeterred, Compel continued importing thousands of shipments of components manufactured by Analog Devices, Microchip Technology, Murata Manufacturing, Nexperia, NXP Semiconductors, STMicroelectronics and Texas Instruments. Compel’s product catalogues seem to have removed a couple of these suppliers, including Texas Instruments, Analog Devices and STMicroelectronics, since the US sanctioned the Russian company.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Compel catalogue, September 2022.__ Sources: Compel’s website, RUSI._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: Compel catalogue, December 2023.__ Sources: Compel’s website, RUSI._
+
+
+### Where Do They Come From?
+
+While the number of suppliers to Compel has dwindled since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Germany-based WWSemicon GmbH and Hong Kong-based Finder Technology continued shipping to Compel in 2023 and appear to have become the company’s largest suppliers, accounting for at least 65% of Compel’s imports since 2022.
+
+Russian trade data indicates that before February 2022, Compel’s largest suppliers were WWSemicon GmbH, Finder Technology Ltd and the now-dissolved Compel International Oy, a possible affiliate company of Compel based in Finland. From January 2019 to February 2022, 98% of Compel International Oy and WWSemicon’s exports and 83% of Finder Technology’s exports were destined for Compel and Beliv LLC, another Rudyak company.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3: Compel’s annual imports and suppliers from 2019 to 2023.__ Source: Data seen by RUSI, Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR._
+
+Compel’s suppliers diversified in the lead-up to the invasion, seeming to peak at 40 companies in 2021. However, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the roster of suppliers shrunk drastically, with nearly all imports coming from only six companies. WWSemicon and Finder Technology were by far the largest, accounting for over 98% of imports.
+
+Despite trade records showing that WWSemicon continued exporting millions of dollars’ worth of components to Compel as recently as July 2023, representatives for WWSemicon told Nieuwsuur they had stopped shipments to the company “long ago”.
+
+As sanctions and export controls have complicated Russian procurement efforts, microelectronics have increasingly been routed through hubs such as Hong Kong. To restrict Russia’s access to critical technologies, the US and UK have sanctioned several Hong Kong companies for supplying Russia’s defence industry.
+
+Notably, in June and July 2023, Finder Technology shipped over $1.1 million in microelectronics to Compel under nine HS codes identified in May by the US as “high priority items” for Russian weapons systems. These HS codes cover several categories of critical microelectronics, including processors, field-programmable gate arrays, tantalum capacitors, ceramic capacitors, amplifiers and memory modules.
+
+Finder Technology did not respond when contacted by Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR.
+
+
+_▲ WWSEMICON GMBH, Munich, Germany._
+
+> From the outskirts of a residential neighbourhood in Munich, WWSemicon appears to have maintained exceptionally close ties with Compel for nearly 20 years.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4: WWSemicon’s connections to Compel.__ Sources: Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation, Russia’s Unified State Register of Legal Entities, Deutsches Unternehmens Register, Slovak Ministry of Justice’s Business Register, RUSI._
+
+#### WWSemicon GmbH
+
+While Boris Rudyak told Nieuwsuur that WWSemicon was “not part of the Compel network”, he claimed the companies engaged in “good business before the war”.
+
+However, an analysis of trade data, corporate documents, social media and other records indicates that Compel and WWSemicon have maintained exceptionally close ties for nearly 20 years.
+
+For example, WWSemicon was registered in 2005 by Russian nationals Oleg Shtots (AKA Alex Stotz) and Vladimir Avetisyan. Notably, Avetisyan is also the sole shareholder and general director of RBA-Management LLC in Russia, one of Compel’s founding shareholders.
+
+Almost two decades after WWSemicon was founded, the company is now owned by several former Compel employees, including Boris Rudyak’s daughter, who worked for Compel from 2007 to 2015.
+
+Another shareholder of the company listed their LinkedIn title as “lead developer” at Compel-SPB LLC – a company owned by Rudyak’s RBA-Group. Meanwhile, a third shareholder, who also manages the Slovakia-based WWSemicon branch, was referred to as Compel’s general director in 2021.
+
+
+_▲ FINDER TECHNOLOGY LTD, Chai Wan, Hong Kong._
+
+> Overlooking the waterfront of a Hong Kong suburb, Finder Technology has shipped millions of dollars’ worth of components to Compel, including various high-priority items for Russian weapons systems.
+
+Finder Technology was co-founded in April 2005 by the same person that founded WWSemicon in Germany, Oleg Shtots. Hong Kong registry documents from 2019 reveal that Shtots used both Russian and German passports, and that same year, he began using the name “Alex Stotz” on Finder Technology’s corporate documents. Corporate documents from 2023 for Finder Technology still list Shtots as the sole shareholder of the company.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5: Oleg Shtots using “Alex Stotz” on Hong Kong corporate documents.__ Source: Hong Kong Companies Registry._
+
+An email for Oleg Shtots listed on a Russian-language German employment forum appears in the URL of a public Google Calendar for an “Alex Stotz”. The calendar blocks off “Electronica”, a trade event in Munich, and contains departure dates of Compel from the event. It also includes meetings labelled “Boris” during one of several apparent trips to Moscow.
+
+As with WWSemicon, Finder Technology’s employee base seems to include individuals affiliated with Compel. Russian court records reveal that, in 2017, Avetisyan – WWSemicon’s co-founder – led Finder Technology’s legal representative’s office in Russia, and another employee’s LinkedIn account states that until March 2022, they were also a purchasing manager for Compel and two US-based companies, Rapid GCS Inc and Real Time Components (RTC) Inc.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 6: Finder Technology’s connections to Compel.__ Sources: Arbitration lawsuits in “Court proceedings and legal acts of the Russian Federation online database”, Hong Kong Companies Registry, LinkedIn, Meta Platforms Inc, RUSI._
+
+#### Stateside Suppliers Pre-invasion: Rapid GCS and RTC
+
+While neither Rapid GCS nor RTC appears to have shipped to Russia since the 2022 invasion, both historically shipped millions of dollars in microelectronics and related components from Analog Devices, NXP Semiconductors, STMicroelectronics and Texas Instruments to Compel, Beliv and Dadjet LLC, the latter of which is also owned by Boris Rudyak. RTC’s shipments into Russia appear to have ceased in July 2020, but Rapid GCS continued its exports until February 2022 – the month of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
+
+Both companies share a phone number and a New Jersey address, and Rapid GCS’s registered agent appears to operate an X account with the biography “Regional Purchasing Manager at Real Time Components (RTC/Compel)”.
+
+
+### Where Do They Go?
+
+While many of Compel’s customers include commercial enterprises, data seen by RUSI, Nieuswsuur and ARD MONITOR reveals that the company has received thousands of payments from dozens of Russian companies sanctioned after the invasion began. Many of these companies have extensive links to the country’s defence industry.
+
+Several companies that were later sanctioned for being part of Russia’s defence industrial base made thousands of payments to Compel from January 2022 to January 2023, including:
+
+> Testkomplekt LLC, which is sanctioned by the US, the UK, Switzerland and Ukraine. Testkomplekt is also a key microelectronics supplier for Radiopriborsnab LLC, which is ultimately owned by subsidiaries of Rostec, the Russian state-owned defence industrial conglomerate.
+
+> Staut LLC, which is sanctioned by the US and UK for supplying export-controlled technology to the Russian defence industry.
+
+> EuroMicroTech LLC (EMT), which is sanctioned by the US. EMT’s website features letters of gratitude for the “timely provision of items” from a Rostec subsidiary and a military facility founded in 2009 by the Russian Ministry of Defence.
+
+> NIIIT LLC (AKA RIIT Ltd), which is sanctioned by the US. One of NIIIT’s founders was Ostec Enterprises Ltd, a semiconductor supplier for several Russian defence entities, including an alleged manufacturer of Kinzhal hypersonic missiles.
+
+> Specialized Devices and Systems CJSC (SPS), which is sanctioned by Ukraine, Switzerland and, most recently, the EU for facilitating a Netherlands-based sanctions evasion operation. Nieuwsuur confirms that SPS lists several EU-sanctioned Rostec subsidiaries as customers, and other reports claim that SPS is licensed by Russia’s Federal Security Bureau to supply Rostec.
+
+> EKB Neva LLC, which is sanctioned by the US and Ukraine and certified by the Russian government to supply Russian military end-users. In 2020, EKB’s director was arrested for allegedly forging certificates of Western microelectronics imported for military use.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 7: Payments to Compel by sanctioned Russian customers, 2022.__ Sources: Data seen by RUSI, Nieuwsuur and ARD MONITOR, OpenSanctions, RUSI._
+
+
+### Hiding in Plain Sight
+
+Like many of the companies that have continued to import microelectronics, components and technology into Russia following the 2022 invasion, Compel appears to have been forced to reroute trade flows through jurisdictions like Hong Kong.
+
+However, the movement of millions of dollars’ worth of components through Europe, even after the invasion, unfortunately highlights the ease with which some Russian companies have continued to procure technologies that could be used by the country’s military–industrial complex.
+
+As Russia faces the prospect of a protracted conflict in Ukraine, the Kremlin is increasingly gearing up its economy for war. The Russian finance minister left little room for interpretation about Moscow’s priorities when he said in October 2023 that “the main emphasis is on ensuring [Russia’s] victory – the army, defence capability, armed forces, fighters – everything needed for the front, everything needed for victory is in the budget”.
+
+Hence, with Russia diverting all possible financial and technical resources to support its war of aggression, Ukraine’s partners should ensure that Western technology and microelectronics are not in Russia’s arsenal.
+
+---
+
+__James Byrne__ is Director of the Open-Source Intelligence and Analysis (OSIA) Research Group at RUSI.
+
+__Denys Karlovskyi__ is a Research Fellow with OSIA research group at RUSI.
+
+__Gary Somerville__ is a Research Fellow with OSIA Research Group at RUSI.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-15-profiting-from-proliferation.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-15-profiting-from-proliferation.md
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+layout: post
+title : Profiting From Proliferation?
+author: Daniel Salisbury and Darya Dolzikova
+date : 2023-12-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/XEljFga.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "North Korea’s Exports of Missile and Nuclear Technology"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This paper examines North Korean onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology, based on a review of Pyongyang’s recent technological advancements and developments in North Korea’s customer base. The authors assess the likelihood of North Korea selling its missile and nuclear technology onwards, and the kinds of technology that may be for sale and to whom._
+
+
+
+The September 2023 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un raised concerns over the possibility that Pyongyang may supply Moscow with arms to support its war of aggression in Ukraine. Subsequent reports of North Korean transfers of ammunition to Russia and unconfirmed intelligence of suspected ballistic missiles transfers solidified those concerns. While the fact of Russia – host to one of the world’s most capable military–industrial complexes – turning to North Korea for arms was shocking, it did not come as a surprise to those familiar with the latter’s long history of arms trading and missile proliferation activities.
+
+North Korea has exported missile technology since the 1980s and has, on several occasions, also transferred technology directly relevant to the development of nuclear weapons. Despite the introduction since 2006 of a progressively extensive sanctions regime against North Korea and its proliferation activity by the UN Security Council (UNSC), North Korean exports of missile and nuclear technology have persisted. Considering developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities in recent years, the range of technologies that Pyongyang may be able to offer potential customers has also expanded. These technological advances, combined with the expansion of the UNSC sanctions regime over the past two decades, as well as other recent developments – like North Korea’s apparently expanding military collaboration with Russia, Moscow’s increasing disregard for UN sanctions, and North Korea’s reopening after the Covid-19 pandemic – make a reassessment of North Korea’s missile and nuclear exports timely.
+
+This paper builds on existing literature on North Korea’s missile and nuclear proliferation, supplementing it with expert interviews and leveraging the emergence of new information and cases related to North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities and transfers over the past decade. The authors consider the potential for future missile and nuclear sales by Pyongyang, asking: how likely is North Korea to sell its missile and nuclear technology onwards, what technology may be for sale, and to whom? With a growing technological offering and a continuing need to generate hard currency, incentives for North Korea to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to foreign customers persist. As well as North Korea’s more novel technologies potentially being for sale, Pyongyang’s technological progress may also have created surpluses of older technology which it may be looking to sell off.
+
+However, despite clear supply-side drivers, there are a range of restraining factors that are likely to prevent an all-out onward proliferation bonanza emanating from North Korea. A variety of factors have whittled down the potential markets for these technologies, while the restrictive sanctions landscape and unprecedented monitoring of the Korean peninsula have also worked to reduce opportunities for sales and increase the risks posed by interdiction. North Korean concerns over the possibility of its more advanced capabilities falling into adversary hands, thus potentially putting its own deterrent at risk, are also likely to temper its willingness to export such capabilities, despite the potentially high price tag that could be attached to them.
+
+The changing geopolitical landscape resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may, however, open new opportunities for North Korea. Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea could give other countries the green light to accept North Korean arms, missiles and perhaps even nuclear technology. There remains a real risk of a broader collapse of the UNSC sanctions regime and the resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.
+
+Building on the analysis of North Korea’s expanded technological offering, reduced customer base and other factors affecting export decisions – and the clear need to pay attention to the issue – this paper presents 10 recommendations to help in countering North Korean missile and nuclear technology proliferation. These recommendations are organised in two categories, which attempt to address the supply side of the problem – deterring, dissuading and encouraging North Korea to refrain from engaging in onward proliferation – as well as demand-side factors – by trying to reduce North Korea’s customer base.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+In September 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un travelled by armoured train to Russia’s far east to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Kim’s visits to the Vostochny Cosmodrome and a fighter jet factory in Komsomolsk-on-Amur further raised existing concerns that the two countries were seeking to exchange military technology. Indeed, recent research has confirmed that hundreds of shipping containers, likely carrying ammunition, have been moved from North Korea to Russian military bases since the leaders’ meeting. The meeting was preceded two months earlier by the visit of Russian and Chinese delegations to North Korea to mark the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice, with officials from Moscow led by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. Russia and North Korea – both countries under extensive international sanctions and with acute military equipment needs – put on a strikingly united front. Notably, Shoigu was treated to a defence exhibition featuring many of North Korea’s newest weapons systems – including UAVs, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and even ICBMs. In November 2023, South Korean intelligence publicly shared its suspicions – otherwise unconfirmed – that North Korea may have already sent SRBMs to Russia.
+
+Pyongyang has long been an exporter of missile and nuclear technology; this has included exports of Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) to Iran and Pakistan in the 1990s, Scud SRBMs to a range of customers (largely in the Middle East) through the 1980s and 1990s, as well as nuclear reactor technology to Syria, and uranium hexafluoride gas to Libya in the early 2000s through the proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan (Boxes 1 and 2 summarise North Korea’s historical trade).
+
+North Korea’s exhibition of missiles to Shoigu is far from the only indicator that Pyongyang remains open for business to countries looking to procure missile and even nuclear technology. Reporting by the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 Committee Panel of Experts (PoE) has noted that Pyongyang has engaged in missile cooperation with Iran and Syria as recently as 2020 and 2019, respectively. A 2020 documentary film of unclear veracity entitled The Mole also showed an actor – playing the part of a private arms dealer – venturing to Pyongyang undercover in 2017 and being offered a wide range of short- and even intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). While most of the handful of known nuclear technology transfers by North Korea date back two decades, the last publicly known case of North Korea offering nuclear-weapons-relevant materials on the open market – in that instance, the isotope lithium-6 – was uncovered just six years ago.
+
+North Korea has engaged in these transfers despite an expansive UNSC sanctions regime that prohibits most trade with the country, including a prohibition on trade with the country in missile and nuclear technology, and most types of arms, in place since 2006. Pyongyang’s advancements in its nuclear and missile capabilities have had an impact on what, how and to whom North Korea may sell its nuclear and missile technology in the future. Its experience in identifying customers and engaging in illicit trade under the international sanctions regime over the past two decades will also have influenced its patterns of onward proliferation.
+
+Developments in the international sanctions regime and North Korean missile and nuclear capabilities, as well as changing geopolitical dynamics, necessitate a re-examination of North Korean onward proliferation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has resulted in the widening of existing schisms in the international community, with countries opposing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on one side, and those that have supported Russia or remained ambivalent on the other. Those in the latter camp, which includes North Korea and Iran, appear to have found in Russia a willing trading and diplomatic partner as Moscow seeks to reduce its isolation. This study is thus particularly timely in light of the recent high-level meetings between Pyongyang and Moscow, and the more general apparent expansion of relations between the two countries, as well as other developments – such as the gradual reopening of North Korea’s borders following the Covid-19 pandemic, the expiry in October 2023 of the UN Security Council (UNSC) embargo on trade in nuclear-capable missile technology with Iran, and the expiry of UNSC proliferation-related targeted financial sanctions on Iran.
+
+The paper builds on existing academic literature, expert analysis and case studies relating to North Korea’s onward proliferation of nuclear and missile technology by considering how what is already known about North Korean transfers of nuclear and missile technology may have been – or may in the future be – impacted by some of the technological, economic and geopolitical developments outlined above and throughout the paper. Based on this analysis, the authors explore developments relevant to already-identified factors, as well as emerging ones, that shape whether Pyongyang may transfer its nuclear and missile technology, and what wares North Korea may transfer, and to which client states.
+
+#### Existing Literature
+
+While some previous work has considered North Korea’s onward proliferation, the literature is limited and much of it is more than a decade old. Much of the existing literature on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes has focused on developments in its nuclear and missile capabilities, Pyongyang’s revenue-raising efforts under sanctions, and its procurement of WMD and military technologies. More broadly, discussion of the threat posed by North Korea’s weapons programmes has focused on denuclearisation and (more recently) deterrence, rather than on the threat posed by onward proliferation.
+
+The most insightful and in-depth work on North Korea’s onward proliferation was published by Joshua Pollack. In 2011, Pollack examined North Korea’s missile sales and how these had changed since what he called the “Golden Age” of North Korean missile exports in the 1980s. Pollack observed that Pyongyang had shifted – with some exceptions – from supplying complete missile systems to transferring parts, materials and expertise instead. He also noted that North Korea was moving its focus towards cooperation in joint missile development and production with a smaller number of countries – particularly Iran and Syria – as opposed to transferring full missiles to a range of customers. Pollack argued that these shifts stemmed from market saturation for North Korea’s missile offerings as a result of past missile transfers and requirements for components and maintenance services from past customers. He also attributed this shift to a deprioritisation of ballistic missiles among some potential customers, particularly in the Middle East, in favour of Western-supplied piloted aircraft, cruise missiles and missile defence systems, and pressure from the US to curtail engagement with North Korea. As the authors outline in this paper, some analogous factors appear to be impacting on more recent supply and demand drivers in North Korea’s onward proliferation.
+
+Pollack also examined North Korea’s nuclear exports, arguing that Pyongyang seems to have prioritised technological exchange instead of currency generation in the limited number of known transfers of its nuclear technology. However, Pollack also argued that Pyongyang may seek to leverage its nuclear expertise and technology for revenue generation in the future. Naturally, his work relied on the data available to him over a decade ago; since then, additional cases and data points on North Korean missile and nuclear exports have afforded greater understanding. The present-day utility of other works in understanding the phenomenon of North Korean onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology has been even more limited by their age. Others studying North Korean onward proliferation have limited their study to discrete aspects, such as transfers to non-state actors, or China’s role.
+
+This paper has also benefited from research on adjacent topics such as North Korea’s arms exports and sanctions evasion networks. Notably, in her 2016 book, Target Markets: North Korea’s Military Customers in the Sanctions Era, Andrea Berger identified a range of factors driving demand for North Korean military goods, considering customers in three categories: “resilient” customers with deep political and military ties to Pyongyang, “reluctant” customers with few other options in terms of suppliers, and less committed “ad hoc” customers. Berger’s work highlights the unique nature and context of specific relationships and their developments, which has helped to inform some of the analysis in this paper. Others have considered the role of specific entities in North Korean proliferation activities and procurement networks. However, no study in the past decade has revisited the question of North Korea’s onward missile and nuclear proliferation activities.
+
+#### Key Arguments, Research Methodology and Structure
+
+Given its growing technological offering and continuing need to generate hard currency, North Korea has significant incentives to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to other states. Surpluses created by technological advances may also be available for sale. However, despite clear incentives to proliferate, a range of factors that work to constrain North Korea’s sales are likely to prevent an all-out onward-proliferation bonanza. Many of these drivers and restraints, discussed in the literature, continue to shape North Korea’s onward proliferation activity.
+
+Furthermore, the changing geopolitical landscape – particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – may provide new opportunities for North Korea. Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea may give other countries the green light to breach UN sanctions and accept North Korean arms, missile or even nuclear technology. There is a real risk that such developments could lead to a resurgence of the North Korean arms and missile export enterprise.
+
+In re-examining the topic and building on others’ work, the authors were able to consider a wider range of data, as new material has become available over the past decade. Part of the reason for limited research on North Korean onward proliferation is the methodological challenge inherent in the study of Pyongyang’s proliferation activities. The extreme opacity of the North Korean economy, its regime and policymaking process makes the country a challenging target for researchers. Like any other country, North Korea guards the details of its military programmes – including procurement, technological developments and exports – particularly closely, making the study of its nuclear and missile matters especially difficult. Partial data on specific cases most often becomes available with a significant time lag, following interdictions of technology, the discovery of major proliferation rings such as the AQ Khan network, or in reports on the movement of North Korean technicians to customer states.
+
+More data on North Korean missile and nuclear developments and transfers is available than ever before. The UNSCR 1718 PoE has produced almost 20 detailed public reports since it was established in 2009, rich in details on North Korea’s sanctions evasion activities and illicit networks. Pollack’s work was largely unable to benefit from this data, which has provided insights into North Korea’s missile relationships with Egypt, Iran and Syria, as well as its dual-use technology exports. Increased access to open source data by investigative journalists, think tank analysts and academics has also led to the proliferation of analysis on NorthKorean capabilities and sanctions evasion.
+
+The authors have supplemented the information available in public sources with 20 semi-structured interviews conducted with experts through video conferencing and in person in London between June and early August 2023. Interviewees included former government officials and former members of the UNSCR 1718 PoE, as well as academics and other researchers working on matters related to North Korea’s nuclear, missile and broader military programmes, North Korean domestic, economic and security policies, and broader Asian security issues. Interview questions were tailored to each expert’s respective area of knowledge, but broadly focused on North Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes, proliferation activities and networks, domestic and foreign policies, and international efforts to counter North Korean proliferation. The interviews allowed the authors to gauge current views on the state of North Korea’s onward proliferation enterprise and to test hypotheses as they were developed over the course of the research.
+
+Given the methodological challenges in studying matters related to the North Korean missile and nuclear programmes, and the dearth of current data on the subject, interviewees often had to caveat their assessments, noting that they were based on limited data and assumptions and were thus speculative. Consequently, the authors extend the same disclaimer to the findings outlined in this paper. Nevertheless, common themes in interviewees’ assessments emerged and these were supported by further research, allowing the authors to confidently formulate their conclusions.
+
+The authors’ analysis is presented across two main chapters. Chapter I considers recent developments in North Korea’s technological offering and assesses which technologies may be of interest to customers. Chapter II outlines the likely factors influencing North Korean decision-making on whether to transfer its nuclear and missile technology, and how these may have evolved in recent years. The paper concludes with 10 recommendations to address supply of and demand for North Korean missile and nuclear technology.
+
+> #### `Box 1: North Korea’s Historical Missile Sales`
+
+_`North Korea has long acted as an exporter of ballistic missile technology – particularly SRBM systems. According to one estimate, North Korean supply made up around 40% of the ballistic missiles supplied to the developing world between 1987 and 2009; more than 500 missile systems in total.`_
+
+_`The genesis of North Korea’s own missile programme was the transfer of Soviet-design Scud SRBMs from Egypt in the 1980s. North Korea in turn supplied the Scud system – and related components – to a wide range of customers, many based in the Middle East. This included Iran, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen and the UAE. North Korea also transferred Scud missile technology to Myanmar and Vietnam in East Asia.`_
+
+_`Pyongyang transferred Nodong MRBMs, a scaled-up version of the Scud SRBM, to Iran and Pakistan in the 1990s. Both states’ programmes have advanced far beyond this early North Korean assistance – as is the case for a number of North Korea’s earlier customers.`_
+
+_`North Korea has also transferred IRBM technology to Iran and has allegedly offered IRBMs to private arms dealers in the past.`_
+
+> #### `Box 2: North Korea’s Historical Nuclear Sales`
+
+_`The authors are aware of just four cases in the public domain of North Korean transfers of technology pertaining directly to nuclear weapons capabilities, from the 1990s to 2016.`_
+
+- __`Nuclear trigger technology to Pakistan.`__ _`North Korean technicians assisted Pakistani weapons scientists in producing krytrons – components used to trigger a nuclear device – in the mid-1990s. This was part of a series of technological deals between the two states, with Pakistan receiving complete missiles and parts from North Korea, as well as North Korea receiving centrifuge technology, and its technicians training in Pakistani facilities.`_
+
+- __`Uranium gas to Libya.`__ _`In December 2003, after the revelation that Libya was purchasing a centrifuge enrichment plant from the AQ Khan proliferation network, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors in the country were shown three mystery cylinders of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), a uranium gas that is fed into the centrifuges during the enrichment process. US analysis of contamination on the outside of the cylinders showed that they had originated in North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Centre. The IAEA later stated that the 1.7-tonne shipment was the first of a larger planned series of transfers of 20 tonnes between North Korea and Libya brokered by Khan.`_
+
+- __`A reactor for Syria.`__ _`North Korea worked with Syria to construct a nuclear reactor near Al-Kibar in Syria between the late 1990s and 2007 (when the site was bombed by Israeli aircraft). The reactor – the most extensive example of North Korea’s nuclear exports in the public domain – was a smaller-scale version of North Korea’s 5-megawatt (MW) graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon. Intelligence reports suggested that the reactor would have been capable of producing plutonium for one or two weapons annually, had it been fuelled or gone critical.`_
+
+- __`Sale of thermonuclear weapon isotope online.`__ _`In 2016, an open source investigation revealed an advertisement for lithium-6. Lithium-6 is an isotope that can be used in thermonuclear weapons – either directly, or by irradiating it in a reactor to produce tritium. The advert was posted openly on a business-to-business (B2B) website and listed a phone number linked to the North Korean embassy in Beijing.`_
+
+
+### I. North Korea’s Current Technological Offerings
+
+North Korea has acquired and developed – and therefore could potentially export – a wide range of missile and nuclear technologies. This potential technological offering has expanded over the past decade as North Korea has advanced its missile and nuclear capabilities – both indigenously and through acquisition of technology from other countries. While the offering has expanded, the fundamental range of options for transfer has not changed, and includes everything from fuel cycle facilities and complete missile systems to capabilities for building these facilities, individual dual-use goods and components, as well as expertise relating to elements of missile production, and to the nuclear fuel cycle or to weaponisation. Table 1 summarises some of the main types of transfers North Korea could consider (there is evidence of past exports across all these categories, except for the transfer of complete nuclear warheads).
+
+North Korea’s developments in nuclear and missile technology over the past decade could have a dual effect on its supply of technology. First, newly developed capabilities – which are more attractive to a wider range of customers – could be transferred. Second, the replacement of older designs and systems with newer, higher-quality or more capable ones could create surpluses of older systems, goods and expertise that could be exported. These surplus items may be appealing to a different subset of customers – those with less ability to absorb technology, lower capability needs, limited budgets or perhaps similar older systems in need of spare parts or interoperable systems. At the same time, North Korea’s expanding catalogue of missile systems and nuclear capabilities raises the question of whether it could now consider a sub-set of this catalogue of technologies to be too strategically important for its own security for them to be transferred to customers abroad. These security concerns are explored further in Chapter II.
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: North Korea’s Potential Missile and Nuclear-Related Offerings.__ Source: Author generated._
+
+#### Missile Technology Offerings
+
+Historically, North Korea has mostly exported short-range, and sometimes medium-range, ballistic missiles. Could recent developments in its short-, medium- and longer-range ballistic missiles create new sales opportunities?
+
+_Developments in SRBM and MRBM Capabilities_
+
+North Korea has debuted a series of solid-fuelled SRBMs since 2018. Although the exact specifications of the systems – some of which have multiple variants – are unclear, they will likely replace the liquid-fuelled Scuds and Tochka-type systems in North Korea’s arsenal, and potentially also in its sales catalogue.
+
+North Korea first revealed the KN-23 solid-fuelled SRBM during a 2019 parade. Since then, several variants have been developed, including smaller shorter-range and larger longer-range versions. KN-23 variants have been developed for deployment on a variety of platforms, such as road mobile transportable erector launchers, underground silos, railcars, submarines and underwater silos. The KN-24 – another solid-fuelled SRBM, with a range of around 400 km – was also unveiled in 2019. A further 2019 debut, the KN-25, is a solid-fuelled system described in North Korean media as a “super-large multiple rocket launcher”. It has four launch tubes on each launcher, and a range of up to 380 km.
+
+These newer solid propellant missile systems could appeal to customers for several reasons. Beyond their quicker time to launch, solid-fuelled systems are easier to operate than liquid-fuelled ones (which require greater expertise for maintenance and handling of highly explosive, corrosive and toxic fuels). Older liquid-fuelled systems also require the procurement of a range of support vehicles and handling facilities – increasing the human and financial investment required. North Korea has also recently shown signs of exploring ampulisation technology – a set of measures to ensure maintenance of liquid-fuelled missiles in combat readiness for longer periods of time. This could both make a more appealing product, overcoming some of the shortcomings of liquid-fuelled systems, and see North Korea find ways to reduce the maintenance burden and investment required by customers for liquid-fuelled products.
+
+_Developments in IRBM and ICBM Capabilities_
+
+North Korean advances in missile technology that have received the most media attention relate to the country’s long-range systems, such as IRBMs and ICBMs. This includes the KN-17 IRBM, successfully tested in 2017; the KN-26 medium- range submarine-launched ballistic missile, successfully tested in 2019; the KN-28 (Hwasong-17) ICBM, successfully tested in 2022; and, most recently, the Hwasong-18. The latter, debuted in February 2023 and successfully tested in April, is North Korea’s first solid propellant ICBM – a significant development in its strategic capabilities.
+
+Some have suggested that Pyongyang may consider transferring some of its longer-range missile systems to customers abroad. Indeed, North Korea did transfer IRBMs to Iran, which were likely based on imported Soviet missile technology. However, the strategic significance of these systems to North Korea’s own defence – and the insights they could betray into North Korea’s technology (including the state of its missile capabilities and domestic production capability, or reliance on foreign components) – may disincentivise Pyongyang from transferring them to others. The strategic importance that North Korea places on its missile capabilities, as well as the limited opportunities for intelligence collection on these systems by external actors, may make Pyongyang sensitive about having these capabilities fall into the hands of an adversary. Similar considerations could be applied to the Hwasong-8 carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle, which – while being an SRBM – has strategic significance for Pyongyang that could make transfer less likely. Although, as some of the experts interviewed for this project noted, any missile technology might be for sale for the right price, and Pyongyang may not care about its technology being intercepted provided it has received payment from the customer. These competing security and economic considerations are discussed in more detail in Chapter II.
+
+The potential customer base for longer-range missile systems is also limited. There are few countries that would benefit from an ICBM capability (which suggests the need to hold at risk an adversary further than 5,500 km away) who have not already shown some interest in developing these systems domestically. The relationship between ICBMs and nuclear weapons, in which one technology often necessitates the development of the other to have strategic value, also reduces any potential customer base. Iran may be the most obvious exception, and would likely benefit from further collaboration with North Korea on long-range missile technology (albeit probably without the transfer of complete long-range missile systems), and is a case discussed further below and in Chapter II.
+
+_Potential for Surplus Sales_
+
+There is also a risk that North Korea may export surplus older systems, notably those based on liquid-fuelled Scud or Nodong technology that are likely being replaced (or may be in future) by newer solid-fuelled systems. North Korea used to frequently parade these missiles, but a system based on Scud or Nodong technology has not appeared in a parade since 2017. The KN-02, an early North Korean-manufactured version of the solid-fuelled Soviet OTR-21 Tochka missile, which was first unveiled in 2007, has also not been paraded since 2012.
+
+While it remains unclear how many newer systems North Korea has been able to deploy, the apparent phasing out of older missile models raises questions as to what might have happened to these older systems, and whether surpluses could be for sale. Arms marketing material of unclear veracity handed over in the 2020 undercover documentary film The Mole included Scud C and Nodong (marketed as Scud E) systems and supporting vehicles allegedly for sale, as well as a system described as “Tochika-U”, likely the KN-02.
+
+Surplus missile technology – including full missile systems, spare parts or components – may appeal to customers still operating Scud- or Tochka-type systems (see Table 2). However, this group of states is declining in size, with the returns of maintaining such aged technology diminishing, if not already non-existent – particularly if states have access to more modern options in the form of more advanced missiles or UAVs. The two states that received North Korean Nodong-type missiles in the 1990s, Iran and Pakistan, both indigenised the technology and have since progressed in their own programmes, although surplus Nodong-type systems could potentially be of interest to new customers.
+
+
+_▲ __Table 2: States Holding Scud and Tochka Technology.__ Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2023 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2023) and a survey of other open source information. Note: Current data is difficult to compile – but inclusion in this table suggests that there is either evidence these countries currently operate these systems, or little evidence to suggest that the capability has been retired._
+
+Surpluses created by the superseding of North Korea’s Scud fleet could lead to parts being available for sale. Evidence of North Korean trade in spare parts for these older systems, though, is dated. A 2013 shipment of Scud parts originating in North Korea, including connectors, relays, voltage circuit breakers and a barometric switch, was interdicted en route to Egypt from Beijing. North Korean markings were visible on two of the items – suggesting manufacture in North Korea. Egypt has continued to maintain and operate Scud systems, and it is not out of the question that more recent (and successful) shipments of spare parts and components have occurred.
+
+North Korea may have other uses for its surplus missiles besides sales – including recycling, cannibalising them for materials, parts or components, mothballing them for future contingencies, or launching them in provocations. The war in Ukraine may also yield lessons. As one interviewee pointed out, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the continued value of short-range systems on the battlefield, and this may lead North Korea to retain older systems in great numbers for future contingencies.
+
+_Collaboration in Missile Development_
+
+Due to the sanctions environment and an evolving customer base, North Korea’s missile proliferation behaviour has largely adapted from the shipment of full systems towards the provision of spare parts, materials and technical support. As an unnamed UN member state noted to the UN PoE in 2019, “Instead of exporting full missile systems, the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) is sending technicians to a buyer country and establishing a complete supply chain”, noting that this pattern had been seen in Egypt, Iran and Syria.
+
+Missile collaboration with Syria has been ongoing for many years. North Korean technicians were reportedly involved in the upgrade of the Scud D to create a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle in 2008. A delegation of Syrian engineers allegedly spent six years in North Korea from 2011 to 2017, and further exchanges took place around 2016, with a group of North Korean missile technicians staying on a Syrian airbase. North Korea has also supplied missile-related components to Syria as part of its collaboration with the country. Five containers of commercial items (many with applications in Scud missiles) originating in Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Denmark, Japan and the US were seized by an unnamed state while being shipped to Syria from Dalian, China in 2014. The PoE also noted in 2015 and 2016 that a Syria-based official from North Korean arms exporter Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) imported ball bearings and fibre optic cables, as well as bringing in three North Korean technicians.
+
+North Korea’s missile collaboration with Iran has involved higher-end missile technology, given that Iran has a large (and expanding) missile industrial base and export capability of its own. Collaboration with Iran has not always been smooth sailing, with trust levels taking a significant hit after North Korea supplied the BM-25 Musudan IRBM, a missile with significant technical issues. US information suggests that over recent years there has been further collaboration on technology that is potentially of use in longer-range systems.
+
+A 2016 sanctions notice suggested that North Korean technicians were collaborating with Iranians on an “80-ton rocket booster” being developed by North Korea. The notice stated that Iranian technicians from liquid-fuel missile producer SHIG travelled to North Korea for this purpose and named individuals who had travelled to Pyongyang for “contract negotiations”. It also suggested that KOMID had made shipments of missile-related goods to Iran, including “valves, electronics and measuring equipment suitable for use in ground testing of liquid propellant ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles”. Further information on this collaboration was included in a 2021 UN PoE report, which noted that North Korea and Iran had “resumed cooperation on long-range missile development projects”, with the report focusing in particular on the development of a space launch vehicle (SLV). This collaboration included the “transfer of critical parts” and 13 North Koreans were named who had travelled to Iran to support KOMID’s work. The report also noted the high level at which such engagement was signed off within Iran, naming senior SHIG and Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) officials, and noting that the current director of AIO was a “key player in negotiations” when he had been the SHIG director.
+
+#### Nuclear Technology Offerings
+
+Short of the transfer of a complete warhead – something that all experts interviewed for this paper suggested was highly unlikely – there is a range of other nuclear-related technologies that North Korea could transfer. For instance, Pyongyang could sell nuclear material or isotopes, with a range of options short of weapons-usable fissile material. However – beyond the transfer of dual-use technologies with applications relevant to the production of nuclear weapons – the transfer of nuclear-weapons-relevant technology, nuclear material and other relevant isotopes was judged relatively unlikely by experts interviewed for this paper, for a number of reasons outlined further below. Nevertheless, previous North Korean transfers of nuclear technology – including reactor technology, nuclear materials, and even weaponisation technology (see Box 2) – suggest that the possibility for future transfers exists.
+
+While US government assessments have suggested that North Korea likely has an arsenal of “up to 60 nuclear warheads”, there are significant gaps in public knowledge about the state of its programme and stockpile. Early attention to North Korea’s nuclear programme focused on the plutonium aspects of the fuel cycle and the 5-MW reactor at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre. While it was suspected that North Korea may have uranium enrichment capabilities, the plutonium programme was, for a long time, the only publicly known North Korean nuclear weapons pathway. This changed in 2010, when a US delegation, including former Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Siegfried Hecker, was shown a centrifuge facility at Yongbyon. There have been no further public reports of foreign access to North Korea’s nuclear facilities since.
+
+Uncertainty persists regarding other potential enrichment facilities, the numbers and types of centrifuges North Korea may be deploying, and many other details about its uranium and plutonium fuel cycles and weaponisation processes. The limited number of recently seized shipments of goods or materials destined for North Korea’s centrifuge programme or other parts of the country’s nuclear weapons programme also restricts public understanding of the programme and how its recent development may have shaped North Korean nuclear wares available for sale.
+
+_Reactor and Enrichment Technology_
+
+Although North Korea has shown a willingness to transfer reactor technology in the past – namely, in its provision of assistance and materials for the construction of the Al-Kibar reactor in Syria – it would be incredibly risky for North Korea and any potential customers to engage in a further reactor construction project. Any such project would be relatively easy for foreign intelligence agencies to detect using a variety of human, signals and technical means. Reactors are large construction projects that are visible in open source satellite imagery. Even if the reactor being constructed were relatively small (as in the case of Al-Kibar), and even if most of the necessary physical materials could be sourced overseas, the development of such a structure would almost certainly be noticed by various national intelligence agencies, the IAEA or even open source analysts using commercially available satellite imagery, drawing significant scrutiny. As in the Al-Kibar case, other intelligence sources – such as human and signals intelligence – would likely reveal any North Korean involvement.
+
+Centrifuge enrichment technology perhaps offers greater opportunities for export, as demonstrated by the AQ Khan network’s sale of centrifuges and related technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya in the 1990s and 2000s. The transfer of centrifuge capabilities could range from a small number of machines with associated expertise to a full turnkey centrifuge facility, and could be harder to detect than the construction of a reactor, given that facilities can be constructed covertly underground and that they lack the distinctive visual signatures of a nuclear reactor. However, the construction or expansion of such facilities in past instances has also been monitored using open source satellite imagery in the context of North Korea, Iran and other states. Disassembled shipping – consisting of many shipments of largely benign-looking industrial goods and materials (as seen in some of Khan’s transfers of enrichment technology to Libya) – could also make detection difficult. However, greater awareness of the risks posed by the transfer of centrifuge technology among customs and intelligence agencies following the Khan case, as well as the enhanced ability of NGOs to collect and monitor data on illicit trade activity, could mean that multiple connected shipments would be detected more readily.
+
+Limited knowledge of North Korea’s centrifuge technology makes it difficult to assess whether it has old surplus centrifuge models it may want to sell and/or whether it possesses newer technologies that are more appealing to customers. During his 2010 visit, Hecker observed a facility with around 2,000 machines that appeared to be based on the Pakistani P-2 centrifuge model, and fabricatedwith rotors made from “alloys containing iron” according to one North Koreanengineer – interpreted by Hecker to mean maraging steel. As some analysts have noted, that North Korea is still operating these P-2 type machines is “an assumption that should be treated with caution”. Indeed, a paper published by a North Korean scientist indicates at least some interest in more advanced models of centrifuges. Taking the Iranian nuclear programme as a point of comparison, Tehran has developed multiple generations and models of centrifuges in a similar time span. It would be reasonable to assume that North Korea could have made comparable progress. However, the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and the motivations behind it are different from those of North Korea: Iran is more focused on publicly displaying its technical capabilities and trying to create leverage in the context of diplomacy over its nuclear programme, while North Korea is likely focusing on improving the efficiency of its centrifuge technology to expand its fissile material stocks and nuclear arsenal, with no public communication aspect – at least for the time being.
+
+Movement towards more advanced models would suggest that North Korea has developed domestic advanced centrifuge production capabilities and may indicate that there are fewer chokepoints for the sub-technologies required for production. Full centrifuges (whether more or less advanced) or constituent dual-use technologies (discussed further below) could both appeal to customers. However, the extreme secrecy surrounding this aspect of North Korea’s programme would make the practicalities of marketing and sharing this technology difficult and risky for North Korea, as the interdiction of shipments could provide significant insights into Pyongyang’s programme. Development of more advanced centrifuges could also create surpluses of older machines and spare parts – items that Khan’s network tried to provide to Iran and Libya, with mixed success.
+
+_Intangible Nuclear Transfers_
+
+Beyond the transfer of tangible enrichment or reprocessing technologies, North Korea may seek to capitalise on the export of intangibles – that is, expertise, skills and design information relevant to nuclear weapons development. Such an offering could certainly be useful for states looking to develop aspects of a nuclear fuel cycle or move towards a nuclear weapons capability. Transfer of intangibles could accompany tangible transfers, as was the case in Syria when North Korea deployed experts and transferred technology to construct the Al-Kibar reactor. It could also involve North Korea aiding other states in solving specific technical challenges, such as North Korean technicians’ support to Pakistan in producing krytrons in the 1990s (see Box 2).
+
+The value of the different aspects of North Korea’s nuclear knowledge will ultimately be decided by Pyongyang’s prospective customers/partners, but the most useful and unique offering is likely to be North Korea’s tacit knowledge – the things that cannot easily be codified and transferred, and only learned by doing. This could include the experience of producing fissile materials through reactor operation and reprocessing, running an enrichment plant, or experience related to nuclear weapons design, testing and weaponisation (an even rarer area of expertise outside the nuclear weapons states). This sphere of knowledge might be of particular interest to Iran, a state that has mastered enrichment technology and may have an interest in pursuing a weapons capability in the future.
+
+#### Dual-Use Technologies
+
+Given that the level of monitoring of North Korea’s borders has risen, and the transfer of full missile systems or other large missile and nuclear-related technology has thus become riskier, North Korea is likely to look to export more innocuous dual-use technologies and materials – those that have both civilian and military applications. While North Korea likely relies on imports for a large proportion of the higher-end items for its WMD and military programmes (the so-called “chokepoint” technologies), as its programme has advanced, Pyongyang has undoubtedly indigenised the production of some dual-use components and materials, and may look to capitalise on these production abilities and any surpluses through onward sales. It may also look to act as a broker, leveraging its procurement networks around the world to source dual-use goods for customers, either for use directly by the customer or by North Korean technicians assisting in missile- and nuclear-related manufacturing and development projects.
+
+While the transfer of dual-use items from North Korea would still violate UN sanctions, such transfers would be more inconspicuous than the movement of large missile and nuclear technologies. North Korean-manufactured goods could be laundered within the extensive legitimate global trade in dual-use technologies and would, if uncovered, be less politically contentious than full systems. Russian or Chinese markets provide extensive laundering opportunities which could be capitalised on with minimal risk, as Moscow and Beijing have historically turned a blind eye to North Korean sanctions violations. Online platforms – such as the Chinese B2B site used to market North Korean lithium-6 in 2016 (see Box 2) – could provide opportunities for the anonymous sale of technology, obfuscating obvious links to North Korea.
+
+There is precedent for North Korean transfers of dual-use goods to countries that had previously purchased North Korean missile technology. For example, PoE reports note the interdiction in 2010 of a shipment of aluminium alloy rods, copper bars and brass discs to Syria, with the products likely originating in North Korea. A shipment of North Korean-origin graphite cylinders was also interdicted in 2013 en route to Syria. North Korea has also previously marketed its dual-use machine tools overseas. In 2013, the UN listed Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation – North Korea’s main machine tool producer – for its involvement in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes. As researchers noted in 2014, the company attended a trade fair in Dandong, China in 2013 and marketed machine tools in China and Russia under the names of “Millim Technology Company” and “Koryo Technologies” (or “KORTEC”), respectively.
+
+
+### II. Evolving Factors Influencing Supply and Demand
+
+While technological developments in North Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes help dictate what may be available for sale, a range of political, economic and security factors also play an important role in influencing both demand for – and North Korean willingness to supply – these technologies. This chapter explores in more detail what is likely to motivate and restrict both North Korea and its potential customers when it comes to engaging in missile and nuclear technology transfers. While the need to generate revenue remains a strong motivator for Pyongyang, demand for its wares has been progressively waning. This decline is the result of several factors, namely, changing technological needs and greater supplier choice among Pyongyang’s customers, as well as concerns over the quality of North Korean goods and the risk of interdiction. The chapter also maps out the changing sanctions context, and how Russia’s arms purchases from North Korea could undermine the sanctions regime and risk a resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.
+
+#### Continued Need for Revenue Generation
+
+As in the past, revenue generation remains a key incentive for North Korean missile technology transfers. North Korea’s economic troubles long predate the UN sanctions regime, with the country repeatedly defaulting on debt repayments from the 1970s onwards. The imposition from 2006 of increasingly expansive UNSC sanctions on the country’s economy exacerbated existing economic challenges, while more recent sectoral sanctions introduced in 2016 and 2017, and the border closures stemming from the Covid-19 pandemic, have put North Korea in an especially precarious economic situation. States are prohibited from virtually all economic engagement with the country, leaving it cash-strapped and desperate to seek out and exploit economic opportunities.
+
+Precisely how much revenue North Korea has generated, or may be able to generate, through the sale of missiles or nuclear technology is challenging to ascertain. Public reporting on individual North Korean missile and nuclear transfers is extremely limited and very rarely includes data on the value of transactions. Furthermore, reported figures may not include estimates for the transfer of expertise, manufacturing facilities, or maintenance and support services. Some of the available figures unsurprisingly suggest that military transfers offer North Korea lucrative opportunities for revenue generation, with estimates – which are based on sources that are either unclear, dated and/or difficult to verify – citing figures in the hundreds of millions of US dollars.
+
+Some examples provide insights into the revenue raised from individual transfers,transactions or weapons systems. While comparing the prices offered for ballistic missile systems is extremely challenging, a review of the prices of North Korean conventional weapons offerings supports the hypothesis that North Korean systems are generally cheaper than the alternatives. The prices offered in the 2020 documentary The Mole, and to British arms dealer Michael Ranger in a deal around a decade ago, suggest that North Korean arms are often offered at a price below the market rate of equivalent systems. This has historically made North Korean arms appealing to customers, particularly in the developing world.
+
+The Mole saw marketing materials – including a price list for North Korean weapons systems – handed to an actor playing the role of an investor during a 2017 trip to Pyongyang. The price list included a cost breakdown for missiles with different types of warheads, launchers and associated handling vehicles. Missiles and vehicles were priced per unit and in quantities of five, three or two units. For example, Scud C missiles with high explosive warheads were offered for $2.795 million per unit, but sold in lots of five for $13.975 million, whereas Nodong missiles (termed Scud E for extended range) were offered for $4.94 million per unit and $24.7 million for five. While they are impossible to verify, such values are not outlandish compared to figures seen elsewhere. Sale of components and parts can also be lucrative: the PoE noted in 2015 and 2016 that a KOMID official based in Syria (with the rank of major general) shipped ball bearings and fibre optic cables, and brought in three North Korean technicians, earning over €100,000.
+
+North Korea could potentially leverage more sensitive nuclear transfers for extensive profits far above the market rate, especially in situations where the customer has no alternatives. Illicit procurement networks often see intermediaries monetise the risk by charging a premium, and North Korea could do this through selling goods it has either produced or procured, as part of a package for customers. Analysis of the cost of the UF 6 sold to Libya through the Khan network in the early 2000s suggests that the three cylinders of 1.7 tonnes were sold for $2 million, the equivalent of 40 times the then market rate. Similarly, transfer of North Korea’s more advanced missile systems (or, more likely, related technology) such as its IRBM, ICBM or newer hypersonic technologies may offer particularly lucrative opportunities for revenue generation. However, as mentioned, Pyongyang may be reluctant to transfer some of these higher-end technologies to avoid betraying the details of its advanced systems and production capabilities to adversaries.
+
+Despite the high risk, larger projects such as the construction of facilities could also garner significant sums. While of unclear veracity, media reporting from 2009 citing an Iranian defector and Israeli intelligence claimed that Iran financed Syria’s purchase of the Al-Kibar reactor from North Korea, paying Pyongyang between $1 billion and $2 billion for the project. The Khan network – and especially Khan’s Libya deal – saw the transfer of a 10,000-centrifuge plant for between $100 million and $200 million.
+
+North Korean arms sales have also been heavily shaped by the financial incentives of North Korean arms trading company representatives – essentially, the salespeople – working overseas. These representatives are often accredited as diplomats, work out of embassies, and are entrepreneurial in building relationships and exploiting opportunities. Indeed, they are compelled to be entrepreneurial: North Korea’s overseas missions, including embassies, are believed to be self-funding, tasked with raising funds to sustain themselves and the regime back in Pyongyang. While the financial driver at this working level may manifest itself through arms sales, decisions to sell missiles and nuclear technology are likely far more sensitive, and almost certainly are taken in Pyongyang. Nevertheless, North Korean operatives abroad are likely to be under pressure to identify revenue-generating opportunities to decision-makers in Pyongyang, which may include potential deals for the transfer of missile or even nuclear technology.
+
+There is also potential for North Korea to engage in barter trade as it has in the past, exchanging missile and nuclear technology, expertise and materials for other goods. Experts interviewed for this paper pointed to oil, grains and fertiliser as goods that North Korea may be especially interested in procuring in a barter arrangement. In the 2000s, the Myanmar government “gifted” rice to North Korea in exchange for “technical services and equipment”, which reportedly included conventional weapons. Recent reports have suggested that Moscow may offer Pyongyang food in exchange for munitions. Such barter arrangements allow North Korea to receive payment without needing to access the international financial system, while also accessing goods it is prohibited from (or may struggle in) procuring freely as a result of sanctions.
+
+Transfers of the full missile and nuclear systems that are likely to prove most lucrative to North Korea have become riskier and more challenging due to increased global awareness of UNSC sanctions on North Korea, improved interdiction capabilities and expanded open source scrutiny of the country’s trade activities. This led some of the experts interviewed to ask whether Pyongyang would continue to pursue missile and nuclear transfers, or shift to less risky and easier to move commodities for revenue generation. North Korea’s increasing exploitation of cryptocurrency is one example of an alternative yet highly lucrative revenue-generation line, with cryptocurrency hacks allegedly generating $1.7 billion for North Korea in 2022.
+
+Sales of more innocuous but still sanctioned goods and services – such as textiles or the export of construction labour and IT services – are also less risky sources of revenue. For instance, coal has historically been a major source of revenue for North Korea and has been directly linked to the financing of the country’s missile and nuclear programmes, although it may be seen by the broader international community as being less politically sensitive than trade in missile, nuclear or other military technology. However, North Korea’s desperate economic situation may mean that it does not have the luxury of choosing between revenue streams, and may instead require it to pursue all means available to raise funds.
+
+#### Opportunities for Technology Barter
+
+One form of barter trade which may be particularly attractive to North Korea is the exchange of its missile- or nuclear-related expertise and capabilities for that of other states, or engagement in collaborative missile and nuclear technology development. As mentioned earlier, striking deals which benefit North Korea technologically has long been at the core of the country’s proliferation deal-making. As Pollack has noted in his work on North Korea’s nuclear trade:
+
+> While the evidence is ambiguous, a careful examination suggests that many past transfers were actually done not for profit but in exchange for components or materials that benefited Pyongyang’s own nuclear program.
+
+Of the three nuclear cases that Pollack examines (see the first three listed in Box 2), he noted that each potentially had a barter aspect to them. However, evidence is admittedly thin in places. For example, assisting Pakistan’s krytron development came after the transfer of centrifuge components, drawings and plans to North Korea; transfers of UF6 into the Khan network may have been repayment for Khan’s assistance to North Korea in producing it; and North Korea could potentially have benefited from plutonium produced in the Al-Kibar reactor.
+
+As Pyongyang continues to develop its missile and nuclear programmes, exchanging complementary expertise or working on new advances in collaboration with partners will remain an attractive option, albeit one that likely has less necessity and more limited returns than in the past, given North Korea’s own recent technological successes in its nuclear and missile programmes. Priority areas for North Korea’s missile development – and for potential collaboration opportunities – are likely to include items outlined in the five-year plan for the development of defence science and weapons systems adopted at the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in January 2021. These include improvements in missile accuracy up to a range of 15,000 km, improvements in solid fuel propulsion for submarine-launched and ground-based ICBMs, military reconnaissance satellites, and R&D in hypersonic glide vehicles, nuclear-powered submarines and UAVs.
+
+Given North Korea’s technological successes and the sanctions regime, there is now a smaller range of countries that could both offer technology the country could benefit from and, importantly, be willing to offer such technology in exchange for North Korean wares. An obvious candidate would be Iran, as it has made great leaps in its centrifuge and missile programmes over the past decade. One expert interviewed for the project also suggested that there may be room for cooperation between Iran and North Korea on hypersonic glide vehicles. Russia could be another candidate. Further North Korean arms transfers to Russia (potentially including ballistic missiles) could allow North Korea to request technology from Russia’s extensive WMD and other high-technology programmes – such as its space launch or submarine programmes – in return. Moscow’s willingness to provide such technologies, given its historical commitments to non-proliferation and its potential security concerns vis-à-vis a North Korea with more advanced missile and nuclear capabilities, are not a given, but recent engagement seems to suggest a potential willingness to cooperate (see Box 3).
+
+> #### `Box 3: War in Ukraine and the Growing North Korea–Russia Technology Transfer Axis`
+
+_`Recent developments in North Korea’s relationship with Russia are concerning for the future of both non-proliferation efforts and the UN sanctions regime. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created a need for weaponry and materiel, as well as renewed efforts by an increasingly isolated Moscow to garner political support from a smaller range of allies and partners. Initial arms transfers of “infantry rockets and missiles” were allegedly made between North Korea and the Wagner Group in November 2022. More recently, research has suggested that hundreds of containers of weaponry – likely ammunition – have been transferred from North Korea to Russian military bases, while South Korean intelligence reported indications of North Korean ballistic missile transfers to Russia in early November 2023.`_
+
+_`The potential for exchange of more advanced and strategically important technology is clear. In July 2023, Russian Defence Minister Shoigu was shown around an arms fair in Pyongyang by Kim Jong-un, where he viewed ICBMs, SRBMs, hypersonic missiles and UAVs. During Kim’s trip to Russia to meet Putin in September 2023, the Russian leader hosted his North Korean counterpart at Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome and noted North Korea’s interest in rocket and space technology. Media reports surrounding the meeting also suggested North Korea was interested in “advanced technology for satellites and nuclear-powered submarines”. Further details are yet to emerge. However, advances in missile technologies – including items identified in Pyongyang’s 2021 plan for the development of defence science and weapons systems – are also likely to be on North Korea’s wishlist for Moscow.`_
+
+_`With these breaches of the arms embargo and possible movement towards breaches on the prohibition on transfers of other technologies, the future of the UN sanctions regime – which in some senses has been on life support for several years – is precarious. In September 2023, around the time of Kim’s visit, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov noted that sanctions were “adopted in a completely different geopolitical situation” and accused Western states of “lies” over humanitarian support. If Russia, a UNSC permanent member, so blatantly violates sanctions and is seen to use North Korean arms or missile systems in Ukraine, it may lead other states to look to North Korea for arms, and could potentially open the floodgates for further North Korean arms and missile sales.`_
+
+#### Ideological and Foreign Policy Considerations
+
+In the past, North Korea’s sales opportunities have been influenced – in part – by its broader foreign policy relationships and objectives, and vice versa. Pyongyang’s arms exports began during the Cold War, expanding significantly through the 1970s and 1980s, as North Korea built its military–industrial complex. Through its Cold War military sales, the country sought to demonstrate its commitment to the socialist cause, strengthen the capabilities of fellow members of the socialist bloc, and gain favour with Moscow and Beijing. Even during the Cold War, however, ideology was not the sole driver of North Korea’s military transfers, with the export of military technology and expertise being part of its broader efforts to consolidate relationships with developing countries around the world and compete with Seoul for influence.
+
+Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has continued to do business and conclude cooperation agreements in a range of fields with a variety of countries, with no indication of any discrimination on ideological grounds or links to any known direct North Korean security interests. Unlike Iran, which has been known to transfer missiles to its proxies across the Middle East, North Korea does not have similar relationships with proxies on whom it might rely to achieve certain security objectives, and thus be incentivised to transfer capabilities to.
+
+Recent geopolitical developments may create greater opportunities for North Korea to strengthen political ties through technology transfer. Russian arms purchases from, and growing engagement with, North Korea creates political benefits for Pyongyang. While new UN sanctions resolutions have been an unlikely prospect in recent years, with no agreement even on new entities to be added to the UN sanctions list, the relationship with Russia helps to bring North Korea out of its sanctions isolation. The apparent degradation of the international sanctions regime could also see a resurgence in what Berger describes as “reluctant” customers, as well as “ad hoc” ones. This could make other potential customers view relationships with North Korea involving arms transfers as acceptable, and could even give North Korea new opportunities to pursue such relationships alongside (and in support of) Russian activities in Africa, for example.
+
+In short, these recent developments mean that North Korea has more to play for in pursuing its international relationships and in using technology to that end. However, there is no indication that ideological sympathies or diplomatic priorities are going to be the only or even the primary driver of North Korean sales of military technology abroad – including missile and nuclear technology. Rather, these considerations will serve as a facilitator for, and an additional benefit from, Pyongyang’s illicit trade, which will still likely be driven by opportunism and the need for revenue generation.
+
+#### Sanctions, Transfer Environment and Risks of Interdiction
+
+The risk of interdiction, sanctions and other punitive measures is a major disincentivising factor for most countries when it comes to engaging in missile, nuclear and most other trade with North Korea. As such, North Korea’s biggest customers for arms and missile technologies today largely fall within what Berger describes as the “resilient” group. These are customers that continue to engage in business with Pyongyang despite UNSC sanctions, driven by longstanding political and military ties or else similarly under international arms embargoes or otherwise isolated. Iran, Syria and potentially Myanmar (see Box 4) clearly fit this profile, as countries that have little to lose politically by engaging with North Korea, have historical ties with Pyongyang (including in the sphere of military cooperation), and which are themselves isolated and limited in their weapons procurement options. The benefit (or necessity) of doing business with North Korea outweighs the risk of further sanctions or other reprimands for these countries from the US, the UN or others, as their economies are already subject to sanctions. However, the actual demand for North Korean longer-range missile and/or nuclear technology from these countries is likely to be tempered by some of the other factors outlined in this paper – including absence of need for these more strategic technologies, perceived unreliability of North Korea as a supplier, and the availability of similar options from other isolated suppliers.
+
+> #### `Box 4: Myanmar: A Relationship Renewed?`
+
+_`Myanmar is believed to have previously purchased ballistic missile technology from North Korea alongside a more extensive variety of other conventional weapons technology. However, the specifics of the transfers are opaque. In 2012, the US government noted that Myanmar had been a customer of North Korea’s missile programme, while a leaked Myanmar government report suggested that Burmese military representatives had visited a missile factory in North Korea capable of producing Scuds and likely Nodong missiles in 2008, alongside a range of other facilities in the country. A more recent, unconfirmed report notes that 20 North Korean missile technicians were in Myanmar until 2015, and – citing independent researchers based in the country – that missile cooperation has restarted between the two countries in the wake of the 2021 military coup.`_
+
+_`Myanmar’s military regime has also been accused of nuclear weapons aspirations in the past, notably around 2010, centred around allegations by a defector who worked in Myanmar’s strategic industries – but these were largely discounted. Experts interviewed for this paper expressed scepticism that Myanmar would be interested in a nuclear weapons capability, noting the country’s pressing economic and internal security challenges. Past reports that Myanmar was interested in building a nuclear weapon have also been rejected by members of the US intelligence community and other experts. The fact that the Myanmar military’s primary concern is domestic armed insurgency also raises questions over the utility of procuring advanced missile capabilities or nuclear weapons technology from North Korea, although such capabilities could help the regime feel more secure against external invasion.`_
+
+Moving large physical shipments to and from North Korea covertly (see Box 5) has become markedly more difficult amid an improved understanding of common sanctions-evasion practices, and in light of the ability of governments and non-governmental organisations over the past decade to scrutinise North Korea’s airports, ports and border crossings using satellite imagery, trade and corporate data, and other investigative resources. The border closures caused by the Covid-19 pandemic (see Box 6) and resultant reductions in trade have also made recent movements of goods easier to detect. Increased monitoring and the potential for interdiction has therefore raised the risks of undertaking transfers of missile and nuclear goods, as well as deploying North Korean technicians, from North Korea itself. In contexts where interdiction was not possible previously, ships believed to be carrying suspicious cargo for Pyongyang have been pursued by naval vessels and forced to return to North Korea.
+
+> #### `Box 5: Evolving Means of Transfer`
+
+_`Historically, transfers of North Korean missiles were undertaken by state-connected air freight and shipping fleets. In large part, a shift away from the more obvious state-connected modes of transport towards commercial shipping has been observed since the mid-2000s. A 2021 PoE report, however, notes that state-owned shipping companies have continued to play a role. According to one unnamed UN member state, KOMID – which has been called North Korea’s “primary arms dealer” and main exporter of missile technology – has reportedly cooperated with Iran’s SHIG on shipment logistics, engaging in “shipments to Iran, using vessels belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and routinely operating non-stop voyages from one third country ports to Iran”.`_
+
+_`Geography also determines the easiest shipment routes, with rail connections across the border between North Korea and Russia allegedly being used to move weapons to the Wagner Group in November 2022. Russia and China’s evolving stance on North Korean sanctions could make North Korea’s land borders important vectors for proliferation-sensitive exports. However, more recent arms transfers between North Korea and Russia seem to have involved initial shipments from the former to a Russian submarine base using Russian-flagged and military-connected cargo ships running a “shuttle” service with their automatic identification system (AIS) transponders turned off to avoid detection.`_
+
+_`The challenging logistical environment will likely see North Korean proliferation networks continue to adapt. Pyongyang may seek to fulfil more of its contracts entirely outside its borders, establishing manufacturing facilities in client states – as it previously had in Namibia to produce conventional weapons, for example – or in third countries, and relying increasingly on the extensive procurement networks it has established, notably in China but also around the world, to source the necessary components and materials. There may also be fewer interdiction risks if North Korean exports continue to shift towards projects that combine tangible and intangible support. In these arrangements – as seen in missile relationships with Iran and Syria, and the Al-Kibar reactor project – North Korean operatives can procure goods for projects largely outside of North Korea, and exports from North Korea can be limited to specific goods and technicians.`_
+
+The constraint that the sanctions environment is currently imposing on North Korea is contingent to a significant degree on Russia and China’s future actions, with the evolution of North Korea’s growing relationship with Russia being pivotal. However, several interviewed experts noted that China’s willingness to turn a blind eye to North Korea’s onward missile and nuclear proliferation is not likely to be unlimited, especially in cases where developments affect China’s national security interests. Beijing is a signatory to a range of non-proliferation agreements and has its own security interests that may be undermined by North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear weapons technology transfers. For example, China’s clear interest in avoiding instability on the Korean peninsula, and particularly any proliferation actions by North Korea that might elicit a response from the US and its allies, could potentially lead Beijing to exert pressure on Pyongyang to prevent it from engaging in such transfers. However, the degree of influence that Beijing has over Pyongyang’s onward proliferation decision-making calculus is likely limited. Some analysts have argued that China’s interest in maintaining stability in Pyongyang actually makes Beijing reticent about applying political or economic pressure, unless the risks of inaction outweigh the costs (for example, in the instance of potential North Korean nuclear warhead or fissile material transfers). Ultimately, the degree of direct coordination between Beijing and Pyongyang on sensitive matters such as missile and nuclear transfers – which would likely take place at the highest levels – is very difficult to ascertain.
+
+> #### `Box 6: The Covid-19 Pandemic`
+
+_`North Korea shut its borders to all passenger and commercial traffic at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic. Satellite imagery in March 2020 showed North Korean ships being recalled to the country’s ports, while land crossings with China and Russia were closed and border fences, guard posts and patrol roads were reinforced and expanded. North Korea also stopped the rotation of diplomats from its missions abroad – as it likely also did with its missile and arms technicians and procurement operatives based overseas. The country, relatively isolated in normal times, closed itself off almost entirely from the rest of the world. In the second half of 2023, though, there were signs that the borders were starting to open up again. Movement through ports and land crossings increased, restrictions on some official travel eased in spring, and North Korean nationals abroad (including some workers) were allowed to return as of August 2023, with limited commercial flights restarting that same month.`_
+
+_`It is difficult to definitively assess the impact of these restrictions on North Korea’s procurement efforts and the onward transfer of missile and nuclear technology from the country. It is reasonable to assume that transfers slowed significantly between early 2020 and 2023. Several experts interviewed for this paper pointed to the pandemic restrictions as a reason why they were sceptical that North Korea was actively exporting missile and nuclear technology. However, North Korean technicians based overseas were also likely stuck abroad in customer states and unable to return home. As the country begins to open its borders and resume trade, missile and nuclear technology transfers may become more likely – particularly given recent North Korean efforts to exhibit its wares, and amid the further disintegration of the UN sanctions consensus. The restrictions on trade and travel since 2020 have also further exacerbated the economic situation within North Korea, creating further pressure to generate revenue or source critical supplies like food from abroad, which may further incentivise the sale of missile and/or nuclear technology.`_
+
+#### Security Concerns Over Advanced Deterrent Capabilities
+
+Security concerns, paired with the challenging transfer environment, will likely make North Korea carefully consider the transfer of certain particularly strategically important systems and technologies. These sensitivities are likely to stem from the risk that transferred technologies or information surrounding them may fall into enemy hands, with negative impacts for North Korea’s own nuclear deterrent. For example, North Korea’s adversaries could gain valuable information about North Korean capabilities from seized shipments of nuclear or missile technologies, related goods and materials, or even wreckage recovered from the battlefield. Intelligence can be derived from seized technologies, providing insights into manufacturing, supply chains and capabilities.
+
+Examination of interdicted missiles, or wreckage recovered after their use, may yield insights into North Korea’s manufacturing capabilities or the specific types of technology that it is importing to develop its programmes. This could allow North Korea’s adversaries to better counter the country’s illicit supply chains. Nuclear forensic techniques could provide insights into North Korea’s fuel cycle if North Korean fissile material or contaminated goods were seized in transit. Intelligence gained through examination of seized or recovered goods can also be used to construct countermeasures. This is a particular concern with regard to more modern ballistic missiles that might yield insights to inform developments in missile defence capabilities and arrangements by the US or its partners such as South Korea and Japan. The transfer of certain newer systems unique to North Korea would also reduce the prospect of potential plausible deniability of Pyongyang’s involvement in the transfer.
+
+If North Korea is concerned about undermining its own security through transfers, this would lead to the development of two categories of systems. The first includes items that are core to North Korea’s security, and which would not be transferred: interviewees referred to these as the “crown jewels” or “top state secrets core to North Korea’s survivability”. This would include nuclear warheads and fissile material – which would be unlikely to be transferred for several reasons – as well as ICBMs and other missiles core to North Korea’s deterrent. The second category would include lower-level and older technology, which North Korea would be less concerned about transferring.
+
+Chapter I explored some of the surplus technologies that may fall into this second category and discussed several reasons why North Korea may not be willing to transfer all of its older systems. A few further considerations may also follow from this security thesis. Reluctance to export newer systems and reveal information could lead to the development of export variants for the new SRBMs. However, this would require significant upfront investment from Pyongyang or its customers, which would be challenging in an environment with limited cash flow – which is exactly the situation in which North Korea and many of its historical and potential customers find themselves. It is also possible that if the design information of certain systems is compromised (for example, after wreckage is recovered after a test, or following a hack of the manufacturers), the security rationales against wider transfer for that particular system may be undermined, if concerns about the compromise of strategically important information on certain North Korean capabilities is indeed a consideration.
+
+#### Changing Technologies and Markets
+
+Technological developments may also restrict demand for North Korea’s missile offerings. Chapter I outlined the remaining (but shrinking) market for the Scud-and Tochka-like technologies that North Korea may have in surplus. Indeed, due to its extensive history of Scud exports and – in some cases – related manufacturing capabilities, North Korea may have reduced its appeal as a supplier to some customers that managed to absorb the technology. However, in the present day, North Korea’s missile sales also have to compete with newer technologies and suppliers.
+
+For instance, militaries’ growing demand for UAVs is well documented. UAVs may be seen as a less expensive and more operationally appropriate system by some countries that would have previously sought short-range missiles. While UAV and SRBM capabilities differ significantly, including in their utility, the former may be well-suited – if not more desirable – for states without an active missile programme and in need of low-yield but high-precision capabilities to carry out limited and precise attacks in neighbouring countries or against factions on their own territories. UAVs are cheaper, more versatile, and easier to produce and transfer than ballistic missiles.
+
+North Korea has shown some advances in its UAV programme, with drones penetrating South Korean airspace in recent years, and two large novel UAV systems shown to Shoigu in Pyongyang in July 2023. However, Iran’s capabilities for producing and exporting these systems are more advanced: Iran has well-established UAV capabilities and has exported drones to partners in the region and further afield. Critically, Iranian UAVs have now been extensively battle-tested – not only by Iranian proxies in the Middle East but also on a large scale by Russian forces in Ukraine. As such, past customers of North Korean SRBMs may now look to Iran as a UAV supplier instead. As Pollack noted, the 1991 Gulf War helped to shape missile markets, reducing interest in North Korean products as cruise missiles played a prominent role. Russia’s war on Ukraine could also affect potential North Korean missile markets, although extensive UAV and missile use makes it difficult to establish possible lessons at this stage.
+
+Iran is also an established proliferator of missile technology, having exported missiles to proxies and partners in the Middle East. With the expiry of the UNSC embargo on nuclear-capable missiles and related technology trade with Iran in October 2023, Iran may seek to expand its customer base and thus pose competition for North Korea in securing new customers for its missile technology (although such trade with Iran is still sanctioned by the US, Europe and others).
+
+#### Claims to Nuclear Responsibility
+
+A final restraining factor – albeit one with unclear salience – consists of the non-proliferation norms that emerged after 1945, and North Korea’s notion of nuclear responsibility. The UN sanctions regime imposed on North Korea was, in some sense, an embodiment of these norms. Since acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, North Korea has repeatedly referred to itself as a “responsible nuclear power”, including in the context of onward nuclear proliferation. These are likely efforts by Pyongyang to normalise itself as a legitimate nuclear power outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – akin to the status enjoyed by Pakistan and India.
+
+In an October 2006 statement, just days after North Korea’s first nuclear test and the subsequent UNSC resolution condemning it, North Korea’s foreign minister referred to the country as a “responsible nuclear weapons state [that] will never use nukes first and will not allow nuclear transfer”. These claims have most recently been codified in the September 2022 Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces (Section 10):
+
+> The DPRK, as a responsible nuclear weapons state, shall neither deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of other countries nor share them and not transfer nuclear weapons, technology and equipment concerned and weapon-grade nuclear substances.
+
+Of course, the earnestness of these claims is unclear. By virtue of developing a nuclear weapons programme outside the recognised international non-proliferation framework – namely, the NPT – North Korea has already demonstrated its disregard for nuclear non-proliferation norms. Several experts interviewed for this paper also noted that North Korea has not offered any definition of what it means by “responsibility” in the nuclear non-proliferation context. However, the excerpt from the 2022 law could arguably be taken as a definition of what Pyongyang considers to be “responsible” behaviour by a nuclear power. Whether Pyongyang’s commitments can be taken at face value is debatable, but its past proliferation of nuclear technology after the 2006 statement should raise serious doubts. There is less of an international consensus regarding missile non-proliferation. North Korea has tended to deny allegations rather than make claims about responsibility when it comes to the transfer of missile systems.
+
+
+### Conclusion and Recommendations
+
+With a growing technological offering and a persistent need to generate hard currency, North Korea still has significant incentives to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to foreign customers. It now has a wider range of more advanced missile and nuclear technologies than ever before, some of which may be available for sale to interested buyers. Pyongyang’s technological progress may also have created surpluses available for transfer, particularly Scud, Tochka and Nodong missiles, or even surplus or second-hand nuclear and dual-use technologies.
+
+Despite these clear supply-side drivers, though, a range of factors work to constrain North Korea’s sales – particularly on the demand side of the equation – and these are likely to prevent an all-out onward-proliferation bonanza. The potential markets and customers for North Korean missile technology have been whittled down by a variety of factors, including North Korea’s assistance to customers in indigenising the technology it has sold, the emergence of competitors such as Iran, and the development of newer and more appealing technologies – namely, UAVs, but potentially also other suppliers and systems in future. The sanctions landscape and the unprecedented monitoring of the Korean peninsula also reduce sales opportunities and increase the risks of interdiction. Given Pyongyang’s recent technological advances, there may also now be only marginal returns on North Korean efforts to obtain technology for its own programmes through barter.
+
+Concerns about putting its own deterrent at risk are also likely to temper North Korea’s willingness to export more advanced capabilities, despite the potentially lucrative price tag that could be attached to them. Offering these systems for sale is far riskier than peddling the Scud or even the Nodong systems that were based on well-understood and frugal 1960s Soviet missile technology. Insights gained from interdicted systems or those recovered from the battlefield after leaving North Korean control could do harm to North Korea’s national security. The export of such systems would increase the chances of them falling into adversaries’ hands, despite minimal recent large interdictions of North Korean military shipments.
+
+In a continuation of some of the trends observed by Joshua Pollack in his work over a decade ago, the limited potential customer base, as well as a more challenging transfer environment, suggests that North Korea is most likely to continue engaging with established missile customers – those that Andrea Berger termed “resilient”, such as Iran or Syria. Future transfers are likely to involve dual-use components or intangible transfers of expertise rather than complete systems – because of limited demand and due to the greater chances of the latter being interdicted. North Korea’s extensive procurement networks outside its borders may also allow it to procure technology from third countries to transfer to customers, meaning that fewer direct shipments would be required. The ubiquity of largely anonymous online platforms may also help to identify potential customers and facilitate the sale of dual-use technology, despite the extensive international sanctions regime.
+
+At the same time, the changing geopolitical landscape resulting from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine may bring new opportunities for North Korea. On the one hand, Pyongyang may benefit financially and technologically from technological exchanges with Russia. On the other, Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea and Moscow’s ability to veto further UNSC sanctions against Pyongyang or any of its future customers may give other countries the green light to accept North Korean missile and maybe even nuclear technology. The cover provided by Russia’s – and, to a less public extent, China’s – patronship of Pyongyang could lead to a significant change in North Korea’s fortunes as a supplier. Although only time will tell how the relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow develops, there remains a real risk of a broader collapse of the UN sanctions regime and the resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.
+
+Building on the above analysis – and the clear need to pay attention to the issue – this paper presents 10 recommendations, organised into two sets, to help in countering North Korean missile and nuclear technology proliferation. The first set concerns efforts to deter and dissuade Pyongyang from engaging in onward proliferation – that is, they address the supply side of the equation. The second set addresses the demand side, suggesting ways to reduce North Korea’s customer base. The recommendations call for an approach that relies both on diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang and on harder measures that signal a willingness to disrupt and punish violations of sanctions and international non-proliferation norms.
+
+#### Recommendations for Addressing Supply-Side Factors
+
+__Recommendation 1: Clearly message and demonstrate commitments to interdict, learn from and exploit North Korean missile and nuclear transfers.__ A concern that North Korea is likely to have over the transfer of its missile and nuclear technology – particularly more advanced or strategically significant systems – is the potential for that technology to fall into the hands of Pyongyang’s adversaries. This concern should be validated and leveraged. The US, the UK and their partners need to continue prioritising efforts at interdicting North Korean shipments of weapons technology, as per their UNSC obligations – either in transit or at their destination (for instance, in Ukraine, should Russia procure and use North Korean missiles in the future). They must also make clear that the technology will be inspected, shared with North Korea’s adversaries and used to help develop effective countermeasures, including missile defence. Outreach should also continue to be conducted on the relevant UNSC resolutions and through informal networks such as the signatory states to the Proliferation Security Initiative “Statement of Interdiction Principles”.
+
+__Recommendation 2: Bolster intelligence efforts, engage with allies and support open source researchers as force multipliers.__ Further bolstering intelligence collection to target potential North Korean procurement and export networks can help strengthen countermeasures across the board. The US, the UK, and Western and Asia-Pacific allies should ensure that the necessary processes are in place to allow for intelligence-sharing and collaboration in this sphere. They should ensure that new means to monitor potential intangible transfers (especially the movement of people such as technicians and engineers) are developed. This also includes greater exploitation of open source intelligence to further investigate North Korea’s relationships and monitor the internet for potential North Korean marketing of dual-use technologies on B2B websites. The lithium-6 and machine tool examples discussed above, as well as North Korea’s recent arms transfers to Russia, are all export or marketing activities that were uncovered by non-government researchers using open sources. Open source exploitation by non-governmental organisations can be a force multiplier when the intelligence community’s resources are stretched.
+
+__Recommendation 3: Strengthen counter-proliferation-financing efforts to weaken the revenue-generating potential of North Korean missile and nuclear transfers.__ Revenue generation is likely to be North Korea’s key driver for engaging in onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology. Continuing to invest in efforts to prevent Pyongyang from receiving or moving funds can help weaken that incentive. While North Korea may receive some payment by way of barter trade (not involving the formal financial system), targeting financial flows can impact how lucrative Pyongyang believes its proliferation activities to be. This should include continued awareness-raising of international and multilateral sanctions on North Korea, of standards and best practices for countering proliferation financing (CPF), and of common sanctions-evasion methods. National governments and international organisations engaged on CPF issues should prioritise sharing best practices and resources – for instance, model CPF legislation or lists of entities suspected of supporting North Korean proliferation financing (even if these are not sanctioned). While there have so far not been any known cases of North Korea using cryptocurrency as payment for proliferation-related transactions, Pyongyang is clearly transitioning its activities to the online space and has engaged extensively in crypto theft for revenue generation. Ensuring that CPF efforts keep up with these adaptations will be critical.
+
+__Recommendation 4: Include non-proliferation commitments in any nuclear negotiations with North Korea.__ Any future negotiations with North Korea on its nuclear programme should include commitments to international non-proliferation and nuclear security standards. Including an explicit commitment from North Korea to not transfer nuclear technology to other states – particularly with reference to the 2022 law on its policy on nuclear forces and clarifying North Korea’s definition of nuclear “responsibility” – as part of future negotiations could help positively reinforce any existing tendencies in Pyongyang to present itself as a responsible nuclear custodian. Such an approach, however, would require some level of recognition (even if tacit) of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability – a proposition that is the subject of much debate within the expert community.
+
+__Recommendation 5: Engage with China on preventing North Korea’s onward proliferation, including by highlighting implications for Chinese interests and security.__ China has been a key facilitator for North Korean sanctions-evasion activity and likely has at least some, albeit limited, influence on Pyongyang’s decision-making in relation to onward proliferation. Engaging with China on the issue may therefore yield some benefit, especially if Beijing can be convinced to curtail Pyongyang’s access to transhipment routes, as well as financial and corporate infrastructure. To be sure, the likelihood of this approach’s success is dubious, as Chinese interests and security concerns diverge significantly from those of the US, Europe and other East Asian countries concerned with North Korean proliferation. In fact, creating instability in certain parts of East Asia might be in China’s interest if such instability were to absorb US resources and attention. There may be potential to incentivise Chinese cooperation, including through appeals to Beijing’s desire to be seen as a responsible nuclear power, as well as through continued identification and sanctioning of Chinese entities involved in supporting North Korean sanctions evasion. Taking a transactional approach may be another possibility – linking US openness to addressing issues of Chinese concern with Chinese willingness to prevent – or at least not support – North Korean onward proliferation activity. However, the currently limited state of dialogue between the US and China, as well as other issues such as the tension over semiconductor export controls and the issue of Taiwan, will make having an impact in this regard challenging.
+
+#### Recommendations for Addressing Demand-Side Factors
+
+__Recommendation 6: Double down on counter-proliferation messaging and support.__ If indications emerge that North Korea’s onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology is starting to ramp up again, the US and its partners should consider making a clear statement that buyers of North Korean arms, missiles or nuclear technology will be heavily punished with sanctions and other tools. This messaging should, among other things, make clear that states purchasing North Korean technology will be cut off from Western technology across the board, and that they will be made subject to unilateral sanctions and other measures. Messaging should also continue to include the broader implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea. A tailored approach should acknowledge that some states may not perceive engagement with North Korea as problematic – despite international prohibitions to this end – and may actually be sympathetic to supporting the growing camp of anti-Western countries, or may be ambivalent about condemning or countering the behaviour of these anti-Western countries. As such, providing incentives to these countries to comply with their international obligations – whether through appealing to their standing as responsible members of the international community or by offering economic or other support – may be necessary. A combined “carrot and stick” approach is likely to be most effective.
+
+__Recommendation 7: Consider offering alternatives to North Korean missile technology.__ Following Recommendation 6, the US and its partners should consider offering alternative technologies or other incentives to potential customers when possible. Some states that seek to source missile capabilities from North Korea might do so because they lack – or cannot afford – alternative technologies or suppliers. As part of a targeted approach, the US and its allies should consider whether helping such states find alternative missile technology suppliers may be possible, without compounding the global proliferation problem or exacerbating situations of insecurity. Offering alternative sources of nuclear technology is, of course, a lot more problematic. In these instances, interested governments may be able to engage with countries on other strategic issues to identify drivers for the desire to acquire nuclear technology and identify possible solutions to addressing these concerns.
+
+__Recommendation 8: Target demand-side countermeasures to specific customers and prioritise engagement with those that are most likely to be receptive.__ At the same time, the US and its partners should prioritise engagement with countries that are likely to be most receptive to being dissuaded from engaging in trade with Pyongyang, and tailor approaches to individual potential customers. Trying to prevent missile transfers between North Korea and states that have had long-term missile cooperation partnerships with Pyongyang or which are themselves already subject to sanctions – the likes of Iran and Syria – through diplomatic engagement or threats is unlikely to bear fruit. Offering alternative suppliers in these instances is also not an option.
+
+__Recommendation 9: Make North Korea an unreliable supplier and technical partner.__ Countries interested in preventing North Korea’s onward proliferation should commit to efforts to making Pyongyang an untrustworthy supplier and partner for technical collaboration. As mentioned earlier in relation to Iranian reservations about the dependability of North Korean missile systems, sowing such mistrust can help discourage future purchases from – or collaboration with – Pyongyang. This should include increasing efforts to interdict shipments of weapons and materials, and could also include attempts to target North Korea’s procurement networks operating overseas, using some of the established extraterritorial tools targeted at customers’ programmes. Efforts could also be made to try to insert compromised technology into North Korea’s procure-to-supply networks, thus further undermining the credibility and reliability of North Korea as a supplier. Countries that are important suppliers of key technologies that North Korea may need for its missile and nuclear wares – namely, countries in North America, Europe and Asia – can play an important role in efforts to prevent North Korean procurement.
+
+__Recommendation 10: Carefully utilise unilateral counter-proliferation tools.__ While the current political dynamics on the UNSC will likely preclude any further UNSC sanctions against North Korea (or its facilitators or customers) in the foreseeable future, individual governments should continue to sanction North Korean and related entities that facilitate North Korean proliferation, or target them with other unilateral tools. While unilateral sanctions technically create no obligations for compliance by entities outside the relevant country’s jurisdiction, their appearance on sanctions lists will – or at least should – trigger adverse media and other compliance-screening measures at financial institutions or companies proactively seeking to comply with export controls. In the case of the US in particular, the importance of its financial sector and the US dollar to global markets means that many financial institutions around the world screen against US sanctions lists even if they are under no domestic obligation to comply with them. Such designations can also help facilitate open source investigations or the sanctioning of these entities in other jurisdictions. Use of other elements of the unilateral toolset developed and deployed by the US in recent years – which includes civil asset forfeiture as well as other targeted efforts against specific entities overseas – may also be appropriate in certain cases. However, application of these powerful tools should be considered on a case-by-case basis due to the risks of political blowback.
+
+---
+
+__Daniel Salisbury__ is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is currently undertaking a three-year research project on arms embargos as part of a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship.
+
+__Darya Dolzikova__ is a Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including proliferation financing and other illicit trade by actors of proliferation concern. Her research areas include the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy, Iranian and North Korean proliferation-related sanctions evasion, as well as other issues concerning nuclear technology and proliferation.
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+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第一日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-12-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 黎智英爭議串謀發布煽動刊物罪逾時檢控、涉新聞自由應寬鬆詮釋法例
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（18日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）開審。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻，爭議控方前年加控串謀刊印煽動刊物罪時，超出了檢控時限4日，法庭沒有司法管轄權處理；又指本案涉及新聞自由等基本權利，應以較寬鬆的尺度詮釋法例，但對於控方應較嚴謹。至於控方指在檢控期限未屆滿前，曾去信通知法庭「有意」申請新增控罪，辯方則認為直至控方把黎智英帶上法庭加控，才算正式就該罪開始進行檢控。辯方明天將繼續陳詞。
+
+已還柙逾3年的黎智英，今身穿淺藍色恤衫、灰色西裝褸，被4名懲教人員帶進被告欄。黎身形明顯消瘦，但精神不俗，向旁聽席的家屬揮手、點頭，又微笑豎起拇指，天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君亦有站起身向黎揮手。黎於審訊期間戴上耳機輔助聆聽，神情專注，休庭時與女兒多次互相飛吻。
+
+被告為：黎智英（76歲）、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司。
+
+
+▲ 黎智英
+
+黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及Marc Corlett。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。
+
+控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處高級警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。
+
+黎智英的太太李韻琴、黎的3名子女，及天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君均坐在家屬席。
+
+
+▲ 黎智英太太 李韻琴（左）、幼子 黎順恩（右）
+
+
+▲ 天主教香港教區榮休主教 陳日君
+
+
+▲ 國安處高級警司 李桂華
+
+#### 媒體報導稱黎申請海外證人作供被拒 法官澄清沒有收到相關申請
+
+甫開庭，法官杜麗冰指，有見本地傳媒上周報導稱法庭拒絕被告申請海外證人以視像形式作供，特此澄清《刑事訴訟程序條例》規定，海外證人如要作供，須在案件交付至高院後42日之內提出申請，但本案並無任何人申請海外證人作供，也沒有任何申請要求延長42日期限。代表黎的資深大律師彭耀鴻及代表3間蘋果公司的大律師王國豪在庭上確認。
+
+#### 辯方爭議煽動刊物罪超出檢控時限 法庭無司法管轄權處理
+
+黎智英就控罪答辯之前，其代表資深大律師彭耀鴻先就「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪逾時檢控提出爭議。控方案情指稱黎智英與其他被告於2019年4月1日起，一同串謀發布煽動刊物，該串謀直至2021年6月24日《蘋果日報》停運為止。
+
+彭指，根據《刑事罪行條例》第11條，煽動控罪的檢控「只可於犯罪後6個月內開始進行」；而據《刑事罪行條例》第159D條，對於依據協議而犯下的串謀罪行，若果提出檢控的時限已經屆滿，便不能就該串謀罪行「提出法律程序」。
+
+彭續指，若果由串謀的首天2019年4月1日起計，檢控時限是同年10月1日；若法庭不接納，由最後一天2021年6月24日起計算，控方的檢控時限亦是同年12月24日。然而黎在12月28日的法庭聆訊上才被正式加控「煽動刊物」罪，已逾時4日。
+
+彭指，逾時檢控的問題關乎法庭是否有司法管轄權處理控罪，若果超過檢控時限，法庭便沒有司法管轄權處理「煽動刊物」控罪，且本案涉及新聞自由等基本權利，應以較寬鬆的尺度詮釋法例，但對於控方應較嚴謹。
+
+
+▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻（中）、大律師 關文渭（後）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）
+
+#### 法官質疑串謀屬持續 辯方指不能以此避過檢控時限
+
+法官杜麗冰問及，若果串謀並非一次性，而是持續一系列的串謀呢？彭耀鴻回應，若果串謀罪行只是一次性，檢控時限便須由作出串謀的首天起開始計算。
+
+法官李運騰亦指，本案被告是持續干犯一連串的罪行，若控方分成多項控罪提控，並如辯方所指運用相同的檢控時限，或會出現較早干犯的控罪超出檢控時限、而較遲干犯的控罪則在時限之內檢控的情況；又質疑後來加入串謀者便不能被控。彭耀鴻同意，但強調控方可分開檢控，亦須及時檢控，不能以串謀來繞過檢控時限。
+
+法官李運騰又問及，若被告人不在香港，但在海外導致煽動刊物在香港發布，控方便未能趕在檢控限期內將他帶上法庭提控。彭耀鴻則指，同樣的檢控期限依然適用，被告人依然受到條例所規定的時限保護。
+
+#### 辯方：帶上法庭加控始算開始進行檢控 控方仍違檢控時限
+
+而就控方於2021年12月13日曾去信法庭表示「有意」申請新增煽動刊物罪、黎智英於翌日獲悉，彭耀鴻認為控方當時並未將黎帶上法庭正式加控，至12月28日才正式加控，故即使採納12月24日為檢控期限，仍然超出檢控時限4天。
+
+彭解釋，《刑事罪行條例》第11條列明煽動罪須於6個月內「開始進行（begun）」檢控，是立法時特意選用的字眼，強調直至控方把黎智英帶上法庭加控，才算「開始進行」檢控，而非如控方據《裁判官條例》第26條所指，於12月13日去信表示有意加控，「作出申訴或提出告發（making any complaint or laying any information）」，便可視為已「開始進行」檢控。
+
+根據《裁判官條例》第26條，若罪行無規定作出申訴或提出告發的時效，則「申訴或告發」須於6個月內作出或提出。彭認為，只有很少罪行會訂明檢控時限，若《刑事罪行條例》第11條已為煽動罪訂明檢控時限，則將兩條法例的字眼理解為同一意思，會令《刑事罪行條例》第11條變得完全多餘，故「開始進行」檢控必定指「作出申訴或提出告發」以外的意思。
+
+案件明續審，彭耀鴻將繼續陳詞。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-19-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-2.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-19-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-2.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第二日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-12-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方指黎智英持續串謀、無逾時檢控 官周五頒判決
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，踏入審訊第2天。黎智英一方昨爭議控方加控煽動罪屬逾時檢控，法庭無權處理，辯方今補充指，煽動罪設6個月的檢控時限是平衡公眾利益，以盡快制止煽動刊物發布，強調控方應及時檢控。控方則指，串謀屬持續的罪行，被告在案發兩年間持續發布逾160篇煽動刊物，可視為同一犯罪計劃，檢控期限應由串謀結束當天、而非被告首次犯法起計；而控方向法庭表示有意加控已屬「開始」檢控，故控方檢控並無逾時。法官聽畢陳詞後，押至本周五就法律爭議頒下裁決，料控方同日將不會讀出開案陳詞。
+
+身穿淺藍色恤衫、灰色西裝褸的黎智英，今步入法庭時向旁聽席微笑揮手和點頭，其妻子和兩名子女也有到庭，女兒向黎飛吻，黎亦微笑回以飛吻。有旁聽人士高呼「撐住！頂住！」，司法機構職員及保安人員立即阻止稱：「保持安靜！」
+
+辯方昨爭議，控方前年加控黎智英串謀刊印煽動刊物罪時，已超出煽動罪6個月的檢控時限，法庭無司法管轄權審理；亦認為就《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條列明煽動罪檢控「只可於犯罪後6個月內開始進行」，當中「開始（begun）」一詞是立法時特意選用，只有在控方把被告帶上法庭加控才算「開始」進行檢控，而控方於2021年12月13日去信通知法庭有意加控，並不算「開始」檢控，控方仍然超出檢控時限。
+
+#### 辯方：檢控時限為確保盡快制止煽動作為、平衡公眾利益 無對控方不公
+
+代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻今重申，控方單單去信法庭「提出告發（laying any information）」並不算是「開始」檢控，解釋煽動條例立法時確保需保障基本權利，因此設有嚴格的6個月檢控時限，亦列明須律政司司長的同意才能提出檢控。
+
+彭亦認為，檢控時限無對控方造成不公，指當有人發布煽動刊物，為了公眾利益，應盡快檢控來制止刊物發布，並讓公眾知悉哪些刊物不應發布；而若控方認為煽動罪不足以反映刑責，望以串謀罪檢控，亦可於6個月的時限內進行。彭強調，控方應及時檢控，不能什麼也不做，等到數年後才因時限已過、無法以煽動罪檢控，而改用串謀罪檢控；又指檢控時限雖或令一些人逃過法網，但相關「不公」是條文所固有，立法者制定時已平衡公眾利益。
+
+
+▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻（中）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）
+
+代表3間《蘋果日報》相關公司的大律師王國豪，採納彭的陳詞，同意3間公司被帶上法庭加控才算「開始」檢控，並補充3間公司於2022年2月10日才被正式加控串謀發布煽動刊物罪，比黎智英遲兩個月。
+
+#### 控方：被告持續串謀、分開檢控屬「荒謬」
+
+就辯方主張檢控時限應由被告首次完成犯罪、即2019年4月1日發布首篇煽動刊物起計算，副刑事檢控專員周天行回應，串謀是持續的罪行（continuing offence），而本案串謀協議歷時多於兩年，被告並非僅在案發首天發布一篇煽動刊物，而是於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日《蘋果日報》結束營運期間，持續發布逾160篇煽動刊物，因此檢控時限應由串謀最後一天、即6月24日起計算。而本案所涉行為性質相似、互相關聯，故可被視為同一個犯罪計劃（criminal enterprise）。
+
+周又指，即使只是發布一篇煽動刊物，但若能持續被公眾瀏覽，串謀時期亦應由刊物首次出現至其下架為止；並認為辯方稱應分開檢控每項串謀行為的說法荒謬，直言會令案件變得支離破碎（fragmented），無法反映整體罪行的嚴重性。
+
+#### 控方：法庭收到提控已屬「開始」檢控、若須親帶上庭令控罪難實行
+
+而對辯方爭議將黎智英帶上法庭加控才算「開始」進行檢控，周天行則認為法庭收到有關控罪的告發（laying information），即控方於12月13日去信法庭指有意加控，已算是「開始」檢控，解釋《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條中的「開始」，與《裁判官條例》第26條的「提出告發」，用字不同但意思一樣。
+
+根據《裁判官條例》第26條，無規定時效的罪行須於6個月內「作出申訴或提出告發」。惟法官李運騰指，《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條正規定了煽動罪的檢控時限，因此第26條不適用；又指制訂第11(1)條時，第26條已存在，若兩項條文效果一樣，為何還有需要制訂第11(1)條？又指控方詮釋會令第11(1)條變得多餘。周天行同意兩條法例字眼不一，但認為只是字眼上的改變，實際意思是一樣；並指若須將被告帶上法庭才算「開始」檢控，會令控罪難以實行（impracticable），因被告或潛逃和無法聯絡。
+
+
+▲ 副刑事檢控專員 周天行（左）、高級檢控官 陳穎琛（右）
+
+#### 周五頒判決 料不會同日讀出開案陳詞
+
+彭耀鴻回應時重申，《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條比《裁判官條例》第26條較遲制訂，若「開始」檢控等同「提出告發」，則會令《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條變得毫無用處，故兩者必然有分別。彭亦重申檢控時限應由被告首次犯罪起計。
+
+雙方陳詞完畢，法官杜麗冰表示需時考慮，將於周五（22日）頒下裁決，並認為不會在當天讀出開案陳詞。法官李運騰亦補充，控方開案陳詞或受裁決結果影響，不方便於當天開始讀出。
+
+黎智英於中午1時由俗稱「鐵甲威龍」的囚車送走，警方電單車及私家車護送囚車離開，現場亦有反恐特勤隊警員持槍戒備。
+
+
+▲ 黎智英的囚車駛離法院，多名警員戒備。
+
+
+
+#### 記者採訪一度遭司法機構職員阻止 後新聞主任澄清屬誤會
+
+今早西九龍法院外警力較昨日稍微減少，但仍有至少60名警員在場戒備，每輛進入法院的汽車同樣須接受檢查，有部分車主及乘客須下車及打開車尾箱。
+
+
+
+另外，記者欲於法院大樓地下採訪排隊市民時，遭掛上司法機構證件的職員阻止，指今早獲指示該處不得進行採訪。記者追問下，職員稱會邀請「新聞官」向記者解釋，其後3名警民關係科警員到場，向記者指相關安排是法院的「house rule（場地規則）」、是管理的政策，要「尊重返」，又指警方本身無權入法院執法，但被司法機構職員邀請入內。
+
+司法機構新聞主任到場了解後，向記者澄清法院並無相關「house rule」，純粹誤會，又指職員是擔心擾亂秩序，故溝通上「多咗啲」、「誤會咗」，記者可與人聊天採訪，只是不得進行拍攝。
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及Marc Corlett。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處總警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。
+
+
+▲ 警方國安處總警司 李桂華
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-21-euro-sifmanet-tbilisi-report.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-21-euro-sifmanet-tbilisi-report.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Euro SIFMANet Tbilisi Report
+author: Tom Keatinge and Gonzalo Saiz
+date : 2023-12-21 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/fzy0BsU.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network: Tbilisi Report"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Discussions revealed the particular challenges that Georgia faces in implementing sanctions against Russia – and how its partners can help._
+
+
+
+Georgia, as a country which borders Russia and has ambitions to join the EU, is in a difficult geopolitical situation. The raft of sanctions that the EU and allies have imposed on Russia therefore raises serious questions for Tbilisi.
+
+As an EU candidate country, Georgia is expected to align with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes the numerous restrictive measures imposed on Russia. However, with 20% of its territory – Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region or South Ossetia – under Russian occupation, Georgia faces the challenge of striking a balance. On the one hand, it has sympathy and solidarity with Ukraine given the Russian occupation. On the other, it wants to avoid actions that lead to further Russian aggression against Georgia.
+
+In November 2023, the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI, in collaboration with the Regional Institute of Security Studies (RISS), hosted a series of roundtable discussions in Tbilisi with Georgian authorities and representatives from the private sector and civil society. The aim of these discussions was to obtain insights into Georgia’s position on the international sanctions against Russia and the current Georgian efforts, within their national jurisdiction, to prevent circumvention and evasion. This engagement is part of the European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.
+
+
+### Georgia’s Approach to Financial Sanctions Against Russia
+
+On 25 February 2022, the government of Georgia announced its decision not to implement international sanctions against Russia. However, in reality, Tbilisi’s approach to sanctions is far more complex. Alignment with the EU’s CFSP is important for Georgia’s EU candidacy status and the country’s connections to global markets and correspondent banking relations effectively mandate compliance with these restrictions. Under these conditions, without the introduction of any new laws in Georgia, the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) instructed the country’s financial sector to comply with the sanctions imposed by the US, the EU and the UK. To support compliance in the sector, the NBG has a dedicated anti-money laundering (AML) department that is liaising with banks on sanctions and conducts inspections in relation to sanctions against Russia.
+
+A representative from the NBG highlighted that businesses in Georgia have boosted their resources dedicated to sanctions and are increasingly adopting programmes to check and identify sanctions issues. The NBG representative noted that they are aware of the complex rules and licences related to the monitoring of goods and services under restrictions, as well the cost of compliance for the private sector. Although businesses seek support from the NBG, Georgia’s central bank faces the challenge of responding to questions about foreign sanctions regimes over which it has no control, and no insight beyond what is on the relevant sanctions coalition websites. For this reason, the NBG intends to guide the private sector in the right direction but informs financial institutions that they must assess their own risks.
+
+A representative from Georgia’s Banking Association expressed its satisfaction with the performance of the banking sector on sanctions, due to the effectiveness of AML and sanctions procedures that the industry has in place. However, the participant noted that several banks operating in Georgia are part of regional banking groups in countries that are not implementing sanctions, such as Turkey, Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan. This creates risk. The Banking Association representative added that the services of VISA and Mastercard credit cards of Russian banks in Georgia had been suspended to comply with international sanctions.
+
+A representative from the Bank of Georgia (BOG) also described its limited risk appetite for customers from Russia and transactions related to the country – these are now subject to enhanced due diligence procedures. The BOG, one of the main banks in Georgia with 2.5 million customers, is listed on the London Stock Exchange, so it is under the supervision of the UK Financial Conduct Authority and therefore is required to comply with UK (and wider international) sanctions against Russia. The BOG currently has two co-directors – one for general financial crime issues and another oversees the sanctions programmes – in its compliance department, as well as 80 employees in the “second line of defence”.
+
+Against this background, the number of suspicious transaction reports in Georgia has increased. Participants explained that the financial sector has expanded its criteria of high-risk activities to include: international transactions; transactions in US dollars; high-net-worth individuals; and jurisdictions under suspicion of facilitating sanctions evasion, among others. Georgia has taken significant steps to mitigate risks of breaching international sanctions, for example, the Tbilisi City Hall terminated the almost $50 million-contract for 44 subway cars for the Tbilisi Metro, that was agreed with the EU-sanctioned Russian company Metrovagonmash. However, private sector representatives noted that while businesses will not trade with a company that raises clear red flags, the emerging challenge is around companies that pose “yellow flags”. To ensure compliance in Georgia, correspondent banks now ask Georgian banks about their transaction monitoring systems, their automated alerts systems, the percentage of false alerts generated, the number of transactions rejected, and the resources allocated to effectively check these procedures.
+
+> #### `When Sanctions Come Home: The Case of Otar Partskhaladze`
+
+_`As many participants in the workshops noted, the topic of Russia sanctions is highly politicised. Nothing illustrates this more than the case of Georgian citizen, businessman and former prosecutor Otar Partskhaladze, who was sanctioned by the US in September 2023.`_
+
+_`Partskhaladze and two companies of which he owned a majority were sanctioned for allegedly facilitating malign Russian influence in Georgia led by Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), and personally profiting from his FSB connection`_
+
+_`In June 2023, in line with a change in the law that had been criticised by the IMF and other experts as damaging the NBG’s independence, a new governor was appointed. Following the designation of Partskhaladze, the newly appointed governor, Natia Turnava, issued an executive order that required a local court order before the assets of a Georgian national could be frozen under international sanctions. This overturned the NBG’s previous position that banks should implement Russia sanctions.`_
+
+_`Among other implications of this decision, the IMF suspended its programme for Georgia over its concerns for the independence of the central bank.`_
+
+Although Georgia’s financial sector has, in effect, complied with international sanctions, trade with Russia has continued to increase. This poses numerous challenges to tackling circumvention through Georgia. The following section looks more closely at the state of trade restrictions in Georgia and the related insights provided by participants at the workshops.
+
+
+### Trade Restrictions Between Georgia and Russia
+
+Russia is Georgia’s third-largest trade partner, with 11.1% of Georgian exports going to Russia. Georgia has clearly stated that it will not implement trade sanctions against Russia.
+
+Still, Georgian authorities emphasised that Georgia is one of the main partners of the EU and the US in the region. While the combined EU market is Georgia’s main trade partner, the share is gradually decreasing. Georgian businesses understand the importance of the EU market and are motivated to increase their trade relations, but they require support from the EU to promote investment in the country to support trade decoupling from Russia.
+
+Participants emphasised that the complexity of monitoring supply chains makes it futile for international partners to tackle circumvention unilaterally. Georgian authorities stressed the resources they are allocating to supporting international partners, prioritising the list of 45 high-priority items, and they find discussions on secondary sanctions frustrating. To facilitate compliance, authorities also highlighted their interest in obtaining consolidated sanctions lists from the international coalition, given the costs of monitoring all the lists independently.
+
+According to participating authorities, since the beginning, Georgia conveyed to international partners that it would support their aims of preventing circumvention. Authorities noted that half of their capacity is currently focused on sanctions implementation, identifying banned EU goods bound for Russia and the parties involved in their trade. They also noted that the closure of trade borders with the EU via the Baltic states has led to a notable displacement of trade transit through Georgia.
+
+One side-effect of the introduction of international sanctions on Russia is that Georgia has become a regional re-export hub for used cars from the EU and the US. Both Brussels and Washington have demanded Georgia cease this trade with Russia. In August 2023, Georgia agreed to introduce this ban on the re-export of Western cars to Russia. However, participants at the workshop explained that this action has simply created another layer in the circumvention route. Georgia remains part of the supply chain, but cars are now first transported to Kazakhstan and are likely re-exported again to Russia, despite efforts to identify the real end-user. A further complication is the export of the spare car parts, given their dual-use nature. For their export, Customs requires official letters from manufactures on where these parts are going and how they will be used.
+
+More broadly, participants highlighted the circumvention challenge Georgia faces as a trading partner with the Eurasian Economic Union, a mechanism that Russia is increasingly using to obfuscate the destination of trade flows.
+
+Georgian authorities were concerned that the focus of sanctions discussions is dominated by financial integrity, neglecting the key role played by trade integrity, particularly when considering Georgia’s geographic location. Trade integrity requires a combination of export control capacity and trade transparency, which demands good customs communication channels between exporting and importing countries and capacity to monitor the supply chains. This system depends on the reporting information provided by the private sector, but businesses do not have the capacity to identify everything related to sanctions and thus information is incomplete. This is particularly true in the non-financial sector, which participants described as notably less experienced in sanctions implementation. Representatives from the private sector explained that while no meetings have been arranged with authorities to support sanctions implementation, a good cross-sector relationship exists whereby businesses can approach authorities to receive guidance and training when required.
+
+To improve its domestic controls, Georgia has received technical and capacity-building training from EU member states. The Ministry of Finance reported that as of 8 November 2023, Georgia had stopped 2,970 containers and denied 1,683 applications from companies to conduct operations related to goods and services subject to restrictions. As a small jurisdiction, the Georgian authorities see these numbers as a sign of success. However, they raised frustrations with the time it takes the EU or the US to respond to queries about trucks stopped at the border.
+
+Georgian authorities at the roundtable also share the concern expressed by international partners regarding the involvement of Russia’s Federal Security Service (the FSB) in establishing front companies in third countries. Investigations into FSB-facilitated circumvention schemes are ongoing.
+
+The flow of land-based exports from Georgia to Russia – which some participants suggested might be complicated by the development of a north–south trade corridor between Iran and Russia – continues to attract international attention. However, Georgian authorities pointed to an overlooked yet significant challenge that they face: monitoring maritime transport.
+
+
+### The Challenges of Maritime Trade
+
+Monitoring land-based trade is a complex and resource-consuming effort for Georgia. Detecting banned goods transported in trucks at the border with Russia and identifying the real end-user of the products is a challenging task. Alongside this task, Georgia also has access to the Black Sea and monitoring maritime trade entering and leaving its ports presents significant challenges.
+
+Georgia’s Maritime Transport Agency is monitoring vessels and their cargo to prevent the circumvention of international sanctions. Representatives from the agency described the challenge that the small six-hour vessel inspection window poses. Authorities must operate within this period, and delays in obtaining the necessary answers from the beneficial owners of vessels can be problematic.
+
+A representative of the Maritime Transport Agency explained that, between August and September 2022, several companies wanted to re-flag their vessels with the Georgian flag, but they were identified to be Russian so Georgia denied their requests. Still, a major challenge the Agency faces in this regard is the presence of vessels with flags from non-cooperative jurisdictions. Georgian authorities try to communicate with the reported beneficial owners in these jurisdictions – notably British Overseas Territories in the Caribbean – but often fail to establish contact.
+
+Georgia also faces a unique challenge on maritime trade through the ports of Russian-occupied Abkhazia. Georgia monitors trade through these ports but has no control over this activity. Georgian authorities track vessels in Abkhazia that involve suspicious beneficial owners and offshore jurisdictions and shares these reports with international partners. Authorities described how the vessels that Georgia tracks from Russia to Abkhazia go to Turkish ports to obfuscate their origin. By visiting Turkish ports, they can obtain the necessary papers to then access EU ports and thus circumvent sanctions. Georgian authorities expressed their dissatisfaction with the scarce support received from the EU and the US on this concern, a view consistent with their wider frustration on support received for implementing trade-related sanctions.
+
+
+### Impact of Russian Inflows (of People and Money) into Georgia
+
+A final point emerged from the workshop on the unique challenge of geography and the resulting incoming flows of Russian citizens and investment. Participants noted that Georgia gets economic benefits from the increasing numbers of Russian citizens coming into the country and opening businesses. Tourism from Russian nationals has increased, and new Russian-owned businesses have opened in the country, notably in the IT industry. But participants also agreed that this presents security risks for Georgia. Real estate market prices in Georgia have doubled and participants described the IT industry as posing particular risks in terms of sanctions, given that these services are banned in the EU and US but can now operate from Georgia.
+
+Furthermore, while these booming economic sectors generate wealth in the country, participants were concerned about the negative impact their sudden departure would have on Georgia’s economy should they leave immediately the war is over. Moreover, participants added that these new businesses are competing with existing Georgian businesses, with resulting impacts on business opportunities and/or recruitment. One interesting observation related to Russian tourism is that Russian nationals are setting up tourist guides that Georgian authorities fear may be spreading pro-Russian propaganda as part of their service.
+
+Russia is a visibly divisive topic in Georgia, which, participants assert, is fuelled by mis/disinformation. Pro-Russian media pushes a narrative on the ineffectiveness of sanctions on the Russian economy and their negative impact on the sanctioning country’s population, while opposing media focuses on the scandal, noted earlier in this report, around the former prosecutor. Georgian media also focuses on how Georgia is economically dependent on trade with Russia and the aforementioned Russian inflows. These dependencies are made more acute by the lack of EU trade growth. Participants disagreed with these views and added that economic ties with Russia are not critical to Georgia’s economic security, having survived a direct war with Russia, although participants did share their concerns over Russia’s influence on Georgia’s critical infrastructure.
+
+
+### Recommendations
+
+The Georgian government chose not to implement sanctions against Russia and the lack of a relevant national law has provided an opportunity for it to make some questionable decisions (such as the case of Partskhaladze and the NBG). However, the insights provided by both public and private sector participants at the recent workshops reflect the solid efforts of the Georgian authorities to prevent circumvention and evasion from happening through its jurisdiction. In doing so, Georgian authorities face similar challenges to those found across EU member states. Participants agreed on the following list of recommendations to improve Georgia’s ability to support relevant elements of the international sanctions regime against Russia by tackling circumvention:
+
+1. __Establish a dedicated government sanctions unit.__ While several departments and agencies consider sanctions, Georgia’s response would benefit from greater coordination that could be achieved by establishing a national sanctions coordination unit that can draw on relevant expertise from across the public and private sectors. This unit could also highlight where new legislation is needed to ensure the integrity of EU sanctions implementation.
+
+2. __Promote trade transparency.__ Integrity and transparency are essential in trade. This must be supported by the quality and accessibility of data regarding beneficial ownership, as well as the availability of information-sharing channels to ensure a robust framework and facilitate investigations to enforce it.
+
+3. __Continue providing international support to Georgia.__ Georgian authorities appear committed to preventing the circumvention of international sanctions but, as in all jurisdictions implementing sanctions, the country requires substantial technical assistance support from international partners. The EU and its allies must ensure they provide sufficient and timely support to Georgia’s anti-circumvention efforts.
+
+4. __Simplify bureaucratic impediments for Georgia’s trade with the EU.__ Georgian economic operators should see the EU as an accessible market. Entering and initiating trade with the EU should not be a complicated process. Facilitating smooth trade between the two jurisdictions will see Georgia’s trade shift from Russia towards the EU. As a share, trade with Russia is currently increasing and trade with the EU is decreasing.
+
+5. __Invest in EU/US–Georgia trade relations.__ If Georgia is expected to further decouple from Russia, the EU and the US should encourage their businesses to invest in Georgia and expand trade links with the country. Participants explained that Georgian businesses understand that Russia is not a reliable partner, but if they are to reduce trade with Russia, they need to identify a sustainable alternative.
+
+The workshop discussions highlighted the challenges Georgia faces from both a trade and security perspective when considering the implementation of sanctions on Russia. While there is support for sanctions across the public and private sectors, Georgia clearly needs greater support in managing the related trade and security risks. The EU and allies must show that they understand Georgia’s security predicament. Russia’s intention to hold a referendum to annex the occupied territories in Georgia – as it did in Ukraine – can be reactivated any time, creating a sense of vulnerability in Georgia. Georgia is a strategic partner for the West in the region and thus its national interests, particularly related to trade, should be taken into consideration to foster heightened commitment to the implementation of sanctions on Russia.
+
+---
+
+__Tom Keatinge__ is the founding Director of the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies (CFCS) at RUSI, where his research focuses on matters at the intersection of finance and security. He is also currently a specialist adviser on illicit finance to the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee ongoing enquiry.
+
+__Gonzalo Saiz__ is a Research Analyst at the Centre for Financial Crime & Security Studies at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter threat finance. He is part of Project CRAAFT (Collaboration, Research and Analysis Against Financing of Terrorism) and Euro SIFMANet (European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network).
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-22-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-3.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-22-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-3.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d2342907
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-22-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-3.md
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第三日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2023-12-22 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 官裁煽動刊物罪非逾時檢控 去信法庭「提出告發」未等黎智英上庭 已屬啟動程序
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（22日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第3日審訊。就辯方所提出的串謀煽動刊物罪逾時檢控爭議，3名《國安法》指定法官作出裁決，指法庭在檢控期限屆滿10日之前收到控方通知擬加控罪，所以認為不存在逾時檢控的情況，因此駁回辯方申請，換言之控方就煽動刊物罪的檢控仍然有效。案件押後至明年1月2日續審，屆時黎將庭上答辯，之後控方將讀出開案陳詞。押後期間黎繼續還柙。
+
+76歲的黎智英由3名懲教人員帶往被告欄應訊，近日氣溫降至只有10度或以下，黎亦穿上深藍色厚褸，並戴上灰色頸巾。他透過耳機聽取判決時表現平靜。
+
+#### 黎智英稱煽動刊物控罪逾時檢控：期限應由串謀首天起計、帶上法庭加控才算啟動檢控
+
+黎智英尚未正式就各項控罪答辯，在審訊首天，控辯雙方先處理法律爭議。黎的法律代表、資深大律師彭耀鴻指「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪逾時檢控，法庭無權處理。3名《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰及李素蘭頒下書面裁決，駁回辯方申請。
+
+據判詞，黎智英在2021年12月13日被控3項罪名，包括兩項《國安法》控罪及一項串謀妨礙司法公正罪。控方在同日去信西九法院，表示有意申請新增「煽動刊物」控罪，而西九法院裁判官翌日收悉信件及相關文件，副本亦送達黎的法律代表。至12月28日的提訊日，控方申請加控，而黎的代表律師並未有提出反對。
+
+辯方指檢控期限應由串謀犯罪首日起計算6個月，即2019年10月1日便屆滿；即使辯方接受檢控期限由串謀犯罪的最後一天起計6個月，控方也需要在2021年12月24日或之前提出檢控，可是黎智英在12月28日才被帶上法庭加控，超出了期限4日。
+
+
+▲ 代表黎智英的資深大律師 彭耀鴻（左）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）
+
+控方則稱「串謀」屬持續的罪行，被告在2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日《蘋果日報》結束營運期間，持續發布逾160篇煽動刊物，可視為同一犯罪計劃，檢控期限應由「串謀」結束當天、而非被告首次犯法起計。此外，控方稱他們於2021年12月13日向法庭表示有意加控，已屬「開始」檢控，故控方檢控並無逾時。
+
+#### 判決：檢控期限應由最後一日起計算
+
+判決指，不接受辯方稱檢控期限由首天串謀起計，因為控方現時指控黎不只一次串謀犯罪，與一次性的串謀罪行並不相同，所以被告完成首天串謀犯罪之後，串謀協議仍然存在（still be very much alive），直至串謀完結當天，控罪並不會「過時」（stale）。
+
+判決指，只要控方有足夠證據證明有一個串謀協議貫穿整個控罪時段，那麼檢控期限便應由串謀的最後一天才開始計算，不會對被告帶來不公。就本案而言，法官裁定檢控期限應由2021年6月24日起計6個月，因此於2021年12月24日才屆滿。
+
+
+▲ 2021年6月24日，《蘋果日報》發刊最後一份報章。
+
+#### 官：條文引入「提出」檢控是為統一字眼 原意非改變條文內容
+
+《刑事罪行》條例第11(1)條規定，煽動控罪的檢控，「只可於犯罪後6個月內開始進行。」第11(2)條亦規定，未經律政司司長書面同意，不得就煽動控罪提出檢控。沒有爭議條文目的是要確保相關檢控及時，而不會起訴「過時」的罪行。上述兩項條文首次寫進煽動罪條例以及生效是1938年9月2日。至1972年12月31日，煽動罪條例合併入《刑事罪行條例》，經修訂後成為第11(1)及(2)條，而「提出檢控」中的「提出（instituted）」此時首次出現。
+
+判決指，從上述過程可以推論，立法機關之所以在《刑事罪行條例》中引入「提出（instituted）」一詞，原意是對於所有需要首席檢察官（Attorney General）同意而檢控的罪行統一用字，而不是有意改變條文內容。直至1997年香港主權移交，條文中的「首席檢察官」修訂為「律政司司長」，除此之外便沒有任何其他修訂。
+
+#### 官：當控方「提出告發」檢控程序便算開始
+
+判決指，沒有爭議「煽動罪」是可公訴的罪行（indictable offence），受《裁判官條例》第三部管轄，考慮《裁判官條例》第8及27條有關「申訴」或「告發」的字眼，法官認為不論在公訴程序或簡易程序中，當控方「提出告發（laying of an information）」，檢控程序便算是開始，而毋須等到被告人出庭應訊或帶上法庭才算開始。
+
+根據《裁判官條例》第2條的定義，「告發（information）」意思包括「控告」。而第75(1)條規定「任何指稱有人犯了可公訴罪行的申訴或告發，均須以書面提出，並須載有或包含有指稱已犯罪行的陳述，以及為提供有關該項罪行性質的合理資料的所需詳情。」
+
+就本案而言，法官認為西九法院裁判官在2021年12月14日收妥控方的信件、控罪詳情及相關文件後，毫無疑問地已充份地構成「提出告發」，符合第75(1)條的要求。而控方一旦提出了告發，便毋須做額外功夫，檢控程序已算是啟動。（“The information once so laid, no more was required of the prosecutor and the prosecution had ‘begun’.”）
+
+當控方提出告發後，裁判官可以發出拘捕令把被告人帶上法庭，或簽發傳票要求被告人自行到庭應訊，不論是哪一種的上庭方式，它們只是為了被告能被帶到裁判官席前的程序，是法庭的事務，與控方無關。
+
+判決指，雖然《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)及(2)條分別使用「開始（begun）」及「提出（instituted）」，字眼不同，但是兩者均指向相同的東西。判決又提到，兩項條文目的是保障被告人，若果立法機關有意賦予兩詞不同意思，理應提供兩詞各自的釋義。
+
+#### 倘被告留院或不在港 致未能及時檢控 法官不接受辯方稱不應受審
+
+判決又指，辯方堅稱只有當被告人上庭應訊及面對控罪時，檢控程序才算啟動，會導致令人驚訝（surprising）的結果。法官曾在庭上問及，若然被告人留院、不在香港或潛逃，以致未能趕及在檢控期限之內上庭應訊呢？辯方則回答在如此情況下，被告人便不應就控罪受審，因他未能在檢控期限屆滿之前上庭。法官表示不接受辯方說法，因這不是立法原意。
+
+
+▲ 黎智英
+
+判決指，第11(1)及(2)條處理檢控程序的不同範疇，第11(2)條從控方角度出發，即提出告發者，並聚焦檢控須經律政司司長同意，以免濫用程序；第11(1)條則從法庭作為接收告發者的角度出發，以確保控方乃及時檢控。
+
+總括而言，法官認為西九法庭於2021年12月14日，即檢控期限10日之前，已收妥控方通知及有關煽動控罪的資料，故此檢控並沒有超出期限，遂駁回辯方的申請。
+
+被告為：黎智英（76歲）、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司。
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。
+
+黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師Marc Corlett、關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及李峰琦。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。
+
+控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處總警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。
+
+同案8名被告：前行政總裁張劍虹、前總編輯羅偉光、前副社長陳沛敏、前執行總編輯林文宗、前英文主筆馮偉光、前主筆楊清奇、李宇軒和陳梓華，早前已承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，現正還柙，等待黎智英審訊完畢後判刑。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-27-ukraine-can-but.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-27-ukraine-can-but.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..66242606
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-27-ukraine-can-but.md
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Ukraine Can, But...
+author: Jack Watling
+date : 2023-12-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/4wQAXb1.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Yes, Ukraine can still defeat Russia – but it will require far more support from Europe"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_By finally delivering on their promises, Kyiv’s European allies will find the benefits extend to them, too._
+
+
+
+Here is one fact that sums up the gap between the promises that Kyiv’s European partners have made to Ukraine and the reality. In March 2023, the EU made the historic decision to deliver a million artillery shells to Ukraine within 12 months. But the number that has actually been sent is closer to 300,000. For all the rhetorical commitments to support Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s invasion “for as long as it takes”, Europe has largely failed.
+
+The price of this complacency is already being paid in Ukrainian blood. According to the armed forces of Ukraine, over the summer of 2023, Ukraine was firing up to 7,000 artillery shells a day and managed to degrade Russia’s logistics and artillery to the point where Russia was firing about 5,000 rounds a day. Today, the Ukrainians are struggling to fire 2,000 rounds daily, while Russian artillery is reaching about 10,000. Artillery isn’t everything, but the disparity speaks to Ukraine’s relative shortage of materiel, evident in other areas such as the number of drones it can field.
+
+Russia is likely to be able to fire about 5m rounds at Ukraine in 2024, based on its mobilised defence production, supply from Iran and North Korea, and remaining stocks. Despite the flippant observation – often made by European officials – that Russia’s economy is the same size as that of Italy, the Kremlin is producing more shells than all of Nato. Meanwhile, Ukraine is unlikely to see any significant increase in supply for some months. This will cede the initiative to the Russians. The Kremlin believes it can win by 2026, and so Putin is in no mood to negotiate or back down.
+
+It does not have to be like this. Earlier this month, the Estonian Ministry of Defence published a white paper detailing the levels of military equipment required to make Ukraine’s defence sustainable and for it to pursue the liberation of the occupied territories by 2025. The Estonians costed the requirements, showing they were well within the bounds of possibility. The issue is not money, but competence in delivery. If the steps to implement these measures are not taken, Ukraine will lose.
+
+Ensuring Russia’s defeat in Ukraine is feasible, but it requires some important steps. First, Ukraine will need a steady supply of weapons to be able to blunt Russian attacks over the first half of 2024. This will require plenty of US support, but also increasing supply from European Nato members, whose backing will be critical as the US election looms in November. Many of the munitions provided since the beginning of the war were purchased from the international market or drawn from stockpiles, and investment in European production has been slow. But as stocks run out, sustaining Ukraine’s war effort depends critically on increasing Europe’s manufacturing capacity.
+
+Second, it is essential that Ukraine corrects the mistakes that led to its failed counteroffensive in 2023. Improving the training of its troops must be the top priority. During the second world war, British forces considered 22 weeks of infantry training the minimum before a soldier was ready to join a unit, where they would then carry out collective training as part of a battalion. Ukrainian troops are lucky to get five weeks of training, while collective training is rarely carried out above the scale of the company. European Nato must expand and extend the training support provided in order to give Ukrainian units a wider tactical repertoire, and more importantly expand the scale at which the army can command and synchronise operations.
+
+Persistent inflation and economic shocks, like the disruption to global shipping from Houthi missile attacks in the Bab al-Mandab, mean that among European countries, making a long-term economic commitment to Ukraine will be a domestic political challenge. But that is to ignore its potential upsides. Investment in defence production, rather than relying on purchases from abroad, comes with significant levels of domestic industrial investment and with the potential for expenditure to be recovered through increased tax receipts.
+
+There are good security reasons to invest in domestic production, too. A failure to do so now could leave European leaders needing to deter a fully mobilised Russia without stockpiles or the capacity to replenish them. Meanwhile, a simultaneous escalation in the Indo-Pacific in 2025 could cause the US to shift a range of critical military capabilities – aerial refuelling, logistics, air defences – to deter China, leaving Europe significantly exposed.
+
+For Ukraine, the immediate future is one of several months of hard fighting without critical resources, while endeavouring to regenerate the combat power that was expended over 2023. But Europe can determine what the second half of 2024 and indeed 2025 will look like. This is a war that can be won. The recent successful strike on the Russian landing ship Novocherkassk in harbour, protected by layers of Russian defences, shows how Ukraine can make effective use of the equipment that it is supplied with. But European security must not be squandered by more complacency.
+
+---
+
+__Jack Watling__ is a senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-02-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-4.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-02-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-4.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0caff71f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-02-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-4.md
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第四日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-01-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方開案陳詞：黎智英為「主腦」 國安法生效前已著手聯絡及會面外國官員
+- 控方指黎智英與李柱銘晤佩洛西 多次受訪稱需要外國向中國施壓制裁
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（2日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第4日審訊。3名《國安法》指定法官上月裁定煽動刊物罪無逾時檢控後，黎今早庭上答辯，否認3項控罪。之後控方讀出開案陳詞，指黎智英是本案「主腦」，對《蘋果日報》的運作有完全的控制權，他曾指示下屬開設英文版，以圖尋求外國制裁中國及香港特區官員。控方又指黎在《國安法》生效之前，已開始與不同的外國官員及非政府組織人士聯絡、會面，尋求實施制裁、封鎖及敵對行動，至今共有42名中國及香港特區官員被制裁。
+
+76歲的黎智英身穿白色恤衫、藍色西裝褸，由數名懲教人員帶往被告欄應訊，他面帶笑容、神情愉悅地與妻子及兒女打招呼。
+
+
+▲ 黎妻 李韻琴
+
+#### 黎否認一項發布煽動刊物及兩項串謀勾結外國勢力罪 另一項勾結外力罪則存檔法庭
+
+在上月開審首天，辯方爭議串謀煽動刊物罪逾時檢控，3名《國安法》指定法官聽畢控辯雙方陳詞後，裁定法庭在檢控期限屆滿10日之前收到控方通知擬加控罪，所以認為不存在逾時檢控的情況，因此駁回辯方申請，換言之控方就煽動刊物罪的檢控仍然有效。今天辯方向法庭申請釐清相關裁決，指稱控罪時段應縮短至10日，即2021年6月14至24日，惟3名法官認為辯方是提出新理據並意圖重啟爭議，最終拒絕申請。
+
+接著4名被告在庭上答辯。黎智英否認一項「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物罪」及一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪。蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司派出一名代表，該人士代表3間公司同樣否認上述兩罪。
+
+黎亦否認另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪。他另面對的一項「勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，控方則申請存檔於法庭，獲法庭批准。
+
+#### 控方形容黎為「激進的政治人物」 是案中主腦
+
+控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行作開案陳詞，指本案關於一名「激進的政治人物」，激起市民對中央及特區政府的憎恨，以及勾結外國勢力以對中國及香港特區實施制裁、封鎖及敵對行動，危害國家安全。
+
+控方指，黎智英是3項控罪的主腦，並與政治倡議團體「Stand with Hong Kong, Fight for Freedom」一同串謀犯案。在案發時期，《蘋果日報》一共發布了161篇具煽動性文章，其中31篇在2020年7月1日《國安法》實施之後發布。
+
+控方指稱，早在《國安法》於2020年7月生效之前，黎智英已開始支持或提出請求外國勢力向中央及特區政府實施制裁或封鎖。據《蘋果日報》報導，黎智英於2019年7月與時任美國副總統彭斯、時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧及美國參議員等人會面，討論《逃犯條例》修訂，當黎被問到美國可以做什麼時，黎曾提出制裁中國及香港官員，讓他們知道有何後果。控方指，上述顯示《蘋果日報》被利用作為平台提倡制裁。
+
+#### 控方指黎智英與多名外籍人士聯絡 導致42名中港官員受制裁
+
+控方又指，從2020年7月1日《國安法》實施起，至2021年2月15日陳梓華被拘捕，黎與 Mark Simon 和陳梓華等人一同串謀勾結外國勢力。控方在庭上屏幕展示人物關係圖，其中 Mark Simon 是黎智英的私人助理，二人均在 WhatsApp 群組「DC Dems」及 Signal 群組「Jimmy Mark」。其他涉案人士包括前美國陸軍上將 Jack Keane、前美國國防部副部長 Paul Wolfowitz、前美國駐港澳總領事郭明瀚（James Cunningham）、「香港監察」創辦人 Benedict Rogers 及「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」行政總監 Luke de Pulford 等，控方指部份人加入上述兩個通訊群組，亦會與黎智英「一對一」聯絡及電郵。
+
+控方指，事實上不同的制裁措施的確有實施，至今共有42名中國及香港特區官員被制裁，審訊期間將會傳召香港城市大學法律學院教授王貴國就此作供。
+
+#### 控方指擬傳召4名前蘋果高層出庭作供 其中3名為同案被告
+
+就煽動刊物和涉及蘋果高層的串謀勾結外國勢力罪，控方將會依賴同案被告張劍虹、陳沛敏、楊清奇，以及未被起訴的前營運總監兼行政總裁周達權的證供，以證明串謀犯罪協議的存在，以及相關串謀協議乃源自黎智英的指示。
+
+控方邀請法庭考慮相關串謀是持續性的，亦邀請法庭考慮黎智英在2020年5月開設了個人 Twitter 帳戶，作為顯示意圖的「外顯行為（Overt act）」。此外，控方依賴22篇黎智英個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」的評論文章、一段訪問影片，以及24段網上直播節目「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」影片，題為「Live Q&A with Jimmy Lai」。控方亦會依賴黎智英接受外國傳媒訪問及 Twitter 帖文。
+
+#### 控方：黎智英指示開設英文版 以圖尋求外力制裁
+
+控方指，《蘋果日報》於1995年1月根據《本地報刊註冊條例》註冊，直至2021年6月24日停運之前，《蘋果日報》一直是香港廣泛流通的報紙，無論實體報紙還是網站均有影響力。《蘋果》亦開設社交媒體包括 Facebook、Twitter 和 YouTube 。
+
+2020年5月25日，黎智英指示《蘋果》開設英文版，以圖尋求外力向中央及香港政府實施制裁，並發布了一篇文章題為「打國際線 蘋果英文版免費試睇」。
+
+#### 控方提及社長與總編輯等各人角色 黎智英對《蘋果》運作有「完全控制權」
+
+就各人在案中角色，控方指黎智英為串謀犯罪的主腦，對《蘋果日報》的運作有完全的控制權，他會向編輯發出指示以執行日常運作。
+
+張劍虹於案發時為《蘋果日報》社長，負責公司的整體運作，以及報紙的出版及發行。陳沛敏則是副社長，是實體報紙日常運作的決策人，亦撰寫評論文章，刊於專欄「堆填生活」。羅偉光是《蘋果日報》的總編輯，負責編輯工作及擔任《蘋果》網上平台的決策人。而林文宗是執行總編輯。
+
+
+▲ 張劍虹
+
+馮偉光是英文版網站的編輯，並會以筆名「盧峯」撰寫評論文章。楊清奇是《蘋果日報》的主筆，負責撰寫社論，以及尋找適合的時評作者供稿。楊自己亦以筆名「李平」撰寫評論文章。
+
+控方指，黎智英作為「飯盒會」的主席，平日會與陳沛敏、張劍虹、羅偉光、林文宗及楊清奇一同討論《蘋果日報》及其網上平台的編採方向。黎亦撰寫評論文章，刊於其專欄「成敗樂一笑」。
+
+#### 控方指Simon Lee於海外管理黎的Twitter帳戶
+
+至於利世民（Simon Lee）則負責管理黎智英的Twitter 帳戶，黎的帳戶於2020年5月發布首則帖文，但《國安法》生效後，利已經停止管理黎的帳戶，直至他離港後再次恢復相關工作。
+
+周達權案發時則為《蘋果日報》的營運總監，亦是壹傳媒管理服務有限公司的財務總裁。
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。
+
+黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師 Marc Corlett、關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及李峰琦。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。
+
+控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處總警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。
+
+同案8名被告：前行政總裁張劍虹、前總編輯羅偉光、前副社長陳沛敏、前執行總編輯林文宗、前英文主筆馮偉光、前主筆楊清奇、李宇軒和陳梓華，早前已承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，現正還柙，等待黎智英審訊完畢後判刑。
+
+
+▲ 林文宗（左）、陳沛敏（右）
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（2日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第4日審訊。控方早上開始作開案陳詞，指黎智英掌控《蘋果日報》的運作，為案中主腦，並且在《國安法》實施之前便著手聯絡外國官員。下午控方在庭上展示時任美國眾議院議長佩洛西 Twitter 截圖，顯示黎於2019年10月曾聯同民主黨創黨主席李柱銘一同見面。庭上播放多段黎智英接受採訪的片段，他提及香港反修例是「最後一戰」，非常需要「外國勢力」的支持，以改變中國乃至世界，又促請美國向中國實施制裁，「我相信特朗普是一個守信用的人」。控方亦展示黎與蘋果副社長陳沛敏的對話，二人曾討論制裁名單，並提及「賣港賊」字眼。
+
+#### 控方籲法庭考慮社會騷亂背景 蘋果頭版籲上街
+
+控方邀請法庭採取司法認知（judicial notice），自2019年6月反修例運動開始，本港處於社會動亂及暴力事件頻繁發生的時期。在這段期間，《蘋果日報》刊登了題為《黎智英：倘修例傳媒冇得做》的文章。
+
+而在政府宣布暫緩修訂後，報紙頭版題為「惡法擬暫緩但不撤、遊行前夕、林鄭緩兵、明天照上街」。同年7月1日更有示威者闖入立法會大樓。政府其後於2019年9月4日宣布撤回修訂條例草案，報紙頭版則以「Freedom Summer」作為英語標題。
+
+
+▲ 2019年6月15日，林鄭月娥宣布暫緩《逃犯條例》修訂草案。
+
+#### 控方庭上播片 稱黎智英多次與外國官員會面、接受外媒訪問 談及制裁
+
+控方指，在《國安法》實施前，黎智英已多次與外國官員會談、接受外國媒體訪問以及在美國報紙撰寫文章。控方展示黎與美國、英國及台灣連繫的時間表，時間由2016年開始至2020年。控方亦在庭上播放8段黎智英與外國官員會談、接受外國或台灣媒體訪問的片段。
+
+控方接著簡述黎智英與外國官員等人的關係。於2019年7月9日，《蘋果》刊登文章《蓬佩奧晤黎智英》。同月，黎會見美國國家安全顧問博爾頓。黎其後在何俊仁主持的網台節目《細說中南海》擔任嘉賓。《蘋果》網站報導黎在節目中的言論，包括：「黑社會文化就是要讓人恐懼、用暴力打低對方，跟共產黨如出一轍」，又指控中央政府管治下的社會是「恐懼社會」而不是「自由社會」。對於721白衣人襲擊事件，黎亦表示：「今次恐襲必須交由國際機構如聯合國或英美等國家，作公開的獨立調查。」他其後稱：「反送中行動發展至今，越來越需要國際支持」，報導提及「（黎）早前與美國國務卿會面時，對方問他：『美國可以怎樣做？』」，黎認為美國可以實施制裁，令中國官員可以知道後果。
+
+控方指，當美國在2019年8月開始提出《香港人權及民主法案》時，黎智英與香港民主委員會一同呼籲美國支持，並對香港及中國政府實施制裁。控方庭上展示時任美國眾議院議長佩洛西（Nancy Pelosi）的 Twitter 截圖，顯示2019年10月與黎智英和民主黨創黨主席李柱銘等人會面。影片顯示同年10月25日，黎與李柱銘出席時任美國副總統彭斯的專題演講，黎發言指，以人道方式解決香港問題是貿易戰的重要考慮。
+
+> So pleased to welcome Jimmy Lai, Martin Lee and Janet Pang to the U.S. Capitol. My full support and admiration goes to those who have taken to the streets week after week in non-violent protest to fight for democracy and the rule of law in #HongKong. pic.twitter.com/maeTwTR8eV — Nancy Pelosi (@SpeakerPelosi) October 22, 2019
+
+#### 庭上展示黎智英與陳沛敏對話截圖 討論「賣港賊」制裁名單
+
+於2019年10月及2020年3月，黎指示員工取消公司的「飯盒會」，因他需要出席由 Mark Simon 所安排的美國參議員會面。控方亦展示雙方合照。
+
+2020年5月，《壹傳媒》前副社長陳沛敏告知黎智英，政府或會提出《國安法》。黎及後於 Twitter 發文，附有一張政協委員手持「支持國安立法 護航一國兩制」橫額的圖片，並在帖文寫道：「美國政府是否應該將他們納入制裁名單？」，同時標籤「#MagnitskyAct （馬格尼茨基法）」。
+
+控方庭上展示黎智英與蘋果副社長陳沛敏之間的 WhatsApp 對話內容，當中顯示二人討論制裁名單，提及「賣港賊」字眼。黎智英又向陳提及，希望警察為他們所犯的罪行付上代價。
+
+控方另展示黎智英與楊清奇之間的通訊對話內容，顯示楊向黎報告再有多兩名作者可供稿給《蘋果日報》英文版。
+
+#### 黎形容香港在「新冷戰」前線 籲美國以行動支持 包括派人來港
+
+控方指2019年7月，黎智英與時任美國副總統彭斯及其他資深參議員會面。控方又展示 WhatsApp 對話截圖，顯示同年3月李柱銘和陳方安生與彭斯見面後，黎向李表示現在似乎是在美國華盛頓游說的好時機，因現時氣氛「反中」和支持抗爭，美國兩黨對中國的敵對行動是顯而易見的。
+
+另外，黎智英於2019年7月曾與「保衛民主基金會」的資深副主席 Johnathan Schanzer 進行現場對談。黎強調反修例是「最後一戰」，而香港人的反抗是道德力量的戰爭，又指美國政府是道德權威，其支持是有力量的武器，因此香港極需要美國支持，否則香港缺乏持續反抗的能力。黎形容「新冷戰」是關乎價值的鬥爭，而香港正在「前線」，他最後指，美國不能只說不做，同時亦要以行動支持香港人，包括派人員來港。
+
+#### 黎指有效方法是凍結中國官員戶口
+
+控方展示黎智英與 Mark Simon 之間的對話截圖，2019年7月 Mark Simon 轉述時任美國國務院高級顧問 Mary Kissel 的要求，指屆時黎與副總統彭斯會面時，可提出建議美國可就香港局勢採取什麼行動，包括制裁的時機及對象。
+
+> The arrest of @JimmyLaiApple in Hong Kong is deeply offensive & an affront to freedom loving people around the world. When I met w/ Jimmy Lai @WhiteHouse, I was inspired by his stand for democracy & the rights & autonomy that were promised to the people of Hong Kong by Beijing. pic.twitter.com/ZwioCrvNb7 — Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence) August 10, 2020
+
+黎智英另在 Signal 中向 Mark Simon 指，經深思熟慮後認為美國應該取消香港特殊地位，因為若美國與中國脫鉤，當香港這個唯一出路都關上後，便會逼使中國滿足美國的要求。
+
+黎智英亦於2020年3月至7月與 Mark Simon 以電郵通訊，並提及最有效的方法是凍結中國官員的戶口，他們就會感到害怕。
+
+#### 黎於台灣節目稱：外國支持是我們唯一能夠撐下去
+
+黎於2020年4月接受英國《金融時報》（Financial Times）訪問，談及唯一能阻止中國及拯救香港的就是國際力量。另於同年5月，黎接受台灣 YouTube 頻道《Yahoo TV 一起看》的節目「鄉民來衝康」訪問，他表示：「我很想美國影響我們⋯⋯我很想英國影響我們⋯⋯我很想外國影響我們⋯⋯他們的支持是我們唯一能夠撐下去的⋯⋯外國的勢力是現在我們非常需要⋯⋯讓我們撐下去的。」
+
+#### 黎多次接受英美媒體訪問 表示：相信特朗普守信用、會制裁中國
+
+於2020年5月，黎智英接受美國媒體《福斯財經》（Fox Business）訪問，他其後在 Twitter 轉載有關片段。他在訪問中提到：「是時候改變中國，這樣才能改變世界⋯⋯除非中國改變，否則我們不會有和平。」他亦指美國可採用很多途徑逼使中國改變，包括凍結中國的戶口及其於美國的金錢，同時停止出口科技及電子產品到中國。
+
+同月，黎接受美國《彭博》（Bloomberg）訪問，他建議美國總統特朗普向中國實施制裁，並引述特朗普稱若北京確實在香港實行《國安法》並摧毀法律，他會認真採取行動。黎接着指：「我相信特朗普是一個守信用的人，因此希望他會向中國實施制裁。」
+
+黎亦接受《BBC》訪問，再次促請特朗普對中國實施制裁，並解釋一旦《國安法》實施，將會是香港的「末日」，因未能保護在港商人，而香港亦不再是國際金融中心。
+
+#### 黎籲撤銷中港官員子女在外地的學生簽證
+
+於2020年5月，黎撰寫文章表示：「我的 Twitter 帖文是否真的威脅到中國的國家安全？」他在文中呼籲，撤銷中國及香港政府官員子女在外地的學生簽證。
+
+黎亦接受美國節目《Uncommon Knowledge with Peter Robinson》的訪問，他指需要美國協助制裁中國，而本港的特別貿易待遇不應被撤銷。
+
+#### 黎表示若實施制裁 有機會即使立《國安法》也不會執行
+
+至2020年6月，黎智英接受《RFA 自由亞洲粵語》的訪問，他表示：「點都要抗爭，希望我哋有機會係美國、甚至歐洲其他國家支持下，我哋能夠保住法治同自由。」他又指：「而家中國處境唔係我哋覺得咁穩定⋯⋯李克強同習近平已經反晒面，你就知道佢哋下面嘅權鬥去到乜嘢地步」、「好緊要係外國盡量畀中國嘅壓力、制裁⋯⋯將中國專橫嘅做法阻擋住」。他認為外國若實施制裁，「有機會《國安法》就算立咗都唔會執行，或者執行都會將佢 water down（沖淡），唔會做到咁辣。」
+
+#### 黎撰文指引渡惡法令大陸法律凌駕香港司法 並籲人參與遊行
+
+至於黎撰寫的文章方面，他在其專欄「成敗樂一笑」發表題為「請站出來保住最後防線」的文章，內容包括：「『引渡惡法』的作用，就像恐怖分子襲擊產生『可用性級聯』的效果，讓香港市民都被籠罩在恐慌的順民意識下，讓大陸無法無天的法律凌駕香港的司法制度。」他有提到：「修訂《逃犯條例》就是要摧毀『一國兩制』這個習帝的眼中釘⋯⋯『引渡惡法』就是讓中央的魔爪撕破《基本法》和一國兩制的最後防線。」他於文末呼籲：「請你們相信群眾的力量，加入今天反惡法的示威遊行吧！」
+
+另一文章題為《諗移民定諗遊行》，內文指：『「逃犯條例」還可以隨時拉你鎖你，多神奇的權力，多神聖的地圖啊！」、「若我們人多勢眾站出來遊行⋯⋯」及「我們會去到盡，堅決抗爭到底的事實」。
+
+黎另在文章《為自己和下一代 阻擋香港沉淪》表示：「你要跟中共講法律，你從火星來的嗎？」、「修訂逃犯條例就是奪去香港的法治，拿住大陸那套陽光司法在港任拉任鎖肆虐橫行」、「香港無形中成為了集中營」、「若我們今天還有機會行出來發聲，卻袖手旁觀」。他最後呼籲：「請看前一步，六月九號花三小時，為自己和下一代留下阻擋公義沉淪的足跡。」
+
+#### 黎要求將陳方安生與美國副總統彭斯會面的消息散播
+
+另外，黎於2019年3月通知《蘋果日報》的社長張劍虹，要求將陳方安生與副總統彭斯會面的消息散播開去，於是翌日的報紙以《彭斯晤陳太 關注港人權 學者：高規格接待向京施壓》為頭版標題。
+
+同年4月，黎指示副社長陳沛敏訪問「銅鑼灣書店」前店長林榮基，翌日的報紙題為《送中例殺埋身 林榮基流亡台灣 臨別呼籲 守護香港明日上街》。
+
+
+▲ 佩洛西（左）、林榮基（右）
+
+控方開案陳詞未完，案件明日續審。
+
+黎智英否認一項「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物罪」及一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪。蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司派出一名代表，該人士代表3間公司同樣否認上述兩罪。
+
+黎亦否認另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪。他另面對的一項「勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，控方則申請存檔於法庭，獲法庭批准。
+
+首項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪」指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司，於2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀，請求外國或者境外機構、組織、人員實施對香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。
+
+另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，指黎智英於2020年7月1日至今年2月15日間，與 Mark Simon、陳梓華、李宇軒、劉祖廸及其他人串謀，請求外國或境外機構、組織、人員，實施對中國或香港進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。
+
+「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示及/或複製煽動刊物，具意圖：
+
+> a) 引起憎恨或藐視中央或香港特別行政區政府或激起對其離叛
+
+> b) 激起香港居民企圖不循合法途徑促致改變其他在香港的依法制定的事項
+
+> c) 引起對香港司法的憎恨、藐視或激起對其離叛
+
+> d) 引起香港居民間的不滿或離叛
+
+> e) 煽惑他人使用暴力
+
+> f) 慫使他人不守法或不服從合法命令。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-02-us-india-relations-in-2023.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-02-us-india-relations-in-2023.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..52241e5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-02-us-india-relations-in-2023.md
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : U.S.-India Relations In 2023
+author: Richard M. Rossow
+date : 2024-01-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/dKVGWNi.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "2023 Roundup: Small Steps and Big Shifts in U.S.-India Relations"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_2023 was one of the more consequential years for U.S.-India relations — for both, positive and negative reasons. Poring through the numerous senior-level engagements and outcome documents, the relationship largely remains in the “agenda-setting mode”. However, as indicated by the types of engagements and frequency — one can expect concrete outcomes soon. Notably, China remains a driving imperative behind U.S.-India strategic and commercial relations._
+
+
+
+However, there were several tangible steps marking important shifts in U.S.-India relations. I have outlined five big events from the past year and underscored their larger implications. Additionally, I have also linked the work produced by the CSIS India Chair on the five subjects to provide additional detail. The events are not chronological but rather in the order of significance.
+
+
+
+1. __GE Engine Deal, June 2023:__ General Electric and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited announced an agreement to co-produce the F-414 engine for India’s domestic “Tejas” light fighter. The two governments first announced plans to work towards co-production of jet engines in January 2015, but discussions soon died off.
+
+ _The Significance:_ This agreement underscores growing U.S. trust in India, based on shared security concerns. Helping India improve defense production will also reduce India’s continued reliance on Russian-made defense equipment. This agreement also shows that ideas which may have failed a decade ago can be successfully revisited.
+
+2. __Dropping WTO Disputes, June 2023:__ During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington in June, the two governments agreed to drop six outstanding disputes before the World Trade Organization. The seventh and final dispute was dropped during President Biden’s visit to India in September 2023.
+
+ _The Significance:_ Trade policy remains one of the weakest areas of bilateral government engagement. While the two sides have made some progress in discussions over areas of strategically significant trade, general trade concerns fester. Utilizing leader-level summits to end disputes might be an “overkill,” but it shows growing recognition from both nations that improving commercial ties is crucial for the long-term sustainability of the relationship. However, as I noted in an earlier piece, despite the significance of the measures, a comprehensive framework akin to the Australian government’s 2018 India Economic Strategy would be momentous for bilateral commercial relationship.
+
+3. __Combined Maritime Force Bahrain, November 2023:__ While the American and Indian militaries regularly conduct exercises, there is a dearth of practical military cooperation. That changed at the India-U.S. 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in November, in Delhi when India announced it would join the 28-member “Combined Maritime Forces” naval partnership based in Bahrain.
+
+ _The Significance:_ India’s membership of the CMF provides a new, regularized venue for U.S.-India interoperability training. We may soon witness more regular joint security missions in the Gulf to counter piracy, smuggling, and other illicit operations.
+
+4. __New York Assassination Attempt Indictment, November 2023:__ As the year was nearing its close, U.S.-India relations were shook with the unsealing of an indictment in the Southern District of New York. The indictment alleged a plot outlining an Indian intelligence officer’s involvement in the attempted assassination of a Sikh separatist who is an American citizen. As this case moves ahead, there will likely be other closely watched moments that could alter the trajectory of U.S.-India ties
+
+ _The Significance:_ American policy circles are already replete with critics of India’s recent record in areas like religious tolerance and human rights. While the Biden Administration has chosen — so far — to press ahead on cooperation, the assassination attempt further strengthens these critics and raises fundamental questions about the depth of our “shared values.” As noted by my colleague Katherine Hadda, the United States’ approach to focus on a specific Indian official rather than implicating the entire government is pragmatic. Most likely, reasonable action from India in response to these allegations will suffice to maintain the relationship’s momentum. However, the event adds uncertainty to the relationship. Other steps by the Modi government that shrink the civil society space can further move these currents.
+
+5. __Steep Drop in FDI:__ Media reports of significant investments by foreign technology firms into India engenders the feeling that “Make in India,” paired with increased trade pressure on China, has finally started to build momentum. However, the government of India’s own data proves otherwise. According to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Monthly Bulletin data, India saw a 27 percent year-on-year drop in 12-month foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow (new equity) and a 43 percent drop in FDI inflow from the mid-2021 peak. World Bank data shows manufacturing stuck at around 13 percent of India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). One major potential investor, Foxconn, dropped its massive $20 billion chip venture with Vedanta this summer. However, there are some “green shoots” that foreign investment might finally be shifting back towards India — including a healthy $6.5 billion new equity inflow in October 2023.
+
+ _The Significance:_ There are a multitude of reasons that the FDI into India has declined. First, there has been a significant slowdown in new reforms during the Modi government’s second term, as indicated by our own “India Reforms Scorecard.” Second, too few state governments are aggressively pursuing foreign investment. Third, regulatory shifts occur quite often. Finally, dozens of sectors still have foreign investment restrictions including both sectoral FDI caps as well as stringent operational regulations that only apply to foreign companies. U.S.-India cooperation on boosting Indian manufacturing will be mutually advantageous. For instance, my colleague Raymond Vickery, notes that the signing of the U.S.-India Memorandum of Understanding on Semiconductor Supply Chain and Innovation will allow the two countries to the identify complementary competencies, and prevent unrequited competition.
+
+The coming year is replete with promises and pitfalls. National elections in both India and the United States could trigger shifts in foreign policy and economic policymaking. New revelations related to the attempted murder case in New York may provide new fuel to the relationship’s critics. Additionally, the United States’ and India’s differing approaches to the elections in Bangladesh will underscore geostrategic divisions.
+
+However, we can expect the several workstreams outlined above to bear fruit. Senior-level engagements provide action-forcing events — with great urgency over time as China increases its dangerous activities across the Indo-Pacific.
+
+In the words of the author Karl Schroeder, “Foresight is not about predicting the future, it’s about minimizing surprise”. We may not know every significant in 2024 that will influence the relationship, but the high level of dialogue between the United States and Indian governments is reason for cautious optimism.
+
+---
+
+__Richard Rossow__ is a senior adviser and holds the Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In this role, he helps frame and shape policies to promote greater business and economic engagement between the two countries, with a unique focus on tracking and engaging Indian states. He has been working on U.S.-India relations for over 25 years.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-03-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-5.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-03-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-5.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3d4eb17e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-03-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-5.md
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第五日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-01-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方：黎智英籲下屬勿針對特朗普 指示Mark Simon邀彭斯和蓬佩奧訂閱英文版
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（3日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第5日審訊。控方繼續開案陳詞，指黎智英在美國國務院前資深顧問 Christian Whiton 的建議下，指示下屬設立蘋果英文版，目的是爭取外國人的支持，以尋求外力向中央及香港政府實施制裁。黎又指示國際組同事不要針對特朗普，因蘋果靠特朗普政府的支持「保命」。當黃之鋒表示不認同蘋果發起的「一人一信救香港」行動，黎則向陳沛敏表示不同意黃，現時任何有助於香港的方法都應該採用，因已沒有其他方法對付中共。控方又指黎於2020年5月開設了個人 Twitter 帳戶，以圖增加影響力打「國際線」，列出黎智英所追蹤的外國政治人物及機構，遭法官質疑控方想反映什麼。
+
+#### 控方：黎智英FCC演講獲蘋果報導 另指示下屬訪問彭定康
+
+控方昨日開案陳詞提到，黎智英對《蘋果日報》的日常運作有完全的控制權，他會給予指示其他同案被告，是串謀犯罪的「主腦」。控方今天繼續開案陳詞，就發布煽動刊物罪，控方指2019年4月，黎智英指示張劍虹訪問「銅鑼灣書店」前店長林榮基，希望報導能有效地引發市民上街反送中。黎智英亦吩咐張想想如何推動更多人參與遊行，並向張轉發訊息，顯示黎早前請求「香港監察」創辦人 Benedict Rogers 聯絡前港督彭定康，採訪其對反送中的評論，後來相關報導於2019年4月28日刊出。
+
+2019年5月21日，黎智英在外國記者協會場合發表演講，後來《蘋果日報》報導演講內容，題為〈送中惡法 黎智英：修例後香港玩完 FCC演講斥林鄭非常邪惡〉。
+
+#### 控方：反送中運動開始後 蘋果報導及黎智英專欄文章煽動對政府仇恨
+
+控方指，2019年6月9日的反修例大遊行標誌著「社會騷動」的開始。雖然政府其後宣布暫緩以至撤回修例草案，但暴力示威浪潮持續。在這社會背景下，《蘋果日報》發布不同內容，包括針對中央政府及香港特區政府的煽動性陳述、呼籲市民參與示威、宣揚對警察的憎恨、提倡透過非法、暴力及「攬炒」手段來對抗中央及特區政府。
+
+控方列出31篇從2019年6月15日至2020年1月26日期間發布的文章，指稱它們具煽動性：
+
+- 〈和變勇 「是政權，逼我進化」〉：控方指稱文章意圖激起市民對中央政府及香港特區政府的憎恨
+
+- 〈天下制裁集會 今勢逼爆遮打〉：控方引述內容「2020年才過了不足20天，林鄭月娥政府已經急不及待要『推動』逆權運動另一浪高潮。民政事務專員擅離職守架空區議會、警察喬裝市民濫捕公眾場所拍照少年、監警會借故延遲提交報告……種種事端都有意無意為刻下看似已緩和的民怨重新撥火。民間集會團隊呼籲港人今日再集結，向國際社會展示民意，冀求各國政府向迫害港人的香港官員與警察落實制裁措施。」控方指稱文章意圖激起市民對中央政府及香港特區政府的憎恨
+
+- 〈社會專題：自己手足自己救〉
+
+- 〈屠龍隊邊緣呼喚 全民勇武／三罷〉：文章提到「隊名『層龍，對抗警察是家常便飯，有人試過被警棍打穿頭，亦有人遭橡膠子彈爆頭險死，但他們明白不是每個人都有這種勇氣。」控方指文章意圖引起對警方的仇恨
+
+- 〈港鐵大搜捕 釀元朗恐襲2.0 速龍無差別毆打市民〉
+
+- 廣告〈誰殺死他她他和她......〉
+
+- 廣告〈一次過變黑又得 逐漸變黑又得 黑晒！〉
+
+- 〈攬炒巴×G20 團隊 眾籌1,400萬連登13國賣廣告 推爆警暴〉：控方指稱文章意圖提倡透過非法、暴力及「攬炒」手段來對抗中央及特區政府
+
+控方又指，從2019年6月15日至2020年1月16日，黎智英透過其個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」發表評論文章，旨在煽動市民對中央、特區政府和警察的仇恨。
+
+- 〈我們堅持下去，才有希望〉
+
+- 〈反極權 台灣更不用怕〉：控方引文「中共可怕的地方是，把人當成是純綷被物質驅使的動物，而不是有靈性和精神面貌的人。」、「在中共金錢萬能的思維世界裡，自由如糞土，人民只是極權機器中的螺絲，最後只會令他們在這資訊開放的時代無地自容。」
+
+- 〈2020 和勇繼續一起撐下去〉：黎在文中稱2020年元旦與李柱銘及何俊仁參與遊行，途中見到有一名年約14至15歲的少女大叫「黑警死全家」、「香港差佬，X你老母」。黎向何說：「有這樣的後生，我哋冇得輸。」黎續指，不知道「裝修」滙豐銀行的，是否「我們的勇武手足」，但打爆中國人壽店舖玻璃的兩名黑衣人便十分可疑，現場有人質疑二人是喬裝警員。
+
+- 〈捍道德抗極權 全球人人有責〉
+
+2019年7月2日，黎智英指示陳沛敏報導示威者七一佔領立法會事件，以引起市民對年輕示威者的同情和支持。同年7月19日，黎智英向陳沛敏轉述 Benedict Rogers 的要求，轉述美國眾議員 Ted Yoho 有意投稿。同年10月，黎智英與美國眾議院議長佩洛西（Nancy Pelosi）會面後，黎要求陳訪問她。
+
+
+▲ 林文宗（左）、陳沛敏（右）
+
+#### 控方：疫情爆發後 蘋果持續煽動
+
+2020年1月底開始，新冠肺炎在香港爆發，令示威活動暫時沉寂，但《蘋果日報》持續發布內容，針對中央政府及香港特區政府的煽動性陳述、宣揚對警察的憎恨，以及提倡透過非法及暴力的手段來對抗中央及特區政府。
+
+- 〈擬用反恐例 控爆炸品案 鄧炳強學新疆鐵腕壓抗爭〉：控方指內容有意煽動對警察的仇恨，以及提倡使用不守法及暴力手段。
+
+控方另指黎智英5篇專欄文章含煽動內容：
+
+- 〈現代人不是西方文明機制外生存的動物〉
+
+- 〈武漢瘟疫 中共喪鐘〉：「肺炎疫情在中共維穩大前提下，謊言泛濫真相模糊，層層官僚架構層層謊言重疊，肺炎災情有多深重，就是中共也不知道。謊言治國不講誠信難服眾，習帝靠的是極權操控，絕對扼殺人民資訊自由，把人民變成盲從的羊群，管治便乾脆脷落。」、「習帝的極權控制了所有資訊，連拍電影現在也找不到題材了。」、「人民噤聲，政府霸道，惡毒病菌肆虐橫行，受苦的最後是人民。」
+
+- 〈我們最光輝的時刻〉
+
+- 〈專橫暴政打壓 我們氣魄不滅〉：「今日我們明知有事，中共打到嚟必然大清算大清洗，清算不聽話的人，清洗英國殖民地遺留下來保護港人自由的法治和機制，把香港人變成任由習帝擺佈的奴才，因此我們會繼續起來抗爭到底，希望趁習帝內外危機四伏，和慘遭武漢肺炎瘟疫人命摧殘和經濟淪陷後，各國尤其美國向中國責難及局部制裁，迫使中共不敢太明目張膽，暫時克制對香港的迫害」
+
+- 〈無賴在摧毀香港法治〉
+
+#### 控方：在美國國務院前資深顧問建議下 黎智英指示設蘋果英文版
+
+控方指2020年5月，有傳媒報導人大打算在香港實施《國安法》，其時黎智英已開始從事針對中央的敵對活動，支持或提出請求外國勢力向中央及特區政府實施制裁或封鎖。早於同年4月，美國國務院前資深顧問 Christian Whiton 電郵向黎智英提議設英文版，黎智英便指示下屬設立《蘋果日報》英文版，以尋求外力向中央及香港政府實施制裁。
+
+控方展示黎智英與 Christian Whiton 之間的對話，後者在2020年4月17日指設立《蘋果日報》英文版在政治上有好處。4月19日，Mark Simon 向黎指英文版原意是好，但可能不符成本效益。
+
+#### 群組對話顯示黎稱不需做平衡報導 指示應集中「保衛香港的聲音」
+
+至2020年5月10日，黎智英創立 WhatsApp 群組「English news」，其他成員包括張劍虹、陳沛敏、羅偉光、馮偉光及張志偉。他們其後討論英文版的運作方式，黎提出請求美國政治領袖去訂閱，以得到他們的支持（“By enlisting foreign leaders to subscribe to us is enlisting their support.”）。
+
+黎強調不需全面地向外國人展示香港的不同政治派別，只需要聚焦在「蘋果日報觀點，即黃營的一般觀點」。（“We only concentrate in our Apple Daily HK view, a general view of the yellow side.”) 黎又指不需要做平衡報導，因保衛香港的聲音需要被世界聽見。（“We are not trying to strike a balance but the point of view of the people on the side of protecting HK. This is the voice the world wants to know.”）直至黎智英被拘捕之前，該群組一直有持續運作。
+
+#### 黎智英指示Mark Simon邀請彭斯和蓬佩奧等人訂閱蘋果英文版
+
+黎智英亦與 Mark Simon 討論，黎指引入英文版可吸引美國人及其他外國人支持，遂指示 Mark Simon 協助宣傳，以及邀請時任美國副總統彭斯和時任國務卿蓬佩奧訂閱。黎其後表示聽聞有一些撰稿人不想再替《南華早報》寫文章，提議可邀請他們供稿予蘋果英文版，籲 Mark Simon 聯絡南華早報前總編輯 Mark Clifford 商討。
+
+黎其後指出，英文版除了讓支持反修例運動的美國人有方法訂閱蘋果之外，若果彭斯（Mike Pence）、蓬佩奧（Mike Pompeo）和共和黨參議員 Marco Rubio 等外國官員都訂閱的話，可在政治上保護到蘋果，因蘋果現時是中聯辦的針對目標，而外國支持是黎的關注點。黎決定英文版每天發布約10至12篇報導、專題和評論文章，另加8至10篇關於中國內地的文章，目標對象是美國讀者，希望打破《南華早報》的壟斷。
+
+> Jimmy Lai is a Champion of Freedom & I was honored to welcome him to the White House in 2019. Today, he sits in prison for his support of Democracy in Hong Kong & @VoCommunism rightly awarded him their Highest Honor for his Courageous Commitment to Freedom. God Bless Jimmy Lai.🇺🇸 pic.twitter.com/oU69TSkex2 — Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence) June 11, 2021
+
+黎智英亦向張劍虹提議在英文版加入台灣的報導，以吸引美國人的注意。張回覆：「老闆，一定需要的，中美大戰，台灣重要，必須要加的，謝謝」。
+
+#### 控方列黎智英Twitter追蹤名單 官質疑可反映什麼
+
+控方指在大約同一時間，黎於2020年5月開設了個人 Twitter 帳戶，以圖增加影響力打「國際線」。帖文不時標示美國、英國、日本及台灣的政治人物，與他們互相交流。而李兆富（Simon Lee）則負責管理黎的 Twitter 帳戶。
+
+控方列出黎智英 Twitter 帳戶追蹤的多名外國政治人物，包括時任美國副總統彭斯、時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧、Natan Sharansky、台灣領導人蔡英文、「香港監察」創辦人 Benedict Rogers、「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」創辦人兼執行董事 Luke de Pulford、「Fight for Freedom. Stand with Hong Kong. 重光團隊」、對華政策跨國議會聯盟、前香港大專學界國際事務代表團發言人邵嵐、美國國會及行政當局中國委員會、美國眾議院外交委員會、美軍前副參謀長 Jack Keane、美國參議員 Ted Cruz、《華爾街日報》編輯 Bill McGurn。
+
+法官李運騰問到，控方列出黎追蹤的帳戶是想顯示什麼？控方代表周天行則指名單可顯示到黎的「聯繫」，李官指「聯繫」的意思可以很廣闊。周天行指可反映黎與上述人士在 Twitter 上有交流，以及犯案時的心思意念（state of mind），即黎是知悉自己在做什麼，並且有相關意圖。
+
+#### 黎智英曾指示蘋果員工不要針對特朗普 因蘋果靠其支「保命」
+
+同年5月25日，《蘋果》發布一篇文章題為〈打國際線 蘋果英文版免費試睇〉，內容表示香港的人權被中共侵犯，英文版可供國際的朋友認識香港的狀況。
+
+控方指，黎智英宣傳英文版時提及，多人訂閱不但可提供經濟上的支持，亦可保護《蘋果》免受政治打壓。黎智英又指示國際組同事「不要跟紐約時報及CNN針對川普，我們蘋果卻要靠川普政府支持保命」。
+
+2020年6月16日，《蘋果》發布彭定康支持訂閱的宣傳短片，題為「彭定康拍片撐新聞自由：每日一蘋果全為你好」。黎智英其後指示張劍虹安排《蘋果》發起「一人一信救香港」，呼籲香港人寫信給時任美國總統特朗普，並提供書信範本及步驟。
+
+黃之鋒對「一人一信救香港」持不同意見，並在社交媒體稱「冇理由叫人哋國家嘅總統SaveHK」。陳沛敏把相關帖文 WhatsApp 發送給黎，黎則回應他不同意黃的觀點，現時任何有助於香港的方法都應該採用，雖然他知道很多人不同意「一人一信救香港」行動，包括李柱銘，但唯一出路就是要勇敢起來，因已沒有其他方法對付中共。
+
+#### 控方：國安法生效後 黎智英在網上直播對談節目談制裁
+
+控方指，當《國安法》於2020年6月30日晚上11時生效，《蘋果》隨即發布一篇題為〈惡法生效 兩制蓋棺 泛民7.1繼續抗爭〉的新聞報導，實體報紙亦夾附一張海報，寫有「Fight For Freedom 為自由抗爭」。
+
+此時《蘋果》製作了新的網上直播節目「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」，首次播出時間為7月9日，題為「Live Q&A with Jimmy Lai」，黎在節目中表示以後會每週播放，並對《國安法》作出批評。之後的集數則邀請不同人士與黎智英對談，包括南華早報及英文虎報前總編輯 Mark Clifford、前港督彭定康 Chris Patten、Benedict Rogers、Jack Keane、前美國外交官 Raymond Burghardt、美國前副國防部長 Paul Wolfowitz、Natan Sharansky、美國記者兼時評作家 Nicholas Kristof 等。
+
+控方列舉黎智英在節目中的言論，並在庭上播放影片。黎以英語形容《國安法》生效後香港會「玩完」，若果美國取消香港特殊地位的話，意味關上中國通向世界的窗口，中國會更易接受美國的要求，因此黎支持美國取消香港特殊地位，因在國安法下特殊地位變得無意義。
+
+黎又指，歐洲國家應與美國聯合一起對付中國，制裁措施可以拖慢中國的通訊科技和晶片科技發展和研究，影響「華為」手機和中端科技（CTE）等企業。屆時台灣將會成為亞洲的科技樞紐，而中國則會逐漸衰退，最終使習近平讓步及立場軟化。
+
+#### 控方指黎智英被捕後繼續辦節目 稱有機會被起訴勾結 籲海外人士繼續發聲
+
+控方指，黎在2020年8月10日首次被拘捕，即使如此，黎在同月13日繼續舉行直播節目，並在 Twitter 稱「the show has to go on」。黎又在其後的節目中稱自己被捕一事顯示香港人正面對一個怎樣的政權，並批評香港政府隨意拘捕及是極權，猶如「俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭」。
+
+在另一集節目，黎智英與 Benedict Rogers 對談時提到，他自己有機會被控告「勾結外國勢力」，所以海外人士的聲音變得重要，呼籲 Benedict Rogers 繼續堅持他的工作，並感謝他所做的工作，又形容國際社會是香港人的「救星」（savior）。
+
+2020年11月13日的節目中，前港督彭定康指中共是香港自由民主的威脅，如果想中國改變的話，要持續為香港勇敢走出來。有觀眾問國際社會可以做什麼，黎智英表示，民主派聲音將在立法會消失，意味國際社會可能再也聽不到香港的聲音，「香港可以講係喺窒息之中」，所以新聞很重要，可以令世界繼續留意香港並為香港發聲，「如果世界忘記咗我哋，就會好大鑊。」
+
+黎智英在另一次節目中強調，不可以向中國認輸，而他現時與不同外國人士交流，面對被起訴「勾結外國勢力」的風險，但他必須堅持及繼續手上的工作。黎又提到，很多人崇拜他，使他肩負很多責任，一方面感到責任重大，另一方面感到振奮，因他有這樣的身位去做如此美妙的工作（wonderful thing），沒有放棄的理由。
+
+#### 黎智英稱特朗普較難以捉摸 於中國而言比拜登更「危險」
+
+黎智英在其後的集數中指，制裁不會帶來最大的破壞，最大的破壞是中美對立局面導致開戰，若果中美之間開戰的話，會帶來不確定性，最終沒有人敢來中國投資。不過黎指，若果美國與亞洲國家愈走愈近，最後孤立中國的話，便會削弱中國應對戰爭的力量，所以他認為未來中美不會開戰。另一個黎認為不會開戰的原因，是若果開戰的話，外國將不會運送石油給中國，而中國並未準備好開戰。
+
+有聽眾問到海外人士在美國大選應怎樣做，黎智英則指對中國來說，特朗普（Donald Trump）比拜登（Joe Biden）更「危險」，因特朗普比較難以捉摸，認為他當選是很重要。黎在一集與彭定康對談時表示，對於拜登採取「多邊主義」外交手法並不抱希望，因各個國家對中國採取不同做法，導致削弱整體立場，籲拜登對中國強硬，又鼓勵海外人士游說外國官員。
+
+黎亦呼籲美國更多連繫太平洋亞洲，因他們是未來最大的經濟市場。就台灣局勢，黎形容美國是台灣的「國防後盾」（security backbone），無可避免地會提升軍事和經濟支援予台灣。
+
+案件明日續審，控方將繼續開案陳詞及播放「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」片段。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-03-us-china-relations-in-2024.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-03-us-china-relations-in-2024.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-03-us-china-relations-in-2024.md
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : U.S.-China Relations In 2024
+author: Scott Kennedy
+date : 2024-01-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/184aWZv.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Managing Competition without Conflict"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_From 2018 to 2023, U.S.-China relations were in a linear downward spiral. The trade war, the pandemic, growing technology competition, rising tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, and contrasting approaches to the Russia-Ukraine conflict have collectively fed a sense of fatalism that they were heading toward the outright economic decoupling and military conflict._
+
+
+
+The summit meeting between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping held in November near San Francisco, just in advance of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Week, was the culmination of a year-long process that calmed the waters. The two sides announced a range of deliverables on economic and security issues and tried to convey a sense that they could effectively manage their differences. Although the United States and China are still engaged in a comprehensive contest for power and over setting the global rules of the game, guardrails are gradually being created, and as a result, the likelihood of the most disastrous outcomes has receded. Moreover, even though the chances of a genuine thaw that resolves fundamental differences and leads to greater cooperation are low, there also are underappreciated sources of structural stability that could keep relations from further deteriorating in the coming years. Nevertheless, it will take active diplomacy and some good luck to keep ties from fraying in 2024.
+
+
+### Surpassing Low Expectations
+
+During their four-hour meeting on the Filoli Estate in Woodside, California, both Biden and Xi appeared to stick to their original positions on technology and economic security, Taiwan, Ukraine, human rights, and several other issues. At the same time, they were able to produce a series of deliverables exceeding the expectations of most analysts.
+
+Based on the readouts from the White House and People’s Republic of China (PRC) media (Xinhua, Caixin), it appears that, at a minimum, the two sides agreed to several actions:
+
+1. Resume military-to-military dialogue through a variety of channels and on a number of specific topics.
+
+2. Commit to accelerate efforts to expand renewable energy and reduce carbon emissions, including from methane and other greenhouse gases, in accordance with the joint statement issued at Sunnylands just before the bilateral meeting.
+
+3. Restore and expand cooperation on countering the production and trafficking of fentanyl and other narcotics.
+
+4. Step up discussions to minimize risks related to artificial intelligence.
+
+5. Push for more direct flights between the two countries and expand people-to-people exchanges.
+
+6. Begin consultations aimed at renewing the U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, which is set to expire in late February 2024.
+
+Beyond specific actions, the two sides adjusted the tone of how they frame the relationship. The Biden administration’s readout said the two sides “are in competition,” dropping the previously ubiquitous adjective “strategic” from the characterization of ties. U.S. officials have continued to avoid using the “s” word in public statements. In place of the highly critical language about the United States and the Biden administration that have been dominant in the past few years, Chinese state media coverage has consistently highlighted the friendly and respectful nature of the meeting and has presented a hopeful vision for future ties. Chinese ambassador Xie Feng’s speech to the U.S.-China Business Council’s annual gala in mid-December is perhaps the best example of this major shift in tone.
+
+
+### Different Roads to San Francisco
+
+The United States and China both wanted the meeting to be successful, but their leaders arrived in San Francisco on very different trajectories.
+
+President Biden came in with the wind at his back. The U.S. economy has recovered; growth has regained momentum, while inflation has slowed. Although Congress seems locked in eternal battles internally and with the executive branch, it did adopt, in consultation with the administration, major pieces of legislation — the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the CHIPS and Science Act — that will provide a stronger foundation for the U.S. economy in the coming years.
+
+Moreover, the United States’ relations with allies in Asia and Europe have improved dramatically in general and with respect to their approach toward China in particular. Analysis of the challenge China poses on economic and national security issues sounds increasingly similar whether one is in Tokyo, Berlin, Brussels, Washington, or other advanced market democracies. Closer alignment has been generated by China’s increasingly ambitious and distortionary industrial policies, the human rights situation in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, China’s close ties with Russia and its approach to Ukraine, instances of economic coercion by Beijing, and the worsening security situation in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and along the China-India border.
+
+The narrowing of differences reflects a greater willingness by the Biden administration, relative to its predecessor, to develop a foreign policy framework rooted in longtime alignments with allies, as well as a willingness to shift its own language and approach in a way that is more comfortable to friends in Europe and Asia. This certainly applies to the administration’s emphasis since the spring of 2023 that it is pursuing “de-risking,” not decoupling. At the same time, likeminded countries have become more willing to be openly critical of China and develop a range of policy responses, individually and together with others. This is most visible in the area of economic security, for example, with Japan’s Economic Security Promotion Act and the European Commission’s investigation into subsidies for China’s electric vehicle (EV) sector. Although there are still significant frictions — U.S. tariffs on European steel and aluminum, different approaches to data security and privacy, and disagreement over how to reform the World Trade Organization (WTO) — the dramatic reduction in differences between Washington and its allies is the more important trend.
+
+President Xi, by contrast, came in facing substantial domestic and international headwinds as a result of his changing policies at home and abroad. China’s zero-Covid policies, which initially were successful in 2020 and 2021, proved to be a failure in 2022 in the face of the Omicron variant. Lockdowns in Shanghai and elsewhere generated widespread anger, and the sudden removal of restrictions in late 2022 in the face of protests left many Chinese people feeling abandoned.
+
+The economic front has brought a long string of bad news: the extended crackdown on the private tech sector, the imposition of a range of national security–oriented laws, the shrinking of the workforce and graying of the population, the property market’s woes, and growing restrictions on access to Western markets and technology. China’s economy may meet its official economic growth target for 2023 of around five percent, but the recovery has been far slower than expected, and the sense of inevitable continued economic success has disappeared.
+
+Xi’s record abroad has been equally problematic. Tensions with the United States, growing frictions in the Taiwan Strait, and alignment with Russia have brought the United States and its allies together. Access to Western technology and markets has been constrained, and global supply chains are gradually reducing their disproportionate reliance on China. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has attracted criticism for failed projects that have added to the debt load of developing countries.
+
+The combination of problems at home and abroad has led to a crisis of confidence among Chinese citizens, who have become far less certain about their individual and collective futures than at any time in the last three decades. Xi Jinping himself may exude self-confidence and believe that the “East is rising and the West is declining,” but he has not persuaded his populace of this prediction. Hence, Xi needs to stabilize relations with the United States and the West more generally, not only for foreign policy reasons but to rebuild confidence at home, which is central to generating growth and maintaining social stability.
+
+That is why China’s bark has been bigger than its bite. Xi attended the APEC summit and held the bilateral meeting with Biden despite the fact that Washington made essentially no concessions to get Xi to California. In the months leading up to APEC, the administration issued an executive order on outbound investment, stepped up export controls on the semiconductor industry, and held firm in not inviting Hong Kong chief executive John Lee to the APEC leaders’ meeting. Beijing has sent signals of potential penalties through its investigation into a few consulting firms and by placing several minerals on its export control list, but it has not pulled the trigger on any of these yet, fearful that doing so would accelerate the decoupling it still hopes to avoid.
+
+
+### Sources of Stability
+
+Xi’s problems at home and abroad have left the impression that his conciliatory moves are tactical gestures that will be only temporary and fade away once China’s economy rebounds and domestic confidence in his leadership is restored or will disappear suddenly if Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s current vice president and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, wins Taiwan’s presidential election in mid-January and China is compelled to react with dramatic moves. Such concerns are entirely reasonable, but observers should appreciate that the sources of recent tempering of stresses are rooted in three structural characteristics of the relationship.
+
+The credible military deterrents that the United States and China both maintain against the other form the first source of stability. China’s relative power has risen dramatically in recent years, and the United States and others take as credible Chinese threats to use force in the Taiwan Strait if Taiwan were to cross any of Beijing’s red lines. Conversely, the U.S. credibility to provide defensive support to Taiwan and its allies has been strengthened through the development of the Quad and AUKUS, improved bilateral relations with countries around China’s periphery, and its support to Ukraine. Equally important, although there are “green” and “blue” wings in Taiwan’s political spectrum regarding their ideal preferences for cross-strait outcomes, in the context of realistic constraints, the vast majority of the population — and the political parties — are one or another shade of turquoise. In sum, the astronomical costs of an outbreak of hostilities have created a widely shared preference in favor of maintaining the status quo.
+
+Second, although U.S.-China bilateral trade and investment ties have stagnated, the two countries are still embedded in an extensive web of complex interdependence across all aspects of their economies and broader societies, which extends to countries around the world. Interconnectivity has created certain vulnerabilities, such as overdependence for critical goods and the potential transfer of dual-use technologies, but it also has created extensive economic and national security benefits that raise the costs of conflict and the value of continued interaction to both sides. Understandably, neither side is keen to abandon such ties. The fact that other countries are deeply connected to the United States and China further raises the costs to Washington and Beijing from taking precipitous actions. Interdependence is no panacea, but it is a structural feature shaping the choices of all parties.
+
+Finally, the resumption of regular people-to-people ties, track 2 dialogues, and official consultations, in the wake of their collapse due to the Covid-19 pandemic, provides another set of stabilizers. Washington and Beijing have established roughly a dozen working groups on a wide range of topics, and the two governments now have normal interactions at the cabinet and working levels. So far there has been one recent congressional delegation, in October 2023, and there likely will be more in 2024. Communication does not necessarily generate momentum for extensive cooperation, but it provides pathways for reducing misunderstanding about policies and broader developments in both countries and elsewhere.
+
+
+### Looking Ahead to 2024
+
+The new normal of what could be called “competition without conflict” does not presage a return to the era of engagement, but the United States and China deserve credit for reducing the chances of the worst negative tail risks, including outright decoupling and military conflict. That said, the short-term incentives and long-term structural features of relations guarantee absolutely nothing. Maintaining momentum in 2024 will require a series of steps on the domestic, bilateral, and multilateral fronts.
+
+Most urgently, every effort must be taken to avoid an escalation of tensions and outright conflict in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. The outcome of the Taiwan election is in doubt, but there should be no doubt that all sides need to act with prudence once the results are announced, and that extraordinary vigilance will be needed through the inauguration of Taiwan’s next leader in May and their first few months in office. Equally complex will be finding a way to defuse tensions involving China and the Philippines around Second Thomas Shoal in the face of Beijing’s increasingly aggressive moves.
+
+Next, with the creation of new channels for dialogue, the United States and China need to move forward with consultations on all fronts, including on trade, technology, artificial intelligence, climate, and security issues. Given the previous dearth of communication, discussion itself will be valuable, but before long it will be reasonable to expect the two sides to refine their agenda in each working group and gradually shift from consultations to negotiations that deliver substantive results.
+
+It will be equally important for the Biden administration to expand and deepen consultations and coordination with allies in Europe and Asia on China policy. General agreement about de-risking needs to be accompanied by more concrete alignment or harmonization with regard to the implementation of economic security in a range of sectors (semiconductors, EVs, and critical minerals being the most urgent), rules related to the digital economy, carrying out commitments from the latest UN Climate Change Conference (COP28), and how to resuscitate the WTO and keep the global trading system from collapsing.
+
+Finally, the Biden administration needs to further develop the architecture of its China policy. The administration deserves credit for putting meat on the bones of its three-pronged strategy of “invest, align and compete,” enunciating the goal of de-risking while maintaining extensive economic ties, and resuming extensive dialogue. It can build on this progress by clarifying the goals of its China policy. This begins by further articulating how the United States aims to strengthen and reform the rules-based international order and then, on that basis, how relations with China should be managed in light of those broader goals. Equally important is to begin an evaluation of the effectiveness of its approach across a range of areas. For example, what are the right metrics to measure progress with regard to advancement of American technology innovation, reduced overdependence on China, and the imposition of security-based restrictions on Chinese industry? That will then offer a foundation for judging whether U.S. policy is making progress, having unintended consequences, or both.
+
+In short, in 2024 the Biden administration needs to take steps to institutionalize the various elements of its China policy. Doing so could mean making measurable progress and having a less volatile year than many foresee, which would make its approach less vulnerable to criticism from Beijing, other countries, and other domestic perspectives. The last source of disagreement is particularly important given that China policy undoubtedly will be a central topic of discussion in the lead-up to the United States’ congressional and presidential elections in November.
+
+---
+
+__Scott Kennedy__ is senior adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-04-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-6.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-04-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-6.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-04-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-6.md
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第六日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-01-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方：黎智英受訪稱不會離開 留港直至最後一日 被捕後稱「坐監都揀呢條路」
+- 控方：黎智英倡「支爆」 經中間人指示李宇軒及「攬炒巴」國際游說促制裁中港
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（4日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第6日審訊。控方繼續開案陳詞，指國安法生效後，黎智英持續在專欄撰文及在 Twitter 發文，稱推行國安法會導致中國被國際圍堵，又表態支持美國推行《香港避風港法案》和《香港人自由和選擇法》。黎接受外媒採訪時稱：「我將會留在這裡直至最後一日⋯⋯直至我不能再留或我們陣營的人全部被捕或離去。」如果他離開會令自己蒙羞，也會令《蘋果日報》名譽受損。黎於2020年8月10日被拘捕，他獲釋後，《蘋果日報》隨即以頭版報導黎智英稱：「坐監都揀呢條路。」
+
+#### 控方：國安法生效後 黎智英續撰文提制裁
+
+控方繼續開案陳詞，指《國安法》生效之後，黎智英持續利用《蘋果日報》作為平台發布煽動文章，美化及鼓吹示威者的違法行為，又請求外國勢力向中港官員實施制裁。在2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日期間，《蘋果》發布了合共85篇煽動刊物，其中31篇含有請求外國勢力向中港官員實施制裁、封鎖或其他敵對措施的內容。
+
+其中黎智英在專欄「成敗樂一笑」所撰寫的文章，涉及請求外國制裁的內容，包括：
+
+- 《有種回力鏢......自插心臟》（2020年7月26日）：黎稱國安法生效後，會損害中國經濟及引來國際圍堵。黎又指美國會有強烈反制措施，以及制裁和懲罰。
+
+- 《繼續打壓香港 還是以身報國？》（2020年9月27日）：黎形容國安法是中央殘暴和惡毒的手段去打壓香港人追求民主自由
+
+- 《台灣也要感謝黨》（2020年10月11日）：黎稱若日本、澳洲和西方國家向中國實施科技禁運及制裁，中國的經濟和科技發展將會停滯，而台灣能獲得好處，又指國家領導人習近平是自大及獨裁
+
+- 《天下圍中 拜登騎虎難下》（2020年11月29日）：黎呼籲拜登政府不要採取「多邊主義」外交手段，若果拜登政府不繼續上一任總統特朗普的「對中國不妥協」政策，台灣的形勢將會惡化
+
+#### 控方：黎被捕獲釋後 蘋果頭版報導「坐監都揀呢條路」
+
+黎智英於2020年8月10日被警方國安處拘捕，其後獲得警方擔保。8月13日，《蘋果日報》頭版報導黎智英稱：「坐監都揀呢條路」，並引述黎稱：「將來瞓喺監獄，whatever，我都係會揀呢條路。」報章另發布報導引述黎稱「手銬都不能侮辱我」。
+
+控方提到，黎於2020年12月還柙後，來監獄探訪的人包括張劍虹、陳沛敏、羅偉光、馮偉光、張志偉。《蘋果日報》仍繼續運作，而黎則繼續給予指示。
+
+
+
+控方又提到，楊清奇負責聯絡《蘋果》不同專欄作者，包括李怡，亦曾安排區家麟撰稿，而區的文章亦構成部份煽動內容。黎亦曾介紹日本籍的作者替《蘋果》撰文。
+
+#### 黎受訪稱「不會離開」 否則令自己蒙羞
+
+控方指，黎智英在2020年7月1日接受《霍士新聞》（Fox News）訪問，提到香港或不再是金融中心（financial hub），當中譴責《國安法》和中共，又指會在香港留到最後一刻。庭上播放片段，黎提到《國安法》內文比最壞的想像更差，港人之間溝通要變得非常小心，又批評《國安法》凌駕立法會、取代法治和《基本法》，令做生意的人無法受到保障，難以維持香港的金融地位。被問到是否害怕被捕，黎指「我不擔心，因為我不能擔心，如果我擔心就不能做或講任何事情」。
+
+至於會否離港，他則堅決表示不會：「我將會留在這裡直至最後一日（“I’m going to stay until the last day.”）⋯⋯直至我不能再留或我們陣營的人全部被捕或離去。不，我不能離開，如果我離開，我令自己蒙羞，我令《蘋果日報》名譽受損，我也損害民主運動的團結。（“Until I can’t stay or everybody in our camp is either arrested or gone. I can’t go away, if I go away, I disgrace myself, I discredit Apple Daily, I also undermine the solidarity of the democratic movement.”）」被問到他曾被捕數次，所涉罪名或能判終身監禁，黎指他不知道將會發生什麼，「但當政府不尊重法律，你不會知道紅線在哪。」
+
+
+
+播放片段期間，黎智英專注望向前方螢幕，一度輕輕搖頭。
+
+#### 控方：黎Twitter發文支持美推行法案及制裁 獲特朗普讚勇敢受寵若驚
+
+控方亦展示多則 Twitter 帖文。2020年7月15日，黎智英轉載美國駐港澳領事館關於民主派初選的聲明，黎標註（Tag）時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧及美國駐港澳領事館的 Twitter，感謝他們對香港人的支持，又稱國際間發聲及採取行動防範中共打壓自由，是前所未有的重要。
+
+2020年7月17日，黎智英在 Twitter 發文指《香港避風港法案》（Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act）和《香港人自由和選擇法》（Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act）是逆權運動的重要資源，向所有前美國政府及國務院職員致敬。
+
+> “#HongKong #SafeHarborAct and #PeoplesFreedomandChoiceAct are good wherewithals to our resistance movement. Salute all former CGs and State Dept staff for caring about this place we call home.” — 黎智英 Twitter
+
+2020年7月23日，黎智英 Twitter 發文指年輕人是爭取自由運動的中流砥柱，但他們危在旦夕，而英國推行BNO簽證新政策作為香港人的「救生艇」。
+
+> “This is urgent and necessary. Our young people are the backbone of our freedom movement. They’re in the most danger. U.K. launches lifeboat for Hongkongers with focus on younger generation with new BN(O) visa.” — 黎智英 Twitter
+
+同日黎智英再發文，指美國應對尋求庇護的香港年輕人寬大，因他們為了爭取自由失去很多（“The US should be lenient for young #HKers seeking asylum. They suffered a lot fighting for #HongKong’s freedom.”），並轉載《蘋果》英文新聞，標題指《國安法》生效後，辦理移民美國的律師稱有關政治庇護的查詢驟增。（“Political asylum inquiries surge after national security law: US immigration lawyer”）
+
+2020年8月21日，黎智英 Twitter 引述《蘋果》報導指時任美國總統特朗普稱呼黎作勇敢的人，他感到受寵若驚，但他還未夠勇敢去對抗習近平，他只是為香港和台灣站出來。
+
+> “President @realDonaldTrump calls me a brave man. I am flattered. But I am not brave enough to stand against the whole world like #Xi. I only #StandWithHongKong #StandwithTaiwan” — 黎智英 Twitter
+
+2020年9月17日，黎智英 Twitter 稱，當美國等聯合一起實施制裁，中共同伙便會無處躲避，他們的資產亦無處可藏，並需為迫害香港人而承受後果。
+
+> “When America and the rest of the free world are aligned and put in place the sanctions, CCP’s accomplices have nowhere to turn, and their assets have nowhere to hide. Their evil deeds persecuting of HKers will have consequences.” — 黎智英 Twitter
+
+2020年12月1日，黎轉載《蘋果》英文新聞指林鄭因被美國制裁而家中堆放大量現金，黎稱拜登政府應令協助中共的人付上責任，制裁措施可挫他們的士氣，即使只為他們帶來少許不便，也是有效用。
+
+> “Biden administration should know that by making those abetting CCP repression personally accountable the measures can frustrate their morale of evil doing, thus will be effective even the measures may seem inconveniences in small ways.” — 黎智英 Twitter
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。
+
+黎智英的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師 Marc Corlett、關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及李峰琦。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。
+
+
+▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻（右）、大律師 Marc Corlett（左）
+
+控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處總警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。
+
+同案8名被告：前行政總裁張劍虹、前總編輯羅偉光、前副社長陳沛敏、前執行總編輯林文宗、前英文主筆馮偉光、前主筆楊清奇、李宇軒和陳梓華，早前已承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，現正還柙，等待黎智英審訊完畢後判刑。
+
+首項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪」指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司，於2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀，請求外國或者境外機構、組織、人員實施對香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。
+
+另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，指黎智英於2020年7月1日至今年2月15日間，與 Mark Simon、陳梓華、李宇軒、劉祖廸及其他人串謀，請求外國或境外機構、組織、人員，實施對中國或香港進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。
+
+「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示及/或複製煽動刊物，具意圖：
+
+> a) 引起憎恨或藐視中央或香港特別行政區政府或激起對其離叛
+
+> b) 激起香港居民企圖不循合法途徑促致改變其他在香港的依法制定的事項
+
+> c) 引起對香港司法的憎恨、藐視或激起對其離叛
+
+> d) 引起香港居民間的不滿或離叛
+
+> e) 煽惑他人使用暴力
+
+> f) 慫使他人不守法或不服從合法命令。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（4日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第6日審訊。控方續開案陳詞，就涉及李宇軒、陳梓華和「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人的「串謀勾結外國勢力」控罪，控方指黎智英為主腦和金主，透過陳梓華作為「中間人」，向李宇軒和劉祖廸傳達指示，以「重光團隊（SWHK）」作平台，請求外國對中港實施制裁或敵對行動。當中黎智英曾在台灣向陳梓華和劉祖廸等人解釋其「支爆」計劃，並提出進行國際游說，令港府同意其議程、甚至推翻中共，李宇軒等人負責執行。而落實策略包括全球登報和眾籌；以「美國線」、「英國線」和「日本線」與當地政治人物接觸和聯繫，游說制裁中港；及發布制裁名單等。其中黎曾為全球登報墊支約500萬港元，並資助外國政治人物來港監察區選。
+
+#### 控方：陳梓華經李柱銘認識黎智英助手、指示李宇軒加入「攬炒團隊」
+
+控方今續讀出就黎智英與李宇軒等人，串謀勾結外國勢力罪行的開案陳詞。控方指稱，黎智英與李宇軒、陳梓華、Mark Simon、劉祖廸，及英國保守黨人權委員會委員裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）、日本眾議院議員菅野志櫻里、及英國金融家比爾布勞德（Bill Browder），串謀請求英、美、日及歐洲等國，對中港政府實施制裁或採取敵對行動，包括停止與香港的司法互助及或引渡協議、向香港停售武器、限制中港貿易，並以「重光團隊（Stand with Hong Kong Fight for Freedom，簡稱 SWHK）」作平台促進串謀。
+
+控方指，2019年6月反修例運動期間，陳梓華在 Telegram 群組「G20」得悉有示威者欲尋求黎智英資助進行「全球登報」，以尋求外國對中港政府施壓。陳其後嘗試透過李柱銘接觸黎智英，並獲介紹認識黎的助手 Mark Simon，Simon 轉告黎支持計劃，願預留500萬港元作廣告開支，事後需還款。
+
+陳梓華遂聯絡群組成員之一的李宇軒，表示自己是黎智英的「中間人」，並要求李在G20峰會時組織全球登報，促使外國向港府施壓；陳並於2019年7月指示李加入「攬炒團隊」為核心成員，李和「攬炒巴」劉祖廸其後負責團隊運作，並透過陳接收黎智英和 Mark Simon 的指示。
+
+2019年7月，陳梓華首次與黎智英會面，同場還有李柱銘，飯局上黎智英指示陳透過 Mark Simon 接觸他，又着陳向激進示威者轉達訊息，指他們應採用較溫和的手段以爭取國際支持。同年8月，李宇軒和劉祖廸等人成立「重光團隊（SWHK）」，目的是請求外國制裁中港政府和介入警暴。
+
+#### 控方：黎智英為主腦、金主 陳梓華為中間人 李宇軒執行指示
+
+就各人角色，控方指黎智英為主腦和金主，負責「最高指揮」；Mark Simon 是黎的代理人，直接向黎匯報和負責執行其指示，及審理財政援助的申請，黎本人會批核大額財政，Mark Simon 則負責較低金額。
+
+至於陳梓華是中間人，直接從黎智英或透過 Mark Simon 接收黎的指示，再傳達予李宇軒和劉祖廸，並與外媒聯絡放置廣告；李和劉則為團隊對外核心成員，按黎智英或 Mark Simon 經陳梓華的指示，指揮其他團隊成員，李並曾在眾籌前預付登報的費用。
+
+而 SWHK 則自2019年8月起被用作平台實施串謀，透過社交媒體上的政治宣傳、發布文章、與外國政治人物或社運人士聯繫，請求外國對中港實施制裁、封鎖或其他敵對行為。
+
+#### 控方：黎在台與「攬炒巴」等會面談「支爆」 促制裁甚至推翻中共
+
+控方續指，2020年1月，黎智英指示 Mark Simon 安排與陳梓華、劉祖廸和一名林姓女示威者在其台灣陽明山寓所會面，會上黎解釋其「支爆」計劃，即透過造成中國行政及經濟動盪令中國政府倒台，並解釋國際游說的4個階段：
+
+> （i）令外國知悉香港發生什麼事；
+
+> （ii）呼籲外國政府關注和譴責港府；
+
+> （iii）會見外國官員並將他們想法帶回香港；
+
+> （iv）會見外國政治顧問，以影響其政府對華政策，促使對香港及中國實施制裁，令港府同意其議程，甚至推翻中共。
+
+何俊仁和李永達其後亦加入該會面。此外，黎智英亦安排陳梓華、李宇軒和女示威者在台灣會見施明德，讓施分享抗爭的經驗。
+
+控方指，各人其後討論如何執行黎的「支爆」計劃，當中陳梓華負責聯絡抗爭相關人士，李宇軒繼續國際游說及建立國際網絡，劉祖廸扮演精神領袖宣揚「攬炒」。至2020年5月，Mark Simon 與陳梓華會面重申4階段國際游說；黎智英於同年6月與陳會面，指示他繼續進行國際游說，又邀請陳到壹傳媒大樓會面，強調《蘋果日報》英文版的重要性。
+
+#### 控方：李宇軒被捕後 Mark Simon曾稱運作不受影響
+
+控方並指，《國安法》生效後，陳梓華和 Mark Simon 繼續保持聯絡，而李宇軒於2020年8月被捕後，Simon 告知陳梓華 SWHK 的運作不會受影響，因他們有 Plan B，就是讓劉祖廸到美國演講宣揚「攬炒」理念，並繼續要求美國制裁中港政府。同年10月，陳梓華被以「協助罪犯罪」被捕並獲保釋，Simon 仍鼓勵他繼續國際游說，又稱會向他提供協助，包括安排他到美國。
+
+#### 控方：黎智英指示李宇軒3次全球登報、墊支約510萬
+
+控方續指，黎智英等人採取不同策略勾結外國勢力，包括全球登報和眾籌、建立國際網絡、及發布文章、新聞稿和制裁報告等。
+
+就全球登報及眾籌，控方指，李宇軒在黎智英及 Mark Simon 經陳梓華指示下，於2019年6、7、8月分別組織3次全球登報，在美、加、英、日及台等多地報章刊登文章，呼籲譴責中國、香港政府和香港警察，並促請對中港實施制裁。其中加拿大《環球郵報》〈Stand With Hong Kong Until Dawn〉，提到望加政府承認香港警察犯下反人類罪行，實施制裁和禁向香港售武；美國《紐約時報》〈Catch Hong Kong As We Fall〉，則促美方停止賣彈藥予香港警察並通過《香港人權及民主法案》。
+
+為支付相關費用，李宇軒及陳梓華等人發起3次眾籌，分別籌得約700萬港元、30萬英鎊（約310萬港元）及183萬美元（約1,440萬港元），即共約2,450萬港元。控方並指黎智英透過 Mark Simon 提供財政支持，其中第一次登報開支約600萬港元，黎和 Simon 透過二人持有的公司 LAIS Hotel Properties Limited 及力高顧問，墊支156萬港元給至少5份報章；李宇軒其後在8月初將156萬港元轉帳到台灣的查德威有限公司償還黎，以避免黎的身分曝光。
+
+Mark Simon 亦協助處理眾籌款項，就第二次全球登報，Mark Simon 將眾籌的約310萬港元，存入《蘋果日報》專欄作者 Jack Henry Hazlewood 的英國戶口，再轉帳給李宇軒。就第三次全球登報，Mark Simon 將眾籌資金存入其美國戶口，再存入他成立的信託基金「The Project Hong Kong Trust」，再透過基金將約320萬港元存入李宇軒戶口；LAIS Hotel 及力高亦向6份報章支付354萬港元，包括向《日本經濟新聞》支付約147萬港元。庭上展示 WhatsApp 訊息，Mark Simon 曾表示已獲歸還所有就國際廣告支付的款項（“all monies that were used for the international ad campaign are now back with us”）。
+
+法官李運騰一度問及，控方展示 Mark Simon 的 WhatsApp 訊息，是否依賴該些訊息的真實性，周天行回應視乎情況，指部分訊息有銀行紀錄支持。惟李運騰指即使如此，該些訊息仍屬「傳聞證供」，控方不能以此證明 Simon 訊息所說為真，周天行終稱只會用以證黎智英犯案時的心態。
+
+
+▲ 周天行
+
+#### 控方：黎智英資助辦展覽及組織選舉監察團、轉讓公司予陳梓華作回報
+
+控方續指，黎智英亦為其他宣傳提供財政支持，包括2019年8月，Mark Simon 轉帳3萬元予陳梓華，由李予信協助籌辦報紙展覽；10月黎智英再轉帳14.41萬元予陳，組織其他報紙展覽和街站；11月 Mark Simon 轉帳50萬元予李宇軒組織「選舉監察團」，邀請外國政治人物來港監察區議會選舉。2020年1月，黎智英亦將一所在英屬維爾京群島註冊的公司「LACOCK」轉讓予陳梓華，包括股權、董事及銀行戶口的簽署人，作為陳提供協助的回報。
+
+此外，黎智英和 Mark Simon 亦透過陳梓華，批准李宇軒免費使用《蘋果日報》就鄧小平簽署《中英聯合聲明》的版權相片；《蘋果日報》亦在重要版面刊登第三次全球登報的詳情。
+
+控方續指，眾籌的資金同時用作 SWHK 營運開支及作國際游說工作，及邀請英國國會議員 Bob Seely 於2019年8月來港觀察反修例運動。而由於眾籌資金用畢，劉祖廸於2020年5月提出進行第4次眾籌，團隊於8月籌得170萬美元（約1,320萬港元），並存放在由 Mark Simon 設立和控制的「the Project Hong Kong Trust」，並按其指示將有關款項用於國際游說工作。
+
+#### 控方：黎指示分美、英、日3線 李宇軒向美議員展警彈藥游說警暴
+
+除了全球登報，控方亦指 SWHK 被用作平台以建立國際網絡爭取外國支持，及向中港施壓。在2019年10至11月，團隊資助香港大專學生在日內瓦、柏林、巴黎、倫敦及華盛頓會見外國政治人物，游說他們支持反修例示威；同年11月發起「選舉監察團」，邀請19名外國政治人物來港監察區議會選舉，期間李宇軒與 Lord Alton、Luke de Pulford、陳方安生和李柱銘會面，擴展網絡。
+
+> #### 📣 🗳️ Hong Kong Electoral Observation Mission
+
+> We are very pleased to welcome the following independent observers of the 2019 District Council Election! Thank you for being witnesses for Hong Kong!#HongKongEOM #HongKongProtests #StandwithHK pic.twitter.com/v9WIeyShko — Fight For Freedom. Stand With Hong Kong. 重光團隊 (@Stand_with_HK) November 23, 2019
+
+而為促進串謀，及在黎智英指示下，陳梓華、李宇軒及劉祖廸等人與美國、英國及日本的政治人物接觸和持續聯繫，並稱之為「美國線」、「英國線」與「日本線」。「美國線」方面，黎智英同意 Mark Simon 於2019年9月安排李宇軒與潛在美國總統參選人、參議員斯科特 Rick Scott、其助手 Scott Sciretta 及美國領事職員 Alan Brinker 會面，李透過展示277粒警方使用過的彈藥，就「警暴」進行游說，陳梓華並曾指示李宇軒隱藏「資助人（backers）」黎和 Simon 的身分。
+
+同年12月，李宇軒到美國與「香港民主委員會」創辦人、朱耀明兒子朱牧民及美國參議員 Rick Scott、Todd Young 和 Ted Cruz 會面，陳梓華提醒李把握機會建立美國網絡並游說制裁中港政府。
+
+#### 控方：陳方安生邀李宇軒與英領事等會面、李協助IPAC工作
+
+「英國線」方面，2019年12月，黎智英安排陳梓華於倫敦與「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯 Benedict Rogers 會面；同月在陳方安生邀請下，李宇軒參與時任英國駐港領事 Andrew Heyn 舉辦的飯局，席間除陳方安生外，李柱銘、郭榮鏗和莫乃光均有出席。至2020年1或2月，陳方安生再邀陳梓華和李宇軒在其辦公室會面，就對示威的看法交流意見。
+
+同年5月，英國保守黨人權委員會委員裴倫德向李宇軒提出，有意成立「對華政策跨國議會聯盟（IPAC）」，成員包括對中國採強硬立場的各國議員，以爭取落實制裁中港政府的政策。Mark Simon 指示 SWHK 應加入 IPAC，SWHK 遂於2020年6月在裴倫德招募下加入 IPAC 秘書處。
+
+同年7月，李宇軒向裴倫德建議游說英、美、日、德國、西班牙、意大利等多個國家，停止與香港的司法互助或逃犯引渡協議；其後在黎智英和 Mark Simon 指示下，陳梓華建議李宇軒繼續協助 IPAC 的工作，負責網站編輯及發布文章。
+
+#### 控方：李宇軒向日議員交制裁草案、協助翻譯推立法
+
+「日本線」方面，李宇軒於2020年1月至4月，向3名日本眾議院議員提交有關「馬格尼茨基式」制裁的草案，並將 IPAC 的會議紀錄翻譯成日文，以協助菅野志櫻里推動《馬格尼茨基人權法案》立法。李又與裴倫德等人討論 SWHK 可如何協助 IPAC 和由日本議員組成的「對中政策相關國會議員聯盟（JPAC）」，其中 Bill Browder 和菅野志櫻里原擬會面討論該法案，但該視像會議終因李宇軒被捕而未成事。
+
+控方並指，李宇軒在黎智英透過 Mark Simon 和陳梓華的指示下，執行和管理 SWHK 的事務，與外國政治人物建立網絡、進行國際游說，請求外國制裁中國；負責 SWHK 會計紀錄，批出團隊活動開支；亦負責編輯 SWHK 的網頁。
+
+#### 控方：SWHK發布多篇文章籲制裁、致函外國政府促停引渡協議
+
+控方另指，在黎智英及 Mark Simon 透過陳梓華指示下，李宇軒本人或透過 SWHK，發布一系列文章、新聞稿和制裁名單，以促請制裁。其中2019年12月，SWHK 發布一份與香港大專學界國際事務代表團制作，針對144名中港官員的制裁名單；2020年7月1日，SWHK 發布題為〈Darkness is descending on freedom and democracy in Hong Kong, a leading global campaigning organisation has warned〉的新聞稿，譴責《國安法》頒布，並呼籲英政府急切考慮對中國及香港實施馬格尼茨基式制裁、及撤銷與香港的引渡協議，並對中國國企如華為施加限制。同年7月17日，SWHK 致函捷克、愛爾蘭及葡萄牙政府，促請她們終止與香港的引渡協議，3封信於李的電腦搜得。
+
+7月期間，SWHK 亦多次在 Twitter 轉發外國政治人物的帖文，如轉發美國議員帖文，感謝他們投票通過《香港自治法案》；轉發 Bill Browder 帖文呼籲制裁中港官員；轉發美國白宮帖文，感謝美國取消香港「特別待遇」和對中國施加關稅；及轉發羅冠聰帖文，促請國際社會對前特首和選舉主任進行制裁等。
+
+SWHK亦曾於7至8月發布數篇文章，包括〈The destruction of the democratic process in Hong Kong〉，呼籲美國對中港進行制裁，並於2021年1月發布由數個海外組織聯署的聲明，促請美政府啟動「救生艇」政策及英國政府實施對中港制裁。
+
+#### 控方稱黎智英2013至2020年期間 向民主派課金逾9千萬元
+
+就資金流向，控方指在2013年7月至2020年7月期間，黎智英共86次轉帳予 Mark Simon，款項達1億1,860萬元。其中9,326萬元再被分配給不同民主派人士及政黨。此外，黎智英於2019年10月18日指示 Mark Simon，將25,819.15元美金（即港幣約202,163.94元）捐給「香港監察」。
+
+稅務局的資料顯示在2013至2020年期間，Mark Simon 報稱為壹傳媒動畫公司的職員，年薪為110至120萬元。在2020至2021年期間，Mark Simon 亦報稱為力高顧問有限公司的商業經理。
+
+#### 李宇軒被捕後獲警方擔保 惟其後被內地水警截獲 終移交回港
+
+就各被告的被捕情況，控方指，李宇軒於2020年8月10日被警方以「勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」、「無牌管有槍械或彈藥」、「藏有可作非法用途的工具」及「洗黑錢」罪拘捕。8月12日李獲警方擔保，惟須交出護照等旅遊證件及不得離港，並須於同年9月1日到警署報到。
+
+惟8月23日李乘船非法闖入中國水域時被內地水警拘捕。至2021年3月22日，李從中國被移交至香港警方。
+
+#### 陳梓華2021年2月還柙至今 劉祖廸和Mark Simon於2020年離港
+
+至於陳梓華於2020年10月10日被警方以「協助罪犯」罪名拘捕，其後獲警方擔保。同年10至11月，Mark Simon 向陳說自己可能會因國安法罪名而被捕，但鼓勵陳繼續國際游說工作，Mark Simon 並向陳保證黎智英及他會提供一切協助，包括提供逃往美國的路線。
+
+至2021年2月15日，陳再度被警方以「勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」罪拘捕，其後一直還柙至今。
+
+至於劉祖廸和 Mark Simon，則分別於2020年1月5日及4月18日經出境關口離開香港。
+
+黎智英於2020年8月10日首次被捕。其後於9月1日，黎進行警誡錄影會面，警員向他展示部份專欄文章，他承認作者是自己。黎亦承認 Twitter 帳戶屬於他持有及使用。
+
+#### 控方：3法案通過立法 42名官員被制裁
+
+控方最後指，在涉案時段，外國推行不同法案及政策，以制裁中港官員、限制貿易和出入口，以及延長港人外國居留期限等。包括2019年6月13日，《香港人權及民主法案》（The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act）在美國眾議院審議，並於同年11月27日獲時任美國總統特朗普簽署立法。2020年6月30日，美國議員提出《香港避風港法案》（Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act），相關立法程序仍在進行中。
+
+2020年7月14日特朗普正式簽署《香港自治法》（Hong Kong Autonomy Act）。法案授權美國政府制裁有份損害香港自治的中國及香港官員、機構或企業。同日，特朗普簽署《香港正常化總統行政命令》（President’s Executive Order 13936 on Hong Kong Normalization），暫緩或取消對香港的部份特別待遇，以及授權美政府實施制裁措施。
+
+2021年6月30日，美國有議員提出《香港人自由和選擇法》（Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act），要求為合資格的港人提供臨時庇護和難民身份，以及其他有關移居美國的措施，相關立法程序仍在進行中。
+
+2020年8月至2021年7月期間，美國向42名中央及香港特區政府官員實施制裁。
+
+2020年8月11日，美國政府宣布由同年9月25日起，從香港進口美國的產品須註明原產地是「中國」，而不能標示「香港」。2020年8月19日，美國國務院宣布終止與香港簽署的三項雙邊協議，包括逃犯的移交、被判刑人士的移交、豁免國際船運利得稅。
+
+此外，約於2020年11月9日，英國、愛爾蘭、澳洲、紐西蘭等9個國家分別暫緩與香港之間的逃犯移交協議。
+
+控方指，香港城市大學法律學院教授、梁美芬丈夫王貴國會以美國法律和國際經濟法的專家身份出庭作供，講述制裁及封鎖措施的法律效力，包括影響、後果及時效等。
+
+#### 下周一續審 料將讀出同意事實
+
+控方讀畢179頁的開案陳詞，表示原預計傳召60名證人，但可減至31人，並望減至30人以下。控方亦將讀出同意事實，但望法庭給予時間與辯方商討，以視乎可否同意更多事實。案件下周一（8日）續審，將讀出同意事實。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-05-lidar-trade-and-security.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-05-lidar-trade-and-security.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Lidar Trade And Security
+author: Catharine Mouradian, et al.
+date : 2024-01-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Cyx1m1H.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Mapping a Trade Tool Kit for National and Economic Security: A Lidar Case Study"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Lidar is the newest piece in the ever-evolving competition between the United States and China to control the future of technology._
+
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Strategic trade tools, advanced technologies, and de-risking continue to feature prominently in evolving economic and national security agendas. The nexus of trade policy and national security has been particularly dynamic in the United States, which maintains one of the world’s most advanced trade tool kits for national security. Questions have emerged, however, about whether the use of these trade tools serves primarily as a national security instrument or whether their use is motivated primarily by a bid to protect domestic industry. As technology grows in foreign policy importance, the line between what is critical to national security versus what is critical to economic security is increasingly blurred. One technology increasingly under the security spotlight is lidar.
+
+
+### Defining Lidar
+
+Light detection and ranging, or lidar technology, is a dual-use technology, which means it has both civilian and military uses. Lidar uses laser pulses to hit objects and reflect back, calculating the position, size, and velocity of surrounding objects. These laser pulses occur at rates of millions of beams per second, creating a highly accurate and real-time 3D image of the environment.
+
+Lidar is widely used in commercial and scientific applications. In 2018, archeologists used lidar to scan the jungle along the border of Guatemala and Mexico, digitally removing the dense tree layer to reveal swaths of Mayan ruins. In “smart city” infrastructure programs, lidar collects data to improve road safety and support traffic management. Lidar is also critical in driverless cars. All major autonomous vehicle producers (with the exception of Tesla) use lidar as “3D eyes.”
+
+
+### Lidar and U.S. National Security
+
+Lidar also has myriad military applications. The integration of lidar into aerial vehicles like drones can enhance their autonomous capabilities, such as navigation and collision avoidance, improving their ability to navigate complex environments. Lidar can also map battlefields and gather reconnaissance, scouting for potential danger without risking soldiers’ lives to map the places satellites cannot see. Lidar can also assess buildings for structural damage, locate sea mines using bathymetric lidar (which passes through water), and estimate the effectiveness of weapons by evaluating atmospheric conditions. The U.S. Army is currently developing its own autonomous vehicles through a $49.9 million project with autonomous truck company Kodiak Robotics, which uses only U.S.-produced lidar for military purposes.
+
+#### Data Concerns
+
+One national security element of lidar that has garnered attention among U.S. policymakers is its potential to generate large swaths of data about urban environments and critical infrastructure. A 2016 Intel study revealed that autonomous vehicles could produce 4,000 gigabytes of data each day, underscoring the tremendous amounts of data they hoover up from surrounding environments. Lidar is used in almost all commercial autonomous vehicles currently tested and sold in the United States. Transmitting data to China could also lead to its access to perfect renderings of critical U.S. infrastructure.
+
+Fears about data generation and gathering are likely exaggerated. Hesai, a major Chinese producer of lidar, has publicly stated that their products are closed systems, do not connect to the internet, and therefore cannot physically transfer data. Hesai has also stated that their lidar is not suitable for military use and is not sold to U.S. military end-users. A recent House Select Committee report on the need to “reset” U.S.-China economic relations has asked the Department of Commerce to investigate whether lidar produced by a foreign adversary poses a national security risk.
+
+
+### Chinese Lidar
+
+In 2020, several Chinese ministries, including the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), identified lidar as a “strategic emerging industry.” This designation jumpstarted growth in state investment in the industry and was accompanied by additional support for sectors that use lidar, such as autonomous vehicles and smart city programs. Chinese companies have also been accused of stealing foreign intellectual property, resulting in patent infringement lawsuits from several U.S. companies. China also pursued “leapfrogging,” an effort to ensure that Chinese companies could jump to produce the most advanced technology and avoid having to fight for space in which foreign countries already dominate. A Chinese expert on intelligent vehicles suggested applying this agenda to lidar by focusing on solid-state lidar instead of the typical 360-degree lidar produced by U.S. companies.
+
+#### Possible Military Connections
+
+Hesai is the largest Chinese lidar company by sales, capturing over 47 percent of global market share and 67 percent of the autonomous vehicle market. Hesai is reportedly tied to the Chinese military through the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), a state-owned dual-use electronics manufacturer that produces technology for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Hesai has denied these allegations. The House Select Committee letter to the executive branch also accuses Robosense, another major Chinese lidar manufacturer, of ties to the Harbin Institute of Technology, a military university. Huawei, long accused of having ties to the Chinese government, has also recently entered the lidar market. However, linkages between private companies and the Chinese government can be murky, and unsubstantiated conjecture can increase tensions without bolstering U.S. national security.
+
+#### Economic Security Considerations
+
+Lidar technology was originally developed in the United States, but the growth of Chinese firms has imperiled the long-term viability of the U.S. lidar sector. The United States maintains robust and well-utilized national security instruments to combat nonmarket economic practices that result in injury of U.S. firms. These include Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974; Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; and antidumping, countervailing, and Section 337 investigations under the Tariff Act of 1930.
+
+The application of these statutes to specific cases is contingent upon a lengthy litigation and investigation process, in which identifying injury by a foreign government can be difficult. While lidar was originally developed and dominated by U.S. firms, the proliferation of lidar in domestic Chinese markets has brought costs down and created a more competitive market overall. There are obvious parallels to the electric vehicle market, in which China’s electric vehicle market has shrunk from 300 companies in 2021 to 50 firms today, far outpacing the number of U.S. peer competitors. The potentially bleak consequences of Chinese electric vehicles on European and U.S. firms are likely to result in enhanced protective measures and have already resulted in a European Commission anti-subsidy investigation. A similar dynamic is playing out in the lidar sector.
+
+The growth of foreign lidar companies, even if driven by good faith competition, could potentially imperil the longevity of U.S. firms. Foreign domination of a U.S. sector potentially creates a “weaponized interdependence” scenario in which a foreign government can exercise chokepoints and cut off supplies. This risk is not theoretical. Lidar was added to a draft Chinese government export control list in December 2022, with an official announcement that certain types of lidar — specifically laser range finders — would be restricted on July 31, 2023, as part of a larger swath of controls on drones and drone equipment.
+
+
+### U.S. Trade and Investment Instruments
+
+The United States maintains what is arguably the world’s most advanced trade and investment tool kit at the nexus of national security. Exercising some of these instruments to a fuller extent could better protect the U.S. lidar sector.
+
+#### Commerce Department Instruments
+
+The Bureau of Industry and Security’s (BIS) Entity List identifies and lists organizations believed to be acting against the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. The entities listed face presumptions of denial for export licenses for all items subject to export regulations, restricting access to sensitive U.S. technologies for national security and foreign policy reasons. Huawei, which now produces lidar products, is listed, as are CETC and the Harbin Institute, which are reported to have ties to Hesai and Robosense. No other Chinese lidar firms are included on the Entity List.
+
+Members of Congress have recently accused BIS of underutilizing its full authorities by permitting the outflow of certain technologies to China. Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX), who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has accused the agency in a major 90-day review report of enabling “a virtually unrestricted flow of American technology to CCP-controlled companies, facilitating China’s rapid rise as a technological, economic, and military superpower.” BIS, on the other hand, maintains that permitting the outflow of technologies to China provides badly needed export revenue for U.S. firms, allowing them to redouble research and development efforts, thus enabling them to retain a competitive edge.
+
+In November 2023, the House Select Committee addressed a letter to Secretaries Raimondo, Yellen, and Austin calling for additional scrutiny over foreign lidar. The letter urged BIS to implement narrow controls on Field Programmable Gate Array chips, which are necessary for lidar and overwhelmingly produced by Xilinx Inc. and Altera Corporation in the United States. Current controls cover some of these chips but not those used in lidar.
+
+#### Treasury Department Instruments
+
+The Department of the Treasury’s Non-SDN Chinese-Military Industrial Complex (NS-CMIC) List identifies entities that the U.S. government has determined are involved in the development or production of military equipment or materials for the PLA. The list is designed to prevent U.S. persons and entities from investing in or supporting companies that could contribute to advancing PLA military capabilities. The NS-CMIC List undergoes regular updates to reflect changes in China’s military industry. The overarching goal of the NS-CMIC is to impede China’s military-civil fusion strategy and overall modernization of the PLA. The list has also identified Chinese companies involved in the development of other advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence, advanced semiconductors, and hypersonic weapons. Huawei and CETC are included on this list.
+
+#### Defense Department Instruments
+
+The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Chinese Military Companies List, also known as the Section 1260H list, is a list of Chinese military companies that are “operating directly or indirectly in the United States.” The DOD began publishing this list in 2021 as required by an amendment to the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). It was intended to replace a previous list published by the DOD that identified communist Chinese military companies as instructed by Section 1237 of the 1999 NDAA. A major difference between the two lists is that 1260H list redefined what constituted military ties to capture companies that were a part of civil-military fusion, reflect the modern Chinese military chain of command, and narrow the scope of companies to identify risks more effectively. Under Executive Orders (EO) 13959 and 13974, then president Trump blocked U.S. persons from owning securities from companies on the Section 1237 list, a decision that was continued through President Biden’s own EO. Huawei and CETC were included in the earliest tranche of the 1260H list published in 2021.
+
+#### Investment Instruments
+
+In August 2023, the Biden administration issued an EO establishing an outbound investment notification regime covering chips, artificial intelligence, and quantum investments. The EO directs the Department of Treasury to require notification of certain transactions, while prohibiting certain higher-risk transactions. Senators John Cornyn (R-TX) and Bob Casey (D-PA) had included networked lasered scanning systems, a type of lidar, in the amendment to the 2024 NDAA via the Outbound Investment Transparency Act, although lidar was not included in the EO.
+
+The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) examines national security risks of foreign investment. A September 2022 EO expanded CFIUS’ ability to protect U.S. technology and more directly tied CFIUS objectives to preserving U.S. technological leadership and enhancing U.S. supply chain resilience in line with overall security objectives. Prior to the EO, CFIUS had approved Chinese acquisitions, reverse mergers, and investments in U.S. lidar companies but will likely face growing pressure to approach those transactions more critically. CFIUS is simultaneously facing calls to maintain openness where possible, particularly since it has reviewed a record number of filings, despite slowing foreign direct investment.
+
+#### Tariff Remedies
+
+Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act grants the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) the power to conduct investigations and measures to uphold U.S. rights under trade agreements, as well as to address specific foreign trade practices, including intellectual property violations, discriminatory taxation, unfair subsidies, currency manipulation, and illegal sourcing. Under presidential guidance, Section 301 authorizes the USTR to investigate and effectively counteract unfair trade practices.
+
+On August 14, 2017, then president Trump called on the USTR to investigate China’s technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation practices under Section 301. This investigation identified four Chinese practices related to technology as unreasonable or discriminatory, specifically their technology transfer requirements, licensing restrictions, outbound investment regime, and theft of intellectual property. In March 2018, the USTR announced tariffs of 10 or 25 percent on a variety of Chinese products. One of the covered products was lidar, under HTS code 9015.80.20, which was then subject to a 25 percent tariff.
+
+
+### Policy Recommendations
+
+Even if certain hard security aspects of lidar remain murky, it is critical that the U.S. government bolster efforts to support the domestic lidar industry and pursue preventive measures where possible. Policymakers should consider the following measures to support the U.S. lidar sector:
+
+1. __Ensure that the United States maintains a domestic supply of lidar.__ Ensuring domestic supplies reduces the likelihood of a foreign actor weaponizing dependance on lidar. It also “de-risks” lidar use in military applications by ensuring that the provider is not an entity with foreign military ties.
+
+2. __Initiate additional investigations into foreign lidar to determine data leakage risks.__ Questions abound about the hard security risks of lidar, spanning data flows and 3D mapping of critical infrastructure. The Department of Commerce, in partnership with the End-User Review Committee, should conduct a review that would provide resources to more definitively identify data flow risks.
+
+3. __Use export restrictions lightly.__ Unlike other critical technologies, it is difficult to claim that the United States maintains chokepoints over lidar since some Chinese products are superior in both quality and price. U.S. export controls could thus have a limited effect on certain Chinese lidar capabilities, while narrowing the market for U.S. companies.
+
+4. __Invest in talent strategies and technology capabilities.__ It is critical that the U.S. government pursue “promote” policies in addition to “protect” policies. Relaxing immigration requirements to encourage more advanced STEM professionals to work in the United States should be a key priority, particularly as workforce woes become increasingly acute. Moreover, future talent gaps could ultimately decide the winners of the tech race.
+
+5. __Consider the application of emerging instruments to the lidar sector.__ The U.S. Congress demonstrated some enthusiasm for covering lidar under an outbound investment regime. Upon concluding an investigation, if it is determined that lidar does pose a national security threat, the United States should consider expanding the scope of an outbound investment regime to include lidar technologies.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Advanced technologies are driving a new era of economic security in which national security and domestic economic interests are increasingly intertwined. The U.S. government should explore the full toolkit at its disposal to evaluate the possible risks of an overdependence on foreign lidar. Lidar will enable significant leaps forward in both civilian and military applications, underscoring the necessity of maintaining a U.S. supply that cannot be weaponized by a foreign actor, but protective trade measures are only part of the equation. Efforts to “run faster” will better enable the United States to map the geostrategic future.
+
+---
+
+__Catharine Mouradian__ is a program manager and research associate with the Project on Trade and Technology at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Her work has focused on the European Union and technology ecosystem in the transatlantic context, including the geopolitics of semiconductor supply chains.
+
+__Emily Benson__ is director of Project on Trade and Technology, and senior fellow of Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS, where she focuses on trade, investment, and technology issues primarily in the transatlantic context.
+
+__Gloria Sicilia__ is an intern with the Project on Trade and Technology at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-08-in-gazas-shadow.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-08-in-gazas-shadow.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..80d3119e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-08-in-gazas-shadow.md
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : In Gaza’s Shadow
+author: Tobias Borck
+date : 2024-01-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/3C4nGIe.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Middle East in 2024"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza is dominating the start of 2024 in the Middle East, but the fallout from the war will also shape the region once the fighting eventually ends._
+
+
+
+Israel’s furious military response to the atrocities committed by Hamas on 7 October is about to enter its fourth month, and there are signs that it will not be the last. Early in the new year, Israel announced that it would withdraw some of its ground forces from Gaza, but rather than signalling an end to the war, this likely represents only a shift in Israel’s approach towards a slightly less intensive campaign.
+
+The fact is that Israel is unlikely to stop and declare victory until it can credibly claim to have reached its war aims: the removal of Hamas from power in Gaza, and the destruction of the group’s capacity to pose a military threat to Israel from the territory. Given the somewhat intangible nature of these goals, this may well require – at least from the perspective of the Israeli government – achieving some symbolic victories, including the killing of Hamas’s elusive senior leaders Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Daif, who are widely thought to have been behind the 7 October attacks. How long it will take the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to track them down is anyone’s guess. Other questions, including how Israel intends to deal with an almost completely destroyed Gaza and a displaced and starving population after the war, are even more difficult to answer.
+
+The other way this war could end, it has long been assumed, would be as the result of increased US pressure on Israel to wrap up the fighting, which would eventually culminate in Washington joining the increasingly global consensus to call for a ceasefire. The Biden administration’s rhetoric has changed gradually over the past three months, from an unconditional embrace of Israel and its right to strike back after 7 October to growing warnings about the long-term consequences of the mounting civilian death toll. But the president himself still seems reluctant to do more than to try – presumably – to exert influence on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in private. Moreover, it is also far from certain that Netanyahu would be particularly receptive to US pressure, at least in the short term, and especially in a presidential election year in which he might see an opportunity to extract as much as he can from across the US’s deeply polarised political spectrum.
+
+
+### The Iranian/Houthi Challenge in the Red Sea
+
+As the war in Gaza continues, the risks of an expansion of the conflict will remain ever-present. At the beginning of 2024, the Red Sea and the Houthis in Yemen have moved into the spotlight in this regard. Through a combination of missile and drone attacks and hijackings, the group whose rebellion against the Yemeni government in 2014 triggered the war in Yemen that is still going on today and which has close ties to Iran has significantly disrupted traffic through one of the world’s most important shipping lanes.
+
+The US, backed by European allies like the UK, is leading the international response, and will likely do what it can to keep Israel from taking direct action against the Houthis. From Washington’s perspective, it is clearly preferable to treat the Houthi problem as one akin to that posed by piracy off the Somali coast in the 2000s, rather than to let the Yemeni militia claim to be part of a regional war against Israel and the West. Still, any military effort to remove the Houthi threat to international shipping through the Red Sea is liable to have unintended consequences and might reduce the chances of bringing the war in Yemen to a close in 2024.
+
+___`The challenge of how to deal with Iran, including its nefarious influence across the Middle East and its nuclear programme, must once again be a top priority for policymakers everywhere`___
+
+Moreover, unless they are destroyed completely (a highly unlikely prospect), the Houthis – and with them their backers in Tehran – have already succeeded in shifting parts of the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East and beyond. From 2023/24 onwards, anyone with a stake in global shipping – that is, almost every economy in the world – will have to face the fact that Iran and its allies now hold at risk two of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab Al-Mandeb. In other words, the challenge of how to deal with Iran, including its nefarious influence across the Middle East and its nuclear programme, must once again be a top priority for policymakers everywhere, from Washington to capitals across Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere.
+
+
+### The Risk of a Hezbollah–Israel War Remains
+
+But escalation risks loom large elsewhere too. Thus far, the much-feared escalation between Israel and Hezbollah has not happened. Violence across the Israeli-Lebanese border has reached its highest level since the 2006 conflict, but both Israel and Hezbollah have carefully avoided a full-scale war. This could change in 2024.
+
+The assassination of Hamas deputy leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut on 2 January, widely attributed to Israel, should put everyone on notice. Israel may bet on Hezbollah’s – and its backer Iran’s – continued desire to keep most of its powder dry for some future confrontation. But brazen strikes on residential areas in Lebanon’s capital are precisely the kind of actions that are liable to increase the political pressure on Hezbollah, which likes to present itself as Lebanon’s protector, especially against its southern neighbour. (It must also be noted that the al-Arouri assassination highlights the possibility that Israel could make good on its threats to pursue Hamas leaders elsewhere in the Middle East – with obvious deleterious consequences for regional stability.)
+
+Yet, the risk of war between Israel and Hezbollah goes beyond the possibility of a tit-for-tat spiralling out of control. In October, fearing Hezbollah might follow Hamas’s example and try to invade northern Israel, the IDF evacuated dozens of towns and villages near the border (including Kiryat Shmona, a city of more than 20,000 residents). The Israeli government now faces the dilemma that it can hardly tell people to go back to their homes unless it can claim that their security situation has meaningfully changed. Israel insists that Hezbollah must at least comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and withdraw to the north of the Litani River – about 20 miles from the border with Israel – but to no avail.
+
+This raises the risk that Israel might eventually resort to using more force than it already does in its near-daily skirmishes with Hezbollah. Israeli leaders may convince themselves that they can achieve their objectives with a limited military campaign, but any operations by Israeli ground forces on Lebanese soil could well upend the restraint Hezbollah has shown to date and result in a war that could be hard to contain. At the very least, the front in such a war would likely extent beyond Lebanon to the Israeli-Syrian border, where Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed groups have long been expanding their positions.
+
+
+### Beyond Boiling Point: The West Bank and Israel
+
+The third area in which the war in Gaza is likely to contribute to existing instability, with potential consequences for the wider region, is the situation in the West Bank and Israeli domestic politics, which are closely linked.
+
+___`In 2024, regional powers will likely seek to protect whatever they can of the de-escalatory trend of the past few years`___
+
+Although overshadowed by the death and destruction in Gaza, the West Bank has seen the highest levels of violence since the Second Intifada in the early 2000s. More than 450 Palestinians were killed in 2023 – most of them in IDF operations, some by extremist Israeli settlers; 28 Israelis, including 24 civilians, also died in the West Bank in 2023. The Palestinian Authority, which nominally controls at least part of the West Bank, is feckless and despised by the people it is meant to represent. Within the Israeli government, the territory falls under the purview of Netanyahu’s most right-wing allies, National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, both of whom are committed to further settlement expansion and removing any prospect of a future Palestinian state. This, together with a Hamas’s aspirations to expand its influence in the West Bank, is a recipe for the eruption of a Third Intifada. But even if there is no escalation in 2024, the West Bank is likely to move to the centre of the reinflamed Israeli-Palestinian conflict once the war in Gaza ends.
+
+One key driver of developments in the West Bank will be Israeli domestic politics. Hamas’s 7 October attack brought Israel’s deeply polarised political landscape together, but the stark divisions clearly remain. On 1 January, the Israeli Supreme Court struck down the judicial reform the Netanyahu government had pushed through the Knesset in July in the face of massive public protests. The prime minister has been on the ropes politically since 7 October; with the worst breakdown of security in Israel’s history happening on his watch, his defeat in any upcoming election is widely regarded as almost certain. However, Netanyahu has been nothing if not a political survivor. His and his right-wing allies’ fight to stay in power will shape Israel – and what Israel does, including in Gaza, the West Bank and the wider region – throughout 2024.
+
+
+### A Regional Order in Tatters
+
+Zooming out to the regional level, 2024 in the Middle East will likely be defined – once again – by questions about the region’s future order. The Gaza war has upended what appeared to be the beginnings of a new arrangement in the region that was characterised by a collective pragmatic emphasis on de-escalation among regional powers. The Gulf Arab states, Iran, Turkey, Egypt and even Syria all appeared intent on finding ways to work together despite their differences; Israeli-Arab normalisation seemed to be progressing towards an eventual deal to formalise relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
+
+In 2024, regional powers will likely seek to protect whatever they can of the de-escalatory trend of the past few years. Their domestic socioeconomic development, the number one priority for most governments in the region – especially those in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, the region’s most influential Arab states – depends on maintaining at least a modicum of stability. However, as the events of the past three months have shown, their ability to prevent the region’s various complex conflicts – not only that in Israel–Palestine, but also those in Libya, Syria and Yemen – from exploding in their faces is very limited.
+
+In late 2023, the US stepped in. From the perspective of most of the US’s long-term Arab partners in the region, the Biden administration has given Israel too much leeway and been too uncritical of its response to the Hamas attack. But they were also relieved that the massive deployment of US military assets to the region after 7 October, aimed at deterring Iran and Hezbollah, helped to stave off an immediate widening of the conflict. Riyadh is also glad that the US is dealing with the Houthis’ disruption of traffic through the Red Sea, enabling the Kingdom itself to preserve its own fragile understanding with the group which it hopes can allow it to end its eight-year military intervention in Yemen.
+
+However, Saudi Arabia and other regional states can be under no illusion that the US, regardless of who is elected president at the end of the year, ultimately does not want to regard the Middle East as one of its top priorities anymore. At the same time, the current crisis has shown that neither China, Russia nor any other contenders – real or imagined – to the status of centres of gravity in an emerging multipolar order have the ability or will to meaningfully support or manage regional security and stability. For the Middle East, 2024 will therefore be yet another unsettling year, in which governments will have to dedicate far more bandwidth than they would like to their region’s disorder and uncertain place in the world.
+
+---
+
+__Tobias Borck__ is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East. He also co-leads the development and delivery of the RUSI Leadership Centre’s programme of executive education training courses, including for diplomats, military personnel, and security professionals from the Middle East and beyond.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Amphibious Futures
+author: Sidharth Kaushal and Mark Totten
+date : 2024-01-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/UCp2qk7.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Royal Marines in Contested New Operating Environments"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This paper analyses the key adaptations that Western amphibious forces will need to make to contribute to deterrence and warfighting in the future operating environment._
+
+
+
+In particular, the paper addresses how the force design of the UK’s Royal Marines will need to evolve for the marines to be able to contribute to the amphibious capabilities of an alliance or a coalition.
+
+The paper argues that, rather than being a capability which is used to exploit sea control once a fleet has secured it, amphibious forces should represent a landward extension of the fleet. This is subtly different, as it involves closely integrating amphibious forces with two strictly naval functions: maritime strike; and efforts to secure sea control. Such a use of amphibious forces entails tactical specialisation, with a particular focus on closing a potential gap between bluewater navies and the joint force. However, as will be discussed, a tactical focus on enabling strikes need not limit the number of use cases for more specialised amphibious forces.
+
+A major feature of the future operating environment is likely to be adversaries with enhanced anti-access capabilities and longer-ranged fires ashore. For allied and coalition amphibious forces, this means that disembarked forces will need to be distributed more widely, and the shipping that supports them will have to operate from greater distances. While this challenge will be especially acute in contexts involving near-peer opponents, the proliferation of anti-access capabilities makes it a likely challenge in several contexts in which UK and allied amphibious forces may be deployed.
+
+This paper argues that adapting to this emerging operating environment will be best achieved through a concept of operations that subsumes amphibious power projection under the naval functions of strike and sea control. Distributed amphibious forces have a key operational role to play in tackling the challenge of enhanced anti-access capabilities through converging long-range fires capabilities. While this approach, epitomised by the US Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations framework, is typically treated as synonymous with sea denial, it in fact has wider applicability. Having a mix of dispersed long-ranged fires, both afloat and ashore, and small groups of raiding forces, can present serious dilemmas to large opposing ground forces.
+
+Though the combination of raiding and fires is not an exclusively amphibious solution, forces capable of manoeuvring both at sea and on land can compound the challenge for an opponent. In many contexts, including the narrow archipelagic seas of Europe, using amphibious forces in this way would force an opponent to survey an extended littoral space that encompasses mainland areas, the maritime domain and offshore islands. This would considerably increase the opponent’s ISR burden.
+
+There are a number of functions on the maritime side of the littoral to which amphibious forces can also contribute, among them the exercise of sea control in politically sensitive conditions. This paper argues that amphibious operations should therefore be subsumed under two naval missions – strike and sea control – rather than being treated as a separate function.
+
+Within this rubric, the Royal Marines have the potential to act as an enabling force, both for strike-centric partners, and for both UK and allied naval forces. As a light raiding force, the marines can set the conditions for strike missions to be conducted on favourable terms. An emphasis on a lighter disembarked force should allow the maritime enablers upon which the commando force depends to evolve in ways that make them more multifunctional. Once a requirement to move heavy equipment is reduced, more emphasis can be placed on priorities such as the ability to carry sensors and strike munitions and achieving low observability. This can then enable tasks such as sea control, as well as archipelagic warfare on both sides of the littoral.
+
+Shifting the emphasis of the Royal Marines towards the two priorities of strike and sea control implies tactical specialisation. But it does not necessarily imply a limitation of the operational and strategic roles that marines will play. Having a strike-centric concept of operations has demonstrable utility, both in contingencies in Europe and at expeditionary reach. It would involve narrowing the tactical roles and certifications of commandos, as well as a reduced emphasis on traditional light infantry functions. However, the size of the force and the changing operating environment mean that many of these functions are likely to be redundant in any case.
+
+Emerging threats are making theatre entry for amphibious forces as it is presently conducted increasingly difficult and increasing the demand on the rest of the fleet and the wider joint force to provide protection to such forces where they do contribute. The risk facing amphibious forces, then, is that the value of amphibious insertion comes to be seen as being outweighed by its costs and risks. It is the argument of this paper that amphibious forces, including the Royal Marines, need not cede the littoral to shore-based anti-access/area denial capabilities. Such forces have the potential to add considerable value to allied deterrence. But to be able to do so in the future operating environment, they must integrate more closely with fleets, both in conceptual terms and in force design.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+This paper is based on work conducted by the UK’s Royal Marines and supported in areas by RUSI to address how the marines must evolve in the future operating environment. Its function is to elaborate the rationale for changes underway, as well as to discuss the decisions which will need to be made as the force continues to evolve. The paper addresses two research questions that will be of importance to the Royal Marines as they continue their efforts at force transformation.
+
+1. How can Western amphibious forces, in particular those within NATO, continue to contribute to deterrence and competition in contested environments across the spectrum of conflict?
+
+2. What will the Royal Marines, specifically, need to do to deliver value to an amphibious force generated by an alliance or coalition?
+
+While there are a number of contexts in which amphibious forces can be useful, including a range of missions other than war, the paper’s focus is on operations in environments where forces’ freedom of manoeuvre is contested.
+
+Some of the challenges that will be faced by amphibious forces in contested environments are common to all operating environments. The convergence of increasingly capable methods of sensor fusion and processing with the proliferation of long-range strike capabilities will make expeditionary forces vulnerable both at sea and on land. Both peer competitors and sub-peer challengers possess long-range strike capabilities that are becoming more cost effective and are proliferating as a result, along with – to varying degrees – the ability to cue them at reach.
+
+While generating wide-area situational awareness at sea remains a complex task, the proliferation of sensors both military and commercial, coupled with developments in areas such as software-defined sensors and machine learning, will equip a growing range of actors with the ability to rapidly detect, classify and engage targets at sea. Movement inland will also become increasingly difficult. This has been illustrated in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. An evolving man-portable air defence system (MANPADS) threat adequately networked with longer-range radar can make airborne manoeuvre and assault – which previously helped to counteract the challenge of anti-access area denial (A2/AD) capabilities – increasingly risky. Once ashore, amphibious forces will have to contend with shorter-ranged fires, cruise and ballistic missiles, and attack from fixed-wing aircraft. The threat to amphibious lodgements is not new, but it will become increasingly multi-tiered, combining threats that fly at different altitudes with different profiles, making air defence increasingly difficult.
+
+In addition, anti-access capabilities are likely to become more potent and, crucially, are no longer the preserve of a small subset of actors. Consider, for example, the Ukrainian army’s successful destruction of what were likely the forward elements of a Russian force near Odesa early in the conflict, or, in Yemen, the Houthi movement’s partially successful efforts to contest the anti-Houthi coalition’s freedom of movement at sea.
+
+Certainly, defensive countermeasures to the threats described above are emerging. For example, directed-energy weapons can enable the cost-effective intercept of certain types of munition. However, the incorporation of new modes of defence creates new requirements, both in relation to the size and power generation of platforms needed to defend an amphibious force, and for these platforms to be risked in forward positions. Moreover, the asymmetry of costs between missiles and vessels means that attackers enjoy more room for error and, in littoral areas, vessels can be struck by a range of both long- and short-ranged weapons, making it difficult to optimise against specific threats. Once ashore, concentrated force elements can be defended, but at increasingly high cost and for limited periods of time. While these challenges are not unique to littoral combat in every instance, the challenge of concentrating will be especially acute in the littoral context, given the vulnerability of a force when it is building up ashore, and the risks it faces if cut off from naval support.
+
+Cumulatively, not only do these new threats make theatre entry increasingly difficult for amphibious forces, but they also increase the demand on the rest of the fleet and the wider joint force to provide protection. This will be an especially acute challenge when blue-water capabilities will have to operate at greater distances from coastlines and dedicate considerable effort to defending themselves and performing purely naval functions. The risk facing amphibious forces, then, is that the value of amphibious insertion comes to be seen as being outweighed by its costs and risks. Of course, there are a number of other roles that amphibious forces have come to play over the course of previous decades, but many of these do not depend on their amphibious roles per se.
+
+In order for their specialism to continue delivering operational and strategic value, then, amphibious forces will need to adapt to this increasingly contested operating environment. This paper seeks to articulate an approach through which Western amphibious forces can continue to do so, in both alliance and coalition contexts. The paper’s key contention is that amphibious forces should act as an extension of the fleet, with their function being to enable two naval functions – strike and sea control. Rather than being a force projected by the fleet, amphibious forces should operate as an integral part of it.
+
+The paper’s proposition is that the amphibious forces most capable of supporting the fleet will be capable of delivering convergent effects from distributed positions. This requires lower force-to-space ratios, greater mobility on both sides of the littoral, and an emphasis on long-range fires.
+
+In the 20th century, the primary mode of adaptation to increases in the range and lethality of weapons was to reduce force-to-space ratios. The most extreme example of this is non-state actors, who must contend with superior firepower and thus typically do not have force-to-space ratios over 10 fighters per square kilometre. Reducing these ratios, however, makes it difficult to concentrate forces for tactical effect.
+
+Another way of addressing the challenge is for dispersed forces to coordinate long-range strikes. For example, infantry teams equipped with portable loitering munitions can concentrate fire to saturate specific high-value targets even where they are distributed over very broad frontages. Similarly, a system such as the US Marine Corps HIMARS can concentrate fire with munitions such as the 500 km-range precision-strike missile without being colocated. While the ability to bring a weight of fire upon opponents from dispersed positions is not a uniquely amphibious function, amphibious forces have two advantages in this field. First, their ability to operate both from land and from the maritime side of the littoral creates an expanded range of vectors from which amphibious forces can deliver fires. Integration with a maritime component command can also allow amphibious forces to draw on naval fires. Second, the relative mobility of amphibious forces can enable them to support fires with other functions, such as raiding at depths that other force elements cannot access.
+
+Beyond strikes and raiding ashore, amphibious forces can also contribute to a range of maritime functions, including the exercise of sea control, and sea denial against adversary vessels in littoral waters. While amphibious forces already play a role in tasks such as interdiction and the generation of situational awareness, this role could be expanded if the force structure and capabilities of amphibious units were to make operating in close coordination with the fleet on both sides of the littoral into a core competency.
+
+One proposal of this paper is that amphibious forces can become more survivable and lethal by adopting a strike-centric concept of operations that emphasises better integration with fleets. The paper further argues that the adaptations required to enable such an approach, including an emphasis on multifunctional surface manoeuvre craft rather than on dedicated connectors, can also allow marine units to better contribute to missions on the maritime side of the littoral – such as the exercise of sea control, for example. This concept of operations implies a degree of specialisation that does entail a cost in terms of multifunctionality. However, an approach based on optimisation within the fleet can make amphibious forces more relevant to the most consequential challenges that Western nations may face.
+
+The issues outlined here will be central to the force transformation decisions of all European marine forces over the next decade. A key question for the Royal Marines specifically will be how the force model upon which its Future Commando Force programme (FCF) is based can deliver greatest value in an Allied context. The size of the Royal Marines means that the force will need to be configured to work with Allies and coalition partners.
+
+This paper is composed of five chapters. Chapter I outlines the traditional contributions of amphibious forces and their relevance to current UK national priorities. Chapter II summarises the challenges posed to forces’ effective operation by the contemporary operating environment. Chapter III articulates the case for what the authors see as the major adaptations that amphibious forces will need to make to be effective in this environment: becoming more focused on a strike-led concept of operations; and achieving greater integration with naval forces. Chapters IV and V examine the implications for the Royal Marines’ force design and capability needs.
+
+Methodologically, the paper is informed by a combination of a review of historical literature, operations analysis and insights from experimentation and exercises undertaken under the aegis of the Royal Marines’ FCF programme. An assessment of historical trends and patterns in the contemporary operating environment has been used to frame the paper’s discussion of how amphibious forces might contribute to the goals of a single state, alliance or coalition.
+
+
+### I. The Enduring Roles of Amphibious Forces and Their Application to UK National Priorities
+
+There has historically been a strong case to be made for both the operational manoeuvrability and the strategic flexibility that amphibious forces offer policymakers. However, for these forces to continue to be tactically relevant, they will need to equip and operate in ways that differ considerably from current practice. Amphibious forces have in the past played a range of roles both above and below the threshold of high-intensity conflict. Below the threshold of conflict, their primary roles have included:
+
+- __Signalling.__ Amphibious capabilities can play a role in deterrent signalling. By virtue of the visibility of their supporting vessels, they represent a visible diplomatic signal. However, amphibious forces are scalable – a portion of a force can be deployed ashore while the rest remains offshore, for example. They can also be withdrawn from a theatre as diplomatic circumstances dictate, meaning that their deployment need not represent a commitment that is difficult to reverse. Scalability is important, as a key dimension of deterrence is that it must be balanced against efforts to mitigate misperception – an opponent should be able to distinguish between a deterrent threat and preparations for an attack. Moreover, the coordination of military means with diplomacy also necessitates the ability to demonstrate that a threat can be withdrawn if an opponent complies.
+
+- __Presence in a theatre.__ Amphibious forces have the capacity to remain engaged in a theatre over extended periods without drawing on local basing to the same degree as other capabilities. They can also, by virtue of their mobility, engage with multiple actors within a given theatre. The tasks they can perform in this capacity range from HADR (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief) activity to engaging local partners in advise-and-assist missions. In this capacity, they can contribute both to diplomatic influence and to what might be described as “general deterrence”, which denotes efforts to shape perceptions of a state’s commitment to an area, rather than a specific threat to dissuade a specific action.
+
+In escalating crises and conflict, amphibious forces have historically played the following roles:
+
+- __Rapid reaction to contingencies that develop outside the Euro-Atlantic area.__ Examples include the early deployments of the US Marine Corps in Lebanon by the Eisenhower administration in 1958 and the early deployment of the Royal Marines’ 42 Commando into Kuwait in 1961 as part of Operation Vantage, a successful effort to forestall an Iraqi invasion. Early presence is often crucial, either for deterrence or, if deterrence fails, for setting the conditions for subsequent efforts.
+
+- __Deception and operational dislocation.__ The presence of amphibious forces can force the diversion of an opponent’s resources across multiple fronts. We might consider how, historically, British forces embarked in the Downs tied down a considerable Napoleonic army or – for a more recent example – how the afloat presence of the 4th and 5 th Marine Expeditionary Brigades were used to unhinge Iraqi defences during the 1991 Gulf War.
+
+- __Disruption.__ The actions of commando units during the Second World War stand out as a particularly notable example.
+
+- __Securing advanced bases or points of entry__ for heavier forces to enter a theatre of combat – a role that became especially prominent for the US Marine Corps during the interwar years, and which may be one of the functions of the Marine Corps of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in a Taiwan contingency.
+
+In addition, there is a range of roles that marine units have played in both peacetime and conflict. Among these are tasks such as boarding and interdiction at sea, and the provision of niche capabilities such as riverine craft in support of joint activity.
+
+The conduct of operations and the tactics used to achieve objectives will be impacted by technological change, a subject that will be explored in more depth in subsequent chapters. However, this paper’s contention is that this will not fundamentally alter the roles of amphibious units as described. For example, the disruption of an opponent’s rear area by amphibious units posturing offshore could, in some cases, be achieved by these units launching loitering munitions from positions on or near the coast, rather than through infantry raids. Indeed, this would be desirable in many cases, given the risks posed to landing forces by A2/AD. However, the logic of disruption that would underly such an action would remain unaltered. The most significant changes would be at the level of equipment and tactics, rather than the underlying logic of employment.
+
+While forces’ versatility to play the full gamut of the roles described above is desirable, delivering on national and Alliance-level priorities does entail emphasising some functions over others. The priorities identified in this paper are understood within the context of the UK’s Integrated Review (IR) and the Integrated Review Refresh, which identify Russia as the most acute threat to British national security, while acknowledging the reality of systemic competition with China and enduring risks in areas such as the Strait of Hormuz. With the specific roles that a state prioritises most heavily for its amphibious forces determined by the context in which they operate, this discussion focuses primarily on the strategic concerns of the UK.
+
+Though the UK’s priorities will not align completely with those of allies and partners, they do overlap to a significant degree with those of other nations within NATO, and the rank ordering of priorities in the IR is also broadly mirrored in NATO’s Strategic Concept. This makes them a useful baseline for discussing the contexts in which other Western amphibious forces might also be employed. To be sure, concepts for utilising amphibious forces will not always converge across nations (though for scenarios such as those that trigger NATO Article V, alliance-level planning will introduce some coherence). One of the aims of this paper is to articulate an idea of how the UK’s amphibious forces might be used that can plausibly be aligned with the local circumstances of partner amphibious forces, based on the capabilities they either possess, or are planning to procure.
+
+There are three scenarios attendant on the list of priorities that emerged from the IR to which amphibious forces can be particularly relevant, and which therefore deserve particular attention.
+
+- __Dislocation and disruption__ in the context of a regional war or an escalating “war in sight” crisis within Europe involving NATO and Russia – a low probability but high-impact scenario. Though not a main line of effort, amphibious capabilities can provide a level of mobility at both the tactical and operational levels. This can compel the dispersion of adversary capabilities.
+
+- __Expeditionary power projection.__ This function will be of particular salience to interstate competition beyond Europe. Such competition will include elements of direct conflict, albeit at comparatively low levels of intensity. The ability to commit a unit of force alongside partner force elements that represents a meaningful contribution, but which is small enough to reflect the political constraints inherent in expeditionary activity, is an important tool when attempting to balance deterrence and escalation control.
+
+- __Enabling sea control__ in the context of either sub-threshold competition or an escalating crisis. This role can be relevant to both the European context and to theatres such as Hormuz.
+
+This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of roles that amphibious forces can play. Rather, it outlines the contingencies where there appears to be an especially significant role that amphibious forces such as the Royal Marines can play in realising the aspirations set out in the IR.
+
+#### A Crisis or Conflict in Europe
+
+In Europe, NATO’s deter and defend framework will depend in no small part on the ability to outmanoeuvre an opponent which, for all its deficiencies, has demonstrated an ability to sustain materiel and human attrition at a scale that NATO would struggle to match. Although bloodied by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russia is likely to reconstitute its forces over the medium term. Particularly when concentrated on a narrow front, the combination of Russia’s fires, its electronic warfare (EW) and air defences can pose a considerable challenge. Though Russia’s force is, in some respects, qualitatively degraded, the Russians have demonstrated the ability to combine smaller numbers of capable infantry with large numbers of more expendable forces in a force model that, while highly wasteful in both material and human terms, is effective.
+
+At both the tactical and the operational level, the Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) seeks to overcome the challenge of mass through a series of integrated plans. One likely consequence of developing integrated regional plans is to force the commitment of Russian capabilities on multiple fronts in a way that prevents them from being concentrated to effect. Efforts to exacerbate Russia’s traditional weaknesses in the maritime domain can contribute to this. The country remains vulnerable to operational dislocation along an extended maritime periphery – something illustrated in historical conflicts such as the Crimean War and more recently, in the 1980s, when the US Reagan administration’s maritime strategy envisioned the aggressive use of Allied naval and amphibious power in the High North and Soviet Far East to draw Soviet ground and air forces away from the central front.
+
+Today, Russia can be faced with similar challenges on its northern flank, where the Alliance’s borders place key Russian facilities, such as Murmansk, within reach of long-range precision fires. This could exert an indirect influence on other parts of the Alliance’s eastern flank. In the context of an escalating crisis in a region such as the Baltic, the posturing of amphibious forces on NATO’s northern frontier, coordinated with activity by other force elements on other fronts as envisioned by the DDA, would impose multiple operational dilemmas on Russia. At a minimum, a decision to posture amphibious units this way would force the diversion of air assets, defensive SAM systems and some of Russia’s best assault troops from the VDV and 200th Arctic Brigade, which are largely responsible for cold-weather operations, from other theatres. The requirement to resource multiple fronts concurrently could contribute to the objective of denial by preventing Russian planners from believing that they can concentrate enough force on any one front to achieve meaningful strategic effects.
+
+As the vanguard element of a larger force, the Royal Marines would not be the biggest element in any force engaged in such an operation – allowing the Alliance to signal deterrent, as opposed to offensive, intent. The marines could arrive and go emissions dark, leaving Russian planners guessing both their ultimate goals and whether or not they were the vanguard element of a larger force such as a US Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). Uncertainty about the Alliance’s force dispositions could impose considerable demands in terms of surveillance and conventional hedging. Notably, this was crucial to deterrence vis-á-vis the Soviet Union. Routine carrier deployments to the High North had limited effect until the exercise Ocean Venture, in which Soviet planners recognised they were not able to spot NATO carrier strike groups.
+
+There is, of course, an escalatory dimension to any such deployment near Russia’s nuclear bastions. However, an advantage of an amphibious vanguard component is that it would not pose an imminent threat to the Kola Peninsula (which hosts critical Russian naval and nuclear infrastructure) by itself, but could be the forward element of a force that could do so – it would be large enough to draw resources, but need not incur inadvertent escalation. Amphibious forces played a similar role in the context of NATO’s maritime strategy in the 1980s – though without the reach to be an operationally significant threat in their own right, as modern strike-enabled forces can be.
+
+In addition to the diversion of Russian forces at the operational level, mobile forces can exacerbate Russian weaknesses with respect to dynamic targeting at the tactical level. As an example of this, we might consider the difficulty Russia had sinking Ukraine’s last warship, the Yuri Olefirenko, while the vessel was at sea. Though Russia’s targeting system can be formidable, it is at its most dangerous when many sensors can be concentrated on a narrow sector. Expanding the geography Russian forces must survey by conducting offensive manoeuvre from the littorals can place Russian forces at a disadvantage. Consider, for example, that the landmass of a nation such as Norway increases by 20% when islets and not only the mainland are included. Similarly, Estonia has 2,222 islands. Forces operating from offshore islands could disrupt the rear of a Russian advance using long-range precision fires, large numbers of containerised loitering munitions, or infantry raids inland. In theatres where narrow frontages can be saturated by adversary UAVs and ISR assets, exploiting this manoeuvre space can substantially expand the area an opponent must survey, and prevent an adversary system such as a Russian reconnaissance fire complex from operating as intended.
+
+#### Expeditionary Power Projection
+
+Another area in which amphibious forces such as the Royal Marines would likely be expected to deliver value is expeditionary operations at reach. Such operations will, with some exceptions, be of a lower intensity than those within the NATO Area of Responsibility and will involve more limited political commitment. The unit of force likely to be committed by a nation such as the UK will, then, only be strategically effective in tandem with either a coalition or local partners.
+
+The Alliance must hedge against the possibility that, much like the Cold War, contemporary interstate competition will occur short of open war at high intensity, because the risks of a direct large-scale war are too substantial for both sides. Though not as immediately consequential as a direct great power clash, the cumulative effects of persistent competition and conflict can be considerable.
+
+As an example, we might consider the risks to sea lines of communication (SLOCs) upon which both the inputs that sustain both the defence industry and Western trade in general depend. Many geographically crucial SLOCs, including Hormuz and the Bab el Mandeb, are flanked either by hostile powers such as Iran, or by fragile states in which internal instability can intersect with great power competition. Opponents such as Russia and Iran have proven capable of leveraging internecine conflicts in Libya, Syria and Yemen to good effect to create strategic bastions along key SLOCs, and develop leverage over regional actors such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. Not only does this pose a challenge to economically vital SLOCs, it can also threaten the flows of inputs such as microelectronics and explosive charges upon which European defence industries depend. The need to pre-empt further losses in key areas makes the ability to respond rapidly to an evolving crisis beyond Europe a priority, one which will indirectly impact the security of Europe itself.
+
+The traditional functions of amphibious forces can be of relevance in such contexts. The deployment of units can generate early presence to both signal intent and deter intervention by a rival third party. Once in theatre, amphibious forces can perform a number of functions, including supporting partner forces in seizing military objectives; and enabling theatre entry by heavier forces by securing sea ports of debarkation (SPODs), and conducting raids against A2/AD capabilities to secure theatre access.
+
+#### Sea Control Missions Within the NATO Area of Responsibility and Beyond
+
+Amphibious forces can contribute to efforts to secure sea control in several ways. First, they can provide the fleet with additional ISR capabilities, and the capability to interdict hostile shipping. In peacetime competition this function will be of particular importance against opponents who may conduct activities such as minelaying or maritime sabotage using auxiliary vessels, as it will be vital to prove that a given vessel was involved in malign activity. As cases such as US special forces’ seizure of the clandestine Iranian minelayer Iran Ajr illustrate, this requires vessels defended by armed crews to be seized, rather than sunk.
+
+While there is nothing especially novel about the use of capabilities such as auxiliary vessels for tasks such as minelaying and sabotage, the range of targets that can be affected by such activities is expanding, partly as a function of the growing reliance of nations on coastal and subsurface critical infrastructure. For example, while transoceanic cables have always been a chokepoint in global communications, their centrality has grown in line with states’ reliance on the internet. Moreover, the range of tools with which opponents can impact critical infrastructure is growing – a uncrewed underwater vessel (UUV) such as the Russian Harpsichord, for example, can be operated from a range of vessels to conduct either surveillance or sabotage. Crucially, the ability to prevent clandestine sabotage will be important not only to protect critical infrastructure, but also to prevent an opponent from conducting shaping operations in an area such as the Baltic Sea or the Strait of Hormuz, should a crisis in one of these sites escalate.
+
+In addition to interdiction and boarding vessels, the capabilities that support marine forces can also support tasks such as generating situational awareness and preventing interdictions by hostile naval vessels. For example, we might consider how SOCOM (US Special Operations Command) used the Hercules and Wimbrown, two converted vessels used as sea bases, to counter Iranian small-boat swarms during the Iran–Iraq war. In the context of conflict in a region such as the Persian Gulf, amphibious forces can support sea control by generating situational awareness about threats to vessels at sea and conducting raids to eliminate anti-access threats to vessels at sea such as coastal defence cruise missiles. Amphibious capabilities should be considered for tasks of surveillance and presence, rather than simply insertion. Such usage better reflects the range of functions – including boarding – that these forces offer.
+
+
+### II. A New Operating Environment: The Need for Change
+
+For marine forces to achieve any of the functions discussed in Chapter I under current and likely future operating conditions will require a radical change to the way these forces are structured and, in particular, greater integration between them and blue-water assets. To an extent, this change is already underway across several Western militaries. What the scope and degree of integration between naval and amphibious forces remains, however, the subject of some debate.
+
+#### Challenges to Theatre Entry
+
+In recent history, amphibious forces have been both the beneficiaries of sea control, and a means of exploiting it to strategic effect. Once a navy secured littoral waters, amphibious forces were inserted and typically benefited from support from the sea in the form of sustainment and air support. However, in many contemporary contexts, the fleet is likely to have to fight to enter a theatre and cannot loiter near hostile shores for long. This challenge will be especially acute against a peer competitor such as Russia, but will hold even against sub-peer opponents, as illustrated by events such as Ukraine’s sinking of the Russian flagship Moskva and the possession of anti-ship missile batteries by both the Houthis and Hizbullah. This is not to say that operating in a threat envelope is impossible – solutions exist for each challenge, including EW, shipboard air defences and a growing suite of counter-UAV measures. However, it will not always be possible for fleets to loiter offshore in support of marine forces for extended periods. Instead, until adversary sensors and effectors have been considerably degraded, amphibious forces will need to be able to both fight and deliver effects inland under the assumption that support from the fleet is intermittent, rather than persistent. If postured for deterrence by denial, amphibious forces will find themselves operating under these conditions for considerable periods – though in the later stages of a conflict they may enjoy more unfettered freedom of movement.
+
+Once forces are disembarked, amphibious forces’ lodgements ashore will be at considerable risk, and the operational pauses needed to build up capabilities will likely prove fatal. A range of capabilities, including tactical ballistic missiles, artillery UAVs and glider-equipped unguided bombs, such as the Russian FAB-500, launched from fixed-wing aircraft, will threaten disembarked forces. Of course the risk posed by operational pauses has long been a persistent feature of amphibious campaigns. But the diversification of air and missile threats will make protecting a lodgement even more difficult than it has been previously. Beyond Europe, the proliferation of strike capabilities would create a similar, though less sophisticated, set of challenges. The gulf between the types of capability needed to defeat peers and sub-peers is narrowing.
+
+A key question for amphibious forces will be how to deliver tactical and operational effects when achieving the force-to-space ratios needed to do so is very difficult, and the mechanisms that support these forces ashore and afloat are held at risk.
+
+#### Changing Coastal Geography
+
+Many environments in which expeditionary activity is likely to be conducted will also be shaped by another trend – the urbanisation of coastal areas. As of 2030, roughly 60% of the world’s population will live in cities, many of which will be coastal. Moreover, urban area coverage has outstripped population growth, implying that considerable stretches of many coastlines will be urbanised. As illustrated by the prominence of cities such as Aden, Marawi and Mocimboa da Praia in recent conflicts, battles within coastal conurbations will be a major feature of littoral combat. This is noteworthy because urban warfare often requires considerable amounts of manpower to hold ground, as well as the expenditure of small-arms ammunition at rates that exceed consumption in open terrain by several orders of magnitude. Such conditions will pose an especially acute challenge to size-restricted light expeditionary forces, and to Western nations that must balance the requirements of deterrence in theatres such as Europe with the need to project power. The challenge will be compounded by adversary efforts to shield key capabilities from the effects of Western airpower by using palliatives such as underground tunnels – something that can be seen in both urban terrain and in fortifications such as those Iran has constructed in the Tartus mountains. The basic challenge that expeditionary forces will face is finding a way to deliver policy imperatives such as providing value to local partners with comparatively small forces while operating in terrain that requires considerable commitments, in terms of munitions and manpower.
+
+#### Resource Burdens on Fleets
+
+The evolving nature of sub-threshold threats at sea will require greater levels of persistent presence. While this is a naval challenge, rather than one that applies specifically to marines, it has an indirect effect, both on tasks such as maritime boarding and on the availability of hulls from the wider fleet to support amphibious forces. To justify the dedication of naval vessels to support amphibious warfare, the conduct of amphibious operations must come to more fully embrace tasks that support sea control. Marines already support sea control through activities such as interdiction, but there are broader contributions to be made.
+
+In sum, the risk to amphibious forces in the emerging operating environment is threefold. First, they will face challenges in areas such as theatre entry and sustainment in likely combat environments. These challenges, while not unique to amphibious operations, will impose considerable burdens upon these forces. Second, they must be able to impact events in theatres such as urban environments that typically demand more manpower than expeditionary forces can expect to have at hand. The final risk is an organisational one – that the resource burden of inserting forces into a theatre and subsequently sustaining them exceeds the value they provide to the wider joint force, and to blue-water navies in particular.
+
+The remainder of this paper describes ways that amphibious forces can address these challenges such that they can continue to contribute to Allied security in the ways that they historically have done. It also addresses the specific capability niches that the UK’s Commando Force can fill in this context.
+
+
+### III. New Approaches
+
+Previous chapters have discussed the potential roles that amphibious forces can play in the context of UK and Allied national security objectives, and the operational impediments to their accomplishment. This chapter sets out the case for the paper’s key argument, that to retain their utility to the wider joint force, amphibious operations in contested environments should be subsumed under two doctrinal naval functions – strike and securing sea control. It also connects this argument to the strategic objectives outlined in Chapter I.
+
+The challenges to amphibious power projection described in the previous chapter have been incipient for some time, and a variety of solutions have been proposed to mitigate them. Broadly speaking, these solutions may be grouped into three categories which, while not exhaustive, capture the major areas of focus with respect to operations in contested environments.
+
+- Approaches that depend on distributing the force across a broad front, maintaining a high operational tempo and manoeuvring towards operational objectives, while bypassing adversary concentrations to the extent possible. This approach is captured by concepts such as the US Marine Corps’ Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea (OMFTS), but early traces of it can be seen in historical amphibious operations such as the Japanese assault on Malaya in the Second World War.
+
+- Strike-centric concepts that envision delivering convergent effects with distributed forces equipped with long-range fires. This is arguably a partial description of the primary focus of the US Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations framework, although the concept also embraces tasks such as supporting naval forces from offshore positions.
+
+- A shift in focus towards raiding and unconventional operations in a Tier 2 special forces role.
+
+Concepts such as the direct assault and seizure of ports, which are still seriously considered by many nations, including China, are excluded here on the grounds that direct assault to seize and hold heavily defended high-value targets is likely to entail a degree of attrition that no Western force will tolerate. For a contemporary example of a state operationalising such a concept, see, for example, the VDV’s assault on Hostomel airport in February 2022. While there are differences between amphibious and airborne assault, both rely to a considerable extent on airborne insertion. Amphibious forces might be better supported by airpower and naval support, but would still face the challenge of being a concentrated target against which a range of capabilities could be concentrated – much as the VDV was at Hostomel. The seizure and subsequent defence of SPODs may be an ultimate objective of amphibious insertion, but direct assault would seem an unlikely approach in most cases where credible resistance is likely to be encountered.
+
+Each of the three approaches described articulates part of a potential solution to some of the challenges outlined in Chapter II. However, it is this paper’s contention that they are individually incomplete. High-tempo dispersed operations comparable to those envisioned under OMFTS can succeed in discovering, creating and exploiting weaknesses within an opponent’s defensive lines. The distribution of forces can deny an opponent an obvious point at which to concentrate defences, and can enable infiltration. Combined with longer-range means of theatre entry such as long-range surface connectors and vertical lift solutions, this can force an opponent to thin out defences and spread ISR capabilities over wider areas, thereby contributing to mitigating the risk from A2/AD capabilities.
+
+However, the history of distributed assault suggests that avoiding strongpoints may not always be possible – meaning that a force needs to be capable of reducing those strongpoints it does encounter. This creates a trade-off – a force sufficiently large to overcome serious resistance has traditionally required things such as a headquarters and organic artillery and armour. This, however, undermines the principle of low force densities central to such concepts. Notably, this appears to be a challenge that the PLA’s marine corps is facing, with its combined arms battalions that operate on a model comparable to OMFTS.
+
+The distribution of long-range precision fires in littoral areas including offshore islands, and amphibious vessels as envisioned under concepts such as Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, can help resolve some of the trade-offs between lethality and dispersion. Long-range precision fires can allow a convergence of effect to be achieved by dispersed forces which, by virtue of operating offshore, do not face some of the challenges that manoeuvring inland entails. However, the challenge that such an approach would face is cross-regional applicability. Strike-centric forces distributed on offshore islands have obvious utility in a theatre such as the First Island Chain, where their main function is sea denial against an opponent such as the PLA Navy. But this approach has been challenged on the basis that there is applicability for strike-centric concepts to missions other than sea denial, particularly in theatres where many important targets are likely to be on the ground, and concealed within complex terrain-challenge sets that have historically necessitated combined arms approaches. These latter target sets have historically necessitated the ability to conduct a close fight with the opponent on the ground.
+
+Finally, a special-forces-driven model can deliver value in a number of areas, including human intelligence and preparation of the battlefield. Additionally, functions such as raiding can limit some of the risks posed by A2/AD capabilities by limiting the size of forces inserted and their signatures. However, to be effective, raiding and other special forces activities must be integrated with a wider joint effort – they can rarely, if ever, deliver meaningful effects in isolation.
+
+The three broad approaches outlined above can be mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually exclusive. Distributed ranged fires capabilities positioned offshore on islands, amphibious vessels and auxiliaries can provide dispersed forces ashore with the fire support needed to eliminate concentrations of adversary forces, without these forces needing to be so large that they require an operational pause, headquarters and additional enablers. In turn, distributed forces ashore act both as an ISR screen for offshore fires and as a raiding force that compels adversary targets to move, unmask or concentrate for protection in ways that create vulnerabilities to offshore fires. Supported by offshore fires, comparatively light forces can also concentrate to perform tasks such as assaulting adversary strongpoints or defending SPODs.
+
+This discussion illustrates that there is a symbiotic link between strike-centric concepts and manoeuvre inland from the sea. Thus, while amphibious power projection and maritime strike have historically been doctrinally separated, this paper argues that they should now converge. Such convergence can be of importance to blue-water navies, which presently face limitations in their offensive strike capacity relative to the number of potential missions they face both at sea and on land.
+
+Another key way that amphibious forces can be better integrated with core naval tasks is by generating presence and situational awareness at sea. Many of the enablers needed to underpin a strike-centric concept of power projection can – as will be discussed below – also enable marines to contribute capacity to sea control missions.
+
+Instead of being viewed as a distinct maritime function, then, amphibious power projection should be subsumed under the rubric of strike and sea control – which would entail greater conceptual and functional integration with blue-water navies.
+
+The following sections will articulate the key lines of effort that will be needed in order to realise the conceptual framework that has been described thus far. Broadly speaking, there are three lines of operational effort: a focus on sea control, archipelagic operations, and the enabling of partner forces. Success in delivering these priorities will be determined by the ability of marines to both generate fires and help the fleet win superior situational awareness.
+
+#### Fires
+
+Long-range strike could be provided by ground-based fires distributed on the littoral, but could also be delivered directly from the sea if enabled by a shift in the design principles that underpin surface connectors and enabling vessels towards a model that emphasised strike. Specifically, we might consider vessels such as the Chinese Type-22 catamaran, which can launch C-802 cruise missiles, or the British-designed Bladerunner, which is used as a missile launcher and more recently an air defence platform by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Such vessels are comparable in size to both existing surface connectors and ones envisioned under future programmes, and even when equipped with missiles are generally cost effective (a Type-22, for example, costs $13 million). A shift in design philosophy from boats dedicated to moving marines ashore to more multifunctional vessels capable of operating on and striking from the maritime part of the littoral could significantly enhance the strike capabilities of marine units.
+
+Recent experiments have also demonstrated that systems such as HIMARS can be used from the decks of amphibious vessels. While risking dedicated shipping would likely be unacceptably hazardous, it might be more acceptable to launch containerised munitions from auxiliary vessels. As seen during conflicts such as the Falklands War, non-military shipping can be repurposed. Coupled with trends towards the containerisation of both munitions and communications nodes, this could enable auxiliary assets to be used as mobile fires platforms in a conflict.
+
+#### A Dispersed Contact Layer
+
+Dispersed forward elements capable of tasks such as assessing an opponent’s pattern of life and identifying elusive targets, and of passing data to strike assets via shared datalinks and network protocols, can more easily cue in fires if these forces have the tools to generate situational awareness in forward positions. Forward elements can deepen situational awareness, both through technical means such as deploying UAVs, and by interacting with partner forces. As an example of the former method, we might consider how Russian forces have employed complexes of three short-ranged Orlan-10 UAVs equipped respectively with EW, optical/designator and communications relay payloads to stimulate Ukrainian SAM radars, degrade them and designate them for strikes by networked artillery and long-range missile units. Evidence from exercises such as Green Dagger has shown that such forces can also disrupt adversaries in ways that force them to concentrate capabilities to counter raiders, in so doing becoming vulnerable to offshore strike platforms.
+
+The importance of a dispersed contact layer to enable counter scouting is not exclusive to maritime operations. However, it has a particular salience in this context because the ability to move along multiple axes on the littoral (either by land, by sea or through the air) creates an expanded set of avenues for disruption by amphibious force elements.
+
+#### Archipelagic Warfare
+
+Greater integration of amphibious forces with UK and Allied fleets, particularly in missions in narrow seas such as the Baltic, necessitates a focus on operating within and from archipelagos. Narrow archipelagic waterways often possess distinctive climatic conditions. For example, in the case of the Baltic Sea, fog is a frequent feature of the environment on a year-round basis, complicating the use of some sensors, such as electro-optical sensors. Similarly, water temperatures relative to the air can cause either subrefraction of radar waves, limiting the range of radar, or super refraction, which makes radar more sensitive to clutter. Force concealment can leverage these conditions based on local circumstances. While it is never possible to defeat the full spectrum of sensors that an opponent can aggregate, making use of climatic features to limit the effectiveness of some sensors can simplify the task of overcoming others. For example, if radar is subject to subrefraction, cueing sensors with a narrower field of view, such as electro-optical or infrared sensors, becomes more difficult. Moreover, knowing that specific sensor types represent a primary threat vector because others will be compromised by the climate can provide the focus for efforts at tactical deception.
+
+Archipelagic contexts tend to enable smaller vessels to hide within clutter, particularly in crowded waters such as the Baltic. The navies of Baltic states have historically relied upon this when preparing for sea denial missions against a stronger Russian navy, as has the Norwegian navy in the north. It is possible, given the comparative weakness of the Russian surface fleet, that assets such as missile boats built for sea denial can be repurposed for sea control or projection inland. If this is the case, Allied marine units can usefully integrate with littoral-focused navies – using their platforms as launch pads for activity and strike assets, while making them more lethal against ground targets by providing them with situational awareness inland.
+
+The geography of archipelagic contexts also lends itself to the distribution of long-ranged precision fires, something which is central to concepts such as Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations. This dynamic can also be applicable in a European context.
+
+#### Sea Control
+
+Relatedly, the requirement to support the gaining and exercise of sea control at sea will remain, but the relevance of marines to this task can grow. There will be a greater requirement for multifunctionality in areas such as surface connector design, since numbers of hulls have shrunk relative to historical force structures across Western navies (though this trend may be starting to reverse). Western navies will, for a time at least, operate with fewer hulls, even as they face a growing imperative to meet persistent challenges, including the use of auxiliary vessels by rivals for tasks such as challenging freedom of navigation and coercive signalling near critical infrastructure. There is no single solution to these challenges, but one dimension of a solution set would be to expand the capability of marine forces to provide sensor coverage and the ability to act at sea. Dedicated and auxiliary amphibious platforms have demonstrated the ability to cover wide areas using vertical lift capabilities.
+
+Rather than being an auxiliary role, this can be a core function. Teaming existing vertical lift assets with unmanned platforms that have greater endurance could enhance this potential for a single hull to generate both presence and wide area coverage. Moreover, a shift in the design principles that determine which types of surface platforms are launched from amphibious vessels, towards an emphasis on surface manoeuvre, as opposed to ship-to-shore movement of heavy equipment, can yield amphibious capabilities that provide wide area coverage and can thus support the fleet, rather than being specialised purely for insertion.
+
+#### Local Force Partnering
+
+As noted above, many of the contexts in which the UK may wish to achieve strategic effects at expeditionary reach may be urban environments. Amphibious forces will therefore need to reconcile their often limited size with the need to support expeditionary missions that will necessarily involve an urban component. While amphibious forces will likely not have the mass to conduct urban assaults, they can fulfil niche roles within them. A strike-centric concept of operations can have relevance both in high-intensity scenarios and in lower intensity expeditionary activity in complex terrain. It is likely that, given the forces required for urban fighting, the latter form of activity will almost always be undertaken alongside a local partner – this has been the case not only in recent urban battles in which Western forces were involved, such as Mosul, but also in many of the battles fought by non-Western militaries at expeditionary reach. Examples of the latter include the UAE’s role in the Battle of Aden, and the Russian role in Aleppo. In such contexts, the challenge is not necessarily providing partners with infantry or munitions, which local partners often have, but rather with offering niche capabilities, including the precision-strike capabilities needed to engage elusive and buried high-value targets, reduce fortified positions and disperse concentrations of adversary forces.
+
+The challenges of operating within complex terrain, however, mean that the use of strike capabilities will often require forces postured forward to build pattern-of-life assessments, cue in fires and directly engage targets that cannot readily be struck from offshore. Given that engagement opportunities will be intermittent, such operations will also require fires platforms that can remain in theatre on a more persistent basis than fast air assets. Finally, a network of relationships with likely local partner forces will need to be generated – something that can be facilitated by engagement in peacetime. The potential sensitivities involved in engaging some partners creates a role for special-forces-capable elements of an amphibious force, as these force elements offer policymakers somewhat more flexibility of deployment in theatre, relative to conventional units.
+
+
+### IV. The Royal Marines: Specialisation and Force Design
+
+Having set out in the previous chapter ways in which forces can adapt to meet the challenges posed by the emerging operating environment, this chapter focuses on the particular role of the Royal Marines within the amphibious constructs described. Size and budget constraints are likely to mean that the marines will not be able to deliver the full spectrum of capabilities needed to enable a strike-centric concept of amphibious operations or operations in support of sea control at scale. However, the UK’s marines can perform niche roles within an allied amphibious construct centred on strike and sea control. At a smaller scale, it may also be possible for the Royal Marines to deliver strike and sea control on a self-contained basis for a time, to enable theatre entry by a heavier element of the joint force.
+
+A number of Western marine forces are developing capabilities that can support a strike-led approach to power projection from the littoral. The most notable example of this comes from the US Marine Corps, whose Force Design 2030 heavily emphasises long-range strike capabilities. Some European marine forces, such as the Swedish marines, also appear to be prioritising the ability to generate fires from littoral areas, through capabilities such as mortar boats equipped with NEMO mortar. Moreover, a number of European navies are optimised to operate in littoral spaces. Forces such as the Swedish and Finnish navies, which were built around smaller vessels such as the Hamina-class missile-equipped fast-attack craft and the Swedish Visby-class corvette, procured for the probably now redundant task of sea denial against the Russian fleet in the Baltic (which would likely not be survivable beyond the early stages of a conflict), could readily be repurposed to generate offensive fires from Baltic littorals using the same low-observable fast-attack craft and corvettes.
+
+While the number of missiles a vessel such as the Visby-class corvette can carry is limited (the Visby-class has capacity for eight RB-15 surface-to-surface missiles), it is worth noting that, cumulatively, the countries of the Baltic are poised to possess a considerable force of small combatant vessels, including 13 Visby- and Hamina-class vessels (and their successor classes) that can theoretically carry a collective throw weight of 72 RB-15 and Gabriel dual-use missiles. With the presence of the Swedish marines in the Baltic, and Poland due to purchase the dual-capable naval strike missile for its coastal defences, plus Germany, which intends to equip its sea battalion with a long-range strike capability, also in possession of the NSM, ground-based fires in this region, along with the maritime assets detailed above, represent a considerable locally available long-range strike capability, comparable in many ways to that fielded by an individual MEF. Surface manoeuvre craft supporting the Royal Marines that are capable of carrying strike capabilities such as long-range loitering munitions could augment this strike capability in the littorals.
+
+Ukraine’s successful use of Neptune Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles against high-value targets such as an S-400 and a Kilo-class submarine illustrates how such strike capabilities can pose a considerable threat to the limited number of operationally critical assets upon which a Russian ground force depends. Of course, cohering these capabilities into a single concept of operations in littoral spaces depends on Allied agreement – something that can be pursued through engagement, both bilaterally and through frameworks such as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). However, it is likely that the components of a distributed force capable of inland strike from the Baltic littorals exists in principle.
+
+There exist, then, a number of prospective partners with whom the Royal Marines can interoperate to generate strike from littoral areas. The most important area that the Royal Marines can most readily support such forces within the confines of the model we describe is – should Allies accept it – by providing a forward-postured reconnaissance and raiding force that operates inland ahead of the offshore striking component. The function of such a force would not be to conduct raiding as an independent strategic function (as was the case during the Second World War), but rather to enable the strike capabilities held by Allies. They can achieve this in two ways: generate the situational awareness inland needed to enable strikes from the maritime vector; penalise the dispersion of adversary high-value targets through direct attack – in turn forcing the concentration of assets in ways that makes them vulnerable to strikes (see below).
+
+#### Helping the Fleet to Out-Scout an Opponent
+
+_ISR Gathering_
+
+Forward-posture reconnaissance elements can complement wider efforts to generate situational awareness regarding complex target sets using capabilities such as UAVs, but they can also deliver awareness in ways that cannot be achieved from stand-off positions. For example, Israeli commandos routinely tapped the fibre optic cables underpinning Hizbullah’s firing positions in southern Lebanon – delivering access to a system that UAVs could not compromise. In Vietnam, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group performed a similar function by placing sensors around the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In the context of a future battlefield that operates at machine speed, physically forward human operators can also play an important role in battle damage assessment.
+
+Second, the inherent physical trade-offs involved in building ISR systems such as UAVs mean that they will often trade range for things such as sensor payload, except in the case of large and very expensive unmanned combat aerial vehicles. It is likely, then, that UAVs with sophisticated multispectral payloads will need to be launched at relative proximity to their targets – creating a role for forward-deployed forces.
+
+_Battle Damage Assessment and Counter Deception_
+
+As methods of surveillance evolve, forward-positioned forces can also play an important role in the verification of target data, and course correction in the face of adversary deception. Surveillance enabled by computer vision can be confounded by data poisoning – the act of making AI misclassify an object by slightly modifying its physical appearance. Learning when this is occurring will require data to be gathered from within an opponent’s controlled areas by forces that can visually identify patterns of adversary deception. This is a role that “Tier 2” special forces – those certified as special forces for the purposes of special operations – can play.
+
+#### Command and Control
+
+The dedicated shipping that supports forward deployed amphibious forces can play an important role as a command node. Though vessel size can be a vulnerability, it also underpins key functions. Considerable size and power generation is required, both to underpin the processing power needed to receive and translate multiple feeds, including those from forward-deployed elements, and to then distribute data across the force. A command vessel would need to loiter more than 400 km from hostile shores to avoid coastal defence cruise missiles such as the Russian P-800. It would, moreover, need protection against longer-ranged threats, such as bombers. However, it would still be less vulnerable than an immobile ground-based headquarters, which can be struck by a range of land-attack missiles, and which would not present opponents with a dynamic target. The risk to static command nodes has been illustrated by the effective use of Storm Shadow missiles against Russian command nodes in Ukraine. Maritime headquarters can – all other things being equal – co-locate more personnel and processing power at lower risk than can comparable ground-based headquarters, though they do not operate without risk. The relative proximity at which this shipping can operate – even when the need to avoid A2/AD capabilities is factored in – in addition to its size, mobility and organic protection, makes such shipping a useful node for the coordination of ISR and fires without requiring reach-back to C2 nodes in the homebase. In the medium to long term, improvements in processing power may enable resilient communications across self-forming networks of capabilities in littoral spaces, underpinned by systems such as those envisioned by DARPA’s DYNAMO and STITCHES programmes.
+
+#### Raiding
+
+In addition to their ability to support the gathering of ISR data, raiding by distributed forces can also complicate adversary efforts at concealment. Historically, concealment has depended on cover and dispersion. However, dispersion makes a force vulnerable to raiding, while concentrating to overcome raiders makes forces vulnerable to strike.
+
+While special forces operating in a reconnaissance and raiding function have sometimes struggled in contexts such as the 1991 Gulf War, there are some reasons to believe they might fare differently under emerging circumstances. First, light UAVs that can be transported by forward-positioned teams can considerably expand the area that any given team can survey and conduct attacks on. Secondly, a new generation of lightweight vehicles equipped with tactical strike capabilities can provide forward-deployed forces with a degree of survivability against well-armed opponents when they encounter them. For example, we might consider the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, which is being equipped by SOCOM with a spike anti-tank guided missile. Third, open-architecture C4ISR processing systems such as the Royal Marines’ Project EVE can enable data from the wider joint force to be leveraged by forward-deployed elements through software integration.
+
+Thus, while it should be assumed that forward-deployed forces will operate under information denial and with only intermittent access to wider joint force networks, all of the above mean that these forces will have a degree of situational awareness that exceeds that of similar forces deployed under comparable circumstances in the past.
+
+#### A Future Force Design for the Royal Marines
+
+The Royal Marines is an organisation that has long viewed the ability to force-generate small units capable of operating with minimal support as a core competency. As such, it would be well suited to the roles outlined above. However, this would require a shift from the existing model of deploying commando companies. The core conclusion from internal work conducted by the Royal Marines and supported by external bodies (including experimentation, wargaming and exercises) is that a redesigned commando force built to operate as a forward screen for offshore strike elements would have, as its primary unit of force, a 12-person strike company. The order of battle of such a force would be structured as shown in Figure 1.
+
+Such a force differs from the existing Royal Marine force design in that it implies a transition away from commando companies operating as aggregated light infantry units that can be treated as interoperable with their ground-based counterparts (as was the case in Korea and, more recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq). Divided into strike teams of 12 individuals, the proposed force has been tested over areas spanning 40 x 30 km – implying a force-to-space ratio comparable to the average insurgent force. Its organic vehicles, such as the MRZR, also reflect an emphasis on mobility over carrying capacity. This represents a considerable shift, which necessarily means deemphasising functions such as holding and patrolling ground, to enable the force to optimise for tasks such as strike and raiding.
+
+_Enabling Strike_
+
+This model would see the Royal Marines often acting as a source of information to cue fires generated by partner forces or the wider joint force. To illustrate, wargaming has seen the Royal Marines operate ahead of a notional II MEF ground component comprised of two marine infantry battalions and two artillery batteries comprised of M777 and HIMARS units, along with NMESIS, which has both an anti-ship and a land attack capability. Alternatively, the marines could operate as the forward element of a littoral fires capability generated by JEF partners in a region such as the Baltic Sea. In each instance, the function of the force would be to enable and support strike-heavy partners, while deemphasising seizing or holding ground in most instances.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: The Organisation of an Individual Littoral Response Group, as Part of a Wider Littoral Strike Group.___
+
+The nature of the envisioned ground component has an impact on the maritime force supporting insertion and subsequent operations. The reduction of the size of individual strike teams has an indirect effect on methods of insertion. Smaller teams can be inserted using a range of mechanisms, including submersible craft. This potentially obviates challenges such as the threat of UAVs near contested shores. Moreover, a reduction in the amount of heavy equipment that needs to be moved from ship to shore can enable surface manoeuvre craft to be optimised to meet other demands, such as maintaining a low observable profile and carrying fires to support the disembarked force. This will be crucial given that the force will depend on surface manoeuvre craft (as well as on Allied fires) for much of its ability to generate lethality against concentrated targets.
+
+_Surface Manoeuvre_
+
+A different approach to surface manoeuvre that emphasised longer-ranged and more complex platforms than the connectors currently used could also see the marines generate their own organic fires from littoral spaces. In the same way that complex warships are increasingly being built with modularity at their core, surface manoeuvre platforms could be built to operate either as connectors, or as launch pads for artillery or loitering munitions or C-UAS (counter-uncrewed aerial systems) platforms, or else as hosts for EW decoys. As illustrated by Iran, which has placed a range of effectors such as SAM systems and anti-ship missiles on relatively cheap Bladerunner boats, this can be achieved at low cost. Uncrewed or optionally crewed solutions can also support such functions. The major trade-off here is between range and weight – relatively small vessels can carry both personnel and effectors comfortably but would struggle to move heavy vehicles. If the insertion requirement is for small teams of infantry and relatively light vehicles, this can allow for manoeuvre vessels with longer ranges and lower signatures, without creating unviable requirements in terms of size and cost.
+
+In effect, there is a symbiotic link between transitioning to a distributed and strike-centric force ashore and supporting functions such as sea control on the maritime side of the littoral. To the extent that the force becomes more distributed, the surface craft that support it can be designed in ways that allow them to be more multifunctional, as they do not need to insert and then sustain an aggregated brigade and its enablers.
+
+#### The Commando Force Model in Practice
+
+The force design described above would see the marines shift from being a multifunctional force capable of acting as auxiliary light infantry to being a more specialised force which, while deployable in multiple contexts, would deliver value primarily by optimising for specific niche tactical roles. Lethality against high-value targets and the enablement of fires would supersede holding ground.
+
+There exists a body of empirical evidence drawn from exercises and wargaming to validate the force model described above. Royal Navy-led force development has included wargaming, live exercising, threat analysis and modelling, and studies of similar force models. Two deductions have emerged from this process. The first is that the commando force model, if equipped, organised and trained as proposed above, can achieve the range of tactical actions and operational effects that this paper calls for littoral forces to achieve.
+
+One illustration of this comes from Exercise Green Dagger, in which UK commando forces operating against larger US Marine Corps formations in repeated large-scale exercises had a disruptive effect in excess of what one would expect from a battalion-sized force operating against brigade formations. 40 Commando was divided up into 12-person strike teams that operated ahead of a light defensive screen. The presence of distributed raiding strike teams of marines posed considerable challenges to the opposing US Marine commander, who could not distribute his forces without raising the risk of raiding, but was exposed to fires if he chose to concentrate to both better defend against raiding and to overrun a fairly light Royal Marine defensive screen. To be sure, 40 Commando was operating ahead of 7th Marine Regiment, and was reliant on the US Marine Corps’ organic fires capabilities, as well as support from US airpower. However, it is notable that a comparably equipped Marine Corps opposing force that was not enabled by a light raiding element struggled against one that was. This was due in no small part to the challenge that a combination of fires and raiding posed – dispersion created vulnerabilities against the latter, while concentration was punished by the former.
+
+Additionally, a considerable cognitive impact was observed, whereby brigade-level C2 structures were failing to choose positive courses of action, in terms of their tactical plan, because of a perceived threat from the commando force – a threat that was amplified beyond the physical reality. When the adversary force did concentrate against the Royal Marines, it became vulnerable to fires employed by the Marine Corps regiment with which the marines were partnered. Evidence from these exercises illustrates that the force can be disruptive and survivable, even early into the change programme.
+
+_Niche Capabilities in the Urban Littoral_
+
+In addition to the experimental evidence regarding the utility of distributed forces in holding up larger ground formations, there is also recent historical evidence to show that forces built around the imperatives of generating situational awareness and forcing adversaries into unmasking for engagement by longer-range strike can be useful in the urban littoral specifically. Urban battles such as those between Russia and Chechen rebels in Grozny (1991) and between the IDF and Palestinian insurgents in Jenin (2002) have illustrated the utility of small teams of infiltrators, as have more recent battles, such as Aden (2016), where the Houthi movement used small teams equipped with Kornet anti-tank guided missiles to good effect. Such forces are not a substitute for heavier forces, and there is a particular utility in being able to call on both armour and large numbers of infantry in urban environments. However, backed by long-range fires, small teams can disrupt adversary movement, and support the reduction of strongpoints. Offshore fire support can be of particular utility for the latter function, as also illustrated at Aden. Low-latency links between distributed teams and fire support from either offshore or disembarked forces can help obviate one of the challenges of providing air support in urban environments – the fact that generating target sets in complex terrain is time consuming and requires careful pattern-of-life analysis, and that air power cannot always be called to bear before circumstances have changed. In the urban littoral, relatively light forces supported by maritime fires can also perform tasks such as the defence of the SPODs that heavier forces need for theatre entry.
+
+To summarise: an emphasis on distribution with a view to enabling strike-centric operations can enable amphibious forces to be relevant to a range of tasks, from the disruption and attrition of ground formations, to the provision of niche capabilities to partner forces in expeditionary contexts that may involve urban littoral conflict. Moreover, adaptations that can enable dispersion and strike – chief among these being changes to the design philosophy of maritime enablers – can also allow marines to support tasks such as securing and exercising sea control.
+
+#### A More Specialised Force
+
+A major consequence of the proposed force design is likely to be the optimisation of the commando force in a way that removes certain elements of multifunctionality from its force design. An emphasis on a light force with a limited logistics tail supported by manoeuvre craft, rather than by connectors per se, is likely to remove the force’s ability to aggregate as a more concentrated force to perform tasks such as replacing ground units in the line or conducting patrolling. Moreover, an emphasis on connectors that can support surface manoeuvre at reach and generating fires necessarily means design choices that deemphasise the movement of heavy vehicles. A vessel built to manoeuvre on the water and support fire missions will have a very different profile from one intended to move heavy vehicles.
+
+It should be noted that the assumption that the marines would operate as a line unit is a product of an era in which the corps was roughly twice its current size. Moreover, at Alliance level, there has been a broader shift towards threat-based planning, and implicit in this is the optimisation of forces for specific functions. Finally, as discussed, in most likely contested environments, heavy assets may only be moved and sustained after threats to theatre entry have been overcome. At this juncture, their movement is likely to be less reliant on connectors, given that local SPODs and aerial ports of debarkation can be used, along with methods of insertion such as roll-on-roll-off craft.
+
+The need to optimise for strike and sea control, along with existing Tier 2 special forces functions, will also likely mean that tasks such as fleet protection in home ports will need to be deemphasised. Notably, security functions are an area where autonomous capabilities can reduce the requirements for human operators in relatively short order, given that these functions are performed in safe home ports. Moreover, certifying marines for a wide range of competencies – a product of the era of counterinsurgency – will likely be impossible, especially if key competencies in areas such as working with autonomous platforms, supporting fires, and operating at sea in support of blue-water forces are to be adequately delivered.
+
+The Royal Marines will need to become a more specialised force to be able to deliver the concepts of operations described above. A specialised structure is more consistent with a threat-based planning framework than is the existing force structure. Moreover, given the size of the force, the choice between multifunctionality and specialisation is a notional one – the force cannot perform roles such as line replacement in any case, even if its personnel and structures could theoretically enable it.
+
+
+### V. The Royal Marines: Capability Requirements
+
+This paper has sought to articulate the use cases for the Royal Marines in the context of a broader, strike-led, Alliance-level framework for amphibious power projection. This chapter sets out the capability requirements that emerge from the discussion above. At a minimum, a redesigned commando force would need to demonstrate progress towards the following six features:
+
+- A distributed model of tactical operations across the littoral.
+
+- Increased range from point of launch of the system to target effect.
+
+- Delivery of integrated effects at lower levels.
+
+- Resilient sustainment in high-threat contexts.
+
+- Integration of crewed/machine teaming and robotic and autonomous capabilities ashore and afloat.
+
+- Deception as a central planning consideration and a capability investment line.
+
+The chapter discusses the design principles and attendant capability sets that can enable the force to deliver progress on achieving these features. The design principles represent the foundational priorities which, if delivered, will drive progress towards attaining the six features.
+
+#### Signature Management and Resilient Communication
+
+The delivery of integrated effects at lower levels will depend on signature management and a communications architecture that can support a distributed force drawing on non-organic enablers and fires.
+
+While exercises such as Green DaggerGreen Dagger demonstrated the utility of distributed forces, a limitation in their evidence base is that they did not test the resilience of communications networks. With frequency jamming dictating with whom personnel can communicate at any given time – dependent on which EW assets an opponent is operating – the ability to communicate across multiple pathways takes on increased importance. Organisationally, this will require amphibious forces to be able to communicate across multiple component commands – if a commando unit is cut off from maritime forces, for example, it can still usefully contribute to the ISR screen of a ground component command.
+
+This C4ISR requirement brings the “dispersal dilemma” into focus. David Kilcullen has described the difficulty that comes from the need to avoid force concentration, as proximity builds a “targetable” entity. Applying a more distributed model that improves force survivability is inherently desirable, but the communication and information systems network capability that is needed to remain effective builds an electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) signature that offers targeting opportunities for an adversary.
+
+In terms of capabilities, this dilemma introduces two requirements. The first is the ability to rely on multiple redundant networks to deliver data across the force. Expendable bearers such as UAVs can represent one pathway towards this. Equally, as illustrated in Ukraine, a growing range of civilian satellite communications networks can be used by military units, and can remain active even in the face of concerted jamming efforts. Modes of communication such as tropospheric scatter can also be used for reach-back communications, albeit with limitations on the size of data packets.
+
+Emerging solutions, such as fully autonomous capability, that can operate without GPS and be fielded at the lowest tactical echelons, will form part of the answer, and feature as a force design principle. Other developments will assist in time, such as machine-learning-based systems that can identify targets from blurred images. If a single image of target quality takes 12 KB of data, machine learning enhancements will allow targets to be decided on the basis of very small data passage requirements. Of course, a behavioural shift away from a currently observed desire for full-motion video (FMV) is still required.
+
+The Commando Force programme’s ongoing technical response to the dispersal dilemma includes introducing low-signature mesh network systems and novel long-range bearer capability, alongside employment of high frequency radio and satellite communications where opportunities allow. The technical response will need, however, to be complemented by the application of recently lost techniques, such as minimising communication traffic, beyond reducing forces’ reliance on FMV. These behavioural adjustments will need to be matched by policy changes that enable targeting decisions to be devolved to lower levels.
+
+Processing at the edge is also likely to become increasingly important, especially as processing power enables more functions to be performed without the need for reach-back. Project EVE, designed by the Royal Navy’s Marworks team, is an example of a prospective solution here. It will enable data to be processed forward, set the computational capacity for unmanned (UXV) systems to be integrated and controlled when communications are challenged, and provide the battlespace-management platforms that enable the swift allocation of assets.
+
+#### Distributed Logistics
+
+It will not only be imperative to distribute the force tactically, but also to create a logistical model ashore that is distributed. While offshore vessels can serve as concentrated logistical nodes, once moved ashore, resupply must be distributed over a wide area, both to prevent interdiction and to meet the requirements of a similarly distributed force.
+
+At the tactical level, logistic support to a distributed force, at greater range, within a higher threat environment, represents a considerable challenge. Trusted methodologies will need to evolve. Consider, for example, how predictable, linear, “frontline-pull” resupply places a significant constraint on the force, as it tends to drive concentration of assets/activity that is at odds with both the threat picture that has been described above, and viable solutions to it. These tensions were at play in the Falklands campaign: Julian Thomson’s logical desire to build out a beachhead before embarking on assault operations brought with it increased exposure to the Maritime Task Group that could not be accepted. Under emergent conditions in which air-based threats of the kind faced in the Falklands will be joined by short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and UAVs, concentrated logistical marshalling points will not be survivable for long.
+
+It will be imperative, therefore, to design logistic distribution for a distributed force, with fuel, power and ammunition as the foremost logistic concerns. One means of limiting logistical demands is by managing the logistical “pull” by making the force lighter – with heavier vehicles and assets such as the 105-mm light gun representing sources of demand that can be jettisoned. To the extent that the force is one that aims to disrupt a comparatively small number of high-value targets, as well as enable heavier strike elements, these capabilities become superfluous. Moreover, considerable striking power can be fitted on a comparatively small vehicle.
+
+The logistical “push” can also be better managed. The Royal Marines are currently conceiving a more prediction-based “logistic-push” model, where supply needs are anticipated, and deposited for forces to collect at their time of choosing. This will rely on automated modelling and acceleration of uncrewed systems into service. In particular, low-cost UAVs capable of carrying large payloads over extended distances will be vital to making this model operational. Examples of cargo drones are already visible in civilian contexts and could be adapted to military requirements.
+
+The disadvantages are that such models are likely to be more resource intensive, are open to compromise, and present non-kinetic targeting opportunities to adversary EW. However, the removal of concentrated logistical nodes nonetheless reduces the prospect of catastrophic failure. Instead, one might expect to see a steady loss rate in the face of adversary EW, which can be better mitigated than a single discontinuous event such as the destruction of a single concentrated hub. Some work on use of AI/autonomy proposes the rule that a push-driven model, in which the AI anticipates, is valuable in inverse proportion to the consequences of the AI being wrong. So, for resources such as food or fuel, which are not expendable, but are replaceable, it might be useful to do this on an anticipatory basis, while the movement of munitions will need to be more carefully considered depending on the risk of compromise, and may depend more heavily on surface manoeuvre platforms and collection at the coastline.
+
+We see, therefore, that on both sides of the conflict threshold, the challenge of supporting a forward-deployed force is one that must be overcome, if amphibious forces are to be effectively optimised for the new operating environment. In routine operations, maintaining capability forward adds pressure to supply chains and contracting solutions. This cost growth might be offset through economies of scale, as partners (notably the US) look to develop stand-in concepts at greater mass. Another cost offset and operational benefit will be in the pressure that littoral forces at sea, positioned with warfighting stocks, takes off the “strategic outload” as a significant conflict breaks out. In this situation, the benefit of holding combined arms capability forward, and being able to sustain it until the joint supply chain is established, will bring opportunities, both to deny the adversary room to manoeuvre, and to project more combat power early in a crisis.
+
+#### Mobility and Reach on Both Sides of the Littoral
+
+A distributed force that must deliver convergent effects will depend on reach. Many capabilities that provide reach, such as long-range fires or long endurance UAVs should, by virtue of their size, be drawn from the maritime portion of the littoral.
+
+Thus, a critical capability underpinning the force described will be surface manoeuvre platforms (as opposed to ship-to-shore connectors), which have the size, versatility and low observability to act as either connectors, strike assets or C-UAS platforms. The aspiration for multirole surface craft – both troop and missile carrying – has previously been shown to have both defensive and offensive benefits. Such capabilities might offer a framework around which integrated coalition activity can be built in constrained geographies, such as the Baltic or Black seas. Moreover, greater ambiguity regarding the function a vessel is playing creates additional dilemmas for an opponent, even if the vessel is detected. This is unlike contemporary connectors, which can only be assault platforms, and which an opponent would likely detect. As noted, platforms such as the Chinese Type-22 low-observable missile catamaran and the Iranian Bladerunner boats already illustrate that potent strike and defensive capabilities can be incorporated onto relatively small vessels by nations with limited resources.
+
+A key focus area for the FCF programme will be building modularity into future surface manoeuvre platforms as a design principle. This principle already underpins uncrewed solutions such as the US Navy’s planned medium uncrewed surface vessel (MUSV). The FCF programme’s own aspirations are for future surface manoeuvre platforms to have a reach of over 400 nautical miles. An increase in reach will enable manoeuvre platforms, along with other assets, such as vertical lift capabilities, to cover a larger area of the sea with the support of a mothership – enabling sea control missions to be more easily supported in a way that removes pressure from the blue-water navy.
+
+Improving the ability to find and strike at range allows the shipping from which force elements launch more options for maritime manoeuvre, specifically to position within protective umbrellas. Improved connector range presents not only the opportunity for more flexible ship positioning, but also the capacity to create more numerous attack profiles – for example from shore to shore, as well as from ship to shore. Needless to say, the increased size of such vessels as compared with traditional connectors would impose a requirement for size increases on host vessels such as the planned multirole support ship. However, the fact that the reach of these vessels enables motherships to operate at greater distances will, in turn, mitigate the effects of an increase in size in areas such as vulnerability to detection.
+
+The challenge of building a correct manoeuvre option extends to mobility options ashore – what is the vehicle mix? The UK Commando Force approach sees ISR, mobility and sustainment as part of both offensive capability and force protection. The force must prioritise mobility and a limited logistical burden over protection, unless circumstances make prioritising the latter absolutely necessary. Although recent fighting has illustrated the importance of protected mobility against indirect fires, the size of the elements of the envisioned force means that their primary means of survival is likely to be evading detection to the extent possible and being mobile enough to avoid being fixed when detected. Moreover, the envisioned concept of force employment would see the commando force employed before opponents could entrench and support positions with a large weight of fire. While there may be instances where protection is desired, particularly in lower-intensity conflicts, where sensitivity to casualties is likely to be higher, there is an inverse relationship between the force protection of the commando force’s vehicles and its aggregate lethality.
+
+Integration of strike and vehicle systems, particularly smaller missile and indirect-fire systems, is an objective of UK development that will serve to increase platform lethality, while reducing the footprint of tactical elements. As noted above, the integration of systems such as NMESIS and SPIKE on platforms such as the joint light tactical vehicle is analogous, if not quite identical, to the solutions that might be pursued. This does not represent a new concept, therefore, but it is novel for light forces.
+
+#### Capabilities Underpinning Tactical Deception
+
+The benefits of deception as a design principle do not need to be rehearsed in detail, except to identify that, as is the case for autonomous systems, difficult investment choices will need to be made if a viable capability suite is to be generated.
+
+There are a number of tools that can enable deception against at least some of the sensors on which adversary concepts of operations depend. Through the use of capabilities such as expendable uncrewed assets acting as decoys, manoeuvre elements can hide within the noise of multiple false positives. Of course, it is precisely this challenge that multispectral sensing architectures are built to defeat, but the challenge of compromising these systems in littoral spaces can be simplified through the exploitation of climatic conditions. For example, climatic conditions can lend themselves, either to subrefraction, which limits the range of radar, or super refraction, which generates false positives (a challenge that can be exacerbated using decoys). Factors such as mist and smog can also pose a challenge for electro-optical sensors. The former is a challenge in theatres such as the Baltic Sea for much of the year, and the latter will become particularly prevalent as littoral spaces are increasingly urbanised. Urbanisation also has the effect of cluttering the electromagnetic spectrum. Of course, forces cannot expect to be safe from the full plethora of methods of detection, but it may be assumed that climatic conditions will confound at least some of them – meaning that the challenge is simplified, relative to that of countering those methods of detection that remain effective. Where radar can be compromised, this can be especially viable, given that many other modes of detection depend on radar.
+
+In view of this, a primary focus for the commando force should be on uncrewed solutions that exacerbate the challenges of employing radar effectively in the littoral. This could include offboard active decoys on uncrewed surface vessels that are designed to mimic the radar returns of a surface manoeuvre platform or a larger vessel. Mimicking the visual appearance of platforms and the emissions and thermal signatures of fires platforms in littoral areas is likely to be another priority for forces, to protect both themselves and allied forces. There are a number of existing solutions in this area, including relatively primitive ones, comparable to those employed by Serbian forces against NATO in 1999. The key will be organisational experience, rather than new capabilities.
+
+A final emerging area in which practices underpinning deception will likely need to evolve is in defeating classification, as distinct from detection. Insofar as detection is, at least to a degree, inevitable, to some extent the focus of deception should shift to defeating efforts to classify targets. For example, where opponents rely on modern methods of classification such as machine-learning-based algorithms, it may become more important to focus efforts on “poisoning” data in peacetime – altering the appearance of one’s forces to lead an opponent’s algorithm to draw incorrect correlations in ways that could confound wartime classification efforts. To some extent, this will be a joint force priority, but it is one to which marines can contribute over the course of peacetime activity, such as exercises that they know are being observed. A degree of knowledge regarding adversary algorithms will likely underpin many future approaches to deception. Generating this understanding is a task which will likely be performed at higher echelon, but to which bodies such as 30 Commando Information Exploitation Group could contribute.
+
+Multispectral concealment will be a sine qua non for forces ashore. While the details of the specific solutions to multispectral camouflage being pursued by the commando force are not for public disclosure, the primary factor to note for future study is that the major limiting factor is cost, not capability. Thus, the further forward a force is to be placed, the smaller it must be, as viable solutions do not scale. This in turn will create considerable requirements for a small forward element to be able to survey and operate in a comparatively large area to generate value for the strike-centric forces that it is supporting.
+
+On the organisational front, there is a pressing need for all militaries, not least those involved in littoral operations, to rediscover the criticality of deception to operational success. Indeed, there is a case for the integration action model to feature deception activity as a recognised element that must be orchestrated.
+
+#### Restructuring Organisational Practices
+
+Alongside the paradigm shift in the deception arena that is needed to enable successful combat operations, this paper has highlighted how deterrence by denial may be enhanced through a partner force, if conducted as part of a coordinated campaign approach. There must be changes, however, if this benefit is to be realised. First, within Ministry of Defence (MoD), Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and fleet scheduling, the shift to a campaign approach has yet to take place, and operational-level planning remains ad hoc. Alignment with US Marine Corps planning routines (orchestrated with an 18-month lead-in through their force synchronisation process) might offer a beneficial forcing function. This does not mean that planning agility is removed, rather that plans are constructed among partners, all of whom realise that national priorities might change what can be done, as their political masters react to events.
+
+Within the force, there will be changes to individual training as a new operational methodology and new technology is integrated. The primary tactical-level adjustment will come, however, in force-generation mechanisms. The UK commando force and other like-sized amphibious forces are not big enough to generate credible forward presence and maintain sequential, onshore force-generation pathways. However, force generation models that assume in-theatre development are not only possible, but deliver considerable value. Furthermore, this type of generation pathway opens the door to force development forming an element of national and Alliance statecraft.
+
+Historically, convergent development through programmes such as Fleet Operational Sea Training (FOST) played this role within NATO and served as both a force multiplier and a diplomatic benefit to the UK. This is something that navies have traditionally done well with their ship deployments, and it has gathered pace of late with deterrence efforts in Eastern Europe – but further development is possible. Consider, for example, how the UK, the US and Australia could form a core of littoral force development in the Indo-Pacific region around the development of Force Design 2030, and the move of the Australian Army to be more “amphibious” in its approach. UK commando forces would provide a valuable element in the force mix and would offer a catalysing presence, insofar as they are different but complementary enough to the equivalent forces of both countries. In the European theatre, they would offer the alliance-building function of a force that trains in the High North for a mission in which fires integration is predominant.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+To retain their utility in the contemporary operating environment, the Royal Marines will need to make significant change to the ways that they deploy, operate and sustain themselves. Key elements of this change will be:
+
+- A shift in emphasis from assault to manoeuvring to enable fires held by other elements of the force.
+
+- The ability to achieve theatre insertion at reach.
+
+- Greater levels of dispersion once disembarked.
+
+These adaptations require considerable adjustments to both capabilities and force models, which would see the ability to strike and raid emphasised at the expense of the light infantry functions that amphibious forces such as the marines have traditionally performed.
+
+These changes imply a degree of ruthless specialisation in term of tactical competencies, if not overall functionality. If realised, however, this kind of change can enable the marines – and indeed other Western forces – to better utilise the advantages that maritime preponderance has historically conferred on them – the opportunity to make the political choice to engage in operations at reach, and the operational flexibility to impose multiple dilemmas on an opponent.
+
+This paper has built on evidence from the Royal Marines’ experimentation, academic literature, and previous work conducted by RUSI and the marines to inform ongoing work on the FCF. As the commando force will often find itself operating alongside allies and coalition partners, the discussion has been situated within a broader analysis of the future of Western amphibious capabilities.
+
+A key finding of the paper is that the maritime forces of Western nations do not need to cede littoral spaces or resign themselves to a growing spatial gap between themselves and the wider joint force. While it is undeniable that challenges to littoral manoeuvre exist, these can be surmounted. To do so requires a radical rethinking, both of force design and of tactics, techniques and procedures.
+
+First, marine forces will need to be able to generate fires that can contribute to tasks such as suppression of enemy air defences, engaging adversary vessels and striking in the deep areas of the ground fight. The reforms being undertaken by both the US Marine Corps and some European amphibious forces represent a logical progression in this direction. To a great extent, littoral manoeuvre will involve manoeuvre by fire.
+
+The ability to use the capabilities being generated to effect against complex targets inland requires, however, the ability to survey adversary positions, conduct battle damage assessment and, where possible, force adversary units to concentrate in ways that make them vulnerable. These functions represent an area where lighter forces such as those envisioned in the FCF programme can play an important complementary role alongside heavier Allied assets.
+
+Light, rapidly deployable special operations forces with organic shipping can also support other competitive functions, including the exercise of sea control and early posturing during a crisis that occurs beyond NATO’s area of responsibility.
+
+For the UK, development of the Commando Force is geared towards building a capability that can inhabit the littoral contact layer, bringing increased ISR and strike options to the operational commander. Further, the UK’s political position in NATO, JEF and in the Indo-Pacific region, alongside the UK Commando Force’s relationship with key partners at the military level, sets the conditions for the force to play a vital integration function that enhances military options and the country’s deterrence posture. While the foundations have been set and progress is ongoing, achieving the benefits that this paper describes is by no means certain – both in terms of the MoD’s capacity to resource the transition, and the Royal Navy’s ability to implement a sufficiently rigorous and integrated programme of change. That said, the financial burden on the MoD is manageable, and the change programme, while very complex, is very much within the Royal Navy’s ability.
+
+Future efforts to build the commando force through a wargaming process that allows adaptation to be modelled and tested must include industry and address how changes to the force structure and techniques can be implemented. The lessons learned will help to drive an industrial strategy and determine the balance of investment choices to create more flexibility from production to frontlines.
+
+Such progress will require an acceleration of the rate of experimentation. There will be a need for national capacity to model, simulate, wargame and analyse at a tempo that supports force development that will hold relevance. How this might be achieved is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is intrinsic to the successful development of littoral forces, as well forces more widely, and it deserves attention.
+
+---
+
+__Sidharth Kaushal__ is the Research Fellow of Sea Power at RUSI. His research covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.
+
+__Mark Totten__ is Deputy Director of the Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) Weapons Operating Centre, before which he served as Director of the Future Commando Force programme.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-09-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-8.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-09-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-8.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第八日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-01-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方指原打算傳召張劍虹 惟辯方大狀需缺席聆訊兩周 改為先讀專家證人供詞
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（9日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第8日審訊。控方指原打算今傳召「從犯證人」、前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹作供，但由於辯方資深大律師彭耀鴻遇上不能預見的因素，需要申請短暫缺席聆訊，因此控方為善用法庭時間，決定先處理其他證人，並讀出研究社交媒體的專家證人、香港大學計算機科學系副教授鄒錦沛博士所撰之書面證供。辯方建議隨後播放一小時的黎智英錄影會面片段，又透露或會在完成張劍虹的主問後，申請將案押後至少3天，以待資深大律師彭耀鴻進行盤問。至於涉案片段，將會於傳召證人期間播放。
+
+
+▲ 辯方資深大律師 彭耀鴻（右）
+
+#### 港大計算機科學系副教授鄒錦沛 獲警方指示撰專家報告
+
+控方昨日讀畢承認事實，辯方亦透露資深大律師彭耀鴻因私人事務申請缺席聆訊兩周。副刑事檢控專員周天行今表示，原打算先傳召「從犯證人」、前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹作供，但由於辯方資深大律師彭耀鴻遇上不能預見的因素，需要申請短暫缺席聆訊，因此控方為善用法庭時間，決定先處理其他證人；辯方並不反對。署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤讀出專家證人、香港大學計算機科學系副教授鄒錦沛博士，就社交媒體使用的書面證供。
+
+
+▲ 香港大學計算機科學系副教授 鄒錦沛博士
+
+鄒錦沛在供詞提到，其專業範疇為網絡安全及電子取證。就本案，他於2022年3月13日獲警方指示，就即時通訊軟件 WhatsApp、Telegram 及 Signal，以及社交媒體 Twitter 及 Facebook 撰寫報告，並解釋各項功能。鄒在測試各即時通訊軟件時，分別開設3個帳戶，並嘗試傳送及編輯訊息。他表示，Telegram 可選擇隱藏登記用戶的電話號碼。他在測試社交媒體時，亦有開設兩個帳戶。
+
+#### 辯方指完成張劍虹主問後 或申請押後至少3天才盤問
+
+辯方建議隨後播放一小時的黎智英錄影會面片段，又透露或會在傳召張劍虹並完成主問後，申請將案押後至少3天，以待資深大律師彭耀鴻進行盤問。
+
+#### 辯方指片段將於傳召證人期間播放
+
+辯方早前聯合申請播放涉案片段，共涉24段影片，包括《Live Chat with Jimmy Lai》，總長35小時。關文渭今指，他們獲告知片段將會於傳召證人期間播放。
+
+
+▲ 辯方大律師 關文渭
+
+控方指明天將會讀出負責財政調查的洪姓女督察的供詞，共約35頁。另外，辯方透露或爭議為專家證人的城大法律學院教授王貴國所撰報告的呈堂性，稍後會交代呈上聯合陳詞的時間表。翻查資料王為梁美芬丈夫。
+
+#### 控方透露將傳15名證人
+
+另外，控方昨日透露，稍後將會傳召15名證人作供，包括5名「從犯證人」，即前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹、副社長陳沛敏、楊清奇、李宇軒及陳梓華。另會傳召前壹傳媒集團營運總裁周達權，以及作為專家證人的城市大學法律學院教授王貴國，他為梁美芬的丈夫。
+
+首項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪」指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司，於2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀，請求外國或者境外機構、組織、人員實施對香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。
+
+另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，指黎智英於2020年7月1日至2021年2月15日間，與 Mark Simon、陳梓華、李宇軒、劉祖廸及其他人串謀，請求外國或境外機構、組織、人員，實施對中國或香港進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。
+
+「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示及/或複製煽動刊物，具意圖：
+
+> a) 引起憎恨或藐視中央或香港特別行政區政府或激起對其離叛
+
+> b) 激起香港居民企圖不循合法途徑促致改變其他在香港的依法制定的事項
+
+> c) 引起對香港司法的憎恨、藐視或激起對其離叛
+
+> d) 引起香港居民間的不滿或離叛
+
+> e) 煽惑他人使用暴力
+
+> f) 慫使他人不守法或不服從合法命令。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-10-securing-the-red-sea.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-10-securing-the-red-sea.md
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--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Securing The Red Sea
+author: Sam Cranny-Evans and Sidharth Kaushal
+date : 2024-01-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cr4Al5F.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "How Can Houthi Maritime Strikes be Countered?"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Middle East have been rudimentary, despite using theoretically advanced weaponry. However, it may prove difficult for the West to effectively degrade Houthi capabilities._
+
+
+
+On 30 December the USS Gravely, an Arleigh-Burke-class destroyer, responded to a distress call from the Maersk Hangzhou along with the USS Laboon. The CENTCOM post on X noting the event states simply that Gravely shot down two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) in the process of responding. An ASBM is technically a significant maritime strike capability; the fact that a non-state actor is in possession of this kind of weapon, and is employing it with impunity, is of grave concern. The US and its partners have responded to these attacks – 25 in total between 19 November and 4 January – primarily with defensive methods. However, a 4 January statement from the White House promised “consequences” if the Houthis do not end their attacks. This article will examine the Houthis’ capabilities and targeting possibilities for Western partners to counter them, as well as the difficulties they might face in doing so.
+
+
+### Top-Shelf Capabilities
+
+The Houthis are able to deploy a range of missiles, drones and uncrewed kamikaze boats. Theoretically, the most sophisticated weapon available to them is the Asef ASBM, which carries a 500 kg warhead and has a range of 400 km. It employs an electro-optical seeker for the terminal phase of its target engagement, and is believed to be based on the Iranian Kahlij Fars ASBM. The Houthis also have access to anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) such as the Al-Mandeb 2, which appears to be a close copy of the C-802, a Chinese ASCM sold to Iran in the 1990s. It has a range of 120 km and a 165 kg warhead; Iran reverse-engineered the C-802 into a domestic variant known as Noor. The ASCMs are truck-launched and have been used by the Houthis to damage and attack multiple ships since 2016. The C-802 or Noor was also used by Hizbullah to damage the Israeli ship INS Hanit in 2006.
+
+The Al-Mandeb 2 and Asef represent just two of the anti-ship missiles available to the Houthis; they claim to have developed many more domestically. The US disputes this claim and has reiterated that Iran either provides the weapons, or is instrumental in enabling the Houthis to build them. In addition to their arsenal of anti-ship missiles, the Houthis are also able to employ uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the Samad-2 and -3. The latter can travel more than 1,500 km with an explosive payload, and is equipped with a dorsal antenna which likely enables it to be remotely operated as it approaches its target, while possibly being controlled in its terminal phase by a nearby operator on a small boat or onshore (though some UAVs may be controlled using satellite communications). Furthermore, the Houthis have attempted to board and seize vessels, as well as attack them with suicide boats.
+
+
+### Strengths and Weaknesses
+
+The primary strength of the Houthi missile arsenal is experience. The Saudi Air Force has been conducting strikes in Yemen since 2015, which means the Houthis have become adept at minimising the damage that they cause. In 2018, for example, they unveiled an underground missile launcher that was designed to conceal the launch site of ballistic missiles fired into Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were initially able to destroy much of the original Houthi missile arsenal in 2017, which was inherited from the Yemeni military. However, since then, the Houthis and Iran have developed and manufactured many more missiles and drones – 70 were fired into Saudi Arabia in March 2021 alone, with a total of 340 launches that year, despite 600 Coalition airstrikes per month. Not all of those airstrikes were targeted at the Houthi missile production infrastructure, but the number nevertheless serves to illustrate the group’s familiarity with Western air power.
+
+The crucial weakness of the Houthis’ maritime strike capabilities is their lack of effective targeting infrastructure. A series of coastal radars were used in 2016 to coordinate attacks against UAE and US vessels in the Red Sea. However, three of them were subsequently destroyed by US strikes, and it is unlikely that the Houthis would use the same tactics again. Instead, it is believed that they are provided with intelligence from an Iranian surveillance ship, the MV Behshad. The Behshad is thought to be limited in its intelligence-gathering capabilities to signal intelligence (SIGINT) and observation of shipping movements. Its predecessor vessel, the Saviz, which was also a converted civilian cargo ship, carried a complement of fast boats which could be used to provide visual identification of target vessels as well as SIGINT. This, coupled with data UAVs and open source AIS tracking, can be used to triangulate the range and bearing of a target vessel.
+
+___`Securing shipping requires a disproportionately resource-intensive effort on the part of the defender relative to the attacker when the latter has the advantage of proximity`___
+
+This would be sufficient to fire an ASCM in the direction of a vessel, while relying on its onboard seeker to identify a target in the terminal phase. This form of targeting would be less effective against warships, which can take evasive action and deploy countermeasures, but it is sufficient to enable strikes on commercial vessels. In principle, this should also be a viable means of targeting ASBMs, particularly as the altitudes that these missiles reach mean that their onboard sensors can cover very wide areas in the terminal phase. The challenge, however, is that ballistic missiles require a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MARV) to be accurate against moving targets. MARVs are inherently difficult to design and could not be easily moved from Iran, so it is not clear that Houthi ASBMs have them. This could explain the margins by which they appear to have missed their targets.
+
+
+### The Challenges of Defence and Coercion
+
+A major issue facing the Coalition is not the difficulty of intercepting Houthi missiles and UAVs per se, but rather the cost of doing so and the mismatch between tactical and strategic effectiveness. While vessels such as the USS Carney have proven highly capable, they have had to expend disproportionately expensive interceptors such as the SM-2 and ESSM in order to engage relatively cheap targets. Moreover, the challenges of replenishing vertical launch cells at sea mean that once a destroyer has expended its missile magazine, it must rotate to a friendly facility to reload. Aircraft such as the carrier-based F/A-18 can operate in a defensive role and can be reloaded more effectively, but this requires the persistent presence of a US aircraft carrier in the region when the demand signal from other theatres is growing.
+
+Overall, securing shipping requires a disproportionately resource-intensive effort on the part of the defender relative to the attacker when the latter has the advantage of proximity. This was illustrated during previous challenges to freedom of navigation such as the 1980s Tanker War. Because of this, the Coalition may have to shift its approach from defence to coercion, as only a cessation of Houthi attacks is likely to mitigate the effects of increased insurance costs and lengthened shipping routes. The challenge will be identifying an appropriate approach, as the Coalition will have to balance the need to present the Houthis with a credible threat to compel a change in behaviour with preventing misperceptions by both the Houthis and their Iranian backers which could lead to a larger conflict. Faced with the rollback of Hamas in Gaza and the possibility of an Israeli attack on Hizbullah, the Iranians could misperceive an extensive strike campaign against the Houthis as being part of a broader effort to roll back their regional proxy network, and may react unpredictably.
+
+
+### Three Possible Approaches
+
+One approach, dubbed “turning the screw”, involves limited actions with the threat of more to come. This approach entails striking a target of marginal value, such as a missile launcher or a coastal radar, while withholding the option of further action to give the target an opportunity to comply. Though the Houthis have become adept at operating under conditions of adversary air superiority, countries such as the UAE have struck Houthi missile launchers in the past, and the US struck Houthi radars in 2016 in a similar effort. However, this approach cedes the option of escalation to the opponent, who may perceive limited action as evidence of irresolution and continue as if nothing had happened. This leaves the options of further strikes or backing down, and could mean sleepwalking into the large-scale conflagration one is trying to avoid. Should initial failure result in wider strikes to disable a larger number of launchers, this might prove indistinguishable from a full-scale bombing campaign to the Iranians.
+
+An alternative approach would be to present the Houthis and Iranians with the prospect of large-scale attacks on the Houthis’ military infrastructure, along with a privately communicated deadline for compliance. Posturing for action at scale while communicating the conditions for de-escalation can deliver effects, as it did during the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, but time is on the side of the opponent. Posturing the resources needed to act at scale can only be done for a limited period, and an opponent can always desist for a time and wait for aircraft carriers to rotate out before resuming attacks. However, such an approach could secure temporary relief.
+
+___`The Houthis are a persistent and determined opponent, and it is unlikely that they will halt their strikes simply because they are ineffective`___
+
+The most viable coercive approach would likely involve direct attacks against a limited but valuable target set. The model here would be Operation Praying Mantis, in which the US Navy sank a portion of the Iranian fleet during the Tanker War, but desisted from carrying out strikes inland. The target set chosen was valuable enough to dispel any ambiguity about irresolution, but did not threaten the Iranians with the prospect of wider US attacks.
+
+Any target set chosen must combine several characteristics. It should involve targets with concentrated value where sufficient damage can be inflicted with a minimal number of strikes. It should also involve targets related to the Houthi maritime strike capability and exclude assets that are not, in order to signal limited intent. The latter would include command and control nodes, as strikes on them could be viewed as the opening stages of a wider campaign. There are targets within Yemen which might meet this description. For example, the Houthis’ indigenous missile manufacturing capability might represent a target that can be struck on a limited basis. Though the Houthis import missile components, assembly is often done locally and thus requires some specialist equipment and personnel, with the latter being especially hard to replace. This comes with certain risks, as these facilities and the personnel who man them are in urban nodes such as Sanaa. Stockpiles of missiles represent another target, as requirements such as temperature-controlled storage limit an opponent’s capacity to distribute them. Though these storage sites are hardened and buried, they can be struck with some existing maritime strike capabilities such as the Tomahawk Block V. The boats which may be used to cue UAVs like the Samad could also be struck.
+
+
+### In Sum
+
+The Houthis’ maritime strike capabilities are technically advanced but lack targeting sophistication. They therefore represent a manageable threat that can be countered with air defence assets in the region, providing that Iran does not improve target cuing for the Houthis. However, the Houthis are a persistent and determined opponent, and it is unlikely that they will halt their strikes simply because they are ineffective. This makes direct coercion to stop them more likely. The most effective course of action would involve strikes against limited but valuable target sets within the Houthi organisation. Doing so would impact the group’s ability to continue its missile strikes while minimising the risk of a wider regional conflict, thereby enabling the US and other navies to free up capacity for other strategic concerns.
+
+---
+
+__Sam Cranny-Evans__ was a Research Analyst at RUSI in C4ISR between October 2021 and December 2022. During his time at RUSI he focused on multi-domain integration, electronic warfare, and the war in Ukraine. He co-led the establishment of the Red Team project, which provides analysis of the Russian and Chinese militaries. He has also spent time researching lethal autonomous weapons and their proliferation risk. He now works at Helsing, a defence AI company providing thought leadership and in government affairs.
+
+__Sidharth Kaushal__ is the Research Fellow of Sea Power at RUSI. His research covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-10-surveying-the-seas.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-10-surveying-the-seas.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..10a840c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-10-surveying-the-seas.md
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Surveying The Seas
+author: Matthew P. Funaiole, et al.
+date : 2024-01-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/u6siJbP.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "China’s Dual-Use Research Operations in the Indian Ocean"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_China is deploying dozens of civilian vessels to survey the world’s oceans. While these ships support scientific and commercial objectives, they can also help China’s navy understand the maritime environment as it ventures into less familiar waters like the Indian Ocean._
+
+
+
+China is undertaking sweeping efforts to transform its navy into a formidable “blue water” force capable of projecting power far beyond its shores. As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ventures into less familiar waters like the Indian Ocean, Beijing has sought to deepen its understanding of the maritime operating environment by studying water conditions, currents, and the seafloor.
+
+To survey the Earth’s oceans, China has developed the world’s largest fleet of civilian research vessels. While these ships support scientific and commercial objectives, they are also being used to advance Beijing’s strategic ambitions.
+
+
+_▲ Chinese oceanographic surveys span the globe._
+
+> Maritime activity data collected using the Windward Intelligence Platform reveals Chinese survey vessels have carried out hundreds of thousands of hours of operations globally over the past four years.
+
+> Hidden Reach analyzed Chinese oceanographic missions since 2020 and identified 64 active research and survey vessels.
+
+> China’s dual-use approach to oceanographic research raises questions about the nature of these activities. Many vessels that undertake missions for peaceful purposes are also capable of providing the PLA with critical data about the world’s oceans.
+
+> Of the 64 active vessels, over 80 percent have demonstrated suspect behavior or possess organizational links suggesting their involvement in advancing Beijing’s geopolitical agenda.
+
+> China’s surveying operations have been heavily concentrated along its maritime periphery in the South China Sea and western Pacific Ocean.
+
+> But it has also set its sights on the Indian Ocean, an emerging arena of competition between Beijing and New Delhi.
+
+> The PLA can leverage the insights gained from these missions to enhance its knowledge of the dynamic undersea environment — a crucial precursor to confidently deploying naval forces abroad.
+
+Exploring and mapping the world’s oceans is not unique to China. Dozens of countries have active oceanographic research programs, which contribute to global efforts to study climate change, marine life, geology, and the distribution of natural resources.
+
+China is also not alone in applying oceanographic research to support military needs. Yet the scale of China’s activities is immense, and the line between its civilian and military research is heavily blurred.
+
+Beijing’s lack of transparency makes it challenging to discern the true nature of its survey operations, but three specific indicators shed light on which vessels may be supporting Beijing’s military and national security objectives.
+
+
+### Vessel Ownership and Type
+
+Many of China’s research vessels are owned and operated by state-affiliated organizations with close ties to the Chinese military. For example, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Chinese Academy of Sciences both operate research vessels and have signed cooperation agreements with the PLA.
+
+Some survey ships were in service with the PLA before entering civilian service. Hulls in the Xiang Yang Hong (向阳红) class, for example, were originally built for the Chinese navy but were later transferred to civilian authorities with ties to the PLA.
+
+Other ships are operated directly by the Chinese Coast Guard, which ultimately reports to the country’s Central Military Commission.
+
+Chinese officials are not always quiet about the dual function of these ships. During the commissioning of the Shiyan 06 (实验-06), officials acknowledged the ship would “provide strong scientific and technological support for homeland security.”
+
+
+### Military-Affiliated Port Visits
+
+Many Chinese survey ships have a record of calling at port in military-affiliated facilities in China. This includes Sanya, Guangzhou, Qingdao, and other ports known to host major contingents of PLA Navy warships and maritime militia vessels. Some have also visited China’s unlawfully constructed military outposts in the South China Sea.
+
+Notably, some vessels have gone dark for hours or days while near PLA installations, a potential sign of intentional efforts to obscure activities there.
+
+
+### Activities
+
+Behavior at sea can also raise red flags. Repeated instances of “spoofing” (providing falsified identification information) or “going dark” (turning off automatic identification system signals for extended periods) are important warning signs. Data from Windward indicates these activities occur frequently — sometimes near foreign military facilities.
+
+In other instances, China has deployed research vessels to strengthen its presence in geopolitical hotspots. Commercial and scientific research ships, such as those operated by the state-owned China Oilfield Services Limited (COSL), have played a major role in helping Beijing assert its claims of “indisputable sovereignty” over vast swaths of the contested South China Sea.
+
+Some ships have conducted survey operations within the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of other countries without prior approval, which is prohibited under international law. These activities have sparked diplomatic spats, including a 2019 confrontation between an Indian warship and Chinese research vessel operating unauthorized in India’s EEZ.
+
+The blurred boundaries between China’s oceanographic research ecosystem and its expansive national security apparatus bear the hallmarks of Beijing’s military-civil fusion (军民融合) strategy, which seeks to break down barriers between the country’s civilian and military scientific, technological, and economic development.
+
+China’s national economic blueprint, the 14th Five Year Plan, names deep sea exploration as one of its seven focus areas for scientific and technological research and calls for the development of “submarine scientific observation networks.” In 2021, the Ministry of Natural Resources laid out specific guidance on furthering the Five Year Plan, including linking ocean surveying to military objectives.
+
+PLA personnel have written extensively on the need for a robust set of advanced deep-sea technologies to support undersea warfare, a domain where China considerably lags the U.S. military. The data collected by China’s civilian research fleet, which is outfitted with cutting-edge measuring and monitoring equipment, can help fill in major gaps in the PLA Navy’s undersea capabilities.
+
+The connections between the Chinese military and civilian oceanographic research are often in plain sight. The PLA Navy Submarine Academy openly touts its frequent collaborations with China’s major maritime research institutions.
+
+The Qingdao National Laboratory for Marine Science and Technology (QNLM) is the crown jewel in China’s oceanographic research technology ecosystem. It is located among a cluster of advanced research labs built near the submarine academy’s main campus.
+
+These partnerships have raised security concerns abroad. Texas A&M University terminated a research partnership with QNLM in 2022, citing “more than 200 instances of Foreign Talent Recruitment activity.” In the same year, the U.S. Department of Commerce added QNLM to its Entity List due to its involvement in supporting China’s military modernization efforts.
+
+
+
+> #### XIANG YANG HONG 06 向阳红 06
+
+> One of China’s most extensive expeditions took place in 2019 and 2020, when the research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 06 traveled more than 10,000 kilometers over 110 days to survey vast swaths of the Indian Ocean. Scientists from Sri Lanka and Myanmar joined for parts of the ship’s expedition.
+
+> Part of its mission involved releasing 12 advanced underwater gliders and deploying 15 profiling floats, which spent months collecting data on the area’s hydrological conditions. That data was then fed back to China via satellite transmission.
+
+> These floats are part of an effort to build up a real-time ocean observation network of hundreds of devices spanning the “Two Oceans and One Sea” (两洋一海) region, a conceptualization of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and South China Sea put forward by Beijing as a focus area for maritime surveillance.
+
+
+
+> #### HAI YANG SHI YOU 760 海洋石油 760
+
+> In another telling example, the seismic survey ship Hai Yang Shi You 760 completed a four-month ocean bed mapping mission in early 2023.
+
+> The vessel is owned and operated by COSL, a subsidiary of the state-owned oil giant China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). During its mission, it followed an extensive “lawnmower” path within Bangladesh’s EEZ, indicating the vessel was exploring the seabed for oil and gas deposits.
+
+> CNOOC ships and large-scale rigs have been routinely deployed to assert Beijing’s sovereignty claims in the highly contested South China Sea. In 2012, CNOOC’s chairman famously referred to the firm’s oil rigs as a “strategic weapon” supporting national interests. CNOOC’s ties to the PLA led the U.S. Treasury Department to add the firm to its Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List.
+
+> There is no indication that the Hai Yang Shi You 760 operated within Bangladesh’s EEZ without official consent. Its repeated port calls at Chittagong suggest it received permission. Nonetheless, the seismic and bathymetric data collected during the survey could be of significant value to the PLA.
+
+> Once the survey was complete, the Hai Yang Shi You 760 returned to its home port at Zhanjiang, just beside the headquarters of the PLA Navy’s South Sea Fleet.
+
+
+
+> #### SHIYAN 06 实验 06
+
+> More recently, in October 2023, the research vessel Shiyan 06 entered the eastern Indian Ocean bound for the Port of Colombo in Sri Lanka.
+
+> The vessel is operated by the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology, a research institute that has provided technical and logistical support for China’s militarization of the South China Sea.
+
+> Sri Lanka initially demurred on China’s requests to dock the vessel at Colombo due to objections raised by India. Local researchers also expressed concern about their lack of access to the data gathered by Chinese expeditions. Colombo eventually relented, however, allowing the Shiyan 06 to dock for five days before it left to execute research surveys along the island’s west coast.
+
+> Beijing’s interest in Sri Lanka goes well beyond scientific pursuits. China’s massive investments in ports and other infrastructure there have raised concerns — including from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) — that the PLA has likely considered setting up a military facility in the island nation.
+
+While Chinese surveys in the Indian Ocean contribute to scientific and commercial efforts, the data collected on research missions has clear military value — especially to submarine operations.
+
+The most recent Chinese defense white paper highlights the need for the PLA to support “far seas protection and strategic projection.” The Indian Ocean is a pivotal region for the PLA as it pushes to extend its “strategic perimeter” (战略外线) farther from China’s borders.
+
+The underwater domain is critical to China’s interests in the Indian Ocean. Chinese submarines could be called on to support a wide range of missions, ranging from intelligence collection to nuclear deterrence patrols. In a crisis, Chinese attack submarines operating there could complicate attempts by U.S. or allied forces to interdict China’s supply lines or traverse the region to reach the Pacific.
+
+
+_▲ This Hidden Reach Snapshot uses satellite imagery to reveal how China is quietly using submarine diplomacy to deepen its influence along the Bay of Bengal._
+
+Expanding submarine operations, however, requires overcoming significant hurdles. China’s lack of a nearby military facility forces its submarines to navigate key chokepoints between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
+
+Beijing may seek to address this vulnerability. The U.S. DOD assesses that China has likely considered 18 countries as potential hosts for an additional overseas military facility. Of these, 11 ring the massive Indian Ocean.
+
+Even with a regional military facility, submarine operations remain highly complex — a fact that has been brought home to the PLA Navy through its own experiences and those of foreign navies. In 2014, a Chinese submarine operating near Hainan Island was nearly lost when it encountered an unexpected change in water density, causing the submarine to sink rapidly into an underwater trench. The PLA Navy awarded the captain and crew high honors for successfully averting disaster.
+
+Safely navigating submarines requires thorough knowledge of complex undersea conditions. Changes in subsurface topography, currents, thermoclines, salinity, and other factors have major impacts on how submarines navigate their surroundings.
+
+Civilian oceanographic research helps to arm the PLA Navy with critical data, enhancing its capability to safely deploy in distant waters.
+
+
+
+The PLA and its civilian surrogates are harvesting data from the world’s oceans. While scientific and commercial benefits may accrue from Chinese oceanographic research, these activities may also prove crucial for the PLA in expanding its operational reach and capabilities in the Indian Ocean.
+
+This expansion poses a significant challenge to key regional players like India, as well as to the United States and its allies. Beijing’s track record of defying international norms to serve its own interests further heightens the stakes.
+
+Some of China’s erstwhile partners in the region have started to pull back from research collaboration with China. At India’s encouragement, Sri Lanka announced in January 2024 that it would implement a one-year pause on Chinese research vessels docking at its ports. The country’s foreign minister suggested the ban would allow Sri Lanka to develop its capacity to “participate in such research activities as equal partners.”
+
+Such efforts are critical to holding Beijing to account. Engagement with Chinese researchers should not be unnecessarily curtailed, but these collaborations should be handled equitably and transparently.
+
+In the long term, countries can also work together to ensure that a heightened PLA presence in the Indian Ocean does not destabilize the region.
+
+India’s cooperation is crucial, and New Delhi has already demonstrated a degree of willingness to engage with partners. Amid simmering tensions with China, India has supported maritime security efforts with members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad).
+
+As China charts its course in the Indian Ocean, Washington and its partners should keep a close watch on Chinese actors and explore opportunities to cooperate as an effective ballast.
+
+---
+
+__Matthew P. Funaiole__ is vice president of iDeas Lab, Andreas C. Dracopoulos Chair in Innovation and senior fellow of China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He specializes in using data-driven research to unpack complex policy issues, specifically those related to Chinese foreign and security policy, cross-Strait relations, and maritime trade.
+
+__Brian Hart__ is a fellow with the China Power Project at CSIS, where he researches the evolving nature of Chinese power. His particular research interests include Chinese foreign and security policy, Chinese military modernization, and U.S.-China technological competition.
+
+__Aidan Powers-Riggs__ is a research associate for China analysis with the iDeas Lab at CSIS, where he primarily supports the Hidden Reach special initiative.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-10-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-9.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-10-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-9.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-10-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-9.md
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第九日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-01-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 國安警證供指黎智英向美國前國防副部長轉賬逾百萬 亦曾匯款近億予泛民
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（10日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第9日審訊。控方讀出負責財政調查的國安處女高級督察洪麗芬所撰之書面供詞。當中提及黎智英自2013至2016年間，以「不明原因」向美國前國防部副部長 Paul Wolfowitz 轉賬共約176萬港元，黎於2017年亦曾向天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機轉賬共350萬。另外，供詞指黎智英自2013年起透過助手 Mark Simon 及其公司，向泛民政黨轉賬近1億元，民主黨曾獲轉賬8百萬，其他政黨包括工黨及社民連；至於前立法會議員區諾軒亦獲轉賬37萬。辯方透露，將會爭議專家證人、為梁美芬丈夫的城大法律學院教授王貴國所撰報告的呈堂性，將於明天呈交書面陳詞。案件押後至下周二（16日）續審。
+
+控方高級檢控官陳穎琛，讀出負責財政調查的國安處女督察洪麗芬的36頁供詞，她主要調查案中各人的銀行戶口及資金流向，包括：黎智英、李宇軒、陳梓華、黎的助手 Mark Simon、劉祖廸、張劍虹、陳沛敏、羅偉光、林文宗、馮偉光、楊清奇及《蘋果日報》公司。
+
+#### 警指黎向美國前國防部副部長轉賬176萬、向陳日君樞機轉賬350萬
+
+供詞指，黎智英於2013、2014及2016年，以「不明原因（unknown reason）」向美國前國防部副部長 Paul Wolfowitz 共轉賬22萬美元（約176萬港元）。他亦於2015至2017年向「美國企業研究院（American Enterprise Institute）」轉賬11萬港元。黎於2017年，分兩次向天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機轉賬共350萬。黎同時曾向陳梓華及「香港監察」分別轉賬14萬及20萬。
+
+
+▲ 天主教香港教區榮休主教 陳日君樞機
+
+#### 警指黎旗下公司向泛民政黨轉賬約2千萬 包括民主黨、工黨、社民連
+
+屬黎智英旗下的加拿大公司「LAIS Hotel Properties Limited」曾多次向泛民不同政黨轉賬共約2千萬，包括於2019年向民主黨轉賬約8百萬、向工黨轉賬1百萬、向民主黨總部轉賬5百萬、向社民連轉賬50萬。同年他亦轉賬36萬給李宇軒。至2020年，「LAIS Hotel」向社民連轉賬43萬，以及向前立法會議員區諾軒轉賬37萬。
+
+#### 警指黎轉賬1.18億予助手 當中9千萬轉予泛民政黨
+
+另外，Mark Simon 於2013至2020年期間，收到黎智英轉賬約1.18億港元。Mark Simon 其後分70多次將其中9,300萬元轉賬予不同政黨，包括於2014年向民主黨轉賬2萬元，於2019年轉賬25萬及10萬港元予支聯會。他於2019年亦轉賬3萬元予陳梓華，同年轉賬50萬予李宇軒。
+
+#### 警指Mark Simon轉4百萬予何謝韋律師事務所
+
+Mark Simon 於2016年曾收到來自黎智英持有的「Comitex Knitters（公明織造廠有限公司）」匯款5百萬，然後將2百萬港元轉賬至何謝韋律師事務所（Ho Tse Wai, Philip Li & Partners），其餘3百萬港元則轉賬予民主黨。但其後銀行本票被彈回，於是 Mark Simon 再把3百萬轉賬予民主黨。另外，黎智英其後亦透過 Mark Simon 再轉賬2百萬予何謝韋律師事務所。
+
+至於黎智英的資金來源方面，來自香港及台灣的分別有10億，其他的包括美國、新加坡、加拿大等。
+
+#### 警指李宇軒支付980萬予本地及海外媒體公司 作登報宣傳費
+
+就「重光團隊」核心成員李宇軒，他共有6個銀行賬戶，共涉6項存款及41項提款紀錄。於2019年6月28日進行首次眾籌行動後，李宇軒經美國的 E Stripe Payments E Limitied 獲得615萬港元轉賬至其渣打銀行戶口。至於在2019年8月8日的第二次眾籌，《蘋果日報》專欄作家 Jack Henry Hazlewood 的英國銀行賬戶，轉賬了30萬英鎊（約310萬港元）到李宇軒的渣打戶口。於2019年11月21日，黎的助手 Mark Simon 再轉賬50萬港元予李宇軒。
+
+李宇軒曾使用眾籌及 Mark Simon 轉賬予他的款項，共約980萬港元，支付予本港及國際的媒體或傳播公司，作為宣傳及出版費，涉及的日期為2019年6月26日至2020年6月15日。該些公司包括《自由時報》（Liberty Time Limited）、「白宮顧問有限公司（The Whitehouse Consultancy Limited）」。而屬黎智英的公司「LAIS Hotel Properties Limited」，則先為李宇軒墊支，向《日經》支付約147萬港元的出版費，其後李歸還款項。
+
+另外，「LAIS Hotel」亦於2019年6月向英國《衛報》支付1.8萬英鎊（約17萬港元）、向美國《華盛頓郵報》支付8萬美元（約66萬港元）、向意大利《RCS Media Group S.p.A》支付20,000歐元（約17萬港元）。
+
+#### 黎於錄影會面承認為專欄文章之作者 被問誰批准刊其他文章時稱「唔知」
+
+控方接着播放黎智英約一小時的警誡會面紀錄。國安處警員5830於2020年9月向黎錄取警誡會面，當時有律師在場陪同。期間警方向黎展示多篇《蘋果日報》刊登的文章。警方問及由誰人撰寫及誰批准刊登，黎均表示「無嘢想講」及「唔知」。警方亦展示署名為黎智英的「成敗樂一笑」專欄文章，包括於2019年12月刊登的〈我們堅持下去，才有希望〉，黎承認是他本人撰寫。惟被問及撰寫目的時，他表示「無嘢想講」。其他均是其署名的文章包括：〈反極權 台灣更不害怕〉及〈2020年和勇一起撐下去〉。警方展示於2019年11月刊登的文章〈參議員關注暴力升級 黎智英冀美多發聲 令青年面對警暴不孤單〉，並播放相關片段。
+
+#### 黎表示不認識李宇軒 又指不認識「LAIS Hotel」公司擁有人
+
+警方其後展示黎曾經在社交媒體轉貼的推文。警方亦問黎是否認識李宇軒，他回答「唔認識」。另外，警方展示「LAIS Hotel」向《華盛頓郵報》、《衛報》等國際媒體登報的單據。警方問及有否匯款到《衛報》，黎表示「應該冇」。黎亦表示不認識「LAIS Hotel」公司擁有人或股東，黎表示「唔認識」。被問公司是否屬於其名下，他回答「唔知」、「無嘢講」。警方又問，單據的收款人為《華盛頓郵報》，黎與該公司有否連繫，黎表示「冇，冇嘢想講」。警方亦問，力高公司是否屬黎名下，以及其運作情況，黎表示「冇嘢想講」。
+
+#### 辯方透露爭議法律教授王貴國的專家報告 明交書面陳詞
+
+代表黎智英的辯方大律師關文渭昨表示，將會爭議專家證人、為梁美芬丈夫的城大法律學院教授王貴國所撰報告的呈堂性，主要爭議其專家報告對「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」控罪元素的關連性。辯方亦指，會爭議王貴國就美國之外，在其他國家實施相關制裁方面的專家知識。但副刑事檢控專員周天行強調，王的專家證供只涉美國的部分。辯方將會明天下午5時前呈交書面陳詞，控方會於下周一早上呈交書面回應陳詞，並於下周二作口頭陳詞。至於代表3間蘋果日報公司清盤人的大律師王國豪則指，他們仍未決定是否加入申請，並需時索取指示。法庭要求他於本周五去信通知其決定。案件押後至下周二（16日）續審。
+
+
+▲ 辯方大律師 關文渭
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-12-western-pacific-security.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-12-western-pacific-security.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a5086c69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-12-western-pacific-security.md
@@ -0,0 +1,477 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Western Pacific Security
+author: Mark F. Cancian
+date : 2024-01-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/5KCNkOJ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Building Future Capabilities in the Time of AUKUS"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_AUKUS is a historic agreement signed to develop a nuclear submarine force in Australia, but it will be decades before more submarines are available. To cover this gap, the United States and its partners need to explore a variety of promising technologies._
+
+
+
+This report aims to help the defense industry and governments identify future capabilities to deal with the rising challenge from China. The AUKUS agreement has been a major development in facing this challenge, but insights here apply to the full spectrum of U.S. allies and partners in the Pacific. Although strategists seek to expand the number of submarines, the U.S. submarine fleet will not grow beyond its current size until the 2040s. Thus, the project studies wargames and the war in Ukraine to identify ways for the United States and its partners to manage this submarine gap.
+
+#### The Challenge Ahead
+
+The need for action is clear. China’s military buildup is well documented and continuing. Its fleet now outnumbers the U.S. Navy, and its ground-based missile force is massive. The United States has many partners and allies in the region, but the lack of an integrating structure like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) means that any coalition responding to Chinese aggression must be developed bilaterally. This requires U.S. presence and leadership.
+
+The AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States represents a major development in the Western Pacific. Pillar 1 of the agreement will develop an Australian nuclear submarine capability and enhance U.S. submarine presence in Australia. Pillar 2 seeks to share emerging technologies across the three countries. The insights of this report relate particularly to Pillar 2.
+
+Strategists inside and outside of government see submarines as a key capability in a conflict with China because of the stealth and firepower of these platforms. They have proposed U.S. submarine fleets ranging in size from 66 to 78 vessels, compared to the current fleet of 53. However, the U.S. submarine fleet will decline through the 2020s due to a lack of submarine construction in the 1990s, reaching a low of 46 in 2030 before rebuilding and returning to the current level in the late 2030s. Fleet levels after that are highly speculative, but even under optimistic circumstances, the submarine fleet will not reach the size targeted by strategists until the 2040s or beyond.
+
+#### Filling the Gap
+
+What should the United States and its partners do to manage the impending gap in submarine numbers over the coming decades?
+
+Wargames of a Chinese invasion, blockade, or gray zone squeeze of Taiwan illuminate capabilities that would be helpful. Early assessments of the war in Ukraine give additional insights.
+
+The following provides a thematic menu of possibilities. Some are available in the near term, while others are possible in the longer term. Not all will work out, but many could evolve into programs of record that would balance China’s military buildup, enhance deterrence, and strengthen warfighting if deterrence fails.
+
+__Make existing submarines more effective:__
+
+- Large uncrewed underwater vessels (UUVs) can operate autonomously inside the Chinese defensive zone.
+
+- Medium UUVs can extend the reach of individual submarines.
+
+- Enhanced submarine maintenance would increase the number of operational submarines.
+
+__Bring more forces to bear more effectively:__
+
+- Deployable command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) packages would allow U.S. forces to link more effectively with allies and partners.
+
+- Contractors can expand coalition training without diverting military personnel.
+
+- Operational contracting can supplement limited military logistics units in providing the logistics needed to cover the vast expanses of the Pacific.
+
+__Plan to operate in a hostile environment:__
+
+- Dispersed aircraft basing complicates Chinese targeting.
+
+- Building hardened aircraft shelters would protect aircraft remaining at large bases during conflict.
+
+- Stronger surface ship defenses would allow operations deeper inside the Chinese defensive zone.
+
+- Assisting Taiwan in developing a balanced force with both traditional and asymmetric capabilities would hedge against the spectrum of threats it faces, from gray zone harassment to invasion.
+
+- Sustaining efforts to build resilience against cyberattacks would help prevent such attacks from having an operational or strategic effect even if they cannot be fully thwarted.
+
+- Backup systems for communications and geolocation would provide a hedge against jamming and GPS spoofing.
+
+- Peacetime preparations can enhance wartime operations in an environment where logistics are contested.
+
+__Hedge against unconventional threats:__
+
+- Stronger countermine capabilities, long neglected by the U.S. Navy, would protect against a common adversary tactic.
+
+- Counter-swarming capabilities would allow military and civilian ships to continue operations without resorting to lethal force against harassing elements.
+
+- Uncrewed aerial systems (UASs) could be used to harass Chinese harassers.
+
+__Defend against air threats in all their manifestations:__
+
+- Upgraded defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles would protect forces against an expanding and constantly evolving threat.
+
+- Expanding and fielding systems to counter adversary UASs would protect friendly forces from adversary reconnaissance and attack amid the ubiquity of such systems on the battlefield, and defensive systems against aircraft are generally too expensive for this use.
+
+__Think offensively, even when on the defensive:__
+
+- Enhanced jamming and counter-C3I would disrupt China’s ability to coordinate forces.
+
+- Uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) can extend the awareness and reach of crewed vessels.
+
+- UASs can perform missions that are too dangerous, extended, or monotonous for crewed platforms.
+
+- Hypersonic missiles, even if niche weapons, can contribute to campaigns by attacking high-value, well-defended targets.
+
+- Sea mines with standoff capabilities can emplace minefields with less risk to the launch platforms.
+
+This report does not make recommendations on which of these capabilities to pursue. That requires an in-depth analysis of each capability’s cost, technological maturity, operational effectiveness, and political acceptability. The report does recommend moving forward across many possibilities to illuminate the most promising approaches and to provide signals to industry about where it should focus its attention and resources.
+
+
+### Why This Study?
+
+Pacific security has been at the top of the national security agenda since at least 2014, when the Obama administration announced an end to the United States’ focus on counterinsurgency and regional stability and laid out five challenges: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and global terrorism. China was challenge number two after Russia, which had just occupied Crimea. The Trump administration continued this framework, clearly articulated a new focus on great power conflict, and moved China to the top position ahead of Russia. The Biden administration has essentially continued this approach.
+
+The most dramatic recent event in this space has been the signing of the AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to develop a nuclear-powered Australian submarine fleet and share key technologies. The challenge from China and the AUKUS response has spawned a wide variety of analyses. This study adds to that body of research by focusing on one key question: What promising technologies are available in the near and mid-term to enhance capabilities while the United States and its partners wait for this expanded submarine force to arrive? The report aims to help industry work with governments to pursue these capabilities.
+
+The report does not claim to be a comprehensive analysis of what is needed to compete against China. That would include new operational concepts, force posture, force readiness, force size and structure, relations with partners and allies, and budget — all important topics but beyond the scope of this project.
+
+After this short introduction, the report is organized as follows:
+
+Chapter 2 examines today’s security environment in the Western Pacific, including a brief overview of the challenge from China, U.S. alliances and partnerships in the region, and finally the AUKUS agreement.
+
+Chapter 3 describes what wargames and campaign analyses say about potentially useful capabilities. The chapter concludes with insights from the war in Ukraine.
+
+Chapter 4 analyzes the U.S. submarine fleet and the submarine industrial base. It concludes that while additional submarines would provide critical capabilities, the U.S. submarine fleet will decline through the mid-2030s. Therefore, enhanced near and midterm capabilities will need to come from elsewhere to meet China’s rising military challenge.
+
+Finally, Chapter 5 pulls all these threads together. It identifies capabilities that should be expanded, technological areas for exploration, and some services that the defense industry might provide.
+
+
+### Today’s Security Environment in the Western Pacific
+
+_China’s Challenge, U.S. Alliances, and AUKUS_
+
+This chapter sets the stage by exploring three key elements of today’s security environment in the Western Pacific: the China challenge, U.S. alliances and partnerships, and the AUKUS agreement. These shape the military requirements the United States, Australia, and other partners must meet to compete in this environment.
+
+#### China’s Challenge
+
+It is commonplace to note how China has become increasingly assertive diplomatically and politically, backed by a massive military expansion. This assertiveness arises from China’s view of itself as an alternative to the U.S.-led international system based on free markets and democratic values. As a result, the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy identifies China as the primary global competitor to the United States: “The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power.” In response, Congress has taken several legislative actions, from bolstering U.S. semiconductor manufacturing via the CHIPS Act of 2022 to cutting off U.S. funding from Chinese entities that abuse human rights via the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of 2021. The House of Representatives has created a committee focused on China: the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.
+
+To implement its new strategic vision, China began a long-term military modernization program in the late 1990s, focusing particularly on air and maritime capabilities. This was a change from China’s previous military strategy, which was land-focused, relied on masses of poorly trained conscripts, and could not exert influence at a distance from its borders. Its poor performance in the 1979 border war with Vietnam underscored its weakness, as did the 1996 transit of the Taiwan Strait by U.S. naval forces.
+
+This has changed. As the Department of Defense (DOD)’s annual assessment of Chinese military power notes:
+
+> In 2022, the PRC turned to the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] as an increasingly capable instrument of statecraft. Throughout the year, the PLA adopted more coercive actions in the Indo-Pacific region while accelerating its development of capabilities and concepts to strengthen the PRC’s ability to “fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy,” counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s periphery, and to project power globally.
+
+
+_▲ __Map 1: Taiwan and Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands.___
+
+The DOD report also documents the continuing expansion of the Chinese military. The Chinese navy — the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) — grew from 216 ships in 2005 to 351 ships in 2022, making it nearly 60 ships larger than the U.S. Navy. China’s nuclear modernization has accelerated, growing from 300 to 500 nuclear warheads, “exceed[ing] some of our [DOD’s] previous expectations.”
+
+This military buildup and assertive diplomacy — characterized in China as a “wolf warrior” attitude — pose challenges to countries in the region. Three challenges — to Taiwan, Japan, and the South China Sea region — are particularly important:
+
+- __Taiwan:__ China has been emphatic that Taiwan is a part of greater China. It therefore regards Taiwan as a renegade province, not an independent or autonomous entity. China has also been clear about its intention to reunite Taiwan with the mainland and that it will not renounce the use of force to achieve reunification.
+
+- __Japan:__ Japan and China have a long history of conflict, from the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century to the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s and 1940s. Recently, those tensions have focused on the Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu Islands by China), which both nations claim. China has sailed warships near Japan and fired missiles into Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Japan also has concerns about China’s client, North Korea, which has launched missiles over Japan and regularly threatens nuclear holocaust.
+
+- __South China Sea region:__ Although recent attention has focused on Taiwan, the South China Sea is also a region of intense competition. The region is important because of the high level of seaborne traffic and large oil and gas deposits. China’s infamous “nine-dash line,” by which China seeks to claim most of the South China Sea, exacerbates regional tensions. These claims have put China in competition with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, which also have territorial claims. China has been aggressive in asserting its claims, including by building and fortifying artificial islands in the region, demanding that ships and aircraft recognize an expanded Chinese identification zone, and harassing the ships of other nations. Such tactics were seen recently as China endeavored to prevent the Philippines from resupplying a garrison in the Second Thomas Shoals. The United States does not take a position on territorial claims but regularly conducts freedom of navigation operations in the region, to which China strongly objects
+
+___`Admiral Philip S. Davidson, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) until April 2021, testified the same year that the Chinese threat to invade Taiwan “is manifest . . . in the next six years.” . . . The notion of a “Davidson window” has thus entered the national security vocabulary.`___
+
+
+_▲ __Map 2: Maritime Claims in South China Sea.__ Source: [“Maritime Claims of the Indo-Pacific,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS](https://amti.csis.org/maritime-claims-map/)._
+
+#### Alliances and Partnerships
+
+The United States has a strong set of Pacific alliances with a variety of wealthy, powerful, and strategically located nations. In addition, the United States has less formal security links to many other countries. However, all these relationships are bilateral, not united through a common structure like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As a result, nations will react individually to any crisis. Such ally countries include:
+
+- __Australia:__ The Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty) binds the United States, Australia, and New Zealand to meet common dangers together, and the countries have a long security relationship, having fought side by side in six wars: World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and Iraq. The relationship has become closer with the AUKUS agreement (discussed later) and regular rotations of U.S. aircraft and Marines to bases in northern Australia.
+
+ China has attempted to squeeze Australia economically to make Australia’s policies more China friendly. For example, in 2020, after Canberra questioned the origins of Covid-19, China imposed restrictions on the import of Australian beef, wine, and other commodities. This alerted Australia to the dangers that China posed. In a 2022 event held at CSIS, Australian deputy prime minister and defense minister Richard Marles noted, “For the first time in decades, we are thinking hard about the security of our own strategic geography; the viability of our trade and supply routes; and above all the preservation of an inclusive regional order founded on rules agreed by all, not the coercive capabilities of a few.”
+
+ Australia is a strong democracy with high-quality armed forces. As Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review states, a close relationship with the United States has ensured that, since the 1960s, “While small in size, the ADF [Australian Defense Force] was [is] highly capable and could outmatch potential regional opponents in critical areas of technology, planning, and operations.”
+
+ The downside is that Australia’s armed forces are relatively small, and Australia is far from some potential conflict zones.
+
+- __Japan:__ The United States and Japan are bound through the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960. This authorizes the United States to station troops in Japan and obligates the parties to defend each other if either is attacked on the territories administered by Japan. This alliance is particularly important because 53,600 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan, about half on Okinawa. The Japanese constitution allows the country to maintain only self-defense forces as a result of the country’s defeat in World War II; indeed, its military is called the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force. For decades, Japanese governments have defined self-defense as 1 percent of GDP and focused on defensive weapons. However, in response to China’s aggressiveness, Japan has made plans to acquire more offensive weapons, increase its defense budget above the traditional 1 percent, and conduct exercises aimed at China.
+
+- __South Korea:__ The United States and South Korea are bound through the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty. As a result of the Korean War of 1950 to 1953, the United States still has 24,300 troops stationed in the country and a joint military command with the South Korean armed forces. The Mutual Defense Treaty obligates the parties to defend each other if either is attacked in the Pacific on territories under their administrative control. South Korea has powerful armed forces, but they are designed for national defense. Although South Korea sent combat troops to Vietnam and peacekeepers to Afghanistan, the willingness of the South Koreans to participate in conflict outside of the Korean Peninsula is unclear. South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol has strengthened ties with the United States and other regional partners such as Japan and has been willing to criticize China. However, he has stated that in the event of a U.S. conflict with China, South Korea would keep its forces at home to deter any aggression by North Korea.
+
+- __The Philippines:__ The United States and the Philippines are linked through the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and a long history of mutual security arrangements dating back to when the Philippines was a U.S. colony. Although the United States has provided equipment and training over the years, the Philippine armed forces are relatively limited, being equipped with older equipment. A major recent development is a set of agreements by which the Philippines granted the United States access to nine bases.
+
+- __Thailand:__ The United States and Thailand are bound to defend each other’s territory in the Asia-Pacific by the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty of 1954. As a result, the countries conduct regular military exercises together. However, Thailand’s military forces are weak, as are its democratic institutions. This limits the strength of the relationship.
+
+In addition to formal alliances, the United States has security relationships with several countries in the region:
+
+- __Taiwan:__ Although the United States has no formal security agreement with Taiwan, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 states, “Any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes is considered a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” For decades, U.S. policy has been governed by “strategic ambiguity” regarding how the United States would react to any Chinese attack on Taiwan. However, Congress and President Biden have recently indicated that the United States would defend Taiwan.
+
+- __Singapore:__ The United States and Singapore have an agreement that allows U.S. access to port facilities in the city-state but are not formal allies. Singapore’s legendary founder, Lee Kuan Yew, established this relationship after the United Kingdom withdrew from Asia in the 1960s, and it has since been a central element of Singapore’s security architecture. However, that close relationship has faded somewhat since Lee’s death in 2015, and most Singaporeans now view China more positively than the United States. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has stated that Singapore does not want to choose sides in a U.S.-China war.
+
+- __India:__ India is a major military power with nuclear weapons and 1,460,000 personnel on active duty in its armed forces. It is also intensely independent, being one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement. It resists the establishment of formal alliances. However, increased tensions with China have compelled India to augment security ties with partners, including the United States, Australia, and Japan. India has been incrementally diversifying its defense imports away from Russia while attempting to jump-start a stronger indigenous defense manufacturing base.
+
+- __Vietnam:__ Once bitter enemies, Vietnam and the United States have been pushed together by mutual concerns about China. China is Vietnam’s traditional enemy, having occupied the country at various times in the past and most recently having fought a border war in 1979. Although Vietnam has large ground forces — its army numbers 412,000 personnel — its air and naval forces are limited, and it is overshadowed militarily by China. Therefore, Vietnam is unlikely to participate in a U.S.-China conflict unless attacked directly.
+
+The bottom line is that the United States will be able to draw on support from many other countries in the event of a crisis or a conflict. However, the amount and nature of the support will depend on the circumstances. Further, any action will require U.S. leadership since all these relationships are bilateral. There is no substitute for U.S. forces and presence.
+
+#### AUKUS
+
+AUKUS is a defense collaboration between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States that was initially announced in September 2021. A joint report followed from defense industry associations in the three countries. In March 2023, the three countries signed a trilateral agreement describing how AUKUS would be operationalized. The agreement aims to “boost defense capabilities, accelerate technological integration, and expand the industrial capacity of all three nations.” On December 2, 2023, the AUKUS defense ministers met, reaffirmed the three nations’ commitment to the program, and elaborated on implementation plans.
+
+___`Any action will require U.S. leadership since all these relationships are bilateral. There is no substitute for U.S. forces and presence.`___
+
+AUKUS has two pillars. Pillar 1 will assist Australia in acquiring conventionally armed nuclear attack submarines (SSNs). Under the agreement, the United States will sell Australia three to five Virginia-class submarines in the early 2030s. The United States will also base a submarine rotational force in western Australia as early as 2027. Starting in 2032, the United Kingdom and Australia will co-develop a new nuclear-powered submarine class to enter service in the late 2030s, with initial production in the UK and later production in Australia. The three nations will cooperate to build a stronger trilateral submarine industrial base. The additional submarine capacity will increase Australia’s ability to defend its sea routes from Chinese interference. The United Kingdom has recently signed contracts for £4 billion ($5 billion) to develop the new submarine design. In addition to submarine construction, Pillar 1 calls for rotating U.S. submarines to Australia’s west coast and enhanced basing there.
+
+AUKUS Pillar 2 seeks to enhance cooperation in key technological and functional areas. Eight intragovernmental working groups coordinate Pillar 2 activities: undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and autonomy, advanced cyber, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, electronic warfare, innovation, and information sharing. The defense ministers identified six capability areas for cooperation (anti-submarine warfare, undersea vehicle launch and recovery, quantum positioning, navigation, and timing, and resilient and autonomous artificial intelligence. The defense ministers also specified a variety of processes and structures for coordinating capability development and conducting experiments.
+
+Pillar 2 activities are expected to help fill the partnership’s capability gaps in the decades before Pillar 1’s SSN procurement activities take effect. A recent technology readiness experiment (dubbed T-REX 23-2) moved Pillar 2 forward by evaluating 11 advanced technologies.
+
+The agreement has received tremendous fanfare and has the potential for unprecedented military and industrial cooperation among the participants. The deal is particularly important to Australia, as AUKUS is one of the largest military projects the country has ever undertaken. However, as one U.S. official described it, AUKUS will remain a promise rather than a reality for many years. It has great future potential but involves modest steps in the near term.
+
+
+### What War and Wargames Say about Conflict in the Western Pacific
+
+Three potential conflicts in the Western Pacific are particularly important to examine because of their plausibility, potential severity, and relevance to AUKUS commitments. The first is a full-scale conventional war between China and a U.S.-led coalition. The second is a blockade of Taiwan. The third is Chinese gray zone activities, particularly in the South China Sea. Collectively, these describe the broad set of military demands that would be put on the United States and its partners and that AUKUS needs to hedge against. Wargames and associated analyses can illuminate the nature of such conflicts and the military requirements that flow from them. A real war — the Russian invasion of Ukraine — provides additional insights. Many other potential conflicts, such as North Korean aggression, constitute serious threats but are less relevant to the AUKUS agreement and competition with China because the conflict would be relatively low-tech (except for missiles and nuclear weapons) and mainly on the ground.
+
+#### Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
+
+As noted in the first chapter, China has been unrelenting in its goal of uniting Taiwan with the mainland. A Chinese military invasion of Taiwan may not be the most likely course of action to accomplish this goal. However, given China’s rhetoric and military buildup, an invasion is plausible and the most dangerous Chinese course of action. Several Taiwan-focused wargames warrant consideration:
+
+- __CSIS Wargame:__ For the reasons described above, CSIS conducted a project that examined Taiwan invasion scenarios. The project developed a wargame and ran 25 iterations in a dozen scenarios. Because the wargame was based entirely on unclassified information, the project could describe the assumptions, mechanics, and results in detail. Several findings bear on requirements for future capabilities:
+
+ - Submarines were highly lethal. Whereas surface ships had to pull back in the face of the Chinese anti-ship missile threat, submarines could push into the Chinese defensive bubble, often called the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone or weapons engagement zone. Once inside the Taiwan Strait, they rapidly exhausted their inventories of missiles and torpedoes against the Chinese invasion fleet. Indeed, the project dubbed this the “happy time” for U.S. submarines.
+
+ - Their ability to strike the Chinese center of gravity, the amphibious ships, made them particularly valuable. However, once submarines expended their munitions, they had to travel to either Sasebo or Guam to reload before returning to the fight. This conveyor belt — strike, return to base, reload, transit back to the war zone, strike again — was effective but slow. U.S. players always wanted more submarines.
+
+ - Bombers were survivable and highly effective. They could be based outside of Chinese missile range, thus avoiding attack on the ground. Armed with long-range missiles, bombers could launch from outside of the Chinese air defense zone and strike ground and naval targets at relatively low risk.
+
+ - However, long-range anti-ship munitions were too few. The United States ran out of these munitions after just a few days. Their long range was critical, allowing U.S. aircraft to launch from outside of the range of Chinese air defenses.
+
+ - U.S. fighter/attack aircraft were most vulnerable on the ground. About 90 percent of U.S. and coalition aircraft losses occurred on the ground to Chinese missile strikes. The Chinese have enough long-range missiles to saturate U.S. bases several times over the course of a conflict.
+
+ - Hypersonic missiles were valuable but niche weapons. They were extremely effective in striking high-value defended targets. However, their high cost limits inventories, so they lack the volume needed to counter the immense numbers of Chinese air and naval platforms.
+
+ - Surface ships were highly vulnerable to Chinese missile attacks. As long as China retained substantial long-range missile inventories, U.S. and coalition surface ships had to back off to the east of Guam. It was too dangerous for them to remain within range of Chinese anti-ship missiles. Once China’s missile inventories declined as they repeatedly struck land targets such as air bases, the surface ships could move forward.
+
+ - Taiwan’s surface ships and aircraft struggled to survive. These traditional capabilities are valuable in day-to-day operations to counter Chinese harassment and encroachment but are highly vulnerable to the massive and growing Chinese navy and air force in a major conflict. Most Taiwanese surface ships and aircraft were destroyed in the first few days. The balanced force structure that served Taiwan so well from 1949 needs re-examination, a discussion that is already taking place as Taiwanese national security literature considers a “porcupine strategy.”
+
+- __CNAS Wargames:__ The Center for New American Security (CNAS) has run several wargames on a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan. These wargames arrived at conclusions similar to those of the CSIS wargame, with several additional insights:
+
+ - The United States has insufficient supporting forces. It also lacks enough access to partner or allied bases across the Indo-Pacific to sufficiently disperse its forces to survive initial attacks and blunt China’s initial strikes.
+
+ - The United States needs a greater emphasis on conducting logistics in a contested environment so that it can sustain combat power beyond the first days or weeks of a war.
+
+ - China is likely to engage in nuclear brinkmanship despite its stated “no first use” policy.
+
+ - Taiwan requires improved training for its armed forces, especially its reserves.
+
+ - Taiwan is highly dependent on imports of critical supplies and should stockpile these resources in advance of a conflict.
+
+ - Several critical capabilities are needed, including long-range precision-guided weapons, undersea capabilities such as uncrewed underwater vessels (UUVs), and improved passive and active base defenses.
+
+- __RAND Wargames:__ RAND conducted a series of wargames focused especially on technologies that can be applied in the near term. Although the details have not been released and are apparently classified, some general insights are available. Some particularly useful capabilities were as follows:
+
+ - Multi-domain decoys and smart sea mines, which can disrupt the adversary’s kill chain.
+
+ - Real-time language translation, which can enhance situational awareness for allies while protecting friendly information.
+
+ - Integrated warfighting networks, which can make better use of networked devices on the tactical edge.
+
+#### Chinese Blockade of Taiwan
+
+Many commentators consider a Chinese blockade of Taiwan more likely than an invasion because such an approach is less violent and confrontational. Blockades are different from invasion scenarios because political and diplomatic aspects are often paramount, though military capabilities still have a key role. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine analyses and wargames about blockades to see which military capabilities might be useful in countering a blockade.
+
+- __Chinese Military Exercises:__ In recent years, China has conducted regular exercises simulating a blockade of Taiwan. Exercise Joint Sword in April 2023 was revealing. Chinese military commentators cited the effort to attain “information agility” whereby China would speed up the kill chain through a “system-of-systems” approach. China also conducted major military exercises in the seas around Taiwan in September 2023, which included practicing sustained carrier-based air operations that would be useful in enforcing a blockade on Taiwan.
+
+- __CSIS Emerging Wargame Results:__ CSIS is beginning a series of wargames and analyses of a Chinese blockade of Taiwan as a follow-on to its First Battle of the Next War invasion analysis. Although this work is still in progress, several emerging insights are worth noting.
+
+ - Sea mines are especially attractive in blockades because of their covertness and persistence. China has many mines and the platforms to employ them. Its doctrine explicitly includes such use.
+
+ - Missile attacks are part of a blockade strategy. Chinese exercises conducted before House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit showed how China might use missiles to impose a blockade.
+
+ - China will harass civilian shipping. Although cargo ships are large and imposing, they are risk averse and therefore susceptible to pressure unless provided with mechanisms for resistance.
+
+ - China might attack civilian shipping. Cargo ships are highly survivable because of their large size but need protection and incentives to accept the risk of damage or loss.
+
+ - Several capabilities are needed: sea mines and mine clearance, protection packages for merchant shipping, and missile defense.
+
+- __RAND Analysis:__ A 2002 RAND study examined the implications of a blockade of Taiwan. Although the study focused mostly on the political and economic aspects of such an operation, it did note the likelihood of China employing swarming tactics. In such situations, China often uses nonmilitary platforms such as the China Coast Guard, Maritime Militia, or fishing vessels to crowd an adversary ship and prevent it from accomplishing its mission.
+
+- __Other Studies:__ In a study published by the China Maritime Studies Institute, former U.S. intelligence officer and East Asia expert Lonnie Henley describes how a blockade might unfold. He notes Taiwan’s maritime vulnerability due to the concentration of its major ports on Taiwan’s west coast, closest to Chinese power. He argues for enhancing mine clearance, developing concepts and technologies for blockade running and convoy operations, and degrading the Chinese integrated air defense system through electronic and kinetic methods.
+
+ A Carnegie-sponsored study by Sean Mirski examined the dynamics of a U.S. naval blockade of China. Nevertheless, the study identifies several capabilities that would be needed in the event of a Chinese blockade, particularly sea mines, mine clearance, and maritime domain awareness.
+
+ A forthcoming CSIS study on Taiwan blockade scenarios raises the possibility of cyberattacks being part of a Chinese blockade operation.
+
+#### Gray Zone Competition in the South China Sea
+
+Gray zone competition refers to actions short of war that challenge U.S. interests, influence, or power in ways designed to avoid direct U.S. military responses. Although these activities could occur anywhere in the Pacific, the South China Sea is a region of particular attention because of Chinese ambitions, making it a flashpoint for conflict.
+
+In 2023, RAND conducted a wargame simulating Chinese gray zone coercion of Taiwan. Their findings highlight the conditions under which a conflict over Taiwan might begin and illuminate which capabilities would be useful to the United States and its allies and partners. Their conclusions include the following:
+
+- Gray zone coercion is relatively unlikely to escalate to full-blown war.
+
+- The United States will consider escalating to military force if Taiwan faces an existential threat, such as a blockade or an invasion.
+
+- Taiwan will not escalate without explicit U.S. support.
+
+- The United States is more likely to intervene to support Taiwan if the island takes steps to defend itself.
+
+- Several capabilities are needed: air defense, maritime surveillance, and anti-harassment tools.
+
+#### The Real War in Ukraine
+
+The war in Ukraine is occurring in a different geography than would a war in the Western Pacific. In Ukraine, the ground domain dominates, whereas the air and maritime domains would dominate conflict in the Western Pacific. Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine provides a current example of high-intensity conflict between large and well-equipped adversaries and, therefore, is relevant to all future conflicts. Although it will be many years before the lessons learned from this conflict are fully examined and understood, several important insights relevant to a conflict in the Western Pacific can be discerned now.
+
+- __The Importance of Inventories:__ In the post-Cold War period, the United States and its allies assumed that future wars would have a short, high-intensity phase. If there were an extended stabilization phase, it would not put heavy demands on firepower, so inventories of weapons and munitions would not need to be extensive. However, the war in Ukraine has had a fundamentally different character. The continuing demands for weapons and munitions have strained U.S. and coalition inventories, limiting what they can send, as deliveries deplete stockpiles to levels that threaten other global commitments.
+
+- __The Need for Industrial Surge:__ Maintaining full stockpiles of all systems for long wars is impossible because of the high cost. Industrial surge must be able to meet the demands of longer and more intensive wars. However, in the United States and elsewhere, most surge capabilities have been eliminated in the name of efficiency. Production levels were set to produce weapons and munitions efficiently at peacetime rates.
+
+- __The Major and Evolving Role of Uncrewed Systems:__ Ukrainian ground forces note the ubiquity of uncrewed aerial systems (UASs) that spot targets for artillery attacks. “Kamikaze” UASs fly into targets, whether personnel or vehicles, acting as a tactical cruise missile. Uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) have attacked Russian ships and driven them from Crimea.
+
+- __The Centrality of Connectivity:__ Ukrainian forces have connected their diverse and expanding forces by using Starlink, a civilian system. They have thus avoided what might have been a major limitation on Ukrainian operations — an inability to communicate rapidly and reliably across geography, organizations, and domains.
+
+- __The Power of Electronic Warfare:__ Communications are routinely jammed. GPS spoofers — widely anticipated for many years — are commonplace.
+
+- __The influence of narrative:__ Narrative shaping has been an essential tool for Ukraine to drive political support. It has dominated the information space by reaching out to experts and journalists, sending representatives — including the president — to other countries to make their argument, and ensuring that good news got out while bad news was restricted.
+
+
+### Submarines
+
+_The Unobtainable Solution_
+
+In light of Chinese threats, the AUKUS agreement, and wargame results, a clear solution would be for the United States to build more submarines. Indeed, a strong submarine force is a feature of nearly every proposed fleet architecture, whether developed by government organizations or outside experts, and is the foundation of AUKUS. However, expanding the submarine fleet in the near or midterm is not possible because of constraints on the submarine industrial base. Indeed, the size of the submarine fleet will drop below the current level through the mid-2030s. Therefore, enhanced near- and midterm capabilities to meet a rising Chinese military challenge will need to come from elsewhere. This chapter lays out the strategic desirability of submarines, the difficulties in building more, and the future size of the submarine fleet.
+
+__Strong Support from Strategists:__ Strategists like SSNs because the firepower and covertness of these platforms are useful in great power conflicts. Unlike surface ships, submarines can easily operate inside an adversary’s defensive bubble.
+
+Figure 1 shows how support for increasing the submarine fleet — including SSNs and guided missile submarines (SSGNs) — has been strong across many different fleet architectures developed by the Navy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and think tanks. The horizontal line shows the current level of the attack submarine fleet (FY 2024). The vertical bars show the proposed level in the different architectures, all of which are above the current inventory level.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Target Inventory for Attack Submarines (SSNs and SSGNs) Compared with Current Fleet.__ Source: Fleet architectures as described by the DOD, Navy, and research organizations._
+
+__The Implementation Challenge:__ The problem is getting to these higher goals. The obvious solution would be to build more submarines, but having two submarine construction programs operating simultaneously — for Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and Virginia-class SSNs — puts pressure on the shipbuilding budget and the submarine industrial base.
+
+In the president’s proposed FY 2024 defense budget, building two SSNs and one SSBN will cost $16.1 billion in a Navy shipbuilding account that totals $29.5 billion for new construction. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that: “The three alternatives in the Navy’s 2024 plan would require average annual shipbuilding appropriations that were 31 percent to 40 percent more than the average over the past five years.”
+
+SSBNs have the highest priority because of their strategic nuclear role. As Admiral Lisa Franchetti stated in her confirmation hearing, “CLB [the Columbia class] is the Navy’s number one acquisition priority, with no further margin for program delay. The Navy must fully fund CLB to meet U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) requirements for the first patrol no later than October 2030 to replace retiring Ohio-class SSBNs.” Because of this program’s high priority, it will be fully funded, including any cost growth. So far, the Columbia class has not shown large cost growth, but programs of that size and technical complexity often do, and the program has high schedule risk. In October 2022, the Navy estimated that there was a high probability that procurement costs would be greater than what the Navy previously forecast: 54 percent for the first Columbia-class boat (excluding costs for plans) and 49 percent for boats 2 through 12. Attack submarines will have to fight for the remaining shipbuilding funds.
+
+Further, only two shipyards build submarines, General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) in Groton, CT, and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), in Newport News, VA. The Navy is investing $2.4 billion over the next five years to strengthen the submarine industrial base to handle both programs. The president has proposed another $3.4 billion in his October 2023 Ukraine/Israel supplemental. Nevertheless, the challenge for the industrial base — both shipyards and suppliers — is to ramp up production from one “regular” Virginia-class boat per year (the volume of work before FY 2011) to the equivalent of about five “regular” Virginia-class boats per year (the approximate volume of work represented by two Virginia Payload Module-equipped Virginia-class boats and one Columbia-class boat).
+
+The AUKUS agreement, by providing nuclear submarines and nuclear facilities to the Royal Australian Navy, will put additional pressure on the U.S. submarine industrial base even as it strengthens security in the Western Pacific.
+
+__A Shrinking Fleet:__ Figure 2 shows the size of the submarine fleet over time. The dotted horizontal line shows the level of the current fleet (FY 2024).
+
+The solid line shows the current plan. In the near term, the size of the attack submarine fleet declines, bottoming out at 46 boats in FY 2030. This decline reflects the low production rates of the 1990s and 2000s, when the strategic focus was on regional conflicts, and the Navy often built only one submarine a year. The large inventory from the Cold War has kept the fleet size high for many years, but those Cold War submarines are now retiring in large numbers.
+
+To mitigate this trough, the Navy has extended the service life of some older Los Angeles-class submarines. There is unlikely much more that can be done using this approach.
+
+Figure 2 also shows two alternative futures. One line extends the Navy’s base plan, which builds two SSNs in most years (solid line). Fleet size eventually recovers as new ships join the fleet, reaching the level of today’s submarine fleet in the late 2030s but never rising to the recommended level of most fleet architectures. This plan could change, as it does not incorporate the effects of the 2022 National Defense Strategy; that analysis is still undergoing review. Neither does it include the effects of the AUKUS agreement, which was signed after the projection was developed. Nevertheless, whatever plan emerges next year, the previously described limits on the submarine industrial base will constrain it in the near- and mid-term.
+
+The alternative (dashed line) assumes that the Navy builds three SSNs per year once production of the Columbia class ends and pressure on the industrial base eases. Under these circumstances, the submarine fleet reaches the target level of many proposed architectures in the late 2040s and the level of the most ambitious plans in the early 2050s. The obstacle to achieving this alternative, higher level of production would be finding the budget space.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: Projected Attack Submarine Fleet, FY 2023–FY 2053.__ Source: Data from Long-Range Naval Inventory tables in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, [Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2024 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2023)](https://www.govexec.com/media/navy_2024_shipbuilding_plan.pdf)._
+
+The need to give priority to the Columbia-class program and AUKUS, the limits of the industrial base, and the aging of the existing fleet constrain what the Navy can do in the near and midterm to increase the size of the submarine fleet.
+
+In theory, regional allies might help fill the gap, but numbers and capabilities are limited. Taiwan has four old submarines (30+ years), though it has begun construction on a modern class. Australia has six Collins-class submarines, but these are aging and based far from potential conflict areas. Japan has 22 excellent submarines but may not be involved and, if involved, might be unwilling to use its forces offensively. Beyond these countries, the analysis in Chapter 2 indicates that it is unlikely that other allies or partners would be willing to provide military forces to a conflict.
+
+Thus, regardless of what strategists may want, the submarine fleet will remain below desired levels for many decades. The challenge is to find other mechanisms to compete in the Western Pacific for the two decades until a larger submarine inventory becomes available.
+
+___`Regardless of what strategists may want, the submarine fleet will remain below desired levels for many decades.`___
+
+
+### Filling the Gaps
+
+_What to Do until More Submarines Arrive_
+
+AUKUS offers a powerful mechanism for enhancing U.S. and partner security interests in the Western Pacific. A coalition submarine fleet with increased numbers, wider basing, and more diversified capabilities will enhance deterrence and strengthen warfighting.
+
+However, since additional submarines will not be available for many years, the United States and its partners need to take other measures. Pillar 2 of AUKUS offers a mechanism with its focus on technological cooperation. Beyond AUKUS, the United States has many other relationships in the Western Pacific that would benefit from an expanded menu of capabilities.
+
+The threats described in Chapter 2 and the wargame results described in Chapter 3 suggest several potentially useful capabilities, which are described below.
+
+#### Making Existing Submarines More Effective
+
+Because the size of the submarine fleet will decline through the 2020s, there is a need to increase the effectiveness of the submarines that are available. Two items come up repeatedly in wargames and the warfighting literature:
+
+- __Uncrewed Underwater Vehicles:__ The Navy is investigating a range of UUVs, from the very small to the very large. The Navy envisions UUVs being a force multiplier for their motherships, which will not decrease in numbers. Two kinds have promise for enhancing the effectiveness of existing submarines.
+
+ On the high end, there is the Orca, 50 tons and the size of a bus. The Orca, the only Extra-Large UUV (XLUUV) program, will initially provide a minelaying capability, with the platform deploying the planned Hammerhead mine. This mine would be tethered to the seabed and armed with an antisubmarine torpedo, similar to the Navy’s Cold War-era CAPTOR antisubmarine mine. Although six prototype Orcas are being built, they are still experimental and not a program of record.
+
+ Medium UUVs (MUUVs) are systems with a diameter larger than 10 inches but less than 21 inches, allowing torpedo tube deployment. The two primary MUUV missions are intelligence gathering (“Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment”) and mine countermeasures. By deploying from a submarine, they can respond rapidly to a tactical situation.
+
+ A recent trilateral exercise by the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia — Technology Readiness Experimentation, or T-REX 23-2 — tested some of these capabilities.
+
+ CSIS’s working group of outside experts noted that UUVs were attractive because of their stealth, but also that command and control underwater was extremely difficult. It represented a technological challenge that industry needs to overcome.
+
+- __Improved Submarine Maintenance:__ What matters ultimately is not how many submarines a fleet has but how many submarines it can deploy. U.S. submarine availability has been low because of maintenance backlogs. In recent years, availability has run about 60 percent; that figure is up to 64–67 percent now, and the Navy hopes to get it up to 80 percent. Extended shipyard maintenance periods for submarines contribute to this low availability rate. From FY 2015 to FY 2019, only 5 of 33 submarine maintenance periods were completed on time, with a total of 6,296 days (about 17 years) lost to maintenance delay. Across the fleet, the difference between 60 percent and 80 percent availability is 10 boats that should be sailing the seas but are instead sitting in shipyards. The budget supplemental proposed in October 2023 contains $3.4 billion for the submarine industrial base. This would help substantially, though it will take years before the fleet feels the effects of those funds.
+
+- __Forward rearming:__ In wargames, submarines rapidly exhaust their munition inventories and must return to base to reload. Currently, those reload locations are limited to Guam and Yokosuka. The Navy is considering additional reload locations and could, for example, build more submarine tenders. Accelerating the reload cycle gets submarines get back into the fight more quickly.
+
+#### Bringing More Forces to Bear, More Effectively
+
+As noted in Chapter 2, the United States has many allies and partners in the Western Pacific. The challenge is bringing these forces to bear, especially since there is no overarching alliance like NATO to establish joint structures and set standards. Instead, these must be established bilaterally. Measures to enhance cooperation include:
+
+- __Coalition Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Packages:__ These systems are critical for creating a common operating picture across an entire coalition. However, every country has its own technologies and procedures. Therefore, systems that allow the U.S. C3I systems to link with those of an ally or partner would be enormously valuable.
+
+ Such systems must be effective without multibillion-dollar acquisition programs, imposition of common standards, or years of training and exercises. Although all these approaches would be useful, they are likely unobtainable except with the closest allies because of the cost and need to exchange highly sensitive data. One example of an alternative approach would be a deployable package that could sit in an allied or partner command center. This would build on the fusion centers that already exist. However, many other approaches are possible.
+
+ In considering solutions, the perfect is the enemy of the good. It would be better to have some simple systems in the hands of U.S. and allied forces now, given the immediacy of the threat, rather than wait for the perfect network solution in the distant future.
+
+ The working group emphasized that these arrangements need to be made before war breaks out. Improvising joint C3I during a conflict takes time, misses warfighting opportunities, and weakens defenses.
+
+- __Air and Maritime Domain Awareness:__ All three potential conflict scenarios — invasion, blockade, and gray zone competition — require excellent air and maritime domain awareness. The United States and its allies and partners need to know the location of potential adversaries’ forces, their own forces, and coalition forces. The latter can be challenging because allied and coalition forces do not always connect to friendly information systems. Low-tech solutions may, therefore, be a better option to bridge gaps in air/maritime domain awareness with some allies and partners. This requirement does not diminish as the intensity of conflict diminishes; it is as important for gray zone competition and blockades as it is for full-scale conflict.
+
+- __Coalition Training:__ Some allies, such as Australia and Japan, have highly trained forces; others struggle to attain adequate levels of training proficiency. All allies and the United States need training on how to work together. Analyses and wargames often gloss over “soft” factors such as training. The United States has recognized the need for training and education for decades, instituting a wide variety of training programs with allies. The availability of troops and units to conduct this training is frequently a constraint. Expanded contractor support could increase coalition training opportunities and thereby link military forces more closely.
+
+ Contractors can supplement military personnel in meeting these training demands and have done so in the past. Indeed, contractors have been described as the fourth element of military force structure, along with active-duty troops, National Guard and reserves, and government civilians.
+
+- __Contractor Logistics Support:__ Many allies and partners struggle with obsolescent equipment and readiness challenges. All militaries must compete with the civilian sector for technically skilled personnel to maintain the equipment. Further, maintainers are often junior enlisted personnel who are essentially apprentices as they gain experience. As with training, one solution is to have contractors augment military personnel. Contractors often have substantial technical skills that can supplement military maintenance efforts, not just in peacetime but also in wartime. The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan was that contractors would stay at their posts in conflicts as long as they understood the risks beforehand.
+
+#### Operating in a Hostile Environment
+
+China has been able to threaten adversary forces at increasing distances by building large missile forces, and it is not alone in this regard. Russia and Iran have similarly developed long-range capabilities. Although this environment is widely understood and appreciated in the United States, it will nevertheless be a shock for U.S. naval and air forces, which have operated in sanctuary for many decades. The following actions would enhance the ability to operate in this hostile environment:
+
+- __Aircraft Dispersion:__ Wargaming indicates that aircraft are most vulnerable on the ground. For many years, the U.S. solution to airbase defense was interceptors. That is still an essential part of any strategy but is insufficient because of the potentially massive strikes that China can conduct. Therefore, another element of the strategy needs to be dispersal. The Air Force has recognized this with its agile combat employment doctrine. The doctrine seeks to “shift operations from centralized physical infrastructures to a network of smaller, dispersed locations that can complicate adversary planning and provide more options for joint force commanders.” Part of implementing the doctrine involves training personnel and conducting exercises. However, part requires creating the units and equipment needed to operate successfully from many more sites, some of which may be austere and lack the required supporting capabilities.
+
+- __Aircraft Survivability:__ The Air Force has made some investments in explosive ordinance demolition and runway repair, recognizing that air bases will be attacked. These initiatives should be continued. One aspect of aircraft survivability that the Air Force has not embraced is hardened shelters. Although the United States built many during the Cold War, it has not built any since. Yet, dispersal alone is insufficient because of the large number of aircraft requiring forward basing and the need to continue using large U.S. bases despite missile strikes. Without hardened shelters, any aircraft at these bases would be highly vulnerable.
+
+- __Surface Ships’ Defensive Capabilities:__ Surface ships that want to operate west of Guam during a conflict with China need strong defensive capabilities. Indeed, any ship operating near a hostile shore needs strong and vigilant defenses, as the Russian cruiser Moskva learned to its sorrow. The Navy is aware of this and is constantly upgrading ship defensive systems. This project is never done, as adversaries continue to develop new attack capabilities that require new responses.
+
+- __Asymmetric Capabilities for Taiwan:__ Taiwan’s need for asymmetric defenses has been widely discussed and needs no expansion here. This does not mean that Taiwan should retire all of its conventional capabilities. However, it does mean that asymmetric capabilities — land-based antiship missiles, land-based air defenses, sea mines, and missile boats — need greater priority because of their ability to survive in this increasingly hostile environment. This is often called a “porcupine” strategy and has been hotly debated in Taiwan. A more balanced force structure would also enhance deterrence by reducing the possibility of a debilitating Chinese first strike.
+
+- __Resilience against Cyberattacks:__ Cyber defenses are now well established as integral to modern warfare. These defenses need to be tended continuously like those in any other domain. The war in Ukraine has shown that robust cyber defenses are possible, particularly when developed in connection with commercial firms. These defenses cannot deflect all attacks but can protect friendly assets sufficiently so that cyberattacks do not have a major operational impact.
+
+- __Resilience against Electronic Warfare:__ The working group emphasized that China has powerful electronic warfare capabilities, and many wargames have speculated about what these capabilities might be able to do. This represents a level of threat that other post-Cold War adversaries have not possessed. Decades of operating in “electronic sanctuary” have created vulnerabilities in U.S. and allied forces even as electronic systems have greatly enhanced military capabilities. One vulnerability is the loss of communications. Such a loss would not be absolute because some mechanisms for communication will always be available. However, a generation of military officers has become accustomed to reliable voice, internet, chat rooms, and video and will find it difficult to operate in a severely degraded communications environment. Finding ways to harden communications, for example, by using wire and cable instead of airwaves, would cushion the force against electronic warfare shock.
+
+ Related to the loss of communications is the loss of the Global Positioning System (GPS). As with reliable communications, U.S. and partner forces have come to expect reliable GPS service for guiding munitions, ascertaining unit locations, and developing a common operating picture. Indeed, GPS is so ingrained into U.S. operations that loss of its capability would have second and third-order effects that are not fully understood. Alternatives to GPS, such as determining location through inertial navigation systems and even old-fashioned map reading, are available. However, the accuracy, precision, and low cost of GPS make adopting alternatives difficult despite the system’s widely recognized vulnerability.
+
+- __Contested Logistics:__ Since the German U-boats of World War II, no adversary has been able to interfere with U.S. logistics flow. That is changing. China can now disrupt flows within the second island chain and will soon be able to reach beyond that. Building logistics systems that can operate in a contested environment requires new technologies, platforms, and concepts. The Navy has begun such adaptation by closing the Red Hill depot and instead building a network of fuel distribution points, including on-call tankers. The military services are conducting wargames to understand what contested logistics mean operationally. However, programmatic efforts in this space have just begun.
+
+#### Hedging against Unconventional Threats
+
+When thinking about threats, it is natural to mirror image, imagining that threats to U.S. forces are the same as threats to adversary forces. For many aspects of great power conflict, this is true. However, some challenges from adversaries lack strong U.S. counterparts, and these need careful consideration lest the United States be surprised. Such challenges include:
+
+- __Countering Mines:__ Periodically, a major article appears in military journals noting how sea mines have constituted the greatest threat to U.S. Navy ships since World War II and bemoaning the lack of preparation to deal with this well-documented threat. The United States could encounter mines in any future conflict, whether due to an invasion of Taiwan, a blockade, or gray zone competition. Countering mine warfare requires locating minefields, clearing lanes, and then keeping the lanes open. This, in turn, requires a spectrum of capabilities from mine reconnaissance to mine neutralization. In the past, the United States has developed a variety of imaginative approaches, from using sea mammals to spot mines to sailing sacrificial ships through minefields. Yet, U.S. countermine capabilities today remain weak.
+
+- __Countering Maritime Swarming:__ Chinese maritime swarming comes up repeatedly in wargames and analyses. The tactic seeks to defeat adversaries without kinetic attack. This low-level threat is not something the United States has had to deal with because of its powerful naval forces, but it is a day-to-day reality for many allies and partners in the Western Pacific. Technologies that inhibit swarming tactics without resorting to deadly force would be helpful.
+
+ Efforts to counter piracy developed some non-kinetic approaches such as fire hoses, restricted shipboard access, and barbed wire. In a blockade or gray zone confrontation, these same systems could be used to counter attempts to board transiting vessels.
+
+ Portable defensive packages might be placed on merchant ships to provide some protection. Such packages would include capabilities that are too expensive to place on every ship but inexpensive enough to be produced in large numbers and deployed on those ships that need it. Some examples include sonic systems, foams, water cannons, and dazzlers to discourage boarding parties. The aim is to increase survivability to the point where operations are viable, not to prevent all losses, which is an unattainable goal. This space is open for imaginative solutions, as major navies have historically been less susceptible to these challenges, and therefore, not thought deeply about them.
+
+ The DOD’s Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program has developed a wide variety of nonlethal systems “to arm the Joint Force with the fullest range of capabilities in support of National Security objectives.” Many of the technologies developed by the task force have been used in combat. Expanding them to partner nations and commercial shippers would be new but could potentially provide significant leverage in a blockade or gray zone situation. Partner nations might find these capabilities easier to employ during gray zone or blockade confrontations because they are the ones being directly threatened. Commercial organizations might use these capabilities under the concept of self-defense, expanding what they have done to protect themselves against pirates.
+
+- __UASs to Harass the Harassers:__ Building on the discussion above, small, shipborne UASs might help thwart harassment by Chinese ships, particularly nonmilitary vessels such as the China Coast Guard and Maritime Militia. By harassing the harassers, UASs could warn of impending danger and interfere with attacks by Chinese water cannons or “shouldering.”
+
+#### Defending against All Manifestations of Air Threats
+
+An area universally noted in discussions about future conflict is the need to counter a wide variety of air threats, from ballistic missiles, to cruise missiles, to UASs. Once the province of well-funded states, these capabilities are now obtainable by every nation. Indeed, even non-national groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas now field large rocket and cruise missile forces.
+
+This drives a demand for air defenses to protect populations, military forces, and the flow of goods. Missile defenses need not be 100 percent effective to have value. All defenses complicate an adversary’s planning. Such efforts could include:
+
+- __Missile Defenses:__ Regional U.S. ballistic missile defenses are relatively well developed since these threats have been around for a while, such as from North Korea, Iran, and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Cruise missile defenses have received considerable attention recently as more countries have obtained these missiles, and U.S. ground-based air defenses have atrophied. The CSIS Missile Defense Project has written extensively about these needs. Although many of these analyses have focused on U.S. homeland defense, many of the insights and systems described are applicable to overseas operations and other countries. Their 2023 report on the Russian missile offensive against Ukraine notes that U.S. missile defense systems have been largely successful in intercepting Russian missiles, that fixed air defense platforms are themselves highly vulnerable, and that passive defenses remain critical to mitigating missile threats. Their 2022 review of North American missile defense architecture argues that U.S. homeland cruise missile defenses have been neglected, leaving the United States vulnerable to non-nuclear attack and coercion.
+
+ Even hypersonic missiles can be countered. A pair of CSIS Missile Defense Program reports argue that, although hypersonic missiles are formidable weapons, they are not unbeatable. The United States can develop defenses, and these can be deployed overseas.
+
+- __Counter Uncrewed Aerial Systems:__ The wars in Ukraine and between Israel and Hamas have highlighted the need to counter UASs with inexpensive systems. Systems designed for aircraft and cruise missile defense are too expensive. It makes little sense to shoot down a $20,000 kamikaze UAS with a million-dollar missile. Further, countering the swarms of cheap, often commercial reconnaissance UASs requires many systems to cover the entire length of the front lines.
+
+ This need is not a surprise, as the United States has been developing a wide variety of such systems for some time, including small-scale interceptor rockets, electronic warfare and jammers, and nets that capture adversary UASs. While some of these countermeasures involve complex technologies, others are simple since many Chinese UASs rely on simple radio links that can easily be jammed or overpowered. Many of these countermeasures have been sent to Ukraine. On the horizon is the possibility of directed energy weapons, which could rapidly attack multiple targets at low cost per shot.
+
+ Nevertheless, the field is underdeveloped, and with UAS technology constantly evolving, a measure/countermeasure competition will play out for many years. Innovation and new systems will be needed constantly.
+
+ The working group emphasized that systems to counter small and medium-sized UASs need to be integrated with front-line units because UASs are so widely proliferated. Creating specialized units is not sufficiently responsive except for dealing with the largest UASs.
+
+#### Thinking Offensively, Even When on the Defense
+
+Much of the literature relating to the Western Pacific is about defense and coping with Chinese A2/AD capabilities. This is reasonable considering the threat environment. However, even in defensive situations, there are opportunities for the offense. Several technologies can facilitate these opportunities:
+
+- __Jamming and Counter-C3I:__ Chinese reliance on “information agility” and “system-of-systems” operational concepts opens vulnerabilities. Without fully functioning C3I systems to coordinate and integrate, the disconnected parts will be less than the integrated whole. Thus, jamming activities could pay huge dividends.
+
+- __Uncrewed Surface Vessels:__ USVs might provide a way to operate inside the Chinese defensive zone while minimizing risk to crewed surface ships. The Navy is investigating many such vessels, from the size of rowboats to the size of corvettes. All can extend the sensor range of crewed vessels. The additional standoff distance provides more warning of attack and longer-range targeting for offensive weapons. Larger USVs will likely incorporate weapons, thus increasing the magazine depth of the total fleet. The Navy is conducting many experiments in this area, not having settled on a particular architecture or set of programs.
+
+ The working group saw great potential here and noted that USV command and control was much easier than with UUVs because air is a better medium for communications than water. However, they cautioned against making the platforms multi-mission. That increased cost and complexity, removing one of their advantages over crewed systems. Instead, missions for both USVs and UASs (below) should be focused.
+
+- __Uncrewed Aerial Systems:__ Like USVs, UASs offer the ability to extend sensor range and potentially be strike assets of their own, with the ability to penetrate A2/AD zones without risking crews. Unlike USVs and UUVs, the Navy has several programs of record, the MQ-25 Stingray and MQ-4 being the most relevant here. The MQ-25 program has particular potential. Its units are beginning production and will reach the fleet in 2026. Although currently configured as tankers, they have the potential to be strike assets on their own.
+
+- __Hypersonic Weapons:__ Hypersonic weapons have become the iconic weapon of the new era, with close attention being paid to the technology’s relative development among the United States, China, and Russia. As noted earlier, the problem with hypersonic missiles is their high cost. Nevertheless, even low-inventory weapons can be hugely valuable. The ability of hypersonic weapons to strike distant, high-value, and well-defended targets holds at risk adversary assets that might otherwise be invulnerable or nearly so. Losing these assets, such as headquarters or major platforms, such as aircraft carriers, would disproportionately affect adversary capabilities and morale.
+
+- __Standoff Sea Mines:__ As previously noted, sea mines are enormously powerful weapons because of their latency and covertness. However, emplacing them can be a challenge, particularly for the United States, which abides by international rules and has relatively distant bases. Mines that need to be dropped from aircraft risk the survivability of the delivery platform. Mines that can glide some distance reduce this vulnerability. Thus, standoff mines have great potential. The United States has begun developing such a capability with the QuickStrike Extended Range mine, but there is much more that could be done given the increasing strength of Chinese and Russian air defenses. Indeed, sea mines and similar technologies — such as new kinds of mines, decoys, and different emplacement methods — are areas where creative solutions can add friction to Chinese military plans.
+
+ The working group recommended enhancing the sea mine capabilities of regional allies since they were already present at key locations and had the latitude to conduct mining in their territorial waters.
+
+#### Conclusion: Opportunities for Cooperation
+
+The foregoing lays out many areas of potential cooperation between nations and between the governments and their defense industry. All provide insight into the question of what might be done while waiting for the submarine fleet to expand. Some areas may prove more fruitful or easier to coordinate than others. Deciding which to pursue requires prototyping, experimentation, and field testing. That process needs to move forward.
+
+Only by beginning the forward movement can the assessment process illuminate challenges that inevitably occur. For example, export controls and restrictions on data sharing are emerging as key challenges to the technology coordination envisioned by AUKUS.
+
+Finally, government decisions on promising technologies signal industry where it should focus its attention and resources. The defense industry in every country wants to produce products that the defense establishment requires, but these industries need pointers to ensure they are being responsive to government strategies.
+
+---
+
+__Mark Cancian__ (Colonel, USMCR, ret.) is a senior adviser with the CSIS International Security Program. He joined CSIS in April 2015 from the Office of Management and Budget, where he spent more than seven years as chief of the Force Structure and Investment Division, working on issues such as Department of Defense budget strategy, war funding, and procurement programs, as well as nuclear weapons development and nonproliferation activities in the Department of Energy.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : The Scourge Of Ransomware
+author: Jamie MacColl, et al.
+date : 2024-01-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Ean6Me3.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Victim Insights on Harms to Individuals, Organisations and Society"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Ransomware incidents remain a scourge on UK society. Based on interviews with ransomware victims and incident responders, this paper outlines the harms to organisations, individuals, the UK economy, national security and wider society._
+
+
+
+The research reveals a wide range of harms caused by ransomware, including physical, financial, reputational, psychological and social harms.
+
+We set out a framework of:
+
+- __First-order harms:__ Harms to any organisation and their staff directly targeted by a ransomware operation.
+
+- __Second-order harms:__ Harms to any organisation or individuals that are indirectly affected by a ransomware incident.
+
+- __Third-order harms:__ The cumulative effect of ransomware incidents on wider society, the economy and national security.
+
+Building on an existing taxonomy of cyber harms, this framework will enable policymakers, practitioners and researchers to categorise more case studies on ransomware incidents and to better explain new and existing types of harm to the UK and other countries.
+
+Ransomware is a risk for organisations of all sizes. The findings from this paper highlight that ransomware can create significant financial costs and losses for organisations, which in some cases can threaten their very existence. Ransomware can also create reputational harm for businesses that rely on continuous operations or hold very sensitive data – although customers and the general public can be more forgiving than some victims believe.
+
+The harms from ransomware go beyond financial and reputational costs for organisations. Interviews with victims and incident responders revealed that ransomware creates physical and psychological harms for individuals and groups, including members of staff, healthcare patients and schoolchildren.
+
+Ransomware can ruin lives. Incidents highlighted in this paper have caused individuals to lose their jobs, evoked feelings of shame and self-blame, extended to private and family life, and contributed to serious health issues.
+
+The harm and cumulative effects caused by ransomware attacks have implications for wider society and national security, including supply chain disruption, a loss of trust in law enforcement, reduced faith in public services, and the normalisation of cybercrime. Ransomware also creates a strategic advantage for the hostile states harbouring the cyber-criminals who conduct such operations.
+
+Downstream harm to individuals from ransomware is more severe when attacks encrypt IT infrastructure, rather than steal and leak data. There is no evidence from this research that the ransomware ecosystem is exploiting stolen or leaked personal data in a systemic way for fraud or other financially motivated cybercrimes. At present, exploiting stolen data for other activities is less profitable than extortion-based crime that takes away victims’ access to their systems and data. This finding may inform victim decision-making on when they should and should not consider paying a ransom demand.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) recently assessed that ransomware remains one of the most acute cyber threats facing the UK. In 2023 alone, companies and public bodies affected by ransomware incidents in the UK included the Royal Mail, outsourcing firm Capita and an NHS trust. In late May 2023, one cybercrime group exploited a critical software flaw within a file transfer platform (MOVEit), reportedly impacting over 60 million individuals and more than 2,600 organisations worldwide. In the UK context, this incident enabled attackers to compromise a third-party HR company, likely exposing employees’ personal data – including company IDs and national insurance numbers from organisations such as British Airways, Boots and the BBC – to organised cyber-criminals. This may have been the largest ransomware incident of 2023, with a Russian-based threat actor linked to the CL0P ransomware operation claiming responsibility and demanding ransom payments in exchange for deleting the data. It demonstrated ransomware threat actors’ ability to continue to evolve their tactics and scale their operations to affect multiple victims in one operation.
+
+The threat from ransomware shows no signs of abating, thanks to its profitable and innovative business model, poor cyber security practices in many organisations, and a permissive law enforcement environment in Russia. No sector is off limits as threat actors continue to target public and private sector organisations, schools, hospitals and local government.
+
+However, the victims of these attacks rarely share their experiences. There are many reasons for this reticence, including legal reasons, reputational concerns, or even plain fear – ransomware groups use aggressive language and methods to increase the victims’ propensity to pay a ransom. Consequently, the lack of reporting to law enforcement and cyber security agencies, and limited transparency on the part of victims (including in terms of communicating with the media) means that there is scant understanding of the range of harms experienced by victims during and after such incidents. This research paper addresses that gap, by speaking to victims or others associated with an incident.
+
+By shining a light on the harms experienced by victims, this research provides a clearer picture of the harm caused by ransomware and therefore also the economic, societal and national security risks posed by ransomware groups to the UK and beyond. This is important for policymakers and industry, as a more holistic understanding of the harms stemming from ransomware will allow government to make more informed policy prioritisation choices so as to reduce the threat and help law enforcement, incident responders and organisations to better support victims.
+
+At present, much of the coverage of ransomware focuses on the financial harm inflicted by ransomware incidents. This is understandable, as financial harm is a highly relevant impact that is both tangible and, at times, measurable. For example, media coverage often addresses the immediate financial impact of ransomware in the form of ransom payments and business continuity costs. Similarly, several studies focus on the cost of data breaches or other cyber incidents, including ransomware attacks. This paper does not seek to play down financial harm – indeed, ransomware causes wider financial harm than is usually recognised, but there are few studies that attempt to make a macroeconomic impact assessment of the harm from ransomware beyond the cost to a particular organisation.
+
+However, there are a range of other harms from ransomware too, beyond the obvious financial impacts. These harms go beyond just affecting the direct victim of an incident – indirect victims can include other organisations, communities and individuals – and can be physical and psychological in nature. There is a real human impact to ransomware attacks that is yet to be fully grasped and measured. Although some reporting has tried to focus on this aspect by exploring the impact of incidents on students and council tenants, or by exploring the psychological and long-term harms caused by ransomware, such reports remain few and far between.
+
+Ransomware can ruin lives. This paper addresses the broader harms caused by ransomware, ranging from individual victims through to UK national security and prosperity. By engaging with victims and those associated with an incident, such as incident responders, insurers, lawyers, law enforcement officers and government officials, this research uncovers unique insights into a range of harms from ransomware. The findings should not only alert more policymakers to the scourge of ransomware, but also lead to a serious rethink about the resources required to combat ransomware in a meaningful way, both in the UK context and more widely.
+
+#### Structure
+
+This paper comprises three chapters. Chapter I sets outs out the tactics and techniques used by ransomware threat actors to cause harm. Chapter II details the harms that result from ransomware attacks, in an analysis based on interview data, workshops and public reporting; impacts from ransomware incidents are listed as first-, second- and/or third-order harms respectively. Chapter III sets out important implications for policymakers and practitioners to consider.
+
+#### Methodology
+
+This paper is part of a 12-month research project on “Ransomware Harms and the Victim Experience”. The project is funded by the UK’s NCSC and the Research Institute in Sociotechnical Cyber Security, and conducted by RUSI and the University of Kent. The paper’s aim is to understand the wide range of harms caused by ransomware attacks to individuals, organisations and society at large.
+
+The paper focuses on the question of what harms (for example, physical, economic, societal, psychological) ransomware incidents cause to organisations and individuals in the UK, and to the UK more broadly.
+
+The data collection and analysis for this paper entailed a literature review, semi-structured interviews and workshops. One strength of the research approach is that participants were encouraged to speak freely about their own experience of ransomware attacks.
+
+- __Literature review__: This consisted of a literature review of publicly available sources on ransomware harm and ransomware victims. It included a non-systematic review of publicly available academic and grey literature, including surveys and reports conducted by stakeholders in the ransomware ecosystem. The initial literature review was conducted in August and September 2022.
+
+- __Semi-structured interviews:__ The primary dataset for the paper is based on 42 semi-structured interviews with victims of ransomware attacks and with subject matter experts from across the ransomware ecosystem, including individuals from the insurance industry, government and law enforcement, as well as incident responders. Interviews were conducted between November 2022 and March 2023, and were anonymised to allow individuals to speak openly about potentially sensitive issues. The research team then analysed the interview transcripts using NVivo data analysis software. Throughout this paper, an anonymised coding system, based on Table 1, is used to refer to interview data in the footnotes.
+
+- __Workshops:__ In November 2022 and February 2023, the research team conducted two online workshops with key stakeholders from UK government, the insurance and cyber security industries, lawyers and law enforcement. Attendees included a mix of interviewees and new participants, using contacts established during the interview phase. The first workshop was used for data gathering and had 26 participants; the second was used to validate and reassess themes identified in the first workshop, the literature review and in interviews, and had 21 participants.
+
+The paper focuses primarily on the harm caused in a UK context, but it also draws on experiences from other countries, such as the US. A small number of international participants were included in this research project.
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: Interview Participants (Non-Victims/Victims).___
+
+#### Definitions
+
+For the purpose of this paper, a “victim” is any person or organisation that experiences harm as a result of a ransomware attack. This term can apply to individuals and organisations that are directly impacted, and to those that are indirectly affected and experience harm as a result. The term “harm” refers to any negative impact the victim may experience, which could be of a financial, physical, psychological, reputational or other nature. These underlying definitions are intentionally broad, allowing this paper to examine the full range of harms and victims that are impacted by ransomware attacks.
+
+#### Limitations
+
+A number of factors limit the generalisability of the research’s findings. First, the victim interviews should not be considered representative of a “universal” victim experience. As identified in the research, there is variation in the harms experienced by different victims. Additionally, the interviews included more public sector than private sector victims, with a very limited number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) represented. Moreover, there may also be a self-reporting bias, given that the interview data is based on organisations that were happy to speak about the harm they experienced.
+
+Second, the observations made in this paper are primarily about the UK. While many businesses – victims and those that are part of the cyber security ecosystem alike – provide services globally, the focus of this research rested on incidents and victims in the UK and their interactions with the UK cyber security ecosystem, including UK law enforcement and government.
+
+
+### I. Ransomware: Tactics and Targeting
+
+Ransomware has historically been defined as a form of malware that disrupts a user’s access to their computer system through encryption or locking. However, in recent years “ransomware” has become a catch-all term for different types of cyber extortion – including data theft. As such, this paper follows the Ransomware Task Force’s broader definition of ransomware as activity where threat actors compromise computer systems and demand a ransom for the restoration or non-exposure of encrypted and/or stolen data and systems.
+
+#### Creators of Harm: The Ransomware Ecosystem
+
+Ransomware, after nearly a decade of growth and innovation, is a highly profitable criminal enterprise supported by a diverse and professionalised ecosystem.
+
+Although there is no fixed business model for ransomware threat actors, a recent joint report by the UK’s NCSC and the National Crime Agency (NCA) outlined three broad business models that all cause harm to UK victims:
+
+- The “buy-a-build” model, which usually involves smaller groups of less experienced cyber-criminals obtaining existing ransomware code to develop.
+
+- The “in-house” model, where the same organisation responsible for developing the ransomware also conduct the operations (although they may still rely on other parts of the cyber-criminal ecosystem for other services necessary to monetise ransomware).
+
+- The “ransomware-as-a-service” (RaaS) model, which involves collaboration between groups/individuals who develop and maintain the infrastructure and tools behind ransomware operations, and “affiliates” who conduct operations for a percentage of profits. This model has become dominant in the ransomware ecosystem and has enabled operators to scale and increase the volume of attacks, thereby increasing the amount of harm ransomware causes.
+
+Ransomware operations are also supported by specialists in the criminal ecosystem, such as botnet operators, initial access brokers (who specialise in gaining access to victims’ networks), negotiators and money launderers.
+
+#### Methods of Harm: Extortion Tactics and Techniques
+
+Ransomware criminals are profit-driven and have developed a range of tactics and techniques to extort payments from victims. These methods rest on causing harm (or the fear of potential harm) to victims to pressure them into ceding to threat actors’ demands. Cyber-criminals use two primary extortion methods, although these are supported by a range of additional extortion tactics and techniques to increase their leverage.
+
+_Primary Extortion Methods_
+
+- __Encryption:__ Encrypting data is the most common tactic used by ransomware threat actors. This approach involves gaining access to a victim’s network, escalating privileges and accessing as many systems as possible before deploying malware that encrypts files and delivers the ransom note. Although early “pray-and-spray” ransomware campaigns only targeted individual endpoints, ransomware affiliates now aim to compromise domain administrator accounts so as to encrypt thousands of computers within a single organisation in one go. To maximise disruption and harm, threat actors will often spend time seeking out the critical systems and backups before encrypting them. These attacks can be particularly harmful to organisations that rely on maintaining continuous operations.
+
+- __Data theft:__ Since late 2019, cyber-criminals have also adopted so-called “double extortion” tactics, stealing victims’ data as well as encrypting it, then threatening to leak it unless the ransom is paid. Data theft can be a particularly useful tactic for targeting organisations with sensitive intellectual property, safeguarding data (such as schools) or medical data. Stolen financial information, including accounting and insurance policies, can be used to help threat actors design negotiation strategies and set ransom demands. Recently, some ransomware operations have foregone encrypting victims’ data altogether, and just stolen it. This trend is in part driven by larger organisations’ efforts to improve their resilience against ransomware by introducing offline backups and other measures, but also by the emergence in 2022 and 2023 of ransomware operations that exploit vulnerabilities in file transfer services, enabling criminals to steal data from dozens or even hundreds of victims at a time.
+
+_Secondary Extortion Methods_
+
+After encrypting systems and/or stealing data, ransomware threat actors often use additional methods to raise the stakes for victims and disrupt their response and recovery.
+
+- __Data leak sites:__ Since adopting data theft tactics, ransomware operators have also launched “name-and-shame” leak sites, on both the dark and clear webs, where they can name victims and leak data. This shames victims, but also serves as a warning to future victims who might consider refusing to pay. Threat actors can also draw additional attention to data leaks through social media or by contacting journalists.
+
+- __Harassment of employees and customers:__ More aggressive ransomware threat actors will also directly contact an affected organisation’s employees or customers. This method can be untargeted – for instance, cold calling a company’s phonelines in the hope that an employee will pick up; or more targeted – such as directly contacting executives or sending stolen personal data to relevant employees. This can be particularly embarrassing – and involve reputational risk and commercial consequences – if cyber-criminals send stolen data to a victim’s customers or users. Some reporting suggests that ransomware threat actors are adopting more extreme forms of harassment as victims’ willingness to pay ransoms decreases.
+
+- __DDoS attacks:__ Ransomware threat actors have also been known to use distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks to increase disruption to victims’ digital infrastructure. However, industry reporting indicates that this is not a widely used tactic: for instance, a report by the cyber security vendor Unit 42 (part of Palo Alto Networks), suggested that only 2% of the ransomware incidents they responded to in 2022 involved a DDoS attack as part of the extortion attempt.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: The CL0P Data Leak Site Lists New Victims.__ Source: [Cyberint, “CL0P Ransomware: The Latest Updates”, 23 October 2023](https://cyberint.com/blog/techtalks/cl0p-ransomware/)._
+
+#### Who Experiences Harm: Ransomware Targeting and Victimisation
+
+Ransomware threat actors are largely agnostic about who they choose to target, which means that almost any organisation is a potential ransomware victim. However, there are several considerations that, to varying degrees, appear to influence ransomware targeting and victimisation.
+
+- __Opportunism:__ Ransomware affiliates either gain access to organisations themselves or use specialist access brokers. In either case, organisations are typically compromised through opportunistic tactics and techniques that are designed to gain access to a wide range of victims through scanning for internet-facing vulnerabilities or poorly secured remote desktop protocols, or via phishing campaigns. This makes organisations and sectors that underinvest in or mismanage IT infrastructure and cyber security particularly vulnerable to ransomware.
+
+- __Nature of business/organisation:__ Some ransomware threat actors appear to prioritise organisations that are incentivised to quickly resolve incidents. Criminals often seek targets for whom it is critical that their operations provide certain products or services in a timely manner. Alternatively, being attuned to the potential regulatory and reputational risks that the exposure of customer or client data can entail, they might prioritise organisations that hold sensitive information. This means that victims may be targeted by virtue of the vulnerabilities linked to their industry sector. While some ransomware actors adopt a risk-averse avoidance of critical national infrastructure (CNI) sectors (although this is unlikely to be an absolute commitment to avoid disrupting such sectors), others prioritise their targeting based on the assumption of an increased likelihood of payment. Some ransomware groups were relentless in their targeting of healthcare organisations during the Covid-19 pandemic, while one more recent ransomware operation, Vice Society, has focused on targeting and stealing sensitive data from education providers in the US and the UK.
+
+- __Size of organisation:__ Some threat actors deliberately target larger organisations. So-called “big game hunting” ransomware operations aim to generate sizeable pay-outs from large corporations. However, size does not matter for most ransomware threat actors, and reporting from Coveware, a specialist ransomware response firm, consistently highlights that the median ransomware victim is a medium-sized organisation.
+
+Taken together, these factors emphasise that a wide range of organisations (and by extension, their employees and customers, or users of their products and services) can be harmed by ransomware. The rest of this paper examines the impact of ransomware on organisations, individuals and society.
+
+
+### II. Ransomware Harms
+
+This chapter identifies the range of harms that organisations, individuals and countries such as the UK experience as a result of a ransomware incident. The findings build on existing research that analyses or categorises ransomware or cyber breach harms. Existing research has, for instance: drawn a distinction between “direct” and “indirect” harms to a victim (particularly financial); explored cumulative impacts, such as reduced employee productivity; emphasised the potential societal impacts arising from protracted CNI downtime; articulated the risk of tangible loss of reputation; considered psychological harms experienced by impacted individuals; and reflected on the broader range of impacts that may be experienced by clients, including hospital patients and school students.
+
+To improve understanding of the different types of harm caused by ransomware across society and to help understand the scale of the policy challenge, this paper uses a framework with three categories:
+
+- __First-order harms:__ Harms to any organisation (and its staff) directly targeted by a ransomware operation.
+
+- __Second-order harms:__ Harms to any organisation or individuals that are indirectly affected by a ransomware incident (e.g. organisations that are customers or clients of a victim, or individuals that are customers of a victim or use a service that is disrupted).
+
+- __Third-order harms:__ The cumulative effect of incidents on wider society, the economy and national security.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: The Three Different Categories of Ransomware Harms, and Who/What They Affect.___
+
+Figure 2 illustrates how ransomware attacks can cascade through the supply chain, economy and society, distinguishing between harms that are experienced by organisations, individuals and countries. Some harms impact the organisations directly targeted by ransomware, others impact organisations and individuals indirectly affected by ransomware.
+
+This analysis draws on a 2018 taxonomy of cyber harms, which identifies five broad types of harm: physical or digital; financial or economic; reputational; psychological; and social or societal. These five themes are applied to the three categories in the framework to illustrate the range of harms that organisations, individuals and countries can suffer. Each order of harm is contextualised using an author-generated figure, the content of which was derived from interviews and workshop data.
+
+Crucially, this framework is not intended to be definitive. It builds on previous research and should be added to in the future. We urge policymakers, researchers and practitioners to continue to identify new types of harms based on further case studies and personal experiences, particularly with regard to sectors not represented in our evidence base. New types of harm will no doubt emerge as ransomware operators find new ways to harm and extort their victims.
+
+#### First-Order Harms
+
+The first category involves harms to the organisations and staff directly targeted by ransomware. Interview and workshop data highlighted areas of convergence and divergence between “organisation” and “staff” harm, to the extent that it is necessary to distinguish overtly between the two. The distinction between an organisation and individuals (and the harm they experience) is less apparent for small business owners or sole traders. They typically do not distinguish between the organisation and themselves, and might not have any other employees.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3: Categorisation of First-Order Harms to Organisations and Their Staff.___
+
+_First-Order Harms to Organisations_
+
+At the organisational level, this research has identified three main types of harm caused by ransomware: physical/digital harm to systems and data; financial harm; and reputational harm. While general reporting on ransomware harms often focuses on the immediate financial harm, for example, when media reporting stresses the size of a ransomware payment, the research data indicates that the range of harm experienced by the victim organisation is much broader. The following section identifies themes that emerged from the research data.
+
+- _Digital and Physical Harm_
+
+This category of harm describes negative impacts on an organisation’s digital and physical systems, and on its data. Broadly, such harm results from the effects of ransomware threat actors’ efforts to encrypt systems or steal data, and sometimes, in turn, from defenders’ efforts to contain an incident.
+
+Ransomware attacks involving encryption can have a profound negative impact on an organisation’s IT infrastructure. Several of the victims interviewed revealed that their servers had been encrypted by the ransomware in their entirety, with one victim in the education sector losing access to more than 10,000 computers as a result. The impact becomes even more significant if ransomware operators are also able to encrypt or delete any backups. Interviewees also highlighted how common it is for cyber-criminals to deploy ransomware at the end of the week or during public holidays, when organisations are slower to react and defend themselves.
+
+The extent of disruption to IT infrastructure from ransomware varies from incident to incident. One government agency described how, in the aftermath of the ransomware deployment, “we had lost access to all of our systems and … all of our data. We were right back to being a non-digital non-IT organisation”. Indeed, a number of interviewees highlighted how, in the absence of key digital services, ransomware often forces organisations to return to operating by “pen and paper”.
+
+In other cases, ransomware can be isolated to a single server or IT function, either because it fails to deploy as planned or because security controls or resilience measures are (at least partially) effective. However, even in these cases, the effort to contain ransomware can still have significant impacts on the delivery of business operations. Several interviewees highlighted how they had to disconnect or isolate their IT infrastructure from the internet for several days – or even weeks – while they assessed the extent of the attack and removed the threat actor’s access to their networks. The impact from drastic incident response measures can be as harmful to operations as the initial infection.
+
+A ransomware attack and the subsequent recovery efforts can also result in prolonged reduced performance of IT infrastructure. Although some victims are able to recover within weeks or months, interviewees reported that recovery efforts can sometimes stretch into years. One interviewee from the professional services sector emphasised that their company still had trouble with impacted financial systems several years after the incident. Hackney Council, which was targeted by cyber-criminals using Pysa ransomware in October 2022, took more than two years to recover fully from the incident. And if backups are encrypted or destroyed, organisations may lose access to data permanently. One interviewee from the education sector, for instance, highlighted how teachers permanently lost teaching material following an attack against their academy trust, with some losing 20 years’ worth of resources.
+
+Ransomware can also harm physical systems and processes. Although most ransomware operations lack the capability to directly compromise industrial control systems (ICS) and operational technology (OT), the disruption of IT infrastructure can cause cascading operational impacts. Indeed, the increasing convergence of IT and OT leaves physical infrastructure more vulnerable to ransomware. One notable example is the 2019 ransomware attack on Norsk Hydro, a Norwegian aluminium and hydroelectric producer, which caused several plants to shut down at great cost. A small number of the victims interviewed for this research paper used ICS as a core part of their business or operations, but most did not. Nonetheless, several interviewees highlighted examples where disruption to their IT digital infrastructure had knock-on effects on their operations. These included schools that lost access to CCTV, fire control systems, and doors and gates, and a victim in the education sector that lost control over fridges and freezers containing sensitive research.
+
+- _Financial Harm_
+
+Victims of ransomware attacks experience a wide range of financial harm. Some forms of financial harm – such as the cost of a ransom payment – can be measured relatively easily, with studies finding that both ransom demands and incident response costs are steadily increasing. Other aspects of financial harm are harder to quantify, such as the cost of missed opportunities and reduced productivity. This means that there is limited understanding of the long-term financial harm caused by ransomware attacks.
+
+Overall, interview data confirmed that, in line with wider public reporting, primary attention rests on immediate financial harm, for example in the form of the additional costs encountered from a ransom payment, or losses arising from business interruption. One notable finding is that interviewees from victim organisations frequently reported that senior leadership would make assessments of the cost of the given ransomware incident, although it was challenging to disaggregate the overall costs of the ransomware incident from other fiscal shocks that occurred in the same timeframe as the incident, such as the Covid-19 pandemic. These assessments would typically have a tightly restricted readership. The interviews also confirmed that many organisations generally have limited understanding of the overall financial impact a ransomware attack has on the organisation, particularly with respect to financial harm that is not covered by an insurance policy, or which plays out over the long term. Therefore, the data represented here is subject to the same limitations: assessments of financial impact are unlikely to be definitive, and there is a need for further research in this area. Given the scale and depth of ransomware as an impactful form of contemporary cybercrime affecting almost all organisational sectors, it is important to further collective understanding of the scale of this harm to individual organisations and the wider economy.
+
+- _Additional Costs_
+
+Immediate financial harm spans the cost of paying the ransom itself and hiring external parties to help with the response to the incident – for example, incident response teams and lawyers, but also PR professionals. Often, the costs of hiring such third parties far exceeds the demand for the ransom payment. Some providers, such as lawyers, are costly, especially when incidents are complex. The high additional costs of hiring help from third parties are financially challenging where they are not covered by insurance, especially for small companies or for public service providers with limited financial reserves.
+
+Additional costs may also be incurred from paying existing staff overtime, or from hiring new (or temporary) staff. A victim from the education sector, for example, paid employees extra during the initial response phase, but also hired a cryptocurrency broker to facilitate access to cryptocurrency.
+
+But additional costs can also occur in less expected ways: one victim in the education sector was no longer able to charge students for school meals, and as a result had to cover the cost of food in the interim. Some companies also offered to pay for counselling services for their staff, but these costs are typically not covered by insurance. Some organisations also paid for credit monitoring for their employees.
+
+Many victims also face additional costs due to increased insurance premiums. While interviewees were often able to renew their cyber insurance policy after a ransomware attack, they had to do so at a higher cost.
+
+In the immediate reaction to a ransomware attack, additional costs may arise when replacing technology, as a ransomware attack often infiltrates many devices, or impairs communications for the victim. The victim may have to acquire additional devices, as was the case for one interviewee, who described how their company replaced all its employees’ phones after a ransomware attack. When phone systems in a local government entity failed due to a ransomware attack, extra telephones and mobile phones had to be acquired to enable staff to communicate with local citizens. Another victim purchased large numbers of Chromebook devices to access their Microsoft 365 environment so as to enable communication between employees and with clients.
+
+Further significant, long-term costs are accrued when improving cyber security measures and updating IT networks. While these measures are not always strictly required in response to a ransomware attack, such incidents often create the impetus for increased cyber security measures and spending. The costly decision to “build back better” is often deemed necessary or even overdue, but not covered by insurance. As a victim in the education sector said, “It’s all a lot of money, but money we should have spent a year earlier”.
+
+Other long-term costs stem from regulatory fines, although in the UK it is not clear how many fines have been issued to victims of ransomware by the Information Commissioner’s Office. Moreover, decisions on these fines are often only delivered months or even years after an attack, in the meantime weighing on a victim’s mental health and limiting their ability to move on after the incident. Similarly, litigation costs may also only arise months or years after the ransomware attack has occurred. Again, victims often require legal support during these processes, dragging out the additional costs incurred for hiring third parties such as data protection lawyers.
+
+While some additional costs come in the form of clearly defined bills, others are harder to directly trace back to the ransomware attack. One example of this is the additional cost of employee turnover. While some individuals might lose (or leave) their jobs directly as a result of an attack and need to be replaced, employees’ decisions to leave often have more than one cause. A ransomware attack may be a contributing factor or the tipping point in a decision process, for example due to the stress or anxiety the attack evoked. Other influencing factors – such as the Covid-19 pandemic or an organisation’s existing internal dynamics – make it hard to isolate a ransomware attack as the sole factor causing employee turnover. Nevertheless, exit interviews in the education sector revealed that some teachers leaving the profession cited the ransomware attack as a tipping point, due to some of their data being lost to the attack – something they felt their employer should have protected them from. Another victim described how the ransomware attack led to lower morale among employees, which in turn had “a knock-on effect as people started to leave. It makes those people that are on the fence of … leaving make that decision”. Low morale and other such intangible influences take a long time to overcome, the interviewee noted.
+
+For other interviewees, ransomware incidents were clearly the reason why people left their jobs, for example due to stress levels experienced during the ransomware response or because the person’s account had been used by the hacker (and, although this was not their fault, the repeated mentioning of their name throughout the response led to them leaving the organisation in question).
+
+Higher costs due to employee turnover may also arise because experienced IT staff receive more attractive employment offers from elsewhere. An interviewee in the engineering sector explained that “trying to hold on to people who are battle-tested in that kind of space is extremely difficult because everybody wants them”.
+
+In addition, higher costs may occur where staff needs to be – temporarily – replaced due to burnout or other psychological harm. For example, one interviewee described how staff were unable to return to work for months after the ransomware response due to the high stress levels experienced.
+
+Finally, victims often experience a more intangible type of cost: opportunity costs, wherein budgeting is disrupted by the need to redirect resources away from other objectives. A recent survey of 100 directors of UK firms impacted by ransomware identified that their organisations cut operating costs by an average of 17% following their ransomware incident.
+
+The impact of opportunity costs is likely to affect all victims operating with constrained finances, but may be particularly noticeable for victims in the public sector, such as councils, schools or hospitals, which are already running on tight budgets and have little ability to build back reserves. One interviewee in the public sector described how further cuts in funding put them in a worse position now than they were when the attack occurred, and that, in order to build back reserves, the organisation had to be particularly frugal in its spending and to increase revenue sources. In other ways, opportunity costs stem from reductions in productivity or from diverting staff from other pressing priorities to work on recovering from an incident.
+
+Ransomware victims thus encounter additional costs in many ways, some of which are better anticipated than others. These additional costs often exceed the ransom demand by a significant degree. Moreover, many additional costs only occur in the long term, such as litigation costs or the cost of building back IT networks. Long-term costs can also arise as a consequence of other harms, for example when new employees need to be hired after former employees leave their positions or need to be replaced due to burnout. Some of these costs are covered by insurance providers, but where this is not the case, ransomware victims often have limited insights into the long-term additional costs they face.
+
+- _Financial Losses_
+
+As well as the additional costs a victim organisation may face due to a ransomware attack, it may also experience a number of financial losses; indeed, small businesses may face the threat of going out of business. Even where the financial losses do not present an existential threat, they can nevertheless be significant. The following paragraphs provide some examples of the kind of financial losses that can occur.
+
+Business interruption accounts for the majority of financial losses after a ransomware attack – for example, when a company is unable to produce products or provide services to customers. The high financial impact of business interruption was confirmed by a 2022 study of cyber insurance claims for ransomware that found that the average cost of business interruption amounted to $657,000. Similarly, the interview data confirmed the significant financial harm caused by business interruption. One incident responder recalled working with manufacturing firms that were “losing tens, if not hundreds, of millions of euros or pounds a day because … their manufacturing lines were flying [disrupted]”. Business interruption also affected a victim in the charity sector, where the memberships team was unable to collect money from renewed membership subscriptions. As the annual direct debit collection was no longer working, the renewal process (worth £3 million) had to be delayed by a month. Business interruption, including delayed payments, is thus not only a significant financial harm but can also lead to reputational harm if a victim is no longer able to provide their services. While there are generally few examples of organisations going out of business or facing insolvency solely due to a ransomware attack, financial losses due to business interruption can be a significant influence in causing a business to shut down.
+
+This factor is closely linked to financial harm caused by loss of expected income, for example where a victim organisation had to cancel several reservations for a venue it offers as a conferencing space. Delay to another victim’s project meant that an education institution was unable to secure funding for further related research. Loss of expected income is of course closely related to the loss of clients. While often mentioned as a feared consequence, loss of clients is often difficult to directly attribute to the ransomware attack. An interviewee in the insurance business explained that although most insured parties do not lose a significant proportion of their customer base, this may happen in certain sectors (in the technology sector, for example, where customers display lower risk tolerance). For organisations that provide immediate services, losing clients may be a more tangible harm, for example in the construction industry, where the inability to provide a service would lead to the client immediately looking for a different supplier.
+
+Beyond the financial loss caused by loss of clients or expected income, ransomware attacks also result in a loss of time: the time that is needed to respond and recover. Ransomware attacks are highly disruptive, requiring the attention not just of IT staff but of staff from all departments. Financial harm also arises from time being spent responding to the ransomware attack, rather than on the usual tasks. As a victim in the education sector said, “The time cost is immense … The time cost of not only recovering, but not doing the work that you could have been doing”.
+
+Due to these financial losses and additional costs, interviewees widely regarded ransomware as a severe risk for organisations and potentially even as “business ending ... if you haven’t got your data, you don’t have a business”. An executive of a micro-enterprise noted that they would have lost their house and their company would have gone bankrupt if they had not had the cushion of cyber insurance.
+
+While public reporting has highlighted some cases of organisations permanently ceasing to trade after a ransomware incident, none of the victims interviewed reported that their organisation had ceased to be a going concern as the result of a ransomware attack. Interviewees from the ransomware recovery ecosystem (for example, incident responders and cyber insurers) were also hard-pressed to identify concrete cases where an organisation had ceased trading altogether. This may indicate a degree of selection bias: for example, organisations that were unable to afford incident response or did not have cyber insurance would not have been on these professionals’ radar. The limited cases of this kind that interviewees could recall tended to relate to the healthcare sector – such as a fertility clinic holding highly sensitive data – where it was the combination of business interruption and irrecoverable reputational harm that resulted in the business folding.
+
+- _Reputational Harm_
+
+Alongside any financial impact, harm to their external reputation is often a primary concern for victim organisations. Victims fear reputational harm arising either from media reporting or because customers and clients realise that the organisation is unable to provide a particular service. In some instances, victims have a contractual or regulatory – if not a moral – obligation to disclose that they have experienced a ransomware incident. Such incidents are, however, typically perceived as reflecting organisational weakness, and victims – who are also often subject to victim blaming – often fear that this will affect their reputation and professional credentials. A victim in the technology sector felt that “we were humiliated in front of the customer”, while another victim, in the education sector, confirmed that their “biggest bit of damage was probably reputational and confidence”.
+
+The driver behind such fear is the assumption that reputational harm in turn also leads to financial harm, for example due to loss of expected income or loss of clients. One employee at a manufacturing company recollected that customers would repeatedly ask about the ransomware incident even months after the attack, and that rumours about customers’ leaked personal data added to the reputational harm done. As a result, the company was perceived as being less safe, and questions were raised about whether larger competitors were a safer choice for doing business with, indicating that this perception could have resulted in/contributed to a loss of orders. Furthermore, the employee also noticed an impact on customer relations, as open communication with customers was prohibited, resulting in a feeling of lost trust among customers, who thought the employee knew more than they were telling. This echoes a risk highlighted more widely in reporting on the subject: that, where there is an alternative supplier, the reputational fallout from a ransomware incident can include the loss of existing and future customers. In 2023, the hosting firms CloudNordic and AzeroCloud experienced ransomware attacks which irrevocably removed some hosted client data; the director of the companies said publicly that he did not expect many customers to remain with them.
+
+Reputational harm is often especially impactful for smaller firms providing professional services, particularly where there is an “implied and contractual level of confidentiality” – for example, in legal or accountancy firms. Customers perceive that it is part of these organisations’ duty – but also their business model – to guard customers’ personal information, which is often of a sensitive nature. In these instances, the disappointment and loss of trust increases the risk of reputational harm. Victim blaming after an attack can further aggravate reputational harm, including via social media platforms. While less pertinent for some of the interviewees at organisations that are less exposed to direct financial implications as a result of reputational damage (for example, because they are public sector organisations with no real competitors), reputational harm can thus have a significant impact on organisations.
+
+However, while the fear of reputational harm heavily influences victims’ decision- making, some interviewees, including crisis communications experts and lawyers, indicated that reputational harm may not be as severe as has been assumed in the literature. One interviewee did not think that there is “stigma attached to being the victim of a cyber attack in the same way that there was inthe past”. Some victims said they had supportive clients or, in the case of schools and universities, students. A victim in the professional services sector found that the attack “did not do damage to our reputation as much as one might think, clients were quite sympathetic”.
+
+Nonetheless, the extent of reputational harm caused by a ransomware attack appears to be highly contingent and based on a range of factors. Some interviewees, for instance, highlighted that sympathy is likely to be dependent on the context of the incident and the nature of the business. One interviewee noted that their inability to speak openly about the incident led to increasingly strained interactions with clients.
+
+Some interviewees also indicated that, if data exfiltration occurred, “the risk of reputational harm is much greater”. The same is true if customer services are interrupted. An interviewee at a professional services provider found that clients were “reasonably sympathetic” as long as the company was still able to provide the relevant services and secure their data. Other interviewees highlighted that the timing, cadence and tone of client communications was an important consideration for minimising harms to the organisation, its staff, clients and other third parties. While each ransomware case will be different, it was emphasised that there was a balance to be struck between transparency and opacity, particularly with a public audience. Such assessments are speculative, but again illustrate the prominence that the fear of reputational harm has for victims.
+
+Another important finding from the interview data was that reputational damage can also occur within the impacted organisation itself. This is particularly likely where internal communication is poor, and especially among employees who are not directly involved in responding to the incident and who may, as a result, feel excluded. A victim in the professional services sector, who found that external reputational damage was not as significant as expected, said that the attack was indeed “more damaging to our internal reputation”, adding that the attack’s impact on morale made the organisation a bad place for people to work and that people were leaving as a result, with the organisation’s reputation as an employer also suffering.
+
+Finally, victim organisations are often concerned about experiencing reputational harm as a result of media reporting. The interviewees for this project only mentioned a small number of examples of negative reporting in the media. Individual cases are not discussed here, given the risk of inadvertent attribution, but the interviews made clear that the fear of negative press often meant that victims – particularly those in the private sector – were less likely to be transparent about the attack. One victim spoke of negative publicity on social media.
+
+_First-Order Harms to Staff_
+
+In addition to the harm experienced by an organisation itself, the individuals who work for (or own) an organisation that has fallen victim to a ransomware attack are also directly impacted. As an interviewee in the charity sector put it, “everyone was affected in a way, but just to different degrees”. The degree to which staff members experience harm depends on a number of factors, including the extent to which they are involved in the immediate incident response and whether there are underlying issues, such as pre-existing health conditions. This section provides an overview of the different ways in which staff members may be negatively impacted by a ransomware attack, including psychological, physical, financial, reputational and social harm.
+
+- _Psychological Harm_
+
+In contrast to public reporting, which often focuses on the financial harm of ransomware attacks, our interviews stressed that the first-order harm employees experience is primarily of a psychological nature. Interviewees repeatedly emphasised that psychological impacts are often overlooked in the wider discourse on ransomware attacks.
+
+Psychological impacts are naturally perceived at an individual level and are therefore highly subjective. The categories of psychological harm listed here are therefore not based on medical definitions but are guided by the interview data and by the words that individuals used to describe their feelings. Furthermore, psychological and physical harms are often closely interlinked, especially where psychological harm has physical consequences, such as mental burnout leading to tiredness or physical exhaustion. The distinction between the psychological and the physical is thus not always straightforward, but, to avoid duplication, not all harms are listed in both categories.
+
+Primarily, experiencing and responding to a ransomware attack creates considerable stress for the individuals involved. For example, an interviewee from the engineering sector confirmed, “There’s a huge amount of pressure and stress that everybody was under”, to the extent that their company hired a post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) support team.
+
+While stress was widely reported, the interview data shows that individuals experience different forms of stress, depending on their position and allotted tasks. An interviewee in the professional services sector explained how management- and board-level employees felt stress due to financial concerns, while people in the middle management tier were stressed by the extremely long workdays, including particularly stressful communications with the threat actor.
+
+Stress is often particularly grave for individuals in involved IT teams. One external service provider went so far as to state that “the IT staff – they’re the main victims of crime here”. An interviewee from the education sector explained that the human toll on the IT service was especially severe due to their detailed understanding of the gravity of the situation, adding that the impact on the IT team was, however, often not talked about. As the technical details of attacks are often difficult to understand, the wider perception is that “magical IT will come and sort it all out”, obscuring how stressful this experience can be for the IT team. Stress is also particularly prominent for IT teams because they feel a direct responsibility for protecting an organisation’s systems.
+
+Although stress is thus often acknowledged as a harm inflicted by ransomware attacks, the interview data implied that the more detailed impact of stress, particularly on IT teams, is often overlooked and insufficiently addressed. This is particularly regrettable, as in some instances stress on staff is so significant that it leads to other harms such as burnout or other sickness, leading personnel to leave their jobs or to be absent temporarily on sick leave.
+
+Along with stress, victims also often described a feeling of confusion and loss of orientation in the initial phase of a ransomware attack, especially where victims were not familiar with technical details or did not yet have enough information to form a full picture of the situation. The loss of orientation may be rooted in there being insufficient preparation or procedures in place, while confusion can also stem from victims questioning why they have been attacked, or from uncertainty among staff about what is going on and how they should respond.
+
+As is the case for other categories of harm, victims noted that emotional reactions to ransomware attacks also varied with time. For example, a victim in the education sector said that “those first few hours are quite horrific actually, until you get into a position where you start working out what the facts are”. Others described feelings of very low mood in the first week after the attack. One victim recalled a burdensome feeling that they “for the foreseeable future belonged to the criminal underworld”.
+
+Some victims of ransomware attacks were also said to be angry, for example when an insurance provider recalled client interactions with victims who were angry at the attackers, questioning why they had been targeted. Other interviewees said that former employees whose data was exfiltrated were also less sympathetic but “much more angry”.
+
+Initial reactions of panic in the wake of a ransomware attack can also cause psychological harm. One interviewee said “there was a terror about what might happen next”. On a related note, worry was a typical harm experienced by victims, for example worry about reputational risk, but also, while responding to an attack, worry about whether they were taking the right actions. An external counsel noted that “it’s a harm in itself of distress and worry of making the wrong decision”. A victim in the education sector spoke of a fear of recovering the IT systems too quickly, in case criminals still had access to the networks. Fear of a repeated incident also affected other victims: when receiving suspicious emails or similar, even after the ransomware incident had been dealt with, victims experienced a sense of “PTSD” (in the non-technical sense used by lay people), for example saying that “there was a bit of a PTSD about every time I walked through the office door”. Others described a sense of fear over potential job losses as a result of the ransomware attack. These feelings underline how personally victims experience an attack, and how a ransomware incident casts a shadow over their personal and professional life.
+
+The interviews revealed a number of further emotional harms that were experienced in response to ransomware attacks, stressing how wide-ranging the psychological impacts can be. The difficult decision about whether to pay the ransom demanded often weighs heavily on victims and is not a purely financial or risk management decision: it often raises feelings of guilt, an aspect often overlooked when considering the seemingly binary decision to pay or not to pay. A victim in the education sector described how challenging it was to make a decision in this context, given that they believed “it’s not ethical to pay the ransom”. This concern had, however, to be balanced against students’ potential delay to their studies. While the interviewee believed it was ultimately right to pay the ransom in this instance, they also stressed that “we’re not happy with the decision of paying”.
+
+Related to the feeling of guilt are feelings of shame and self-blame. An interviewee from the charity sector said “we all blame ourselves” – a human reaction that was difficult to overcome. Some members of IT teams can feel particularly responsible, often because they feel that they knew about potential system problems and did not raise them sufficiently, subsequently blaming themselves and burning themselves out working on the ransomware response. Again, this underlines the overlooked – but heightened – impact that ransomware attacks have on the mental wellbeing of IT teams in particular.
+
+Interviews also highlighted that ransomware attacks caused feelings of doubt and resignation among victims, again underlining how personal the attack is felt to be by its victims. One interviewee said the incident made them doubt everything they had done. Similarly, another interviewee said that the incident made them question whether they had run their business properly, because “at that time you second guess yourself, [and] that adds to the mental anxiety”. Another victim described a sense of doubt about whether they were doing enough, but also a feeling of resignation “to the fact that if someone wants to get in [and] if they have enough time and enough energy and enough effort – they’ll get in”.
+
+Recent research shows that the range of psychological harm experienced, and its severity, can affect victims’ mental health. Indeed, interviewees overwhelmingly felt that this aspect was often overlooked in popular discourse. One victim concluded that “the overall piece is that we very rarely talk about the mental health impact of these events”.
+
+Like other categories of harm, psychological harm continues far beyond the immediate timeframe of the incident, creating an additional mental health burden and making it challenging for victims to move on after the incident. Victims repeatedly mentioned concerns over the role of the Information Commissioner’s Office and the impact that the prospect of being fined had on their mental state. The challenge of moving on mentally after an incident was also reported by an interviewee in the education sector, who said that subsequent Ofsted surveys revealed that “some staff are still very raw about this. When you ask them about workload, they may well say the ransomware attack … made our lives hell”. Another victim felt “a real disappointment” given that their company was ultimately unable to find out how the attacker gained access to their systems. Indeed, one victim went as far as to say that the attack made them feel like they had “failed”. Another victim found the ransomware attack “actually really traumatic” (especially given their strong identification with success in business, and in their own business in particular), indicating that this had brought them close to suicide.
+
+Interview data shows that not only is the psychological impact of ransomware incidents overlooked in the short term, but that the long-term psychological impact of attacks is even less likely to be noticed (or sufficiently addressed) than immediate harms such as stress.
+
+While the psychological harm a ransomware attack causes is of course highly context specific and also depends on the individuals involved and their existing mental health conditions, the interviews stressed the significance, extent and multiplicity of ways in which victims experience psychological harm. Such psychological harm can reach far beyond the immediate response to a specific incident, affecting an individual’s wider professional life and impacting their personal life. Interviewees repeatedly noted that the psychological impact of ransomware attacks is insufficiently recognised, not only by the broader public, but also in academic and/or industry studies and within the organisations responding to such attacks.
+
+The research data demonstrates how central the psychological impact is to victim experience and how varied the psychological harm is, especially for IT teams. In turn, such psychological impact on individuals also has financial impact for victim organisations, for example where it affects productivity, when staff suffer burnout and need replacing, or in terms of other forms of employee turnover.
+
+- _Physical Harm_
+
+Victims’ physical health also suffers in the wake of ransomware attacks. Physical harms reported by interviewees ranged from minor ailments (for instance, weight changes) to serious health issues (such as heart attack or stroke). While not a commonplace occurrence, one law enforcement interviewee noted that they knew of a member of IT staff at an organisation who took their own life following a ransomware incident. Far more commonly, interviewees reported sleep deprivation and follow-on impacts, with employees falling asleep at the office or reporting problems sleeping at home. One victim reported that “the fatigue on people was extreme”, referring to physical but also mental exhaustion, illustrating how closely linked the two harms are. This is also true for harms such as burnout, which can manifest in both mental and physical ways. Other reported physical impacts included weight loss and dehydration.
+
+One interviewee even reported health issues within their team that resulted in hospitalisation, with employees not looking after themselves well in the immediate response to a ransomware attack, for example by drinking too much coffee and not enough water (which in this instance resulted in the need for hospital checks because of pre-existing heart complications). In a more grievous example, a victim experienced a heart attack and required surgery, citing the stress of managing the incident as a key factor. Physical harm is thus closely linked to the mental harm experienced, such as stress and anxiety; this can be especially grave where victims have underlying health conditions (albeit this is the exception rather than the rule).
+
+- _Financial Harm_
+
+While wider reporting of ransomware incidents often focuses on the financial impact for organisations or the economy more broadly, the interview data stresses that financial harm is also experienced by individual staff members. (The distinction is, of course, somewhat superfluous in the case of sole traders or freelancers, whose individual financial situation is hardly distinguishable from that of their business.)
+
+Employees can suffer financial harm as a result of a ransomware attack, for example if they lose their job as a result of the attack – an outcome that is more likely for members of the IT team or an organisation’s board members. An external counsel reported that, especially where a publicly listed company pays the ransom, board members are likely to be changed within six months to a year.
+
+While many victims reported that their organisation was still able to meet payroll despite the ransomware attack, this was often because the incident came just after staff had been paid, or otherwise that it had been a close call with regard to meeting payroll during response to the incident. Not being paid, or being underpaid (for example, because a recent pay rise has been ignored due to fallback to earlier backups of personnel data), is thus another way in which a ransomware attack can financially impact staff members. Another example of harm was described by one victim, who paid for their own therapy sessions (which were not covered by insurance) and had to cancel holiday plans in order to make time to respond to an attack.
+
+- _Reputational Harm_
+
+Like organisations, individual staff members may also be concerned about suffering reputational harm as the result of a ransomware attack. This is particularly true for IT staff, who often feel that they may not have done enough to prevent the incident from occurring. They might also be blamed by board members or other senior staff for not doing what might superficially be considered “doing their job”.
+
+Reputational harm is also a problem for staff who might have clicked on a malicious link (allowing ransomware to access the organisation’s systems) or whose credentials have been abused during the attack. Even if they were not necessarily responsible for the breach, their reputation might suffer if they are erroneously assigned blame by superiors or colleagues. Blaming individuals and contributing to their reputational harm might also cause them further psychological harm.
+
+- _Social Harm_
+
+In addition to the psychological, physical and financial harm caused, a ransomware attack can also impact employees’ professional lives, and the social relations between members of staff, and their relationships outside work.
+
+For example, the psychological harm experienced by staff members can have wider impacts on social relations within an organisation or team, potentially leading to strained relationships with colleagues. One victim described employees as being “grumpier”, amid increased workloads and diminished pastoral care. Others noted the negative effect on morale and said that the repeated complaints of colleagues were “annoying”. Work relationships might also become strained if external help is hired. One victim described how the in-house IT team felt challenged when an external IT team was hired as additional help, with poor integration leading to duplication of efforts and resources.
+
+The impact of ransomware attacks is, however, also felt beyond social relations in a professional context, extending into private and family life. Some victims reported missing out on personal or family life. One victim described “a personal toll”, particularly given increased commuting demands and long working hours. The impact on personal life was also felt by a victim in the technology sector who described a “work–life balance loss through extended hours of working weekends”. Another interviewee, who coordinated incident response, described how he personally provided impromptu childcare for one of their chief IT technicians, so that the technician could be “hands-on-keyboard”.
+
+Those staff members who are not part of an organisation’s “core” ransomware response team also experience harm to their professional and private lives, although the nature of the harm may differ from that of those forming part of the “inner circle”. Those outside the immediate response team might feel “like really nobody had a handle on it” and feel left out of the communication loop, receiving little information about what is going on. Understandably, there is also a degree to which professional and personal life entwine, particularly where staff pursue their work as a personal passion. Interviewees also noted that some staff treated the ransomware attack as an opportunity – or impetus – to resign from their role or take retirement; for instance, educational staff who had lost many years’ worth of teaching materials. Another interviewee noted that staff who had been with their organisation for decades felt a form of “love” towards the archives of data that they had personally collected during their career, and felt bereft at the loss of this data.
+
+Many staff members experience different degrees of ransomware harm, which in turn have negative impacts on their professional and private lives. Such negative impacts are closely tied to the psychological impact staff members experience, again demonstrating the interconnectivity of harms – as well as the wide range of forms that psychological harm can take.
+
+This section has illustrated the categories of harm experienced by direct victims of ransomware attacks: that is, the organisations and staff members who experience the ransomware attack. Organisations face potential digital/physical, financial and reputational harm, while staff members may encounter financial, reputational, psychological, physical and social harm. Importantly, though, harm is also felt beyond these first-order harms, extending to those who indirectly experience harm as a result of a ransomware attack. The following sections illustrate what these second- and third-order harms can look like.
+
+#### Second-Order Harms
+
+The second category of harms involves organisations and individuals indirectly harmed by ransomware. The former group includes organisations that are customers/clients or in the supply chain of a victim entity that has had its IT systems encrypted or data stolen, while the latter group – individuals – refers to the customers or users of a public or private organisation that provides services or holds data.
+
+The research conducted for this paper highlights that, the further “downstream” we get from the initial impact of the attack, the more challenging it is to effectively characterise and illustrate harms to organisations. However, the research has been able to identify a range of second-order harms to organisations and individuals through the interviews with direct victims, third-party experts and law enforcement, and via academic literature and media reporting. The results of a ransomware-harm modelling exercise conducted as part of this project and published as an academic conference paper have also been important in highlighting the different types of harms that can indirectly affect individuals, particularly healthcare patients and residents of local authorities that are affected by ransomware.
+
+Taken together, the various types of second-order harms from ransomware operations help emphasise their long tail and wide reach, shedding light on the various ways in which individuals are impacted by ransomware attacks. Ransomware attacks that disrupt the operations of businesses and public services have cascading effects that harm the lives of citizens of the UK and many other countries.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4: Types of Second-Order Harms Affecting Downstream Organisations and Individuals.___
+
+_Second-Order Harms to Organisations_
+
+As illustrated in Figure 4, ransomware operations have the potential to create a range of second-order harms for organisations and their employees, even when they are not directly targeted.
+
+Ransomware attacks on outsourced IT services, such as managed service providers or cloud hosting providers, can harm organisations’ digital systems and data. A 2022 ransomware operation against Rackspace Technology, a cloud hosting provider, encrypted Microsoft Exchange email servers and caused thousands of SMEs to lose access to email services for several days. A more recent ransomware attack against CloudNordic, a cloud services provider, resulted in customers losing all their data after the company’s backups were deleted.
+
+Disruptions to organisations’ supply chains and subsequent harms are not limited to ransomware attacks on technology providers. Nor are they a rare exception, with data indicating that 52% of firms say that one of their suppliers has experienced a ransomware attack. Physical supply chains can be particularly sensitive to ransomware harm: attacks against organisations in sectors such as manufacturing and logistics can create cascading effects that spread financial and reputational harm down the supply chain as suppliers and customers experience delays and loss of trust. One interviewee from the manufacturing sector, for example, highlighted how a ransomware attack against their company resulted in delays to their customers’ operations; in some cases, this resulted in customers finding new suppliers. Interviews also highlighted that being downstream from a ransomware attack can be even more challenging than being at the epicentre, as access to information about the attack may be much more limited. As a breach response lawyer argued, second-order harms may be “in a way, slightly worse, because you’re reliant on [the organisation experiencing the ransomware attack] for information … but they’re not going to be able to give you complete information in the early stages”. In some cases, suppliers experiencing ransomware attacks may even attempt to pretend the ransomware attack is not happening in an effort to reduce their own reputational harm.
+
+In this sense, first- and second-order harms are not discrete – rather, they are closely linked. Severe second-order harms are likely to multiply the extent of harm or pressure on the direct victim organisation. For instance, an insurance claims handler recalled supporting an industrial system supplier to the fast food industry. The victim emphasised to the interviewee that their clients had zero tolerance for downtime; kitchens were supposed to be operating at full capacity in a context where fryers and other equipment would routinely break down, warranting rapid repair. If the victim could not return to operations within a matter of hours or days, they would be “booted off” contracts worth millions of pounds.
+
+It is also increasingly common for organisations to have data stolen by ransomware threat actors via their suppliers’ systems. When Capita, a major provider of outsourced IT services in the UK, was targeted by cyber-criminals using BlackBasta ransomware, more than 90 of its customers had data stolen.
+
+Listing all the various potential types of financial, reputational, physical, psychological and social second-order harms to organisations and their employees from ransomware is beyond the scope of this paper, given that the interviews and workshops focused predominantly on the experiences of direct victims. However, it is reasonable to conclude that second-order harms may take a similar form to the first-order harms listed in the previous section, since they ultimately stem from disruption to business operations and the theft of data. In this sense, the harms experienced by third parties can be comparable to those experienced by the direct victim (rather than being seen as vicarious nuisance). As one breach response lawyer articulated, “If you’re reliant on someone that has an incident, you can’t do business as a result of their incident, then clearly you’re in a pretty similar position in a way, insofar as you may not be able to do business properly”.
+
+_Second-Order Harms to Individuals_
+
+Ransomware also creates a range of second-order harms – some of which are sector specific – for individuals downstream from the initial victim. Here, the term “individuals” refers to customers or users of goods and services, including people from groups such as hospital patients or schoolchildren. Given the digital dependencies of most businesses and service providers in modern economies and societies, individuals have significant exposure to ransomware harms. This paper’s research shows that individuals who are already vulnerable, such as patients seeking medical treatment or people receiving benefits, are disproportionately impacted by the indirect harm caused by ransomware attacks.
+
+- _Physical Harm_
+
+There is a growing body of evidence that ransomware causes downstream harm to the physical health of individuals, most significantly when such harm reduces health outcomes at hospitals after attacks. Many ransomware groups have been ruthless in directly targeting hospitals and healthcare providers, showing scant regard for the impact on essential services and patients.
+
+As the attack on Ireland’s Health Service Executive (HSE) by the Conti ransomware group illustrates, the disruption of IT services can cause cascading harms to clinical services and patients. Attacks against hospitals have forced elective surgeries to be cancelled and disrupted patient services such as cancer treatments. During the HSE attack, for instance, radiation therapy stopped at five centres, while 513 patients had their cancer treatment disrupted. In other cases, ransomware attacks have caused emergency services to be diverted to other hospitals; in critical care services, where minutes or hours can determine whether a patient lives or dies, these kinds of diversions can reduce survivability and recovery. One recent report has suggested that between 2016 and 2021, between 42 and 67 Medicare patients in the US died as a result of ransomware incidents, while several surveys and studies indicate that ransomware attacks are linked to increased mortality rates at affected hospitals. In a recent survey of healthcare professionals in the US by the Ponemon Institute, for example, 24% of respondents said their hospital experienced an increase in excess deaths following a ransomware attack.
+
+Other effects may be less noticeable, but nevertheless still degrade the quality of care individuals receive. Losing access to electronic health records, for instance, forces doctors and nurses to revert to pen and paper; this reduces productivity, which in turn limits the number of patients that can be treated. In the longer term, patients whose detailed records inform choices about their treatment receive less effective care if those records are inaccessible or corrupted.
+
+Ransomware can affect individuals’ physical health even if their healthcare provision is not disrupted. The attack on Hackney Council, for example, contributed to delays in repairs to social housing stock. According to reporting, one resident’s home suffered damp, mould and leaks after the council lost access to records about the property. Disruptions to the provision of social care can also cause physical harms: a disabled resident in Hackney told a journalist that the ransomware attack had prevented her from accessing social care services for several months – “I could not wash myself. I couldn’t wash my own hair”. These examples highlight how ransomware attacks against local government entities can be particularly harmful, due to the range of basic services these entities provide, further emphasising that it is the already vulnerable who are disproportionately affected by the second-order harms caused by ransomware attacks. Policymakers must consider what policy measures can be taken to protect these vulnerable people from such harm.
+
+In extreme circumstances, the exfiltration and release of data also has the potential to expose individuals to varying degrees of personal physical risk. This stems from an emergent trend in which ransomware operators exfiltrate data from organisations that hold highly sensitive personal data – for instance, schools and law firms. A severe example highlighted in interviews was the possible doxing of relocated domestic abuse survivors following the theft of data from a law firm; the malicious public release of such data could put such individuals and those around them at extreme personal risk. An interviewee from the education sector recalled feeling relief when they realised that the ransomware operators involved in their attack had gained access to commercial data – including payroll – but did not get access to pupil safeguarding data.
+
+- _Financial Harm_
+
+Ransomware also has the potential to harm individuals financially. In some cases, second-order financial harm can stem from disruption to particular financial services or goods; or, in a small number of cases, from the risks associated with stolen and leaked personal financial information.
+
+In the UK, ransomware operations against local authorities have disrupted residents’ ability to access housing benefits, again disproportionately impacting those who were already vulnerable. One senior leader at a council described the “massive disruption” to local residents, recounting that “people couldn’t pay their rent”. Hackney Council’s housing benefit services were also significantly impacted, and in July 2022 a news report suggested that a family of seven living in Hackney had been forced to leave their home because the council was unable to update their housing benefit payments. A UK law enforcement officer said that disruptions to state benefits “might stop [residents] being able to put food on the table for their kids”. Critically for policymakers, these examples highlight how personally ransomware attacks are experienced, and how already vulnerable groups are disproportionately affected by them – problems that require nuanced consideration when designing policy responses.
+
+More intangible are the potential downstream impacts from ransomware attacks on the costs of goods and services for individual consumers. Although this research did not uncover specific evidence of price rises for consumers following ransomware attacks, a study by IBM highlights that 62% of firms affected by ransomware raised their prices in the aftermath. It is reasonable to expect that some price rises may be directly felt by individuals, particularly for consumer-facing services.
+
+There is also a small possibility that individuals whose personal data is stolen by ransomware operators may be personally extorted or defrauded by other cyber-criminals in the ransomware ecosystem. On a small number of occasions, threat actors have tried to personally extort individuals whose data has been stolen as part of a ransomware operation, the most notable example being the theft of healthcare data from a Finnish therapy provider by cyber-criminals, who then also extorted patients. However, interviewees highlighted that this example is likely to be the exception rather than the rule.
+
+An insurance claims interviewee recalled an attack on a private school, wherein the ransomware operators directly contacted pupils’ parents before delivering the ransomware payload. These fraudulent emails offered parents a 10% discount on forthcoming school fees if the parents made an expedited payment (to a false payment address). This reflects the relatively new ransomware attack model of “triple extortion”, wherein the threat actors not only encrypt and exfiltrate data held by the direct victim organisation, but also target secondary parties (clients) to solicit additional payments.
+
+Media reports on ransomware, particularly incidents involving large stolen datasets, often speculate that stolen and leaked personally identifiable information and financial details might be used for identity theft and fraud. However, the research conducted for this paper suggests that ransomware operators or other cyber-criminals are not monetising stolen personal data in a systematic way. Interviewees and workshop participants from incident response, law firms and law enforcement all emphasised there is little evidence that ransomware operators are cleaning and aggregating stolen data in a way that would allow them to sell it to other cyber-criminals or use it for financial fraud.
+
+There are likely several reasons why ransomware criminals do not currently exploit stolen data for further criminal gains. First, for the time being, it is simply much more profitable for criminals in the ransomware ecosystem to engage in or enable extortion-based crimes. Second, it is costly and time consuming to host, clean and aggregate stolen data in a way that would be useful and monetisable. A ransomware negotiator noted that a personal record for an individual was likely to be worth between $1 and $4, thus offering limited profitability unless the dataset was ordered in a readily hostable and saleable format. The saleability of such data is also likely to be hampered by the cost of server storage and the unreliability of darknet-hosted platforms. As a lawyer involved in breach response explained, lawyers and forensic experts often take weeks or months (with the use of specialist software) trying to figure out what type of data has been stolen during a ransomware incident, a process which cyber-criminals are unlikely to have the resources or inclination to emulate.
+
+Taken together, these factors suggest that the potential financial harm to individuals from data stolen by ransomware threat actors is not as significant as many people believe. While policymakers must be aware that further extortion from leaked data is a possibility, this impact should not be overestimated, although this should certainly not distract attention from the concrete psychological harm that victims experience (and which is currently often overlooked). However, this does not rule out cyber-criminals or other threat actors exploiting this data in the future, particularly if technological changes enable them to aggregate it more efficiently.
+
+- _Psychological Harm_
+
+Ransomware can also cause psychological harm to individuals who are not involved with the immediate response or who do not work for the targeted organisation. Although the research conducted for this paper does not include interviews with victims from outside (direct) victim organisations, other sources such as media reporting, academic literature and our interviews with subject matter experts illustrate some of the negative impacts from ransomware on individuals’ mental health and wellbeing.
+
+First, ransomware attacks that cause downtime for essential services like healthcare, local government and education can cause stress, anxiety, confusion and fear for the individuals who use these entities’ services. Beyond the immediate impact on physical health stemming from ransomware attacks on healthcare services, the mental health effects on patients and families have also been made clear in news coverage. Delays to important test results or outpatient services like cancer treatments or elective surgeries can cause distress and anxiety for patients and their families, as the attack against HSE illustrated. The interruption of local government services such as social care, housing and child benefits, and council housing can also lead to stress and even anger among affected residents.
+
+Second, the rise of double-extortion ransomware operations has created additional psychological harms for individuals whose data has been stolen and leaked.
+
+Although the concrete risk of fraud and identify theft related to data stolen by ransomware threat actors appears to be low, this is not the dominant public perception. As one incident response practitioner suggested, “you can’t necessarily reassure [people] who, through no fault of their own, have had all of their details compromised”.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5: Ransomware Incidents Involving Exposure of Personal Data.__ Source: [Alexander Martin, Ransomware Attacks Hit Record Level in UK, According to Neglected Official Data’, The Record, 12 September 2023](https://therecord.media/ransomware-attacks-record-in-UK)._
+
+As highlighted in Figure 5, a range of personal data can be impacted by ransomware incidents. When particularly sensitive data, such as private photos or medical records, is stolen and leaked, it has the potential to create psychological harm such as considerable levels of stress, anxiety and embarrassment for individuals.
+
+Additionally, one legacy of the recent surge in ransomware attacks targeting schools is the exposure of large amounts of safeguarding data and other sensitive pupil records. Following a ransomware attack against Minneapolis schools in March 2023, threat actors leaked intimate and graphic reports about students that included descriptions of sexual assaults, domestic violence and mental health issues. Many of the most sensitive files were posted on Twitter and Facebook, increasing the chance of families and pupils discovering them. Although none of the UK schools interviewed had pupil data stolen and leaked, one leader at an academy trust emphasised that the attack on their schools caused fear among pupils, as they understood they were being targeted by criminals. And while the Minneapolis schools example comes from a US context, similar events could also occur in the UK. Moreover, the fact that ransomware threat actors are finding it harder to monetise their operations means that there is a risk of them adopting the kind of extreme “shaming” tactics like the ones used in the Minneapolis schools incident.
+
+It is worth emphasising that first-order harms to organisations and second-order harms to individuals can flow in both directions. For instance, a client’s psychological distress may be sufficient for secondary victims to file legal action against organisations compromised by ransomware. In a recent case, patients launched a lawsuit against a cosmetic surgery provider after their pre- and post-operation photographs were leaked by ransomware operators.
+
+Second-order harms to organisations and individuals largely resemble the first-order harms. For organisations that experience indirect harm because a supplier has suffered a ransomware attack, this means they can still experience financial, reputational or physical/digital harm, but also often lack first-hand information about the evolving situation. Like the staff members who are direct victims of a ransomware attack, individuals outside the targeted organisation can also experience financial, psychological, or physical harm indirectly in the wake of the attack. Finally, although the risk to individuals due to ransomware operators’ theft of personal data is currently low, this calculus could change in the future if cyber-criminals develop the intent and capability to exploit such data.
+
+#### Third-Order Harms
+
+This category of harms describes the cumulative effects of ransomware incidents on a state’s economy, society and national security. Taken together, these harms emphasise the threat ransomware poses to states, as well as to organisations and individuals. It should be noted, however, that there are significant knowledge gaps about the impact of ransomware at a national level. This makes it challenging to assess the severity of the harm caused by ransomware to the UK and other countries, and creates the risk that governments will not prioritise and properly resource responses to ransomware. This chapter draws on examples from both the UK and other countries.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 6: Third-Order Harms to the Economy, National Security and Society.___
+
+- _Economic Harms_
+
+Ransomware has the potential to create considerable economic harm at a national level. However, there are significant challenges to be overcome when assessing the cost that ransomware exacts on the UK economy.
+
+As highlighted elsewhere in this paper, ransomware operations generate costs and losses for victims, reduce productivity, lead to missed opportunities for growth, and disrupt supply chains, in turn spreading financial harms downstream to businesses of all kinds and scales. Disruptions of specific sectors or of individual companies that have significant market share of niche (but essential) products for global or national supply chains also have the potential to cause economic harm. One recent example of this was a ransomware attack against MKS, a US manufacturer that produces specialist parts and tools that are essential for companies making semiconductor chips. The incident caused disruptions to the semiconductor supply chain – an essential component of modern digital infrastructure and the global economy. As the challenges posed by Covid-19, geopolitical tensions and energy price rises have highlighted in recent years, disruptions to supply chains can have a wide range of negative effects that reach into all corners of a modern economy.
+
+The sensitivity of modern globalised supply chains means that disruption to the operations of just one contributory logical element – for instance, imports at ports – have the potential to cause economic harm at scale. An interviewee with first-hand experience of a protracted ransomware event in a developing country noted that its society had “a total dependency on the customs system. Therefore, when this service disappeared, the imports and exports disappeared, the fruits were lost by the docks, they rotted. The technological products that we import, they were blocked. Everything was scarce in the country”. Developed countries are also vulnerable to societal harms resulting from attacks on freight-related systems. A November 2023 incident against a shipping firm – responsible for 40% of Australian goods traffic – left shipping containers stuck at Australian ports. This incident reportedly threatened the supply of Christmas goods, risked higher inflation, and raised the prospect of a future interest rate increase.
+
+However, while it is possible to describe the types of economic harms that ransomware causes a country, it is considerably more challenging to accurately calculate economic costs and losses. In order to assess the scale and scope of economic harm to the UK from ransomware, reliable costings for incidents are required, as well as aggregated quantitative data.
+
+Existing governmental, law enforcement and regulatory reporting mechanisms have several limitations in this regard. The UK Information Commissioner’s Office has published data showing that since Q2 2019, there have been 1,940 ransomware incidents in the UK that required notification due to the risk to personal data. However, data protection reporting is not focused on financial costs, and many attacks may not require ICO notification if the incident only encrypts servers that do not hold personal data. Reporting of ransomware incidents to law enforcement, meanwhile, is likely much lower. The UK’s NCA, for instance, has estimated that less than 10% of victims report ransomware attacks to Action Fraud (the UK’s national centre for reporting fraud and cybercrime). Moreover, existing Action Fraud reporting mechanisms are not designed to capture the variety of costs and losses that ransomware imposes.
+
+As noted in the section on first-order financial harms, surveys and other forms of research by cyber security vendors can shed some light on mean/median financial costs. Sophos’s annual survey on ransomware includes figures on ransom payments, recovery costs and loss of business (although the 2023 version did not include these for the UK), while IBM’s annual Cost of a Data Breach report also includes the average cost of a ransomware attack. Coveware, an incident response firm specialising in ransomware, also produces quarterly reports on mean/median ransom payments and incident length. However, there is no standardised approach for calculating the costs and losses from ransomware, or their long-tail financial impact on other organisations, individuals or the economy. As a 2021 report from the US’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency highlighted, there are considerable barriers to putting a value on the economic harm of ransomware and cyber incidents, be it for an individual victimised organisation or a country’s economy as a whole.
+
+- _Harms to National Security_
+
+Ransomware is now widely considered to be a threat to national security in the US, Germany, Canada and the UK, among others. Two primary harms to national security emanate from ransomware: the disruption of CNI and strategic sectors, with knock-on effects on economic prosperity and public safety; and the strategic advantage that ransomware can create for hostile states.
+
+Ransomware operations targeting CNI in a number of different countries are now well publicised. The disruption of emergency services, energy infrastructure, telecommunications and healthcare has demonstrated the ability (or potential) of ransomware threat actors to cause harms to public safety. In some cases, ransomware operations have explicit implications for national defence. There are now several examples of cyber-criminals targeting defence and aerospace companies, disrupting defence supply chains, or stealing sensitive data on intellectual property or military personnel.
+
+The growth of ransomware has also created strategic advantages for some states hostile to the UK and its allies. In the case of North Korea, ransomware operations by threat actors linked to the North Korean state are primarily financially motivated and aim to generate revenue for the regime.
+
+Meanwhile, the Russian-speaking ransomware ecosystem provides a number of advantages to the Russian state. Although the Russian state does not direct all cyber activity that emanates from within its borders, it provides a safe harbour, maintains close ties to some cyber-criminals or groups, and co-opts them or their capabilities for its own needs. In 2019, the US Treasury highlighted the direct relationship between Evil Corp, a Russian cyber-criminal organisation responsible for a number of ransomware attacks, and Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB); the same US Treasury advisory note suggested that Maksim Yakubets, one of the leaders of Evil Corp, was directly tasked by the FSB to conduct cyber espionage on its behalf. In a similar vein, the organised cyber-criminal group linked to the Conti ransomware operation was reportedly tasked by the FSB to collect intelligence on researchers at Bellingcat, an investigative non-profit organisation whose reporting has frequently embarrassed the Kremlin.
+
+The ransomware ecosystem also provides more indirect benefits to the Russian state. Russian intelligence units can benefit from using services, malware or tools developed by the criminal ecosystem to augment their own capabilities or provide plausible deniability for their own operations. Moreover, while the vast majority of ransomware operations conducted by Russian cyber-criminals are financially, rather than ideologically, motivated, the fact that they harm the economic and societal resilience of the Kremlin’s adversaries in North America and Europe is a useful by-product.
+
+- _Societal Harm_
+
+As has been argued elsewhere, ransomware creates a range of societal harms. Disruption of basic services, the diversion of resources from other priorities, and citizens’ potential loss of trust in the state to protect them all illustrate the impact of ransomware on modern societies. These types of harm are arguably less well understood or prioritised than those that more obviously affect economic prosperity and national security.
+
+As highlighted earlier in this paper, the disruption of healthcare providers can degrade the quality of care that individual patients receive. Several participants stressed that the HSE incident in Ireland was one of the most impactful ransomware cases they had seen. Harms to patient care can extend beyond the blast radius of an incident: one study in the US, for instance, showed that any hospitals physically adjacent to a hospital directly disrupted by a ransomware attack also experienced drops in their quality of patient care. On a broader scale, ransomware operations targeting the healthcare sector can have cascading impacts that undermine the state’s ability to provide or protect healthcare services. In national healthcare systems like the UK’s NHS, single incidents can have systemic effects. In August 2022, for example, a ransomware operation against Advanced, a major NHS IT provider, caused disruption to NHS services that lasted for months, degrading the quality of patient care and increasing the workload of administrative and medical staff who were already under strain.
+
+The impact of ransomware on educational institutions also has societal implications. Although the UK government does not currently designate education as part of the country’s CNI, it plays an essential role in maintaining the development of a well-functioning society. Ransomware operations targeting the sector have grown in frequency, with one ransomware threat actor, Vice Society, seemingly deliberately targeting schools and universities. Although none of the interviewees from the education sector believed that the incidents involving their schools or universities caused lasting harm to students’ education or outcomes, such attacks create significant recovery costs for victims, and are often timed to coincide with the beginning of the school or academic year so as to maximise disruption.
+
+Beyond the immediate impact on the quality of life, wellbeing and development of citizens, ransomware operations against basic services also create significant opportunity costs and diversion of resources away from other priorities. Although these impacts also affect other organisations affected by ransomware, these types of harms, when inflicted on providers of public services, have societal implications. In the UK, ransomware attacks involving the NHS, state education or local authorities take place within a broader context of acute public spending constraints. At the time of writing, for instance, Hackney Council had spent £12.2 million on recovering from the attack in 2020, having previously experienced nearly a decade of some of the highest budget cuts in the country. One interviewee from a UK local authority described how their council had been forced to use up most of its reserves to recover from an attack, diverting resources from other pressing issues.
+
+Finally, the prevalence of ransomware has the potential to undermine trust in the state. The workshops and interviews highlighted the low level of confidence that many victims and ransomware response providers have in the ability of the UK government (or law enforcement) to protect UK organisations or disrupt ransomware threat actors. If citizens perceive the security of public services and data as being in doubt, they may lose confidence in the ability of law enforcement and government to protect them. One recent study of a ransomware attack against a hospital in Düsseldorf, Germany observed a sharp reduction in the local population’s trust in the government and security agencies after the attack. At present, though, there is little evidence that ransomware specifically has caused the UK public to lose trust in the NCSC or in law enforcement, although this could change if there were to be a significant attack against CNI.
+
+While it is often challenging to directly link specific developments to a ransomware attack or to put a number on the financial cost of third-order societal harm caused by such attacks, the interview data has illustrated repeatedly that the harm caused by ransomware attacks has implications for wider society and national security, be it due to the interplay of cyber-criminals and state actors, or to the cumulative effects of ransomware harms on individuals, organisations, the economy and society at large.
+
+
+### III. Implications for Policy and Future Research
+
+This paper has described the wide range of harms that ransomware attacks can cause and has provided examples of how victims – organisations as well as individuals – and countries experience these harms. In doing so, it starts to fill the knowledge gaps surrounding the ways ransomware causes harm to organisations, individuals and the UK as a whole. Deeper knowledge of these vectors of harm is critical to designing better responses to the ransomware threat and mitigating harm to victims. Several key findings from the research are important for pushing forward ransomware policy and future research. The next paper from this project will provide recommendations on how to mitigate some of the challenges laid out below.
+
+#### 1. There is generally a low level of understanding of the long-term economic impact of ransomware attacks.
+
+At the time of writing, there are ongoing efforts within the UK government to calculate the economic impact of ransomware on the UK. Mobilising political will, prioritising intelligence and law enforcement resources, and building industry support for combating ransomware are to some extent all predicated on a clear costing of the harm being done to businesses and the UK economy. This paper has highlighted the wide range of costs, losses and downstream economic harms that must be included in any effort to calculate the economic impact of ransomware on the UK, but also the numerous challenges in doing so. For example, the costs of psychological harm caused to victims (impacting their productivity) and the long-term costs that might arise from additional staff turnover do not seem to be captured in interviewees’ financial assessments, which focus predominantly on immediate costs – especially those that are recoverable via insurance. Including long-term and indirect costs, although methodologically challenging, would paint a more accurate picture of the true financial harm caused by ransomware.
+
+In addition to these reporting challenges for governments and law enforcement, there is little evidence that victims or ransomware response services are collecting data on the full range of financial costs and losses from ransomware. This is partly due to the methodologically challenging nature of this task, but such data gathering is also hampered by the fact that many victims may not be resourced to assess the impact of incidents on their finances; moreover, victims sometimes have very little interest in dwelling on incidents. A number of interviewees highlighted that their organisation wanted to “move on” in the aftermath of a ransomware attack, with little desire to measure or quantify long-term financial harms.
+
+Just as victims are unlikely to have a comprehensive understanding of the financial harm inflicted, no stakeholder in the ransomware ecosystem possesses the long-term insights or general overview that would make possible an assessment of the wider economic harm. The other parties in the ecosystem (for instance, incident responders, insurers, legal counsel, law enforcement and regulators) only have limited insights into specific aspects of the financial harms and are therefore unable to collate all the information that is needed to make a comprehensive assessment of long-term financial harm. Likewise, it is unlikely that any other party would feel it was their responsibility to take on such a burdensome task. Consequently, it is unlikely that we will attain a comprehensive picture of long-term financial harm in the near future, meaning that the current figures probably underestimate the level of financial harm, since they are unlikely to have taken into account other forms of indirect additional costs or financial losses.
+
+#### 2. Reputational harm is a major concern for organisations, but may be overestimated by victims in some contexts.
+
+Although the interview data confirmed that victims have a considerable fear of reputational harm, and that this often guides their response to incidents, the actual degree of reputational harm stemming specifically from data theft/exposure is not always as significant as imagined. Customers and clients can be forgiving, potentially indicating a wider societal acceptance that cyber security breaches cannot always be prevented. However, poor communication practices, both internally and externally, may have significant reputational consequences, as may the risk of data exfiltration. Reputational harm is also to some extent business- and sector-specific, and tightly interconnected with financial harm. Businesses that rely on continuous operations or that hold particularly sensitive information are more susceptible to reputational harm, which can lead directly to financial harm. Public sector organisations, on the other hand, are less exposed to reputational harm given that they often have a monopoly on the provision of basic services and that their funding is less dependent on reputational standing. While reputational harm should not be overlooked, the fact that such harm is often not as serious as some victims fear has important implications for organisations which believe that, in order to protect their reputation, they need to pay ransoms so that ransomware threat actors will delete stolen data.
+
+#### 3. There is currently little evidence that exfiltrated data is systematically exploited for further criminal activities.
+
+Although there is wider concern about the potential for leaked data obtained in ransomware attacks to be exploited for fraud or other criminal activity, we have not found evidence that the ransomware ecosystem is exploiting stolen and leaked data in a systematic way. For the time being, exploiting stolen data is less profitable than extortion-based crime. While developments in cybercrime (particularly the skills and methods of large-scale data analysis) are likely to impact criminal practices in the future – with criminals potentially revisiting previously exploited data – our research indicates that such data is currently not being systematically exploited for criminal gains. This finding has implications for victims who believe they should pay ransoms to mitigate some of the risk from stolen and exfiltrated personal data.
+
+#### 4. Psychological harm to staff and individuals is significantly overlooked, both in public discourse and in organisational responses to ransomware attacks.
+
+While the fear of reputational harm among victims is perhaps overstated in many instances, the opposite is true with regard to the psychological impacts of ransomware attacks, which are relatively neglected. Interviews highlighted that the psychological harm to staff is significantly overlooked, both in wider reporting and in organisational responses to ransomware attacks. Interviewees also repeatedly stressed that IT teams in particular suffer the psychological impacts of ransomware attacks. To reduce the harm caused by ransomware attacks, addressing the psychological impact on staff (and other individuals) needs to be at the centre of responses to a ransomware incident. This would involve not only raising awareness of potential psychological harm, but also ensuring that crisis management best practices focus on mitigating psychological harm.
+
+#### 5. The second- and third-order harms from ransomware attacks disproportionately affect vulnerable groups.
+
+Ransomware attacks start by harming technology and organisations, but ultimately lead to harm to individuals. However, the effects on individuals are not felt equally. As noted above, within organisations, certain members of staff will likely experience more harm than others. Similarly, the external, downstream effects of ransomware may affect certain groups disproportionately. This is underlined by the impact that attacks on schools, hospitals, law firms that hold sensitive data, and local government services, have on vulnerable groups such as schoolchildren, healthcare patients and residents who rely on benefits or social care.
+
+#### 6. Government responses to ransomware must focus more on highlighting and reducing societal harms, rather than focusing solely on economic harms.
+
+By targeting essential public services and other forms of CNI, ransomware harms the physical and mental health, development and prosperity of UK citizens. However, the enduring focus on the financial costs of ransomware risks making wider societal impacts seem abstract and unrelatable to policymakers and the public. In the simplest terms, ransomware has the potential to ruin lives. More openness and clarity about the impact of ransomware on society may help to galvanise efforts, boost resources and increase the political will to find solutions. People – whether politicians or individual citizens – might be more likely to publicly categorise the cumulative effect of ransomware as a societal or national security risk if they knew that many cyber-criminals, some harboured by hostile states, regularly disrupt the services that are an essential part of modern society such as GP appointments, schools, and having rubbish bins collected by local councils.
+
+This paper has underlined how impactful ransomware is upon individuals, organisations and wider society. Different forms of harm are felt by a wide range of individuals and groups, who are impacted directly or indirectly. To foster a better understanding of the necessity and nature of policy interventions, it is vital that policymakers understand the scale and breadth of ransomware harms. While ransomware crime is an intractable contemporary issue with no immediate solution, action, where it is applied, should seek to increase resilience and alleviate harms. Greater attention urgently needs to be paid to the human impact of ransomware attacks, be it the psychological harm often overlooked in the wider discourse or the fact that vulnerable groups such as patients and benefits recipients are disproportionately impacted by ransomware harm.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Ransomware attacks remain a threat to individuals and organisations across the UK and indeed the globe. While the wider focus of reporting is often on the financial implications of ransomware attacks, this paper has set out a detailed analysis of different kinds of harm experienced directly or indirectly by ransomware victims and by society at large.
+
+The interview data has suggested a framework including first-, second- and third-order harms to assist in distinguishing between those directly impacted by ransomware, those indirectly impacted, and the cumulative effect ransomware has on society at large. Within each order of harm, this paper identified several categories of harm, such as financial, psychological or reputational harm, and provided numerous examples of how such harm is experienced by victims.
+
+Key findings based on this research underline that the psychological impact of ransomware attacks is significantly overlooked, and that currently no-one has a full understanding of the economic impact of ransomware attacks, such that the cost of the long-term and indirect financial harms is likely to be missing from current estimates of the economic harm caused by ransomware attacks. While the reputational harm stemming from a ransomware attack is a valid concern for some companies, especially those whose clients expect a higher level of privacy (such as customers of legal or financial services), the danger of reputational harm is often overestimated by victims. Similarly, the feared impact of exfiltrated data being used to cause further harm through financial fraud or other crime was not confirmed by interviewees. Instead, interview data showed that groups that are already vulnerable, such as benefits recipients or healthcare patients, are disproportionately impacted by ransomware harm. Finally, the paper found that government responses to ransomware attacks must focus on preventing societal harm.
+
+The paper’s detailed account of the ways in which ransomware attacks negatively impact individuals, organisations and society offers new insights into the actual harm caused by ransomware attacks. Although naturally limited, given that it reflects interview data and contemporary criminal activities that must be expected to evolve, the framework proposed in this paper will allow policymakers and practitioners – as well as those preparing for a potential cyber incident – to understand the ways in which victims are negatively impacted by ransomware attacks. This knowledge provides a critical baseline understanding for taking effective steps to mitigate such harm, both when responding or preparing for individual instances but also when designing policy interventions to tackle the ransomware threat. The framework further offers a valuable starting point for future analysis and data gathering, as findings from further research can be incorporated into the framework.
+
+---
+
+__Jamie MacColl__ is a Research Fellow in cyber threats and cyber security. His research interests include cyber security, the evolution of the cyber threat landscape, the role of emerging technologies in security and defence policy and the uses of history in policymaking. Current research projects focus on cyber insurance and cyber risks related to the Globalisation of Technology.
+
+__Pia Hüsch__ is a Research Analyst in cyber, technology and national security. Her research focuses on the impact, societal risks and lawfulness of cyber operations and the geopolitical and national security implications of disruptive technologies such as AI.
+
+__Gareth Mott__ is a Research Fellow in the Cyber team at RUSI. His research interests include governance and cyberspace, the challenges (and promises) of peer-to-peer technologies, developments in the cyber risk landscape, and the evolution of cyber security strategies at micro and macro levels.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-16-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-10.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-16-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-10.md
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+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第十日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-01-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 官批准控方專家報告呈堂 料明傳召張劍虹出庭作供
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（16日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第10日審訊。辯方反對控方專家、香港城市大學法律學院教授王貴國的兩份專家報告呈堂，因認為與本案控罪元素無關。3名《國安法》指定法官考慮控辯雙方陳詞後，認為王貴國的證供有助法庭了解美國針對中港官員而實施的措施，以及提供足夠資訊予法庭判斷相關措施是否能夠構成「制裁、封鎖及其他敵對行為」，最終批准兩份專家報告呈堂。控方表示，明天將會傳召首名證人，預料主問需時一星期。據悉首名證人為前蘋果日報社長張劍虹。
+
+#### 辯方反對專家報告呈堂 稱黎涉案行為與外國措施沒有因果關係
+
+控方擬引用香港城市大學法律學院教授王貴國分別於2022年11月17日及2023年11月15日撰寫的兩份報告，以圖列出美國針對中港官員而實施的制裁、封鎖及其他敵對行為，以及解釋相關措施的法律效力，包括影響、後果和時效。
+
+辯方代表、大律師關文渭則反對報告呈堂，並指它對於本案沒有足夠關聯，因黎智英的涉案行為與報告提及的外國措施之間並沒有因果關係，例如《香港人權及民主法案》於2019年下半年立法，比兩項串謀勾結外國勢力控罪時段更加早。
+
+
+▲ 辯方大律師 關文渭
+
+法官李運騰則認為，當外國政府聲稱會實施制裁，並不代表相關措施構成「制裁」，法庭需要王貴國的專家證供，去判斷外國採取或立法的措施是否構成「制裁、封鎖及其他敵對行為」。李官澄清，王貴國的報告並未有評論黎智英的言論或請求，因此與黎的犯案意圖無關。
+
+#### 報告提及外國措施立法過程 辯方質疑轉移焦點
+
+關文渭續指，王貴國提交的補充報告提及《香港人權及民主法案》影響香港的利益，他質疑這部份何以與措施是否「制裁、封鎖及其他敵對行為」有關係。關又指，報告闡述外國措施的立法過程和背景，可是既然外國立法並不是因為黎智英的言行所致，這些資料僅轉移焦點（red herring），並不能協助法庭。
+
+法官杜麗冰則指，專家報告是否能協助到法庭，最終可交由法庭決定。法官李運騰則指，法庭需要一名專家的協助，以了解這些外國措施的法律效力和後續影響，否則難以知道它們是否構成「制裁、封鎖及其他敵對行為」。關文渭則指這與控罪元素無關。
+
+控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行則表示，他們並非依賴王貴國的證供去證明黎的行為導致外國採取制裁措施。但控方指相關因果關係乃依賴「共犯證人」的庭上證供。控方重申王貴國的專家報告能夠協助法庭理解外國的措施是否構成「制裁、封鎖及其他敵對行為」。
+
+
+▲ 副刑事檢控專員 周天行
+
+#### 官批准王貴國專家報告呈堂
+
+經休庭約一小時考慮，由法官李運騰讀出裁決，他指王貴國的專家報告與本案相關，批准呈堂。控辯雙方均不爭議王貴國是一名美國法律專家，至於報告提及美國以外的其他國家，控方則不會依賴。
+
+法官指，兩項串謀勾結外國勢力控罪均是「串謀」請求外國實施制裁、封鎖及其他敵對行為，而控方並不需要證明外國實際上有實施相關措施。若然真的有任何外國措施擬訂立或實行，那只是環境證據，協助控方證明涉案「串謀」存在。
+
+法官指專家證供的作用在於告知法庭外國法律的內容，以及在有需要時解釋外國法院如何解讀相關法律，因此法官接納控方所指，外國法律的事實部份有待專家證供證明。法官認為王貴國的證供有助法庭了解美國針對中港官員而實施的措施，以及提供足夠資訊予法庭判斷相關措施是否能夠構成「制裁、封鎖及其他敵對行為」。
+
+法官又提到，現階段只需處理專家報告是否可以呈堂，而不需處理證據比重，至於法庭最終是否接納王貴國的證供則有待決定。假如法庭最終認為王的證供無助他們判斷，他們便不會予以考慮。基於以上，3名法官批准王的專家報告呈堂。
+
+案件明日續審。
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。
+
+黎智英的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師 Marc Corlett、關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及李峰琦。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。
+
+控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。
+
+同案8名被告：前行政總裁張劍虹、前總編輯羅偉光、前副社長陳沛敏、前執行總編輯林文宗、前英文主筆馮偉光、前主筆楊清奇、李宇軒和陳梓華，早前已承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，現正還柙，等待黎智英審訊完畢後判刑。
+
+首項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪」指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司，於2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀，請求外國或者境外機構、組織、人員實施對香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。
+
+另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，指黎智英於2020年7月1日至今年2月15日間，與Mark Simon、陳梓華、李宇軒、劉祖廸及其他人串謀，請求外國或境外機構、組織、人員，實施對中國或香港進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。
+
+「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示及/或複製煽動刊物，具意圖：
+
+> a) 引起憎恨或藐視中央或香港特別行政區政府或激起對其離叛
+
+> b) 激起香港居民企圖不循合法途徑促致改變其他在香港的依法制定的事項
+
+> c) 引起對香港司法的憎恨、藐視或激起對其離叛
+
+> d) 引起香港居民間的不滿或離叛
+
+> e) 煽惑他人使用暴力
+
+> f) 慫使他人不守法或不服從合法命令。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-17-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-11.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-17-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-11.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第十一日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-01-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 張劍虹出庭作供 稱黎智英追求民主自由反極權 冀透過蘋果籲上街、引西方關注
+- 張劍虹：蘋果過往形象「狗仔隊、娛樂」 黎智英投入佔中後 始成「反政府」報紙
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（17日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第11日審訊。已認罪候判的前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。張於1991年加入《壹週刊》，並於1994年升任為總編輯，其後於2005年離開壹傳媒集團。5年後，張接受黎的邀請重新入職，並於2016年升任為《蘋果日報》社長。張形容黎是集團的「最高領導人」及「最終決策人」，被問到何謂「黎智英的編採指示」，張指黎的形象「一直以來都好鮮明」，即追求「民主、自由、反極權」，特別是2019年反修例事件開始，黎認為要透過《蘋果日報》呼籲市民上街、示威及抗爭，並在國際層面上希望獲得西方民主國家的關注，「希望佢哋能夠提供援助，甚至一啲強烈啲嘅行動，好似制裁。」
+
+#### 前蘋果日報社長張劍虹循職員通道出庭
+
+控方傳召首名證人、前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹出庭作供。張於2022年5月承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」罪，現正還柙候判。他身穿黑色西裝褸、深藍色格仔恤衫，透過法官席旁邊的職員通道進入法庭，由三名懲教人員的帶領下步行至證人台就坐。張手持聖經，以基督教儀式宣誓，其後開始以廣東話作供，一名法庭傳譯員坐在其身旁把供詞翻譯成英語。
+
+
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹
+
+#### 張劍虹於1991年加入壹週刊 1994年升任總編輯
+
+在控方主問下，張確認他畢業於香港中文大學社會科學及新聞學學士學位課程。他於2021年6月17日被警方以「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」罪名拘捕，之後被正式起訴該罪及煽動刊物罪，同案被告包括黎智英、陳沛敏、羅偉光、林文宗、馮偉光、楊清奇及3間蘋果公司。
+
+張確認自己於2021年6月17日被捕，而控罪則提及他直至2021年6月24日仍參與本案的串謀，法官李運騰關注到，這是否指稱張在還柙的數天期間仍然有參與串謀。李官認為情況並不尋常，並要求控方澄清。周天行表示稍後會向張問及此事並澄清。
+
+在控方提問下，張先交代他在壹傳媒集團的工作經驗。他憶述於1991年加入《壹週刊》，當時任職財經組編輯。1994年，他獲黎智英委任為《壹週刊》總編輯：「因為黎生對我工作表現滿意。」張提到，雖然當時《壹週刊》社長是楊懷康，但是黎智英每日都會在辦公室工作，參與雜誌的事務。
+
+張解釋，他加入《壹週刊》時候，公司業務只有一本雜誌，後來發展出愈來愈多雜誌，包括《一本便利》。及後1995年，黎智英創立《蘋果日報》，並於1999年上市，就在那時形成了一個壹傳媒集團。
+
+#### 張劍虹於2005年離職 5年後黎智英邀請下重新入職
+
+張續稱，在2000年左右，黎智英決定在台灣創辦《壹週刊》，於是委派張赴台灣協助創辦雜誌。張稱在2001至2005年間，他是台灣《壹週刊》的社長，並與黎緊密合作，故有很長時間留在台灣工作，平均每週有約3日身處台灣。
+
+直到2005年4月，張有見台灣《壹週刊》業務已上軌道，加上開始有盈餘，所以他決定離開壹傳媒集團，「因為想趁呢個機會休息吓。」
+
+2010年，在黎智英的邀請下，張劍虹重新加入壹傳媒集團，任職內容顧問。約於2011年4月，黎將他調職往《蘋果日報》，擔任總編輯。在2011年4至12月期間，張根據本地報刊條例登記為《蘋果日報》的註冊編輯。
+
+#### 2016年張升任蘋果日報社長 相信因獲黎欣賞工作能力
+
+張稱他於2014年12月起擔任《蘋果日報》副社長一段時間。至2016年左右，他獲黎智英升任為社長。
+
+控方問到張知不知道為何黎決定將他升職。法官李運騰一度打斷，質疑此問題與案件無關，控方則稱可以顯示黎與張之間的關係。張遂回答，相信是因為黎欣賞他的工作能力。
+
+張續稱，他作為《蘋果日報》的社長，會負責整個《蘋果日報》的營運和確保報紙每日出版。被問到社長與總編輯之間在職務上的分別，張解釋總編輯負責每日登報文章的審批及決策，而決策包括新聞選材、角度及決定哪一宗新聞做頭條；而社長則負責較高層面的監督工作，包括確保報紙的出版及運作，以及確保編採方針符合黎智英的政策。
+
+2017年，張獲黎委任為壹傳媒有限公司，即整個壹傳媒集團的副行政總裁。2018年2月，張繼而獲委任為集團的行政總裁、執行董事，以及集團旗下公司的董事。
+
+#### 張劍虹指黎智英為壹傳媒的「最高領導人」及「最終決策人」
+
+控方向張展示壹傳媒集團的2019至2020年度的年報，封面寫有「Witness History」字眼，年報內容包括主席黎智英的話、公司的業務分佈、香港及台灣《蘋果日報》的出版業務等。控方續展示列出董事局成員的頁面，張確認直至2020年3月31日，董事局共有7名成員，包括2名執行董事、2名非執行董事，以及3名獨立非執行董事。直至同年5月25日，董事局成員的組合有變，改為3名執行董事、1名非執行董事，以及3名獨立非執行董事。
+
+年報中列出黎智英為主席，張劍虹則為行政總裁。張確認黎於2018至2020年均任主席。控方問及兩人的職務有何分別，張表示：「黎生作為主席，係成個集團嘅最高領導人同最終決策人」，「我自己作為行政總裁，負責執行黎生同董事局嘅指示。」
+
+#### 張指3名非執行董事包括《華爾街日報》前社長、《南華早報》前總編輯
+
+張續解釋該3名執行董事，分別為黎智英、他自己以及周達權。他指周為財政營運總裁，負責的範疇包括行政、公司秘書、廣告以及管理印刷廠。至於1名非執行董事為葉一堅，他為台灣《蘋果日報》的顧問，亦負責監督董事會。另外，3名獨立非執行董事分別為：《華爾街日報》前社長 Louis Gordon Crovitz、《南華早報》前總編輯 Mark Lambert Clifford，及專業會計師 Lam Chung Yan, Eric。3人均負責監察董事局的運作。
+
+#### 張指黎智英曾任非執行董事 期間仍積極參與集團決策及運作
+
+張確認黎智英於2018年2月至2020年5月25日期間，為集團的非執行董事；但於2020年5月25日後，他恢復為執行董事。控方追問原因，張表示不清楚記得原因，但補充指：「不過我自己覺得，雖然佢自2018年2月到2020年月係非執行董事，但係佢都好積極參與成個集團嘅決策同運作。」
+
+#### 張表示副社長陳沛敏負責每天揀選《蘋果日報》頭版新聞
+
+控方其後問及壹傳媒集團的高層，張表示陳沛敏於2019年4月至2021年6月為副社長，主要職責是負責《蘋果日報》紙媒的決策，以及每日揀選《蘋果日報》的頭版新聞、港聞各版的頭條，同時亦負責審批各部門的開支。
+
+#### 張表示總編輯羅偉光負責網站新聞、管理編採部同事
+
+張續指，羅偉光則任總編輯，主要負責《蘋果日報》網站的中文新聞出版，以及管理港聞版編採部同事。張表示理論上羅應該同時紙媒稿件的審批工作，但由於2019至2021年公司集中於網上新聞，而網上新聞需要24小時運作，因此張把紙媒工作交由陳沛敏負責。張表示陳的職位較羅高。
+
+
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》總編輯 羅偉光
+
+至於執行總編輯林文宗則為陳沛敏的助手，於陳休假時會協助處理審批紙媒的職務，包括跟進執行編採會議中陳給予員工的指示。
+
+另一執行總編輯馮偉光，自2020年6月起負責《蘋果日報》的網上英文版，並會在每天的紙媒或網上稿件中，選取某些翻譯成英文。他亦負責管理外判翻譯團隊，並聯繫專門為英文版寫稿的寫手。
+
+
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 馮偉光
+
+#### 張指黎智英會透過 Mark Simon 等介紹英文版寫手
+
+控方問，馮需否向任何人索取指示，張表示馮會自行決定揀選甚麼稿件翻譯，有需要時馮會問他。他補充，雖然架構上馮應該向羅偉光負責，「但係多數有關於呢樣嘢，佢都會搵我嘅。」控方追問馮需否向其他人索取指示；張解釋黎智英原本已經好清楚指示英文版的編採運作，黎亦會透過 Mark Simon 及 Mark Clifford 介紹寫手。
+
+張續指，馮亦以筆名「盧峯」在專欄「蘋論」撰寫政治評論，他尚未負責英文版職務時，每周會撰寫兩篇社評，但於擔任上述職位後，黎智英認為他應該減少寫社評，於是改為每周一篇。
+
+至於張志偉則為蘋果動新聞平台總監，負責動新聞製作，以及網上非新聞類的內容，包括娛樂、副刊、馬經及波經。他同時負責《蘋果》旗下的社交媒體帳戶，包括 Facebook、Instagram、Twitter、YouTube、PSCP.TV，以及網上直播。
+
+張又指，楊清奇為《蘋果日報》主筆，會以筆名「李平」撰寫社評，同時負責管理紙媒及網上的評論文章，需要審批稿件及聯絡作者，邀請對方寫稿。
+
+#### 張指楊清奇按黎的編採指示審批文章 形容黎追求民主自由反極權
+
+控方問張是否知道楊審批的準則，張表示楊會「按住黎智英定下嘅編採同評論政策」，即其編採指示審批文章。
+
+控方問到何謂「黎智英的編採指示」，張回答指黎的形象「一直以來都好鮮明」，即追求「民主、自由，同埋反極權」，特別是2019年反修例事件開始，黎智英認為政府對香港的民主自由存在打壓，並認為要透過《蘋果日報》去呼籲市民上街、示威及抗爭，以向政府施壓。此外，在國際層面上，黎希望獲得西方民主國家的關注，「希望佢哋能夠提供援助，甚至一啲強烈啲嘅行動，好似制裁。」張又指，上述《蘋果日報》高層的職位均由黎指派。
+
+被告黎智英（76歲）否認一項「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」及兩項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪。
+
+
+▲ 黎智英幼子 黎順恩（左）、黎智英妻子 李韻琴（右）
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。
+
+黎智英的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師 Marc Corlett、關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及李峰琦。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。
+
+控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。
+
+同案8名被告：前行政總裁張劍虹、前總編輯羅偉光、前副社長陳沛敏、前執行總編輯林文宗、前英文主筆馮偉光、前主筆楊清奇、李宇軒和陳梓華，早前已承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，現正還柙，等待黎智英審訊完畢後判刑。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（17日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第11日審訊。控方傳召認罪候判的前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。張提到，黎智英透過每週召開的「飯盒會」，向《蘋果》高層下達編採方面的指示。他指由《蘋果》創刊至2014年佔中之前，《蘋果》基本上予人印象是「狗仔隊、娛樂」，後來黎投入參與佔中，自此積極制訂編採政策，因而成為了《蘋果》的分水嶺，「好似成為一間反政府、對抗中央嘅一個報紙。」2019年政府提出修訂《逃犯條例》，黎亦曾向管理層稱修例侵犯香港人的民主自由和人權，並擔心倘通過修例「傳媒都冇得做」，所以認為要透過《蘋果》呼籲市民上街抗爭。
+
+#### 張劍虹午休後簡述蘋果日常運作 列出各種會議
+
+控方今早開始傳召首名證人、已認罪的前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹出庭作供，他上午交代其在壹傳媒集團的工作經驗，下午則開始談及《蘋果日報》的日常運作。張作供期間，被告欄內的黎智英不時手執原子筆和記事本抄寫。
+
+張劍虹供稱，營辦一份報紙牽涉很多新聞材料，要在當中揀選角度及決定「做幾大」，乃涉及整個《蘋果日報》的編採政策，所以他們的日常運作過程中，每天都需要召開不同會議。
+
+張指每日下午2時半有一個「鋤報會」，出席的同事包括陳沛敏、羅偉光、林文宗，以及各部門主管，會議目的是檢討當天已出版的實體報紙，審視內容、標題有何不足及需要改進的地方。
+
+張續指，每日下午3時則有一個「初會」，出席的人包括陳沛敏、林文宗、羅偉光，亦有不同部門的主管，包括突發新聞、港聞、國際、兩岸、法庭及財經等。會議由陳沛敏主持，各部門主管會匯報當天有哪些新聞發生，而陳則會從中揀選一些新聞，指示同事如何繼續跟進及「做詳細啲、豐富啲」。張又指，上述牽涉《蘋果日報》的編採政策，由管理層按照黎智英的指示而訂立。
+
+
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、前《蘋果日報》副社長 陳沛敏（右）
+
+張續指，每日下午大概5時至5時半有一個「編前會」，主要決定翌日出版的實體報紙頭版，以及港聞版每頁的頭條。出席者包括陳沛敏和林文宗，但張不肯定羅偉光是否出席者之一。
+
+張指，《蘋果日報》逢周二都會舉辦一次「Planning 會」，出席者包括陳沛敏、林文宗、羅偉光及各部門主管，由陳主持會議。各部門主管會報告手上有什麼新聞材料及正在跟進什麼專題，而陳、林和羅會向一眾部門主管下達黎智英的指示，包括有哪些「故仔」可以跟進、吩咐他們如何準備。此外，《蘋果》主筆楊清奇會報告星期六的論壇版會有什麼專題，同樣是按照黎的立場而定。
+
+張表示，他通常不會出席上述會議，而據他所知，黎智英亦沒有出席這些會議。
+
+#### 張劍虹稱黎智英透過「飯盒會」下達編採指示
+
+至於黎智英如何下達編採方面的指示，張劍虹指會透過召開「飯盒會」。每逢星期四，黎會輪流與《蘋果日報》、《壹週刊》、《飲食男女》、廣告部等舉行「飯盒會」，例如今個星期與《蘋果日報》團隊開會，下周便會與《壹週刊》團隊開會，接著下周則是《飲食男女》團隊。
+
+就《蘋果日報》的「飯盒會」，張指由黎主持，其他出席者包括他自己、壹傳媒集團財務總裁周達權、資訊科技部主管Connie Chan、陳沛敏、羅偉光、林文宗，以及陳邀請的部門主管，每次與會者人數有10至15人。
+
+張指，由於「飯盒會」逢星期四舉行，所以早於星期一或二，有意出席的同事會加入黎智英設立的聊天群組，若有任何想法或問題可在群組內提出，屆時黎會在「飯盒會」中現身解答。張指會議之前，眾人會在壹傳媒大樓的飯堂買飯盒，然後於下午12時半前往5樓的貴賓房，一邊吃飯盒一邊參與會議。
+
+張續指，黎在會議期間會談及對時局的看法、其政治取態，以及在當時形勢底下《蘋果日報》的編採政策，讓與會人士再下達給沒有出席會議的管理層，之後各人會各司其職。張稱黎指示他做會議記錄，另會吩咐他跟進某些工作。
+
+法官李運騰指，黎不只參與會議，更是制訂編採政策的角色，問張是否正確。張確認，因黎是《蘋果日報》的創辦人，也是最大股東，持有超過70%股權。張亦形容黎是《蘋果日報》的「舵手」。
+
+
+▲ 黎智英（左）
+
+#### 張劍虹：2014年黎智英投入佔中運動 《蘋果》成反政府報紙
+
+張劍虹表示，他記得由《蘋果日報》創刊至2014年佔中運動之前，黎智英比較少參與《蘋果》的編採工作。「當時基本上好多人都認為《蘋果日報》嘅形象都係狗仔隊、娛樂」，直至2014年佔中前後，「黎生就好積極咁制訂《蘋果日報》的編採政策。」
+
+張續指，黎當時要求用《蘋果日報》去呼籲市民爭取民主、上街抗爭，「嗰時我好記得，要推動6.22公投，啫係爭取『我要真普選』，反對白皮書吖。」（註：2014年國務院發表的《一國兩制在香港的實踐》白皮書）張提到當時有一首歌曲改編自電影《孤星淚》歌曲，《蘋果》曾找人演唱，黎亦獻唱了一、兩句。
+
+後來2014年9月佔中爆發，張形容「黎生亦都好投入呢個佔中運動」，「我覺得呢件事係一個分水嶺，《蘋果日報》呢就好似成為一間反政府、對抗中央嘅一個報紙。」張指「由嗰時開始《蘋果日報》就行緊呢條路」，管理層亦跟從黎智英這個方向去經營這份報紙。
+
+#### 張劍虹：黎智英憂倘通過修例 「傳媒都冇得做」 冀透過《蘋果》籲上街
+
+控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行提及2019年的香港社會騷亂，問張事件有否影響《蘋果》的編採方向。張表示有影響，當政府宣布修訂《逃犯條例》後，黎智英會向高層說「《逃犯條例》啫係侵犯香港人嘅民主自由，同埋香港人嘅人權」，並認為「中共要透過呢個條例，將唔聽話嘅人，同中共政權嘅眼中釘送返大陸」。黎又提到「商界都好擔心」，並指若然修例通過，「傳媒都冇得做」，「所以黎生認為要透過《蘋果日報》叫啲人上街、抗爭。」在國際層面，黎亦認為要透過《蘋果》呼籲西方民主國家關注修例事件，希望他們出手對抗中央，甚至制裁香港官員，務求「等佢哋唔敢亂嚟」。
+
+張補充，黎於2019年3至4月期間，除了在「飯盒會」談及過上述言論，亦曾在張的辦公室房間內說過相同言論。
+
+
+▲ 黎智英
+
+#### 張劍虹：「蘋論」作者須經黎智英批准才能聘用
+
+至於評論文章，張劍虹指黎智英同樣有下達指示，因新聞報導和評論的方針均是一致。張指《蘋果》社論一定要根據黎訂立的方向去撰寫，而刊於評論版的文章則由楊清奇負責審批。楊亦是按照黎的編採方向批核稿件。
+
+就「社論」和「評論版」之間的分別，張指社論即是「蘋論」，每日均在一個專欄刊出，共有4名寫手，分別為馮偉光（筆名盧峯）、楊清奇（筆名李平）、方圓和古立。
+
+張提到，黎智英會就社論寫手人選給予建議，並會把一些寫得好及符合其方向的作者介紹給楊清奇。其中方圓乃由黎介紹，因他的文章多是批評政府和「反共」，黎認為方圓對中國共產黨熟悉，所以文章寫得好。由於社論作者必須經黎的批准才能聘用，所以從未試過社論作者不符合黎的指示的情況。
+
+而評論版則由不同的作者撰寫文章，內容比較多元化，不過「評論版」與「蘋論」一樣均刊載於「A疊（港聞版）」。楊清奇負責審批文章，當中部份作者由楊邀約，有的則由黎介紹，張自己也會不時介紹適合人選。
+
+張稱，他在2020年曾向楊清奇建議邀約一名日本人撰寫評論文章，惟一時記不起該日本人的名字。由於該日本人曾經訪問過黎智英，二人互相認識，他的文章亦有批評政府和談及日本的政治鬥爭，所以張認為他適合在供稿予《蘋果》。
+
+#### 張劍虹：黎智英專欄文章 「冇人敢修改」
+
+至於黎智英的專欄「成敗樂一笑」，張指它每逢星期日出版，但不是刊登於港聞的評論版，而是刊登於副刊的專欄版。他形容黎的文章「一般都係反共同批評政府」，但因為楊清奇不需負責審批副刊的專欄文章，所以不需要處理黎的專欄文章，除非黎要求其文章刊登於港聞的評論版，但這情況只發生過一、兩次。張又補充：「可以咁講，黎生嘅文係冇人敢修改。」
+
+案件明日續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-18-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-12.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-18-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-12.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..42d80cff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-18-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-12.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第十二日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-01-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 張劍虹：黎智英指示報導陳方安生會見彭斯 「做到最大嘅效果」 翌日擺頭版
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（18日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第12日審訊。認罪候判的前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹，繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。談到黎曾下達的指示，控方展示 WhatsApp 訊息，顯示2019年3月前政務司司長陳方安生會見時任美國副總統彭斯之後，黎指示張報導及「做到最大嘅效果」。張遂把黎的指示轉達給其他同事，包括時任總編輯羅偉光和副社長陳沛敏。翌日《蘋果日報》實體報紙頭版便以〈彭斯晤陳太 關注港人權〉為標題。此外，黎於2020年5月指示管理層籌備英文版，形容黎「好心急英文版快啲面世」，又催促資訊科技部同事盡快設立英文版網站，因黎希望讓美國讀者「成為《蘋果日報》同美國政治嘅槓桿」。
+
+#### 張劍虹續作供：黎智英「好心急」冀英文版盡快面世
+
+認罪候判的前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹，繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。就《蘋果日報》英文版的成立過程，張憶述約於2020年5月中，黎智英成立了一個名為「English news」的 WhatsApp 群組，黎是群組管理員，其他群組成員包括張自己、副社長陳沛敏、總編輯羅偉光、動新聞平台總監張志偉、兩岸版的副總編輯蔣美紅、資訊科技部同事Connie Chan。而英文版主筆馮偉光亦在後來加入英文版工作。
+
+張指，黎在 WhatsApp 群組裡開宗明義，當時「覺得係好需要成立英文版嘅時候」，遂吩咐管理層盡快成立英文版，並在群組內詳細解釋他對英文版的目標、期望和做法。黎亦指示張負責聯絡馮偉光重新入職《蘋果》，主理英文版。張遂於同年5月下旬相約馮午餐，其後馮答應6月初回來上班。
+
+張形容，「黎生亦都好心急英文版快啲面世」，又催促資訊科技部同事盡快設立英文版網站，以及在《蘋果》的手機應用程式引入英文版頁面。
+
+張劍虹：黎智英冀英文版「走向美國」 使美讀者成為蘋果與美國政治「槓桿」
+
+控方問到，為何黎智英認為當時是合適的時候設立英文版。張指黎曾在群組中表示，「如果外國讀者、支持香港的讀者，透過訂閱《蘋果日報》英文版，咁樣對《蘋果日報》本身嚟講都係好大幫助。」
+
+張又指：「黎生特別提到做呢個英文版係走向美國啦」，因他希望「讓呢啲美國讀者成為《蘋果日報》同美國政治嘅槓桿」。
+
+
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹
+
+張稱黎表明英文版寫手要「偏黃」、意指「支持抗爭及逆權」
+
+控方問到，馮偉光憑甚麼準則，揀選中文版部分文章翻譯成英文。張劍虹解釋，馮主要根據黎智英的指引，黎在英文版 WhatsApp 群組，「開宗明義」表示選擇英文版寫手的標準，就是要偏向《蘋果日報》的立場，即「偏黃」，以張的理解即是「支持抗爭、支持逆權」。張又指黎曾經吩咐不要揀選「Pro China（親中）」的文章。於是同事討論後，確認揀選出來的文章「要係啲抗爭呀、逆權呀、制裁呀」，並與「反香港政府」及「反中共」相關。
+
+控方展示黎智英專欄「成敗樂一笑」其中一篇文章，標題為〈大時代快將來臨〉，又展示該文章同時被翻譯成英文並上載至網站。張表示，文章是由馮偉光根據黎智英定下的框架自行揀選。法官李運騰問，黎智英是否不會指明揀選哪一文章，張同意。
+
+#### 張表示黎冀透過與外國前官員等有影響力人士訪談 以造成輿論
+
+控方其後問及英文網站上的節目《Live Chat with Jimmy Lai》，張確認節目成立於2020年7月9日，並為公開節目，公眾可於《蘋果》網站及其手機應用程式觀看。控方問及黎設立節目之目的，張表示黎智英希望在《國安法》生效之後，與「外國知名學者、政客和前官員」進行訪談，因「佢哋都係有影響力嘅人」，黎希望藉此「造成輿論」。
+
+#### 張指黎會在訪談中提及香港被打壓情況 希望外國援助
+
+張續指，黎會在訪談中提及香港的局勢情況，特別是《國安法》成立之後，「香港被打壓嘅情況、對於法治嘅影響、對金融中心地位嘅影響」，黎希望外國可以援助香港。張表示自己沒有親自參與製作上述節目，而時任《蘋果》動新聞平台總監張志偉則要協助將訪談片段上載至各網上平台。
+
+#### 張表示黎及助手Mark Simon負責邀約嘉賓
+
+法官李運騰問，誰人負責訪談前的安排和準備工作，例如邀約嘉賓。張表示據其所知，是由黎智英及其助理 Mark Simon 自行處理，並沒有經張及《蘋果日報》其他同事處理。
+
+#### 張劍虹：黎智英指示報導陳方安生會見彭斯 「做到最大嘅效果」
+
+控方其後在庭上展示 WhatsApp 訊息，黎智英於2019年3月23日以 WhatsApp 轉發一張照片給張劍虹，顯示前政務司司長陳方安生赴美國會見時任副總統彭斯。張稱黎告知他這是很重大的新聞，並吩咐他將此新聞「做到最大嘅效果」，張之後回覆「收到」。
+
+
+▲ 黎智英
+
+控方續指，黎在另一個訊息中提及英國駐港澳前總領事郭明瀚（James Cunningham）。訊息中，郭明瀚提及已經與陳方安生傾談，指對方關注修例爭議及抵抗的需要。郭明瀚提議陳方安生應該在美國報章《The Hill》（國會山報）發表意見。陳太表示已經嘗試，但好像未能凝聚「民主」力量。張解釋，郭明瀚亦都建議黎將這個新聞做到最大效果。
+
+被問到何謂「最大效果」，張形容意即將該新聞「做到最盡」，以他所知，同事有需要採訪陳方安生及其隨行人士，以獲得會見彭斯的內容。此外，編輯可將相關新聞擺放在《蘋果》手機應用程式的「焦點」一欄，使讀者一整天均可見到，而不會被後來的新聞替代。編輯可以決定該新聞放在「焦點」欄目為時多久，也可安排重要的新聞「推播」，使讀者收到推播通知（push notifications）。
+
+張稱，他收到黎的訊息後，便把該些訊息轉發給時任總編輯羅偉光，又著羅盡量採訪陳太與彭斯會面的詳情及更多資料，以及將相關新聞置放在「焦點」欄目，若果採訪到新資訊便可不斷更新網上新聞，「搵到新嘅料可以再豐富佢。」張亦把黎的訊息轉發給時任副社長陳沛敏，「等佢知道黎生吩咐我哋將呢個新聞做到最大效果。」
+
+
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》總編輯 羅偉光
+
+控方展示翌日《蘋果日報》實體報紙頭版，題為〈彭斯晤陳太 關注港人權〉，照片則與黎轉發給張的照片相同。
+
+案件明日續審。
+
+藝人王宗堯今亦到庭旁聽。
+
+
+▲ 王宗堯
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-19-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-13.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-19-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-13.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..17ffdd0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-19-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-13.md
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第十三日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-01-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 4.28反送中遊行前夕報導林榮基彭定康 張劍虹：黎智英冀催谷上街人數
+- 張劍虹：感覺黎智英會晤美國官員後「幾雀躍」 編採政策轉趨「偏激」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（19日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第13日審訊。認罪候判的前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹，繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方在庭上展示多則 WhatsApp 訊息，顯示黎智英在2019年4月28日反送中遊行前夕，先後指示張劍虹訪問前銅鑼灣書店店長林榮基和報導彭定康對《逃犯條例》修訂的評論，希望「催谷」遊行人數。同年7月，《蘋果》推行付費訂閱，首階段向每名讀者收取3元的訂閱手續費，張提議把其中1元撥出來作為抗爭者的訴訟費和醫療費，後來因為民陣成立一個支援反送中抗爭者基金，黎便指示把款項捐給民陣基金。
+
+#### 張劍虹：黎智英指示訪問林榮基 以催谷4.28反送中遊行
+
+認罪候判的前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹，繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。就黎智英向張劍虹下達的編採指示，控方指黎於2019年4月以 WhatsApp 指示一名叫「廖兄」的同事：「我們會用林榮基的新聞催谷廿八號大遊行，但要做頭條必須有林的電話訪問，請與林聯絡促成此事。謝謝。黎」，而相關訊息其後轉發給張。張解釋林榮基是前銅鑼灣書店店長，因在國內被人拘留一段時間，回港後連同律師何俊仁召開記者會講述事件，此後便沒有再返回國內，故在國內被通緝。林其後移居台灣，因此張請當地的《蘋果》同事嘗試聯絡林，並回覆黎稱「老闆，我已經請台灣同事處理」。黎回覆「很好，謝謝」，之後再傳送另一個訊息「衷心感謝」。以張的理解，黎是「希望利用《蘋果日報》的頭條來谷28號的大遊行人數」。
+
+
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹
+
+#### 張劍虹按黎指示訪問林榮基 遊行前一日頭版報導
+
+張稱，由於當時他正在台灣公幹，而同事大概知道林身處某一間書店，所以便與台灣《蘋果》的攝影師一同前往尋找林。完成訪問後，張向黎報告「老闆，已經完成訪問了」，其後撰寫報導，然後把稿件分別傳送給香港和台灣的《蘋果》同事。其中香港的同事即時任總編輯羅偉光，讓他可先行以網上新聞形式發布。至於實體報紙，張跟時任《蘋果》副社長陳沛敏聯絡，轉達黎智英想以此新聞作為頭版，「就催谷跟住禮拜日嘅遊行，我就請佢（陳）去做A1。」
+
+控方展示2019年4月27日的《蘋果日報》頭版，標題為「林榮基流亡台灣 臨別呼籲 守護香港明日上街」。報導首段提到：「《逃犯條例》修訂殺到埋身，因偷運禁書被中國公安部追緝的前銅鑼灣書店店長林榮基為了不想成為逃犯，只好選擇逃命。他在佔中九子被判刑翌日隻身出走到台灣，投奔免於恐懼的自由。要永遠離開土生土長之地，他雖然難過，但痛心香港已淪陷，期望「香港人唔好詐瞓」，為了自己及下一代，每個人都要盡一己責任，上街反對《逃犯條例》惡法。」張解釋稱，林在訪問中以過來人身份，講述被壓迫要離開香港的經歷，並呼籲市民上街。而4月28日「反送中遊行」的確有舉行。
+
+
+▲ 林榮基（前排中）
+
+#### 張指黎未覺滿意 繼而指示報導彭定康
+
+遊行前一日，黎向張傳送訊息，稱林榮基的報導對催谷遊行有幫助，但認為氣氛仍然「未夠熾熱」，希望催谷更多人參與翌日的遊行，「俾我感覺係，佢未夠滿意。」黎又轉發數個訊息給張，顯示黎邀請「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）訪問前港督彭定康，以得到其對於《逃犯條例》的評語。之後羅傑斯回覆黎，他本人身在雅加達，而彭定康則在法國，會嘗試透過電話做訪問。
+
+彭定康後來以訊息回覆，稱修例對於填補制度漏洞並不重要，反而它侵害香港的價值和繁榮穩定，對於香港的營商環境帶來恐懼和不確定性。政治活動亦陷入險境。彭定康又稱修例直接衝擊法治制度下的一國兩制和香港自治。
+
+張稱黎希望《蘋果》能報導彭定康上述評語，並在網上新聞及翌日報紙盡快刊登。張遂向同事轉達黎的指示，最終報導在4月27日刊於《蘋果》網站，並於4月28日刊於實體報紙。
+
+#### 辯方指黎智英眼睛有問題 難以閱讀屏幕訊息內容
+
+早休之前，辯方代表、大律師關文渭指黎智英因眼睛有問題，所以在被告欄內透過庭上電視屏幕閱讀涉案訊息時有困難，只能依靠聆聽證人讀出相關訊息內容。關又透露黎的眼睛曾做過手術，未知何時將會做下一次手術。控方遂表示會放大相關訊息方便黎閱讀。
+
+再次開庭後，關指懲教人員已安排黎坐在被告欄第一排，但這仍未足夠，經辯方與懲教、法庭職員和控方商討後，各方同意安排把一個電子屏幕搬到被告欄內。
+
+#### 張劍虹指黎智英指示印製「反送中」長幡 隨報附送
+
+控方續指，黎於2019年6月13日指示張，指「星期日遊行泛民想我們印十萬張長幡35寸長15寸闊，派給遊行人士，給他們從家裹的窗口放出來」。張指因6月16日有反送中遊行，黎希望張以毛筆字寫「反送中」，然後印製十萬張長幡，隨報附送，讓市民遊行期間可以拿著該長幡。庭上展示長幡樣本，其中一張以黃色做底色，除了有黑色字「反送中」之外，還有「罷工、罷課、罷市」，張解釋當時職工盟正在策劃罷工，所以黎希望寫上「三罷」字眼以作宣傳。張指由於《逃犯條例》修訂暫緩，及後有人自殺，泛民人士如李卓人建議不要派發長幡。
+
+#### 張提議三分一訂閱手續費支援抗者 獲黎同意
+
+控方之後展示2019年6月15日的 WhatsApp 訊息，張建議「就今次出來抗爭的人日後療傷和訴訟，我們可以在三元手續費撥一元出來成立基金協助」。黎則回覆：「非常好idea！」張解釋，由2019年4月1日起，黎決定推行「免費訂閱」，讀者只要登記做會員，便可免費閱讀《蘋果》網站新聞；同年7月1日起至9月1日期間，《蘋果日報》需向每人收取3元手續費，讀者才能看到網站新聞；直至9月1日起，《蘋果》開始正式收取訂閱費用，即每日1.68元。黎認為，將3元手續費之中的1元撥出來作為示威者的訴訟費和醫療費，可以鼓勵支持抗爭運動的人訂閱《蘋果》。後來黎指民陣已成立一個「支援反送中抗爭者基金」，指示「我們的錢可以給他們運用」。
+
+2019年7月5日，張劍虹向黎報告指付費人數突破30萬人，並會按照黎的指示，請會計部同事以《蘋果日報》名義簽發支票，向民陣的基金捐款30萬元。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（19日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第13日審訊。認罪候判的前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹，繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。他稱黎於2019年7月赴美會見時任副總統彭斯和時任國務卿等官員，事後感覺到黎「幾雀躍」，並指示張報導訪美一事及「做大佢」。張憶述後來在言談之間，覺得黎「講制裁係多咗」，《蘋果日報》的編採政策亦轉趨「偏激」，例如「對成個運動比較暴力場合，同埋激進嘅場面，都會照報導、同情」。
+
+#### 張劍虹：感覺黎對會見官員感到「幾雀躍」
+
+控方展示一則由美國國務院前顧問 Christian Whiton 發送給前美國國防部副部長 Paul Wolfowitz 的訊息，載有《彭博新聞》的報導連結，標題為「Trump Team Sends Defiant Signal to Beijing by Meeting Activists」，內容講述黎智英赴美國會見官員。黎於2019年7月11日將該訊息轉發給張劍虹。
+
+張稱以他所知，黎的確於2019年7月赴美國會見時任副總統彭斯、時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧和美國國家安全顧問 John Bolton，該次旅程結束後相隔一段時間，黎與張才有機會就旅程談話，張感覺到黎對會見官員感到「幾雀躍」，認為對反送中運動有幫助。
+
+> Jimmy Lai is a Champion of Freedom & I was honored to welcome him to the White House in 2019. Today, he sits in prison for his support of Democracy in Hong Kong & @VoCommunism rightly awarded him their Highest Honor for his Courageous Commitment to Freedom. God Bless Jimmy Lai.🇺🇸 pic.twitter.com/oU69TSkex2 — Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence) June 11, 2021
+
+#### 黎智英出席網上節目談制裁 事後指示張劍虹報導及「做大佢」
+
+控方續展示一則《蘋果》報導，內容提及黎智英出席何俊仁主持的網上節目「細說中南海」，當中黎談及與蓬佩奧會面，蓬佩奧問黎：「美國可以怎樣做？」黎則回答美國可以實施制裁，讓中國官員知道其所作所為會有後果。
+
+張供稱，黎出席節目後，吩咐他報導節目內容及「做大佢」，包括較詳盡篇幅、擺在較顯眼位置和安排推播通知（push notifications）。張遂通知時任《蘋果》總編輯羅偉光，著他跟進。
+
+在張的記憶中，黎在訪美之前，曾經在私下談話間提及制裁官員，「等佢哋唔敢亂嚟」，但是首次公開談論制裁則是在「細說中南海」節目裡。
+
+#### 張劍虹指黎訪美後多談制裁 蘋果編採政策轉趨偏激
+
+控方問到，黎會見美國官員一事，有否影響到《蘋果日報》的編採政策。張則指，當時人們覺得「黎生原來可以去到白宮見到啲咁勁嘅官員」，並把香港的情況告知美國官員，張形容「好似有啲 high 咁囉，原來真係可以去到白宮㗎」，又指事件令人們認為「個運動好似⋯⋯啫係有希望咁囉」。張表示，後來與黎言談之間，「覺得佢（黎）講制裁係多咗囉。」他又指，《蘋果日報》的編採政策「後來愈來愈激烈，啫係偏激咁囉」。
+
+至於「偏激」的意思，張劍虹指黎在飯盒會及二人見面的場合裡，曾說過「示威抗爭、和勇唔好畀佢哋分化」的言論，「佢又會提到『抗爭會係長期性』咁囉」，「《蘋果日報》就會因為咁樣，而對成個運動比較暴力場合，同埋激進嘅場面，都會照報導、同情，啫（認為）係個政府同中共逼成咁嘅。」
+
+#### 張表示黎冀藉訪問抗爭者激起「同情」及「抗爭情緒」
+
+張劍虹稱，黎智英曾經在台灣舉行的「飯盒會」上，吩咐台灣及香港《蘋果》增加「訪談節目（video talk）」的數目，由每星期4次增至40次。訪談節目需要找「泛民反對派有代表性嘅人」或「抗爭者」作為拍攝對象。張在回港後有跟進上述事件，而黎亦有與張討論。
+
+張解釋，他們會找「抗爭者」講述為何出來抗爭，以及他們的經歷和苦況，張相信黎希望藉此「激起啲人對抗爭者嘅同情，同埋抗爭情緒」。但由於很多「抗爭者」不願出鏡，因此張建議用訪問形式拍攝，然後將片段上載至動新聞。
+
+#### 張表示節目以「泛民反對派代表」或「抗爭者」作主題
+
+法官李運騰希望了解更多關於「訪談節目」的詳情，張解釋節目時長45分鐘，通常會用「Zoom」軟件對話，由港聞組節目部同事負責，並以「泛民反對派代表」或「抗爭者」作為節目主題，有時會找他們到《蘋果》的工作室對談。張表示，曾討論過訪談節目是否最適合的方法表達上述題材。
+
+#### 張稱港聞組「全程投入」處理反修例主題節目
+
+李運騰問，訪談節目是否由2019年反修例運動衍生，張回答不是。李亦問，自2019年7月至年底，訪談節目的主題是否全都與反修例及示威相關，張表示大部分均是，且「成個港聞組差唔多全程投入晒去做呢個運動」。另外，張表示負責決定訪問對象的同事需向羅偉光負責，而羅會向張報告，張最後會按照黎智英指示執行。
+
+
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》總編輯 羅偉光
+
+李運騰表示自己沒有看過《蘋果》動新聞，因此問及誰人可以觀看訪談節目。張表示，付費訂閱的讀者可以觀看。他又確認，直至2019年7月初，共有30萬名訂閱者。
+
+案件押後至下周二（23日）續審，下周一會給予時間張閱讀文件，但不會開放法庭予公眾。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-22-iran-pakistan-conflict.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-22-iran-pakistan-conflict.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..18bc0a5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-01-22-iran-pakistan-conflict.md
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Iran–Pakistan Conflict
+author: Kamal Alam
+date : 2024-01-22 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/A4KdCPK.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "An Undeclared Intelligence War Comes Out into the Open"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Recent strikes by Iran and Pakistan on each other’s territory in the region of Baluchistan have raised fears of a wider escalation. While the two countries enjoy a near-unbreakable bilateral relationship and close political ties, there has been an ongoing intelligence war between the two since the Islamic Revolution in Tehran._
+
+
+
+The last few days have seen global headlines focused on the tit-for-tat airstrikes between Iran and Pakistan. There has been speculation about an Iranian escalation and a wider Middle Eastern conflict that might suck in the Pakistani military. To be clear, no such scenario is on the cards. Iran and Pakistan are already deescalating, with both sides stating a lack of interest in harming their “brotherly ties”. However, a clear violation has been committed by both countries, initiated by Iran, and there is historical bad blood when it comes to the Baluch border, with both sides backing each other’s respective proxies. Friction between the two countries has also been raised by competition for control and influence in Afghanistan, overt Pakistani support for Azerbaijan, and Iran’s recruitment of Shia fighters from Pakistan to fight in the Middle East. While the two have not engaged directly in open conflict in the Middle East, there have been numerous irregular small wars between Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
+
+
+### The Shah’s Steadying Hand to Support a Young Pakistani State
+
+Long before 1979, the Shah of Iran had been one of Pakistan’s foremost backers against a much larger India. Indeed, the Shah even threatened to attack India if it went beyond its remit when it came to attacking East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971. The Shah along with Jordan and Syria were the only countries in the Islamic world that helped Pakistan with military hardware, intelligence and logistics. All of this is described in some detail in a lucid account by the Shah’s chief courtier, Assadollah Alam.
+
+Furthermore, Baluchistan, which has seen numerous insurgencies sponsored by India and Afghanistan, was always a sore point for the Shah. Iranian jets and military helicopters used to be based in Pakistan while hunting Baluch and Afghan insurgents on both sides of the Iran–Pakistan border. The Shah also repeatedly batted for Pakistan, convincing Nixon and Kissinger to go all the way in supporting Pakistan against the Indians in the 1971 war. In fact, Kissinger’s first trip to Pakistan was to study the Baluch insurgency and its impact on US–Persian Gulf security relations. Both Roham Alvandi’s Nixon, Kissinger and the Shah and Alex Vatanka’s Iran and Pakistan go into some detail about the US influence on the Pakistan–Iran joint strategy for security partnerships to protect the Persian Gulf and South Asia from Soviet designs. Baluchistan was central to the security partnership that had endured since 1947, and the Shah was resolute in protecting a young and inexperienced Pakistani state from implosion, especially after the loss of East Pakistan. However, after the ousting of the Shah by Islamic hardliners in 1979, the ebb and flow between Iran and Pakistan began to change for the worse, with an increasing hostility between the two and the convergence over Baluchistan becoming a divergence.
+
+
+### Tehran’s Export of Its Revolution and Changing Tides
+
+During the early years of the Iranian revolution, the two sides continued to maintain close relations and to cooperate on security issues. Pakistan was pivotal in ending the Iran–Iraq war, with former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani mentioning in his memoirs that along with Syria, Pakistan played a key role as an arbitrator between Tehran and the Saudi-backed coalition led by Saddam Hussein.
+
+However, ties began to worsen after the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, as various proxies in the country began to aim their guns at each other. Iran favoured the Shia-dominated warring parties, while the Saudis and Pakistan backed the Sunnis. Before the emergence of the Taliban, the Iranians had already begun to support Shia groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan to challenge a growing Saudi madrassa movement which had been spawned by the Afghan war.
+
+The 1990s and early 2000s also saw a peak in the power and strength of Saudi-funded groups in Pakistan, culminating in multiple bombings and the targeting of Shia mosques and prominent Shia figures. The Iranian consulate in Peshawar was attacked twice, and a senior diplomat was also kidnapped in the same city in 2009.
+
+___`A clear violation has been committed by both countries, initiated by Iran, and there is historical bad blood when it comes to the Baluch border, with both sides backing each other’s respective proxies`___
+
+Of course, the use of proxies was a two-way street, and Tehran allegedly had a hand in attacking the Saudi consulate in Karachi. The Pakistanis had not been comfortable with the Iranian-Indian alliance in Afghanistan, which was seen as a direct attempt to undermine both Baluchistan and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan. Iran’s cooperation with India over the port of Chabahar (bypassing Pakistan) is also seen by Pakistan as a threat to its own port of Gwadar.
+
+The use of Pakistani Shia fighters in Syria and Iraq was another red line that crossed by Iran. This took the competition firmly into the sectarian realm, with the risk that thousands of battle-hardened Shia would return to cause havoc in Pakistan, and has upset the status quo in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2020, Javad Zarif, the then Iranian foreign minister, said that Shia fighters could be used to stabilise Afghanistan and Pakistan. This caused considerable anger in both countries, but showed the Iranian desire to dominate by using proxies to fight local civil wars and to provoke ethnic and sectarian strife. The Saudis have also shown an increasing mistrust of Iranian involvement and influence in domestic Pakistani politics that has bordered on purely sectarian lines. Further evidence of this emerged when one of the former president’s right-hand men confessed to spying on the Pakistani military on behalf of the Iranians, with political cover provided by a party the Saudis had always suspected of being pro-Iranian.
+
+
+### The India Factor and Super Spies
+
+After the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the new Afghan Republic also pulled closer to India and Iran when it came to trying to isolate Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. In contrast to the Shah’s time when Iran ensured that India kept out of Baluchistan and Afghanistan, Tehran now welcomed India in both Afghanistan and Baluchistan owing to its desire to weaken the Pakistanis’ grip over Afghanistan.
+
+The case of the Indian spy Kulbhushan Jadhav, captured in Iran by the ISI, has led many in Pakistan to suspect that the Iranians have tolerated Indian spies in sensitive Baluch areas, thereby confirming an Iran–India partnership to trap Pakistan. However, the Indians firmly believed that the ISI had used its own Baluch agents to capture Jadhav deep inside Iranian territory. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made no secret of his desire to raise the temperature in Baluchistan to test Pakistani defences and nerves.
+
+The popular film Kandahar, released last year, portrays a four-way battle on the Iran–Afghanistan–Pakistan border between Pakistani, Indian, US and Iranian intelligence agencies to solidify gains in the Afghan endgame. The Great Game for control of Central Asia has now morphed into an all-out battle between regional players in Afghanistan, as opposed to the Russians and the British of the 19th century. India has even moved into Kabul and established friendly relations with the Taliban, in stark contrast to its entrenched enmity with the group in the 1990s. Iran and India have both cornered Pakistan by doing a U-turn on their ties with the Taliban, ensuring that the ISI can no longer use the group against them.
+
+
+### Geopolitics Trumps Sectarianism
+
+Notwithstanding the use of significant sectarian elements by both sides in the pursuit of strategic and tactical intelligence wins, this fight is by and large about power and influence, from Baluchistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan all the way to the Caucasus. Pakistan has closely supported Shia-majority Azerbaijan in its fight against Iranian-backed Armenia. Moreover, Pakistan has had multiple Shia Chiefs of Army Staff and a significant number of Shia generals, and so it is clear that in their military calculus, there is no room for sectarian-influenced decisions. Wajahat S Khan of the Atlantic Council, Pakistan’s foremost defence journalist, also believes that Iran and Pakistan are engaged in extensive geopolitical competition in the region.
+
+___`Notwithstanding the use of significant sectarian elements by both sides, this fight is by and large about power and influence, from Baluchistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan all the way to the Caucasus`___
+
+Similarly, in contrast to an almost war-like situation with the Taliban in the 1990s, Tehran is now heavily embedded in the Taliban’s return to power despite the group’s heavy Sunni tilt, with little or no room for Shia minorities in its leadership. The Iranians began recalibrating their previous animosity towards the Taliban by hosting senior Taliban and Al-Qa’ida leaders who were on the run. A lot of this was done out of necessity in order to balance against the Pakistanis and to widen mistrust between Pakistan and the US during their joint quest for an amicable balance of power in 2021. The killing of the Taliban leader Mullah Mansour in 2016 in a drone strike was viewed with suspicion by the Pakistani military, given that Mansour had just crossed the border from Iran into Pakistan. Pakistan alleged that Iran and the US had colluded in making Pakistan the fall guy once again, when in fact the Taliban were now also being supported fully by Tehran. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, another former Sunni strongman in Afghanistan who was previously a favourite of Pakistan’s, subsequently fled to Iran and became its ally against the US. Iran and Pakistan both used him against each other, with his presence in Kabul after his return during Ashraf Ghani’s government making him a major asset in the ongoing intelligence war.
+
+Major General Sahibzada Isfandiyar Pataudi (Retired), a former Director General of the ISI, told me:
+
+> “There has been an intelligence failure in Iran that has caused a disproportionate response and a violent lashing out in all directions – particularly so in Pakistan’s case – which has been immature and unnecessary. I would not put a sectarian twist on it, nor would I suggest a Cold War-type situation. I do believe, however, believe that Pakistan’s measured response shows our resolve to deal with any violation of our sovereignty.”
+
+Both countries have already restored their diplomatic channels, and their ambassadors will be returning to each other’s capitals very soon. There will not be a further escalation. However, from Karachi to Baluchistan and all the way to the Caucasus, both are waging a covert war for influence and leverage against each other in the modern-day Great Game.
+
+---
+
+__Kamal Alam__ was a RUSI Fellow from 2015 to 2019. He was also part of the UK-Pak Army COIN engagement with Afghanistan. He works on Pakistan’s defence engagement with the Middle East. He is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.
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title: The Republic of Agora
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+ repo: https://gitlab.com/agora0/pen/0x23
+ site: https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x23
- name: VOL.34
repo: https://gitlab.com/agora0/pen/0x22
site: https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x22